GUIDE TO THE ED1 RUMANIA FILE

[This file is concerned with 20th century Rumanians and their culture. Modern Rumania is bordered by the USSR on the northeast, the Black Sea on the east, Bulgaria on the south, Yugoslavia on the southwest, and Hungary on the northwest. The borders have shifted considerably during the 20th century. The Carpathian mountains run north-south and the Transylvanian Alps run east-west through the country. To the north-west of the mountain ranges is the Transylvanian Plateau and to the southeast are the Moldavia and Walachia plains. The distribution of ethnic groups and differences in settlement pattern follow this highland versus lowland distinction with the indigenous Rumanians living in the mountains in dispersed pastoral settlements and the Saxons and Szeklers living in the lowlands in nucleated settlements. Rumania was a Roman province from A.D. 100-275. From the 6th to the 12th centuries many different barbarian conquerors passed through. In 1881 Rumania became a kingdom. A communist dominated government was elected in 1946. It became a people's democracy of the Soviet type under the 1952 constitution (see 1: Braham). A new constitution adopted in 1965 proclaimed Rumania a socialist republic but emphasized national autonomy.

The Rumanian language is basically of the Romance family with a large admixture of Slavic. The 1974 population estimate was 21,210,000. The capital is Bucharest and 80% of the population is of the Rumanian Orthodox religion. Before the 20th century, stock raising was the most important economic activity but in the 20th century crop raising has become more important. The main crops are cereals with wheat, rye, and maize being the most important.

Although industrialization was begun in the late 19th century, it was between the two World Wars that industrial development accelerated. Even in 1974, however, 65% of the population was still engaged in agriculture. The economy is usually described as poor or backward.

There are nine sources in the file, numbered 1-5, 10-12, and 16. The file was apparently designed to emphasize political and economic developments of the 20th century. Sources 1, 2, 3, 10, 12, and 16 deal with various aspects of politics and/or economy. 4: Fleure deals with the effects of climate and topography on occupations and settlement patterns. 5: Fleure describes life in the peasant town of Curtea De Arges. 11: Clark is a study of the ethnic composition of the population and border shifts of the past. The file was processed in 1955-56.]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

I.—A PHYSICAL INTRODUCTION

105 197 01 133 ROUMANIA owes its name to the rustic Latin speech of the Roman provincials of Moesia and Dacia, impressed on the region in a period before language had acquired its later powers of tenacious resistance to fundamental change. It is true that subsequent contacts gave the local language a large number, perhaps even a majority, of Slavonic words, emphasising the country's links with eastern Europe, but the associations with the west were actively revived in the nineteenth century, when there was also a reaction against the connecting of Roumania with its southern and south-western neighbours as a Balkan State as had seemed natural to those impressed by the results of Turkish rule. These varying links of Roumania are understandable from a study of its physical features. The eastern projecting arc of the Carpathian Mountains and the Transylvanian Alps is, physically, as well as in a large measure culturally, an eastward outpost of western Europe standing out as a mighty rampart over against the south Russian steppe and its continuation into the loess-floored Polish platform. The curve from the Transylvanian Alps southward past the Iron Gates also connects them with the Balkan peninsula.

133 CENTRAL EUROPE, farther west, includes broken remnants of old (Permo-carboniferous) mountain systems passing through south Ireland, south Wales and south England as well as through Brittany, the Ardennes and the Vosges to the hills of middle Germany between Hannover and Frankfürt-a-M. Brittany lies mainly at low levels but most of the other elements of this old system have been lifted again into the round-shouldered hills, sometimes with extensive remains of old plains now at considerable heights, and usually with deep-cut stream lines that have often worked their way along fault lines. To the south of this old mountain-system stand the Alps, some of which incorporate the results of refolding of older mountain fragments.

THE GREAT ARC of the Carpathians and Transylvanian Alps shows relationships with both these great schemes. Old, Permo-carboniferous mountain blocks were refolded in the upper Cretaceous and again in the early Tertiary period, in the latter of which the Transylvanian platform, between

V.—PEOPLES AND SETTLEMENTS: THE POST-ROMAN PERIOD

101 MOUNTAIN REGIONS are often regarded as the refuges of conquered peoples and the repositories of cultures that once flourished in the plain, but although the highlands of Roumania have, from time to time, absorbed groups of folk for whom the lowlands offered insufficient security, the population of the Carpathian valleys must not be regarded as racial sweepings from the broad human highways of the Steppe. The long period of invasions that followed the withdrawal of the Roman legions from Dacia led to a concentration of Roumanians within the mountain areas of either Transylvania, whence they spread later to reoccupy the plain, or the Balkans, where their descendants, the Vlachs, still maintain their traditional form of life; but, since those early days, their numbers in the former region have been considerably diluted by Saxons and Szeklers who have come in not as refugees but as outposts against Tatar and Turk in what for long remained an eastward frontier zone of western Christianity.

175 OUR KNOWLEDGE of events during the Dark Ages is necessarily scanty, but it is clear that settled life on the open grasslands where, indeed, it was possible at all, was subject to constant interruptions. One of these interruptions, the result of Magyar pressure, is of special significance for the history of Roumania from both a political and a cultural point of view. The Magyar invaders of central Europe in the ninth century penetrated far to the west before meeting with any serious resistance. After their defeats at Merseburg in 933 and at Augsburg in 955, however, they fell back towards the Hungarian Plain, and about A.D. 1000 their Szekler advanced guards began to penetrate the hill country of 175 Transylvania. In spite of their comparatively recent Asiatic 195 origin, the Szeklers introduced certain features of western civilisation into their newly-acquired territory, particularly feudalism, which appears to have been the chief concomitant of the Roman Catholicism that they had adopted while in the plain.

THE spread of Roman Catholicism towards the east brought it into conflict in the eastern Carpathians with the Greek

175 the various families according to their needs. The pastures and forests, however, were kept in the hands of the community.

THE latter part of the thirteenth century was a critical period for these people; the Tatar invasions were over, and the Turkish invasion had not yet begun. Many of the Roumanian peasantry moved out from the mountains and re-established themselves in the foothills of the Carpathians and of the Transylvanian Alps. The pressure from the west was maintained, however, and the Roumanians became organised on a more strictly military basis. Much of the power of the knesi was usurped by the "boyars," a new military aristocracy that arose, whilst the peasants were gradually forced into a serfdom from which they were not emancipated for several centuries. The various kneaseates became united into small states, under the leadership of princes or "voivods," and were welded eventually into the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. The success was short lived, however, for by the end of the fourteenth century Wallachia had fallen under the control of the Turks, and Moldavia soon followed.

THE STRUGGLE against the Turkish invaders was long and bitter; the ways through the mountains needed constant vigilance; the necessity for maintaining a united front against a common foe strengthened the communal spirit; and it is not, therefore, surprising that the alien groups in Transylvania should have preserved their individuality to a remarkable degree. This is particularly noticeable in the case of the Saxons, whose settlements to-day are veritable microcosms of Germanic culture (see Plate V).

● [101] ALTHOUGH they originally had a common purpose, these two racial groups of Saxons and Szeklers have remained very different in character, for whereas the Saxons are still very largely confined to the settlements which they established in the early Middle Ages, the political, and to some extent the ethnic, boundaries of the Szeklers have been enlarged from time to time until they now encompass a considerable area of Transylvania.

144 OF the early history of the Szeklers we know but little. Racially they appear to differ somewhat from the Magyars of the plain, and to approximate more to the Roumanians in

THE ARGEŞ DISTRICT

101 133 THE EXTENDED ROUMANIA that was organised after 1918 includes the old areas of Wallachia, Dobrogea, Moldavia, Bessarabia, Bukovina, Transylvania and Timişoara, of varied allegiance before the World War, but all containing from early historic times onwards a proportion of Roumanian-speaking people. Transylvania is the mountain bastion with the eastern Carpathians as its eastern boundary, the southern Carpathians or Transylvanian Alps as its southern edge, and the western Roumanian Carpathians or Bihor, etc., mountains on its western flank. Its mountainous frame and its hilly interior give it a very decidedly upland character, even if the Olt, the Maroş and the Szamoş, which drain it, have considerable systems of tributary valleys. Outside the bastion to the east Bukovina and Moldavia slope down to the great plain of eastern Europe, of which Bessarabia forms the flank west of the Dniestr. Behind the bastion to the west Timişoara stretches down to the Tisza, and forms the south-eastern flank of the middle Danubian plain. Outside the bastion on the south is Wallachia, sloping down towards the lower Danube, while beyond the considerable barrier formed by the lowest portion of the Danube and to the south-east, is the low plateau area of the Dobrogea.

[113] IN A PREVIOUS study we gave in some measure a picture of rural life in the eastern Carpathians near the border between Transylvania and Moldavia, where the mountains barely reach 1,900 m. (say 6,200 feet), and the highest land is often in great expanses of pasture with deep valleys cut by the rival drainage systems of the two sides, which are separated by a number of passes that may indent the watershed. In the eastern Carpathians Roumanians and Szeklers, respectively Uniate and Roman Catholic, live in adjacent villages, and the former, especially, send flocks and herds to the highland pastures.

121 THIS STUDY is intended to deal more especially with what is thought to be a typical area of rural Wallachia, having an almost entirely Roumanian population attached to the Orthodox Church and living under circumstances differing

121 considerably from those of the eastern Carpathians; this area is the district focusing upon Curtea de Argeş.

101 133 WALLACHIA has already been described as the land stretching from the southern Carpathians or Transylvanian Alps to the Danube. The mountains themselves are largely of metamorphosed rock with flanking Miocene deposits; they are about 40 km. wide with the sharp main ridge (rising at Negoiu to 2,544 m. or 8,331 feet) parallel to the long flanks about 11 km. from the northern and 29 km. from the southern edge. Several rivers have worked their valleys out among the mountains in a direction parallel to the ridge and the edges.

133 THERE ARE huge accumulations of pebbly, often deltaic, outwash beyond the south flank of the mountains, the layers sloping southward and giving sunward dip-slopes separated by small northward-facing scarps, the woods of which contrast with the arable lands on the dip-slopes. This pebbly outwash is deeply dissected by southward-flowing consequent streams, some of which rise in it, while others, like the Argeş, penetrate the mountain wall, making a wild narrow gorge. In the deep valleys of the pebbly material houses shelter from the north winds. The Olt has cut right through the mountains and captured a subsequent river of the northern flank, and its way through the mountains is by a deep valley, which is wider in some sections that are more or less "subsequent" and narrower in others that are rather "consequent." At about 20-25 km. southward from the mountain wall the residual hills of loose material that stand out between the consequent valleys milden down; the amount of alluvium and the breadth of the river valleys increase and it becomes possible to bridge the rivers, so it is at about this distance from the mountains that have grown the towns of Ramnicu Valcea on the Olt and Curtea de Argeş on the Argeş. Ramnicu Valcea is at the last narrowing of the Olt before it begins to braid on a broad alluvial plain, and its site is not easily defensible. The Argeş has terraces near the stream on the eastern side at the bridge, and the river has already swung against this bank some 2 km. north of the bridge. This gives defensible positions as well as facilities for bridging, and helps to account for the historic, if somewhat localised, importance of the town of Curtea de Argeş, the focus of the region of which studies were made.

133 361

H. J. F.
E. E. E.

3

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p 1

RUMANIA & THE RUMANIANS

CHAPTER I

AN HISTORICAL OUTLINE

101 The country known between the two Great Wars as
175 Greater Rumania has had twenty-three centuries of violent and dramatic history. From about 400 B.C., when it was first colonized by Thracian tribes, up to the present day this territory has been the victim of many invasions and the scene of many migrations. It has been conquered and ruled by dozens of races and peoples who have all left their mark upon the country and its inhabitants. To-day the Rumanians form an island of Latinity between the Slavonic peoples and one of the last Asiatic invaders of Europe, the Hungarians. The language and culture of the Rumanians, although containing many elements of Slavonic, Germanic and other origins, are closely related to the civilization of Italy, France and Spain.

175 To the foreigner who visits Rumania for the first time this country and its mixed population seems full of inexplicable and insoluble contradictions. The numerous problems confronting Rumania and the Rumanians in the twentieth century have their roots in the historical development of the past. The issues of the present day cannot be understood or solved unless they are examined in the light of this history. In order to analyse the condition of contemporary Rumania, it is therefore necessary to present a short outline of Rumanian history.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

● 102

3a

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

● 102

102
b2

[Page 60 a]

a.	b.	c.	d.
e	f.	g.	h.

pagination of Map. —

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

1c 2

[page 60 b]

102

[page 60 c]

102


Capital
Municipality, county capital
Town, county capital
Town
Village
Frontiers
Provincial boundaries
Double track railways
Main lines
Subsidiary lines
Narrow gauge lines
Highroads
2nd class roads
Air routes
Historical ruins
Pass
Altitude in metres
LEVELS OF ALTITUDE
2500 m
1800 m
800 m
500 m
200 m
100 m
0 m
Mountains
Highlands
Foothills
Lowlands
CHISHINEU
VASLUI
ODESSA

[page 60 d]

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl



[page 60e]

5: Fleure S-5 (no date) 1939 EDl Rumania EDl

102

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY GEORGE PHILIP &

[page 60 f]

102

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl



[page 60g]

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDI Rumania EDI

102



[page 60 R]

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

p. 39

102

Rumania: showing frontier changes 1919–20.

Rumania: showing frontier changes 1940.

12: Kormos S-45 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED2

102



End map (A)

12: Kormos S-4,5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

102

End map (B)

17: Thurnher E-4 (no date) 1956 EF6 Serbs EF6
Yugoslavia EF1
Albania EG1
Rumania ED1
Bulgaria EE1

SYARB
102
361
341



[P.86-R]

I.—A PHYSICAL INTRODUCTION

105 197 101 133 ROUMANIA owes its name to the rustic Latin speech of the Roman provincials of Moesia and Dacia, impressed on the region in a period before language had acquired its later powers of tenacious resistance to fundamental change. It is true that subsequent contacts gave the local language a large number, perhaps even a majority, of Slavonic words, emphasising the country's links with eastern Europe, but the associations with the west were actively revived in the nineteenth century, when there was also a reaction against the connecting of Roumania with its southern and south-western neighbours as a Balkan State as had seemed natural to those impressed by the results of Turkish rule. These varying links of Roumania are understandable from a study of its physical features. The eastern projecting arc of the Carpathian Mountains and the Transylvanian Alps is, physically, as well as in a large measure culturally, an eastward outpost of western Europe standing out as a mighty rampart over against the south Russian steppe and its continuation into the loess-floored Polish platform. The curve from the Transylvanian Alps southward past the Iron Gates also connects them with the Balkan peninsula.

133 CENTRAL EUROPE, farther west, includes broken remnants of old (Permo-carboniferous) mountain systems passing through south Ireland, south Wales and south England as well as through Brittany, the Ardennes and the Vosges to the hills of middle Germany between Hannover and Frankfürt-a-M. Brittany lies mainly at low levels but most of the other elements of this old system have been lifted again into the round-shouldered hills, sometimes with extensive remains of old plains now at considerable heights, and usually with deep-cut stream lines that have often worked their way along fault lines. To the south of this old mountain-system stand the Alps, some of which incorporate the results of refolding of older mountain fragments.

THE GREAT ARC of the Carpathians and Transylvanian Alps shows relationships with both these great schemes. Old, Permo-carboniferous mountain blocks were refolded in the upper Cretaceous and again in the early Tertiary period, in the latter of which the Transylvanian platform, between

NOTE ON SPELLING AND PRONUNCIATION

●104 The spelling throughout is taken, as far as possible, from Harta României Fizica—Administrativa şi Turistica, by M. D. Moldoveanu (1933). The Times Atlas version, where it differs from this, is shown in brackets. It should be noted that ţ=ts, and ş=sh.

1: Braham, Randolph, L. The New Constitution of Rumania. American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. III, pp. 418-427. Baltimore: American Association for the Comparative Study of Law, 1954.

Yale: Law School RR P. An261

[This is an analysis of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Rumania adopted in 1952. It points up the extent to which the Constitution follows its Soviet counterpart; the extent, in fact, to which Rumania has virtually been incorporated into the USSR. The basic features of the new society, civic rights and duties, as well as the major bodies of government are outlined. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Angelica Baumann

Evaluation: Social Scientist-4
Processed in 1955

111

ED1 Rumania

2: Rosu, George and Hircea Vasilin. Churches and Religion. Digest-Index of Eastern European Law, pp. 1-46. New York: Free Europe Press, ca. 1951.

HRAF copy (mimeographed)

[This is a historical survey of the functional role and the political status of churches and religions prevalent in Rumania, primarily from World War I up to the present. Relationship of church and state, general and individual, are dealt with at length and are widely documented. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Angelica Baumann

Evaluation: Social Scientist-4
Processed in 1955

3: Roberts, Henry L. Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951.

Pp. xiv, 414; 34 Tables; bibliographical note; index.

[This book examines the agrarian question in Rumania and its political implications. The author discusses the effect of an impoverished and restive peasantry upon political life and, conversely, the attitudes and actions of the major political groups toward peasant poverty and agrarian reform. While the author is primarily concerned with the period between 1922 and 1945, he also traces briefly the important land reforms before 1922, as well as the economic changes and land reforms after 1945. The author analyzes the applicability of Marxist-Leninist theories to the economy of Rumania. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Dragan Zivanovic

Evaluation: Social Scientist-4
Processed in 1955.

111 ED1 Rumania

4: Fleure, H. J. and R. A. Pelham, eds. Rumania. Eastern Carpathian Studies. London: Le Play Society, 1936.

Pp. 81; Plates XVI

Yale: ED1 b. 933f. v. 1.

/This study describes the effects of the climate and topography of Rumania upon the occupations and settlements of the people. The stress is on geography, but there is also much information about the dress, dwellings, and customs of the peasants. The author supplies many interesting facts about the economy of the country. An abundance of photographs, maps, and appendices, is included. --Analyst/

Field date: none
Analyst: June Yudenfreund

Evaluation: Social Scientist-5
Processed in 1955

5: Fleure, H. J. and E. Estyn Evans, Editors. Roumania II. South Carpathian Studies. London: The Le Play Society, 1939.

Pp. 60, bibliography; 12 plates; 1 map.

Yale: Edlb 933F v. 2.

/This, second in a series of two studies on Rumania by the Le Play Society, deals primarily with life in the town of Curtea De Arges. The description of the topographical features of the Arges District, generally, and the town, specifically, is followed by detailed sections on dwellings, schools, health conditions, agricultural and pastural life (one whole section is devoted to transhumance) and annual trading fairs. A rather general introduction presenting highlights, both historical and cultural, on settlement patterns in Europe at large will be found only in category 116. All material is extensively illustrated by plates and drawings. HRAF pagination has been assigned to the former. --Analyst/

Field date: none
Analyst: Mary Ann Friedman

Evaluation: Social Scientist-5
Processed in 1955

10: Logio, George Clenton. Rumania: Its History, Politics, and Economics. Manchester: Sherratt and Hughes, 1932.

Pp. ii; 208; index.

Yale: Bx51.21

[After a lengthy historical introduction, an analysis is made of Rumanian politics and economics between 1918 and 1932, the initial years of Rumanian democracy. The author indicates that although attempts were made to achieve political and economic stability, these attempts were dissipated by widespread corruption among both civil servants and office-holders. This study also includes an examination of the problems involved in governing ethnic minorities and the resulting tension arising from these problems. No bibliography included. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Robert Flynn

Evaluation: Social Scientist--4
Processed in 1955

111 EDl Rumania

11: Clark, Charles Upson. Racial Aspects of Romania's Case. (Place of publication not given), 1942.

Pp. xii; 50; 8 tables.

Yale: Nbp95. T8. 94lc

[The author presents an ethnic study of the composition of the population in Rumania based mainly on data available as of 1930. He also traces the history of the numerous border shifts that have been made in the past, and comments upon the effect that these constant changes had upon peoples whose nationality differed from that of the governments by which they were ruled. It is the writer's belief that the re-integration of Rumanian provinces was based upon basic loyalties of racial groups rather than upon the formal agreements drawn up among nations. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: June Orloff

Evaluation: Social Scientist--4
Processed in 1955

111 ED1 Rumania

12: Kormos, C. Rumania. British Survey Handbooks II. London: Cambridge University Press, 1944.

Pp. viii; 122; end map.

Yale: Bx51.11

[This book, issued by the British Society for International Understanding, provides the general reader with a useful background study for understanding the course of political and social developments in Rumania up to the time of its publication. The major portion of the book is devoted to an outline of Rumanian history from the days of the Roman Empire to events in World War II. Separate chapters on the peoples, the provinces and the national economy of the country present the reader with factual information on the minority problem, the political framework, and the economic structure of the Rumanian society. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Robert Lee

Evaluation: Social Scientist-4
Processed in 1955

16: Great Britain. Rumania. Economic Survey. London: Ministry of Economic Warfare, 1943.

Pp. 57. [HRAF MS: Pp. 154]

Library of Congress: DR 205. G57. Copy 2.

[This source is a survey of the Rumanian economy up to 1943, and includes data on the following subjects: food and agriculture; oil; other fuel and power; metals and minerals; engineering, armaments and shipbuilding; textiles; timber, paper and pulp; chemicals, rubber, leather; transport and communications; foreign trade; finance; and labor. --Analyst]

Field date: no date
Analyst: Eugene Lerner

Evaluation: Government-4
Processed in 1956

113
333
323

Slovenes EF7
Yugoslavia EF1
Albania EG1
Rumania ED1
Bulgaria EE1

/For additional miscellaneous bits of information on the use of brick, stone, tiles and masonry in building construction, see scattered references in 17: Thurnher, EF6 Serbs file, category 116./

113	Yugoslavia EF1
231	Albania EG1
233	Rumania ED1
235	Bulgaria EE1
	Slovenes EF7

/For information on the types of shelter provided for domesticated animals (including cattle), see scattered references in 17: Thurnher, EF6 Serbs file, category 116./

113
192

Slovenes EF7
Yugoslavia EF1
Albania EG1
Rumania ED1
Bulgaria EE1

/For the use of special terms associated with the parts of a dwelling or of a non-residential structure, see scattered references in 17: Thurnher, EF6 Serbs file, category 116./

● 113
513

Yugoslavia EF1
Slovenes EF7
Albania EG1
Rumania ED1 ●
Bulgaria EE1

/For general information on sleeping quarters in the house, see scattered references in 17: Thurnher, EF6 Serbs file, category 116./

Yugoslavia EF1
Albania EG1
Rumania ED1
Bulgaria EE1

/For additional bibliography, see 17: Thurnher, EF6 Serbs, category 116, pp. 88-92./

113, 648

Rumania ED1

[For a discussion of Soviet policy vis-à-vis Rumania, as exemplified in the establishment of the Moldavian Soviet Republic and the annexation of Rumanian Bessarabia, see 21: Kolarz, R1 Soviet Union, category 116, pp. 150-152. Bibliographic notes appear on pp. 161-162.]

113, 648 ED1 Rumania

[For the text of the Treaty of Guarantee between Poland and Rumania, signed at Geneva, January 15, 1931, see EA1 Poland, 31: Retinger, Category 116, pp. 237-239.]

113, 439, 648 Rumania ED1

[For a discussion of the nature, scope and probable future trends (up to 1970) of Soviet economic relations with the East European satellites since World War II, and the degree of inter-satellite economic integration, see 60: Bergson, R1 Soviet Union, category 116, pp. 321-355]

113, 423, 474 Rumania ED1

[For information pertaining cooperative farms and collectivization, see 5: Free Europe Committee, El Europe, category 116, pp. 65, 68-71. -- Analyst]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

I

PEASANT AGAINST LANDOWNER

The Peasant Revolt of 1907

175
668

IN MARCH, 1907, the peasants in northern Moldavia, not far from the Russian frontier, arose in revolt.[1] Initially the uprising was directed, perhaps as a result of anti-Semitic instigation, against certain Jewish tenants renting large estates, but in its rapid extension south and west into Muntenia and along the Danube into Oltenia it became an increasingly violent assault upon all large tenant farmers and absentee landowners. The peasants not only demanded an amelioration of their labor contracts but in some districts seized land and organized revolutionary bands. The poorer peasants, those with insufficient holdings to support themselves, seem to have been the first to revolt, but they were soon joined by the more prosperous villagers. Indeed, subsequent investigations revealed that the active heads of the movement, in so far as it received any direction, had been village leaders, ex-army sergeants, clerks, and schoolteachers.[2]

For a time neither the central authorities in Bucarest nor the local administrations were able to cope with the spreading unrest, but after the dismissal of the Conservatives a Liberal government, perhaps under the threat of foreign intervention by Austria, took vigorous countermeasures. Troops under General Averescu, later a war hero and political figure, descended on the countryside and after some sharp conflicts restored order. Reprisals in districts where there had been peasant violence were extremely severe. It has been estimated that upward of 11,000 peasants were killed in the course of the revolt and its suppression.

Although the uprising lasted less than a month and was completely subdued, it was, and was felt to be, an event of frightening significance. Here was no by-product of foreign invasion, the frequent

[113]

1. For an account of the revolt see Radu Rosetti, *Pentru ce s'au răsculat ţăranii* (Bucarest, 1908). A recent novel by Leo Katz, *Seedtime* (New York, 1947), is based on this uprising. Many aspects of the revolt are obscure, and the dossiers relating to its suppression are reported to have disappeared subsequently from the Ministry of War. In 1948, however, under the auspices of the Groza government, Mihail Roller edited a collection of state documents regarding the 1907 uprising. This new material, which may contain important additional information, was not available when this chapter was written.

2. C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *Neoiobăgia* (Bucarest, 2d ed., n.d.), p. 204.

[1 is blank]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 what has been called "the most questionable act of King Ferdinand's
185 reign."[7] Although peasant disturbances, general instability, and the inexperience of the Vaida government have been cited as reasons
423 for its downfall, it seems clear that its dismissal stemmed directly from the hostility of the landowners to the proposed agrarian bill.[8] Thus, the effort of the Peasant party to carry through a more radical reform by legal means was defeated.

The new premier, General Averescu, was selected because he was a popular military hero. He immediately ordered new elections and by the usual controls was able to obtain a majority for his People's party. Mihalache was replaced by Constantin Garoflid. Garoflid, as has been seen, was by no means opposed to land reform, but he did not approve of the emphasis upon large-scale expropriation and the creation of a multitude of small holdings. It was his task, however, to complete a measure based upon principles he had always attacked.

423 The second land reform law for the Old Kingdom was promulgated on July 17, 1921. Although primarily concerned with allotting land and resettling the peasants, it also extended expropriation to obtain the 450,000 hectares lacking after the 1918 decree-law. Expropriation was now based on proprietors rather than properties, and the old sliding scale was abandoned in favor of a more elastic measure which took account of regional geographic differences and relative land hunger.[9] Land left to the proprietor was to be determined at once,

[113]

7. R. W. Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians* (Cambridge, 1934), p. 551.

8. The attitude of the landowners at this time is shown in a circular distributed by the Union of Syndicates of Moldavian Landowners: "We, landowners, are firmly determined to oppose by all means, and especially by impeaching before the Court of Cassation, all those provisions of the decree-law of 1918, of the law for communal grazing, and of any future law or decree, which may conflict with the letter of the Constitution regarding the expropriation of land . . . To re-consecrate the intangible right of property, we demand that a law shall be passed which shall punish with hard labor for life whomsoever shall speak of expropriation again." Quoted in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

9. Land was left to the proprietors on the following basis:

	Land cultivated by owner (hectares)	*Land cultivated by owner with important capital investments (hectares)*
In highlands and hills	100	100
In plains, where demand for land was great	150	200
In plains, where demand for land was moderate	200	300
In plains, where demand for land was satisfied	250	500

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

it appears that in eastern Europe the birth rate has begun to decline, 163
but its effect will not be reflected in the population for a number of 165
years.

The decline of the death rate in the West resulted from the numerous social, hygienic, and nutritional improvements gradually introduced and disseminated over the last two centuries, all of which were slow in reaching eastern Europe. The subsequent fall in the Western birth rate appears to have been largely a conscious social restriction and not any decline in "national virility." [2] It generally accompanies a rise in living conditions and has shown a direct correlation with class differences.

The extent to which those factors bringing about the growth of population in the West apply to eastern Europe is not known with certainty. The fall in the eastern European death rate after the middle of the nineteenth century appears to have corresponded with the introduction of some of the social and hygienic improvements from the West, but it may also have resulted from a moderate improvement in internal and external security at a somewhat earlier date.[3]

Birth and death rates for Greater Rumania showed a decline during the interwar years, largely a result of drops in the rural rates. The rural birth rate in 1936, however, was still well above that of the towns (33.8 per thousand as against 21.4). The rate of natural increase, the excess of births over deaths, also displayed a perceptible decline, from over 14 per thousand inhabitants in the early 1920's to about 11 in the late 1930's. The birth rate fell greatly during the Second World War (to a low of 19.9 in 1945) and seems to have increased only slightly in the postwar years. The death rate having remained approximately the same, the rate of growth of Rumania's population has diminished tremendously under the exceptional conditions of the past decade.

Agricultural Overpopulation

While Rumania's over-all density of population is not very high 161
as compared with that of western Europe, most of the people live on the land, and the agricultural population is quite dense. In 1941 the agricultural population of Rumania (minus Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina, Northern Transylvania, and Southern Dobrogea) represented 71.4 per cent of the total population and 94.4 per cent of the

2. Dudley Kirk, *Europe's Population in the Interwar Years* (League of Nations, 1946), p. 88. 113

3. A. M. Carr-Saunders, *World Population: Past Growth and Present Trends* (Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 80.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

161 rural population.[4] There were 94.3 inhabitants of the agricultural population for every 100 hectares of agricultural land in private hands (including arable surface, meadow, vineyards, orchards, and pastures). Agricultural population was densest in the poor mountainous areas, in contrast to total population which was densest in the plains; in the Oltenian and Muntenian Carpathians 121.5 agricultural inhabitants occupied every 100 hectares of agricultural land in private hands, 112.8 in the Moldavian Carpathians and 108.3 in Bucovina.

That the density of Rumania's agricultural population was relatively high is shown in the following table, comparing Rumania (on the basis of earlier and somewhat different statistics) with other eastern European and some of the western European countries:[5]

Country	*Density of population dependent upon agriculture per square kilometer of "arable-equivalent" * agricultural land, ca. 1930.*
RUMANIA	79.7
Old Kingdom	79.9
Bessarabia	69.7
Bucovina	145.9
Transylvania	81.3
Bulgaria	95.4
Greece	86.7
Yugoslavia	100.1
Hungary	63.1
Poland	86.9
Austria	64.2
Czechoslovakia	59.4
Italy	53.4
Germany	52.1
France	28.8
Netherlands	81.7
Denmark	37.5
England and Wales	33.8

* "Arable-equivalent" is a statistical device to achieve a rough comparability between different types of land (arable, pasture, vineyards, etc.) used for agricultural purposes. A hectare of pasture land is clearly not equivalent to a hectare of arable.

The director of the Rumanian Central Institute of Statistics, in interpreting the results of the 1930 census, concluded that "These

● 113 4. Institutul Central de statistică, *Recensământul agricol al României din 1941* (Bucarest, 1945), Table 21.

5. Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (League of Nations, 1945), pp. 197–204.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

figures permit one to affirm that our country has arrived at the saturation point, and even at an agricultural overpopulation."[6] The term "overpopulation," however, has been subject to numerous interpretations and must be used cautiously.[7] In particular, in Rumania the issue of overpopulation has been too frequently brandished as a political weapon for contending parties. 161

Surplus population is sometimes defined in terms of an "optimum" population, one that achieves the maximum per capita real income. In such a case overpopulation would mean that a withdrawal of population from the land would increase per capita income since the marginal productivity of the surplus cultivators, given the law of diminishing returns, is less than the average per capita productivity. Apart from the manifold difficulties of determining such an optimum, this approach is somewhat artificial in the case of eastern Europe, where the problem of overpopulation is concerned not with any ideal optimum but with a possible Malthusian nightmare of mass suffocation. To be meaningful in this connection overpopulation must indicate that in some way more people are engaged in agriculture than are required for the type of cultivation prevailing, that they could be withdrawn from the soil without loss in agricultural production, the output of the surplus population being less than the loss occasioned by their presence (soil destruction, irrational holdings, etc.).[8]

It is clear that density alone does not determine overpopulation in this sense, since the Netherlands, for example, had a slightly higher agricultural density than Rumania but with entirely different social and economic consequences because of an intensive form of cultivation. The level of agricultural productivity, expressed in yield per unit of area is also a factor. That is, output per capita (C), which ultimately determines the level of existence, is equivalent to yield per unit of area (Y) divided by the density of agricultural population (D): $C = \frac{Y}{D}$.

Now for purposes of general orientation it is possible to make a rough comparison of this equation for Rumania with that for

6. Sabin Manuila, *Structure et évolution de la population rurale* (Bucarest, 1940), p. 17. 113

7. For discussions of the definition of overpopulation see Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 55–77; Carr-Saunders, *op. cit.*, pp. 330–331; and "The Problem of Surplus Agricultural Population," *International Journal of Agrarian Affairs*, *1*, No. 1 (October, 1939); the entire issue is devoted to articles on the question.

8. If overpopulation is not defined in some such sense as this, it is necessary to consider alternative means of employment for the surplus population, unless the surplus is to be physically liquidated. This problem will be discussed presently in connection with town and country relations.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

311

				Hectares (in 1936)	*Per Cent*
Total area 29,505,000 hectares	A. Agricultural area	1.	Arable	13,940,000	47.3
		a.	Cereals	11,609,000	
		b.	Alimentary plants	532,000	
		c.	Industrial plants	493,000	
		d.	Cultivated or artificial meadows (forage crops)	783,000	
		e.	Fallow	523,000	
		2.	Natural meadows	1,410,000	4.7
		3.	Grazing and pasture	2,448,000	8.3
		4.	Vineyards	328,000	1.1
		5.	Orchards	233,000	0.8
	B. Nonagricultural area	1.	Woods and forests	6,449,000	21.9
		2.	Occupied land (yards, houses, streets and roads, cities, industrial and commercial land) and nonproductive	4,697,000	15.9

tion may be held on lease or in metayage. The statistics always show some difference between the two; in most cases large properties are more extensive than large exploitations, an indication that a portion of the large properties is being leased. A secondary distinction between privately owned and state or publicly owned properties is also important, and here again Rumanian statistics are often inconsistent.

Although official accounts of the results of the 1918–21 land reforms were issued by the Rumanian government, they are not a very reliable guide to the effect of these reforms on the distribution of agricultural property. About 6,000,000 hectares were reported to have been expropriated, of which about 3,900,000 hectares were distributed to some 1,393,000 peasants, or 69.5 per cent of those having a claim to land.[16] But while the land reform was supposed to have been completed around 1929–30, in 1940 it was officially announced that the reform was not yet terminated: 3,900 estates were still in possession of land which was to have been expropriated; 434,000 hectares of expropriated land had not even been surveyed for distribution; 440,000 hectares had not yet been divided; 900 law cases re-

113

16. Alexander Nasta, "La Réforme agraire en Roumanie," report presented to the Fourteenth Congress of the International Congress of Agriculture (Bucarest, June 7–10, 1929), p. 16; Biblioteca de Sociologie, Etică şi Politică, condusă de D. Gusti, *60 Sate romînesti* (5 vols., Bucarest, 1941–43), II, 10.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

of less than one hectare were several hundred meters long and only 5 to 10 meters wide. The strips were at a great distance from one another, some authorities estimating the average distance to be from 4 to 7 kilometers.[36] The division of farming units into such small strips is obviously an impediment to any rationalization of agriculture.

Primitive techniques and irrational organization of holdings, while directly responsible for low productivity, are really manifestations rather than causes of the stagnation of Rumanian agriculture. What has inhibited the introduction of technical and organizational improvements? Poverty and "lack of capital" merely describe the situation; they do not explain it. Nor can this stagnation be ascribed to the natural inertia of a primitive agricultural society: the Rumanian economy has been in the midst of a dynamic process of change for over a century.

The fall in yield after the agrarian reforms of 1918–21 naturally raised the question whether the expropriation of the large estates was responsible for the critical state of Rumanian farming. This question is likely to be misleading if it is reduced to a comparison of the theoretical merits of large scale and peasant agriculture. Criticism that the agrarian reforms are responsible for the decline in agricultural productivity is apt to assume that the pre-1914 estates were well-organized large farms, whereas for the most part they were latifundiary cultivations, farmed out to the peasants who cultivated them with their own animals and equipment.[37] To be sure, some of the large farms were relatively well managed (although the yield even on the big estates was low in comparison with western European standards), and it may be that certain other controls employed by the large farms—notably the selection of seed and the regulation of the date at which sowing should begin [38]—were sufficient to account for the higher yield of the large properties. During the interwar years, as before 1914, large farms continued to have a higher cereal

36. M. Gormsen, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

37. For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, in a study of Rumanian agriculture, cites the great annual fluctuation in the wheat yield, a result of the variation in rainfall, as an example of the inability of the small peasant to take appropriate moisture conservation measures. "Managers of the large estates knew how to overcome this handicap to a considerable extent." U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, *op. cit.*, p. 715. A comparison of pre-1914 yields, however, indicates that while the yield of large properties was higher than that of small properties, the fluctuation in yield was practically the same for both categories. Cf. Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

38. Doreen Warriner, *The Economics of Peasant Farming* (Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 153.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241 yield than the small peasant holdings,[39] though there appear to be
311 no satisfactory statistics on this point.

On the other hand, defenders of the agrarian reform and small peasant properties have tended to assume that the Rumanian small holder was on his way to becoming an independent peasant proprietor, a doubtful assumption in view of the prevalence of dwarf holdings and the continued excessive cultivation of cereals. In 1937 G. Ionescu-Sișești and N. Cornățeanu upheld the reform and peasant farming on the following grounds:

The reform was an economic necessity under the conditions of devastation after the First World War; it was only by giving land to the peasants that they were induced to make the great effort necessary for agricultural recovery. Peasant farming became more intensive and less devoted to cereal cultivation. The peasant was better able to withstand agricultural crises, largely because the large farmer lacked his ability to reduce expenses and increase family labor. Finally, peasant agriculture should not be judged in terms of its contribution to the national income but by its ability to "assure the existence of the greatest possible number of citizens." It is therefore erroneous to "establish a comparison between peasant agriculture and the system of large property."[40]

311 The necessity of the agrarian reforms need not be argued, although
185 they could be defined more convincingly as a social than as an economic imperative (i.e., the peasants would have refused to continue to work under the old system). It may also be true that peasant farming cannot be judged by narrow profit-and-loss accounting methods, since it is a manner of living as well as a form of livelihood. But Sișești's and Cornățeanu's supporting arguments do not appear relevant to the actual Rumanian situation. There is no indication that peasant cultivation did become to any significant degree more intensive and varied. The examples they give, taken from a survey of a number of farms between 1930 and 1934, to illustrate the viability of peasant farming are not representative but comprise farms well above the average size for Rumania. Hence the real problem of dwarf holdings is avoided. The argument that small holdings are more resistant to crises because the peasant is able to restrict his consumption and increase family labor is not altogether reassuring in face of the growing pressure of population, regardless of its dubi-

39. M. Gormsen, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

[113] 40. G. Ionescu-Sișești and N. Cornățeanu, *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie et ses conséquences* (Bucarest, 1937), pp. 42-53.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

ous merits from the point of view of social welfare. The effort to ignore the importance of national income as a criterion for judging the advantages of peasant farming is unrealistic, given the existence of a modern Rumanian state with its manifold requirements. Finally, for all their optimism, Sișești and Cornățeanu admit the serious menace of continued subdivision of the land and urge the creation of a "peasant bourgeoisie." They do not indicate, however, what is to become of the poor peasants displaced in such a creation except to appeal for a further expansion of a national industry. The appeal to national industry, as a *deus ex machina*, at once undermines the whole argument for the viability of the Rumanian peasant proprietor.

311
185

Actually, such discussions of the merits and defects of peasant agriculture have only a limited relevance in Rumania. For example, in a study of 275 peasant households made in 1938, it was discovered that in general both the gross income per hectare (the total agricultural product of the holding, whether consumed or sold) and the agricultural income per hectare (gross income minus expenses for agriculture—labor payments, inventory, buildings, seed, etc.) tended to be higher on the small (under 3 hectares) than on the larger holdings. This higher net yield would appear to substantiate the contentions of the advocates of small farming.[41] In fact, however, the majority of the small holdings in this investigation operated at a deficit because the consumption needs of the household, largely food and clothing, were greater than the farm could produce. Only 14 per cent of the holdings between 1 and 3 hectares had an agricultural income greater than consumption, whereas in 86 per cent of the cases consumption was greater. Only 30 per cent of the holdings between 3 and 5 hectares had agricultural incomes greater than consumption. On the larger farms, between 10 and 20 hectares, 59 per cent had an agricultural income sufficient to meet consumption needs.[42] Therefore, the relative net incomes of farms of different sizes were of less

113

41. This higher rate of agricultural income among the small holdings is net, as it might appear, in contradiction to the statement that the cereal yield is higher on large farms than on small. A much smaller proportion of the income of the small holdings is derived from cereals; most of it comes from the sale of animals, fowls, fruits, etc. This, however, does not really represent a turn to intensive farming, since it is conducted on a very primitive level and only reflects the dwarf holder's efforts to maintain himself at a subsistence level.

42. *60 Sate românești*, II, 292. It should be noted that this investigation did not include large farms but only peasant holdings up to 40 hectares. Moreover, the results of the investigation showed an extremely wide range of variation, both regionally and among farms of the same size. Hence, the sampling may not have been extensive enough to permit confident generalization.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

439 and services than it gave, the difference being gained by the towns.[9]
433 According to these views, trade relations were actually detrimental
241 to the rural areas, which were being drained by the towns and industries.

It is not necessary here to discuss the theoretical question whether there is any absolute disadvantage to the countryside in its commerce with the towns. If during a period of change toward industrialization the countryside's position declines in relation to the town, it is quite possible for a number of other factors—which may be "short term" or even noneconomic—to convert this relative disadvantage into an absolute loss in income. Such factors may include the inelasticity of agricultural supply, the immobility of agricultural labor, and the increase in agricultural population. Finally, governmental and political policies may favor industry at the expense of agriculture. This last point requires further elucidation, as it was quite important in
651 Rumania.
433 Rumanian industry was created in the shelter of high protective tariffs, which undoubtedly served to increase the costs of agriculture and to benefit industry at its expense. These tariffs have been justified by the "infant industries" argument, and in part they were brought about by the agricultural protectionist policy of the European industrial states. But the combination of protectionism and the development of cartels did give industry a monopolistic position in the internal Rumanian market which worked to the disadvantage of agriculture. In addition to tariff protection, Rumania had a long tradition of direct encouragements to industry—such as exemptions from taxation and special transport rates—which persisted in the interwar period and were expanded in the 1930's.

433 The protective tariffs, by restricting foreign imports, had the
651 effect of bringing in foreign capital for investment in local industry.
457 But while foreign capital has been of great importance in the development of Rumania's larger industries and in the creation of its transportation system, the effect on the total economy has been somewhat one-sided, partly because the capital was naturally attracted to industries working for export: "Without depreciating the influence of foreign capital in stimulating industrialization, it is to be underlined that the benefits of invested foreign capital do not for the most part serve to create purchasing power in the national market

[113] 9. M. Manoilescu, "Das wirtschaftliche und soziale Dreieck der Agrarstaaten: die Stadt, das Dorf, das Ausland," *Internationale Agrarrundschau*, No. 6 (Berlin, 1940), also cited in Hugo Böker, "Agriculture's Share in the National Income and the Agricultural Situation," *International Review of Agriculture*, 32, No. 1 (January, 1941), 22. For a discussion of M. Manoilescu's views, see below, pp. 193–197.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

433 and do not contribute to increasing the supply of capital, since they
651 are exported." [10]

457 A comparison of industrial manufacture, industrial imports, and
consumption of manufactured goods between 1927 and 1938 shows
433 that while the percentage of industrial consumption which was provided for by Rumanian industry rose from 63.5 per cent to 78.6 per cent, the total consumption of industrial products dropped from about 93 billion lei in 1927 to 88 billion lei in 1938. That is, the increase in industrial production (from 59 to 69 billion lei) was more than balanced by the fall in industrial imports (from 34 to 19 billion lei).[11]

From this the conclusion might be drawn that Rumanian industrialization, instead of increasing purchasing power, was reducing it. Such indeed was Madgearu's opinion: "It is certain that the position of quasi-monopoly created by the system of protection of the national industry is the principal cause of the state of inferiority into which agriculture in general and peasant agriculture in particular have been driven." [12]

If the desirability of a policy of industrialization is granted, it is clear that since industries do not materialize from thin air and are not created by amiable fairy godmothers energy and resources must be diverted from other fields to the creation of industry, at least during the period of its inception and establishment. But the ultimate effect, presumably, is to raise the whole level of the economy; perhaps the agricultural sector will not advance as rapidly or as far, but in the long run at least the whole community should benefit. If Madgearu's conclusion is correct, such was not the result of Rumanian industrialization; instead, the industrial sector pulled away from the rest of the economy, was not directed to satisfying its needs, and may actually have reduced the over-all power of consumption.

Admittedly, twenty-five years may be too brief a period in which to judge such a development. Moreover, as has been mentioned before, a great many external influences had a powerful effect upon the Rumanian economy. The first years after 1921 were spent in recover-

[113]

10. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 204. In this connection see also Jozo Tomasevich's chapter on "Foreign Economic Relations," in *Yugoslavia*, ed. Robert J. Kerner (Berkeley: Los Angeles, 1949), which expresses substantially the same view regarding the role of foreign investment in Yugoslavia.

11. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

12. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 258. Madgearu's conclusions, however, are not altogether disinterested. As an old National Peasant who had attacked the protectionist policy of the Liberal party and had lowered tariffs when he was Minister of Finance, he was always of the opinion that industrial development in Rumania had been artificially forced and was battening on the peasant.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

433 ing from the very extensive devastations of the war; the agrarian crisis and the world depression hurt agriculture all over the world; the agricultural protectionism of the European industrial states drove the east European nations toward industrial protection; from the middle of the 1930's the increasing menace of war led to a growing demand for heavy industries to supply armaments.

But despite all these external influences, there is still reason to believe that the relation of Rumanian agriculture to industry worked to the disadvantage of the former. Politically, of course, there is abundant evidence that industry was a far more promising source of funds than agriculture, and undoubtedly political and private interests worked to the benefit of industry. In 1927, G. D. Creangă observed, "The situation which before the war existed on the land, where a number of latifundiary owners retained the greater part of the agricultural revenue has now passed into the domain of trade and industry." [13] No doubt Rumania's need for industrialization was often used to camouflage private financial motives; in 1932 an English observer maintained that the high protectionist policy was not really designed to protect Rumania from the ravages of foreign capital but had been introduced "mainly because the Brătianu party aimed at reserving for themselves the monopoly of such profits as could be made through the exploitation of the national resources." [14]

In Rumania one can never be sure that such aims are not dominant. Nevertheless, the tension between industry and agriculture certainly involves more than the personal scramble for wealth and profits. The impulse toward industry was also intimately connected with Rumania's foreign commercial relations.

Commerce

Economic tensions on two levels have already been observed: between the peasant and the estate owner in the countryside, especially before 1914, and between agriculture and industry. Both were in some measure a consequence of Rumania's increasing involvement in the complex of world industry and commerce. It is now necessary to examine these external relations.

439 Rumanian foreign commerce was on a relatively small scale; in 1929, for example, the total value of imports and exports per capita was only one-tenth as great as that for Great Britain in the same

[113]

13. Quoted in Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, p. 575.

14. George Clinton Logio, *Rumania, Its History, Politics, and Economics* (Manchester, 1932), p. 126.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

439 the distribution of industry were determined by a number of historical contingencies and are not an accurate reflection of the allocation of natural resources.[16] In the second place, historical evidence seems to indicate that the international division of labor has not, in fact, been successful in providing the more backward countries with manufactured goods. "Non-industrial countries can profit from such division of labor only to the extent they enjoy a surplus of their production that can be exported in exchange for foreign manufactures. Figures analyzed . . . clearly indicate that in the majority of non-industrial countries this surplus is not large enough to ensure them a plentiful supply of manufactures." [17] In the third place, regardless of the original reasons for a country's backwardness, the mere fact of backwardness in a competitive international system can serve to impede the country's advance toward industrialization.[18]

In addition to these general disadvantages which face undeveloped agrarian countries in world commerce, certain specific factors during the interwar years damaged Rumania's position as an exporter of agricultural products. The overseas cereal exporters, with their vast extent of land and mechanized agriculture, could produce grain more cheaply than Rumania with its peasant husbandry. The agricultural protectionism of the European industrial states had a very serious effect upon Rumania and all the eastern European states. Finally, the world agrarian depression after 1929 greatly reduced the value of Rumanian exports and created a price scissors.[19]

[113] 16. For a defense of the industrialization of agrarian states as a means of achieving a closer correspondence between the distribution of industry and the allocation of natural resources, see S. N. Prokopovicz, *L'Industrialisation des pays agricoles et la structure de l'économie mondiale après la guerre* (Neuchâtel, 1946).

17. League of Nations, *Industrialization and Foreign Trade*, p. 34.

18. K. Mandelbaum, *The Industrialization of Backward Areas* (Oxford, 1945), p. 4.

19. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Balkan States: I. Economic* (Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 65:

Price per Metric Ton of Rumanian Imports and Exports
(in Swiss francs)

	Exports	*Imports*
1922–30	121.3	815.8
1931	68.5	853.9
1932	57.0	823.4
1933	49.3	768.5
1934	46.5	629.6
1935	49.4	547.0
Percentage fall between 1922–30 average and lowest point, 1931–35	62	33

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

434 decade 1925–35). In Mr. Clark's opinion, this represented a drop from a pre-1914 level of 298 international units and set Rumania at the bottom of the eastern European states:[24]

INCOME PER HEAD OF WORKING POPULATION, 1925–34 (IN INTERNATIONAL UNITS)

Rumania	243
Bulgaria	284
Yugoslavia	330
Hungary	359
Poland	352
Czechoslovakia	455
Great Britain	1,069

It is very difficult, however, to make a satisfactory comparison of Rumania's national income before and after the First World War because of the addition of new territories which doubled the area and population and because of the depreciation of the leu. A comparison of the per capita consumption of certain manufactured articles in 1913 and 1927 shows a slight improvement:[25]

ANNUAL PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION IN KILOGRAMS

	1913	1927
Sugar	4.59	5.94
Cotton goods	2.26	2.82
Paper	1.41	2.50
Soap	0.20	0.41

On the other hand, the per capita consumption of cotton goods, which is a fairly good measure of the purchasing power of the peasant, showed no steady advance over the last sixty years. Local consumption of cereals, especially of wheat, increased after the agrarian reforms, although at the expense of exports. Peasant housing appears to have improved through the introduction of better building ma-

[113] 24. Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress* (London, 1940), pp. 40, 132. The method used to reach this conclusion was, by necessity, quite complicated. The pre-1914 national income estimate for the Old Kingdom was taken from Dresdener Bank figures; estimates for Bucovina and Transylvania were taken from studies on Austria-Hungary by Walzner and Fellner. The figure for Bessarabia was established arbitrarily. In addition to the task of combining these three estimates, it was necessary to take into account the enormous depreciation of the leu from its pre-1914 level and the change in the level of prices. Given the ultimate uncertainty of Rumanian statistics, it seems impossible to judge the probable accuracy of Mr. Clark's estimate.

25. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

434 terials and wooden floors, and it is quite possible that there were other improvements in village conditions which would not appear in statistics.

The depression greatly reduced the Rumanian income, and by 1937 the per capita real income had not yet regained the 1927 level.

[165] In the chapter on population it was seen that Rumania had an extremely high death rate. This was matched by an extraordinarily high infant mortality rate, the highest in Europe. Between 1931 and 1938 infant deaths showed no sign of declining, but ranged between a maximum of 19.2 per 100 living births in 1935 and a minimum of 17.4 in 1933.

511 The low standard of living implicit in the vital statistics is also reflected in the dietary deficiencies of the Rumanian peasant. A number of surveys taken in the 1930's reached the same general conclusions:[26] while the caloric content of the diet was usually adequate, its quality was very poor; an excessive consumption of grains, especially maize in the form of corn meal (*mămăligă*) and not enough animal products or protective foods. Seasonal consumption, as might be expected, varied widely. The prevalence of pellagra has been an obvious indication of an unbalanced diet.

511 Statistics on housing, disease, medical service, education, and illiteracy confirm the impression that the Rumanian peasant had one of the lowest standards of living in Europe. Admittedly, the statistically average Rumanian is an abstraction. Peasants with holdings over 5 hectares lived better and were healthier than peasants on dwarf holdings. The husbandman with an intensively cultivated farm in Ţara Bârsei in Transylvania had about three times the income of the small holder in Dobrogea. Nevertheless, the flat picture of widespread poverty and squalor presented by the statistics is not far from the truth. The colorful costumes and picturesque folk dances of the Rumanian peasantry should not obscure the fact that in 1930 nearly half the population was illiterate and in 1938 one child in five died before it was a year old.

Accompanying this peasant poverty was a marked inequality in the distribution of the total income. Rumanian statistics do not permit an exact estimate of its extent, but it was perfectly obvious to anyone who visited Bucarest. The unmistakable signs of luxury spending

26. D. C. Georgescu, *L'Alimentation de la population rurale en Roumanie* (Bucarest, 1940); W. Aykroyd, I. Alexa, I. Nitulescu, "Étude de l'alimentation des paysans dans la région à pellagre de Moldavie," *Archives roumaines de pathologie expérimentale et de microbiologie* (Paris, 1935); Ioan Claudian, *Alimentaţia poporului român* (Bucarest, 1939).

[113]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

page 94

VI

THE LIBERAL PERIOD, 1922–28

Survey of Political Events

175
665

RUMANIAN politics did not really "return to normal" until Ion I. C. Brătianu and the National Liberal party took office in January, 1922. The coalition government under Vaida Voevod, which had come in as a result of the first postwar elections in the autumn of 1919, had been arbitrarily ousted by the king in March, 1920,[1] and the war hero General Averescu was called to form a government. Averescu, who had widespread popularity among the troops and was of peasant origin, appears to have played a double role. In 1918 he had formed his People's League as a rallying point against the established corruption and inefficiency of the old parties; he had even engaged in negotiations with the extreme Left.[2] In 1919 he had temporarily joined the Vaida government; on his political campaigns he had promised five hectares of land to every peasant cultivator, a demagogic promise quite impossible of fulfillment. When he came to power, however, as leader of his People's party, it was as the restorer of order, or, as he said, "the last reserve of the Rumanian bourgeoisie."[3]

If the Averescu movement can be said to have had any leading idea at all, it was, as General Cantacuzino put it, that the reforms which were required could not be carried out by the old Liberal party

[113]

1. For the circumstances surrounding the fall of the Vaida government see above, p. 27. According to the Liberals in 1922, the Vaida government collapsed because of a rising bolshevist current: "public opinion demanded General Averescu." *Istoricul Partidului Naţional Liberal de la 1848 şi până astazi* (Bucarest, 1923), p. 226. While there was doubtless a great deal of social unrest at this time, especially since the Socialists had refused to recognize the 1919 elections, there seems to be no reason to doubt that the downfall of the Vaida government was a direct result of collusion between King Ferdinand and the landowners to check Mihalache's proposed agrarian bill.

2. According to the socialist Titel Petrescu (*Socialismul în România*, p. 314), after the armistice Averescu had consulted with the socialists on the prospects of collaboration and had even discussed the possible overthrow of the monarchy.

3. L. Trotsky and Ch. Rakovsky, *Ocherki politicheskoi rumynii* (Moscow, 1922), p. 126. In a debate in the chamber Mihalache inveighed against Averescu's group: "Your party is a heterogeneous conglomeration, without a program, without a clear vision, and without consistency. Your party is based solely on the popularity of General Averescu, and will last only as long as that popularity endures. . . . You are purely and simply covering troops for the old parties of the ruling classes." Mihalache, *Partidul Ţărănesc în politica ţărei* (Bucarest, 1925), pp. 17–18.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

664 manian senate on December 9, 1920, which killed several persons and led to a temporary state of siege in Bucarest. This type of violence was less characteristic of Rumanian than of Bulgarian or Serbian political life, but was a foreshadowing of the political degeneracy of the 1930's.

665 175 Having served his purpose as man of the hour, Averescu's position gradually deteriorated in 1921, partly because of blunders in the cabinet but largely because the various groups which had installed him now deserted and turned against him. The Liberals, who had accepted him, withdrew their support and retired from parliament, on the rather disingenuous grounds that the government was not representative and had mishandled the Liberals' land reform. Whatever the occasion, it was apparent that with the passing of the postwar turmoil the Liberals were prepared to resume their traditional leadership. General Averescu resigned on December 17, 1921. Take Ionescu attempted to form a cabinet but failed to obtain a vote of confidence. On January 19, Ion I. C. Brătianu took over the government.

With the exception of an interlude between March, 1926, and June, 1927, the Liberals were in office from 1922 to 1928. They retained a hold on the key administrative and financial posts and exerted a decisive influence over King Ferdinand in his last years. Perhaps their strongest bulwark was the dominating personality of Ion I. C. Brătianu. This masterful old politician, who had fought stubbornly throughout the war and the peace negotiations for the realization of Greater Rumania, ruled his party and the country in an arbitrary patrician manner, and until his death the Liberals were firmly established.

On the other hand, there is little evidence that they commanded extensive popular support during these years, practically none outside the Old Kingdom. Part of their success lay in the failure of the other parties to create or maintain a united and effective opposition. Although the Liberals did resort to crude electoral manipulations and to repressive police measures, usually in connection with periodic Communist scares, they were still an old-fashioned party and had not developed these procedures to the unhappy perfection now so familiar.[7] Under sufficient pressure they preferred to retire rather than to overthrow the constitution. But it required several years for the National party of Transylvania and the Peasant party of the Old Kingdom to form the consolidated opposition which ultimately dislodged them.

[113] 7. A somewhat sensational glimpse of the dark side of the Liberal administration is given in C. G. Costa-Foru's *Aus den Folterkammern Rumäniens* (Vienna, 1925), an exposé of the terrorist methods employed by the Rumanian secret police, the *Siguranja*.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 thereafter they drifted apart again.[13] In January, 1925, the National
665 party of Transylvania temporarily fused with the historian Iorga's National Democratic party (to which Argetoianu now belonged). In May, 1925, a United Opposition, including Iorga's group, Maniu's Transylvanians, and the Peasant party, was temporarily established and demanded the resignation of the government. Averescu did not join the opposition bloc and it was rumored that he had a secret understanding with the Liberals to succeed them. In elections to the newly created Chambers of Agriculture,[14] 44 out of 75 districts were won by the United Opposition, 27 by the government, and 4 by the People's party. The tide seemed to be turning against the Liberals.

One reason the Liberals were able to maintain their position in the face of a growing if uncoordinated opposition during the years from 1922 to 1925 was the perennial fear of bolshevism, which in turn served to weaken or discredit all radical or reformist movements. On
648 the international level Soviet-Rumanian relations were very bad be-
175 cause of the unresolved Bessarabian dispute. A conference held in Vienna in April, 1924, failed to bring any agreement between the two disputants.[15] Each side accused the other of plotting aggression and each took measures which aggravated the tension. The creation in 1924 of a Moldavian Soviet Republic on the left bank of the Dniester and ominous Soviet speeches forecasting the ultimate reunion of all Moldavians increased Rumanian anxiety. At the same time, in February, 1925, Vintilă Brătianu, Minister of Finance and brother of Ion I. C. Brătianu, stated his opposition to returning Wrangel's fleet to the U.S.S.R. because of the danger of a strong Soviet Black Sea fleet, and announced that negotiations were in progress for the cooperation of British, French, and Rumanian capital in the establishment of an armaments and munitions factory in Rumania.[16] Such an announcement obviously matched the Soviet thesis that the Western bourgeois powers were using the eastern European states as advanced bases for an assault upon the U.S.S.R.

13. For a discussion of the union of the Transylvanian National party and the Peasant party see below, pp. 140–141.

14. Chambers of agriculture were established in each district in 1925, with a mixed membership of elected and appointed members. In addition to their agricultural functions, they elected members to the senate. They soon became political instruments and were of very little value in the improvement of agriculture.

● 113 15. According to Louis Fischer, on the basis of information obtained from Christian Rakovsky, Litvinov and Trotsky were willing to accept the loss of Bessarabia, but Stalin, Rakovsky, and Chicherin were not. The latter hoped that by means of the Bessarabian issue they could "keep Rumania perennially on tenterhooks." Louis Fischer, *Men and Politics* (New York, 1941), pp. 134–135.

16. *Times* (London), February 7, 1925.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

a majority of the seats going to the Liberals. The Liberals resigned 665 from the Ştirbey cabinet on June 21, stating that it had failed in its 175 mission.

On June 22 the king called Brătianu, who formed an all-Liberal government, with the addition of Dr. Lupu, Argetoianu, and Titulescu, and issued a manifesto:[22]

The mission of the Government headed by M. Barbu Ştirbey to achieve an understanding and collaboration between the various political parties has not succeeded, and because of the differences of views in the midst of the cabinet, the electoral campaign threatened to become the occasion of agitation favoring political passions and subversive currents. In these conditions, a government was required which could be upheld by a solidly organized and experienced party and could assume entire responsibility for the situation. His Majesty the King has entrusted us with this heavy responsibility. We desire the sincere application of the laws guaranteeing the liberty of elections. We will not permit the disturbance of order nor the violation of law, and will not tolerate anarchist tendencies. Closely united with our collaborators in the parties which assure us their co-operation we will carry out our program which the country knows well.

This manifesto is a nice epitome of the Liberals' politics. Presenting themselves as the solid defenders of the law and the constitution, they had actually achieved, with the cooperation of the king, a very neat coup. By breaking the Ştirbey coalition and relying on the king's mistrust of the opposition, Brătianu had driven the National Peasants back into the wilderness without the slightest popular justification. The references to "subversive currents" and "anarchist tendencies," while conjuring up the specter of communism, cannot be taken very seriously unless the whole mass of the peasantry was to be considered subversive. It is not surprising that the National Peasants should have seen all the complicated political maneuvers of those years, including the schisms in their own ranks, as Brătianu machinations.

The Liberals dropped their talk of a national cabinet, and conducted the elections of July 7, 1927, in the usual manner; they won 298 out of 387 seats in the chamber; Dr. Lupu was rewarded for his cooperation with 22 seats. The National Peasants managed to obtain 49; Averescu's People's party and Iorga's group failed to obtain even the minimum of 2 per cent of the votes. The political picture

22. *L'Économiste roumain* (Organ de l'Institut Économique Roumain et de l'Association des Banques Roumaines) (July 1, 1927), p. 171. [113]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 A more realistic defense of the role of the Liberal party as the leading exponent of the Rumanian bourgeoisie was provided by Stefan Zeletin.[31] Zeletin, however, did not approach the subject from the point of view of liberal principles but employed a quasi-Marxian analysis, though for purposes that were certainly not Marx's. He contended that Rumania was actually in the process of duplicating the course of capitalist development which had taken place in the western European states a century or more earlier. In his view capitalism passed through three stages, each with its own political and social system:

a) commercial capitalism—mercantilism
b) industrial capitalism—liberalism
c) finance capitalism—imperialism.

Rumania was now in the mercantilist phase, which implied energetic state intervention in the economic life of the nation.[32] High protectionist tariffs were justified as proper mercantilist measures, as was the fight against foreign capital.

The leading force in Rumania's economic development, according to Zeletin, had been the smaller boyars who, in the nineteenth century, had entered commerce and finance and by the twentieth century had become a real bourgeois class. He identified the history of the Rumanian bourgeoisie with the history of the Liberal party, which was and remained the "classical party of liberalism." As for the unhappy condition of the peasants, Zeletin held that a period of peasant misery was to be expected as a necessary phase in the transition to capitalism; just as the expansion of the British economy at an earlier date had been accompanied by enclosures and the destruction of the yeomanry, so the backward mass of the Rumanian peasantry had to suffer in the rise of Rumanian capitalism. The peasant was destined to play a secondary role in social movements and none at all in politics. In short, Zeletin was a stout defender of the Rumanian bourgeoisie, whose standard-bearer was the Liberal party, as an indispensable and inevitable element not only of past but of future progress. He condemned the Socialists on the grounds that since Rumanian capitalism was still in the process of formation and had

[113] 31. Zeletin's two most important studies, which led to lively controversies in the 1920's, were *Burghezia română, origina şi rolul ei istoric* (Bucarest, 1925), and *Neoliberalismul* (Bucarest, 1927). An extensive criticism was made by the Social Democrat Şerban Voinea in *Marxism oligarhic* (Bucarest, 1926). A brief appraisal of Zeletin along with other Rumanian political and economic writers is given in Ion Veverca's review article, "L'Évolution économique de la Roumanie, *Archives pour la science et la réforme sociales, 16,* Nos. 1–4 (Bucarest, 1943), 332–337.

32. Zeletin, *Burghezia română,* p. 19.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 firm the supposition that the principles of the Peasant party itself were unstable. The evolution traced here was to be carried even farther when the National Peasants came to power in 1928.

Economic and Agrarian Policy

[113] A fair illustration of the economic interests of the National Peasant government is to be found in Virgil Madgearu's little book, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, published in 1930. Of the 63 pages of text, 14 are devoted to agriculture, 22 to the exploitation of state enterprises and the reform of the mining law, ten to foreign trade policy, and eleven to the improvement of transport. The fact that the booklet was published in England and designed for foreign readers merely underlines the preoccupation with affairs other than agricultural. As has been seen, this broadening of interests was the result of the pressing demands of financial, monetary, and commercial matters in 1928–30, but also of the internal trend away from a purely agrarian outlook.

665 241 The most striking feature of the agrarian policy of the National Peasant government was the things it neglected to do or even to consider doing. While the party's attitude toward further redistribution of land had become increasingly moderate, nevertheless in 1926 the program of the united party called for expropriation of properties over 100 hectares. Not a step was taken toward carrying out this measure. To be sure, many reasons militated against such a move. Agriculture was still in the process of readjustment from the previous reforms. Expropriation would undoubtedly have caused a political furor since the mere passage of time was serving to consolidate the previous reform, with all its shortcomings and abuses. Moreover, since the 1917 act was entered in the constitution, it could be modified only by a constitutional amendment, which was forbidden under a regency. Quite obviously, however, the National Peasant party by 1928 was not the radical agrarian movement which had attempted to introduce the reform bill under the Vaida government of 1920.

A second omission was the failure to take any active steps toward the consolidation of peasant strips, a measure which was virtually a precondition for any effective improvement of agriculture. Again, this would have been unsettling and peasant support for this particular reform was by no means certain.

665 241 671 The only serious measure taken in connection with agricultural property relations was an act passed in 1929 which amended the Liberals' law of 1925 concerning the alienation of allotments obtained

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

through the agrarian reforms.[45] The new law, which was designed to facilitate the transfer of land and to further a "process of selection among the peasant cultivators," abolished certain of the restrictions and delays imposed by the Liberals and greatly simplified the procedure of sale, although maintaining safeguards to keep land in the hands of actual cultivators and limiting purchases to Rumanian citizens having not over 25 hectares of land.

The idea that a "process of selection" would enable peasants with "superior competitive efficiency" to create prosperous holdings has had considerable popularity not only in Rumania but in other eastern European states.[46] For such a process to have beneficial consequences, however, it is necessary, first, that superior efficiency on tiny holdings will actually result in sufficient capital accumulation to buy out less efficient peasants, and, second, that the peasants displaced in the process have some alternative means of employment. Otherwise the poorer peasants would be reduced to a landless proletariat and the land taken over by the wealthier peasants. Such seems to have been the effect of the National Peasants' law, although it was not the sole cause; the survey of sixty Rumanian villages made in 1938 reported that the law of 1929 had intensified the differentiation in the peasantry by building up the category of middle peasants on the one hand and of increasing the agricultural proletariat on the other.[47] It was this law perhaps more than any other single act which gave

45. See above, p. 125.

46. Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe*, p. 105, cites a Greek author (C. Evelpedis, *La Réforme agraire en Grèce*, Athens, 1926), as an advocate of this view. In Rumania the alienation of peasant property has had a tangled political history in which at one time or another almost all political parties have reversed their positions. Up to the 1918–21 reforms, official policy tended toward inalienability, whereas the older reformers, such as Dobrogeanu-Gherea and Garofiid, demanded alienation as a necessary step to creating an independent peasantry. The Liberals in 1911 came out for a "process of selection," but in 1925 they restricted the transfer of land. The Peasant party, on the contrary, in 1921 was for government control of all sales, whereas in 1929 it moved toward freer purchase. The Communists, it may be added, roundly condemned the National Peasants for their 1929 law, but Lenin, in his agrarian writings before the Russian revolution, was strongly for alienation. The Communist position is seen in Pătrăşcanu's interpretation of the 1929 law: "From the point of view of opening a way for capitalism in the villages and of differentiation within the rural strata, the measure represented an advance in comparison with the past. But what was the cost of this progress? The land of the poorest and economically most feeble layers of the peasants quickly became the principal object, the prey on which urban banking capital and the village bourgeoisie threw themselves." Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, *Sous trois dictatures* (Paris, 1946), p. 106.

47. *60 Sate româneşti*, II, 6. The depression doubtless intensified this effect. During the 1946 famine in Moldavia the same thing occurred: peasants who had obtained land under the 1945 reform began to sell to the larger peasants at such a rate that the government was obliged to pass a law nullifying these sales.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

135 The government seeks to facilitate the forming of middle-sized estates of about 10 hectares in area, making them indivisible so that there can be no relapse into sub-dividing. The State has taken to itself the right of acquiring any land which is for sale. It gives preference in its purchase and distribution of land to farms adjoining it, in order that small properties may be enlarged and concentration attained even through private purchase.[8]

The execution of this policy was assigned to BINAG. If property purchased through BINAG could not be sold as a whole within two years, it could be sold in lots of not less than 15 hectares. Sales could be only to Rumanian subjects who undertook to cultivate the land themselves. Such properties could not be broken up and had to be transferred in their entirety. Moreover, such estates could be inherited only as a whole by a single heir. To some extent this law is similar to the German *Erbhofgesetz* of 1933, although it was not as restrictive since it did permit the sale of the land.[9] The aims of this measure were reasonable enough but it was of little use to the small peasant and certainly showed greater interest in the medium holder.

Along with the emphasis upon larger holdings was a rather superficial government paternalism for the peasant. Some of the activities were of value. The studies of village life continued and in several instances produced extremely useful collections of information for an understanding of the agrarian question. The emphasis upon a sociological interpretation of Rumanian peasant life was beneficial in focusing attention upon the realities in Rumania and getting away from the application of quite unsuitable Western political and economic concepts to the local situation. From the scholarly point of view this was all to the good. As a political phenomenon it had a certain danger. Looking at one's fellow countrymen as objects for sociological investigation does not overcome the social chasm between the rulers and the ruled, but may merely put it on a more enlightened basis. It is certainly preferable to dismissing the peasants as "animals who can speak,"[10] but it still regards the peasant as object rather than subject.

Other manifestations of Carol's paternalism were of value only in providing employment for his publicity agents. The shabby quality of

[113] 8. *Ibid.*, p. 348.

9. For a discussion of the problem of succession to agricultural property and of recent European legislation in this regard, see M. Tcherkinsky, "The Evolution of the System of Succession to Landed Property in Europe," *International Review of Agriculture*, 32, No. 6 (June, 1941), 165E–196E.

10. I heard this definition defended in dead earnest by a landowner in Bucarest in the winter of 1944.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

● 113 *the Peasant in Rumania* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 241–242.

COMMENT: Unfortunately this table and Table VIII, on the distribution of properties, appear to defy comparison, and in certain important respects they are in serious contradiction. The total area for properties is some 2,000,000 hectares larger than that for farms. Probably a large part of this difference is attributable to grazing lands and fallow, which are not included in the statistics for farms. According to figures for 1905, pasture and fallow amounted to about 1,400,000 hectares. L. Colescu, *Progresele economice ale Romaniei indeplinite sub domnia M.S. Regelui Carol I, 1866–1906* (Bucarest, 1907), p. 51. Owner-cultivated farms under 100 hectares are given as some 1,300,000 hectares less than properties under 100 hectares (2,727,000 hectares as against 4,016,000 hectares). It seems impossible to explain this difference either by the absence of grazing land, which belonged mainly to large properties, or by mutual interleasing among peasants, which could scarcely have achieved such a magnitude. The figure for farms over 100 hectares is some 2,100,000 hectares less than that for properties over 100 hectares (1,681,000 hectares as against 3,810,000 hectares). This difference is to be explained by the absence of grazing land in the farm statistics, by the fact that land was leased from the large estates to peasant farms, and by the sale of estate land between 1907 and 1913, but the relative importance of these factors is not clear. The total area leased from properties over 100 hectares is given by Creangă at about 2,300,000 hectares; the total farm area under tenant cultivation, for both large and small farms, is about 2,336,000 hectares, but this similarity is misleading because the figure for leased properties presumably includes grazing land.

The only point in mentioning these inconsistencies—especially in statistics which are known to be of uncertain reliability—is that repeated attempts have been made to reach too definite conclusions through a collation of these tables or a selected part thereof.

31 TABLE XI. PRE-1914 DISTRIBUTION OF LAND IN BESSARABIA

A. By Type of Property

Categories		Number of Properties	Total Area (hectares)	Average Area (hectares)	Per Cent of Total Area
1. Private individual properties	Nobles	1,474	818,744	555.4	20.1
	Priests	126	4,308	34.2	0.1
	Merchants, etc.	1,944	253,867	—	6.7
	Peasants	7,718	135,384	17.5	3.2
	Foreigners	13	30,390	2,337.6	0.8
	Various	10,102	94,157	9.0	2.3
	Large owners	275	169,416	616.3	4.3
		21,652	1,506,266	69.4	36.9
2. Joint holdings		540	201,591	373.3	4.9
3. Nadyel lands		2,209	2,111,940	956.0	50.7
4. State domains		—	53,648	—	1.3
5. Churches and monasteries		—	204,190	—	5.0
6. Town properties		—	23,600	—	0.6
7. Private institutions		—	30,362	—	0.7
		24,401	4,131,597	166.3	100.0

SOURCE: E. Giurgea in *Buletinul Statistic*, No. 2 (1919), pp. 324–327, quoted in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

THIS note is not an exhaustive bibliography but includes only those sources employed or consulted in the preparation of this study. A useful bibliography of material on Rumania has been prepared by the Division of Bibliography, Library of Congress: *The Balkans, a Selected List of References: I. General* and *IV. Rumania* (mimeographed, Washington, D.C., 1943). Other extensive bibliographies are Leon Savadjian, *Bibliographie balkanique, 1920–1938* (2 vols., Paris, 1931–39), and Mario Ruffini, "Introduzione bibliografica allo studio della Romania," *L'Europa orientale* (Rome) *15* (May–June, 1935), 236–289. Paul Henry has written two historiographical articles which include discussions of post-1918 works: "Histoire roumaine," *Revue historique* (Paris), *176* (July–December, 1935), 486–537, and "Histoire de Roumanie," *ibid., 194* (1944), 42–65, 132–150, 233–252.

Works which have been used extensively or which have a special interest are discussed briefly. Other sources—technical aids, general studies, and minor Rumanian works—are listed without comment at the end.

OFFICIAL AND SEMIOFFICIAL SOURCES

Most of the statistical information in this study has been obtained from the publications of the Rumanian Central Institute of Statistics (Institutul Central de Statistică), which has issued a variety of censuses, periodical reports, and special studies. Among the more important are:

Censuses:

Recensământul general al populației României din 29 decemvrie 1930 (10 vols., Bucarest, 1938).

Recensământul general al României din 1941, 6 aprilie, date sumare provizorii (Bucarest, 1944). A collection of articles on the national significance of the 1941 census was published as *Recensământul României din 1941, lamurirea opiniei publice* (Bucarest, 1941).

Roman Cresin, *Recensământul agricol al României din 1941, date provizorii*, Biblioteca Statistică No. 10 (Bucarest, 1945).

A. Golopenția and D. C. Georgescu, *Populația Republicii Populare Române la 25 ianuarie 1948, rezultatele provizorii ale recensământului* (Bucarest, 1948).

A. Golopenția and P. Onica, *Recensământul agricol din Republica Populară Română, 25 ianuarie 1948, rezultate provizorii* (Bucarest, 1948).

Periodical reports:

Anuarul statistic al României. An annual statistical survey; before 1914 it was prepared by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

● 113 *Bréviaire statistique de la Roumanie.* An abbreviated French version of *Anuarul.*

Statistica agricolă a României. An annual statistical survey of the agricultural situation. Included under this title are certain special surveys: Vol. IV, *Inventarul agricol în Anul 1943* (Bucarest, 1946), and Vol. V, *Inventarul agricol în Anul 1945* (Bucarest, 1947).

Comunicări statistice. Since 1945 the institute, to make up for the lapses during the war, has published fortnightly a selection of miscellaneous statistics to be issued later in more detail. Very useful for recent developments.

Analele Institutului Statistic al României. A publication started during the war and containing articles on statistical methods.

Special studies:

Roman Cresin, *Agricultura din Judeţul Argeş* (Bucarest, 1945). A detailed study of one district, based on the 1941 census. Extremely useful so long as the complete results of the census are not published.

Petre Onica, *Statistica agricolă* (Bucarest, 1945). A guide to the preparation of agricultural statistics in Rumania.

G. Retegan, *Condiţiile de viaţă ale oamenilor de serviciu,* Biblioteca Statistică, No. 21 (Bucarest, 1945). One of the few pieces of precise information about the living conditions of government employees and their reasons for leaving the village to work in the capital.

Nicolae M. Dunăre, *Fii de ţărani vânzători ambulanţi în capitala,* Biblioteca Statistică, No. 22 (Bucarest, 1945). A survey of street vendors who have emigrated from the villages to Bucarest; touches on the question of agricultural overpopulation.

Sabin Manuila, *Demografia rurală a României* (Bucarest, 1940).

Sabin Manuila, *Studiu etnografic asupră populaţiei României* (Bucarest, 1940).

Sabin Manuila and D. C. Georgescu, *Populaţia României* (Bucarest, 1938).

Official texts of laws are published in the government gazette, *Monitorul oficial.* The first part is devoted to laws and decrees, the second to legal notices, and the third to parliamentary debates.

The Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerul Agriculturii şi Domenilor) published a monthly *Buletinul agriculturii* (sometimes appearing under the French title, *Bulletin de l'agriculture*), devoted largely to technical studies but including economic and regional surveys. Among these were R. C. Stere, "Particularităţile economice ale micilor gospodării ţărăneşti" (April–June, 1927), pp. 33–64; R. Cresin, "Agricultura in Basarabia" (March–April, 1929), pp. 132–151; Mihai Şerban, "Les Conséquences de la réforme agraire sur l'état social et économique de la Roumanie" (May–June, 1929), pp. 21–27. The ministry also published, on the occasion of the Fourteenth Congress of the International Congress of Agriculture in Bucarest (June 7–10, 1929), *L'Agriculture en Roumanie: atlas statistique* (Bucarest, 1929), which is filled with

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

charts and diagrams; the accuracy of some of the information is doubtful however. At the same conference A. Nasta presented a paper, "La Réforme agraire en Roumanie," which contained the official though not very reliable statistics on the application of the 1918–21 agrarian reforms. 113

The Ministry of Industry and Commerce (Ministerul Industriei şi Comerţului) published a quarterly periodical in French and English, *Correspondance économique roumaine*, containing articles on Rumanian economic life, texts of laws, and summaries of the economic situation. Designed to present Rumania in the best possible light, it suffered from chronic overoptimism.

The Ministry of Finance (Ministerul Finanţelor) published an annual *Expunere de motive la bugetul general al statului*, which in addition to information on the budget contained a summary of economic developments.

The Rumanian National Bank (Banca Naţională) published a monthly *Bulletin d'information et de documentation*, containing financial and economic studies. A somewhat similar publication was the semiofficial *L'Économiste roumain* (*Organ de l'Institut Économique Roumain et de l'Association des Banques Roumaines*), which discussed most of the economic laws and agreements of the Liberal regime. In economic policy it followed Vintilă Brătianu.

The semiofficial *Enciclopedia României* (4 vols., Bucarest, n.d.) was started as a monument to the Carol regime but was completed under Marshal Antonescu. It contains many articles, some of them excellent, on all aspects of Rumanian life. The last two volumes are devoted to economic and commercial affairs. As a whole, however, it reflects the political bias of the years of the Carol and Antonescu dictatorships and strives to gloss over the unpleasant parts of the political and economic scene.

Since the advent of the Groza government, its propaganda ministry has issued a number of publications, of rather low quality, on economic developments. *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie* (Bucarest, November, 1946) contains the text of the 1945 agrarian reform, but the commentary is worthless. The periodical *Rumanian Review* (French edition, *Revue roumaine*) has a number of articles on economic and political life, but they are all tainted with propagandist aims. Of somewhat greater value, though also containing a good deal of propaganda, is a series of pamphlets put out by Oficiul de Studii şi Documentare, Biblioteca Economică: *Îmbunătăţirile funciare în agricultura românească* (Bucarest, 1946); Cornel Irimie, *Centrele de maşini agricole* (Bucarest, 1946); *Intensificarea creşterii animalelor în cadrul refacerii economice* (Bucarest, 1946); Traian Săvulescu, *Problema alimentării populaţiei* (Bucarest, 1947). The last work has some useful data on the severe famine of the winter of 1946–47.

An extremely valuable source of information is the work carried on by the semiofficial Institutul de Ştiinţe Sociale al României, under the direction of the sociologist D. Gusti; *60 Sate româneşti* (5 vols., Bucarest, 1941–43) presents the results of a sampling investigation in a number of Rumanian villages in the summer of 1938. It is especially useful for its data on peasant agriculture, land relations, and the standard of living in the countryside. Detailed studies have been made of certain villages selected as representative of

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

●113 a particular aspect of Rumanian peasant society. *Nerej, un village d'une région archaïque* (3 vols., Bucarest, 1939) investigates a community in a region of traditionally free peasants. *Dâmbovnicul, o plasă din sudul Judeţului Argeş* (Bucarest, 1942) was chosen as a representative Wallachian peasant community under the impact of modern economic pressures. A more general study of the forms of village landholding was prepared by H. H. Stahl, *Sociologia satului devălmaş românesc* (Bucarest, 1946). The institute also published two periodicals which have articles on a wide range of social, political, and economic topics: *Arhiva pentru ştiinţa şi reforma socială* (occasionally issued in French as *Archives pour la science et la réforme sociales*) and *Sociologie românească.*

GENERAL HISTORIES

There is, in English, only one extensive history of Rumania from its origins: R. W. Seton-Watson, *A History of the Roumanians from the Roman Times to the Completion of Unity* (Cambridge University Press, 1934). It does not extend to the period covered in the present study but gives a useful outline of Rumania's activities in the First World War and the acquisition of the new territories. The two most extensive histories of Rumania in Rumanian are Constantin C. Giurescu, *Istoria Românilor* (4 vols., Bucarest, 1935–37) and Nicolae Iorga, *Istoria Românilor* (10 vols., Bucarest, 1936–39). (For a recent appraisal of Iorga's work as a historian see John C. Campbell, "Nicholas Iorga," *The Slavonic and East European Review, 26,* No. 66 [November, 1947], 44–59.) Neither of these works, however, treats the interwar period.

Although he is primarily concerned with the agrarian reforms of 1918–21, David Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania: the War and Agrarian Reform (1917–1921)*, Economic and Social History of the World War, Rumanian Series, published for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History (London; New Haven, Yale University Press, 1930), provides much the best background to the agrarian question. It studies the period of reform in the greatest detail and analyzes the consequences of the reforms up to the fall of the Brătianu government. Prepared in the 1920's, this book expressed optimistic hopes regarding the future of the peasant movement in eastern Europe which have not been realised. In some cases the wealth of statistical material leads to confusion rather than clarity, but in its general sweep it is a very impressive study. Of much less importance are two other books in the Carnegie war history series: G. Ionescu-Sişeşti, *L'Agriculture de la Roumanie pendant la guerre,* and Gr. Antipa, *L'Occupation ennemie de la Roumanie et ses conséquences économiques et sociales* (Paris; New Haven, Yale University Press, 1929).

There are no satisfactory histories of Rumania in the interwar period. Joseph S. Roucek, *Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems: a Study in Modern Nationalism* (Stanford University Press, 1932), attempts a general survey up to 1931, but it is largely a chronicle and a compendium; analysis is very weak. Roucek also devoted a chapter to Rumania in his later study, *The*

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Politics of the Balkans (London; New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939), but a far more adequate treatment of Rumania in the general setting of eastern Europe is given by Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918–1941* (2d ed., Cambridge University Press, 1946), a work of great insight and originality. George Clinton Logio, *Rumania, Its History, Politics, and Economics* (Manchester, Sherratt and Hughes, 1932), is a very uneven book but is useful where it reflects Logio's own experiences in Rumania. Charles Upson Clark, *United Roumania* (New York, Dodd, Mead, 1932), is an enlargement of the earlier study, *Greater Roumania* (New York, Dodd, Mead, 1922), but neither work is outstanding. C. G. Rommenhöller, *Gross-Rumänien, seine ökonomische, soziale, finanzielle, und politische Struktur, speziell seine Reichtümer* (Berlin, Puttkammer und Mühlbrecht, 1926), is mainly concerned with Rumania's industrial potentialities; the political and historical sections are very brief. Norman L. Forter and Demeter B. Rostovsky, *The Roumanian Handbook* (London, Simpkin, Marshall, 1931) is a loosely organized collection of information on Rumania. Pavel Pavel, *Why Rumania Failed* (London, Alliance Press, n.d.) is an anti-Carol, pro-Maniu apology for Rumania's participation in the Second World War; it is factually unreliable. Convenient as a brief handbook is C. Kormos, *Rumania*, British Survey Handbooks (Cambridge University Press, 1944).

REGIONAL STUDIES

The Royal Institute of International Affairs prepared a number of Balkan studies, with a special emphasis on economic questions, which include some useful information on Rumania: *The Balkan States. I. Economic* (Oxford University Press, 1936); *South-Eastern Europe, a Political and Economic Survey* (Oxford University Press, 1939); and *South-Eastern Europe, a Brief Survey*, Information Department Papers, No. 26 (Oxford University press, 1940). A recent study of post-1945 constitutional developments in this region is Andrew Gyorgy, *Governments of Danubian Europe* (New York, Rinehart, 1949).

A good survey of the economic policy of the Danubian states in the early 1920's is provided by Leo Pasvolsky, *Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States* (New York, Macmillan, 1928). Especially valuable for the 1930's and the period of German economic penetration is Antonin Basch, *The Danube Basin and the German Economic Sphere*, International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction (London, Kegan Paul, 1944). Frederick Hertz, *The Economic Problem of the Danubian States* (London, Victor Gollancz, 1947), is mainly concerned with Austria and Hungary; the material on Rumania is scanty and in some cases inaccurate. The PEP study (Political and Economic Planning), *Economic Development in S. E. Europe* (London, 1945), contains some helpful comparative information on economic conditions but is chiefly interested in future plans. N. Momtchiloff, *Ten Years of Controlled Trade in South-Eastern Europe*, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, Occasional Papers, Vol. VI (Cambridge University Press, 1944),

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

●113 is a brief examination of the trade policy pursued in the 1930's and suggests that certain of the controls developed in those years may have a useful function in the proper context.

A number of League of Nations studies have been of value, above all Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (Economic, Financial and Transit Department, League of Nations, Geneva, 1945), which has an excellent analysis of agricultural overpopulation in its relation to the agrarian problem in eastern Europe. Also to be mentioned are *Industrialization and Foreign Trade* (1945); *Agricultural Production in Continental Europe during the 1914–18 War and the Reconstruction Period* (1943); *Final Report of the Mixed Committee of the League of Nations on the Relation of Nutrition to Health, Agriculture, and Economic Policy* (1938), which has a section on the Rumanian peasant diet; *The Agricultural Crisis* (2 vols., 1931); Dudley Kirk, *Europe's Population in the Interwar Years* (1946); *Memorandum on Public Finance, 1926–28* (1929), with a section on Rumania, pp. 203–221; and *The League of Nations Reconstruction Schemes in the Inter-War Period* (1945), Appendix I, "Trade and Production in the Danubian States."

RUMANIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY

The most recent large study is Virgil Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești după războiul mondial* (Bucarest, Independența economică, 1940). While the organization of this work is cumbersome, it is the only extensive Rumanian interpretation of the interwar period. It contains a good deal of information which Madgearu obtained from unpublished sources. Its outlook is that of a disappointed and somewhat disillusioned National Peasant. N. Razmirița, *Essai d'économie roumaine moderne, 1831–1931* (Paris, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1932) is largely devoted to the pre-1914 period; its sections on the postwar years are not very good. Florin Em. Manoliou, *La Réconstruction économique et financière de la Roumanie et les partis politiques* (Paris, J. Gamber, 1931), undertakes to analyze the economic policy of the Liberal, People's party, and National Peasant governments in the years between 1920 and 1931. Not a very penetrating study, it is of value in sketching the principal economic measures of the various cabinets.

Like Razmirița and Manoliou, quite a number of Rumanian students in Paris wrote dissertations on aspects of Rumanian economic life. The quality of these is very uneven; some are worthless, others are quite good. Perhaps the best are Savel Radulescu, *La Politique financière de la Roumanie depuis 1914* (Paris, Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1923), and Nicolas C. Cristoveanu, *Essai critique sur la politique roumaine en matière de dettes agricoles* (Paris, A. Rousseau, 1933). Less useful are C. A. Tatarano, *Les Nouvelles tendances économiques de la Roumanie* (Paris, 1922); Dorin Kastris, *Les Capitaux étrangers dans la finance roumaine* (Paris, 1921); A. Theveneau, *La Roumanie économique et le change roumain au lendemain de la guerre* (Paris, Les Presses Universitaires, 1923); Alexandre-Ionescu Ivanof, *La*

3; Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Réforme monétaire roumaine (Paris, Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1929); A. G. Georgescu, *Le Régime juridique et financier des capitaux étrangers en Roumanie* (Paris, Les Presses Universitaires, 1932); Ludovic Iavorschi, *L'Équilibre budgétaire en Roumanie de 1920 à 1932* (Paris, J. Gamber, 1933); Mihail-Dumitru N. Israil, *Le Marché monétaire roumain après la stabilisation monétaire* (Paris, Librairie L. Rodstein, 1933).

THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

As has been mentioned, David Mitrany's *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania* is the most satisfactory study of the agrarian question. Much briefer and less comprehensive is Ifor L. Evans, *The Agrarian Revolution in Roumania* (Cambridge University Press, 1924). A very informative history of the Rumanian peasant question in the nineteenth century is Marcel Emerit, *Les Paysans roumains depuis le Traité d'Andrinople jusqu'à la libération des terres, 1829–1864* (Paris, Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1937). It was M. Emerit's intention to write a second volume on the years between the emancipation and the agrarian reform, but it has not yet appeared.

Classic Rumanian studies on the peasant question are the two works of Radu Rosetti, *Pământul, sătenii, și stăpânii in Moldova* (Bucarest, SOCEC, 1907) and *Pentru ce s'au răsculat țăranii* (Bucarest, SOCEC, 1908). Rosetti wrote from a populist point of view, and his belief in the peasants' original right to the land was challenged by his contemporary, Gheorghe Panu, in *O Încercare de mistificare istorică* (Bucarest, Broser and Parzer, 1910). It is now generally agreed that a number of Rosetti's conclusions were based on very weak evidence.

Among other studies which date from the time of the 1907 uprising but which are still important for an understanding of the Rumanian agrarian question are those of Garoflid and Creangă. Constantin Garoflid's penetrating analysis, *Chestia agrară in România* (Bucarest, Gutenberg, 1920), was originally written in 1907 but later published with other articles and speeches. A landowner himself, Garoflid criticized the old latifundiary system of cultivation but was opposed to the creation of a multitude of small properties which would not be self-sustaining. Some of his statistics, which have been employed by subsequent authors, are clearly incorrect. His views on the postreform period may be found in two articles: *Un Program agrar* (Bucarest, 1924) and *Rolul social al proprietății mijlocii* (Bucarest, 1926), as well as in a contribution to the *Enciclopedia României*. G. C. Creangă, *Grundbesitzverteilung und Bauernfrage in Rumänien*, 3 Teile, in *Staats- und sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen*, Hefte 129, 140 (Leipzig, 1907, 1909), is the most complete statistical analysis of Rumanian property relations before the agrarian reforms; Creangă's figures, while not wholly satisfactory, have provided the basis for most estimates of the pre-1914 situation.

The veteran agricultural economist G. Ionescu-Sișești wrote a number of works on the agrarian question. For the most part, however, they are marred by the tone of bland optimism which is the bane of much Rumanian writing

3; Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

● 113 of an official or semiofficial nature. *Politica agrară cu privire specială la România* (Bucarest, Libraria L. Alcalay, n.d., ca. 1913) has an interesting review of Rumanian writings on the agrarian question. In *Structure agraire et production agricole de la Roumanie* (Bucarest, 1924) he examined the consequences of the agrarian reforms, especially in their effect upon cultivation in metayage. He collaborated with A. Frundianescu in a contribution to *Agricultural Systems of Middle Europe, a Symposium*, ed. O. S. Morgan (New York, Macmillan, 1933), and with N. Cornăţeanu in *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie et ses conséquences* (Bucarest, Académie roumaine, 1937), which provides some useful farm-accountancy statistics but is quite misleading in its interpretation of Rumanian peasant agriculture. During the Second World War, however, he wrote a very pessimistic study, "Le Nouvel Aspect du problème agraire en Roumanie," *Archives pour la science et la réforme sociales, 16*, Nos. 1–4 (1943), 260–267.

The legal aspects of the 1918–21 agrarian reforms are discussed in Ilie S. Diaconescu, *Chestiunea ţărănească în România* (Bucarest, Cultura Poporului," 1928), which gives the texts of the laws and an extended commentary; its value as a historical narrative is limited. Mitiţa Constantinescu, *L'Evolution de la propriété rurale et la réforme agraire en Roumanie* (Bucarest, 1925), while written at great length and with assurance, was prepared before many of the results of the reforms were known. In 1945 Constantinescu came out as a stanch advocate of intimate Rumanian-Soviet relations (see his pamphlet *Relaţiile economice între România şi U.R.S.S.*, Bucarest, Cartea Rusă, 1945), but in this earlier study he stressed the importance of the agrarian reform as a bulwark against bolshevism.

A number of Paris dissertations were concerned with the agrarian question; none is outstanding: C. C. Bosiano, *La Politique paysanne en Roumanie depuis la guerre* (Paris, 1920); Valeriu Bercaru, *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie* (Paris, H. Gamber, 1928); Antoniu Saki, *La Question agraire en Roumanie* (Paris, Les Presses Modernes, 1926). Of the same order is Ernest Grintzesco, *Le Problème du redressement agricole en Roumanie* (Bucarest, F. Göbl et Fils., 1931).

A good summary of Rumania's agrarian position at the outbreak of the Second World War, especially in regard to its export position, was prepared by the United States Department of Agriculture, "Wartime Agricultural Surpluses of the Danube Basin," *Foreign Agriculture, 4*, No. 12 (December 1940), 705–778. The article does, however, attribute too many virtues to the pre-1914 large estates.

A very intelligent analysis of the Rumanian agrarian problem is by the Danish specialist, M. Gormsen, *Short Introduction to the Principal Structural Problems of the Agriculture in Roumania* (Bucarest, 1945). The Rumanian text of this rather bad English translation is to be found in the volume issued by Institutul Economic Românesc, *Problema agrară* (Bucarest, Cartea Românească, 1945) which also includes an article by Valeriu Bulgariu on the subdividing of peasant property, "Divizibilitatea proprietăţii ţărăneşti."

In the last decade or so there have been a number of studies on the plight of

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

the eastern European peasant countries. Doreen Warriner, in *The Economics of Peasant Farming* (Oxford University Press, 1939), came to the negative conclusion that emigration was virtually the only solution to the problem of overpopulation. A more positive solution has been proposed by K. Mandelbaum, *The Industrialisation of Backward Areas*, Oxford Institute of Statistics Monograph, No. 2 (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1945). This study, which is based on the southeastern European states, draws up a formal model for their planned industrialisation. Its principal limitation, as the author admits, is that it abstracts all the political difficulties. Two other works may be mentioned which reflect the same interest: S. N. Prokopovicz, *L'Industrialisation des pays agricoles et la structure de l'économie mondiale après la guerre*, trans. N. Nicolsky (Neuchâtel, 1946), and P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "Problems of Industrialisation of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe," *The Economic Journal*, *53* (1943), 202–211.

POLITICAL MOVEMENTS

A useful guide for political developments up to 1936 is the publication of the Conférence Permanente des Hautes Études Internationales, *Chronique des événements politiques et économiques dans le bassin danubien, 1918–1936: Roumanie* (Paris, Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle, Société des Nations, 1938). This booklet also lists and summarizes the principal laws and decrees of the period. A symposium of lectures on political theories current in Rumania at the beginning of the interwar period was published by Institutul Social Român as *Doctrinele partidelor politice* (Bucarest, Cultura Națională, n.d.). The book includes lectures on nationalism by Iorga, peasantism by Virgil Madgearu, liberalism by I. G. Duca, conservatism by Al. Marghiloman, neoliberalism by M. Manoilescu, and socialism by Șerban Voinea. No Communist was invited to speak. While one may feel that a number of these lectures had little or nothing to do with Rumanian realities, the collection is most interesting in showing the eagerness with which the Rumanians were attempting to relate their society to the West. A much less interesting work is *Politics and Political Parties in Roumania* (London, International Reference Library Publishing Co., 1936), which includes the programs of the principal parties and a political "Who's Who."

a. *Liberals*

Istoricul Partidului Național Liberal de la 1848 și până astazi (Bucarest, 1923) is a rather conventional official history of the party. It is of little use for the interwar period. A biography of Vintilă Brătianu was written by C. Georgescu, *Vintilă Brătianu ca om de stat, economist și financiar* (Bucarest, 1936). Brătianu's economic views found frequent expression in the abovementioned *L'Économiste roumain;* they were also clearly displayed in a parliamentary address which was translated into French: *La Situation financière de la Roumanie; discours tenu à la Chambre des Députés les 1 et 2 février 1923* (Bucarest, Imprimeria "Indépendance," 1923). Some informa-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

113 tion on the banking activities of the Liberals is to be found in Alfred Bonafous, "Les Grandes Banques d'affaires de Roumanie," *Revue d'économie politique* (Paris), *36* (1922), 323–340. The darker side of the Liberal regime is seen in the somewhat sensational exposé of the methods employed by the secret police: C. G. Costa-Foru, *Aus den Folterkammern Rumäniens* (Vienna, Kulturpolitischer Verlag, 1925).

The most brilliant defense of the role of the Rumanian Liberal party was made by St. Zeletin, who propounded a highly ingenious though probably untenable theory of Rumania's historical development in his two studies, *Burghezia română, origina şi rolul ei istoric* (Bucarest, Cultura Naţională, 1925) and *Neoliberalismul* (Bucarest, Editura "Pagini agrare şi sociale," 1927). His quasi-Marxist approach was bitterly attacked by the Social Democrat, Şerban Voinea, in *Marxism oligarhic, contribuţie la problema desvoltarii capitaliste a României* (Bucarest, Editura I. Brănişteanu, 1926).

b. *National Peasants*

The best exposition of the principles of Rumanian populism is Constantin Stere's series of articles entitled "Socialdemocratism sau poporanism," *Viaţa românească* (August, 1907–April, 1908). Stere's views, somewhat modified, are also to be found in his pamphlet *Naţionalizarea industriei de petrol* (Bucarest, 1921). The issue between Marxism and populism is also examined in David Mitrany, "Marx vs. the Peasant," *London Essays in Economics: in Honour of Edwin Cannon*, eds. T. E. Gregory and H. Dalton (London, Routledge, 1927). J. Delevsky, "Les Idées des 'narodniki' russes," *Revue d'économie politique, 35* (1921), 432–462, gives a brief history of Russian populism and is a source frequently cited by Rumanian peasantist writers. A biting criticism of Rumanian populism is to be found in the essays of H. Sanielevici, collected as *Poporanismul reacţionar* (Bucarest, SOCEC, 1921). For a recent exposition of populism by a well-known Bulgarian politician see George M. Dimitrov, "Agrarianism," *European Ideologies. A Survey of Twentieth Century Political Ideas*, ed. Felix Gross (New York, Philosophical Library, 1948), pp. 396–451.

The most vivid and intelligent expressions of the radical agrarianism of the early Peasant party are Ion Mihalache's parliamentary speeches, which were published separately as political pamphlets: *Proectul legei de improprietarirea ţăranilor, intocmit de ţăranul I. Mihalache* (Bucarest, Tipografia "Lupta," 1920); *Dreptul ţăranilor la pământ, izlazuri, şi păduri* (Bucarest, Tipografia Berbecaru, 1922); and *Partidul Ţărănesc în politica ţărei* (Bucarest, 1925).

The move away from populism and toward a form of liberal capitalism is seen in the writings of Virgil Madgearu: *Ţărănismul* (Bucarest, "Reforma Socială," n.d.); "Doctrina Ţărănistă," in *Doctrinele partidelor politice; Revoluţia agrară şi evoluţia clasei ţărăneşti* (Bucarest, 1928); *Agrarianism—un discurs parlamentar* (Bucarest, Imprimeria Statului, 1927): *Rumania's New Economic Policy* (London, P. S. King, 1930); *La Politique économique extérieure de la Roumanie, 1927–1938*, Conférence Permanente des Hautes

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Études Internationales, xiie session, Mémoire roumaine, No. 1 (Paris, Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle, Société des Nations, 1939). 13

An attempt to unite peasantism with a revived conservatism was made by C. Rădulescu-Motru, *Țărănismul, un suflet și o politică* (Bucarest, Cultura Națională, 1924). While one may doubt the feasibility of this attempt, the essay is excellent in its portrayal of all the anomalies in Rumania's political life.

The modifications in the outlook of the Peasant party appear clearly in the successive programs of 1921, 1922, 1924, and 1926: *Proectul de program al Partidului Țărănesc din România* (Bucarest, "Viața românească," 1921); *Partidul Țărănesc, Programul și Statutele* (Bucarest, 1922); *Partidul Țărănesc, Programul general și Statutele* (Bucarest, 1925); and *Partidul Național-Țărănesc, Principiile programul și statutul* (Bucarest "Reforma Socială," 1926).

c. *The Carolist Era*

An "official" biography of King Carol by Baroness Helena von der Hoven, *King Carol of Romania* (London, Hutchinson, 1940), is of practically no value and shows little understanding of Rumanian politics. A more serious study, A. L. Easterman, *King Carol, Hitler, and Lupescu* (London, Gollancz, 1942), recognizes Carol's autocratic and arbitrary instincts but does not give him sufficient credit for his part in wrecking the parliamentary system. Easterman makes Antonescu, the Iron Guard, and the Germans the complete villains of the piece.

The most interesting, if also most exasperating, political economist of this period was Mihail Manoilescu, whose works are listed in Florin E. Manoliou, *Bibliographie des travaux du Professeur Mihail Manoilesco* (Bucarest, "Luceafarul," 1936). The earlier phases of Manoilescu's thought are represented in his article, "Neoliberalismul" in *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, and in his critique of peasantism: *Țărănism și democrație* (Bucarest, 1922). His most important study was translated into English as *The Theory of Protection and International Trade* (London, P. S. King, 1931). An expanded German edition, *Die nationalen Produktivkräfte und der Aussenhandel* (Berlin, 1937), included his rebuttals of the numerous criticisms of his theory of permanent protection.

A series of articles—obviously designed for foreign consumption—on the economic policy of the Carolist dictatorship appeared in several issues of *The Banker* (London): V. Dimitriuc, "Roumanian Exports and Agrarian Policy," *51* (July, 1939), 49–53; Valeriu Bulgariu, "Agrarian Policy in Roumania," *49* (March, 1939), 344–348; Mitița Constantinescu, "The Monetary and Credit Policy of Roumania," *44* (February, 1938), 183–189; C. Angelescu, "Banking Development in Roumania," *ibid.*, pp. 189–192; Eugene Savu, "The Financial Policy of Roumania," *ibid.*, pp. 193–194; G. Ionescu-Sișești, "Agriculture in Roumania," *ibid.*, pp. 197–201; Ch. Penesco-Kertsch, "Industry in Roumania," *ibid.*, pp. 206–209.

The Germans produced a mass of official and semi-official literature in the

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

113 course of their economic drive in the Balkans. One of the more important examples is Ernst Wagemann, *Der neue Balkan: altes Land—junge Wirtschaft* (Hamburg, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1939), a portion of which was translated as "The Pressure of Population as an Economic Force," *Weekly Report of the German Institute for Business Research*, Nos. 25/26 and 27/28 (June 29–July 14, 1939). Wagemann criticised the forced industrialization of the Balkan states and attempted to show that they would do better to develop their raw materials and let Germany provide the manufactured goods.

Although Grigore Gafencu's two books, *Prelude to the Russian Campaign*, trans. E. Fletcher-Allen (London, Frederick Muller, 1945), and *Last Days of Europe. A Diplomatic Journey in 1939*, trans. E. Fletcher-Allen (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1948), are chiefly concerned with diplomatic relations, they do provide some information on the last phase of the Carolist dictatorship. Also dealing with foreign relations before 1939 are two books by another Rumanian foreign minister, N. P. Comnène, *Preludi del grande dramma* (Rome, Edizioni Leonardo, 1947) and *I Responsabili* (Verona, Arnoldo Mondadori, 1949).

d. *The Fascists*

Codreanu's memoirs were published in German as Codreanu, *Eiserne Garde* (Berlin, Brunnen Verlag/Willi Bischoff, 1939). Codreanu's narrative stops at 1938, but the German edition includes some later information provided by members of the Guard. Klaus Charle, *Die Eiserne Garde* (Berlin-Vienna, Deutscher Rechtsverlag, 1939), is an enthusiastically pro-Guardist account of the movement. I. P. Vifor, *Doctrina fascismului român* (Bucarest, 1924), which contains the program of the ephemeral Fascia Națională Română, is of interest as an expression of an early imitation of Italian fascism. For a macabre account of the atrocities committed while the Iron Guardists were in power see "Blood Bath in Rumania," published by *The Record*, 4, Nos. 6–7, (New York, July–August, 1942).

Harald Laeuen, *Marschall Antonescu* (Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1943), provides an admiring biography of Germany's loyal ally. The first volume of an account of Antonescu's career by a former secretary, G. Barbul, *Mémorial Antonesco: Tome Premier, le IIIe Homme de l'Axe* (Paris, Editions de la Couronne, 1950), appeared too late to be used in this study.

e. *The Marxists*

Constantin Titel Petrescu's history of Rumanian socialism, *Socialismul în România* (Bucarest, Biblioteca Socialistă, n.d., *ca.* 1945), is valuable for its inclusion of party programs, resolutions, and speeches. It is very uneven in its treatment, however; over three-fourths of the book is devoted to the years before 1919, and the interwar period is covered superficially. Some useful information on the Rumanian socialist movement before the war and in the unsettled months after 1917 is given in L. Trotsky and Ch. Rakovsky, *Ocherki*

3: Roberts 5-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

politicheskoi Rumynii (Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo, 1922). The first half of the book consists of a collection of articles written by Trotsky while in Rumania in 1913; in the second half Rakovsky interprets the political situation of postwar Rumania. An account of the final absorption of Rumanian Social Democracy by the Communists may be found in Valentin Thoma, "Wie es zur Liquidierung des rumänischen Sozialismus kam," *Die Zukunft* (July, 1949). 173

There is relatively little reliable information on the history of the Rumanian Communist party, largely because the party was illegal during most of its existence. However, in the issues of the organs of the Comintern, *The Communist International* and *International Press Correspondence*, there are occasional directives to the Rumanian Communists as well as comments on their activities.

Some information on conditions in Rumania, though surprisingly little, is in the publications of the Red Peasant International: *Der Weltbund der Bauern: Der Gründung des Internationalen Bauern-Rates* (Berlin, 1924); Dr. Kazescu, "Die rumänische Bauernschaft und der Europäische Bauern-Kongress," *Bulletin zum Europäischen Bauern-Kongress*, No. 4 (Berlin, 1930), pp. 39–48; *Europas werktätige Bauern schreiten zur revolutionären Tat* (Berlin, 1930); N. L. Mecheriakov, *The Peasantry and the Revolution* (Berlin, 1927); Guido Miglioli, *Bauernnot und Hakenkreuz* (Berlin, Verlag des EBK, n.d.).

The International Agrarian Institute in Moscow published a periodical, *Agrarprobleme*, which occasionally had articles on agrarian conditions in the Balkans and in Rumania: B. Boschkowitsch, "Der revolutionäre Aufschwung auf dem Balkan," Band 4, Heft 3–4, (n.d., *ca.* 1931), pp. 151–157; Tatarow, "Die Agrarkrise in Rumänien," Band 4, Heft 2, pp. 44–80; S. Timow, "Wird Rumänien agrarsiert oder industrialisiert?" Band 2, Heft 2 (1929), pp. 310–346.

The outstanding Marxist thinker in Rumania was undoubtedly C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, whose book *Neviobăgia* (1st ed. 1910, 2d ed., Bucarest, Viața românească, n.d.) is still extremely valuable for an understanding of Rumania. During the Second World War the Communist Luereţiu Pătrăşcanu, until 1948 Minister of Justice in the Groza cabinet, wrote a trilogy of studies on Rumanian history and society: *Un Veac de frământări sociale, 1821–1907* (Bucarest, Cartea Rusă, 1945); *Problemele de bază ale României* (3rd ed., Bucarest, Editura de Stat, 1946); and *Sub trei dictaturi*, which has been translated into French as *Sous trois dictatures* (Paris, Editions Jean Vitiano, 1946). Although rigidly bound to the Marxist analysis, these studies are intelligently conceived and emphasize aspects of Rumanian life which are usually overlooked or concealed. It is doubtful however, whether Pătrăşcanu's intellectual communism can be identified with the outlook of the present regime.

Although the Ploughmen's Front was initially an independent agrarian movement, since 1944 it has been completely under the influence of the Communist party. The most detailed account of the Front is Gheorghe Micle

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

●113 *Răscoala pământului: Istoria luptelor politice ale țăranimii române, 1933–1945* (Bucarest, Editura Frontul Plugarilor, 1945).

There is no satisfactory history of the Bessarabian question, that prolonged source of conflict between Rumania and Russia. Communist and Soviet views are to be found in Ch. Rakovsky, *Rumyniya i Bessarabiya, k semiletiyu anneksii Bessarabii* (Moscow, Izdanie Litizdata N.K.I.D., 1925); *Bessarabia . . . the Roumanian Hell* (published by the British Section of the International Class War Prisoners Aid, London, n.d.); A. Dolnik, *Bessarabiya pod vlastyu rumynskikh boyar, 1918–1940 gg.* (Ogiz-Gospoditizdat, 1945); and Akademiya nauk Soyuza SSR, Institut Geografii Akademii nauk SSSR i Moldavskii Nauchno-Issledovatelskii Institut, *Moldavskaya SSR* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1947). For the Rumanian side see Charles Upson Clark, *Bessarabia: Russia and Roumania on the Black Sea* (New York, Dodd, Mead, 1927); Andrei Popovici, *The Political Status of Bessarabia* (published for the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, by Ransdell, Inc., Washington, D.C., 1931); and *Facts and Comments Concerning Bessarabia, 1812–1940, Compiled by a Group of Roumanian Press Correspondents* (London, 1941).

Events after August 23, 1944, have been described by a number of American foreign correspondents, some of whom have written books: William B. King and Frank O'Brien, *The Balkans, Frontier of Two Worlds* (New York, Knopf, 1947); George Moorad, *Behind the Iron Curtain* (London, Latimer House, 1947); and Reuben H. Markham, *Rumania under the Soviet Yoke* (Boston, Meador, 1949). The last is much the most extensive, shows intimate and long familiarity with Rumania, but is marred by the author's intense personal feelings. Robert Bishop and E. S. Crayfield, *Russia Astride the Balkans* (New York, Robert M. McBride, 1948), is also a work of reportage rather than analysis; the two authors were U. S. intelligence officers in Rumania.

A bitter indictment of the Groza regime has been prepared by a Rumanian group in exile in the United States: the Rumanian National Committee, *Suppression of Human Rights in Rumania* (Washington, D.C., September, 1949).

The Soviet view of events in Rumania in 1944–45 may be found in K. Dimitrov, "Agrarnyi vopros i agrarnaya reforma v Rumynii," *Mirovoe Khozyaistvo i Mirovoya Politika*, No. 6 (1945), pp. 15–19; and Ilya Ehrenburg's chapter on Rumania in *Dorogi Evropy* (Moscow, 1946).

PERIODICALS

The publications of the International Institute of Agriculture (Rome), especially the *International Review of Agriculture*, are quite useful, though most of the information on Rumania has an official character which often limits rather than increases its reliability. The organ of the Green (Prague) International, *M.A.B.* (*Mezinárodní Agrární Bureau*): *Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, contains a number of articles on Rumania in the 1920's. It is of value, too, in giving the general outlook of the eastern European

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

peasant parties. The publications of the International Labour Office, the *International Labour Review* and *Industrial and Labour Information* have occasional items on social and labor conditions in Rumania. The first issue of the *International Journal of Agrarian Affairs* (London) (October, 1939) was entirely devoted to a series of articles on surplus agricultural population. *The Slavonic and East European Review* (London) has several articles on Rumania during the interwar period. For the years since 1945 *East Europe* (London), a periodical hostile to the present regimes behind the iron curtain, provides a weekly chronicle of events in Rumania. Among the pro-Soviet periodicals the most authoritative is the Cominform organ, *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy,* now published in Bucarest.

Among Rumanian magazines and newspapers the following have been consulted: *Viaţa românească,* at one time the leading periodical, containing numerous articles on social, political, and philosophical questions; *Argus* and *Finanţe şi Industrie,* economic and commercial journals; the party organs: *Viitorul* and *L'Indépendance roumaine* (Liberal), *Dreptatea* (National-Peasant), *Libertatea* (Social Democrat), and *Scânteia* and *România Liberă* (Communist); and the formerly independent newspapers: *Universul, Timpul, Jurnalul de dimineaţa,* and *Semnalul.*

OTHER WORKS CONSULTED

a. *General or Well-known Works and Technical Aids*

Arndt, H. W. *The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen-Thirties.* Oxford University Press, 1944.

Baykov, Alexander. *The Development of the Soviet Economic System.* Cambridge University Press, 1946.

Beloff, Max. *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929–1941.* 2 vols., Oxford University Press, 1947–49.

Borkenau, Franz. *The Communist International.* London, Faber, 1938.

Byrnes, James F. *Speaking Frankly.* London; New York, Harper and Brothers, 1947.

Carr-Saunders, A. M. *World Population: Past Growth and Present Trends.* Oxford University Press, 1936.

Clark, Colin. *The Conditions of Economic Progress.* London, Macmillan, 1940.

Cohen, R. L. *The Economics of Agriculture.* Cambridge University Press, 1940.

Dareste, F. R., and P. *Les Constitutions modernes.* 4th ed., 6 vols., Paris, 1928–34.

David, Eduard. *Sozialismus und Landwirtschaft.* 2d ed., Leipzig, Quelle und Meyer, 1922.

Deutscher, I. *Stalin, a Political Biography.* Oxford University Press, 1949.

Dobb, Maurice H. *Soviet Economic Development since 1917.* London, Routledge and K. Paul, 1948.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

● 113 Fabian Society, International Research Section. *Hitler's Route to Bagdad.* London, G. Allen and Unwin, 1939.

Fischer, Louis. *Men and Politics, an Autobiography.* New York, Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1941.

Gunther, John. *Inside Europe.* London, Hamish Hamilton, 1936.

Hevesy, Paul de. *World Wheat Planning and Economic Planning in General.* Oxford University Press, 1940.

Hull, Cordell. *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull.* 2 vols., New York, Macmillan, 1948.

International Institute of Agriculture. *World Trade in Agricultural Products.* Rome, 1940.

Jasny, Naum. *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR.* Stanford, Stanford University, Food Research Institute, "Grain Economics Series," No. 5, 1949.

Keeton, George W., and Schlesinger, Rudolf. *Russia and Her Western Neighbors.* London, Jonathan Cape, 1942.

Lenin, V. I. *Selected Works.* 12 vols., London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1936–39.

Macartney, C. A. *Hungary and Her Successors: the Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences, 1919–1937.* Oxford University Press, 1937.

Marx, Karl. *Capital,* Vol. I, English trans. by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling. London, 1887. Vol. III, English trans. by Ernest Untermann. Chicago, 1909.

Mitrany, David. *The Effect of the War in Southeastern Europe.* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1936.

Mosely, Philip E., *Face to Face with Russia.* Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 70, July–August, 1948.

Owen, Lancelot A. *The Russian Peasant Movement, 1906–17.* London, King, 1937.

Robinson, Geroid Tanquary. *Rural Russia under the Old Regime.* New York, London, and Toronto, Longmans, Green, 1932.

Royal Institute of International Affairs. *World Agriculture, an International Survey.* Oxford University Press, 1932.

Schmidt, Paul. *Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, 1923–45; Erlebnisse des Chefdolmetschers im Auswärtigen Amt mit den Staatsmännern Europas.* Bonn, Athenäum-Verlag, 1949.

Sherwood, Robert E. *Roosevelt and Hopkins. An Intimate History.* New York, Harper and Brothers, 1948.

Stalin, J. *Voprosy Leninizma.* 11th ed., Ogiz, Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1945.

Stettinius, Edward R., Jr. *Roosevelt and the Russians: the Yalta Conference.* New York, Doubleday, 1949.

United Nations, Research and Planning Division, Economic Commission for Europe. *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948.* Geneva, 1949.

United States, Department of State. *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941.* Washington, D.C., 1948.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Von Franges, Otto. *Die Bevolkerungsdichte als Triebkraft der Wirtschaftspolitik der südosteuropäischen Bauernstaaten*, in *Kieler Vorträge, gehalten im Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel*, No. 59. Jena, 1939. 113

White, Leigh. *The Long Balkan Night*. New York, Scribner's, 1944.

b. *Miscellaneous Works on Rumania*

Académie Roumaine, *La Transylvanie*. Bucarest, 1938.

——. *La Dobroudja*. Bucarest, 1938.

Antim, St. *Chestiunea socială în România*. Bucarest, "La Roumanie," 1908.

Auboin, Roger. *Rapport annuel sur la situation financière et monétaire de la Roumanie*. Bucarest, 1935.

Baerlein, Henry, ed. *The Romanian Scene*. London, Muller, 1945.

Bussot, A. "Le Bloc des états agricoles de l'Europe centrale et orientale et son programme," *Revue d'économie politique*, 47 (1933), 1544–1558.

Calinescu, Armand. *Roumania, the Country of National Renaissance and of Royal Revolution*. Pamphlet in English, translated from a speech in the Chamber of Deputies, January 28, 1939.

Ciomac, Ion Luca. *Despre starile agrare din Transilvania sub regimul maghiar, şi cercetari asuprā situaţiei exploatarilor agricole după reforma agrară*. Bucarest, 1931.

Ciorıceanu, Georges D. *La Roumanie économique et ses rapports avec l'étranger de 1860 à 1915*. Paris, Marcel Giard, 1928.

Claudian, Ioan. *Alimentaţia poporului român în cadrul antropogeografiei şi istoriei economice*. Bucarest, Fundaţia "Regele Carol II," 1939.

Codrescu, Florin. *Essai de synthèse sur l'évolution du commerce extérieure de la Roumanie, 1918–1934*. Extract from the periodical, *Les Balkans*, Athens, 1934.

Colescu, L. *Progresele economice ale României îndeplenite sub domnia M.S. Regelui Carol I, 1866–1906*. Bucarest, 1907.

Dugdale, Mrs. Edgar. *The Hungaro-Rumanian Dispute. The Optants' Case before the League*. London, The Association for International Understanding, 1926.

Filitti, I. C. *Clasele sociale în trecutul românesc*. Bucarest, 1925.

Georgescu, C. C. *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie*. Paris, 1908.

Ghyka, Matila. *A Documented Chronology of Roumanian History from Pre-Historic Times to the Present Day*. Oxford, B. H. Blackwell, 1941.

Giannini, Amadeo. *La costituzione romena*. Rome, 1928.

——. *Le Vicende della Rumania, 1878–1940*. Milan, 1940.

Giurescu, C. *Despre boieri*. Bucarest, Cartea Românească, 1920.

Graf, O. P. *Die Industriepolitik Alt-Rumäniens und die Grundlagen der Industrialisierung Gross-Rumäniens*. Bucarest, 1927.

Hausknecht, Louis. *Politica impositară a României după răsboiu*. Cernăuţi, 1931.

Hoffmann, Walter. *Südost-Europa: Bulgarien-Jugoslavien-Rumänien*. Leipzig, 1932.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

● 13 Hoffmann, Walter. *Rumänien von Heute. Ein Querschnitt durch Politik, Kultur, und Wirtschaft.* 2d ed., Leipzig, 1942.

Issacenco, A. G. *La Roumanie inconnue.* Berne, 1917.

Jaszi, Oscar. "The Economic Crisis in the Danubian States," *Social Research* (February, 1935), pp. 98–116.

Lémonon, Ernest. "La Situation économique de la Roumanie, 1918–1928," *Journal des économistes* (March 15, 1931), pp. 264–273.

Leon, Gh. N., *Struktur und Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten der rumänischen Volkswirtschaft.* Jena, 1941.

Lovrin, C. D. *Rumania Today.* London, 1945.

Micşuinescu, Emil Gr. *Die rumänische Getreideausfuhr.* Nürnberg, 1914.

Mitrany, David. "The New Rumanian Constitution," *The Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law,* 3rd ser., *6,* Pt. 1 (February, 1924), 110–119.

Obedenare, M. G. *La Roumanie économique d'après les données les plus récentes.* Paris, Ernest Leroux, 1876.

Raducanu, Mircea I. *Die Genossenschaftsbewegung in Rumänien.* Dresden, 1941.

Rădulescu-Motru, C. *Cultura română şi politicanismul.* Bucarest, n.d.

Rambaud, Benoit. *La Question des fermiers généraux en France et à l'étranger* (Paris, 1913).

Reithinger, Anton. "Grossdeutschland und Südosteuropa im Lichte der Statistik," *Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv, 29* (1939), 129–139.

Rumanian Democratic Committee. *How Rumania Was Surrendered: Statements Made by M. Juliu Maniu, Leader of the National Peasant Party, and M. Constantin Bratianu, Leader of the National Liberal Party.* London, Favil Press, 1941.

Rumania, Ministry of Agriculture. *La Roumanie, 1866–1906.* Bucarest, SOCEC, 1907.

Rumer, Willy. *Die Agrarreformen der Donau-Staaten.* Innsbrück, 1927.

Schiff, Walter. *Die grossen Agrarreformen seit dem Kriege.* Vienna, 1926.

Sollohub, W. A. "The Conversion of Agricultural Debts in Roumania," *The Economic Journal, 42* (December, 1932), 588–594.

Strat, George. *Industria românească în cadrul economiei europene.* Bucarest, "Remus Cioflec," 1945.

Tătărescu, G. *Quatre années de gouvernement, 1933–1937, exposé fait devant le comité central du Parti National-Liberal le 1 novembre 1937.* Bucarest, 1937.

Thomas, P. J. *Les Roumains nos alliés?* Paris, F. Sorlot, 1938.

Tilea, V. V. *Iuliu Maniu, der Mann und das Werk.* Hermannstadt, 1927.

Union des Chambres de Commerce et d'Industrie de Roumanie. *La Roumanie économique en 1926.* Bucarest, F. Göbl et Fils, n.d.

Vararu, M. *Le Métayage en Roumanie.* Paris, M. Giard et E. Brière, 1915.

Waldeck, R. G. *Athene Palace Bucarest: Hitler's New Order Comes to Rumania.* London, Constable, 1943.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

Year-Book of Agricultural Co-operation, 1930 (London), "Rumania: the State as Co-operator," pp. 404–428. 113

Zăroni, Romulus. *De ce nu trebue să fie plugarul român fascist.* Cluj, Viața Creștină, n.d.

page 400 is blank.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Constantinesco, M.: L'Evolution de la Propriété Rurale et la Réforme Agraire en Roumanie (1925).

Cvijic, J.: La Péninsule Balcanique (1918).

East, W. G.: The Union of Moldavia and Wallachia, 1859 (1929).

Evans, I. L.: The Agrarian Revolution in Roumania (1924).

Iorga, N.: A History of Roumania (1925).

Madgearu, V.: Rumania's New Economic Policy (1930).

Martonne, E. de: La Valachie (1902).

Mihailescu, V.: Les Grandes Régions Morphologiques de la Roumanie (Buletinul Societatii Regale Romane de Geografie, vol. 50, 1931).

Mihailescu, V.: Une Carte des Principaux Types d'Habitat Rurale en Roumanie (B.S.R.G., vol. 46, 1927).

Mitrany, D.: The Land and the Peasant in Rumania (1930).

Opreanu, S.: Le Pays des Sicules (Travaux de l'Institut de Géographie de l'Université de Cluj, vol. III, 1929).

Oprescu, G.: Peasant Art in Roumania ("Studio," Autumn Number, 1929).

Parvan, V.: Dacia (1928).

Pittard, E.: La Roumanie (1917).

Seton-Watson, R. W.: A History of the Roumanians from Roman Times to the Completion of Unity (1934).

Wachner, H.: Judet Ciuc, samt Toplita und der Muresenge (Travaux de l'Institut de Géographie de l'Université de Cluj, vol. III, 1929).

[Page 80]

THE ARGEŞ DISTRICT

101 133 THE EXTENDED ROUMANIA, that was organised after 1918 includes the old areas of Wallachia, Dobrogea, Moldavia, Bessarabia, Bukovina, Transylvania and Timişoara, of varied allegiance before the World War, but all containing from early historic times onwards a proportion of Roumanian-speaking people. Transylvania is the mountain bastion with the eastern Carpathians as its eastern boundary, the southern Carpathians or Transylvanian Alps as its southern edge, and the western Roumanian Carpathians or Bihor, etc., mountains on its western flank. Its mountainous frame and its hilly interior give it a very decidedly upland character, even if the Olt, the Maroş and the Szamoş, which drain it, have considerable systems of tributary valleys. Outside the bastion to the east Bukovina and Moldavia slope down to the great plain of eastern Europe, of which Bessarabia forms the flank west of the Dniestr. Behind the bastion to the west Timişoara stretches down to the Tisza, and forms the south-eastern flank of the middle Danubian plain. Outside the bastion on the south is Wallachia, sloping down towards the lower Danube, while beyond the considerable barrier formed by the lowest portion of the Danube and to the south-east, is the low plateau area of the Dobrogea.

[113] IN A PREVIOUS study we gave in some measure a picture of rural life in the eastern Carpathians near the border between Transylvania and Moldavia, where the mountains barely reach 1,900 m. (say 6,200 feet), and the highest land is often in great expanses of pasture with deep valleys cut by the rival drainage systems of the two sides, which are separated by a number of passes that may indent the watershed. In the eastern Carpathians Roumanians and Szeklers, respectively Uniate and Roman Catholic, live in adjacent villages, and the former, especially, send flocks and herds to the highland pastures.

121 THIS STUDY is intended to deal more especially with what is thought to be a typical area of rural Wallachia, having an almost entirely Roumanian population attached to the Orthodox Church and living under circumstances differing

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

113

BIBLIOGRAPHY

GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS

HERSENI TRAIAN: L'Organisation Pastorale en Roumanie. (Archives pour la science et la réforme sociales, 1936.)

MARTONNE, E. DE: La Vie Pastorale et la Transhumance dans les Carpathes Méridionales. (Zu Friederich Ratzels Gedächtnis, 1904.)

FLEURE, H. J. and PELHAM, R. A. (Editors): Eastern Carpathian Studies (1936).

DE MARTONNE, E.: La Valachie (Maps and Illustrations) (1902).

MADGEARU, V.: Rumania's New Economic Policy (1930).

HISTORY

CVIJIC, J.: *La Péninsule Balkanique (Paris, 1918).

EVANS, I. L.: The Agrarian Revolution in Roumania (excellent summary) (1924).

IORGA, N.: *A History of Roumania (T. Fisher Unwin, 1925).

PARVAN, V.: Dacia (outline of early civilisations of Carpatho-Danubian country. Illustrated. 1928).

SETON-WATSON, R. W.: A History of the Roumanians from Roman Times to the Completion of Unity (Cambridge U.P., 1934).

SOCIAL AND GENERAL

HIELSCHER AND GOGA: Rumania: Landscape, Buildings, National Life (F. A. Brockhaus, Leipzig, 1933).

OPRESCU, GEO.: *Peasant Art in Roumania. Fully illustrated (1929).

PITTARD, E.: La Roumanie. Illustrated. (Excellent for race types and peasant costumes.) (1917).

Stahel de Capitani: Rumanien (1925).

*Books marked * can be borrowed from the Le Play Society's Library. Postage must be refunded; books must be returned within fourteen days of receipt.

NOTE.—Should these books be unobtainable at any school, public, or other libraries, ask the librarian to apply to the NATIONAL CENTRAL LIBRARY, Malet Place, London, W.C.1, for the loan of these books, mentioning that you are a member of the Le Play Society's Group.

505 648 It is a cardinal principle of the Statute that the customs dues levied on goods must not be higher than the duties levied at frontier stations of the country concerned. The cost of improvements [651] was to be met by navigation dues, these being assessed on the tonnage of ships, and not based on the goods transported.

Bratislava was fixed as the Headquarters for the Commission for the first five years, and it was laid down that thereafter, for five-year periods, other Danube towns were to be selected in rotation.

Since the outbreak of this war, Germany has virtually controlled the Danube, has abolished the C.I.D., and set up the "Consulting Committee for Danube Affairs above Brăila."

C.E.D. (European Danube Commission)

This Commission was constituted under the [503] Treaty of Paris in 1856 with Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey as members, for the express purpose of dredging the mouths of the Danube below Isaccea, and leaving the various channels free from all obstructions to navigation. It was apparently expected that this preliminary task would take two years, and the life of the Commission was originally fixed for that period; but, by a series of later treaties, it was kept in being up to the outbreak of the Great War.

In 1918 the Central Powers set up their own Danube Commission, membership naturally being restricted to those Powers and their allies.

By the Treaty of Versailles the European Commission was reconstituted with Great Britain, France, Italy and Rumania as provisional members; and by the Convention of July 21st, 1921, was placed on a more permanent basis. The provisional membership of the four countries was confirmed and all the powers of the original Commission restored. A proviso added that any nation whose commercial interests in that part of the river warranted their being represented on the Commission could be admitted. In fact, no country was admitted under this proviso until the inclusion of Germany in August, 1938.

In August, 1938, an arrangement was signed at Sinaia relative to the exercise of the Powers of the C.E.D. In effect the Powers of the Commission were transferred to the Rumanian Government who were to set up a "Maritime Danube Board." This board, under Article 5, was "to be responsible for the preparation and execution of plans for works on the maritime Danube and at the mouths for levying dues and dispensing of the yield thereof."

In September, 1940, Germany summoned a conference at Vienna for the purpose of regulating Danube shipping anew, and eliminating Great Britain and France from membership of the Commission.

[113] [For further information see *La Commission Européenne du Danube et son Œuvre de* 1856 *à* 1931 (Paris 1931); Treaty of Versailles, Articles 331-339, 346-353; Treaty Series No. 38 (1939) Cmd. 6068, and Treaty Series 38 (1939), Cmd. 6069.]

E. TELECOMMUNICATIONS

I. Pre-War Situation

1. Telegraph and Telephones

206 The telegraph system of Rumania was controlled by the Ministry of Communications, the telephone by the Societatea Română de Telefoane, a subsidiary of the International Telephone and

[45b]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 ED1 Rumania ED1

FOREWORD

By LORD MESTON

President of the Le Play Society

121
114

LET US ASK OURSELVES—students, busy workers, travellers, ordinary newspaper-reading stay-at-homes, whoever we are —what do we know about Roumania? Extraordinarily little, would be the honest answer of most of us. We know that Roumania was our ally in the Great War, and picked up some territory thereby. We believe that her language is nearer to Latin than any other European vernacular. We remember that her map is dotted with romantically-named provinces—Bessarabia, Moldavia, Transylvania and others. But there we halt. Encyclopaedias would tell us more, but encyclopaedias are dull things. Here is a little book without a dull page, which nevertheless tells us a very great deal.

It is the work of members of the Le Play Society, who employed a holiday tour in seeing Roumania for themselves. Trained observers most of them, they brought back a collection of fresh, first-hand studies of the country and its life. They show us the land as it now is, built up from its geological past. They tell us of the peoples who have dwelt in it since pre-historic times; of the tribes which have poured backwards and forwards across it; of the folk who inhabit it now, of their usages, their faiths and their social life. We learn about the agriculture of the land, its industries, its mineral resources, and its economic limits. Its trees and flowers and cottage gardens are described; its climate, and the gala dress of its peasantry. There are no politics, but one gets a glimpse of how political change has reacted on rural life and prosperity.

Running through all the various studies, and linking them together, is a thread which each of the workers recognises as of the essence of the pattern. That thread is the special interest of the geographer in all that he sees, his capacity

121
114

for tracking the constant inter-relation between Man and Nature. Without claiming, as has been claimed, that Geography is the oldest of the sciences, he follows its guidance in the sure confidence that it will explain the life and activities of a country as no other single science can do. Hence his affection for "regional studies," such as this of Roumania. Hence his ready appreciation of much in a country's anthropology, sociology, economics, which would otherwise be isolated and undigested knowledge.

This is the *raison d'être* of the Le Play Society. It has now produced a series of these small handbooks, all based on original expert observation on the spot, clothing the dry bones of the old geographies with the flesh and blood of life and its story. As contributions to our knowledge of the world, and as companions to the more formal text-books, they ought to be of special value to teachers and students; and they may safely be used as models for other regional work, whether on a similar or on a less ambitious scale. Those who find the handbooks helpful may wish to make the closer acquaintance of the Society and its methods.

There is another aspect of the Society's work which appeals strongly to me personally. Having watched for years the *va et vient* at Geneva, where men and women of different nations are constantly mixing in work and in pleasure, I cannot overstate the value of kindly human intercourse as a solvent of international problems. Barriers have to be broken down before mankind get to know and understand their fellows: and there is nothing for levelling barriers like crossing frontiers. Friendly excursions such as those of the Le Play groups, intent only on studying and understanding the ways of other peoples and their problems, can do great good. To show interest in other people's lives is surely to generate mutual sympathy; and mutual sympathy is the only sure foundation for world peace. All success therefore to the Le Play Society and its members.

MESTON

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

p. 418

THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF RUMANIA

642
829

The new Constitution of the People's Republic of Rumania of September, 1952 will in all probability become a landmark in the constitutional history

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

of the Soviet world. It is the first document to reconcile the conflict hitherto existing between the satellite constitutions and two Soviet official theories: the one, relating to the essence and character of the "New Democracies," emphasizes in its latest version the substantial identity of the political and economic structures of the two types of "Soviet" and "popular" democracies; the other, the Soviet theory on constitutional law, supports the thesis that there can be no divergence between constitution and society in a "socially advanced and progressive" state. Previous satellite constitutions, however, in contradiction to Soviet legal theory that the constitution is a mirror reflecting changing reality—the legal crystallization of existing arrangements—did not correspond to the fundamental changes occurring in the state. 642 829

The new Rumanian Constitution,[1] however, assumes to reflect the enormous transformations that have taken place in the political and socio-economic life of the country since March, 1948, when the first Constitution of the People's Republic of Rumania was adopted. In the interval, the means of production, transportation, and banking have been nationalized; the "socialist sector" of agriculture has been widened by the ever-growing influence of the state through the establishment of state farms ("sovchozi") and tractor stations; collectivization of land has been consistently pursued through a policy aiming at the elimination of the "kulak" elements and the support of the lower and middle strata of the peasantry; two monetary reforms have completely changed the financial status of the population—while the leu has been stabilized and pegged to the ruble, the people have been deprived of their savings; the structure and functions of the central and local governmental agencies and of the judiciary has gradually developed along Soviet lines; the opposition has been eliminated and the rank-and-file of the Communist Party purged of "unreliable" or "deviationist" elements. 642 178

The new Constitution, as a whole, very closely approximates to its Soviet prototype. While the Constitution of 1948—advanced as it was at the time from the Soviet legal point of view—preserved some outward manifestations of "bourgeois constitutionalism," particularly in its technique and its neo-latin legal style, the framers of the new Constitution carefully avoided 642

[1] The new Constitution of the People's Republic of Rumania was adopted by the Grand National Assembly on September 24, 1952. It differed little in substance from the original Draft submitted to the Assembly (March 27, 1952) by the Constitutional Commission headed by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, President of the Council of Ministers and Secretary-General of the United Workers' (Communist) Party. Out of the 18,836 "suggestions for amendments" offered by the population, only 34 were accepted. Of these 28 were primarily editorial, 2 changed the composition of the Council of Ministers, one stipulated the tax-levying authority of the Grand National Assembly, and one provided for the inclusion of the initials RPR (Rumanian People's Republic) in the country's emblem. Two amendments, however, were more significant. One eradicated the peasantry's personal property rights, granted in the Draft, to the land and farm implements which they brought into the collectives; the other, seeking to dissipate the democratic world's allegations that the country had obviously become a "Soviet province," purports to establish the principle of complete sovereignty by the inclusion of the provision that Rumania is a "unitary, sovereign, and independent" state. 642

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

642 these "antiquated" forms and sancrosanctly adopted the constitutional tenets of Stalinism.[2]

Compared to the earlier document the new Constitution contains certain features which seem to corroborate the complete Sovietization of the country. In fact, were it not for political expediency in the field of foreign affairs, the incorporation of the People's Republic of Rumania into the USSR as a constituent member would be only a matter of sheer formality, necessitating merely the amending of the USSR Constitution.

[648] Short of this final step, however, the new Rumanian Constitution provides, in an almost unique manner in constitutional law, for the freezing of Rumania's foreign policy by incorporating in the text friendship and alliance with the USSR. Whereas the former Constitution completely failed to mention the USSR, the present document refers to the Soviet Union and the Red Army not less than five times. The USSR is depicted as the liberator of the country, whose friendship ensures "the independence, state sovereignty, development, and flourishing" of Rumania (Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Introductory Chapter and Article 3).

[565] The basic features of the new society are outlined in Chapter I. It defines the People's Republic of Rumania as a "state of the working people of town and countryside" (Article 1). The political foundation of the state is the "alliance of the working class with the working peasantry . . . in which the leading role is held by the working class" (Article 2). Thus, for the first time in a Rumanian constitution, the preponderance of the working class is formally acknowledged. Furthermore, the central strategic position of the Communist Party and its implicit identification with the state is, as in the USSR, legally declared (Article 86). In fact, notwithstanding the discrepancies existing between the constitutions of the people's republics, their main difference from the Stalin Constitution has thus far concerned the legal position of the Party. Whereas Article 126 of the USSR Constitution openly refers to the Party as the vanguard in "the struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system," the satellite constitutions typically make no mention of its role. The Hungarian Constitution of 1949, which until lately was considered as the most advanced, faintly refers to it in Article 56. In reference to the right of organizing, this Article asserts that the state "in fulfilling its tasks . . . bases itself . . . on the working class, led by its *advanced guard* (emphasis supplied) and supported by the democratic unity of the whole people." Even the new Polish Constitution of 1952 fails to acknowledge the exclusive role of the Communist Party. Although the provisions of Article 72 have merely theoretical importance, as

665
642

642 [2] In fact, all component chapters of the Constitution proper—the Social Structure, the Supreme Organ of State Power, the Organs of State Administration, the Local Organs of State Power, the Courts and the Prosecutor's Office, the Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens, the Electoral System, the Arms, Flag and Capital of the Rumanian People's Republic and the Procedure for Amending the Constitution—have an equivalent in the Soviet Constitution. Indeed, some of the articles have been copied verbatim.

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

in practice no open opposition is permitted in Poland, they nevertheless "legalize" the existence of other political organizations. 665 642

The constitutional legalization of the Communist Party's exclusive control of state power in Rumania is based on the contention that with the complete eradication of the active opposition in the country the Party no longer needs to hide under the paraphernalia of tactical secrecy. The Party's "legal" control of the state apparatus is assured by its exclusive right to nominate candidates in the elections of deputies to the Grand National Assembly (Article 100). This control is further facilitated by the provisions of the new Electoral Law restricting the right of certain groups of people considered inimical to the regime to participate in the national elections. In this respect, the 1936 Constitution of the USSR (Article 135) is more liberal; it removed all discriminatory provisions—religious, economic, and political—formerly applied against non-Bolsheviks. This distinction is based on the supposition that, unlike the USSR, Rumania as well as the other popular republics, advanced as they are, are still in the presocialistic stage of development, which necessitates an incessant waging of the class-struggle against the "enemies of the working class."

Theoretically, the people exercise their power through duly elected organs, the Grand National Assembly and the People's Councils. These, in turn, appoint the necessary administrative and judiciary bodies, the Presidium, the Council of Ministers, the higher echelon of the judiciary, and the Executive Committees of the People's Councils respectively. Though the constitutional theory of exclusive legislative power in the Grand National Assembly is constantly maintained, Soviet and satellite legislative history reveals the preponderance of the Council of Ministers. While the Council is formally appointed by, and theoretically subordinate to, the Grand National Assembly, its members in reality are chosen by the Central Committee of the United Workers' (Communist) Party from among its leading functionaries. The primary function of the Council of Ministers is to effectuate the policies of the Party through the vast bureaucratic apparatus it controls; that of the Grand National Assembly is the ratification of governmental decrees. 642

Justice in the People's Republic of Rumania, according to the new Constitution, is administered by the Supreme Court, the Regional Courts, the People's Courts, and the Special Courts. Their main function is the defense of the political regime and the protection of communal property and of the rights of citizens (Article 65). Unless otherwise provided for by law, all judicial cases are tried with the participation of people's assessors (Article 66). [692]

The supreme supervisory power over the observance of law by all central and local governmental organs of state power and administration as well as by all officials and citizens is vested in the Procurator General of the Rumanian People's Republic (Article 73). He is appointed by the Grand National Assembly for a term of five years, and he in turn, appoints his deputies and the procurators of the local units for a term of four years (Article 74). Whereas the organs of the Procurator's Office are independent of all local governmental 693 642

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

693 agencies, being subordinate only to the Procurator General, the latter is
642 responsible to the Grand National Assembly, and in the interim between its sessions, to the Presidium (Article 75).

[671] The powers and functions of the Procurator General are specified by Law No. 6 of June 2, 1952, concerning the "Setting up and Organization of the Procuratura of the Rumanian People's Republic." The Procurator General has the right to take part, "with a consultative vote," in the meetings of the Presidium and of the Council of Ministers (Article 4). He is empowered to see to it that the decisions and rules issued by the central and local agencies of state power and administration conform with the laws of the country. Charged with the administration of justice, he supervises the activities of the agencies of penal investigation; he may ask for the dossier at any stage of the investigation, and has the right to "issue compulsory instructions with regard to the development of penal investigation and inquiry and to be present at any act of penal investigation or to carry it out himself" (Article 7, Paragraph a).

642 The Supreme Court, whose chief function is the supervision of the judicial
692 activities of all the courts (Article 72), is elected by the Grand National Assembly for a term of five years (Paragraph 1 of Article 67). The judges, theoretically independent and subject only to the law (Article 70), and the people's assessors are elected in accordance with the provisions of a special law (Paragraph 2 of Article 67). All judicial proceedings are conducted in the Rumanian language, with special provisions for the use of other languages in areas inhabited by compact groups of other nationalities or minorities. Persons not knowing the language in which the judicial proceedings are conducted are constitutionally guaranteed the right to acquaint themselves with the material of the case and the privilege to use their own language in the summation of their case (Article 68).

Unlike the Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme Tribunal of the People's Republic of Rumania, like its Soviet counterpart, has no power of constitutional interpretation and is more of an auxiliary than an independent branch of government.

177. The constitutional provisions regarding the administration of justice, how-
69 ever "progressive" they may sound, conceal the true nature of the Marxist-
692 Leninist concept of justice, which has been adopted by the People's Republic of Rumania as well as by the other countries in the Soviet orbit. The modern principles of penal law ("*nullum crimen sine lege; nulla poena sine lege*") applied and observed in all civilized countries, have been replaced by the concept of "class-justice." Marxist doctrinaires assert that the purpose of "proletarian class justice" is the maintenance of the regime of the dictatorship of the working class and the complete elimination of all "reactionary" and "anti-democratic" elements.

Although the principle of "class-justice" has not been embodied in the two Rumanian constitutions framed under the regime of popular democracy, it nevertheless has found clear expression in Law No. 5 passed by the Grand

National Assembly on June 2, 1952, concerning the "Organization of the Judicature." Article 1 of the Law emphatically states that the function of the judiciary is the defense of the socio-economic structure of the state and of the rights and interests of state institutions and organizations. Furthermore, it is emphasized that the aim of the judiciary is the "education" of the citizens "in the spirit of devotion to the fatherland and in the spirit of the construction of socialism" (Article 2). 177 69 692

The people's assessors perform in practice a much greater function in judicial proceedings than those specified by the Constitution. The Minister of Justice is authorized to detail them from one court to the other whenever circumstances require. Thus, there are actually special teams of "people's judges" which the Ministry of Justice can use in accordance with the political interests of the Party. 692

Article 9 of Law No. 5 of 1952 also authorizes the courts to hear cases outside their seats if this is required "to fulfil the educational purpose of justice." Furthermore, hierarchically superior courts may take away from subordinate courts any case "in order to hear it themselves or have it heard by another court."

The required impartiality of judges is furthermore impaired by limitations imposed by the electoral laws on the right to participate in the election of people's judges. The privilege is restricted to the "democratic" elements only (Article 13, Paragraph 7, of Law No. 5). This is coupled with the provisions confining the nomination of candidates to the United Workers' (Communist) Party or to its affiliated mass organizations (Article 13, Paragraph 1). [666]

In discussing the new role of justice and law, Vasilescu-Alba, a jurist of the Rumanian People's Republic, asserted that "all legal rules, being the expression of the will of the working class, must be understood and interpreted in the light of the class struggle." Justice is thus "an executive organ of the will of the working class." Positive law, when in disagreement with this principle, must make room for the "legal conscience of the proletariat."[3] [565]

The fundamental rights and duties of citizens are enumerated in a special chapter. The primacy of social rights over individual rights is, as in the USSR, both functional and political.[4] Most of the rights and freedoms stipulated by the Constitution are either programmatic, circumscribed by escape clauses, or outright illusory. Thus, for instance, the provision relating to freedom of the press, speech, and assembly, as stated by Article 85, (a word-by-word replica of Article 125 of the Soviet Constitution of 1936), emphatically denies 641

[3] "Statul Poliţienesc" Cronica Românească, October 1, 1950, p. 25.

[4] Professor Boris Mirkine-Guetzevitch, while recognizing the dictatorial character of all the constitutions in the Soviet sphere, makes nevertheless a distinction between the declarations of rights of the Soviet constitutions and those of the satellite constitutions. According to Professor Mirkine, whereas the declarations of the People's Republics establish the "functional" primacy of social rights over individual rights, those of the Soviet republics establish "political" primacy. See Boris Mirkine-Guetzevitch, Les Constitutions Européennes, 2 vol. Paris, 1951.

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 EDl Rumania EDl

641 the right and freedom of citizens to write, publish, or otherwise express their views, except such as are in accord with the given party-line. For the exercise of this right, the state places at the disposal of the "working classes and their organizations, printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets (and) communication facilities." Freedom of speech is furthermore restricted by the provisions of the Law for the Defense of Peace, enacted on December 15, 1950. Article 2 of this Law specifically prohibits "propaganda inciting to war, the spreading of tendentious or invented news, of a nature to serve the warmongers, etc. . . ."

[204] Freedom of the press and publication is likewise nonexistent. Two directorates attached to the Council of Ministers are charged with complete supervision over the press, publications of any sort, and their distribution. The Directorate of the Press and Printed Matter, established on May 23, 1949 (Decree No. 218) "authorizes the publication of all printed matter;" the General Directorate of Publishing, Graphic Arts Industry, Book and Press Distribution, established on March 16, 1950 (decree No. 62), "controls the output of publishing houses from the point of view of contents and form." The Communist press is furthermore restricted to the services of the AGERPRESS (the Rumanian Press Agency) which by virtue of Decree No. 217 of May 23, 1949, is the only agency permitted to receive and transmit news. Aside from the nationalization of all printing presses, a governmental decision (Decision No. 69 of the Ministry of the Interior, July 1, 1950) requires the registration with the militia of all hand printing presses, duplicating machines, and "materials needed for the reproduction of printed matter," owned by individuals or associations.

[575] Freedom of assembly is similarly controlled. Excepting the Communist-controlled mass organizations, viz., public organizations, co-operative societies, youth and women's organizations, etc. (Article 86), no independent organization or association is permitted. Anyone attempting to organize or participate in such an organization is liable to prosecution by virtue of Article 86 of the Constitution, prohibiting the organization of or the participation in associations of a "fascist" or "anti-democratic" character. Such participation would furthermore entail "plotting against the internal and external security" of the state, an offense punishable by death under Article 1 of the Law for Punishing Certain Crimes Which Endanger the Security of the State of January 19, 1949.

641 461 The right to work is guaranteed by the "socialist transformation" of the economy and the "elimination of the possibility of economic crises and the abolition of unemployment" (Article 77). The right to rest and leisure is ensured by the reduction of the working hours to eight in factories and offices and to less in the more arduous trades.[6] This right is supplemented by

[6] The constitutional provisions relating to the reduction of working hours are puzzling in the light of the introduction of the piece-work system and norms of production (Labor Code of May 20, 1950) and the adoption of the Soviet model of "Stachanovism" and "voluntary labor."

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

the establishment of rest-homes, sanatoria, and cultural establishments (Article 78). The right to maintenance in old age and in case of sickness or disability is ensured by the development of social insurance and free medical service (Article 79). The right to education is ensured by universal, compulsory, and free elementary education and by the system of state scholarships awarded to deserving students (Article 80).[6] Equality of rights in all spheres of economic, political, and cultural activity is guaranteed to all citizens irrespective of their nationality, sex, or race. Any transgression of these provisions by the manifestation of race-hatred, chauvinism, or discrimination is punishable by law (Article 81).[7]

Some distinction was made at the beginning with regard to the German ethnic group, which had actively collaborated with Nazi Germany. The original decision to expel the Germans from the country, however, was officially changed in December, 1948, when the Rumanian Communist Party decided to replace the denunciation of the German minority as a whole and encourage instead the class struggle within its ranks. The resolution of the Party maintained that the "struggle against their own bourgeoisie . . . (would) open a new perspective to the German working population of Rumania, working alongside the Rumanian people and other nationalities."[8]

Whereas at the beginning Zionism enjoyed a tremendous popularity and even received latent, if not active, support from the Communist-dominated government during the Jewish-Anglo-Arab disturbances in Palestine, the above quoted resolution on the national question also declared:

> "Zionism of any color is a political nationalist and reactionary movement of the Jewish bourgeoisie, which tries to isolate the Jewish working people from the other peoples and to hinder them in their struggle against capitalism in the ranks of the anti-imperialist camp."

Notwithstanding the legal and constitutional provisions relating to the defense of the rights of nationalities and minorities,[9] the official policies of the Communist Party in regard to these questions have been based on the tenets of Leninism-Stalinism. While the development of national cultures and the use of national languages in all the fields of cultural and political endeavors are encouraged, the guiding principle is that of "socialism." "Na-

---

[6] The system of education underwent drastic changes. See "The Perversion of Education in Rumania" published by the Rumanian National Committee, Washington, D.C., July, 1950.

[7] See Law No. 86 of February 7, 1945 (Statute for Nationalities) and Law No. 630 of August 6, 1945, in the Yearbook on Human Rights for 1946, United Nations, (1947) 248–49 and 249–51, respectively.

[8] La Roumanie Nouvelle, Bucharest, No. 14, December 30, 1948.

[9] As an apparent concession to the Hungarian minority in Rumania, the Constitution also provides for the establishment of a Magyar Autonomous Region (Articles 19–21) in the territory inhabited by compact Magyar and Székely population, including the districts of Ciuc, Gheorgheni, Odorhei, Reghin, Sangiorgiu de Padure, Sft. Gheorghe, Targu-Mures, Targu-Secuesc and Toplita.

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

641 563 tional culture" from the Leninist-Stalinist point of view is a culture *national only in form* and *socialist in content* and aims at the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat.[10]

In fact, this principle has been legally formulated in Paragraph (j) of Article 17 of the new Rumanian Constitution according to which the state

> "ensures the development of the culture of the Rumanian people and of the culture of the national minorities, *socialist in content, national in form.*" (emphasis supplied)

641 [563] Women are given equal rights with men in all spheres of cultural, economic, or political activities. The institution of marriage and the family is protected by the state, which grants aid to mothers of large families and unmarried mothers (Article 83). Freedom of conscience and religious worship is guaranteed. The school is separated from the church; except for the training of the personnel of the religious denominations, no congregation may open or maintain [798] institutions of general study (Article 84). The constitutional provisions relating to freedom of conscience are rendered practically meaningless by virtue of Decree No. 177, Establishing General Regulations for Religious Cults, of August 3, 1948, and the Law on the Organization of the Ministry of Cults, of February 5, 1949. According to the Decree, all religious cults must be recognized by the Presidium, which must approve the statute of organization of the respective cult. The Ministry of Cults, the organ through which the Party exercises its control over religious denominations, is empowered to "supervise and control all religious cults and their institutions, and the special religious education for the training of all personnel of religious cults, the property and funds of any nature belonging to cults, as well as to confirm (or deny) the appointment of the entire permanent and temporary staff of religious cults, and to act as intermediary for relations and exchanges of information between cults in the country and abroad" (Article 1 of the Law for the Organization of the Ministry of Cults). The implementation of these provisions has resulted in the unequivocal subserviency of the cults to the regime.[11]

641 The inviolability of the home, the privacy of correspondence (Article 88) and of the citizen is guaranteed. No person may be placed under arrest without the decision of a court or "of the procurator" (Article 87). This assurance of the inviolability of the person is subject to the exclusive privilege of the Party or of its affiliated organizations to nominate candidates in the election of judges and the arresting power of the Prosecutor General, which is independent of the courts. Since there can be no writ of habeas corpus against the Procurator General—always a loyal servant of the Party—it evidently follows that extrajudicial arrest of any individual is within his discretion (see Article 8 of Law No. 6 of June 2, 1952).

Hand-in-hand with the rights enumerated above, the Constitution specifies

---

[10] J. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (1942) 207.

[11] For details see "Persecution of Religion in Rumania" published by the Rumanian National Committee, Washington, D. C., 1949.

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

the following duties of the citizens. It is the duty of every citizen to: abide by the constitution and the laws in force; safeguard and develop public socialist property; maintain labor discipline; actively contribute to the strengthening of the power of people's democracy; further the economic and cultural advancement of the country (Article 90); serve in the Armed Forces (Article 91); and defend the fatherland (Article 92). 641

The only international connotation in the Constitution is the provision of a "right of asylum" accorded to "foreign citizens persecuted for defending the interests of the working people" (Article 89).

Whatever the merits or shortcomings of this Constitution, it should be borne in mind that a "people's democracy," like the Soviet state, is not a legal state in the true sense of the word. Such constitutions are not truly fundamental laws, in the sense that they do not define or limit the powers of the state and protect rights of the citizens against arbitrary governmental actions. They are not based upon a compromise embodied in rules of law to which all citizens, irrespective of their ideological conceptions or political affiliations, are equally subject. In Marxian terminology, the Soviet state (like that of the People's Republics) is a "class-state," a class dictatorship. The misleading fallacy, however, lies—as the Soviet experience of the last 36 years and the satellite experiences of the last few years show—in the complete identification of the working class with the Communist Party and of the Party itself with its hierarchy. 000

RANDOLPH L. BRAHAM*

* Ph.D., The New School for Social Research.

2: Rosu and Vasilin S-4 (no date) ca. 1951 EDl Rumania EDl

000 Draft

Library of Congress

National Committee
for a Free Europe

DIGEST-INDEX

of

EASTERN EUROPEAN LAW

Prepared under the supervision of

Lawrence Keitt
Law Librarian

R O M A N I A

Churches & Religion

Compiled by
George Rosu Hircea Vasilin

Edited by
Vladimir Gsovski

(#1122 - on the basis of data available in March 1950)

Mid-European Studies Center
4 West 57th Street
Room 308-9
New York 19, N. Y

2: Rosu and Vasilin S-4 (no date) ca. 1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Churches and Religion Romania

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. Prior to 1919.....1

II. From World War I to the end of World War II
1. General Regime of Churches.....3
2. Organization of the Romanian Orthodox Church.11
3. Status of the Roman Catholic Church.....13
4. The Greek Catholic Church.....17

III. Churches under the Communist Regime
1. Basic Provisions.....20
2. Regime of the Religious Creeds
A. General Survey.....21
B. Church Property.....29
C. Church and School.....31
3. Status of the Romanian Orthodox Church.....34
4. Present Status of the Roman Catholic Church and Other Religious Denominations.....36
5. Greek Catholic (Uniate) Churches (Romanian, Ruthenian Armenian).....39
6. The Christians of the Old Rite.....43

Churches and Religion

Romania

1.

Digest

I. Prior to 1919

175
195
[179]

The available evidence indicate that Christianity had been well established on the territory of the present day Romania in the second century. The region designated as Dacia, a province of the Roman Empire, had, between 106 and the end of the third century, an organized church with an established hierarchy. A bishop of "Gothic Dacia", (the name of this region after the withdrawal of the Roman legions) took part at the first Ecumenical Council at Nicea 325 A.D. Also, a Gothic Dacian bishop is mentioned among those present at the second Ecumenical Council of Constantinople, 381 A. D. We do not possess any particular information concerning the Christianity in this region from the 5th until the 13th century. This was the period of barbarian invasion which destroyed organized social life and forced the great majority of the population to seek refuge in the mountains.

The available informations for the beginning of the 13th century show the church of that region as being a part of the Eastern Orthodox Church. From that time on and until the second half of the 19th century the Romanian Eastern Orthodox Church was under the ecumenical Patriarchy of Constantinople. This applies not only to the canonical and dogmatic matters but also to the investiture (appointment of high dignitaries of the

175
195
[642]

church). The Romanian church has become independendent from this Patriarchy only as a result of a long and complex process which began when the independent Romanian State came into being in 1859 as "the United Romanian Principalities." The first constitution of the kingdom of Romania of 1866 stated (Article 21) that "the Romanian Orthodox Church is independent." But the recognition of its autocephaly by the Patriarchy of Constantinople was declared only in 1885. Nevertheless, the Romanian Church has continued to maintain its unity with the ecumenical church of the East. This relation was, however, confined to the purely religious aspect. The Romanian church considered to be its duty to consult Constantinople Patriarchy on difficult questions of dogmas, canons, and cults whenever it was necessary.

Thus, it may be observed that the independence of the Romanian church was a consequence of the political independence of the Romanian State. The independence of the church signified the achievements of the sovereignty of the Romanian people and the church organization rendered important help and support to the incipient state.

[793]

The Romanian clergy took part in the government administration and in political life. The clergymen could be elected to the parliaments and seats in some important governmental bodies were reserved to it. This was rather a consituation of the established tradition because in the past the representatives of the clergy had always been counsellors of the "domnitor" (the ruler) and members of the "Sfatul Tarii" (country's Assembly).

000 (the ruler) and members of the "Sfatul Tarii" (country's Assembly)
795 In general, the Romanian Orthodox Church has been since the
642 foundation of the "United Principalities" in 1859 considered
175 the predominant church and had a priority over other churches.
This situation continued when the Kingdom of Romania was formed after 1866 (hereafter called Old Kingdom in contrast to Romania after 1919). Nevertheless, the religious practices of other
[798] churches were tolerated and undistrubed. The Romanian Orthodox Church did not consider itself universal, was not animated by any spirit of proselytism and was rather passive and tolerant towards other creeds and rites. For this reason and because of the small number of persons professing other religions in the Kingdom of Romania, the situation did not call for any special legislation on freedom of religion prior to World War I.

II. From World War I to the End of World War II

1. General Regime of Churches

651 The necessity for special legislation regulating the status of churches other than the Romanian Orthodox has arisen after World War I.

175 The Romanian Kingdom emerged after World War I with
671 an enlarged territory. The newly incorporated provinces were hitherto governed by different laws. Bulgarian law prevailed in Banat and Maramurosh, the same law with some specific provisions was also in force on Transylvania; Austrian law was

175 in force in Bukovina and the Russian law, with some specific
671 local rules, was in force in Bessarabia.

175 The population of the newly incorporated provinces was
162 predominantly Romanian but, in view of the long separation from the Old Kingdom, was somewhat different. Moreover, there were also other ethnological groups and a variety of churches and even sects.

The population of Transylvania and Banat, for instance, was divided mainly among the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches. The population of Bukovina and Maramurosh was either of Catholic (Uniates) or Orthodox religion and had an important Jewish minority. In Bessarabia, in addition to the Eastern Orthodox Church, there was a real conglomerate of creeds and and rites, many of them originating back in the 17th century and subsequent reforms of the Russian Orthodox Church.

659 A new Constitution was adopted in 1923. It declared
[642] the principle of freedom of religion which needed to be developed in details and put into effect by special laws. This did not follow immediately but, instead, the Romanian Government carried out, in 1925, the unification and hierarchical reorganization of the Romanian Orthodox Church (see infra).

This step increased the pressure of the numerous other churches and rites practiced within the new frontiers. They intervened seeing that their status be defined and that their relations with the higher church authorities abroad, as well as with the Romanian State and the Orthodox Church, be settled by

659 law. For these reasons the Law No. 54, on the general regulation of the religious denominations, was enacted on April 22, 1928.

The State assured to all religious denominations an equal freedom and protection provided their practice did not endang public order and are not contrary to the laws and morals. (This principle, as well as the provisions of Article 24 regarding the establishment of religious associations have been repealed by Law No. 431 of 1943.).

Any disturbance of the free practice of any religion was declared subject to punishment under the Penal Law. (This provision was later stated in the new Penal Code of March 18, 1938, which in Articles 308 to 312 provides severe penalties for those impeding the free practice of religious creeds recognized by law.)

The religious belief does not prevent a person from acquiring and practicing civil and political rights and does not relieve anyone from the obligations imposed upon him by law.

The positive law has priority over the canonic.

Political organizations on a confessional basis are forbidden.

No church is allowed to entertain relations of dependency with any foreign church authority or organization except relations imposed by the dogmatic and canonical principles of the church. The jurisdiction of the domestic religious authorities should

659 not extend beyond the frontiers of the country and, vice versa, no foreign church may have jurisdictional powers over any denomination in Romania. Moreover, any material support granted and accepted from outside must be communicated to the Romanian Government.

793 The clergymen, the heads of the religious organizations and their officers must be Romanian citizens or they must apply for naturalization. A foreign citizen may be admitted only by special authorization and specifically if otherwise the existence and the functioning of a religious community would be imperilled.

As in the case of the Orthodox Church, the heads of [678] all religious denominations and their clergymen are triable for common and political offenses by the High Court of Cassation and Justice (not by ordinary courts). However, the disciplinary cases in church matters shall be tried by their own Synods.

The organizations of the historical churches (infra) are legal entities.

794 The religious denominations freely administer their assets as well as establish and manage as many charitable and educational institutions as they wish or need. The same is true of schools for preparation of the clergy. These, however, must communicate to the Ministry of Religious Affairs concerning their curricula.

[871] Each church has the right to give religious instruction to their youth of the given denominations in either public or private schools, as well as to men on active service.

659 The keeping of vital statistics (Civil Status Records) was assigned to civil authorities and was governed by civil law. Thereby this matter became uniformly regulated for the whole of Romania.

795 659 By the provisions of the Law No. 54 of 1928 and its amendments (see infra) a general regime for the religious denominations was well established. However, from the point of view of a status the denominations were divided into several groups as follows:

1) National Churches: this term was applied to the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church.

2) Roman Catholic Church had its own status defined by the Concordat with the Holy See of 1927 which was also applied to the Uniate Church.

3) Historical but not National Churches: Calvinist, Evangelic-Lutheran, the Unitarian, the Armenian-Gregorian, Jewish and Mohammedan religions.

4) The so-called religous associations which are also called minor denominations. This term was applied to a variety of sects. Since 1933 this group became divided into two categories;

a) those which acquired the status of a legal entity under the law concerning non-profit corporations and were officially recognized and allowed to function;

b) those which were considered as dangerous for the public order and morality and therefore prohibited.

The Law No. 54 of 1928 was applied to the Romanian

795 Orthodox Church only insofar as its provisions are not contrary
659 to the Organic Law of this Church enacted in 1925 (infra). The same law reserved the regulation of the status of the Roman Catholic Church, including the Uniate Church, to the Concordat which was already agreed upon in 1927 but which was ratified in 1929.

The Jewish religion did not have a central organization at the time when the Law No. 54 of 1928 was enacted. Thus the law postponed the regulation of its status until such central organization was formed. Such organization was achieved only about 1930. Its primary purpose was to obtain a representation in the Senate (upper Chamber) because the law provided for the right of each national and historical church for such representative.

With these exceptions the Law No. 54 of 1928 was applicable to the status of the churches enumerated above under the category of historical churches. Besides, the law provided for the possibility of recognition of other or new religious denominations provided they comply with the provisions of the Law No. 54 and its tenets and practices are not contrary to the public order, the Constituti n or the laws and morals. These are the other salient provisions of the Law No. 54.

659 In principle the State retains the right of supervision and control over all denominations. Their heads, whether elected or appointed, must be approved by the King and take an oath of allegiance to Him and to the Constitution.

659
794 Besides their own revenues, the Churches were entitled to ask for contribution from their parishioners to cover the expenses of maintenance. In case of need the State may supply the amounts required for specified needs; in this case it reserved the right to verify that they are lawfully used.

[798] Articles 43 and 44 provided that since the Constitution guaranteed to all citizens the freedom of religion and conscience every individual has the right to belong to any religious denomination he desires, as well as to change his religion after he reaches the age of 18 years.

659 Up to the end of World War II the Law No. 54 was amended several times.

[793] The first amendment was caused by the fact that some sects carried on a propaganda which was considered to affect the public order. Thus by Decree No. 2752 of August 3, 1929 the Government introduced more severe penalties for clergymen who induced their flock to disobey the laws of the country.

798 Moreover, the decree allowed for the same reasons to
659 withdraw from a religious association the authorization to function. The same fact induced the Government to make further a distinction among the religious associations which were not enumerated as historical in the Law No. 54 of 1928.

The Order (Decizune) No. 114, 119 of 1933 of the Ministr of Religious Affairs made a distinction between the permitted religious associations and those forbidden on the grounds of

798
659

being dangerous to public order. The list of the latter was later expanded or reduced according to the evolution of the political concept of "public order". During World War II, for instance, several rites of the Russian Orthodox Church were forbidden because they became mere tools for the policy of Soviet propaganda.

The second amendment was made by Decree No. 3286 of October 2, 1940, promulgated by the rightist (Iron Guard) Government. By this act all religious orders and congregations not duly permitted to function at the time of enactment of the Law No. 54 of 1928 were forbidden. The primary purpose of these provisions was to outlaw the Jewish religion because the provisions of the Law No. 54 of 1928 could be interpreted as not providing for its definite status (see supra).

[793] In addition, this act restated the requirement of Romanian citizenship for clergymen of all denominations and fixed a certain period of time within which the clergymen had either to comply with this rule or leave the country.

Finally, all religious associations were obliged to register with the Ministry of Religious Affairs which had the right to refuse the registration of any one of these bodies.

A further amendment by Decree-Law No. 711 of April 21, 1941, forbade the admittance to other denominations of people of Jewish religion.

The Law No. 927 of December 30, 1942, changed the procedure for establishment of religious associations provided for in Article 24 of the Law No. 54 of 1928. The authorization

798 for their establishment was to be done by Order of the Cabinet.
659 No motivation was required if the Cabinet decided to repeal a previously issued authorisation.

Finally, the fight against sects (suspected of spying for the enemy) reached its climax by the Law No. 431 of July 9, 1943, which forbade the practice of religions other than the "historical denominations", specified by the Law No. 54 of 1928. The Government was empowered to suppress, by order of the Cabinet, the spreading of a specific sectarian cult and to expropriate its assets.

The further fate of all those laws and decrees is discussed infra.

128 A few words seem to be appropriate to explain the organization of material dealing with the status of individual churches. In the present part of the study devoted to the period before World War II, only the status of the Romanian Church, of the Roman Catholic Church and of the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church is discussed.

The problem of the status of other religious groups acquired special significance only after World War II. Therefore, even the historical aspect of these denominations is treated in the third part of the present study dealing with the communist period (see infra III, 5).

795 2. Organization of the Romanian Orthodox Church
659 After World War I the unification and reorganization of the Romanian Orthodox Church became a stringent necessity because,

795
659

within the new frontiers, there were several orthodox churches governed by various hierarchical authorities, in addition to the Romanian Orthodox Church of the Old Kingdom. This was done by Law No. 1402 of May 6, 1925. It provided not only for the organization and procedure but it also stated that, since the Romanian Orthodox Church is the religion of the great majority of the Romanian people (72.6 percent, according to returns of the census of 1930, in 1930), it is considered, in comparison with the other religions of the country, as the dominant religion. In its relations with the other Orthodox churches, it was declared autocephalous, that is, administratively independent.

[162]

By this law the role of the Romanian Orthodox Church as a national church has been reiterated. The salaries of the clergy were paid by the State out of budgetary appropriations.

As the Law of 1925 was silent on this point, the dioceses of the Orthodox Church were granted the status of legal entities by a separate law of May 3, 1928.

793
659

By th Law No. 1002 of May 4, 1936, Article 21 of the Law of 1925 was amended defining the status of the Orthodox clergy. Since they were paid by the Treasury there was a question as to whether the clergymen were civil employees.

The amendment clearly stated that clergymen enjoy all the rights and benefits of public servants only as far as the pay is concerned. In all other respects (appointment, promotion, discipline, etc) they remained under the rules of church law and the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastic authorities.

793 They were subject to church law and to disciplinary authority
659 of the Synod. At the same time, the amendment provided that the State shall pay, besides the salaries, all the other administrative expenses of the Orthodox church.

3. The Status of the Roman Catholic Church

795 There are two jurisdictions within the Roman Catholic Church in Romania: the Roman Catholics in the strict sense and the so-called Greek Catholics or Uniates.— Both are under the supreme authority of the Holy See and the Uniates are considered a rite within the Roman Catholic Church. It is proper, therefore, to begin the study with the status of the Roman Catholic Church in general.

The Catholic Church appeared for the first time in the Romanian provinces (Moldavia and Wallachia) toward the end of the 14th century and, in fact, it did not have any kind of diocesan organization before the beginning of the 17th century. During this time its organization consisted merely of several Catholic missions. From 1611 until 1919, the Catholic Church was organized into two dioceses: one for Moldavia with a bishop in Iassy and another for Wallachia governed by an archbishop in Bucharest who was also the highest dignitary for Romania.

[162] After 1919, the Catholic population from the provinces incorporated after World War I merged with that of the Old Kingdom and, according to the census of 1930, made up a Catholic minority of 6.8 percent of the total Romanian population. The Catholic Church insisted upon recognition as a National Church and upon

795 the granting of broader rights and a corresponding status.
[659] After long negotiations between the Vatican and the Romanian Government an agreement was reached on May 10, 1927, known as the Concordat, and it was ratified by the Parliament on May 29, 1929.

659 The most important provisions of this Concordat[1] which refer to the relations between the Romanian State and the Catholic Church are the following:

The Catholic Church in Romania is recognized to have the status of a legal entity in conformity with the general laws of the country. This status is granted to all Catholic organizations, including the orders and congregations which are legally established both in accordance with the canon law and the laws of Romania.

794 The right of property in all assets of any kind is
659 recognized and guaranteed to the Church by the State in conformity with the Constitution and the laws of the country. The property and other assets for religious, educational, charitable and similar purposes for which they were originally established must be used according to their initial destination, and the proceeds must be used exclusively within Romanian territory. The property may be alienated or hypothecated only in accordance with the rules established by the laws of Romania and the canon law.

In conformity with the provisions of the Law on legal entities, the Government maintains the right of supervision over the material resources of the Catholic Church and the use made of them.

1 [ratified by Parliament, May 29, 1929 --Analyst]

794
659

The Catholic Church is authorized to form, in Romania, a "Sacred Diocesan Fund" composed of the bonds belonging to the Church, its congregations and religious organizations. This fund shall be administered by the Diocesan Bishops' Council and it is destined to cover the expenses required by religious and educational activities as well as for salaries to be paid to the Catholic clergy. In case the fund should become insufficient for these expenses, the Romanian Government assumes the obligation of allocating the necessary subsidies from budgetary appropriations.

Besides the "Sacred Fund", there are two other funds to which the status of a legal entity has been granted as well. They are:

a) the General Catholic Fund for religion; and

b) the General Catholic Fund for education.

The administration of properties belonging to schools, educational institutions, etc., is conferred upon the Catholic diocesan authorities.

The Catholic Church has the right to open as many schools or charitable institutions of any kind as is desired. Since they are entitled to issue publicly recognized diplomas, these schools had to be supervised by the Ministry of Education.

000

The religious instruction of Catholics in all kind of

794 The religious instruction of Catholics in all kind of
659 schools, including government schools, is conducted according
871 to directives issued by the Catholic Bishop. The directives are to be communicated also to the Ministry of Education.

The Bishop has the right to request the dismissal of teachers of Catholic religion in public or private schools, even where such teachers are appointed and paid by the Government, if the Bishop considered the teacher unqualified for this task.

[874] Finally, the Catholic Church has the right to establish all kinds of Divinity Schools for preparing the Catholic clergy. The curriculum of those schools is established by the competent Catholic Church authorities.

793 The Catholic bishops and their assistants, appointed
659 by the Vatican, must be Romanian citizens and are obliged to take an oath of allegiance to the King, the Constitution and the laws of the country. Those who are not citizens are allowed to apply for citizenship within a reasonable period of time.

The appointment of the clergy is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Church authorities. However, an appointment must be communicated, in advance, to the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

Article 23, the last article of the Concordat, states that "The two contracting parties reserve the right to denounce this Concordat after notice has been served six months in advance."

659 An additional Protocol was signed on May 30, 1932 (Official Gazette No. 180 of August 3, 1932 and ratified by Decree-Law No. 659 (Official Gazette No. 52 of March 2, 1940) pertaining to the

659 interpretation of Article of the Concordat dealing with the use of property which did not alter or restrict the original provisions.

[208] In any event, the Concordat granted the Catholic Church unlimited possibilities of religious propaganda since it provided that the Romanian Government would not oppose the establishment of new Catholic parishes whenever this would be requested by a minmum of 400 worshippers or even less.

According to these provisions and those of the Law No.54 of 1928, the Catholic Church has been treated as a national church on equal footing with the Romanian Orthodox Church. The Concordat ruled also on the status of the Armenian, Greek-Ruthenian and Greek Catholic Churches in Romania insofar as they were considered as Catholic rites. Some specific information on the two last named denomination are given in the next chapter.

4. The Greek Catholic Church

795 It must be borne in mind that in addition to the Roman Catholic Church in the strict sense there were three churches in Romania which, though originated as Church of the Eastern Christian Orthodoxy were, in the long run, united with the Roman Catholic Church under the supremacy of the Pope.

These churches generally called Uniates were as follows:

a) Romanian Uniates called in Romania Greek Catholics.

b) Russian or, rather, Ukrainian Uniates, called in Romania Greek Ruthenians, mostly inhabitants of Bukovina and

795 part of Northern Bessarabia.

c) Armenian Uniates called also Roman Catholic of Armenian rite.

Each of these churches came under the supremacy of the Pope at a different time and under slightly different conditions. Only the Romanian Greek Catholics are dealt with in the present chapter (for others see infra III, 5).

175 795 779 The union of the Greek Orthodox Romanians by nationality with the Roman Catholic Church was accomplished by an agreement in 1698 between the Vatican and the Orthodox Bishopric of Alba-Julia, ratified later, by the Pope. In joining the Catholic Church, this fraction of the Greek Orthodox Church, however, reserved, among other things, the right to officiate at the services in the Romanian language, and the right of the clergymen to marry. In exchange, the Uniates admitted four dogmatic points of the Catholics, among which the more important were the acceptance of the Pope's supremacy and the Filioque. This union was a result of a compromise accepted by the Holy See in view of circumstances which prevailed in Hungary in particular in Transylvania and Banat in the 17th century. Several political causes contributed to this union. To mention the principal ones, the Hungarian kings endeavored to convert the Romanian minority to Catholicism and thus to detach it from the influence of Romanian Principalities. The spreading of protestantism among the German minority in Transylvania presented a possibility of swaying the Romanians to the same religion.

175
795 The Greek Catholic fraction was amalgamated into the hierarchy of the Roman Church and became simply a rite within that church. At the very beginning, this church was organized as a single diocese with the rank of a Bishopric but, later on, the number of dioceses was raised to three. Nevertheless, during a period of approximately 90 years from the time of the union, the Uniate bishops were supervised and controlled by Jesuit monks sent from Rome. In 1855, the Greek Catholic Church was raised to the rank of a Mitropoly and the Jesuitic control was withdrawn.

115
659 Until the Concordat of 1929, the status of this church was based mainly on the provisions of the Act of Union of 1698. Both the Constitution of 1923 and the Law No. 54 of 1928 granted it priority above all the other religious minorities. It has been reorganized since the conclusion of the Concordat and was given all rights and privileges of the Catholic Church. The [713] highest dignitaries of the Greek Catholic Church were equally senators ex officio of the Romanian Parliament as were those of the Roman Catholic Church. The clergy has been paid by the State. For preparing its clergy the church was maintained three theological academies. The returns of the census of 1930 [162] showed that 7.9 percent of the population of Romania belonged to the Greek Catholic faith.

III. Churches under the Communist Regime

1. Basic Provisions

175
642

Although Romania has been ruled by Soviet Russia since its surrender in August 1944 and is actually governed by a Communist Cabinet appointed by Moscow in March 1945, the beginning of the Communist regime is set as of January 1, 1948, e. g., after the King's abdication and the creation of a People's Republic, since the main revolutionary social reforms have been enacted after that date.

648
798

Romania signed and ratified the Peace Treaty with the Allied Nations (Official Gazette No. 199 of August 30, 1947). According to clear stipulations of the treaty Romania is bound to translate into national legislation its main provisions and apply them strictly. Article 3 of the Peace Treaty reads:

> "Romania shall take all measures necessary to secure to all persons under Romanian jurisdiction, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship..." (Italics supplied.)

The freedom of religious worship was, therefore, considered as a fundamental one and the Romanian Government was supposed to make no discrimination between the different churches of rites of various denominations existent and practiced within its boundaries.

642
798

The first attempt to comply with these provisions was made through the new Romanian Constitution enacted on April 11, 1948.

642 Article 27 of this fundamental law reads as follows:

798

794

Article 27

Freedom of conscience and freedom of religious worship shall be guaranteed by the State.

Religious creeds shall be free to organize themselves and may freely function provided their ritual and practice are not contrary to the Constitution, public security and morality.

No religious denomination, congregation or community may open or maintain institutions for general education, but may only run special schools for training personnel necessary to the Cult under State control.

The Romanian Orthodox Church is autocephalous and unitary in its organization.

The way of organizing and functioning of the religious creeds will be established by law." (Italics supplied.)

Consequently, three main principles are to be retained:

a) The freedom of religious worship is guaranteed by the State;

b) The organizing and functioning of religious creeds is, with specified exceptions, free;

c) The various creeds are entitled to run special school for training their clergy.

However, these constitutional provisions do not reflect the true situation which will be brought to light only after the analysis of laws later enacted and analyzed in subsequent chapters.

2. The Regime of the Religious Denominations

A. General Survey

659 After World War II. the original law for the regulation of the religious creeds (No. 54 of 1928) suffered only one major

659 amendment; namely, by Law 62 of March 2, 1948. Its main provisions were as follows:

[421] All reorganized denominations were ordered to take detailed inventory of their assets and communicate it to the Ministry of Religious Affairs in order to enable the latter to exert an easier control over their material resources. Further, the denominations were obliged to hold religious services every time the Government so ordered.

[793] The heads of the Churches, elected or appointed, shall be recognized only upon taking of an oath of allegiance to the newly established People's Republic. By this oath they promised not only to obey the laws, but also to enforce them, to compel their subordinates to obey them and defend the Republic against "any enemies from within or without."

[421] Finally, the Ministry of Religious Affairs was empowered to control and verify all assets and revenues of all kinds belonging to any church, as well as the use made of them.

It is clear that by this amendment the Government took quite a different attitude towards the church. Its existence is justified in the eyes of the government and protected only insofar as the church organizations enforce the law of the country and defend its political order. This amounts rather to bestowing executive and police powers upon the churches and to force upon them to practice political discriminations instead of religion.

There is a novel provision according to which the Government is entitled to control the use made by the churches of their

assets and incomes without drawing a distinction, as the Law No. 54 of 1928 did, between the assets owned by the church and the State subsidies. 659

Yet, soon after these amendments had been made, the law No. 54 of 1928 was repealed in its entirety by the Decree No. 177 of August 4, 1948. This decree establishes a new regime governing the practice of religion in Romania, presumably in accordance with the principles set up in the new Constitution and interpreting them.

The first five articles of the decree proclaim that the State guarantees the freedom of conscience and the freedom of religion and punishes the hatred engendered on account of a religious creed. The religious belief does not impede anyone from his duties and obligations under the law nor is it an obstacle to acquiring and exercising civil and political rights. Yet, no mention is made about the State assuring equal protection under law to all religous creeds. 659 178

In contrast with the Law No. 54 of 1928 no distinction is made any longer between the national, historical or minor denominations. Articles 6 to 9 of the Decree No. 177 provide, in general, that all religious creeds are free to organize and function, provided their practice and ritual are not contrary to the Constitution, the morals and (this is a new criterion) "the public security or public order".

The religious creeds are free to establish and organize endowments, associations, orders and congregations, according to their own rules, teachings, canons and traditions. However, in

order to be organized and to function, the religious denominations must be recognized and granted permission to do so by decree of the Presidium of the Great National Assembly upon proposal of the Cabinet. 659 798

"In well-founded cases, the recognition can be withdrawn in the same way" (Article 13).

Consequently, the existence of a religious denomination, including all its orders, congregations, etc., is left entirely at the discretion of the political authorities.

Only the recognized religious denominations and their local organizations possess the status of legal entities. Such status may be granted to their civil associations and endowments, pursuing religious aims, as well as their orders and congregations if they comply with all requirements provided by the Law for legal entities (Article 28).

The heads of the religious denominations as well as the dignitaries of their churches and the entire personnel must be Romanian-citizens and "enjoy fully the exercise of civil and political rights" (Article 20). No mention is made with regard to the situation or fate of those dignitaries who are not, or not as yet, citizens. 659 793

As to who has the full exercise of the civil rights is clearly defined by the Civil Law. But a different situation exists with regard to the political rights. Although those rights are well defined the statutory provisions, the final and only proof that a person enjoy the political rights is the fact that he has

659
793

been registered in the electoral list in 1946 and that his name was still there subsequently. In other words, only those clergymen and officers of the church are admitted to serve their churches who came successfully through all purges practiced by the Communist Government since 1945. Since the beginning of 1949, the lists are checked annually and are kept by the local People's Soviets which enjoy almost unlimited administrative and political powers. So far these local soviets were not elected but were appointed by the Communist Party's machinery and it stands to reason that nobody is entered on the electoral lists who is not completely trusted by the Party. Other usual reasons to strip a citizen of his political rights are: "undemocratic attitudes", "People's foe", "traitor", etc. Therefore, the political capacity is no longer a status granted to every citizen by the Constitution which could be exceptionally taken away for great and precisely defined offenses against the State after due process in courts, but it may be taken away by the decision of the Communist Party alone. Moreover, Article 33 of the Decree No. 177 provides that a clergyman of a recognized church who shows an "anti-democratic attitude", may be deprived, totally or in part, of the right to draw salary.

The requirement of oath established by the Law No. 62 of 1948 is maintained also in the new law and every minister of religion or officer of any church must take it before the admission to this office.

Article 25[1] provides that: 659 793 671

"the Ministry of Religious Affairs shall suspend any decision, instruction or directive, as well as any order (of a church authority) having a church administrative, cultural, educational or a charitable character or pertaining to endowments if it is contrary to the status of the denomination, to the act of its establishment, to public security or public order or morals. The pastoral and circular letters shall be communicated in advance to the Ministry of Religious Affairs." (Italics supplied.)

The religious denominations and their endowments, associations, etc., must submit a full report on their financial situation for approval and verification by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The law provides that the salaries of clergymen and the officers of the church shall be paid by the State. But, in contrast to the Law No. 1002 of 1936, Article 34 of the Decree No. 177 suggests that these persons are on the same footing with other government employees in all respects. This article reads:

Article 34

Placing on the payroll of the clergymen and officers of the religious denominations shall be done according to the general rules.

The "general rules" of government employment referred to here (Code of Civil Service of 1946) makes clear that everybody who draws salary from the Government treasury enjoys all rights and has all of the duties of a governmental employee.

Several provisions deal with the disposal of property of parishes where a part of the parishioners decided to choose 659 425

[1. Law No. 62, Article 25, 1948- Analyst]

another denominational jurisdiction. Disregarding the ecclesiastical rules of the denomination, the decree provides that the assets of the parish are transferred to the denomination chosen by the parishioners who leave the parish in proportion to their number as compared with those remaining in the parish. In case 75 percent leave a creed, its entire assets, including the church building, are transferred to that adopted by the parishioners. The implication of this rule is discussed infra under 5. 659 425

The religious denominations may maintain with other countries only such relations as are of a religious nature and they must be carried after approval of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and through the medium of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. These provisions were intended to interrupt direct contact between the Roman Catholic Church in Romania and the Holy See, required by the dogma and organization of the Roman Catholic Church. 659 648 794

Any direct communication by Catholic prelates in Romania with the Holy See could be brought, in view of these provisions, under the provisions of the Decree of August 12, 1950, on state security which threatens with the death penalty:

a) "Treason to the country, rendering service to the enemy or causing prejudice to the power of the state;

b) Procurement and the transmission of state secrets to a foreign or enemy power; . . ."

Unfortunately, there were several instances in which expulsion or conviction was imposed upon the prelates and minister

of the Roman Catholic Church in connection with these provisions. 659
Reference is made to the case of Archbishop O'Hara, Monsignor 648
Guido Del Mesti and Monsignor J. Kirk expelled on July 6, 1950, and other members of nunciature who were convicted on July 4, 1950, the case of Bishop Augustino Pascha, on September 16, 1951, and four other Catholic priests on September 7, 1951.

By Decree No. 178 (Official Gazette No. 178 of August 4, 659
1948) the Minister of Religious Affairs was reorganized to fit the new tasks and was empowered to exert complete control over all religous denominations in the country.

Later on, by Decree No. 37 (Official Gazette No. 30 of February 5 1949) its administration has been simplified in fulfillment of a general order requiring the dismissal of a number of public servants.

After this reduction in personnel, the Ministry of Religious Affairs concentrated only on control and laic matters and dissolved divisions dealing with some spiritual questions, documentation and studies.

The law for general regulation of the creeds has been, 659
later on, implemented by Decree No. 243 (Official Gazette 217 795
of September 18, 1948) by which the number of dioceses for each recognized creed was strictly fixed on the basis of 750,000 worshippers per diocese, as follows:

Greek Orthodox	17 dioceses
Greek Catholic	2 dioceses
Roman Catholic	2 dioceses

Christians of old rite:	1 diocese	659
Protestants:	1 bishop and 1 superintendent.	795

The other religious denominations must andh have one central organization.

B. Church Property

The general Decree No. 177 on religious denominations grants the recognized denominations and their parishes the status of a legal entity. The institutions, orders, congregations, associations and establishments organized by the Church may, however, obtain such status only upon a special petition in a procedure established for granting the legal entity in general. It may also be observed that under the Law No. 54 of 1928 the status of legal entities was recognized automatically to a broad group of churches enumerated therein as national or historical denominations. The Decree No. 177 does not grant to any denomination automatic recognition by virtue of the law. Recognition of any denomination is within the discretion of the government which is not limited in its decision. Consequently, a denomination must petition to be recognized and only if the recognition is granted, it acquires the status of a legal entity. 659

The most salient point, however, lies in the expressly state right of the Ministry of Religious Affairs "to verify and control" the inventory of all church property and its budget (Articles 29, 30 of Decree No. 177). 659 425

In addition, it may be borne in mind that some churches,

in particular the Roman Catholic Church, were already deprived of their funds. This was a result of practices supported by legal provisions. 659 425

In the first place, it refers to land. Agricultural land still possessed by the church after the land reform of 1919 was in fact taken away in direct violation of the law. [423]

Article 8 of Law No. 187 of March 23, 1945, on agrarian reform provided that: [671]

> "agricultural land belonging to monasteries, mitropoles, bishoprics, parishes as well as clerical endowments are excepted, from expropriation, and left in the ownership of the present title holders."

Likewise, certain categories of land, such as vineyards and forests, were generally exempted from expropriation. Nevertheless, most of Catholic landed property, including forests, vineyards, etc., were commandeered early in 1945 and thereafter seized by various "local committees" and, eventually, divided into small holdings. The remainder was seized in its entirety in February 1949 without compensation. This time the Government did not even take pains to issue a decree legalizing the actual seizure.

The "Sacred Fund" of the Catholic Church (see supra) also lost its value. It was composed almost exclusively of governmental bonds and were given after 1919 to the religious Catholic bodies in Transylvania as compensation for estates expropriated at that time. The terrific inflation of 1944-1947, swept out their value. Then, just before the monetary stabilization of August 14, 1947 government bonds were compulsorily called in and paid for in inflated lei, only an insignificant part of which was exchanged after the monetary stabilization for new currency. [454]

currency. 000

In this way, most of the material means of the Catholic 659
Church for support of its religous, educational and charitable 425
program disappeared.

These successive expropriations have been applied to [798]
all religious denominations. However, the Russian Church ("Christians of Old Rite" and the parishes included later on in the Ukrainian Vicariate) was exempted from such measures. If the Romanian Orthodox Church possesses today some material means, these were either granted subsequently by the Government or were transferred by the government from the seized assets of other religious denominations.

C. Church and School

The right to establish and run schools of all kinds 659
granted to all religious denominations by the Law No. 54 of 1928 871
and in particular to the Roman Catholic Church by the Concordat was abolished. The same is true of the right to administer religious instruction in private and public schools. This is the result of a series of decrees.

The first step toward this goal was to suppress the denominational schools and those supported in some way by churches. The Government started by suppressing all foreign schools existing in Romania by Order No. 191,653 (Official Gazette No. 176 of August 2, 1948). Many of these schools were, to a certain extent, connected with the religious denominations.

The next step was a reform of the school system

accomplished by Decrees No. 175 and 176 (Official Gazette No. 177 of August 3, 1948). By Article 35 all denominational schools were taken over by the government. It reads as follows: 659 871 [671]

Decree No. 175 of 1948

Art. XXXV. All the denominational and private schools shall become governmental schools.

Decree No. 176 of 1948

Art. 1. For a better organization of the public education, as well as the expansion and democratization of the educational system, all personal and real properties that belonged to the churches, congregations, religious communities, non-profit organizations and trade corporations and, in general, to individuals or legal entities which were destined to serve as support...to denominational schools, are transferred to the government ownership and shall be used for educational needs.

This provision covers school buildings, dwelling for professors, boarding houses and students' homes, etc., as well as funds, estates, and legacies serving educational purposes. No compensation was to be paid for them. A list of over 2,000 denominational and private schools of all kinds, from kindergartens to colleges, which were thus expropriated, was attached to Decree No. 176. The provisions quoted make plain that no denominational school may be opened in the future which conclusion is supported by the fact that a subsequent Decree No. 177 of August 4, 1948 regulating the religious denominations does not mention the right of the church to open general schools. It deals with schools in Chapter VI but provides exclusively for divinity schools.

These decrees affected especially the Roman Catholic Church to which belonged the majority of the denominational schools. [798]

000

schools.

Neither the Decrees No. 175,176 and 177 nor any other law or decree mention the religious instruction in any way. The officially approved curricula of secondary and higher educational institutions do not provide for religious instruction. Nowhere is mentioned the right of the church to supervise religious instruction in case it would be given in general schools. 659 871

The only kind of schools allowed to the church are the special divinity schools for the training of clergymen and auxiliary personnel. These schools are in all aspects, including that of the curriculum, under the supervision of the Ministries of Religious Affairs and of Education. The Ministry of Religious Affairs may, among other things, dismiss at any time the professors appointed by the church whenever it deems that "public order and the security of the State" so requires. 659 871 793

Article 49 of the Decree No. 177 limited the number of Schools of Divinity of university rank in the whole country to: two for the Orthodox Church, one for the Catholic Church and one for all Protestant Churches. But a subsequent order of the Ministry of Religious Affairs reduced further the number of divinity and clerical schools of all denominations and did not mention the establishment of any Roman Catholic Divinity Schools. All of this shows the intention of the government to bar the opportunity for training of the ministers of religion.

It must also be mentioned that no general education may be given at the Divinity Schools. Notwithstanding according

to the curricula approved by the government, an important place is given to three special subjects of "general education", viz., Constitution and law of the Romanian People's Republic, Russian language, and History of Russian Theology. 659 871 793

By the Order No. 42,898 (Official Gazette No. 226 of November 15, 1948) the curricula were approved for the divinity schools of the following denominations: Greek Orthodox, Protestant (including Evangelist, Reformed and Unitarian), Jewish, Baptist, Adventist and Moslems. No mention is made of any curricula for the Roman Catholic Divinity Schools. The same is true of the "Christian Church of Old Rite" but for a different reason (see infra).

3. Status of the Romanian Orthodox Church 659

No new general law on the Romanian Orthodox Church was enacted and it continues to be regulated by the provisions of the Law for the Organization and Unification of May 6, 1925, as amended, since 1947 (see infra). Yet, an interesting question seems to remain open; viz., is it still the dominant church in the State, e. g., the National Church or not? As it has been mentioned previously, the Organic Law of 1925 provided that, since the Greek Orthodox Creed is the religion of the majority of the Romanian people, the Romanian Orthodox Church is dominant in the country. The new amendments of the law of 1925 did not directly affect this provision. But this principle has been taken from the old Constitution of 1923 which, in Article 22, paragraph 4, specifically stressed its role as a 795 659 795 642

national church. The old Constitution has been repealed and replaced by the Constitution of April 11, 1948 and its Article 27, paragraph 4, provides only that "the Romanian Orthodox Church is autocephallous and unitary in its organization." Article 15 of Decree No. 177 of 1948 has similar provisions. However, no mention is made in the new regulation of religious creeds as it was done in the repealed Law No. 54 of 1928 that the Romanian Orthodox Church shall also be directed by its principles, provided they are not contrary to its organic law. 659 795 642

There are strong reasons to believe that the Romanian Orthodox Church is no longer considered a national church since such status is based on the text of an ordinary law which only implemented a constitutional provision no longer in force. According to the new Constitution and more recent legislation, it appears rather that the Orthodox Church is only one of the recognized denominations and is on an equal footing with the others. This treatment could be the result of the revival of the old Russian Church in Romania (infra) that would not accept a second-rank role in a satellite country. 659 795

The contradiction between the new constitution and the Law of 1925 may be explained by the fact that the present government did not yet come to revise all the laws in order to bring them in harmony with the new Constitution. Only the following amendments of the Law of 1925 were enacted thus far.

The Law No. 167 of May 30, 1947, changed the procedure in filling the vacancies in membership of the Diocesan Councils.

659
795

Such councils are governing bodies of dioceses and consist of clergymen and laymen elected by the Council itself. Under the Law of 1925 several candidates used to be nominated. Under the Law No. 167 only one candidate is nominated, who must have, in advance, a specific motivated approval by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In this way the Government succeeded in staffing these bodies with members who, afterwards, in their turn, elected such church dignitaries who would be obedient to the present political regime. Futhermore, the National Church Council which convenes for the election of Bishops, Archbishops and Mitropolitans has been enlarged to include all the members of the Cabinet, the Under Secretaries, as well as members of the Parliament, elected from the districts of the Diocese for which the vacancy occurred. The result was that the laymen members outnumbered the clergymen and thus the Government could be sure of the outcome of the elections.

Law No. 60 of March 2, 1948 and Presidential Decree No. 133 of February 5, 1949, brought only minor changes in the church organization.

4. Present Status of the Roman Catholic Church and Other Religious Denominations

A. The Denumciation of the Concordat of 1927

As previously stated, the Roman Catholic Church organizations, as well as its congregations, institutions and assets were administrated and run according to principles laid down in the Concordat of 1927 and its subsequent implementations. The Roman Catholic Church administered in 1939 the following

establishments: 177 churches; 21 chapels; 669 parishes; 2,002 prayer stations; 9 divinity schools; 6 students' homes led by nuns; 5 orphans' asylums; 1 hospital; 32 pious conventions; 26 Franciscan monasteries; 56 nuns' cloisters; 18 high schools; 5 students' homes; and 1 Ursulines Institute (these figures are derived from an article by Professor Olimp Cracium "Cultele religioase" in Encyclopedia Romaniei, vol. 2, Bucharest, 1939). 659 795

The Concordat set up definite limits to the supervision by the Romanian government over the Catholic Church in Romania.

By Decree No. 151 (Official Gazette No. 164 of July 19, 1948) the Romanian Government denounced the Concordat and its additional Protocols and briefly stated that the application of all these agreements ceased on the day of the publication of the decree in the Official Gazette. Yet, Article XXIII of the Concordat provided that its denunciation by either side must be preceded by a notice served six months in advance. During this period, the agreement continued to apply but negotiations concerning a new agreement could be initiated.

Thus, the manner in which the Romanian Government chose to denounce the Concordat obviously disregarding this provision could mean only a mere rupture of agreement and relations.

The Decree No. 151 did not mention at all whether the Catholic Church was to be guided by the provisions of the law regulating religious denominations in general, or of any other law and thus left this church without a regulation by law. This refers not only to the Roman Catholic Church but also to its rites, congregations, assets, etc. In fact, the steps 659 795 798

659
795
798

subsequently taken by the Government demonstrated that the Decree meant to deprive them of legal protection. The Roman Catholic Church was practically barred from any educational activities and deprived of its funds (see supra III 2, B and C). The expropriation of schools was followed by the disbanding of the Catholic organizations.

The first step was taken through the Orders of the Cabinet No. 1677 and 1679 (Official Gazette No. 299 of December 25, 1948) by which eleven main associations and endowments and all their branches were suppressed and their assets transferred to the State. The same steps were taken by the Order of the Cabinet No. 1770 (Official Gazette No. 10 of January 13, 1949) against additional eleven Roman Catholic and Reformed non-profit organizations and all their branches. [425]

Order of the Cabinet No. 161 (Official Bulletin No. 48 of February 26, 1949) suppressed also sixteen main religious and professional Catholic associations and all their district branches. Their assets were transferred to the Ministry of Interior.

Finally, the Order of the Cabinet No. 810 (Official Bulletin No. 51 of August 1, 1949) suppressed the existing Roman Catholic Orders and Congregations with all their dependent institution, regardless of the form in which they were organized. Herein were included the eleven congregations and four orders of the Catholic Church in Romania. Only two monasteries for monks and three convents for nuns were excepted where the clerical numbers of the disbanded congregations were allowed to continue their monastic life. Those who were not Romanian citizens were summoned to appear before the local police for arranging the formalities concerning their leaving the country. Those who

659
795
798

refused to join the monasteries and convents, were given the choice either to request internment in public poor houses (that is, the old people) or to be trained for a handicraft and afterwards assigned to work by the Office for Distribution of Labor Forces. Each member was obliged to communicate in writing his decision to the Ministry for Religious Affairs within 20 days.

It should be also mentioned that under the Law of November 3, 1948, providing for the nationalization of private hospitals, sanatoria and similar health institutions, a number of important Catholic hospitals were taken over by the government from the Church.

175
795

5. Greek Catholic (Uniate) Churches
(Romanian, Ruthenian, Armenian)

As it was mentioned supra II, 4., there were three Uniate churches in Romania. The origin and status of the so-called Greek Catholics, i.e., Romanian Uniates, was described there. The adherents of this church inhabit Transylvania. The members of Armenian Uniate Church (Roman Catholics of Armenian rite) inhabit also in Transylvania (bishopric in Gherla). The third Uniate church, so-called Greek Ruthenian, embraces only Ukrainian (i.e., Russian) population in Bukovina and Maramurosh. Its origin is dated from the Brest Church Council of 1596 when the prelates of the Orthodox Church then within the confines of Poland accepted the union with the Holy See on conditions similar to those accepted subsequently by the Romanian Church in 1698 (see supra II, 4).

To this Church belonged the Ukrainian population of the northern part of Bukovina and of Galicia--which incorporated in the Soviet Union after World War II--and also the Ukrainian and Belorussian population of these provinces. However, the latter population was officially incorporated into the Russian Church by the decree of Emperor Nicholas I in 1839. 175 795

All three Uniate churches in Romania were until now branches of the Roman Catholic Church and after the Concordat was denounced found themselves in a similar position, i.e., without a regulation by law. The members of all three churches experienced a pressure on the part of the government to induce them to "return", so to speak, to the Orthodox Church and to break with the Holy See. The disbandment of the Uniate parishes or rather their transformation into Orthodox parishes was indirectly stimulated by the Order No. 39,380 of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Official Gazette No. 242 of October 18, 1948). Under the previous decree No. 177 of 1948, if members of a parish select another church they carry with them a part of the assets of the parish proportionate to their number. If 75 percent of the parishioners decide to join another church, the church building is transferred to the newly selected one. The Order No. 39,380 provided that, in counting such members, only the heads of each family are taken into account. Thus the counting was greatly facilitated and expedited. 175 795 659 [425]

No decrees were disclosed dealing especially with the Armenian Uniate Church.

But the Decree No. 358 (Official Gazette No. 281 of December 2, 1948) suggests that the Greek Catholic Church ceased to be a separate ecclesiastic body in Romania and there may be only separate parishes. The Order reads as follows: 659 795 [671]

Article 1

Subsequent to reverting of the local Greek Catholic Parishes to the Romanian Orthodox Church and in conformity with the Article 13 of Decree 177/1948, its central organization and those provided by its Constitution shall cease to exist.

The Order says that the assets of the Greek Catholic Church shall become the property of the Romanian State, without any compensation, and shall be assigned partly or wholly to the Romanian Orthodox Church or to its various constituent parts. [425]

The Government obviously has made use of the provisions of Article 13 of the Law for Religious Denominations of 1948 to withdraw recognition from this church which, after the denunciation of the Concordat, lacked a definite status.

The wording of this article shows, beyond any doubt, that the Greek Catholic Church has been since July 1948 absorbed by the Romanian Orthodox Church by Administrative Order.

The fate of the Ukranian (Ruthenian) Uniate Church was different. The Concordat of 1927 provided for the establishment of this church of a separate diocese within the Roman Catholic Church with the seat to be designated later. It may be mentioned in this connection that the Uniate churches in Galicia and the northern part of Bukovina-now incorporated in the Soviet Uni[illegible] [illegible]e declared united with the Russian Church

headed by the Moscow Patriarchy in 1947 and 1948. Thereafter, the Ministry for Religious Affairs of Romania issued the Order No. 34,695 (Official Gazette No. 76 of December 2, 1949) which authorized the creation of a "Ukrainian Orthodox Vicariate General" whose task is to organize and have jurisdiction over all Ukrainian Orthodox parishes in Romania. (The original order mentioned a Ruthenian Vicariate, but a note published in the Official Gazette No. 81 of December 16, 1949, substituted for the word "Ruthenian" the word "Ukrainian."

659
795

The Ukrainian Vicariate is "an organization independent of any Orthodox diocese and it depends upon the Patriarchy of the Romanian Orthodox Church being directed by the provisions established by the Law on Organization and funtioning of the Romanian Orthodox Church (of 1925). (Article 2) The scheme of organization of the Vicariate is reserved for future regulation by the Vicariate with the approval of the Romanian Patriarchy and the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

It must be borne in mind that there are no Ukrainian (or Ruthenian) Orthodox parishes in the present Romania other than the Uniates. The Orthodox parishes with Ukrainian parishioners were only in Bessarabia and a few in Northern Bukovina; but these provinces are now within the Soviet Union. Thus, the Vicariate will obviously embrace the Uniate parishes. In this way, the Greek Ruthenian Uniate Church in Romania is detached from the Holy See and brought within the Romanian Orthodox Church as the Uniates in Galicia and Northern Bukovina were brought within the Russian Orthodox Church.

Churches and Religion Romania

795
563

6. The Christians of Old Rite

The name "Christians of Old Rite" is applied to a group of dissenters who originally belonged to the Muscovite Orthodox Church, broke away from it to some extent in the 17th century and, because of persecution, left Russia and settled at various times on the territory of the present day Romania. They are generally called in Russian raskolniki (shismatics) staroobriadtsi (old believers or followers of the old rite), and in Romanian Lipovani (from the name of Bessarabian town Lipova) or muscali. They Russians by nationality of the great Russian Branch and in the new place of settlement up to the present time preserved their language, dress, habits and customs. The schism was the result of the revision of the church books undertaken in the middle of the 17th century by Moscow Patriarch Nicon. The idea of the reform was to eliminate from the liturgical books in circulation in Russia erroneous deviations from the books used in other Eastern Orthodox Churches and correct in the same some local departure from the established ritual. "The Christians of the Old Rite" are the descendants of those Russians who refused to accept those corrections and stubbornly adherred to the practices hitherto customary in the Russian Church. Originally, there were no dogmatic or canonical differences. But with the time those adhering to the old customs became divided into a large number os sects, some of which went very far from the teachings of the Orthodox Church and even Christianity. There are among them sects which completely deny priesthood, sacraments

and any obligation toward the State including taxes and military service. In any event, those who settled abroad broke away from any administration connection with the Moscow hierarchy but did not join any other established Eastern Orthodox Church. Only a part of those remaining in Russia reunited with the official Russian Orthodox Church in the 1830's. These are the so-called "edinovertsi." 795 563

However, those who settled in the Romanian Eastern provinces and their descendants continued their life in religious communities separately from the Romanian society and from the Russian Church. As they were opposed to any assimilation or unification with the Romanian Orthodox Church, they have been treated as a separate religious denomination. The religious tolerance has been granted by documents several times.

This church succeeded in organizing closed religious communities in parishes, in building churches, establishing monasteries and in some sects even establishing a certain hierarchy. But the movement did not have its own Divinity Schools and many sects were not willing to train the priests in Romanian or Russian schools. [793]

After the enactment of the Law No. 54 of 1928, the dignitaries of the Church of the Old Rite prepared a Constitution and by-laws and submitted it to the Romanian Government for approval in order to become recognized as a denomination. Up until 1942 they repeatedly tried to get this recognition and thus transform a de facto tolerance into the de jure recognition. Because of political reasons and suspicions of disloyalty, this status has never been granted. 795 659

After World War II, Russia became interested in this Russian minority in Romania and its organization and helped it to become recognized by the Romanian Government, although not all of the Lipovan communities were willing by now to take such a step under the Soviet tutelage. The recognition was done by Law No. 728 of 1946 (Official Gazette No. 212 of September 13, 1946).

795
659

The status of legal entity was granted to the hierarchical organizations of the Christians of the Old Rite, including their monasteries.

Yet, the law provides that the Romanian State does not in contrast to the statutory provisions of the Law No. 54 of 1928 grant any kind of subsidies to this denomination, either for maintaining its organization and institutions or for paying its clergy.

It must be borne in mind that under the present setup the government, by taking upon itself the financial support of the churches, makes thereby the churches dependent upon it. Therefore, the abovementioned provision of the Law No. 728 may be considered a privilege of the Lipovan Church and a token of its independence from the government.

Besides a complete hierarchical independence, this church is enabled to establish and direct by itself parish schools for the young believers with teachers appointed by the Parish Assemblies.

794
659

Those schools are neither controlled in any way by

the Ministries for Education and for Religious Affairs nor are they obliged in the least to send the curricula for approval (Article 73). 794 659

Consequently, the Christian Church of the Old Rite is not under the control of the Ministry for Religious Affairs with reference to its organization and cult as other denominations are. 795 659

Nor are its assets and financial status checked upon by the government authorities as are the assets of other denominations. Finally, it is permitted to establish and manage denominational schools independent of any kind of supervision exercised by the Department of Education. No other denomination has such a right. [454]

It may be assumed that the Soviets have taken a special interest in this denomination and therefore its status-as any other matter of interest for the Soviets-is not subject to Romanian law.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

000

Rumania

POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF AN AGRARIAN STATE

BY HENRY L. ROBERTS

NEW HAVEN : YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON : GEOFFREY CUMBERLEGE : OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

1951

[Title page]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

PART I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK

000

[ii - iv blank]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

PREFACE

121 RUMANIA is economically one of the relatively backward regions of the world. It is not as backward as vast areas of Asia and Africa, but like them it is faced with the problems of an agrarian society in the twentieth century. How are such societies to adapt themselves to the demands and challenges of the industrial world economy? This is perhaps the most interesting and compelling reason for a study of Rumanian politics and agriculture. A further reason is that since the end of the Second World War Rumania has been "behind the Iron Curtain" and has therefore acquired a certain immediate significance as part of the complex of issues dividing the Soviet Union and the United States. Finally, literature in English on Rumania is comparatively limited and unsatisfactory. Hence, this study of a country rather remote from the interests of most Americans may shed some light in a dark corner.

The premise of this book is that an understanding of Rumania's recent history requires familiarity with the depressed status of its peasantry, whose plight has been a chronic source of alarm, anxiety, or despair since the time of Tudor Vladimirescu, who in 1821 raised a popular revolt against the boyars. Discussions I heard in Bucarest in the winter of 1944–45 echoed to a surprising extent the manifestoes of 1848, the debates on the emancipation of 1864, the polemics evoked by the 1907 uprising, and the Peasant party's radical pamphlets of 1920.

[433] To be sure, between 1821 and 1944 Rumania underwent tremendous changes which might make one question whether the same problems were involved. An independent kingdom was created from the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which had formerly acknowledged the Turkish sultan as their suzerain; after the First World War this kingdom doubled its area. World commerce came to Rumania; industry, if not large, expanded rapidly in the twentieth century. The population multiplied many times over. In agriculture itself there were important developments. From a semipastoral land, where stock raising was more important than farming, Rumania became, for a time, one of the great wheat and maize exporters of the world.

Agrarian problems, too, seemed to change during this period. Initially the chief sources of social discontent were servile dues and labor obligations which bore heavily upon the peasant. Later the un-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

121 equal distribution of land, a great part of which was monopolized by huge latifundiary estates, seemed the root of the trouble. Still later the spokesmen of the peasants complained of the lack of credit and capital and claimed that industry was growing parasitically at the expense of agriculture. Finally, rural overpopulation appeared to supersede all other causes of agrarian distress.

Different efforts at reform, however, failed to overcome these evils, which seemed to be interlinked. For example, servitudes, in the guise of labor contracts, reappeared after their formal abolition because of the unequal distribution of property. The manifestations of overpopulation were only in part a consequence of demographic pressure; they also arose from the low level of output and from the estate owners' control over large areas of land. It was as though Rumania were suffering from one of those maladies which display varying symptoms at different times but continue to waste the victim. The peasantry remained poor and abased throughout, agricultural technique stayed at an exceedingly primitive level, and Rumanian society was marked by a deep chasm between capital and countryside, between peasant and ruler. In 1944 it was obvious that this changing yet persistent affliction was still present, still serious despite the extensive land reforms of 1918–21 which were to have led to a prosperous peasant agriculture by the extensive distribution of estate land to the small cultivators.

Since 1945, of course, with the progressive absorption of the country into the Soviet economic and political sphere, Rumania and its problems must be considered in the vastly more complex context of the Soviet system and in that sense cease to be an altogether intelligible field for independent investigation. While many elements of the agrarian problem remain the same—under any system demographic pressure, level of productivity, and organization of farming are objective data not to be conjured away—control of policy now lies largely in Moscow and is presumably designed for an enormous territorial and economic unit.

The aim of this book is to investigate the agrarian question and its political implications: the effect of a depressed peasantry and a retrograde agriculture upon political life, and, conversely, the attitudes and actions of the major political groups in regard to peasant poverty and agrarian reform. In general terms, the conclusion reached is that the all-pervading influence of the West in the course of the last century or more is the decisive element in this problem. Not only do the outstanding features of the agrarian crisis in Rumania stem directly or indirectly from this influence, but the domestic polit-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

ical activity is understandable only as a variety of responses, involving the copying, modification, or rejection of Western political and ideological models, to the social and economic dislocation which growing contact with the West has brought about. 121

Consequently, the eventual resolution of the agrarian problem in its broader implications depends not upon certain specific technical or political reforms but upon the much more extensive task of adjusting the total relations of Rumanian society to the Western industrial civilization which has enveloped the globe. Present Soviet domination, while reducing the possibility of Rumania's continued direct and uninhibited contact with the West, complicates and amplifies but does not alter this conclusion, for the Soviet system itself appears to be a response—on an overwhelming scale and in a particularly dynamic manner—of a society subject to the same Western influence. In this respect a study of the Rumanian agrarian question may help to clarify what seems to be the central and most fateful issue of our times.

In working out this conclusion I have attempted to combine political analysis and economic survey. Too frequently in works on Rumanian history and on the agrarian question in general I have noticed a tendency to separate politics and economics. For purposes of simple narrative or economic theorizing such a separation has its advantages. But studies dealing with the economics of the agrarian problem are apt to sidetrack the political elements and then conclude by saying, "Such-and-such would be the best economic cure for these difficulties but the unfavorable political situation has prevented its application." Similarly, a straight political narrative of the bewildering confusion of Rumanian public life is likely to conclude with the sentiment, "After all, what more could be expected under such depressed economic conditions?" In each case the picture is incomplete, the question of final responsibility evaded. Obviously, there is a continuous and reciprocal relationship between the political and the economic, and both must be constantly in mind in the search for practical solutions.

I must confess, though, that this study, too, has certain limitations with respect to scope, period covered, and precision of information. Apart from the currently decisive fact of Soviet domination, much of Rumanian history must, if my general conclusion is correct, find its explanation in the impact of external influences over which the Rumanians have had little or no control. Yet it was clearly impossible here to trace the ultimate origins and significance of such external influences as the European industrial and commercial revolution or

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

121 the manifold political and imperialist interests making up the so-called Eastern question. By limiting myself to a relatively close study of Rumania in its reaction to these influences I hope, however, to have achieved a concreteness not attainable in a more extensive survey. As William James said, "A large acquaintance with particulars often makes us wiser than the possession of abstract formulas, however deep."

With regard to the period covered, I have concentrated primarily on the years between 1922 and 1945. I have discussed only briefly the historical background and the important land reforms of 1918–21 since they have been treated in elaborate detail by Dr. David Mitrany in *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*. While I have written at some length on events since the Communists came to power, I prefer to regard that section as a tentative postscript. My personal observations ceased in the summer of 1945, the many important subsequent developments are highly controversial and cannot be handled satisfactorily without reference to all of eastern Europe, and the information concerning them has become increasingly difficult to obtain or assess.

A third limitation, which affects the precision of my analysis, arises from the inaccuracy, unreliability, and incompleteness of Rumanian statistics, which have been a source of anguish to all who have attempted any quantitative appreciation of the Rumanian situation. Three principal reasons account for these statistical difficulties:

a) the absence of a sound basis for statistical information because of the relative immaturity of the country's economy and administration;

b) the distortion of statistics for political or propagandistic reasons;

c) the apparent inability of many Rumanians to handle the simplest arithmetical operation, a perplexing but frequently noted phenomenon. The last two difficulties, while exasperating, are in most cases amenable to a degree of criticism and correction. The first, however, is more fundamental and limits any effort to obtain a precise picture.

In 1940 the Rumanian economist and former finance minister, Virgil Madgearu, gave an accurate description of Rumanian statistical sources at that date:

The principal difficulty of research on the Rumanian economy is the inadequacy of official statistics. . . . Thus, we have at our disposal only one census of the population of the country since it has been united in its

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

ethnic frontiers—that of 1930. We have the most rudimentary knowledge of the agricultural sector, which is the most important in the Rumanian social-economic organization. We lack statistics on agricultural exploitations, and even the statistics on the extent and division of agricultural terrain, on inventory, livestock, etc., are defective. We lack statistics on agricultural laborers. Although there is more information on the industrial sector, statistical data are limited to manufacturing industries. Data on extractive industries are incomplete, and are non-existent for crafts and domestic industries.[1]

121

As Madgearu observed, agricultural statistics are particularly weak. For several years after the First World War estimates of the distribution of agricultural property were based on information gathered in 1905 or before. Plans were laid for a thorough agricultural census in 1930, but only a brief summary for the whole of Rumania was published. In 1941 the government organized a much more scientific agricultural census, but unfortunately only a provisional summary of the results was published, plus detailed studies of a few districts. Another drawback was that the frontiers of Rumania in 1941 did not correspond with those before 1940 or with those after 1945, and as the director of the Rumanian Central Institute of Statistics said, "Our results cannot be compared with preceding situations." The relatively few statistics which have been published by the Groza regime since 1945 are highly tendentious and suspect.

In short, any attempt at rigorous quantitative precision in discussing Rumanian agriculture seems hopeless. Although in the pages that follow a good deal of numerical data has been included, I have used it cautiously and with a painful awareness of its weaknesses and dangers.

Undoubtedly, my general attitude toward Rumania has been fundamentally determined by my own experiences while in that country during the first year after the armistice of September, 1944. To balance these subjective impressions, which have led to bias and unwarranted generalizing in so much of the writing about eastern Europe and the Balkans, I have checked my conclusions with as many primary sources as possible. These are discussed in a bibliographical note at the end of this study. Needless to say, the events of the past five years have compelled modification and in some cases rejection of my earlier opinions. But then, the writer of contemporary history can scarcely hope to build his house upon a rock.

1. Virgil Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești după războiul mondial.* (Bucarest, 1940), p. v.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

OOO I have a number of people to thank for their advice and assistance in the preparation of this book. It was originally written as a dissertation and submitted to the Faculty of Social Studies of Oxford University in 1948. To Mr. Hugh Seton-Watson, my supervisor, and Mr. C. A. Macartney and Dr. David Mitrany, my examiners, I owe great thanks for their careful reading of the manuscript. Dean John Krout of Columbia, Professors Philip Mosely of Columbia, and Sherman Kent of Yale were also kind enough to read this study and to offer numerous scholarly and editorial suggestions. Professor Abram Bergson of Columbia was most helpful on matters relating to Soviet economic and agrarian policy. Mr. Seton-Watson, Dr. Mitrany, Mr. F. W. D. Deakin, Mr. Mihail Farcaşanu, and Mr. Şerban Vallimarescu put at my disposal some indispensable Rumanian books, pamphlets, and newspapers which would otherwise have been unavailable to me. I am indebted to the librarians of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London and the Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale in Paris for aiding me in the use of their collections. I owe much to my American colleagues in Bucarest, especially Louis E. Madison, for endless conversations, discussions, and arguments concerning Rumanian affairs. Above all, I have a great and unpayable debt to one Rumanian friend, now dead, whose clear vision and intellectual integrity—rarities in these times and in that land—have been a source of profound and continued inspiration to me.

Note on Proper Names, Spelling, and Conversion of Weights and Measures

It seems impossible to follow a consistent method in the spelling of Rumanian proper names without producing awkward results. As a general rule I have employed the Rumanian spelling except where a name is most familiar in an anglicized form.

The name of the country itself presents difficulties. "România," the true spelling, does not indicate the English pronunciation at all (as pronounced by the Rumanians, the accent is on the third syllable, and the "â" resembles the difficult Russian vowel "ы"). "Roumania" comes from the French, but the "ou" is unnecessary in English, so I have employed "Rumania," a generally accepted variant. I have used the anglicized forms of the regional names, Moldavia (Moldova), Bessarabia (Basarabia), and Transylvania (Transilvania). Dobrogea, however, is given its Rumanian spelling rather than the older Turkish forms.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

"Wallachia," which I use, is a foreign word not used by the Rumanians and rather disliked. On the other hand, of their words for this region between the Danube and the Carpathians, "Ţara Românească" might be misleading, and I preferred to restrict "Muntenia" to its narrower meaning as the region east of the Olt River, in contrast to Oltenia to the west. Bucarest (Bucureşti) is the only city which I have anglicized, though I might have used Jassy instead of Iaşi (the capital of Moldavia). With regard to personal names, I attempted to follow the most familiar usage and avoid odd-sounding distortions. Thus, King Michael instead of Mihai, but Carol, Ion, and Iuliu rather than Charles, John, and Julius. 000

I have spelled Rumanian words with their diacritical marks. The following English equivalents may serve as a guide to pronunciation:

	suggests pronouncing a back "u" without rounded lips
ă	= like the "e" in "suffer" or the "u" in "burn"
i	= final "i" is usually not pronounced but softens the preceding consonant
u	= "oo" as in "food"
c	= before "e" or "i" like English "ch" or "tch"; otherwise like "k"
â, î	= have no English equivalent; like the Russian "ы"; one grammar
g	= before "e" or "i" like English "j" or "g" in "gentle"; otherwise hard as in "garden"
ş	= "sh"
ţ	= "ts" as in "hats"

The following are the American equivalents to the weights and measures used in this book: 804

1 kilometer (km.) = 0.62 mile
1 square kilometer (km.^{2}) = 0.386 square mile
1 hectare (ha.) = 2.47 acres
1 cadastral yoke (used in Transylvania) = 1.4 acres = 0.58 hectare
1 pogon = approximately ½ hectare (5012 square meters)
1 kilogram (kg.) = 2.20 lbs. avoirdupois
1 quintal = 220.46 lbs. avoirdupois
1 metric ton = 1.1023 short tons
1 hectoliter = 2.84 U.S. bushels

In the measurement of crop yields it is difficult to convert quintals into bushels, since the first is a measure of weight and the second of capacity. The weight of the bushel varies according to the crop. shelled corn, or maize, 48 lbs. of barley, 56 lbs. of rye, and 32 lbs. of Roughly, one U.S. bushel is equivalent to 60 lbs. of wheat, 56 lbs. of

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

804 oats. Hence one quintal of wheat is approximately 3.67 bushels, and a yield of 10 quintals per hectare equals 14.9 bushels per acre. A quintal of corn is about 3.94 bushels, and a yield of 10 quintals per hectare equals 16.0 bushels per acre.

436 Because of the instability of Rumanian money it is difficult to make satisfactory conversions of the *leu* to the dollar. Before the First World War the leu at par was equal to 19.3 cents U.S. gold (old parity), the value of all currencies in the Latin Monetary Union to which Rumania belonged. After the postwar inflation the leu was stabilized in 1929 at 10 milligrams of gold, .900 fine; one leu was equal to .598 U.S. cents. In 1936 the gold content was reduced, and the leu was equal to 1.0127 U.S. cents (new parity). In August 1947, after a terrific inflation, the leu was restabilized at 6.6 milligram of gold, or .66 U.S. cents.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

CONTENTS

Preface 1

Note on Proper Names, Spelling, and Conversion of Weights and Measures

PART I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK

I. Peasant against Landowner 3
II. War and Agrarian Reform, 1918–21 22
III. Agricultural Population and Production 40
IV. Town, Country, and Foreign Trade 67

PART II. POLITICS AND THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

V. Politics in Greater Rumania 89
VI. The Liberal Period, 1922–28 94
VII. The Peasantist Period, 1928–30 130
VIII. The Carolist Period: Depression, 1930–33 170
IX. The Carolist Period: Neoliberalism, 1934–37 187
X. The Carolist Period: Dictatorship, 1938–40 206
XI. The Fascist Period, 1940–44 223
XII. The Communist Period: the Advent to Power, 1944–45 242
XIII. The Communist Period: the 1945 Agrarian Reform 274
XIV. The Communist Period: Since 1945 300
XV. Conclusion 332

APPENDIX: Tables

I. Population of Component Parts of Rumania, 1860–1948 355
II. Demographic Characteristics of Rumania and Selected European States 356
III. Regional Demographic Characteristics in Rumania 357
IV. Vital Rates in Rumania 357
V. Agricultural Population, 1941 359
VI. Agricultural Population, 1941: Percentage and Density 360
VII. Agrarian Overpopulation, by Region, in Rumania 361
VIII. Distribution of Agricultural Property in the Old Kingdom, 1907 362
IX. Leasing of Agricultural Property in the Old Kingdom, 1907 363

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

000

X. Distribution of Land by Farm Units in the Old Kingdom, 1918 363
XI. Pre-1914 Distribution of Land in Bessarabia 364
XII. Pre-1914 Distribution of Land in Bucovina 365
XIII. Prereform Distribution of Land in Transylvania 366
XIV. Land Expropriated under the Agrarian Reforms of 1918 and 1921, as of 1927 366
XV. Disposition of Land Expropriated under Agrarian Reforms of 1918 and 1921, as of 1927 367
XVI. Land Received by the Peasants under the Agrarian Reforms of 1918 and 1921 367
XVII. Distribution of Agricultural Property Following the Agrarian Reforms of 1918 and 1921, as of 1927 368
XVIII. Fiscal Censuses on Landholdings, 1923 and 1928 369
XIX. Distribution of Agricultural Land According to Size of Exploitation, 1930 Census 370
XX. Distribution of Agricultural Properties and Exploitations According to Size, 1941 Census 370
XXI. Distribution of Agricultural Exploitations According to Use of Labor, 1941 372
XXII. Distribution of Agricultural Exploitations According to Use of Labor and Type of Tenure, 1941 372
XXIII. Prevalence of Types of Cultivation (by Percentage) According to Size of Exploitation in the Judeţ of Argeş, 1941 373
XXIV. Expropriation and Redistribution of Land under 1945 Agrarian Reform, as of January 8, 1947 374
XXV. Distribution of Agricultural Proprietorship and Exploitations after 1945 Agrarian Reform, as of January 25, 1948 374
XXVI. Comparison of Distribution of Exploitations by Size in 1941 and 1948 (Excluding Northern Transylvania) 375
XXVII. Principal Branches of Agricultural Activity 375
XXVIII. Percentage of Land Devoted to Different Crops According to Size of Property, 1938 376
XXIX. Production of Principal Grains 376
XXX. Wheat and Maize Yields, 1892–1946 377
XXXI. Rumanian Industry 378
XXXII. Rumanian Foreign Commerce: Balance of Trade 379
XXXIII. Rumanian Foreign Commerce: Imports 379
XXXIV. Rumanian Foreign Commerce: Exports 380

Bibliographical Note 381

Index 401

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

I

PEASANT AGAINST LANDOWNER

The Peasant Revolt of 1907

175
668

IN MARCH, 1907, the peasants in northern Moldavia, not far from the Russian frontier, arose in revolt.[1] Initially the uprising was directed, perhaps as a result of anti-Semitic instigation, against certain Jewish tenants renting large estates, but in its rapid extension south and west into Muntenia and along the Danube into Oltenia it became an increasingly violent assault upon all large tenant farmers and absentee landowners. The peasants not only demanded an amelioration of their labor contracts but in some districts seized land and organized revolutionary bands. The poorer peasants, those with insufficient holdings to support themselves, seem to have been the first to revolt, but they were soon joined by the more prosperous villagers. Indeed, subsequent investigations revealed that the active heads of the movement, in so far as it received any direction, had been village leaders, ex-army sergeants, clerks, and schoolteachers.[2]

For a time neither the central authorities in Bucarest nor the local administrations were able to cope with the spreading unrest, but after the dismissal of the Conservatives a Liberal government, perhaps under the threat of foreign intervention by Austria, took vigorous countermeasures. Troops under General Averescu, later a war hero and political figure, descended on the countryside and after some sharp conflicts restored order. Reprisals in districts where there had been peasant violence were extremely severe. It has been estimated that upward of 11,000 peasants were killed in the course of the revolt and its suppression.

Although the uprising lasted less than a month and was completely subdued, it was, and was felt to be, an event of frightening significance. Here was no by-product of foreign invasion, the frequent

[113]

1. For an account of the revolt see Radu Rosetti, *Pentru ce s'au răsculat ţăranii* (Bucarest, 1908). A recent novel by Leo Katz, *Seedtime* (New York, 1947), is based on this uprising. Many aspects of the revolt are obscure, and the dossiers relating to its suppression are reported to have disappeared subsequently from the Ministry of War. In 1948, however, under the auspices of the Groza government, Mihail Roller edited a collection of state documents regarding the 1907 uprising. This new material, which may contain important additional information, was not available when this chapter was written.

2. C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *Neoiobăgia* (Bucarest, 2d ed., n.d.), p. 204.

[p.1 is blank]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

102

3a

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

102

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175
668

occasion of many of Rumania's woes, nor a national revolt against an alien dominant class, but the unmistakable sign of a deep cleft within Rumanian society. The explosive culmination of a situation which had been building up during the preceding half-century, it rendered explicit and obvious the political dangers of the unresolved agrarian question. The outbreak had been foreshadowed by local uprisings in 1888, 1889, 1894, and 1900, and a few observers had predicted trouble. On the whole, however, an atmosphere of optimism and complacency had prevailed in the years following Rumania's emergence as a united and independent state. In 1906 the Minister of Domains had proudly declared in the Rumanian senate: "Gentlemen, you know that Rumania is one of the countries in Europe in which the small holding is more widespread than elsewhere, where the relation between the large and the small proprietor is more to the advantage of the latter than even in democratic France." [3]

The brief but intense convulsion of 1907, which in the eyes of terrified contemporaries had threatened Rumania's existence as a state and had nearly become a civil war, broke this complacency and gave rise to some soul searching. Politicians and writers ardently debated the causes of the revolt. Indeed, the stimulus of this unsettling event produced some of the most original social writings that have appeared in Rumania. For those who were unwilling or unable to see the full import of the uprising, it was most simply explained as the result either of "instigation" or of "peasant misery." The Conservatives accused the Liberal party of instigating the revolt to overthrow the Cantacuzino government. Despite the vagaries of Rumanian politics, it seems unlikely that the Liberals, many of whom were large landowners themselves, should wittingly have used such a dangerous device, although there is evidence of Liberal agitation directed against the Jewish *fermiers*.

The Liberals in turn charged that the revolt was the work of foreign revolutionaries: "The Rumanian authorities have discovered that the peasant uprisings are the fruits of a secret propaganda carried on among the peasants by a revolutionary group, in which teachers, priests, and Russian seamen of the cruiser "Potemkin" are taking part." [4] They expelled from the country some 880 persons, in-

3. Quoted in G. D. Creangă, *Grundbesitzverteilung und Bauernfrage in Rumänien*, 3 Teile, in *Staats- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen*, Hefte 129, 140 (Leipzig, 1907, 1909), I, 25.

4. Const. Titel Petrescu, *Socialismul în România* (Bucarest, n.d.), p. 198. In 1905 the Russian cruiser "Potemkin," after the mutiny, eventually sailed to Constanța, where the crew debarked as political refugees.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

cluding Christian Rakovsky, one of the leaders of the Rumanian socialist movement. 175 668

Although signs of revolutionary activity and organization had been observed in certain districts, and some inflammatory pamphlets from Bessarabia had circulated in Rumania, the spontaneous spread of the revolt and the lack of evidence of careful preparation would argue against any important significance of such activity. The Rumanian socialists, who were in an extremely weak position, opposed the uprising. In 1892 the party program had declared that a backward country like Rumania was in no position to initiate a social revolution, and in 1907 the party advised the peasants against revolting: "Uprisings benefit only the boyars. The peasants afterward become even weaker and more depressed. . . . Peasants, you will not be delivered by uprisings, you will achieve profitable and lasting results not through violence and plundering but through seeking to destroy the political power of the boyars, landowners, and tenants." [5] In any event, the charge of instigation is a superficial one which, if sustained, explains the spark, not the conflagration.

Neither is peasant misery, while clearly a necessary ground for the revolt, a sufficient explanation. Extreme misery "dulls the mind, numbs the soul, destroys energy and the spirit of revolt, and leads to resignation and blind submission—a state of mind diametrically opposed to that which leads to revolt." [6] Moreover, the 1906 harvest had been exceptionally good. The important part played by village leaders and wealthy peasants would indicate that the revolt was more than a simple reaction to misery.

Certain contemporaries, notably G. D. Creangă, Radu Rosetti, Constantin Garoflid, and C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, made more penetrating analyses of the problem. Creangă, by his statistical studies of property holdings, provided concrete evidence of the high percentage of land occupied by great estates. Rosetti, after an extensive historical survey of the agrarian question, concluded that "the latifundia is the enemy," that the true instigators of the rising were not Liberals or foreign agents but the "egoism, greediness, lack of scruple and lack of foresight on the part of the ruling classes both old and new." [7] Garoflid, an agrarian expert and himself a landowner, held that the acknowledged maldistribution of land was a consequence of a basic crisis in the system of agricultural production. The socialist

5. *Ibid.*, p. 196.
6. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *op. cit.*, p. 179.
7. Rosetti, *op. cit.*, p. 624.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 668 Dobrogeanu-Gherea argued that a state of permanent crisis in Rumania was being effected by the impact of Western political and economic forms upon the traditional Rumanian pattern. The result was an unfortunate hybrid, *neoiobăgia* (neoserfdom), the form of liberal-bourgeois institutions superimposed upon a feudal reality. Although Dobrogeanu-Gherea placed excessive trust in neoiobăgia as an all-inclusive explanation, he correctly realized that Rumania's contact with the Western world had a dynamic and by no means simple effect upon the existing economic and social structure.[8]

Economic and Social Roots of the Agrarian Problem[9]

311 An extreme concentration of land in large estates, an excessive fragmentation of small holdings, and the insignificance of medium-sized properties were the most obvious elements of the Rumanian agrarian problem at that time. In 1905 the disparity between large and small holdings probably exceeded that of any state in Europe, including Russia. On the basis of his investigations, which are probably the most accurate available, G. D. Creangă estimated that Rumanian properties were divided in the following manner: in the terminology of the time, small properties (0–10 hectares), comprising over 95 per cent of all properties, covered 40 per cent of the arable and grazing land; medium properties (10–100 hectares), comprising 4 per cent of all properties, occupied 11 per cent; whereas about 5,000 large and latifundiary estates held nearly 50 per cent.[10] If forests, orchards, and vineyards are included, the area covered by large property exceeded 57 per cent. These figures on property do not, of course, include the landless peasants. Creangă estimated that there were at that time about 300,000 peasants without land and

8. For a further analysis of Dobrogeanu-Gherea's ideas in connection with Rumanian Social Democracy, see below, pp. 276–280.

9. More extensive, and in some respects conflicting, discussions of the economic background of the agrarian problem are given in David Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Economic and Social History of the World War" (London; New Haven, Yale University Press, 1930), and Marcel Emerit, *Les Paysans Roumains depuis le traité d'Andrinople jusqu'à la libération des terres (1829–1864)* (Paris, 1937).

10. In numbers the division was as follows:

Size of holdings in hectares	*Number of holdings*	*Area in hectares*
0–10	920,939	3,153,645
10–100	38,723	862,800
Over 100	5,385	3,810,351
	965,047	7,826,796

For more detailed figures on the distribution of property see the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

another 200,000 who held property jointly and were not included 311
in his computations.

On the assumption that a holding of less than 3 hectares was to- 511
tally inadequate, at the Rumanian level of production, to provide a family with even the bare means of subsistence, Creangă concluded that over 60 per cent of the peasant cultivators (landless peasants plus those with less than 3 hectares), "for the most part heads of families, find themselves in unconditional dependence upon landowners and tenants."[11] If peasants owning between 3 and 5 hectares —holdings certainly on the margin of subsistence—are included, it appears that nearly 85 per cent of the peasants were unable to earn a secure living from the produce of their soil and had to seek additional income elsewhere.

The concentration of land in great estates does not, of course, necessarily imply an agrarian crisis; English and Prussian agriculture developed successfully on large properties. Nor does the peasant's need to go beyond his own holding to earn a living necessarily spell misery for him. The reason the large estate appeared at this time to be the central feature of the Rumanian agrarian problem lies in the particular development of rural property and labor relations in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Unfortunately, the background of Rumanian agrarian history is 423
still extremely obscure. The original social function and source of 566
privilege of the landowning nobles, the boyars, have been the subject of several notable but inconclusive controversies among Rumanian scholars. It is not certain when and to what degree the mass of Rumanian cultivators were reduced to a servile status. Evidence provided by villages of *răzeşi* and *moşneni*—free peasant communities with a form of common landholding, which have survived as relics in the hilly districts—suggests that they at one time were a prevalent form of rural organization, but scientific investigation of these villages has been undertaken only in recent years.[12] There is no question, however, that by the eighteenth century the boyars—and the monasteries—had come to control a great deal of the land, to which

11. Creangă, *op. cit.*, I, 189.

12. The term *boier* has been the popular, if historically inaccurate, name for all large landowners. The problem of ascertaining the boyar's original role resembles in some respects the confusion in Russian history between allodial hereditary landowners and the nobility of service. The villages of free peasants (răzeşi in Moldavia and moşneni in Wallachia) pose, in respect to their nature and origins, questions similar to those relating to the Russian *mir* and the South Slav *zadruga*. Illuminating discussions of these points may be found in H. H. Stahl's article, "Organizarea socială a ţărănimii," in *Enciclopedia României* (4 vols., Bucarest, n.d.), I, 559–576, and in his recent book, *Sociologia satului devălmaş romînesc* (Bucarest, 1946), I.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

423 566 the majority of the peasants were bound as *rumâni* (the most common term for serfs). In its form as in its relatively late flowering the Rumanian servile system more nearly resembled that of Russia than that of western Europe.

The life of the Rumanian serfs was bitter and squalid, as is illustrated by periodic mass flights across the Danube or into Transylvania. Their burdens resulted from their being on the bottom of the social structure of a state first fighting and then subservient to the Ottoman Empire and from the task of supporting, in a relatively self-sufficient economy, the needs of the boyars and their retainers. Although the growing boyar domination was a gradual process and apparently accompanied an internal breakdown of the village community, the act of binding the peasant to the land, carried out as a general measure by Michael the Brave (*ca.* 1558–1601), had, in large part at least, a military and political purpose: to insure a settled population able to provide military supplies. However, while the tax burden and the tributes owing the Turks were transmitted from prince and boyar to the back of the peasant, servile labor obligations, the *clacă*, were relatively light. The population was sparse, and the boyars were not reluctant to grant the peasants land, of which there was an abundance, provided, of course, they paid their tithes in kind.

566 175 Toward the middle of the eighteenth century two new elements appear: increasing state legislation, superseding or codifying customary practices, and the growth of commercial activity. The twin action of these two factors becomes ever more important right through the nineteenth century, and on their interrelation hangs much of the agrarian problem. Both were destructive of the old closed society of traditional rights and a relatively static economy; both were introduced from without. Sometimes they reinforced one another in promoting change; sometimes one held the other in check.

Around 1750 the Phanariot prince, Constantin Mavrocordat, formally abolished serfdom in an act anticipating and resembling the Habsburg Emperor Joseph II's emancipation of 1781. Although this act, in principle, relieved the peasant of personal bondage and of being tied to the land, it did not rid him of labor obligations or dues to the boyar for the use of the land he cultivated. Indeed, at about the same time the boyars initiated a persistent and successful effort to increase the number of days of the clacă and to define a working day in terms which greatly exceeded what a peasant could actually accomplish in one day. Simultaneously, they began to estab-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

lish and extend seigneurial monopolies on such activities as milling and the sale of wine. 566

Both actions clearly arose from the growing commercial possibilities of these years. The Turks were increasing their imports of grain from the principalities, and despite Turkish restrictions trade was developed with neighboring states. Hence it was in the interest of the boyars to increase the amount of labor available to them and to monopolize profitable commercial undertakings. One direct consequence of this new commercial pressure on the peasant was the revolt led by Tudor Vladimirescu in 1821 "against the boyars who have devoured our rights." 175

The next step is signalized by the Treaty of Adrianople of 1829, which opened Rumanian ports to world commerce, and the Organic Statutes of 1831–32, which gave the principalities their first constitutional documents. The effect of the first was vastly to accelerate the pace of commercial expansion. At the beginning of the nineteenth century raising livestock had been the principal occupation, but it was now replaced by the cultivation of cereals, for which the acreage nearly doubled in the thirty years betwen 1829 and 1859. This expansion of commerce in cereals continued until by the outbreak of the First World War Rumania ranked fourth among the world's cereal exporters and fifth among the wheat exporters. As a result, the relative value of land steadily increased. As early as 1805 the boyars undertook to limit the peasants' right to pasture, and in 1828 Prince Sturdza announced that the peasants had no right to exploit more than two-thirds of the lord's domain.

This trend was reinforced by the Organic Statutes. Introduced during the period of Russian occupation, these acts attempted to codify, in somewhat different terms for the two principalities, the relations between boyar and peasant. In so far as they reduced arbitrary action and made precise and definite the peasant's obligations, they were to his benefit. This gain, however, was largely canceled by the fact that for the first time the lord of the land was defined as a full proprietor of his estate. The traditional concept of "master of the land" was replaced by legal ownership. In return for set labor obligations and tithes, the peasants were granted use of land not in excess of two-thirds of the estate, the remaining third being totally in the lord's hands.[13] Under this system, while the peasants had life use of 423

13. The extent of the lord's demesne land—the land actually cultivated under his direction—before the nineteenth century is not certain. Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 21, points out that early village maps show no separate reserve for the master of the land, but

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

423 land, it was not passed on from father to son but reverted to the landowner, who was in turn responsible for providing newly married young cultivators with a holding. In fixing the extent of land to be held by each cultivator, these acts, especially the one for Moldavia, reduced the amount customarily enjoyed for pasturage and restricted the peasants' forest rights. Although the peasant was theoretically free to move, he was in fact tied to his community by a net of regulations.

[433] With a few modifications Rumanian agrarian relations were determined by the Organic Statutes for the next third of a century. Under
566 them, as a contemporary observer remarked, "The principalities took
175 on a new life"; there was a marked increase in economic activity. That
421 the benefits of this activity were not generally shared by the peasants, however, is shown by their continued exodus across neighboring frontiers. They were being forced out of their old semipastoral habits, and the very increase of cereal exports could work to their disadvantage. For example, the entire 1847 wheat crop was sold in advance because of the urgent demands in other European states suffering from food shortages in the late 1840's. As a result of these premature sales, made largely through the boyars, the principalities experienced a food crisis which contributed greatly to the peasant unrest in the turbulent year 1848.

Apart from the abortive attempts at reform during the short-lived Wallachian revolution in 1848 and a moderate revision of the Organic Statutes in 1851, the next major change was the Act of 1864, which paralleled the 1848 emancipation in the Habsburg lands and the Russian emancipation of 1861. This act, promulgated for the united principalities by Prince Cuza, for political and social rather than for economic reasons, abolished the clacă and other servitudes. The peasants obtained full title to the land they had in use, based upon earlier regulations, and the landowners were given a compensation for the loss of their labor. The law followed the now recognized provision that peasant property could not exceed two-thirds of the former lord's estate. The new holdings could not be sold or alienated for a period of thirty years.

By this act, so it seemed, the remnants of the old servile system had been abolished. Possession and use of land were transformed into absolute property rights; the peasant holder was now a free proprietor, owing no servile obligations, and, indeed, the translation of the clacă and other dues into a redemption payment does seem to have dimin-

Emerit, *op. cit.*, p. 45, doubts if there is sufficient evidence to permit a positive declaration that the peasants traditionally had had the use of all the land.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

ished his burdens.[14] Yet a quarter of a century after the Act of 1864 there began those peasant disturbances which culminated in the 1907 uprising. In some way, as Dobrogeanu-Gherea said, "The year 1864 carried in its womb the terrible year 1907."

The connection, however, is not a simple one and is paradoxical in several respects. Between 1864 and 1907 Rumania continued its rapid expansion in agriculture and commerce. Exports of grain, for example, increased from about 1,400,000 tons per year in the early 1880's to nearly 2,500,000 tons in 1905. Hence it is necessary to explain how under such circumstances there should have been growing peasant discontent. Was there, to repeat that old and difficult question, increasing poverty in the midst of expanding national wealth?

In the first place, while the Act of 1864 was passed against the wishes of the boyars, by a coup d'état on the part of Prince Cuza, the administration of the country, especially local administration, was still largely under their control, and they had ample opportunity to twist the provisions of the law to their advantage. Undoubtedly many injustices were committed in its application: often the landowner was able to distribute the worst land to the peasants, holding the best in his own estate; in a number of cases false measuring standards were used, an easy trick in a country lacking basic ground surveys; sometimes the landowner so divided the holdings that the peasants were unable to reach their property without paying a toll. As a cumulative result of these malpractices it is possible that although by the law the peasants were to receive the land they had in use before the reform, they actually received less and of lower quality. Local studies of a few districts indicate that such may have been the case, but statistics are lacking to make a general conclusion.

Another criticism of the law has been that while the peasants' claims to land could not exceed two-thirds of the lord's estate, the excess demand being met by grants of state land, in those regions where the peasants' quota was less the lord was able to retain as absolute property, with no future obligation, well over the minimal one-third. Moreover, under the Organic Statutes the lord was responsible for providing newly married peasants with a holding, while the new act made no adequate provision for subsequent generations. Peasant holdings now became inheritable property to be passed on from father to children. Since the new holdings were virtually inalienable and

14. This point, as in Russia, has been much disputed, and some authors have maintained that the peasants' burdens actually increased. The comparative figures, however, which are provided by Emerit, *op. cit.*, p. 516, if they are accurate and representative, show a considerable falling off of the amount owed by the peasant.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

566
175
423

since the practice was to distribute land equally among heirs, there was an inevitable tendency, on many peasant holdings at least, toward a progressive subdivision of the property. This tendency has been regarded as one of the worst consequences of the reform: "At the end of three generations, the land distributed by Cuza to the rural workers was dispersed into an impalpable dust." [15] Unquestionably the fragmentation of holdings constituted a major obstacle to the introduction of rational agricultural techniques. Further, the reform did not grant land to a number of peasants, those who previously had not performed the clacă or who were listed as free proprietors. Finally, an examination of the size of the lots granted to the peasants reveals that a large number of cultivators did not receive enough land in the first place to enable them to establish a self-supporting holding on the level of cultivation then prevailing.[16]

It is clear, then, that the peasants' gains were limited, that in most cases they were not in a position to set up an independent farm, that the lord was relieved of all future responsibility, and that a number of categories of peasants were not taken care of. Such certainly were the drawbacks. The basis of Rumanian agriculture was not really altered. The reform of 1864 neither set Rumanian agriculture on the path of small peasant farming on the western European model—whether that was even theoretically possible, given the general nature of the Rumanian economy, will be discussed later—nor fostered large-scale farming based upon agricultural wage labor in the English or Prussian pattern.

In addition to the limitations of the 1864 reform, two other factors have been adduced to explain growing peasant dissatisfaction: the laws on agricultural contracts of 1866 and 1872, which are said to have reintroduced serfdom, and the land hunger of an increasing population. The immediate effect of the reform was to create a crisis in production and a great decline in the area sown, largely because the peasants preferred to cultivate their new holdings and refused to work for the landowners, who were faced with a serious labor shortage. The boyars attempted to compensate for this by passing special laws governing agricultural contracts, which unquestionably put the peasant at the landowner's mercy in matters regarding the fulfill-

15. Emerit, *op. cit.*, p. 519.

16. The allotments were based on an earlier threefold division of the peasants, determined by the number of oxen they possessed. Though the figures are only approximate, peasants having four oxen received roughly 6 hectares; those with two oxen 4½ hectares; and the so-called "tail-end" peasants, 2½ hectares. At the prevailing level of cultivation it was estimated that only the first class, a rather small minority of the peasantry, could obtain an assured surplus.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

566 ment of labor contracts and even permitted the employment of mili-
175 tary force to drive the peasant to work. Although the harsher aspects
of these laws were later abandoned, they permanently affected land-
423 lord-peasant relations and did much to justify the term neoserfdom, "the confirmation of the old servitudes in contractual form."

Yet these laws, while harsh on the peasant once he fell into the power of the landowner, would be significant only on the assumption that the peasants were increasingly obliged to go to the landowner for assistance. That is, the laws of contracts merely accelerated the relapse into a servile system—one lacking the paternalistic protection of the old order—but were not in themselves the cause of a deteriorating situation. Moreover, the peasant uprisings did not occur when the laws were at their harshest but later when some of the worst provisions had been abrogated.

Land hunger, in general, results from an excess of population relative to the amount of land available. As has been noted, at the beginning of the nineteenth century the Rumanian principalities were not thickly settled, though even at the time of the Organic Statutes it was not possible to give adequate grants of arable land to the peasants in the old and relatively thickly settled mountainous districts. By the middle of the century the boyars were invoking population pressure to explain the high cost of land. There is no question that in the second half of the nineteenth century Rumania's population expanded at a very rapid rate.

At the same time, however, the expansion of land under cultivation
311 appears to have been increasing even more rapidly, as the plough was put to untilled pastures, waste, and meadow.[17] The extent to which the peasants were able to benefit from this expansion of cultivated area cannot be estimated with any precision. Undoubtedly much of it took place on large estates under the control of the landowners. To some extent, too, it resulted from the peasants converting their pasture land to arable. The act of 1864 had made no provision for communal pasturing; the small peasant holdings were inadequate for both grain and livestock, and from 1864 there is a notable decline in animal husbandry. It is estimated that whereas in 1860 meadows and pasture comprised 33 per cent of the total surface of Rumania, they were reduced to 17 per cent in the years 1901–5, thus offsetting to a considerable degree the gain in land under cultiva-

17. According to Constantin Garofild, *Chestia agrarĂ la România* (Bucarest, 1920), p. 128, between 1859 and 1899 the population of Rumania increased by 54 per cent, whereas the area of land under cultivation increased by 85 per cent between 1862 and 1905.

3: Ro. erts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

311 tion.[18] Hence it may be concluded that much of the expansion of the arable either took place outside the peasant lands or at the expense of pasture. Against this, however, was the periodic doling out of state land, which, while only a palliative, did serve to balance in some measure the growing pressure of population.[19]

The most that may be said is that the growth of population was beginning to become an important element, one that would become increasingly troublesome in the twentieth century, and that while the plight of the Rumanian peasant at this time cannot really be attributed to rural overpopulation, the ratio of land to labor was shifting to his disadvantage. Given this tendency plus the fact that many peasants never had enough land to begin with, one can see how the landowners, controlling much of the land and armed with the laws on agricultural contracts, were able to preserve a quasi-servile system of social and labor relations.

Another development contributing greatly to social friction in the countryside was the increase, from the middle of the nineteenth century on, of absenteeism on the great estates, as the landowners found it pleasanter to live abroad or to engage in politics in Bucarest. By 1900, 56 per cent of the area of properties over 50 hectares and more than 72 per cent on the vast estates over 5,000 hectares were being leased, for the most part not to individual peasants but to large tenants.

The effects of absenteeism were particularly unfortunate in Rumania. To some extent the tenant may have been performing a useful entrepreneurial function in initiating economic activity,[20] but in most cases he merely sublet the greater part of the land to the peasants, who cultivated it in the old manner. The tenant was inclined to regard his lease, which was usually for a short term, as a speculative venture to provide quick gains not by improved cultivation but by

18. Ministère de l'Agriculture, de l'Industrie, du Commerce et des Domaines, *La Roumanie, 1866–1906* (Bucarest, 1907), pp. 267–268.

19. According to Creangă, *op. cit.*, I, 80, the state, in addition to some 572,000 hectares granted in 1864, had parceled out approximately 980,000 hectares by 1905.

It is apparently impossible to make a comparison of the average size of peasant properties at these two dates. The average size of the peasant allotments in 1864 was about 3.8 hectares, whereas by the end of the century the average size of peasant properties under 10 hectares was 3.4 hectares. But the first figure does not include peasant properties already held in full ownership in 1864.

20. The entrepreneurial character of the tenant is reflected in the fact that the larger the lease the higher was the percentage of foreign tenants. The problem of foreign tenants was closely associated with Rumanian anti-Semitism, and it was the common charge that Jewish tenants were grinding the peasant and ruining the country. While Jewish tenants were important on the largest estates of Moldavia, the great majority of tenants (73 per cent) were Rumanians.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

making greater demands upon both the land and the peasant. Since 311
his profits tended to be in direct proportion to the area he was able to lease, there was a marked inclination to build up vast agricultural trusts, some of which covered more than 100,000 hectares. Although ultimately the large tenant was a consequence rather than a cause of the agrarian problem, he was the focus of hatred and abuse: hated by the peasants because he dealt directly with them, verbally abused by the landowner-politicians who made him their scapegoat. Certainly some of the more spectacular injustices and preposterous labor contracts can be found on lands operated by tenants.

This speculative interest on the part of the tenant in acquiring 566
more land contributed to a rapid rise in rents. Between 1870 and 423
1906 rents mounted between 100 and 200 per cent for a third of the 175
properties and over 200 per cent for another third. The peasants 241
consequently were obliged to pay more dearly for the use of land. In 1870 they generally retained from two to four parts of the produce of rented land and delivered one part to the landowner or large tenant; by 1906 in over half the cases studied in an investigation, the ratio was one to one.[21]

The rise in the value of land was not accompanied by an equivalent improvement in agricultural techniques. Most of the peasants were both inexperienced in the careful cultivation of small holdings and financially unable to improve their methods, and the large landowners and tenants had little incentive. By the working of the 1864 reform the peasants remained attached to their strip of land, lacking even the free mobility of the farm laborer. They continued to own most of the means of production: over 90 per cent of the draft animals, ploughs, and harrows in Rumania belonged to the peasants.

Under these conditions the distinction between large-scale and small-scale farming was blurred, and it was characteristic of the latifundiary cultivation prevailing in Rumania that the size of an undertaking was not determined by an organized integration of the productive factors of a given area but was rather the arithmetical sum of a large number of peasant cultivations. The peasant, in return for a piece of land, contracted either to cultivate another piece of land for the proprietor or tenant or to share the produce in a form of metayage. Money payments were uncommon except in Moldavia.[22]

21. Creangă, *op. cit.*, II, 18–22.

22. It must be observed, however, that while the great estates did not, in most cases, utilize progressive farming methods, the output of the large farms was consistently higher than that of the peasant holdings. The reasons for this difference have been the occasion of much dispute. Supporters of large-scale cultivation have held that despite

ɔ: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

From a consideration of all these factors the peculiar nature of the Rumanian agrarian crisis emerges. The poorer peasant, who had been forced to go to the landowner or tenant for additional land, was in an increasingly bad bargaining position. The landowners or tenants, in responding to commercial incentives, could increase production with little cost to themselves merely by demanding more of him, since he supplied the implements and draft animals as well as the labor.[23] Clinging to his little plot of ground and doggedly refusing to become a migrant wage laborer, the poor peasant could see no possible relief to his situation except to have more land. On the other hand, the richer peasant, whose land was sufficient to produce a surplus, likewise found himself restricted by the relative monopoly in land, the high rents, and the speculation of the large tenants: the system was an obstacle to the further improvement of his position.[24]

In general, then, the economic background of the 1907 revolt lay not in peasant poverty alone but in the protracted dislocating effect of commerce upon a previously "natural economy" and a society involved in the ambiguities of neoserfdom. This dislocation has occurred in many forms throughout the globe where modern industry and commerce have impinged upon traditional social and economic patterns. The particular form it took in Rumania, increasing agrarian tension in the midst of a flourishing foreign commerce in cereals, was a product not only of economic and demographic factors but of Rumania's particular social structure, which was dominated by a boyar oligarchy.

Socially and economically Rumania resembled tsarist Russia in several ways. As Dobrogeanu-Gherea observed: "We are the only country in Europe, with the exception of Russia, which has the sad privilege of peasant revolts—neither the Western countries, superior to us in culture, nor those of the East, such as Serbia and Bulgaria, which are inferior to us, have them." [25] In both countries the history

---

the prevalence of unprogressive latifundiary cultivation, large property was making technical advances and was paving the way toward more scientific farming. Advocates of peasant farming have replied that the large owners had kept the best land to themselves and that the peasants were unable to give adequate attention to their own fields. As one peasant is reported to have said: "Do you think this beautiful maize is mine? It belongs to the Jewish tenant. I haven't even hoed my own once yet, his twice. He didn't allot us the land till late." Creangă, *op. cit.*, I, 14.

23. This curious fact, that under the prevailing agrarian relations prosperity seemed to sharpen social tensions, may explain why the 1907 revolt should have followed the excellent 1906 harvest.

24. This grievance of the richer peasants may serve to explain why the minor uprising of 1888 had been most violent in the district of Ialomița, a sparsely populated region having a comparatively prosperous peasantry, but in which an exceptionally high percentage of the land (69 per cent) was in the hands of large proprietors, who leased out more than 70 per cent of their estates.

25. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

of property relations followed a different course from that in the West, and in both countries contact with the West created a steadily increasing crisis which the legislative measures of the nineteenth century did not solve and in some respects exacerbated. In neither case did peasant emancipation lead to the healthy development of small holds but rather to the appearance of the land-hungry cultivator still in a position of dependence on the landowner.[26]

While there were these similarities in Russian and Rumanian social and economic life, and more than a casual parallel in the development of agrarian relations, the political and international positions of the two states were entirely different. This difference explains in part some of the very great divergences in the recent history of these countries.

Political Aspects of the Agrarian Question

Although Rumanian economic and social relations were such as to create a dangerous tension in the countryside, politically, in marked contrast to tsarist Russia, there was relatively little revolutionary activity. This difference has often been attributed to the lethargy and supineness of the Rumanian peasant or to his Daco-Roman stability and love of order and hard work. National qualities may have played some part, though the violence of the 1907 revolt was damaging to many such theories. A more substantial reason would appear to lie in the contrast between the political and international situations of the two states.

Russia, a great empire, was assured of its independence as a nation. Existing institutions were firmly fixed. Russian social reformers could direct their energies toward internal issues without being preoccupied with the question of national survival. For these reasons the climate was favorable to a revolutionary spirit. Quite opposite conditions obtained in Rumania, a newly created state whose position in the community, or anarchy, of nations was by no means secure. Many Rumanians were not as yet included within the country's

26. The sensitivity in Rumania to developments in Russia would suggest the presence of common characteristics. The Russian emancipation of 1861 was followed by Prince Cuza's Act of 1864. There is evidence that the Rumanian rising of 1889 was aroused by a rumor that the tsar had ordered land to be divided among the peasants. The Russian Revolution of 1905 found a reflection in the 1907 revolt in Rumania, and of course the Russian Revolution of 1917 had a direct bearing upon the Rumanian agrarian reforms of 1918–21. The correlation of these events is certainly more than a chronological coincidence. It might be added that Stolypin's program to reform Russian agriculture by creating a class of strong peasant holdings resembles some of the recommendations put forward by the Conservative agrarian expert Constantin Garofid.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

668 boundaries. Consequently, national aims and ambitions tended to receive first attention from all articulate Rumanians.

175 Whatever may be the answer to the much debated question of Rumanian origins, the two principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, did not make their appearance until the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. After a couple of centuries of precarious independence they fell under the domination of the Ottoman Empire. For a time native princes maintained some degree of internal authority; later Phanariot Greeks became the *hospodars* of the principalities; but the two provinces were not united until 1862, and the remnants of Turkish suzerainty were not shaken off until the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. While the Rumanians did contribute to achieving their national independence, the rise of a united Rumania was largely conditioned by events beyond their control: the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the repulse of Russia in the Crimean War, and the equilibrium established by the Concert of Europe at the Congress of Berlin. Rumania's independence and existence as a national state were thus externally determined, at least in the negative sense of permitting the Rumanians to enjoy some freedom of action in the nineteenth century.

[566] The national progress of Rumania did not correspond with the social or material progress of the peasantry. On the contrary, the high points in Rumanian history from the national point of view often marked a decline in the peasant's status. The process of social differentiation which followed the foundation of the principalities seems to have led to a further subjugation of the peasant to the boyar. Under Michael the Brave, who for a short period ruled over all Rumanian lands, the peasants were definitely bound to the land. The Organic Statutes represented an advance constitutionally but also granted full proprietorship to the boyars and rendered the peasants' tenure even more precarious. To be sure, such a process is not unusual; in a society which is becoming more articulated the emerging ruling elements, which from a national aspect represent an advance by strengthening and organizing the state, may achieve their position at the expense of the more amorphous body of that society.

Because of the weakness and precarious position of the Rumanian state, preoccupation with national prestige outweighed and often ran counter to concern for social reform. In the abortive revolution of 1848 the young revolutionaries, educated in France, were undoubtedly fired by ideals of freedom and the rights of man, but more from desire to create in Rumania a proper modern state than from direct interest in the sufferings of the peasant. The manifestoes issued by the Muntenian revolutionaries promised land but at the same time,

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 partly out of fear of Russian intervention, enjoined the peasants to shun violence and to continue working for the boyars.

Similarly, critics of conditions provoking the 1907 revolt show concern for Rumania's position as a nation. Radu Rosetti, for example, believed the threat of foreign intervention which such an outbreak might produce to be one of the most dangerous features of the peasant uprising. Despite his sympathy for the peasants and desire for reform, he pressed for a strong army and an increase in the village gendarmerie, to prevent a repetition of the disorders of 1907 and to show the peasants that the law would be enforced.[27] The socialist Dobrogeanu-Gherea, approaching the question from a different point of view, was equally anxious to maintain Rumania's independence. Fearing that the many similarities between Rumania and tsarist Russia might lead the latter to "regard the Moldo-Wallachian provinces as an easy prey," [28] he urged that Rumania must be protected from tsarist advances by the introduction and preservation of liberal institutions, completely unlike those of Russia. The populist Constantin Stere flatly stated that Rumania could not afford the "luxury of a revolutionary party," since in Rumania's uncertain position such activity invited foreign intervention.[29]

Consequently, although many economic and social tensions disturbed Rumania, and it was obvious that the boyars would not on their own initiative undertake any reforms likely to change the established order, there was little organized revolutionary activity or even revolutionary thinking. On the other hand, the prevalent sense of national insecurity also made the ruling groups more cautious in the exercise of power. King Carol I, a German prince who had been called to the throne in 1866, could not pretend to be an autocratic tsar. On more than one occasion the king, for reasons of national interest, advocated reform and undertook to soften the obstinacy of the boyars, who were likewise sensitive to real pressure from above or below and frequently showed themselves accommodating and flexible when threatened with serious resistance.

642 Rumania's weak power position led many of its political leaders to seek both political and ideological support from the West. Western political and constitutional forms were adopted wholesale: the Constitution of 1866 was based on Belgium's model, the legal system was taken from the Code Napoléon. Imitation of Western institutions had two different and contrary results. On one level, many

27. Rosetti, *op. cit.*, p. 668.
28. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
29. Constantin Stere, "Socialdemocratism sau poporanism," *Viaţa romînească* (January, 1908), p. 50.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

642 of these institutions naturally became mere façades to conceal a much cruder reality. Party politics, for example, bore a very superficial re-
665 semblance to those of nineteenth-century England: two principal parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, alternated in office. But the reality behind this two-party system was altogether different. Politics were based on a very narrow franchise,[30] the parties themselves tended to be coteries surrounding a dominant personality or family, and there were constant factions and party splits. Both the Conservatives and the Liberals obtained their support from the landowners, the principal distinction between them being that the Conservatives were usually the explicit spokesmen of the large agrarian interests, whereas the Liberals were increasingly interested in making Rumania a strong modern (i.e., commercial and industrial) state and held the controlling positions in the growing financial institutions.

671 In the field of law the Rumanians demonstrated what Dobrogeanu-Gherea correctly called a "mania for legislation." A flood of laws was
177 continually being passed—elegantly rendered by men who had taken their law course at Paris—but with remarkably little effect. Some were inapplicable at the outset, few were administered properly, and most were soon forgotten by all concerned, with no effort made to examine their consequences. Other examples could be cited from the fields of public finance, civil rights, and the press to illustrate the abyss lying between political and constitutional forms and actual practice. The persistence of this dualism right up to the 1940's has undoubtedly had a corrupting effect upon Rumanian politics and society.

566 Notwithstanding these contradictions, which have struck all for-
177 eign observers in the past century, the very introduction of Western paraphernalia had certain important positive effects. A peasant who had been inducted, under universal conscription, into the army, who could read in the press (or have read to him) about agrarian disturbances in Sicily, Ireland, or Russia, or who heard the charges and countercharges of the political parties, however rhetorical these may have been—such a peasant was moving out of the closed circle of the village. This is evidenced in the active role played by ex-army ser-
185 geants, clerks, and schoolteachers in the 1907 uprising. Moreover, the mere existence of constitutional and legal devices, however in-
177 operative they may have been, provided potential channels for change and increased the flexibility of the existing order. Thus, in spite of the fact that changes were apt to prove illusory rather than real,

30. A system of electoral colleges, rather like that of Prussia before 1918, assured a preponderant strength in the assembly to the landowners and the wealthy urban groups.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

that an endless series of palliatives and half-measures would take the place of real reforms, even so vigorous a critic of Rumanian institutions as Dobrogeanu-Gherea held that the presence of liberal institutions set Rumania in favorable contrast to tsarist Russia.[31] 155 177

In short, while economic and social tensions precipitated the 1907 revolt, the political situation prevented it from becoming more than a social eruption. It remained a revolt and not the initial stage of a revolution.

The Aftermath of 1907

The peasant uprising frightened the rulers of Rumania into attempting some measures of reform. A law on agricultural contracts was designed to protect the peasant by regulating agreements between him and the landlord or tenant, by prohibiting certain forms of rent in labor, by instituting communal grazing lands, and by establishing regional committees to fix agricultural wages and rents. This law was never really applied and quickly fell altogether into disuse. The proprietors preferred informal and unwritten agreements, which the law did not cover, and few peasants dared to demand application of the law for fear of being driven from the estate.[32] 656

A second law created a state-supported Rural Office to aid in the transfer of land from large properties to the peasants. Up to the beginning of 1912, however, the Rural Office had bought only 76,000 hectares, had divided up 15,000 hectares, and had sold to the peasants only 6,500 hectares.[33] A third law, by limiting the size of leases to 4,000 hectares of cultivable land, attacked the large agricultural trusts held in lease. A fourth law established cooperatives for renting land. It was probably the most successful; between 1908 and 1916 the land rented by the cooperatives increased from 133,000 hectares to 410,000 hectares.[34]

Although these laws were heralded as introducing a new conception into Rumanian life, *socialism de stat*—state intervention on behalf of the peasants—they really provide only examples of Rumanian legislative escapism. They but scratched the surface of the problem and were "fated to disappear without trace in the quicksand of Rumanian public life." [35] The state socialism proclaimed by the Liberals had very little to do with socialism in any Western sense of the term but more closely resembled the paternalistic policies of mercantilism.

31. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
32. Ilie S. Diaconescu, *Chestiunea țărănească în România* (Bucarest, 1928), p. 115.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 120.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
35. Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

page 22.

II

WAR AND AGRARIAN REFORM, 1913–21

The Balkan and First World Wars

175 THE relative calm and the economic revival which followed the 1907 revolt were interrupted shortly by the outbreak of war. Rumania's part in the Second Balkan War was a brief excursion across the Danube into Bulgaria to obtain Southern Dobrogea, but that campaign had an important effect on the agrarian question. Rumanian troops saw in Bulgaria a land of small holdings, without great landowners or large tenants, where the villages were better built and the fields more successfully tilled than in Rumania. The Liberal leader Ion I. C. Brătianu, returning from Bulgaria, published an article in the party organ *Indépendance Roumaine* in the autumn of 1913, in which he advocated a reform of the franchise and an expropriation of large properties to provide the peasants with land. This statement marked an abrupt shift in Liberal party policy, as in the years immediately after 1907 the Liberal leaders had declared themselves opposed to expropriation. Whether Brătianu was reading the signs of the times or whether he was making a calculated political move to oust the Conservatives, then in power, the question of land reform by expropriation had at last been taken up by one of the major political parties.

The Liberals were called to power in December, 1913. Elections were held in February, 1914, and the new Liberal assembly voted for the principle of revising the articles of the Constitution of 1866 relating to the inviolability of property and to the franchise. A constituent assembly, elected in June, 1914, appointed two commissions to prepare the reforms. At this point the First World War broke out and became the exclusive object of attention. The national interest outweighed the social. The constituent assembly was not reconvened until three years later; the commission for land reform met twice, but according to one of its members, "No work was done at all. In 1914—nothing; in 1915—nothing; that was all its preparatory work." [1]

The history of Rumania in the First World War is an exceedingly complex intermingling of international, national, and social cross-currents. When war came Rumania remained neutral, although it had

1. Quoted in Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, p. 98.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

been party to the Triple Alliance (by a treaty which had been kept a complete secret from the Rumanian people). For two years it held this position while the Allies and the Central Powers attempted to outbid one another in promises of territory. The Allies, however, were in the better bargaining position: they could offer the Habsburg lands, Transylvania and Bucovina, as against Russian Bessarabia. The entry of Bulgaria on the side of the Central Powers and the initial successes of the Russian 1916 offensive tipped the balance in favor of the Allies. On August 27, 1916 the government declared war on Austria-Hungary. 175

Rumania immediately met military disaster. The Russian offensive came to a halt, and the anticipated Allied offensive in the Balkans, sufficient to occupy the Bulgarians, failed to materialize. The Rumanian assault on Transylvania was repulsed; the German General Mackensen successfully counterattacked from Bulgaria. With the German occupation of Bucarest in December, 1916, the Rumanian government withdrew to Iaşi, the capital of Moldavia. After a brief period of calm, the entire situation on the Eastern Front was altered by the Russian Revolution.

The February Revolution had an immediate effect upon the Rumanian situation. Russian and Rumanian troops were in close contact on the Moldavian front; the revolutionary ferment spreading among the Russian soldiers, the organization of soldiers' councils, and the agitation for taking over the land could easily have been communicated to the Rumanians. This revolutionary atmosphere, combined with military defeat and the occupation of much of the kingdom by the Germans, rendered the Rumanian government's position extremely precarious. At this critical juncture King Ferdinand [2] visited the front in April, 1917, and made the following declaration to the troops: [3]

> Sons of peasants, who, with your own hands, have defended the soil on which you were born, on which your lives have been passed, I, your King, tell you that besides the great recompense of victory which will assure for every one of you the nation's gratitude, you have earned the right of being masters, in a larger measure, of that soil upon which you fought.
>
> Land will be given you. I, your King, am the first to set the example; and you will also take a larger part in public affairs.

That there was need for such a move to bolster the morale of the troops and to ward off imminent danger of revolution is shown in a

2. King Carol I died in October, 1914, and was succeeded by his nephew Ferdinand I.
3. Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 speech of May 27, 1917 by Professor N. Basilescu, who had been one of the few to foresee the 1907 uprising: "This is the state of mind in the country: disbelief in the government, disbelief in Parliament, disbelief in the constituted authority. . . . Today as yesterday revolution appears to the Rumanian peasant the only possible means for him to resolve the great case between him and the proprietors of estates." [4] The eleventh-hour move by the king, which was supported by both the parties, seems to have been instrumental in averting trouble and in encouraging the troops. In the final Russian offensive of July, 1917, the Rumanian troops made a brave showing against the Germans and fought valiantly at the battles of Mărăşti (July 28) and Mărăşeşti (August 12–19).

175 423 The paternalistic tone of the king's address was also apparent, however, in the steps taken to carry out his proclamation. No peasant delegate participated in the constituent assembly which convened in 1917, and the bill passed by that assembly was simply a compromise worked out by the leaders of the Liberal and Conservative parties. Under Article 19 of the 1866 Constitution, property was inviolable; it could be expropriated only for reasons of public utility, narrowly defined as communications, public health, and national defense. Hence, to expropriate land for the purpose of distributing it to the peasants, it was necessary to amend the constitution.

The 1917 amendment extended the definition of public utility to include expropriation for the purpose of increasing peasant holdings. Cultivable land belonging to the crown and to public and private institutions and all rural properties belonging to foreigners and absentee owners were to be expropriated in their entirety. In addition, 2,000,000 hectares of cultivable land were to be expropriated from private properties (including absentee holdings) of over 100 hectares, the expropriation to be based on a progressive scale which was not defined. Thus, no maximum limit was set to properties. The figure of 2,000,000 hectares was not based on any agricultural criteria but represented a compromise between the amounts proposed by the Liberals and the Conservatives. The chief fault of this amendment was that it was not itself a law for expropriation but only set forth the principles of such a law. Section 5 of the amended Article 19 provided for the promulgation of a law to be passed six months after the national liberation by a two-thirds majority, usually required only for constitutional amendments. If this law were not passed, there would be no land reform.

With the October Revolution, Russia's withdrawal from the war,

4. Quoted in Disconescu, *Chestiunea ţărănească în România*, p. 141.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

and the collapse of the Eastern Front, Rumania was in a hopeless military position, and in March, 1918, it sued for peace. The pro-German Alexandru Marghiloman, who had remained behind in Bucarest, was entrusted with a new government. This government dissolved the constituent assembly, and Marghiloman declared that "the whole agrarian problem must be taken up anew from the beginning." 175 423

During the brief term of the Marghiloman government, Constantin Garoflid, Minister of Agriculture, introduced a series of agrarian measures: obligatory leases, the reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture, and the organization of agricultural workers. Garoflid, though a Conservative and a landowner, had long been opposed to the latifundiary system in Rumania and desired to build up a prosperous medium peasantry. He regarded the 1917 amendment as "not a scientific work but an electoral manifesto." Although previously recognizing the need for expropriation, he considered such an extreme measure unsuited to wartime conditions and advocated forced leases of land to the peasants as a temporary solution. Much in Garoflid's program was conducive to a rational development of Rumanian agriculture. He may even have had in mind a progressive series of reforms, but his proposals were open to the criticism that in Rumania a policy advocating such moderation and gradualness most often meant doing nothing at all. His program, however, was not even to be begun.

The collapse of the Central Powers in the autumn of 1918, Rumania's reentry into the war, and the withdrawal of Mackensen's forces again reversed the situation. The Marghiloman government was dismissed and its laws declared null and void. With the breakdown of the Central Powers, chaos spread through eastern Europe. Revolutionary conditions prevailed in Russia, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In Rumania a dry year, combined with the dislocations caused by the war and the German occupation, left the peasants hard pressed for food. The action of the Marghiloman government in dissolving the constituent assembly had increased their doubts in the good faith of any government. Tension was heightened by the revolutionary activity among the Rumanians in the neighboring regions of Transylvania, Bucovina, and Bessarabia, which had been or were shortly to be incorporated in Greater Rumania. [178]

The Agrarian Reforms of 1918–21

Immediately after the armistice, on November 12, 1918, King Ferdinand issued a new proclamation reaffirming his pledge of 1917. 175 423 656

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 656 423 Under the pressure of events the government did not bother to follow the formalities prescribed in the 1917 amendment but quickly drafted a decree-law, to be ratified subsequently by the parliament. This decree-law of December 15, 1918, laid down the norms under which land was immediately to be expropriated. Some of the leading provisions were as follows:[5]

a) As in the constitutional amendment, arable crown and mortmain land as well as foreign and absentee properties were completely expropriated.

b) The amount of 2,000,000 hectares was to be expropriated on a sliding scale from private properties of over 100 hectares. This rather arbitrary scale did represent an advance upon the 1917 amendment in limiting all properties to 500 hectares, but it made no provision for geographical differences, relative land hunger, or rational organization of estates. The law based the expropriation on properties rather than on proprietorship, to the benefit of the landowner with multiple holdings. Moreover, the relation between the scale of expropriation and the 2,000,000 hectares to be obtained was not accurately computed, and the expropriation actually fell short by some 450,000 hectares.

c) Compensation for expropriated land was to be based on a number of factors: price of sale in the region for five years prior to 1916, regional level of rent, evaluation by credit institutions, net income per hectares, etc., but was not to exceed twenty times the regional rental rate. Payments to proprietors were to be made by 5 per cent state bonds, redeemable in fifty years. The state was to contribute up to 35 per cent of the cost.

d) Peasant associations were to be created to serve as temporary recipients of the transferred land. The law went into little detail as regards resettlement, which was covered later by the law of 1921.

175 423 185 Ion I. C. Brătianu, who had headed the government on December 14, 1918, resigned on September 27, 1919, in a dispute with the Allies on the peace settlement. King Ferdinand accepted the resignation and formed a nonparty cabinet under General Vaitoianu to hold a general election. This election, virtually the first to be uncontrolled in Rumanian history, produced surprising results. The Liberals lost most of their seats in the Old Kingdom, and after some delay a bloc made up of the newly formed Peasant party and the National party of Transylvania assumed office.

During its brief term this government, with the Transylvanian Vaida-Voevod as Premier and Ion Mihalache as Minister of Agricul-

5. Full summaries of this and the subsequent agrarian law of 1921 are given in Diaconescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 148–334, and Mitrany, *op. cit.*, pp. 111–182.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

ture, introduced a bill for the resettlement of the peasants as well as for an extension of the expropriation. According to Mihalache, the Vaida government sought to make a new agrarian reform which was not based on the limited concept of the constituent assembly at Iaşi.[6] Although this bill was not passed, it is of importance as an early expression of the agrarian program of what was to become the National Peasant party.

The *exposé de motifs* of the bill granted that when promulgated the acts of 1917 and 1918 represented the only workable formulae, given the composition of parliament and the state of the nation, but stated that the incorporation of Bessarabia and the other provinces in Greater Rumania now made imperative further action on behalf of the peasants in the Old Kingdom, since the new provinces were enjoying extensive land reforms. By the terms of this bill expropriation was to be based on the total holdings of a proprietor, not on separate properties, and was extended to include property continuously rented for ten years prior to 1916. Private property in excess of 100 hectares of cultivable land was to be expropriated; in this the framers of the bill consciously followed the provisions of the relatively radical Bessarabian land reform. Exceptions, however, were made for estates organized as farms with a significant capital investment; these were limited to 250 hectares in densely populated regions and to 500 hectares in regions of sparse population. Property remaining after expropriation was not to be leased except to peasant cooperatives. In general, the bill was more radical than its predecessors in the Old Kingdom and represented a peasant point of view, both as regards the expropriation and the organization of agriculture, rather than a political compromise formulated by the landowners to avert peasant revolt.

As soon as the nature of Mihalache's bill became known, the old parties took steps to block it. The Minister of Agriculture was unable to obtain an audience with the king, allegedly as a result of Liberal intrigue. On March 12, 1920, after failing to obtain the king's approval to present the bill as a government measure, Mihalache presented it to the assembly as a private member's bill. At that session he warned: "But it should be known that if parliament has to leave, or if the government has to leave, it is because of a conspiracy by the whole oligarchy of all the boyar political parties." His prediction was realized; on the following day the government, which still held a substantial parliamentary majority, was dismissed by the crown in

6. For the text of this bill and the debate at its introduction, see the pamphlet published by the Federaţia Democraţiei, *Proectul legei de improprietărirea ţăranilor* (Bucarest, 1920).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 what has been called "the most questionable act of King Ferdinand's
185 reign."[7] Although peasant disturbances, general instability, and the inexperience of the Vaida government have been cited as reasons
423 for its downfall, it seems clear that its dismissal stemmed directly from the hostility of the landowners to the proposed agrarian bill.[8] Thus, the effort of the Peasant party to carry through a more radical reform by legal means was defeated.

The new premier, General Averescu, was selected because he was a popular military hero. He immediately ordered new elections and by the usual controls was able to obtain a majority for his People's party. Mihalache was replaced by Constantin Garoflid. Garoflid, as has been seen, was by no means opposed to land reform, but he did not approve of the emphasis upon large-scale expropriation and the creation of a multitude of small holdings. It was his task, however, to complete a measure based upon principles he had always attacked.

423 The second land reform law for the Old Kingdom was promulgated on July 17, 1921. Although primarily concerned with allotting land and resettling the peasants, it also extended expropriation to obtain the 450,000 hectares lacking after the 1918 decree-law. Expropriation was now based on proprietors rather than properties, and the old sliding scale was abandoned in favor of a more elastic measure which took account of regional geographic differences and relative land hunger.[9] Land left to the proprietor was to be determined at once,

[113]

7. R. W. Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians* (Cambridge, 1934), p. 551.

8. The attitude of the landowners at this time is shown in a circular distributed by the Union of Syndicates of Moldavian Landowners: "We, landowners, are firmly determined to oppose by all means, and especially by impeaching before the Court of Cassation, all those provisions of the decree-law of 1918, of the law for communal grazing, and of any future law or decree, which may conflict with the letter of the Constitution regarding the expropriation of land . . . To re-consecrate the intangible right of property, we demand that a law shall be passed which shall punish with hard labor for life whomsoever shall speak of expropriation again." Quoted in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

9. Land was left to the proprietors on the following basis:

	Land cultivated by owner (hectares)	*Land cultivated by owner with important capital investments (hectares)*
In highlands and hills	100	100
In plains, where demand for land was great	150	200
In plains, where demand for land was moderate	200	300
In plains, where demand for land was satisfied	250	500

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

but land to be expropriated was not to be taken over until it could be utilized. Thus expropriation was to be gradual, keeping pace with resettlement. 423

The 1921 law established a list of priorities of claims to receive land, determined primarily by war service rather than by economic considerations. Land to be distributed was divided into complementary lots for peasants with less than 5 hectares, full lots of 5 hectares, and colonization lots of 7 hectares. Provisions for grazing land had been made by a special act of September 24, 1920; these were supplemented by Article 23 of the law of 1921. Nothing was done with respect to woodlands and forest.

The problem of compensation created much confusion. The acts of 1917 and 1918 had merely limited compensation to not more than twenty times the regional rent for 1916. With the decline of the leu after the war, this compensation was deemed inadequate, and the 1921 law raised the rate to forty times the 1916 regional rent. Half the price was to be paid by the state. The peasants' payments were to extend over a period of twenty years, on condition of a 20 per cent payment at the outset.

The scattered distribution of peasant holdings in uneconomic strips was one of the chief hindrances to rational cultivation. Garoflid had always regarded consolidation as indispensable for a more productive agriculture, and Article 136 of the 1921 law stated that measures for consolidating holdings would be provided for in a special act. This act, however, never appeared, and scattered strips remained characteristic of Rumanian farming. One reason for inaction on such an important issue was that the peasants themselves were not striving for consolidation as they were for more land. Mihalache, while granting that "none of us could be against consolidation on principle," feared that the dangers of misapplication under existing circumstances were greater than the probable benefits.[10]

A related problem was the practice of dividing holdings equally among heirs. The law of 1864 had made peasant allotments inalienable but had not prevented their fragmentation through inheritance. Article 126 of the 1921 law limited the splitting of allotted land by succession to a minimum of two hectares in the plains and one hectare in the hills and highlands. Article 127 permitted the owner of a property to leave it to only one heir, with a money payment to the others. Under Article 133 a landowner was allowed to declare indivisible an area up to 50 hectares. Article 120 reversed previous practice by

10. I. Mihalache, *Dreptul țăranilor la pământ, islazuri și păduri* (Bucarest, 1922), pp. 129–130.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

423 permitting the sale of small property, on certain conditions and after five years. Article 122, however, limited purchases to 25 hectares in the hills and 100 hectares in the plains.[11]

423 185 In general, the 1921 law was more carefully drafted than that of 1918 and did attempt to remedy some of the technical errors of previous legislation. The economic effects of these land reforms, which together were reported officially to have expropriated nearly 2,800,000 hectares of land in the Old Kingdom, will be discussed in a later chapter.[12] The acts of 1918 and 1921 were, however, essentially defensive political rather than economic measures. As Mihalache said in his critique of the decree-law of 1918,

> it is not the work of a social concept, not the response to a social ideal, not the work of conviction; under the threat of the events of 1917, it is the continuation of a series of land settlements on the model of 1881 and 1889, it is the over-simplified concept that a new equilibrium between large property and small property must be stabilized in order that there be future peace.

In his opinion, "The ruling class has made only such concessions as were necessary to assure its own existence. The reforms have been a kind of safety valve."[13]

The safety valve, however, was successful. Despite its very precarious position, Rumania passed through the revolutionary storm in eastern Europe without an overthrow of the established order. Several reasons explain this success. A decisive factor, doubtless, was the flexibility of the ruling groups. Notwithstanding the obduracy of many members of the landed oligarchy and in spite of efforts to avoid or delay the reform, the landowners did at least yield sufficiently to prevent an outbreak. Their recalcitrance between 1917 and 1921 was in inverse ratio to the amount of peasant unrest. Moreover, the king, although conservative socially, was able to take the correct 423 steps at two critical moments, in April, 1917, and in November, 1918.

186 Apart from the flexibility of the landowners, certain other forces 668 were at work. Among the Conservatives, the stronghold of the landed interests, there were such men as Garoflid who recognized the failings of Rumanian agriculture and desired to make thorough-going changes, though along lines different from those followed. In the

11. For subsequent modifications, in 1925 and 1929, of these provisions for sale, see below, p. 125 and pp. 156–157.

12. The difficult task of discovering just what the land reforms accomplished in redistributing property is discussed below, pp. 48–49, and in the Appendix.

13. Mihalache, *op. cit.*, pp. 5, 29.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

423
195
668

Liberal party, the primary interest was in the expansion of industry, commerce, and finance, and since 1913 the party had officially stood for expropriation. In several respects the Liberal position was unfortunate since it had neither the reforming zeal of the new Peasant party nor the Conservatives' interest in the improvement of agriculture. The Liberals tended to regard land as a bone to be thrown to the peasants when the howls of the latter seemed menacing or detrimental to the national interest. Such a view was apt to neglect the economic aspects of the agrarian problem and to reduce it to a question of finding more land for distribution. Nevertheless, this Liberal attitude did make for change. Finally, once the question of land reform became the order of the day, the mere pressure of politics led the parties, if only for electoral reasons, to make the appearance of favoring reform.

A second factor was that the land laws, despite delays and omissions, were sufficiently extensive to pacify the peasants. A great deal of land changed hands, and the Rumanian reform was the most far-reaching of all the postwar agrarian measures in eastern Europe (excluding Russia, of course).

A third factor was concern for the national interest, which, as noted above, has usually been of primary importance in determining Rumanian internal policy. Notwithstanding military defeats, enormous human losses, and devastation of land, Rumania emerged from the war a victorious power with doubled population and territory.[14] The mere fact of being victorious and having achieved the national aim of Greater Rumania undoubtedly served to mitigate social tensions. The parties were in agreement in glorifying and protecting the new national unity; since Rumania was surrounded by states from which it had obtained territory, the defense of the new frontiers was a major concern of all postarmistice governments.

The very violence of the Russian Revolution, particularly the Bolshevik Revolution, served to create an opposing reaction in Rumania, heightened by the territorial dispute over Bessarabia. The political parties, including the Peasant party, were exceedingly hostile to bolshevism, which became the ultimate term of abuse in political debates. Mihalache had been sent to Bessarabia during the war to carry on antibolshevist propaganda, and one of his appeals for a more extensive land reform was that in the future the peasants should not be tempted to look beyond Rumania's frontier on the Dniester for better conditions. Fear of Soviet communism was one of the cardinal fea-

14. The area of Rumania in 1915 was 137,900 square kilometers; in 1919, 294,000 square kilometers. Its population in 1913 was 7,625,000; in 1919, 15,500,000.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

423 tures of Rumanian policy for the next twenty-five years, and in the
185 international councils Rumania was to stress its role as the European
668 bulwark against bolshevism.[15]

175 ## *Agrarian Reform in the New Territories*

423 Thus far only the agrarian reform in the Old Kingdom has been considered, and it does provide the central thread of the agrarian question in the interwar period. But as a result of the war Rumania also acquired Bessarabia from Russia, Bucovina from Austria, and Transylvania from Hungary. The agrarian problems in these three provinces were different in several respects from that of the Old Kingdom; the separate laws passed for each of the provinces further increased the complexity of the Rumanian agrarian situation after the First World War.

1. BESSARABIA

Bessarabia, which had formed a part of the principality of Moldavia, was ceded by the Turks to Russia in 1812 at the Treaty of Bucarest, in return for the evacuation of the remainder of Moldavia and Wallachia.[16] Three southern districts were returned to Moldavia after the Crimean War, but reverted to Russia after the War of 1877. The population was predominantly Rumanian, though large numbers of Ukrainians and Bulgarians inhabited the southern districts. In the last decades of the nineteenth century the tsarist regime undertook to Russify Bessarabia but without marked success. The Moldavian boyars in Bessarabia were notoriously obscurantist, and the province was a "natural breeding ground of such movements as the Black Hundreds." [17]

15. F. Borkenau, in his study, *The Communist International* (London, 1938), p. 99, attaches great importance to the Rumanian agrarian reform in this connection: "The agrarian reform in Rumania was perhaps the strongest single obstacle that opposed the advance of Bolshevism towards the West. It was very far from solving all problems, even for the peasantry, but for a decade it took the sharp edge off them. Revolutionary trends among the proletariat remained, but the proletariat alone was nothing in Rumania, and revolutionism among its members was more of a convulsion than a clearly defined movement."

16. The current Soviet interpretation of this event appears to be that in the eighteenth century the Moldavian and Wallachian boyars had sought the incorporation of the principalities in Russia as the sole means of escaping the Turkish yoke. This act of liberation was taking place during the Turko-Russian war of 1806. The threat of Napoleon, however, forced Tsar Alexander to come to terms with the Turks, so that only Bessarabia was fortunate enough to be liberated and incorporated in the tsarist empire. See A. Dolnik, *Bessarabiya pod vlastyu Rumynskikh boyar, 1918–1940 gg.* (Moscow, 1945), p. 5.

17. R. W. Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 563.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Although the general agrarian structure of Bessarabia resembled that of the Old Kingdom, certain differences developed during the century of Russian control. The emancipation of 1861 corresponded roughly to the Cuza reform, but the allotted land, *nadyel*, was given over not to the peasant but to the peasant commune, the mir. While the Bessarabian allotments at the time of the emancipation were greater than for most parts of Russia, there was, as in Rumania, an increasing land hunger arising from the nature of the reform and the rapidly expanding population. The Stolypin reforms, after the 1905 revolution, worked to increase individual peasant ownership and to break up the mir, but by the outbreak of the war nadyel land still constituted the largest category of property. In Russia after 1907 the sale of land to the peasants by the large landowners was widespread and especially so in Bessarabia. Although a comparison of the pre-1914 distribution of property in Bessarabia with that in Rumania is difficult to make since the Russian returns were based upon distinctions between types of ownership rather than size, the general order of the problem was similar in the two regions.[18]

The history of Bessarabia's incorporation into Rumania is still bitterly controversial. Only the major developments can be sketched here. Immediately after the February Revolution, two political currents began to emerge in Bessarabia, an agrarian-revolutionary (which tended to be hostile to Rumania as a land dominated by boyars) and a nationalist-Moldavian. From July, 1917, the peasants began to seize land, and by the end of the year some two-thirds of the large property had been taken over. A military committee, representative of the Moldavian element, convoked a congress which, on October 21–23, 1917, passed a resolution in favor of the "historical and political autonomy" of Bessarabia and decided to convoke a national council (*Sfatul Ţării*). The situation was utterly disorganized by the October Revolution and the Ukrainian break with the Bolsheviks. The *Sfat*, which was strongly Moldavian nationalist, was opposed to the centralism of the new Bolshevik regime. On December 2, 1917, it announced the formation of a Democratic Moldavian Republic as a self-governing unit in the Federative Democratic Russian Republic.

A crisis was reached in January, 1918, when Rumanian troops, sent to Bessarabia at the request of the Sfat, ousted the Bolshevik Soviets which had gained power in several cities and had attempted to supersede the Sfat. Shortly thereafter, the Sfat proclaimed the independence of the Moldavian republic. When Rumania sued for peace in March, 1918, the Germans favored the Rumanian interest

18. For statistics on land distribution in Bessarabia see the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175
423

in Bessarabia. On April 9, 1918, the Sfat by open vote—86 to 3, with 36 delegates abstaining—declared for the union of Bessarabia with Rumania, but with important reservations: the Bessarabian land reform was to be maintained and the province was to have administrative autonomy.[19]

In Bessarabia, unlike the Old Kingdom, the redistribution of land was achieved by the direct action of the peasants. As a consequence, there were doubts, to say the least, among the cultivators as to the desirability of uniting with Rumania. Mihalache reported that the Bessarabian peasants said to him, "We will not unite with Rumania, since Rumania belongs to the *ciocoi*, who have fleeced the peasants." [20] Before Bessarabia was united with Rumania, however, there was a retreat from the first wave of land seizures. The Sfat succeeded in retaining 50 hectares for each proprietor, and subsequently the area was increased to 100 hectares. The land reform law proposed by the Sfat was subsequently ratified in Rumania by the decree-law of December 22, 1918, but 47 of the 73 articles of this decree-law were later modified by the law adopted by the Rumanian assembly in 1920.

The Bessarabian reform as finally drafted expropriated in full: former state and crown domains, mortmain estates, monastic properties (except one-half hectare for each monk), estates belonging to towns (except land reserved for town planning), estates of foreigners, and estates farmed out for five successive years. One million hectares were to be expropriated from private property, including all properties above 100 hectares (multiple holdings were counted as one property). Peasant allotments were set at 6–8 hectares, with complementary lots for peasants lacking the minimum. Compensation was based on rent obtained in the period 1910–14, capitalized at 5½ per cent. The price of the land, in general, was set at 800 lei per hectare, over the protests of the peasants who maintained that they had obtained the land through the revolution. The state assumed 25 per cent of the price. According to official Rumanian statistics, the total area expropriated was about 1,492,000 hectares.[21]

19. The Bessarabian controversy has centered on the actions of the Sfat: whether it was representative and whether its decisions reflected the wishes of the people. In the Soviet view, the Sfat was merely the tool of the landlord counterrevolutionaries, and the ousted Soviets the true representatives of the peasant masses. Dolnik, *op. cit.*, p. 20. There have been doubts as to the validity of the vote of April 9, 1918, and assertions that it was made under Rumanian military pressure. The high number of abstentions and the open vote would lead to the suspicion that it was scarcely an ideal referendum.

20. *Proectul legei de impropriștărirea țăranilor*, (Bucarest, 1920), p. 54. Ciocoi was the peasant's term for the boyar's pack of retainers.

21. For further statistics on the Bessarabian land reform see the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

It has been held that Bessarabia provided a revolutionary leaven for the rest of Rumania. To a degree this is true. Even before the First World War both socialist and populist theories were transmitted from Russia to Rumania through Bessarabia. The Bessarabian land reform had an effect upon the policy of the nascent Rumanian Peasant party; the exposé de motifs of the Peasant party's reform bill of 1920 argued that the law passed by Sfatul Țării for Bessarabia made equally extensive measures mandatory for all of Rumania. Mihalache, in defending his bill, pointed out that the Bucarest assembly was unwilling to accept for the Old Kingdom measures they had previously ratified for Bessarabia, and asked whether the impression was to remain that the Bessarabian peasant had achieved more for himself through revolution than had the peasant of the Old Kingdom through the good offices of the parliament.[22] 175 423

But the radical influences coming from Bessarabia were less than the contrary influence of Rumania upon Bessarabia. Successive formulations and arrangements regarding Bessarabia progressively reduced the extent of the agrarian reform, took away the administrative autonomy of the province, and extended the centralized administration of Bucarest. As a result, regardless of the original sentiment favoring incorporation in Rumania, Bessarabia was a disaffected area throughout the interwar period, with much the most corrupt administration of any Rumanian province.

2. BUCOVINA

Bucovina, which had formed the northern portion of the principality of Moldavia, was ceded by the Turks to Austria in 1775. The population was originally largely Rumanian; in 1848 Rumanians numbered 209,000 as against 108,000 Ruthenians. This proportion altered in subsequent decades until by 1910 the Ruthenians were the largest group, though not a majority, outnumbering the Rumanians 305,000 to 233,000. There were also some 102,000 Jews and 66,000 Germans at that date. In general, the Ruthenian population was concentrated in the northern part of Bucovina, the Rumanian in the south. 176 [162]

By the treaty of alliance of August 17, 1916, between the Allies and Rumania, the latter was to receive all of Bucovina to the Prut River. At the time of the peace conference, it was suggested that part of northern Bucovina be included, for ethnic reasons, in eastern Galicia. This suggestion was dropped with the collapse of Galician au-

22. *Proectul legei de improprietărirea țăranilor*, pp. 29 and 58.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 tonomy because of the desire not to increase the number of Ukrainians under Polish rule. The incorporation of Bucovina had none of the turbulence that accompanied Bessarabia's. A general congress met on November 28, 1918, and voted for union with Rumania.

311 Before the First World War, of the cultivable area of Bucovina, holdings over 100 hectares occupied 25 per cent, holdings between 10 and 100 hectares 27 per cent, and small holdings 48 per cent. (If the very extensive forest lands are included the holdings over 100 hectares covered more than 60 per cent of the surface of the province.) Large properties were less dominant than in the Old Kingdom and medium properties much more important, partly because of German colonization and efforts by the Austrian government to foster this category of holding.

423 The decree-law of September 7, 1919, for the Bucovina land reform was ratified by the law of July, 1921, which modified the decree in favor of the landowners and reduced the extent of land to be expropriated. Land reform in Bucovina was made under more peaceful circumstances than elsewhere and was more carefully worked out. The state was given a right to reserve land for general needs, and the landowner was allowed continued use of his land until it was actually taken over. The reform expropriated in full: estates of foreigners and absentees, mortmain estates, estates of persons who had lost their civil rights, and estates farmed out for more than nine years. Expropriation of private properties was on a sliding scale beginning at 100 hectares and permitting a maximum of 250 hectares on properties having considerable inventory and equipment. Scattered properties belonging to the same owner were counted as one. The allotment of land was made in lots of 4–8 hectares, colonization lots of 5 hectares, and complementary lots of not less than ¼ hectare for peasants having less than 4 hectares. Compensation to landowners was approximately the same as in the Old Kingdom, and the state assumed 50 per cent of the cost. The peasant could pay in whole or in part, the remainder becoming a mortgage payable in 50 years at 5 per cent. According to official statistics the total area expropriated in Bucovina was about 76,000 hectares.[23]

3. TRANSYLVANIA

175 The disputed history of Transylvania and the endless controversy that has raged between the Rumanians and the Hungarians

23. For further statistics on the distribution of land in Bucovina and the effects of the land reform see the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

are far too complex for inclusion here. Whatever the origins of the 175
Transylvanian population, at the outbreak of the First World War the Rumanians constituted a majority of the inhabitants of this region; with the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the Transylvanian Rumanians, along with the other ethnic groups in the empire moved to break away. On October 12, 1918, the Rumanian National party of Transylvania drafted a resolution demanding the right of self-determination. A national assembly was called at Alba Iulia on December first and passed a resolution in favor of the union of all Rumanians. The basis of this union was to be:

1) full national liberty for all races;
2) full autonomy for all regions;
3) a democratic regime with general, direct, equal, and secret elections;
4) complete liberty of press, assembly, and association;
5) radical agrarian reform;
6) equitable conditions for industrial workers.

A Governing Council (*Consiliul Dirigent*), under Iuliu Maniu, was established as the temporary administration. The Treaty of Trianon assigned Transylvania and the adjacent regions of Maramureş, Crişana, and the Banat to Rumania.

Servile tenures had been abolished somewhat earlier in Transylvania than in the Old Kingdom, and the relative importance of medium properties reflected the generally higher level of cultivation. [566] 311
Nevertheless, there was a great disparity between large and small properties, a disparity intensified by the national question. The Rumanians were almost entirely peasants, and most of the large estates belonged to Hungarians. Reliable information, however, is lacking regarding the distribution of land either by size of property or by nationality; according to Hungarian critics of Rumanian statistics, no exact figures have ever been available for the land distribution in 1919 in the total area annexed by Rumania.[24] The Rumanians have claimed that they held only 24 per cent of the total area and that 98 per cent of the properties over 100 cadastral yokes (the yoke, used in Transylvania, equals .58 hectares) were held by non-Rumanians. While this claim may have been extreme, Hungarian sources grant that 87 per cent of the owners of properties exceeding 100 yokes were Magyars.

The project for the land reform, prepared in thirty-two sittings 671
of the Governing Council, became a decree-law on September 12, 423

24. C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors* (Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 316, n. 2.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

671 1919, and was subsequently ratified by the law of July 23, 1921. In
423 Transylvania, where economic life was more advanced and extensive cereal cultivation played a less dominant role than in the Old Kingdom, the agrarian reform while radical in intent was more broadly conceived and had numerous exceptions and exemptions. It expropriated in full: estates of foreigners, estates of certain public and private institutions, estates which had been leased for more than twelve consecutive years, and any estate land of more than 500 cadastral yokes. Below 500 yokes, land was expropriated on a sliding scale down to an exempted minimum of 200 yokes. If, however, further land were needed, property below 200 yokes could be expropriated. Multiple holdings by one proprietor were considered one. The size of allotments was not fixed. The order of preference was determined primarily by war service rather than by land need, but peasants owning more than 5 yokes were not to receive land until other demands had been satisfied. The Transylvanian reform went beyond the others in its provisions for communal woodlands, which were not created for the Old Kingdom, Bessarabia, and Bucovina until a law for the expropriation of forests was passed in 1924. Compensation for expropriated land was subject to less rigid limits and the payment to the landowner was prompter. According to official statistics about 1,664,000 hectares were expropriated in Transylvania.[25]

423 The Rumanian land reforms, in the years 1918–21, did not, then, represent a unified program but varied considerably, depending upon geographical differences, previous agrarian conditions, and political circumstances. The reforms in Bessarabia and Transylvania reflected the more revolutionary spirit in those provinces; the complexities of the Transylvanian law and the attempt to relate it to the whole economy correspond to the generally higher level of Transylvanian agriculture and the presence of a nascent industry.

Notwithstanding these differences, however, which make it impossible to give a simple summary of the agrarian reform, the laws have certain common features: they were all based on expropriation in the "public interest" for the purpose of increasing peasant properties and communal pastures; although the decline of the leu in the 1920's almost destroyed the value of the compensation, the reforms were not planned as confiscations; and despite economic provisions of varying merit, the laws were not primarily economic reforms but social measures designed to appease the peasants' land hunger. More-

25. For further statistics on the effects of the reform in Transylvania see the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

over, the process of incorporating the new provinces into Greater 423
Rumania did tend to level out the differences in the laws. The reform in the Old Kingdom was altered somewhat by the more radical atmosphere in the provinces. On the other hand, the Bessarabian, Bucovinan, and Transylvanian reforms were considerably modified by the time the parliament ratified them in 1921. National interest, as conceived of in Bucarest, demanded equilibrium, if not complete similarity, between the various agrarian laws.

An element of xenophobia, in the form of discrimination against foreign landowners and minorities, also appeared in the agrarian reforms and was the subject of the interminable case of the Hungarian optants, which was before the Council of the League of Nations throughout the 1920's. Unquestionably certain of the expropriation provisions were directed against the non-Rumanian minorities, and in Transylvania and Southern Dobrogea the execution of the reforms had a decidedly nationalist tinge. On the other hand, since the Rumanians in the new provinces usually included the poorest strata of the population, and many of the larger landowners were members of the minorities, it was inevitable that the leveling process of the land reforms should have benefited the Rumanians at the expense of the minorities. In any event, nationalist discrimination was a by-product of the land reforms, not a primary incentive.

At the conclusion of the First World War Rumania, in spite of 178
terrible human and material losses, seemed to be entering a new and promising era. By an extraordinary combination of circumstances a united Greater Rumania had been achieved. The acquired territories with their resources and industry promised to add a new dimension to the Rumanian economy. The passage of the land reforms gave hope for greater social stability and the eventual growth of a prosperous peasant agriculture. The revolutionary fever subsided, the peasants had not revolted, a general strike of workers in 1920 had been successfully suppressed, and although new parties and politicians appeared on the scene, the continuity of the Rumanian monarchy and government stood unique in eastern Europe. But the two basic problems of Rumanian history remained: a weak power position and a backward economy. The first did not present an immediate threat because of the exhaustion of neighboring great powers through war and revolution. The task of adjusting the economy to a more advanced and rapidly changing world economy faced the nation immediately as Rumania began to repair the damage caused by the war.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

page 40

III

AGRICULTURAL POPULATION AND PRODUCTION

121 THE course of Rumanian politics between the wars can be understood only in its economic setting; urgent economic problems constantly demanded the attention of all governments, and at the same time the prevailing poverty and economic backwardness undermined political life and contributed powerfully to the emergence of the dictatorships. This and the following chapter sketch the general features of the economic framework, with particular emphasis upon agriculture and the demographic problem. Industry, commerce, and finance are considered primarily in their relation to the agrarian question.

Population [1]

161 According to the 1930 census, Rumania had a population of
162 18,057,028 persons, the largest of any state in eastern Europe with the exception of Poland. While the density, 61 persons per square kilometer in 1930, was less than that of the more highly industrialized states of western Europe, the population was increasing at a rapid rate. Rumania had one of the highest birth rates in non-Russian Europe as well as the highest death rate. In general, its population pattern resembled that of the other states of eastern Europe, especially Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Ukraine, and was in marked contrast to the stable or declining populations of the West.

163 Eastern Europe is now passing through the phase of great popu-
165 lation growth which began in England and western Europe in the eighteenth century and has since radiated eastward. This phenomenon, one of the most important in European history, appears to have followed a definite sequence: first, a high death rate and a high birth rate, more or less in balance, giving a stable or only slightly expanding population; then the death rate dropped rapidly; finally the birth rate dropped down to or below the death rate. The lag between the fall in the death rate and the subsequent fall in the birth rate produced the great expansion of population. From current evidence

1. More complete statistical information on the population is given in the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

it appears that in eastern Europe the birth rate has begun to decline, 163
but its effect will not be reflected in the population for a number of 165
years.

The decline of the death rate in the West resulted from the numerous social, hygienic, and nutritional improvements gradually introduced and disseminated over the last two centuries, all of which were slow in reaching eastern Europe. The subsequent fall in the Western birth rate appears to have been largely a conscious social restriction and not any decline in "national virility." [2] It generally accompanies a rise in living conditions and has shown a direct correlation with class differences.

The extent to which those factors bringing about the growth of population in the West apply to eastern Europe is not known with certainty. The fall in the eastern European death rate after the middle of the nineteenth century appears to have corresponded with the introduction of some of the social and hygienic improvements from the West, but it may also have resulted from a moderate improvement in internal and external security at a somewhat earlier date.[3]

Birth and death rates for Greater Rumania showed a decline during the interwar years, largely a result of drops in the rural rates. The rural birth rate in 1936, however, was still well above that of the towns (33.8 per thousand as against 21.4). The rate of natural increase, the excess of births over deaths, also displayed a perceptible decline, from over 14 per thousand inhabitants in the early 1920's to about 11 in the late 1930's. The birth rate fell greatly during the Second World War (to a low of 19.9 in 1945) and seems to have increased only slightly in the postwar years. The death rate having remained approximately the same, the rate of growth of Rumania's population has diminished tremendously under the exceptional conditions of the past decade.

Agricultural Overpopulation

While Rumania's over-all density of population is not very high 161
as compared with that of western Europe, most of the people live on the land, and the agricultural population is quite dense. In 1941 the agricultural population of Rumania (minus Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina, Northern Transylvania, and Southern Dobrogea) represented 71.4 per cent of the total population and 94.4 per cent of the

2. Dudley Kirk, *Europe's Population in the Interwar Years* (League of Nations, 1946), p. 38. 113

3. A. M. Carr-Saunders, *World Population: Past Growth and Present Trends* (Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 80.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

161 rural population.[4] There were 94.3 inhabitants of the agricultural population for every 100 hectares of agricultural land in private hands (including arable surface, meadow, vineyards, orchards, and pastures). Agricultural population was densest in the poor mountainous areas, in contrast to total population which was densest in the plains; in the Oltenian and Muntenian Carpathians 121.5 agricultural inhabitants occupied every 100 hectares of agricultural land in private hands, 112.8 in the Moldavian Carpathians and 108.3 in Bucovina.

That the density of Rumania's agricultural population was relatively high is shown in the following table, comparing Rumania (on the basis of earlier and somewhat different statistics) with other eastern European and some of the western European countries:[5]

Country	*Density of population dependent upon agriculture per square kilometer of "arable-equivalent" * agricultural land, ca. 1930.*
RUMANIA	79.7
Old Kingdom	79.9
Bessarabia	69.7
Bucovina	145.9
Transylvania	81.3
Bulgaria	95.4
Greece	86.7
Yugoslavia	100.1
Hungary	63.1
Poland	86.9
Austria	64.2
Czechoslovakia	39.4
Italy	38.4
Germany	52.1
France	28.8
Netherlands	81.7
Denmark	37.5
England and Wales	33.8

* "Arable-equivalent" is a statistical device to achieve a rough comparability between different types of land (arable, pasture, vineyards, etc.) used for agricultural purposes. A hectare of pasture land is clearly not equivalent to a hectare of arable.

The director of the Rumanian Central Institute of Statistics, in interpreting the results of the 1930 census, concluded that "These

113 4. Institutul Central de statistică, *Recensământul agricol al României din 1941* (Bucarest, 1945), Table 21.

5. Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (League of Nations, 1945), pp. 197–204.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

figures permit one to affirm that our country has arrived at the saturation point, and even at an agricultural overpopulation."[6] The term "overpopulation," however, has been subject to numerous interpretations and must be used cautiously.[7] In particular, in Rumania the issue of overpopulation has been too frequently brandished as a political weapon for contending parties. 161

Surplus population is sometimes defined in terms of an "optimum" population, one that achieves the maximum per capita real income. In such a case overpopulation would mean that a withdrawal of population from the land would increase per capita income since the marginal productivity of the surplus cultivators, given the law of diminishing returns, is less than the average per capita productivity. Apart from the manifold difficulties of determining such an optimum, this approach is somewhat artificial in the case of eastern Europe, where the problem of overpopulation is concerned not with any ideal optimum but with a possible Malthusian nightmare of mass suffocation. To be meaningful in this connection overpopulation must indicate that in some way more people are engaged in agriculture than are required for the type of cultivation prevailing, that they could be withdrawn from the soil without loss in agricultural production, the output of the surplus population being less than the loss occasioned by their presence (soil destruction, irrational holdings, etc.).[8]

It is clear that density alone does not determine overpopulation in this sense, since the Netherlands, for example, had a slightly higher agricultural density than Rumania but with entirely different social and economic consequences because of an intensive form of cultivation. The level of agricultural productivity, expressed in yield per unit of area is also a factor. That is, output per capita (C), which ultimately determines the level of existence, is equivalent to yield per unit of area (Y) divided by the density of agricultural population (D): $C = \frac{Y}{D}$.

Now for purposes of general orientation it is possible to make a rough comparison of this equation for Rumania with that for

6. Sabin Manuila, *Structure et évolution de la population rurale* (Bucarest, 1940), p. 17. 113

7. For discussions of the definition of overpopulation see Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 55–77; Carr-Saunders, *op. cit.*, pp. 330–331; and "The Problem of Surplus Agricultural Population," *International Journal of Agrarian Affairs*, *1*, No. 1 (October, 1939); the entire issue is devoted to articles on the question.

8. If overpopulation is not defined in some such sense as this, it is necessary to consider alternative means of employment for the surplus population, unless the surplus is to be physically liquidated. This problem will be discussed presently in connection with town and country relations.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

161 Europe as a whole.[9] If we take Europe to be the norm, $C = \frac{Y}{D}$, then the equivalent equation for Rumania is, very roughly, $.48C = \frac{.69Y}{1.44D}$. That is, Rumania's per capita output in agriculture is only 48 per cent of the European average because the yield is only 69 per cent as great and the density of agricultural population is 44 per cent greater. There are, however, marked regional differences within Rumania. The situation in the Old Kingdom is approximately the same as in Greater Rumania as a whole, but in Bucovina per capita output is only 45 per cent of that for Europe, although yield is 17 per cent above the European average ($.45C = \frac{1.17Y}{2.60D}$) because of the extreme density of the population, over two and a half times that of Europe. On the other hand, in Bessarabia the per capita output is low because of the low yield although the density of agricultural population is only 24 per cent greater than that for Europe ($.45C = \frac{.56Y}{1.24D}$). In Transylvania the per capita output is the highest in Rumania ($.51C = \frac{.74Y}{1.45D}$), a reflection of the generally more advanced level of agriculture in that region which more than compensates for the density of the population.

Some efforts were made in Rumania to calculate the hidden unemployment resulting from overpopulation. In 1933 A. Frunzanescu and C. Vasiliu, after calculating the number of man-days required to carry on a year's agricultural activity in Rumania, estimated that only 43.66 per cent of the potential energy of agricultural labor was actually employed in direct agricultural work, and not over 55 per cent in all farm activities.[10] An investigation of 200 peasant farms of less than 3 hectares and of 100 farms between 3 and 5 hec-

9. See Wilbert E. Moore's work, *op. cit.*, which undertakes to convert European agricultural output and agricultural land into "crop units" and "arable equivalents," statistical devices to render commensurate different kinds of agricultural produce and land. Relying on his basic figures I have used them here in a somewhat different manner. See also Table VII in the Appendix.

10. A. Frunzanescu, *Munca omenească în actuală conjunctura agricolă* (Bucarest, 1935), cited in Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești*, p. 48. Estimating an agricultural working population of 9,990,000 men, women, and children to be equivalent to 7,900,000 men, and assuming 235 working days a year, they arrived at a working potential of 1,865,100,000 man-days per year. They then calculated that the total man-days necessary to achieve the various agricultural works in Rumania required only 814,400,000 man-days.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

161 tares reached the conclusion that on farms under 3 hectares only 38 per cent of the available labor was being utilized and on farms between 3 and 5 hectares, only 60 per cent.[11]

Other indications of overpopulation during the interwar period were the continued expansion of arable at the expense of meadow and pasture (which is reflected in the decline of the number of cattle between 1921 and 1935 from 34 to 24 per 100 inhabitants), the increasing fragmentation of small properties and the extension of holdings under 3 hectares, and the emigration of peasants' sons to Bucarest, especially from the hilly and mountainous districts.[12] Thus there appears to be ample evidence of crowding, land hunger, and widespread hidden unemployment. What were the causes for this appearance of surplus population?

In a study of agricultural overpopulation, written in 1939, H. M. Conacher suggested that a surplus agrarian population could arise in a variety of ways:

1. Under conditions where the Malthusian theory has come true, and the pressure of population on subsistence is severe, usually through excessive fragmentation of land;

2. Under conditions less severe than in (1), where the cultivation of land has come under the formula of diminishing returns through straining a system of husbandry, and this has gone on over a widening area;

3. In cases where the distribution of returns among the different classes of producers is inequitable, with the result that the laborers are much in the same position as might be reached under (2) if they had been landholders;

4. In cases where, apart from the foregoing causes, a rural economy producing for export suffers from a considerable fall in demand, especially if such an economy has been using up its capital in the soil.[13]

In Rumania all these conditions have contributed in varying measure in the different regions. The first condition, in which pressure of population growth is the primary factor, operates as a tendency throughout most of Rumania, but appears to be of particular importance in Bucovina and the Carpathian districts. In 1941 the agricultural population per 100 hectares reached 164.7 in the *judeţ* of Dâmboviţa in the Wallachian Carpathians, 123.4 in Baia in the

11. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

12. Nicolae M. Dunăre, *Fii de ţărani vânzători ambulanţi în capitală*, Institutul Central de Statistică, Biblioteca Statistică, No. 22 (Bucarest, 1945), p. 6.

13. Contribution by H. M. Conacher in "The Problem of Surplus Agricultural Population," *International Journal of Agrarian Affairs*, *1*, No. 1 (October, 1939), 27.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

161 Moldavian Carpathians, 161.1 in Suceava in Bucovina, and 126.3 in Bihor in western Transylvania. Dwarf holdings of less than 3 hectares are most numerous in these judeţe. The mountainous regions represent an economic dead end; the land is poor and much of it unsuitable for cultivation; the pressure of population has forced the multiplication of dwarf holdings; and social inertia and poverty have limited emigration to less congested areas.

Such extreme population pressure is mainly limited, however, to the mountainous and hilly regions. As has been indicated by the equations already given, agrarian overpopulation for the greater part of Rumania is only in part a demographic problem. The rapid growth of population from the middle of the nineteenth century did not initially cause trouble because of the sparsity of inhabitants in the Danube plain and the great extension of land put under the plough. However, the relatively late emergence of the peasant as a proprietor, the general lack of capital, and the predominant position of large properties under neoserfdom combined to maintain the primacy of extensive grain cultivation. This form of husbandry eventually began to undermine Rumanian agriculture, especially after the expansion of small-scale farming, which was ill-suited to such an emphasis upon cereals. Pasture land was reduced without the substitution of forage crops, livestock declined, and the primitive wheat-maize rotation threatened to deplete even the rich soil of the plains. In the plains regions, then, overpopulation is to some extent the result of the prevailing type and level of agriculture, although the constant increase of population has undoubtedly aggravated the problem.

The fourth way in which a surplus agrarian population arises—through a decline in exports—is only indirectly related to overpopulation and is primarily an economic maladjustment. The general decline of European cereal exports in the face of overseas competition, and particularly the world grain crisis after 1929, intensified the manifestations of overpopulation by depressing the whole agrarian sector of the Rumanian economy. This, however, is a special case.

There remains to be discussed the third way in which a surplus agrarian population arises: through inequitable distribution of returns. In regions dominated by great landowners who control a large part of the soil, the peasants are likely to give the appearance of overpopulation, since they lack sufficient land of their own to support themselves. There is no question that in nineteenth-century Rumania, the concentration of land in large estates created land hunger and the symptoms of overpopulation. It should be noted, however, that even by 1907 it was becoming evident that the over-all density of

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

agricultural population in relation to the total agricultural land and the level of production was approaching a critical point.

To what extent was distribution a significant factor in overpopulation after the 1918–21 land reforms? To answer this question it is necessary to attempt an investigation of the effects of these reforms upon distribution.

The Distribution of Land [14]

Although the distribution of agricultural land in Rumania has been, if not the core of the agrarian question, at least the focus of attention, and although innumerable books, pamphlets, and articles have dealt with it, it is still difficult to provide a satisfactory picture of land distribution and impossible to give an exact account of its development in time. The incompleteness and irregularity of statistics, the intrusion of wars and the frequent changes of territorial boundaries, the unsettling effect of the agrarian reforms themselves, and on occasion the warping of figures to fit a political thesis have combined to obscure the real situation.

Before proceeding to an analysis of the available statistics it is necessary to be as clear as possible about the use of certain categories and definitions, since confusion over these has been the source of numerous erroneous conclusions. In particular it is indispensable to know what types of land are being included in the term "agricultural," and whether the distribution of land is on the basis of properties or of farming units.

During the interwar years the Rumanian Central Institute of Statistics came to classify land in the manner shown by the table on the following page (the 1936 areas of the respective types of land are included to indicate their comparative size).[15] Earlier Rumanian statistics frequently employed different classifications, and the inclusion or exclusion of pasture and woodland seriously alters the pattern of land distribution.

The second important distinction is between *properties*, based upon legal ownership of the land, and *exploitations*, defined in 1941 as "the area comprising all the land effectively cultivated under the direction and participation of the head of the exploitation." Exploitations and properties are obviously not identical, since an exploita-

14. For a more detailed discussion of the statistics of Rumanian land distribution see the Appendix.

15. Petre Onica, *Tehnica statisticii agricole*, Institutul Central de Statistică, Biblioteca Statistică, No. 9 (Bucarest, 1945), p. 17.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

311

				Hectares (in 1936)	Per Cent
Total area 29,505,000 hectares	A. Agricultural area	1.	Arable	13,940,000	47.3
		a.	Cereals	11,609,000	
		b.	Alimentary plants	532,000	
		c.	Industrial plants	498,000	
		d.	Cultivated or artificial meadows (forage crops)	783,000	
		e.	Fallow	523,000	
		2.	Natural meadows	1,410,000	4.7
		3.	Grazing and pasture	2,448,000	8.3
		4.	Vineyards	328,000	1.1
		5.	Orchards	233,000	0.8
	B. Nonagricultural area	1.	Woods and forests	6,449,000	21.9
		2.	Occupied land (yards, houses, streets and roads, cities, industrial and commercial land) and nonproductive	4,697,000	15.9

tion may be held on lease or in metayage. The statistics always show some difference between the two; in most cases large properties are more extensive than large exploitations, an indication that a portion of the large properties is being leased. A secondary distinction between privately owned and state or publicly owned properties is also important, and here again Rumanian statistics are often inconsistent.

Although official accounts of the results of the 1918–21 land reforms were issued by the Rumanian government, they are not a very reliable guide to the effect of these reforms on the distribution of agricultural property. About 6,000,000 hectares were reported to have been expropriated, of which about 3,900,000 hectares were distributed to some 1,393,000 peasants, or 69.5 per cent of those having a claim to land.[16] But while the land reform was supposed to have been completed around 1929–30, in 1940 it was officially announced that the reform was not yet terminated: 3,900 estates were still in possession of land which was to have been expropriated; 434,000 hectares of expropriated land had not even been surveyed for distribution; 440,000 hectares had not yet been divided; 900 law cases re-

113

16. Alexander Nasta, "La Réforme agraire en Roumanie," report presented to the Fourteenth Congress of the International Congress of Agriculture (Bucarest, June 7–10, 1929), p. 16; Biblioteca de Sociologie, Etică şi Politică, condusă de D. Gusti, *60 Sate romînesti* (5 vols., Bucarest, 1941–43), II, 10.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

garding the agrarian reform still awaited adjudication.[17] This belated but damaging announcement naturally throws in doubt many of the earlier statistics which painfully calculated the final effects of the reform to two decimals. 311

Similarly, it is not possible to make any satisfactory comparisons between prereform and postreform figures, even for the Old Kingdom. The official estimates of the post-1921 situation, which have been generally used in most studies of Rumanian agriculture, are suspect: they merely subtracted from Creangă's estimate of large properties in 1905 the amount of land presumed to have been expropriated and added it to the area of small properties, a method taking no account of twenty years' unofficial changes in property relations. The results were naturally most impressive: large property had been reduced from 40 per cent of the agricultural area to 10 per cent, whereas small peasant properties, which had previously covered about 60 per cent of the land, now accounted for 90 per cent. This was undoubtedly an inflated estimate of the consequences of the reform.

Statistics available for the years between 1921 and 1945 do not, unfortunately, altogether clarify the picture. Between 1921 and 1929 there was both a progressive resettlement of peasants on land acquired through the reforms and a natural division and dispersion of properties through inheritance and, to a lesser degree, through sale. The only sources to give an indication of the results of these developments are some fiscal censuses prepared by the Ministry of Finance. Since these were gathered for tax purposes and employ different categories for dividing land holdings, they are not comparable with other available figures on land distribution. A comparison of the 1923 and 1928 censuses does, however, indicate certain trends. The number of agricultural taxpayers increased more rapidly than the extension of arable land, indicating an increasing density of agricultural population and a reduction of the average size of holdings from 3.6 hectares to 3.5 hectares.[18] There was a marked decline in the area of properties over 250 hectares, partly as a result of the continued application of the land reforms, although the increase in average size of properties between 50 and 250 hectares might mean that some of the land of large properties was falling into the hands of the larger peasant owners. The area of properties under 10 hectares and especially of those under 5 hectares increased greatly.

17. Quoted in Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 77, n. 1.

18. These censuses are discussed in *60 Sate romînesti*, II, 12–15 and are given in the Appendix below.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

311 Although this increase may have been to some extent the result of the subdivision of holdings through inheritance, it was largely the reflection of allotments granted under the reform, since the situation in Bessarabia, which had completed its reform at an early date, was almost stationary, while there was a marked increase in the area of small properties in Transylvania, where the reform had been more gradually applied.

Only a very general summary of the distribution of land was published after the 1930 census, and even this summary is sufficiently ambiguous to prevent a comparison with earlier or later figures. According to this census, exploitations over 100 hectares in size still occupied almost 28 per cent of the total agricultural area (presumably also including some forest land) and nearly 15 per cent of the arable, the difference resulting from the high percentage of non-arable land possessed by large properties. Exploitations of less than 3 hectares, which amounted to 52 per cent of the total number, occupied less than 13 per cent of the total area and 16.5 per cent of the arable. Exploitations between 10 and 100 hectares occupied almost 25 per cent of the total agricultural area and over 25 per cent of the arable, a marked increase over the prewar situation in the Old Kingdom. This change reflects in part, however, the inclusion in the 1930 census of Transylvania and Bucovina, where medium holdings had been more numerous. In general, this census would show that large properties had not been reduced to the extent called for by the agrarian reforms, that holdings under 3 hectares still constituted the majority of the exploitations, and that medium holdings had increased in number and extent, although the agrarian reforms had made no provision for them.

The census of 1941 was the first careful attempt to analyze the distribution of land. Although its usefulness for present purposes is impaired by the omission of Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina, Northern Transylvania, and Southern Dobrogea, which had been lost in 1940, its summary results are the best information available. This census, which covered only individual and private exploitations, comprising 52 per cent of the total area of Rumania at that date, appears to show to an even greater extent the characteristics noted in the 1930 summary:

1) The group of exploitations and properties [19] between 3 and

19. The number of properties and exploitations were not identical for all categories; there were more properties than exploitations in holdings below 3 hectares and above 20 hectares, and more exploitations between 3 and 20 hectares. These differences merely reflect the fact that agricultural exploitations are not based solely on properties but also involve the use of property through lease or metayage.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania ED

5 hectares, which the 1918–21 land reforms considered as the basis of Rumanian agriculture in the allotment of land, actually constituted in 1941 only 19.5 per cent of the exploitations (18.4 per cent of the properties), occupying 16.4 per cent of the area of exploitations (16.1 per cent of the area of properties). On the other hand, exploitations under 3 hectares constituted 54.1 per cent of the total number (properties under 3 hectares constituted 58.4 per cent of the total number of properties). 311

2) The largest category of exploitations in terms of area was that between 5 and 10 hectares, i.e., above the average size for all holdings.

3) Despite the agrarian reforms, exploitations over 100 hectares occupied 14.2 per cent of the area; 8 per cent of the area was occupied by properties over 500 hectares.

Regionally, exploitations under one hectare were most numerous in mountainous districts and in industrial areas, where factory workers had small plots of land. Exploitations between one and 3 hectares were most common in the Carpathians and Bucovina. The large holdings were concentrated mainly in the southeast.

The 1941 census also provides the first comprehensive statistical picture of the way in which the land was farmed. More than 58 per cent of all exploitations properly speaking (that is, excluding the minute plots of land of less than one hectare of arable) were cultivated exclusively by family labor; and an additional 24.9 per cent utilized only part of the family's labor (the family also had recourse to other sources of income). Thus, 83 per cent of all exploitations proper were purely family cultivations. Exploitations using no family labor but employing workers, whether on a daily or yearly basis or in return for a piece of land, accounted for only 1.5 per cent of the total, although they covered 12.1 per cent of the land. For the most part these exploitations represented the residues of the expropriated estates. The fourth category, using both family and employed labor, represented intensive peasant farms, and comprised 15.3 per cent of the number of exploitations and 24.8 per cent of the area.

Over 71 per cent of the exploitations were owned by the cultivator, 28 per cent included additional land held in lease or metayage, and less than one per cent of the exploitations were entirely on rented land. If these criteria are combined with those above, the most prevalent form of peasant cultivation, accounting for 41.6 per cent of all exploitations proper, was one owned in its entirety by the cultivator and employing only family labor.

Unfortunately, the information on agricultural labor in 1941 has 311 162

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

311 not been fully organized and published. According to a statistical
162 bulletin issued in 1947, on the 2,300,000 odd agricultural exploitations in 1941, 813,546 "members of families," after completing work on their own holding, worked for others, either for money or for produce. Of these, 748,821 worked in the same village and 64,725 took the road to work in other villages. On September 1, 1940, there were 191,199 permanently hired agricultural workers, of whom 103,353 were men, 68,325 women, and 19,521 children. As might be expected, the practice of seeking additional work was most extensive in the Carpathian regions of Oltenia and Muntenia, where for every 100 family exploitations, 50 members of families sought work, as against 35.3 for all Rumania. The same area had the least number of permanent hired workers, 4.7 per 100 exploitations as against 8.3 for all Rumania.[20]

311 The general results of the 1941 census, as published thus far, do not correlate size of exploitation with type of labor and holding. However, a special study for the judeţ of Argeş, "which by the variety of the soil and the nature of the exploitations constitutes one of the most representative judeţe of our country," [21] gives such a correlation, which may be a fair sample for all of Rumania. This correlation is what might be expected. Large farms, especially those over 100 hectares, were cultivated mainly by hired labor. Farms between 10 and 50 hectares were most frequently cultivated by a combination of family and hired labor. Peasant farms between 1 and 5 hectares used only family labor, and in about one-third of the cases the labor of the family was not completely utilized. Cultivators with holdings of less than one hectare fell into the class of agricultural laborers.

What conclusions may be drawn from these scattered and not altogether comparable figures regarding: (a) the effect of the agrarian reforms upon the distribution of land; (b) land distribution as a cause of agricultural overpopulation; (c) trends in land distribution during the interwar period?

(a) While there is no doubt that the agrarian reforms of 1918–21 greatly reduced the amount of land held by property owners of over 100 hectares, they did not bring about the virtual disappearance of large landed estates, as was so often proclaimed in the years after the First World War. In 1941 properties over 100 hectares still

20. Institutul Central de Statistică, *Comunicari statistice Nr. 16, 15 ianuarie 1947*, p. 3. In 1930 the Rumanian National Bank estimated that there were 464,000 agricultural workers, 16.7 per cent of the total agricultural active population of 2,773,769. *60 Sate romînesti*, II, 18.

21. Roman Cresin, *Agricultura din Judeţul Argeş* (Bucarest, 1945), p. 11.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

occupied over 16 per cent of the privately owned land.[22] The extent of leasing and cultivation in metayage decreased considerably, however, and reflected the reduction of differences in the size of properties. As has been seen in the first chapter, before the First World War leasing and subleasing in a variety of forms was extremely widespread in the Old Kingdom. While the 1941 statistics do not present a clear picture of the exact amount of land let out, 71.8 per cent of the exploitations proper were owned by their cultivators, and only 0.4 per cent were cultivated entirely by tenants or in metayage. Of the 225,890 hectares covered by the census in the judeţ of Argeş, only 21,591 were rented. Properties in Argeş let out by their owners in rent or in metayage comprised 9.5 per cent of the total area of properties and 16.2 per cent of the arable terrain. These percentages are somewhat higher than the estimate made by the Rumanian Ministry of Finance in 1927 that 8.4 per cent of the land (based on taxpayers) in the Old Kingdom was let out.[23]

The agrarian reforms were not successful, however, in creating a satisfactory peasant agriculture based upon small properties of between 3 and 5 hectares.[24] In 1941 over 58 per cent of the properties were below 3 hectares, a perilous minimum for a self-sustaining cultivation; properties between 3 and 5 hectares amounted to only 18.4 per cent of the total number and covered only 16 per cent of the area. The reasons for this failure will be discussed shortly.

(b) The unequal distribution of land was not a primary cause of agrarian overpopulation during the interwar period. The 1941 census does not provide decisive evidence on this question, as it covered only a little over half the total area of Rumania in its 1941 frontiers. It included, however, over 87 per cent of the total arable, and is therefore fairly reliable as regards cultivable land. According to this census, the average size of all properties under 5 hectares was

22. This figure, it must be repeated, is not comparable with the pre-1914 figures. In the first place, geographical area is not the same. Moreover, Creangă in his 1905 estimate included state and public properties and grazing land but excluded forests. The 1941 census included whatever forest and grazing land was owned privately but omitted communal and state controlled pastures and forests.

23. Quoted in Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, p. 246.

24. In 1945 the Danish agricultural economist, M. Gormsen, who had been employed by the Rumanian government, stated that in its practical consequences, "the transformation of estate land into peasant land in Rumania in 1918–1921 meant in spite of everything only the continuation on a much larger scale of the old short-sighted policy of the past. This policy consisted in leaving as little land as possible to the peasants without taking into consideration whether it was sufficient or not for a rational and independent peasant agriculture." M. Gormsen, *Short Introduction to the Principal Structural Problems of the Agriculture in Roumania* (Bucarest, 1945), p. 40.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

31| 2.0 hectares. If all land in excess of 100 hectares were distributed to properties below 5 hectares, their average size would rise to 2.7 hectares; if all property in excess of 50 hectares, the average size would be 2.9 hectares. (This computation does not, of course, take into account regional differences in land distribution, which would considerably reduce the gains to small properties unless the farm population were far more mobile than it has been in the past.) Actually, the increase in arable would be less than the figures indicate because a fairly large proportion of big properties was forest land. In Argeş, for example, although it has more forest land than most judeţe, forests accounted for 57.1 per cent of the land of exploitations over 100 hectares, and 40. 9 per cent of the land of exploitations between 50 and 100 hectares.[25] According to a sampling of a number of villages throughout Rumania, 26 per cent of the land of properties over 25 hectares was forest.[26]

In short, while a further redistribution of the land would have some effect in increasing the size of peasant holdings and would provide a temporary relief for a number of peasants, it could not in itself remedy, even temporarily, the more fundamental problems connected with agricultural overpopulation. This point must be born in mind in connection with the land reform of 1945, to be discussed in a later chapter.

(c) While the changes in land distribution during the interwar period are not altogether clear, one principal development is discernible. Properties between 3 and 5 hectares, which are statistically the average size, failed to become the predominant type of holding. Instead, there appears to have been an increase in the number of submarginal holdings under 3 hectares and in the extent of medium peasant properties between 5 and 20 hectares. In the judeţ of Argeş, the renting of supplementary land was most widespread in exploitations between 5 and 10 hectares and between 10 and 20 hectares, a fact which would indicate relative economic strength. In 1940, Madgearu observed that after 1929 there had been a strengthening of middle properties on the one hand and the formation of an agricultural proletariat on the other.[27]

The investigation of sixty villages in 1938 showed in what way land reform contributed to this development. According to this sampling, the initial effect of the agrarian reform had been a leveling of the difference between poor and rich peasant households, an effect

25. Roman Cresin, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
26. *60 Sate romanesti*, II, 49.
27. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

more marked in the plains than in the mountains. However, the evolution of the two categories of peasant households—those which had received land under the reform and those which had not—was quite different. Holdings which had been either created or supplemented by allotments under the agrarian reform had a much lower resistance to the process of fragmentation of land than the nonallotted holdings; sale of holdings was more frequent among peasants who had received land by the reform.[28] The conclusion is that the agrarian reforms had not established the new properties on a firm basis, which would enable the poor peasant to maintain himself, and had only temporarily checked a tendency toward inequality in the village.

In general, the unequal distribution of land, as a purely economic factor, was not the primary cause for the agrarian difficulties of the interwar period. For a more complete explanation of these difficulties it is necessary to turn to the question of agricultural productivity and the relations of agriculture to the whole of the Rumanian economy.

Agricultural Production [29]

During the interwar years Rumanian agriculture was still largely devoted to the cultivation of cereal crops, which in 1938 occupied 82.1 per cent of the total arable surface:[30]

	In 1,000 hectares	*Per cent of arable*
Total arable	13,873.8	100.0
Cereals	11,387.3	82.1
Wheat	3,926.9	28.3
Maize	5,033.6	36.3
Barley	1,250.8	9.0
Oats	648.7	4.7
Rye	478.3	3.4
Alimentary plants	494.3	3.6
Industrial plants	487.6	3.5
Forage crops	734.3	5.3
Fallow	770.3	5.6

A slight shift in emphasis occurred during this period; the percentage of arable land under cereals dropped from 87 to 82 per cent, although the area under the principal grains, wheat and maize, in-

28. *60 Sate românești*, II, 38, 41.
29. Statistical material supporting and illustrating the conclusions of this section is included in the Appendix.
30. *Statistica agricolă a României în 1938*, p. 2.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241 creased. Certain industrial plants, such as sunflower and soybean, showed a rapid rate of growth, especially in the second half of the 1930's, but they represented a very small percentage of the total acreage.

Considerable regional variations corresponded to differences in soil and terrain. Cereal cultivation was most widespread in the Old Kingdom and Bessarabia, especially in the plains of the Siret, Prut, and Danube rivers, and in Dobrogea; it was of much less importance in the Carpathian regions, Transylvania and Bucovina. In a few districts, of which the most notable was Ţara Bârsei in southeastern Transylvania, the peasants carried on an intensive cultivation and had a standard of production well above the average for the country.

In the village investigations of 1938 it was discovered that cereal cultivation was predominant in all categories of holdings. It was most extensive in properties between 5 and 25 hectares, but even on dwarf holdings of under one hectare more than half the land was devoted to cereals.

With respect to the general volume of production, maize, which the peasants preferred to cultivate and which formed the major element in their diet, rose above the pre-1914 level, but wheat, which had been grown principally by large cultivators, never achieved the prewar level. Exports of both wheat and maize declined greatly below the prewar level.

PRODUCTION AND EXPORT OF CEREALS, 1909–39 [31]

(1909–13 production and export = 100)

[439]

	Wheat		*Maize*	
	Production	*Export*	*Production*	*Export*
1909–13 (1919 boundaries)	100	100	106	100
1928–32	67.7	15.9	104.1	58.1
1933–37	70.5	19.3	101.7	42.8
1935–39	88.7	39.8	108.8	32.5

The slump in cereal production was primarily the result of low yield per hectare, since by 1924 the area under cultivation had recovered from the immediate postwar decline and surpassed the average area cultivated between 1909 and 1913.

31. U.S. Department of Agriculture, "Wartime Agricultural Surpluses of the Danube Basin," *Foreign Agriculture*, 4, No. 12 (December, 1940), 712.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

INDEX OF AREA, YIELD, AND PRODUCTION OF CEREALS[32]

(1909–13 = 100)

241
311
[433]

	1909–13	1920	1922	1924	1925	1926	1933–37
Area	100	84.4	94.5	101.2	103.5	102.8	114.3
Yield	100	86.7	77.5	60.0	71.7	99.2	81.7
Production	100	72.9	73.6	60.6	74.6	101.6	93.1

In the discussion of overpopulation it was seen that the productivity per hectare in Rumania was exceedingly low. For the four-year period 1928–32 the Rumanian wheat yield was below that of any Balkan state except Greece, averaging 9.5 quintals per hectare, as contrasted with a French yield of 14.8 and a Danish yield of 29.4 quintals per hectare during the same years. Although the Rumanian peasant has been more successful with maize, his output of that grain is also very low. This low rate of yield has been the most striking symptom of the unhealthy condition of Rumanian agriculture. The records of the past half century give little evidence of improvement, and there has been a noticeable decline in comparison with the pre-1914 figures.

Technical and material factors provide an immediate explanation for Rumania's poor output, but beyond these are more general causes which inhibit the improvement of agriculture and the introduction of more efficient techniques. On the whole, physical conditions in Rumania do not prevent a satisfactory agriculture. The hilly regions are somewhat deficient in humus but the soil of the plains is unusually fertile. The plains are exposed to extremes of rainfall and temperature, and the irregularity of the rainfall, the most serious threat to crops, is conducive to a wide fluctuation in output. Nevertheless, these conditions would present no serious obstacle to an increase in production if farming methods were adapted to the soil and climate.[33]

The principal material reasons for the low productivity are the extremely limited use of manure and fertilizers, absence of which is causing gradual depletion of the soil, even in the best plains regions; the lack of moisture-conserving measures; a primitive crop-rotation system; the low quality of livestock; backward techniques of cultivation and the shortage of agricultural equipment; and the prevalence of strip farming. The two last points require additional explanation.

32. League of Nations, *Agricultural Production in Continental Europe* (1943), p. 73.
33. U.S. Department of Agriculture, *op. cit.*, p. 715.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241
31

The low level of productivity is clearly a function of the investment in agricultural inventory, which is exceptionally small in Rumania:[34]

	Value of agricultural inventory in lei/hectare	*Average production of wheat in kilograms/hectare*
Rumania	1,000	860
Bulgaria	2,000	1,320
Poland	3,000	1,440
Germany	15,000	2,070
Switzerland	42,000	2,250

While there is a great dearth of investment in agricultural equipment, there is also an overinvestment in certain items because of the large number of small holdings, each with its primitive inventory. According to the 1941 census on agricultural equipment—the first adequate estimate—though there was less than one plough to every two exploitations, there was one plough for every seven hectares of arable land. But since one plough was capable, according to Rumanian estimates, of turning over fifteen hectares, there were about twice as many ploughs as were necessary in terms of technical requirements.[35]

The division of agricultural exploitations into numerous small plots or strips is, of course, intimately related to the question of agrarian reform and to the pressure of population, although strip farming was prevalent before 1918. The agrarian reforms contributed to its extension, not only because they omitted any provisions for consolidation, but also because the land of the expropriated estates was usually divided into a number of small, narrow strips of land of from ½ to 5 hectares, which were given either to landless peasants or to those with inadequate holdings. These strips were often several kilometers away from the peasant's village or his other holdings. In 1941 the average area of all exploitations was 4.5 hectares, with an average of 5 plots per exploitation. Frequently these plots

34. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

35. Census of agricultural equipment, 1941 (*Recensămîntul agricol din 1941*, p. 56):

	Number	*Number per 100 exploitations*	*Number per 100 hectares arable land*
Ploughs	1,083,018	48.0	14.5
Harrows	752,063	33.3	10.0
Seed drills	58,589	2.6	0.8
Reapers	39,245	1.7	0.5
Tractors	8,416	0.4	0.1
Carts	1,191,254	52.7	15.7

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

of less than one hectare were several hundred meters long and only 5 to 10 meters wide. The strips were at a great distance from one another, some authorities estimating the average distance to be from 4 to 7 kilometers.[36] The division of farming units into such small strips is obviously an impediment to any rationalization of agriculture.

Primitive techniques and irrational organization of holdings, while directly responsible for low productivity, are really manifestations rather than causes of the stagnation of Rumanian agriculture. What has inhibited the introduction of technical and organizational improvements? Poverty and "lack of capital" merely describe the situation; they do not explain it. Nor can this stagnation be ascribed to the natural inertia of a primitive agricultural society: the Rumanian economy has been in the midst of a dynamic process of change for over a century.

The fall in yield after the agrarian reforms of 1918–21 naturally raised the question whether the expropriation of the large estates was responsible for the critical state of Rumanian farming. This question is likely to be misleading if it is reduced to a comparison of the theoretical merits of large scale and peasant agriculture. Criticism that the agrarian reforms are responsible for the decline in agricultural productivity is apt to assume that the pre-1914 estates were well-organized large farms, whereas for the most part they were latifundiary cultivations, farmed out to the peasants who cultivated them with their own animals and equipment.[37] To be sure, some of the large farms were relatively well managed (although the yield even on the big estates was low in comparison with western European standards), and it may be that certain other controls employed by the large farms—notably the selection of seed and the regulation of the date at which sowing should begin [38]—were sufficient to account for the higher yield of the large properties. During the interwar years, as before 1914, large farms continued to have a higher cereal

36. M. Gormsen, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

37. For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, in a study of Rumanian agriculture, cites the great annual fluctuation in the wheat yield, a result of the variation in rainfall, as an example of the inability of the small peasant to take appropriate moisture conservation measures. "Managers of the large estates knew how to overcome this handicap to a considerable extent." U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, *op. cit.*, p. 715. A comparison of pre-1914 yields, however, indicates that while the yield of large properties was higher than that of small properties, the fluctuation in yield was practically the same for both categories. Cf. Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

38. Doreen Warriner, *The Economics of Peasant Farming* (Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 153.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241 yield than the small peasant holdings,[39] though there appear to be
311 no satisfactory statistics on this point.

On the other hand, defenders of the agrarian reform and small peasant properties have tended to assume that the Rumanian small holder was on his way to becoming an independent peasant proprietor, a doubtful assumption in view of the prevalence of dwarf holdings and the continued excessive cultivation of cereals. In 1937 G. Ionescu-Sişeşti and N. Cornăţeanu upheld the reform and peasant farming on the following grounds:

The reform was an economic necessity under the conditions of devastation after the First World War; it was only by giving land to the peasants that they were induced to make the great effort necessary for agricultural recovery. Peasant farming became more intensive and less devoted to cereal cultivation. The peasant was better able to withstand agricultural crises, largely because the large farmer lacked his ability to reduce expenses and increase family labor. Finally, peasant agriculture should not be judged in terms of its contribution to the national income but by its ability to "assure the existence of the greatest possible number of citizens." It is therefore erroneous to "establish a comparison between peasant agriculture and the system of large property."[40]

311 The necessity of the agrarian reforms need not be argued, although
185 they could be defined more convincingly as a social than as an economic imperative (i.e., the peasants would have refused to continue to work under the old system). It may also be true that peasant farming cannot be judged by narrow profit-and-loss accounting methods, since it is a manner of living as well as a form of livelihood. But Sişeşti's and Cornăţeanu's supporting arguments do not appear relevant to the actual Rumanian situation. There is no indication that peasant cultivation did become to any significant degree more intensive and varied. The examples they give, taken from a survey of a number of farms between 1930 and 1934, to illustrate the viability of peasant farming are not representative but comprise farms well above the average size for Rumania. Hence the real problem of dwarf holdings is avoided. The argument that small holdings are more resistant to crises because the peasant is able to restrict his consumption and increase family labor is not altogether reassuring in face of the growing pressure of population, regardless of its dubi-

39. M. Gormsen, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

[113] 40. G. Ionescu-Sişeşti and N. Cornăţeanu, *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie et ses conséquences* (Bucarest, 1937), pp. 42–53.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

ous merits from the point of view of social welfare. The effort to ignore the importance of national income as a criterion for judging the advantages of peasant farming is unrealistic, given the existence of a modern Rumanian state with its manifold requirements. Finally, for all their optimism, Sişeşti and Cornăţeanu admit the serious menace of continued subdivision of the land and urge the creation of a "peasant bourgeoisie." They do not indicate, however, what is to become of the poor peasants displaced in such a creation except to appeal for a further expansion of a national industry. The appeal to national industry, as a *deus ex machina*, at once undermines the whole argument for the viability of the Rumanian peasant proprietor.

311
185

Actually, such discussions of the merits and defects of peasant agriculture have only a limited relevance in Rumania. For example, in a study of 275 peasant households made in 1938, it was discovered that in general both the gross income per hectare (the total agricultural product of the holding, whether consumed or sold) and the agricultural income per hectare (gross income minus expenses for agriculture—labor payments, inventory, buildings, seed, etc.) tended to be higher on the small (under 3 hectares) than on the larger holdings. This higher net yield would appear to substantiate the contentions of the advocates of small farming.[41] In fact, however, the majority of the small holdings in this investigation operated at a deficit because the consumption needs of the household, largely food and clothing, were greater than the farm could produce. Only 14 per cent of the holdings between 1 and 3 hectares had an agricultural income greater than consumption, whereas in 86 per cent of the cases consumption was greater. Only 30 per cent of the holdings between 3 and 5 hectares had agricultural incomes greater than consumption. On the larger farms, between 10 and 20 hectares, 59 per cent had an agricultural income sufficient to meet consumption needs.[42] Therefore, the relative net incomes of farms of different sizes were of less

113

41. This higher rate of agricultural income among the small holdings is not, as it might appear, in contradiction to the statement that the cereal yield is higher on large farms than on small. A much smaller proportion of the income of the small holdings is derived from cereals; most of it comes from the sale of animals, fowls, fruits, etc. This, however, does not really represent a turn to intensive farming, since it is conducted on a very primitive level and only reflects the dwarf holder's efforts to maintain himself at a subsistence level.

42. *60 Sate româneşti*, II, 292. It should be noted that this investigation did not include large farms but only peasant holdings up to 40 hectares. Moreover, the results of the investigation showed an extremely wide range of variation, both regionally and among farms of the same size. Hence, the sampling may not have been extensive enough to permit confident generalization.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

311
185

importance than the fact that the general level of productivity was so low that a great number of the small farms simply did not produce enough to support themselves.

The effect of the 1918–21 land reforms upon production is also obscured by the numerous other factors which worked to reduce output: the destruction caused by the First World War, the economic policy of the postwar governments, the agrarian crisis and the "price scissors" of the 1930's.[43] While one cannot dismiss the effect of the redistribution of land as of only historical interest, since the leading feature of the 1945 agrarian reform was a further expropriation of large properties, it should be stressed that the reforms of 1918–21 were passed because of a pressing political and social necessity for a redistribution of the land; they were not primarily designed to increase production, and whatever their effect upon yield, it should be regarded as incidental to the aims of the reforms.

In general, it seems fair to say that the redistribution of land in Rumania—except in so far as it contributed to a further extension of uneconomic strip farming—had only a marginal direct effect upon productivity. The decline in yield, even if it was caused by the expropriation of the large estates, was only a modest contribution to the generally low level of Rumanian productivity. A comparison with the yield per hectare in neighboring countries reveals that states with more extensive large properties than Rumania (Hungary and Poland) as well as states in which small holdings predominated (Bulgaria and Yugoslavia) all had a yield well below that of western and central Europe.[44]

If the reforms of 1918–21 failed to bring about a more efficient organization of Rumanian agriculture, what were the principal organizational defects which, by preventing the introduction of more rational techniques, maintained a low level of productivity?

A Danish agricultural economist, M. Gormsen, who came to Rumania in 1939 at the request of the Rumanian government, has made

43. For an extensive discussion of these factors and their effect upon productivity to 1930 see Mitrany, *op. cit.*, pp. 306–331.

44. Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 35, 82.

	Per cent of land held in undertakings of over 50 ha. (*ca.* 1930)	*Yield in crop units per ha.*
Rumania	32.2	17
Hungary	51.3	21
Poland	47.3	18
Bulgaria	1.6	19
Yugoslavia	9.7	17
Europe (excluding U.S.S.R.)		24

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

a useful distinction between "agrarian reforms," which affect the organization of farming, and "agricultural reforms," which seek to improve the techniques.[45] In his opinion the agrarian reforms must be applied first or the agricultural reforms will be fruitless. Moreover, agrarian reforms can be carried out only by some superior body, such as the state, as the result of a conscious act of decision, whereas agricultural reforms are more gradual and can be applied by the farmers themselves. Among the main agrarian reforms indispensable for a prosperous agriculture he would include:

1) The abolition of servile relations—binding the peasant to the land, forced labor, feudal property relations, tithes, and the common utilization of the land. This reform was achieved in principle by the emancipation of 1864.

2) The transformation of estate land into peasant land. This was largely achieved by the reforms of 1918–21. Gormsen feels that a further transfer would yield positive but limited benefits.

3) The consolidation of individual peasant farms and, as a corollary, the partial evacuation of the villages and the establishment of farmhouses on the consolidated holdings. Gormsen regards this as the most important reform still to be carried out in Rumania.

4) The limitation of divisibility and expansion of holdings, to prevent the undoing of consolidation.

5) The introduction of a land register, definite property demarcations, and enclosures if necessary.

Under agricultural reforms he would include all such measures as the rationalization of farming methods; soil, seed, and livestock improvement; organization of agricultural credit and cooperation; the development of experimental stations; and so on.

In Gormsen's opinion, the Rumanian governments between the wars made the very serious mistake of devoting all their attention to efforts, often quite expensive, to introduce agricultural reforms. These were of little permanent value so long as the necessary agrarian reforms had not been made. An example is the complete failure of attempts to establish agricultural credit and peasant cooperatives, which have been the perennial promise of every new Rumanian government.

An effective permanent system of organized credit for peasant agriculture in Rumania does not exist although a number of institutions have been created from time to time to that purpose, as a rule with the assistance of the state or the national bank, but they only worked for a

45. M. Gormsen, *op. cit.*

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

short time and then died out or were transformed into something else. The lack of a land register, the small size of the peasant holdings, the whole backwardness of the system of agricultural exploitation, and, of course, the lack of really available capital, are the main reasons for the failure of the organization of agricultural credit in Rumania.[46]

To be sure, the shortage of the supply of credit is merely a sign of the lack of capital in Rumania. Such funds as there were found greater attractions in fields other than agriculture. But, as M. Gormsen says, not only was there a shortage of credit but peasant agriculture was not able to utilize greater quantities of investment properly under existing agrarian conditions. "As a matter of fact, a considerable part of the limited quantity of capital invested in peasant agriculture in the past has simply been lost, as was to be foreseen, without doing agriculture much good." [47]

The various cooperatives, in which the active participation of the peasants was extremely limited, have been of little real value, and at times they did more harm than good. The management quite frequently exploited the peasants' ignorance and inexperience to its own benefit. The cooperatives were not really cooperative ventures but rather official institutions, financed, directed, and controlled by the state and therefore completely subject to political vicissitudes. But most important a poor peasant is not in a position to be very useful in a cooperative. "The causal relationship between cooperative organizations and peasant prosperity is reciprocal, not unidirectional," [48] or, as a Rumanian economist remarked in this connection, "How are you to ring the bell if you do not have a bell?"

In the first chapter of this study it was observed that the structure of Rumanian society had led to a certain legislative "escapism"—an endless tinkering with laws and decrees, most of which had very little consequence. The numerous laws for the creation of agricultural credit and cooperatives are splendid examples. Why should there have been this resort to ineffective, though often expensive, experiments? To some extent they can be dismissed as efforts to solve a problem by means of sleight of hand rather than face the rigors of a more radical reform. They also reflect the Rumanian practice of copying Western procedures without ascertaining whether they are appropriate.

There is, however, the more serious question whether even appropriate agrarian reforms, along the lines suggested by Gormsen,

46. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
47. *Ibid.*
48. Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

OOD

would be sufficient to rescue Rumanian agriculture. Gormsen himself, while believing that if the reforms he outlined had been applied in times past they might have set Rumanian agriculture on the right path, admits that it is now too late for them to be effective alone.

In other words, thanks above all to the disastrous delay in the realization of some of the most important agrarian reforms in Rumania . . . we have the paradox that the Rumanian peasant and agriculture cannot in fact be entirely saved from the temporary but very serious crisis even by the most rapid accomplishment of these very reforms, but one further and special means must be employed, namely the continuation of the rapid expansion and progress of another national occupation, industry.[49]

Once again, the solution to Rumania's agricultural crisis is seen to lie beyond agriculture,[50] suggesting, however, that failure to solve it is not solely the consequence of delay in carrying out necessary agrarian reforms. For while it is true that such reforms are a prerequisite to an improved peasant agriculture, conditions in Rumania have not been conducive to their successful application. Servile relations, which were legally abolished in 1864, reappeared immediately in the form of neoserfdom. The 1918–21 agrarian reforms attempted to limit the subdivision of properties below a certain minimum, but they clearly failed of their purpose. Constantin Garoflid, in 1921, strongly recommended a law for the consolidation of peasant properties but it was never passed, partly because the peasants themselves mistrusted such a measure. In other words, the difficulty is not simply, as Gormsen suggests, that agrarian reforms have been delayed too long to be wholly successful, since some early efforts were made and miscarried.[51]

49. Gormsen, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

50. Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 118, reaches the same general conclusion for all the peasant countries of eastern and southern Europe: "The net conclusion, accordingly, is that marked improvements in the levels of production and consumption in Eastern and Southern Europe cannot be expected from those measures that would place first and most emphasis upon agricultural production."

51. The difference here is largely one of emphasis but is quite important in judging the Rumanian situation. Gormsen approaches the question as an agricultural economist seeking to define the conditions necessary for a successful peasant agriculture. Quite naturally, he sees in the absence of agrarian reforms the basic structural defect in Rumanian farming; observing correctly that even these reforms are now inadequate to rescue Rumanian agriculture he concludes that if they had been achieved at an earlier stage the present crisis could have been avoided. While this may be true, the fact is that the reforms were not applied, and in those cases where they were attempted they did not achieve the desired effect. The necessity of creating independent peasant properties has been a cliché of Rumanian writers for the last half century at least and, as Mihalache said in 1921, no one was opposed to consolidation on principle. The danger of a purely structural analysis is that it underestimates the importance of the numer-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

000 The agrarian problem is not rooted solely in agriculture. As was shown in the historical introduction, contact with the West had an unsettling effect upon the whole of Rumanian society. Among the dislocations, the following were of particular importance to agriculture:

1) The expansion of the population, which was one of the fundamental results of the contact with the West, made a "stable" agriculture impossible; there must be either a corresponding improvement in productivity or a decline in the level of consumption.[52]

2) The emphasis upon cereal cultivation, brought about by the possibility of profits in commerce, led to the creation and maintenance of extensive cultivation which persisted even after the expropriation of the great estates.

3) The social and economic relations of neoserfdom, which was a hybrid of Western and traditional practices, gave an excessive importance to the possession of land and a false emphasis to land distribution as the solution of the peasants' difficulties. As more and more land was distributed, it provided a decreasingly adequate remedy. The ultimate causes of these conditions lay outside Rumania but produced a profound modification in the internal structure of the agrarian economy.

While these manifestations of Western influence continue to have their effect upon Rumanian agriculture, they are largely an inheritance of the last century. More dynamic influences can be seen in the relations of agriculture to industry and commerce during the interwar years.

---

ous historical influences which have shaped Rumanian agriculture and is apt to place all the blame upon irresponsible legislators, selfish landowners, and unenlightened peasants.

52. A League of Nations study, *Industrialization and Foreign Trade* (1945), p. 68, mentions the danger of a backward country being involved in a "false start" in its efforts to catch up with the industrial states: "It has become increasingly clear, however, that undeveloped countries utilizing certain results of western knowledge and technique but not ready to assimilate western civilization with their own, run the risk of paying a heavy price for the influences to which they are subjected. The risk materializes if these influences fail to bring about the process of self-propelling development so characteristic of the western type of civilization. The most obvious cases of such a 'false start' occur when the impulses received tend to raise the population at the same or a higher rate than the national product."

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

page 67

IV

TOWN, COUNTRY, AND FOREIGN TRADE

Rumanian Industry

INDUSTRY has a Jekyll and Hyde role in the minds of many 433 Rumanians. It is regarded as the potential savior of the economy 178 through its ability to increase national productivity and to absorb surplus agricultural population. At the same time it is accused of exploiting the countryside and of gaining all the rewards. These two views are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Before the First World War industry in the Old Kingdom was relatively undeveloped; the two most important industries were petroleum production and lumbering, both largely financed by foreign capital and both producing principally for export. Industrialization was naturally restricted by the scarcity of local capital and the lack of a trained labor force. Although the economy was predominantly agricultural, the Rumanian government, in 1887, inaugurated a policy of encouraging national industry by means of a high protectionist tariff, partly to avoid the complete destruction of household industries by foreign competition, partly for nationalist reasons.

The acquisition of new territories after the First World War—especially Transylvania with its mineral resources, metallurgical industry, and more highly developed economy—provided additional impulse to industrial expansion. Greater Rumania was moderately [135] well endowed with raw materials: petroleum, fair lignite reserves, some iron, lead, zinc, and salt. Nevertheless, Rumania remained a predominantly agrarian country; in 1930 only 10 per cent of the active population was engaged in industry.

The growth of industry in the Old Kingdom in the first third of 178 the twentieth century is shown by the following figures:[1] 433

	Number of industrial enterprises	*Personnel*	*Horsepower in enterprises*
1901	62,188	168,198	60,744
1930	58,892	279,897	628,442

The decrease in the number of establishments and the increase in horsepower show a concentration of industry in larger undertakings

1. Madgearu, *Evoluţia economiei romînesţi*, p. 138.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

118 and the decline of small shops. Against the increase in personnel em-
433 ployed must be set the growth of population from 5,957,000 in 1899 to 8,791,000 in 1930.

The rate of growth was somewhat slower in Transylvania, which had a more important industry at the beginning of the century than the Old Kingdom:[2]

[162]

	Undertakings	*Personnel*	*Undertakings with less than 20 employees*		*Undertakings with more than 20 employees*	
			No.	*Personnel*	*No.*	*Personnel*
1900	94,112	212,599	93,651	153,223	461	59,376
1930	59,040	269,623	58,000	123,260	1,040	146,363

According to the 1930 census there were 140,948 industrial enterprises in all of Rumania employing 616,743 persons; 130,433 were small shops employing between 1 and 5 persons. The chemical industry, including of course the petroleum industry, had the greatest capital investment, followed by the food, metallurgical, and textile industries. The food industry was most important in terms of value of output, followed by the textile, chemical, and metallurgical industries.

Except for a slump in the depression years, which was overcome by 1934, Rumanian industry experienced a fairly constant growth during the interwar period. The years 1921–26 were spent in recovering from wartime destruction, but by 1938 manufacturing production stood at 177.9 as against 100 for the year 1913:[3]

INDEX OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION (Base: 1913 = 100)

1913	100	1927	118.8	1934	167.8
1921	47.2	1928	131.8	1935	165.2
1922	73.2	1929	136.9	1936	175.0
1923	73.2	1930	132.5	1937	182.0
1924	89.0	1931	140.6	1938	177.9
1925	92.2	1932	111.9		
1926	103.7	1933	136.2		

The recovery and expansion of Rumanian industry after the depression was quite marked; the rate of growth was somewhat above

2. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
3. League of Nations, *Industrialization and Foreign Trade*, p. 137.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania ED

that for world manufacturing as a whole.[4] This recovery was accompanied by a further concentration of undertakings and an elimination of smaller establishments. The emphasis shifted from consumer goods toward capital goods: between 1927 and 1937 the volume of output of capital goods increased by 57.4 per cent, that of consumer goods by 45 per cent. In 1937 the value of the output of capital goods was only slightly less than that of consumer goods.

433
178

The rapid expansion of industry, especially of the capital goods industries, contrasts strangely with the backward state of Rumanian agriculture and the generally low level of consumption. In fact, however, the expansion of industry was not closely integrated with the development of the whole of the economy, but was the result of very special circumstances. The growth of capital goods industries did not correspond to the development of an internal market: two of the most important items, petroleum and wood, were primarily for export; the rapid growth of the metallurgical industry was caused by increasing state demands, above all for armaments. (In 1938, 70 per cent of the metallurgical output was consumed by the state.) The growth of the consumers goods industries did not lead to an equivalent increase in consumption. Indeed, in 1937 per capita consumption of most consumers goods was below the 1927 level, since the increase in production was matched by a decline in imports. While it is meaningless to consider the development of an industry as "artificial," since industry almost by definition is the essence of artificiality, nevertheless Rumanian industry was a forced growth, aided by high tariff production, state support, and a relatively high degree of cartelization.

In certain respects the precocious maturity of Rumanian industry resembles the development of Rumanian agriculture in the nineteenth century, in that both were molded by external economic forces of the more advanced West. Agriculture was driven into extensive cereal cultivation by the expansion of commerce; industry, instead of developing gradually from commerce and small crafts, rapidly assumed the Western form of large cartelized undertakings. To be sure, there is no reason why Rumanian industrial development should have repeated the historical stages of Western industry; on the contrary, the fact that the West had evolved a high level of industry made it both unnecessary and impossible for Rumanian industry to pursue the same path; but this hurried adoption of alien industrial patterns was bound to lead to economic dislocations.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 95. Rumanian manufacturing in 1936–38 was 45 per cent above that in 1926–29; for world manufacturing as a whole the increase was 33 per cent.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

433 178 What was the effect of this industrial expansion upon Rumanian agriculture? In the first place, it did little to intensify farming, provide it with improved equipment, or lead to the creation of agricultural industries.

With all the accelerated rhythm of the process of industrialization, the cultivation of the soil and the raising of livestock have not received any notable stimulus toward intensification; food industries based upon agricultural produce have not developed; the textile industry, while well advanced, has neglected native textile plants—flax and hemp—it has stimulated the cultivation of cotton only in the last years, and has provided no incentive for improving the quality of wool; the oil industry has been unable to cause an increase in the production of oleaginous plants, and the introduction of the soy bean in recent years is the result solely of the influence of foreign commercial relations. Finally, the rudimentary and insufficient technical investment in agriculture and the minimal importance of chemical fertilizers illustrate the absence of any positive influence in this direction by the metallurgical and chemical industries.[5]

In the second place, industry in the interwar years, while growing rapidly, was in no position to absorb the excess labor force which was accumulating in agriculture in the absence of a more intensive cultivation. Between 1929 and 1938 personnel engaged in manufacturing industries increased by 90,000 or by about 10,000 a year, whereas the annual rural excess has been estimated at between 100,000 and 200,000.[6] Rumanian industry at its existing level was clearly unable to provide much relief to agricultural overpopulation.

It may be concluded, then, that the development of Rumanian industry was of little direct benefit to agriculture, either in improving or intensifying cultivation or in absorbing surplus labor. It has been maintained, on the contrary, that the advance of industry was at the expense of agriculture, a common complaint in most agrarian communities. Two preliminary observations should be made in this connection. In a society which is advancing there is a natural tendency for agriculture to play a relatively smaller part, the proportion of income spent on food is less, and agriculture's share in the total income declines. Moreover, since agricultural supply is less elastic than the supply of industrial products, agriculture is more apt to suffer in the event of price fluctuation. In a depression a price scissors is likely to occur; in the period 1929–39 this effect was very strong in

5. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 190.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Rumania and undoubtedly served to maintain agriculture in a depressed condition.[7] These, however, are general tendencies which, in theory at least, should adjust themselves in time; in the long run, and on the assumption of mobility in the factors of production, an equilibrium should be reached between agriculture and industry. But apart from such general factors, did the specific form of the development of Rumanian industry work to the disadvantage of agriculture?

A Yugoslav rural health worker, in describing the relations between town and country in the Balkans, concluded that agriculture was losing in the exchange of goods:[8]

> A survey undertaken in several rural countries on the nutritional status of the population showed that there exists undernourishment among a large number of the rural population, and that agricultural products are exported from rural countries without consideration of the nutritional requirements of the people. The reasons are purely commercial. The industrial products imported into the rural countries in exchange serve merely the urban population and industrial establishments from which the farming population derives comparatively small benefit. To cover their money requirements, the farmers owning small holdings are usually compelled to sell the best products of their farms to the town people. Thus they are helping the cities and industries, themselves remaining far in the rear in regard to sanitation, housing, health, and general education.

The Rumanian economist Manoilescu undertook to demonstrate that, in the Rumanian trade triangle between countryside, town, and foreign market, the countryside received far less in the way of goods

7. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 80:

(1929 prices = 100)

	Price of agricultural products	*Price of industrial products used by agriculture*	*Relation*
1929	100.0	100.0	100.0
1930	68.2	98.0	69.6
1931	50.8	86.6	58.7
1932	47.7	80.9	59.0
1933	44.9	81.1	55.4
1934	44.1	82.6	53.4
1935	48.4	90.2	53.7
1936	54.0	95.4	56.6
1937	64.6	101.8	63.9
1938	67.1	99.2	67.6
1939	72.7	112.5	64.6

8. Andreya Stampar, "Observations of a Rural Health Worker," quoted in *International Journal of Agrarian Affairs*, *1*, No. 1 (October, 1939), 71.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

438 and services than it gave, the difference being gained by the towns.[9]
433 According to these views, trade relations were actually detrimental
241 to the rural areas, which were being drained by the towns and industries.

It is not necessary here to discuss the theoretical question whether there is any absolute disadvantage to the countryside in its commerce with the towns. If during a period of change toward industrialization the countryside's position declines in relation to the town, it is quite possible for a number of other factors—which may be "short term" or even noneconomic—to convert this relative disadvantage into an absolute loss in income. Such factors may include the inelasticity of agricultural supply, the immobility of agricultural labor, and the increase in agricultural population. Finally, governmental and political policies may favor industry at the expense of agriculture. This last point requires further elucidation, as it was quite important in
651 Rumania.
433 Rumanian industry was created in the shelter of high protective tariffs, which undoubtedly served to increase the costs of agriculture and to benefit industry at its expense. These tariffs have been justified by the "infant industries" argument, and in part they were brought about by the agricultural protectionist policy of the European industrial states. But the combination of protectionism and the development of cartels did give industry a monopolistic position in the internal Rumanian market which worked to the disadvantage of agriculture. In addition to tariff protection, Rumania had a long tradition of direct encouragements to industry—such as exemptions from taxation and special transport rates—which persisted in the interwar period and were expanded in the 1930's.

433 The protective tariffs, by restricting foreign imports, had the
651 effect of bringing in foreign capital for investment in local industry.
457 But while foreign capital has been of great importance in the development of Rumania's larger industries and in the creation of its transportation system, the effect on the total economy has been somewhat one-sided, partly because the capital was naturally attracted to industries working for export: "Without depreciating the influence of foreign capital in stimulating industrialization, it is to be underlined that the benefits of invested foreign capital do not for the most part serve to create purchasing power in the national market

[113] 9. M. Manoilescu, "Das wirtschaftliche und soziale Dreieck der Agrarstaaten: die Stadt, das Dorf, das Ausland," *Internationale Agrarrundschau*, No. 6 (Berlin, 1940), also cited in Hugo Böker, "Agriculture's Share in the National Income and the Agricultural Situation," *International Review of Agriculture, 32*, No. 1 (January, 1941), 22. For a discussion of M. Manoilescu's views, see below, pp. 193–197.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

433 and do not contribute to increasing the supply of capital, since they
651 are exported." [10]

457 A comparison of industrial manufacture, industrial imports, and
433 consumption of manufactured goods between 1927 and 1938 shows that while the percentage of industrial consumption which was provided for by Rumanian industry rose from 63.5 per cent to 78.6 per cent, the total consumption of industrial products dropped from about 93 billion lei in 1927 to 88 billion lei in 1938. That is, the increase in industrial production (from 59 to 69 billion lei) was more than balanced by the fall in industrial imports (from 34 to 19 billion lei).[11]

From this the conclusion might be drawn that Rumanian industrialization, instead of increasing purchasing power, was reducing it. Such indeed was Madgearu's opinion: "It is certain that the position of quasi-monopoly created by the system of protection of the national industry is the principal cause of the state of inferiority into which agriculture in general and peasant agriculture in particular have been driven." [12]

If the desirability of a policy of industrialization is granted, it is clear that since industries do not materialize from thin air and are not created by amiable fairy godmothers energy and resources must be diverted from other fields to the creation of industry, at least during the period of its inception and establishment. But the ultimate effect, presumably, is to raise the whole level of the economy; perhaps the agricultural sector will not advance as rapidly or as far, but in the long run at least the whole community should benefit. If Madgearu's conclusion is correct, such was not the result of Rumanian industrialization; instead, the industrial sector pulled away from the rest of the economy, was not directed to satisfying its needs, and may actually have reduced the over-all power of consumption.

Admittedly, twenty-five years may be too brief a period in which to judge such a development. Moreover, as has been mentioned before, a great many external influences had a powerful effect upon the Rumanian economy. The first years after 1921 were spent in recover-

[113] 10. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 204. In this connection see also Joso Tomasevich's chapter on "Foreign Economic Relations," in *Yugoslavia*, ed. Robert J. Kerner (Berkeley; Los Angeles, 1949), which expresses substantially the same view regarding the role of foreign investment in Yugoslavia.

11. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

12. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 259. Madgearu's conclusions, however, are not altogether disinterested. As an old National Peasant who had attacked the protectionist policy of the Liberal party and had lowered tariffs when he was Minister of Finance, he was always of the opinion that industrial development in Rumania had been artificially forced and was battening on the peasant.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

433 ing from the very extensive devastations of the war; the agrarian crisis and the world depression hurt agriculture all over the world; the agricultural protectionism of the European industrial states drove the east European nations toward industrial protection; from the middle of the 1930's the increasing menace of war led to a growing demand for heavy industries to supply armaments.

But despite all these external influences, there is still reason to believe that the relation of Rumanian agriculture to industry worked to the disadvantage of the former. Politically, of course, there is abundant evidence that industry was a far more promising source of funds than agriculture, and undoubtedly political and private interests worked to the benefit of industry. In 1927, G. D. Creangă observed, "The situation which before the war existed on the land, where a number of latifundiary owners retained the greater part of the agricultural revenue has now passed into the domain of trade and industry." [13] No doubt Rumania's need for industrialization was often used to camouflage private financial motives; in 1932 an English observer maintained that the high protectionist policy was not really designed to protect Rumania from the ravages of foreign capital but had been introduced "mainly because the Brătianu party aimed at reserving for themselves the monopoly of such profits as could be made through the exploitation of the national resources." [14]

In Rumania one can never be sure that such aims are not dominant. Nevertheless, the tension between industry and agriculture certainly involves more than the personal scramble for wealth and profits. The impulse toward industry was also intimately connected with Rumania's foreign commercial relations.

Commerce

Economic tensions on two levels have already been observed: between the peasant and the estate owner in the countryside, especially before 1914, and between agriculture and industry. Both were in some measure a consequence of Rumania's increasing involvement in the complex of world industry and commerce. It is now necessary to examine these external relations.

439 Rumanian foreign commerce was on a relatively small scale; in 1929, for example, the total value of imports and exports per capita was only one-tenth as great as that for Great Britain in the same

[113]

13. Quoted in Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, p. 575.

14. George Clinton Logio, *Rumania, Its History, Politics, and Economics* (Manchester, 1932), p. 126.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

year. While the principal Rumanian imports were manufactured goods—textiles, iron and steel products, and machinery—the nature of these imports does show a fairly important shift between 1920 and 1938. Increasing imports of raw materials and semifinished goods (from 2 to 20 per cent of total value of imports) and a decline in finished manufactured goods (from 88 to 74 per cent) reflect the move toward industrialization. Rumania's principal exports were agricultural products (chiefly grain), timber, and petroleum products.[15] During the interwar years petroleum became the most important export, replacing cereals, which never regained their pre-1914 position. 439

The significance of petroleum in Rumania commerce was, of course, very great; Rumania had a more favorable balance of trade than the other Balkan states, thanks largely to its oil shipments. In addition to its importance as an export the oil industry provided the state in normal years with nearly one-third of its revenue, not including benefits to the railways which were state-operated. But while petroleum meant a great deal to Rumania's balance of trade, its importance to the whole economy should not be overemphasized. A large part of the industry was owned by foreigners, and a considerable proportion of the proceeds from exports did not reach the country in terms of foreign exchange. Moreover, the petroleum industry, being something of a lucky windfall and detached from the rest of the Rumanian economy, did not greatly influence the pattern of exports, though it added to their total value. Except for oil, Rumania's exports resembled those of the other eastern European agrarian states, with perhaps a greater emphasis upon cereals. 439 315

What were the disadvantages of this form of commerce which should have driven Rumanian governments to strain the economy in an effort to industrialize? In recent years there has been a widespread reaction against the classical theory of the international division of labor and an increasing belief that agricultural countries are trading at a disadvantage, regardless of the doctrine of comparative costs. This reaction has taken a number of forms, ranging from a reaffirmation of Friedrich List's ideas to an advocacy of economic autarky. Without becoming involved in the theory of international trade, one may observe at least three concrete ways in which the principle of international division of labor fails to satisfy an agrarian state. 439

In the first place, the existing international division of labor and

15. In 1928–30 the principal exports, in percentage of total value of exports, were: grain, 29.2; livestock, 6.0; timber, 14.8; petroleum, 33.0.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

439 the distribution of industry were determined by a number of historical contingencies and are not an accurate reflection of the allocation of natural resources.[16] In the second place, historical evidence seems to indicate that the international division of labor has not, in fact, been successful in providing the more backward countries with manufactured goods. "Non-industrial countries can profit from such division of labor only to the extent they enjoy a surplus of their production that can be exported in exchange for foreign manufactures. Figures analyzed . . . clearly indicate that in the majority of non-industrial countries this surplus is not large enough to ensure them a plentiful supply of manufactures." [17] In the third place, regardless of the original reasons for a country's backwardness, the mere fact of backwardness in a competitive international system can serve to impede the country's advance toward industrialization.[18]

In addition to these general disadvantages which face undeveloped agrarian countries in world commerce, certain specific factors during the interwar years damaged Rumania's position as an exporter of agricultural products. The overseas cereal exporters, with their vast extent of land and mechanized agriculture, could produce grain more cheaply than Rumania with its peasant husbandry. The agricultural protectionism of the European industrial states had a very serious effect upon Rumania and all the eastern European states. Finally, the world agrarian depression after 1929 greatly reduced the value of Rumanian exports and created a price scissors.[19]

[113] 16. For a defense of the industrialization of agrarian states as a means of achieving a closer correspondence between the distribution of industry and the allocation of natural resources, see S. N. Prokopovicz, *L'Industrialisation des pays agricoles et la structure de l'économie mondiale après la guerre* (Neuchâtel, 1946).

17. League of Nations, *Industrialization and Foreign Trade*, p. 34.

18. K. Mandelbaum, *The Industrialisation of Backward Areas* (Oxford, 1945), p. 4.

19. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Balkan States: I. Economic* (Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 65:

Price per Metric Ton of Rumanian Imports and Exports
(in Swiss francs)

	Exports	*Imports*
1922–30	121.3	815.8
1931	68.5	853.9
1932	57.0	823.4
1933	49.3	768.5
1934	46.5	629.6
1935	49.4	547.0
Percentage fall between 1922–30 average and lowest point, 1931–35	62	33

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

It is obvious, of course, that the real impulse toward industrialization in backward countries has been only in part economic; nationalism and the demands of state security have probably been more important in forming the actual decisions to create national industries. National interests, moreover, have a way of making relative economic differences appear absolute. Thus, if two countries are making economic progress, but one at twice the rate of the other, from the purely economic point of view both countries are gaining and the whole situation is on the positive side of the ledger. But if these two states are also involved in power politics, the relative economic disadvantage of the one state appears, and may in fact prove to be, an absolute loss. Consequently, when power relations enter into the picture, and in the Balkans that is axiomatic, economic disadvantages, which may be only relative or "temporary" in theory, appear much more menacing. 439

For all these reasons, in which economic and national interests are intermingled, foreign commerce or, more broadly, Rumania's economic contact with the West served as a spur to the creation of industry. Since unregulated commerce did not seem to bring this about but rather underlined Rumania's role as an agricultural nation, with all the real and imagined disadvantages that implied, industrialization was forced. While, as has been said before, there is no reason to regard this development as unnatural, that does not mean there was no dislocation. One does not know how Rumania's traditional institutions might have developed if left undisturbed. On the other hand, the superimposition of Western industrial, financial, and commercial organizations and techniques upon the undeveloped Rumanian economy did create a strain, one which is shown clearly in the financial and monetary difficulties that hounded Rumania throughout the interwar period.

Money and Finance

Rumanian finances and monetary policy have been notoriously wobbly. The cause is frequently ascribed to official graft and corruption, of which, no doubt, there was a great deal, some of it theatrically extravagant. Foreign advisers had occasion to be very critical of the use of foreign loans, state speculation in commodities, and laxness in the tax system. These shortcomings, however, were symptoms as well as causes, though they certainly exacerbated the financial troubles and contributed to a generally low standard of official ethics. 457

Before the First World War, Rumania's balance of payments was

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

457 conditioned by the fact that it was an agricultural country developing with the aid of foreign capital. A positive balance of trade was usually devoted to covering the invisible exports—interest on state borrowings and returns on foreign capital invested in the country. Under postwar circumstances, the fairly stable situation which had obtained before 1914 was thrown out of equilibrium as a consequence of war losses, the incurrence of war debts, and the decline in cereal exports. German investments, which had been of major importance before the war, were cut off and were not replaced by an equivalent influx from the West. Despite Rumania's generally favorable balance of trade, the balance of payments was negative.

458 Rumania's financial position was further weakened by the chronic
659 instability of the leu. Following the First World War the leu depreciated until 1927. It was legally stabilized in 1929 with the aid of an international loan of $100 million. This effort, however, was wrecked by the depression and the collapse of central European finance in 1931. In the 1930's Rumania, though at a somewhat later date than the other Balkan states, was forced to introduce exchange controls and suspend a considerable portion of the foreign debt payment. The gradual move toward increasing financial and commercial controls was largely a consequence of exchange difficulties. Despite the relatively favorable commercial position, Rumania was even less successful than the other Balkan states in achieving monetary stability, and the value of the leu continued to decline. By 1939 the Rumanian monetary situation was altogether chaotic, and the diversity of the rates of the leu made it impossible to ascertain the real value of the money.[20]

It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze the tortuous course of Rumanian financial and monetary policy, which was extremely complicated, subject to frequent change, and not successful in achieving its aims. In general, the financial field showed Rumanian administration at its worst. While the real difficulty was basically that of an immature economy attempting to catch up with a world economy —itself in serious crisis—the fact that Rumania, although in a somewhat better commercial position than the other Balkan states, was even less successful in its financial policy must be attributed largely to the political circumstances of the 1930's.

452 To some extent Rumania's financial vicissitudes by-passed the peasant in so far as he was leading a self-subsistent, nonmonetary life. He was principally affected in his requirements for credit. Although, as has been mentioned above, the Rumanian peasant was not in a

20. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 323.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

position to utilize credit very effectively, he was burdened with debts. 452
These debts, for the most part, had not been contracted for capital investment in improved agricultural equipment but rather to meet his deficit of net income or to enable him to purchase land.[21] The supply of credit to agriculture was not sufficient to ease this burden. The underlying difficulty, of course, was the general lack of capital in Rumania; the available supply moved toward industry, a more remunerative and less precarious field than agriculture. It is not easy to determine whether credit discrimination in favor of industry was greater than the difference in risk between agriculture and industry. Certainly Rumanian agriculture offered very little security to loans, especially since many of the new allotments of land were legally inalienable.

But just as industry was being consciously fostered, so the diversion of credit away from agriculture was not solely the result of economic factors. For one thing, credit institutions were primarily designed for the benefit of industry; in 1925 the governor of the National Bank remarked that while Rumania had a national bank to help trade and a Society for Industrial Credit to help industry, there was no organized agricultural credit on a similar scale.[22] In any event, by 1938 industry was receiving double the amount of credit going to agriculture, not including foreign credit. Between 1928 and 1938 the National Bank's discounts to industry rose from 32.02 to 55.95 per cent of the total, whereas discounts for agriculture dropped from 22.97 to 4.94 per cent.[23] Under these circumstances it is not surprising that many a peasant was forced to go to the usurer to whom he had to pay exorbitant rates of interest, and went on from year to year falling deeper and deeper into debt.

Standard of Living

Unfortunately, there are no sound official evaluations of the Ru- 434
manian national income. Certain estimates have been made but they can serve only as a rough guide. Colin Clark has put the Rumanian income per head of working population, between the years 1925 and 1934, at 243 international units (i.e., the amount of goods and services that could be purchased for $1 in the United States over the

21. In 1928 the interest charge on debts equalled 10 to 11 per cent of the average gross income on 6,000 farms; after the agrarian depression, in 1931, this rose to 35 per cent. N. Cornăţeanu, "Effects of the Agricultural Crisis on Peasant Farms in Rumania," *International Review of Agriculture*, 22, No. 7 (Rome, 1931), 208E.

22. Quoted in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 424.

23. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 353.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

434 decade 1925–35). In Mr. Clark's opinion, this represented a drop from a pre-1914 level of 298 international units and set Rumania at the bottom of the eastern European states:[24]

INCOME PER HEAD OF WORKING POPULATION, 1925–34 (IN INTERNATIONAL UNITS)

Rumania	243
Bulgaria	284
Yugoslavia	330
Hungary	359
Poland	352
Czechoslovakia	455
Great Britain	1,069

It is very difficult, however, to make a satisfactory comparison of Rumania's national income before and after the First World War because of the addition of new territories which doubled the area and population and because of the depreciation of the leu. A comparison of the per capita consumption of certain manufactured articles in 1913 and 1927 shows a slight improvement:[25]

ANNUAL PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION IN KILOGRAMS

	1913	1927
Sugar	4.59	5.94
Cotton goods	2.26	2.82
Paper	1.41	2.50
Soap	0.20	0.41

On the other hand, the per capita consumption of cotton goods, which is a fairly good measure of the purchasing power of the peasant, showed no steady advance over the last sixty years. Local consumption of cereals, especially of wheat, increased after the agrarian reforms, although at the expense of exports. Peasant housing appears to have improved through the introduction of better building ma-

[113] 24. Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress* (London, 1940), pp. 40, 132. The method used to reach this conclusion was, by necessity, quite complicated. The pre-1914 national income estimate for the Old Kingdom was taken from Dresdener Bank figures; estimates for Bucovina and Transylvania were taken from studies on Austria-Hungary by Walzner and Fellner. The figure for Bessarabia was established arbitrarily. In addition to the task of combining these three estimates, it was necessary to take into account the enormous depreciation of the leu from its pre-1914 level and the change in the level of prices. Given the ultimate uncertainty of Rumanian statistics, it seems impossible to judge the probable accuracy of Mr. Clark's estimate.

25. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

434 terials and wooden floors, and it is quite possible that there were other improvements in village conditions which would not appear in statistics.

The depression greatly reduced the Rumanian income, and by 1937 the per capita real income had not yet regained the 1927 level.

[165] In the chapter on population it was seen that Rumania had an extremely high death rate. This was matched by an extraordinarily high infant mortality rate, the highest in Europe. Between 1931 and 1938 infant deaths showed no sign of declining, but ranged between a maximum of 19.2 per 100 living births in 1935 and a minimum of 17.4 in 1933.

511 The low standard of living implicit in the vital statistics is also reflected in the dietary deficiencies of the Rumanian peasant. A number of surveys taken in the 1930's reached the same general conclusions:[26] while the caloric content of the diet was usually adequate, its quality was very poor; an excessive consumption of grains, especially maize in the form of corn meal (*mămăligă*) and not enough animal products or protective foods. Seasonal consumption, as might be expected, varied widely. The prevalence of pellagra has been an obvious indication of an unbalanced diet.

511 Statistics on housing, disease, medical service, education, and illiteracy confirm the impression that the Rumanian peasant had one of the lowest standards of living in Europe. Admittedly, the statistically average Rumanian is an abstraction. Peasants with holdings over 5 hectares lived better and were healthier than peasants on dwarf holdings. The husbandman with an intensively cultivated farm in Ţara Bârsei in Transylvania had about three times the income of the small holder in Dobrogea. Nevertheless, the flat picture of widespread poverty and squalor presented by the statistics is not far from the truth. The colorful costumes and picturesque folk dances of the Rumanian peasantry should not obscure the fact that in 1930 nearly half the population was illiterate and in 1938 one child in five died before it was a year old.

Accompanying this peasant poverty was a marked inequality in the distribution of the total income. Rumanian statistics do not permit an exact estimate of its extent, but it was perfectly obvious to anyone who visited Bucarest. The unmistakable signs of luxury spending

26. D. C. Georgescu, *L'Alimentation de la population rurale en Roumanie* (Bucarest, 1940); W. Aykroyd, I. Alexa, I. Nitulescu, "Étude de l'alimentation des paysans dans la région à pellagre de Moldavie," *Archives roumaines de pathologie expérimentale et de microbiologie* (Paris, 1935); Ioan Claudian, *Alimentaţia poporului român* (Bucarest, 1939).

[113]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

511 —palatial villas and flats in the residential sections, large automobiles, yachting clubs, and Parisian fashions—were in startling contrast to the conditions in the countryside. While the employment of surpluses in unproductive expenditure is a characteristic of undeveloped economies, this tendency was somewhat aggravated in Rumania by the inheritance of boyar extravagance and by the traditional social chasm between the peasant and the ruling groups. To some extent the unequal distribution of income was derived from the pre-1914 oligarchic agrarian society, but a great deal of the actual wealth was gained through industry and finance and through state connections.[27] Unequal distribution was not reduced by the tax structure, which depended largely upon indirect taxes on consumption goods and only to a limited degree upon income taxes.[28]

511 434 The economic importance of this distribution of income is difficult to measure. Obviously a mere leveling out of incomes would not make the Rumanian peasant significantly wealthier. On the other hand, the diversion of the nation's relatively limited surpluses into nonproductive expenditure undoubtedly restricted much-needed investments in agriculture and industry. In general, the social significance of this inequality—its reflection of the deep abyss between town and country—was more important than the immediate economic effects.

433 In its broad features the Rumanian economy during the interwar years resembled that of the pre-1914 Old Kingdom. The addition of new territories increased the internal market and provided important resources and industries. With these advantages came the task of unifying the economies of the different provinces and of recovering from the war. On the international level, the situation was less favorable than before; world trade was more restricted, especially after 1931; the industrial states protected their agriculture; the supply of foreign credit was limited and fell off greatly in the depression. For these reasons, plus a mixture of economic and nationalist mo-

27. The importance of politics and government connections in the acquisition of wealth in Rumania is proverbial, partly because the government played such an important role in economic undertakings. In 1939 the capital invested in state economic enterprises was considerably larger than the total capital investment of all private commercial and industrial undertakings. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 360.

28. In 1935/36 22.8 per cent of the total tax revenue came from income and other direct taxes; 12.3 per cent from taxes on property transactions; 12.1 per cent from turnover taxes; 44.9 per cent from consumption taxes; and 7.9 per cent from customs duties. PEP study (Political and Economic Planning), *Economic Development in S.E. Europe* (London, 1945), p. 21.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

tives, industrial expansion was fostered and while industry remained relatively small it displayed a rapid rate of growth. 433

In agriculture, on the contrary, there was general stagnation resulting from the interplay of a number of factors:

1) the growing pressure of population, which tended, in some regions at least, to nullify reforms and kept the per capita income at a low level;

2) the decline in European cereal commerce and the fall in grain prices after 1929;

3) the relative and perhaps absolute disadvantage of agriculture in internal commerce, allocation of capital, and government support;

4) what may be called the "residues" of the old landlord system: the persistence despite the land reforms of strip farming, extensive cereal cultivation, and, in an attenuated form, large estates, metayage, and labor contracts.

A vicious circle resulted. The peasant was unable to obtain credit because agriculture was a poor field for investment and was bound to remain so until it became more productive. Low yields were a function of primitive techniques, which in turn could not be improved without a reform in the organization of farming. The rational organization of farming was thwarted by the pressure of population as well as by government policy.

Despite the agrarian reforms of 1918–21, an independent small peasantry was not established; instead, dwarf holdings, insufficient to sustain a peasant family, predominated. So long as there was no alternative field of employment for peasants driven below the margin of subsistence, the appearance of a larger class of medium peasants by no means compensated for the increasing fragmentation and subdivision of the majority of peasant holdings. On the other hand, industry, which was regarded as a means of raising the level of productivity and of draining off surplus agrarian population, seems to have had the effect of reducing purchasing power and of aggravating the difficulties of the countryside. In general, one receives the impression that the Rumanian economy in attempting to lift itself by its bootstraps had merely driven the feet through the soles.

To be sure, it is uncertain just how much of this discouraging situation was a consequence of an internal maladjustment. Both in 1929 and in 1938–39 there was some promise of general improvement, but in both cases it was broken off, first by the depression and then by the outbreak of the Second World War. Perhaps under more propitious external circumstances these incipient improvements might

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

433

have lasted and led to a general amelioration of the whole economy. It should be observed, however, that in each case the show of prosperity was based on a gamble. In 1929–30 it depended upon a high or rising level of prices, an unrestricted market for agricultural exports, and access to foreign capital. As soon as these conditions disappeared, the peasant as a debtor and Rumania as a debtor nation fell into serious difficulties. Similarly, the improvement in 1938–39 was intimately related to the economic advance of Hitler Germany, which was clearly directed to preparation for war.

The depressed condition of the Rumanian economy, which probably appears bleaker in retrospect with the sad knowledge of the disastrous culmination of the interwar period, had a twofold effect upon political activity. First, the chronic poverty and low level of economic life of the majority of the Rumanian people unquestionably undermined the fragile parliamentary foundations and fostered the survival of the traditional vices of political corruption. While Rumania was poor, its poverty was not simply that of a primitive community: sectors of the economy were advancing rapidly, partly at the expense of agriculture. Consequently, there was a great temptation to snatch at the available wealth through speculation, through monopoly, and through political influence.

Moreover, the obstinacy of the agrarian question and the difficulty of finding a satisfactory way out of the impasse contributed to the multiplicity of parties and programs. That is not to say that the confusion of Rumanian politics can be wholly explained by the economic problem or that the parties can be defined as consistent standard-bearers of different economic schools of thought; Rumanian politics were shot through with opportunism. But the complexity of the factors producing the agrarian problem led to a variety of opinions as to its solution. Since the agrarian reforms had not produced a healthy agriculture, had they gone too far or not far enough, or had they merely been mismanaged? Was further industrialization the ultimate solution, or had the forced growth of industry been responsible for the plight of agriculture? Was foreign capital indispensable to Rumanian recovery or was it a threat to the country's economic independence? Was agrarian overpopulation remediable through higher productivity or was emigration the only answer? [29] The dif-

29. Although the National Peasant party is reported to have contemplated mass emigration in 1929 (Logio, *op. cit.*, p. 165), this solution did not play a very important part in local politics, partly because it so flatly contradicted the ethnic nationalism of Greater Rumania. It has been regarded by some foreign observers, however, as the only adequate solution. Doreen Warriner (*The Economics of Peasant Farming*, p. 199), for example, concluded that "Without a redistribution of farm populations to regions

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

ferent responses to these questions provide at least a thread of mean- 433
ing to the welter of political controversies during the interwar period.

---

outside Europe, Europe's farm problem cannot be solved in a way which can be reconciled with economic progress and political stability." Whatever the merits of emigration, it is a rather academic solution, given the increased barriers to immigration since the First World War. It is also doubtful in any event whether it could be on a scale large enough to balance population growth.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

page 86 blank

000

PART II

POLITICS AND THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

page 87

page 88 blank

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

V

POLITICS IN GREATER RUMANIA

THE political history of Rumania since 1922 has been extraordinarily involved and unstable, frequently verging on the absurd but ultimately tragic. Economic circumstances as outlined in the preceding section have contributed to the continuing instability both through the tangle of political issues which they have produced and through the demoralizing effect upon political life of widespread and chronic poverty. Two important qualifications must be made, however. 178

While it is true that the task of finding remedies to Rumania's economic difficulties was forced upon all successive administrations, the governments rarely acted on the basis of purely economic considerations. A strong economic nationalism, in part arising from the desire to defend the acquisitions of Greater Rumania against Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Russian irredentism, determined policy during most of the years after the First World War.[1] 565 665

The unhealthy condition of politics stemmed not merely from the poverty of the peasants but from the fact that they were not really included in the political life of the nation. In 1924 Professor Rădulescu-Motru observed that "The passivity of the peasantry has been the principal cause of Rumania's immorality." [2] Even the Peasant party had its ideological origins in a literary movement, and the leaders of the party were, in the main, professional men and intellectuals. To be sure, in all countries there is a divergence between the direction and active membership of a political party and the mass of the electorate, but it was carried to an extreme in Rumania because of the vast gulf which had existed for centuries between the peasant and his rulers. Parliamentary politics, including even the names of parties, had been copied from the West in the nineteenth century by sections of the ruling groups anxious to modernize Rumania. Since these imported parties had little to do with the great majority of the

1. For a discussion of the effects of national interests upon the economic policy of all the Danubian states in the 1920's see Leo Pasvolsky, *Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States* (New York, 1928). Antonin Basch, *The Danube Basin and the German Economic Sphere* (London, 1944), gives a sympathetic appreciation of the difficulties confronting these states in shaping their economic policy.

2. C. Rădulescu-Motru, *Ţărănismul, un suflet şi o politică* (Bucarest, 1924), p. 87.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

565 665 inhabitants, they had remained a field for partisan skirmishes among the different factions of the boyars and the growing financial and industrial interests. The limited ambit of politics was not, however, altogether the responsibility of the boyars, though most of them certainly cannot be charged with equalitarian leanings.

829 642 621 Much has been written in Rumania on the primitive state of the peasant, his inability to govern himself, and the necessity for his gradual, supervised initiation into the mysteries of government. While such writings often conceal an *arrière pensée*, they contain one element of truth: the economic role of the peasant, as a relatively self-contained and self-sufficient producer, does confine the orbit of his interests to his village. This limitation of interests has nothing to do with any shortcomings on the part of the peasant, but merely means that his economic and social life does not extend into many of the fields which comprise the necessary activities of modern governments. The immediate and obvious wishes of the peasant—such as more land, more lenient credit, and lower taxes—cannot be the satisfactory basis of a political program unless they can be related to some means of realizing them. The possibility of their direct and immediate fulfillment in Rumania was limited; the indirect measures which could ultimately improve his status—the over-all increase of the nation's productivity and capital—involved questions quite beyond his understanding as a peasant, if not as an individual.

565 In all states there is a gap between the desires of the average voter and the complexities of economic and administrative activity; in Rumania this gap was accentuated by the fact that almost four-fifths of the population was of the peasantry. Moreover, since such a large percentage of the population was devoted to one occupation, there was relatively little scope for the diversified play of economic and social interests in politics such as characterizes a more advanced society. Rumanian writers, regretting the division of their society between a formless mass of peasants and an oligarchic ruling group, have perennially pined for the emergence of a middle class. During the interwar period the base for political activity broadened somewhat through increasing industrialization, through the growth of a more numerous middle peasantry, and through strong regional interests in the new provinces, but the great bulk of the electorate was still the poor peasantry, whose chief historical means of declaring its wishes had been in sporadic and unsuccessful uprisings.

660 Partly for these reasons the extension of the suffrage after the First World War did not lead to political democracy. Politics, which retained a distinctly Phanariot flavor, was the art of taking advan-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

tage of the amorphous character of the peasantry. Rumanian elections were notorious for their corruption, ballot stuffing, and general unreliability as measures of public sentiment. Perhaps only two elections in the entire period were at all free and fair, and both produced a marked upset in political life. In most cases elections were "made" in advance. Many governments were in power through no popular mandate whatsoever but merely through political arrangements; dismissals were equally arbitrary and only occasionally resulted from the loss of popular confidence. It would be futile and misleading to attempt to explain the course of Rumanian politics by an analysis of the elections.

The most notable shifts in the political pattern in the years immediately after the First World War were the disappearance of the Conservative party and the rise of a number of new political formations, some of which were very short-lived. The position of the Conservatives had been declining even before the war, partly because of periodic crises in the selection of leaders.[3] The question of land reform and Rumania's participation in the war completely split the party; after 1918 there were two principal factions, the Conservative Democrats under Take Ionescu and the Progressive Conservatives under Alexandru Marghiloman. Ionescu participated in the Averescu cabinet of 1920–21, and after its fall attempted unsuccessfully to form a government; he died in 1922 and his followers subsequently joined Maniu's National party. Although Marghiloman confidently declared in 1923 that the "conservative doctrine is enjoying a flowering and an extraordinary vigor throughout the world,"[4] his party disappeared shortly and was absorbed by other groups.

Perhaps too much social significance has been attributed to the disappearance of the Conservatives as a sign of the uprooting of the old boyar class through the land reform and the extension of the suffrage. Considering the ease with which Rumanian parties were concocted from thin air and parliamentary majorities obtained, equal emphasis should be placed upon internal party weaknesses and schisms and upon the consequences of the Germanophile attitude of many Conservatives during the war. To be sure, the Conservative doctrine, if there was such, had little to offer. Marghiloman could insist that *natura non facit saltum* and urge the importance of tradition and natural development, but in plain fact Rumania was pro-

3. "The history of the Conservative Party in Rumania has been the history of struggles for chiefs." Rădulescu-Motru, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

4. A. Marghiloman, "Doctrina conservatoare," in Institutul Social Român, *Doctrinele partidelor politice* (Bucarest, n.d.), p. 111.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 gressing by irregular leaps and everyone was inclined to ridicule and revile the unhappy past. The Young Conservatives (Junimists) in the latter years of the nineteenth century had broken with the old-fashioned traditions of the great boyars, and before the war the party had included an increasing number of nonlandholding elements. In short, "conservatism" ceased to be a particularly promising political label.

A multitude of new parties made their appearance, ranging from the quickly outlawed Communists to a variety of fascist and anti-Semitic groups. Some of the parties, such as General Averescu's People's party and the historian Nicolae Iorga's National Democratic party, were little more than a coterie around a prominent man; some, notably the Peasant party and the Rumanian National party of Transylvania, had a relatively broad popular basis. Small parties represented the Jewish, German, Magyar, and Ukrainian minorities.

As the years passed the number of parties increased, often through schisms and regroupings, and the significance of political activity came to be in inverse proportion to the multiplicity of parties. The weak popular support of most of the parties, together with the extravagance of interparty squabbles, had the inevitable consequence of increasing political indifference among the mass of the people and of lending a certain plausibility to the claims of those who stood "above politics." From the beginning of the period there were appeals to "social harmony" and "solidarism" which were to reconcile political differences. Two institutions in particular served as foci for this "nonpolitical" current: the crown and the army. Although Rumania was a constitutional monarchy the crown had a strong position in both the Constitution of 1866 and the Constitution of 1923. From the days of Prince Cuza and Carol I there had been a tradition of the king father to his people, protecting them against the machinations of politicians; under Carol II this paternalism was to reach an extreme form in a monarchist dictatorship. The army played perhaps a less prominent role in Rumania than in the other Balkan states, but it was always in the background as a defender of law and order. In times of crisis or of transition, a general often appeared as head of the government; the Antonescu dictatorship was the culmination of the army's participation in politics.

Despite the multitude of parties and the general political confusion, five major currents, which successively dominated Rumania, can be discerned: the Liberal, the Peasantist, the Carolist, the Fascist, and the Communist. Chronologically, these currents overlapped and all were present throughout the period. In general, however, the

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Liberals dominated the years between 1922 and 1928. The National Peasants came to power in the latter year and were in complete control for about two years. After 1930, although they formed a government as late as 1933, their position was completely undermined by the depression, by Carol II's activities, and by internal weaknesses. Carol reigned from 1930 to 1940. The first three years, during which he was establishing himself, were altogether muddled politically; eight cabinet crises arose between June, 1930, and December, 1933. From 1933 to 1937 the Liberals, under Gheorghe Tătărescu, were again in power, but they were scarcely the party they had been under the Brătianus and were overshadowed by the king. After 1937 Carol broke up the political parties and instituted a royal dictatorship. He was ruined by the international developments which led to the loss of Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina, Northern Transylvania, and Southern Dobrogea. Marshal Ion Antonescu came to power in 1940, initially with the support of the Iron Guard, and maintained a military and fascist dictatorship until Rumania's defeat in 1944. The first governments following the armistice were coalitions, but after March, 1945, the Communists held effective power in the nominally coalition cabinet of Petru Groza.

This division of the years since 1922 into five periods, each with its dominant political current, is, of course, somewhat arbitrary. It oversimplifies the complexity of the actual political scene, and at the same time is apt to give a false impression of coherence and distinctness to these selected currents. All the parties had certain points in common, arising from the nature of Rumanian society. Parties out of power tended to raise the same objections and complaints; when they came into office they began to pursue the same practices as their predecessors. The same clichés—and this is especially the case in the agrarian question—reappear in the literature of all parties. In addition, there was a steady flow of individuals, for opportunist or other reasons, from one party to another. Nevertheless, with all these limitations, the division used here does appear to correspond to the main lines of development in the segment of Rumanian history under consideration.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

page 94

VI

THE LIBERAL PERIOD, 1922–28

Survey of Political Events

175
665

RUMANIAN politics did not really "return to normal" until Ion I. C. Brătianu and the National Liberal party took office in January, 1922. The coalition government under Vaida Voevod, which had come in as a result of the first postwar elections in the autumn of 1919, had been arbitrarily ousted by the king in March, 1920,[1] and the war hero General Averescu was called to form a government. Averescu, who had widespread popularity among the troops and was of peasant origin, appears to have played a double role. In 1918 he had formed his People's League as a rallying point against the established corruption and inefficiency of the old parties; he had even engaged in negotiations with the extreme Left.[2] In 1919 he had temporarily joined the Vaida government; on his political campaigns he had promised five hectares of land to every peasant cultivator, a demagogic promise quite impossible of fulfillment. When he came to power, however, as leader of his People's party, it was as the restorer of order, or, as he said, "the last reserve of the Rumanian bourgeoisie." [3]

If the Averescu movement can be said to have had any leading idea at all, it was, as General Cantacuzino put it, that the reforms which were required could not be carried out by the old Liberal party

[113]

1. For the circumstances surrounding the fall of the Vaida government see above, p. 27. According to the Liberals in 1922, the Vaida government collapsed because of a rising bolshevist current: "public opinion demanded General Averescu." *Istoricul Partidului Naţional Liberal de la 1848 şi până astăzi* (Bucarest, 1928), p. 226. While there was doubtless a great deal of social unrest at this time, especially since the Socialists had refused to recognize the 1919 elections, there seems to be no reason to doubt that the downfall of the Vaida government was a direct result of collusion between King Ferdinand and the landowners to check Mihalache's proposed agrarian bill.

2. According to the socialist Titel Petrescu (*Socialismul în România*, p. 314), after the armistice Averescu had consulted with the socialists on the prospects of collaboration and had even discussed the possible overthrow of the monarchy.

3. L. Trotsky and Ch. Rakovsky, *Ocherki politicheskoi rumynii* (Moscow, 1922), p. 126. In a debate in the chamber Mihalache inveighed against Averescu's group: "Your party is a heterogeneous conglomeration, without a program, without a clear vision, and without consistency. Your party is based solely on the popularity of General Averescu, and will last only as long as that popularity endures. . . . You are purely and simply covering troops for the old parties of the ruling classes." Mihalache, *Partidul Ţărănesc în politica ţărei* (Bucarest, 1925), pp. 17–18.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

but only by a new and popular force united around a man representing the "principle of discipline." [4] This yearning after discipline and order usually manifested itself in all parties when once they came to power, but was especially noticeable in those men or groups who were in office, not through the operation of the electoral system—however unreliable it may have been—but through some special circumstance. General Radescu, who was Prime Minister in the winter of 1944–45, was the last and most pathetic example. This call for discipline was an attempt to compensate for Rumania's underlying political instability. In most instances it was directed against the Left and the doctrine of class warfare.

Elections were held in May, 1920, and produced, not unexpectedly, a resounding success for Averescu's party, which obtained 209 out of 369 seats in the chamber. Averescu had made an electoral pact with Take Ionescu and had been joined by a splinter group of Transylvanians under the poet and subsequent fascist, Octavian Goga. He was also supported by a number of Conservatives and Liberals who, it was unkindly observed, felt the need of finding new bottles for their old wine. There is also evidence, however, that he did attract a fairly large popular vote from the peasants.[5] The new cabinet included Take Ionescu as Foreign Minister, and Nicolae Titulescu, well known later in the League of Nations, as Minister of Finance. The Conservative landowner Constantin Garoflid was Minister of Agriculture and Domains, and the sinister and cynical Constantin Argetoianu, an accomplished election manipulator, was Minister of the Interior. The position of the National Liberal party at this time is not altogether clear. While Averescu had attacked the Liberals, they were willing to accept his election. Doubtless they were not reluctant to stay in the background until the storms of popular discontent had been subdued.

The two principal actions of the Averescu government were the agrarian reform law of 1921, already discussed, and the suppression of Left-wing activity. In October, 1920, an abortive general strike was crushed, and the socialists who had voted for affiliation with the Third International arrested.[6] Tension aroused by the general strike and its suppression was augmented by a bomb explosion in the Ru-

4. *Ibid.*, p. 18. The position of some of the men in Averescu's group, notably Manoilescu, came to be known as neoliberalism and provided a transition from the policy of the old Liberals to the leading ideas of the Carolist period.

5. Mihalache admitted as much, saying that in 1919 a great many peasants had confused General Averescu with the Peasant party and thought that he was working with the peasants against the landlords. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

6. For further discussion of socialist activities at this time see below, pp. 246–247.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

664 manian senate on December 9, 1920, which killed several persons and led to a temporary state of siege in Bucarest. This type of violence was less characteristic of Rumanian than of Bulgarian or Serbian political life, but was a foreshadowing of the political degeneracy of the 1930's.

665 175 Having served his purpose as man of the hour, Averescu's position gradually deteriorated in 1921, partly because of blunders in the cabinet but largely because the various groups which had installed him now deserted and turned against him. The Liberals, who had accepted him, withdrew their support and retired from parliament, on the rather disingenuous grounds that the government was not representative and had mishandled the Liberals' land reform. Whatever the occasion, it was apparent that with the passing of the postwar turmoil the Liberals were prepared to resume their traditional leadership. General Averescu resigned on December 17, 1921. Take Ionescu attempted to form a cabinet but failed to obtain a vote of confidence. On January 19, Ion I. C. Brătianu took over the government.

With the exception of an interlude between March, 1926, and June, 1927, the Liberals were in office from 1922 to 1928. They retained a hold on the key administrative and financial posts and exerted a decisive influence over King Ferdinand in his last years. Perhaps their strongest bulwark was the dominating personality of Ion I. C. Brătianu. This masterful old politician, who had fought stubbornly throughout the war and the peace negotiations for the realization of Greater Rumania, ruled his party and the country in an arbitrary patrician manner, and until his death the Liberals were firmly established.

On the other hand, there is little evidence that they commanded extensive popular support during these years, practically none outside the Old Kingdom. Part of their success lay in the failure of the other parties to create or maintain a united and effective opposition. Although the Liberals did resort to crude electoral manipulations and to repressive police measures, usually in connection with periodic Communist scares, they were still an old-fashioned party and had not developed these procedures to the unhappy perfection now so familiar.[7] Under sufficient pressure they preferred to retire rather than to overthrow the constitution. But it required several years for the National party of Transylvania and the Peasant party of the Old Kingdom to form the consolidated opposition which ultimately dislodged them.

[113] 7. A somewhat sensational glimpse of the dark side of the Liberal administration is given in C. G. Costa-Foru's *Aus den Folterkammern Rumäniens* (Vienna, 1925), an exposé of the terrorist methods employed by the Rumanian secret police, the *Siguranja*.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

In March, 1922, the Liberals made an election in which they con- 665
trived to win 260 seats, as against 17 in the 1920 elections (Gen- 175
eral Averescu's party dropped to 11 seats). The opposition parties challenged the validity of the elections and withdrew from parliament.

A sharp controversy arose over the coronation of King Ferdinand on October 15, 1922. The opposition parties contended that the coronation should be sponsored by a coalition of all parties. Despite the fact that the coronation was held in the Transylvanian town of Alba Iulia to celebrate the unity of all Rumanian lands, the Transylvanian National party boycotted the ceremony.[8]

When the Liberals called for the March, 1922, elections they an- 642
nounced that one of the main tasks of the new assembly would be the preparation of a new constitution. Following the coronation, they proceeded to push through this act in the session opening in November. The legality of such a one-party procedure was denied by the opposition as contrary to the guarantees of autonomy in the original contracts made between the representative bodies of the new territories and the government of the Old Kingdom.[9] The opposition parties temporarily attended the parliamentary debates on the constitution, but the tumultuous sessions did not block its passage in March, 1923.

The 1923 Constitution was based on that of 1866, which it followed in many respects.[10] Because of the acquisition of such extensive new territories, a new constitutional document was deemed necessary. The following are some of its more controversial points:[11]

8. It is illustrative of the antagonism created by the centralizing policy of the Liberals that none of the chief figures responsible for the union of the new provinces with the Old Kingdom was present at the Coronation.

9. The arbitrary action of the Liberals was particularly resented in Transylvania, where the National party was undoubtedly the strongest political group. The regional autonomy of the province had already been infringed upon when General Averescu quite illegally abolished the Transylvanian Consiliu Dirigent in 1920.

10. The 1866 Constitution, closely patterned after the Belgian model, had been significantly amended on three occasions before 1923: 1) In 1879, in accordance with the stipulations of the Congress of Berlin, religious beliefs were removed as an obstacle to naturalization. This amendment was introduced to prevent the exclusion of Jews from citizenship. 2) In 1884 the number of electoral colleges for the chamber was reduced from four to three, thus broadening the franchise somewhat for the benefit of the growing urban middle class. 3) In 1914 the Liberals initiated measures for electoral and agrarian reforms. This work, which was delayed by the war, was carried out by the constitutional assembly in Iaşi in 1917. Article 19 was amended to permit land expropriation for purposes of agrarian reform; Articles 57 and 67 established universal suffrage and proportional representation for the chamber.

11. For a French translation of the text with commentary see F. R. and P. Dareste, *Les Constitutions modernes* (4th ed., 6 vols., Paris, 1928–34), II, 355 ff.; for a bibliography of Rumanian commentaries, *ibid.*, III, 223–226. An examination of some of its shortcomings was made by David Mitrany, "The New Rumanian Constitution," *The*

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

642 1) The first article ("The Kingdom of Rumania is a unitary and indivisible state") set the key for the centralist tendency of the constitution, which showed little evidence of the respect for local autonomy demanded by the new provinces.

2) Universal suffrage was limited to males. Article 6 stated that special laws would determine the conditions under which women could exercise political rights, but women did not receive the franchise for national elections until 1946.

3) The usual civil and political liberties were assured, but in many instances the assurances were qualified in such a manner as to permit their infringement, either by reference to state security or to special laws to be passed subsequently. For example, the right of association was guaranteed in Article 29, but the right of association did not imply the right to create legal entities. The conditions under which legal personality could be established were laid down in a separate law. In practice this severely limited the value of association, especially in trade union activities.[12]

4) Rural property could be owned only by Rumanian citizens (Article 18). Subsoil resources belonged to the state (Article 19). The latter article occasioned a great deal of foreign criticism as an example of the Liberals' economic xenophobia; it was also attacked by the peasant representatives as a means of defrauding the owner of land.

5) All power, according to the constitution, was derived from the nation through its delegates. The national assembly was bicameral: a senate and a chamber, the members of which were elected for a term of four years. All legislation had to pass both bodies. The chamber was elected by universal male suffrage, but the senate was composed of elected members and members by right. Senators were elected by citizens over forty years of age and by various professional bodies (municipal councils, chambers of commerce and agriculture, universities, etc.). Senators by right included: the heir to the throne, high church dignitaries, former presidents of the Council of Ministers, certain former senators and deputies who had served long terms, presidents of the supreme court of cassation, certain high military officers, and former presidents of the provincial national assemblies which had preceded the union.

Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, 3d Ser., *6*, P. 1 (February, 1924), 110–119.

12. See the article by the International Labor Office, *Freedom of Association, Vol. IV: Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, Bulgaria, Rumania*, Studies and Reports, Ser. A: Industrial Relations, No. 31 (Geneva, 1928), pp. 376–388.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

6) District and local councils had both elected members and members introduced by the national assembly. The ratio of the two types of members was not fixed (in the original draft of the new constitution, appointed members were limited to one-fifth the total) and permitted an indeterminate amount of central control over local councils. 642

7) The powers of the crown, while confined to those enunciated in the constitution, were considerable and included the right to summon, prorogue, and dissolve the assembly, appoint and dismiss ministers, and sanction or veto laws. In many constitutional monarchies the crown has similar powers, which are formalized or limited by custom; in Rumania the crust of tradition was quite thin and the crown was actually in a position to exert a great deal of influence.

8) "In case of danger to the state, martial law, partial or general, may be established by means of a bill" (Article 128).

In summary, the constitution was relatively brief (138 articles), vague on many points, and left important details to be determined by subsequent laws. There were a number of loopholes whereby civil rights guarantees could be evaded and arbitrary executive action imposed. To be sure, in most constitutions qualifying clauses recognize the state's right to take exceptional measures for its own preservation, but whereas these exceptional measures are usually understood to be applicable only in cases of emergency, the situation in Rumania was such as to make exceptional measures—arrests without warrant, violation of privacy of correspondence, and prolonged states of siege—more or less standard practice. The omissions and evasions in the Rumanian constitution were of less importance than the spirit in which the document was interpreted.

Although the opposition parties hotly attacked the Liberals, denounced the new constitution, and boycotted the assembly, they were by no means united in their actions or purposes; in 1924 and 1925 there was a frequent regrouping of party alignments. The most important question was the course to be taken by the National party of Transylvania. All parties desired to gain the support of this well-organized body; since it had been formed as a regional Rumanian party in opposition to the Magyars, rather than on a social basis, its position in the political system of united Rumania was somewhat ambiguous. In 1920 General Averescu had tried without success to gain its adherence; when Brătianu came to power in 1922 he offered Maniu three portfolios in the cabinet but Maniu refused the offer. 175 665

In June, 1924, it was announced that the National party of Transylvania and the Peasant party had officially united, but shortly

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 thereafter they drifted apart again.[13] In January, 1925, the National
665 party of Transylvania temporarily fused with the historian Iorga's National Democratic party (to which Argetoianu now belonged). In May, 1925, a United Opposition, including Iorga's group, Maniu's Transylvanians, and the Peasant party, was temporarily established and demanded the resignation of the government. Averescu did not join the opposition bloc and it was rumored that he had a secret understanding with the Liberals to succeed them. In elections to the newly created Chambers of Agriculture,[14] 44 out of 75 districts were won by the United Opposition, 27 by the government, and 4 by the People's party. The tide seemed to be turning against the Liberals.

One reason the Liberals were able to maintain their position in the face of a growing if uncoordinated opposition during the years from 1922 to 1925 was the perennial fear of bolshevism, which in turn served to weaken or discredit all radical or reformist movements. On
648 the international level Soviet-Rumanian relations were very bad be-
175 cause of the unresolved Bessarabian dispute. A conference held in Vienna in April, 1924, failed to bring any agreement between the two disputants.[15] Each side accused the other of plotting aggression and each took measures which aggravated the tension. The creation in 1924 of a Moldavian Soviet Republic on the left bank of the Dniester and ominous Soviet speeches forecasting the ultimate reunion of all Moldavians increased Rumanian anxiety. At the same time, in February, 1925, Vintilă Brătianu, Minister of Finance and brother of Ion I. C. Brătianu, stated his opposition to returning Wrangel's fleet to the U.S.S.R. because of the danger of a strong Soviet Black Sea fleet, and announced that negotiations were in progress for the cooperation of British, French, and Rumanian capital in the establishment of an armaments and munitions factory in Rumania.[16] Such an announcement obviously matched the Soviet thesis that the Western bourgeois powers were using the eastern European states as advanced bases for an assault upon the U.S.S.R.

13. For a discussion of the union of the Transylvanian National party and the Peasant party see below, pp. 140–141.

14. Chambers of agriculture were established in each district in 1925, with a mixed membership of elected and appointed members. In addition to their agricultural functions, they elected members to the senate. They soon became political instruments and were of very little value in the improvement of agriculture.

113 15. According to Louis Fischer, on the basis of information obtained from Christian Rakovsky, Litvinov and Trotsky were willing to accept the loss of Bessarabia, but Stalin, Rakovsky, and Chicherin were not. The latter hoped that by means of the Bessarabian issue they could "keep Rumania perennially on tenterhooks." Louis Fischer, *Men and Politics* (New York, 1941), pp. 134–135.

16. *Times* (London), February 7, 1925.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

In July, 1924, by order of the Commander of the Second Army Corps, the Communist party in Rumania and its associated organizations were dissolved for having violated state of siege regulations and for endangering the security of the state. 648 175

Bessarabia naturally suffered badly in the conflict; reports of foreign observers in these years present a desolate picture of rotting commerce, depressed agriculture, miserable administration and widespread fear and disaffection. The province had been continuously under martial law since 1919. The Rumanians reported frequent Soviet raids, plots, and instigations to violence; the Russians reported brutally suppressed peasant uprisings. Both were taking place. In the notable rising at Tatar Bunar in 1924, which involved a whole village, there is ample evidence of Communist agitation, yet an entire community does not participate in a revolt without serious occasion. 668 175

Tension was not limited to Bessarabia; in December, 1924, some 400 persons described as Communist terrorists were arrested throughout Rumania. In September, 1925, 28 members of committees of "red" unions were arrested in Bucarest. Disturbances, however, were not solely the result of Left-wing activity. Several anti-Semitic outbreaks occurred, with the usual attacks on synagogues and Jewish shops. On October 27, 1924, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, later the leader of the Iron Guard movement, achieved his first prominence by shooting the chief of police of Iaşi; he was subsequently acquitted.[17] 665 175

Under these circumstances, in which opposition to the government could so convincingly be depicted as anti-Rumanian, the Liberals, self-appointed guardians of Rumanian patriotism, were somewhat strengthened, whereas the Peasants were continually forced to protest their loyalty and to defend themselves against the charge of bolshevism.

At the beginning of 1926, however, the opposition to the Liberals became more intense. The announcement on December 28, 1925, of Prince Carol's renunciation of his right to the crown in favor of his infant son Michael [18] brought protests from the Transylvanian Nationalists and the Peasants. While expressing their continued loyalty to King Ferdinand, they refrained from voting on the bill of renunciation on the grounds that they had not been consulted on the appointment of the regency which was to govern during Michael's minority. It was widely known that Brătianu and Carol had not got

17. For the origins of the Iron Guard movement see below, pp. 226–228.

18. Carol had gone abroad with Mme Lupescu. Upon King Ferdinand's demand that he return, without her, Carol refused and renounced his right to the throne.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 on well together, and it was generally believed that Brătianu had
665 forced the king to exclude Carol.

[661] Communal elections were held in February in an atmosphere of political excitement. The government, for all its electioneering techniques, did badly, especially in the larger towns. It won only one-third of the seats in the Bucarest municipal council. In Bessarabia the United Opposition won all lists. The government was defeated in most Transylvanian towns, notwithstanding its pact with the Magyar party; it won most of the rural Transylvanian communes through official pressure and the aid of the gendarmerie.

195 In March the Brătianu cabinet reached the end of its four-year
671 term. In the last session of parliament it passed a new electoral law,
666 whose unusual provisions were to make Rumanian elections even less representative of public opinion. Deputies had previously been elected on a proportional basis. According to the new act, modeled on Mussolini's law of January 7, 1923, the party gaining a plurality and at least 40 per cent of the votes was declared the majority party: it was to receive, as a premium, half the seats in the chamber plus a number of the remaining seats corresponding to its percentage of the total vote. Thus, a party gaining 40 per cent of the votes would occupy 70 per cent of the seats in the chamber (50 per cent plus two-fifths of the remaining 50 per cent). The remainder of the seats was divided proportionally among the other parties; a party failing to gain 2 per cent of the total votes obtained no representation.

According to the Liberals, there was nothing extraordinary about this law. A bill for electoral reform had been part of the Liberal program and had been stipulated in the 1923 Constitution.[19] In a country with such a multitude of unstable parties it might be argued that the "premium," as it was called, was a necessary device to give the party in office a sufficiently strong parliamentary majority to enable it to carry on its business.

Nevertheless, given the idiosyncrasies of Rumanian politics, the law had two very unfortunate effects. Since it was the practice for the crown to summon a government, which then proceeded to hold, or "make," elections with the aid of the administrative apparatus, the electoral law increased the opportunity for the selected group to swing the elections in its favor. On the other hand, the failure of a party obtaining less than 2 per cent of the votes to gain any repre-

19. According to Article 138 of the constitution, the current national assembly (i.e., the Liberal majority) could function after the promulgation of the constitution until the expiration of its mandate. During that period an electoral law was to be passed in accordance with the principles laid down in the constitution.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

sentation was a natural incentive for such parties to abandon the 175
parliamentary track altogether. The timing of the law led the op- 671
position parties to charge that it was merely part of the Liberals' 666
plan of grooming General Averescu to replace them, since his party was obviously weak in popular support. There is no question that in 1924 and 1925 Averescu had not cooperated with the other opposition parties but had worked in some measure with the Liberals.

On March 27, 1926, Brătianu resigned amid rumors that he fa- 665
vored General Averescu as his successor. The opposition was still 175
fumbling in its efforts to unite; negotiations between the Transylvanian Nationalists and the Peasant party had broken down again on March 22 over a disagreement on the distribution of cabinet posts. The king, on March 29, consulted the leaders of the Transylvanian National, Peasant, and People's parties and requested a coalition cabinet; apparently the Peasants and the Nationalists agreed. But on the following day, much to their chagrin, King Ferdinand called on General Averescu to form a government.

The reasons for the king's action are not altogether clear. The Nationalists and the Peasants had blundered in not mending their differences earlier and achieving a solid coalition. On the other hand, the king had been responsible for their dismissal in 1920 and was probably quite doubtful of their ability to govern properly and likely to accept the advice of Brătianu. Brătianu of course denied that his party had any agreement with General Averescu but his disclaimer is not convincing. "All we did," he said, "was to prepare the atmosphere in order to bring into power a government which would present a guarantee for the continuity of the work accomplished by us. Apart from this we are the declared opponents of the present government." [20] It was generally believed, and probably correctly, that Brătianu had strongly urged the king to install General Averescu.

Averescu held elections in May. The National party and the Peas- 661
ants, still unable to achieve fusion, agreed to collaborate in the elec- 666
tion. Despite the premium Averescu faced quite a task in overcoming his party's numerical weakness, but he acted resolutely and altogether successfully in one of the more outrageous Rumanian elections. Military officers on active service were appointed as prefects of a number of districts. Circulation of vehicles and persons was strictly controlled. The leaders of the opposition were unable to get in touch with their constituents; even Ion Brătianu was blocked on one trip, and Mihalache was arrested by gendarmes in his own electoral district. Gendarmes supervised public gatherings and were directed to intervene

20. *Times* (London), April 21, 1926.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

661 if anyone attempted "to excite the people." Political manifestoes and
666 slogans required the approval of the prefect. On the day of the election, numerous opposition delegates were arrested and not permitted to supervise the voting or the counting. There was some violence and a few deaths.[21] Averescu, by these means, obtained 52 per cent of the votes, but under the premium he gained 292 out of 387 seats in the chamber, the Opposition block held 69 seats, the Liberals 16, Cuza's League of Christian Defense (an anti-Semitic formation) 10; the socialists and the Communist-sponsored workers' bloc, having obtained less than 2 per cent of the votes, were not represented.

665 After the election the National and Peasant parties continued their
175 efforts to unite. In September delegates of the two parties voted for fusion into a National Peasant party with Maniu as president and Mihalache as vice-president. Iorga, however, declined to vote, and the Peasant leader Dr. Lupu opposed the decision. The fusion was confirmed by the general congress held on October 10.

A new crisis arose with the serious illness of King Ferdinand in November, 1926, and the renewed controversies over the succession, Carol's renunciation, and the regency. The National Peasants, who believed that King Ferdinand had been an instrument of the Liberals, were dissatisfied with the succession and were reluctant to regard Carol's renunciation as final. All parties, however, felt that in the king's failing condition the Averescu cabinet was not sufficiently representative to govern alone. Brătianu sounded opposition leaders on the possibilities of forming a national cabinet. General Averescu made several unsuccessful efforts to achieve a coalition with the National Peasants, perhaps in an effort to free himself from his dependence upon the Liberals. Having failed to create a coalition he was obliged to resign on June 3, 1927.

A new "impartial" cabinet under Prince Barbu Ştirbey (a relative by marriage of the Brătianus and periodically proposed as the head of a caretaker cabinet, the last time in 1945) came to office and included some Liberals and Dr. Lupu, who had split with the National Peasants in February and formed an independent peasant group. After negotiations with the National Peasants, three members of Maniu's party joined the coalition. The principal object of this cabinet, which was in effect a temporary Liberal-National-Peasant coalition, was to preside over new and free elections. However, negotiations between Maniu and Brătianu broke down. Maniu refused Brătianu's proposal for a common list of candidates in the coming election with

21. The electoral abuses were brought up by opposition leaders in parliamentary interpellations after the elections.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

a majority of the seats going to the Liberals. The Liberals resigned from the Ştirbey cabinet on June 21, stating that it had failed in its mission. 665 175

On June 22 the king called Brătianu, who formed an all-Liberal government, with the addition of Dr. Lupu, Argetoianu, and Titulescu, and issued a manifesto: [22]

The mission of the Government headed by M. Barbu Ştirbey to achieve an understanding and collaboration between the various political parties has not succeeded, and because of the differences of views in the midst of the cabinet, the electoral campaign threatened to become the occasion of agitation favoring political passions and subversive currents. In these conditions, a government was required which could be upheld by a solidly organized and experienced party and could assume entire responsibility for the situation. His Majesty the King has entrusted us with this heavy responsibility. We desire the sincere application of the laws guaranteeing the liberty of elections. We will not permit the disturbance of order nor the violation of law, and will not tolerate anarchist tendencies. Closely united with our collaborators in the parties which assure us their co-operation we will carry out our program which the country knows well.

This manifesto is a nice epitome of the Liberals' politics. Presenting themselves as the solid defenders of the law and the constitution, they had actually achieved, with the cooperation of the king, a very neat coup. By breaking the Ştirbey coalition and relying on the king's mistrust of the opposition, Brătianu had driven the National Peasants back into the wilderness without the slightest popular justification. The references to "subversive currents" and "anarchist tendencies," while conjuring up the specter of communism, cannot be taken very seriously unless the whole mass of the peasantry was to be considered subversive. It is not surprising that the National Peasants should have seen all the complicated political maneuvers of those years, including the schisms in their own ranks, as Brătianu machinations.

The Liberals dropped their talk of a national cabinet, and conducted the elections of July 7, 1927, in the usual manner; they won 298 out of 387 seats in the chamber; Dr. Lupu was rewarded for his cooperation with 22 seats. The National Peasants managed to obtain 49; Averescu's People's party and Iorga's group failed to obtain even the minimum of 2 per cent of the votes. The political picture

22. *L'Économiste roumain* (Organ de l'Institut Économique Roumain et de l'Association des Banques Roumaines) (July 1, 1927), p. 171.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665
175

was reverting to a two-party system, in the Rumanian style, with the National Peasants the only significant opponents of the Liberals.

Two deaths, however, were to undermine the position of the Liberals. On July 20, 1927, King Ferdinand died;[23] he was succeeded by the five-year-old Michael under a regency comprising Ferdinand's second son Prince Nicholas, the Patriarch Miron Cristea, and the first president of the Court of Cassation, Buzdugan. All parties recognized the regency but Maniu immediately demanded the resignation of the Liberals and new elections. With the death of Ferdinand, the Carol issue again insinuated itself into the conflict between the National Peasants and the Liberals. The National Peasants maintained a somewhat equivocal attitude toward the regency and while not demanding Carol's return, gave no indication that they would not welcome it. Carol, on his part, was issuing ambiguous statements from abroad, saying that he was making no plans for return but that if the people called him he would not be deaf to their appeal. The government accused the National Peasants of duplicity and prohibited their political meetings. Maniu responded by a call for a popular movement to oust the Liberals by all legal parliamentary and extraparliamentary means. In October, 1927, Mihail Manoilescu, who had been associated with General Averescu's People's party and who was to blossom into a well-known political economist, was arrested by the government on the charge of carrying political letters from Carol to Rumanian opposition leaders. The government brought him to trial, but he was acquitted, much to the Liberals' discomfiture. During the trial the government quoted letters to show that Carol had abdicated of his own will; Manoilescu in his defense maintained that Ferdinand had wanted Carol to return but that efforts at reconciliation had been thwarted by the Brătianus.

On November 24, 1927, Ion I. C. Brătianu died. With his death, following close upon that of the king, the Liberals began to lose their grip, although they remained in power for another year. There was no change in the government; Vintilă Brătianu became head of the cabinet and leader of the party. Although he had been a conscientious minister and had determined the party's economic policy, he lacked the political stature of his elder brother. Feeling the insecurity of his position, he proposed collaboration with the National Peasants, on the basis of an equal division of cabinet posts and a common list in new elections with 55 per cent of the seats going to the Liberals.

23. For a résumé of events after Fedinand's death see "La Situation politique en Roumanie après la mort du roi Ferdinand I," *M.A.B.* (*Mezinárodní Agrární Bureau*) *Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, No. 1 (Prague, 1928), pp. 55–69.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Maniu naturally refused the offer, and Vintilă Brătianu declared his intention to continue as head of the government. 175 665

In the winter and spring of 1927–28, the National Peasants extended their attacks on what they called the usurping government. Maniu embarrassed the government in its efforts to obtain a foreign stabilization loan by declaring on December 22, that his party disapproved of the new budget and that a government without the support of the nation was not in a position to receive foreign loans.[24] In January, 1928, the National Peasants sent representatives abroad, to Paris, London and Berlin, to persuade foreign opinion that the Liberals lacked national approval.

Large protest meetings were held throughout Rumania, climaxed by a massive peasant demonstration in Alba Iulia on May 6. This demonstration aroused great excitement and some apprehension, but it ended in a slightly ludicrous vein. Thousands of peasants came from all over Rumania, though principally from Transylvania, to attend a dramatic denunciation of the Liberals, but at the conclusion of the rally the leaders were at a loss as to what should be done next—a problem that always plagued the Peasant leaders. Some of the more ardent ones wanted to prepare a "March on Rome," and indeed a column of peasants did march off in the direction of Bucarest, but dispersed on the way. Other leaders favored a moderation in sharp contrast to the violence of the oratory, which had blasted the government as the "enemy of the people." Most humiliating, the National Peasants were forced to appeal to the government to provide rail transport to return the peasants to their homes. But despite this touch of *opéra bouffe*, the demonstration was an impressive display of the opposition's ability to call out the peasantry. 175 662

It is quite possible, however, that the government was less worried by the direct threat of these measures than by their effect in increasing the difficulty of obtaining a stabilization loan, the principal preoccupation of Vintilă Brătianu during his year in office and his principal excuse for remaining in power. In the summer of 1928 the loan threatened to be the rock which would wreck the government. In July Vintilă Brătianu convoked the chamber in extraordinary session to report on his negotiations and to get authorization to obtain an external loan of up to $250,000,000. The National Peasant depu-

24. It should be added, however, that Maniu had not blocked discussion or voting on the budget. On December 27 the National Peasant representatives Madgearu and Popovici, while repeating that the Liberal government did not have legal authority to contract foreign loan, stated that if it did succeed the National Peasants would not subsequently refuse to recognize the undertaking, but would respect engagements taken, however unjustifiably, in the name of the state.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 ties boycotted the assembly, formed their own gathering, and resolved that laws passed by the Liberal chamber could not bind the Ru-
662 manian nation. Vintilă Brătianu tried to persuade the regency that he should remain in office until the loan negotiations were completed. Ultimately, his delays and in particular his request that even after the completion of the negotiations he be permitted to retain office to supervise the application of the loan brought him into conflict with the regents, who were anxious to calm the political situation. Overestimating his position, he resigned on November 3 and dropped the negotiations.

To his surprise his resignation was accepted. The regents consulted Maniu and Averescu on the formation of a coalition cabinet; Maniu would make no agreement except on the basis of new and free elections. The regents requested Titulescu to form a coalition cabinet; Titulescu failed. Finally, the regents were obliged on November 9 to call upon Maniu to form his own cabinet.

Thus ended the long regime of the Brătianus. The combination of two failures contributed to their defeat. Politically they failed to obtain the mass support of the peasants, necessary under universal suffrage, but were unwilling, or unable, to adopt measures to prevent the rise of an effective opposition. Economically, they were unable to restore either the national finances or the condition of agriculture. The stabilization loan and the bad harvest of 1928 directly contributed to their downfall, but the continuing economic uncertainty and instability of the postwar years always gave the opposition a long stick with which to belabor them.

Composition and Political Principles of the Liberals

665 Although the National Liberal party[25] was pleased to trace its origins to the group of young Rumanian intellectuals who had been inspired by the ideals of the French Revolution of 1848, the temper of the Brătianu party in the 1920's bore a far greater resemblance to the rigid and narrowly conceived liberalism of Guizot in the latter years of the July monarchy. In both cases there was the same curious combination of a not unimpressive austerity with the crassest manifestations of the spirit of "enrichissez-vous." The limitations of the Brătianus' conception of political liberty should be evident from

25. This was the party's official title. The word national has usually been omitted in this paper to avoid possible confusion with the term, National Peasant, which indicates the actual fusion of two distinct parties.

3: Roberts S-4 (to date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

665

the preceding section; they consistently rigged elections, were masters at backstage maneuvers, exerted a decisive influence over King Ferdinand, and maintained the unholy reputation of the gendarmerie. In their economic policy they displayed few of the characteristics normally associated, at least in Anglo-Saxon countries, with classical economic liberalism. The state took the lead in economic activity through monopolies and subsidies, tariffs were highly protectionist, agriculture was subjected to export duties, and foreign capital was viewed with marked suspicion.

It is perhaps too easy to dismiss the liberalism of the Liberals as pure hypocrisy having no relation to their actual practices, or to conclude, as did Mihalache, that "the Liberal party has had the tactic of bringing to its bosom the most advanced elements and of uniting them with the most conservative and reactionary elements. For the advanced elements it has one task: to write principles into the program; for the reactionary elements it has another: not to carry them out!" [26] The divergence between creed and reality cannot be attributed solely to hypocrisy and double-dealing. The Brătianus, for all their highhanded and arbitrary ways, were not unprincipled, nor are the distortions of Rumanian liberalism simply a product of personal ambitions and selfishness.

Historically, the two factors which gave Rumanian liberalism its particular bent were nationalism and the absence of a middle class. From the very beginning the Liberals were ardent nationalists and desired above all to transform Rumania into an independent modern state. A liberal creed was attached to this nationalist aim largely because of the general association in the mid-nineteenth century of liberalism with the various European national liberation movements; the Rumanian principalities in 1850 were surrounded by three autocratic empires, and it was altogether natural that liberalism should have been regarded as a weapon in the movement for independence. At the same time, liberalism in the West was intimately related to the rise of the urban bourgeoisie. In Rumania, as this element was conspicuously absent, the state was the only organ which could assume the functions of this bourgeoisie. Hence from the very outset the Liberals relied upon the state as a principal medium for economic and political progress.

In its composition the Liberal party was based originally, as were all the early political formations, upon the landowning class, perhaps primarily upon the smaller landowners, who were in opposition to the great boyars but who were scarcely representatives of a bour-

26. Mihalache, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665

geoisie. In the course of time it gained additional support from the growing professional and bureaucratic groups, which made their appearance with the development of the state. With their interest in commerce and finance the Liberals obtained control of the principal banking institutions, such as the National Bank, founded in 1880, and the Banca Românească, founded in 1911. These institutions, along with the possession of important administrative posts, came to be the real strongholds of the party. Because of their predominantly nationalist outlook and their ambition to modernize the Rumanian economy, the Liberals desired to create a strong national industry. Since a nascent industry was faced with strong foreign competition, the Liberals were high tariff advocates and disciples of Friedrich List. Moreover, although Rumania was sorely lacking in capital, mistrust of imperialism—which in any Balkan state was not altogether unfounded—led the Liberals to adopt a very grudging attitude toward foreign capital. By the beginning of the twentieth century the Liberals had already formulated the phrase which was to be associated with Vintilă Brătianu's economic policy: "prin noi însine"—through ourselves.

While the development of Rumanian liberal principles does, then, find at least a partial explanation in the conditions of the country, it led to some very serious consequences. Since the state, which was controlled by a narrow oligarchy, was the principal and perhaps indispensable vehicle for economic progress, business and bureaucracy became identical. Aspirants to financial and to political success scrambled up the same ladder. Just as the state represented a concentration of political power in the hands of a restricted number, so Rumanian industry, instead of developing through the interplay of competitive producers, was created by fiat and state subsidy and was highly concentrated. These circumstances favored the worst forms of corruption. The size of the individual's income did not depend upon his productivity or even upon his economic acumen, but was more easily increased through influence, deals, and state-granted monopolies. At the same time, the total national income was so low that the vastly expanding bureaucracy which accompanied the growth of the state was inevitably underpaid and was driven to graft, bribes, and the concoction of new variations on the traditional methods of obtaining bakshish.

The main lines of the Liberal party's policy and outlook had been established before the First World War, and the Liberal regimes between 1922 and 1928 attempted to continue the party's traditions under the altered circumstances of the post-1918 world. In this they

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

were faced with a dilemma, partly of their own making. In the narrow 665
political life of the Old Kingdom, with its restricted franchise and small ruling class, the Liberals had been most successful in retaining power for the greater part of Rumania's independent existence; with the Conservatives as a foil they were even able to appear as the supporter of progressive forces, and did indeed attract a number of peasant leaders and socialists into their ranks.

With the agrarian reform, however, and the appearance of a new electorate under universal suffrage, their situation became less comfortable. It was not that they were driven to the Right—on the whole their attitude showed a marked consistency—but that their actual policy now appeared in more obvious contrast to their theoretical principles. After the agrarian reform they could no longer pose as opponents to the boyars; they became quite clearly the advocates of industry as opposed to agriculture. Since the great majority of the population were peasants, universal suffrage was bound to produce mass parties opposed to the financial and industrial domination of the Liberals, whose only defense was a perversion of the electoral process. Under these circumstances, it is rather surprising that the Liberals should have been the agents for the introduction of both the agrarian reform and universal suffrage. Two explanations may be offered. In the first place, the Liberals' initiative in these matters was by no means as great as they proclaimed it to be. They were intelligent enough to see which way the wind was blowing and realized that an attempt to block electoral and agrarian reform would merely produce a violent social upheaval. Their initiative was largely in adapting themselves to the course of events. At the same time, a closer examination of their action shows that they attempted to avoid the full implications of these reforms. Their dilatory tactics in the history of the agrarian reform have already been described. The same evasiveness is apparent in their electoral policy.

In 1913 Ion I. C. Brătianu did come out for electoral reform, but 665
his intention seems to have been the unification of all electors in one 666
college rather than three, not universal suffrage. The franchise ap- 642
parently would have been limited to literates, which would have excluded the greater part of the peasantry. In 1914, according to Mihalache,[27] Constantin Brătianu, third brother of Ion I. C. Brătianu and leader of the Liberals in the last decade, declared universal suffrage to be an aberration. The 1917 amendment, passed under the pressure of social unrest, provided for "proportional" representation. The Constitution of 1923 omitted this term, and the electoral law

27. Mihalache, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 of 1926 introduced the system of the majority party premium. In
666 these developments, as Mr. Mitrany has observed, one can detect a
642 "subtle reactionary alchemy."

665 On the other hand, the Liberals' agrarian and electoral policy may not have been altogether opportunistic. There is ample reason to believe that they really regarded western European society as a model for Rumania. Many of them had been trained in Paris and in their personal lives they strove to be as Western as possible. Hence, they probably quite honestly felt that ultimately the western European peasant cultivator who enjoyed the franchise should find his replica in Rumania. Unfortunately, this goal had little to do with present Rumanian realities, and the Liberals were confronted with the alternative of Balkanizing their Western ideals or of being overthrown by them. They chose the former course.

The disparity between liberal theory and Liberal party practices in the post-1918 period appears clearly in a lecture on the "Liberal Doctrine" delivered in 1923 by I. G. Duca, who later became leader of the party on the death of Vintilă Brătianu.[28] After taking pains to refute the prevalent belief that between Rumanian parties there were only differences of persons and ambitions, not of conceptions and doctrines, Duca defined the Liberal credo in the following formula: "Progress in all forms but within the framework of the concept of individual property." Progress, however, could be realized only "through order, through democracy, through nationalism, and through social harmony." By order he meant the avoidance of anarchy, not the absence of change. He defined democracy as government of the people, by the people, and for the people, and in antithesis to demagogy. While opposing excessive or exclusive nationalism, he held that progress was possible only through the developments of national forces; economic nationalism expressed the instinct of self-preservation and was a means "to safeguard the material individuality of each nationality, to prevent its destruction by elements superior in strength or in organization." Collaboration with foreign powers or even with foreign capital was not excluded but it should be on terms which corresponded with national interests. He regarded social harmony as a necessary counterbalance to the doctrine of class struggle.

Duca then went on to show that liberalism was not a rigid doctrine, but had adapted itself to changing circumstances. It had abandoned the classical idea of property as sacred and inviolable and had accepted the principle of property as a social function, allowing for such measures as expropriation and the nationalization of the subsoil. In the field of political economy Rumanian liberalism had

[28] I. G. Duca, "Doctrina Liberală," *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, pp. 103–110.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

dropped Manchesterian laissez faire and had recognized the right of 665
state intervention to protect the weak against the strong. "Interventionism has arisen from the complexity of modern economics not merely as a condition of progress but as a means of avoiding violent conflicts and anarchy." Finally, in the social realm, Rumanian liberalism had advanced beyond unlimited individualism to the recognition that the individual had responsibilities for the preservation of justice and general equilibrium.

Duca recognized the far-reaching implications of these modifications and granted that "To-day there exists an antinomy between the formulae of classical liberalism and those of modern liberalism. . . . Liberty is not a sufficiently broad or inclusive concept to embrace everything which the present liberal doctrine represents." But, he maintained, the Liberal party was right in keeping its name, as a symbol forever associated with the renaissance of the Old Kingdom and the creation of Greater Rumania.

The difficulties of Duca's exposition are obvious. In so far as he defined liberalism along recognizable and customary lines, it clearly did not describe the Rumanian Liberal party. In modifying the doctrine to explain the interventionist and "state socialist" policies of the party, he so altered it that there was little reason—beyond sentiment and patriotism—to label the result "liberal." Understandably, he did not become involved in the even more difficult task of providing a liberal explanation for the electoral practices of his party.[29]

The divergence between liberal theory and the realities of the administration was too great to be overlooked, but was usually explained on the grounds of expediency. For example, in 1924, I. N. Angelescu, general secretary of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, justified state economic intervention as a temporary necessity:

> As soon as the elements of the national wealth have developed, intervention of state economic policy is quite useless. National output would reach a maximum, and its utilization on the international market would be achieved in the best conditions without the state's intervention. Until then, however, the state's economic needs and far-reaching aims may be in contradiction to the momentary needs of economic freedom.[30]

29. Rumanian Liberals have frequently resorted to the theory, so ably developed by the Italian philosopher, Benedetto Croce, that liberalism is not really a party program but rather a regulative principle standing above parties, with the duty of assuring that political and social changes are made in conformity with the requirements of liberty. Whatever the virtues of this theory, it is obvious that the Rumanian Liberal party was scarcely in a position to be considered as a detached regulative principle.

30. I. N. Angelescu, "The Increase of Production and Its Influence on the National Currency of Roumania," *Correspondance économique roumaine*, published by the Rumanian Ministry of Industry and Commerce (January–February, 1924).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 A more realistic defense of the role of the Liberal party as the leading exponent of the Rumanian bourgeoisie was provided by Stefan Zeletin.[31] Zeletin, however, did not approach the subject from the point of view of liberal principles but employed a quasi-Marxian analysis, though for purposes that were certainly not Marx's. He contended that Rumania was actually in the process of duplicating the course of capitalist development which had taken place in the western European states a century or more earlier. In his view capitalism passed through three stages, each with its own political and social system:

a) commercial capitalism—mercantilism
b) industrial capitalism—liberalism
c) finance capitalism—imperialism.

Rumania was now in the mercantilist phase, which implied energetic state intervention in the economic life of the nation.[32] High protectionist tariffs were justified as proper mercantilist measures, as was the fight against foreign capital.

The leading force in Rumania's economic development, according to Zeletin, had been the smaller boyars who, in the nineteenth century, had entered commerce and finance and by the twentieth century had become a real bourgeois class. He identified the history of the Rumanian bourgeoisie with the history of the Liberal party, which was and remained the "classical party of liberalism." As for the unhappy condition of the peasants, Zeletin held that a period of peasant misery was to be expected as a necessary phase in the transition to capitalism; just as the expansion of the British economy at an earlier date had been accompanied by enclosures and the destruction of the yeomanry, so the backward mass of the Rumanian peasantry had to suffer in the rise of Rumanian capitalism. The peasant was destined to play a secondary role in social movements and none at all in politics. In short, Zeletin was a stout defender of the Rumanian bourgeoisie, whose standard-bearer was the Liberal party, as an indispensable and inevitable element not only of past but of future progress. He condemned the Socialists on the grounds that since Rumanian capitalism was still in the process of formation and had

[113] 31. Zeletin's two most important studies, which led to lively controversies in the 1920's, were *Burghezia română, origina şi rolul ei istoric* (Bucarest, 1925), and *Neoliberalismul* (Bucarest, 1927). An extensive criticism was made by the Social Democrat Şerban Voinea in *Marxism oligarhic* (Bucarest, 1926). A brief appraisal of Zeletin along with other Rumanian political and economic writers is given in Ion Veverca's review article, "L'Évolution économique de la Roumanie, *Archives pour la science et la réforme sociales, 16*, Nos. 1–4 (Bucarest, 1943), 332–337.

32. Zeletin, *Burghezia română*, p. 19.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

a revolutionary character, "a proletariat pursuing its own revolutionary goals is nonsense." 665

Although Zeletin's thesis, because of its callousness and low regard for the potentialities of the peasantry, could scarcely have been employed as a party doctrine, it was at least closer to the real situation than Duca's interpretation of Rumanian liberalism and did attempt to provide a justification—if only in terms of historical necessity—for the actual practices of the Liberals, the tariff policy, the economic nationalism, the supremacy of the financial oligarchy, the lack of interest in the peasants, and the hostility to radical or revolutionary politics. Nevertheless, Zeletin's defense of Rumanian liberalism, if it may be called such, will not bear critical examination. Apart from the arbitrary assumption that historical developments must follow a set course, his assertion that Rumania was retracing the path of the mercantilist states of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was based upon very questionable examples and forced parallels. The entire histories of eastern and western Europe display important social, political, and economic differences; the circumstances giving rise to mercantilism in the West were altogether different both internally and externally from those of nineteenth-century Rumania. The development of Rumanian capitalism had been continually and decisively affected by contemporary influences from the West. The curious formation of the Rumanian financial and industrial oligarchy was not a replica of the rise of the bourgeoisie in western Europe but was a particular product of Rumanian society, though similar in many respects to developments in other eastern European states. Nor is Zeletin's dismissal of the impoverishment of the peasantry as a universal necessity a tenable proposition; in some countries it did occur, but in others, such as central Germany, Bohemia, and Switzerland, industrialism developed along with a free and prosperous peasantry.

The position and activities of the Rumanian Liberals cannot satisfactorily be explained in terms of "liberal" principles, as Duca attempted to do, nor can the party be regarded simply as the sign of the rising bourgeoisie in the mercantilist phase, as Zeletin would contend. More than any other party the Liberals bear the mark of the intermingling of Western and traditional elements which so characterizes modern Rumania. The resultant anomaly led to numerous disheartening social and political consequences:

Unfortunately, our glorious urban institutions, for all their liberal-democratic techniques, are pure falsehoods. . . . We have introduced

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 liberal commercial laws, but with anti-semitism at their base; we have introduced universal suffrage, but with ballot stuffing; we have ruined rural households in order to increase credit institutions, but we have not permitted free competition among these institutions, but have favored some—those belonging to us—and have attacked others—those belonging to our adversaries; we have encouraged national industry, but not for the benefit of the rural population, as would have been right, since they made the sacrifices, but for the benefit of politicians who are pensioners of this national industry; we have centralized the administration of the country, but not in the hands of a trained bureacracy but in the hands of the party and its partisans; in a word, we have aped the European bourgeoisie in form, but at bottom we have persisted in the sycophantic habits of the past. In this way we have transformed political life into a hopeless turmoil.[33]

Economic and Agrarian Policy

665 178 The 1911 program of the Rumanian Liberal party stated that "The agrarian question has undoubtedly been the chief preoccupation of the Liberal Government," but, significantly, went on to say, "A country in such geographic conditions and with its natural wealth cannot remain exclusively an agrarian country." [34] The second phrase was to be the dominant theme of the Liberals, and in the guidance of their actual conduct certainly overshadowed whatever agrarian preoccupations they may have had.

In November, 1921, just before its return to power, the party held a general congress and adopted a new program, suitable to the needs of Greater Rumania.[35] Like most political programs it attempted to promise all things to all people. The workers were to have an increased share in the benefits of industry. The agrarian question was seen as not merely one of property relations but of production. Better farming techniques were to be introduced, and the party undertook to encourage agricultural education, expand peasant credit, and organize the sale of agricultural products on a cooperative basis. Measures would be taken to enable the peasant to make use of forest land. As regards general economic policy:

The point of view of the National Liberal Party has long been known: the development of the wealth of the country, principally by labor, initiative, and Rumanian capital. This policy assured the economic inde-

33. C. Rădulescu-Motru, *Țărănimea, un suflet și o politică*, p. 43.
34. *Istoricul Partidului Național-Liberal*, pp. 196–199.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 231–234.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

pendence of Little Rumania; it will assure the economic independence of Greater Rumania. Such a policy does not exclude the collaboration of foreign capital, but it wishes to have relations of sincere collaboration with such capital, not relations that will degenerate into a monopoly, dangerous to the national sovereignty and leaving the Rumanian nation poor in one of the richest lands of Europe.

As in 1911, the 1921 program combined a professed interest in the agrarian sector with a determination to develop the wealth of the nation—i.e., to industrialize—primarily through local initiative and capital.

Facing this optimistic program was the bleak reality of Rumania, devastated by the war but with extensive new territories whose economies were as yet unintegrated. Because of the campaign against Bela Kun's Hungarian Soviet republic in 1919, the war had lasted a year longer than in the West. By 1921 some recovery had been made and the first postwar budget presented, but the principal work of recovery and unification still lay ahead. The Liberals attempted to achieve recovery and industrialization simultaneously; in this effort, which strained Rumania's limited economy, interest in agriculture occupied a second place.

1. UNIFICATION OF THE ECONOMY

Before the First World War, the Old Kingdom, Bessarabia, Bucovina, and Transylvania had belonged to entirely distinct economic organizations, and their amalgamation after the war involved not merely administrative and financial readjustments but a complete reorientation in transport, commerce, and communications. The process of reorganization required a number of years, and indeed was not really completed by the end of the interwar period. Western Transylvania and the Banat suffered from the disruption of their ties with the Hungarian plain, the more so as industry was moved toward eastern Transylvania for reasons of security. Bessarabia seems never to have recovered from the loss of the Russian market for its agricultural produce.

A number of steps toward unification had been made before the Liberals came to office. Administrative centralization began under General Averescu in 1920; the various agrarian reform laws had been coordinated in some measure. In 1920 Russian rubles and Austro-Hungarian crowns had been exchanged for lei. This process was carried forward under the Liberals. The law of February 23, 1923, unified the tax system for the whole of Rumania. Banks of the Old King-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665
178

dom, many of which were controlled by the Liberals, extended their influence into the new territories, either by absorbing local banks or by setting up branch offices.[36] The nationalization laws of 1924, which will be discussed presently, increased the participation of the Old Kingdom in the industrial life of the new provinces. These measures evoked threefold criticism: the provinces complained that they were being exploited to the benefit of the Old Kingdom; the minorities, especially the Hungarians, complained that they were suffering discrimination; the opposition parties charged the Liberals with using their official status and banking connections for the personal advantage of party members. Although it is next to impossible to find the core of truth in Rumanian financial scandals, there is little reason to doubt that the acts of unification and centralization were to the advantage of the Old Kingdom as against the provinces, of the Rumanians as against the minorities, and of the Liberal party as against all comers.

Transylvania with its relative wealth was the happy hunting ground for such activities (Bessarabia suffered wretchedly from the administrative centralization, but seems rather to have been a place of exile for unsuccessful administrators and political black sheep). National Bank credits were more generously supplied to Rumanian than to Magyar banks.[37] In 1929 the National Peasant economist, Virgil Madgearu, charged the Liberals with having introduced the law for the nationalization of methane gas for the purpose of gaining control over Transylvanian industries.[38] On the other hand, as Mr. C. A. Macartney has pointed out, the actual effect of "nationalization" upon the minority firms in Transylvania was less than might have been expected because of the generally lax way in which the measure was applied.[39] With respect to taxes there was a general belief among the Transylvanians that they were paying more than their

36. Alfred Bonafous, "Les grandes banques d'affaires de Roumanie," *Revue d'économie politique*, *36* (Paris, 1922), 823–840.

37. C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors*, p. 322.

38. G. C. Logio, *Rumania*, p. 125. According to Madgearu, an exclusive monopoly for the production of methane was given to a Liberal group, who supplied gas to industrialists at excessive prices, forcing them out of the market and leaving it free for rival firms belonging to Liberal confreres.

39. "The 'nationalisation' of the minority firms has consisted in the practice of putting in a few Rumanian directors, who are given a packet of free shares or allowed to buy them at a nominal rate. After this, the average Rumanian director has been perfectly content to fill the role of guinea pig, his contribution to the business being to protect it against the Government. As most of these directors are Liberal politicians, they have usually been able to do so effectively. The activities of the 'Special Economic Commissions' have thus, paradoxically enough, been the strongest defence for the minority firms." Macartney, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

share, because of stricter tax collection, and were receiving less in the way of public benefits. 665 178

2. RECOVERY

In tackling the problem of economic recovery the Liberal Minister of Finance, Vintilă Brătianu, adopted a policy of stern but primitive retrenchment. A dogged and truculent nationalism was manifest in the futile effort to revalorize the leu, in the restrictive tariff schedules, and in the suspicious attitude toward the investment of foreign capital. While his policy did achieve some desirable financial housecleaning, it was a strait jacket on the Rumanian economy and signally failed in its major aims. The fault, perhaps, lay not so much with his ideas as such, which did show a sturdy desire that Rumania should stand on its own feet, as with the fact that his goals and technique were not in accord with the potentialities of the Rumanian economy and administration. 665 652

One of Vintilă Brătianu's paramount aims was a balanced budget, which he saw as the keystone to the country's economic well-being. Between 1919 and 1922 the budgets, even though they made no provision for servicing the national debts, showed deficits which were covered by new issues of paper currency. He set about to balance the budget by cutting expenses to the bone, by covering expenses solely from the normal resources of the state, and by giving the budget sufficient elasticity to meet the fluctuations of the currency. Beginning with the fiscal year 1922–23 the budget showed a constant surplus of revenues over expenditures. Later reports of the French technical adviser to the National Bank indicate, however, that the announced surpluses in this period were in fact either nonexistent or far smaller than would appear from the accounts.[40] He also succeeded in consolidating part of Rumania's considerable foreign indebtedness by means of a British loan and in arranging for regular means of payment of a portion of the nation's debts.[41] These measures were necessary in clearing up the complete economic chaos of the war years; they did not, however, succeed in really strengthening the economy.

40. According to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Balkan States: I. Economic*, p. 48, somewhat the same thing occurred in all the Balkan states. After 1924 most of them showed a budgetary equilibrium that was, in fact, largely fictitious, partly because of doubtful accounting techniques, and the continued increase of expenditure even after the *de facto* stabilization of the currencies, indicating that the budget equilibrium was dependent upon continued rising prices.

41. V. V. Badulescu, "La Dette publique roumaine," *L'Économiste roumain*, 2, No. 4 (April, 1926), 111–114.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665
652

Vintilă Brătianu was particularly unsuccessful in his efforts to revalorize the leu, which had been one of the chief reasons for his budget policy. The currency had been badly hit by the war, by the unbalanced budgets which had led to state borrowing from the National Bank, and by the unfavorable balance of payments. In 1923, however, with the balanced budget and the funding of some of the foreign debts, the currency ceased to depreciate, although it remained very unsteady. His severe deflationist policy, which was to restore the leu to its prewar gold level in the course of ten or fifteen years, had a depressing effect upon production; the restriction of currency led to a stringency in credit and a great rise in the interest rate. The leu did not recover but wobbled in such a manner as to create an atmosphere of chronic uncertainty in trade and industry. As the years passed there was increasing clamor for a stable currency. Vintilă Brătianu was reluctant to seek the aid of foreign powers or the League of Nations in stabilizing the currency, largely, it appears, because of a fear of external interference and supervision over internal financial policy.[42] In 1927, however, the original plan of revalorization was abandoned, and the last hectic year of the Liberal regime was spent in attempting to secure a foreign loan to stabilize the currency. But by that time the internal political situation had placed Vintilă Brătianu in the center of a vicious circle: the political crisis impeded his foreign negotiations and his delay in obtaining the loan undermined his position in the country.

The same exaggerated and self-defeating rigidity is to be seen in the field of foreign commerce. Immediately after the war, when production was low and demand great, export trade was put under severe controls and restrictions, though imports were unrestricted. The resulting great excess of imports over exports was checked in 1921 by rising tariffs. After the Liberals came to power the import tariff became increasingly an instrument of industrial protection. Tariffs were raised in 1924 and again in 1926 and 1927. By the end of the Liberal regime, Rumania had one of the highest tariff systems in Europe. This policy was in accord with the whole tenor of Liberal thinking with its emphasis upon the protection of industry.

More surprising, however, was the policy on exports. After 1922 the initial system of export prohibitions and quotas was dropped but was replaced by high export duties. There were several reasons for these export restrictions and duties. They were designed in a period of shortage to keep down the internal cost of living as an anti-inflationary move. They facilitated the process of directing the trade of

42. *L'Économiste roumain*, 3, No. 9 (June 15, 1927), 164.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

the new territories away from Austria, Hungary, and Russia and 665
into the domestic market. Most important, perhaps, they came to be 652
an important source of fiscal revenue. Since they were payable in gold or foreign currency, they supplied the government with funds for foreign debt payments.[43] Between 1923 and 1926 they yielded a greater revenue than the import duties; the government was naturally reluctant to part with them. They had, however, an altogether depressing effect upon Rumanian commerce and upon agriculture. Since exports were really the sole means by which Rumania could improve its adverse balance of payments, these duties, in their effect of reducing exports, appear to have very little justification.

Export duties were dropped in 1927, and Vintilă Brătianu announced, "The progressive reduction of these taxes until their final suppression forms, as you know, part of our governmental program." At this time he took the position that Rumania was at last ready to move on to a new stage of activity. "If up to the present I have been obliged to perform the work of a doctor in healing the wounds of the past, I hope to be able to resume in the future my profession as engineer—which is to create." [44] Whether or not one accepts his assertion that the Liberals had planned these changes all along, it must be admitted that the Liberals were remarkably adept at reversing themselves and then assuming credit for farsightedness.

To summarize, the Liberals' policy for recovery was only in part successful. Despite an almost puritanical view toward the economy and the desire to improve "through ourselves," their program had a way of destroying on the one hand what it attempted to create with the other. The Brătianus' injunction that Rumania get a firm grip on itself seemed likely to lead to self-strangulation.

3. INDUSTRIALIZATION AND EXPLOITATION OF RESOURCES

665
433

The Liberals not only tried to bring about economic recovery, they were also intent upon exploiting the natural resources of the country and creating a national industry, primarily by state encouragement. In 1927 Vintilă Brătianu defined the principal factors in the development of the nation's riches as "the state, professional chambers, official bodies, and private action, individually or in association." [45] A law for the encouragement of national industry, already passed in 1912, was extended to the whole of Rumania in 1921. Industries

43. Pasvolsky, *Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States*, p. 452.

44. Vintilă Brătianu, exposé de motifs for the 1928 budget, *L'Économiste roumain*, 3, No. 10 (December 1, 1927), 338.

45. *L'Économiste roumain*, 3, No. 4 (April 1, 1927), 83.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 433 covered by this law were permitted to purchase public land at a discount, were exempted from duties on imported machinery, and received reduced transportation rates and cheap fuel. In 1923 the Liberals introduced a National Industrial Credit Association for the purpose of granting credit to manufacturers and of encouraging industrial development; the government owned 20 per cent of its stock, the National Bank 30 per cent, and private investors 50 per cent. Tariffs, as has been mentioned, were designed to protect industry from foreign competitors.

665 656 In their industrial activities the Liberals most clearly demonstrated their suspicion of foreign capital. This suspicion was nothing new. In the 1890's the Liberals, then in opposition, had led a successful campaign against granting concessions to the Standard Oil-Diskonto Gesellschaft consortium.[46] In the 1920's they maintained they were not hostile to foreign capital but would not be dominated by it. In 1923 Vintilă Brătianu protested to a foreign correspondent:

> It would be madness to suppose that we can develop the country without the help of foreign capital. We need it in every form to develop mineral resources, water power, and industry. We also require things which must be paid for in foreign money. But we want this capital to operate within the lines of a general policy which is approved of by the state and which accords to the interests of the country. We do not want the type of investor who comes to exploit the country simply to make money, but one who has a feeling for our national evolution and keeps our interests at heart. We want to be treated as an adult and not as a minor.[47]

[671] Nevertheless, the Brătianus were accused both by the opposition in Rumania and by foreign investors of being economic xenophobes. The accusations are based largely on a series of four "nationalization" laws passed in 1924:[48] a law for the commercial exploitation of state enterprises (June 6, 1924), laws on water power (June 23) and other sources of energy (July 1), and a mining law (July 3).

These laws, which covered a wide range of industrial activities—hydroelectric power, natural gas, petroleum, mines, railroads, river navigation, postal services, telephones and telegraphs, and government monopolies—had generally the same provisions. Invested foreign capital in the enterprises could not exceed 40 per cent; the remaining 60 per cent was to be covered by state and private Rumanian

46. C. G. Rommenhöller, *Gross-Rumänien* (Berlin, 1926), p. 434.
47. *Times* (London), May 19, 1923.
48. A French text of these four laws is given in *L'Économiste roumain*, Nos. 2–6 (1924).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

capital. At least three-fourths of the personnel and two-thirds of the 665
boards of directors were to be Rumanians. Since the subsoil had been 656
nationalized under the constitution, all mines and oil wells were in the form of concessions which would ultimately revert without indemnity to the state, although existing enterprises were to be guaranteed their holdings for a period of fifty years. Because of its importance to the oil industry, the mining law created the greatest stir and the most complaint from foreign investors.

The Liberals' suspicion of foreign capital was not altogether 665
groundless; pre-1914 foreign investments in the Balkans, while of 241
vital importance to their development, were entangled in the play of power politics. In view of subsequent actions in other states and in Rumania itself, the 1924 laws must be considered as quite mild. But at the time they were regarded as inhospitable and evoked formal protests from abroad and lavish criticism at home. Essentially, however, the question was not whether the Liberals were justified in their suspicions nor whether the opposition was right in charging the Liberals with personal greed, but whether Rumania was in a position at that time to develop at the desired rate without the benefit of foreign capital. From the subsequent turn of events it would appear it was not. The limitation of foreign capital, together with the stringent monetary policy and the impediments to agriculture united in stifling the economy. When the People's party took office in 1926 it promised better relations with foreign capital, and when the Brătianus returned in 1927 their tone underwent a change. Foreign observers spoke of Vintilă Brătianu's more cooperative attitude, and *L'Économiste roumain*, his faithful echo, wrote hopefully of increased foreign interest in Rumanian enterprises.

4. AGRARIAN POLICY

The general economic program of the Liberals did not make for a constructive agrarian policy. Not only was agriculture relegated to second place in the attentions of the administration but several of the courses pursued were directly inimical to it. The encouragement of industry was at the expense of agriculture; the commercial and financial policy impeded the rehabilitation of farming after the war and the dislocations of the agrarian reform.

Of course, many of agriculture's woes were not the fault of the Liberal policy. As has been seen in the preceding chapter, the underlying sources of the agrarian problem are numerous and deep-rooted. Rumania, for all its natural resources, was a poor country and no government could have established a flourishing peasantry overnight.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 241 Nevertheless it may be said that Liberal policy harmed rather than aided agriculture. The more important question, however, is whether the sacrifices exacted from agriculture were more than balanced by benefits to the whole of the economy. Final judgment of Liberal economic policy must rest on this question, which will be examined presently.

Liberal neglect of Rumanian agriculture was criticized by Constantin Garoflid, Minister of Agriculture in the Averescu cabinet of 1926: "It is not normal that our country should possess a *Crédit Industriel*, while agriculture is deprived of a financial institution when its needs are at their greatest." [49] The limited supplies of capital were directed by the government and the banks into industrial channels where they were promised better returns. Indeed, facilities for agricultural credit were less than before the First World War.[50] The absence of credit, only in part a consequence of policy, drove the peasants to the usurers and into chronic indebtedness. The handling of payments and compensation for land transferred in the agrarian reforms served to drain money from the agricultural sector of the economy. Peasants were urged to make full payment as rapidly as possible, while the funds received were not devoted to the amortization of the long-term bonds owing to the expropriated landowners but became a source of revenue for the state.[51]

[651] A serious drag on agriculture was the tariff policy pursued by the Liberals. The import tariffs, especially the duties on agricultural implements and textiles, raised the operating costs of the peasant.[52] Even more crippling were the export duties which primarily affected agricultural products, the chief Rumanian export. On some occasions these duties equalled 50 per cent of the value of the product.[53] They were not only a heavy burden on agriculture but completely disorganized the grain trade. Since the smaller peasants were producing primarily for their own consumption, the export duties did not affect them directly, but as the tariffs were aimed at maintaining a low cost of living they affected those particular commodities which the small peasant did supply to the local market.

Against these disadvantages, the Liberal party offered very little

49. *L'Économiste roumain*, 2, No. 5 (May, 1926), 160. During his short term in office Garoflid attempted to establish such an institution but was unable to put it into effect.

50. Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, p. 425.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 421.

52. The duty on ploughs was 20–30 per cent ad valorem, that on imported sacks was about 50 per cent.

53. Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 436.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

in the way of concrete benefits. Liberal agrarian policy can be divided under two heads: measures taken in supplementing or amending the agrarian reforms and measures for the improvement of agriculture.

Of the land reforms, only that for Translyvania had provided for the expropriation of forest land. Article 132 of the 1923 Constitution approved the principle of expropriating forest land in the Old Kingdom, Bessarabia, and Bucovina for firewood and construction purposes. The law implementing this article was published on July 1, 1924. Where woodland was needed and was not available from state holdings, it could be expropriated from private owners leaving them a minimum of 100 hectares. Communal woodlands were to be created, the exploitation of which was to be under the control of the state.[54]

By the law of March 13, 1925, and the executive regulation of April 15, which abrogated Articles 120–124 of the 1921 law, the Liberals, to safeguard peasant holdings, considerably stiffened requirements for the sale and purchase of agricultural property. The state was given the right of preemption on lands received not only under the 1918–21 reforms but under earlier distributions of state domain. If this right were not exerted, purchases could be made only on the following conditions:

1. The purchaser was to be a Rumanian citizen, a cultivator of the land or a graduate of an agricultural school, and residing and working in the commune in which the holding was situated.

2. Holdings could be sold in minimum blocs of 2 hectares in the plains and 1 hectare in the hills.

3. Sales could be made only five years after their owner had received definite title to his property following full payment of its price.

4. The purchaser could not own more than 25 hectares of cultivated land, including the area to be purchased. Houses and gardens, up to one hectare, could not be mortgaged or sold; land up to 25 hectares could be mortgaged only to certain authorized institutions.

The detailed instructions in the accompanying administrative regulation made the act of sale quite complicated by requiring numerous forms, proofs of domicile, and evidence of proper ownership. While the Liberals did not make peasant land inalienable they did render the process of transfer slower and more difficult and extended the state's rights of preemption to a large proportion of peasant properties. This law was in harmony with the tight-laced spirit of the Liberals in 1924–25 and showed the same restrictive view of property as the mining law of 1924. Historically, the reversion toward inalien-

54. See Diaconescu, *Chestiunea țărănească în România*, pp. 266–272, for analysis of the text of the law.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

423 665 656 241 671 ability was an aftermath of nearly all the land reform measures. It is characteristic of the liberalism of the Liberal party that it should have feared—though perhaps correctly—the consequences of free and uninhibited sales of land.[55]

665 241 The Liberals, in the law of April 14, 1925, instituted chambers of agriculture, modeled on the chambers of commerce, and united in a Union of Chambers of Agriculture. At first sight these organs appeared to have very important functions: to be the official representatives of agricultural interests, to give advice on agricultural legislation, to supervise agricultural schools, to collaborate with the administration in the application of laws, to improve livestock, to aid in the advancement of agricultural techniques, to prepare statistics, and to organize fairs. They were also to elect members to the senate.

Unhappily, the chambers accomplished very little. Their budgets depended upon the Ministry of Agriculture, and they were not supplied with sufficient funds to carry out the work delegated to them.[56] They were not even representative of the whole of the peasantry. Each chamber was composed of 17 elected members and 11 appointed functionaries. But since only proprietors with a minimum of 3 hectares of arable land, or tenants with 10 hectares were permitted to vote for members, a large percentage of the poor peasants was not represented at all.[57] (In 1930, 52 per cent of the peasant farms were of less than 3 hectares.) Worst of all, the chambers, with their right to elect senators, became hopelessly entangled in politics. Under the law creating them, the government could dissolve the chambers for serious irregularities or bad faith in the accomplishment of their legal work or for activities against the interests of the state. Inevitably, the chambers were repeatedly dissolved on any pretext for the purpose of facilitating the election of senators.

665 656 241 In May, 1928, the Liberals passed a law for the classification of cereals, designed to improve the quality of grain destined for export and to reduce the number of middlemen between producer and foreign consumer. There had been frequent complaints of the inferior quality of exported Rumanian grain and the presence of an excessive amount

55. In 1911 the Liberal program has spoken of the desirability of creating a medium property by natural selection, that is, by the purchase and sale of land. The 1924 law certainly represents a retreat from that position. On the other hand, as will be seen below, the National Peasants revised the 1925 law, for the purpose of permitting "natural selection," but with unfortunate results for the poorer peasants.

56. F. E. Manoliou, *La Reconstruction économique et financière de la Roumanie et les partis politiques* (Paris, 1931), p. 159.

57. Filip Chefner, "Camerile agricole in România," *M.A.B.: Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, 2 (1926), 36.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

of impurities. An improvement was undoubtedly desirable. Yet the 665 low quality of exported grain was but a symptom of the generally bad 656 condition of agriculture. Attacking the problem at the level of exports 241 was indicative of the Liberals' attitude. The opposition sharply criticized the law as missing the point: "We are not suffering from a commercial crisis," said Mihalache, "but from a crisis of production. The problem of production must be solved first." [58]

In July, 1928, shortly before the Liberals fell they passed a co- [652] operative code which had little effect except to reorganize previous cooperative organizations and to increase the direct control of the state. On the whole, as has been mentioned, the cooperative movement was and remained weak and ineffectual. In 1923–24 the National Bank granted 600 millions of lei credit to the whole of the cooperative movement, whereas private bankers received 7,500 millions.

A "battle for production" was inaugurated in 1928 by the Minister of Agriculture, Argetoianu, and in March an agricultural congress voted a resolution which is striking in its complete emphasis upon technical improvements: better seeds, more rational crop rotation, more fertilizers, the expansion of experimental stations. The resolution opposed a further extension of the area under wheat and recommended an effort to raise the output per hectare. In no case, however, did it penetrate to the level of agrarian reforms, as defined in the preceding chapter, but was wholly occupied with desiderata, which were simple enough to call for but very difficult to achieve.

These final efforts of 1928 were, however, of little import, as they were in large part a belated effort to meet the challenge of the opposition which was on the point of coming to power.

It is not easy to judge the successes and failures of the Liberals' economic policy. It seemed easier immediately after their defeat to see their errors and particularly their shortcomings in the agrarian question. But with the failure of subsequent administrations to improve agriculture or to provide a stable economy the nature of the Liberal failure becomes less obvious. Moreover, many of the economic practices of the Brătianus, regarded as heretical at the time, have become generalized not only in the Balkans but throughout Europe; state-supported industrialization has become a commonplace and has received a substantial body of theoretical justification. Yet with all these added qualifications, it may be concluded that the Liberal policy failed.

58. Quoted in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 452.

: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 For all their opportunism, favoritism to party members, and questionable economic ethics the Liberals had an economic policy. It was not a "liberal" policy and it was not altogether self-consistent, but it was manifest in almost all the economic legislation passed between 1922 and 1928, in agriculture as well as in industry, finance, and commerce. It was based upon a strong nationalism and upon a greatly simplified view of the nature of economic progress. Failing to realize the double-edged nature of most economic decisions, the Liberals had a rather naive faith in the possibility of creating things by fiat. They spoke of Rumania's natural resources as though they were something to be garnered with a little diligent shoveling; they expected the currency to regain its prewar gold level by a mechanical correction of the budget and the balance of trade; in so far as they concerned themselves with agriculture they attempted improvements at the level of export trade or of Chambers of Agriculture. The same attitude was shown in their tendency to restrict movement: currency issues were held below the level necessary for normal business transactions; both imports and exports were inhibited; sales of agricultural land were impeded.

This Liberal attitude should not be confused with "planning." There is little evidence that the Liberals had a comprehensive view of the economy. Industry undoubtedly expanded at the expense of agriculture, yet the policy of export duties on agricultural produce would not indicate a consistent program of nourishing industry through the proceeds of agriculture.

The Liberals fell between two stools. They were unwilling, more for nationalist than for economic reasons, to accept the consequences of a free economy; they feared it would keep Rumania a weak agrarian state at the mercy of foreign capital and unable to provide the means for its own defense. But they were not fully aware of the far-reaching consequences of a directed policy of forced industrialization. In a country as poor and as small as Rumania, a successful policy of development "through ourselves"—and not merely a policy whereby a minority skims off the cream at the expense of the majority—would have involved a long-range program of organized forced savings quite beyond the powers of the Brătianu regime.

The Liberals' economic program had a decisive effect upon their political position. Under the best of circumstances, it would be difficult to persuade a peasant electorate that agriculture should pay for the advancement of industry. In Rumania, with a very primitive peasantry on the one hand and a not very public-minded group of industrialists on the other, it was impossible, especially when there

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

was a large and articulate Peasant party vociferously criticizing "artificial industries." The Liberals, however, were unwilling to accept the logical consequences of this contradiction and make a clean break with democratic procedures. They preferred to pervert them and when, in 1928, that failed they fell from power. In the 1930's there was to be less squeamishness in this matter.

665

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

VII

THE PEASANTIST PERIOD, 1928–30

Survey of Political Events

665 175 PERHAPS the most disheartening episode in Rumanian history between the wars was the failure of the National Peasant party during its brief term of office after the fall of the Liberals. The period between the formation of the Maniu government in November, 1928, and Maniu's resignation in October, 1930, is a watershed: 1928 was the culmination of a political struggle which had been going on since the end of the First World War; 1930 was the beginning of the long descent into the abyss of 1940 and 1941. The inability of the National Peasants either to relieve the agrarian question or to maintain their political power ended the prospect o a peasant democracy.

When the regents, on November 9, called upon Maniu to form his own government, the National Peasants came into office on a wave of national enthusiasm and optimism. There were widespread rejoicings over the "bloodless revolution"; not only peasants but even business circles and some Liberals were happy to escape from the confining atmosphere of the Brătianu regime. On November 11 Maniu formed an all National Peasant cabinet, including in its important posts: Vaida Voevod at the Interior, G. Mironescu, a wealthy Moldavian who had come from Take Ionescu's party, in the Foreign Office; Ion Mihalache at Agriculture; and Virgil Madgearu at Commerce and Industry. On the following day he announced that "Our first aim will be to give the principles of the Constitution their real meaning and impart a character of strict legality to the working of the administration." [1] He went on to say that he would not disrupt his predecessors' work in the negotiations for a stabilization loan, that he would organize agricultural credit, and give greater power to local institutions. Certain ministries were to be abolished, martial law and censorship to be suspended.

665 In these initial statements the general aims of the new government are apparent: the primary stress is upon restoring, or rather creating for the first time, a truly constitutional regime. Secondly, the aid of

1. *Times* (London), November 12, 1928.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

665 foreign capital is to be sought to repair the national economy. Thirdly, if not as an afterthought at least not underlined, agriculture is to be assisted. Considering the battle against Liberal arbitrariness and the general clamor for a stable currency and foreign capital, such an order of emphasis is not surprising, but it does indicate that direct interest in the welfare of the peasantry was qualified by other, though not necessarily unrelated, considerations.

In the general elections of December 12 the National Peasants, allied with the German party and the Social Democrats, won an overwhelming victory in what is conceded to have been a free and fair election. They gained about 80 per cent of the votes and 348 seats in the chamber (333 seats to the National Peasants, 7 to the German party, and 8 to the Social Democrats). The Liberals obtained only 13 seats; the Averescu-Iorga coalition 5; the Magyars 16; Dr. Lupú's dissident peasants 5; the Peasant Labor party (a Communist organization) and Cuza's anti-Semitic Christian League failed to gain the necessary 2 per cent of the votes. Despite their criticism of the 1926 electoral law, the National Peasants did not repeal it when they came into office and, like the other parties, took advantage of the government premium.

665 The first major step was the stabilization of the leu. Vintilă Brătianu's foreign negotiations were resumed, and an agreement was
652 reached in Paris on February 3, 1929.[2] A $72,000,000 loan for stabilization and railway construction was floated in Washington, London, and Paris; a further $30,000,000 was secured against a concession of the Rumanian match monopoly to a Swedish group. The security of the loan was based on the revenues of the Institute of State Monopolies, created for the purpose. Orders for railway equipment were to be made in the countries floating the loan. The French economist, Charles Rist, who had informed Maniu in December that the loan was dependent upon a reorganization of the treasury, went to Bucarest to supervise the loan and the operation of Rumanian finances. All these conditions were, of course, precisely what Vintilă Brătianu had hoped to avoid through his unsuccessful policy of revalorization. On February 8 the Rumanian assembly passed a law fixing the leu at 10 milligrams gold, 167.18 lei to the dollar.[3]

The government worked hard to attract foreign capital and to set

2. Largely for reasons of prestige, Brătianu, unlike the governments of the other Balkan states, had not gone to the League of Nations for the stabilization loan but had sought it through independent negotiations. Maniu felt obliged to continue this course, although it was reported that he could have obtained better terms through the League.

3. For a detailed account of the monetary reform, see Alexandre-Ionesco Ivanof, *La Réforme monétaire roumaine* (Paris, 1929).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 internal finances in order. In March the 1924 mining law was revised
652 to give more favorable treatment to foreign concessions. State expenditures were reduced through the elimination or consolidation of several ministries.[4]

665 For all their energetic beginning, before the National Peasants had been in power a year, the first flush of enthusiasm was beginning to fade. The badly defeated opposition undertook to rally its forces and started a press campaign of villification and sensational rumors. After the passage in July of the administrative reform bill, which attempted to reduce excessive centralization and place greater authority in the hands of local administrations, both the Liberals and General Averescu's party withdrew from the assembly. In the same month was uncovered an absurd fascist plot among army officers to overthrow the government. To defend the regime against these fascist currents, some of the party's younger followers set up their own paramilitary bodies.

665 At the same time that the Right was increasing its activities, the government came into conflict with the Left. Bessarabia was still a
661 trouble zone; there were frequent reports of Soviet espionage teams crossing the Dniester. In February, 1929, A. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, son of the old Social Democratic leader and himself a former leader of the Rumanian Communists, was arrested and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment for secretly returning to Rumania from the U.S.S.R. In August a strike broke out among 3,800 coal miners in the Jiu Valley. Troops were called and when the strikers attempted to take over the electric plant of the Lupeni mines the troops fired, killing over a score of miners. The massacre in the Jiu Valley has often been cited as an example of the perfidy of the National Peasants, but it should be said that when the government investigated the event, it not only blamed the miners for having violated the law but also censored the mining companies for permitting the conditions which had led to the strike. It dismissed all the police and military officials connected with the affair.

A couple of months later an attempt was made on Vaida Voevod's life. In the investigation which followed, one suspect, who was later proved to have been innocent, was horribly beaten and crippled by the police. Again there was a public scandal and the government

4. The bewildering changes in the names and numbers of Rumanian ministries seem to be largely a result of the need to provide portfolios for persons or groups who have supported the administration. The Ministry of Fine Arts has been the favorite post to be granted as a political reward.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

was charged with bad faith. The National Peasants reprimanded the 665
offending officials and maintained that such police brutality was an 661
evil inheritance which they were attempting to eradicate. Such incidents are of importance here only in showing the tenacity with which old habits persisted under the new order.

The failure of the economy to rally provided the really vulnerable 665
point for opposition attacks. The stabilization of the currency had 175
given rise to overly sanguine hopes that money would become plentiful—the Bucarest Jockey Club on the strength of it had doubled its bridge points—but much of the funds went to paying old debts. Crops [433]
had been bad in 1927 and 1928, and one of the first tasks of the Maniu government had been to send relief supplies to Bessarabia. The 1929 harvest was excellent, one of the best in the interwar years, but exports were not great, and world grain prices were already beginning the long descent which was to continue until 1934.

The death in October, 1929, of one of the regents, Buzdugan, produced a typical Rumanian crisis. The Liberals contended that the two other regents should select the third member. The National Peasant assembly, however, elected the new regent, Constantin Sarateanu, thus laying the party open to the same criticism that it had made of the Liberals in the creation of the regency in the first place. Moreover, Maniu seems to have failed to inform some of the Peasant members of the person to be selected and rumors spread, assisted by wishful opposition thinking, that the Transylvanians were forming an inner cabinet in the government. The principal result of the regency affair, however, was to arouse general dissatisfaction over such an arrangement and to increase talk of Carol's return.

In 1930 the situation was even less favorable. Economic improvement failed to round the corner. The opposition press increased its polemics by publishing wild reports of Soviet mobilization on the frontier, Communist uprisings in Bessarabia, and the government's secret intention to devalue the leu. This technique, long familiar in Rumania, was designed to rattle the government into making a false step, and did succeed in driving it to pass a law establishing a prison sentence for persons found guilty of spreading tendentious rumors likely to damage the credit of the state. Under this law the government confiscated several newspapers.

The municipal elections of March, 1930, showed an increase in Liberal strength, as the National Peasants led only by two to one. In May by-elections government candidates were returned in five constituencies, but were defeated in Cernăuți by a Ukrainian Nationalist

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665
175
candidate and in Roman by a fascist. The Communist candidate in Timişoara polled over 25,000 votes. Here were the seeds of the political upheavals of the next decade.

665
175
643
At this point, when the National Peasants still commanded a strong majority but were suffering a perceptible loss of popularity and a slackening of impetus, Carol dramatically returned to Rumania on June 6, 1930. His return was not a surprise, as there had been rumors about it for weeks, so many in fact that the government had forbidden the mention of his name in the press. Maniu, after announcing that the government had sanctioned his return, resigned and was replaced by Mironescu, who annulled the act excluding Carol from the throne. He then resigned and a brief period of confusion ensued. The Liberal party split on the question; Vintilă Brătianu sharply opposed Carol's return and expelled a section of the party under Gheorghe Brătianu, the historian and adopted son of Ion I. C. Brătianu, who had come out for Carol. After two days, during which Marshal Presan attempted unsuccessfully to create a coalition cabinet, Maniu was recalled and formed a new National Peasant government, much the same as his first but with the addition of the economist Manoilescu, who had worked diligently for Carol's return.

The details of Carol's spectacular return are not altogether clear. Apparently the initiative had been his but Maniu had welcomed him.[5] As has already been noted, the National Peasants had never been satisfied with Carol's renunciation of the crown. The disadvantages inherent in the regency, which still had many years to go before Michael reached his majority; the hope of having a king on their side as Ferdinand had been on the Liberals'; the increasing difficulties of the party and the portents of waning popularity; and finally the obvious popular approval of Carol's return—all these combined to make the National Peasants accept the fatal step. At that the party

5. Ten years later Maniu wrote an article in the journal *Timpul* (September 14, 1940), describing his attitude toward Carol's return: "Ever since 1926 I was against Prince Carol's retirement and favored his return, not only in order to satisfy public opinion—which manifested this desire increasingly—but also to insure the continuity of the dynastic order and the normal government of the country. . . . Therefore, in my capacity as Prime Minister I favored the return of Prince Carol, but only under certain well-defined conditions which were to be put into force from the very beginning. However, after only a few weeks of his reign, I realized to my regret that these conditions were not being fulfilled. Thus, among other things the Coronation of King Carol II and of Queen Helen, arranged for the month of September 1930, was indefinitely postponed. Instead, and in defiance of Christian morals, he compromised his reign by leading a life against which I protested unceasingly for ten years. Having arrived at the conclusion that under these conditions I could no longer accept responsibility for Prince Carol's return and for his rule, I resigned, but maintained my attitude of energetic and continuous protest."

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

leaders were not in complete agreement. Some desired Carol's immediate proclamation as king, some were hostile to him, and others advocated his entering the regency. Maniu himself was opposed to proclaiming him king until Carol should leave Mme Lupescu and achieve a reconciliation with his wife. "But," he said later, "I could not force my views in face of public opinion." [6]

The newly constituted government was short-lived. When Maniu learned that Mme Lupescu had returned to Rumania contrary to what he believed to be Carol's agreement, he resigned in protest on October 6. A new National Peasant cabinet was formed under the wealthy but colorless Mironescu, without Maniu or Vaida Voevod. Although this cabinet remained in office until the following April, its dismissal was only a matter of time. Carol had announced his desire to create a coalition government, and as soon as the National Peasants had completed a new loan agreement they were removed from office. The second National Peasant government of 1932–33 will be discussed later in connection with the depression.

Maniu's resignation in October, 1930, was a significant event as it marked, when viewed in retrospect, the conclusion of Rumania's brief experiment with responsible government. In so far as his action was a protest against royal irresponsibility and bad faith, Maniu was remaining true, as he did always, to his conception of legality and constitutionality. But as a protest against the king's moral standards it was misdirected. "Bourgeois sexual morality," Mr. Hugh Seton-Watson has said, "is probably less esteemed in Rumania than anywhere else on the Continent. It was not the right issue on which to base the whole conflict between Democracy and Dictatorship." [7]

The episode is inexplicable without some insight into Maniu's personality, which, in its rather cold incorruptibility, was in the sharpest possible contrast to the laxness and opportunism of Rumanian public life. Born in Transylvania in 1873, Iuliu Maniu had studied law in Vienna. He had been attorney of the Uniate Metropolitanate of Blaj and professor of law at the Blaj Theological Academy. As deputy to the Hungarian parliament he had gained a reputation as a stubborn and doughty opponent of Hungarian policy in Transylvania. The clerical atmosphere of Blaj and the parliamentary atmosphere of the Budapest chamber had a lasting influence. Maniu

6. John Gunther, *Inside Europe* (London, 1936), pp. 367–369, includes an unpublished speech by Maniu which was to have been delivered in 1934 and which provides some additional details concerning the National Peasant leader's position on Carol's return.

7. Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918–1941* (2d ed., Cambridge University Press, 1946), p. 204.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

159 was renowned as the man in permanent opposition and as one whose acts were always directed by what he considered to be the judgment of posterity. From the very beginning of postwar politics his strength of character gave him an influence which is otherwise difficult to explain. He has always been a source of tremendous admiration to his followers and of singular exasperation and hatred to his opponents.

Those traits, however, which contributed to Maniu's very considerable stature had two serious disadvantages. His personal probity not only led him into politically untenable positions, such as making a political issue of Mme Lupescu, but was far too elevated for his party to emulate. There was always a noticeable divergence between Maniu's precepts and the activities of rank and file of the party, and while Maniu cannot bear the responsibility for the foibles and shortcomings of his followers, it left him, as leader of the party, open to charges of hypocrisy. A more serious drawback was the negativeness and passivity, though not from weakness, of Maniu's attitude; he was always withdrawing, retiring, and resigning, frequently on occasions which demanded a more positive response. Characteristic of this attitude and showing both an admirable democratic belief in his compatriots, together with the absence of any constructive action, is a speech he delivered later, in February, 1932:

> To-day the nation is deprived of its constitutional rights; we are on the threshold of bankruptcy, both economic and moral; we see anarchy enthroned in men's souls and hatred fomented in the provinces, and in the murmur of this growing dissolution one hardly hears the voice of the national conscience, one and undivided. . . . In such solemn moments you ask for my guidance. I shall offer you none. You have both intelligence and conscience. I pray you to revere the memory of the sufferings which brought about the consummation of the national unity.[8]

165 More, however, was involved in Maniu's resignation than personal differences between two individuals. In effect, the leader of a government which had come into power with a tremendous—and authentic—majority of votes surrendered its authority to a monarch who had assumed the crown only four months earlier. Admittedly, there was nothing unconstitutional in this, since the king had the right to appoint and dismiss ministers, but it did bring out the implicit contradictions in the Rumanian constitution between the powers of the monarch and representative government. More than that, it raises

8. Quoted in G. C. Logio, *Rumania*, pp. 59–60.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

serious doubts as to the significance of representative government in a country such as Rumania. 665

The National Peasant defeat, for such it proved to be, is open to two interpretations. Either the party ineptly permitted itself to be eased out of office, thus failing to maintain its responsibilities as the representatives of the great majority of the electorate, or the true sources of power and influence in Rumania were not embodied in the electoral process which had so strongly shown its approval of the National Peasants. Both interpretations, of course, are largely true. The full significance of Maniu's resignation could not be apparent immediately, and it could well have been a tactic of *reculer pour mieux sauter* for which he was well known. Nor was Carol's ultimate overthrow of the parliamentary system necessarily implicit in his initial activities, although it was widely known that he favored a coalition cabinet under the parental eyes of the monarch and disliked the wrangling of politicians. Nevertheless, the surrender of delegated authority rather than resistance to Carol's arbitrary moves is the responsibility of the National Peasants and especially of Maniu.[9]

On the other hand it would be difficult to gauge the relative strength —if it had come to a clear-cut decision—of the National Peasants, for all their popular majority, and the king. The issue, if it had become such, would have been between the "constitutional" elements of Rumanian political life—i.e., the actual strength residing in a party honestly elected by a majority of politically illiterate voters —and the nonconstitutional or apolitical elements, i.e., the rallying power of the crown itself, the attitude of the army, and all the backstage, Byzantine aspects of Rumanian politics. Such an issue would have been in doubtful balance, and it is quite possible that the National Peasants could have won out only if they had undertaken a more dynamic course, including recourse to force. This in turn would have been a denial of Maniu's whole concept of constitutionality and legality, and might indeed have led to the dictatorial practices he had combated so long.

9. Admittedly, this is an oversimplification. There was a great difference, in degree if not in kind, between Carol's refusal to give up Mme Lupescu and his subsequent abrogation of the 1923 Constitution. Furthermore, since Maniu's views on the Lupescu issue were essentially ethical rather than political, it would have been difficult for him to have obtained the support of the government or the nation; under the circumstances resignation was his only move. This retirement, however, deprived Rumania of the one man who was in a position to stop Carol's political encroachments.

But even had it been a different issue Maniu's response by resignation was likely, as his whole political outlook came close to passive resistance.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

65 Actually the question never presented itself in such a formal manner. Moreover, the most important factor which was to wreck the National Peasants was the onset of the great depression, which not only undermined the popularity of the party but destroyed its economic program and weakened its political defenses against the attacks of the opposition. When one regards the general collapse of parliamentary institutions—many of them far stronger than the fragile structure in Rumania—throughout central and eastern Europe during the depression years, it is quite obvious that the fall of the National Peasants was not solely the consequence of Maniu's personal differences with King Carol, although this dispute did provide the particular pattern in Rumania.

By the time of Maniu's resignation the world agrarian crisis had begun and was especially disastrous in Rumania which had not made a complete recovery from the First World War. The 1930 harvest was good but prices were ever lower. The stabilization of the leu failed to bring about the anticipated business revival. Ten years later Virgil Madgearu concluded,

> To have obtained the favorable results which were expected from the stabilization of the leu it would have been necessary for this operation to have coincided with a period of international economic prosperity. In fact it was made too late, only eight months before the outbreak of the world crisis which was to produce general disequilibrium and disorganization of international economic life. Thus, the world economic crisis surprised Rumania in a moment of convalescence, achieved by artificial means, annihilated all the favorable results obtained in the course of 1929, and accentuated to the extreme the evils under which the national economy had suffered before the stabilization.[10]

With stabilization and the fall in world agricultural prices, the peasants who had borrowed during the period of inflation and rising prices found themselves with an overwhelming burden of indebtedness. A cry went up for the reduction of debts, a league against usury was formed, riots broke out in Moldavia and Bessarabia, accompanied by attacks on Jewish money lenders. Worse years were yet to come but this foretaste of depression was clearly involved in the decline of the National Peasants.

In addition to these two external factors—the arrival of Carol on the political scene and of the depression on the economic scene—the National Peasants were also laid low by internal weaknesses and contradictions. These derived a) from the dual origin of the party,

10. Virgil Madgearu. *Evoluția economiei romînești*, p. 309.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 b) from certain shortcomings inherent in the peasantist philosophy, and c), as a result of a) and b), a watering down of this philosophy into a somewhat eclectic position which lacked the strength to oppose the onrush of the Rightist authoritarian doctrines of the Carolist era.

Origins and Composition of the National Peasant Party

The National Peasant party was created by the amalgamation of the Rumanian National party of Transylvania and the Peasant party of the Old Kingdom at a general congress of both parties held in October, 1926. Other political formations had had temporary affiliations (Iorga's National Democratic party) or had been absorbed (Take Ionescu's faction of the Conservatives and the Bessarabian Peasant party), but the strength of the party lay in these two organizations. The origins and composition of the National party and the Peasant party were quite different and explain some of the characteristics of the National Peasants' policy when in power.

The Peasant party of the Old Kingdom appeared during the troubled months after the First World War. Some of its leaders had been members of the ephemeral Party of Labor which arose during the constituent assembly of 1917 to vote against the terms of the agrarian reform amendment.[11] The principal figures of the Peasant party were Ion Mihalache, a schoolteacher of peasant origin and a man of considerable intelligence and integrity; Dr. Lupu, a country doctor with a long record of interest in peasant problems, but a rather erratic politician who veered from extreme radicalism to blatant opportunism; the Bessarabian writer and political philosopher, Constantin Stere, an intermittent member; and the economist Virgil Madgearu, its principal theorist on economic affairs. Although of this group, only Mihalache could be said to have been a peasant, the party in its first years was a radical agrarian movement, similar in its general lines and purposes to the other agrarian currents which appeared in the states of eastern Europe immediately after the First World War.

The Rumanian National party of Transylvania had its origins in

11. A group of progressive deputies broke away from the Liberal party to form a Labor group. They opposed the limitations of the agrarian reform and desired to extend expropriation to all properties over 100 hectares. The Party of Labor soon dissolved, however; some of the group went into General Averescu's People's League, others returned to the Liberal party, but the rest, including Dr. Lupu, helped to found the Peasant party.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 the Hungarian parliament in the first years of the twentieth century as spokesman of the Transylvania Rumanians against the policy of the Magyars. By the time of the creation of Greater Rumania it had a long experience with parliamentary practice and had become the leading party in Transylvania. Its two outstanding leaders were Alexandru Vaida Voevod, an ardent Rumanian nationalist, and Iuliu Maniu. The National party was the defender of the Rumanian peasants against the Magyar overlords and advocated extensive agrarian reform, but it was more nationalist than peasantist in its outlook, and its leaders were from the middle class. It was a vertical rather than a horizontal organization and while it had great support among the Transylvanian peasants, it was also representative of the Rumanian intellectuals, professional men, and small tradesmen.

The difference in the two parties' origins was reflected in the attacks they directed against the Liberals, their common enemy. To the Peasant party the Liberals were the spokesmen of the ruling classes, the ciocoi, and the financial interests; to the National party the Liberals were the advocates of administrative centralism, of Old Kingdom primacy, of unconstitutional and arbitrary politics. While the National party and Peasant party were joined in the brief Vaida Voevod government of 1919–20, it would be a mistake to regard this coalition as an immediate prelude to fusion. After the fall of the Vaida government, the parties drifted apart and despite periodic reports of union did not unite until October, 1926, more than six years later. In the meantime the National party had absorbed Take Ionescu's Conservatives and had even merged for a time with Iorga's party, which temporarily included the sinister Argetoianu. In a lecture delivered in 1923 Mihai Popovici, one of the Transylvanians and later Minister of Finance in the National Peasant government, was quite critical of the Peasant party and denied that it could reconcile its individualist principles with its social radicalism.

In 1924 there was an attempt at fusion but it failed, according to Madgearu, because "certain intriguers in the Camerilla found favorable ground among certain formerly conservative elements in the National Party." [12] Actually, King Ferdinand himself seems to have opposed the union of the two parties.

On the advice of the King that the Rumanian National Party should unite with other parties, the fusion with the party of the late Take Ionescu and later with that of Iorga was carried through and only on

12. Virgil Madgearu, "Fuziunea Partidului Țărănesc cu Partidul Național," *M.A.B. Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, 4 (1926), 6.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

the wish of the King was the fusion with the Peasant Party frustrated after Maniu had succeeded in moving the Peasant Party to accept his ten-point program, by which he had rendered not only the crown but the country a great service, for the Peasant Party as a result gave up its idea of the class struggle and its republican sentiments.[13] 665

Ultimately the common interests of the two parties proved greater than their differences, but even after their amalgamation they were not altogether in harmony, as is shown in the case of Dr. Lupu's break from the National Peasants in February, 1927. According to Dr. Lupu, the National party had virtually the same social views as the Liberals, the 1926 electoral pact between the Peasants and the Transylvanians was only a "non-aggression pact between two political adversaries," the National party had absorbed reactionary elements and was too regional.[14] Madgearu, in rebuttal, accused Dr. Lupu of opportunism:

> In reality, Dr. Lupu has broken from our party because he no longer believed possible the arrival of a constitutional democratic regime and because he found it necessary to employ opportunist tactics, to collaborate with no matter whom in no matter what fashion in order to participate in the government of the country . . . One can well understand the true character of Dr. Lupu's effort, which he represents as a reconstitution of the old Peasant Party. . . . If he succeeds he will give the Liberal Party the occasion of garnishing its future government with a "Peasant" appendix.[15]

Although Dr. Lupu's subsequent participation in the Liberal government smacked of opportunism,[16] his contention that the two parties did not represent the same social views was not unfounded.

After the National Peasants came to power, there was occasional friction between the Peasant and Transylvanian ministers, but largely through the personalities of Maniu and Mihalache the party remained united, and indeed the worst schism after the party's fall from power was not along these lines but occurred when Vaida Voevod's Ru-

13. V. V. Tilea, *Iuliu Maniu, der Mann und das Werk* (Hermannstadt, 1927), p. 24.

14. See the defense of Dr. Lupu's action in Petre P. Suciu, "La Scission dans le parti national paysan roumain," *M.A.B.: Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire, 2* (1927), 71–78.

15. V. N. Madgearu, "Essai d'une scission dans le parti national paysan roumain," *M.A.B.: Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire, 2* (1927), 69–70.

16. It is interesting to note that two decades later, in 1945, Dr. Lupu repeated the same move. He again left the National Peasant party (which he had rejoined in 1933) on the grounds that it was reactionary, formed a new peasant party, and collaborated with the Communists in the National Democratic Front.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 manian nationalism led him to introduce an excessive chauvinism into the party's platform.

The principal effect of the dual origin was not, however, party instability but the ambiguity which it imparted to National Peasant policy. This effect should not be overemphasized because, as will be seen presently, the Peasant party's policy was by no means fixed and had undergone important modifications even before the amalgamation.

The Peasant Ideology

The political and economic principles of the National Peasant party displayed a number of inconsistencies, part of which stemmed from the dual origin of the party. A more fundamental difficulty, however, lay in the party's professed "peasantism" (*ţărănismul*). The Peasant party is usually regarded as the spiritual descendant of the populist (*poporanist*) movement which flourished in Rumania at the turn of the twentieth century and which was to some extent derived from the Russian *narodniki* of the latter years of the nineteenth century. Although this genealogy is not altogether incorrect it is quite misleading. Before the National Peasants had come to power and indeed before the two sections of the party had united, the populist doctrines had been significantly modified, and for a very good reason. In so far as a thoroughgoing and coherent populism was formulated, it proved incapable of facing contemporary problems; and conversely the working program developed by the Peasant party, not to speak of its actual practices, contained a number of extraneous elements, some of which were quite incompatible with a consistent populist outlook. This transformation is quite apparent in the development of the peasantist doctrine through such men as Constantin Stere, Ion Mihalache, and Virgil Madgearu.

A powerful current of rather diverse agrarian ideas, known broadly as populism, *narodnichestvo*, sprang up among Russian intellectuals in the second half of the nineteenth century, and was associated with the "going to the people" movement and the formation of the Land and Liberty party. Russia and Rumania, as has already been observed, had numerous social and economic similarities in the years before the First World War. Both were countries of large latifundiary estates, and of recently emancipated but land-hungry peasants who lived in a state of semiservitude. (The Rumanian term neoiobăgia, neoserfdom, finds a close parallel in the Russian *polukrepostnoe sostoyanie*, semibondage.[17] To be sure, the Russians were concerned with

17. Cf. Lancelot A. Owen, *The Russian Peasant Movement, 1906–1917* (London, 1937), p. 9.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665

certain problems that were less important in Rumania. The narodniki, for example, were involved in the conflict between Slavophiles and Westerners; in Rumania nearly all writers looked to the West, and the principal manifestation of an anti-Western feeling was the Fichtean nationalism of some of the populists. In Russia the peasant commune was more important than in Rumania and was the focal point of the semisocialist ideas of the narodniki. Finally, Russia was an autocracy and the narodniki tended to split on the question whether to advocate revolution and violence or reform and propaganda; in Rumania the weak international position of the new state, together with the presence of a constitutional government, however unsatisfactory, served to dampen the revolutionary side of populism. Despite these important differences, the agrarian problems in the two states were much the same, as was the challenge of Western capitalism.

Although Russian populism had a number of strands, its principal thesis, so far as it concerns this study, was that the future of Russia lay in the peasantry, especially in the development of the communal institutions; that Russia could not hope to industrialize because its capitalism had arrived on the scene too late to capture the external markets which were regarded as the necessary stimulus for further advance. From this it was concluded that Russia should progress to a sort of agrarian socialism by avoiding the path of industrial capitalism with its attendant social miseries and evils. To be sure, not all populists accepted all these arguments, and in later years the Social Revolutionaries, who were something of a hybrid, admitted the possibilities of industrialization but continued to deny that agriculture was destined to follow the course of capitalist development.

A direct transfer of the ideas of the Russian narodniki into the Rumanian poporanist movement is to be seen in the writings of Constantin Stere, although this Russian influence was by no means the only source of Rumanian populism, which had an indigenous development for the same reasons that caused its rise in Russia.[18] Stere,

18. Rumanian populism was also a literary movement reflecting the growing national consciousness and desire to create a national language and literature. H. Sanielevici, in a series of articles collected as *Poporanismul reacţionar* (Bucarest, 1921), made a highly critical survey of the literary and philosophical sides of populism. In his unfriendly opinion, it was an escapist and reactionary movement, displaying a medieval turn of mind and an unwillingness to face reality. The socialist Dobrogeanu-Gherea, while admiring certain sincere if misguided aspects of the populist position, regarded it as a dangerous movement because it could be used by the ruling groups to conceal the real misery in Rumania behind an idyllic mask. Populism could mean anything or nothing: "The whole country is covered with populists and populism, civil and military populists, lay and clerical populists, men and women populists, liberal populism, conservative populism, government populism, opposition populism, national populism, anti-semitic populism, democratic populism, socialist populism, and populist populism properly speaking." *Neoiobăgia*, p. 229.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 however, was the most brilliant of the populist writers and through his journal *Viața românească* exerted a far-reaching influence. He was born in Bessarabia of a boyar family, had associated with the narodniki, and had been banished to Siberia for his activities.[19] He later came to Rumania where he joined the nascent socialist movement. In 1899 he broke with the socialists on the question of collaboration with the Liberals, and in 1900 led a group into the Liberal camp.[20]

The best exposition of Stere's populist ideas was a series of articles, entitled "Social Democracy or Populism," published in *Viața românească* shortly after the 1907 peasant uprising.[21] The articles were primarily a polemic against the Social Democrats, but they provide the main lines of Stere's thought. Stere denied the Marxist analysis of the economic position of the peasant and held that the peasantry was neither proletarian nor bourgeois but a distinct social category. "The peasantry, as the undifferentiated base of society, constitutes a separate social category, upon whose back are raised all other social classes, not excepting even the industrial proletariat."[22] In a peasant society there could be no class struggle; since the elements of production were not differentiated, there would be no classes. Consequently, the elements leading to class struggle had been introduced via the superstructure of differentiated classes standing above the peasantry. The only way to progress in a peasant society lay through strengthening the peasant economically by means of cooperation and by introducing a true "rural Rumanian democracy."[23]

With regard to industrialization, Stere started from the premise that different countries could evolve in different manners, that the "thorny road of capitalist industrialism" was not the only way. To the question whether "industrialization after the European model was inevitable or even possible in Rumania," his response was negative. Industrialization could not develop without foreign markets, and

19. Trotsky and Rakovsky, *Ocherki politicheskoi Rumynii*, p. 123.

20. C. Titel Petrescu, *Socialismul în România*, pp. 150–151. The socialists of course regarded Stere as a renegade. The problem which faced the Rumanian socialists was that which faced socialists elsewhere, but worse. The party had spent years in the wilderness with little prospect of achieving any effective power. Stere felt that since there was no hope of a revolution, it was wise to collaborate with the more progressive of the existing parties—the Liberals. For some years he was regarded as the unofficial adviser of I. I. C. Brătianu.

21. The articles, "Socialdemocratism sau poporanism," appeared in six issues of *Viața românească:* August, 1907, pp. 170–193; September, 1907, pp. 318–341; October, 1907, pp. 15–48; November, 1907, pp. 173–208; January, 1908, pp. 49–75; and April, 1908, pp. 59–80.

22. *Ibid.* (September, 1907), p. 338.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 341.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Rumania, a backward state, had small chance of capturing them from the great industrial powers.[24] 665

> An economically backward country, by the very fact of its backwardness, inevitably finds itself in a state of painful inferiority. . . . For this reason, the simple fact that the industrial development of a country has been delayed itself serves as an impediment in the battle for markets.[25] . . . Thus, from theoretical deductions confirmed by the critiques of capitalism made by K. Marx himself, and from the sad experience of our industrial protectionism, we reach the conclusion that Rumania *cannot follow* the industrial development of Western Europe.[26]

Having denied the possibility of Rumanian industrialization, Stere proceeded to develop his own theory of progress, which was based upon a view of Rumanian society as a cultural and historical entity with its own "national genius." In this connection he was particularly incensed by the socialists who would insist that nothing good could arise in Rumania until after the triumph of socialism in the West. Stere's organic nationalism, while deploring "vulgar or ferocious" anti-Semitism, saw the Jews as alien elements and agents of "vagabond capital," who by their increasing numbers and wealth threatened to disrupt the inchoate cultural development of the Rumanian nation. He realized that the struggle for political democracy in Rumania could be achieved only through "determined, conscious and organized action—but this way is, unfortunately, still in large part closed to our peasantry." [27] He would therefore seek political support in the wealthier peasants, the village petty bourgeoisie, and the intelligentsia.

As to the economic goal, the conditions in Rumania demanded "the organization of the whole national economy on a peasantist foundation: a vigorous peasantry, master of the land on which it works, and for which—through the organization of a perfected system of cooperative societies—the advantages of small properties are united with all the technical advantages to-day available only to large property." [28] Stere did not deny the desirability of any industry whatsoever, but recommended a type of industrial organization which could make use of the peasants' free time in the winter months; in other

24. Although this argument closely resembles that of the narodniki, nowhere in these articles does Stere cite a Russian authority. Most of his arguments are culled from the German Social Democrats and from Marx and Engels themselves.
25. *Ibid.* (October, 1907), p. 86.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.* (January, 1908), p. 59.
28. *Ibid.* (April, 1908), p. 59.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 words, a form of peasant household industry designed to satisfy internal consumption.[29] He was opposed to the Liberals' effort to create a national industry by means of a protectionist tariff. Small urban industries should remain as crafts and serve as accessories to agriculture. Existing large industries, such as the petroleum industry, should be nationalized, not socialized, and become a state monopoly. In summary, he advocated:

> A free peasantry master of its land, the development of crafts and small industries, with the aid of an intense cooperative movement in the villages and in the towns; state monopoly of large industry (with the exception of special cases which are able to develop on their own without prejudice to the economy): this is the formula for our economic and social progress, which the very conditions of our national life impose upon us.[30]

Although Stere's thesis is well argued, it presents serious difficulties. In the first place, his initial premise that the peasant is the "undifferentiated base of society" has altogether negative implications, since it is precisely by a "differentiation" of society, by surmounting the primordial peasant, that the dynamic process of economic advance has been achieved. Moreover, while he could point to the undoubted obstacles confronting Rumania in any attempt to emulate the West, the actual fact was that Rumania had long since been caught in the toils of the West; the cash nexus had even penetrated agriculture through the commerce in cereals and had, as has been seen, contributed to the serious plight of the peasantry. His ideal of a prosperous small peasant was based on the models of Denmark and Switzerland—favorite paradigms of the populists—the structure of whose markets and economies was altogether different from that of Rumania. His recommendation that industry should take the form of household crafts, to occupy the peasant during the winter months, has also had much popularity but is of limited value. The separation of cottage industry from agriculture has generally been the mark of advancing cultivation. Any industry run on such an intermittent basis would be forced to remain on a primitive and inefficient level. Moreover, the winter unemployment was in part a consequence of the extensive nature of Rumanian agriculture; a more labor-intensive form of peasant cultivations would diminish this seasonal difference. Above all, cottage industries have shown small powers of resistance

29. *Ibid.*, p. 60.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

to the competition of machine-made goods.[31] Stere's theory really provides no adequate solution to the problem of improving the level of agriculture or the status of the peasant. 665

In addition to these shortcomings, Stere's populism contained certain very dangerous implications which were to be realized in the 1930's. Along with his desire for a rural democracy and a rustic economy, there is also the persistent note of organic nationalism, with its eloquent love of the "national genius" embodied in the Rumanian peasant, its fear of the alien cultural and economic intrusion of the Jew, its belief that Rumania had its own particular destiny to fulfill, and its desire to avoid the "Golgotha of capitalism." In Stere these elements appeared in a relatively moderate and balanced guise, but taken together and intensified they closely resemble the driving impulses of the Iron Guard.

The connection between certain aspects of populism and the Rumanian fascism of Codreanu is not accidental but is closely bound to the question of Rumania's relation to Western industrial society. Rumanians faced by the impact of the West with its power, high material level, and more articulate cultural development, have always been in peril of being driven to one of two emotional extremes: either abject imitation of the West or rejection. In general, imitation has prevailed, though frequently with quite un-Western consequences. In Stere, however, there is the element of rejection, although it is moderated by an effort at a rational analysis of the actual relations between Rumania and the industrial West. In the Iron Guard, on the other hand, the rational element is dissolved, leaving only the emotional reaction in a singularly malignant form. Therein lies the danger of this type of populism: in so far as it fails to provide a solution to Rumania's social and economic questions, it is apt to erupt into a wildly irrational and negative movement.

While these potentially dangerous qualities appear in Stere's work, it would be a mistake to read them into the future Peasant party. Indeed, as will be shown presently, the Peasant party, despite Stere's affiliation with it and despite the persistence of the populist ideology, did not pursue a populist course but followed a different line, which

31. The Peasant party economist, Madgearu, conceded that the populist writers were incorrect in their views on cottage industry (*op. cit.*, pp. 11–12). These arguments have nothing to do with the question of the value of decentralized industrialization based upon household units, since with the use of electric power such industries might be quite feasible. Cf. League of Nations, *Industrialization and Foreign Trade*, p. 50. But the introduction of such things as electric power presupposes a whole series of developments not included in the populist theory.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 also led to difficulties but of another kind. An indication of this difference appears as early as 1920 when a Peasant party deputy said: "We are not against industry, and not against towns, and not against 'foreigners,' and we have nothing in common with the populism of *Viața românească*." [32]

In the remarkable parliamentary speeches of the Peasant leader Ion Mihalache in 1920 and 1921 one finds a quite different attitude from that expressed in Stere's writings. Mihalache was at once more authentically peasant and more pragmatic than Stere. In his attack on the existing order and the ruling class he showed the anger of the peasant against the boyars and a profound distrust in the willingness or ability of the old parties to defend him. He violently assailed the temptation of "social harmony"—"Social harmony is the seductive song by which the naïve are put to sleep; while they are sleeping the ruling class satisfies its own class interests"—and announced that the peasants must organize for their own defense. He thus granted the existence of social classes and of a class struggle. He did not, however, erect either the concept of classes or the class struggle into theoretical principles, but said they were merely names for what was obviously happening in Rumania:

"Class struggle," the parties of social harmony shout at us. "So be it," we reply if that is the only means by which the peasantry can guarantee the realization of its needs.

"You are not a class party. The peasantry is not a social class," the socialists shout at us. "So be it," we also answer the socialists; we are very little interested in the definition whether we are or are not a class party.[33]

Mihalache stated that the peasantry had a class attitude toward the large proprietors because its goal was the elimination of large estates and the establishment of the peasant as master of the land. He did not, however, regard the peasantry as the exclusive class. "The Peasant party is not opposed to the development of all other social classes; in contrast to the Socialist party which proposes to dissolve the bourgeoisie and replace it with a single social class, the Peasant party considers legitimate the existence of other social classes, industrialists, merchants, etc." [34] His concept of the function of the

32. Sanielevici, *op. cit.*, p. 432. The deputy, unnamed, was protesting against the anti-populist line of Sanielevici's periodical *Curentul Nou*.
33. Mihalache, *Partidul Țărănesc în politica țarei*, p. 82.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

peasant lacked the overtones which are found in Stere and at the same time he did not endow the class struggle with an independent vitality as the mainspring of history. 665

He had a pragmatic view toward industry; while he opposed the control exerted by the Liberals over the nation's economy, he did not adopt Stere's view that Rumania must follow a different course of development from the West. He did not even deny the socialists' contention that in the long run increasing industrialization might introduce capitalist development into the countryside, but present politics could not wait for that eventuality:

> It is possible that in the future it will be as you believe. I do not come with prejudices against socialism. It is possible that mechanization will make such great progress in agriculture that personal equipment, individual initiative, and the personality of the man will not be the essential factors in agricultural production they are to-day . . . and then it may occur that the notion of individual property will suffer a great blow and socialism will come to the peasantry. It is possible. But gentlemen, in politics we must base our actions not on what might happen in decades or in future centuries. A healthy policy is the management of current needs, of the real necessities of the existing society.[35]

This essentially practical tone ran through Mihalache's pronouncements, and his thesis was the simple and straightforward one that the great majority of the Rumanian peasants had been deprived of land and kept out of power by the greed and selfishness of the boyars. His aim was to correct that state of affairs by organizing the peasants to protect themselves (he admitted the assistance of intellectuals, but without the connotations of Stere's intelligentsia) by redistributing agricultural land, by establishing small peasant farms which he believed were more efficient than the large estates, and by increasing peasant cooperation. In pursuing this line he attacked the parties of "social harmony" for their hypocrisy and the socialists for their doctrinaire denial of the role of the peasantry. While a patriot and a monarchist, he displayed little of Stere's organic nationalism. The principal limitation to Mihalache's position was that he did confine himself largely to the immediate agrarian question, and did not really explore the connections between agriculture and the whole economic complex.

Turning to the Peasant party economist Virgil Madgearu, one

35. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 finds a broader if less intense view of the economic scene. By a series of articles in the early 1920's [36] Madgearu established himself as one of the leading spokesmen of the Peasant party, although unlike Mihalache there was little of the peasant about him. He had a Leipzig doctorate and was a professor at the Academy of Commercial Studies in Bucarest.

Madgearu, like Stere and Mihalache, argued that agricultural development, in contrast to the views of the Marxists, was from large holdings to small peasant properties, which could demonstrate a higher level of productivity. He also maintained that the peasantry constituted a separate social category; while granting that some peasants employed labor and others were virtually an agricultural proletariat, he denied that this proved a lack of homogeneity in the peasantry.[37] On the other hand, Madgearu's writings displayed a spirit quite different from Stere's. He saw that the populists had been wrong in their belief that agrarian countries would evolve without becoming involved in industrialism, since in fact capitalist industry in the form of factories, cartels, and trusts was developing by leaps and bounds in the agrarian states. The peasant *mystique* which appeared in Stere's populism was lacking in Madgearu. Indeed, Madgearu's "peasantism" was founded upon a set of ideas which were typically "liberal" in the Western sense of the word.

He granted the existence of the class struggle, but for him it was not a dynamic concept but a mere statement of fact. It was not the peasants who preached social discord but the false exponents of "political harmony," the old oligarchy, who had created the antagonisms[38]. He denied that Rumanian liberalism could develop an adequate peasant policy, but for the reason that real liberalism had perished. Contemporary Rumanian liberalism was founded on a financial oligarchy, financial trusts, and a despotic militaristic state. He opposed the industrial policy being followed in Rumania, not from the populist desire to avoid a "capitalist Golgotha," but because industrialization was not developing on the basis of free competition. "If peasantism does not have an inherent tendency against

36. Some of these include *Ţărănismul* (Bucarest, n.d.), "Doctrina Ţărănistă," in *Doctrinele partidelor politice, Revoluţia agrară şi evoluţia clasei ţărăneşti* (Bucarest, 1923), *Agrarianism—un discors parlamentar* (Bucarest, 1927).

37. *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, p. 72. However, in his last work written in 1940, Madgearu admitted that in Rumania there was a tendency toward a differentiation between the middle peasantry and the agricultural proletariat. *Evoluţia economiei româneşti*, p. 34.

38. Madgearu, *Ţărănismul*, p. ii. On several occasions he quoted with approval Guizot's remark, "The class struggle is not a hypothesis, not a theory, but purely and simply a reality."

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665

industrial development, it is, on the other hand, against tariff protectionism, the creator of hot-house industries, trusts and cartels."[39] He denied any contradiction between agrarianism and industrialization; he admitted the necessity of developing Rumania's industries and natural resources but rejected those industries which required continued artificial support. Wherever public utilities or basic industries showed signs of becoming monopolies they should be regulated by the state.

In the political sphere, the peasant was important not because of any innate rustic virtues but because he represented the great majority of Rumanian citizens. He should not be deprived of his share in the government for any theoretical reason, whether coming from the Left or the Right. Socially the peasant was important because of his threefold role as producer, consumer, and citizen.

The peasant, having become a small proprietor of land, through allotment or purchase on his own, has an interest in earning from the cultivation of his lot the greatest product which can be obtained in the shortest time, to endow his holding with equipment and livestock, and to provide enough for himself and his family. This presupposes an organization of production which guarantees a maximum return and an organization of sales, which, by doing away with intermediaries, gives the villager the whole value of his produce. . . . The peasantry forms the most numerous strata of consumers. It is therefore directly interested in the industrial regime. Understanding the necessity of encouraging the progress of a national industry, it cannot admit a protection based on a prohibitive tariff system which artificially maintains certain industries that lack any favorable conditions for their development. . . . Finally, as citizen the peasant has an interest in living in a community of free men, who administer their interests through elected representatives.[40]

Madgearu's criticism of the Social Democrats, while to some extent based on their hostility or indifference to the peasantry, was along lines quite different from Stere's. He opposed Social Democracy primarily because in Rumania it was apt to produce extremist repercussions either to the Left or to the Right:

It is problematic whether a Social Democratic party could soon succeed in penetrating the peasant masses, not so much because the mentality of the latter, attached to the idea of private property, is closed to the socialist ideology, as because the economic influence of the parties of "social

39. *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, p. 85.
40. Madgearu, *Ţărănismul*, pp. 21–27.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 harmony" over the villages, along with their means of propaganda, would be able to frustrate any serious action by the Social Democrats among the peasants. As long as the Social Democratic party was unsuccessful in attracting the peasant masses, it could only be a spectator, condemned to a passive role. In periods of burgeoning "ministerialism" in its ranks, it would be in the situation of seeing its leaders agreeing to collaborate in the governments of the bourgeois parties, of the capitalist oligarchy. This would lead to breaking the unity of the socialist movement and to strengthening the revolutionary syndicalist and communist currents, the adversaries of political democracy. A change in direction away from political democracy and toward a proletarian dictatorship would, however, give rise to reaction in the cadres of the parties of order and social harmony, a restriction of public liberties through a state of siege, courts martial and censorship, with the tendency to install a white dictatorship. Whoever has closely observed the course of events in recent years can foresee the fate of the Rumanian people if it were to be their lot to oscillate between the rule of the financial oligarchy in a democratic form and the same rule of the financial oligarchy installing a political dictatorship every time it appeared to be in danger of being ousted or destroyed by a dictatorship of the proletariat. Cannot the entry of peasantism into the political arena determine a new orientation to social evolution? [41]

In these prophetic words, Madgearu's criticism of the Social Democrats is seen to be altogether practical and was really meant as a plea for cooperation from the Social Democrats in defeating the financial oligarchy of the Liberals and in fending off Leftist excesses.

In his foreign economic policy, Madgearu displayed none of the populist mistrust of the West. He believed in freeing trade channels and giving a friendly reception to foreign capital, and he heartily opposed Vintilă Brătianu's economic xenophobia.

Clearly, the spirit prevailing in Madgearu's writings is quite unlike that of the earlier populists. Peasantism has become a radical democratic movement. In many respects Madgearu's position is a great advance over Stere's populism. It shows none of the irrational and primitive strains and is thoroughly aware of the twentieth century. It avoids integral nationalism and advocates international cooperation. Above all, it realizes that the peasant cannot remain isolated but is involved in the complex of the world economy. It was Madgearu's principal desire to keep the peasant from being exploited in this economy.

41. *Ibid.*, pp. 15–16.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665

But in thus escaping the limitations of populism Madgearu's peasantism contained its own weaknesses. In the first place, this rationalization of the peasantist philosophy, which gave it an almost middle-class flavor, was in danger ultimately of depriving it of its fighting strength. A more serious drawback, though Madgearu was scarcely at fault, was that the ideals and indeed the society on which Madgearu based his argument and which he was trying to translate into Rumanian terms were on the verge of suffering a terrible setback throughout Europe. A third and more specific danger was that the very broadening of Madgearu's concepts with their acceptance of a number of nonpeasant elements (especially the qualified support of industry and the interest in foreign capital) would, in the course of time, lead these elements to claim first attention.

An analogous shift in direction is observable in the series of Peasant party programs of 1921, 1922, 1924, and 1926, as may be illustrated by comparing the passages on agrarian affairs, industry, and foreign capital.[42] Rumanian political programs should not be taken very seriously as a guide to probable action, but as each of these was prepared while the party was in opposition they do at least show the Peasants' changing views on Rumanian economic policy.

The projected program of 1921 is quite radical in tone but vague and loosely formulated in its contents.[43] It affirms that the land must belong to those who cultivate it and that the state should have constitutional right to continue to purchase large and medium properties and transfer them to the actual cultivators. Expropriation should follow the model of the Bessarabian agrarian reform (i.e., all properties over 100 hectares) and be applied by bodies elected by the peasantry. Only the state should have the right to purchase land, peasant holdings should not be larger than a peasant family could cultivate with its own labor, and measures should be taken to prevent the reappearance of large properties.

The 1922 program is generally similar in tone. It omits the right of the state to purchase medium and large properties and merely

42. *Proectul de program al Partidului Țărănesc din România* (Bucarest, 1921); Partidul Țărănesc, *Programul și Statutele* (Bucarest, 1922); Partidul Țărănesc, *Programul General și Statutele* (Bucarest, 1925); Partidul Național-Țărănesc, *Principiile programul și statutul* (Bucarest, 1926). A projected program was voted by a congress of the party on November 20–21, 1921; a definitive program was passed in the general congress of Iași on November 26–28, 1922, and was modified by a congress in Bucarest on October 26–27, 1924. A new program was adopted in the congress of October 10, 1926, when the National and Peasant parties fused.

43. It contains a large number of Slavonic words, which were later replaced by more sedate words derived from French or Latin. The whole document bears the impression of Stere's influence.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 says that the state should assist the process of evolution toward "properties of cultivation." It would extend expropriation to properties of over 100 hectares with the exception of model farms necessary for the improvement of small cultivation. (This qualification was omitted in 1921.) It is less explicit on restrictions on sale of land, but goes into greater detail on the question of communal pastures and forests, agricultural education, experimental stations, and credit.

The 1924 program omits reference to the land belonging to him who cultivates it, and stresses the need for correction of abuses of the agrarian reform. It would extend expropriation to properties over 100 hectares, unless they were organized farms with their own inventory and equipment, in which case they could be 250 hectares in regions with demands for land, and 500 hectares in regions where the need for land had been satisfied. It shows greater interest in rationalizing peasant holdings through establishing norms for the sale and purchase of land, preventing the fragmentation of property, and consolidating small properties.

The 1926 program—after the fusion of the National and Peasant parties—is substantially the same. It emphasizes the need for completing the land allotments and for raising the level of production. It makes one significant addition, however, in advocating freedom of purchase and sale of agricultural land—after a period of transition—to promote the "natural selection of serious cultivators."

The four programs show a consistent trend away from a radical agrarian policy advocating a leveling out of properties and determined to maintain family cultivated plots, to a more elastic concept with less emphasis upon land distribution than upon the improvement of production. The principal changes occurred before the union of the Peasant party with the Transylvanians.

The 1921 program takes a very narrow view of industry. "Agriculture cannot advance if it is not aided by the establishment of certain industries . . . but industry to be successful must be based only on those things which can be made from what is found in the country." It recommends cottage industries which could occupy the peasant after the completion of his work in the fields. It recognizes the need of a national industry and of tariffs, but the latter should not be excessive.

The 1922 program follows the same lines, but adds the need of state control over the exploitation of natural resources. It opposes the support of "artificial" industries, protection of monopolies which raise the cost of living, and state monopolies.

The 1924 program for industry is brief and presents fewer restric-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

tions. It still favors small and cottage industries but approves the encouraging of large industries, especially those which use agricultural products. 665

The 1926 program is still briefer. However, in contrast to the 1924 program on the utilization of sources of energy, which stresses the need for public control, it "encourages private initiative and capital." This is a complete reversal of the 1922 program which criticized the "anarchic exploitation" of sources of energy for "private capitalist interests."

With respect to foreign capital, the preface to the 1921 program has some very unpleasant things to say about "capitalist imperialism which has achieved world domination." While it admits the value of foreign loans to repair the railway system, "we must have, however, great care when it is a question of taking loans from bankers of other countries. We must take the precautions of the mouse when it goes for food that it is not seized by the cat!"

The 1922 program omits the prefatory harangue against capitalist imperialism. It rejects foreign railway concessions but grants the need of foreign credit to repair transport and consolidate the national debt. The suspicious note is still present: while Rumania needs foreign credit, the party recognizes the tendency of the large capitalist states to exploit through concessions the riches of backward agrarian states such as Rumania. "We are fully aware of the great difficulties and dangers of the immediate future."

The 1924 program drops this attitude completely and has a special section on collaboration with foreign capital, the necessity of attracting it to repair the economy and to develop the natural riches of the country. It favors equal treatment to foreign and Rumanian capital, an attack on the policy of the Liberals.

The chapter on collaboration in the 1926 program is identical with that of 1924, except in its omission of the phrase, in speaking of attracting foreign capital, "in a form corresponding to the national economic interests." The phrase probably sounded too much like a Liberal party pronouncement.

From these examples it should be quite clear that the policy of the Peasant party underwent an important and perhaps fundamental evolution from its radical origins of 1921.[44] Moreover, the bulk of changes occurred before the fusion of 1926, a fact which would con-

44. Similar changes are observable in most sections of the programs. For example, the programs through 1924 demanded the dissolution of the security police and the rural gendarmes, and the inauguration of the eight-hour day. These points were dropped in the 1926 program.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 firm the supposition that the principles of the Peasant party itself were unstable. The evolution traced here was to be carried even farther when the National Peasants came to power in 1928.

Economic and Agrarian Policy

[113] A fair illustration of the economic interests of the National Peasant government is to be found in Virgil Madgearu's little book, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, published in 1930. Of the 63 pages of text, 14 are devoted to agriculture, 22 to the exploitation of state enterprises and the reform of the mining law, ten to foreign trade policy, and eleven to the improvement of transport. The fact that the booklet was published in England and designed for foreign readers merely underlines the preoccupation with affairs other than agricultural. As has been seen, this broadening of interests was the result of the pressing demands of financial, monetary, and commercial matters in 1928–30, but also of the internal trend away from a purely agrarian outlook.

665 241 The most striking feature of the agrarian policy of the National Peasant government was the things it neglected to do or even to consider doing. While the party's attitude toward further redistribution of land had become increasingly moderate, nevertheless in 1926 the program of the united party called for expropriation of properties over 100 hectares. Not a step was taken toward carrying out this measure. To be sure, many reasons militated against such a move. Agriculture was still in the process of readjustment from the previous reforms. Expropriation would undoubtedly have caused a political furor since the mere passage of time was serving to consolidate the previous reform, with all its shortcomings and abuses. Moreover, since the 1917 act was entered in the constitution, it could be modified only by a constitutional amendment, which was forbidden under a regency. Quite obviously, however, the National Peasant party by 1928 was not the radical agrarian movement which had attempted to introduce the reform bill under the Vaida government of 1920.

A second omission was the failure to take any active steps toward the consolidation of peasant strips, a measure which was virtually a precondition for any effective improvement of agriculture. Again, this would have been unsettling and peasant support for this particular reform was by no means certain.

665 241 671 The only serious measure taken in connection with agricultural property relations was an act passed in 1929 which amended the Liberals' law of 1925 concerning the alienation of allotments obtained

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

through the agrarian reforms.[45] The new law, which was designed to 665
facilitate the transfer of land and to further a "process of selection 241
among the peasant cultivators," abolished certain of the restrictions 671
and delays imposed by the Liberals and greatly simplified the procedure of sale, although maintaining safeguards to keep land in the hands of actual cultivators and limiting purchases to Rumanian citizens having not over 25 hectares of land.

The idea that a "process of selection" would enable peasants with 656
"superior competitive efficiency" to create prosperous holdings has 665
had considerable popularity not only in Rumania but in other eastern European states.[46] For such a process to have beneficial consequences, however, it is necessary, first, that superior efficiency on tiny holdings will actually result in sufficient capital accumulation to buy out less efficient peasants, and, second, that the peasants displaced in the process have some alternative means of employment. Otherwise the poorer peasants would be reduced to a landless proletariat and the land taken over by the wealthier peasants. Such seems to have been the effect of the National Peasants' law, although it was not the sole cause; the survey of sixty Rumanian villages made in 1938 reported that the law of 1929 had intensified the differentiation in the peasantry by building up the category of middle peasants on the one hand and of increasing the agricultural proletariat on the other.[47] It was this law perhaps more than any other single act which gave

45. See above, p. 125.

46. Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe*, p. 105, cites a Greek author (C. Evelpedis, *La Réforme agraire en Grèce*, Athens, 1926), as an advocate of this view. In Rumania the alienation of peasant property has had a tangled political history in which at one time or another almost all political parties have reversed their positions. Up to the 1918–21 reforms, official policy tended toward inalienability, whereas the older reformers, such as Dobrogeanu-Gherea and Garoflid, demanded alienation as a necessary step to creating an independent peasantry. The Liberals in 1911 came out for a "process of selection," but in 1925 they restricted the transfer of land. The Peasant party, on the contrary, in 1921 was for government control of all sales, whereas in 1929 it moved toward freer purchase. The Communists, it may be added, roundly condemned the National Peasants for their 1929 law, but Lenin, in his agrarian writings before the Russian revolution, was strongly for alienation. The Communist position is seen in Pătrăşcanu's interpretation of the 1929 law: "From the point of view of opening a way for capitalism in the villages and of differentiation within the rural strata, the measure represented an advance in comparison with the past. But what was the cost of this progress? The land of the poorest and economically most feeble layers of the peasants quickly became the principal object, the prey on which urban banking capital and the village bourgeoisie threw themselves." Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, *Sous trois dictatures* (Paris, 1946), p. 106. [113]

47. *60 Sate româneşti*, II, 6. The depression doubtless intensified this effect. During the 1946 famine in Moldavia the same thing occurred: peasants who had obtained land under the 1945 reform began to sell to the larger peasants at such a rate that the government was obliged to pass a law nullifying these sales.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

656 rise to the charge that the National Peasants really represented the
665 richer peasants and the village bourgeoisie.[48]

671 A similar attitude appears in the other principal agrarian measures of the National Peasants; the law for the organization of cooperation, of March 28, 1929, and the law for the organization of rural mortgages and agricultural credit of July 29, 1929. These laws were acclaimed at the time as proof of the government's concern for the peasant, but they need not be considered in great detail here.[49] Laws for credit and cooperation are hardy perennials in Rumanian legislative history, but none of them appears to have accomplished much. These particular laws were quickly blighted by the onset of the depression.

474 The law for the organization of cooperation abrogated the act passed by the Liberal government in July, 1928, which the National Peasants thought gave the state too much control over the cooperative movement. The new code was designed to broaden the legal frame "to offer the cooperatives the freedom of movement which every economic enterprise needs if it is to develop in the present economic world."[50] Notwithstanding this effort to assure greater autonomy and independence, a foreign observer concluded in 1930 that even the new regime had not abandoned the idea that the cooperatives were a government maid of all work.[51] The real difficulty, as has been mentioned before, was that the poor peasant, that is, the average Rumanian, had very little to offer in a cooperative movement. Until the level of the peasantry was raised above the margin of subsistence, the cooperative movement was bound to be a name rather than a reality and to be altogether dependent upon the state for financial support and direction.

452 The law for the organization of rural mortgages and agricultural credit was intended to improve the channels supplying credit to agriculture, which had been seriously undernourished during the Liberal

48. This charge is given some weight when one considers Madgearu's remark, made in 1930: "With farms of medium size, limited to 25 hectares, the agricultural credit granted will be used in a more economical way and will bear fruit in a degree hitherto unknown in our agrarian organization." *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 11. In a country where 75 per cent of all agricultural holdings were under 5 hectares, and 92 per cent under 10 hectares, reference to farms of medium size could have only an extremely limited application.

49. Analyses of the law for the organization of cooperatives may be found in Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, pp. 409–411, and in F. E. Manoliou, *La Réconstruction économique et financière de la Roumanie et les partis politiques*, pp. 236–237, and of the law for the reorganization of agricultural credit in Manoliou, pp. 239–243.

50. From the exposé de motifs, cited in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 409.

51. "Rumania: The State as Co-operator," *Yearbook of Agricultural Co-operation, 1930*, pp. 404–428.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

regime. New institutions were set up to provide credit suitable to agriculture's particular wants. It was hoped that these would stimulate the influx of foreign capital "to satisfy the needs of agricultural financing." [52] In its form the new law was better adjusted to the needs of agriculture, but the depression completely halted the desired flow of capital. It may be doubted if this law was of primary benefit to the poor peasant, who was of necessity a bad risk and whose impoverished condition prevented him from employing credit profitably.[53]

In addition to these financial measures, the National Peasants passed acts for the organization and reform of agricultural instruction intended to spread and popularize better agricultural techniques and to prevent trained agriculturalists from being completely absorbed by the bureaucracy; a law of July, 1929, for the reclamation of the inundated region of the Danube; measures for leasing agricultural machinery to cultivators and developing seed selection stations; and a law to promote systematic colonization in areas of sparse population. These measures, while desirable in themselves, could be of only marginal benefit.

Although the National Peasants' concern with agriculture is shown by the fact that the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture in 1929 was double that of any of the preceding postwar years,[54] the general results are somewhat flat and uninspiring. According to Madgearu ten years later, the National Peasants, because of the difficult circumstances under which they had received the stabilization loan and because of the increasingly unfavorable international economic situation, had been unable to carry out all their financial plans but had been forced to limit themselves to certain priority tasks: assuring the liquidity of the National Bank's portfolio, liquidating the state's floating debt, reconstructing the railways, and making certain productive investments. "The necessary means were lacking to create an agricultural mortgage bank." [55]

Doubtless, financial difficulties and the lack of capital were important obstacles, and the depression washed away what might have been promising beginnings toward improvement in agricultural finan-

52. Madgearu, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 9.

53. Manoliou, *op. cit.*, p. 242, was of the opinion that certain measures of inspection and control, included in the law to safeguard the credit societies, would have the effect of discouraging the small cultivator and diminishing his productive efforts.

54. According to Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 453, after the First World War the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture had not exceeded 33,500,000 gold lei until the advent of the National Peasants. In 1929 it reached the figure of 78,500,000 gold lei.

55. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei romînești*, p. 306.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

241 cial organization. But the agrarian policy had other defects. In the
665 first place, the National Peasants fell into the old Rumanian fallacy
656 of counting too greatly upon an act of legislation to cure any problem.[56] Much more serious however was the fact that while the National Peasants had an agrarian policy it was scarcely a peasant policy. The measures actually taken were not of the kind that could greatly help the poor peasant. The modifications of the party programs between 1921 and 1926 foreshadowed this attitude, but even so the more far-reaching parts of the 1926 program were not carried out.

665 Measures intended to benefit agriculture were not, however, limited
241 to agricultural legislation. The new tariff policy inaugurated by the
652 National Peasants on August 1, 1929, was specifically designed to assist the farmer. The National Peasants had consistently attacked the Liberals' (and the People's party's) tariff policy, which was highly protectionist, raised the cost of agricultural equipment, and was "in its technical structure a feeble instrument of negotiation for securing markets for our export products." [57] The new tariff was, as Madgearu announced, based on the recommendations of the Geneva Conference of 1927. It created a more elastic customs system to permit commercial conventions with other states. Duties on goods were divided into two groups: 1) irreducible minimum duties for goods produced within the country and requiring protection; these could not be reduced through convention; 2) duties on all other articles, which could be reduced through mutual arrangement with other states. Even before signing any customs conventions the government reduced the duties on agricultural equipment.

In thus lowering the cost of imported agricultural equipment as well as in reducing tariffs on articles of mass consumption, the 1929 tariff undoubtedly benefited the peasant. As to the protection of industry, "it was in general calculated so as not to exceed the difference by which the conditions of local production were more difficult than conditions of foreign production, and only for branches of industry which had the possibility of sound development in the country." [58] The tariffs did not renounce industrial protection but tried

56. Note, for example, Madgearu's remark, "Up to 1929 agricultural instruction in Rumania was based on no uniform principle, nor was it adapted to the situation, since its organization was not based on legislation which could solve the problem as a whole." *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 12. Clearly the real reasons for Rumania's lack of adequate agricultural education were not to be found in the absence of a uniform legal code.

57. Madgearu, *ibid.*, p. 39.

58. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei romînești*, p. 221.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

to protect only those industries showing "natural" promise of development and to promote the necessary rationalization of those industries which had been permitted to become inefficient behind the Liberal tariff. 665 241 652

Throughout Madgearu's exposition of the 1929 tariff there is an evident desire to increase international cooperation and trade, and an altogether friendly attitude toward the great capitalist powers—an attitude quite different from Vintilă Brătianu's cautious and rather grudging admission of the need for increased trade and foreign capital. This attitude is most clearly shown in the laws of 1929 modifying the Liberal acts of 1924 on mines and the commercialization of state-owned enterprises.[59] The National Peasants criticized the 1924 laws as chauvinistic and failing to promote the exploitation of natural resources. "The aggressive nationalist policy exemplified in the Mining Act of 1924, which did so much harm to the country, bringing it into a state of financial and economic disorganization, could not continue without grave consequences for our economic future. A policy of sincere co-operation with international capital is the only means of improving the situation."[60] The new laws threw open the doors to foreign capital. With the exception of requiring that 75 per cent of the personnel (both administrative and subordinate) be Rumanians, no restrictions were placed on the percentage of foreign capital in the companies or upon the nationality of directors and chief officials. 457 665 652 [671]

These laws were in marked contrast not only to the attitude of the Liberals but also to the policy recommended by Constantin Stere in 1921.[61] Stere, with his hostility to "vagabond capital" and the menace of imperialist great powers, opposed foreign capital investments in the Rumanian petroleum industry, since all profits passed beyond the frontiers. Nor was foreign capital concerned with satisfying the needs of the population but only with raking in a profit. He was, however, aware that without foreign capital the resources simply could not be developed. He disapproved of the Liberals' policy of "nationalizing" petroleum and creating concessions with a majority of Rumanian capital. Having no confidence in the Liberal plutocracy's willingness or ability to defend the nation's interests, Stere advocated state operation of the petroleum industry. Foreign capital 652 665

59. A detailed comparison of Liberal and National Peasant policy on this question, from a pro-Liberal position, is given by Alexandre G. Georgesco, *Le Régime juridique et financière des capitaux étrangers en Roumanie* (Paris, 1932).

60. Madgearu, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 30.

61. C. Stere, *Naţionalizarea Industriei de Petrol: Cuvântare rostită în şedinţa Adunării deputaţilor din 28 Martie 1921* (Bucarest, 1921).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

652 should be obtained not through investments but through loans under-
665 taken by the state. In this way Rumania would have full control over the allocation of capital and would not, except for the interest on loans, see the profits from the oil industry go abroad. The petroleum policy of the National Peasants, as formulated in 1929, was even more removed from Stere's recommendations than from the Liberals' policy. It was, however, perfectly consistent with their economic outlook during their term in office.

665 Rumanian transportation and communications had been in no-
652 toriously bad condition since the First World War, and the Liberals'
496 policy of retrenchment had been particularly damaging to the rail-
464 way system. The 1929 stabilization loan allocated $34,000,000 for
471 railway expansion and $9,000,000 to pay off overdue railway debts.
491 By a law passed in July, 1929, the National Peasants transferred the state railways to an autonomous public body, "to be administered
206 according to commercial principles."[62] They also undertook to repair and extend the highway network, and abolished the primitive *corvée* which was still being used for road maintenance. In 1930 the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation received a concession for the construction of the Rumanian telephone network.

665 The stabilization loan required a reform of the National Bank and of the state accounting system. In March, 1929, the government passed a series of new statutes for the bank; the principal changes were the abolition of the ceiling on the issue of currency, established by the Liberals' in 1925, and the limitation of the influence of the state in the appointment of directors. The bank was given somewhat greater independence from state control and powers to maintain the newly achieved stability of the currency. In July, 1929, the government passed a law reforming the state accounting system and the organization of the budget. There was no doubt that Rumanian state finances needed reform and modernization. The accounting system had been that of France of 1860, plus the accretion of a number of purely Rumanian practices, with the result that the actual condition of government finances at any given time was never known with any exactness. The new law, in reorganizing the preparation of the budget, exerted more stringent control over the expenditures of various ministries. While this law was well intended, its actual results in rationalizing Rumanian finance methods seem to have been very

62. Madgearu, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 50. The organization of Rumanian railways after 1918 had been altogether hectic. In 1925 the Liberals had given some autonomy to the railways; this policy was reversed by the People's party in February, 1927, and reestablished by the Liberals in August of that year.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 slight. In 1929, 1930, and 1931 there was an increasing disparity between budget revenue forecasts and actual receipts.

Certain late measures of the National Peasants will be considered presently in connection with the depression. But from the above it should be evident that during their brief term in office they passed a great deal of legislation, generally consistent in aim, and definitely reversing the main lines of the Liberals' policy. The most important measures, however, were not in the field of agriculture.

665 575 A word might be said on the relation of the National Peasants to foreign agrarian movements. Throughout eastern Europe a strong agrarian current appeared after the First World War. More or less extensive land reforms took place in the belt of states between Soviet Russia and central Europe, and peasant parties of varying political shades made their appearance. In 1921, on the initiative of the Bulgarian Peasant Prime Minister, Alexander Stambuliski, and with the support of the Czech agrarian leaders, Antonin Švehla and Milan Hodža, was formed the International Bureau of Agriculture, known as the Green International. Initially the bureau, which established its headquarters in Prague, was an organization for cooperation among the agrarian parties of the Slavic states of eastern Europe. In 1923, Virgil Madgearu, in discussing the international policy of the Rumanian Peasant party, showed a lukewarm attitude toward the Green International. In his opinion, its purposes were not clearly defined and it displayed a tendency toward Pan-Slavism which would scarcely recommend it to the Rumanians. Above all, he felt that international peasant action had only limited value. "The nation is a decisive factor in determining social progress, since no political party can form itself on an international base. Internationals can be annexes to the development of political action; they cannot become supranational." [63]

The Green International broadened somewhat in the following years. In 1925 Hodža defined the scope of the movement: "We know that agrarian democracy . . . is the strong bond which will create of the peoples an international unity, a formal, organic and psychological unity against which all attacks, whether directed by the imperialist right or the bolshevist left will be shattered." [64] The bureau's secretary Karl Mečir pointed out that the peasantry by their very nature and strong local attachments were not to be organized into a rigid international. The purpose of the movement in his eyes was to

63. *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, p. 86.

64. Milan Hodža, "La Politique étrangère et l'organisation internationale des agriculteurs," *M.A.B.: Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, 8-9 (1928), 22.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 serve as a clearing house to establish common ties and to exchange
575 information.[65] In its general lines it represented an attempt to defend the eastern European peasantry against the more highly organized forces of industrialism and the dynamic inroads of Soviet communism.

In 1926 and 1927 the Rumanian and Finnish Peasant parties joined the Green International. There were no real meetings until 1928, when the bureau was formally constituted. After that annual congresses were held until the movement was engulfed by the depression and the political storms of the 1930's. Eventually it came to include peasant parties from Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Austria, Switzerland, Poland, France, the three Baltic states, and Finland. Although Mihalache had spoken of the rising peasant tide in eastern Europe, and Madgearu and Lupu contributed articles to the later issues of the bulletin of the Green International, it appears to have had no effect upon the course of internal Rumanian politics, and the Rumanians were among the less active members of the bureau.

A far more active, though in its aim unsuccessful, international effort was the agrarian bloc of eastern European states, in which Madgearu played a prominent part. This bloc had its origins in the growing agricultural crisis of 1930. The failure to obtain any favorable action at the first preliminary international conference for concerted economic action (held in Geneva, February 17 to March 24, 1930) led some of the agrarian states of eastern Europe, with the Little Entente at the core, to act together in defense of their interests. A series of conferences at Štrbske Pleso, Bucarest, and Warsaw during the summer of 1930 were attended by representatives from Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. The attempt was made to coordinte the economic policy of the members of the bloc and to obtain better commercial conditions from the industrial states. The failure of the bloc to achieve its aims belongs, however, in the more general framework of the depression.[66]

665 The economic, agrarian, and administrative policy of the National
656 Peasants in 1929 and 1930 has definite homogeneity. A prevailing emphasis upon decentralization and autonomy appears in the administrative reform, in the laws for mines and state enterprises, in the reorganization of the cooperatives. An attempt to relax restric-

65. Karl Mečir, "Le Bureau International Agraire," *M.A.B.: Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, 4 (1926), 26–29.

66. See below, pp. 184–185.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

tions and to permit a natural circulation is seen in the abolition of the censorship and state of siege, in the 1929 tariff, in the law permitting the free sale and purchase of peasant property. A friendly attitude toward foreign capital appears in all the laws on trade and the exploitation of natural resources and in the important concessions granted to foreign firms. Finally, a concern for agriculture is shown not merely in the agrarian laws but in the tariff and financial policy. While many of these measures failed to produce the anticipated results, and some were applied inefficiently, still, taken together, they constitute a recognizable policy and one quite different from that pursued by the Liberals. The conflict between the National Peasants and the Liberals was not merely a struggle for office and a place at the feeding trough, although it is not difficult to cite instances where *mirosul fripturei* ("the fragrance of the roast joint") played an important part.

Two questions, however, must be answered. Was it a peasant program? Was it adequate to the economic needs of Rumania, and in particular did it provide a solution to the agrarian question?

From the preceding discussion of the development of the party's ideology, its modifications of program, and its actual policy there can be little doubt that the National Peasant government was not very "peasantist" either in its composition or in its activities. That is not to say that the National Peasants lacked an agrarian program or that they were indifferent to the peasant; certainly the party regarded itself as the spokesman of the peasantry. But in the course of the party's evolution, from its inception after the war to its arrival in power, a significant change had taken place. Perhaps it was mostly a change in emphasis. Initially as was so well shown in Mihalache's speeches, which are more representative than Stere's more sophisticated arguments, stress was upon the peasant and upon the measures which should be taken to improve his condition. When the party came to power, the chief concern was for greater political democracy and more economic liberty, from which the peasant was to benefit. To some extent this shift showed the influence of the Transylvanians with their middle-class and professional interests, but the Peasant party itself had gone a long way in this direction. Moreover, this change was quite natural, given the passage of time and the subsiding of social ferment. But if such a change was natural, it was also dangerous: in Rumania, if the peasant did not command first attention it was too easy for him not to be taken into consideration at all.

The most important reason for this change, and it has been a fatal defect of most peasant parties, is that a purely peasant movement

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 is almost impossible to sustain both because of the nature of its support and the limitations of its program. Because of their relative physical isolation and simple, often primitive, way of life, the peasants are exceptionally difficult to organize politically. A peasantist philosophy has proved to be uncertain and ambiguous in its aims; it can provide mood and feeling, and is a natural inspiration to poster art, but it becomes confused on the more practical level and for a very fundamental reason. Those elements which are celebrated in the peasant—the primordial qualities, the roots planted deep in the earth—represent everything which the modern world is not. In so far as the peasant is defined in these terms, he provides no clue to the solution of the manifold problems confronting contemporary society.

Therefore one can either reject the peasant outright as an essentially neutral or negative factor, as was the tendency among the Liberals and the Social Democrats,[67] or attempt to broaden the peasant concept by adding, often quite eclectically, other principles. This, in fact, has happened to most peasant movements in practice. Various types of alliances can be made, sometimes with conservatism [68] or with socialism.[69] The actual course which the Rumanian peasant movement took was to absorb Western political and parliamentary democracy together with some of the forms of liberal capitalism—the "trust-busting" capitalism, which believes in free enterprise but favors state intervention to prevent the formation of trusts and monopolies. By this means the peasantry, comprising the greatest numbers of citizens, became identified with the majority will of political democracy, and the economic welfare of the peasant with the belief in economic advance through the free competition of an idealized capitalism.

Apart from internal reasons, such as the conflict with the Liberal

67. Thus, the super-Liberal Zeletin said: "The peasant is the very personification of the principle of inertia: he wishes to be just as his ancestors were. For him tradition is sacred. . . . Capitalism raises itself on the ruins of the agrarian classes, peasants and boyars." *Neoliberalismul*, pp. 16, 20. The Social Democrat Ilie Moscovici concluded that the peasant "cannot be a factor of progress as producer, cannot give new methods of production, cannot enrich society. The peasantry has no immediate interest in changing social forms; by its individual property, its isolated work, its narrow horizon, it forms a conservative element, almost the most conservative in contemporary society." "Lupta de clasă şi transformarea socială," *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, p. 302.

68. C. Rădulescu-Motru thought there was a natural alliance between the peasantry and the enlightened conservatives. He sought to develop this idea in his study, *Ţărănismul, un suflet şi o politică*.

69. In Rumania this effort took two forms: an internal alliance with the socialists, if the latter would drop their doctrinaire attitude toward the peasantry; or externally, seeing in the Western proletariat an ally in the common struggle against the domination of Western industrial capitalism.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

party, certain external circumstances help to explain this particular 665
development. In the years immediately after the First World War Germany was in eclipse, the Soviet Union was in the midst of a social experiment of which none of the Peasant leaders wanted any part, and the Western powers, particularly Great Britain and the United States, were clearly the dominant states. As a result one finds among the writings of the National Peasants a rather curious Anglo-Saxon overlay, both in political and economic affairs.

The National Peasants are not necessarily to be reproached for having thus donned a somewhat eclectic garment; the narrowness of pure peasantism rendered some such addition necessary, especially when the party came into office. But it may be doubted whether in fact this combination was able to help the peasantry. In the first place, one of the most profound evils in Rumanian society has been the abyss between the peasant and the governing and urban classes. Although Rumania was not a caste-bound society, but had a constant if not very voluminous movement up from the peasantry, the transition—symbolized by discarding the *opinci* (peasant footwear) for shoes and acquiring a knowledge of French—was very sharp, and the persons who had crossed the line were all too tempted to escape as far as possible from their peasant origins. Under these conditions the Peasant party's absorption of nonpeasant principles was the beginning of its actual alienation from the peasantry. Indeed, in the 1930's and 1940's the National Peasants, as a party, became increasingly removed from their rural origins.[70]

In the second place, it is doubtful whether free competition is unqualifiedly beneficial in Rumania's case. Internally, the policy of "natural selection" among the peasants had as its aim the creation of a prosperous middle peasantry. The drawbacks of this policy in a country of small holdings under 3 hectares with an increasing pressure of population have already been discussed. It might of course be maintained that such a process of selection—whatever its hardships on the submarginal cultivators—was a necessary step to creating a sound peasant economy. But for political if not for other reasons this created a serious contradiction between the National Peasant party's role as standard-bearer of the peasantry and the actual effects of

70. The National Peasants whom I met in 1944, in Bucarest or at their country estates, could hardly have been called representatives of the peasantry. Many of them were democrats politically (though some were not) but one had the feeling that they regarded the "good peasants" as something essentially *other*. They were mostly middle-class lawyers, doctors, engineers, and business men who regarded Mihalache's continued use of peasant clothes with gentle amusement as rather quaint.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 such a policy upon a large percentage of the peasants.[71] Externally, the approach toward freer trade and the abandoning of industries unless they were capable of "natural" development (though Madgearu was not against protection of infant industries) had certain shortcomings. Recent economic analysis, admittedly still under debate, has considerably modified the definition of the natural development of industry through the idea of "social marginal net profit" and "external economies."[72] It has also raised doubts whether a small backward state should regard classical free trade as an ideal policy. Aside from the theoretical aspects of the question, it is obvious that the success of such a policy is dependent upon a congenial atmosphere in the realm of international trade and finance.

It was the unhappy fate of the National Peasants to have based their policy upon a world situation which was just on the brink of collapsing in the great depression and which, to date, shows little sign of returning to those conditions upon which their foreign commercial policy was founded.[73] Of course, the National Peasants can hardly be blamed for not foreseeing the consequences of the world collapse. Nevertheless the fact that they had thus committed themselves to a pattern which was to be shaken to the ground had fatal consequences for their internal position. They had abandoned the narrowness of the original radical peasantism of 1920–22 for a more promising set of ideas, and when these collapsed their economic program was bankrupt.

Similarly, in the political field they had rested their hopes upon political democracy—again by a somewhat too formal acceptance of Western principles. When Carol and the rising antiparliamentary movements began to come into action in 1930 and 1931, they were defenseless. In 1928 the National Peasants won much praise for the orderly behavior of their mass demonstration at Alba Iulia and their official disavowal of the one column of peasants which had half-heartedly started a march to Bucarest. This very spirit, which was

71. The Communists, of course, have seen in this contradiction a betrayal of the peasantry by a party which had come to represent the lower middle class and the wealthy peasants. Admitting the contradiction, this charge can be judged only in connection with the success of the Communists' efforts at a solution. See below, pp. 325–327.

72. Cf. P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe," *The Economic Journal, 53* (1943), 202–211, and a criticism by Yuan-Li Wu, "A Note on the Post-War Industrialization of 'Backward' Countries and Centralist Planning," *Economica, 12*, New Ser. (1945), 172–178.

73. In 1930 Madgearu said: "A new economic ideology was spreading over Europe—the spirit of international economic co-operation, which asserted itself so impressively at the Geneva Economic Conference in May 1927. Rumania understood the spirit of Geneva . . . " *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 39.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665

essential to their constitutional and legal principles, helped to cause their subsequent downfall. In abandoning, perhaps inevitably, the strong peasant fervor in favor of majority parliamentary support they failed to preserve their ultimate point of support.

The combination of their political and economic principles, which clearly had a mutual effect upon one another, thus led to their overthrow under the impact of the depression and in the particular circumstances of Maniu's quarrel with King Carol.

In comparing the Liberals and National Peasants, in many ways antithetical, one is struck by a curious parallel between them. Both were somehow out of phase with world developments. The Liberals embarked on a policy of economic nationalism and semiautarky during just the years Europe was making a last if unsuccessful effort to restore the old economic order. The National Peasants, when they came into office, attempted to reverse Rumanian policy at just the time when the European economy was moving into a new stage of economic nationalism. Both parties fell into contradictions arising from their Western preoccupations and the realities of the Rumanian situation. The Liberals in attempting to copy Western capitalism ceased to be "liberal" in the process; the Peasants in attempting to copy parliamentary democracy ceased to be "peasants." The Peasants' economic policy bore a far greater resemblance to traditional liberalism than did that of the Liberals, whereas the Liberals' economic policy—at least in its restrictions and hostility to Western capital—had points in common with the initial attitude of the Peasants.

The following decade was to witness an attempt to overcome these contradictions by carrying certain of the implications to an extreme degree. The Liberals' economic policy, if it was to be realized, implied a move toward corporatism and more state control: this was to be the line followed by the neoliberalism of the Carolist period. On the other hand, the failure of the National Peasants to safeguard the peasant was the cause, in part at least, of the upsurge of the Iron Guard. In both cases the parliamentary pattern was dropped.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

page 170

VIII

THE CAROLIST PERIOD: DEPRESSION, 1930–33

175 ALTHOUGH the ten years between 1930 and 1940 were increasingly dominated by the figure of King Carol, and in that sense may be considered as a unit, three more or less distinct phases are observable: a period of confusion and transition from 1930 through 1933, a period of uneasy stability from 1934 to 1937, and a period of crisis from 1938 to 1940. These phases resulted from a complicated intermingling of economic, political, and international circumstances.

[145] On the international level the decade witnessed the return of the most decisive of all factors in Rumanian history: the impact of great power interests, which had been relatively in abeyance during the first years after 1918 with the collapse of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires. As has been seen above, Rumania has been fated throughout its history either to be within the orbit of a great power or caught in a conflict between two or more great powers. Its independence in the nineteenth century had been achieved through a temporary equilibrium of these foreign forces, and the creation of Greater Rumania was possible only because of the power vacuum in eastern Europe. The 1930's saw the revival of Soviet Russia and the hectic ascendency of the Third Reich. The predominance of German influence in the late 1930's and the special turn of events given by the German-Soviet pact of 1939 were of decisive importance in determining the course of Rumanian history.

Internal politics advanced in three stages: a time of political uncertainty accompanied by rapid changes in the government, the breakdown of the older parties, and the burgeoning of new movements; a period of apparent stability during the four years of the Tătărescu administration from the end of 1933 to the end of 1937; a period of royal dictatorship which began with Carol's dissolution of all political parties in 1938 and ended with his abdication and flight after the territorial losses of 1940.

178 Economically, the picture was one of continuous slump until 1934, and then a slow rally accelerating until the outbreak of war in 1939. Industry was the chief gainer; agriculture barely recovered from the losses of the depression. Economic policy underwent a tremendous

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

change, in Rumania as elsewhere, from a paralyzed economic liberalism to increasing controls in commercial, financial, and industrial activity. 178

King Carol's own role in all these developments is rather elusive. 661 In the intricate game of political maneuvering his shrewdness is seen in the fact that starting from a weak position he not only established himself but drove all other political groups into the wilderness or prison. But for all his adept political manipulations and his flamboyant propaganda there is something unsubstantial about his reign, and nothing seems less real than his dictatorship. While he was not, as king, the frothy playboy the international press had depicted, he did not, either in his ideas or actions, show himself to be a statesman of any magnitude. He had a strong bent for personal rule, to which he attached some rather inconsequential corporatist clichés and an exaltation of the "younger generation." He seems to have had no coherent set of economic ideas beyond a romantic notion of himself as the first peasant, the first laborer, and the first public servant of his realm. The real economic direction came not from Carol but from the increasingly powerful industrialists who came to the fore in the years after the depression.

Survey of Political Events

Between Maniu's resignation in October and the accession of the Liberals in November, 1933, Rumanian political and economic life was more than usually bewildering and confused. The depression was undoubtedly largely responsible for the feeling of panic and uncertainty apparent in the governments of these years. At the same time, the political events were not wholly a reflex of the immediate economic influence but had a certain logic of their own. Rumania's quasi-parliamentary party system was beginning to crumble, extraparliamentary groups were moving into the foreground, and Carol made his first if not successful effort to reorganize political life according to his own lights. These developments proceeded from sources deeper than the depression, though they were intensified by it; they were a part of that profound social crisis which has stricken most of the world in the last thirty years. 175

The National Peasant cabinet, reconstituted under Mironescu after Maniu's resignation, had a brief and unhappy career. Mironescu was an altogether colorless figure; the government during his term in office was halting and hesitant in its actions, and showed none of the enthusiasm of 1929. Carol was known to feel that the old parties—

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

195 and it is illustrative of the nature of Rumanian politics that the National Peasant party had by this time already become an "old" party —had outlived the impulses which had created them. He desired a rearrangement of the political mosaic to give due place to "younger" elements and believed that this required the installation of a disinterested government of "personalities." Besides the knowledge that Carol was counting their days, the National Peasants saw their once impressive popularity draining away, through the depression and their manifest failure to bring about the new Jerusalem.

In by-elections of January, 1931, the government lost a number of seats, and perhaps the only safe conclusion one can draw from Rumanian elections is that the loss of government-held seats means an undeniable fall in public confidence. The customary flurry of rumors presaged the government's overthrow, and indeed its negotiations for a second foreign loan were the condition for its remaining in power, as had been the case with Vintilă Brătianu's government three years [648] before. On March 10 the loan agreement was signed in Paris, and on April 4 Mironescu resigned. Rumania's outstanding diplomat, Titulescu, was recalled from London—a standard procedure during the cabinet crises of these years—to form a coalition government. Both the National Peasants and the Liberals accepted on certain conditions but Iorga, significantly, voted against it and demanded a cabinet of personalities.

On April 18 Carol called upon Iorga, who, with Argetoianu as his capable hatchet man, formed a cabinet of at least some of the talents. Iorga, announcing his program to be hard work and economy, summoned and immediately dismissed the National Peasant chamber. New elections were held, but even with Argetoianu doing his efficient best at the Ministry of the Interior and with an electoral pact with the Liberals, the government bloc of National Union obtained only 48 per cent of votes. The National Peasants of course were forced down to 15 per cent, and Maniu announced his retirement from politics. The Communists' Workers and Peasant Union won five seats, their first representation in the chamber. Incidentally, none of their members was returned from Bessarabia, reputedly the seat of Rumanian communism; all five were from the industrial centers of Transylvania, the Banat, and Bucovina.

Carol's guiding hand is evident in the creation of the Iorga-Argetoianu government, and after its formation he announced his 159 intentions to preside over cabinet meetings once a week. Nicolae Iorga, the internationally known and incredibly voluminous historian, had never commanded any following beyond a coterie of ad-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

mirers. His individualism, or perhaps his vanity, had made him an 159
uncertain political ally, and he took to himself the role of mentor and guardian of the Rumanian national consciousness. His efforts in politics, however, were far less impressive than his output as a historian.[1]

The government's term in office was not edifying.[2] As the economic 175
situation deteriorated, the complete absence of any organized political support made itself felt when all the other parties began a violent press campaign; the Liberals belabored Argetoianu's financial policy as one of bankruptcy; the Transylvanian press threatened a demand for autonomy; the aging Marshal Averescu, bitterly disappointed by Carol's failure to select him as man of the hour, assailed both the government and the king. A crisis rose between Carol and the government over the salaries of state officials. The government, faced by a bad deficit and the failure to obtain an additional loan from France, was attempting to reduce official salaries. Carol opposed this and forced Iorga's resignation on June 6, 1932.

After an unsuccessful effort by Titulescu, the National Peasants, 665
under Vaida Voevod, were recalled for their second term of office. In 175
the elections of July they obtained only 45 per cent of the votes, a great decline from their 80 per cent of 1928, but sufficient to give them the premium. The Iron Guard and other fascist groups showed gains and won some additional seats, primarily in Bessarabia, the region of deepest discontent. An effort was made to bring Maniu out of retirement; he did resume leadership of the party but was unable to reach an understanding with Carol.

The program of the new National Peasant government was along the same lines as its predecessors and included the reintroduction of the administrative decentralization law, which had been revoked by the Iorga government; a modification of the electoral law, which all parties promised to change but which they somehow did not get around to when in power; and a reduction of taxes and expenditures. The party had an initial success in obtaining a Swiss loan of 50 million francs for the payment of back salaries of state officials. In October, however, Vaida Voevod resigned after a disagreement with the influential Titulescu on the question of Rumanian-Soviet nego-

1. For a recent tribute to Iorga, who was assassinated by the Iron Guard in 1940, see John Campbell, "Nicholas Iorga," *The Slavonic and East European Review*, 26, No. 66 (November, 1947), 44–59.

2. For a particularly jaundiced account of the Iorga-Argetoianu administration see G. C. Logio, *Rumania*, pp. 39–52. Logio, as a foreign business man, was especially bitter on the subject of Rumanian business ethics and heartily disliked Carol, "who promulgates rascally laws defrauding the unwary foreign investor and trader."

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 175 tiations,[3] and was replaced by Maniu, with Titulescu as Foreign Minister. On January 8, 1933, Maniu again broke with Carol, and on January 14 Vaida Voevod returned to head the government.[4]

By this time the National Peasants were badly disorganized. With Carol's assistance a definite split in the party leadership between Maniu and Vaida Voevod was developing and was to lead to a rupture in 1934. The government itself had not only lost its peasant enthusiasm but under Vaida Voevod's leadership was rapidly drifting into the political habits of the Liberals. On the first of February 648 oil workers at Ploeşti struck over a wage decision, and a fight en- 665 sued between strikers and troops. At the same time in Bucarest some 175 7,000 workers in the state railway shops went on strike. The government hastily proclaimed martial law in Bucarest, Cernăuţi, Galaţi, Iaşi, Timişoara, Ploeşti, and the oil fields. The Communist party and its affiliates were again dissolved, the government passed laws against antisocial and antistate organizations, and over 200 Communists were arrested throughout Rumania. This brought a protest demonstration from the railway workers, troops were called out, and there was a vicious street fight.

To some extent this tension was a fatal by-product of the deepening depression, and the strikes, while obviously having their roots in the misery of the Rumanian industrial workers, were not confined solely to economic demands. Indeed, since the installation of the Groza regime, the Communists have played up the revolutionary elements of the railway strike and the guiding role of the Communist party in it. Even so, the government all too hastily resorted to the 175 very measures for which it had so long taken the Liberals to task. 665

Moreover, while Vaida Voevod was thus combating labor unrest,

[648] 3. Rumania and Soviet Russia had not resumed diplomatic relations since the First World War because of their inability to reach any agreement on Bessarabia. In January, 1932, the Poles, with French urging, had signed a treaty of friendship and nonaggression with the U.S.S.R. Now Poland and France were pressing Rumania to do the same. Vaida Voevod, apparently without consulting Titulescu, had instructed the Rumanian representative in Warsaw to negotiate with Litvinov. Titulescu had heard of his move and had objected to the manner in which the negotiations were being conducted and especially to the possibility that Bessarabia might be recognized as a subject of dispute. In this disagreement Titulescu was sufficiently influential to squeeze out Vaida Voevod.

4. In this instance the specific difficulty arose over the dismissal of Colonel Marinescu, Prefect of Bucarest. Carol had been installing military officers in a number of civil posts. The National Peasant government undertook to replace them by civilians. Colonel Marinescu, in a circular letter, denied rumors that he was about to be removed and said that since he was appointed by the king, only the king could remove him. Mihalache, Minister of the Interior, then demanded his resignation, and failing to obtain it resigned himself. Maniu supported Mihalache and the cabinet resigned.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

 175 665

he was on good terms with the up-and-coming Iron Guard. Indeed, a year later he said, under oath, that as early as 1929, when he had been Minister of the Interior, he had been in touch with the Iron Guardists for the purpose of directing their youthful enthusiasm toward less extreme ends and "of drawing the attention of the organization to the necessity of combating Communism."[5] In 1934 Vaida Voevod, after failing to get the National Peasants to accept his "numerus Valachicus"—a device to oust non-Rumanian minorities, especially the Hungarians, from posts in the government and in "nationally important enterprises"—abandoned the party and formed his own hypernationalist, semifascist political group.[6]

In November, 1933, the Vaida government resigned, partly at least because of the king's dissatisfaction with its handling of the increasing fascist activity and its failure to prevent attacks directed against himself, Mme Lupescu, and his entourage.[7] After five years out of power the old Liberals, under Duca, came into office on November 14. Duca, who, like Vaida Voevod, stated that he had tried to "channelize" the energies of the Iron Guard, undertook to dissolve the movement on the eve of the new elections. On December 29 he was assassinated by three Iron Guardists at the Sinaia railway station. After several days' confusion, Gheorghe Tătărescu became head of the Liberal cabinet which was to remain in office until November, 1937. 175

During these three years of hectic political changes, five main developments are observable:

1) The growing influence of the king. While Carol was unsuccessful in establishing a government of personalities, he was making rapid progress in unraveling the old political fabric and undermining and splitting the leadership of the major parties. He was also increasing his extraparliamentary influence through his camerilla and through his appointees in administrative posts.

2) The increasing paralysis and confusion of the National Peasants. As has been seen already, their decline was more or less implicit in the situation as of 1930, and during the following years the

5. *Patria*, March 31, 1934, quoted in Pătrăşcanu, *Sous trois dictatures*, p. 76.

6. See C. A. Macartney's account of a conversation with Vaida Voevod on the "numerus Valachicus," *Hungary and Her Successors*, p. 326.

7. Although internally Rumanian politics were moving to the Right, the Vaida government did, in July, sign the London Convention defining aggression, to which the U.S.S.R. was also a signatory. This step, which marked a slight improvement in Rumanian-Soviet relations, was a part of the realignment of forces after the rise of Hitler.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 leadership divided, many of the party's most capable men deserted, the party's popularity declined, and an increasing number of peasant supporters were attracted to the Iron Guard.

3) An apparent recovery of the Liberals. The Liberal party had been badly hit by their defeat in 1928 and the schism between Vintilă Brătianu and Gheorghe Brătianu, occasioned by Carol's return. With Vintilă Brătianu's death in 1930 the way was cleared for a gradual reconciliation with the king. The Young Liberals (Gheorghe Brătianu) failed to make any significant headway, and under Duca the old Liberals seemed to be heading for a comeback.

4) The flowering of fascism. The meteoric rise of the Iron Guard was the most spectacular event of those years, and trailing in its wake were a number of less fiery fascist, semifascist and anti-Semitic formations of unequal importance. In the party system they served to replace the older coteries, such as Iorga's and Averescu's parties, which were fading from the scene, but in fact they heralded the collapse of parliamentary government.

5) The total impotence of the Left-wing labor movements. They had never been strong in Rumania, but during these three years they were driven from the offensive, however weak, to the defensive. Popular discontent did not, after 1933, swell the ranks of the labor movements but strengthened the Iron Guard.

The Struggle against the Depression

434 439 During these years the economic situation steadily deteriorated. It was estimated that the nominal national income in lei dropped by about 45 per cent between 1929 and 1932.[8] While Rumania was able to maintain a positive balance of trade throughout the depression, the value of exports fell from 29 billion lei in 1929 to 14 billion in 1933 and 1934, even though the weight of exports increased from 7,000,000 metric tons to 8,000,000. Imports fell from 1,102,000 metric tons in 1929 to 467,000 in 1933 (450,000 in 1932). State revenues declined from 36 billion lei in 1929 to 18 billion in 1933.

439 The depression in Rumania had been initiated by the world agricultural crisis in 1929, which produced a tremendous fall in the price of agricultural products, particularly disastrous in the Balkan states because of their inability to compete with the great overseas producers. As industrial commodities fell neither so soon nor so far the resulting price scissors hurt the peasant as agricultural producer

8. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *South-Eastern Europe* (Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 127.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

and Rumania as agricultural exporter. The average price per metric ton of Rumanian exports fell in 1934 by 62 per cent of its 1922–30 average, whereas the price of imports fell by only 33 per cent in 1936. Internally agricultural prices dropped to 44 per cent of the 1929 level, industrial prices to 62 per cent.[9] The situation was further aggravated by the inauguration at this time of an agrarian protectionist policy by the European industrial states. After 1928 Germany introduced high agricultural tariffs; Italian grain and flour duties reached prohibitive levels between 1929 and 1931; France imposed heavy tariffs on cereals.

In May, 1931, the failure of the Austrian Kredit-Anstalt unleashed the financial crisis which swept across Europe and ended the flow of foreign capital to Rumania. Inevitably, the fall in grain prices, the disappearance of foreign markets for agricultural produce, and the stoppage of foreign credit had a disastrous effect upon the Rumanian economy. State finances, never on a very steady foundation, and having just been reorganized in 1929, were hit by the decline in revenues (direct taxes dropped from 8.6 billion lei in 1930 to 3.4 in 1933), and there was a budget deficit each year between 1930 and 1934.[10]

One peculiarity should be observed in the Rumanian depression. In several respects Rumania was in a better position than the other Balkan states. Because of a series of good harvests in 1929, 1930, and 1931, and because of petroleum exports, it was able to maintain a considerably better balance of trade. Moreover, because of the acquisition of a good deal of foreign capital in the loans of 1929

9. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei romînești*, p. 80, and *Breviaire Statistique de la Roumanie* (Bucarest, 1940), p. 226:

	Wholesale agricultural prices	*Industrial prices*	*Prices of industrial products required by agriculture*
1929	100	100	100
1930	68.2	92.9	98
1931	50.9	72.0	86.6
1932	47.7	62.2	80.9
1933	44.9	62.2	81.1
1934	44.1	63.4	82.6
1935	48.4	75.2	90.2

10. As a matter of fact, a budgetary deficit in Rumania is a very relative term; many of the so-called budget surpluses of the 1920's were quite fictitious. See Ludovic Iavorschi, *L'Equilibre budgetaire en Roumanie de 1920 à 1932* (Paris, 1933). I doubt if the budget deficits can in any way be regarded as a planned attempt to counter the depression, since all the governments promised balanced budgets and the deficit appeared as the result of altogether undirected and uncontrolled expenditures through a number of channels.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

439 and 1931, Rumania was somewhat less pressed financially than the
656 other states, and was indeed the last of the Balkan countries to introduce foreign exchange controls and to declare a partial moratorium on foreign debts.[11]

652 Nevertheless, Rumania was the slowest to show signs of recovery, an indication that something in addition to the general causes for the depression was having an effect. Such was the opinion of the French foreign advisers to the Rumanian National Bank, MM. Rist and Auboin. According to Auboin, in his report of 1935, a distinction should be drawn between the causes of disequilibrium arising from the world crisis and those proper to Rumania itself. In his opinion the first were predominant between 1929 and 1932 in the fall in prices and the disruption of international credit. But local causes became manifest, especially after 1932, despite a certain easing of international conditions. The two principal evils, in his view, were the weaknesses in the whole Rumanian credit system and the unstable budget position, both of which had afflicted Rumania since the First World War. As a financial adviser he was particularly indignant that the Rumanian government should try to enjoy all the benefits and amenities of a modern state through its expenditures but should still rely upon primitive means of organizing state finances: "It is necessary to adopt and apply not merely the methods of expenditure but also the methods of receipt of modern states."[12]

The fall in prices and the reduction of credit presented the Rumanian peasant with a serious debt load which he was in no position to discharge. The advocates of small peasant agriculture have contended that one of the principal advantages of this form of cultivation was the peasant's resistance to crises through his ability to cut expenses, reduce his relations to the market, and live on his own. It is true that debts contracted for agricultural investment were quite small in Rumania as compared with other European states.[13] Never-

11. Rumania introduced exchange controls on February 27, 1932; Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Austria, Bulgaria, and Greece had introduced them between August and October, 1931. Rumania declared a partial moratorium in January, 1933; Greece, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia had done so in 1932.

12. Roger Auboin, *Rapport annuel sur la situation financière et monétaire de la Roumanie* (Bucarest, 1935), p. 36. Auboin was primarily concerned with Rumania's ability to honor its foreign obligations, and hence stressed the need of tightening state finances and creating a sound budget, perhaps at the expense of local requirements. Nevertheless, his, and Rist's, reports are devastating in their picture of the irresponsibility of Rumanian financial administration, its slovenliness, and tendency to make increasingly complex and meaningless regulations.

13. Comparative figures in the International Institute of Agriculture's *Farm Accountancy Statistics for 1928–29* (Rome, 1932), show very little investment and very little debt for Rumanian farms as contrasted with those of other European states. These

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

theless the peasant did have a burden arising from purchases of land652 after the agrarian reform or from debts incurred for consumption, and it is necessary to emphasize that the size of the greater number of peasant holdings put their owners on the margin of subsistence. These debts had been contracted during years of rising prices and at a high rate of interest. When the depression came the debts, in many cases not used for productive purposes but merely to keep the peasant going, quite exceeded his capacity to pay. Thus, in 1931, the average indebtedness per hectare, in an investigation of 60,000 farms, was computed at 3,218 lei. Since for an indebtedness of 3,500 lei per hectare the interest averaged 700 lei per hectare, and the average gross income was 2,000 lei per hectare, 35 per cent of the gross income was absorbed by interest on debts.[14]

The figures for 1932 were even bleaker. In that year the number of debtors owning less than 10 hectares who applied for debt relief was 2,474,781 or 64 per cent of all small proprietors.[15] The total land owned by those peasants amounted to 5,696,000 hectares, or 60 per cent of the total of small properties. The total debt was 37.4 billion lei, 15,000 lei per debtor, or 6,585 lei per hectare. It may be concluded that the smaller peasants were the more involved in debt since by these figures the average size of properties under 10 hectares was 2.5 hectares, whereas the average size of the debtors' properties was 2.3 hectares. Of this debt 24.21 per cent was owed to popular banks and cooperatives, 43.58 per cent to private banks, 31.42 to private individuals, and 0.79 to other institutions. A League of Nations inquiry into agricultural credit in central and eastern Europe, made at about this time, found that in Rumania banks of agricultural credit charged 9–13 per cent; private banks 12–15 per cent plus a quarterly commission of 1–3 per cent; and private lenders from 12 to 22 per cent and even up to 30 per cent.[16]

---

figures mean nothing statistically, however, as they cover only 63 Rumanian farms having an average area of 30 hectares; 30 of them are forest-farming combinations with an average area of 50 hectares. This point is worth mentioning only because Frederick Hertz, in his study, *The Economic Problems of the Danubian States* (London, 1947), p. 111, takes these figures as representative and expresses his surprise that in the depression the Rumanian peasant should have been regarded as debt-ridden.

14. Nicolae Cornăţeanu, "Effects of the Agricultural Crisis on Peasant Farms in Rumania," *International Review of Agriculture, 22,* No. 7 (Rome, 1931), 211E. In 1928 the gross income had been 6,000–7,000 lei, which would make the interest charge only 10–11 per cent.

15. G. Costanzo, "Credit Conditions and the Indebtedness of Agriculture in Central and Eastern Europe," *International Review of Agriculture, 24* (1933), 238E; Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

16. International Labor Organisation, *Industrial and Labor Information, 41,* No. 1 (January 4, 1932), 22.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

652 In addition to the debts of small farmers, 15 billion lei were owed by debtors owning over 10 hectares (who had applied for debt relief in 1932), making a total of 52.4 billion lei of agricultural debts.[17] Some 17,000 middle and large proprietors contrived to run up a debt 40 per cent as large as that of 2½ million peasants. The size of the debt apparently increased with the size of the property: 524 debtors (those owing 5,000,000 lei or more), with average properties of 200 hectares, owed over 40 per cent of the total debt of proprietors of over 10 hectares. Moreover, the average size of property of debtors owning more than 10 hectares was 53 hectares, whereas the average size of all properties over 10 hectares (according to Ministry of Finance figures which appear to be those used) was only 30 hectares.

It would thus seem that the weight of the debt load fell upon the extremely small and the large properties, whereas the middle peasantry was less affected. That is, the peasant owning about 10 hectares was in a relatively good position to weather the crisis, a fact of only limited relevance, however, to Rumania. The figures also show that Rumania's agricultural debt was of two essentially different types: debts of the small peasants who were unable to create or maintain a self-subsistent holding in the ten years after the agrarian reforms, and the debts of the larger properties, which were probably suffering directly from the fall in world grain prices which hit them as exporters.

As the finances of the state were badly weakened by the depression, its power of direct assistance to agriculture was limited. Since the peasants' plight was a result of their debts and low prices, the obvious tasks of the government in Rumania and elsewhere in the Balkans were to support the price of grain, to try to obtain more favorable export conditions, and to provide for a conversion or moratorium of agricultural debts. These remedies did not represent any particular program but were rather specific measures passed under an increasingly severe situation with growing indications of peasant unrest.

By the time of Maniu's resignation in October, 1930, the agricultural crisis had become acute and there was growing agitation for a reduction of debts. Three prominent economists, Madgearu, Manoilescu, and Argetoianu, each published a plan for a readjustment of agricultural indebtedness; in each plan the state was to assume responsibility for part of the burden. Nothing was done at this time,

17. Constanzo, *op. cit.*, p. 288E, taken from the Rumanian Ministry of Justice, *Conversiunea datorilor agricole* (Bucarest, 1932).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

partly because the plans required large sums of liquid capital, which 652 was not on hand.

The Mironescu National Peasant government attempted to improve the situation from the credit side. It undertook negotiations in Paris for an agricultural loan to provide for the establishment of an agricultural mortgage bank, a long-cherished aim of the National Peasants who hoped to facilitate thereby the transfer of agricultural debts into long-term obligations less onerous as to time of payment and rate of interest. Eventually agreement was reached on a second development loan, modeled after that of 1929, of 1.3 billion francs, of which 200 million was to go to the creation of the Agricultural Mortgage Institute and the remainder for railway, roads, and Treasury working capital. The loan met with much local criticism; there was general resentment at the continuation of foreign financial supervision which it entailed; the director of the National Bank fought the loan so stubbornly that the government was obliged to dismiss him; Titulescu and Argetoianu opposed the whole idea of borrowing foreign capital for a land bank at a time when such an institute could be only a palliative for the agricultural crisis. Indeed, the *Credit Agricol Ipoteca* was formed on the eve of the credit crisis which hit Europe in 1931.

In a final flurry of legislation, just before its fall, the Mironescu [656] government passed two other measures designed to improve agricultural credit: a law to keep down the interest rate of agricultural credit institutions and a law against usury, prohibiting exaggerated rates of interest by private lenders. These laws, which were in the spirit of the National Peasant program, were altogether inadequate. The credit problem in Rumania was not to be solved by attempting to prohibit what was a secondary symptom. Like much Rumanian legislation, they were an effort to improve the weather by adjusting the dial on the barometer. Furthermore, they did not touch the question of the existing agricultural debt load which was becoming unsupportable.

In December, 1931, the chamber, with all major parties concurring, voted a moratorium for agricultural debts. From 1932 to 1934 appeared a series of laws for the relief of agricultural indebtedness. These laws, passed by successive governments in turn, were in part political measures and in part concessions progressively extorted by the deepening depression. As at the time of the land reforms of 1917–21, political competition plus popular pressure forced the parties toward more and more extensive measures. No party dared

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

652 come out against debt relief when the more radical groups, including the irrepressible Dr. Lupu, were demanding a complete moratorium or a cancellation of debts. But if the necessity of relief was admitted, the methods were by no means agreed upon. Banks opposed debt cancellation as ruinous to future credit and as throwing a heavy burden on them. The state proposed relieving the banks of their losses, but this in turn evoked protests from foreign creditors who maintained that increasing the state's indebtedness contravened the loan agreements. The simple fact, of course, was that there was no solution that would hurt no one; against the damage to the credit structure had to be set the obvious inability of the peasant to pay his debts and the certain social dangers of undertaking foreclosures.

671 In April, 1932, the Iorga government passed a law by which debts of all properties under 10 hectares were reduced by half, the remainder to be paid over a period of thirty years at 4 per cent interest. Debts of properties over 10 hectares were to be diminished by the reduction of accumulated interest or by special legal procedure, if 60 per cent of the borrowed capital had been used for agricultural purposes. Although in 1930 Iorga had stated his opposition to assuming charge of the debts of the larger landowners,[18] the law framed by his government was immediately abused by the big owners, who employed it to slough off debts acquired, as it was said, on the green cloth rather than on the green fields.[19] The law also had the effect of increasing the demands of urban and other nonagricultural debtors.

652 In October, 1932, the Vaida Voevod government suspended this conversion law and introduced a system of moratoria. To prevent 671 misuse the debtor had to prove that agriculture provided 60 per cent of his total income, that the money borrowed had been for agricultural purposes, and that the debt did not exceed 20,000 lei per hectare of arable land.

This measure, which was largely a delaying action, was supplemented by the law of April, 1933, which abrogated the act of 1932 and granted a five-year moratorium with a 1 per cent interest charge. If the creditor offered a 50 per cent reduction of the debt the moratorium ceased to apply. In this case the remaining 50 per cent was to be paid off in half-yearly installments. Holdings between 10 and

18. *Adeverul*, September 9, 1930, cited in G. C. Logio, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

19. According to Logio, *ibid.*, pp. 170–171, the larger landowners were the most insistent that agricultural debts should be converted and were intended to be the principal beneficiaries. In his opinion the controls exerted over the peasants who took advantage of the law—the prohibition of mortgages and the direction of cultivation—would further undermine their position.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

50 hectares were also granted a five-year moratorium, with the possibility of the creditor offering a 33 per cent reduction in the debt. Holdings of over 50 hectares were granted a six-month moratorium and a possible reduction of 25 per cent of the debt. The debtor, if he wished, was permitted to abandon his holding, retaining one-fifth of it for himself, the remainder to go to meet his debts. The law was an improvement over its predecessor in scaling the provisions in accordance with the size of the holding.

A year later, in April, 1934, the Liberal government passed a new law whereby all agricultural debts without respect to size of property were reduced by 50 per cent, the residue to be paid in 34 half-yearly installments at 3 per cent interest. For payments in advance debtors were to receive a 6 per cent annual reduction on their debts. Debts paid off within two years were to benefit from a 70 per cent reduction of the total, those paid off in five years gained a 60 per cent reduction. While the creditor had a theoretical right to refuse conversion he was obliged to make a formal declaration of the fact and to accept a ten-year moratorium which could be prolonged for an additional five years. This law was more sweeping than its predecessors, especially in its pressure on the creditor, and it did provide the peasant with an incentive for a quick liquidation of his debt.

These laws, for all the political bickering which accompanied them, were a necessary consequence of the crisis and progressively extended the scope of conversion. They were negative measures, however; while they eased the peasants' debt load they in no way improved his basic situation or remedied the condition which had led to his plunging so hopelessly into debt.[20]

Besides reducing peasant debts, the governments of the depression years tried to maintain the price of grain and to secure favorable export markets. As with the other acts of those years, their efforts were hesitant and often inconsistent. During its period in office the Mironescu government had accelerated the National Peasant party's policy of removing the remaining export duties on agricultural products, and in April, 1931, it passed a law for the valorization of

20. Madgearu, while admitting that the Liberal law of 1934 had meant a benefit for all farmers, maintained that the peasant debtor was still in a sufficiently difficult position which excluded him from obtaining the credit necessary to rationalize his cultivation. According to his estimate, peasant credit available after the conversion was only one-seventh of what it had been before. He also pointed out that the peasants as shareholders in the cooperative banks lost 2¾ billion lei through the conversion. *Op. cit.*, p. 84. This, however, would not hit the poorer peasant who never had the funds to invest in the first place.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

652 671 farm products, aimed principally at maintaining the prices in the home market by the reduction of various charges and taxes. The Iorga government, however, at once superseded this measure by inaugurating in July, 1931, an export bounty of 10,000 lei for 10,000 kilograms of wheat and 16,000 lei for flour, the cost to be met by a bread tax. The government, however, discovered that it lacked the funds to carry out this measure and discontinued it in 1932. Moreover, it turned out to be largely for the benefit of the export houses rather than the producers and merely tempted Rumanian exporters to engage in wheat dumping. On the other hand the tax on bread, which was to pay the bounty, was borne largely by the peasant consumer.[21] In 1933 and 1934 a different method was tried; the last Vaida Voevod cabinet set up a State Cereal Commission by which the government appeared on the market as a consumer to support wheat prices.

Like debt conversion, the price-supporting measures, which were taken up by the various governments in turn, were not the result of any over-all plan but were simply steps to counteract the depression. In fact, in their effect they ran against all plans for agrarian improvement. The parties, in their programs and writings, had all agreed that the future of Rumanian agriculture lay in intensive farming and in persuading the peasant to abandon extensive cereal cultivation for which his small holding was obviously ill-suited. The bounties on wheat had precisely the opposite effect and led to an even greater emphasis upon cereal production. Between 1930 and 1935 the area under wheat showed a definite, if highly irregular, tendency to rise.

439 648 The governments also undertook to obtain more favorable foreign markets. The first effort, under the National Peasants, was by means of collaboration with the other eastern European states in an agrarian bloc. Through the series of conferences in 1930 the agrarian states attempted to create a program of common action to gain preferential treatment from the industrial states for their agricultural products. Although the agrarian bloc pleaded its case at various meetings of the League and at international conferences between 1930 and 1932, it failed to open markets for agriculture. Its requests were opposed by the maritime states and overseas grain producers as contrary to free trade and the most-favored-nation principle. Madgearu, one of the most eloquent spokesmen for the bloc, declared that the agrarian states did not demand permanent preferential treat-

21. Manoïlou, *La Reconstruction économique et financière de la Roumanie et les partis politiques*, p. 284.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

ment but merely assistance to recover from the depression.[22] The whole tenor of international trade policy at that time was against his recommendations, and nothing tangible was achieved. Nor did the various international efforts of 1931–33—the Tardieu Plan, the Stresa Conference, and the London Economic Conference—bring the southeastern European states any substantial benefits in relieving their foreign indebtedness, establishing common economic policy, or providing more favorable foreign markets. 439 648

With the failure of international attempts to obtain better markets for its agricultural produce, the Rumanian government was driven toward increasing restrictions and controls. Although Rumania under the Brătianus had pursued a policy of economic nationalism, and was to do so again in the latter half of the 1930's, the commercial and monetary controls imposed by the different cabinets between 1931 and 1933 did not, in their inception at least, appear to be the result of any comprehensive policy but were applied as emergency measures. Many of the steps were taken by Virgil Madgearu, who had been a bitter critic of the Liberals' policy and was later to attack the trend toward increasing protectionism; he repeatedly explained that he was being forced against his wishes into these restrictive measures.

In the spring of 1932 the government introduced foreign exchange controls to preserve the national currency in face of the deteriorating balance of payments and the threat of speculation. Import controls were imposed in December, 1932, and were, according to Madgearu, primarily designed to stimulate exports and only secondarily to restrict imports, although the association of the two was inevitable and followed from the exchange controls.[23] In the summer of 1933 Madgearu declared a moratorium on foreign debts [24] and in the autumn demanded their reduction. In defending these moves he stated that unless markets were opened to Rumanian products the government was left with no alternative but to restrict imports, control exchange, and freeze its foreign obligations. All these moves "served directly or indirectly as an instrument of agricultural protection." [25]

In the same years Rumania was making the first steps toward clear-

22. A. Bussot, "Le Bloc des états agricoles de l'Europe centrale et orientale et son programme," *Revue d'économie politique*, 47 (Paris, 1933), 153.

23. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

24. Under this measure the equivalents of sums due abroad were deposited in lei in the National Bank; they could not be withdrawn from the country but could be invested in Rumania. Part of Rumania's subsequent industrialization was financed by these captive funds.

25. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

439 ing agreements and bilateral trade, again in the effort to find markets.
648 In 1931 a trade convention was made with Germany which reduced its duties on Rumanian maize and barley; in 1932 agreements were reached with France for the export of maize and with Germany for meat.

All these steps, however, were defensive efforts to protect agriculture against the depression. It is less easy to find much evidence of attempts to get at the roots of the agrarian question. The different cabinets passed a variety of laws, some of them transparent vote-catchers, others old favorites which each new Rumanian government seemed to pass as a matter of routine. All the cabinets announced their goal of increasing the use of agricultural machinery: the Mironescu government passed an act reducing the import duties on agricultural equipment by two-thirds, the Iorga government in 1932 and the Liberals at the beginning of 1934 granted credits for the purchase of agricultural machinery. To judge from the figures on the consumption of agricultural equipment the results were very slight, at least until 1934 with the beginning of recovery.

The only apparent effort at overcoming the disadvantages inherent in Rumania's system of strip cultivation was a law for the establishment of agricultural associations passed by the Iorga cabinet in July,
[671] 1931. By this law cultivators whose separate properties formed an economic whole could combine to cultivate their land more rationally by the introduction of mechanical cultivation, use of fertilizers, selected seeds, and other technical improvements. Funds required by the associations for this purpose could be obtained through the cooperative and agricultural banks, the state to assume 6 per cent interest on the loans on the condition that the association follow a plan approved by the Ministry of Agriculture. Nothing seems to have come of this law, and a very similar semicollective state-sponsored proposal was attempted by the Antonescu regime a decade later.

In general, 1931–33 were years of steady retreat before the onslaught of the depression. In the course of this retreat a number of economic devices were developed, in Rumania as elsewhere, which were to take on increasing importance in the years to follow. To a considerable extent they had been introduced to protect agriculture, but they were soon to find pleasanter and more lucrative employment.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

page 187

IX

THE CAROLIST PERIOD: NEOLIBERALISM, 1934–37

Survey of Political Events

THE term neoliberalism, which may appear a gross misnomer for these singularly unliberal years, is descriptive of two facts: 1) The Liberal party returned to office and, what is more, remained there for the full term of four years, thus repeating its record as the only party under the 1923 Constitution to achieve such a feat of endurance. Nevertheless, the Liberal cabinet of the 1930's was not the same as the party of Ion I. C. and Vintilă Brătianu. Not only did King Carol really hold the leading strings of political power but within the Liberal party itself (not to speak of Gheorghe Brătianu's Young Liberals) there was a growing cleavage between Gheorghe Tătărescu, the head of the government, and Constantin Brătianu, the third of the elder Brătianu brothers, who was party chief. This split did not become open until later, but Tătărescu as a king's man was clearly moving away from the old lines of the Liberals. 2) The leading ideas of the administration at this time have a certain relation to the doctrine of so-called neoliberalism, which was advanced in the 1920's but which at that time was associated with Averescu's People's party.[1]

The years 1934 and 1935 were a kind of plateau in the troubled history of the 1930's. The depression leveled off and there was a slow move toward recovery. The political party system, while basically completely unstable, did at least pause from the rapid changes of government which had marked the years 1931–33. King Carol seemed less bent on securing a personal political dictatorship. Even on the international scene there was a temporary, if uneasy, breathing spell. The first impulse of fascism which had brought Hitler to power had not set all of east Europe tumbling as had been feared. Rumania reestablished diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.[2] The Lit-

1. The People's party was a melange of "regenerated" liberalism combined with an emphasis upon order and discipline, plus a great deal of crass opportunism.

2. Without, however, obtaining a clear statement of recognition of its possession of Bessarabia. For a discussion of this point see Philip E. Mosely, "Is Bessarabia Next?" *Foreign Affairs*, *18*, No. 3 (New York, April, 1940), 557–562.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 648 tle Entente remained, the Balkan Entente was formed, and people were heard to say that the Balkans were beginning to mature. It was only a lull before the storm but it was perceptible.

175 661 The political history of these years is relatively uneventful. In the elections of December 20, 1933, the Liberals obtained a handsome majority in the chamber. After Duca's assassination and the creation of a cabinet under Tătărescu, a period of comparative quiet ensued. That this period was not one of tranquillity is shown by the repeated prolongations of the state of martial law, which had been applied after Duca's death and remained in force throughout the Tătărescu administration. In reality an intense tug-of-war was going on between the king and Tătărescu on the one hand and the Iron Guard on the other. It was less a conflict than a competition to gain a monopoly on the increasingly nationalist and extremist atmosphere which was pervading Rumania.

The relations between the Carol regime and the Iron Guard were equivocal, to say the least. Duca, leader of the Liberals, was assassinated by the Iron Guard, and yet the efforts of his successor to control the movement were certainly not convincing.[3] The Guard was officially dissolved but it quickly reappeared in a new guise as the All for the Fatherland party and continued to flourish. Even one of the Liberal members of the cabinet, Iamandi, ascribed the growth of the Iron Guard to the fact that since 1929 successive governments, including the Liberals, had tolerated or halfheartedly encouraged it in the hopes that they could deflect it from its more violent aims and find in it allies for combating communism.

Tătărescu said in 1936 that there was an abyss between the Liberals and the extreme Right, both in methods and concepts, but added, rather obscurely, that only a policy of conciliation was possible in a country where one-third of the population was minorities.[4] He held that the Liberals were tolerant of all parties, if they obeyed the law, but could not permit movements favoring either a red or a white dictatorship. There was all the difference in the world, however, between the earnest and efficient manner in which the government pursued the Communist party,[5] and the obvious indulgence

3. In the trial of the assassins, for example, it was well known that the Guardist leader, Codreanu, was closely implicated in the murder but he was acquitted.

4. *Times* (London), April 24, 1936.

5. It was in 1936 that Ana Pauker, now Rumanian Foreign Minister, was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, along with 18 associates, on the charge of propagating communism. She gained a good deal of publicity at this time because of public criticism of her treatment in prison and because of a newspaper dispute between *Dimineaţa* and *Universul* over her trial.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

with which the Iron Guard and the other fascist formations were treated. 175 661

By the 1930's the Iron Guard had become the manifestation of a quite powerful current in Rumanian life, a current arising out of the strains and dislocations in the society and intensified by the depression. The government, instead of opposing the current, tried to become master of it, and during these years it took on many of the attitudes and paraphernalia of the extreme Right. Early in its term in office the cabinet pressed for powers to issue decree-laws during parliamentary recess, ostensibly to improve efficiency. In the same year, 1934, the government announced that supervision of telephone calls—wire tapping—was to be extended from international to local and interurban calls. Compulsory labor brigades were introduced in 1936. Carol, for his part, was more and more the flamboyant father of his people. To counter the Iron Guard youth formations he created in 1934 his own youth movement, *Straja Ţării*. Carol's own activities may in part be ascribed to his willful and arbitrary character, his belief that the king should be more than a passive symbol, and his dislike and distrust of the Rumanian party system,[6] but the atmosphere of the time unquestionably nurtured these inclinations. [575]

In 1936 the temporary calm showed signs of breaking and a new element, foreign relations, began to play its decisive role in determining Rumanian politics. It was only a relative change; Rumania has always been exceedingly sensitive to the reverberations of international events, and the rise of the extremist fascist parties in the 1930's was certainly associated with other similar movements elsewhere in Europe. Nevertheless, it may be said that up to 1936 the most important factors in the Rumanian political scene had been internal: the failure of the democratic parties to establish themselves, the long-standing social tensions and the chronic misery of the peasantry, and the personal influence of King Carol and his entourage. These internal forces continued to exert an important influence but the uneasy equilibrium of 1934 and 1935 was broken by the ascendancy of the European fascist states and the mounting international crisis leading to the Second World War.

Titulescu, the strong advocate of the League and of the Versailles system, and at that time advocate of Little Entente-Soviet collaboration, was removed from the Foreign Office in August, 1936. His fall 648

6. In 1937, in an interview with the journalist Wickham Steed, Carol said that in his own country political parties were sterile and their leaders fit only to criticize. It would be his business as king to discipline them and harness them to constructive work. Notes on the interview are quoted in Pavel Pavel, *Why Rumania Failed* (London, n.d.), p. 142.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

648 appears to have been the consequence of personal differences but presaged a shift in Rumania's international orientation. As Rumania had been one of the principal gainers in the First World War, all the governments up to this time had a similar foreign policy, pro-French and against any treaty revision, which indeed was the only way Rumania could preserve its new territories from Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Soviet claims. When it became clear that the Western powers had lost the initiative, foreign policy became less simple. The extreme Right was vociferously pro-German. Carol personally would have preferred to stay clear of German influence, since only the Western attachment gave promise of guaranteeing all the territories acquired by the war. But if Britain and France weakened, he was inclined to improve his relations with Germany. Rumania's relations with the U.S.S.R. had improved somewhat in the 1930's, but it was a negative improvement—a hope of assurance against Soviet attack. The underlying hostility between the two powers was deep and so pervasive as scarcely to require any discussion. Thus in 1937 Carol stated to Wickham Steed that the chief difficulty of Rumania's position lay in the fact that "the immense weight of Russia was always bearing upon her and she had to withstand it as best she could. Russia was, so to speak, the hereditary enemy. As regards Hitler, he felt admiration for Hitler, whom he did not look upon as a sinister or dangerous man." [7]

665 From 1936 on, as a consequence of this shift in the international balance, the extreme Right became more and more blatant; anti-Semitic activities increased in extent and vileness; university students showed the advantages of their education by attacking Jewish shops; hostility and scorn for the decadent democracies became the vogue; defections from the old parties decreased their strength and added to the forces of the Right.

During this time the National Peasant party, as the principal nonfascist opposition to the government showed little strength or determination. Mihalache did attempt to reinvigorate the peasantist element in the party's ideology and formed a "peasant guard" to protect National Peasant meetings from fascist bullies. In May, [668] 1936, there was a demonstration of some 80,000 peasants in Bucarest, directed against the Liberals, demanding better conditions for peasants and workers and decrying the tolerance shown to the fascists. These efforts, however, had no significant results.[8]

7. Quoted in Pavel Pavel, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

8. According to Pătrăşcanu (*Sous trois dictatures*, p. 114), the National Peasants had planned a large demonstration in November, 1935, but had canceled it upon Carol's promise that the Liberal government was about to fall and that they would succeed it.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

In November, 1937, the Liberal government reached the end of its term and resigned. Carol requested Mihalache to form a new cabinet, on the unacceptable condition that he collaborate with Vaida Voevod. On his refusal, Tătărescu was recalled to form a cabinet and prepare for elections. He obtained Iorga's collaboration and made an electoral pact with Vaida Voevod's nationalist group. Then, to the general surprise, it was announced that Maniu and the Iron Guard leader Codreanu (and also Gheorghe Brătianu) had formed a non-aggression pact to insure free elections. This pact in recent years has been loosely used by the Communists to prove Maniu a pro-fascist. Such an interpretation obviously will not hold water, and there is no reason to doubt that his purpose in making the pact was as he defined it: to guarantee that Tătărescu could not employ the usual method of fixing the election. It was not a political agreement nor were joint lists established. It might also be added that the Rumanian Communist party gave its support to the National Peasants even after the pact with the Iron Guard.[9]

Nevertheless, the pact was a blunder. It was bound to have a demoralizing effect upon democratic elements struggling for survival to see an alliance between Maniu and the frank and open enemy of democratic and parliamentary institutions, especially since the National Peasant electoral campaign could not be directed against the Iron Guard. Codreanu certainly had much more to gain from such a pact in being able to associate his name with Maniu's. Above all it showed the National Peasants' own loss of confidence in themselves or their ideas, and was in the sharpest contrast to their refusals to make any deals on the road to power in 1927 and 1928. The defection of some of the outstanding leaders of the party in the following months was a further indication of the disruption of the party.

The pact was, however, successful in its immediate aim; by the balancing of forces which it achieved the elections were relatively free (though they elicited a low turnout of the electorate, a sign, perhaps, of the decline of parliamentarism).[10] For the first time in Rumanian history, and the last, a government in power failed to get the 40 per cent of the votes necessary for the premium. The government obtained 36 per cent, the National Peasants 21 per cent, the

9. *Ibid.*, p. 135.

10. Whereas in the 1928 elections 77.4 per cent of the registered voters actually voted, the percentage dropped off steadily in subsequent elections; in 1937 the figure was only 66 per cent. It is possible, and it has been suggested, that government pressure in 1937 kept people from the polls in some areas. A very interesting analysis of this election is given by C. Enescu, "Semnificaţia alegerilor din decemvrie 1937 în evoluţia politică a neamului românesc," *Sociologie Românească*, 2, Nos. 11–12 (November–December, 1937), pp. 512–526.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 Iron Guard 16 per cent, and the National Christian party (the fu-
665 sion of Goga's and Cuza's nationalist, anti-Semitic parties) 9 per cent. Rumania's curious electoral system had broken down. The Liberals' failure was clearly a loss of confidence. The National Peasants or the Iron Guard seemed the most likely alternatives.

At this point, however, Carol moved in and on December 28, 1937, called upon the Transylvanian poet and lyrical fascist, Octavian Goga, to form a cabinet. Carol's own explanation of this surprising decision, which was in fact the immediate prelude to his personal dictatorship, was that he had no alternative. He could not bring back the Liberals; he did not want the Iron Guard in power, so his only move was to spike the guns of the extreme Right by putting in another but less dynamic Rightist party. There was, of course, another solution: to have called in the National Peasants, but the personal feud between Carol and Maniu precluded that course. There is no evidence, however, that Carol was at all reluctant to take power into his own hands.

Goga was installed with a rather heterogeneous cabinet including Gen. Ion Antonescu and three runaways from the National Peasants, chief of whom was Armand Calinescu. This government had a brief and hectic career, notable chiefly for arousing foreign protests because of its anti-Jewish activities but for little else. On February 10 Carol ended the farce, dismissed Goga, and set up a government of National Union under the Patriarch Miron Cristea, including an assortment of old worthies: Averescu, Vaida Voevod, General Vaitoianu, Mironescu, Iorga, Tătărescu, Argetoianu, Calinescu, and General Antonescu. It was a strange collection when one considers Carol's advocacy of the "younger generation." The period of explicit royal dictatorship had started.

Economic and Agrarian Policy

642 If the drift toward a royal dictatorship was induced by the victories of fascism throughout Europe and by the political conflict within Rumania itself, a third reason was the economic policy pursued after the depression. While much of the dictatorial paraphernalia of these years may be attributed to Carol's personal tastes or to the political desirability of making use of the nationalist and fascist sentiments of the times, a quite separate impulse toward an authoritarian, corporatist society was contained in the economic policy of neoliberalism.

159 Perhaps the clearest illustration of this impulse is to be found

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

in the writings and career of the economist-politician Mihail Manoilescu, a man who never achieved his political ambitions in Rumania but whose unorthodox economic writings have attracted a fair amount of international attention. Trained as an engineer, he became engaged in politics after the First World War as a member of General Averescu's People's party. In 1927 he was arrested by the Liberal government for his efforts to bring Carol back to Rumania; he was later rewarded by being foisted on the Mironescu cabinet as Minister of Industry and Commerce. Although he held a number of cabinet posts in the governments of the 1930's, he did not fare as well under Carol as he had hoped. He was, however, called to the foreign ministry in 1940, and had the unpleasant privilege of signing the Vienna Decree by which Rumania lost Northern Transylvania.[11] 159

Manoilescu began his political career as a neoliberal and as an opponent of the peasantism (țărănismul) of the radically inclined Peasant party of 1922.[12] At that time he announced democracy to be his ideal and the essential truths of liberalism to be valid and timeless. He criticized the peasantist doctrine, elaborated by Madgearu and Stere, as anachronistic and self-contradictory. Since the land reform had already been achieved, the Peasant party, born too late, had lost its *raison d'être*. Like all opponents of the Peasants, he denied the homogeneity of the peasantry and its ability to act successfully as a class. He deplored the party's current emphasis upon class struggle, as beyond the powers of the peasantry to master and as dangerous to society. As for liberalism, he felt that its historical manifestations—as distinct from its essential principles—had been altogether too limited by an atomistic concept of society, by the passive role assigned to the state, and by the narrow definition of private property. Superficially, in his opposition to peasantism and his reformulation of liberalism, he was not far from the Liberal Duca. 165 159

But if one examines his neoliberalism of 1922 and 1923, certain very important differences appear. In the first place, he openly attacked the Rumanian Liberal party and was thus not obliged, as was Duca, to reconcile liberalism to the party of the Brătianus. Unlike Duca, who pleaded for "social harmony," Manoilescu was for a "political equilibrium" of the various independent productive groups which form society; he advocated vertical rather than horizontal parties. The principal difference, however, lay in Manoilescu's em-

11. A brief biography is given in the bibliography of his works: Florin Em. Manoliou, *Bibliographie des travaux du Professeur Mihail Manoilesco* (Bucarest, 1936).

12. His two principal studies in this connection are *Țărănism și democrație* (Bucarest, 1922), and "Neoliberalismul," in *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, a lecture delivered in February, 1923.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665
159

phasis upon economic productivity: "In order to live as a civilized state, Rumania requires the political and social form which will realize its energies to the maximum." [13] This emphasis had a decisive effect upon his whole line of thought. The peasant, because of his relatively low productivity, could not be the dominant factor in Rumanian social and economic life. On the contrary, Manoilescu defended the old Rumanian oligarchy which had been the necessary advance guard in the national awakening. Above all he saw society as a planned work of engineering. "To-morrow the principles of scientific organization will dominate the whole of society and will be applied to the entire system of national production as to a single enterprise." [14]

It was this ideal, and not any "regeneration of liberalism," which marked the real divergence of Manoilescu's neoliberalism from the views of the old Liberal party. This distinction is quite important. As has been seen, the Liberals had taken over nineteenth-century liberalism largely for nationalist reasons. In the course of applying it to Rumania, they had warped it beyond recognition, especially in regard to economic nationalism and state control. Nevertheless, it remained a derivative, if a perverted one, of the liberalism of the nineteenth century. As a result the Liberals were caught in a contradiction between their actual policy and their political philosophy, and it has been noted that the Liberal leaders justified their economic policy on grounds of temporary necessity or because of Rumania's backward condition. Even in their stress upon industry the old Liberals held a somewhat simple view of the exploitation of natural resources coupled with a nationalist desire to have a strong Rumania.[15]

In Manoilescu, on the other hand, economic productivity, that is, industrialization, was the focal point of his thought, and drove him entirely away from liberalism toward a doctrine of corporatism. Manoilescu's best known work, *The Theory of Protection and International Trade*,[16] shows a notable evolution from his articles of the

13. *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, p. 161.

14. *Ţărănism şi democraţie*, p. 50.

15. In this connection it should be noted that Zeletin's neoliberal defense of Rumanian liberalism (see above p. 114) has a rather retrospective air, justifying Rumanian economic policy in terms of the earlier mercantilist behavior of the western European states. Zeletin also wrote a book on *Neoliberalismul*, but his point of view was quite different from Manoilescu's and really referred to the modifications of liberalism mentioned by Duca and appearing in the 1923 Constitution. Zeletin approached the subject in a quasi-Marxist fashion and regarded the development from liberalism to neoliberalism as one of historical necessity. Manoilescu, on the other hand, displays a marked voluntarism.

16. The book was first published in French, *Théorie du protectionnisme et de l'échange international* (Paris, 1929); an English translation appeared in 1931; a

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania ED.

early 1920's although many of the changes were implicit in the earlier writings. In 1923 he had wanted to reformulate liberalism to meet contemporary requirements. By 1930 he was attempting a total refutation of the classical theory of international trade as it had come down from Ricardo. The core of his new theory, which he reiterated incessantly, was that "the product of the labor of an industrial workman is almost always exchanged for the product of the labor of several agricultural workmen." [17] From this premise he concluded that international exchange was only to the benefit of the industrial country and furthered the economic domination of the European industrial states.

The economic domination of a country signifies the economic state which allows the produce of the labor of its workmen to be exchanged for the produce of a larger number of workmen of other countries. In the life of nations, as in the life of individuals, wealth never comes only from one's own labor. "Make others work for you" has always been the classical means of becoming wealthy.[18]

If an agricultural country is absolutely unable to produce industrial goods it is obliged to make this disadvantageous exchange, but if it can produce an industrial article—even at a permanently higher cost than a foreign industrial state—it should do so rather than import. Thus, even though it might require the labor of 300 Rumanian workmen to produce a quantity of cloth that could be produced by the labor of 100 British workmen, it would still be advantageous to do so, if, to import the cloth, Rumania was obliged to export a quantity of wheat which had required the labor of 500 workmen. With his theory of permanent protection, Manoilescu was quite critical of those protectionists, such as List, who had gone only halfway and rested their argument on the fostering of infant industries. He demanded protection, however, only for those industries whose "productivity surpasses the average productivity of the country." He opposed autarky, which he thought defensible only as a measure of preparedness for war, and did believe in an international division of labor, but one which was based upon specialization within different branches of the more productive industries.[19]

---

revised and expanded version later appeared in German, *Die nationalen Produktivkräfte und der Aussenhandel* (Berlin, 1937).

17. Manoilescu, *Theory of Protection*, p. vi.

18. *Ibid.*, p. vii.

19. It is unnecessary here to give an account of his quite lengthy effort to provide a mathematical refutation of the principles of free trade. His chief attack was upon

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

829 665 Regardless of the theoretical merits or fallacies in Manoilescu's analysis, it is obvious that he had made a clean break with economic liberalism. Moreover, he flatly denied the premise upon which the Peasantist economists had based their argument.

> An agricultural country cannot raise itself by increasing slowly and uniformly the income of all its agricultural producers. Economic progress never spreads in a similar manner in all parts of a country. All the work of progress begins through a *center* or *nucleus of progress* and these nuclei are formed by the industries which represent a superior productivity.[20]

Far from admitting the Peasants' attack on "artificial industry," he held the artificiality of the support to be of no consequence so long as his rather loosely defined "productivity" increased.

The principal danger in Manoilescu's doctrine lay not in its stress upon industry nor in its denial of the ability of Rumanian agriculture to lift its own level of productivity. Industrialization in some form appears to be a necessary element in raising the miserable economic conditions of the peasant states of southeastern Europe, and it is quite unlikely that remedies sought in the agricultural sphere alone can produce an adequate alleviation. But in Rumania the critical question in many cases is not what is to be done but who is to do it.

In a country with such marked social and economic inequalities, with industry monopolized in the hands of a narrow, state-subsidized group, Manoilescu's doctrine of protectionism would have the fatal

---

the famous Ricardan cloth and wine example of comparative costs in the determination of exports. In my opinion he gains little in attempting to make a logically watertight demonstration, and indeed by trying to establish an absolute argument on the basis of a much oversimplified model he weakens the argument that in practice the operation of free trade has caused backward agricultural countries very serious difficulties. In particular he seems to underestimate the problems involved in the task of increasing the productivity and capital intensity per worker and assumes that protectionism alone is an adequate stimulus for the industrialization of a backward country. To be sure some of his contentions, such as the distinction between "national gain" and "individual profit," have been considerably elaborated in recent years, and the recognition of the extent of hidden unemployment in a peasant society has led to numerous recommendations that planned industrialization is the only remedy; but such recommendations (e.g., K. Mandelbaum's *The Industrialization of Backward Areas*) are based upon premises quite different from Manoilescu's. For a critical appraisal of Manoilescu's theory see J. B. Condliffe's review in *The Economic Journal*, *43* (1933), 143–145, and Jacob Viner's review in the *Journal of Political Economy* (1932). M. Kalecki's review of the German edition of Manoilescu's work, in *The Economic Journal*, *48* (1938), 708–711, is relatively favorable as regards Manoilescu's recognition of the plight of backward countries, though critical of his theoretical approach.

20. Manoilescu, *Theory of Protection*, p. 30, n. 1.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

829
665

effect of increasing this inequality and extending the power of the industrial groups. Moreover, the policy of extending protection exclusively to industry and not to agriculture—whatever its intrinsic benefits for the national economy—would mean increased costs for the agricultural sector, uncertain markets, and, at best, a forced transfer of personnel from agriculture into industry. Furthermore, if over three-fourths of the electorate belongs to the peasantry, it is difficult to see how such a process could be achieved within the framework of a representative government.

Manoilescu's response, quite naturally, was to abandon liberal politics and take up corporatism on the Italian model. In the 1930's he wrote a number of articles on the "Century of Corporatism." In 1934, for example, he made a comparison of the liberal, the Communist, and the corporative societies.[21] Corporate society "is characterized by *organization*. It allows freedom of individual possession of the means of production. The corporative economy assumes that the maximum of social welfare is realized by the discipline of economic activities in harmony with the ends of the state. Its motto is: National interest; its representative type: the organizer." Employing a quasi-scientific jargon, Manoilescu defined "corporative space" as a

> space where the egoistic impulses of the individual do not cease to exist and always represent active forces, but where, in addition to these forces [which are the sole qualities of a "liberal space"] there is a system of forces which direct individual actions toward a common goal created by the ends of the state. . . . Corporative space is a "magnetic field" dominated by national "lines of force" directed uniformly toward the ends assigned by the state.[22]

It is not necessary to take Manoilescu's utterances on this line very seriously or to inquire who was to determine these all-powerful state aims. He welcomed the coming of the royal dictatorship as the embodiment of the necessary revolution against outworn forms.[23] Apart from the vanity and opportunism which runs through his work, the significance of his writings lies:

1) in the evolution they display from the neoliberalism of the 1920's to the more thoroughgoing corporatism of the 1930's, and

21. *L'Espace corporatif* (Paris, 1934).

22. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

23. It is somewhat ironic that Manoilescu, who had boasted of his friendship with Mussolini and the Germans, should have been forced as Minister of Foreign Affairs to sign the Vienna Award in 1940, by which his fascist friends obliged Rumania to give up Northern Transylvania. The blow was so great that he collapsed at the conference table.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

829
665

2) the distinctly undemocratic implications of this evolution in economic ideas, at least in their Rumanian context.

It would be absurd to suppose that the actual development of Rumanian economic policy was based upon any such theoretical considerations, but there is a reasonably close parallel between the progress of Manoilescu's ideas and the development of the economic and industrial policy of the Rumanian government from that of the old Liberals under Vintilă Brătianu to that of the Liberal government of the 1930's. Although the old Liberals had favored a program of industrialization with state support, it was handled primarily through the private banks, controlled by the Liberals, and was directed chiefly toward extracting natural resources and creating secondary industries. Moreover, the tight-fisted fiscal policy of Vintilă Brătianu had served as a check on economic activity.

178
433

After 1933 industrialization proceeded at a much more rapid tempo and in a somewhat different direction. The private banks after the depression played a less important part in financing industry; the principal initiative was by the National Bank or the state itself, both through state-owned corporations and through the growing importance of the state as consumer of industrial products. Expansion was most extensive in heavy industry; large cartels appeared and there was a notable concentration of industrial activity. Between 1933 and 1938 the number of "large" industrial concerns (i.e., with at least 20 workers and more than 10 horsepower) increased only from 3,487 to 3,767, whereas the installed horsepower increased from 529,965 to 746,789, and the employed personnel from 184,777 to 289,117.[24] The horsepower employed in capital goods industries increased from 287,266 in 1932 to 452,870 in 1937, as contrasted with a more modest increase from 237,442 to 289,666 in consumer goods industries. The output in quantity of capital goods had by 1937 increased by 57.4 per cent over the 1927 level, consumer goods by 45 per cent.[25] The production of steel, which had hit a high of 143,511 metric tons in 1928, and dropped to a low of 103,046 in 1932, rose from 144,766 tons in 1933 to 276,532 in 1938.[26] There was no doubt that the policy was directed toward heavy industry and was having results.

Two important reasons for this industrialization were, of course, the depression and the rearmament program. The collapse of the grain market and the spread of agrarian protectionism among the

24. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești*, p. 149.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
26. *Breviaire statistique de la Roumanie* (1940), p. 164.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

industrial states naturally stimulated Rumania, as it did the other Balkan states, to create its own industries. The growing international tension in the 1930's led to a heavy demand for arms and munitions. In 1937 the president of the Rumanian union of metallurgical and mineral industries stated that the principal characteristic of the years of recovery had been the large industrial investments, especially for the purpose of creating a powerful armaments industry.[27]

But if the depression and the demand for armaments stimulated industrialization, they in turn assisted in the rise of very powerful industrial interests, which progressively dominated not only the economic but the political scene.[28] These years witnessed the rise of such industrial giants—giants at least in Rumania—as Max Ausnit and Nicolae Malaxa. These men represented a different type of influence from that of the Brătianus. The latter, through their position in the banks, had equated the Liberal party with a policy of industrial advance through the financial institutions, but they were primarily politicians. Ausnit and Malaxa, on the other hand, were primarily industrialists who were able political manipulators but whose field of action was outside the political arena. It might be added that King Carol himself, who operated "outside" politics, was by no means disinterested in industrialization and had a large personal stake in the new industries.[29]

Rumanian industries, and especially the new heavy industry, required both protection and capital. Industrial protection had marked the whole history of Rumanian tariff policy, and even the National Peasant tariff of 1929 did not renounce it. But the new devices, developed as defenses during the depression, became far more potent weapons than any which had existed heretofore. Indeed, they were far more effective in assisting industry than in fulfilling their ostensible function of safeguarding national finances and the currency.[30]

27. Quoted in Pătrăşcanu, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

28. An example is the Skoda scandal of 1935, in which a storm was raised over a contract for armaments made by the National Peasants with the Czech Skoda works in 1930. Although an effort was made to involve some National Peasant ministers in charges of graft, the real cause of the scandal appears to have been that the contract had been made "without regard for the law concerning national armament activity."

29. For obvious reasons it is difficult to ascertain the extent of Carol's industrial interests. According to Pătrăşcanu (*op. cit.*, p. 48), in published reports of enterprises in which he was a shareholder Carol held 30 to 35 per cent of the shares of the Malaxa works, and almost as much in several smaller industries. Four of the largest sugar mills were in his hands, as well as a beer factory. He had important shares in the gold mines and the telephone company and a large control of Banca de Credit Român.

30. Rumania's exchange position and the leu never achieved any stability despite the most elaborate series of measures. I would agree with Antonin Basch's conclusion (*The Danube Basin*, p. 148) that the signal failure of Rumania either to achieve cur-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

656 To the protective tariffs, which were greatly increased in the 1930's,
457 was added the system of import quotas and restrictions, plus a 12 per cent tax for all imports. Together these provided a high protective wall for the development of the national industry. Their effectiveness is shown by the fact that between 1933 and 1938 the percentage of imports of manufactured and semimanufactured goods dropped markedly, whereas that of machines and raw materials rose sharply.[31]

Protection alone, however, was not the only device employed to aid the expansion of industry; other forms of assistance included exemptions from taxation, state subsidies, special transport rates, the obligatory use of certain locally produced goods, and monopolies granted to industries considered nationally desirable.

652 Since the inflow of new foreign capital stopped during the depression, the supply of capital for industry had to come largely from internal sources. In part this was achieved through the tariffs, which diverted purchases toward local industry, and by the increasing state expenditures for armaments, which amounted to a tax on the public. In 1934 a 12 per cent tax on the construction of new buildings was imposed in an effort to divert investment toward industry and away from nonproductive expenditures. To a considerable extent the foreign funds frozen in Rumania at the time of the depression were subsequently employed in industrialization.[32]

The political implications of this economic policy—which was by no means a plan but rather the result of the depression and the deepening international tensions plus the steady pressure of interested industrial groups—were very similar to those observed above in the

---

rency stability or a price equilibrium, despite the relatively favorable balance of trade and rich resources, may be laid to bad management and political reasons, to which one could add that in many cases the measures taken were employed for purposes quite different from those for which they were presumably intended.

31. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 252. Madgearu took a selected group of key imports and calculated their volume by percentage as follows:

	In per cent of total imports	
	1930	*1938*
Raw materials	5.86	12.82
Semifabricated	23.01	7.58
Machines	1.27	4.00
Manufactured goods	13.02	8.34

32. Oscar Jaszi, "The Economic Crisis in the Danubian States," *Social Research* (February, 1935), pp. 98–116, attributed a major role to captive capital in the creation of Rumanian industry. According to Madgearu (*op. cit.*, p. 353), foreign credit continued to serve those industries created by international capital, but in his opinion the most important source of industrial credit was the National Bank.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

case of Manoilescu.[33] The trend toward heavy industry was a forced development, carried on by monopolies subsidized and protected by the state—probably the only way in which such industries could have been created in short order. It did not reflect a growing individual domestic demand, as the state was the principal consumer for the new products. The increased industrial production was largely balanced by continued low imports. Thus, over the eleven years from 1927 to 1938, industrial production rose from 59 to 69 billion lei, but total industrial consumption fell from 93 to 88 billion because of a fall in imports from 34 to 19 billion lei.[34]

On the short run at least, and relatively if not absolutely, this forced development was at the expense of agriculture. Funds which might have gone into agriculture went into industry; the peasant as a consumer was obliged to pay high prices for industrial products. The relation between agricultural prices and the price of industrial products necessary to agriculture, which had dropped from an index of 100 in 1929 to 53.4 in 1934, climbed only to 63.9 by 1937. Clearly such a policy was exposed to opposition from an electorate consisting largely of peasants—if the representative parliamentary system functioned. The economic policy of these years by its very nature implied an extension of control over political activity. The Tătărescu regime was the last effort to carry on politics in the traditional manner, through a quiet perversion of the constitutional system, but the growing differences between Tătărescu and the old guard of the

33. An excellent example of the political and social implications of this industrial drive is to be seen in a resolution of a congress of the Rumanian Federation of Manufacturers, held in Bucarest on February 3–6, 1936. The congress considered the industrialization of Rumania necessary not only for the development of the country's natural resources but to provide employment and meet the requirements of national defense and the balance of payments. It demanded a stable system favorable to the development of industry; privileges on tariffs and railway rates; legislation requiring public authorities to obtain all their supplies from Rumanian industry; statutory recognition of agreements between industrialists having the object of "improving production and sales by lawful means." In the field of social legislation the congress demanded that employers should be relieved of all charges which did not correspond "either to the workers' real needs or to the capacity of Rumanian industry." Specifically, it proposed that representation of employers and workers in social insurance schemes should be proportional to the amount shared in their support, the repeal of payments to employees for the first seven days' illness, and the repeal of the employers' civil liability to an insured worker in case of accident. The supervisory rights of the Chambers of Labor should be limited to small manufacturers and they should not be permitted to "tyrannize over employers in large-scale industry." Finally, it demanded that the Federation of Manufacturers be consulted on all laws and regulations affecting industrial life. ILO, *Industrial and Labor Information*, 57, No. 13 (March 30, 1936).

34. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 257. There was, however, a rise in imports between 1934 and 1937 from 13 to 19 billion lei, corresponding to the general economic recovery.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 Liberal party are indicative of the move toward a less inhibited industrial drive.

During the four years, then, between the depression and the inauguration of the Carolist dictatorship, it is possible to find inside Rumania, not to mention the external influences, three quite distinct factors making for the destruction of parliamentary government and the creation of an authoritarian regime:

1) Carol's own personality and his streamlined interpretation of the old-fashioned prerogatives of a monarch;

2) The unrest and growing extremism in broad sections of the population, which was finding a mouthpiece in the Iron Guard;

3) The economic policy of neoliberalism, which not only carried overtones of a more authoritarian state but through the centralization of economic power and control increased the possibilities of creating such a state.

656 While the general atmosphere of these years of neoliberalism re-
435 sembled Manoilescu's teachings in its industrial protectionism, increasing economic nationalism, and growing corporatism, there was an important difference: contrary to Manoilescu's thesis, agricultural protection was maintained and extended. During the years 1935 to 1937 there was a complex system of minimum prices, state purchases, and export bounties for wheat. By the law of 1935 the government paid a minimum price of 35,000 lei for 10 metric tons of wheat weighing 75 kilograms per hectoliter. An export premium financed by a tax on milling, paid 10,000 lei per ten-ton truckload of wheat, and 12,000 lei per truckload of flour. This premium was dropped with the rise in agricultural prices but was reapplied in
[647] 1938. A Wheat Valorization Office was formed to supervise these payments and to improve the quality of wheat. Similar steps were taken for medicinal plants, textile plants, and wool.

439 In 1936 Rumania signed a series of wheat export agreements with
435 Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, and other states. Foreign trade in grains was also assisted by an extremely complicated system of taxing imports to pay for export bounties and permitting the exporter to keep a portion of the free exchange obtained by his exports. In general these measures, which were aimed at maintaining the commercial balance, had a beneficial effect in supporting the price of agricultural products and in increasing exports. Between 1934 and 1937 agricultural prices rose from 44.1 (1929 = 100) to 64.6; the value of agricultural production increased from 42 to 62 billion lei; the value of cereal exports rose

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

from 2 to 10 billion lei (in quantity from one million to 2.2 million metric tons).

Two qualifications should be made however. The emphasis upon wheat exports and upon the improvement of quality was primarily for the benefit of the middle and large producer, though the maintenance of the price of grain did help agriculture as a whole. In the second place, as has been mentioned in connection with the depression, the premiums on wheat served to extend the area under wheat cultivation, in direct contradiction to the recommendations of agricultural experts, who continued to believe that "peasant agriculture should no longer limit itself, in imitation of the old system, to the culture of cereals; its success will come from a parallel development of the resources of the field and of livestock raising." [35] This contradiction, which shows the absence of any real coherence to the agrarian program of the Liberal government, had two obvious sources: wheat, for all its decline after the First World War, was important commercially and from the point of view of foreign commerce there was a strong incentive to support it. Moreover, the wheat growers were the larger farmers and were in a better position to make felt their wishes than were the small maize-producing peasants.

The government did, however, make certain efforts to increase the variety of agricultural production. The most elaborate was the creation, with the assistance of I. G. Farbenindustrie, of the "Soya" company, which was authorized to import soybeans, distribute them to cultivators, provide equipment, and purchase the entire crop for export to Germany. The area under this crop expanded rapidly, especially in Bessarabia: 1,465 hectares in 1934, 20,411 hectares in 1935, 58,037 hectares in 1936, and 102,000 hectares in 1937. The government through price guarantees and subsidies also furthered the cultivation of sugar beet, tobacco, rice, and textile plants.

These measures to diversify agriculture did not, despite all the publicity given to them, achieve very great importance. They were only a drop in the bucket compared with the vast area under peasant cereal cultivation, and their rate of expansion seemed unlikely to produce any general amelioration for a very long time. Moreover, the introduction of such industrial crops, whose main purpose—almost exclusively so in the case of soya—was for export, shows the persistent if natural effort to solve the agrarian question by a sort of legerdemain. The soybean had been an old favorite, and as early

35. G. Ionescu-Sişeşti and N. Cornăţeanu, *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie et ses conséquences*, p. 79.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241 as 1910 Dobrogeanu-Gherea had some harsh words to say of the
433 men who thought it could magically solve the deep-rooted ills of Ru-
654 manian agriculture.[36]

The Tătărescu government, following precedent, also reorganized agricultural credit and the cooperative system, set up more experimental stations, and devoted funds to the raising of better livestock and the purchase of tractors, but those measures seem to have been only of marginal benefit.

423 The government did try in the law of March, 1937, for the encouragement of agriculture to grapple with the problem of land tenure. It regulated the transfer and mortgage of rural lands and undertook to enforce the indivisibility of property as a means of preventing the progressive subdivision of peasant holdings. The effort was unsuccessful. The two-hectare minimum, which in any case was too small for a self-subsistent holding, was not observed; the prohibition extended only to properties obtained from the state or with the state's assistance. An attempt was also made to promote the consolidation of peasant properties, but this met with too great opposition in the chamber and was dropped.[37] The government also exerted its right of preemption on sales of agricultural land for the purpose of providing land for the peasants but its achievements were insignificant. Between April 1, 1934, and August 1, 1938, of the 326,200 hectares put on sale the government used its right of preemption on only 12,250 hectares, 3.8 per cent of the total.[38]

241 In brief, if the position of agriculture was somewhat better in the
654 years of the Tătărescu regime than in the depression it was largely
656 a consequence of general economic recovery. Agriculture did benefit from the protective measures applied and extended by the government, although part of these benefits was lost by the continued depreciation of the leu, and some efforts were made to raise the level of agriculture and diversify production. Nevertheless, the government's chief interest was industry and commerce and the principal benefits to agriculture were those which corresponded to this interest. The desperate problem of the millions of small peasants owning less than 3 hectares, unable to support themselves and their families, dividing their land into smaller and smaller fragments, suffering from pellagra —this problem was scarcely touched.

654 It must be said, however, that in the 1930's there was a notable
511

36. C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *Neoiobăgia*, p. 254.

37. Valeriu Bulgariu, "Divizibilitatea proprietăţii ţărăneşti," *Problema agrară* (Bucarest, 1946), pp. 77–97.

38. G. Ionescu-Sişeşti, "Le Nouvel Aspect du problème agraire en Roumanie," *Archives pour la science et la réforme sociales, 16*, Nos. 1–4 (1948), 264.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

increase in scientific investigations of village life—sociological studies undertaken by Professor Gusti and his students, farm accountancy studies, examinations of rural health and diet—which brought into clear light the deplorable living conditions of the peasants. It was at this time too that the factor of overpopulation was brought into prominence, although as early as 1907 Constantin Garoflid had warned of its approach. Unfortunately, the real fact of overpopulation was too easily employed as a scapegoat, and one finds a growing tendency from the middle of the 1930's to place upon it all the responsibility for the plight of the peasant.

654
511

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

page 206

X

THE CAROLIST PERIOD: DICTATORSHIP, 1938–40

Survey of Political Events

642 WITH the advent of Carol's personal dictatorship, Rumania's parliamentary government came to an end. The particular party alignments of 1937 and the interplay of personal ambitions and conflicts may have determined the time and to some extent the form of the dictatorship, but the social and economic situation more than paved the way. The fact that Carol could reassert and indeed vastly expand the powers of the monarch on the ground of defending his people against the depredations of politicians illustrates the difficulty of creating a healthy representative regime in a country such as Rumania, where the bulk of the electorate are poverty-stricken peasants who have always been separated by a gulf from their rulers. The only constitutionally minded party which claimed to voice the sentiments of the peasantry, the National Peasant party, proved completely unable to master the situation. In the latter years of the 1930's it had only two alternatives if it was to regain its position: either to outplay the dictatorial movements in rough-and-tumble tactics, which its scruples forbade it from doing, or to recover the massive support which had carried it to power in 1928. It seemed incapable of achieving the latter and its 1937 campaign showed little of the zeal formerly displayed. Some of its most promising younger men, Calinescu, Ghelmegeanu, and Ralea, deserted to the king.

The Carol dictatorship was not merely a relapse into old practices; it was also an advance to a new authoritarian regime. In this it showed the political implications of a policy of forced industrialization in an agrarian society with great social and economic inequalities. If the relation between Carol's dictatorship and the expansion of heavy industry is not as inevitable as the Marxists would have it, it is, nonetheless, not difficult to see that such industrialization when directed from above by a handful of men would be conducive not merely to the perversion of democracy, as in the case of the old Liberals, but to its replacement by an explicit dictatorship. In this respect the advent of Carol's dictatorship is intimately bound to the

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

agrarian problem, which in its broadest sense is the reverse side of 642
the question of industrialization.

On the other hand, the tortuous history of Carol's last three years 661
as king is of less interest here. Internally, it was the confused un- 642
raveling of the peculiar relations between Carol and the Iron Guard, a vicious if ambiguous struggle between two dictatorial movements. Externally, it was the attempt to ride out the rapidly mounting tempest of the Second World War. Carol, who had mastered the internal situation, was ultimately destroyed by outside events. So while the tumultuous events of the years 1938 to 1940 are of the greatest importance to Rumanian history in general, their relevance to the agrarian question is largely external. Unlike the fall of the Liberals in 1928, the collapse of the peasantist *esprit*, and the creation of a dictatorial regime, all of which are causally related to the agrarian question, Carol's fall was a political and diplomatic rather than an economic transition.

Immediately after removing the Goga cabinet and installing under martial law his new Government of National Union, Carol moved rapidly to create his new order. He abolished the 1923 Constitution and on February 20 promulgated a new corporatist constitution, subsequently ratified by a farcical popular referendum. The new constitution greatly augmented the king's powers, dwarfed the role of the legislative bodies, and did away with the party system. Ministers were selected by and responsible solely to the king and had to be of Rumanian nationality for at least three generations. The franchise was limited to citizens over thirty who practiced either agriculture or manual labor, industry or commerce, or intellectual activity; a corporatist concept of the voter replaced universal suffrage. The spirit of organic nationalism pervaded the whole document, stressed the responsibilities of the individual Rumanian to the nation, and circumscribed guarantees of civil rights and liberties. The economic and social outlook of the constitution is shown in Article 7, whereby no Rumanian could advocate by word or letter any changes in the form of the government (all constitutional amendments had to be initiated by the king), the division or distribution of property, exemption from taxes, or class hatred.

At the same time that Carol unseated the old parties by destroying their constitutional base, he attacked the Iron Guard, and in 1938 and 1939 directed an increasingly violent suppression of its formations. The Guard was outlawed, Codreanu was arrested, tried, and imprisoned. In November, 1938, he and thirteen of his followers were shot "while attempting to escape." In September, 1939, the Prime

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

661 Minister, Armand Calinescu, the strongest man in the Carol dic-
642 tatorship and the executor of the campaign against the Guard, was assassinated. His death was followed by murderous mass reprisals against the Legionaries. Carol seemed to be thoroughly the master of his country.[1]

In place of the disbanded parties he concocted in December, 1938, a single body, the Front of National Rebirth. Through 1938 and 1939 he added the various regalia associated with a corporatist state, but there is little evidence that anyone took these trappings seriously. Administrative and political corruption, always healthy plants in Rumania, blossomed in full splendor in these years; public ethics hit a new low.

648 Meanwhile, however, the international situation was closing in and
642 here Carol was caught, as it proved, in a hopeless dilemma. While throughout the 1930's the Rumanian state took on an increasing resemblance to the fascism of the Axis powers, and men of the extreme Right advocated a pro-Axis foreign policy, Rumania, with its interest in maintaining the Versailles system—the guarantor of its territorial integrity—could not be really happy in Axis company. Regardless of internal political developments, and Carol himself repeatedly stressed the difference between internal and external policy, Rumania had strong reason to rely on the Western powers. Germany, however, was clearly in the ascent and the Western powers were pursuing the policy of appeasement. With the collapse of Czechoslovakia after the Munich Conference the Little Entente broke down. In November, 1938, Carol visited both London and Berchtesgaden in an effort to maintain his balance.

The great blow to Rumania's position came with the Soviet-German pact of August, 1939, which forecast common action between the two

1. It is impossible to attempt here to clear up the obscurities in the struggle between Carol and the Iron Guard. Numerous interpretations have been made, of which two might be mentioned. The British correspondent, A. L. Easterman, in his book *King Carol, Hitler, and Lupescu* (London, 1942), was of the opinion that in assuming the dictatorship Carol was fighting fire with fire, that he was really anti-Guardist and anti-German. Under this interpretation he was attempting to preserve Rumania from German advances, and his fight against the Guardists, who are regarded as simple German tools, was a part of this national defense. A more complex interpretation is provided by the Rumanian Communist Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu in *Sous trois dictatures*. Briefly, his thesis is that Carol had given secret support to the Guard on his road to the dictatorship, as a means of destroying the bourgeois-democratic parties, but had turned against it because of the potential social ferment it engendered and because the Guard was explicitly pro-Axis, whereas Carol was attempting to play a noncommittal game. Pătrăşcanu attributed the increasing violence of the measures employed by Carol against the Guard to the simple fact that having set up a dictatorship himself Carol had no weapon against another dictatorial movement except crude police repression.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

great powers of eastern Europe, both of which were interested in revising the Versailles system. By the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement, the Reich recognized the Soviet Union's interest in Bessarabia.[2] 648 642

When war came, Rumania remained neutral, although the German control over the economy, which will be discussed presently, grew steadily. With the fall of France in the summer of 1940 and the disappearance of any hope of effective support from the West, Rumania was left with three unattractive alternatives: isolated neutrality, rapprochement with the U.S.S.R., or entering the German camp. Carol chose the latter course.[3] The corporate state was replaced by a totalitarian regime with the creation of the Party of the Nation, which included the Iron Guard and to which all government and business officials were obliged to belong. Horia Sima, the new leader of the Guard, came into the government.

After the Soviet ultimatum of June 26, resulting in the loss of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, Rumania renounced the Franco-British guarantees, and the active pro-Germans, Gigurtu and Manoilescu, were installed as Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The new direction was accompanied by zealous efforts to emulate the Axis powers through increased anti-Semitic and anti-British measures. The loss of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina set loose other revisionist claims, and at the end of August, under German and Italian auspices, Rumania lost Southern Dobrogea to Bulgaria and Northern Transylvania to Hungary.

At this point Carol's policy of isolating and breaking up the political parties turned against him, and he found himself altogether without support in face of national indignation that a third of the nation's territory had been given up without a sign of resistance. As an eleventh hour prop for his regime he called in, on September 4, General Antonescu, who had been in disgrace for his association with the Guard. Antonescu forced Carol to renounce his dictatorial powers 642

2. Paragraph 3 of the Secret Additional Protocol to the Nonaggression Treaty of August 23, 1939, stated: "With regard to South-eastern Europe, attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterestedness in these areas." U.S. Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941* (Washington, 1948), p. 78.

3. According to ex-Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu, Carol's decision was taken at a crown council meeting on May 29, 1940. *Prelude to the Russian Campaign*, trans. E. Fletcher-Allen (London, 1945), pp. 282–285. Such a decision is not surprising. Neutrality would have saved little except honor. The U.S.S.R. had been indicating, rather obliquely, the desirability of a revision in Bessarabia, and with the fall of France was determined to move quickly. The chances of a Rumanian-Soviet rapprochement were nil. On the other hand, German influence had increased steadily since the fall of Czechoslovakia.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

642 and a couple of days later, with the agreement of Maniu and Constantin Brătianu, demanded his abdication. Carol fled the country, with Mme Lupescu and Colonel Urdareanu, the core of his camerilla. For Rumania, however, the absurd result was that popular indignation over the loss of Transylvania at the hands of the Axis merely placed in power an ardently pro-Axis government which immediately recognized the Vienna Decree.

Economic and Agrarian Policy

178 In the economic sphere the years of the Carolist dictatorship show four important characteristics:

1) a continued emphasis upon industrialization;

2) a reaction against small peasant agriculture and a growing agricultural paternalism;

3) increasing regimentation of the economy, both for economic planning and for military preparedness;

4) the growing dominance of Germany in Rumanian economic life.

The policy of industrialization which had got under way after the depression continued its course of expansion under the dictatorship, with the additional stimulus of the menace of war. After the outbreak of war the restriction of trade channels and raw material imports reduced industrial production somewhat. The loss of territory in 1940 produced, of course, a general dislocation of the economy. Industrial policy, however, was merely the culmination of the whole trend of the Carolist regime.

In the field of agrarian policy there was a noticeable reaction against small peasant holdings and renewed talk of creating a middle peasantry. As has been seen, the policy of all Rumanian governments on this question has been confused and contradictory. The National Peasants in 1929, by relaxing regulations for the transfer of peasant property, had hoped to create more prosperous and self-sustaining holdings, but their action had rather the effect of dispossessing the small peasant. On the other hand, the debt conversions of 1932–34 had the opposite effect and in a negative way were, as Garoflid called them, a new peasant resettlement in that they limited the effect of the economic crisis in weeding out the weaker peasants. The Tătărescu government had attempted to colonize relatively underpopulated areas with medium holdings and by the law of 1937 had tried, ineffectually, to check the subdivision of land.

642 654 Under the Carol dictatorship somewhat more extensive measures

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

were initiated, at least on paper. The 1938 Constitution, by prohibiting any public discussion of redistribution of property, showed the regime's attitude toward further expropriation as a remedy to the agrarian question. During the interwar years the governments were accustomed to state that large estates had virtually disappeared through the reforms of 1918–21, but after 1938 increased attention was paid to medium and large properties.[4] In the law of December 5, 1938 (amended January 7, 1939) the government established a Bank for the Industrialization and Valorization of Agricultural Products (BINAG), one of the recurrent efforts to provide agricultural credit. It is to be noted, however, that by Article 6 of this law the main credit functions of this bank applied only to farms of over 5 hectares, thus overlooking the majority of the peasantry.[5]

The spirit of the regime is well shown in an article by the agricultural economist Valeriu Bulgariu,[6] who announced that King Carol, "the first farmer in the land," had plans to change completely the existing conditions in agriculture by a twofold effort to organize small farming on rational lines and to encourage owners of medium-sized estates to increase the area of their holdings.

> When the great land division took place after the war, the agrarian reform went too far. . . . It assigned land to a very large number of villagers, and as a result subsequent successive divisions had increased the excessive subdivision of land. Reaction was necessary, and to-day economists and sociologists are in favor of the concentration of scattered property, a policy adopted by the government and all its agents.[7]

The desirability of concentrating peasant holdings was no new discovery, and Carol's regime for all its new direction was not a bit more successful than previous regimes in doing anything about it. The policy of creating larger holdings, also no novelty, was faced as always by the difficulty of creating them without dispossessing peasants in the process. According to Bulgariu,

4. See, for example, Aureliu Lapedatu's article, "A Technical Study in Rumanian Cereals," *Correspondance économique roumaine* (April–June, 1938), pp. 1–28, in which the author discussed the manifest advantages of the large Rumanian farms in the use of technical equipment for rational cultivation.

5. The same thing is to be seen in the case of the cooperatives. According to A. Galan, "General Survey of the Co-operative Movement in Rumania," *Correspondance économique roumaine* (January–May, 1939), pp. 1–65, in 1939 one farmer in three was affiliated with one of the several agricultural cooperatives. Unquestionably the other two-thirds included the poorer peasants.

6. Valeriu Bulgariu, "Agrarian Policy in Rumania," *The Banker*, *49* (March, 1939), 344–348.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 346.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

185 The government seeks to facilitate the forming of middle-sized estates of about 10 hectares in area, making them indivisible so that there can be no relapse into sub-dividing. The State has taken to itself the right of acquiring any land which is for sale. It gives preference in its purchase and distribution of land to farms adjoining it, in order that small properties may be enlarged and concentration attained even through private purchase.[8]

The execution of this policy was assigned to BINAG. If property purchased through BINAG could not be sold as a whole within two years, it could be sold in lots of not less than 15 hectares. Sales could be only to Rumanian subjects who undertook to cultivate the land themselves. Such properties could not be broken up and had to be transferred in their entirety. Moreover, such estates could be inherited only as a whole by a single heir. To some extent this law is similar to the German *Erbhofgesetz* of 1933, although it was not as restrictive since it did permit the sale of the land.[9] The aims of this measure were reasonable enough but it was of little use to the small peasant and certainly showed greater interest in the medium holder.

Along with the emphasis upon larger holdings was a rather superficial government paternalism for the peasant. Some of the activities were of value. The studies of village life continued and in several instances produced extremely useful collections of information for an understanding of the agrarian question. The emphasis upon a sociological interpretation of Rumanian peasant life was beneficial in focusing attention upon the realities in Rumania and getting away from the application of quite unsuitable Western political and economic concepts to the local situation. From the scholarly point of view this was all to the good. As a political phenomenon it had a certain danger. Looking at one's fellow countrymen as objects for sociological investigation does not overcome the social chasm between the rulers and the ruled, but may merely put it on a more enlightened basis. It is certainly preferable to dismissing the peasants as "animals who can speak,"[10] but it still regards the peasant as object rather than subject.

Other manifestations of Carol's paternalism were of value only in providing employment for his publicity agents. The shabby quality of

[113]

8. *Ibid.*, p. 348.

9. For a discussion of the problem of succession to agricultural property and of recent European legislation in this regard, see M. Tcherkinsky, "The Evolution of the System of Succession to Landed Property in Europe," *International Review of Agriculture*, 32, No. 6 (June, 1941), 165E–196E.

10. I heard this definition defended in dead earnest by a landowner in Bucarest in the winter of 1944.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania E1

the social program of the regime appears in a speech delivered by Calinescu in January, 1939: 185

> Gentlemen, it is enough to look at all that has been done to improve our workmen's conditions of living. The improvement of the work contract, pensions for old age, new buildings, the organization "Work and Joy." All these were designed to give a social significance to the present regime. . . . Thus a regime with authority was able to accomplish in the field of work problems things which nobody could accomplish in the demagogic regime of the democracies. . . . Also we must point out the activity of social order undertaken amidst the peasantry. Cultural hostels which are intended to develop the sense of solidarity in spiritual and educational matters among the peasants have already given the most wonderful results. And the Social Service, established last year, is the very greatest action that has ever been taken to raise the level of the peasants.[11]

The regime also tried its hand at planning. In the autumn of 1939 it undertook to organize agriculture to guarantee a sufficient output for military and civil requirements. The Minister of Agriculture was required to prepare an annual crop plan, to provide necessary seed, and to requisition labor for farms. More ambitious was a five-year plan drawn up in March, 1940, for the rationalization and intensification of agriculture. The work of the 1921 land reform, which had been dragging on for nearly twenty years, was to be completed. The area under wheat was to be reduced by 800,000 hectares, that under maize by 500,000 hectares. Output, however, was to be maintained by a higher yield. Fallow ground was to be diminished by 300,000 hectares. The surplus area was to be devoted to the cultivation of oil-producing, textile, industrial, and medicinal plants. Vegetable cultivation was to be encouraged with a view to improving peasant diet. The plan also included a program of technical improvements, dam construction, irrigation, and drainage projects. Agricultural laborers were to be given fair wages and assured a decent diet; the price scissors between agricultural and industrial products was to be closed. In all, the plan envisaged spending 600 million lei annually. One cannot say what the plan might have achieved had Carol not fallen and if Rumania had not lost a third of its territory and become involved in the war.

11. Armand Calinescu, *Roumania, the Country of National Renaissance and of Royal Revolution* (no pub., n.d.), a translation of a speech delivered in the Chamber of Deputies on January 28, 1939.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

German-Rumanian Economic Relations

439 This plan, however, was but part of a larger scheme which concerned not only Rumania but the Third Reich. In the course of Nazi Germany's economic penetration of southeastern Europe in the 1930's,[12] Rumania was, initially at any rate, better able than the other states to maintain an independent position, partly because it had at least one important export, petroleum, which could be sold on the world market. In the mid-1930's the Rumanian government took definite steps to limit exports to Germany. As late as 1937 Germany's share in Rumania's foreign trade was no greater than it had been in 1929.[13] The German market was, however, important as a purchaser of Rumania's agricultural products. Thus, in 1937 Germany absorbed 61.2 per cent of Rumania's maize exports, 57.4 per cent of the barley, though only 8.3 per cent of the wheat.

Germany was not initially interested in Rumania's grain exports. Indeed the policy of protecting German cereal production, which had started before the Nazis, was not dropped until rather late, and Germany did not import large quantities of bread cereals until 1937.[14] It was, however, very much interested in obtaining fodder and oil plants; it was for this purpose that in 1934 I. G. Farbenindustrie had set up the Soya Company to foster soybean production in Rumania.

After 1937 the picture changed; the economic recession hurt Balkan exports and increased Balkan dependence upon the German market. The *Anschluss* in the spring of 1938 cast Germany's political shadow over all the Balkans, and a rash of German publications announced the Reich's destiny in *Südosteuropa*. German dominance was increased with the Munich decision and the failure of the Anglo-French economic drive in southeastern Europe to achieve any important countereffect. In Rumania the shift in the international political balance, more than purely economic penetration, led to

12. For an account of Germany's trade policy which brings out some of the benefits to the Balkan states see H. W. Arndt, *The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen-Thirties* (Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 176–206; Antonin Basch, *The Danube Basin*, pp. 165–213, emphasizes the sinister aspects of the German advance.

13. Rumania's trade with Germany between 1929 and 1938 in per cent of total values was as follows:

	1929	*1930*	*1931*	*1932*	*1933*	*1934*	*1935*	*1936*	*1937*	*1938* (*including Austria*)
Imports	24.1	25.1	29.1	23.6	18.6	15.5	23.8	36.1	28.9	36.8
Exports	27.6	18.8	11.5	12.5	10.6	16.6	16.7	17.8	19.2	26.5

(In 1937, Austria had provided 8.5 per cent of Rumania's imports and absorbed 6.8 per cent of its exports.)

14. Basch, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Germany's growing economic influence. By 1938 Germany and Austria absorbed 26.5 per cent of Rumania's exports, but even in the German-Rumanian agreement of December, 1938, the Rumanians were able to block German efforts to increase substantially the clearing rate of the reichsmark. 439

A new stage was reached, however, in the German-Rumanian agreement of March 23, 1939, which really did tie Rumania's economy to that of Germany.[15] By this treaty, which was to run for five years, very close economic collaboration was envisaged, involving German assistance in the internal development of the Rumanian economy. The principal aim of this treaty, which emphasized the complementary nature of the two economies, was to expand and diversify Rumanian agricultural production. Germany was to assist in promoting the cultivation of agricultural products of interest to its economy, especially foodstuffs, oilseeds, and textile plants. New industries were to be established for processing agricultural products. Mixed Rumanian-German companies, in which Germany was to supply the machinery, were to exploit mineral and petroleum resources. The treaty also made provision for mutual collaboration in various industries, road, rail and water transport, and public enterprises. Rumanian and German banks were to collaborate on methods of financing the activities contemplated under the plan. Finally, the agreement provided that Germany would supply armaments and munitions to Rumania.[16] 648

In assessing the significance of this agreement, as well as Germany's increasing economic monopoly in the Balkans, it is necessary to distinguish between the actual effects under the international circumstances and its merits as a purely economic program. In actual fact, of course, Germany's economic activities in the Balkans proved to be part of its over-all task of preparing a war economy, and it could be maintained that to overlook the military premise behind Germany's actions is to miss the essential point. Certainly Germany's primary concern was to obtain in southeastern Europe a source of vegetable and mineral raw materials to assist in creating an economy secure from blockade. At the same time, Germany appears to have regarded

15. According to Grigore Gafencu, at that time Rumanian Foreign Minister, this economic agreement was designed to appease Hitler, who had displayed an ominous irritation over Carol's assault on the Iron Guard in the autumn of 1938. See his book, *Last Days of Europe* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 23–25.

16. For a discussion of this agreement from the German side, cf. Anton Reithinger, "Grossdeutschland und Südosteuropa im Lichte der Statistik," *Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv*, 29 (1939), 129–139, and German Institute for Business Research, "The German-Rumanian Trade Treaty," *Weekly Report*, Nos. 13–14 (April 6, 1939).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

648 its activities in Rumania as primarily economic and not, directly at least, as an instrument for political penetration. The Germans did not feel they had Rumania sewed up diplomatically by this agreement.[17]

Although there was this hidden military menace in Germany's actions, Rumania did gain certain short-term advantages from its economic relations with the Third Reich. Contrary to numerous reports Germany was not merely draining Rumania in exchange for aspirins, harmonicas, and cameras. The relations with Germany, aside from the political danger, were certainly not without their disadvantages; there were all the limitations of being tied to a bilateralism with a much more powerful state, difficulties in obtaining certain commodities, and German reluctance to provide materials for secondary industries. In so far as it was possible Rumania struggled to keep the Reich from obtaining a too favorable rate of exchange and to retain as large a share as possible of its exports for the free world market. Nevertheless, Germany did offer a market for Rumanian agricultural products at prices which Rumania could not obtain elsewhere. In the absence of remunerative world prices and the failure of the other great powers to provide any assistance, Germany's policy, whatever its aim, was a benefit *fauté de mieux*.[18] The benefits were not unconditional but the comparison should not be made with an ideal and stable system of free world trade, but with the collapsed and paralyzed situation of the 1930's.

As to setting up the German and Rumanian economies as complementary units in a system of regional trade, the most obvious danger was that Germany would in effect reduce Rumania to a colonial status, producing vegetable and mineral raw materials for the German in-

17. Thus Hitler in his letter to Mussolini of August 25, 1939, regarding the Soviet pact, indicated that because of this pact "Rumania is no longer in a situation to take part in a conflict against the Axis" (U.S. Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, p. 81), a clear sign that the Axis leaders had serious doubts whether Rumania, even after the March economic agreement, was on their side. In the German diplomatic correspondence of 1940, the whole concern of the Germans appeared to be that Rumania, which was so important for its vegetable products and petroleum, should not become involved in military and political disturbances.

18. The conclusion of a study by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *South-Eastern Europe, a Political and Economic Survey*, p. 196, stated: "At any rate up till the spring of 1939, the countries of South-Eastern Europe on balance have gained in a material sense and in the short run, by the increase in German purchases. Germany has helped to raise their export prices and to increase their national incomes, and she has not so far taken advantage of her bargaining position to turn the terms of trade in her favor, so that their 'real' incomes have been raised. On the other hand, one of Germany's objects may be to associate the economic systems of these countries so closely with her own as to make it difficult for them to sever their connections in time of war."

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

dustrial economy. Indeed, German economists commenting upon the 1939 agreement argued that Rumania should not undertake a further drive toward industrialization until the state of economic advance called for in the agreement was reached. In fact they claimed that under exchange control the industry of southeastern Europe had developed to such an extent that it had reached the saturation point and that control of investment was necessary.[19] 48

The agreement did, however, provide for the creation of industries preparing foodstuffs and raw materials for export and also for the development of railways and the armamants industries. That is, the Germans favored industries "organically" connected with Rumania's natural resources but were opposed to the expansion of secondary industry.

It is not necessary to point out the obvious advantage to Germany of this policy nor to go into the array of arguments which Hitler's economists employed to carry their point. But from the Rumanian side one very curious paradox arises, precisely the kind of paradox which runs throughout the history of Rumanian economic policy. The German policy, as shown in the March, 1939, agreement, resembled in many respects that of the National Peasant party and was in definite opposition to the industrial policy of the pro-Axis Manoilescu and of the Carolist regime. This opposition appears quite explicitly in an article by Ernst Wagemann, director of the German Institute for Business Research.

Wagemann, one of the most ardent advocates of Germany's destiny in the Balkans, was quite critical of Manoilescu's economic theory, though not on traditional grounds of free trade.[20] He regarded Manoilescu's policy as doubtful in practice because of the lack of consumer purchasing power in Rumania. Moreover, Manoilescu's emphasis upon increasing labor productivity would intensify rather than improve the problem of surplus population. "For the more labor-productive an industry is, the more capital and the fewer workers it needs . . . The solution of the overpopulation problem is to be sought least of all in the development of highly technical and strictly rationalized or, as Manoilescu says, 'labor productive' industries."[21] Wagemann recommended intensification and diversifica- 185

19. German Institute for Business Research, *Weekly Report*, Nos. 13-14 (April 6, 1939), p. 42.

20. Ernst Wagemann, "The Pressure of Population as an Economic Force," German Institute for Business Research, *Weekly Report*, Nos. 25/26 and 27/28 (June 29–July 14, 1939). This article is a translation from Wagemann's book, *Der neue Balkan; altes Land, junge Wirtschaft* (Hamburg, 1939).

21. *Ibid.*, Nos. 25/26, p. 3.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

185 tion of agriculture, which would increase yield, diminish surplus population, and, incidentally, supply Germany with agricultural products. As for industry,

> in the Balkan countries the point has not yet been reached where industrial plants can be developed with the resources available within the country. . . . Industrialization must be limited at first to those industries which make use of domestic raw material. Germany, the most important trade partner, can in the long run deliver industrial products, but not raw materials such as cotton. If industrialization includes the first processing of agricultural products and the smelting of mining products, the export is assured.[22]

While Madgearu's appraisal in 1940 of the 1939 agreement may have been cautiously phrased for political reasons, it probably reflects his views. His chief reservations concerned the manner in which the agreement might be carried out but not the principles of the agreement. He was worried lest wheat, which did not receive preference in the agreement, might suffer during the period of reorganization, although he was always in favor of reducing the production of cereals in Rumanian agriculture. More particularly, he was afraid that the system of assuring prices and markets for the peasants cultivating the new specialized crops might—if the peasants were unable to defend themselves through cooperative organization—be to their ultimate disadvantage, since the purchasing societies, which had a monopoly, could dictate prices. Here, of course, he showed a quite realistic awareness of the way in which the best laid plans were usually carried out in Rumania. He also expressed some concern lest the mixed German-Rumanian companies transfer all the benefits to Germany, the stronger partner. Finally, he was not pleased with Ger-

22. *Ibid.*, Nos. 25/26, p. 3, and Nos. 27/28, p. 3. There are several flaws in Wagemann's line of argument. His criticism of Manoilescu's theory in terms of the overpopulation question, or of unemployment, is not relevant to Manoilescu's thesis. Moreover, as Wilbert Moore (*Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe*, p. 115–118) points out, diversification of agriculture also requires increased capital and an improved market structure. While Wagemann attacks Manoilescu's industrialization as failing to solve the overpopulation problem, Moore quite correctly shows that Wagemann's program for increasing agricultural output would scarcely compensate for the growth of population. Wagemann estimated that agricultural production in the Balkans could increase by 50 per cent in the course of a generation. Moore, however, shows that with Rumania's rate of population growth the per capita production in Rumania, using as a base European per capita production, 1931–35 = 100, would rise only from 48 to 55, hardly enough to justify Wagemann's rosy predictions. Moore's conclusion is, I believe, justified: "Wagemann's 'analysis' . . . follows from the official policy and not from a scientific appraisal of the facts."

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

many's increasing monopoly over Rumanian trade and hoped to keep the door open for other markets.[23] 185

Apart from these important qualifications, however, he expressed his approval of Germany's program for Rumania, the intensification of agriculture, the creation of agricultural industries, and the establishment of mixed companies for mining and petroleum. In general, he seems to have regarded Rumania's increasing economic ties with Germany as largely in the nature of things and only secondarily as a result of policy: "This situation is not so much the result of a crystallization of policy as a change in the structure of the Rumanian economy, which gradually with the advance of the process of industrialization diminished the degree of complementarity with a series of countries and increased it with regard to one alone—Germany."[24]

Although it may seem surprising that the German policy embodied in the agreement of March, 1939, should have more in common with the economic aims of a National Peasant than with a pro-Axis corporatist, the reason is obvious. The National Peasants, believing in economic interdependence and the international division of labor, disapproved of fostering Rumanian industry at the expense of agriculture.[25] Germany, for its own reasons, desired the Balkans to increase their agricultural production and to stay away from secondary industries. On the other hand, Manoilescu's industrial ambitions were unwelcome to the Germans because of their similarity to German aims, a case of like poles repelling. This antagonism arising out of an attempt at similarity is a characteristic of Rumanian history. The earlier effort of the Liberals to emulate the West had led to the economic xenophobia of the Brătianus.

The success of the German-Rumanian agreement could have been measured only after a number of years of peaceful development; it may be doubted whether the results anticipated could have been achieved in the five years of the agreement. But such a peaceful period was not to be granted. In the year after the inauguration of the five-year plan Rumania had lost one third of its territory, Carol had fled the country, and Marshal Antonescu had joined Hitler's war against the Soviet Union. The territorial losses alone severely disorganized the economic program. By the loss of Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina, Northern Transylvania, and Southern Dobrogea Rumania was deprived of 34 per cent of its total area, 37 per cent of the arable land, 311 433

23. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei romînești*, pp. 372–374.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 301.

25. For somewhat analogous reasons, at the time of the First World War several Rumanian populists had been pro-German because they saw Germany as the industrial complement to Rumania's agrarian society.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

311 44 per cent of the forest land, 27 per cent of the orchards, and 37
433 per cent of the vineyards. Of the area devoted to wheat (as of 1939) it lost 37 per cent, to maize 30 per cent, to sunflower 75 per cent, to hemp 43 per cent, and 86 per cent of the area devoted to soya. The regions, chiefly Bessarabia, in which the new industrial crops had been most intensively cultivated were lost. Finally, the whole economy was put on a war footing, first for Germany and then for Rumania itself.

185 Notwithstanding all Carol's laws and decrees, no real solutions
433 were found to the agrarian question. It is illuminating to look through the volumes of the *Enciclopedia României*, published in the last years of Carol's reign as a monument to the Rumanian rebirth. Amid all the fanfare of Rumania's marvelous progress and glowing future, the articles on agriculture and land tenure strike a discordant and often deeply pessimistic note.

To be sure, the trend in the 1930's was toward increasing industrialization as the solution to Rumania's economic difficulties, and in the long run, had the war not intervened, this might have brought beneficial results even to agriculture. As it was, however, much of the industrialization was achieved at the expense of agriculture, and for all its expansion it was neither bringing agriculture any great technical improvements nor beginning to absorb the excess agricultural population. The five-year plan and the laws to rationalize land tenure and consolidate holdings might have provided a healthier foundation for agriculture had they been carried out conscientiously, but there is little evidence that they meant anything more than many previous legislative acts which clutter the Rumanian statute books. It is doubtful whether the peasant would have benefited greatly from a plan ordained by divine providence if it had been left to the Carol administration to execute it. With all its attacks on "outworn" parties and its praise for the younger generation, the Carol dictatorship lacked the stature to be a modernizing dictatorship along the lines of Kemal Ataturk's regime. The new German orientation might have benefited Rumanian agriculture, but given the power relations it is more likely that Rumania would have become the object of an efficient colonial policy.

654 Among the social studies undertaken in the period of Carol's dictatorship there was one which makes a fitting conclusion to the Carolist period, and indeed illustrates the failure to master the agrarian question during the interwar years. In the summer and autumn of 1939 a Rumanian research team made a field study of the *plasă* (an administrative unit in a judeţ) Dâmbovnicul, in the south of the

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

judeţ of Argeş.[26] This plasă was selected and is of interest for a number of reasons. It lay midway between the Carpathians and the Danube Valley and was in the heart of Wallachia. Having closer communications than many regions with roads leading to the capital, it had long been under the commercial influences which have so profoundly affected Rumanian society; it was not a primitive untouched district but was showing the full effect of what the investigators called "Americanization." Its population was almost entirely Rumanian and almost entirely devoted to agriculture. It lay near Răteşti, the family estate of the Brătianus, and Topoloveni, Mihalache's town, and had consequently received a good deal of attention from the parties in their political campaigns. Hence, Dâmbovnicul, if not the average Rumanian plasă, was an excellent representative of an agricultural community of the Old Kingdom and displayed the principal problems peculiar to Rumania.

What were the conditions in this community in the summer of 1939? Over nine-tenths of the population was engaged in agriculture; in the remaining tenth there were more public officials than merchants, tradesmen, or artisans. Of the 9,400 heads of families, about two-thirds (6,681) were cultivators on their own land or estate owners; 772 worked the land in dijma, that is, under the old crop-sharing tenure; 571 were agricultural day laborers, 144 were farm hands, and only 30 were tenants. About 87 per cent of the land was agricultural; forests which had once been extensive had by this time been reduced below the local needs for firewood and timber. Wheat, maize, and oats occupied almost three-fourths of the arable land.

The density of agricultural population was somewhat below the average for Rumania, but there were just under 70 inhabitants dependent upon agriculture per square kilometer of agricultural land. Evidence of overpopulation was seen in the use of practically all the land for cereals, the small size of exploitations, and in the search for auxiliary sources of income. About 23 per cent of the families had less than one hectare of land, and 56 per cent less than 3 hectares. These small holdings were further subdivided into numerous strips; the properties between one and three hectares, for example, were composed on the average of 6 plots of .3 hectares each. For the level of cultivation in this region, 4–5 hectares were the minimum adequate to feed a family of 4–5 members, but only 22 per cent of the properties were over 5 hectares. Competition for land was intense, the terms for land worked in dijma were becoming increasingly severe,

26. Mihai Pop and A. Golopenţia, *Dâmbovnicul, o plasă din sudul Judeţului Argeş* (Bucarest, 1942).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

162 and the investigators found many of the old labor contracts and obli-
311 gations associated with pre-1914 Rumania.

Unable to support themselves in the community, many peasants
511 were seeking temporary work in nearby market towns, and a number
464 traveled as far as Bucarest, a distance of about 70 kilometers. The
369 exodus in most cases was not permanent, and the peasants after earn-
166 ing some money returned to Dâmbovnicul. This movement to the city was a reflection of the new conditions, which were also seen in the houses and garments of the peasants: houses were no longer built to last generations as was the case in the more isolated districts to the north; the national costume was relegated to Sundays. Birth and death rates were high and the natural increase outran the emigration away from the plasă. The standard of living was very low; many families were undernourished.

A definite differentiation in the peasantry was developing. A few peasants—mostly those who had inherited medium properties—were enlarging their holdings; a few new peasant estates of over 100 hectares had been created. The poorer peasants, including many who had been allotted land, were losing their holdings. Investigations into debts and credit showed that even after the conversion of 1934 about half the households were in debt. Credit provided by the cooperative banks went almost entirely to the larger peasants; in one commune holdings of up to 5 hectares received only 7.9 per cent of the loans. The special political interest shown by the parties in the judeţ of Argeş seemed to have brought no benefits beyond permitting local party stalwarts to obtain extra funds to purchase land from peasants who were in debt or in need of money.

Such, then, was the land of happy peasants with their colorful folkways so picturesquely displayed in the travel literature of the Carolist era.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

page 223

XI

THE FASCIST PERIOD, 1940–44

Rumanian Fascism

THE term fascist period, here used to cover the years of the Iron Guard and Antonescu dictatorships is not altogether satisfactory except in the general sense of describing a dictatorial regime in military alliance with Hitler Germany. The government of Marshal Antonescu, especially after his victory over the Iron Guard in January, 1941, was really a military dictatorship, in many respects like the numerous other military dictatorships in Balkan history, although it took over many of the trappings and practices of fascism. The word fascism itself has been given any number of meanings and nuances. To some it is the death rattle of monopoly capitalism; to others, anti-Semitism and racial glorification; to others, a form of national chauvinism; and to others merely a synonym for dictatorship plus hooliganism. It would be fruitless here to attempt an exact definition of fascism, especially for Rumania where, at one time or another, practically every party has had the word "fascist" hyphenated to it by its opponents. 68

For all the vagueness of the term there was in Rumania a political current, appearing in a relatively unadulterated form in the Iron Guard and as a more or less important element in other political formations, which is quite recognizable and for which fascism is as good a name as any. Perhaps it can best be approached negatively, for ultimately it was a negative spirit. In the preceding sections the effort has been made to extract the positive content of several political currents and to examine their significance in terms of the problems of Rumanian society. It has been seen that the agrarian question was a perennial and chronic affliction deeply rooted in Rumanian society and to a very considerable extent the product of Rumania's contacts with Western industrial society. Along with the various attempts to find a positive solution—however inadequate or misdirected they may have been—there was also an impulse to a negative response. Indeed it is possible to say that fascism represents an irrational reaction against an unsolved problem in the body politic or, more precisely, in the context of an industrial or industrializing

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

668 economy. It is something like a cancerous growth in an organism which arises from some chronic irritation, takes on a life of its own, displays great dynamism for a time, and ultimately is destructive of the body which produced it. If such an analogy be fair, it is necessary not to confuse an analysis of the unsolved problem with a justification of the fascist response, or to regard fascism as an inexplicable evil possessing the body of an innocent.

In its resort to the nonrational, fascism makes an appeal to the spontaneous, the organic, the primitive, and the mythical, to the instinctive rather than the logical aspects of human and social experience. From these it gains its emotional force and appeal. At the same time, the appeal to the natural and the traditional is itself an artificial and somewhat self-conscious act; the effort to reinvoke the spontaneous is itself not a wholly spontaneous act. Thus, fascism does not originate in the lowest and most backward strata of society but is usually in its initial stages an intellectual movement. In its origins at least it is not the creation of a nation or a social group which is at the bottom of the heap, but rather appears among those nations, social groups, or individuals which have advanced to the extent of being aware of their position and at the same time of being resentful and frustrated.

563 668 Conditions favorable to the various manifestations of fascism were certainly not lacking in Rumania. The struggle to achieve an independent national existence, the prolonged insecurity as a small state, the effort not only to escape the shadow of the great powers but to maintain a position in the scrambling of the Balkan states—all these led to an intense political nationalism which easily boiled over into chauvinism. The ethnic confusion of southeastern Europe and especially Rumania's sense of isolation in the "great sea of Slavs" produced a strong ethnic nationalism. Anti-Semitism had been endemic in Rumania since its appearance as an independent state; the Congress of Berlin had obliged the new Rumanian government to amend the constitution to grant Jews citizenship. The Jewish problem in Rumania was not a simple one. Especially in Moldavia there had been a rapid influx of Jews, largely from Russian Poland, in the nineteenth century; the population of the urban centers was largely Jewish; most of the commercial activities were carried on by the Jews. This situation, combined with Rumanian nationalism and the desire for self-assertion, produced the perfect atmosphere for anti-Semitism. The national literary movement at the end of the nineteenth century had a strong anti-Semitic tone. Professor Cuza, the Rumanians liked

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

to say, was preaching the gospel of anti-Semitism while Hitler was still an infant.

But if nationalism and anti-Semitism are the constant handmaids of fascism, they do not wholly describe it. The element in fascism giving it its significance to the twentieth century is its response to the challenge of industrialism. It is for this reason that of the various political currents of pre-1914 Rumania populism had the closest affinity to some of the later manifestations of Rumanian fascism.[1] The populist response to this challenge, for all the specific rational arguments it may have advanced regarding the economic advantages of peasant farming, was fundamentally negative in its idealization of the unspoiled peasant and in its hostility to industry and the capitalist Golgotha. To these it added a strong cultural nationalism, a tendency to anti-Semitism, and that special characteristic of later fascism, a hatred of Marxism. To be sure, fascism is not generally anti-industrial. The tensions of contemporary industrial society impinge in different ways on different countries. But in the case of Rumania, with its particular position vis-à-vis industrial society, the fascist response in its most characteristic form involved this negation and an exaltation of the peasant.

During the interwar period Rumanian fascism developed in two phases. A number of fascist groups appeared immediately after the First World War, principally among students and the military, as a part of the general social turmoil brought about by the war. At that time fascism developed its leadership but did not become a mass movement. A second phase appeared with the depression; fascism broadened its influence and in the course of the 1930's increasingly dominated the political horizon. It took innumerable forms in Rumania: as an element in a larger political party, as a conscious imitation of foreign fascism, or as an authentic Rumanian fascist movement. In the first case, various manifestations of fascism, such as extreme chauvinism or anti-Semitism, appeared as a tendency in one of the established parties and often led to a schism. The defections of Octavian Goga and later of Vaida Voevod from the National Peasants may be taken as examples. In those cases where it took the form of an imitation of foreign fascism it was merely following the Rumanian practice of borrowing from the more developed European states.

An interesting example of borrowed fascism was the short-lived Fascia Națională Română, which began as a student organization

1. See above, p. 147.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

668 in Bucarest in 1923 and was later absorbed by Cuza's League of Christian Defense. This movement, which was never of any importance, was explicitly modeled on Italian fascism.[2] Its program had all the formulae of early fascism, but smelled of the candle and was a rather unimaginative academic exercise. A rabid anti-Semitism was the core of the program, which included detailed plans of the best ways to rid Rumania of the Jews. The Fascia was to be highly nationalistic, anticapitalist, antisocialist, anti-Communist, and antiparliamentarian.

But after a parade of these sentiments, with appropriate quotations from Mussolini, Barrès, and Maurras, and the promise of a two-year dictatorship to eradicate rotten politicians, the actual economic program was reminiscent of populism. Rumania should be an exclusively agricultural country; industrial states were less happy and had social upheavals. Agrarian reform should limit property to 100 hectares and land should belong only to those who cultivated it. Proposed agricultural improvements included the familiar clichés, model farms, cooperation, more machinery, more fertilizer, and better seed. Industry should not be protected; cottage crafts should be fostered. The commercial policy was quite simple: no imports without twice as many exports; this it was felt would assure a safe balance of trade. The program was clearly intended to appeal to peasants, workmen, and, above all, to the army, but in general it gives the impression of being the outpouring of a rather vicious schoolboy, which in all probability it was.[3]

Of far greater importance than this jejune attempt at fascism was the Iron Guard, or, more properly, the Legion of the Archangel Michael, which, while it had a number of similar traits and copied certain Italian and German features, was an authentic Rumanian fascist movement. Its founder Corneliu Zelea Codreanu was born in Iaşi in 1899.[4] Physically he was extremely impressive, tall, very handsome, with powerful and compelling features. He had received a good deal of military training in his youth and had absorbed the nationalist doctrines of Cuza and Iorga. In the spring of 1919 he began his career

2. Titus P. Vifor, *Doctrina fascismului român, şi anteproiectul de program* (Bucarest, 1924).

3. The only really original proposal was that the clubhouses of the disbanded political parties should be converted into state-supervised brothels.

4. There was a great controversy whether Codreanu was really a Rumanian or not. His opponents pointed out that his mother was of German origin and his father had changed his name from Zelinski to Zelea in 1902. Codreanu's supporters maintained that the name Zelinski had been forced upon his forebears because they had lived in southern Galicia under the Austrians, and pointed out that both sides of the family had belonged to the Orthodox Church, a sign of their Rumanian nationality.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

by organizing a group of companions in the Moldavian border town of Huşi to fight the Communists. In the same year he entered the law faculty at the University of Iaşi, where his principal activity was fomenting student riots against Jews and Communists. Codreanu was not of peasant origin; his father was a teacher, an active politician, and colleague of Professor Cuza. Codreanu not only studied at Iaşi but in 1922 attended lectures at the University of Berlin and later studied law at Grenoble.

In 1923 Professor Cuza founded his anti-Semitic party, the League of National Christian Defense; Codreanu became one of the party organizers. He was soon imprisoned for preparing a list of prominent politicians and Jewish leaders to be liquidated. While in prison he conceived the idea of the Legion of the Archangel Michael, taking the name from a statue of the saint in the prison chapel at Văcăreşti. Initially the Legion was a youth movement attached to the League of Christian Defense. Codreanu first gained national recognition in October, 1924, when he shot the police chief of Iaşi who had tried to break up his anti-Semitic activities. He was acquitted in a much-publicized trial which only augmented his popularity in anti-Semitic circles.

After 1924 Codreanu broke with Cuza. He always recognized his debt to the older man's teachings but felt that Cuza was tied to parliamentary politics and failed to see the need of a more dynamic policy. After a stay in France he founded, in 1927, an independent Legion of the Archangel Michael. In 1930 he created the Iron Guard as a combat unit to fight communism. In effect it was identical with the Legion, although intended to be its military branch and to include other groups desiring to enter the crusade.

When Vaida Voevod was Minister of the Interior in the National Peasant government he gave Codreanu a measure of unofficial support and even granted him permission to take a column of Guardists across the Prut to preach the archangelic gospel in darkest Bessarabia.[5] Mihalache, who replaced Vaida Voevod in 1930, took a sterner attitude and on January 11, 1931, attempted to dissolve the Legion and the Iron Guard. By this time the movement was gaining a strong mass following. In August, 1931, Codreanu won a seat in the chamber. The Liberal leader Duca again dissolved the Guard in 1933, for which he was assassinated, with Codreanu's knowledge and approval. In November, 1934, the movement assumed a new label, the All for the Fatherland party (Totul pentru Ţara), under the nominal leadership of General Cantacuzino. The Legion continued to grow in

5. Klaus Charle, *Die eiserne Garde* (Berlin; Vienna, 1939), p. 28.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

668 strength and by the time of the 1937 elections it appeared to be the outstanding force in Rumanian politics.

With Carol's sudden counterattack in 1938 it collapsed in surprising fashion. On February 21, 1938, Codreanu disbanded the movement to avoid, he said, unnecessary loss of blood. This may have been a purely tactical retreat, but it was certainly an anticlimax to the blood and thunder of Legionary oratory. The following day he sent a letter to all the old ministers who participated in Carol's coup, protesting against the dictatorship, which he saw as a dead form, and complaining that the older generation had betrayed its own ideals of legality. In the spring he was arrested, on a charge of libel against Iorga, condemned, and imprisoned. In November, 1938, he was shot by the Siguranța "while attempting to escape."

What was the Legionary movement? In some respects it was a copy of Italian fascism and German national-socialism, with its colored shirts, Roman salutes, paramilitary formations, and cult of a leader—*Capitanul*. Its anticommunism, anti-Semitism, and antiparliamentarianism, however, were home-grown. Codreanu used to say that he had adopted these principles before he had ever heard of Hitler, and that indeed when he had been in Berlin in 1922 he was able to show the light to several Germans who later became prominent Nazis. Codreanu's anti-Semitism had something of the frenzied quality one finds in the authentic Nazi—he professed to be physically stricken at the sight of Jews. His anticommunism was in part a corollary to his anti-Semitism, in that he considered communism a vehicle of international Jewish machinations.

The anticommunism of the Legion cannot, however, be explained wholly in terms of anti-Semitism. To some extent at least it was a reaction against what might be called the outrageous logicality of Marxism. Like fascism, Marxism was a response to the tensions of contemporary society but in its critique it attacked not only bourgeois society but also all the popular coexisting romantic and traditional attachments: its internationalism outraged national sensibilities; its dialectical materialism robbed the world of its myths and its homely beliefs. Fascism was based precisely upon these nonrational but deep sentiments. Hence, despite their mutual assault upon bourgeois society and their similarity in tactics there was a mortal enmity between the two movements.

In these qualities, however, the Iron Guard was merely the Rumanian manifestation of a European phenomenon. It had, in addition, certain more specifically Rumanian features. While the Nazis

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

and the Italian Fascists were not on good terms with the churches,668 the Legion of the Archangel Michael was avowedly an Orthodox Christian movement and was fully aware of its distinctiveness in this respect. Guardist meetings were preceded by a religious service. The employment of religious symbolism and mysticism was not merely a tactical device of the Legion but was an integral part of its ideology. This religious element was undoubtedly of importance in the diffusion and quality of the Iron Guard's influence in Rumania, especially among the peasantry.

A second quality of the Guard was its cult of the primitive; not, however, the German primitivism of an ancient golden age in the *Urwald* but the primitivism of contemporary Rumanian peasant life. Reacting against the frustrations and anomalies of Rumanian society the Guard invoked the unspoiled soul of the peasant, sometimes even to the extent of glorifying his illiteracy. Such a reaction is not difficult to understand. Anyone who has visited Bucarest and seen the pseudo-French culture of the wealthy, the overeager imitations in art, architecture, and thought, and then contrasted them with the attractive side of Rumanian peasant life, the strange but moving music, the magnificent taste and sensibility of peasant handwork and folk ballads, is strongly tempted to condemn the former and wish wistfully that something authentic and real could develop from this peasant culture. At best there is something touching in this attempt to restore a national integrity permitting the flowering of native potentialities in place of a bastard culture, derivative, and without life of its own.[6]

Unfortunately this problem cannot be solved by simply eradicating foreign influences and reverting to the simplicity of the peasant: "Those who have a Fall behind them can never become innocent again."[7] Rumanian folk culture, if left to itself for an indefinite period of time, might have evolved its own advanced cultural forms but it was not. The Rumanian peasant today adds a sheet iron roof to his picturesque hut, tops his traditional costume with a battered felt hat, and pins up a cheap photograph with his icons and wood

6. In this connection it is of interest to note that in his analysis of the 1937 elections, C. Enescu observed that the purely anti-Semitic vote (i.e., in the districts with a large Jewish population) tended to go to the Cuza-Goga party rather than to the Iron Guard, which seemed to gain its votes from a more general dissatisfaction with the whole of Rumanian public life. *Sociologie Romînească*, 2, Nos. 11–12 (November–December, 1937), p. 523.

7. Alfred Weber, *Farewell to European History*, trans. R. F. C. Hull (London, 1947), p. 198.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

668 carvings without the slightest feeling of incongruity. An attempt to take away the sheet iron, the manufactured hat, the photograph, and all which they imply would be a retrograde step.

A third, and less attractive, characteristic of the Legionary movement was a marked morbidity and cult of death. To some extent this derived from the Christian belief that death must precede resurrection. It was also an aspect of the idea of sacrifice and self-abnegation to be found in other fascist movements. It stimulated the "heroic assassination" and the "death squads" and contributed to the series of political murders which convulsed the 1930's.

According to the Legionary code the unit was not the individual but the "nest," a collectivity that included not only living Legionaries but ancestors and those yet unborn. This spirit led to the Legionary practice of continually exhuming and exalting dead comrades. The code included also the less distinctive commandments of loyalty, comradeship, obedience, discipline, work, and honor.

Such were the emotional drives of the Iron Guard. It is not surprising that the program of such a movement should have been vague. In fact, the Legion was against programs. "The country is going to ruin," said Codreanu, "not for lack of programs but for lack of men." [8] All the old parties had a superfluity of programs which had achieved nothing. Before a program could be meaningful, it was necessary to develop the new man, free from the corruption of the past. "Today the Rumanian people do not need a great politician, as is erroneously believed. The Rumanian people today need a great teacher and leader, who will overcome the powers of darkness and destroy the brood of Hell." [9] In their slogans the Legionaries used such phrases as *Omul şi pogonul* (the man and the pogon) and *Hectarul şi sufletul* (the hectare and the soul) but these should be understood not as an agrarian program but rather as a symbol of the peasant's deep ties with mother earth.

In 1937 Codreanu did create the Battalion of Legionary Commerce, the purpose of which was to replace the Jews in trade and to prove that Rumanians, too, could be good merchants. Restaurants and shops were set up which were to be the core of a new economic spirit. In Italy, fascism had formed an alliance with corporatism, and in Rumania a similar mingling took place in some of the fascist currents. But it is interesting to note that Codreanu did not take up corporatism. In spite of the fact that Manoilescu was a good friend of the Legion and had been elected to the senate on its list, his efforts

8. Codreanu, *Eiserne Garde* (Berlin, 1939), p. 273.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 275.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

to incorporate his economic doctrines had little effect. Moţa, one of 668
Codreanu's lieutenants and theoretician for the movement—his initial scholarly contribution had been the translation of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion into Rumanian—had written that corporatism was "entirely colorless from a folk point of view." [10] Corporatism should not come before the basic reform, the creation of the new man, since it would only solidify the existing corruptions in society. It should come afterward if at all.

This distrust of corporatism is not without importance, for it reinforces the supposition that in the 1930's the corporatist current, which so characterizes the latter half of Carol's reign, was in its origins quite different from Guardist fascism, although both were antiparliamentary and in many cases made political alliances. Corporatism was a consequence of an economic outlook, the Guard was an emotional and evangelical reaction against the existing order.

In its initial stages the Iron Guard found its principal support in student circles and in discontented elements on the fringes of society. In the 1930's it became a mass movement, as is shown—in rough approximation at least—by comparing its popular vote of 30,783 (1.2 per cent) in 1931 with the 478,378 (16.5 per cent) votes it received in 1937.[11] It obtained a following in the peasantry and in urban middle class and working circles. Its most active members were the social misfits, unemployed intellectuals, dismissed civil servants, a number of the members of the old boyar families, plus an assortment of plain toughs and hooligans. The Communists, in attempting to relate this movement to the class struggle, have held that the active support for the Iron Guard came from the interstitial groups, the declassés—the broken aristocracy, the petty bourgeoisie, and the *Lumpenproletariat*.[12] While it is not to be denied that the Iron Guard would have a special appeal to the dispossessed and uprooted, the terms "petty bourgeois" and Lumpenproletariat are notoriously evasive and too easily become catchalls for phenomena not fitting into the Marxist scheme. A somewhat simpler approach would be to see Rumanian society as a whole suffering from general dislocation and the fascist current as a reaction to that dislocation, taking on greater intensity in those parts of society most seriously affected. This would account

10. Charle, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

11. In the same interval Cuza's League, initially the larger, rose only from 113,863 to 281,107, an accurate reflection of greater effectiveness of the Iron Guard's dynamism.

12. Cf. Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, *Problemele de bază ale României* (3d ed., Bucarest, 1946), pp. 259–262. While his argument contains a good deal of truth it suffers from the necessity he feels to prove that the proletariat proper and the peasantry proper could not be activists in a fascist movement.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

668 for the peculiar venom of the declassés as contrasted with the less fanatical support of the impoverished which arose more specifically from the depression.

It is difficult to obtain reliable evidence concerning the calculated support given to the Iron Guard by interested groups, but there are numerous indications that government ministers in the 1930's, such as Vaida Voevod and Tătărescu, did support the Legion unofficially and did not greatly hamper its activities. Undoubtedly in the vast underworld of Rumanian police life, Siguranța officials found it a useful organization for combating Left-wing labor movements. Perhaps one should not place too great stress upon such Machiavellian motives. It is tempting to see in ministers, police chiefs, and mysterious financial interests absolutely cold and calculating individuals who were not in the slightest affected by the atmosphere of their surroundings. But after all both Vaida Voevod and Duca had said that apart from the battle against communism they had hoped to harness what they felt was constructive in the Iron Guard and divert it to less violent activities. It would seem reasonable to assume that they, too, were moved by some of the same sentiments which impelled the Guardists.

648 As to foreign support, there is no question that Hitler regarded
668 Codreanu as his ally, and for good reason. In November, 1937, for example, Codreanu made his celebrated electoral declaration that he was against the Western democracies, against the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente, against the League of Nations, against bolshevism, and in favor of the Rome-Berlin Axis: "Forty-eight hours after our victory we shall have an alliance with Germany and Italy." There is also evidence that in later years, at least, the Germans gave financial support to the Iron Guard, although some of the proofs produced by the Carol dictatorship are suspect. It would be wrong to conclude, however, that the Iron Guard was nothing more than a German fifth column. It was a very significant aspect of Rumanian social and political life.

Rumanian writers of various political beliefs have sought, understandably enough, to prove—by calling the Legion a tool either of the Germans, or of intriguing police chiefs and politicians, or of a class—that it did not represent the Rumanian people. Granted that the Rumanian people are not by nature fascist beasts, nevertheless the Iron Guard cannot be written off as a superficial phenomenon. In its way it was the nemesis of all the false constitutionalism and pseudo-democracy which have been observed in the course of recent Rumanian history.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

Yet the Iron Guard collapsed, not without some horrible spasms 668
and death throes, but collapsed whenever a strong hand was raised against it. When Carol attacked it in 1938, despite the lash-back in the assassination of Calinescu, he had it under control. In 1940 he was overthrown by it only because his regime had been completely discredited. In January, 1941, the Guard was to show its ineffectiveness against Antonescu's army.

This strange weakness lay not in the fact that the Iron Guard was an artificial body, completely unrepresentative, but because it was all too indigenous. Its effectiveness seemed to be inversely related to its nearness to power. In opposition and under Carolist persecution, it seemed powerful and menacing; martyrdom became it well. When it came close to power it showed itself inept and maladroit. In the face of real problems, whether of government or of maintaining power, its aura vanished and its new men proved to be nothing but pillagers and thugs with no idea how to master a country, much less run it. The very negativeness of the Iron Guard, which gives it its particular interest, was its own undoing.

The Dictatorships

The Iron Guard enjoyed a brief period of triumph from Septem- 665
ber, 1940, to January, 1941, during which time it shared power with Gen. Ion Antonescu in a "National-Legionary State." Carol fell because the Germans lacked confidence in him but also because all political groups, including the National Peasants and the old Liberals, detested his regime which had discarded political freedom for the presumed interests of the nation and then had failed to make a move in its defense. At the last hour he had summoned Antonescu, a talented and forceful officer, but a man whose stern ambition both Carol and the Guardists failed to appreciate. After Carol's abdication and Michael's accession to the throne, Maniu and Constantin Brătianu supported Antonescu in the hope and on the condition that he would reestablish a constitutional regime. Such a hope had no chance of realization. Although Antonescu had been known as pro-French in the 1930's, he had by this time made his peace with Hitler and was thoroughly committed to a pro-Nazi policy.[13] He had long been criti-

13. It is evident, however, from the recently published memoirs of the former chief interpreter in the German Foreign Office that Antonescu's attitude was not one of obsequious servility. He vehemently criticized the Vienna Award to Hitler's face and expressed his desire to win back Northern Transylvania by force of arms. Apparently his outspoken attitude, which enabled him to match the Führer's harangues ("Er monologisierte genau wie dieser") plus his enthusiastic hatred of the Slavs and willing-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 cal of traditional Rumanian politics and for several years had been in touch with the extremists advocating a "regeneration" of public life.[14] Moreover, while the Iron Guard had been harried under Carol, had lost its top level of leaders as well as much of its popular support, it still had its fighting cadres who felt that their day had come. The army, the only effective opposing force, was at this time badly demoralized by its inaction during the loss of Bessarabia and Transylvania.

665 661 In the cabinet formed on September 15 Antonescu was head of the state; Horia Sima, leader of the Guard, was Deputy Prime Minister; five other ministers were members of the Guard and the rest personal friends of Antonescu. The Guard was declared the sole legal party, responsible for the moral and material uplift of the Rumanian people. While Antonescu had been on good terms with Codreanu for several years and was at this time wearing the Legionary green shirt, tension quickly developed between him and his unruly allies. As a military man he wanted to reestablish law and order, whereas the Guard was champing for its revolution. Within the Guard itself were a number of factions, moderate and extreme, which were disputing Codreanu's mantle.

The pentup violence of the Guard, which had not found satisfaction at the time of Carol's abdication and had not been diverted into other channels, finally broke loose at the end of November, apparently with Horia Sima's approval but without Antonescu's knowledge. The Legionaries incited bloody Jewish pogroms and attempted to wipe out the politicians and civil servants of the previous regime. The army prevented the successful completion of this undertaking, but the Guard did succeed in killing the historian Iorga, the economist Virgil Madgearu, and in massacring sixty-four political prisoners in the Jilava Prison, most of whom had been Carol's agents and police chiefs instrumental in repressing the Legion.

By this time, however, German influence had become decisive. In October, 1940, German troops came into Rumania, ostensibly to reorganize the army; a German economic mission arrived to coordinate the Rumanian economy with the German war machine. The Third Reich's greatest interest was in increasing Rumania's output, and

---

ness to fight the Russians, won Hitler's confidence and trust to a surprising degree. See Dr. Paul Schmidt, *Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, 1923–45; Erlebnisse des Chefdolmetschers im Auswärtigen Amt mit den Staatsmännern Europas* (Bonn, Athenäum-Verlag, 1949), pp. 511–512, 538, 548–549, 574.

14. Harald Laeuen, *Marschall Antonescu* (Essen, 1943), p. 27.

3. Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

for this it required a degree of stability, not the hectic atmosphere created by Guardist terror squads. Consequently, when Antonescu in December began to take measures to bring the Guard to heel, he had German support, although the Legionaries refused to believe that the Germans would desert their most ardent allies. Antonescu proceeded to disarm their formations and to strengthen the army. Seeing their position undermined, the Guard on January 21, 1941, attempted to revolt. They were suppressed by the army after three days of savage fighting in which they outdid themselves in committing bestial atrocities. On January 27 Antonescu formed a new cabinet composed almost entirely of military officers. The Iron Guard was dissolved, the Legionary state abolished, and a firm military dictatorship under the *Conducator* came into being. Thus fell one of the first fascist movements in Europe and, ironically enough, at just the time Nazi Germany achieved complete predominance in Rumania.

Under the Antonescu dictatorship political life ceased altogether; the army and the Germans were in complete control. A couple of plebiscites provided the necessary stamp of legality and the government, with very few changes, remained in power for the next three years. In June, 1941, Antonescu joined Hitler in the war against the Soviet Union. Maniu and Constantin Brătianu supported the war until the recovery of Bessarabia and Bucovina, though they protested against the dictatorship. After Rumanian troops crossed the Dniester, they dispatched notes of protest to Antonescu demanding Rumania's withdrawal from the war. But by this time he was too deeply involved in the German adventure. In October, 1941, he annexed Transnistria, that part of the Ukraine lying between the Dniester and Bug rivers and including Odessa. Rumanian troops went on and on until they reached Stalingrad. Then began the slow retreat.

Well before his overthrow Antonescu, now a Marshal, realized that the war was lost but was unwilling to take the steps to extricate Rumania, although he permitted envoys of the political parties to establish contact with the Allies. In the absence of effective opposition he was able to maintain power until the Russians, who had been checked in northern Moldavia in the spring of 1944, resumed their offensive in the late summer. With the imminent threat of Rumania becoming a battlefield and being further devastated by increasing American bombing raids, King Michael seized the initiative, arrested him, and sought an armistice.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

The Agrarian Question

668 The agrarian policy of the Iron Guard may be dismissed briefly. The Legionaries prided themselves on having no formal program and they were in power only five months. During its years of growth the Iron Guard had gained extensive influence among the peasants because of its range of emotional appeals and even more because of its extravagant if nebulous promises to provide land. As has been said, however, the slogan, omul şi pogonul was less a directive—which would have been absurd, since a pogon equals half a hectare—than an emotional rally. For example, one of the Legionary writers, A. Balota, said that there should be a return to the village, not "to seek under false democratic pretexts social justice for the worker on the land, but to achieve ethnic justice for the peasant." [15]

The activities of the Guard during its five months in office appear to have been little more than pillage and extortion. Some of the actions purported to be in the Robin Hood tradition of taking from the rich to give to the poor, but the taking was far more evident than the giving. The Guard was active in the villages; there were incessant parades, processions and ceremonies but no constructive action. The only important land measure was a decree converting Jewish-held rural property into state property, in exchange for "interest-bearing securities." Land thus obtained was to be used to provide for refugees from Bessarabia, Transylvania, and Bucovina. The abysmal failure of the Guard, for all its *élan* and promises, to achieve anything for the peasant increased the skepticism among the peasants, if such was possible, that anything good could come from the powers above.[16] The importance of the Iron Guard to the agrarian question does not lie in anything which it achieved, for it achieved nothing, but in evidence it affords of the dead rot in Rumanian society.

Although Antonescu frequently expressed his love for the Ru-

15. A. Balota, *Satul izvor de viaţa romînească*, quoted in Pătrăşcanu, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

16. In this connection I recall a conversation with a group of peasants in the village of Hangu in the Moldavian Carpathians in January, 1945. Like most mountain villagers they were desperately land hungry, and were particularly resentful that several thousand hectares of land, mostly forest, belonged to one large landowner. At that time they were curious to learn more about the activities of Petru Groza's Ploughmen's Front, whose organisers had not yet reached them. They were of course interested in the prospects of having more land but stated they were very skeptical of such promises. A number of the men in the village had joined the Iron Guard in the hopes of obtaining land; they had not received any land but had been imprisoned when the Guard was suppressed.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

manian peasant,[17] under his dictatorship the overriding concerns were mobilizing agriculture for the war, compensating for the lost territories (though part of these were regained after 1941), and maintaining production against the drain on manpower and the requisitioning of equipment and livestock for military purposes. The majority of acts were specific war measures: price controls, export controls, laws against agricultural sabotage and speculation, control of livestock, state requisitioning of cereals, crop planning, and the mobilization of agricultural labor. Most of the measures had been initiated in Carol's reign under the trade agreement with Germany and the five-year plan for agriculture, but the war intensified them and put them on a directly military footing. By necessity there was an increase in the mobilization of agricultural labor. Field commandos and labor gangs were sent about the country under the supervision of gendarmes and rural agents of the Ministry of Agriculture.

An attempt was made to compensate for the shortage of manpower and livestock by increasing agricultural equipment, largely through import from Germany. If the figures are to be trusted imports in 1941 and 1942 were quite extensive:[18]

	1941	*1942*
Tractors with ploughs	1,000	2,814
Animal-drawn ploughs	20,000	40,000
Sowing drills	4,000	1,400
Harvesters	2,000	2,230
Hoes	10,000	30,000
Harrows	4,000	9,200
Threshers	200	250

By a law of June 22, 1942, for the organization of agricultural associations, the government attempted to overcome the disadvantages of small strip farming by means reminiscent of the Iorga law of 1931. By this act a group of at least fifteen cultivators residing in the same commune could constitute an agricultural association, authorized to purchase farm machinery, seeds, fertilizers, etc., sell produce in common, purchase or lease land, and obtain credit. The association was not an independent body however. It was to be man-

17. According to an admiring German biography, Antonescu first attracted attention during the 1907 uprising when, as a young lieutenant, he succeeded, without firing a shot, in persuading a crowd of rebellious peasants to disband.

18. Brief accounts of the measures undertaken up to 1948 are given by N. D. Cornăţeanu, "International Chronicle of Agriculture: Rumania," *International Review of Agriculture, 32* (Rome, July–August, 1941), 247E–254E; and *34* (April, 1943), 156E–164E.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

56 aged by five trustees; the Ministry of Agriculture was to supervise
241 its business transactions, and technical and administrative control lay in the hands of the chief of the agricultural district. Members were obliged to conform to the requirements of the government crop plan. It was reported in 1944 that about 200 such associations had been established.[19]

This law did not really represent anything new in Rumania but was merely one of the various measures which had been applied from time to time to overcome the agrarian impasse. It represents, however, a somewhat different approach from that emphasized by either the National Peasants or the Carolist dictatorship. The National Peasants had placed greatest stress upon credit, cooperatives, and diversification of production, with a view to creating the small peasant on the Western model. The Carolist regime, in its activities of 1938 and 1939, was aiming at consolidation and the creation of middle properties. The law of 1942 was an attempt to improve the situation on the basis of existing circumstances, of utilizing in the most efficient way possible the uneconomic system of land holdings. To be sure, all the approaches overlapped somewhat, but in a way the 1942 act was a bridge to the agricultural policy of the post-1945 government.

311 The Germans, for their own reasons, were anxious to develop Ru-
185 manian agriculture as part of the economy of the new order, although their estimate of what could be achieved in Rumanian agriculture was relatively modest. A wartime analysis by some German experts[20] presented a very dismal picture of Rumanian farming as of 1940. According to their report the principal difficulties lay in the low yield resulting from the small size of the majority of the holdings (they noted that most of the large properties were cultivated in metayage) and in the inadequacy of the transport system, both the general network and the village roads. They doubted whether agriculture itself

19. Otto von Franges, "Agricultural Labour Communities in South Eastern Europe," *International Review of Agriculture, 35* (January–February, 1944), 22E–32E. Von Franges was heartily in favor of these associations, of which similar types had been established in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. In his opinion they corresponded to traditional labor associations of the Balkan peasants and showed an admirable balance between individualism and collectivism, between control and liberty. He sharply contrasted these associations with agricultural cooperatives. The latter, while having a useful function, were obliged to neglect the poorer peasant. The associations, he felt, were the only possible compensation for the fragmentation of peasant properties and the only means of obtaining a decent improvement of productivity until the slow process of consolidation could take place.

20. H. L. Fensch and O. Thiel, *Rumänien, Untersuchung über die Betriebs- und Ernährungswirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse der Landwirtschaft.* (I have seen only a manuscript Rumanian translation of this study.)

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

was in any position to remedy either of these defects. They had hopes, however, that measures—such as those taken in 1942—of compensating for inefficient small holdings by means of common use of machines, purchase of seed, and organization of sale could bring some improvements. They believed that under existing circumstances it would be possible to increase agricultural production by 25 per cent over ten years and that some 40 per cent of the surplus of cereals and vegetables would be available for export to Germany.

The actual course of Rumanian agriculture during the war showed no such progress. The area devoted to cereals fell appreciably between 1940 and 1943 because of the labor shortage, the decline in livestock and equipment, and the price controls which held cereal prices well below industrial prices.[21] Yields fell off in the principal grains, maize and wheat. The total production of cereals dropped from a 1935–39 average of 75.7 million quintals (for the area as of January, 1941) to 61–64 million (38 million in 1942 following an exceptionally severe winter).[22] Because of war needs the area devoted to industrial and food crops increased, in most cases as the result of government support and crop plans. It was still very small, however, compared with that under cereals. In livestock the greatest reduction, as was to be expected, was in horses; cattle increased somewhat; sheep, goats, and pigs remained about the same.

The number of draft animals declined by one-third, though the most serious fall was between 1943 and the beginning of 1945; that is, at the time of the final military collapse when both German and Soviet troops were on Rumanian soil. There was a notable increase in the number of tractors (from 4,170 in 1940 to 8,340 in 1943 and 8,178 in 1945), although in the opinion of the Central Institute of Statistics it did not compensate for the decline in draft animals which were the only feasible form of traction on the small strip farms.[23]

21. Area devoted to cereals, 48 judeţe (area as of January, 1941):

	Millions of hectares
1935–39	7.4
1940	6.8
1941	6.6
1942	6.4
1943	6.6

Source: Institutul Central de Statistică, *Statistica agricolă a României în 1941–1944* (Bucarest, 1947), p. xiii.

22. According to the Central Institute of Statistics, *ibid.*, p. xv, the recorded figures for production may have been well below the actual production because of extensive and often irregular army requisitioning; the wheat crop may have been underestimated by 20 per cent, the maize crop by 10 per cent.

23. Institutul Central de Statistică, *Statistica agricolă a României, Vol. V, Inventarul agricol în Anul 1945* (Bucarest, 1947), p. 14.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

433 The inventory of other agricultural equipment was more or less sta-
241 ble or showed a slight decline.
185 For all the controls and economic collaboration with Germany the Antonescu dictatorship appears to have accomplished nothing for Rumanian agriculture. The relative improvement, at least in terms of total production, which had appeared after the depression was broken by the war. The position of peasant agriculture was clearly deteriorating, and the industrial boom, arising mainly from war demands, was not an adequate compensation.

Although pessimistic voices could be heard in the Carolist dictatorship, the official attitude was optimistic. During the war years, however, there was increasing concern over the manifest failure of Rumanian agriculture to show any improvement. The agricultural census, taken in the spring of 1941, provided ample evidence of the unsatisfactory situation of the peasant. The veteran agricultural economist, Ionescu-Sișești, who had been writing confident articles throughout the interwar period, was quite gloomy in 1943.

> It was anticipated that such a gigantic transformation of property [the 1918–21 reforms] would keep the peasant class in a state of equilibrium for a long time and that the country would benefit from a long period of prosperity because of the distribution of land to the peasants. Unhappily this hope has not been completely realized. Today, when all the claims of the peasants appear satisfied, and there is nothing left to distribute—since a minimum of large and medium property is indispensible—a new peasantry is appearing which threatens to take on a grave character if measures are not adopted in time. The very rapid growth of the population and the advanced fragmentation of properties are engendering this crisis.[24]

His recommendations, however, were largely a recapitulation of the various measures which had been legislated, if not applied with any consequence, in the 1930's: exerting the state's right of preemption, preventing subdivision of properties below a certain minimum, encouraging consolidation, and creating larger colonization holdings. If such steps were taken, he said, "the peasantry will be divided into two categories: on the one hand, peasant proprietors with holdings of an adequate size, on the other, a class of agricultural workers living on the product of their labor on the farms of others.[25] Ionescu-Sișești's hopes were not to be realized. Within a year and a

24. G. Ionescu-Sișești, "Le Nouvel Aspect du problème agraire en Roumanie," *Archives pour la science et la réforme sociales, 16*, Nos. 1–4 (1943), 263.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 267.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

half the Communist party was in power and the last thing it wanted was such a "Stolypinist" situation in the countryside. 433 241

From the point of view of dramatic unity, the Antonescu dictatorship would make a convenient terminal point for recent Rumanian history, as the last act of a rake's progress. With a state encompassing virtually all Rumanians, a new constitution, and an extensive land reform, Rumania had entered the interwar period full, it seemed, of high promise. The promise had not been fulfilled, democracy did not flourish, the peasantry remained poor but prolific. The constitutional regime was replaced by a royal dictatorship and then by the *Walpurgisnacht* of the Iron Guard. Finally, Rumania was swept into the war to join Hitler's crusade. History, however, is no respecter of dramatic unity but persists in its devious course. 185

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

page 242

XII

THE COMMUNIST PERIOD: THE ADVENT TO POWER, 1944–45

669 ON August 23, 1944, King Michael, with the cooperation of a four-party bloc comprising the National Peasants, the Liberals, the Socialists, and the Communists overthrew Marshal Antonescu through a skillful palace coup d'état. On September 12 Rumania signed an armistice with the Allies. Six months later, on March 6, 1945, the Groza government, nominally a coalition but dominated by the Communist party, came into office and has remained in power since that date.

668 The sudden flowering of the Rumanian Communist party, the result of external rather than internal influences, marks a definite break in the continuity of Rumanian politics. Communism was not totally lacking a past in Rumania, and the Communist program had a relevance to Rumanian problems, but without the direct and active intervention of the Soviet Union the Groza government would not have obtained office. To be sure, the Conservative Marghiloman cabinet of 1918 was the direct consequence of Germany's military successes on the Eastern Front; the return of Brătianu in the same year was made possible by the Allied victory. The fall of Vintilă Brătianu and the success of the National Peasants in 1928 were to some extent connected with Rumania's foreign financial relations. Above all, Carol's fall and the Iron Guard and Antonescu dictatorships were certainly conditioned by the Nazi hegemony over southeastern Europe. Rumania has always been affected in its internal politics by direct or indirect foreign influences. Nevertheless, there is a difference.

All the preceding political changes hitherto considered were effected by parties or groups, which, if they were not popular, were at least associated with important Rumanian institutions. Thus the Liberals, the extent of whose popular support was doubtful, formed the oldest party in Rumania and were in control of the nation's banking and financial apparatus. Carol made use of the institution of the monarchy and its tradition of royal paternalism. Antonescu relied upon the army. The National Peasants, less well connected with the institutional framework, one of their weaknesses, were, in their period of growth, the representatives of a broad mass movement in the peas-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

antry. As for the Iron Guard, while its rise was in part fostered by 668
sympathetic politicians and its temporary success after Carol's fall was with the approval of the Germans, it was in its insane way the culmination of a widespread indigenous fascist impulse which had been building up in the interwar years.

The Rumanian Communists, on the other hand, while not altogether without support, enjoyed neither wide popularity (party membership in 1944 was approximately 1,000) nor control of the instruments of power, and they could not, in 1945 at least, have gained the latter without the aid of the Soviet Union. Admittedly, the previous political movements had by 1945 become rather threadbare, either through internal disintegration, senility, or public failure, and one might argue that a break with the past was salutary. But that the Communists were to create the new dispensation was in no way a Rumanian decision. Whatever the merits or shortcomings of communism as such, the Groza government was a Soviet creation. The implications of this fact will be considered shortly.

History of Marxist Parties in Rumania

In the first half of the nineteenth century there were slight signs 668
of pre-Marxist socialism in the Rumanian principalities.[1] Some of 175
Fourier's and Louis Blanc's ideas had been picked up by Rumanian students in Paris, and indeed a short-lived phalanstery was formed at Scaeni near Ploeşti. Marxist socialism, however, came to Rumania by way of Russia. In the 1870's Iaşi, capital of Moldavia, was a meeting place and haven for Russian revolutionaries. In 1879 the first Rumanian socialist newspaper, *Basarabia*, was published; its editorials were along Bakuninist-anarchist lines, with a strange flavor of anti-Semitism. In 1881 the first small socialist group in Iaşi was disbanded by the Rumanian authorities upon the demand of the Russian government.

Between 1887 and 1897 the socialist movement in Rumania revived and developed. Like many currents of foreign thought, Marxism in Rumania was something of a fad. All manner of people employed the terminology. Its political content was loosely defined and combined with anarchist and populist ideas. The intellectual leader of Rumanian socialism was the Russian emigré Constantin Dobrogeanu-

1. For a brief account of the socialist movement in Rumania, cf. N. Ghiulea, "Labour Organizations in Rumania," *International Labour Review*, 9, No. 1 (January, 1924), 31–49. C. Titel Petrescu has a lengthy but scrappily organized account in *Socialismul în Romînia*. Trotsky was in Bucarest in 1913; his articles on the Rumanian socialist movement are collected in *Ocherki politicheskoi Rumynii*.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

668 Gherea, whose stream of articles defining Marxism and applying it to
175 Rumania had a lasting influence not only upon Rumanian socialism but upon Rumanian thought in general. In 1884 a socialist study group appeared in Bucarest, and in the following year a newspaper, *Rights of Man*. In 1890 a socialist club began to enter candidates in local and national elections. In 1893 was founded the Rumanian Social Democratic party with a program based upon that of the German Social Democrats. Rumania was recognized as a backward country which could not take the initiative in the socialist movement. The work of the Rumanian socialists was to be preparatory, their tactics moderate and legal. The demands of the program were universal suffrage, administrative decentralization, abolition of the standing army, separation of church and state, equal conditions for women, secularization of schools, equal application of laws, the right of association, limitation of the royal prerogative, a progressive income tax, and an eight-hour day. The program was explicitly antirevolutionary. The new party attempted to organize workers in the few industrial centers of the country, Bucarest, Galaţi, Brăila, and Ploeşti, and to anchor the socialist movement to the nascent trade unions. It also tried in 1897 to spread socialism in the villages, but this effort was immediately suppressed by the Conservative government. For the most part, however, in this period the socialist movement was confined to intellectuals, who had made a good deal of progress toward formulating a program which they felt suitable to Rumania's special needs.

Between 1898 and 1900 the socialists hit a crisis. A section of the party, weary of the political wilderness and seeing no future in isolation, were tempted by the devil, collaboration. In 1899, under their influence, the party changed its name from Social Democrat to National Democrat on the grounds that Rumania was not ripe for socialism. In 1900 Constantin Stere, later the populist leader, split the party by taking a group into the Liberal camp. By the turn of the century the first effort at creating a socialist party had collapsed in confusion and disagreement.

The Russian revolution of 1905 and the significant increase in urban and labor population led to a second revival of socialism. In this phase the party found a broader base of support; it had more contact with the working class and the trade unions, and a talented leader in Christian Rakovsky, a doctor of Bulgarian-Dobrogean origin with international socialist connections. The tactics of the party were still reformist. While labor groups in a few towns sided with the peasants in the 1907 uprising, the Social Democratic party

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

took an altogether negative view and admonished the peasants to retire, as they were only playing into the hands of their adversaries. Nevertheless, in the repression that followed, the Liberal government suppressed the Social Democratic party and expelled Rakovsky from the country as an undesirable alien. He was later readmitted by the Conservative government.

The Rumanian Social Democrats campaigned against the Balkan wars, against Rumania's participation, and against the annexation of the Dobrogean quadrilateral. They came out for a federative republic of all the Balkan states, including Turkey. When the First World War came they maintained their antiwar stand and demanded Balkan neutrality. An inter-Balkan socialist conference held in Bucarest in July, 1915, issued a resolution favoring the German antiwar Socialists, Liebknecht and Luxemburg, and the Russian Left-wing socialists; opposing class collaboration and "social patriotism"; and criticizing the passivity of the Bureau of the Second International. On June 15, 1916, just before Rumania's entry into the war, the workers of Galați demonstrated against Rumanian participation. After Rumania entered the war, the Social Democrats remained opposed but ineffective. Party papers were confiscated, meetings disbanded, and Rakovsky arrested and imprisoned.

A new phase appeared with the outbreak of the 1917 revolution in Russia. On the first of May Russian troops liberated Rakovsky from the prison at Iași, and during the period of complete confusion on the Eastern Front in 1917 and 1918 the Rumanian socialist movement more or less merged with the Russian revolution. Rakovsky himself took an increasingly important part in the Russian revolution, becoming president of the Ukrainian Sovnarkom in 1919. Rumanian Social Democrats, under Mihai Gheorghiu Bujor, formed a Rumanian revolutionary battalion with its headquarters in Odessa. Inside Rumania itself, however, the socialists were repressed, both in Iași, held by the Rumanian government, and in Bucarest, occupied by the Germans.

At the end of the war, in the autumn of 1918, the social situation in Rumania was unsettled, and three years later Rakovsky observed, oversanguinely, that "the prospects of a revolutionary movement were excellent, the position of the administration was critical." [2] Within the country new radical parties sprang up, expressing the widespread dislike of Ion I. C. Brătianu, who was considered responsible for Rumania's involvement in a ruinous war. Externally revolutions were stirring in Austria, Hungary, and Germany. On the other

2. Trotsky and Rakovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

668 hand, the steps taken toward agrarian reform in 1917 and 1918
175 provided a safety valve for peasant unrest. Rumania was among the victorious powers and Brătianu was soon to fight for its territorial rewards. The Bessarabian issue was already introducing a national element into the relations with Bolshevik Russia. At the same time Brătianu took firm measures against signs of social upheaval.

On December 13, 1918, the government harshly repressed a labor manifestation at the National Theater in Bucarest.[3] Social tension continued through 1919 and 1920 and reached a final climax in the abortive general strike of October 20–28, 1920. The strike was set off by the restrictive measures of the Averescu government, which had been called in as a party of discipline and order. The general council of the Social Democratic party and leaders of the labor syndicates had presented the government with demands to respect the right of association, to recognize work councils in industrial establishments, to remove troops from all factories, and to abolish the state of siege and censorship. The government responded by arresting the socialist and labor leaders, including the deputies to the chamber. The general strike which followed was precipitated by an independent strike of the workers in the railway shops, always the most militant section of Rumanian labor. The strike lasted only seven days and the government had little trouble in breaking it.

After the failure of the general strike the Rumanian socialist movement split, the more radical section forming the Communist party and the moderates the Social Democratic party. Before 1914 the Rumanian socialists had followed the moderate policy of the Second International and were perhaps even more moderate because of Rumania's situation as a backward agrarian state. The war, however, had the effect of associating the party with the more radical section of the international socialist movement. This trend to the Left was not for doctrinal reasons; the Rumanian socialists had not taken a Leninist position. Rather it was because the big Social Democratic parties in the West, in France and Germany, had become involved in the war and because the Russian Marxists, with whom the Rumanian socialist leaders had close personal contacts, were becoming the standard-bearers of militant socialism. Moreover, the antiwar stand of the Rumanian socialists had put them into conflict with the authorities and driven many of them into illegal activity. Finally, the Russian revolution itself produced a wave of enthusiasm which quite

3. According to the socialist leader Moscovici, the demonstration had no revolutionary intent, had occurred more or less by accident, and the socialist leaders had not known of it in advance. Petrescu, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

668
175

overpowered any doubts about the "ripeness" of east European countries for the socialist revolution. Thus, such men as Rakovsky and Al. Dobrogeanu-Gherea (the son of the socialist leader), who had been reformists before the war, joined the Communist camp.[4]

According to Rakovsky, the program of the party congress of April, 1919, accepted the basic theses of the Third International, but this trend was opposed by the Social Democratic leaders of Bucovina and Transylvania who were closer to the traditions of Austrian and Hungarian Social Democracy.[5] In 1920 a group of Rumanian delegates was sent to Moscow—solely as observers according to the socialist Petrescu—to examine the situation in Russia and to inform themselves on the principles of the Comintern. This group returned in January, 1921, and it transpired that they had affiliated the Rumanian party with the Third International. A general council met in February, at which the Communists gained control (according to Petrescu, the socialist leaders were in prison as a result of the general strike) and called a general congress for May, 1921. The government now stepped in and arrested for high treason all the delegates to the congress who voted for affiliation, some 70 in number.

After 1921 the Social Democrats and the Communists went their separate ways. In 1922 the Communists attempted to establish a united front in the trade union movement but were defeated. At a general council, the trade unions maintained their political independence; trade union members could belong to any party but party activity within the unions was to be prohibited. In 1925 the General Council of Trade Unions affiliated with the Amsterdam International Federation. The Communists in retaliation set up a "United" Trade Union General Council which never achieved a substantial following but which rendered any trade union activity liable to government repression.

The history of Rumanian Social Democracy between the wars is not inspiring, and the party never achieved a large following. It based itself upon the trade unions, a rather narrow foundation for a political party in Rumania. Moreover, it was never quite clear what the relations between socialism and the trade unions should be. Most of the Social Democratic leaders were trade union officials but in many cases they favored complete separation of political and union activities. There is little evidence that the Socialists had any success

4. This enthusiastic and nondoctrinal support of revolution was of course the cause of later friction when the Third International undertook to impose the Leninist outlook on the member parties.

5. Trotsky and Rakovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

668 175 in improving labor conditions, partly because of their anxiety lest their actions be considered subversive.[6] The Rumanian trade union movement remained weak,[7] legislation passed to assist labor was not applied, and the representatives of industry were successful in impeding labor reforms on the grounds of national interest.[8]

As a political party the Social Democrats had a fundamental handicap. In their interpretation of Marxism they believed that Rumania had not yet reached the stage where it could embark upon or even directly prepare for the socialist revolution. The hopes of the party lay not in Rumania itself but in the advanced states of the West. One of the party leaders, Ilie Moscovici, said in 1923: "Lacking the objective factors—the concentration of capital, sufficient development of industry, and a large proletarian mass—and not having the subjective factors—education and a class conscious proletariat—Rumania suffers all the contradictions of the capitalist regime without having the necessary factors for social transformation."[9] Such a passive outlook, which was admittedly depending upon developments beyond Rumania to realize its ideals, was scarcely likely to win an enthusiastic following. The Social Democrats considered it their principal function to remove the obstacles set by the oligarchy to the free industrial and capitalist development of Rumania, to lift the cultural level of the masses, to bring democracy to Rumania, and to foster international cooperation of labor.

Because of their weak position the Socialists wobbled between maintaining doctrinal purity and collaborating with other parties. They

6. For example, M. Flueraş, in 1926, felt it necessary to explain rather apologetically that the great interest shown by the workers in labor legislation should not be interpreted as a revolutionary tendency. ILO, *Industrial and Labor Information, 17,* No. 7 (February 15, 1926), 231.

7. Trade union membership increased only from 25,000 in 1919 to 42,000 in 1929. Transylvania and the Banat had, in 1929, 25,000 members, the Old Kingdom only 11,000, Bucovina, 6,000, and Bessarabia, 790. *Ibid., 33,* No. 8 (February 24, 1930), 265.

8. In 1934 the Rumanian Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry submitted a memorandum to the Ministry of Labor which said, among other things, "The improvement of the living conditions of workers can only be gradually achieved. Any defiance of this rule must be detrimental to the national economy in that it would bring about both a weakening of the credit of the state and an increase in unemployment, thus leading to a worsening of social conditions. The present limits of economic possibility can only be exceeded by means of an increase of production brought about through the formation of new capital and through an increase in the productive capacity of labor on a sound economic basis." *Ibid., 49,* No. 11 (March 12, 1934), 352. To a degree, of course, this statement was perfectly true. On the other hand, the constant reports of employers' infringements of labor laws, such as the weekly rest act, leave no doubt that their actions were hardly determined by any such general considerations. *Cf. Ibid., 52,* No. 11 (December 10, 1934), 325, report by the Rumanian Chamber of Labor on the application of labor laws.

9. "Lupta de clasă şi transformarea socială," *Doctrinele partidelor politice,* p. 302.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

worked with the National Peasants in the 1926 communal elections in an effort to oust the Liberals, and again in the general elections of 1928 which established the Maniu government. A dissenting splinter group broke away to form an Independent Socialist party, somewhat to the Left of the Social Democrats and advocating collaboration with "legal" Communists. Collaboration between the National Peasants and the Social Democrats ceased shortly after the former came to power. The Socialists charged the Maniu government with betraying the working class; at a party congress held in 1930 collaboration was condemned and the party reaffirmed its independence and single-minded loyalty to the workers.

In the years leading up to the Carolist dictatorship the Social Democrats were altogether ineffective and powerless. They drafted numerous resolutions against fascism and in favor of democracy, but were in no position to do anything about either. In 1935 and 1936, when courted by the Communists, who had adopted the Popular Front, they replied that they were unwilling to sign any agreement with the various Communist-front organizations and that common action was possible only if the Communists came into the open and renounced their illegal activities. In the 1937 elections they refused to have anything to do with the National Peasants because of the pact with Codreanu, and succeeded only in reuniting with the Independent Socialists, an achievement of little consequence.

After the overthrow of the parliamentary regime in 1938, the Social Democrats folded up. The collaborationist spirit again made its appearance. The party reexamined its theoretical principles and altered its definition of the state, which was no longer seen as a class instrument but as "an instrument useful and necessary to all." [10] Two of the Social Democratic leaders, Flueraş and Mirescu, entered the labor commission of the Goga-Cuza government. When Carol replaced the trade unions by corporatist bodies, the General Confederation of Labor was absorbed into the Front of National Rebirth, and one of the Socialist leaders, Grigorovici, became an undersecretary in the Ministry of Labor under the dictatorship.[11]

If the Social Democrats found agrarian Rumania an unpromising

10. This change was expressed in an article by Lotar Rădăceanu in *Gândul Vremii* (March–June, 1938), cited in Pătrăşcanu, *Problemele de bază*, p. 269. Pătrăşcanu was very critical of the theoretical position adopted by Rădăceanu and stated that it cleared the way to accepting the Carolist dictatorship. Still, such facility has its advantages. Rădăceanu is now in the Groza government whereas Pătrăşcanu was discharged from the Ministry of Justice and ousted from the Communist party.

11. Titel Petrescu, while admitting a good deal of opportunism in these actions, defends them as necessary to preserve what rights still remained to labor.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

668
175

environment for their moderate Marxism and their reliance upon the urban working class, the Communists encountered far more serious obstacles. In Rumania the question of communism was completely entangled in the issue of Soviet-Rumanian relations. More than in most European countries communism and high treason were regarded as completely synonymous terms. This national conflict, which the Rumanian Communists could not begin to overcome, dogged their efforts from the start. Rumania's relations with Russia had never been very good; tsarist Russia may have acted as protector of the Balkan Christians, but its own interests in the Black Sea littoral had always been a source of anxiety to the Rumanian principalities. The dispute over Bessarabia, beginning in 1812 and heightened by the territorial transfers of 1856 and 1878, was a constant source of irritation. Because of the Rumanian occupation of Bessarabia in 1918, the Soviet Union and Rumania did not resume full diplomatic relations until 1934.

In addition to this territorial dispute, the Communists faced another difficulty. The Third International was founded in the hope and expectation that the disasters and havoc of the First World War would create sufficient social upheaval to bring about the proletarian revolution. But as has been seen, while revolution threatened to gain the upper hand in many eastern European states, Rumania stood fast and indeed sent troops to put down Bela Kun's Soviet regime in Hungary. As a result Rumania, perhaps more than any state of eastern Europe, regarded itself as the bulwark against bolshevism, both against Soviet territorial advance and against the Communist revolutionary doctrine. All sides were in agreement on the point. Rumanian authors repeatedly referred to the agrarian reform as the most effective protection against communism. At the League of Nations and other international meetings, Rumania exerted a good deal of diplomatic pressure on the grounds of its importance as an outpost against the Soviet Union. For their part the Russians saw in Rumania one of the key points of the *cordon sanitaire*, an advance base for the malevolent capitalist states.

Where were the Communists to find their support in such a country? They sought it among the proletariat, the small peasants, and the national minorities. The proletariat, as the Social Democrats discovered, was too small to be effective, although the Communists did obtain their few nuclei in the industrial centers. As for the small peasants, the Communists, unlike the Social Democrats, tried hard to penetrate the countryside but the land reforms had weakened its revolutionary potentialities. Besides, the Peasant party was much more likely to obtain the support of the peasantry, and did. The

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Communists did have some success with the minorities (the present leaders of Rumanian communism, Pauker, Luca, and Bodnaraş are all from the ethnic minorities), but any success in this direction would only intensify the feeling that they were an antinational and treasonous party. 668 175

Finally, the Communists were handicapped by the fact that almost from the outset they were an illegal party and with but occasional relaxations remained so throughout the interwar period. Although most of the Rumanian governments were not averse to having the Communists as a whipping boy, the Communists brought a good deal of their difficulties on their own heads by their tactics, which were devious, disingenuous, and unsuccessful. In 1921 Rakovsky remarked with some bitterness that General Averescu was arresting not only the "illegal" party workers but those working "lawfully." [12] In a similar spirit a Communist pamphlet of 1925, describing the uprising at Tatar Bunar in Bessarabia, castigated the cordon sanitaire and the provocative accusations that the Soviet Union was stirring up trouble, but went on to say, "Not only the free booters of Bucarest, but the capitalists of the whole world are trembling before the convulsions of the proletarian giant. They fear that the red wave rolling out of the East will burst the Dniester dam and flood onward to the coast of the Atlantic Ocean." [13] Although this dual policy of pursuing both legal and illegal activities received a brilliant defense and elaboration in Lenin's pamphlet, *Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, it has probably, in the long run, done the Communists far more harm than good. It may be, as Lenin said, that a good warrior should know all his weapons, legal as well as illegal, parliamentary as well as revolutionary, but such a military plan of campaign should have remained a highly classified document, not a broadside, and was bound to lose effectiveness with repetition. As soon as the enemy became aware of this tactic the Communists were left open to the charge of bad faith no matter what course they followed. In the case of Rumania, of course, they had very little opportunity for any legal activity in their own name, but their efforts to achieve fronts of one complexion or another in the 1920's and 1930's were all unsuccessful.

The Rumanian Communist party got off to an unfortunate start. The arrest in 1921 of the delegates who had voted for affiliation with the Third International deprived it of many of its leaders. Among

12. Ch. Rakovsky, "The Communist Movement in Roumania," *The Communist International*, No. 13 (n.d.), pp. 112–114.

13. *Bessarabia . . . The Roumanian Hell*, published in English by the British Section of the International Class War Prisoners Aid (London, n.d.), p. 13.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

668 175 the active members who took their place was Ana Pauker, a young Jewish schoolteacher from Moldavia who had joined an illegal group in the Social Democratic party in 1918. She had married Marcel Pauker, son of a leading Rumanian publisher.[14] Elected to the Central Committee she became one of the party's most determined fighters. In 1924 when the party was definitely outlawed, she was arrested, but was subsequently released and left the country.

The directives of the Comintern did not facilitate the work of the Rumanian Communists. For example, the resolution on the national question, passed by the Fifth World Congress of the Communist International, stated that under the Versailles system a number of small imperialist states had been created in eastern Europe to fight the proletarian revolution.[15] The states had been formed by the annexation of large territories with foreign populations.

> At the same time the struggle of the oppressed peoples against national oppression has become a struggle against the power of the imperialistic bourgeoisie who were victorious in the world war, since the strengthening of the new imperialist powers means the strengthening of the forces of world imperialism. The importance of the struggle against national oppression is still further augmented by the fact that the nationalities oppressed by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Greece, in their social composition are largely peasants, and the struggle for their national liberation is at the same time the struggle of the peasant masses against foreign landlords and capitalists.

Under these conditions, the resolution declared, the general formula, "The right of every nation to self-determination even to the extent of separation," should be rendered more specific: "The political separation of oppressed peoples from Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Greece." The resolution noted with disapproval that certain Communist parties were falling into deviations on this question, that their slogans were not directed against the states founded on national oppression but toward partial reform and autonomy within existing boundaries.

The resolution was even more specific on the Ukrainian question, an evident example of the overlapping of Soviet and Comintern aims. The congress declared that the Ukrainian national problems in Po-

14. C. G. Costa-Foru, *Aus den Folterkammern Rumäniens*, p. 21; C. Bobrovskaya, "Two Bolshevik Heroines," *The Communist International, 14*, No. 8 (1937), 958–960.

15. "Resolution of V. World Congress of Comintern on National Question in Central Europe and Balkans," *The Communist International*, New Ser., No. 7 (December, 1924–January, 1925), pp. 98–99.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

land, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia formed one Ukrainian problem demanding a common solution for all three countries. In this case it opposed slogans of autonomy for Carpathian Russia, the western Ukraine, Bessarabia, and Bucovina because they were directed toward forming a coalition with the wealthy strata of the Ukrainian peasantry. The congress, therefore, considered it necessary "for the Communist Parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania to launch the general slogan of separation of the Ukrainian lands from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, and their union with the Soviet Ukraine and through it with the U.S.S.R." As for Transylvania and Dobrogea, the congress merely recommended that these areas be separated from Rumania and made independent regions.

Much of the nationalities program of the congress was admirable, its opposition to the hypernationalism of the Balkan states, its championing of national equality and cultural and educational rights for minorities. But these reform measures were clearly of less importance than the demand for separation. It is difficult to see how a party advocating the loss of Transylvania, Dobrogea, Bessarabia, and Bucovina was going to gain much popularity in Rumania, especially when the majority of the population in these areas (with the exception of Bucovina) and much the greatest number of peasants were Rumanians. With such instructions the Rumanian Communist party was never able to shake off the imputation of being an antinational party.

In addition to handing out such uncomfortable assignments, the Comintern heckled the Rumanian Communists for lapsing into any number of deviations. Because the party had been forced underground, it had been unable to conduct the necessary educational campaign to bolshevize itself, with the result that there were deplorable signs of "ultra-left and right liquidatorial tendencies." [16] The Sixth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in 1926 felt called upon to rebuke the Rumanian Communists and directed them to correct their errors. Specifically the party was to issue a journal, fight the Right-wing deviations, and "struggle against even the smallest sectional manifestations."

At this time the party was troubled by two questions, the trade union issue and a united front against the Liberals. With regard to the "unitary" trade unions and their relations to the Amsterdam Union, the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist party issued the following orders:

16. Al. Badulescu, in a review of the Rumanian party organ *Lupta de Clasă*, *The Communist International*, *4*, No. 15 (October 15, 1927), 311–312.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

668 175 The duty of mobilizing the working class masses to insure the legality of the unitary trade unions is a primary one for us Communists. Although the unitary trade unions are not by any means a Communist organization and still less a Communist Party organization, as the Social Democrats and the bourgeoisie together maintain, they are the one legal organization based on the class struggle, and it is the duty of the Communists to use all their influence in the unitary and reformist trade unions, in the workshops and factories, for rousing the worker to fight for the legality of the unitary trade unions.

With this approach it is not surprising that the Social Democrats should have complained that wherever the Communists showed an interest in trade union matters, it was disastrous to the unions.

The Sixth Plenum criticized the Rumanian Communist party for its tactical errors in the 1926 communal elections when the party had preached the tactics of the united front of the working class with all opposition bourgeois parties against the Liberal oligarchy. This policy was considered to involve a serious misreading of the Rumanian situation. The error—it was an error in 1926 at any rate—lay in failing to realize that the Liberals were the most highly developed section of the Rumanian bourgeoisie, and that no real anti-Liberal bloc on the side of the opposition parties (i.e., the National Peasants) was possible. The effort to create such a bloc was a serious error, since it "obscures the class-consciousness of the working class, it gives rise to illusions which prevent the crystallization of the one social force which is actually capable of putting an end to the dictatorship of the Liberals: the united front of the proletariat with the broad masses of the peasantry, liberated from the guardianship of the opposition bourgeoisie." In effect this meant that the Communists were not to work with the National Peasants in ousting the Liberals but were rather to attract the peasants away from them.

In terms of the Rumanian situation this tactical directive of the Comintern was absolutely hopeless, although in a negative way it was correct in forecasting the difficulties in ousting the Liberals from their entrenched positions in the Rumanian economy. It must also be admitted that the Communists foresaw the dangers of Carol's return. "The 'Persecution and Exile of Prince Carol,' " said *Lupta de Clasă*, the party organ, "utilized politically by the opposition bourgeoisie can win over petty-bourgeois sections and create the illusion among many workers that a Rumanian 'Mussolini' regime would be in a position to change the miserable conditions of the masses. That Prince Carol is closely associated with the fascist organizations in Rumania is an open secret."

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

As might be expected, the victory of the National Peasants in 1928 668 caused no rejoicing among the Communists. In later years they wrote 175 of the National Peasants as having come in on a wave of popular protest against the Liberals; but the Communists themselves were hostile to the National Peasants before 1928 and fought with them throughout their term in office. Under the National Peasants Bessarabia remained a center of discontent and international friction; Vaida Voevod courted the Iron Guard as allies against the Communists.

To some extent at least this conflict arose from the fact that the National Peasants came to office at just the time the Comintern went off on an ultra-Left tangent, denouncing socialists as social-fascists, and appeared firmly convinced that the Western powers were preparing an immediate assault upon the Soviet Union.[17] During this period Rumania was considered to have a foremost place in the anti-Soviet plans of the Western imperialists. All the energies of the National Peasants were described as being employed against the U.S.S.R., and even the feeble Rumanian Social Democrats were called warmongers.[18]

The Comintern again felt called upon to rebuke the Rumanian comrades. "In spite of the most savage terror, the Communist Party lives and becomes stronger. The only obstacle in the path to the growth of its influence over the proletariat and the toiling masses lies in the *slow* surmounting of *right opportunist* conceptions in some sections of its work, particularly in the field of the peasant movement." [19] The error here was the old heresy of regarding the peasantry as a social unit and failing to split the poor peasants from the kulaks. Counting on the depression to produce a revolutionary situation—although the swing to the Left had preceded the depression—the Comintern apparently had hopes of bringing social issues to the boil. "The increasing upsurge of the class struggle creates a basis on which the Communist Party could win the trust of the toiling masses, establish its hegemony. . . . With a correct policy the Communist Party can become a factor for the acceleration of the approach of a revolutionary situation." [20]

In retrospect this ultra-Left tactic of the early 1930's must be regarded as a disaster which wrought a great deal of damage. The

17. Of course these suspicions were fed by such events as Maniu's reported request in 1930 that the British survey the Black Sea coast with a view to constructing a strong naval base near Constanța. Pavel Pavel, *Why Rumania Failed*, p. 240.

18. T. Marin, "The Role of Rumania in Intervention against the U.S.S.R.," *The Communist International*, 7, No. 10 (May 15, 1931), 300.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 302.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 303.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

668 175 veering from Right to Left in the Comintern in the 1920's had brought no results but had merely caused the local parties to be regarded as altogether untrustworthy and treacherous political allies. The tactics in 1930 of smearing all non-Communist groups as fascist certainly did nothing to prevent the rise of fascism. It is hard to say how important this was in Rumania. The Rumanian Communist party was clearly on the fringes of politics and failed to make any appreciable headway. By its irresponsible behavior, however, it enabled the parties of the Right to use the Communist label as a means of discrediting all working class activity.

The last effort of the Rumanian Communists to pursue a revolutionary line was the Griviţa railway strike of 1933, in which many of the later Communist leaders—Gheorghiu-Dej, Vasile Luca, and Pătrăşcanu—were involved and arrested. This strike, which began with economic demands, quickly assumed a political character. Vaida Voevod's National Peasant government violently suppressed it. After that, as Pătrăşcanu said, the radicalization of the masses served to fortify the Iron Guard and the labor movement was put on the defensive.

The rise of Hitler and the realization that the fascist onslaught was not necessarily the immediate prelude to the Communist revolution was belatedly met by a shift in the party line, officially inaugurated at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International held in the summer of 1935. Gheorghe Dimitrov, in the leading speeches, criticized the previous practice of calling Social Democrats social-fascists and came out for a popular front of democratic forces against fascism. Reflecting this change was an article by one of the Rumanian Communist leaders, Boris Stefanov.[21] "We are basing ourselves," he said, "upon the undoubted fact that the overwhelming majority of the working population of Rumania and even a considerable section of the bourgeoisie are opposed to fascism." What was required was a concentration of democratic forces, including the bourgeois parties, in an anti-fascist Popular Front. The Social Democrats were requested not to remain aloof and even the National Peasants received moderate praise: "The National Tsaranist (Peasant) Party is one of the biggest mass democratic forces in Rumania. Despite all the waverings and reactionary tendencies of some of its leaders, despite its great sins in the past in its relation to the Ru-

21. Boris Stefanov, "The Concentration of Democratic Forces in Rumania," *The Communist International, 14,* No. 3 (1937), 943. Stefanov, in 1920, had been one of the members of the general council of the Socialist party who signed the ultimatum for the general strike.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

manian people, the National Peasant Party is nevertheless today 668
one of the most important anti-Fascist forces." Stefanov undertook 175
to refute criticisms that the Communist party was undemocratic, illegal, and antinational. As to the charge that it put forward irredentist slogans aimed at separating the new provinces from Rumania he replied that while the Communist party was against national oppression and for national self-determination it was the sworn enemy of the fascists who were trying to utilize the national issue to tear away Transylvania and Dobrogea and subject them to the fascist yoke. Significantly, even in this reconciliatory mood there was no mention of Bessarabia.

This change of tactics had no important results in the course of Rumanian politics. The Social Democrats remained suspicious and aloof. A Democratic Union was set up in the last years of the Tătărescu cabinet for the purpose of achieving a broad coalition against the extreme Right but, as Pătrăşcanu said, while it was a legal movement it worked "in the ideological cadres of the Communist Party." [22] The Tătărescu government dealt severely with the Communists. In November, 1934, the party, with all its affiliates, was again dissolved; although it had never been reinstated after 1924 its front, the Workers and Peasants bloc, had participated in elections in the early 1930's. In 1936 was held the much publicized trial of nineteen Communists, including Ana Pauker who received a sentence of ten years' imprisonment.

At the time of the 1937 elections the Communists again attempted to create a Popular Front. This effort was foiled by the Maniu-Codreanu pact and by the Social Democrats' refusal to cooperate with either the National Peasants or the Communists. The Communists eventually threw their modicum of support to the National Peasants, a move which was later regarded as a mistake.[23] In retrospect it is indeed lamentable that some sort of Popular Front was not created in 1937, the last relatively free election which Rumania was to enjoy, but certainly the Communists by their previous activity had contributed to rendering such a front impossible and must share the responsibility for the breakdown of Rumanian parliamentary government.

Shortly after the German-Soviet pact, in December, 1939, Boris Stefanov, the same who had ardently supported the Popular Front

22. Pătrăşcanu, *Sous trois dictatures*, p. 110.

23. According to Pătrăşcanu, the Communists should have forced collaboration upon the Social Democrats, who, in his view, could not easily have refused; if the Social Democratic leaders had later tried to break away, they could have been unmasked. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

668 and had denied that the Communist party was antinational, wrote
175 an article in *The Communist International* attacking British and French capital and its attempt to drag Rumania into the imperialist war, insisting that Rumania's interests demanded a treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union (presumably modeled after the Soviet treaties with the Baltic states which involved the establishment of Russian bases and armed forces in these countries) and directing the Rumanian Communists to work for the right of self-determination in the annexed provinces (Bessarabia, Bucovina, Transylvania, and Dobrogea), even if this meant their political separation from Rumania. Although the Soviet Foreign Office publicly denied that Stefanov represented the views of the Soviet government, the article provides some evidence that the Russian interest in Rumania at this time was not limited solely to the recovery of Bessarabia. When this province and Northern Bucovina were taken over in the summer of 1940, the Rumanian Communists naturally defended the action and placed the blame on Carol for his bellicose declaration in the spring that he would fight for these areas. One other event, of importance for the future, occurred in 1940: Ana Pauker, who had been in a Rumanian prison since 1936, was exchanged for two members of the Rumanian parliament who had been picked up in Bessarabia when the Russians moved in.

After Hitler's declaration of war on the Soviet Union, the Rumanian Communists again shifted their tactics and called for resistance to the German aggression, but unlike the Communists in Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia they seem to have achieved very little in the way of partisan activity or sabotage.[24]

The Formation of the Groza Government

In 1944 a four-party bloc headed by Iuliu Maniu for the National Peasants, Constantin Brătianu for the Liberals, C. Titel Petrescu for the Social Democrats, and Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu for the Communists collaborated with King Michael and his intimate advisers in preparing for the coup d'état of August 23 which ousted Marshal Antonescu, expelled the Germans from Bucarest, and brought Rumania to the side of the Allies. Negotiations for a Rumanian capitulation had been carried on sporadically in various neutral capitals since 1943, generally in Maniu's name, and in some cases with the knowledge of Marshal Antonescu and his Foreign Minister Mihai An-

24. In 1944 there was a good deal of vague talk about their deeds of derring-do, but I could never obtain any specific examples.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

tonescu. These negotiations were not successful and were impeded principally by the Rumanians' understandable if unrealistic reluctance to face the fact that they must surrender to the Soviet Union and the Red Army. Their repeated requests for an Anglo-American landing in the Balkans or for some type of Western protection against the foe to the East had no possibility of success, given the strategic and political arrangements arrived at by the Big Three, and could only serve to intensify the suspicions of the Russians, who were in an increasingly powerful position as their forces drove westward into Europe. The coup finally came after a Soviet offensive broke the German lines in northern Moldavia in the summer of 1944. Following the coup a provisional government was formed under General Sanatescu; the four party chiefs were ministers but most of the cabinet posts went to army officers, in the expectation, apparently, that the first days of the government would be far more seriously threatened by conflict with the Germans than proved to be the case.

By the terms of the armistice signed in Moscow on September 12 Rumania was to join the Allies against Germany, supply twelve infantry divisions, intern German and Hungarian forces, and provide free passage for Soviet troops. It was obliged to face three economic obligations: provide for the Allied Command in Rumania, pay to the U.S.S.R. reparations of $300,000,000 over six years, and restore all loot taken by Rumanian troops from the Soviet Union during the war. The 1940 Soviet-Rumanian frontier was reestablished, but the Vienna Award giving northern Transylvania to Hungary was nullified. All persons arrested for favoring the United Nations or for racial reasons were to be released; war criminals were to be arrested; and fascist and Hitlerite formations disbanded. The application of the armistice was to be supervised by an Allied Control Commission operating under the Allied (Soviet) High Command. The term in parenthesis was clearly the ultimate authority

With the arrival of the Russians the Rumanian Communist party took on new life and a new leadership in Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, and Emil Bodnaraş, all of whom had learned their communism the hard way and had spent many years in the Soviet Union.[25] In Rumania as in the other eastern European states a distinction may be made between the purely local Communists, many of whose connections had been primarily with Western Communist parties, and the Moscow-trained group. The difference is somewhat difficult to define, since

25. In the beginning none of the three assumed official posts; Ana Pauker was occupied with high policy, Luca, among other things, edited the party organ *Scînteia* (*The Spark*), and Bodnaraş appears to have been busy preparing his armed squads.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 all were Leninists, all disapproved of Social Democratic reformist policies, and all believed in party discipline. Yet there was a difference, which may be illustrated by an example. Communists who had participated in the coup of August 23, were pleased that Rumania had switched sides so facilely and that the country had been spared the devastation of an invasion. Among the people coming from the East, however, there was some disappointment that the state structure had remained intact and they rather regretted that the issue had not been settled by force of arms, which would have cleared the way for immediate Communist reconstruction. This difference in view led to a number of arguments as to whether communism could be created on a rubble heap, an important issue, of course, in the interpretation of Marxism. Those who approached the subject theoretically held to the belief that communism should cap the existing economic structure. The Russian experience, however, seemed to create a different emphasis: once one had achieved power and cleared the political air, communism could proceed to work constructively on the most unpromising type of terrain.

The four-party bloc soon showed signs of strain. Early in October the National Democratic Front was launched, comprising the Communist party, the Social Democratic party, the Ploughmen's Front, the Union of Patriots, as well as representatives of the newly revived trade unions. The Union of Patriots was a rather amorphous body, often called the vestibule to the Communist party, with the apparent purpose of attracting to the National Democratic Front nonproletarian elements, professional men, and intellectuals; it never achieved any particular importance.

The Ploughmen's Front, however, deserves some mention. It was originally founded at Deva in Transylvania in 1933. Its leader was the rather eccentric but prosperous landowner and industrialist, Petru Groza, who had been a minister in Marshal Averescu's People's party cabinets of 1920 and 1926. Initially it seems to have been a straightforward radical peasant movement, rather in the spirit of Mihalache's peasantism of 1920, born in protest against the agricultural debt load resulting from the depression and against the failure of the National Peasants to fulfill their role as spokesmen for the poor cultivator. Its 1933 program was largely a series of peasant demands; three-fourths of the amount of debts to be cancelled, the remaining fourth to be paid over a more or less extended period of time, depending upon the size of the debtor's property; monetary reform to provide more money; reforms in the civil service to prevent nepotism and the holding of multiple posts; the extension of expropri-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

ation to properties over 100 hectares as well as expropriation of forest land; abolition of special privileges to industry, monopolies and cartels; reduction of the cost of the products of state monopolies; abolition of metayage, payment in kind, and labor dues; increased mechanization of agriculture; and a truly democratic regime.[26]

During the period of the attempted Popular Front it collaborated with the Communist party affiliates and strongly opposed the tendency of the peasants to join the Iron Guard.[27] During the 1930's it did not achieve any widespread following except in Transylvania, but during the months immediately after August 23 it made rapid strides throughout Rumania, an expansion that was not altogether artificial but did represent an appeal to peasant dissatisfaction. By 1944, however, it had fallen under the direction of the Communists, who were unquestionably the guiding force in the National Democratic Front, and its later function was largely as the rural arm of the Communist party.

An important feature in the political situation in the months after the armistice was the fact that while the Rumanian state structure in the central Bucarest administration had remained intact, the countryside was politically almost a *tabula rasa*. The six years of dictatorships plus the war had broken up local party organizations and their connections with the party leadership. To a considerable degree the political leaders in Bucarest were generals without armies.[28] This exceptional concentration of all political life in the capital, although there has always been a great deal of centralization, gave a certain advantage to the parties of the Left which could rally the workers in the industrial sections of the capital for demonstrations and processions.

After a three weeks' political crisis, on November 5 a more "politi-

26. For a history of the Ploughmen's Front, cf. Gheorghe Micle, *Răscoala pământului; istoria luptelor politice ale țăranimii române 1933–1945* (Bucarest, 1945).

27. In 1937, Romulus Zăroni, who was briefly Minister of Agriculture in the Groza government, wrote a simple but very clear and effective pamphlet explaining why the hard-pressed Rumanian peasant should not be tempted by the antidemocratic reaction of the fascists: *De ce nu trebue să fie plugarul român fascist* (Cluj, n.d.).

28. During December, 1944, and January, 1945, I made fairly extensive field trips through Transylvania, Moldavia, and southern Bucovina. The farther I went from Bucarest the less organized were the local branches of the historical parties. In many cases the local Liberal and National Peasant leader had received no word whatsoever from his party's headquarters. The most impressive movement was the rapid expansion of the Ploughmen's Front which was extending its branches up into northern Moldavia and west to Timișoara. At the same time, in villages not far from Deva, its point of origin, there were many peasants who had never heard of the organization. It was my impression that, at that time at least, the growth of the Ploughmen's Front was by no means merely an invention of the National Democratic Front propagandists.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 cal" coalition government was set up, again under General Sanatescu, with ministerial seats going to members of each of the four parties of the democratic bloc. This ministry was short-lived partly because of the vehement objections of the National Democratic Front to the National Peasant Minister of the Interior, N. Penescu. The case of Penescu is a perfect example of the curious political situation at this time. There is no question that the reason why the Communist-inspired National Democratic Front attacked Penescu was because it wanted control of that important ministry for itself. The directness with which Communist parties have gone after the ministry of the interior in all the eastern European states is well known. At the same time, Penescu was in fact violently anti-Soviet and anti-Communist and had indeed organized a section in his ministry to keep watch on the Communist party. That is to say, the Communists would have been quite justified in suspecting Penescu of hostile intentions, but that was not the reason they wanted him removed. In fact, the arguments they employed in the press were altogether disingenuous.

On December 2 the Sanatescu cabinet was replaced by a new government under General Radescu, who had gained a reputation for speaking bluntly to the Germans and being put in a concentration camp. The cabinet was about the same; Radescu took over the Ministry of the Interior, with the Communist Teohari Georgescu as Undersecretary. Petru Groza was Vice-Premier. For a time it appeared as though this ministry would be stable.

In January, 1945, however, two of the leading Rumanian Communists, Ana Pauker and Gheorghiu-Dej, went to Moscow. From all evidence it appears that they were given permission, or were instructed, to carry on their campaign. Shortly after their return, the National Democratic Front announced a bid for power on the basis of its program. By this program Rumania was to make a maximum war effort and to strengthen and democratize the army. There was to be an elimination of fascists, arrest and trial of war criminals, and honest fulfillment of the armistice terms. Above all, an agrarian reform was to be carried through. The Front announced that if it came to office Northern Transylvania would be handed over to Rumania. In February the crisis steadily mounted, with violent press polemics and periodic criticisms from the Soviet radio at the laxness with which the Radescu government was carrying out the armistice conditions. At first the attack was directed against the National Peasants and the Liberals, but when General Radescu rather untactfully indicated his displeasure with the agitation and demands, the Front turned against him. The National Peasant and Liberal papers were suppressed, in

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

one case by a Soviet order, in the other by a strike of the printers' union. Teohari Georgescu refused to take orders from Radescu and demanded that the officials in the Ministry of Interior pay no attention to the general. 175

The crisis reached a climax on February 24 when, at the conclusion of a large National Democratic Front demonstration, the crowd moved into the palace square and headed toward the Ministry of the Interior. Shots were fired, several people were killed, and that night in a rash—and final—broadcast General Radescu roundly abused the Communist leaders Pauker and Luca, and called on the army to stand by him.[29] Certainly Radescu was a greatly provoked man but owing his appointment to an agreement of the four parties he was not in a position to take an independent stand when this coalition broke down under the Communist attack. Moreover, by his rather intemperate language and appeal to the army he left himself open to damaging attacks from the National Democratic Front and the Russians.

The Soviet Union, in the person of Deputy Commissar Andrei Vyshinsky, now stepped in and demanded General Radescu's immediate resignation. After some hesitation King Michael agreed and started consultations for a new cabinet; again Vyshinsky intervened and demanded that a National Democratic Front government under Petru Groza be installed.[30] Meanwhile the Soviet command had taken the necessary precautions. There was at that time only one Rumanian force capable of resisting the National Democratic Front's armed formations—the army. The Russians ordered the Rumanian units stationed in and near Bucarest to be sent to the front, and the capital was denuded of troops. The following weekend witnessed another mass demonstration which was clearly in a position to take over the government forcibly if need be. In the midst of the demonstration it was announced that the king had accepted the Groza government. On March 6, 1945, it was installed, as a coalition of the groups making up the National Democratic Front, and also including an insignificant 175 648 668

29. This riot is to me a particularly discouraging example of the difficulty of writing history *wie es eigentlich gewesen*. This incident, as it later proved, was the event which led to the overthrow of the Radescu government and the installation of the Groza cabinet. I had watched the procession and was in the crowd no more than fifty feet from the first shots. Yet at that time and since I have been unable to discover precisely what happened. I do know that the government had kept Rumanian troops off the street that day to avoid inciting trouble. The crowd did move toward the Ministry of the Interior building, although it showed little signs of direction. The first shots were fired from a small piece and from somewhere in the crowd, but by whom and for what purpose I do not know, although there has been no lack of stories and explanations.

30. An account of Vyshinsky's actions, taken from official American sources, is given in James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York; London, 1947), pp. 50–55.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 'EDI Rumania EDI

668 dissident National Peasant party and a Liberal fraction under the
648 opportunist Gheorghe Tătărescu, whose government in 1936 had
175 sentenced Ana Pauker to ten years' imprisonment.

Why did the Groza government come to power? This question is difficult to answer, even though many of the facts are reasonably well established, because it involves the intentions behind the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. In the first place, the Groza regime was directly and positively installed by the Soviet Union, in an explicit manner by Vyshinsky, but even before that by the Soviet decision to break up the Radescu government through the National Democratic Front. Although there is no convincing evidence that the National Democratic Front possessed broad popular support, it was not without effective strength in Bucarest. Before it came to office it was able to assemble large crowds of demonstrators, which were really quite impressive despite the tendency of Tass and the Communist press greatly to inflate their numbers. Moreover, it had special squads of armed guards, which had obtained weapons in preparation for the August 23 coup and had subsequently refused to relinquish them, much to the dismay of the National Peasants and Liberals. Nevertheless, they could not have stood up against the Rumanian army had General Radescu been given the opportunity to employ it. In no sense, however, did the National Democratic Front represent the will of the people, although it must be said that at the time there was a general political vacuum in Rumania. It is doubtful whether the historical parties represented the will of the people except in the purely negative sense of being anti-Russian.

In the second place, the U.S.S.R. did not overthrow the Radescu government because the Rumanians were sabotaging the armistice agreement, or to guarantee the lines of communication to the Hungarian front, or because the Radescu government could not maintain order. If the latter was true it was because Radescu had been deprived of the means. This is not to say that the Rumanians of the historical parties were behaving in a manner satisfactory to the Russians. Hatred of Russia among these parties was bitter and profound. There was a constant hope that somehow the Western powers would come to their rescue. Well before the end of the war, and indeed immediately after the armistice, many nonfascist Rumanians expressed the belief that a conflict betwen the Soviet Union and the Western powers was the only hope for Rumania. Nor were the Rumanians altogether reasonable in their fulfillment of the armistice conditions. There were numerous cases where they tried to squirm out of a delivery by means of elaborate legal technicalities in a manner inevitably highly ex-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

asperating to the Soviet authorities. In a word, many Rumanians 668
did not realize the implications of the new situation and were doing 648
everything in their power to avoid the consequences of their military 175
defeat. Undoubtedly this attitude was well known to the Russians; it would have been difficult to have missed it.

Nevertheless, as far as may be judged from the evidence available, conditions in Rumania and the behavior of non-Communist Rumanian politicians were not a primary factor in determining Russian action; Soviet initiative in installing the National Democratic Front government did not arise from Soviet-Rumanian relations but was an aspect of Soviet policy regarding the pattern of the postwar world and Russia's relations with the Western powers, Great Britain, and the United States. It might be well here to review briefly some of the information which has come to light on Rumania's place internationally in the last part of the Second World War. The Soviet Union was certainly interested in preserving its gains made in eastern Europe before Hitler's attack, and as early as 1941 was pressing the British and American governments, without success, for an agreement on postwar territorial boundaries. Soviet frontiers with Rumania were to be those of 1940, i.e., Bessarabia and northern Bucovina being reincorporated in the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet regime desired special facilities for bases in Rumania.[31] On April 2, 1944, however, as Soviet troops advanced into northern Rumania, Molotov gave a reassuring announcement: "The Soviet government declares that it does not pursue the aim of conquering any part of Rumanian territory or of changing the existing social order in Rumania."

In May, 1944, the British government proposed to Russia a division of areas of predominant interest, whereby, "in the main, Rumanian affairs should be the concern of the Soviet Government and the Greek affairs the concern of United Kingdom. This British-Russian understanding would apply only to war conditions and would not affect the rights and responsibilities which each of the three great powers would have to exercise at the peace settlement."[32] On the condition that it be limited to three months' trial and definitely did not establish postwar spheres of influence, President Roosevelt gave 648

31. Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (2 vols., New York, 1948), II, 1167. In connection with the request for bases in Rumania, one might note that in 1943 the Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain, Maisky, stated that the U.S.S.R. probably would not oppose a Balkan federation, provided it excluded Rumania, another indication, perhaps, of a special status for Rumania in Soviet plans. Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History* (New York, 1948), p. 714.

32. Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 1451–1455. Roosevelt's approval was given without Hull's knowledge and against his wishes.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

648

American approval to the proposal. It is evident that Churchill's move was an attempt to regain the position lost when his plan for an Anglo-American invasion of the Balkans was overruled in 1943; he was clearly interested in securing Greece for Britain's Mediterranean sphere.

When Churchill and Eden visited Moscow in October, 1944, this arrangement was extended even further in establishing the degrees of influence the two powers should enjoy in the various Balkan states. According to former Secretary of State Byrnes, "We knew they had reached the informal understanding that, if the British found it necessary to take military action to quell internal disorders in Greece, the Soviets would not interfere. In return, the British would recognize the right of the Soviets to take the lead in maintaining order in Rumania." [33] The result undoubtedly was, as Hull points out, that "the Russians took it for granted that by the agreement of June 1944, Britain and the United States had assigned them a certain portion of the Balkans, including Rumania and Bulgaria, as their sphere of influence." [34] Hull was correct in his starting assumption that an agreement ostensibly limited to military affairs could too easily lead to political arrangements of a lasting nature. On the other hand, his opposition to spheres of influence and independent political action by one or two of the great powers does not seem to have been wholly consistent, nor would it have been convincing to the Russians, given the evident political action of the United States and Great Britain in Italy where the Russians had very little voice, though Hull maintains they were kept informed. In brief, by the end of 1944 not only did the Russians have considerable reason to believe that Rumania was in their sphere, but Anglo-American political as well as military action in Italy provided them with a precedent for independent action. The first power to make use of the October agreement was Great Britain in its intervention against ELAS during the Greek crisis of December, 1944.[35] Russia, at this time, kept to the bargain; the Soviet press and radio gave no sign of support for the Left-wing Greek partisans.

Such was the state of affairs when, in January, 1945, Russia appears to have given the green light to the Rumanian Communists.

33. Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

34. Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 1458. Sherwood states, however, that Roosevelt sent a cable to Stalin indicating that the United States regarded the Churchill-Stalin conversations as "preliminary" and not committing the American government. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 834.

35. For recent accounts, from different points of view, of the background to the British intervention in Greece, see L. S. Stavrianos, "The Immediate Origin of the Battle of Athens," and W. H. McNeill, "The Outbreak of Fighting in Athens, December 1944," both in *The American Slavic and East European Review*, 8, No. 4 (December, 1949).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Between this decision, however, and the installation of the Groza cabinet in March the Yalta Conference took place. Although Stalin at Yalta made several pointed remarks to the effect that he "had no intention of criticizing British actions in Greece, nor . . . any intention of interfering in that country,"[36] the agreement signed by the Big Three made no mention of spheres of interest. On the contrary, the declaration regarding liberated areas in Europe seemed wholly in accord with American interests and was, with slight modifications, the same as Roosevelt's proposed text:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of America . . . jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems. . . . The three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require: (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed people; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections. . . .

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

There is no question that the Soviet action in Rumania at the end of February was scarcely in accord with this declaration. As Byrnes later said, "From the close of the Yalta Conference to the present day it [the declaration on liberated Europe] has been a source of conflict between the Soviet Union and ourselves. But it is the basis on which we have shown the world that Russian actions in eastern Europe have been in violation of Russia's pledged word."[37] Unfortunately, there seems to have been no explicit discussion at Yalta of

36. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference* (New York, 1949), pp. 217–218, 244.
37. Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

the possibilities of a contradiction between this declaration, which is not altogether unambiguous, and the British-Soviet division of spheres of influence.[38]

During the Rumanian crisis the Russian head of the Allied Control Commission refused to consult with the American and British representatives. Molotov informed Ambassador Harriman that "the Radescu Government was unable to maintain order and fulfill the armistice terms and that the Allied Control Council would take the necessary measures and keep the Allies informed," [39] but presumably after the decisive steps had been taken. Later, in September, 1945, Molotov admitted to Byrnes that Vyshinsky had "helped in the formation of the government," but said that the U.S.S.R. had acted because "there was very serious danger of disorder and civil war." [40] If there was danger of civil war it was only because the Soviet Union had urged the Rumanian Communists to action.

Thus the initial American protests and inquiries had no effect in checking the Russian action and the administration was unwilling to press the issue at this time, partly because the war was still being fought. It refused, however, to recognize the Groza government. The British, while also deploring the Soviet move, were in no position to make a vigorous objection. As Churchill explained in a message to Roosevelt on March 8, 1945:

> We have been hampered in our protest against these developments by the fact that, in order to have the freedom to save Greece, Eden and I at Moscow in October recognized that Russia should have a largely preponderant voice in Rumania and Bulgaria, while we took the lead in Greece. Stalin adhered very strictly to this understanding during the thirty days fighting against the Communists and ELAS in the city of Athens, in spite of the fact that all this was most disagreeable to him and to those around him.[41]

It is reasonable to assume, then, that to the Soviet government the division of southeastern Europe into spheres of influence meant that it was to act in accordance with its interests in Rumania as Great

38. Stalin, in proposing an amendment to the declaration on liberated Europe—"support will be given to the political leaders of these countries who have taken an active part in the struggle against the German invaders"—remarked that Churchill need have no anxiety that this proposal applied to Greece, a fairly clear indication that he would consider the division into spheres of influence the basic agreement.

39. Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

41. Quoted in a statement by James F. Byrnes, *New York Times*, October 18, 1947.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

648

Britain had in Greece. Consequently, when challenged for having contravened the Yalta agreement—a challenge which might well have been received with some surprise and irritation—it responded either by warping the meaning of the declaration, by maintaining that subsequent investigation of the Groza regime required the united approval of all three powers, or by relying on the overriding priority of military requirements and the ultimate authority of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. It is difficult to see just how Stalin could have accepted the Yalta declaration without mental reservations. Apart from his doubtful record as an advocate of self-government and free elections, there was the undoubted basic dilemma that a popularly elected government would in all probability be anti-Soviet.[42]

Why did the Soviet government act at this particular time? It is possible that a connection exists between the British measures in Greece and Vyshinsky's work in Bucarest. But beyond this the underlying reason, apparently, was the assumption that the war in the Pacific would be more protracted than it proved to be, and hence that the Western Allies would be unable or reluctant to oppose this Soviet move to secure its position in a state which, after all, had been an Axis satellite and was certainly of great strategic importance to the U.S.S.R.[43]

This answer, however, leads to the further question whether the installation of the National Democratic Front government was primarily a security measure to protect Soviet interests in a vital strategic area or represented the first step of a premeditated campaign to communize all eastern Europe. There is, perhaps, no need to develop the arguments for the latter view; subsequent events themselves seem to support it. Even the Communists today hold to that interpretation.[44] There is no evidence, despite the upsurge of Russian nationalism during the war, that the Communists ever renounced their ultimate hopes of a world revolution and a worldwide union of Soviet

42. The same dilemma appeared, of course, in the Polish question. Harry Hopkins, in his last visit to Moscow, stated that the United States would accept any government in Poland which was desired by the Polish people and was at the same time friendly to the Soviet Union. I have yet to find satisfactory evidence that the expression of the popular will, in such a country as Rumania or Poland, would have any likelihood of bringing about a regime friendly to the U.S.S.R. This is not to say that the widespread antipathy may not have had political and historical justification, but merely that the formula of free elections and friendly government involved a contradiction.

43. This, at least, was the most satisfactory explanation I was able to obtain while in Rumania.

44. See below, p. 313.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

648 republics. Certainly the Soviet political record leaves little doubt that agreements with bourgeois states were to be regarded solely as measures of expediency, not as means of reconciling the antagonisms of the two systems, which by definition were irreconcilable.[45]

Nevertheless, there is some evidence that developments were not all planned in advance in accordance with a secret blueprint, some indication of indecision in the Soviet leadership. In 1944 Ambassador Harriman suggested that elements in the Russian government close to Stalin opposed too close collaboration with the West, but that Stalin liked to have two strings to his bow.[46] Later, in April, 1945, Harriman cabled that he detected three parallel lines of Soviet foreign policy: 1) collaboration with the United States and the United Kingdom in a world organization; 2) creation of a security ring through domination of the border countries; 3) penetration of other countries through their Communist parties.[47] Since it is obvious, and should have been obvious to the Russians, that simultaneous pursuit of all three lines was impossible Stalin may have felt there were alternate paths to follow, that the course had not been set.

Two additional possibilities suggest themselves in this regard: The first is that initially the united front governments of the liberated states of eastern Europe were regarded not—as they later came to be—as mere springboards for exclusive Communist domination but as providing a modus vivendi for the states which had united in fighting Nazi Germany. The second is that the Russians may have regarded Rumania as occupying a special status and that actions taken there did not necessarily apply to the rest of Europe.

With regard to the first possibility, Isaac Deutscher, in his recent biography of Stalin, has suggested that the concept of a people's democracy—a much milder affair in theory than what the Communists had been trained to expect—as distinct from the Soviet system was taken seriously for a time after the war by Soviet political theorists

45. An even more explicit indication, if it is authentic, of a long-held plan to use united front governments after the war as the first step to achieving a Communist revolution is to be found in a recent biography of Tito, in what purports to be a secret Comintern directive of May 9, 1941, stating that "The Communist world revolution must be presented as a series of measures to achieve 'true democracy.'" The steps to be followed look very much like those which have been taken in eastern Europe since 1945: establishment of a broad coalition government, then its progressive liquidation through arrests, trials in people's courts, etc. Stephen Clissold, *Whirlwind, an Account of Marshal Tito's Rise to Power* (New York, 1949), pp. 238–241. The author informs me that the directive came from the archives of the wartime pro-German Serbian police. Despite its apparent authentication by subsequent events, certain passages in it do not, in my opinion, ring true.

46. Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 1460.

47. Stettinius, *op. cit.*, p. 815.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Stalin may have felt such a form of government would "help him to preserve the condominium of the Big Three." [48] 648

In 1945 one does find such statements as Stalin's to Harry Hopkins "that Poland would live under the parliamentary system which is like Czechoslovakia, Belgium, and Holland, and that any talk of an intention to Sovietize Poland was stupid . . . the Soviet system was not exportable—it must develop from within on the basis of a set of conditions which were not present in Poland." [49] Now one may regard this statement as a triumph of mendacity or see certain sinister implications in the last phrase, but still there is an impression, for the short run at least, of Stalin's pursuing a noncommunizing line. Moreover, certain events in 1945 are rather difficult to explain on the premise of a fixed intention to sovietize eastern Europe. Why was Hungary permitted to have free elections in 1945, elections which brought in an anti-Communist majority? Even in Rumania, the Soviet presentation to King Michael of its highest award, the Order of Victory, would seem an unnecessarily extravagant gesture if he was to be dethroned at an early date. The inclusion in the Groza government of such a questionable person as Tătărescu, who was not really needed for his technical competence, whom the local Rumanian Communists regarded with great distaste, and whose presence certainly did not greatly reassure business circles, is perhaps best, if rather weirdly, explained by the Soviet determination to have a "bourgeois" politician in the new coalition.[50]

While it is true that Hungary, for a time at least, was permitted to enjoy the fruits of a free election, that Czechoslovakia preserved a relatively independent internal status until 1948, and that Finland, though at one time associated with Hitler, is still free of Communist control, there is little evidence that Rumania would ever have been permitted such freedom, or such a long leash. There is the possibility, suggested above, that Soviet interests in Rumania were more extensive than elsewhere. Historically, tsarist Russia frequently dis-

48. I. Deutscher, *Stalin, a Political Biography* (Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 542–543.

49. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 900.

50. I cannot prove this statement but it was the only plausible explanation I could obtain from some Rumanian Communists who were most embarrassed by Tătărescu's presence in the government. Deutscher, who is bothered by the same problem, cites several other actions which are hard to explain if Stalin had a definite and coherent plan to communize eastern Europe, e.g., Stalin's excessive concern with the Russian-Polish and Polish-German frontiers and the obviously damaging effect to the Communist cause of the reparations burdens placed on the defeated states. Deutscher's conclusion is that Stalin had no master plan but a number of extremely self-contradictory intentions. Deutscher, *op. cit.*, pp. 536–537.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

648 played ambitions in Moldavia, the path of approach to Constantinople and the Straits; recent Soviet writings on Bessarabia interpret the "liberation" of that province from the Turks in 1812 as a half-completed freeing of the Moldavian people, frustrated by Napoleon's invasion. As has been noted above [51] the Soviet government in a few chance remarks showed a special concern over Rumania during the war. Since 1947, with the reinforcing of the iron curtain, Rumania appears to have become the most tightly sealed and impenetrable of all the Soviet satellites. Moreover, of all the nations of eastern Europe, Rumania offered perhaps the least promise of voluntary cooperation with the Soviet regime: there were the unresolved territorial conflicts, the absence of any Pan-Slav feeling, and a miserably weak Communist party. Hence even if one assumes, hypothetically, no fixed intention from the beginning to sovietize eastern Europe but only a desire to secure friendly governments and strategic security, Russian action in Rumania was likely to be heavy-handed and arbitrary.

These possibilities are suggested very tentatively; their further implications will be treated briefly in the first section of Chapter XIV. One observation, however, may be made at this point. The two interpretations, a) that the Russians had a blueprint for all of eastern Europe, or b) that there was no such plan but that their actions arose from the play of events, especially from the deterioration of international relations following the war, are not in their practical consequences as far apart as they might seem. In the first place, the term blueprint is misleading in giving an impression of a predetermined course of action. Communist strategy is more likely to be along the lines of a chess game: the very notion of the plan involves the consideration of alternative lines of action, depending in part upon the opponent's response. This Leninist flexibility, which is rather ponderous and mechanical in the Soviet regime's hands, often is forgotten after the fact by the Communists' own proclivity to see all developments as inevitable and foreordained by Stalin's wisdom. Perhaps the only constants are the ultimate goal of world communism and a deep sense of ill-will and hostility toward the Western bourgeois states.

Secondly, even if one assumes the Soviet intention to follow limited objectives, their application in practice immediately encounters some very thorny difficulties. Thus, the Soviet Union wanted friendly states on its western frontiers, since these states in the past had been avenues of invasion. Well enough, but such a state as Rumania has

51. See above, p. 265.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

historically been not only an avenue of invasion into Russia but also a Russian avenue for expansion. As so often is the case in the world of power relations, the Russian attempt to secure what it regarded as its defensive requirements was at the same time a threat to the western European states, not to mention the border states obliged to be friendly. The Soviet demand for security carried with it potentially aggressive implications. 648

Further, even if one supposes that the united front governments were not meant to be merely flimsy covers for a Communist dictatorship, what did they mean, how were they to develop? Surely not toward bourgeois parliamentarianism, to the Russians a retrograde step. The concept of a united front, in the absence of a pressing fascist threat, was purely formal, and as soon as the Communists attempted to give it some content it became suspiciously, if inevitably, like a false façade. Similarly, with respect to elections, a single prearranged list of candidates would be the only means of maintaining the front; otherwise the Communists would feel obliged to rig the ballots to prevent a return to the old rut of bourgeois politics.

Finally, at the end of the war the Big Three coalition was bound to loosen, as coalitions always do when the common enemy has been defeated. But any increase in disputes, when viewed through Marxist-Leninist spectacles, was certainly to be interpreted as a sign of renewed bourgeois perfidy. Hence, it would require relatively little actual friction for the Russians to draw, or anticipate, the most damaging conclusions, which would in turn exacerbate relations and lead to a rapid deterioration of great power cooperation. For all these reasons it appears that the only difference between the two interpretations mentioned above is that if the Russians had from the outset a fixed determination to communize eastern Europe, by force if need be, there was no chance of an amicable settlement with the United States and Great Britain; if they did not have such a plan, there was only a very slight chance.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

page 274

XIII

THE COMMUNIST PERIOD: THE 1945 AGRARIAN REFORM

Marxism and the Agrarian Question

000 AGRICULTURE has caused much confusion and controversy among Marxists. As Lenin said, "The peasant question in modern capitalist states most frequently gives rise to perplexity and vacillation among Marxists and to most of the attacks on Marxism by bourgeois (professorial) political economy."[1] Marx's primary political and economic interest was in the development of capitalist industrial society and in the rise of the proletariat which was to inherit that society. Agriculture did not hold the key to the future, and in so far as it was involved in capitalist relations it would follow the main lines of capitalist development. In particular, he believed that the small independent peasant property could not survive in a capitalist society, for a number of reasons:

> Destruction of rural house industries, which form its normal supplement, as a result of the development of great industries; a gradual deterioration and exhaustion of the soil subjected to this cultivation; usurpation, on the part of the great landlords, of the community lands, which form everywhere the second supplement of small peasants' properties and alone enable them to keep cattle; competition, either of plantation systems or of great agricultural enterprises carried out on a capitalist scale. Improvements of agriculture, which on the one hand bring about a fall in the prices of the products of the soil, and on the other require greater investments and more diversified material conditions of production, also contribute towards this end, as they did in England during the first half of the 18th Century.[2]

As can be seen, Marx used a profusion of reasons to demonstrate the necessary demise of peasant agriculture. In the first place, he

1. V. I. Lenin, "Small Production in Agriculture," *Selected Works*, XII (London, 1939), 288.
2. Karl Marx, *Capital: a Critique of Political Economy, Vol. III, The Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole*, ed. Frederick Engels, English trans. Ernest Untermann (Chicago, 1909), p. 938.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

saw the transformation of small peasants into wage laborers and the expulsion of the agricultural population from the land as an integral part of the genesis of capitalism.[3] In the second place, he regarded the peasant farm as economically unsound and retrograde because of the high expenditure of money capital for purchase of land. "Small property in land creates a class of barbarians standing half way outside of society, a class suffering all the tortures and all miseries of civilized countries in addition to the crudeness of primitive forms of society." [4] In this case peasant farming is seen not as a historical form being eliminated but as a degraded type of economic activity. Finally, peasant agriculture is technologically unable to survive: "In the sphere of agriculture, modern industry has a more revolutionary effect than elsewhere, for this reason, that it annihilates the peasant, that bulwark of the old society, and replaces him by the wage laborer." [5] Here again the peasant is eliminated, though not at the time of the genesis of capitalism but in the course of the expansion of industry. The variety of Marx's attacks upon peasant agriculture was to cause his followers confusion.

In the course of the development of the Marxist movement this analysis of peasant agriculture presented two disadvantages. First, it was not a doctrine that would win adherents among the peasantry but, if anything, would alienate them. Hence in countries with an important agricultural population it was a serious political handicap. Second, a more disturbing difficulty was that farm statistics from a number of countries in the latter years of the nineteenth century seemed to controvert Marx's conclusions; agriculture was not sharing in the anticipated concentration of capitalist development. Peasant farms were not being eliminated by large capitalist farms, but rather the peasant seemed to be gaining at the expense of the large farmers. These difficulties contributed to a crisis in the socialist movement in the last years of the century, especially in Germany where a strong revisionist movement appeared, which, among other things, denied that the process of concentration was bound to take place in agriculture as in industry. Eduard Bernstein and Eduard David championed the view that peasant agriculture was proving its ability to survive. Karl Kautsky supported Marxist orthodoxy and while admitting that the number of small farms was growing, contended that concentration was nevertheless taking place through the media of

3. *Ibid.*, I, English trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (London, 1887), pp. 740–758.
4. *Ibid.*, III, 944.
5. *Ibid.*, I, 513.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

000 mortgaging, indebtedness, and leasing; that ultimately and in general large-scale agriculture would prove its advantages.[6]

The revisionist controversy had important repercussions in radical circles of eastern Europe, where agriculture was the principal occupation. The populists profited from the crisis and took over a number of the revisionist tenets. Most of the socialist writers in Rumania, as well as in Russia, were influenced by this controversy. In particular, Dobrogeanu-Gherea in Rumania and Lenin in Russia worked out their agrarian theories more or less in the context of this issue.

Much the most important Rumanian Marxist theorist was C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea (1855–1920).[7] Born of a Jewish family in Russia, Dobrogeanu-Gherea had been a member of Russian populist and socialist circles and had started his career as a revolutionary. He had come first to Rumania in 1875 to organize the underground transmittal of letters and books to Russia. He had been arrested by the Russian police and, after a period of Siberian exile and European travel, returned to Rumania where he settled permanently. He quickly mastered the Rumanian language and became not only a leader of the socialist movement but an important literary critic.

Gherea's outstanding contribution was the quite remarkable study *Neoiobăgia* (1910)—*Neoserfdom*—which undertook to apply Marxism to the special conditions of backward countries. His basic thesis was that the impact of capitalism upon a backward agrarian society, such as Rumania, produced a hybrid, in which there was a monstrous mingling of old and new. He called this result neoserfdom, which he characterized as:

> Relations of production in good part servile and feudal; a condition of liberal-bourgeois laws, created in illusions and lies, and leaving the peasant to the discretion of the master; a tutelary legislation which decrees the inalienability of peasant land and regulates the relations between master and worker; finally, inadequate land for the so-called small peasant proprietor for cultivation and for maintaining his family, a fact which obliges him to become a vassal of the large proprietor.[8]

He undoubtedly tried to explain too many phenomena by the formula of neoiobăgia, but he had a profound insight into the corrosive

6. An account of this controversy, from the revisionist point of view, is given in the second edition of Eduard David, *Sozialismus und Landwirtschaft* (Leipzig, 1922), pp. 1–37.

7. Biographical sketches of Dobrogeanu-Gherea are given by Trotsky, *Ocherki politicheskoi rumynii*, pp. 69–78, and by Titel Petrescu, *Socialismul la Romînia*, pp. 340–348.

8. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *Neoiobăgia*, p. 373.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

effects of Western capitalism upon traditional social forms. As a socialist he believed that this process was inevitable:

> Countries remaining behind enter into the orbit of advanced capitalist countries; they move in the orbit of these countries; and their whole life, development, and social activity are determined by the life and activity of the advanced countries, by the historical epoch in which we live, the epoch of bourgeois capitalism. And this determination of the life and social activity of backward countries by advanced countries is itself a necessary condition for their existence.[9]

He was therefore totally opposed to those populists who sought to avoid the capitalist industrial path. "A country eminently agricultural," he said, "is a country eminently poor and socially and economically backward." [10] He believed that Rumania must enter the procession, move toward increasing industrialization, break the feudal bonds, and convert the liberal formulae into a reality.

He did not take sides on the David-Kautsky dispute over the future of large and small agricultural properties, but he pointed out that this argument was not relevant to Rumania, since the miserable half-serf was not a peasant proprietor in any meaningful sense, and the latifundiary estate owner was not a large-scale farmer. Under conditions of neoserfdom the latifundia tended to increase at the expense of the defenseless peasant; this was not because it possessed any inherent competitive superiority but because of the abnormal system of social and property relations obtaining in Rumania.[11]

In the field of agrarian reform Gherea's whole stress was upon clearing the way for the free development of capitalist relations and getting rid of the feudal residues. He was not particularly in favor of wholesale expropriation and redistribution of land, as the repeated distributions of land without further reforms had merely prolonged and extended the misery. He was most interested in abolishing feudal relations and giving the peasant an opportunity to become a small cultivator, which he believed to be a more advanced and efficient form of cultivation than the latifundia. With the abolition of the feudal servitudes, now disguised in contractual form, the large estate owners would be driven to become modern capitalist farmers, and in all probability would also be forced to sell a good deal of their land to the peasants. If this natural pressure toward sale of estate land proved

9. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 482.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 248.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

000 to be insufficient, then he would recommend forced sale or expropriation.

He admitted that this process would create an agricultural proletariat, but he held that a free proletariat was still in a better position than the semiservile peasant attached to his inadequate morsel of land. Moreover, once the proletariat became a distinct group it could be organized and protected by appropriate legislation. He granted that the reforms he recommended would not solve all problems overnight, that the contradictions inherent in capitalism would of course remain but these were, in his opinion, preferable to the existing anomalous situation. In response to the charge that in effect he was working for capitalism rather than socialism, he replied that a Marxist did not invent social forms but analyzed them.

By and large Gherea's social policy was quite moderate: the establishment of small farms which could become independent peasant properties and open the door to the development of capitalism. Nor did he think that too much could be achieved in the agricultural field alone: "This solution of the agrarian problem not only does not resolve the social questions of the country, but does not totally resolve even the problem of peasant misery." [12] Such a resolution could come about only through a rise in national productivity. Finally, it should be noted that he regarded the peasant revolt of 1907 as a negative event and as a disaster. "In the event of the success of a *jacquerie*, the result would be profoundly bourgeois, reactionary and anti-social-democratic, not revolutionary." [13] For this reason he was quite skeptical about the advisability of undertaking socialist agitation in the countryside. At the 1896 socialist congress, in which the question of rural propaganda was raised, Gherea said: "If it is easy to rouse the villages and create a socialist movement among the peasantry, I do not believe that it is so easy to dominate and master a powerful movement which would break out in consequence of propaganda in the village. Let us not by imprudent propaganda provoke a danger as great for the peasants as for the Socialist Party." [14]

In terms of Marxist thinking Dobrogeanu-Gherea made a significant contribution in his extraordinarily acute analysis of the conditions of the states on the fringes of the capitalist world and of the curious developments to which they were subjected. The principal difficulty of his view, however, was that as the basis of a party pro-

12. *Ibid.*, p. 430.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 185.
14. Quoted in Şerban Voinea's article, "Socialismul," in *Enciclopedia Romîniei*, III, 288.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

gram it would not really satisfy any social group. Although his attitude toward the peasants and toward peasant agriculture was not hostile, he was firmly opposed to the ideal of peasant society. Hence the Social Democrats were vulnerable to the attacks of the populists, who delighted, moreover, in ridiculing their revolutionary ideology and their modest liberal-bourgeois program. On the other hand the bourgeoisie would obviously find far more congenial companionship in the Liberal party.

The 1892 program of the Rumanian Social Democrats, which Dobrogeanu-Gherea helped to draft, showed the influence of his ideas on the agrarian question, although it was somewhat more radical. The principal emphasis was upon abolishing feudal residues and promoting a freer economy. It did, however, recommend gradual state purchase of private landed properties as well as public holdings, to create an inalienable domain to be leased out to cultivators, especially to syndicates of agricultural workers. (In *Neoiobăgia*, Gherea had mentioned this possibility but felt that until the existing structure of the Rumanian state was changed such a measure might do more harm than good.) The 1919 program of the Social Democrats continued to show his influence. Speaking of the semiservile peasant, it denied that the simple process of expropriation and resettlement would resolve the social question in the agricultural sector.

In the interwar years, the new generation of socialists—such men as Şerban Voinea, C. Titel Petrescu, and Lotar Rădăceanu—showed themselves to be strongly under the influence of Dobrogeanu-Gherea's ideas in their interpretation of Marxism as applied to Rumania. For example, Voinea felt that the principal task of Rumanian Social Democracy was to bring about bourgeois-capitalist development, since the revolution could be achieved only in the ripe conditions prevailing in the West.[16] He did feel that some revision of Marx was necessary in regard to the role of the peasants and their importance as a political force. The postwar agrarian movements in eastern Europe and the retreat to the New Economic Policy in Soviet Russia had, in his opinion, shown that it was dangerous for the peasants to develop an antiproletarian sentiment. So he was concerned with the method of finding village allies for the workers. While the peasants could not achieve the next level of society, socialism, this long-range problem should not interfere with present possibilities of cooperation with the peasant parties. "If with respect to the future profound theoretical differences divide us from the peasants, in regard to im-

16. See his study, *Marxism oligarhic*, an attack upon the Marxist-Liberal theories of Stefan Zeletin.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

mediate political practices we find ourselves in full agreement. Both political organizations seek the removal of the oligarchic system of government." [16]

In the last analysis, however, Dobrogeanu-Gherea's interpretation of Marxism was unable to provide Rumanian Social Democracy with an adequate program for the agrarian question. The reasons for his failure are quite important. As has been seen, he made an important advance upon earlier Marxism in his efforts to make socialism relevant to the backward agrarian nations, in his realization of the importance of the agrarian question to the Marxist, and in his interpretation of the impact of capitalism upon a backward society. His analysis, however, did not go far enough. For if he saw that capitalism had produced the hybrid, neoiobăgia, yet he believed that the removal of the feudal relations—dijma, labor contracts, exceptional legislation, inalienability, etc.—would suffice to put Rumania on the right track. For that reason he was not interested in more specific remedies for agriculture, such as the various palliatives of the populists, or even in the redistribution of land, since this measure without the removal of the semiservile relations would be self-defeating. He was quite correct in his predictions that the Rumanian legislative mania, formal universal suffrage, and agrarian reform conforming to the old practice of handing out land would produce no lasting remedies for the ills of Rumanian society. Unfortunately he saw the feudal-capitalist combination as a mechanical mixture whereas, to pursue the metaphor, it more nearly resembled a chemical solution. The interaction of capitalist and traditional elements was producing a society, and however unpleasant some of its manifestations may have been, its creation was not a reversible process.

The insufficiency of this conception became evident as time passed. The Rumania of the interwar years presented just as many anomalies as it had in 1910, which is why Dobrogeanu-Gherea still makes very relevant reading. But the term neoserfdom no longer described it. Although semiservile elements still persisted in the countryside, they were not the outstanding characteristic. Yet Gherea's followers, such as Voinea and Rădăceanu, Rumanian Social Democratic theorists of the 1920's and 1930's, still contended that the country must be rid of the oligarchy as the first step toward healthy capitalism, ignoring the fact that the only type of bourgeoisie likely to arise in Rumanian society was an oligarchic one. In short, Gherea is responsible for the Social Democrats' unrealistic assumption that the peculiar form of oligarchic, bureaucratic capitalism which dominated Rumania was

16. *Ibid.*, p. 248.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

an accidental feature on the body politic, to be removed like a wart.[17]

Just as the Rumanian Social Democrats hoped somehow to bring about a nonoligarchic capitalism, so, under Dobrogeanu-Gherea's influence, they wished to have a nonservile peasantry. In this, however, they were by no means consistent but fluctuated between admitting the desirability of small peasant farming and taking the more orthodox line on the advantages of large-scale cultivation. The land reforms of 1918–1921, while not at all to their liking, had the negative result of making the servile elements in Rumanian agriculture seem less important and of increasing doubts as to the likelihood of a prosperous small peasantry of the Western type. As a consequence, the Social Democrats failed to achieve any coherent agrarian program. Throughout the interwar period, at party congresses and in articles, they kept futilely insisting that the agrarian problem was very important and that the party must formulate its attitude on the subject, but they never overcame their dilemma. For a time they solved the problem by evading it, through seeking short-term political allies in the Peasant party, which presumably would be responsible for agrarian policy in the period of small peasant cultivation. A constructive alliance of the Peasant party and the Social Democrats would doubtless have been beneficial to Rumania but it was prevented both by the growing social conservatism of the National Peasants and by the Socialists' fluctuations between collaboration and doctrinal purity.

It is in the light of the uncertainties and contradictions of Social Democratic agrarian policy that Lenin's dynamic interpretation of Marxism is seen in all its originality and paradoxicality. As with many aspects of Lenin's thought, it is difficult to tie his agrarian policy to a consistent pattern or to say whether in apparent shifts he was changing his mind or, with his extraordinary subtlety, he was merely bringing forth a new response to a new "objective situation."

As a starting point it is instructive to compare Lenin's and Dobrogeanu-Gherea's views on the agrarian question. Both men pro-

17. The Communist Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu (*Problemele de bază*, pp. 264–278) vigorously attacked the Social Democrats for their attempt to distinguish the Rumanian oligarchy from the bourgeoisie, and pointed out how it led to a tendency to collaborate with Carol's enlightened despotism as an antioligarchic force. Pătrăşcanu, of course, was intent on proving that capitalism is the real villain of the piece and that its more unpleasant manifestations in Rumania merely reflect the ugly qualities of capitalism in the last stage of monopoly and imperialism. There is, to be sure, something to be said for the opinion that Rumania in attempting to industrialize and compete with the highly developed capitalist states was obliged to take over an advanced form of capitalism. But in my opinion Pătrăşcanu was altogether incorrect in regarding the differences between Rumanian and Western capitalism as only superficial, a view which can be maintained only if Western capitalism is seen in the totally baleful light of the Communist interpretation.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date) 1951 EDI Rumania EDI

000 duced their agrarian studies at about the same time, both were concerned with the need of relating Marxism to backward agricultural states, and both were writing under the influence of the revisionist crisis. Gherea had left the question of large versus small properties open, whereas Lenin stoutly defended Kautsky's orthodoxy, a fact of considerable importance later on. In several respects both men saw the problem in the same light: they realized that the dispute in the West between large and small properties was not the principal issue in Rumania and Russia, since the real difference lay between semiservile peasant cultivators and feudal estates; they regarded the small peasant holding as an advance upon the feudal latifundia. Both were enemies of the populist ideal of a peasant society. Both were against restrictive agricultural legislation and enforced inalienability of peasant property and desired the free development of capitalist relations in the countryside. Moreover, both men, initially at least, were opposed to the wholesale expropriation and redistribution of land, and were suspicious of nationalization of land because of the reactionary character of the existing state.

But with all these similarities, which set both men apart from the German Social Democrats and from the populists, there was a very important difference in outlook and center of interest. For Gherea the ultimate goal was the arrival of a socialist society; for Lenin, the revolution was the driving force of all his thoughts. Thus Gherea favored the development of capitalism in the villages, with all its attendant miseries and conflicts, because he thought it an advance upon existing semifeudal conditions. Lenin, on the other hand, urged the spread of capitalism in the village precisely because it would intensify the class struggle. "In this case," he said in 1902,

> we want to support small property not against capitalism but against feudalism; in this case by supporting the small peasantry we give a tremendous impetus to the development of the class struggle. Indeed, on the one hand, we, by this, make a *last* attempt to fan the embers of the class ("estate") enmity of the peasants towards the feudal landlords. On the other hand, we pave the way to the development of the bourgeois antagonism of classes in the countryside, because that antagonism is still masked by what is supposed to be the common and equal oppression of all the peasants by the survivals of serfdom.[18]

Their attitudes toward the upheavals of 1905 and 1907 were altogether different. Gherea saw the 1907 peasant uprising as a tragedy,

18. Lenin, "The Agrarian Program of Russian Social-Democracy," *Selected Works*, II, 312.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

whose roots lay deep in the conflicts of Rumanian society; he hoped by his policy to rid Rumania of such dreadful and essentially negative jacqueries. Lenin, on the other hand, while aware of retrograde elements in a peasant revolt, recognized it as a powerful tool for advancing the cause of revolution.

It has been said that as a result of the 1905 revolution Lenin altered his attitude toward the small peasants; realizing their political importance, he abandoned the traditional views of Marxism.[19] This is not altogether correct, for in Lenin's writings well before the 1905 revolution one finds an intense awareness of the importance of the peasant in Russia. Moreover, he avoided the Kautsky-revisionist dispute by his threefold distinction between feudal estate, peasant property, and large capitalist farm, and based his opening tactics upon the conflict between the first two. Thus, in 1902:

> Speaking generally, it is not the business of the Social Democrats to develop, encourage, fortify, still less multiply small-scale farming or small property. But the point is that we are not faced with a "general" but with an *exceptional* case of small-scale farming, and this exceptional character is clearly expressed in the preamble to our agrarian program: "The abolition of the survivals of serfdom and the free development of the class struggle in the countryside." Speaking *generally* the encouragement of small property is reactionary, because it is directed against large-scale *capitalist* economy and, consequently, retards the social revolution and obscures and glosses over the class struggle. But in this case we want to support small property not against capitalism but against feudalism.[20]

Or even earlier, in 1901:

> We have seen that in the modern Russian countryside two kinds of class antagonism exist side by side: first, the struggle between the rural workers and the rural employers; and second, between the peasantry as a whole and the landlord class as a whole. The first antagonism is developing and becoming more acute; the second is gradually diminishing. The first is still wholly in the future; the second to a considerable degree already belongs to the past. And yet in spite of this, it is the second antagonism that has the most vital and most practical significance for the Russian Social Democrats at the present time.[21]

19. For example, F. Borkenau (*The Communist International*, p. 52) stated that Lenin before 1905, in supporting Kautsky, felt that it was impossible to win over the peasantry, but that after 1905 in considering the lessons of the revolution he saw the necessity of obtaining the support of the small peasants.

20. Lenin, *Selected Works*, II, 312.

21. Lenin, "The Workers' Party and the Peasantry," *Selected Works*, II, 237.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

Lenin did, however, make an important switch, apparently as a result of the 1905 revolution, on the question of redistribution of land and nationalization. Before the 1905 revolution he stated that while he favored restoring to the peasants some land which had been cut off from them at the time of the emancipation, he was opposed to the wholesale redistribution of land, which had been urged by a section of the narodniki, the so-called Black Redistributionists, since it would have the reactionary effect of generalizing and perpetuating small-scale peasant production. As for nationalization, he said that ultimately he would favor it, but that it was premature in Russia and would only lead to state socialism.[22] By 1908 Lenin came to favor nationalization, not as a step toward socialism, but as part of the fight against the feudal relationships:[23]

> The abolition of private property in land does not by any means change the bourgeois foundations of commercial and capitalist agriculture. There is nothing more erroneous than the opinion that the nationalization of the land has something in common with socialism, or even with the equal right to the use of land. Socialism, as is well known, means the abolition of commodity production. Nationalization, however, means converting the land into the property of the state, and such a conversion does not in the least affect private enterprise on the land. Whether the land is private property or whether it is in the "possession" of the whole country, of the whole nation, makes no difference in so far as the economic system on the land is concerned, nor does it make any difference whatever to the (capitalist) economic system of the rich muzhik whether he buys land in perpetuity, rents land from the landlord or state, or whether he "gathers up" allotment land abandoned by bankrupt peasants. If exchange remains, it is ridiculous to talk of socialism. . . . The economic significance of nationalization does not by any means lie where it is very often sought for. It does not lie in the fight against bourgeois relationships (as Marx long ago pointed out, nationalization is one of the most consistent bourgeois measures), but in the fight against feudal relationships.

He was still reluctant to accept wholesale redistribution of land, although he realized that a revolutionary movement would bring it to the fore:[24]

> Concerning the attitude the workers' party should take towards the possible demand of the new farmers for the division of the land, a definite

22. *Ibid.*, II, 318–319.

23. Lenin, "The Agrarian Question in Russia at the End of the Nineteenth Century," *ibid.*, I, 208–209.

24. Lenin, "The Agrarian Program of Social Democracy," *ibid.*, XII, 334.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

reply can be given. The proletariat can and must support the militant bourgeoisie when it is waging a genuinely revolutionary struggle against feudalism. But it is not the business of the proletariat to support the bourgeoisie when it is calming down. If it is certain that a victorious bourgeois revolution is impossible in Russia without the nationalization of the land, then it is still more certain that the subsequent turn to the division of the land is impossible without a certain amount of "restoration," without the peasantry (or, as it would be more true to say from the point of view of the presumed relationships: farmers) turning toward counter-revolution. The proletariat will defend revolutionary traditions against all such strivings and will not further the latter.

When the 1917 revolution came, however, Lenin was fully aware of the power of the desire for more land, even though as a socialist he opposed the extension of small private holdings. In his reply to Kautsky's criticisms, he said: [25]

Kautsky will never be able to refute the view that equal land tenure has a progressive and revolutionary significance in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. Such a revolution cannot go beyond this. On reaching this limit, it clearly, quickly, and easily reveals to the masses the inadequacy of bourgeois-democratic solutions and the necessity of proceeding beyond their limits, of passing on to socialism. Having overthrown tsarism and landlordism, the peasantry dreamed of equal land tenure, and no power on earth could have prevented the peasantry, who had been freed from landlordism and from the bourgeois parliamentary republican state, from realizing this dream. The proletarians said to the peasants: We shall help you to reach "ideal" capitalism, for equal land tenure is the idealization of capitalism from the point of view of the small producer. At the same time we will prove to you its inadequacy and the necessity of passing to the social cultivation of the land.

These two measures, nationalization and equal land tenure, were both regarded by Lenin primarily as tactical and political rather than as economic measures. The first was useful as a sweeping revolutionary step which wiped out feudal landholding. It was also desirable as the "agrarian system which is most flexible from the point of view of the transition to socialism." [26] Equal land tenure, however, was regarded as purely a necessary measure to gain the support of the peasantry. "When adopting the Land Socialization Act—the 'spirit' of which is equal land tenure—the Bolsheviks most explicitly and definitely declared: this is not our idea, we do not agree with this slo-

25. Lenin, "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky," *Selected Works*, VII, 201.
26. *Ibid.*, VII, 205.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

gan, but we think it our duty to pass it because it is demanded by the overwhelming majority of the peasants." [27]

Thus Lenin did in fact accept the narodniki goal of land distribution, a decision which undoubtedly was a factor in bringing the Bolsheviks to power. But when he explains this action in Marxist terms, one has the impression that something very odd has happened to the doctrine of Karl Marx. For example, in 1919 he said,

> The proletariat after having defeated the bourgeoisie must unswervingly conduct its policy towards the peasantry along the following fundamental lines: the proletariat must separate, demarcate the peasant toiler from the peasant owner, the peasant worker from the peasant huckster, the peasant who labours from the peasant who profiteers. In this demarcation lies the *whole essence* of socialism.[28]

While the selection of random quotations may not do Lenin justice, it is interesting that whatever the circumstances Lenin should have seen in the demarcation of the peasant toiler from the peasant owner the "essence" of socialism. One cannot avoid feeling that there is a considerable distance between this view and Marx's critique of the peasant economy.

Tactically, of course, this emphasis derives from Lenin's basic plan of campaign for the proletariat:

> First, with the "whole" of the peasantry against the monarchy, the landlords, the medieval regime (and to that extent the revolution remains bourgeois, bourgeois-democratic). Then with the poorest peasants, with the semi-proletarians, with all the exploited, against capitalism, including the rural rich, the kulaks, the profiteers, and to that extent the revolution becomes a socialist one.[29]

Briefly, then, Lenin saw the peasant question primarily in terms of its role in bringing about the Russian revolution. The question whether the Russian revolution was the one Marx had in mind has been endlessly disputed by the Social Democrats and the Communists. But whether one regards the bolshevist revolution as a betrayal or as a perfect manifestation of "Marxism in the era of imperialism," it is obvious that a profound change has occurred. Moreover, by his stress upon the peasantry Lenin was able to give a dynamics to the socialist movement in eastern Europe which not only was more power-

27. *Ibid.*, VII, 200.
28. Lenin, "Economics and Politics in the Era of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," *Ibid.*, VIII, 9.
29. *Ibid.*, VII, 191.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

ful than what the Social Democrats had to offer but involved a much more realistic appraisal of the actual forces at work in a peasant society under the impact of capitalism.

It has been necessary to spend this time on Lenin because of the decisive influence of his ideas on the Communist parties in the interwar period. The agrarian policy of the Rumanian Communist party attempted to be a faithful reflection of the directives of the Comintern, although it often lapsed into deviations. In particular, the agrarian policy of the Rumanian Communists was dictated by considerations of political power rather than of economic reform.

The Comintern took a good deal of interest in the peasant question as a fruitful field for revolutionary opportunities. In 1923 a Red Peasants International was formed in Moscow in an effort to rally the peasantry to the Communist ideal and to combat the influence of the peasant parties uniting in the Green (Prague) International. The Red Peasants International, however, had very little success in any of its efforts, and in going through its reports one finds very little mention of Rumanian participation.

Unfortunately for the Communists, the Rumanian land reform, while in many respects ill-considered as an economic measure, did at least have the effect of making their task very difficult. For the extensive redistribution of land, whatever its shortcomings, robbed the slogan, land to the peasant, of much of its potency. Throughout the interwar period the Rumanian Communists seem to have been uncertain whether they should continue to attack the landlords with the whole of the peasantry, or the kulaks with the poor peasants. Actually they succeeded in doing very little with either.

In 1924, the Presidium of the International Peasant Council in Moscow sent out an appeal to the Rumanian peasants, first telling them that Bessarabia should be allowed to settle its own destiny, and then saying that the land reform was not being carried out. At that time it called for: immediate expropriation and uncompensated confiscation of all boyar property; no land to anyone unless he worked it himself; livestock and inventory for the poor peasant masses; no payment of taxes for armaments; no money for speculation; factories to the workers; and all power to the workers and peasants in alliance with the Soviet Union.[30] This, of course, was not an agrarian program but a call to revolution, and a rather poorly timed one at that.

While the Communists hated the Liberals they were not at all pleased with the National Peasants, who at best were regarded as

30. *Die Bauerninternationale* (Erstes Heft, Berlin, 1924), pp. 176–178.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

representatives of the rich peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie and at worst as merely another section of international finance capital. They were particularly critical of the law facilitating the alienation and sale of peasant land as a means of undermining the poor peasant, even though Lenin before the revolution repeatedly supported this measure as a splendid device to extend capitalism into the village. The fall of the National Peasants was greeted as a just punishment.

The period of ultra-Left tactics was reflected in the agrarian program of the Communist parties. In 1931, for example, the Comintern rebuked the Rumanian party for its Right opportunist conceptions in the field of the peasant movement. The Rumanian party paper had stated that to attract the peasants to the defense of the Soviet Union and against the impending imperialist war it was necessary to penetrate the village: "At the present moment the peasant is the victim of the terrible economic and political crisis . . . The question of usury, taxation, and the acceleration of the process of differentiation and the proletarization of the village must all be discounted by our party in its work of winning over the peasant masses." [31] The authors of the article had clearly fallen into the Right opportunist conception of the peasantry as a class as a whole. The Comintern severely pointed out that the Rumanian Communist party could scarcely base itself on the kulaks in the struggle against intervention. The party was therefore to address itself to the middle and poor strata of the village with a challenge and a slogan. The principal slogan, however, which the Comintern had to offer, was a campaign against the lies about "Soviet Dumping"—a slogan that must have brought great joy indeed to the hard-pressed Rumanian peasant. It is plain that here the agrarian program of the Rumanian Communist party had little to do with Rumanian agriculture or even with Rumanian revolution but was an instrument for the defense of the U.S.S.R.

Although Lenin had announced that in the eventual progress from individual to socialized agriculture the small peasant should be persuaded, not dragooned, there was little evidence of this attitude in Stalin's exposition in 1929 of the reasons for proceeding with the collectivization of Russian agriculture.[32] He stressed the impossibility

31. Quoted in T. Marin, "The Role of Rumania in Intervention against the U.S.S.R.," *The Communist International*, 8, No. 10 (May 15, 1931), 302.

32. Cf. Stalin's speech of December 27, 1929, on the question of agrarian policy in the U.S.S.R., in *Voprosy Leninizma* (11th ed., Moscow, 1945), pp. 275–294. The accepted slogan on the peasant question was reliance on the poor peasants, in alliance with the middle peasants (generally, those who did not employ labor), and in continuous battle with the rich peasants or kulaki. This meant that while the kulak class was openly recognized as an enemy, the middle and poor peasants were not to be antagonized or forced into collective agriculture. Stalin later reiterated this point in his

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

of part of the Soviet economy being frozen in private cultivation while socialized industry was expanding: "Either one way or the other: either back—to capitalism—or forward—to socialism. There is no third way nor can there be." [33] He again attacked the old revisionist view of the persistence of the small peasant, and held that the peasant should be liberated from his slavish attachment to his little plot of land. Fortunately, he said, this slavish attachment did not exist in Russia because there was no private ownership in land—hence the importance of nationalization at the time of the revolution.

The Soviet move to collectivized farming was not, however, followed by any shift in the agrarian line of the Comintern. In 1931, Kolarov, speaking of the tasks of the Communist parties in agrarian countries, emphasized organizing and leading the strikes of agricultural workers, supporting the revolutionary struggle of the toiling peasant, understanding the differentiation in the countryside and especially the role of the middle peasantry, who must be neutralized or attracted.

> The Communist Parties must make the question of the basic slogan in the village—viz., land for the toiling peasant and agricultural worker without purchase—completely clear, contrasting it with the collective agrarian policy of the landowners and the bourgeoisie. This slogan must be set up particularly against the bourgeois land reforms, connecting it with the struggle of the proletariat for power, for the Workers' and Peasants' Government. The *collectivization* of agriculture cannot take the place of the struggle for land without compensation in capitalist countries. Collectivization must come on a plane with the exposition of the lies and slanders concerning the U.S.S.R., contrasting the success of agriculture in the U.S.S.R. on the basis of its socialist reconstruction to the agrarian crisis of capitalist countries.[34]

Throughout these years the Communists both in Rumania and in Moscow were intent on proving both that the land reform had not rid Rumania of all boyar estates and that a differentiation was developing in the village between the agricultural proletariat and the wealth-

---

article "Dizzy with Success" in 1930, when he complained that the enthusiasm of some of the comrades had led them to use pressure on the middle and poor peasants. Nevertheless, one finds very little of this cautious tone in the above-mentioned speech, except for the conviction that somehow the nationalization of land a decade earlier had rid the peasant of his attachment to the land. As the turmoils of the years of collectivization showed, this was simply not the case.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 778.

34. V. Kolarov, "The World Agrarian Crisis and the Peasant Movement," *The Communist International*, *8*, No. 9 (May 1, 1931), 270.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

000

ier peasants. As a matter of fact, both these contentions were true to a certain degree, as has been seen above in Chapter 3. But the Communists greatly exaggerated the extent both of large estates and of differentiation, and their statistical efforts to prove their point were either inaccurate or patently false.[35]

829 241 185

The adoption of the Popular Front in 1935 led to a corresponding modification in the Communist agrarian policy. While ultimate aims of socialism were not renounced, a distinction was drawn between socialist reforms and reforms designed to restore democracy. The militant revolutionary note of the early pronouncements was dropped. The new policy appears in Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu's study of the basic problems of Rumania, *Problemele de bază ale României*, written during the war but showing the influence of the Popular Front tactic. Pătrăşcanu was no proletarian but the son of a socialist intellectual and himself a lawyer. He was not Moscow-trained, and while his writings were based upon Lenin, they have a certain Western outlook. He led the Rumanian Communist party in 1944, was Minister of Justice in the coalition governments and in the Groza cabinet until the beginning of 1948. His influence in the party diminished steadily after the return of the comrades who had been in Moscow, and he was eventually discharged from his position because he had become "the exponent of bourgeois ideology and detached himself from the masses and from the ideology and principles of the working class."

Much of Pătrăşcanu's analysis of the Rumanian agrarian problem is sound and illuminating, although on many points of fact he obviously relied on the information compiled by the National Peasant economist Virgil Madgearu. He was fully aware, of course, of the unhealthy state of Rumanian agriculture, the persistence of extensive cereal cultivation and low level of productivity, the failure of the 1918–1921 land reforms to establish a prosperous peasantry, the persistence of metayage and other semiservitudes, the proletarization of the poorer peasantry, and the inability of a great number of Rumanian peasants to support themselves on their meager holdings. In trying, however, to adapt this promising material to perfect Marxist-Leninist categories he overtaxed the evidence; he exaggerated the failure of the 1918–1921 reforms to equalize land holdings, he probably gave too much importance to the differentiation between the poor and the rich peasants, and in attempting to demonstrate the

35. Two such examples are S. Timov, "Wird Rumänien agrarsiert oder industrialisiert?" *Agrarprobleme*, International Agrarinstitut Moskau, Band 2, Heft 2 (1929), pp. 310–346; and Tatarow, "Die Agrarkrise in Rumänien," *Agrarprobleme*, Band 4, Heft 2 (1931), pp. 44–80.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

prevalence of agricultural laborers he definitely mishandled his statistics.[36] 829 241 185

Pătrăşcanu was at his best in showing that the optimistic statements of official Rumanian spokesmen during the interwar years were altogether unjustified, and at his worst in reducing the agrarian question to an oversimplified formula. He was too intent upon proving that all difficulties could be laid at the door of Rumanian capitalism, with the support of the moribund but sinister boyar class. There is of course a certain amount of truth in this contention, but it served to distort his analysis. For example, "overpopulation" as a cause of economic misery was obviously unwelcome to him since it put the blame outside the realm of political economy and made it an act of God. He was correct in maintaining that Rumanian officialdom had all too eagerly seized upon overpopulation in recent years as a perfect scapegoat for the prolonged failure to improve agriculture, but it cannot be written off as an unimportant factor. Pătrăşcanu, however, felt obliged to attack it and devoted considerable attention to destroying the "myth" of overpopulation. He distinguished, quite properly, between absolute or biological overpopulation and an overpopulation resulting from economic circumstances. In his view there were three principal causes of this relative, or economic, overpopulation:

1) the existence of large properties, whereby 25,000 families held a quarter of the arable land, thus depriving hundreds of peasants of the possibility of creating a holding (according to the 1930 census 25,000 exploitations of over 50 hectares occupied only 18.8 per cent of the arable surface);

2) under semiservile conditions labor was intensively exploited; consequently one man was driven to accomplish the work on a piece of land which normally would provide a living for three;

3) the extensive use of women and children in place of men on boyar estates produced the appearance of overpopulation.

While these conditions, all of which he associated with the existence of large properties, doubtless had some effect—especially the first—they were certainly not the major reasons for Rumanian agrar- 185 241

36. Virgil Madgearu (*Evoluţia economiei româneşti*, p. 358), making use of some calculations of the agrarian economist Roman Cresin, stated that while small cultivators under 5 hectares had an excess of labor power, middle and large properties required additional labor, evaluated at 190 million days a year. Of this, 40 per cent (around 371,300) was undertaken by paid agricultural laborers, and 60 per cent represented supplementary work performed by the families of small proprietors. Pătrăşcanu, however (*op. cit.*, p. 85), took this figure of 40 per cent of paid agricultural laborers, equated it with the fact that 40 per cent of the arable land in Rumania in 1930 was in holdings over 10 hectares, and gave the quite unjustified impression that in effect agricultural laborers were responsible for the cultivation of all land over 10 hectares.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

185 ian overpopulation after 1921. Moreover, he granted that Rumanian
strip cultivation and dwarf holdings led to overpopulation because of
241 their economic inefficiency but he went on to say:

> The solution of this aspect of the Rumanian agrarian question cannot be achieved in the framework of small properties, nor in the framework of private property in land. It cannot find a solution either in individual or isolated fashion, but involves structural transformations which concern the whole of Rumanian society, hence far past the restricted limits of the agricultural sector properly speaking.[37]

In a word, for all his criticism of the "myth" of overpopulation Pătrăşcanu really provided no convincing evidence that it was not a real problem, nor could he. This point is important, because the propaganda for the subsequent 1945 agrarian reform was obviously based on similar premises.

In his proposal of remedies, he limited himself to immediate reforms, which were not socialist but which were intended to rid Rumania of fascism and restore a constitutional bourgeois society. For agriculture he advocated the complete expropriation of large properties over 50 hectares, the abolition of servile labor relations, the resettlement of landless peasants and peasants with insufficient land; distribution to the peasants of livestock and equipment obtained from the expropriated estates; cancellation of peasant debts to the banks and to the state. Other economic measures included the nationalization of the Rumanian Bank and the consolidation of the banking structure; state control over cartels and the nationalization of certain combines; an eight-hour day for labor, minimum wages, social security, and protective legislation. For a Communist it was certainly a minimum program.

In explaining this program, Pătrăscanu relied upon the ideas of Lenin of 1900. The whole of the peasantry—while carrying within itself the latent conflict between poor peasant and the kulak—was the adversary of large property, although for a number of different reasons. In some European states peasant solidarity was no longer possible, but in Rumania there still remained a substantial antiboyar spirit common to poor and rich peasant alike.

The Agrarian Reform of 1945

241 Rumanian agriculture was disorganized after the defeat of 1944,
423 although as always the very backwardness of peasant farming re-
185 duced the shock. The war had depleted stocks of grain, draft animals,

37. Pătrăşcanu, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

and equipment. There had been fighting during the spring and summer over a wide strip of Moldavia, and less extended fighting was going on in Transylvania. The German army had retreated, the Red Army had marched through the country. There had been a considerable dislocation of population, and many landowners had fled from their estates in Moldavia and Bucovina.

Despite these unsettled conditions there was initially very little peasant action. There were cases of peasants taking land, primarily from absentee owners or those who had fled the Russian advance. But as late as January, 1945, at Botoşani in northern Moldavia—a region bordering the Soviet Union and which had been under Soviet control since the preceding spring—an agreement was reached, with the approval of the local Soviet commander, whereby landowners who had left their estates could return to them, provided they agreed to operate them personally and not as absentees.[38]

When the National Democratic Front began its drive to power in February, 1945, the calm was broken. In September, 1944, the Rumanian Communist party had put forward a demand, incorporated in the program of the National Democratic Front, for the expropriation of land over 50 hectares. Even before Groza and the Communists came into office peasant committees in the villages began taking over large estates. While this display of zeal, in most instances initiated by local organs of the Ploughmen's Front, was authentic in the sense that it corresponded to the primordial land hunger of the Rumanian peasant, it in no way reflected a revolutionary situation. The peasants in the winter of 1944 were not in a gay frame of mind; they were poor, heartily sick of the war which had cost many of them their sons, not to speak of their horses, cattle, and equipment. They were tired of troops—German, Russian, and Rumanian—marching by and requisitioning. They did not like the old order, they hated the local gendarmes but they were not in a revolutionary frame of mind. They welcomed land but they were not in a rick-burning mood.[39] The premature seizures of land before any law had been passed were merely part of the mock revolution the National Democratic Front was undertaking.

One of the first acts of the Groza government after its tumultuous rise to power was to promulgate a decree-law, on March 22, 1945, for a land reform.[40] According to Article 1 of this law, "Agrarian reform

38. This may seem surprising, but I saw the agreement in the prefecture at Botoşani.

39. Such at least was my impression after traveling though some 30 judeţe in December and January, 1944–45.

40. A text of the law is given in a pamphlet published by the Rumanian Ministry of Information, *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie* (Bucarest, November, 1946).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

is a national, economic, and social necessity for our country. Rumanian agriculture should be based upon sound and productive farms, which are the private property of those who cultivate them."

241
423
185

The stated purposes of the reform were:

a) the enlargement of the cultivable area of existing peasant farms which were less than 5 hectares;

b) the creation of vegetable gardens in the environs of cities, for workers, civil servants, and artisans;

c) the creation of new individual private farms for agricultural laborers without land;

d) the use of certain land for model farms and experimental stations, to be administered by the state.

The following land was to be expropriated:

a) all properties belonging to German citizens and to Rumanian citizens of German ethnic origin who had collaborated with Hitler Germany;

b) the properties of war criminals and those responsible for the "disaster of the country";

c) properties of those who had fled to countries with which Rumania was at war and of those fleeing after August 23, 1944;

d) the land of absenteeists (excluding persons on official business abroad, or absent by necessity, or workers who had gone abroad and who had less than 10 hectares);

e) properties of those who during the last seven years had not cultivated the land themselves (excepting those with less than 10 hectares);

f) properties of those who had volunteered to fight against the United Nations;

g) mortmain lands;

h) lands of private owners in excess of 50 hectares, including arable, orchards, meadows, ponds, marshes, and inundated land. The proprietor was permitted to select which 50 hectares he was to retain but it had to be in one place. Multiple properties and properties of husband and wife were considered as one.

All tractors, threshing machines, sowing machines, and combines found on expropriated land were to pass to the state for the creation of agricultural machine stations. Other equipment and livestock was to go to the state for redistribution to the peasants. Expropriation of inventory and livestock was to be in proportion to the amount of the proprietor's land expropriated.

The law exempted from expropriation rice fields, church and monastic properties, crown lands, and lands belonging to certain specified

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

cultural and philanthropic institutions, urban communes, and co-operatives. 241 423 185

The mayor of each commune was directed to call a general assembly of all peasants having less than 5 hectares. This assembly was to elect a local committee of 7–15 members. These committees, whose actions were to be coordinated by a district committee operating with the Ministry of Agriculture, were to draw up lists of land to be expropriated and of peasants who were entitled to receive land.

Priority in the distribution of land was as follows:

a) cultivators mobilized in the anti-Hitler war;

b) widows, orphans, and invalids of this war;

c) widows, orphans, and invalids of any war;

d) landless peasants;

e) agricultural laborers and peasants who had worked on the land expropriated;

f) peasants with less than 5 hectares.

A necessary condition for all categories, however, was that the recipient lack 5 hectares of land.

Expropriation was without compensation. The price of the new lots was to be equal to the annual average harvest of one hectare, that is, 1,000 kilograms of wheat or 1,200 kilograms of maize. The new proprietors were to pay immediately in money or in kind 10 per cent of the purchase price, the remainder to be paid in ten years for peasants with little land and in twenty years for landless peasants. Landless peasants could obtain a three years' moratorium on the payment of their first installment.

Holdings created under this law could not be divided, sold, leased or mortgaged, either in whole or in part, except in certain special cases, with the authorization of the Ministry of Agriculture. The new land was received without obligations.

Lands expropriated and divided before the promulgation of this law were to be made to conform with its provisions.

By a subsequent administrative regulation certain large properties could be exempted from expropriation, if they were well-organized enterprises, suitable to serve as model farms under the direction of the Ministry of Agriculture; even these farms, however, were not to exceed 150 hectares.

For a number of reasons it is difficult to ascertain the results of the law in terms of the redistribution of land. Expropriation began before the law was promulgated, and although the irregularities in its application were not as great as some of the dispossessed landowners made out, there was a good deal of uncontrolled seizure and redistri-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241
423
185

bution. A reform carried out so brusquely and through the agency of local peasant committees was bound to be a hectic procedure and not likely to be very accurately recorded. As has been mentioned already the statistics on the 1918–21 reform, even those presented officially, were far from accurate, and there is no reason to believe that the figures on the 1945 reform are a bit more reliable. Indeed, it is quite obvious that some of the figures were rigged for political purposes.

As of January, 1947, according to official announcement, 1,443,911 hectares had been expropriated under the 1945 reform from 143,219 proprietors; 1,057,674 hectares had been distributed to the peasants and 387,565 hectares held as state reserve. Of the 1,114,888 peasants having claims, 796,129 had received land.[41] The average area expropriated was only 10 hectares. Of the number of peasants having claims 72 per cent received land. The average amount received per peasant was about 1.3 hectares. In magnitude this reform—if the figures are at all comparable—by no means equaled the 1918–21 reforms. For roughly the equivalent area (i.e., minus Bessarabia, though including Northern Bucovina and Southern Dobrogea), the first reform had expropriated 4,312,911 hectares, 2,824,962 hectares had been distributed to 1,036,367 peasants, an average of 2.7 hectares per peasant.

The regional results of the 1945 reform correspond to the nature of the terrain, with the notable exception of Transylvania. In the mountainous overpopulated areas the average allotment was very small: 0.6 hectares in the Moldavian Carpathians, 0.7 hectares in the Wallachian Carpathians, and 0.5 hectares in Bucovina. In Dobrogea, which was relatively sparsely settled, the peasants received an average of almost 3 hectares. An interesting feature of the reform is that while in most of the regions the average area of land expropriated was relatively large (over 130 hectares in the Moldavian Plain, 111 hectares in the Danube Plain, 57 hectares in Dobrogea, and 58 hectares in Bucovina) the average area expropriated was only 5.5 hectares in the Transylvanian Plateau and 5 hectares in the Tisa Plain. Of the total number of expropriations over nine-tenths were in Transylvania, although the area expropriated in that province was only about one-half the total. Clearly this meant the expropriation of numerous properties well under 50 hectares and presumably reflects the forced reduction of the German communities in Transylvania.[42]

41. Institutul Central de Statistică, *Communicări statistice, Nr. 17, 15 martie 1947* (Bucarest, 1947), p. 9.

42. The extensive German settlements in Transylvania, many of which had been there

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

In January, 1948, the Statistical Institute of the new Rumanian People's Republic undertook an agrarian census to ascertain the distribution of land after the 1945 reform. Unfortunately, this census does not permit satisfactory comparison with that of 1941. It presents a table, comparing the number of agricultural exploitations in the various categories of size for 1941 and 1948, which shows, as might be expected, a decrease in the number of dwarf holdings under ½ hectare and of large holdings over 20 hectares, and a marked increase in the number of exploitations between 1 and 5 hectares. However, since the amount of area occupied by these categories of exploitations is not given and it is unclear whether the same types of land (especially forests and pastures) are included in both cases, the comparison is not very illuminating and may be misleading.[43] It was obvious, however, that the land reform of 1945 did not, as it could not, create a nation of prosperous small-holders. Indeed, the conclusion reached as to the size of Rumanian exploitations has a very familiar ring: "If 3 hectares represents in general the minimum lot necessary to sustain by farming a household of 4 persons, then more than half of the agricultural exploitations of Rumania fall short of this level and are obliged to have recourse to outside income." [44] To be sure, this sour note was not the one prevailing in 1945 and 1946, when the reform was being pushed through, but anticipated the new agrarian line taken up in 1948.

In judging the 1945 land reform, it is necessary to realize, however, that it was not a Rumanian reform but had its sources in the Soviet Union, and that its immediate aims were political not economic.

---

for hundreds of years, were greatly reduced by the wholesale transfer of nearly the entire able-bodied population to the Soviet Union in the winter of 1944–45. Undoubtedly a high percentage of the Germans had been actively pro-Nazi, but the Soviet order paid no attention to any such criteria.

43. Number of agricultural exploitations (excluding Northern Transylvania):

		1948		*1941*	
Size of exploitation		*Number*	*Per cent*	*Number*	*Per cent*
Total		2,596,900	100.0	2,303,472	100.0
0–½	hectare	190,169	7.3	277,500	12.0
½–1	"	246,016	9.5	213,088	9.3
1–3	"	933,383	35.9	760,700	33.0
3–5	"	604,540	23.3	441,213	19.2
5–10	"	462,607	17.8	449,716	19.5
10–20	"	122,262	4.7	116,537	5.1
20–50	"	26,607	1.0	27,845	1.2
Over 50	"	11,316	0.4	16,873	0.7

A. Golopenția and P. Onica, *Recensământul agricol din Republica Populară Română, 25 Ianuarie 1948. Rezultate provizorii*, Institutul Central de Statistică (Bucarest, 1948). For further details of the 1948 census see the Appendix. It appears that a good deal more land was included in this census than in 1941.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

423
178

Although it was represented as the manifestation of the wishes of the broad masses of the Rumanian peasantry, it seems evident that the main outlines of the law were not drafted in Rumania at all but in Moscow. A comparison of the texts of the Rumanian land reform law with those for the provincial administrations of the Soviet Zone of Germany, passed in the summer of 1945, reveals striking parallels. With the exception of the size of property subject to expropriation (in Germany properties over 100 hectares were to be expropriated), the laws were altogether similar and in certain sections employed identical phrases.[45] Whatever the merits or faults of the reform, it was not a local measure but part of a more general agrarian policy being prepared for a much larger area.

In its general lines and intentions the agrarian reform clearly derives from Lenin's interpretation of class relations in a predominantly agrarian society: the need of eradicating the feudal remnants and of gaining the support of the peasantry by fulfilling its desires for land. In its specific context it was an important part of the National Democratic Front's attempt to obtain mass support in its political campaign. As a means of obtaining positive popularity among the peasants it may be doubted whether it was a great success, and there is no satisfactory evidence that it won the Groza government an enthusiastic peasant following. In the first place, it was physically impossible to grant the Rumanian peasant sufficient land to make him a satisfied and prosperous cultivator. Moreover, the peasants have always felt that the land was theirs and they have never shown themselves particularly grateful to those who parceled it out. On the other hand, the Communists' interest in winning over the peasantry should not be understood as merely a desire to gain popularity. The whole purpose of Lenin's peasant policy was to "neutralize" the peasantry at critical junctures in the party's progress so as to make sure it did not become actively hostile. As such a guarantee it was, perhaps, more successful.

The importance of the agrarian reform in eradicating feudal residues was indirect rather than direct. The Communists undoubtedly

45. Cf. *Frankfurter Zeitung*, September 12, 1945, which gives an account of the German laws. Both reforms started with the same formula that agrarian reform was a national, economic, and social necessity. In both laws local committees of poor peasants were to prepare the land lists, peasants with less than 5 hectares were entitled to land, payment could be in money or kind, with a 10 per cent payment the first year, although poor peasants could obtain a three-year moratorium. The price of the lots was the equivalent of one year's produce. New properties could not be sold, mortgaged, leased, or broken up. Farm machinery was to be placed in a common pool. These similarities are obviously no coincidence, and it is certainly unlikely that the German provincial administrations should have copied the Rumanian land reform independently.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

exaggerated the economic importance of the boyars and the extent of their holdings. Nevertheless, a certain boyar spirit still prevailed in Rumania and the fact of land ownership continued to be a mark of prestige.[46] The agrarian reform, in this respect, was probably effective in removing one of the symbols, if not the real source of strength, of Rumania's traditional ruling group.

As an equalitarian measure the land reform undoubtedly has an emotional appeal. When one has followed the history of the agrarian question in Rumania and the way in which the landed interests held out against the peasants until forced to grudging compromises; when one has seen the peasant humbly removing his *căciulă* as the landowner passed, and has perceived the chasm between the peasant and his rulers, one is moved by a feeling that retributive justice has been done. Retributive justice, however, does not reconstruct a society, solve economic problems, or even guarantee that the peasant will not be burdened with a new master.

The immediate economic effects of the reform were unfavorable but should not be exaggerated. The law was applied in the midst of spring planting, and the carefully planned spontaneity of its execution undoubtedly caused a decline in production. Some well-organized large properties were broken up in the process, but on the whole the output of Rumanian large properties had not been very impressive and much of the land was let out. Their function as guides to improved cultivation could certainly be taken over by model farms.

In its professed aim of creating a prosperous peasant agriculture, the agrarian reform alone could have only marginal value, although it undoubtedly provided a temporary relief for a number of peasants. It did not solve the problems of overpopulation, low productivity, strip farming, and the progressive fragmentation of properties. Although the new allotments were not to be broken up, the reform did, by creating new small holdings, increase the area where fragmentation had been most destructive in the past. Essentially the agrarian reform was only the last step of a process which had been going on in Rumania since 1864—the gradual reduction of estate land and its conversion into peasant holdings. Unfortunately the process had been so slow that it could never be more than a palliative. As the final stage in this conversion the 1945 reform was of much less importance than its predecessor. It should not, however, be considered as merely a last step; for the Communists it was clearly a first step.

46. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe*, p. 137, comments on the persistence of land ownership as a source of prestige and social position in these countries, and on the tendency of the successful tradesman or politician to acquire an estate.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

page 300

XIV

THE COMMUNIST PERIOD: SINCE 1945

Political Developments

175 WITH the exception of a brief interlude after the Moscow Conference of December, 1945, the evolution of the Groza regime has been steadily toward exclusive political domination by the Communist party, increasing state direction of the economy, and complete absorption of Rumania within the Soviet sphere of control. Several stages are apparent: March-December, 1945, when the Groza government was holding on, with Soviet support, against the nonrecognition of the United States and Great Britain, and the opposition of King Michael and the National Peasant and Liberal parties; January-November, 1946, a period of uneasy and abortive compromise which broke down completely with the holding of national elections; December, 1946–December, 1947, a year spent in liquidating all political opposition and expelling the king; from 1948 on, the consolidation of the Rumanian People's Republic, the inauguration of economic plans, and a turn to collectivization in agriculture.

It is difficult to determine precisely the degree to which this progress was inherent in the Rumanian situation, and to what extent it merely mirrored the intensification of the cold war between the Soviet Union and the West. It was clear at the outset that having come to power through the will of the Russians, lacking extensive popular support, encountering widespread anti-Communist and anti-Soviet sentiment in the other political parties, and confronted by a difficult economic condition which was bound to be bad in the years immediately following the war, the Groza government if it was to maintain itself had every prospect of becoming increasingly dictatorial. At the same time, the phases of increasing severity and political *Gleichschaltung* not only paralleled similar trends in other eastern European states but are closely related to the growing animosity between the Great Powers, an animosity to which the eastern European issue greatly and at points decisively contributed.

At the Potsdam Conference, July 17–August 2, 1945, the American delegation presented its contention that the Yalta Declaration

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

had not been carried out in Rumania and Bulgaria. The immediate Soviet response was, significantly, to condemn the political situation in Greece.[1] There followed lengthy and inconclusive debates in which Stalin at one point stated the problem clearly: "A freely elected government in any of these countries would be anti-Soviet, and that we cannot allow." [2] The Potsdam communiqué showed the failure to reach any real understanding: 175

The three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing peace treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of peace treaties with recognized democratic governments in these states will also enable the three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries.

The only concrete gains were declarations that the press would enjoy full freedom to report from these countries and that the work of the Allied Control Commissions would be improved through regular conferences, three-power consultation, and the free movement of the American and British representatives.

The Potsdam Conference did have certain immediate consequences in the Balkans, however. In Bulgaria the elections, which showed every prospect of being rigged, were postponed for a few months. In Rumania King Michael, on the strength of the Potsdam declaration, asked for the resignation of the Groza government as the apparent prerequisite to a peace treaty, and requested the assistance of the three powers in forming a cabinet acceptable to the United States and Great Britain. It was naturally, if incorrectly, assumed by the Russians and the Rumanian Communists that Michael's action was the result of a deep-laid American plan; their reaction was truculent and negative.[3] Groza refused to resign and took a trip to Moscow,

1. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, p. 73.

2. Philip E. Mosely, *Face to Face with Russia*, Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 70 (July–August, 1948), p. 23.

3. Rumanians of various political views at first absolutely refused to believe that there was no American scheme behind King Michael's action, but if persuaded such was the case they showed great alarm at the thought of an undirected situation getting out of hand. As far as I know, American action in Rumania did not extend beyond informing King Michael that the Groza regime was unacceptable, a fact generally known, and indicating approval of measures taken to broaden it. The United States did not have, perhaps unfortunately, a positive, thought-out plan of action.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 where he received full support. An anomalous situation resulted, in which the king declined to sign decrees and the government continued to carry on its business and even attempted to deny the existence of the rupture. There were, however, fleeting and perhaps illusory intimations in September and October of milder behavior and limited political objectives on the part of the regime. Minister of the Interior Georgescu indicated that political prisoners would be liberated; Prime Minister Groza stated that "his government did not intend to apply either collectivization of land or nationalization of banks or industry." Even Ana Pauker declared to an American correspondent that the Rumanian Communist party wanted unity to exist between the people, the government, and the king.[4]

The Rumanian impasse continued to disturb international negotiations. At the unsuccessful London conference, September 11–October 3, 1945, Molotov charged Byrnes with desiring a government in Rumania unfriendly to the Soviet Union and was apparently baffled by the American attitude, as he was reported to have said he wished he could discover what Byrnes wanted so they could negotiate.[5] Byrnes continued to maintain that the present government was not representative and refused, correctly, to accept Molotov's contention that it enjoyed "the support of the overwhelming majority of the population." On the other hand, while Byrnes, in a radio address on October 31, stressed the importance of the Russians having friendly states as neighbors and declared that "America will never join any groups in those countries in hostile intrigues against the Soviet Union," he seems not to have faced the fact that in pressing for free elections the United States was in effect supporting groups hostile to the U.S.S.R.

In Rumania open violence broke out on November 8, when a crowd celebrating King Michael's birthday was dispersed from the palace square by truckloads of Communist workers and fired upon by the Russian-trained Tudor Vladimirescu Division. Although the Groza government made a number of arrests and charged the historical parties with fomenting the outbreak, there is little question that the violence was introduced by the regime and its organized squads. It

4. See her interview with Sam Brewer, *New York Times*, October 19, 1945. In the course of this interview, however, she made two dots on a piece of paper and said: "We are realists . . . this dot is where we are and that one is Communism. When we come to an obstacle on the straight line between them we go around it, but we come back to our original line. We had to deviate to win the war. Now we must deviate to conquer present problems. But Communism is always our ultimate goal." A clear-enough sign, if that were needed, that the Communist party was not renouncing its ends, but not really a forecast of the policy to be followed.

5. Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175

would be rather naive, however, to assume that the crowd had gathered merely to felicitate the king; it was a political challenge, in a pattern familiar to Rumania and resorted to when the parliamentary structure collapsed.

The Moscow Conference, December 16–December 26, 1945, gave renewed hopes for continued allied cooperation and for an end to the political stalemate in Rumania. According to its final communiqué, King Michael was to be advised that one National Peasant and one Liberal should be included in the government, provided they were "truly representative members" of the parties, "suitable," and would "work loyally with the government." This reorganized cabinet should declare that free and unfettered elections would be held as soon as possible, elections in which all democratic and antifascist parties could take part; it should give assurances concerning freedom of the press, speech, religion, and association. Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky and the American and British ambassadors to the Soviet Union, Harriman and Clark Kerr, were to form a commission to consult with King Michael and the Groza government on the execution of these tasks. As soon as these conditions had been fulfilled and the required assurances received, the United States and Great Britain would recognize the Rumanian government.

Although this formula had the approval of the three powers, it had little chance of success. From the point of view of the Western powers and the Rumanian opposition, the presence of two members in the cabinet could not be regarded as an adequate concession, so all hopes were necessarily placed upon the forthcoming elections, but it was quite clear by this time that a free and unfettered election was something which the Soviet Union would not permit. At no time could the historical parties of Rumania be regarded as positively friendly to Russia; by 1946, with the experience of the past fifteen months behind them, their hostility was profound.[6] Moreover, since American and British recognition would be given before the actual holding of elections, there was no obvious means of assuring their honesty, nor could there have been unless the Western powers had been willing to force a general showdown with the Soviet Union.

After a delay in which the terms "representative" and "suitable" occasioned some dispute, Mihai Romniceanu, Liberal, and Emil Hațieganu, National Peasant, entered the government. Both agreed

6. For example, in October, 1945, Maniu stated in a declaration that the "present government is a Quisling government imposed by Russia . . . the Soviet government is doing everything possible to keep Groza and Tătărescu in power." This statement was true, of course, but it is difficult to imagine that the Soviet Union would have permitted the exponent of such a view to come to effective power in Rumania.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

to "work loyally" but held that their responsibility extended only to seeing that the Moscow agreement was carried out. Although they could scarcely be expected to assume responsibility for the cabinet's other actions, it was clear that no real coalition had been achieved. Groza, on his part, agreed to hold elections "as soon as possible" and to guarantee political rights. On February 4, 1946, the United States and Great Britain, with the explicit understanding that the Groza regime would fulfill the Moscow provisions, recognized the government.

For a time the political atmosphere relaxed somewhat, the opposition parties became active, set up newspapers, and planned their political campaigns. This promising situation did not last long. Soon the government resumed press censorship, political discrimination, arrests, and the terrorizing of anti-Communist politicians. In the spring and summer as violence increased the United States and Great Britain repeatedly protested against the delay in having the elections which they expected to be held in April or May.

The government, however, required time to undermine the strength of the National Peasants and to line up their own forces.[7] In March the Social Democratic party divided on the issue of running a common electoral list with the Communists. Titel Petrescu, leader of the party, was ousted and attempted to set up an Independent Socialist party. The indecision which had haunted the Social Democrats since their inception was now approaching its final and pathetic consequences. Petrescu, who was obviously uncomfortable after March, 1945, had compromised his own position by supporting the Communist drive to power; his belated break merely split the party, and the Left-wingers, opportunists, and Communist agents moved into the government fold. In April Tătărescu's Dissident Liberal party agreed to entering a common list with the Communist-dominated bloc. In July the regime issued two decrees, one abolishing the senate and establishing a unicameral legislature, the second creating a new electoral law which extended the franchise to include women but contained certain provisions facilitating the perversion of the electoral process.

The government finally held elections on November 19, 1946, and in all the unedifying history of Rumanian ballots these more than

7. A vivid eyewitness account of the election campaign is given by Reuben H. Markham, *Rumania under the Soviet Yoke* (Boston, 1949). Markham, who was expelled from Rumania by the Soviet Control Commission for too close association with the National Peasants and for speaking on their behalf, makes no pretense at being a dispassionate observer, but his account of Communist electioneering tactics appears to be substantially correct.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 held their own. The patently false vote received by the government bloc (the Communists, purged Social Democrats, Tătărescu Liberals, Ploughmen's Front, and National People's party, successor to the Union of Patriots) of 4,766,000, as against 880,000 for the National Peasants and 289,000 for the Liberals, was obtained through a crass combination of preelection press censorship and radio discrimination, terrorism and murder, falsification of electoral registers, multiple voting, and unabashed manipulation of the results.

There is little point in debating whether this election was more or less corrupt and unfree than its predecessors. If, as has generally been the case in Rumania, the perversion of elections is in inverse proportion to the government party's popular support, the Groza regime was clearly obliged to resort to extreme measures in rigging the election if it was to remain in power. But while it is true that a prevailing low standard of electoral ethics had been established by the Liberals in the 1920's and by the more outrageous plebiscites of Carol and Antonescu in the 1930's and 1940's, one should not resort to the rather shabby consolation that "Rumanians do not know the meaning of honest elections." The Communists knew; they had spent the preceding two decades criticizing electoral terrorism. The question is rather whether elections should ever have been regarded as a constructive solution under the prevailing circumstances.

The elections of November, 1946, mark the end of the Allied effort to resolve the Rumanian controversy. Wherein does the responsibility lie? There can be no doubt that the Groza regime and the Russians have the responsibility of breaking an international commitment. The Moscow decision was not faithfully observed in any meaningful interpretation of its terms. This responsibility is not lessened by reference to semantic difficulties, to the assumption that rigged elections aimed at simulating unanimous popular support represent true democracy to the Eastern soul, or that the opposition parties really were regarded as "fascist" by the Communists and hence not within the terms of the Moscow agreement. There may be semantic barriers between East and West but it is a dangerous delusion to take these as examples. The matter was much more simply one of taking the necessary steps to maintain and secure power. If that is the case, why did the Russians and the Rumanian Communists agree to a decision committing them to elections? Perhaps a partial answer is that it would be politically embarrassing to have to admit publicly the truth, that the "overwhelming majority" of the Rumanians really preferred not to have Russia as a neighbor, deeply mistrusted the Soviet regime and any party directed by it.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

The United States and Great Britain share two responsibilities, one moral and one political. While they did not violate the Moscow agreement, they incurred a certain obligation toward those Rumanians who, wisely or unwisely, came to believe that the Anglo-American stand gave them some hope of resisting and combating the Communist party and Soviet pressure. As Arnold J. Toynbee observed in connection with an earlier but analogous situation, the Western powers, by encouraging the local opponents of the Russians "to look to them for a guidance and a protection which they had no intention of giving at any sacrifice to themselves . . . deterred them from coming to terms before it was too late . . . and merely exposed them to reprisals as satellites of . . . Russia's most dangerous enemies." [8]

The other element of Anglo-American responsibility concerns what might be called injustice in Thomas Hobbes's nonmoral but severely logical sense—involvement in a political contradiction. As has been mentioned, at no time did the Western powers really meet the fact that their expressed twin desires to have a Rumanian government friendly to the U.S.S.R. and one representing the majority of the inhabitants were, in all likelihood, incompatible. Stalin obviously required a friendly government and apparently believed he had received Allied agreement through his arrangement with Churchill. In 1945, when the question came to the surface, the United States, rather hesitantly backed by Great Britain, felt obliged to stand out for a truly representative government obtained through the holding of elections.

Now if the United States really desired to maintain amicable relations with the Soviet Union on the Balkan question, it should not have pressed so persistently for the one act which would certainly and predictably arouse either open Soviet hostility or, as happened, a dishonest and hence unsatisfactory response. On the other hand, if it is true that the Soviet regime by its very nature was impossible to get on with, that it would demand, as Byrnes said later, not friendly but subservient governments, that the anti-Communist politicians in Rumania were justified in their abiding mistrust of the neighbor to the East, then the alternatives left to the Western powers were either to give up, as not worth the cost, the attempt to influence events in the area, or to take the measures necessary to achieve their effective

8. Toynbee was speaking of the disaster which overcame the Transcaucasian republics after the First World War. *Survey of International Affairs, 1920–1923* (Oxford University Press, 1925), pp. 373–374. Of course, it might be contended that it was just a matter of time in any case before the political opposition, active or passive, was knocked down. But this possibility, which if strong was not a certainty, does not absolve the Western powers from a definite responsibility.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

control over the situation. Admittedly the postwar attitude to be adopted by the Soviet Union was by no means clearly foreseen in 1944–1945, and as suggested above it may not have been altogether fixed, but if, as it appeared in 1950, any effort at American-Soviet agreement in eastern Europe involved fitting a square peg in a round hole there was not, during the period of uncertainty, even an effort to shave off some of the sharper edges of the peg.

In any event, whatever slight chances there might have been of resolving the Rumanian political crisis, through international agreement and peaceful internal adjustment, had disappeared by the time the elections were held. The National Peasants and Liberals naturally refused to accept the results, and their delegates did not occupy their seats in the parliament. In a formal communiqué of November 25, 1946, Maniu and Brătianu, after enumerating the electoral outrages, concluded: "Our parties consider that they can no longer authorize their representatives to continue to collaborate with the present government, the perpetrator of fraudulent and blood stained elections, with which they can have no solidarity whatsoever." [9] The United States and Great Britain did not accept the elections as representing the opinion of the Rumanian people or as complying with the assurances given by the Groza government.

The peace treaty with Rumania, which had been drafted by the Council of Foreign Ministers in the course of 1946 and was finally signed on February 10, 1947, did not materially alter the situation. Although Article 3 obliged Rumania to secure for all persons "the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press, of publication, of religious worship, of political opinion, and of public meeting," it was in nowise observed.[10]

9. See the annex to the booklet published by the Rumanian National Committee, *Suppression of Human Rights in Rumania* (Washington, D.C., September, 1949), a hostile but heavily documented indictment of the Groza regime.

10. Some of the main points of the treaty, which in general followed the lines of the 1944 armistice, were: frontiers to be as of January 1, 1941, except for the Hungarian frontier which remained as of January 1, 1938; the obligation to repeal and henceforth not to pass any measures discriminating against persons for sympathizing with the United Nations; dissolving and not permitting in the future any organization of a fascist type or other organization conducting propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union or other United Nations; limitation of the army to 120,000 persons; reparations in kind to the U.S.S.R. to the amount of $300,000,000, payable in eight years from September, 1944; guarantee of economic and property rights of United Nations nationals: German assets in Rumania to go to the Soviet Union; free commercial navigation on the Danube for all states; Allied forces to be withdrawn from the country within ninety days of the treaty's coming into force, except for the Soviet right to retain forces necessary to maintain the line of communication with the Soviet Zone in Austria.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDi Rumania EDi

175
661

The Groza regime, bolstered by the simulacrum of popular support gained in the elections and faced by an opposition unwilling to accept an unwarranted minority position in parliament, undertook in 1947 to wipe out all unfriendly or doubtful political organizations. In the spring it unleashed a new wave of arrests of opposition leaders, arrests made suddenly, at night, and with no explanation. The Communist Minister of Justice, Pătrăşcanu, expressed his belief that an uprising was being plotted but said "there was no evidence on hand fixing the responsibility upon former Premier Iuliu Maniu as leader of preparations for a revolution." [11] In July a number of National Peasant leaders, including Mihalache, were caught in an attempt to flee the country; the government arrested Maniu and the top party leadership and outlawed the party, an action which apparently evoked no popular response one way or the other.

Amid much publicity the regime, in November, tried Maniu and his followers, primarily on the charge of conspiring with "Anglo-American imperialism"; as the Communist paper, *Scânteia*, remarked, the United States was really the "twentieth defendant." Some damaging evidence was produced at the trial; observers seem generally to agree that certain members of the National Peasant party were shown to have been in contact with American intelligence officers to discuss means of overthrowing the regime.[12] Maniu, the principal defendant, while perfectly frank in his opinion of the government's illegitimacy and admitting attempting to smuggle National Peasants out of the country for the purpose of organizing resistance abroad, maintained that his opposition was within the framework of international agreements concerning Rumania, agreements which the government had flagrantly violated. But since the regime had effectively blocked any possibility of parliamentary opposition, underground planning—whether actually envisaging violence or not—was the only alternative to complete passivity.

The trial itself was conducted in a manner unhappily too familiar these days: the judge, Colonel Petrescu, was reportedly the director general of all prisons and concentration camps under the Antonescu dictatorship. Maniu and Mihalache were sentenced to terms of life imprisonment, the other leaders to terms ranging from one to twenty-five years. Whatever weight one may attach to the demands of *raison*

11. See his interview with W. H. Lawrence, *New York Times*, June 25, 1947.

12. As a matter of fact, as early as the spring of 1945 a number of Rumanians, some of whom had close connections with the Liberal and National Peasant parties, were developing underground plans for ousting the Groza government and sought to enlist American support. The charges of plots against the regime were not pure concoctions, whatever the purpose of the trial may have been.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDi

d'état—and it is obvious that Maniu and Mihalache did represent a threat to the Groza government—it is absurd to regard in any manner their sentences as an act of justice.

While the Maniu trial was in progress, the controlled press raised a clamor against Tătărescu and pointed out, quite correctly, that many anti-Groza elements were being sheltered in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic service. Tătărescu's position had been weakening for some time. In June, 1947, he had circulated a memorandum which contained a fifteen-point proposal for changing internal and external policy: he assailed the government's economic policy, expressed alarm over the country's low economic output, which was still at only 48 per cent of the 1938 level, requested better treatment of foreign capital and less stifling state intervention, and criticized the number of preventive arrests and the poor prison conditions. The Communists were naturally displeased by this note which clearly exceeded the conventions of "criticism and self-criticism." Rumors circulated of Tătărescu's resignation, and in September he was obliged to dismiss several hundred employees in the Foreign Office. On November 5 the parliament passed a vote of no confidence in him; the following day he and the other Dissident Liberal cabinet members were removed from their posts, to be replaced by Ana Pauker at the Foreign Office and Vasile Luca at the Ministry of Finance. (In December Bodnaraş took over the Ministry of War. The real rulers of the country were at last assuming governmental positions.)

Thus ended the political career of an able if unscrupulous man, who had first attracted attention in the early 1920's for his efficient action against the Communists and who had threaded a devious course through Carol's reign. Though disliked and mistrusted by all political groups, he seems to have had a rather Talleyrandian interest in the welfare of Rumania as he saw it.

Plans for the merger of the Social Democratic and Communist parties were announced in the autumn of 1947, though this amalgamation, which was in effect the complete absorption of the Social Democrats within a Leninist-Stalinist organization and ideology, was not completed until the following spring. It seems to have met with the sincere if ineffectual opposition of most of the socialists, some of whom joined Titel Petrescu's Independent Socialist party.[13] The Petrescu faction, however, was subject to increasing attack and

13. For an account of this last, faltering episode in the career of the Social Democratic party, see Valentin Thoma, "Wie es zur Liquidierung des rumänischen Sozialismus kam," *Die Zukunft* (July, 1949).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 charged with illegally distributing political leaflets; on May 6, 1948, Petrescu was arrested and kept in prison without trial.

661 On December 30, 1947, King Michael, an anomalous monarch in a universe of burgeoning people's democracies, was suddenly and rather unexpectedly forced to abdicate. At the time he said his abdication was voluntary but subsequently, after his departure from Rumania, announced that it had been made under duress and he could not regard it as binding. Government propaganda became increasingly unfriendly to the king and listed with great relish the castles, forest land, and industrial shares that reverted to the nation. Following the overthrow of the monarchy the government at once announced the creation of the Rumanian People's Republic (Republica Populară Română) and prepared the draft of a new constitution.

Having thus eliminated the monarchy and all overt political opposition, the Communists then turned to the task of removing disaffected or doubtful elements in their own ranks. In the autumn of 1947 Gheorghiu-Dej, commenting on the rapid growth of the Rumanian Communist party to 710,000 members, had criticized the "low political and ideological level of our cadres and the presence of chauvinism among party members." In the course of a three-day congress of Communists and Social Democrats, assembled in February, 1948, to ratify their unification in a United Workers party, Minister of the Interior Teohari Georgescu launched an attack on the Communist Minister of Justice Pătrășcanu, whom he charged with falling under bourgeois influence and overestimating the forces of the enemy, the Western powers. Pătrășcanu was removed from his post and from the Central Committee of the party; later reports have suggested his being a likely candidate for a purge trial such as the other people's democracies have enjoyed.

There had been friction between Pătrășcanu, a local Communist, and the "Muscovites," Pauker and Luca, since before the installation of the Groza regime. They found him too nationalistic and he was undoubtedly alarmed by the heavy, mechanically brutal tactics of the new order, its complete disregard of the nation's sensitivities, and its absolute subservience to Soviet state demands. Without question, many of the same elements which created Titoism and similar national heresies in the Communist camp were present in the Rumanian party, but because of the basic weakness of the Communist movement in Rumania and the ineluctable dependence upon the Soviet Union they never had a chance of obtaining control.

668 In February, 1948, the Communists concocted a new Democratic Popular Front, comprising the United Workers party; the Plough-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

men's Front, which had absorbed the dissident National Peasants to 668
become a united peasant party; the National Popular party, which dissolved itself a year later on the grounds that the intellectuals and representatives of the middle class supporting this artificial organization should henceforth work within the cadres of the "mass parties"; and the Hungarian Popular party, controlled by the Communists but presumably designed to represent the Hungarian minority. On March 28 this bloc conducted and won elections, against a wholly spurious opposition, for a new assembly to vote on the constitution.

The Constitution of 1948 closely resembled the 1947 Constitution 642
of the Bulgarian People's Republic and was clearly derived from and inspired by the Soviet Constitution of 1936. Apart from the fact that the latter is concerned with the union of a number of constituent republics, the principal differences reflect the transitional character of the so-called popular democracy. The People's Republic is defined as arising from the struggle against fascism, reaction, and imperialism rather than from the overthrow of landlords and capitalists. Private property is still recognized as one form of ownership of the means of production, though it is circumscribed by the "general interest" and subject to expropriation and nationalization. The Communist party does not have the preeminent status it enjoys in the U.S.S.R. As in the Soviet constitution stress is laid upon the right to work, to have leisure, and to receive an education; civil liberties, freedom of the press and of speech are guaranteed, but clearly for proletarian purposes; the right of association may not be directed against the democratic order established by the constitution. The supreme organ of the state is the unicameral Grand National Assembly, headed by a Presidium; the executive branch of the government is the Council of Ministers.[14]

Since the adoption of the constitution there have been few im- 661
portant structural changes in the government but rather a consolida- 642
tion of the regime, the reorganization of the administration and the army (which apparently now exceeds treaty limits), and a running fight to eliminate the remnants of political opposition and to subdue sporadic uprisings brought about by the extensive new economic activities. A series of well-advertised public trials continued through 1948 and 1949, against Liberals, industrialists, military officers, students, Catholic and Uniate clergy, and Zionists, all categories that might cause the regime trouble or embarrassment. The new legal apparatus, including the addition of "people's assessors" to assure

14. For a recent study of constitutional developments within the Soviet sphere, see Andrew Gyorgy, *Governments of Danubian Europe* (New York, 1949).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

661 proletarian justice and the introduction of the death penalty for
642 treason, espionage, and economic sabotage, proved an efficient weapon
in this attack. The creation, announced in January, 1949, of People's
[641] Councils as the organs of local government was to provide the basic
unit for the administrative hierarchy and to pave the way to a socialist society. In September, 1949, a State Control Commission was formed "to develop the spirit of responsibility toward public property, to wipe out bureaucracy, to verify the carrying out of government decrees, and to prevent sabotage in the work of building socialism." Avram Bunaciu, Pătrăşcanu's tougher successor at the Ministry of Justice, became head of this commission, which promised to be a very formidable instrument.

643 Along with the consolidation and coordination of the political and administrative apparatus came a marked shift in the party line from what it had been at the end of the war. The original program sought a government friendly to the U.S.S.R. and in which the workers' front would operate in coalition with middle-class parties. After 1947 not only the fact but even the pretense of collaboration was dropped. At the end of that year Gheorghiu-Dej said,

> The resignation of Tătărescu and his group means the removal of the last representatives of the reactionary bourgeoisie from the government; it means that the proletariat and its allies no longer share state power with the representatives of the exploiting classes. . . . The proletarian vanguard, in close alliance with the peasants and the progressive intelligentsia, is the backbone of the government.[15]

By 1949 the People's Democracy was explicitly defined as fulfilling the functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was distinguished from the Soviet form because it was possible, through the assistance of the U.S.S.R., to establish the dictatorship without civil war. In the People's Democracy, unlike the Soviet, the old state apparatus was not immediately smashed; bourgeois elements were retained for a time.

> But only with the establishment of People's Councils—local organs of state power built on broad democratic lines—will the new state apparatus be created, corresponding from top to bottom in every way with the aims and tasks of the new state and adjusted to the tasks of building Socialism. . . . The establishment of the People's Councils signifies

15. *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy* (January 1, 1948). (Published in Belgrade until December, 1948; subsequently in Bucarest.)

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

that in form the People's Democracy is approaching the higher form of the dictatorship of the proletariat—the Soviet form.[16] 642

Vasile Luca even read this view into the earlier tactics of the party, stating that in 1944 the Rumanian Communists had realized that the only road forward was the one mapped by the October revolution: "There was no third path, and there can not be one." [17]

Hence by the beginning of 1950 the Rumanian government was openly recognized as a proletarian dictatorship, well on the way to the Soviet form and in full pursuit of socialism. It might seem from these statements that this program had been planned all along; certainly Georgescu and Luca, in their current stress upon the regime's revolutionary origins, sought to give that impression. Yet there is evidence that this renewed Leftist line of international communism was causing some confusion in the cadres.

For example, an article appearing in 1949 in a Hungarian Communist periodical pronounced the same general line, which is that of all eastern European Communist parties today, but in greater detail.[18] The new People's Democracy was identified with the dictatorship of the proletariat; this identity did not exist at first but was created in the course of a developing struggle, first against fascism and big business but later against all capitalist elements including the rich peasantry. The article was frank in granting that this advance was rendered possible through the initiative and continuing aid of the Soviet Union.

Significantly, however, it went on to say that the Hungarian party did not have a clear view of all this until it received clarification from the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the Cominform in the autumn of 1947 and the summer of 1948. As a consequence, the party membership had fallen into a number of errors: it was inclined to forget that the People's Democracy was really more than just a plebeian variety of bourgeois democracy; it stressed the differences rather than the similarities between the Soviet system and the People's Democracy; it believed that the transition to socialism could be made without the dictatorship of the proletariat, or, if not, that the dic-

16. *Ibid.* (June 1, 1949).

17. *Ibid.* (November 4, 1949). In this same vein Luca proceeded to congratulate the party for wrecking all the coalition cabinets after August, 1944: "Before March 6, 1945 not a single government had been able to consolidate itself. The pressure of the masses led by the Communist Party and the work of the Communist Ministers inside the government brought about the fall of all these governments."

18. This article was translated into English and appears as "The Character of a 'People's Democracy,'" *Foreign Affairs, 28,* No. 1 (October, 1949), 143–152.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

tatorship would follow the People's Democracy and was not contained within its form; it believed that power might be shared with the peasants.

But what, it should be asked, was the source of these errors? Surely not an independent, uninformed, "soft" mood on the part of the Hungarian party. The hard line now enunciated was no new discovery; it was the familiar revolutionary message all Communists had been brought up on. Quite obviously all these mistakes were likewise, at an earlier date, the official line emanating from Moscow in support of popular fronts, and while it may be that the Moscow leadership never really subscribed to this line, the article itself would indicate that party membership had been sufficiently indoctrinated in the more moderate tactic that it was now necessary to make a special effort to redirect its views. Given the tight coordination of all Communist parties in the Soviet sphere, there is no reason to doubt that this interpretation also applies to the Rumanian case.

On the international level, Rumania's relations deteriorated steadily after 1946; the American and British governments repeatedly wrote notes of protest against the violation of Allied agreements and the peace treaty; the Rumanian government responded sharply with charges of American imperialism and espionage. In 1949 the issue of the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Rumanian violation of human rights was brought before the General Assembly of the United Nations, which recorded its disapproval of the completely uncooperative attitude displayed by these states and resolved to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice for definition and clarification.[19] It was not clear by the end of the year that this action could achieve any important results under existing circumstances.

Since the creation in 1947 of the Cominform, which signalized the return to a hard line, and especially with the transfer of its headquarters to Rumania after the break with Tito, Bucarest has become one of the principal centers of international communism. At the same time the country has been increasingly isolated from the Western world. In April, 1949, even diplomatic representatives were prohibited from traveling in the Banat, Bucovina, Moldavia, or Dobrogea.

It is idle to speculate whether or when Rumania will enter the Soviet Union as a member republic, although rumors anticipating that event have not been lacking in the last two years. It would appear to be a question of relatively little practical importance, since the U.S.S.R.

19. United Nations, *Official Records of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly. Resolutions, 20 September–10 December 1949* (Lake Success, N.Y.).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

already enjoys virtually complete control over the country. Moreover, 648
while the Rumanian political and economic structure is steadily approaching, and probably not asymptotically, the Soviet model, the final decision on incorporation will be based—apart from considerations of expediency—on political definitions which a mind not steeped in Leninism-Stalinism would have small chance of foreseeing.[20]

Economic Conditions

Economic developments since 1945 may be divided into two periods: 178
two years, 1945–47, of confusion and distress resulting from the war, Russian withdrawals, severe drought, the agrarian reform, monetary inflation, and the unsettled political situation; since 1947, a period of greater stability, an apparent increase in production, and the beginning of a directed and planned economy. In neither period can one obtain a very satisfactory picture of economic conditions. In the first months there was much administrative disorganization, and the government itself frequently lacked accurate information. The Groza regime has not hesitated from the outset to manipulate statistics for political and propagandistic purposes. Since the tightening of the administration in 1948, Rumania has been as reluctant as the Soviet Union, more reluctant than the other satellites, to publish any measurable economic data. Today, the few figures that appear are given as percentage gains for which it would be exceedingly difficult to supply a reasonably accurate base.

In general, it may be said that Rumania was slower than the other 433
eastern European states to recover from the war, in somewhat the 241
same way it lagged in coming out of the depression. Agricultural production fell off seriously in 1945 and 1946, partly because of the disorganization attendant upon the agrarian reform, but largely because of two years' serious drought. Both the acreage sown and the crop yields, especially in maize, the peasant's source of food, were exceptionally low; in 1946 the level of agricultural production was only 59 per cent of the 1934–38 average.[21] The production of indus-

20. This point is not very important but it is of interest to note that in the exchange of notes leading to Tito's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, after referring to Kardelj's hope, expressed in 1945, that the Yugoslav government would be regarded as the representatives of one of the future Soviet republics, rather scornfully dismissed his "primitive and fallacious reasoning . . . about Yugoslavia as a future constituent part of the USSR." It did not, however, vouchsafe its own authoritative views on the subject. Cf. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute* (London; New York, 1948), p. 39.

21. United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948* (Geneva, 1949), p. 17.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

433 trial and food crops fell successively in 1945 and 1946, and it is to
241 be noted that the soybean, so extensively advertised in the 1930's, virtually disappeared as a crop when the peasants were left to their own devices.

The absence of accumulated stocks of grain, the large deliveries to Russia under the armistice, and the failure of the maize harvest in 1946 produced a disastrous and tragic famine, above all in Moldavia, in the winter and spring of 1947. Relief shipments had to be brought in from abroad, including substantial assistance from the United States.

The livestock position, while improving over the situation immediately after the war, was still weak by 1948. There were, in that year, 30 horses and 138 oxen (including buffaloes) per 100 agricultural exploitations as against 56 and 150 respectively in 1941; in terms of cultivation, there were 21 draft animals per 100 hectares of arable land in 1948 as against 27 in 1941. The quantity of agricultural equipment showed less diminution: an increase in the total number over 1941 was matched by a slight decline in the amount of equipment per exploitation, a result presumably of the increase in small holdings after the 1945 reform.[22]

Rumanian industry, which had expanded under wartime demands, registered a decline in 1944 and 1945, but a slight recovery in 1946. According to the Ministry of Finance, total industrial production was 80 per cent of the 1941 level in 1944, 60 per cent in 1945, and 77 per cent in the first ten months of 1946.[23] The chemical, metallurgical, and food industries were the most severely hit. The petroleum industry, which appears to be facing an exhaustion of the tapped fields, had already showed signs of decline before the war; in 1947 the output of crude petroleum was 3.8 million tons as against 8.7 million in 1936 and 5.8 million in 1940.

433 In addition to the slump in agricultural and industrial production,
C48 the Rumanian economy suffered from the flow of goods to the Soviet Union. The total value of Rumanian wealth transferred officially or unofficially, as restitution, reparations, or war booty has been the

22. A. Golopenţia and P. Onica, *Recensământul agricol din Republica Populară Română, 25 Ianuarie 1948. Rezultate provizorii*, Institutul Central de Statistică (Bucarest, 1948).

23. Rumanian Ministry of Finance, *Expunere de motive la bugetul 1947/48*, p. 338. The validity of these figures is uncertain, and they may represent an inflated estimate. Tătărescu is reported to have said in 1947 that after two years of the Groza regime the general level of production was only 48 per cent of the 1938 output. *New York Times*, June 6, 1947.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

subject of a number of heated disputes at international conferences, 433
and it would be very difficult to make a reliable estimate.[24] That the 648
drain was serious is indicated by the fact that as early as 1945 some Rumanian Communists, with more than the average amount of economic insight and less than the usual blind devotion to the Soviet Union, were in despair over the effect of the Russian withdrawals upon the country's economy and their own political position. The glaring contradiction between Russia's efforts to woo Rumania and to secure some measure of popularity for the Communist party and its rather frantic removal of goods and equipment has puzzled many observers. The explanation may simply be that the policy of this monolithic state was not consistent, or rather, that two different policies were here overlapping.

Rumania's foreign trade was greatly reduced after the war; by 439
1948 the value of its exports was only 50 per cent of the 1938 figure (in 1947, 21 per cent), and its imports 69 per cent (in 1947, 57 per cent).[25] The bulk of the trade was with the generally similar economies of the other eastern European states, which were being increasingly linked by a network of trade agreements.

The combination of low output, armistice obligations and war costs, 652
and the general political uncertainty of the postarmistice months led to a fearful inflation. Rumanian currency had never been sound since the First World War and had showed a tendency toward inflation in the 1930's and the war years; between 1945 and the summer of 1947, when a drastic stabilization was achieved, prices rose to dizzying heights. The cost of living index increased from a base of 100 in 1938 to 145.0 in 1940, 413.9 in 1943, 3,678.7 in 1945, 46,140 in December, 1946, and 525,688 in July, 1947.[26]

24. At the time of the Paris Peace Conference the American delegate, Willard L. Thorp, complained that the Rumanian delegation had been of no assistance in supplying information on this point, but he estimated that the total cost to Rumania of its defeat would be about $2,000,000,000. As of 1946 he estimated that about $1,050,000,000 had already been transferred: $325,000,000 for the maintenance of occupation troops, $100,000,000 for reparations based on the 1938 price level, $175,000,000 for property restitution, and $450,000,000 for requisitions. U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin*, 15, No. 379 (October 6, 1946). In July, 1948, General Radescu, in exile in the United States, stated that since Thorp's estimate Rumania had paid an additional $735,000,000. *New York Times*, July 18, 1948. Some attempts have been made to relate these withdrawals to Rumania's national income, but both figures would by necessity be exceedingly uncertain.

25. United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*, Table XVI.

26. Institutul Central de Statistică, *Comunicări statistice, No. 19* (Bucarest, January 31, 1948).

3: Roberts S-- (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

The Change in Economic and Agrarian Policy

185 With regard to economic policy, the first two years after the war might be regarded as an induced and foreshortened NEP; not a retreat from war communism as the Soviet New Economic Policy had been, but, in form at least, the creation of a transitional economy between the older Rumanian capitalism and the drive toward socialism. This concept is closely related in the Communist mind to the functions of the People's Democracy and is embodied in the Constitution of 1948, though by that time the actual economic policy was moving beyond it.

241 465 For all the fanfare accompanying the 1945 agrarian reform, the organization of Rumanian farming in the first two or three years after its application showed little change. In the planting year 1946/47 much the greater part of the working force was engaged in family farms. About 181,000 persons (2.3 per cent of those active in agriculture) were permanent farm laborers, about 783,000 were engaged in seasonal work, and 1.4 million persons did some work on farms other than their own.[27] Payment for work continued to be a mixture of money and produce, only one-third of the work being paid solely in money.

The type of cultivation was much the same, though there was a retrogression from mixed agriculture. If the figures are comparable, some 61 per cent of the exploitations in 1948 were devoted to cereal cultivation as against 51 per cent in 1941; only 1.2 per cent of the exploitations concentrated on raising livestock as against 12 per cent in 1941, a reflection of the wartime loss of animals and the breaking up of large estates.

About two-thirds of the exploitations obtained their money income through sale of produce, the other third through outside labor. Two-fifths of the exploitations in 1947 were obliged to buy agricultural produce to supplement their own deficient production.

185 241 In 1945 the Groza regime announced that the agrarian reform was but the initial step in a whole series of projected reforms which would transform Rumanian agriculture, but at this time there was no mention of collectivization as the general goal. On the contrary, any mention of collective farming was frowned upon, and the whole emphasis was on assisting the independent peasant. Actually, the list of

27. *Recensământul agricol din Republica Populară Română, 25 Ianuarie 1948*, p. 35. The relation between the last two categories is not clear, but the figures on permanent and seasonal workers are quite similar to those of 1941. See above, p. 52

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

proposed measures was very similar to those brought forward repeatedly by various Rumanian governments in the preceding twenty-five years. Great publicity was given to state-operated agricultural machine stations which were to enable the peasant to mechanize his cultivation; from the beginning, however, this measure was regarded as a powerful potential lever in the hands of the state to direct agriculture. The promise of an agricultural machine industry was also a familiar item of earlier programs. Other recognizable projects were land reclamation, the creation of better experimental stations, improved agricultural education, more credit, a vigorous cooperative movement, development of agricultural industries, a scientific land survey, and the encouragement of animal husbandry.[28]

In 1945 the government created a National Cooperative Institute to assist agriculture, but its principal function appears to have been grain collection.[29] In November, 1946, appeared a new organ, REAZIM, an autonomous administration for developing agriculture, animal husbandry, and the use of agricultural machinery. REAZIM took over most of the state functions for agrarian improvement, rationalizing cultivation, supplying seeds and equipment, executing production plans, and managing agricultural machine stations.

Although many of these projects resembled those proposed by earlier regimes, it was obvious that the Communists had no intention of permitting Rumanian agriculture to proceed in its traditional rut. Even in the first phase of ostentatious silence about collective agriculture, the nature of the reforms, or rather the absence of certain reforms, provided an indication of developments to come. In its plans for agricultural improvement, the regime appears to have laid little stress on the desirability of consolidating holdings in private ownership, and the 1948 census showed the fragmentation of properties to be just as extreme as in 1941. The emphasis was upon increasing cereal output through mechanization rather than upon the intensified and diversified cultivation suitable to peasant farming. When, as a consequence of the 1946–47 famine, poor peasants began to sell their holdings, the government took steps to cancel sales to rich farmers. All these moves showed that it had no intention of fostering the growth of an independent, potentially capitalist peasantry on the

28. See, for example, the two pamphlets outlining the government's plans for intensifying livestock raising and for land reclamation: *Intensificarea creşterii animalelor în cadrul refacerii economice* (Bucarest, 1946), and *Îmbunătăţirile funciare în agricultura românească* (Bucarest, 1946).

29. In 1945 INCOOP was granted 57 billion lei for the collection of grain, of which 13 billion was for deliveries to the U.S.S.R., 8 billion to supply Soviet troops, 1 billion to supply the Rumanian army, and 35 billion for the civil population.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

185 241 Western model, but during this first period, to avoid alienating the peasants, it held its hand.

185 433 A somewhat similar situation obtained in the question of industrial policy, though here official propaganda was much more hostile to exploiting industrialists. So long as the Tătărescu Liberals were in the government, it called for the cooperation of private capital, and the only important step taken in this first phase was the nationalization of the National Bank. As late as March, 1947, Mihail Ralea, Rumanian Minister to the United States, protested against rumors that the government was proceeding against private enterprise and maintained, either disingenuously or without information (Ralea was not a member of the Communist party), that one of the main goals of the Groza regime was to "foster private initiative," to which it granted complete freedom.[30] Nevertheless, in practice the sphere of private industrial activity was increasingly circumscribed and restricted by a number of devices: obstructive action by the workers, appeals to the national interest, or simply charges of inefficiency and sabotage.

439 Perhaps the most significant economic innovation in the months after the armistice was the creation of a number of joint Soviet-Rumanian enterprises. On May 8, 1945, the Rumanian government signed an agreement with the Soviet Union providing for extensive economic collaboration. The U.S.S.R. was to assist Rumanian agriculture by supplying tractors, seed, and agricultural experts. A number of SOVROM companies were set up in the important fields of river and air transport, banking, lumbering, and oil production and refining. (A 1948 trade agreement created two new SOVROM companies for the manufacture of tractors and chemical products.) Participation in the companies was on a 50–50 basis, and the Rumanian state was to grant them special privileges and monopolies. Much of the Soviet capital was quite easily obtained from the German assets in Rumania, awarded to the U.S.S.R. in the Potsdam agreement. These concerns clearly gave the Soviet Union a controlling position at key points in the Rumanian economy.

This form of economic collaboration was reminiscent of the Rumanian-German trade agreement of 1939. The principal difference lay less perhaps in the agreements themselves than in the structure of the Soviet and German economies. Under the German-Rumanian agreement the two economies were seen as complementary, and the major function of Rumania was to provide raw materials; the Germans showed some hostility to the further development of Ru-

30. See his letter to the *New York Times*, March 12, 1947.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

manian industries, especially secondary industries. Both Russia and 439
Rumania, however, are still industrializing economies and there seems to be little evidence, in the Rumanian case at least, of a desire to check the industrialization of the latter.[31]

The turning point in the economic policy of the immediate post- 652
war period was the stabilization of the currency in August, 1947, which more or less liquidated the old financial structure and served as a vast economic leveler. On the fifteenth of that month, the leu was devalued (to 150 to the dollar) and the old money was ordered to be exchanged immediately at the rate of one new leu for 20,000 old lei. Peasants were limited to exchanging 5,000,000 lei; workers to 3,000,000; and other persons to 1,500,000. That is, at the official new rate, peasants could receive in exchange $1.67, workers $1.00, and others $0.50. Gold and foreign currency were entitled to full value but had to be declared under penalty of life imprisonment. This drastic measure, which came at a time of continued commodity shortages, inevitably caused widespread hardship. There were numerous reports of resistance by the peasants who felt as usual that they were being sacrificed to the benefit of the towns. The government hurled many charges of speculation and exchange violation, and part of the brutal behavior of the regime in the course of 1947 is to be associated with, if not explained by, this Draconian financial reorganization.[32]

Along with the tightening of political control the Groza govern- 185
ment now entered a new phase of economic policy marked by the pro- 471
gressive nationalization of industry, collectivization of agriculture, and the beginning of economic plans. In 1947 pressure against private industry consisted primarily in assuming control over certain specific enterprises, supervising industrial activity, and making accusations of sabotage against foreign-owned concerns. At the beginning of 1948 Gheorghiu-Dej launched a general attack on private capital, which dominated industry, banking, and insurance: "Our democratic regime has been very patient with private enterprise, but private owners do not make capital investment, nor do they renew equipment. They transfer capital abroad and openly sabotage reconstruction." In January the concession of the Rumanian match monopoly to the Swedish firm (this concession had been granted at the time of the stabilization loan of 1929) was declared invalid and

31. See also below, pp. 327–329.

32. A defense of the stabilization, written by the National Bank, is published as "La Réforme monétaire en Roumanie, 15 août 1947," in *Les Archives internationales*, Doc. 664.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

185 annulled. In the following months government administrators were
471 appointed to supervise the British and American-owned oil companies, which action, in effect, put these firms in a state of forcible dissolution. The Rumanian industrialist, Nicolae Malaxa, who had made great efforts to accommodate himself to the Russians and the Groza regime, was unable to ride this new wave and his factories, the most important in the country, were also taken over. While, as has been seen, the Rumanian government has always worked in close conjunction with Rumanian industry—fostering desirable undertakings and even setting up state-owned enterprises—this new advance was under quite different auspices and had a far more ambitious intent.

The decisive step came in June, 1948, with a bill providing for the nationalization of all industrial, mining, banking, insurance, and transport concerns. The law at the outset affected some 1,068 enterprises, including 132 heavy industries, 20 coal mines, 25 oil and natural gas companies, 56 building material companies, 163 textile factories, 15 insurance companies, and 4 shipping concerns. While the law did not, in theory, deny compensation, it was to be based on profits, its amount was to be determined by a government commission, it was to be paid in state bonds, and would not be given to persons who "have enriched themselves illegally or left the country illegally." The motives given for the bill were largely political: the new situation demanded changes in the national economy; the bourgeoisie, which had been disarmed politically, must not be permitted to retain its potent economic weapons.

In November all privately owned health institutions, hospitals, sanatoria, and the film industry were nationalized. In April, 1949, the state took over a new batch of private companies, pharmacies, laboratories, drug and cosmetic factories. Thus, by the end of the year, a significant and certainly decisive sector of the economy was directly controlled and managed by the state.

423 The switch in agrarian policy came at a somewhat later date, though in 1946 and 1947 one finds mounting criticism of the predatory activity of the rich peasants and the sabotage committed by estate owners on the land remaining to them. A foreshadowing of a change in eastern European agriculture was given in a Russian broadcast of February 9, 1948, to Soviet farmers: "Today the governments of the new democracies know that the present small peasant holdings are not a paying proposition and that the peasants' road to wealth lies in co-operation and the uniting of small holdings into large collective estates. . . . The movement for setting up co-operative agri-
culture is growing apace

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

culture is growing apace."[33] Nevertheless, in the spring of 1948 Gheorghiu-Dej was denying rumors that the land would be taken back from the peasants, and a decree in March permitted peasants possessing more land than they could till to employ day laborers.[34] 000 423 656

By the summer, however, the government was emphasizing the need of "sharpening the class struggle in the countryside, organizing agricultural laborers, and fighting the rich peasant." It introduced progressive scales of taxation and forced grain delivery aimed at preventing accumulation of grain or wealth by kulak or estate owner and ultimately undermining their economic position. It set up "village information offices" with instructions to "unmask all the dishonest kulaks and inform the farmers of their duties." 665

On March 2, 1949, the regime, on the simple sweeping charge of sabotage and failure to comply with regulations, seized the land, livestock, and inventory which had been left to the large landowners under the 1945 reform. In this action, carried out abruptly and without prior notification, some 17,000 families were evicted from their homes at night and sent to various resettlement areas. The government now directed all its energies against the rich peasants.[35] Lenin's dictum that "Small-scale exploitation generates capitalism and the bourgeoisie constantly, daily, hourly, in an elemental way, and on a mass scale," again made its appearance and became the leitmotiv for innumerable articles.

Embroidering on this theme, Gheorghiu-Dej marked out the party line for 1949. In 1945 the landlords had been liquidated as a class, but this act fostered small-scale economic activity in agriculture. "It follows that the complete victory of socialism is impossible so long as private property in the means of production, in the towns and in the countryside, including private property in land, continues to exist." The Communist party, therefore, had a number of important 423 565 661

33. *East Europe* (February 19, 1948).

34. *Ibid.* (April 1, 1948).

35. The distinction between poor, middle, and rich peasant, or kulak, is not based on size of holding or amount of wealth alone and seems to take on different meanings under different political circumstances. In simplest terms, the rich peasant is one who hires labor or charges rent for machinery and equipment; the middle peasant uses only family labor but produces enough, or more than enough, to support his household; the poor peasant is unable to support himself on his holding and is on the verge of drifting into the agricultural proletariat. In 1941, 12 per cent of the land in Rumania was farmed solely by paid labor, and 24.8 per cent by a mixture of paid and family labor. The first category, in the main, represented the properties of estate owners, the second the holdings of the richer peasants. In 1948, according to Gheorghiu-Dej, 57 per cent of the rural population belonged to the small peasantry and 33 per cent to the middle peasantry.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

423 tasks. The first was to restrict the kulaks and dislodge them from
565 their position. Then it would be possible "when conditions are ripe,
661 to pass over to the policy of the complete liquidation of the kulaks."[36] He anticipated, of course, that the kulaks would resort to underground struggle, sabotage, and criminal acts in an effort to avert their approaching fate.

185 The second task was to undertake propaganda convincing the poor
241 and middle peasants of the need to unite in collective farms. When that task had been achieved, when all the land belonged to the collectives in perpetuity, the goal of making the land public property and bringing about the socialist transformation of the countryside would be reached. Gheorghiu-Dej emphasized, however, the necessity of making this transition gradually, by means of persuasion, and with the voluntary support of the peasant. The poor peasants should not be driven into collectives, the middle peasant should not be identified with the kulak, and the whole process must be paced by the development of agricultural machinery, machine tractor stations, and the expansion of the network of consumer and producer cooperatives as broad mass movements.[37] These words of caution presumably reflect the wisdom gained from the Soviet experiment in collectivization.

Gheorghiu-Dej concluded his remarks with the inevitable "self-criticism": in the past the party had not provided a clear political line for work in the countryside and had failed to popularize the notion of uniting the working peasantry into collective farms, and had even ignored or denied this goal.[38] That these so-called errors were the fault of the Rumanian Communists is, of course, nonsense. The party line, emanating from Moscow, had shifted, and in this instance a strong case can be made that the change had been planned long in advance. The Communists could have had no intention of stopping at the stage of small peasant cultivation which had, in any event, reached a cul-de-sac in Rumania.

474 The creation of collective farms got under way in 1949, and by the end of the year, according to the glowing account of a Russian visitor, 56 *kolkhozi* comprising 4,000 peasant families had been estab-

36. As in Russia representatives of the restricted and soon to be liquidated kulak class are not to be admitted to the collective farms.

37. The cooperatives, however, must rid themselves of capitalist elements, must intensify their collaboration with the state trading organs, and must promote the spirit of "socialist emulation" among the peasants.

38. G. Gheorghiu-Dej, "Tasks of the Rumanian Workers Party in the Struggle for the Socialist Reorganization of the Countryside," *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy* (Bucarest, March 15, 1949).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

lished; in addition, 55,000 households had joined producer cooperatives.[39] By the official account these collectives, which took on such spontaneously peasant names as the Red Tractor, the Red Field, the Victory of Socialism, and the New Way were organized through the voluntary action of the peasants. 474

Take, for example, the collective farm, "1907," set up in August, 1949, in the commune of Căldăraşti, Judeţ Buzău, as described by the enthusiastic reporter of the Communist paper, *România Liberă*.[40] Thirty-seven families had united their land, livestock, and equipment and had received the government's permission to establish a collective. The peasants brought with them 13 carts, 7 horses, 7 oxen, 6 ploughs, and 3 harrows. On the day of its inauguration the collective received from the state one tractor, 2 tractor-drawn ploughs, one threshing machine, one electric generator, 6 iron ploughs, one seeder, 74 hoes, and 107 pitchforks. It also received advice on an agricultural plan from the provisional judeţ committee. The collective possessed 151 hectares of land, of which 88 had previously belonged to the peasants, the remainder coming from the state. Six hectares were to be distributed among the peasant households for garden plots, most of the rest were to be devoted to a three-year rotation schedule of mixed crops. Such, in the prospectus at least, was the promising new life awaiting the multitude of poor peasants who would now leave behind them the undeniable poverty and squalor of their earlier small-holder existence.

It is too early to say what relation this promise is likely to bear to future reality in the Rumanian countryside. Public information from Rumania is so scanty and unreliable that one cannot ascertain how the peasants are reacting to this new departure. In principle, at least, collectivization is supposed to be wholly voluntary and there is to be no bullying of the middle peasants. But since the return to the peasant is to be based upon work performed rather than upon the amount of land he contributed, it is difficult to see what incentive the middle peasant will have for joining a collective unless its aggregate output is exceptionally high. There have been reports, moreover, of armed peasant resistance, especially in the Banat, a region of comparatively large and prosperous farms.

It is also too soon to tell what effect collectivization will have upon the level of agricultural output, peasant income, and the whole of the economy. As has been stressed throughout this study, something

39. I. Rukhadze, "Rumanian Village Yesterday and Today," *New Times*, No. 3 (1950), p. 27.

40. *Romania Liberă*, August 11, 1949.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

474 unquestionably had to be done to pull Rumanian agriculture out of its ever-deepening rut; many of the criticisms raised by the Communists against the earlier order are largely valid. The attempt to create a prosperous small holder, specializing in intensive cultivation, made little headway between the wars. The richer peasant seems to have been gaining at the expense of the submerged mass of marginal producers, though he was not as wealthy nor nearly as responsible for the poor peasants' plight as Communist propaganda has made out. So long as cereals were to be the major crop, cultivation on a scale large enough to permit the amalgamation of strips and the use of mechanized equipment seemed to be called for. In brief, given the political impossibility and undesirability of returning to the old privately owned great estates and the failure of small-holding to prosper, some type of cooperative or collective agriculture would appear to be at least a partial answer to the agrarian problem.

Beyond this, however, one is inevitably faced with the Soviet example: the kolkhozi are now the inspiration of the Rumanian planners and probably provide the best clue, if one could interpret it, to the future of the Rumanian peasant. Here, of course, certain doubts present themselves. On the dark side of the picture stand the vast misery occasioned by the tempestuous collectivization of the first five-year plan, the widespread peasant resistance leading to the catastrophic destruction of livestock, the forcible uprooting not only of kulaks but of many smaller peasants, and the obvious fact that the step was taken not for the immediate benefit of the peasant but to increase and assure deliveries of grain for the towns and for export and to check any resurgence of capitalism in the countryside. It might be said that many of these hardships need not be repeated in the Rumanian case, that the transformation now can be more gradual and less jolting, and that increased grain deliveries would be more than matched by the greater efficiency of mechanized agriculture, by the removal of excess population to the rapidly industrializing towns, and ultimately by the vastly higher productivity of an industrial economy.

Unhappily, the evidence is by no means clear that such has been the result in the Soviet Union, at least to the present. The surplus which was obtained seems to have been at the direct expense of the peasant, since agricultural productivity did not increase to the degree anticipated (especially when the costs of the new agricultural machinery are deducted); peasant income ten years after collectivization was still lower than before. The task of sifting out what was exceptional and temporary in the Soviet experience and what was a

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

natural concomitant and hence relevant for an estimate of the Rumanian future is exceptionally difficult; at the present state of our knowledge of Soviet agriculture it would be hazardous to base any Rumanian prediction upon it.[41]

In a curious way, however, this issue resembles the pre-1914 dispute in Rumania between the proponents of estate and peasant farming, and in certain respects the wheel has turned full circle. The collective farmer, with his own tiny personal plot, working on the great farm, delivering what amounts to payments in kind and performing a set number of work days, is obviously reminiscent of his grandfather under neoserfdom, with, of course, a different master and the promise contained in, if not yet realized by, the power of the tractor. Somehow, through all the changes the past century has witnessed, an apparently distinctive eastern European pattern is reasserting itself.

Both the nationalization of industry and the move toward collective agriculture are to be understood within the context of an over-all planned economy, not only for one nation but for all the eastern European satellite states. In the field of planning Rumania lagged a bit behind its neighbors, perhaps because of difficulty in creating an adequate and reliable administrative staff, but is now proceeding along the same path.

In general, after putting through a land reform and obtaining control of the industrial sector of the economy, all these states have inaugurated short-term plans of one or two years to restore their economies from the devastation wrought by the war and to pave the way for the next stage, long-term development programs. The primary aim of all the plans is, naturally, increased industrialization; agricultural development takes second place. In the view of a United Nations study, the plans "appear to aim at the development of more or less self-contained industrial economies in order to minimize their dependence on trade with the outside world. . . . The similarity in the investment pattern in the various countries suggests that the industrial plans were drawn up individually, on a national basis."[42] This presumed element of individuality is rather surprising in view

41. Favorable interpretations of the success of Soviet collectivization may be found in Alexander Baykov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (New York, 1946), and Maurice H. Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development since 1917* (London and New York, 1948). A quite pessimistic view, based on an extensive criticism of Soviet statistics, is given in Naum Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR* (Stanford University Press, 1949).

42. United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*, p. 202.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

185 of the evidence that the Soviet Union exerts a dominating influence in the whole area.[43] It should be observed, however, that even within the countries the plans "aim at a geographical spread of industrialization throughout their individual areas by concentrating on the industrial development of the most backward regions."[44] Hence, the guiding philosophy seems to be that industrialization per se is the cure all and should therefore be spread as widely as possible. In consequence, less attention appears to be paid to the matter of economic complementarity; certainly the complementarity is not to be based on an agriculture-industry exchange.

In this respect the plans differ sharply in their outlook from Nazi Germany's schemes for southeast Europe with their emphasis upon economic exchange. The Polish economist Oskar Lange has recently stressed this fact as proof of the nonexploitative, anti-imperialist behavior of the Soviet Union. It is hard to say what economic advantages are being lost by this parallel rush to industrialization. There must be a point at which the principle of "socialization in one country" can be driven to an absurdity.

The long-term plans anticipate a steep increase in the rate of capital investment, with an annual increase of gross national product of about 10 per cent. However, employment in industry, for the four or five years of the plans, will increase by only one or 2 per cent of the total population, which itself may rise by some 5 per cent in the same period; the plans will not, in the immediate future, do much to solve the pressing problem of agrarian overpopulation. One reason for the relatively low increase in industrial employment is the concentration on heavy industry, in which the capital per worker employed is comparatively high. The prior development of light industries, which would expand employment, is apparently being avoided, perhaps because such an approach would increase dependence upon imports, perhaps because of the need to strengthen the sinews of war.

When the major Rumanian industries were nationalized in the summer of 1948 the government announced that this act rendered possible the creation of a planned economy. The first plan, a one-

43. One recent article asserts that "according to the secret protocol to the pact for the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance [the Soviet response to the Marshall Plan, established at the beginning of 1949], the Soviet State Planning Committee will 'coordinate' the economic planning of member countries for the next twenty years." "The Peasant in Eastern Europe's Economic Planning," *The World Today* (August, 1949), p. 364.

44. United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*, p. 202.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

year plan for recovery, was inaugurated in 1949. It was to involve 185
the expenditure of 82,000 million lei, including 7,000 million for the completion of work started in 1948, and was to achieve a 40 per cent increase in the level of production over 1948. The capital expenditure was to be invested, percentage-wise, as follows: mining and manufacturing, 47; transportation and roads, 21; agriculture, 9; housing and public services, 21; other, 2. Throughout the year the government issued reports of various portions of the plan being "fulfilled and over-fulfilled," but no absolute quantities were mentioned, only percentage gains over 1948, a singularly uninformative year. In the summer of 1949 the government announced that a budget surplus rendered available several billion additional lei which would be used to begin construction of the Danube–Black Sea Canal.[45] The plan for 1950 appears to be still a preliminary rather than a long-term development program.

Viewed abstractly, and hence, as all Leninists know, incompletely, Communism has three aspects which might commend it to the Rumanian situation: its emphasis upon the importance of industry, its equalitarianism, and its insistence that a backward society can make meaningful progress through its own efforts. Previous Rumanian political movements lacked one or more of these aspects. The Liberals and the neoliberals of the Carolist regime saw the desirability of industrialization, but it proved to be largely for the benefit of a narrow oligarchy. The National Peasants were far more democratic but they tended to be, if not hostile to industry, at least opposed to forced industrialization, which was probably the only way to bring industry to Rumania. Feeling that their country was too weak for such an effort, they turned to foreign capital for assistance, but their hopes for international economic progress "in the spirit of Geneva" were blighted by the depression. The Iron Guard had nothing to offer in this connection. The Social Democrats recognized the importance of industry as well as the necessity of achieving a truer democracy in Rumania, but they were unable to see how their socialist goals could be gained in Rumania with its peasant economy.

The Russian Bolsheviks under Lenin's influence achieved a re- 185
markable tour de force in uniting these elements. They were aware 668

45. Along with the growing similarity of the Rumanian economy to that of the Soviet Union, there have been a number of reports of forced labor, primarily in connection with the Danube–Black Sea Canal. It may be relevant to note that by a law of January 21, 1939, the Carolist regime established an Administration for the Exploitation of Penal Labor; on May 31, 1945, the Groza regime transferred this administration from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Interior.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

185
668

of the political importance of the peasantry, but refused to accept the rural ideals of populism; they saw the need for industrialization but were not going to let industry fall into the hands of a capitalist oligarchy. Having achieved their revolution they set about to prove that it was possible to achieve socialism in one state, be it a backward state such as Russia. Whether this revolution and this socialism were what Karl Marx had in mind is a different matter.

The question remains, of course, whether the Bolshevik achievement was anything more than a tour de force. One can maintain that it succeeded simply because it has survived and expanded under exceptionally difficult circumstances. On the other hand, the shadow of repression which darkens the Soviet state, the heavy weight of a bureaucracy forming its own hierarchy, and the vast extension of forced labor, under whatever guise, would indicate that the Leninist synthesis did not reveal a magical solution for the economic problems of a backward state and that the Soviet Union has paid dearly for its ambition to build socialism in a single and relatively retarded country.

Aside from these problems of the Soviet economy, the installation of a Communist regime in Rumania involves additional difficulties. The mere fact that the Groza government was externally imposed has stigmatized it as an alien intruder. To say that this is of no moment except to the nationalist middle classes is but casuistry. It is significant that while one may find certain justifications for the Soviet action in Rumania—in the strategic importance of the area, in the pronounced hostility displayed by Rumanian regimes since 1917, in the advantages of coordinating the eastern European states in one large economic region—Soviet and Rumanian Communist apologists unfailingly fall back upon the one explanation which simply is not true, that the Groza government represents and is supported by the overwhelming majority of the Rumanian people. This does not mean that it will be vigorously and permanently resisted; alien domination is an old familiar in eastern Europe, and history tends to overlook the many cases when national independence, crushed to earth, remained there. But it does mean, for the near future at least, the blighting of whatever democratic tendencies may be contained in the theory of communism. Those Rumanian Communists who were known to have a Rumanian rather than a Soviet point of view were dropped from their posts and eliminated from the political scene well before the Titoist heresy became a public issue.

As to the economic prospects, there is, of course, the general advantage of participating in a large economic space. People of nearly all political outlooks have felt that the multitude of small states cre-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

ated in eastern Europe after the First World War did not represent a rational economic solution. The principal, and decisive, differences arose over the nature of the union or federation which should be inaugurated. 185 668

On the other hand, Rumania is now in the position of being a junior partner in a belt-tightening association. There is no question that in blatant contrast to the Soviet political aim of creating an eastern European coprosperity sphere, the actual Soviet activities, largely under the terms of the armistice, have thus far constituted a heavy drain on the Rumanian economy. There is no need to attribute malevolent intentions to this drain. The Russians were badly in need of supplies and equipment to restore their economy, and it is altogether natural that they should have accorded a higher priority to their needs than to Rumania's, and given the power relations they were perfectly able to do so. Unfortunately, this pressure in one form or another, most probably in relation to military requirements, may last for an indefinite period of time.

Ultimately, the development of the Rumanian Communist party and the fate of the People's Republic will depend upon the Soviet Union's relations with the Western powers. The Groza government was installed for reasons of international policy and its future rests with the fruits of that policy.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

XV

CONCLUSION

000 THE agrarian problem is but one aspect of a crisis that has persisted in the economic, political, and intellectual life of Rumania since the impact of Western capitalist civilization began to make itself felt. Various disrupting effects of this protracted influence have been considered earlier. The society it has produced is a hybrid, monstrous in some respects. This statement should not be taken to imply that the earlier society was better. Nor is it constructive to suggest solutions to any of Rumania's problems in terms of going back to old ways. Modern Rumania must be dealt with as it is.

Although the record of peasant-boyar conflict extends much farther into the past, a new source of tension appeared with the growing commercial importance of cereals and the consequent increased cultivation which strained the traditional forms of agricultural organization based on a relatively self-sufficient economy. Labor servitudes, always a focus of discontent, became increasingly so under the pressure of export requirements. After the emancipation peasant land hunger was the major problem, despite the rapid extension of the area under cultivation. From 1864 to 1917, under the system called neoserfdom, the redistribution of land in one manner or another became the principal preoccupation of reformers. The full complexity of the agrarian problem become apparent after the 1918–21 reforms when estate land had been substantially, though by no means wholly, expropriated and redistributed. The dream of a prosperous peasantry on the Western model failed to materialize, and throughout the years 1922–45 successive governments experimented with one remedial measure after another, with no significant results.

The principal features of the agrarian problem in the period under review may be stated simply: low productivity; too many peasants on too little land, in parts of the country at least; and inadequate capital accumulation to permit of improvement. Proposed remedies included: a) technological changes, i.e., improved methods of cultivation, mechanization of agriculture, soil conservation, use of fertilizers, seed and livestock improvement, rational crop rotation, diversification and intensification of production, as well as improve-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

ments in internal transport; b) financial and economic reforms, including more and cheaper credit, and the development of cooperative activity in purchasing, marketing, and cultivation; c) demographic changes, including emigration and birth control; d) changes in property and tenure relations, including further redistribution of land, consolidation of strips, and regulation of alienation, inheritance and subdivision of land; e) and finally, industrialization, a solution based on the assumption that reforms in agriculture alone would be inadequate. It was variously believed that industrialization would increase the value of agricultural produce through the development of agricultural industries, be a source of employment for excess agricultural labor, provide agricultural equipment and fertilizers, increase total national output and expand the internal market, and, eventually, create a different mode of living, bringing with it, among other things, a declining birth rate.

These proposed reforms are really a catalogue of the points wherein the Western economies differ from the Rumanian and Western agriculture is superior to Rumanian. It has been shown in the preceding chapters how in one way or another there were more or less serious obstacles to the successful application of any of these measures. Purely technical reforms would have been of limited advantage to Rumania so long as the land was cultivated in minute strips. Besides, in most cases they presupposed available capital, and to be economically successful they required a more extensive market than Rumania possessed. As for credit and cooperatives, the poor peasant was not in a position to benefit greatly from the one or to participate effectively in the other. What credit facilities did exist were directed into fields other than agriculture, but Rumania did not in any case have much credit to provide. Emigration, which was not seriously considered because it ran counter to the whole national idea of a Greater Rumania, would have been difficult because of general world restrictions on immigration after 1918 and because of the physical difficulty of transporting enough people to provide substantial relief.

There was certainly room for reform in land tenure. The predominance of large latifundiary estates before 1914 had, however, centered attention on the question of large-scale versus small-scale agriculture, which was not the main problem in Rumania. After the 1918–21 land reforms there still remained more large property than was generally admitted, but it was not enough to relieve the peasants' need for land. Moreover, even where further redistribution would provide at least temporary relief for the peasants, it would not benefit the country as a whole unless accompanied by other re-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

300 forms, since it would extend the area of properties subject to the process of fragmentation. Of far greater importance was the need to consolidate peasant farms and to find some means of preventing their continual degeneration into uneconomic dwarf holdings.

Consolidating peasant holdings, partially evacuating the villages, and establishing separate farmhouses on the holdings were undoubtedly prerequisites to efficient peasant farming on the Western model. The peasants, however, were indifferent to, if not actually suspicious of, a consolidation which would involve their giving up strips of their own land, no matter how inadequate or widely separated. There was no natural or spontaneous movement toward consolidation; it would have required government action. In this respect, the operation of expropriating the estate owner and distributing his land to the peasants, for all its appeal as an act of social justice, was an oversimplified solution representing the path of least resistance.

Conversion of estate land to peasant land was not accompanied in Rumania, as it had been in western Europe, by the creation of an intensive mixed farming. The emphasis upon extensive cultivation of grain persisted after the land had been transferred to the small holder, partly because of economic inertia, but largely because grain remained the means by which Rumania could obtain foreign industrial products. The produce of intensified agriculture usually requires a nearby market, and the internal Rumanian market was too limited to provide an adequate stimulus.

In recent years the agrarian problem has been intensified by the emergence of a surplus agricultural population. To a degree, real overpopulation has come to replace the apparent overpopulation of pre-1914 Rumania, which to a considerable extent was the result of unequal distribution of land. The so-called "vital revolution" had quite different consequences in eastern and in western Europe. In the West the expansion of population was matched by the industrial revolution which greatly increased productivity, absorbed labor, and also created new social patterns characterized by a declining birth rate. Extending to eastern Europe the vital revolution completely unsettled the old equilibrium without substituting a new.

Western Europe had become the workshop of the world, and the expansion of population in the East was not followed by those other developments which counteracted its effect in the West. Through channels of commerce an economic complementarity was established between the East and the West, whereby agricultural products were exchanged for industrial goods. It cannot be said that this was without advantage to the eastern European states since it did open the

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

door to accelerated material progress by bringing them into the world economy. But it fostered the continuation of a relatively low degree of productivity and a rural economy which did not provide for the rapidly increasing population.

It has only been fairly recently that Western economists have recognized that there may be sound economic reasons for the industrialization of the more backward agrarian areas. The peoples of these areas, however, have long resented the real or apparent advantages accruing to the industrial states. In 1879, the Rumanian writer Xenopol said bitterly,

> Western Europe throws upon us the heavy and fatiguing work of agriculture while reserving to itself the nobler work of industry, which saves energy as well as being better recompensed. In other words, in the great European society, we Rumanians are charged with rude debasing labor akin to that of the animals; we are reduced to the status of being the helots of civilization.[1]

The fact that Rumania lacked the special combination of circumstances which initiates the process of self-propelling industrialization was not in itself a necessary disadvantage; practically all states, except for Great Britain and the urban areas in western Europe which actually started the industrial revolution, began industrialization by borrowing techniques which had already been developed. Nor was it to be expected that the development of Rumanian industry should have been a telescoped and foreshortened version of the history of Western industrialization. It was obviously an advantage to be able to import at the outset a modern locomotive rather than start off with Stephenson's "Rocket." Nevertheless, the advantages to the latecomer who is able to make use of the industrial experience and techniques of the more advanced states have their price. Adopting modern industry involves taking over a vast technological and economic structure and superimposing it upon the traditional economy; the less developed a society and the later it undertakes industrialization, the greater the shock resulting from this superimposition.

Hence, while it may be conceded that some form of industrialization was necessary to extricate Rumania from its impasse as an agrarian society, it was bound to bring very serious problems. The "natural" play of economic forces would not be conducive to rapid industrialization, if for no other reason because the countries which had already

1. Quoted in N. Razmirița, *Essai d'économie roumaine moderne, 1831–1931* (Paris, 1932), p. 80.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

000 achieved a higher degree of industrialization could more than compete with initial local efforts. From the very outset Rumania pursued a protectionist policy. Tariff debates were not concerned with free trade versus protection but with the advisability of protecting even those industries which showed little sign of ever being able to fend for themselves without assistance. Even protection was not sufficient, since the potentialities of the Rumanian market were so limited that the elimination of foreign competition was not enough to provide a powerful stimulus to industry. Consequently, the state engaged in a variety of more positive actions: subsidies, special exemptions, and state purchases.

Up to the present, however, Rumanian industrialization has not notably benefited agriculture either in providing it with equipment, absorbing surplus labor, or increasing the local market. On the contrary, the intensive drive toward industrialization in the 1930's was at the expense of agriculture. The reason is obvious. Although industrialization was often advocated as a means of remedying the agrarian situation, industries actually grew up where there were opportunities for profit or where the government took the initiative in the national interest, which was conceived of in terms of defense and prestige. Most foreign investment was directed toward the exploitation of natural resources or toward export industries. Internal investment moved to those industries which gave the best promise of gaining a monopolistic position, either through tariffs and import regulations or through positive state support. While the state participated in a variety of undertakings, it was, especially in the later years, primarily interested in heavy industry for armaments. European industry as a whole was becoming a network of cartels, and inevitably Rumanian industry followed this trend. Moreover, the sudden leap into industrialization in the face of powerful foreign competitors naturally promoted internal combinations and agreements.

The pattern of Rumanian industry showed the effect of its forced growth. In 1937, capital goods industries were almost as important as consumer goods industries, usually a sign of a relatively advanced industrial economy, but here indicating rather the lack of integration of industry with the older sectors of the economy. Rumania did not have that complex of intermediate activities, including what Colin Clark calls tertiary industries—the vast variety of services connected with marketing, distributing, and selling—which can be taken as evidence of an advanced economy and a high per capita income. There is an impression of disparateness throughout Rumania. In Bucarest one is startled by the abrupt transitions from modernity

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

to backwardness. The oil wells and refineries at Ploeşti spring out of a peasant landscape. Discussions of Rumanian industry revolve not around branches of industry but around specific large enterprises—Reşiţa, Malaxa, I.A.R.—isolated spots in the economy. In both Rumanian agriculture and industry there is lacking a "middle ground," a diversified, intensive peasant farming and the complex of intermediate industrial activities.

It is frequently held that the distortions of the Rumanian economy, and especially the continued misery of the peasantry, cannot be ascribed solely to the working out of economic forces. Indeed, it is a commonplace to maintain that the real trouble has been the deplorable corruption in politics which has thwarted all reforms; the bureaucrat, not the capitalist, has been the real exploiter. This contention has a good deal of truth; attempts to borrow institutions and programs from the West proved as disturbing in the political and administrative fields as in the economic.

There is no denying the programs not carried out, the persistence of corruption in one regime after another, the ineradicable proclivity for *şmecherie*,[2] which lead one to dismiss Rumanian politics as vicious nonsense and to consider the government and administration a huge trough in which successive cliques take turn in wallowing. Nevertheless, these features of Rumanian public life are symptoms rather than the cause of Rumania's basic difficulties.

The two outstanding characteristics of Rumanian political institutions are the failure of the adopted Western constitutional and political forms to produce Western results in political and administrative behavior and the growth of "bureaucratism." In bringing out the contrasts between theory and practice in Rumania there is a danger, of course, of idealizing Western forms and of attributing to them virtues which have never been realized in the Western states themselves. But even with that reservation, there is no question that the venality of Rumanian politics is exceptional. It was scarcely to be expected, however, that forms developed in a quite different social and economic milieu should have been taken over wholesale and applied to Rumanian society without maladjustment. The Byzantine and Phanariot traditions in Rumanian public life, for all their unpleasant qualities, were at least long-standing modes of social and political behavior closely integrated with the life of the country. Consequently, at those points where the new constitutional forms came into conflict with traditional institutions—above all with the oli-

2. Usually a term of half-admiration for fraudulent actions performed with a degree of poise and dexterity.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

garchic structure of society, in which the landed boyars held power over a mass of backward and long-subjugated peasants—habitual relationships persisted within the new framework.

The resultant, however, was neither the traditional boyar society nor a replica of Belgium or France, but something new. Despite the temptation to call Rumanian politics Phanariot, one has only to look at the strangely exotic portraits of the early nineteenth-century Rumanian boyars to realize the vast change which has occurred since the term was really applicable. The mingling of Western forms and traditional practices has, in the course of time, created a distinctive political amalgam.

A phenomenon more difficult to explain is what Dobrogeanu-Gherea called "bureaucratic hypertrophy," that excessive expansion of government activity accompanied by all the evils customarily associated with the eastern European bureaucrat. The principal explanation appears to be that in suddenly entering the modern world, the Rumanian state simply could not wait to evolve gradually from the simple boyar court to a modern government. A nation attempting to affirm its national independence and to modernize in the midst of powerful and more advanced states and empires was hardly in a position to experiment with a passive government. Since neither the boyars nor the peasants, who made up most of the nation, were equipped to take the initiative, whatever was to be done had to be done by the state. Once it had assumed the modernizing role, its administrative machinery tended to be self-expanding and self-perpetuating.

The state was obliged to create agencies for internal and external security. The armed forces, to be effective, had to keep abreast with the technical demands of modern warfare, which was being perfected by states of much greater power and wealth. A gendarmerie to preserve order in the countryside—for all the evil reputation it enjoyed among the villagers—had a necessary and positive function in superseding the hired bullies maintained by the old boyars.

Economic activity, as has been seen, was undertaken to a large degree through the state or with its official or unofficial support. Business success and political maneuvering were intimately related. Since the most lucrative field for professional men—lawyers, economists, men with a Western education—was in the state service, an exceptionally high percentage of them worked for the government or engaged in politics. Since Bucarest was the place for advancement, doctors, agrarian experts, and other trained men clustererd in the capital, though there was a desperate need for their services in the

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

countryside. Practically all the political parties promised to reduce the obviously overstaffed bureaus and to induce bright young men to study less law and more public health and useful technical arts, but since the parties themselves were products of the same process, these promises were not carried out: "One crow does not peck out the eyes of another." The resulting civil and military bureaucracy, built on the model of states with a much greater national income, was beyond the means of Rumanian society to support; rank and file civil servants and police officers were perennially underpaid and had no recourse but to corruption and bakshish.[3]

A more subtle crisis, one which greatly increases the difficulty of understanding the Rumanian situation, has occurred in the realm of ideas and political theory. Just as Western economic, institutional, and political forms were superimposed, so most of the coherent and organized ideas on politics, society, and economics have been adopted from the West and applied to Rumania. The result is particularly confusing to the Western student, for the Rumanian writer is using terms and concepts—whether historical categories, economic theories, or political axioms—which are familiar to the Westerner but which describe the Rumanian reality only approximately and may indeed be quite inapposite. It is understandable why this should have happened. Rumanian society lacked the conceptual apparatus to provide an adequate explanation of what was occurring in and to Rumania, so Rumanian students looked to the West, primarily to France and Germany, not only for scientific instruction but for the whole content of modern secular thought. In Rumanian writings one is continually struck by the frequency with which quotations from Western authorities are inserted to bolster an argument on some phase of Rumanian life.

Ever since their emergence as an independent nation the Rumanians have been preoccupied, almost obsessed, with the nature of their relation to the West. Broadly, this relationship has been interpreted in four ways. There is first the belief that, whatever the superficial differences, Rumanian society is essentially a part of Western society and while suffering certain handicaps is moving along with it. This has been the position of those who have stressed Rumania's Latinity and French connections, who like to regard Bucarest as the

3. A study undertaken in May, 1941, of a group of state employees in the Central Institute of Statistics—one of the first studies made of the actual conditions of the Rumanian civil servant—revealed that on the average 62.3 per cent of the personal budgets of employees was devoted to food alone, 13 per cent to housing, and 11 per cent to clothing. Cf. G. Retegan, *Condițiile de viața ale oamenilor de servicîu*, Institutul Central de Statistică, Biblioteca statistică No. 21 (Bucarest, 1945).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

000 little Paris of the Balkans, and Rumanian civilization as the outpost of Western culture against a Slavic and barbaric East. Curiously enough, it has also been, for quite different reasons, the view of the Communists, who have contended that Rumania was participating in the worldwide era of capitalist imperialism. The difficulty of this view is that it ignores the obvious differences between Rumanian and Western society or denies their significance.

A second interpretation, a modification of the first and upheld by Zeletin, is that Rumania is repeating the historical evolution of the Western states but at a later date, that Rumania today is passing through the phase of mercantilism. While this concept has the apparent advantage of assuring the Rumanians that they are really Westerners and also of explaining the marked differences, it is based on doubtful premises. It assumes that the constant external influences are not so great as to make any such repetition impossible and it puts excessive faith in the idea that certain definite stages in historical development are universally necessary. Its political effect was a rather ingenious justification of the status quo.

A third interpretation, expounded by the populist Stere, is that Rumania has its own unique course to follow, a view which borrows from the German romantics as well as from the Russian narodniki and has a strong national emotional appeal. This concept recognizes the fact that societies do have a life of their own and that institutions, like literature, are a reflection of the society which created them. But it does not accept the fact of the interactions between societies. Stere is able to show as an illustration of Rumania's individuality that the rich connotations of the Rumanian word *miorița* (diminutive from *mioară*, young sheep) are untranslatable because of their old association with Rumanian shepherd life, but fails to note that Rumania has long since been torn from a pastoral existence and is now using the *dinamo-electric* and the *motor cu benzină*, which notably lack bucolic overtones.

A fourth interpretation, formulated by Dobrogeanu-Gherea, is that Rumanian social development is a hybrid between Western and local forms. In general, this seems to be the most satisfactory in providing an explanation of the various anomalies of Rumanian society, although as has been observed Dobrogeanu-Gherea, perhaps because of his Marxism, viewed this relationship too mechanically and in terms of a "normal" development from which Rumanian development unhappily deviated.

The passion with which the Rumanians have argued these various views for the last half century derives from the urgency of the very

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

difficult problem of adjustment to modern Western society as well as from the fact that the sides taken in the dispute often reflected the social and economic interests of their proponents. In turning to the political movements which have been examined in the preceding chapters, one finds in their party ideologies, in their economic policy and practices, and in their political behavior all the elements of crisis and distortion associated with Western influence and inspiration.

The National Liberal party, which was in power far longer than any other party and has left a deep mark on Rumanian politics, took as its inspiration the two nineteenth-century forces it incorporated in its name, nationalism and liberalism. In the twentieth century these two terms have come to be regarded as antithetical rather than complementary, but in the national independence movements liberalism was generally seen as the ally of nationalism in the struggle against the prevailing conservatism of the post-Napoleonic era. The Liberals considered themselves in the Western tradition and the bearers of enlightenment to their benighted land, as indeed they were in 1848. Nationalism, however, was always the dominant force. Historically, liberalism was associated with the development of capitalism and a middle class, but capitalism advanced in Rumania not under the aegis of Manchester but through the state. The entrepreneurial function was not carried on by a middle class in the broad Western sense of the word but by the so-called financial oligarchy, which was socially attached to the landed gentry.

Briefly, the Liberals in looking to the West saw the national state and capitalism as the keys to progress, but when these were translated into Rumanian terms they produced a strident nationalism, economic xenophobia, a tutelary state, and a controlled, if not regulated, economy. Although a Liberal government had introduced universal suffrage and the 1918 agrarian reform, the Liberals were unable to face the consequences of free elections and sacrificed agriculture to the interests of industry. These contradictions resulted in their defeat, which they could have staved off, not by a return to liberalism, which for them was impossible, but by a total denial of it. But the Brătianus, while willing to pervert the parliamentary form of government, were not the men to overthrow it.

In considering the peasantist movement and the National Peasant party, one must distinguish three distinct political philosophies which were not integrated but were, in fact, opposed on certain points: populism, radical agrarianism, and a liberal capitalism. Populism in its purest form advocated a nonindustrial democracy, holding that Rumania should not attempt to pursue the course of Western capi-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

060

talist development but should nourish its agrarian economy. It was faced, however, by an impossible dilemma: if it remained constantly hostile to industry it condemned Rumania to a backward, primitive level; on the other hand, once it made concessions to industry, either in respect to internal development or to foreign commerce, it undermined its own premises. As a matter of fact, these concessions had been made—for the most part unconsciously and gradually but irrevocably—long before the populists put forward their philosophy, which was a rather belated reaction to a process already devouring the old society.

A less philosophical and more practical peasantism is found in the speeches of Mihalache in 1920 and also in the early literature of the Ploughmen's Front, formed in 1933. It arose from the active discontent of the poor peasant cultivator, and as such quite authentically reflected his demands, much more so than populism, which was rather an intellectual's view of what the peasant wanted or ought to want. Unfortunately, the demands of the hard-pressed peasant, while indicative of the ills of Rumanian society and of the failure of other political movements to provide any relief, were by their very origin too limited to provide an adequate total response to the political and economic problems of Rumanian society. As a result, these radical peasant currents in the course of time fatally became attached to more comprehensive movements—in one case to the National Peasants and in the other to the Communists—which quickly overbore them.

The actual political philosophy of the National Peasants, as displayed in their actions, was not really peasantist—though they were interested in the peasants—but a form of liberal capitalism. It probably had the closest affinity of any Rumanian political movement with Anglo-America economic and political traditions. Although the National Peasants often spoke of the peasant state's having a positive function, the tendency of the party while in power was toward decentralization and removing the Liberals' economic controls and restrictions to permit a natural course of development. They opposed the Liberal policy of protecting "artificial" industries and hoped that a process of "natural selection" in the countryside would produce an economically healthy peasantry.

People who use the term natural selection are apt to forget that the selection is brought about by elimination, that it destroys as well as creates. Rumanian agriculture and Rumania as a nation were in weak positions to gain from natural selection, even in the polite form of free trade and free competition. If the Rumanian peasantry

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

had come into full possession of the land seventy-five years ago, when the pressure of population was less acute—that is, if Rumania's history had been quite different—competition among proprietors might have aided in establishing a more prosperous peasant agriculture.[4] But in the interwar period, with over half the proprietors living on the margin of subsistence, with increasing pressure of population, and with limited alternate means of employment, natural selection would have a principal effect of dispossessing the poorer peasants.

Attacking excessive protectionism, the National Peasants counted on the international division of labor plus the assistance of foreign capital to remedy Rumania's industrial deficiencies. Rumania's position in international commerce and finance was, however, that of the last man in a game of crack-the-whip, and when the international regime showed its instability, as in 1929–31, the effects in Rumania were disastrous. In general, the National Peasants had an unwarranted confidence in the immediate applicability of liberal capitalism to the Rumanian situation and in the stability of the liberal-capitalist system itself. In 1940 Virgil Madgearu, who had been a leading advocate of the "spirit of Geneva," reluctantly decided that "the road of a pure liberal capitalist economy, in light of the experience of the whole world, appears utopian." But by 1940 the phase of liberal capitalism in Rumania had long since passed.

Under Carol, especially after 1933, there was a reaction against the National Peasant policy, a reaction initiated by the exigences of the depression. The Carolist regime developed a form of corporatism as a means of rescuing Rumania from the quagmire of agrarian backwardness. There was a vigorous drive to industrialization, an emphasis upon a directed economy, and the establishment in the 1938 Constitution of what amounted to a corporatist state.

It seems doubtful, however, whether the royal dictatorship was equipped to achieve its avowed aims, even had there been no war. In theory a corporatist economy envisages a harmonious and coordinated development of the whole economy in the interests of the state, but in Rumania the policy which developed in the Tătărescu administration and was climaxed by Carol's dictatorship was largely that of furthering industry—above all heavy industry—by whatever means possible, with very little regard to its effect upon agriculture.

4. The somewhat more intense and diversified form of cultivation practiced by Bulgarian peasants on the south bank of the Danube indicates the advantage of having escaped the semiservile conditions under which Rumania lived after the emancipation. On the other hand, in its broad lines the agrarian problem in Bulgaria is similar to that in Rumania, as both suffer from low productivity, surplus agricultural population, and a limited local market.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

000 The only agrarian measure followed consistently and requiring the outlay of important government funds was the maintenance of wheat prices, which was of commercial advantage and assisted the wheat grower but which did not touch the problem of the small peasant. Nor was the industrial drive accompanied by the other measures which should reinforce such an effort. A program of forced industrialization may involve forced saving and a diversion of labor and capital to industry, but it should not have the effect of crippling the other sectors of the economy. With all the maze of controls and regulations which multiplied as the Carol regime progressed, there is little evidence that it had any comprehensive policy. On the positive side, the rate of industrial development did increase, though industrial production as a whole remained quite small, and an increasing percentage of Rumanian industry was financed by local rather than by foreign capital.

After 1939, under the influence of the German trade agreement and the direct menace of war, there were signs of a more integrated economic program. It is to be noted, however, that in a very important respect the goals under the terms of the German trade agreement were not those which had been pursued in the preceding years of the regime. The Germans disapproved of the attempt of the Balkan states to industrialize themselves and advocated rather a European complementarity, by which Germany should provide them with manufactured goods, while they undertook a diversified and intensified agriculture and exploited their natural resources. (They were permitted, however, to undertake initial processing of raw materials.)

Carol's corporate state completed the breakdown of parliamentary government in Rumania. At the same time, the increasing corruption of Rumanian political life fostered a one-sided economic expansion. While the general desirability of increasing industry may be admitted, it is doubtful that industrialization dictated by pressure groups and extraparliamentary influences, including the royal industrialist Carol, best served the interests of the nation as a whole. Of course, if one assumes that the personal interests of an Ausnit or a Malaxa have a preestablished harmony with those of Rumania, no difficulty arises. But from the coincidence that Rumania required a greater degree of industrialization and that Malaxa and Ausnit were aggressive industrialists, it did not follow syllogistically that all was for the best. The span of the Carolist regime in its dictatorial phase was too brief to permit a definitive judgment, but it would appear that under it the Rumanian people were not paying temporarily for the establishment of industries which would benefit them subsequently but were

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

instead being drained of their resources for the profit of a small group of industrialists, politicians, and court favorites in no way responsible to them.

Thus, the borrowing of corporatism failed, as had the borrowing of national-liberalism and liberal capitalism, to solve Rumania's social and economic problems. The Carolist regime did, however, introduce an explicit dictatorship, which under different auspices has continued to the present. Although dictatorships are nothing new, they appear increasingly to have become in the twentieth century the instrument for the forced modernizing of backward countries. In this respect, Carol's break with parliamentary government implies more than a borrowing from the West.[5]

The emergence of the fascist Iron Guard, which differed from other political movements in having—for all its German and Italian trappings—a strong indigenous impulse, was a sign of the crisis of Rumanian society. The Guard's wholesale denial of parliaments, parties, and programs, its glorification of the untouched peasant, were clearly a revulsion against all the mimicry, simulation, and hypocrisy of Rumanian public life. But while it represented a native and widespread reaction to the dislocations of Rumanian life, it did not come into being spontaneously. Perhaps the only purely spontaneous political actions in Rumania have been peasant uprisings such as that which took place in 1907. In a less violent and more reasoned form, the creation of the Peasant party after the First World War and of the Ploughmen's Front in 1933 may be regarded as spontaneous, in that they were direct expressions of the dissatisfaction of the peasantry.

The Legionary movement was obviously quite different. It was not an immediate reaction against poverty and oppression but was rather an almost esthetic reaction against the distortions of Rumanian society. It took its most violent form and gained the most rabid of its adherents precisely in those parts of Rumanian society where there would be the greatest awareness and feeling of anomaly: among the

5. In this connection F. Borkenau (*The Communist International*, p. 43), speaking of backward countries, suggests the necessity of a "modernizing dictatorship" if they are to advance: "In all those countries the impact of Western capitalism has shattered the *ancien régime* without creating modern classes which could take the lead in reconstruction and they are therefore compelled to choose either interminable and futile convulsions or the establishment of some sort of dictatorship to execute the task in which the bourgeoisie fails, namely to modernize the country. Whether the dictator calls himself Lenin, Ataturk, or Chiang Kai-Shek matters less than may sometimes appear; it is not decisive whether originally he starts from a dogma of proletarian revolution, of national or of religious revival. The fact of a modernizing dictatorship is decisive."

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

students, unemployed intellectuals, discharged civil servants, and, in a more general way, among those who had been uprooted from the old agrarian society but who lacked a secure place in the new.

The Iron Guard failed utterly to solve any of Rumania's difficulties or even to master the problem of gaining and maintaining power. It has been suggested above that the basic reason for this failure was the unadulterated quality of Legionary fascism. Most successful fascist movements have allied themselves with or taken over one or more of the positive forces of modern society, industry and the army being perhaps the most important. But the Guard did not adopt corporatism; in 1938 Carol was able to win over industrial circles against them; in 1941 Antonescu used the army to defeat them. By its ultimate failure the Guard demonstrated the fact that Rumania was fatally attached to the modern world. This is not to say that Rumanian fascism was not dangerous. The savagery displayed by the Guard during its brief spell in power is ample evidence of its viciousness. Nor should it be forgotten that many of the emotional appeals of fascism were employed to an important extent in both the Carol and Antonescu dictatorships.

In sharp contrast to the Iron Guard, the ideas of the Rumanian Social Democratic party, in the years after 1922, seemed almost wholly un-Rumanian. To be sure, in Dobrogeanu-Gherea's writings the Rumania Social Democrats thought they saw a means of relating Marxism to an agrarian country, but this was only in the limited sense of recognizing that the agrarian issue in Rumania had not been between peasant and capitalist farming but between feudal latifundia and a peasant agriculture which contained the seeds of subsequent capitalist development. But as the Social Democrats said repeatedly their real goal—the inauguration of the socialist society—could not be sought in Rumania until it had been achieved by the advanced capitalist countries in western Europe. Thus they were put, despite their protests to the contrary, in the odd position of having little to work for except the unimpeded advance of capitalism. It may be said that unlike the other parties, the Social Democrats bred no monsters but remained sterile.

The Communists had a doctrine which had already been borrowed and altered before it reached Rumania. In the preceding chapters mention has already been made of the numerous social and economic problems which Rumania and Russia had in common and of Lenin's unique interpretation of Marx for the purpose of bringing about the Bolshevik revolution. It seems evident that the Communist use of Marxism is but another example of the same process by which po-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

litical theories and ideologies taken from the West have been warped and somehow transmuted in the course of their application in eastern Europe. Despite the Communist contention that under the conditions of "capitalism in the period of imperialism" it is logical that the socialist revolution should have occurred first in backward Russia, the weakest link in the chain of world capitalism, one is left with the feeling that the situation which Marx envisaged as leading to the proletarian victory and the conditions under which the Bolshevik revolution took place are worlds apart.

Although Marx had expected the revolution to come in advanced industrial states where the contradictions of capitalism had reached their culmination, parts of his message had a profound appeal to backward lands on the periphery of the capitalist world. Agrarian countries, resenting the superior situation of the industrial states and yet envying their prosperity, could be attracted by his corrosive critique of capitalism and his prophecy of its doom. Not only would the present holders of power and wealth be overthrown, but the downtrodden would inherit the earth. The task, however, was to make this Marxist promise applicable to a backward nation.

This was Lenin's achievement. He saw that if there was to be a Marxian revolution in Russia—his basic premise—he must find interpretations of party organization, the peasant question, and the state that would be relevant to the Russian situation. It is to be noted that where he most strongly influenced Marxist theory he was introducing Russian elements: the clandestine organization of the earlier revolutionaries, the land aims of the narodniki, and much of the old state apparatus. It may be maintained, as the Social Democrats have done, that for all his dialectical skill Lenin misapplied Marx when he undertook the Bolshevik revolution and distorted him to justify it. The important fact is that, in addition to a number of accidental and contingent factors working to his advantage—the shock of the First World War, the incapacity of the tsarist regime in its last days—Lenin succeeded in the revolution because he had modified his doctrine to fit his country instead of trying to apply it in its purely Western form to be blunted and paralyzed by the uncompromising differences of Eastern agrarian society.

After the overthrow of Antonescu on August 23, 1944, the Rumanian Communists, especially upon the return of the Moscow group, set about their work in the best Leninist tradition: openly and underground, within the Radescu government and against it, rousing the workers to demonstrations, and seeking to attract the peasant masses by a campaign for radical land reform. But there is no evidence that

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

these tactics would have succeeded if the Red Army had not been in Rumania. Indeed, it was the Soviet emissary, Vyshinsky, who obliged King Michael to accept the Groza cabinet. The communism thus installed in Rumania in 1945 was even farther removed than Lenin's from Marx. In the first place, it had evolved considerably in twenty years of Stalin's application of Lenin's principles to a rapidly growing and developing nation. In the second, it was not a political system arising from the actions of the Rumanian people or even from the Rumanian proletariat, but one imposed by a foreign power.

Hence, in estimating the consequences of the victory of Soviet communism in Rumania, it is necessary to consider two facts: 1) that Leninism is a political-economic system created for and developed in a type of society resembling Rumania's; 2) that its coming to power in Rumania was a Russian decision connected with the eminently worldly interests of the Soviet Union. From the first fact it follows that Leninism is relevant to Rumania. This does not mean that Leninism provides a final answer to Rumania's difficulties nor that it will gain popular support for its program, but that the problems with which it is primarily concerned, the social and economic milieu which it presupposes are to be found in Rumania.[6] The sense of maladjustment and inappropriateness one feels when Leninist concepts are placed in a western European context is far less jarring in the case of Rumania. The ultimate question arises, however, whether for all its relevance Leninism can in fact resolve the complex of refractory problems which have been the subject of the preceding chapters. It has been suggested above that Leninism did not unravel the tangle of economic and social difficulties besetting a backward state but, perhaps by necessity, slashed through them violently and brutally. It remains to be seen whether such practices as the widespread use of forced labor are to continue as an integral part of the Communist pattern and whether Soviet industry will in time be able to raise the per capita income of the Russian citizen to the western European level. Here, the Rumanian proof must be found in the Soviet pudding.

With respect to the second fact, supporters of the present regime in Rumania and in the other eastern European states have contended that the "controlled revolution," or "revolution from without," which the Russians brought to Rumania, is really a blessing since it en-

6. There is, of course, the one important political difference which the Rumanian Social Democrats have always and correctly pointed out: Rumania did not have a background of tsarism but of constitutional, parliamentary government, however poorly it may have functioned.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

ables the Rumanians to benefit from the lessons of the Russian Revolution without having to pass through all its tribulations; the progress from capitalism to socialism and thence ultimately to communism can take place by a series of orderly, planned steps that avoid the mistakes and disasters Russia encountered as pathfinder.[7]

Admittedly the Soviet experience has instructive lessons to teach, and thus far the eastern European states have not suffered the tremendous throes of the Russian Revolution or the first years of collectivization. Further, it may be granted that no particularly promising answers seemed to be forthcoming from native Rumanian leadership in the 1930's and early 1940's. The correspondent, Leigh White, reports a remark made to him by a Rumanian—presumably of the Left—at the time of the Iron Guard revolt in 1941: "The day will come when the Red army will have to save us from ourselves. Then we'll be able to make a decent revolution."[8] Nevertheless, the controlled revolution not only assumes the total correctness of the whole series of stages to be covered but involves complete political death since it means the surrender of any Rumanian voice in setting the course to be followed. Finally, it provides no guarantee that Rumania will not continue to be exploited for the benefit of the senior partner, the Soviet fatherland, whether as a quasi-independent People's Republic or as a member of the U.S.S.R.

A general question remains: how is a backward country to advance? How is a society, whose own pattern of life, government, and economic organization has been irrevocably altered, if not destroyed, by the inroads of the advanced material civilization of the West to adjust itself to that civilization? In view of the experience not only of Rumania and the agrarian states of eastern Europe but also of the colonial areas of Africa and Asia, the optimistic hopes of the nineteenth century for a natural, automatic, and progressive readjustment must be abandoned. Nor in most cases is the hurdle to be overcome merely by installing Western procedural techniques, whether economic or political. Rumanian history shows only too clearly how easily these fail to take root or else produce disconcertingly un-Western results.

The answer would seem to be that a healthy, constructive, and peaceful readjustment is possible only with the active and enlightened help of the advanced countries; failing this, the backward state

7. See, for example, Paul M. Sweezy's discussion of the advantages of the "peaceful transition to socialism" of the eastern European states since 1945, in his recent study, *Socialism* (New York, 1949), pp. 66–69 and 130.

8. Leigh White, *The Long Balkan Night* (New York, 1944), p. 145.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

000 is compelled to seek a compensation, rather than a solution, in a modernizing dictatorship, which may, if it has adequate material to work with, give the appearance of advance, but only at the expense of internal liberties and amicable foreign relations. In the case of Rumania, the Western democracies provided no real assistance during the interwar period; after the great depression, which seriously increased their difficulties, the Rumanians were driven to just such a substitution of compensation for solution: the dictatorial regimes of Carol and Antonescu.

Three courses are open to advanced states, which by necessity carry a heavy responsibility in the conduct of their relations with backward areas. First, they can refuse to see the problem until forced by it to take strenuous defensive action. Second, they may do everything in their power to keep the backward states weak and helpless. The danger of this course, apart from its moral obliquity, is that it is likely merely to stave off the reckoning. Eternal vigilance is also the price of repression. The third and perhaps obvious course is consciously to aid the backward countries. The decision to follow this course is made extremely difficult, however, for two reasons.

In the first place, it means the adoption of policies—especially in the field of foreign trade and foreign investment—which are departures from the habitual economic mores of the Western states and may in fact run counter to a number of commercial and financial interests. It is not easy in any case to supplant the long-standing complementarity between producers of raw materials and producers of industrial goods by a new pattern of international trade, or to undertake long-term development programs in place of investments based on the prospect of relatively quick and high returns.

In the second place, even if such policies are carried out, there is no certainty that they will succeed in their purpose of improving the relations between advanced and backward states. Unfortunately, the dislocation of the traditional society has by now a long history in most areas and has produced a deeply ingrained heritage of tension and frustration. Since a nation suffering a long-felt sense of frustration may well become more rather than less truculent as its power and prosperity increase, there is the danger that the well-intentioned actions of the Western nations might serve only to promote the strength of hostile powers. Here, indeed, is a risk and one which the nations of the West must recognize and be prepared to meet.

The risk today is intensified by the fact that the Soviet system was founded upon and has made enormous capital of the distortions besetting a backward society. The sense of resentment has become iden-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

tified with and consecrated by the Marxist prophecy of the ultimate collapse and destruction of world capitalism; the compensation—socialism in one country through a stern dictatorship—has become an implement of great power. The leaders of the Soviet Union have recognized the dynamic effects of frustration and appear to have no intention of depriving themselves of the energy it can evoke. Thus, the U.S.S.R. has not only brought a large part of eastern Europe, including Rumania, under its direct control, but it is able to cast a shadow over most of the colonial and semicolonial world, realizing that the beginnings of an economic advance may heighten rather than diminish social friction and ready with its answer if the Western states should fail.

The danger of this third course is, nevertheless, a risk, not a certainty, and it is preferable to the other two: the first involves a blind renunciation of any control over the course of events; the second is morally unacceptable. The individual citizen of a Western state may be tempted to close his eyes to the plight of the backward areas; he may further rightly feel that he bears no personal, causal responsibility for the wretched conditions obtaining in other lands. Yet he has a moral responsibility: if he is not to make Cain's denial, he must face that disturbing question:

> "Who has given to me this sweet,
> And given my brother dust to eat?
> And when will his wage come in?"

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

page 352 blank

600

APPENDIX

page 353

page 354 blank

162

TABLE 1. POPULATION OF COMPONENT PARTS OF RUMANIA, 1860–1948

	1860 (Census)	1899 (Census)	1912 (Census)	1920 (Estimate Based on 1930 Census)	1930 (Census)	1939 (Based on 1930 Census)	1941 (Census)	1948 (Provisional Census Figures)
Oltenia			1,414,737		1,513,175		1,673,255	1,717,982
Muntenia			3,297,139		4,029,008		4,904,712	4,991,289
Dobrogea			(662,000) [3]		815,475		519,297 [5]	503,217
Moldavia			2,131,527		2,433,596		2,769,380	2,598,258
Total Old Kingdom	3,917,541 [1]	5,956,690 [2]	7,160,682		8,791,254		9,866,644	9,810,746
			(1910)					
Transylvania			(2,977,608)		3,217,988		1,781,038 [6]	3,420,859 [9]
Banat			(968,947)		939,958		957,957	948,596
Crişana-Maramureş			(1,314,409)		1,390,417		643,908 [6]	1,391,672 [9]
		(1897)						
Bessarabia		(1,935,412)			2,864,402		..... [7]	.....
			(1910)					
Bucovina			(807,262)		853,009		336,215 [8]	800,751
Total Greater Rumania				15,541,424 [4]	18,057,028	19,933,802	18,535,757	15,872,624

1. Including districts of Cahul, Ismail, and Bolgrad in Bessarabia, lost in 1879.
2. Including the northern part of Dobrogea.
3. This figure includes the acquisition of Southern Dobrogea in 1913, not included in total figure for Old Kingdom.
4. Showing acquisition of Transylvania, Banat, Crişana and Maramureş, Bucovina, and Bessarabia after First World War, and Southern Dobrogea acquired in Second Balkan War.
5. Showing loss of Southern Dobrogea to Bulgaria, 1940.
6. Showing loss of Northern Transylvania to Hungary, 1940.
7. Showing loss of Bessarabia to U.S.S.R., 1940.
8. Showing loss of Northern Bucovina to U.S.S.R., 1940.
9. Showing recovery of Northern Transylvania, 1945.

SOURCES: *Anuarul statistic al României, 1939–40.*
Recensământul general al României din 1941, 6 aprilie, date sumare provizorii (Bucarest, 1944).
A. Golopenţia and D. C. Georgescu, *Populaţia Republicii Populare Române la 25 ianuarie 1948—rezultatele provizorii ale recensământului* (Bucarest, 1948).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

162

TABLE II. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RUMANIA AND SELECTED EUROPEAN STATES

	Area, Population, and Density			Average Annual Interwar Per Cent Growth	Average Vital Rates 1930–31			Reproduction (a) Rates ca. 1930	
	Area (1,000 km.²)	*Population (1,000's)*	*Density (per km.²)*		*Birth*	*Death*	*Natural Increase*	*Gross*	*Net*
RUMANIA	295.0	18,057	61	1.27	34.2	20.1	14.1	2.16	1.40
Bulgaria	103.0	6,078	59	1.30	30.4	16.5	13.9	1.70	1.20
Greece	130.2	6,205	48	1.93	31.2	17.1	14.1	1.80	1.26
Yugoslavia	247.5	13,934	56	1.43	34.6	19.4	15.2	2.09	1.45
Hungary	93.1	8,688	93	.76	24.6	16.1	8.5	1.34	1.01
Poland	388.6	32,107	83	1.44	31.6	15.6	16.0	1.70	1.25
Ukrainian SSR (1926)	451.6	29,018	64	.53	41.2	18.0	23.2	2.49	1.70
Austria	83.9	6,760	81	.36	16.4	13.8	2.6	.80	.66
Czechoslovakia	140.5	14,730	105	.71	22.1	14.3	7.8	1.22	.95
Italy	310.2	41,177	133	.85	25.8	14.5	11.3	1.59	1.15
Germany	468.8	65,218	139	.67	16.8	11.1	5.7	.80	.70
France	551.0	41,835	76	.44	17.8	16.0	1.8	1.10	.93
Denmark	42.3	3,551	84	.82	18.4	11.1	7.3	1.10	.96
England and Wales	151.1	39,952	264	.49	16.1	11.9	4.2	.93	.81

(a) Since birth and death rates fail to take into account the differences of age and sex in the composition of the population and are therefore not precise measures of the manner in which the population is growing, a more accurate device, the "reproduction rate," is employed. The "gross reproduction rate" measures the extent to which women of childbearing age are replacing themselves with girl babies, in the absence of mortality between birth and the end of the childbearing period. The "net reproduction rate" takes into account the average mortality experience of females between birth and the childbearing years. It is thus a ratio of successive female generations. In both rates 1.00 equals simple replacement. "Thus a net reproduction rate of 2.00 indicates that at current fertility and mortality the population would double in each generation. A rate of 1.00 would ultimately yield a stationary population; a rate of .50 indicates a decline of 50 per cent per generation."

SOURCE: Dudley Kirk, *Europe's Population in the Interwar Years* (League of Nations, 1946), p. 263.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

TABLE III. REGIONAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS IN RUMANIA 162 163 165

	Area (1,000 km.²)	Population (1,000's)	Density (per km.²)	Vital Rates, 1930			Reproduction Rates	
				Birth	*Death*	*Increase*	*Gross*	*Net*
RUMANIA	295.0	18,057	61	34.2	20.1	14.1	2.16	1.40
Oltenia	24.1	1,513	63	33.7	20.4	13.3	2.11	1.37
Muntenia	52.5	4,029	77	35.4	20.1	15.3	2.22	1.44
Dobrogea	23.3	815	35	39.2	23.7	15.5	2.70	1.75
Moldavia	38.0	2,434	64	39.9	21.4	18.5	2.48	1.61
Bessarabia	44.4	2,864	64	38.3	20.8	17.5	2.57	1.67
Bucovina	10.4	853	82	31.3	19.0	12.3	1.88	1.22
Transylvania	62.2	3,218	52	30.1	18.5	11.6	2.01	1.30
Banat	18.7	940	50	21.3	18.7	2.6	1.25	.81
Crişana and Maramureş	21.3	1,390	65	28.8	19.1	9.7	1.77	1.15

SOURCE: *Ibid.*

TABLE IV. VITAL RATES IN RUMANIA 163 165

A. The Old Kingdom, 1859–1915

Period	Vital Rates per 1,000 Inhabitants		
	Births	*Deaths*	*Excess of births over deaths*
1859–63	31.3	21.4	9.9
1864–68	33.4	28.2	5.2
1869–73	33.3	28.0	5.3
1874–78	35.4	31.3	4.1
1878–83	42.0	27.7	14.3
1889–93	40.2	30.4	9.8
1894–98	40.7	28.0	12.7
1899–1903	42.1	27.6	14.5
1904–08	40.5	25.7	14.8
1909–13	41.7	25.3	16.4
1914–15	41.3	24.0	17.3

B. Greater Rumania, 1920–46

Year	Vital Rates per 1,000 Inhabitants (U = Urban; R = Rural)		
	Births	*Deaths*	*Excess of births*
1920	34.7	26.7	8.0
U	19.7	18.3	1.4
R	39.0	29.1	9.9
1921	39.4	23.7	15.7
U	22.7	16.3	6.4
R	44.2	25.7	18.5

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

163
165

Year Vital Rates per 1,000 Inhabitants (cont.) (U = Urban; R = Rural)

	Births	Deaths	Excess of births
1922	38.4	23.5	14.9
U	22.5	17.5	5.0
R	42.9	25.3	17.6
1923	37.6	23.0	14.6
U	22.3	17.2	5.1
R	41.8	24.6	17.2
1924	37.9	23.3	14.6
U	22.2	16.8	5.4
R	42.1	25.0	17.1
1925	36.3	21.7	14.6
U	20.7	15.7	5.0
R	40.5	23.3	17.2
1926	35.9	22.0	13.9
U	21.6	17.5	4.1
R	39.7	23.2	16.5
1927	35.2	22.9	12.3
U	21.4	17.4	4.0
R	38.8	24.4	14.4
1928	35.9	20.2	15.7
U	22.3	17.0	5.3
R	39.4	21.1	18.3
1929	34.0	21.4	12.6
U	21.4	18.4	3.0
R	37.3	22.2	15.1
1930	35.0	19.4	15.6
U	23.6	17.7	5.9
R	37.7	19.8	17.9
1931	33.4	20.9	12.5
U	22.3	18.8	3.5
R	36.1	21.4	14.7
1932	35.9	21.7	14.2
U	22.3	18.9	3.4
R	39.1	22.3	16.8
1933	32.0	18.7	13.3
U	20.8	17.2	3.6
R	34.7	19.1	15.6
1934	32.4	20.7	11.7
U	20.9	17.9	3.0
R	35.0	21.3	13.7
1935	30.7	21.1	9.6
U	20.7	19.3	1.4
R	33.0	21.5	11.5
1936	31.5	19.8	11.7
U	21.4	19.4	2.0
R	33.8	19.9	13.9

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

163
165

Year Vital Rates per 1,000 Inhabitants (cont.)

	Births	*Deaths*	*Excess of births*
1937	30.8	19.3	11.5
1938	29.6	19.2	10.4
1939	28.3	18.6	9.7
1940	26.5	19.1	7.4
1941	23.0	19.3	3.7
1942	21.5	19.0	2.5
1943	20.3	16.7	3.6
1944	21.7	19.6	2.1
1945	19.9	19.3	0.6
1946	23.7	18.0	5.7

SOURCES: Sabin Manuila, *Structure et évolution de la population rurale* (Bucarest, 1940), p. 45; Sabin Manuila and D. C. Georgescu, *Populația României* (Bucarest, 1938), pp. 83–84; Institutul Central de Statistică, *Comunicări statistice*, No. 18 (August 15, 1947).

TABLE V. AGRICULTURAL POPULATION, 1941 162

	Total Population	Rural Population	Agricultural Population	Active in Agriculture	Passive in Agriculture
RUMANIA	13,535,757	10,238,255	9,690,428	6,504,291	3,186,132
Plain of Siret and Prut	2,037,892	1,601,094	1,572,169	1,030,235	541,934
Moldavian Carpathians	949,617	747,918	749,741	489,178	260,563
Muntenian and Oltenian Carpathians	2,577,913	2,190,766	2,117,182	1,379,258	737,924
Plain of the Danube	3,781,925	2,377,906	2,354,502	1,576,694	777,808
Dobrogea	519,297	365,585	331,740	210,714	121,026
Bucovina	336,215	266,619	273,545	185,685	87,860
Transylvanian Plateau	1,731,038	1,376,353	1,186,546	819,298	367,248
Western Transylvania	1,601,860	1,312,014	1,104,998	813,229	291,769

SOURCE: Roman Cresin, *Recensământul agricol al României din 1941, date provizorii*, Biblioteca Statistică, No. 10 (Bucarest, 1945), Table 20.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

162

TABLE VI. AGRICULTURAL POPULATION, 1941: PERCENTAGE AND DENSITY

	Agricultural Population as Per Cent of:		Percentage of Agricultural Population:		Total Population per 100 Ha. Total Area	Agricultural population per 100 Ha. Agricultural Surface (a)	Active per 100 Ha. Agricultural Surface (a)	Active per 100 Ha. Arable Surface (b)
	Total population	*Rural population*	*Active in agriculture*	*Passive in agriculture*				
RUMANIA	71.4	94.4	67.1	32.9	69.5	94.3	63.3	71.9
Plain of Siret and Prut	77.2	98.2	65.5	34.5	81.4	87.7	57.5	64.4
Moldavian Carpathians	79.0	100.2(c)	65.2	34.8	65.7	112.8	75.0	101.0
Muntenian and Oltenian Carpathians	82.1	96.6	65.1	34.9	77.2	121.5	79.2	103.6
Plain of the Danube	61.7	98.1	67.1	32.9	96.7	89.7	60.1	64.7
Dobrogea	63.9	90.7	63.5	36.5	31.2	48.8	31.1	32.4
Bucovina	81.4	102.6(c)	67.9	32.1	47.2	108.3	73.5	84.8
Transylvanian Plateau	68.5	86.2	69.0	31.0	58.1	98.5	68.0	75.0
Western Transylvania	69.0	84.2	73.3	26.7	55.4	84.0	61.8	66.5

(a) Agricultural surface (i.e., arable, meadows, pastures, vineyards, and orchards) in the 1941 census includes only land under private exploitation, or approximately 73 per cent of the total agricultural area of the country.

(b) Arable surface included in the 1941 census represents approximately 87 per cent of the total arable.

(c) The figure of over 100 per cent merely means that part of the urban population was also engaged in agriculture.

SOURCE: *Ibid.*, Table 21.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

TABLE VII. AGRARIAN OVERPOPULATION, BY REGION, IN RUMANIA 162

	1 Population Dependent on Agriculture (1,000's)	2 Output in Crop Units per Ha. / Density of Agricultural Population		3 Output in Crop Units per Cap.	4 Agricultural Production in Crop Units (1,000's)	5 European Output per Ha. / European Density		6 European Output per Cap	7 Standard Population Assuming European per Cap. Output (1,000's)	8 "Surplus" Population: Number (1,000's)	9 "Surplus" Population: Per Cent
RUMANIA	13,000	17/.80	=	21	273,000	24/.56	=	43	6,300	6,700	51
Old Kingdom	6,400	17/.80	=	21	133,000	24/.56	=	43	3,100	3,300	51
Bessarabia	2,400	14/.70	=	20	48,000	24/.56	=	43	1,100	1,300	54
Bucovina	600	28/1.46	=	20	12,000	24/.56	=	43	280	320	53
Transylvania	3,600	18/.81	=	22	80,000	24/.56	=	43	1,900	1,700	48

COMMENT: This table, adapted from the computations made in Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (League of Nations, 1945), can be used only for purposes of general illustration. Output and area are given in terms of "crops units" and "arable equivalent" hectares, statistical devices to make possible a comparison of different types of agricultural land and different agricultural products. Cols. 1 to 4 give the agricultural population of Rumania and its four major regions as of 1930; the total agricultural production; and the relations between output per unit of area, density of population, and per capita output. Col. 7 gives the population which would be required to achieve this total production on the basis of the average European (excluding Russia) per capita output (Col. 6), which in turn is determined by the European output per unit of area and the European density of agricultural population (Col. 5). Col. 8 then shows the resulting "surplus" population, and Col. 9 this surplus as a percentage of the total Rumanian agricultural population.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

311 TABLE VIII. DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE OLD KINGDOM, 1907

Categories (hectares)	Number of Holdings	Per Cent of Total Properties	Area (hectares)	Per Cent of Total Area
0–½ ha.	62,832	6.60	26,426	0.34
½–1	81,089	8.50	72,757	0.98
1–2	147,900	15.20	287,029	3.81
2–3	131,630	13.60	337,000	4.30
3–4	172,446	17.90	631,964	8.08
4–5	148,717	15.40	711,033	9.08
5–7	131,145	13.50	743,486	9.50
7–10	45,230	4.70	393,950	5.05
Total, 0–10 ha.	920,989	95.40	3,153,645	40.29
10–50	36,318	3.70	695,953	8.89
50–100	2,405	0.26	166,847	2.13
100–500	3,314	0.41	816,385	10.43
500–1,000	1,122	0.13	803,084	10.26
1,000–3,000	771	0.09	1,236,420	15.80
3,000–5,000	112	0.01	434,367	5.55
Over 5,000	66	0.00	520,095	6.65
Total	965,047	100.00	7,826,796	100.00

SOURCE: G. D. Creangă, *Grundbesitzverteilung und Bauernfrage in Rumänien*, in *Staats- und sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen*, Heft 129 (Leipzig, 1907), p. 93.

COMMENT: This table includes private properties, land owned by religious and other public foundations, state land, and crown domains. With regard to type of land, it includes arable, meadows, and pasture, but not vineyards, orchards, or forests. Creangă estimated that there were in Rumania some 74,000 hectares of orchards and 98,000 hectares of vineyards, belonging mostly to small holders, and 2,422,000 hectares of forest (not including swamp land), belonging almost entirely to large proprietors, either public or private. His figure for the area of holdings under 10 hectares is too low, as it was based on data from 1896, and about 153,000 hectares of state land were distributed to the peasants between 1897 and 1905.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

TABLE IX. LEASING OF AGRICULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE OLD KINGDOM, 1907

Category of Property (hectares)	Amount Leased (hectares)	Percentage of Land Leased
50–100	40,184	24.09
100–500	409,608	50.17
500–1,000	467,819	58.28
1,000–3,000	721,198	58.33
3,000–5,000	318,628	73.36
Over 5,000	376,708	72.43
Total over 50 ha.	2,334,145	56.86

311

SOURCE: *Ibid.*, p. 140.

TABLE X. DISTRIBUTION OF LAND BY FARM UNITS IN THE OLD KINGDOM, 1913

Categories of Farms (hectares)	Number	Percentage of Total Number	Total Area Covered (hectares)	Percentage of Total Area	Average of the Category (hectares)
0–2	476,849	42.0	572,169	9.7	1.20
2–5	441,336	39.0	1,546,311	26.5	3.50
5–10	161,550	14.3	1,118,409	19.2	7.34
10–25	42,996	3.8	622,174	10.7	14.47
25–50	5,697	0.5	193,128	3.3	33.91
50–100	1,554	0.1	107,182	1.8	68.96
100–500	2,377	0.2	587,549	10.1	247.50
Over 500	1,043	0.1	1,093,699	18.7	1,047.10
	1,133,202	100.0	5,840,621	100.0	5.15

Categories of Farms	Owner-cultivated		Tenant-cultivated	
	Area (hectares)	*Per Cent*	*Area (hectares)*	*Per Cent*
0–2	421,712	73.7	150,457	26.3
2–5	1,045,525	67.6	500,786	32.4
5–10	647,518	57.9	470,891	42.1
10–25	396,764	63.8	225,410	36.2
25–50	141,263	73.1	51,865	26.9
50–100	74,408	69.4	32,774	30.6
100–500	281,871	48.0	305,678	52.0
Over 500	495,860	45.3	597,839	54.7
	3,504,921	60.0	2,335,700	40.0

SOURCE: Rumanian Ministry of Agriculture, *Agricultorii şi repartizarea pămîntului cultivat in 1913* (Bucarest, 1915), quoted in David Mitrany, *The Land and* 113

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

113 *the Peasant in Rumania* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 241–242.

COMMENT: Unfortunately this table and Table VIII, on the distribution of properties, appear to defy comparison, and in certain important respects they are in serious contradiction. The total area for properties is some 2,000,000 hectares larger than that for farms. Probably a large part of this difference is attributable to grazing lands and fallow, which are not included in the statistics for farms. According to figures for 1905, pasture and fallow amounted to about 1,400,000 hectares. L. Colescu, *Progresele economice ale României îndeplinite sub domnia M.S. Regelui Carol I, 1866–1906* (Bucarest, 1907), p. 51. Owner-cultivated farms under 100 hectares are given as some 1,300,000 hectares less than properties under 100 hectares (2,727,000 hectares as against 4,016,000 hectares). It seems impossible to explain this difference either by the absence of grazing land, which belonged mainly to large properties, or by mutual interleasing among peasants, which could scarcely have achieved such a magnitude. The figure for farms over 100 hectares is some 2,100,000 hectares less than that for properties over 100 hectares (1,681,000 hectares as against 3,810,000 hectares). This difference is to be explained by the absence of grazing land in the farm statistics, by the fact that land was leased from the large estates to peasant farms, and by the sale of estate land between 1907 and 1913, but the relative importance of these factors is not clear. The total area leased from properties over 100 hectares is given by Creangă at about 2,300,000 hectares; the total farm area under tenant cultivation, for both large and small farms, is about 2,336,000 hectares, but this similarity is misleading because the figure for leased properties presumably includes grazing land.

The only point in mentioning these inconsistencies—especially in statistics which are known to be of uncertain reliability—is that repeated attempts have been made to reach too definite conclusions through a collation of these tables or a selected part thereof.

31 TABLE XI. PRE-1914 DISTRIBUTION OF LAND IN BESSARABIA

A. By Type of Property

Categories		Number of Properties	Total Area (hectares)	Average Area (hectares)	Per Cent of Total Area
1. Private individual properties	Nobles	1,474	818,744	555.4	20.1
	Priests	126	4,308	34.2	0.1
	Merchants, etc.	1,944	253,867	—	6.7
	Peasants	7,718	135,384	17.5	3.2
	Foreigners	13	30,390	2,337.6	0.8
	Various	10,102	94,157	9.0	2.3
	Large owners	275	169,416	616.3	4.3
		21,652	1,506,266	69.4	36.9
2. Joint holdings		540	201,591	373.3	4.9
3. Nadyel lands		2,209	2,111,940	956.0	50.7
4. State domains		—	53,648	—	1.3
5. Churches and monasteries		—	204,190	—	5.0
6. Town properties		—	23,600	—	0.6
7. Private institutions		—	30,362	—	0.7
		24,401	4,131,597	166.3	100.0

SOURCE: E. Giurgea in *Buletinul Statistic*, No. 2 (1919), pp. 324–327, quoted in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

311

B. By Size of Property

Properties (hectares)	Area	Per Cent of Total Area	Number of Proprietors	Per Cent of Total Number
0–10	2,156,827	51.6	285,663	98.4
10–100	180,984	4.3		
Over 100	1,844,539	44.1	4,480	1.6
	4,182,350	100.0	290,143	100.0

SOURCE: Alexander Nasta, "La Réforme agraire en Roumanie," report presented to the Fourteenth Congress of the International Congress of Agriculture (Bucarest, June 7–10, 1929).

COMMENT: These figures must be regarded as very approximate, since they involve, among other things, a translation of Russian returns which were based upon types of ownership rather than size. The number of proprietors in Table B, which is much greater than the number of properties in Table A, includes the peasants cultivating nadyel (allotted) land, which had been granted to the peasant commune rather than to the individual under the Russian emancipation.

TABLE XII. PRE-1914 DISTRIBUTION OF LAND IN BUCOVINA

A. Distribution of Total Area

Categories (hectares)	Number of Properties	Per Cent	Area (hectares)	Per Cent
0–10	191,737	96.27	270,730	25.92
10–100	6,606	3.32	134,115	12.84
100–500	585	0.29	130,989	12.53
Over 500	257	0.12	508,674	48.71
	199,185	100.00	1,044,458	100.00

SOURCE: Livius Lazar, *La Mise en oeuvre de la réforme agraire*, p. 64, quoted in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

B. Distribution of Agricultural Land (Arable, Meadows, and Pasture, but Excluding Forests)

Categories (hectares)	Area (hectares)	Per Cent
0–10	264,678	48
10–100	152,094	27
Over 100	140,560	25
	557,327	100

SOURCE: Ifor L. Evans, *The Agrarian Revolution in Roumania* (Cambridge, 1924), p. 87, from information provided by Rumanian authorities in Bucovina.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

311

TABLE XIII. PREREFORM DISTRIBUTION OF LAND IN TRANSYLVANIA

Category (hectares)	Number of Owners	Per Cent	Area (hectares)	Per Cent
0–10	843,448	87.6	2,536,738	34
10–100	113,887	11.8	2,153,117	29
Over 100	4,601	0.6	2,751,457	37
	961,936	100.0	7,441,312	100

SOURCE: Nasta, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

COMMENT: The reliability of this official estimate is extremely doubtful. The table appears to be only an approximate conversion into hectares of figures compiled in cadastral yokes by the provisional Transylvanian government in 1919. The reliability of the latter compilation has been challenged. According to Hungarian critics "no exact figures are or ever have been available for the land distribution in 1919 in the total area annexed by Rumania." C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors* (Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 316, n. 2.

311
423

TABLE XIV. LAND EXPROPRIATED UNDER THE AGRARIAN REFORMS OF 1918 AND 1921, AS OF 1927

	Old Kingdom (hectares)	Transylvania (hectares)	Bucovina (hectares)	Bessarabia (hectares)	Total (hectares)
Arable	2,269,192.27	470,389.56	48,544.64	1,210,627.20	3,998,753.67
Meadow	27,386.94	80,745.60	9,742.63	—	117,875.17
Pasture	442,988.68	398,257.50	8,296.69	—	849,542.87
Forests	19,156.10	663,967.24	8,420.54	198,404.60	889,948.48
Orchards, Vineyards	2,466.18	12,114.07	—	—	14,580.25
Building land, farmyards, etc.	360.11	14,006.35	357.16	—	14,723.62
Barren	14,851.15	24,328.71	605.69	82,888.44	122,673.99
Total	2,776,401.43	1,863,809.08	75,967.35	1,491,920.24	6,008,098.05

SOURCE: Nasta, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

COMMENT: Despite the confident calculation to two decimal places, the accuracy of this table is rather uncertain. In 1937 the figure given for the total amount of expropriated land was somewhat less: 5,811,827 hectares. G. Ionescu-Sişeşti and N. Cornăţeanu, *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie et ses conséquences* (Bucarest, 1937), p. 36. In 1940 it was officially announced that 3,900 estates were still in possession of land which was to have been expropriated. Moreover, there seems to have been a good deal of circumvention of the expropriation laws through the reconstitution of estates by a variety of semilegal or illegal means. According to Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 228, the Ministry of Agriculture confirmed that in the steppe region of the Bărăgan newly formed estates, running up to 3,000 hectares, could be found.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

TABLE XV. DISPOSITION OF LAND EXPROPRIATED UNDER AGRARIAN REFORMS OF 1918 AND 1921, AS OF 1927

	Old Kingdom (hectares)	Transylvania (hectares)	Bucovina (hectares)	Bessarabia (hectares)
Distributed to peasants	2,037,293.04	451,653.96	42,832.25	1,098,045.50
Communal pastures	524,720.87	418,861.43	5,831.85	—
Communal forests	—	484,805.24	4,377.72	—
Forests administered by state to be distributed	21,027.90	179,162.00	8,523.84	198,404.60
Land unfit for distribution	17,677.44	36,442.78	605.69	82,888.44
Reserved for general needs	175,682.18	93,383.62	13,796.00	112,581.70
Total expropriated	2,776,401.43	1,663,809.03	75,967.35	1,491,920.24

311
423

SOURCE: Nasta, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

COMMENT: The reliability of this table depends upon that of Table XIV.

TABLE XVI. LAND RECEIVED BY THE PEASANTS UNDER THE AGRARIAN REFORMS OF 1918 AND 1921

A. As of 1927

	Number of Peasants Entitled to Land	Number of Peasants Receiving Land	Area Distributed (hectares)	Area Distributed as Communal Pasture (hectares)	Area Distributed as Communal Forests (hectares)
Old Kingdom	1,053,628	630,113	2,037,293.04	524,720.87	—
Transylvania	490,528	310,583	451,653.96	418,861.43	484,805.24
Bucovina	77,911	71,266	42,832.25	5,831.85	4,377.72
Bessarabia	357,016	357,016	1,098,045.50	—	—
Total	1,979,083	1,368,978	3,629,824.75	948,914.15	489,182.96

SOURCE: *Ibid.*

B. As of 1938

	Number of Peasants with Right to Land	Number Receiving Land		Land Distributed (hectares)	Average Area per Peasant Receiving Land under Reform
		Number	*Per Cent of those with right*		
Old Kingdom	1,075,330	648,843	60.3	2,286,740	3.4
Transylvania	490,528	310,583	63.3	489,043	1.6
Bucovina	82,608	76,941	93.2	49,179	0.6
Bessarabia	357,016	357,016	100.0	1,098,045	3.1
Total	2,005,477	1,393,383	69.5	3,923,007	2.8

SOURCE: *60 Sate romînești* (5 vols., Bucarest, 1941–43), II, 10.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

311
423

TABLE XVII. DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL PROPERTY FOLLOWING THE AGRARIAN REFORMS OF 1918 AND 1921, AS OF 1927

Before the Reform:

	Small Property (under 100 ha.)	Per Cent	Large Property (over 100 ha.)	Per Cent
Old Kingdom	4,593,148	57.5	3,397,851	42.5
Bessarabia	2,337,811	55.9	1,844,539	44.1
Transylvania	4,689,855	63.0	2,751,457	37.0
Bucovina	405,000	78.0	115,000	22.0
	12,025,814		8,108,847	

or:

Small Property: 12,025,814 ha. or 59.77%
Large Property: 8,108,847 ha. or 40.23%
20,134,661 ha.

After the Reform:

	Small Property	Per-Cent	Large Property	Per Cent
Old Kingdom	7,369,549	92.22	621,450	7.78
Bessarabia	3,829,731	91.57	352,619	8.43
Transylvania	6,353,664	85.38	1,087,648	14.62
Bucovina	480,967	92.49	39,033	7.51
	18,033,911		2,100,750	

or:

Small Property: 18,033,911 ha. or 89.56%
Large Property: 2,100,750 ha. or 10.44%
20,134,661 ha.

SOURCE: Nasta, *op. cit.*, pp. 26–27.

COMMENT: Although these figures have been used as the basis for most studies of Rumanian agriculture, they are misleading and incorrect. The area estimated as having been expropriated from properties over 100 hectares (Table XIV) was simply subtracted from estimates of the prereform extent of such property and added to the estimates of properties under 100 hectares. The results are naturally quite impressive but unacceptable. The prewar figures for the Old Kingdom were based upon G. D. Creangă's estimate for 1905 (Table VIII) (except that the figure for properties under 10 hectares was taken from the somewhat higher estimate of the Ministry of Finance for 1905, a justified substitution). An estimated reduction of properties over 100 hectares between 1905 and 1918 (amounting to 412,500 hectares) was added to the 1905 figure for those below 10 hectares. As a result of this method of computation, the total area of medium properties, between 10 and 100 hectares, is assumed not to have changed at all between 1905 and 1927. All the land expropriated is considered to have been transferred to the small peasants, when, in fact, of the 2,776,000 hectares reported expropriated in the Old Kingdom, only 2,087,000 hectares of arable had been distributed to the peasants by 1927, and 525,000 hectares of communal grazing land established.

It has already been noted that the accuracy of estimates of prereform land distribution in Transylvania was doubtful. Only properties of over 100 hectares are reported

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

to have suffered expropriation, although in Transylvania there were undoubtedly numerous cases where land under that figure was taken. In Bucovina, of the 75,967 hectares expropriated, some 23,000 were reported in 1927 to be either unfit for settlement or held as state-administered forest, and therefore cannot be regarded as having increased peasant holdings. In Bessarabia, all properties over 100 hectares were to have been expropriated; of the 1,845,000 hectares in this category, 1,492,000 were expropriated, and only 1,100,000 distributed to the peasants. 311 423

Finally, forest land is handled ambiguously. In Transylvania about 40 per cent (664,000 hectares) of the area expropriated from large estates was forest; in the Old Kingdom, however, the forests of large landowners—which were not expropriated but which in 1905 amounted to over 800,000 hectares in private ownership alone—were not included in the figures (this seems also to have been the case with the extensive forests of Bucovina). To have made the statistics consistent either all forest properties in all regions should have been included, which would have increased considerably the area shown as remaining to large properties after the reform, or they should have been omitted, which would have reduced the size of the area reported expropriated by nearly 900,000 hectares. In general, then, the conclusions were artificially established and certainly represent an inflated picture of the redistribution of property.

TABLE XVIII. FISCAL CENSUSES ON LANDHOLDINGS, 1923 AND 1928 162

	1923			1928		
Hectares	Number of Taxpayers	Area (hectares)	Average Size (hectares)	Number of Taxpayers	Area (hectares)	Average Size (hectares)
0–5	3,154,211	5,745,921	1.8	3,408,503	6,653,801	2.0
5–10	458,534	2,618,824	5.7	455,934	3,000,859	6.6
10–50	181,494	2,359,075	13.0	139,807	2,286,413	16.4
50–250	16,557	1,425,053	86.0	13,163	1,308,121	99.4
Over 250	3,168	1,537,046	485.1	1,834	861,299	469.4
Total	3,813,964	13,685,919	3.6	4,019,241	14,110,493	3.5

SOURCE: *60 Sate romînești*, II, 12–15.

COMMENT: Although these tables, prepared by the Ministry of Finance for tax purposes and using different categories of size of landholding, cannot be compared with earlier or later figures, they are of use in showing certain trends in land distribution in the 1920's. The 1928 figure for properties over 250 hectares seems very low, however, since a Ministry of Finance estimate for 1927 (given in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 247) listed 2,597 owners in this category with an area of 1,305,672 hectares.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

311

TABLE XIX. DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND ACCORDING TO SIZE OF EXPLOITATION, 1930 CENSUS

Categories of Exploitations (hectares)	Exploitations		Total Area		Cultivated Area	
	Number	*Per Cent*	*Hectares*	*Per Cent*	*Hectares*	*Per Cent*
0–1	610,000	18.6	320,000	1.6	275,000	2.1
1–3	1,100,000	33.5	2,200,000	11.1	1,850,000	14.4
3–5	750,000	22.9	3,015,000	15.3	2,475,000	19.3
0–5	2,460,000	75.0	5,535,000	28.0	4,600,000	35.8
5–10	560,000	17.1	3,955,000	20.0	3,110,000	24.2
10–20	180,000	5.5	2,360,000	12.0	1,715,000	13.3
20–50	55,000	1.7	1,535,000	7.8	1,015,000	7.9
50–100	12,800	0.4	895,000	4.5	540,000	4.2
100–500	9,500	0.3	2,095,000	10.6	920,000	7.2
Over 500	2,700	0.1	3,375,000	17.1	950,000	7.4
Total	3,280,000	100.0	19,750,000	100.0	12,850,000	100.0

SOURCE: Institutul Central de Statistică, *Statistica agricolă a Romăniei în 1938* (Bucarest, 1939), p. 94.

COMMENT: This table, the only general summary published for the 1930 census, presents certain difficulties. The figure for the total cultivated area corresponds with the 12,857,112 hectares of arable (cereals, artificial meadows, fallow, alimentary and industrial crops) reported under cultivation in 1930. It is less easy to determine what the 19,750,000 hectares include. Since in 1930 arable land plus grazing, orchards, and vineyards amounted to only 17,525,000 hectares, the figure must include some 2,000,000 of the 7,134,000 hectares of forest land. Some sources (e.g., *Bréviaire statistique de la Roumanie, 1940*) state that the 1930 figures refer to properties rather than exploitations.

TABLE XX. DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL PROPERTIES AND EXPLOITATIONS ACCORDING TO SIZE, 1941 CENSUS

Category of Size (hectares)	Properties		Exploitations		Extent of Properties		Extent of Exploitations	
	Number	*Per Cent*	*Number*	*Per Cent*	*Hectares*	*Per Cent*	*Hectares*	*Per Cent*
Total	2,257,050	100.0	2,263,963	100.0	10,419,000	100.0	10,419,570	100.0
Under 0.1			83,815	3.7				
0.1–0.5			172,709	7.6				
0.5–1.0			211,337	9.3				
Total under 1	524,549	23.3	467,861	20.6	230,000	2.2	190,883	1.8
1–3	792,969	35.1	757,646	33.5	1,559,000	15.0	1,446,627	13.9
3–5	415,921	18.4	439,919	19.5	1,660,000	16.1	1,704,211	16.4

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

311

Category of Size (hectares)	Properties		Exploitations		Extent of Properties		Extent of Exploitations	
	Number	*Per Cent*	*Number*	*Per Cent*	*Hectares*	*Per Cent*	*Hectares*	*Per Cent*
5–10	381,444	16.9	448,188	19.8	2,707,000	26.0	3,072,676	29.5
10–20	100,932	4.5	115,481	5.1	1,340,000	12.9	1,489,895	14.3
20–50	31,479	1.4	26,167	1.1	888,000	8.5	713,360	6.8
50–100	4,891	0.2	4,789	0.2	315,000	3.0	317,842	3.1
100–200	2,544	0.1	2,099	0.1	349,000	3.3		
200–500	1,690	0.1	1,286	0.1	521,000	5.0	1,484,076	14.2
Over 500	631	0.0	527	0.0	835,000	8.0		

SOURCE: Roman Cresin, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

COMMENT: This census, which did not cover Northern Transylvania, Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina, or Southern Dobrogea, was limited to land in private cultivation and did not include state, public, or communal holdings. It did, however, include forests and other nonagricultural land if these were in private hands.

The area covered by the census comprised a little over half the total area of Rumania:

Type of Terrain	Total Area (1,000 ha.)	Area Covered in Census (1,000 ha.)	Difference	
			In 1,000 hectares	*In per cent*
Arable	8,578	7,486	1,090	12.7
Meadow	1,069	831	238	22.3
Pasture	2,209	368	1,841	83.3
Vineyards	209	167	42	20.1
Orchards	195	145	50	25.6
Forest	4,789	803	3,986	83.2
Other land	2,476	387	2,089	84.4
Total	19,525	10,187	9,338	47.8

The difference of 9,338,000 hectares between the total area and the area covered by the census was accounted for as follows:

	Hectares
Individual exploitations omitted from the census but included subsequently, and in Table XX	232,000
Communal pastures	1,600,000
State forests	1,500,000
Forests belonging to various institutions	ca. 2,500,000
Lakes, ponds, etc. from the floodable regions of the Danube	ca. 900,000
Areas occupied by communications, cities, industries, etc.	ca. 1,000,000
State farms, land belonging to Ministry of Agriculture, crown domains, and undeclared areas	ca. 1,600,000
	9,332,000

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

311
464

TABLE XXI. DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL EXPLOITATIONS ACCORDING TO USE OF LABOR, 1941

	Number	Per Cent	Per Cent	Area (hectares)	Per Cent	Per Cent	Average Size (hectares)
General total	2,258,530	100.0		10,187,003	100.0		4.51
Dwarf exploitations (a)	471,618	20.9		318,965	3.1		0.68
Exploitations remaining after leasing (b)	54,882	2.4		45,856	0.4		0.83
Exploitations proper (c)	1,732,030	76.7	100.0	9,822,182	96.5	100.0	5.67
Exploitations worked by hired labor only	25,466	—	1.5	1,188,015	—	12.1	46.65
Exploitations worked by family and hired labor	265,906	—	15.3	2,438,642	—	24.8	9.17
Exploitations worked by family labor only	1,009,081	—	58.3	4,667,069	—	47.5	4.63
Exploitations worked by only part of family labor	431,627	—	24.9	1,528,436	—	15.6	3.54

(a) Very small exploitations cultivated by peasants with little or no land; exploitations not the principal occupation of the cultivator.

(b) Land remaining after the proprietor has rented out more than 80 per cent of the total property, the remainder representing only limited agricultural activity—a few animals, a garden, etc.

(c) Exploitations of at least two hectares, or one hectare of arable, or 0.5 hectares of land devoted to vineyards, orchards, etc.

SOURCE: *Ibid.*, pp. 24–25.

TABLE XXII. DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL EXPLOITATIONS ACCORDING TO USE OF LABOR AND TYPE OF TENURE, 1941

	Number	Per Cent of Total	Per Cent of Subgroup
Total exploitations proper	1,732,030	100.0	—
A. Worked by hired labor only	25,466	1.5	100.0
1. On own land	16,294	0.9	64.0
2. On own and rented land	4,716	0.3	18.5
3. On rented land only	4,456	0.3	17.5

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

311
464

	Number	Per Cent of Total	Per Cent of Subgroup
B. Worked by hired and family labor	265,906	15.3	100.0
1. On own land	192,674	11.1	72.5
2. On own and rented land	70,775	4.1	26.6
3. On rented land only	2,457	0.1	0.9
C. Worked by family labor only	1,009,031	58.3	100.0
1. On own land	720,013	41.6	71.4
2. On own and rented land (a)	289,018	16.7	28.6
D. Worked by part of family labor	431,627	24.9	100.0
1. On own land	315,167	18.2	73.0
2. On own and rented land (a)	116,460	6.7	27.0

(a) Peasant exploitations using family labor on rented land only were too infrequent to warrant inclusion as a separate category.

SOURCE: *Ibid.*, p. 28.

TABLE XXIII. PREVALENCE OF TYPES OF CULTIVATION (BY PERCENTAGE) ACCORDING TO SIZE OF EXPLOITATION IN THE JUDEŢ OF ARGEŞ, 1941 311

		Categories of Size (hectares)									
	Total	*Under 0.1*	*.1–.5*	*.5–1*	*1–3*	*3–5*	*5–10*	*10–20*	*20–50*	*50–100*	*Over 100*
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total exploitations proper	70.5	1.9	3.0	10.9	78.9	99.8	99.9	99.8	100.0	97.5	97.6
A. With hired labor only	1.3	—	—	0.1	0.3	0.9	2.2	7.3	23.4	53.7	97.6
B. With hired and family labor	11.7	0.1	0.1	0.6	6.8	14.9	25.9	50.6	65.9	43.8	—
C. With family labor only	30.9	0.2	1.0	3.9	34.6	47.4	47.0	27.2	8.1	—	—
D. With part of family labor	26.6	1.6	1.9	6.3	37.2	36.6	24.8	14.7	2.6	—	—
Remaining after leasing	1.2	23.4	5.0	1.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.2	—	2.5(a)	2.4(a)
Holdings of agricultural workers with little land	24.3	33.3	73.8	78.7	19.3	—	—	—	—	—	—
Holdings of agricultural workers without land	0.5	15.5	2.4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Dwarf exploitations whose cultivator has nonagricultural occupation	3.5	25.9	15.8	9.1	1.5	—	—	—	—	—	—

(a) The unexplained presence of exploitations of over 50 hectares in the category "Remaining after leasing" (i.e., remaining after 80 per cent of the property has been let out) presumably indicates a few large properties of little agricultural value, since according to the census this category was unimportant agriculturally.

SOURCE: Roman Cresin, *Agricultura din judeţul Argeş* (Bucarest, 1945), p. 11.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

311
423

TABLE XXIV. EXPROPRIATION AND REDISTRIBUTION OF LAND UNDER 1945 AGRARIAN REFORM, AS OF JANUARY 8, 1947

Regions	Number of Proprietors Expropriated	Area Expropriated (hectares)	Area Distributed (hectares)	Area Reserved by the State (hectares)	Peasants	
					Having right to land	*Having received land*
RUMANIA	143,219	1,443,911	1,057,674	387,565	1,114,888	796,129
Plains of Siret and Prut	1,542	196,130	162,486	33,644	198,608	160,334
Moldavian Carpathians	349	47,529	32,615	14,914	87,542	50,171
Muntenian and Oltenian Carpathians	1,802	115,065	71,214	51,851	178,618	99,088
Danube Plain	2,787	309,886	241,213	68,673	248,720	220,181
Dobrogea	1,122	62,333	52,089	3,562	34,795	18,165
Bucovina	79	4,610	4,412	198	17,707	8,518
Transylvanian Plateau	62,157	345,598	215,956	129,642	206,054	123,938
Tisa Plain	73,381	362,760	277,689	85,071	142,849	115,737

SOURCE: Institutul Central de Statistică, *Comunicări statistice*, No. 17 (March 15, 1947), p. 9.

TABLE XXV. DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL PROPRIETORSHIP AND EXPLOITATIONS AFTER 1945 AGRARIAN REFORM, AS OF JANUARY, 25, 1948

Categories of Size (hectares)	Proprietors		Exploitations	
	Number	*Per Cent*	*Number*	*Per Cent*
0–0.5	901,016	16.4	233,153	7.5
0.5–1	1,100,852	20.0	296,321	9.6
1–2	1,472,785	26.8	1,106,754	35.7
2–3	838,286	15.2		
3–5	697,318	12.7	707,001	22.8
5–10	363,678	6.6	551,090	17.8
10–20	88,335	1.6	153,516	5.0
20–50	23,698	0.4	34,222	1.1
Over 50	15,170	0.3	14,120	0.5
Total	5,501,138	100.0	3,096,177	100.0

SOURCE: A. Golopenţia and P. Onica, *Recensămîntul agricol din Republica Populară Romînă, 25 ianuarie 1948, rezultate provizorii* (Bucarest, 1948), pp. 11–16.

COMMENT: The value of this census is greatly reduced by the failure to publish the amount of land comprised in the various categories of properties and exploitations. Of a total area of 23,730,000 hectares, 20,661,000 were declared as properties and 19,199,000 hectares as exploitations (of which 94 per cent were declared as owned by the cultivator). The fact that there were 1.8 proprietors to each exploitation (5,501,000 proprietors and 3,096,000 exploitations) is explained, presumably, by the numerous cases of joint proprietorship: husband and wife, parents and children, etc.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

TABLE XXVI. COMPARISON OF DISTRIBUTION OF EXPLOITATIONS BY SIZE IN 1941 AND 1948 (EXCLUDING NORTHERN TRANSYLVANIA) 3N

Categories of Size (hectares)	1941 Number	1941 Per Cent	1948 Number	1948 Per Cent
0–0.5	277,500	12.0	190,169	7.3
0.5–1	213,088	9.3	246,016	9.5
1–3	760,700	33.0	933,388	35.9
3–5	441,213	19.2	604,540	23.3
5–10	449,716	19.5	462,607	17.8
10–20	116,537	5.1	122,262	4.7
20–50	27,845	1.2	26,607	1.0
Over 50	16,873	0.7	11,316	0.4
Total	2,303,472	100.0	2,596,900	100.0

SOURCE: *Ibid.*, p. 20.

COMMENT: Although the geographic regions covered in these two tables are the same, the comparison sheds little light and may be misleading, because the amount of land included in each category is not given. In 1941, according to the census of that year, the 2,300,000 exploitations occupied only 10,419,000 hectares, of which about three-fourths was arable. According to the 1948 census the 2,600,000 exploitations occupied approximately 17,000,000 hectares, of which less than one-half was arable. Because of this great difference in the amount of land involved, it would be fallacious to use these tables as a demonstration of the effects of the 1945 agrarian reform.

TABLE XXVII. PRINCIPAL BRANCHES OF AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY 241

A. Percentage of Arable Devoted to Different Crops

	Cereals	Wheat	Maize	Barley	Oats	Rye	Alimentary Plants	Industrial Plants	Forage Crops	Fallow
1921–25	87.1	25.5	31.7	15.6	11.3	2.5	3.3	2.2	4.2	3.2
1926–30	85.4	24.4	34.7	14.4	8.8	2.5	3.3	3.1	5.1	3.1
1931–35	83.9	24.0	36.8	13.4	6.2	2.9	3.6	2.8	5.5	4.2
1936	83.3	24.6	37.7	11.6	5.8	3.0	3.8	3.5	5.6	3.8
1937	82.4	25.7	36.5	10.8	5.6	3.3	3.7	3.6	5.2	5.1
1938	82.1	28.3	36.3	9.0	4.7	3.4	3.6	3.5	5.3	5.5

SOURCE: *Statistica agricolă a Romîniei în 1938*, pp. xiv–xv.

B. Distribution of Agricultural Exploitations According to Type of Farming

	Percentage of Total Number of Exploitations 1941	1948
Cereals	50.7	60.7
Animal husbandry	12.5	1.2
Viticulture	1.4	1.3
Fruits	0.7	0.7
Mixed, and other	34.7	36.1

SOURCES: *Recensămîntul agricol din 1941; Recensămîntul agricol din Republica Populară Romînă.*

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

241
311

TABLE XXVIII. PERCENTAGE OF LAND DEVOTED TO DIFFERENT CROPS ACCORDING TO SIZE OF PROPERTY, 1938

	Size of Property (hectares)						
	0.1–1	*1–3*	*3–5*	*5–10*	*10–25*	*Over 25*	*Total*
Cereals	51.37	62.61	64.61	72.94	73.14	50.42	66.05
Alimentary plants	4.21	3.59	3.17	2.27	2.75	2.40	2.75
Intercropped plants	2.64	2.36	1.86	1.14	0.86	0.90	1.35
Forage crops	4.27	6.63	7.58	5.00	3.97	3.06	5.03
Industrial plants	1.12	1.77	2.46	1.84	1.29	1.44	1.73
Fallow	0.90	1.77	2.33	2.46	1.90	0.71	1.90
Natural meadow	10.53	7.90	5.36	3.42	3.12	7.62	5.11
Pasture	0.25	1.09	1.67	1.87	1.70	2.22	1.73
Orchards	5.50	1.75	1.19	0.77	0.76	0.53	1.00
Vineyards	10.29	4.61	3.91	3.43	2.99	0.79	3.22
Forests	5.60	3.83	3.61	2.67	3.95	25.43	7.18
Barren	0.15	0.59	0.23	0.38	0.49	0.52	0.42
Not utilised	3.16	1.56	2.02	1.83	3.07	3.96	2.47

SOURCE: *60 Sate romînești*, II, 97.

COMMENT: These figures were reached through a sampling investigation of some 60 villages.

243

TABLE XXIX. PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL GRAINS

	Output in 1,000 Quintals				Area Covered
	Wheat	*Maize*	*Barley*	*Oats*	
1921–25	24,377	35,613	12,083	9,118	71 *judeje*, frontiers as of January, 1938
1925–30	30,138	45,071	19,139	11,047	
1931–35	26,255	53,672	13,122	6,553	
1936	35,031	56,120	16,119	8,471	
1937	38,096	46,560	9,453	5,158	
1938	49,124	52,281	8,232	4,603	
1935–39	25,960	39,020	5,500	4,010	40 *judeje*, frontiers as of January, 1941
1940	13,758	37,452	4,963	3,707	
1941	19,862	32,472	3,911	3,330	
1942	8,549	21,816	3,328	3,372	
1943	23,287	22,283	5,163	4,536	
1944	26,529	32,649	3,521	3,502	
1945	10,983	13,138	2,441	2,334	
1945	12,745	18,196	3,376	3,567	58 *judeje*, postwar frontiers
1946	16,087	10,040	2,334	2,823	

SOURCES: *Statistica agricolă a Romîniei în 1938*, p. xvii; *Statistica agricolă a Romîniei în 1941–1944*, p. xiii; *Expunere de motive la bugetul general al statului* (Bucarest, 1946, 1947).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

243

TABLE XXX. WHEAT AND MAIZE YIELDS, 1892–1946

Yield in Quintals per Hectare

	Old Kingdom		Rumania	
	Wheat	*Maize*	*Wheat*	*Maize*
1891–95	10.9	9.7		
1896–1900	8.9	9.6		
1901–1905	12.5	8.8		
1906–1910	11.3	11.6		
1911	13.5	14.1		
1912	11.8	13.3		
1913	14.1	14.2		
1914	6.0	13.2		
1915	12.8	10.9		
1921	10.1	8.5	8.6	8.1
1922	10.2	9.0	9.5	8.9
1923	10.7	12.3	10.3	11.3
1924	6.8	10.9	6.1	10.9
1925	9.5	11.1	8.6	10.5
1926	8.5	13.3	9.1	14.4
1927	8.4	7.4	8.5	8.4
1928	9.1	5.6	9.8	6.2
1929	8.5	12.4	9.9	13.3
1930	12.5	10.3	11.6	10.2
1931	12.4	13.1	10.6	12.7
1932	5.2	12.1	5.1	12.5
1933	9.8	9.8	10.4	9.4
1934	6.2	9.1	6.7	9.6
1935	7.2	11.0	7.6	10.4
1936	10.0	9.9	10.2	10.7
1937	10.8	8.1	10.7	9.6
1938	13.4	8.6	12.5	10.4
1939			11.7	13.7
1940			6.4	10.4
1941			8.7	10.9
1942			5.5	6.5
1943			10.7	7.9
1944			11.4	12.8
1945			5.7	5.0
1946			5.9	2.9

SOURCES: *Statistica agricolă a României în 1938*, pp. 41, 96; Traian Săvulescu, *Problema alimentării populației* (Bucarest, 1947), Annex 1.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

433

TABLE XXXI. RUMANIAN INDUSTRY

A. Distribution of Industries with More than Twenty Employees, 1938

	Number	Capital Invested (1,000 *lei*)	Horsepower	Personnel	Salaries (1,000 *lei*)	Value of Output (1,000 *lei*)
Food	974	10,773,000	137,018	38,736	789,919	15,577,444
Textile	640	8,230,382	79,561	74,077	1,798,766	14,691,948
Chemical	397	12,325,308	183,393	28,298	1,196,853	14,154,605
Metallurgic	366	8,466,368	152,147	51,321	1,847,665	11,362,803
Wood	713	2,273,553	64,121	43,326	860,423	3,583,563
Leather	158	1,025,357	13,415	13,366	450,351	3,437,533
Paper	157	3,577,369	53,366	15,222	656,410	3,088,518
Construction materials	258	2,493,447	56,563	15,104	421,624	1,959,621
Electrotechnic	31	199,837	2,958	2,684	94,281	674,620
Glass	39	561,446	3,216	5,691	141,109	527,135
Ceramic	34	143,322	1,031	1,652	39,592	148,948
Total	3,767	50,069,389	746,789	289,117	8,301,610	69,206,738

SOURCE: Virgil Madgearu, *Evoluţia economiei româneşti după războiul mondial* (Bucarest, 1940), p. 146.

B. Expansion and Concentration of Rumanian Industry, 1927–38

	Number of Enterprises	Horsepower	Personnel	Index of Production (1929 = 100)
1927	4,097	463,436	214,052	85.2
1928	3,966	472,271	206,547	94.9
1929	3,736	497,963	201,184	100.0
1930	3,646	482,715	174,227	97.2
1931	3,524	496,059	152,309	96.7
1932	3,557	514,743	152,196	81.8
1933	3,487	529,963	184,777	100.9
1934	3,509	538,468	206,240	126.0
1935	3,613	582,946	280,717	123.8
1936	3,553	579,543	260,934	131.0
1937	3,512	722,638	278,918	137.4
1938	3,767	746,789	289,117	156.3

SOURCE: *Ibid.*, p. 148.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

TABLE XXXII. RUMANIAN FOREIGN COMMERCE: BALANCE OF TRADE

439

	Imports (metric tons)	Value (1,000 *lei*)	Exports (metric tons)	Value (1,000 *lei*)		Difference (1,000 *lei*)
Average 1901–05	534,622	298,923	3,054,871	360,651	+	61,728
Average 1906–10	805,574	408,939	3,804,380	501,274	+	92,335
Average 1911–15	1,002,056	526,969	3,765,234	605,320	+	78,351
1919	413,939	3,762,300	109,140	104,385	—	3,657,915
1920	304,485	6,980,290	1,467,118	3,447,848	—	3,532,442
1921	615,451	12,145,405	2,713,138	8,263,009	—	3,882,396
1922	583,668	12,325,366	4,069,963	14,039,296	+	1,713,930
1923	699,124	19,516,026	4,900,734	24,594,129	+	5,078,103
1924	825,754	26,264,582	4,833,419	28,361,044	+	2,096,462
1925	899,925	29,912,645	4,563,892	29,126,824	—	785,821
1926	924,442	37,195,415	6,117,781	38,264,805	+	1,069,390
1927	1,006,069	33,852,131	7,337,087	38,110,810	+	4,258,679
1928	952,808	31,640,956	5,886,405	27,029,728	—	4,611,228
1929	1,101,992	29,628,038	7,064,619	28,960,005	—	668,033
1930	805,233	23,044,163	9,214,754	28,522,028	+	5,477,865
1931	560,366	15,754,569	10,047,002	22,196,914	+	6,442,345
1932	449,980	12,011,325	9,056,959	16,721,593	+	4,710,268
1933	446,962	11,741,850	8,777,730	14,170,828	+	2,428,978
1934	635,868	13,208,543	8,854,096	13,655,734	+	447,191
1935	533,268	10,847,530	9,276,009	16,756,223	+	5,908,693
1936	630,443	12,637,698	10,548,913	21,703,391	+	9,065,693
1937	709,415	20,284,748	9,637,497	31,568,357	+	11,283,609
1938	820,603	18,767,830	7,409,084	21,532,580	+	2,764,750
1939	739,039	22,890,474	7,564,146	26,809,349	+	3,918,875

SOURCE: *Bréviaire statistique de la Roumanie, 1940*, p. 188.

TABLE XXXIII. RUMANIAN FOREIGN COMMERCE: IMPORTS

Value of Imports, by Per Cent

	Animals	*Food*	*Raw materials and semifinished*	*Finished goods*	*Gold and silver*
1920	—	10.4	1.9	87.6	—
1921	—	9.8	3.2	87.0	—
1922	—	11.0	4.8	84.1	—
1923	—	10.3	4.3	85.3	—
1924	—	7.7	5.4	86.9	—
1925	—	8.1	6.1	85.8	—
1926	0.1	5.7	7.0	87.0	0.2
1927	0.2	6.0	10.1	83.7	—
1928	—	6.5	9.7	83.8	—

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

439

TABLE XXXIII. RUMANIAN FOREIGN COMMERCE: IMPORTS (cont.)

Value of Imports, by Per Cent

	Animals	*Food*	*Raw materials and semifinished*	*Finished goods*	*Gold and silver*
1929	—	8.9	10.6	80.5	—
1930	0.1	6.4	10.6	83.0	—
1931	—	7.2	9.9	82.7	0.2
1932	—	7.4	10.3	77.6	4.7
1933	—	6.9	12.6	80.5	—
1934	—	5.3	14.3	80.3	—
1935	—	6.6	14.1	79.5	—
1936	0.1	5.1	14.5	80.2	—
1937	—	4.4	17.5	77.5	0.6
1938	—	4.9	20.2	74.4	0.4

SOURCE: N. Georgescu Roegen, *Comerțul exterior al Romîniei în perioada 1920–1938*, quoted in Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

TABLE XXXIV. RUMANIAN FOREIGN COMMERCE: EXPORTS

Value of Exports, by Per Cent

	Animal	*Vegetable*	*Cereals* (*as per cent of total vegetable*)	*Wood*	*Mineral* (*almost entirely petroleum*)	*Other*
1919	4.4	28.4	—	—	66.8	0.4
1920	1.3	78.9	85.2	4.6	19.6	0.2
1921	12.8	62.8	80.3	9.1	24.1	0.4
1922	15.0	63.9	59.9	29.0	20.1	0.9
1923	9.0	76.0	65.2	21.9	14.1	0.8
1924	14.7	71.4	60.6	27.4	13.0	0.9
1925	20.8	56.5	44.9	38.8	21.5	1.3
1926	14.0	59.6	61.7	26.1	25.8	0.5
1927	10.4	68.3	79.1	17.7	20.5	0.8
1928	12.9	54.9	51.5	32.8	31.1	1.1
1929	12.4	52.5	58.9	30.8	34.2	0.9
1930	11.6	50.5	69.4	21.5	37.4	0.5
1931	12.0	58.2	71.6	19.4	32.1	0.7
1932	8.3	47.0	72.9	15.7	44.1	0.6
1933	6.8	36.3	63.5	19.8	56.3	0.6
1934	9.6	36.3	48.1	29.7	53.6	0.5
1935	9.7	37.6	52.1	23.1	52.1	0.5
1936	10.6	47.3	66.6	16.4	41.6	0.4
1937	9.3	48.7	66.2	18.4	41.7	0.8
1938	10.6	44.8	54.5	23.5	44.2	0.4

SOURCE: *Anuarul statistic, 1939–40*, pp. 577, 580–583.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

This note is not an exhaustive bibliography but includes only those sources employed or consulted in the preparation of this study. A useful bibliography of material on Rumania has been prepared by the Division of Bibliography, Library of Congress: *The Balkans, a Selected List of References: I. General* and *IV. Rumania* (mimeographed, Washington, D.C., 1943). Other extensive bibliographies are Leon Savadjian, *Bibliographie balkanique, 1920–1938* (2 vols., Paris, 1931–39), and Mario Ruffini, "Introduzione bibliografica allo studio della Romania," *L'Europa orientale* (Rome) *15* (May–June, 1935), 236–289. Paul Henry has written two historiographical articles which include discussions of post-1918 works: "Histoire roumaine," *Revue historique* (Paris), *176* (July–December, 1935), 486–537, and "Histoire de Roumanie," *ibid., 194* (1944), 42–65, 132–150, 233–252. 113

Works which have been used extensively or which have a special interest are discussed briefly. Other sources—technical aids, general studies, and minor Rumanian works—are listed without comment at the end.

OFFICIAL AND SEMIOFFICIAL SOURCES

Most of the statistical information in this study has been obtained from the publications of the Rumanian Central Institute of Statistics (Institutul Central de Statistică), which has issued a variety of censuses, periodical reports, and special studies. Among the more important are:

Censuses:

Recensământul general al populației României din 29 decemvrie 1930 (10 vols., Bucarest, 1938).

Recensământul general al României din 1941, 6 aprilie, date sumare provizorii (Bucarest, 1944). A collection of articles on the national significance of the 1941 census was published as *Recensământul României din 1941, lămurirea opiniei publice* (Bucarest, 1941).

Roman Cresin, *Recensământul agricol al României din 1941, date provizorii*, Biblioteca Statistică No. 10 (Bucarest, 1945).

A. Golopenția and D. C. Georgescu, *Populația Republicii Populare Române la 25 ianuarie 1948, rezultatele provizorii ale recensământului* (Bucarest, 1948).

A. Golopenția and P. Onica, *Recensământul agricol din Republica Populară Română, 25 ianuarie 1948, rezultate provizorii* (Bucarest, 1948).

Periodical reports:

Anuarul statistic al României. An annual statistical survey; before 1914 it was prepared by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

113 *Bréviaire statistique de la Roumanie.* An abbreviated French version of *Anuarul.*

Statistica agricolă a României. An annual statistical survey of the agricultural situation. Included under this title are certain special surveys: Vol. IV, *Inventarul agricol în Anul 1943* (Bucarest, 1946), and Vol. V, *Inventarul agricol în Anul 1945* (Bucarest, 1947).

Comunicări statistice. Since 1945 the institute, to make up for the lapses during the war, has published fortnightly a selection of miscellaneous statistics to be issued later in more detail. Very useful for recent developments.

Analele Institutului Statistic al României. A publication started during the war and containing articles on statistical methods.

Special studies:

Roman Cresin, *Agricultura din Judeţul Argeş* (Bucarest, 1945). A detailed study of one district, based on the 1941 census. Extremely useful so long as the complete results of the census are not published.

Petre Onica, *Statistica agricolă* (Bucarest, 1945). A guide to the preparation of agricultural statistics in Rumania.

G. Retegan, *Condiţiile de viaţă ale oamenilor de serviciu,* Biblioteca Statistică, No. 21 (Bucarest, 1945). One of the few pieces of precise information about the living conditions of government employees and their reasons for leaving the village to work in the capital.

Nicolae M. Dunăre, *Fii de ţărani vânzători ambulanţi în capitala,* Biblioteca Statistică, No. 22 (Bucarest, 1945). A survey of street vendors who have emigrated from the villages to Bucarest; touches on the question of agricultural overpopulation.

Sabin Manuila, *Demografia rurală a României* (Bucarest, 1940).

Sabin Manuila, *Studiu etnografic asupră populaţiei României* (Bucarest, 1940).

Sabin Manuila and D. C. Georgescu, *Populaţia României* (Bucarest, 1938).

Official texts of laws are published in the government gazette, *Monitorul oficial.* The first part is devoted to laws and decrees, the second to legal notices, and the third to parliamentary debates.

The Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerul Agriculturii şi Domeniilor) published a monthly *Buletinul agriculturii* (sometimes appearing under the French title, *Bulletin de l'agriculture*), devoted largely to technical studies but including economic and regional surveys. Among these were R. C. Stere, "Particularităţile economice ale micilor gospodării ţărăneşti" (April–June, 1927), pp. 33–64; R. Cresin, "Agricultura in Basarabia" (March–April, 1929), pp. 132–151; Mihai Şerban, "Les Conséquences de la réforme agraire sur l'état social et économique de la Roumanie" (May–June, 1929), pp. 21–27. The ministry also published, on the occasion of the Fourteenth Congress of the International Congress of Agriculture in Bucarest (June 7–10, 1929), *L'Agriculture en Roumanie: atlas statistique* (Bucarest, 1929), which is filled with

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

charts and diagrams; the accuracy of some of the information is doubtful however. At the same conference A. Nasta presented a paper, "La Réforme agraire en Roumanie," which contained the official though not very reliable statistics on the application of the 1918–21 agrarian reforms. 113

The Ministry of Industry and Commerce (Ministerul Industriei şi Comerţului) published a quarterly periodical in French and English, *Correspondance économique roumaine,* containing articles on Rumanian economic life, texts of laws, and summaries of the economic situation. Designed to present Rumania in the best possible light, it suffered from chronic overoptimism.

The Ministry of Finance (Ministerul Finanţelor) published an annual *Expunere de motive la bugetul general al statului,* which in addition to information on the budget contained a summary of economic developments.

The Rumanian National Bank (Banca Naţională) published a monthly *Bulletin d'information et de documentation,* containing financial and economic studies. A somewhat similar publication was the semiofficial *L'Économiste roumain* (*Organ de l'Institut Économique Roumain et de l'Association des Banques Roumaines*), which discussed most of the economic laws and agreements of the Liberal regime. In economic policy it followed Vintilă Brătianu.

The semiofficial *Enciclopedia României* (4 vols., Bucarest, n.d.) was started as a monument to the Carol regime but was completed under Marshal Antonescu. It contains many articles, some of them excellent, on all aspects of Rumanian life. The last two volumes are devoted to economic and commercial affairs. As a whole, however, it reflects the political bias of the years of the Carol and Antonescu dictatorships and strives to gloss over the unpleasant parts of the political and economic scene.

Since the advent of the Groza government, its propaganda ministry has issued a number of publications, of rather low quality, on economic developments. *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie* (Bucarest, November, 1946) contains the text of the 1945 agrarian reform, but the commentary is worthless. The periodical *Rumanian Review* (French edition, *Revue roumaine*) has a number of articles on economic and political life, but they are all tainted with propagandist aims. Of somewhat greater value, though also containing a good deal of propaganda, is a series of pamphlets put out by Oficiul de Studii şi Documentare, Biblioteca Economică: *Îmbunătăţirile funciare în agricultura românească* (Bucarest, 1946); Cornel Irimie, *Centrele de maşini agricole* (Bucarest, 1946); *Intensificarea creşterii animalelor în cadrul refacerii economice* (Bucarest, 1946); Traian Săvulescu, *Problema alimentării populaţiei* (Bucarest, 1947). The last work has some useful data on the severe famine of the winter of 1946–47.

An extremely valuable source of information is the work carried on by the semiofficial Institutul de Ştiinţe Sociale al României, under the direction of the sociologist D. Gusti; *60 Sate româneşti* (5 vols., Bucarest, 1941–43) presents the results of a sampling investigation in a number of Rumanian villages in the summer of 1938. It is especially useful for its data on peasant agriculture, land relations, and the standard of living in the countryside. Detailed studies have been made of certain villages selected as representative of

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

113 a particular aspect of Rumanian peasant society. *Nerej, un village d'une région archaïque* (3 vols., Bucarest, 1939) investigates a community in a region of traditionally free peasants. *Dâmbovnicul, o plasă din sudul Judeţului Argeş* (Bucarest, 1942) was chosen as a representative Wallachian peasant community under the impact of modern economic pressures. A more general study of the forms of village landholding was prepared by H. H. Stahl, *Sociologia satului devălmaş românesc* (Bucarest, 1946). The institute also published two periodicals which have articles on a wide range of social, political, and economic topics: *Arhiva pentru ştiinţa si reforma socială* (occasionally issued in French as *Archives pour la science et la réforme sociales*) and *Sociologie românească.*

GENERAL HISTORIES

There is, in English, only one extensive history of Rumania from its origins: R. W. Seton-Watson, *A History of the Roumanians from the Roman Times to the Completion of Unity* (Cambridge University Press, 1934). It does not extend to the period covered in the present study but gives a useful outline of Rumania's activities in the First World War and the acquisition of the new territories. The two most extensive histories of Rumania in Rumanian are Constantin C. Giurescu, *Istoria Românilor* (4 vols., Bucarest, 1935–37) and Nicolae Iorga, *Istoria Românilor* (10 vols., Bucarest, 1936–39). (For a recent appraisal of Iorga's work as a historian see John C. Campbell, "Nicholas Iorga," *The Slavonic and East European Review, 26,* No. 66 [November, 1947], 44–59.) Neither of these works, however, treats the interwar period.

Although he is primarily concerned with the agrarian reforms of 1918–21, David Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania: the War and Agrarian Reform (1917–1921)*, Economic and Social History of the World War, Rumanian Series, published for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History (London; New Haven, Yale University Press, 1930), provides much the best background to the agrarian question. It studies the period of reform in the greatest detail and analyzes the consequences of the reforms up to the fall of the Brătianu government. Prepared in the 1920's, this book expressed optimistic hopes regarding the future of the peasant movement in eastern Europe which have not been realized. In some cases the wealth of statistical material leads to confusion rather than clarity, but in its general sweep it is a very impressive study. Of much less importance are two other books in the Carnegie war history series: G. Ionescu-Siişeşti, *L'Agriculture de la Roumanie pendant la guerre,* and Gr. Antipa, *L'Occupation ennemie de la Roumanie et ses conséquences économiques et sociales* (Paris; New Haven, Yale University Press, 1929).

There are no satisfactory histories of Rumania in the interwar period. Joseph S. Roucek, *Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems: a Study in Modern Nationalism* (Stanford University Press, 1932), attempts a general survey up to 1931, but it is largely a chronicle and a compendium; analysis is very weak. Roucek also devoted a chapter to Rumania in his later study, *The*

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

Politics of the Balkans (London; New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939), but a far more adequate treatment of Rumania in the general setting of eastern Europe is given by Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918–1941* (2d ed., Cambridge University Press, 1946), a work of great insight and originality. George Clinton Logio, *Rumania, Its History, Politics, and Economics* (Manchester, Sherratt and Hughes, 1932), is a very uneven book but is useful where it reflects Logio's own experiences in Rumania. Charles Upson Clark, *United Roumania* (New York, Dodd, Mead, 1932), is an enlargement of the earlier study, *Greater Roumania* (New York, Dodd, Mead, 1922), but neither work is outstanding. C. G. Rommenhöller, *Gross-Rumänien, seine ökonomische, soziale, finanzielle, und politische Struktur, speziell seine Reichtümer* (Berlin, Puttkammer und Mühlbrecht, 1926), is mainly concerned with Rumania's industrial potentialities; the political and historical sections are very brief. Norman L. Forter and Demeter B. Rostovsky, *The Roumanian Handbook* (London, Simpkin, Marshall, 1931) is a loosely organized collection of information on Rumania. Pavel Pavel, *Why Rumania Failed* (London, Alliance Press, n.d.) is an anti-Carol, pro-Maniu apology for Rumania's participation in the Second World War; it is factually unreliable. Convenient as a brief handbook is C. Kormos, *Rumania*, British Survey Handbooks (Cambridge University Press, 1944).

REGIONAL STUDIES

The Royal Institute of International Affairs prepared a number of Balkan studies, with a special emphasis on economic questions, which include some useful information on Rumania: *The Balkan States. I. Economic* (Oxford University Press, 1936); *South-Eastern Europe, a Political and Economic Survey* (Oxford University Press, 1939); and *South-Eastern Europe, a Brief Survey*, Information Department Papers, No. 26 (Oxford University press, 1940). A recent study of post-1945 constitutional developments in this region is Andrew Gyorgy, *Governments of Danubian Europe* (New York, Rinehart, 1949).

A good survey of the economic policy of the Danubian states in the early 1920's is provided by Leo Pasvolsky, *Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States* (New York, Macmillan, 1928). Especially valuable for the 1930's and the period of German economic penetration is Antonin Basch, *The Danube Basin and the German Economic Sphere*, International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction (London, Kegan Paul, 1944). Frederick Hertz, *The Economic Problem of the Danubian States* (London, Victor Gollancz, 1947), is mainly concerned with Austria and Hungary; the material on Rumania is scanty and in some cases inaccurate. The PEP study (Political and Economic Planning), *Economic Development in S. E. Europe* (London, 1945), contains some helpful comparative information on economic conditions but is chiefly interested in future plans. N. Momtchiloff, *Ten Years of Controlled Trade in South-Eastern Europe*, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, Occasional Papers, Vol. VI (Cambridge University Press, 1944),

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

113 is a brief examination of the trade policy pursued in the 1930's and suggests that certain of the controls developed in those years may have a useful function in the proper context.

A number of League of Nations studies have been of value, above all Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (Economic, Financial and Transit Department, League of Nations, Geneva, 1945), which has an excellent analysis of agricultural overpopulation in its relation to the agrarian problem in eastern Europe. Also to be mentioned are *Industrialization and Foreign Trade* (1945); *Agricultural Production in Continental Europe during the 1914–18 War and the Reconstruction Period* (1943); *Final Report of the Mixed Committee of the League of Nations on the Relation of Nutrition to Health, Agriculture, and Economic Policy* (1938), which has a section on the Rumanian peasant diet; *The Agricultural Crisis* (2 vols., 1931); Dudley Kirk, *Europe's Population in the Interwar Years* (1946); *Memorandum on Public Finance, 1926–28* (1929), with a section on Rumania, pp. 203–221; and *The League of Nations Reconstruction Schemes in the Inter-War Period* (1945), Appendix I, "Trade and Production in the Danubian States."

RUMANIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY

The most recent large study is Virgil Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești după războiul mondial* (Bucarest, Independența economică, 1940). While the organization of this work is cumbersome, it is the only extensive Rumanian interpretation of the interwar period. It contains a good deal of information which Madgearu obtained from unpublished sources. Its outlook is that of a disappointed and somewhat disillusioned National Peasant. N. Razmirița, *Essai d'économie roumaine moderne, 1831–1931* (Paris, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1932) is largely devoted to the pre-1914 period; its sections on the postwar years are not very good. Florin Em. Manoliou, *La Réconstruction économique et financière de la Roumanie et les partis politiques* (Paris, J. Gamber, 1931), undertakes to analyze the economic policy of the Liberal, People's party, and National Peasant governments in the years between 1920 and 1931. Not a very penetrating study, it is of value in sketching the principal economic measures of the various cabinets.

Like Razmirița and Manoliou, quite a number of Rumanian students in Paris wrote dissertations on aspects of Rumanian economic life. The quality of these is very uneven; some are worthless, others are quite good. Perhaps the best are Savel Radulescu, *La Politique financière de la Roumanie depuis 1914* (Paris, Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1923), and Nicolas C. Cristoveanu, *Essai critique sur la politique roumaine en matière de dettes agricoles* (Paris, A. Rousseau, 1933). Less useful are C. A. Tatarano, *Les Nouvelles tendances économiques de la Roumanie* (Paris, 1922); Dorin Kastris, *Les Capitaux étrangers dans la finance roumaine* (Paris, 1921); A. Theveneau, *La Roumanie économique et le change roumain au lendemain de la guerre* (Paris, Les Presses Universitaires, 1923); Alexandre-Ionescu Ivanof, *La*

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Réforme monétaire roumaine (Paris, Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1929); A. G. Georgescu, *Le Régime juridique et financier des capitaux étrangers en Roumanie* (Paris, Les Presses Universitaires, 1932); Ludovic Iavorschi, *L'Équilibre budgétaire en Roumanie de 1920 à 1932* (Paris, J. Gamber, 1933); Mihail-Dumitru N. Israil, *Le Marché monétaire roumain après la stabilisation monétaire* (Paris, Librairie L. Rodstein, 1933). 113

THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

As has been mentioned, David Mitrany's *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania* is the most satisfactory study of the agrarian question. Much briefer and less comprehensive is Ifor L. Evans, *The Agrarian Revolution in Roumania* (Cambridge University Press, 1924). A very informative history of the Rumanian peasant question in the nineteenth century is Marcel Emerit, *Les Paysans roumains depuis le Traité d'Andrinople jusqu'à la libération des terres, 1829–1864* (Paris, Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1937). It was M. Emerit's intention to write a second volume on the years between the emancipation and the agrarian reform, but it has not yet appeared.

Classic Rumanian studies on the peasant question are the two works of Radu Rosetti, *Pământul, sătenii, și stăpânii in Moldova* (Bucarest, SOCEC, 1907) and *Pentru ce s'au răsculat țăranii* (Bucarest, SOCEC, 1908). Rosetti wrote from a populist point of view, and his belief in the peasants' original right to the land was challenged by his contemporary, Gheorghe Panu, in *O Încercare de mistificare istorică* (Bucarest, Broser and Parzer, 1910). It is now generally agreed that a number of Rosetti's conclusions were based on very weak evidence.

Among other studies which date from the time of the 1907 uprising but which are still important for an understanding of the Rumanian agrarian question are those of Garoflid and Creangă. Constantin Garoflid's penetrating analysis, *Chestia agrară in România* (Bucarest, Gutenberg, 1920), was originally written in 1907 but later published with other articles and speeches. A landowner himself, Garoflid criticized the old latifundiary system of cultivation but was opposed to the creation of a multitude of small properties which would not be self-sustaining. Some of his statistics, which have been employed by subsequent authors, are clearly incorrect. His views on the postreform period may be found in two articles: *Un Program agrar* (Bucarest, 1924) and *Rolul social al proprietății mijlocii* (Bucarest, 1926), as well as in a contribution to the *Enciclopedia României*. G. C. Creangă, *Grundbesitzverteilung und Bauernfrage in Rumänien*, 3 Teile, in *Staats- und sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen*, Hefte 129, 140 (Leipzig, 1907, 1909), is the most complete statistical analysis of Rumanian property relations before the agrarian reforms; Creangă's figures, while not wholly satisfactory, have provided the basis for most estimates of the pre-1914 situation.

The veteran agricultural economist G. Ionescu-Sișești wrote a number of works on the agrarian question. For the most part, however, they are marred by the tone of bland optimism which is the bane of much Rumanian writing

3; Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

113 of an official or semiofficial nature. *Politica agrară cu privire specială la România* (Bucarest, Libraria L. Alcalay, n.d., *ca.* 1913) has an interesting review of Rumanian writings on the agrarian question. In *Structure agraire et production agricole de la Roumanie* (Bucarest, 1924) he examined the consequences of the agrarian reforms, especially in their effect upon cultivation in metayage. He collaborated with A. Frundianescu in a contribution to *Agricultural Systems of Middle Europe, a Symposium*, ed. O. S. Morgan (New York, Macmillan, 1933), and with N. Cornăţeanu in *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie et ses conséquences* (Bucarest, Académie roumaine, 1937), which provides some useful farm-accountancy statistics but is quite misleading in its interpretation of Rumanian peasant agriculture. During the Second World War, however, he wrote a very pessimistic study, "Le Nouvel Aspect du problème agraire en Roumanie," *Archives pour la science et la réforme sociales, 16*, Nos. 1–4 (1943), 260–267.

The legal aspects of the 1918–21 agrarian reforms are discussed in Ilie S. Diaconescu, *Chestiunea ţărănească în România* (Bucarest, Cultura Poporului," 1928), which gives the texts of the laws and an extended commentary; its value as a historical narrative is limited. Mitiţa Constantinescu, *L'Evolution de la propriété rurale et la réforme agraire en Roumanie* (Bucarest, 1925), while written at great length and with assurance, was prepared before many of the results of the reforms were known. In 1945 Constantinescu came out as a stanch advocate of intimate Rumanian-Soviet relations (see his pamphlet *Relaţiile economice între România şi U.R.S.S.*, Bucarest, Cartea Rusă, 1945), but in this earlier study he stressed the importance of the agrarian reform as a bulwark against bolshevism.

A number of Paris dissertations were concerned with the agrarian question; none is outstanding: C. C. Bosiano, *La Politique paysanne en Roumanie depuis la guerre* (Paris, 1920); Valeriu Bercaru, *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie* (Paris, H. Gamber, 1928); Antoniu Saki, *La Question agraire en Roumanie* (Paris, Les Presses Modernes, 1926). Of the same order is Ernest Grintzesco, *Le Problème du redressement agricole en Roumanie* (Bucarest, F. Göbl et Fils., 1931).

A good summary of Rumania's agrarian position at the outbreak of the Second World War, especially in regard to its export position, was prepared by the United States Department of Agriculture, "Wartime Agricultural Surpluses of the Danube Basin," *Foreign Agriculture, 4*, No. 12 (December 1940), 705–778. The article does, however, attribute too many virtues to the pre-1914 large estates.

A very intelligent analysis of the Rumanian agrarian problem is by the Danish specialist, M. Gormsen, *Short Introduction to the Principal Structural Problems of the Agriculture in Roumania* (Bucarest, 1945). The Rumanian text of this rather bad English translation is to be found in the volume issued by Institutul Economic Românesc, *Problema agrară* (Bucarest, Cartea Românească, 1945) which also includes an article by Valeriu Bulgariu on the subdividing of peasant property, "Divizibilitatea proprietăţii ţărăneşti."

In the last decade or so there have been a number of studies on the plight of

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

the eastern European peasant countries. Doreen Warriner, in *The Economics of Peasant Farming* (Oxford University Press, 1939), came to the negative conclusion that emigration was virtually the only solution to the problem of overpopulation. A more positive solution has been proposed by K. Mandelbaum, *The Industrialization of Backward Areas*, Oxford Institute of Statistics Monograph, No. 2 (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1945). This study, which is based on the southeastern European states, draws up a formal model for their planned industrialization. Its principal limitation, as the author admits, is that it abstracts all the political difficulties. Two other works may be mentioned which reflect the same interest: S. N. Prokopovicz, *L'Industrialisation des pays agricoles et la structure de l'économie mondiale après la guerre*, trans. N. Nicolsky (Neuchâtel, 1946), and P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "Problems of Industrialisation of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe," *The Economic Journal, 53* (1943), 202–211. 113

POLITICAL MOVEMENTS

A useful guide for political developments up to 1936 is the publication of the Conférence Permanente des Hautes Études Internationales, *Chronique des événements politiques et économiques dans le bassin danubien, 1918–1936: Roumanie* (Paris, Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle, Société des Nations, 1938). This booklet also lists and summarizes the principal laws and decrees of the period. A symposium of lectures on political theories current in Rumania at the beginning of the interwar period was published by Institutul Social Român as *Doctrinele partidelor politice* (Bucarest, Cultura Națională, n.d.). The book includes lectures on nationalism by Iorga, peasantism by Virgil Madgearu, liberalism by I. G. Duca, conservatism by Al. Marghiloman, neoliberalism by M. Manoilescu, and socialism by Șerban Voinea. No Communist was invited to speak. While one may feel that a number of these lectures had little or nothing to do with Rumanian realities, the collection is most interesting in showing the eagerness with which the Rumanians were attempting to relate their society to the West. A much less interesting work is *Politics and Political Parties in Roumania* (London, International Reference Library Publishing Co., 1936), which includes the programs of the principal parties and a political "Who's Who."

a. *Liberals*

Istoricul Partidului Național Liberal de la 1848 și până astazi (Bucarest, 1923) is a rather conventional official history of the party. It is of little use for the interwar period. A biography of Vintilă Brătianu was written by C. Georgescu, *Vintilă Brătianu ca om de stat, economist, și financiar* (Bucarest, 1936). Brătianu's economic views found frequent expression in the abovementioned *L'Économiste roumain;* they were also clearly displayed in a parliamentary address which was translated into French: *La Situation financière de la Roumanie; discours tenu à la Chambre des Députés les 1 et 2 février 1923* (Bucarest, Imprimeria "Indépendance," 1923). Some informa-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

113 tion on the banking activities of the Liberals is to be found in Alfred Bonafous, "Les Grandes Banques d'affaires de Roumanie," *Revue d'économie politique* (Paris), *36* (1922), 323–340. The darker side of the Liberal regime is seen in the somewhat sensational exposé of the methods employed by the secret police: C. G. Costa-Foru, *Aus den Folterkammern Rumäniens* (Vienna, Kulturpolitischer Verlag, 1925).

The most brilliant defense of the role of the Rumanian Liberal party was made by St. Zeletin, who propounded a highly ingenious though probably untenable theory of Rumania's historical development in his two studies, *Burghezia română, origina și rolul ei istoric* (Bucarest, Cultura Națională, 1925) and *Neoliberalismul* (Bucarest, Editura "Pagini agrare și sociale," 1927). His quasi-Marxist approach was bitterly attacked by the Social Democrat, Șerban Voinea, in *Marxism oligarhic, contribuție la problema desvoltarii capitaliste a României* (Bucarest, Editura I. Brănișteanu, 1926).

b. *National Peasants*

The best exposition of the principles of Rumanian populism is Constantin Stere's series of articles entitled "Socialdemocratism sau poporanism," *Viața românească* (August, 1907–April, 1908). Stere's views, somewhat modified, are also to be found in his pamphlet *Naționalizarea industriei de petrol* (Bucarest, 1921). The issue between Marxism and populism is also examined in David Mitrany, "Marx vs. the Peasant," *London Essays in Economics: in Honour of Edwin Cannon*, eds. T. E. Gregory and H. Dalton (London, Routledge, 1927). J. Delevsky, "Les Idées des 'narodniki' russes," *Revue d'économie politique, 35* (1921), 432–462, gives a brief history of Russian populism and is a source frequently cited by Rumanian peasantist writers. A biting criticism of Rumanian populism is to be found in the essays of H. Sanielevici, collected as *Poporanismul reacționar* (Bucarest, SOCEC, 1921). For a recent exposition of populism by a well-known Bulgarian politician see George M. Dimitrov, "Agrarianism," *European Ideologies. A Survey of Twentieth Century Political Ideas*, ed. Felix Gross (New York, Philosophical Library, 1948), pp. 396–451.

The most vivid and intelligent expressions of the radical agrarianism of the early Peasant party are Ion Mihalache's parliamentary speeches, which were published separately as political pamphlets: *Proectul legei de improprietarirea țăranilor, intocmit de țăranul I. Mihalache* (Bucarest, Tipografia "Lupta," 1920); *Dreptul țăranilor la pământ, izlazuri, și păduri* (Bucarest, Tipografia Berbecaru, 1922); and *Partidul Țărănesc în politica țărei* (Bucarest, 1925).

The move away from populism and toward a form of liberal capitalism is seen in the writings of Virgil Madgearu: *Țărănismul* (Bucarest, "Reforma Socială," n.d.); "Doctrina Țărănistă," in *Doctrinele partidelor politice; Revoluția agrară și evoluția clasei țărănești* (Bucarest, 1923); *Agrarianism—un discurs parlamentar* (Bucarest, Imprimeria Statului, 1927); *Rumania's New Economic Policy* (London, P. S. King, 1930); *La Politique économique extérieure de la Roumanie, 1927–1938*, Conférence Permanente des Hautes

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Études Internationales, xiie session, Mémoire roumaine, No. 1 (Paris, Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle, Société des Nations, 1939). 113

An attempt to unite peasantism with a revived conservatism was made by C. Rădulescu-Motru, *Țărănismul, un suflet și o politică* (Bucarest, Cultura Națională, 1924). While one may doubt the feasibility of this attempt, the essay is excellent in its portrayal of all the anomalies in Rumania's political life.

The modifications in the outlook of the Peasant party appear clearly in the successive programs of 1921, 1922, 1924, and 1926: *Proectul de program al Partidului Țărănesc din România* (Bucarest, "Viața românească," 1921); *Partidul Țărănesc, Programul și Statutele* (Bucarest, 1922); *Partidul Țărănesc, Programul general și Statutele* (Bucarest, 1925); and *Partidul Național-Țărănesc, Principiile programul și statutul* (Bucarest "Reforma Socială," 1926).

c. *The Carolist Era*

An "official" biography of King Carol by Baroness Helena von der Hoven, *King Carol of Romania* (London, Hutchinson, 1940), is of practically no value and shows little understanding of Rumanian politics. A more serious study, A. L. Easterman, *King Carol, Hitler, and Lupescu* (London, Gollancz, 1942), recognizes Carol's autocratic and arbitrary instincts but does not give him sufficient credit for his part in wrecking the parliamentary system. Easterman makes Antonescu, the Iron Guard, and the Germans the complete villains of the piece.

The most interesting, if also most exasperating, political economist of this period was Mihail Manoilescu, whose works are listed in Florin E. Manoliou, *Bibliographie des travaux du Professeur Mihail Manoilesco* (Bucarest, "Luceafarul," 1936). The earlier phases of Manoilescu's thought are represented in his article, "Neoliberalismul" in *Doctrinele partidelor politice,* and in his critique of peasantism: *Țărănism și democrație* (Bucarest, 1922). His most important study was translated into English as *The Theory of Protection and International Trade* (London, P. S. King, 1931). An expanded German edition, *Die nationalen Produktivkräfte und der Aussenhandel* (Berlin, 1937), included his rebuttals of the numerous criticisms of his theory of permanent protection.

A series of articles—obviously designed for foreign consumption—on the economic policy of the Carolist dictatorship appeared in several issues of *The Banker* (London): V. Dimitriuc, "Roumanian Exports and Agrarian Policy," *51* (July, 1939), 49–53; Valeriu Bulgariu, "Agrarian Policy in Roumania," *49* (March, 1939), 344–348; Mitița Constantinescu, "The Monetary and Credit Policy of Roumania," *44* (February, 1938), 183–189; C. Angelescu, "Banking Development in Roumania," *ibid.*, pp. 189–192; Eugene Savu, "The Financial Policy of Roumania," *ibid.*, pp. 193–194; G. Ionescu-Sișești, "Agriculture in Roumania," *ibid.*, pp. 197–201; Ch. Penesco-Kertsch, "Industry in Roumania," *ibid.*, pp. 206–209.

The Germans produced a mass of official and semi-official literature in the

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

113 course of their economic drive in the Balkans. One of the more important examples is Ernst Wagemann, *Der neue Balkan: altes Land—junge Wirtschaft* (Hamburg, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1939), a portion of which was translated as "The Pressure of Population as an Economic Force," *Weekly Report of the German Institute for Business Research*, Nos. 25/26 and 27/28 (June 29–July 14, 1939). Wagemann criticized the forced industrialization of the Balkan states and attempted to show that they would do better to develop their raw materials and let Germany provide the manufactured goods.

Although Grigore Gafencu's two books, *Prelude to the Russian Campaign*, trans. E. Fletcher-Allen (London, Frederick Muller, 1945), and *Last Days of Europe. A Diplomatic Journey in 1939*, trans. E. Fletcher-Allen (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1948), are chiefly concerned with diplomatic relations, they do provide some information on the last phase of the Carolist dictatorship. Also dealing with foreign relations before 1939 are two books by another Rumanian foreign minister, N. P. Comnène, *Preludi del grande dramma* (Rome, Edizioni Leonardo, 1947) and *I Responsabili* (Verona, Arnoldo Mondadori, 1949).

d. *The Fascists*

Codreanu's memoirs were published in German as Codreanu, *Eiserne Garde* (Berlin, Brunnen Verlag/Willi Bischoff, 1939). Codreanu's narrative stops at 1938, but the German edition includes some later information provided by members of the Guard. Klaus Charle, *Die Eiserne Garde* (Berlin-Vienna, Deutscher Rechtsverlag, 1939), is an enthusiastically pro-Guardist account of the movement. I. P. Vifor, *Doctrina fascismului român* (Bucarest, 1924), which contains the program of the ephemeral Fascia Națională Română, is of interest as an expression of an early imitation of Italian fascism. For a macabre account of the atrocities committed while the Iron Guardists were in power see "Blood Bath in Rumania," published by *The Record*, 4, Nos. 6–7, (New York, July–August, 1942).

Harald Laeuen, *Marschall Antonescu* (Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1943), provides an admiring biography of Germany's loyal ally. The first volume of an account of Antonescu's career by a former secretary, G. Barbul, *Mémorial Antonesco: Tome Premier, le IIIe Homme de l'Axe* (Paris, Editions de la Couronne, 1950), appeared too late to be used in this study.

e. *The Marxists*

Constantin Titel Petrescu's history of Rumanian socialism, *Socialismul în România* (Bucarest, Biblioteca Socialistă, n.d., *ca.* 1945), is valuable for its inclusion of party programs, resolutions, and speeches. It is very uneven in its treatment, however; over three-fourths of the book is devoted to the years before 1919, and the interwar period is covered superficially. Some useful information on the Rumanian socialist movement before the war and in the unsettled months after 1917 is given in L. Trotsky and Ch. Rakovsky, *Ocherki*

3: Roberts 5-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

politicheskoi Rumynii (Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo, 1922). The first half of the book consists of a collection of articles written by Trotsky while in Rumania in 1913; in the second half Rakovsky interprets the political situation of postwar Rumania. An account of the final absorption of Rumanian Social Democracy by the Communists may be found in Valentin Thoma, "Wie es zur Liquidierung des rumänischen Sozialismus kam," *Die Zukunft* (July, 1949). 173

There is relatively little reliable information on the history of the Rumanian Communist party, largely because the party was illegal during most of its existence. However, in the issues of the organs of the Comintern, *The Communist International* and *International Press Correspondence,* there are occasional directives to the Rumanian Communists as well as comments on their activities.

Some information on conditions in Rumania, though surprisingly little, is in the publications of the Red Peasant International: *Der Weltbund der Bauern: Der Gründung des Internationalen Bauern-Rates* (Berlin, 1924); Dr. Kazescu, "Die rumänische Bauernschaft und der Europäische Bauern-Kongress," *Bulletin zum Europäischen Bauern-Kongress,* No. 4 (Berlin, 1930), pp. 39–48; *Europas werktätige Bauern schreiten zur revolutionären Tat* (Berlin, 1930); N. L. Mecheriakov, *The Peasantry and the Revolution* (Berlin, 1927); Guido Miglioli, *Bauernnot und Hakenkreuz* (Berlin, Verlag des EBK, n.d.).

The International Agrarian Institute in Moscow published a periodical, *Agrarprobleme,* which occasionally had articles on agrarian conditions in the Balkans and in Rumania: B. Boschkowitsch, "Der revolutionäre Aufschwung auf dem Balkan," Band 4, Heft 3–4, (n.d., *ca.* 1931), pp. 151–157; Tatarow, "Die Agrarkrise in Rumänien," Band 4, Heft 2, pp. 44–80; S. Timow, "Wird Rumänien agrarsiert oder industrialisiert?" Band 2, Heft 2 (1929), pp. 310–346.

The outstanding Marxist thinker in Rumania was undoubtedly C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, whose book *Neoiobăgia* (1st ed. 1910, 2d ed., Bucarest, Viața românească, n.d.) is still extremely valuable for an understanding of Rumania. During the Second World War the Communist Luereţiu Pătrăşcanu, until 1948 Minister of Justice in the Groza cabinet, wrote a trilogy of studies on Rumanian history and society: *Un Veac de frământări sociale, 1821–1907* (Bucarest, Cartea Rusă, 1945); *Problemele de bază ale României* (3rd ed., Bucarest, Editura de Stat, 1946); and *Sub trei dictaturi,* which has been translated into French as *Sous trois dictatures* (Paris, Editions Jean Vitiano, 1946). Although rigidly bound to the Marxist analysis, these studies are intelligently conceived and emphasize aspects of Rumanian life which are usually overlooked or concealed. It is doubtful however, whether Pătrăşcanu's intellectual communism can be identified with the outlook of the present regime.

Although the Ploughmen's Front was initially an independent agrarian movement, since 1944 it has been completely under the influence of the Communist party. The most detailed account of the Front is Gheorghe Micle

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

113 *Răscoala pământului: Istoria luptelor politice ale țăranimii române, 1933–1945* (Bucarest, Editura Frontul Plugarilor, 1945).

There is no satisfactory history of the Bessarabian question, that prolonged source of conflict between Rumania and Russia. Communist and Soviet views are to be found in Ch. Rakovsky, *Rumyniya i Bessarabiya, k semiletiyu anneksii Bessarabii* (Moscow, Izdanie Litizdata N.K.I.D., 1925); *Bessarabia . . . the Roumanian Hell* (published by the British Section of the International Class War Prisoners Aid, London, n.d.); A. Dolnik, *Bessarabiya pod vlastyu rumynskikh boyar, 1918–1940 gg.* (Ogiz-Gospoditizdat, 1945); and Akademiya nauk Soyuza SSR, Institut Geografii Akademii nauk SSSR i Moldavskii Nauchno-Issledovatelskii Institut, *Moldavskaya SSR* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1947). For the Rumanian side see Charles Upson Clark, *Bessarabia: Russia and Roumania on the Black Sea* (New York, Dodd, Mead, 1927); Andrei Popovici, *The Political Status of Bessarabia* (published for the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, by Ransdell, Inc., Washington, D.C., 1931); and *Facts and Comments Concerning Bessarabia, 1812–1940, Compiled by a Group of Roumanian Press Correspondents* (London, 1941).

Events after August 23, 1944, have been described by a number of American foreign correspondents, some of whom have written books: William B. King and Frank O'Brien, *The Balkans, Frontier of Two Worlds* (New York, Knopf, 1947); George Moorad, *Behind the Iron Curtain* (London, Latimer House, 1947); and Reuben H. Markham, *Rumania under the Soviet Yoke* (Boston, Meador, 1949). The last is much the most extensive, shows intimate and long familiarity with Rumania, but is marred by the author's intense personal feelings. Robert Bishop and E. S. Crayfield, *Russia Astride the Balkans* (New York, Robert M. McBride, 1948), is also a work of reportage rather than analysis; the two authors were U. S. intelligence officers in Rumania.

A bitter indictment of the Groza regime has been prepared by a Rumanian group in exile in the United States: the Rumanian National Committee, *Suppression of Human Rights in Rumania* (Washington, D.C., September, 1949).

The Soviet view of events in Rumania in 1944–45 may be found in K. Dimitrov, "Agrarnyi vopros i agrarnaya reforma v Rumynii," *Mirovoe Khozyaistvo i Mirovoya Politika*, No. 6 (1945), pp. 15–19; and Ilya Ehrenburg's chapter on Rumania in *Dorogi Evropy* (Moscow, 1946).

PERIODICALS

The publications of the International Institute of Agriculture (Rome), especially the *International Review of Agriculture*, are quite useful, though most of the information on Rumania has an official character which often limits rather than increases its reliability. The organ of the Green (Prague) International, *M.A.B. (Mezinárodní Agrární Bureau): Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, contains a number of articles on Rumania in the 1920's. It is of value, too, in giving the general outlook of the eastern European

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

peasant parties. The publications of the International Labour Office, the *International Labour Review* and *Industrial and Labour Information* have occasional items on social and labor conditions in Rumania. The first issue of the *International Journal of Agrarian Affairs* (London) (October, 1939) was entirely devoted to a series of articles on surplus agricultural population. *The Slavonic and East European Review* (London) has several articles on Rumania during the interwar period. For the years since 1945 *East Europe* (London), a periodical hostile to the present regimes behind the iron curtain, provides a weekly chronicle of events in Rumania. Among the pro-Soviet periodicals the most authoritative is the Cominform organ, *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy*, now published in Bucarest.

Among Rumanian magazines and newspapers the following have been consulted: *Viața românească*, at one time the leading periodical, containing numerous articles on social, political, and philosophical questions; *Argus* and *Finanțe și Industrie*, economic and commercial journals; the party organs: *Viitorul* and *L'Indépendance roumaine* (Liberal), *Dreptatea* (National-Peasant), *Libertatea* (Social Democrat), and *Scânteia* and *România Liberă* (Communist); and the formerly independent newspapers: *Universul*, *Timpul*, *Jurnalul de dimineața*, and *Semnalul*.

OTHER WORKS CONSULTED

a. *General or Well-known Works and Technical Aids*

Arndt, H. W. *The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen-Thirties*. Oxford University Press, 1944.

Baykov, Alexander. *The Development of the Soviet Economic System*. Cambridge University Press, 1946.

Beloff, Max. *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929–1941*. 2 vols., Oxford University Press, 1947–49.

Borkenau, Franz. *The Communist International*. London, Faber, 1938.

Byrnes, James F. *Speaking Frankly*. London; New York, Harper and Brothers, 1947.

Carr-Saunders, A. M. *World Population: Past Growth and Present Trends*. Oxford University Press, 1936.

Clark, Colin. *The Conditions of Economic Progress*. London, Macmillan, 1940.

Cohen, R. L. *The Economics of Agriculture*. Cambridge University Press, 1940.

Dareste, F. R., and P. *Les Constitutions modernes*. 4th ed., 6 vols., Paris, 1928–34.

David, Eduard. *Sozialismus und Landwirtschaft*. 2d ed., Leipzig, Quelle und Meyer, 1922.

Deutscher, I. *Stalin, a Political Biography*. Oxford University Press, 1949.

Dobb, Maurice H. *Soviet Economic Development since 1917*. London, Routledge and K. Paul, 1948.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

113 Fabian Society, International Research Section. *Hitler's Route to Bagdad.* London, G. Allen and Unwin, 1939.

Fischer, Louis. *Men and Politics, an Autobiography.* New York, Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1941.

Gunther, John. *Inside Europe.* London, Hamish Hamilton, 1936.

Hevesy, Paul de. *World Wheat Planning and Economic Planning in General.* Oxford University Press, 1940.

Hull, Cordell. *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull.* 2 vols., New York, Macmillan, 1948.

International Institute of Agriculture. *World Trade in Agricultural Products.* Rome, 1940.

Jasny, Naum. *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR.* Stanford, Stanford University, Food Research Institute, "Grain Economics Series," No. 5, 1949.

Keeton, George W., and Schlesinger, Rudolf. *Russia and Her Western Neighbors.* London, Jonathan Cape, 1942.

Lenin, V. I. *Selected Works.* 12 vols., London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1936–39.

Macartney, C. A. *Hungary and Her Successors: the Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences, 1919–1937.* Oxford University Press, 1937.

Marx, Karl. *Capital,* Vol. I, English trans. by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling. London, 1887. Vol. III, English trans. by Ernest Untermann. Chicago, 1909.

Mitrany, David. *The Effect of the War in Southeastern Europe.* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1936.

Mosely, Philip E., *Face to Face with Russia.* Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 70, July–August, 1948.

Owen, Lancelot A. *The Russian Peasant Movement, 1906–17.* London, King, 1937.

Robinson, Geroid Tanquary. *Rural Russia under the Old Regime.* New York, London, and Toronto, Longmans, Green, 1932.

Royal Institute of International Affairs. *World Agriculture, an International Survey.* Oxford University Press, 1932.

Schmidt, Paul. *Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, 1923–45; Erlebnisse des Chefdolmetschers im Auswärtigen Amt mit den Staatsmännern Europas.* Bonn, Athenäum-Verlag, 1949.

Sherwood, Robert E. *Roosevelt and Hopkins. An Intimate History.* New York, Harper and Brothers, 1948.

Stalin, J. *Voprosy Leninisma.* 11th ed., Ogiz, Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1945.

Stettinius, Edward R., Jr. *Roosevelt and the Russians: the Yalta Conference.* New York, Doubleday, 1949.

United Nations, Research and Planning Division, Economic Commission for Europe. *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948.* Geneva, 1949.

United States, Department of State. *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941.* Washington, D.C., 1948.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Von Franges, Otto. *Die Bevolkerungsdichte als Triebkraft der Wirtschaftspolitik der südosteuropäischen Bauernstaaten*, in *Kieler Vorträge, gehalten im Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel*, No. 59. Jena, 1939. 113

White, Leigh. *The Long Balkan Night*. New York, Scribner's, 1944.

b. *Miscellaneous Works on Rumania*

Académie Roumaine, *La Transylvanie*. Bucarest, 1938.

——. *La Dobroudja*. Bucarest, 1938.

Antim, St. *Chestiunea socială în România*. Bucarest, "La Roumanie," 1908.

Auboin, Roger. *Rapport annuel sur la situation financière et monétaire de la Roumanie*. Bucarest, 1935.

Baerlein, Henry, ed. *The Romanian Scene*. London, Muller, 1945.

Bussot, A. "Le Bloc des états agricoles de l'Europe centrale et orientale et son programme," *Revue d'économie politique*, 47 (1933), 1544–1558.

Calinescu, Armand. *Roumania, the Country of National Renaissance and of Royal Revolution*. Pamphlet in English, translated from a speech in the Chamber of Deputies, January 28, 1939.

Ciomac, Ion Luca. *Despre starile agrare din Transilvania sub regimul maghiar, şi cercetari asupră situaţiei exploatarilor agricole după reforma agrară*. Bucarest, 1931.

Cioriceanu, Georges D. *La Roumanie économique et ses rapports avec l'étranger de 1860 à 1915*. Paris, Marcel Giard, 1928.

Claudian, Ioan. *Alimentaţia poporului român în cadrul antropogeografiei şi istoriei economice*. Bucarest, Fundaţia "Regele Carol II," 1939.

Codrescu, Florin. *Essai de synthèse sur l'évolution du commerce extérieure de la Roumanie, 1918–1934*. Extract from the periodical, *Les Balkans*, Athens, 1934.

Colescu, L. *Progresele economice ale României îndeplenite sub domnia M.S. Regelui Carol I, 1866–1906*. Bucarest, 1907.

Dugdale, Mrs. Edgar. *The Hungaro-Rumanian Dispute. The Optants' Case before the League*. London, The Association for International Understanding, 1926.

Filitti, I. C. *Clasele sociale în trecutul românesc*. Bucarest, 1925.

Georgescu, C. C. *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie*. Paris, 1908.

Ghyka, Matila. *A Documented Chronology of Roumanian History from Pre-Historic Times to the Present Day*. Oxford, B. H. Blackwell, 1941.

Giannini, Amadeo. *La costituzione romena*. Rome, 1923.

——. *Le Vicende della Rumania, 1878–1940*. Milan, 1940.

Giurescu, C. *Despre boieri*. Bucarest, Cartea Românească, 1920.

Graf, O. P. *Die Industriepolitik Alt-Rumäniens und die Grundlagen der Industrialisierung Gross-Rumäniens*. Bucarest, 1927.

Hausknecht, Louis. *Politica impozitară a României după răsboiu*. Cernăuţi, 1931.

Hoffmann, Walter. *Südost-Europa: Bulgarien-Jugoslavien-Rumänien*. Leipzig, 1932.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

1B Hoffmann, Walter. *Rumänien von Heute. Ein Querschnitt durch Politik, Kultur, und Wirtschaft.* 2d ed., Leipzig, 1942.

Issacenco, A. G. *La Roumanie inconnue.* Berne, 1917.

Jaszi, Oscar. "The Economic Crisis in the Danubian States," *Social Research* (February, 1935), pp. 98–116.

Lémonon, Ernest. "La Situation économique de la Roumanie, 1918–1928," *Journal des économistes* (March 15, 1931), pp. 264–273.

Leon, Gh. N., *Struktur und Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten der rumänischen Volkswirtschaft.* Jena, 1941.

Lovrin, C. D. *Rumania Today.* London, 1945.

Micşuinescu, Emil Gr. *Die rumänische Getreideausfuhr.* Nürnberg, 1914.

Mitrany, David. "The New Rumanian Constitution," *The Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law,* 3rd ser., *6,* Pt. 1 (February, 1924), 110–119.

Obedenare, M. G. *La Roumanie économique d'après les données les plus récentes.* Paris, Ernest Leroux, 1876.

Raducanu, Mircea I. *Die Genossenschaftsbewegung in Rumänien.* Dresden, 1941.

Rădulescu-Motru, C. *Cultura română şi politicanismul.* Bucarest, n.d.

Rambaud, Benoit. *La Question des fermiers généraux en France et à l'étranger* (Paris, 1913).

Reithinger, Anton. "Grossdeutschland und Südosteuropa im Lichte der Statistik," *Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv, 29* (1939), 129–139.

Rumanian Democratic Committee. *How Rumania Was Surrendered: Statements Made by M. Juliu Maniu, Leader of the National Peasant Party, and M. Constantin Bratianu, Leader of the National Liberal Party.* London, Favil Press, 1941.

Rumania, Ministry of Agriculture. *La Roumanie, 1866–1906.* Bucarest, SOCEC, 1907.

Rumer, Willy. *Die Agrarreformen der Donau-Staaten.* Innsbrück, 1927.

Schiff, Walter. *Die grossen Agrarreformen seit dem Kriege.* Vienna, 1926.

Sollohub, W. A. "The Conversion of Agricultural Debts in Roumania," *The Economic Journal, 42* (December, 1932), 588–594.

Strat, George. *Industria românească în cadrul economiei europene.* Bucarest, "Remus Cioflec," 1945.

Tătărescu, G. *Quatre années de gouvernement, 1933–1937, exposé fait devant le comité central du Parti National-Liberal le 1 novembre 1937.* Bucarest, 1937.

Thomas, P. J. *Les Roumains nos alliés?* Paris, F. Sorlot, 1938.

Tilea, V. V. *Iuliu Maniu, der Mann und das Werk.* Hermannstadt, 1927.

Union des Chambres de Commerce et d'Industrie de Roumanie. *La Roumanie économique en 1926.* Bucarest, F. Göbl et Fils, n.d.

Vararu, M. *Le Métayage en Roumanie.* Paris, M. Giard et E. Brière, 1915.

Waldeck, R. G. *Athene Palace Bucarest: Hitler's New Order Comes to Rumania.* London, Constable, 1943.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Year-Book of Agricultural Co-operation, 1930 (London), "Rumania: the State as Co-operator," pp. 404–428. 113

Zăroni, Romulus. *De ce nu trebue să fie plugarul român fascist*. Cluj, Viața Creștină, n.d.

page 400 is blank.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

page 401

INDEX

ADMINISTRATION, attempted decentralization of, 182, 178; *see also* Bureaucracy

Agrarian bloc of eastern European states, 164, 184–185

Agrarian policy and programs: Communist party, 262, 292–298, 322; Liberal party, 123; Peasant party, 27, 153–154

Agrarian problem: and Carolist dictatorship, 206–207; characteristics of, v–vi, 6, 57–59, 332–333; and Rumanian fascism, 223; *see also* Agricultural property, Agriculture, Farming, Overpopulation

Agrarian reform: contrasted with agricultural reform, 63; and strip cultivation, 58; 1917 amendment to Constitution, 24; of 1918–21, 26–30, 34, 36–39, 95, 290, 332, 366–367, Carolist criticism of, 211, effects on production, 62, and Marxist parties, 246, 250, 261, unreliability of official accounts of, 48–49; of 1945, 54, 62, 157 n., 292–299, 316, 318, 374; confiscation of remaining estate land in 1949, 323; *see also* Agricultural property, Expropriation

Agricultural associations, laws concerning, 186, 237–238

Agricultural contracts: laws of 1866 and 1872, 12–13; reform of, 21

Agricultural cooperatives. *See* Cooperatives

Agricultural credit. *See* Credit

Agricultural crisis. *See* Depression

Agricultural debts: in the depression, 178–180; moratoria and reductions of, 181–183, 210; of peasants, 79, 84, 138

Agricultural education, 159, 160 n.

Agricultural exports. *See* Commerce

Agricultural labor: after 1945, 318; number of hired laborers, 52, 291 n.; and types of tenures, 51, 372–373; wartime mobilization of, 237

Agricultural machinery, 159, 186, 239, 319

Agricultural Mortgage Institute (Credit Agricol Ipoteca), 181

Agricultural population. *See* Overpopulation, Population

Agricultural property: alienation and sale of, laws regulating, 29–30, 125–126, 156–157, 165, 204, 288, 295, political views concerning, 157 n., National Peasant program advocates freedom of, 154, state control over, 212; consolidation of, 29, 63, 156, 319, 334; distribution of, before 1914, 6, 362–363, in Bessarabia, 33, 364–365, in Bucovina, 36, 365, in Transylvania, 37, 366, between 1921 and 1945, 49–52, 367–371, after 1945, 297, 374–375; as factor in overpopulation, 46, 53–54; leasing of, on large estates before 1914, 14–15, 363, in metayage, 238, after First World War, 53; subdivision and fragmentation of, through inheritance and sale, 11–12, 49, 65, creating dwarf holdings, 46, 54, efforts to check, 29–30, 154; *see also* Expropriation

Agriculture: condition of in interwar period, 63; economic planning in, 213–214; and industrialization, 201; investment in, 58; losses to in Second World War, 220; means of production in, 15, 58; mechanization of, 319; production in, 15 n., 55–57, 133, 239, 315–316; productivity in, 43–44, 57–62; protection of, 76, 177, 183–186, 202–203; *see also* Tariffs

Alba Iulia, 37, 97, 107, 168

All for the Fatherland party (Totul pentru Ţara), 168, 227; *see also* Iron Guard

Allied Control Commission, 259, 268, 301

Amsterdam International Federation of Trade Unions, 247; *see also* Trade Unions

Angelescu, I. N., 113

Animal husbandry, 13, 45, 239, 316, 318

Anti-Semitism, 97 n., 101, 116, 145, 176, 190, 224–226, 234, 248; and absentee ownership, 14 n.; and Codreanu, 228; and Iron Guard dictatorship, 236; and 1907 uprising, 3, 4; in 1937 elections, 229 n.

Antonescu, Marshal (also Gen.) Ion, 92, 93, 219, 241, 305, 308, 347, 350; in Goga cabinet, 192; advent to power, 209–210; nature of his dictatorship, 223; as dictator, 233–235; relations with Hitler, 233 n.; and Iron Guard, 235, 346; agrarian policy of, 236–240; overthrow of, 242, 258

Antonescu, Mihai, Foreign Minister, 258–259

3: Roberts, S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

060 Argeş (judeţ), 52, 53, 54, 220–222, 373
Argetoianu, Constantin, 100, 108, 127, 140, 180 f., 192; Minister of Interior, 98, 172
Armaments, 198–199
Armistice, of September 12, 1944, 259; *see also* Wars
Army, 92, 234, 268, 307 n., 338
Ataturk, Kemal, 220, 345 n.
Auboin, Roger, 178
Augult, Max, 199, 344
Austria, 25, 42, 121, 164, 170, 178 n.; and Bucovina, 35; and Transylvania, 37; Soviet Zone in, 307 n.; threat of intervention by in 1907, 8
Averescu-Iorga coalition, 131
Averescu, Marshal (also Gen.) Alexandru, 92, 95, 104, 108, 176, 192, 251, 260; subdues peasant uprising, 8; forms government in 1920, 28, 94; and general strike, 246; resigns, 1921, 96; administrative centralization under, 97 n., 117; attempts to win over National Party of Transylvania, 99; reported understanding with Liberals, 100; forms government, 1926, 108; resigns, 1927, 104; assails Iorga government, 173; *see also* People's party
Axis (Rome-Berlin), 208; and Codreanu, 232

BAIA (judeţ), 45
Balance of trade, 77–78, 176, 379; *see also* Commerce
Balkan Entente, 188, 232
Balota, A., 236
Baltic states, 164, 258
Banat, 37, 172, 314; peasant resistance in, 325
Banca Românească, 110
Bank for Industrialization and Valorization of Agricultural Products (BINAG), 211–212
Barrès, Maurice, 226
Basch, Antonin, 199 n.
Basilescu, Professor N., 24
Battalion of Legionary Commerce, 230; *see also* Iron Guard
Belgium, 202, 271
Bernstein, Eduard, 275
Bessarabia, 23, 31, 39, 50, 56, 98, 102, 117, 125, 138, 172, 187 n., 209 n., 257, 287, 296; agrarian reform in, 27, 34; agricultural productivity in, 44; and Communist party, 255, 258; density of population in, 42; distribution of land in, 364–365; economic difficulties of, 117; food relief for, 133; historical background of, 32–35; incorporation in Greater Rumania, 33–34; and Iron Guard, 173, 227; loss of, 209, 219–220, 234, 258; radical pamphlets in, 5; Rumanian recovery of in 1941, 235; and Russia, 32 n., 174 n., 209 n., 246, 250, 265, 272; soybean in, 208; trade unions in, 248 n.; and Ukrainian question, 258, unrest in, 100–101, 132
Bessarabian Peasant party, 139
Bihor (judeţ), 46
Black Redistributionists, 294
Blaj, 135
Blanc, Louis, 248
Bodnaraş, Emil, 251, 259, 309
Bolshevism. *See* Communism
Borkenau, Franz, 32 n., 283 n., 345 n.
Botoşani (judeţ), 298
Boyars: and agrarian question, 7–11; and Conservative party, 91; influence of on Rumanian society, 337–338; political flexibility of, 19
Brătianu family, 93; economic policy of, 74, 127, 199, 219; and liberalism, 109; opposition to King Carol II, 106; *see also* Liberal party
——— Constantin: on universal suffrage, 111; head of Liberal party, 187; agrees to King Carol's abdication, 210; gives conditional support to Antonescu, 233; on Second World War, 235; and overthrow of Antonescu, 258; denounces 1946 elections, 307
——— Gheorghe, 176, 187, 191; breaks with Liberal party on King Carol's return, 134
——— Ion I. C. (Ionel), 144 n.; advocates agrarian and electoral reform, 22, 111; and socialist movement, 245–246; resigns from government, 1919, 26; forms government, 1922, 94, 96; personality of, 96; offers Maniu cabinet posts, 99; and Prince Carol, 101; resigns, 1926, 108; issues manifesto and forms new government, 1927, 104–105; death of, 106
——— Vintilă, 112, 131, 152, 161, 172, 198; and Soviet Union, 100; heads government in 1927, 106; resigns, 1928, 108; opposes King Carol's return, 134; death of, 176; economic and financial policy of, 107–108, 110, 119–128; attitude toward foreign capital, 123–128, 242
Bucarest, 102, 153 n., 164, 187 n., 174; abortive march on, 107, 168; and Cominform, 314; labor manifestation in, 246;

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

660

luxury spending in, 81–82; peasant demonstration in, 190; state of seige in, 96
Bucovina, 23, 38, 42, 50, 56, 117, 125, 172, 298, 314; agrarian reform in, 36; agricultural productivity in, 44; and Communist party, 258; density of population in, 42; distribution of land in, 51, 365; incorporation in Greater Rumania, 35–36; Northern, 296, loss of, 93, 209, 219–220, 258, recovery of in 1941, 295, to Soviet Union, 265; Social Democrats in, 247; trade unions in, 248 n.; and Ukrainian question, 253
Budgets, 119, 177 n., 178
Bujor, Mihai Gheorghiu, 245
Bulgaria, 16, 25, 40, 42, 62, 90, 164, 179 n., 209, 258, 314; agriculture in, 22, 239 n., 348 n.; postponement of elections in, 301
Bulgarian People's Republic, 311
Bulgariu, Valeriu, 211
Bunaciu, Avram, 312
Bureaucracy, expansion of, 110, 338–339
Busdugan, Gheorghe, regent, 106; death, 133
Byrnes, James F.: on Rumania and Soviet Union, 266, 302; on Yalta agreement, 267

CĂLDĂRAŞTI, collective farm "1907" in, 325
Calinescu, Armand, 192, 206, 213; assassination of, 208, 238
Cantacuzino government, and peasant uprising, 4
——— Gen. G., 94; heads All for the Fatherland party, 227
Capitalism: development of in countryside, 149; impact on backward countries, 276–277, 280; and National Peasant party, 155, 166; *see also* Commerce, Industry, Western influence
Capitanul. See Codreanu
Carol I, King, 19, 23 n., 92
Carol II, King (also Prince), 92, 98, 104, 106, 168, 170, 215 n., 219, 231, 237, 305; renounces throne, 101; statements regarding regency, 106; returns to Rumania, 1930, 134; and Maniu, 135–138, 169; personality and political role, 171; political activities, 1930–1933, 172–175; political position, 1934–1937, 187; and Iron Guard, 188–189, 207–208, 228, 233–234, 346; on political parties, 189 n.; and Germany, 190, 209; and Soviet Union, 190; moves toward dictatorship, 189, 192, 202; personal dictatorship, 206–209, 350; abdication and exile, 209–210, 233, 243; and agriculture, 211, 220, 238; and Communist party, 254, 258; and industry, 198, 344; paternalism of, 212–213; and Social Democrats, 249, 261 n.; summary of regime, 343–345
Carpathian mountains, 42, 56; 1945 agrarian reform in, 296; overpopulation in, 45, 51, 52
——— Russia (Ruthenia), 253
Cartels, 69, 150, 198, 336; *see also* Industrialization, Industry
Census, agricultural: of 1930, ix, 50, 370; of 1941, ix, 50–52, 240, 370–373; of 1948, 297, 319, 374–375; *see also* Statistical information
Central Institute of Statistics, ix, 42, 47–48, 297, 320 n.
Cereals: area devoted to, 239, 375–376; cultivation of after 1945, 318; emphasis on in Rumanian agriculture, 55; increase of area under wheat in depression, 184; law for classification of, 126; rate of yield of wheat and maize, 377; regional distribution of, 56; wheat export agreements, 202; *see also* Agriculture
Cernăuţi, 183, 174
Chambers of Agriculture, 100, 126
Chambers of Labor, 201 n.
Chiang Kai-shek, 345 n.
Chicherin, G., 100 n.
Churchill, Winston: agrement with Stalin on Balkans, 266, 306; on Groza government, 268; at Yalta, 268 n.
Clacă, 9
Clark, Colin, 79–80, 336
Class struggle, 150; Manoilescu on, 198; Mihalache on, 146; *see also* Communism, Social harmony
Clearing agreements, 185–186
Codreanu, Corneliu Zelea, 147, 191, 249; early career, 101, 226–227; and assassination of Duca, 188 n.; pact with Maniu, 257; disbands Iron Guard, 228; arrest and death of, 207, 229; and Antonescu, 234; on politics, 230; on Rumanian foreign policy, 232; *see also* Iron Guard
Collectivization of agriculture, 300, 324–327; and Communist International, 269; not mentioned as goal in 1945, 318; in Russia, 268; *see also* Agricultural property, Agriculture
Colonization, internal, 159, 210
Cominform, 313, 314

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Comintern. *See* Communist International
Commerce: effect on peasant agriculture and natural economy 18, 146, 382; foreign, 74-77, 317
exports: agricultural, before 1914, 8, 11, in interwar period, 56, duties on, 124, bounties on, 184; attempt to preserve markets for, 183; in depression, 176; to Germany, 214; pattern of, 75, 380; quantity and value of, 379
imports: composition of, 75, 200, 379-380; from Germany, 214, 277; and industrialization, 201; quantity and value of, 379
Communism: Ana Pauker on, 302 n.; externally imposed on Rumania, 348-349; and Iron Guard, 229; and Rumanian problems, 329, 348; *see also* Marxism, Socialism
Communist International, 96, 247, 250, 251; on agrarian and peasant question, 287-288; on national question, 252; purported directive of, 270 n.; Seventh World Congress of, 256; Sixth Plenum of Executive Committee of, 253-254; ultra-Left tactics of, 255-256
Communist party of Hungary, on significance of People's Democracy, 313-314
Communist party of Rumania, 92, 98, 104; distinction between local members and "Muscovites," 259-260; Lenin's influence on, 287; and national minorities, 251, 257; Soviet direction of, 266; summary of, 346-349; and Third International, 253-254; and trade unions, 247, 253-254; view of Rumanian and Western culture, 340
history of before 1944: formation, 246-247; dissolutions, 101, 174; in interwar years, 250-258; attitude toward National Peasant party, 168 n., 191, 254-255, 287; part in railway shops strike, 174; relation to Tătărescu government, 188; in period of Popular Front, 249; attitude toward fascism, 227, 231, 256-257; partisan activity, 258; cooperates in overthrowing Antonescu, 242
history of since 1944: represents a break in continuity of Rumanian politics, 242-248; activities after Soviet occupation, 259-260; dominates National Democratic Front, 260; increasing domination since 1945, 300 ff.; and elections of 1946, 305; ousts Tătărescu, 271 n., 309; takes over Social Democratic party, 309; party purge, 310; position in 1948 Constitution, 311; shift in party line, 312-314; an alien intruder, 330; dependence upon international developments, 331
agrarian and agricultural policy of (*see also* Red Peasants International): in interwar years, 241, 287-288; attitude toward peasantry, 250; on alienation of peasant land, 157 n.; on agrarian reform, 288; 1948 policy, 323-326
See also Communist International, Groza government, National Democratic Front
Coacher, H. M., 45
Congress of Berlin, 97 n., 234
Conservatism, and alliance with peasantry, 166
Conservative Democrats, 91
Conservative party, 3, 20, 30, 111, 244; disappearance of after First World War, 91-92
Consiliul Dirigent, 37, 97 n.
Constitution: of 1866, 19, 22, 24, 92; of 1923, 92, 97-99, 102 n., 111, 137 n., 187, 194 n., 207; of 1938, 207, 211, 343; of 1948, 310-311, 343; Soviet, of 1936, 311
Constitutional amendment of 1917, 24, 156
Cooperatives, agricultural, 204, 211 n.; failure to establish, 64; for renting land, 21; Liberal code concerning, 127; in populist theory, 145; National Peasant measures concerning, 158; under Communist regime, 324
Cornăţeanu, N., 60-61
Corporatism, 169, 197, 343; in Carolist dictatorship, 206; contrast with Guardist fascism, 230-231; Manoilescu on, 194-197
Corruption, financial, 77
Cottage industry, 154
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 328 n.
Council of Foreign Ministers, 301, 307
Creangă, G. D., 49, 53 n., 74; on distribution of agricultural property, 6-7
Credit: shortage of, 333; weakness of credit system, 178; agricultural, 63, 79, 181, 204, 211, 222; under Liberals, 124; under National Peasants, 158-159; during depression, 179
Crişana, 37
Cristea, Patriarch Miron: regent, 106; head of government, 192
Croce, Benedetto, 113 n.
Crown, constitutional position of, 92, 99

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Currency: chronic instability of, 78; depreciation of after First World War, 29, 38; Liberal effort to revalorize, 120; stabilization of in 1929, 131; stabilization of and the depression, 138; and exchange controls, 185; depreciation of in 1930's, 204; inflation of after Second World War, 317; stabilization of in 1947, 321
Cuza, Prince Alexandru, 10, 11, 92
——— Alexandru C., 104, 192; and anti-Semitism, 224-225; founds League of National Christian Defense, 227; influences Codreanu, 226-227
Czechoslovakia, 42, 80, 164, 178 n., 208, 252, 271

DÂMBOVIŢA (judeţ), 45
Dâmbovnicul (plasă), 220-222
Danube-Black Sea Canal, 329
David, Eduard, 275
Democratic Popular Front, 310
Democratic Union, 257
Denmark, 42, 146
Depression, 159, 164, 168, 170; and agricultural crisis, 48, 76, 133, 164, 176; and agricultural credit, 158; and industrialization, 198-199; and national income, 81; and National Peasant party, 138, 329; effect of on Rumania, 176-178, 350; and foreign capital, 159; and Iron Guard, 232; slow recovery from, 178
Deutscher, Isaac, 270, 271 n.
Deva, 260
Dictatorship of the proletariat: Madgearu on, 152; distinction between Soviet form and that of People's Democracy, 312-313; *see also* Communist party
Dietary deficiencies, 81
Differentiation of peasantry, 55, 150 n., 222, 288, 289-290; *see also* Agricultural property
Dimitrov, Gheorghe, 256
Dobrogea, 61, 314; agrarian reform of 1945 in, 296; and Communist party, 257 f.; and national question, 253; Southern, 39, 50, acquisition of, 22, and Social Democrats, 245, loss of, 98, 209, 219-220
Dobrogeanu-Gherea, A., 132, 247
——— C., 11, 21, 338, 340, 346; on agrarian question and neoserfdom, 6, 276-279; on alienation, 157 n.; career, 276; comparison of with Lenin, 281-282; leading socialist theorist, 242-244; on legislative mania, 20; on populism, 143 n.; on similarities between Rumania and Russia, 16, 19; on the soybean, 204; on state purchase of land, 279; criticism of views, 280-281
Duca, Ion G., 115, 176, 198, 194 n., 232; on Liberal doctrine, 112-113; heads government, is assassinated, 175, 227

EASTERMAN, A. L., 306 n.
Eden, Anthony, 266, 268
ELAS, 266, 268
Elections: Communist party and, 278; as guide to Rumanian politics, 91; turnout at, 191 n.; national, of 1919, 26, of 1920, 28, 95, of 1922, 97, of 1926, 103-104, of 1927, 105, of 1928, 131, 249, of 1931, 172, 251, of 1932, 173, of 1933, 188, of 1937, 191-192, 231, 249, 257, of 1946, 300, 304-305, of 1948, 311; by-elections, of January, 1931, 172; communal, of February, 1926, 102, 249, 254; municipal, of March, 1930, 133
Electoral law, of 1926, 102
Emancipation of peasants: in eighteenth century, 8; act of 1864, 10-12, 63; in Bessarabia, 33
Emigration, 84 n., 333
Enciclopedia Romînei, 220
Enescu, C., 229 n.
Engels, Friedrich, 145 n.
England. *See* Great Britain
Estonia, 164
Europe, per capita agricultural production, compared with Rumania, 44
Exchange controls, 78, 178, 185; *see also* Currency
Exports. *See* Commerce
Expropriation: in 1918 reform, 26, 366; in 1921 reform, 28-29; in 1945 reform, 294-296, 374; in Bessarabia, 34; in Bucovina, 36; in Transylvania, 38; demand for in 1945, 293; by direct action of peasants in Bessarabia, 33-34; National Peasant policy on, 156; in Peasant party programs, 153-154; of remaining estates in 1949, 323

FAMINE, in 1946-1947, 316, 319
Farm income, 61
Farming: large-scale versus peasant, 59 ff., 275; comparison of pre-1914 outputs, 15 n., Mihalache on, 149, relevance of issue to Rumania, 15, 277, renewed interest in large farms under Carolist dictatorship, 211, and Marxism, 282; types of by crop, 375-376; *see also* Agriculture

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

Fascia Naţională Română, 225–226
Fascism, 176, 187, 223 ff., 346; *see also* Iron Guard
Ferdinand I, King, 94 n., 101, 134; promises land to peasants, 23; reaffirms pledge, 25; influence of Liberals on, 96, 109; coronation of, 97; opposes union of National and Peasant parties, 140–141; calls Averescu to form government, 100; illness, 104; death, 106
Finland, 164, 271, 301
Finnish Peasant party, 164
Flueraş, Ion, 248 n., 249
Forced labor, 189, 329 n., 330, 348
Foreign capital and investment, 78, 336, 343; as captive funds, 185 n., 200; effect of on Rumanian economy, 72; flow of to Rumania stops in depression, 177; Liberal party attitude toward, 117, 122–123; Madgearu favors, 152; National Peasant party attitude toward, 159, 161, 165; Peasant party attitude toward, 155; *see also* Loans
——— debts, 78, 119, 178
——— policy and relations, 39, 170, 189, 190, 208; *see also* Germany, Soviet Union, Wars
Forests, 29, 36, 38, 125, 154, 221
Fourier, Charles, 243
France, 42, 162, 164, 174 n., 186, 339; and agricultural tariffs, 177; Revolution of 1848 in, 108
Franchise: in 1866 constitution, 20 n.; in 1923 constitution, 98; in 1938 constitution, 207; Communist decree on, 304; extension of and democracy, 90; and Liberal party, 111
Franges, Otto von, 238 n.
Front of National Rebirth, 208, 249
Frunzanescu, A., 44

GALAŢI, 174, 244 *f.*
Garofiţă, Constantin, 30, 95, 210; agrarian measures introduced by, 25; on alienation, 157 n.; on consolidation of properties, 65; on crisis in agricultural production, 5; criticizes Liberal agrarian policy, 124; frames 1921 reform, 28–29; on overpopulation, 205
Gendarmerie, 9, 102, 109, 155 n., 338
General Confederation of Labor, 249
Geneva economic Conference, of 1927, 160, 168 n.; of 1930, 164
Georgescu, Teohari: Under-Secretary in Ministry of Interior in Radescu government, 262; orders disobedience to Radescu, 263; Minister of Interior, 302; attacks Pătrăşcanu, 310; on Communist party tactics, 313
German Institute for Business Research, 217
German party, 131
German-Rumanian economic agreement of March, 1939, 215–217, 344; comparison with Soviet-Rumanian economic collaboration, 320–321
German-Soviet pact of 1939, 170, 208–209, 257
Germans: in 1945 agrarian reform, 294; expelled from Transylvania, 296
Germany, 42, 84, 167, 170, 202, 203, 223, 232, 320, 339; agrarian reform in Soviet Zone of, 298; agricultural tariffs in, 177; economic plans and actions in southeastern Europe, 216 n., 328; economic and political ascendancy of, 170, 208, 210; economic relations with Rumania, 186, 214 ff.; and Iron Guard revolt, 234; Rumania to fight against, 259; Social Democratic party in, 275, 282; wartime interest in Rumania, 238–239
Ghelmegeanu, M., 206
Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe, 256; on agrarian policy, 323; attacks private industry, 321; on Communist party discipline, 310; goes to Moscow, 262; on new party line, 312
Gigurtu, Ion, 209
Goga, Octavian: leaves National Party of Transylvania, 225; makes political agreement with Averescu, 95; forms cabinet, 192
Goga-Cuza government, 207, 249
Gormsen, M., 53 n., 62 ff.
Government of National Union, 192, 207
Great Britain, 42, 74, 90, 156, 167, 202, 265, 270, 335; and Groza government, 300, 301, 303, 304, 307; and Rumania, 20, 306, 314; and Soviet Union concerning eastern Europe, 265–266, 278
Greece, 42, 57, 178 n., 202, 252, 258, 266, 269; British action in, 268; Soviet attitude toward, 266, 268 n., 301
Green (Prague) International, 163 *f.*, 287
Grigorovici, Gheorghe, 249
Griviţa railway strike, 256
Groza, Petru, 263 n., 293, 303 n.; leader of Ploughmen's Front, 260; Vice-Premier, 262; heads government, 263; refuses to resign, 301; denies intent to collectivize or nationalize, 302; *see also* Ploughmen's Front

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

——government, ix, 174, 242, 290, 300, 331; and agrarian reform, 298; agricultural policy of in 1945, 318; attacks richer peasants, 323–324; comes to power, 263; externally imposed on Rumania, 243, 330; and inclusion of bourgeois elements, 271; industrial policy, 320–321; and Moscow decision, 305; and penal labor, 329; and political opposition, 304, 308–310; and statistics, 315; and United States recognition, 268; *see also* Communist party, National Democratic Front
Guizot, François, 108, 150 n.
Gusti, Professor Dimitrie, 205

HANGU, 236 n.
Harriman, Averell, 268, 270, 308
Hațieganu, Emil, 303–304
Helen (Elena), Queen, 134 n.
Hertz, Frederick, 179 n.
Hitler, Adolf, 175 n., 225, 228, 256, 258; and Antonescu, 233, 235; attitude toward Rumania, 216 n.; and King Carol II, 190; efforts to appease, 215 n.; and Iron Guard, 232
Hobbes, Thomas, 306
Hodża, Milan, 163
Hopkins, Harry, 269 n., 271
Hull, Cordell, 265 n., 266
Hungarian optants, case of, 39
Hungarian Popular party, 311
Hungary, 25, 42, 62, 80, 121, 164, 178 n., 209, 250, 301, 314; Rumanian war against in 1919, 117; and 1945 elections, 271; *see also* Austria
Huși, 227

IAMANDI, V., 188
Iași, 23, 153 n., 174, 226; haven for Russian revolutionaries, 243; police chief of shot, 227; University of, 227
I. G. Farbenindustrie, 203, 214
Imperialism, 155, 252
Imports. *See* Commerce
Income, distribution of, 81–82
Independent Socialist party, 249
Industrialists, growing influence of, 171, 198, 344
Industrialization in Rumania, 335–337; and agriculture, 333; under Carolist dictatorship, 210, 343; after the depression, 198–202; German attitude toward, 217–218; Manoilescu on, 194–195; in 1930's, 220; political implications of, 201
Industry, 67 ff.; and agriculture, 61, 65, 70; and capital goods, 69, 73; categories of, 378; concentration and expansion of after the depression, 69; Groza government policy toward, 320–322; Liberal support of, 121–123; National Peasants on protection of, 160–161; after 1945, 316; peasant party program regarding, 154–155; populist view of, 144–145; state support of, 72, 121–122
Institute of State Monopolies, 181
International Bureau of Agriculture. *See* Green International
International Court of Justice, 314
International division of labor, 75–76, 343
International Telephone and Telegraph Company, 162
Ionescu, Take, 91, 95, 96, 140
Ionescu-Sișești, G.: on peasant farming, 60–61; on Rumanian agriculture in 1943, 240
Iorga, Nicolae, 92, 100, 105, 140, 176, 191, 192; refuses to join National Peasants, 104; influence on Codreanu, 226; forms government, 172–173; libel against, 228; assassination of, 234
Iorga government, 182, 184, 186
Iron Guard, 98, 101, 147, 169, 202, 209, 215 n., 223, 226 ff., 241 f., 255 f., 329, 345–346; agrarian policy of, 236; assassinates Duca, 175; assassinates Iorga and Madgearu, 173 n., 234; atrocities committed by, 234; and King Carol II, 188–189, 207–208; and corporatism, 230–231; and cult of the primitive, 229; growth of in 1930's, 173, 176, 189; relation to Italian fascism and German national-socialism, 228; and Orthodox Church, 229; and Ploughmen's Front, 261; against political programs, 230; in power, 233–235; revolt of, 235, 349; social composition of, 231, 243; and Vaida Voevod, 175; *see also* Codreanu, Fascism
Italy, 42, 202, 226, 232

JAMES, WILLIAM, viii
Jilava prison, massacre of, 234
Jiu valley, 132
Joseph II, Emperor, emancipation of 1781, 8
Junimists, 92

KARDELJ, EDVARD, 315 n.
Kautsky, Karl, 275, 282, 285
Kerr, Sir Archibald Clark, 303
Kolarov, V. P., 289

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

000 Kolkhozi, 324, 326; *see also* Collectivization
Kredit-Anstalt, 177
Kun, Bela, 117, 250

LABOR. *See* Agricultural labor, Communist party, Forced labor, Social Democratic party, Trade unions
Land and Liberty party (Russia), 142
Land classification, 48
Land hunger, 12–13, 28, 157; *see also* Overpopulation
Land reclamation, 159, 319
Lange, Oskar, 328
Latvia, 164
League of National Christian Defense, 104, 131, 226, 227, 231 n.; *see also* Anti-Semitism, Cuza
League of Nations, 39, 66 n., 95, 120, 131 n., 179, 184, 232, 250
Legion of the Archangel Michael, 226 f.; *see also* Codreanu, Iron Guard
Legislative escapism, 20, 160
Lenin, V. I., 276, 345 n.; on agrarian and peasant question, 157 n., 274, 281–287, 288, 298; and political tactics, 251, 272; adaptation of Marxism, 286, 347–348; and revolution, 346
Liberal government: takes measures against peasant uprising, 3; expells Rakovsky, 245; and law on cooperatives, 127, 158; passes law on agricultural debts, 183; of 1934, 187; agrarian program, 1933–1937, 202–203; resignation in 1937, 191; *see also* Brătianu, Liberal party, Tătărescu
Liberal party, 31, 93, 94 ff., 141, 155, 166, 202, 279; and peasant uprising, 4; and state socialism, 21, 109; 1913 shift in policy of, 22; blocks Peasant party's reform, 27; and Averescu, 95–96; economic nationalism of, 98; composition and principles of, 108 ff.; and industrialization, 111, 160–161, 329; and Western ideals, 112; programs of 1911 and 1921, 116–117; agrarian policy, 111, 123 ff., 157 n., 166; assessment of economic policy, 127–128; withdraws from assembly, 132; on regency, 133; effect of economic policy on transportation system, 162; attacks Argetoianu, 173; forms government in 1933, 175, 187; apparent recovery of, 1930–1933, 176; holds office until 1937, 187 ff.; economic policy under Tătărescu, 198 ff.; favors King Carol II's abdication, 233; and Antonescu's overthrow, 242; Communist view of, 254; in 1944, 258; newspaper suppressed, 262; and Groza government, 300, 303, 307; and 1946 elections, 305; summary of, 341
Liberalism: of Liberal party, 109, 113, 115; Manoilescu's critique of, 193
Liebknecht, Karl, 245
List, Friedrich, 75, 110, 195
Little Entente, 187–188, 208, 232
Litvinov, Maxim, 100 n., 174 n.
Loans: stabilization, Liberal attempt to obtain, 107–108, of 1929, 131, 162; second development, of 1931, 172, 181; Swiss, of 1932, 173
Logio, G. C., 173 n.
London Conference, September–October, 1945, 302
London Convention, defining aggression, 175 n.
London Economic Conference, 185
Luca, Vasile, 251, 256, 310; and General Radescu, 263; Minister of Finance, 309; on Communist party tactics, 313; return to Rumania, 259
Lupeni mines, massacre of, 132
Lupescu, Elena, 101 n., 136, 137 n., 175, 210; Maniu and, 135
Lupta de Clasă, 254
Lupu, Dr. Nicolae, 131, 139, 164; splits with National Peasants in 1927 and 1945, 104, 141; demands debt moratorium, 182
Luxemburg, Rosa, 245

MACARTNEY, C. A., 118
Mackensen, Gen. August, 23
Madgearu, Virgil, 139, 140, 142, 168, 193, 290; on agricultural proletariat, 54, 150 n.; on industrial protection, 73, 152, 160–161; on Liberal budget, 107 n.; on nationalization of methane gas, 118; Minister of Commerce and Industry, 130; on stabilization of leu, 138; criticizes Dr. Lupu, 141; on cottage industry, 147 n.; on peasantism, 149–153; on Social Democracy, 152; author of *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, 156; on agricultural credit, 158 n.; on National Peasant agrarian program, 159; on agricultural education, 160 n.; on Green International, 163; on agricultural debts, 180, 183 n.; on preferential treatment for exports, 184–185; on Rumanian-German economic agreement, 218–219; on liberal capitalism, 343; assassinated, 234

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Magyar party of Transylvania, 102, 131
Maisky, I. M., 265 n.
Malaxa, Nicolae, 199, 322, 337, 344
Maniu, Iuliu, 37, 140, 141, 171, 180, 192, 249; personality, 135–136; refuses portfolios in 1922, 99; president of National Peasant party, 104; negotiations with I. I. C. Brătianu, 104; demands Liberals' resignation, 106; refuses to collaborate with Vintilă Brătianu, 107; forms cabinet, 108; announcement of policy, 130; reported request for British coastal survey, 255 n.; and regency question, 133; and King Carol II, 134–135, 169; resigns, 135; significance of resignation, 136–137; announces retirement, 172; resumes leadership of party, 173; heads government briefly, 174; makes election pact with Codreanu, 191, 257; agrees to Carol's abdication, 210; gives conditional support to Antonescu, 233; and Second World War, 235; and overthrow of Antonescu, 258; on Groza government, 303 n.; denounces 1946 elections, 307; arrested and tried, 308
Manoilescu, Mihail, 95 n., 201, 202, 218 n., 219; arrested, 106; on agricultural debts, 180; career and economic theories, 193–197; enters National Peasant government, 134; Foreign Minister, 209; and German economic policy in Rumania, 217; and Iron Guard, 230; on trade between town and country, 71–72
Maramureş, 37
Marghiloman, Alexandru, 25, 91, 242
Marinescu, Colonel, 174 n.
Markham, R. H., 304 n.
Marx, Karl, 114, 145; and the peasant question, 274–275, 279; and the Russian Revolution, 330
Marxism, 225; and agriculture, 274 ff., 280; and fascism, 228; Leninist interpretation of, 286, 346–347; *see also* Communism, Socialism
Match monopoly, 131, 321–322
Maurras, Charles, 226
Mavrocordat, Constantin, 8
Mečir, Karl, 163–164
Michael the Brave (Mihai Viteazul), 8, 18
Michael (Mihai), King, 101, 134, 348; assumes throne under regency, 106; king after Carol II's abdication, 233; overthrows Antonescu in coup d'état of August 23, 1944, 235, 242, 258; and Groza government, 263, 300, 303; receives Soviet Order of Victory, 271; requests Groza's resignation, 301; riot at birthday celebration for, 302; forced to abdicate, 310
Mihalache, Ion, 94 n., 95 n., 111, 139, 141 f., 150, 164 f., 167 n., 221; Minister of Agriculture, 1919, 26–27; on consolidation of peasant holdings, 29, 65 n.; criticizes 1918 reform, 30; opposes bolshevism, 31; on Bessarabian agrarian reform, 34 f.; arrested in 1926 elections, 108; Vice-President of National Peasant party, 104; on Liberal party policy, 109, 127; Minister of Agriculture in Maniu cabinet, 130; parliamentary speeches of, 148; on peasantism, 148–149, 260, 342; resigns as Minister of Interior, 174 n.; attempts to dissolve Iron Guard, 227; tries to invigorate National Peasant party, 190; refuses to form government, 191; arrested and tried, 308
Mining laws, 122–123, 156, 161, 164
Ministry: of Agriculture, 126, 159, 186, 237, 238, 295; of Finance, 49, 53, 180; of Fine Arts, 132 n.; of Foreign Affairs, 309; of Interior, 329 n.; of Justice, 329 n.; of Labor, 248 n.; of War, 3 n.
Mirescu, 249
Mironescu, G., 171, 181, 183, 186, 192, 193; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 130; annuls act excluding Carol from throne, 134; heads cabinet, 185; resigns, 172
Mitrany, Dr. David, viii, 112
Moldavia, v, 3, 10, 138, 235, 293, 314; and Jewish question, 224; famine in, 157 n., 316; origins, 18; Russian interest in, 272
Moldavian Soviet Republic, 100
Molotov, V. M., and Rumania, 265, 268, 302
Money and finance, 77 ff.; *see also* Currency, Taxes
Moore, Wilbert E.: on surplus population, 44 n.; on agricultural improvements, 65 n.; on Wagemann's thesis, 218 n.
Moscovici, Ilie, 166 n., 248
Moscow Conference, December, 1945, 300, 303, 305
Moşneni, 7
Moţa, 231
Munich Conference, 208
Muntenia, 8
Mussolini, Benito, 102, 197 n., 216 n., 226

NARODNIKI, 142, 284; *see also* Populism

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

National Bank, 79, 119, 122, 159, 185 n., 198, 200 n., 292; credit policy of, 118, 127; director of opposes development loan, 181; Liberal control of, 110; nationalization of, 320; National Peasant reform of, 162
National Christian Party, 192
National Cooperative Institute (INCOOP), 319
National Democratic Front, 141 n.; agrarian program of, 293; and agrarian reform, 296; attacks Penescu, 262; bids for power, 262–263; demonstration by, 263; formation of, 260; program of, 262; and Soviet foreign policy, 269; *see also* Communist party, Groza government
National Democratic party, 92, 100
National income: in depression, 176; estimate of, 79; and peasant farming, 60–61
National Industrial Credit Association, 122
National Liberal party. *See* Liberal party
National minorities, 89, 92; and Communism, 251, 252–253; complain of economic discrimination, 118
National Party of Transylvania. *See* Rumanian National party of Transylvania
National Peasant government: first, agrarian policy of, 159, 238, and King Carol II, 137, and Communist party, 255 f., 287–288, financial reforms of, 162, opposition to, 132, 133–134, railway policy of, 162, reconstituted under Mironescu, 171, tariff policy of, 160–161, 183, 199; second, 173–175, agrarian policy of, 181, proclaims martial law, 174, and railway strike, 256, seeks foreign markets, 184–185; *see also* Maniu, Mironescu, Madgearu, Vaida Voevod, National Peasant party
National Peasant party, 27, 98, 172, 225, 242, 304; origins and composition of, 189 ff.; 1926 program of, 154–155; economic and agrarian policy of, 126 n., 156 ff., 210, 217, 219, 329; and peasantism, 165, 342; comparison of with Liberal party, 165, 169; and absorption of nonpeasant elements, 167, 281
political activities of: creation of party, 104; opposes Carol's renunciation, 104; fails to obtain office, 105; attitude toward regency, 106; attacks Liberals, 107; wins 1928 elections, 181; joins Green International, 164; and the depression, 168; considered an "old party," 172; increasing confusion of, 175; under King Carol II, 190; and Skoda scandal, 199 n.; unable to ward off dictatorship, 206; favors Carol's abdication, 233; and Antonescu's overthrow, 242; and Social Democrats, 249; and question of Popular Front, 257; situation in 1944, 167 n., 258; newspaper suppressed, 262; dissident faction enters Groza government, 264; and Groza government, 300; inclusion of member in Groza government, 303–304; and 1946 elections, 305, 307; trial of leaders, 308–309; *see also* Maniu, Madgearu, Mihalache, Peasant party, Rumanian National Party of Transylvania
National People's (Popular) Party, 305, 311; *see also* Union of Patriots
Nationalism, 340, 341; and agrarian reforms, 31, 39; economic, 77, 89, 169; and fascism, 224; in 1938 constitution, 207; and peasantism, 152; and Rumanian liberalism, 109, 111, 128, 194; in Rumanian populism, 145; Russian, 269; and social reform, 17–18
Nationalization: laws of 1924, 118, 122–123, modification of in 1929, 161; Lenin on, 284; industrial under Groza regime, 321–322
Natural selection, in agriculture, 154, 157, 167, 342–343
Neoliberalism, 95 n., 169, 187, 192 ff., 202
Neoserfdom (neolobăgia), 6, 13, 46, 65, 66, 142, 280; definition of, 276
NEP (New Economic Policy), in Rumania, 318
Netherlands, 42, 43, 202, 271
Nicholas (Nicolae), Prince, 106
Numerus Valachicus, 175

OLD KINGDOM, 26, 28, 32, 34, 39, 42, 50, 56, 82, 221; development of industry in, 67; trade unions in, 248 n.
Oltenia, 3
Organic Statutes, 9–10, 11, 18
Ottoman Empire, 8, 9, 18
Overpopulation, vi, 41–47, 83, 167, 205, 334, 361; Communist view of, 291–292; in Dâmbovnicul, 221; and growth of industry, 70; and peasant farming, 60; and planned industrialization in eastern Europe, 328; *see also* Population

PAN-SLAVISM, 163, 272
Paris Peace Conference, 1946, 317 n.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Party of Labor, 139
Party of the Nation, 209
Pătrăşcanu, Lucreţiu, 257; on agrarian question, 157 n., 290–292; career of, 290; on King Carol II, 208 n.; criticizes Social Democrats, 249 n., 281 n.; and overthrow of Antonescu, 258; proposed economic program of, 292; and railway shops strike, 256; removed from office, 310; on suspected uprising, 308
Pauker, Ana, 251, 310; early career of, 252; trial of, 188 n., 257, 264; goes to Soviet Union, 258; returns to Rumania, 259; goes to Moscow, 262; and General Radescu, 263; on king and people, 302; Foreign Minister, 309
Pauker, Marcel, 252
Peace treaty of 1947, 301, 307
Peasant Labor Party, 131
Peasant parties, in eastern Europe, 163
Peasant party, v, 89, 92, 96, 100, 129, 148, 150, 193, 250, 345; origins of, 139; in office, 26; and Bessarabian reform, 85; and National Party of Transylvania, 99, 103; does not adopt populism, 147; comparison of party programs, 153 ff.; change in outlook of, 155–156, 165; and Social Democrats, 279–280, 281; *see also* National Peasant party, Peasantism
Peasant unrest: in depression, 138; resistance to collectivization, 325; uprisings, 345, of 1888 to 1900, 4, 16 n., of 1907, 3, 20, 144, 237 n., 244–245, 278, 282–283
Peasantism (ţărănismul), 142, 150, 166–167, 193, 341–343
Peasants, and political organization, 90, 166
Penescu, N., 262
People's Councils, 312
People's Democracy, 270–271; equated with dictatorship of the proletariat, 312–313; and transition to socialism, 318; *see also* Communist party
People's League, 94, 139 n.; *see also* Averescu, People's party
People's party, 92, 94, 103, 105, 123, 187 n., 193, 260; *see also* Averescu
Petrescu, Colonel, 308
——— C. Titel, 279; on Third International, 247; on Social Democratic opportunism, 249 n.; and overthrow of Antonescu, 258; attempts to set up Independent Socialist party, 304; attacked by Communist party and arrested, 309–310
Petroleum industry, 67 f., 146, 316; significance of to Rumanian commerce, 75, 177, 214; Stere's views on, 161–162; taken over by government, 322
Phanariot Greeks, 18
Planning, economic, 327–329
Ploeşti, 174, 337
Ploughmen's Front, 236 n., 305, 310–311, 342, 345; early program of, 260–261; expansion of, 261 n.; and agrarian reform, 293; *see also* Groza
Poland, 40, 42, 62, 80, 164, 174 n., 252; and Soviet Union, 269 n., 271
Popovici, Mihai, 107 n., 140
Popular Front, 249, 256, 261, 270 n.; and agrarian question, 290; meaning of, 278; and new tactics, 314; *see also* Communist party
Population, 40–41; agricultural, 41–42, 359–360; by censuses, 355; demographic characteristics of, 356–357; density of, 42; expansion of, 13–14; *see also* Overpopulation, Vital rates
Populism (poporanismul), 142; criticized by Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 277; and fascism, 147, 225; and nationalism, 147; and revisionist controversy, 276; summary of, 341–342; *see also* Peasantism, Stere
"Potemkin," 4
Potsdam Conference, 300–301, 320
"Premium," in electoral law, 102, 112, 131, 173, 191
Presan, Marshal Constantin, 134
Price scissors, 71 n., 76 n., 176–177
Progressive Conservatives, 91
Property. *See* Agricultural property

RĂDĂCEANU, Lotar, 249 n., 279, 280
Radescu, Gen. Nicolae, 95, 268, 347; forms government, 262; forced to resign, 263; and National Democratic Front, 264; on Soviet economic withdrawals, 317 n.
Rădulescu-Motru, Professor Constantin, 89, 166 n.
Railway shops, strike of 1920, 246, of 1933, 174, 256
Railways, organization of, 162 n.
Rakovsky, C., 100 n.; leader of Rumanian Social Democrats, 244; expelled from Rumania, 5, 245; and revolution, 247; and party tactics, 251
Ralea, Mihail, 206, 320
Răteşti, 221
Răscăi, 7
REAZIM, 319

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Red Peasants International, 287–288; *see also* Communist International, Communist party
Regency, 106, 108, 130, 133, 156
Rents, rise in, 15; *see also* Agricultural property
Reparations, 259, 307 n.
Revolution of 1848, 18
Ricardo, David, 195
Rist, Charles, 131, 178
Roman, 134
Romniceanu, Mihai, 303–304
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 265 ff.
Rosetti, Radu, 5, 19
Rumâni, 8
Rumanian Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 248 n.
Rumanian Federation of Manufacturers, 201 n.
Rumanian National party of Transylvania, 26, 91, 92, 96, 99, 139; origins of, 139–140; resolution of October 1918, 37; boycotts coronation, 97; temporary fusion of with Iorga's party, 100; protests Carol's renunciation of crown, 101; *see also* National Peasant party
Rumanian People's Republic (Republica Populară Română), 297, 300, 310
Rumanian-Soviet relations. *See* Soviet Union
Rural Office, 21
Russia, 25, 121; activities of and interest in Rumania, 9, 18–19, 250, 271–272; contrasted with Rumania, 16–17, 346; and populism, 142; *see also* Soviet Union
Russian Revolution: of 1905, 17 n., 244, 282; of 1917, 23, 31, 245, 349; of October, 24, 33; and Marxism, 285–287, 347

SANATESCU, GEN. CONSTANTIN, 259, 262
Sanielevici, H., 143 n., 148 n.
Saraţeanu, Constantin, 133
Scaeni, phalanstery, 243
Scânteia, 308
Second International, 245; *see also* Social Democratic party, Socialism
Serbia, 16; *see also* Yugoslavia
Serfdom, 8; *see also* Neoserfdom
Seton-Watson, Hugh, 135
Sfatul Ţării, 33–35
Sima, Horia, 209, 234
Sinaia, 175
Skoda scandal, 199 n.
Social Democratic party, 104, 131, 144, 250, 348 n.; founding of, 244; 1892 party program of, 5, 279; crisis in, 144 n., 244; opposes 1907 uprising, 5; 1919 program of, 279; and 1919 elections, 94 n.; splits after First World War, 246–247; and populists, 279; criticized by Zeletin, 114; criticized by Madgearu, 151–152; career of between the wars, 247–249; and trade unions, 247 f.; cooperation of with National Peasants, 249; and Communist party, 254–255; and Popular Front, 256–257; influence of Dobrogeanu-Gherea on, 280–281; and agrarian question, 166, 281; and Lenin, 286, 347; and Antonescu's overthrow, 242; in 1944, 258; in National Democratic Front, 260; splits on election issue, 304; merges with Communist party, 309–310; and Rumanian economy, 329; summary of, 346; *see also* Socialism
"Social harmony," 92, 148, 149, 152, 193
Social Revolutionaries (Russia), 143
Socialism: Marxist, comes to Rumania from Russia, 35, 243; pre-Marxist, 243; and property in land, 284; and question of alliance with peasant parties, 166; and revisionism, 275
Socialist Conference, inter-Balkan, 245
Socialist Congress of 1896, 278
Sociological investigations of rural life, 7, 205, 212
Soviet-Rumanian (SOVROM) companies, 320–321
Soviet Union, 163, 167, 170, 287, 288, 307 n.; and backward countries, 350–351; collectivized agriculture in, 326–327; and eastern Europe, 313, 328; and Greek crisis of December, 1944, 266; intentions of, 272–273; NEP in, 279; and Poland, 269 n.; and the West, 250–251, 255, 264 ff., 270, 300–301, 306–307
and Rumania: dispute over Bessarabia, 33–34, 100, 174 n., 187 n., 209 n.; negotiations in 1932, 173–174; sign convention defining aggression, 175 n.; establishment of diplomatic relations, 187; relations in Carolist regime, 190; at war, 235; and Communist party, 242, 250; and demand for mutual assistance pact, 258; and armistice, 259; and installation of Groza regime, 263, 330, 348; and question of Soviet foreign policy, 264 ff.; and question of frontiers and bases, 265; and Western powers, 268–269; and agrarian reform of 1945, 297–298; and 1946 elections, 303; and de-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)[1951] EDI Rumania EDI

pendence of Rumanian Communist regime, 310; and question of Rumanian incorporation in USSR, 314–315; economic relations between, 316, 320–321, 331; *see also* Russia, Communist party
Soybeans, 56, 70, 203, 214, 220, 316
Stalin, J. V., 100 n., 266 n., 270; and application of Leninism, 348; and Churchill, 268; and collectivization, 288; on elections, 301; on Greece, 268 n.; intentions of, 271 n.; on Poland, 271; and Rumania, 306; and Yalta Conference, 267, 269
Stambuliski, Alexander, 163
Standard of living, 79 ff.
Standard Öl-Diskonto Gesellschaft consortium, 123
State Control Commission, 312
State finances: reform of by National Peasants, 162–163; and revenues, 162–163, 176, 180
State, importance of in economic life, 109–110, 338–339
State land, distributed to peasants, 14
Statistical information, viii–ix, 315
Steed, Wickham, 190
Stefanov, Boris, 256–257, 257–258
Stere, Constantin, 139, 142, 149 f., 152, 165, 193, 340; exposition of populism, 143–147; on foreign capital, 161–162; influence of on first Peasant party program, 153 n.; opposes revolutionary policy, 19; splits socialist movement, 244
Ştirbey, Prince Barbu, 104–105
Straja Ţării, 189
Štrbske Pleso, 164
Stresa Conference, 185
Strike: general, of 1920, 39, 95, 246, 256 n.; of miners in Jiu Valley, 132; of Ploeşti oil workers, 174; in railway shops (Grivița), 174, 256
Strip cultivation, 29, 58, 186, 221; *see also* Farming
Sturdza, Prince Ion Sandu, 9
Suceava (judeţ), 46
Švehla, Antonin, 163
Switzerland, 146, 164

ŢARA BÂRSEI, 56, 81
Tardieu Plan, 185
Tariffs: agricultural by industrial states, 177; export duties on agriculture, 120–121; of 1929, 165; policy of National Peasants toward, 160–161; in program of Peasant party, 154; protectionist, 67, 72, 74, 114, 120, 151, 199, 336
Tatar Bunar, uprising, 101, 251
Tătărescu, Gheorghe, 93, 170, 192, 201, 257, 303 n.; heads Liberal cabinet, 175, 186; splits with old Liberals, 187; attitude of toward radical Left and Right, 188–189, 232; prepares election, 191; enters Groza cabinet, 264, 271; accepts common list with Communists, 304; on postwar production, 316 n.; removed from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 309; Communist interpretation of his resignation, 312
Tătărescu government: agrarian policy of, 204, 210; and industry, 343; *see also* Liberal government
Tax structure, 82
Taxes, decline in revenue from, 177
Third International. *See* Communist International
Thorp, Willard L., 317 n.
Timişoara, 134, 174
Tito, Marshal, and Titoism, 270 n., 310, 314, 315 n., 330
Titulescu, Nicolae, 105, 181; Minister of Finance in Averescu cabinet, 95; fails to form government in 1928, 106, in 1931, 172, in 1933, 173; dispute with Vaida Voevod, 173–174; Foreign Minister, 174; discharged, 189
Topoloveni, 221
Toynbee, Arnold J., 306
Trade Unions, 98, 247–248
Transcaucasian republics, 306 n.
Transnistria, 235
Transportation: and agriculture, 238; and communications, 162
Transylvania, 8, 23, 36, 39, 50, 56, 107, 117, 135, 172, 234, 293; agricultural output in, 44; and Communist party, 257 f.; density of population in, 42; distribution of property in, 366; economic difficulties of, 117–118; German population of removed, 296 n.; industry in, 67–68; and national question, 253; Northern, loss of, 93, 193, 197 n., 209, 219–220, Antonescu's desire to recover, 233 n., return of to Rumania, 259, 262, 307 n.; Social Democrats in, 247; trade unions in, 248 n.
Treaties: of Adrianople (1829), 9; of Trianon (1920), 37; of Paris (1947), 307
Trotsky, Leon, 100 n.
Turkey, 245

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

000 UKRAINE, 40
Ukrainian question, and Third International, 252–253
Unemployment, in agriculture, 44; *see also* Overpopulation
Union of Patriots, 260
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. *See* Soviet Union
Union of Syndicates of Moldavian Landowners, 28 n.
United Nations, 259, 294, 301, 307 n.; and violation of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, 314
United Opposition, 100, 102
United States, 167, 265, 270; actions of in Italy, 266; and assistance to Rumania, 316; and Groza government, 268, 300–307, 314; and Maniu trial, 308; and Russia concerning eastern Europe, 273
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 59 n.
United Workers party, 310; *see also* Communist party
Urdareanu, Colonel E., 210
Utilities, public control over, 155

VĂCĂREŞTI, prison, 227
Vaida Voevod, Alexandru, 94, 141, 191 f.; heads government in 1920, 26, 140; Minister of Interior in Maniu cabinet, 180; attempt on life of, 182; leaves cabinet, 185; Prime Minister, 173–175; leaves National Peasant party, 175, 225; and Iron Guard, 227, 232; and Communists, 255
Vaitoianu, General, 26, 192
Vasiliu, C., 44
Viaţa romînească, 144, 148
Vienna Award (Decree), 1940, 193, 197 n., 210, 233 n., 259
Vienna Conference, 1924, 100
Vital rates, 222, 357–358; birth and death, 41; infant mortality, 81
Vladimirescu, Tudor, v, 9; Division, 302
Voinea, Şerban, 279, 280
Vyshinsky, A. Ia., 263, 264, 268, 269, 308, 348

WAGEMANN, ERNST, 217–218
Wallachia, v, 18, 221; 1848 revolution in, 10
Wars: Russo-Turkish, 18; Balkan, 245; Second Balkan, 22; First World, 22–25, 245; Second World, 207, and Communist party, 258, fall of Rumanian birth rate in, 41, Rumania and, 235; and Rumanian agriculture, 239–240, 292–293, Rumanian armistice, 242, 259, and Rumanian economy, 210, 237 ff., Rumanian peace treaty, 307, Rumanian territorial losses in, 209–210, 219–220, Rumania's place in diplomacy of, 265, relation of Pacific war to Soviet policy, 269
Western influence on Rumania, 19–20, 66, 147, 332, 339–340
Western Europe, economic relations with eastern Europe, 334
Wheat Valorization Office, 202
White, Leigh, 349
Workers and Peasants Union, 172

XENOPOL, ALEXANDRU, 335

YALTA CONFERENCE AND DECLARATION, 267–268, 300–301
Young Conservatives, 92
Young Liberals, 176; *see also* Brătianu, Gheorghe
Yugoslavia, 40, 42, 62, 80, 164, 178 n., 238 n., 252, 258; and Soviet Union, 315 n.

ZARONI, ROMULUS, 261 n.
Zeletin, Stefan, 279 n., 340; contrasted with Manoilescu, 194 n.; on the peasant, 166 n.; on Rumanian liberalism, 114–115

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

EASTERN CARPATHIAN STUDIES

ROUMANIA

Edited by
PROF. H. J. FLEURE, F.R.S.
and
R. A. PELHAM, M.A., Ph.D.

With Contributions by
HILDA ORMSBY, D.Sc.(Econ.) *and* H. J. HOWARD, F.L.S., F.R.M.S.

Being a summary of work undertaken by a group of the Le Play Society's members in 1933

With a Foreword by
THE RT. HON. BARON MESTON OF AGRA AND DUNOTTAR

LONDON
PUBLISHED BY THE LE PLAY SOCIETY
58 GORDON SQUARE, W.C.1
1936

Page 1

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

531
291
462

[Plate I-facing title page]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

ɔoo

THE LE PLAY SOCIETY,
58 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1

The Council of the Le Play Society wish to place on record their warmest appreciation of the courtesy extended to them by Monsieur C. M. Laptew, Roumanian Chargé d'Affaires in London, as representing the Roumanian Government. Also to His Excellency Monsieur N. Titulescu, the Roumanian Foreign Minister, and the Bureau de la Presse of the Roumanian Foreign Office for the help they gave in bringing about this visit. The Le Play Society is also indebted to the Lord Mayor of Bucarest, Monsieur Dem. Dobrescu, Professor Vladescu-Racoasa, Monsieur Jean Dragu and many other Roumanian friends. Their special thanks are due to Vice-Consul J. Popovici, who acted as guide and friend throughout the whole expedition, to M. Alexander Cosocariu and Dr. Pop of Cluj.

Special contributions have been included on Economic Geography by Dr. Hilda Ormsby and on Vegetation by Mr. H. J. Howard. The Editors wish to thank these contributors and the other members of the party for their help in compiling this record: Miss L. Adam, Miss E. M. Barke, Mr. E. Bruce, Miss G. E. Buist, Miss A. R. Burgess, Capt. C. D. Chase, Miss K. E. Coast, Mr. J. Craw, Mr. J. E. Daniel, Miss De C. L. Dewar, Miss K. C. Dewar, Miss L. Hegarty, Mr. H. M. Kinloch, Miss L. A. Lennox, Rev. H. Mattinson, Miss A. Moncrieff, Miss H. Mortimer, Miss G. I. MacGeagh, Miss A. D. Malden, Miss M. K. Marsland, Miss M. A. Oddie, Miss C. A. Peebles, Miss M. O. Reid, Miss M. E. Tatton, Dr. C. P. Snodgrass, Mrs. B. Swire, Miss M. B. Vines, Miss L. M. Warren, Miss G. A. Wood, Miss N. Wilkinson, Mr. E. Woodhead, Mr. W. Veevers.

PRINTED BY THE STANHOPE PRESS LTD., ROCHESTER, KENT

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 ED1 Rumania ED1

000

CONTENTS

Chapter		Page
	FOREWORD BY THE RT. HON. BARON MESTON OF AGRA AND DUNOTTAR	5
I	A PHYSICAL INTRODUCTION	7
II	CLIMATE IN THE CARPATHIANS	14
III	NOTES ON THE VEGETATION OF ROUMANIA	18
IV	PEOPLES AND SETTLEMENTS: EARLY TIMES	30
V	PEOPLES AND SETTLEMENTS: THE POST-ROMAN PERIOD	36
VI	ECONOMIC ROUMANIA	46
VII	CORBU: A CARPATHIAN VILLAGE	62
	APPENDICES:	
	1 Some Vital Statistics of Corbu	76
	2 "Dot" or Marriage Portion	76
	3 Domestic Animals	77
	4 The Farming Calendar	77
	5 Things seen at Borsec Fair, August 20th	78

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

NOTE ON SPELLING AND PRONUNCIATION

104 The spelling throughout is taken, as far as possible, from Harta României Fizica—Administrativa şi Turistica, by M. D. Moldoveanu (1933). The Times Atlas version, where it differs from this, is shown in brackets. It should be noted that ţ=ts, and ş=sh.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

FOREWORD

By LORD MESTON

President of the Le Play Society

921
.114

LET US ASK OURSELVES—students, busy workers, travellers, ordinary newspaper-reading stay-at-homes, whoever we are —what do we know about Roumania? Extraordinarily little, would be the honest answer of most of us. We know that Roumania was our ally in the Great War, and picked up some territory thereby. We believe that her language is nearer to Latin than any other European vernacular. We remember that her map is dotted with romantically-named provinces—Bessarabia, Moldavia, Transylvania and others. But there we halt. Encyclopaedias would tell us more, but encyclopaedias are dull things. Here is a little book without a dull page, which nevertheless tells us a very great deal.

It is the work of members of the Le Play Society, who employed a holiday tour in seeing Roumania for themselves. Trained observers most of them, they brought back a collection of fresh, first-hand studies of the country and its life. They show us the land as it now is, built up from its geological past. They tell us of the peoples who have dwelt in it since pre-historic times; of the tribes which have poured backwards and forwards across it; of the folk who inhabit it now, of their usages, their faiths and their social life. We learn about the agriculture of the land, its industries, its mineral resources, and its economic limits. Its trees and flowers and cottage gardens are described; its climate, and the gala dress of its peasantry. There are no politics, but one gets a glimpse of how political change has reacted on rural life and prosperity.

Running through all the various studies, and linking them together, is a thread which each of the workers recognises as of the essence of the pattern. That thread is the special interest of the geographer in all that he sees, his capacity

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 ED1 Rumania ED1

121
114

for tracking the constant inter-relation between Man and Nature. Without claiming, as has been claimed, that Geography is the oldest of the sciences, he follows its guidance in the sure confidence that it will explain the life and activities of a country as no other single science can do. Hence his affection for "regional studies," such as this of Roumania. Hence his ready appreciation of much in a country's anthropology, sociology, economics, which would otherwise be isolated and undigested knowledge.

This is the *raison d'être* of the Le Play Society. It has now produced a series of these small handbooks, all based on original expert observation on the spot, clothing the dry bones of the old geographies with the flesh and blood of life and its story. As contributions to our knowledge of the world, and as companions to the more formal text-books, they ought to be of special value to teachers and students; and they may safely be used as models for other regional work, whether on a similar or on a less ambitious scale. Those who find the handbooks helpful may wish to make the closer acquaintance of the Society and its methods.

There is another aspect of the Society's work which appeals strongly to me personally. Having watched for years the *va et vient* at Geneva, where men and women of different nations are constantly mixing in work and in pleasure, I cannot overstate the value of kindly human intercourse as a solvent of international problems. Barriers have to be broken down before mankind get to know and understand their fellows: and there is nothing for levelling barriers like crossing frontiers. Friendly excursions such as those of the Le Play groups, intent only on studying and understanding the ways of other peoples and their problems, can do great good. To show interest in other people's lives is surely to generate mutual sympathy; and mutual sympathy is the only sure foundation for world peace. All success therefore to the Le Play Society and its members.

MESTON

4;Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

I.—A PHYSICAL INTRODUCTION

105 197 101 133 ROUMANIA owes its name to the rustic Latin speech of the Roman provincials of Moesia and Dacia, impressed on the region in a period before language had acquired its later powers of tenacious resistance to fundamental change. It is true that subsequent contacts gave the local language a large number, perhaps even a majority, of Slavonic words, emphasising the country's links with eastern Europe, but the associations with the west were actively revived in the nineteenth century, when there was also a reaction against the connecting of Roumania with its southern and south-western neighbours as a Balkan State as had seemed natural to those impressed by the results of Turkish rule. These varying links of Roumania are understandable from a study of its physical features. The eastern projecting arc of the Carpathian Mountains and the Transylvanian Alps is, physically, as well as in a large measure culturally, an eastward outpost of western Europe standing out as a mighty rampart over against the south Russian steppe and its continuation into the loess-floored Polish platform. The curve from the Transylvanian Alps southward past the Iron Gates also connects them with the Balkan peninsula.

133 CENTRAL EUROPE, farther west, includes broken remnants of old (Permo-carboniferous) mountain systems passing through south Ireland, south Wales and south England as well as through Brittany, the Ardennes and the Vosges to the hills of middle Germany between Hannover and Frankfürt-a-M. Brittany lies mainly at low levels but most of the other elements of this old system have been lifted again into the round-shouldered hills, sometimes with extensive remains of old plains now at considerable heights, and usually with deep-cut stream lines that have often worked their way along fault lines. To the south of this old mountain-system stand the Alps, some of which incorporate the results of refolding of older mountain fragments.

THE GREAT ARC of the Carpathians and Transylvanian Alps shows relationships with both these great schemes. Old, Permo-carboniferous mountain blocks were refolded in the upper Cretaceous and again in the early Tertiary period, in the latter of which the Transylvanian platform, between

133 the Apuseni and Bihor (Bihar)* mountains on the west and the Carpathians on the north-east and east, seems to have been let down. In this process it became outlined against its mountain frame largely by a series of faults and it was subsequently covered by new deposits. The great folding notable in the Alps further west, so active in the mid-Tertiary period, was apparently of short duration in north Roumania, but seems to have been continued on to Pleistocene times in the Transylvanian Alps on the south, with much faulting giving the impressive rise from the south and east to the line of heights. There was also in Tertiary times a great volcanic outburst that added a broad zone of highland on the west flank of the Carpathians from the two Bistriţa rivers southwards to the northern part of the Olt (Alt) valley. In the Pleistocene period earth movements seem to have increased the differencebet ween highlands and lowlands, and they were not uniform, for Pliocene deposits that lie 1,000 to 1,200 metres above sea at Borsec (Borszek) and Bilbor (Gyergyo-Belbor) are at only 500 to 700 metres further north. Again, remnants of the old land surface worn down before the Miocene movements and known to geologists as the Borescu platform, are at 1,200 to 1,300 metres in the Bihor and Apuseni Mountains, but at 2,000 metres in parts of the Transylvanian Alps. These examples suffice to show that these relatively recent movements have been more marked in the south, where, as a result, the contrast between Wallachia below and the mountain wall above is so splendid a feature. It seems that, already before the earth movements of the Pleistocene exaggerated the contrast just named, streams had eaten back through the mountain walls, for example, the Olt, or had linked themselves to and captured streams running between the mountain lines, for example, the Jiu. The Pleistocene period obviously brought great changes both through movements of land-blocks and through its climatic oscillations which were on a grand scale. Gorges were deepened as the mountain wall rose or Wallachia and Moldavia sank, and tributary streams were made to cut most impressive ravines that give the neighbourhood of Sinaia such a romantic character. Cirques near some of the highest hill tops preserve the direct evidence of ice action, but farther down there are few, if any, evidences of hanging

* Strictly speaking, the term Bihor applies only to a small section of these mountains (see Fig. 1) but is often used in a more comprehensive sense.

133



FIGURE 1. The division near Brasov between the eastern Carpathians and the Transylvanian Alps should be noted. The term "Western Carpathians" is used by Mihailescu to include regions 1-4. The Dobrogea is classed by Mihailescu as a "mountainous region" but is shown here as a "high plateau" because it is of Hercynian age. The numbered regions are: (1) Bihor, (2) Apuseni, (3) Poiana Ruscai, (4) Banat, (5) Fagaras, (6) Bucegi, (7) Ceahlau, (9)-(12) Volcanic Mts., (13) Transylvanian Plateau, (14) Moldavo-Bucovinian Plateau, (15) Dobrogea, (16) Oltenia, (17) Giurgeu (Gyurgyo), (18) Ciuc (Cic), (19) Trotusesme.

valleys, and it seems that the topography has been very much adapted since the latter part of the Ice Ages of the Pleistocene. The cutting of ravines is demonstrated magnificently in the case of the Iron Gates of the Danube.

THE above short historical or evolutionary summary of the physical geography may now be supplemented by a more definitely regional survey, the main features of which are illustrated in Fig. 1.

THE CARPATHIAN MOUNTAINS are made up of overlapping arcs, the main series including mainly altered Palaeozoic

133 and Mesozoic rocks, many of which have become crystalline. One of the main arcs forms the axis of the eastern Carpathians from just beyond the Czechoslovakian frontier to the northern border of the Olt basin; some rock west of Sinaia, much farther south, is sometimes considered an outlying part of this arc. The next main axis starts west of Braşov and stretches (with the name of Fagaraş Mountains and sharper relief than the previous arc) westward to the Banat, forming the Transylvanian Alps. In the west a third curve begins south of the last mentioned, in Oltenia, and sweeps around southwards to the Balkan mountain-line. This sweeping curve is heavily cut by faults, and streams working back along fault lines and other weak bands finally tapped the Hungarian basin so that its drainage poured over and deepened the cuttings to form the unique defile of the Kazan with the Iron Gates. The floor on which Pleistocene deposits accumulated in parts of the Hungarian plain lies 100 metres below the level of the rock under the Iron Gates, a sufficient indication that the tapping is a recent affair, as indeed the scenery of the long gorge abundantly testifies by the freshness of its great precipices arising direct from the powerful stream which is in places some 70 metres deep.

On the east side of the eastern Carpathian axis a long belt of Flysch, i.e. Mesozoic and Tertiary folded rocks, forms a subordinate mountain zone of varying width from Poland southwards to the Dambovița valley west of Sinaia.

On the west side of the eastern Carpathian axis a broad zone of volcanic accumulations stretches from the two Bistrița rivers northwards to the north of the Olt basin, but this zone is made less of a barrier by the fact that streams have sawn their way down through even this rock.

The Transylvanian Alps, especially in the zone known as the Fagaraş Mountains, almost reach an alpine height and character, but, even there, the greatest height is only 2,536 metres (8,320 feet) and in the eastern Carpathians the chief peak, Ceahlau (Ciahlau), attains only 1,908 metres (6,260 feet). Permanent snow and ice are therefore unknown at present and water-effects are much more prominent as factors of surface form than ice-effects. The results of block-uplift and faulting strike the observer, and undulating stretches of flowering high pastures dominate steep wooded slopes that bound terraced valleys often of a narrow kind.

133



FIGURE 2. (1) Caliman (Kelemen), (2) Gurghi, (3) Harghita (Hargitta), (4) Ceahlau, (5) Fagaraş

133 The prominence of the main axis of the eastern Carpathians north of the Olt basin and the occurrence there of the volcanic belt give to the mountain zone a strength it lacks further south where it is more broken in the zone along which the main axis is buried beneath later formations. When the south-east corner of the arc is turned heights increase and we approach the Transylvanian Alps with their deep-cut southern slopes and especially the through gap of the Olt. The high pastures, to a considerable degree isolated from the valley bottoms, are one of the most important characteristics of the country and have greatly affected its historical and economic evolution. Passes through the eastern and south-eastern Carpathians have also been of great importance for communication between the Russian steppe and the Moldavian platform on the one hand and the Transylvanian and Hungarian basins on the other. It is along these ways, rather than *via* the Danube at the Iron Gates or along detours near them, that movements of culture spread across, eastwards or westwards, in ancient times.

THE BELT east of the Carpathian arcs is generally called Sub-Carpathian and in its structural features it is obviously related to the mountains, but in its denudation it is more akin to the Moldavia-Bucovina-Bessarabia platform generally. This is mainly the result of Pliocene denudation, and there are traces of a higher platform above it, and a lower one beneath, the latter showing that after the main platform was developed there was some uplift and rejuvenation of streams. Considerable areas, especially along the rivers Siret (Sereth) and Prut (Pruth), are loess-covered, but large areas between 47° and 46° N. lat. have Pliocene formations at the surface. To the south again, towards the lower Danube, loess covers most of the country.

THE extent to which a direction parallel or slightly oblique to the Carpathian curve is developed in the drainage system is a feature of the land east of the Carpathians which contrasts markedly with the Wallachian drainage scheme. In Wallachia the long continuance of uplift of the Transylvanian Alps as above mentioned has greatly emphasised the southward slopes and a great number of streams run nearly at right-angles to the mountain axis across a plain covered by loess save in the west (Oltenia). These streams bunch on their way to the Danube and the eastern ones naturally

1:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDI Rumania EDI

133

The road leading down to the Bicaz gorge which the river has cut through Cretaceous rocks just to the south of Ceahlau. *Photo: Miss M. Vines.*

133
361

View looking across the tectonic basin of the upper Olt. *Photo: J. Cruz.*

Bilbor—a characteristic "dispersed" settlement in a small intermont basin, most of the floor of which is given over to the production of hay. *Photo: J. E. Dowd.*

facing page 12

133 trend eastwards as they go. Wallachia has a far greater proportion of its surface less than 100 metres above sea level than has Moldavia and the rise to the mountains is far more regular, as one would expect in view of the simple, consequent, character of much of the river system.

THE DOBROGEA beyond the lower Danube is not touched upon in the remainder of these studies, which are concerned with parts of the Carpathian region, but, for the sake of completeness, it should be explained that the Dobrogea is a platform extending northwards from the eastern end of the Balkan Mountains, based on a Permo-carboniferous mountain scheme which has been planed down completely, but these older rocks emerge towards the north though the land is low. The block they form is responsible for the main bends of the lower Danube which turns north when it meets the block and bends east again at the north-western corner of the block. There are considerable areas of loess on the eastern and southern parts of the platform.

TURNING now to the area within the Carpathian arc, the historic Transylvania, we note that the land is almost all more than 300 metres above sea level, a great part being over the 500 metre contour. The Transylvanian platform, at levels between 300 and 1,000 metres, is framed by the Carpathians on the east, the Transylvanian Alps on the south, and the Bihor and Apuseni Mountains on the west, save that in the last direction the westward-flowing Mureş (Maros) river occupies the depression south of the Bihor block and drains most of the platform save the extreme east and south-east, where the upper Olt takes a complex course dictated mainly by structural features. The Someş (Szamos), flowing like the Mureş to the Tisza (Theiss), drains the lowland between the north of the Bihor block and the Carpathians. The chief city of Transylvania, Cluj (Klausenburg, Kolozsvar) is situated below the north-east of the Bihor block. From the western part of this block the land grades down through the Banat of Timişoara (Temesvar) on to the Hungarian frontier and the Tisza.

THE TRANSYLVANIAN platform within its mountainous frame is floored in many parts by Pliocene or late Miocene deposits and true loess is not characteristic. It does, however, occur west of Transylvania in the plains towards the Hungarian frontier.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDI Rumania EDI

Plate II

142
292

Roumanian peasants in national costume at the fair at Borsec. The man is wearing trousers of thick, home-woven material and home-made shoes, whilst the woman is wearing modern button boots. The coats are of sheepskin embroidered with coloured wool.

Photo: H. J. Round.

facing page 13

II.—CLIMATE IN THE CARPATHIANS

132 IN CLIMATE, as in structure, the Carpathian region is related both to Western Europe and to the steppe lands farther east, but it is essentially continental with the characteristic cold winter and hot summer, and usually a maximum of rainfall in June, delayed at Vatra Dornei (Dorna Vatra) until July. Dorohoi (Dorohoiu)—4.2° C.; Cernauţi (Czernowitz) —5.1° C.; and Vatra Dornei—6.4° C., have specially low mean monthly temperatures for January, the last named owing its low figure especially to its height (789 m.) above sea level, a fact which helps to account for its five months (Nov.-March) with mean monthly temperatures below freezing point as against three (Dec.-Feb.) in the other cases. On the Transylvanian side both Cluj and Sibiu (Hermannstadt) also have three months (Dec.-Feb.) with mean monthly temperatures below freezing point. On both sides of the Carpathians the mean monthly temperature is highest in July with figures round about 19.5° C. save in the case of Vatra Dornei which is considerably higher than the other stations named and has a maximum mean temperature of 14.2° C. delayed until July. Out towards the Russian plain the Dec.-Feb. period below freezing point and the January mean monthly temperature approximately correspond, allowing for difference of altitude. Iaşi, at 100 metres, has —3.3° C. in January and Chişinau (Kishinev), at 96 metres, has —4.0° C., but there the summer maximal mean monthly temperatures are higher and later, 21.2° C. at Iaşi and 21.9° C. at Chişinau, both in July with a continuation of these hot conditions into August. Chişinau has mean monthly temperatures below freezing point for four months (Nov.-Feb.). Beneath the south-eastern Carpathians at Focşani there are as before three months of frost, and the highest mean monthly temperature is 21.7° C. for July with a continuation of hot conditions into August. The range of mean monthly temperatures during the year is usually 23° C. to 25° C. but is lower, for lack of prolonged summer heat, at such a place as Vatra Dornei. Differences in temperature related to height-differences are as usual far more marked in summer than in winter in many cases, as in winter the inner valleys of the highlands may have long periods of intense cold if they are narrow and shaded from

132 the sun's rays and so may be much colder, especially during calm periods which are frequent, than places with southward aspect on the hills above: on occasion a difference of 20° C. has been noted. Places out in the opener lands towards Russia feel the winter cold of the steppe spreading westward, but both these and places in shut-in valleys may be very dry. The high pastures have a good deal of snow in winter and are nearly forsaken at that season but, when the snow melts in spring, growth sets in rapidly, and the change of season is [137] sudden. Out east in the opener lands there is, however, for a while a danger of the sudden recurrence of frost (the Ice Saints in the Russian steppe), a fact which helps to limit the eastward extension of the beech tree almost as much as does the summer heat, for both these conditions are specially harmful to the delicate beech leaves. Roumania is thus on the eastern limit of the general European distribution of the beech which is one of the characteristic plants of western and central Europe and is absent from Russia, save the Crimea and parts of the Caucasus region. It is important to note that winter cold is not an important factor of this distribution as the beech grows on the higher slopes of the Carpathians under severe conditions.

A MONTH with an average of less than 25 mm. (or 1 inch) of rain or the equivalent in snow is very rare save at Cernauţi, Dorohoi, Vatra Dornei and Chişinau in winter especially January. The summer maximum is in June at Dorohoi (102 mm.); at Cernauţi June and July both average 94 mm.; at Vatra Dornei June has 129 and July 135 mm. On the west side of the Carpathians, at Cluj and Sibiu, for example, the June rainfall is the highest (111-114 mm.), and the figures show a tendency to rather more rain in April and May as well as in July and August than on the east side. The annual totals on both sides of the Carpathians in the latitude of most of the places named may be said to vary between 550 and 750 mm. Farther south, on the east side, at Focşani, for example, the June rainfall attains only 82 mm. average, and May and July have 60 mm. and 57 mm. respectively; further, the annual total is just 550 mm. and at Buzau (Buzeu) rather farther south it diminishes to 476 mm., and at Constanţa to 381 mm. At Vatra Dornei it may rain on nearly half the days of the year, at Buzau on hardly a quarter. At Vatra Dornei, moreover, precipitation may be

132 in the form of snow during any month save July or August. Thunderstorms are frequent in the afternoons during June and July but they rarely occur from November to March. Thunderstorm rain is thus a feature of summer in the Carpathians.

ON THE MOUNTAINS the winter anticyclonic calms often give clear skies while the spring and to some extent the summer until July are apt to be cloudy. Air may stream from the anticyclone on the heights to Wallachia and southern Moldavia and the Black Sea, so north-westerly winds are a marked feature in these lower lands in winter. In Transylvania though summer has most rain December is the cloudiest and August the clearest month.

IT IS CUSTOMARY to draw attention to the complete absence of the climatic conditions that are apt to prevail near the Mediterranean Sea. Roumania is emphatically un-Mediterranean in climate. Its relation is with western Europe on the one hand and the Russian steppe on the other. If a period of greater cold or increased precipitation, or both, supervened, the Carpathians could well develop a permanent snow cap, and it has been stated in the last section that there are cirques on some of the heights indicating that this has happened in the past. It would be very interesting to know whether any developments in this direction occurred during the cold, wet period of the west about 700 B.C. On the whole perhaps the indications are that the winters would have been harder rather than wetter to any great extent, but this phase may well have been followed by one in which, before warmer conditions were re-established, there was a lot of rain. During the Pleistocene Age, in one or other, probably in one of the later, of the glacial phases, if not in more, there must have been glaciers in the high lands with enormous amounts of flowing water in the immediately post-glacial stages. On the other hand, if a period of reduced rainfall, and perhaps greater summer heat, supervened, steppe conditions and æolian deposits would easily become a feature of Roumania, and there are abundant indications of their importance in the country at some early periods; loess is widely distributed not only in eastern Wallachia, the southern and eastern Dobrogea and middle Moldavia, but also in some of the drier upland valleys such as that of the upper Olt.

241 It will be seen that structure and climate conspire together
132 to encourage a scheme of summer utilisation of high pastures
221 combined with valley cultivation that was much enriched when the maize plant was introduced, but this was not so long ago, and the older régime was none too prosperous both because of climatic troubles in the highlands and especially the sensitiveness of the wheat plant to abnormal seasons, and because of the hindrances to organisation arising from the diversities of language between governments and
371 subjects. The encouragement of industry was not easy while some lignite and a little coal were the main sources of power, but later on it became possible to use abundant petroleum and natural gas and we have yet to see, in the
565 next generation, what influence they may have. Up to the
241 present, however, a true peasantry survives, and has increased its hold on the soil; it still makes at home a great proportion of what it needs, it still finds that in the hills the maize crop may not ripen, and old communal schemes relating to the high pastures remain important.

III.—NOTES ON THE VEGETATION OF ROUMANIA

137 AFTER a voyage of five days down the Danube wh re hundreds of miles of its banks were clothed with willows (*Salix cinerea*) and formed our almost sole glimpse of vegetation, the first thing the Vegetation Group did on landing at Giurgiu was to make contact with the flora of Roumania. A walk along the side of the railway parallel to the river revealed the following species: *Xanthium speciosum*, *Trifolium fragiferum*, *T. lappaceum* (an alien possibly transported by rail or ship), *Setaria glauca*, *Datura stramonium*, *Berteroa incana*, *Trigonella procumbens*, *Althaea officinalis*, *Inula brittanica*, *Hibiscus trionum*, *Salvia sylvestris*, *Glycyrrhiza echinatum*, *Amaranthus albus* and many others less worthy of note and mostly belonging to the mid-European element.

DURING our visit to Snagov, where we enjoyed the kind hospitality of the Mayor of Bucureşti (Bukarest), we saw large quantities of *Vallisneria spiralis* growing close to the banks of the lake. Near the old monastery church the following plants were noted: *Xanthium strumarium*, *Astragalus acer*, *Galega officinalis*, *Chenopodium ficifolium*, *Filago arvensis*, *Nepeta pannonica*, etc.

243 BOTH on our way from Giurgiu to Bucureşti by train, and by the roadside on leaving the capital towards Ploeşti, we were reminded of the fact that the maize was the staple crop and it was here seen in the plains growing to perfection in striking contrast to that seen later around Borsec in the narrow valley towards Corbu.

OUR next contact with vegetation was during the motor drive over elevated ground from Sinaia to Dobreşti; here the grass had not been cut in the sub-alpine meadows and the flora was seen to be a very rich one, but time did not permit of its being examined. From Dobreşti, a climb via a fine gorge was made to the alpine Peştera hut. On our way up the gorge large masses of the tall, yellow *Inula helenium* were passed and *Achillea Schurii* (endemic to the Carpathians) was seen on the wet walls of rock, and also *Bruckenthalia spiculifolia*. As more elevated ground was

137 reached there was little to be seen, the alpine meadows having been closely cropped by sheep. During an early morning walk in the neighbourhood of the hut, more alpine conditions were seen to be prevalent and plants typical of such regions were recorded, such as: *Ranunculus nemorus, Polygala amara, Genista tinctoria, Saxifraga aizoon, Alsine gerardi, Heliosperma quadrifida, Viola declinata* (endemic), *Gentiana nivalis, G. utriculosa, Campanula carpatica, Dianthus gelidus* (endemic), *D. spiculifolius* (endemic), *Pedicularis verticillata, Rhododendron Kotshyi* (endemic), *Sedum atratum, Pleurogyne carinthiaca, Phleum alpinum, Potentilla aurea, Anemone alba, Primula minima, Scorzonera rosea, Loiseleuria procumbens*, etc. Unfortunately a very heavy thunderstorm with torrential rain made it impossible to investigate the flora on the interesting plateau country passed shortly after leaving the Peştera hut on our way down to Bu-teni.

BRAN was our next place of stay and the hill sides round the town proved very interesting floristically. Some 160 common plants were recorded in addition to *Coronilla varia, Impatiens noli-tangere, Actaea spicata, Monotropa hypopitys, Centaurea pseudo-phrygia, Nepeta pannonica, Trifolium alpestre, T. ochroleucum, Chaerophyllum aromaticum, Inula hirta, Erysimum repandum, Galinsoga parviflora, Salvia verticillata, Brunella grandiflora, Linum flavum, Hypericum transylvanicum, Scabiosa ochroleuca, Selinum carvfolium, Bupleurum falcatum, Seseli annuum, Luzula albida*, etc. Above the hotel was a considerable stretch of beech forest intermixed with spruce (*Picea excelsa*); on the lower edge of this was the usual hazel (*Corylus avellana*), alder (*Alnus incana*), Cornelian cherry (*Cornus mas*), hornbeam (*Carpinus betulus*), etc. At the foot of the slope on damp ground were [241] clumps of *Salices* and *Alnus incana*. Around the cottages on the hillsides were patches of potatoes with oats and sometimes a small patch of hemp; some of this freshly cut and being retted in a shallow pit dug in the ground was also noted. Generally speaking, the flora around Bran itself was a very rich one. Close by the hotel the following species of Mycetozoa were seen: *Stemonitis hyperopta* on an old tree stump, *Arcyria denudata*, maturing on soil, and masses of *Mucilago spongiosa* ripening on old sticks.

137 THE JOURNEY to Braşov (Kronstadt) took us along the valley, both sides of which were well cultivated, potatoes, beans,
[241] oats, maize being the chief crops; sunflowers and small patches of hemp were also seen. A halt for petrol, a short distance from Bran, provided an opportunity for studying the meadow land vegetation close to the road; the following were noted: *Scilla trilobium, Centaurea scabiosa, Coronilla varia, Hypericum perforatum, Medicago falcata, Peucedanum oreoselinum, Knautia arvensis, Campanula rotundifolium, Helianthemum chamaecistus, Stachys betonica, Dianthus Carthusianorum, Viola tricolor, Senecio aquatica, Trifolium procumbens, Achillea millefolium, Chrysanthemum leucanthemum, Campanula trachelium, C. rapunculus, Cirsium oleracea, Galium verum, G. Mollugo, Geranium pratense, Lathyrus pratensis, Melampyrum nemorosum*, etc.

AT BRAŞOV were seen *Potentilla canescens* and *Silene otites* among many commoner species.

IT WAS NOT until we reached Borsec that we had time to study the vegetation in any detail, and it was somewhat unfortunate that the truly sub-alpine and alpine regions were not within easy reach. The greater part of the mountain sides surrounding Borsec were covered with spruce forests quite to the summits and beech forest was not well represented, being met with as somewhat poor specimens often at a considerable height. These forests proved to be rather deficient in species, botanically.

DURING our walk from Borsec across meadows and up on to the summit of Bukkhavas, it was interesting to see the beech and birch above the limit of the spruce. *Ribes grossularia* was seen in fruit in open spots in the forest. The open summit was covered with *Vaccinium myrtillus* with its usual association; *Scorzonera rosea* was also growing upon the summit. Leaving the mountain and going down towards Bilbor we noted a grassy clearing with a building where cattle had been housed: this as in other cases was covered with a prolific growth of dock (*Rumex sp.*); it invariably accompanied places where mountain dairies had been established. On reaching the valley a fine clump of *Dianthus superbus* was seen.

244 A WALK around the cottages of Old Borsec revealed several vegetable gardens apparently associated with the possibility

244 of supplying the summer visitors with vegetables. Runner beans, potatoes, poppy-seed, cabbages, red beet, onions, lettuce, and carrots were common, and in one garden in addition to the above, red currants, gooseberries, vegetable marrows, fennel, caraway and leeks were growing.

137 THE following plants were noticed in the neighbourhood of Borsec: *Senecio fuchsii, Maianthemum bifolium, Gentiana cruciata, G. asclepiadea, Stachys alpina, Chaerophyllum hirsutum, Dipsacus laciniatus, Trifolium pannonicum, Myosotis sparsiflora, Carduus personata, Campanula cervicaria, Lychnis viscaria, Silene armeria, Dianthus armeria, Dianthus superbus, Salix pentandra, Turritis glabra, Calamagrostis epigeios.*

ONE very interesting area was visited by Capt. Chase, viz. the Red Rocks near Tulgheş (Tölgyes): on account of the number of interesting plants to be found there this area has been preserved under the care of the Botanic Garden of Cluj. Tulgheş is the village which comes next to Corbu and here the mountains rise up from the valley floor of the Bistricioara and are covered with forests, the spruce (*Picea excelsa*) being dominant and reaching quite down to the valley which here has an altitude of about 600 metres. It was noted that sparse deciduous forest occurred above the spruce, the chief trees being the pedunculate oak (*Quercus pedunculata*), hazel (*Corylus avellana*), ash (*Fraxinus excelsior*), hornbeam (*Carpinus betulus*), with scattered examples of lime (*Tilia cordata*) and poplar (*Populus tremula*). Climbing higher, a narrow belt of birch (*Betula verrucosa*) occurred followed by beech (*Fagus silvatica*), with examples of sycamore (*Acer pseudo-platanus*) and lime. Still higher up, as usual, there was summer pasturage for sheep. The conspicuous cliffs, the "Red Rocks," could be seen standing out above the forest, and near them Capt. Chase recorded the following: *Sempervivum hirtum, Arabis arenosa, Phleum montanum, Cytisus leucotrichus, Campanula carpatica, Senecio rupestris, Spiraea ulmifolia, Allium montanum, Libanotis montana, Thalictrum foetidum, Melampyrum saxosum*, and what was one of the chief objects of the visit, plants of the outstanding endemic *Astragalus Romeri* growing in a ravine between the rocks.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

133
137

The Visit to Mt. Ceahlau.

One of the most interesting excursions botanically was that made to Mont Ceahlau, which forms part of the Moldavian Carpathians and rises in its most elevated part to just over 1,900 metres.

The mountain itself is formed of Cretaceous Flysch which is much folded; near the summit there were banks of sandstone and excellent examples of conglomerate.

Unfortunately, the mountain was a considerable distance from Borsec, necessitating a start at 6.30 a.m. and a long journey by car. As the same journey had to be made on the homeward route much less time was spent upon this interesting mountain than one would have liked. The ideal would have been to have spent at least one night in the well-appointed alpine "Cabine" upon the summit. With the exception of the climb to the Peştera hut after leaving Sinaia, Ceahlau was the only really typical sub-alpine region visited during our stay in Roumania. As we drove along the



Fig. 3—Profile of Mt. Ceahlau seen from the east (after E. Nyiadov)

narrow road by the side of the small tributary stream, to the Durau monastery from which the ascent was made, the following plants were noticed: *Myricaria germanica*, *Petasites albus*, *Salix incana* and the large yellow-flowered *Telekia speciosa*; the three first-named are typical plants found in the neighbourhood of stream beds in such regions, the other had never been seen previously by any member of the Vegetation Group.

137 After passing across the meadows near the monastery we passed successively through three definite zones of vegetation (see Fig. 3):

(a) The beech zone (*Fagus silvatica*).
(b) The spruce zone (*Picea excelsa*).
(c) The zone of mountain pine (*Pinus montana*).

1. The Beech Zone, or Lower Mountain Zone.

This reached up to a height of about 650 metres. The beech here was the dominant tree, the woods were somewhat thin and here and there one occasionally saw a very tall specimen with a perfectly straight bole and practically no branches except at the top. In this area there was also a number of rather weedy-looking birches (*Betula verrucosa*). The principal plants of this zone were *Pyrola uniflora*, *Circaea alpina*, *Impatiens noli-tangere*, *Geranium phaeum*, *Salvia glutinosa*, whilst among the woody elements were *Salix caprea*, *Alnus incana*, *Sorbus aucuparia*, *Sambucus racemosa*, *Corylus avellana*, *Populus tremula*, and *Acer pseudo-platanus*.

2. The Spruce Zone, or Upper Mountain Zone.

This began at about 650 metres and reached to 1,700 metres, forming a broad belt which appeared to encircle the entire mountain as it could be seen all along the slopes as we mounted somewhat steeply. As is usually the case on mountain slopes the line of demarcation between this zone and the previous one was not at all clearly defined; here and there one intruded into the other as the result of the influence of the ecological factors in a particular area. In this spruce zone two other conifers are said to occur sporadically, viz., the larch (*Larix decidua* forma *carpatica*) and the Scots fir (*Pinus sylvestris*); on our ascent only an occasional example of the latter was seen.

In the forest and the clearings and on the rocky walls were many plants and one could only notice a few in passing: *Daphne mezereum*, *Lonicera xylosteum*, *Ribes alpinum* and *R. grossularia*, *Allium victorialis*, *Listera ovata*, *Trollius europaeus*, *Aconitum moldavicum*, *Parnassia palustris*, *Linum catharticum*, *Alchemilla vulgaris*, *Epilobium parviflorum*, *Circaea alpina*, *Pyrola rotundifolia*, *P. secunda*, *Gentiana carpatica*, *Geum robertianum*, *Sanicula europaea*, *Centaurea*

137 *scabiosa*, *Stachys alpina*, *Chrysanthemum rotundifolium*, *Salvia glutinosa*, *Arnica montana*, *Carlina acaulis*, *Lycopodium selago* and *L. clavatum*. In shady places several ferns occurred such as *Asplenium trichomanes*, *Phegopteris robertianum*, *Asplenium viride*, etc.

3. Zone of Mountain Pine (*Pinus montana* Var. *mughus*) or Sub-alpine Zone.

As one emerged from the spruce forests on to the plateau, the dominant feature was the masses of *Pinus montana* sub-species *mughus* with associations of the dwarf juniper (*Juniperus nana*) accompanied by *Vaccinium myrtillus*, *V. vitis-idaea* and *V. uliginosum*. In one instance *V. myrtillus* covered a large slope and peasants were gathering the fruits. Another characteristic plant covering a large area as we passed the path leading up the slopes to the summit of Toaca (1,904 metres) was *Dryas octopetala*, the light feathery fruits making the patch very conspicuous. A species of willow, *Salix Kitaibeliana*, was also noticed. As previously mentioned, the dominant tree of this zone is *Pinus montana*, met with in similar situations on our visits to the High Tatra of the Carpathians in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and to the Julian Alps of Yugoslavia. Its tortuous, flexible branches growing out close to the ground formed in places an almost impenetrable barrier. Some fine and very old specimens were seen bearing cones, and, from its characteristic features, it obviously belonged to the sub-species *mughus*. As is well seen in the photograph (Plate III), *Pinus montana* occurs either massed in association or in circular, flattened, isolated clumps. Occasionally where sufficient protection was afforded, small spruces were seen.

Where the mountain pine formed a large association it provided sufficient shelter for the development of *Vaccinia* and mosses, *Vaccinium myrtillus* being dominant and *Hylocomium splendens* the commonest moss. In company with these plants one saw patches of Iceland lichen (*Cetraria islandica*), *Oxalis acetosella*, *Homogyne alpina*, and *Luzula silvatica*.

It was in this sub-alpine region that we found many interesting plants and they may be grouped roughly under the following habitats :

133
137

4:Fleure S-5 , date)1936 EDI Rumania FDI

Near the summit of Caslaia, showing zone of mountain pine (*Pinus mugo var. mughus*)—sub-alpine "Krummholzregion." The pine is seen in rounded clumps on the mountain slopes, but covers a large area on the flattened summit (see Vegetation notes).

Photo: H. J. Breuer.

[facing page 24]

137

(*a*) *Clearings and uncovered areas.*

THE endemic *Primula leucophylla*, *Dentaria glandulosa*, *Soldanella hungarica*, *Veratrum lobelianum*, *Alyssum repens*, *Linum extraxilare*, *Alchemilla montana*, *Scorzonera rosea*, *Silene Zawadskii* (endemic), *Solidago alpestris*, *Erigeron alpinum*, *Doronicum austriacum*, etc. Among the *Gramineae* and *Juncaceae* were seen *Festuca supina*, *Nardus stricta*, *Sesleria caerulea*, *Calamagrostis villosa*, *Luzula silvatica* and *Luzula maxima*.

(*b*) *The sub-alpine meadow.*

ALTHOUGH there was little time to explore the very large area covered by this type of vegetation, several plants of distinctly alpine character were found and are regarded by Roumanian botanists as undoubted glacial relics. We were surprised to see several of these plants at such relatively low altitudes and were quite prepared to find that their occurrence was a floristic peculiarity of Ceahlau. Those noted were: *Pedicularis versicolor*, *Saxifraga oppositifolia*, *Polygonum viviparum*, *Saxifraga androsace*, *Dryas octopetala*, *Cerastium lanatum* and *Lycopodium selago*.

(*c*) *The Tundras.*

THESE occurred in the *Pinus montana* clearings and open slopes and as is usual in such habitats the chief elements were lichens, *Cetraria islandica*, and species of *Cladonia* intermingled with patches of *Vaccinia*. There were large rounded masses of mosses and the only woody element conspicuous in this somewhat dry region was the dwarf juniper (*Juniperus nana*). One could not help in passing comparing this type of vegetation with that seen on our visit to the Scandinavian plateau and also in the neighbourhood of Abisko in Swedish Lapland.

(*d*) *The Rocky Walls.*

AROUND the "Cabine" and still more pronouncedly around the summit of Toaca, where the underlying rocks were covered with a thin bed of humus, we met with our most interesting plants. Here grew, unfortunately overpicked by shepherd lads, Edelweiss (*Leontopodium alpinum*), *Eritrichium Jankae* (endemic), *Gypsophila petrea*, *Hieracium villosum*, *Sempervivum Simonkaianum*, *Saxifraga adscendens*, *S. oppo-*

4;Fleure 3-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

142
291

PLATE IV

Our shepherd guide down mountain side to Paltinis, on journey from Borsec to Vatra Dornei. He was milking sheep at a "stana."

Photo: H. J. Sawyer.

293



A mountain shepherd boy playing his wooden pipe near "stana"—seen on journey to Paltinis.

Photo: H. J. Sawyer

[Facing page 25]

sitifolia, *S. aizoides*, *S. aizoon*, *Erysimum Witmanni*, *Phyteuma orbiculare*, *Silene Zawadskii*, *Onobrychis montana var. transilvanica*, *Cerastium alpinum*, *C. lanatum*, *Oxytropus campestris*, *Alsine gerardi*, *Campanula alpina*, *C. carpatica*, *Alyssum repens* (endemic), *Rhinanthus alpinus*, *Rhodiola rosea*, *Sedum atratum*. In the cracks in the rocks where moisture collected were noted *Pinguicula alpina*, *P. vulgaris*, *Saxifraga aizoides*, *S. androsacea*, *Viola biflora*, *Arabis alpina*, *Achillea Schurii*, *Biscutella laevigata*, and *Androsace lactea*.

It was obvious that to make a detailed study of this interesting mountain with its forest, plateau, gullies, scree slopes, etc., and other varying ecological factors, a much longer time would have been necessary than was possible under the conditions of our visit to the country.

The Walk by Way of Bilbor, Paltiniş, Vatra Dornei, etc., and down the Bistrita River by Timber Raft to Broşteni (Brosceni).

This interesting excursion was made by a number of the party, and afforded a very good opportunity of seeing the country as some fifty miles were covered on foot in two days. We passed over fine slopes and through delightful valleys with their meadows bedecked with many species of flowering plants. There was time during such a walk only to notice the most salient features of the vegetation. We, however, saw hillsides where sheep were grazed quite to the top, also a mountain dairy where they were being milked. The temporary shelters for those cropping the hay in the valleys at some distance from their usual habitations were interesting, and the whole family appeared to sleep there and cook their meals till the area had been cleared.

During our stay at Vatra Dornei, through the kindness of the mayor and the prefect of the district, we were taken by car over a mountain pass down to Campulung and from thence to the wonderful walled monastery of Moldoviţa (Moldawitza) with fine sixteenth-century frescoes covering its walls. The chief point of interest from a vegetation point of view was the fine spruce forests which we saw and in which felling was in progress, the logs being pushed down the mountain side to timber carts at the bottom. The next day we had evidence of the importance of the lumbering industry

3 3 as we proceeded down the Bistriţa river on a raft of spruce logs to Broşteni. In this way thousands of logs are transported by the current to saw mills lower down the stream. Lumbering was seen *en route* as we passed between slopes covered with fine spruce forests with here and there beech woods and also areas covered with birch.

LEAVING the raft at Broşteni we proceeded to Borsec by car and on the way saw an interesting effect of indiscriminate deforestation. On the slopes far too many trees had been cut down and a huge gully had been formed by a landslide ; a

Gullies and detrital fans resulting from deforestation in Bistrita valley.

house had been completely swept away and near by the soil was level with the top of the fencing round another house (see illustration above).

137 [133] BUDACUL (5,800 feet) was another mountain visited by members of the Vegetation Group. Spruce forest covered the slopes to a height of about 5,000 feet and there were no rocks. The last 500 feet were covered with mosses as well as *Festuca sp.* and the usual three *Vaccinia* with dwarf juniper (*Juniperus nana*). *Veratrum album* and *Hieracium* were the dominant plants in association with those mentioned on the summit, and in the woods below the following occurred : *Chrysanthemum rotundifolium, Scleranthus uncinatus, Scorzonera rosea, Ajuga genevensis, Meum*

137 *mutellina*, etc. The forester mentioned that beech forest was of no practical value but that hornbeam (*Carpinus betulus*) was sought after because of its hardness.

THE VEGETATION AROUND CORBU.

OF the vegetation around Corbu, the special village studied, little need be said: the hillsides had in many places been denuded of timber for building and domestic purposes throughout the whole length of the village.
THE following zones may be distinguished:

241 1. THE ZONE OF THE VALLEY BOTTOM (BISTRICIOARA).
THIS was devoted to agriculture, but the maize was poor in comparison with that seen on the hot Wallachian plains; patches of barley occurred chiefly on the south-facing slopes, and there were small patches of potatoes and hemp; hay was cut on the meadows near the river and on the lower slopes.

2. THE ZONE OF FOREST.
137 SPRUCE was the dominant tree, but on the church side of the
313 village, particularly towards the Borsec end, stretches of Scots pine (*Pinus sylvestris*) had evidently been planted just above the valley floor. This was presumably to retain detritus and to consolidate the soil as they were planted much too closely to have any economic value for timber. Conversation with the forester on Runcul above Tulghes confirmed this fact and Dr. Pop, the botanist at Cluj, also mentioned that *Larix decidua* var. *polonica* had been planted above Corbu. The schoolmaster said that the valley floor and lower slopes had originally been covered with trees and that wood was very cheap but labour was dear. Timber plays a very great part in the domestic economy of a village like Corbu, being used for building, furniture, carts, looms, winding frames, etc., as well as for fuel.

THE TRAIN JOURNEY FROM TOPLITA (OLAH TOPLICZA) TO CLUJ.

241 FINALLY the train journey from Toplita to Cluj afforded
137 another opportunity for observing the crops grown. All along the railway in the Mures valley much maize was

241
137

grown with sunflowers round the edges of the fields; little tent-like stacks of hemp were seen drying, and on one occasion a field of tobacco was noticed. The common tree was the false acacia (*Robinia pseudacacia*). Along the stream sides one invariably saw the flowering rush (*Butomus umbellatus*). Vines were seen growing around Rasboeni.

A VERY interesting salt marsh area was noticed before reaching Cluj, large areas being covered with sea aster (*Aster tripolium*) and a species resembling sea lavender (? *Statice gmellini*) recalling the vegetation of the salt marshes on the North Norfolk coast around Blakeney, etc. AT CLUJ we were privileged to visit the fine Botanic Gardens under the guidance of Prof. Emil Pop, and saw the special floras of the various regions of Roumania.

IN CONCLUSION I should like to mention my indebtedness to Miss Vines and Capt. Chase for their observations and lists of plants from various areas which they visited.

HENRY J. HOWARD, F.L.S., F.R.M.S.,

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 ED1 Rumania ED1

IV.—PEOPLES AND SETTLEMENTS: EARLY TIMES

131 THE POSITION OF ROUMANIA with its mountain ramparts forming an outpost of central Europe, over against the south Russian steppe on the one hand and the Balkan peninsula on the other, has been emphasised in a brief review of its features and relief and climate. The same fact of position is most important in the study of its human relations throughout history, and here it is necessary to emphasise once more that relations between the south Russian and Hungarian plains in the far past have been carried on *via* the Carpathian passes rather than by the Iron Gates which may well have been impassable until Trajan's engineering feat made a platform along the right bank, and the temporariness of that construction suggests that the grim defile did not remain in use. To what extent some detours not very far away may have been utilised at various periods is a matter for research.

172 174 TOO LITTLE is known concerning Roumania in the Old Stone Age to permit of any useful discussion, but the country was much affected when, in the relatively short Neolithic period heralding the advent of metal, a cultivating population was spreading westward through central Europe. It is a matter for further research to decide to what extent south Russia and to what extent Thrace were routes of this first peasant [177] civilisation in its spread westwards. The earliest agriculturists of Roumania, in their equipment, show relationships or participation of ideas with contemporaries in the Ukraine, in the Balkan peninsula, including Vinça near Belgrade, and Thessaly, and in north Hungary, Roumania yielding specially important material from Cucuteni, near Iaşi, from Erösd in the south-east of Transylvania, and from Tordos in central Transylvania on the upper Olt. The former has yielded figurines that are female and steatopygous, but without the large breasts and general development of fat that occur in some other centres. The pottery is painted, and on the whole it seems that, at this stage, the Ukraine was richer; we may well be dealing with a spread that was to some extent westward, using passes of the south-eastern Carpathians (Fig. 4). At the same time it should be borne in mind that the Olt, the Mureş and several other rivers of Transylvania yielded

172
174

gold, while copper was found in those regions as well, so the desire for these materials may have brought settlers here apart from the general spread of pioneering cultivators which is perhaps better attested further west. In Lower Austria and Moravia the equipment of the very early cultivators includes ornaments of Spondylus shells that in several cases have come from the Mediterranean, indicating already at that primeval stage of the development of civilisation those wide-ranging links which seem so generally to have been, and to be, factors of progress. This thought is further supported by a knowledge that the Roumano-Ukrainian area seems to show links with far-off Elam, north-east of the Persian Gulf.

WE MAY provisionally picture the pioneers of settlement and cultivation as spreading from the south-east some time in the latter half of the third millennium B.C., as yet shifting their villages from time to time, probably because schemes of rotation in land-use and of dung-manuring had not come into operation. They seem to have preferred sites on the Loess as would be expected, because that material is fertile, and usually less wooded than areas of clay subsoil. They apparently met and probably incorporated into their groups remnants of older hunting groups, but they were concerned with cultivation, apparently using especially stone hoes ground into the shape of a shoe-last. Hoe cultivation suggests, by analogy with modern Africa, that a good deal of the work was done by women. The figurines show that great importance was attached to the idea of fertility, symbolised by woman; this is often described as "Worship of the Mother-Goddess," a description that may be correct, or may perhaps give a somewhat too definite impression. That sooner, rather than later, the early cultivators interested themselves in gold washing and in copper seems to stand out fairly clearly. They became considerable artists in pottery, and appear to have built rectangular houses with a porch, partly open, and an inner room. The possible relationship of this (Megaron) scheme to later ones in the Aegean and Greece, leading right on to the classical Greek temple, gives it a great interest; it is widely agreed that the main ideas of the construction of the classical Greek temple were derived from forested lands well to the north. The houses appear to have often been agglomerated, as one would expect, and the group had a rampart-ditch around it. The people used bows

172 and arrows and valued deer-horn for making holders for
174 stone axes and for other purposes. Later, perhaps, hunting became more important, and incised ornament on the pottery became a feature here as it was also further west-north-west.

THERE SEEM indications that, as time passed, aristocratic herders spread among the early cultivators, and they emphasise connections between the Ukrainian steppe and Hungary across the south-eastern Carpathians and down the Mureş. Copper axe-adzes, some with a median hole for the shaft, have been found at various spots, chiefly in Transylvania, as Childe has well shown. It is thought that the hole was punched through the heated metal and not cast. Ornaments and other details suggest that the aristocracy at least had some connections with the Aegean, and bronze was gradually introduced, as a copper-antimony alloy at first. Parvan has emphasised the importance of the Carpathian area in the Bronze Age, with fine workmanship in bronze and gold, and, in the late Bronze Age and the transition to the early Iron Age, the culture connections seem to have been mainly westward, the analogies with north Italian bronze cauldrons being specially noteworthy. There are several indications that in this period, which, in Europe, seems to have been one of dry warm summers, the south Russian steppes were relatively empty. Probably the previous spread across the south-eastern Carpathians had brought westward horsemen, either already armed with the sword or about to learn to make it, a weapon that would suit cavalry better than the axe-adze of older days. In the transition from bronze to iron the Transylvanian Carpathians were thus the eastern limit of an area including Hungary and North Italy, while southward they were linked with Attica. Agriculture had doubtless improved, settlements had become more or less permanent as it is likely that a rotatory scheme of soil use had been evolved; craftsmanship in gold and bronze for luxury objects had reached a high level.

175 THE PICTURE changes again dramatically round about 700 B.C., through two mutually supplementary influences. Firstly, the climates of Denmark and Switzerland became colder and wetter, so probably that of the Carpathians felt the influence of a lowering of the snow-line and an impoverishment of agriculture and craftsmanship. Iron work had

175 become widespread further west but had hardly reached our region before local decline set in. Secondly, the Russian steppe had become active once more with moister conditions, and the Scythians spread westward, with iron weapons and bronze-pointed arrowheads, through the Carpathian passes into Transylvania and beyond, as well as into Wallachia, where, however, they do not seem to have got through the Iron Gates, though they very probably spread into Yugoslavia. Scythian graves in Roumania are often poorer than those in South Russia, and no doubt Scythian bands were spreading through the Carpathians as they did through Polish Galicia farther north, and into Wallachia as well as via the Dobrogea into Thrace farther south. The old aristocracy of the previous period was apparently temporarily submerged under the barbarian conquerors who scattered in small groups and melted in due course into the general population. Some time after about 550 B.C. Greek trade came northward *via* the river mouths opening to the Black Sea, and Greek cities attained great strength, but did not really Hellenise Roumanian lands; perhaps the Greeks' idea of themselves as contrasted with the barbarians gives some clue to this.

CELTIC CONQUERORS spread eastward and had great influence in the Roumanian area, the early traces, dating perhaps from the fifth or the fourth century B.C. being important in eastern Transylvania and showing a civilisation using bronze and iron, and adapting ideas of ornament brought from farther west but ultimately derived from the classical world (the La Tène culture). It was apparently especially between 200 B.C. and 100 B.C. that the Celtic La Tène civilisation became dominant in this part of the world. It favoured houses crowded together to the number of nearly a hundred, built of wood, or of reeds and mud, and the clusters or villages were on defensible sites over a river or lake in many cases; there was, as in the previous phase, a large survival of fashions from the very early days of agriculture. Fortresses were built by nobles, and included terraces rising up to the central princely residence, often blocks of stone in the ramparts were kept in position by wooden beams, a scheme of building the Romans found widespread among Celtic-speaking peoples, and called the *murus gallicus;* this scheme has of course regional variations. In the mountains of

175 Roumania one of these fortresses at Gradistea Muncelului was built with enormous labour based on extensive organisation at a height of 4,000 feet above sea level. It was the work of a King Burebista who ruled over a large territory. Celtic conquerors penetrated northern Roumania on their way to the Ukraine, and touched southern Roumania on their way to Asia Minor. They brought to the Carpathians the potter's wheel and eventually made iron fairly common, but gold was apparently less abundant than before. The last feature has long been known for the corresponding phase of culture in the west, and has sometimes, rather too readily, been put down to exhaustion of gold supplies from river sands.

FROM very early times the people of this region maintained the habit of cremating the dead, though the Celtic conquerors and others before them favoured interment. Indeed, we get an impression of persistence of the simple folk with a simple early culture under a long succession of conquerors. The connections with North Italy already important in the phase of transition from bronze to iron, and revived in marked fashion by the Celtic peoples, became Roman connections, and after much difficulty the Roman Empire brought the region into subjection, the Roman province of Dacia occupying most of modern Roumania except Bessarabia. It was under Roman rule from A.D. 107 to A.D. 255 with a lingering of that rule until the official evacuation in A.D. 270-275. The Romans were different from previous conquerors in that they developed regular communications and organised agricultural and military settlement, and in Roumania they found the ground as it were prepared for them by earlier Italian connections with Transylvania mentioned just above. Christianity, in this instance at first of western rather than eastern type was brought into Roumania and the clerical leaders no doubt promoted the persistence of Latin elements in the language and helped the more or less latinised peasantry to maintain itself and its Roman tradition for some centuries after direct Roman rule was withdrawn. In Gaul the bishops in their cities maintained a good deal of the Roman tradition through the Dark Ages when trade routes were cut by the advance of Islam and northern barbarians were giving very inexperienced treatment to the ills of a decayed Roman rule. But in the west so much was maintained that in the end the cities

175 revived with, under the circumstances, the Cathedral as their focus of expression. In Roumania fate worked out things differently. The seventh to the tenth century in east-central Europe saw much forest cutting and planting of villages, and the widespread languages of these settlers belonged to the Slavonic family which may have had its [197] early home in or near Polish Galicia. This linguistic influence penetrated Roumania and combined itself with the Latin heritage to make the later language of the country. Magyars passed through on their way to the Hungarian plain, and [184] Huns and Visigoths had gone that way before. So the local tradition weakened along the valley and lowland ways and kept itself alive in the highlands where still dwell people who are no doubt largely descendants of the primeval cultivators with many waves of culture washed over them but the Roman influence vital still.

346

Bell tower, Borsec.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

V.—PEOPLES AND SETTLEMENTS: THE POST-ROMAN PERIOD

101 MOUNTAIN REGIONS are often regarded as the refuges of conquered peoples and the repositories of cultures that once flourished in the plain, but although the highlands of Roumania have, from time to time, absorbed groups of folk for whom the lowlands offered insufficient security, the population of the Carpathian valleys must not be regarded as racial sweepings from the broad human highways of the Steppe. The long period of invasions that followed the withdrawal of the Roman legions from Dacia led to a concentration of Roumanians within the mountain areas of either Transylvania, whence they spread later to reoccupy the plain, or the Balkans, where their descendants, the Vlachs, still maintain their traditional form of life; but, since those early days, their numbers in the former region have been considerably diluted by Saxons and Szeklers who have come in not as refugees but as outposts against Tatar and Turk in what for long remained an eastward frontier zone of western Christianity.

175 OUR KNOWLEDGE of events during the Dark Ages is necessarily scanty, but it is clear that settled life on the open grasslands where, indeed, it was possible at all, was subject to constant interruptions. One of these interruptions, the result of Magyar pressure, is of special significance for the history of Roumania from both a political and a cultural point of view. The Magyar invaders of central Europe in the ninth century penetrated far to the west before meeting with any serious resistance. After their defeats at Merseburg in 933 and at Augsburg in 955, however, they fell back towards the Hungarian Plain, and about A.D. 1000 their Szekler advanced guards began to penetrate the hill country of Transylvania. In spite of their comparatively recent Asiatic origin, the Szeklers introduced certain features of western civilisation into their newly-acquired territory, particularly feudalism, which appears to have been the chief concomitant of the Roman Catholicism that they had adopted while in the plain.

175 79

THE spread of Roman Catholicism towards the east brought it into conflict in the eastern Carpathians with the Greek

175 795 Orthodox Church, which was extending its influence north-westwards. The ensuing struggle continued until the seventeenth century, when a compromise was effected and a new church, the Uniate, arose. Strictly speaking, this was a new branch of Roman Catholicism, for its members recognised the suzerainty of the Pope, although they kept the ritual of the Eastern Church (see Figure 7).

175 THESE contacts with the west were strengthened in the thirteenth century, when groups of Saxon crusaders settled in Transylvania at the invitation of the Magyar kings. They became established first of all near Alba Julia (Karlsburg), in the Mureş valley, and later on in the region of Mediaş (Medgyes) on the Tarnava Mare (Nagy küküllö); in the neighbourhood of Sibiu, which they named Hermannstadt; and near the mines of Rodna in the north. Feeling that the Carpathian frontier to the east and south was still insecure, Andrew II invited the Teutonic Knights to occupy strategic points that were undefended, with the result that Kronstadt (Braşov), commanding the Prahova valley, and Campulung were built. The Teutonic Knights quarrelled with the Magyar king, however, and left this area, which was taken over by the Saxons. The defence of the eastern Carpathians, with their two important passes of Ghimeş (Grymes) and Oituz (Oitoz), was entrusted to the Szeklers (see Figure 4).

BEHIND these frontier posts the Saxons were organised in seven colonies under the authority of a count, and they enjoyed various civil privileges in return for the military duties which they performed. The Szeklers were at first grouped in three colonies of a similar character in the tectonic basin of Treiscaune, but they were dislodged by the Tatars in the thirteenth century and sought refuge in the lowlands of Ciuc and Giurgiu where they are still numerically strong (see Figure 7).

DURING the early Middle Ages, the Roumanians were organised in semi-autonomous local groups, each village being under the charge of a chieftain or "kneas" (*pl.* knesi) who combined the functions of military leader, administrator and judge. Although stock-raising was the main occupation of these villagers, arable farming was also practised, and the meagre stretches of cultivable land were divided up amongst

175 the various families according to their needs. The pastures and forests, however, were kept in the hands of the community.

THE latter part of the thirteenth century was a critical period for these people; the Tatar invasions were over, and the Turkish invasion had not yet begun. Many of the Roumanian peasantry moved out from the mountains and re-established themselves in the foothills of the Carpathians and of the Transylvanian Alps. The pressure from the west was maintained, however, and the Roumanians became organised on a more strictly military basis. Much of the power of the knesi was usurped by the "boyars," a new military aristocracy that arose, whilst the peasants were gradually forced into a serfdom from which they were not emancipated for several centuries. The various kneaseates became united into small states, under the leadership of princes or "voivods," and were welded eventually into the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. The success was short lived, however, for by the end of the fourteenth century Wallachia had fallen under the control of the Turks, and Moldavia soon followed.

THE STRUGGLE against the Turkish invaders was long and bitter; the ways through the mountains needed constant vigilance; the necessity for maintaining a united front against a common foe strengthened the communal spirit; and it is not, therefore, surprising that the alien groups in Transylvania should have preserved their individuality to a remarkable degree. This is particularly noticeable in the case of the Saxons, whose settlements to-day are veritable microcosms of Germanic culture (see Plate V).

[101] ALTHOUGH they originally had a common purpose, these two racial groups of Saxons and Szeklers have remained very different in character, for whereas the Saxons are still very largely confined to the settlements which they established in the early Middle Ages, the political, and to some extent the ethnic, boundaries of the Szeklers have been enlarged from time to time until they now encompass a considerable area of Transylvania.

144 OF the early history of the Szeklers we know but little. Racially they appear to differ somewhat from the Magyars of the plain, and to approximate more to the Roumanians in

175
361



FIGURE 4. B — Brasov, C — Cluj, M — Miercurea Ciucului, O — Odorhei, R — Rodna, S — Sibiu, S-G — St. Gheorghe, T — Turda, T-M — Targu-Mureş, T-S — Targu-Secuesc. Passes: (1) Olt, (2) Prahova, (3) Oltuz, (4) Ghimeş.

144

head form, but whether this is due to the persistence of original characteristics or to partial fusion with the Roumanians it is impossible to say. At all events, they are essentially Magyar in culture, and accompanied the Magyars in their conquest of Hungary in the ninth century.

361
175

FIGURE 4 shows that their penetration of Transylvania followed the valleys of the Mureş and its tributaries, which

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

175
361



FIGURE 5. The distributions shown are only approximate, but they show the broad distinction between the typical Roumanian settlements ("dispersed" and "transitional") of the mountains and foothills and the compact Saxon and Szekler settlements of the Transylvanian lowlands.

175
361
178

led naturally towards the tectonic basins of Treiscaune, Ciuc and Giurgiu, though these were not actually occupied until the thirteenth century. The Szeklers did not, however, displace the indigenous Roumanian population in these lowland areas; neither have they maintained the same degree of "contiguous isolation" as have the Saxons. During the nineteenth century in fact, there has been a steady assimilation of the Roumanian peasantry, some measure of which may be gained from the fact that since the middle of the century a Roumanian majority has been changed into a Szekler majority in 169 communes, whereas the reverse process has been effected in only 28 communes. In the former case, large numbers of Roumanians have adopted the dress and religion of the Szeklers, but the Roumanian

137

FIGURE 6. This illustrates the sharp distinction between the forested highlands and the lowlands, and should be compared with Figures 5 and 7.

175
178
361

majorities have resulted from the valleyward movement of families that had previously farmed the slopes overlooking these intermont basins.

361 361 AN IMPORTANT distinction between the Roumanians and the rest of the population is seen in the types and distribution of their settlements (see Fig 5). The former, with their customary attachment to highland areas and to pastoral life, are usually associated with a dispersed or loosely agglomerated

361 type, whereas the truly compact or nucleated type is found only in regions settled by Saxons and Szeklers (see Fig. 8). It is difficult to determine how far this distinction is ethnographic and how far it is the product of differences between two sharply contrasted environments. Generally speaking, in eastern Transylvania the mountain population is Roumanian and the lower lands are peopled by Saxons and Szeklers, environments which would normally suit the dispersed and compact types respectively. On the other hand, the Roumanian steppe villages which one would expect to be

[162]



FIGURE 7. Although the statistics have had to be taken from two different periods they suggest a close correlation between nationality and religion in this section of the eastern Carpathians. The concentration of Roumanians in the hills and Szeklers in the plains is also very marked.

compact or nucleated differ from those of the Saxons and Szeklers in this important respect: whereas the houses in the latter are often contiguous, those in the former, although closely packed, are almost invariably detached. Even where the amount of space available for building is very limited the Roumanian prefers to surround his house with a garden, and, where ample space prevails, orchards in the foothills and the plain and hay meadows in the highlands tend still further to segregate the dwellings. In small upland basins such as that of Bilbor the "village" may occupy hundreds of

342

A plan of this farmstead is shown in Fig. 10, with which it should be compared.

German Farms in Cristian

[facing page 42]

acres, each house, apart from a small agglomeration around the church, being separated from its neighbours by what is almost an unfriendly distance.

THE most typical Roumanian settlement, then, is one that may be broadly described as "scattered," with a tendency towards dispersion in the mountains and nucleation in the plains. It is one that admirably suits the varied geographical conditions of the country, for it is essentially elastic and capable of adaptation to almost any environment. We shall have an opportunity of studying one more fully in Chapter VII.

IN the Eastern Carpathians it is generally true to say that on the west of the main water-divide all settlements above 800 metres are of the dispersed type, except where they command passes, whereas those on the floor of the tectonic basins are nucleated. The former, of course, are mainly inhabited by Roumanians, the latter by Szeklers. The intermediate zone, which would normally be characterised by villages of the "scattered" type, has become largely depopulated owing chiefly to erosion that has followed unregulated deforestation of the lower slopes (see page 27). Even on the floors of the basins, where the population density is greatest, villages are tending to desert the river banks and to become concentrated at the foot of the slopes on account of the flooding that has resulted from the increased run-off. Huge detrital fans are another by-product of the same process, and are seriously impinging upon the already limited stretches of cultivable land.

ON the Moldavian side of the water-divide the more characteristic form of "scattered" village prevails, though giving place in the plain to a more compact type, and higher up, where opportunity allows, to dispersion. Although there are several small highland areas of relatively flat land in the eastern Carpathians, there is nothing to compare with the great stretches of plateau in the western Carpathians, which have been cleared of forest and utilised for the cultivation of grain crops at an altitude which in the former will support only pastoral activities. And although permanent villages (of the dispersed type) are found as high as 1,200 metres in the Bihor, the only habitations at a corresponding height in the eastern Carpathians are the dairies of the transhumant shepherds that are occupied only during the summer months.

[p. 43 is blank]

349

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDi Rumania EDi

PLATE V

Brasov—the Market Place. Behind the shops rises the mediæval Gothic church, which contrasts strikingly with the churches of the Greek Orthodox communities. *Photo: Dr. C. P. Sandgrun.*

361



Cristian (formerly Neustadt), a typical Saxon compact village near Brasov. The individual farmsteads are placed closely together and present a somewhat forbidding appearance from the road. The well laid-out area in the foreground is the cemetery. *Photo: Rumanian Press*

[facing page 44]

233 221 TRANSHUMANCE has long played a prominent part in the pastoral life of the Carpathians, for agriculturally the region is marginal and it is not very unusual for the maize crop, which covers an astonishingly large proportion of the arable land, to fail to mature. Before the late war the flocks of the eastern Carpathians used to winter in the plains of Moldavia, Bessarabia, the Dobrogea and south Russia, more rarely in Transylvania. During the nineteenth century, however, many Roumanian shepherds stayed in the plain and formed the nuclei of small permanent Roumanian colonies outside the boundaries of Transylvania.

423 311 DURING the last few centuries there have been considerable changes in schemes of land holding. In the late eighteenth century the scattered possessions of the landlord class were consolidated into Latifundia. In the first half of the nineteenth century arable farming was extended into the Danubian plain and on the rich lands between Siret and Prut—in areas, that is to say, which had not been previously cultivated. This development progressed with the rise of an export trade in cereals to feed the industrial populations of the west. It is interesting to note that much of this newly-developed territory in Wallachia was organised on the system of métayage, the new colonists from the hills becoming tenants on a produce-sharing basis.

IN CONNECTION with this development, many of the Roumanian transhumant herdsmen gave up their pastoral life and settled as agriculturists or went into commerce. After 1918 the large estates were broken up and plots of land were given to the peasantry. This was the occasion for the return to Transylvania of some of the former emigrants who had gone to Wallachia and Moldavia, but naturally many features of the old life have disappeared, e.g. the July fairs that were formerly held high up in the mountains and did much to preserve the cultural heritage of the pastoral people.

[221] BUT, if large-scale seasonal migrations over long distances have declined, the short distance movements still play a vital part in the rural economy of the eastern Carpathians and fortunately have not as yet been divested of all their old-time ritual.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

PLATE VI

563
142
291

A group of Corbu children. The girls are Roumanians, the boys Gipsies, the broad-headedness of the former contrasting markedly with the narrow-headedness of the latter. *Photo: R. A. Pelham.*

A group of peasants at the Borsec Fair. The girl in the foreground is a Szekler, her costume contrasting with those of the Roumanian women behind. *Photo: Miss M. Oddie.*

[facing page 45]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

VI.—ECONOMIC ROUMANIA

AGRICULTURE.

311 162 MODERN ROUMANIA is essentially an agricultural state, as was the Old Kingdom (43 to 46 per cent of the land being arable and 22 per cent forest, whilst over 80 per cent of the population of 18 millions are agricultural workers), although it has valuable potentialities for the development of industry.

132 241 134 ARRANGED in zones round the bastion of the southern and eastern Carpathian highlands, the main agricultural regions of post-war Roumania exhibit, according to aspect and altitude, a considerable variety of climatic conditions, which is reflected in a varying emphasis in the selection of crops raised. In general, we may say that the continental nature of the climate and the resulting succession from north to south and from highland to lowland of soils, graded from poor ashen-grey podsol in the Carpathians through oak-forest loams to a rich chernoziom in the south-eastern Danube plains, has resulted, wherever the ground is sufficiently level, in a concentration on grain production. The heavier rainfall of the uplands, the relatively great humidity and shelter from the driving winds that sweep across the open plains, coupled with the exposure of less [137] fertile rocks—granites and coarse sandstones—explains the large area of forested land (24.5 per cent, nearly 7¼ million hectares) in those districts that extend into the Carpathian highlands.

243 OF THE 13 odd million hectares of arable land, cereals occupy some 37 to 39 per cent. Production varies greatly from year to year and from district to district. In the old kingdom of Wallachia-Moldavia, maize is by far the heaviest crop, particularly in Oltenia, where the summer rainfall is heavier. It is also the heaviest crop in Transylvania, the cultivated areas under maize, wheat, barley and oats being [262] respectively 4, 3, 2 and 1 million hectares. Maize is the staple crop of the peasant holder almost throughout the country, for it not only provides the bread cakes and the "mamaliga," maize pudding, the main food of the mass of the people, but also fodder for the cattle to eke out the hay in

243
372]

the winter; moreover, the annual life of this cereal is short, freeing the ground for other uses. In the plains, the maize stalks are used for fuel. The proportion of land devoted to maize has therefore increased since the agrarian reforms and the expropriation of much of the land of the large landowners.

THIS CONCENTRATION on maize production by the peasant farmer has its dangers, besides handicapping the country from the point of view of export. In a succession of dry summers a poor maize crop has a disastrous result where there are no root crops and no winter wheat to fall back on. The cultivation of potatoes and lucerne is being encouraged, but peasant farming is backward throughout the kingdom, though less so in Transylvania and the Bucovina than in the Old Kingdom.

THE MOST intensive maize cultivation is found in the departments of Gorj and Valcea and Muşcel in Oltenia (the sheltered valleys of foothill country of Oltenia) and that of Bacau in the upper Trotuş basin of Moldavia. In these districts, where the annual rainfall is in the neighbourhood of 600 mm., with an early summer rain maximum and a dry autumn, over 50 per cent of the agricultural land cultivated is under maize; but, with the exception of the Black Sea coastlands, the bulk of Roumania has only between 30 and 50 per cent of the cultivable land under cultivation devoted to maize. True, in the higher valleys of the Carpathians, the maize not infrequently fails to ripen, owing to the early onset of cool weather, but early ripening species of maize are sown in the Carpathian valleys. Again, a dry spring and early summer is a grave menace to the crop. It is unfortunate that the least nourishing and latest ripening type of maize is, owing to its high yield, that most favoured by the Vlachian peasant.

WHEAT.

IT IS only in Transylvania that wheat assumes a rôle approaching in importance in the peasant agricultural régime to that of maize. It was being cultivated, however, before the War on an increasing scale, on the large estates of Muntenia, where the steppe type of climate and rich soil conditions (chernoziom on loess and the black and brown

243 soils of the oak forest) prevail, and where the low rainfall is inimical to maize cultivation. Wheat is an important crop also on the well-drained soils of the Tertiary loess-covered plateau, on which chernoziom also develops, between the Prut and Siret. Here, below 1,000 feet, wheat is extensively grown, for here again the climate approximates to the steppe type. Grain began to be exported from the Danube plain depression in appreciable quantities only in 1833, the year of the great Russian famine, but in thirty years it had taken the place of grazing land and meadow over all the Black Earth region. The breaking up of the large estates, however, and the unsettled conditions during and since the War have checked the development of large-scale wheat production for export. After the War, the production of grain of all sorts fell off heavily as a result partly of a heavy tax imposed on grain export, partly of uneconomic farming due to the subdivision of estates, partly of the Government's taking over the marketing of wheat and rye and fixing prices for those commodities—a policy which discouraged production of these crops by the peasants, who concentrated on the production of maize, with barley and oats for home consumption in the wetter highlands. In any case, the yield of wheat in regions of steppe climate varies enormously from year to year with the winter and spring precipitation, and even during the period of normal progress in the decade preceding the War the export varied between nearly 2 million tons and less than 200,000. In spite of the rich soils, the yield per acre is small judged by western European standards.

BARLEY does very well as a peasant fodder crop in the dry south-east of the Old Kingdom, and is a crop of some importance in Transylvania (1½ to 2 million hectares). In Moldavia and Oltenia under moister conditions, the high starch content makes it useful for brewing, and it is grown mainly on the larger estates.

248 HEMP AND FLAX are grown, the latter decreasingly, by the peasants for use in domestic textile industry. Imported cotton yarn has largely taken the place of linen.

245 As regards the vine—the best grapes for wine are produced in small holdings in the hill country of Transylvania (chiefly produced by the Saxon communities), Wallachia and

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

291

Captain and crew. *Photo: Dr. C. P. Snodgrass.*

137
133

Passengers.

These two photographs give a good impression of the gorge-like character of the transverse section of the Bistrita where it is cutting through crystalline schists. *Photo: R. A. Pelham.*

[facing page 48]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDI Rumania EDI

PLATE VIII

133



Shooting the rapids on the Bistrita.

Photo: Dr. H. Grothy.

241

Harvesting by hand on the level Danube plains.

Photo: Roumanian Press.

The above illustrations from blocks kindly loaned by the R.R.C.

291

Spinning with a distaff—an occupation symbolical of the traditional life of the Roumanian peasantry in the hill country.

Photo: H. J. Howard.

[Facing page 45]

245 Moldavia, where the spring and copious early summer rains and the luminous late summer provide advantageous conditions. The use of American stocks, resistant to the phylloxera, has proved successful particularly in Moldavia. Bessarabia supplies about 40 per cent of the acreage under vines, and Wallachia about 23 per cent. The quality of the wine is much below the quality of the grapes, the peasant finding the production of ţuica, a spirit simply distilled from the ubiquitous plum, a less difficult and exacting undertaking. There is no export of wine worth mentioning.

231 BEFORE the Great War the rearing of animals, which had played an important part in the economy of Roumania in the early nineteenth century (providing an export to Turkey of sheep and horses from the lower Danube lands and of army horses to Prussia) had been giving way rapidly to grain cultivation. Since the War, however, the number of sheep, cattle and horses has increased, in spite of the great losses in the areas overrun by the enemy. The subdivision of the land into small holdings has been a factor in the increase of animals, for every peasant aims at having a few sheep, a couple of cows and a pig or two. In Transylvania, the development of cattle breeding had been scientifically encouraged, breeds peculiarly suited to various districts being improved. There are three types of permanent pasture in Roumania—the flood plain pastures of the Baltea and of the wider valleys in general, available for grazing in the winter and spring, the permanent meadows of the plains, which can be grazed only in the spring before the summer drought sets in, and the high pastures in the forest clearings, available during the summer months. The provision of winter fodder where the flood plains are not available is a serious problem, and one to which the Ministry of Agriculture is turning serious attention, for the cultivation of fodder crops is very little developed. Hay is harvested painfully one to three times in the year in the rich alpine pastures of the Carpathian valleys and is eked out in the peasant communities with maize stalks and straw. The small mountain cattle are the best milkers but of not much service for draught or for butchers' meat. The sheep is far more important in the peasant economy, providing cheese, wool for the domestic loom and mutton—for the most part dried. In Transylvania the cattle are mainly of the Hungarian steppe type with a

considerable admixture of cross-bred Swiss. On the Wallachian plains we find a cross between the Moldavian cattle of the plains and the Hungarian type which gives good milk, is easily fattened for market, and makes a good draught animal. Throughout the Danube plains the powerful water buffalo is important for draught purposes and for milk, and may be seen frequently also in the Transylvanian plains.

FOREST.

RICH in ploughland and not ill-provided with pasture, Roumania is fortunate in a third type of land utilisation which brings her vast acreage of mountainous upland into service. Forest covers about one-quarter of the land surface. Its greatest development occurs on the sandstones of the Flysch formation. Coniferous trees clothe the higher slopes above 1,400 metres, particularly on the Moldavian and Bucovinan frontiers of Transylvania. Below the coniferous forest zone with its peaty, acid soils, stretches the zone of beech forest, mixed, on its lower edge, with oak. (It is the beech forest that has given its name to Bucovina.) Here the characteristic soil is the leached, ashen-grey podsol, yielding poor crops in the clearings unless heavily manured. This zone tongues up the valleys into the coniferous zone. It widens to 100 kilometres in the Siret and Olt basins, but narrows in Muntenia, where the high mountains drop abruptly to the agricultural plains. The beech, unfortunately, has little economic value, and to this, with its poor soil, may be attributed the survival of so large a part of the beech forest. Its chief use is for firewood.

THE OAK FOREST on the lower slopes and foot hills, with its relatively rich brown soils, has naturally suffered most at the hands of settlers, and survives to-day mainly on the ridge combs and hill-tops. There are several species of oak, and hornbeam, lime and elm appear here and there in the oak forest with beech and birch on the upper margin of distribution. In Transylvania the lower hill country has been practically cleared of forest.

TIMBER is one of the mainstays of life of the peasant. All the constructional work of his village—dwelling house, barns,

313 church, fencing, roofing, flooring, is of timber, and also many of his household utensils: water-buckets, jugs, spoons, etc.

It is very unfortunate that the most lucrative type of timber should be the most inaccessible. Timber from the great stands of pine has to take the slow and tortuous route down the rivers in rafts (see Plates VII and VIII) to the Danube and Black Sea. Afforestation has not reached a high stage of development as yet. The trees are propagated by naturally-sown seeds, and there are very few nurseries. Where the clearings are made, the stumps are left in the ground to add to the difficulties of the hay harvester.

221 We may sum up the tale of Roumania's agricultural assets by saying that she is well endowed by nature as regards soils and climatic conditions for the wide-spread production of grain, fruit and vegetables; that natural pasture, whether upland or lowland, is seasonal and insufficient for a satisfactory development of cattle raising, though much may be done by an intensified cultivation of fodder crops. The increased provision of communal grazing for the peasants has been a useful step. Conditions are better for sheep, which are more adaptable than cattle and are better able to stand the rigours of the hard winter. Transhumance is everywhere practised with these animals: those of the great plains moving from the Danube lowlands in the spring to the hill pastures in the summer. Local transhumance of cattle, sheep and pigs from villages of the upland valleys to the high dairies is the rule.

Land Tenure.

241 123 Agricultural conditions, past and present, and the marketing of the products of land-utilisation are so closely bound up with conditions of land tenure that it is relevant to include here a short summary of those conditions.

In the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the Great War, 50 per cent of the land of Old Roumania was in large holdings (over 250 acres), and in the Bucovina, where the Roumanian peasants' holdings were pitiably small, 60 per cent. About 40 per cent of the holdings were of less than twenty-five acres. In Old Roumania and Transylvania the average was only eight acres per family, in the grain lands of Bessarabia eleven, but in the Bucovina uplands

241
423 only three and a half. But 50 per cent of the registered large holdings were farmed in small parcels by peasants who paid rent largely in kind or in services to absentee landlords or large tenant holders, mainly Jews, to whom the land had been farmed out. Such an arrangement often meant a considerable return to the landowner or direct farmer at the
243 expense of the peasant labourer. On the large holdings wheat was the main crop, only about 14 per cent of the maize in Old Roumania being grown on large holdings. There are a number of reasons for this. First, more capital is required for the cultivation of wheat; wheat seed grain costs ten times as much as maize for an equal area; then, in the higher lands, where the smaller holdings are to be found, the heavier rainfall and shorter growing period is more conducive to maize cultivation than to that of wheat. Again, the traditional staple food of the peasant is the easily prepared "mamaliga" or maize pudding, and the difficulty of persuading a peasant people to change their habits of life is well known, also the heavy animal fodder provided by maize is an important consideration for the peasant. And lastly, where the maintenance of life is dependent on an adequate winter store, the peasant is more concerned with securing that tangible store than with providing a cash crop with which to acquire luxuries. The large farmer, on the other hand, was mainly concerned in producing a surplus crop of wheat for export.

423 BETWEEN 1916 and 1926 a great redistribution of land in the interest of the peasants took place both in Old Roumania and in the newly-acquired territories. Such a redistribution in a land with important ethnical minorities has naturally given rise to much discontent among the dispossessed landlords and as naturally forms the basis of much political discussion and unrest and endless propaganda by all parties. But we are only concerned here with the economic results of the redistribution.

423 IT MUST be recognised that the change from large- to small-
241 scale farming, however advantageous to the peasant against whom the scales had always been weighted in the past, means a change in the character of the land cultivation, and though farming methods even on the large farms cannot be said to have been very enlightened, a certain amount of

423 capital expenditure on the provision of machinery, artificial
241 manures and so forth had been possible, and labour was cheap and available when required. With the small holding, these advantages can be acquired only by means of a highly-organised co-operative system and a controlled credit organisation, and there is no doubt that there has been a set-back in productiveness of large sections of the land. The large holders have been greatly handicapped in the exploitation of their land, moreover, first by government restrictions in the matter of wheat export, and second, by the great slump in wheat prices, probably also by inclement weather conditions. As a result there has been a drop of over 12 per cent in 1933 in the acreage under wheat and a corresponding rise in that under maize and barley.

241 To GET the best out of Roumanian agricultural land, im-
322 proved communications is one of the first essentials, for the removal of surplus crops, for the supply of artificial manures, particularly nitrates, and for the spread of agricultural education. The Roumanian peasant is backward in farming methods and requires help, both educational and financial, in such matters as seed selection and manuring. He uses too light a plough to get the best results from the soil and for the conservation of moisture in the soil. A system of irrigation would be of immense benefit not only in the plains but also in the valleys of the uplands. Of course, lacking the great reservoirs of water in snowfield and glacier and lake with which Switzerland and Austria are endowed, the perennial irrigation which is common in those lands cannot be so easily obtained, though much more utilisation might be made of the streams if the peasantry were more enlightened in their use. Large-scale irrigation works would necessitate the construction of reservoirs in the major river valleys to store the surplus rains of spring and early summer and the snow melt. Control of the streams is a very urgent matter, for the amount of damage they cause, in the sudden floods to which they are liable, to roads, bridges and to arable land is enormous. One of the great difficulties that the engineers have to deal with, and this may also be an important consideration in reservoir construction, is the friability of the rock material in most of the foot-hill country of the Carpathians. (This was illustrated very forcibly in a journey by car from Vatra Dornei through the Campulung district.)

Dry farming is practised to some extent, but is capable of development in the districts of semi-steppe.

Co-operation.

Although it is not by any means reduced to a science, as in Belgium and Denmark, for example, co-operation is practised by the Roumanian peasant farmer to an important extent. In Transylvania and Bessarabia, the system has for long been well established, owing to the initiative and encouragement of village priests and schoolmasters. For example, there are community herds of water buffaloes, which tend to prevent deterioration of the breed. The forest industry is in the main run by co-operative societies which control the felling, local distribution and marketing of timber.

In 1931 there were 5,200 popular co-operative banks, with over 1,150,000 members; 236 forest co-operative societies, with about 341,600 members; 1,600 consumption and supply co-operative societies, with 236,000 members; besides a number of village buying and leasing associations.

Much has been done, and efforts are continuing by propaganda and instruction, to encourage more up-to-date methods among the peasant farmers and there are a number of schools for primary instruction in agricultural method. Modern farm machinery is loaned by the Ministry of Agriculture to peasants for small fees, stud farms have been established to improve the breed of horses and cattle, and funds have been loaned to the peasant communities for the purchase of stud animals.

Industry.

From the point of view of power and raw materials for the development of industry, Roumania is also well endowed by nature. True, her supply of coal is negligible, the only deposit worth mention being that of the brown coal basin of Jiul at Lupeni in Oltenia, which is capable of producing about two million tons per annum. (The output in 1933 was in the neighbourhood of 1.4 million metric tons.) It contains much sulphur but is used to some extent in iron smelting. On the other hand, there are very rich stores of mineral oil. The oil-bearing rocks occur in abundance along the outer rim of the Carpathians in lower Miocene deposits which are

135 rich in salts. More accessible than these deposits are those of the sub-Carpathian hill country where upper Tertiary rocks are intensely folded in with salt-bearing Flysch deposits and have become impregnated with oil from the salt formations of the Flysch that has been forced up along lines of folding and fracture. Exploitation is mainly confined to the oil of these Pliocene rocks.

315 THE MAJOR oil-field follows the Carpathian arc from the neighbourhood of Piteşti through Târgovişte, Ploeşti in Muntenia and northward through Bacau in Moldavia to the Polish frontier (i.e. within the districts of Dambovița, Prahova, Buzau and Bacau in the Trotuş valley). There is also a small field in the Maramureş district.

THE Prahova district is the most important, producing 65 to 70 per cent of the whole, while Dambovița produces about 25 per cent. Pre-war development of oil industry was mainly in the hands of foreigners. By the 1929 Mining Law equality of Roumanian and foreign capital is provided. By an Act of 1924 the subsoil became the property of the State, which grants new leases for a period of thirty years. The State has acquired oil plot zones as permanent reserves. Oil getting is proceeding on up-to-date lines. Deeper strata are being tapped as the upper one becomes exhausted. Modern wells now reach down to about 1,800 metres. In Prahova and Dambovița State concessions are the most productive and active (e.g. Moveni and Gura-Ocnitsei). The total output of crude oil in 1933 was 7.37 million metric tons, 19.7 of the total oil products being used for home consumption.

NATURAL GAS is also tapped in the oil-fields for gasolene and for domestic lighting and heating. It is largely used in the chemical industry. Transylvania has no oil of importance, but some useful gas-fields. Crude oil is used for steam raising in the metallurgical industry and for generating electricity: it also figures as fuel in the tile and pottery industry. Oil- and petrol-driven machinery is installed in electric factories, in pottery and tile works, and particularly in the alimentary industries.

313 TIMBER, owing to the lack of good communications and to the abundance and lavish use of the forests, remains an important item in the production of power, particularly in

313 the small industries of the remoter upland districts. It is particularly important in the wood and pulp and paper industries, and in the small textile and pottery works. Charcoal is still used for smelting.

377 ELECTRICITY is mainly generated thermally, in spite of the great potentialities of water-power provided by the rivers from the Carpathians, not to mention the Danube current. Lack of natural reservoirs in snow-field, glacier and lake means that exploitation of the hydro-electric resources would entail enormous capital expenditure in the construction of reservoirs. The sum total of direct water-power used must, however, be very great, for the number of water-wheels is legion.

317 SALT is another asset of real importance. Like the mineral oil, it is found in greatest abundance, and is most accessible, in the upper Tertiary deposits of the sub-Carpathians, in the region of greatest disturbance. Sometimes it is exposed in cliffs, sometimes it is covered with thin layers of loam. Salt mines are being worked at Slanic, at Targu-Ocna (Tergu Ocnei) in the Trotuş basin, and at Ocnele-Mare (Ocna) on
316 the Olt. In 1932 the amount extracted was 288,000 metric tons, of which 240,500 tons were for home consumption, the rest being exported to the Balkan countries and to Russia. Salt mining and marketing are state monopolies.

IN iron ore Roumania is not rich, the output being only about 90,000 tons per annum. The most important deposits lie in the mountains of the Banat and in the Poiana Ruscai (Ruszka) massif farther north, between the Mureş and the Bistra (Bisztra) tributary of the Timiş (Temes). The Reciţa (Reciţa Montana) district in the Banat mountains, opening towards Hungary, has foundries and steel works employing about 15,000 hands.

WITH the recent rise in the price of gold, the mining of that metal, which formerly was almost negligible, has become more active, and the output reached nearly 4,000 kgs. in 1933. The ore is mined in the Trachyte massif of the Bihor.

433 IN SPITE of considerable advantages in natural resources, and solicitous nursing on the part of the State, particularly in the Old Kingdom, industry in Roumania is still in its

infancy. The mass of the people—the peasants—still supply their own modest wants almost entirely. The women make, in their own homes, the garments required by the household for summer and winter, using home-spun wool and home-woven cotton. A village expert fashions the leather embroidered coats worn by men and women alike. In the mountains, often the foot-gear is still of local manufacture. (Hats and shoes are mainly imported from the town, however.) Houses are made of locally-felled and sawn timber, and all the household utensils and furniture, except the crockery, are made in the village.

THERE is little accumulated capital in the country, and it is natural that modern industrial developments should tend to be based on local raw materials and traditional skill. Home-grown wheat, maize and barley feed the flour-milling and brewing industries which are well developed. There are about 400 large flour mills, steam driven and capable of producing graded flour. These are mainly in the Old Kingdom and grind wheat chiefly. The wheat districts of Bessarabia and Bucovina have a number of modern mills, as well as a large number of windmills, but the maize districts still use the old-fashioned water-mills, which can only grind coarse meal. The brewing industry has been encouraged by the government, partly with the idea of reducing the consumption of the potent alcoholic beverage, "ţuica", which the peasants distil from plums. Most of the breweries are either in Bucureşti and Iaşi or in one of the larger Saxon towns of Transylvania. Potato and maize spirit are made on a large scale, particularly in Transylvania, for export.

FOR POTTERY MAKING the Dobrogea supplies a good kaolin, but the industry has not reached a high stage of development, although the ancient peasant pottery has much merit in form and decoration. This is due in part to lack of suitable fuel for the furnaces.

WITH the acquisition of Transylvania, Roumania has become independent in the matter of that most important constructional commodity, cement.

THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY is still backward. The post-war development is chiefly in the Banat, where, under protection, silk, artificial silk, cotton and wool have made

288 progress. The production of cocoons is in the neighbourhood of half a million pounds weight per annum. The production of boots and shoes is sufficient to supply the home market, but the quality is poor.

FOREIGN TRADE.

ROUMANIA produces in bulk for export three things: timber, grain and oil. The market for timber is the eastern Mediterranean and chiefly Egypt. Where good rail communications are lacking, the timber is moved from the forested Carpathians by water. Much is floated down the various tributaries of the Siret to Galaţi and the Black Sea. It is unfortunate that up-stream transport to western
439 markets for this bulky commodity should be so difficult, while in the Levant it has to meet the severe competition of cheap Russian timber. In the up-stream markets there has been keen competition from Jugoslavia and Poland. Cheap rail freights and abatement of export tax are means taken to combat the retrogression of the trade.

WITH REGARD to trade in grain, Roumania suffers in common with all grain-surplus producing countries. Before the War the lower Danube and Black Sea grain trade was closely linked with the demand for British coal in the Mediterranean countries, the return cargo ensuring cheap freights for a more or less regular supply. The slump in the British coal trade, the check on production brought about by the break up of large estates, a series of bad harvests, and finally a world slump in grain prices, which reduced the export price of wheat below that of the home market, all these factors have been at work in reducing the wheat trade of Roumania and producing a consistent decrease in the average value per ton. Poor transport facilities and port equipment have also acted adversely in the moving of timber and grain.

THE EXPORT of petroleum increased from 2.8 million tons in 1929 to 5.6 million tons in 1933, drilling activities having increased, especially in the Dambovița district. The port of Constanța has been considerably improved by the installation of 10-inch pipe-lines, the construction of oil reservoirs, the fitting of special hose-handling cranes and the doubling of the railway track between Cernavoda and Constanța.

000 AN IMPROVED world situation with regard to oil would benefit Roumania very greatly, for the oil industry may fairly be said to be the one industry of the country which has developed to the stage of maturity.

TRANSPORT.

489 THE TRANSPORT of the country is organised, where it is organised, from the standpoints of trade, administration and defence, but from all these standpoints re-orientation has been necessary since the acquisition of new territories, and so far achievement has only been very partial. In measuring the extent of progress the great engineering difficulties and immense cost of construction in so mountainous a country where disastrous floods are a common feature must not be forgotten.

487 THE OLD KINGDOM developed its lines of communication as a purely agricultural country with a grain and timber surplus for export. Its natural markets were the industrialised countries of west-central and western Europe, where grain and timber could be exchanged for manufactured goods. The Danube river seems at first sight to offer the natural line of communication to the west, but its swift current has always been an obstacle to up-stream traffic, especially before the days of high-powered river-craft, and the still greater obstacles of the Iron Gate reefs and the Klissura gorges and cataracts have always prevented the full use of the waterway. Through the gorges of the Banat, Trajan's hanging road is replaced by the fine metalled Szecheny road built by Hungarian engineers a hundred years ago, but there is no railway along the river except for the small stretch between Orşova and Turnu Severin, the marsh and lagoon and loose sand of the lower Danube valley present conditions that have from early times diverted traffic away from the almost bridgeless river. From Roman times the Cerna and Timiş valley route has been the more important western exit from the lower Danube plains. The Roman bridge at Turnu Severin gave access to the Jiu basin and the Valcan (Vulkan) pass. Both these are important railway routes to-day.

AN ALTERNATIVE to the up-stream route, and one which gives full advantage to bulk cargoes utilising the Danube, is that via the Black Sea and Mediterranean, and thus we

find that, in spite of the classical importance of the Danube valley as the link between the Orient and the west of Europe, the Black Sea ports drew the trade of the Lower Danube and Siret basins and established a traffic with the Mediterranean and north-western lands which increased in importance until the Great War. A two-way traffic in Danube grain and British coal gave a great advantage to British merchants and British shipping, the only other shipping engaged in the lower Danube traffic, that under the Greek flag, coming a long way behind. Partly as a result of the cessation of her Mediterranean coal trade, and partly as a result of energetic development of Greek, Italian (carrying mail) and Roumanian shipping lines (the last two subsidised), Great Britain in 1933 stood fourth on the list, being outstripped by Roumania itself, which has recently purchased a couple of 8,000 ton Hamburg-America liners. Braila and Galaţi, the two grain ports of Wallachia and Moldavia (which, with a depth of 20 to 24 feet, can accommodate 6,000 ton ocean-going steamers) have up-to-date equipment, the former catering mainly for the Prut river traffic of Bessarabia and the latter for the larger Wallachian hinterland. A large number of small grain ports on the Danube remain so far with but primitive equipment. Constanţa, on the Black Sea, has received most of the attention of the Government, in the form of petrol basins, pipe-lines, dredging, etc. It is, of course, a rail port and has thus the advantage over the ports of Braila and Galaţi when the Danube and Prut are frozen, as they usually are from December or January till March, or in summer when the water is low. Over a period of forty-seven years there were only eleven years when the rivers remained open.

THE SIRET, which debouches at Braila, is unfortunately unnavigable, and can only be used for floating timber, which is shipped in ocean-going vessels at Galaţi. The port of Sulina and the channel between that port and Braila, entirely under the administration of the European Commission of the Danube, has recently been much improved, and traffic on the Sulina arm has accordingly improved too. It is, however, feared that, in spite of the extension of the moles, the persistent silting at the Sulina outlet will render necessary the diversion of the Sulina cut to an outlet five miles to the south.

496 499 ROUMANIA has had a hard and costly task in the restoration of her railways and rolling stock to pre-War efficiency. This has been accomplished, and, in addition, steps have been taken towards the re-orientation of communications necessitated by the change of frontiers. A new line is under construction to link Braşov in Transylvania with Buzau and so with the Danube and Black Sea ports. It should play an important rôle in the movement of timber. The Olt valley line from Sibiu is being linked with that which runs from Bucureşti up the Argeş valley to shorten the journey from Bucureşti to Arad and western Europe. It is planned also to link up the Reciţa iron district with the Jiu valley coal field and bring both into closer communication with the capital.

491 ALTHOUGH there has been great progress in the reconstruction and improvement of the railways, road transport is still frankly bad. Only about 17 per cent of the roadways of the country are metalled and can be described as in fairly good condition. The bulk of the roads are mere dirt tracks, which vary in their resistance to frost and rain according to whether they lie on the dusty chernoziom, the loose brown soils or the more cohesive and better-drained podsol.

HILDA ORMSBY, D.Sc. (Econ.)

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

VII.—CORBU: A CARPATHIAN VILLAGE

I. THE COMMUNE AND ITS INHABITANTS

Position.

The village of Corbu is situated in the eastern Carpathians at a height of 700 metres above sea-level. It stands just to the east of the main water divide, and in pre-war days was included within Austro-Hungarian territory, the boundary cutting across the Bistricioara valley a few miles below the village.

The commune sits astride one of the Carpathian passes, the Bistricioara valley linking up with that of the Mureş on the one hand and of the Bistriţa on the other to form a continuous route from Transylvania to the Moldavian Plain. Its position naturally made it the centre of a good deal of fighting during the War, and the blasted spruces on the slopes above the village are grim mementoes of the struggles that took place.

Physical Features.

The physical geography of the commune is comparatively simple. The Bistricioara river, which cuts the commune into two unequal segments, is the principal feature. On either side it receives tributary valleys for the most part normal in profile, though in one or two cases a steep-sided and narrow lower section gives place higher up to somewhat broader, flat-bottomed stretches. Indeed, the upper Bistricioara itself winds its way through a fairly extensive intermont basin of this kind in the commune of Bilbor just before entering that of Corbu.

At one point the main valley is constricted by an outcrop of Porphyry which appears formerly to have extended right across the present course of the Bistricioara. It has been breached, however, leaving a truncated spur running out from the south side of the valley and affording excellent views both up- and down-stream. Largely as a result of deforestation the crystalline schistose and gneissic slopes which rise steeply on either side of the main valley are scored with numerous re-entrants, the masses of detrital

133 material eroded therefrom being spread out fanwise along
361 the edge of the alluvium. Higher up, small alp-like terraces appear, giving place to precipitous slopes once more where calcareous rocks of Triassic and Jurassic age occur.

132 CONCERNING climate and vegetation little need be added to
361 the accounts already given of the Eastern Carpathians as a whole. In the case of climate the most important features to be borne in mind are the risk of late summer storms that limit the ripening period for grain, and the winter snowfall which creates a close season for agriculture.

THE VILLAGE.

361 CORBU has been tentatively classified as a "dispersed" type of village, though it is clear from the photographs (Plate IX) that the narrowness of the valley has rather limited the extent of the dispersion and has given rise to a plan resembling that of the "street village" of Western Europe. Closer examination, however, will reveal a certain looseness of structure, especially where a slight widening of the valley occurs near the confluence of a tributary stream, and it is very probable that if the same village had been founded in a broad flat upland area the houses would have been spread out as in Bilbor (see Plate I).

PEASANT HOUSES.

342 A GROUP of typical Roumanian farmsteads is illustrated in Plate X whilst the plan on page 67 shows in detail the lay-out of the one depicted on page 43. The principal features in each case are clear. The dwelling houses, of which there are frequently two to a farm, can usually be distinguished by their bright colour-washed walls. There is an abundance of local stone, but the crystalline rocks that are nearest to hand are very intractable, and, although they are employed for the foundations, the superstructure is almost invariably of wood. In Lower Borsec, which is just visible in the distance in Plate IX, an outcrop of Travertine provides a much more easily-worked material, and is very freely employed, but its use does not appear to extend into Corbu. The walls of the Corbu houses are usually built of roughly-squared, less frequently of sawn, timber, to which, in the better-class houses, laths are nailed to form a key for

361



FIGURE 8. The amorphous plan of Corbu contrasts strongly with the more orderly and compact village of the plain. Cristian is near Braşov.

the plaster with which the exterior is then coated. In the poorer houses the gaps between the timbers are merely caulked with clay before a colour-wash is applied.

THE most popular type of roofing material is shingles, which is a welcome contrast to the sheet iron of the plain, though perhaps less picturesque than the steeply-pitched roofs of thatch that are a feature of other mountainous parts of the country. On some of the houses, usually those of the poorer inhabitants, shingles are replaced by longer boards which sometimes extend from ridge to eaves, all three types being illustrated in Plate X.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

361
133

Corbu—view from top of porphyry spur looking down-stream. Arable land on the valley floor is devoted mainly to the cultivation of maize. On the right in the foreground lucerne is seen stacked on poles. The lower portions of the steep hill-sides have been cleared for hay meadows, but continuous stretches of forest clothe the upper slopes.

Photo: R. A. Pelham.

Corbu—looking upstream towards Borsec.

Photo: R. A. Pelham.

[facing page 64]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

133



Fig. 9

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDI Rumania EDI

PLATE X

Hay meadows on deforested slopes above the limits of cultivation at Corbu. Although this is the upper section of a valley tributary to that of the Bistricioara, it is much broader than the narrowly constricted lower section. *Photo: R. A. Pelham.*



Typical Roumanian farmsteads in Corbu. The houses are roofed with shingles, the outbuildings with boards. The house in the centre has the characteristic louvre in place of chimney, and its walls are of timber with plaster covering. Hemp is drying on the verandah. The mud caulking in the outbuilding is clearly visible. *Photo: R. A. Pelham.*

A MARKED FEATURE is the comparative absence of chimneys. The cooking is done in an outhouse, no doubt to minimise the risk of fire, but the dwelling house is generally heated by a stove, the smoke from which passes up through the ceiling in an iron pipe and then escapes into the open air through holes cut in the gable ends or, in the case of a hipped roof, through a small louvre.

THE OUTHOUSES are for the most part simple structures and call for no special comment.

CLEANLINESS and simplicity are the keynotes of the domestic economy. Household effects are kept down to a minimum, but upon their manufacture an enormous amount of time and skill is lavished, especially in the case of textiles. The skilfully-woven designs on the tapestries and pillows shown Plate XVI are an illustration of such effort.

POPULATION.

ACCORDING to the 1930 census Corbu had a population of 1,563, distributed among 358 households. The majority of the inhabitants are, of course, Roumanians, for the commune lies right on the fringe of the Szekler country. In spite of having lived in close association with the Roumanians for many generations, however, the Szeklers are easily distinguished by their dress, their physical type (though this is by no means an infallible guide), their adherence to Roman Catholicism, and, of course, their language. Although culturally there is an appreciable difference between the Roumanian and Szekler peasantry, there is to-day an even wider gap between these folk and the Tsiganes or Gipsies who form a much smaller, though very interesting, minority. Generally speaking, the Roumanians contribute a dark, and the Szeklers a fair, element to the broad-headed population, whereas the Gipsies are for the most part distinctly long-headed and very dark. There is an equally well-marked difference on economic grounds, for both Roumanians and Szeklers are essentially peasants, whereas the Gipsy, being landless, is compelled to seek a livelihood by trading, unless he be either smith or musician, following the traditional pursuits of his forbears (see Plate VI).

THE HOUSES occupied by Gipsies, while resembling in style those of the peasants, can usually be recognised by the

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

CORBU

PLAN OF PEASANT FARMSTEAD

342



Fig. 10

342 absence of small fields, although a vegetable garden is a
563 normal feature. Most of them are grouped together in a small colony on a piece of steeply-sloping ground near the western end of the village that could not be used for agricultural purposes, thus emphasising the fact that they constitute an exotic element living on the outskirts of the community (see Plate XII and Fig. 11).

311 THERE is no emigration from Corbu, but the tendency is to extend cultivation by forest-cutting. A good deal of land in the Bistricioara valley is still available.

II. FARMING ACTIVITIES

THE LAND AND INHERITANCE.

428 FARMING in Corbu is carried on essentially for subsistence
241 rather than for profit. Large-scale cultivation with its attendant economies would in any case be difficult in such an environment, but it is rendered impossible by a land tenure system, intimately bound up with laws of inheritance, which permits the subdivision of land from generation to generation. On the death of the father the widow receives a quarter of the estate, the remainder being divided equally amongst all the children. Alternatively, the latter take over their portion on marriage, but the result in each case is the same—the peasant holdings not only decrease in size but portions of the same holding may be widely separated. For it does not even follow that all the land surrounding a farmstead necessarily belongs to the family residing there. It did, of course, when the holding was first formed, but marriage has in most cases added complications. A portion of the holding, for example, may belong to a married daughter living elsewhere in the village and her husband will then come periodically to cultivate it as part of his estate. Much time is wasted in this way, so wherever possible an interchange of plots is arranged, especially where the parties to the marriage belong to different villages.

423 IN a register covering about 207 hectares of privately owned land there were 133 parcels registered, sometimes more than one in the name of a particular person. Of the 133, 56 were less than one hectare each, but at least 8 of these parcels were accessories to other holdings and those owners

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

361
133



This is part of the area mapped in Fig. 11. The photograph is taken from the top of the porphyry spur shown in Fig. 9.

241
342

A peasant holding at Corbu in process of sub-division. A son about to marry is erecting a house (roofs on left) on his share of his father's land. The parental farmstead extends across the right-hand half of the picture. A strip of maize is seen in the foreground and a small patch of hemp on the extreme left, close to the new house. For plan of holding see Fig. 11.

[facing page 68]

423 dealt with a considerably larger area. Forty-six holdings were between one and two, 18 between two and three, 8 between three and four, 3 between four and five, and 2 larger (8.8 and 19.5) hectares in extent. These holdings do not necessarily represent the whole of the land owned by a peasant.

LAND UTILISATION.

311 BROADLY SPEAKING, the land within the commune may be divided into three categories: the alluvium of the Bistricioara valley and the lower portions of its tributary valleys which is devoted to arable farming; the deforested lower slopes of the valley sides, together with the broad upper portions of some of the tributary valleys and odd patches of level ground here and there which are reserved for hay; and the rest, which is forest with the exception of the small high-altitude clearings that provide summer pasturage for the transhumant flocks and herds.

311 ABOUT 58 per cent of the land belongs to the state, 37 per
423 cent to the commune, and the rest, comprising about 400 hectares, is owned by the peasants. These 400 hectares represent the arable land of the commune, whilst the state lands are entirely forest. The commune lands include a certain amount of forest, together with the hay meadows and summer pastures. The law tries to make peasants plant trees to replace those that they cut down.

CROPS.

241 IN the arable area the outstanding crop is maize, from which
[262] "mamaliga," the staple food of the peasants, is made. It is sown at the beginning of May, two hillings, separated by an interval of three or four weeks, are made during June, and the crop is harvested between September 25th and October 10th. Potatoes, hemp, flax, lucerne (of which three cuttings are usually made), a little rye, sunflowers and vegetables are grown, mostly in very small patches, giving the impression of garden, rather than field, cultivation. Occasionally a small orchard adds further variety to the general pattern.

246 THE HAY CROP is of vital importance, as in all mountain communities of this kind throughout Europe. It is harvested

4:FTeure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

PLATE XII

342

A Gipsy smith and his family. The building on the left is the forge.

The Gipsy colony in Corbu. The houses are clustered together on a steep slope and although resembling in style those of the Roumanian peasants are easily distinguished therefrom by not having any arable land attached.

Photo: R. A. Pelham.

[facing page 69]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDI Rumania EDI

241



FIGURE 11. A = Joinery mill. B = Smithy (Plate XII). C = Wool-combing shed. D = Saw-mill. E = Gipsy colony. F = Holding in process of subdivision. Numbers refer to position and direction of camera: (1) Plate XII (lower), (2) Plate XI (lower), (3) Plate XI (upper).

in the Bistricioara valley in the early part of July, the peasants then working up the hillsides to the higher meadows where the hay-making is completed about the third week in September. What is not needed in the village byres is stacked on the lower slopes near the sheep pens in which the animals are housed during the winter months.

421

TRANSHUMANCE.

TRANSHUMANCE forms an essential supplement to arable farming in Corbu, for the cultivable land is too valuable to be used for grazing purposes except for a short time after the harvest, whilst the produce of the hay meadows is required for winter feed.

221 SCATTERED over the commune are eight "stâne" or
233 temporary summer settlements which are all situated be-
[342] ween 400 and 800 metres above the village. The stâna itself is a simple affair, consisting of a log hut which affords living accommodation for the shepherds and acts as a dairy and store-house, together with the folds into which the animals are driven for milking. The one illustrated had a population of three men and two boys, all Roumanians, 350 sheep and 20 cows, as well as a few pigs, the only animals left in the village being the one or two milch cows retained at each farm for family needs and the draught animals (see Plate XIII).

234 THE change from winter to spring takes place very rapidly
221 during the second fortnight of April, and the ascent to the dairies is made at the end of that month or early in May. Before the animals are taken up the milk yield of the cows is test d in order to determine the apportionment of the cheese made therefrom, but the ewes' milk cheese is distributed on the basis of the number of sheep belonging to each peasant. Shortly after the ascent the village priest performs
[234] the ceremony of blessing each stâna in turn, and before the end of May the sheep are sheared by peasants who go up specially for the purpose, the wool being brought down to the village on horseback.

233 SINCE the summer pastures are communal property their
221 administration is in the hands of an assembly of heads of
476 families which assesses the rent to be paid for the season—generally 12-15 lei for a sheep and 50 lei for a cow. The money thus received forms a fund from which the shepherds are paid for their services. Each peasant makes personal arrangements with the senior shepherd as to the amount of cheese he will require for household purposes, any surplus going into a common stock which is marketed at the end of the season. Any disputes that arise are settled by arbitration in the presence of the mayor when the shepherds return to the village. This takes place during the latter part of October, the descent of each group being celebrated by minor festivities at which the shepherds are the guests of honour. The general feast held when all are down marks the
221 official end of the season's activities.

476 UPON their return to the village the cows are immediately stabled, but each peasant splits up his sheep into two groups,

233
231 the main flock being taken direct to the sheds on the foothills where they are fed on the hay gathered during the summer, whereas the remainder are grazed on the maize stubble until about Christmas. By then the weather becomes rather severe, and although sheep are better able than cows to withstand the rigours of a continental winter they are all kept in sheds during the early months of the year.

SURPLUS ANIMALS are disposed of at the autumn fairs at Tulgheş or Topliţa where they are bought up by dealers for conveyance to Italy or Czechoslovakia.

III. OTHER OCCUPATIONS

TEXTILES.

THE OUTSTANDING FEATURE of the Carpathian villages is the remarkably high standard of peasant craftsmanship. The degree of artistic expression revealed in their clothing is particularly striking, and although best seen on festive occasions it is scarcely less noticeable in their ordinary working garb. Wool, flax and hemp are the traditional fibres used, but imported cotton yarn is beginning to displace linen for some of the lighter summer garments. Most of the dyestuffs are obtained from local plants, for example, red from the leaves of the wild crab apple, yellow from the osier, black from the alder or birch and fawn from the walnut, but imported dyes are beginning to be employed. The mordant used is salt, but colours other than black fix themselves in wool without salt treatment.

SPINNING with a distaff is the normal occupation of the women in their leisure time during the summer, very little knitting being done at all. The other processes of combing, weaving and dyeing are also undertaken by the women, as is the embroidering of dresses and household linen, but the embroidering of the sheepskin waistcoats which are worn by both sexes is done by one or two men who specialise in this craft (see Plate XV).

LEATHER.

245 ALTHOUGH still made in the village, the old type of laced shoe with its characteristically pointed toe is being displaced

342

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

PLATE XIII

A Corbu "stâna" occupied by transhumant flocks during the summer season. A deforested portion of the mountain 2,000 feet above the village has been set aside for pasturage. The buildings are very simple. The large hut on the left combines the functions of dairy and dwelling house, the smaller sheds in the compounds being used for milking purposes.

Photo. R. A. Pelham.

342
241
142



Close-up view of dairy showing adult members of "stâna" with their utensils. The man on the left is holding a horn.

Photo R. A. Pelham.

[facing page 72]

295 by imported boots and shoes, whilst socks and stockings bought at the local fairs are beginning to be preferred to the traditional method of bandaging the feet (see Appendix V).

WOOD.

312 THE most characteristic of the other local occupations are concerned with wood. Each peasant is allowed a certain amount of timber annually, the cutting of which is arranged by the Forestry Co-operative Society, but for every tree [531] felled a new one has to be planted. Among the men of the village the making of wooden spoons, jugs and plates, often elaborately carved, is a favourite pursuit, though it is being threatened by cheap imported metal goods, so that in this, as in other ways, a rapid transition from medieval to modern conditions seems likely to occur in the near future.

THE GREEK CATHOLIC PRIEST.

793 ALTHOUGH primarily concerned with the spiritual welfare of his flock, the Greek Catholic (Uniate) priest in Corbu, as elsewhere in Roumania, is intimately bound up with the economic life of the community. Following the rule of the Eastern and Uniate Churches for their secular clergy with a cure of souls, the priest is married and depends to a considerable extent upon his land for his maintenance. He is often trusted with public and private business on behalf of the commune and its members. To him the peasants may bring their maize to be ground, their sunflower seeds to be crushed, their timber to be sawn and their cloth to be scoured. The water of the Bistricioara that runs past the priest's house is harnessed to provide power at Corbu for these operations, and from the services he thus renders to the villagers the priest gets part of his income.

IV. THE FUTURE

CTO IT IS CLEAR from the foregoing account that Corbu is a mountain community that is rapidly approaching a crisis in its history. The old economic self-sufficiency is being undermined by the insidious influence of the journeyman, and the cheapness of the new wares that he is introducing will tend to increase the amount of leisure that the peasant already enjoys by releasing labour that he has hitherto expended on

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

PLATE XIV

291
142

Woman combing wool for spinning at Corbu by drawing it through iron spikes fixed in a woollen hat-like handle. The boy is holding a distaff. *Photo: H. J. Howard.*

[43]



Woman weaving on primitive home-made wooden loom at Corbu. *Photo: H. J. Howard.*

[facing page 73]

000 manufacturing these essentials for himself. On the other hand, the neighbouring spa of Borsec will doubtless become an ever-increasing market for any surplus that the Corbu peasants may have for disposal, in spite of a toilsome journey of several miles that separates the two settlements, for its greater altitude and more exposed position make farming even more precarious there than it is at Corbu.

In this respect Corbu is in a more fortunate position economically than most of the other Carpathian villages, though culturally it may suffer by the multiplication of such contacts. At present the high-powered car dashing through the pass is insulated from the village by a cloud of dust in a way that seems to symbolise the distinction between urban and rural life. But that distinction is bound to diminish and be replaced by a scheme of interdependence which, it is to be hoped, will benefit both, though at the moment the reactions of this change upon social and economic life are fraught with danger.

It must have been foreseen that the mere distribution of land to the peasants in 1918 could be only a temporary solution to the land-hunger problems of the country. Sooner or later the natural increase in population, together with the continued subdivision of the cultivable land, was bound to lead to one of two things: either a rural exodus or an increase in the productive capacity of the farming land in the country. A steady drift into neighbouring towns or emigration abroad are solutions that unfortunately appeal to a conservative peasantry more readily than do suggestions of a scientific character for the improvement of agricultural technique, but the steady march of events since the war seems, at any rate for the present, to have eliminated the first alternative. The period of expanding industry before 1914, coupled with the ease of entry into America, enabled the pressure upon the agricultural land in Europe to be relieved without much difficulty, but these avenues are no longer open. Nor is it any longer as easy as it was before 1914 to export the surplus of the crops. The network of international exchange has been grievously damaged by the consequences of that war, and the policy of economic nationalism, though for a time offering considerable scope for development in countries that had previously been agricultural, has by no means fulfilled the high hopes of its

sponsors. Moreover, the immigration policy of the U.S.A. in 1923 and 1924, together with the inability of France to absorb further contingents of immigrants since the beginning of the present economic depression, has had the effect of bottling up these surplus rural populations in Europe within their own boundaries. Even so, however, in a country like Roumania much is still possible. It is true that any extensive addition to the arable land would reduce the area under forest, which, in view of the wealth that that represents is perhaps not desirable. But on the other hand, agricultural research, to which already several institutes scattered over the country devote themselves, should be able in time to increase the yield per hectare of the present arable land sufficiently to counter these adverse tendencies.

Nor should this preclude the possibility of a measure of industrial development. The high standard of native craftsmanship is a valuable national asset and one that should be preserved. Domestic industries are for the most part confined to the winter months, when farming activities are reduced to a minimum, and it is very much to be hoped that the peasants will be encouraged to develop that period of comparative leisure for the maintenance of those traditional elements in their culture which the modern machine may imitate but should never be allowed to displace.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

APPENDICES

1. SOME VITAL STATISTICS OF CORBU

162 In 1928 there were born in Corbu 34 boys and 33 girls, of whom 53 babies belonged to Uniate and 13 to Roman Catholic households, while one was of Orthodox parentage. In 1929 the births included 35 boys and 27 girls, of whom 34 babies belonged to Uniate and 22 to Roman Catholic households, while 4 were of Jewish, one of Orthodox and one of Baptist parentage.

Of the fathers of 57 legitimately born children in 1928 forty-seven were described as peasants, five as labourers, one as joiner, one as baker, one as bootmaker, one as chauffeur.

Of the fathers of 55 legitimately born children in 1929 thirty-four were described as peasants, eleven as labourers, one as joiner, one as bootmaker, one as smith, one as forester ; these apparently do not include the 4 Jewish children.

Apparently the numbers of children in a family were usually 3, 4 or 5, but there was one family of 10 children. There were in the village 415 heads of households, among whom were included a number of widows.

2. "DOT," OR MARRIAGE PORTION

A girl of moderate means brings to her home on marriage :

Seven to nine pillows, blankets and sheets ;

At least fifteen towels ;

Four or five carpets or rugs, to adorn the walls ;

Personal clothes dependent on her skill. She will try to have special clothes for the great festivals such as Easter, Christmas, etc. ;

Sheep, cows, and her share of the heritage from her father.

It is said that a girl begins to make her "dot" at the age of 6 years. The proportions of the sexes are approximately equal, and few adults remain unmarried.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDI Rumania EDI

WOMAN'S SHEEPSKIN COAT

291
531

Front

Back

MAN'S SHEEPSKIN COAT

Front

Back

[facing page 76]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

3. DOMESTIC ANIMALS

422 The following figures were collected for two households (August 1933),
231 one smaller and one larger :

Farm A	Farm B
3 milch cows, two on high pastures, one at the farm	7 milch cows, six on high pastures, one at the farm
No draught oxen	2 draught oxen
1 calf	5 calves
2 horses	2 horses
30 sheep	50 sheep
2 pigs	4 pigs
15 fowls	21 fowls
15 beehives, near house	4 or 5 beehives, away from house in lower pastures

Housing for geese was usually available, and several flocks with six to eight geese in each were noticed on the road. A few turkeys were observed, also a few large guinea fowl in a farm in a tributary valley. There were doves at the priest's house.

The Forestry control forbids the keeping of goats.

4. THE FARMING CALENDAR

221 Late April, early May.—Prepare soil, sow maize and potatoes, harrow hayfields.

Early May.—Sheep and some cattle and pigs go up to the high pastures.

Late May.—Peasants shear sheep on high pastures.

Early June.—Weeding and first hilling-up of maize by work with a hoe when plants are 15-20 cm. high.

Late June.—Second weeding and hilling-up of maize. General tidying-up before hay harvest.

Early July.—First cut of hay in the lower lands.

July, August and first three weeks of September.—Hay harvest. Peasants make temporary shelters when harvesting in remote spots. Hay on hills mostly stacked near the shelters used for sheep during part of the winter. Beside this is a hut for the man in charge.

September 25-October 10th.—Maize harvest.

Third week of October.—Potatoes lifted.

October.—Stock brought down from high pastures and sorted out among owners by means of earmarks.

October until first serious snow.—Sheep may be kept in remote pastures that have not been much used or reaped.

Thence until May.—Some sheep on lower hills near shelters with hay (see above, July, August). Some sheep folded on lowland fields to fertilise them. No artificial manure. Hay used as fodder. Lambing on lowland fields near homesteads.

291
531

Woman's embroidered blouse.
Photo: Miss C. A. Perkins

Roumanian peasant at Bran in the Transylvanian Alps.
Photo: H. J. Howard.

583
531



Portion of girl's dowry, showing elaborately embroidered pillows and bed-covers.
Photo: Miss G. I. Mackeogh.

Plate XVI.

[facing page 77]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

543

5. THINGS SEEN AT BORSEC FAIR, AUGUST 20TH

[286] 1. MATERIAL BY THE YARD.

Cotton: Prints, calicoes, zephyrs, ginghams, men's shirtings.

Wool: Coloured serges, rough grey and brown woollen material (very thick) for men's and women's winter clothing.

Artificial Silk: In plain colours, Crêpe de Chine in plain colours, a very few printed silks.

Lace: Coarse white lace edgings (from Nottingham).

[291] 2. CLOTHING.

Men's: Trousers, coats, waistcoats, cloth caps, embroidered lambskin waistcoats, braces.

Women's: Knitted and crocheted wool caps and berets, patent leather belts. Printed cotton and artificial silk pieces for head coverings. Ribbons.

Children's: Babies' knitted woollen garments. Modern-style dresses in artificial silk with machine-made embroidery. Socks and stockings of cotton and wool hand-knitted in Roumania. Artificial silk stockings manufactured from yarn imported from Switzerland and France.

[295] 3. BOOTS AND SHOES FOR MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

Field boots and heavy nailed boots for men.

Manufactured boots and shoes for women and children.

Ready-made peasant shoes of leather.

Ready-made peasant shoes of leather with rubber attached to sole.

Ready-made peasant shoes made from old motor tyres.

Shoes of plaited felt of all sizes for women and children.

Shoes of knitted coarse wool with straps.

Pieces of leather of correct size for making the peasant shoes and leather thongs for lacing them.

Leather and mohair laces for using with the manufactured boots and shoes.

[415] 4. POTTERY.

Large brown glazed earthenware pots only. No other pottery of any kind was seen in the fair.

[285] 5. BASKETS, ETC.

Hand-made of rushes gathered by the peasants who make them. Some colour introduced into the larger baskets; strong, neat weaving. Also a few big hats as worn in the fields by the Hungarian peasant women.

244 6. GREENGROCERY.

Turnips, potatoes, yellow beans, cabbages, gherkins, carrots, onions, tomatoes, ardei, lemons, apples, pears, Indian corn, water melons, cantaloupes.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 ED1 Rumania ED1

543

[257] 7. CONFECTIONERY, ETC.

Gingerbread (all shapes).

Sweets: Packets of sweets, sweet-stuffs in various shapes. Dolls, ladies, hearts, diamonds, all with rough pieces of mirror inset.

[524] 8. TOYS.

The only toys for children seen were gaily-coloured thin rubber balls (large), also small wooden flutes similar to those used by shepherds.

[322] 9. CARVED WOODEN ARTICLES.

Wooden cigarette-holders; various sizes, some grotesquely large.

Mirrors with flower-borders carved in high relief.

Match-stands, cigarette stands, wooden boxes.

Large pipes (for playing jokes). Powder is secreted in the mouth-piece and is puffed into the face when the pipe is blown.

10. ARTICLES FOR THE HOME.

[285] Blankets patterned in red and natural wool.

Rug-strips made of pieces of cotton and woollen waste pieces of material.

[415] Modern cooking tins and saucepans, enamelled dishes and all sorts of "Household Helps," which attracted crowds of peasant women, e.g. egg and tomato slices, vegetable cutters, pastry moulds, etc.

Strainers with wooden frame and wire base, the wire coloured in tartan and other patterns.

Alarm clocks, boot polish in tins, soap, hempen rope and string.

[301] 11. CHEAP JEWELLERY, ETC.

Rings, brooches, neck and watch chains. Necklaces of coloured pearl and glass beads. Spectacles of plain and tinted glass. Jewelled combs for wearing in the hair. Studs, fancy buttons, thimbles, all kinds of plain and fancy pins. Mirrors.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDI Rumania EDI

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Constantinesco, M.: L'Evolution de la Propriété Rurale et la Réforme Agraire en Roumanie (1925).

Cvijic, J.: La Péninsule Balcanique (1918).

East, W. G.: The Union of Moldavia and Wallachia, 1859 (1929).

Evans, I. L.: The Agrarian Revolution in Roumania (1924).

Iorga, N.: A History of Roumania (1925).

Madgearu, V.: Rumania's New Economic Policy (1930).

Martonne, E. de: La Valachie (1902).

Mihailescu, V.: Les Grandes Régions Morphologiques de la Roumanie (Buletinul Societatii Regale Romane de Geografie, vol. 50, 1931).

Mihailescu, V.: Une Carte des Principaux Types d'Habitat Rurale en Roumanie (B.S.R.G., vol. 46, 1927).

Mitrany, D.: The Land and the Peasant in Rumania (1930).

Opreanu, S.: Le Pays des Sicules (Travaux de l'Institut de Géographie de l'Université de Cluj, vol. III, 1929).

Oprescu, G.: Peasant Art in Roumania ("Studio," Autumn Number, 1929).

Parvan, V.: Dacia (1928).

Pittard, E.: La Roumanie (1917).

Seton-Watson, R. W.: A History of the Roumanians from Roman Times to the Completion of Unity (1934).

Wachner, H.: Judet Ciuc, samt Toplita und der Muresenge (Travaux de l'Institut de Géographie de l'Université de Cluj, vol. III, 1929).

[Page 80]

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDI Rumania EDI

000

SOUTH CARPATHIAN STUDIES

ROUMANIA

II

Edited by
PROF. H. J. FLEURE, F.R.S.
and
E. ESTYN EVANS, M.A.

With Contributions by
AMY R. BURGESS, N. HUNTER STEIN
MARGARET TATTON and others

and a Foreword by
Prof. P. M. ROXBY, B.A. (Oxon.)

LONDON
PUBLISHED BY THE LE PLAY SOCIETY
1 GORDON SQUARE, W.C.1
1939

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

346

[Curtea de Arges, the Cathedral (1510)]

[cover page]

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 ED1 Rumania ED1

000

THE LE PLAY SOCIETY

1 GORDON SQUARE, W.C.1.

THE COUNCIL OF THE LE PLAY SOCIETY wish to place on record their appreciation of the courtesy extended to them in connection with the visit to Roumania (August 1936) by the Roumanian Chargé d'Affaires in London as representing the Roumanian Government. They include in this acknowledgment Monsieur D. Dem Dimancesco, Press Attaché, Monsieur Jean Drago, Monsieur D. O. Mateesçu, Dr. Emil Pop, Madame Dunareana, the Mayor and Mayoress of Curtea d'Argeş, and other Roumanian friends. Their thanks are also due to the Roumanian Government for making it possible to include the physical maps of Roumania. To the Vice-Consul, Dr. J. C. Popovici, who again acted as guide and friend throughout the entire expedition, the group owed much.

Contributions to this volume have been made by:

Mrs. Abbs, Miss M. L. Brown, Miss G. E. Buist, Miss Amy R. Burgess, Miss Helen M. Burgess, Miss A. F. Cossey, Miss De Courcy L. Dewar, Miss K. C. Dewar, Dr. E. Estyn Evans, Professor H. J. Fleure, Mr. H. J. Howard, Miss Rachel Jones, Mr. K. Povey, Miss E. M. Robarts, Miss Dora Roberts, Dr. N. H. Stein, and Miss Margaret Tatton.

M. E. T.

PRINTED BY THE STAEROPE PRESS LTD., ROCHESTER, KENT

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
	Foreword by Prof. P. M. Roxby, B.A. (Oxon.)	5
I	The European Setting	7
II	The Arges District	18
III	Curtea de Arges	23
IV	Houses in Curtea de Arges	27
V	Education in Curtea de Arges	33
VI	Medical Conditions at Curtea de Arges	36
VII	Farming Around Curtea de Arges	39
VIII	Transhumance in the Southern Carpathians	48
IX	The Fair	54
	Bibliography	60

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

FOREWORD

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY saw the rise of systematic sociology, the natural response of thinkers to the increasing complexity of social relationships, which itself was in large measure due to the coming of industrialism and the revolution in the means of communication. But this sociology as developed by pure economists tended to be intensely abstract. It was the supreme contribution of Le Play to impress on the minds of many of his contemporaries, particularly through his notable book *"Les Ouvriers Européens"*, that the problems and needs of human communities could only be fully appreciated through their respective *genres de vie* as conditioned by all the circumstances of their geographical environments. Pushed to an extreme this concept may easily try to explain too much and lead to an arid form of determinism. It is when the adjustment of man or rather of men in communities to nature is studied with full awareness of all the varied influences which affect the human response to the stimulus of a particular environment that the concept is really fruitful and illuminating. It is from this standpoint that the Le Play Society, which commemorates the name and continues the work of the great pioneer, has for many years organized a series of regional studies and published a summary of their results.

MANY of these studies have been concerned with the critical zone of contact between Western Industrial and Eastern Agrarian Europe which extends from Poland through the Czecho-Slovak Republic to Roumania and the Balkans. Recent events have drawn the pained attention of the West to the importance of the countries of this zone, but even now

[Pages 3 and 4 are blank]

the majority limits its enquiries to the policies of their rulers and the significance of their resources in terms of power politics. In the long run it is the mode of life and outlook of their peoples which will count for most and herein lies the value of the Le Play "Studies" as portraying the present phase of adjustment to environment.

THE appearance of this survey is particularly opportune. Roumania is rapidly acquiring a new significance in the chequer-board of Europe, and with its complex geographical relationships, its mixed inheritance, its strikingly contrasted but interdependent natural regions and its predominantly peasant population, needs precisely this method of investigation for its interpretation to western students. The present volume supplements an earlier study of life in the Eastern Carpathians by an analysis of a typical Wallachian district and of the important transhumant movement which has long linked the economy of Mountain and Plain. This detailed survey is preceded by an admirable exposition of the wider European setting of Roumanian life.

P. M. ROXBY

19th December, 1938.

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

THE EUROPEAN SETTING

THE MOUNTAIN RANGES OF EUROPE from the Pyrenees to the Carpathians and Balkans divide Europe into two strongly contrasted regions which may be called Mediterranean Europe and The European Plain. In Mediterranean Europe, with its many framing mountains, the sea retains the warmth of summer far longer than do the surrounding mountains down which cold air slides to interfere with and lift the warm air over the sea. Thus cyclones form and process eastwards, giving rain that begins fairly gently in autumn in some parts towards the east, though it is the season of specially great rainfall in others, especially towards the north-west. In December and January the cyclones are well developed. By March they are often weakening, and in the east the rains become gentle once more before they pass away. So in the east, in Palestine for example, we have the "former" and the "latter" rains of autumn and early spring on the flanks of the great rainy season, the "former" rains helping to soften the hard-baked earth for the plough, the "latter" rains helping the seeds to germinate ere the rain is over and gone. In late spring the increasing warmth farther south strengthens northerly components in wind directions over the Mediterranean and only a little rain falls, as the air is moving from cooler to warmer regions. There are a few exceptions to these general rules, such as the east coast of the Adriatic, with its steep hills fronting the sea to the south-west and getting a good deal more and more prolonged rain than the rest. Other parts in the north-west near high mountains also remain cold for a time, and air slipping down over melting snow in spring may have a good deal of moisture and may contribute to cyclones there. But, broadly, the Mediterranean is a region of rain in the winter half of the year and of drought in the warm summer half. This favours the cultivation of plants with deep roots able to penetrate down to damp layers even in summer, and the cultivation of fruit trees, notably vine and olive, has long been a feature of Mediterranean life, while honey from the heaths has been a supplement, and small field patches, not seldom on built-up terraces of the hillsides, have given hard wheat and a barley with strong straw.

There is here little scope for huge open fields to be ploughed by great teams of oxen, and there would be little opportunity to pasture great herds in summer when the grass is often parched and brown. So a small plough (aratrum) and a small field are a feature, and fruits rival cereals in importance, while farm animals count for relatively little, save that goats can be sent up to the heights, where, if they give milk for cheese, they also destroy the forests.

THE MEDITERRANEAN, especially in the Ægean region, is studded with islands inviting settlement by vine and olive growers, who found there safe bays for fishing havens and opportunities to voyage from point to point without often losing sight of land for any length of time. The voyagers traded from island to island in such commodities as the sharp-edged obsidian of Melos, the hard emery of Naxos, the olive oil of Crete. The abundance of limestone led the rain-water down its cracks to gush out at springs near which men clustered, especially on defensible hills near the sea, and they were the better able to do this because Mediterranean farming with few cattle or horses absolved them from living in the closest contact with their work. When we add to these considerations the importance of fishing, navigation, trade and defence, we understand in what measure the large cluster, i.e. town or city, has come to be a feature of Mediterranean life. From the town the farmers might go out to their fields and, with the growth of wealth in a slave-using scheme of life, the free citizens might well gather in culture centres. The city has been a feature of Mediterranean Europe for nearly, if not quite, five thousand years.

MATTERS HAVE worked out very differently in Europe north of the Alps. The plains or lowlands of the west are visited by Atlantic cyclones at most periods of the year, but these are apt to be strongest and rainiest in autumn. Towards the interior of the continent these late cyclones spend their energy in vain against the dense air masses lying over the surface that, away from the sea, becomes bitterly cold in winter. While, therefore, in the west, autumn and winter are specially rainy seasons, in the interior of the continent this component of the precipitation is small, and chiefly in the form of snow, though there is some rain, especially in autumn. When the land begins to warm up again in spring, air is apt to slip down the still snow-clad mountain-sides, and this, as usual, gives rise

900 to some disturbances that cause a certain amount of rain at this change of seasons. As heating increases still further the air in contact with lowlands, and especially lowland hollows among the hills, is apt to become very warm and to rise rapidly, giving thunderstorms and rain, which are most marked in the south-eastern interior in June and farther north may reach a maximum in July or later. There is thus rain at the change of seasons and a summer maximum of rainfall, and the pastures maintain themselves better than those around the Mediterranean. The trees are often deciduous; that is, they shed their leaves ere the winter cold begins, so the bare boughs give a brown hue to the wintry landscape and the contrast between this area of winter brown (and white) and summer green, and the Mediterranean, with its winter green and summer brown, is complete.

THE OLIVE cannot stand the cold, but the need for it is less in a region of summer green, where there is thus pasture for cattle and thence also a supply of fat. Mixed farming is the general rule, with cattle and horses to pull heavy ploughs (caruca) over the great level stretches, too large, of old, to be held save in common by peasants, often under a lord. The vine has been acclimatised in sunny spots, but is by no means general, and in the last few centuries the races of vine have been specially bred to give wines of quality in Champagne, Burgundy, the Rhinelands and a few spots in Switzerland, Hungary and Bulgaria. The vine is, however, here a luxury plant, and in farming the care of stock rivals in importance the cultivation of the soil. This means that the farmers must live near their animals in villages or hamlets, or even—especially in modern times, when ancient and local means of defence are no longer of value—in single farms dispersed over the land. In the early days the small groups, as it were lost in the plains, had little opportunity to trade or travel, so the community was in the main self-sufficing, and there was, for a long time, never a town in the whole region. Indeed, in east-central Europe, though cultivation may be five thousand years old, few if any towns have reached their thousandth anniversary, and it is especially obvious in this region that the very idea of a town is imported from the west, whither it was carried from the Mediterranean by the Roman power. In south-west Russia, let us note incidentally, the city may preserve a small heritage from Greek colonial cities, the communities of which

200 were feeling their way up the Don and Dnieper and were followed centuries afterwards by Norse traders adventuring down these rivers to get into touch with the trade of the East, particularly after the spread of Islam and its quarrel with Christianity had for a while closed the westward trade routes through the Mediterranean. The trading cities or ports of south-west Russia did not, however, spread the idea of the town and city into central Europe, which thus remained a land of villages and hamlets until the Middle Ages. The contrast in social development between Mediterranean Europe and Europe north of the Alps is as striking as that in climate and vegetation.

IMMENSE STRETCHES of forest of old clothed the heavier clay-lands, and bush obstructed even some of the lighter soils, though these were easier to clear, and were earlier settled. Apparently the primitive cultivators took crops until the soil was exhausted and then they moved on. They were but a pioneering fringe of the greater agricultural civilizations of south-west Asia. At first they may not even have had domestic animals, but later on, probably in the Bronze Age, that is, when horses had been introduced and metal was in use and spread by exchanges of some sort, the dunging of the fields, a rotation of crops and team-ploughing with a big instrument began. Cultivation was still, however, a thing apart from metals and trade, and the "tinkers" and other wanderers, like the gipsies of later times, were outside the farming groups and difficult to assimilate, often keeping up a language of their own and living outside the village's customary law. When tools had improved and iron was in use, many clearings were made in the forests—and the period after the Fall of the Roman Empire is thence called *die Rodungszeit*,—but even this did little to bring larger clusters of people together, and all we find from early days on the plains is a *Burgwall* or earth-ramparted refuge here and there, to be used no doubt in time of danger from enemies. The forest was the abode of wild beasts, and the folklore thence derived gives us Little Red Riding Hood, and many stories collected by the Grimms bring out the further point that evilly-disposed people also lurked among the trees; travel was a dangerous adventure, the villagers knew little of the world until Christianity came; their intellectual condition offers us a further contrast over against that of the citizens of Mediterranean lands. Their

narrow horizon, their self-contained communities governed by customary law, their houses not seldom sheltering both men and animals, their rituals connected with fruitfulness of land and stock and families, contrasted with the broader experience, the trading communities with coins for exchange tokens and codes of law, the elaborate houses and cults, not to mention philosophical speculations, of the people of the Mediterranean, using sea as well as land for travel, exchange and administration.

AMONG THE MOUNTAINS between the two main zones opportunities for cultivation might be to some extent restricted in the valleys, but higher up there were in many places ledges, called alps, in the mountains to which they have given their name, or even, as in the Carpathians, large extents of land that grew rich grass as soon as the water from melting snow sank into the soil. The animals could be taken up to the highlands for the summer and the riverside meadows could be left for hay to be cut and stored for winter food when the cattle came down hill again. Some members of the village groups were, and are, sent up to the high pastures with the cattle or, more often still, the sheep, to make cheeses from the milk, and in parts of the Alps even women and children may accompany these seasonal migrants, as in the Val d'Anniviers; but in the Carpathians it is usually mainly men and boys who migrate in this way, though they may receive visits from their women if they are not too far from home. This transhumance is a feature added to the routine of farming in the mountain zone between the Mediterranean and the North, but it has penetrated into the north and west where opportunities have offered themselves, and it naturally has its important analogues in Mediterranean mountain lands.

IN THE WEST of Europe where, in Gaul and on the Rhine for example, towns are at least two thousand years old in some cases, trade has knit town and country together sufficiently to induce the villagers to bring produce to market and to buy there and at festival fairs many of the things they need, especially as in the west the climate permits farm work all the year round and gives a variety of activities and products, so that there is not the time to spare to make textiles and pots at home. The peasantry of France thus has knit itself to the market towns and the bourgeois is often a peasant slightly altered—"Grattez le bourgeois et vous trouvez le paysan."

SOMEWHAT FARTHER EAST, where German has long been spoken, town and country are still fairly closely linked in a thousand years of experience, although the town may have been founded with special legal privileges and government distinguishing it from the feudal lordships over the countryside. The community of language, however, kept town and village in touch to a considerable extent, although less so than in France, because here, with, of old, poorer cultivation and harder winters, the villagers both lacked the wherewithal to buy much in the town and retained leisure during the snowy winter to make a good deal at home. Peasant crafts are more varied and of greater importance.

IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE the idea of the town was introduced mainly across German-speaking areas and mainly just after Christianity spread. So the town was often a German foundation in a Slavonic land, and to it there flocked also Jewish elements, especially as Christian guild organisations made conditions difficult for them further west in the German cities. City and country might therefore be kept apart by difference of language as well as tradition. Moreover, in many cases, the men who developed the city, as they came from the west, often cherished the Roman tradition in religion, while the countryside had in many cases just been Christianised from Constantinople; that is, by the Orthodox Church. Contrasts in religion that go deep down into social life are thus a difficulty as between town and country, a difficulty that has in places been increased because some of the erstwhile Roman Catholic communities became partly Lutheran or even Unitarian in the sixteenth and following centuries. The country folk here are for the most part poorer in exchange-tokens, if not always in real wealth, than those farther west; they accordingly buy less and make more, and the self-contained community is still discernible in spite of the inroads of modern discovery and trade. Those modern movements have brought potatoes, root crops and maize to be added to the farmer's produce, and modern communications and industry have forced upon him the idea of cash crops and large production; but the old life is still there, the village crofts, little market towns, and the schemes of transhumance still survive and will be the object of the studies which follow.

THE LANGUAGES of prehistoric Europe have been the subject of much speculation, and hypothetical inferences have been

made as to the introduction of Aryan speech into east-central Europe with or soon after the beginnings of cultivation five thousand years ago. We shall not enter into that stricken field. The evidence seems all too poor. Suffice it to say that at some time in the earlier part of the last millennium B.C. Celtic of some kind appears to have been in use in south Germany and to have spread thence with elements of the "Urnfields Culture" of the Late Bronze Age reaching distant Catalonia about 600 B.C., according to the best dating available, and Gaul and Britain at a date on which no agreement has yet been reached. That there were Germanic-speaking peoples to the north of those who spoke Celtic at that time seems very probable, and there certainly were the Italic and Greek groups to the south. We have no evidence as to whether the Slavonic forms had as yet taken shape as such in east-central Europe, but if Germanic, Celtic, Italic and Greek were all more or less differentiated, it is highly probable that Slavonic of some kind was already in use among the populations on the areas of light-soil (loess) in east central Europe. There is little doubt that these various families of language differentiated themselves from a common mother-tongue which came into Europe from the Russo-Asiatic steppe, and in all probability came west before the last millennium B.C. Before the days of written contracts and rituals, while as yet men's outlooks were very limited, it was easy enough to change a language by introduction of new words and phrases; language had not yet acquired that halo of sanctified associations which makes it such an immovable feature in our time. It is highly probable that elements of Aryan language were acquired by peoples who spoke older languages and that many of the features of the different families of Aryan speech are survivals from older tongues. People in central Europe with long upper lips can pronounce *b* and *p* more easily than those with short upper lips in the north, who tend rather to say *v* and *f*, or even *k* instead.

OF ONE language-spread in pre-Roman Europe we have many traces, and this is the extension of Celtic speech already mentioned from south Germany to Gaul and Britain; according to some, with a culture characterised by bronze swords; according to others, with an iron-using culture later on. It also spread to Catalonia and to north Italy (Gallia cisalpina), as well as through south-east Europe, including Roumania,

which owes some prehistoric earthwork fortresses to Celtic conquerors.

We know from Britain that Latin and Celtic were near enough to one another for Latin to influence Celtic without much difficulty or delay, and when the Roman power took charge of Dacia east of the Danube the Latin element in speech spread among the people.

After the fall of the Roman Empire followed a period when the quarrel between Islam and Christianity cut the old trade routes, and barbarian efforts to establish order were too inexperienced to succeed. Therefore the towns were impoverished, the advance of the idea of the town beyond the Rhine was retarded for centuries, and, instead, there was a great forest-clearing movement, founding villages and spreading a scheme of agriculture with rotations of two or three years, dividing the village lands into two or three fields for the purpose. Whatever the date and place of their birth, the Slavonic languages spread enormously in east-central Europe at this time, but neither their nor subsequent pressure was ever able to destroy the Latin heritage in Roumanian language, though Slavonic words were introduced in large numbers and some items of Slavonic syntax also modified the older language.

The course of what may be called language-waves seems to have been different in different phases of civilization. When words were chiefly names of things in use and of matters of personal contact it may be that changes of language could be more complete than after writing and liturgies and the like had come into existence. Also, whereas early peoples seem to have been concerned with essentially local ideas of, for example, so-called supernatural powers, under Roman and Christian influence they faced wider generalizations that indicate on the whole a step forward in mentality. We can trace the taking of the step forward in the west by noting how local deities and their legends came to be attached to saints recognised by the Church; some, like the Blessed Virgin Mary, transcending all local attachments. Language thus became a vehicle for larger ideas with clearer abstractions and, especially, more definite legal phraseology; and all this added to the difficulty of change of speech. In Gaul, Celtic languages had given place to a Latin type; in Britain,

Celtic forms, Latin and Anglo-Saxon followed one another, but Norman French was unable to oust Anglo-Saxon, though it left a deposit of legal phrases and helped to make English grow towards the remarkable amalgam of Teutonic and Romance elements that it now is, though much of this growth came during the Renaissance. Roumania is in a sense an analogous amalgam of Latinised and Slavonic elements. The survival of the older, Latin, element is an interesting fact.

The Roumanian people, as we may begin to call them, were spread over the Carpathian bastion, using the high pastures in summer, so that contacts were maintained over long distances, independently of adjacent peoples more specially concerned with farming in lowland villages. It is a Roumanian theory, with much probability behind it, that the summer life on the upland pastures has had not a little to do with the survival of the Latin element to such a degree in Roumania, and with the survival of the Roumanian people's consciousness of themselves as distinct from their neighbours. It is noteworthy that groups of Germans, Szeklers, and so on, spreading in the Carpathian bastion later on, when Christianity had come to this part of the world, have not changed their language, nor have they caused their neighbours to change theirs. The resistance to language-change has become too great.

In the days when Latin and Slavonic were, as it were, competing in and around the Carpathian bastion, Christianity was expanding from Rome and Constantinople, with characteristic differences, only some of which concern us here. In the west, Roman cities had grown, often from camps, ere the empire fell, and cities tended to acquire bishops, for whom the Roman tradition was their main link with the larger world. The insistence on the general language (Latin) for religious purposes and the growth in authority and prestige of the Bishop of Rome are thus easy to understand. And the combination gave the bishop's city a prestige that helped to Christianise barbarian conquerors and to spread the idea of the city when a revival began in the tenth and eleventh centuries. In the east there was less spread of the idea of the city northward from Constantinople and the Ægean, save in the case of the cities on a Greek basis in south Russia. Nor was there the same spread of a general language. We accordingly find that the Church consecrated Slavonic forms,

000 and the Cyrillic script invented for Slavonic purposes came to be used for religion, even in Roumania. Cities and towns were as yet hardly born in central and east-central Europe.

In the tenth and eleventh centuries, as the Dark Ages were passing away in the west, the idea of the city spread eastwards from the Rhine, sometimes under the leadership of the Church, sometimes around a military leader, sometimes through the planting of colonists by a leader. The Magyar kings accepted Christianity and were drawn into this current of activity, and Transylvania was a frontier land that needed to be developed and guarded. A people of transhumant shepherds and lowly cultivators scattered over a mountain territory was as yet too weak to do this or to resist effectively, while it had no reason to attach itself to the Magyar power, which had different linguistic and religious associations. The Magyars established allied Szekler peoples within the arc of the eastern Carpathians, apparently to some extent as a guard for the passes. They also brought in Saxon immigrants to establish cities as well as villages, and the Teutonic knights and Magyar aristocrats also came to add to the complexity. Szekler and Saxon were Roman Catholic, so a religious complication was added to the linguistic one, and this complexity was further increased when the Saxon element became Protestant on a Lutheran basis, while Unitarianism developed among the Magyars, and the Uniate scheme spread in the border zone between Catholic and Orthodox.

133 Beyond the old Dacia, that is outside the Carpathian bastion, the plains of Wallachia and Moldavia long were highways of barbarian warriors, while their lands nearer the hills are floored by large quantities of boulder-strewn outwash from old sub-glacial conditions in the mountains, so that the areas of more cultivable alluvium are, in the hill country, largely
369 riverside zones. The development of a measure of urban life
361 apparently came later here than in Transylvania, and it may owe something to the Saxon ideas expressed in Transylvania, though neither Saxons or Szeklers are present, and the characteristic Saxon house type with its great arched doorway is completely absent, as is the walled town. The Transylvanian Saxon village (note the villages called Cristian near Sibiu and near Braşov) might have a fortified enclosure around its church, a centre of refuge and of authority. How far analogous developments outside the Carpathian arc are due

5_Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDI Rumania EDI JE

133

The Transylvanian Alps with Negoiu.

Olt Valley. View of the valley taken from the bridge at Câlimănesti.

[Page 16a]

.: Fleure S-5 (no date)193? EDI Rumania EDI

133



Curtea de Argeș. River terrace in foreground. Pliocene deposits on horizon.

346

Biserica Domnească, Curtea de Argeș (1343), within a fortified enclosure.

[Page 16 B]

369
361

To imitation of the Saxon, and how far they are independent levelopments of a natural and comparatively simple idea, it would be difficult to decide. It is at any rate interesting that the old town of Curtea de Arges shows clearly as its nucleus a fortified enclosure around its splendid old church of the fourteenth century, the Biserica Domneasca.

H. J. F.



5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

THE ARGEŞ DISTRICT

101 133 THE EXTENDED ROUMANIA that was organised after 1918 includes the old areas of Wallachia, Dobrogea, Moldavia, Bessarabia, Bukovina, Transylvania and Timişoara, of varied allegiance before the World War, but all containing from early historic times onwards a proportion of Roumanian-speaking people. Transylvania is the mountain bastion with the eastern Carpathians as its eastern boundary, the southern Carpathians or Transylvanian Alps as its southern edge, and the western Roumanian Carpathians or Bihor, etc., mountains on its western flank. Its mountainous frame and its hilly interior give it a very decidedly upland character, even if the Olt, the Maroş and the Szamoş, which drain it, have considerable systems of tributary valleys. Outside the bastion to the east Bukovina and Moldavia slope down to the great plain of eastern Europe, of which Bessarabia forms the flank west of the Dniestr. Behind the bastion to the west Timişoara stretches down to the Tisza, and forms the south-eastern flank of the middle Danubian plain. Outside the bastion on the south is Wallachia, sloping down towards the lower Danube, while beyond the considerable barrier formed by the lowest portion of the Danube and to the south-east, is the low plateau area of the Dobrogea.

[113] IN A PREVIOUS study we gave in some measure a picture of rural life in the eastern Carpathians near the border between Transylvania and Moldavia, where the mountains barely reach 1,900 m. (say 6,200 feet), and the highest land is often in great expanses of pasture with deep valleys cut by the rival drainage systems of the two sides, which are separated by a number of passes that may indent the watershed. In the eastern Carpathians Roumanians and Szeklers, respectively Uniate and Roman Catholic, live in adjacent villages, and the former, especially, send flocks and herds to the highland pastures.

121 THIS STUDY is intended to deal more especially with what is thought to be a typical area of rural Wallachia, having an almost entirely Roumanian population attached to the Orthodox Church and living under circumstances differing

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

133



The Olt Valley and the Upper Argeş.

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

133



Geology of the Area shown in Physical Map.

121 considerably from those of the eastern Carpathians; this area is the district focusing upon Curtea de Argeş.

101 133 WALLACHIA has already been described as the land stretching from the southern Carpathians or Transylvanian Alps to the Danube. The mountains themselves are largely of metamorphosed rock with flanking Miocene deposits; they are about 40 km. wide with the sharp main ridge (rising at Negoiu to 2,544 m. or 8,331 feet) parallel to the long flanks about 11 km. from the northern and 29 km. from the southern edge. Several rivers have worked their valleys out among the mountains in a direction parallel to the ridge and the edges.

133 THERE ARE huge accumulations of pebbly, often deltaic, outwash beyond the south flank of the mountains, the layers sloping southward and giving sunward dip-slopes separated by small northward-facing scarps, the woods of which contrast with the arable lands on the dip-slopes. This pebbly outwash is deeply dissected by southward-flowing consequent streams, some of which rise in it, while others, like the Argeş, penetrate the mountain wall, making a wild narrow gorge. In the deep valleys of the pebbly material houses shelter from the north winds. The Olt has cut right through the mountains and captured a subsequent river of the northern flank, and its way through the mountains is by a deep valley, which is wider in some sections that are more or less "subsequent" 133 and narrower in others that are rather "consequent." At 361 about 20-25 km. southward from the mountain wall the residual hills of loose material that stand out between the consequent valleys milden down; the amount of alluvium and the breadth of the river valleys increase and it becomes possible to bridge the rivers, so it is at about this distance from the mountains that have grown the towns of Ramnicu Valcea on the Olt and Curtea de Argeş on the Argeş. Ramnicu Valcea is at the last narrowing of the Olt before it begins to braid on a broad alluvial plain, and its site is not easily defensible. The Argeş has terraces near the stream on the eastern side at the bridge, and the river has already swung against this bank some 2 km. north of the bridge. This gives defensible positions as well as facilities for bridging, and helps to account for the historic, if somewhat localised, importance of the town of Curtea de Argeş, the focus of the region of which studies were made.

H. J. F.
E. E. E.

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

133
361



Plan of Curtea de Argeş. Wooded areas shaded. Heights in metres.

CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

REFERENCE has already been made to the bridging of the Olt and the Argeş about 20-25 km. from the mountain-edge and to the rise near these bridges of the towns of Ramnicu Valcea and Curtea de Argeş. It has also been explained that terraces on the left bank of the Argeş swing near the river to give an effective bridge-end site capable of defence. Curtea de Argeş is one of the oldest settlements in Muntenia.

AT THE BRIDGE the river is over 420 m. above sea, and from its western end an old trackway, now a main road, follows approximately the 440 m. contour on what appears to be a terrace against which the river swings about 1½-2 km. north of the bridge. Here also gravel reaches, connected with the junction of a brook with the main stream, provide a ford; and at this spot on the east side of the river there is the monastery of royal associations founded in 1510 and celebrated as a place of pilgrimage. Beyond this the road goes on up a tributary valley towards the east. The bridge and town however grew up not at this ford, but at a point farther south, where the north-south residual ridge bounding the Argeş valley on the east sends a spur almost to the actual river but just cut off by a seasonal tributary brook. The end of this spur shows two marked terraces, one just slightly above the river, the other some 12 m. above it and rising, as was said above, to about the 440 m. contour. On the end of the spur is a ruined Roman Catholic church, built for Marghita, wife of Prince Basarab. The Wallachian princes of these days appear to have had a habit of marrying Catholic women. One seems to see faint indications that the site of this church has been to a slight extent developed artificially. In 1390 this church served as a cathedral for Catholics in Wallachia, and the see lasted until 1602, by which time many Catholics had become Orthodox and the Catholic bishopric was removed to Dacau.

REFERENCE has already been made to the north-south road on the terrace, no doubt a modernisation of an old trackway, with the town near the end of the spur and the bridge, and the monastery to the north. Near the end of the spur, and

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl
[Curtea De Arges]
346



Cream-washed and painted church of St. Mary at Curtea de Argeş

33
361
[346]

related to the brook already mentioned, is a spring of some value. Above this, on the terrace, is the nucleus of the town—an Orthodox church (1352) of exceptional dignity and beauty, the Biserica Domneasca, built in a fortified enclosure. This scheme suggests comparisons with such Saxon villages as Cristian, near Sibiu, and several others, though there the church was Catholic. The fortification at Curtea de Argeş is larger than those at such places at Cristian, but it is far from being equivalent to the fortification enclosing the primary nucleus of Sibiu, for that nucleus included church, market places, shops and residences. It seems to have been a widespread rule that where a whole town was not walled there should be at any rate a fortified refuge enclosing the church. In the Slavonic parts of the European plain there were, of old, burgwälle or earthwork refuges, in some cases one for each area of about 120-130 km., or, say, fifty British square miles. These burgwälle sometimes became the nuclei of towns, the Wawel at Krakow being perhaps the best known among many examples. On the Wawel, and in analogous places in many

361 towns, stands a church in a fortified enclosure, and the town
133 has been laid out beyond this. It is possible to infer that a similar process has worked itself out, but to a lesser degree, both in the Saxon villages of Transylvania and in such cases
361 as that of Curtea de Argeş. Here the church-and-castle
491 nucleus is as usual the focus of roads, the principal one of which runs along the terrace as already mentioned. Two others lead down towards the river, one on each side of the fortification, but not exactly to the bridge, the position of which is rather determined by gravel banks where the small seasonal brook referred to above joins the river. Some other roads or trackways branch off in a bunch just east of the nucleus and stretch up into hills of unconsolidated material, their woodland cover increasing with altitude and becoming practically continuous forest at about 600 m. altitude over sea. Where the woods are not continuous there is pasture up to which animals may be drawn every day in summer. One of these roads leads past a little old church of S. Mary and appears to be an old track leading obliquely up the hillside over into the next valley to the east. Along the beginning of this trackway are the homes of numerous craftsmen, especially potters, but we did not get evidence of a guild or zunft of potters. We are not here dealing with quite the same scheme of organisation as that of a trade in a street within a walled town. The main business part of the town has lain between the bridge end and the road on the terrace, 10-20 m. above the river, and the town has been physically constrained to spread along that road. The extension southwards has an interesting eighteenth century house overlooking a square set out quite recently. The extension northwards towards the monastery gives a ribbon of buildings mostly modern.

369 On the whole, one has the impression of a focus of peasant
443 life with fairs and markets and opportunities of sale of craft products, especially pots, to country folk. There is evidence of considerable quite modern growth, and also apparently of growth one to two centuries ago, a growth which it is tempting to associate with agricultural development gathered around the spread of maize and potato, but proof is lacking.

361 Curtea de Argeş owes a great deal of its importance to its
771 religious and princely associations, and both the Biserica Domneasca and the monastery church are important here. The latter, near a ford, may well have more ancient associa-

[in Curtea de Arges -- 25 Analyst]

361 tions, but we know of nothing there before 1510. To the
771 existence of the monastery, which is the seat of a bishop, is due the development of a seminary.

161 THE POPULATION[2] in 1930 was 6,831. In 1931 there were 181
163 births, 24 infant deaths (under one year), 20 still-births, and 125 deaths from all causes. Marriages numbered 61 and divorces 4. The birth-rate is thus high, the infant death-rate considerable, but not so high as might be expected; still-births are numerous.

H. J. F.
E. E. E.

1[cf Curtea de Arges -- Analyst]

415

BROWN CLAY.
WHITE & GREEN SLIP.

NOTES ON THE HOUSES IN CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

342 THE SMALL TOWN of Curtea de Argeş has from time to time suffered destruction from fire, in consequence of which there is very little to be found in the way of early buildings.

The oldest house in the town is that occupied by the present mayor and his family, and they claim that their ancestors have held the property since about 1630, when it was built.

The illustration (op. p. 28) shows it to be a well-built brick structure with a fairly steep roof of dark brown shingles. The brickwork is whitewashed and is very solidly constructed. The present family uses the entire first floor as their dwelling-house. At some recent period part of the ground floor was converted into a restaurant. The spacious rooms under the balcony are used partly for the purpose of a store and the mayor has a private office there.

353 THE DWELLING has a peculiar and individual charm. The furniture is mostly in the traditional peasant style, and much of it is similar to that found in the simple houses, but shows a superior workmanship and quality. The bed, as in the living-room of every peasant, has retained its traditional place in this house, though in this case its purpose to-day is that of a divan or sofa. The coverings and cushions, hand-embroidered, and the woven wall-hangings round the bed, are such as may be seen throughout the countryside, though richer in the materials used and more artistic than most of those to be seen in the peasants' cottages, where often the primary colours are used with little attempt to grade the design by the use of intermediate shades. Small decorated patterns are to be found on the walls. The large living-room has an elaborate and beautifully-painted ceiling—a thing rarely found in the [336] country houses. Modern sanitation, water-supply, etc., have [291] been put into the house. The women of the present family choose to maintain peasant tradition in dress.

342 The spacious balcony, approached from the courtyard, serves for reception of guests in summer. Here meals are taken, and a good many of the household occupations are carried on.

[See pp. 28a (HRAF paging system) - Analyst]

342



PLAN OF MAYOR'S HOUSE - CURTEA de ARGES

Measured by the Mayor and Miss Tatton *Drawn by M. Tatton*

THE EXTENSION shown on the left includes a kitchen, laundry and servants' quarters, added to meet the needs of the present family. Below these rooms are stables and storeplaces. There are several small houses in the town, all among the older buildings, which follow a similar plan. We examined about thirty houses in Curtea, and give below descriptions of two of these, which are typical. In addition, numerous photographs were taken, which illustrate how the houses vary in detail.

THE FIRST DWELLING is of a very common type found on the outskirts of the town. We singled out this one for its added

342

The House of the Mayor, Curtea de Argeş

352

The interior of the Mayor's salon, Curtea de Argeş

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

PLATE IV

34

Note. The walls of the house are 85 cm. in thickness; the rooms 2 metres 15 cm. high; windows 60 cm. in width and 90 cm. high; the balcony is 1 metre 85 cm. above the ground.
(House A).

Photo by H. J. Howard.

House in Potters' Street, Curtea de Argeş, showing how the potter has used his art in the decoration of his own house. Plaques and tiles of pottery let in plaster of side of house. Plaques and tiles of pottery are let in plaster of next balcony.
(House B).

Photo by H. J. Howard

34

323

(B) House in Potters' Street, Curtea de Argeş.
For photo see page 19.

It being Sunday the potter was not actually at work, but was wearing his finely embroidered shirt.
(House B.)

Photo by H. J. Howard

[page 286]

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

342



House B

—— Ground Floor Plan ——

Drawn by M. Tattu

A House in the Potters' Street (see illustrations opposite).



House B

—— First Floor Plan ——

Drawn by M. Tattu

A House in the Potters' Street

342



Plan of small house of illustration in top left-hand corner of facing page 29.

Plans drawn by Margaret Tatton and measured in cooperation with Rachael Jones.

interest in that its present occupants were busy over the forthcoming marriage of their daughter (age sixteen), and had many lovely things in the way of embroideries, clothes, cushion covers, etc., part of the bride's dowry, which we examined. The interior of the room on the right shows the girl's own bed, covered with the things she has made and embroidered to take to her future home. (House A, Plate IV.)

THESE WERE NOTED as follows: 10 pillows (ornamental), 12 sheets, 6 woven rugs for wall or floor, 2 woollen bed-covers (like long blankets), 4 woven bed-covers (patterned), 6 woven bed-covers (plain), and 20 towels (decorated). In addition, she was embroidering her own dresses and under-garments. Much of the work was quite fine and well done. We were informed that this dowry was a fair average one for a girl from this type of home.*

342 THE HOUSE ITSELF, which was built about fifty years ago, had brick and plaster walls, whitewashed throughout. Many of the houses are colour-washed, bright blue being a popular colour. The floors were of wood, as were also the steps leading up to the balcony. Chickens were housed in the vault under the left room. There was a large garden, most of the ground

* Inventory by Rachel Jones.

1 [see pp. 30 on (HRAF pagination) -- Analyst]

FLATE V

353



(House B.)
Curtea de Arges. The interior of the potter's house—his bedroom. Large unbaked pots were standing on the floor.
Photo by H. J. Howard



(House A.)
Curtea de Arges. Primitive arrangement for winding warp lengths on balcony of house measured up by M. Tattori and R. Jones

323

(House B.)
Curtea de Arges. The potter's kiln in his back yard. A primitive affair of sticks, poles and clay.
Photo by H. J. Howard

(House A.)
Curtea de Arges. Part of trousseau. Rugs, blankets, cushions, bed-covers, etc.
Listed by Miss R. Jones. *Photo by H. J. Howard*

[Page 30 a]

PLATE VI

343
252

Outdoor Summer-Kitchen

[Page 30 b]

342

A small house in Curtea de Argeş of similar type to Mayor's house.

being given to growing maize and vegetable marrows, though there were various small fruit-trees. The open space in front of the house had a summer kitchen. These out-door kitchens are used by almost all the peasants where an open space or yard of any sort provides available space (see illustration opposite).

342 THE SECOND HOUSE which we visited and examined is illustrated facing page 29 (B). This shows a well-built structure and represents the type which is more common in the town itself. The walls, which are whitewashed, are of brick and rubble and have an average thickness of 32 cm. There is a good shingled roof with good carved wooden decoration under the eave. The floor of the terrace is earth, and the entire structure of the balcony is of wood, without paint or stain. The end of the house has a pleasing finish in the form of a moulded cornice and pilasters (B).

THIS HOUSE is occupied by two families; the men, both being potters, share the potter's table (two wheels) in the lower house.

1 [See pp. 30 b (HRAF pagination) -- Analyst]

2 [See pp. 28 b (HRAF pagination) -- Analyst]

342 THE CHARACTER of this house is of the simplest. The walls are
352 whitewashed, the floors bare, and there is practically no furniture other than wooden beds and tables. The stoves are of porcelain, and wood or charcoal is used as fuel. The usual
323 practice is for potters to share a kiln with their neighbours. The one illustrated here was the property of this particular house and was placed in its yard (Plate IV, B).

[463] THE FIGURES given by the mayor show that there are 101 potters in Curtea de Argeş. We visited a good number and found that most of them live and work under conditions similar to those illustrated here. The potters for the most part occupy houses in one area of the town. A fine clay is found locally and can be had for nothing, but it must be collected by the potter himself. This clay he stores in his house (see upper plan on page 29).

THE POTS vary in design within a limited range. They are mostly of a buff colour, with the main part of the outside unglazed. The inside is glazed brown and the rim is usually covered with a bright green glaze, which makes the pots very attractive; some pots have splashes of green in parts or all over them. Most of the pots are marketed locally and can be bought at a low price. The pot is often made porous so that evaporation may keep the water cool. Pots are sent to other
[438] places near Curtea, but are not sufficiently strong, we were informed, for long-distance transport.

341 NEW DEVELOPMENT in housing is making steady progress. Some houses are still being constructed on the traditional lines, half brick half timber, and the "eye" in the roof, which is common in the older houses, is not necessarily omitted in the modern roof; tiles, however, are replacing the shingle. The wooden balcony is disappearing in the larger type of house and is being replaced by a brick verandah. These brick verandahs are built with ornate columns, sometimes with elaborate capitals. The classical influence is, in fact, strong, for some houses have a pediment, and in one ambitious dwelling the capitals were gilded and the pediments contained gilded decorations. The simple wooden window frames are now little used, and are replaced by elaborate mullions. Wall decorations in elaborate stucco or stencil work and ornamental details on doors are a common feature of the new houses. Most of the new houses are detached and stand in their own gardens. M. E. T.

1 [See pp. 286, HRAF pagination -- Analyst]

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

342
323



Curtea de Argeș. A house in Potters' Street. Notice jars, etc., drying in the sun ready for baking.
Photo by H. J. Howard

283

Women separating hemp fibres from the stems after they have been retted and dried.

[page 32a]

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDI Rumania EDI

PLATE VIII

234

Early morning at a Stînà. Time about 5-6 a.m. Milking the sheep.

Early morning at a Stînà. [illegible] being released after milking.

[page 326]

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

EDUCATION IN CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

871 368 IN THE TOWN there are five primary schools—three mixed, one for girls and one for boys. In the latter there is a kindergarten class for children between five and seven. There are two vocational secondary schools, the Theological College and the Technical School; these are for boys only. The nearest lycée for girls is at Piteşti, 37 kilometres away. Boys also must leave the town for ordinary secondary education.

872 The kindergarten was founded in 1928 by the Orthodox National Society of Roumanian Women. There is a special local committee of management. The room used is large; part of it serves as a cloakroom and for washing; the children use the same playground and offices as the boys.

[876] THERE ARE two teachers and about fifty-five children. Careful records of the progress of each child are kept. The children work in groups in low chairs at tables; no individual work is taken. Froebel's principles are followed, but Dr. Montessori's sense-training apparatus is used and Dr. Decroby's principles of teaching arithmetic are adopted.

INTERESTING HANDWORK is taken: paper-cutting pictures, modelling in clay and in paper, lace, crochet, etc. The first twenty minutes of each morning are set apart for the care of plants and animals and of the classroom. Speech training, physical exercises, free-play and singing are taught; as the school has no musical instrument, much depends on the musical ability of the mistress. The training is similar to that of primary school teachers; the salary is fixed by the local committee.

[346] THE PRIMARY SCHOOL for girls that we visited is housed in a large building of one storey, standing in its own grounds; it contains, all leading out of a central hall, four large and lofty classrooms, a teachers' small-room and an art room; there are no cloakrooms, the children hang their clothes on stands in the classrooms. These rooms are rather bare, but very light; they are heated by a big porcelain stove and the desks take three children. In summer classes are held in the garden. The

872 size of the classes varies from 40 to 50 children; there are five teachers. The Head takes a different class each year. The hours are from 9 to 12 and from 2 to 4. Some preparation is done at home. Holidays are generous—eight weeks in the summer, two at Easter, two at Christmas. There are no fees, but children buy their books if they can. The time-table and the syllabus are drawn up by the Minister of Education, and are the same for all schools. Inspectors visit frequently. There [758] is a full medical inspection of each child at the beginning of the year and then each subsequent month. In the first four years the curriculum resembles that of an English elementary school; in the fifth and sixth years the girls combine with general subjects either a commercial, an industrial or a housewifery course. In the seventh year they concentrate on vocational subjects and open their morning working away from school.

We saw some good examples of handwork, clay modelling, paper-cutting pictures, dolls in national dress, etc., and in Class I—the seven-year-olds—some most amusing pictures for the teaching of numbers. Religion is taught daily; there is a religious service on the first day of each month and the children go together to church with one teacher every Sunday.

874 If a girl wishes to become a teacher in a primary school, after four years in such a school she must spend eight in an Ecole Normale and then teach for three years before obtaining her full diploma. For secondary school teaching, after eight years in a lycée the girl goes, at nineteen, to the university for three or four years, and then spends four months in a lycée pédagogique. She then takes her "examen de capacité."

The Theological College, housed in a large red-brick building now being enlarged, takes 260 boys, many of whom come from a distance; all are boarders. The course lasts eight years: four years in the High School (12-16); four years in the College (16-20). Entrance is by means of an examination in Religion, Roumanian, Mathematics and History; there were in 1936 100 candidates for 40 places. The boys are worked very hard; lessons are from 8 to 12 and 2 to 4; preparation from 6 to 7.30 a.m. and from 7 to 9 p.m. In the High School the languages taken are Latin and French; in the College the course includes Greek, German, Pedagogy, Philosophy, Psychology, Sociology, Church History. The course at the College is followed by four years at a university.

874 THE TECHNICAL or Trade School is one of forty such schools in the country. The Minister of Education has ordered this number to be doubled. The boys come from all districts and can go on to a higher grade Trade School. There is a still higher grade of school in Roumania called the Academy, from which pupils are turned out as teachers.

IN THIS TRADE School at Curtea de Argeş the boys live in and pay an inclusive fee of 4,500 lei per annum; those attending as day boys pay only 760 lei per annum. Two-thirds of these fees must be paid at the beginning of the session; the cost of material is not included.

Boys can enter between the ages of 11 and 15; the number taken is 100. They are divided into four classes. The subjects taught are Woodwork, Pottery and Tailoring. In woodwork, when the boys leave they are considered to have qualified in all the processes of house-building and furnishing. [323] In pottery, the chief industry of this town, the *traditional* shapes, colouring and decoration (mostly of ships) are charming, but *modern* designs and shapes are less good and often tasteless.

[353] THE CLASSROOMS are airy and heated by stoves. The boys sit in couples. The walls are hung with pictures of Roumanian history and of architectural interest, e.g. York Minster, Notre Dame, the Forum, etc. Each room has a religious picture. The woodwork room is large; each bench has a wooden vice; the wood is neatly stacked on a large shelf a few feet from the roof. Few tools were seen, as they were being prepared for next session. There is a room set apart for exhibiting the work done. All articles are for sale, and the pupil gets most of the money. Both the french polishing and the chip carving reach an excellent standard.

[7] THE MILITARY SERVICE required from boys attending Trade Schools is of one year's duration only. There are in the country five Higher Trade Schools—at Bucureşti, Braşov, Craiova, Iassi and Turgul Mureş.

N. H. S.

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

MEDICAL CONDITIONS AT CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

CURTEA DE ARGEŞ is a small town of 6,831 inhabitants (in 1930), situated in the valley of the River Argeş, at an altitude of 1,400 feet.

A SERIES of wells supply the town with water, there being no system of pipes to supply running water. The drainage system is necessarily of a primitive type, the dry closet type being the one in use.

THE TOWN possesses two hospitals:

(1) A general hospital with pavilion for epidemic cases.

(2) Home for incurables—a branch of a nerve clinic in Bucharest.

THE GENERAL HOSPITAL is situated in the centre of the town on a slight eminence, a few yards from the main street. It consists of two wards, one for men and one for women. The cases are mixed, medical and surgical cases being nursed in the same ward. There are fifteen beds for men and fifteen for women. In addition there are two small wards for clean surgical cases, each containing two beds.

THE BEDS are of the usual hospital type, but placed close together about three feet apart. The mattresses and pillows are stuffed with straw and are very hard. The patients wear their own clothes. This being summer, less than one half of the beds were in use. The villagers refuse to come to hospital in summer, when there is work to be done in the fields, unless in cases of stern necessity. A belief in witchcraft and secret remedies is prevalent, so that progress as regards treatment is hampered. Epidemics of dysentery and typhoid are common. Tuberculosis is widespread, and goitre is found in all the villages in this valley. Cretinism in the children is untreated, and most villages contain cases. No medication of the water supply is undertaken. Pulmonary tuberculosis is treated in sanatoria, but other cases of tuberculosis are admitted here. Cancer is also common, but is not dealt with here—the cases are sent to Bucharest for radium treatment.

164 Rickets is unknown, and difficult labour among peasant women is rare, though puerperal fever is common. In some instances, if there is a midwife, she is shared by several [847] villages. A law has recently been passed forbidding attempts at abortion, but it is not strictly enforced. There are a good many infant deaths. Maternal morbidity is not high, in [142] spite of the prevalence of puerperal fever. The women as a whole are robust, of good physique and inured to hardship. [757] The French treatment of sepsis by induced (turpentine) abscess is common and is found to be very successful, the fever running its course in 7-8 days, with low mortality rate. [855] Children are breast-fed, feeding bottles being unknown. The feeding continues until the age of one year or longer. Infantile paralysis is unknown in this district, though it does occur in other parts of the country. Rheumatism and arthritis are common.

743 752 A SMALL operating theatre is attached to the hospital for emergency cases like suppurating appendices and ruptured hernia, other cases being sent to the hospitals in larger towns. Small surgical operations are also performed. The table is convenient, in that it can tilt at any angle from head to foot, but it cannot be lowered or raised at will. The only light is a small electric globe high up in the ceiling, with no facilities for lowering. Operations are, however, mostly done in daylight. If necessary, lamps or even candles are requisitioned. A small room for sterilising purposes opens off the theatre.

743 164 THE PAVILION for infectious cases is situated about twenty feet from the main building, in close proximity to the staff house and kitchen. Its beds were empty at the moment of inspection. Scarlet fever is the most common epidemic in this vicinity, and the beds were full one month ago. Epidemics of dysentery and typhoid also occur. Typhus is not known here, though frequent in Bessarabia. Diphtheria is fairly common.

759 THERE ARE a medical doctor and a surgeon in attendance, the latter being only part-time.

743 THE HOME for the incurables was next visited. It is a handsome villa, situated near the main street, but farther from the centre of the town. As before stated, it is a branch of the nerve clinic in Bucharest, and is under the supervision of

1 [in Curtea De Arges -- Analyst]

743 Prof. Dr. Cantacuzene, who visits it two or three times yearly. A doctor is in charge with a Sister of Mercy as nurse and two untrained local nurses, one for the men and one for the women. There are thirty male beds and twenty female [764] beds. The cases are mainly paralytic and epileptic, with a certain number of war invalids and diabetics. The beds were mostly empty when seen, as the cases are ambulant.

BATHROOM and lavatory accommodation in both hospitals is necessarily primitive.

759 744 THERE ARE three other doctors in the town—one for the military, another for the insurance societies, and a third for the direction of general sanitary work, corresponding to a British Medical Officer of Health. The headquarters of the last-named are at the Mayor's office. Medical inspection takes place once a month in the schools, each child being examined thoroughly each time. There are no dentists in the town, extraction of teeth, etc., being performed by the [751] local doctors. Vaccination is obligatory and is done when the child is one month old. At the age of seven, on entry into school, a second vaccination is required, and in the case of a boy, at the age of 18, when he begins his premilitary service.

758 As REGARDS payment for medical treatment, poor people who cannot afford to pay are treated free, otherwise 10-20 lei is charged for a consultation and 20-30 lei per day in hospital. Most of the patients are insured against sickness by paying regular contributions under State guidance.

759 DOCTORS RECEIVE their training in one of the three centres, Cluj, Bucharest or Jassy. Cluj is considered the best equipped. So far there are no medical text-books in Roumanian. German text-books and German medical traditions are followed at Cluj, while French text-books and French traditions are in use at Bucharest and Jassy. One year is spent in preparation, Chemistry, Physics, etc., being studied. Five years of actual medical work, theoretical and practical, follow. For the past eight years a further course of two years in specialised work at a hospital has been insisted upon.

N. H. S.

[in Curtea De Arges -- Analyst]

FARMING AROUND CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

AMY R. BURGESS

133 IN THE region of Curtea de Argeş the river flows in a valley of varying width, floored with fine sandy alluvium and bounded by somewhat rounded hills. Some traces of river terraces are discernible.

THE LAND of this region can be divided into four categories: (*a*) arable, (*b*) hay meadows, (*c*) forest, (*d*) high mountain pasture. The arable land is principally on the first terrace, but stretches both down the slope to the valley bottom and up the slope to the second terrace. The hay meadows are above the arable land, spreading upwards towards the [137] forest. The forests comprise 75 per cent of the total area, and consist mainly of timber trees, such as beech and pine, together with a considerable number of walnut trees. The high pastures are above the forest belt and may be as much as fifty kilometres away from the village centre of the commune to which they belong.

423 THE ARABLE land is owned by the peasants, holdings ranging from less than one hectare to fifty hectares, the majority being from two to five hectares. The smallness of the holding [428] is due partly to the laws of inheritance, by which the land is divided between the children on the death of the owner, and partly to the fact that the district is so hilly that only small areas are available for cultivation.

241 476 THE HAY meadows belong to the commune and are both worked and used collectively by the peasants, all necessary organization being in the hands of the mayor and committee.

471 [313] THE FORESTS are largely state-owned, although some portions belong to the commune, in which case the peasants are allowed to cut for their own personal use (house-building, implements, etc.), but not for profit.

[285] THE HIGH pastures belong to the commune; the peasants pay a small fee to the commune for their use (20 lei per head per season for sheep, rather more for cattle).

132 AN IMPORTANT climatic feature affecting agriculture is the shortness of the summer, late spring and early autumn frosts

132 being common at this height (440 metres and upwards). July and August are the hottest months.

THE MEAN annual rainfall for Curtea de Argeş (taken over a period of nine years) is 672 mm. Precipitation occurs all the year round, but the rainiest months are May and June.

243 THE PRINCIPAL crop is maize, from which not only is the staple food "mamaliga" made, but the stems and leaves are used for animal fodder and bedding. Oats and rye are grown for fodder on the larger farms only. Wheat is not grown in the region. Soil and climate are suitable, but at present the peasant possesses very little machinery; harvesting would have to be done with a sickle or scythe and threshing with a flail. It is easier to buy such wheat as is required from the Wallachian Plain.

244 IN ADDITION to the above, every farm, however small, grows various vegetable crops: pumpkins for fodder, tomatoes, paprika, potatoes, onions, runner beans, cabbages, aubergines, often amongst the maize, sometimes as ground crops in the orchards.

246 CULTIVATED FODDER crops are grown only on the larger farms, and consist of clover, lucerne and sometimes a mixture of vetch and oats, and very occasionally turnips.

THE LOWER slopes of the hills form the natural hay meadows of the commune, but occasionally the grass of the orchard is used as rough pasture.

248 HEMP IS grown on the low-lying farms, usually as a boundary crop for the maize. Flax is also grown, but very few sunflowers.

245 AN IMPORTANT aspect of agriculture around Curtea de Argeş is fruit cultivation. Apples, pears and plums are the main crops, with occasional cherries. Every farm, however small, has some fruit trees, sometimes scattered over the whole holding, but more usually in a small orchard. Sufficient apples are grown to allow a considerable export trade to Bucharest. Plums are used for the manufacture of the alcoholic drink tuica in Curtea de Argeş. Recently plum-drying has been tried, and is already being taken up successfully by the more enterprising peasants. Walnuts also are gathered and sold.

5; Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDI Rumania EDI

313

Kumpana. Forestry. Logs, etc., lying by stream-side ready to be dealt with.
—*Photo by H. J. Howard*

Forestry. Kumpana. A kind of barrage where logs are let through into sheets graded as regards size. They are then rolled down to side of railway and rolled up inclines on to the trucks. *Photo by H. J. Howard*

[page 40a]

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDI Rumania EDI

PLATE X

313

Kumpana. Forestry. As the logs pass down the "shoot" a man on the elevated platform sees that logs of even lengths are let out at side of "shoot" for loading on to the trucks seen on left-hand side. *Photo by H. J. Howard*

252
342

The Argeş District. Visit to Forestry section (Kumpana). Inside of forestry hut, showing large open stove for cooking meals. Huge logs of wood were being burnt on a stone hearth. There were sleeping bunks for the lumber-jacks all round the sides of the hut. *Photo by H. J. Howard*

[page 40 b]

241 PAID AGRICULTURAL labour is very rare; the work of the farm is done entirely by the peasant and his family, including women. Modern machinery is still almost unknown, so that agricultural practice is rather that of the garden than that of the field in our Western sense.

PLOUGHING IS done with a wooden plough tipped with iron and ox drawn. Sowing is done largely by hand, while intermediate operations, such as hilling the maize, are done with a hoe of the form illustrated on page 59. Harvesting, if not done by "pulling" (e.g. flax), or picking (e.g. fruit), is done by means of a sickle (maize) or scythe (hay).

[242] AMONG SOME farmers some idea of rotation of crops is understood, but only very imperfectly; in many cases it is not practised at all, the same plot of land being used for maize year after year.

ARTIFICIAL FERTILIZERS are seldom used, peasants depending for renewal of fertility upon animal manure and ploughing in and burning the stubble. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the yield is low and crops poor in quality.

[22] SOWING BEGINS at the end of April or the beginning of May (oats) and continues until the middle of June. Harvesting begins as soon after July 30th as possible and continues until the end of October, when the last of the maize is gathered.

231 ANIMALS PLAY an important part in the agricultural economy of the Rumanian peasant. Every holding possesses sheep, particularly milking ewes, milking cows, draught oxen, perhaps a horse or horses, pigs, together with geese and fowls. Few holdings are without one or two hives of bees. Occasionally on a very small holding (less than one hectare) milking cows are replaced by goats. During the summer (from the beginning of May until the end of August) the sheep and such cattle as are not needed at the farm for draught or milking purposes are sent up to the high pastures. Pigs are sometimes sent up with them, but not goats. During this time the animals left are either fed on fodder crops at the farm or are sent out daily to pasture on a portion of the hay meadows set aside for that purpose. On being brought down from the mountains the animals are pastured for a short time on the hay meadows from which the crop has already been taken. They are then brought back to their

231 owner's farm, where the cows are kept in sheds, and the sheep, which are more hardy, are penned on the arable land, particularly on the maize stubble. Both sheep and cattle are fed on fodder crops during the winter. The surplus animals are sold at the autumn fair, and form a source of revenue.

476 [236] [234] WHILST ON the high pastures the sheep are clipped twice, and the wool is divided amongst the peasants in proportion to the number of animals sent up. The cheese is usually shared by the owners of the animals in the same way, the mayor and his committee being responsible for the correct apportionment. In the Valley of the Arges co-operative dealers from Bucharest frequently buy the cheese "in bulk" direct from the commune, and the monetary value is shared between the owners of the animals.

291 OXEN ARE used almost exclusively for draught purposes, the numbers kept in this district being somewhat in excess of the farmers' requirements, owing to their use for lumbering (see below).

241 [369] [439] PEASANT FARMING in the Valley of the Arges is no longer entirely on a subsistence basis. Two factors have tended to modify it. Firstly, the position of the valley, opening as it does directly on the Wallachian Plain, with its rich grain lands and containing the capital Bucharest, has allowed commercial intercourse to develop. The Arges peasant no longer cultivates wheat; he does not mind if his maize crop is good enough for fodder only, for he can buy both wheat and maize from the plain. Further, he finds a ready market and so a money income in Bucharest for his surplus fruit,
313 particularly apples, and cheese. Secondly, the forests form a valuable asset to the peasant. During the winter felling takes place in the upper basin of the Arges; in spring and summer the timber is transported, and work in the State mill in Curtea goes on all the year round. Practically every household has somebody working in the timber trade, and the money so earned (as much as 100 lei per day for a man supplying his own yoke of oxen) reduces the dependence of the family on the farm.

874 242 AT CURTEA DE ARGES is the School of Agriculture, Regina Elizabeta. Although only a small percentage of its pupils is local, it is gradually influencing the farming of the neighbourhood. Experiments in cultivation, plant breeding and

874 the use of machinery are carried on at the school. Advisers
242 are sent out to the farms, and seeds and plants, as well as artificial manure, are supplied to the peasants at a very low cost. Machinery is also loaned out cheaply. The average
[57] peasant, however, is very conservative, and progress is slow.

SOME DETAILS OF TWO FARMS: AUGUST 1936

FARM A

423 SIZE: one half-hectare approximately. This farm is situated
241 approximately two miles north of Curtea de Argeş.

THE HOLDING consists of a narrow rectangular strip, bounded on one of its long sides by a rough lane and on its short side by the main road. The ground is fairly level and sufficiently above the river to be well drained. (See Plan A for utilization of land and arrangement of buildings.)

Animals

[23] 2 milking cows, 2 calves (at farm), but no oxen (this was unusual).
10 sheep, away on high pastures.
3 pigs, at farm.
10 geese, 6 ducks, 50 hens.

FARM B

SIZE: Five hectares approximately. This farm is situated at Corbeni, several kilometres north of Curtea de Argeş, at a point where the river valley widens out and the river braids. The farm is situated on the second terrace. The plot is rectangular, with its narrow side bordered by the road and its long side running parallel to the river, thus giving a well-drained but flat holding. The son of the owner holds a diploma for agriculture and the farm shows every evidence of prosperity. See PLAN B for utilization of land and arrangement of buildings.

SMALL PEASANT HOLDING

(Farm A)

241
423



A. House
B. Loom
C. Plum trees

Approximate length 250 m.
Approximate breadth 20m.

Not drawn to scale

Drawn by A. R. Burgess

241
423

PLAN OF LARGE HOLDING

(Farm B)

Approximately 5 hectares
Not drawn to scale.



A. House with food store under.

Drawn by A. R. Burgess

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

231

Animals

5 milking cows, 2 at farm, 3 with calves away on the high pastures.
2 draught oxen.
2 bulls.
100 sheep, away on high pastures.
2 horses.
3 pigs.
30 goats at farm.
Large number of poultry (fowls and geese) impossible to estimate.
2 hives of bees in flower garden.

221

AGRICULTURAL CALENDAR

April.	Preparation of ground, sowing of oats and vetch. Sheep go up to low hill pastures.
May.	Sowing of maize, potatoes, beans. May 1st, sheep go to high pastures.
June.	Sowing of fodder crops; all sowing finished by middle of month.
July.	Early part of month, first cutting of hay, making and collecting. July 20th, beginning of harvest, i.e. flax, cherries, oats and barley.
August.	Middle of month, second cutting of hay, oat harvest, plum harvest, followed by apple and walnut harvest. Harvesting and retting of hemp. Some ploughing of grain stubble. August 31st, sheep return from high pastures to low hill pastures.
September.	Beginning of maize harvest, sheep penned on maize stubble as soon as possible.
October.	End of maize harvest according to season.
November to March.	Sheep penned on maize fields, cattle kept in sheds and fed on hay and fodder crops.

A. R. B.

412

Mould for hay fork

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDI Rumania EDI

342
352

Interior of Stână Găujoara. *Drawn by P. Stinson, after E. E. Evans*



Interior of Stână Cărbunele. *Drawn by P. Stinson, after E. de Martonne*

See page 51

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 ED1 Rumania ED1

TRANSHUMANCE IN THE SOUTHERN CARPATHIANS

233 221 IN THE SOUTHERN CARPATHIANS we have a region which still retains its pastoral activities, little disturbed by the social and economic forces which have invaded the pastoralists' domain elsewhere. Few Roumanian villages are without sheep, and in the summer great numbers are taken to the high pastures when these become free of snow. This seasonal migration, or transhumance, is an ancient feature of European life, and a study of its forms and functions in Roumania not only throws light on important aspects of peasant life, but provides valuable comparative material for the study of similar movements in regions like western Britain, where transhumance survives only in a modified way.

SHEEP ARE the pivot of rural economy in these Carpathian lands; the pastoral element pervades all aspects of peasant [291] life—from the traditional costumes of woollen cloth trousers and sheepskin waistcoat to popular poetry and music. But the intimate contact with upland pastures thus ensured has been of deeper significance: it has enabled the Carpathian peoples to preserve their sense of unity when the lowlands were overrun by invaders, while the contacts maintained between summering groups have helped to preserve the Roumanian language and kept its dialectal variations within limits. In a very real sense, the Southern Carpathians are the heart of Roumania.

133 PHYSICAL CONDITIONS have, from very remote times, favoured the development and survival of pastoral life. The steepness of the forested valley slopes which isolate the upland core is in strong contrast to the gently undulating platforms which rise above the tree-line, at about 5,000 feet, and terminate in rugged glaciated *monadnocks* which may reach 8,000 feet or more (Negoiu, 2,544 m.). The prolonged erosion of Tertiary times which produced the upland platforms also provided the great masses of unconsolidated material—mostly coarse sands—which now form the extensive foothills stretching half way to the Danube over a width of some sixty miles. Curtea de Argeş is one of the settlements of this foothill belt,

133 dependent for the working out of its economy, as for its setting, upon the high Southern Carpathians.

233 133 WHILE IN some parts of Roumania all the sheep must be moved to distant highlands in summer, there are many regions which have sufficient local pasture to keep a certain proportion of stock through the year. This applies to the country around Curtea de Argeş; here the late Tertiary (Pliocene) deposits are provided with frequent terraces. The lower terraces are glacial and may be three in number; higher up the dip-slopes of the coarse sands have often been cleared of the bad forests which still cling to the scarps, while at all levels slips have occurred in the loose materials to produce small mesa-like areas, sparsely covered with grass, juniper and birch, accessible to nimble sheep and goats.* In general, however, such local pasturage is reserved for cows in milk, while young cattle and bullocks, if not required for the many activities of farming and forestry, are sent with the sheep to the high pastures.

WE MAY best examine some of the features of this transhumance by following the sheep in their movements through the year in the valley of the Argeş and its background of high mountains, the Fagaras, extending eastwards from the valley of the Olt. The commune of Corbeni, some seventeen kilometres upstream, provides us with a few figures. Here is the first widening of the Argeş Valley, for the river has left the last range of the Carpathians (1,500 m.) through which it cuts one of the great gorges which characterize this zone, and it is here entering on its braided course through the [137] Miocene and Pliocene deposits to the south. The proportion of forested land in the commune is high (75 per cent), and its 2,500 sheep can be maintained only by extensive transhumance. The summer pastures are from thirty to fifty kilometres distant, the stâne† extending from the forest's upper limit (1,500-1,600 m.) to the scarred rock faces of the high core at 2,000 m. Each commune has its stână, 471 which takes its name from the mountain on which it is 233 situated: it is the property of the commune, but there are certain payments to be made each year for the services of

*Goats tend to be kept only by the poorer peasants; they are naturally not encouraged by the Forestry authorities.

†Stână (singular). The word is applied as here to the summer pastures and also to the huts where the shepherds sleep and make the store the cheese. By extension it is sometimes used for the general economy of transhumant shepherding.

471 the shepherds and cheese-maker. These dues, amounting to
233 some 10 or 20 lei per sheep, are worked out each year by a committee which regulates the financial side of the transhumant economy.

234 EACH STÂNĂ has its baciu or cheese-maker, who is paid by
233 the commune. In some districts this scheme is varied by arrangements which must represent modifications of the
471 old economy of collective shepherding. Occasionally a large farmer may be proprietor of a stână and may possess enough sheep to run his own pasturing, in which case he may either hire a cheese-maker or fill that rôle in person. Or he may let his stână to the highest bidder, who pays in cheese obtained from the flock. From this it is a short step to the emergence of the middleman who, possessing no sheep himself, rents a pasture and guarantees to return an agreed quantity of cheese per sheep to those who send him their stock.

233 BEGINNING OUR account with the descent from the mountains,
221 we find that the uppermost pastures are abandoned by the last day of August, and the return downhill takes place during the first fortnight in September, being normally completed by September 14th (The Feast of the Cross). The sheep are driven to the local pastures until the maize crop is gathered, when they are penned on the stubble. Movement uphill begins about the middle of April and is completed by May 1st in an average year, St. George's Day (April 23rd) being a central date. Each peasant is responsible for driving his own sheep, using recognized tracks which tend to follow the watersheds. The sheep thus avoid the deep valley-crossings and can avail themselves of occasional natural clearings for temporary halts in a journey which may last a week. These are points of some importance in connection with the study of ridgeway roads generally.

342 THE SHEPHERD'S hut is a log-cabin erected on a single foundation-course of boulders. It is roofed with shingles or long planks; the gable is boarded above the level of the eaves, and a gap at the apex serves in place of chimney. Scarcely any metal is used in the construction of these summer dwellings, which serve as dairies and storehouses in addition to providing shelter and sleeping-places for the shepherds.
000 The furniture is of the simplest, but much ingenuity is

1 [for explanation see footnote 50 pp. 49, cat. 116 -- Analyst]

352 The furniture[1] is of the simplest, but much ingenuity is displayed in contriving hinges, benches, and so on, the devices used having an air of ancient custom about them. Nearly all the woodwork could be done with the axe (see
354 p. 47). A simple crane, the probable prototype of the iron
372 hearth-crane as we know it in Britain, allows the pot to be suspended at the desired distance from the open wood fire, which burns on a rough hearth towards the centre of the stamped earth floor. A certain sanctity attaches to the fire: it is not allowed to go out, and much ceremony accompanies its lighting. The "living fire" (*focul vin*) should be prepared on arrival at the head stână[2] of the commune's pasturage, by means of two sticks rubbed together, and the operation should be performed by a pure youth, otherwise the flocks will fare badly. The fire must then be carried to the other huts. We were not able to observe this custom, but the shepherd-boy at the Stână Găujoara, situated to the north of the watershed some fifteen miles south-west of Sibiu, was persuaded to show us how the fire was lit. Here the more familiar "flint-and-steel" method was used, but in place of flint the sparks were obtained from a piece of quartz, a substitution which suggests one reason for the common ceremonial use of quartz by ancient man in Europe.

233 In the Carpathians, as in Europe generally, there is much
462 variation in the personnel of the transhumant shepherds, but the exclusion of women in some areas is a feature for which
000 parallels cannot readily be adduced. In Norway it is the women who take the flocks to the summer pastures, an arrangement which is natural where the men are fishers. The same scheme is found in parts of the Central Plateau of France, where the men cannot be spared from their work in the fields, and the same appears to have held for the Scottish Highlands. Switzerland offers the best example of mass transhumance, and the movements formerly practised in Wales and in Ireland, though simpler and less regular, seem to have involved men, women and children. The *hafodty*, described by Welsh writers early last century, was a cowhouse with a fire at one end, but no chimney, and, except that the whole was stone-built, the assemblage of pens and shelters must have closely resembled the Roumanian. In Wales, too, ewes were milked and sheep's cheese made into the nineteenth century.

In the Carpathians, while some stâne are inhabited by

1 [In the shepherd's hut -- Analyst]
2 [For explanatory footnote see pp. 49, Cat. 116 -- Analyst]

462 In the Carpathians, while some stâne are inhabited by
233 families of shepherds, others have men only, and purely "feminine" stâne are not unknown. There appear to be regional differences based perhaps on the varying requirements of the lowland crops, and all forms are said to be of some antiquity; it cannot be shown that the "masculine" stâne represent an older type than those where both sexes [834] take part, or vice versa. But it is significant that in some parts there is a definite *tabu* against women, and the shepherds must have no relations with them in the prescribed season, from the arrival at the stână to July 20th (St. Eloi). In the areas we visited, while the shepherds were exclusively male, women from the villages occasionally ride up with messages or food, and may stay at the hut for a day or two.

234 On reaching the pastures, to resume, the sheep are divided into separate flocks—milkers and non-milkers, lambs and wethers. Only the milkers are kept in the immediate neighbourhood of the stână, the rest being driven uphill or to the shelter of the forest's edge, according to their requirements. Two milkings are usual, about 6 o'clock morning and evening. The sheep are driven into the *strunga*, a fenced enclosure near the hut, where the shepherd-boy introduces them one by one into a narrow roofed exit at which the milkers sit. The milk is forthwith poured into a copper cauldron over which the *baciu* stands at the fireside, stirring [p. 5] the contents with the peeled, spiked top of a spruce. The copper pot is tinned inside, this work being done by the gipsies. Into the simmering milk the *baciu* throws a pinch of rennet, and then works the curds into a thick pulp. A simple press—a canvas bag twisted with a tourniquet and weighted with a stone—next comes into use, and after three days salt is added and the cheese is finally kneaded and stored in a sheepskin which has been specially prepared by drying and scraping. This is cheese of the first quality (brânză), a poorer quality (urdă) being obtained from the whey left in the copper after taking out the curds. The urdă is often stored in small skins, e.g. rabbit, or in containers made of bark or hollowed branches. Much of the cheese in these days is bought by co-operative societies.

262 It is the duty of the *baciu*,[2] further, to prepare food for the shepherds. Onions, beans and paprika make vegetable soup, and maize-bread and cheese complete a diet which may be varied now and again with smoked mutton. Another task

2 [For explanatory footnote see pp. 49, cf. 116 - - Analyst]
2 [cheese maker of the Stâna -52- Analyst]

Another task

233 devolving on the shepherds is the shearing, which is done
[236] twice in the summer, but they are spared the "dipping" regulations, which British shepherds find so irksome. For the rest there is much to be done to keep the flocks healthy and safe from wolves, to look after the dogs, to carry water
[517] and cut wood. In rare moments of leisure the shepherd will be found blowing his simple pipe, or singing songs, or carving a stick with his versatile knife, cutting out those ancient geometric patterns which are the common heritage of peasant Europe.

E. E. E.

415



A Beetle

A reaping glove

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

THE FAIR

IN AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITIES it is customary for the exchange of goods to be concentrated at certain periodic gatherings known as fairs. The countryman has little time to spare for commerce, and where an element of pastoral nomadism is present, as in Roumania, the times of meeting will be closely restricted. Fairs tend, in Europe, to be held in summer; frequently at the beginning and end of summer—in May and November—when the year's routine is broken by seasonal changes of activity. They are often well developed in regions of pastoral nomadism, where they serve as social centres and may be regarded as temporary market towns. The weekly *suq* in Morocco, for example is an essential feature of the economic and social life of the country, which has recently been studied by Mr. Fogg.

IN EUROPE, where the market town is an ancient product of rural society, fairs usually supplement the functions of established towns, although in origin they are thought to be much older than urban life. They have been described as parasite towns brought into being to meet the periodic needs of country dwellers, but such a description fails to reveal their significance.

THE SUBJECT of fairs in its social and economic aspects has scarcely received the attention it merits in the history of Europe. It is true that the great fairs of the Middle Ages, such as those of Champagne and Flanders, have often been described, but they were "commodity fairs," concerned with the exchange of goods over wide areas and frequented by merchants from all parts of Europe. As is well known, the *foci* of these great fairs moved eastwards into Germany in the sixteenth century, and again in the nineteenth century into Russia, where Nijni Novgorod has held an exceptional position for over a century. In central Asia, as in Africa (cf. the annual *mouggar* of South Morocco), much commerce is still conducted at such commodity fairs. While the development of communications and of means of exchange has undermined the large fairs in Europe, the local fair is still an active institution.

291
531

Two peasants at the fair. Curtea de Argeș.

A hand-embroidered peasant's blouse. The back is as richly decorated as the front. (Peasant woman at Curtea de Argeș.)

Curtea de Argeș. Peasants in their richly embroidered coloured costumes arriving at the fair.
Photos by H. J. Howard

[page 54a]

415
44:

PLATE XII

Curtea de Arges. Pots were sold at the local fair. They had been made in the village. Cart for packing and bringing pots shown in background.

[page 54 b]

543



PLAN OF THE FAIR. *Drawn by P. Stinson after E. E. Evans.*

1. Bridge.
2. Shoeing-smith.
3. Tinker.
4. Stations.
5. Stores for salt, maize and fruit.
6. Timber.
7. Mill.
8. Weighing machine and toll office.
9. Pots.
10. Enclosures for animals.
11. Food stalls.
12. Gipsy camp.
13. Skirts and rugs.
14. Shirts and waistcoats.
15. Leather goods.
16. Factory goods and trinkets.
17. Well and peasant carts.
18. Restaurants.
19. Amusements.
20. Dancing.

543 THE FAIRS at Curtea de Argeş are held twice a year, each
527 lasting about a week and ending respectively on August 15th
443 (Assumption) and October 25th (St. Demetri). The association with Christian festivals is a widespread feature (the word "fair" is derived from *feriæ*, feast), the fairs attracting the crowds which gather for the festivals. It can sometimes be shown that the time and place of meeting are older than Christianity and that the periodic pagan assemblies later received the sanction of the Church. The fair, at any rate, satisfies a deep peasant instinct for worship, the exchange of goods and social intercourse.

THE AUGUST fair at Curtea corresponds with the early harvests of fruit—especially the plum—and, formerly, with the cereal harvests (buckwheat and millets) which maize replaced. It is probably connected in origin with the Lammas fairs of the West. The first of August, in the ancient Celtic calendar, marked the beginning of autumn and was celebrated as a harvest festival. In Ireland the day is still called Lewy's Fair, and is traditionally associated with the lighting of fires, with games and the making of marriage matches. Lammas fair is the largest of the year in some Irish towns.

THE OCTOBER fair would seem to derive its importance primarily from the return of the stock from the mountain pastures, when cheese and wool and surplus animals can be exchanged. A feature of the October fair is the high proportion of sheep and goats among the stock offered for sale. In the French Alps, too, the autumn stock fairs are the most important of the year. The maize harvest has by this time been gathered even in the Carpathian valleys, where winter sets in early. But whatever the position may once have been, the fairs are now more concerned with goods than with stock.

543 CURTEA FAIR-GROUND is situated on the flood plain, on waste ground kept free of permanent habitations by the danger of spring floods. The scarp leading to the first river-terrace rises steeply behind and is planted with trees which provide
[312] some shelter for peasants and animals. Here, too, under the scarp, is the well which supplies the needs of man and beast.
[496] The main railway—terminus of the line downstream to Pitesti—has extensive sidings on the first terrace immediately behind, while the branch (timber) line to Cumpana runs

543 through a corner of the fair-ground as it begins its journey northwards. The fair-ground extends from the bridgehead, where in former times there must have been a ford, southwards for an indefinite distance between river and railway. A tributary stream which joins the Argeş at the bridge is named, after the fair, Valea *Târgul*. From the bridge a lane winds southwards to the rows of buildings and sheds which
256 constitute the permanent nucleus of the fair. Here is the corn mill, perhaps once dependent on power from the river, but now driven by electricity. We may note in passing that among the many survivals in the Carpathians is the horizontal water-wheel, used here as in Norway to turn corn mills. The mill consists of a log-hut erected directly over a stream
543 or a branch of a river. The sale of cereals, chiefly maize, is
443 also conducted by the mill, at the entrance to the fair, and there are stores of building materials, fruit, rock-salt and charcoal.

Rows of permanent open-sided sheds face each other along the "main street" of the fair, and are hired for the duration by merchants and caterers. Other goods—mostly those brought by peasants—are displayed in improvised booths or exposed on the ground by the wayside. Further on, the inevitable amusements are concentrated in a corner of their own, the stalls in this section increasing in number throughout the week, until pleasure becomes the chief business by the last days of the fair. This is the natural culmination of events which begin with the sale of cattle in the opening days; the "order of the fair" is a traditional feature of such gatherings everywhere.

543 But in Roumania there is another element which contributes
326 to the variety of the fair—the gipsies who pitch their camps
563 behind the booths and hawk trinkets or unobtrusively engage in metal-work and wood-carving. They appear to keep apart from the rest. To them the food-stallholders bring their copper pots, used for boiling fat, for retinning, while the peasants drive up the draught oxen which may need to be reshod. The tinning is done over an improvised hearth and a handful of charcoal; the shoeing—by the bridge-head—requires somewhat more elaborate equipment in the shape of
[735] a forge and a post and ropes for felling the oxen. Finally, squatting by the wayside, or actively exhibiting their sores, there are the beggars and cripples, who complete the human picture.

543 443 WE HAVE classified the chief items observed at the fair between August 11th and 15th, 1936.

1. *Livestock.* Draught oxen, cows and calves, pigs and piglets. A few horses and goats. No sheep or fowl. The bargaining for cattle is completed when the buyer contrives to thrust a piece of silver into the hand of the seller. Acceptance of the earnest is followed by a hand-clasp.

[391] 2. *Agricultural Implements and Metal-work.*—It is said that gipsy-made metal tools were formerly displayed, but what little metal-work is now sold is factory-made and comes mostly from Czechoslovakia—cow-bells (of sheet-metal), horse-bells (of cast-metal), knives, etc. Hay-forks are gipsy-made, as are washing tubs and cradles, hollowed out of split tree trunks. Kitchen spoons are hand-carved. Wooden saddles and gipsy-made baskets and brooms may come under this head.

3. *Fruits and Vegetables.*—Tomatoes, potatoes, sweet-corn, onions, garlic, peppers, cabbage, water-melons, gherkins, aubergines, pears, apples, plums, blackberries. Also eggs and cheese.

[323] 4. *Pottery.*—The chief local craft is naturally well represented. The vessels, displayed on the ground, vary greatly in size, decoration and purpose; but they are all of brown clay, usually with simple floral patterns and debased geometrical designs in burnt sienna, yellow and green: vessels with or without lids, with or without handles, with or without spouts, glazed inside, outside, or both, in size ranging from salt-and-pepper stands to large waterpots. We find the old device of making pots in imitation of birds and animals.

[282] 5. *Leatherwork.*—Several booths display white leather sheepskin waistcoats, having the wool inside and the outside decorated with applied strips of thin orange-dyed leather embroidered usually by machine stitching, but occasionally by hand. These waistcoats are made at Curtea de Argeş. Leather belts, 4 to 6 inches wide, are machine-stitched but hand-tooled; they have buckle fastenings. Bridles and saddlery. Knotted leather thongs for whips. Hempen ropes for halters are sold in this section, too. Ready-made boots and shoes. The bulk of the shoes for sale, however, are made of rubber, in the shape of the traditional pointed shoe of skin. Most of them are cut from old motor tyres, but others are now made from specially manufactured rubber strips which repeat the patterns of the tyres.

543
443
[286]

6. *Woven Goods.*—Here the high skill and craftsmanship of the Carpathian peasant is most obviously illustrated. Woollen cloths are the commonest, carded wool also being offered for sale. Linen, silk and hempen stuffs are displayed, the finer materials often having gold or silver threads woven into them; they are made up into blouses, skirts, veils and belts. Some machine-made cotton goods also for sale.

[531]

7. *Embroidered Goods.*—Velvet waistcoats with gold embroidery and bead work. Linen or woollen cloths are embroidered with wool, silk, or mercerised cotton. Round sequins, thought to betray Turkish influence, are very popular.

8. *Carpets.*—Locally woven carpets of traditional colours and designs far outnumber machine-made copies of Persian carpets.

9. *Food and Confectionery.*—Bread, doughnuts, sausages, fish, gingerbread, sweets. Sugar dolls, hearts, circles, diamonds and other shapes. Sugar rosaries. Drinks are hawked by Turkish itinerants. The restaurants and drinking booths have gipsy fiddlers.

10. *Cheap Jewellery.*—Trinkets, mirrors, beads, combs, buttons, studs, pins, rings, brooches, etc.

543
517

11. *Entertainments.*—The fat woman and the one-minute photographer, shooting ranges, cock-shies, games of chance, fortune-telling. The merry-go-round is driven by five men, who push it round on a high wooden platform fixed to the central axis, with the accompaniment of peasant music. Other bands supply music for the dancing which takes place under the trees.

543
443

APART FROM the gipsy goods and the articles offered in the permanent booths, the goods displayed vary from day to day as different groups of peasants come in from the country. There is a constant coming and going of bullock carts over the bridge, bringing in stock and peasant products for sale. The normal limit of influence exerted by the fair is some 25 kilometres.

E. E. E.

412



Hoe.
Blade the size of an English spade. See page 41.

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

BIBLIOGRAPHY

GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS

HERSENI TRAIAN: L'Organisation Pastorale en Roumanie. (Archives pour la science et la réforme sociales, 1936.)

MARTONNE, E. DE: La Vie Pastorale et la Transhumance dans les Carpathes Méridionales. (Zu Friederich Ratzels Gedächtnis, 1904.)

FLEURE, H. J. and PELHAM, R. A. (Editors): Eastern Carpathian Studies (1936).

DE MARTONNE, E.: La Valachie (Maps and Illustrations) (1902).

MADGEARU, V.: Rumania's New Economic Policy (1930).

HISTORY

CVIJIC, J. : *La Péninsule Balkanique (Paris, 1918).

EVANS, I. L.: The Agrarian Revolution in Roumania (excellent summary) (1924).

IORGA, N.: *A History of Roumania (T. Fisher Unwin, 1925).

PARVAN, V.: Dacia (outline of early civilisations of Carpatho-Danubian country. Illustrated. 1928).

SETON-WATSON, R. W.: A History of the Roumanians from Roman Times to the Completion of Unity (Cambridge U.P., 1934).

SOCIAL AND GENERAL

HIELSCHER AND GOGA: Rumania: Landscape, Buildings, National Life (F. A. Brockhaus, Leipzig, 1933).

OPRESCU, GEO.: *Peasant Art in Roumania. Fully illustrated (1929).

PITTARD, E.: La Roumanie. Illustrated. (Excellent for race types and peasant costumes.) (1917).

Stahel de Capitani: Rumanien (1925).

*Books marked * can be borrowed from the Le Play Society's Library. Postage must be refunded; books must be returned within fourteen days of receipt.

NOTE.—Should these books be unobtainable at any school, public, or other libraries, ask the librarian to apply to the NATIONAL CENTRAL LIBRARY, Malet Place, London, W.C.1, for the loan of these books, mentioning that you are a member of the Le Play Society's Group.

5; Fleure S-5 (no date) 1939 EDI Rumania EDI

[Page 60 a]

a.	b.	c.	d.	pagination of Map.
e	f.	g.	h.	—

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

1c 2.



[page 60 b]

102

[page 60 c]

5: Fleure S-5 (no date) 1939 EDl Rumania EDl

102



[Page 60 d]

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

GEORGE PHILIP & SON, LTD.

[page 60e]

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

102

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY GEORGE PHILIP &

[page 6 of]

102

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

[page 60g]

5; Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

102



[page 60 R]

116

116 TEXTS--a full set of pages from each processed source, arranged in page order, as a means of establishing the context for any particular slip. Sets are arranged in the numerical order of the sources. See also:

Literary texts 539

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

000

RUMANIA

ITS HISTORY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

BY

GEORGE CLENTON LOGIO

" Buna tara, rea tocmeala,
Hât'o'n cour de randoneala."
—*A Rumanian Proverb.*

" A good country, badly run,
Don't get entangled, it's no fun."

MANCHESTER
SHERRATT & HUGHES
1932

Title page

194

NOTES ON PRONUNCIATION

The letters of the Rumanian alphabet have generally the same value as in French, with the following exceptions:

ă and î are pronounced as *u* in *but*
u is pronounced as *oo* in *good*
ş ,, *sh*
ţ ,, *ts*
c ,, *k* when placed before the vowels *a*, *o*, and *u*, and as *ts* before *e* and *i*.

The compound vowel *au* is pronounced as *ow* in *how*.

The definite article *ul* is always placed after masculine substantives.

The Rumanians, the same as the Latin tribe of Samnites, use a 'p' where the Romans used a 'q.'

The unit of currency is the *leu*, plural *lei*.

As place-names occasionally differ in Rumanian from the form which so far has been familiar in English, a table containing the most important ones is given below:

English	*Rumanian*
Akermann	Cetatea Alba
Bender	Tighina
Czernowitz	Cernauţi
Dniester	Nistru
Hermannstadt	Sibiu
Grosswardein	Oradea Mare
Karlsburg	Alba Julia
Khotin	Hotin
Kishineff	Chişinau
Kronstadt	Braşov
Mures	Maroş
Segesvar	Sighişoara
Temesvar	Temişoara
Theiss	Tisa

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

000

CONTENTS

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION:

(a) Origin of the Rumanians 1
(b) From the Formation of the Danubian Principalities to 1914 13
(c) Rumania during the World War 22
(d) The Peace Negotiations 25
(e) The Post-War Period 32

POLITICS:

(a) Political Parties 53
(b) Ethnic Minorities and their Grievances 64
(c) Inner Glimpses of the Administration 83
(d) The Electoral Law 94
(e) Mistakes and Muddles 96

ECONOMICS:

(a) Geographic and Ethnographic Notes 106
(b) Commercial Morality 111
(c) The Economic Situation following the War 121
(d) Rumania's Economic Policy 124
(e) State Finances 133
(f) The Budget, National Revenue, and Public Debt 138
(g) Trade 150
(h) Agriculture 159
(i) Banking 177
(j) Industry 185
(k) Oil and Mining Industries 185
(l) Railways and Communications 190

INDEX 203

ORIGIN OF THE RUMANIANS.

175 THE Dacians or Getae, who are regarded as the forefathers of the present-day Rumanians, were one of the numerous Thracian tribes, that together with the Illyrians, occupied the extensive lands lying between the Black, Aegean and Adriatic seas, and stretching northwards to the confines of the Russian steppes. Their presence in the Danubian basin as far back as 1400 B.C. has been confirmed by the researches of the late Professor V. Pârvan. In his book, "Dacia," as well as in his latest book "Getica," he shows that the Dacians were in occupation of Transylvania at so early a period as 1500 B.C. and that they had evolved an original art of their own, as may be inferred from the large number of gold ornaments which had been found.

By 700 B.C. they began to be influenced by Greek civilization through the Scythians who invaded the country, and whose rulers were almost completely Hellenized. The influence of the Greek towns on the Black Sea coast likewise contributed in bringing Dacia into the Greek orbit somewhere about the year 300 B.C. The Dacians or Getae occupied a very extensive territory; objects of art attributed to them have been found as far apart as Serbia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, and even in certain parts of Asia Minor, according to the testimony of Professor E. Pittard of Geneva ("La Roumanie," page 28). Excavations, conducted at numerous localities in Rumania have brought to light objects which testify that the Dacians or Getae had attained to a high degree of civilization, and this is further corroborated by the fact that they were able to oppose a determined and prolonged resistance to the Romans. Even before the appearance of the Roman armies in the Balkans, numerous Latin immigrants had already preceded them. The decline of agriculture in the Italian Peninsula, due to the importa-

RUMANIA

175 tion of cereals from the African colonies, and to the employ of slaves on the large estates, had compelled large numbers of Latin farmers to give up their lands on which they could no longer live, and to seek new homesteads across the Adriatic and in southern Gaul. The immigrants seem to have succeeded in imparting a Latin character to the country, and to have imposed their language on the Thracians. Latin settlements, such as the town of Drobeta, or Drubetis, Ratiaria, Oescus and Novae on the Danube arose. Their influence slowly permeated the region and made itself felt even north of the Danube. According to Professor Parvăn: "By Vespasian's time the veterans and the Roman civilians settled in the Danubian provinces as far as the Black Sea are legion . . . Like Gaul during the same period, Dacia must have been full of *italici negotiandi causa consistentes* . . . A statistical review of the hoards found in Dacia shows that the south-eastern parts of the country were covered, in the main, by Greek merchants, while the Romans spread to the west and to the north. From the first century B.C., however, Roman penetration was at once so powerful and so general that *denarii* of the republic became quite frequent in Wallachia and even in Moldavia" ("Dacia," pages 151 and 139). And this diffusion of Roman influence was so persistent that Professor Părvan believes that part of Wallachia must have formed part of the Roman Empire even prior to Trajan's campaign. "It seems that about A.D. 6 that a broad strip of territory north of the river was then incorporated into the Empire as a sort of extended bridgehead to face Ratiaria, Oescus and Novae." "Dacia," page 180.) The latinization of the Thracians was so complete and thorough that this latinized population subsisted long after the irruptions of the Slavs in the Balkan peninsula. When the latter were conquered by the Bulgarians, the latinized remnants of the population were yet so numerous and powerful that they managed to impose, during the eight century, two rulers from amongst their midst, in the persons of Sabinus and Paganus, as heads of the newly-established Bulgarian Empire. Though this is rigorously denied by the Bulgarian historians, who aver that these names had been wrongly

transcribed by Byzantine writers, the fact that after the 175
lapse of yet another four centuries, the Bulgarians, who had then been subjected by the Byzantines, only recovered their independence through the intervention and under the leadership of this latinized population, seems to fully confirm Professor Iorga's contention that the Bulgarian "Tsars" Sabinus and Paganus were of Latin extraction.

There are even further reasons for assuming this to be so, because Sabinus followed a pro-Byzantine policy that was strongly resented by the more warlike section of his subjects, those of Bulgarian extraction, who finally overthrew him.

When the Romans had occupied the Balkan peninsula, they found in the Dacians living in the region of the Carpathians and in the lands to the north of the Danube, warlike and restless neighbours, who by their persistent incursions delayed and hampered the work of colonization. Under their king Decebalus, the Dacians in the year 86 A.D. crossed the Danube, defeated the Roman garrisons, and threatened to overrun the whole province of Mysia. The Emperor Domitian himself had to head an army in order to drive out the invaders, and though he pursued the Dacians across the Danube, and followed them to their mountain strongholds in Translyvania, he was unable to subdue them. Soon after his withdrawal, the Dacians renewed their raids, until finally the successor of Domitian, Trajan, decided to put a stop to their annoying tactics. In the course of two arduous campaigns between the years 98 and 106 A.D., the whole of Dacia was occupied and became a Roman province.

Trajan's column in Rome is a striking chronicle of the difficulties encountered in the course of the two campaigns, and forms a vivid commentary on its chief episodes, while the vestiges of the stone bridge across the Danube near the Serbian town of Kladovo, which was then erected and over which Trajan's soldiers had marched to the conquest of Dacia, may be cited as a testimony of the seriousness and thoroughness with which the expeditions had been organized. A considerable colonization by Latin settlers, reinforced intensively by veterans of the Legions—(these

175 must have been extremely numerous since the Rumanians have derived their word 'batran' = old, from 'veteranus') —followed upon the Roman conquest. Though according to Eutropius (Book VIII, chap. VI)—

"*Trajanus victa Dacia, ex toto orbe Romano infinitas eo copias hominum transtulerat, ad agros et urbes colendas,*" "this infinite host of people" may not have been all of Latin stock, yet their common tongue and dominating culture were certainly Latin. So that if the Rumanian claims of continuity of racial descent from the Romans may seem to be exaggerated, on the other hand it must be admitted that they possess a sure and legitimate basis in claiming continuity of tradition and language from the days of the Roman colony of Dacia.

Vestiges of Roman towns such as those of Ulpia Trajana, Micia, Porolissum, Romula, Apulum, Napoca, and Potaissum, testify to the importance of these settlements, while numerous ruins of roads, temples, palaces and baths, show that an era of prosperity ensued which merited the epithet of "Dacia felix," ascribed to the colony on Roman medals. From the fusion of Dacians with Latin settlers arose the ancestors of the Rumanians, who to this day continue to cherish living memories of the Roman connection in the spoken word they use, and in the name they proudly carry.

The appellations of Wallachs and Wallachia, conferred at times on the Rumanian people and the land they inhabit, seem to have a striking similarity to the term "Wealas" by which Anglo-Saxons in England designated the Romano-Britons. It may be casually remarked that the Anglo-Saxons called the Romans of Gaul, "Galwealas," and the Byzantine Empire, "weala ric." That "wealas" was equivalent to the epithet 'Roman' is also apparent from Aelfric's glossary in which "*jus quiritium*" figures as "Weala sunder riht." So that the name "Wallach" may well constitute yet another proof of the Latin ancestry of the Rumanians, since they seem to have elicited this appellation by Teutonic and Slav tribes who used this term of "Wealas" or "Wallachs" as a generic designation of Latin-speaking peoples. One may yet find further

evidence in support of this contention in the fact that various kindred groups of Latinized Thracians who survived the barbarian invasions in the Balkan peninsula, were all designated by similar terms, namely:—Wallach, Kutso-Wallach, Mauro-Wallach, etc. 175

There is a certain parallelism in the Roman conquests of Britain and of Dacia, for both constituted the most outlying European provinces of the Roman empire, and nevertheless remained to the last amongst the most loyal and attached to the Roman tradition.

If the spread of the Latin language after the conquest was rapid in Britain, since we find the poet Martial boasting that "*dicitur et nostros cantare Britannia versus,*" it seems that the Latinization of the Dacians and Thracians must have progressed at an equally rapid pace; for when the Romans proceeded to plant settlements of latinized races in Britain, we find amongst others, those of Amboglanna (Birdoswald) and Gabrosentis (Drumburgh), both near Hadrian's wall, the first composed of Dacians, and the second of Thracians; while further south we find two other settlements of the latter at Wroxester and at Cirencester. These settlements were not exclusively composed of military in temporary occupation, but had a permanent character, as may be deduced from the inscriptions on altars and tombs which show that these settlers had remained in the same place from a very early period.

In fact, numerous stone effigies of the so-called Thracian horseman have been found all over Britain, which would prove that the contingent of Thracians who settled in Britain was considerable. The withdrawal of the Roman Legions from Dacia in A.D. 271, was in no way followed by a mass exodus of the latinized population, and the situation must have resembled that of Britain in 407 on the same occurrence. As the Roman Britons were able to maintain themselves politically unassisted until 582, when they were overwhelmed in the battle of Deorham, though, even this disaster does not seem to imply that every vestige of Roman influence and culture was extirpated; so, with most of the Latinized Dacians who remained after the departure of the Roman troops and functionaries from

175 Dacia. They were able to preserve a certain vague relation with the Empire, seeking refuge in the mountain fastnesses of the Carpathians whenever the tide of foreign invasions ran high, and returning again to the plains when the ebb set in. The plain country bordering on the Danube, and especially its eastern portion was on the main road of invasions, and must have always been unsafe for settlement. Even when Rumania had secured her independence, this region was almost a desert, and it was at a later period that it was colonized gradually. The Wallachian plain was very sparsely inhabited early in the nineteenth century, while its eastern part, the Baragan, was only colonized after 1860.

The main body of the nation, established in the highlands of Transylvania, Maramureş, and Bucovina, did not have to suffer overmuch from babarian invasions. Slavs and other barbarian tribes overran the country, but the narrowness of its cultivable area did not sufficiently attract the invaders who moved on southwards and crossed the Danube, lured on by the glamour of the rich lands of the Eastern Roman Empire. Small bands of Slavs probably strayed out of their way, and lost themselves in the maze of the mountainous valleys, to be merged finally in the dominating nationality, or have remained in isolated groups, undisturbed and stagnant as the backwater of a stream. Even to-day one comes suddenly on descendants of these invaders of old who may be recognized by their more primitive traits from their more comely Rumanian neighbours.

That the inhabitants of the mountainous regions are the real descendants of the old Daco-Roman population is confirmed by Prof. E. Pittard in his "Roumanie" (p. 33): "The mountaineers are more decidedly brachycephalous than the inhabitants of the plains. They are of higher stature——this type represents the real aboriginal Rumanian type."

The Latinized Dacians who remained behind after the departure of the Roman Legions must have been in preponderating strength since they seem to have exerted a strong civilizing influence on the Goths, if we are to judge

from the writings of Gibbon, who rather heedlessly bestows on them the epithet "degenerate" which they hardly seem to deserve since they were able to curb the fury of the Goths. Nor is there any proof which would justify his imputation of their having renounced their allegiance to Rome. In his "Decline and Fall" (Vol. I, chap XI, p. 226) writing on the relinquishment of Dacia by the Emperor Aurelian, Gibbon states:—"the old country of that name retained, however, a considerable number of its inhabitants who dreaded exile more than a Gothic master. These degenerate Romans continued to serve the empire whose allegiance they had renounced, by introducing among their conquerors the first notions of agriculture, the useful arts, and the conveniences of civilized life. An intercourse of commerce and language was gradually established between the opposite banks of the Danube, and after Dacia became an independent state it often proved the firmest barrier of the empire against the invasions of the savages of the North. A sense of interest attached these more settled barbarians to the alliance of Rome, and a permanent interest very frequently ripens into sincere and useful friendship." The Emperor Constantine, in 330, undertook a campaign in Dacia, at the time overrun by the Goths, and assumed the title of "Restorer of Dacia." The restoration, though brief in the political sense, was not altogether of an ephemeral character however, for it is recorded that the Emperor Justin, himself a Dacian by race, adopted towards the end of his reign his nephew Justinian as his successor, and according to Gibbon (Decline and Fall, Vol. III, p. 36) "drew him from the rustic solitude of Dacia to have him educated (520-527) at Constantinople." . . . . This would indicate that the state of Dacia was very far from being disturbed, and was considered as a by no means unfit place for the residence of even such an ambitious and talented youth as the then heir to the Empire.

In Justinian's reign an expedition was sent across the Danube against the Gepidae who had invaded Dacia. Fortresses along the Danube were reconstructed and enlarged and new ones were built with an eye to the protection

175 of Dacia. In the words of Gibbon (Decline and Fall, Vol. III, p.67) "several military stations affected to spread beyond the Danube the pride of the Roman name." So that it seems more than likely that part at least of the Latinized population was able to hold its own and to safeguard its individuality and language in spite of the odds it had to contend against, though the towns must have probably succumbed.

Even as late as the end of the seventh century it is recorded that when the Byzantine Emperor Mauritius undertook a campaign against the Slavs and Avars across the Danube, he still found the natives of Dacia speaking a Latin vernacular. The reappearance of a Byzantine fleet on the Danube would prove that the connection between Dacia and the Empire had not been entirely severed, and that at any rate commercial relations had continued. The extensive salt mines of Rumania were greatly prized by the Romans, and it is possible that they were repeatedly occupied and exploited by them; and though there was no stable administration throughout Dacia, yet the most valuable parts of the country may have been held by a sprinkling of fortified outposts.

With the creation of the Bulgarian Empire, followed by the advent and settlement of the Cumanians in the eastern part of present Rumania, a barrier was constituted against further barbarian irruptions from the East. The Bulgarians, and subsequently the Cumanians, by extending a kind of vague sovereignty over the lands to the north of the Danube seem to have conferred for some centuries an era of relative stability and peace, which permitted the Rumanians, or Wallachs, as they were then called, to attain to a comparative prosperity which necessarily preceded the creation of organized communities from amongst their midst. The recent findings of the Hungarian historian, Dr Geza Feher, would tend to show that the ancestors of the Bulgarians at the time they invaded Rumania and Bulgaria were far from being a wild nomadic people, but that on the contrary they had attained to a certain degree of civilization which was in the main original. The remnants of their fortifications in Bessarabia would prove that

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

they were in effective occupation of that region, and that /175 they must have successfully withstood for a long period any attempt by other tribes to move towards the Danube. Dr Feher goes even so far as to opine that the ancestors of the Hungarians derived the elements of civilization from these "Proto-Bulgarians," as he calls them.

According to Byzantine chroniclers, Bulgarian suzerainty during the eight and nine centuries extended as far north and west as to include parts of Transylvania. Thus the Bulgarian Khan or "Tsar" Krum is mentioned as having removed the prisoners taken in his Thracian campaigns to "Bulgaria across the Danube." In this respect it would be pertinent to refer to Prof. S. Runciman who asserts that Krum reigned over the Bulgarians of Pannonia prior to becoming the ruler of the Balkan Bulgarians. "How it happened we cannot tell. Probably the Balkan Bulgarians had always kept in touch with their cousins. Since Asperuch's day the Khan of Plisca (the first capital of Bulgaria) had controlled the plains of Wallachia and Moldavia, and the Pannonian Bulgars in Transylvania were not far off; only the Carpathians divided them." (History of the First Bulgarian Empire, p. 51).

The region to the east of the river Theiss is known to have remained for some time under the sway of the Bulgarians. Thus Prof. E. Sayous in his "Histoire Générale des Hongrois" affirms that when the Magyars at the end of the 9th century first invaded Hungary under their leader Arpad, they found the country to the east of the Theiss and Transylvania, in possession of Bulgarians, either alone, or mixed with Wallachs. The country was ruled over by four distinct Bulgarian Kings who were subjected by the Magyars in the 11th century.

This Bulgarian overlordship of Rumania is contested by some Rumanian historians though others admit it. Thus Professor Bogdan, in his book "Romîni şi Bulgari" affirms that between 680 and 1018 the Bulgarians exerted a cultural influence on the Rumanians, who adopted from them their religious and political institutions as well as the Bulgarian language for diplomatic and church use. The Rumanians had been converted to Christianity before the

175 arrival of the Bulgarians in the Balkan peninsula. An inscription is still to be found at Cluj which proves that a branch of the Christian church existed there under Roman domination.

A Latin episcopate had been founded in 535 at Ochrida (Prima Justiniana) for all Illyricum, including lands south of the Danube, as well as Dacia, and it was after the Bulgarians had been converted to Christianity at about 866 that the Rumanians adopted the Bulgaro-Slavonic liturgy for their church. Though Professor Bogdan believes that Bulgarian influence ceased with the fall of the first Bulgarian Empire in 1018, and that subsequently only the results of this Bulgarian influence made itself felt, this seems hardly likely. On the contrary, Bulgarian influence must have been further intensified owing to the migration into Rumania of Bulgarian dignitaries and refugees who at this time sought to escape from the Byzantines.

Professor Bogdan in his work "Luptele Romînilor cu Turcii pana la Mihai Viteazu" states that the Rumanians on the north and south banks of the Danube, overwhelmed by the successive invasions of Goths, Huns, Bulgars, Avars and Slavs, sought refuge in the mountainous valleys, and there, under the authority of the Bulgarians, formed the basis of their future organizations in principalities and duchies. When the Hungarians made their appearance these small states already existed and fell gradually under their rule. Professor P. Constantinescu of Jassi seems to share the same views as to the influence exerted by Bulgaria. In a very interesting booklet entitled "Criptographia si istoria Românească," published in 1925, M. Em. Grigoras adduces certain facts which would tend to prove that by the year 1111 the district of Oltenia formed an independent state under the sceptre of a so-called Cosnila Assen, who may well have been a relative of the Assenides of Bulgaria, since it is well established that the founders of that dynasty were very closely connected with the populations of the north bank of the Danube and only succeeded in freeing Bulgaria from the Byzantine mastery in 1186, after receiving substantial help from across the Danube.

It is possible that following on the subjection of the first

Bulgarian empire, the Byzantines may have extended their /175 domination even beyond the Danube, so that the newly formed duchies and principalities acknowledged their suzerainty, and even co-operated with them against an enemy that threatened the security of both. We thus find the Byzantine historian Cinamus, in his narrative of Manuel Comnenus' campaign in 1152–4 against Hungary, stating that the Emperor's army was joined by many Wallachians, to whose Latin origin he alludes. The close co-operation and understanding which obtained among the Wallachians and Bulgarians, and at a later period the Cumanians, is illustrated by the events which led to the restoration of the second Bulgarian Empire in 1186. The revolt was led by the brothers Peter and Assen of Wallach lineage, supported mainly by Wallachs living on the right bank of the Danube, throughout Mysia, and as far south as the Pindus. At first the movement was not successful, and the leaders had to retire to the north of the Danube in order to solicit the help of the kindred populations living there. It was only after summoning them and the Cumanians to their assistance that they succeeded in defeating the Byzantines and securing their independence. As, further, the new Bulgarian rulers assumed the title of "rex Bulgariae et Blachiae," and the bishop of Tirnovo (the then capital of Bulgaria) that of "primus Bulgarorum et Blachorum," one may surmise that there was a very close collaboration between the two peoples. Nikita Akominat, whose writings form the main source of documentation for this period, distinctly indicates that Mysia was peopled mainly by Wallachs, and that the Bulgarians were mostly in Macedonia. What the Byzantines at the time seemed to dread most was the possibility that the Wallachians might unite with the Bulgarians. (Nic. Honiatae, Historia ex recensione Im Bekker Bonnae 1835, p. 488–489).

Prof. Onciul in his "Originele Principatelor Romane," also lays stress on the close co-operation between Bulgarians and Wallachs during this period, and ascribes the weakening of the Wallach element in the regions to the south of the Danube to the relative safety that ensued with the rise of the Bulgarian Empire, which event encouraged

175 many Wallachs to return to their homeland to the north of the Danube.

During the eleventh century the Hungarians engaged in a policy of steady expansion to the east, and came into collision with the Wallachs. It is through Hungarian sources that we first hear of Wallacho-Bulgarian principalities existing on the eastern confines of Hungary, in the Banat and Transylvania. The famous Notarius Regis Belae of Hungary refers to Hungarian victories over a Prince Glad, who is designed as "dux Bulgarorum et Blacorum," and relates that the latter's army was composed of Bulgarians, Wallachs and Cumanians. King Bela also, in an epistle addressed to the Pope, complains of incursions by Bulgarians and Cumanians against which for his protection he found himself compelled to settle the Knights Hospitallers of St John on his eastern frontier near the Danube. In 1233 reference is again made to a Hungarian ruler who had been established in the Banat of Severin, whose subjects were "Valachi schismatici."

The subjection of Bulgaria by the Turks in 1394 was followed by a large immigration of Bulgarian nobles and church dignitaries into Rumania, and Bulgarian influence and culture was further strengthened and gave rise to a period of literary and artistic flowering that recalled, according to Prof. Bogdan, the influence exerted by the Greek *émigrés* in Italy after the taking of Constantinople by the Turks. This is in no way surprising, since the Bulgarians being for centuries direct neighbours of the Byzantines, were able to assimilate to a certain extent their civilization and transmit it to the Rumanians who were further away.

197 Numerous manuscripts dating from the 14th to the 17th
175 centuries, mainly compiled in the chancelleries of the
177 various Wallach princes, testify to the deep influence Bulgaria had exerted during this period. The language in use was not uniform but gradually evolving, which proves that it was not used merely as a standard language, like Latin, but that it was spoken by those who made use of it. This will explain the large admixture of Slav words in the Rumanian tongue, which were derived mainly from

Bulgarian sources. The toponymy also of Rumania reveals a great number of names of Slavo-Bulgarian and Cumanian origin, which can only be explained by the former presence in large numbers of these two peoples in Rumania. Prof. Xenopol, in his "Istoria Romanilor," vol 1, p.71, dilating on the Slavo-Bulgarian toponymy extant in Rumania, expresses the belief that the mere official use of the Slavo-Bulgarian language is not sufficient to explain the adoption of geographical terms in this language, and that their presence must be ascribed to a "connection between people and people." An examination of D. Francescu's "Dictionaru Topograficu şi statistico al Romaniei" (1872) and Dr L. Colescu's "Dictionarul statistic al Romaniei (1914/5) would reveal an astounding number of such names. As regards the nomenclature derived from Cumanian sources, we have, Coman, Comana, Comanae, Comania, (thrice) Comanianca, Comani (twice), Comaniţa, and Comanesti (six times). Similar names are met with in Bulgaria and Macedonia (i.e. Kumanovo) and if we recollect that the Cumanians gave a royal dynasty, that of the Terters, to Bulgaria, it will be understood that this now lost people had exerted a wide-spread influence in the Balkan peninsula.

FROM THE FORMATION OF THE DANUBIAN PRINCIPALITIES TO 1914.

The policy of easterly expansion pursued by the Hungarians forced the first Rumanian political communities which had developed in the relative security of Transylvania to retreat before the continuous pressure exerted by the Hungarians. Many of the Rumanian nobility, however, seem to have passed over to the conqueror in order to safeguard their wealth and privileges at the price of Magyarization, as did the Serbian aristocracy in Bosnia which accepted the faith of their Turkish conquerors so that they might retain their lands. These Magyarized Rumanians of Transylvania gave to Hungary her most heroic figure, that of John Hunyady, as well as one of her great kings, Matthias Corvinus, son of the former.

RUMANIA

175 Towards the end of the thirteenth century we find these Rumanian communities abandoning Transylvania and emerging from the defiles of the Carpathians to settle to the south and east of these mountains, where they appear as the two sister principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia extending gradually their sway to the Danube and the Black Sea.

They had hardly consolidated their rule before the Turks appeared on the Danube, and Wallachia was the first to become tributary to the Sultan in 1391. The greater part of the succeeding five centuries was spent in the effort to maintain a precarious semi-independence. The subjection of Wallachia and Moldavia to the Turks differed essentially however from the submission of the other Balkan states to the same rule. In exchange for the tribute to the Sultans, the native aristocracy remained undisturbed, and continued to enjoy its privileges, one being the right of electing the ruling prince, so that the Rumanian people could continue to develop, having never experienced the abject servitude endured by Bulgaria, Greece or Serbia. The relatively privileged position of the Rumanians may be gauged by the fact that Moslems were not allowed to settle in the principalities nor to erect mosques to the north of the Danube. The history of the next five hundred years is not edifying, for it abounds in sordid intestine rivalries and intrigues, alternating with incursions by Hungarians and Poles. The fleeting appearance of outstanding personalities such as that of Stephen the Great, prince of Moldavia, threw occasionally a brief glimmer on the prevailing darkness. He inflicted a signal defeat on the Turks on the river Racova in 1475, an event that rendered him a conspicuous champion of Christianity, winning for him the praise and benediction of Pope Sixtus IV. It may be said that he was the main factor that brought to a stop the raid of Mohamed II against Central Europe. He endeavoured to create an alliance of Christian Powers to continue the war of liberation against the Turks, but instead of meeting with aid he had to face the hostility of the Poles, who even invaded Moldavia. At the end of his reign, disgusted by the in-

sincerity of his Christian neighbours, Stephen the Great 175 finally came to terms with the Turks, and acknowledged their suzerainty in order to safeguard Moldavia from even greater misfortunes.

Another heroic figure is that of Michael the Brave, who for the brief period of a few years battled incessantly against Turks, Hungarians and Poles, and succeeded in enfranchising and uniting all the Rumanian territories. His exploits fired the imagination of Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbians, all of whom hailed in him the predestined liberator of the Balkan Christians; premature hopes that were to vanish at his untimely assassination in 1601. His military feats are somewhat tarnished by the fact that he introduced serfdom in Rumania, rendering thereby the lot of the hard pressed peasantry even more grievous than before. On his disappearance the Turks further strengthened their hold on the country, and exerted their rule almost without restraint. It may be incidentally noted that Michael the Brave's accession to the dignity of prince was facilitated through the support of Barton, the English Ambassador at Constantinople, though the latter's intercession was not entirely disinterested. The next instance we hear of reference to England relates to a commercial treaty concluded between Peter V of Moldavia, and Queen Elizabeth in 1588.

Two other princes of mark, Matthew Basarab and Basil Lupu, reigned almost simultaneously about the middle of the seventeenth century over Wallachia and Moldavia, and distinguished themselves as legislators and protectors of literature. The coincidence of their rule was most unfortunate, as they wasted their mutual abilities in underhand plots and intrigues to oust each other from their respective territories.

By 1716, the Turks became so predominant in power that they forbade the future election of native princes, finding them too prone to intrigue with the neighbouring Christian powers, and henceforth they appointed Greek Phanariots from amongst their Constantinople subjects to rule over the two principalities. The imposition of alien rulers left a most deplorable impress on the political life of

175 the country, owing to their addiction to corruption and rapacity. The thrones of the two principalities were put up to auction to the highest bidder, and as the posts, though lucrative, were precarious, their holders sought to recover the money spent in their acquisition by exactions from the unfortunative natives who were literally fleeced in order to satisfy the grasping covetousness of the rulers palmed upon them. As the Turks found that the conferring of these offices was a very profitable business they proceeded to accelerate the rate at which they were filled, until every two or three years new appointments were made. If the princes had come by themselves the evil would have been circumscribed; unfortunately, they were followed by retinues of hungry and greedy retainers who coveted and secured all the ecclesiastical and administrative offices. They acted like veritable harpies, bleeding the country white, and it is not surprising that they should have imparted to the Rumanians, by nature most kindly and hospitable, a sense of intense destestation for the foreigner, that found expression in such popular sayings as the following: "Nici o poamă nu-i amara ca strainatatea'n ţara" (There is no bitterer fruit than the foreigner in the land). "Atunci ii face strainul frate, cand a da din piatra lapte, Si straina suriora, Cand a pocni pusca goala." (You will turn the foreigner into a brother when the stone will yield milk, and the foreigner into a sister when the gun will go off unloaded).

The only counterbalancing advantage the Phanariots brought to Rumania was the dissemination of Western and mainly French culture. The Phanariots had all been reared in a centre which for centuries had been impregnated by French ideas, where the French tongue was spoken by all who claimed to have some refinement. France, in Constantinople, had succeeded to the rôle formerly played by the Venetians and Genoese, and her influence both politically and commercially had been paramount for centuries, and was so fertile, at least culturally, that French is still the predominant tongue to-day in the maritine zone of the Near East.

The Phanariot princes used French in their international

relations, and were usually accompanied by French secre- 175
taries during their stay in the Danubian principalities. Their court receptions were conducted in French, and the native aristocracy came more and more to copy the fashion set them by their rulers. French literature was widely diffused, the youth of the wealthy classes flocked more and more to Paris for their studies, until Rumanian intellectuals became so imbued with French ideas that they began to look on France as their second country. It is regrettable that while slavishly copying the French they did not show more discrimination between good and bad, and failed to assimilate to any great degree those qualities of the French which inspire admiration and respect, but rather tended to copy French superficiality. It may be pleaded in defence of the Rumanians that, owing to their inexperience and naivety, it was natural that they should be impressed by the gloss and tinsel of a civilization rather than by its more solid and austere aspects; all the more so, since being semi-orientals, they would as such be more prone to be struck by what is pompous and ostentatious and to neglect what is more positive and sane. After all, in the social as in the economic field, Gresham's law is always operative—the bad always drives out the good; this is why customs which are worst are those which seem to spread most readily. At any rate such was the strength of French cultural influence in Rumania that the memories of the old Latin connection were completely revived and the sense of her Latinity once more restored after the consciousness of it had been somewhat dimmed by the lengthy connection with Slavo-Bulgarian culture in the middle ages. It is certainly owing to their saturation with French culture that the Rumanians have not been absorbed by the Russians, and for this reason the Phanariots may be pardoned for all the evils they brought in their train, since at the same time they bestowed on Rumania that which safeguarded her most precious possession, the notion of her nationhood. It should be noted, however, that the Phanariots had imparted a particular tone to French culture which they transmitted, which is characteristically Byzantine, and not French, and for this reason it will be vain to search in

175 Rumanian cultural life expressions of that virility and stamina which distinguish the French. The large influx of Greek Phanariots, and their assimilation by the wealthier class of the Rumanian population, resulted in the formation of a distinct group among the people, which, though it constituted the leading class, yet did not possess the essential traits usually the mark of a real nobility. Moral apathy, laxity, inertness . . . these formed, and unfortunately still form, the distinctive traits of this class, and in a sense, differentiate it from the great bulk of the people, which fortunately for itself does possess more virile qualities than its hybrid aristocracy.

The psychical disassociation of the aristocracy from the people is patent, since the former has contributed nothing to the national literature or art, nor to its spiritual development. The aristocratic class has stood haughtily aloof from the masses and even repudiated what kinship there may have been between the two by adopting French for their language, copying servilely French manners and turning their backs provokingly on such native traditions as others would have cherished and revered. The reign of the Phanariots came to a close with the outbreak of the Greek revolution in 1821; the Turks nominating henceforth native princes to the thrones of Wallachia and Moldavia. Their advent was marked by an increased interference of Russia in the affairs of the principalities, until by the treaty of Adrianople (1829) the Tsar virtually assumed the power which the Sultans had hitherto exerted.

During the rule of the Phanariots, the Rumanians suffered other and more serious misfortunes than their depredations. The Turks had countenanced the annexation by Austria of Bucovina in 1775 on the most flimsy of pretences, while in 1812 they ceded Bessarabia to Russia. Owing to the series of wars undertaken by Russia against Turkey, the principalities were repeatedly occupied by Russian troops, who remained in indisputed possession for several years at a time, until the outbreak of the Crimean war, when their place was taken by the Austrians.

The solitary compensation the Rumanians derived from the Russian interventions was the conferring by the latter

of a more modern constitution in 1831, known as the "règlement organique," which, though altogether inadequate from the liberal point of view, yet placed the administration on a sounder footing than before. The inspirer of this reform, General Kisseleff, being an enlightened man, would have conferred several privileges on the peasantry whose status was akin to serfdom, but unfortunately he encountered obstinate opposition on the part of the landed aristocracy, who insisted on the maintenance of their feudal privileges and thus proved an obstacle to real reform. At the Congress of Paris (1856) on the close of the Crimean War an attempt was made by the Western Powers to checkmate Russia's expansion policy. She was therefore forced to retrocede the southern part of Bessarabia to Moldavia, and her tutelage over the principalities was abolished. The subject of the union of Wallachia and Moldavia was broached by the Rumanian delegates, and although this proposal met with warm support from France and Italy, and strange to say from Russia also, unfortunately owing to strenuous opposition on the part of England and Austria, the scheme was rejected, though certain concessions to the Rumanian demands were acceded to, amongst others that of the right of permitting Wallachia and Moldavia to assume the title of "United Principalities," a concession that ultimately rendered the attainment of union feasible a few years later, when, thanks to the benevolent attitude of Napoleon III, the two principalities were able to merge into one, a measure that made them better adapted to defend their national integrity.

As it was known that the neighbouring Powers would not countenance such a move, the Rumanians of the two principalities used the subterfuge of electing the same prince in the person of Alexander Cuza, who was finally acknowledged by the Turks, thanks to France's strenuous exertions on behalf of the principalities. His brief reign (1858-1866) forms a landmark in Rumanian history, as it indicates the end of dissensions and intestine rivalries between Wallachia and Moldavia which prepared and maintained that condition of helplessness

175 which had left them at the mercy, first of the Turks, and later of the Russians and Austrians.

Prince Cuza proved a very enlightened and patriotic ruler. Seconded by his able minister Cogalniceanu, he introduced a law making elementary education compulsory and free. He founded the two universities of Bucarest and of Jassy, and improved the status of the peasants, emancipating them from the intolerable burden of their feudal obligations. In order to allot land to the landless peasants, he proceeded to sequestrate monastic properties, and expropriate part of the larger estates belonging to the nobility. By his patronage of the peasantry he brought himself into conflict with the Church and the aristocracy, and as his innovations were counterbalanced by high-handed methods in dealing with his opponents, he displeased even those among his subjects who were more liberal-minded. Finally a conspiracy was hatched and the organizers, breaking one night into the palace, forced him to sign his abdication, and drove him into exile where he died seven years later. It is regrettable that in spite of Prince Cuza's courage in emancipating the peasants, the latter's position became even worse owing to the predominating political influence of the larger landowners, and finally in 1907 a desperate rising occurred, which was suppressed after some 11,000 peasants had been slaughtered.

Some difficulties were raised by interested foreign Powers at the election of Prince Charles of Hohenzollern as Cuza's successor, difficulties which were finally overcome through Napoleon III's friendly attitude. Prince Charles showed himself a sagacious and capable ruler. His early efforts were devoted to the reorganization of the army and the overhauling of the country's finances. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877 left him no choice but to take sides with Russia, as she had intimated that she would force for her army a passage through the principalities. At the siege of Plevna owing to the critical situation of the Russian armies, the Rumanians were at last allowed to intervene effectively in the siege and to secure the capture of the fortress.

Unfortunately Rumania's sacrifices were not fairly requited. At the Congress of Berlin, though Rumania's

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

independence was recognized, she was forced to hand back once more to Russia the southern part of Bessarabia, and was given in exchange the northern part of the Dobrudja. The Rumanians vehemently protested against what was a double spoliation, committed at their expense and that of their neighbours the Bulgarians, to whom the Dobrudja belonged. The Dobrudja, in its then undeveloped condition, could not be any compensation for the loss of southern Bessarabia, and its annexation, as was feared by Prince Charles and his advisers, might have eventually caused the estrangement of Bulgaria. Russia, however, proved unyielding, and Rumania was forced to bow finally before the inevitable.

Prince Charles was proclaimed King on May 22nd, 1881, and to the end of his reign in 1914, devoted himself to the peaceful consolidation of his country, completely transforming Rumania during this period and making her one of the most prosperous and powerful states in the Near East.

The disillusionment caused by Russia's attitude in 1878, and the personal proclivities of King Charles permitted the latter to bind Rumania to the Central Powers, with which he signed a secret defensive treaty in 1883. It did not imply, however, blind allegiance on Rumania's part, since in 1913 her intervention in the second Balkan war was clearly inimical to the interests of Austria.

Her intererence in that fratricidal struggle brought her some territorial accretion in the form of Southern Dobrudja, a territory mainly inhabited by Bulgarians and Turks. Its obtention was made feasible by the astonishing pigheadedness of certain Bulgarian politicians, who refused to make timely and reasonable concessions to Rumania. It proved, however, of very doubtful value since it alienated Bulgaria's sympathy and provoked the latter's attack during the world war which proved the main cause of Rumania's undoing.

It may be incidentally noted that Bulgaria had always cherished the most friendly feelings towards Rumania, and had never resented the annexation of northern Dobrudja which had been forced on Rumania. These sentiments of goodwill had always been reciprocated by the Rumanians who had welcomed the Bulgarians when fleeing from the

175 Turks, and assisted them to organize and prepare their struggle for independence. Such was the friendliness the Bulgarians displayed towards the Rumanians that on the forced deposition of their first prince Alexander Battenberg, brought about through Russian hostility, Bulgaria's greatest statesman, Stambulov, offered the Bulgarian crown to King Charles, and it is to be deplored that owing to Russia's veto and threat of intervention the offer could not be accepted. For a close co-operation between Rumania and Bulgaria, under the common sceptre of King Charles, would have been tantamount to the creation of a sound bulwark against the underhand schemes and machinations of the Russian and Austrian Empires which were the main cause of all the unrest in the Balkans.

RUMANIA DURING THE GREAT WAR.

The conduct of the foreign policy of Rumania had been considered by King Charles as his special prerogative. His sympathies for the Germans, and his belief in their final victory prompted him to involve Rumania in the war on the side of the Central Powers, all the more so, since he considered himself in honour bound to assist them by the treaty of 1883.

There were other practical reasons which operated in favour of such a policy. The Central Powers occupied a predominant position in Rumania's commerce. Germany, followed by Austria, headed the list of Rumanian exports and imports, the Rumanian state loans had been floated on the Berlin and Vienna stock exchanges, and Rumanian industry had been largely financed by German capital. In spite of these considerations, however, the king failed in his attempt to enlist the support of Rumanian politicians on the side of the Central Powers. Sentimental reasons prevailed. The strong pro-French leanings of the upper classes, and the more popular desire of taking advantage of the struggle in order to free the Rumanians of Transylvania from the intolerable oppression of the Magyars proved decisive.

M. Carp, a former prime-minister, seemed to be the only

person of importance who seconded King Charles and openly advocated siding with the Central Powers. In his paper, the "Moldava," he laid stress on the grave danger that a Russian occupation of Constantinople would constitute for Rumania, and advocated a policy that would thrust back Russia from the mouths of the Danube. German propaganda, which had suborned a large number of newspapers, did its utmost to re-awaken the old distrust of Russia, and did not weary of pointing out the precarious situation in which Rumania would find herself after an Entente victory, surrounded as she was on all sides by Slav nations.

The general staff of the army also did not at all approve of the armed intervention of Rumania so long as the Russians had not occupied Bucovina. They insisted on the necessity of the right wing of the Rumanian army being in direct contact with the Russians and Moldavia being thereby protected from a possible direct enemy attack from Bucovina. The shortage of ammunition was a further deterrent to immediate action, and the military must certainly have greatly influenced the attitude of M. Bratianu, the then prime minister, in his policy of procrastination during which he attempted to drive as hard a bargain with the Entente Powers as possible.

King Charles's death in October, 1914, removed a serious obstacle to Rumania's intervention. His nephew and successor, Ferdinand, was more amenable to Entente influences, but the failure of the Dardanelles expedition and the entry of Bulgaria into the war furnished further justification for the pursuit of a policy of expectancy, and it was only in August, 1916, after the Russian government had sent a note to Bucarest threatening to annul the promised territorial acquisitions made by the Entente, and after further assurances had been vouchsafed that the Salonica army would undertake an offensive, and Russian troops would be sent to the Dobrudja to counter a possible Bulgarian attack, that finally, Rumania was coaxed into declaring war.

Military reasons concurred in favour of an attack on Bulgaria; psychological considerations, however, rendered

175 such a plan almost impossible to carry out, so that the Rumanians decided to invade Transylvania. This move was followed by a Bulgarian onslaught on the Dobrudja, most of which fell rapidly in their possession, thus proving once more that the friendship of a neighbouring nation is a more valuable security than the possession of a strategic frontier. These swift and unexpected Bulgarian successes forced the Rumanians to draw upon their army in Transylvania so as to strengthen their defence in what remained of the Dobrudja. At this critical moment the Entente Powers failed to redeem their promises. The Bavarian troops, especially prepared for the invasion of Rumania, and which the Entente had promised to immobilise by simultaneous attacks on the western front, forced the Carpathians in spite of the desperate defence put up by the Rumanians. Almost at the same time the redoubtable von Mackensen, heading a motley army of Germans, Turks and Bulgarians, the latter released owing to the inactivity of the Salonica army, crossed the Danube, thus sealing the fate of Wallachia. The Germans entered Bucarest on Dec. 6th, 1916, the Rumanians withdrawing to Moldavia to rally and reconstruct their forces.

Undaunted by the misfortunes which had befallen them, the Rumanians set to work to reorganize their army, and by the succeeding summer, under the leadership of General Averescu, were able to secure a great victory at Marasti over the Austro-Germans. Unfortunately, the Bolshevik revolution had demoralized the Russian army, and by August, 1917, the Germans were able to draw troops from their eastern front and to concentrate them against the Rumanian positions. A fierce German attack followed but it was beaten off at Marasesti. The bravery of the Rumanians, however, proved of no avail owing to the defection of Russia, and no alternative was left for them but to initiate negotiations. These were conducted at Buftea and resulted in the peace of Bucarest. (May 7th, 1918.)

The clauses of the treaty were most humiliating to Rumania. Those who harp on the harshness of the Versailles treaty would rectify their judgement if they were to take cognizance of the conditions the "victimized" Germans

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

imposed on Rumania. The territorial losses Rumania had to suffer were comparatively light as contrasted with the draconian economic clauses of the treaty, and comprised the cession of the entire Dobrudja, and of a district of 2,920 sq. miles along the mountain passes of the Carpathians. Rumania as a solace, was allowed to annex Bessarabia, which had already been abandoned by Russia and had demanded its union with Rumania in March, 1918. The ratification of the treaty was delayed, however, King Ferdinand anticipating an Entente victory which would liberate Rumania from the onerous clauses the Germans sought to impose on her. 175

The collapse of the Bulgarian front and the victorious Allied offensive in the west soon justified these hopes. The Rumanians thereupon assumed the offensive on Nov. 9th, 1918, re-occupied Wallachia, re-entered Transylvania which had in December, 1918, proclaimed its union with Rumania, marched into Bucovina, the Rumanians of which province had formed a provisional government on Oct. 27th, 1918, and had invoked the assistance of the Rumanian troops, and by April, 1919, reached the line of the river Theiss. Rumania's definite frontiers, however, were to be traced by the diplomats after protracted and unedifying wranglings in Paris.

RUMANIA AND THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

It is usual to accuse the Rumanians of having evinced at the Peace Conference an intolerance and superciliousness that did not at all accord with the services they had rendered to the Allied cause. The Entente Powers alleged that the Rumanians, having concluded a separate peace with the enemy, had thereby forfeited their rights to the territories which had been originally promised them. Besides, President Wilson had taken up a most determined attitude against all secret treaties, and as Rumania's claims were based on them it is easy to understand that immense difficulties were encountered before a settlement was effected. 728

C

RUMANIA

728 The Rumanians might well have retorted that the disaster they had suffered was due mainly to the absence of the assistance the Entente had pledged itself to grant, and that to evoke the case of the peace of Bucarest, which after all had not been ratified by King Ferdinand, was tantamount to making use of a legal flaw in order to avoid moral obligations, an attitude that might be appropriate to the narrow conceptions ruling at a county court, but unworthy of the proceedings of a world areopagus.

Much bitterness was engendered by the arrogance manifested by the delegates of the Great Powers and the arbitrary character of most of their decisions. Thus Rumania was allowed to appoint two delegates to the Conference, while Yugoslavia, with a smaller population, was permitted to send three. Throughout the sittings of the Conference the Rumanian delegates were practically ignored, decisions in matters that interested them were taken over their heads, and injunctions and intimations were transmitted to Bucarest instead of being handed to them, who, after all, were the only competent persons to receive them. Drafts of the treaty with Germany and Austria had been communicated to several journalists while the Rumanian delegation received incomplete summaries, though the conditions imposed on Austria were of vital interest to Rumania. How and for what reasons the Triumvirate, composed of Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Wilson, adopted such a slighting attitude towards not only Rumania, but also towards our lesser allies, is only explainable on psychological grounds.

They were obviously unfit to exert such limitless powers as had been conferred on them, and their sudden elevation had apparently obscured their intelligence. For otherwise how could they ignore the clauses of the treaty which had been concluded with Rumania in 1916, which provided that "Rumania shall have the same rights as the Allies in the peace preliminaries and negotiations, and also in discussing the issues which shall be laid before the Peace Conference for its deliberations?"

It must be admitted, however, that M. Bratianu, the head of the Rumanian delegation, and acting prime minister, owing to his arbitrary and intolerant disposition, was not a

person whose immixture in these difficult negotiations could exert any auspicious influence upon them. The arrogance with which he rejected the Serbian arguments in favour of the revision of the Russo-Rumanian treaty concerning the Banat, which was characteristic of his attitude, will partly explain why he was not in special favour with President Wilson, who was likewise endowed with a rather intolerant disposition. Thus the "Isvestia" of Jan. 19th, 1918, reported that when the Serbian Minister, with the consent of the Russian statesman Milyukov, had approached Bratianu in order to obtain a revision of this treaty, the latter arrogantly replied that he would also ask for the Timok valley across the Danube, which had always formed an integral part of Serbia.

But that which most incensed the Rumanians was the attitude adopted by the Supreme Council on the question of the disposal of the Banat, which had been promised in its entirety to Rumania. Owing to the presence of iron and coal mines in the eastern part of the Banat, a certain group of capitalists who were powerful enough to bring influence to bear on the members of the Supreme Council, came in close contact with Bela Kun, the Hungarian dictator, and secured from him the promise of the bestowal of concessions on their group for the exploitation of these mines, should Hungary be left in possession of the Banat. Thereupon the Supreme Council assumed an attitude which was more than friendly towards Hungary's Bolshevik dictator, and everything was done to thwart the Rumanians from attaining their aim. Though the plan miscarried, owing to the fall of Bela Kun, brought about by Rumania's military intervention, carried out despite the injunctions of the Supreme Council, this intrigue was followed by yet another attempt to set up an independent republic of the Banat, which, owing to its extreme weakness, would have proved very amenable to the will of these international financiers. Then, as if these disgraceful manoeuvres were not enough to inspire disgust at the way the affairs of the Peace Conference were conducted, the Rumanian delegates were pressed to grant industrial concessions to Jewish-American financiers, failing which Rumania was threatened with the loss of America's

728 active support. So cocksure were these gentry of their omnipotence that they even sent representatives to Rumania to earmark in advance whatever enterprises seemed lucrative for them to exploit. It is even averred that finally a note was addressed to the Rumanian delegates enjoining them to grant certain concessions, as otherwise neither diplomatic nor financial help would be forthcoming from the United States.

The spirit of mercantilism which seemed to dominate the decisions taken by the Supreme Council would have sufficed to ruffle the susceptibilities of men of more tolerant disposition than Messrs Bratianu and Mishu. In view of the high stakes at play they did their best to put up with the discourtesies which were showered on them, but when they were prevented from taking part in discussions that affected Rumania directly (thus M. Clemenceau did not hesitate to exclaim in a sitting of the Council to M. Bratianu that the latter was there to listen and not to comment), the Rumanian delegates were obliged to conclude that it consorted better with the maintenance of their dignity to depart, after M. Bratianu had delivered a trenchant attack against the pretensions of the Great Powers to settle the fate of Europe guided uniquely by their own private interests.

These reprehensible altercations go a long way to explain the causal complex of that rabid xenophobia which subsequently inspired the policy of M. Bratianu and his followers. In justice to them it must be conceded that after the treatment meted out to them in Paris they had good reason to eye with grave suspicion any offer of co-operation emanating from western financiers, since at the Peace Conference an attempt had been made to exploit them economically, even blackmail having been employed for the attainment of this object. Nothing has been done to dispel the deplorable impression thus created. On the contrary, the behaviour of their powerful allies at the Spa Conference, where a disproportionally low percentage of reparation payments had been allocated to the Rumanians, could only further confirm their suspicions as to the motives that usually actuate westeners, and this notwithstanding the latters' clever efforts to cloak their mercantilism with a profusion of ethical con-

siderations all professing to aim at the regeneration of the 728
country to which they were to be applied.

M. Bratianu, by the determination and strength of will displayed in his efforts to counter certain decisions taken by the Supreme Council, whose utter ignorance of the prevailing state of affairs in the Near East was more than manifest, rendered unwittingly a signal service to Europe.

Thus it is really incomprehensible that the members of the Supreme Council should have gone so far as to attempt to propitiate that band of adventurers who under the mask of Bolshevism had usurped the government of Hungary, and to have even allowed them to threaten for a time the very existence of Czechoslovakia. So certain was Bela Kun of enjoying the patronage of the Supreme Council that he did not hesitate to launch an attack on the Rumanian army guarding the banks of the Theiss in July, 1919.

Fortunately for Europe the soldiers of the Magyar Soviet Republic were defeated, and the Rumanians, flouting the objurgations and fulminations hurled at them by the Supreme Council sitting in Paris, completed their victory by occupying Budapest within a fortnight, shattering the government of Bela Kun and removing a grave danger to Europe by extirpating this nest of Bolshevism in its midst.

The inconceivable partiality of the Supreme Council for the Magyar Bolsheviks had created such a parlous state of affairs in the East of Europe that had the Rumanians failed to occupy the city of Budapest it is more than likely that the Magyar Bolsheviks would have joined hands with the Russians over the prostrate bodies of Czechoslovakia and Rumania, with the most dire consequences for the fate of our continent.

The Rumanian occupation of Budapest further envenomed their relations with the Supreme Council. Instead of evacuating the city as they were enjoined to do, the Rumanians (having been entirely despoiled by the Austro-Germans, while the latter had occupied Rumania) now attempted to recuperate some of their losses. They therefore refused to depart before they had secured delivery of at least a part of the goods of which they had been despoiled. It was natural for the Rumanians to resent allied intervention

728 in this matter, for at the time that their country was being plundered by the Germans and their allies the Entente had not interposed to protect them. It may be further mentioned that the Rumanians had asked to be allowed to send delegates to Germany to point out to the inter-allied authorities the objects of which they had been defrauded, but their request had been rejected; so that we should not be surprised if on this occasion they decided to take justice into their own hands. The Magyars have of course bitterly complained of the exactions they suffered at the hands of the Rumanians, but, whatever their severity they never attained the magnitude of those suffered by Rumania. Rumania, for instance, possessed 932 locomotives at the time the Austro-Germans occupied her territory, and they left behind them on their departure only fifty!

After the demonstrative departure of M. Bratianu from Paris, the Rumanian government refused to sign the treaties of St Germain, and that relative to the protection of minorities, since its plenipotentiaries had hardly been consulted in their framing, and as a result diplomatic relations between Rumania and the Entente became exceedingly strained. The Supreme Council finally addressed a note in the form of an ultimatum to Rumania, ordering her to withdraw her troops to the frontiers that had been fixed in the meanwhile at Paris, and to sign the Peace treaties, failing which diplomatic relations were to be severed and all further financial aid suspended. M. Bratianu tendered his resignation in guise of a protest, and King Ferdinand thereupon entrusted the government of the country to Dr Vaida-Voevod, who complied with the demands of the Entente, thereby putting an end to the misunderstandings which had arisen. He further succeeded in securing from the Allies the recognition of Bessarabia's union with Rumania, a demand which had previously been put forward by M. Bratianu, but which the Supreme Council had refused to grant, as at the time it was making advances to the Bolsheviks, and striving by every means to secure their goodwill. It was indeed deplorable for the future pacification of the Near East that the Entente Powers had not fallen in at the time with M. Bratianu's request, but only accepted it subsequently, for

M. Bratianu had coupled it with the offer of retroceding 728 southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria, an offer that would have propitiated the Bulgarians and secured their friendship to Rumania, a friendship that is of inestimable value to her. At the same time the retrocession of this territory would have enabled Bulgaria to carry out the financial obligations that had been imposed on her by the Treaty of Neuilly, and the taxpayers of the Western Powers would later have been absolved from the privilege of contributing funds for propping up yet another state, rendered insolvent by the ineptitude of their own diplomats, who by this heedless act of theirs also deprived our own exporters and manufacturers of a small but valuable market.

Concerning the final frontiers which the Peace Conference at Paris fixed for Rumania, though in certain cases they were not as favourable as those promised by the Entente Powers in 1916, nevertheless it must be admitted that they are drawn more in accordance with the principle of nationality. Rumania was not granted the line of the river Theiss as she had been promised, as this would have incorporated within her territory a yet larger number of Hungarians. It would have been even better for Rumania if her western frontiers had not extended so far as to include preponderatingly Magyar urban populations such as those of Arad, Grosswardein (Oradea Mare) and Satmar (Satu Mare) the assimilation of which is bound to prove exceedingly difficult, and whose incorporation is likely to be a burden rather than an asset to her exchequer. Even such a sincere friend of Rumania as Dr Seton Watson did not approve of the annexation of these towns, and long before the frontiers were drawn he warned the Rumanians not to allow themselves to be influenced by their super-nationalists. It is highly unfortunate that such an authoritative warning and counsel as is contained in the following lines was not heeded at least by those who were entrusted by our fellow-citizens with the task of looking after the welfare of our continent at the Peace Conference. Yet the admonition was as clear as it was convincing. Dr Seton Watson did not hesitate to affirm, even at the time when Rumania was being cajoled into joining the Allies, and when lavish promises were being

728 made, that "it is to be hoped that such exaggerated demands will be disallowed at the future Conference. The possession of Arad, with its poignant sentimental associations for the Magyar race, would be a permanent challenge to Hungary and would embitter tenfold her relations with Rumania, which must at the best be strained for many years to come." ("Rumania and the Great War," page 96.)

With regard to Bucovina, Rumania secured more advantageous frontiers than those the Allies had promised to concede her in 1916. She obtained the line of the river Dniester as her northern frontier.

The decision with regard to the Banat was not so favourable for Rumania, for the Yugoslavs insisted on incorporating the western part, which was peopled mainly by Serbs, and they protested against the allotment to another Power of a territory which stretched right up to their capital, Belgrade, and would have placed the latter under a permanent menace from another state. In consequence the experts of the Conference had to adjust the frontier as best they could, guided mainly by the principle of nationality. The arrangement is not particularly auspicious, as a small Yugoslav enclave cuts the railway line Temesvar (Temişoara)—Bazias, and leaves the latter town isolated from Rumania. The various nationalities inhabiting the Banat are, however, so intermingled that it was next to impossible to reach a more satisfactory solution.

THE POST-WAR PERIOD.

668 648 [728] On Bratianu's[1] resignation, in consequence of the presentation of an ultimatum by the Allies in October, 1919, King Ferdinand formed a Cabinet presided over by General Vaitoanu, with a mandate to call a general election.

A strong majority composed of heterogeneous left groups was returned, out of which a Cabinet presided over by Dr Vaida-Voevod was formed. He entered upon the difficult and ungrateful task of dispelling misunderstandings with the Entente and signing the Peace treaties. No sooner, however, had this been accomplished, than Dr Vaida-Voevod, while

1 [head of Rumanian delegation to the peace conference, acting prime minister, and leader of Liberal Party -- Analyst] 32

still abroad, was summarily dismissed. Peasant risings, a movement for autonomy in Transylvania, and general instability led to the nomination of General Averescu to office, owing to the reputation he enjoyed of being a strong man, having taken an active part in suppressing the peasant rising of 1907. [668] 642 648

General Averescu's government passed the enactment dealing with the distribution of land to the peasants, while his Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Take Jonescu, laid the foundation of the Little Entente by concluding alliances with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. General Averescu attempted to open pourparlers with Russia, so as to prepare the recognition of Rumania's right to Bessarabia, and there was a fair chance of his succeeding, but he was baulked of his aim, for the King vetoed his plan. [423]

To M. Titulescu was assigned the task of reorganizing the country's finances. This was deemed to be an intrusion into the special domain of the Bratianus[1] and so by provoking their hostility, brought about Averescu's downfall. M. Take Jonescu was his successor, but he was able to maintain himself in office only for a month. A government constituted by the Bratianu party followed in January, 1922, and remained in power until March, 1926. Owing to the disunion among the Opposition groups the Bratianu party was allowed to carry into effect its nefarious project of securing complete control of the economic resources of Rumania. The whole legislation passed during its tenure of office was of a purely economic character, and under the pretext of consolidating the finances of the country they merely consolidated their own financial dominance. 652 665 661

Popular dissatisfaction was steadily growing in the meanwhile, as instead of relieving the money stringency, the economic policy of the government did nothing but intensify the evil from which the country was suffering. On the other hand the Opposition was closing its ranks and organizing mass demonstrations throughout the country. A monster meeting of peasants was held at Alba-Julia in May, 1925, followed up by vigorous onslaughts against the government. The latter, unable to obtain a foreign loan which would have enabled it to stabilize the currency and relieve [664]

[1] [The Liberal Party, headed by John Bratianu--Editor]

[652] the economic crisis which had become endemic, sought to
665 withdraw for a brief period from office in order that popular
661 indignation might be appeased. As it had become obvious, however, that the Opposition, headed by the Transylvanian and peasant groups of the old kingdom aided by the Bessarabians, would sweep the polls and deprive the Bratianu party of the privileges it had arrogated to itself during its last tenure of office, the government manoeuvred to appoint in its stead a political group on whose subservience it could count. The choice fell on General Averescu, who could not pretend to independence of action owing to the numerical weakness of his group, and who was forced to act in leading strings held by the Bratianus on account of his absolute dependence on their support. As a consequence of the prevailing exasperation throughout the country it could be foreseen with certainty that it would be impossible to secure a favourable majority at the election following the exit from office of the Bratianus, even if use was made of the devices habitually employed on such occasions.

666 Before the dissolution of the Chamber, therefore, the
646 Bratianus passed a law reforming the electoral system then in use, which completely altered the very essence of democratic government. By the new system a party obtaining 40% of the total votes cast secured 70% of the seats in the Chamber, and thereby a party which did not possess the support of the majority of the electors might nevertheless secure an imposing majority in the Legislative Chamber. Through the passing of this measure into law, the coming to power of unpopular parties and royal favourites has been made possible, for owing to the malpractices and abuses current at elections, it is relatively easy in Rumania for any person in control of the state-machine to secure the requisite 40% of the votes necessary to ensure him complete domination of the Chamber.

666 In ordinary circumstances there would have been no necessity for this electoral law, since the public has usually a very wholesome respect for whatever party is in power, allowing it to organize the elections to suit its wishes, and permitting it to exert a dominating influence on the polls so that it may be said that the elections are always "made."

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

The elections which followed in May, 1926, were among the 666
most violent which had been witnessed in Rumania. Though 661
the Averescu group had secured the support of the Magyars, Germans, Jews, Bulgarians and Turks by holding out to them the most alluring promises, it in no way felt secure, and therefore had recourse to extensive terrorist methods. Most Opposition leaders were arrested. Opposition leaders like Maniu and Vaida-Voevod were prevented from holding meetings. Mihalache was set upon by gendarmes and beaten at his home at Topoloveni. The Bessarabian leaders, Stere and Halippa, while travelling to Bessarabia were ignominiously thrown out of their train at Floresti, placed under an escort of gendarmes and conveyed on foot to Cetatea-Alba, a distance of 300 kilometers, despite the fact that they were both in a poor state of health at the time. The army and gendarmerie were mobilized and ordered to see to it that Rumanian citizens did their duty (such as it was conceived to be by the government of H.M. King Ferdinand of Rumania). One of the manifestos issued and distributed broadcast by army air-planes at the time read:—"If you trust in the King then you must trust in his government." As for the way royalty in Rumania conceived its duty of 643
guarding the letter and spirit of the Constitution, one may 666
judge by the fact that the King, aware of the violence to be committed, and knowing that as the supreme arbiter in the country he would be besought from all sides to intervene and put a stop to it, could think of nothing better than to elude his responsibilities by betaking himself to his yacht, and cruising on the Danube for a whole week so as not to be importuned by the complaints of his liege subjects!

In spite of the unprecedented violence employed the 666
government obtained only 54% of the total votes cast, but it must be remembered that this percentage included almost the whole of the votes cast by the minorities.

For some time Averescu meekly followed the lead of 642
Bratianu. He surprised nobody, however, when he began 661
to show manifest signs of insubordination, but to no avail.

For the Liberals, knowing the shifty customer with whom they were dealing, had taken their precautions. During their four years of office they had bestowed on most of the

661 state administrations a certain degree of autonomy which,
[642] effectively amputated the central government of many of its prerogatives, and having filled these administrations with their own partisans they still exerted an influence which could, if necessary, paralyse the governments destined to succeed them in office.

In his electoral manifestoes, Averescu had held out to the Rumanians the most seductive inducements, among others that of a flow of foreign capital into the country. Time passed, however, and so, without any sign of an impending materialization of these assurances, the public began to chafe and inveigh against him. The resentment which the Liberals had aroused against themselves was thus deftly diverted on to the heads of their successors. This result having been duly effected, the Liberals emerged from the seclusion they had hitherto voluntarily imposed on themselves, and now appeared on the scene in the guise of indispensable factors for the restoration of the order and legality so grievously compromised by their incompetent henchman! The King was induced to demand General Averescu to form a coalition Ministry, but after a fruitless effort he was summarily dismissed and replaced by Prince Stirbey, who a fortnight later retired, making way for a Bratianu Government, so that the transition might not appear too brusque.

643 King Ferdinand died in July, 1927, and as the crown passed to his grandson, Michael, a boy of six, a Regency Council was nominated. Ferdinand's son, the notorious Prince Carol, had been excluded from the throne owing to Ferdinand's conviction that Rumania's prestige would suffer if a person with Carol's record became King. A similar opinion seems to have been held by our Foreign Office, for when Prince Carol came over to England in 1925 he received a polite but firm request to leave our shores.

665 Unhappily for the Liberals, their leader, John Bratianu, died suddenly in November, 1927. His was a strong willed and dominating personality, capable, but not over scrupulous in the choice of methods. The leadership then passed to his brother, who until then had been Minister of Finance.
665 The rising storm of popular exasperation caused by the
652 financial policy of the Liberal party, which had brought the

country to the verge of a catastrophe, proved, however, to 665
be too much for the less experienced hands of Vintila Brati- 652
anu. Unable to secure a foreign loan, the need of which had become imperative, he had no choice but to allow the transfer of the reins of power in November, 1928, to the Opposition, represented by M. Maniu and the National Peasant party. The elections which followed took place in freedom, and 666
though this time the minorities did not all vote for the 665
government, nevertheless the latter secured for itself about 78% of the total number of votes cast, which may be taken as an infallible proof of its popularity. This assured it of a compact majority of 348 seats in the Chamber. The Opposition was insignificant, and was composed of sixteen Magyars, thirteen Liberals, and ten seats distributed amongst various groups. This election disposed of the fiction that Communism had a hold on the Rumanian people, for the total Communist vote attained only 35,000 out of a total of 2,840,660, and it thus became evident that the bogey of Bolshevism had been cleverly exploited by the Bratianu dictatorship, in order to justify its terroristic methods in Bessarabia, as well as for the purpose of winning the goodwill of the Western Powers for its alleged attempts to repress it. The most pressing need the Maniu government 652
had to face was the obtention of a foreign loan in order to avoid the certain catastrophe with which the finances of the country were threatened. The funds obtained, however, barely sufficed for stabilizing the currency, and were altogether inadequate for the task of reconstruction, and even for the purpose of paying off the most pressing debts left by the former régime, so that a further loan had to be secured in 1931.

Unfortunately the country was in a derelict condition, and with the banking institutions under the control of its adversaries, determined to undermine the work of the new government, the latter had an exceedingly difficult task to tackle. The government passed several liberal measures, 671
such as the suppression of the censorship, the abrogation of military law in Bessarabia, the reduction of the personnel of the gendarmerie (chiefly employed by Bratianu for dragooning the population at election times), and set about

671 preparing a system of regional decentralization which would largely have satisfied the desires of the minorities.

662 Having to rely upon an inefficient administrative staff, with the various autonomous State departments still filled with supporters of the Opposition, and the latter hampering and undermining the government's attempt to clear up the mess in which the country had been left, it was hardly possible to expect that the government of M. Maniu could effect the miraculous change that was expected of it. In order to counteract the underhand machinations of its Liberal opponents, who did not scruple even to sap its credit 642 abroad by circulating scurrilous attacks on it among foreign 643 banking institutions, while at home they brought pressure 561 to bear on the Regency (which had been elected at their dictation) to create irritating hindrances to the smooth working of the government's plans, the latter at last allowed itself to be won over to what at the time was a fairly popular view, namely that of permitting the former Crown Prince Carol to return and ascend the throne. His advent was reckoned as likely to strengthen the hands of the Government, for he shared with the National Peasant Party the hostility of the Bratianus. Carol II, however, after his accession to the throne on June 8th, 1930, began to manifest a distinct predilection for autocratic measures. He arbitrarily removed from his post the able Rumanian Minister in Paris, M. Diamandi, a man who had distinguished himself for years by his devoted and brilliant service to his country, and nominated a personal friend whose sole qualification for this important diplomatic post was that he was a racing man. He estranged both M. M. Maniu and Vaida-Voevod by unconstitutionally interfering in the government, and thereby provoked the resignation of both. As he did not yet feel himself strong enough to dissolve the Chamber he allowed the National Peasant Party to form another Cabinet with M. Mironescu at its head, but he imposed on them as colleague an outsider in the person of M. Manoilescu, another personal friend of his. An attempt was made to form a Coalition Cabinet to be presided over by M. Titulescu, but as this failed the Mironescu Cabinet was tolerated for a time because it was conducting negotiations for a loan, and a premature

disclosure of the impending adoption of a dictatoral régime 642 might have influenced them adversely. Once the loan was 643 obtained, and when it was deemed that the favour with [661] which the National Peasant Party was regarded had somewhat subsided, owing to the unpopular budget measures it had adopted, M. Mironescu was forced to resign, and death having removed in the meantime the most determined adversary of the King, M. Vintila Bratianu, the former now proceeded to unfold his plan of action.

M. Titulescu was once more summoned to Bucarest and asked to form a broad Coalition Cabinet; but as the National Peasant Party refused to lend its support to a cabinet which would have contained two royal favourites, Manoilescu and Argentoianu, M. Titulescu wisely abandoned the task and returned to London.

The next step of Carol was an attempt to follow the nefarious example of his brother-in-law, the Serbian monarch, and form a military cabinet, but the Spanish revolution which broke out at the time induced him hastily to alter his plans.

M. Argentoianu, who had in the meantime become the 645 favourite adviser of the King, opted for the dissolution of the Chamber and the formation of a cabinet of "technical" experts to shore up the tottering framework; himself to occupy the two most important posts, those of the Ministry of Finances and of the Interior. The technical capacities of M. Argentoianu are of peculiarly sinister character, judging from what former colleagues of his have to say of his activities. Thus General Averescu, in whose cabinet he held the post of Minister of Finances ad-interim, accuses him of unconstitutionally squandering £1,500,000, of thereby defrauding the State, and rendering himself liable to penalties provided in Art. 326 of the Rumanian penal code, as well as in Art. 3 of the law regarding ministerial responsibilities—infractions that had been established by the Judicial authorities in 1923, if we are to trust General Averescu's affirmations as they were published and reproduced in a series of articles in all the principal Bucarest newspapers during January, 1932. Another ex-Finance Minister, M. Virgil Madgearu, on whose integrity we may rely, likewise

645 accuses him of having caused a loss of 90 million lei to the State in 1921, and further affirms that Argentoianu never offered a satisfactory explanation of the reasons which led him to operate so disadvantageously to the interests of the State, though he had been interpellated several times on the subject in the Chamber. We may surmise, therefore, that the technical capacities of M. Argentoianu, who enjoys the reputation of being an arch cynic, were somewhat deficient from the moral point of view, and in order to compensate for this shortcoming the respectable personality of Prof. Iorga, upon whom the dignity of Prime Minister was foisted, was made use of to complete the Cabinet. We may take it for granted that Prof. Iorga, who is a distinguished historian and man of letters, was, like Plato's model ruler, least eager to rule, for he was engaged in an occupation better than ruling, and led a life finer than that of those wielding authority. But his duty to his former royal pupil, as he conceived it, compelled him to quit his life of contemplation and return to work for the general good in what, according to Plato, is the 'cave.' Prof. Iorga, doubtless, must have lost sight to some extent of the difference between the perfect State, which is unattainable, and the good State which is a present possibility, as expounded respectively in the "Republic" and the "Laws." Otherwise, he would have halted before returning to the darkness of the cave. His presence would have been desirable in such conditions as prevail in the unattainable and ideal perfect State, but such would not be those obtaining in a State with the present possibilities of Rumania.

642 645 It is to this confusion of ideas, as well as to the evident desire to exert even a limited restraining influence on his sovereign, that we must have recourse in order to explain Prof. Iorga's consent to read a royal decree dissolving Parliament and ordering new elections to be held in June, 1931.[1]

[1] In an interview published by the "Echo de Paris," June 29th, 1930, Professor Iorga stated, amongst other things, that "whenever the party spirit overruled the spirit of patriotism he would be found by the side of the King, in order to defend the supreme interests of the nation." Professor Iorga's attachment to the throne is explicable by his traditionalism. As a historian he sees in his sovereign, the lineal descendant of Stephen the Great, or of Michael the Brave. A non-Rumanian, however, may be dispensed from taking such a view, and excused if he does not hold a very high opinion of a scion of the Hohenzollerns who promulgates rascally laws defrauding the unwary foreign investor and trader.

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

A very unfavourable impression was created by the dis- 642
missal of the Chamber controlled by the National Peasant 666
Party, the only standard-bearer of democracy in the country. It is probable that the electorate would have reacted with more spirit if the people had not foreseen that the thwarting of the royal will would have entailed the abolition of even the semblance of a Parliamentary system, and the proclamation of a pure dictatorship. Though not to an overwhelming extent, violence and illegality were pretty freely employed, to judge from the cases reported in the Press, yet in spite of all these artifices and the mass abstention of its opponents the elements supporting the Iorga-Argentoianu Coalition secured only 48% of the total votes cast; a very meagre performance indeed if it be remembered that even the Liberal party figured among its supporters.

That the Iorga-Argentoianu Cabinet did not fulfil the 645
hopes placed in it by the King became obvious when he again 665
summoned M. Titulescu, early in 1932, to Bucarest, and asked him to form a broad coalition cabinet. No real coalition cabinet truly representative of the national will could be formed without the inclusion of the National Peasant Party, and the leaders of the latter, when sounded, replied in a truly dignified manner that so long as constitutional methods were not observed they would abstain from participation. M. Titulescu gave up the mission and once more returned to his ambassadorial duties in London. Even those who by their votes helped the Cabinet to install itself in office seemed to have turned against it, for during a sitting of the Rumanian Senate on December 5th, 1931, M. Pillat, belonging to the Liberal party, delivered the following trenchant criticism on the Cabinet: "When you came to power you had promised three principal things: 1st, reduction of the Budget and a lightening of taxation through economies; 2nd, a redressing of the financial and economic situation and of the agrarian crisis; 3rd, penalties for all abuses. But what has been realised? The policy of feigned economies has not stopped the practice of dissipation, aggravated by fresh injustices. In a time of such poverty you have not only maintained old sinecurist in office but you have created even new ones. Favourites of other régimes who exert cumulative

645 functions have been left undisturbed. We have a plethora
665 of functionaries drawing starvation wages instead of a body of well-selected officials decently rewarded. You who have no party and no party attachments to satisfy, and who always attacked political parties, might have effected this change easily, but you have not done so. The reductions in the Budget were necessary, yet they ought not to have cut into the very vitals of the country. The financial policy of M. Argentoianu may be qualified as the policy of bankruptcy. No institution, however strong its foundations, can resist it. You have destroyed the schools and disorganized the army by a criminal reduction of credits. In the name of the Liberal party I must affirm that we cannot accept a constitutional theory which, if it be applied, will debilitate our political life, and by the elimination of political parties vitiate the expression of the national will in its essence, expose the Crown dangerously to attack, and even provide the possibility of irremediably compromising it."

871 The indictment with regard to the schools found in the above rebuke refers to the decision taken by the Government
652 to shift on to the municipalities 50 per cent of the educational charges. As the Municipal authorities cannot balance their budgets, and as an example the community of Solca was cited, which with a total annual budget of 430,000 lei would have been obliged to incur an additional expenditure of 400,000 lei in order to provide for the maintenance of its primary school, the deputies admitted that such charges were beyond the resources of the municipalities to bear, and the proposed legislation was at last rejected after a most strenuous opposition from the National Peasant Party supported by the Liberal deputies who had hitherto sided with the Government.

871 Another cause likely to prejudice education in Rumania
875 is the non-payment of salaries to teachers. During the sitting of the Chamber on April 4th, 1932, a case was reported of certain teachers, who are all State functionaries in Rumania, who had not received their pay for seven months. Associations of teachers in various localities have called meetings and have addressed telegrams of protest on the subject to the King. Thus, those of the region of Radauţi on

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

May 7th, 1932, solicited the King's intervention, and demanded that their emoluments, already four months in arrears, should be paid. Those of Balţi appealed to the Press on the same date, complaining that nothing had been paid them during the last five months. A general strike of the members of the teaching profession is being talked about if a remedy is not found. They are incensed by the fact that while public money is being squandered on useless objects and worthless individuals at Bucarest, humble functionaries in the provinces are left to famish. 871 875

The "Adeverul" of Jan. 19th, 1932, takes the Government to task for paying regularly its superior functionaries and neglecting the lower grades as well as its pensioners, and proceeds to relate particulars as astounding as they are scandalous, namely details about famishing teachers who are forced to beg for morsels of bread from their pupils ! Such facts are really staggering, and when one recollects that France is generously advancing in instalments a loan of over one hundred million francs for the exclusive purpose of enabling the Rumanian State to pay its functionaries and pensioners, one demands what has become of this money and whether these funds have not again been diverted in the habitual manner to other purposes or pockets than those destined by the original providers of these sums ? 652 647 871

The inept waste of public money at this critical period is simply revolting. The press daily reveals cases of gross extravagance and profligacy, while in the Chamber it has been admitted that the State keeps in its employ over 50,000 redundant functionaries. The "Argus" of May 5th, 1932, for instance, points out that the Ministry of Commerce and Industry maintains without any justification a sub-secretariat with a personnel of 116, among whom are twelve solicitors, one architect, one doctor of medicine, 14 chiefs of sections, etc, at an annual cost of 15,176,900 lei to the State, while on April 1st, 1932, the paper condemned at length the waste involved in the maintenance of a Faculty of Medicine at the University of Bucarest with a staff of 400 professors and assistants, while the total number of students matriculated to this faculty reached barely 900. 652 647

The paper likewise affirmed that there was a scandalous

647 prodigality displayed in the lavishing of big salaries on
652 certain functionaries occupying inferior posts, salaries which were altogether disproportionate with their functions, and that this form of favouritism was rampant in every administration. These remarks of the "Argus" are certainly not amiss, and it could be added that the faculty of Law has a greater number of Professors than the corresponding faculty of the Paris University. In its issue for the 14th May it criticizes the War Ministry for undertaking the construction of an arch of triumph in Bucarest, a matter which obviously is not one of pressing importance. The same could also be said about the Royal Palace at Bucarest, which is being enlarged and renovated. The "Curentul" of 6th May, 1932, discloses that the State maintains a school of gamekeepers at an annual cost of 1,512,000 lei and demands its prompt closure. In its issue of May 19th, 1932, it virulently condemns the Government for allowing fifty of its parliamentary supporters to undertake a voyage of relaxation to Constantinople, Jerusalem and Cairo, during the Easter holidays of 1932, at the expense of the State. It may be remarked that Rumanian governments often recompense their partisans by attaching them to various missions sent abroad so that they may enjoy free trips. Thus at the recent Balkan Conferences it was remarked that the number of Rumanian delegates often equalled the joint numbers of Albanian, Bulgarian, Greek and Yugo-Slav representatives. The "Dreptatea" of May 19th, 1932, takes the Government to task for not paying its functionaries, yet finding some 800,000 lei for the purchase of books for the public libraries, and delegating to Paris two public functionaries at a cost of 40,000 lei for making the purchase of the said books from a French publishing firm.

The "Argus" of May 6th, 1932, in a leading article insists that this costly and luxurious organization with which the Rumanian State has been endowed should be got rid of, and order and sobriety introduced, for otherwise neither loans nor assistance from without will be of any use. In 1929 and 1931, 24 milliard lei were borrowed; of this sum almost nine milliards were absorbed to cover previous deficits, and yet to-day, assures the "Argus," Rumania is no better off.

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

There is a deficit of five and a half milliards left over from the years 1930/31, and of 1,100 millions arising from the first three months of the current year. In all, a deficit of six and a half milliard lei, which is entirely due to bad management. 652 647

To these budget deficits should be added some ten milliard lei, owing by the State to various local contractors and industries, the non-payment of which has caused an enormous prejudice to the internal economy of the country, since these enterprises, having all their liquid funds "frozen up," have been obliged to stop their activities and dismiss their staffs, thereby intensifying the crisis. 652

The legislation recently passed by the Government has also had a most unfortunate repercussion on the general situation. Thus the law sanctioning the cancellation of agrarian debts has resulted in the ruin of almost every bank in the country, for, with a few rare exceptions, all have directly or indirectly advanced money to agriculturists, who by this law, promulgated in April, 1932, are dispensed from their obligations to the extent of 50 %, while the remaining 50% is rendered recoverable within 30 years. No compensation whatever is granted by the State to the banks or to private individuals who had been unfortunate enough to have advanced money to the peasants, even on the security of a mortgage. The result is that almost every banking institution and thousands of people have been ruined at one stroke. 652 426

This measure has not met with the general approval even of the peasantry, for the most prosperous and enterprising among them, who naturally had placed their savings in the banks, have thereby lost their money, since all the rural banks have been rendered insolvent. The total cessation of all credit, which has naturally followed the suspension of banking operations in the rural districts, has caused immense loss to the farmers, who can no longer borrow money even for their most pressing needs. Another law, that of the so-styled "Liquidation Judiciaire," completes and intensifies the evils fostered by that of the "Concordat preventif," rendering all commercial debts practically irrecoverable without the condescension of the debtor. Such measures are 648 652

648 indicative of the complete chaos which prevails in the minds
652 of those at the helm of the State, and who, seeing the *impasse* to which they have brought the country, appealed to France to send a mission of financial experts to devise means whereby Rumania may be extricated from the morass in which she has been entangled. This mission, headed by M. Rist, former adviser to the Rumanian National Bank, has arrived at the end of April, 1932, and is preparing a report which apparently is to recommend a drastic curtailment of the government staffs, and a reorganization of the tax-collecting system. Though exceedingly discreet, these advisers could not help expressing their astonishment at the bungling methods obtaining, and several higher officials in the Ministry of Finances have been summarily dismissed in consequence of their gross incompetence. Surprise, too, has been expressed at the number of officials employed in the Ministries
[647] of War and Public Instruction, 33,533 and 82,821 respectively, staffs more numerous than in the corresponding institutions in France, a country noted for its bureaucratism. The activities of these foreign advisers, who, after all, had been invited to come, and who are rendering a signal service to the country, have given rise to an outburst of xenophobia which is truly surprising. The press, with a few rare exceptions has protested against this immixture in the internal affairs of the State, which it pretends to regard as an affront to the national dignity, and has not wearied of insisting that Rumania should desist from paying her external debt service, which absorbs some six milliard lei per annum. Such a solution seems natural for a State which condones the annulment of all pecuniary engagements of the most numerous class of its citizens, as is provided in the law concerning the cancellation of agrarian debts. However, the Government seems unwilling to go so far, and it declares on all occasions that it will fulfil its foreign obligations in spite of the heavy sacrifices this decision may entail. Already it has taken the cue given by the French experts, and promptly dismissed five Under-Secretaries of State, early in May, 1932. The fall of the Tardieu Cabinet, which seemed disposed to extend a loan to Rumania on certain conditions, may now induce the Rumanian government to retrace its steps to a

certain extent, as apparently the new French government 648
will be less inclined to make financial advances. Neverthe- 652
less the Cabinet will hesitate to assume the responsibility of openly defaulting, lest such action should be resented by France and to a lesser extent by England, and bring about Rumania's political isolation in face of Russia. So that, strange as it may seem, the dread of the Bolsheviks may contribute to the respect of engagements, the repudiation of which would be applauded by the latter.

The press organ of General Averescu, the "Indreptarea," 648
in its issues of 12th and 18th May, 1932, contains some inter- 652
esting comments on the findings of the French experts. It 647
thus affirms that the experts have ascertained that there is a lack of control in the handling of the public funds, that there is a great redundancy of officials, and that huge frauds are committed at the expense of the State revenues. As an example, the case of the revenue from the Customs was given, which was estimated at 1,200 million lei, yet only yielded 400 millions, the balance of 800 millions having been fraudulently diverted to other pockets than that of the State. M. Rist, affirms the "Indreptarea," had recommended a compression of the expenses through the dismissal of a large number of functionaries, and the creation of a control of all payments made to the State so as to eliminate the numerous frauds to which the Budget deficit is principally due. If these reforms were effected, Rumania, according to M. Rist, could fulfil her external obligations. However, the findings of the experts were not likely to enhance the prestige of Rumania in Paris and it hardly seemed likely that the French would now keep their promise made to M. Argentoianu to give pecuniary assistance to Rumania, unless they were allowed to exert a control which would be tantamount to applying to Rumania the status of what in its essence would be a colonial dependency. Such measures, if their acceptance were advo- 648
cated by the Government, would weaken its prestige to such 666
an extent that it could no longer maintain itself in power, 645
even if it enjoyed royal support. The weakening of its authority was manifested by its decision not to allow the holding of municipal elections which were to take place in

RUMANIA

645 June, 1932, a measure which is resented by all political
[666] parties as a formal violation of the constitution.
[644]

From the above it will be clear that whatever popularity the Iorga-Argentoianu Cabinet may have enjoyed, and whatever the hopes to which it may have given rise on its formation, these have now been totally dispelled. This is not without causing a distinct prejudice to Rumania, for undoubtedly, Prof. Iorga is one of the most distinguished Rumanians and represents an immense moral asset for the country. He would have proved an ideal chief for a broad coalition of all political parties, and his presence, owing to his integrity as well as to his erudition would have immensely strengthened the position of such a popularly elected government.

Owing to the marked "lipsandry" from which Rumania is suffering, it was an unpardonable mistake on the part of her ruler to expose an eminent personality like that of Prof. Iorga to risk his reputation, and by trading on his sentiments of devotion to the throne to force him to join a team headed by an Argentoianu, who, according to General Averescu, ought to be in the dock, and not on the Ministerial bench.[1]

665 With the passing of time, and with the worsening of the situation, attacks on the present régime have become more virulent. General Averescu, who under Rumania's former kings was often appealed to on difficult circumstances, and who feels that he has been undeservedly ousted by the Iorga-Argentoianu combination, continues his vehement attacks on both Government and King, whom he threatens with the fate of Prince Cuza, deposed forcibly in 1866. Far more significant, however, is the attitude of the National Peasant Party, which so far has maintained a very dignified attitude. All of a sudden on May 15th, 1932, the "Patria," the organ of the Transylvanian section of the party, launched a virulent attack on the régime, denouncing the scandalous exploitation to which Transylvania is being subjected and threatening with a demand for autonomy. This campaign,

[1] In June, 1932, the "Dreptatea" repeatedly accused Argentoianu of having appropriated 20 million lei of public money, of which, 12 millions between May 17th and 31st, and eight millions on June 3rd and 4th, after he had resigned from office.

which is supported by the bulk of the party, may prove salutary for the country, as it is the only peaceful means by which a reversion to constitutional practice may be secured. A similar campaign has been launched by the Liberal or Bratianu party, for the elimination of the present régime, and it is possible that the force of circumstances may lead eventually to a close co-operation between these two political parties in order to attain this common object which at the present moment each is attempting to secure independently. That such a contingency is well within the domain of possibility, is clear owing to the widespread dislike and unpopularity the present régime is encountering, which is apparent from the persistent attacks it is subjected to by the Press; even independent newspapers like the "Lupta" and "Adeverul" joining in them. In fact nothing could better characterize the prevailing discontent than the following excerpts from articles published by the above mentioned newspapers on 17th May, 1932. "Whither this sort of government has brought us is made clear by a perusal of the newspapers published in all regions of the country. They show that the laws promulgated by the Government are either inapplicable or prove the source of new unforeseen confusions, explainable by the lack of forethought or the haste of those in authority. Their incompetence has undermined confidence amongst all classes of the population and has created a state of moral depression which shows itself in regrettable violent agrarian manifestations, in protests by members of the teaching profession and the frequent suicides committed all over the country, the majority of which are due to poverty.

The Government, which since its assumption of the reins of power has not even once had the moral courage to verify whether it enjoys the confidence of the nation or not, should comprehend from these manifestations that it has lost even the ultimate justification for continuing its activities, namely the hope of obtaining an amelioration of the present situation."

While the "Adeverul," commenting on the campaign launched by the Transylvanian section of the National Peasant Party affirms: "The echoes of discontent which

668 resound from the province across the Carpathians are not isolated. The whole country is agitated by this discontent which may explode at any moment."

The above statements should not be taken as outbursts of spite, for even in official publications, such as the bulletin of the Constantsa Chamber of Commerce, we come across similar pronouncements: "We are facing a complete economic disaster. All the productive forces of the country are exhausted. All private savings lent on credit are lost owing to general insolvency. The State is unable to collect even one fourth of the direct taxes it imposes. We have arrived at this state of affairs owing to the irrational financial policy of post-war governments . . . . . Great mistakes were committed, and this fact should be admitted before we start on the right path. Many of our rulers were incompetent and dissipated, not to say that they acted as profiteers." (February, 1932, p. 23–26.)

645 Since proofs were submitted the following events have [652] occurred in Rumania:

Owing to the growing discontent among public functionaries, pensioners and officers at their not receiving their pay, the King felt constrained to enjoin the Cabinet to satisfy forthwith the legitimate claims of these public servants. The government, unable to comply with this behest, tendered its resignation early in June, whereupon the King once more convoked M. Titulescu to Bucarest, and bade him form a coalition cabinet. M. Titulescu's efforts proved again fruitless; for while the National Peasant Party did not refuse its co-operation, the Liberal Party asked that it should be entrusted with a mandate to form a government, as it pretended to be strong and capable enough to deal singly with the situation.

666 As, however, no party possessed a majority in the Chamber, it was decided to dissolve it, and to appeal to the electorate. M. Vaida-Voevod, who is known to be strongly opposed to gerrymandering, and other electoral abuses in vogue in Rumania, formed a provisional government to supervise the elections. These were held in July, and the

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

National Peasant Party, though it polled less than 50% of the votes cast, secured 272 seats against 114 won by the Opposition. (The Liberals obtained 28, and the section of the party led by M. G. Bratianu, 14 mandates.) 666

M. Vaida-Voevod having discharged the duty assigned to him retired from office; but as the National Peasant Party possessed a working majority in the newly-elected Chamber, it was called upon to assume power. The Opposition attempted to challenge the right of the National Peasant Party to govern the country owing to the smallness of the poll it secured at the elections, though it was the Liberal party itself, now heading the Opposition, which introduced the law conferring a majority of seats in the Chamber on the party which would poll 40% of the votes. 646

M. Maniu was besought by his partisans to resume once more the premiership, but after several interviews with the King, declared himself unable to do so. He recommended, however, M. Vaida-Voevod to undertake the task, and accordingly a Cabinet headed by the latter was formed which includes both M. Mihalache and M. Madgearu, and other prominent members of the party. The government thus formed proceeded to secure a loan of 50 million swiss francs, wherewith to pay its officials for the time being, and to publish its program, which in the main lines aims at: Reforming the present electoral law, reintroducing administrative decentralization, and reorganizing the railway administration. Equitable treatment of minorities is promised, as well as a modification of the law concerning the conversion of agrarian debts. At the same time State finances are to be reorganized with the co-operation of the League of Nations. 645 652

This last plan, however, will not work out so smoothly, for the Opposition will do its utmost to stir up popular feeling against it. Even when two League delegates arrived in June, 1932, to examine the economic situation, the Press was unanimous in deprecating this public investigation and treating it as an offence against the country's dignity. The most widely read paper, having a daily circulation of some 40,000 copies, appeared with a leading article entitled "the day of shame." 652 648

RUMANIA

652 Though there may be nothing derogatory in foreign super-
648 vision of Rumanian finances, Rumanian politicians will insist on decrying it as an affront to the *amour propre* of their country, because such control will prevent them from embezzling public funds. However, one may well question whether the League of Nations is the most suitable authority to take in hand such a difficult task after its lamentable failures in Bulgaria and Hungary, where the proceeds of the loans raised under its aegis served mainly to bolster up reactionary governments. After such a disastrous experience—at least so far as British subscribers to these loans are concerned, who have lost two thirds of their capital—it is doubtful whether the League of Nations would again venture to appeal with any hope of success for funds on behalf of its prospective ward. All the more so, since the League is not cut out for dealing with such a mendacious and elusive body of political mountebanks as it will have to transact business with in Rumania. M. Maniu's refusal to reassume the premiership is to be interpreted as a failure on his part to secure from the King implicit assurances that constitutional practices would not be tampered with again, so that the League will not know whom it will have to face when the National Peasant Party is once more turned out of office. It would be better apparently if this formidable job of cleansing Rumania's Augean stables were tackled by a single country, like France, which owing to its ascendancy as an ally, could exert the requisite authority. If the French were given a free hand, they would see at least that their money served its purpose, and they would take adequate precautions to counter-check effectively all the evasions and underhand manoeuvres in which Rumanian politicians are past masters.

POLITICS.

POLITICAL PARTIES.

The Liberal or Bratianu Party.—The regular system of party government composed of two great political parties, the Liberal and Conservative, which had ruled alternatively in Rumania during the reign of Charles I, came to a close with the Great War, which brought about the dismemberment of the Conservatives. It was an arrangement based on the "spoils" system, and entailed a change of the majority of state officials with every change of government. This instability of tenure of all posts in the Civil Service necessarily encouraged corruption, but it may be said that it was a political system which for the time being made on the whole for stability and assured to Rumania an immunity from revolts and crimes by which other States of South Eastern Europe had distinguished themselves during the same period. 665 647

It is regrettable that both parties had neglected to create a contented class of peasant proprietors which would have constituted a sound bulwark against the onset of disintegrating forces let loose by the war. Instead, great land and financial monopolies closely connected with the personnel of these two political parties were fostered. 665

The agrarian revolution led to the elimination of the Conservatives, while the Liberal party retained its vigour owing to its grip on the economic life of the country. Owing to the absence of a powerful rival, the Liberal party became the supreme arbiter in the land during the first decade following the conclusion of the war. But, from a political party it had degenerated into a coterie aiming solely at the exploitation of the country for the benefit of its partisans, and, as such, though firmly established in the old kingdom, seeing that it constituted the main avenue by which one could accede to political life, it was unable to extend its influence in the newly incorporated provinces, where, fortunately, other political conceptions prevailed. 661 665

It had identified itself with the Bratianu family, which exerted an autocratic sway over it. After John Bratianu's death, in 1927, the leadership passed to his brother Vintila 665

665 Bratianu, the inspirer of that rabid xenophobia to which may be ascribed the major part of the woes from which the country is suffering to-day. On his death, the conduct of the party was entrusted to M. Duca, but there is a small dissident fraction of the party which is led by M. George
665 Bratianu. The split was due to the fact that the majority of
642 the party was opposed to the return of the present King Carol II, and to their taking up an altogether intransigent attitude on the subject which was considered impolitic by M. G. Bratianu. After M. Vintila Bratianu's death, however, the party's relations with the Crown considerably improved, and it even went so far as to lend its concourse to the election and maintenance in power of the Iorga-Argentoianu Cabinet in order to emphasize its determination to maintain good relations with the King. It changed its tactics as regards the Government after the latter had been in office for a year, and opened a violent campaign aiming at its overthrow, as it considers that this régime is causing much harm to the country, and apprehends that it may be succeeded by yet other political combinations enjoying royal favour, thus perpetuating a system which would tend towards the elimination of political parties from participation in the government of the country.

Speeches made by M. M. Duca and Tatarascu, a prominent member of the party, at a political meeting held at Braila on May 15th, 1932, give a clear indication of the attitude of the party. It was explained at this meeting that the support extended to the Iorga-Argentoianu government was due to the desire to avoid all difficulties to the king, and allow the latter to carry on the experience he wished to initiate without embarrassment. After a year's trial, however, it became obvious that it was imperative to remove this Government which was bringing disaster to the country, to change the methods and system of government, and to revert to constitutional practice.

665 *The National Peasant Party.*—The agrarian reform which had been carried out on the conclusion of the peace led to the emergence of an agrarian political party of ultra-radical tendencies. It formed. however, an amorphous mass that required the demagogic activities of a leader such as the late

POLITICAL PARTIES

Bulgarian Prime Minister Stambuliiski, in order to weld it 665
together and impart to it the driving energy of a revolutionary party. Fortunately for Rumania, its peasantry was led by a man who is remarkable not only for his common sense, but also for his extreme frankness, sincerity and modesty, and who in the midst of unparalleled corruption leads and insists on living a clean life. His devotion to the ideal he serves explains his readiness to relegate himself to the background whenever he believes that his self-effacement can be conducive to the advancement of his party or to the welfare of his country. He grasped the dangers inherent in an extremist policy for a country which had not yet firmly consolidated its various constituent segments, nor secured the spiritual unity of its people, and instead of following the easy course of giving a free rein to the hotheads of his party, he used his authority instead to curb their revolutionary zeal. M. Ion Mihalache, a former teacher by profession, foresaw that the wisest policy was to secure the adherence to the Peasant Party of various groups and public men who by their moral standing might add to its prestige, and by their influence help to exert a restraining force on its revolutionary activities. Such individuals were unfortunately inexistent in the old kingdom with the solitary exception of Prof. Iorga, who for over forty years had been performing the combined functions of a national tribune and a moralist. Mihalache, therefore, had to turn to the newly incorporated provinces, though his decision to co-operate with outsiders and facilitate their access to the government of the country created intense resentment in the old kingdom. Of the new territories, 186
Transylvania alone had been distinguished for its tenacious 665
defence of its nationality under Hungarian rule. It possessed a National party which for fifty years had battled heroically against Magyar despotism, and had been purified and tempered through the endless persecution it had been subjected to. Such a political group was ideally designed to serve as the nucleus of a larger party aiming at the emancipation of the Rumanian people from the oligarchy which persisted in exploiting it both politically and economically. The National Party of Transylvania, though naturally including intellectuals, was mainly a peasant party itself,

RUMANIA

[186] since it was a purely Rumanian party and represented pro-
665 portionately all strata of the population, while Transylvania formed part of Hungary. Those of its adherents who pursued their personal advancement rather than that of their party had deserted it, and on the union of Transylvania with Rumania they joined the ranks of the various political groups of the old kingdom, believing that such conduct would be conducive to more rapid promotion for them. The party had thereby been purged of all doubtful elements, and those who remained could be considered as absolutely devoted to their ideal, namely the emancipation of the Rumanian democracy from a tyranny, which, though no longer Magyar, was to liberal-minded men perhaps even more stifling and more repulsive than that exerted of old
[187] from Budapest. The Transylvanian National Party should not be mistaken on account of its name, for a group permeated by narrow nationalistic views; on the contrary, in respect to treatment of racial minorities in Rumania, it aims at securing for them the widest possible autonomy compatible with the maintenance of the Rumanian State. The majority of its rank and file being composed of peasants, its union with the Peasant party of Rumania was an occurrence which was bound to happen, fostered as it was through a community of suffering and an identity of desires. From every point of view the fusion of these two parties may be regarded as the most hopeful portent in Rumanian political life in recent times.

It was particularly felicitous also for the Transylvanian section since it afforded it an opportunity to repudiate the charge of cherishing separatist tendencies. The new group undoubtedly represents the most numerous and sanest elements in Rumania. The predominance of the Transylvanian intellectuals in it is due to the fact that these men are conscious of their civic duties, that they are resolved to serve their less developed peasant brethren and to bear their burdens in common, rather than to hoist themselves up into oligarchic groups intent on exploiting the rural masses. When the intellectuals of the old kingdom learn to subordinate their personal interest to that of their country, they will

undoubtedly be eager to follow the example set by M. M. Maniu and Vaida-Voevod.

The fusion of the two parties was officially proclaimed on Oct. 10th, 1926, and led to enthusiastic demonstrations. The only regret formulated at the time was that Prof. Iorga had not seen his way to accept the presidency of the new party.

His abstention was most regrettable since his presence in the party would have added immensely to its moral prestige, and the disappointment caused was all the keener since he had potently helped to bring about the fusion. Apparently at the last moment he must have been frightened by the undue preponderance of the peasant element in the party and have come to the conclusion that it would not be possible to maintain its policy within strictly constitutional bounds, nor impose on the more restive elements of the party the discipline and authority he is accustomed to exert on his own small party, composed entirely of the intellectual *élite* of Rumania absolutely devoted to his views. Prof. Iorga's apprehensions seem to have been partly justified, for prior to the National Peasant Party's accession to power in November, 1928, it traversed several internal crises which caused the shedding of several members, but fortunately these difficulties were finally surmounted, thanks to the self-sacrifice and circumspection shown by its leaders.

The program of the party is extremely radical and distinguished by its liberality for the ethnic minorities to which it promises the granting of complete satisfaction concerning their cultural desiderata. It aims at the adoption of a system of regional autonomy, an excellent measure which would go a long way to allay the dissatisfaction caused by the excessive centralization so far exerted from Bucarest. Another important object is the stabilization of the status of public functionaries which naturally will remove them from the influence of the politicians. In the economic domain its scope is to subordinate the interests of an excessive and artificially created industrialism to agriculture, which it considers as the country's mainstay. The concourse of foreign capital being considered an indispensable condition for the country's development, a régime of complete legality was to be introduced and foreign and local capital were to be treated on an

RUMANIA

665 equal footing. The development of railway communications was to be achieved by the granting of complete and effective autonomy to the railway administration, and in certain cases even the construction and exploitation of new lines was to be left to private enterprise.

M. Maniu, the leader of the party, has temporarily withdrawn from political life as a sign of protest against the unconstitutional methods adopted by the King. In spite of persistent and recurring demonstrations on the part of his followers, M. Maniu has refused to reconsider his decision, but his post of president of the party is being kept vacant in the belief, that eventually a return to constitutional methods will permit him to emerge from his self-imposed exile in Transylvania and to resume his political activities. The latter region, having evolved under Magyar rule an alert public opinion, has recently been the scene of imposing political manifestations, in the course of which the most profound and touching attachment for M. Maniu has been evinced. The latter has consistently counselled moderation to his followers, expressing his confidence that the King would in time perceive his mistake and return to constitutional methods. The Transylvanians form the better educated and more enlightened section of Rumania's population, and therefore it should not be surprising that they should be both more vigilant and restive. Already voices are raised advocating the abandonment of the passive policy of dignified abstention as prescribed by M. Maniu, and a revision of the tactics hitherto followed is demanded. It is probable that the whole party will come round to this view, as Bucarest has been incapable of either formulating a generous policy or, what is even more difficult, of carrying it into effect. This latent possibility of the appearance of a 186 militant opposition headed by the National Peasant Party is 665 not, it seems, too remote, for the Transylvanians are dissatisfied not only with the present régime, but also with the general attitude adopted towards them by politicians of the old kingdom. In a congress of the Transylvanian section of the party, held at Cluj at the end of March, 1932, M. Vaida-Voevod declared " we clearly see that there exists a conspiracy which premeditates the undermining of the forces of

POLITICAL PARTIES

Transylvania, so that by impoverishing us they may exploit and lord over us."

[186] 665

Both M. M. Maniu and Vaida-Voevod are known for their moderation and circumspection and through the "Patria," the mouthpiece of the Transylvanian section of the party, they have endeavoured to impose silence on their more turbulent followers and on the advocates of militant methods. But if a new political combination is imposed on the country from above, it seems that their hands will be forced and a more combative attitude adopted, which may well be the signal for radical changes in Rumania. The Transylvanian peasantry is far from being prone to allow the Rumanian goverment to ride roughshod over its constitution, and the absence so far, of subversive movements in that province is solely due to the demureness and composure of M. M. Maniu and Vaida-Voevod and should not be taken as indicative of a peaceful disposition. On the contrary, the Press campaign of General Averescu against the present régime has been widely approved and the peasantry is openly expressing sympathy with him. He is in fact becoming a very popular figure. Owing to the severe crisis which the province is traversing, which is more acutely felt than in the old kingdom because from the cultural point of view it is several stages ahead of the latter, it would not require much effort to turn the brewing dissatisfaction into open revolt. Already the peasants are beginning to manifest their disapproval of M. Maniu's attitude, and are more and more insistently demanding that he should abandon his present seclusion and explain the reasons for the passivity he has so far shown. Apparently they believe that the time has come for more drastic methods. A speech from M. Maniu delivered in February, 1932, to a delegation of his party, which went to greet him at his country retreat at Badacin and ask him to resume his duties as leader of the party, is characteristic of the efforts he employs to assuage the militant ardour of his supporters. He refused to accept anew the leadership, and among other things he is reported to have declared: "To-day the nation is deprived of its constitutional rights; we are on the threshold of bankruptcy, both economic and moral; we see anarchy enthroned in men's souls and hatred fomented in the pro-

665 668

RUMANIA

668 vinces, and in the murmur of this growing dissolution one
665 hardly hears the voice of the national conscience, one and undivided. The nation is in the midst of disquieting social and economic troubles, and is being conducted by inexperienced and unprepared men, deprived of intuition and without inspiration. In such solemn moments you ask for my guidance. I shall offer you none. You have both intelligence and conscience. I pray you to revere the memory of the sufferings which brought about the consummation of the national unity. I beg of you that momentary incitations should not be allowed to trouble the purity of your devotion to the ideal of the unity of our State. . . . Uphold the unity of the National Peasant Party because it is by its aid that we shall revert to a democratic and constitutional life and extricate the peasantry and the whole social structure from its present wretchedness. Do not forget that you have to fight for a policy of equity towards the provinces. . . . . We have the advantage of having a youthful king of our own generation. We have received him with justified enthusiasm, and we believe that thanks to the qualities with which he is endowed, he will respond to the people's heartfelt desire and lead it accordingly."

665 This policy of passivity, hitherto followed, seems to have reached its close, for all of a sudden on May 14th, 1932, the "Patria" published a vehement attack on the government which may be taken as the preliminary move in a systematic campaign aiming at its removal. This fulminating article created a sensation in Bucarest, and hopes were expressed that this rebellious attitude of the Transylvanian section of the National Peasant party would not meet with the approval of its partisans in the old kingdom, but fortunately for the Rumanian people these forebodings were soon dispelled when the Bucarest organ of the party, the "Dreptatea," announced that this campaign had the full support of the party behind it. A concise summary of the above mentioned article in the "Patria" is given below as it indicates very clearly not only the wrongs inflicted on Transylvania, but also that the patience of the people is at an end.

661 "Transylvania and the Banat have been reduced to the
668 state of colonies left to the discretion of illiterate exploiters.

POLITICAL PARTIES

Eighty-six per cent of the State revenue is being raised this year in our province. Transylvania forms one-third of the total territory of Rumania, and possesses only one-fifth of the total wealth of the country; how then can this imposition of 86% of the total burden of taxation on our province be justified? 661 668

This oligarchy at Bucarest constitutes a gigantic swindle which has transgressed all limits and which in any other civilized State would long since have been blown up from its very foundations, so that every trace of this moral ugliness which disgraces this country should be removed. We do not enjoy equality of treatment with other Rumanians, for we have been excluded from appointments in the army, the customs, the railways, the post, the administration and the magistrature. We are far from being autonomists, but we will ask whether under such circumstances it is possible to stem for long the claim for autonomy. In all corners of the country people begin to display restlessness. They demand that a campaign be opened not only against the government but also especially against the present régime which aims at despoiling the nation of its birth-rights. This campaign will soon begin and citizens will have the privilege of sacrificing themselves for the purpose of securing the return of a constitutional régime. It will be a campaign of extreme violence in the course of which nobody will be spared.

The present economic disaster which we are experiencing is to a great part due to the disorderly conduct of State affairs from which Rumanians of the provinces have been excluded. For decades the provinces have been subjected to a policy of pauperization and political serfdom. We raise a solemn protest and warning that the time is not distant when Rumanians of the provinces will no longer tolerate these adventurers and political mountebanks who treat the provinces as colonies fit only to be exploited." . . . . . .

This overt and frank criticism of Bucarest circles naturally excited a certain indignation in the Rumanian capital, yet independent papers like the "Adeverul" were courageous enough to express a certain sympathy. In its issue of 15th May, 1932, the latter journal regrettfully admitted "it is probable that this warning from across the Carpathians will 661

661 have no effect. Not even now, when events in Yugoslavia should serve as a lesson to us."

665 *General Averescu's "People's Party."*—General Averescu had distinguished himself during the war and on its conclusion initiated a campaign demanding the taking of severe sanctions against all those who by their ineptitude or moral falterings had contributed to bring humiliation on Rumania during the war. His appeal rallied to his side the majority of the ex-soldiers, mainly peasants, and this led him to espouse their demand for a rapid distribution of the land among them. He is a determined upholder of an iron-hand policy and it is owing mainly to his advocacy of strong measures that he was called to the government in 1920, at a time when the country was threatened with upheavals brought about by the dilatory fashion in which the allocation of the land to the peasants was being conducted. His maintenance in office for almost two years at the time was due mainly to the support given to him by M. Take Jonescu, who acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs in his Cabinet.

This group is a purely personal coterie and has no enduring connection with any section of the people. Whenever it has assumed office it has done so by support other than that of the people. General Averescu expected that on the return of King Carol II from exile, he would be entrusted with the task of putting things in order in Rumania. But hope deferred has shattered his faith in his sovereign's capacity of discernment, and at last his chagrin at being shunned has led him to take up an uncompromising attitude towards the Crown, against which he has launched a vehement press campaign. Some of his partisans, headed by his former lieutenant Goga, have in consequence receded from the party and have founded a separate political organization. Goga is in intimate relation with the Palace, and it is rumoured that the Iorga-Argentoianu Cabinet may eventually be replaced by a political combination including the triumvirate Goga, Lupu, and Argentoianu

Dr Lupu's Peasant Party.—This is another small personal coterie which for some time had adhered to the National Peasant Party. It is practically of no importance, but by lending its feeble support to reaction it can help to turn the

scales against a popular government as was the case with 665
General Averescu's party in 1926. Dr Lupu refutes the imputation levelled against him of being an opportunist and has declared on a memorable occasion that the maxim "the wolf may change his skin but not his habits," was wrongly applied to him. His subsequent conduct, however, belied to a certain extent this solemn declaration which he made in October, 1926. It is to be hoped that he may dispel such misgivings as may exist and show himself in action as staunch a friend of the peasantry as he is in speech. Though his advocacy of inflation and of non-payment of the State's foreign debts is a policy that does not inspire overmuch confidence in his political discernment.

The Socialist and Communist Parties.—These are altogether insignificant and unlikely to exert in influence on the destinies of the country so long as they fail to attract the peasantry within their orbit. . . . A vigorous and well-organized peasant group such as the existing National Peasant party is the safest barrier against Communism.

The Minority Parties.—These have been constituted as a means of defence of the cultural life of the various national minorities in Rumania. Once the cultural life of these finds its desiderata satisfied, the representatives of the minorities would probably be absorbed by the Rumanian political parties, as there would remain no reason for their continuing a separate political existence.

So long, however, as the legitimate aspirations of these are not satisfied, their political representatives will not scruple to strike bargains with any reactionary force through whose patronage they may hope to snatch some particles of the rights which are being denied them. It is surprising that Bucarest politicians should be so obtuse as to fail to perceive how indispensable it is to grant satisfaction to the minorities if they are really intent on effectively disarming reaction in Rumania which so far has found in these groups an ever-ready and potent support.

Anti-Semite organizations presided over by M. A. C. Cuza.—Among these the most important is the L.A.N.C. 665 563
group (Christian League for National Defence). One may judge of the moral standing of this individual by an article

665 published in the "Cuvantul" of May 29th, 1927, in which it
563 was reported that the ecclesisatical authorities of Bucovina as well as those of Jassy had refused to collaborate with M. Cuza, because he had converted the club-house of his party at Jassy into a brothel. The paper proceeded to give various unsavoury, as well as pungent, details of the regulations prevailing in this "Christian" League club—regulations, which, according to the "Cuvantul" had been drafted by M. Cuza himself, to the immense benefit of the institution and its "pensionnaires." According to this paper this document serves as a striking testimonial to the organizing capacity possessed by this . . . . gentleman. M. Cuza has been elected as a deputy and early in October, 1931, he delivered a violent diatribe against the League of Nations; a very inconsiderate proceeding seeing that Rumania's salvation may well depend on the League and the aid of international finance.

THE ETHNIC MINORITIES AND THEIR GRIEVANCES

563 Rumania shares with Czechoslovakia and Esthonia the distinction of treating her ethnic minorities with a spirit of tolerance that speaks much in favour of the Rumanian people, who, as most impartial observers will admit, are distinguished by their kindliness and good humour. Most of the complaints one hears of, and they are numerous, arise mainly from the general maladministration from which all sections of the community suffer, and for this reason it is not the Hungarians, nor the Germans, nor the Bulgarians of the Dobrudja who are most vociferous in their lamentations, but strange to say, the Rumanians of Bessarabia. A whole book could easily be written on their tribulations, and as their woes are representative in an intensified form of those endured by other sections of the community, it may be judicious to dwell on them rather than on grievances specifically formulated by Magyars or Bulgarians, as one will thus avoid the imputation of partiality for the latter.

563 Without wishing to cast any disparaging reflections on
642 Rumania one cannot help deploring the failure to take

regional differences into account. The persistent endeavour 642
to create a strong centralization has been accompanied by 563
parallel attempts to choke all natural expression of local life, contributing thereby to the drying up of the springs of national vitality and instilling in the mass of the people a spirit of apathy or of scarcely disguised hostility. Had the reverse policy been adopted, there is little doubt that the various provinces would have fostered local institutions on their own lines, and would have given a better structure to the whole system of administration by providing it with a backbone of local interest and control which it otherwise will continue to lack. At any rate it becomes daily more obvious that the decision taken at Versailles to transfer high-cultured communities completely out of harmony with Rumanian methods to Rumanian rule, without securing for them a certain degree of autonomy, was particularly unfelicitous for their members.

Whenever general elections are impending, the ethnic 66
minorities are solicited by the various Rumanian parties for their votes, in exchange for which they secure assurances 563
that their aspirations will be completely satisfied. The election over, however, these alluring promises are forgotten, as are also similar electoral pledges made to Rumanian electors. If the hopes of the ethnic minorities were not elated every now and then by such extravagant engagements they would feel less keenly the injustice that had been inflicted on them. As matters stand, Rumanian parliamentary candidates at election time serve to keep this wound open, which, with a little more skilful handling on their part, would have had a better chance of healing.

The main grounds for complaints in the case of Hungarians 563
and Germans is the subject of their language. They find that a too exclusive use of the Rumanian tongue is insisted on in the various administrations as well as in the Tribunals, and that their children do not enjoy the same facilities to pursue their studies in their vernacular as when Transylvania formed a part of Hungary. All this is true, but it cannot be gainsaid that the Hungarian and German minorities are infinitely better off than is the German minority in the Italian

563 Tyrol, or the Ukrainians in Poland, for they at least possess a large number of schools and churches, mainly in communes [658] in which they form the majority of the population. At a time when the Rumanian government has been obliged for reasons of economy to close down several hundreds of schools and colleges, it would not be fair to impugn it for a shortage [423] of Magyar schools in Transylvania. The burning grievance, of course, remains the agrarian reform, not only because it has dispossessed Hungarian and German owners, but also because the depreciation of the Rumanian currency has practically nullified the paltry compensation they were accorded. Furthermore, religious establishments possessed extensive domains which likewise were expropriated and [559] have thereby lost most of their revenues which formerly were employed in the upkeep of churches, educational missions, and benevolent societies. This naturally constitutes a source of bitter recriminations, for both Hungarians and Germans are inclined to ascribe the treatment meted out to their religious establishments as dictated by the desire of the Rumanians to discourage their cultural activities, and to hinder the normal development of their nationality by depriving it of pecuniary resources. It is a great pity that so far no law has been framed to define the status of minorities in Rumania though this has been persistently promised them. Such an enactment would formulate once and for all the respective privileges and duties of both parties, and there would be no further grounds for recrimination except in the case of a patent violation of its clauses. The National Peasant party had prepared such a scheme which, if enacted, would have gone a long way to settle this vexed question; unfortunately after its abandonment of power it has apparently been forgotten.

With the advent of the Iorga-Argentoianu government the laudable initiative of creating a sub-secretariat for minorities was taken, to which post, M. Brandsch, a member of the German minority was appointed. He seems to have carried out his duty very conscientiously, as he has repeatedly been attacked by the ultra-nationalist press of Bucarest for his disregard of the superior interest of the Rumanian cause, and for overduly favouring the minorities. There seems to

be a determination in government circles to go a long way to satisfy most of the just demands of the minorities and to avoid as much as possible giving cause for irritation; at least Professor Iorga's declarations in the Rumanian Chamber on Dec. 14th, 1931, can be regarded as inspired by a spirit of sincerity and goodwill that constitutes a sure basis for an understanding. Among other things he affirmed: "We have no desire to create hypocritical Rumanians out of minoritarians, for he who renounces his past and sells his soul in order to secure advantages, is no gain to the people to which he transfers his allegiance, but rather a corrosive poison for the soul of that people. We must not frighten the minorities by an oppressive policy on the part of the Rumanian State, and by an absence of fraternal sentiments on their behalf amongst the Rumanian people; for it is not by such means that we shall consolidate our position, but rather by collaborating with the minorities and by respecting their most elementary rights."

Both the Hungarian and the German minorities constitute extremely valuable elements for furthering the general progress of the country, because, standing culturally higher than the Rumanian element in all domains of activity they can serve as examples to the latter. This is particularly noticeable in farming; the German villages especially constituting veritable model farms which have powerfully contributed to the general dissemination of the more advanced agricultural methods used in Transylvania.

This intercourse between these three peoples has reacted very favourably on the Rumanians of Transylvania, who from every point of view stand at a much higher level than their brethren of the old kingdom. In fact, however unpalatable this truth may be to the latter, it must be frankly declared that the main chance of a regeneration in Rumanian political life can come only through a larger participation in it of the Transylvanians, who certainly have a clearer conception of their civic duties than is prevalent south of the Carpathians. The marked pre-eminence of the Transylvanians over other sections of the Rumanian people must be ascribed to their having been in contact with Germans and Hungarians, though the latter by their oppressive methods

RUMANIA

523 did little to foster their civic development at the time when Transylvania formed a part of their kingdom, and this has been most lucidly exposed by Dr Seton-Watson in his book, "Corruption and Reform in Hungary." Nevertheless, this intercourse, whatever its momentary drawbacks may have been in the past, has influenced very favourably the Rumanian element, a matter that would seem to confirm once more the theory of Professor Wm. McDougall that "the development of the group spirit in general and of national self-consciousness in particular is favoured by, and indeed dependent upon, conditions similar to those which develop the self-consciousness of individuals, by intuition, by conflict, by compulsion, and by co-operation." (V. "The Group Mind," page 165.)

523 662 In general, it may be admitted that the minorities have been more favoured by the Bucarest Government than the Rumanian majority of Transylvania, for the latter, except during the time the Maniu Government was in power, was always in the ranks of the Opposition, and as such it could not reckon on obtaining any bounties, while the support of the minorities was very often secured by the dispensation of various privileges. Even in the economic field the minorities could reckon on a certain financial support which Budapest generously granted to their industrial and banking firms, while corresponding Rumanian establishments in Transylvania were stinted of all help from Bucarest because it was the policy of the Bratianus to stifle every enterprise that had not come within the orbit of the Liberal party, and for this purpose they did not hesitate to employ the most unscrupulous methods.

523 668 The Magyar minority is undoubtedly better off than the Rumanians of Transylvania from many points of view, and this is the reason why all Magyar propositions for offering the Hungarian throne to King Carol II have not been viewed favourably at Bucarest. It is felt that the Rumanian population has not yet been able to rise overmuch, from both the cultural as well as the economic point of view, and that it is still dominated by the Magyars. It is felt also that a personal union with Hungary under the common sceptre of a Rumanian King would mean the consolidation of the

supremacy which the Magyar still retains, and such an 563
eventuality is fraught with danger for the Rumanian element 668
in general, as it would tend to recreate a state of affairs similar to that existing before the war. Hungarian advances purporting to bring about the realization of such an eventuality have so far been coldly received, even those made by Count Bethlen to King Carol in person at Temişoara have not evoked a hearty response among Rumanians, either of Transylvania or of the old kingdom. The Magyar pre- 666
ponderance in urban districts of Transylvania became 563
evident by the criticism with which the alteration of the law concerning the election of advisers in the Chambers of Commerce was met in 1929, when all these posts became elective instead of being partially nominatival. It was then reported that in the town of Cluj the Rumanians could count on only 20% in the commercial, and on only 30% in the industrial section of the Chamber, and it was proclaimed that measures ought to be taken to remedy the position of inferiority in which the Rumanian element had been placed, all the more so, since in other commercial and industrial centres, the position of the Rumanians was even worse than at Cluj.

Concerning these reported pourparlers for a personal union 563
between Hungary and Rumania, it may be of interest to 668
record what a Hungarian paper, the "Friss Hirek," published at Cluj, had to say on the meeting which took place at Temişoara between Count Bethlen and King Carol in 1932. In its issue of May 8th, 1932, dilating on this interview it stated among other things:—

"The negotiations concerning the personal union met with complete success and were based on the granting of independence to Transylvania under the leadership of Prince Michael, whose seat would be at Cluj, common Ministers for Foreign Affairs, War, and Finance. These matters were definitely agreed to. King Carol was to take up his residence for six months at Budapest and for six months at Bucarest.

The independence of Transylvania satisfied Count Bethlen as it would solve the minority problem. Transylvanians would enjoy equal rights and the various denominations

RUMANIA

563 would obtain equal grants, while officials would be nomin-
664 ated proportionately to the numbers of each nationality.

Count Bethlen, however, desired to justify the millions spent on the revisionist campaign and demanded the revision of frontiers, namely the retrocession of the Hungarian towns bordering on the frontier (Arad, Oradea-Mare, and Satu Mare). The advisers of King Carol considered that the present frontiers of Rumania were final, and in order that the idea of a personal union be rendered acceptable to the Rumanian people, all reference to a revision of frontiers should be dropped as it was sure to provoke a fiasco, all the more so since the Liberal party was known to be hostile to the idea of a personal union. The Rumanians would accept the scheme only in case Hungary agreed to recognize the actual frontiers without rectification and in exchange for the other concessions. It was on this point that the negotiations came to a standstill. Count Bethlen was bound by engagements towards the revisionist group. According to his conception, only Transylvania was to remain under Rumanian rule as a Duchy, while other parts were to revert to Hungary."

In conclusion the paper stated that "the interview left painful recollections with Count Bethlen who now talks of an alliance with Italy and Austria."

The Dobrudja.

563 If the state of the minorities in Transylvania may be stated
166 to be relatively satisfactory, taking into consideration the
657 general shortcomings of the Rumanian administrative
647 system, it is to be regretted that as much cannot be said of the Dobrudja, where both the Turkish and Bulgarian minorities, living in compact masses, have well-founded grievances. One of the main causes of dissatisfaction has been the ill-considered plan of the Rumanian Government to colonize southern Dobrudja with Kutso-Vlachs from Macedonia. Without making any adequate preparations to provide these people with dwellings, food and clothing, it proceeded to billet them in the small cottages of the Bulgarian and Turkish farmers which were barely sufficient for their owners. The newcomers being destitute, had no alternative to that of

a life of rapine, a matter which led to bloody encounters followed by mass arrests of the local population. The latter had been further embittered by the State seizing one-third of their lands, no compensation whatever being given, even in cases of these lands carrying growing crops. Such was the tension that had been created that on the advent of the Maniu government, both M. M. Vaida-Voevod and Mihalache considered it imperative to intervene in order to put a stop to the abuses and the provocations that both Turks and Bulgarians were subjected to. The intercession of the leaders of the National Peasant Party caused extreme ill-feeling in Chauvinist circles which fomented a violent agitation against what was represented as treachery to the Rumanians. This culminated in the assassination of an under-secretary of State by a hot-headed student. The Maniu government had delegated a commission to study on the spot the complaints of the population of the Dobrudja and prepare a report, a summary of which was published in the "Adeverul" of March 4th, 1929. In this we read that "the enterprise of colonizing the Dobrudja had been left without control and had become a means of exploitation and the furthering of personal interests," that the system of quartering the colonists on the Bulgarian and Turkish inhabitants "led to an unbearable state of affairs causing endless conflicts." As for the situation of the colonists, the report shows that the ineptitude of the Rumanian authorities transcends all imagination, "out of 10,000 heads of families only 15 had received monetary help from the government, the lands that were to be allotted to the colonists remained in possession of State functionaries. The colonists had no houses nor timber wherewith to construct them." As a consequence of this report the Maniu Government created a special commissariat for building houses for the colonists, 1,257 of which were built in 1929, 938 during 1930, and 1,200 in the course of 1931, at an average cost of 44,000 lei each.

The situation, unfortunately has not improved, and murders of Turks and Bulgarians by the Kutso-Vlachs are frequent. What is most regrettable is that they are left practically unpunished, as has been the case with the murderer of one of the leaders of the Bulgarian minority, the

RUMANIA

[166] late C. M. Stephanov, who was also a member of the
657 Rumanian Senate. The main cause of the effervescence that
563 still subsists is this ill-advised scheme of planting the destitute
[647] Kutso-Vlachs on the farms of the aboriginal inhabitants, proof of which has been given by M. Georoceanu in a booklet he has published. M. Georoceanu was formerly a member of the Rumanian Senate during M. Maniu's tenure of office.

It may be added that the Bulgarians complain of not
[658] having a single school in their villages, and that when they presented petitions for opening such their signatories had
[659] been prosecuted. Bulgarian priests are no longer allowed to be nominated, and those that still remain are being gradually replaced by Rumanians who officiate naturally in their own language which is not understood by their flocks. A lesser
[204] wrong which receives the condemnation only of the intellectuals, is the ban on Bulgarian newspapers and periodicals. Their introduction into Rumania is prohibited, and though a few months ago the Bucarest press announced that this embargo would be raised, yet as late as April, 1932 the police authorities in the Dobrudja had received no intimation of
563 this commendable measure. It is obvious that all these
648 grievances could easily be removed with a little goodwill on
657 the part of the Rumanian government, and to the westerner it is incomprehensible that the latter should make no effort to safeguard the happiness of hundreds of thousands of human beings whose destiny has been entrusted to its hands. For it is not only the elementary duty of a government to care for its subjects, but in this case even political reasons dictate the following of a more humane and civilized policy. The bulk of the population being Bulgarian, and having for forty years enjoyed an independent existence, is utterly unaccustomed to such maladministration as it is now experiencing. It is therefore natural that it should be soliciting the intercession of the Bulgarian government under whose suzerainty it lived until recently. This is a course that creates friction between the two governments, keeps open an old sore, and embitters and strains relations between Bulgaria and Rumania. The former country would incur every sacrifice in order to ensure Rumania's friendship, and

it is most regrettable that Rumania, on account of this consti- 563
tutional impassibility from which she suffers, should neglect 657
the accomplishment of a simple duty that would simul- 648
taneously ensure the pacification of a province and the friendship of a neighbouring State. Even Sir Ian Hamilton in one of his books extended this advice to Rumania: "If she values her life let her make it up with Bulgaria whilst she is in the gate." (The Friends of England, p. 130). But so far this soldierly exhortation has not been heeded.

Bessarabia.

"Twelve years of Rumanian rule has alienated Bess- 563
arabia more than a century of Russian administration," 647
declared Constantine Stere, the veteran Bessarabian politician who may be considered as the mouthpiece of the population of that hapless region. If one wishes indeed, to form an idea of what the combined evils of corruption, ineptitude, nepotism, and inefficiency can bring upon a land he should visit Bessarabia. It is a standing disgrace, a festering sore, a danger point that will cause a fresh conflagration the moment the Russians across the Dniester can divert their attention from their economic plans to engage in world politics. Such is the desperation of the local population, their utter aversion to Rumanian misrule, the pessimism with which they regard every scheme emanating from Bucarest, that if the Russians would decide to cross the Dniester they would be hailed as liberators.

Not that the Bessarabians cherish any particular affection for the Russians and for communistic dogmas, but because there is after all a limit to human endurance to evils arising from such glaring maladministration. There is no hope for any amelioration; the Bucarest administration has demonstrated its incapacity to reform itself, and the only hope there may be of placating Bessarabia is the granting of a regional autonomy that may save her from casting longing glances at Bolshevik Russia across the Dniester. As the writer does not wish to be accused of exaggeration or of being imbued with unfriendly feelings towards Rumania, he will proceed to give a description of the position in Bessarabia by an interpolation of various excerpts culled from newspapers that he

RUMANIA

563 bought at random during his brief stays in Rumania. These
647 quotations have not been specially selected and they may be considered as generally descriptive of what is being said on Bessarabia in the Rumanian press. If one were to study the latter assiduously there is no doubt that a vast quantity of incriminating matter could easily be adduced to form a most damning indictment of the incapacity of Rumanian governments.

661 "Lupta," Dec. 8th, 1931:—After the union[1], the men who
563 were most compromised were dispatched there[2] to work for
647 the spiritual unification of the nation; at any rate they were individuals utterly incapable of understanding the ideal or the scope of the mission which had been confided to them. The administrative authorities were constituted entirely of the scum of the political parties of the old kingdom. It is to these social dregs that the errand of infusing into the Bessarabians a sentiment of confidence in us was entrusted. How they fulfilled this mission, how they alienated even those who trusted us, is well known. Bessarabia was and remains a sort of land of promise for those desirous to grow rich quick . . . not by honest means . . . after a self-imposed exile accepted solely for this purpose. Enrichment being the sole initial and final aim of these propagandists sent out from the old kingdom, they inaugurate a state of affairs which conforms with their pursuits. Persecutions of all sorts, inquisitorial constraints of all manifestations of collective and individual liberty. All corners of Bessarabia were represented as fertile for the culture of Bolshevism. For thirteen years we have heard of nothing else concerning this province save terrorist plots and communist actions all purporting to aim at the dissolution of the Rumanian State. Those interested, created purposely a state of affairs that completely denaturalized existing facts and finally succeeded in imposing their conception on "the administrative machinery of Bessarabia," &c. The paper concludes by relating how workmen and intellectuals are persecuted, imprisoned, subjected to all sorts of vexations by the Rumanian authorities at Kichineff and at other urban centres.

The "Cuvantul" of Feb. 20th, 1929, designates Bessarabia as "the sick man of Rumania." The Bratianu

1 [of Bessarabia with Rumania - Analyst] 2 [Bessarabia - Analyst]

régime had consummated Bessarabia's ruin, and its people 563
were dying of hunger. The irruption of the Rumanian army 647
was not the triumphal arrival of a liberator but the invasion 661
of a hunger-stricken horde. The requisitions for obtaining supplies both for the army and for the population of Moldavia, on account of the haste and disorder with which they were carried out, assumed the aspect of revolting spoliations and led the natives to ask "what sort of brothers are these hogs and these robbers?"

"Our army's attitude was both offensive and aggressive, in conformity with the usages of war, in short, that of an army of occupation in an enemy country. When the time came to organize the civil administration of Bessarabia, very few of the regular functionaries agreed to be transferred to a remote and unsafe province. . . . Adventurers, those who had nothing to lose and who were under the threat of being dismissed or imprisoned, accepted to join in this "campaign to Siberia" in the hope of being rehabilitated or of becoming rich. For a long time the transfer of a civil functionary to Bessarabia was considered as a redoubtable disciplinary sanction. . . . ."

"The Bessarabians have found out what elements we can contribute to the restoration of their former material prosperity. These are poverty, demoralization, political debauchery, a decade of violence, fraud and illegality. Hence the permanent hostility with which they regard us; a state of irritability which is maintained owing to the prevailing wretchedness."

The main responsibility for this astounding state of affairs 665
should be ascribed to the Bratianus, who inaugurated and 576
maintained this system for ten years. When finally they were ejected from office, their Bessarabian partisans began to quarrel among themselves and attack most virulently their former regional leader, M. Inculeţ. They started a paper called "The Voice of Bessarabia" in 1929, in which their former leaders were denounced as vulgar and dangerous adventurers, robbers and criminals. As for their former local chief Inculeţ, he was accused of having retired to Jassi in order to enjoy in peace the thousands of millions he had accumulated by a triple betrayal of Russia, Bessarabia, and

RUMANIA

665 Rumania. The paper concluded by an exhortation addressed
574 to Bessarabians to evict Inculeţ from the political arena of Bessarabia where he had operated as though this region had been an African colony, and the appeal concluded with the hortatory incitation "Eject this putrefaction from Bessarabia."

In spite of the severe financial crisis which afflicted this
661 region, the fiscal agents of the government insisted on
563 collecting taxes even when in years of drought the peasantry
661 was destitute and utterly unable to pay. The methods employed were so barbarous that they provoked several interpellations in the Rumanian Chamber. During its sitting of Dec. 10th, 1926, M. V. Madgearu denounced the abusive and inquisitorial methods by which Bessarabian tax-payers had been sold up and his arraignment was confirmed by similar indictments formulated by a member of the (then) government majority.

423 In October, 1930, a revolt broke out in southern Bess-
563 arabia. The peasants of the village of Baimaklia, near the town of Kagui, revolted and burned down the residence of a
661 big landowner because certain grazing lands were given to him by the State instead of being distributed among the peasants. That similar abuses are current may be inferred from an article in the "Aurora" of June 3rd, 1926, which is headed "The pauperization and humiliation of the Bessarabians," and in which it is related how certain State lands were put up for sale at Balţi, and though the peasantry of six adjoining villages had combined and offered 400,000 lei more than three big landowners, the lands were allocated to the latter, obviously through favouritism. That State functionaries often act with an arbitrariness and brutality
563 inconceivable in a civilized State may be illustrated by
661 the Soroca affair, which is of quite recent occurrence. In January, 1932, six Jewish youths, inhabitants of Soroca, on the Dniester, after coming to terms with the frontier-guards as to the amount of the bribe they would have to pay to be allowed to escape into Russia, and after they had paid 40,000 lei, were ambuscaded and shot down. In order to instil terror into the local population, their bodies were hurled pell-mell on a sledge which was driven by a soldier

sitting on the corpses through the streets of Soroca and conveyed to the mortuary. Such barbarous conduct naturally aroused bitter indignation which was re-echoed in the Bucarest press and was qualified "as a premeditated massacre," and the Rumanian Government was severely censured for providing Russia by such acts, good motives for anti-Rumanian propaganda. ("Adeverul" 10th Jan. 1932.) Such cases do not seem to be rare, for the same journal in its issue for the 20th Jan. reports the perpetration of a similar outrage at Balţi, when two persons were shot down by the frontier guards after they had secured their tacit permission to cross into Soviet Russia. It is obvious that if Russia exerts such a magnetic attraction on the Bessarabians as to incite them to abandon their belongings, disburse considerable sums in tolls, and endanger their lives in order to gain admittance to what they consider a haven of comparative repose, conditions in Bessarabia must be truly unendurable. At any rate the Iorga-Argentoianu Government has not so far shown any disposition to grapple more vigorously than its predecessors in office with this aggravating question of Bessarabian maladministration; on the contrary it has followed meekly in the footsteps of its predecessors. Thus, in the "Adeverul" for Jan. 28th, 1932, we read of a protest of Bessarabian intellectuals who denounced the favouritism shown by the Government for two of its political friends, who, after being munificently supplied with funds, were dispatched to Bessarabia in order to start the publication of a newspaper whose ostensible object was the spreading of Rumanian culture in that province. This dilapidation of government funds in favour of "budgetivorous" persons having no connection whatever with Bessarabia was strongly resented by Bessarabian intellectuals, who deemed themselves the sole persons qualified to carry on such propaganda in what they considered as their private domain. Bucarest governments have always shown themselves incapable of facing grave questions seriously, and one ought not to be surprised at their dalliance with the question of Bessarabia. Their latest device for placating the Bessarabians was to create two new Under-Secretaries of State and fill these posts with natives of Bessarabia. "The new system,"

563 ironically remarked the "Adeverul," "of dealing with
661 the woes of Bessarabia consists of appointing a Minister for Bessarabia at Bucarest, while a Bessarabian whose sole qualification is that of having published a book of poems is nominated to the post of Under-Secretary of State to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. This is the government's conception of putting a stop to the agitation in Bessarabia, but alas ! the satisfaction of two vanities does not mean that the problems appertaining to the region between the Pruth and the Dniester are approaching solution."

In another article the "Adeverul" takes the Government to task for creating fresh sinecures and sarcastically exclaims that Bessarabia must be happy since she has now two ministers. The Government felt constrained to declare that these two new posts would not create a very heavy additional charge on the budget as it had arranged that the Governor of Bessarabia would give up his salary to his new colleague, but the "Adeverul" retorted that if the Governor gave up his salary, he being a general, would draw a pension, so that there would still be an increase in expenditure, all the more so, since a salary had to be provided for the new Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. That the creation of posts for new under secretaries of State is highly unpopular may be seen from a report of a sitting of the Senate early in April, 1932, when Senator Banescu formally demanded the abolition of five such posts declaring that it was a shame to create new charges when the State had not the means wherewith to pay its pensioners. The Opposition was reported to have loudly applauded him, shouting "it is tragic, people are dying of hunger."

433 The dissatisfaction existing in Bessarabia has been intensified through the economic crisis which had become endemic in that province since its separation from Russia, and which the Rumanian authorities so far have done nothing to alleviate or to assuage. Bessarabia was one of the most fertile and productive provinces of the Russian Empire, the latter providing a ready market for Bessarabian produce. Its orchards and vineyards were famous and provided annually some 28,800 tons of fruit of a value of 5 milliard

lei which was absorbed by Russia. Through the latter 433
country an annual surplus of over a million tons of cereals was also marketed, as an excellent network of railway lines connected Odessa and the chief towns of Russia with Bessarabia. Further, under the Russian régime credit facilities 452
were obtainable and a capital of some 10 million roubles or 10 milliard lei was at the disposal of the agriculturalists, while now it is reckoned that the Rumanian banks do not dispose of even 1½ milliard lei for this purpose, and in spite of the fact that the present requirements of the population are incomparably greater, since with the breaking up of the large estates, it was indispensable to provide the peasantry with funds wherewith they might buy implements and cattle for their farms.

It would appear that any civilized government, however 489
vague its conception of its duty might be, would have proceeded to endow this province with a network of roads and railways to aid the population by thus facilitating the transport of its produce to the ports, since Odessa, the former outlet, is no longer available for this purpose. But strange to say, the Rumanian authorities have done nothing whatever; though even the construction of a few short connecting lines permitting a partial reorientation of the existing railway tracks and the construction of a grain elevator at the Danubian town of Reni would have gone a long way to relieve the strain. Even the deepening of the bed of the Pruth as far as Ungheni might have provided cheaper transport facilities to a large percentage of the available grain, which was often left to rot in the fields because overland transport charges, in the absence of roads, were found prohibitive.

Even out of mere solicitude for the safety of the State the Rumanian government ought to have provided means of communication whereby its army might in an emergency be concentrated on an ever-exposed frontier, in a region where a perpetual state of war exists. But even this weighty consideration has not sufficed to rouse the Bucarest Government from its self-complacency. There are, of course, persons 668
who would explain the continual agitation brewing in Bess- 177
arabia and the predilection of its inhabitants for Russian rule by the assertion that these dunces of Moldovans (as the

668 Bessarabians are popularly called) forming the most back-
177 ward section of the Rumanian people are mentally incapable of appreciating at their true value all the qualities which the Rumanian administration exhibits in its conduct towards populations whose goodwill it has set out to win. For the organs of the Rumanian State are inspired by a high purpose, that of converting these Moldovans of Bessarabia into loyal Rumanians, by inculcating in them a consciousness of the collective national will. When they shall finally see eye to eye with the various cultural missionaries which Bucarest has so far dispatched for their edification, then at last will loyalty and love follow, for loyalty after all is but the consciousness of oneness, and it is this consciousness of oneness that the Bucarest "Kulturträger" are attempting to impress on the Bessarabians.

668 These altruistic efforts, however, seem unavailing, for in January, 1932, a pan-Bessarabian congress of all parties and creeds was held at Kichineff, and delegates resolved to create a united Bessarabian front so as to impose on the Government which had done nothing for this province since its union with Rumania, the taking of certain measures designed to ameliorate the situation. M. Batsaria, a veteran Rumanian journalist, commenting on this congress in the "Adeverul" stated that a member of the cabinet had confided to him that this discontent was not peculiar to Bessarabia, but existed in all the new provinces. An atmosphere, which was in no way favourable to the realization of a complete spiritual unity among the inhabitants of Great Rumania had been created. And so long as the legitimate rights of all were not respected, and their just grievances remained unredressed, so long would unity be unattained.

The Jews.

[162] The Jewish minority numbers some 800,000 souls (accord-
563 ing to Winckler's racial statistics, 778,094) who are mainly
641 concentrated in the urban districts of Bessarabia, Moldavia, Bucovina, and the province of Maramureş. As petty trading, commerce and, to a large extent, banking is in their hands, all the more important towns have a numerous Jewish element in their population. The manifest disinclination of the Rumanians for commerce has permitted the

THE ETHNIC MINORITIES AND THEIR GRIEVANCES

Jewish element to gain a place of importance in the life of the community, which has unfortunately provoked the resentment and jealousy of their Christian co-nationals and created a Jewish problem in Rumania. To counteract their economic influence they were refused political rights by the Rumanian Constitution of 1866, and though the Congress of Berlin obtained the abolition of this law, such obstacles were placed in the way of Jews wishing to acquire naturalization that only a few hundreds succeeded in obtaining this privilege by 1914. According to the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities which Rumania finally signed, the Rumanian nationality is conferred on all Jews in Rumania. The Jews have not followed the example of the Magyars and Germans, who have created political parties of their own, yet prejudice against them is pretty strong and has led to the formation of political groups which are purely anti-Semitic. The supporters of anti-Semitism are mainly recruited among students, and the universities have often been the scenes of ruthless and barbarous acts of violence. The leaders of the anti-Semitic leagues are unscrupulous individuals, who by pandering to the lowest instincts of the mob see a way to secure personal advantages for themselves. Thus the chief henchman of Cuza, the anti-Semitic leader, an individual named Codreanu, gained notoriety by shooting the Police Prefect of Jassi while the latter was doing his duty in suppressing a pogrom that had been organized in the capital of Moldavia.

The Jewish problem is purely economic, and this is the reason why student circles are so anxious to impose the "numerus clausus" in the Rumanian universities. They wish to eliminate potential rivals in the liberal professions as far as they possibly can. In many of these the Jewish element has certainly distinguished itself, especially in law and in medicine. Rumanian youth feels that the prominent position Jews hold in society is a serious obstacle to its advancement, and the methods adopted to eliminate this hindrance are certainly not always commendable. It should be added, however, that where Jews do not exist other races occupy their place, so that it is always the non-Rumanian elements which fill the more lucrative posts in the urban

554 districts. Thus in the Banat, and Transylvania, the Germans
and Magyars dominate commerce and industry and Magyar
563 influence has been so powerful that it has practically assimilated the Jews. In the lower Danubian ports and at Constantsa, it is the Greeks and Armenians who form the largest section of the commercial community, though in certain Danubian ports the Jewish element predominates.

461 These facts would tend unequivocally to show that the Rumanians do not possess the necessary perseverance that is indispensable for those who desire to engage in commerce. It would appear, too, that the French educational system which they have adopted helps to foster a contempt for all occupations which are not purely intellectual, and for these reasons Rumanians who claim to have received some degree of education look askance on all manual work. This apparent aversion for commerce explains to a certain extent the 565 absence of a Rumanian middle class, an absence which ought to be remedied, for the country is deprived of a useful steadying element which is indispensable for its normal development. As things are, it possesses a small superficial leading class, that cannot be said to compensate by its quality for its lack of quantity, and a huge mass of almost illiterate peasants that lags far behind. The example of 565 Russia proves the danger that exists for a community which 563 shows such an unstable equilibrium of classes. A solution of the problem would consist in attracting the Jews from the occupations to which they have hitherto been restricted. The Jewish problem in Russia has been solved by adapting the Jews to industry and agriculture. An exceedingly instructive and interesting article entitled "Soviet Russia solves the Jewish Problem," from the pen of Mr Wm. Zukerman, and published in the "Contemporary Review" for Dec., 1931, may well supply useful hints for Rumania. There is no doubt that if the Jews in Rumania enjoyed greater freedom of action they would not concentrate all their activities on commerce, and they would thereby offer to Rumanians more possibilities and better opportunities to engage in trade than they now possess.

INNER GLIMPSES OF THE ADMINISTRATION.

It is with no desire to cast discredit on the Rumanians that 000
the following political happenings related in this chapter are
being published, but with the intent of giving, judging from
the past, a rough idea of the mentality of the ruling classes
and what may be expected of them in the future. It would
be utterly unfair if we were to judge them after our western
conceptions and by accepting our standard of morality as a
criterion. "The moral standards of a people are evolved in
correspondence with the practical needs of that people"
wrote our distinguished philosopher, the late L. T. Hob-
house, in his remarkable treatise "Mind in Evolution," and
the auspices under which Rumania evolved were peculiarly
unpropitious if we are to judge from Dr. Seton Watson's
weighty pronouncement that" the Phanariot régime reduced
the national and religious life of the peninsula to utter stag-
nation and has left its corroding mark upon the politics of
every Balkan nation." ("Europe in the Melting-pot.")
And the Phanariot influence was more deep rooted and 565
lasting in Rumania than in any other country in South- 641
Eastern Europe. In all these countries except Rumania it 661
was a transient phenomenon, it was a virus which thought it
had inculcated its poison deep within the tissues of the native
plant, yet nevertheless, owing to the inherent qualities of the
latter, the scourge was tenaciously fought and was being
slowly eliminated. But in Rumania, unfortunately, the bane
went much deeper, for the Phanariots and their retainers had
come in their thousands and settled in the country for good,
and their numerous descendants form to-day the *élite* of the
ruling classes of the old kingdom. The basic conception of
the State held by the Phanariot was that it was the best and
shortest avenue to personal advancement and enrichment.
He applied and lived by the maxim of his Turkish patron of
yore:

"Dovleten mali denŭz
Yemeyen onou domŭz,"

which may be translated by "the goods of the State are as
vast as the sea, and he who does not help himself to them is
no better than a pig"

000 no better than a pig." If we take into consideration that according to L. T. Hobhouse "the whole system of moral tradition governing the life of a society is evolved from the practical impulses and feelings at work in the past and present," we may easily comprehend that the aspects of social life as revealed by current events in Rumania, show a natural process which could not be altered or deflected except by titanic efforts of re-education. We have no right, therefore, to blame the Rumanians for what we may consider to be grave lapses, but which they prefer to interpret differently, for after all, as A. R. Wallace affirms in his "Social Environment and Moral Progress," "morality is not wholly due to any inherent perception of right or wrong conduct, but is to some extent a matter of convention varying with the degree and kind of social development attained." And this opinion is confirmed by L. T. Hobhouse, who, in his book "Morals in Evolution" states "the instinctive in human morality is by no means an unfailing power implanted by nature in all men to distinguish right from wrong." 461 Rumanian youth continues to cherish the traditional 585 Phanariot ambition of enriching itself through access to a public post; other careers are neglected and looked askance at. They are left to the more enterprising Jewish element, which owing to its energy and capacity has taken complete control of Rumanian trade and banking. Through the neglect of the commercial professions, Rumanians have hampered the formation of a middle class which, more than any other element, is conducive to the creation of stability 647 and a vigilant public opinion. The public functionary class 465 is an unstable element, and as it enjoys no security of office 661 but depends for its tenure on the favours of politicians in power, it naturally follows that it easily lends itself to corruption, and all the more so seeing that it is disgracefully underpaid. In a lettter published by the "Argus" on 16th May, 1932, it was averred that the number of public functionaries amounted to 500,000. (Including the staff employed by municipalities). The number could easily be halved, and the administration would stand to gain both in efficiency and thoroughness by such a reduction. Greece, with a population amounting to one-third that of Rumania, had a

total of only 43,943 functionaries (exclusive of those 647
employed by municipalities. Even this figure was con- 465
sidered excessive, and a decree was enacted prohibiting 661
for a series of years the creation of fresh posts and the nomination of new functionaries to vacant posts in order that their number might be reduced. In Rumania such a measure is hardly likely to be enacted, for every politician must have the possibility of providing the more important of his electors with sinecures, for otherwise how would he induce them to vote for him? This is how the principle of public solidarity is understood and applied ! Amongst us, state functionaries are considered as the servants of the public, in fact their function is revealed by the appellation under which they are designated; they are, in fact as well as in name, public servants. Rumanian functionaries are, one must admit, on the whole both courteous and obliging, especially to strangers, but such services as are rendered must be requited. Since the State barely remunerates them, it is obvious they have to secure their means of livelihood somewhere. Ot course no tariff is posted up in Government offices as to the amount of pecuniary compensation expected for the services demanded; *that* is a matter left to the discretion of the person soliciting the service, but a solatium of some sort has to be given to the functionary, as otherwise you will be made to feel the tediousness of waiting in a usually stuffy office. It is not surprising that such methods have gradually evinced probity from amongst the administrative personnel and made room for a venality which is occasionally exhibited so brazenly as to impel such an attentive observer as Mr Charles Wood to declare " there is nobody and nothing in Rumania who and which cannot be bought with money." (Contemporary Review, February, 1921.) Though the country teems with acts of maladministration there are yet many excellent, honest and plodding functionaries, who are all the more meritorious since they are neither properly remunerated nor encouraged for their loyal service to the State. This proves that if the Civil Service was placed beyond the withering influence of politics, stability of occupation guaranteed, and decent remuneration offered, a remedy for the ills which afflict Rumania would easily be devised. There

647 are certainly no insuperable obstacles to the removal of what
465 constitutes a drain on the strength and probity of the country,
661 which is being visibly weakened in every sphere of administration.

The following article, which was published in the "Lupta" of Dec. 17th, 1931, is instructive as to the manner in which public functionaries behave in order to supplement the scanty salary they draw from the State and which generally does not suffice to keep them alive.

647 It is obvious that no civilized State would tolerate methods
651 which in Rumania are benevolently winked at. There is no
499 doubt that the evil could easily be remedied if functionaries were decently paid. The increased outlay for the State
661 which this would involve would be largely compensated by a more conscientious performance of duty by the administrative staff. For instance, it is well known that owing to the high duties in force, smuggling on a colossal scale is being carried on with the connivance of officials, with the result that the State is defrauded of millions. M. V. Madgearu, former Minister of Finances, openly admits it in his book "Rumania's New Economic Policy," published in English, on page 39 of which we come across this astounding statement: "It has been shown that while pre-war Rumania imported about 70,000 kilos of natural silk, united Rumania registered the importation of only 1,000 kilos in 1927. It is well understood that the rest has been imported through smuggling." On a rough computation this item alone would account for an annual loss of some 50 million lei to the revenue.

But, apparently, blackmail is even more lucrative than smuggling, according to the article referred to in the "Lupta":—

647 "Truly, *smuggling* constitutes a source of big revenues for
651 the State. Not bona-fide smuggling which involves the
661 introduction of goods into the country without the disbursement of duties. This latter sort of smuggling is never discovered, or if discovered is rapidly hushed up with the connivance of the ablest pillars of the Ministry. The principal sources of revenue from smuggling are derived from the hypothetical variety, when for instance an anony-

mous letter of denunciation reaches the Ministry concerning 647
a commercial or industrial firm. This is immediately followed 651
by a close investigation of the firm's books. Though no 661
trace of contraband may have been found, yet rumours of high fines to be imposed on this firm get into circulation. Its owners make desperate efforts to dissipate them. The firm's bank announces that its overdraft will be suspended until the matter is cleared up. The merchant who cannot wait for a judicial examination of the charge brought against him, nor engage in protracted discussions with the Ministry, finding his credit at the bank has been suspended, endeavours to strike a bargain. He will offer 10%, occasionally even only 1% of the amount of the fine with which he has been threatened. The State pockets 80% of the sum thus offered and the zealous inspector who has "discovered" the reported contraband appropriates the remaining 20%. Why should these sums indeed be rejected? Such tactics, when employed by a clever functionary or inspector, will soon allow him to become the owner of palaces and buildings in the capital. Such is the just reward of labour!"

And in conclusion the "Lupta" advises the Ministry of Finance as to the measures it ought to take to prevent merchants from suffering unduly from the blackmailing activities of its financial inspectors!

That blackmailing and extortion are not unusual practices 647
may be inferred from the following announcement appearing 661
in a Bucarest daily on 15th March, 1929:—"The tribunal of 697
Cluj having received an endless number of complaints and denunciations against Lieut.-Colonel Mihai, of the gendarmery, lately occupying the post of Police-Prefect at Cluj during the Liberal régime, has transmitted them to the judicial procurator. The investigations which are being pursued prove that the charges are well founded and that this Liberal terrorist had extorted moneys through blackmail from high class people while he was police prefect in the capital of Transylvania. Those who suffered most from the exercise of the functions of the accused (sic), were merchants, who, if they failed to deliver to the prefect the sums or goods demanded, were subjected to tortures and heavy fines and were threatened with the closing of their

shops and the confiscation of their goods." The most sensational administrative affair in Rumania was undoubtedly that of the prison scandals of 1926, which gave rise to lively press comments throughout the continent and thanks to which the author of these scandals won widespread notoriety.

The following details concerning the methods in vogue in penitentiaries were given by the Bucarest "Socialismul" on May 16, 1926, on the occasion of the reported arrest of the notorious Cernat. . . . . "Directors and warders, seeking to grow rich rapidly, divide among themselves the moneys destined for the prisons. They appropriate both the food and the clothing set apart for those under arrest, they extort money from those better off, receive bribes in exchange for privileges, or force prisoners to work for them. The arrest of Major Cernat, who was appointed Director-General of Prisons while awaiting his appointment as Chief of the State Police Service, is no satisfaction for us. For we know that this man will be as well off in prison as at his home. We know further that in a few weeks or in a few months he will walk out free, with his head erect, for in our well-ordained country a big swindler has never been condemned or imprisoned, indeed it would be a crying injustice were such a thing to happen, since all our rulers have made their fortunes by similar dishonest practices."

The "Aurora" of June 3rd, 1926, reported the arrest of the directors of the penitentiaries of Doftana and Galatz, and gave details concerning the sums embezzled by these worthies. The system of imprisonment inaugurated by these clever rogues, however, deserves being enlarged upon as it is both amusing and illuminating. The following lucid and jocund report appeared in the French newspaper "Paris-Midi" on 17th June, 1926:—

"The Thousand and one joys of Rumanian Prisons."

"Bucarest. June 17th. Major Cernat, Director-General of Rumanian prisons, as well as the directors of several other penitentiary establishments, have been arrested. They are accused of failing to carry out their duties and of having shown too great indulgence towards the prisoners. Bucarest newspapers publish astounding details following on the

inquiry ordered last week throughout all the prisons of the 697
kingdom by the Minister of the Interior.

Galatz, the paradise of prisoners.

The most typical example of these queer Rumanian prisons in which incarceration is only relative, is Galatz.

Prisoners had the possibility of communicating with the outside world on payment of a small sum, but if a larger bribe was given to the Director, which in justice was more important for the wealthier prisoners, permission could be obtained to leave the prison so that urgent affairs might be attended to. When an even larger gratification was forthcoming, the administration would benevolently overlook even an absence of several days. One of the prisoners who had been able to win the goodwill of the penitentiary staff lived practically in freedom in a room he had hired in town. He was tactful enough to turn up at times and spend an hour in prison chatting with the warders so that his presence might be recorded. Another inmate of the establishment, on whom the severity of the law had imposed a sojourn of five years, made use of such persuasive arguments that he was able solemnly to celebrate his marriage in the cathedral of that town and peacefully enjoy his honeymoon. So far as the small fry were concerned, on whom weighed sentences of a few months, they figured nominally only on the registers of the prison.

The pretty servants of the compassionate Director.

The judicial authorities had already protested against Dr Cocea's behaviour, but such sanctions as had been ordered were never applied, owing to Major Cernat's intervention on behalf of this tender-hearted official. A curious figure indeed, this Dr Cocea, who had no scruples for old-fashioned conventions ! The judicial inquiry established that in the prison, the rigours of which he knew so well how to mitigate, this Director had engaged some young girl servants of exceptional beauty, whose only business consisted in setting off by their presence and graceful deportment the brilliant charm of the parties fines to which he invited the distinguished guests who were in his custody. But alas ! implacable Jus-

691 tice could not comprehend this 'artist of the grand style,'
671 who obviously stood above common-place regulations!"

Disrespect for the law is pretty general in high circles in Rumania, for there are two weights and measures, and it is only the lowly who are made to feel the heavy hand of the law when it strikes them. This is due to the reciprocal toleration among the political parties of legal infractions which "de facto" have abrogated ministerial responsibility.

In fact peculation and misappropriation of funds are considered as mere peccadilloes. Interference in this practice is strongly resented, thus, in 1927, when one of the regents, the Patriarch Miron Christea, evinced a desire to investigate into the stewardship of the Minister of the Interior, strongly suspected of having misappropriated several million lei, he was severely reproved and given to understand that it was no business of his.

Commenting on the utter disregard of law by politicians, the "Argus" of March 3rd, 1929, wrote:—

"A real new era, a true revolution in our spirit and our customs as well as in our public life will dawn only on the day when penal responsibility for illegalities, abuses and frauds committed by our rulers will be enforced as provided in the Constitution and the special law of 1879. The threat of penalties will constitute the most effective check on the abusive use of authority and the personal dishonesty of partisans."

As a check to the frauds perpetrated, a bill was submitted to the Chamber in April, 1932 providing for the control of fortunes of functionaries and other State dignitaries. Fears were expressed in the Press, however, that such a bill would never be passed and that eventually it would either be emasculated by the Chamber, or rejected by the Senate. The inspirer of this proposal was M. Mihalache; his party, however, had showed no haste to pass such a bill into law while it was in office.

000 In such an environment, integrity and good faith are finally discarded, for they are taken as tokens of mental dullness, while such respect as may still subsist is transformed into servility. The absence of higher spiritual ideals leads to a craving for more material enjoyments and the latter to an

insatiable passion for the means wherewith they may be secured. 000

Venomous rivalries are engendered and mortal envies excited in the pursuit of such narrow and base aims. Antagonism between political men in Rumania is bitter and uncompromising because they are brought into mutual conflict by personal motives. They are always absorbed in their ambitions and grievances, and they reject all compromise, ready as they are to destroy if possible their opponents, for to them they naturally ascribe the same base motives by which they themselves are impelled. As they are seldom inspired by loyalty and devotion to any higher ideal they cannot recognize that their antagonists may pursue other than purely egoistic motives. Hence the intolerance and bitterness of the feuds among political factions. 662

In such an environment it is the unscrupulous and the unprincipled who float to the top, and by a system of alliances between big business and political bosses that smacks of American methods, the whole machinery of State is attuned to the express purpose of exploiting the masses for the benefit of the oligarchy at the head of affairs. No wonder that such methods check the vitality and the progress of any society within which they should happen unfortunately to appear, all the more so since there is a tendency to perpetuate themselves and become a permanent system. 661 565

Professor E. A. Ross, of Wisconsin, in his "Social Psychology," says: "The men society allows to succeed and to be honoured are taken as models by the rising generation. It is in this that society receives its just punishment when it allows bad men to float to the top. Being imitated by the young, they spread their virus throughout the social body. Not the crook in the alley is the greater menace, but the crook in office." 000

Corruption has been instilled from above and it is hopeless to expect salvation from these upper strata of Rumanian society so far as the old kingdom is concerned. Transylvania, the cradle of the Rumanian people, which fortunately has not been contaminated by the Phanariot taint may perhaps prove the source from which eventually there may be regeneration from below by helping to reopen the sluices and

000 letting in the flow of the great body of people to the offices of government.

642 668 But there are those of course who mistrust democracy and who would prefer to seek renovation by other methods. Corruption among the political parties in Serbia prepared the way to the dictatorship. A similar trend has been discernible lately in Rumania, and among the exponents of despotism we find university professors such as M. Paul Negulescu. In his "Treatise of Rumanian administrative law," the second volume of which appeared late in 1930, we read that "most of the politicians being incompetent, and occupying high posts thanks to party influence, sympathize with men of similar mentalities, and look askance at men of independent character. . . . By the intervention of politicians in the administration its personnel is demoralized, as also by the creation of sinecures for party friends." The author proceeds to demonstrate that the authority of the State is compromised by such habits and indicates as a remedy . . . . a Government appointed by the King and responsible solely to him.

Political corruption brings grist to the fascist mill, scandals and incompetence are adduced as justifying the adoption of another system of government. The following article, which appeared in the "Epoca" for Oct. 24th, 1930, a newspaper with conservative traditions, reveals how gravely the system of parliamentary government has been undermined by the dishonest practices of Rumanian politicians:—"The task of reconstruction was incontestably easier for Rumania than for other States. First, owing to the similarity of race, language and religion in the annexed provinces, and secondly, owing to the immense resources possessed by our country.

Thanks to odious and dishonest party politics we have lived through an era of continuous descent into wretchedness more and more acute. Every party that has acceded to office has left behind it an abyss of hopelessness and of ever increasing poverty, empty State coffers, and a growing disgust in the mind of the taxpayer. Political persons speculating on the naivity of the masses have accumulated colossal fortunes which have been placed in safety beyond the danger of possible judicial revisions. This country, blessed in all by the Lord, which ought to have been the most prosperous

corner of Europe, has been allowed to become the prey of 642
odious vampires, who have sucked everything dry and have 668
even robbed us of our hope of possible salvation. Nevertheless, Providence hath granted the return of our long expected King," etc.

One is justified in expressing doubts as to the expediency 641
of applying fascist methods in Rumania as one fails to per- 565
ceive the dominating personality who might control and 661
direct such a policy; one may also ask, where are the indispensable coadjutors to be recruited from? It can hardly be said of King Carol that he has been able to live down his unfortunate reputation so as to assume with some hope of success such a formidable task. As for his likely collaborators who, presumedly, are to be selected from among the Rumanian ruling circles, one need only peruse the posthumous memoirs of the late Rumanian Prime Minister, Marghiloman, in order to be convinced of the utter abjectness of this class. M. Pamfil Seicaru, who may be likened to the late Henry Labouchere of "Truth" for his fearless criticisms, when writing on the boundless vista of putridity disclosed by this compilation, stigmatized in the "Cuvantul" of July 17th, 1927, in the following scathing terms the leading circles of his country:—"These memoirs form a vast archive concerning turpitudes of a whole ruling class . . . the majority of this class which remained in the territory occupied by the enemy openly practised with him . . . while those in Moldavia offered a spectacle of the most trying moral bankruptcy. A parliament of speculating fugitives revealing a criminal insensibility in face of the tragedy of a whole country; one cannot imagine a more sinister divorce between a ruling class and a nation in arms. . . . And who amongst them can indict the others for their subversion of the national ideal? Can the aristocratic fugitive fragment which took refuge in Moldavia or Russia claim to represent a higher standard of morality than the section which remained in the occupied territory meekly to serve the enemy? They both form two aspects of the same filth."

As recently as May 6th, 1932, Octavian Goga, an ex- 565
Minister and presently in intimate relation with the King, 641
who publicly brags of being the successor designate of Prof.

565 641 Iorga, spoke as follows at Bucau: "The upper class is totally devoid of an ideal, and of a moral mainspring, while the masses are not only tired and exhausted but impregnated by sullen dissatisfaction. The whole body of the State is in a condition of molecular dissolution." And this worthy, who according to the "Dreptatea" of May 19th, 1932, "compensated himself by seizing thirteen million lei on the evacuation of his tenure of the Ministry of the Interior in 1927," a feat which won for him at the time the appropriate name of "Vacuum cleaner," had the effrontery to conclude his oration with an appeal to the youth of the country to rally round him:—"We must change the moral structure of the country, but such a change cannot proceed from the old. We must appeal to the young intellectuals to join in the building of a new structure around us. Their place is not in the building which is tumbling down, but in those which are being built up. Come on, we are sure to win." If, indeed, Carol II has set his heart on saving his country by the help of such sorry individuals, we may well pity Rumania.

PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS:
THE ELECTORAL LAW

646 660 The present electoral law, which confers a premium on the party which secures 40% of the total votes cast at an election and enables it to secure 70% of the mandates in the Chamber, was due to the initiative of the Bratianus who in 1926 aimed at installing General Averescu in office. They themselves had no need of this law, as at the elections which took place in 1927, 62% of the electors voted for them. It is a law that is favourable to groups devoid of popular support, as they can very easily, when in control of the administrative machinery, so manipulate the elections as to secure the requisite 40% which would confer on them a majority of 70% in the Chamber. So that as long as this law is not repealed there is little chance of a really popular party being elected to office, except if it be entrusted beforehand by the Crown with a mandate to call a general election.

It forms actually the great obstacle to a return to constitutional government, for, thanks to it, any coterie appointed to

power by the Crown can install itself in office, with the semblance of popular support, since it is relatively an easy matter for it to win the requisite 40%. It is somewhat surprising that the two main parties have not so far combined to secure the repeal of this law, which is the main instrument by which unpopular governments can be maintained in office, but their attitude may be explained by the fact that each is doubtful in present circumstances of obtaining a clear majority, while if by chance one of them were to be granted a mandate to call a general election it would easily gain a big majority through the existing law.

The present law is even unfavourable to the formation of a coalition government, for any one of the constituent parties obtaining 40% of the votes at an election would secure a majority which would dispense it from the obligation of co-operating any longer with other parties. The only way in which the present law could remain operative would be to decide beforehand on the allocation of the seats between the groups forming the coalition, but this is hardly within the bounds of possibilities as each party would insist on securing the largest number of seats for itself, and endless conflicts would be engendered over the allotment of ministerial posts and other functions which would endanger the very existence of the coalition.

Neither is it possible to form a government from among prominent members of the various parties without the participation of the latter, as these would object to being weakened and would react against their former leaders, undermining their prestige and authority, so that in the end such a government would be opposed by the political parties and consequently lose its popularity.

The difficulties inherent in the present electoral law have become obvious through the repeated failures of M. Titulescu to form a Coalition Government and the only explanation we may find for its maintenance is that the King finds in it a useful instrument wherewith to support his nominees in power. In fact, during the (1932) spring session of the Chamber some deputies moved that the law be revised, and the government at first condescended, but later, owing probably to palace influences, the matter was dropped.

MISTAKES AND MUDDLES

661 The supreme mission of a Rumanian Government seems to consist in providing posts for its adherents and of furnishing means to its members and leading partisans of amassing fortunes. The psychology of such a governing clique is strangely akin to that of the predatory wolf-pack which is held together by the common pursuit of prey which is more easily secured by collective rather than by individual effort.

The mainspring of political activity seems to be the quest for the "odoriferous exhalation of the roast joint," *Mirosul Fripturei,* a sentence coined by Prof. Iorga whose integrity has had the effect of a centrifugal force on the main body of politicians. And it could hardly be otherwise since the Government plan of action is strictly adapted to conform to the necessity of satisfying the greed of its adherents before proceeding much farther. This constitutes a dire necessity, for if the appetites of the herd are not appeased the leaders run the risk of being repudiated and left in the lurch, the main body of their followers hastening to take up a more promising trail.

000 The maxim of "*primum vivere, deinde philosophari*" is observed in the letter. The experience of Prof. Iorga, one of the most honourable and respected figures of present day Rumania who had the temerity to invert the order of this popular dictum and exact of his followers a strict application of it in its reversed form, prevented him from ever forming a political following numerous enough to exert an influence on the political life of the country, and this in spite of his high and almost unique personal merits.

The following casual compilation of haphazard events, as reported at random in the Rumanian press, will enable the reader to form a general idea of the particularities of the political life of the country. No pains have been taken to prepare this selection except that of collecting reports of such piquant events whenever the writer had time to indulge in the reading of an odd Rumanian newspaper that might from time to time come into his possession. There is no doubt,

however, that a somewhat prolonged sojourn in Rumania 000 might offer untold opportunities to the inquisitive for compiling volumes of records of intrigue and sharp practice. One indeed cannot but deplore the waste of so much intelligence, overreaching itself, and becoming cleverness, exhausting itself in mutual conflict, exercising itself anarchically without conscience or social motive to achieve in the end nothing but destruction and ruin. For this reason no surprise should be expressed at the repeated failures of all attempts to form a broad Coalition Government which might have extricated Rumania out of the financial quagmire in which she is wallowing. To secure this goal it would have been necessary to supply the unifying purpose of an elevated ideal, but instead of this only sordid and base aims such as provoke lamentable and fatal division have so far been available, and out of such poor material, an imposing edifice of unity and harmony can never be constructed.

The paternal solicitude of the Averescu Government for the endowment of its supporters. 661

According to the "Cuvantul" of June 17th, 1927, Goga, the Minister of the Interior decided to take a census in Transylvania. He entrusted this task to his brother who was also a deputy, assigning to him 28 million lei. As this operation consisted merely of printing forms, public agents being instructed to distribute them, the newspaper finds that M. Goga may well merit inclusion in the list of "honourable" men. We read in the "Cuvantul" of 15th August, 1927:

"Like master, like man."

"The disciplinary commission of the State Railways had ordered at its workshops a sumptuous writing desk. During an inspection, General Jonescu, who then occupied the post of Under-Secretary of State for the Railways, was seen using this desk. To-day this desk is to be found in the General's house, and has been placed in his dining room.

Since General Averescu departed from the Presidency of the Council, taking with him the furniture, why should not General Ionescu follow the example set by his chief ?"

The Bucarest press was rather hard on General Averescu,

661 and failed to discern the true motives behind this somewhat singular act. The General was so attached to his duties that he felt most keenly his dismissal, all the more so since it came so unexpectedly. In order to assuage his feelings he must have thought that it was best to indulge in the illusion that he was still at the head of the Government. To carry out such an idea it was necessary to furnish one of his rooms in the same style as his office at the Ministry. Whence, probably the decision to transfer the furniture from the latter place to his home. The correctness of this interpretation cannot of course be vouched for, but it will be admitted that it is more generous than that offered by the Rumanian press at the time. The latter, too, showed itself particularly unpleasant towards another colleague of the General, dubbing him "Vacuum cleaner" because he managed to dispose, prior to his withdrawal from his ministerial post, of the total annual credits allocated to his department, although several months had still to elapse before the completion of the year. His successor in office, finding that the funds allotted to his department had been completely expended, had to ask for the provision of a supplementary credit of several million lei in order to meet current expenditure which had already been voted and the requisite funds supplied by the Treasury.

"A new scandalous affair at the Ministry of Public Instruction." The wife of General Averescu secures the exclusive right . . . of supplying the workshops of the professional schools with materials.

The "Cuvantul" of Sept. 27th, 1926, published an article with the above title in large type and protested against the manifest favouritism which such decisions entail and the flagrant viol tions of the law which they imply.

"The Pica Affair" and the Ministry of Public Instruction.
"From one affair to another."

The "Cuvantul" of 3rd Oct., 1926, published two articles with the above titles and protested against the decision of the Ministry to compel school children to buy their clothes exclusively at the shop "Pica." It relates that the price

asked for a mantle and a hat is as high as 1,650 and 500 lei 661
respectively, whilst in other shops both these articles may be obtained easily for 1,000 lei. The "Cuvantul" is naturally indignant that the Ministry should permit school children to be so shamefully exploited.

In the second article the paper narrates how pupils have been ordered to obtain their school uniforms at a particular tailor's shop in Bucarest and protests against the creation of such monopolies for the benefit of a few individuals and to the detriment of the public interest.

In its issue of Oct. 8th, 1926, the "Cuvantul" publishes an open letter to the Minister of Public Instruction, ironically greets him on his arrival from Carlsbad, and demands his immediate attention to twelve different "affairs" which it enumerates in turn. The paper concludes in the following style: "Shall we continue farther? it has sufficed for you to absent yourself for a month in order that your ministry should become a daily purveyor to the press of abuses and scandals. You have done well to come at last. We are awaiting you. We wish you to get to work, . . .with the broom and the birch." . . .

In the same issue the "Cuvantul" publishes a lengthy article on another affair characterized as a "Panama of tens of millions of lei." An individual enjoying political protection had secured the right to supply all schools with icons at the modest price of 600 lei each, plus 25 lei for transport charges. Every single schoolroom had to be furnished with one. The paper ends up by declaring ironically "this holy icon intended to maintain the sacred fire of faith and morality should also have been placed in all barracks, hospitals, and tribunals, for people gather together in such buildings, and the moral and religious education of these people might be improved by the sight of this same icon."

The Army Supplies Scandal.

During the Chamber's session on 15th March, 1926, M. Virgil Madgearu attacked the Liberal Government for supplying the army with aeroplanes which were unfit for service, and qualified this act as criminal. He stated that the guilty party sat on the Ministerial bench, that a com-

661 mission of 30 million lei had been pocketed, amounting to 25% of the total amount of the order. This had been confirmed by the Royal Commissary, while General Hentescu had asserted that there were no orders placed without commissions being received. The Minister of War, General Mardarescu, was directly involved in this affair and he should be made to accept full responsibility. The latter's defence was exceedingly lame. The "Cuvantul" of 7th July, 1927, relates how it had been decided to repair the defective motors of the aeroplanes. After remaining for two years at Bucarest they were shipped to France, where on examination they were found to have deteriorated to such an extent that they were useless. They were nevertheless superficially repaired and shipped back, at a total cost to the State of twelve million lei, wasted money as the paper declares. In its issue of 28th Sept., 1927, the same paper, commenting on the mortal accidents which recently befell Rumanian aviators, vehemently condemns the Liberals for supplying the army with such worthless planes, and accuses the ministers of being actuated solely by the desire to pocket commissions and of showing no consideration for the human lives that are imperilled. The order for these aeroplanes had been placed by the Ministry in spite of the advice of the Technical Committee.

During the year 1929, the press enlarged on the contract for the supply of sanitary material, amounting to 400 truckloads. Many irregularities were pointed out, and the question came to be referred to as the "syringe affair." Such grave derelictions of duty on the part of those in authority have resulted in the army being placed in a state [701] of utter unpreparedness, as was revealed by a speech of the Minister of War, General Mircescu, delivered in the Chamber on September, 1927, and in the course of which he was reported to have said: "We have no aeroplanes, no rifles, no machine guns; neither poisonous gases, nor gas masks; we have no artillery, we have no tanks; we have no navy, even sufficient for our defence. No seaplanes. We have not enough non-commissioned officers; our reserves are not trained; we have no horses, no equipment, no medicinal supplies. We just have enough troops to marshal at parades

when foreigners are received, and to maintain internal order." 661

The Reşiţa Affair.

The Reşiţa is the largest metallurgical establishment of Rumania, and being in close proximity to the iron and coal mines of the Banat, is susceptible of rapid development. Its shares, which fetched 809 lei in 1929, have dropped to 402 in 1930, 205 in June, 1931, and 130 lei in 1932. The "Epoca" of 24th Oct., 1930, reported the following details on the management which may partially explain this depreciation, but at any rate they serve to show on what principles limited companies are generally run in Rumania :- 661 327

"We published during May details as to the amount of directors' remuneration distributed. This amounted to 83 million lei, while 86 millions were distributed among the shareholders. The director, Prince Barbu Stirbey, received over 10 millions annually. In other countries such particulars would have created consternation. With us nothing happened, because Stirbey's dictature is all-powerful. Today the Reşiţa is at the mercy of the Credit Anstallt, of Vienna, owing to the manner the Company was administered, the interest of the shareholders being always the last consideration. Secret conventions were signed by Prince Stirbey who drew tens of millions of lei annually for travelling expenses. The ordinary revenue was insufficient to face such wastefulness, even with the 200% subsidy furnished by the State, and therefore recourse to loans from the Credit Anstallt was necessary, the Reşiţa being on the threshold of bankruptcy. The great Viennese bank has put a stop to the scandalous remuneration received by Stirbey and has increasingly taken control of the Company."

Prince Stirbey was one of the leading pillars of the Liberal party and took a prominent part in exiling the (then) Crown Prince Carol from the country. The Reşiţa seems to be associated with scandal. In 1921 it was disclosed that some eighty deputies and senators had received shares in the concern in order to support interests inimical to the Rumanian State, and these disclosures provoked at the time tumultuous debates in the Chamber. 661

RUMANIA

661 *The Exploitation of the Forest of Bucovina.*

The "Cuvantul" of the 3rd–8th Oct., 1926, in a series of articles, enlarges on a contract passed for the exploitation of the forests of Bucovina on the basis of a fictitious price which would cause an approximate loss of 120 million lei to the State domains. After exposing in detail this shady affair, the author, a deputy named Florescu, asks whether in view of the enormous prejudice caused to the State such a contract should be upheld, as it was concluded in violation of the law and of all principles of honour.

Frauds in the Banat and the Maramureş.

In the above-mentioned numbers of the "Cuvantul" one meets the story of how 280 truckloads of maize, destined for the relief of the famine-stricken population of the Maramureş Province, were disposed of for the benefit of some big party bosses. . . "Of the 280 trucks, 120 were distributed, but only after the maize had become unfit for use; as for the remaining 160 trucks, no one knows where they have gone. But people whisper that three big rats have eaten them up and their names are well known." Another article is devoted to the fraudulent activities of a personage who, after embezzling moneys and engaging in contraband, was, instead of being thrown into prison, nominated by politicians to the post of Prefect of Temişoara. Yet another case of a corrupt and inefficient, but officially shielded functionary !

Irregularities in the Bucarest Municipality.

The "Cuvantul" in December, 1926, published a series of articles giving full details of a mass of important frauds committed to the detriment of the public, and it appealed to the Minister of the Interior to put a stop to the scandals.

The Activities of certain Directors of the National Bank of Rumania.

The "Cuvantul" of 8th Dec., 1926, published a leader on M. Oromolu, appointed to the post of Director of the National Bank through political intervention, and who by extending his protection to a dishonest individual permitted the latter to commit numerous frauds. The National Bank

661

was finally involved to the tune of 40 million lei, and the "Cuvantul" vents its wrath on M. Oromolu. In its issue of 10th November, 1926, the same paper relates how another director, Ghiorghiu, took under his protection the brothers Berkovitz, who had a bank at Bucarest and who committed various frauds and engaged in contraband. Whenever they were found out, politicians intervened to hush up the matter, but finally, owing to the "Cuvantul's" campaign, the financial inspectors succeeded in proving that these sharpers kept two sets of books, one for themselves and one intended for the inspection of the financial authorities, in order to avoid paying too much in taxation.

The Failure of the Bank Cetatea of Braşov.

The "Cuvantul" of 17 June, 1931, expatiates upon the activities of this bank and its association with prominent members of the National Peasant Party, who however are in no way implicated in the disaster. The bank, in order to extricate itself from its difficult position, spent more than 13 million lei in developing a stone quarry for the purpose of providing the material for the refection of the whole system of roads of the State. Political influences were brought to bear, but the onerous contract for the construction of these State roads was rejected by the Chamber, in spite of the fact that the National Peasant Party had a large majority in it. Thus one may come now to understand why the much-talked of Stewart contract concerning the roads was concluded; the tension that existed between the National Peasant Party and the Director of the National Bank, M. D. Burillianu, is likewise explained. The latter refused to come to the aid of the Cetatea bank as the institution was too deeply involved and could not be saved. This is yet another example of the nefarious results arising from alliances between business and politics.

The Complaints of State Pensioners.

The "Adeverul" of 28th Jan., 1932, reports the proceedings of the congress of pensioners. The budget provided for a reduction of 390 million lei on the total amount of pensions

661 to be paid during the year. Nevertheless the Ministerial Council had decreed that the amount payable should be reduced by yet another 110 millions. This was considered unfair, all the more so since the critical condition of the pension fund is due to the fact that a mass of politicians having no right whatever to pensions have been awarded very generous ones, while men who had devoted their whole life to the service of the State ran the risk of dying of hunger.

The Bank of Industrial Credit.

652 The "Cuvantul" of 11th March, 1929, published an article revealing the unsound character of the expedients which are occasionally resorted to in order to secure temporary alleviation for the Treasury, and some of the results of this policy.

"The management of the public finances was so irregular during these three last years that the State was obliged to conclude a foreign loan in order to pay its debts to local contractors. This was not only a period of financial insincerity, but also one in which the conception of honestly meeting one's pecuniary obligations was undermined. The bad example of the State proved contagious to commerce in general. The "Industrial Credit" was created to enable the National Bank to obtain relief from a mass of bills that found their way to it to be rediscounted at a time when the State had obtained the maximum amount of credit from local industry, and when the latter was no longer in a position to pay the excessive interest on State debts which the banks insisted on charging when discounting the said debts. The irregular payment of State debts created other inconveniences. Local industries, to protect themselves from being ruined, were obliged to increase the price of the articles supplied. The cost of materials furnished to the State was thereby very sensibly increased. To prevent foreign industrialists from under-selling local producers, who were thus forced to sell their products at inflated prices, it became necessary to impose excessive protective duties, the burden of which fell ultimately on the inarticulate masses."

MISTAKES AND MUDDLES

The Congress of Egg Exporting Firms.

Astounding details of the corruption prevalent in Rumania were disclosed at this congress held at Bucarest in 1931, to discuss the standardization of eggs, a measure imposed by the Government. No export permits were obtainable without the payment of bribes. The names of several officials who extorted sums from the egg exporting firms were mentioned, and the delegates of the latter did nothing but criticize this Government measure which resulted in a falling off in egg exports by 50 %. One of the delegates ironically declared that the only advantage secured was the standardization of bribes !

661

Frauds Committed by Oil Firms.

The "Cuvantul" of 14th May, 1932, relates how the State had been defrauded of several milliard lei during the last few years. Invoices of all oil exported had to be stamped with revenue stamps amounting to 1.32% of the value declared on the invoices. In 1922 it was decreed that the sums represented by these stamps should be paid direct to the State. Recent investigations showed that there had been a systematic evasion of this impost by almost all oil exporting companies since 1922, and that they would now be fined. Though the State could not recover the sums of which it had been defrauded during the years 1922–1927 (owing to the time limit for claims having elapsed) yet after 1927 the sums involved could be recovered, and these would certainly amount to several milliards of lei.

Other Frauds and Scandals.

The "Cuvantul" of May 16th, 1932, gives sensational details concerning the arrest of a Chief Constable who carried on simultaneously with his official profession the more lucrative one of a ringleader of a band of housebreakers and pickpockets.

In another article it reveals extensive frauds which are taking place at the Bucarest Municipality in the town-planning department, etc. While yet in another column it enlarges on the discovery of a fraud of 12 million lei perpetrated by certain functionaries in the tax-collecting department of Constantsa.

ECONOMICS

GEOGRAPHIC and ETHNOGRAPHIC NOTES.

131 Rumania has an area of 294,967 square kilometers, approximately larger than that of Italy, and owing to its circular form has proportionately to its surface a very short stretch of frontiers, only 2,669 Km.—which are mainly formed by natural features. It is situated between the 43-rd and 49-th degrees north latitude and 20° and 31° east longitude. The highlands of the Maramureş separate Rumania from Czechoslovakia, but there is no clearly defined frontier between Rumania and Poland. The river Dniester constitutes the frontier with Russia for a distance of some 700 Km. To the east Rumania is bounded by the Black Sea for a distance of 277 miles. It is separated from Bulgaria partly by an artificial frontier across the Dobrudja, and partly by the Danube for a distance of about 450 Km. The latter river also provides a partial boundary with Yugoslavia to the south, while to the west the frontier separating Rumania from Yugoslavia and Hungary is drawn through the plain of the river Theiss at about a distance of 30-40 Km. to the east of the latter. The country is divided into the following provinces :—

133 *Wallachia*, which is sub-divided by the river Olt into the
635 district of Oltenia to the west and Muntenia to the east, the latter being separated from Moldavia by the river Sereth and its affluent, the Milkov. Oltenia is composed of a wide belt of hilly country bordered by the Danubian plain to the south, which, narrow at its western end, gradually broadens out to the east into the plain of the Baragan, considered to be the granary of Rumania and extending from the river Ialomitsa to the Sereth. Wallachia is watered by numerous rivers, which with the exception of the Olt, the source of which is in Transylvania, all rise in the southern Carpathians and flow into the Danube, the largest of them being the Jiu, Argesh, and Ialomitsa.

The Rumanian bank of the Danube, owing to its extreme flatness, is subject to inundations and forms a fringe of marshes and swamps extending along the whole length of the river to a width of some 20 Km. in some places. The

imposing range of the Southern Carpathians, otherwise 133
known as the Transylvanian Alps, shuts off Wallachia on the 635
north from Transylvania, the main means of communication between the two provinces being provided by the Vulcan, Red Tower, Predeal, and Buzau defiles.

Moldavia is divided in almost two halves by the river Sereth which rises in Bucovina and flows southwards until it joins the Danube, receiving in its onward course several tributaries, the most important of which are the Moldova, Suceava, Bistritsa, and Trotush, the valleys of which furnish means of access to Transylvania. Western Moldavia is a hilly region very similar in structure to the Transylvanian basin, while the region between the rivers Sereth and Pruth forms a country of vast rolling plains.

Bessarabia is separated from Moldavia by the river Pruth and is delimitated to the north-east by the river Dniester, which constitutes its frontier with Russia. It is a country of vast, sparsely wooded plains, and is renowned for its orchards and extensive vineyards. The southern portion has a steppe-like appearance, though intersected by numerous lakes. It is deficient both in wood and in spring water, and for a long time this deficiency proved an obstacle to its colonization. Bessarabia originally constituted part of Moldavia, with which it also forms a geographic unit. Its capital, Chişinau, or Kichineff, is a well-built city. It possesses numerous colleges, religious institutes and governmental buildings, which form the relics of the former Russian administration and evoke memories of its past magnificence. Owing to the stoppage of traffic with Odessa, complete stag- [489]
nation prevails. The Rumanian authorities have avoided the construction of communications in Bessarabia, and Chişinau, though being the second largest town in the kingdom, with a population of 117,016, is practically isolated, for the existing railways laid out by the Russians to suit different requirements, are from the commercial point of view now utterly unpractical for actual necessities. As a result stagnation has set in, and this maintains among the population a regret for the past Russian régime.

The Dobrudja lies to the south of the Danube, and may be regarded as an extension, both geographically and ethnologi-

133 cally, of the Bulgarian plateau that projects northward to
635 the Danube delta. The northern part is covered by hills, gradually sloping southwards towards the vast wooded but waterless stretches of the Dely-Orman, part of which still lies in Bulgaria.

The Banat and the Crishana form parts of the Hungarian plain and possess the same climatic and agricultural features as the latter. The eastern part of the Banat is mountainous, forming geologically an extension of Transylvania and of the western spurs of the southern Carpathians, while the Crishana is separated from Transylvania on the east by the mountainous mass of the Bihor mountains, reaching to an altitude of 1,800 meters.

Transylvania forms a circular tableland whose mean altitude is from 350 to 600 meters, and forms the essential nucleus of Rumania, both geographically and ethnically. It is encircled to the north, east, and south by the Carpathians, which occasionally reach to an altitude of 2,000 meters in the
[132] north and 2,544 meters in the southern section. Owing to an average annual rainfall of about 35 inches, numerous streams take their rise and drain the region, breaching the mountain rim and thus forming the main ways of egress. The Somesh, Muresh, and Timish, the former two affluents of the Theiss, the latter of the Danube, connect Transylvania with the Hungarian plain and with the Banat, while to the south the river Olt flows through the Red Tower pass to join the Danube and offers the main and easiest way of access into Rumania. The whole region consists of an undulating upland cut up by ranges of hills into valleys, some of which are fairly extensive and fertile, owing to the frequency of
[34] alluvial deposits. The mountains are thickly wooded, about a third of the total area (32.19%) being under forest, and give rise to numerous streams, the presence of which explains the abundance of pasture land and meadows and accounts for the thriving live-stock rearing industry which forms the main source of the wealth of the province. The highlands of the Maramureş, to the north, form part of Transylvania, and are separated from it by the river Somesh.

Bucovina forms a geographic unit with Moldavia and used to form part of that principality prior to its occupation by the

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

Austrians in 1775. Bucovina, in spite of its exiguousness in arable land—about one fourth of its surface being devoted to a variety of agricultural crops and orchards—is one of the most advanced agricultural regions of Rumania, maintaining in certain parts of the valleys of the Pruth and Sereth as dense a population as 300 inhabitants per square kilometre. Its forests are better preserved than those of the other provinces of the kingdom, thanks to the careful sylvan administration the Austrians had initiated. They cover 43% of the region and form the main source from which timber is obtained in Rumania, the river Sereth being used largely for floating down the logs to the Danubian port of Galatz, whence they are exported. When the Austrians annexed Bucovina in 1775 its population was only 72,000. Thanks to their excellent administration and their efforts to develop the country, its population had surpassed 800,000 when it was reunited to Rumania; the increase was due partly, however, to the Austrian attempt at denationalizing the country by settling Ruthenian immigrants. Cernauţi, better known as Czernowitz, is a modern town, beautifully planned and with all the amenities of a western city. The spirit of its inhabitants is distinctly occidental and reminds one of the mentality of Vienna, the more so, since they have distinct leanings towards Socialism owing to the preponderance of German culture. The town used to be an important centre of traffic between Galicia and Russia, but owing to the loss of its hinterland it seems as though struck with a sudden blight while in full prosperity. It has a population of 111,147, and constitutes the third largest town of Rumania.

Table showing population and area of provinces according to census of 1930.

	Population.	Area (sq. km.)
Wallachia	5,542,467	76,583.
Moldavia	2,413,123	38,058.
Bessarabia	2,865,506	44,422.
Bucovina	845,903	10,442.
Dobrudja	811,332	23,262.
Transylvania	3,217,149	102,200.
Maramureş and Crishana	1,387,675	
Banat	942,072	
Total population	18,025,237	Area .. 294,967.

RUMANIA

162 The preliminary figures of the 1930 census do not give details of the various national minorities inhabiting Rumania, and the more reliable estimate will be found in Winkler's "Racial Statistics," om which the following data are extracted :—

Germans	713,564
Russians	174,293
Jews	778,094
Magyars	1,463,373
Bulgarians	351,328
Yugo-Slavs	52,570
Czechoslovaks	31,884
Ukrainians	500,484
Various	404,104
Total	4,469,694

634 The whole kingdom is administratively divided into 71 departments, but in the case of Transylvania, Maramureş, Crishana, and the Banat the departments created out of these provinces do not correspond exactly with the frontiers
161 of the latter. The density of the population per sq. km. is 63 in the old kingdom, including the Dobrudja, 64 in Bessarabia, 82 in Bucovina, and 54 in Transylvania.

163 The birth rate for 1930 was 35 per thousand, while the
165 death rate was 19.4, and the excess of births over deaths reached 278,722, this being the largest figure recorded since the war.

162 The total urban population formed 20.13 per cent, while the rural population formed 79.87 per cent. There were 172 towns, some of which must be mere villages, as at least two are shown to possess less than 1,000 inhabitants. The following towns have a population of over 20,000: Bucarest 631,288, Chişinau 117,016, Cernauţi 111,147, Iassi 102,595, Galatz 101,148, Cluj 98,569, Timişoara 91,866, Oradea 82,355, Ploeşti 77,325, Arad 77,225, Braila 68,310, Craiova 63,063, Brasov 59,234, Constantsa 58,258, Satu-Mare 49,917, Sibiu 48,013, Targul-Mureş 38,116, Buzau 36,115,

GEOGRAPHIC AND ETHNOGRAPHIC NOTES

Cetatea Alba 33,495, Focşani 32,799, Botoşani 32,007, 162
Tighina 31,698, Bacau 31,264, Balţi 30,667, Giurgiu 30,348, Piatra-Neamt 30,211, Bazargic 29,938, Roman 28,948, Sighet 27,684 (French edition of census gives 27,646), Barlad 26,189, Ismail 26,123, Lugoş 23,674, Targovişte 22,482, Tulcea 20,104, Turda 20,057, Reşiţa 20,008.

COMMERCIAL MORALITY

One can best judge of a country by the mentality of its 439
commercial circles, and it is not therefore amiss to enlarge 452
on this subject prior to analyzing Rumanian finance, for it will be found that State affairs are generally conducted very much after the business methods in vogue. In fact, as we all know, legislation concerning finance and trade is often, if not always, inspired and directed by the views held by the commercial and its allied industrial and banking professions.

An outsider would have expected that in a country like Rumania, practically devoid of liquid assets, every possible safeguard would have been extended to foreign capital so as to attract it, seeing that the country's development and welfare are dependent on it. But instead, post-war Rumanian legislation has been distinctly inimical to the foreign creditors of the country, and has openly favoured and encouraged debtors to repudiate their engagements to such an extent, that finally all operations based on credit have had to be suspended. This has had a disastrous effect on Rumanian commerce, for traders are generally devoid of cash resources and depend entirely on credit for their operations. Importers of foreign goods used to obtain their supplies on a six to nine months credit basis, and were able to extend corresponding facilities to their customers, so that these transactions really corresponded to the granting of a short-term loan to Rumania which was perpetually renewed and which permitted the financing of these operations.

Several laws, amongst which that of the so-called "concordat préventif," finally superseded by the so-termed "judicial liquidation," have rendered commercial opera-

439 tions on a credit basis so hazardous that they have prac-
452 tically ceased, to the great discomfiture of Rumanian merchants, who have seen their activities completely paralysed.

426 As matters stand, a creditor is at the mercy of his debtor,
452 and if the latter refuses to honour his engagements there is nothing to be done but to accept whatever compromise may
651 be offered, for a recourse to tribunals would be tantamount
686 to a total loss not only of the amount involved, but of the supplementary expenses arising from legal disbursements and inordinately high judicial taxes which unlucky creditors will have to defray.

[439] What is singular is a tax imposed by the State on all bankruptcies to the amount of 20 per cent of the total assets declared, so that this explains, though it can hardly justify, the State's manifest indifference to the undermining of the country's commercial reputation through fraudulent bankruptcies, the frequency of which is positively alarming, for it derives corresponding advantages from this impost on bankruptcies. Instead of attempting to circumscribe this evil it would appear that the State has done much to encourage it, especially where foreigners are involved. Apparently it is actuated by the shortsighted view that the loss of the foreigner is to the benefit of the country in general, since through bankruptcies foreign capital is transferred to its own nationals. At any rate, bankruptcies have been regarded as a means of raising revenue, and the State as a privileged party has always secured its 20 per cent impost plus other legal taxes, and the debtor has usually managed to alienate a good part of his assets so as to safeguard himself in a very satisfactory manner, while the wretched creditor not only gets nothing but usually finds he is being called upon to make further disbursements on account of legal formalities involved. The *Argus* of June 15th and 16th, 1931, commenting on the law of the "Concordat préventif," qualified it as disastrous, and added: "Among the principal obstacles which prevent the development and normalization of our commerce this law stands in the front rank. . . . it has given free rein to the unscrupulous debtor, permitting him to carry out his underhand manœuvres without any risks, to sell the goods he bought with-

out paying for them, spoliating thereby his creditor and underselling and ruining the honest trader."

The paper advocated a revision of the law and demanded that debtors should be obliged to make a composition on the basis of the ratio existing between the assets and the liabilities, or with a variation of only 10 or 20 per cent of this proportion. As matters now stand a dishonourable merchant is entitled to file a demand for a "Concordat préventif" though his assets may far exceed his liabilities. He is then allowed to pay 40 or 60 per cent of his debts, and after they have been thereby considerably reduced is even accorded a delay of several years to pay them off. With such facilities at hand the majority of merchants did not scruple to avail themselves of the opportunity of repudiating their engagements and so getting rich quickly. The consequence is that commerce has been completely dislocated through the complete suppression of credit which naturally followed. The Under-Secretary of Justice in the Iorga-Argentoianu Government, M. N. Lenguceanu, overtly admitted in the *Neamul Romanesc*, September 5th, 1930, that the above-mentioned law "had permitted merchants, 98 per cent of whom were foreigners, overtly to despoil their creditors." Another very serious defect from which Rumanian legislation suffers is the tendency to enact laws with retroactive effect, which permits the invalidation of contracts, thus creating a state of instability that affects most adversely all commercial and financial operations. For how can foreign investors risk their capital in a country where uncertainty and instability have become its distinguishing features?

Senator Marino, on February 26th, 1932, deplored the disrespect shown for contracts, criticized the State for various measures passed undermining confidence, among which was the moratorium of 1919–1920 by which foreigners had lost some 7 milliard lei, and demanded the granting of serious guarantees which would instil confidence once more. Similar pronouncements by public men abound, for the serious consequence of the present policy are obvious to all.

Professor Flinders Petrie once stated (*Contemporary Re-*

view, January, 1921, "What Is Civilization?") that there are certain principles essential for any community or civilization: First of all, justice; secondly, security; and thirdly, toleration. Rumania unfortunately is deficient on the first count, defective on the second, since security is but the permanence of justice, and as far as concerns the third point she is far from perfect. So that if she intends evolving a civilization of her own it seems to be time that she should make an effort to rise above the stage she has at present attained and from which her rulers seem unwilling to depart.

The disrepute this lamentable state of affairs and its inevitable corollary, suspension of credit facilities, have brought on Rumania have so far left the country's legislators indifferent, and owing to the absence of a critical public opinion which might bestir them, things are left as they were. Occasionally, when an impressionable Rumanian strays a little farther afield and gets into a fresher and breezier atmosphere, he finds his national susceptibilities grievously shocked when he proceeds to embark on propaganda in favour of his country. Such was the experience of Prof. N. Basilescu, of Bucharest University, who, in a series of articles published in the *Argus* in 1926, proceeded to narrate his experiences in London. The sudden realization by this Rumanian intellectual that his country had been "excommunicated and rejected from among the ranks of honourable people" caused in him a salutary revulsion of feelings which found expression in the following stirring appeal to his compatriots: "We must make searching and detailed inquiry into the causes of this discredit and of this moral crisis, and do all we can in order to win back the esteem and confidence of foreign countries which we have lost. Economic, financial, vital interests relative to our country's defence, and moral interests ordain that every people should seek and obtain the assistance and friendship of other nations, their confidence and esteem. Rumania to-day is beyond the pale, and is considered as infected by a most dangerous epidemic—the plague of dishonesty—and the consequences of this will be borne not only by the present generation, responsible for this discredit, but also by future generations. It is the duty of every Rumanian to react

against this national misfortune, the greatest which has be-000 fallen us, and by every sacrifice to wash off this stain on our character, so that we may re-establish Rumania's credit. . ."

Prof. Basilescu's appeal unfortunately fell on deaf ears and caused no reaction whatever. The writer, too, was naïve enough to entertain the belief that by throwing a stone into the turbid pool of Rumanian consciousness it would be possible to impart some movement to its stagnant waters. He therefore, some years ago, published a booklet of social essays containing some of the quintessence of our western social thought, as well as a short criticism of the misgovernment from which Rumania was and is suffering. In order to ensure the distribution of the booklet it was sold for the benefit of a Rumanian educational institute, but, as happened with Prof. Basilescu's campaign, it evoked no response whatever in the hidebound consciousness of the Rumanian intelligentsia.[1] Rumanians cannot plead that they have not been put on their guard as to the inevitable consequences of their shortcomings. Both native and foreign observers have repeatedly admonished them and urged them to mend their ways before it was too late; so that the crisis they are traversing to-day may with some justification be diagnosed as of their own making.

There is no country which has been the cause of greater [44] disillusionment and bitterness to the British investor or exporter than Rumania, and the writer, who has largely shared this experience, feels in duty bound to his fellow countrymen to counsel total abstinence from participation in Rumanian enterprises so long as the present system endures. These practices have cast a slur on the mercantile classes, and educated Rumanians have shown a tendency to avoid following a commercial career, leaving this field of activity to alien elements, to the great detriment of the country, which is thus deprived of the opportunity of building up an independent middle-class, whose steadying effect on the general life of the community and in the formation of an enlightened public opinion would be invaluable.

So it is not merely financial reasons that press for the re-

[1] This was published in Rumanian, under the title: "Essays, Social and Scientific" by the Bucarest publishing firm of Datina Romaneasca.

000 moval of this stigma on Rumania's honour, but also more weighty considerations concerning her very national existence. In the long run no community, however impervious to contamination, can survive with a stinking cesspool in its midst.

426 The late Minister of Justice, M. Hamangiu, in June, 1931, addressed a circular to the judges reprimanding them for their remissness, and calling upon them to supervise more strictly the carrying out of the law in the case of abuses committed by dishonest merchants and manufacturers. His rescript contained the following passage: "The lack of sanctions against defaulters threatens the security of the country's credit. The gravest infractions are committed in bankruptcy cases. So far the magistracy has been too lenient; this becomes obvious from bankruptcy statistics of the last four years, the returns of which amount to thousands of millions of lei, and compositions are concluded on the basis of payment to the extent of 3 per cent to 8 per cent. What is particularly staggering is the excessive indulgence shown in the repression of penal offences in cases of simple or fraudulent bankruptcy. . . ." The Minister concluded by stating that this could no longer be tolerated, and gave instructions for restricting these abuses.

The opportuneness of radical reform in judicial methods 686 is more than urgent since an unscrupulous debtor by force 696 of chicanery is allowed to postpone the hearing of his case by the courts for years, during which time he not only has every opportunity of alienating his assets by overtly transferring them to relatives and friends, but what is most revolting, he has often the possibility by dexterous manipulation of subordinate officials, of making away with the most incriminating documents which his unsuspecting adversary has submitted to the Court for its enlightenment.

000 The late M. Hamangiu, whose untimely death all friends of Rumania must deplore, was a bosom friend of Prof. Iorga and as such fully recognized the imperative necessity of maintaining a high standard of justice in the country. In this respect he undoubtedly shared the opinion of one of our distinguished historians, Mr. Ramsay Muir, that "in the Western view no people can be called fully civilized until

there is widely diffused among its members the sense of their obligations, not merely to obey the law but to obey it willingly and to co-operate in enforcing and maintaining it. Because the law embodies the common conscience and also the common interest" (*v.* 'Nationalism and Internationalism.')

What hope there may have been for an improvement in this respect has at least for the present vanished with M. Hamangiu's decease, for his successor was nominated mainly with the object of placating public feeling in Transylvania, which region did not possess a single representative in the Iorga-Argentoianu Cabinet. The selection, however, of M. Valer Pop let loose a storm of indignation in independent Transylvanian circles, so that one may take it for granted that he was not the appropriate person for this high post. As the *Patria*, a newspaper of Cluj, wrote in January, 1932, "The men who have recently entered the Government do not represent even a part of the population, nor even a petty clan; they do not even form a part of the *élite* of their profession. . . ." At any rate, he has so far not manifested any inclination to follow the commendable initiative of his predecessor in office. On the contrary, he is responsible for the so-styled law of "judicial liquidation," which intensifies all the evils contained in the law of the "Concordat préventif" which it supplants. In fact this law prolongs indefinitely the liquidation of all ramshackle enterprises which were bound to go bankrupt, and puts off the reimbursement of creditors for an indefinite period without any guarantee whatever for them. The *Argus* of April 24th, 1932, commenting on this, wrote as follows: "Serious commercial circles consider this law as a new, corrected, and aggravated edition of the "Concordat préventif," a direct invitation addressed to traders in general not to pay. Immediately upon the promulgation of the latter law one witnessed a steeplechase of merchants taking advantage of it in order to escape the rigours of the bankruptcy law. We shall now witness the same mass-rush of those who do not wish to pay and who desire to avail themselves of this new law so that they may escape the opprobrium of bankruptcy and the loss of civil rights. . . ." Naturally these laws, which annul formal engagements, have

426 gradually imbued people with the conviction that engage-
686 ments and promises need not be considered seriously, and that on the contrary, elusion of obligations is a mundane affair and a fashionable art which should be cultivated assiduously. As a result, not only debtors always find means to
651 avoid paying, but taxpayers also use every possible stratagem to avoid payment of taxes. There are huge arrears of taxes that remain uncollected, every imaginable trick being resorted to by taxpayers in order to escape from their monetary obligations to the State. The present tremendous falling off in the revenue should mainly be ascribed to this reason, as well as to the venality of the tax-collectors, whose leniency is secured by a slight gratification whenever they tend to become over sedulous in the execution of their duties. M. N. Petrascu, a fashionable speaker, while delivering an address at the Rumanian Social Institute in Bucarest on May 18th, 1932, asserted, "we should explain the non-realization of the budgetary revenue forecasts by the fact that our civic consciousness is not sufficiently developed to allow us to understand that by paying our taxes we fulfil an elementary duty; this is also the reason why fiscal frauds have attained extraordinary and unimaginable proportions. . . ."

675 The utter disregard of contracts and formal engagements
454 can hardly be better illustrated than by the attitude of the State Railways administration in rescinding contracts with metallurgical establishments at Arad, Braila, and Reşiţa, contracts on the basis of which these very workshops were built. Another flagrant case of repudiation of solemn promises by an official organization is that of the municipality of Cluj which, after confirming a contract with the society "Electrobel" for a duration of fifty years, and after the Brussels firm had carried out 80 per cent of the work it had undertaken to perform, was requested by the municipality, hardly one year after signature of contract, to alter its provisions which had received the royal assent and had been unanimously approved and passed by the municipal council. The municipality brazenly demanded a reduction in the time period of the concession originally granted, namely from 50 years to 15, an increase in the royalty payable to the municipality from 3 per cent to 6 per cent, and

the right of the municipality to demand a revision of the 454
price of the electric current supplied by the "Electrobel" 675
whenever and as often as the municipality might think fit!

The "Electrobel" had completed the work contracted for to the extent of 80 per cent and had sunk millions in the undertaking in hand. Naturally it had made its calculations for a return on its capital on the terms of the original contract. If the clauses of the latter are to be so radically and arbitrarily altered it is bound to incur a huge loss. Such treatment meted out to the foreign capitalist has had the result of frightening him away for good, though his aid would have proved of inestimable value in helping Rumania to-day to surmount the difficulties with which she is confronted.

Owners of real property have also been very unjustly hit 675
by a law promulgated in February, 1932, decreeing that all 426
rents should be reduced by 25 per cent to 30 per cent, all 427
existing contracts being rendered void. Most owners were already in a precarious situation, for they had built with borrowed money, and the recent drop in rents made it impossible for them to meet their engagements and pay off their mortgages, and as a consequence of this an immense number of buildings were being sold up for default, as the *Adeverul* for January 21st, 1932 records. This law, therefore, will complete the ruin of another class of the urban population, and will impress on the minds of all intending investors that it is as risky a proceeding to invest one's money in Rumania as in Soviet Russia. Various municipalities are doing their best to attract unwary investors by holding out to them the most alluring prospectuses and dazzling promises, and it would be well to sound a note of warning so that no more British capital be enticed into Rumanian enterprises, which have proved a veritable bottomless pit.

The writer also committed the folly of relying on the relative immutability of the law, as is customary in other European countries, and leased a certain site in a fashionable Rumanian resort for the purpose of constructing certain dwellings and letting them, all buildings to revert to the original owner of the site after the expiration of a ten-year period. The law reducing rents forces down the revenue by

426 25 to 30 per cent, but on the other hand, no corresponding
675 increase in the time limit of the lease can be secured, and
427 there is no authority to which one may appeal. Besides, how can one possibly expect to receive more favourable treatment than the banks, which have been ruined by the enforcement of the law cancelling agrarian debts. What is truly surprising is that the Government had been seriously considering the passing of yet another law, cancelling all private urban debts, which, after all, would only have been the natural complement of the agrarian prototype, but this it was prevented from doing by the French financial experts! Rumanian politicians seem to be grievously deficient in the conception of what constitutes right, for otherwise it is impossible to explain the enactment of laws which not only undermine the very foundations of credit but also of property. That this
693 is so may also be inferred from the not very high standing of the judicial administration, which, if the scandals of 1926 be recollected, certainly needs to be overhauled. The then Government of General Averescu, under pressure of an outraged public at the scandalous venality of some judges, was obliged to dismiss several magistrates, including the President of the Bucharest Court, on account of "acts which were found incompatible with the dignity of magistrates," to quote the *Argus* of October 30th and the *Cuvantul* of October 23rd, 1926. Nor can one pass in silence the undignified attitude of the highest magistrate in Rumania, the then President of the highest Court of Appeal, who, setting at naught the findings of the Court, attempted by all imaginable subterfuges and chicanery to evade its verdict, which was unfavourable to him. (See an article headed "When you apply the law, and when it is applied to you" in the *Cuvantul*, October 6th, 1926). . . .

000 Professor Henry Sedgwick, in his "Elements of Politics," opines that "in determining a nation's rank in political civilization no test is more decisive than the degree in which justice, as defined by law, is actually realized in its judicial administration." Judged by this criterion, Rumania must indeed stand very low in the scale of nations, for the law is sadly deficient, as is woefully admitted even by Rumanians themselves. The *Adeverul* of March 3rd, 1932 wrote: "By

such methods the conviction is instilled among the humble 600
and meek that sanctions, and punishments as provided by
the law are only destined for them, while the higher classes
are exempt from penalties. . . ."

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION FOLLOWING THE WAR

At the end of the War Rumania was confronted with a 647
series of problems, the magnitude and difficulty of which
might well have strained an economic organization far more [727]
powerful than her own. The assimilation of the various segments that had belonged to the neighbouring States, of a total area and population about as large as that of the pre-war kingdom, was a formidable task that necessarily demanded the utmost exertions and self-sacrifice on the part of the Central Government. The impossibility of recruiting an adequate administrative staff for the newly-annexed territories, forced the central authorities to draw on their own of the old kingdom, with the result that the vacancies created were filled with inexperienced persons whose appointment was, according to the prevailing fashion, mainly due to favouritism. This resulted in a serious lowering of the standard of the Civil Service, which even during pre-war times had never been distinguished for its efficiency. There were plausible arguments for avoiding the enlistment of men of ex-enemy nationality at times when it was necessary to guard above all against every subversive movement against the integrity of the State; but at the same time the pressing of men into the service of the State who were in no way proof against the seductions of easily-acquired wealth involved risks that were equally detrimental to the State. On the one hand it undermined the financial stability of the State by deflecting from the national exchequer to the pockets of its servants resources destined for the former; and on the other hand, these shortcomings of its agents gravely compromised the prestige of the State in the newly-annexed regions, where such a system of subornation and corruption was something of a novelty.

RUMANIA

652 The first pressing task which the Government had to face[1] was the unification of the currency. It was decreed that the 457 roubles circulating in Bessarabia, and the Austro-Hungarian crowns hitherto used in Transylvania, Banat, and Bucovina, were to be exchanged against Rumanian lei, at the rate of one lei per rouble and one lei per two crowns. It had been roughly estimated that the amount needed for the conversion of these roubles and crowns would be approximately 2,500 million lei. Unfortunately, owing to the dilatory fashion in which the redemption of these foreign currencies proceeded, it became possible for smugglers and speculators to introduce into the country huge sums of these notes from the adjoining States, since the announced rate of exchange in Rumania was far above the intrinsic value of these notes in their respective countries of origin. Of course, this vast fraud was only rendered possible through the connivance of politicians and functionaries, but it resulted in a net loss to the State of some 5,000 million lei. For the conversion of these roubles and crowns, instead of the 2,500 million lei originally estimated, absorbed a sum of over 7,000 million lei. A similar fraud was perpetrated in the case of the notes issued by the Banca Generala during the Austro-German occupation. Further quantities were introduced clandestinely into the country from Germany. Though the original notes had been re-stamped by the Rumanian Government, this proved no deterrent to the smugglers, who with great ease proceeded to forge the Rumanian special stamp and affix it to their notes before putting them into circulation. These notes of the Banca Generala were secured by sums deposited in the Reichsbank, but, owing to the depreciation of the mark, the Germans took advantage to contest the Rumanian claim for the return of these deposits, offering as a pretext that they were in marks and had therefore become worthless.

The unification of the currency was completed by the end of 1921, the State assuming thereby a formidable financial burden which very seriously undermined the stability of its currency. Besides the loss caused by the redemption of these unsecured notes, the State had to reckon with the forfeiture of 315 million gold lei belonging to the reserves of

1 [after World War II -- Analyst]

the National Bank which had been removed during the War for safety to Moscow, and which the Bolsheviks now refused to return. 652 457

Another factor which further militated against a quick recovery was the state of utter destitution in which the Germans had left that part of the country which they had occupied, and which they had taken care to despoil of everything of value that was removable. Production being utterly disorganized, the requirements of the population had to be satisfied by mass import from abroad, which necessarily caused a drain on the exiguous gold reserves. This, coupled with the fiduciary increase necessitated by the redemption of the roubles, crowns, and banknotes issued by the Austro-Germans, depreciated steadily the Rumanian currency between 1919 and 1926.

Yet another cause which retarded the economic recuperation of the country was the agrarian reform, which during its initial stages naturally disorganized production, and imposed on the State a huge load of debt due to the necessity of providing funds wherewith the former owners of the land might be at least partially indemnified. All these causes contributed to the inflation of the fiduciary circulation, which from 4,431 million lei at the end of 1919 passed gradually to 20,126 millions in 1926, causing a corresponding depreciation of the leu, which, from its pre-war parity of five leu to the dollar, passed to 55 in 1920, 86 in 1921, 150 in 1922, and to as much as 220 in 1926. Since that date it has steadily improved until its stabilization in February, 1929, when the rate was fixed at 167 to the dollar or 31 lei to one Swiss franc, or 81.359 lei to the (gold) pound. This instability of the currency that had lasted until 1929, had created an atmosphere of uncertainty extremely detrimental to commerce and industry, and had seriously retarded their revival. And the precariousness of the situation was further accentuated by the serious budgetary deficits during the years 1919–1922. If it be remembered that during these years Rumania was confronted by other serious problems, the solution of which demanded an immense outlay incommensurate with the resources of the country, it must be admitted in fairness to the Rumanians that in spite of the very inade- 652 458 652

652 quate means at their disposal they yet succeeded in achieving a certain measure of success, and notwithstanding the tremendous difficulties with which they had to cope. Some of the issues demanding attention were the reorganization of the administrative machinery in the newly-annexed territories, the complete overhauling of means of communication, the readjustment of agriculture, the reconstruction of the oil industry, which had greatly suffered during the war, and the necessity of providing for the needs of the army owing to the exposed geographical position of the country.

RUMANIA'S ECONOMIC POLICY

186 454 Until the advent to power in 1928 of the National Peasant Party under M. Maniu, the policy of the country was inspired by an uncompromising nationalism that tended to the complete exclusion of foreign capital so necessary for the development of Rumania. The chief instigators of this policy were the late brothers John and Vintila Bratianu, who had raised the maxim "prin noi insine" (by ourselves alone) to the sanctity of a religious dogma. The governments that had succeeded each other since the conclusion of the war, with the exception of the one presided over by M. Vaida-Voevod, were either formed by the Bratianu, or so-called Liberal Party, or by some nominees of theirs who were quite amenable to their views, so that a certain sequence in the policy pursued may be detected throughout this period, in spite of the change of persons at the helm of the State, while any divergence in their pronouncements from the original programme may be explained by the desire to allay the mistrust engendered by the Bratianu policy. The principal aim of this policy was the attainment of self-sufficiency through the industrialization of the country. This found expression in extensive legislation dealing with the development of national resources, the chief enactment being the special mining law promulgated in July, 1924.

382 471 315 The subsoil resources had already been declared national property, and the special mining law, which was aimed par-

ticularly at the oil industry, prescribed the manner in which 471
they were to be exploited. The development of these re- 315
sources was to be entrusted to corporations or "régies" in 382
which the Government as well as private capital, both Rumanian and foreign, would participate, but in such a way as to permit of the majority of shares being controlled by the Rumanian Government. At the same time laws were 375
enacted for increasing the utilization of methane gas (C.H.4) 471
which was already in use both for lighting and heating 666
purposes in Transylvania, and which is available as a large source of industrial power, its output being calculated to amount to as much as 2,000 million cubic metres per annum, the consumption of which for 1930 reached over 503 million c. metres. The methods used by the Liberal Party to secure a mainhold of the supplies of methane gas are particularly illuminating of the mentality of the leaders of that party, as they were revealed by M. Madgearu in the Rumanian Chamber in 1929. An exclusive monopoly was conferred on a group of "Liberals," who supplied the gas to industrialists at arbitrary prices so as to force the latter out of the market and leave this to rival firms belonging to adepts of the "Liberal" Party. All the efforts of the Liberal Party to promote the nationalization of this gas were aimed at securing the economic mastery of Transylvanian industries. A 376
similar law was also passed dealing with water power, the 471
reserves of which are estimated at 5,206,225 H.P., of which 665
amount 735,425 h.p. represent 50 per cent of the force produced at the Iron Gates by the Danube, 1,422,465 h.p. by the tributaries of the Theiss, 2,164,748 h.p. by the Danube tributaries between the Timish and the Sereth, and the remaining 884,665 h.p. by the Sereth and its tributaries. Of all this potential force only about 52,000 h.p. is actually in use. The State owned practically the totality of the railway 655
lines, most of the extensive fisheries in the marshes and delta of the Danube, the salt mines of Ocnele Mari, Slanic, Uioara and Targu Ocna, which are exploited as a State monopoly and assure to it a revenue of some 700 million lei per annum, over 75 per cent of the entire vast timberlands, several coal and iron mines, the gold mines in the Bihor mountains, the annual output of which is about 2,500 to 3,000 kilogrammes

1 July, 1924--Analyst

655 maritime and fluvial shipping companies, the docks, ports, warehouses, and grain elevators of Braila, Galatz, and Constantsa.

661 Laws were drafted aiming at the commercialization and exploitation, either independently or in co-operation with 471 the State, of these State-owned properties, as well as of other 186 national resources. But the purpose which actuated the entire economic legislation enacted by the Bratianu Governments was that of preventing foreign capital from acquiring a dominant position in the country. This policy of restraining the activities of foreign capital by legal restrictions was not due to the fact that Rumania might be imperilled by foreign capital securing a preponderating influence, but mainly because the Bratianu party aimed at reserving for themselves the monopoly of such profits as could be made through the exploitation of the national resources. The direct result of this policy was to sink whatever Rumanian capital existed in big enterprises, while agriculture was entirely neglected, and to deplete completely the liquid assets of the country to such an extent that its credit organization was dislocated.

433 It is sad to record that during the years when there was a 457 plethora of capital seeking investment which could have been easily attracted to Rumania with the object of endowing her with an adequate equipment for the development of her immense resources, such narrow and selfish views should have prevailed among her rulers. Indeed, had the opposite policy been adopted it would have secured prosperity to her even during the lean years which are now upon us. Foreign capital naturally fought shy, and refused to be enticed into enterprises in which it was not allowed to exercise legitimate control, which in many instances would have proved both salutary and indispensable. Rumania's natural wealth certainly provides a basis for industrial activity, there is an abundance of raw material, fuel, as well as a supply of cheap labour, but there is a serious deficiency of capital, which is reflected by the high rates of interest 426 prevalent. Commercial bills were discounted at rates vary- 433 ing between 18 per cent and 30 per cent, and first mortgages 454 were concluded on the basis of an average interest of 20 per

cent. It can easily be understood that no enterprises could 426
possibly bear the burden of such interests, and that if foreign 433
capital was to be excluded it would be necessary to have 454
recourse to artificial encouragements in order to create and
foster the industries it was contemplated to set up. Protec- 439
tion in its extremest form, therefore, was resorted to, and a 477
tariff wall, the highest in Europe, was erected to protect the
budding of these hot-house industries. In order to start a
new industry the theoretical case for Protection is admittedly
strong. Temporarily the new industry needs help, and even-
tually the country as a whole may gain from its creation,
though in the meantime it has to bear the burden. The im-
mediate effect is to increase the costs of the various articles
produced locally to an extent that places them beyond the
reach of a poor community such as the rural population of
Rumania. The repercussion of an increase in the costs of
articles required by the agrarian population naturally
causes a rise in the costs of production of agricultural pro-
duce, which renders less easy its marketing in neutral mar-
kets in which the Rumanian peasant can neither enjoy nor
demand the favour of a protective duty. So that eventually
protection has proved an arm which has turned against him.
In the case of Rumania, most of the industries which have
been created proved to be clearly detrimental to the State.
Certainly the textile industries, which import the totality of
their raw material in the form of yarn from abroad, confer
no benefit except to their proprietors. The raw material is 651
usually allowed free admission, or pays a very light duty,
while the finished article is sold at a price corresponding to
that of a similar foreign product on which a duty amounting
to as much as 300 per cent is occasionally imposed. Almost
the whole of the difference is pocketed by the manufacturer,
and the native purchaser gets no benefit whatever. On the
contrary, he usually gets an inferior home-made article at
almost the same price as he would pay for a foreign one
generally of better quality. In this arrangement the State is
deprived of a very important source of revenue since it
desists from collecting the tariff dues it would otherwise
have received if, instead of raw materials imported free,
foreign dutiable manufactured articles had been imported.

RUMANIA

651 As a result the revenue from Customs, which formed one of the basic sources of revenue for the State, has gradually ceased to function as such. Revenue from this head gradually declined from 9,243 million lei in 1927 to 2,516 million lei in 1931, though this decrease is also attributable to other causes, such as the lowering or elimination of export taxes.

651 Probably one of the most acrimonious criticisms that ever
661 appeared in the Press concerning the excessive Protectionism obtaining in Rumania was published in the *Cuvantul* for March 3rd, 1931, and the following quotation from it is worth retaining as it casts a lurid light on the inner machinery of government:

"A Rumanian State, in the true and proper meaning of the word, is non-existent. For the essential functions of this State have been usurped by certain gangs whose main preoccupation is to furnish their members with money wrested from the taxpayer. The national revenue is annually amputated of an exorbitant portion in the form of taxes, with which the State does no good. The State administration functions from bad to worse while hordes of politicians wax fat on the public treasury. The State administration has been annexed by the party bosses and the public budget has been confiscated for the benefit of the clients of these parties. And when the resources of the State revenues have no longer sufficed for these highwaymen, other means have been devised in order to rob the citizens and provide for the upkeep of these harpies. A scandalous legislation, characterized by a Protectionism without parallel in Europe, and aiming at the protection of a parasitic industry, was voted for the benefit of profiteers, who are intimately interested in all the pec 'niary calculations of the politicians. Under the aegis of this Protectionism the most rapacious trusts flourish to-day in Rumania and exploit the consumer. Instead of aiding agriculture, the latter has been dislocated and ruined by the extreme favours lavished on this artificial industry, and all this for the sole purpose of satisfying the exorbitant pretensions of the industrial bandits, who have known how to turn governments and parliaments into docile instruments for fleecing the consumer. . . ."

That the extreme Protectionism adopted by Rumania is

+ That the extreme Protectionism adopted in Rumania is

not approved by the public may also be seen from the following excerpts culled from an article published by the same paper on May 15th, 1932: "There is a profound difference between industries which utilize local raw materials and such pseudo-industries which import from abroad semi-manufactured materials and finish them off in this country. . . . The importation of semi-manufactured goods is in the great majority of cases carried on solely to evade the Customs tariffs, and if we do not see things as they are, this is on account of private interests, for the sake of which we allow a prejudicial system to continue to function. . . ." 651 661 429.

The *Argus*, too, several times attempted to call public attention to the nefarious results of the policy of bolstering up artificial industries, and especially in the case of the textile industry, on which it wrote as follows: "Why are clothing materials so costly? Because our protected textile industry sells its products at the same price as the goods imported from abroad. The encouragement given to the textile industry has resulted in increasing the cost of wearing apparel because industrialists are not content with a reasonable profit, and as a result a woollen suit to-day is a luxury. When our Custom tariff is to be revised the interests of industrialists alone should not be considered, but also those of the consumers."

As one may infer from the above, this policy of industrialization was a wild scheme which materialized on a large scale, chiefly because various politicians had been directly interested in the manufacturing concerns which had been started. 661 [651] 289 477

The case of the paper industry may be cited as an example. All the paper mills belonged to or were controlled by friends or relatives of the Bratianus. In order to secure big profits an import duty of 50 per cent was placed on paper, creating thereby a virtual monopoly of the paper trade on behalf of the owners of the mills. As they could dictate their will to the Chamber, the high duty was maintained in spite of the protest of the Opposition. For not only the public at large suffered by the high price of such an essential commodity as paper, but political interests were equally affected. Opposition parties had to pay high prices

661 for the paper necessary for their pamphlets and newspapers,
477 while the Bratianus' Press organs naturally enjoyed pre-
[289] ferential rates. Another deplorable result of this monopoly was the high cost of books. The same book published in
[212] Bulgaria cost about half as much as in Rumania, and this explains to some extent the high percentage of illiterates in the latter country, which according to the *Lupta* of May 18th, 1932 reached as high a percentage as 70 per cent of the
433 total population. The creation of industries, the raw material of which is not indigenous, is likely in the long run to prove extremely wasteful. They are clearly of a parasitic nature, and their maintenance will not only continue to be a charge on the Revenue but is likely to continue to handicap very seriously Rumania's staple industry, agriculture. The initial costs of installation are necessarily high, for foreign experts have to be called in to set up the machinery, supervise, and train the native workpeople, since there is a lack of experienced workmen. Moreover the stringency of monetary resources and the high rates of interest ruling necessitate a high return on capital that can be secured only by selling the manufactured article at the highest possible price, a level which is usually fixed by the cost of the corresponding foreign article, on which a heavy duty has been imposed. The high prices will forcibly curtail output since the latter is adjusted to the capacity of the local market, the possibilities of which are restrained owing to the low buying power of the peasantry. The more consumption is reduced the more manufacturers will endeavour to recoup themselves by further raising their prices, which can be attained only by increasing the protective duty. Thus a vicious circle is created, to the great disadvantage of the peasantry, who
[162] constitute 80 per cent of the population and who have to defray in the same proportion the expenses of these experimental attempts to industrialize Rumania. It is obvious that the high prices paid by the peasantry for manufactured articles affect adversely the cost of agricultural produce; even the transport rates of the latter stand high in order to compensate for the low preferential rates granted to local manufactures. One need not, therefore, be surprised if Rumanian agriculturalists can no longer market their pro-

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

duce remuneratively on the basis of present world prices. 433 At first sight it would appear that the simplest solution would be the abandonment of the present policy. An alleviation of the burden imposed on the peasantry would reduce drastically their costs of production and would better enable them to adjust the price of their produce to the prevailing world prices. If capital were withdrawn from industry and applied instead to the improvement of the means of cultivation, or to the diversification and intensification of agricultural production, Rumanian agricultural produce would be in a better position than at present to meet competition in neutral markets. It is true that as a result of the present tendency among industrial states to develop their own agricultural resources, and to curtail imports of agricultural produce by raising their tariff barriers, agrarian countries find it increasingly difficult to market their produce. Yet there is a possibility for the latter to secure regular markets if they would give up in exchange their attempts at general industrialization; and it is surprising that so far no understanding has been arrived at on these lines between industrial and agricultural countries, both parties persisting in a policy that is mutually ruining them. The adherents of the policy [184] of industrialization partly explain their attitude by the necessity of severing all connection with former enemy states like Hungary, since the latter country would use commercial intercourse to further its irredentist propaganda in the territory which has reverted to Rumania. It is also partly explained by the necessity of making the country as self-supporting as possible so as to render it independent of foreign help in case of another war. So military considerations also tend to intensify economic nationalism, and as the military are fairly powerful and can make themselves heard there is little hope of a change in the policy which is being pursued. This policy of economic nationalism seems therefore to be, on the one hand, the direct outcome of the unbridled nationalism actually existing, and on the other, the result of a surreptitious understanding between politicians and profiteers to despoil the public, as the *Cuvantul* points out in the article quoted a little higher.

There are of course men of independent character who 000

view this question from another angle, in whose conception political and economic domination have become identified and to whom the policy of economic nationalism appears to offer the best safeguard for their country's independence. Industrialization has also certain partisans, who draw their arguments in its favour from rational grounds. Their most vociferous spokesman appears to be M. Manoilescu, a former Sub-Secretary of State in General Averescu's Cabinet in 1926, and later a member of the National Peasant Government and subsequently that of M. M. Iorga-Argentoianu. He withdrew from this post in order to secure a more stable office, that of the Director of the National Bank. He seems to have made a miscalculation, however, as he fell out with M. Argentoianu, the Minister of Finances, and had to give up his situation, not without protests and a lawsuit. M. Manoilescu was Rumanian delegate at the Second International Economic Conference held in Geneva in 1930, in the course of which he set forth the disadvantages under which agricultural States laboured in comparison with industrial communities, and emphasized the advantages which the former would derive by attempting to industrialize themselves. His arguments were based on the following [433] figures he himself cited: The output of an industrial worker, after making allowances for the cost of raw materials, is roughly 3,600 Swiss francs or 720 dollars per annum. On the other hand, the net output per annum of an agricultural worker cultivating cereals in Central and Eastern Europe is only 600 Swiss francs or 120 dollars, that is six times less. It is easy to deduce from these figures the advantages that a State would derive by abandoning agriculture and diverting the energy of its citizens to industry, especially when one makes light of the attendant difficulties. National income would increase six-fold, and prosperity would *ipso facto* ensue.

M. Manoilescu has recently published a book invoking various specious arguments in favour of the policy of extreme industrialization. He undoubtedly possesses a versatile mind and a surprising ability to twist figures and facts in support of his thesis, a faculty which tallies with the intellectual agility he has displayed in adapting his political con-

victions to those of the prevailing party in power, but with all the extreme brilliancy of his argumentation he will hardly shake the convictions at which one arrives concerning the results of Protectionism in Rumania, and which may best be summarized in J. Novicov'c pronouncement on the subject: "*Le système protecteur est une spoliation mutuelle autorisée par la loi . . . il est non seulement une spoliation mutuelle des citoyens d'un même pays, mais une spoliation mutuelle des citoyens de tous les pays. . . . Tout gaspillage dans les frais de production diminue la masse des richesses existantes et par consequent la masse du bien-être general. . . .*" (*Luttes entre Sociétés humaines*, p. 208.)

In a lecture M. Manoilescu delivered in Bucarest during January, 1932, under the auspices of the Rumanian Social Institute, he still harped on his favourite theme, namely, that Rumania was exchanging the labour of 600,000 men engaged in agriculture for that of 60,000 men engaged in industry and that this was the source of Rumania's wretchedness. The Russian Five-Year Plan seems to have been obsessing his fancy, for he exhorted his audience "to draw inspiration from the methods of others so as to apply them in their own midst under a controlled economic system," assuring them that "the industrialization of Rumania would invigorate its agriculture to such an extent that the latter would be able to absorb the products of its industry. . . ." According to him an agricultural people could develop only if it pursued the fostering of its agriculture parallel with its industry, as had been demonstrated by the example of Russia. It is difficult to gauge the impression created on Rumanian intellectuals by M. Manoilescu's fine spun and twisted logic, but his advocacy of applying Russian nationalization methods to Rumania is undoubtedly an example of the attraction the former country is beginning to exert in the Near East, and the gradual dispelling of the misgivings that were once entertained about Russia's economic future.

STATE FINANCES

On the attainment of her independence Rumania was obliged to endow her economic organization with the necessary equipment. Owing to the primitive economic condition

652 in which she subsisted it was impossible for her to provide out of her budget the requisite means for the construction of roads and railways, ports, etc., and she therefore began to seek foreign loans in order to finance these productive works, which of course could yield no returns for some years. The State budget, therefore, was burdened at first with heavy charges on these loans while it derived no corresponding revenue from the expenditure involved. This will explain why, up to 1905, the budgets closed usually with a deficit. From 1905 to 1914, however, the situation changed, and every year showed a surplus varying from 41 to 110 million gold lei, a sum that represented about one-fifth of the total budget revenue. This favourable state of affairs naturally changed radically after the war. For the period 1919 to 1922, though the budgets did not contain any provisions for the service of the national debt, they nevertheless showed an excess of expenditure over revenue that was alarming. These budgetary deficits were covered by an increase in the fiduciary circulation that naturally tended to depress still further the value of the national currency. The steady depreciation of the leu rendered the balancing of the budget an exceedingly difficult process, as it was impossible to estimate beforehand the exact amount of expenditure which increased as the leu fell, seeing that the State had to make payments abroad in gold, while the revenue was also adversely affected owing to the losses suffered by tradesmen through currency depreciation and its inevitable corollaries—curtailment of credit and abnormally high rates of interest.

From 1923 onwards the Liberal Party attempted to put some order in the national finances, and by a drastic policy of compression it managed apparently to balance the budgets. There were many who condemned this policy of excessive economy that tended to cut down all expenses, even on items that were essential for the development of the country's resources.

The Bratianus' economic policy was inspired by two main principles. One was doing without foreign aid, and the other that of achieving the revalorization of the leu, two aims that mutually excluded one another. The revalorization of the leu was to be achieved by balancing the budget, and the

method adopted was to cut down expenditure indiscriminately. Essential credits for the maintenance and repairing of roads and railways were drastically curtailed until the means of communication became almost useless. The salaries of State functionaries were reduced to an extent which no longer sufficed to keep them alive, and consequently the public service became completely disorganized and corrupted, for the functionaries had, after all, to make up for the inadequacy of their emoluments either by indulging in peculations or by accepting bribes. The rabid xenophobia of the Bratianus was in no way shared by the thinking public, as may be inferred from the following article published by the *Argus* while they were in office:

"From our first appearance in history until the present moment we have done nothing but change masters, and nevertheless we have not perished. Why should we not appeal for help to the capital reserves of civilized States so that we may raise ourselves to their level? Instead of copying Western civilization we have, after the war, pursued an economic policy which has placed us in a situation parallel to that of Russia. We have broken up the large estates in order to create small rural holdings without practically indemnifying the owners. In Russia the same thing was done without any indemnity being paid. We have severed our commercial relations with Germany without creating new ones. We have placed the control of the nation's economic life in the hands of the State. We have concentrated public wealth in the hands of a minority. We have disorganized the system of transport. All these measures have been applied in one form or another in Russia, but nowhere else in civilized Europe. We are determined partisans of Western civilization as we are conscious of the necessity of orientating ourselves after the ideals of the West and not those of the East. The policy of abusing and vilipending foreign capital is due to a misunderstanding. The modernization of our State with the aid of foreign capital is an indispensable and vital necessity. The economic decadence of our people brought about through this policy of isolation will bring about the decadence of the State organism. A weak State will not secure immunity from the Bolshevik bacillus. If we

652 do not assimilate our conditions and life to those of the West we shall be forced to assimilate them to those ruling in the East. We must emphatically reject such an ideal. . . ."

By 1928 this policy had brought the country to a complete deadlock, and foreign financial aid had to be appealed to in order to get it out of the *impasse* into which it had been driven. Not only trade and industry had been brought to a standstill, but the public treasury was also in desperate straits through the disorder and dissimulation that had been practised. The much-advertised budget surpluses of 1924 and 1925 were found out to be fictitious, and instead they left a deficit of three and a half milliard lei to be dealt with, while the year 1928 was threatening to close with a deficit of 6½ milliards.

The National Peasant Party which came to power at the end of 1928 secured two foreign loans in 1929 and 1931, of a total amount of 24 milliard lei. They were used up in the stabilization of the currency, the paying off of pressing debts, and the liquidation of budgetary deficits, while a small part was earmarked for the improvement of the railways. Owing to the prevailing maladministration, the loans failed to restore the economic situation of the country, and, as the *Argus* of May 6th, 1932, declared, "to-day, barely three years since we contracted the loan of 1929, we are as badly off as we were before we borrowed the money, for we have to face 6½ milliards of deficits due to our bad management. . . ." The situation, unhappily, is far worse than may be inferred from the above statement. For the policy of dissimulation and insincerity in public accounts which was constantly practised, in order to conceal expenditure of public money on unjustifiable purposes, has led to an accumulation of a huge deficit of some 21 milliard lei. Thus, between the budget revenue forecasts and the actual receipts there is a tremendous deficit of 6,583 millions in 1928, 682 millions in 1929, 6,295 millions in 1930, and 7,370 millions in 1931, and it may be added that the current year 1932 will also close with a deficit of at least some 6½ milliard lei. This policy of making exaggerated revenue forecasts was dictated by the desire to justify expenditure on certain heads of the budget which might have been reduced or suppressed.

STATE FINANCES

It is true that a drastic retrenchment was effected in the expenditure of 1931, and that the whole 35,305 millions provided for were not spent, so that the difference of 7,370 millions between the revenue forecast and the actual revenue will not correspond to the real deficit for that year, which will be smaller than that figure. The 1928 budget deficit, too, was partly covered by the proceeds of the 1929 loan, but these modifications will hardly alter the desperate situation which the Rumanian Exchequer has reached, and owing to which the salaries of State functionaries are in many cases seven months in arrears. For besides the budget deficits, there are some 10 milliard lei which the State owes to contractors, outstanding Treasury bills of an approximate value of one milliard, and various sums the Exchequer has borrowed from autonomous public institutions such as the Pensioners' Fund, Savings Banks, Chambers of Commerce, in order to face certain pressing needs. No real estimate of these sums can be made owing to the unparalleled confusion reigning in the public accounts, which are deliberately doctored in order to cover up the malversations and the continuous dissipation of public money. What is even more serious is the multiform nature of the guarantees the State has given concerning the debts contracted by the various autonomous administrations such as that of the Monopolies, the Railways, etc., as well as the charges it has explicitly assumed towards other establishments. Thus it is estimated that the guarantee extended to the National Bank, securing it against losses through the application of the law concerning the cancellation of agrarian debts will involve the State in a loss of at least some 5 milliard lei, and this is not the only loss the State will incur on this head, for similar commitments were entered into with various other establishments. Such squandering of public funds and such utter disregard of the consequences of this phenomenal profligacy have certainly no counterpart among European nations, and they clearly show that the only hope of salving the country is to place its finances under a rigorous and severe foreign control. For no party has proved itself immune from this mania of squandering the national patrimony. In fact it would be strange and something bordering on the miraculous if any

did so, for by nature the Rumanian is a jolly wastrel, and economy is foreign to his idiosyncrasy. If Rumanian finances during a brief period prior to the war were on a sound basis, this must be attributed to the energetic supervision of the late King Charles I, who would tolerate no nonsense on this head.

THE BUDGET, NATIONAL REVENUE, & PUBLIC DEBT

1931 BUDGET.

	Lei.
Revenue:	
Direct taxation	9,310,000,000
Indirect taxation: Customs	4,575,000,000
Alcohol and spirituous liquors	1,250,000.000
Other consumption taxes	2,589,960,546
Turnover tax	2,000,000,000
Theatres, etc.	100,000,000
Stamp and registration fees	4,150,000,000
Surplus from Monopolies and State commercial enterprises	5,477,917,747
Exploitation of State properties	767,500,522
Ministry of Finance	850,583,674
,, the Interior	37,988,000
,, Justice	146,950,000
,, Foreign Affairs	70,000,000
,, Agriculture and Domains	196,490,000
,, Labour, Health and Social Welfare	24,262,476
,, Industry and Commerce	167,370,000
,, the Army	124,269,352
,, Public Works and Communications	12,650,000
,, Education and Cults	29,011,354
Total	31,879,953,671
Sum resulting from reduction of salaries of employees at the Ministries, Monopolies and State Enterprises	3,426,000,000
Grand total	35,305,953,671

	Lei
Expenditure:	
Ministry of Finance	12,289,590,039
,, the Interior	1,716,234,526
,, Justice	1,314,876,270
,, Foreign Affairs	262,140,000
,, Agriculture and Domains	919,680,116
,, abour, Health and Public Welfare	1,267,659,541
,, Industry and Commerce	405,028,771
,, War	10,204,029,661
,, Public Works and Communications	131,857,420
,, Education and Cults	6,419,666,327
Presidency of the Council of Ministers	75,191,000
Total	35,005,953,671
Fund for extraordinary and supplementary credits	300,000,000
Grand total	35,305,953,671

BUDGET AND NATIONAL REVENUE

The forecasts for the revenue were not realized, revenue receipts for the year 1931 attaining 27,616 millions, from which 2718 millions should be deducted as this sum was obtained by a curtailment in the salaries of officials. The 1932 budget was prepared on the basis of the revenue receipts for 1931, since it had become evident that this yield would not be exceeded. It is balanced at the approximate figure of 24½ milliard lei. The forecasts for the revenue, however, have so far not been realized, the first five months having yielded only 6,700 millions. Owing to the serious decrease in the revenue receipts it was decided that a sufficient sum should be set aside each month to meet the requirements of the debt service, and the balance only would be distributed to the various ministries to allow them to face their most urgent necessities. In consequence, strict orders were issued that no expenses were to be incurred beyond the sum thus available. During the first months of the year some 1,250 millions were thus allocated monthly for the purpose of paying salaries and pensions, 505 millions were earmarked for the public debt, and another 250 millions were assigned for the purchase of materials, etc., but owing to the continuous diminution of the revenue even this very limited expenditure cannot be maintained, and the administration has been obliged to suspend the payment of salaries, which in certain cases are seven months in arrears.

The above budget figures do not show the total amount of State expenditure, for there are autonomous administrations which have independent budgets of their own, as, for instance, the railways, post office, monopolies, etc., and only the net results of the operation of these autonomous administrations are included in the budgets. The total amount of these autonomous budgets for 1931 was 21,888,333,272 lei. At the same time the grand total of the budgets of these administrations and that of the State for the year 1932 amounts to about 52 milliard lei. The service of the public debt for 1932 absorbs 6,764 millions, which does not seem to be a disproportionate charge as compared with a grand total public expenditure of 52 milliards, all the more so seeing that 2,150 millions are payable by the autonomous administrations of the monopolies on account of the service of

652 the loans concluded in 1929 and 1931, and some 930 millions are for the service of the internal debt.

The national revenue for the years 1926–1928 was computed at an average of 171 milliard lei annually, of which 110 milliards, or 64 per cent, were contributed by agriculture. The revenue *per capita* was computed at 9,709 for 1927, 11,324 for 1928, 10,400 for 1929, 7,875 for 1930, and at only 5,523 lei for 1931, the fall recorded being due to the drop in the prices of raw materials. State expenditure, as represented by the budget for 1931, absorbs approximately 25 per cent of the national revenue, but this is not the only expenditure which has to be faced. Thus for the year 1930, the last year for which complete figures are available, enabling us to form a true estimate of the total social expenditure incurred, we have:

Budgets of the State and of the Autonomous Administrations: 59,908,750,553 lei.

Budgets of the Communes, Municipalities, and Departments: 10,156,051,778 lei.

These sums represent a total charge *per capita* of 3,920 lei, while the national revenue was estimated at a *per capita* charge of 7,875 lei. This amounts to a charge of approximately 50 per cent for social expenditure, an altogether disproportionately heavy burden which largely accounts for the catastrophic decrease in the revenue, and points to the 439 gradual pauperization of the country. This inference may also be drawn from the fact of the steady diminution of 652 imports, which have declined enormously since 1927, not only in value but also in bulk, which proves that the buying power of the people has been gravely impaired, as may be seen from the following figures, the diminution in quantity indicating that the fall was in no way due to the drop in prices:

		Value	*Tons*
Imports for 1927	...	33,428 million lei	1,008,069
,, 1930	...	22,541 ,,	773,745
,, 1931	...	15,858 ,,	564,338

BUDGET AND NATIONAL REVENUE

It is obvious that the present administrative machinery is too sumptuous an affair and that Rumania cannot afford to continue to live on such an ostentatious scale. Retrenchment is imperatively needed as well as a rapid return to methods of austerity, however disagreeable these may be to a people who are naturally inclined to profligacy. A drastic economy could be effected by the dismissal of well over 50,000 State functionaries who are superfluous. The *Revista Functionarilor publici*, their mouthpiece and organ, admits that in 1914 the number of State functionaries was 90,334. The war brought about a territorial increase of 216 per cent, so that proportionately the number of functionaries should be 195,133, but by 1930 there were as many as 245,187, or about 50,000 more than necessary. But apparently this total does not disclose the whole truth, for the writer was able to ascertain that while, according to the figures published in the above paper, the Ministries of Public Instruction, Home Affairs, and War had respectively 68,977, 28,894, and 32,630 public officials at the end of 1931, the numbers figuring on their respective pay-lists were 82,821, 31,318, and 33,533. To these enormous armies of officials should be added the staffs employed by the municipalities, etc., which would bring the total number up to nearly half a million. That public opinion is fairly alert on the matter and expects a drastic cutting down may be inferred from the following open letter published in the *Argus* for 16th May, 1932, which is of particular interest from many points of view:

"Rumania has a population of 18 millions, of which only 13 millions are Rumanians by race. Out of the 500,000 public functionaries 99 per cent are Rumanians by race, and a bare 1 per cent is recruited from among Hungarians, Germans, Jews, and Ukrainians. The proportion of the non-Rumanian elements in the public services is therefore infinitesimal, which proves that some 5 millions of people can live without constituting a charge to the budgets of the State, municipalities, and 'régies.' Why should not Rumanian functionaries once dismissed from the public services be able to fend for themselves as do those members of the ethnic minorities who receive no support from the budgets?"

It is admitted publicly that over 100,000 functionaries

647 could be dismissed without the working of the administra-
652 tive machine being impaired in any way, and several instances are given of the plethora of officials. M. Bratanescu, deputy for Tighina, for example, pointed out in the Chamber that in his town, with a population of 31,698, there were 130 teachers, but as there were not enough children for each to have a full class, whenever an inspector came down, each teacher used to borrow children from the other classes in order to complete the number of his own so that he might escape being reprimanded by the inspector.

652 Another head on which various economies could be
657 effected is pensions, which absorb about one-fifth of the total revenue, and many of which are served out to people who have not the slightest justification for drawing them. The tendency to spend overmuch for the upkeep of the social services is a characteristic trait of Rumania and was noticed and commented on many years ago by one of her distinguished social writers, M. C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, in his work "Neoiobâgia." Referring to the period 1910–1911, he pointed out that the State budget and those of the communes absorbed over one-third of the national revenue, and what remained for the subsistence of the population amounted to 123 gold lei per head, or almost 4,000 lei, a figure closely approximating to the 3,955 lei which, according to the calculations given above, represented the net income per head for
647 1930. The above-cited writer condemned very caustically
652 the profligate methods of the administration as likely to bring the State to ruin:

"By withdrawing annually from production these big sums and lavishing them on a parasitic bureaucracy, the State sets the example of a mad waste . . . by letting the bureaucracy spend extravagantly what the other classes create by hard toil, people form the illusion that this country is very prosperous and that it is easy to live in it comfortably. . . . This hypertrophy of the State organism is one of the most pernicious sicknesses which attack modern societies." (p. 455.)

647 It is indeed a great pity that no political party ever en-
651 deavoured to tackle the problem of thoroughly overhauling the administrative machine of the country, but that instead

a policy of drift has so far been practised. The alarming 647
falling-off in the revenue receipts is nevertheless a disquiet- 651
ing sign which ought to impress sufficiently the Rumanian authorities, and rouse them from their apathy, if they are to avoid the disaster they are heading for. For the drying up of the revenue is not entirely due to fraud, but also to the gradual pauperization of the masses. The *Cuvantul* of December 29th, 1928 wrote as follows:

"There is no country where fiscal fraud is so intensely 657
practised as in Rumania . . . though fraud is due partly to the unjust distribution of the fiscal charges. A sane fiscal policy should take into consideration that the ratepayer is poor. We should not be far wrong if we affirmed that at least 80 per cent of the population are in debt. If these 80 per cent of the population toil in order to pay off their debts, or only the interest on their debts, how can the State expect to raise from them what it needs for the public services? . . ."

Rumania's main source of income is her export trade. All
other items are of secondary importance and can hardly off- 457
set the important payments she is obliged to make on behalf of her indebtedness abroad. During the years 1930 to 1931 there was an excess of exports over imports which enabled her to meet her payments abroad, all the more so since foreign capital invested in Rumania is no longer productive and therefore next to no interest on it is being actually remitted. On the contrary, it may be said that, owing to the crisis, foreign enterprises in Rumania require financial aid which is being supplied from abroad, a process which helps to offset the total of foreign payments Rumania has to make. An automatic equilibrium has therefore been attained which allows Rumania to face her payments abroad without drawing on her gold reserves or necessitating her to have recourse to foreign borrowing, and this situation will be maintained so long as she continues to have plentiful harvests as those of 1930 and 1931 and her population remains in its present state of poverty, which prevents it from purchasing foreign articles, a state of things which explains the present excessively low figure of imports. Of course these recent years cannot be taken as representative of normal times, and for this purpose a table showing the balance of payments during

RUMANIA

451 1925 has been prepared. The figures for 1929 and 1930 are those of the reports prepared for the League of Nations. These should be taken as approximate estimates. There seems to be a serious error in the item of transports, and probably a much larger income must have been derived from transit traffic than is indicated, for the total receipts of the railways for 1929 and 1930 amounted respectively to 12,375 and 11,291 millions.

Figures are stated in millions of lei.

Net Income from	1925	1929	1930
Excess of exports over imports ...	nil	nil	5985
Foreigners and foreign legations ...	1000	700	600
Transports	500	129	75
Professional and other services... ...	150	314	204
Emigrant remittances	600	1000	860
Interest on Rumanian capital abroad	150	130	140
Fresh foreign capital invested in Rumania	4500	—	4135
Reparations	—	681	274
Government receipts	—	70	64
Excess of proceeds of loans and advances over the purchase abroad of Rumanian bonds	—	15095	1622
Totals	6900	18119	13959
Net Outgoings			
Excess of imports over exports ...	786	449	—
Expenses of Rumanians and Rumanian Legations abroad	700	672	586
Insurances and Services	100	92	91
Dividends and interest on private capital invested in Rumania	7550	2860	2931
Interest on State Debt...	3210[1]	2930	3918
Earnings of foreigners remitted abroad	150	—	—
Totals	12496	7003	7526
Balances	−5596	+11116	+6433

[1] The 1925 figure includes the amount of the sinking fund.

BUDGET AND NATIONAL REVENUE

From the above it may be seen that Rumania, in order to 457
meet her foreign debt payments, requires that her favourable trade balance should attain 7½ milliards and even further expand. The surplus of 1929 is to be attributed to the proceeds of the loan floated during that year. The surplus of 1930 is ascribable not only to the inflow of foreign capital but also to the very substantial excess of exports over imports. As an even more important excess of exports over imports was registered in 1931 (6,226 millions), that a considerable inflow of money followed upon the conclusion of a loan in Paris, and as, further, there was little or no outflow of money on account of foreign private capital invested in the country, it may be safely surmized that the balance of payments for 1931 must have shown an even more favourable result than that of the preceding year.

Owing to the deplorable plight of the Exchequer and its 652
inability to find the means wherewith to pay the salaries of 457
State officials, the view has been gaining ground that the State ought to suspend the payment of its debt service. The majority of the Press have widely approved and encouraged this idea, which is becoming exceedingly popular, as might be naturally supposed in a community which has deliberately fostered contempt for all engagements. Both public and Press, taking into consideration the default of adjoining States, find that it would be quite natural for Rumania to follow in their footsteps, since she has been equally affected by the present crisis. The fact that Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, and Hungary have been obliged to suspend their foreign payments abroad because they are unable to secure the requisite foreign currencies while Rumania, at least for the present, is not faced with any difficulties concerning the question of transfer, is entirely lost sight of. Even newspapers closely connected with the Government have joined in this campaign, and seeing that former Ministers like M. Junian, of the National Peasant Party, have openly indicated this measure as a panacea for the evils from which the country is suffering, it may be that eventually the question may be raised by the Government and foreign bondholders sounded on the subject. Should such be the case this delicate question will require to be handled with great tact and

RUMANIA

457 suavity, as the susceptibilities of France have to be carefully
652 considered, for her political support is necessary to Rumania, and the latter cannot afford to jeopardize it for the sake of such transient monetary relief as the suspension of her public debt service might afford. Should this contingency arise and foreign bondholders be confronted with a demand for an alleviation in the charge of the actual debt (a revision of which may be justifiable to a certain extent, because the fall in world prices has increased the burden of the world's debts by at least 30 per cent, and has therefore correspondingly improved the position of creditors), then it would be well if British bondholders would keep in mind that the depreciation in sterling has already effected this readjustment so far as *they* are concerned. In fact this fall in sterling has brought about an annual saving of some 450 to 500 million
000 lei to the Rumanian Exchequer. This matter is alluded to because in recent negotiations, British delegates have meekly accepted the same terms as were offered to other creditor States, the currency of which had not sustained a loss of some 30 per cent of its intrinsic value. The agreement reached on the Bulgarian loans issued under the auspices of the League of Nations may be taken as an example. French and American creditors will be receiving 50 per cent of the stipulated interest in francs and dollars, while the British investor will be receiving this 50 per cent in his depreciated currency, so that in reality he will be receiving only 35 per cent. At first sight it would seem that our official delegates might have stood up and insisted on equality of treatment with other countries and not contented themselves with a settlement which is distinctly more favourable to others. They might also have seized this opportunity and done something for the commercial debts due to our of foreign credits, and under pressure from French bankers, has been obliged to use her slender monetary resources for nationals, which are 'frozen hard,' because Bulgaria, devoid the payment of her State rather than of her private debts. This unilateral way of meeting obligations is certainly not to our advantage as a nation, for these commercial debts owing to our exporters constitute their capital, and so long as they are deprived of this money they must find it impossible to finance other exports from this country.

finance other exports from this country.* The total amount of private foreign capital invested in Rumania is estimated at some 28,300 million lei, according to the figures supplied to the League of Nations for 1930, but it seems to have been somewhat underestimated, judging from the amount of interest annually payable on foreign investments, which has always been computed at a much higher figure than 2860 or 2931 millions for 1929 and 1930 as is the case of the above-mentioned report.

The following table gives particulars of the Public Debt on January 1st, 1932, totalling 175,559,644,622 lei, of which 162,182,471,062 represent the external debt payable in foreign currency. The *per capita* indebtedness would therefore amount to 9,753 lei, on the basis of a population of 18 millions.

PUBLIC DEBT IN LEI

	Nominal amount.	Amount outstanding.
Pre-war loan	1,725,812,000	410,337,300
National Loan 1916 5%	400,000,000	354,194,800
District Railways Loan	39,000,000	23,678,413
Non-redeemable Loans:		
4% 1900 Brasov Schools	963,500	963,500
5% 1910 Pasturages	20,000,000	20,000,000
4% 1912 Mortmain	34.894,487	10,541,849
Union Loan 5% 1919	1,143,143,800	1,030,607,500
Reconstruction 5% 1920	2,730,911,000	2,477,280,000
,, ,, ,, (unblocked) ...	315,000,000	306,899,000
Expropriation Loan 5% 1922 redeemable ...	6,500,000,000	6,500,000,000
,, ,, ,, ,, non-redeemable	800,000,000	800,000,000
,, Mortgage Debt	560,000,000	560,000,000

DEBTS DEVOLVING FROM THE PEACE TREATIES

Annuities owing to Arad-Temiscara Rly. ...	11,843,765	8,796,616
Pre-war Austro-Hungarian loans stamped in Rumania	146,089,353	146,089,353
Rumanian quota of 3½% 1897 Hungarian Loan	37,926,002	37,926,002
Austrian Loan for Rly. Cernauti—N. Sulita	2,306,800	2,306,800
Loans of Bucovina 4% 1894 and 1910 ...	6,242,600	6,242,600

FLOATING DEBTS

Internal Treasury Bonds	687,652,430	687,652,430

*Our exporters to countries which have placed restrictions on exchange operations suffer yet from another disability, in so far as what available foreign exchange there may be is granted to local importers of raw materials in order that the native industry may not be stinted of its supplies. Naturally there is no foreign exchange left for importers of manufactured goods after the former have been supplied.

457
152

RUMANIA

	Currency.	Nominal amount.	Outstanding amount of debt on Jan. 1st, 1932, in foreign currency.	Amount in lei.
PUBLIC DEBT IN FOREIGN CURRENCIES.				
Unified Stock 4% Paris Agreement	Gold Francs	433,000,000	290,256,540	9,363,095,467
,, ,, 5% ,, ,, ...	,, ,,	87,000,000	69,165,170	2,231,130,054
,, ,, 4½% London ,, ...	,, lei	60,000,000	57,343,670	1,849,792,107
,, ,, 4% Berl ,, ...	,, ,,	425,000,000	118,551,225	3,824,225,416
,, ,, 1889, 4%	,, ,,	21,000,000	6,475,680	208,892,485
,, ,, 4½%	,, ,,	133,500,000	77,092,795	2,486,859,381
,, ,, 5%	,, ,,	57,000,000	18,172,590	586,211,408
,, ,, Consolidated 1922. London 4%	£ sterling	35,000,000	25,774,730	20,970,062,581
,, ,, ...	,,	2,500,000	1,613,760	1,312,938,998
,, ,, 6% 1925	Italian Lire	41,145,300	27,619,200	242,993,721
,, ,, 5% 1926 (for purchase of private rys)	£ sterling	680,315	646,115	525,672,702
,, ,, ,, ,, (,, ,, of Maramures rys) ...	,,	8,630	8,280	6,736,525
,, ,, ,, ,, (,, ,, of Arad-Cenad rys) ...	,,	111,890	107,410	87,387,702
,, ,, ,, ,, (,, ,, of Somes rys)	,,	148,740	139,710	113,666,658
WAR DEBTS.				
War Debt to Great Britain	£ sterling	31,295,000	30,395,000	24,729,068,050
,, ,, ,, U.S.A.	Dollars	122,506,260	119,806,260	20,029,210,555
,, ,, ,, Italy	Italian Lire	247,500,000	173,500,000	1,526,453,000
,, ,, ,, France	Gold Francs	924,105,350	659,562,566	21,276,169,270
,, damages, Petroleum, 1916	£ sterling	16,475,818	15,361,050	12,497,596,670
DEBTS OF RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILISATION.				
Loan 7% 1926	Italian Lire	200,000,000	165,495,566	1,456,029,989
,, ,, 1929 Stabilisation	£ sterling	2,000,000	1,945,500	1,582,839,345
,, ,, ,, ,, ...	Dollars	69,000,000	67,172,200	11,229,848,396
,, ,, ,, ,, ...	French Francs	561,638,000	546,320,600	3,587,399,930
,, 7½% 1919 Reconstruction	,, ,,	1,325,000,000	1,322,250,000	8,660,737,500

DEBTS DEVOLVING FROM THE PEACE TREATIES.	Currency.	Nominal amount.	Outstanding amount of debt on Jan. 1st, 1932, in foreign currency.	Amount in lei.
Perpetual Stock 4%	Fl. gold	143,884,877	47,482,009	3,829,186,649
4½% 1913 Hungarian amort.	Gold Crowns	35,368,996	9,903,318	335,434,323
Perpetual 1910 Hungarian 4%	,, ,,	63,195,660	17,694,784	599,338,286
4½% Stock 1914 Amort.	,, ,,	103,436,037	28,962,090	980,972,066
Annuities to Ry. Cos.	French Francs	30,555,500	23,860,596	156,286,909
Agrarian "A" Optants	Crowns	25,735,728	16,979,987	575,127,472
Rys. St. E.G.	French Francs	71,941,574	17,077,230	550,877,285
Loans, liberated in Crowns and Florins	Swiss ,,	42,500,000	42,500,000	1,370,965,000
VARIOUS				
Rumanian quota of Danube Com. Loan	Gold Francs	2,125,000	1,087,500	35,080,575
Relief Bonds, England	£ sterling	3,703,012	2,976,575	2,421,711,654
,, ,, Australia	,,	201,982	162,358	132,093,333
,, ,, Denmark	Danish Crowns	201,982	154,785	6,934,810
,, ,, France	French Francs	824,761	662,964	4,342,415
,, ,, Norway	Norv. Crowns	84,159	64,493	2,889,504
,, ,, Norway	£ sterling	3,366	2,580	2,099,265
,, ,, Sweden	Swed. Crowns	151,486	116,088	5,201,108
,, ,, Switzerland	Swiss Francs	269,310	206,380	6,657,406
William Pyton and Anne du Pont Pey, New York	Dollars	548,911	152,600	25,511,668
G. & D. Perkins, New York	,,	543,297	152,600	25,511,668
Paul Stuppel, New York	,,	1,260,291	314,990	52,660,028
Cie Franc. d'Etudes et d'Entr. Coloniales	£ sterling	19,614	4,355	3,543,387
Marché Central de Cuirs, Peaux et Laines	,,	17,269	4,815	3,917,862
Bca d'Italia Roma	Italian Lire	13,731,200	1,716,400	15,100,887
New York Trust Co., New York	£ sterling	2,107	948	771,669
Heirs of Anton Dimou	,,	9,854	2,457	1,998,990
Co-op. Wholesale Society, Manchester	,,	991,023	740,818	602,722,523
Banque Belgo-Helvetique, Brussels	Belg. Francs	53,454,655	12,814,660	59,516,510

457
652

TRADE

139 Pre-War Rumania was known as one of the chief grain-exporting countries. She occupied the third and occasionally the second place for maize, attaining and sometimes surpassing the one million ton figure of the United States, while for wheat she ranked fifth, coming immediately after the U.S. In spite of the fact that other countries have vastly increased their agricultural production, yet in 1931 Rumania still came second in the exports of maize and fifth in those of wheat, though after 1928 cereals no longer formed the largest group of her exports, for petroleum and its derivatives came to rank first, attaining 33.26 per cent of the value, and 40.80 per cent of the bulk of exports in 1929, as against 30.63 per cent and 24.37 per cent respectively for cereals. The following table sets out the distribution of exports during the last three years:

	1929		1930		1931	
Products	Quantity Tons.	Value in millions of Lei.	Quantity Tons.	Value in millions of Lei.	Quantity Tons.	Value in millions of Lei.
Animal	95,439	3596	121,999	3,303	119,877	2,685
Vegetal	3,910,333	15,202	5,055,770	14,404	5,126,764	12,145
Mineral	3,024.947	9,887	4,018,709	10,668	4,788 231	8,149
Combined	32,403	260	17,942	148	18,316	959

The group of vegetal products includes also timber, the exports of which amounted in 1929 to 4,679 million lei and represented 16.17 per cent of the total exports and 28.02 per cent of their bulk. Timber exports have steadily declined in value, falling to 3,094 million lei in 1930, and to 2,368 millions in 1931. The main export products of Rumania being petroleum, cereals, and timber, she is exposed to suffer more than any other nation from the Russian policy of dumping, since the principal goods exported by Russia are of an identical kind. As Russia's policy is to expand her exports to the utmost in order to secure the necessary foreign credits wherewith to buy the requisite machinery for her industrial equipment, it is to be feared that this Russian competition will be likely to cause immense prejudice to Rumania, who,

for reasons easily understood, is incapable of competing 439
against her northern neighbour. Having to face likewise in the grain trade the formidable competition of the trans-oceanic countries which have industrialized their agricultural production, Rumania finds herself to-day in a most unenviable position, which explains why she is so desperately anxious to conclude preferential agreements with European industrial countries, so that she may have the possibility of disposing of her products at better prices than those at which similar Russian goods are being offered.

In order to market the 1931 harvest the Rumanian Government was obliged to grant a subsidy of 1,000 lei per ton of cereals exported, but after paying about one milliard lei in subsidies, it found that the system constituted too great a strain on its resources and the subsidy was suddenly suspended, many exporters not even receiving their due. The real ratio of exchange between raw materials and manufactured articles, which has lately shifted so markedly in favour of the latter, is another powerful factor which, added to her difficulties in exporting her produce, is making for the industrialization of Rumania.

As this policy of industrialization, which has been followed [439]
since the conclusion of the war, has not given the expected
results, its continued pursuit and intensification can only be 471
persisted in through State intervention, which is also growingly exerted in organizing the exports. Control of exchanges, the clearing system, quotas, and inter-state barter are all gradual stages leading to the ultimate elimination of individual initiative in commercial intercourse and its substitution by collectivist methods. From this stage to the adoption of integral communism is an easy transition, and in view of the close proximity of the Russian example no surprise should be shown if it be imitated not only by Rumania, but by other Near Eastern States, if no other way of escape out of their present difficulties be offered them. The prospect of these States adopting Bolshevism is quite within the domain of possibilities, and this can hardly constitute a very reassuring portent for our Western democracies.

The visit of Ismet Pasha to Moscow in April, 1932, for the 648
purpose of seeing at close quarters how the Communist

administrative machinery worked, should serve as an eye-opener to the sceptic. Already, early in June, the Constantinople *Journal d'Orient* has announced that Ismet was intent on applying Russian methods to agriculture in Turkey, and that his Government had decided to create a textile industry on the Russian model and with Russian help. Subsequently the Turkish Press has announced that Russian experts had arrived to choose sites for the proposed works. For this reason it is to be deeply regretted that at the recent Grain Conferences, held in Paris and Rome, the delegates of the British Government did not adopt a more sympathetic attitude towards the views set forth not only by Rumania but also by her neighbouring countries, all of which are faced with the same difficulties. Their demand for preferential treatment with regard to their cereals may run counter to the 'most favoured nation' clause, yet there are methods by which such difficulties as may arise from such complications can eventually be circumvented, and the agreement reached between Rumania and France on May 26th, 1932, which grants the former country a total annual quota of 80,000 tons of wheat with a 40 per cent reduction in duties, is a case in point. This agreement brought into force automatically the long-talked-of preferential treaty with Germany,[1] which gives to Rumania an annual quota of some 200,000 to 250,000 tons of maize and of 400,000 to 500,000 teons of barley, with a 60 per cent reduction for the former and one of 50 per cent for the latter, and also secures for Rumania the right to export to Germany 7,000 head of cattle and 70,000 pigs per annum. Of course Rumania has had to grant corresponding advantages to Germany for certain of her industrial products, so that, taking into account that Great Britain is the largest grain-importing country, importing on an average three or four times as much as Germany, it would seem that it would be to our advantage and within our means to conclude similar arrangements. In 1931 we imported a total of 222 million bushels, of which 50 millions came from Canada, 39 from the Argentine, and 21 from the

[1] In August, 1932, a trade agreement between Italy and Rumania was signed, both countries making mutual concessions in their tariffs.

United States. At first sight it would appear that ample scope exists for the provision of a market for the cereals of the Danubian countries, provided that the latter would agree to grant corresponding facilities to our manufacturers. If our delegates at the grain conferences, instead of turning down all proposals on this head emanating from these countries, had demanded a *quid pro quo*, they would have done better work. Such an arrangement would seem more advantageous to us than the policy of subsidizing wheat growing in our country since, to quote the Rt. Hon. Viscount Astor, "the world price of wheat for 1930 was 25s. per quarter, but the average cost of producing it in England was stated by many farmers to be 45s. to 55s. . . . the subsidy on wheat will cost from £3 to 5 millions . . . it would be cheaper for us to have this land derelict and to give every landlord £1 per acre, every farmer £2 per acre, and every labourer £2 per week to sit at home and smoke his pipe in idleness than to pay the quota scheme at recent prices. . . ." (*v. Nineteenth Century and After*, March, 1932.) On the whole it would certainly be more profitable if our dairy and cattle-rearing industry received cheap grain from the Danubian countries, the acquisition of which would offer our manufacturers the possibility of placing in those countries an increasing share of their manufactured products, rather than to proceed with the economically unsound policy of subsidizing grain growing in this country, and thereby intensifying the existing glut of agricultural produce in the world markets.

At any rate, if we abstain from assisting the Danubian countries, the force of circumstances will compel them either to seek the realization of the Mittel Europa scheme, or to adopt a distinctly Bolshevik economic policy, and it must be admitted that neither of these contingencies would be to our advantage. Besides the agreements with France and Germany, Rumania concluded in May, 1932, a temporary arrangement with Argentina concerning the export of maize, both countries agreeing to prohibit their exports if prices fell below an agreed figure, which for Argentina was fixed at 5 pesos per quintal, and for Rumania at 33 French francs per quintal. As these countries export respectively eight

439 million and two million tons, or 75 per cent and 20 per cent of the total quantity of maize exported (for the world), it seems that there is a possibility for them to stabilize effectively its price at a reasonable figure.

Rumania still remains an essentially agricultural country in spite of the development of her petroleum industry, and as such she will continue to import from abroad the essential semi-manufactured goods for her artificially-created industry, subsisting solely by Protection, and in addition a limited quantity of better quality articles which cannot be manufactured locally, as well as machinery necessary for the equipment of her industries. Germany continues to be (as during the pre-war period) the country to which Rumania sells and from which she buys most; Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Italy being the next best purveyors as well as customers. Rumania therefore continues to be in close commercial relations with the countries of Central Europe, owing to her geographical propinquity to these States, and the facilities afforded for traffic by the Danube waterway and the main railway lines which connect Central Europe with Rumania.

The following table shows the relative importance of foreign countries in Rumania's export and import trade for 1930:

TRADE

439

EXPORTS TO:—

Country	Tons.	Value in 1,000 Lei.	Percentage of total.
England	993,362	3,230,452	11.33
Austria	425,175	2,588,535	9.07
Czechoslovakia	308,552	1,985,011	6.96
Germany	1,438,698	5,363,396	18.80
Hungary	1,187,651	2,127,371	7.46
Italy	1,260,742	3,674,836	12.88
Poland	95,499	452,250	1.58
France	607,302	1,958,980	—
Greece	218,049	696,169	—
Yugoslavia	242,750	509,558	1.79
Bulgaria	142,554	363,246	—
Holland	453,576	1,356,742	—
Egypt	544,911	1,194,361	—
Belgium	284,881	905,519	—

IMPORTS FROM:—

Country	Tons.	Value in 1,000 Lei.	Percentage of total.
England	54,303	1,873,712	8.13
Austria	41,412	2,678,949	11.63
Czechoslovakia ...	138,236	3,370,354	14.63
Germany	135,911	5,776,751	25.07
Hungary	60,817	908,111	3.94
Italy	38,367	1,825,419	7.92
Poland	134,675	983,301	4.27
France	—	—	—
Greece	—	—	—
Yugoslavia	23,532	79,600	0.34
Bulgaria	—	—	—
Holland	—	—	—
Egypt	—	—	—
Belgium	—	—	—

An examination of the above figures will readily convince 439
the reader that Rumania, which exports 90 per cent of its 648
cereals and 75 per cent of its oil, outside the Danubian countries, can find little inducement to participate in such a scheme as that of the Danubian economic federation proposed by France. Even members of the Government paid lip-service to M. Tardieu's plan, and if there was no outspoken criticism of it this was due mainly to the desire to avoid hurting French susceptibilities. The promised financial

439 aid was the only attractive feature of the scheme, and if this
648 plan materializes it may be taken for granted that the pecuniary assistance implied is the reason for its acceptance, and even then it is clearly indicated that such co-operation between the Danubian countries is to serve only as a prelude to a vaster project, namely that of a European Customs Union. A few figures will, however, show that this plan is not practicable. Thus Austria in 1930 imported 765,600 tons and Czechoslovakia 592,600 tons of cereals, while Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia annually disposed of 3,350,000 tons on an average during the years 1928–1930, or about two million tons more than the two industrial countries of the Danube basin could absorb, for the quantity of cereals these two countries buy from other than the Danubian States is infinitesimal. They likewise import 90 per cent of the meat they require from Hungary, Poland, and Rumania, so that the available margin for an increase on this item is also very limited. Concerning petroleum, Rumania exported in 1930 a total of 3,850,000 tons, of which only 1,150,000 tons were absorbed by Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, so that she had to dispose of the rest elsewhere. Apparently there is no inducement whatever for Rumania to join this proposed Danubian Union, and it is only the bait of financial aid and the desire not to ruffle France that will induce her to adopt a benevolent attitude towards it. In fact Rumania will be adversely affected, for she can only increase her sales to the other Danubian countries to a very limited extent, while she will be obliged to extend a preferential tariff to Austrian and Czechoslovakian manufactured goods which, on the one hand, will injure her own industry, and on the other, will affect adversely the import of manufactured goods of other countries, since they will have to pay higher duties than those on the corresponding Austrian and Czechoslovakian articles. It is certain, now that the preferential treaty with Germany has come into force, that the latter country will not regard with equanimity the realization of a Danubian Customs Union, which is likely to debar her from the advantages her trade arrangement with Rumania actu-
000 ally confers on her. All these considerations go to show that

when the British Government proceeded to give its blessing 000 to the Tardieu plan it had not considered it even worth while to consult the interests of British exporters to the Danubian countries, who had so far no reason to congratulate themselves on its activities. Thus a few years ago it readily gave its consent to the proposed increase in the Bulgarian tariff in order (as was alleged) that the stabilization loan floated under the aegis of the League of Nations might have additional revenues allocated to it. The result was an immediate increase in the number of weaving sheds in Bulgaria, followed by the shutting out of British textiles, which brought about in that country an alarming drop in the revenue from Customs. A yet more recent instance of the slackness of our politicians was afforded when in Sept., 1931, we went off the gold standard. Our Government might have thought of restricting the losses this decision had brought on our exporters by decreeing that debts already contracted would be payable on the gold basis. Such a decree would have been strictly in conformity with the usage of the French Government, which has always managed to extort from its debitors payment in gold francs, though at the same time when the rôle is reversed and France is a debtor, it does not scruple at paying its creditors in paper francs.* No wonder that most of our trade-pioneers abroad, heartily sick of being treated

* We may crave the indulgence of our readers for engaging in a short digression from our main subject in order to remind them of the controversy raised over the French War Loans floated in this country. Not for the purpose of airing a personal grievance against the French, because of the huge losses inflicted on British investors, among the vast number of whom was the writer, but rather with the object of giving an illustration of the extremes to which other governments are prepared to go when it is a question of protecting the interests of their nationals, while our own politicians, in similar cases, offer a spectacle of asinine imperturbability.

During the war the French Government issued war bonds to the value of some fifty million sterling in England, and though the scrip was denominated in francs, yet the subscriptions received were all in sterling. British subscribers naturally expected to be reimbursed in the same currency. Owing to the fall in the franc, however, and its stabilisation at one-fifth of its original value, the French Government proceeded to pay the interest on these bonds in paper francs, in consequence of which their value was seriously impaired. To the protests of the British holders, the French replied that the loan floated in Great Britain formed only part of the war loan issued in France, and that, as all of it was denominated in francs, its service would be necessarily in the same currency, and that no preferential treatment could be accorded to the holders of the British section of the loan.

000 as pariahs, and conscious that they can never count on support from their Government, have had to give up the game in disgust, and the present decay of our export trades may to a large extent be attributed to this supineness on the part of those in authority at home.

This was a plausible statement. But subsequently the French provided us with excellent reasons for its refutation. Thus they proceeded to sue, at the International Court at the Hague, Serbia, Brazil, and Portugal, because these states undertook to refund the loans contracted in France on the basis of the current value of the franc, while the French insisted on being reimbursed in gold francs, and, strange to say, they secured a favourable verdict. It is obvious that the very same arguments invoked by the French at the Hague would have served to substantiate our claim against them, and for this very reason, when finally our Government, under pressure from the British bondholders, suggested to the French Government that the case ought to go to arbitration, it met with a refusal, which in itself was a masterpiece of jesuitical casuistry and sophistry, intended to mask the plain fact that the French had rejected arbitration. We meekly accepted the French reply. Possibly higher interests dictated such humility at the time. But what are we to say of the British Government when it proceeded to settle the French claims for the transport of British troops in France during the war, at the rate of twenty-seven francs to the pound sterling, instead of at ninety-two, the rate ruling at the time this claim was settled? Clearly this was a liability in francs, and should have been settled in francs, and if the British Government had possessed any sense of dignity it ought flatly to have refused to comply with the French demand, or, if it had complied, it ought to have insisted that the advantage of £8,250,000 which accrued to the French Government, by our Government paying at the rate of twenty-seven instead of ninety-two to the pound, should have been repaid by the former to British holders of French war loans in partial compensation for the losses sustained by them.

Nor is this to be regarded as a mere solitary instance of the supine absentmindedness our politicians have displayed when the interests of their fellow-subjects were at stake. Thus when the war broke out, our Government seized the Turkish warships being built in England, the cost of which the Turks had already defrayed. This act incensed the Turks against us and they vented their rage on the British colony in Constantinople and Smyrna by requistioning the stores of British subjects. Our unfortunate nationals expected that the British Government would use the money paid by the Turks for their warships which it had seized, to compensate them for their losses. But instead, Lord Curzon, that very "superior person," in a moment of seigniorial magnanimity decreed that this sum should also serve to indemnify French and Italian sufferers, with the result that there was not sufficient money to go round, and that most of the British claimants received next to nothing. Had this been known in time, British subjects in possession of Turkish requisition receipts would have secured more adequate compensation by dealing directly with the Turkish Government instead of complying with the injunctions issued by our own Consular authorities to file their claims with the latter. It required twelve years for the members of the "Commission for the Assessment of Damages suffered in Turkey" to examine and settle these claims. The writer, who was among this last category of claimants possessing these requisition receipts, attempted to bring his case before a higher court, but was officially notified that the findings of the "Commission" were final, and that no further action could be taken . . .

AGRICULTURE

As a result of the legislative measures enacted in 1917 and 1921 Rumania, which was a country of vast latifundia, was transformed into one of smallholdings. Fear, rather than generosity or a desire to promote the country's welfare, prompted the initiation of these enactments. The Russian example which was nigh would have proved contagious had a policy of repression been adopted similar to that of 1907, when over 11,000 Rumanian peasants were ruthlessly massacred in their vain attempt to secure more humane treatment at the hands of their landlords. The landed classes had therefore to yield much in order to retain at least a little. Besides, the initiative had already been taken by Bessarabia, prior to her final declaration of union with Rumania in 1918, of enacting the expropriation of the large estates, and Rumania was confronted with the dilemma of following suit or of seeing Bessarabia demand the annulment of the act of union just passed, for it was impossible for the latter to rescind this measure. 423

That no high motives were behind this policy of expropriation may be inferred from the perfunctory manner in which it was applied, and the absence of a rational plan for putting it into operation. In fact, one of the reasons for the sudden dismissal of the first Vaida-Voevod administration in 1920 was apprehension lest Mihalache, the then Minister of Agriculture, would have seen to the thorough and rational execution of the expropriation decrees. It could have been easily foreseen that the peasantry, who until then had been in a state akin to serfdom, were destitute and had not the capital wherewith to exploit the lands that were being allotted them. It was the imperative duty of the State to find the means necessary to endow the peasantry with the indispensable agricultural equipment for the cultivation of their lands. The Governments presided over by the Bratianus, however, were busy reserving the exploitation of the natural resources of the country for their partisans, and the peasants were left to fend for themselves as best they could. The Bratianus would suffer no harm from the fact that the State was 661 423

neglecting the peasants; on the contrary, they saw in them a numerous and profitable crowd of clients for the banks, the majority of which were under their control. The less pecuniary aid the peasant obtained from the State, the greater would be his need of the private bank or usurer. And so well did the latter entangle the peasants in their tentacles that within ten years of the enactment of the Land Distribuion Act the debts contracted by the peasants had surpassed the value of their lands. Thus the much-belauded agrarian revolution in Rumania was threatened with complete failure, and so another revolutionary measure had to be passed, the strangely-termed "law for the sanitation of agrarian debts," in order to save the peasantry from being dispossessed of their land.

The *Argus* of 13th February, 1932, published the following table which shows how the land was actually distributed:

Area of properties.	Total hectares.	Percentage of area.	Number of proprietors.	Percentage of total. Owners.	Average area of farm for each category.
Up to 5 hectares ...	6,280,993	43.60	3,731,403	84.20	1.94
5 to 10 hectares ...	2,919,863	20.20	435,715	11.30	6.70
10 to 50 hectares ...	2,392,689	16.60	148,860	3.90	16.07
50 to 250 hectares ...	1,505,257	10.40	18,122	0.50	83.06
Over 250 hectares ...	1,305,670	9.10	2,597	0.10	502.00
Total ...	14,404,462,	100.00	3,836,757	100.00	3.75

As one hectare sown to wheat yields approximately 1,200 kg. of wheat, and the average price of wheat during 1931 was about 2.25 lei, the revenue per hectare may be reckoned at about 2,700 lei. As the average holding of 84 per cent of the peasantry is about 2 hectares, the paper assumed that the revenue of each peasant household amounted approximately to some 5,400 lei, or about 160 gold francs. For the year 1931 the total revenue from agriculture was computed at 46,500 million lei, of which 21 milliards were derived from the cattle-rearing industry, 21 milliards from cereals, and 4½ milliards from other plants. Other crops were even less profitable; thus the average price of maize was 1.50 lei per kg. and the yield 1,500 kg. per hectare, so that the revenue per hectare amounted to 2,250 lei, and the figures for barley were respectively 2 lei, 1,400 kg., and 2,800 lei.

AGRICULTURE

It was the policy of imposing export taxes on all agri- 244
cultural produce, which despoiled the peasantry of all the 434
legitimate profit they should have made on the marketing [650]
of their grain, and which not only tended to discourage 435
them from increasing the area under cultivation but prevented them from consolidating their position as independent farmers. Indeed, had not the Rumanian peasant been unduly burdened with taxes during the years following the conclusion of the war, when cereals fetched highly remunerative prices, he would undoubtedly have been able to make sufficient money to equip himself with the necessary instruments and cattle for his farm, avoided running into debt, and he would even have been able to constitute a small reserve on which to draw in the lean years. But these possibilities were frustrated by the culpable negligence of his rulers. And yet there were plenty of men who clearly foresaw and foretold the disastrous outcome for agriculture of such negligence, and protested against this system as well as against the undue partiality accorded by Government circles to industry in general. Certain organs of the Press continued for years to warn the public, and to deprecate the disastrous policy that was being followed. But it was in vain, the Bratianus would accept no counsel from anyone. The *Argus* on October 21st, 1926, commenting on this theme, drew the following conclusions:

"From the above-cited appreciations one may infer that on one hand the prices obtained by the producers are below those they secured before the war, while on the other hand the prices of the articles they need for their upkeep are at about 70 per cent above the pre-war level. In spite of these facts all these taxes which burden production are being maintained, and agriculture is placed not only in an impossible situation for developing itself but in a state of inferiority when compared with that of other countries which export cereals."

In another article published by the same paper on October 10th, 1926, we find a similar pessimistic strain: "From the above figures it becomes obvious that agriculturalists instead of making a profit have lost money, both this year and in previous years of drought. Such a result has completely discouraged them, especially the 161 younger among them..!"

000 previous years of drought. Such a result has completely discouraged them, especially the younger among them. . . ."

489 241 And it was not only the export taxes which impeded the development of agriculture, but also the deplorable state of the whole transport system. The shortage and deficiencies of the latter would have been very easily remedied with foreign aid, but the Bratianus were deaf to all such suggestions, though the imperative necessity of eliminating these defects was daily insisted on in the Press. Here is yet another excerpt from the *Argus* of October 8th, 1926, and it will be found both apposite and illuminating on this subject:

"So long as the Railway Administration does not dispose of adequate funds to obtain the necessary rolling stock, nothing can be done. Without locomotives, without trucks, without warehouses, a transport system is helpless in a country like ours, which cannot develop without exports. In order to stimulate and encourage the production of our soil, the subject of the re-establishment of our means of communication by land and water ought to be constantly in the minds of our governing circles. We have paid no heed to this truth during the eight years following the war, and as a result, if we except Russia, our country is the hindermost in Eastern Europe as far as transport is concerned. For this reason, in almost all railway stations quantities of grain remain for months waiting for trucks, to the immense prejudice of the producers and the merchants. The capital which is thus immobilized for so long a time, when interest rates are soaring fantastically, the warehouse dues, the loss in quantity and quality of the cereals through exposure and theft, are some of the factors which are contributing to the ruin of our agriculture and of our commerce in cereals. . . ."

651 241 To these complaints and remonstrances, however, the Government turned a deaf ear, and it even went farther and threatened to impose still heavier burdens on this harassed industry by an increase in the land tax. The injustice of this contemplated measure was exposed at length by Dr Ernest Ene in the *Argus*, who marshalled figures and facts to prove that, in comparison with other industries, agriculture had so far been treated as a Cinderella, although it had furnished

to the State a very notable portion of its revenues. According to the figures cited, the total value of the products of industry during 1924 was about 20,000,000,000 lei, while the taxes derived from industry amounted to 488,858,000 lei only. But even this yield was only apparent, for the preferential rates granted for the transport of local industrial products and other subsidies more than absorbed this sum. Agriculture, on the other hand, with an output amounting to 60,000 million lei, contributed revenue to the extent of 7,000 million lei to the State, of which more than 761 millions was in the form of the land tax. Another writer in the *Argus* of November 26th, 1926, is equally indignant at this threatened increase in the land tax, and finds that the 8,000 million lei which the peasantry contributed indirectly to the State revenue, mainly through the export taxes, is already a disproportionate burden. In fact by 1929 agriculture, including cattle rearing, was reckoned to contribute 122 milliard lei to the national revenue, which was calculated to amount to a total of 175 milliards. The remissness the Government displayed towards the agricultural population was bound to have yet further regrettable results, namely, the decrease in the quantity and quality of the yield of cereals. Devoid of means, the small farmers (whose average holdings amounted to less than 5 hectares and represented 60 per cent of the cultivated area and 90 per cent of the rural population) were unable to buy decent seed grain, so that the quality of the cereals grown deteriorated and the yield per hectare steadily decreased. This fact was persistently pointed out by intelligent agriculturalists in the Press. Commenting on the increasing deterioration of the maize crop, a writer in the *Argus* of November 10th, 1926, stated: "The average yield of maize per hectare for the last five years has sunk to 10 hectoliters, while in the United States it is 22.7 and individual farmers who apply more rational methods obtain more than 40 hectoliters. . . . It should be noted that both the climate and the soil of the U.S. are far inferior to ours. . . ." Yet another agricultural engineer, in a series of articles published in the *Argus* in November, 1926, asserted that if good seed corn were distributed to the peasantry there would be an immense increase in the yield

244 of at least 30 per cent in three years, which would represent an increment of 20,000 million lei to the national income, and the writer proceeded to show how erroneous it was to continue following a policy of encouraging industry, since the latter could never yield similar results in so short a time no matter what amount of capital was invested in it. He further enlarged on the necessity of creating a system of credit institutions which would offer loans to the peasantry, for the latter had been completely abandoned to themselves, and he stigmatized the attitude of the Government in this respect as "a policy of complete economic aberration."

241 423 There are many who attribute the decadence of agriculture in Rumania to the Agrarian Reform, but this is an altogether gratuitous conclusion, though in a particular sense their assertion is correct. One may, for instance, take it for granted that had the large landowners subsisted, owing to their political influence they would never have allowed the Bratianu Governments to institute such legislation as rendered the marketing of agricultural produce impossible on a remunerative basis. Indeed the cultivation of the soil had ceased to be a profitable one even as early as 1924, and large farmers employing paid labour could not make enough out of their produce to cover their outlay plus the normal rent of their farms. This was exposed at length in the *Argus* of July 29th, 1926, and the paper attributed to this cause the decrease in the area sown with wheat in Moldavia and Bessarabia, where the best corn lands in Rumania are to be found. One could further infer from the arguments invoked that it was only the smallholder who could persevere in such a disadvantageous occupation as agriculture, because he neither stinted his efforts nor valued at its true worth the amount of labour he expended on his own land, such being the traditional attitude of the peasant. M. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, in his informative book "Neoiobâgia," relates how the peasantry persisted in cultivating their land in the neighbourhood of Ploeşti after 1907, when owing to the development of the oil industry the price of land had increased to such an extent as to render agriculture an uneconomical occupation. Thus, while a pogon[1] of land was let at 50 lei,

[1] One pogon is equivalent to 5,012 sq. metres.

the price of the quantity of maize grown on it would fetch only 40 lei; nevertheless the peasant owner persisted in cultivating his patch of land because he felt ashamed to allow it to lie fallow, having always been accustomed to cultivate it, and buy the maize he needed instead, for which, however, he would probably have to pay a somewhat higher price than the 40 lei at which he could have sold his own (p. 111). So that, far from exerting an adverse influence on production, the breaking up of the large estates has, on the contrary, proved to be the salvation of the industry, for were it not for the abnegation and attachment of the individual smallholder to his farm, agriculture would have been completely ruined by the policy imposed by the Bratianus. Indeed, one cannot but admire this profound devotion of the peasant to the land and his dogged persistence in carrying on, despite the odds which confronted him and the utter lack of encouragement he met with from the State. We may take it for granted that the small farm of five hectares was more productive than the large estates, even from official statistics. This peculiarity was commented on in the *Cuvantul* of July 23rd, 1927, which at the same time decried the maladministration of the then Finance Minister, M. Vintila Bratianu, and his threat to increase the land tax. That paper contested the official statement that the land tax in Rumania amounted to one gold franc per hectare, as this affirmation would cast a slur on the country. In fact it was estimated that in 1924 the export taxes on cereals had yielded the equivalent of a tax of 8 gold francs per hectare.

The determined perseverance of the peasantry could not undo the harm caused by the erroneous agrarian policy pursued, and the situation could not but grow worse with time.

So that when finally the National Peasant Party assumed power at the end of 1928, the situation had become so hopeless that the Rumanian Government even contemplated organizing a mass emigration to France and her colonies in order to relieve the strain. Early in 1929 the Press, commenting on this unexpected decision of the Government to encourage emigration, admitted that the cause of the disastrous condition agriculture had reached in Rumania could

241 423 [511] 167 be clearly traced to the carelessness with which the law of land distribution had been drafted, and to the utter neglect to provide financial means for its rational application, as well as to the export taxes on agricultural produce. The outcome was appalling, as may be judged from an article in the *Cuvantul* in which, after dilating on the causes that had brought about this disaster, it was asserted: "We are obliged to admit that the entire rural population had reached a state of pauperism at a time when we should reasonably have expected it to be thriving, since it had been endowed with lands. It seems a paradox, yet we have only wrecked the old system of production, founded on the unjust system of latifundia, in order to replace serfdom by pauperism. At the time of the large estates the rural worker had no need to emigrate; on the contrary, there was a shortage of labour, and foreign labourers had to be admitted from neighbouring countries. To-day, however, we are forced to direct the rural population abroad so as to save it from starvation; that is the situation we have reached ten years after the enactment of the expropriation laws. . . ." According to the *Adeverul* of March 29th, 1929, the Minister for Agriculture, speaking about the state of that industry, drew a very dark picture and lamented the wretched condition to which agricultural production had fallen. Rumanian agriculture, once the source of wealth and the economic basis of the State, was, he said, on the verge of ruin. The Minister not only condemned the culpable manner in which the land distribution law had been carried out, but also denounced the laxity and incapacity of the functionaries who had been appointed to show the peasants new methods of cultivation. According to him, the so-called model school farms were a positive disgrace. . . . Apparently matters have not improved since, for as late as March, 1932, one could read in the *Ellenzek*, a paper published in Hungarian at Cluj, that the Hungarian Cultural Association of Transylvania had decided to present a petition to the League of Nations to demand the creation of an agricultural school destined exclusively for sons of Rumanian citizens of Hungarian nationality. One ought not to feel surprise that the Hungarian minority, convinced of the glaring ineptitude of the Rumanian administration, had

241 874

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

at last been compelled to assume at its own expense the professional training of its youth. 241/874

It is sad to record that even in educational institutions the remissness which has characterized Rumanian administration has not been adequately grappled with, and it is not surprising that the laxity manifested in this particular domain should appear especially odious to the national minorities in Rumania, which have a different moral conception of life than that of the predominating nationality. That there is much to be done in this department is obvious to all, owing to the persistence of the complaints. A storm of indignation was raised by the scandalous condition of the College of Salonta, in Transylvania, in which some 400 Hungarian and Rumanian students were being educated. Of this number of students, 50 per cent were incapacitated, owing to the disgusting lack of hygiene prevailing, and the anarchic system on which it was conducted. The parents of the students had to petition the Minister of Education to obtain amelioration of the methods in vogue, and the details exposed were so revolting that the *Cuvantul* of March 28th, 1929, commenting on them, more or less admitted that such facts justified the opprobrious epithet of "putrid Wallachs" conferred on the latter by the Hungarians. 658 871

From this it may be deduced that agriculture had already been ruined through the culpable remissness of Rumania's rulers before the present crisis made itself felt. The country was caught like some disabled ship by the economic hurricane which suddenly sprang up, and materially it is suffering intensely, because in its battered condition it finds it difficult to weather the storm. Fortunately, the peasantry has been used to a life of suffering and hard toil; the peasants are patient and long-suffering to an extent inconceivable in the West. Docile and good-humoured, they put up with a situation that a Westerner would long since have found intolerable and against which he would have revolted. Poverty-stricken and unguided, the peasant has not only been left to provide the means wherewith to develop his farm, but at the same time he has been forced to supply from his own scanty resources the needs of the urban populations and the bulk of the funds requisite for carrying on the administration 241/565

241 565 of the State. It is this utter lack of consideration for this hard-pressed mass of humanity that raises the indignation of the foreign observer against those who, through the cruel irony of fate, have been called upon to look after the destinies of this luckless people. The selfishness, incapacity, and corruption of which they have given proof can only be compared to that moral disintegration existing under the Tsarist régime, and one should not feel surprise if finally the same developments supervene. The rural population is absolutely sick of the present system and has lost all faith in its politicians.

An important meeting was held early in 1932 at Focşani [668] by fruit-growers and viticulturists, who may be considered to represent the more intelligent classes of the rural population, and the prevalent opinion expressed by the delegates was to the effect that no alleviation could be expected so long as the present system was maintained, and that Bolshevism held out better prospects. This did not cause any alarm, and passed almost unheeded, save for some mild criticism from one of the veterans of journalism in Rumania, M. Batsaria, who, in an article which appeared in the *Adeverul* on January 20th, 1932, admitted that this attitude was significant, yet opined that it was not aimed against the Crown, which at the time was being very roughly handled by General Averescu in the Press campaign the latter had just launched.

241 433 In spite of the culpable neglect with which agriculture has always been treated, the industry remains Rumania's mainstay and sole hope of survival. The whole social life of the country, even its future existence, depends on the normal development of agriculture, which provides not only the food, but also the raw materials for the more promising sections of the country's budding industries, and the means wherewith Rumania can pay for the indispensable articles she imports from abroad, as well as for the payment of interest on her public debt. It is a matter of grave concern, therefore, that the average yield of cereals per hectare should have steadily diminished in the last nine years and sunk below the pre-war average of 1,130 kg. per hectare. If nothing be done to remedy this evil Rumania,

owing to the natural increase of her population, will in a 241
couple of years have no more wheat available for export, (423)
and in ten or twelve years it will be the same with maize. It
is imperative, therefore, for the Government to take without
delay the steps necessary to increase the yield. This can
only be done if the State will undertake to provide selected
seed corn, to establish rural banks to enable the peasantry
to obtain advances of funds at cheap rates in order to buy
machinery and implements, and to create model farms in
which more modern methods of cultivation might be demon-
strated practically. If grain elevators were also constructed
in important agricultural centres, and adequate storage
accommodation made available, it would be easy to advance
money to farmers on the security of the cereals they could
store as a pledge. And if Rumania decided to return to 241
methods of legality and offer safeguards to foreign capital 454
there would be no difficulty whatever in obtaining all the
capital she requires for financing such operations, as they
would then prove perfectly sound. It is this utter lack of
capital which has handicapped the development of agricul-
ture since the war, for the smallholder had to pay usurious
rates of interest (40 to 60 per cent being current), while prior
to the war large owners could obtain advances from the
banks on very reasonable terms. It would be altogether 423
unjustifiable, therefore, to assert, as some people allege, 241
that the breaking up of the large estates had led to the 454
decline of agriculture. On the contrary, it is this measure
which has permitted agriculture to survive, for owing to the
systematic diversion of capital from agriculture to industry,
the owners of the large estates would have found themselves
in a worse fix than the smallholders if they had continued to
exist and therefore required advances for the maintenance
of their estates, as was formerly their wont. Without liquid
assets they would have found themselves utterly unable to
carry on the cultivation of those large estates, while the
smallholder, by dint of hard work and privation, has man- 241
aged to keep his patch of land under the plough. Some 423
persons may retort that, if the breaking up of the large 420
estates had proved to be a practical operation, the rural
population would not have run into debt to the extent of

M

241 423 426 some 80 milliard lei, and obliged the Government to pass the law decreeing the conversion of agrarian debts, in order to save the peasantry from the predicament of being dispossessed of their land by their creditors. The large owners, however, were in as bad a plight and perhaps worse off, for when the legislation concerning the cancellation of agrarian debts was under discussion in the Chamber, the director of the *Argus* suggested that Ministers and deputies should be excluded from being among the beneficiaries of the proposed law, so that they should not be accused later of having passed such a revolutionary measure mainly for self-interested motives. His suggestion was not supported, a fact which would tend to prove that large owners were perhaps more insistent on the adoption of this measure than smallholders, to many of whom it has proved highly prejudicial.

That the agrarian revolution did not solely profit the peasantry, and that others took advantage of it to appropriate lands to which they had no right, and that the latter were more insistent on the voting of the law for the conversion of agrarian debts, is an undisputed fact. This is proved also by an interview published by the *Adeverul* on September 9th, 1930, in which Prof. Iorga was reported to have said: "When the expropriation of the large estates was carried out many mistakes and injustices were committed. Real cultivators were not endowed with land in order that in their place land should be bestowed on various political partisans, electoral agents, and others who had nothing in common with the land or agriculture. Having thus secured the land, they set about to increase their holdings by buying up with borrowed money adjoining tracks, and started exploiting them on American methods. But their calculations were erroneous, because with us agriculture is not profitable except for the owner who himself cultivates his land. This category of landowners should not be assimilated with the peasantry, and the State should not assume charge of their debts." This wise recommendation, however, was not followed, and large owners were permitted to a certain extent to take advantage of the law of conversion of agrarian debts.

241 426 453 That it was absolutely indispensable to extend some help to the peasantry no one will dispute, but this law of con-

version of agrarian debts will probably do more harm than good in the long run, not only because it has undermined confidence and ruined the banks, but also on account of the adverse effects it will have on agriculture itself, for it brings no relief to the peasant in the way of obtaining the credit facilities he needs, but on the contrary it renders borrowing now almost impossible. Prior to the promulgation of this law both banking institutions and private persons who had lent money to peasants were ready to help them, if by so doing they could recover part of their debts; there was a certain sense of solidarity between creditor and debtor; now, however, that the law has arbitrarily stepped in between them and settled their relations, practically ruining the creditors, the latter have no longer the means nor any interest to assist their debtors. Another disastrous outcome of the law is the loss of all the savings which the more industrious among the peasantry may have had, and which naturally were placed in the keeping of the rural banks now rendered insolvent. It is calculated that these sums amount to some 6 milliard lei. This law, therefore, instead of encouraging the more progressive peasants, has ruined them and reduced them to the level of the more indolent. Another drawback in this law is that it subjects all land, the owners of which take advantage of its clauses, to a certain legal servitude for 30 years, precluding the owners from mortgaging it and contracting loans, although the securing of fresh credit constitutes their most pressing need. It may be taken for granted that, in consequence of this law, the area sown will be considerably less in extent this year, owing to the impossibility for the peasants to obtain timely advances for cultivating their fields, and also to the discouragement of the most enterprising among them, who lost their capital through the failure of the banks.

This law, if not repealed, will be yet another obstacle to the creation of a rural mortgage bank, of which the country is in such dire need, for peasants taking advantage of the conversion law cannot mortgage their holdings. The necessary preliminary for the normal working of such an institution would be the creation of cadastral registration, which is non-existent in the country. If the Rumanian Government

241 426 453 really intended to revert to a régime of legality and to the granting of adequate security to foreign capital, there would be hardly any difficulties in its obtaining the necessary aid from abroad in order to permit the establishment of such an institution, and in order to save time it would be politic on its part if without further delay it took the requisite steps to prepare a cadastral register or ground-book. Such measures of self-aid would prove more efficacious than the solicitation at international conferences of preferential rates for Rumanian agricultural produce. For they would help to convince foreign investors that Rumania had at last decided to put her house in order, a decision which, if seriously taken, would probably cause foreign capital to come to her aid and bring to her corresponding or equal advantages to those she would derive from the obtaining of the preferential rates for which she is now craving as a favour from industrial States. There are no insuperable obstacles to the salving of Rumanian agriculture. All that is needed is cheap credit and the lowering of the cost of industrial products used by 241 the peasantry. These *desiderata* may be secured whenever 461 the Government decides to change its methods and adopt as its guiding principles honesty, retrenchment, and austerity. After all, the peasants have done more than their share, and no greater effort can be demanded of them. One who has witnessed the long heartbreak of endless and often unrequited labour that has been their lot, and the fortitude with which they have faced the apathy the State has so far shown towards them, can have no doubts as to the response a little encouragement would evoke from them. Without decent seed grain, and with the most primitive implements, it was but natural that the yield per hectare should decrease. Nevertheless, the steady although small increase of the area under cultivation is a convincing proof that the peasants have never stinted their labour and that they are determined to persist to the extreme limits of human endurance in their efforts to wrest a bare subsistence from the soil. The following table will be found to confirm fully what has been stated 241 above, namely, that while the area cultivated has been 433 maintained, the yield per hectare is on the whole diminishing:

AGRICULTURE

	Average for 5 years 1922—1926		1927		1928		1929		1930		1931	
	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.
Wheat	2,806	24,250	3,118	26,320	2,814	31,440	2,664	28,000	3,055	36,000	3,466	36,800
Rye	287	2,280	277	2,470	319	2,910	310	3,400	391	4,800	407	3,600
Oats	1,197	9,530	1,185	8,420	1,304	9,800	1,200	13,600	1,087	11,600	871	6,700
Barley	1,668	13,180	1,749	13,310	2,190	15,110	2,000	30,400	1,975	23,700	1,919	14,100
Maize	3,593	40,790	3,847	35,330	4,626	27,530	4,790	60,800	4,426	45,200	4,754	63,600
Total	9,551	90,003	10,176	85,850	11,253	86,790	10,944	136,200	10,934	121,100	11,417	124,800

AVERAGE CROP YIELDS IN QUINTALS PER HECTARE

	Average for 1911/15	Average for 1921/26	Average for 1926/30	1929	1930	1931
Wheat ...	11.9	8.7	9.8	9.9	11.6	10.6
Rye ...	9.0	7.9	10.1	10.8	11.9	8.7
Oats ...	9.2	7 7	10.1	11.2	10.6	7.7
Barley ...	10.5	7.6	10.4	13.3	12.0	7.4
Maize ...	13.6	10.7	10.6	13.3	10.2	13.7

The above figures show that there is a vast scope for an improvement, for in Central European countries the average yield of wheat per hectare is about 20 quintals and in Denmark and Great Britain higher yields are common with a much poorer soil than that of Rumania.

241
311
433

RUMANIA

241 The following table indicates the proportions of lands de-
311 voted to the various cultures and the distribution among the different provinces, according to official statistics for the year 1930:

Arable land in:	Area in hectares.	Percentage of total.
Old Kingdom	6,515,995	22.09
Bessarabia	2,915,941	9.88
Bucovina	311,616	1.06
Transylvania	3,113,500	10.55
Total of arable lands ...	12,857,112	43.58
Meadows and pastures ...	4,054,475	13.75
Orchards and Vineyards ...	613,614	2.08
Forests	7,134,200	24.18
Unproductive lands, roads, sites of buildings, rivers, mines, etc.	4,837,399	16.41
Total Area	29,496,700	100.00

From the above it will be seen that there is little scope for bringing more land under cultivation, and that an expansion in the output must be sought by improving the method of cultivation. Of course there is a vast expanse of marshes along the Danube which may be reclaimed—the total area of these is computed at two million hectares—and if they were turned to account they would considerably augment the arable area. It may be added that similar works of reclamation have been undertaken in Bulgaria and Greece and have been reported to be remunerative.

241 Besides cereals, industrial plants such as hemp, colza,
249 sun-flower, tobacco, sugar-beet are grown, some 399,506 hectares being sown with them. The sugar-beet industry is sufficiently developed to provide for the total requirements of the country and to allow even for an export surplus. There are 14 sugar refineries, with invested capital of 3,300 million lei and occupying some 15,000 workmen. It was reported in the *Ar*[illegible]*s* of February 20th, 1932, which took up the defence of the industry and emphasized the necessity of granting it adequate protection (since it prevented some 700 million lei from being annually remitted abroad), that the State
[651] obtained a revenue of 13.70 lei per kg., or 42 per cent of the official price at which sugar was sold; that agriculturalists obtained 20 per cent, merchants 5 per cent, manufacturing and packing accounted for the remaining 33 per cent. But when expenses were deducted the net profit available to the

refineries did not exceed 1.65 lei per kg. The total consumption of sugar, averaging 100,000,000 kgs. per annum, would thus yield a net profit of 165 million lei, which represented a return of 5 per cent on the invested capital. The cultivation of beet-sugar was reported to be considerably more profitable to the peasant than wheat, for while one hectare sown with wheat yielded 1,200 kgs., which would fetch 2,700 lei, one hectare sown with sugar-beet produced 20,000 kgs., which was bought by the refineries for 16,000 lei. 241 249

Though the actual production of cereals surpasses that of the pre-war period, the quantity exported shows a considerable diminution. Transylvania and Bucovina do not produce enough grain for their needs, and cover their requirements by imports. The relative values of the various cereals, as well as the quantities available for export from the 1929 harvest and those consumed locally or used for seed, are given below: 243

Crop	Total interior consumption in quintals.	Quantities available for export in quintals.	Total production in quintals.	Total value in million lei.
Wheat ...	25,600,000	2,400,000	28,000,000	19,600
Rye ...	2,100,000	1,300,000	3,400,000	2,049
Oats ...	8,000,000	5,600,000	13,600,000	5,169
Barley ...	7,600,000	22,800,000	30,400,000	12,768
Maize ...	34,000,000	26,800,000	60,800,000	30,400
Total ...	77,300,000	58,900,000	136,200,000	69,975

Of the available quantity for export only about half was shipped, viz., 28,000,000 quintals, while from the harvest of 1930 the quantity exported was 29,500,000 quintals.

The harvests of the last three years were abundant, and their respective yields in quantity differed but little. Owing, however, to the catastrophic fall in prices, the sums at which they were marketed varied considerably.

	Total production of all cerials.	Total estimated value in lei.
1929	136,200,000 quintals	69,975,000,000
1030	121,100,000 ,,	28,905,000,000
1931	124,800,000 ,,	24,311,000,000

RUMANIA

243 The following were the average prices of the principal cereals at the port of Constantsa per ton during the years 1928–1931, according to the bulletin of the Constantsa Chamber of Commerce:

		1928	1929	1930	1931
Barley	...	5,900	4,580	2,430	1,800
Oats	...	3,400	2,440	1,800	1,520
Maize	...	5,280	4,010	2,600	1,800
Wheat	...	5,280	4,010	2,600	2,550

241 433 If it be remembered that the value of the agricultural production of Rumania constitutes about 60 to 65 per cent of the whole national revenue, it is easy to realize what a terrible strain such a sudden and brusque diminution in the resources of the country is likely to throw on the entire structure of its economic and social life. For the period of 1926–28 the national revenue was computed at 171 milliard lei, of which 110 milliards were derived from agriculture. According to the *Argus* of February 13th, 1932, this last figure for 1931 had declined to 46.5 milliards.

245 Among the 613,614 hectares occupied by orchards and vineyards, some 209,321 hectares are planted with plum trees which yield an annual average crop of about 5 million quintals of fruit, the yields for the years 1928–30 being respectively 28, 9.5, and 14.6 quintals per hectare. The vine is also very extensively cultivated, 239,825 hectares being planted with it. In 1930 the amount of wine obtained from the grapes grown attained about 8,385,374 hectoliters, about half of which was produced in Bessarabia.

241 231 The position of the livestock population in a country of small farmsteads like Rumania is liable to exert a great influence on agriculture, for not only are horses and horned cattle used as draught animals, but their manure is the only kind of fertiliser applied to the fields, so that the gradual reconstitution of the livestock situation after the serious damages inflicted on it during the war is a reassuring sign. The recovery would have been much more rapid if the export taxes on cattle and meat had not discouraged the cattle breeders by unduly restraining exports. The following

figures show the livestock population during the pre-war 241
period and for the years 1926 and 1930: 231

Livestock.	Pre-war figures for all regions forming part of present-day Rumania.	1926.	1930.
Horses and donkeys ...	2,678,000	1,890,000	1,818,560
Horned cattle ...	6,760,000	4,992,000	4,011,141
Sheep and goats ...	15,250,000	14,059,000	12,273,347
Pigs	4,634,000	3,168,000	2,322,971

BANKING

The meagre capital resources of Rumania proved inade- 453
quate to the task allotted to them after the war and the general dislocation it had caused. Banks were called upon to finance the reparation of the damage suffered in the territories of the old kingdom, to advance moneys to the rural population which had just been endowed with land, and to furnish capital for the execution of the policy of industrialization to which the country had committed itself. The banks were subjected to a heavy strain, but owing to the financial assistance they received from foreign banking firms this was somewhat relieved. Unfortunately, very often less circumspection than the situation called for was shown in the granting of credits, for in many cases other considerations than those obtaining in Western countries prevailed, and as a result several banking firms were put in jeopardy through immobilization of too great a share of their assets in industrial undertakings.

The report of the experts on the liquidation of the Bank Dacia, of Iassi, published in the *Argus* on June 17th, 1931, is sufficiently enlightening on the subject. This bank, the total capital of which was only 20 million lei, had invested 70 millions in industrial enterprises, and the managers were blamed for not having asked for the winding-up of the bank when they no longer disposed of even one-third of the capital, as was stipulated in the statutes.

According to official statistics, at the end of 1929 there were in existence 1,097 banks, with a paid-up capital of 11,180 million lei. The great majority, however, were very small concerns which hardly deserve the preten-

453 tious appellation of "bank," which they bestowed on themselves, for they are mere money-lending firms of very dubious standing. There are only about 12 firms that may be called banks, and these hold between them about one-quarter of the aggregate banking capital. The offices of all these firms is at Bucarest, except that of the Banca Comerţului, which is at Craiova. Besides these private banks there were 4,757 popular banks, with a capital of 7,248 million lei, in operation at the end of 1929. These banks operate mainly in rural districts and are of great help to the peasants, to whom they provide funds and also offer a method for the investment of their savings. They are run on co-operative lines and counted a membership of 1,003,082, the great majority being agriculturalists. The depositors at these banks numbered some 478,315, with a total amount on deposit of 1,417 million lei, while the paid-up capital was 1,801 millions.

426 The recent law decreeing the conversion of agrarian debts
453 will completely paralyze the activities of all banks in Rumania, and will work inestimable harm to the peasantry, as credit will be entirely disorganized. The passing of the law caused consternation, and most banks decided to go into liquidation. According to the reports published in the Press of a meeting held at Cluj on May 8th, 1932, at which were present delegates from all the Rumanian banks of Transylvania, it was considered that this was the only course left open to them. It was stated that these banks had a capital of 1,200 millions and deposits amounting to 3,000 millions, so that the law of conversion extinguished at one stroke all the capital of the banks and immobilized for 30 years half of the deposits they had received. The representative of the banks of Cluj stated that "such a stunning blow has not been experienced since the Rumanian banks of Transylvania were founded some sixty years ago. Many cherish the illusion that it is yet possible for the banks to survive. My opinion is that no banking institution in Transylvania will henceforth be able to function. Within three months we shall see the disastrous effects of the law; there is nothing left but to liquidate." The extent to which the banks will be affected can be realized if it be noted that the estimated

amount owed by agriculturalists is some 80 milliard lei. So 426
that even if only half of them availed themselves of the law, 453
this would mean an immediate wiping out of about 20 milliards of capital and the immobilization of another 20 milliards for a period of 30 years. On this half of their debt agriculturists will be paying 4 per cent interest, while the banks which have borrowed the sums they had advanced to the peasants are paying 7 to 10 per cent interest. When it is considered that the total capital and reserves of private banks in Rumania hardly reaches 15 milliards, one can realize what a staggering blow this law will be to the economic life of the country. It is true that over four milliards worth of bills belonging to agriculturalists have been rediscounted by the National Bank of Rumania, and that the State has undertaken to indemnify this bank for the loss it will sustain on this head; yet the balance of the loss caused by this astounding law is so formidable that one wonders how the private banks are to survive the blow. One may also question the capacity of the State to find adequate means wherewith to indemnify the National Bank for its losses, seeing that its own plight is so hopeless that its own officials have been left unpaid for months.

It may be apposite to record the opinion of the members 426
of the legal profession in Transylvania and the Banat concerning this law, which is likely to ruin all the banks in the country. Members of this profession met at Cluj on June 5th, 1932, and passed a resolution in which it was affirmed: "That this law, which permits the confiscation of property and annuls acquired rights, is unconstitutional. That it is contrary to the established principles of thousands of years and overthrows the legal order on which the present social order is established. That in consequence this meeting moves that this law should be abrogated and replaced by another, which, while solving the problem of agrarian debts, should be in conformity with the constitution and with the established principles of justice. . . ."

Even before the passage of the law of conversion of 453
agrarian debts most of the banks were in a precarious condition, owing to the fact that they had sunk a large fraction of their assets in industrial undertakings which, at the

453 best, were hazardous ventures. Runs on the banks were frequent, even State institutions such as the Agricultural Bank saw its deposits shrink from 42 millions in December, 1930 to 17 millions in March, 1931. During 1931 one of the leading Rumanian banks, the old-established firm of Marmorosch Blank and Co., was obliged to suspend payments, and this failure increased the prevailing scepticism which the public had so far entertained as to the solvability of the banks. The following table, showing the respective prices of leading bank stocks, is indicative of the continued depression under which these institutions are labouring and of the absence of any hopefulness at the present time:

FIGURES ARE GIVEN IN LEI.

Bank.	Average annual quotation, 1929.	Average annual quotation, 1930.	Price in June, 1931.	Price in June, 1932.
National Bank	12,782	6,788	4,900	3,525
Marmorosch Blank & Co. ...	1,207	854	710	——
Banca Romaneasca ...	950	676	500	185
Banca Generala Tarii Romanesti	708	360	90	50
Banca de Scont	308	217	90	30
Banca Comertului (Craiova)	889	633	300	90
Banca Comerciala Italiana si Romana	848	706	675	450
Banca de Credit Roman ...	1,058	665	500	175
Banca Agricola	194	100	70	20
Banca Commerciala Romana	1,482	782	500	250

INDUSTRY

433 To the policy of industrialization, adopted not only by Rumania but also by other neighbouring States, may be ascribed a large share of the crisis that Europe is now traversing. For the creation of parasitic as well as redundant industries, which can only exist under the protection of high tariffs, has had as a result the shrinkage of the markets in which Western European industrial products were sold. This in its turn brought about a diminution of the buying power of these latter nations, who so far had constituted the sole customers for the agricultural produce of the Near East.

Another result of the creation of these industries was the burdening of the populations of Near Eastern Europe with

a cumbersome load of indirect taxation disproportionate to 433
their resources, by which these industries had to be supported, and the further handicapping of these rural populations by the obligation imposed on them to purchase all the industrial articles they required at inflated prices, owing to the fact that these local industries were unprofitable and had to recoup themselves by selling their products at excessive prices under the protection of a high customs barrier.

This policy brought about the gradual pauperization of the rural populations, and the dissipation of the exiguous liquid wealth which the agrarian States had sunk in these artificially created industries. Thus the capital so urgently needed for the development of their agriculture was frittered away through the prevalence of the irrational idea that concentration on agriculture necessarily implies an inferior economic status.

Two policies were now open to these agrarian states: either a further intensification of industry, which necessarily would have to be extended to all domains of activity if it was to succeed (a policy that would clearly end in the final adoption of the collectivist or communist system), or the abandonment of industrialization, followed by the concentration of all available resources on agriculture, mining, and on such industries as find their raw materials locally produced. But this latter course can no longer be adopted except with the financial aid and with the moral and economic co-operation of the Western European States, which will have to choose between the narrow-minded pursuit of self-interest, a policy which is tantamount to condemning these industrial communities to slow death by inanition, or that of embarking on a bold programme of economic co-operation which would once more clear the choked-up channels of international intercourse and allow the vivifying stream of trade to circulate. This is the only salutary path, obstructed though it may be by the stumbling-blocks of well-entrenched vested interests, ready to play upon the emotional nature of an intransigent nationalism whenever they deem it to their interest to discredit international co-operation by decrying all foreign intervention as an affront to the national dignity and a menace to national independence.

000 Though the obstacles may seem insuperable, yet actual suffering must have rendered the agrarian States more amenable to reason, so that one may hope with some confidence that they will not spurn a helping hand. To the layman it would appear to be more rational to go to the assistance of over 50,000,000 of potential customers, inhabiting the five mainly agrarian States of South-Eastern Europe, than to dissipate our energy and resources in the attempt to buttress up Germany.[1]

We may as well face the plain truth that in present-day Europe there is no longer room for two mainly industrial States living solely by exports, and that to make this possible it would be indispensable to scrap all protected industries in Europe and institute universal free trade. As this cannot be accomplished, we would act wisely if we abandoned the present task of salvaging Germany. Patronizing has not been a very propitious policy to us. Our friendship for the Japanese has resulted in our loss of the Chinese market and in the emergence of a most formidable rival to our Lancashire cotton industry, and our present quixotic attitude towards Germany, were it to succeed, would bring in its train even greater difficulties.

433 471 The policy of industrialization was adopted by Rumania after the war, when her frontiers had been sufficiently enlarged to provide an apparently large local market. During the pre-war years Rumania used to import from abroad some 85 per cent of the industrial articles she required, and such industries as she possessed were principally those the raw materials of which were locally provided, namely the milling, brewing, sugar-beet, and lumber industries. In 1913 there were only about 45,000 workmen employed in these occupations, and the total capital invested amounted to about 750 million lei. The acquisition of Transylvania and the Banat (where, owing to the presence of minerals and coal, an industry had developed) increased considerably the number of industrial enterprises in Rumania and led to similar industries being set up in the old kingdom

[1] This was the pet scheme of our bankers, owing to which we were forced to go off the gold standard. (See an article by J. A. Hobson in the "Contemporary Review" for November, 1931).

through a spirit of ill-conceived emulation. According to 433 official statistics there were in 1929 a total of 3,736 industrial 471 establishments, with an invested capital of 40,284 million lei, and employing 201,184 workpeople. Of these firms 1391 were in the old kingdom and 1789 in the Banat and Transylvania. The continuous fall in the purchasing power of the population, the lack of adequate working capital, which forces these industries to borrow money at high rates of interest owing to the prevailing monetary stringency, the disorganization of credit, the diminution of State purchases, and the non-payment by the State for the goods ordered by it from these industrial firms, have placed most of them in jeopardy, and it is very doubtful whether they will be able to survive the present crisis unless the State intervenes further on their behalf.

The following table sets forth the data concerning the various branches of industry operating during the year 1929:

Industry.	Number of establishments.	Capital (million lei.)	H.P. used.	Annual value of output in million lei.	Workpeople employed.
Metallurgical	448	6,444	84,775	8,443	40,236
Electrotechnical	12	83	2,026	208	839
Timber	787	3,457	73,827	5,362	41,656
Food and Aliments	1,004	11,686	126,336	15,312	25,644
Textile	516	5,515	40,421	8,448	35,963
Leather goods	211	1,406	15,117	2,614	7,925
Glassware	35	505	2,500	602	4,218
Building materials ...	296	2,085	52,981	1,573	13,963
Pottery	32	119	683	104	834
Chemical	248	6,131	69,326	11,011	19,238
Paper and Graphic Arts ...	147	2,128	29,971	2,447	10,668

The metallurgical industries have been developed to such [32] an extent that practically all the current implements, from pails and wire to railway locomotives and waggons, as well as agricultural machinery, are locally produced in sufficient quantities for the requirements of the local market.

RUMANIA

433 The alimentary industry includes the important sections of sugar-refining, milling, alcohol distillation, and brewing.

[288] The textile industries have shown the greatest expansion, owing to the excessive protection they have enjoyed. The woollen industry is capable now of producing excellent cloths, most of the yarn being supplied by the local spinning mills, which employ wools produced in the country.

The artificial silk and cotton mills obtain their yarn from abroad, practically duty free, and are able to supply about three-fourths of the local requirements. Only the better qualities of cottons are imported, while foreign silks are practically excluded by the prohibitive duty imposed on them.

The knitting industry has also secured a complete control of the market, and no foreign knitted articles are imported.

[313] The lumber industry was some time ago one of the most prosperous in the country. Until 1925 its output was about 3,200,000 cubic metres of timber, out of which some two million cubic metres were exported annually. Since 1930 the demand has fallen off very considerably, and huge stocks have accumulated, and as prices have dropped the sawmills are registering immense losses. Thus one well-known timber firm, the Foresta, had sustained a loss of 250 million lei during 1930, and it may be said that actually all the timber industry is in a very precarious condition, owing to its inability to cope with Russian competition.

[282] The leather industry obtains all its raw material locally, and its production of sole leather and uppers is sufficient for the home requirements. Even gloves, leather cases, etc., are manufactured locally, and only a very limited quantity of fine and superior leather is now being imported.

000 The following table shows a detailed list of imports during 1930:

The following table shows a detailed list of imports during 1930:

439

INDUSTRY

Imports	Tons.	Percentage of total bulk.	Value in 1,000 lei.	Percentage of total value.
Livestock	296	0.04	16,439	0.07
Animal food products	10,240	1.32	221,872	0.98
Furs	120	0.02	244,046	1.08
Leather and leather goods ...	3,309	0.43	485,519	2.15
Wool, hair and goods ...	5,907	0.76	1,365,991	9.06
Natural silk and goods ...	47	0.01	86,746	0.39
Various animal substances ...	3,977	0.51	156,554	0.70
Cereals and derivatives ...	29,802	3.85	306,702	1.36
Seeds	4,133	0.54	113,976	0.51
Vegetable oils	2,331	0.30	96,980	0.43
Vegetables, flowers, etc. ...	9,713	1.26	221,084	0.98
Fruit and groceries	33,315	4.31	818,244	3.63
Beverages	240	0.03	8,422	0.04
Sugar and confectionery ...	1,248	0.16	16,975	0.07
Vegetable textiles	49,592	6.41	6,702,290	29.73
Timber and derivatives ...	13,538	1.75	146,850	0.65
Paper and derivatives ...	13.561	1.75	524,469	2.34
Rubber celluloid & derivatives	8,183	1.05	740,386	3.28
Mineral waters and salts ...	900	0.13	8,355	0.04
Glassware	2,464	0.32	161,939	0.72
Earths, stones and derivatives	83,542	10.80	473,880	2.10
Fuel (mineral) and derivatives	180,841	23.37	302,589	1.34
Iron and ironware	236,723	30.59	3,442,482	15.28
Apparatus, machines & motors	34,604	4.47	2,836,640	12.58
Vehicles	8,539	1.10	638,734	2.83
Metals and metalloids other than iron	12,473	1.61	868,706	3.86
Toys	215	0.03	40,836	0.18
Musical instruments ...	472	0.06	139,055	0.62
Optical instruments	126	0.01	101,446	0.45
Watches and clocks	153	0.02	77,480	0.34
Jewellery	73	0.01	41,410	0.18
Chemicals and medicines ...	14,673	1.89	606,471	2.69
Perfumery	47	0.01	48,744	0.21
Colours and varnishes ...	7,620	0.89	373,402	1.66
Explosives	728	0.99	105,215	0.47
Totals	7,737,745	100.00	22,540,929	100.00

OIL & MINING INDUSTRIES

In spite of the continuous increase in the output of crude oil (the output for 1931 amounting to 48 million barrels), the industry is facing a most critical situation owing to the Russian competition and low world prices, excessive transport charges, and high taxation. Notwithstanding these adverse factors, however, the output of oil is steadily increasing, Rumania now being the fourth largest producer of petroleum, as may be seen from the following table:

315
382

N

RUMANIA

315
382

Production in millions of barrels

	1931	1930	1929
U.S.A.	856	898	1007
Russia	158	135	99
Venezuela	118	137	137
Rumania	48	42	35
Persia	47	45	42

315 According to a report published by the *Adeverul* of Janu-
382 ary 21st, 1932, of which a summary is given below, there
651 are no signs of an early improvement:

"The recent abrogation of the law extending certain subsidies to small producers has created much dissatisfaction, for this enactment, while rescinding the advantages already granted, maintained taxes recently imposed. Only a few of the producers who possessed refineries of their own had so far been able to secure the subsidies that the law had allocated to them, and that only indirectly, as they have been simply credited with these sums, which they will eventually be allowed to use against payment of taxes to the State. As the situation of the public finances is unsatisfactory, one can scarcely hope that these subsidies will be paid out shortly to the rest of the producers.

Another question which preoccupies the industry is the
315 marketing of the heavy oil residues, the output of which in
382 1930 amounted to 1,959,371 metric tons. Though this residue constitutes an excellent fuel, its manipulation is difficult and necessitates a large expenditure for the construction of special receptacles. Some companies, in order to get rid of their accumulated big stocks, had recourse to a new method, that of destroying them by fire. This is a disastrous solution for all concerned, and many members of the industrial community affirm that the problem could be solved if our railway administration would reduce its transport charges, so as to permit the marketing of this product abroad at the prevailing world prices. As the railway administration, however, refuses to make concessions in the matter, the oil companies see no other solution than to construct a new special pipe-line to Constantsa, though this scheme meets with violent opposition from railway circles. . . ."

OIL AND MINING INDUSTRIES

The above article shows how erroneous were the views of the late V. Bratianu in decreeing the nationalization of the oil deposits in order to prevent foreign companies from sharing in the development of the oil industry. The native producers, being without adequate capital resources, have been unable to take advantage of the benefits the mining law meant to reserve for them. They have undoubtedly contributed in increasing the crude oil output, but on the other hand, not possessing the means either to provide for its refining or its marketing, they have only contributed towards creating a glut on the market which is disastrous to themselves, but which unfortunately also affects adversely, though to a lesser degree, the foreign companies in Rumania. 315 382

Yet it could easily have been foreseen that an increase in the crude oil output would necessitate the expenditure of large sums of money for the construction of refineries, storage tanks, pipe-lines, tank-wagons, etc., all of which would have to be secured from abroad, seeing that the financial resources of Rumania were utterly inadequate to cope with the demands which were made on them from all sides. The [489] scheme for the construction of a second pipe-line from the oil-fields to Constantsa, mooted by the companies, has been definitely rejected owing to the intervention of the railway administration, which naturally wanted to reserve as much as possible of the transport of the oil for itself. It has offered to grant increased transport facilities for oil, but it is very doubtful whether it will be able to fulfil its promises, because the bridge over the Danube at Cernavoda carries only a single track and its carrying capacity is limited. The construction of a second pipe-line to Constantsa therefore seems to be indispensable. The one already existing between Ploeşti and Constantsa has a total length of 320 km. Some 3,000 tons of oil may be pumped through it in 24 hours, and in 1931 the total quantity of motor oil conveyed through this pipe-line amounted to 753,000 tons. Another pipe-line exists between Ploeşti and Giurgiu, on the Danube, 180 km. in length, but the main port by which petroleum products are exported is Constantsa. In 1931, 3,926,247 tons were shipped from that port.

The principal oilfields extend in a semi-circular strip on the

315 southern slopes of the bend of the Carpathians, where the
382 mountains gradually merge into the plains of Wallachia and Moldavia. About two-thirds of the production is secured from the regions of Moreni and Ochiuri, the basins of the rivers Prahova and Dombovitsa furnishing almost 90 per cent of the total yield. There are minor fields farther east in the neighbourhood of Buzau, and also in Moldavia in the region of Bacau. The main oil refineries are situated at Ploeşti. The capital invested in the oil industry is estimated at 11 milliard lei, 60 per cent of which is Rumanian. The number of workmen employed in the industry is about 30,000. The output of crude oil for the years 1928–30 was:

Year	*Tons*	*Estimated value in lei*
1928	4,282,377	7,345,923,066
1929	4,836,974	7,441,204,190
1930	5,792,311	6,552,118,582

About half of the yield was from oilfields owned by the State. The ratio for 1930 was 3,083,468 tons from State-
[47] owned oilfields, or 53.20 per cent, and 2,708,843 tons, or 46.80 per cent, from privately-owned oilfields. The quantities produced were distributed per region as follows: Prahova, 4,275,721 tons; Dambovița, 1,390,215 tons; Buzau, 61,225 tons; Bacau, 65,150 tons.

Of the total output for 1930, some 1,602,757 tons were consumed locally. At the end of June, 1932, it was reported that the total monthly output had attained about 543,000 tons, the average monthly production of the principal companies being as follows: Astra Romana, 109,464 tons; Steaua Romana, 83,667 tons; Concordia, 78,974 tons; Creditul Minier, 27,760 tons; Romano-Americana, 33,800 tons; Phoenix, 65,286 tons; Prahova, 20,878 tons; and Columbia, 17,564 tons.

315 Prices of petroleum products having dropped to the extent
484 of 75 per cent since 1928, the Rumanian oil industry is pass-
382 ing through an era of grave depression which is causing a very serious repercussion on the whole economic life of the country, taking into account the great amount of capital in-

vested in it and the high contribution it is expected to make to the revenue of the State. The average price in lei of petroleum products per ton during the years 1928–31 were as follows, as reported by the Constantsa *Chamber of Commerce Bulletin*: 1928, at 4,080; 1929, at 3,800; 1930, at 2,600; 1931, at 1,031 lei. The following table, which gives quotations of the leading oil shares on the Bucarest stock market, is indicative of the depression which exists:

Average annual quotations

Share	1929	1930	*June* 1931	*June* 1932
Astra Romana ...	2391	1430	500	340
Steaua Romana ...	1234	571	230	135
Speranta	1210	639	380	100
Petrol Block ...	320	176	75	54
Concordia	1286	767	265	250
Creditul Minier ...	690	364	185	90
Redeventa	321	182	65	30
I.R.D.P.	397	143	92	35

The other mineral resources of Rumania are considerable, especially in Transylvania, but no proper geological survey has ever been made, nor have any mines other than salt mines ever been properly exploited. The following figures give the quantities of minerals mined during 1930, the total value of the same being estimated at 10,437 million lei: Lignite, 2,071,057 tons; coal, 298,825 tons; copper, 6,655 tons and 169; iron, 92,517 tons; manganese, 33,528 tons; bauxite, 678 tons; pyrites, 24,264 tons; amber, 107 tons; salt, 304,777 tons; lead and antimony, 984 tons; lead glaze, 194 tons; gold, 2,672 kilograms, silver, 4.418 kilograms.

Lignite is found in extensive beds not only in Transylvania and the Banat but also in the old kingdom. It is mainly used for the railways. The better qualities of coal are found in south-western Transylvania and the Banat. Copper is principally mined at Tulcea, near the mouth of the Danube, and at Ciuc in Transylvania.

RUMANIA

THE RAILWAYS AND COMMUNICATIONS

4% The Rumanian railways may be said to consist of three different systems interconnected by a few single lines, which are inadequate for the purpose. These three groups consist of:

(1) The railways of the old kingdom, mainly radiating from Bucarest, and aiming at feeding the traffic of the Danubian ports and Constantsa;

(2) The railways of Transylvania, directed towards Budapest.

(3) The lines of Bessarabia, directed towards Odessa.

At the suspension of hostilities the railways were in a complete state of dislocation, the Austro-Germans having destroyed a large number of bridges on their withdrawal and left behind them only fifty locomotives. The railway tracks in Bessarabia, having formed part of the Russian railway system, were of wider gauge than the normal, so that the lines had to be re-laid and the rolling stock replaced. At first sight it would seem that there was an imperative need to connect western Transylvania with Oltenia by prolonging the railway line along the River Jiu, facilitate central Transylvania's access to the sea by linking up Brașov with Buzau, connect northern Transylvania with Bucovina via Vatra Dornei, and join up Bessarabia on the one hand with Moldavia, and on the other with the Danube mouths, so as to provide this province with a new outlet in place of the Russian port of Odessa. In 1912 a vast programme of railway construction had been elaborated by Al. Coltescu, then director-general of the railways. This comprised the construction of new lines which are of essential importance even to-day, namely:

(1) Extending the line ending at Curtea de Argeș to Jiblea, on the River Olt, thereby shortening the distance between Bucarest and western Transylvania by several hours.

(2) Constructing a new direct line from Craiova via Caracal, Rosiori de Vede, and Vida to Bucarest, and prolonging it to Urziceni and thence either to Buzau or Faurei.

THE RAILWAYS AND COMMUNICATIONS

(3) Prolonging the line along the river Jiu and linking it up with the Transylvanian system at Petroşani. 496

(4) Constructing a line from Tecuciu to Faurei and Giurgeni, the latter at the mouth of the Ialomitsa river, building a bridge over the Danube at Harşova, and connecting the latter with Constantsa.

(5) Terminating the line Medjidia-Tulcea, via Babadag.

Owing to the war this plan had not been carried out, so that a very extensive amount of construction remained to be undertaken, the more so since, besides the lines enumerated above, several important lines had to be constructed in Transylvania in order to provide more direct communication between Cluj and Brasov.

It was roughly estimated that an outlay of some forty milliard lei would be required for the carrying out of the construction of the new lines considered indispensable for the normal development of traffic, but as this sum could not be raised locally, and as the economic policy pursued by Rumania since 1919 precluded the raising of so large a sum abroad, not more than one hundred kilometres have been constructed since 1923. This is an astounding policy in view of the paramount importance of railway communications, both from the point of view of the development as well as that of the defence of the country. Actually all idea of new construction has been abandoned, and the justification given is that the railways cannot be run economically; but this is entirely due to the prevailing mismanagement, and sufficient evidence will be offered in support of this statement. After spending vast sums for the construction of the line Braşov–Buzau, all work has been suspended, and no new lines are expected to be opened for traffic in the near future except some 45 kms. between Chişinau and Sachaidache.

At the end of 1931 the railway system consisted of 11,133 kms. of track, but all this was single track, with the exception of 203 kms. of double track connecting Bucarest via Ploeşti with Campina, and Ploeşti with Buzau. This total of 11,133 kms. also includes 716 kms. of narrow-gauge railways.

The railway lines in the new provinces were laid out to suit different requirements than those actually prevailing,

496 and the unification of the whole system can only be realized by the construction of connecting lines between what so far has been three distinct systems. The laying of double tracks on trunk lines is also imperatively needed in certain sections, such as that of Constantsa-Feteşti. Several offers by foreign groups were made for the reorganization of the railways, but the Rumanian Government would not agree to the stipulations set forth by foreign capitalists, namely, that they should exercise control over the expenditure and that they should be guaranteed repayment. It is indeed strange that financiers should be expected to advance funds without adequate security, especially to an administration which has been characterized by disorder and waste, and that to an extent surpassing what is customary even in Rumania. The methods employed in running the railway system are generally indicative of the chaotic manner in which the whole machinery of government is being run, and will serve to show that there is little hope for real improvement so long as there is no outside control.

496 661 The whole railway system had been endowed with an autonomous administration in 1925 by the Bratianu Government, but, as was to be expected, the chief purpose of the initiators of this measure was to create as many "cushy jobs" for the veterans of the party as possible, so that instead of a simplification and co-ordination there ensued a complication bordering on chaos. The disorder rendered control difficult, or well nigh impossible, and has facilitated fraud to an unprecedented extent. No year has passed without discoveries being made of sensational embezzlements perpetrated to the detriment of the railway administration, through which the latter was despoiled of important sums. Even as late as March, 1932, the Press was publishing details of a fresh scandal through which the State railways had been defrauded of several millions. The *Cuvantul* of May 15th, 1932, related that the chief cashier of the railways at Brasov had embezzled over a million lei. On September 7th, 1927, the *Argus* published an article by a former Minister of Communications in which the latter stated that "he estimated the loss suffered by the railways through lack of control to be about 25 per cent of their gross revenue," and he referred

to methods of fraud applied on a wholesale scale at Galatz 496 by which the railways had been systematically defrauded. 661 For instance, whole truckloads of timber forwarded from Bucovina and destined for Giurgiu, on their arrival at Galatz were fraudulently diverted to another destination, so that the consignee at Giurgiu had to be indemnified by the railway administration for the loss of his goods. In another article, published two days later, the writer enlarged on the lack of co-ordination among the different departments of this administration and the total absence of reliable data on which to form an estimate of the situation, a state of affairs that was positively chaotic. As an illustration of this he cited the fact "that while the Under-Secretary of State affirmed that the year 1926 showed a deficit of one milliard and a half lei, the General Manager of the Railways averred on the contrary that there was a surplus of 200 millions"!

Another paper, the *Cuvantul*, which had undertaken a vigorous campaign against the disgraceful disorder prevailing on the railways, referred in its issue of July 24th, 1927, to the following statement of the Under-Secretary of State for Communications: "It is enough to say that according to the accounts there ought to be one milliard and a half of cash, but instead I am 500 millions in debt. This situation is due to the fact that the profit and loss accounts of preceding years have not yet been closed." The *Cuvantul* proceeded to compliment the Under-Secretary for his outspokenness and to condemn M. V. Bratianu for having deliberately misled the public by affirming that the working of the railways was quite normal and that it had been carried on at a profit for the State. Both the *Argus* and the *Cuvantul* continued to publish articles emphasizing the necessity of foreign loans being obtained so that the railway system might be properly reorganized, and laying stress on the disastrous consequences for the country arising from the actual disorganization. According to these articles, the lines were in complete decay and were almost useless. "The rails of one-fourth of the track were so worn out that it was a miracle that trains could run on them. The number of rotten sleepers exceeded imagination. There were three times less locomotives than the normal average, and the railway junctions were

496 continually blocked up. . . ." On October 27th, 1927, the
661 *Cuvantul* related how extensive frauds were found to have been committed by higher railway officials in Transylvania, and that the affair was being hushed up so that these persons might not be incriminated.

On March 3rd, 1928, the same paper enlarged on the collapse of the railway bridge over the Milcov, near Focşani, the construction of which had been entrusted to a favourite of M. V. Bratianu who, so far, instead of being punished, had been appointed to another post. The *Argus* of February 20th, 1929, in an article entitled "What has been done with the Railways?" cites the following facts: "It was decided to illuminate the railway cars with methane gas, and lamps and instruments were bought for this purpose. All these remain unused in the warehouses because it has since been found out that methane gas could not be used for such a purpose. . . . Lathes of a value of 40 millions were ordered; this is a quantity likely to suffice for a period of ten to fifteen years. . . . There are some 280 trucks loaded with corrugated iron. As the annual requirements of the railway administration are about two to three truckloads, this stock is likely to last a century. . . ."

497 With the advent of the National Peasant Party to power a
661 slight improvement set in, but it was too much to expect that a system which had become traditional could be altered in the course of a few years. The *Cuvantul* of March 31st, 1929, commenting on the resignation of the general manager of the railways, declared that this was a good beginning. "So far our railways were not an institution for furthering travel and facilitating transport, but a counting-house for the sale, at exorbitant prices, of all kinds of manufactures of the various industrial firms associated with the Liberal Party. . . ." In previous articles the *Cuvantul* had described how the railway administration, being under the control of partisans of the Liberal Party, the latter had done everything in its power to promote the interests of members of that party to the detriment of those of the State. The carelessness and remissness of the railway administration may be gauged by the fact that it positively discouraged traffic on its own lines, and diverted it to foreign countries

by a policy of high rates. Thus in January, 1927, the *Argus* 497
complained that timber exports from Bucovina, instead of 661.
being forwarded for shipment via Galatz, were being diverted to Dantzig because (owing to the new rates) the cost of transport for one truckload of timber to the first port amounted to 9,500 lei, while the freightage to the second port cost only 4,400 lei. In another article the complaints of the Transylvanian industrialists were aired, and these likewise complained that owing to high rates and lack of trucks they were losing their foreign trade. It was affirmed that only one-fifth of the number of trucks necessary for Transylvania had been allotted to that region, and that the shortage was made more acutely felt owing to the manifest favouritism attending the allocation of trucks. Moreover, trucks which had been slightly injured were not repaired promptly but shunted on to sidings, where they were left to rot and fall to pieces.

The neglect with which the traffic requirements of Transylvania were treated led industrialists of that region to the conclusion that this was a deliberate policy so that their rivals in the old kingdom might be protected from the influx of goods from Transylvania. (*Argus*, November 27th, 1926.)

A policy of excessive transport rates has been applied, 497
which has wrought incredible harm to the railways by reducing traffic and fostering the development of motor road transport, which is rapidly increasing. The latter is proving a formidable rival to the railways, and competition has become so keen that the railway administration has thought of making use of motor railcars on some lines in order to provide increased services and attract some of the traffic it has lost back again, but though this scheme was mooted several years ago it was only recently that an order for a few steam railcars was given to a Birmingham firm.

In fact the railway administration has since 1927 shown a loss every year. Thus 1927 showed a deficit of 1,278,395,915 lei, 1928 of 1,625,634,902, 1929 of 981,635,257, 1930 of 1,286,001,744, while for 1931, according to the *Adeverul* of January 28th, 1932, it was reported that the deficit would be the largest so far recorded, for while expenditure had re-

497 mained stationary, the revenue was inferior by some 1,600 million lei. Since then it has been announced that the deficit had attained 2,000 millions, and that the year 1932 would also close with an equally large deficit. One of the causes of these huge deficits is that the State never pays its debts to the railway administration, in spite of the formal undertakings it assumed when the 1929 loan was floated. On the other hand the State insists on the railway administration paying into the State Treasury the savings it has effected by the reduction of the salaries of its officials. At the end of March, 1929, M. Vidrighin, a former director of the railways, published in the *Argus* a series of articles which explain some of the reasons why the exploitation of the railways is carried on at a loss. He thus pointed out that there are about four and a half millions of persons who make regular use of the railways, but of these some 800,000 are deputies, officials, pensioners, and military, who benefit by great reductions in the current fares, as do their families. So that some 1,200,000 persons, or about one-third of the regular users of the railways, are carried at a loss. Further, the law encouraging national industries provides that raw materials needed for them are to be carried to the factories at a rebate of 30 per cent, while goods despatched from these factories are to enjoy a 45 per cent reduction from the usual tariff. Thus a large part of the goods transported is handled at a loss. Losses are also incurred on official transport, which is mainly gratuitous.

To make good these losses the administration had hit on the simple contrivance of increasing the rates on goods as well as passenger fares, which expedient has resulted in a steady decrease in revenue. Thus in 1929 the total revenue amounted to 12,375,669,870 lei, in 1930 it had decreased to 11,291,600,463, and for 1931 it is reported that the revenue would again decrease by another 1,600 million lei. Passenger rates were so abnormally high that peasants could scarcely afford to travel by rail. For example, for a distance of 40 kms. a peasant would have to disburse 60 lei, a sum which it would have taken him two days to earn. To put a stop to the decrease in the traffic a drastic reduction of 40 to 60 per cent in the transport rates was recommended again

in the *Argus* of 14th May, 1932, and statistics were quoted 497
to show that since 1927 freight rates had increased by 112.5 per cent, and these charges, which were estimated in 1929 to represent 5.2 per cent of the value of the goods handled, represented in 1931 as high a percentage as 10.2. Owing to the high transport charges there was a serious falling off in traffic; thus while 18,191,860 tons had been carried in 1930, there were only 16,403,536 tons handled in 1931. The *Argus* of 24th and 25th January, 1932 affirmed that railway charges on grain exported averaged 20 per cent of its value, while the cost of carrying timber often reached 40 per cent of its value.

A further reason why the railway administration cannot 497
even cover its expenses is the high price which it has had to 661
pay for its coal. So far it seems to have been under the tutelage and grip of the "Liberal" Party, the partisans of which forced it to buy the bulk of its coal at exorbitant prices from mines which belonged to them. Thus the *Cuvantul* of December 29th, 1928, affirmed that these "Liberal" companies received annually some two milliard lei for supplying coals at the extravagant price of 1,643 lei per ton. The *Lupta*, in an article published on May 14th or 15th, 1932, asserted that while in Rumania expenditure on fuel amounts to 14½ per cent of the total expenses of the railways, Germany expended only 6 per cent on this head, Poland 8 per cent, and Italy, a country totally deprived of coal, spends only 9½ per cent. The paper also complained that expenditure for the upkeep of rolling stock was inordinately high, amounting to 30.6 per cent. in Rumania, as against 12.7 per cent in Germany, 14.7 per cent in Austria, and 17.7 per cent in Poland.

The *Argus* of 24th April, 1932, relates how political influences are being exerted to bring pressure to bear on the railway administration so that it should place orders for a supply of lignite from mines in the valley of the Jiu, at a cost of some 100 millions per annum. This fuel was shown to be useless, and had to be burned mixed up with crude oil in the locomotives. Its purchase constitutes a downright waste, "but when repeated and weighty interventions are resorted

497 661 to we understand why the railway administration has not yet excluded lignite from among the fuels of which it makes use. . . ." A close examination of the items of the expenditure would probably reveal undue liberality under certain heads. Thus the total expenditure for 1930 amounted to 12,577,602,209 lei, of which 2,700 millions were devoted to the upkeep and repair of rolling stock, 746 millions to the upkeep of the lines, 1,830 millions to fuel, 6,743 millions to salaries, wages, etc.

496 Out of the proceeds of the 1929 loan, some 4,751 million lei were earmarked for the reconditioning of the railways. The sum was to be employed for the renewal of the tracks, the purchase of rolling stock, the construction of new lines, and for the improvement and enlargement of workshops. Expenditure on this last item was exceedingly ill-advised, for the railway administration had entered into engagements with certain foreign firms, on the strength of which the latter had built repair-shops, such as the "Astra" Company at Arad, the "Lemaître" workshops at Reşiţa, and the Franco-Romana Co. at Braila. In 1929 there still remained four outstanding contracts expiring in 1935, and guaranteeing a yearly expenditure of 640 millions for constructing locomotives, and two other contracts expiring in 1939 which provided for the repairing of locomotives, of a value of 335 millions. As soon as the railway administration was able to use its new workshops it proceeded to disregard these contracts, and as a result these private firms had to close down and dismiss their workmen. The *Argus* of 11th May, 1932 denounces the railway administration for its indefensible attitude in the following terms:

"These industries have suffered immense losses. Their staff had to be dismissed, and they have been rendered incapable of meeting their engagements. All of them will put in claims for damages, and we can hardly doubt that Justice, taking into consideration the contracts made with the railways, will be found to pronounce in their favour. Who is to pay the damages? Naturally the State, which is also going to lose the taxes which it would have raised on the contracts had they been carried out. But the greatest loss consists in

the loss of confidence which this stupid policy of disregarding legal engagements entails for the State and its administrations." 496

The *Dreptatea* of May 19th, 1932, gives an example of the prevailing favouritism in the granting of contracts by the railway administration. Thus tenders were invited for the renovation of the signalling apparatus on the line Feteşti–Cernavoda in August, 1931, but as the administration desired to favour a certain firm no contract was passed, but finally the order was placed with this particular firm at a price of eleven million lei when other firms had undertaken to do the work for only six and a half millions. Naturally the *Dreptatea* takes the Director-General, M. Ionescu, to task for his attitude, and declares that no one should wonder if the railway administration runs into deficits every year. An additional cause for the losses incurred is the overstaffing of the administration, and especially the numerous sinecures that have been created for the benefit of persons enjoying official protection. A few years ago it was impossible to find out how the administration was being run, for no proper balance sheets had been drawn up for years. Fortunately, a British expert has been invited to supervise the accounts, so that data are now available up to date. But this is obviously an inadequate measure, and the railways will become a paying concern capable of responding to the necessities of the country only when and if they are placed under foreign control, or under the management of some capable and honest Rumanian effectively shielded by foreign influence from all interference by political circles. . . . The slovenly methods so far employed in the railway administration have hampered not only the internal development of the country but have also prevented it from increasing its revenues from traffic transit across Rumania; for the country controls two big trade routes, namely that from Poland and the Baltic States towards the Black Sea and the Near East, which used to be one of the great trade routes of old, and that from Central Europe through Transylvania to Constantsa. 496 661

There are two alternatives to the latter, namely the Danube and that through Yugoslavia, so that if the Rumanian railways were properly managed they could easily 496 505

496 secure a decent share of the traffic, but apparently this is 505 being diverted to the Danube route. In fact the "Commission Internationale du Danube" reported that the river-borne traffic in 1931 had reached the highest figure since the end of the war. This was due not only to the abundant harvests of 1931, but also to increased petroleum transport from both Rumania and Russia to Central Europe. Certain singular anomalies were recorded in this river-borne traffic, namely, that while grain was conveyed from Russia up to Vienna and Ratisbonne, Hungarian grain was being carried downstream for shipment via Sulina to Antwerp and Hamburg.

In order to attract Polish traffic, the Rumanian Government some years ago proposed to create free zones at Galatz, Braila, and Constantsa. A bridge, also, was to be constructed across the Danube between Giurgiu and Rustchuk, the Polish Government even offering to defray half the expenses, but for the present all these schemes seem to have been shelved.

COMMUNICATIONS

491 In a report made by the Minister of Public Works and published by the *Adeverul* in its issue of January 14th, 1932, the following details were given respecting the length and state of the roads.

The state of the roads is lamentable; most of these arteries are impassable, and a superficial reparation would prove useless. The following table will give an approximate idea of their condition:

	Length in Kilometers
Roads paved in stone	
Good condition	16,118
Medium condition	27,961
Bad condition	14,949
Roads laid in gravel	9,318
Natural unlaid roads...	33,636
Total	101,982

COMMUNICATIONS

Out of this total, 58,028 are nominally laid in stone, but of 491
these only 16,118 kms. can be reckoned as good. The rest may be divided into two categories: 27,961 kms. requiring reparation, and 14,909 kms. requiring complete reconstruction. A good network of roads answering the requirements of the country would necessitate the construction of 2,000 kms. of permanent surface roads (paved with granite), 9,000 kms. of semi-permanent or macadamized, while the remaining 59,000 kms. of the existing network should be completely overhauled every six or seven years.

The requisite sum for the construction of this mileage on the basis of present prices would be 40 milliard lei, and the annual outlay for its maintenance may be reckoned at 1,380 million lei.

It was reported that owing to lack of resources the Minister contemplated the adoption of a system of conscript labour, similar to that introduced into Bulgaria, in order to carry on the work of repairing the roads and of constructing 300 to 400 kms. annually, especially in Bessarabia, which was utterly devoid of semi-metalled trunk roads.

The lack of roads in Bessarabia has been one of the stand- 494
ing grievances of the population against the Bucarest Government, for along with the absence of railways, it is next door to impossible to convey agricultural produce to market. One might have thought that steps would have been taken 503
at least to deepen the channel of the Pruth, from its mouth to Ungheni (near Iassi), which would have served as an excellent water avenue for heavy traffic, but such a plan has not proved attractive; on the other hand, a scheme for the construction of a canal to connect Bucarest with the Danube was much to the front during recent years, though no foreign group so far has found the conditions offered by the Government acceptable.

The natural unlaid roads, of which the total length is 491
33,636 kms., usually become impassable in the rainy season even for ox-carts, and as many districts possess only such natural tracks, they are practically cut off for considerable periods from the rest of the country.

O

RUMANIA

491 A contract was recently signed with a Swedish firm for the
661 laying of 570 kms. of permanent and 180 kms. of semi-permanent roads by the end of 1936, but this is far from satisfying even the most urgent requirements of the country. As matters stand now there is some probability that the contract will be cancelled, for it was found out that during the winter of 1931 the roads which so far had been constructed had undergone serious deterioration through the frost. In the discussion which ensued in the Chamber the Minister of Communications accused his predecessor in office of having been bribed, and in support of this charge he adduced the fact that, while the Government delegate who was despatched to Paris to sign the contract with the company had been instructed to accept as maximum prices 618 lei per square metre for the permanent roads, and 330 lei per square metre for the semi-permanent, he exceeded his instructions and signed the contract on the basis of 740 and 426 lei respectively, thereby causing the State to lose a sum of five hundred million lei.

The accusation of bribery was denied by those involved, but it was decided that the contract would have to be revised and the matter submitted to the Law-Courts. This Swedish company is related to the Kreuger & Toll groups, and it is more than likely that the contract will now lapse.

491 The following data concerning the highways and their distribution among the different provinces, also of their condition at the beginning of 1930, is found in the statistical bulletin for that year:

Province.	Roads laid in stone. Good.	Medium.	Bad.	Roads in gravel.	Natural unlaid roads.
Old Kingdom	13,043.722	13,607.486	5,897.907	5,043.919	12,848.255
Transylvania	4,511.625	10,558.301	6,180.164	3,504.744	19,585.426
Bucovina	444.095	923.923	809.304	444.373	665.603
Bessarabia	165.851	384.281	166.640	370.378	7,089.472
Total for all Rumania in kilometres	18,165.293	25,473.991	13,054.015	9,363.414	40,188.756

496


RUSSIA
BLACK SEA
BESSARABIA
MOLDAVIA
DOBRUDJA
DANUBE
POLAND
BUCOVINA
MARAMURESH
TRANSYLVANIA
WALLACHIA
BULGARIA
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
CRISHANA
BANAT
HUNGARY
YUGOSLAVIA
VARNA
BUCAREST
FRONTIERS
MAIN RAILWAY LINES

p 203

INDEX

000

"ADEVERUL," articles in, 43, 49, 61, 71, 77, 78, 119, 120, 166, 168, 170, 195
Adrianople, treaty of, 18
Agrarian debt legislation, 45, 170–1, 178–9
—— reform, 159, 164, 170
Akominat, Nikita, 11
Alba-Julia, 33
America, U.S., 27, 28, 150
Anti-Semite, 63, 81
Arad, 31, 32, 69
Argentoianu, 39, 40, 42, 47, 48, 132
"Argus," articles in, 43, 44, 84, 90, 112, 114, 117, 120, 129, 135, 136, 141, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 174, 177, 193, 195, 196, 197–8
Army supplies scandal, 99
—— condition of, 100
Assens, Bulgarian Tsars, 10, 11
Astor, Right Hon. Viscount, 153
Aurelian, Emperor, 7
"Aurora," articles in, 76, 88
Austria, 18, 20, 109
Avars, 8, 10
Averescu, General, 24, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 48, 59, 94, 168
—— Party, 62
—— Scandals, 97, 98

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 144
Balkan, 1, 13, 14, 21
Balti, 43, 76
Banat, 12, 27, 32, 60, 108
Banat, Frauds in, 102
Banescu, Senator, 78
Banks, 177, 180
Baragan, 6, 106
Barton, 15
Basarab, Matthew, 15
Basilescu, Professor N., 114
Batsaria, 80, 168
Battenberg, Prince Alexander, 22
Bela, King of Hungary, 12
Berlin, Congress of, 81, 120
Bessarabia, 8, 18, 25, 33, 34, 37, 107, 176, 190, 201
——, Maladministration of, 64, 73–80
Bethlen, Count, 69, 70
Bogdan, Professor, 9, 10, 12
Bolsheviks, 27, 29, 30, 37, 74, 123, 135, 168
Brandsch, 66
Bratanescu, Deputy, 142
Bratianu, John, 23, 26, 28, 32, 36, 53, 124
——, Vintila, 37, 39, 54, 124, 165, 187, 193, 194
——, George, 54
—— Party, 33, 34, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 68, 75, 124, 125, 126, 129, 134, 159, 161, 162, 194, 197
Britain, Roman, 5
British bondholders, 52, 146, 157
—— Government and delegates, impolitic attitude of, 146, 152, 157, 158
Bucarest, Danube Canal, 201

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

INDEX

Bucarest, fall of, 24
—— municipal scandals, 102, 105
—— University, 20, 43
Bucovina, 108, 109
——, frauds in, 6, 18, 23, 25, 32, 93, 102, 195
Budapest, Rumanian occupation of, 29
Budget, 138, 140
Buftea, negotiations, 24
Bulgarian Empire and Rumania, 8, 13
Bulgaria, 21, 23, 24, 31, 201
Bulgarian minorities, 70, 73
Byzantine, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17

Carol II., 36, 38, 39, 40, 62, 68, 69, 93
Carp, 22
Carpathians, 6, 9, 14, 24, 25, 50, 61, 106, 108, 188
Census of 1930, 110
Cereals, yield of, 168, 173, 175
Charles I., 20, 21, 22, 23, 52, 158
Christianity, 9, 10
Cinamus, 11
Clemenceau, 26, 28
Cluj, 10, 69, 87, 191
Cogalniceanu, 20
Colescu, Dr. L., 13
Commercial morality, 111
Communist, 63, 73
Comnenus, Emperor Manuel, 11
Concordat préventif, law of, 112, 113, 117
Constantine, Emperor, 7
Constantinescu, P., 10
Constantinople, 7, 12, 15, 16, 23, 44
Constantsa, 50, 82, 146, 187
—— Chamber of Commerce Bulletin, 50, 176, 189
Conversion of paper money, 122
Corvinus, King Mathias, 14
Crimea, 18, 19
Crishana, 108
Cumanian, 8, 11, 12, 13
"Curentul," articles in the, 44
Curzon, Lord, 158
Cuza, Prince Alexander, 19, 20, 48
Cuza, A. M., anti-Semite leader, 63, 64, 81
"Cuvantul," articles in the, 64, 74, 93, 94, 97, 98, 99, 100, 102, 129, 131, 143, 165, 166, 167, 192, 193, 194, 197

Dacia, Dacians, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10
Danube, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 23, 106, 174, 200, 201
Danubian Federation, 155, 156
Dardanelles, 23
Decebalus, 3
Diamandi, 38
Dniester, 76, 106, 107
Dobrudja, 21, 23, 24, 31, 64, 70, 71, 107
Domitian, Emperor, 3
"Dreptatea," articles in the, 44, 48, 60, 94, 199
Duca, 54

Electoral abuses under General Averescu, 35
Elizabeth, Queen, 15
Engagements, disregard of, 118, 119
"Epoca," articles in the, 92, 101
Eutropius, 4
Exports, 151, 155, 177, 187

Feher, Dr. Geza, 8, 9
Ferdinand I., King, 23, 26, 30, 32, 35

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

INDEX

000 Focşani, 168
France, 52, 156, 157
—— Benevolent attitude of, 19, 20, 43
—— Cultural influence, 16, 17
—— Financial experts, 46, 47, 120
Functionaries, 84, 85, 141, 142

George, Lloyd, 26
Georoceanu, Senator, 72
Gepidae, 7
Germany, 22, 24, 30, 65, 152, 153, 154, 182
Getae, 1
Gherea, Dobrogeanu, 142, 164
Gibbon, 7, 8
Goga, Octavian, 62, 93, 97
Gold mines, 125
Goths, 6, 10
Greece, 14, 18, 44
Gresham's Law, 17
Grigoras, Em., 10

Hamangiu, late Minister of Justice, 116, 117
Hamilton, Sir Ian, 73
Hobhouse, L. T., 83, 84
Huns, 10
Hungary, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 29, 52, 65, 106, 166
Hunyadi, John, 13

Illiterary, 130
Imports, 155, 185
Inculeţ, 75, 76
" Indreptarea," newspaper, 47
Industrial Credit Bank, 104
—— Establishments, list of, 183
Industrialization, policy, 152, 180, 184
Interest, rates of, 126, 169

Iorga, Professor N., 3, 40, 48, 55, 57, 66, 96, 170
Iorga-Argentoianu Government, 41, 48, 54, 62, 66, 117
Ismet Pasha, 152

Jassy, 20
Jews, 80
Jonescu, Take, 33, 62
Judicial scandals, 120

Kagul, 76
Kichineff (Chişinau), 74, 107 191
Kisseleff, General, 19
Kladovo, 3
Krum, Khan, 19
Kutso-Vlachs, 5, 70, 71

Land, present distribution of, 160
Latin, 2, 3, 4, 8, 11, 12, 17
Lenguceanu, N., 113
" Liquidation Judicaire " law, 45, 117
" Lupta," articles in, 49, 74, 84, 86, 130, 197
Lupu, Prince Basil, 15
—— Dr., 62, 63

Macedonia, 70
Mackensen, General von, 24
Madgearu, Virgil, 39, 51, 86, 99
Magyar, 9, 13, 22, 29, 31, 37, 58
—— minority, 64–70
Maniu, Julius, 35, 37, 38, 51, 52, 57, 58, 59, 71, 124
Manoilescu, 38, 39, 132, 133
Maramureş, 6, 80, 102
Marasesti, 24
Marasti, 24
Marino, Senator, 113
Martial poet, 5
Mauritius, Emperor, 8

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

INDEX

McDougall, William, 68
Methane, Gaz, 125, 194
Michael the Brave, 15, 40
—— Crown Prince, 36, 69
Michalache, Ion, 35, 51, 55, 90
Milyukov, 27
Mineral resources, 189
Minorities, ethnic, 63
Mircescu, General, 100
Mironescu, 38, 39
Mishu, 28
Mohamed II., 14
Moldavia, 2, 14, 15, 18, 19, 23, 24, 75, 81, 107
Muir, Prof. Ramsay, 116

NAPOLEON III., 19, 20
National Bank of Rumania, 102, 103, 137
—— Peasant Party, 54–62, 136, 165, 194
—— resources, law of exploitation of, 124
—— Revenue, 140
Nations, League of, 52, 146, 147, 157
"Neamul Romanesc," newspaper, 113
Negulescu, Prof. P., 92
Neuilly, Treaty of, 31
Novicov, J., 135

OCHRIDA, 10
Oil industry, 185
—— production, 186–188
Onciul, Professor, 11
PAGANUS, Bulgarian ruler, 2 3
Paper industry, 129

Paris, Congress of 1856, 19
Pârvan, Professor, 1, 2
"Patria," articles in, 48, 59, 60 117
Patriarch Miron Christea, 90
Pensioners, State, 103, 104, 142
Petrascu, N., 118
Petrie, Prof. Flinders, 113
Phanariot, 15, 16, 17, 18, 83, 91
Pillat, Senator, 41
Pipe lines, 187
Pittard, Prof., 1, 16
Plato, 40
Plevna, 20
Poles, Poland, 14, 15, 199, 200
Pop, Valer, ex-Minister of Justice, 117
Preferential Treaties, 152, 153, 154
Price fluctuations, cereals, 176
—— oil, 189
Prison scandals, 88–90
Protectionism, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131
Pruth, 79, 107, 109, 201
Public debt, 147–150
—— functionaries, 42, 43, 46, 141

RADAUTI, 42
Railways, 190–199
—— workshops, 118, 198
Reni, 79
Reşiţa, 101
Rist, M., 47
Roads, 200–202
Romans, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8
Ross, Prof. E. A., 91
Runciman, Prof. S., 9
Russia, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 29, 33, 73
—— attraction by, 77, 133, 135, 152, 168
—— competition of, 151

SABINUS, Bulgarian ruler, 2, 3
Salonica, 23, 24
Salt mines, 125

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

INDEX

000 Sayous, Prof. E., 9
Sedgwick, Prof. H., 120
Seicaru, Pamfil, 93
Serbia, 13, 14, 15, 27
Sixtus IV., Pope, 14
Slavs, 2, 4, 6, 8, 12
"Socialismul," article in, 88
Socialist, 63, 109
Solca, 42
Soroca, 76
Spa, Conference, 28
Stabilization of currency, 123
Stambuliiski, 55
Stambulov, 22
Stephanov, Senator C. M., 72
Stephen the Great, Prince, 14, 15, 40
Stere, Constantine, 73
Stirbey, Prince B., 36, 101

TARDIEU, 46, 155
Temişoara, 32, 69
Terter dynasty, 13
Theiss, 9, 25, 106, 108
Thracian, 1, 2, 5, 9
Timok, 27
Tirnovo, 11
Titulescu, 33, 38, 39, 41, 50, 95
Trajan, Emperor, 3
Transylvania, 1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 13, 14, 22, 24, 25, 33, 48, 55, 56, 58, 60, 67, 68, 87, 106, 108
Turks, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 24, 70, 71, 83, 158

VAIDA-VOEVOD, Dr., 30, 32, 35, 38, 50, 51, 57, 58, 59, 70, 124
Vaitoanu, 32
Vespasian, Emperor, 2
Vidrighin, ex-Director of Railways, 196

WALLACE, A. R., 84
Wallachia, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 106
Watson, Dr. Seton, 31, 68, 83
Wealas, 4
Wood, Mr. Charles, 85
Wilson, Pres., 25, 32, 44, 106
Winkler's racial statistics, 110

YUGOSLAVIA, 23, 32, 44, 106

ZUKERMAN, Mr. William, 82

p. 208

113, 162, 563, 641 European Jews E14

[For information on Jews in Rumania see 10: Logio, ED1 Rumania, category 116, pp. 80-82.]

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

000

RACIAL ASPECTS
OF
ROMANIA'S CASE

CHARLES UPSON CLARK, Ph.D.
Corresponding Member of the Romanian Academy

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

000

To facilitate reference to the official publications of the Romanian Census Bureau, its spelling of Romanian place names has been followed in this monograph, with the diacritical marks omitted for typographical reasons.

[p. ii]

[pp. iii, iv, v, vi are blank]

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

FOREWORD

175

AT the close of the first World War the Romanian people achieved the unity it had temporarily attained in 1601 under Michael the Brave. In the interval before the outbreak of the second World War new Romania succeeded in bringing about a mutual comprehension among components who had lived for centuries under widely differing administrations and in inaugurating among other reforms a minorities règime far more civilized than that to which the Romanian minority had been subjected in Austria-Hungary and Russia. It will suffice to point out that in Transylvania, for instance, there were in 1940 more Hungarian public schools, more Hungarian newspapers and books than there had been under the crown of St. Stephen and far greater equality of opportunity in business as in politics, and this after the ravages of a war in which Romania's devotion to the Allies had cost her one-tenth of all her population, a loss higher than that of any Allied country.

Romania after 1918 has supported every international effort for peace and a better understanding between nations. In her desire for good relations with her neighbor, Bulgaria, she has even agreed voluntarily to cede southern Dobrudja to the Sofia Government, an action which may well be compared with the cession by Great Britain of the Ionian Isles to Greece a century ago; but for this Romania deserves higher credit, for southern Dobrudja, as I was able to satisfy myself during an extended automobile tour in the Spring of 1940, was in part overwhelmingly Romanian and the Romanian element was conspicuous everywhere, while Balcic was especially dear to Romanian hearts.

Unfortunately, in this era of the glorification of force, Romania's other neighbors took this manifestation of magnanimity for one of weakness. For example, the great generosity of Bucharest to the Hungarians in Transylvania had always been considered by them as a tribute to their superiority, and had increased their traditional scorn for the Wallachs who had been subjected to them so long. And to the world's general astonishment it was the champions of self-determination, the very government which had had its definition of "aggression" accepted by others and had bound itself not to commit "aggression," which made the first unprovoked attack.

RACIAL ASPECTS OF ROMANIA'S CASE

175 648 On June 26, 1940, the Soviet Government delivered an ultimatum at Bucharest demanding the immediate cession of the province of Bessarabia, which had been under Russian domination for a brief century of its existence, as well as of the northernmost districts of Bucovina. Many Romanian patriots counseled resistance and hoped for assistance from the Western democracies; but those with longer memories recalled the non-arrival of the British and French aid solemnly promised in the treaty under which Romania entered the first World War, and the more recent fate of Czechoslovakia. Not merely was aid uncertain and remote, but once the Romanian Army was engaged on the Russian frontier, attacks were certain to follow on the western Transylvanian border. So with a heavy heart Romania yielded to overwhelming force and onte more a blow such as Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland had experienced succeeded in its impact.

000 Only a month earlier I myself had given a lecture in Romanian in the huge, filled to overflowing Eparchial Hall of the Bessarabian capital, and had thus had recent and vivid experience of the cultural upswing given by the Romanians to a city I had first known in 1919 as a sleepy provincial center, for generations victim of administrative neglect and with even Russian schools few and far between. Some ten years ago I had had the privilege of being present at the dedication of a school in a large Russian village in Bessarabia and had been keenly impressed by the good feeling between Russians and Moldavians evidenced by the ceremony and the celebration afterward.

175 648 The Communist aggression of 1940, establishing Russia at the mouth of the Danube and a step nearer the Dardanelles, affected not merely Romania but the entire continent of Europe, upsetting as it did the balance at a traditional danger spot. It was not merely a warning to Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Turkey that a new campaign of aggression had started, with no more justification than the right of the stronger, but it focussed German attention on that part of the world and evidently led the German strategists to feel that a stronger bulwark against future Russian aggression was needed than would be furnished by the Pruth or the Sereth rivers. The Carpathians were obviously the new line of resistance, and subservient Hungary was only too ready to act as the German tool. It is tragic to reflect that a genuine policy of reconciliation on the Kremlin's part, which by creating a loyal border zone all the way from the White Sea and the Baltic to the Black Sea might even perhaps have prevented this war, was sacrificed to imperialistic ambitions that have since plunged mankind in its bloodiest struggle.

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

FOREWORD

Anxious to guard against the new Russian move, the Germans gave Romania no credit for her correct attitude in holding aloof from the appeals of Romanian fractions of the Carpathian Ukraine to be annexed to Transylvania, just as later she maintained the same correctness by turning a deaf ear to similar prayers from Romanian communities in the break-up of Yugoslavia. To the Germans also this attitude was merely evidence of weakness, and a weakness of which the Hungarians have never been guilty. Accordingly, Berlin and Rome encouraged the Hungarians by the Vienna Award to seize parts of Transylvania where the Romanians have always been in a majority not contested even by the Hungarian census figures; and Magyar troops not merely occupied the territory, but with the utmost ruthlessness expelled the Romanian intellectual élite whose rights had been guaranteed by the Award, and with their traditional barbarity even put a considerable number of them to death.

175
648

Romania had to yield to force, the German-Russian pact still holding. But the next turn of the kaleidoscope, the break between Hitler and Stalin, gave her the cherished chance of recovering her lost provinces of Bessarabia and Bucovina. And here Romania has again given proof of her sense of justice by refraining from lodging claim to territorial expansion east of the Dniester into the Ukraine notwithstanding the hundreds of thousands of Romanians forcibly settled there in the century of Czarist rule over Bessarabia.

Opposed to expansion at the expense of her neighbors, Romania is not less determined to protect her natural and historic limits against encroachment and to bring within them the greater part of such Romanian masses as still live under other règimes. With the recovery of the territory lost in the east, the Romanian nation once more feels free to look with hope to a solution of its western problem. True enough, after a searching inquiry the claims of Hungary to Transylvania had been definitely denied by the concert of Europe in 1920. Nor was the right of Romania to Transylvania thus affirmed on historical grounds alone. In 1920, and doubtless more so today, the right of all peoples to a government of their own choosing and the exercise of this right for the whole by the decision of a majority could not be denied. The Romanians are fortunately able to establish by facts and figures that every historical subdivision of their homeland has an uncontested Romanian majority. The proof consists of the scientific data collected by an American-trained staff during the population census of 1930. Their authenticity rests not only on the fact that nationality was not determined arbitrarily by the

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 648 census taker but by the free statement of each inhabitant; it is confirmed by the consonance of the findings whether taking race, language or religion as criteria, as well as by comparison with the official population statistics of Austria-Hungary and Russia.

121 Inasmuch as the Award of Vienna was necessarily an expedient, I have thought it useful to give here a comprehensive abstract of Romania's racial figures together with historical outlines of her border regions, in the conviction that no lasting solution of European unrest could afford to disregard or minimize the racial realities of the continent's perennial danger zones.

C. U. C.

North Hatley, P. Q.
October 20, 1941.

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

CONTENTS

FOREWORD vii

HISTORICAL OUTLINE 1

Bucovina 3

Bessarabia 6

Transylvania 11

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA 23

Population According to Nationality

Actual Figures 26

Percentages 30

Population According to Language

Actual Figures 32

Percentages 36

Population According to Religion

Actual Figures 38

Percentages 42

The Population of Transylvania

Racial Composition of Ceded Transylvania 44

Hungarian and Romanian Censuses 50

MAPS AND CHARTS

THE PROVINCES AND COUNTIES OF ROMANIA xii

THE ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP OF TRANSYLVANIA . . . . . opp. 16

THE COUNTIES OF TRANSYLVANIA 17

631

Census of 1930
The Provinces and Counties of Romania



Muntenia (Wallachia)
8 Arges
9 Braila
11 Buzau
22 Dambovita
31 Ialomita
33 Ilfov
39 Muscel
43 Olt
45 Prahova
48 Ramnicu Sarat
62 Teleorman
71 Vlasca

Oltenia
23 Dolj
28 Gorj
37 Mehedinti
50 Romanati
70 Valcea

Moldavia
4 Bacau
5 Baia
8 Botosani
21 Covurlui
24 Dorohoi
27 Falciu
32 Iasi
41 Neamt
46 Putna
49 Roman
61 Tecuci
68 Tutova
69 Vaslui

Dobrudja
13 Caliacra
20 Constanta
25 Durostor
66 Tulcea

Transylvania
1 Alba
10 Brasov
18 Ciuc
19 Cluj
26 Fagaras
30 Hunedoara
38 Mures
40 Nasaud
42 Oderhei
51 Salaj
54 Sibiu
55 Somes
59 Tarnava Mare
60 Tarnava Mica
65 Trei Scaune
67 Turda

Banat of Timisoara
15 Caras
53 Severin
64 Timis Torontal

Crisana—Maramures
2 Arad
7 Bihor
36 Maramures
52 Satu Mare

Bessarabia
6 Balti
12 Cahul
17 Cetatea Alba
29 Hotin
34 Ismail
35 Lapusna
44 Orhei
56 Soroca
63 Tighina

Bucovina
14 Campulung
16 Cernauti
47 Radauti
57 Storojinet
58 Suceava

A HISTORICAL OUTLINE

UNTIL 1940 Romania, a strong force for peace, contained within her boundaries all her historical domain and most of her people. In 1940, amid world-wide changes, she saw her racial and territorial unity shattered in a partition involving not less than one-third of her population of 20,000,000 and of her territory of 113,917 square miles. 131

The beneficiaries of this forcible division were Russia and Hungary.[1] 728 On July 3, 1940, following an ultimatum, Russia invaded northern Bucovina, part of the Moldavian county of Dorohoi, and all of Bessarabia, altogether some 17,000 square miles with upward of 3,750,000 inhabitants. On September 13, 1940, following the Vienna arbitration decision of August 30, Hungary occupied half of Romanian Transylvania, again some 17,000 square miles with almost 2,400,000 inhabitants.

The two squeezes from east and west, timed to coincide with the collapse of the last vestiges of the European system of regional guarantees, [186] could not be opposed by Romania. The retirement of her armies from Bucovina and Bessarabia reflected the realities of the situation, but did not imply a renunciation of her historic rights to the lost provinces, nor was this loss ratified formally by her parliament. On the contrary, Premier General Ion Antonescu, several times in his earliest official statements, reasserted Romania's claim to the whole of Transylvania; and less than one year later, on June 22, 1941, he led the Romanian armies in the liberation of Bucovina and Bessarabia.

The problems which the action of Russia and Hungary has restored to an acute phase are as old as the ideologies that give them form. Heretofore, as local problems, they have been allowed to smolder under temporary solutions enforced in high-handed and arbitrary manner. Today, as obstacles to the peace and progress of the world, they have become world problems. As such they require a lasting solution that must accord with 000

[1] A rectification of the frontier of Dobrudja accepted by Romania and Bulgaria as a permanent settlement of the differences between them was effected by the treaty signed at Craiova September 7, 1940. The treaty provided for the return to Bulgaria of the two counties of Caliacra and Durostor ceded by her to Romania at Bucharest, July 27, 1913, at the end of the Balkan wars from which Bulgaria emerged with a net territorial gain of 6,062 sq. mi. Provision was also made for a wide exchange of populations. Bulgaria also undertook to pay Romania one billion lei as indemnity for losses resulting from the territorial transfer and to take over the maintenance of the Romanian graves and battle monuments dating from the 1877-78 war to which Bulgaria owes the restoration of her statehood.

000 historical and racial truth if the peoples in the invaded areas are to be freed of physical and spiritual terror and assured a peaceful development.

175 Until June, 1940, the population of Romania was divided among seventy-one counties grouped administratively into districts approximating the several historical provinces. This territory corresponded in area to that of the Dacian Kingdom colonized as an imperial province by Rome, 105-271 A.D. To use the current names, the provinces of Moldavia, Bessarabia and Bucovina formed the principality of Moldavia, with the capital at Jassy; while Oltenia and Muntenia formed the principality of Wallachia, with Bucharest as capital. Early in their national evolution the two Romanian states came to feel the influence of the expanding Turkish power. This they recognized by mutual assistance pacts,[3] renouncing their sovereign rights only insofar as they assumed obligations toward the Turks, who in turn guaranteed their liberties and integrity.[4] Still under Turkish suzerainty, Moldavia and Wallachia united on January 24, 1859 to form modern Romania who declared her independence May 10, 1877, when she joined Russia in war against Turkey. By proclamation of her parliament Romania became a Kingdom on May 10, 1881.

Like Italy on May 20, 1882, Romania on October 30, 1883, adhered to the defensive alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary. Like Italy in 1915, Romania in 1916 joined the Allies in the first World War. Toward the conclusion of this war Bessarabia, emerging an autonomous republic from Communist chaos by proclamation of her Diet January 24, 1918, voted the following March 27 to reunite with Romania. Bucovina and Transylvania (with the Banat of Timisoara, Crisana and Maramures), also autonomous since October, 1918,[5] followed suit, the first proclaiming her union at Cernauti November 28, the latter December 1 at Alba Iulia. Thus the integration of the Romanian provinces came about through the exercise by their peoples of the right to self-determination, and not through armed conquest or international negotiation. The peace treaties of Versailles (June 28, 1919), St. Germain (September 10, 1919) and Trianon (June 4, 1920) merely added formal recognition to a factual situation ante-dating them by more than a year.

---

[3] F. C. Nano, "Condica tratatelor si a altor legaminte ale Romaniei, 1354-1937," Bucharest, 1938, p. 7, for treaty between Mircea the Old of Wallachia and Mehmed I of Turkey, 1416 (1418 ?), and p. 28, for treaty between Bogdan III of Moldavia and Selim I, 1511.

[4] N. P. Comnène, "La terre roumaine à travers les ages," Paris and Lausanne, 1919, p. 24.

[5] "The Romanian nation which lives in the (Dual) Monarchy awaits and demands after centuries of suffering the achievement of its inalienable rights in full national life." (Dr. Alexander Vaida-Voevod in the Hungarian Parliament, October 18, 1918.)

Bucovina

ON May 7, 1775, Emperor Joseph II of Austria secured the consent of a Turkey weakened by corruption and endless warfare to the occupation of the northern region of the Romanian principality of Moldavia; he claimed this "strip of land" to improve communications[1] between Galicia, which he had wrested from Poland in 1772, and the imperial province of Transylvania. 175

Bucovina, as the Austrians named their new domain, had had no separate political or administrative life before 1775. It had always been an integral part of Moldavia, and included the early Moldavian capital of Suceava, some of the most famous fifteenth and sixteenth century battlegrounds and the ancient monasteries endowed by the Moldavian princes, the best known among whom, Stephen the Great (1457-1504), lies buried at Putna, county Radauti.

For some years after its annexation Bucovina remained under a military government. In 1786 it was merged with Galicia, an arbitrary administrative measure that had the effect of opening the gates to a slow infiltration of Poles, Jews and Ruthenians in quest for better living conditions. Despite repeated Romanian appeals, it was not until 1848 that Bucovina received administrative autonomy as a Hapsburg duchy. Thereafter, if the status of her Romanian inhabitants differed greatly from that of the Romanians under Hungarian rule, Bucovina was kept advisedly in complete spiritual isolation[2] from the Romanian centers in contiguous Moldavia and Transylvania and efficient precautions were taken to impede the development of Romanian national life.

The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in October, 1918, resulted in the geographical isolation of Bucovina (by the intervening new States of Hungary and Czechoslovakia) from Austria, whose crown land it had been. This forcible political tie once severed, the path was cleared for the reunion with Romania of her 800,000 people and 4,000 square miles of woodland.

---

[1] R. W. Seton-Watson, "A History of the Romanians," Cambridge, 1934, pp. 149-50.

[2] I. Nistor, "Bessarabia and Bukovina," Bucharest, 1939, p. 35: "Whoever in Bukovina held fast to Rumanian sentiments was persecuted and execrated. There was no place in Bukovina for a Rumanian national life and some of the greatest men of the country, like the learned George Popovici and the great historian, Demetrius Onciul, were forced to take refuge in Rumania in order to be able to live and to think as Rumanians."

[Bucovina]

162 In the World War small and populous Bucovina withstood for four years the sweep of Russian and Austrian drives over her territory. She emerged greatly transformed, but the extent of this change, especially as regards her population, was only made clear by the Romanian census of 1930 which, coming twenty years after the last Austrian enumeration, assumes the importance of a basic scientific appraisal.

Significantly, that appraisal shows that the Romanians, after 143 years of foreign rule, have retained a relative majority in the province as a whole and an absolute majority in three out of its five counties. The census found less than 1% Russians in Bucovina, about ten times as many Germans and Jews, and almost three times again as many Ruthenians and Ukrainians. Their distribution illustrates the southward migration of Galician farm labor that had theretofore been encouraged by Austria.

The return of Bucovina to Romanian rule, the restoration of her ancient trade with the rich neighboring districts of northern Moldavia and Bessarabia, the endowment of 76,911 of her landless peasantry with 187,300 acres of tillable land of her own, the improvement of communications, sanitation and education, are all positive Romanian achievements checked only temporarily by the Russian invasion of 1940.

163 Moreover, the Romanian element has gained new strength once freed of the constraints of alien interests. On the extent of this gain the second Romanian census, scheduled for December, 1940, but postponed under the pressure of events, would have supplied a wealth of circumstantial information. But a decided trend is discernible even in the available data,[1] that for the years 1935-37, according to which the two counties with a relatively large foreign population, Cernauti and Storojinet, have had the smallest annual excess of births over deaths, while the three counties with large Romanian majorities have shown the greatest increase. The figures are:

County	Population in % of Total				Annual Increase per 1,000		
	Romanians	Germans	Ruthenians	Jews	1935	1936	1937
Suceava	79.5	8.2	1.7	5.5	10.0	14.7	13.8
Campulung	61.3	20.2	6.7	8.2	11.9	15.1	12.2
Radauti	55.4	11.1	8.7	7.2	10.9	14.5	11.9
Storojinet	33.9	3.3	45.5	9.0	7.0	13.2	10.9
Cernauti	25.7	6.4	44.5	16.7	3.3	5.3	2.9

[1] Anuarul statistic al Romaniei, 1937 si 1938 (Statistical Yearbook of Romania, 1937 and 1938), Bucharest, 1939, p. 86 & seq.

BUCOVINA

648

The latest trial of the population of Bucovina at the hands of a powerful neighbor emphasizes the possible fate of every small nation intent on peaceful progress. By her ultimatum of June 26, 1940, Russia attempted to justify her demands on northern Bucovina, to which she had never had a vestige of title, as "a means of securing indemnity even in an insignificant degree for the great damage inflicted upon the Soviet Union and the population of Bessarabia by twenty-two years of Romanian domination." It is far more convincingly described as an act of unprovoked aggression by the very terms which Russia herself had subscribed to at London, July 3, 1933.[1]

[1]Convention for the Definition of Aggression, between the U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan, Esthonia, Latvia, Persia, Poland, Romania and Turkey, Art. 2: "Shall be deemed aggressor in an international conflict . . . the state that first shall commit one of the following acts: 1. declaration of war on another state; 2. invasion by its armed forces, even without a declaration of war; 3. attack with its land, naval or air forces even without a declaration of war, against the territory, vessels or airships of another state, 4. naval blockade of the shores or harbors of another state; 5. aid to armed bands which from its territory shall invade the territory of another state . . ." Art. 3: "No consideration of a political, military, economic or any other nature shall serve as an excuse or justification of aggression as defined in Art. 2.'

Bessarabia

175 WHILE Austria was reaching eastward to Galicia through Moldavian Bucovina in 1775, Russia was slowly extending westward from the river Dnieper to the Bug and, by 1792, to the Dniester, thereby becoming a neighbor of Moldavia along the entire course of that river. In her wars with Turkey from 1768 onward Russia had twice invaded the Romanian principalities. The war begun in 1806 afforded her a third opportunity of quartering her armies on Romanian soil.

The Russo-Turkish peace of Bucharest, May 28, 1812, gave Russia the Moldavian territory between the Dniester and the Pruth, and with it control over the Danube delta. This territory had been Moldavian for over 450 years[9] before the advent of Russia on the shores of the Dniester; and while officially it received the name of Bessarabia, after the famous princely family of the Bessaraba, its inhabitants preferred to call themselves Moldavian throughout the period of Russian occupation.

In the cynical pre-Napoleonic era of large-scale grabs the fate of Poland, the Baltic States, and Finland rested with the good pleasure of the Powers. No justification had been thought necessary for writing whole peoples off the map or suppressing liberties long established other than the self-interest of the strongest.[10] At the time of the signature of the Bucharest Treaty the Russian armies had been in Bessarabia six years, and this together with the weakness of declining Turkey was sufficient ground for taking it. Later the Czarist government and its Communist heir sought to justify the rape of Bessarabia on the ground that in 1812 it had been Turkish, not Moldavian, and that therefore Turkey had had a valid right to dispose of it.

The Romanian position in regard to Bessarabia, as in regard to Bucovina, is that Moldavia, a sovereign principality under Turkish suzerainty, had not been consulted, and that Turkey as suzerain could not have trans-

[9] A. Boldur, "La Bessarabie et les relations russo-roumaines," Paris, 1927, p. 54.

[10] Tommaso Tittoni, "Bessarabia, Romania and Italy" (in Romanian), Bucharest, 1927, p. 20: "Russian designs on Bessarabia, first under the form of a protectorate, then of annexation, had in the 19th century the earmarks of conquests. *Quia nominor leo* was their sole justification."

mitted to Russia more extensive rights to Bessarabia than she herself had held at the time by the consent of Moldavia.[11]

The fall of the Czarist règime in 1917, the Red revolution and the establishment of a "democratic" government at Moscow provided the circumstances that enabled the Bessarabians to proclaim the independence of their Moldavian republic and to exercise the recognized right of all peoples to self-determination.

The reunion with Romania is of itself a reaffirmation of the Romanian character of the province. In 1812 it counted from 250,000 to 350,000 inhabitants, mostly Romanian Moldavians. There were one million of them by 1856, and two millions by 1897.[12] During this interval the schools and the Church, the bureaucracy and the judiciary were all used by the Czarist government in a policy of Russification that embraced a program of mass colonization in which Bulgarian, Jewish, German and Ukrainian immigrants were counted upon to alter the Moldavian complexion of the province. The failure of this policy has been attested to by the official returns of the Russian state censuses and confirmed by the Romanian census of 1930. 162

Thus, the 1871 figures[13] compiled under the supervision of K. N. Oberoutchev, a Major General in the imperial army, gave for Bessarabia, exclusive of the three southern counties reunited to Romania in 1856, an absolute Romanian majority:

1871 Census	Total	%
Romanians	692,000	67.4
Ukrainians / Great Russians	162,252	15.8
Jews	93,590	9.1
Germans	33,501	3.5
Others	45,003	4.2
Total Bessarabia	1,026,346	100.0

The Russians, it will be noted, were grouped with the Ukrainians to enhance the importance of the Slav element.

[11] When, as a result of the Crimean War, Russia was obliged to return the three southern Bessarabian counties of Cahul, Ismail and Cetatea Alba to Moldavia, the Treaty of Paris (March 30, 1856) implicitly recognized Moldavia as an independent state when it provided in Art. 21 that "The territory ceded by Russia shall be annexed to *the Principality of Moldavia*, under the suzerainty of the Porte. The inhabitants of this territory shall enjoy *the rights and privileges assured the Principalities* . . ." This territory was subsequently reoccupied by Russia in 1878.

[12] Boldur, op. cit., p. 134.

[13] Id., p. 136.

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1
[BESSARABIA]

162 The next Russian census, that of 1897, reported the following findings:

1897 Census	Total	%
Romanians	920,919	47.58
Ukrainians	382,169	19.75
Great Russians	155,774	8.05
Jews	228,168	11.79
Germans	60,206	3.11
Others	188,176	9.72
Total Bessarabia	1,935,412	100.00

This tabulation included the population, numbering 136,087,[14] of the three southern counties of Cahul, Ismail and Cetatea Alba which Russia for the second time had forced from Romania at the Congress of Berlin (1878).[15] It showed an increase of 330% in the Russian and Ukrainian populations from 162,252 to 537,943 in the short span of twenty-six years and proportionately large increases for all other races except the Romanian; it failed, however, to dislodge the Romanian mass from its preponderant position.

These findings, based as they were on the discretion of the census officials in determining the declarer's nationality according to language, have been considered partisan by many authorities insofar as they tended to list as Russians all who declared themselves able to speak Russian. The comparable Romanian data (the 1930 census figures of the population *according to mother tongue*), based on the mandatory provision that the census taker record unchanged the declarations of the inhabitants, are listed by counties on pages 32 and 36 both in actual figures and in percentages. For the province as a whole, the record is:

1930 Census	Total	%
Romanians	1,598,573	55.81
Russians	370,112	12.92
Ukrainians	331,183	11.56
Jews	201,278	7.03
Bulgarians	164,551	5.74
Others	198,705	6.94
Bessarabia	2,864,402	100.00

[14] Anuarul statistic, p. 41.

[15] Tittoni, op. cit., p. 7: "At the Berlin Congress, Russia won Bessarabia, Germany the freedom of navigation on the Danube, Austria-Hungary won Bosnia and Herzegovina; England won Cyprus; France obtained permission to occupy Tunisia. Sacrificed were only Romania, who was forcibly deprived of Bessarabia, and Italy, whose interests in Tunisia were entirely disregarded."

162

A tabulation by counties of the 1930 and 1897 records, with the Russians and Ukrainians listed separately in the first and jointly in the latter, reveals the following shift in the relative position of the several races:

County	Romanians		Russians	Ukrainians	Russians and Ukrainians		Others	
	1930	1897	1930		1930	1897	1930	1897
Orhei	87.3	77.86	3.8	0.9	4.7	8.24	8.0	13.90
Lapusna	77.8	62.90	7.1	0.7	7.8	13.81	14.4	23.29
Soroca	73.6	63.51	8.1	8.2	16.3	20.91	10.1	15.58
Balti	70.1	66.37	12.0	7.6	19.6	18.13	10.3	15.50
Tighina	53.4	45.14	14.7	3.0	17.7	20.35	28.9	34.51
Cahul	51.2	39.09	7.5	0.3	7.8	32.08	41.0	28.23
Ismail	31.9		29.7	4.7	34.4		33.7	
Hotin	35.0	23.87	13.6	41.6	55.2	59.55	9.8	16.58
Cetatea Alba	18.5	16.38	17.3	20.5	37.8	36.36	43.7	47.26
Bessarabia	56.2	47.58	12.8	11.0	23.8	27.8	20.5	24.62

A clear Romanian majority of 56.2% emerges for the province as a whole and is based, as the table shows, on majorities in six out of the nine counties that rise from 51.2% in Cahul to as high as 87.3% in Orhei. Furthermore, there is a relative Romanian majority in the seventh county, Ismail, and a near-equality of the Romanians with the most populous races, the Bulgarians and Ukrainians, in the remaining counties of Cetatea Alba and Hotin respectively.

The most recent Russian statistics show for the whole of the Communist Union in 1939 not more than 58.41% Russians and a multitude of other races. Among the latter are several hundreds of thousands of Romanians removed during the Czarist règime from their Bessarabian homeland to the region between the rivers Dniester and Bug, now (October, 1941) under Romanian military administration. Of these, 185,266 were listed as living in the Moldavian autonomous republic (AMSSR) created October 12, 1924, on the Ukrainian side of the Dniester to undermine the consolidation of Romanian Bessarabia. An exchange across the river of Moldavians and Ukrainians has been advocated as a first move toward Russo-Romanian understanding, the feasibility of which is supported by the Greek-Turkish pact of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, regulating the exchange of their populations, the similar agreement between Bulgaria and Romania bearing on the Dobrudja populations and more re-

162 cently the Russo-Hungarian accord for the removal of the Hungarian population in northern Bucovina districts then overrun by Russia.

More active as a long-range factor in the evolution of Bessarabia, as indeed of all Romanian provinces, is the biological truth[18] that city populations tend to diminish in the span of a few generations. Since the surrounding rural areas serve as natural reservoirs for city populations, it has been predicted that the migration from village to city will in the course of time alter the present position even more in favor of the Romanians. The conclusion holds for 64 out of the 71 counties whose rural population is 90% Romanian.

[18]Manuila, Dr. Sabin, "Ethnographical Survey of the Population of Romania," Bucharest, 1938, pp. xiv-xv.

Transylvania

THE Romanians regard Transylvania as the cradle of their race born from the fusion of the Dacians with the colonists of Rome, 105-275 A.D. Their Daco-Roman origin and their continuous existence thereafter in the shelter which the tableland of Transylvania afforded them against successive barbarian invasions is well recognized today.[17] 175

Most of the invaders left few traces; but the Slavs in the seventh century and the Hungarians (Magyars) in the ninth century had come to stay. With the first the Romanians early established friendly contacts. The latter, checked in their advance westward by Otto the Great at Augsburg in 955 A.D., settled in the Pannonian plain, received Christianity from the Bohemians, and organized a state that was to bring in time increasing pressure on the organized settlements of the autochthonous Romanians in Transylvania. The influence which Hungary was able to exert on this province by 1100 A.D. was thereafter maintained not through her singlehanded effort, but by the colonization of the Carpathian foothills with Szekelys (Szeklers or Siculi) and Saxons (Germans), 1100-1149 A.D. The sweeping medieval privileges accorded the newcomers by Hungarian kings in consideration of their aid in defending Transylvania to the east formed the nucleus of the social inequality that was to prevail there as in Hungary proper until 1848.

Ruthlessly using the power conferred by feudal land tenure and social distinction,[18] the Hungarians and their federates gradually increased the subjection of the mass of the population that was largely Romanian. Partly to escape this subjection, the latter crossed the Carpathians to the south and east where they founded the independent states of Wallachia (about 1290) and Moldavia (1349). Thereafter the nobles among the Transylvanian Romanians found it increasingly expedient to join the privileged class of the Hungarians (John Hunyady and Matthias Corvinus, princes of Transylvania, were of Romanian stock); while the mass of the peasantry was left to shift as best it could under mounting impositions and exactions that culminated in the revolt of 1437.

The Magyars, Saxons and Szekelys answered this attack on their privileges with the proclamation at Kapolna (1438) of a mutual-aid

[17] Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 13.
[18] Id., p. 103.

11: Clark. S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1
[TRANSYLVANIA]

175 "Union of the Three Nations" through which Transylvania was to be ruled thenceforth to the exclusion of her other nationalities. Characteristically, this narrow class system of exploitation of the masses was tenaciously upheld despite the grave consequences it exerted on the Hungarian state. One searches in vain for evidences of "the power to build up and maintain a state by urban culture rooted in tradition, Christian ethics and ecclesiastical organization," as a recent Hungarian apologist would have us believe.[19] But there is ample proof that the collapse of the Hungarian kingdom before the Turks at Mohacs (1526) was directly traceable to the second in a long series of mass uprisings, that of Dozsa in 1514, which weakened the internal structure of the country.

The eclipse of Hungary under the Turks gave Transylvania, already locally autonomous under the triune règime, the occasion for achieving separate existence in 1538.

Under the Turkish influence extending westward through Hungary toward Vienna and eastward through the Romanian principalities far into the Ukraine and beyond, Transylvania now assumed new importance for Moldavia and Wallachia. "The history of four further centuries was to prove that the two Romanian states must either be drawn into the orbit of a great Danubian empire or, in order to achieve a sure and permanent independence of their own, must attach Transylvania to themselves."[20]

For the purpose of this outline, which is concerned with problems arising out of the independence of Romania through the union of the three Romanian states of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania, it will serve to record that, from 1526 to the Peace of Karlowitz (January 26, 1699), Transylvania existed as an independent Voevodate and that thereafter it remained uninterruptedly a possession of the imperial Hapsburg crown first as a principality and after 1765 as a "Great" principality until 1867.

In that year Emperor Francis Joseph I, his position imperiled by the effects of the disastrous war with Prussia (1866), was obliged to consent to a compromise (Ausgleich) establishing within a Dual Monarchy the equality with Austria of a Hungary enlarged by the cession to her of the whole of Transylvania. It is from this event, as we shall see, that the acute phase of the problem of Transylvania dates.

The incorporation of the imperial province into a Hungary just emerged from long political subjection, instead of prompting the Mag-

[19] John Balogh, editor, in The Hungarian Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 4 (Winter 1940-41), Budapest.
[20] Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

175

yars to extend to the Transylvania populations the newly won liberties for which they had clamored in Vienna in 1848, fired their imagination with the dream of a great Magyar state that would encompass the greater part of Eastern Europe. The mutual checks theretofore imposed by the jealous defense of the privileges rigidly apportioned among Magyars, Szekelys and Saxons now gave way to a unilateral attempt at solving at one stroke all the difficulties confronting the establishment of a homogeneous Hungarian nation by the mass absorption of her non-Hungarian populations.[21]

The practical obstacles to the realization of this scheme have been often described; here it will suffice to point out that these populations were then contiguous to and in close spiritual communion with the main body of their connationals living in independent national states—the Slavs to the south and north, the Germans to the west and the Romanians to the east; that Latin and not Hungarian had been the official language in Hungary before 1800, (the Central Asiatic Magyar or Ural-Altaic dialect of few root-words admittedly being a difficult literary and cultural medium compared with the Romance language of the Romanians, easily understood and freely used by the inhabitants of Transylvania); that the economic structure of Hungary, in contrast to that of the states surrounding her, rested then as now on the control by a few of latifundiary estates worked by peasant-serfs isolated and insulated against modern democratic liberalism;[22] and that Magyardom, while achieving some inroads into the surrounding mass of non-Magyar nationalities, had itself become permeated socially, culturally, artistically and economically

[21]This policy is made clear by the declarations in parliament of her leaders as to what constituted a danger to Hungary (Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 525-26). Said Count Tisza: "A radical franchise constitutes a great danger for our nation. . . . The intellectual standard is a great danger for the Magyars, since a large proportion of the non-Magyars can learn to read and write, and then there will be an end of Magyar supremacy." Also Count Bethlen: "The question of democratization is one of life and death for Transylvania, and threatens the existence of every class of society;" and lastly Count Andrassy, on self-determination, "a dangerous catchword, the realization of which would mean the end of the Hungarian State."

[22]Illyes, Gyula, "Pusztak Nepe," Budapest, 1936, p. 31. The position of labor in twentieth century Hungary is thus described by Seton-Watson (op. cit., p. 429): "The working class was entirely unrepresented in Parliament. Everything was done to hinder the growth of trade unions (as late as 1908 the Government dissolved the federations of iron-workers and timbermen). The imprisonment of strikers was an ordinary occurrence. Meanwhile housing conditions for the labourer actually grew worse. The working day for farms was from 'sunrise to sunset.' Government had devised special measures to prevent harvest strikes, and to supply the big estates with underpaid workers imported from other districts. The Agricultural Law of 1907 even legalised flogging of labourers up to eighteen by the landowner. In 52 per cent. of the Hungarian factories there were children under fourteen working twelve or more hours per day. In the richest county, Bacs-Bodrog (Backa), tuberculosis was rampant and the main certified cause of death. Emigration rose by leaps and bounds owing to bad labour conditions, coupled with political repression. Between 1900 and 1906, 657,000 left Hungary out of a population of 19,000,000; and from 1906 to 1914 the rate exceeded 200,000 a year."

175 by the patient genius of the Jewish race.[33] Lastly, it is not to be gainsaid that the Hungarians themselves are comparatively a small race, numbering according to their own partisan census of 1910 only 10,050,575 out of a total population of 20,886,487.[34] And this brings us to our main object, the consideration of the racial structure of Transylvania.

162 Religious, civil, and fiscal censuses of Transylvania under both Austrian and Hungarian domination establish from the beginning the preponderance of the Romanian element. The early censuses of the Romanian Greek-Catholic bishopric (1714, 1733 and 1750) were not complete, counting as they did families, not individuals, and omitting the region of Barsa surrounding the city of Brasov. The 1760 Austrian census, a thorough fiscal record, listed 777,170 Romanians; the 1786 count, showing a *total* population of 1,577,515, afforded the ecclesiastical authorities a basis for reaching the following conclusion as to its racial composition:

Romanians	1,048,416
Hungarians	341,058
Saxons	188,041

For the pre-Dualist era we have the report of A. Fenyes[35] for the whole of Hungary in 1840:

Hungarians	4,812,759	37.4%
Romanians	2,202,542	17.1
Germans	1,273,677	9.9
Serbs	828,365	6.4
Croats	1,315,947	10.2
Slovenes	1,687,256	13.1
Ruthenes	442,903	3.4
Jews	244,035	1.9
hers	72,922	0.6
Total	12,880,406	100.0

[33]Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 429: "One other vital factor in the Hungarian situation must be mentioned,—the economic transformation, which expressed itself on the one hand in the decay of the gentry, the class which had long been Hungary's political backbone, and on the other hand in the virtual capture of industry, banking, commerce and the press by the Jews."

[34]Hungary in 1910 had just elected a new parliament, to which but 8 non-Hungarians had been returned by the aid of "only 194 batallions of infantry and 114 squadrons of cavalry." The census found not more than about 50% Hungarians in all Hungary, as we have seen, and but 31.62% Hungarians in the whole of Transylvania. Yet Count Stephen Tisza felt justified to address parliament as follows: "Our non-Magyar fellow-citizens must first of all reconcile themselves to the fact that they here belong to a national state, which is not a conglomerate of different races, but which one race has conquered and founded, upon which one race has stamped the ineradicable impress of its individuality." (Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 427.)

[35]Seton-Watson, R. W., "Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers," London, 1934, p. 27.

We also have a British estimate of 1848 for Transylvania proper:* 162

Romanians	1,130,000
Hungarians	550,000
Germans	292,000
Others	28,000

Thereafter we are entirely dependent on the official Hungarian figures, showing for Transylvania proper the following evolution:

Year	Romanians	%	Hungarians	%	Germans	%
1850	1,202,000	58.0	585,000	28.2	219,000	10.6
1880	1,184,883	56.8	630,477	30.3	211,748	10.2
1890	1,276,890	56.7	697,945	31.0	217,670	9.7
1900	1,397,282	56.4	814,994	32.9	233,012	9.4
1910	1,472,021	55.0	918,217	34.3	234,085	8.7

That these figures fail to render a true picture has been proved beyond dispute by the discrepancy noted between the annual net increment (the natural excess of births over deaths) of each of the nationalities listed and the reported nationality totals. Further proof is afforded by the Romanian census of 1930 which lists the nationalities in accordance with the statements of the declarers. Thus, for Transylvania (the Banat, Crisana and Maramures included) the last Hungarian figures available, those of 1910, compare as follows with the Romanian data of 1930:

	1910		1930	
Romanians	2,830,040	53.76	3,208,767	57.82
Hungarians	1,664,296	31.62	1,353,288	24.38
Germans	565,116	10.74	544,278	9.81
Jews	.....	.....	178,810	3.22
Others	204,150	3.88	264,663	4.77
Total	5,263,602	100.00	5,549,806	100.00

It is at once evident that the figure for Hungarians had been bolstered in the 1910 count by the inclusion of the Jewish population of Transylvania. For a closer scrutiny of the two censuses here compared, a tabula-

*Exclusive of the Banat of Timisoara, Crisana and Maramures.

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

[TRANSYLVANIA]

175

THE CENSUS OF 1930.

ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP OF TRANSYLVANIA.

Red line shows southern boundary of territory awarded to Hungary August 30, 1940.

opp. p. 16

162 tion by counties is available,[*] giving the populations found living in 1930 within the identical administrative (county) boundaries to which the Hungarian count of 1910 applied.

The accompanying ethnographic map illustrates in distinctive colors the distribution of the principal nationalities inhabiting Transylvania. It is to be noted, however, that this convenient mode of presentation, while outlining clearly the areas of greatest concentration of each of the nationalities considered, fails to impart any information as to the relative proportion of the various races in any given section; it tends, in fact, to convey the very definite impression that each color zone represented is inhabited exclusively by the nationality to which the color corresponds, obviously an erroneous impression. A reference to the map (page 17) which outlines the administrative boundaries of the Transylvanian counties, serves to locate in the counties of Ciuc, Odorhei and Trei Scaune the great concentration of Hungarians shown in green on the color map. This region, the greatest single minority island in the province, contained in 1930 in addition to the preponderant Szekelys (listed as Hungarians) 62,817 individuals of other races. Similarly, the county of Timis-Torontal, a region which on the color map would seem preponderantly German, while actually representing one of the greatest concentration of Germans in Transylvania, contained in addition to 174,395 Germans 325,048 individuals of other races.

The Award of Vienna

175 The sinuous red line which runs from east to west on the ethnographic map was drawn at Vienna, August 30, 1940, by the Foreign Ministers of the German Reich and the Italian Kingdom, and represents their joint decision as arbiters of the claim of Hungary to Romanian Transylvania. History shows that political and other factors can and do make possible arbitrary settlements; when they do, as in the present instance, the settlement is of the essence of a compromise—a temporary working arrangement.

The Treaty of Trianon created the modern independent kingdom of Hungary. The claim of this kingdom to the territories over which Hungary as a member of the former Dual Monarchy once extended her authority were formulated by her in minute detail and submitted for the careful consideration of the experts of the Versailles peace conference. There is nothing new that Hungary could add today to what, as

[*] See page 50.

[technically impossible to reproduce for HB File -- Analyst]

/1:Clark S-4 (no date)1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

162

Census of 1930
Counties of Transylvania, The Banat of Timisoara, Crisana and Maramures



Vienna Award Frontier (solid black line)
County Boundaries (dotted line)

Transylvania

1 Alba
10 Brasov
18 Ciuc
19 Cluj
26 Fagaras
30 Hunedoara
38 Mures
40 Nasaud
42 Odorhei
51 Salaj
54 Sibiu
55 Somes
59 Tarnava Mare
60 Tarnava Mica
65 Trei Scaune
67 Turda

The Banat of Timisoara

15 Caras
53 Severin
64 Timis Torontal

Crisana—Maramures

2 Arad
7 Bihor
36 Maramures
52 Satu Mare

175 was then pointed out to her, was in effect but a specious plea for the perpetuation of a 1000-year old injustice."

162 That claim had been based mainly on historical, geographical and
728 economic arguments. Whatever effort was made to present it from the viewpoint of the populations whom it would have affected referred in the main to the compact mass of the Szekelys, the twelfth century colonists inhabiting today the exact geographical center of post-War Romania. Romania contended that the cession to Hungary of this mass of aliens would have carried with it an even greater number of Romanians living in the territory separating the Szekelys from Hungary. As long as it will stand, the Award of Vienna will serve to prove the Romanian contention of twenty years ago. In figures the picture is as follows:

Census of 1930
Racial Composition of the Population Ceded to Hungary

County	Romanian	Hungarian	German	Jewish	Others	Total
1. Bihor	136,351	130,127	2,101	20,420	16,549	305,548
2. Ciuc	20,976	120,627	439	2,383	1,381	145,806
3. Cluj	141,607	85,284	2,669	16,057	11,034	256,651
4. Maramures	93,207	11,174	3,239	33,828	20,127	161,575
5. Mures	115,773	121,282	11,271	9,848	11,564	269,738
6. Nasaud*	103,897	7,488	21,211	6,450	6,528	145,574
7. Odorhei	5,430	112,375	454	1,250	2,475	121,984
8. Salaj	192,821	107,662	16,010	13,380	13,474	343,347
9. Satu Mare	178,523	74,191	9,530	23,967	8,664	294,875
10. Somes	169,942	33,870	351	10,546	4,646	219,355
11. Tarnava Mare	270	62	656	7	15	1,010
12. Tarnava Mica	131	1,580	3	42	165	1,921
13. Trei Scaune	17,505	105,834	760	707	2,963	127,769
Total	1,176,433	911,556	68,694	138,885	99,585	2,395,153

*Inclusive of the population, numbering 1,443, of the villages of Cosna and Carlibaba Noua transferred from the County of Nasaud to the County of Campulung, Bukovina, as of September 25, 1925.

The recovery by Hungary of 911,556 of her nationals thus caused Romania to lose a population of 1,176,433 Romanians. (An official 1940 estimate based on current vital statistics lists 978,074 or 37.1% Hungarians and 1,304,903 or 50.2% Romanians in the ceded territory.) The recovered Hungarian population lies broadly in two groups: a central group, mainly Szekelys, as we have seen, in the counties of Ciuc, Odorhei and Trei Scaune, extending also into the county of Mures, or in all 460,118 souls; and a western group in the border counties of Cluj, Salaj, Bihor,

"Letter of A. Millerand, President of the Peace Conference, replying on behalf of the Allies, May 6, 1920.

1/1 [cession of territory by Vienna agreement in 1940- --Analyst]

Satu Mare and Maramures, or 408,438 souls. The remainder of 43,000 Hungarians in the territory recently awarded Hungary live scattered over a region containing not less than 274,240 Romanians, besides other races. 162 728

Clearly, a permanent solution of the Hungaro-Romanian problem would have had to recognize this geographical distribution and treat each group on its merits.

The western group of 408,438 Hungarians forms 30.0% of the total population (1,361,996) of the region containing them; the Romanians there number 742,509, or 54.5%, and other nationalities 211,049, or 15.5%. At the preliminary conference* held in the early Summer of 1940 at Turnu Severin between Hungarian and Romanian delegates seeking a direct amicable settlement of the dispute, the Romanian delegation could not fail to point out that by an equitable rectification of the then existing frontier and an exchange of populations a settlement could be reached that would in effect reduce to a minimum the number both of Hungarians in Romania and of Romanians in Hungary. But the Hungarian delegation, instructed to claim the whole of Transylvania, would not entertain a practical and real settlement. As a consequence, 742,509 Romanians and 211,049 other nationalities, or a total of 953,558 non-Hungarians, were turned over to a bitter foster-government to make possible the repatriation of the 408,438 Magyars of Western Transylvania. As beneficiary of a settlement that delivers to her two unwilling aliens for every one of her nationals, Hungary has proved again that she is not interested in the creation of conditions that would insure a firm peace, but in an expansion which, at the cost of her neighbors, will enable her to assume the role of Hapsburg Austria in the East. 648 [728]

The central Hungarian group in Transylvania poses a different problem. This group, non-contiguous with the Hungarian frontier traced in 1920, had even before that date shown but little interest in Hungary, to them a distant country; their concern had mostly been in Moldavia, adjoining and familiar territory where they often sought and found profitable employment. There are thus grounds to doubt that they could find satisfaction in their present position, isolated as it is by the new Vienna boundary from main railway connections, from their natural economic outlet of Brasov and the opportunities of steady employment in Romania. Nor, seemingly, could they find comfort in an embittered atmosphere, in the close everyday contact with the 159,684 Romanians living among them or in the solid block of 273,839 Romanians that divide them in the north from their kinsmen. 162

* [preceeding the Vienna[19] agreement in 1940 -- --Analyst]

563 The Szekelys have found during twenty-two years of Romanian administration that the feudal privileges they had enjoyed under Hungary had cost them a high price to uphold and had yielded little real benefit. Indeed, Hungarian propaganda had inspired them with restlessness in the last two decades. But it cannot be doubted that, had the western boundary been settled in good faith, the Szekelys would have found their right place in the Romanian state, the more so as their ethnic origin has never been conclusively proved.*

*

000 The Peace Conference of 1920 had to struggle as best it could with the statistical approximations submitted by Serbia, Austria, Romania and Hungary in recasting the Eastern European map with which we have been familiar until 1939. The nations that from the beginning have attacked that map are to a large extent responsible for the present war. The changes brought about by this war are forced changes. Whether affecting Romania, as they did in Transylvania and Bessarabia, or any of her former friends and allies, they are changes for the worse in every single instance. Were it practicable to poll national European opinion, the Russian not excepted, hardly anyone would be surprised if the restoration of the *status quo ante* were overwhelmingly upheld.

Broadly, this is forecast by the Atlantic Charter when it proclaims "the desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." Broadly this, and no more, is also Romania's desire when, declining to expand beyond her own domain, she struggles to reconstruct her national unity.

Is this reconstruction justifiable? The question may be answered today with statistical certainties. Where there is a Romanian majority, as indeed there is in every Romanian province, "sovereign rights and self-government," the Atlantic Charter asserts, must be "restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." There is general agreement

---

*Whether they be Huns, Petchenegs, Cabars, Avars, Huno-Avars, Kezaro-Cabars or Gepides, as has been variously contended (Theodorescu, Vasile M., "Transilvania sub Maghiari si Romani," Bucharest, 1941), there is a distinct possibility that while Hungarian-speaking they may not be Hungarians. Historically this supposition is supported by their membership in the "Union of the Three Nations" formed in 1438 with the Hungarians and Saxons. This alliance, adhered to until modern times, argues for a distinct racial identity of Szekelys, the absence of which would have dictated a Union of two, and not of three, nations.

Not less interesting is the argument resting on scientifically conducted blood tests to determine biologically the racial indices of Szekelys, Hungarians and Romanians, the results of which indicate according to Dr. Pierre Ramneantu ("Origine ethnique des Seklers de Transylvanie" in *Revue de Transylvanie*, Vol. 2, No. 1, Cluj, 1935, pp. 45-59) a pronounced dissimilarity between those of Szekelys and Hungarians and an equally marked resemblance between those of Szekelys and Romanians.

that the Romanian census taken twelve years after the last War has candidly revealed the true racial situation when it found for Romania as a whole 28.1% non-Romanians to 71.9% Romanians. There can be no less agreement that the Romanians in Transylvania and Bessarabia have been forcibly deprived of their rights. 000

Given a long-standing racial intermixture such as that of Eastern Europe, the last Peace Conference could not have done better in restoring the minorities to their main national bodies merely by redrawing political frontiers. Since then a new means of completely doing away with the minorities question has been successfully tested when Greece and Turkey in 1923 agreed to exchange their nationals. Romania too has adopted this method in her recent settlement with Bulgaria. Should the future world order be as successful in affording "to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries," a wide exchange of populations between Russia and Romania and between Hungary and Romania might remove forever the principal cause of friction among neighboring nations whom war has so far debarred from enjoying the ever widening benefits of peace.

 (pg. 22 is blank)

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

659 As recently as twelve years ago, no inquiry into the population of the provinces of post-War Romania would have been possible without reference to five separate censuses taken at different times by varying methods and criteria peculiar to the administrative systems and inclinations of five independent states. There were the Bulgarian census of 1910 for southern Dobrudja (Dobrogea); the Romanian census of 1912 for the Old Kingdom; the 1910 Hungarian census for Transylvania with the Banat, Crisana and Maramures; the 1910 Austrian census for Bucovina and the 1897 Russian census for Bessarabia. To make matters worse, population statistics were often deliberately distorted to minimize racial problems or bolster the fiction of national states. Old Romania alone, with its small foreign population and no minorities problem, made no provision for the registration of aliens in her 1912 census.

The first census to lift the racial complexion from conjecture to fact was carried out in Romania on December 29, 1930. This was a scientific undertaking by American-trained specialists headed by Dr. Sabin Manuila and aided by a Demographic Institute established with the American aid of the Rockefeller Foundation. The collating of the material gathered in one day took four years, and has since been recorded in ten quarto volumes of some 800 pages each.

Volume II of the series (*General Census of the Population of Romania of December 29, 1930: Nationality, Mother Tongue, Religion.* Published by Dr. Sabin Manuila, Director of the Census; Central Institute of Statistics. Bucharest: Monitorul Oficial, 1938) deals exclusively with racial statistics, a summary of which is offered in the following pages as evidence of the preponderance of the Romanian element throughout Romania. To insure the accuracy of this evidence, the Romanian Census Bureau adopted at the time a number of safeguards described by Dr. Manuila in his Preface to volume II.

To begin with, the determination of the nationality of each inhabitant was left in his own hands. Every person was required to declare the nationality to which he or she belonged, nationality being simply defined as "the race to which one felt bound by tradition and sentiment." The Bureau felt reasonably certain that, for example, no Romanian would declare himself a Hungarian and that no German would claim to be a

659 Russian. Nevertheless, further to insure the exactness of these declarations, four separate criteria, "among the most complete of those known to modern demographic science," were adopted, and the inhabitants were asked to give in every instance in addition to (1) their nationality according to the definition above outlined, (2) the language they had learned in their homes from their parents and were speaking in preference to all others; (3) their religion, "which for certain races is a means of positive ethnical identification and for others a relative one, but always of value in conjunction with other data," and lastly (4) their citizenship.

Given these four separate checks, to question the accuracy of the broad conclusions of the 1930 census would have implied, Dr. Manuila points out, to question the census record of any given locality. To meet this contingency the complete population data collected on December 29, 1930, and classified not according to the names of individuals who naturally move from place to place, but according to streets, buildings and stable households, have been permanently stored in the Central Institute of Statistics at Bucharest, where they are freely accessible to the general public. Since 1930, if Romanian nationalists have occasionally criticized the Census authorities for having permitted the listing of Jews and Szeklers as Hungarians, it is a fact that scientists remain unanimously agreed on the unimpeachable authenticity of the Romanian figures which, incidentally, gives the key to the otherwise inexplicable unwillingness of all Hungarian irredentists to rest their case on the ethnical realities of Transylvania.

*

000 Of the general tables that follow, those numbered I to VI correspond exactly to tables A, E, H, L, O and S, volume II of the census, pp. xxxii-cii, also available in the Statistical Yearbook of Romania for 1937-38, pp. 58-75. They are in fact summaries showing for each county (*judet*) the population of which volume II provides a far more comprehensive record not by counties alone but for every township (*plasa*) in every county and every village in each township down to the smallest hamlet. These county summaries are stated both in actual figures and in percentages that reveal at a glance the racial situation in any given place, and list the population of Romania according to nationality (tables I and II), language (III and IV) and religion (V and VI).

For the more limited area of ceded Transylvania we are able to give in table VII, pp. 44-49, a somewhat more detailed picture of the nationality of the population in the urban centers and the rural area of every township in each of the counties affected by the Vienna Award. This table

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

corresponds to the data alphabetically listed under each county in volume II, part I, pp. 1-519, and will be specially useful in visualizing in greater detail the racial pattern of the ceded population disclosed by the condensed tabulation on page 18, itself computed from volume II according to the official Romanian Interior Department's gazetteer of the ceded territory. 000

Lastly, table VIII, p. 50, is the condensation of a series of tabulations of the population of Transylvania accompanying a study published by Dr. Manuila in 1929 ("Trend of the Population Movement in the Counties of Transylvania, 1920-27," in *Transilvania, Banatul, Crisana, Maramuresul*, 1918-28; Bucharest: Cultura Nationala), and is invaluable in that it makes possible a direct comparison of the racial Hungarian statistics of 1910 with the returns of the Romanian census of 1930 within the administrative (county) limits of Transylvania as modified following the union of the province with Romania.

162

Table I—Population

Actual figures

COUNTY	TOTAL	Rumanians	Hungarians	Germans	Russians	Ruthenians, Ukrainians	Serbs, Croats, Slovenes	Bulgarians	Czechs, Slovaks	Poles
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
ROMANIA	**18,057,028**	**12,981,324**	**1,425,507**	**745,421**	**409,150**	**582,115**	**51,042**	**366,384**	**51,843**	**68,310**
Oltenia	**1,313,175**	**1,475,265**	**2,587**	**3,443**	**713**	**45**	**1,347**	**588**	**428**	**174**
Dolj	485,149	469,219	1,365	1,663	323	7	417	220	195	77
Gorj	208,339	202,103	168	164	143	6	95	36	32	12
Mehedinti	303,878	296,845	300	859	92	4	357	107	118	13
Romanati	271,096	260,816	244	161	49	5	132	108	12	18
Valcea	240,713	240,282	480	595	106	23	146	67	68	54
Muntenia	**4,029,998**	**3,761,527**	**33,806**	**28,836**	**6,941**	**777**	**3,938**	**3,664**	**2,697**	**3,444**
Arges	257,378	251,181	591	353	143	26	93	85	37	81
Braila	219,831	196,553	1,360	1,024	1,380	27	268	358	96	162
Buzau	309,405	301,254	517	258	135	35	230	76	49	82
Dambovita	309,676	300,092	708	362	166	22	409	148	66	69
Ialomita	293,352	283,344	460	174	265	17	198	256	19	12
Ilfov	999,362	842,942	24,690	14,330	3,710	458	1,506	1,872	1,901	1,884
Muscel	149,797	145,442	254	106	58	2	33	28	28	21
Olt	183,595	180,206	351	142	59	2	82	153	26	17
Prahova	477,750	453,861	3,824	3,447	612	136	396	281	400	457
Ramnicu Sarat	184,956	178,116	251	75	79	17	69	53	10	33
Teleorman	347,294	340,704	284	159	50	5	282	244	21	9
Vlasca	296,412	287,832	510	196	184	30	169	140	44	27
Dobrogea	**815,475**	**368,572**	**2,194**	**12,581**	**27,426**	**96**	**962**	**188,279**	**165**	**209**
Calacra	166,911	37,640	285	500	1,000	43	198	70,797	24	15
Constanta	253,093	167,568	1,492	9,605	3,832	28	268	22,560	94	106
Durostor	211,433	60,088	337	58	216	20	165	72,412	20	5
Tulcea	184,038	115,276	180	2,418	22,378	5	333	19,510	27	54
Moldova	**2,433,996**	**2,185,432**	**20,964**	**8,990**	**6,997**	**1,349**	**1,068**	**1,444**	**888**	**3,382**
Bacau	261,019	231,250	8,497	944	634	89	198	127	70	393
Baia	157,501	144,535	279	937	270	52	26	57	31	394
Botosani	218,258	193,723	272	732	198	646	34	84	85	391
Covurlui	210,006	175,864	2,238	1,305	3,083	57	303	325	98	342
Dorohoi	211,354	194,533	71	404	160	120	9	39	11	147
Falciu	115,055	108,669	332	86	125	4	43	108	1	19
Iasi	275,796	225,130	1,281	1,177	1,617	120	59	162	113	398
Neamt	198,223	179,038	2,384	1,092	269	38	30	53	85	431
Putna	194,105	181,081	2,106	347	258	46	161	157	13	129
Roman	151,550	137,399	2,050	477	157	47	33	88	20	205
Tecuci	156,405	148,438	1,148	191	136	7	92	103	3	29
Tutova	144,821	135,682	239	271	145	18	81	107	3	32
Vaslui	139,503	130,270	97	133	175	5	19	34	1	72
Basarabia	**2,864,082**	**1,610,757**	**829**	**81,889**	**351,912**	**314,211**	**348**	**163,726**	**348**	**8,194**
Balti	386,721	270,942	105	1,623	46,569	29,288	26	66	32	3,165
Cahul	196,693	100,714	21	8,664	14,740	619	9	28,565	247	100
Cetatea Alba	341,176	62,949	114	55,598	58,922	70,095	41	71,227	42	232
Hotin	392,430	137,348	80	323	53,453	163,267	16	26	11	1,017
Ismail	225,509	72,020	121	983	66,987	10,655	65	43,375	38	270
Lapusna	419,621	326,455	161	2,823	29,770	2,732	93	712	88	1,642
Orhei	279,292	243,936	68	156	10,746	2,469	7	87	6	388
Soroca	316,368	232,720	87	417	25,736	26,039	24	69	32	850
Tighina	306,592	163,673	72	10,324	44,989	9,047	64	19,599	34	483
Bucovina	**853,009**	**279,691**	**11,881**	**75,533**	**7,948**	**236,139**	**43**	**133**	**671**	**38,300**
Campulung	94,816	58,104	105	19,109	482	6,362	9	1	48	1,730
Cernauti	306,194	78,589	610	19,586	3,295	136,380	38	92	315	15,243
Radauti	160,778	86,082	10,291	17,857	1,426	13,916	1	8	86	2,311
Storojinet	169,894	57,595	62	8,990	1,582	77,382	9	8	163	7,985
Suceava	121,327	96,401	813	9,991	1,163	2,099	6	24	57	3,311

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

162

According to Nationality

Actual figures

Romanians 12	Jews 13	Greeks 14	Albanians 15	Armenians 16	Turks 17	Tatars 18	Gagauzes 19	Gipsies 20	Others 21	Not declared 22	COUNTY 1
12,456	728,115	26,695	4,670	15,844	154,722	23,141	105,750	262,501	56,353	7,114	*ROMANIA*
											Oltenia
1	3,388	639	117	185	588	-	8	22,239	1,496	191	*Dolj*
1	2,259	260	54	107	78	-	8	8,065	796	35	*Gorj*
-	108	21	-	1	9	-	-	3,355	83	3	*Mehedinti*
-	396	164	19	44	460	-	-	3,718	161	35	*Romanati*
-	157	136	8	15	32	-	-	3,104	77	2	*Vilcea*
-	585	28	36	18	23	-	-	3,997	379	26	
											Muntenia
-	86,545	10,899	1,939	5,558	2,148	22	105	71,796	12,137	1,281	*Arges*
-	634	138	70	62	67	-	-	3,667	145	25	*Braila*
-	6,774	4,733	118	275	404	3	30	3,276	2,670	111	*Buzau*
-	1,615	129	44	59	28	-	3	4,092	177	22	*Dambovita*
-	731	210	68	10	27	-	-	6,350	219	22	
											Ialomita
-	513	313	116	28	99	-	12	7,228	283	15	*Ilfov*
-	70,887	4,461	1,382	4,761	1,147	18	67	17,230	6,423	843	*Muscel*
-	29	39	6	3	18	-	-	3,450	255	25	*Olt*
-	181	66	9	13	7	-	-	2,214	51	16	*Prahova*
-	4,663	322	111	196	73	-	8	7,348	1,719	128	
											Rimnicu Sarat
-	1,112	71	17	21	18	-	6	4,970	43	5	*Teleorman*
-	227	181	24	23	143	1	1	4,900	27	9	*Vlasca*
-	229	146	64	109	157	-	1	6,459	125	30	
											Dobrogea
-	3,796	9,033	389	5,379	158,773	22,092	7,126	11,446	15,489	266	*Caliacra*
-	410	1,027	31	1,007	38,630	4,601	6,342	4,578	61	62	*Constanta*
-	1,824	4,616	471	3,350	17,114	15,174	752	2,149	1,911	119	*Durostor*
-	597	253	52	733	90,995	2,885	14	3,037	978	70	*Tulcea*
-	1,164	3,127	35	280	4,634	372	18	1,682	12,530	15	
											Moldova
1	158,431	3,784	185	1,587	368	5	204	33,194	6,752	483	*Bacau*
-	13,945	92	23	158	14	-	15	3,886	451	31	*Baia*
-	7,576	28	1	16	6	-	4	1,830	1,449	48	*Botosani*
-	19,553	10	10	161	8	-	16	1,751	561	43	*Covurlui*
-	19,924	2,982	48	573	148	1	71	1,361	1,861	182	
											Dorohoi
-	14,720	1	2	24	15	-	11	935	77	55	*Falcin*
-	3,580	101	4	6	5	-	3	1,887	42	11	*Iasi*
1	60,199	109	33	192	24	3	34	3,171	1,363	218	*Neamt*
-	12,935	30	5	36	8	-	-	1,438	329	22	*Putna*
-	6,888	188	23	241	42	-	5	2,250	160	30	
											Roman
-	7,129	16	21	64	31	-	38	3,526	216	35	*Tecuci*
-	2,871	114	6	18	10	-	35	3,146	49	7	*Tutova*
-	4,132	97	7	16	34	1	51	3,749	127	7	*Vaslui*
-	4,960	24	-	12	5	-	21	3,266	337	74	
											Bucovina
4	304,858	2,044	1,899	1,309	541	14	98,172	13,518	8,975	1,445	*Baia*
-	31,695	75	2	242	7	2	8	1,929	885	60	*Cahul*
-	4,454	503	-	36	37	-	35,299	1,466	1,188	113	*Cetatea Alba*
-	11,390	190	2	607	7	1	7,876	1,605	358	122	*Hotin*
-	35,985	20	3	8	19	2	2	643	95	112	
											Ismail
1	6,306	601	1,776	73	387	1	15,591	460	5,470	329	*Lapusna*
3	90,013	478	23	585	54	8	37	3,109	395	422	*Orhei*
-	18,999	65	1	42	7	-	1	2,062	270	67	*Soroca*
-	29,191	16	-	60	16	-	13	960	56	62	*Tighina*
-	16,845	96	2	58	7	-	39,545	1,286	320	158	
											Bucovina
12,427	93,492	23	1	260	49	-	28	3,164	2,317	608	*Campulung*
190	7,738	7	1	32	3	-	-	807	56	32	*Cernauti*
-	51,247	13	-	78	35	-	19	112	130	412	*Radauti*
12,244	11,308	1	-	19	8	-	-	352	1,708	40	*Suceava*
3	15,322	-	-	34	3	-	-	287	405	62	*Suceava*
-	6,677	2	-	97	-	-	9	606	18	62	

162

Table I—Population

Continued

COUNTY	TOTAL	Rumanians	Hungarians	Germans	Russians	Ruthenians, Ukrainians	Serbs, Croats, Slovenes	Bulgarians	Czechs, Slovaks	Poles
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Transylvania	**2,257,988**	**1,802,739**	**934,042**	**353,426**	**3,589**	**2,153**	**668**	**886**	**9,138**	**2,391**
Alba	212,749	171,601	24,028	7,583	555	78	26	111	211	47
Bihor	168,125	8,948	44,761	33,348	331	141	66	96	309	101
Cluj	145,888	20,976	120,647	439	99	16	10	10	54	50
Sibiu	334,991	204,139	100,759	2,788	453	284	69	166	564	98
Fagaras	80,039	67,375	4,768	10,750	102	6	8	11	21	6
Hunedoara	352,118	272,281	37,584	9,28[illegible]	324	497	172	86	1,012	1,091
Mures	299,546	134,219	125,517	11,283	134	76	50	79	93	99
Trei Scaune	144,131	105,910	7,476	20,785	218	54	18	39	53	86
Ciuchis	139,282	6,562	119,385	464	27	5	5	1	18	27
Satu Mare	581,367	192,521	107,662	16,010	328	774	42	17	5,901	39
Sibiu	196,614	120,738	9,085	50,999	509	40	76	111	187	130
Solnoc	219,555	109,942	33,870	351	145	93	10	58	53	76
Tarnava Mare	147,996	66,907	17,419	58,810	68	3	51	32	217	149
Tarnava Mica	149,482	80,606	55,306	24,011	51	6	15	42	119	22
Turda	136,122	21,259	109,581	781	102	73	53	25	119	50
Turda	185,282	156,315	19,214	742	54	9	12	4	179	230
Banat	**939,958**	**511,083**	**97,639**	**223,167**	**1,998**	**3,885**	**40,583**	**30,012**	**14,996**	**592**
Caras	168,929	139,651	5,032	25,654	132	43	9,925	197	7,328	308
Severin	259,586	153,412	15,838	23,118	495	3,552	1,014	129	3,254	150
Timis Torontal	499,443	188,020	76,769	174,395	971	685	28,706	9,686	3,514	134
Crisana and Maramures	**1,390,417**	**844,078**	**328,795**	**67,259**	**2,156**	**23,649**	**2,171**	**502**	**33,580**	**683**
Arad	425,649	258,259	82,488	32,102	438	826	1,909	171	11,790	212
Bihor	519,518	314,109	152,942	2,288	496	493	131	211	11,162	131
Maramures	161,525	95,207	11,174	3,259	73	19,240	10	30	23	95
Satu Mare	284,875	178,523	76,191	9,510	1,149	3,020	61	84	555	85

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

According to Nationality

Continued 162

Hungarians 12	Jews 13	Greeks 14	Albanians 15	Armenians 16	Turks 17	Tatars 18	Gagauzes 19	Gypsies 20	Others 21	Not declared 22	COUNTY 1
											Transylvania
-	78,626	133	21	1,041	98	3	3	75,342	1,993	1,374	
-	2,995	8	-	10	11	-	-	5,762	86	31	*Alba*
-	2,438	38	-	23	0	1	-	1,997	229	272	*Bihor*
-	2,183	2	1	94		-	-	935	55	57	*Cluj*
-	17,163	15	6	186	24	-	2	7,809	119	287	*Clos*
-	442	3	1	3	-	-	-	2,513	15	15	*Fagaras*
-	4,602	3	3	13	10	-	-	5,128	852	118	*Hunedoara*
-	9,959	3	3	66	0		-	11,305	73	103	*Mures*
-	6,150	7	-	37	0	-	-	5,893	44	66	*Nasaud*
-	1,289	-	-	5	-	-	-	2,632	21	23	*Odorhei*
-	13,180	3	-	91	10	-	-	6,100	26	123	*Salaj*
-	1,400	15	-	14	20		1	4,961	165	86	*Sibiu*
-	10,546	-	7	424	1	2	-	3,767	19	41	*Someş*
-	1,081	-	-	3	3	-	-	3,806	35	32	*Turzuzu Mare*
-	1,631	-	-	14	1	-	-	7,573	29	30	*Turzuzu Mica*
-	714	15	-	11	-	-	-	2,929	71	59	*Trei Scaune*
-	[illegible]	1	-	43	-	-	-	4,176	54	21	*Turda*
											Banat
7	11,248	27	11	14	171	3	-	17,919	6,975	889	
-	603	4	-	1	11	-	-	5,550	6,411	75	*Caraş*
-	2,166	7	1	-	29	1	-	5,321	328	122	*Severin*
7	8,485	16	10	13	81	2	-	7,042	236	611	*Timiş Torontal*
											Crisana and Maramuresu
6	88,875	23	8	100	96	3	1	15,995	330	578	
2	9,046	13	5	29	16	2	-	5,883	130	134	*Arad*
4	21,482	8	3	7	17	-	1	6,006	131	196	*Bihor*
-	35,828	-	-	7	10	-	-	485	26	122	*Maramures*
-	23,967	2	-	7	11	-	-	3,521	43	126	*Satu Mare*

RACIAL ASPECTS OF ROMANIA'S CASE

162

Table II—Population

Percentages

COUNTY	Romanians	Hungarians	Germans	Russians	Ruthenians, Ukrainians	Serbs, Croats, Slovenes	Bulgarians	Czechs, Slovaks	Poles	Hebrews	Jews	Greeks	Albanians	Armenians	Turks	Tatars	Gagauzis	Gipsies	Others	Not declared
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
ROMANIA	71.9	7.9	4.1	2.3	3.3	0.3	2.0	0.3	0.3	*	4.0	0.1	*	*	0.9	0.1	0.6	1.5	0.3	*
Oltenia	97.5	0.2	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.2	*	*	*	*	–	*	1.5	*	*
Dolj	96.7	0.3	0.3	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.4	*	*	*	*	–	*	1.7	0.2	*
Gorj	97.9	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	–	*	*	–	–	1.8	*	*
Mehedinti	97.7	*	0.2	*	*	0.2	*	*	*	–	0.1	*	*	*	0.1	–	–	1.8	*	*
Romanati	98.4	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	*	*	*	–	–	1.1	*	*
Valcea	97.4	0.2	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	0.2	*	*	*	*	–	–	1.8	0.2	*
Muntenia	93.6	0.8	0.5	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	–	3.1	0.3	*	0.1	*	*	*	1.8	0.3	*
Arges	97.8	0.2	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	0.2	*	*	*	*	–	–	1.4	*	*
Braila	89.4	0.7	0.6	0.6	*	0.1	0.2	*	*	–	3.1	2.2	*	0.1	0.2	*	*	1.3	1.2	*
Buzau	97.4	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	0.6	*	*	*	*	–	*	1.6	*	*
Dambovita	96.2	0.2	0.1	*	*	0.1	*	*	*	–	0.2	*	*	*	*	–	–	2.1	*	*
Ialomita	96.6	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	0.2	0.1	*	*	*	–	*	2.6	*	*
Iliov	84.2	2.5	1.5	0.4	*	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	–	7.0	0.4	0.1	0.5	0.1	*	*	1.7	0.2	*
Muscel	97.1	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	*	*	*	–	–	2.2	0.2	*
Olt	96.8	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	*	*	*	–	–	1.2	*	*
Prahova	95.0	0.2	0.7	0.1	*	0.1	*	*	*	–	0.2	*	*	*	*	–	*	1.5	0.4	*
Rammicu Sarat	96.2	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	0.6	*	*	*	*	–	*	2.7	*	*
Teleorman	96.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	1.4	*	*
Vlasca	97.1	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	2.2	*	*
Dobrogea	44.2	0.3	1.5	3.4	*	0.1	22.7	*	*	–	0.5	1.1	*	0.7	18.5	2.7	0.9	1.4	1.9	*
Caliacra	29.6	0.2	0.2	0.6	*	0.1	48.4	*	*	–	0.2	0.6	*	0.6	22.0	2.7	2.2	2.7	*	*
Constanta	66.2	0.6	2.2	1.5	*	0.1	8.9	*	*	–	0.7	0.2	0.2	1.2	6.2	6.0	0.2	0.6	0.2	*
Durostor	16.0	0.1	*	0.1	*	*	34.2	*	*	–	0.2	0.1	*	0.2	49.2	1.0	*	1.4	0.5	*
Tulcea	62.6	*	1.2	18.2	*	0.2	10.6	*	*	–	0.6	1.7	*	0.2	2.5	0.2	*	0.9	2.2	*
Moldova	99.2	0.9	0.3	0.2	*	*	*	*	0.1	*	4.5	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	1.3	0.3	*
Bacau	88.6	2.2	0.4	0.2	*	*	*	*	0.2	–	6.2	*	*	*	*	–	*	1.1	0.2	*
Baia	91.2	0.1	0.6	0.2	*	*	*	*	0.2	–	4.2	*	*	*	*	–	*	1.2	0.2	*
Botosani	88.2	0.1	0.2	*	0.2	*	*	*	0.2	–	9.0	*	*	*	*	–	*	0.2	0.2	*
Covurlui	83.7	1.1	0.6	1.6	*	0.1	0.2	*	0.2	–	9.6	1.4	*	0.2	*	*	*	0.6	0.2	*
Dorohoi	92.1	*	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	7.0	*	*	*	*	–	*	0.4	*	*
Falciu	94.4	0.2	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	–	3.1	*	*	*	*	–	*	1.2	*	*
Iasi	81.6	0.2	0.4	0.6	*	*	*	*	0.2	*	14.8	*	*	*	*	*	*	1.1	0.6	*
Neamt	90.2	1.2	0.2	0.1	*	*	*	*	0.2	–	6.2	*	*	*	*	–	–	0.7	0.2	*
Putna	92.2	1.1	0.2	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	–	5.2	*	*	0.1	*	–	–	1.2	*	*
Roman	90.7	1.4	0.2	0.1	*	*	*	*	0.1	–	4.7	*	*	*	*	–	*	2.2	0.1	*
Tecuci	94.9	0.7	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	1.2	*	*	*	*	–	*	2.0	*	*
Tutova	92.7	0.2	0.2	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	–	2.2	*	*	*	*	–	*	2.6	*	*
Vaslui	92.4	*	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	–	3.2	*	–	*	*	–	*	2.2	0.2	*
Bessarabia	56.3	*	2.2	12.3	11.0	*	2.7	*	0.3	*	7.2	*	*	*	*	*	3.4	0.5	0.2	*
Balti	70.1	*	0.4	19.0	7.2	*	*	*	0.2	–	2.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.2	0.2	*
Cahul	51.2	*	4.4	7.6	0.2	*	14.6	0.1	*	–	2.2	0.2	–	*	*	–	17.2	0.7	0.2	*
Cetatea Alba	18.2	*	18.2	17.2	20.2	*	20.2	*	*	–	2.2	*	*	0.1	*	*	2.2	0.2	*	*
Hotin	85.0	*	*	13.0	41.2	*	*	*	0.2	–	2.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.2	*	*
Ismail	21.2	*	0.4	29.7	4.7	*	19.2	*	0.1	*	2.2	0.2	0.2	*	0.2	*	6.2	0.2	2.4	0.1
Lapusna	77.2	*	0.7	7.1	0.7	*	0.2	*	0.4	*	11.2	0.1	*	0.1	*	*	*	0.7	*	0.1
Orhei	87.2	*	*	2.2	0.2	*	*	*	0.1	–	6.2	*	*	*	*	–	*	0.7	*	*
Soroca	72.6	*	0.1	2.1	2.2	*	*	*	0.2	–	2.2	*	–	*	*	–	*	0.2	*	*
Tighina	45.4	*	2.4	14.7	2.0	*	6.4	*	0.2	–	2.2	*	*	*	*	–	12.2	0.4	0.1	*

*) Less than 0.1.

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

According to Nationality

Continued 162

COUNTY	Romanians	Hungarians	Germans	Russians	Ruthenians, Ukrainians	Serbs, Croats, Slovenes	Bulgarians	Czechs, Slovaks	Poles	Italians	Jews	Greeks	Albanians	Armenians	Turks	Tatars	Gagauzes	Gipsies	Others	Not declared
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
Bucovina	44.5	1.4	8.9	0.9	37.7	*	*	*	3.6	1.5	10.3	*	*	*	*	–	*	0.3	0.3	*
Campulung	61.5	0.1	20.2	0.5	6.7	*	*	*	1.2	0.2	8.2	*	*	*	*	–	–	0.2	*	*
Cernauti	28.7	0.2	6.4	1.1	44.6	*	*	0.1	3.0	–	16.7	*	–	*	*	–	*	*	*	0.1
Radauti	55.4	6.4	11.1	0.9	8.7	*	*	*	1.4	7.6	7.8	*	–	*	*	–	–	0.2	1.1	*
Storojinet	33.9	*	5.3	0.2	45.4	*	*	*	4.7	*	9.0	–	–	*	*	–	–	0.2	0.2	*
Suceava	79.5	0.7	8.2	1.0	1.7			*	2.7	–	5.5	*	–	*	–	–	*	0.5	*	*
Transylvania	57.6	29.0	7.9	0.1	*	*	*	0.3	*	–	2.4	*	*	*	*	*	*	2.3	*	*
Alba	81.5	11.5	3.6	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	–	1.4	*	–	*	*	–	–	1.2	*	*
Brasov	49.2	26.5	10.8	0.2	*	*	*	0.2	*	–	1.5	*	–	*	*	–	–	1.2	0.1	0.2
Cluc	14.4	58.7	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	1.8	*	*	*	*	–	*	0.6	*	*
Cluj	60.2	30.1	0.2	0.1	*	*	*	0.2	*	–	5.1	*	*	*	*	–	*	2.2	*	*
Fagaras	78.3	5.6	12.5	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	–	0.5	*	*	*	–	–	–	2.9	*	*
Hunedoara	52.0	11.5	8.5	*	0.1	*	*	0.5	0.2	–	1.4	*	*	*	*	–	–	1.5	0.2	*
Mures	45.8	48.6	5.0	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	–	2.4	*	–	*	*	–	–	3.9	*	*
Sasaud	71.6	5.2	14.4	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	–	4.4	*	–	*	–	–	–	4.1	*	*
Odorhei	4.9	91.5	0.4	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	1.0	–	–	*	–	–	–	2.0	*	*
Salaj	56.2	31.4	4.7	*	0.2	*	*	1.7	*	–	2.2	*	–	*	*	–	–	1.2	*	*
Sibiu	62.0	4.7	29.3	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	–	0.7	*	–	*	*	–	*	2.3	*	*
Somes	77.5	18.4	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	4.2	–	*	0.2	*	*	–	1.7	*	*
Tarnava Mare	44.2	11.2	39.7	*	*	*	*	0.1	0.1	–	0.7	–	–	*	*	–	–	2.6	*	*
Tarnava Mica	53.9	23.6	16.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	1.1	–	–	*	*	–	–	5.1	*	*
Trei Scaune	16.0	80.4	0.6	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	0.5	*	–	*	–	–	–	2.2	*	*
Turda	74.4	21.4	0.4	*	*	*	*	*	0.1	–	1.2	*	–	*	–	–	–	2.2	*	*
Banat	54.4	10.4	23.7	0.2	0.4	4.3	1.1	1.5	*	*	1.2	*	*	*	*	*	–	1.9	0.7	*
Caras	69.4	2.5	15.2	*	*	4.0	*	2.6	0.2	–	0.2	*	–	*	*	*	–	2.2	2.2	*
Severin	76.8	6.6	8.6	0.2	1.4	0.2	*	1.4	*	–	0.9	*	*	*	–	*	–	1.4	*	0.1
Timis Torontal	37.6	18.4	24.9	0.2	*	5.2	1.9	0.7	*	*	1.7									
Crisana and Maramures	60.7	22.1	4.2	0.2	1.7	0.2	*	1.7	*	*	6.4	*	*	*	*	*	*	1.1	*	*
Arad	61.0	19.5	18.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	*	2.2	*	*	2.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	1.4	*	*
Bihor	61.6	30.0	0.4	*	*	*	*	2.2	*	*	4.2	*	*	*	*	–	*	1.2	*	*
Maramures	47.7	0.2	2.0	*	11.2	*	*	*	*	–	20.2	–	–	*	*	–	–	0.2	*	*
Satu Mare	60.5	25.2	2.2	0.4	1.0	*	*	0.2	*	–	2.1	*	–	*	*	–	–	1.2	*	*

*) Less than 0.1.

RACIAL ASPECTS OF ROMANIA'S CASE

Table III—Population

Actual figures

162
197

COUNTY	TOTAL	Romanian	Hungarians	German	Russian	Ruthenian, Ukrainian	Serbian, Croat., Slovenian	Bulgarian	Czech, Slovakian
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
ROMANIA	**18,057,028**	**13,180,936**	**1,354,535**	**766,487**	**650,981**	**641,485**	**47,734**	**364,373**	**63,141**
Oltenia	**1,513,175**	**1,493,788**	**3,286**	**3,216**	**678**	**31**	**825**	**377**	**184**
Dolj	485,149	475,587	1,175	1,473	289	8	259	178	83
Gorj	206,339	205,209	153	145	136	2	80	28	19
Mehedinti	303,878	299,863	237	905	84	4	277	65	36
Romanati	271,096	269,013	224	151	47	3	99	64	15
Vilcea	246,713	244,111	466	542	114	14	110	42	31
Muntenia	**4,029,808**	**3,884,679**	**32,980**	**21,817**	**10,195**	**587**	**2,938**	**3,424**	**1,177**
Arges	257,378	254,862	504	350	144	28	55	37	21
Braila	219,831	203,900	1,453	959	3,392	18	175	243	32
Buzau	309,405	306,467	457	252	132	26	118	63	23
Dambovita	309,676	304,056	656	346	162	18	368	133	30
Ialomita	293,352	289,490	439	124	482	12	106	150	13
Ilfov	999,562	913,653	24,486	15,769	4,828	354	1,119	2,195	791
Muscel	149,797	148,111	236	112	45	1	30	23	16
Olt	183,595	182,081	332	192	61	2	88	139	12
Prahova	477,750	464,644	3,473	3,378	637	88	504	182	184
Ramnicu Sarat	184,956	182,298	235	80	76	19	43	33	8
Teleorman	347,294	343,898	231	142	51	3	208	133	7
Vlasca	296,412	291,210	478	173	185	18	130	93	40
Dobrogea	**815,475**	**369,118**	**2,077**	**12,439**	**40,867**	**74**	**668**	**183,593**	**64**
Caliacra	160,911	38,049	287	474	986	27	174	70,900	7
Constanta	253,093	171,611	1,400	9,548	4,886	25	170	22,167	41
Durostor	211,433	41,690	243	51	819	18	142	71,503	5
Tulcea	184,038	117,760	147	2,366	34,176	4	182	19,023	11
Moldova	**2,433,596**	**2,250,678**	**28,894**	**8,942**	**11,286**	**4,742**	**700**	**1,181**	**249**
Bacau	261,019	235,563	13,999	896	420	60	159	90	48
Baia	157,501	147,335	134	907	1,762	26	32	32	29
Botosani	218,258	196,565	249	667	990	2,330	21	54	13
Covurlui	210,006	186,943	2,027	1,423	3,258	98	174	404	32
Dorohoi	211,354	194,474	75	374	233	1,999	1	30	8
Falciu	115,055	110,676	28	113	134	2	14	32	1
Iasi	275,796	240,214	356	1,176	2,672	108	56	118	32
Neamt	198,223	185,559	1,612	1,191	425	85	23	36	40
Putna	194,105	185,014	2,149	347	280	25	99	107	8
Roman	151,550	144,728	462	442	332	31	31	183	7
Tecuci	156,405	149,467	2,277	183	119	4	34	66	2
Tutova	144,821	140,366	229	208	202	10	49	83	8
Vaslui	139,563	133,774	97	121	459	5	7	26	1
Basarabia	**2,864,482**	**1,598,973**	**747**	**80,568**	**370,112**	**531,183**	**189**	**164,531**	**236**
Balti	386,721	271,023	93	1,456	48,368	32,197	21	51	14
Cahul	196,693	100,777	6	8,630	16,120	480	6	28,173	227
Cetatea Alba	341,176	62,839	107	55,607	64,617	67,500	28	70,891	11
Hotin	392,430	130,959	65	270	47,235	176,940	1	18	7
Ismail	225,500	68,460	123	943	75,303	9,571	27	46,457	7
Lapusna	419,621	325,346	151	2,701	35,266	3,853	61	355	64
Orhei	279,292	245,132	65	117	9,778	4,055	6	49	3
Soroca	316,360	232,089	81	381	26,236	27,295	12	42	26
Tighina	306,592	162,739	57	10,463	47,189	9,382	29	18,503	15
Bucovina	**853,989**	**336,981**	**11,860**	**93,812**	**11,236**	**280,651**	**45**	**114**	**681**
Campulung	94,816	58,499	91	20,876	370	7,292	4	1	33
Cernauti	306,194	66,701	634	30,693	3,364	149,700	30	65	233
Radauti	160,778	83,906	10,283	20,125	3,332	31,315	1	10	63
Storojinet	169,894	48,979	48	10,759	2,989	85,715	6	9	110
Suceava	121,327	92,816	804	11,359	1,181	6,629	4	29	43

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

According to Mother Tongue

Actual figures

162
197

Polish	Yiddish	Greek	Albanian	Armenian	Turkish, Tartar	Gipsy	Others	Not declared	COUNTY
11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	1
38,265	**518,754**	**20,861**	**4,347**	**11,377**	**288,973**	**101,015**	**23,419**	**7,165**	***ROMANIA***
88	**601**	**482**	**93**	**146**	**548**	**8,586**	**1,265**	**199**	**Oltenia**
30	338	195	50	82	59	4,606	700	37	*Dolj*
5	36	16	1	–	4	435	65	5	*Gorj*
–	61	142	3	40	460	1,549	117	30	*Mehedinti*
9	35	104	2	15	31	1,210	72	2	*Romanati*
44	131	25	37	9	14	706	291	26	*Valcea*
1,633	**19,842**	**8,781**	**1,636**	**4,654**	**2,988**	**22,886**	**8,436**	**1,314**	**Muntenia**
69	176	99	63	49	43	754	100	24	*Arges*
84	3,360	4,097	97	215	453	832	429	94	*Braila*
42	512	78	31	32	30	997	128	17	*Buzau*
36	235	160	64	2	28	3,210	146	26	*Dambovita*
8	184	223	113	18	102	1,822	49	17	*Ialomita*
1,017	13,592	3,468	1,061	4,060	1,133	5,247	3,860	935	*Ilfov*
7	18	25	10	3	10	947	178	25	*Muscel*
7	47	46	7	4	6	578	37	16	*Olt*
330	1,344	230	107	180	35	1,174	1,344	116	*Prahova*
13	427	47	10	18	21	1,604	21	3	*Rameicu Sarat*
10	67	133	21	13	105	2,240	23	9	*Teleorman*
10	80	95	52	92	122	3,481	121	32	*Vlasca*
119	**1,816**	**7,744**	**494**	**4,904**	**183,018**	**5,620**	**2,581**	**287**	**Dobrogea**
9	217	824	23	980	50,525	3,213	157	39	*Caliacra*
94	685	3,892	422	3,065	33,414	788	746	139	*Constanta*
2	216	154	24	690	94,134	1,229	442	71	*Durostor*
14	698	2,874	25	169	4,945	390	1,236	18	*Tulcea*
1,984	**109,656**	**2,855**	**132**	**855**	**635**	**12,598**	**2,206**	**805**	**Moldova**
219	7,910	59	16	55	18	1,224	238	36	*Bacau*
240	5,789	14	2	5	7	3,122	16	49	*Baia*
238	16,219	8	3	32	16	777	30	46	*Botosani*
167	11,099	2,313	35	457	253	352	856	115	*Covurlui*
87	13,837	11	1	15	16	121	28	44	*Dorohoi*
7	2,857	67	2	–	44	1,060	34	12	*Falciu*
611	27,344	78	23	120	85	1,760	703	320	*Iasi*
320	7,948	16	3	19	5	835	126	30	*Neamt*
86	4,577	160	20	82	32	997	112	30	*Putna*
109	4,170	3	21	49	53	942	36	31	*Roman*
29	1,890	66	3	4	35	2,184	32	10	*Tecuci*
45	2,025	70	3	13	78	1,386	46	8	*Tutova*
35	3,980	10	–	4	23	838	49	74	*Vaslui*
2,862	**201,278**	**972**	**1,765**	**448**	**101,336**	**6,320**	**596**	**1,326**	**Bessarabia**
1,159	31,200	31	–	36	13	983	15	60	*Balti*
30	4,334	274	–	10	36,683	805	5	131	*Cahul*
92	11,051	79	–	130	7,899	641	283	111	*Cetatea Alba*
585	35,936	2	–	1	22	263	15	111	*Hotin*
90	3,832	312	1,737	26	16,107	222	23	248	*Ismail*
1,012	48,148	203	26	196	99	1,370	203	387	*Lapusna*
151	19,017	18	–	16	9	792	31	63	*Orhei*
678	29,127	6	–	18	24	494	5	54	*Soroca*
265	16,633	47	2	15	40,500	748	24	161	*Tighina*
28,411	**76,288**	**13**	**2**	**99**	**75**	**232**	**141**	**648**	**Bucovina**
1,647	5,851	3	1	13	4	39	37	35	*Campulung*
13,959	40,102	9	1	41	54	51	74	483	*Cernauti*
2,207	9,421	–	–	5	8	54	10	39	*Radauti*
7,807	13,694	–	–	1	3	13	11	50	*Suceavei*
3,091	5,220	1	–	39	6	55	9	41	*Suceava*

162
197

Table III—Population

Continued

COUNTY	TOTAL	Romanian	Hungarian	German	Russian	Ruthenian, Ukrainian	Serbian, Croat, Slovenian	Bulgarian	Czech, Slovakian
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Transylvania	**3,217,988**	**1,873,691**	**997,653**	**346,587**	**3,337**	**1,272**	**484**	**830**	**8,966**
Alba	212,749	176,852	24,513	7,617	365	44	16	97	158
Brasov	168,125	85,519	44,798	33,592	308	104	54	76	239
Cluc	145,806	18,455	124,971	503	84	18	15	9	34
Cluj	334,991	206,559	109,165	2,964	487	260	48	170	394
Fagaras	80,039	69,685	5,049	10,828	94	3	7	9	9
Hunedoara	332,118	277,705	40,375	7,422	242	492	123	70	717
Mures	289,546	131,825	133,045	11,437	322	57	37	76	66
Naosaud	144,131	106,548	7,174	21,056	206	38	11	39	27
Odorhei	130,282	4,588	123,885	404	24	3	4	1	12
Salaj	343,347	191,144	125,544	8,706	229	112	24	17	5,771
Sibiu	194,619	125,686	9,325	57,215	561	28	69	101	104
Somes	219,355	172,607	34,710	478	147	65	8	52	30
Tarnava Mare	147,994	68,259	18,094	58,970	57	3	35	32	187
Tarnava Mica	149,482	83,504	36,461	24,026	48	5	8	45	107
Trei Scaune	136,122	16,748	117,868	625	125	33	19	23	64
Turda	183,282	137,697	40,676	744	38	7	6	3	147
Banat	**939,958**	**520,041**	**105,584**	**221,062**	**1,697**	**3,901**	**40,077**	**9,870**	**10,945**
Caras	200,929	142,315	5,113	28,622	106	36	10,371	165	5,102
Severin	239,586	187,021	17,048	24,689	459	3,410	1,768	109	2,727
Timis Torontal	499,443	190,705	83,423	177,751	932	455	27,938	9,596	3,116
Crisana and Maramures	**1,390,417**	**829,484**	**377,475**	**63,144**	**1,781**	**19,044**	**1,798**	**443**	**21,619**
Arad	423,649	259,884	96,756	50,005	384	654	1,638	125	10,883
Bihor	510,318	313,404	172,322	2,364	566	253	98	199	10,277
Maramures	161,575	92,611	14,285	3,189	65	17,794	7	22	59
Satu Mare	294,875	173,585	94,112	7,586	766	343	55	97	400

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

According to Mother Tongue

Continued

162
197

Polish	Yiddish	Greek	Albanian	Armenian	Turkish, Tartar	Gipsy	Others	Not declared	COUNTY
11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	1
1,752	52,088	69	59	187	89	39,106	1,271	1,437	Transylvania
16	1,751	1	4	6	7	1,190	69	43	*Alba*
62	615	35	–	14	8	230	187	284	*Brasov*
28	1,413	1	5	6	–	162	42	60	*Cluc*
49	9,949	9	20	18	21	4,466	94	318	*Cluj*
4	58	1	–	2	1	269	4	16	*Fagaras*
943	2,268	–	5	2	7	1,049	585	113	*Hunedoara*
54	6,344	–	1	6	4	6,061	59	122	*Mures*
21	5,915	8	2	–	4	2,977	32	63	*Naosad*
9	619	–	–	–	–	403	7	23	*Odorhei*
25	9,501	–	3	4	10	2,107	22	129	*Salaj*
93	691	6	6	2	12	512	113	95	*Sibiu*
13	9,709	–	9	119	11	1,357	16	24	*Somes*
141	511	–	5	2	3	1,629	34	32	*Turnava Mare*
18	932	–	–	4	1	4,270	15	38	*Turnava Mica*
30	175	8	–	–	–	293	56	55	*Trei Scaune*
210	1,557	–	–	3	–	2,131	36	22	*Turda*
171	757	13	46	5	146	8,688	4,693	643	Banat
80	53	4	–	–	12	2,733	6,143	74	*Caras*
21	85	1	19	–	67	1,870	166	126	*Severin*
70	619	8	27	5	67	4,085	184	442	*Timis Torontal*
265	58,510	12	29	49	98	5,859	289	586	Crisana and Maramures
88	1,002	5	8	47	33	1,895	107	132	*Arad*
91	7,497	4	5	–	38	2,894	97	209	*Bihor*
34	33,239	–	7	–	3	124	16	120	*Maramures*
32	16,772	–	–	2	24	946	30	125	*Satu Mare*

RACIAL ASPECTS OF ROMANIA'S CASE

162
197

Table IV—Population

Percentages

COUNTY	TOTAL	Romanian	Hungarian	German	Russian	Ruthenian, Ukrainian	Serbian, Croat, Slovenian	Bulgarian	Czech, Slovakian	Polish	Yiddish	Greek	Albanian	Armenian	Turkish, Tartar	Gipsy (Romany)	Others	Not declared
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
ROMANIA	**100.0**	**73.0**	**8.6**	**4.2**	**2.5**	**3.6**	**0.3**	**2.0**	**0.2**	**0.2**	**2.9**	**0.1**	*	*	**1.6**	**0.6**	**0.1**	*
Oltenia	**100.0**	**98.7**	**0.1**	**0.2**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	**0.6**	*	*
Dolj	100.0	98.0	0.8	0.3	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.9	0.1	*
Gorj	100.0	99.5	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.5	*	*
Mehedinti	100.0	98.7	*	0.5	*	*	*	*	*	—	*	*	*	*	0.8	0.5	*	*
Romanati	100.0	99.5	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.4	*	*
Valcea	100.0	98.9	0.2	0.8	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.3	0.1	*
Muntenia	**100.0**	**96.4**	**0.8**	**0.5**	**0.3**	*	*	*	*	*	**0.5**	**0.2**	*	**0.1**	*	**0.6**	**0.2**	*
Arges	100.0	99.0	0.8	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.5	*	*
Braila	100.0	98.8	0.7	0.4	1.5	*	*	0.1	*	*	1.5	1.9	*	*	0.8	0.4	0.2	*
Buzau	100.0	99.1	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.2	*	*	*	*	0.3	*	*
Dambovita	100.0	98.8	0.2	0.1	*	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	1.0	*	*
Ialomita	100.0	98.7	0.1	*	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.6	*	*
Ilfov	100.0	91.4	8.4	1.6	0.5	*	0.1	0.2	*	0.1	1.4	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.5	0.8	*
Muscel	100.0	98.9	0.3	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.6	0.1	*
Olt	100.0	99.2	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.3	*	*
Prahova	100.0	97.3	0.7	0.7	0.1	*	0.1	*	*	*	0.2	*	*	*	*	0.8	0.3	*
Ramnicu Sarat	100.0	98.6	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.2	*	*	*	*	0.9	*	*
Teleorman	100.0	99.0	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.6	*	*
Vlasca	100.0	98.8	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	1.2	*	*
Dobrogea	**100.0**	**45.3**	**0.2**	**1.5**	**5.0**	*	*	**22.5**	*	*	**0.2**	**0.9**	*	**0.6**	**22.4**	**0.7**	**0.3**	*
Caliacra	100.0	52.8	0.2	0.3	0.0	*	0.1	42.5	*	*	0.1	0.2	*	0.6	50.5	1.9	*	*
Constanta	100.0	67.8	0.6	3.8	1.9	*	*	8.2	*	*	0.5	1.4	0.2	1.2	15.2	0.5	0.5	*
Durostor	100.0	19.7	0.1	*	0.4	*	*	53.2	*	*	0.1	*	*	0.3	44.5	0.6	0.2	*
Tulcea	100.0	64.0	*	1.9	18.6	*	*	10.5	*	*	0.4	1.8	*	*	2.7	0.2	0.7	*
Moldova	**100.0**	**92.5**	**1.0**	**0.3**	**0.5**	**0.2**	*	*	*	*	**4.5**	**0.1**	*	*	*	**0.6**	*	*
Bacau	100.0	90.2	5.4	0.3	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	3.0	*	*	*	*	0.8	*	*
Baia	100.0	88.6	*	0.6	1.1	*	*	*	*	0.2	3.7	*	*	*	*	0.7	*	*
Botosani	100.0	90.1	0.1	0.3	0.6	1.1	*	*	*	0.1	7.4	*	*	*	*	0.4	*	*
Covurlui	100.0	89.0	1.0	0.7	1.8	*	*	0.2	*	*	6.3	1.1	*	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.4	*
Dorohoi	100.0	98.0	*	0.2	0.1	0.9	*	*	*	*	0.5	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Falciu	100.0	98.8	*	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	0.5	*	*	-	*	0.9	*	*
Iasi	100.0	87.1	0.2	0.4	1.0	*	*	*	*	0.1	9.9	*	*	*	*	0.8	0.2	0.1
Neamt	100.0	98.6	0.2	0.2	0.2	*	*	*	*	0.2	4.0	*	*	*	*	0.4	*	*
Putna	100.0	96.5	1.1	0.2	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	2.4	*	*	*	*	0.5	*	*
Roman	100.0	98.5	0.2	0.2	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	0.5	*	*	*	*	0.9	*	*
Tecuci	100.0	96.8	1.5	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	1.2	*	*	*	*	1.4	*	*
Tutova	100.0	98.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	1.4	*	*	*	*	1.0	*	*
Vaslui	100.0	96.0	*	*	0.5	*	*	*	*	*	2.2	*	-	*	*	0.6	*	*
Bessarabia	**100.0**	**55.5**	*	**3.8**	**12.9**	**11.6**	*	**5.7**	*	**0.1**	**7.0**	*	*	*	**3.5**	**0.3**	*	*
Balti	100.0	70.1	*	0.4	19.5	8.2	*	*	*	0.2	9.1	*	-	*	*	0.2	*	*
Cahul	100.0	61.8	*	4.4	8.8	0.2	*	14.2	0.1	*	8.2	0.1	-	*	18.6	0.4	*	*
Cetatea Alba	100.0	18.8	*	16.2	16.9	19.9	*	30.2	*	*	3.8	*	-	*	8.2	0.2	*	*
Hotin	100.0	35.4	*	*	18.0	46.1	*	*	*	0.1	9.2	*	-	*	*	*	*	*
Ismail	100.0	90.4	*	0.4	28.4	4.2	*	30.6	*	*	2.6	0.1	0.2	*	7.1	*	*	0.1
Lapusna	100.0	77.8	*	0.8	8.4	0.8	*	*	*	0.2	11.5	*	*	*	*	0.4	*	*
Orhei	100.0	87.8	*	*	3.5	1.5	*	*	*	*	6.2	*	-	*	*	0.2	*	*
Soroca	100.0	73.4	*	0.1	8.3	8.6	*	*	*	0.2	9.9	*	-	*	*	0.2	*	*
Tighina	100.0	53.1	*	9.4	18.4	9.0	*	6.0	*	*	5.4	*	*	*	18.2	0.3	*	*
Bucovina	**100.0**	**41.1**	**1.4**	**11.0**	**1.3**	**32.9**	*	*	*	**3.5**	**8.7**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Campulung	100.0	61.7	*	28.0	0.4	7.7	*	*	*	1.7	6.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Cernauti	100.0	81.8	0.2	10.0	1.1	46.9	*	*	*	4.6	15.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.2
Radauti	100.0	58.8	0.4	18.5	0.1	18.6	*	*	*	1.4	6.9	-	-	*	*	*	*	*
Storojinet	100.0	88.6	*	6.8	1.8	60.5	*	*	*	4.4	8.1	-	-	*	*	*	*	*
Suceava	100.0	76.5	0.7	9.4	1.0	6.5	*	*	*	2.5	4.2	*	-	*	*	*	*	*

*: Less than 0.1.

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

According to Mother Tongue

Continued

162
197

COUNTY	TOTAL	Romanian	Hungarian	German	Russian	Ruthenian, Ukrainian	Serbian, Croat, Slovenian	Bulgarian	Czech, Slovakian	Polish	Yiddish	Greek	Albanian	Armenian	Turkish, Tartar	Gipsy (Romany)	Others	Not declared
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Transylvania	**100.0**	**58.2**	**31.0**	**7.7**	**0.1**	*	*	*	**0.3**	*	**1.6**	*	*	*	*	**0.9**	*	*
Alba	100.0	85.1	11.5	3.6	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	0.8	*	*	*	*	0.6	*	*
Brasov	100.0	50.9	37.2	30.0	0.2	*	*	*	0.1	*	0.4	*	–	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.2
Cluc	100.0	18.7	55.7	0.3	*	*	*	*	*	*	1.0	*	*	*	–	0.1	*	*
Cluj	100.0	61.7	38.6	0.9	0.1	*	*	*	0.1	*	3.0	*	*	*	*	1.3	*	*
Fagaras	100.0	81.0	8.9	18.6	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	0.3	*	*
Hunedoara	100.0	83.6	12.8	2.8	*	0.1	*	*	0.2	0.3	0.7	–	*	*	*	0.3	0.2	*
Mures	100.0	46.5	45.9	5.9	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	2.2	–	*	*	*	2.1	*	*
Nasaud	100.0	72.9	6.0	14.6	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	4.1	*	*	*	*	2.1	*	*
Odorhei	100.0	3.8	96.1	0.3	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.4	–	–	–	–	0.3	*	*
Salaj	100.0	55.7	36.6	2.5	*	*	*	*	1.7	*	2.2	–	*	*	*	0.6	*	*
Sibiu	100.0	64.6	4.8	29.4	0.3	*	*	*	*	*	0.4	*	*	*	*	0.3	*	*
Somes	100.0	78.7	15.2	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	4.4	–	*	*	*	0.8	*	*
Tarnava Mare	100.0	46.1	18.8	32.2	*	*	*	*	0.1	*	0.3	–	*	*	*	1.1	*	*
Tarnava Mica	100.0	65.9	24.4	16.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.8	–	–	*	*	2.9	*	*
Trei Scaune	100.0	12.3	86.6	0.5	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.1	*	–	–	–	0.2	*	*
Turda	100.0	76.1	22.2	0.4	*	*	*	*	*	0.1	0.2	–	–	*	–	1.2	*	*
Banat	**100.0**	**55.3**	**11.2**	**34.6**	**0.2**	**0.4**	**4.3**	**1.1**	**1.2**	*	*	*	*	*	*	**0.9**	**0.7**	*
Caras	100.0	70.8	2.5	14.2	*	*	5.2	*	2.5	*	*	*	–	–	*	1.4	3.1	*
Severin	100.0	78.1	7.1	10.5	0.2	1.4	0.7	*	1.1	*	*	*	*	–	*	0.8	*	*
Timis Torontal	100.0	38.2	16.7	35.6	0.2	*	5.6	1.2	0.8	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	0.5	*	*
Crisana and Maramures	**100.0**	**60.4**	**27.1**	**4.5**	**0.1**	**1.4**	**0.1**	*	**1.6**	*	**4.2**	*	*	*	*	**0.4**	*	*
Arad	100.0	61.3	22.2	11.8	*	0.2	0.4	*	2.6	*	0.2	*	*	*	*	0.4	*	*
Bihor	100.0	61.4	33.5	0.6	0.1	*	*	*	2.0	*	1.5	*	*	–	*	0.6	*	*
Maramures	100.0	57.2	5.2	2.0	*	11.0	*	*	*	*	20.6	–	*	–	*	*	*	*
Satu Mare	100.0	58.9	31.9	2.6	0.3	0.1	*	*	0.1	*	5.7	–	–	*	*	0.3	*	*

*) Less than 0.1.

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

162
795

Actual figures

Table V—Population

COUNTY	TOTAL	Greek-Orthodox	Greek-Catholic	Roman-Catholic	Reformed, Calvinist	Protestant, Lutheran	Unitarian	Armenian-Gregorian
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
ROMANIA	18,057,028	13,168,227	1,427,391	1,234,151	718,786	398,759	69,257	18,005
Oltenia	1,513,175	1,498,885	985	6,726	623	1,309	18	89
Dolj	485,149	477,274	289	3,338	328	702	4	38
Gorj	206,339	205,610	85	385	33	60	—	—
Mehedinti	303,878	300,909	155	1,539	39	148	1	4
Romanati	271,096	270,124	129	357	72	70	8	5
Valcea	246,713	244,268	297	1,107	149	329	5	12
Muntenia	4,829,888	3,820,478	17,379	86,528	10,257	16,990	614	3,314
Arges	257,378	255,153	94	735	206	212	4	35
Braila	219,831	205,740	324	2,717	267	560	13	113
Buzau	309,405	305,969	311	748	156	135	41	25
Dambovita	309,676	306,361	372	1,045	191	248	18	4
Ialomita	293,352	291,205	183	377	182	86	7	6
Ilfov	999,342	844,743	13,146	36,997	7,357	12,409	300	2,838
Muscel	149,797	148,772	62	482	101	75	1	2
Olt	183,595	182,675	39	337	138	79	—	2
Prahova	477,750	458,570	2,545	5,959	1,143	2,964	125	125
Ramnicu Sarat	184,956	182,939	68	246	79	39	8	6
Teleorman	347,294	343,846	63	283	64	78	5	—
Vlasca	296,412	294,505	132	582	173	113	2	58
Dobrogea	815,475	589,219	940	7,739	843	7,593	83	4,383
Calacra	166,911	117,556	61	333	151	269	21	761
Constanta	253,093	199,580	689	4,520	537	6,228	44	2,774
Durostor	211,433	114,254	95	124	101	42	16	479
Tulcea	184,038	157,829	95	2,762	54	1,054	2	188
Moldova	2,433,596	2,145,683	2,420	189,953	1,482	2,919	122	974
Bacau	261,019	197,862	523	47,139	270	310	14	178
Baia	157,501	146,294	189	1,497	11	179	2	6
Botosani	218,258	195,075	165	1,460	36	110	5	93
Covurlui	210,006	182,782	363	4,008	462	722	33	311
Dorohoi	211,354	195,267	53	579	13	94	1	4
Falciu	115,055	105,462	24	5,655	3	35	—	1
Iasi	275,796	226,188	239	6,335	110	433	29	98
Neamt	198,223	179,314	292	4,528	52	532	6	10
Putna	194,105	182,767	283	7,132	230	108	5	185
Roman	151,550	110,900	90	32,462	45	111	3	61
Tecuci	136,605	130,599	57	2,493	75	96	7	16
Tutova	144,821	139,735	85	373	78	139	18	8
Vaslui	139,303	133,442	8	272	17	83	1	3
Basarabia	3,864,482	3,395,842	983	13,597	727	74,879	33	1,236
Balti	386,721	345,323	86	3,224	14	1,325	3	137
Cahul	196,693	181,135	1	166	—	8,530	—	15
Cetatea Alba	341,176	289,688	15	2,865	466	52,484	1	608
Hotin	392,430	341,412	81	1,282	4	114	—	4
Ismail	225,509	198,309	47	576	30	658	—	33
Lapusna	419,621	361,110	390	2,112	142	2,261	11	550
Orhei	279,292	257,739	131	353	17	69	3	43
Soroca	316,368	280,252	183	1,175	20	228	2	15
Tighina	306,392	274,180	69	1,754	28	9,199	3	39
Bucovina	853,609	613,358	19,264	98,347	534	20,655	67	139
Campulung	94,816	64,711	781	16,030	10	5,186	7	3
Cernauti	306,194	205,284	11,466	30,687	103	3,219	47	22
Radauti	160,778	113,503	2,098	20,037	410	4,249	1	8
Suceava	160,804	132,736	3,271	15,389	5	1,976	10	1
Suceava	121,327	97,124	1,650	10,204	6	4,025	2	103

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

According to Religion

Actual figures

162
795

Armenian-Catholic 10	Lipovan 11	Adventist 12	Baptist 13	Mosaic 14	Mohammedan 15	Others 16	Atheists 17	Not declared 18	COUNTY 1
1,440	57,208	16,182	60,362	756,930	185,486	7,434	6,604	6,686	*ROMANIA*
12	1	696	82	3,525	712	199	88	98	**Oltenia**
—	—	402	38	2,357	133	153	53	38	*Dolj*
—	—	41	—	106	7	1	8	1	*Gorj*
10	1	165	30	456	466	12	12	31	*Mehedinti*
—	—	43	10	197	52	11	14	2	*Romanati*
2	—	42	4	407	54	10	1	26	*Valcea*
74	2,189	5,296	1,157	94,216	3,198	637	1,367	1,341	**Muntenia**
5	—	45	1	671	113	46	15	23	*Arges*
13	1,825	300	107	7,259	462	22	21	88	*Braila*
—	1	230	11	1,697	54	9	1	17	*Buzau*
—	—	465	1	788	95	44	18	28	*Dambovita*
—	304	86	68	542	206	14	78	10	*Ialomita*
52	29	667	620	76,845	1,485	208	998	758	*Ilfov*
—	—	113	43	29	23	34	11	29	*Muscel*
—	—	81	9	195	15	1	2	22	*Olt*
4	—	811	168	4,743	117	130	216	130	*Prahova*
—	—	220	9	1,124	60	24	130	4	*Rimnicu Sarat*
—	—	2,048	104	255	400	77	65	6	*Talcerman*
—	—	332	16	268	165	8	12	26	*Vlasca*
28	17,945	861	1,234	4,031	198,488	197	78	394	**Dobrogea**
4	3	80	10	445	47,067	25	31	94	*Caliacra*
23	2,386	223	832	1,981	33,039	32	27	158	*Constanta*
—	317	349	3	401	95,289	17	12	32	*Durostor*
1	15,239	9	367	1,204	3,093	123	8	10	*Tulcea*
42	2,610	3,977	254	162,268	477	1,332	486	454	**Moldova**
3	—	284	3	14,305	22	9	66	31	*Bacau*
—	1,425	46	—	7,770	8	24	2	48	*Baia*
6	100	368	44	20,092	6	555	103	42	*Botosani*
19	42	166	69	20,617	201	17	80	114	*Covurlui*
—	13	188	81	14,874	12	112	15	48	*Dorohoi*
—	1	96	2	3,627	7	123	8	11	*Falciu*
6	594	211	31	41,120	103	63	48	188	*Iasi*
—	11	183	5	13,214	9	26	18	23	*Neamt*
7	—	81	18	7,054	43	8	30	32	*Putna*
1	146	78	—	7,464	25	136	4	27	*Roman*
—	—	74	—	2,955	9	17	—	11	*Tecuci*
—	2	127	1	4,184	32	58	37	7	*Tutova*
—	276	178	—	4,992	—	184	3	72	*Vaslui*
81	31,844	1,927	18,861	286,958	148	3,826	476	977	**Basarabia**
38	1,963	92	3,205	31,916	7	343	8	47	*Balti*
—	930	98	1,230	4,444	6	101	—	27	*Cahul*
1	167	175	3,970	11,480	7	319	241	69	*Cetatea Alba*
1	3,809	1,233	7,321	36,132	30	718	224	75	*Hotin*
2	17,051	41	1,718	6,433	22	394	121	170	*Ismail*
22	689	101	698	30,683	60	672	62	336	*Lapusna*
7	781	—	395	19,546	8	117	—	61	*Orhei*
8	3,498	101	983	39,510	13	318	4	52	*Soroca*
2	3,432	94	1,341	16,954	7	354	16	140	*Tighina*
284	3,318	918	1,145	93,181	49	437	997	584	**Bucovina**
4	25	110	29	7,748	3	22	123	22	*Campulung*
121	37	584	227	31,681	35	70	241	390	*Cernauti*
1	2,056	68	261	11,578	7	119	329	53	*Radauti*
99	498	62	336	15,397	4	16	57	37	*Storojinet*
7	603	114	292	6,697	—	200	247	53	*Suceava*

162
795

Table V—Population

Continued

COUNTY	TOTAL	Greek-Orthodox	Greek-Catholic	Roman-Catholic	Reformed, Calvinist	Protestant, Lutheran	Unitarian	Armenian-Gregorian
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Transylvania	**3,237,988**	**993,176**	**1,001,527**	**413,724**	**497,861**	**344,766**	**67,833**	**91**
Alba	212,749	108,590	67,258	7,225	15,946	7,007	2,580	2
Brasov	168,125	82,060	6,042	16,681	12,765	46,675	2,324	9
Ciuc	145,906	1,879	20,072	118,535	1,947	257	85	15
Cluj	334,991	64,543	142,993	28,716	72,739	2,601	3,495	9
Fagaras	86,039	47,487	22,093	1,642	2,506	11,141	312	2
Hunedoara	332,118	213,235	61,386	30,318	15,086	3,328	1,559	5
Mures	289,546	41,919	93,897	35,037	87,713	11,319	7,651	5
Nasaud	144,131	19,960	86,746	3,371	5,153	22,531	35	—
Odorhei	130,282	4,777	1,443	45,035	48,739	1,002	26,882	—
Salaj	343,347	15,183	180,608	41,757	87,350	1,172	50	2
Sibiu	194,619	101,129	24,746	7,832	4,250	54,082	371	1
Somes	219,355	32,881	139,317	6,955	28,005	238	78	19
Tarnava Mare	147,994	54,169	15,369	6,696	9,186	38,005	2,934	13
Tarnava Mica	149,482	24,826	60,906	6,828	24,817	24,264	3,009	10
Trei Scaune	136,122	19,911	3,119	49,139	35,250	1,105	6,277	4
Turda	183,282	60,606	77,532	7,457	26,389	269	8,188	3
Banat	**959,958**	**527,293**	**33,572**	**321,436**	**20,987**	**13,980**	**149**	**33**
Caras	200,929	141,162	10,336	43,211	1,265	917	23	1
Severin	239,386	180,643	9,459	35,731	7,367	1,282	31	4
Timis Torontal	499,443	205,488	13,877	242,494	12,305	11,781	95	28
Crisana and Maramures	**1,390,417**	**511,887**	**350,246**	**212,691**	**177,522**	**15,669**	**249**	**57**
Arad	422,649	226,576	17,766	112,097	23,180	13,546	109	49
Bihor	510,318	253,942	54,438	52,899	107,269	1,531	162	3
Maramures	161,575	8,469	104,132	10,409	2,935	137	37	—
Satu Mare	294,875	12,880	173,910	37,286	44,138	455	41	5

162
795

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

According to Religion

Continued

Armenian-Catholic 10	Lipovan 11	Adventist 12	Baptist 13	Mosaic 14	Mohammedan 15	Others 16	Atheists 17	Not declared 18	COUNTY 1
									Transylvania
965	—	2,933	10,296	81,503	125	708	1,329	1,452	*Alba*
2	—	16	630	3,101	12	21	123	36	*Brasov*
1	—	141	148	2,778	12	110	36	313	*Ciuc*
239	—	94	96	2,525	3	—	5	54	*Cluj*
39	—	475	1,178	17,655	35	41	118	354	*Fagaras*
—	—	231	114	445	1	36	11	18	*Hunedoara*
1	—	193	1,888	4,829	13	88	77	122	*Mures*
15	—	542	472	10,497	14	101	209	162	*Nasaud*
2	—	29	30	6,375	5	5	20	69	*Odorhei*
1	—	180	607	1,404	—	16	123	53	*Salaj*
4	—	46	7,881	13,754	10	141	252	137	*Sibiu*
—	—	67	405	1,237	20	35	84	97	*Someş*
539	—	111	427	19,619	5	15	68	78	*Turnava Mare*
—	—	213	200	1,164	3	23	32	57	*Turnava Mica*
119	—	394	469	1,705	1	36	58	39	
—	—	37	245	949	—	6	28	52	*Trei Scaune*
3	—	164	296	2,233	—	34	85	21	*Turda*
									Banat
—	8	143	6,770	14,945	193	183	453	665	*Caras*
—	—	15	3,046	725	14	83	59	72	*Severin*
—	—	58	2,267	2,329	80	46	152	137	*Timoi Torontal*
—	8	70	1,457	10,985	99	54	242	456	
									Crisana and Maramures
4	3	1,487	20,773	97,287	91	728	1,910	651	*Arad*
2	3	456	9,017	10,021	41	215	436	135	*Bihor*
1	—	254	11,087	27,807	24	459	233	209	*Maramures*
—	—	710	289	34,089	11	39	179	119	*Satu Mare*
1	—	32	380	25,370	15	12	162	188	

162
795

Table VI—Population

Percentages

COUNTY	TOTAL	Greek-Orthodox	Greek-Catholic	Roman-Catholic	Reformed, Calvinist	Protestant, Lutheran	Unitarian	Armenian-Gregorian	Armenian-Catholic	Lipovan	Adventist	Baptist	Mosaic	Mohammedan	Others	Atheists	Not declared
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
ROMANIA	**100.0**	**72.6**	**7.9**	**6.8**	**3.9**	**2.3**	**0.4**	*	*	**0.3**	*	**0.3**	**4.2**	**1.0**	*	*	*
Oltenia	**100.0**	**99.0**	*	**0.4**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	**0.2**	*	*	*	*
Dolj	100.0	98.4	*	0.7	*	0.1	*	*	–	–	*	*	0.8	*	*	*	*
Gorj	100.0	99.8	*	0.2	*	*	–	–	–	–	*	–	*	*	*	*	*
Mehedinti	100.0	99.0	*	0.5	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.2	0.2	*	*	*
Romanati	100.0	99.8	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	–	–	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Valcea	100.0	99.0	0.1	0.4	*	0.1	*	*	*	–	*	*	0.2	*	*	*	*
Muntenia	**100.0**	**94.5**	**0.4**	**1.3**	**0.3**	**0.4**	*	*	*	*	**0.1**	*	**2.3**	*	*	*	*
Arges	100.0	99.1	*	0.5	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	0.2	*	*	*	*
Braila	100.0	93.6	0.1	1.2	0.1	0.3	*	*	*	0.2	0.1	*	3.3	0.2	*	*	*
Buzau	100.0	98.9	0.1	0.2	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	*	0.5	*	*	*	*
Dambovita	100.0	98.9	0.1	0.3	*	*	*	*	–	–	0.1	*	0.3	*	*	*	*
Ialomita	100.0	99.3	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	–	0.1	*	*	0.2	*	*	*	*
Ilfov	100.0	84.5	1.3	3.7	0.2	1.2	*	0.3	*	*	*	*	7.7	0.1	*	*	*
Muscel	100.0	99.3	*	0.3	*	*	*	*	–	–	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Olt	100.0	99.5	*	0.2	*	*	–	*	–	–	*	*	0.1	*	*	*	*
Prahova	100.0	96.0	0.5	1.3	0.2	0.6	*	*	*	–	0.2	*	1.0	*	*	*	*
Ramnicu Sarat	100.0	98.9	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	–	–	0.1	*	0.6	*	*	*	*
Teleorman	100.0	99.0	*	*	*	*	*	–	–	–	0.8	*	*	0.1	*	*	*
Vlasca	100.0	99.4	*	0.2	*	*	*	*	–	–	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*
Dobrogea	**100.0**	**72.3**	**0.1**	**9.9**	**0.1**	**0.9**	*	**0.5**	*	**2.2**	*	**0.2**	**0.5**	**22.1**	*	*	*
Caliacra	100.0	70.4	*	0.2	*	0.2	*	0.2	*	*	*	*	0.5	28.2	*	*	*
Constanta	100.0	78.9	0.3	1.8	0.2	2.5	*	1.1	*	0.9	*	0.3	0.2	15.1	*	*	*
Durostor	100.0	54.0	*	*	*	*	*	0.2	–	0.1	*	*	0.2	45.1	*	*	*
Tulcea	100.0	88.8	*	1.5	*	0.8	*	0.1	*	3.3	*	0.2	0.7	2.8	*	*	*
Moldova	**100.0**	**88.2**	*	**4.5**	*	**0.1**	*	*	*	**0.1**	*	*	**6.7**	*	*	*	*
Bacau	100.0	75.8	0.2	18.1	0.1	0.1	*	*	*	–	0.1	*	5.6	*	*	*	*
Baia	100.0	92.9	0.1	1.0	*	0.1	*	*	–	0.9	*	–	4.9	*	*	*	*
Botosani	100.0	89.4	*	0.7	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.2	*	9.2	*	0.5	*	*
Covurlui	100.0	87.0	0.2	1.9	0.2	0.3	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	9.8	*	*	*	*
Dorohoi	100.0	92.4	*	0.3	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	*	7.0	*	*	*	*
Falciu	100.0	91.7	*	4.9	*	*	–	*	–	*	*	*	3.3	*	0.1	*	*
Iasi	100.0	82.0	*	4.2	*	0.2	*	*	*	0.2	*	*	14.9	*	*	*	*
Neamt	100.0	90.5	0.1	2.3	*	0.2	*	*	–	*	*	*	6.7	*	*	*	*
Putna	100.0	94.8	0.2	1.5	0.1	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	3.6	*	*	*	*
Roman	100.0	73.8	*	21.4	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	4.9	*	*	*	*
Tecuci	100.0	96.3	*	1.6	*	*	*	*	–	–	*	–	1.9	*	*	–	*
Tutova	100.0	96.4	*	0.2	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	*	2.9	*	*	*	*
Vaslui	100.0	86.7	*	0.2	*	*	*	–	–	0.2	0.1	–	5.6	–	0.1	*	*
Bessarabia	**100.0**	**87.4**	*	**0.3**	*	**2.6**	*	*	*	**1.1**	*	**0.7**	**7.3**	*	**0.1**	*	*
Balti	100.0	89.3	*	0.2	*	0.2	*	*	*	0.5	*	0.2	9.5	*	*	*	*
Cahul	100.0	98.1	*	*	–	4.3	–	*	–	0.5	*	0.6	5.5	*	*	–	*
Cetatea Alba	100.0	78.0	*	0.3	0.1	18.4	*	0.1	*	*	*	0.2	2.5	*	*	*	*
Hotin	100.0	87.0	*	0.2	*	*	–	*	*	1.0	0.2	1.0	9.2	*	0.2	*	*
Ismail	100.0	87.9	*	0.2	*	0.2	–	*	*	7.0	*	0.2	2.9	*	0.2	*	*
Lapusna	100.0	98.1	*	0.5	*	0.5	*	0.1	*	0.2	*	0.2	18.1	*	0.1	*	*
Orhei	100.0	92.5	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	0.3	–	0.1	7.0	*	*	–	*
Soroca	100.0	88.6	*	0.4	*	*	*	*	*	1.1	*	0.3	9.3	*	0.1	*	*
Tighina	100.0	89.4	*	0.8	*	3.0	*	*	*	0.2	*	0.4	5.5	*	0.1	*	*

*: Less than 0.1.

162
795

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

According to Religion

Continued

COUNTY	TOTAL	Greek-Orthodox	Greek-Catholic	Roman-Catholic	Reformed, Calvinist	Protestant, Lutheran	Unitarian	Armenian-Gregorian	Armenian-Catholic	Lipovan	Adventist	Baptist	Mosaic	Mohammedan	Others	Atheists	Not declared
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
Bucovina	**100.0**	**71.9**	**2.3**	**11.5**	*	**2.4**	*	*	*	**0.4**	**0.1**	**0.1**	**10.9**	*	*	**0.1**	*
Campulung	100.0	68.8	0.8	16.9	*	5.5	*	*	*	*	0.1	*	8.8	*	*	0.1	*
Cernauti	100.0	67.0	8.7	10.0	*	1.7	*	*	*	*	0.8	*	10.9	*	*	*	0.1
Radauti	100.0	70.6	1.2	16.9	0.3	9.6	*	*	*	1.2	*	0.8	7.8	*	*	0.8	*
Storojinet	100.0	78.1	1.9	9.1	*	1.8	*	*	*	0.3	*	0.3	9.1	*	*	*	*
Suceava	100.0	80.1	1.4	8.4	*	8.5	*	*	*	0.5	*	0.3	5.5	–	0.8	0.8	*
Transylvania	**100.0**	**27.8**	**31.1**	**13.8**	**15.5**	**7.6**	**3.1**	*	*	–	*	**0.3**	**3.5**	*	*	*	*
Alba	100.0	61.0	31.8	5.4	7.5	3.5	1.3	*	*	–	*	0.4	1.5	*	*	*	*
Brasov	100.0	48.8	8.4	9.8	7.6	27.8	1.4	*	*	–	*	*	1.7	*	*	*	0.2
Cluc	100.0	1.3	13.8	81.5	1.5	0.3	*	*	0.2	–	*	*	1.7	*	–	*	*
Claj	100.0	19.3	48.7	8.8	21.7	0.8	1.0	*	*	–	0.1	0.4	5.3	*	*	*	0.1
Fagaras	100.0	58.8	36.7	1.9	8.9	19.9	0.4	*	–	–	0.5	0.1	0.8	*	*	*	*
Hunedoara	100.0	64.3	18.8	9.1	4.5	1.0	0.8	*	*	–	*	0.8	1.5	*	*	*	*
Mures	100.0	14.5	38.4	19.1	30.5	3.9	8.8	*	*	–	0.2	0.2	3.8	*	*	*	*
Namand	100.0	13.8	60.9	8.3	5.6	15.5	*	–	*	–	*	*	4.4	*	*	*	*
Odorhei	100.0	3.7	1.1	54.9	37.4	0.8	90.6	–	*	–	0.1	0.8	1.1	–	*	*	*
Salaj	100.0	4.4	38.6	19.9	36.4	0.8	*	*	*	–	*	0.8	4.0	*	*	*	*
Sibiu	100.0	48.0	12.7	4.0	8.8	27.8	0.8	*	–	–	*	0.8	0.8	*	*	*	*
Somes	100.0	16.0	63.5	8.8	19.8	0.1	*	*	0.8	–	*	0.8	4.8	*	*	*	*
Tarnava Mare	100.0	36.6	10.4	4.5	6.8	39.8	8.0	*	–	–	0.1	0.1	0.7	*	*	*	*
Tarnava Mica	100.0	16.8	40.7	4.6	16.6	16.3	8.3	*	*	–	0.3	0.3	1.1	*	*	*	*
Trei Scaune	100.0	14.6	8.5	36.1	40.6	0.8	4.6	*	–	–	*	0.8	0.7	–	*	*	*
Turda	100.0	33.1	48.5	4.1	14.4	0.1	4.6	*	*	–	*	0.8	1.8	–	*	*	*
Banat	**100.0**	**56.1**	**3.6**	**34.3**	**2.3**	**1.5**	*	*	–	*	*	**0.7**	**1.5**	*	*	*	*
Caras	100.0	70.8	6.1	21.5	0.8	0.6	*	*	–	–	*	1.8	0.4	*	*	*	*
Severin	100.0	78.4	3.9	14.9	3.1	0.6	*	*	–	*	*	0.9	1.0	*	*	*	*
Timis Torontal	100.0	41.1	8.8	48.8	8.5	3.4	*	*	–	*	*	0.3	3.8	*	*	*	*
Crisana and Maramures	**100.0**	**36.8**	**26.3**	**15.3**	**12.8**	**1.1**	*	*	*	*	**0.1**	**1.5**	**7.0**	*	*	*	*
Arad	100.0	58.8	4.8	26.5	5.5	3.8	*	*	*	*	0.1	2.1	8.4	*	*	0.1	*
Bihor	100.0	49.8	10.7	10.4	21.0	0.3	*	*	*	–	*	8.8	5.4	*	*	*	*
Maramures	100.0	5.8	64.4	6.4	1.8	*	*	–	–	–	0.4	0.8	21.1	*	*	0.1	*
Satu Mare	100.0	4.4	59.0	18.8	18.0	0.8	*	*	*	–	*	0.1	8.8	*	*	*	*

*) *Less than 0.1.*

162

Table
CENSUS
Ethnical composition of the
of the Counties partly or

COUNTY CITY TOWNSHIP	TOTAL	Romanians	Hungarians	Germans	Russians	Ukrainians	Yugoslavs	Bulgars	Czechs, Slovaks	Poles
1. BIHOR County Total	**510,318**	**314,109**	**152,942**	**2,288**	**496**	**493**	**121**	**211**	**11,162**	**131**
Percentages	*100.0*	*61.6*	*30.0*	*0.4*	–	–	–	–	*2.2*	–
A. Cities Total	**102,277**	**27,047**	**56,918**	**1,020**	**356**	**425**	**81**	**139**	**297**	**75**
Percentages	*100.0*	*26.4*	*54.8*	*1.0*	*0.3*	*0.4*	–	*0.3*	*0.3*	–
CITIES:										
Oradea	82,687	22,412	42,430	927	300	414	75	135	228	69
Beius	4,293	2,574	1,121	37	10	2	1	8	26	6
Salonta	15,297	2,061	12,267	56	46	9	5	16	33	–
B. Townships Total	**408,041**	**287,062**	**96,024**	**1,268**	**140**	**68**	**40**	**82**	**10,875**	**56**
Percentages	*100.0*	*70.4*	*23.5*	*0.3*	–	–	–	–	*2.7*	–
TOWNSHIPS:										
Aleod	43,146	34,326	3,434	67	19	10	3	1	3,846	2
Beius	47,234	40,689	5,886	10	1	3	4	–	3	–
Baile	20,135	19,181	588	25	1	1	1	–	3	–
Ceica	31,760	30,340	876	15	16	–	3	–	8	9
Centrala	49,538	27,730	20,291	650	22	41	9	45	56	8
Marghita	43,314	19,999	15,020	280	15	9	7	–	4,926	10
Salonta	29,811	21,231	7,447	26	3	1	3	5	579	–
Secuieni	23,182	3,221	17,618	59	14	2	7	1	708	1
Sehard	22,477	8,854	12,532	41	3	–	1	–	490	2
Tileagd	31,689	24,256	6,134	23	23	–	9	–	200	17
Tinca	35,326	27,508	6,675	21	12	1	–	–	19	2
Vascau	30,429	29,727	423	51	6	–	3	–	17	5
2. CIUC County Total	**145,806**	**20,976**	**120,627**	**439**	**99**	**16**	**10**	**10**	**54**	**50**
Percentages	*100.0*	*14.4*	*82.7*	*0.3*	–	–	–	–	–	–
A. Cities Total	**15,163**	**1,230**	**12,708**	**142**	**27**	**9**	**4**	**7**	**20**	**12**
Percentages	*100.0*	*8.1*	*83.8*	*0.9*	*0.2*	–	–	–	*0.1*	–
CITIES:										
Mercurea-Ciuc	4,807	598	3,796	71	9	5	1	3	–	7
Jigodin (Suburb)	1,195	90	1,093	1	4	–	–	–	–	1
Gheorgheni	10,355	632	8,912	71	18	4	3	4	20	5
B. Townships Total	**130,644**	**19,746**	**107,919**	**297**	**72**	**7**	**6**	**3**	**34**	**38**
Percentages	*100.0*	*15.1*	*82.6*	*0.2*	–	–	–	–	–	–
TOWNSHIPS:										
Centrala	32,947	766	31,820	57	11	1	2	–	7	12
Frumosan	23,321	4,771	17,840	77	27	1	1	3	3	9
Gheorgheni	52,539	12,704	38,461	102	23	4	2	–	22	18
Sanmartin	21,637	1,498	19,798	61	11	1	1	–	2	2
3. CLUJ County Total	**334,991**	**204,139**	**100,739**	**2,788**	**453**	**284**	**69**	**166**	**864**	**98**
Percentages	*100.0*	*60.9*	*30.1*	*0.8*	*0.1*	–	–	–	*0.3*	–
A. Cities Total	**106,248**	**36,632**	**58,872**	**2,516**	**406**	**246**	**54**	**132**	**273**	**78**
Percentages	*100.0*	*33.9*	*47.8*	*2.4*	*0.4*	*0.2*	–	*0.1*	*0.3*	–
CITIES:										
Cluj	100,944	34,995	47,689	2,300	405	244	54	132	262	76
Huedin	5,401	1,137	2,883	16	1	2	–	–	11	2
B. Townships Total	**228,746**	**168,107**	**88,187**	**272**	**47**	**38**	**15**	**34**	**291**	**20**
Percentages	*100.0*	*73.5*	*21.2*	*0.1*	–	–	–	–	*0.1*	–
TOWNSHIPS:										
Borsa	20,516	14,867	2,933	9	3	–	–	1	1	–
Cluj	51,049	32,439	16,047	89	28	34	4	29	30	4
Gilau	26,978	17,828	8,133	19	2	1	1	4	1	–
Hida	29,574	24,757	3,042	19	2	2	1	–	73	1
Huedin	49,509	39,540	8,587	68	8	9	9	1	182	7
Mocis	27,600	18,854	7,253	12	2	–	–	–	3	–
Sermesul	23,711	17,802	4,192	26	2	2	–	–	1	8
4. MARAMURES County Total	**361,875**	**93,207**	**11,174**	**3,339**	**73**	**19,230**	**10**	**36**	**73**	**58**
Percentages	*100.0*	*27.7*	*6.9*	*2.0*	–	*11.9*	–	–	–	–
A. Cities Total	**27,270**	**9,658**	**5,434**	**161**	**44**	**1,221**	**10**	**36**	**44**	**36**
Percentages	*100.0*	*35.4*	*19.9*	*0.6*	*0.2*	*4.5*	–	*0.1*	*0.2*	–
CITIES:										
Sighet	27,270	9,658	5,434	161	44	1,221	10	36	44	36
Iapa (Suburb)	2,136	1,651	8	–	7	1	–	–	–	–

*) The counties of Tarnava Mare and Tarnava Mica are not listed here, only a small part of their population (1,010 and 1,921 respectively) having been transferred to Hungary.

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

162

VII
OF 1930
urban and rural population
wholly ceded to Hungary.*

Hutsuns	Jews	Greeks	Albanians	Armenians	Turks	Tatars	Gagauzis	Gipsies	Other races	Undeclared	COUNTY CITY TOWNSHIP
4	21,982	8	3	7	17	-	1	6,006	131	196	1. BIHOR County Total
-	*4.5*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*1.2*	-	-	*Percentages*
4	15,731	8	3	1	12	-	-	860	111	79	A. Cities Total
	16.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	*0.8*	*0.1*	-	*Percentages*
4											CITIES:
-	14,764	3	3	1	5	-	-	571	71	75	Oradea
-	462	5	-	-	2	-	-	-	39	-	Beius
-	505	-	-	-	5	-	-	289	1	4	Salonta
-	6,251	-	-	6	5	-	1	5,146	20	117	B. Townships Total
-	*1.5*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*1.2*	-	-	*Percentages*
											TOWNSHIPS:
-	947	-	-	1	-	-	-	463	3	4	Aleud
-	153	-	-	-	-	-	-	474	6	3	Belin
-	133	-	-	-	-	-	-	202	-	-	Bulta
-	262	-	-	-	-	-	-	231	-	-	Cotea
-	371	-	-	-	1	-	-	300	2	12	Centrala
-	2,233	-	-	4	-	-	-	787	1	23	Marghita
-	88	-	-	-	2	-	-	416	-	3	Salonta
-	892	-	-	-	2	-	-	619	1	37	Sacuenl
-	278	-	-	-	-	-	-	269	-	7	Salard
-	425	-	-	-	-	-	1	583	-	18	Tileagd
-	346	-	-	-	-	-	-	736	6	-	Tinca
-	123	-	-	1	-	-	-	68	1	6	Vascau
-	2,383	2	1	94	-	-	-	933	56	57	2. CIUC County Total
-	*1.5*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*0.8*	-	-	*Percentages*
-	846	1	1	37	-	-	-	89	7	22	A. Cities Total
-	*5.8*	-	-	*0.2*	-	-	-	*0.8*	-	*0.1*	*Percentages*
											CITIES:
-	253	-	-	17	-	-	-	27	3	17	Mercurea-Ciuc
-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	Egodin (Suburb)
-	593	1	1	20	-	-	-	62	4	5	Gheorghenl
-	1,537	1	-	57	-	-	-	844	48	35	B. Townships Total
-	*1.9*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*0.8*	-	-	*Percentages*
											TOWNSHIPS:
-	102	-	-	-	-	-	-	159	9	1	Centrala
-	583	-	-	30	-	-	-	210	4	18	Frumosea
-	771	1	-	5	-	-	-	400	10	16	Gheorghenl
-	161	-	-	2	-	-	-	75	25	-	Sanmartin
-	17,163	15	6	186	34	-	2	7,869	119	287	3. CLUJ County Total
-	*6.1*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*2.8*	-	-	*Percentages*
-	14,800	14	6	164	31	-	-	1,371	97	243	A. Cities Total
-	*19.3*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*1.8*	-	*0.3*	*Percentages*
											CITIES:
-	13,062	13	6	162	21	-	-	1,043	97	243	Cluj
-	1,018	1	-	2	-	-	-	328	-	-	Huedin
-	2,363	1	-	22	3	-	2	6,498	22	44	B. Townships Total
-	*1.8*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*2.8*	-	-	*Percentages*
											TOWNSHIPS:
-	249	1	-	22	3	-	-	427	-	-	Borsa
-	424	-	-	4	-	-	2	1,861	11	34	Cluj
-	256	-	-	5	-	-	-	723	-	3	Gilau
-	646	-	-	4	-	-	-	1,826	-	3	Hida
-	618	-	-	1	-	-	-	443	6	-	Huedin
-	402	-	-	10	-	-	-	864	3	4	Mocis
-	468	-	-	36	-	-	-	1,152	2	-	Sarmasel
-	33,526	-	-	7	10	-	-	483	36	122	4. MARAMUREŞ County Total
-	*40.9*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*0.3*	-	-	*Percentages*
-	10,526	-	-	5	9	-	-	58	8	40	A. Cities Total
-	*38.8*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*0.8*	-	*0.1*	*Percentages*
											CITIES:
											Sighet
-	10,526	-	-	5	9	-	-	58	8	40	Iapa (Suburb)
-	442	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	

162

Table

Ethnical composition of the
of the Counties partly or

COUNTY CITY TOWNSHIP	TOTAL	Romanians	Hungarians	Germans	Ruthens	Ukrainians	Yugoslavs	Bulgars	Czechs, Slovaks	Poles
B. Townships Total	**134,385**	**83,549**	**5,786**	**3,078**	**39**	**18,999**	**–**	**–**	**39**	**39**
Percentages	*100.0*	*62.2*	*4.3*	*2.3*	*–*	*14.4*	*–*	*–*	*–*	*–*
TOWNSHIPS:										
Ina	36,921	31,539	95	39	6	19	–	–	–	3
Sighet	43,706	25,742	4,507	133	12	6,681	–	–	23	11
Vişeu	53,678	26,268	1,148	2,906	11	11,309	–	–	6	15
5. MUREŞ County Total	**299,546**	**132,719**	**129,317**	**11,283**	**324**	**76**	**50**	**79**	**93**	**99**
Percentages	*100.0*	*44.3*	*43.2*	*3.8*	*0.1*	*–*	*–*	*–*	*–*	*–*
A. Cities Total	**47,897**	**11,647**	**25,957**	**2,854**	**189**	**56**	**18**	**72**	**39**	**12**
Percentages	*100.0*	*24.3*	*54.2*	*6.0*	*0.4*	*0.1*	*–*	*0.2*	*–*	*–*
CITIES:										
Târgu-Mureş	38,517	9,795	22,387	632	181	53	18	70	36	9
Reghin	9,290	1,812	3,570	2,222	8	1	–	2	3	3
B. Townships Total	**241,739**	**121,112**	**97,268**	**8,429**	**145**	**20**	**32**	**7**	**54**	**87**
Percentages	*100.0*	*50.1*	*40.2*	*3.5*	*–*	*–*	*–*	*–*	*–*	*–*
TOWNSHIPS:										
Band	21,173	14,690	5,202	13	1	–	1	–	2	–
Mercurea	32,709	2,449	28,639	23	5	–	1	–	5	3
Mureş	51,265	16,857	31,445	91	10	2	4	6	12	11
Raciu	18,706	13,952	3,853	17	4	–	–	–	1	–
Reghin	71,114	43,378	18,419	4,699	15	3	13	–	4	13
Tesca	22,877	15,359	2,720	3,800	2	–	1	–	–	–
Topliţa	23,895	14,427	7,082	286	108	15	12	1	30	55
6. NASAUD County Total	**144,131**	**103,010**	**7,476**	**20,785**	**218**	**54**	**18**	**39**	**53**	**86**
Percentages	*100.0*	*71.5*	*5.2*	*14.4*	*0.2*	*–*	*–*	*–*	*–*	*–*
A. Cities Total	**17,648**	**8,535**	**1,463**	**4,544**	**149**	**39**	**11**	**38**	**25**	**8**
Percentages	*100.0*	*48.4*	*8.3*	*25.8*	*0.8*	*0.2*	*–*	*0.2*	*0.1*	*–*
CITIES:										
Bistriţa	14,128	5,666	1,363	4,461	146	38	11	38	21	8
Năsăud	3,512	2,869	98	83	3	1	–	–	4	–
B. Townships Total	**126,491**	**94,475**	**6,015**	**16,241**	**69**	**15**	**7**	**1**	**28**	**78**
Percentages	*100.0*	*74.7*	*4.8*	*12.8*	*–*	*–*	*–*	*–*	*–*	*–*
TOWNSHIPS:										
Bargau	31,069	20,487	292	6,850	21	3	1	1	8	20
Năsăud	32,596	27,888	1,068	1,922	26	–	–	–	3	–
Rodna	28,584	25,495	1,179	177	18	12	4	–	15	58
Sieu	34,242	20,605	3,476	7,292	4	–	2	–	–	–
7. ODORHEI County Total	**130,282**	**6,382**	**119,385**	**464**	**27**	**3**	**5**	**1**	**18**	**27**
Percentages	*100.0*	*4.9*	*91.6*	*0.4*	*–*	*–*	*–*	*–*	*–*	*–*
A. Cities Total	**8,518**	**962**	**6,928**	**172**	**10**	**3**	**–**	**1**	**7**	**9**
Percentages	*100.0*	*11.3*	*81.3*	*2.0*	*0.1*	*–*	*–*	*–*	*–*	*0.1*
CITY:										
Odorhei	8,518	962	6,928	172	10	3	–	1	7	9
B. Townships Total	**121,764**	**5,420**	**112,457**	**292**	**17**	**–**	**5**	**–**	**11**	**18**
Percentages	*100.0*	*4.5*	*92.4*	*0.2*	*–*	*–*	*–*	*–*	*–*	*–*
TOWNSHIPS:										
Cristur	30,492	2,317	27,019	107	5	–	1	–	9	–
Ocland	23,316	1,704	22,860	112	1	–	3	–	3	9
Odorhei	37,341	125	36,666	51	8	–	2	–	–	5
Praid	29,615	1,274	25,912	22	3	–	–	–	1	4
8. SALAJ County Total	**343,367**	**192,821**	**107,662**	**16,010**	**326**	**774**	**42**	**37**	**5,961**	**89**
Percentages	*100.0*	*56.2*	*31.4*	*4.7*	*–*	*0.2*	*–*	*–*	*1.7*	*–*
A. Cities Total	**31,826**	**10,088**	**14,685**	**1,788**	**89**	**363**	**13**	**13**	**79**	**35**
Percentages	*100.0*	*31.8*	*46.1*	*5.6*	*0.3*	*1.1*	*–*	*–*	*0.2*	*–*
CITIES:										
Zalau	8,340	2,115	3,614	90	7	16	2	9	18	1
Carei	10,042	3,603	3,637	1,719	80	343	10	1	43	31
Simleul-Silvaniei	7,448	2,340	3,434	19	2	2	1	2	17	1

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

VII, Continued

urban and rural population wholly ceded to Hungary.

162

Rutenes	Jews	Greeks	Albanians	Armenians	Turks	Tatars	Gagauzi	Gipsies	Other races	Undeclared	COUNTY CITY TOWNSHIP
-	28,302	-	-	3	1	-	-	427	18	82	B. Townships Total
-	*37.4*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*0.5*	-	-	*Percentages*
											TOWNSHIPS:
-	3,074	-	-	-	-	-	-	120	6	20	Ion
-	4,369	-	-	-	1	-	-	180	10	37	Sighet
-	11,859	-	-	3	-	-	-	127	2	25	Vişeu
-	9,989	3	3	44	6	-	-	11,386	73	103	5. MUREŞ County Total
-	*5.4*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*0.9*	-	-	*Percentages*
-	6,384	3	3	37	5	-	-	583	37	42	A. Cities Total
-	*18.4*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*1.1*	-	-	*Percentages*
											CITIES:
-	4,823	2	3	36	5	-	-	480	30	40	Târgu-Mureş
-	1,536	1	-	1	-	-	-	102	7	2	Reghin
-	3,575	-	-	17	1	-	-	10,803	36	61	B. Townships Total
-	*1.5*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*4.5*	-	-	*Percentages*
											TOWNSHIPS:
-	168	-	-	1	-	-	-	1,098	1	4	Band
-	385	-	-	6	-	-	-	1,192	-	1	Miercurea
-	270	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,535	1	1	Mureş
-	141	-	-	-	-	-	-	707	1	20	Răcău
-	938	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,598	13	16	Reghin
-	213	-	-	1	-	-	-	1,278	2	1	Toaca
-	1,468	-	-	9	1	-	-	375	18	8	Topliţa
-	4,339	7	-	37	6	-	-	5,993	44	66	6. NASAUD County Total
-	*4.4*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*4.1*	-	-	*Percentages*
-	2,596	6	-	8	6	-	-	362	24	28	A. Cities Total
-	*14.7*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*0.9*	*0.1*	*0.5*	*Percentages*
											CITIES:
-	2,177	6	-	8	6	-	-	131	20	28	Bistriţa
-	419	-	-	-	-	-	-	31	4	-	Năsăud
-	3,743	1	-	29	-	-	-	5,731	20	38	B. Townships Total
-	*5.0*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*4.8*	-	-	*Percentages*
											TOWNSHIPS:
-	898	1	-	3	-	-	-	2,466	6	12	Bargau
-	1,198	-	-	1	-	-	-	482	1	5	Năsăud
-	834	-	-	14	-	-	-	760	13	3	Rodna
-	813	-	-	11	-	-	-	2,023	-	16	Sieu
-	1,209	-	-	5	-	-	-	2,652	21	23	7. ODORHEI County Total
-	*1.0*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*2.0*	-	-	*Percentages*
-	203	-	-	3	-	-	-	122	6	12	A. Cities Total
-	*0.3*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*1.4*	-	*0.1*	*Percentages*
											CITY:
-	203	-	-	3	-	-	-	122	6	12	Odorhei
-	1,006	-	-	2	-	-	-	2,530	15	11	B. Townships Total
-	*0.8*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*2.1*	-	-	*Percentages*
											TOWNSHIPS:
-	421	-	-	-	-	-	-	610	-	3	Cristur
-	55	-	-	1	-	-	-	357	13	1	Ocland
-	84	-	-	1	-	-	-	398	1	-	Odorhei
-	446	-	-	-	-	-	-	945	1	7	Praid
-	12,000	3	-	91	10	-	-	6,109	26	128	8. SALAJ County Total
-	*8.0*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*1.8*	-	-	*Percentages*
-	6,364	3	-	18	2	-	-	861	13	61	A. Cities Total
-	*19.4*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*1.1*	-	*0.8*	*Percentages*
											CITIES:
-	411	-	-	-	-	-	-	86	1	10	Şelaş
-	2,329	3	-	6	2	-	-	196	10	47	Cavaş
-	1,536	-	-	11	-	-	-	80	2	[illegible]	[illegible]

162

Table

Ethnical composition of the
of the Counties partly or

COUNTY CITY TOWNSHIP	TOTAL	Romanians	Hungarians	Germans	Russians	Ukrainians	Yugoslavs	Bulgars	Czechs Slovaks	Poles
B. Townships Total	**311,517**	**182,763**	**92,977**	**14,322**	**239**	**411**	**29**	**5**	**5,833**	**36**
Percentages	*100.0*	*58.7*	*29.8*	*4.6*	-	*0.1*	-	-	*1.9*	-
TOWNSHIPS:										
Carei	37,367	13,826	9,519	12,564	35	75	14	2	30	12
Cehul-Silvaniei	44,333	30,098	11,389	649	21	-	2	1	11	6
Crasna	30,009	22,470	5,945	5	-	-	-	1	253	-
Jibou	37,535	32,974	2,613	38	8	1	3	-	4	3
Simleul-Silvaniei	44,870	22,627	15,425	42	1	1	-	-	4,876	1
Tasnad	44,388	24,209	16,140	728	149	10	5	-	464	5
Valea-Lui-Mihai	31,487	9,685	19,887	154	21	320	3	1	11	6
Zalau	41,528	26,874	13,059	22	4	4	2	-	174	3
9. SATU MARE County Total	**294,875**	**178,523**	**74,191**	**9,530**	**1,149**	**3,020**	**61**	**84**	**553**	**85**
Percentages	*100.0*	*60.5*	*25.2*	*3.2*	*0.4*	*1.0*	-	-	*0.2*	-
A. Cities Total	**69,526**	**36,314**	**29,139**	**1,100**	**286**	**496**	**26**	**81**	**131**	**66**
Percentages	*100.0*	*52.0*	*41.9*	*1.6*	*0.4*	*0.7*	-	*0.1*	*0.2*	-
CITIES:										
Satu-Mare	51,495	16,251	21,916	939	269	488	24	80	65	54
Baia-Mare	13,906	6,622	4,927	153	13	6	2	1	65	11
Baia-Sprie	4,127	1,441	2,296	8	4	2	-	-	1	1
B. Townships Total	**225,349**	**154,209**	**45,052**	**8,430**	**863**	**2,524**	**35**	**3**	**424**	**19**
Percentages	*100.0*	*68.4*	*20.0*	*3.7*	*0.4*	*1.1*	-	-	*0.2*	-
TOWNSHIPS:										
Arusel	29,488	16,875	4,066	6,562	15	21	1	-	11	-
Baia-Mare	35,028	29,973	4,138	34	4	9	6	-	4	1
Manastur	15,895	15,048	101	10	1	1	-	-	-	-
Oaslu	28,276	21,509	3,968	21	34	42	2	-	370	5
Satu-Mare	40,860	17,137	19,887	95	282	1,577	10	-	29	5
Seini	25,901	19,453	4,238	547	14	7	2	-	2	5
Somcuta-Mare	25,205	22,138	1,255	31	10	-	1	-	1	1
Ugocea	24,696	12,076	6,799	1,124	503	867	3	3	7	2
10. SOMES County Total	**219,356**	**169,942**	**33,870**	**351**	**145**	**93**	**10**	**38**	**53**	**26**
Percentages	*100.0*	*77.5*	*15.4*	*0.2*	-	-	-	-	-	-
A. Cities Total	**21,718**	**8,979**	**7,171**	**197**	**139**	**91**	**5**	**54**	**26**	**13**
Percentages	*100.0*	*41.3*	*33.0*	*0.9*	*0.6*	*0.4*	-	*0.2*	*0.1*	-
CITIES:										
Dej	15,110	5,965	5,234	131	64	80	1	47	19	11
Gherla	6,608	3,014	1,937	66	45	2	4	7	6	2
B. Townships Total	**197,637**	**160,963**	**26,699**	**154**	**35**	**2**	**5**	**4**	**26**	**13**
Percentages	*100.0*	*81.4*	*13.5*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOWNSHIPS:										
Beclean	37,913	27,235	8,193	66	18	1	1	-	2	3
Dej	53,007	43,230	6,821	37	4	-	3	2	3	3
Garbou	14,335	13,691	157	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Gherla	38,674	28,923	8,527	4	5	1	-	2	8	-
Iliesnda	25,371	23,988	250	11	5	-	1	-	4	3
Lapus	28,337	23,896	2,751	35	2	-	-	-	12	4
11. TREI SCAUNI County Total	**136,122**	**21,759**	**109,281**	**781**	**182**	**73**	**23**	**25**	**119**	**50**
Percentages	*100.0*	*16.0*	*80.4*	*0.6*	-	-	-	-	-	-
A. Cities Total	**15,925**	**2,444**	**12,456**	**260**	**22**	**61**	**5**	**19**	**21**	**11**
Percentages	*100.0*	*15.3*	*78.2*	*1.6*	*0.1*	*0.4*	-	*0.1*	*0.1*	-
CITIES:										
M. Gheorghe	10,818	2,181	7,926	260	18	61	4	18	17	6
Targu Secuesc	5,107	263	4,530	57	4	-	1	1	4	5
B. Townships Total	**120,197**	**19,315**	**96,825**	**521**	**160**	**12**	**18**	**6**	**98**	**39**
Percentages	*100.0*	*16.1*	*80.5*	*0.4*	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOWNSHIPS:										
Baraolt	16,210	2,960	13,038	100	12	2	-	-	13	2
Comana	33,986	5,460	27,587	131	31	3	17	-	37	33
M. Gheorghe	38,877	8,178	28,377	340	11	4	10	6	38	1
Tg. Secuesc	30,923	3,674	30,923	60	6	1	1	-	2	14

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

VII, Continued

urban and rural population wholly ceded to Hungary.

162

Hungarians	Jews	Greeks	Albanians	Armenians	Turks	Tatars	Gagauzes	Gipsies	Other races	Undeclared	COUNTY CITY TOWNSHIP
-	9,114	-	-	76	8	-	-	8,739	13	43	**B. Townships Total**
-	*2.9*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*1.8*	-	-	*Percentages*
											TOWNSHIPS:
-	521	-	-	-	4	-	-	746	1	18	Carei
-	1,502	-	-	5	-	-	-	621	1	7	Cehui-Silvaniei
-	786	-	-	27	-	-	-	321	-	1	Crasna
-	1,259	-	-	35	-	-	-	379	6	12	Jibou
-	838	-	-	1	-	-	-	1,048	-	10	Simleul-Silvaniei
-	1,600	-	-	3	-	-	-	1,067	3	1	Tasnad
-	1,902	-	-	-	4	-	-	488	2	3	Valea-Lui-Mihai
-	706	-	-	5	-	-	-	669	-	6	Zalau
-	22,967	2	-	7	11	-	-	3,521	43	126	**9. SATU MARE County Total**
-	*8.1*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*1.5*	-	-	*Percentages*
-	12,953	2	-	7	4	-	-	829	32	50	**A. Cities Total**
-	*10.8*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*1.8*	-	-	*Percentages*
											CITIES:
-	10,093	2	-	5	4	-	-	642	24	29	Satu-Mare
-	1,952	-	-	2	-	-	-	127	6	17	Baia-Mare
-	308	-	-	-	-	-	-	60	2	4	Baia-Sprie
-	11,014	-	-	-	7	-	-	2,692	11	76	**B. Townships Total**
-	*4.9*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*1.5*	-	-	*Percentages*
											TOWNSHIPS:
-	616	-	-	-	-	-	-	703	-	12	Ardud
-	668	-	-	-	-	-	-	185	6	-	Baia-Mare
-	621	-	-	-	-	-	-	109	1	3	Mamatur
-	2,168	-	-	-	-	-	-	156	1	-	Oaste
-	1,311	-	-	-	1	-	-	495	2	29	Satu-Mare
-	1,411	-	-	-	-	-	-	211	-	11	Seini
-	1,336	-	-	-	-	-	-	425	1	6	Somcuta-Mare
-	2,883	-	-	-	6	-	-	408	-	15	Ugocea
-	10,546	-	7	434	1	2	-	3,767	19	41	**10. SOMES County Total**
-	*4.8*	-	-	*0.8*	-	-	-	*1.7*	-	-	*Percentages*
-	6,365	-	-	371	-	2	-	388	11	12	**A. Cities Total**
-	*60.1*	-	-	*1.7*	-	-	-	*1.4*	-	-	*Percentages*
											CITIES:
-	3,346	-	6	5	-	2	-	178	3	9	Dej
-	1,019	-	1	366	-	-	-	127	8	3	Gherla
-	6,181	-	-	63	1	-	-	3,462	8	29	**B. Townships Total**
-	*9.1*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*1.8*	-	-	*Percentages*
											TOWNSHIPS:
-	1,554	-	-	4	-	-	-	850	-	6	Bacium
-	1,683	-	-	12	-	-	-	1,197	1	7	Dej
-	318	-	-	2	-	-	-	165	-	-	Garbou
-	617	-	-	17	-	-	-	563	-	10	Gherla
-	791	-	-	3	1	-	-	307	7	-	Iloanda
-	1,216	-	-	15	-	-	-	380	-	6	Lapus
-	714	15	-	11	-	-	-	2,939	71	99	**11. TREI SCAUNE County Total**
-	*0.8*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*0.8*	-	-	*Percentages*
-	371	-	-	8	-	-	-	223	7	18	**A. Cities Total**
-	*9.5*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*1.4*	-	*0.1*	*Percentages*
											CITIES:
-	281	-	-	1	-	-	-	187	6	9	M. Ciucului
-	90	-	-	7	-	-	-	35	1	9	Targul Secuesc
-	343	15	-	3	-	-	-	2,707	64	81	**B. Townships Total**
-	*0.8*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*0.8*	-	-	*Percentages*
											TOWNSHIPS:
-	80	1	-	-	-	-	-	736	-	3	Baraolt
-	159	3	-	1	-	-	-	533	21	4	Comana
-	76	6	-	-	-	-	-	1,070	40	37	M. Ciucului
-	28	5	-	-	-	-	-	391	3	7	Tg. Secuesc

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

152

Table VIII
Ethnical Composition of the County Population of Transylvania, the Banat and Crisana-Maramures

The 1910 Hungarian Census and the 1930 Romanian Census Compared

	Census	Total	Romanians	Hungarians	Germans	Jews	Others
Transylvania							
Alba	1910	221,618	171,483	35,262	7,269	3,845	3,759
	1930	212,749	173,401	24,028	7,583	2,995	4,742
Brasov	1910	101,199	35,091	33,869	29,542	1,503	1,194
	1930	168,125	83,948	44,761	33,348	2,438	3,630
Ciuc	1910	145,720	18,032	123,531	1,080	2,357	720
	1930	145,806	20,976	120,627	439	2,383	1,381
Cluj	1910	290,547	164,997	98,944	3,387	12,581	5,638
	1930	334,991	204,139	100,759	2,788	17,163	10,142
Fagaras	1910	95,174	84,436	5,561	3,236	905	1,036
	1930	86,039	67,375	4,768	10,750	442	2,704
Hunedoara	1910	340,125	271,675	47,041	8,101	5,679	7,629
	1930	332,118	272,283	37,554	8,282	4,662	9,307
Mures	1910	219,589	71,909	126,616	8,312	7,550	5,202
	1930	289,546	132,719	123,317	11,283	9,959	12,268
Nasaud	1910	127,843	87,564	3,483	25,609	7,254	3,983
	1930	144,131	103,010	7,476	20,785	6,339	6,521
Odorhei	1910	124,173	2,840	117,145	2,202	1,313	673
	1930	130,282	6,382	119,385	464	1,289	2,762
Salaj	1910	230,140	136,087	77,463	816	9,849	5,925
	1930	343,347	192,821	107,652	16,010	13,380	13,474
Sibiu	1910	176,921	113,672	8,594	49,757	1,365	3,333
	1930	194,619	120,738	9,085	56,999	1,400	6,397
Somes	1910	248,076	185,725	44,000	6,901	7,995	3,455
	1930	219,355	169,942	33,870	351	10,546	4,646
Tarnava Mare	1910	148,826	60,381	17,385	62,224	1,089	7,747
	1930	147,994	66,307	17,419	58,810	1,061	4,397
Tarnava Mica	1910	116,091	55,585	33,136	20,272	1,766	5,332
	1930	149,482	80,604	35,306	24,011	1,631	7,930
Trei Scaune	1910	148,080	22,963	122,296	617	1,222	982
	1930	136,122	21,759	109,381	781	714	3,487
Turda	1910	174,375	125,668	41,982	576	2,648	3,501
	1930	183,282	136,315	39,214	742	2,224	4,787
Total	1910	2,908,497	1,608,108	936,308	234,901	69,121	60,059
	1930	3,217,988	1,852,719	934,642	253,426	78,626	98,575
Banat							
Caras-Severin	1910	466,484	336,278	28,669	55,915	4,795	40,827
	1930	440,515	323,063	20,870	48,772	2,763	45,047
Timis Torontal	1910	511,016	174,349	76,128	194,965	8,638	56,936
	1930	499,443	180,020	76,969	174,395	8,485	59,574
Total	1910	977,500	510,627	104,797	250,880	13,433	97,763
	1930	939,958	503,083	97,839	223,167	11,248	104,621
Crisana-Maramures							
Arad	1910	418,820	247,635	111,317	31,995	10,102	17,271
	1930	423,649	256,239	82,488	32,202	9,048	21,672
Bihor	1910	455,903	253,662	184,658	3,458	32,462	11,673
	1930	510,319	314,109	152,942	2,288	21,982	18,997
Maramures	1910	150,468	73,437	20,888	7,839	28,311	20,195
	1930	161,575	93,207	11,174	3,239	32,828	20,127
Satu Mare	1910	307,394	128,241	141,108	7,238	29,468	1,734
	1930	294,875	178,523	74,191	9,580	23,987	8,664
Total	1910	1,332,525	702,985	457,744	50,530	100,343	50,923
	1930	1,390,417	944,079	320,795	67,259	88,825	69,460

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

000 p. iv [p. v is blank]

BRITISH SURVEY HANDBOOKS

RUMANIA

By

C. KORMOS

CAMBRIDGE
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
1944

12: Kosmos 3-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

000

British Society for International Understanding

BRITISH SURVEY HANDBOOKS

General Editor: JOHN EPPSTEIN

II

RUMANIA

Title page

[pp. i, ii, iii contain no textual information]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

CONTENTS

000 *Editorial Note* *page* vii
[should be p. vi-] -Analyst

CHAPTER I. AN HISTORICAL OUTLINE 1

The Ancient Rumanians—'Dacia Felix'—The Roman Retreat—Centuries of Invasions—The Slavs—The Bulgarian Empires—The Magyars—The Great Controversy—The Two Principalities—Under Turkish Rule—The Phanariots—The Peasantry—The Pawn of the Powers—Revolt and Unification—Carol I—Greater Rumania.

CHAPTER II. THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE 20

The Population—The Rumanian Peasants—Religion—The Hungarians and the Szekelys—The Slavs—The Jews—The Germans.

CHAPTER III. THE PROVINCES 30

The Regat. Oltenia—Muntenia—Bucarest—The Dobrudja—Moldavia.

Frontier changes, 1919–20, 1940 (sketch-maps).

The New Territories. The Banat—The Crisana and Maramures—Transylvania (Rumanians—Magyars and Szekelys—Germans—Vienna Award—Geography and Products)—The Bukovina—Bessarabia.

CHAPTER IV. ECONOMIC WEALTH OF THE COUNTRY 59

The Land Reforms—Crops—Livestock—Mineral Resources—Oil—Industry and Trade.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

CHAPTER V. POLITICAL HISTORY, 1919–39 *page* 71

The New State—Foreign Policy—The Minorities—Social Reform—The Monarchy—The People—Corruption of the Administration—The Government—The Royal Dictatorship—The Fifth Column.

CHAPTER VI. UNDER GERMAN CONTROL 89

The Last Days of Greater Rumania—The End of Greater Rumania—The U.S.S.R. takes Bessarabia—The Vienna Award—The Flight of the King—Rumania goes to War—Oppression and Exploitation—Oil and Industry—The Political Scene—Rumania and the Western Allies.

CONCLUSION 112

APPENDIX 117

INDEX 121

Map of Greater Rumania *at end*

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

EDITORIAL NOTE

000

This book goes to press at the moment when the Red Army having re-occupied parts of Bessarabia has carried the war with Nazi Germany into the heart of Rumania. It does not attempt to speculate upon the consequences of the Soviet victories in this area, but gives an analysis of the social and economic factors of Rumania in the light of the confused history of the country. It is believed that this will prove to be a useful background for estimating the consequences of defeat and the impact of the U.S.S.R. upon the different parts of Rumania and the various sections of its population.

JOHN EPPSTEIN
Editor

July 1944

p. viii

12: Kormos 3-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p. 1

RUMANIA & THE RUMANIANS

CHAPTER I

AN HISTORICAL OUTLINE

101 The country known between the two Great Wars as
175 Greater Rumania has had twenty-three centuries of violent and dramatic history. From about 400 B.C., when it was first colonized by Thracian tribes, up to the present day this territory has been the victim of many invasions and the scene of many migrations. It has been conquered and ruled by dozens of races and peoples who have all left their mark upon the country and its inhabitants. To-day the Rumanians form an island of Latinity between the Slavonic peoples and one of the last Asiatic invaders of Europe, the Hungarians. The language and culture of the Rumanians, although containing many elements of Slavonic, Germanic and other origins, are closely related to the civilization of Italy, France and Spain.

175 To the foreigner who visits Rumania for the first time this country and its mixed population seems full of inexplicable and insoluble contradictions. The numerous problems confronting Rumania and the Rumanians in the twentieth century have their roots in the historical development of the past. The issues of the present day cannot be understood or solved unless they are examined in the light of this history. In order to analyse the condition of contemporary Rumania, it is therefore necessary to present a short outline of Rumanian history.

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1044
ED1 Rumania ED1

175 **THE ANCIENT RUMANIANS.** The first permanent colonization of Rumania, after the Celtic period which belongs to the twilight before the dawn of history, was carried out by the Dacians who occupied Transylvania, Wallachia and the Banat in the fourth century B.C. Knowing how to exploit the agricultural and mineral wealth of the country the Dacians attained a comparatively high standard of civilization. They were an industrious people, equally skilled in the arts of peace and war. During the last century B.C. the Dacians under King Boirebista rose to the peak of their power. They ruled over a considerable part of South-Eastern Europe. On Boirebista's death this vast empire collapsed. All that remained to the Dacians was the territory which they had first occupied.

The Roman Empire had been seriously disturbed by the growing menace on its north-eastern frontiers. The Emperors Claudius and Domitian were therefore anxious to stabilize their hold upon the Roman provinces in that area. As a preliminary step the provinces at present occupied by the States of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were added to the domains of Rome. The wealth of Dacia and the wish to consolidate the newly conquered Roman provinces tempted the Romans to invade Dacia. King Decebal not only succeeded in defending the country but inflicted several heavy defeats on the Roman legions. He even imposed an annual tribute on the Roman Empire which was paid to him promptly.

While resisting successfully any Roman attempts to subjugate Dacia, Decebal welcomed Roman traders, craftsmen and workers and encouraged the spread of Roman civilization. At the same time he

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

organized the defence of the country from his capital Sarmisegetusa, situated on the edge of the South Carpathian Mountains. 175

Soon after Trajan became emperor, war broke out between him and Decebal. In the years A.D. 100–106 Trajan defeated and conquered the Dacians. The many bridges, military highways and fortresses built by the emperor for this campaign, of which ruins can still be found to-day, show that this Roman conquest was not an easy one.

'DACIA FELIX.' Conquest was followed by systematic colonization. Many military camps, towns and roads were built by the Romans all over Southern Rumania. Colonists from Italy and the vast Roman possessions were brought here to strengthen this outpost of the empire, to cultivate the fertile soil, to develop trade and to spread Roman culture. The majority of the original inhabitants readily adopted Roman rule and civilization, although a minority retreated into mountainous Transylvania, which means 'the country beyond the forest'. There followed, according to one theory, a period of great prosperity during which Dacians and Roman settlers lived peacefully side by side, intermarried and gave birth to a new people; they were the Daco-Rumanians who spoke a Latin dialect, which was the origin of the Rumanian language.

Parallel with this process of Romanization there went great progress in agriculture, trade, transport and mining.[1] Dacia under the rule of Rome was

[1] The salt and gold mines of Transylvania were already exploited by the Romans.

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

175 prosperous, and the province became known as 'Dacia Felix'—happy Dacia.

THE ROMAN RETREAT. This favourable development in the most exposed province of the Roman Empire was interrupted and its achievements were almost completely destroyed by the pressure of barbarian tribes advancing into Europe from the east. So dangerous was the position of the Roman legions in Dacia, who were unable to stop the continuous raids of the Goths, that the Emperor Aurelian decided to abandon this province. The evacuation of the Roman legions and the Roman administration was completed by about A.D. 275. Most of the Daco-Rumanian population probably remained in the territory between the Danube and the Carpathians.

CENTURIES OF INVASIONS. The retreat of the Romans to the southern banks of the Danube opened the floodgates of invasion. From the third to the tenth century a host of nations passed through Rumania on their way to the west and south.

The spearhead of the barbarians was formed by the Visigoths, a military race, who had no difficulty in subjugating the country. During their short stay in Rumania the Visigoths were converted to the Christian faith. The process of conversion started from Constantinople, and the Rumanians, too, adopted the new creed. Thus the Rumanians, a people of partly Roman origin and Latin speech, remained attached to the Eastern Church, when its separation from the Papacy followed the separation of the Western and Eastern Roman Empires. To-day the great majority of Rumanians belong to the Orthodox Church.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

The Visigoths were conquered by the Huns who, about A.D. 375, broke into Europe from Asia. The Visigoths became their vassals, and when the Huns left Rumania after a short period, they took the Visigoths with them to fight in their wars which devastated a great part of Europe. 175

The flow of peoples who invaded Rumania continued. The next tide brought the Gepides, also a Germanic race. They settled down permanently. The Gepides were engaged in continuous warfare and maintained their supremacy over their neighbours, until their defeat by the Langobards and Avars in the sixth century.

THE SLAVS. The Gepides retired into the Carpathian Mountains. The Avars occupied the vast Danubian plains, which formed their base for expeditions far into Central Europe. Their raids were checked by Charlemagne who expelled them from their western outposts. During this time, that is, in the eighth century, the Gepides fought as auxiliaries of the Avars; soon after the fall of the latter, their name disappears from history.

Before and during the Avar period occurred the great influx of the Slavs into the Danubian and Balkan lands. Besides the Balkans, the Slav tribes settled in considerable numbers in Transylvania. Nearly all the oldest place-names of the East Carpathians are Slavonic, and the Rumanian language contains many Slavonic words.

THE BULGARIAN EMPIRES. The seventh and eighth centuries saw the coming of the Bulgars, a race of Turkish nomads from the east who, however, later

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

175 became absorbed by their Slavonic subjects. In the seventh century the Bulgars were already encamped north of the Danube, in the territory of the modern Rumania. Later they moved the centre of their power across the Danube, where they founded the state afterwards known as Bulgaria, though still ruling over much of modern Rumania.

The first Bulgarian Empire was at the height of its power between 893 and 972 B.C. and its Tsar Boris was one of the great conquerors of that age. This empire was in its turn subdued by Basil II, Emperor of Byzantium, in the eleventh century; the Bulgars and their Rumanian subjects were, however, able to continue to observe their own traditions, except that they were involved with the rest of the Eastern Empire in the final Schism between the Eastern Church and Rome. In the next century the Bulgarian Empire became an independent power once more, and the Bulgarian Tsars began to style themselves 'Emperors of the Vlachs and Bulgars'. The Rumanians are still called Vlachs or Wallachs by their neighbours; then, as now, there were many of them living as nomadic shepherds outside the boundaries of what eventually became known as Rumania. The Vlachs of the Second Bulgarian Empire were those of the Central Balkans and Thessaly, and Greek chroniclers tell of autonomous Vlach chieftains in those parts.

THE MAGYARS. At the close of the ninth century the Magyars crossed the Carpathians, conquered the rising duchies of the Banat and the Crisana and began to settle in the Hungarian plain. During the subsequent decades, their westward advance being

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

checked by Otto the Great, they penetrated 175
Transylvania, subjecting the local population. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries they colonized the east and south of that country with the Szekelys, a people akin to themselves, and with German settlers (the 'Transylvanian Saxons').

THE GREAT CONTROVERSY. The Magyar invasion of Europe was the last important stage in the Migration of Nations. To this time is traced the origins of Rumania as a nation.

Before turning to the creation and development of the two Rumanian principalities, mention must be made of the great controversy which centres round the question of the history of the Rumanians *during* the Migration of Nations. Although this historical controversy may seem of purely theoretical interest, it still plays a prominent part in contemporary politics.

Some historians, mostly Hungarians, hold that at the time of the Roman evacuation of Dacia the Daco-Rumanian population withdrew to the lands south of the Danube. According to this theory they recrossed the river in the thirteenth century and later penetrated into Transylvania, that is, *after* the Hungarians had occupied this territory. This theory is used to support the Hungarian claim to Transylvania.

The contrary theory is that the majority of the Daco-Rumanians remained in the lands between the Carpathians and the Danube after the Roman withdrawal. They were subjugated by numerous invaders, assimilated some of them and always managed to preserve their national character or at least their language, which is the instrument of

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

175 national consciousness. In times of danger they retreated into the mountains, just as those Dacians who centuries before wanted to escape the rule of Rome. Owing to the numerous invasions and colonizations, especially of Slavs, a wedge was driven between the Macedo- and Istro-Rumanians, who to-day live in Macedonia and Dalmatia, and the bulk of the Rumanians north of the Danube.

This latter view is put forward by Rumanian writers, who urge in support of it that the Rumanian rite was originally Slavonic and not Greek, as it would have been had the Rumanians immigrated from the south. It is also argued that the Rumanian migration from the north to the south is reflected in the naming of Eastern Wallachia which the Rumanians call 'Muntenia', i.e. 'country of the mountains'—transferring the name of their former home to a country known for its plains. One thing is certain: the two principalities had their origin in Transylvania. Wallachia developed to the south of it, Moldavia to the east.

THE TWO PRINCIPALITIES. Wallachia and Moldavia were created during the second half of the thirteenth and the first half of the fourteenth century. The emergence of the two Rumanian semi-independent States was due to a great extent to a temporary ebb in the movement of peoples. Their rise was furthered by one unfavourable and one favourable circumstance. The ever-increasing pressure of the Hungarians drove many Rumanians from Transylvania into the lands beyond the Carpathians. And the decay of the Slavonic States south and west of the

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

Danube gave the Rumanians an opportunity to consolidate their position. 175

While the formation of the two principalities was the logical result of historical development and the realization of national aspirations nascent since the ninth century, it also led to a considerable weakening of the Rumanian element in Transylvania. Most of the *boiars*[1] migrated to Wallachia and Moldavia and those who remained were quickly absorbed by the Hungarian nobility.[2] For the great majority of the Rumanian population of Transylvania there began a long period of economic, political and national subservience to the Magyars.

The foundation of the two principalities was already overshadowed by the impending conflict between the Turks and the European peoples opposing them, which lasted into the present century and played a decisive part in the history of Rumania. When the two principalities were formed, the Turks had not yet advanced far enough to crush them, as the Hungarians had done with their predecessors in the ninth century.

Nevertheless, the first rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia had to contend with many dangers. It is indeed surprising that the two Rumanian States could be established at all and survive in the face of extreme adversity. They found themselves constantly menaced by all their neighbours. Wallachia was from the outset involved in conflicts with

[1] Landed nobility.

[2] One of the most striking examples is the family of Hunyadi Janos, a Magyar noble of Rumanian descent, who became famous as one of the greatest military leaders against the Turks. His son, Matthias Corvinus, was King of Hungary.

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

175 Turkey and Hungary, Moldavia with Hungary, Poland and Turkey. And more than once Wallachia and Moldavia were in different camps fighting each other.

The short periods of relative peace and prosperity were achieved by the Rumanian princes by diplomacy rather than by decisive military victories. This is not strange in view of the great disparity between their resources and those of their major neighbours. Up to the early sixteenth century therefore the most profitable policy was that of balancing one enemy against the other.

Although there was some important progress during the brief intervals of peace, Moldavia and Wallachia could not stem the advance of the Turkish tide. This was prepared by the steady penetration of the principalities by Byzantine trade and institutions which is reflected in the structure of the Rumanian States at that time. The *voivods*[1] copied the absolutism of Constantinople, choosing their counsellors from the clergy and the big landowning families, and treated the country and its inhabitants as their personal property. The economic decline of the peasantry, continuous warfare amongst pretenders to the Rumanian thrones and against Turks, Hungarians and Poles, weakened the country to such a degree that it could not offer successful resistance to the Turks when they resumed their advance to the north.

UNDER TURKISH RULE. The death of Louis of Hungary in the battle of Mohacs against the Turks brought the end of Rumanian semi-independence

[1] Dukes or princes.

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

and the beginning of three centuries of Turkish rule. /175
For with the collapse of Hungary there was no strong opponent of Turkey left south of Vienna.

The Turkish administration of Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldavia was indirect. It relied on the native princes and ruling classes, leaving the Turks themselves free to concentrate upon their main objective, the defeat of Austria. But this did not by any means secure peaceful development for the Rumanians. The *voivods* of Wallachia and Moldavia, and the Hungarian princes of Transylvania, tried to continue the policy of playing off one power against the other. The Hungarians achieved some success with this method; but for the two principalities it resulted in bloody repression and great misery for the people.

The last determined effort to free Moldavia and Wallachia from Turkish vassalage was undertaken by Michael the Brave. Within a few years this man of exceptional ability conquered Wallachia, Transylvania and Moldavia and in 1600 proclaimed himself Prince of all Rumanians. His achievement was of short duration: it failed because he had to fight both the Turks and the supporters of Austria, and because his own power was not founded upon the people but upon part of the landed nobility and the merchants. This brief interval of Michael's success has, however, been remembered by all Rumanians as a symbol of their highest aspiration, the unification of all Rumanians in one state.

THE PHANARIOTS.[1] The general decay of the two principalities in the early seventeenth century

[1] From Phanar, the Greek quarter of Constantinople in which the Oecumenical Patriarchate is situated.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

175 opened a new stage which lasted about two hundred years and is no doubt the most miserable and tragic in the history of the Rumanian people. It is forever joined with the name of the Phanariots.

The Greek merchants who had already gained considerable influence in the economic life of the country were soon able to govern it politically also. Owing to their financial power, their connexions at the Turkish Court and their position in the Turkish Empire generally, they were able to make or break a Rumanian ruler. The *voivods* became mere tools in the hands of these merchant-politicians; and in the early eighteenth century the Phanariots instead of financing Rumanian princes secured the office of *hospodar*[1] for themselves.

The rule of the Phanariots, who were of Greek, Albanian and Slavonic origin, was one of complete and ruthless economic exploitation. The office of *hospodar* was sold by the sultan to the highest bidder and the sole motive of the prince was the acquisition of great wealth in the shortest possible time. Nor was there much time for these men to enrich themselves. For the sultan soon perceived the possibilities of this new source of income and consequently auctioned the office very frequently.

During this period the *boiars* became more and more dependent on the *hospodars*. Greek influence penetrated all spheres of activity and led to the adoption of the Greek liturgy. The decline of Slavonic culture, however, favoured the rise of Rumanian art and literature which developed with the growth of the movement for national unity and independence.

[1] Title of Governor of the Principality.

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

THE PEASANTRY. One of the most tragic features of this time is the rapid decline of the Rumanian peasantry both in Transylvania and in the two principalities. 175

The position in Wallachia and Moldavia deteriorated with alarming speed. However great the taxes and tributes imposed upon the country by sultan and *hospodar*, the *boiars* always managed to indemnify themselves by fleecing the peasants. The peasantry was soon reduced to a state of abject slavery. This decay of the peasant class led to disastrous consequences sapping the economic and military strength of the country. Within a few years after 1740 the peasant population of Wallachia, for example, is said to have declined by more than 75%.[1] Conditions in Moldavia were similar, and in some respects worse.

In Transylvania the unfavourable economic position of the peasantry was linked with the repression of national aspirations by the Magyars. The fight for political equality was waged at that time chiefly by the Rumanian lower clergy. But the rigorous feudal system on which the power of the Hungarian nobles rested could not afford to grant any substantial political or economic rights to a people upon whose labour the greater part of their wealth and position depended. In 1784 came a revolt of some Rumanian peasants, led by Horia, Closca and Crisan. They demanded the abolition of serfdom and national equality. The wording of their manifestos is re-

[1] From a consular report by the Austrian General von Bauer who states that there were about 147,000 peasant families in 1741; that during the next four years the number was halved and then halved again; an exaggeration, no doubt, but indicative of the deplorable state of affairs.

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

175 miniscent of the language of the men who, two centuries before them, were at the head of the great peasant risings in Germany and Bohemia. But this local movement, too, failed and was followed by bloody repression.

THE PAWN OF THE POWERS. The weakening of Turkish power after the Napoleonic wars and the rapid growth of capitalism brought South-Eastern Europe into the focus of imperialistic ambitions. Owing to its natural wealth and its geographical position Rumania became a valuable pawn on the chessboard, on which the Great Powers played the game of imperialist expansion in Eastern Europe. The movement of liberation from the Ottoman Empire was exploited by rival powers, the Russian and Habsburg Empires, which posed as protectors of subject peoples. The British, anxious to defeat Russian designs upon Constantinople, were not indifferent to the issue. Germany exported dynasties to the liberated countries.

From the beginning of the eighteenth century the hold of Austria and Russia upon the principalities increased steadily. During the first decades of the nineteenth century the purely Turkish overlordship was replaced by combined Russo-Turkish rule and eventually by Russian predominance.[1] But this period was also marked by the vigorous growth of the national liberation movements in the whole of South-Eastern Europe. In Rumania it found ex-

[1] 1718: Austrian occupation of the Banat and Oltenia; 1775: Bukovina annexed by Austria; 1770: Austro-Russian occupation of both principalities; 1812: Russia takes Bessarabia; 1829: Russia occupies Moldavia and Muntenia; 1854: both under Austrian occupation.

2-

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

pression in the struggle against the foreign Greek rulers and for the union of the two principalities into one State. The revolt of Tudor Vladimirescu[1] in 1820 in Wallachia was the signal for a general rising supported by wide sections of the people. It was of only short duration and failed. But it did succeed in securing the appointment of native princes to the thrones of Wallachia and Moldavia. 195

The country was frequently occupied by foreign troops and made to pay tributes. During the Russian occupation Prince Kisseleff introduced the first Rumanian Constitution[2] which confirmed the absolute power of the *boiars* over the peasants, provided some administrative reforms and laid down that the *hospodars* had to be approved by both Russia and Turkey.

REVOLT AND UNIFICATION. The year 1848 saw the rising tide of revolution sweeping all over Europe. Soon after the outbreak of the revolution in Paris, there was a rising in Rumania which achieved some initial success. Led by intellectuals and middle-class landowners, the rebels voiced demands for social and political reforms and, for the first time, for the union of all Rumanians, including those of Transylvania, in one independent State.

In Transylvania the Rumanian revolutionaries ended by playing into the hands of reaction. Owing to the great national antagonism against the Hungarians and the strong anti-Rumanian attitude of the latter, the Transylvanian Rumanians supported

[1] The Greek war of liberation, too, began in Rumania with the rising of Alexander Ypsilanti who hoped to gain Rumanian support.

[2] The Règlement Organique.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

175 the Austro-Russian campaign against the Hungarian revolution, as did the Croats farther west. They hoped that this would bring them Austrian support and national emancipation. But the defeat of the Hungarian revolution also crushed all chances of realizing the national aspirations of the Transylvanian Rumanians and widened yet further the gulf between the two peoples. In Wallachia and Moldavia the revolt was put down jointly by the Turks and the Russians. The year 1848 brought the clearest proof that the rival imperial powers, however violently opposed to each other, were firmly united in keeping their subject peoples in their place.

But repression only served to strengthen the national liberation movement. In 1856, after the Crimean War, which began with the Russian invasion of Moldavia and Wallachia, the unification of the two principalities assumed the character of an international problem, which was complicated by the conflicting interests of the Powers and was finally solved with the help of the greatly increased French influence in favour of Rumania. The Treaty of Paris in that year restored Southern Bessarabia to Moldavia.[1]

In 1857 Moldavia and Wallachia elected the same *hospodar*, John Cuza, who, in 1861, secured the recognition of the union of the two principalities by all the major countries. From the very outset grave social problems confronted the new State, legacies of centuries of foreign occupation and misrule. The most urgent task was that of land reform, naturally opposed very violently by the *boiars*. By staging a *coup d'état* Cuza assumed dictatorial powers, intro-

[1] For changes of frontiers in 1878 see p. 56.

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

duced a radical land reform and legislation for the 175
provision of general public instruction. Cuza's reforms were only partly put into practice when a palace revolution, engineered by some of the *boiars*, and by army officers, deposed him and forced him into exile.

CAROL I.[1] The unificaiton of the two principalities was now achieved. It had been accomplished from above, by the same class, greatly strengthened by Rumanized Greeks and others, who for the past centuries had served foreign rulers and exploited the peasantry. It was based on the very real and strong desire of the whole people to live in a State of its own, but the achievement of this aim was completed as a result of international diplomacy and intrigues at home, not by a genuine national revolution.

The rule of Carol I was the period of the consolidation of the new State. He introduced a constitution based on the Belgian model and after fighting the Russo-Turkish War on Russia's side was recognized by the Powers as the first King of Rumania.

During his reign there was considerable progress 175
in economic life assisted by great investments of 669
foreign capital which enriched many landowners, 565
a number of Rumanian capitalists and the corrupt bureaucracy, who together became organized in the Conservative and Liberal Parties: they ruled Rumania between them. In achieving nominal independence Rumania did not succeed in ridding itself of the old social system, resting on the pre-

[1] Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Prince of Rumania 1866, King 1881.
½ Ie: King Carol I (1881-1914) -- Analyst]

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

175 dominance of a small, wealthy and powerful land-
669 owning class. The situation led in 1907 to one of the
565 bloodiest peasant revolutions of modern times which was put down brutally by General Averescu. Significantly the peasant rising began with pogroms against the Jews who had become very unpopular as the agents of the landowners: it has often been found profitable in Rumania to divert discontent into anti-Semitic channels.

175 In 1913 Rumania joined in the Second Balkan War against Bulgaria and thereby gained the whole of the Dobrudja. During the period preceding the outbreak of the last Great War Rumania became an ally of the Central Powers through a secret Alliance made by King Carol I with Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1883. After the death of Carol and the accession of Ferdinand in 1914 the Rumanian Government remained neutral, until it entered the Great War on the side of the Allies on 27 August 1916.

GREATER RUMANIA. This decision was taken owing to the territorial gains which Russia and the Western Powers offered as an inducement and which were embodied in another Secret Treaty signed on 17 August, and also to the pro-French feeling of the ruling class. As a result, though swiftly defeated and overrun by the Germans and Bulgarians, Rumania was able, after the war, to satisfy her territorial claims against Hungary and Austria, and the weakness of Soviet Russia enabled her to annex Bessarabia. Thanks, therefore, to her Allies, Rumania emerged from the Peace Settlement doubled in area and in population.

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

Before closing this short historical sketch mention must be made of the very remarkable proclamation of King Ferdinand to the troops at the front to whom in April 1917 he promised: 'Land will be given to you.' It is often stated that this promise and the land reform which implemented it was a wise act of statesmanship. It can equally be held that social unrest and dissatisfaction, stimulated by the successful Russian Revolution, had grown to such a degree that it was found necessary to undertake this radical step. 175

Greater Rumania had achieved the unification of the great majority of all Rumanians in one State. But with it the enlarged Kingdom acquired numerous minorities and inherited many grave social problems. The damaging consequences of these are traced in the following chapters. 000

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p. 20

CHAPTER II

THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

/131/ The Kingdom of Greater Rumania which emerged
/161/ after the Peace Settlement of 1919 covered an area of about 118,000 square miles, which is more than Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and had a population of about 15,500,000. Greater Rumania comprised the Old Kingdom (Wallachia, Moldavia and the Northern Dobrudja) and the New Territories, namely the Eastern Banat, the Crisana, Maramures, Transylvania, the Bukovina, Bessarabia and the Southern Dobrudja.[1] In relation to the position before 1914 both the territory and population of Rumania had been doubled. Still more important, the Kingdom was transformed from a national State into a multi-national State.[2]

/133/ The chief geographical features of Greater Rumania were the Carpathian Mountains, which sur-

[1] The Southern Dobrudja was Bulgarian up to the end of the Second Balkan War when it was ceded to Rumania; it was returned to Bulgaria by the Central Powers during the Great War, re-ceded to Rumania in 1919 and ceded again to Bulgaria in 1940.

/162/ [2] The population of the Old Kingdom in 1915 was about 7,625,000. The population of Greater Rumania in 1920 was 15,541,000 and had risen by 1940 to over 20,000,000 (an average yearly increase of about 233,000). The most numerous of the minorities were the Hungarians and Szekelys of Transylvania and the western provinces; the Jews, living all over Rumania; the Germans, living in the Banat, Transylvania and Bessarabia; Ukrainians and Russians in the Bukovina and Bessarabia; Bulgarians in the Dobrudja, Bessarabia and the Banat; Turks, Tatars, Gypsies, Serbs, Poles, Armenians, Greeks, etc.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

round the highland of Transylvania in the north, /33
east and south; the rolling plains of Wallachia; the Danube, which still is the southern frontier and main line of communication; and the slopes and steppes of Moldavia and Bessarabia.

The massive Carpathians are formed by two mountain ranges: the Eastern Carpathians which, rising west of the Pruth, extend southwards to the region of Brasov; and the Southern Carpathians, with high peaks of over 7,500 ft., which stretch westward and then turn to the south, where they reach the Danube. South of the great bend, formed by the two chains of mountains, lies the famous oil district of Campina and Ploesti, one of the chief economic assets of Rumania. The beautiful southern and eastern slopes of the Carpathians flatten out into the fertile plains of Wallachia and Moldavia, the latter merging in the east with the Bessarabian plateau, and in the north with the valleys and forests of the Bukovina. The Dobrudja, lying east of the Danube, as it turns northward, adds considerably to Rumania's share of the Black Sea coast. North and west of Transylvania lie the mountainous province of Maramures and the lowlands of the Crisana, which, geographically, belong to the Hungarian plain. The south-western tip of Greater Rumania was formed by the Banat, partitioned after the Great War between Yugoslavia and Rumania.

In Wallachia and Moldavia there is much which /33
is purely Balkan. There are the small villages with 361
muddy streets and little one-storied cottages of sun-dried brick, painted white and blue, some with wooden gables gaily decorated. On the great, rolling

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

133 plains an endless sea of ripening wheat and maize
361 dips and rises in the summer breeze.

In the Carpathian valleys and in Transylvania dark forests alternate with fertile, gently rising slopes, irrigated by swift rivers which descend from the high mountains. Old castles and mansions of Hungarian nobles still guard the highways which pass through Rumanian, Hungarian and German villages and the small 'Saxon' towns, some of which have still preserved the atmosphere of mediaeval German townships.

In the Bukovina the civilizing influence of the Austrians is still visible. This small province, with its factories and prosperous farms, is one of the crossroads where east and west meet. In Bessarabia Russian and Ukrainian influences are very strong. The churches and cottages, the peasants' carts and dresses recall the Ukraine east of the Dniester. The Dobrudja, with its undulating uplands and its long, sandy Black Sea shore, offers good grazing for many great flocks of sheep which are driven there in the autumn to escape from the icy winter in the Carpathians. The province is only sparsely populated and has a definitely Balkan character. Fezzes and turbans are still common in the streets of its little towns. The plains west of Transylvania differ little in their aspect from the great Hungarian plains, but here too there is a great diversity of peoples and cultures, all adding to the colourful and often confusing picture of Rumania as it was between the two wars.

162 THE POPULATION. The acquisition of the New Territories after the Great War brought many non-

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

Rumanians under Rumanian rule. Although the great majority of the population was made up of Rumanians, about one-quarter was formed by minorities consisting of more than a dozen nationalities. The majority of the people lived on the land, only one-sixth in towns. Ethnically, the population of Rumania consisted approximately of Rumanians 73%; Hungarians over 8%; Slavs nearly 7%; Jews 5%; Germans over 4%; others 3%. About 82% of the people were engaged in agriculture and forestry. 162

The different nationalities living in Greater Rumania have in many cases preserved all the characteristics of their original race and land; others have absorbed the historical and cultural influences to which Rumania has been subject at various times. Both groups—and they are by no means sharply distinct from each other—have been transformed in the process of history and have influenced their neighbours and the life of the country as a whole. 177

THE RUMANIAN PEASANTS. The Rumanians are a simple and hardy people of peasants, used to oppression and poverty. Throughout centuries the Rumanian peasant was a serf, working all his life to satisfy the *boiar*, the tax-collector or the foreign prince. There have been only very short periods of Rumania's history when the peasant could reap and keep the hard-earned fruits of his labour. To-day, too, his fate follows the familiar pattern, only the present system of exploitation is much more efficient. It is all the more astonishing, therefore, that this people has preserved its optimism and a certain 565

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

565 ease of behaviour, a keen sense for music and popular art and a dogged belief in its capacity to achieve progress.

The life of the Rumanian peasant is simple and [262] hard. His main nourishment consists of *Mamaliga*, a dish prepared of maize-flour, similar to the Italian *Polenta*. This forms his staple diet; meat and other [272] luxuries are very rare indeed. The national drink is *Tuica* (brewed from plum juice). The Rumanian [291] men are dressed in white trousers and a long white tunic fastened by a belt, a short jacket, and a fur cap or hat. Footwear, if any, consists of simple leather sandals strapped to the legs, called *Opinci*, similar to those of the Greek and Yugoslav peasants. In the comparatively rich regions short boots are worn. Gay embroidery, whose colouring and pattern vary according to districts, adorns all garments, especially the women's shirts and headcloths, and the aprons [342] which they wear fore and aft. In contrast to their gay dress the houses of the Rumanian peasants are usually small, badly built cottages of sun-dried brick and straw, whitewashed and occasionally [346] decorated with woodwork. The churches too are built in a similar fashion except in the mountain districts where stone and wood are used.

795 **RELIGION.** Most Rumanians belong to the Orthodox Church, but many Transylvanian Rumanians are Uniates, that is, Catholics of the Byzantine Rite. They form a link between the Latin and Orthodox 659 Churches. The Rumanian Orthodox Church is strongly national. The Uniate Church was used in the past by the Hungarian rulers of Transylvania as a means of assimilating the Rumanians in the Hun-

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

garian Kingdom, as by the Habsburgs for their purposes; but it has a very distinctive vitality of its own. 659

The Patriarch of the Rumanian Orthodox Church is a person of great importance in the State and was one of the Council of Regency during the present king's minority. He, the Metropolitans, the Bishops of the Orthodox Church and those of the Rumanian Uniate Church were Senators for life: so were the heads of other Churches having over 200,000 members.[1] 659 793

The village priest, *Popa*, plays a leading part in the life of the Orthodox community. There is great veneration of certain saints—especially the Blessed Virgin and the Saint of the parish—and their ikons. Many of the strongest traditions of the country people are those connected with the seasons, and the Church has christianized many of the old pagan customs. The funeral rites, in particular, only part of which are conducted by the priest, are full of strange symbolism. There is a widespread belief in vampires and other evil spirits and the need of exorcizing them. But though religious practice hovers upon the borderline between faith and superstition, the standard of personal morality among the peasantry is on the whole a high one; the family counts for a great deal and the honour of women is closely guarded. 771 [764]

[1] According to the 1938 census, 13,200,000 belonged to the Orthodox Church (Rumanians, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgars and other Slavs); 2,628,813 were Roman Catholics (Latin Rite, mostly Magyars and Germans, 1,200,000; Greek Rite 1,426,313); 1,195,000 belonged to Protestant Churches (including 400,000 German Lutherans); 1,500,000 were Jews and 260,000 Mohammedans. There were 140,000 'others'. 162

6

12: Korinos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

793 The poor clergy are very active in politics and
661 public affairs generally. Their influence, and even more that of the bishops, has not infrequently been
[212] abused to further private interests.[1] The majority of the Rumanians are only semi-literate and depend for their information and guidance on the priests.
871 Education has been the weak point of almost all the Rumanian governments. But those Rumanians whose parents have been able to give them a good education have proved that this highly intelligent and gifted people can achieve success in all fields of science and the arts.

563 **THE HUNGARIANS AND THE SZEKELYS.** The Hungarians and Szekelys, most of whom came under Rumanian rule after the Great War, live chiefly in Transylvania and the western provinces of Greater Rumania. The forefathers of the Szekelys were brought to these territories by the Hungarian kings and charged with the task of defending and securing the Kingdom's frontiers. The Hungarian nobles and Szekelys were two of the 'Three Ruling Nations' of Transylvania.[2] They were supported and encouraged by their kin in Hungary proper, given many privileges in the economic, political and cultural spheres. Thanks to all this they were able

[1] One blatant example of this occurred about ten years ago when a shepherd, who claimed to have 'visions' and prophetic power was built up into a holy figure. The simple peasants flocked to see and hear him, bringing many gifts. The State railways organized special travel facilities and this enriched many officials and members of the clergy.

[2] The three 'united' or 'recognized nations' of Transylvania were the Hungarian nobility, the Szekelys and the Saxons.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

to develop very favourably. Their villages and towns are well built and neat, their fields well worked. Although by no means rich, these Magyars are generally better off than their Rumanian neighbours. Before the Great War the Magyars of these regions belonged to the dominant section of the population whose leaders controlled all spheres of life. During this period, especially since the eighteen-sixties, the Hungarian Government tried to Magyarize the Rumanians under its rule, using extensive political and economic pressure. This naturally led to great animosity, as the Rumanians resisted these attempts. The reaction came when the position was reversed and the Rumanians became the dominant section of the population. The Rumanian Government's policy towards minorities was anything but democratic; but the Hungarian domination of the Transylvanian Rumanians had even been more effective. Hungarian irredentist movements within Greater Rumania and the revisionist claims of Hungary naturally contributed to a considerable deterioration of relations between the two nations.

563

THE SLAVS. The main Slav races inhabiting Greater Rumania were the Ukrainians, the Russians and the Bulgarians. The Ukrainians live chiefly in Bessarabia and in the Bukovina where, under Austrian rule, they were on the whole a favoured minority. They and the Russians in these provinces have all the characteristics of their brethren in Poland and the U.S.S.R. Under Rumanian domination they belonged to the worst treated minorities of Europe. The Bulgarians, living in Southern Bessarabia, in the Dobrudja and in the Banat, were in a very

3

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1914

ED¹ Rumania ED1

563 similar position. Only a small number of Bulgarians in the Banat, famous as first-class market-gardeners and fruit-growers, were comparatively well off. There live in Wallachia and in the Banat a number of Serbs, settled there as frontier guards by the Austrian emperors. Some live in villages of their own, some together with German, Rumanian or Hungarian communities. They have strong ties with Yugoslavia, and have achieved comparative prosperity.

THE JEWS. The Jews, who are to be found in all Rumanian provinces and have big communities in Bessarabia and in the Bukovina, have always been a persecuted and oppressed minority. The brand of anti-Semitism encouraged by almost all Rumanian governments resembles that of Tsarist Russia. [661] Whenever something went wrong in politics or economics the Jews were blamed for it and pogroms were organized, sometimes surpassing in violence those of the Tsarist regime. This traditional anti-Semitism has its roots in the period when wealthy Rumanian absentee landlords let their estates to Jewish agents for management and tax-collection. This was a convenient means of laying the blame for exploitation at the door of the Jews, whilst the *boiars* pocketed the taxes and rents.[1] Jewish influence in Rumanian finance and trade has been very great, as was their share in introducing modern industries into the country. Many Jewish families, especially in Moldavia and Wallachia, can trace their association with Rumania back to the early Phanariots. Others have lived for many years in the

[1] Some of the Jewish managers of estates deserved all that came to them; but the resentment which they caused was frequently visited quite unjustly upon obscure Jews who did no kind of harm to their Gentile neighbours.

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

Bukovina, in Bessarabia and in Transylvania. The majority has, however, immigrated during the last century. Restrictions on their personal freedom, an almost complete denial of political rights, and organized and government-sponsored pogroms are familiar devices which have been used by most Rumanian regimes. These measures are supported by the ruling circles and certain intellectuals in order to divert the attention of the people from the real causes and the real culprits whenever the country passes through a crisis.

563

THE GERMANS. The first German colonists who came to Rumania were brought to Transylvania in the twelfth century and given substantial privileges, including the right of self-government. The 'Saxons' constituted the third of the three privileged and ruling 'nations' of Transylvania. They were originally Rhinelanders who were later converted to Protestantism. After the Turkish wars of the eighteenth century Catholic German peasants from Bavaria and the Lorraine were settled by the Empress Maria Theresa in Western Transylvania and in the Banat. The influence of these Germans, as well as of those brought by Tsarist Russia to Bessarabia, has been very strong indeed. German workers have been foremost in many Rumanian industries, German peasants have taught their neighbours improved methods of agriculture and German traders have done a great deal to modernize Rumanian commerce. But all these achievements of the German colonists have been offset by their treacherous behaviour; the call of 'German blood' appealed to them, and they became one of the most powerful of all Nazi Fifth Columns.

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p 30

CHAPTER III

THE PROVINCES

000 *In this chapter each of the provinces of Greater Rumania is described separately and certain practical information is given about each. This will enable the reader, should he visit any province, to know the essential facts about it: it will also make it easier for the student of war to judge the effects of military operations upon each of the several parts of Rumania. The general reader may, however, prefer to complete the story of Rumania as a whole by proceeding to Chapter* IV *and continuing to the end of the book, before reverting to this more detailed chapter.*

THE REGAT

631 Greater Rumania was composed of ten historical and geographical units, which in their turn formed two groups: the Old Kingdom or the 'Regat', representing the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia and the province of Dobrudja; and the New Territories, acquired after the Great War and partly lost in 1940. Of the two groups the New Territories contained both a greater area and a more numerous population than the Regat.[1] Historically and economically the most important and the greatest in area of all the territories of the Old

131 161 [1] The area of the New Territories covered 157,000 square kilometres (about 62,800 square miles), that is, 53 % of the total. The population of the New Territories in 1939 was 9,425,000 compared with just over 9,000,000 of the Old Kingdom. However, over half of all arable land was situated in the Regat.

'2: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[oltenia]

Kingdom is Wallachia, which is formed by Oltenia 631
and Muntenia.

OLTENIA. Oltenia is the western part of the prin- /31
cipality of Wallachia. Its boundaries are, in the west /33
and north the Carpathians, in the east the River Olt, /34
and in the south the Danube. The province covers /61
an area of about 9,640 square miles and has a population of about 1,900,000. The soil of the sub-Carpathian hills consists of sand and clay and gravel and is well watered by numerous rivulets. Here are some densely populated valleys, bordered by rich forests and grazing grounds. Farther south and extending to the Danube lies the fertile plain composed of the rich 'yellow earth'. Its character is similar to that of the lowlands of Muntenia, but it lies on a higher level and also has a higher rainfall.

The richest district of this fertile province is the 311
judet[1] of Dolj in the south-western corner of Oltenia. From here, and the similarly fertile *judets* of Mehedinti and Romanati, also on the northern bank of the Danube, high-quality maize and wheat have been exported for many years. From the hilly country farther north fruit is the chief export. In the mountainous districts forestry provides the main occupation for the local inhabitants. There is much sheep-breeding, for the grassy slopes provide good grazing.

Apart from the Danube the two most important /33
rivers of Oltenia are the Jiu and the Olt; the latter rises in Transylvania and enters Oltenia through the Red Tower Pass. Oltenia is not rich in mineral /35
resources. There is, however, oil at Govora, west of

[1] Administrative unit.

135 the Olt, copper near Baia de Arama and salt near Ocnele Mari, north of Govora. The peasant population, in spite of the great agricultural wealth of the province, is extremely poor. The people live in small villages near the rivers. The houses are more often than not almost subterranean mud-huts. Agricultural implements are very primitive. The wooden plough is still widely used.

511 361

175 Oltenia was the first district of Rumania which was colonized by the Romans. It formed the spearhead, and later the base, for the Roman penetration of Dacia. Among the most interesting relics of Roman times found in Oltenia are the ruins of a bridge built by Trajan and the fort just outside Turnu-Severin. After the Roman withdrawal Oltenia shared the fortunes of Muntenia,[1] and in 1859 joined the Principality of Rumania.

361 The capital and chief industrial and commercial town of Oltenia is Craiova with a population of about 60,000. It is also the road and rail junction linking Bucarest with Oltenia and the western provinces. Turnu-Severin on the Danube is the important port guarding the famous 'Iron Gates'. Here the current of the Danube, passing through a narrow gorge is too strong and the water too shallow for shipping to [503] make headway upstream. A deep channel has therefore been blasted in the rock of the river bed and vessels are towed up it by locomotives on the railway alongside. Before the Great War Turnu-Severin was the frontier town between Rumania and Austria-Hungary. It has still preserved the character of a picturesque oriental marketing centre.

[1] Except that in 1718, after the Austrian occupation of Belgrade, Oltenia was temporarily under Austrian rule.

7

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Oltenia]

[Muntenia]

The Danubian ports of Calafat and Corabia handle 361
wheat exports and also have some valuable industries.

MUNTENIA. To the east of the River Olt extends 133
Muntenia, the other province of Wallachia. It [131]
covers an area of about 20,600 square miles and has
a population of about 4,500,000. The southern and [161]
eastern boundaries of the province are formed by the Danube, the northern frontier by the Carpathians. The land surface and climate of Muntenia are similar to those of Oltenia, but the hilly region south of the Carpathians is narrower. The fertile steppes, Baragan, Burnas, Gavan and Burdeas, are situated on the northern banks of the Danube which floods the adjoining districts and forms many lakes and marshes. The highest peaks of the Carpathians in Muntenia are the Negoi and the Moldovan, both over 7,500 ft. The most important of the many rivers descending from the high mountains are the Dambovita, Jalomita, Arges and Buzau, all of which eventually flow into the Danube. The endless maize [311]
and wheat fields of Muntenia are covered in summer with heavy crops and on the steppes great flocks of sheep find their food. In spite of very dry summers and icy winters like those of Russia this region is one of the richest of Rumania and the whole of Europe.

Muntenia differs from all Rumanian provinces in [135]
that, in addition to stock breeding, the raising of high-quality crops, fishery and forestry, it possesses a source of wealth which is not found in such abundance in any other part of Europe, the oil fields of Campina and Ploesti. There the hilly, wooded 361
countryside suddenly changes into a modern in-

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED¹ Rumania ED1

[Muntenia]

[Bucarest]

361 dustrial region with the tall wooden towers above the oil wells and the circular oil containers attached to the refineries. Campina and Ploesti are similar to the towns which sprang up during the American gold rushes. Great modern buildings stand next to primitive huts; fast American cars overtake peasant carts; rich speculators rub shoulders with shabby workers. These are towns in which extreme wealth and abject poverty live side by side.

BUCAREST. A similar, if somewhat more westernized, atmosphere reigns in Bucarest, the capital of Muntenia and of the whole of Rumania. Bucarest, which its more prosperous citizens like to call the 'Paris of the Balkans', has almost 1,000,000 inhabitants, and it has in many respects assumed the character of an American city. With ultra-modern buildings, wide thoroughfares bordered by shady alleys, and fast taxis the centre of Bucarest resembles the most modern of western cities. But the typical features of the Balkans have survived. Narrow little streets, quaint Orthodox churches, horse-carriages and hawkers are plentiful. Bucarest is the greatest industrial town of Rumania. Many factories of all [366] descriptions are situated here. All the great commercial houses and banks, both Rumanian and foreign, have their head offices in Bucarest. The capital's importance is enhanced by its key position as a centre of communications. The main trunk road from Transylvania passing through the Predeal Pass, Sinaia, Campina and Ploesti links up in Bucarest with the roads leading south to the Danube, east to the Danube and the Black Sea and west to Oltenia.

8

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bucarest]

[The Dobrudja]

Bucarest is also the chief railway centre of Rumania. 361

Giurgiu on the Danube, south of Bucarest and the terminus of one of the oil pipe-lines from Ploesti, is one of the main Rumanian wheat and oil ports. Another Danubian port, where great quantities of wheat are handled, is Braila with a population of about 70,000.

There are no natural barriers to communications in Muntenia. In the south the chief flow of traffic is carried by the Danube. Rail and road communications from Transylvania pass through the Predeal and a railway line leads over the Danube to the Dobrudja. 505 491 496

THE DOBRUDJA (Dobrogea[R]).[1] Up till 1878 the whole of the Dobrudja belonged to Bulgaria. Ever since, this province has been a bone of contention between Rumania and Bulgaria. The northern part of the Dobrudja was awarded to Rumania in 1878 to compensate her for the loss of Southern Bessarabia to Russia. The southern part of the province was ceded by Bulgaria after her defeat at the hands of her neighbours in the Second Balkan War in 1913. This region was returned to Bulgaria in 1940. 175

Geographically the Dobrudja is the north-eastern corner of the Balkan Peninsula. Its boundaries are in the north and west the Danube and in the east the Black Sea. There are three distinct regions: the delta of the Danube, the forests of Babadag, and farther south the steppe, which is the most fertile 131 133

[1] The letter R, H or G following a geographical term denotes a Rumanian, Hungarian or German name, respectively.

131 part of the Dobrudja. The delta of the Danube is
133 formed by the three arms Chilia, Sulina and St George. It includes an area of about 1,000 square miles, in which water and land, marshes, lakes and
[503] islands feed an almost tropical vegetation. The chief communications through the delta are provided by the Sulina canal and by causeways.

311 The steppes of the Southern Dobrudja yield good
135 crops of wheat and maize, and the pastures maintain great herds of sheep. Mineral resources are confined to some unworked coal deposits, valuable copper near Altantepe, and sulphur.

131 The Dobrudja is about 9,300 square miles in all:
161 of this some 2,960 square miles were returned to Bulgaria in 1940. The population of the province as a whole is about 850,000. Its main value to the contesting States lies in the Black Sea stretch of
504 coast. The port of Constanza, the greatest and most
361 important on the western shores of the Black Sea, has modern harbour works built at the beginning of this century and covering an area of 60 hectares. It was through Constanza that Rumanian exports used to pass to France and Great Britain. The docks of Constanza are about 30 ft. deep and can, therefore, be used by large, sea-going ships. The harbour facilities include storage buildings for wheat and oil-tanks with a capacity for over 200,000 cubic metres of fuel, which are fed by the pipe-lines coming from Ploesti. Oil can moreover be pumped straight from the pipe-lines simultaneously into four tankers. Another great advantage is that the port is
361 completely ice-free all the winter. Constanza is the administrative centre of the Dobrudja and also a well-known seaside resort. Rail communications

with the rest of Rumania are provided by the line 361
Constanza-Cernavoda-Bucarest.

MOLDAVIA (Moldova[R]). The second of the two 131
original Rumanian principalities is only half as big 161
as Wallachia and its population is about half. Moldavia covers an area of about 15,280 square miles, and is inhabited by about 2,500,000 Rumanians, Jews, Hungarians, Slavs and Germans.

Owing to its geographical position Moldavia was 175
more exposed to Polish, Russian and also Hungarian influence than Wallachia. After the death of the *voivode* Stephen the Great in 1504, the country became part of the Turkish dominions. From then onwards Moldavia shared the fate of Wallachia. Russian influence, however, naturally made itself felt in greater intensity in Moldavia. The independence of the principality was restored under John Cuza who eventually became the first ruler of the United Principalities.

The western boundaries of Moldavia are formed 131
by the Carpathians. In the south the province borders on Muntenia and in the north on the Bukovina, which originally was part of Moldavia. The eastern frontier is formed by the River Pruth. The 133
western part of Moldavia consists of the slopes of the Carpathian Mountains and the hill region below. Farther east the country flattens out into the plains which are bordered by the valley of the Pruth. The most fertile districts lie on the western bank of the Pruth and in the eastern corner of the province. The hills, which reach heights of 1,800 ft., are wooded. But there is much fertile soil which produces wheat and maize. There are also vineyards

7

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Moldavia]

133 and good pasture. The Sereth, which waters this region and runs parallel to the Pruth, flows into the Danube below Galati.

135 On the eastern slopes of the Carpathians there are large deposits of oil which have not yet been fully exploited. In the *comitat* Bacau, also in the mountain region of Moldavia, there are some valuable coal and salt mines. The salt mines of Targu-Ocna are the most important in the whole of Rumania.

311 438 The majority of the people of Moldavia are employed on the land. They grow wheat, maize and sugar-beet and tend the vines. Recently, successful experiments have been made with the growing of industrial crops. Timber felling provides another source of income, especially at Targu-Neamt, Piatra-Neamt and Focsani. There are important refineries at Moinesti and Solont, sugar factories at Roman and Ripiceni, and large textile works at Buhusi.

361 The capital and economic centre of Moldavia is the town of Jasi, on the western bank of the Pruth. Its population numbers about 80,000, more than half of them Jews. Jasi, lying on a number of vine-growing hills overlooking the valley of the Pruth, is an old commercial centre, which used to be visited in the middle ages by Genoese, Venetian and Greek [368] merchants. In Jasi, with its wide streets flanked by long rows of one-storied houses, there is the oldest Rumanian University, founded by John Cuza, a famous library containing over 160,000 books, and many other cultural institutions. Jasi has a number of iron and steel works, several clothing factories and is the chief marketing centre for cattle and wine in Moldavia.

2-

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

p. 39

102

Rumania: showing frontier changes 1919–20.

Rumania: showing frontier changes 1940.

361 Another important town, and the greatest Ru-
504 manian port on the Danube, is Galati with a population of about 75,000. Galati lies about a hundred miles from the Black Sea, but the harbour is so placed that sea-going ships can enter the port through the delta and anchor there all through the ice-free period. From Galati timber, wheat and maize from all over Rumania are sent abroad. Incoming cargoes of industrial goods are unloaded there.

[496] The only line leading directly to Transylvania goes over the Ghimes Pass. The traffic to Bessarabia is carried by four railway lines.

THE NEW TERRITORIES

131 The New Territories, acquired by Rumania after
175 the war of 1914–18 and partly ~~lost~~ since 1940, cover
[161] an area of 62,800 square miles and were inhabited in 1940 by about 10,500,000 people. The Banat, the Crisana, Maramures and Transylvania formed, up to 1918, parts of Hungary; the Bukovina belonged to Austria, and Bessarabia was taken from Russia. Many parts of the New Territories were agriculturally and industrially better developed than the Old Kingdom.

131 **THE BANAT.** The Rumanian part of the Banat covers
161 an area of about 7,400 square miles and has a population of 1,000,000. The province is bordered in the north by the River Mures[R] (Maros[H], Marosch[G]), in the west by the Yugoslav part of the Banat, in the south by the Danube, and in the east by the Car-
000 pathians. The north-western part of the province is

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Banat]

The north-western part of the province is 133
the continuation of the Hungarian plain and is very [135]
fertile. To the east and south there are high mountains with rich forests and iron and coal deposits. The mountains of the Banat are forced by the Danube in the area between Bazias and Orsova, cutting a deep narrow valley which, in the Kazan Pass, is only about a hundred yards wide. This is where the Roman emperor Trajan built the second of his bridges over the Lower Danube. This is also one of the most picturesque regions of the Banat and the whole of Rumania,

The Banat has been a strategic and economic 175
outpost of various States and empires. Throughout 635
the times of known history this province was a favourite region for colonization. Romans, Turks, Hungarians and Austrians sought to strengthen the frontiers of their dominions by settling the Banat with peoples on whose loyalty, military and economic abilities they could rely in case of war. In consequence peoples of all races were transplanted to and took root in the Banat. In Roman times the province was fortified in order to protect the settlers who were brought here from all over the empire against the Dacians of Transylvania. During the many Turkish wars the Banat was an important defensive position upon which the Hungarians based their strategy. For over a century and a half, from 1552 to 1718, the Banat was under Turkish rule and went through a period of decay.

Under the Austrian military administration, which lasted up to 1779, the Banat experienced great prosperity. German settlers from the Rhineland and French-speaking peasants from Lorraine were brought to the Banat by the Empress Maria

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Banat]

175 Theresa; in order to strengthen the non-Magyar
635 element the settlement of Serbs and Rumanians was also encouraged. Under the governorship of Count Mercy, a friend of the statesman and warrior Prince Eugene of Savoy, the communications of the Banat were greatly improved. Land was brought under cultivation, mining and other industries were developed and commerce given a new impetus. The chief purpose of this policy was the creation of a strong military outpost of the Austrian Empire. The military frontier region was put under a special administration. All men living in this region were exempt from taxes and dues, were given land of their own but had to perform military duties. In 1779 the Banat, with the exception of the frontier region, was incorporated into Hungary. But after the defeat of the Hungarian Revolution in 1849 the province was again administered by the Austrians and eventually returned to Hungary in 1860. After the Great War the eastern half of the Banat became Rumanian, the western part Yugoslav.

162 About 55% of the population are Rumanians. There is a German colony 225,000 strong. These 'Swabians of the Banat', including descendants of French-speaking Lorrainers who up to half a century ago had preserved all their national characteristics but have now become absorbed by their German neighbours, constitute a very strong economic and national force. They are prosperous farmers, craftsmen and industrial workers. The Hungarians, who form more than 10% of the population, have, up to a few years ago, been in the majority in most towns. There are in the Banat many Jews, Serbs and Bulgarians and also a number of Slovaks.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 194-

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Banat]

[The Crisana]

The high quality of the crops in this province, 241
amongst them wheat, maize, rye, oats, and the high 134
standard of animal breeding, have made the Banat known far beyond the borders of Rumania. The fertility of the soil is due partly to the 'black earth' which, in a greater or lesser degree, is a component of all the arable land. Apart from being an important agricultural region, the Banat possesses valuable industries, forests and minerals. Iron ore and coal 316
are mined in the area of Resita and Anina, where 327
there are great iron and steel works which produce 315
railway equipment and armaments. The Danubian port of Orsova, guarding the western entrance to the 'Iron Gates', also has an oil refinery.

The capital of the Banat is Timisoara[R] (Temes- 361
var[H]) on the Bega with a population of 100,000. In Roman times the fortress of Ripensia was situated here. In Hunyadi's time it was a centre of resistance against the Turks, only second in importance to Belgrade. To-day the town is a great rail and road junction with many factories, banks, commercial houses and cultural institutions. Lugoj, on the Timis, with a population of 20,000, and Caransebes, north of the Porta Orientalis which leads through the mountains of the Banat to the Danube, are marketing towns of some importance.

THE CRISANA AND MARAMURES. Geographically the 131
Crisana is the eastern borderland of the Hungarian [161]
plain. The province covers an area of about 8,400 square miles and has a population of just under 1,500,000. The Crisana lies between Transylvania in the east, the River Mures (Maros[H]) in the south; Hungary (as reduced by the Treaty of the Trianon) in the west and Czechoslovakia in the north.

7

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Crisana]

000 in the west and Czechoslovakia in the north. The
162 inhabitants of the Crisana are Rumanians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans and some Slavs. Taken as a whole the province contains a slight Rumanian majority, but there is in the immediate frontier region a fairly homogeneous Hungarian population, which forms a local majority.

133 The western part of the Crisana has the same
311 features as the lowlands of Hungary. The types of agriculture also closely resemble those of the rest of
135 the country on both banks of the Tisza[H] (Theiss[G]). There are wide, flat fields of maize and wheat interspersed with pastures, grazed by horses and longhorn cattle. To the east the country rises and forms a chain of hills which produce good fruit and wine. Beyond are the mountains of Bihor (Bihar[H]) which form the western wall of Transylvania. These mountains are rich in coal, gold, copper, bauxite, asphalt and marble. Consequently this region maintains numerous industrial enterprises. Apart from its mineral resources and good wheat and maize the Crisana is also well known for its horses, cattle, pigs and sheep.

361 The capital of the Crisana is Oradea-Mare
438 (Nagyvarad[H], Grosswardein[G]) in the valley of the Cris (Körös[H], Kreisch[G]). Its population of about 95,000 consists of Hungarians, Rumanians, Jews, Germans and others. Oradea is the junction for five railway lines and commands all the main communications leading from the Hungarian plain to Transylvania. The town is also the seat of many industries and the chief market for the agricultural produce of the province. Arad, on the northern bank of the Mures (Maros[H]), is inhabited by 65,000 people,

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Crisana]

[Maramures]

mostly Hungarians, and occupies a similarly important position. Here there are numerous factories, including mills, railway shops and locomotive works and textile factories. Satu-Mare (Szatmar[H]), with 60,000 inhabitants, is the largest town in the Northern Crisana. 361 438

After the Great War the Crisana, which was first occupied by the Hungarians in the tenth century and subsequently colonized by them, was awarded to Rumania. Under the Vienna Award of 1940 part of the Crisana was returned to Hungary, with a considerable Rumanian population. 175

By the same decision the province of Maramures (Marmaros[H]) (about 1,350 square miles), inhabited by over 150,000 people, acquired by Rumania in 1918, was returned to Hungary. Geographically Maramures is a continuation of the Czechoslovak province of Ruthenia. It is enclosed on all sides by chains of mountains covered with thick forests whose great density is rare even in the Carpathians, which are famous for their wealth of trees. It is not easily accessible except by a solitary railway line which comes from Transylvania and leads to Ruthenia. The small population consists of Ruthenians, Rumanians, Jews, Slovaks and Hungarians and is typical of the medley of races to be found in quite small areas of this part of Europe. Owing to the mountainous nature of the country there is little agriculture. The chief occupation of the inhabitants is the felling of trees. The most valuable asset of the province is its mineral wealth. There is oil, gold, copper, salt and coal. The capital and only major town of Maramures is Sighet (Marmaros-Sziget[H]) with a large Jewish population. Sighet, a town of 133 162 [496] 313 135 361

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1
[Maramures]
[Transylvania]

361 about 20,000 people, lies on the upper reaches of the Tisza; it is the centre from which beautifully hand-woven carpets are exported.

175 **TRANSYLVANIA** (Ardeal[R], Erdely[H], Siebenbuergen[G]). The citadel of Transylvania, guarded by the
635 high walls of the Carpathians and overlooking the lowlands of the Danube, dominated the map of Greater Rumania during the interval between the two World Wars. The union of Transylvania was the fulfilment of an aspiration which Rumanians had for long wished to realize. But the incorporation of this principality into Greater Rumania brought with it a number of difficult problems which even to-day are far from being solved.

When the Magyars invaded Dacia in the tenth century there was already, according to the Rumanian contention, a substantial Rumanian population in Transylvania which was subjugated by them. Subsequent colonization with Hungarian and German settlers weakened the position of the Rumanians and led many of them to emigrate into the lowlands, south and east of the Carpathians. Transylvania became an autonomous principality within Hungary and was able to maintain its semi-independence even when the Turks advanced to the gates of Vienna. Many Transylvanian princes played a leading part in the long struggle against the Turks, notably those of the Bethlen family. Transylvania under its native Hungarian rulers succeeded in maintaining itself for a long time against both the Austrians and the Turks. But while the consequences of the struggle for independence invariably had to be borne by the majority of the population, economic and

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
EL1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

political benefits were reaped only by the privileged 175
'nations'—the Hungarian nobles, the Szekelys and 635
the 'Saxons'.

The majority of the Transylvanian Hungarians did not belong to the three ruling 'nations', but, as the nobles depended on their support, they were naturally better off than the Rumanians who were regarded and treated as serfs. The Szekelys, originally free peasants, lost many of their liberties. With the progress of feudal development their position deteriorated steadily and their customs and way of life became similar to those of the mass of non-privileged Hungarians. The 'Saxons', German settlers brought to Transylvania by the Hungarian kings to strengthen the military position of the province, were the third of the ruling 'nations'; they were able to maintain their privileges up to about a hundred years ago. While they often opposed the encroachments upon their rights by the Magyars, the Saxons nevertheless were united with their opponents when it was necessary to prevent the Rumanian majority from obtaining even the most elementary political rights.

From 1526 to 1699 Transylvania was under Turkish suzerainty, but in the latter year, by the Peace of Karlowitz, it was restored to Hungary. From that time until 1848 Transylvania was part of the Hungarian Kingdom. From 1849 till 1860 the principality was administered as one of the lands of the Austrian Crown, but was eventually reunited to Hungary in 1867. By the secret Treaty of 17 August 1917 the Rumanian Government was promised Transylvania and the land as far west as the Tisza by the Allied Powers, as the price of entering the

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

175 war on their side. In December 1918, after the
635 collapse of the Dual Monarchy, an assembly of delegates of the Transylvanian Rumanians, meeting in Alba Julia, voted for union with the Rumanian Kingdom, and the province was occupied by Rumanian troops. The incorporation of Transylvania was later recognized and endorsed in the Peace Treaties.

563 *Rumanians.* The Rumanians of Transylvania, who form approximately 60% of the principality's population, are in many respects more advanced than their countrymen in Moldavia and Wallachia. The intensive State policy of Magyarization pursued by Budapest in the nineteenth century led to the strengthening of Rumanian national consciousness. The struggle for economic and political rights, however, never led to anything more than the granting of concessions on paper. From the Rumanian point of view the aims of the Transylvanian Rumanians were fulfilled only with the union of their country with the rest of Rumania in 1918. But, even under the Rumanian regime, the Rumanians of Transylvania were unable to gain economically in twenty years what they were prevented from obtaining during several centuries. Most of them were peasants; some were industrial workers; some became civil servants.

Magyars and Szekelys. The 500,000 Szekelys, inhabiting the eastern part of Transylvania, have still preserved some characteristics which make them distinct from the Hungarians, but politically and economically their position is now very similar to that of the Hungarian population which, in

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1
[Transylvania]

Transylvania is about 500,000[1] strong. Most Hungarians, however, live in the larger villages and in the towns, which during the last century have been Magyarized to a considerable extent. After 1918 the position of the Magyars of Transylvania, compared with that before the Great War, was an unhappy one. There was in practice a discrimination against them and their institutions, which was not unnatural in view of what the Rumanians had suffered at the hands of the Hungarian Government. But the lack of a positive and constructive policy towards the Hungarian minority was just as much due to the revisionist clamour in Hungary and the separatist troubles caused by certain sections of the Hungarian minority, as to the attitude of successive Rumanian governments. 563

Germans. The German minority in Transylvania, about 250,000 strong, consists of two distinct groups: the 'Saxons', settled here in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and later converted to Protestantism; and the 'Aelpler', Catholics from Southern Germany, who immigrated in the eighteenth century. For centuries, and especially when Transylvania was under Austrian rule, these Germans possessed far-reaching privileges which, coupled with their skill and high cultural standard, enabled them to build up a very strong economic position. From the second half of the last century onwards, however, they were subject to a process of Magyarization and deprived of many of their privi-

[1] The total number of people of Hungarian race, including Szekelys, according to the census of 1930, was 1,426,178. By the natural rate of increase they would now number about 1,500,000.

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

563 leges. In 1919 they accepted the union of Transylvania with the Old Kingdom. In the inter-war period the Germans in Rumania enjoyed a far better treatment than any other minority, and in Transylvania they were by far the most prosperous community. Nevertheless, the pan-German policy of National-Socialism found many supporters in their ranks.

131 648 [161] *Vienna Award.* Before the Vienna Award of 1940 Transylvania covered an area of 24,600 square miles and had a population of over 3,250,000, including 200,000 Jews. The decision of the German and Italian Foreign Ministers in Vienna split Transylvania in two, a measure never before carried out during the eventful history of the principality and certainly harmful and unjust to all the parties concerned. There is no doubt that this 'solution', which has only complicated the Transylvanian question and made its real solution more difficult, was made deliberately in order to make both Hungary and Rumania more dependent on Germany's support.

133 *Geography and Products.* The Transylvanian highlands are surrounded on three sides by the high mountain chains of the Carpathians. In the south-west the border is formed by the 'Western Mountains' (Muntii Apuseni), and in the north-west by the hills which eventually merge into the Hungarian plain. The Rivers Mures, Somes and Tarnava divide the highland in three distinct parts, the steppe, the hills and the forests. Parallel with the outer ring of the Eastern Carpathians there runs a belt of volcanic mountains with many small valleys. In the south-east there is the fertile and hilly district of Trei-

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

Scaune (Haromszek[H]) which also possesses numerous industrial enterprises. Most of the rivers of Transylvania rise in the Eastern Carpathians and flow to the west and south. The Mures, flowing from east to west winds its way between the Carpathians and the 'Western Mountains' near Alba Julia (Gyulafehervar[H], Karlsburg[G]) and descends into the lowlands farther west. The Somes (Szamos[H]) reaches the plains north-west of the Transylvanian highland and eventually flows into the Tisza. Communications with Muntenia and Oltenia go over the mountain passes of Predeal, Bran and the 'Red Tower', with Moldavia over those of Buzau, Ghimes and Bicaz, and with the Bukovina over the Rodna Pass. 133

The climate of Transylvania is not as favourable for the raising of crops as that of Muntenia and the Banat. In the valleys, however, maize, wheat and rye are grown with some success. Stock-breeding is more important than agriculture. But Transylvania is very rich in mineral resources. Apart from coal, gold, copper, salt, bauxite and iron Transylvania possesses the greatest reserves of natural gas in the whole of Europe. The chemically pure methane which is used by many factories for power, as well as for cooking and lighting by many householders, could supply the whole of Transylvania for over a hundred years and make the consumption of coal unnecessary. 311 135

The capital of Transylvania is Cluj (Kolozsvar[H], Klausenburg[G]), with a population of over 105,000, consisting of Hungarians, Germans, Rumanians and Jews. The town is an important rail and road junction and the cultural centre of all the three 361

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

[The Bukovina]

361 peoples of Transylvania. Farther south, on the banks of the Mures, lies Alba Julia, with an old castle, a majestic Gothic church and a chapel in which King Ferdinand was crowned. Sibiu (Hermannstadt[G], Nagyszeben[H]), with a population of 46,000, half of which is German, is an ancient centre of the Transylvanian 'Saxons'. The town is entirely German in character and all the buildings, especially the churches and the market-place, are reminiscent of a little provincial borough in the Middle Ages. Two other places of historical interest are Heltau (Cisnadie[R]) and Michelsberg (Cisnadoara[R]), small German villages with peasant-fortresses built in the thirteenth century. The road to the east, along the foot of the South Carpathian wall, leads to Brasov (Brasso[H], Kronstadt[G]), the most important industrial and economic centre of Transylvania. Although the town has a population of only 60,000, there are numerous factories producing iron and steel, machine-tools, armaments, railway equipment, textiles, and other goods.

175 **THE BUKOVINA** (Buchenland[G]). The Bukovina
635 forms the northernmost tip of Greater Rumania. This province of dense forests, gentle hills and fertile pastures has had a long and varied history. In Roman times it was part of Dacia and was subsequently overrun by many barbarian tribes. Soon after the establishment of Moldavia, the Bukovina was conquered by the rulers of that principality and annexed by them. For some time both Moldavia and the Bukovina were governed from the Bukovinian town of Suceava. In the following centuries the Bukovina was first under Polish, then Turkish

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Bukovina]

rule. It was occupied by the Russians in 1769. In 1774 the province was given to Austria, under which it remained until 1918. On 23 October the Austrian governor handed over the Bukovina to the Ukrainian inhabitants of the province; but four days later an assembly of Rumanian Bukovinians declared for the union of the province with Rumania and asked the Rumanian government for military assistance. This was forthcoming on 11 November and added to Rumania a territory of about 4,100 square miles with a population of about 870,000 (1930). Of these over 38% were Ukrainians, 34% Rumanians and 21% Germans and German-speaking Jews. The Rumanian administration began by a vigorous policy of Rumanization. The Ukrainians, who under Austrian rule had been well treated, and the Jews, were the chief sufferers, but the Germans, too, were ousted from many of their positions.[1]

More than half of the Bukovina is covered with dense forests of beech;[2] one-fifth consists of pastures; less than a third is arable land. The province borders in the west on the Carpathians, in the south on Moldavia, in the east on Moldavia and Bessarabia and in the north on Poland. The western part of the Bukovina is formed by the slopes of the Carpathians, where manganese and iron ore are found, especially in the region of Jacobeni. To the east stretches the hilly country, covered with pastures, on which good livestock is raised, and fields of maize, wheat and tobacco. Mineral resources are confined to some small deposits of coal, gold and lead, but the industry of the province is well developed.

[1] The German University of Czernowitz was completely Rumanized soon after the military occupation.

[2] The German name of the province means 'Land of the Beeches'.

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Bukovina]

[Bessarabia]

000 small deposits of coal, gold and lead, but the industry of the province is well developed.

361 The capital of the Bukovina is Czernowitz (Cernauti[R]) with over 100,000 inhabitants. The town is situated on a high hill near the Pruth and is a great commercial centre. Here branches of the Austrian banks and some big Viennese businesses remained. The population of Czernowitz, like that of the rest of the province, is very mixed. Economically important as a junction of several trade-routes, Czernowitz has also become a great industrial town during the last fifty years.

648 In June 1940 the Northern Bukovina, including Czernowitz, altogether about 2,260 square miles, was ceded by Rumania to the U.S.S.R. Thereby over 550,000 people, mostly Ukrainians and many Jews, became Soviet citizens.

131 **BESSARABIA.** For over twenty years the province of
161 Bessarabia was the eastern frontier region of Greater Rumania. It covers an area of 17,760 square miles and has a population of 3,000,000.[1] Bessarabia is surrounded by natural frontiers: in the north and east by the River Dniester, in the south by the Black Sea and the Danube, and in the west by the Pruth.

133 The north of Bessarabia is formed by a highland about 1,000 ft. high, consisting of fertile arable land which belongs to the 'black-earth' region of the Ukraine. The central area is hilly country, divided

[1] To which were added 120,000 Polish and Ukrainian villagers transplanted from Eastern Poland by the Soviet authorities shortly before their retreat before the German attack in 1941.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

by the valleys through which flow the tributaries of /33
the Pruth and Dniester. In the south, beginning near Besarabeasca, extends the Budjak steppe which merges into the sandy soils, salt marshes and lagoons of the delta of the Danube and of the Black Sea coast. The climate of Bessarabia is the same as that /32
of the regions east of the Dniester. The summers are very hot and dry, the winters very cold with icy winds and great snowfalls. Nevertheless, crops 311
grow well in Bessarabia and 61 % of the whole area is arable land. The chief products are maize, wheat, tobacco and wine and lately also soya beans. There are few factories and the only source of income for the people, apart from agriculture, is the fishing industry in the south.

The capital of Bessarabia is Kishineff (Chisinau[R]) 361
with a population of over 200,000 (1935). Here are concentrated such industrial enterprises as the province possesses, the most important being flour mills, leather factories and other secondary industries connected with agriculture.

The first colonization of Bessarabia was carried 175
out by the Romans who succeeded in occupying this 635
territory only for a short time. During the great period of migration (seventh to tenth centuries), the province was invaded by a host of tribes. Bessarabia was first occupied by Rumanians in the early fourteenth century and incorporated in Moldavia in 1367. A century and a half later Southern Bessarabia fell to Turkey, but several merchant-colonies were still administered by Genoese and Venetian traders on the Danube delta and the Black Sea coast. In the following centuries Bessarabia was often a battleground for Russian and Turkish armies, who alter-

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1344
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

175
635

nated in occupying the province. In 1812 Tsarist Russia annexed the whole of Bessarabia. Three provinces in the south of Bessarabia were returned to Moldavia, which was still under Turkish suzerainty, in 1856; but they were again taken by Russia in 1878 and Rumania received the Dobrudja by way of compensation.

In 1917, after the October Revolution in Russia, an assembly of Bessarabians declared the province to be an autonomous part of the Federation of Socialist Republics and adopted the name of 'Moldavian Democratic Republic'. The Representative Council, however, composed of Rumanian and anti-Bolshevik delegates, frightened by the spread of revolution, appealed to the Rumanian Government for military assistance to deal with revolutionary groups in Bessarabia. This help was forthcoming on condition that the province would eventually join Rumania. As an initial step the 'Independent Moldavian Republic' was proclaimed on 24 January 1918. On 5 March General Averescu declared that the Rumanian troops would be withdrawn within two months. In the meantime his government was conducting peace negotiations with the Central Powers, which had occupied part of the Ukraine and were eager to stem the revolutionary tide. They intimated that they would favour the addition of Bessarabia to the Rumanian Kingdom as compensation for its losses to Austria-Hungary.[1]

[1] Part of Wallachia was to be ceded to the Dual Monarchy. The Treaty of Bucarest (May 1918) also provided for the demobilization of the Rumanian Army, except two divisions needed for the occupation of Bessarabia.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

On 8 April 1918 the Representative Council of 635
Bessarabia,[1] *Sfatul Tari*, by 86 votes to 3, 36 dele- 175
gates abstaining, decided to become an autonomous part of Rumania. This step was sanctioned by Germany when the Treaty of Bucarest was signed one month later. In November of the same year, 1918, after the Armistice, it was decided at a session of the Representative Council, attended by only 46 delegates, to declare for the unconditional union of Bessarabia with Rumania. The annexation of Bessarabia was not recognized by the Peace Conference at Paris; and although recognition was promised by the Conference of Ambassadors in 1920, this undertaking was never ratified by all the Powers.

During the following years Bessarabia was treated 635
as a conquered province. All district councils and 661
other organs of local government were abolished. 669
The country was ruled by prefects appointed by and responsible to the central government in Bucarest. The province was strongly garrisoned and lived in a continuous state of siege. All communications over the Dniester were destroyed and anybody caught attempting to cross the frontier was either imprisoned or shot. Between 1918 and 1924 there were a hundred and thirty-five uprisings in Bessarabia, which were suppressed by the military with the utmost violence. In the course of these revolts it is estimated that over thirty thousand Bessarabians were killed, many more executed or sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. The peasant revolt of 1924 in the region around the town of Tatar-Bunar was put down after heavy fighting and the burning of many villages.

[1] The Council was composed of 138 deputies of whom 103 were Rumanian, 13 Ukrainian, 7 Russian, 6 Jewish, 2 Bulgarian, 1 Pole and 1 Armenian.

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

000 down after heavy fighting and the burning of many villages.

635 563 [452] The political situation[1] in Bessarabia was partly the cause and partly the effect of economic conditions. Agricultural credit for those peasants who had received land was non-existent. Communications were neglected and allowed to fall into complete decay. There was only a small amount of trade, which was largely in the hands of the Jews. This encouraged the spread of anti-Semitic propaganda which was fostered by the Government. The Ukrainian and Russian population was deprived of all cultural rights. The German minority was the best treated, but even the Rumanians of Bessarabia were regarded by the central government with suspicion.

635 648 Following a demand by the Soviet government, which had never recognized the annexation of Bessarabia, Bessarabia was ceded by Rumania to the U.S.S.R. in June 1940. When Rumania joined Germany in the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina were again occupied by Rumanian troops.

[1] [i.e: the frequency of popular uprisings -- Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p 59

CHAPTER IV

ECONOMIC WEALTH OF THE COUNTRY

Greater Rumania was primarily an agricultural 433
country, but its industry held an important place 511
in the economy of South-Eastern Europe. With its fertile soil, great reserves of mineral resources and considerable water-power Rumania could have been one of the richest countries in Europe. But while the land was full of natural wealth the standard of living of the people remained a low one. Only a small part of Rumania's resources was exploited, and an even smaller part for the benefit of her inhabitants.

About three-fifths of the area of the Kingdom 311
were arable land and pastures, and over four-fifths 433
of her population were employed in agriculture, forestry and in the fishing industry. The unbalanced state of Rumania's economy in the period between the two wars is shown by the fact that in spite of the predominantly agricultural character of the country, Rumanian industry, employing only one-twentieth of the population, was responsible for half of the total production as expressed in value. Approximately two-thirds of all income from exports were also derived from industrial products, chiefly oil, of which Rumania is the foremost European exporter.

One million workers and employees, or one- 435
twentieth of the population, contributing one-half of the total yearly value of production: this is one very significant aspect of the economic struc-

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

435 ture of Greater Rumania. It illustrates the effects of low agricultural prices and high prices of finished goods upon the position of a predominantly peasant population, which cannot realize an adequate profit from the sale of its produce and is unable to buy manufactured goods. It is important to realize this, as it demonstrates one of the reasons for the inability of the peasants to acquire agricultural machinery and improve their methods of agricultural exploitation.

565 471 **THE LAND REFORMS.** By the beginning of the twentieth century the position of the Rumanian peasantry had reached a stage which could only be compared with that of Tsarist Russia before the abolition of serfdom. Over half of all the arable land was in the hands of a few thousand *boiars*. Most peasants were landless, some possessed small strips of land which were insufficient for the support of a family. Most peasants were still obliged to work for the landlords without pay, and in addition had to [427] pay taxes and other dues. In order to try and increase their income many peasants rented land from the big landowners. But as the landlord was usually the *boiar* for whom the peasant had to do forced labour and to whom he came in time of need for financial help, he soon found that he had often sold his labour power for years in advance. His indebtedness increased with surprising speed; neither his little strip of land nor, indeed, he himself was anything else than part of the *boiar's* property. The position of the peasantry grew even worse when absentee landlordism increased and great trusts managed the running of the big estates.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

This state of affairs led to the great and bloody peasant revolt of 1907 which was ruthlessly crushed by the Bratianu government with the help of troops commanded by General Averescu. Yet, even after this the rulers of Rumania were unwilling to carry out reforms which were already overdue. Only in 1917, when the position on the Rumanian front seemed completely hopeless and when the Russian Revolution found more and more adherents among the peasant soldiers, did the government of King Ferdinand decide to carry out a thorough land reform. Although this was the most far-reaching of any measures ever carried out in Rumania, it bore all the marks of a step adopted unwillingly, under the pressure of external events. Although the Bratianu government, composed of many big landowners, consented to carry out the land reform, it was violently opposed by many of the government's supporters. The reforms, as finally applied in the early nineteen-twenties in both the Old Kingdom and in the New Territories, differed considerably from the original plans of 1917. They did, however, bring about important changes. Whereas before the Great War half of all the arable land belonged to a few *boiars*, by 1930 about nine-tenths belonged to small holders and only one-tenth to big landowners.

In Bessarabia many of the big estates remained untouched; land was given to reliable farmers, Germans and Rumanian colonists, but not to the landless who needed it most. In Transylvania the land reform was used to strengthen the Rumanian as against the Magyar elements of the population. But many of the holdings remained too small to

8

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

565 provide their holders with a fair income, and a con-
471 siderable part of the rural population remained
423 landless. Worst of all, those peasants who did obtain land were given neither implements nor sufficient financial help which could have enabled them to make a decent living. Neither of the measures which are essential to the success of peasant proprietorship —State aid in money, machinery and technical advice; or the creation of large-scale co-operative [641] societies and banks—were carried out. Undoubtedly the extension of the franchise in 1923 to all men of 21 and the land reforms greatly strengthened the position of the peasantry in the State. But, actually, it was widespread discontent with the working of the agrarian reform that stimulated the organization of the National Peasant Party.

423 CROPS. The great devastation of Rumania during
241 the First World War and the effects of the land reform resulted in a great reduction of the country's agricultural production during the immediate post- [439] war period.[1] Whereas the Old Kingdom alone in 1913 had grown 2,200,000 tons of wheat, of which 1,150,000 tons were exported, and over 3,100,000 tons of maize, of which 1,000,000 tons were exported, the production figures for Greater Rumania in 1921 were for wheat 2,140,000 tons, and for maize 2,810,000 tons. This great decrease is all the more striking in view of the fact that the amount of arable

[1] In Transylvania and the neighbouring territories, taken from Hungary, some of the great *latifundias* had been well and scientifically worked with modern agricultural machinery. There were some conscientious landowners among the Magyar nobility as well as absentee landlords who neglected their peasantry.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

land in 1921 was about twice as much as in 1913. 433
No doubt the breaking up of the big estates con- 241
tributed to the spectacular fall in agricultural production. But it need not have done. It was no fault of the peasants that they could not obtain the implements, seeds and financial help which would have enabled them to work the land profitably. The big landowners who were compensated for their losses by State bonds, controlled the banks which granted agricultural loans at high rates of interest. They obtained interest on the State bonds they held. And all this had to be paid for by the peasant. The peasant, now nominal owner of a small strip of land, insufficient for the upkeep of his family, was burdened with the payment of taxes, dues and interest on his mortgaged property. He was, in fact, often worse off than if he had possessed no land at all. This crushing financial burden, more effective than the bondage of feudal times, led to a great migration of peasants to the towns. This resulted in many fields remaining unworked and an increase in the ranks of the unemployed.

The recovery in the production of crops was slow. By 1936 the wheat harvest rose to 3,500,000 tons, and that of maize to 5,610,000 tons. Exports, however, were still far below those of the Old Kingdom in 1913.[1] The higher yields were due to an increase of the area under seed and not to better working methods. The soil of Greater Rumania is extremely fertile, especially in the lowlands of the Danube, in Moldavia and in Bessarabia. But the implements used were, and still are, primitive. Wooden ploughs are still common. Manure was hardly used, the

[1] 1936: wheat 610,000 tons, maize 771,000 tons.

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

241 ploughing was very superficial. Apart from a few small regions the whole of Greater Rumania's agri-
433 culture was extensive and not intensive. That is, crops were harvested year after year without regard to the soil and without any attempt to preserve its fertility. This is one of the reasons for the fact that in spite of much higher soil fertility the average yield per acre in Greater Rumania was far below that in Great Britain.[1]

In addition to the growing of grains and potatoes, the production of industrial crops was begun in the nineteen-thirties and has since made considerable progress, especially that of oil-seeds, flax, cotton, soya beans and sugar-beet. The development of fodder production has made little progress, owing to a decrease in livestock.

231 LIVESTOCK. Rumanian livestock, especially horses,
433 were well known and eagerly bought during the last century. The country was famous for its hardy and fast geldings and exported many horses to Germany, Denmark and Austria-Hungary. From 1886 onwards, when Hungary closed her frontiers to the import of Rumanian livestock, there began a rapid

[1] Average yield in cwt. per acre in the year 1937–8:

	Rumania	Gt Britain	Germany	Greece
Wheat	9·8	16·0	18·0	8·2
Barley	5·1	13·2	17·0	9·0
Oats	5·2	16·3	26·0	7·9
Rye	8·2	13·3	13·3	7·9
Maize	7·5	—	—	10·1
Potatoes	43·0	121·0	152·0	68·0
Flax	3·1	12·0	5·0	—

(From the Statistical Records of the League of Nations.)

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

decline which during the Great War assumed very 231
serious proportions. Within a short period the Old 433
Kingdom lost more than half of its total livestock. These losses were only partly made good by the acquisition of the New Territories.

In 1921 Greater Rumania had about 1,700,000 horses of which more than half were in the New Territories. There are two main races, both much smaller and lighter and more short-lived than the heavy type of English cart-horse. The horse of the plains, similar to and often crossed with the Hungarian horse, is found in Muntenia and in the western provinces, the Russian horse in Bessarabia and in the Bukovina. The mountain horse is small and tough and is chiefly used for the carrying of loads.

Cattle breeding has been one of the weakest points of Rumanian agriculture for some time. Although Greater Rumania by the acquisition of territories from Hungary and Austria obtained some high-class cattle, there was on the whole a decline both in quality and in quantity.[1] The decline in quality is due to the widespread use of cows as draught-animals and to inbreeding. The import of good foreign stock has been on an insufficient scale to improve this position, although some regions in Transylvania and the Banat have been able to maintain their good stock. The decline in numbers is due to the increase of meat exports and the absence of any planned breeding policy. The consumption [262] of both milk and meat amongst the peasants is extremely low.

[1] 1921: 5,700,000; 1932: 4,400,000. It is safe to assume that this downward trend continued.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

231 For the majority of Rumania's peasants the most
433 valuable of all animals are his sheep, of which Greater Rumania possessed about 12,000,000. Both the wool and the meat of Rumanian sheep are, however, of a lower quality than those of Great Britain or New Zealand. Sheep's milk, and the cheese made from it, supplement the monotonous diet of the peasant.

[439] Of the 3,000,000 pigs in Greater Rumania most were kept in the New Territories and a large proportion of the country's pork production was exported. Apart from the Rumanian Mangalita, English Berkshires were bred in great numbers.

241 Considered as a whole the agriculture of Greater Rumania, favoured by good climatic conditions and great soil fertility, remained undeveloped owing to the general economic conditions. The peasantry did not possess the necessary implements, buildings or animals which could have secured profitable ex-
[452] ploitation of the soil. Financial help was difficult to obtain, and the loans that were granted were ruinous to the peasant, owing to the high rate of interest.
[453] Co-operatives were few. Some agricultural banks and associations confined to the German colonists in the Banat and in Transylvania were the only ones
[435] which succeeded. Agricultural prices were low and the peasant was often forced to sell his produce before the harvest to export trusts which dominated
[454] the market. The only assistance given by the government consisted in loans and seeds at reduced prices for the growing of certain crops, such as soya beans, for export in order to fulfil international trade
[439] agreements. During the last fifteen years Germany secured an ever greater influence upon Rumania's agriculture and took most of its exports.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

MINERAL RESOURCES. The great and varied wealth /35 of the subsoil of Greater Rumania has been ex- 316 ploited only to a small degree. Apart from gold and silver, which are found in rivers and mined in Transylvania, there are iron-ore deposits estimated at about 30,000,000 tons. The average yearly production, however, amounted to only about 100,000 tons. The important alloy, manganese, found in various parts of the country, copper, zinc, chromium and bauxite all contribute to the mineral wealth of Rumania.

Through the acquisition of the New Territories the coal deposits of Greater Rumania were greatly augmented. The total coal reserves, of which the most important are situated in the western provinces and in Transylvania, were estimated at 722,000,000 tons. The average yearly production, of which two-thirds were brown coal, amounted to between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 tons. A source of power which is not found in any other part of Europe, and which could transform and sustain Rumanian industry for many years, is the great subterranean natural gas reservoir in Transylvania which contains chemically pure methane.

Another source of energy of which only a small 376 fraction has yet been exploited is Rumania's potential water power, estimated at 1,500,000 horsepower, which equals the energy of all the coal, oil and natural gas resources of Rumania taken together.

OIL. The centre of the Rumanian oilfields is the 315 region of Campina and Ploesti which also has the biggest refineries for the production of petrol and aviation spirit. Oil is also found in Oltenia, Moldavia and Maramures. Crude oil was already known

3

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

315 in the sixteenth century when the peasants used it as lubricant and medicine and the *boiars* as fuel. In 1815 the British representative in Bucarest drew attention to the oil deposits of Muntenia, and in 1844 the first concession for their exploitation was granted by Prince Bibescu to two Russians. By 1857 the first refinery had been established in Ploesti and in the same year Bucarest became the first town whose streets were lit by oil-lamps. From that time the exploitation of Rumania's oil resources made rapid progress.

The yearly production rose from 50,000 tons in 1890 to 1,885,000 tons in 1913. The destruction of the oil wells by British engineers during the last war retarded the progress of the industry for many years. By the middle of the nineteen-twenties the pre-war record had been exceeded and production reached the record figure of over 8,500,000 tons in 1934. It decreased to about 6,250,000 tons in 1939. The estimate for 1943 was 5,000,000 tons. The export of oil and oil-products was one of the chief sources of the nation's income. The greatest quantity of oil was exported in 1936 (nearly 7,000,000 tons). The average figure was between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 per year.

315 471 Before the Great War a considerable part of Rumania's oil industry was financed and owned by German companies. After the Peace Settlement the position changed in favour of French, American and British interests. By 1938 nine-tenths of all Rumanian oil was controlled by the British 'Royal Dutch Shell' directly or through subsidiary companies. In 1936 the published net profits of the industry amounted to 57%. Half of the 200 million dollars of foreign investments in Rumania was

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

employed in the oil industry. The control of this 315
great source of energy by British and American 471
companies was challenged by Germany, which needed Rumania's oil for the prosecution of her imperialist aims. To-day Rumania is Germany's chief source of natural oil.

INDUSTRY AND TRADE. The industry of the Old 433
Kingdom was hardly developed when, with the annexation of the New Territories, Rumania acquired territories comparatively rich in industrial enterprises, especially the Banat, parts of Transylvania and the Bukovina. Thereby the industrial capacity of Greater Rumania was more than double that of the Old Kingdom. Production, however, was by no means doubled. Trade and industry improved in the years 1925–9 during which considerable capital-imports were effected. The great economic crisis of the next two years hit Rumania very hard and was finally surmounted only in 1936, when the figures for production exceeded those of 1929 by 30%.

The most important Rumanian enterprises were the food, chemical, textile and metallurgical industries. The textile industry increased its output, the number of workers employed as well as the value of its production; but most branches of Rumanian industry increased only the amount and the value of their production, reducing their wage bill and the number of workers partly through the introduction of machinery.

The heavy industry, producing armaments and 433
railway equipment, was controlled by several foreign 471
groups, amongst them Schneider-Creusot, Skoda and Vickers. German capital was invested in the

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

433 Resita works and in the Copsa-Mica concern. The
471 most important Rumanian group, representing both German and British interests, was that of Malaxa-Auschnitt. The centre of Rumania's heavy industry is the region around Brasov.

The chemical industry, drawing to some extent on the unexported surplus of agricultural produce, developed substantially, thanks especially to attempts to make Rumania independent of imports. This industry, too, was controlled to a great extent by foreign, chiefly German, interests.

433 The textile industry, although handicapped by old-fashioned machinery imported from Germany, was the most prosperous. Production and value of output increased, as did the number of employees, but wages decreased.

433 Rumania's total industrial production was
511 doubled in the years 1924–36, but this was not re-
435 flected by a corresponding improvement in trade or in the standard of living. The general index of wholesale prices fell by almost a third and that of agricultural produce by nearly half; the prices of manufactured goods decreased by only a little over one-sixth. By 1933 the value of exports and imports had fallen to about 25,600 million lei and was only one-third of that of all foreign trade in 1926. Real wages in the period from 1929 to 1939 fell by over one-fifth, while the cost of living in 1939 was indexed at 138 points in relation to 100 points in 1933.

652 By 1937 Rumania's national debt had reached 257 million pounds sterling of which only one-fifth was represented by internal loans. Interest on foreign loans in 1932 amounted to about one-quarter of the country's budget and in 1937 to about 16%.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p. 71

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL HISTORY, 1919–39

The crushing defeats which the Rumanians suffered 727
at the hands of the German and Bulgarian armies in 1917, and the provisions of the Treaty of Bucarest, had left the country in a state of utter helplessness and confusion. The only 'compensation' was the annexation of Bessarabia. But in the autumn of 1918, after the collapse of the German, Bulgarian and Austrian fronts in the Balkans and the advance of Allied troops, Rumania re-entered the war. The pro-German government was dismissed and the Francophile leader of the Liberal Party, I. Bratianu, became Prime Minister.

At about the same time the Austro-Hungarian 642
Empire began to disintegrate. Following the 727
example of other minorities, the Rumanians of Transylvania and Hungary formed a National Assembly which, at its session on 1 December 1918 at Alba Julia, voted for the union of Transylvania and the Banat with the Old Kingdom. Among the members of the Directive Council of Transylvania, under the presidency of the peasant leader Maniu, were many politicians who afterwards played a prominent part in Rumanian public life.

The retreat of the German army of occupation 727
from Rumania, which took with it everything it could lay hands on, and the collapse of Austria-Hungary opened a period of great confusion. The former subject-peoples of the Dual Monarchy asserted their national independence while the

3

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

727 socially oppressed sections of the population, stimulated by the Russian Revolution, rose in many regions. The reconstituted Rumanian Army embarked upon a campaign against the Communist government of Hungary and was supported by Allied commanders. An offensive launched in April 1919 led to the capture of Budapest by 4 August. The Hungarian capital was occupied by about 170,000 Rumanian troops. By helping to defeat the Hungarian Revolution they prepared the way for Admiral Horthy's counter-revolutionary régime which has survived to the present day. The Rumanian campaign against Hungary coincided with fierce repressive measures against revolutionary groups in Bessarabia, Moldavia, in the Bukovina, in Eastern Muntenia and in the Banat. Under the pretext of re-establishing peace and order the Rumanian government crushed all the revolutionary forces whose existence might have endangered it.

728 THE NEW STATE. The long drawn-out negotiations in Paris which were to shape the final form of the Peace Treaties found Rumania in a very unfavourable position. The forceful personality of I. Bratianu, who put forward excessive and unreasonable demands for the expansion of Rumania, and the excesses of the Rumanian troops in Hungary, who requisitioned and transferred great quantities of railway and other materials to the Old Kingdom, estranged many of Rumania's friends. In spite of that, and thanks to the intervention of Queen Marie, Rumania emerged as the greatest and most populous of all Balkan States.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

From the very beginning three factors influenced the new State. The territorial gains of Rumania put the country into the ranks of the 'satisfied' powers whose main aim was the preservation of the *status quo*. Moreover, the foreign policy of Rumania had to be based upon the support of Britain and France, who were interested in the strengthening of those States which had been created or enlarged as a result of Allied aid. Another decisive influence was the presence of great numbers of minorities within the borders of Greater Rumania. Apart from the internal problems involved, this was also a continuous source of trouble with at least two of the neighbouring States—Hungary and the Soviet Union. The third, and by no means least important, was the question of social reform and the unification of the administrative machinery. 728

FOREIGN POLICY.[1] All parties in the State agreed upon the foreign policy to be pursued. Support of French interests in South-Eastern Europe coincided with those of the ruling classes of Rumania. The defensive alliance with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia against the revisionist claims of Hungary, known as the 'Little Entente', was sponsored by France, concluded in 1920 and maintained up to September 1938 when Czechoslovakia was forced to make territorial concessions to Germany, Hungary and Poland. In 1921 Rumania concluded a defensive alliance with Poland directed against any westward advance of the Soviet Union and later joined the 'Balkan Entente', whose purpose it was to prevent Bulgaria from regaining territories taken from her. Rumania was throughout the ally of France. 648

[1] [Of the period from 1919 to 1939--Analyst]

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

563 177 **THE MINORITIES.** The presence of large numbers of non-Rumanians in the new State affected the fate of Rumania decisively. While the leaders of the Transylvanian Rumanians, who had themselves had a long experience of foreign rule, advocated a just and liberal policy, the politicians of the Old Kingdom[1] and especially the Right Wing, persisted in a policy of Rumanization and de-nationalization contrary to the Minority Treaties. In Bessarabia this policy was excused by stressing the danger of the spread of revolutionary movements which threatened the safety of the State, and was carried out by the military. In the territories acquired from Hungary the position of the dominant and dominated sections of the people had been reversed so suddenly and so decisively that the change necessarily had violent consequences. Moreover, here the question of the treatment of minorities was closely interlocked with that of administrative unification. The laws and regulations of the Old Kingdom and of the New Territories[2] had to be equalized. The majority of the civil servants in Transylvania were Hungarians and most of these were replaced by Rumanians from the Old Kingdom. Some of the old officials had to be retained, owing to the shortage of trained personnel, and the doubt about their loyalty to the new regime was exploited to strengthen the case for complete centralization.

[1] [Provinces of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Dobrudja--Analyst]
[2] [Territories acquired after World War I--Analyst]

665 565 **SOCIAL REFORM.** The problem of social reform was the most urgent and the most hotly contested of all. The Transylvanian National Party under the leadership of Maniu, and the Peasant Party of Mihalache,

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

who eventually joined forces and formed the National Peasant Party, pressed for the extension and enactment of the agricultural reforms promised in 1917. This was delayed owing to the pressure of the great landed interests who, after the disappearance of the pro-German Conservative Party, had found a new champion in the Liberals. The elections, however, brought a decisive defeat for the Liberals, and King Ferdinand had to entrust the formation of a new government to the victorious Peasant Block. In it were Dr Lupu, who in 1917 had opposed the plans for land reform on the ground that they were inadequate, Vaida-Voevod, a close collaborator of Maniu, and Mihalache, who as Minister of Agriculture proceeded to carry out the land reform.

General Averescu left this new administration within a few days in order to create a new party in opposition to the Peasant Block. Intrigues at court soon secured the fall of the government, which was succeeded by an administration headed by Averescu whose personality was a guarantee that nothing would be done to abrogate the real power of the privileged classes. At the very efficiently 'managed' subsequent elections the General secured 209 out of 369 parliamentary seats. It was obvious that he was dependent on the support of the Liberals and the bureaucracy who preferred, for the time being, not to step into the foreground. Averescu's Minister of Agriculture, Garoflid, was the spokesman of the big landowners and it was he who finally put the land reform into practice. The social structure of the country was not basically altered. Moreover, the transfer of land to the peasants now made it possible

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

665 to blame other factors for whatever might go wrong
565 as there was no *boiar*-class left. The invisible, but
662 much more effective, financial control, continued to assure the rule of the same classes who had governed the country before.

665 Soon the Liberal Party again took over the
648 government. I. Bratianu was the undisputed chief of his party and had the confidence of the king. His whole policy was directed towards the strengthening of the power of the interests he represented. This, combined with his hostility towards the Soviet Union and Hungary had serious consequences which, however, became apparent only several years after his death.

643 THE MONARCHY. King Ferdinand, who had been
665 crowned at Alba Julia in 1923, died in 1927. This caused a serious crisis, for two years earlier the Crown Prince Carol had been forced to abdicate in favour of his infant son Michael. After Ferdinand's death a Regency Council of three was appointed to act in the king's name until he came of age. The Regents were naturally strongly influenced by Bratianu, but, when he died in 1928, the leader of the National Peasant Party was entrusted with the formation of a new government. Maniu secured a great electoral victory and his tenure of office was expected to bring about far-reaching changes. The new administration set about solving the minority question and the serious economic problems resulting from the incomplete land reform which instead of bettering had often worsened the lot of the peasants. Unfortunately at that time the world crisis had reached its worst stage. Although his

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

government had the majority of the people behind it, Maniu was handicapped by sabotage on the part of the bureaucracy, the banks and the great industrialists. Moreover he found it very difficult to work with the Regency Council, especially in such a critical time, as very frequently it could not reach a unanimous decision.

All these circumstances seemed to make the restoration of Carol inevitable. Maniu therefore arranged for the return of Carol to Rumania, but made his accession to the throne conditional upon several undertakings, amongst which was a royal promise to respect the Constitution. Carol returned by plane on 8 June 1930 and was proclaimed King, his son Michael being unceremoniously relegated to the position of Crown Prince. Many high hopes were pinned on Carol whose youth and intelligence were held to be qualities which should make him a good ruler. But the head-strong young monarch, with his ideas of personal rule, soon disillusioned those who had enabled him to return. Before long Maniu resigned and the first period of Carol's personal regime began.

THE PEOPLE. During all these years the people of Rumania had hoped for an improvement of their position. After the first few years of adjustment to the changes consequent upon the World War, it had become apparent that all misfortunes could not be blamed upon the war. The Agrarian Reform which was to have cured all ills had turned out to be a very questionable blessing. The recovery of industry which had a promising start in the middle twenties, when considerable amounts of foreign

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

511 capital had been imported, had come to an abrupt end only a few years later. The prices of agricultural produce continued to fall and manufactured goods became comparatively more expensive. While the value of money decreased[1] and the general level of the standard of living deteriorated up to about 1930, there was a slight improvement in the period following the recovery from the general crisis.

661 **CORRUPTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION.** The lot of the people, however, did not improve. The Rumanians, to whom their government had promised an era of prosperity and national splendour, soon found that the promise held good only for some privileged classes who had not been badly off before. The whole country was ruled by a small clique which had secured the allegiance of a host of civil servants. These officials were badly paid and relied on bribes to swell their income. Before elections the voters were promised reductions of taxation and official positions. But taxes became heavier each year and the new officials' greed had to be satisfied whenever one came in touch with the State apparatus. Identification papers of every description had to be secured before a citizen could go about his business. And in order to obtain these documents one had to visit innumerable offices, fill up innumerable forms and bribe a dozen officials. Arrests were made by the underpaid police for the sole purpose of obtaining money. Officials in all positions looked upon bribes as a legitimate source of income.

The poor peasantry and the minorities were

465 [1] Level wages in 1930 were: in Rumania 39; in Britain 100.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

especially hard hit by this rampant corruption. The 661
moneyed classes, on the other hand, were well satisfied with this state of affairs which guaranteed the continuance of their rule.

The position of the minorities was unenviable. 563
In theory all non-Rumanians had the same rights 641
and duties as the Rumanians. In practice, however, things were very different. The official language was Rumanian and anybody not able to speak Rumanian was handicapped from the beginning when dealing with the authorities. It was very difficult for members of a minority to obtain schooling in their native language, for although there were some Hungarian and German schools they had to be financed by the respective communities and the fees to be paid were high. A public career for a member of a minority was very rare indeed and non-Rumanians had always to expect unfavourable treatment at the hands of the authorities. The Jews, many of whom were denied Rumanian citizenship and had to pay from time to time for the right to live in the country, were worse off than the rest. Often in addition to being persecuted for their origin they could be victimized for having a Hungarian name and speaking German as their native language.

The mass of the Rumanians did not gain by this 661
discrimination ostensibly made in their favour. At 565
best the half-educated sons of peasants could secure some minor position in the State machinery.

The economic life of the country was dominated 471
by all-powerful monopolies. The oil and heavy industries were in the hands of a few foreign and Rumanian shareholders and the enormous profits were divided between a few industrialists, ministers

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

471 of State and foreign concessionaires. State-monopolies, such as the manufacture and sale of explosives, tobacco, etc., were often leased to foreign trusts. Road building, for example, was in the hands of a Swedish company. So was the manufacture of matches sold by the State. The whole telephone system was installed and operated by a subsidiary of the American financial trust of Morgans. Nine-tenths of the oil industry were in British hands, the armaments works of Transylvania were controlled by British, French, Czech and German interests. The newly developed chemical industry of the country soon passed into German hands. As for agriculture, the export of produce was effectively controlled by several banks who were partly or wholly owned by foreign financial houses. During the nineteen-thirties pharmaceutical goods were imported almost exclusively from Germany.

665 THE GOVERNMENT. The most powerful of all poli-
565 tical parties were the Liberals who were entrenched in influential positions of the administration, the army, finance and industry. Led traditionally by a member of the Bratianu family, whose name at one time was almost synonymous with that of Rumania, the Liberal Party was able to rule the country directly or indirectly up to a very short time ago. Her adherents had very little in common with the Liberals of the West, representing, as they did, the Right Wing of the numerically weak but financially
665 and politically powerful Rumanian bourgeoisie. An
666 electoral law introduced by the Liberal Government in 1926 stipulated that the party which had secured 40% of the votes should obtain 60% of all parlia-

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

mentary seats. This device, combined with the 666
electoral methods adopted, normally assured the 665
continuance of the government in power.[1] In
Foreign Affairs the Liberals supported the French [648]
Alliance and the League of Nations in whose councils the Foreign Minister, N. Titulescu, had considerable influence.

The National Peasant Party led by Maniu and 665
Mihalache had the support of the rural population and represented the Left Wing of Rumanian politics. The party stood for a genuine Land Reform. It was not, however, a homogeneous party. From the first it had a Right and a Left Wing. As time went on, and especially when the political situation became more confused in the late thirties, the Right Wing tended to sympathize with the Iron Guard against the Royal dictatorship and the Left Wing with the Communists. The failure of the National Peasant Party to hold power after 1928 was due to the lack of confidence in the people, the fear of radical changes favoured by many sections of the population and hesitation to attack the firmly entrenched vested interests resolutely.

Although Rumania had a parliamentary constitu- 661
tion the country was ruled by anything but democratic methods. Parliamentary representatives, ministers and the press could be made to advocate and carry out any measure if adequately paid by interested parties. The corruption of the lower civil service seemed as nothing compared with that on the top. State contracts, exemption from taxes and

[1] It failed only twice: in 1928 when the National Peasant Party gained an electoral victory and in 1937 when Tatarescu's government fell.

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

661 preferential legislation, the right to exploit natural resources under State control, could all be and were secured by Rumanian and foreign trusts for comparatively small sums. The mismanagement and appropriation of public money by government officials, including the court, had ruinous consequences for the population which knew about these things, but was unable to do anything about it. [651] Indirect taxation, heavier and more ingenious than anywhere else in Europe, provided an inexhaustible source of income for those in power. The 'aviation-stamp', for example, which had to be affixed on every bill, theatre- and cinema-ticket, etc., was supposed to secure a strong Rumanian Air Force. In fact Rumania possessed hardly any aircraft at all as the funds were misappropriated throughout.

648 661 **THE ROYAL DICTATORSHIP.** The instability of Rumania's economic and political life and her geographical position made the country extremely sensitive to any changes in Central Europe. Therefore the rise to power of the National Socialists in Germany, the risings of February and June 1934 in Austria and world reactions to these events had [668] immediate repercussions in Rumania. The Liberal Prime Minister Duca was assassinated in December 1933 by members of the Iron Guard. Tatarescu took over and decreed a state of siege, which has not been lifted since, ostensibly to repress and destroy the Iron Guard. In fact exactly the opposite course was adopted. The democratic forces which began to rally in order to fight Rumanian Fascism were persecuted by the government whilst the terrorists were allowed to continue their activities.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

The Iron Guard was originally part of the Mol- 668
davian and Bessarabian anti-Semitic movement led by Professor Cuza. Amongst his pupils was Codreanu who formed the 'Legion of the Archangel Michael', a terrorist organization modelled on the Fascist and Nazi pattern and supported by Germany and Italy. Codreanu began his political career with the assassination of the prefect of police of Jasi, the blackmail of Jews and the persecution of progressive organizations. His adherents were poor students of the type which in Germany formed the core of the Nazi movement, the lower clergy, army officers and civil servants. His anti-Semitic and anti-Bolshevik slogans sounded attractive to certain big business men, high army officers and the higher clergy who gave him their support. The king regarded the Iron 643
Guard with favour, for it seemed an excellent 668
weapon for weakening the country's democratic forces and preparing the way for his own, undisguised dictatorship. Accordingly the crimes of the Iron Guard were not punished and the activities of her adherents remained unchecked.

In order to exploit the international situation, 643
which was only too favourable for dictatorship, 208
Carol began with an intensive propaganda, taking the slogans of Fascism, National Socialism and the Iron Guard, and laying particular stress upon his desire to rule with the help of the young generation. The schools and universities were militarized and the defence of the country made one of the daily watchwords. By ruling with non-party cabinets and 643
playing off one party against the other Carol under- 662
mined the strength of the Liberals and the adherents of Maniu and Mihalache. From both parties he

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
E1 Rumania ED1

662 attracted personalities who were willing to abjure
643 their political faith and serve the Crown.

While continuing to pay lip-service to the League
643 of Nations, he supported the Italian campaign in
648 Abyssinia by sending food and war material to Italy. During the Spanish Civil War propaganda in favour of Franco was allowed and supported, while anything in favour of the Republican cause was banned.[1]

The result of the elections in December 1937, on
643 the eve of Hitler's seizure of Austria, precipitated
665 events. The government of the day, headed by the Liberal Tatarescu, failed to secure the necessary 40% of the votes and resigned.[2] Carol refused to entrust Maniu with the formation of a government; and the Iron Guard had by now assumed such a hostile attitude towards the king that a compromise with them was out of the question. Consequently Carol called the 'National Christian Front' to power, an anti-Semitic and Fascist organization led by the poet Goga and Professor Cuza. Goga became Prime Minister and his cabinet contained former members of the Liberal and Peasant Parties who now went over to the absolutist camp, as well as the future 'Conducator'[3] Antonescu.

[1] General Cantacuzino and several legionaries joined Franco and when two of them were killed their coffins were carried all over Rumania with great processions and interred at the headquarters of the Iron Guard in the presence of German, Italian, Spanish and Japanese representatives. At the same time collectors for the Republican cause were imprisoned. Nevertheless there were many Rumanians fighting for the Republicans in the 'Dimitrov' battalion.

[2] The result was: Government 35·9%, Peasant Party 20·4%, Iron Guard 15·5%, National Christian Front 9·1%.

[3] Leader.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

The new government at once introduced measures which had become familiar in Germany and Italy. All democratic papers and organizations were suppressed, anti-Semitic laws were carried out without delay and the government's storm-troopers ruled the country. In the meantime the Iron Guard gathered strength and prepared to take power. The king recognized the threatening danger, dismissed Goga after only forty-five days, installed the patriarch Miron Cristea as Prime Minister of a government of 'national concentration' and announced a new constitution on the Fascist model. 642 643

All political parties were dissolved and their property confiscated. Representation was to be 'corporative', that is, according to social status, and the age of the franchise raised from 21 to 30. The king, with an advisory Crown Council, had all executive power. This so-called constitution was put to an open and verbal vote and was naturally accepted.[1] The new single-party, the 'Front of National Renaissance', became the only recognized political organization whose membership was obligatory for all officials.

The king's victory seemed complete. The democratic forces were routed and the whole administration was firmly in his hands. The army and a section of the industrialists supported this new regime, which promised them increased powers and incomes. Codreanu, whose many assassinations had been left unpunished, was imprisoned after being found guilty in a libel action.

[1] Only about five thousand people dared to vote against this constitution in February 1938. Maniu demonstrated his protest by leaving the country before polling-day and returning shortly after.

[Lie: Government of National Christian Front of 1937 -- Analyst]

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

643 [648] found guilty in a libel action. The only immediate danger, the revisionist claims of Hungary and Bulgaria, was to be eliminated by an even friendlier attitude towards Italy and Germany, and Carol's tour of the European capitals, including London, was intended to reassure the democracies.

643 Beneath the surface, however, the struggle between the Iron Guard and Carol continued. While Carol was on his tour, Codreanu and thirteen of his legionaries were shot by their prison guards. The Minister of the Interior, Calinescu, a former member of the National Peasant Party, who succeeded to the premiership after Miron Cristea's death in March 1939, ordered further repressive measures and was himself assassinated by Iron Guardists in the autumn of the same year.

563 668 **THE FIFTH COLUMN.** Nazi Germany found an extremely fertile soil for its propaganda not only among the Rumanian Fascist parties and some generals and industrialists, but also amongst the many Germans living in Rumania. They were economically prosperous and the best treated of all minorities in Rumania. The most important communities were the settlements in Transylvania and in the Banat. At first Nazi propaganda was not very successful owing to the economically favourable position of these Germans and their comparatively strong religious feeling.[1] But as time went on it had great successes. Under the cloak of cultural associations Nazi cells were formed which soon spread into every German village. Unwilling Germans were

[1] The 'Saxons' are Protestants, the 'Aelpler', also in Transylvania, and the 'Schwaben' of the Banat Roman Catholics.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

forced into these organizations by social and economic pressure. Combatant units, armed and trained, consisted of youths who learned the Nazi doctrine in their schools. Financial assistance came from the German banks in Rumania: they supported the transactions of the 'Association for Export to Germany', which secured a virtual monopoly in the export trade of grain, cattle and pigs to Germany and Italy, as well as the hemp-growing scheme, which met with considerable success in the Banat. 563 668

Similarly the German papers published in Rumania soon passed under Nazi control. Their information was received from news agencies in Germany which also supplied them with commentaries and feature articles. Naturally the Rumanian Fascists were supported by the German-Rumanian Nazis who acted as go-betweens and agents of their masters in the Reich.[1]

The pro-Nazi Germans of Rumania who had always possessed good economic, industrial and financial connexions were able to render valuable assistance in the economic penetration of the country by German trusts. In 1933, for example, the fusion of several chemical firms in the Banat and in Wallachia brought them entirely under German control. That they produced semi-finished material for explosives enhanced their value. The iron and 563 471

[1] The outrages of the Iron Guard, such as the desecration of Jewish synagogues and cemeteries, destruction of Jewish shops, political murder and blackmail, were aided and abetted by the German Nazi agents. A series of fires and bomb-explosions in Timisoara in November 1938, as well as other terrorist acts, were committed by members of the Iron Guard jointly with some German youths who were known to the public but escaped punishment. 648

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

563 steel works of Resita and Copsa Mica, with a capital
471 of six million pounds sterling, and many other factories also passed under German control. In the
[439] fight against Franco-British and American capital in Rumania, Germany was favoured by the fact that 50% of Rumania's imports were German, and 36% of the country's exports went to Germany (1938). By 1940 the latter had reached about 70% of the total.

563 This underground activity of the German minority, combined with the pro-Fascist leanings
668 of the majority of the ruling classes, who feared to lose their privileges and were only too glad to join in the Anti-Bolshevik[1] crusade, and the corruption reigning in the army and all branches of the government apparatus, sapped the strength of the country economically, politically and morally. It had become an easy prey for the imperialism of Hitler.

661 [1] Especially savage measures were taken against workers' and intellectuals' progressive organizations, which were made illegal and had to go underground. Their members, if caught, were court-martialled and imprisoned.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p 89

CHAPTER VI

UNDER GERMAN CONTROL

The nineteen-thirties saw an acute sharpening of the conflict between the popular forces and the Rumanian ruling class which was mirrored in all spheres of the country's life. Neither of these two was undivided. On the one side was the majority of the people—the peasants and workers and some intellectuals. On the other the court, the generals, the vast bureaucracy, the professional politicians, industrialists, bankers and big landowners. The peasantry was hardly organized and was split by national divisions, as a part of the non-Rumanian rural population supported Minority parties which were mostly opposed to united action with the corresponding Rumanian parties. The workers' movement suffered from similar divisions and from splits caused by ideological differences. Numerically it was weak owing to the small number of industrial workers. Moreover all workers' organizations were subject to the most severe restrictions.[1] The ruling class of Rumania was united in its determination to prevent any measures harming its interests. The divisions in its ranks were due to differences as to the best means of maintaining its privileged position and to competition between the established section

[1] The most vigorous Left Wing Party were the Communists, whose organizations, though illegal, continued in spite of repressive measures. They were most influential in Bessarabia, the Bukovina and the industrial regions.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

578 of this class and those who wanted to secure this
565 dominant position for themselves.

665 These divisions were complicated by the personality of King Carol and the attitudes of different sections of the ruling circles to his personal regime. One group put its trust in the royal dictatorship and included supporters of the pro-French and pro-British wing. Many prominent politicians from both great parties were attracted to this camp, the Liberals Tatarescu and Micescu, for example, and the peasant leaders Vaida-Voevod and Calinescu. Another group went over to the extreme Right Wing and supported the Iron Guard and similar but smaller organizations, and these inclined to a pro-German foreign policy. There were naturally some who tried to steer a middle course.[1]

665 Economic and financial considerations played an
648 important and often decisive part in this political alignment. The Liberals had a great interest in a pro-Allied policy as they were closely connected with British, French and American investments in Rumania. The extreme Right Wing counted on support from Germany, which was readily given, and in return it facilitated the growth of Germany's political and economic influence. Both groups had discarded both the cloak and the spirit of democracy, and their leanings towards dictatorship, varying in form but not in substance, facilitated the victory of

[1] C. Bratianu, leader of the Liberals, joined Carol's 'party' but only in order to keep his great industrial and financial interests. Maniu, the leader of the Peasant Party, remained passive. He showed sympathy to the Iron Guard in their opposition to the king's dictatorship and later joined Bratianu in seeking to restrain them: but he retained his pro-French leanings.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

the pro-Nazi group. This, combined with the 665
developments in the regions bordering on Rumania, 648
and the changes in the international situation, explain the seemingly inexplicable migration of the majority of the Rumanian ruling class from the Allies' to the Axis camp. The real rulers of Rumania depended to a great extent on foreign support: when the power of Britain and France seemed on the wane they had to look for new protectors, and many, though not all, therefore became pro-German.

THE LAST DAYS OF GREATER RUMANIA. The year 661
1939 opened ominously for Rumania. The align- 648
ment of power on the continent of Europe had its counterpart in the grouping of Rumania's political forces, and the impending Great War threw its shadow on the sombre scene of Rumanian politics. After the assassination of Codreanu in November 1938 a wave of terror and repression swept the whole country, which resulted in a series of wholesale murders committed both by Iron Guards and the police. The new 'Party of the Nation' which had replaced the 'Front of National Renaissance' was an artificial veil for the manipulations of Carol and the court. The unstable political edifice, erected by the king tottered, in spite of the British Government's guarantee of 13 April 1939, which promised to assist in the defence of Rumania's independence. Germany increased her pressure to obtain a greater hold on Rumania's natural resources, while Britain and France tried to maintain their economic position.

At the outbreak of hostilities in September 1939 Rumania, although allied to France and Poland, remained neutral. The internal situation deteriorated

3

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

661 with alarming speed. The assassination of Calinescu,
648 who had been responsible for the murder of Codreanu and others, was followed by yet another series of savage reprisals. The collapse of Poland brought a flood of refugees into the country and made Rumania's international position even more difficult. Many Poles were interned, many managed to bribe their way through to a port or across the frontiers.

648 In the economic field the Rumanian government tried to repeat the policy which its predecessor had pursued in the period 1914–16, when it profited from deals concluded with both belligerent camps. This time, however, German penetration was much more thorough and the economic agreements concluded between Germany and Rumania reinforced Germany's capacity to wage war very considerably. This naturally led to important consequences in the field of internal politics. In spite of the very recent repressive measures against the Iron Guard, Carol now adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards this organization. Now that Codreanu had been eliminated, he sought to strengthen his position by including Iron Guards in his government, amongst them Horia Sima who had become their leader. This seemed all the more necessary as the king's isolation in internal politics had its counterpart in the country's isolation in the international field. The revisionist claims of Rumania's neighbours were raised again, and Carol tried to rally the people by embarking on an intensive policy of rearmament for the defence of Greater Rumania. Distrust in the king and the general disintegration had, however, gone so far that the continuance of the whole régime

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

648

became impossible. The last blow came with the fall of France in June 1940. For over a century the Rumanian middle class had depended on French support. The cultural, economic and military ties between the two countries had always given the Rumanian bourgeoisie a feeling of security. The defeat of France therefore had immediate and profound reactions in Rumania. The pro-German wing, whose policy now seemed more justified than ever before, was triumphant; and the former adherents of the Allies transferred their allegiance more or less reluctantly to the victorious Nazi camp.

THE END OF GREATER RUMANIA. The collapse of the whole framework of the European Settlement, upon which Rumanian foreign policy had relied, occurred in the summer of 1940. The problems which had confronted the new State when it arose after the First World War had not been solved. On the contrary. The question of the minorities had become more complicated and acute; social conditions were in some respects worse than before 1914. In the sphere of foreign affairs the vacillating attitude of subsequent governments had left Rumania completely isolated. The sympathies of Britain and America had been lost; France was defeated; Germany looked upon Rumania as a valuable prize which she intended to seize and exploit; Hungary and Bulgaria were waiting for an opportunity to recover the territories lost to Rumania; Yugoslavia was already under indirect German domination; Czechoslovakia and Poland had disappeared from the map of Europe. The attitude of the Rumanian ruling class to the Soviet Union

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

had remained bitterly hostile in spite of the resumption of diplomatic relations in 1934. The question of Bessarabia had never been solved, and it was this issue which eventually opened the last chapter in the history of Greater Rumania.

THE U.S.S.R. TAKES BESSARABIA. Ever since the annexation of Bessarabia to Rumania, the Soviet Union had demanded the return of this province and had repeatedly proposed to ascertain the will of the population by a plebiscite. These proposals were always rejected by the Rumanian government. On 26 June 1940 the Soviet government addressed a note to Rumania which demanded the return of Bessarabia and the cession of the Northern Bukovina.[1] While the Soviet claim to Bessarabia was based on historical titles, the claim to the Northern Bukovina was made on the ground that the majority of the people were Ukrainian. The Rumanian government first tried to obtain the backing of Germany to oppose the Soviet demands. When this was refused, in virtue of the German-Soviet Pact then in force, it had no choice but to hand over the territories demanded. Soviet troops marched into

[1] The Soviet note stated *inter alia* '...in 1918 Rumania took advantage of the military weakness of Russia and robbed the Soviet Union by force of part of her territory, namely Bessarabia, and thus broke the century-old unity of Bessarabia (principally occupied by Ukrainians) and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic...the handing over of the Northern Bukovina may be regarded as a compensation, though only in a small degree, for the tremendous loss which the population of the Soviet Union and the population of Bessarabia have suffered through twenty-two years of Rumanian rule in Bessarabia'.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina on 28 June; 648 although some local resistance was offered, the occupation was completed swiftly. As soon as the population learned of the impending incorporation of Bessarabia in the U.S.S.R., many peasants flocked into the towns and ejected officials under whose rule they had suffered. Many political prisoners were freed after years of confinement. Some families from Moldavia and other adjoining areas crossed the Pruth and Danube into the new Soviet territories. A number of Rumanians, especially recent settlers, military and administrative personnel and their families fled into the Old Kingdom; most of the German colonists of Bessarabia were evacuated under an agreement with the German authorities and were later re-settled in Poland and Alsace-Lorraine. There were numerous deserters from the Rumanian Army who, instead of returning with their units, remained in Bessarabia and in the Northern Bukovina.

By the cession of Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina, Rumania lost a territory of about 20,000 square miles with a population of nearly 3,500,000. Further, this meant a diminution of Rumanian arable land by about one-quarter, and of livestock by 15%.

THE VIENNA AWARD. The reunion of Bessarabia with the Soviet Union encouraged the Hungarian government to raise once more its claims to the western provinces of Greater Rumania and to Transylvania. The Hungarians had never at any time since 1919 abandoned their hopes for the recovery of these districts.

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

648 Carol realized that some attempt to reach a settlement had to be made, for Hungary's claims were now backed by Germany. Negotiations between Hungary and Rumania began at Turnu-Severin, but they soon broke down. Eventually the representatives of both countries were summoned to a conference at Vienna and Ribbentrop and Ciano imposed upon them the Vienna Award on 30 August 1940. By this decision, Rumania was forced to cede an area of about 17,000 square miles with a population of some 2,500,000 to Hungary. Rumania thereby lost the Maramures and parts of Crisana and Transylvania.[1] The partition of Transylvania has not only not solved the national and economic problems of this area; it has seriously aggravated them. The motives behind this German move were undoubtedly: to prevent an armed clash between Hungary and Rumania; to put Hungary under an obligation of gratitude to Germany; and to leave Rumania with the recovery of Bessarabia as the only possible compensation for her humiliating loss. The success of this artful policy facilitated Hitler's designs, when in the following year he compelled both Hungary and Rumania to take part in his invasion of the Soviet Union.

The loss of the greater part of Transylvania meant much more than the loss of some thousands of square miles of arable land, livestock, natural resources and valuable factories. The Rumanians regard Transylvania as the cradle of the nation and the

[1] According to Rumanian figures the population of the ceded territory was 2,395,153, of which the Rumanians numbered 1,176,433 (based on 1930 linguistic census). The Hungarian figures (1941) give the total as 2,577,291, of whom 1,066,353 were Rumanians.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

heart of their homeland. Their desire to recover 648
Bessarabia, to which their claim was far more contestable, was fanned by German propaganda in order to deflect them from their real aims and interests. Their feeling for Transylvania is a natural one, rooted in the tradition of many centuries.[1]

The transfer of Transylvania to Hungary had serious economic as well as social and political consequences for the population. Rumanian peasants were expropriated and their land was given to Hungarian landowners, who have recovered many of their pre-1918 positions. The treatment of the Transylvanian Rumanians by Hungary has led to many incidents. There is a continuous exchange of accusations and denunciations going on in the press of Hungary and Rumania.[2]

Following the cession of Transylvania Bulgaria demanded the return of the Southern Dobrudja, which was agreed to at Craiova on 7 September 1940. This involved the loss of a further 2,960 square miles with a population of some 350,000.

So in less than two months the inflated Rumania of the Peace Settlement had lost an area of nearly 40,000 square miles and a population of over

[1] Lord Halifax declared on 5 September 1940: '. . . they [the British Government] are unable to accept the settlement now announced of the Hungarian-Rumanian dispute over Transylvania, since that settlement is the result of an award by the Axis Powers and imposed under duress on Rumania.' On the other hand, the return of the Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria did not meet with criticism on the side of the Allies.

[2] There have been numerous demonstrations in Transylvania both for and against Hungarian occupation, and trials of Rumanian patriots and alleged Communists. The atmosphere in that area is extremely tense.

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

648 6,250,000.[1] Greater Rumania had ceased to exist.

668 **THE FLIGHT OF THE KING.** The territorial losses and the disintegration of Greater Rumania were only the outward signs of internal decay. The vigour and strength of the people, however, were not yet broken. The cession of Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina aroused feelings which fortified the popular movement. Demonstrations were held in all the big Rumanian towns demanding the abdication of Carol and the creation of a truly democratic government. At the same time territorial concessions to Hungary were opposed; and when it became known that the Vienna Award was to be accepted, in spite of the vigorous protests of almost all well-known Rumanian statesmen, police and soldiers had to be employed against thousands of indignant demonstrators in order to maintain 'peace and order'.

Popular discontent and fury against the king were cleverly exploited by the Right Wing. The Iron Guard, whose opposition to his personal rule was well known, turned the popular feeling to good account. They were the loudest in demanding the abdication of Carol, but naturally not in order to enable the formation of a democratic regime. This

131 162 [1] The remaining territory covered an area of less than 80,000 square miles; the population had shrunk to about 14,000,000. Official Rumanian figures state that Rumania's population in 1942 was over 16,000,000, of which over 13,000,000 lived on the land (Wallachia, 6,200,000; Moldavia, 2,800,000; Bessarabia, 2,700,000; Bukovina, 800,000; Dobrudja (without Southern Dobrudja), 500,000; Rumanian Transylvania, 2,400,000; Banat, 1,000,000).

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

so-called national and revolutionary movement 668
betrayed its German inspiration by supporting and approving the handing over of Transylvania to Hungary, but opposing the cession of Bessarabia to the U.S.S.R.

The king's Prime Minister, Gigurtu, resigned on 668
4 September and Carol summoned General An- 643
tonescu, who was at the time imprisoned in Bistrita, and charged him with the formation of a new government. This step was all the more remarkable as the German Minister at Bucarest had been able to communicate with Antonescu while he was in prison. Antonescu at once demanded Carol's abdication and obtained it after two days' continuous and heated discussions and negotiations. On 6 September Carol, accompanied by his mistress Mme Lupescu and his aide Udureanu, left Rumania. His son Michael succeeded for the second time to the unstable throne.

Carol's abdication was due to many different 643
factors. The occupation of Bessarabia by the Red 668
Army and the acceptance of the Vienna Award 648
showed how brittle and hollow was his widespread kingdom. Everybody knew how great the king's share in the weakening of the country had been. The ten years of his reign had led to disastrous consequences. The will of the people, voiced for the first time for many years, had a decisive influence on the events leading to the abdication. Another important factor was Hitler's distrust for a man whose country he intended to take under complete domination. The king's renunciation of the British Guarantee was unable to win him Germany's confidence. Since Carol assumed the throne in 1930

643 he had played off one political party against the
668 other in order to strengthen his position. In foreign
648 politics he followed the same tactics. He ended by completely isolating Rumania internationally and undermining her internally.

It may be said in extenuation of his inglorious behaviour, that the dismemberment of Greater Rumania was inevitable, once the whole balance of power had shifted against the Western Allies, whose settlement had created it. But it is at least equally tenable that a democratic and united Rumania, which had succeeded in winning the loyalty of any considerable elements among its minorities, might have held out against the cession of territory to Hungary, by obliging the Hungarians and Germans to use force to effect it at a time when Hitler was anxious to avoid war in the Danubian area. This might have rallied Rumania with Yugoslavia and Greece, who showed a more heroic spirit, to the Allies' camp. In fact, the king's policy only aggravated the internal situation and sharpened the conflict of parties.

642 **RUMANIA GOES TO WAR.** General I. Antonescu,
661 having obtained Carol's abdication,[1] pronounced himself 'Conducator', that is, 'Leader', and proclaimed the creation of the 'Legionary State'. His government was composed of generals, leaders of the Iron Guard and civil servants. Codreanu's successor, Horia Sima, became vice-premier and at once organized an unprecedented regime of terror throughout the whole of Rumania. His henchmen assassinated numerous prominent opponents of the Iron Guard. The looting of shops and the beating

7 [Sept 6, 1940 -- Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

up of Jews became the favourite occupation of the 661
legionaries. The resulting confusion helped many 642
minor officials as well as influential business men in acquiring valuable property.

But it soon became obvious that the real masters 648
of Rumania were the Germans. In October 1940 642
Antonescu invited German troops into the country as instructors for the Rumanian Army. German 669
trade delegations began organizing Rumania's economy and German specialists were appointed to important positions in various ministries. Although Antonescu had included the Iron Guard in his government, the struggle for power between him and Horia Sima continued. In January 1941 the Iron Guard, supporting the latter, made a last bid. The legionaries rose in revolt and succeeded in gaining several strong positions in Bucarest and in some provincial towns. The army, however, sided with Antonescu, who was also aided by the Germans, and within a short time the 'Conducator' emerged as victor. He at once proceeded to the establishment of a completely military administration and based his whole regime on the army.

His[1] success in the fight against the Iron Guard 721
was influenced decisively by the German desire to create a stable Rumanian government which would join in the attack on the Soviet Union. Antonescu did not fail his German masters. On 22 June 1941 Rumanian troops, together with German divisions, crossed the Soviet frontier. Thanks to German 721
support, Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina 727
were re-occupied within a short time. Both provinces were put under a military administration and ruled quite separately from the rest of Rumania.

[1] [I.e. Antonescu -- Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

721 Those sections of the population which had sup-
727 ported the Soviet regime were ruthlessly persecuted and the punitive measures are almost identical with those carried out in 1919.[1]

721 Politically the advance of Rumanian troops into the Ukraine and as far afield as the Caucasus put Antonescu and his propagandists in an awkward position. In order to justify the entry of Rumania into the war[2] he pointed to the necessity of recovering Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina. The Rumanian advance farther east was defended alternatively by the assertion that the land beyond the Dniester was really Rumanian, and by the argument that Rumania could never be safe whilst the Soviet Union existed. The former line of argument carried no conviction: the latter had at first some popularity in view of the wound which the loss of Bessarabia and Bukovina had inflicted on the national pride.

While the German and Rumanian armies continued their advance into Soviet territory these excuses and justifications were accepted without public criticism, although, apart from the few out-and-out Fascists, there is no Rumanian who would really believe that he has any claim to land east of the Dniester. But the ever mounting losses of the Rumanians began to disturb the people. Losses had already been heavy in the capture of Odessa, the

[1] According to Soviet reports over 50,000 Jews and 30,000 Bessarabians have been killed since the re-occupation by Rumanian troops.

[2] Great Britain declared war on Rumania on 7 December 1941, and the United States of America followed suit on 5 June 1942.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

Crimea and Kharkov in 1941. But they became 721
alarming when the Red Army began the great counter-offensive in the Caucasus and at Stalingrad, where five Rumanian divisions under General Lascar were wiped out or put out of action. In May 1943 Antonescu said the Rumanian losses were 500,000, referring apparently to killed and prisoners only. Since then the great German retreat has probably caused many more Rumanian losses. During 1943 the government's action in sending Rumanian troops beyond the old frontier was repeatedly condemned by the leaders of the opposition—Peasants and Liberals. The Minister of War answered these objections by saying, 'It is lucky for us that the war is so far away. If we had to fight so powerful an opponent on the Dniester or the Pruth, all Rumania would be ruins.' But within a year the avenging fate had not rested on the Pruth.

OPPRESSION AND EXPLOITATION. The effects of 661
Antonescu's dictatorial regime showed themselves in 642
all spheres of Rumanian life. Politically the country was ruled by the army generals and in all other fields by Rumanian and German big business. Military administrators replaced local government in the provinces and the towns. The Rumanian industrialists and bankers found it very profitable to work for the German war economy. Their political enemies were liquidated or driven under-ground. In the economic field their exploitation of the people and of the country's resources was only limited by Germany's interests.

Both the political and the economic life of 000

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

648 Both the political and the economic life of
241 Rumania was subject to complete German domination. The agriculture of the country had to supply the German and Rumanian armies in the field. The area of arable land was feverishly enlarged so as to provide more food. This met with considerable success. In 1941 the country produced almost as much wheat as the whole of Greater Rumania in 1935. Exports almost reached the pre-1940 level.[1] By 1943 the area under wheat had been increased to 3,000,000 hectares and that under maize to 4,000,000 hectares. Even more important is the extension of the land used for the growing of rape seeds[2] and of oil-bearing plants.[2] Rumanian agriculture served a double purpose: the provision of food for the Rumanian and German armies and the supply of Germany's war industry with valuable raw material. The introduction of the soya bean into Rumania, the delivery of thousands of iron ploughs, tractors and other agricultural machinery from Germany only served to further this aim. Exploitation of the peasantry was the immediate consequence; but, if the ploughs and machinery remain when the Germans have gone, Rumanian agriculture is bound to benefit.

433 **OIL AND INDUSTRY.** The output of the chemical, textile and heavy industries were increased considerably. Consumer goods, however, are scarce and very expensive. The yearly production of oil has not

[439] [1] Export of wheat in 1940, 379,000 tons; in 1941, 2,500 tons; export of maize in 1940, 564,000 tons; in 1941, 117,000 tons. Both have since risen.

[2] 1942: 350,000 hectares grew rape seeds and 600,000 hectares oil-bearing seeds.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

reached the high level of 1935 and 1936,[1] but it has 433
maintained an average of over 5,500,000 tons, of which about 3,000,000 tons have been exported, chiefly to Germany. The rest has been used by the Rumanian armed forces and war industry. As in all 411
other occupied countries, Germany acquired all the Rumanian key industries. The *Kontinentale Oel A.G.* was the holding company for all German oil interests in Rumania. This trust controlled and regulated the output and sale of all Rumanian oil. Rumanian and French investments (by arrangements with the Vichy government) were also represented, but they were of minor importance. One of the effects of German control could be seen in the fact that whole districts, less than a hundred miles from Ploesti, suffered from a chronic shortage of lamp-oil.

All the great iron and steel works of Rumania passed under the control of the Nazi *Hermann Goering Werke*. The well-known German chemical trust *I.G. Farben* absorbed all chemical factories in Rumania and erected new ones. The use of the Rumanian economy in Germany's interests has been coupled with a very thorough financial exploitation. Credits have been granted by the Rumanian National Bank to certain enterprises, under German control, for the import of machinery from Germany. At every stage of manufacture, purchase and sale, export and import, there was a handsome profit which ultimately benefited only a small number of big shareholders, who had interests in each of the enterprises connected with the transaction. Bribes

[1] 1935: 8,376,000 tons; 1936: 8,703,000 tons.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

471 and smaller profits were the reward of Rumanian officials and business men.[1]

511 How far the natural resources of Rumania have suffered under this intensive exploitation will probably become apparent only after the war. Its effects on the people of Rumania, however, can be gauged already. The cost of living in 1941 was three times as high as in 1934, and in January 1943 it was reported to be 50% higher than one year before. These are official Rumanian figures, based on maximum prices and maximum wages which are 511 only fictitious. In fact many goods, although 465 rationed, could be obtained only on the black market and at phenomenal prices. The general inflation led to a levelling-up of wages; but wages remained far behind prices. The workers, therefore, were worse off than before, although, theoretically, they obtained improved wages A Swiss report in August 1943 showed that the monthly earnings of

457 [1] In January 1944 the Rumanian Government, according to a German paper published in Rumania, 'decided to put at the disposal of the Ministry of Finance a credit of three milliard lei for a new campaign for the modernisation of petroleum installations in Rumania. The Rumanian National Bank has granted a loan of one hundred million Reichsmarks to a number of oil companies for the same purpose. This sum will be used for the import of machinery from Germany... these companies have also been put in charge of the supply of the capital with natural gas'. At about the same time one of the mouthpieces of the Nazi war economy declared quite frankly: 'The practical purpose of the Rumanian export trade policy is to ensure an adequate supply of raw materials for the home industry. In order to stimulate import the concerns in question were permitted... to open up new industries in foreign countries for the purpose of supplying raw materials and half finished goods to the vitally necessary war industries in Rumania.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

a worker, working sixty hours a week, would just be 511
sufficient to buy a pair of shoes or four pounds of 465
coffee, while he would have to spend about three months' wages to buy a suit. The workers do not possess any effective trade unions or other organizations which could better their lot, and peasants' co-operatives are few and weak, except those controlled by the State and those of the German Minority. Antonescu, however, recognized the danger threatening him from this quarter and tried to pacify the workers by creating special services which would supply them with their rations. Other sections of the population had to rely on luck. By creating a class of workers which at last had an assured supply of food he hoped to neutralize the most potent elements of Rumanian discontent.

Another indication of the standard of living is 511
supplied by the official price index. From June to 435
December 1940 prices rose by over 137% and, according to the official Rumanian economic gazette, by 372% between August 1939 and October 1943. This fantastic increase of prices brought no corresponding gains to the farmers or agricultural workers, as can be seen from the Rumanian press.[1] While some industrial workers at least got their rations, and in some instances even increased rations,

[1] In December 1943, one of the German papers in Rumania reported that 'the Union of Farmers' Co-operative Societies states that although there was a record harvest last year, the difficult position of the farmers has not improved. A great part of the harvest is still unsold and...the shortage of capital is very much felt...the Union demands that one-third of the difference between the low inland- and the high export-prices be paid to the farmers instead of giving the whole of the overprice to the State and the exporters....Owing to the lack of

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

511 the economic position of the rural population
435 appears to be lamentable.

648 **THE POLITICAL SCENE.** Both the internal and external
722 policies of Rumania have been shaped by events on the battle fronts, and more particularly by the war on the Eastern front. The fact that Rumania is fighting side by side with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union has had effects upon the national life of which the consequences are inescapable. The artificial stimulation of public opinion against the U.S.S.R., intended to galvanize the people into a fervent nationalism and unreserved support for Antonescu, proved no small embarrassment to him when the tide of battle turned so catastrophically against his Allies. Further, Rumania's position is also anomalous in the extreme. The severest blow which the country suffered during the past decades was the loss of two-fifths of Transylvania to Hungary.[1] Yet Rumania has been fighting in alliance with Hungary against the Soviet Union. At the same time friction between Hungary and Rumania has been one of the gravest problems in the

511 credits the farmers are unable to meet their most urgent
435 obligations and, if no solution is found, an agrarian crisis is imminent which must influence the whole national economy.' A Bucarest paper stated in January 1944: '. . . there are two million farms without milk cows, 160,000 without hogs and 200,000 without even a single chicken. Unfortunately the Ministry of Agriculture with only two and a half per cent of the budget can do little to alleviate the peasants' lot.'

[1] The Czechoslovak President, Dr Benes, stated in London in March 1944 that the Soviet Union would insist on the return of the territories which Hungary stole from her neighbours, including Transylvania.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

Axis camp. Clashes between armed Rumanians and Hungarians have been very frequent, and the Press of both countries has kept up an unabating series of violent accusations. 722 648

The swift advance of the Red Army during the great winter offensive of 1943–4 had by the end of March brought Soviet troops well into Rumanian territory. Hastily-made arrangements for the evacuation of the Rumanian-administered province of 'Transdnistria', actually part of the Ukraine, and of the Bukovina and Bessarabia, in all of which an intensive policy of Rumanization during the past few years had failed to bear fruit, were thereby thrown into complete confusion. 722

The position of the Rumanian government at the time of writing can only be a matter of speculation. The old political parties have failed to provide an effective opposition to the dictatorship of Antonescu, though Maniu and Bratianu have indeed addressed several notes of protest to the 'Conducator'. The strength of the Rumanian underground movement is difficult to assess. There have been several clashes with the Germans,[1] some sabotage and lately also partisan activities.[2] Clandestine organizations

[1] Of the 500,000 Germans in the present reduced Rumania, over 42,000 have joined the Nazi S.S. divisions. Germans from the Banat and Transylvania make up the greater part of the S.S. division *Prinz Eugen*, which has been fighting against Tito's Army of Liberation in Yugoslavia for some time.

[2] There are also reports of stronger activity by the Communist Party of Rumania of which several members have been arrested. It is said that opponents of the Antonescu regime, of various party allegiances, have succeeded in forming the beginnings of a united 'national liberation movement,' of which the title suggests Communist leadership.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

722 amongst railway workers and in the industrial areas around Brasov, Ploesti and Bucarest have lately gained some influence.

648 **RUMANIA AND THE WESTERN ALLIES.** The American air attacks on the oil district of Ploesti first made the Rumanians realize that the war was drawing near them. The capitulation of Fascist Italy was the second blow. But the decisive and all-important factor was, and remains, the advance of the Soviet troops. The last hope of the present government and its supporters lay in a conflict between the Western Powers and the U.S.S.R. They have frequently protested that they do not consider Rumania to be really at war with Britain and the United States. Therefore, the decisions of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences were regarded by them as blows directed against their very existence. Subsequent Press statements, however, show that they still hoped to gain the sympathy of Britain and America; and the journey of Prince Stirbey to Turkey and Egypt in March 1944 could have no other explanation. (This gentleman owns most of the land around Ploesti.) Recently a prominent Rumanian journalist wrote that the country's present position is similar to the pre-revolutionary era of 1917. Then, he said, the worst was averted by granting certain concessions to the people, and he went on to demand that a similar step be taken now for the same purpose. Unwittingly, this Rumanian propagandist has truly summed up the position of his class. It is prepared to do anything to keep its privileges and its powers. Its representatives will side with whoever assures them of the continuance of their rule. As

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

will be seen from the Appendix.[1] M. Molotov, in a speech made on 2 April 1944, professed the intention of the Soviet Government to leave the existing social structure of Rumania unaltered. But Marshall Stalin's Order of the Day of 30 April contained an appeal to the people of Rumania, as of Hitler's other Allies, to revolt. 648

[1] [See pp. 117-120 -- Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4,5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p 112

CONCLUSION

175 648 This short survey of the different phases of the long and unhappy history of Rumania and the Rumanians discloses a number of factors which, in one form or another and with varying intensity and effect, have decisively contributed to the damaging result of events both upon the land and upon the people. The Rumanians and their country, more than many other nations and States, have on the whole been rather the passive object than an active subject of history.

This involuntary passivity characterized the very emergence of the Rumanian nation and has not yet been overcome. The first attempts to form the basis of a national existence were frustrated, and postponed for many centuries, owing to the invasion of Europe by the Magyars. When the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were eventually created in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the emergence of these two primitive States was chiefly due to the pressure of the Hungarians in Transylvania; it was made possible owing to the decay of the Slavonic States south and west of the Danube. Moldavia and Wallachia during the subsequent centuries were the battle-grounds of Great Powers or were exploited as colonies. The nineteenth century saw the rise of Rumanian nationalism with the aim of the union of all Rumanians in one State. This aspiration was warped and misused by rival empires in order to strengthen their position in South-Eastern Europe. When this union became a reality after the First World War, it was achieved not so

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

181 shown that they possess qualities equal to those of other nations, and they still do. These forces are dormant, covered, as it were, by a thick skin which has grown as a result of blows which had to be suffered and could not be parried. If and when the strain becomes too great, and when opportunity comes, then this people may discover its power and, if it be well led, form a healthy State.

669 186 Up to now this has never happened: the people has never won against its oppressors. And this is a factor which has been ever present in Rumanian history. The peasant revolt which broke out amongst the Rumanians in Transylvania in 1785, four years before the French Revolution, ended in complete defeat. The national movement of Tudor Vladimirescu in 1820 resulted in little more than the appointment of Rumanian, instead of Greek, princes to the thrones of Moldavia and Wallachia. The revolutions of 1848 were speedily crushed by the combined forces of the great empires and, in the case of the Rumanians of Transylvania, were used in the most cunning way to defeat the national movement of another people. The union of Wallachia and Moldavia, one of the most genuine aims of the whole Rumanian people, was achieved in the end less by popular forces than by intrigues and international diplomacy. The Great Peasant Revolt of 1907 was put down by the military and cost thousands of peasants' lives. The Land Reforms of 1917 were accepted by a parliament which contained not one single peasant; and they were carried out by one of the richest landowners of Rumania, who, with his associates, had certainly no intention of applying them in such a way as to diminish the power of his

[i.e: the formation of a healthy State -- Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

class over the countryside. The union of all Rumanians in one State was a long-cherished dream. Its realization was only partly due to the actions of the people; Greater Rumania was the result of the greediness of the country's rulers, supported by the anti-Soviet policy of many countries. It carried the seed of its own destruction; and, when disruption came and the popular forces rose to assert their will in 1940, they were again defeated. In place of the royal dictatorship came the dictatorship of Rumanian and German Fascism: in place of partial economic domination by the west came complete domination by Germany. 669 186

One of the greatest barriers to the progress and well-being of Rumania and the Rumanians has been the fact that the geographical position and the wealth of the country have made it the victim of the ambitions of Great Powers. Rumanian governments have sided more often than not with the national enemies of their people and have at best tried to play off one of their foreign protectors against the other. 648

Yet it is exactly the geographical position and the great wealth of Rumania, combined with the hardiness and strength of its inhabitants, which hold out the promise of a happier future. The material and human resources for such a development are abundant. What is necessary is the liberation of these material and human forces under disinterested leadership. If that happens, if the unlucky chain of unsuccessful revolutions is broken; if these forces conquer those of their corrupt rulers, and the unhealthy social system of exploitation and oppression is replaced by the government of the people for the 000

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
E^1 Rumania ED1

000 benefit of the people, then Rumania can become a happy and prosperous country. It is evident that the realization of such hopes now depends mainly upon the policy which the government of the U.S.S.R. adopts towards Rumania, when Russia replaces Germany as the dominant power in Eastern Europe.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p 117

APPENDIX

STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS WITH REGARD TO RUMANIA

I

On 2 April 1944, Mr Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Commissar, addressing representatives of the Press, announced that the Red Army had crossed the river Pruth at various places and had entered Rumania. 648

In his statement, which was later broadcast from Moscow, Mr Molotov declared:

'The Red Army, as a result of a successful offensive, has reached the river Pruth, which is the State frontier between the U.S.S.R. and Rumania. Thus the full re-establishment of the Soviet State frontier as fixed in 1940, in accordance with the agreement between Soviet Russia and Rumania, has been begun.

'This agreement had been treacherously violated by the Rumanian Government in alliance with Hitlerite Germany.

'At the present time the Red Army is carrying out the clearance of Soviet soil of all the enemy still there, and the time when the entire Soviet frontier with Rumania will be completely restored is not far off.

'The Soviet Government hereby declares that the advancing units of the Red Army, pursuing the German armies and their allied Rumanian troops

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

648 have crossed the river Pruth in several sectors and have entered Rumanian territory.

'The Supreme Command of the Red Army has given orders to the advancing Soviet troops to pursue the enemy until his final rout and capitulation.

'At the same time the Soviet Government declares that it does not pursue the aim of acquiring any part of Rumanian territory, or of altering the social structure of Rumania as it exists at present.

'The entry of Soviet troops into the boundaries of Rumania is dictated exclusively by military necessities, and the continuing resistance of enemy troops.'

II

In a May Day Order of the Day to the Soviet fighting forces and the nation Marshal Stalin declared on 30 April 1944:

'...Under the blows of the Red Army the *bloc* of Fascist Powers is breaking and falling to pieces. Fear and confusion reign among the Rumanian, Hungarian, Finnish and Bulgarian "allies" of Hitler. These henchmen of Hitler, whose countries have been or are being occupied by the Germans, cannot fail to see that Germany has lost the war.

'Rumania, Hungary, Finland and Bulgaria have only one chance left to them to escape catastrophe—to break with Germany and withdraw from the war. But it is hardly to be expected that the present Governments of these countries are capable of breaking with Germany. It is to be supposed that the people of these countries will have to cope themselves with the task of their liberation from

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

the German yoke. The sooner the people of these countries realize the *impasse* into which they have been driven by the Germans the sooner they will stop all assistance to their German oppressors and to their henchmen quislings in their own countries. The more they do themselves, the more they can count on the understanding of democratic countries....' 648

III

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and the United States issued the following declaration on 12 May 1944:

'Through the fatal policy of their leaders, the people of Hungary are suffering the humiliation of German occupation. Rumania is still bound to the Nazis in a war now bringing devastation to its own people. The Governments of Bulgaria and Finland have placed their countries in the service of Germany and remain in the war at Germany's side.

'The Governments of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States think it right that these people should realize the following facts:

(1) The Axis satellites, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland, despite their realization of the inevitability of a crushing Nazi defeat and their desire to get out of the war, are by their present policies and attitudes contributing materially to the strength of the German war machine.

(2) These nations still have it within their power, by withdrawing from the war and ceasing their collaboration with Germany and by resisting the forces of Nazism by every possible means, to shorten the

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

648 European struggle, diminish their own ultimate sacrifices, and contribute to the allied victory.

(3) While these nations cannot escape their responsibility for having participated in the war at the side of Nazi Germany, the longer they continue at war in collaboration with Germany the more disastrous will be the terms which will be imposed upon them.

(4) These nations must therefore decide now, while yet there is time for them to contribute to the inevitable allied victory, whether they intend to persist in their present hopeless and calamitous policy of opposing that victory.'

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p. 121

INDEX

Antonescu, General, 84, 99–103, 108, 109
Aurelian, 4
Austria, 11, 14, 18, 42, 56, 64, 65, 82
Avars, 5
Averescu, General, 18, 56, 61, 75

Balkan Entente, 73
Bauer, General von, 13 n.
Benes, Dr, 108 n.
Bethlen, 46
Bibescu, Prince, 68
Boirebista, 2
Boris, 6
Bratianu, C., 90 n., 109
Bratianu, I., 61, 71, 72, 76
British guarantee to Rumania, 91, 99
Bulgaria, 2, 6, 18, 20, 35, 36, 86, 93, 97
Byzantium, 6

Calinescu, A., 86, 90, 92
Cantacuzino, General, 84 n.
Carol I, 17, 18
Carol II, 76, 77, 83–6, 90–2, 96, 98–100
Charlemagne, 5
Claudius, 2
Codreanu, J., 83, 85, 86, 91, 92
Communists, 81, 89 n., 109 n.
Conservative Party, 17, 75
Constantinople, 4, 10, 11 n., 14
Constitution of February 1938, 85 n.
Corvinus, Matthias, 9
Crimean War, 16
Cristea, Patriarch, 85, 86
Cuza, Prof. A. C., 83, 84
Cuza, J., 16, 17, 37, 38

Decebal, 2, 3
Denmark, 64
Domitian, 2
Duca, I., 82

Eugene of Savoy, 42

Ferdinand I, 18, 19, 52, 75, 76
France, fall of, 93
French Revolution, 114
Front of National Renaissance, 85, 91

Garoflid, 75
Gepides, 5
Germany, 14, 18, 57, 64, 66, 69, 70, 82, 83, 85–88, 90–4, 96, 99–101, 103–5, 108, 115, 116
Gigurtu, 99
Goga, O., 84, 85
Goths, 4

Halifax, Lord, 97 n.
Hermann Goering Werke, 105
Horia, Closca and Crisan, 13
Horthy, Admiral, 72
Hungarian Revolution 1848, 16, 42
Hungarian Revolution 1919, 72
Hungary, 10, 11, 18, 26, 27, 40, 42, 43, 45–7, 49, 50, 62 n., 64, 65, 72–4, 76, 86, 93, 96–100, 108
Huns, 5
Hunyadi, J., 9 n., 43

000

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

000 *I.G. Farben*, 105
Iron Guard, 81–7, 90–2, 98, 100, 101

Kisseleff, Prince, 15
Kontinentale Oel A.G., 105

Lascar, General, 103
League of Nations, 81, 84
Liberal Party, 17, 71, 75, 76, 80, 81, 83, 84, 90, 103
Little Entente, 73
Louis of Hungary, 10
Lupescu, Mme, 99
Lupu, Dr, 75

Maniu, J., 71, 74–7, 81, 83–5, 90 n., 109
Maria Theresa, 29, 41
Marie, Queen, 72
Mercy, Count, 42
Micescu, I., 90
Michael the Brave, 11
Michael I, 76, 77, 99
Mihalache, I., 74, 75, 81, 83
Minorities, 19, 20 n., 23, 25 n., 26–9, 41, 42, 44–50, 53, 58, 61, 71, 73, 74, 78, 79, 86, 87, 89, 93, 97, 101, 109
Molotov, V., 111
Morgans, 80
Moscow Conference, 110

National Christian Front, 84

Orthodox Church, 4, 6, 8, 12, 24–5
Otto the Great, 7

Paris, Treaty of, 16
Party of the Nation, 91
Peace Settlement of 1919, 20, 57, 72, 93, 97
Peasant Party, 62, 74–6, 81, 84, 86, 90 n., 103

Royal Dutch Shell, 68
Rumanian language and culture, 1, 3, 5, 7, 12, 24
Rumanians, origin of, 3–8
Russia, 14, 28, 29, 35, 56, 60
Russian Revolution, 19, 56, 61, 72

Schneider-Creusot, 69
Sima, H., 92, 100, 101
Skoda, 69
Soviet Union, 18, 27, 54, 58, 73, 76, 93–6, 99, 101, 102, 108, 110, 116
Spanish Civil War, 84
Stalin, J., 111
Stephen the Great, 37
Stirbey, Prince, 110

Tatarescu, G., 81 n., 82, 84, 90
Teheran Conference, 110
Tito, 109 n.
Titulescu, N., 81
Trajan, 3, 32, 41

Udureanu, 99

Vaida-Voevod, 75, 90
Vickers, 69
Vienna Award, 45, 50, 95, 96, 98, 99
Visigoths, 4, 5
Vlachs, 6
Vladimirescu, T., 15, 114

Ypsilanti, A., 15 n.
Yugoslavia, 2, 21, 28, 93, 100

CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY W. LEWIS, M.A., AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

12: Hormos S-4,5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

102

End map (A)

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

much by the Rumanian people as by the intervention of Rumanian and foreign statesmen, whose interests did not coincide with those of the majority of Rumanians. The history of Rumania during the period between the two Great Wars and during the present war is another and more vivid illustration of this passivity of a people, caught in the titanic struggle between Great Powers. /175 648

The economic and political effects of this development can be seen in the exploitation to which the people have been subjected for centuries, chiefly by foreign merchants and trusts, aided and abetted by a greedy and corrupt ruling class, and in the almost suicidal situation into which the nation has been manœuvred in recent times by its short-sighted leaders.

Psychologically, many centuries of political oppression and of economic exploitation have had an even more serious effect in the attitude of many sections of the people to life in general and to their own fate in particular. Generations of Rumanians have been methodically robbed of the fruits of their work for centuries. Their fate was not greatly affected by superficial changes, such as their elevation from serfs to peasants. This explains that they are reluctant to produce more food than they themselves can eat; for it is certain that the money-lender, the tax-collector, their own or some foreign army will take it from them. This fatalism, and the ignorance which their rulers have shown no great enthusiasm to remedy, explain the backwardness of the great masses of the people. But it would be quite wrong to assume that this implies an exhaustion of their latent powers. The Rumanians have often /181

2

12: Kormos S-4,5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

102

End map (B)

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943 ED1 Rumania ED1

000

RUMANIA

ECONOMIC SURVEY

The information contained herein is believed to be correct as at September 1st, 1943

[Title Page]

000

TABLE OF CONVERSIONS

To Change	*To*	*Multiply by*
centimetres	inches	·394
metres	feet	3·281
metres	yards	1·094
kilometres	miles	·621
inches	centimetres	2·540
feet	metres	·305
yards	metres	·914
miles	kilometres	1·609
hectares	acres	2·471
sq. kilometres	sq. miles	·386
acres	hectares	·405
sq. miles	sq. kilometres	2·590
grammes	ounces	·035
ounces	grammes	28·350
kilogrammes	pounds	2·205
pounds	kilogrammes	·454
long tons	metric tons	1·016
metric tons	long tons	·984
litres	pints	1·760
pints	litres	·568
litres	gallons	·220
gallons	litres	4·546
Fahrenheit	Centigrade	subtract 32 and × $\frac{5}{9}$
Centigrade	Fahrenheit	× $\frac{9}{5}$ and add 32

Rough Approximations

10 cms.	=	4 inches	1 hectare	=	2½ acres
11 metres	=	12 yards	5 kgs.	=	11 lbs.
8 kms.	=	5 miles	1 litre	=	1¾ pints
50 kms.	=	31 miles	1 hectolitre	=	22 gallons
26 sq. kms.	=	10 sq. m.	metric ton	=	2,205 lbs.

Temperatures

212° F = 100°C.
98·6° F = 37°C.
32° F = 0°C.

NOTICE

This Survey has been prepared by the Ministry of Economic Warfare and all enquiries for further information, and any suggestions should be directed to—

Room 716,
Ministry of Economic Warfare,
London, W.1.

Tel. : Grosvenor 4060 (Ext. 3197).

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943
ED1 Rumania ED1

RUMANIA

ECONOMIC SURVEY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

000

PAGE

Introduction 3

CHAPTER I

Food and Agriculture 6
Pre-War Conditions 6
1. General 6
2. Natural conditions and regions 5
3. Crops 7
4. Livestock 7
5. Fish 7
6. Food Industries 8
7. Agricultural Organisation 8
8. Agricultural Exports 8
9. Food Consumption 8
Wartime Changes 9
1. Territorial Changes 9
2. Agriculture in war years 9
3. Fish 10
4. Agricultural Exports 10
5. Administrative Control 10
6. Food Conditions 11
7. Food Prices 11

CHAPTER II

Oil 13
Introduction 13
1. General 13
2. Historical 13
The Petroleum Industry 13
1. Production 13
2. Consumption and Export 13
3. Transport 14
The Industry in Wartime 14
1. General 14
2. German Influence 14
3. Restrictions 14
Natural Gas 15
Tables 15
1. Strength of Oil Groups by Nationalities in 1940 15
2. Strength of Oil Groups by Nationalities in 1942 16
3. Principal Rumanian Oil Companies in 1942 16
4. Principal Rumanian Refineries 16

CHAPTER III

Other Fuel and Power 17
Coal 17
(a) Consumption, Import, Deposits 17
(b) Tables 17
1. Production 17
2. Location of Collieries 17
3. Coke Imports and Production 18
Electric Power 18
(a) General 18
1. Sources of Power 18
2. Output and Utilization 18
(b) Generating Stations 18
1. Public Supply Plants 18
2. Industrial Generating Plants 19
(c) Transmission 19
1. Bucarest Area 19
2. Prahova Area 19
3. Sibiu Area 19
(d) Future Developments 19

CHAPTER IV

Metals and Minerals 21
Introduction 21
Iron and Steel 21
1. Iron Ore 21
2. Pig Iron Production 21
3. Steel Production 21
4. Consumption 22
5. German Penetration 22
Lead and Zinc 22
1. General 22
2. Mines and Plant 22
3. Pre-War Production and Trade 22
4. Wartime Development 22

[16]

000

PAGE

Mica 22
Bauxite 22
Aluminium 23
Chrome 23
Manganese 23
Copper 23
Gold 23
Silver 23
1. Mines and Plant 24
2. Pre-War Production 24
3. Wartime Development 24

CHAPTER V

Engineering, Armaments and Shipbuilding **25**

General Engineering 25
1. General 25
2. Agricultural Machinery 25
3. Locomotives and Rolling Stock 25
4. Motor Vehicles 26
5. Electrical Industry 26
Armaments 26
1. General Development 26
2. Small Arms and Mortars 27
3. Artillery Production 27
4. Aircraft Industry 27
Shipbuilding 28

CHAPTER VI

Textiles and Textile Fibres, Timber, Paper and Pulp **29**

Textiles and Textile Fibres 29
1. Cotton 29
2. Wool 29
3. Hemp 29
4. Flax 30
5. Rayon and Staple Fibre 30
6. Silk 30
7. Other Fibres 30
8. Clothes Rationing 30
Timber 31
I. Pre-War Situation 31
1. Area, Location and Supplies 31
2. Annual Increment and Domestic Consumption 31
3. Annual Cut 32
4. Timber Industry 32
5. Exports 32
6. Employment 32
7. Transport 32
II. Present Situation 32
Tables 32
1. Details of Cut 1930 33
2. Distribution of Industry 1938 33
Paper and Pulp 33

CHAPTER VII

Other Industries Chemicals, Rubber, Leather, etc. **34**

The Chemical Industry 34
1. Acids and Alkalis 34
2. Fertilisers 34
3. Wood Distillation Products 34
4. Soap and Glycerine 34
5. Paints and Varnish 34
6. Pharmaceuticals 34
7. Explosives 34
The Rubber Industry 35
1. Raw Materials 35
2. Factories 35
3. Imports 35
4. Synthetic Rubber 35
5. Cultivation of Rubber-bearing Plants .. 35
6. Present Position 35
The Leather Industry 35
I. Pre-War Period 35
1. Hides, Skins and Leather 35
2. Manufactures 36
3. Tanning Materials 36
II. Wartime Developments 36
1. General 36
2. Tanning Materials 36
Building Materials and Cement 37
Glass 37
Ceramics 37

[1c]

CHAPTER VIII

PAGE

Transport and Communications 39
Railways 39
I Pre-War Conditions 39
1 Communications 39
2 Principal Routes 39
3 Staff 40
4 Locomotives and Rolling Stock 40
5 Traffic 40
(a) Goods 40
(b) Passenger 40
II Wartime Changes 40
1 Territorial Changes 40
2 New Construction and Improvements 41
Roads 42
Shipping 42
1 Introduction 42
2 Mercantile Marine 42
3 Ports 42
Inland Waterways 43
I General 43
II The Danube 43
1 Traffic 43
2 Navigation 44
3 Ports 44
4 Organisation 44
5 The Inland Fleet 45
Telecommunications 45
I Pre-War Situation 45
1 Telegraph and Telephones 45
2 Submarine Cables 45
3 Wireless 45
II Wartime Developments 45
1 Telegraph and Telephones 45
2 Wireless 45

CHAPTER IX

Foreign Trade 47
General 47
Chief Imports and their Sources 47
1 Iron and Steel 47
2 Textile Fibres and Manufactures 47
3 Machinery and Apparatus 47
4 Other Base Metals and Manufactures 48
5 Vehicles 48
6 Chemical Products 48
7 Fruit and Colonial Produce 48
8 Rubber, Celluloid, etc 48
9 Earth, Stone and Manufactures 48
10 Notes 48
Chief Exports and their Destinations 49
1 Materials for Heat, Light, etc 49
2 Cereals and Pulses 49

[2a]

PAGE

3. Timber 49
4. Livestock 49
5. Seeds 49
6. Edible Animal Products 50
7. Fruit and Colonial Produce 50
8. Vegetables, Flowers, etc 50
9. Hides, Skins, etc 50
10. Notes 50

Wartime Changes 50

CHAPTER X

Finance 51

Public Finance 51
1. The Budget in Pre-War Years 51
2. Expenditure in Wartime 51
3. Government Borrowing during the War 51
4. External Position of the Leu 52
5. Prices and Price Control 52

Banking 52
1. State and State Controlled Banks 52
2. Commercial Banks 53
3. German Infiltration, etc 53
4. Advances for Maintenance of German Troops 53
5. The German-Rumanian Clearing 53

CHAPTER XI

Labour 54

Population 54
1. General 54
2. Effect of Changes 54
3. Occupational Distribution 54

Labour Position during the War 55
1. Military Conscription 55
2. Recruitment for Germany 55
3. Foreign Workers in Rumania 55

General Labour Developments 55
1. Agriculture 55
2. Industry 55
3. Mining 56
4. Armament Works 56
5. Timber 56
6. Textiles and Clothing 56
7. Building 56

Control of Labour 56
1. Youth Labour Service 56
2. Civil Mobilisation 56

The Jewish Population 56

Wages 56
1. General 56
2. Agricultural 57
3. Civil Service 57
4. Table of Industrial Wages 57

[2b]

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943
ED1 Rumania ED1 000

NOTE

UNLESS "LONG" TONS ARE SPECIFICALLY STATED IN THE TEXT, ALL WEIGHTS GIVEN ARE IN METRIC TONS. "TONS" MEAN METRIC TONS, NOT ENGLISH LONG TONS.

[2c]

000

PART II

INTRODUCTION

241 The basis of Rumanian economy is agriculture in that some 80 per cent. of the population derive their livelihood from the land and agriculture provides a high proportion of the national income. [315] During recent years, however, the expansion of the oil industry has meant that agricultural pro- [439] duce has played a decreasing part in the country's exports, having been superseded by oil, exports of which amounted to 43 per cent. of the total export trade in 1938, compared with 19 per cent. in 1927; while grain exports in 1938 represented 23 per cent. compared with 46 per cent. in 1927.

In spite of the importance of agriculture to national prosperity farming methods are backward and per acre crop yields are among the lowest in Europe. Attention is particularly given to growing cereals, and of these maize is the chief, [231] providing a large surplus for export (apart from the war years). Livestock density is low, which is one of the weaknesses of Rumanian agriculture, the Banat being the only district in which numbers are fairly high, and farming approaches the [439] intensive system. It must be stressed that the relatively large export surplus, which consists of wheat, maize, barley, oilseeds and pulses, livestock, oilcake, etc., is only made possible by [146] the very low nutritional level which prevails, and that if this were raised to anything like western European standards exports would be commensurately reduced.

248 Since the war more attention has been paid to 249 the growth of industrial crops such as sunflower, soya, cotton, hemp and flax, and the cultivation of rubber-bearing plants has been started following the finding of the *Kok Saghys* plant left by the Russians in Bessarabia. Though some success has been achieved in increasing the areas under textile fibres, and yields have been slightly higher, the hoped for increases in soya and sunflower cultivation have not been achieved due to unfavourable weather conditions and to general wartime dislocation.

313 Rumania's forest resources, though extensive, have suffered severely from a consistent policy of over-exploitation, and, while providing the basis of a fairly important industry during the period between the two wars, have been so depleted that cutting will have to be very restricted for a number of years if they are to be allowed to recover. The loss of Northern Transylvania has affected the timber industry in particular, as a high proportion of the forest resources were located there, and in that district this industry was better developed than elsewhere in the country.

IMPORTANCE OF OIL

315 Oil plays a major part, not only in Rumania's foreign trade, but also in covering her domestic fuel requirements, to a large extent replacing coal, reserves of which are small and of low quality. Since the war and the resulting pressure which Germany has exerted to obtain increased quantities of oil for her armies, (combined with the consistent drop in the rate of production between 1936 and 1941), serious attempts have been made to find alternative sources of fuel. The enormous reserves of natural gas existing in Transylvania, which were exploited only very slightly before the war, are being used increasingly as a source of fuel to supply local industries, and a

315 pipeline has been completed from a secondary source of supply at Manești to convey this gas to Bucarest to supply both household and industrial requirements.

135 Iron-ore deposits are small, so that the heavy industries are very largely dependent on imports. A variety of other mineral resources, which are believed to exist in greater abundance than has so far been established, have not yet been fully surveyed.

433 Rumania has a poorly-developed industry, which lags far behind that of western European countries such as Czechoslovakia, though is ahead of all the other south-east European countries, except Hungary. Financially she is a poor country, with very limited capital resources, which has proved a severe hindrance to industrial development and has laid her open to the invest-
[457] ment of foreign capital, which has been attracted particularly by the rich mineral oil and forest resources. Skilled labour, also a vital factor in the
[464] process of industrialisation, has been lacking, so that the use of foreign technicians has been essential. Other raw-material resources, though adequate to allow the development of a sound and varied industry, are not sufficiently extensive to encourage a very rapid development independent of imported raw materials.

Industrialisation in Rumania did not start until about 1890, and the period of greatest expansion was between 1929 and 1938. The consumption industries were the first to be developed, and of these food industries are the chief, the raw materials being grown on the spot. The growth of such industries as paper, cardboard, printing, soap, chemicals and furniture, etc., followed. The location of industry in the earlier stages was governed not by such factors as the existence of cheap labour, but was built up in those areas richest in raw materials.

MAIN INDUSTRIAL REGIONS

[311] The main industrial region is in the Prahova valley, where the oilfields are to be found, followed by the Reșița district, where the existence of iron ore, coal, manganese, etc., led to the development of metallurgical and engineering facilities, as well as of such auxiliary industries as coal and wood distilleries. Gold, silver, lead, zinc and copper deposits in the Baia Mare region formed the basis for the erection of both metal and chemical factories. The presence of methane gas, salt, gold, silver and stone quarries in and around Turda determined the location of factories for production of cement, limestone, bricks, tiles, porcelain, glass, sulphuric acid, etc. In the rich forest districts of Ferdinand, Nadrag and Hunedoara, where iron ore deposits are also to be found, blast furnaces and metallurgical industries have been established. The textile industry is mainly established in Cisnădia, Piatra Neamț, Bacău and Buhuși. Apart from the regions mentioned, industry is centred in the principal towns—Bucarest, Timișoara, Brașov, Sf. Gheorghe, Arad, Galați, Brăila, Cernăuți, Cluj and Iași.

The following table gives an idea of the relative importance of the various industries, showing the amount of capital invested and value of production in each of the main groups, and also the number of factories and of personnel employed :—

[3c]

INTRODUCTION

433

THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES IN 1938

Industry	No. of enterprises	Invested Capital in million lei	Personnel (including workers and managing staff)	Production in million lei
Food	974	10,773·0	38,400	15,577·4
Textiles	640	8,230·3	74,100	14,691·9
Chemicals	397	12,325·3	28,300	14,154·6
Metallurgy	366	8,466·4	51,300	11,362·8
Timber	713	2,273·6	43,300	3,583·5
Leather	158	1,025·3	13,400	3,437·5
Paper	157	3,577·4	15,200	3,088·5
Building materials	258	2,493·4	15,100	1,959·6
Electro-technics	31	199·8	2,700	674·6
Glassware	39	561·4	5,700	527·1
Pottery	34	143·3	1,700	148·9
Total	3,767	50,069·2	289,200	69,206·4

[4a]

RUMANIA AS A GERMAN ALLY

648 433 To Germany Rumania has been an invaluable if expensive ally—invaluable mainly for her oil production, which accounts for one-third of total Axis supplies; expensive because, in order to exploit the country's usefulness to the full, it has been necessary to provide goods, such as oil-well equipment, agricultural machinery, machine tools, etc., all of which she can ill spare on account of the need for them both in her own country and for supply to her other satellites. To ensure smooth working of the oil-well region German troops have been established in the Ploeşti district. Apart fom oil German expectations have come to very little in Rumania—her demands for cereals, soya beans, sunflower-seed, etc., have not been fulfilled due to bad harvests, labour shortage and peasant hoarding, and livestock deliveries have been affected by fodder shortage and illegal slaughterings.

As to further German demands on Rumanian economy, the most outstanding were for manpower in the form of troops for the Eastern front, and the use of the country for transit of troops and war materials to the battle zones. Both these facilities have been of considerable material value to the enemy, though in order to make use of Rumanian troops Germany has had to provide the bulk of the equipment, as Rumanian industry is not adequate to supply more than the barest minimum; and even where she has the available facilities, raw materials are lacking.

[489] To exploit the country successfully from the transport angle it has been necessary to set up a control organisation to direct transit traffic, and, in addition, to supply and repair locomotives and rolling stock.

GERMAN PENETRATION

648 439 For a great many years, Germany has been the natural supplier of engineering and consumption goods which Rumania was unable to produce for herself, and has provided a ready market for her surplus agricultural produce. Following the coming into power of the Nazi Government, Germany succeeded in acquiring Rumanian trade to an increasing extent at the expense of other countries. With the outbreak of war, Rumania has become even more dependent on Germany as a supplier of manufactured goods in general, and iron and steel products in particular.

648
439

In 1940 an economic agreement was signed between the two countries, by which in exchange for raw materials a ten-year plan for the development of Rumanian economy was formed. Germany agreed to the following main conditions :—

(1) The granting of extensive long-term credits.

(2) The supply of tools and machines for agricultural development.

(3) The provision of technical and financial aid for industry.

(4) The provision of extensive supplies for the development of the transport system.

(5) To put technical experts at Rumania's disposal.

(6) To make capital available for the development of industry and the banking system.

457
471

Germany has exploited Rumania's dependence on her to the full by providing the minimum of goods, so that she owes her an ever-increasing sum in the clearing. German financial interests have gained tremendous impetus since the removal of British and American competition, together with the acquisition of the actual interests of occupied countries, such as France, Holland, and Czechoslovakia. To cite the most important example, in the oil industry German capital has increased from 0.5 per cent. of total investments in 1939 to about 38 per cent. in 1942, while in the heavy industry the Hermann Goeringwerke have achieved a footing in the main engineering firms of Reşiţa and Malaxa, as well as in the aircraft industry and in the shipbuilding yards at Galaţi. The motor-vehicle assembly industry is almost entirely in the hands of the German companies, and German capital is to be found in the banks, in the timber and textile industries, in a number of transport and trading companies, and behind the attempted expansion of the mineral resources.

ITALIAN PENETRATION

There is also some considerable Italian financial penetration in Rumanian industry, though on nothing like the same scale as German; it is mainly confined to the oil, building, timber and textile industries and to various cereal export companies.

[4c]

TERRITORIAL LOSSES

728 In 1940 Rumania suffered serious loss of territory. First in August, Bessarabia and the Northern Bucovina were occupied by the Russians, then a few weeks later Northern Transylvania was given to Hungary by the Vienna Award, following which the Southern Dobruja was ceded to Bulgaria by the Treaty of Craiova. However, in 1941, Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina were regained, so that the loss of these territories was of only temporary significance.

[131] [161] *Territory*	*Area sq. km.*	*Population in millions*	*Date of Loss*
Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina	50,000	3.3	*August*, 1940
Northern Transylvania	43,700	2.75	*Sept.*, 1940
Southern Dobruja	7,700	0.38	*Sept.*, 1940

The temporary loss of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina had serious repercussions on the economic situation of the country, which were of wider effect than might be supposed from the limited time of the annexation, because of the loss of the harvests of both 1940 and 1941, the "scorched earth" policy of the Russians and the dislocation of the transport system caused by the necessary re-conversion to standard European gauge from the Russian gauge.

The cession of Northern Transylvania, apart from the mere physical loss of territory and population, caused a severe disruption of the economic system on account of the valuable raw materials involved, and the loss of industry which had been built up on the basis of these raw materials. The capital invested in industry in this area represented some 13 per cent. of total investments in industry in the whole country. The main features were the mineral resources of the Baia Mare district, containing lead, zinc, gold, silver and small quantities of copper, with lead-refining plants attached. In this area deposits of pyrites were fairly considerable and supplied the bulk

728 135

728 of requirements for sulphuric-acid production. [135] Of lesser importance were the salt and coal deposits.

The forest resources of Northern Transylvania [313] are estimated to have accounted for as much as 25 per cent. of pre-war timber production. Apart from timber the food and leather industries appear to have been the most developed. This [311] area was principally made up of forests and pastures; the arable land provided no surplus after local needs had been covered. Of livestock [233] losses the most outstanding feature was nearly 2 million sheep.

[496] The railway system, and particularly the railway administration, was severely handicapped by the change of frontiers, which in places cut one part of Rumania off from the other.

Caliacra and Durostor, the two ceded Dobrujan provinces, are mainly agricultural, and though producing a small surplus, contributed little to Rumania's total agricultural output. Of more significance is the cotton-growing area. There are no known mineral deposits, and industry in this area is on a very small scale, relying mainly on handicrafts.

TRANSNISTRIA

727 Transnistria is the name which has been given to the territory lying between the Dniester and the Bug, which was given to Rumania to administer in 1941 subsequent to its capture from the U.S.S.R. by Rumanian and German troops. Transnistria is part of the Southern Ukraine and is mainly agricultural, while such industry as existed has been of no use to the Rumanians on account of the heavy destruction carried out by the Russians. It is probably true to say that this territory has been more of a financial liability than an asset to Rumania on account of the heavy expenditure entailed in repairs, particularly of railways and bridges. Some little advantage has, however, been gained from the harvest of 1942-3.

CHAPTER I

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

A. PRE-WAR CONDITIONS

I. General

241 Agriculture occupies about 80 per cent. of the population of Rumania and contributes the greater part of the national income: but, owing to the importance of the country's mineral-oil production, exports of agricultural products accounted for rather less than half of total exports by value, in the immediate pre-war years. [439]

Total agricultural production, even if there were no exports, would fall seriously short of the real food needs of the country. The poorest are actually underfed, while the majority of the remainder subsist on a diet which, though adequate in quantity, is seriously deficient in quality and nutritional elements. [146]

In her farming Rumania suffers from two interrelated difficulties: rural over-population and low food output per acre. There are 16 agricultural workers per 100 acres of farm land, compared with 6 in Denmark and 3 in Britain. Another aspect of this is the extremely small size of most of the farms—75 per cent. of them are less than 5 hectares (12 acres) in extent. Because there is not enough land to go round, most farming families have to eke out a living on holdings which under any system of general farming would be too small to provide an adequate income. [161]

The position would be less serious if a high per-acre food output were achieved. But in fact the Rumanian output per acre is barely one-quarter of that obtained in countries like Belgium and the Netherlands. Rumania pivots her farming on wheat and maize production but, owing to the extensive methods practised, the few livestock kept, and other reasons, per acre yields are among the lowest in Europe.

It is the over-population and land shortage which are largely responsible for agriculture remaining so backward. Having insufficient land the peasant does not produce much for sale, and so cannot afford to purchase fertilisers, good quality seed or better implements. Nor can he spare many acres for fodder crops, since the bulk of his land is needed to grow the food his family eats. And as he cannot buy fodder, he cannot keep many animals. Thus, while there is some scope for agricultural improvements which would ameliorate the peasants' lot, the pre-requisite of farming progress is to find alternative occupations for the surplus population.

423 471 The system of land tenure is peasant proprietorship. This was attained under the Land Reform carried through after the first World War. The effect of this was to divide up and transfer to peasant ownership a large area of land formerly worked in big estates. This revolution in land tenure provided a solution for a long-standing social problem, but its effects on production were unfavourable. The large estates had been run by trained managers, with relatively advanced methods and equipment. Their transfer to ill-equipped, backward and uneducated peasants was followed, for a time at least, by a decline in yields, and consequently in total production and exports.

241 Little progress was made in the period between the two wars in remedying the disadvantages of uneconomic farm sizes, and in raising the low standards of farming. For lack of education the

241 peasant views with suspicion and often hostility all attempts at improvements in traditional
[474] methods. Even the co-operative societies have made less progress than in other Danubian countries. There is need for considerable capital expenditure in grouping small farms into larger units, in providing better buildings, more implements and fertilisers. There is need for diversification of production—more fodder crops and more animal husbandry. Above all, there is need for development in industry and commerce to provide work for the surplus agricultural population.

2. Natural Conditions and Regions

132 The climate is of the extreme Continental type, with long hot summers and severe winters. Precipitation is largely concentrated in winter and early summer. During the greater part of the growing and ripening season rains are light, and from time to time serious droughts occur which may ruin the grain crops.

133 The agricultural regions correspond to the natural divisions into plain and hill country—the
311 Danube plain and Bessarabia which comprise the greater part of the territory and produce the bulk of the crops, and the hilly and mountainous land of Transylvania and the Bucovina.

The plain is well-suited for agriculture, the soil over much of it being of the fertile *chernozem* or
[134] black earth type, but the backward methods of farming and the light rainfall keep yields per acre low.

This region is not equally backward in all parts. The Rumanian Banat at the western end of the country, and formerly part of Hungary, is more prosperous and progressive. The population is
[162] not purely Rumanian but includes Swabians and Saxons, descendants of the German stock systematically settled there on medium-sized peasant holdings in the eighteenth century after the cession of the territory to Austria by the Turks. Methods and yields, by Rumanian standards, are good.
[231] The livestock density is higher than the average and the area produces a substantial surplus of pigs. Rural overcrowding is not as marked as elsewhere.

241 Conditions of life and methods of farming are considerably worse in the plain land of the Old
133 Kingdom. Agriculture here is as primitive as in any part of Eastern Europe, depending on an unbroken alternation of wheat and maize cultivation with little subsidiary production. Some wheat is marketed, but the maize is grown largely
[311] for consumption on the farms. So little land is available per head of population that the farm population and working animals (which eat the maize stalks) can be fed only by devoting an excessive acreage to maize.

Bessarabia makes up the remainder of the plain land; conditions of settlement and farming methods are much the same as in the Old Kingdom, but the density of population is lower and there are substantial grain exports.

Given normal yields, every district of the plain area is at least self-sufficient in foodstuffs; indeed parts of it regularly produce large grain surpluses. Transitional areas between the Danube Valley and the Transylvanian plateau, such as the Carpatho-Moldavia and Carpatho-Muntenia areas, may,

[6c]

241 133 however, be slightly deficient in grain, especially in poor years.

[311] The hilly land of Transylvania and the Bucovina differs markedly from the plain. There is proportionately less arable and much more meadow, grazing and forest land. The soil is poor. Methods are not as primitive as in the plain land of the Old Kingdom, but over-crowding is more serious and output per head is consequently lower. Parts of this region are slightly deficient in grain. Though [146] the level of food consumption is low, the dietary is more varied than elsewhere in the country, less maize and more meat and dairy produce being eaten.

3. Crops

311 Of the total area of pre-war Rumania, of nearly 30 million hectares (119,000 sq. miles) and twice the area of England and Wales), about 13 million hectares, or 45 per cent. was arable. Permanent meadow, pasture and grazing occupied 14 per cent., while tree and bush crops accounted for a further 2 per cent. The remaining land was non-agricultural, forest and waste land.

243 A very high proportion of the arable—over 80 per cent.—was used for grain growing, principally maize, wheat and barley. Owing to low rainfall, use of poor seed and lack of fertilisers, yields were at a low level and fluctuated widely from year to year.

[439] Out of an average grain production of 11 million tons, 6 millions went into domestic human consumption and 1½ million were exported, the remainder going to fodder seed and waste. Grain exports have always figured largely in the country's foreign trade. During the twenty years 1920 to 1939 they only once fell below a million tons, and in some years exceeded three million tons. In value, during the decade before the war, they formed, after petroleum products, the main item in exports.

241 No other category of crops compares with grain. Sown fodder crops took barely 5 per cent. of the arable, all other crops, including potatoes, fibres, oilseeds, tobacco and sugar beet, about 8 per cent. Peas, beans and oilseeds were grown in sufficient quantities to provide surpluses for export. Germany established two companies—Solagra in 1934 and Soya A.G. in 1940—which invested large sums in promoting oilseed cultivation. The area 149 under sunflower was raised only slightly, but that under soya rose from nil in 1933 to 103,000 ha. (254,000 acres) in 1939, but the greater part of both crops was located in Bessarabia which Rumania lost to the U.S.S.R. in 1940 (see below).

244 Production of potatoes, vegetables and sugar 249 beet was just sufficient for domestic consumption, but the tobacco crop did not quite meet requirements. Tobacco production had fallen from 20,000 tons in the late nineteen-twenties to 12,000 tons in the years just prior to the war.

245 Fruit production was undeveloped and there was little organised marketing and processing. Plums were the main crop, but three-quarters of the output was used for making brandy. Apples and other kinds of fruit, and walnuts, were produced in fair quantities, but exports were insignificant, and, owing to low quality and the lack of standardisation, there were no prospects of development.

241

*Production of Principal Crops**
Average 1935-38
('000 *metric tons*)

Wheat ..	3,677
Rye	430
Barley	1,071
Oats	604
Maize	5,215
Potatoes ..	2,010
Sugar beet† ..	570
Peas	45
Beans	230
Tobacco ..	12
Sunflower seed	177
Soya beans ..	42
Rape seed ..	48

* Pre 1939 frontiers.
† This produced 110,000 m. tons of raw sugar

4. Livestock

231 One of the chief weaknesses of Rumanian agriculture is the low density of livestock. Numbers of cattle per 100 acres of farm land are less than half those of this country and Germany; about half the farms possess no cows. A large proportion of the cattle, moreover, are draught animals which require land to feed them but which yield little saleable produce. Moreover, the annual milk [234] yield per cow averages less than 1,350 litres (300 gallons) as compared with over 700 gallons in Denmark.

Of pigs, the numbers and quality compare even less favourably with those of other countries. Only in the Banat district is there an approach to an interlocking of grain production with pig-raising. Sheep are an important source of income to the peasants of the Transylvanian mountains, a region where water buffaloes are kept as draught animals since they require no sustenance other than a daily cold bath and a few maize stalks.

Livestock numbers in 1938, and the production of livestock products in 1935-38, were as follows:—

*Livestock Numbers**
'000 *head*

Horses	2,158
Cattle	4,161
(including cows)	(2,030)
Buffaloes ..	165
Sheep	12,768
Goats	399
Pigs	3,165
Poultry ..	34,660

* Pre-1939 frontiers.

*Production of Livestock Products**
Average 1935-38
('000 *metric tons*)

[234] Milk‡	3,000
Butter	20
Cheese	30
Beef and veal ..	120
Mutton and lamb	20
Pork	152
Poultry meat ..	60

* Pre-1939 frontiers.
‡ Cows, buffaloes, sheep and goats.

5. Fish

228 All fishing along the Danube, including the [656] mouths of the delta, and along the western shores of the Black Sea coast, is controlled by the State Fisheries Administration. The total annual catch in State-owned waters averaged 15,000 tons in the years immediately preceding the war, of which fresh-water fish contributed more than two-thirds. This does not, however, represent the total catch, as fairly large quantities were caught

[76]

CHAPTER 1

228 in private waters. Supplemented by some 4,000 tons of imported fish, this provided nearly 1 kg. (2·2 lb.) per head of population, but, in fact, almost all the fish was consumed by the 5 million persons living in towns. The principal fish caught were sturgeon, carp, pike, eels and crayfish, the main fishing centres being Brăila, Tulcea and Ismail.

6. Food Industries

256 The chief food and agricultural-processing industries are milling, sugar manufacture, oilseed crushing and tobacco curing. While the milling industry was dispersed widely about the country in more than 15,000 small mills employing altogether over 37,000 persons (at 1930 census), the sugar industry was for the most part concentrated in the plain of the Old Kingdom. Of the 17 sugar 257 factories employing 10,000 workers, only one was in the Transylvanian districts lost to Hungary and five in the areas temporarily lost to the U.S.S.R. The vegetable-oil industry, located chiefly in 258 Bessarabia, was only partly carried on in factories, of which there were (on January 1st, 1939) 117, employing 2,026 workers. Among these, 34 were fitted both to extract crude oil and to refine it, six were exclusively refineries, while the remainder produced only crude oil. The rest of the industry consisted of some 2,000 hand, or animal-driven presses mostly owned by individual peasants or by shopkeepers. These primitive presses extracted only a low percentage of oil from the seeds, and consequently the cake—mainly sold for export—had an unusually high oil content. As regards 277 tobacco, both curing and cigarette manufacture [656] were subject to government licence and control. There were 29 factories (in 1939) employing 9,720 workers, but tobacco cultivation subsequently declined, so also doubtless did the numbers employed.

7. Agricultural Organisation

452 The history of the organisation of Rumanian 241 farmers is one of not too successful co-operatives 474 becoming transformed more and more into agencies for the execution of Government Control Schemes. [654] For many years there had been throughout the country a network of agricultural credit societies, co-operative in form but in practice directed by the State. These played an important rôle during the period of the Land Reform in helping the peasants by advances to buy and equip their newly acquired holdings. There was even some co-operative cultivation for a time, until the new peasant-owners could muster sufficient draught animals and implements. Besides this, there have been strong local co-operative unions especially among the [162] minority nationalities—the Hungarians in Transylvania, the Swabian and Saxons in the Banat and the Russian and Polish Jews in the Bucovina.

243 The credit societies revived in importance when 474 after 1933, the Rumanian Government began the organisation of grain marketing. They became 452 the local agents of a Central Marketing Board through which all sales of grain had to be made 654 both for home consumption and for export. Whereas formerly grain prices slumped immediately after the harvest, most peasants, being obliged to sell their grain quickly, under the new scheme prices were stabilised throughout the year, and this brought a great improvement to peasants' [651] receipts. But the scheme and the societies were also used to collect the peasants' taxes (paid in grain) which did not increase the popularity of co-operation.

[8a]

241 654 Alongside this organisation the State ran certain technical services for agriculture, distribution of tested seeds, control of weights and measures, provision of bull and stallion services from its own stud farms. This work, however, remained less developed than in other S.E. European countries.

8. Agricultural Exports

241 231 439 Rumania was the largest grain exporter in Europe. By value, grain accounted for over half the total of agricultural exports. Livestock products, mainly live pigs and cattle, amounted to approximately one-fifth of the total, the remainder consisting of peas, beans, oilseeds, oil and oilcake, eggs and small quantities of fruit. Quantities exported on the average in the years 1935 to 1938 are shown below :—

	*Exports of Principal Agricultural Commodities** *Average* 1935-38 ('000 *metric tons*)
Wheat	686
Maize	543
Barley	297
Peas	21
Beans	43
Oilseeds	108
Vegetable oils ..	5
Oilcake	103
Cattle ('000 head) ..	48
Pigs ('000 head) ..	222
Eggs	10

* Pre-1939 frontiers.

241 439 It is of interest to note that, despite German hopes of a development in oilseed cultivation and exports, no increase had been achieved up to the eve of the war. German interest had succeeded in stimulating production and exports of soya beans, but there was no expansion in total oilseed exports owing to a decline in rape seed and to an increase in domestic consumption of oil.

German purchases of Rumanian agricultural exports were increasing in recent pre-war years. In 1939 the territories of Greater Germany took 25 per cent. of the wheat exports, half the feed grain and the bulk of the oilseeds. Italy also took appreciable quantities of grain.

9. Food Consumption

146 262 The Rumanian diet is perhaps the worst-balanced in south-east Europe. The outstanding feature is its high dependence on grain, which provides three-quarters of the calories and 70 per cent. of the protein. In the towns white wheat bread is eaten except by the very poor, whilst in the country wholemeal bread or maize is usual. Over large areas, particularly in the Old Kingdom, maize forms the chief food. (Taking the country as a whole maize consumption is two-thirds higher than wheat.) During the summer months, when work is very heavy, peasant families may eat as much as 3 kg. (6½ lb.) a head daily, almost always in the form of *mámáliga* (a kind of porridge).

The rest of the rural dietary consists chiefly of beans, some potatoes (especially in Transylvania), cabbage, beetroots, carrots, onions and a certain amount of cheese and milk. Consumption of all these foods is much too low by nutritional standards. Meat is rarely eaten, except at Christmas time when a pig is killed—for the rest of the year small amounts of fat salted pork are used, more or less as a flavouring. Some fish is eaten in villages near rivers. Vegetable oils—mainly sunflower—and pig fats are used for cooking; butter is rarely eaten.

746 Largely because of its cost, the consumption of
262 sugar is very low, except among the well-to-do in the towns. (To encourage sugar-beet growing, a high price was set by the Government.)

[785] The diet is further impoverished by the long religious fasts—seven weeks before Easter, six weeks before Christmas, two shorter summer periods, plus Wednesdays and Fridays of each week. The diet during the fast includes practically no food of animal origin. Children under 10 years do not normally observe these fasts and, in fact, usually have a better diet during these periods since more milk, eggs and butter are available for them.

The diet, though fairly adequate in energy value, is short of animal protein, fats and calcium; moreover, where maize is the principal cereal lack of vitamin B_1 may be very serious. Various symptoms of vitamin and mineral deficiencies are
[165] observed, and the high infant-mortality rate—the highest in Europe—is also partly due to malnutrition. One of the most serious effects of the poor diet is the nervous disease pellagra, caused by this deficiency of the vitamin B_2 factor. In Moldavia, where maize is the staple food, about 5 per cent.
[164] of the rural population suffers from pellagra every spring. In the whole country about 3,000 deaths occur each year from this disease (compared with 4,000 in the maize-eating southern states of U.S.A.).

The average annual pre-war food consumption of Rumania is shown in the following table, with comparative figures for the United Kingdom.

Average per Head Consumption

	Rumania		*United Kingdom*	
	Kg.	*Lb.*	*Kg.*	*Lb.*
Wheat and rye..	104	229	129	285
Maize	166	365	—	—
Potatoes ..	50	110	84	185
Sugar	5	11	43	95
Meat	17	37	63	139
Milk	70	123*	94	165*
Butter	1	2	11	24
Pig fat	4	10	5	11
Vegetable oil ..	1·5	3	—	—
Margarine ..	—	—	4	10
Calories per day	2,700		3,100	

*Pints

B. WAR-TIME CHANGES

1. Territorial Changes

728 The net effect of the territorial changes which
241 have occurred since 1939 is the loss of Northern Transylvania to Hungary and of Southern Dobruja
311 to Bulgaria. For two seasons' crops, 1940 and 1941, Rumania was without Bessarabia, but in the late summer of 1941 she not only regained Bessarabia but acquired administrative control of the Soviet territory now styled Transnistria, and this has made small contributions to the food supplies of Rumania in 1942-43. Ignoring Transnistria, however, Rumania lost 12 per cent. of her former arable area and grain production. The Transylvanian areas ceded to Hungary, though not rich agriculturally, probably needed only small imports of grain to supplement their own production, while south Dobruja, though a surplus producing area, contributed only a fraction to Rumania's total agricultural production. The country's potential agricultural export remains, therefore, substantially what it was before the war.

2. Agriculture in War Years

241
722 Germany, at the outbreak of the war, looked to the Danube countries, and to Rumania in particu-

241 722 lar, for grain, oilseeds and livestock products to provide the balance of food and fodder requirements which she could not obtain from her own agriculture. The normal grain surpluses and the potential output of sunflower and other oilseeds appeared sufficiently large to provide a solid basis for these expectations. Owing, however, to wartime dislocations of economic life, to the absence of adequate administrative control of farming, to the lack of co-operation by the peasants, and, above all, to a succession of unfavourable seasons, these hopes have been almost entirely falsified.

Firstly, in 1940, Rumania lost Bessarabia, her principal surplus region, to the U.S.S.R., and with it all that year's crops. When she regained it in 1941 she obtained no surplus out of that harvest, and, because of disorganisation, little in 1942. In rump Rumania, in 1940 and 1941, the grain harvests were substantially below the average owing to reduced sowings (partly caused by mobilisation) and to disappointing yields. A determined effort was made by propaganda and the release of labour to bring sowings back to normal for the 1942 season. But the early onset of an unusually severe winter again reduced the sowings, while a serious drought in the summer of 1942 reduced the yields.

722 [243] There was a deficiency in wheat sowings of over a million hectares, while grain yields were barely 60 per cent. of the average. The out-turn of the year was consequently worse than that of the two preceding years. Wheat and rye yielded only 1·3 million tons compared with an average for the territory of 3·6 million tons. The maize crop was a little less than 3 million tons compared with an average of 4·7 million tons. The total grain production was about 5·5 million tons, a quantity inadequate to meet the requirements of food and fodder at any approach to normal levels.

[241] Other crops were more successful in 1942, but they could not appreciably offset the disastrous grain results. The potato crop reached an average level for the first time during the war years, and part of it was used to stretch the deficient wheat for bread making. There was also a good crop of beans and peas, largely because, as their prices were not controlled, they were very remunerative crops. The sunflower crop, though sowings failed to reach the ambitious target and yields were only 80 per cent. of normal, was of record dimensions. Soya, rape and sugar beet declined, however, from earlier levels. (A significant supplementary supply of sugar is now being obtained from Transnistria.)

[243] These for the most part poor crop results, besides curtailing the supplies available for human consumption and exports, also brought about a reduction in livestock numbers at the end of 1942. Livestock numbers may, however, have increased somewhat in 1940 and 1941, for it was reported that peasants held back more grain than usual in those years for livestock feeding. If this is true, numbers would now probably be little different from those of pre-war years.

[241] Crop prospects for 1943 point to a more normal result. The winter of 1942-43 was late and mild, making it possible to sow a near-average acreage of winter crops. Preparatory work for spring sowings was also done in good time, and on the whole the weather subsequently has not been unfavourable.

722 249 Tobacco cultivation appears to have declined in the war years, principally because the prices were even more unattractive than those of grain. In 1942 the area sown was reported to be little

CHAPTER I

722 more than half the normal, but the efforts in 1943
[249] to recover to a more average crop may have succeeded.

3. Fish

[228] The general food shortage in Rumania gave a great fillip to the fishing industry. In the 12 months April 1942 to March 1943, some 40,000 tons of fish were caught in State waters besides 13,000 tons in rented and private waters. This is almost double the largest pre-war catch. During 1942 some 6,000 tons were salted down for winter use. In order to promote and introduce better organisation into the fishing industry a German-Rumanian Company has been established, the "Marea-Neagrã," which will devote special attention to developing the Black Sea fisheries.

4. Agricultural Exports

439 The pre-war level of grain exports was well
243 maintained in 1939; wheat in particular was prominent with over a million tons. The exports of 1940, however, showed an immediate reflection of territorial changes and war shortages. Total grain exports in that year barely reached a million tons compared with the pre-war average of about 1·6 million tons. The following year showed a still sharper decline, wheat reaching only 5,000 tons and maize 120,000 tons. In 1942, despite the recovery of Bessarabia, it is most unlikely that even this level was maintained.

439 Oilseed exports, despite direct German interven-
249 tion aiming at an expansion of the crop, also fell below pre-war levels. Sunflower-seed exports, the principal oilseed, fell from an average of 30,000 tons in 1935-38 to 12,000 tons in 1940 and to 5,000 tons in 1941. Exports following the 1942 crop, though probably better, were not at all commensurate with the increased production, for a serious shortage of edible oil and fat had meanwhile developed in Rumania owing to decreased supplies of pig fat and to the retention by the peasants of their seed for consumption at home, or for disposal on the Black Market.

5. Administrative Control

241 Not even the most complete and efficient system
656 of administrative control could have assured the country's food supplies and exports at normal
435 levels during these three unfavourable years, but it is clear that Rumania's food difficulties have been aggravated by mistakes in economic policy and inadequate control measures. Bureaucratic methods of handling the peasants aroused antagonism and resistance. Supplies of tested seed and other farm requisites were not made available in time. On the collection and supply side, too much power was left in the hands of local prefects. But the most serious shortcoming of the official administration was the failure to establish a price control, and an appropriate relationship between agricultural prices and the cost of the things farmers buy. (In the absence of effective discipline this ratio needs to be strongly in the producers' favour if production and marketing of foodstuffs is to be maintained.) Prices of consumers' goods rose rapidly, owing to shortages, while the Government pegged the prices of farm produce at comparatively low levels. Consequently, the peasants curtailed production and sought better prices by selling much of their produce through Black Market channels. The mistake was officially admitted in the autumn of 1941 when grain prices were more than doubled, but the position still remained unfavourable to

241 the peasants and the reduced 1942 sowings both
656 of grain and of sugar-beet indicated continued dissatisfaction. Finally, by the spring of 1943 a
435 wiser ratio was reached, agricultural prices being four times as high as in 1939 and wholesale prices in general three and a half times as high. Nevertheless, this very considerable measure of inflation
[458] has shaken public confidence in the value of money so that peasants increasingly resort to barter transactions.

[655] In the hope of obtaining better control over grain supplies the Government in the autumn of 1941 nationalised the grain trade, later they relaxed this to the extent of leaving the export business to a few selected firms and the internal collection to the Army and to the National Institute of Co-operation. This body handled the pre-war grain marketing scheme, and their
[563] activities—because of the expulsion of Jews from wholesale and retail trade—have recently developed rapidly in the supply of seeds to peasants (80,000 tons of seed distributed in 1942) as well as consumers' goods to peasants and townspeople. But it still proved difficult to extract enough food from the peasants to feed the towns. For the 1943 harvest detailed regulations were made concerning the quantities the peasant might keep for seed, for his family and for his animals, and threshing operations were subjected to inspection. Yet these rules could not in practice be administered.

423 It is now generally agreed in Rumania that the
471 smallness of the holdings has been a principal obstacle to effective organisation of agriculture in war-time, and that a change to larger units of production is needed. Any approach to collectivisation on the Soviet model, however, would be regarded as contradictory to the land reform policy and a threat to the Rumanian State. The official policy, though it has not yet taken its final form, is to maintain private property but to proceed no further with expropriation and division of large estates, and to maintain existing medium holdings by prohibiting their sub-division for inheritance or other reasons. Schemes for the consolidation of strips are also contemplated for a
474 more opportune moment. Further, in order to increase production and to improve the peasants' methods and standards of life, communal farming associations, known as *obștii*, are to be formed. In these associations, farming equipment is to be pooled so that the small-holder would have the same resources as the large farmer. Each *obștie* is to embrace a village and perform all the functions of a co-operative, including joint purchase and sale, use of breeding animals, processing of crops, etc. Villages which are prepared to form themselves into *obștii* and to undertake to work the land according to State directions, are promised tractors, seed and breeding stock without payment. In this way it is hoped that some of the advantages of collectivisation may be achieved while retaining those of individual ownership. But, unless accompanied by far-reaching industrial development, the plan can but aggravate rural unemployment. It is not known how this innovation has been received by the peasants. It was reported in April 1943 that 270 of these communal associations had been formed—an insignificant number—and it is believed that the Government is allocating to them some of the tractors imported from Germany in the war years.*

241 The success of the *obștii* plan, and indeed of any plan for up-grading Rumanian agriculture, depends

* In June, 1943, a temporary ban was placed on the formation of any new *obștie*, because there was insufficient agricultural machinery to supply to them.

241 very largely on the acquisition of tractors and other equipment. Only Germany can provide these requisites and it is of interest that, despite the poor contribution Rumania has hitherto made to Germany's food supplies, the latter has gone some way to assist the attempted reform. Over 4,000 [439] tractors with their ploughs and a variety of other implements have been imported from Germany during the war years. Tractor numbers in Rumania have probably been more than doubled by these imports, but they still represent only the beginnings of mechanisation. They have doubtless been supplied, despite insistent demands for tractors in Germany and elsewhere, in the belief that, if properly applied, they may make some slight increase in available surpluses. Some of these may have been destined for Transnistria to make good the Russian scorching.

6. Food Conditions

511 Food conditions have varied according to local resources, and in the months following the poor crops of 1942, according to the success of local prefects and officials in securing supplementary quantities from the more favoured areas. The greater part of the population is rural, and most [162] families feed themselves with their own home-grown produce. In the earlier years of the war these were able to maintain their consumption standards, but in 1942-43 there must have been a more serious degree of shortage and privation than is usual even after short crops. In the towns there has been a severe curtailment of food supplies, mitigated in individual cases by access to the Black Market.

262 Urban shortages developed early in 1941 and 434 official rationing cards were introduced in May of 511 that year in Bucarest and brought into use soon after. Sugar and meat were the first commodities to be rationed. The original sugar ration was 375 grammes (13 oz.) per week, but since May 1943 it has been only 125 grammes (4½ oz.). Meat, originally 250 grammes (9 oz.), is still (July 1943) at this level, though for a short time at the end of 1942 it was higher owing probably to the abnormal slaughterings caused by fodder shortages in 1942. Bread was first officially rationed in January 1942, but was preceded by baking regulations requiring maize admixtures in the loaf. The ration of jou

262 grammes (10½ oz.) daily was available on five days
434 of the week only; on the other two days maize
511 meal only (for *mămăligă*) could be bought. The bread ration was reduced to 250 grammes in June 1942 and maize meal itself was rationed in August. The number of breadless days has varied, while barley, flour or potatoes have at times been offered in place of maizemeal. The bread mixture has also included varying proportions of maize, barley, potato and other flours. The allowance in June 1943 was 250 grammes of bread on five days and 1,000 grammes (35 oz.) of maize flour or potato flour on each of the remaining two days. All these quantities apply to Bucarest only. Other towns show variants of these regulations, depending on local supplies.

234 The most serious shortage in Bucarest and
435 possibly in other towns, appears to be milk.
511 Owing to the depletion of surrounding herds, following the high cost and scarcity of fodder, only a small part of the former supply now arrives. Some milk, as with all products, is diverted to the Black Market and official mistakes in price policy at various times have caused temporary gluts or stoppages in food supplies. Other livestock products and edible oil are also chronically short in the towns.

7. Food Prices

435 In spite of official attempts to protect con-
565 sumers from increases, retail prices and the cost of
511 living have risen almost to the same extent as producers' and wholesale prices. Taking autumn 1939 as 100, the cost of living was 330 and the cost of food 350 in the spring of 1943. These increases have been severely felt by the working and lower-middle classes. Official measures were taken to alleviate the situation of civil servants by the setting up of stores and canteens with reduced prices, some of the goods being supplied from Transnistria. Likewise firms with over 50 employees were ordered to supply them with essential foodstuffs at low prices. Persons with more ample resources make use of the Black Market on which all the ordinary foodstuffs are obtainable, usually at only two to three times the official prices, the moderate character of these illegal prices being itself another illustration of the large quantities available through these channels due to the laxity of control.

[116]

315


RUMANIA
Crude-Oil Production 1920-1942
Millions of tons
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1920
1922
1924
1926
1928
1930
1932
1934
1936
1938
1940
1942

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943
ED1 Rumania ED1

CHAPTER II

OIL

[oil]

A. INTRODUCTION

1. General

315 Both in peace and in war, the Rumanian oil industry has played an important part in the economy of the nation. Although the numbers directly employed in the industry are comparatively small—some 40,000 men—its importance to the nation can be gauged by the fact that the 4·5 million tons of oil exported in 1938 represented a value of 9·3 milliard lei, or 43 per cent. of the total export trade of 21½ milliard lei. Not only was oil the backbone of the country's foreign trade, but the industrial and general internal economy of the country is probably more dependent on oil than any other country in Europe.

War has not lessened the importance of her oil resources to Rumania—her industries and transport remain equally dependent on oil; her normal oil export trade has gone, but the Axis are greedy for every drop of oil which they can extract from Rumania, and from Rumanian wells comes almost one-third of all the liquid fuel which has to keep the wheels of Axis Europe turning. In 1940, oil exports represented 63 per cent. of the value of Rumanian exports, and whereas in 1938 30 per cent. of Germany's imports from Rumania consisted of oil, in 1940 this had risen to 56 per cent. It is undoubtedly true to say that of all the raw materials coming from outside her own borders on which German war economy is dependent, Rumanian oil is one of the most vital.

[439]

2. Historical

The first commercial oil production in the world took place in Rumania in 1854, when 275 tons were produced. From that date until 1936, with the exception of the years of the Great War, production gradually increased to a peak figure of 8·7 million tons or 3½ per cent. of world production.

The trend of production over the last 20 years is shown on the graph on the opposite page. 2

Although in 1942 the downward trend since 1936 may have been halted, or even reversed, this has been only by dint of a special effort to increase production and possibly uneconomic exploitation. In 1937 Rumanian geologists estimated that the country's oil reserves would be exhausted within ten years, and although declining production may be due in large part to the natural exhaustion of known fields, it is also due to the restrictions of the antiquated mining laws. These tended to curb normal expansion, and made exploratory drilling in non-proven areas so unattractive as not to be a commercial proposition, with the consequence that exploration, by which alone production could in the long run be maintained, was neglected. These mining laws have been superseded by a new law passed in July 1942, the main provisions of which are for the express purpose of encouraging new production by the removal of the restrictions set upon prospecting in new areas. The reserves which, under the 1937 law, the State insisted on maintaining, are now sacrificed, concessions are now granted on the basis of geological structures rather than surface areas and wasteful competition is eliminated in their exploitation. The law empowers the Government to demand the modernisation of refining and drilling equipment.

2 [Pp. 12 ... Ad. pt]

[13b]

B. THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

1. Oil Production

315 There are four districts in which oil production is centred. Prahova, Dâmboviţa, Buzău and Bacău, while the town of Ploeşti is the hub of the oil industry. In 1938 out of a total production of 6·6 million tons, the Prahova district produced 3·98 million tons—2·78 from private and 1·2 from State concessions; Dâmboviţa produced 2·54 million tons, two-thirds of which came from State concessions; Buzău and Bacău produced only some 40,000 tons each. In 1941 Prahova production had dropped from 3·9 to 3·4 million tons; Dâmboviţa from 2·5 to 1·7 million tons, production from Buzău and from Bacău remaining unchanged.

[382] The wells are connected by pipeline with the refineries, all but three of which are in Ploeşti; even at the time of peak production in 1936 Rumanian refining capacity was sufficient to take care of all the crude oil production of the country. The total refinery capacity in 1938 was over 10 million tons including nearly 2 million tons of cracking capacity, but of the total capacity probably not more than half is of modern design.

2. Consumption and Exports

315 439 The following table indicates internal consumption and exports in 1938, when crude production was 6·6 million tons. Exports were made to all countries in Europe including over 700,000 tons to Germany, over 500,000 tons each to the United Kingdom and to Italy, nearly 300,000 tons each to France and Czechoslovakia, and some 400,000 tons to North Africa, of which 280,000 tons to Egypt.

1938

Internal Consumption and Exports

	Internal Consumption	*Exports*	
	'000 *tons*		
Crude oil ..	—	336	74% *via* Constanţa, 20% *via* Giurgiu.
Motor spirit ..	154	1,586	
Kerosine ..	182	827	
Gas/Diesel oil ..	117	755	
Fuel oil	1,001	917	
Special fuel oil*	131	—	
Lubricants ..	24	41	
Wax, asphalt, etc.	64	30	

* Mainly for central heating.

315 Nearly 70 per cent. of internal consumption was therefore represented by fuel and special fuel oil, and this figure shows the extent to which industrial and domestic plant have been built up on the basis of burning fuel oil, and the dependence of the country on adequate supplies of fuel oil for its essential services. In this dependence will be seen some explanation of the fact that Rumania is one of the few countries in the world whose internal consumption of oil for non-military purposes has not declined in war-time.

The main consumers of fuel oil and special fuel oil were as follows :—

	Tons
Railways	195,000
Shipping Services	90,000
Industries	419,000
Power Stations..	160,000
Central Heating	148,000
Agriculture and Peasant Mills	19,000

CHAPTER II

3. Transport

315 For the transport of oil both for internal consumption and for export, Rumania relied largely upon railways, and except between the wells and the refineries, only a relatively small proportion was transported by pipeline. The three main pipelines were State-owned and were laid mainly for the transport of oil for export: one for white products from Ploeşti to Constanţa with a capacity of 810,000 tons per annum, and two lines for crude and heavy residue from Ploeşti to Giurgiu with a combined capacity of 300,000 tons per annum.

The total quantity of oil through three lines in 1938 was 800,000 tons; 13 per cent. of the exports from Constanţa and 17 per cent. of those from Giurgiu were handled in this way as well as the internal transport of some 184,000 tons of crude oil. The Rumanian fleet of 8,000 tank cars was ample to handle all the oil transported by rail. [497]

The main channel for exports was Constanţa on the Black Sea, through which 3·3 million tons were exported in 1938, as compared with only 935,000 tons through Giurgiu for transport up the Danube.

C. THE INDUSTRY IN WAR-TIME

1. General

315 722 The war has completely altered the orientation of the Rumanian oil industry: normal export trade routes through Constanţa and the Mediterranean were cut and exports to most countries in Continental Europe came under German control as soon as the Germans were astride the Danube at Belgrade, and the main railways through Poland and Yugoslavia. Not only were normal export channels disrupted, but the Rumanian oil industry lost the services of all its foreign technical experts, and could no longer get from the United States supplies of drilling and refinery equipment on which it had very largely relied.

The inevitable result of all this was that in spite of the urgent need for increased production and all German efforts to obtain this, the downward production trend was not halted in 1941, and only 5.483 million tons were produced. That year was, however, one of abnormal difficulties owing to the necessity for reorganising the industry on a war-time basis, rapidly rising prices of almost everything but oil, shortage of man-power owing to Rumanian mobilisation, the difficulty of getting equipment, and above all an abnormally severe winter which hampered transport so severely that production had to be restricted for lack of storage. By dint of continuous German pressure and increased control of the industry, production in 1942 probably reached 5.6 million tons.

Internal consumption has, however, not decreased and is thought to be running at a rate of 2 million tons a year, which leaves between 3 and 3½ million tons available for the Axis and neutral countries in Europe. Italy gets approximately one million tons a year, Germany two million tons, and small quantities go to Switzerland, Sweden and Turkey.

315 439 Except during the winter months when navigation on the Danube is suspended, the majority of exports to Italy go by pipeline to Giurgiu and thence by barge to river ports in Yugoslavia or Hungary for transhipment to Italy by rail-tank car. One of the results of the reorientation of Rumania's oil export trade has been the greatly increased use made of the river port of Giurgiu.

[14a]

315 Two additional pipelines, each of 10 in. diameter, constructed largely of material removed from France, have been built between Ploesti and Giurgiu, each with a capacity of over three quarters of a million tons a year.

New refinery and drilling equipment, which prior to the war Rumania used to import largely from the United States, has now to be obtained from Germany. The financial terms on which this equipment is obtained are unfavourable to Rumania and deliveries are slow.

2. German Influence on the Oil Industry

315 648 473 German pressure upon Rumania to obtain greater supplies of oil has been largely exerted by means of commercial penetration into the oil industry, but there is evidence that Nazi diplomats have laid particular emphasis on the German need for oil, suggesting that larger supplies might be available if production was increased and internal consumption reduced.

German penetration into the Rumanian oil industry began to take aggressive form some time before the war. The Germans first acquired a minority holding in Creditul Minier, then in 1939 secured control of Petrol-Block. The collapse of France afforded further opportunities of encroachment, and through Kontinental Oel A.G. control of Concordia and Colombia was secured; similarly, by assuming arbitrary control of Dutch interests the Germans now direct the policy of Astra-Română, the largest of the producing companies. In all, German influence through financial control now extends to about 50 per cent. of the industry, and 60 per cent. of productive capacity, quite apart from the pressure the Germans can exert through control of transport out of the country. The actual effect of this influence is not easily assessed, modified as it is by Rumania's nationalistic oil legislation—particular privileges are reserved under the new mining laws for companies which can show that 75 per cent. of their capital is in Rumanian hands—and the instinctive aversion of the Government to outside control. It is, however, sufficient to ensure that German requirements have a definite priority, and nationalistic as some parts of the new mining law may be, any measures serving to increase immediate production, under whatever pretext they are taken, are beneficial to Germany's interests. Tables I and II on pages 15 and 16 show the approximate strength of the oil groups by nationalities in 1940 and 1942. 1

3. War-time Restrictions

315 135 Nearly 70 per cent. of Rumanian petroleum consumption is represented by fuel oil, and a theoretical saving could be brought about by the use of coal and natural gas. Coal resources, however, are limited, and in any event a greatly increased use of coal is restricted also by the speed at which locomotives and power plants can be converted from oil to coal burning.

315 434 In November 1942 a petrol-rationing scheme was introduced, and although the allowances were on a liberal scale, the regulations do not appear to have been observed and the scheme as a whole was ineffective. In March 1943 this was admitted by the announcement that the scheme would be more strictly enforced and new ration cards issued. Simultaneously regulations were published concerning the use of taxis, and a time limit of September 1943 was set for the conversion of boiler plant.

In general, attempts to restrict consumption either by the announcement of new regulations

1 [Cf. cat. 315, pp. 15c and 16a - Analyst]

[14b]

315 or the enforcement of old, have lately been more
434 determined.

These measures, however, are unlikely to result in a saving of more than a quarter of a million tons a year, and rationing regulations and restrictions are probably less severe in Rumania than elsewhere in Europe.

D. NATURAL GAS

315 In addition to the supplies of liquid fuel derived from her oil wells, Rumania has considerable resources of natural gas. Production of gas in the Ploeşti oilfield area in the years before the war was used mainly for the making of gasolene, for gas lift in wells, for heating purposes in field and refinery, and for household use. There was no surplus for use outside the Ploeşti district.

Of much greater importance than these supplies of casing-head gas are Rumania's resources of methane natural gas from Mănești and Transylvania. While the Mănești gas deposits were known before the war, the extent of the reserves there had not been determined.

In Transylvania the reserves are estimated at not less than 500,000 million cubic metres. Pro-

315

duction has been going on since before the last war and has been restricted to the amount that can be used by consumers over the 200-mile pipeline network, extending as far south as Brasov; 1941 consumption amounted to 300 million cubic metres (or 35 million cubic feet a day), equivalent to approximately 280,000 tons of oil. Industry consumed some 85 per cent. of this, the remaining 15 per cent. being used for domestic purposes.

A law passed in November 1942 laid down the conditions for the supply of natural gas to Bucarest. The State, the National Methane Co., State Railways, Gas and Electricity Supply Co. and the Municipality of Bucarest in conjunction are made responsible for the supply of gas to the capital, where public utilities will be the first to be supplied. Pipeline material was supplied by Germany and gas has now been piped from Mănești to Bucarest, and it is hoped that it may replace fuel oil to the extent of 120,000 tons in the first year of operation in the capital. It is planned eventually to link up the Transylvanian deposits by pipeline with Bucarest via Mănești, when the combined production of the two gas sources will permit an annual consumption of some 500,000,000 cubic metres, or the equivalent of 400,000 tons of oil.

[15b]

315
439

TABLE 1

APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF OIL GROUPS BY NATIONALITIES IN 1940

	Capital		Fixed Assets		Production*	
	In millions of lei	Per cent.	In millions of lei	Per cent.	Thousands of tons	Per cent.
Anglo-French-Belgian .. 5 large companies 14 small companies	9,893	64·72	30,089	64·83	4,253	67·09
American .. .. 1 large company 1 small company	1,913	12·51	5,513	11·88	900	14·20
Italian .. .. .. 1 large company 1 small company	386	2·53	1,259	2·71	335	6·29
German	77	0·50	525	1·13	51	0·80
Rumanian .. .. 2 large companies 33 small companies	3,017	19·74	9,024	19·44	800	12·62
Total	15,28[illegible]		46,410		6,339	

* The production figures shown in this Table appear to be those for 1939.

[illegible]

CHAPTER II

315
439

TABLE II

APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF OIL GROUPS BY NATIONALITIES IN 1942

	Capital		Fixed Assets		Production*	
	In millions of lei	Per cent.	In millions of lei	Per cent.	Thousands of tons	Per cent
German group owns, controls or directs	3,431	22·45	11,267	24·28	1,487	23·46
American	5,795	37·91	13,288	28·63	2,361	37·24
Vacuum Oil	6	0·03	87	0·10	—	—
British	912	5·97	3,835	8·26	640	10·10
Unirea						
Anglo-French	2,387	15·61	8,107	17·47	740	11·67
Steaua Romana						
Anglo-French-Belgian ..	569	4·38	2,600	5·60	145	2·29
14 small companies						
Italian	386	2·53	1,259	2·71	335	5·28
Rumanian	1,700	11·12	5,967	12·86	631	9·96
Total	15,186		46,410		6,339	

* The production figures shown in this Table would appear to be those for 1939

315
473
439

TABLE III

PRINCIPAL RUMANIAN OIL COMPANIES, 1942

Name	Founded	Capital (mill. lei)	1940 Crude Production (tons)	Controlling interest
Astra Română	1910	2,542	1,173,256	Royal Dutch Shell
Concordia	1907	2,030	793,626	Kontinental Oel A.G.
Româno-Americana	1904	1,500	727,345	Standard Oil of New Jersey
Steaua Română	1895	1,500	640,920	French, Rumanian, British
Unirea	1921	720	652,000	General Mining Corporation
Columbia	1905	380	585,193	Kontinental Oel A.G.
Creditul Minier	1919	605	292,166	Rumanian
Prahova	1920	330	271,947	A.G.I.P. (Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli)
I.R.D.P. (Industria Romana de Petrol)	1920	120	117,925	Sudostchemie Hand. A.G. German
Petrolul Românesc	1920	120	83,377	Creditul Minier, Rumanian
Starnaphtha	1926	60	55,530	French
Foraj Lemoine	1923	44	42,658	Rumanian, Franco-Belgian
Redevenţa	1918	300	28,474	Rumanian
Foraky Românească	1922	50	25,958	German
Sondrum	1921	100	17,982	French
Petrol Block	1918	470	—	German (refining company)

382
473

TABLE IV

PRINCIPAL RUMANIAN REFINERIES

Name	Location	Annual Capacity (tons)	Cracking Capacity (tons)
Astra Română	Ploeşti	1,750,000	600,000
Steaua Română	Câmpina	1,500,000	350,000
Concordia	Ploeşti	1,300,000	200,000
Română-Americano	Ploeşti	1,100,000	350,000
Phoenix Unirea Orion	Ploeşti	800,000	150,000
Standard Petrol Block	Ploeşti	550,000	150,000
Creditul Minier	Brazi	530,000	150,000
Colombia	Ploeşti	485,000	260,000
Unirea Speranţa	Ploeşti	400,000	—
Redevenţa	Ploeşti	230,000	—
Prahova	Bucarest	200,000	—
Lumina (Petrolumina)	Ploeşti	140,000	—
Noris	Ploeşti	50,000	—

CHAPTER III

OTHER FUEL AND POWER 000

I. COAL

A. Consumption, Imports, Deposits

372 375 Coal has not played such a large part in Rumanian economy as it has in that of most European countries, because of the abundant mineral oil and timber resources which have been used extensively for fuel, both in industry and for household purposes. The following table shows the percentage consumption of the different types of fuel (average 1937-39) :—

	%
Firewood	28·7
Oil and oil products	26·1
Coal	25·9
Methane and other gases	17·2
Water power	2·1

The railways accounted for 60 per cent. of total coal consumption which was of the order of 2 million tons, the balance being divided between industry, household consumption and bunkers.

135 Before the war coal reserves, which are predominantly brown coal, were estimated at 2·7 milliard tons brown coal (including lignite), and 48 million tons of hard coal. The more important deposits are located in southern and western Transylvania, while a few of lesser importance are in the northern area which was ceded to Hungary.

316 439 In spite of the limited industrial development of the country and extensive use of oil, coal production is hardly sufficient for current needs, and it has been necessary to import both coal and coke to fill the deficiency.

Pre-war coal imports in metric tons were as follows :—

	Metric Tons
1935	21,000
1936	23,000
1937	28,000

316 It is difficult to estimate coal imports since the
439 war, but available evidence suggests that they are in the neighbourhood of 75,000 tons annually or three times as high as the pre-war figure. Owing to the exigencies of war, railway traffic has increased enormously, and the switch-over from oil-burning to coal for industrial and central-heating plants all add to the demands for coal.

135 **Coal Deposits**

The principal coal-producing district is around Petroşani, while the main deposits are as follows:—

Type	*Location*	*Calorific Value*
Anthracite ..	Schela in Gorj district	7,300
Hardcoal* ..	Reşiţa and Anina-Steierdorf	6/7,000
Brown coal and lignite	Jiu valley	6,500
	Comăneşti basin ..	5,200/5,600
	Ialomiţa valley ..	5,000
	Dâmboviţa valley ..	5,000
	Bacău district ..	5,000

* Some is suitable for coking.

B. Tables

1. Coal Production

316 During recent years coal production has been increased in spite of a slight setback in 1940, when with the transfer of N. Transylvania to Hungary a small proportion of the working mines were lost. Further efforts are being made to increase production so that fuel-oil consumption may be reduced. To this end the conversion of central-heating installations, industrial oil-burning plant and oil-fired locomotives to coal burning has been ordered.

316

COAL PRODUCTION

	Brown Coal	%	Hard Coal	%	Lignite	%	Anthracite	%	Total
1930 ..	1,799,877	75·9	298,825	12·6	271,180	11·5	—	—	2,369,882
1935 ..	1,453,394	74·7	261,085	13·4	213,367	11·0	17,207	0·9	1,945,053
1938 ..	1,822,128	76·1	290,575	12·3	274,570	11·5	3,265	0·1	2,390,538
1939 ..	1,904,834	77·4	282,006	11·4	237,710	11·1	4,400	0·1	2,428,950
1940 ..	2,384,586*	—	260,985†	—	—	—	—	—	2,645,571
1941 ..	2,317,138*	—	229,703†	—	—	—	—	—	2,546,841

* Including lignite. † Including anthracite.

2. Location of Collieries

LOCATION OF PRINCIPAL COLLIERIES IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE

	Annual Production		
	Coke	Briquettes	Coal
1. *"Petroşani" S.A. Română pentru Exploatarea Minelor de Cărbuni*—			
Pits at Petrilla and Aninoasa near Lupeni	—	—	1,500,000
At Petrilla there are also a low-temperature carbonisation plant capable of producing 20,000 tons annually and briquetting plant capable of producing	—	100,000	—
2. *Uzinele de Fier şi Domeniile din Reşiţa S.A.*—			
Pits at Anina, produce coal similar to Pecz (Hungary) coal; modern installations	—	—	200,000
Washeries, briquette factory and coke ovens	86,000	50,000	—
The *Doman* mines near Reşiţa produce coal similar to Pecz (Hungary) coal	—	—	50,000
The *Secul* mines near Reşiţa produce coking coal	—	—	25,000
3. *"Creditul Carbonifer" S.A. Minera*, near Comăneşti, produce—	—	60,000	200,000
4. *"Lonea" S.A.R. pentru exploatarea minelor de cărbuni* owns collieries in Hunedoara basin in Jiu valley and produces ..	—	—	100,000
5. There are also a number of smaller colliery companies and a small mine at Gorj producing anthracite	—	—	3,000

[17d]

CHAPTER III

316
439

3. Coke Imports and Production

	Imports	*Production**
	in '000 tons	
1936	39	78
1937	49	78
1938	63	86
1939	55	88
1940	54	86
1941	n.a.	90

* Including gas coke.

Of the total coke available annually—140,000 tons—100,000 tons were consumed by blast-furnaces and iron-works, the remaining 40,000 by other industries.

II. ELECTRIC POWER

A. General

377
371

Being an agricultural country, Rumania, like the other countries of South Eastern Europe, is not extensively developed from the electrical point of view. The most important high-tension transmission lines are located in the neighbourhood of the Prahova oilfields and of Bucarest, but though these two areas are interconnected by means of lines operating at 120 and 60 kV, there is no national grid. There are a few other high or medium-tension lines which mostly connect power stations owned by industrial concerns. The majority of generating stations giving a public supply are quite isolated from each other.

1. Sources of Power

Rumania's potential water-power resources are high. It is estimated that 24,000 million kWh could be obtained annually from the economically

377
371

exploitable water-courses, necessitating the installation of 5,500,000 kW of plant. The water power developed so far, however, amounts to about 50,000 kW. This failure to exploit the available water power is mainly attributable to the abundance of native fuel oil and low-grade coal, and to the high initial capital costs which hydro-electric development entails. In 1938, therefore, about 63 per cent. of the plant installed in Rumanian public-supply stations was of a thermal type, 25 per cent. was Diesel and only 12 per cent. hydro-electric. By 1940 the percentages were 66 : 17 : 17. The table below gives figures of total capacity and output of both public and industrial stations in recent years.

2. Present Output and Utilisation

It is estimated that in 1942 output did not exceed 1,130 million kWh from a total-installed capacity of about 806,000 kW. (These totals include capacity and output of those stations in Bessarabia and N. Bucovina which were regained in 1941.)

The following table shows the probable consumption of electric power in 1942 by the various consumer groups:

	Millions of kWh Consumed	*% of Total Output*
Industrial	791·0	70·0
Household uses and private lighting ..	124·3	11·0
Public lighting ..	17·0	1·5
Agriculture	5·6	0·5
Transmission losses ..	192·1	17·0
	1,130·0	100·0

[18b]

INSTALLED CAPACITY AND OUTPUT OF PUBLIC AND INDUSTRIAL STATIONS

Year	Public Stations		Industrial Stations		Total	
	Installed Capacity '000 kW	Output in million kWh	Installed Capacity '000 kW	Output in million kWh	Installed Capacity '000 kW	Output in million kWh
1933 ..	212	325	160	268	372	593
1935 ..	217	415	218	452	435	867
1937 ..	261	537	248	540	509	1,077
1938 ..	262	568	248	580	510	1,148
1939 ..	285	582	260	630	545	1,212
1940* ..	241	548	250	617	491	1,165

* Allowance made for the loss of N. Transylvania, S. Dobruja, Bessarabia and N. Bucovina.

B. Generating Stations

As will be seen from the following list of Public Supply Plants which it is believed includes all stations with an installed capacity of 5,000 kW and over, only eight of the power stations have a capacity of more than 10,000 kW.

1. Public Supply Plants

Location	Installed Capacity (kW)	Type (Thermal or Hydro)
Bucarest : Grotăveşti	85,000	Steam
Câmpina	28,150	Steam
Gura-Ocniţei	20,450	Steam
Dobreşti	20,000	Hydro
Schitu-Goleşti	19,200	Steam
Bucarest : Filaret	16,250	Diesel
Gălma	10,700	Hydro
Sinaia	10,500	Hydro
Timişoara	9,675	87%, Steam, 13%, Hydro
Arad	7,840	Steam
Cernăuţi	7,675	80%, Steam, 20%, Diesel
Brăila	7,630	83%, Steam, 17%, Diesel
Floreşti	6,300	Steam
Oradea*	6,280	Steam
Sibiu	6,250	Diesel
Braşov	5,800	Steam
Galaţi	5,000	Steam
Constanţa	5,000	Steam

* This plant is now in Hungarian territory.

[18c]

377

2. Industrial Generating Plants

Location	Installed Capacity (kW)	Type	Owner
Dicio São Martin ..	24,000	Steam	Nitrogen S.A.
Lupeni-Vulcan ..	19,200	Steam	Petrosani S.A.R.
Anina	11,780	Steam	Uzinele de Fier şi Domeniile din Reşiţa
Turda	9,400	Steam	Fabrica de Ciment din Turda S.A.
Domniţa Maria ..	9,150	68% Steam, 17% Diesel, 15% Hydro	Letea S.A.R.
Reşiţa	8,700	52% Steam, 48% Gas	Uzinele de Fier şi Domeniile din Reşiţa
Aghires, Cluj* ..	8,400	Steam	Sorecani S.A.
Schela Moreni ..	7,750	77% Steam, 23% Gas	Astra Romana

* Now in Hungary.

[19a]

377 The above list contains only the most important industrial stations, most of which also supply public requirements in their areas.

C. TRANSMISSION SYSTEM

1. Bucarest Area

Dobreşti hydro-electric station is connected with Bucarest by a 120-kV line 70 miles long. The line passes through Doiceşti, north of Târgovişte, and thence to Bucarest via Chitilla. At Doiceşti some power is stepped down to 60 kV and is transmitted to Bucarest via Ploeşti.

Schitu Goleşti thermal station, also 70 miles north of Bucarest, is connected with Doiceşti by a 60-kV line.

2. Prahova Area

The Concordia Petroleum Company owns an extensive distribution network. Its power stations supply not only the installations on the Prahova oilfields, but also the communities of Braşov, Buşteni, Sinaia, Câmpina, Ploeşti and other centres. The Gura Ocniţei station of this company is connected to Floreşti station (owned by Steaua Electrică S.A.R.), by 60-kV lines, which also interconnect with the Doiceşti transformer station of the Bucarest system. Other lines operated at 60 kV run between Floreşti and Ploeşti, and between Floreşti and Bucarest. Floreşti is linked with the Câmpina and Sinaia stations of the Concordia Company by 25-kV lines, which pass northwards to Braşov.

3. Sibiu Area

The industrial generating station Dicio Sân Martin is the chief source of electric current. It is linked with Sibiu by a 60-kV line, and with the other small stations in this and the surrounding areas by lines at lower voltages.

D. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

377 An official decree published in August, 1942,
371 ordered the electrification of the Rumanian State Railways, and at that same time the economies which would result from the develop-

[196]

377 ment for this purpose of hydro-electric power in
place of the coal, which is at present used, were
371 pointed out. A scheme providing for the construction both of hydro-electric stations and of thermal reserve stations for this purpose has been prepared, and includes initially the carrying out of the "Bicaz" project on the River Bistrița, near Tarcău. At this place a dam is to be built to form a regulating reservoir, the water from which will serve to irrigate areas at present uncultivated. In a normal year, a total output of 400-600 million kWh. is expected. Apart from supplying the requirements of the railways, power will be used in the exploitation of local raw materials and to facilitate the development of the following industries:

Wood pulp.
Artificial silk.
Electro-chemistry.
Electro-metallurgy.

Work on the Bicaz dam is to begin in the near future. The first sections of railway track to be electrified are:—

Bucarest-Ploești (59 km.—37 miles).

Ploești-Brașov (111 km.—69 miles, of which Ploești-Brașov is double-track).

Brașov-Sighișoara (129 km.—80 miles).

Up till the beginning of 1943, however, none of these projects appeared to have been begun.

The Rumanian Government is also reconsidering the much-discussed plan for the exploitation of the Danube Rapids at the Iron Gates, where the river enters Rumanian territory. If the work is carried out it will be supervised by a Rumanian-Bulgarian-German concern. The eventual output from this site should reach 3,000 million kWh. per annum, requiring an installed capacity of about 6-700,000 kW. (The largest station yet built in Europe is that on the Dnieper, having an installed capacity of 560,000 kW.) The output from the proposed station will supply the needs of South Rumania (including the railways), North Bulgaria and perhaps also East Serbia.

The important oil-field station of Grozăvești in Bucarest has been adapted to use natural gas, and is believed to have been extended.

[19c]

CHAPTER IV

METALS AND MINERALS

[21 a]

[p. 20 contains no textual material]

A. INTRODUCTION

135 By comparison with Greece or Yugoslavia Rumania has but poor deposits of minerals, with the exception of gold, as a producer of which, before the loss of Transylvania, she ranked second in Europe to Sweden.

316 Iron-ore output is inadequate to meet the requirements of the steel industry. Bauxite output is on a very small scale, though steps are being taken to increase this and to create an aluminium industry. Production of lead and zinc, though sufficient pre-war to cover requirements, was centred in territory now ceded to Hungary, so that the country has become dependent on imports. Silver and copper production, the latter never other than on a small scale, have also suffered through territorial losses. Attempts have been made during the last few years to develop output of chrome and manganese—manganese for production of ferro-manganese for the iron and steel industry, and chrome, deposits of which appear not to have been worked before 1941, for export to Italy.

135 Deposits of mica and molybdenum have both been recently discovered in small quantities in the Mehedinţi district, and the Germans are particularly interested in production of the former.

B. IRON AND STEEL

327 Full use of the Rumanian iron and steel industry is severely hampered by inadequate supplies of metallurgical coke and of iron ore, both of which have to be imported. Shortage of the former particularly has affected the industry since the outbreak of war, because, due to an insufficient supply of metallurgical coke in German Europe as a whole, Rumania has been unable to import the requisite quantities to maintain output of her blast-furnaces. Rumanian plants, however, are new and the steelworks are all open-hearth or electric, which means that they are able to produce the qualities most useful for armaments.

1. Iron Ore

316 Shortage of iron ore is the fundamental weakness of the Rumanian iron and steel industry. Though various other concessions have been granted, but not yet in any way developed, only three mines have been regularly exploited, as follows:—

(a) The Ghelari deposits of limonite (47 per cent. to 54 per cent. iron) owned by the State and exploited by the Hunedoara Works.

(b) The Teliuc deposits of limonite (48 per cent. to 52 per cent. iron) and of siderite (28 to 35 per cent iron), owned and exploited by Titan Nadrag Calan.

(c) The almost exhausted Ocna de Fier deposits of poor quality limonite owned by Reşiţa.

316 439 Rumania has always had to import ore, chiefly from Yugoslavia, and recently from the Russian mines of Krivoi Rog as well. The following table shows Rumanian output and imports of iron ore.

Year	*Output* '000 tons	*Imports*
1936	107	89
1937	127	96
1938	137	114
1939	143	96
1940	151	52
1941	166	n.a.

[21 b]

2. Pig-Iron Production

327 Rumania had nine blast-furnaces, as under —

Company	*No. of Furnaces*	*Annual Capacity '000 tons*
Reşiţa	2	120
Hunedoara	4	90
Titan Nadrag Calan ..	1	25
Vlahiţa*	2	4
Total	9	239

*In Hungarian territory as a result of the Vienna Award.

The full operation of these furnaces is rendered impossible by lack of metallurgical coke. Only Reşiţa possesses coke-ovens, and its production is no more than 80,000 tons a year—insufficient for its own needs. The blast-furnaces of Titan Nadrag Calan and of Vlahiţa are charcoal-burning, but charcoal has now become as rare as coke. These difficulties helped to keep pre-war pig-iron production far beneath capacity, as the following table illustrates :—

Year	*'000 tons*
1936	96
1937	116
1938	107
1939	115

3. Steel Production

Rumania's annual steel capacity is about 500,000 tons of ingots and castings. The principal producers are as follows :—

Company	*Annual Capacity '000 tons*
Reşiţa	210
Hunedoara State Works	200
Titan Nadrag Calan ..	100
Malaxa	65
Others	25
Total	500

All this capacity is open-hearth or electric and therefore requires large supplies of scrap (100 per cent. scrap can be used for electric blast furnaces, and for open-hearth anything between 30 and 70 per cent. scrap). As Rumania is predominantly an agricultural country, native scrap production is small, usually amounting only to about 150,000 tons per annum. Thus scrap had to be imported, as follows :—

Year	*'000 tons*
1936	37
1937	24
1938	74
1939	43
1940	6

Imports almost stopped on the outbreak of war and the situation became serious, but has to a certain extent been retrieved by the collection of battlefield scrap from Bessarabia and Transnistria, with the result that production of crude steel in 1942 should have been about 350,000 ton-

CHAPTER IV

327 compared with the following annual pre-war figures:

Year	000 tons
1936	225
1937	241
1938	326
1939	385

4. Iron and Steel Consumption

The limited native iron and steel production, which was never sufficient to keep the consuming industries fully supplied, became an increasing impediment with the rapid development of these industries during the last few years. Iron and steel products had therefore to be imported at the rate of 2/300,000 tons a year. The outbreak of war in Europe, and consequent restriction of supplies meant a falling off of imports, so that an acute shortage developed. During 1942 however, the situation improved somewhat in that Germany was reported to have sent a total of 130,000 tons of iron and steel products to Rumania.

[439]

5. German Penetration

327 A small degree of penetration into the Rumanian iron and steel industry has been achieved
439 by the Hermann Göring Werke, which, after the partition of Czechoslovakia, acquired Czech in-
473 terests in Reşiţa amounting to 6 per cent., which were later increased to 20 per cent.

In 1941 a company with 50 per cent. German and the remainder Rumanian capital, was formed to take over the management of Reşiţa and its associated companies. The Malaxa Works later also came under the organisation of this company.

C. LEAD AND ZINC

1. General

328 In pre-war years Rumania was practically
439 self-sufficient in lead but not in zinc, since she possessed no zinc-smelting facilities. Her production of zinc concentrates was exported, mainly to Poland, part of the metal content being re-imported after smelting. Belgium and Poland were her chief suppliers of metallic zinc.

2. Mines and Plant

316 The mining of lead and zinc constituted only a small industry in Rumania. Part of the production, almost 50 per cent. in the case of lead, was obtained incidentally to the working of gold and silver ores. The principal producers were
[655] the State-owned mines Baia Sprie, Capnic, Văratec, Valea Roşie, Dealul Crucii, and the Herja mine owned by Phœnix S.A.; all are situated in the Baia Mare district in North Transylvania. The Herja ores averaged approximately 8 per cent. lead and 14 per cent. zinc, whilst ores from the other mines averaged only 4 per cent. lead and 10 per cent. zinc.

135 There are other deposits in the Transylvanian Erzgebirge, where galena and blende are associated with gold occurrences, in the Hunedoara, Banat, and Severin districts, and at Cârlibaba in the Bucovina.

328 Rumania possessed two lead smelters for the treatment of her production of concentrates: the Phœnix plant at Lucaci, with a capacity for about 5,000 tons of crude lead and 3,000 tons of refined lead, and a plant at Feriza belonging to Uzinele Metallurgica din Firiza de Jos. There

[22 a]

328 was no zinc-smelting capacity until 1940, when the "Sonemin" concern (Societatea Nationala de Exploatari Miniere si Industriale S.A.R.) erected a plant at Copsa Mica with a capacity for 6,000 tons of crude zinc annually. The smelter has three retorts fired by natural gas, treating concentrates first roasted at the Phoenix works.

3. Pre-War Production and Trade

Ore production increased over the years 1934-1938, statistics available are conflicting, but it is certain that 1938 production in terms of lead content was not less than 7,000 tons. Smelter production also increased from 4,000 tons to about 7,000 tons and averaged about 5,000 tons over the period. Exports and imports of lead were very small.

Ore production in terms of zinc content varied between approximately 4,000 tons and 8,000 tons. The concentrates were all exported, chiefly to Poland. Metallic zinc was imported almost entirely from Belgium and Poland.

The small output of lead and zinc was of little importance other than to Rumania herself.

4. War-time Development

[728] [439] As practically the whole of the Rumanian lead-zinc industry passed to Hungary when she acquired the Baia Mare district under the Vienna Award, Rumania became largely dependent on imports for the satisfaction of her lead and zinc requirements. However, she retained the Transylvanian Erzgebirge and other areas containing lead-zinc deposits, some of which she is now endeavouring to exploit. For instance, it was reported in December 1942 that deposits in the Banat, near Agadici, and in the Hunedoara district, were being developed. The Copsa Mica zinc smelter has remained in Rumanian hands.

D. MICA

316 135 The Germans are taking considerable interest in the mica deposits discovered in the Mehedinti district, though little is believed to be of high quality. The present annual rate of production is estimated to be about 150 tons.

E. BAUXITE

135 Rumania possessed reserves of bauxite situated in the Bihor Massif and estimated by German experts in 1939 at some 40 million tons. The main deposits are located in the Poiana, Crisul Repede and Jad Valleys, and in the Galbina valley south-east of Beius. Small deposits exist around Remetea and Bratca, in the district around Piatra-Jasi and near Turda.

316 Despite the size of her ore reserves, Rumania's production of bauxite has never been important, largely because of its unsuitability for the Bayer process, which is mostly operated in European alumina plants. Pre-war ouput never exceeded 10,000 tons annually, and was mostly consumed at home in the manufacture of cement and refractory bricks.

Mining operations were carried on before the war by three companies:

(a) *Bauxita S.A.R.*, a subsidiary of the Swiss Aluminium Industrie A.G. Chippis which owned mines at Dobresti and produced small quantities of bauxite for the Rumanian cement industry.

[226]

316 (b) *Alumina S.A.R.*, a subsidiary of the German-controlled Bauxit-Trust A.G. of Zurich, which mined bauxite principally at Bratca in the Jad valley, and also owned concessions at Remetea and Pietroasa.

(c) *Aur S.A.R.*, a subsidiary of the Rumanian Mica Group, owning bauxite properties in the Sohodol region near the railway from Abrud to Turda. It supplied bauxite for the manufacture of cement and at the outbreak of war had reserved stocks for a projected alumina and aluminium plant.

The Dobreşti mines of the Bauxita S.A.R., which are within the present Rumanian frontiers, are producing at the rate of 10,000 tons annually, most of which is delivered to Germany.

F. ALUMINIUM

328 Rumania possessed no aluminium industry before the war although from time to time plans for an alumina-aluminium works were discussed. A few thousand tons of aluminium, mostly in the form of semi-manufactured or finished products, were imported annually, Germany being the principal source of supply. [439]

Aur S.A.R. have been experimenting in the production of alumina in a small pilot plant near Dicio Sân Martin, using the Seailles process which is claimed to be successful in producing alumina from low-grade bauxites of the type mostly found in Rumania.

This company is planning an aluminium reduction works of 20,000 tons capacity with an alumina plant of 60,000 tons. I.G. Farbenindustrie and the Mica group are interested, and the intention is to supply 20,000 tons of alumina annually to Germany. Up to June 1943 these projects had apparently not progressed beyond the experimental stage.

Small tonnages of aluminium, mostly in the form of semi-manufactures, are being imported from Germany, principally for the Rumanian aircraft industry.

G. CHROME

316 Rumania has reserve of chrome ore estimated at 2 million tons, located at Ogradina and Plavişeviţa on the Danube near Orşova. These deposits were not worked before 1941, and the output for 1942 is estimated at 5,000 tons. The ore is low grade, the highest chrome content being 40 per cent. Cr_2O_3. Germany is believed to be receiving the greater part of present output. [135]

H. MANGANESE

The pre-war annual output of manganese averaged 40,000 tons (40 per cent. Mn.), and the probable maximum output that could be obtained is 60,000 tons. The ore is located in the Eastern and Southern Carpathians with reserves estimated at 10 million tons, while the principal mines are near Jacobeni. About 30/35,000 tons of manganese ore is available for export, and is now mainly supplied to Italy and Germany, the remainder being used locally in the making of ferro-manganese. The Nitrogen company at Dicio sân Martin are reported to have extended their plant to produce ferro-manganese for supply to Reşiţa iron and steel works, and to Titan Nadrag Calan.

I. COPPER

316 Apart from copper ore recovered as a by-
135 product in the mining of gold ores, there is no copper-mining industry in Rumania. There are, however, two deposits which have possibilities of future production. They are as follows:—

(a) At Altan-Tepe in the Dobruja, 12 miles south of Tulcea, near the Black Sea, is a deposit which is being developed by Crediton Minier S.A.R. There are three areas totalling about 5,000 acres and reserves of 400,000 tons of ore averaging 1½ to 3 per cent. copper.

In 1940 development was proceeding very slowly, and it did not appear then that any production would take place for at least two years.

(b) At Zam, which is about 19 miles from Brad in western Transylvania, there is another deposit. The veins vary from a centimetre to a metre in width, and the grade of ore ranges from a half to 3 per cent. copper. These deposits have been worked on a small scale in the past, but no work is in progress at the present time.

Production of copper ore in Rumania, mainly from operations at various gold mines, is reported to have been 12,420 tons in 1938, and 35,108 tons in 1939.

J. GOLD

The most important area for gold-mining is in the Apuseni mountain district in Central Transylvania. The principal gold deposits lie within an area bounded by Baia De Aries, Zlatna, Sacaramb and Tebea. The chief mining centre is Brad, the nearby mines of Muşari, Brodisor and Valea Morii providing most of the production. Other mining centres within the area are Sacaramb, Almaş (Neagris), Roşia Montana, Bucium and Stanija.

The gold-bearing veins of the Apuseni district strike in directions between north-west and north-east and vary from a few millimetres to two metres in width. The lengths of the veins range between 300 and 700 metres and some are worked at depths approaching 600 metres from the surface. The ore is said to average 8 to 12 grammes per ton.

The largest producing company is the Societatea Mica with a production in 1940 of 2,096 kilos, and in 1941 of 2,665 kilos. In 1942, the State gold mines of Roşia Montana and Sacaramb produced respectively 150 and 238 kilos of gold.

Production in the Baia Mare district (now Hungarian) represented about one-third of normal ore output.

316 To stimulate gold production in those mines
435 carrying only small values in gold, and also to make up for the loss of output entailed by the transfer of the Baia Mare area in Northern Transylvania to Hungary under the Vienna Award, the premium on gold production in Rumania was increased from the 1st January, 1943. In addition to the fixed basic price of 211,111 lei per kilo, there is now a premium of 189,189 lei per-kilo for ore produced with a gold content of 15 grammes per ton rising to 656,389 lei per kilo for ore with a gold content of 3 grammes per ton or less. This has led to considerable prospecting for new gold deposits in various parts of the country.

K. SILVER

316 Over pre-war years Rumania ranked sixth, or when the Italian production was greater seventh,

CHAPTER IV

316 among European producers of silver. Although imports and exports of silver were irregular, and show no marked trend, it seems certain that production was adequate to meet requirements. Imports were mainly in the form of coinage, minted in London and Paris.

1. Mines and Plant

There were no mines exploited exclusively for silver and the output was to a considerable extent closely related to that of gold, with which it frequently occurs in association with copper and/or lead, zinc, pyrites, etc. Hence the geographical distribution of the main silver-producing areas was almost identical with that of gold. There were two principal districts, the "Triangle of Gold" around Brad, Abrud, Zlatna in the province of Alba, and the Baia Mare district

The larger gold mines were all considerable producers of silver, although the very largest silver producers, the Herja, and the State-owned Baia Sprie mine both in the (Baia Mare district) were only insignificant gold producers.

328 The Rumanian production of argentiferous ores was treated by refineries at Baia Mare and Zlatna and at the Phœnix refinery at Satu Mare, all of which are in the area ceded to Hungary.

2. Pre-War Production

Silver production increased at a much higher rate than gold production over pre-war years; 1937 silver output was nearly double that of 1935, and more than four times as great as that of 1932. However, there was a considerable fall from 824,480 in 1937 to 502,890 troy ounces (metal in ore), in 1938.

3. War-time Developments

728 316 A Rumanian authority has estimated that with the loss of the Baia Mare (Nagybanya) area under the Vienna Award, Rumania was deprived of as much as 87 per cent. of her silver production. Efforts are being made, however, to increase production from the considerable deposits still remaining under Rumanian control. Increased premiums are also being paid on silver mined as from the 1st January, 1943.

CHAPTER V

ENGINEERING, ARMAMENTS AND SHIPBUILDING

A. GENERAL ENGINEERING

1. General

392 The general engineering industries of Rumania are comparatively small, though to meet the increased demand for engineering products development has been appreciable during the last decade.

[439] Rumania is most dependent on imports for her supplies of better class types of engineering equipment, such as machine tools, and whilst receiving technical assistance from Germany, has during 1942 and 1943 been purchasing engineering equipment in increasingly large quantities from Sweden.

391 The rougher classes of engineering products, such as nails, screws, rivets, chains and wire are produced in Rumania and there are a few firms, such as Acta S.A.R., and Industria de Optica

391 Română S.A.R., both in Bucarest, which make precision mechanical instruments; and "Flexodo" Prima Fabrica Română de garnituri pentru frane S.A., also in Bucarest, which specialises in brakes, couplings and transmission equipment. Small tools are made by a few firms, but the quality is indifferent.

397 394 The largest individual firms in Rumania concerned with general engineering production are Reşiţa, Malaxa, Lemaitre, Vulcan and Fraţii Schiel, all of whom undertake diverse production, including locomotive and wagon manufacture, and structural engineering and boiler construction.

391 439 Rumanian firms, such as Uzinele Metalurgice Ploeşti and Concordia S.A.R. of Ploeşti, produce certain types of oil-well machinery and equipment, but the bulk of requirements, particularly of the more specialised types, have to be imported. Before the war the U.S.A. were the principal suppliers, but since the war Rumania has become dependent on Germany for this type of machinery, and in view of the importance of oil to Germany, her requirements probably receive a high priority.

2. Agricultural Machinery

407 Rumanian agricultural methods are backward, and the degree of mechanisation is low, caused by lack of purchasing power of the peasants and the high percentage of small holdings, which make the use of modern equipment impracticable. For this reason the production of agricultural machinery has not been very highly developed, though there has been some expansion since 1927—production of implements has trebled between 1927 and 1937. Production of agricultural machines, however, declined by about 60 per cent. during the same period. Between

391
407

Between 1935 and 1937 the average annual internal sale of agricultural implements amounted to some 6,000 tons, of which two-thirds were home produced and the remainder imported. The average annual internal sale of agricultural machines during this period was 3,300 tons, of which only a fifth were home produced. Germany was the main supplier of agricultural machinery before the war, and since the outbreak of war, has continued to be so.

[437] Agricultural tractors in particular have been imported in increased quantities and it is believed that during the period 1940–1942, inclusive, some 4,000 units were imported, from Germany, as well as a few hundred from Italy.

Agricultural implements are produced in small quantities by about 15 general engineering firms, while the chief firms producing agricultural machinery are as follows :—

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943 EDl Rumania EDl

391
407

Name of Firm	Location	Type of Product
1. Uzinele de Fier şi Domeniile din Reşiţa S.A.	Bocşa-Romana	Threshing machines, sifters and selectors for cleaning corn, harrows, seed-sowing machines, ploughs, etc., small agricultural implements
2. Schramm, Hüttl and Schmidt, S.A.	Topleţ (district Severin)	Threshing machines, harrows, sifters and selectors for cleaning corn, ploughs, seed-sowing machines
3. Fabricile de Maşini And. Rieger, S.A.	Sibiu	Threshing machines, harrows, sifters and selectors for cleaning corn, ploughs, etc.

[25e]

397 **3. Locomotives and Rolling Stock**

The locomotive and rolling-stock industry was small, only two companies, the Bucarest branch of the Malaxa works, and the Reşiţa Iron and Steel works, at Reşiţa, building main-line steam locomotives, while three Companies built main-line wagons, namely, Malaxa, the Astra Works at Braşov and Arad, and the Franco-Romana works in Braila. The Astra works also built narrow-gauge locomotives.

The capacity of the Malaxa plant at Bucarest was probably about 80 main-line locomotives a year; the capacity of the Reşiţa works is not known, but was probably about equivalent to that of Malaxa. The total pre-war capacity of the Rumanian locomotive industry may therefore be estimated at about 150 main-line steam models a year.

With regard to wagon-building capacity, it is believed that Malaxa could build between 800 and 1,000 main-line 20-ton wagons a year, and the Astra plant about 2,500; the capacity of the Franco-Romana works is not known.

In June, 1942, both Malaxa and Reşiţa were stated to have received orders for the German Class "50" locomotive, one report indicating that deliveries were to begin in the summer of 1943. There has recently been some indication that these locomotives are actually under construction, although there is no information regarding the rate of production. The Reşiţa works and also Astra, are believed to have been constructing narrow-gauge locomotives for the Rumanian State Forestry Department.

There is little information regarding wagon production in Rumania since the alliance with

CHAPTER V

397 Germany. It is, however, believed that tank wagons have been built to German order by the Astra Works at Braşov, and that narrow-gauge rolling-stock for the State Forestry Department has been under construction at Braşov.

398 **4. Motor Vehicles**

439 In spite of the gradual industrialisation which was taking place in Rumania in the early 1930's, by 1935 there was no motor-vehicle industry, so that the country was entirely dependent on imports. The Government, therefore, to combat the steady decline in the number of motor vehicles which had been taking place since 1930, issued a decree in 1935, offering special facilities to foreign manufacturers who would establish assembly plants. At the same time the establishment of a domestic manufacturing industry was contemplated, a plan which does not appear to have been realised.

398 Following this decree the whole of the motor-car
439 assembly industry, which was then built up, was dominated by American manufacturers, the three main assembly plants all in Bucarest, being :—

Ford Romana S.A.R., for assembly of Ford motor vehicles of all types.

Leoniida S.A., for assembly of Chevrolet cars, and representatives for General Motors.

Saral S.A.R., for assembly of Chrysler cars and others such as Dodge, De Soto and Plymouth and Fargo trucks.

From 1938 onwards several firms were established by German companies, including :—

Romano-Germana S.A.R., for repairs and servicing of vehicles.

Skoda Industriala Romana S.A.R., for the import and sale of Skoda products, and for assembly and repair work.

Tatra Romana S.A.R., representatives of the Ringhoffer-Tatra-Werke A.G., Prague.

Demag Romana S.A., agents for Demag motors of Duisburg.

With the establishment of these and other affiliated German firms the automobile assembly industry gradually passed into German hands, a process which was completed in 1940 when the Americans withdrew from the country.

398 As a result of the establishment of all these firms, the number of motor vehicles increased, and in 1938 there were 34,000 vehicles of all descriptions in the country. The estimated total number of lorries in civilian use on July 1st, 1943, was 9,600, of which 6,500 with up to 3 tons capacity and the remainder over 3 tons.

398 439 Germany has, during the war period, continued to export motor vehicles to Rumania, and the industry has continued to be engaged on repair and assembly work, parts being supplied by Germany.

5. Electrical Industry

393 439 The electrical industry is small and mainly concerned with the manufacture of accumulators and cables, the former probably being largely a matter of assembly from parts supplied by the German A.F.A. company (Accumulatoren Fabrik A.G., of Berlin and Hagen). Imports in 1937, about 60 per cent. of which came from Germany and Austria, amounted to 20·9 million R.M. (716·87 million lei) which compared with a domestic output in that year of 11 million R.M. (417·3 million lei).

393 The following are the main factories engaged on production of electrical equipment :—

[26c]

393

Firm	Location	Product
1. Tudor S.A.R.	Bucarest ..	Accumulators and batteries
2. Fabrica Românească de Becuri Tungsram S.A.R.	Bucarest ..	Electric bulbs
3. Lumen S.A.R.	Bucarest ..	Electric bulbs (daily capacity, 7,000 bulbs)
4. Electrostar S.A.	Bucarest ..	Electric bulbs (daily capacity, 6,000 bulbs)
5. Standard Fabrica de Telefoane și Radio S.A.	Bucarest ..	Production and repair of telephone, telegraph and radio apparatus, and production of electric cables
6. Industria Sârmei S.A.	Câmpia Turzii	Cables
7. Uz. de Fier din Reșița S.A. ..	Reșița ..	Electric motors

[26 d]

393 439 Present requirements for the Armed Forces for such articles as wireless, field-telephones, etc., and electrical equipment for the oil companies are imported from Germany, as are civilian requirements, though imports for the latter by no means cover the demand. Sweden and Switzerland both supply small quantities of electrical goods of various types.

B. ARMAMENTS

1. General Development

719 Rumanian armament works were for many years badly organised and equipped. In 1936 the Government made the first serious attempt to organise the industry, and selected some eight engineering works for conversion to extensive war production, particularly of shells. Much of this and of subsequent expansion of the industry was carried out under the supervision of foreign concerns, notably Schneider, Skoda and the Ceskoslovenska Zbrojovka, who were not only responsible for equipping the Rumanian works, but also for providing technical and trained personnel.

By 1939 and 1940 a number of new factories came into production, and others either increased their output or adapted their organisation to war production. Despite this expansion, however, the present-day (1943) level of production cannot fulfil the whole of the needs of the Armed Forces, and Rumania has been forced to import war material from Germany, France, Switzerland and elsewhere.

The industry suffers from a lack of certain essential raw materials and of facilities for the production of machine tools, power units and other important engineering components, for which the Rumanians are largely dependent on their already hard-pressed Allies.

[26e]

719

2. Small Arms and Mortars

The principal small arms factory is the Cugir branch of the Copşa Mica şi Cugir Company, which was developed by Zbrojovka of Brno and came into full-scale production in 1938. Apart from the small arms section, which specialises in the ZB 30 type of machine gun, there is also a small arms ammunition plant, and a branch at Copşa Mica which was designed for the production of various types and calibres of artillery and shells.

The production of trench mortars is almost entirely confined to the Voina works at Braşov, which specialises in the Brandt 60 mm. and 81 mm. types. Vulcan of Bucarest also is believed to be engaged on similar work, but on a smaller scale. The Braşov works produce mortar bombs also, but the filling is carried out at Satu-Lung.

3. Artillery Production

Artillery or artillery-component production is believed to be carried out by some five or six firms. The Astra-Vagoane works at Braşov was taken over by the Reşiţa Iron and Steel concern in 1936 for the assembly and finishing of various types, including the 37 mm. A.Tk. gun and the 75 mm. A.A. gun, the barrels being received in the rough state from Reşiţa. There are also facilities for the manufacture, assembly and (it is believed) filling, of various types and calibres of shells. Certain tank components may also be made.

The parent company at Reşiţa, in which Skoda is believed to have an interest, manufactures guns and carriages up to 150 mm. calibre and shell cases. There is an important branch at Orăştie for filling and assembling shells. The Concordia works at Ploeşti was converted by Schneider in 1939 for the production of 37 and 47 mm. A.Tk. guns in addition to various calibres of shells and cartridge cases. The Malaxa factory in Bucarest is also engaged on gun production, but is probably of more importance as a shell producer, particularly as it also possesses an important shell filling and assembly plant at Tohanul Vechiu. The branch at Brăila is believed to have been turned over to gun and shell manufacture in recent years. According to reports, both this works and that in Bucarest produce tanks or tank components.

Apart from the shell and filling plants already mentioned, both the State Pyrotechnical Institute and the State Military Arsenal in Bucarest are important shell and small arms ammunition producers. A new works at Avrig, which was still under construction in July 1941 was to be one of the leading shell-filling and assembly plants in Rumania, accounting for some 40 per cent. of the total output. There are a number of metal works, such as Metrom and Farola of Braşov, Laromet of Bucarest and Costinescu of Sinaia, which add a valuable contribution by supplying components to the main shell producers.

Despite its many shortcomings, the Rumanian armament industry has in recent years become one of the most important in S.E. Europe.

4. Aircraft Industry

399

Rumania before the war possessed a small but active aircraft industry capable of producing about 500 aircraft yearly, which was, however, to a great extent, dependent upon foreign suppliers of aero-engines and aircraft components. There were three airframe factories, one of which also produced engines, output of the latter being sufficient to equip about two-thirds of the aircraft built in the country.

[27a]

399 In the middle of 1942, under German influence, the Rumanian Government proceeded to rationalise the industry, and a Board was set up to control the country's most important armaments and aircraft factories. Under this scheme German managers or supervisors went into the aircraft factories and their main activity has since been the repair of damaged aircraft, though some new production continues. For instance, in August 1942 it was reported that an order for 200 I.A.R. fighter aircraft with 1,200 h.p. engines had been placed on behalf of the Rumanian Air Force.

[439] Rumania is still buying Italian (Savoia Marchetti) aircraft, German gliders, and various components from Germany and Switzerland.

Apart from the aircraft factories listed below, facilities for complete overhauls of airframes and engines exist at the Aviation Arsenal in Bucarest, and it has been reported that a former jute factory in Bucarest is now utilised for repair work, and that the Asam-Pipera works, also in Bucarest, are repairing engines.

Information regarding the number of workers engaged in the aircraft industry is too fragmentary to enable any estimate of their total number to be made.

The main producing companies are as follows :—

[655] (*a*) *I.A.R.* (*Industria Aeronautică Română*), the principal Rumanian aircraft company, is State-owned. It has a factory at Brașov (87 miles N.N.E. of Bucarest) for the manufacture of aircraft and aero-engines, and also produces high-precision tools of a very good quality. The factory occupies a site of some 125 acres, adjoining an airfield about 3 or 4 miles north-east of the central station of Brașov. It is a well-equipped plant and possessed considerable stocks of tools and raw materials at the beginning of the war.

The aircraft, produced before the war at a rate of about 8 monthly, consisted mainly of Potez 25 and I.A.R. 15 and 16 single-seater fighters and an I.A.R. type of four-seater commercial aircraft. The engine department produced under licence, at the rate of 25 monthly, an adaptation of the Gnôme-et-Rhône 14N. A licence was also held for Jumo 211 engines, but none of these appear to have been built.

[439] Since the war this factory has been under German control, exercised through a branch of the Hermann Göring Works. The main types of aircraft produced are I.A.R. 80 and 101 single-engined fighters and the Potez 63. Engine production appears to range between 20 and 30 a month, though the German management is trying to double that figure. Airframe output recently appears to have been about 20 monthly. In addition, a good deal of repair work is done for Germany.

The company depends largely upon imported components. It has a propeller department which, about the end of 1941, was transferred to a former paper factory in Azuga ; its output, however, does not appear to have been equal to requirements, for in July, 1942, propellers were being imported from Germany.

(*b*) *S.E.T.* (*Societatea pentru Exploatări Tehnice Industria Națională Aeronautica S.A.R.*,) known up till September 1938 as I.N.A., i.e., *Industria Națională Aeronautică S.A.R.* This company was founded in 1937, sponsored by

[27 b]

CHAPTER V

399 the Ministry of Air and Marine, but reverted in 1938 to the status of a private company. The original intention was to build airframes and engines, but in practice only four types of airframes were built, equipped with imported engines of British or French design. Output was about eight aircraft monthly. The factory is situated in Bucarest, in a two-storied building on a site of about 100 yards square, and is so hemmed in that no expansion is possible. Early in 1939 there was a proposal to build a branch factory at Târgul Ocna in Moldavia for the manufacture of aircraft parts and the construction of engines and motor-cycles, but this does not appear to have been carried into effect.

The company was reported in 1942 to be under German management. Very little information is available about its present activities, but it is believed to employ about 1,000 workers and to be engaged in repair work, as well as the manufacture of sledges and skis for the Rumanian Army.

(c) *I.C.A.R.* (*Intreprinderile pentru Construcţii Aeronautice Române S.A.*). This concern was established in 1931. Its factory in Bucarest produced only ten or twelve Messerschmitt aircraft in a period of three years. Early in 1942 successive increases of capital, from 14.2 to 45 million lei, appeared to foreshadow a possible development of the company's operations, but as yet there is no sign of any such development.

Present activities are believed to consist of aircraft repair, the construction of a few aircraft for the Rumanian Air Force, and the manufacture of tubes for a Berlin firm.

C. SHIPBUILDING

396 In spite of her Black Sea Coast, the navigable rivers Danube, Dniester and Prut and other streams navigable to some extent to small craft, Rumania has never been a shipbuilding country of any importance.

From a shipbuilding and repairing point of view Galaţi has always been and still is the most

[28 a]

396 important centre, followed by Constanța, Turnu Severin and Brăila in that order, though prior to the war Galați and Turnu Severin were the only ports with yards capable of building anything larger than barges, lighters and small river craft.

Until construction was started on a dry dock at Galați in 1937 there was no dry dock in the whole country. This dock should by now be in use, excavations having been completed in 1942. Constanța has a floating dock (475' × 77') with a lift of 8,000 tons; Galați two, one of 200, and one of 300 tons lift, and Brăila one for small craft of 100 tons lift.

Prior to the war, the largest ships built were a river steamer of 420 tons and barges up to 1,700 tons at Galați, where 500/800 men were employed. Turnu Severin, employing 100 men, had a building capacity of 1,500 tons per annum in 1933, but this figure covered a number of small ships and barges.

In view of the microscopics ize of the navy—some half-dozen ships, of which the largest was a destroyer leader and the rest mainly river craft—and a merchant marine of about the same number of sea-going ships, Rumania's neglect of shipbuilding is not surprising. The war, however, has made a considerable difference. Yards are being expanded under German and Italian influence and a very considerable amount of money is being put into shipyards and their plant. In 1942 an arrangement was concluded by the Santiere Navale at Galați with the Hermann Göring Werke for "assistance in technical matters and in the conduct of the company," and the capital of the company was raised from 50 million to 550 million lei. In 1941 two or three tugs of between 600 and 1,000 tons were built as well as two, possibly three, U-boats completed for Rumania under supervision of Deschimag and Krupp technicians. There had been laid down pre-war with Dutch help. The construction of a large number of Tank Landing Craft, Siebel Ferries, Invasion barges, Motor Torpedo boats and possibly some small Italian U-boats has been achieved, all from pre-fabricated parts sent from Germany and Italy.

[28b]

CHAPTER VI

TEXTILES AND TEXTILE FIBRES, TIMBER, PAPER AND PULP

A. TEXTILES AND TEXTILE FIBRES

248 In the years preceding the war, Rumania had been making efforts, with some success, to reduce the degree of her previous dependence on imports of textile fibres. The cotton crop of fair average quality, though still far short of the expanded mill capacity, was gradually increasing, while [236] indigenous wool supplies—though chiefly of coarse quality—were in the main enough for peasant clothing. Home-grown crops of hemp and flax were sufficient for internal needs, while jute, coir and hard hemps were imported to complete the requirements of industrial fibres.

248 439 The cessation of imports and loss of territory to her neighbours have entirely changed the supply picture, and combined with demands by Germany for imports have greatly reduced the textile "standard of living."

1. Cotton

With the development of her processing industry, Rumania had increased raw cotton imports and was successfully encouraging domestic cotton production. By 1938, imports at some 21,000 tons were about five times larger than those of 1932, and the domestic crop yield, less than 20 tons in 1932, had risen to about 600 tons. The principal sources of raw cotton were Egypt, the U.S.A., and Great Britain.

With the outbreak of war, Rumanian imports generally were curtailed, the combined total of raw cotton and cotton materials being 14,700 tons in 1940, and 13,800 tons in 1941. Thereafter, Rumania was dependent on such supplies as she could obtain by barter, lower grade cotton from Turkey and Italy and cotton and staple fibre union cloth from Italy.

248 Since 1938 the Rumanian cotton crop has continued to increase, though it is still very short of normal requirements, while the cession of some 8,000 ha. (20,000 acres) of cotton land to Bulgaria in 1940, and unfavourable weather conditions, tended to restrict the cotton-growing programme.

Prior to the territorial changes of 1940, cotton was grown close to the Danube at Craiova, and especially in the Southern Dobruja. With the cession of most of this land to Bulgaria, cotton is now mostly grown on the north bank of the Danube, at Banloc near Timişoara in the Banat and in the districts of Teleorman, Vlasca and Ialomiţa. The crop in 1939 was 2,200 tons from less than 10,000 ha. (24,000 acres) and in 1942 was estimated at 5,000 tons from about 20,000 ha. (50,000 acres). A further increase in area has been planned, but the harvest, particularly in the north, is largely dependent upon climatic conditions. The type of cotton now produced is considered superior to Indian, and similar in quality to American.

288 The chief mill centres are at Arad, Bucarest, Cluj, Iaşi, Lugoj and Timişoara; of these, Cluj is the only one to have been affected by the transfer of territory. Cotton supplies are dis- [655] tributed under the direction of the Department of Industry and Trade by "Romacotin," which also has a monopoly of purchase from producers at prices fixed by the General Price Commissariat. Cotton may be sold only to these Government agencies to whom it has to be delivered by

288 31st December. There appears to be a good deal of passive resistance and hoarding.

Cotton spindles had increased from 35,600 in 1927 to 250,000 in 1938, and altogether there were 18 mills of some importance. Power looms in 1938 are believed to have amounted to about 16,000. The apparent disproportion of spindle compared with loom capacity was due to Rumania being a fairly important buyer of foreign yarns, imports being 23,000 tons in 1936, 27,000 in 1937, 14,000 in 1938 and 15,000 in 1939. About 70 per cent. of these yarns were of coarse cotton, called "peasants' yarns," for use in the handicraft industry only, and imported mainly from Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy and Great Britain.

2. Wool

236 Rumania, which had the largest wool-growing industry in S.E. Europe, was also the most important consumer. Production of raw wool in 1938 was about 20,000 tons (greasy) and imports were about 1,000 tons, and of wool yarn about 2,500 tons. On account of its coarse quality, not much more than one-third of the domestic wool clip is ordinarily used in the mechanised industry, the bulk being consumed in village handicraft. Since the war and subsequent loss of territory, [233] the sheep population of Rumania is believed to have declined by some 25 to 30 per cent., and all imports have ceased, so that the industry is now entirely dependent upon the reduced domestic clip.

288 Rumania was never a large importer of woollen cloth, and the weaving industry was always more highly developed than the spinning. The output of cloth in 1936 and 1937 being 6,000 tons and 6,600 tons respectively. In 1938, there were 127,000 mechanised spindles and 4,300 looms, the chief mill centres, in order of importance, being at Buhusi (district of Neamţi), Braşov, Timişoara, Bacău, Bucarest and Sibiu.

655 Both the raw material and the woollen-textile
236 industry are nominally under strict Government control, as by a decree in April 1942, the numbers
288 of sheep and lambs and the quantity of shorn wool must be declared each year, and the wool itself must be surrendered to collecting centres at specified dates. As the due date for the 1942 collection had to be extended month by month up till January 10th, 1943, and all penalties abrogated, the success of the scheme appears to have been doubtful. No wool can be bought or sold except by permit of the Ministry of National Economy, and distribution to the mills is entrusted to an organisation known as "OFIL" (*Oficiul Lânei*), a company with a capital of 10 million lei, and including all firms concerned in the preparation of wool.

3. Hemp

248 In 1937 the area under hemp, which is grown chiefly in the Banat, was 50,000 ha. (123,000 acres) and the outturn 27,000 tons, most of which was consumed internally. Exact details of wartime plantings are not known, but are reported as 45,000 ha. (112,000 acres) and 32,500 ha. (80,300 acres) in 1941 and 1942, and the yield at about 21,000 and 20,000 tons respectively. For 1943, farmers have been urged to plant more hemp—the "national textile"—in order to cover clothing.

CHAPTER VI

248 sack and rope requirements; and a hemp and flax office has been established with a capital of 20 million lei and a credit of 500 million to distribute seed and manure, and to rent and finance retting and scutching plants. This office which is the only purchaser of these fibres, is to make no profits, and prices are to be fixed. Fifteen up-to-date plants are to be erected in 1943 in the hemp-growing areas.

[439] Although Rumania normally had little or no export balance, Germany in 1942 demanded 15,000 tons of the 20,000 tons available. How much of this was actually delivered is not known, but the shortage of hemp and other fibres has led to amazing competition between the various industries for the remaining supplies, and a hemp rope and sack factory is to be built at Chişinău [288] in Bessarabia, where the shortage of these goods is particularly acute.

4. Flax

Flax appears to be the only crop grown on a smaller area in 1943 than in 1941 and 1942, when 20,000 ha. (49,400 acres) were planted, as compared with 15,000 ha. (37,000 acres) in 1938 and 12,000 ha. (29,600 acres) in 1939. Preference, apparently, is to be given to hemp. The pre-war output was about 10,000 tons, but no reliable figures are available since 1939. Normally, there was no appreciable export of flax, but as with other fibres, the Germans appear to have been persistent in their demands. The Rumanian company, Fuiorul Cotonese, in which German capital participates, is to build flax-retting tanks at Cereteni (in the district of Dolj) and Zimnicea (in the district of Teleorman).

5. Rayon and Staple Fibre

288 There were two plants erected before the war the "Apretura" at Popeşti-Leordeni and the Viscosa Românească at Lupeni, the combined daily capacity of which was 12 tons of rayon and 6 tons of staple fibre. (Approximately 4,200 tons rayon and 2,100 tons of staple fibre annually.) There has been but little expansion since, and the present annual production is estimated at 4,400 tons rayon and 2,600 tons staple fibre. Imports [439] from Italy have been 450 tons in 1940, and 2,500 in 1941. Germany promised substantial quantities, but it is doubtful whether they fully materialised. Applications for permission to erect a new pulp mill have been made by both German and Italian interests, but it seems that the Germans objected to Snia Viscosa's being granted a concession and obtained it themselves later.

6. Silk

231 Although Rumania is within the orbit of the silk belt, output is small, reaching a maximum of 20 tons of cocoons in pre-war years, and 35 tons of reeled silk were imported, principally from Italy. Silkworm breeding is located in the Banat, and in common with the drive for increased silk production in German Europe, Rumania has made efforts to increase silkworm breeding.

288 In 1937 about 5,000 workers were engaged in silk weaving (probably including artificial silk); this number was increased to 7,336 in 1941. It is reported that the cocoon crop is now delivered to the Air and Marine Ministries, presumably for making cartridge bags, etc.

7. Other Fibres

248 Raw jute imports averaged about 5,500 tons
439 annually before the war, and in addition there were smaller imports of jute cloth and bags

248 439 Paper, and paper mixed with hemp, are now used to substitute jute.

Although a comparatively large producer of soft hemp, Rumania normally needed to import about 2,300 tons of other hemps for special purposes, and the sources of these imports have been severed since her entry into the war.

Comparatively negligible amounts of coir were also imported in peacetime.

288 291 434 **8. Clothes Rationing**

Unlike almost all other Enemy and Occupied countries, Rumania possesses no official clothes-ration card, although purchases are restricted to a specific number of garments per year. Since 1940 the Government, anxious to avoid the necessity for a card rationing system, has adopted various means in an endeavour to overcome the shortage of textiles, particularly of cotton and wool.

Standardisation of fabrics and fixed prices were introduced in 1940, but clothing of standardised material was frequently unobtainable since the price did not leave the retailer a profit.

Army demands soon called for a great increase in clothing production, thereby reducing the stocks and greatly raising prices of civilian clothing—those for overcoats rose by 300 per cent. and for knitted goods by 400 per cent.—and the difficulty of importing raw materials soon reacted on the industry, so that by 1941 the textile shortage, particularly of bed linen, had become serious. Later in the same year, the Ministry of Supply blocked the sale of all semi-manufactured or manufactured blankets.

Early in 1942 the Government requested the public to purchase only necessities, ordering the industry at the same time to use cotton allocations for the manufacture of standardised bed linen and clothing only. Later in 1942 it was decreed that the annual allotment of garments per head of the population was two suits or frocks, one overcoat, three shirts, 12 handkerchiefs, three pairs of socks or stockings, one sheet, three towels. The sale of standard cloth was restricted to three metres per person per annum. For this arrangement, however, clothing coupons were not issued and purchasers were requested to produce their identity cards and a signed certificate of need if the purchase exceeded 300 lei.

291 435 Non-standard articles are still obtainable, but their exorbitant prices make them accessible to a limited section of the public only. Retailers are known to have refused the sale of standard cloth even when displayed, in order to secure, if possible, the higher profit margin for non-standard goods.

[565] The members of the public most severely affected by clothing shortage and high prices are industrial workers and the poorer urban population. Though the large firms are supposed by law to supply their employees with clothing (as well as food) at cheap prices, it is thought that this is not being widely practised.

Prices of all materials for men's garments have risen to such an extent that people cannot afford to buy even such goods as are available in the shops.

248 656 To counteract shortage of clothing fibres, peasants are being encouraged by the Government to increase cultivation of flax and hemp for production of the rough cloth suitable for peasant clothing.

[30b]

B. TIMBER

313 NOTE: *As for other south-eastern European countries, the statistical and other data available on forest conditions is most insufficient. It has, therefore, been necessary to refer to the works of private foresters who differ considerably in their statements and conclusions. The statements which follow are, it is believed, substantially accurate, but must be considered with a certain degree of reserve.*

I. PRE-WAR SITUATION

The forests of Rumania were one of its most important natural resources and of much value to the country's general economic welfare. A large part of the fuel requirements were supplied in wood, in addition to which the country was self-sufficient in its needs for constructional timber, etc., whilst timber exports took third place after grain and oil. The timber industry was, however, over-expanded in relation to the size of the forests, the normal yield of which although able to cover domestic requirements, was not sufficient to meet the heavy extra demands for export. The result was that over many years, up to the outbreak of the present war, the relatively high exports were only made possible by considerably overcutting the forests.

1. Area, Location and Species

137 According to the last known survey, Rumania's forest land covered about 7.1 million ha. (27,000 sq. miles), of which about 90 per cent., or 6.4 million ha., were stocked—equalling 22 per cent. of the total land surface. As was to be found in all Balkan countries, the forests were dominated by broadleaf species, the area under conifers being only 25 per cent.

The following table shows the division of the stocked forest area by regions and species, in '000 hectares :—

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943 ED1 Rumania ED1

137

	Old Kingdom	Transylvania	Bucovina	Bessarabia	Total	% of Total
Conifers	474	829	312	—	1,615	25
Beech	820	1,528	103	2	2,453	38
Oak species	706	723	6	114	1,549	24
Sundry hard broadleaf* ..	344	141	23	54	562	9
Sundry soft broadleaf† ..	173	61	6	30	270	4
Total	2,517	3,282	450	200	6,449	100

* Including hornbeam, alder, ash, etc.
† Including lime, birch, willow, poplar, etc.

[31 b]

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943

ED1 Rumania ED1

137

About 85 per cent. of the forests, representing those that were the best and most extensive, were located in the hills and mountains—particularly in the east and south Carpathians, the

[31c]

137 Banat and in west Transylvania; and of these 15 per cent. are not easily accessible and are unremunerative to exploit on account of heavy capital expenditure necessary to build suitable roads and railways. The forests of the plains were of minor importance, especially since they consisted almost entirely of young trees yielding firewood only.

Beech was the principal forest tree, except in the plains, where it gave way to various species of oak. The eastern Carpathians constituted the only predominantly coniferous regions.

[423] The following table shows how the forests were owned and managed; column 1 shows the area in million Hectares, column 2 the equivalent in square miles :—

	I	II	% of Total
State owned	1.9	7.3	30
Owned by communes, churches, etc.	2.0	7.7	30
Owned by companies and private persons.. ..	2.5	9.6	40

About 70 per cent. of the forests were treated as "high forests" (i.e., allowed to grow naturally) and the remainder were under varying forms of "coppice management" (i.e., allowed to grow from roots after cutting, thus producing small timber).

2. Annual Increment and Domestic Consumption

313 439 Chiefly as a result of Rumania's Agrarian Reform policy in 1924 and 1925 of clear-cutting huge forest areas to provide peasants with additional agricultural land, very large volumes of timber became available for the export market, with the result that a wrong impression was created abroad that Rumania was a country with a large export surplus of timber.

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943
ED1 Rumania ED1

313 According to V. Sabau, a leading Rumanian forester, the country's estimated domestic consumption and total forest growth in the early 1930's were :—

[31e]

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943 ED1 Rumania ED1

313
137

	Consumption			
	Per capita *solid cu. m.*	Total '000 *solid cu. m.*	Annual growth '000 *solid cu. m.*	Surplus '000 *solid cu. m.*
Firewood	0·50	9,250	12,590	3,340
Timber :—				
Conifers ..	0·17	3,122	3,230	108
Broadleaf ..	0·14	2,660	2,800	140
	0·81	15,032	18,620	3,588

[31f]

CHAPTER VI

313 [439]

From this it appears that there was a surplus for export of only about 248,000 cubic metres of timber, but about 3.3 million cubic metres of firewood.

The figures for firewood growth and consumption include branches and other unmerchantable parts of the tree (*Reisholz*). Growth of these was about 3.6 million cubic metres, and although it is not known what quantity of these were included in consumption, this is not thought to be large, as such wood is mostly left in the forests. It was considered, therefore, that the greater part of the firewood surplus consisted of branches, etc., not sufficiently merchantable to be regarded as available for export.

If *Reisholz* is excluded, net merchantable growth was about 15 million cubic metres consisting of about 9 million cubic metres firewood and 6 million cubic metres timber :—

	'000 *cubic metres*
Conifers ..	3,230
Broadleaf* ..	11,787
	15,017

* Of which (in '000 cubic metres) beech 3,641 ; oak 2,933 ; and sundry 3,212.

3. Annual Cut

As far as can be ascertained, average annual felling, in millions of solid cubic metres, over a number of years was as follows :—

	Annual cut	*Of which Conifers*
1920 21 ..	16.3	3.3
1922 26 ..	20.7	5.8
1927 30 ..	19.3	5.6
1931 37 ..	17.2	4.4

This is equivalent to an average annual cut over the period 1920/1937 of 18.4 million cubic metres, an excess of 3.4 million cubic metres over net growth, or an exploitation of 120 per cent. per annum. The result of this over-exploitation was that by 1936 a large area, estimated to be as much as 3 million ha., was considered unsuitable for further production.

The conifers particularly were overcut, to the extent of an average of 50 per cent. of their growth. This was principally due to the heavy export demand for these, but can be explained in part by the fact that much of the Rumanian beech yields poor quality timber suitable only for firewood. This is shown more clearly in the details of cut by species for 1930 (the only available figures of such cutting) reproduced in Table 1 on page 33. No details of cut by trade categories are known for any year, but after firewood the largest individual item was sawlogs.

4. Timber Industry

After 1920, with the help of foreign capital, the sawmill industry was considerably over-expanded compared with the normal yield of the forests, and by 1928 there were estimated to be 570 mills in operation, which consumed in that year more than 12 million cubic metres of logs. Subsequently, as a result of world economic conditions and increasing competition on the European markets from the U.S.S.R., sawmilling activity, and with it forest exploitation, declined to some extent; but the industry was nevertheless still over-developed up to the outbreak of war.

In 1938 there were 713 timber concerns employing 43,326 people, of which 478 were sawmills with 37,693 employees; the balance consisted mostly of joinery works, furniture factories, and

1/2 [Cf. table, cat. 313, p. 31 f - Analyst]
2/2 [i.e., p. 33 a -- Analyst]

[32 a]

313 cooperage and boxmaking plants. The distribution of these is shown in Table II, although separation of the sawmills from the other industries is not possible. There were also three match factories, which covered internal requirements, and four wood-distillation plants, two of which, situated at Margina and Resita, appeared to be relatively large concerns.

5. Exports

313 439 Rumania's timber exports between 1935 and 1938 averaged 1.8 million cubic metres per annum, which was 5 per cent. of total European exports, and gave her the leading place among south-east European countries. Almost 90 per cent. of total exports were conifers, whilst, as the following table shows, sawn goods made up by far the greater part :—

Categories	*Average annual exports 1935/38 (in '000 cubic metres)*	
		%
Sawn goods	1,280	71
Firewood	222	12
Hewn goods	113	6
Sawlogs	71	4
Boxboard, etc.	37	2
Pitwood	31	2
Pulpwood	26	1½
Sleepers	21	1½
Total	1,801	100

Exports were made to many countries, including South America, but the most important customers were Hungary, Germany, U.K., Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Greece. Trade with Germany in the immediate years prior to the war was tending to increase.

6. Employment

313 [464] It was estimated by a qualified expert that the forests gave direct or indirect employment to 750,000 people (about 10 per cent. of the total labour force) in forest work, transport of forest produce and in the timber industry and trade. At least 250,000 were engaged in actual forestry work, but this number probably included part-time and seasonal workers.

7. Transport

[505] [497] Water transport played but a small part in the carriage of timber, carrying only about 700,000 cubic metres per annum. By far the greater reliance was placed on transport by railways, and some 10 million cubic metres were carried by this service each year.

II. PRESENT SITUATION

Under war conditions Rumania has been faced with increasing difficulties for her supply of timber, and as most of the quantities now made available are required for home consumption, she has very little significance as an exporter.

The forest area lost by the cession of part of Transylvania is estimated to be about 1.4 million ha., and as this area accounted for 25 per cent. of pre-war production its loss is of serious consequence. It is estimated that under existing circumstances the maximum annual cut that is possible, if the present forest area is to be maintained, is 12 million cubic metres.

About 210 timber-processing concerns, of which 178 were sawmills, were also lost with Northern Transylvania, but in view of the over-expansion of the timber industry these losses are probably of less serious consequence.

3/3 Present fellings are not known, but a considerable shortage of forest workers and draught animals, coupled with poor transport conditions generally, are making it impossible to fell and to distribute sufficient timber to meet all home demands. These have been considerably increased by the need for timber for military purposes both in the country and at the front, and for reconstruction work in the war-damaged areas of Bessarabia, Bucovina and Transnistria. The result is a heavy and at times serious shortage of supplies.

[439] Exports, which had already fallen to about 562,000 cubic metres in 1940, further declined after the loss of Transylvania and were only some 210,000 cubic metres in 1941, but of these about 180,000 cubic metres were old accumulated stocks of sawn goods which were sold to Germany and the U.S.S.R. at the beginning of that year. No information has yet been received concerning 1942 exports, but the increasing difficulties of production make it unlikely that these were of any importance, and probably did not exceed 50,000 cubic metres.

[656] The forests are now placed under Government control and many decrees have been published regulating and defining the quantities and dimensions of trees that may be felled. Maximum prices have been fixed for all classes of timber, and a strict rationing of firewood introduced, whilst in 1942 an export embargo was placed on several categories of timber, principally soft woods.

After the cession of Northern Transylvania, German forestry experts visited the country to advise on proper forestry methods, and although there is no real evidence of what was decided, there are indications that the country is now more forestry-minded, and that more regard is being paid to reafforestation and other necessary work. These are, however, long-term policies and can have very little immediate effect or improvement on the country's present difficult situation.

TABLES

1. Details of Cut and Ownership, 1930

[423]

	State	Communes	Private	Total
Timber	(in '000 *solid cubic metres*)			
Conifers ..	570	2,450	2,850	5,870
Beech ..	1,080	300	480	1,860
Oak, etc. ..	350	390	520	1,260
Firewood ..	2,820	2,130	6,930	11,880
Total ..	4,820	5,270	10,780	20,870

2. Distribution of Timber Industry, 1938

	Units	*Personnel*
Total timber industry ..	713	43,326
of which:		
Sawmills	478	37,693
Distribution of total timber industry by administrative regions —		
Olt	18	1,756
Bucegi	159	7,177
Marea	3	38
Dunarea de Jos ..	29	932
Nistru	3	109
Prut	67	6,222
Suceava	110	6,555
Mureş	155	9,196
Someş	83	7,163
Timiş	86	4,178

C. PAPER AND PULP

289
313

With a normal consumption of only 3·3 kg. (7¼ lb.) of paper and board per head of the population, compared with 37 kg. (81·4 lb.) in Great Britain, Rumania is one of the smallest consumers in Europe. The country's requirements in ordinary grades of paper and board are well covered by about thirteen paper mills, some of which also manufacture both chemical and mechanical wood pulp.

Newsprint requirements are met by home production.

Pre-war (1936) production of chemical pulp was 37,000 tons and of mechanical wood pulp 9,000 tons, while the output of paper in the same year was 48,000 tons, and of cardboard 10,000 tons.

[439] Small imports of sulphate pulp normally came from Sweden, and of mechanical wood pulp from Austria.

In 1940 the production of paper rose to 105,150 tons, of which little more than half was sold internally and about 90 per cent. came from mills in the Rumanian Paper Cartel.

By the early part of 1942 a critical situation had arisen due to scarcity of fuel and raw materials.

The principal pulp and paper mills having four or five machines each and an annual capacity each of 24,30,000 tons of paper are as follows:—

(a) Fabrica de Celuloză Zărnești S.A., Brașov.
(b) "Letea" Fabrica de Hârtie Bacău.
(c) Fabrica de Hârtie "Buștenî" (C. & S. Schiel) at Buștenî.

The remaining mills, about ten in number, are much smaller, and three of them, with a combined capacity of 6,7,000 tons per annum, have come under Hungarian ownership following the Vienna Award.

Zărnești Cellulose Mill is of primary importance as the main source of chemical wood pulp for domestic consumption and export, and it is believed that this factory is now making special bleached cellulose for the manufacture of explosives. Elaborate machinery imported from Germany was installed with fair promptitude.

The utilisation of reeds from the Danube delta has not yet (July, 1943) begun, although much publicity has been given to this project in the local and German press, but a concession has been granted to a German-Rumanian Society, "Delta A.G." The Zărnești and Buștenî Paper Mills are participating and investigations are under way. A similar concession asked for by the Snia Viscosa concern in Italy is said to have been refused.

[434] In 1942 consumption of paper in the first half of the year amounted to over 90 per cent. of production, but in the second half-year the Cabinet imposed fresh restrictions on consumption in order to remedy the increasing shortage.

There is a considerable trade with the Italian Government in bitumenised cardboard for walling and roofing military hutments, and it is believed [439] that a part of these are imported from Scandinavia and exported (after bitumenising) to Italy and the U.S.S.R. for the Italian Expeditionary Forces. It is also likely that since the bombing raids on Italy, extra demands have been made for repair purposes.

CHAPTER VII

OTHER INDUSTRIES: CHEMICALS, RUBBER, LEATHER, &c.

A. THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

381 Though the chemical industry of Rumania ranks lowest among the chief industries on the basis of production value, it is better and more comprehensively developed than in the other south-east European countries. Production is chiefly confined to heavy chemicals manufactured largely from indigenous raw materials. Most of the factories are situated in Valachia, Transylvania, and around Timişoara in the Banat.

1. Acids and Alkalis

385 317 Rumania produced annually 45,000 metric tons of sulphuric acid, which was sufficient to cover the pre-war requirements of the country, which were mostly for the refining of mineral oil. The manufacture was in the hands of some six firms, of which the chief producer was the Mărăşeşti S.A.R., with plants at Mărăşeşti, Valea Călugăreasca and Braşov. Three of the smaller plants producing sulphuric acid with a total annual capacity of 18,000 tons, representing 35 per cent. of the total, were acquired by Hungary. The necessary sulphur was obtained from Rumanian pyrites mines located at Baia Mare and Baia Sprie in N. Transylvania, acquired by Hungary in 1940. Since that date supplies have been derived from Fundul Moldovei, Zam, Sacaramb and Altan Tepe, though not in sufficient quantities to cover requirements. Shortage of sulphuric acid has been partly eased by imports from Italy.

The alkali production is normally sufficient to yield a surplus for export. Rock salt, of which there is an important domestic production, forms the basis of the alkali industry.

Salt Production

			metric tons
1939	..	..	374,000
1940	..	..	323,000
1941*	..	..	267,000

* Reduced 1941 production is due to loss of salt mines to Hungary at Ocna Sugatag, Ocna Dejului and elsewhere.

385 Soda ash is made solely by the Solvay Company at Ocna-Mureşului, where the annual capacity of the plant is estimated at 50,000 metric tons. Caustic soda is made by the Solvay-Company and by S. A. Nitrogen at Dicio San Martin. Production of alkali in 1939 and 1942 (estimated) was :—

		1939	1942
Soda ash	..	38,000	40,000
Caustic soda	..	17,800	15,000

Requirements of hydrochloric acid were about 3,000 to 3,500 metric tons a year, and were completely met by home production. Production of sodium sulphate, a by-product in the manufacture of hydrochloric acid, amounted to 2,650 metric tons in 1939.

The most important sulphate made in Rumania before the war was that of copper, production of which averaged 5,700 metric tons between 1933 and 1936, increasing to 12,400 tons in 1937. The chief producers were the Mărăşeşti and the Phœnix chemical works (the latter in ceded territory).

[439] There is at present an acute shortage of copper sulphate, the loss of which as a fungicide is particularly felt. Germany is reported to have supplied small quantities in return for exports of copper scrap.

2. Fertilisers

387 Since the consumption of chemical fertilisers in Rumania is one of the lowest among the European countries, their production is comparatively small.

Synthetic nitrogen compounds are manufactured by the S.A. Nitrogen at Dicio San Martin, where the company has a small Fauser synthetic ammonia plant and a calcium cyanamide works. No recent reliable data exists regarding output, but before the war the Fauser plant is stated to have treated 200 metric tons of nitrogen annually, and the production of cyanamide amounted to about 300 metric tons. The quantity of superphosphate manufactured averaged about 8,000 tons before the war. Owing to the cutting-off of supplies of rock phosphate, production of superphosphate is now probably nil. There was no domestic production of potash salts, and pre-war imports were very small.

3. Wood-Distillation Products

314 This industry is almost entirely controlled by
385 Margina Reşiţa destilariile de lemn unite S.A.R., Timişoara. Prior to the outbreak of the war about 170,000 tons of beech wood were worked per year. The following is a list of some of the products obtained, showing the average annual tonnage produced :—

Wood charcoal	31,000
Methanol	2,000
Calcium acetate	1,400
Acetic acid	50
Formaldehyde	130
Acetone and derivatives ..	1,100

4. Soap and Glycerine

388 Rumania is an important producer of sunflower,
389 rape and pumpkin seeds, and has, therefore, an ample supply of oil for her soap industry. The production of soap amounts to 33,000 tons and is in the hands of several factories, the only one of which is of striking importance being Stella S.A. of Bucarest. Glycerine production, which is a by-product of the soap industry, amounted to 350 tons, most of which was utilised by the explosives industry. Since the war the quality of the soap has markedly deteriorated. Though the present ration of 250 grams per head per month is a fairly generous one, it is not fully met and distribution is very bad. The production of glycerine is estimated to have fallen to about 200 tons, while imports amounted to 160 tons in 1941 compared with an average of about 240 tons in 1936-1938.

5. Paints and Varnish

386 The paint and varnish industry, in which some 60 small firms are engaged, is sufficiently well developed to meet—under normal conditions—the greater part of Rumanian requirements in this particular sphere. The industry is, however, still dependent to some extent on imports of oil paints.

6. Pharmaceuticals

278 Production of pharmaceuticals is on a very small scale, being sufficient to meet only about one-third of requirements, the remainder being covered by imports, mainly from Germany.

7. Explosives

389 The explosives industry is quite inadequate to cover wartime requirements, and these have to be

389 mat by the Axis. The chief products made in the country are mining explosives and nitro-cellulose powder.

B. THE RUBBER INDUSTRY

383 Taking Axis Europe as a whole, the Rumanian rubber industry is of little importance. There is manufacturing capacity for motor tyres located at Floresti and at a much smaller plant at Brasov. The total number of workers employed in normal years was about 4–5,000, a large number of them being engaged on footwear manufacture, which was the chief product of the industry.

1. Raw Materials

Rumanian requirements of raw rubber had been increasing steadily in pre-war years until in 1938 they amounted to over 2,000 tons all of which were imported from British Malaya and the Netherlands Indies. It is probable that several firms produced reclaimed rubber for use in their own factories. Some of the scrap for this purpose would be of domestic origin. Import figures in metric tons were :—

[439]

	1936	1937	1938
Crude rubber	1,273	1,835	2,000
Reclaim	181	214	33
Waste and scrap	305	581	500

Rumania had a small production of soft carbon black of the type suitable for miscellaneous uses, but there was no production of the hard carbon black necessary for tyre manufacture. This and other requirements of rubber chemicals would normally be obtained from the U.S.A., the U.K. and Germany. Supplies of sulphur were imported from Italy and Germany.

2. Principal Factories

The Rumania rubber industry comprises a large number of concerns producing footwear and general rubber goods, in addition to two factories concerned mainly with tyre manufacture. The larger tyre plant is owned by Banloc A.G., a company founded in 1937 with a capital of 200 million lei and supplied with technical assistance by Goodrich, U.S.A. The plant, located at Floresti, was only completed in 1939. Its estimated raw rubber requirements were 1,500 tons per annum, and it has the capacity to produce 6,000 motor and truck tyres monthly, sufficient to cover 75 per cent. of normal Rumanian requirements. This capacity included some plant for making aircraft tyres. The other plant which produces tyres is on a much smaller scale, and is owned by Fabrica de Caucuc at Brasov, with a normal capacity of 10–20 truck tyres daily.

According to the latest information, both these tyre plants were still in production at the beginning of 1943, when Banloc were reported to be producing between 100 and 200 motor tyres daily with technical assistance from Continental, Hanover, while the Brasov plant was producing 12 to 15 lorry tyres daily with technical assistance from Semperit, Vienna.

3. Imports

383 439 The chief item of imports in pre-war years was motor tyres, amounting to between 800 and 900 tons per annum. Since at that time Rumania possessed virtually no capacity for producing any of her own requirements, this figure approximately represents normal domestic needs. Footwear requirements, on the other hand, were normally almost covered by the large and expanding domestic output, so that imports were unimportant.

383 [439] The figures of imports in 1938 in metric tons were as follows :—

Motor tyres	867
Motor tubes	69
Rubber footwear	221
Soft rubber (unvulcanised) ..	32
Rubber solution	27
Miscellaneous	173

4. Synthetic Rubber

It is planned to erect a plant with a capacity of 3,000 tons per annum in co-operation with German interest and using natural gas as the raw material. There is a second plan by independent interests to erect another plant at Ploesti using natural gas or oil as a starting point. Both these projects, however, are as yet in their initial stages and Rumania is, at present, entirely dependent on Germany for supplies of synthetic rubber.

[249] **5. Cultivation of Rubber-bearing Plants**

Rumania has been experimenting with the planting of *Kok Saghys* or Russian dandelion. During 1942 an area of 180 hectares (450 acres) was planted, which it is estimated will eventually yield between 20 and 30 tons of rubber. It is planned to increase the planted area in 1943, but it will be some time before any results of these measures will help substantially to alleviate the Rumanian supply position.

[439] **6. Present Position (July, 1943)**

Although Rumania has sufficient manufacturing capacity to supply most of her essential needs, she lacks supplies of raw materials. The industry is dependent upon Germany for supplies of synthetic rubber and some of her essential requirements of manufactured goods for her armed forces, such as aircraft tyres and some heavy truck tyres, are also being supplied by Germany.

C. HIDES, SKINS AND LEATHER

(I.) Pre-War Period

1. General

237 Rumania's plentiful supply of livestock places her in a comparatively favourable position for hides, skins and leather and the pre-war slaughterings were approximately as follows :—

	'000 *Head*
Cattle	487
Calves	500
Horses	100
Buffaloes	32
Sheep	1,374
Goats	190
Pigs	798

Of the leather producable from the above animals, cattle, horse and buffalo are the most important, being used to a large extent in the manufacture of sole leather, which is the backbone of the industry.

237 439 Rumania is not entirely self-supporting, although home-production enables her to restrict imports to a minimum. Imports and exports in 1937 were as follows :—

	Imports	*Exports*
	tons	
Hides of cattle (including calf and horse)	2,030	Nil.
Other hides and skins (including sheep and pig skins)	340	558
Leather (including waste)	62	416

[35b]

CHAPTER VII

237 [439] The imported hides are in all probability largely heavy hides needed for sole leather. Those designated as "other hides and skins" are not important in tonnage, and exports are almost certainly all sheep and pig. The exports of leather are not very important, as they consist almost entirely of leather waste.

Total supplies of leather, available from internal slaughterings of cattle, calves, horses and buffaloes, together with net imports, would be about 12,000 tons, of which 10/11,000 tons are derived from local hides and skins.

Part of the sheepskins were dewoolled and turned into leather, the wool being sold separately but a considerable number of skins was used as fleece-lined jackets by the peasants. The total quantity of leather from the locally slaughtered sheep would, however, not exceed 750/1,000 tons.

Unlike Western countries, the pigs in Rumania are flayed, and the skins tanned, so that the pigskin industry is certainly of material value, although not of major importance, compared with Rumania's total leather production.

295 2. Manufactures

Rumania's leather trade made rapid strides in pre-war years and, as the bulk of the leather was made into footwear, an important increase in this production was noticeable. Although no official statistics are available, it is estimated that Rumania produced 45,000,000 pairs of leather shoes in 1936 and, in addition, considerable quantities of peasants' footwear were manufactured in country districts.

The industry at that time consisted of about 20 machine shoe factories, six of which were owned and controlled by tanneries, mainly centred in Cluj, Timisoara, Bucarest and Oradea. In addition, numerous small shops existed throughout the country in which shoes were made by hand. With the loss of Northern Transylvania the machine-shoe centres of Cluj and Oradea went to Hungary.

3. Tanning Materials

282 [439] Rumania has in the past relied on other countries for practically all her tanning materials and extracts. She used to import about 8,000 tons of different extracts, about 90 per cent. of which were re-exported from the U.K., probably quebracho and wattle extract. Yugoslavia supplied her with about 2,000 tons of extract, presumably oak and chestnut.

(ii.) War-time Developments

1. General

Though Rumania has suffered during the war from a leather shortage, partly on account of reduced internal production, but more especially because of the increased requirements for the Armed Forces, this shortage has not been so severe as in most European countries.

It has been reported that the leather production in 1940 was 9,200 tons, but that the supply of raw hides fell from 19,000 tons pre-war to 11,000 tons in 1941. This is a severe drop, even assuming that the 19,000 tons included imported hides. A substantial decline in the available supplies of leather has, however, certainly taken place owing to the curtailment of imports, to clandestine slaughterings, and to exports of live cattle to the Axis.

An indication of the extent of supplies allocated for Army need was contained in an official announcement that 68 per cent. of all untanned

282 cattle hides collected in September, October and November, 1941, were for this purpose. The remaining 32 per cent., plus the horsehides, pigskins and goatskins, could be used for civilian purposes. The result was that very soon insufficient sole leather was available for civilians, and repairs to footwear became difficult.

282 656 At present 80 per cent. of the cattle hides weighing over 16 kilos (35 lb.) and 20 per cent. of the hides weighing less than 16 kilos, are reserved for the Army. This leaves the civilians very short of sole leather, normally manufactured from heavy hides.

At the end of 1941, the Ministry of Supply ordered the registration of all leather stocks, and thereafter leather could not be sold without a permit. The entire purchasing and control of raw hides and skins and also the distribution of leather was placed in the hands of the "ORAP" (*Oficiul Român de Aprovisionare și Distribuire a Produselor de Piele*).

In the autumn of 1941 private dealings in sheep- and lambskins were forbidden, the Army Supply Minister having sole right of disposal. Owing to the comparatively important domestic output such a measure should not have been necessary, but was due to the Rumanian, and probably German, demands for warm clothing on the Russian front. Evidence received in 1942 shows that 80 per cent. of the skins are now reserved for the Army.

In July, 1942, leather transmission-belting, etc., was brought under control and made subject to certain restrictions.

295 434 Civilian rationing of footwear was introduced early in 1942 and new shoes could be sold only against permits issued to persons declaring possession of only one other pair of serviceable shoes. Repair cards were also issued. Requisition cards for new shoes are limited to one a year, and repair cards to one every four months. Children under 14 years of age can obtain two requisition cards yearly for new footwear.

The issue of permits does not, however, guarantee footwear supplies, and only about 50 per cent. of repair or purchase demands appear to be met.

The above regulations have been slightly modified from time to time, but remain intrinsically the same. The production of footwear of substitute materials, such as wooden soles, soles of artificial leather, leather waste, buna, etc., has gradually increased.

295 435 Despite the various government regulations the footwear Black Market flourished, and while the average pre-war price for a pair of men's shoes was 800 lei, in October, 1941, the official prices were fixed at about 1,500 lei for a standard pair of men's shoes and about 1,200 lei for a standard pair of women's shoes. In March, 1942, however, the Black Market price for men's shoes was 7/8,000 lei a pair, and this has now gradually risen to 10/12,000 lei. Complete soleing and heeling of men's footwear costs 1,250 lei officially, and women's 1,000 lei. The official price of soleing leather is 530 lei per kilo, whereas the Black Market price is 34,000 lei.

2. Tanning Materials

282 439 Before the war Rumania never made use of her own barks for tanning, as it was more economical to import extracts from overseas. During the war she has made attempts to employ her oak, chestnut, spruce and pine barks for tanning materials, but

282
439

without much success, and has thereby reverted to her former practice of importing tan.

In February 1942, it was reported that with imports from Italy, Turkey and Croatia, Rumania had an eight months' supply in hand.

Under the 1942-43 Italo-Rumanian agreement Italy is providing her with 1,750 tons of chestnut extract, 1,000 tons of sumach and 735 tons of other materials. Turkey also agreed to supply her in 1942 with 1,000 tons of valex and 2,500 tons of valonea.

D. BUILDING MATERIALS AND CEMENT

339

The building materials industry in Rumania is on a small scale and not highly mechanised, employing a total of 16,000 workers in 1937, while the value of production in that year amounted to 1·6 milliard lei, about 2½ per cent. of total industrial production. In the decade before the war cement, which is the most important branch of this industry, had a steadily increased output reaching in 1939 a total of 531,000 tons, with a 800,000 ton capacity. Small quantities had to be imported.

The most important cement firms are at Fieni, Vodă, Turda, Dudești, and Fieni. Since the war, due to limited building activity, consumption of cement has decreased, and was reported to have been 314,000 tons for the first ten months of 1942, the bulk of which was used for military requirements.

[727]
339
656

After the recapture of Northern Bucovina and Bessarabia in mid-1941, a considerable amount of repair work had to be undertaken as a result of war destruction; but at the beginning of 1942, due to raw material and labour shortage, all further reconstruction in these two provinces was forbidden. Later, in February, 1943, a decree

339 [656] came into force forbidding construction throughout the country for the duration of the war of private buildings requiring either iron, steel girders, sheet-iron or other sheet-metal roofing.

In 1942 production of bricks and tiles was reported to have been sufficient to meet the reduced requirements. During the war period there have been considerable exports of asphalt and tarred board for roofing, the latter mainly to Italy. [439]

E. GLASS

323 The glass industry employed 6,000 workers in 1937 in 19 glass factories and 20 glassware factories, the most important of which were the Vitrometan Fabrica de Sticlarie S.A. of Mediaş and the Fabrica de Sticlarie Turda S.A. of Turda, both producing sheet-glass and hollow-ware.

Production did not cover the requirements of specialised types, which were imported from Germany and Czechoslovakia. During the war period window-pane production has been adequate for requirements and small quantities have been manufactured for Germany; while under the 1942 Turco-Rumanian Trade Agreement Rumania agreed to supply both window-panes and glassware.

F. CERAMICS

The ceramic industry employed 1,600 workers in 1937 in 33 factories, and the value of production was 112 million lei. Most of the raw materials for this industry are found in the country, and there has been no difficulty in supplying these during the war period. Apart from the mechanised industry, ceramics are produced in normal times on a comparatively large scale by the peasants. The principal factories are the Nitrogen S.A. in Tărnăveni, the Crinul S.A. in Timişoara and the Uzinele Ceramice S.A. in Ploeşti.

CHAPTER VIII

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

[39a]

[p 38 contains no textual material]

A. RAILWAYS

I. Pre-War Conditions

496

1. Communications

Before the outbreak of the present war, the Rumanian State Railways' system was as follows:

	km.	miles
Total	11,375	7,053
of which:		
Standard gauge ..	10,715	6,643
Narrow gauge ..	660	410

More than half of this mileage had been acquired following the 1914–18 war, when

5,324 km. (3,299 miles) in Transylvania
1,234 km. (765 miles) in Bessarabia
555 km. (344 miles) in Northern Bucovina

were transferred to Rumania. As a break of gauge existed between the railways of old Rumania and those in the former Russian State of Bessarabia, conversion to the 4ft. 8½in. gauge had to be undertaken. Short sections of line are owned by 17 private companies, but all the lines of any importance are State-owned.

[655]

Rumania was relatively well furnished with railway communications. The length of railway line per 100 sq. km. in 1936 was 3.8 km. (6.3 miles per 100 sq. miles), the same as in Yugoslavia, while in Bulgaria it was 3.2 km. (5.1 miles per 100 sq. miles), and the commercial requirements of the country were adequately served thereby. Since the 1914–18 war, the difficulties connected with the unification of three different systems of railway (Hungarian, Russian and Rumanian) were gradually overcome, and with the conversion of the Russian-gauge track in Bessarabia, the railway organisation became more or less standardised. Three of Rumania's five frontiers were crossed by main lines and the other two by branch lines.

1. *Polish Frontier*

This was crossed by the main Bucarest-Cernăuţi line at Cernăuţi, and was formerly the direct line for through traffic from Bucarest to Warsaw, but the conversions of the railway system in Russo-Poland from standard to 5 ft. gauge in the autumn of 1939, rendered through traffic to Warsaw by this district route impossible without transhipment.

2. *Hungarian Frontier*

The main lines Bucarest—Arad—Curtici and Bucarest—Oradea—Episcopia Bihor provided direct communication between Bucarest and Western Europe via Budapest.

2. *Yugoslavian Frontiers*

Through traffic from Bucarest to Western Europe via Italy and the Simplon Tunnel was served by the main-line route, Bucarest—Timişoara—Jimbolia.

4. *Bulgarian Frontier*

The only direct railway connection between Bucarest and Sofia was by a roundabout route from Bucarest through the Dobruja. The shortest route was by train to Giurgiu, whence ferry steamers cross the Danube to the Bulgarian railway at Ruse.

5. *Russian Frontier*

There was only one frontier crossing, at Tighina—Tiraspol, served by the main line to Iaşi,

496 whence there was a slow train service to Tighina. Change of gauge took place at Tighina and Tiraspol, necessitating transhipment of both passenger and goods traffic at one or other of these points.

From a strategic point of view, the railway system of Rumania suffered from three main disabilities :—

(a) Out of the total of 11,375 km. (7,053 miles) only 491 km. (304 miles) were double tracked.

(b) The railway system of the country was originally constructed to serve the needs of Rumania and Hungary individually, and on account of topographical and political difficulties communications between the two countries were limited to the minimum requirements. As a result, communications across the Carpathian Mountains were quite inadequate, consisting only of three single-line railways.

(c) The railway system of Transylvania was constructed with a view to the defence of the old Hungarian eastern frontier along the Carpathians, and is, in consequence, particularly ill-adapted for north-to-south movements.

[655] The Rumanaian State Railways (*Regia Autonomă a Căilor Ferate Române*—in short C.F.R.), set up in 1929, was directed by an Administrative Council in Bucarest, consisting of 11 members, including a representative of the Minister of Communications. In addition, there was a delegate of the Minister of War and a Government Commissioner with an advisory voice and the right to veto all decisions of the Council. For administrative and maintenance purposes, the railways were divided up into four separate Managing Directions at Bucarest, Timişoara, Cluj and Iaşi.

2. Principal Routes

The principal railway routes are set out below :—

1. Jimbolia (Yugoslav frontier)—Timişoara—Craiova—Bucarest, of comparatively recent reconstruction and relatively well maintained.

2. Curtici—Arad—Vintul-de-Jos—Sighişoara—Braşov—Bucarest, which is a main route from the Hungarian frontier.

3. Episcopia Bihor—Cluj—Teiuş—Sighişoara—Braşov—Bucarest, a main route from the Hungarian frontier Episcopia Bihor (Budapest and Vienna) to Bucarest, using, between Teiuş and Bucarest, the same line as route 2.

4. Orăşeni—Cernăuţi—Paşcani—Adjud—Mărăşeşti—Buzau—Ploeşti—Bucarest. This was formerly the direct route between Bucarest and Warsaw, and is a natural route for traffic between Eastern and Central Rumania (including the oilfields) and Eastern and Northern Germany.

5. Chişinău—Iaşi—Tecuci—Buzău—Bucarest. This line, as from Iaşi, was reconstructed a few years ago.

6. Chişinău—Reni—Galaţi—Brăila—Buzău—Bucarest.

7. Constanţa—Feteşti—Ciulniţa—Bucarest. This line, connecting Bucarest with the Black Sea port of Constanţa, was reconstructed a few years ago.

CHAPTER VIII

496 8. Bucarest—Oltenița, a port station on the Danube.

9. Bucarest—Giurgiu, an important Danube port opposite Ruse (Bulgaria).

10. Arad—Oradea—Satu Mare—Halmeu—Câmpulung pe Tisa—Sighet—Valea Visaului—Vișeul de Sus—Borșa.

11. Satu Mare—Baia Mare—Jibou—Dej—Apahida.

12. Dej—Beclean—Ilva Mica—Vatra Dornei—Dărmănești.

3. Staff

497 In 1938 the personnel of the Rumanian State Railways was as follows :—

General and Divisional Headquarters	8,037
Maintenance and Supervision of Permanent Way	13,739
Engine Crews	4,705
Sheds and Workshops	7,584
Main Workshops	21,260
Stations	20,947
Train Staff	6,081
Various	2,322
Total	84,666

4. Locomotives and Rolling-Stock

493 In 1939 there were 3,383 standard-gauge locomotives (2,899 tender type and 484 tank type). As regards narrow-gauge locomotives, figures for 1939 are not available, but in 1938, there were 108 (17 tender type and 91 tank type). Railcars in 1938 totalled 236, of which 8 were steam-operated.

ROLLING-STOCK 1938

(1939 *figures, where available, in brackets*)

	Standard Gauge	*Narrow Gauge*
Total No. of Wagons	62,487	920
Ordinary Wagons ..	52,397 (53,320)	917 (881)
of which covered ..	22,670 (23,233)	227 (153)
open ..	29,437 (30,097)	790 (728)
Special Wagons ..	1,666	3
of which Tank (state owned) .	1,142	3
Privately owned ..	8,714	—
of which oil tank ..	8,613	—
Passenger Coaches ..	3,731 (3,449)	137 (150)

In view of the importance of the oil traffic, it should be noted that there were about 10,000 tank wagons (8,500 owned by the oil companies and 1,500 by the railways).

Coal is the principal fuel used by the railways, consumption of various fuels in 1938 being :—

Coal	944,000 tons.
Brown Coal ..	501,000 tons.
Heavy Oil	233,000 tons.
Petrol	7,000 tons.
Wood Fuel ..	19,000 cubic metres.

5. Traffic

497 The following figures relate to the year 1938—

(a) *Goods (Standard and Narrow-Gauge Lines)*

No. of tons	*Tons—km.*	*Average Haul per Ton—km.*
27,680,179	5,795,041	209

The principal goods normally conveyed by the Rumanian State Railways are petroleum and petroleum products, coal, firewood, timber, grain and building materials.

[40a]

(b) *Passengers*

497 In 1938, 48.7 million passengers were carried over a total distance of 3,765 million km. (2,339 million miles) for an average journey of 77 km. (48 miles).

II. War-time Changes

1. Territorial Changes

496 722 Few railways have so far undergone greater changes, both on account of territorial transfers and alterations in traffic flows as a result of the war than the Rumanian State Railways. Firstly, in 1940 the system suffered considerable dismemberment, in June 1,665 km. (1,032 miles) of standard and 65 km. (40 miles) of narrow gauge in Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina were taken over by the U.S.S.R.; then in September the Vienna Award resulted in the transfer of a large part of Transylvania, including 1,750 km. (985 miles) of standard and 355 km. (220 miles) of narrow gauge line to Hungary, and 70 km. (43 miles) of the Southern Dobruja line were ceded to Bulgaria. Following the German attack on the U.S.S.R. in June, 1941, the Bessarabian and Northern Bucovina lines were recovered in the early autumn of that year and, at the beginning of 1942, the Germans placed the control and operation of the railways in the newly created province of Transnistria in the hands of the Rumanian State Railways. The Transnistrian system consists in essence of the Odessa-Zhmerinka section of the Odessa-Kiev-Lwow main line and all branches (including the Zhmerinka-Mogilev line) on both sides as far as the Dniester (frontier with Rumania) in the west, and the Bug (frontier with the Ukraine) in the east.

Apart from Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina and Transnistria, the Rumanian State Railways have not so far suffered any substanti ' direct physical damage. The Russians on their occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina in June 1940 at once converted all lines from the standard European to the Russian gauge; a task which was made easier by the fact that the system had, prior to 1920, been Russian gauge. The Russians, in spite of the resultant difference in gauge, insisted on taking over all standard-gauge locomotives and rolling-stock formerly in use in the territories, even where this had already been withdrawn by the Rumanians. The Russians during their subsequent evacuation of these provinces, and also of Transnistria, withdrew or destroyed virtually all their locomotives and rolling-stock, and on the whole effectively damaged or destroyed the track, bridges, stations and equipment. The Rumanians, therefore, found themselves faced with the task of reconstructing and reconverting back to standard gauge the lines taken over, and of providing the necessary locomotives, rolling stock equipment and staff to work the traffic. The Transnistrian system from the railway point of view represented a liability rather than an asset.

It was not until the end of 1941 that the lines in Bessarabia and Bucovina were all re-opened, and until early in 1942 that traffic was being worked to and from Transnistria. The Transnistrian system possesses a measure of autonomy, believed in practice to be mainly legal and financial, but for practical purposes the lines are operated as an integral part of the Rumanian system. The transfer of the Transylvanian lines to Hungary and the Southern Dobruja line to Bulgaria were effected without any physical damage and, as far as is known, no locomotives or rolling-stock were handed over by the Rumanians in either case. The change was primarily administrative, but

496 normal traffic was disorganised for several weeks
722 owing to troop movements, the transfer of population, evacuation of equipment and other problems incidental to the transfer of the territory.

497 All these changes of necessity caused considerable problems, particularly administrative
722 and considerably affected traffic working. Of the four Divisions in 1939, most of the Cluj Division including Cluj itself and the Tunel-Cluj-Oradea section of the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Cluj-Oradea-Budapest main line, together with part of the Timişoara Division, were transferred to Hungary. Half of the Cernăuţi Division, including Cernăuţi itself and a section of the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Cernăuţi-Lwow main line, was transferred to the U.S.S.R., and parts of the Bucarest Division were transferred to all three countries. The operation of the system was reorganised and centralised under a military directorate in Bucarest, to which German liaison officers have been attached to co-ordinate working and ensure that all German requirements are met. While these officers must presumably have certain powers, and there are also German officers—thought to be equivalent to R.T.O.—at the more important junctions and traffic centres, there is no evidence that the Rumanian State Railways have ever been under direct German control, or that their autonomy has been seriously impaired.

The Rumanian Authorities have had to cope with all these territorial changes and resultant administrative problems during a period when traffic was both considerably heavier than, and the flows entirely different from, before the war. The closing of the sea routes between Rumania and Germany in September 1939—and since June 1940 largely with Italy and the Northern Mediterranean coast—resulted in the transfer to the Danube or to the direct rail routes, of all traffic between Rumania and Germany, Italy and the rest of Europe. Owing to the closing of the Bucarest - Ploeşti - Cernăuţi - Lwow - Przemysl - Cracow-Silesia main line from September 1939 to December 1941 (except for a trickle of traffic for a few months) on account of the occupation of Eastern Poland by the U.S.S.R., the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Braşov-Copşa Mică-Teiuş-Cluj-Oradea or Teius-Arad-Curtici, and Ploeşti-Bucarest-Orşova-Timişoara lines were called upon to handle all this traffic. An exception was that sent via the Danube, which had to be rail-hauled to and from the Danube ports, particularly Giurgiu and Orşova. Oil has been, apart possibly from military movements, the most important single traffic; and, in general, German traffic has been sent via the Ploeşti-Teiuş-Oradea and Arad routes and Italian traffic via the Bucarest-Timişoara route.

From early in 1941 when the Germans began to move into the Balkans, first for the Yugoslav Greek and then the Russian campaign, the Rumanian railways have had to carry in addition large numbers of troops and quantities of supplies. During the Yugoslav campaign when all routes to Greece and Bulgaria via this latter country were closed, the only all-rail route (apart from ferries over the Danube) into Bulgaria was that via the Cernavodă Bridge and the Dobruja. Rumania served an important rôle as a base for the attack on the Ukraine, and as the German front moved eastwards the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Buzău-Cernăuţi, Buzau-Galaţi-Teghina and Bucarest-Constanţa lines became important as supply routes to the Eastern Front.

2. New Construction and Improvements of the Railway System

499 The lines, which with the exception of the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Câmpina and Ploeşti-Buzău sec-

[41 a]

499 tions, were virtually all single track, were never designed or equipped to carry traffic on this scale. An elaborate programme of new construction and improvement works, certain features of which had been contemplated by the Rumanians for some years, was put in hand to increase the capacity of the various routes. On the routes to the west, the doubling of the Câmpina-Braşov section was pressed forward rapidly and completed by January, 1941, and work is also reported to be in hand on the doubling of sections of the Braşov-Sighişoara-Copşa Mică-Teiuş line. On the routes to the east, the Ploeşti-Buzău double-track section has been extended as far as Adjud on the Cernăuţi line and N. Filipescu on the Galaţi-Tighina line. In addition, extra sidings and new passing loops have been built, and improved signalling and telegraph and telephone circuits have been installed to increase the capacity of the single-track sections. A considerable mileage of line has also been relaid with heavier rails to permit of the use of more powerful locomotives. Work is also in hand on the construction of a number of new lines, including a new line 202 km. (125 miles) long from Bucarest via Videle-Roşiori-Caracal to Craiova, to shorten and relieve the existing route via Piteşti; new lines from Bumbeşti to Livăseni and Deva to Vălcău; a new line from Ploeşti to Târgoviste and certain new routes in Bessarabia. Work on several of these lines is understood to be well advanced, and the Bumbeşti-Livăseni and Bucarest-Caracal-Craiova lines are, according to the latest evidence, likely to be completed in the autumn of 1943. Also the long-projected train-ferry between Giurgiu and Ruse was finally brought into use in June, 1941.

497 722 In spite of the relief granted by these improvements, the heavy volume of oil, military and other urgent traffic could be worked only by severe restrictions on ordinary passenger and freight traffic. The restrictions have inevitably varied from time to time and been most severe during periods of heavy military movements and during the winter when the weather has made operating difficult. Passenger-train services are more or less on a skeleton basis, and are at about one-third of pre-war level; yet the principal long-distance trains still carry restaurant and sleeping-cars. Certain restrictions ahve been imposed on travel and the restrictions on freight traffic have had serious economic consequences, particularly on the distribution of firewood. The shortage of locomotives and wagons, particularly since the recovery of Bessarabia and Northern-Bucovina and the taking over of Transnistria, has been acute. In the early part of the war the tank-wagon position was very difficult, but this has been eased by the construction of new vehicles by Germany, and by German requisitioning of wagons from the occupied countries; but apart from this the wagon position has been continually difficult, though a factor of considerable assistance has been that many of the military and supply movements have been into or through Rumania from Germany, and in consequence the Rumanian State Railways have not had to supply the wagons for these trains. The locomotive position has been met by the transfer of locomotives into Rumania by Germany; in addition to German locomotives, requisitioned French locomotives are said to be stationed at various sheds in Rumania.

The Rumanian State Railways are now in an anomalous position. Although a large programme of new construction and improvements has been carried out, heavy claims are being made on the system by Axis war traffic, with the result that the facilities available for ordinary commercial traffic

[41 b]

497 722 and for passenger travel are severely limited. However, unless there is severe destruction in the later stages of the war, in the long run the Rumanians are bound to benefit from the capital investment in railways, and from the new construction and improvements which have been carried out to meet Axis needs. These improvements though planned long ago, could never have been carried out with the limited financial and technical resources previously available, and could not have been executed so quickly but for German assistance.

B. ROADS

491 Rumania's road system was, by Western European standards, very poorly developed before the war, there being only one International motor road which formed the continuation of the route from Hungary via Oradea Mare—Cluj—Sibiu—Braşov—Bucarest—Giurgiu and a branch line Bucarest—Oleniţa. Apart from this one major road, the system consists of untarred roads, many of which are in a poor state of repair.

The total length of the road system was reported early in 1943 to be 82,098 km. (51,010 miles), with only 12 per cent. in good state of repair, 22 per cent. being mediocre and the remainder in bad condition. Ownership of the total network is divided as follows:—

State roads ..	11,465 km.	(7,118 miles)
Provincial roads ..	26,181 km.	(16,272 miles)
Communal roads ..	44,452 km.	(27,620 miles)

in 1936 there were some 34,000 cars registered.

The development of the road system has long been the dream of Rumanian propagandists, particularly as a stimulus to tourist traffic, but before the war no large-scale development could be embarked upon because of the lack of available capital.

499 Since the war, work has been started on an ambitious programme of road development, the objects of which are to improve communications between urban systems and to link the system with the International road network.

An Italo-Rumanian road company has started work on the Rumanian sector of one of the future trans-European roads, Trieste—Beograd—Turnu Severin—Bucarest—Constanţa, while under a five-year plan, with an expenditure of 75 md. lei, some 5,000 km. (3,100 miles) of road are to be modernised with the help of German and Italian contractors.

C. SHIPPING

1. Introduction

505 439 A high percentage of Rumania's foreign trade is water-borne (55 per cent. in 1937), as not only is she situated on the Black Sea, but the Danube traverses the full west to east length of the country forming an important traffic route and link with Central Europe.

The following table shows comparative tonnages for sea and river traffic in 1937 and 1938:—

	1937	1938
	'000 *metric tons*	
Sea:		
Imports	622	540
Exports	6,918	5,222
River:		
Imports	1,890	1,568
Exports	3,161	2,688

As a result of the cutting-off of overseas markets since 1940 an increasing share of the country's

505 trade is carried on the Danube to European markets, Germany in particular, and, with the
439 exception of an exceedingly limited traffic with Turkey, and a few intermittent shipments of oil to enemy ports in the Aegean Sea, Rumania's foreign sea-borne trade has been brought virtually to a standstill.

In addition to traffic in the Black Sea with U.S.S.R., Bulgarian and Turkish ports, Rumania in pre-war days had important commercial relations with most European and other countries overseas, the trade routes being via the Dardanelles, Mediterranean, Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar.

2. Mercantile Marine

505 All merchant-shipping activities are controlled
[652] by the Ministry of Air and Marine. Rumania's ocean-going mercantile marine in 1939 was constituted as follows :—

		G.R.T.
6	cargo and passenger motor vessels	27,061
16	cargo steamers	67,103
3	steam tankers	14,737
25	Total	108,991

[655] Of the 19 cargo steamers and tankers, 11 were oil-fired and 8 coal burners. Fourteen of these vessels were owned by the Rumanian State Maritime Service (*Serviciul Maritim Român*), the principal shipping company in Rumania, whilst the three tankers belonged to the Steaua Romana Petroleum Company of Bucarest. The remainder were privately owned.

[648] Consequent upon her entry into the war Rumania's mercantile marine came under Axis control and most of her vessels are trading for German and Italian account, partly in the Adriatic and Aegean, and partly in the Black Sea.

A statement of Rumania's estimated non-tanker merchant-shipping resources on the 30th April, 1943, follows :—

ESTIMATED RUMANIAN MERCANTILE MARINE RESOURCES (NON-TANKER) UNDER AXIS CONTROL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA AT 30TH APRIL, 1943.

Tonnage Category	*No. of Vessels*	*Total G.R.T.*
100/499	3	578
500/999	—	—
1,000	2	2,798
2,000	2	4,986
3,000	3	10,170
4,000	—	—
5,000	2	11,395
6,000	3	20,220
Aggregate ..	15	50,147

[726] As to her tanker tonnage, two vessels aggregating 11,705 G.R.T. were seized and are now in Allied service, whilst the third, of 3,032 G.R.T., was sunk in December, 1941, in the Aegean Sea.

3. Ports

504 The chief ports for sea-going vessels are Constanta on the Black Sea and Brăila and Galați on the Danube, which both handle river shipping as well.

[42b]

504
505 The following table shows the quantities of goods discharged and loaded at these ports in 1938 and 1939. Sea and river traffic at the ports of Braila and Galati are shown separately :—

504
505

Ports		1938		1939	
		'000 metric tons		'000 metric tons	
		Discharged	Loaded	Discharged	Loaded
Constanza		192	3,946	137	3,456
Braila	Sea	93	783	70	726
	River	754	120	—	—
Galatz	Sea	73	305	49	421
	River	158	84	—	—

(a) *Constanța*

504
505 Constanța, which is situated on the Black Sea and is Rumania's most modern port, is, in fact, her only port actually on the coast, and before the war was, therefore, of some considerable importance. Since the Russian campaign, however, its significance has dwindled enormously, due to the presence of Russian submarines in the Black Sea and to the curtailment of Rumania's overseas markets, which means that trade is mainly carried on the Danube and by rail.

Exports from Constanța consisted mainly of petroleum products which came by pipe-line from the Ploești district. A considerable portion of the country's general trade, including some cereal export, was also handled here.

[503] Heavy draught ships can anchor in Constanța harbour, but continued dredging is necessary inside the harbour to maintain the various depths. The estimated daily general-cargo discharging capacity of the port is about 7,200 tons. Total capacity for oil storage is about 660,000 tons at and in the vicinity of Constanța.

(b) *Brăila*

Braila, which is situated on the left bank of the Danube, is the normal limit of navigation on the Danube for ocean-going vessels. It is the principal port for grain export and is well equipped with grain-handling facilities, such as silos, elevators, etc. Small quantities of timber are also handled.

The width of the river channel at Brăila is normally 330 yards, though greater during the spring floods.

The estimated daily general-cargo discharging capacity is about 3,000 tons.

Grain is usually loaded into ocean-going vessels by floating elevators, the working capacity of which is estimated to be about 150 tons per hour under normal working conditions.

Total warehouse capacity of all the warehouses in the dock basin section for storing goods is 6,400 tons.

(c) *Galați*

This port is also situated on the left bank of the river Danube and is the chief inland port of entry [712] into Rumania, as well as being the headquarters of the Rumanian navy. It is the centre of the timber export trade, being situated just below the junction of the Siret River down which most of the wood from the Carpathians is floated. It is also well situated for the receipt of timber by rail from the Bucovina and from North Moldavia.

[43c]

504
505 The estimated daily discharging capacity for general cargo is 7/8,000 tons, but it is, however, unlikely that this quantity (which is much greater than the normal traffic of the port) could be

504
505 cleared without very considerable development. It is probable that not more than about 50 per cent. of the above capacity could be worked. Grain is loaded by land and floating elevators.

[502] The ports of Brăila and Galați are ice-bound during some winters, ice occurring to a sufficient extent to prevent navigation from the Black Sea between January and mid-March in about 3 years in 10.

D. INLAND WATERWAYS

I. General

133
505 In 1937 navigable waterways totalled 2,840 km
487 (1,766 miles) and were divided as follows:—

	Km.	*Miles*
Danube	1,075	668
Danube tributaries	395	246
Dniester .. .	740	460
Prut	410	255
Mureș	185	115
Bega Canal .. .	35	22

The rivers Dniester, Prut and Mureș have not been adequately regulated for regular traffic, but are used for local traffic and for timber floating.

II. The Danube

1. Traffic

487 The Danube, Rumania's main traffic artery,
505 carried about 60 per cent. of all import tonnage
439 and some 15 per cent. of all exports in the years immediately before the war. Traffic is of two distinct types; first, the traffic in sea-going vessels with an average size of 2,000-2,500 tons proceeding as far as Galați and Brăila via the Sulina mouth, and second, on the river proper, on the Danube above Galați.

The sea-going traffic passing through the Sulina mouth in the years just before the war consisted of about 1·2—1·4 million tons a year of exports from Rumania or other riparian states. By far the most important items were grain and timber. About half the vessels entering the Danube from the sea appear to have been in ballast, the remainder bringing in some 300,000-500,000 tons of imports mainly for Rumania.

Inland-water traffic on the Rumanian sector of the Danube in 1936 (the latest year for which information for all kinds of traffic is available) amounted to 3 million tons. 1·6 million tons consisted of upstream traffic from Rumania to other riparian states, 0·24 million tons of downstream traffic to Rumania, about 1 million tons of Rumanian internal traffic, and about 0·2 million

[432]

CHAPTER VIII

487 505 439

of transit traffic (mainly downstream). Traf[illegible] with other riparian states was apportione[illegible] follows :—

	From Rumania	*To Rumania*
	'000 tons	
Germany ..	220	40
Austria ..	390	20
Czechoslovakia .	440	30
Hungary ..	300	150
Yugoslavia ..	200	—
Bulgaria ..	80	3
	1,630	243

The composition of inland-water traffic has been fully analysed only at the Iron Gates, at the western end of the Danube's Rumanian course. In the traffic shown below, the upstream traffic consisted mainly of Rumanian exports, while the downstream traffic was made up of imports and transit traffic in approximately equal proportions.

Traffic in '000 metric tons at the Iron Gates :—

	1938	193[illegible]
	Upstream	
Total	1,362·5	1,864·[illegible]
of which (main items only) :		
Timber	20·1	11·9
Iron	21·1	13·4
Wheat	30·3	300·6
Barley	49·8	168·[illegible]
Maize	25·1	128·[illegible]
Petroleum and its products	787·7	1,046·1
Salt	30·8	31·7
	Downstream	
Total	489·3	771·2
of which (main items only) :		
Iron	77·2	22·2
Timber	67·6	86·5
Wheat	74·4	363·0
Maize and oats	79·6	28·2

505 439 722

Little is known about traffic since Rumania finally joined the Axis in 1941. As a whole, it is below pre-war level as a result of a great decrease in the amount of grain coming forward. This has been partly, but certainly not entirely, counterbalanced by a slight increase in oil traffic, by the probable diversion of rail traffic to the Danube and by military traffic. The most important individual traffics at the present time are as follows :—

(*a*) Oil shipments from Giurgiu (i) upstream to Italy (50-70,000 tons a month), to Germany (possibly 30-50,000 tons a month), and (ii) downstream to German forces in South Russia (quantity unknown, but may be substantial).

(*b*) Downstream supplies of (i) coal to Rumanian railways (part only of total supply), and of (ii) military equipment, stores, etc., to South Russia (quantities unknown).

(*c*) Upstream supplies of (i) some S. Russian products, including grain (perhaps 20,000 tons a month) and possibly iron and manganese ore (quantities unknown), as well as of (ii) some small quantities of Rumanian exports of agricultural products.

2. Navigation

133 502

The Iron Gate Sector of the Danube between Orşova and Turnu Severin, with its rapids and reefs causing violent currents, is particularly difficult for navigation, and the use of specially

5

[44a]

133 502 trained pilots is compulsory, while the barge tows have to be broken up into smaller units. This sector of the Danube cannot be negotiated at night, which constitutes an enormous hindrance for large-scale traffic. In order to speed up the traffic, the use of suspension railways and locomotives on rails laid along the river bank was introduced before the war, but the system has met with only moderate success.

[503] Navigation in the Maritime sector of the Danube is affected by silting up—particularly in the autumn—and constant dredging has to be carried out in the Sulina branch to maintain sufficient depth for passage of vessels up to Galați. The depth of this sector was 24 ft. in 1939, permitting the entry of vessels of medium draught only. Danube navigation is held up for varying periods between November and March by ice, averaging 30-50 days, and occasionally even for 90 days.

499 There are no permanent bridges on the Danube to connect Rumania with Bulgaria. However, a Rumanian-Bulgarian Commission was established in 1942 to remedy this deficiency by arranging for the construction of a bridge, which will take five years to complete, between Giurgiu and Ruse. In the meantime a ferry system is in use between Giurgiu and Ruse carrying important supplies of oil for the German forces in Greece.

3. River Ports

503 504 There are in all some 38 river ports, of which the most important, all on the Danube (from west to east), are as follows :—

Moldova	Oltenița
Orșova	Brăila
Turnu Severin	Galați
Giurgiu	Sulina

Since the war started considerable improvements have already been made on the Danube. This is of special significance for, though this waterway is of little use for Rumanian internal traffic, since the closing of the sea route between Rumania and North Germany, it has become vitally important for the carrying of bulky transport. As early as 1940 a scheme for the rationisation of Danube traffic was put into operation, and the installations of Giurgiu, the main Danube port for oil transport, were improved.

To avoid congestion at Giurgiu, the Danube ports of New Moldova and Orșova have been enlarged. Internal traffic has been diverted to Oltenița, which is also used for the unloading of incoming traffic. The construction of new harbour installations is being carried out by a German-Rumania company.

4. Organisation of Inland Water Shipping

505 656 [655] Rumanian Danube shipping is under State control, and organisation is carried out by firms which are partly State-owned and partly owned by private individuals. The most important company is the State-owned "N.F.R." (*Navigațiunea Fluvială Română*), and of lesser importance are the privately owned companies "S.R.D." (*S.A.R. de Navigație pe Dunăre*) and "Sind" (*Societa Italiana di Navigazione Danubiana*).

505 648 All Rumanian shipping companies are members of the Danube Shipping Pool, which is under German supervision, headed by the *Deutsche Donauschiffahrtsgruppe*, which is closely connected with the Hermann Goering-Werke für Binnenschiffahrt. The importance of the Danube Pool (exclusive of the Tanker Pool) will be realised when it is borne in mind that between 1932-1937 the freight carried annually by its vessels on the

[44 b]

505 648 Danube nearly doubled. The Rumanian river traffic is now in fact under German control, which is enforced through a number of official and semi-official bodies. German transport officers operating in the main river ports are regulating all river shipping.

Working in close collaboration with the German railways and the *Frachtenstelle Südost*, Berlin (the office which controls river and sea navigation) the Rumanian authorities are bound to the orders given by this office, which must immediately receive reports of any transport exceeding 1,000 tons between Rumania and other countries. Oil transports are excepted as these are handled centrally by a special body which collaborates with the Rumanian Railway Administration and with the Danube Shipping Agencies.

5. The Inland Fleet

505 At the beginning of 1940, the Rumanian inland fleet consisted of the following craft :—

Passenger boats ..	25	
Tug boats ..	127	
Cargo barges ..	553	with a capacity of 469,546 tons
Tankers ..	66	with a capacity of 41,603 tons

Accurate figures of the Rumanian tonnage park have not been published recently, but press reports at the end of 1942 stated that shipping under the Rumanian flag on the Danube carried only 28 per cent. of Rumania's Danube traffic.

III. Administration of the Danube

505 648 Before the war the administration of the Danube was in the hands of two Commissions, the C.I.D. (International Danube Commission) in charge of the Danube from Brăila to Ulm, a distance of 2,417 km. (1,500 miles), and the C.E.D. (European Danube Commission) in charge of the Danube delta—*i.e.* from Brăila to the Black Sea—a distance of 171 km. (106 miles). Both these Commissions were established by the Treaty of Paris as long ago as 1856.

[729] After the 1914-18 war, the two Commissions were reconstituted under the Treaty of Versailles, and the constitution, powers and functions of each laid down in Articles 331-336 and 346-353 of that Treaty.

C.I.D. (International Danube Commission)

Under the Treaty of Versailles this Commission was composed of the following riparian States :—

2 members from Bavaria and Württemburg.

1 each from Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria.

In addition, the three non-riparian members of the C.E.D., viz. Great Britain, France and Italy, were each allocated one representative.

This Commission was only a provisional one, intended to function pending the creation of a permanent regime. This was accomplished in July, 1921, and under the Statute of the 23rd July of that year, the Powers having representation were identical with those prescribed by the Versailles Treaty.

Article 1 of the Statute provides that the Danube from Ulm to the Black Sea must be free and open to all flags without any discrimination whatsoever. The functions and powers of the C.I.D. are laid down in Articles 9-42, and are concerned with the drawing up of programmes of improved works, the levying of customs dues, police regulations and the control of revenues resulting from customs and navigation dues.

[45a]

505 648 [651] It is a cardinal principle of the Statute that the customs dues levied on goods must not be higher than the duties levied at frontier stations of the country concerned. The cost of improvements was to be met by navigation dues, these being assessed on the tonnage of ships, and not based on the goods transported.

Bratislava was fixed as the Headquarters for the Commission for the first five years, and it was laid down that thereafter, for five-year periods, other Danube towns were to be selected in rotation.

Since the outbreak of this war, Germany has virtually controlled the Danube, has abolished the C.I.D., and set up the "Consulting Committee for Danube Affairs above Brăila."

C.E.D. (European Danube Commission)

[503] This Commission was constituted under the Treaty of Paris in 1856 with Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey as members, for the express purpose of dredging the mouths of the Danube below Isaccea, and leaving the various channels free from all obstructions to navigation. It was apparently expected that this preliminary task would take two years, and the life of the Commission was originally fixed for that period; but, by a series of later treaties, it was kept in being up to the outbreak of the Great War.

In 1918 the Central Powers set up their own Danube Commission, membership naturally being restricted to those Powers and their allies.

By the Treaty of Versailles the European Commission was reconstituted with Great Britain, France, Italy and Rumania as provisional members; and by the Convention of July 21st, 1921, was placed on a more permanent basis. The provisional membership of the four countries was confirmed and all the powers of the original Commission restored. A proviso added that any nation whose commercial interests in that part of the river warranted their being represented on the Commission could be admitted. In fact, no country was admitted under this proviso until the inclusion of Germany in August, 1938.

In August, 1938, an arrangement was signed at Sinaia relative to the exercise of the Powers of the C.E.D. In effect the Powers of the Commission were transferred to the Rumanian Government who were to set up a "Maritime Danube Board." This board, under Article 5, was "to be responsible for the preparation and execution of plans for works on the maritime Danube and at the mouths for levying dues and dispensing of the yield thereof."

In September, 1940, Germany summoned a conference at Vienna for the purpose of regulating Danube shipping anew, and eliminating Great Britain and France from membership of the Commission.

[113] [For further information see *La Commission Européenne du Danube et son Œuvre de 1856 à 1931* (Paris 1931); Treaty of Versailles, Articles 331-339, 346-353; Treaty Series No. 38 (1939) Cmd. 6068, and Treaty Series 38 (1939), Cmd. 6069.]

E. TELECOMMUNICATIONS

I. Pre-War Situation

1. Telegraph and Telephones

206 The telegraph system of Rumania was controlled by the Ministry of Communications, the telephone by the Societatea Română de Telefoane, a subsidiary of the International Telephone and

[45b]

206 Telegraph Co., of New York. The telegraph system covered the whole country, while the telephone was sufficiently extensive to supply about a quarter of the villages with official telephones, which were available for public use. The following figures (January 1940) show the comparative development of telegraph and telephone systems in Rumania and Great Britain :—

	Rumania	*Great Britain*
Number of telephones for every 100 of the population ..	·51	7·06
Miles of telegraph wire for every 100 of the population	·24	·5

After 1930, when the Societatea Română de Telefoane took over from the Government, the telephone system made remarkable progress. Just before the war about 74 per cent. of the subscribers were attached to automatic exchanges. 17 of the largest towns were equipped with these exchanges (Bucarest had two), material being supplied by the International Standard Company. Small towns and country districts had manual exchanges. The system in general was overhead wire, but there was an important 12-channel underground cable taking carrier from Bucarest to Ploeşti with extensions to Buzău and Braşov.

Bucarest had an extensive system of external telephone connections. It communicated with Berlin and Vienna, Sofia and Ruse (Bulgaria), Paris, London, Athens, Warsaw, Prague, Istanbul, Belgrade and Budapest.

The telegraph system in Rumania covered the whole country but although not in as bad a condition as the telegraph system of Bulgaria, it suffered from being entirely divorced from the telephone system, and in 1937 it was proposed that it should be thoroughly reorganised. It is not known whether this reorganisation was ever carried out.

206 Rumania was connected by telegraph to Prague, Istanbul, Odessa and Belgrade.

2. Submarine Cables

There was a submarine telegraph cable from Constanța to Kilyos, which was used on the Bucarest—Istanbul telegraph circuit.

3. Wireless.

207 Rumania was fairly well equipped with wireless stations, but after the Government took them over from "Air France," who originally installed them, their working became less efficient. At the beginning of the war there were three broadcasting stations, of which the most powerful was the Radio Rumania, a 150-kW station at Brașov; 14 wireless stations for civil airlines, and a number of radio beacons, government and commercial stations and police wireless stations.

II. War-time Developments

1. Telegraph and Telephones

206 722 It was reported in 1941 that the Germans had laid a telephone cable from Berlin to Bucarest through Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

2. Wireless

207 722 In May 1942 it was reported that the wireless headquarters in S.E. Europe for the "Lufthansa" was at Bucarest. Budapest, Venice, Rome, Belgrade, Zagreb and Sofia are all controlled from this headquarters. An internal Rumanian network for purely military purposes is also worked from Bucarest.

It was learnt in 1943 that there was a plan for the construction of four new medium-wave transmitters to replace existing stations. The new stations were to be at Iași and Timișoara and in Bucarest and Transylvania. A new 50-kW. short-wave transmitter for foreign broadcasts is also planned.

CHAPTER IX

FOREIGN TRADE

A. GENERAL

[162] 439 Although primarily an agricultural country since about 80 per cent. of her population is rural, Rumania has not been so dependent on the export of agricultural produce as a means of financing her imports as would be expected, oil and oil products having in the years immediately preceding the war accounted for as much as 40 per cent. of total exports.

From the following table it will be seen that the trade balance was consistently favourable from 1930 onwards :—

	Imports	*Exports*	*Balance*
		Million lei	
1929 ..	29,628	28,960	— 668
1930 ..	23,044	28,522	+ 5,478
1931 ..	15,755	22,197	+ 6,442
1932 ..	12,011	16,722	+ 4,711
1933 ..	11,742	14,171	+ 2,429
1934 ..	13,209	13,656	+ 447
1935 ..	10,848	16,756	+ 5,908
1936 ..	12,638	21,703	+ 9,065
1937 ..	20,285	31,568	+ 11,284
1938 ..	18,768	21,533	+ 2,765
1939 ..	22,890	26,809	+ 3,919
1940 ..	27,500	37,500	+ 10,000

This favourable trade balance was increased by the earnings of the marine and river fleets. Total earnings of the marine fleet were 110 million lei in

[476]

439

1932, rising to 186 million in 1937 and 202 million in 1938, of which about two-thirds were derived from freightage. Total earnings of the river fleet were 74 million lei in 1932, 149 million in 1937 and 176 million in 1938. Pilotage through the Iron Gate rapids added another 47 million lei in 1938.

B. CHIEF IMPORTS AND THEIR SOURCES

Between 1921 and 1936 imports of the main deficiency commodities—textile fibres and their manufactures, iron and steel and manufactures thereof, machinery, other base metals and their manufactures, and vehicles, varied but little in their relationship to all imports, these five groups of commodities accounted for about 70 per cent. of the value of all imports.

By 1939, however, iron and steel had assumed chief importance, and these five classes now constituted 80 per cent. of all imports.

In the period 1937-9, when the trade of most of the world was declining, all these classes, with the exception of textiles, showed increased imports, an indication of the progressive industrialisation of the country.

The following table shows the major commodities imported in 1938 with their values, and a breakdown into main sub-classes with their leading sources, values and the shares of such trade for the most important countries :—

[47c]

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943 ED1 Rumania ED1

439

Chief Commodities	*Total value* 1938 (*Million lei*)	*Chief sources (value in million lei in brackets)*
1. Iron and Steel	**4,060**	
Semi-manufactures	842	Germany (321); Hungary (150); Czechoslovakia (122); France (104); Belgium (8)
Tubes	524	Germany (163); Czechoslovakia (122); Hungary (120); France (62); U.K. (17); Belgium (17)
Tool steel	136	Czechoslovakia (86); Germany (47)
Scrap iron and steel	209	Holland (70); France (57); Belgium (36)
Ferro-alloys	51	Czechoslovakia (13); Germany (8); Poland (6); Yugoslavia (6)
Iron ore	34	Yugoslavia (34)
Manufactures	2,110	Czechoslovakia (668); Germany (605); U.K. (158); U.S.A. (80); Hungary (41); France (38); Sweden (32)
2. Textile Fibres and Manufactures	**3,731**	
Cotton yarn	1,184	Czechoslovakia (318); Germany (307); Italy (257); U.K. (213); France (60)
Raw cotton	897	Egypt (623); Turkey (148); U.K. (20); U.S.A. (26); Belgium (25)
Cotton piecegoods	240	Czechoslovakia (66); Germany (61); Italy (30); Switzerland (31); U.K. (16)
Wool yarn	393	Germany (257); Italy (73); Czechoslovakia (14); U.K. (6)
Wool, washed combed	340	France (149); U.K. (106); Belgium (73)
Wool, raw	23	Argentine (14); Australia (5); U.K. (3)
3. Machinery and Apparatus	**3,558**	
Industrial machinery	1,371	Germany (740); Czechoslovakia (242); U.S.A. (160); U.K. (111); Switzerland (40)
Machine tools	522	Germany (418); Belgium (36); Czechoslovakia (24); France (11); Switzerland (11)
Agricultural implements	242	Germany (123); Hungary (46); U.S.A. (40); Czechoslovakia (16)
Electro-technical apparatus	1,117	Germany (635); Belgium (113); U.K. (110); Hungary (73); France (50); Holland (35)
Engines, boilers, etc.	280	Germany (95); Switzerland (42); Hungary (36); U.S.A. (24); France (18)

[47d]

CHAPTER IX

439

Chief Commodities	Total value 1938 (Million lei)	Chief sources (value in million lei in brackets)
4. Other Base Metals and Manufactures	**1,476**	
Copper, unwrought	264	Belgium (174); Yugoslavia (38), U.K. (23); U.S.A. (8)
Copper, scrap	41	U.K. (23); Belgium (13)
Copper manufactures	805	France (262); Belgium (205), Germany (126); U.K. (80)
Zinc, unwrought	53	Belgium (41); Poland (6)
Zinc, other	19	Germany (7), Belgium (3); Poland (3)
Tin, unwrought	48	U.K. (32); Belgium (5); France (5); U.S.A. (5)
Tin, other	9	U.K. (4); Germany (2)
Aluminium, unwrought	23	U.K. (8); Germany (8); France (3), Yugoslavia (2)
Aluminium, other	58	Germany (21); U.K. (13); Italy (9)
5. Vehicles	**1,456**	
Lorries	534	Germany (315); France (182)
Motor cars, private	297	U.S.A. (152); Germany (98); Belgium (30)
Motor car chassis	256	U.S.A. (125); Germany (59); Belgium (42); France (25)
Aircraft	142	Holland (40); U.S.A. (36); U.K. (27); Germany (26)
Motor car parts	94	U.S.A. (39); Germany (33), Belgium (9)
Bicycles	39	Germany (39)
6. Chemical Products	**620**	
Medicaments	269	Germany (182); France (38), Hungary (25); Switzerland (14)
For Textile Industry	34	Germany (22); Switzerland (11)
7. Fruit and Colonial Produce	**525**	
Citrus fruits	171	Palestine (90); Italy (46); Greece (20); Syria (15)
Olives	125	Greece (113); Turkey (12)
Coffee	84	Germany (27); U.K. (14); Denmark (13); Holland (12)
Cocoa	42	Denmark (37); Holland (2); U.K. (2)
Tea	22	U.K. (8); Holland (7); Denmark (2)
8. Rubber, Celluloid and other Vegetable Gums	**424**	
Rubber, raw	100	U.K. (67), Holland (15); Denmark (9)
Rubber manufactures	216	Germany (56); Italy (37); U.K. (28); U.S.A. (13)
Celluloid and manufactures	26	Germany (23)
Gums, etc.	54	Greece (26); France (8); U.K. (7)
9. Earth Stone and Manufactures	**380**	
Glass manufactures	99	Germany (74), Hungary (8), Czechoslovakia (5)
Pottery manufactures	93	Germany (57), Czechoslovakia (26); Hungary (6)
Refractory bricks	79	Germany (60); Czechoslovakia (18)
Coke	68	Germany (24); Poland (22); Czechoslovakia (22)
Coal	25	Turkey (10); Germany (7); U.K. (7)
Total of above classes	17,350 million lei, over 90 per cent. of *total imports* of 18,768 million lei.	

[48a]

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943

ED1 Rumania ED1

439

10. Notes on Imports

1. *Iron and Steel and their Manufactures.*—In 1935 expenditure was merely 1·9 milliard lei, or 17 per cent. of all imports; by 1939, however, this proportion at 6·76 milliard lei had increased to 30 per cent. of all import trade. As a rule, Czechoslovakia and Germany each supplied about one-third of the total class; in 1939 France, Italy and Holland were of next importance as against the previous usual order of Hungary, France and U.K.

2. *Textile Fibres and Manufactures.*—Expenditure in this field declined heavily to 3·6 milliard lei in 1939 (21 per cent. of all imports) compared with 5·8 milliard lei in 1937 (29 per cent. of total import trade).

Raw materials constituted one-third of the whole

L48b]

429

class and yarns more than one-half. Of the raw materials, cotton accounted for about two-thirds and wool one-quarter, while of the yarns two-thirds were cotton and less than one-quarter was woollen.

The import of piecegoods was small by comparison with the rest of the class, reflecting the growing importance of the weaving industry to the country.

3. With a short interval from 1930 to 1932 values of imported *machinery* increased progressively up to 1939, when a record payment of 4·3 milliard lei was made. The proportion of such purchases to total imports had remained about 19 per cent. for many years. Normally industrial machinery constituted two-fifths of the whole

[48 c]

439

class, electro-technical apparatus one-third and machine-tools one-seventh.

Germany provided 60 per cent. and Czechoslovakia 8 per cent. up to 1939, when Germany's share increased to 66 per cent. and Czechoslovakia's fell to 5 per cent.

4. *Base Metals other than Iron and Steel.*—In 1934 a progressive demand began which reached 1·7 milliard lei in 1939; throughout the period between 7 per cent. and 8 per cent. of all imports were of this class.

Three-quarters of this trade was in copper in all forms. Belgium provided one-third, France one-fifth, U.K. one-eighth and Germany one-tenth.

5. *Vehicles.*—In 1937 imports were valued at ·9 milliard lei, four times higher than in 1933; in 1939 they were eight times as high at 1·8 milliard lei. The most spectacular increase was in heavy motor transport vehicles which leapt from ·08 milliard to ·90 milliard lei between 1937 and 1938.

[49 a]

439

Normally the field had been shared by Germany with 40 per cent., U.S.A. 25 per cent. and France 17 per cent.; in 1919, however, Czechoslovakia and Germany each provided 33 per cent., U.S.A. 17 per cent. and France nearly 10 per cent.

C. CHIEF EXPORTS AND THEIR DESTINATIONS

From 1921 to 1927 cereals were by far the most important export, rising steadily from 4 milliard to 19 milliard lei. Only once in the following years i.e. in 1931, did cereal exports exceed in value those of petroleum and its products, which lately averaged over 40 per cent. of total exports.

In the early years after the last war timber ranked second among exports, but the development of the petroleum industry lowered it to third. The other classes in the following table have not changed in relative importance for many years.

439

Chief Commodities	Total imports 1938 (Millions)	Chief destinations (figures in millions in brackets)
1. Materials for Heat, Light, etc.	**9,313**	
Benzine	4,401	Germany (1,055), France (566), U.K. (555), Czechoslovakia (356), Spain (255), Switzerland (210), Belgium (152), Hungary (30), Greece (125), Italy (124), Tunis (122)
Kerosene	1,728	Germany (206), U.K. (204), Egypt (207), Italy (112), Hungary (102), Czechoslovakia (62)
Gas oil	1,377	U.K. (258), Italy (211), Greece (18), Germany (173), Egypt (143), Turkey (36), Yugoslavia (28)
Mazout	1,030	Italy (334), Germany (166), Hungary (53), Egypt (152), Spain (40), Greece (9)
Crude petroleum	535	Czechoslovakia (278), Italy (115), Hungary (65), France (54), Yugoslavia (47)
2. Cereals and Pulses	**5,258**	
Wheat	3,337	Germany (1,160), Czechoslovakia (503), U.K. (420), Greece (222), Belgium (215), Switzerland (196), France (88), Spain (80), Holland (78), Gibraltar (75)
Maize	827	U.K. (166), Greece (166), Germany (122), Czechoslovakia (88), Holland (57), Belgium (56)
Barley	638	Germany (590), Greece (42), Switzerland (22)
Pulses	287	Germany (155), France (5), Greece (26), Belgium (25), Italy (22), U.K. (22)
3. Timber	**2,465**	
Constructional timber	1,946	Germany (432), Hungary (426), Greece (240), Egypt (234), Palestine (118), Syria (105), Turkey (64), U.K. (53), U.S.A. (46), Italy (37), Cyprus (28), Czechoslovakia (20)
Boxes, cases, etc.	162	Palestine (151), Cyprus (7)
Firewood	125	Hungary (88), Germany (23), Italy (12)
4. Livestock	**1,221**	
Swine	795	Germany (476), Czechoslovakia (90), Greece (108), Italy (7)
Cattle (all kinds)	208	Greece (112), Palestine (11), Italy (40), Germany (27)
Poultry	70	Germany (28), Palestine (27), Italy (8)
Horses	46	Germany (27), Czechoslovakia (12)
5. Seeds	**1,098**	
Clover, vetch, etc.	148	Germany (102), Belgium (27), Denmark (11)
Sunflower	216	Italy (85), Czechoslovakia (40), Holland (32), Poland (26)
Colza, rape	169	Italy (62), Czechoslovakia (42), U.K. (18), Germany (5)
Pumpkin	75	Italy (20), Germany (23), Poland (11)
Other oilseeds	463	Germany (402), France (22), Czechoslovakia (18)

[49-]

RUMANIA:— IMPORTS & EXPORTS BY COMMODITIES

439





[Facing p. 50]

CHAPTER IX

439

Chief Commodities	*Total value 1938 (Million lei)*	*Chief destinations (value in million lei in brackets)*
6. Edible Animal Products	**638**	
Eggs	338	U.K. (317); Germany (19)
Fresh meat, mainly pork	49	Germany (40); Italy (5)
Meat, prepared, tinned, etc.	68	U.K. (29); U.S.A. (17); Czechoslovakia (13)
Poultry game, dead	151	Germany (66); Switzerland (57); U.K. (15)
Lard	28	Czechoslovakia (23); Germany (4)
7. Fruit and Colonial Produce	**370**	
Nuts	217	Germany (123); U.K. (29); Poland (24); Czechoslovakia (17)
Pip fruits	96	Germany (56); Czechoslovakia (31)
Plums, all kinds	26	Germany (11); Poland (11)
8. Vegetables, Flowers, etc.	**361**	Denmark (148); Czechoslovakia (44); Germany (36); U.K. (24); Hungary (22)
9. Hides, Skins, etc.	**203**	
Sheep and goat, all qualities	176	U.S.A. (135); Poland (34)
Total of above classes	20,927 million lei, over 95 per cent. of *total exports* of 21,532 million lei	

[50 a]

439

10. Notes

1. *Materials for Heat, Light, etc.*—Though only the most important consumers are shown in the table, nearly all European countries were purchasers.

2. *Cereals and Pulses.*—The figures for one year are but small guide to an export dependent upon harvests in buyers' and sellers' countries, but there never has been any doubt as to Rumania's importance as a European granary. Wheat was normally about one-half and maize one-sixth of the class, and Germany usually bought about one-third of the whole export, which lately ranged between 25 per cent. and 33 per cent. of all exports.

3. *Timber.*—This lost much of its importance between 1925 and 1933, when exports fell to 1 milliard lei. The recovery was gradual, though steady. Exports accounted in recent years for between 9 per cent. and 11 per cent. of total exports.

4. *Livestock* increased in value from 1.3 milliard lei in 1937 to 1.8 milliard in 1939, representing a rise from 4.2 per cent. to 6.7 per cent. of all exports. Pigs consistently composed half the class and cattle one quarter.

5. *Seeds* at 1.1 milliard lei in 1938 maintained the class at 5 per cent. of total export trade. Oilseeds represented three-quarters of the class and of these Germany bought more than half.

6. *Edible Animal Products* increased 50 per cent. in value from 1938 to 1939, reaching a total of 958 million lei, of which nearly one-half was eggs and one-quarter fresh meat (chiefly pork). While the sales of these two commodities were advancing year by year, those of poultry and lard steadily declined.

In 1939 Germany displaced U.K. as the best buyer.

D. WARTIME CHANGES

439
722

Inclusion in the blockade area and consequent severance from former overseas markets has made Rumania increasingly dependent on Germany, both as a market for her exports and as a supplier of essential raw materials and machinery.

Rumania's export surplus has been very considerably reduced during the war period. The

[50b]

489
722

chief pre-war exports have all suffered. Agricultural produce particularly has been affected, as a result of poor harvests. The export of wheat and maize, which averaged a total of 1.32 million tons between 1935 and 1938, did not amount to 100,000 tons from the 1942 harvest. Timber exports, which ranked third before the war, have dwindled to less than 5 per cent. of the quantities exported in 1937 and 1938.

Oil exports now take first place, amounting to 63 per cent. of the 1940 total by value, though, due to reduced production, the total tonnage available is below that of the peak years immediately preceding the war.

Germany's participation in Rumania's foreign trade has increased from 23 per cent. in 1937 to 46 per cent. in 1940, and during 1941 and 1942 had increased to approximately 70 per cent. of both imports and exports. German exports, however, by no means balance her imports, so that there is an ever mounting clearing balance in Rumania's favour, which was reported to amount to 30 milliard lei in December, 1942, and which causes considerable anxiety in Rumanian financial circles. However, in June 1942 an agreement was signed between the two countries by which war essential trade has to be maintained irrespective of the state of the clearing.

The chief products imported from Germany are agricultural and other machinery, iron and steel, semi-manufactured and finished products, and chemicals.

Oil has become Rumania's principal export to Germany, representing in 1940 about 58 per cent. of the total value.

Italy takes second place in Rumania's foreign trade, accounting in 1941 for 11.8 per cent. of Rumanian exports and 16.1 per cent. of imports. Trade is regulated by agreements renewed annually, and petroleum products constitute the principal Rumanian export, other commodities being agricultural products and livestock, both in small quantities. Italian exports in return include textiles, sulphur, fruit and military supplies.

Trade with other European countries has been on a very reduced scale. Agreements were concluded with Slovakia, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark and Finland, the exchanges following obvious lines.

[50 c]

RUMANIA — IMPORTS & EXPORTS BY COUNTRIES.

439



[Facing p.51]

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1-43
SD: Burma EDI

CHAPTER X

FINANCE

A. PUBLIC FINANCE

652 The financial situation in Rumania during the 1930's was very like that of other south-east European countries, being influenced by similar factors.

During the years of depression at the beginning of the period, the situation was dominated by the sharp fall in agricultural prices on the world markets, and the existence of a very considerable foreign debt—amounting in 1935 to about 80 per cent. of the total national debt, which amounted to 139 milliard lei in March of that year.

After 1935, however, when prices began to rise, and various agreements had been reached with creditor countries regarding the service of the foreign debt, a distinct improvement was noticeable, which continued until the outbreak of war, when the heavy expenditure necessary for the maintenance of the armed forces on active service once again strained the financial resources of the country to the utmost.

1. The Budget in Pre-War Years

The budget years from 1930 to 1934/35 inclusive all showed heavy deficits, the largest being registered in 1931 and 1933/34.

In 1935/36 expenditure on the ordinary budget amounted to 20.7 milliard lei, and on the special national defence budget to 1.9 milliard lei—giving a total expenditure of 22.6 milliard lei, as against revenue of 23.09 milliard lei. It was, however, the practice to grant certain credits outside the budget, which, in so far as budget surpluses were insufficient, were covered by borrowing.

The main single items of expenditure in the ordinary budget were the Ministry of Finance (including the debt service), the Ministry of Defence (excluding the special national defence budget), and the Ministry of Education and Culture, accounting for approximately 35 per cent., 23 per cent. and 20 per cent. respectively of the total expenditure.

Expenditure on National Defence amounted to 30 per cent. of the combined total of the ordinary and National Defence Budgets.

By far the greater part of expenditure was covered by normal resources. Indirect taxes, customs duties and stamp and registration duties accounted for approximately 40 per cent. of the total revenue, profits from State monopolies and State enterprises 25 per cent. and direct taxes 15 per cent., the remainder being supplied by other administrative revenue and special resources.

By 1938/39 expenditure on the ordinary budget and the special National Defence budget (excluding any extra budgetary credits in respect of which there is no information) had risen to about 34 milliard lei—with expenditure on National Defence still accounting for some 30 per cent. of the total. In the same year total revenue amounted to approximately 35.5 milliard lei, of which some 45 per cent. came from indirect taxes, 17 per cent. from profits from State monopolies and enterprises, and 25 per cent. from direct taxes.

From March 1935 to March 1939 while the foreign debt dropped by 45 milliard lei, the domestic debt rose by 16.1 milliard lei—from 24.7 milliard lei to 40.8 milliard lei. This rise was

652 largely due, first, to the conversion in 1937, of the foreign debt held by Rumanian nationals into domestic debt, and, secondly, to credits granted outside the budget and not covered by normal revenue. The drop in the foreign debt, while partly due to this conversion, was mainly due to the fact that war debts were excluded from the total.

2. Expenditure in Wartime

652 722 After the outbreak of war, expenditure—particularly that on national defence—continued to rise. In 1941/42 a technical change was made in the budgetary system; instead of including profits from State enterprises in the ordinary budget a separate budget was published for State enterprises. Thus expenditure was divided into three categories, (1) the ordinary budget, (4) the special national defence budget and (3) budget for State enterprises. In addition in 1942/43 and 1943/44 separate budgets were published for Bessarabia and Bucovina.

The following table shows the budget estimates for expenditure on these four accounts for the budget years from 1941/42 to 1943/44.

	milliard lei		
	1941/42	1942/43	1943/44
Ordinary budget ..	44.9	72.5	88
Special National Defence budget ..	16.0	21.0	84
Budget for State Enterprises ..	55.0	113.0	192
Budget for Bessarabia and Bucovina ..	—	6.0	10
Total ..	116.0	212.5	374

The first nine months of the Russian war fell in the Budget year 1941/42. Actual expenditure in that year was 74 milliard lei higher than the estimates, since 90 milliard instead of 16 milliard lei was spent on the special national defence budget and 12.5 milliard from the ordinary budget was allocated to Defence. Thus published expenditure on national defence accounted for over 75 per cent. of all budgetary expenditure (excluding that on State enterprises) as against 30 per cent. in 1938/39.

It is officially stated that in 1941/42 slightly over 50 per cent. of all expenditure was covered by normal resources, and the remainder by loans.

Since the outbreak of war the yield from taxation has increased, partly as a result of inflationary conditions, and partly as a result of increased rates of taxation and the imposition of new taxes.

The burden of taxation was, however, already so heavy that an increase sufficient to cover expenditure could not be achieved and large scale borrowing became necessary.

3. Government Borrowing during the War

Early in 1941 a "Reintegration Loan" with no fixed limit for subscription was issued. It was in two parts, the one bearing 4½ per cent. interest and maturing in 30 years, the other—designed principally for agriculturalists—bearing 5 per cent. interest with 5 years' maturity. Despite the various attractions offered (freedom from taxation on interest, premiums, etc.) the response to this loan was very poor. The final date for subscriptions was repeatedly postponed, in September,

CHAPTER X

652 722 1941, subscriptions were made compulsorily, and in 1942 a Reintegration Tax was levied on all persons who failed to subscribe the amounts allotted to them. In spite of all this the loan had only raised some 18 milliard lei by September, 1942.

A further attempt to borrow from the public was made at the end of 1942, when the Minister of Finance was authorised to issue short term 4 per cent. Treasury Bills to a value not exceeding 10 milliard lei. As with the long term loan, interest from this loan was free from taxation.

In spite of these measures, however, considerable amounts have had to be borrowed direct from the National Bank—partly on account of extra-budgetary credits for non-military purposes, but more especially to finance the war with Russia which—at the beginning at least—was done entirely outside the budget.

In June 1941 when miscellaneous advances to the Government already amounted to 10 milliard lei, the National Bank was authorised to derogate from the provisions of its statutes and to advance any amounts necessary to cover exceptional needs. In this way a further 12 milliard lei credit on this account was put at the disposal of the Government to finance the Russian war. This credit was, however, exhausted by January 1942, but the National Bank's miscellaneous advances continued to rise, reaching nearly 30 milliard lei by June 1942. After June 1942, borrowing on this account fell considerably, only to rise at the end of the year and the beginning of 1943.

4. External Position of the Leu

652 Rumania is still officially on the gold standard, the parity of the leu having been fixed in 1929 at 1 leu=0.009 g. fine gold or 111.111 lei per kg. gold.

This parity has, however, no practical significance, since from 1935 onwards it has been the practice to pay premiums for gold over and above the official price. In order to encourage domestic production of gold additional premiums are paid to domestic gold producers, so that the effective internal price of gold varies, according to the productivity of the mine, from 400,300 lei to 867,500 lei per kg. fine gold. (*See* also section on gold, page 23.) Official dealing in "hard" currencies, too, is done not at parity but at parity plus a premium. From December 1935 to February 1940, the premiums were fixed at 38 per cent., from March 1940 to March 1941 at 107 per cent., and after the latter date at 90 per cent.

652 648 The last reduction of premiums from 107 per cent. to 90 per cent. was made under German pressure, on the grounds that the RM., on which no premium was paid, was undervalued in relation to "hard" currencies. And at the same time as the effective rates for such currencies were lowered (in the case of the $ from 211.65—217.97 to 187.60—196 lei per $); the RM. rate was raised from 50 lei=1 RM. to 60 lei=1 RM., at which level it has since remained.

5. Prices and Price Control

435 As a result of the world depression there was a severe fall in prices during the early 1930's. Both wholesale prices and the cost of living reached their lowest level in the years 1933 and 1934. In the following years there was a gradual recovery, which became increasingly marked after 1939.

The retail price index has increased during the war as follows:—

August, 1939	100.
January, 1940	116.6.

435

June, 1940	137.1.
January, 1941	149.5.
June, 1941	190.9.
January, 1942	200.6.
June, 1942	306.9.
January, 1943	377.6.
March, 1943	403.9.

The less marked rise in 1942 was due principally to the fact that for the first 6 months of the year prices were almost stationary; in the autumn, however, indirect taxes were increased and prices once again rose steeply.

These percentages represent only increases in official prices; the cost of living is in fact considerably higher owing to the prevalence of the Black Market, where prices are very much in excess of the official limits.

The first attempts at price control were made almost immediately after the outbreak of war. In September 1939 an anti-profiteering law was passed, and in November of the same year an anti-speculation law followed, which fixed the maximum prices of all articles in general use and limited wholesalers' profits to 10 per cent. and retailers' to 12 per cent.

The regulations were further tightened up by the price control laws of March, 1941, and the sabotage law of October, 1940.

Control, however, remained largely ineffective, and in October 1941 a stabilisation law was passed. This law, which borrowed much from the existing German laws, laid down a general price stop. Maximum prices and wages were fixed at the level prevailing on 1st September, 1941, and alterations could be made only with the permission of the Minister of Economics.

In addition the State set up goods distribution centres which, among other functions, supervised producers' prices, profit margins and consumers' prices.

Since August 1942 the supervision of prices has been in the hands of a General Commissariat for Price Control, and the local offices subordinate to it. It is evident that corruption among price-control officials was by no means a negligible factor in the very unsatisfactory development of the control system in general. In the autumn of 1942 it was announced that all existing price controllers were to be dismissed and replaced by members of the teaching, legal and literary professions.

[661]

B. BANKING

1. State and State-Controlled Banks

652
453

The National Bank of Rumania was set up in 1880 with a capital of 30 million lei, of which one-third was in the hands of the State. By 1929 this had been raised to 600 million lei. Under the present statute the State may not hold more than ten per cent. of the capital; the remaining ninety per cent. must be held by private shareholders. This bank has the sole right of note issue for the country.

From the end of 1930 to the end of 1938 the note circulation rose from 19·6 milliard lei to 34·9 milliard lei. In the next four years, however, the increase was very much greater as the following table shows:—

		Milliard lei
1939	January	34·1
	June	38·7
1940	January	48·4
	June	54·2
1941	January	65·7
	June	77·1
1942	January	95·6
	June	98·7
1943	January	117·0

[52 b]

652 453 This was largely due to the advances of the National Bank both to exporters with claims on the Rumanian-German clearing, and for the maintenance of German troops stationed in the country (see below).

Among the fairly numerous other State or State-controlled banks, two of the most important are the Central Savings Bank and the National Institute for Industrial Credit. This latter was founded in 1923, but its size and scope have been greatly extended since the outbreak of war, and it is now entrusted with the so-called "Rumanisation" of industry.

2. Commercial Banks

453 There are six important commercial banks in Rumania—viz., Banca Româneasca, Banca de Credit Român, Banca Commerciala Română, Societatea Bancara Română, Banca Commerciala Italiana şi Română, Banca Chrissoveloni—and a fairly large number of other smaller banks. In the big banks there were considerable French, German, Italian and, to a lesser extent, British interests.

The position of the banks was very seriously affected by the collapse of the Österreichische Creditanstalt in 1931.

Between 1930 and 1934 current account deposits in commercial banks fell from 18·2 milliard lei to 7·9 milliard lei and time deposits from 35·1 milliard lei to 10·4 milliard lei, representing a 64 per cent. fall in total deposits. In subsequent years there was a recovery and now inflation contributes a large share to the further increase in deposits. Deposits in commercial banks with a capital of more than 60 milliard lei rose from 10·6 milliard lei at the end of 1934 to 28·8 milliard lei in August, 1942.

In May 1934 a law was passed affecting domestic and foreign banks operating in the country. According to this law a Supreme Banking Council was set up to supervise all banks; minimum capital was fixed according to the locality in which the bank operated; rates of interest were fixed, and conditions of liquidity laid down. This law is still in operation, but certain of its provisions have been relaxed since the outbreak of war—the first time in February 1942, and a second time early in 1943. The alterations principally concerned the proportions of deposits to capital—in each case the maximum limit for deposits being increased.

As a result of the activities of the Supreme Banking Council a large number of small banks has ceased to operate and the banking system in general has been put on a much sounder footing.

3. German Infiltration and Financial Exploitation

453 648 Apart from penetration into other branches of industry, there has been a considerable amount of buying up of shares by Germans in Rumanian banks and insurance companies. Already before the war the Societatea Bancara Romana was controlled by the Dresdner Bank, while the Commerzbank and the Deutsche Bank had a minority holding in the Banca Commerciala Română. This latter holding was increased in 1941 to 60 per cent., and in the same year the *Reichskreditgesellschaft* acquired a minority holding in the Banca de Credit Român, and the Berliner Handelgesellschaft in the Banca Chrissoveloni. In 1942 the Bank der Deutschen Arbeit acquired a holding in the Bukarester Handelsbank. Thus, since the Banca Commerciala Italiana şi Romana is a subsidiary of the Banca Commerciala Milan, five out of the six important banks are to a greater or lesser extent Axis-controlled. In addition there are

453 648 456 648 certain fairly important *Volksdeutsche* saving banks operating in Rumania.

In the case of insurance, too, German companies had considerable interests in Rumanian companies even before the war. These interests have been greatly increased, the most important acquisitions being a majority holding in the Dorna Vatra company acquired by Jauch und Hübener in 1941, a similar holding in the "Franco-Romana" taken over from French hands by the Nordstern Versicherungs A.G. in the same year, and a holding taken over from French hands by a Viennese company in the "Nationala" General Insurance Company—also in 1941.

652 648 722 Though the great increases in budgetary expenditure since 1939 can be attributed indirectly to Germany, the chief instruments of German financial exploitation have taken the form of advances from the Rumanian National Bank for the maintenance of German troops in the country, and for the clearing (i.e. forcing the Rumanian National Bank to make advances to Rumanian exporters whose exports were not balanced by corresponding imports from Germany).

4. Advances for Maintenance of German Troops

It was originally agreed that 1 milliard lei per month should be advanced—against an equivalent RM. credit in Berlin—to the German troops in Rumania. In fact, however, the Germans drew sums in excess of this amount, and continued to do so even after the majority of troops had left the country.

In October 1941, therefore, the National Bank refused to grant any further advances of lei for the use of the German troops. The Germans, however, brought pressure to bear by refusing to honour Rumanian invoices for goods they had received, and by borrowing from the banks through the medium of the firms which they controlled. The situation appears to have remained unchanged until January 1942, when it seems that a new agreement was reached, the National Bank once again undertaking to advance a fixed monthly sum, and in addition to make up arrears in payment. It is reported that towards the end of 1942 the National Bank had advanced some 40 milliard lei on this account.

5. The German-Rumanian Clearing

In addition to this German debt there is a further one of probably at least equal magnitude which has accrued in the clearing.

Precise figures of the actual German clearing debt to Rumania are not available and estimates vary very greatly. The amount of the debt at the end of 1942 has been variously reported at anything between 30 milliard and 100 milliard lei.

It is, therefore, reasonable to assume a minimum clearing debt at the end of 1942 of 30 milliard lei, and a minimum total debt (clearing and advances in the National Bank to the German military authorities) of 70 milliard lei—or approximately £117,000,000.

It is, however, quite possible that there is some justification for the German claim to the effect that clearing and similar debts are not wholy indicative of German commercial practices, inasmuch as certain German exports are made against long-term credits which do not enter into the clearing until several years have elapsed. In the case of Rumania, Germany is known to have granted in recent years two credits of RM. 600 million each (36 milliard lei), but it is not known to what extent actual production for the German export market made it possible for Rumanian importers to utilise these facilities.

CHAPTER XI

LABOUR

A. POPULATION

1. General

161 Before discussing the labour situation in Rumania, it is essential to point out that a number of substantial changes have taken place between 1939 and 1942. The results of all these are shown in the table below. The last official census (in 1930) showed the total population of Greater Rumania as 18,057,000. Allowing for natural increase, the population for 1939 was probably about 20,000,000.

161 728 In August 1940 the U.S.S.R. occupied Northern Bucovina and Bessarabia with a combined population of 3·67 million, while in July 1941 these areas were regained with a reduced population of 3.30 million, the reduction of ·37 million being due to Russian deportations.

In September 1940 Hungary acquired northern Transylvania, including the provinces of Crişana and Maramureş and a population of 2·75 million. This was followed by a further loss of the southern Dobruja to Bulgaria with a population of 0·38 million. Some 200,000 Germans were repatriated from eastern Rumania, mainly to Poland.

161
728

the northern sections of Transylvania and Crişana to Hungary, though it should be noted that a considerable block of Rumanians, of whom over 200,000 have returned as refugees, were placed within Hungary by the new frontier. The German minority was little affected by the territorial changes, but some 200,000 from Eastern Rumania were "repatriated," mainly to Poland. The remaining 550,000 are situated chiefly in the Banat and in southern Transylvania. The Jewish population was distributed as follows :—

[162]

Bessarabia and Bucovina	300,000
Moldavia	158,000
Muntenia	87,000
Transylvania, Crişana and Maramureş ..	180,000

(*See* paragraph on Jewish population on page 56.)

The Bulgarian minority has been returned to Bulgaria partly by the new frontier in the Dobruja and partly by the exchange of Bulgarian and Rumanian nationals which has taken place since 1940.

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943 EDl Rumania EDl

161
728

TABLE SHOWING POPULATION CHANGES BETWEEN 1939-1942

	Losses	Gains	Population
Greater Rumania, 1930	—	—	20,000,000
U.S.S.R.	3,670,000	3,300,000	—
Hungary	2,750,000	200,000	—
Bulgaria	380,000	—	—
Germany	200,000	—	—
Natural increase in population, 1939-December 1942	—	400,000	—
Totals	7,000,000	3,900,000	—
Population of Rumania, December, 1942	—	—	16,900,000

[54d]

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943

ED1 Rumania ED1

162

2. Effect of the Population Changes on the Nationality Distribution

In 1930 only 72 per cent. of the total population was of Rumanian origin. The largest minority groups were Hungarians (8 per cent.) Germans (4 per cent.), Jews (4 per cent.), Ukrainians (3·2 per cent.) and Russians (2·3 per cent.).

162
728

As a result of the territorial changes since 1930 over 85 per cent. of the population are now of Rumanian extraction, and there has been a change in the relative importance of the various minorities. The Hungarian minority has been largely reduced by the cession of the province of Maramureş and

[54e]

162 As a result of these changes it would appear that
728 the largest minority groups are now the Germans, Russians and Ukrainians.

3. Occupational Distribution

162 There is no satisfactory official occupational breakdown. Though the 1930 census gives an industrial and commercial breakdown, figures for agriculture and other occupations are lacking. Using such official figures as are available combined with other unofficial information, the following occupational breakdown (column A) has been drawn up for 1939, taking into account increased industrialisation since 1930.

[54f]

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943 EDI Rumania EDI

162

	A	Per cent	B	C	Per cent
Working population	9,300,000	100	[illegible]	[illegible]	100
of which					
Agriculture	7,200,000	77·5	6,125,000	[illegible]	[illegible]
Industry and mining	758,000	8·1	940,000	560,000	7·6
Trade and commerce	378,000	4·1	320,000	280,000	3·6
Transport	180,000	1·9	152,000	132,000	1·6
Banking and administration	254,000	2·7	213,000	163,000	2·3
Others	530,000	5·7	450,000	395,000	5·2

Columns B and C are estimated for 1942, B allowing for population changes described above and C allowing for population changes described above and for the military mobilisation.

[548]

B. LABOUR POSITION DURING THE WAR

1. Military Conscription

701 The age limits for mobilisation are 19–50, while youths from 17–18 are liable for pre-military training.

During 1942 there have been several indications of the strain which further mobilisation was putting on Rumania's manpower; for example, in April 1942 the sentences on political prisoners were suspended and they were called into the army, while from July of that year onwards there has been a constant revision of previous exemptions and a tightening of control over the granting of leave and call-up. Military service, which previously had been obligatory for Rumanian citizens only, was made compulsory for all non-nationals* resident in the country, and further a decree was passed mobilising all Rumanians of military age resident abroad. [563]

It is calculated that it has never been possible for Rumania to have more than 800,000 men properly equipped under arms at one period. The actual strength of the army has fluctuated considerably during the last two years, as has the number on the eastern front, but a reasonable average figure would be 500,000, of which 200,000 on the eastern front.

727 Rumanian casualties are difficult to assess. 464 One estimate at the end of 1941 put casualties at 150,000, while total casualties up to May 1943 have been estimated at 350,000. Military mobilisation will probably have meant a loss of some 800,000 men to the general labour supply.

2. Recruitment for Germany

464 The recruitment of workers for Germany has 167 been on a small scale, which is not surprising, as Rumania's military contribution has been considerable, and the military mobilisation has already reduced the supply of labour needed for the Rumanian armament industry to a minimum. Such labour as might be available for export is unskilled and therefore of less value to Germany. The total number of Rumanian workers in Germany in December, 1942, was estimated at 14,000. Of these 10,000 were young Rumanians 18–19, who were recruited at the end of 1941 to be "trained" in German metallurgical factories, 1,000 are women employed as domestic servants, and the rest are mainly unskilled general workers.

3. Foreign Workers in Rumania

648 In addition to the German administrators and 463 directors, who are in certain of the key positions in Rumanian industry, there is also evidence of skilled German technicians in Rumanian armament factories. In 1942 there was a nucleus of the German Todt organisation, and Italian builders in the country.

727 About 40,000 ~~Russian prisoners~~ of war are employed, chiefly in agriculture, though also in mining and navvying work.

C. GENERAL LABOUR DEVELOPMENTS

464 In 1937 the average unemployment figure was 722 12,000. The dislocation of trade and industry on the outbreak of war temporarily caused a general increase of unemployment, which was rapidly absorbed by the military call-up and increased activity in the armaments industry. In March

* The German minority was already liable for military service, either in the Rumanian or German army and in December, 1942, it was announced that there were 30,000 *Volksdeutsche* in the Rumanian Army.

[55a]

464 722 1941 there were 2,000 unemployed, while in December 1942, it was announced that the Office of Unemployment Statistics had been abolished, as there were no unemployed. Though Rumania's military mobilisation and losses have been extensive, her labour reserves are theoretically still considerable. On the other hand, there is no doubt that both industry and agriculture are suffering a noticeable labour shortage. This is attributable to the low level of mechanisation, internal economic organisation and to the cumbersome administration, so that comparison with western countries is impossible.

1. Agriculture.

464 241 The proportion of the working population engaged in agriculture is extremely high, so that military recruitment has been principally from this source. The structure of Rumanian agriculture, which is mainly peasant farming with a low output per head, has meant that the withdrawal of some 550,000 men has been more serious than it would have been in a country where more up-to-date methods are used, and the remaining labour supply is more mobile. The normal sources of supplementary wartime labour have been drawn on—*i.e.*, the temporary demobilisation of soldiers, employment of children during the summer holidays, and presumably an increased employment of women, although there is no evidence of women having been forcibly transferred to agriculture.

[727] The most valuable supplementary labour, however, has been the employment of Russian prisoners of war, and the demand for their services has exceeded the supply. The number employed in March 1942 was 40,000. These measures to improve the agricultural labour position do not as yet appear to have had much effect.

2. Industry

162 438 178 According to the latest official census figures (relating to the year 1930) 620,000 persons were employed in industry. The following table shows in column 1 the total number employed in the main branches, and in columns 2 and 3 the numbers working in factories employing ten or more people. A comparison between columns 2 and 3 gives an indication of the growing industrialisation of the country.

	1 1930	2 1930	3 1937
Food	122,000	25,200	34,700
Textiles and Clothing	155,000	34,800	70,500
Metallurgy	101,000	32,000	49,500
Timber..	94,000	31,000	44,000
Mining	53,000	n.a.	n.a.

Allowing for the increased industrialisation during the years 1930–39, and for the general increase in the total population to some 20,000,000, it is estimated that by 1939 the number of industrial workers in Greater Rumania would have risen to some 750,000.

With the loss of part of the provinces of Transylvania, Crişana and Maramureş, Rumania suffered a fairly considerable loss in industrial workers, so that added to the expulsion of Jews, repatriation of Germans, etc., and military mobilisation, it is estimated that at the end of [46A] 1942 the numbers engaged in industry would not exceed 550,000.

As in the case of agriculture, the structure of Rumanian industry tends to prevent a thorough rationalisation and concentration of the available industrial labour.

[55b]

CHAPTER XI

463 438 industrial labour. One-third of all workers engaged in industry are independent artisans, on whom the community is dependent for its services, but who do not play any important part in war production. In certain of the larger armament works German controllers have effected a considerable degree of rationalisation.

3. Mining

316 727 There is a shortage of miners; Russian prisoners of war have been employed in mining during 1942. Many miners were reported to have been included in the territory transferred to Hungary.

4. Armament Works

719 464 There is a general shortage of labour in metal and engineering factories, particularly of skilled labour. A 12-hour day was legalised at the beginning of 1942, but it is doubtful if in fact a 12-hour day is ever worked.

5. Timber

313 464 There is a shortage of labour, both for lumbering and for timber manufacture.

6. Textiles and Clothing

464 288 294 The total number of workers in these industries has probably fallen considerably, due to reduction of available raw materials. The delivery of supplies to individual mills seems to be somewhat erratic, and there is evidence of considerable part-time work: for instance in a survey of some 43 factories in December, 1942, 13 were working full time, 21 on a reduced scale, and 11 at a very reduced scale.

7. Building

499 712 464 The extent of fortification building and general road and rail construction in Rumania is unknown, but in the second half of 1942 there was evidence of a scarcity of general labour for such projects, and of Russian prisoners of war working on rail construction.

438 464 [759] In the other branches of occupation: transport services, etc., there is no evidence of labour shortage, apart from doctors, many of whom have been mobilised for the army.

D. CONTROL OF LABOUR

1. The Youth Labour Service

466 883 A youth labour service founded on the German model was established in March 1941. The leaders were trained in Germany, but it was only in April 1942 that the labour camps began to function. Youths are called up in their 19th–20th year, and the period of service lasts 7 months.

(*See* Part II, Chapter V.B. for further details.)

2. Civil Mobilisation

466 A general civil mobilisation decree was passed in May 1941 by which (1) employment cards were introduced; (2) men and women aged 20-57 were liable to compulsory employment if not employed.

Two subsequent decrees were published in March and May 1943, one for the reorganisation of agriculture, forestry and fishing, and the second for the reorganisation of industry. Each of these decrees gave full powers to the appropriate authorities for the mobilisation and transfer of labour.

In addition to the general labour decrees which have so far had little influence on the labour situation, there have been regional decrees applying to individual localities, e.g. in Bessarabia, in February 1942, all the inhabitants aged 12-70 were called upon for compulsory agricultural labour unless already employed.

E. THE JEWISH POPULATION

162 The Jewish population of Rumania for 1938 is given as 800,000, and for July, 1942, as 270,000. This reduction came about as follows :—

Total, 1938	800,000
Lost to Hungary	200,000
[728] Taken to Russia from Bessarabia and Bucovina by Russians	130,000
[661] Expelled from Bessarabia and other areas by Rumanians to Transnistria, and deaths from unnatural causes in Rumania	200,000
Total losses	530,000
Total, 1942	270,000

The occupational distribution of the Jews in 1930 :—

			Per cent.
Agriculture			4·1
Industry and trade	32·8	81·1	
Commerce and credit	48·3		
Transport			3·4
Professions and Public Services ..			2·7
Army			1·9
Miscellaneous			7·8

It is calculated that in 1939 at least one-sixth of the industrial and half of the commercial population were Jews. During the war Rumanian policy
563 has been to exclude Jews from business and from
661 commercial and professional activity. This process of Rumanisation, while pursued ruthlessly in the provinces of Bessarabia and Bucovina, has been limited in the more industrial areas such as Bucarest by the simple fact that Rumanian industry and trade are dependent to such an extent on Jewish capital and leadership, and there is no doubt that the shortage of labour in industry has been seriously aggravated by the anti-Jewish policy. The degree of Rumanisation so far achieved is given by the following examples :—

Bucarest :—

Number of firms employing Jews, November 1940	8,126
Number of firms employing Jews, December 1942	4,301

Such Jews as are deemed necessary for war production are granted labour permits, whereby they may remain in their profession, but are subject to heavy taxation. Jews who are expelled from their normal activity are compulsorily enrolled in the Jewish labour service and employed chiefly on road work, or, alternatively, they are sent to concentration camps.

(*See* also "Note on Jews in Rumania," Part II, Chapter VIII.)

F. WAGES

1. General

465 The average wage (industrial, commercial and agricultural professions) in 1938 was 1,853 lei per month. The highest average wages were found in the mining, food and transport industries, followed by commerce, textiles, skins, glass and stone, while in the metallurgical industry wages were below the average. The most noticeable feature of pre-war Rumanian wage statistics is the great regional variations, the extreme averages being 889 and 3,059 lei per month.

During the war, various attempts at fixing the wage level have failed to keep pace with the rising cost of living. On the whole it would have been surprising if a wage stop could have been successfully applied in Rumania, because of the great

465 discrepancy in wage levels throughout the country which would involve separate wage boards for each area. All the fixed rates quoted below, with the exception of those in the metallurgical trade, are given for the country as a whole. In view of the regional variations in wage rates, the application of a fixed uniform wage is obviously impossible. This therefore suggests that the given rates are intended to apply to the districts with the highest wage-rate level, and that suitable reductions will be made in other areas, as for the metallurgical industry. The general wage level is estimated to have risen by as much as 200 per cent. since 1939. A general decree in August, 1942, fixed minimum wages at (lei per month) :—

Men	*Women*	*Children*
5,100	3,800	2,300

2. Agriculture

465 241 Up till April 1942 agricultural wages were determined by free negotiation in the different regions and showed great variations. In April 1942 a decree was passed fixing rates for hired labour. A margin of 10 per cent. was granted to allow for local cost of living differences. The following rates (in lei per day) were fixed for the

465
241

different seasons in 1942, the employee also receiving food :—

Period	*Men*	*Women*	*Juveniles**
Spring—June 15th	75	50	40
Summer—Sept. 1st	100	75	50
Autumn and winter	60	40	30
Average for 1937†	40	32	21

(i.e. official money wages have almost doubled and food is now supplied.)

* 14-18 years † Without food.

465
647

3. Civil Service

In August, 1941, the average monthly wage for a civil servant was 2,200-4,000 lei (presumably for non-administrative grades). Beyond this there is no information on actual rates paid, except for a reference in December 1942 to "Ministry Advisers," whose wages were 72,000 lei per month. However, there are frequent references to increased wages for state officials, and especially of increased family allowances, e.g. in October 1941 the allowance per month for children of civil servants was 500 lei per child. By October 1942 it had been increased to 750 lei per child for families living in the country, and 1,000 lei per child for families living in the town.

[576]

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943 ED1 Rumania ED1

465

SUMMARY OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON INDUSTRIAL WAGES

Date	Industry	Category of Worker	Wage	Remarks
			Lei per month	
August 1942	General	Skilled	4,100–5,100	See remarks on variations of the "general wage"
		Unskilled	2,300–2,800	
			Lei per hour	
October 1942	Metallurgy	Skilled (2 years' employment after training) ..	30–75	Industrial areas were divided into four classes, according to their cost of living and general wage level. The given wages are for class I, i.e. with highest cost of living. Class II = 4 per cent. less; class III = 12 per cent. less; class IV = 20 per cent. less
		Industrial (over 21) ..	28–42	
		Unskilled (over 18) ..	26–32	
		Women	20 per cent. less in each category	
			Lei per month (fixed minimum)	
December 1942	Textiles	Men	5,100	
		Women	3,825	
		Juveniles (14–18)	2,550	
			Lei per hour — *Men* / *Women*	
December 1942	Oil ..	"Master" men	50–122 / 40	
		Specialised workers, men	34–98 / 28	
		Industrial workers, men ..	28–65 / 22	
		Industrial workers (under 18)	22–40 / 18	
		Unskilled workers, men ..	26–47 / 21	
		Unskilled workers (under 18)	21–36 / 17	
			Lei per day	
October 1942	Building ..	Master stonework builder	600	
		Labourer	400	
		Youth	200	
		Master joiner or carpenter	600	
		Workman	400	

NOTE.—Of the above listed categories, wages for the textile industry doubled between 1939 and 1942; for general workers, metallurgy and the oil industry they trebled, and for building were quadrupled.

[57c]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

PREFACE

• 121

RUMANIA is economically one of the relatively backward regions of the world. It is not as backward as vast areas of Asia and Africa, but like them it is faced with the problems of an agrarian society in the twentieth century. How are such societies to adapt themselves to the demands and challenges of the industrial world economy? This is perhaps the most interesting and compelling reason for a study of Rumanian politics and agriculture. A further reason is that since the end of the Second World War Rumania has been "behind the Iron Curtain" and has therefore acquired a certain immediate significance as part of the complex of issues dividing the Soviet Union and the United States. Finally, literature in English on Rumania is comparatively limited and unsatisfactory. Hence, this study of a country rather remote from the interests of most Americans may shed some light in a dark corner.

The premise of this book is that an understanding of Rumania's recent history requires familiarity with the depressed status of its peasantry, whose plight has been a chronic source of alarm, anxiety, or despair since the time of Tudor Vladimirescu, who in 1821 raised a popular revolt against the boyars. Discussions I heard in Bucarest in the winter of 1944–45 echoed to a surprising extent the manifestoes of 1848, the debates on the emancipation of 1864, the polemics evoked by the 1907 uprising, and the Peasant party's radical pamphlets of 1920.

[432]

To be sure, between 1821 and 1944 Rumania underwent tremendous changes which might make one question whether the same problems were involved. An independent kingdom was created from the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which had formerly acknowledged the Turkish sultan as their suzerain; after the First World War this kingdom doubled its area. World commerce came to Rumania; industry, if not large, expanded rapidly in the twentieth century. The population multiplied many times over. In agriculture itself there were important developments. From a semipastoral land, where stock raising was more important than farming, Rumania became, for a time, one of the great wheat and maize exporters of the world.

Agrarian problems, too, seemed to change during this period. Initially the chief sources of social discontent were servile dues and labor obligations which bore heavily upon the peasant. Later the un-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

121 equal distribution of land, a great part of which was monopolized by huge latifundiary estates, seemed the root of the trouble. Still later the spokesmen of the peasants complained of the lack of credit and capital and claimed that industry was growing parasitically at the expense of agriculture. Finally, rural overpopulation appeared to supersede all other causes of agrarian distress.

Different efforts at reform, however, failed to overcome these evils, which seemed to be interlinked. For example, servitudes, in the guise of labor contracts, reappeared after their formal abolition because of the unequal distribution of property. The manifestations of overpopulation were only in part a consequence of demographic pressure; they also arose from the low level of output and from the estate owners' control over large areas of land. It was as though Rumania were suffering from one of those maladies which display varying symptoms at different times but continue to waste the victim. The peasantry remained poor and abased throughout, agricultural technique stayed at an exceedingly primitive level, and Rumanian society was marked by a deep chasm between capital and countryside, between peasant and ruler. In 1944 it was obvious that this changing yet persistent affliction was still present, still serious despite the extensive land reforms of 1918–21 which were to have led to a prosperous peasant agriculture by the extensive distribution of estate land to the small cultivators.

Since 1945, of course, with the progressive absorption of the country into the Soviet economic and political sphere, Rumania and its problems must be considered in the vastly more complex context of the Soviet system and in that sense cease to be an altogether intelligible field for independent investigation. While many elements of the agrarian problem remain the same—under any system demographic pressure, level of productivity, and organization of farming are objective data not to be conjured away—control of policy now lies largely in Moscow and is presumably designed for an enormous territorial and economic unit.

The aim of this book is to investigate the agrarian question and its political implications: the effect of a depressed peasantry and a retrograde agriculture upon political life, and, conversely, the attitudes and actions of the major political groups in regard to peasant poverty and agrarian reform. In general terms, the conclusion reached is that the all-pervading influence of the West in the course of the last century or more is the decisive element in this problem. Not only do the outstanding features of the agrarian crisis in Rumania stem directly or indirectly from this influence, but the domestic polit-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

ical activity is understandable only as a variety of responses, involving the copying, modification, or rejection of Western political and ideological models, to the social and economic dislocation which growing contact with the West has brought about. 121

Consequently, the eventual resolution of the agrarian problem in its broader implications depends not upon certain specific technical or political reforms but upon the much more extensive task of adjusting the total relations of Rumanian society to the Western industrial civilization which has enveloped the globe. Present Soviet domination, while reducing the possibility of Rumania's continued direct and uninhibited contact with the West, complicates and amplifies but does not alter this conclusion, for the Soviet system itself appears to be a response—on an overwhelming scale and in a particularly dynamic manner—of a society subject to the same Western influence. In this respect a study of the Rumanian agrarian question may help to clarify what seems to be the central and most fateful issue of our times.

In working out this conclusion I have attempted to combine political analysis and economic survey. Too frequently in works on Rumanian history and on the agrarian question in general I have noticed a tendency to separate politics and economics. For purposes of simple narrative or economic theorizing such a separation has its advantages. But studies dealing with the economics of the agrarian problem are apt to sidetrack the political elements and then conclude by saying, "Such-and-such would be the best economic cure for these difficulties but the unfavorable political situation has prevented its application." Similarly, a straight political narrative of the bewildering confusion of Rumanian public life is likely to conclude with the sentiment, "After all, what more could be expected under such depressed economic conditions?" In each case the picture is incomplete, the question of final responsibility evaded. Obviously, there is a continuous and reciprocal relationship between the political and the economic, and both must be constantly in mind in the search for practical solutions.

I must confess, though, that this study, too, has certain limitations with respect to scope, period covered, and precision of information. Apart from the currently decisive fact of Soviet domination, much of Rumanian history must, if my general conclusion is correct, find its explanation in the impact of external influences over which the Rumanians have had little or no control. Yet it was clearly impossible here to trace the ultimate origins and significance of such external influences as the European industrial and commercial revolution or

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

●/21 the manifold political and imperialist interests making up the so-called Eastern question. By limiting myself to a relatively close study of Rumania in its reaction to these influences I hope, however, to have achieved a concreteness not attainable in a more extensive survey. As William James said, "A large acquaintance with particulars often makes us wiser than the possession of abstract formulas, however deep."

With regard to the period covered, I have concentrated primarily on the years between 1922 and 1945. I have discussed only briefly the historical background and the important land reforms of 1918–21 since they have been treated in elaborate detail by Dr. David Mitrany in *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*. While I have written at some length on events since the Communists came to power, I prefer to regard that section as a tentative postscript. My personal observations ceased in the summer of 1945, the many important subsequent developments are highly controversial and cannot be handled satisfactorily without reference to all of eastern Europe, and the information concerning them has become increasingly difficult to obtain or assess.

A third limitation, which affects the precision of my analysis, arises from the inaccuracy, unreliability, and incompleteness of Rumanian statistics, which have been a source of anguish to all who have attempted any quantitative appreciation of the Rumanian situation. Three principal reasons account for these statistical difficulties:

a) the absence of a sound basis for statistical information because of the relative immaturity of the country's economy and administration;

b) the distortion of statistics for political or propagandistic reasons;

c) the apparent inability of many Rumanians to handle the simplest arithmetical operation, a perplexing but frequently noted phenomenon. The last two difficulties, while exasperating, are in most cases amenable to a degree of criticism and correction. The first, however, is more fundamental and limits any effort to obtain a precise picture.

In 1940 the Rumanian economist and former finance minister, Virgil Madgearu, gave an accurate description of Rumanian statistical sources at that date:

The principal difficulty of research on the Rumanian economy is the inadequacy of official statistics. . . . Thus, we have at our disposal only one census of the population of the country since it has been united in its

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

ethnic frontiers—that of 1930. We have the most rudimentary knowledge of the agricultural sector, which is the most important in the Rumanian social-economic organization. We lack statistics on agricultural exploitations, and even the statistics on the extent and division of agricultural terrain, on inventory, livestock, etc., are defective. We lack statistics on agricultural laborers. Although there is more information on the industrial sector, statistical data are limited to manufacturing industries. Data on extractive industries are incomplete, and are non-existent for crafts and domestic industries.[1]

As Madgearu observed, agricultural statistics are particularly weak. For several years after the First World War estimates of the distribution of agricultural property were based on information gathered in 1905 or before. Plans were laid for a thorough agricultural census in 1930, but only a brief summary for the whole of Rumania was published. In 1941 the government organized a much more scientific agricultural census, but unfortunately only a provisional summary of the results was published, plus detailed studies of a few districts. Another drawback was that the frontiers of Rumania in 1941 did not correspond with those before 1940 or with those after 1945, and as the director of the Rumanian Central Institute of Statistics said, "Our results cannot be compared with preceding situations." The relatively few statistics which have been published by the Groza regime since 1945 are highly tendentious and suspect.

In short, any attempt at rigorous quantitative precision in discussing Rumanian agriculture seems hopeless. Although in the pages that follow a good deal of numerical data has been included, I have used it cautiously and with a painful awareness of its weaknesses and dangers.

Undoubtedly, my general attitude toward Rumania has been fundamentally determined by my own experiences while in that country during the first year after the armistice of September, 1944. To balance these subjective impressions, which have led to bias and unwarranted generalizing in so much of the writing about eastern Europe and the Balkans, I have checked my conclusions with as many primary sources as possible. These are discussed in a bibliographical note at the end of this study. Needless to say, the events of the past five years have compelled modification and in some cases rejection of my earlier opinions. But then, the writer of contemporary history can scarcely hope to build his house upon a rock.

1. Virgil Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești după războiul mondial.* (Bucarest, 1940), p. v.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

page 40

III

AGRICULTURAL POPULATION AND PRODUCTION

121 THE course of Rumanian politics between the wars can be understood only in its economic setting; urgent economic problems constantly demanded the attention of all governments, and at the same time the prevailing poverty and economic backwardness undermined political life and contributed powerfully to the emergence of the dictatorships. This and the following chapter sketch the general features of the economic framework, with particular emphasis upon agriculture and the demographic problem. Industry, commerce, and finance are considered primarily in their relation to the agrarian question.

Population [1]

161 According to the 1930 census, Rumania had a population of
162 18,057,028 persons, the largest of any state in eastern Europe with the exception of Poland. While the density, 61 persons per square kilometer in 1930, was less than that of the more highly industrialized states of western Europe, the population was increasing at a rapid rate. Rumania had one of the highest birth rates in non-Russian Europe as well as the highest death rate. In general, its population pattern resembled that of the other states of eastern Europe, especially Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Ukraine, and was in marked contrast to the stable or declining populations of the West.

163 Eastern Europe is now passing through the phase of great popu-
165 lation growth which began in England and western Europe in the eighteenth century and has since radiated eastward. This phenomenon, one of the most important in European history, appears to have followed a definite sequence: first, a high death rate and a high birth rate, more or less in balance, giving a stable or only slightly expanding population; then the death rate dropped rapidly; finally the birth rate dropped down to or below the death rate. The lag between the fall in the death rate and the subsequent fall in the birth rate produced the great expansion of population. From current evidence

1. More complete statistical information on the population is given in the Appendix.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 ED1 Rumania ED1

FOREWORD

By LORD MESTON

President of the Le Play Society

121 114 LET US ASK OURSELVES—students, busy workers, travellers, ordinary newspaper-reading stay-at-homes, whoever we are —what do we know about Roumania? Extraordinarily little, would be the honest answer of most of us. We know that Roumania was our ally in the Great War, and picked up some territory thereby. We believe that her language is nearer to Latin than any other European vernacular. We remember that her map is dotted with romantically-named provinces—Bessarabia, Moldavia, Transylvania and others. But there we halt. Encyclopaedias would tell us more, but encyclopaedias are dull things. Here is a little book without a dull page, which nevertheless tells us a very great deal.

It is the work of members of the Le Play Society, who employed a holiday tour in seeing Roumania for themselves. Trained observers most of them, they brought back a collection of fresh, first-hand studies of the country and its life. They show us the land as it now is, built up from its geological past. They tell us of the peoples who have dwelt in it since pre-historic times; of the tribes which have poured backwards and forwards across it; of the folk who inhabit it now, of their usages, their faiths and their social life. We learn about the agriculture of the land, its industries, its mineral resources, and its economic limits. Its trees and flowers and cottage gardens are described; its climate, and the gala dress of its peasantry. There are no politics, but one gets a glimpse of how political change has reacted on rural life and prosperity.

Running through all the various studies, and linking them together, is a thread which each of the workers recognises as of the essence of the pattern. That thread is the special interest of the geographer in all that he sees, his capacity

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 ED1 Rumania ED1

121
114

for tracking the constant inter-relation between Man and Nature. Without claiming, as has been claimed, that Geography is the oldest of the sciences, he follows its guidance in the sure confidence that it will explain the life and activities of a country as no other single science can do. Hence his affection for "regional studies," such as this of Roumania. Hence his ready appreciation of much in a country's anthropology, sociology, economics, which would otherwise be isolated and undigested knowledge.

This is the *raison d'être* of the Le Play Society. It has now produced a series of these small handbooks, all based on original expert observation on the spot, clothing the dry bones of the old geographies with the flesh and blood of life and its story. As contributions to our knowledge of the world, and as companions to the more formal text-books, they ought to be of special value to teachers and students; and they may safely be used as models for other regional work, whether on a similar or on a less ambitious scale. Those who find the handbooks helpful may wish to make the closer acquaintance of the Society and its methods.

There is another aspect of the Society's work which appeals strongly to me personally. Having watched for years the *va et vient* at Geneva, where men and women of different nations are constantly mixing in work and in pleasure, I cannot overstate the value of kindly human intercourse as a solvent of international problems. Barriers have to be broken down before mankind get to know and understand their fellows: and there is nothing for levelling barriers like crossing frontiers. Friendly excursions such as those of the Le Play groups, intent only on studying and understanding the ways of other peoples and their problems, can do great good. To show interest in other people's lives is surely to generate mutual sympathy; and mutual sympathy is the only sure foundation for world peace. All success therefore to the Le Play Society and its members.

MESTON

the majority limits its enquiries to the policies of their rulers and the significance of their resources in terms of power politics. In the long run it is the mode of life and outlook of their peoples which will count for most and herein lies the value of the Le Play "Studies" as portraying the present phase of adjustment to environment.

THE appearance of this survey is particularly opportune. Roumania is rapidly acquiring a new significance in the chequer-board of Europe, and with its complex geographical relationships, its mixed inheritance, its strikingly contrasted but interdependent natural regions and its predominantly peasant population, needs precisely this method of investigation for its interpretation to western students. The present volume supplements an earlier study of life in the Eastern Carpathians by an analysis of a typical Wallachian district and of the important transhumant movement which has long linked the economy of Mountain and Plain.—This detailed survey is preceded by an admirable exposition of the wider European setting of Roumanian life.

P. M. ROXBY

19th December, 1938.

THE ARGEŞ DISTRICT

101 133 THE EXTENDED ROUMANIA, that was organised after 1918 includes the old areas of Wallachia, Dobrogea, Moldavia, Bessarabia, Bukovina, Transylvania and Timişoara, of varied allegiance before the World War, but all containing from early historic times onwards a proportion of Roumanian-speaking people. Transylvania is the mountain bastion with the eastern Carpathians as its eastern boundary, the southern Carpathians or Transylvanian Alps as its southern edge, and the western Roumanian Carpathians or Bihor, etc., mountains on its western flank. Its mountainous frame and its hilly interior give it a very decidedly upland character, even if the Olt, the Maroş and the Szamoş, which drain it, have considerable systems of tributary valleys. Outside the bastion to the east Bukovina and Moldavia slope down to the great plain of eastern Europe, of which Bessarabia forms the flank west of the Dniestr. Behind the bastion to the west Timişoara stretches down to the Tisza, and forms the south-eastern flank of the middle Danubian plain. Outside the bastion on the south is Wallachia, sloping down towards the lower Danube, while beyond the considerable barrier formed by the lowest portion of the Danube and to the south-east, is the low plateau area of the Dobrogea.

[113] IN A PREVIOUS study we gave in some measure a picture of rural life in the eastern Carpathians near the border between Transylvania and Moldavia, where the mountains barely reach 1,900 m. (say 6,200 feet), and the highest land is often in great expanses of pasture with deep valleys cut by the rival drainage systems of the two sides, which are separated by a number of passes that may indent the watershed. In the eastern Carpathians Roumanians and Szeklers, respectively Uniate and Roman Catholic, live in adjacent villages, and the former, especially, send flocks and herds to the highland pastures.

121 THIS STUDY is intended to deal more especially with what is thought to be a typical area of rural Wallachia, having an almost entirely Roumanian population attached to the Orthodox Church and living under circumstances differing

121 considerably from those of the eastern Carpathians; this area is the district focusing upon Curtea de Argeş.

101 WALLACHIA has already been described as the land stretching
133 from the southern Carpathians or Transylvanian Alps to the Danube. The mountains themselves are largely of metamorphosed rock with flanking Miocene deposits; they are about 40 km. wide with the sharp main ridge (rising at Negoiu to 2,544 m. or 8,331 feet) parallel to the long flanks about 11 km. from the northern and 29 km. from the southern edge. Several rivers have worked their valleys out among the mountains in a direction parallel to the ridge and the edges.

133 THERE ARE huge accumulations of pebbly, often deltaic, outwash beyond the south flank of the mountains, the layers sloping southward and giving sunward dip-slopes separated by small northward-facing scarps, the woods of which contrast with the arable lands on the dip-slopes. This pebbly outwash is deeply dissected by southward-flowing consequent streams, some of which rise in it, while others, like the Argeş, penetrate the mountain wall, making a wild narrow gorge. In the deep valleys of the pebbly material houses shelter from the north winds. The Olt has cut right through the mountains and captured a subsequent river of the northern flank, and its way through the mountains is by a deep valley, which is wider in some sections that are more or less "subsequent"
133 and narrower in others that are rather "consequent." At
361 about 20-25 km. southward from the mountain wall the residual hills of loose material that stand out between the consequent valleys milden down; the amount of alluvium and the breadth of the river valleys increase and it becomes possible to bridge the rivers, so it is at about this distance from the mountains that have grown the towns of Ramnicu Valcea on the Olt and Curtea de Argeş on the Argeş. Ramnicu Valcea is at the last narrowing of the Olt before it begins to braid on a broad alluvial plain, and its site is not easily defensible. The Argeş has terraces near the stream on the eastern side at the bridge, and the river has already swung against this bank some 2 km. north of the bridge. This gives defensible positions as well as facilities for bridging, and helps to account for the historic, if somewhat localised, importance of the town of Curtea de Argeş, the focus of the region of which studies were made.

H. J. F.
E. E. E.

175
648

census taker but by the free statement of each inhabitant; it is confirmed by the consonance of the findings whether taking race, language or religion as criteria, as well as by comparison with the official population statistics of Austria-Hungary and Russia.

121

Inasmuch as the Award of Vienna was necessarily an expedient, I have thought it useful to give here a comprehensive abstract of Romania's racial figures together with historical outlines of her border regions, in the conviction that no lasting solution of European unrest could afford to disregard or minimize the racial realities of the continent's perennial danger zones.

C. U. C.

North Hatley, P. Q.
October 20, 1941.

798 for their establishment was to be done by Order of the Cabinet.
659 No motivation was required if the Cabinet decided to repeal a previously issued authorization.

Finally, the fight against sects (suspected of spying for the enemy) reached its climax by the Law No. 431 of July 9, 1943, which forbade the practice of religions other than the "historical denominations", specified by the Law No. 54 of 1928. The Government was empowered to suppress, by order of the Cabinet, the spreading of a specific sectarian cult and to expropriate its assets.

The further fate of all those laws and decrees is discussed infra.

● 128 A few words seem to be appropriate to explain the organization of material dealing with the status of individual churches. In the present part of the study devoted to the period before World War II, only the status of the Romanian Church, of the Roman Catholic Church and of the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church is discussed.

The problem of the status of other religious groups acquired special significance only after World War II. Therefore, even the historical aspect of these denominations is treated in the third part of the present study dealing with the communist period (see infra III, 5).

795 2. Organization of the Romanian Orthodox Church
659 After World War I the unification and reorganization of the Romanian Orthodox Church became a stringent necessity because,

IV.—PEOPLES AND SETTLEMENTS: EARLY TIMES

131 THE POSITION OF ROUMANIA with its mountain ramparts forming an outpost of central Europe, over against the south Russian steppe on the one hand and the Balkan peninsula on the other, has been emphasised in a brief review of its features and relief and climate. The same fact of position is most important in the study of its human relations throughout history, and here it is necessary to emphasise once more that relations between the south Russian and Hungarian plains in the far past have been carried on *via* the Carpathian passes rather than by the Iron Gates which may well have been impassable until Trajan's engineering feat made a platform along the right bank, and the temporariness of that construction suggests that the grim defile did not remain in use. To what extent some detours not very far away may have been utilised at various periods is a matter for research.

172 174 TOO LITTLE is known concerning Roumania in the Old Stone Age to permit of any useful discussion, but the country was much affected when, in the relatively short Neolithic period heralding the advent of metal, a cultivating population was spreading westward through central Europe. It is a matter for further research to decide to what extent south Russia and to what extent Thrace were routes of this first peasant [177] civilisation in its spread westwards. The earliest agriculturists of Roumania, in their equipment, show relationships or participation of ideas with contemporaries in the Ukraine, in the Balkan peninsula, including Vinça near Belgrade, and Thessaly, and in north Hungary, Roumania yielding specially important material from Cucuteni, near Iaşi, from Erösd in the south-east of Transylvania, and from Tordos in central Transylvania on the upper Olt. The former has yielded figurines that are female and steatopygous, but without the large breasts and general development of fat that occur in some other centres. The pottery is painted, and on the whole it seems that, at this stage, the Ukraine was richer; we may well be dealing with a spread that was to some extent westward, using passes of the south-eastern Carpathians (Fig. 4). At the same time it should be borne in mind that the Olt, the Mureş and several other rivers of Transylvania yielded

E: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDI Rumania EDI

MEDICAL CONDITIONS AT CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

CURTEA DE ARGEŞ is a small town of 6,831 inhabitants (in 1930), situated in the valley of the River Argeş, at an altitude of 1,400 feet.

A SERIES of wells supply the town with water, there being no system of pipes to supply running water. The drainage system is necessarily of a primitive type, the dry closet type being the one in use.

THE TOWN possesses two hospitals:

(1) A general hospital with pavilion for epidemic cases.
(2) Home for incurables—a branch of a nerve clinic in Bucharest.

THE GENERAL HOSPITAL is situated in the centre of the town on a slight eminence, a few yards from the main street. It consists of two wards, one for men and one for women. The cases are mixed, medical and surgical cases being nursed in the same ward. There are fifteen beds for men and fifteen for women. In addition there are two small wards for clean surgical cases, each containing two beds.

THE BEDS are of the usual hospital type, but placed close together about three feet apart. The mattresses and pillows are stuffed with straw and are very hard. The patients wear their own clothes. This being summer, less than one half of the beds were in use. The villagers refuse to come to hospital in summer, when there is work to be done in the fields, unless in cases of stern necessity. A belief in witchcraft and secret remedies is prevalent, so that progress as regards treatment is hampered. Epidemics of dysentery and typhoid are common. Tuberculosis is widespread, and goitre is found in all the villages in this valley. Cretinism in the children is untreated, and most villages contain cases. No medication of the water supply is undertaken. Pulmonary tuberculosis is treated in sanatoria, but other cases of tuberculosis are admitted here. Cancer is also common, but is not dealt with here—the cases are sent to Bucharest for radium treatment.

ECONOMICS

GEOGRAPHIC and ETHNOGRAPHIC NOTES.

131 Rumania has an area of 294,967 square kilometers, approximately larger than that of Italy, and owing to its circular form has proportionately to its surface a very short stretch of frontiers, only 2,669 Km.—which are mainly formed by natural features. It is situated between the 43-rd and 49-th degrees north latitude and 20° and 31° east longitude. The highlands of the Maramureş separate Rumania from Czechoslovakia, but there is no clearly defined frontier between Rumania and Poland. The river Dniester constitutes the frontier with Russia for a distance of some 700 Km. To the east Rumania is bounded by the Black Sea for a distance of 277 miles. It is separated from Bulgaria partly by an artificial frontier across the Dobrudja, and partly by the Danube for a distance of about 450 Km. The latter river also provides a partial boundary with Yugoslavia to the south, while to the west the frontier separating Rumania from Yugoslavia and Hungary is drawn through the plain of the river Theiss at about a distance of 30-40 Km. to the east of the latter. The country is divided into the following provinces :—

133 635 *Wallachia*, which is sub-divided by the river Olt into the district of Oltenia to the west and Muntenia to the east, the latter being separated from Moldavia by the river Sereth and its affluent, the Milkov. Oltenia is composed of a wide belt of hilly country bordered by the Danubian plain to the south, which, narrow at its western end, gradually broadens out to the east into the plain of the Baragan, considered to be the granary of Rumania and extending from the river Ialomitsa to the Sereth. Wallachia is watered by numerous rivers, which with the exception of the Olt, the source of which is in Transylvania, all rise in the southern Carpathians and flow into the Danube, the largest of them being the Jiu, Argesh, and Ialomitsa.

The Rumanian bank of the Danube, owing to its extreme flatness, is subject to inundations and forms a fringe of marshes and swamps extending along the whole length of the river to a width of some 20 Km. in some places. The

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

Austrians in 1775. Bucovina, in spite of its exiguousness in arable land—about one fourth of its surface being devoted to a variety of agricultural crops and orchards—is one of the most advanced agricultural regions of Rumania, maintaining in certain parts of the valleys of the Pruth and Sereth as dense a population as 300 inhabitants per square kilometre. Its forests are better preserved than those of the other provinces of the kingdom, thanks to the careful sylvan administration the Austrians had initiated. They cover 43% of the region and form the main source from which timber is obtained in Rumania, the river Sereth being used largely for floating down the logs to the Danubian port of Galatz, whence they are exported. When the Austrians annexed Bucovina in 1775 its population was only 72,000. Thanks to their excellent administration and their efforts to develop the country, its population had surpassed 800,000 when it was reunited to Rumania; the increase was due partly, however, to the Austrian attempt at denationalizing the country by settling Ruthenian immigrants. Cernauţi, better known as Czernowitz, is a modern town, beautifully planned and with all the amenities of a western city. The spirit of its inhabitants is distinctly occidental and reminds one of the mentality of Vienna, the more so, since they have distinct leanings towards Socialism owing to the preponderance of German culture. The town used to be an important centre of traffic between Galicia and Russia, but owing to the loss of its hinterland it seems as though struck with a sudden blight while in full prosperity. It has a population of 111,147, and constitutes the third largest town of Rumania.

Table showing population and area of provinces according to census of 1930.

	Population.	Area (sq. km.)
Wallachia	5,542,467	76,583.
Moldavia	2,413,123	38,058.
Bessarabia	2,865,506	44,422.
Bucovina	845,903	10,442.
Dobrudja	811,332	23,262.
Transylvania	3,217,149	102,200.
Maramureş and Crishana	1,387,675	
Banat	942,072	
Total population	18,025,237	Area .. 294,967.

A HISTORICAL OUTLINE

UNTIL 1940 Romania, a strong force for peace, contained within her boundaries all her historical domain and most of her people. In 1940, amid world-wide changes, she saw her racial and territorial unity shattered in a partition involving not less than one-third of her population of 20,000,000 and of her territory of 113,917 square miles. 131

The beneficiaries of this forcible division were Russia and Hungary.[1] 728 On July 3, 1940, following an ultimatum, Russia invaded northern Bucovina, part of the Moldavian county of Dorohoi, and all of Bessarabia, altogether some 17,000 square miles with upward of 3,750,000 inhabitants. On September 13, 1940, following the Vienna arbitration decision of August 30, Hungary occupied half of Romanian Transylvania, again some 17,000 square miles with almost 2,400,000 inhabitants.

The two squeezes from east and west, timed to coincide with the collapse of the last vestiges of the European system of regional guarantees, [186] could not be opposed by Romania. The retirement of her armies from Bucovina and Bessarabia reflected the realities of the situation, but did not imply a renunciation of her historic rights to the lost provinces, nor was this loss ratified formally by her parliament. On the contrary, Premier General Ion Antonescu, several times in his earliest official statements, reasserted Romania's claim to the whole of Transylvania; and less than one year later, on June 22, 1941, he led the Romanian armies in the liberation of Bucovina and Bessarabia.

The problems which the action of Russia and Hungary has restored to 000 an acute phase are as old as the ideologies that give them form. Heretofore, as local problems, they have been allowed to smolder under temporary solutions enforced in high-handed and arbitrary manner. Today, as obstacles to the peace and progress of the world, they have become world problems. As such they require a lasting solution that must accord with

[1] A rectification of the frontier of Dobrudja accepted by Romania and Bulgaria as a permanent settlement of the differences between them was effected by the treaty signed at Craiova September 7, 1940. The treaty provided for the return to Bulgaria of the two counties of Caliacra and Durostor ceded by her to Romania at Bucharest, July 27, 1913, at the end of the Balkan wars from which Bulgaria emerged with a net territorial gain of 6,052 sq. mi. Provision was also made for a wide exchange of populations. Bulgaria also undertook to pay Romania one billion lei as indemnity for losses resulting from the territorial transfer and to take over the maintenance of the Romanian graves and battle monuments dating from the 1877-78 war to which Bulgaria owes the restoration of her statehood.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p. 20

CHAPTER II

THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

/3/ The Kingdom of Greater Rumania which emerged
/6/ after the Peace Settlement of 1919 covered an area of about 118,000 square miles, which is more than Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and had a population of about 15,500,000. Greater Rumania comprised the Old Kingdom (Wallachia, Moldavia and the Northern Dobrudja) and the New Territories, namely the Eastern Banat, the Crisana, Maramures, Transylvania, the Bukovina, Bessarabia and the Southern Dobrudja.[1] In relation to the position before 1914 both the territory and population of Rumania had been doubled. Still more important, the Kingdom was transformed from a national State into a multi-national State.[2]

/33 The chief geographical features of Greater Rumania were the Carpathian Mountains, which sur-

[1] The Southern Dobrudja was Bulgarian up to the end of the Second Balkan War when it was ceded to Rumania; it was returned to Bulgaria by the Central Powers during the Great War, re-ceded to Rumania in 1919 and ceded again to Bulgaria in 1940.

/62 [2] The population of the Old Kingdom in 1915 was about 7,625,000. The population of Greater Rumania in 1920 was 15,541,000 and had risen by 1940 to over 20,000,000 (an average yearly increase of about 233,000). The most numerous of the minorities were the Hungarians and Szekelys of Transylvania and the western provinces; the Jews, living all over Rumania; the Germans, living in the Banat, Transylvania and Bessarabia; Ukrainians and Russians in the Bukovina and Bessarabia; Bulgarians in the Dobrudja, Bessarabia and the Banat; Turks, Tatars, Gypsies, Serbs, Poles, Armenians, Greeks, etc.

12: Kosmos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p 30

CHAPTER III

THE PROVINCES

000 *In this chapter each of the provinces of Greater Rumania is described separately and certain practical information is given about each. This will enable the reader, should he visit any province, to know the essential facts about it: it will also make it easier for the student of war to judge the effects of military operations upon each of the several parts of Rumania. The general reader may, however, prefer to complete the story of Rumania as a whole by proceeding to Chapter* IV *and continuing to the end of the book, before reverting to this more detailed chapter.*

THE REGAT

631 Greater Rumania was composed of ten historical and geographical units, which in their turn formed two groups: the Old Kingdom or the 'Regat', representing the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia and the province of Dobrudja; and the New Territories, acquired after the Great War and partly lost in 1940. Of the two groups the New Territories contained both a greater area and a more numerous population than the Regat.[1] Historically and economically the most important and the greatest in area of all the territories of the Old

131
161

[1] The area of the New Territories covered 157,000 square kilometres (about 62,800 square miles), that is, 53 % of the total. The population of the New Territories in 1939 was 9,425,000 compared with just over 9,000,000 of the Old Kingdom. However, over half of all arable land was situated in the Regat.

'2: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[oltenia]

Kingdom is Wallachia, which is formed by Oltenia and Muntenia.

OLTENIA. Oltenia is the western part of the principality of Wallachia. Its boundaries are, in the west and north the Carpathians, in the east the River Olt, and in the south the Danube. The province covers an area of about 9,640 square miles and has a population of about 1,900,000. The soil of the sub-Carpathian hills consists of sand and clay and gravel and is well watered by numerous rivulets. Here are some densely populated valleys, bordered by rich forests and grazing grounds. Farther south and extending to the Danube lies the fertile plain composed of the rich 'yellow earth'. Its character is similar to that of the lowlands of Muntenia, but it lies on a higher level and also has a higher rainfall.

The richest district of this fertile province is the *judet*[1] of Dolj in the south-western corner of Oltenia. From here, and the similarly fertile *judets* of Mehedinti and Romanati, also on the northern bank of the Danube, high-quality maize and wheat have been exported for many years. From the hilly country farther north fruit is the chief export. In the mountainous districts forestry provides the main occupation for the local inhabitants. There is much sheep-breeding, for the grassy slopes provide good grazing.

Apart from the Danube the two most important rivers of Oltenia are the Jiu and the Olt; the latter rises in Transylvania and enters Oltenia through the Red Tower Pass. Oltenia is not rich in mineral resources. There is, however, oil at Govora, west of

[1] Administrative unit.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Oltenia]

[Muntenia]

The Danubian ports of Calafat and Corabia handle 361
wheat exports and also have some valuable industries.

MUNTENIA. To the east of the River Olt extends 133
Muntenia, the other province of Wallachia. It [131]
covers an area of about 20,600 square miles and has
a population of about 4,500,000. The southern and [161]
eastern boundaries of the province are formed by the Danube, the northern frontier by the Carpathians. The land surface and climate of Muntenia are similar to those of Oltenia, but the hilly region south of the Carpathians is narrower. The fertile steppes, Baragan, Burnas, Gavan and Burdeas, are situated on the northern banks of the Danube which floods the adjoining districts and forms many lakes and marshes. The highest peaks of the Carpathians in Muntenia are the Negoi and the Moldovan, both over 7,500 ft. The most important of the many rivers descending from the high mountains are the Dambovita, Jalomita, Arges and Buzau, all of which
eventually flow into the Danube. The endless maize [311]
and wheat fields of Muntenia are covered in summer with heavy crops and on the steppes great flocks of sheep find their food. In spite of very dry summers and icy winters like those of Russia this region is one of the richest of Rumania and the whole of Europe.

Muntenia differs from all Rumanian provinces in [135]
that, in addition to stock breeding, the raising of high-quality crops, fishery and forestry, it possesses a source of wealth which is not found in such abundance in any other part of Europe, the oil fields of Campina and Ploesti. There the hilly, wooded 361
countryside suddenly changes into a modern in-

8

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bucarest]

[The Dobrudja]

Bucarest is also the chief railway centre of Rumania. 361

Giurgiu on the Danube, south of Bucarest and the terminus of one of the oil pipe-lines from Ploesti, is one of the main Rumanian wheat and oil ports. Another Danubian port, where great quantities of wheat are handled, is Braila with a population of about 70,000.

There are no natural barriers to communications in Muntenia. In the south the chief flow of traffic is carried by the Danube. Rail and road communications from Transylvania pass through the Predeal and a railway line leads over the Danube to the Dobrudja. 505 491 496

THE DOBRUDJA (Dobrogea[R]).[1] Up till 1878 the whole of the Dobrudja belonged to Bulgaria. Ever since, this province has been a bone of contention between Rumania and Bulgaria. The northern part of the Dobrudja was awarded to Rumania in 1878 to compensate her for the loss of Southern Bessarabia to Russia. The southern part of the province was ceded by Bulgaria after her defeat at the hands of her neighbours in the Second Balkan War in 1913. This region was returned to Bulgaria in 1940. 175

Geographically the Dobrudja is the north-eastern corner of the Balkan Peninsula. Its boundaries are in the north and west the Danube and in the east the Black Sea. There are three distinct regions: the delta of the Danube, the forests of Babadag, and farther south the steppe, which is the most fertile 131 133

[1] The letter R, H or G following a geographical term denotes a Rumanian, Hungarian or German name, respectively.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Dobrudja]

131 part of the Dobrudja. The delta of the Danube is
133 formed by the three arms Chilia, Sulina and St George. It includes an area of about 1,000 square miles, in which water and land, marshes, lakes and
[503] islands feed an almost tropical vegetation. The chief communications through the delta are provided by the Sulina canal and by causeways.

311 The steppes of the Southern Dobrudja yield good
135 crops of wheat and maize, and the pastures maintain great herds of sheep. Mineral resources are confined to some unworked coal deposits, valuable copper near Altantepe, and sulphur.

131 The Dobrudja is about 9,300 square miles in all:
161 of this some 2,960 square miles were returned to Bulgaria in 1940. The population of the province as a whole is about 850,000. Its main value to the contesting States lies in the Black Sea stretch of
504 coast. The port of Constanza, the greatest and most
361 important on the western shores of the Black Sea, has modern harbour works built at the beginning of this century and covering an area of 60 hectares. It was through Constanza that Rumanian exports used to pass to France and Great Britain. The docks of Constanza are about 30 ft. deep and can, therefore, be used by large, sea-going ships. The harbour facilities include storage buildings for wheat and oil-tanks with a capacity for over 200,000 cubic metres of fuel, which are fed by the pipe-lines coming from Ploesti. Oil can moreover be pumped straight from the pipe-lines simultaneously into four tankers. Another great advantage is that the port is
361 completely ice-free all the winter. Constanza is the administrative centre of the Dobrudja and also a well-known seaside resort. Rail communications

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Dobrudja]

[Moldavia]

with the rest of Rumania are provided by the line 361
Constanza-Cernavoda-Bucarest.

MOLDAVIA (Moldova[R]). The second of the two 131 ●
original Rumanian principalities is only half as big 161
as Wallachia and its population is about half. Moldavia covers an area of about 15,280 square miles, and is inhabited by about 2,500,000 Rumanians, Jews, Hungarians, Slavs and Germans.

Owing to its geographical position Moldavia was 175
more exposed to Polish, Russian and also Hungarian influence than Wallachia. After the death of the *voivode* Stephen the Great in 1504, the country became part of the Turkish dominions. From then onwards Moldavia shared the fate of Wallachia. Russian influence, however, naturally made itself felt in greater intensity in Moldavia. The independence of the principality was restored under John Cuza who eventually became the first ruler of the United Principalities.

The western boundaries of Moldavia are formed 131
by the Carpathians. In the south the province borders on Muntenia and in the north on the Bukovina, which originally was part of Moldavia. The eastern frontier is formed by the River Pruth. The 133
western part of Moldavia consists of the slopes of the Carpathian Mountains and the hill region below. Farther east the country flattens out into the plains which are bordered by the valley of the Pruth. The most fertile districts lie on the western bank of the Pruth and in the eastern corner of the province. The hills, which reach heights of 1,800 ft., are wooded. But there is much fertile soil which produces wheat and maize. There are also vineyards

361 Another important town, and the greatest Ru-
504 manian port on the Danube, is Galati with a population of about 75,000. Galati lies about a hundred miles from the Black Sea, but the harbour is so placed that sea-going ships can enter the port through the delta and anchor there all through the ice-free period. From Galati timber, wheat and maize from all over Rumania are sent abroad. Incoming cargoes of industrial goods are unloaded there.

[496] The only line leading directly to Transylvania goes over the Ghimes Pass. The traffic to Bessarabia is carried by four railway lines.

THE NEW TERRITORIES

131 The New Territories, acquired by Rumania after
175 the war of 1914–18 and partly lost since 1940, cover
[161] an area of 62,800 square miles and were inhabited in 1940 by about 10,500,000 people. The Banat, the Crisana, Maramures and Transylvania formed, up to 1918, parts of Hungary; the Bukovina belonged to Austria, and Bessarabia was taken from Russia. Many parts of the New Territories were agriculturally and industrially better developed than the Old Kingdom.

131 THE BANAT. The Rumanian part of the Banat covers
161 an area of about 7,400 square miles and has a population of 1,000,000. The province is bordered in the north by the River Mures[R] (Maros[H], Marosch[G]), in the west by the Yugoslav part of the Banat, in the south by the Danube, and in the east by the Car-
000 pathians. The north-western part of the province is

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Banat]

[The Crisana]

The high quality of the crops in this province, 241
amongst them wheat, maize, rye, oats, and the high 134
standard of animal breeding, have made the Banat known far beyond the borders of Rumania. The fertility of the soil is due partly to the 'black earth' which, in a greater or lesser degree, is a component of all the arable land. Apart from being an important agricultural region, the Banat possesses valuable industries, forests and minerals. Iron ore and coal 316
are mined in the area of Resita and Anina, where 327
there are great iron and steel works which produce 315
railway equipment and armaments. The Danubian port of Orsova, guarding the western entrance to the 'Iron Gates', also has an oil refinery.

The capital of the Banat is Timisoara[R] (Temes- 361
var[H]) on the Bega with a population of 100,000. In Roman times the fortress of Ripensia was situated here. In Hunyadi's time it was a centre of resistance against the Turks, only second in importance to Belgrade. To-day the town is a great rail and road junction with many factories, banks, commercial houses and cultural institutions. Lugoj, on the Timis, with a population of 20,000, and Caransebes, north of the Porta Orientalis which leads through the mountains of the Banat to the Danube, are marketing towns of some importance.

THE CRISANA AND MARAMURES. Geographically the 131
Crisana is the eastern borderland of the Hungarian [161]
plain. The province covers an area of about 8,400 square miles and has a population of just under 1,500,000. The Crisana lies between Transylvania in the east, the River Mures (Maros[H]) in the south; Hungary (as reduced by the Treaty of the Trianon)
in the west and Czechoslovakia in the north.

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

563 leges. In 1919 they accepted the union of Transylvania with the Old Kingdom. In the inter-war period the Germans in Rumania enjoyed a far better treatment than any other minority, and in Transylvania they were by far the most prosperous community. Nevertheless, the pan-German policy of National-Socialism found many supporters in their ranks.

131 648 [161] *Vienna Award.* Before the Vienna Award of 1940 Transylvania covered an area of 24,600 square miles and had a population of over 3,250,000, including 200,000 Jews. The decision of the German and Italian Foreign Ministers in Vienna split Transylvania in two, a measure never before carried out during the eventful history of the principality and certainly harmful and unjust to all the parties concerned. There is no doubt that this 'solution', which has only complicated the Transylvanian question and made its real solution more difficult, was made deliberately in order to make both Hungary and Rumania more dependent on Germany's support.

133 *Geography and Products.* The Transylvanian highlands are surrounded on three sides by the high mountain chains of the Carpathians. In the south-west the border is formed by the 'Western Mountains' (Muntii Apuseni), and in the north-west by the hills which eventually merge into the Hungarian plain. The Rivers Mures, Somes and Tarnava divide the highland in three distinct parts, the steppe, the hills and the forests. Parallel with the outer ring of the Eastern Carpathians there runs a belt of volcanic mountains with many small valleys. In the south-east there is the fertile and hilly district of Trei-

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Bukovina]

rule. It was occupied by the Russians in 1769. In 1774 the province was given to Austria, under which it remained until 1918. On 23 October the Austrian governor handed over the Bukovina to the Ukrainian inhabitants of the province; but four days later an assembly of Rumanian Bukovinians declared for the union of the province with Rumania and asked the Rumanian government for military assistance. This was forthcoming on 11 November and added to Rumania a territory of about 4,100 square miles with a population of about 870,000 (1930). Of these over 38% were Ukrainians, 34% Rumanians and 21% Germans and German-speaking Jews. The Rumanian administration began by a vigorous policy of Rumanization. The Ukrainians, who under Austrian rule had been well treated, and the Jews, were the chief sufferers, but the Germans, too, were ousted from many of their positions.[1]

175 685 [131] 162 563

More than half of the Bukovina is covered with dense forests of beech;[2] one-fifth consists of pastures; less than a third is arable land. The province borders in the west on the Carpathians, in the south on Moldavia, in the east on Moldavia and Bessarabia and in the north on Poland. The western part of the Bukovina is formed by the slopes of the Carpathians, where manganese and iron ore are found, especially in the region of Jacobeni. To the east stretches the hilly country, covered with pastures, on which good livestock is raised, and fields of maize, wheat and tobacco. Mineral resources are confined to some small deposits of coal, gold and lead, but the industry of the province is well developed.

131 311 135

[1] The German University of Czernowitz was completely Rumanized soon after the military occupation.

[2] The German name of the province means 'Land of the Beeches'.

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Bukovina]

[Bessarabia]

000 small deposits of coal, gold and lead, but the industry of the province is well developed.

361 The capital of the Bukovina is Czernowitz (Cernauti[R]) with over 100,000 inhabitants. The town is situated on a high hill near the Pruth and is a great commercial centre. Here branches of the Austrian banks and some big Viennese businesses remained. The population of Czernowitz, like that of the rest of the province, is very mixed. Economically important as a junction of several trade-routes, Czernowitz has also become a great industrial town during the last fifty years.

648 In June 1940 the Northern Bukovina, including Czernowitz, altogether about 2,260 square miles, was ceded by Rumania to the U.S.S.R. Thereby over 550,000 people, mostly Ukrainians and many Jews, became Soviet citizens.

131 **BESSARABIA.** For over twenty years the province of
161 Bessarabia was the eastern frontier region of Greater Rumania. It covers an area of 17,760 square miles and has a population of 3,000,000.[1] Bessarabia is surrounded by natural frontiers: in the north and east by the River Dniester, in the south by the Black Sea and the Danube, and in the west by the Pruth.

133 The north of Bessarabia is formed by a highland about 1,000 ft. high, consisting of fertile arable land which belongs to the 'black-earth' region of the Ukraine. The central area is hilly country, divided

[1] To which were added 120,000 Polish and Ukrainian villagers transplanted from Eastern Poland by the Soviet authorities shortly before their retreat before the German attack in 1941.

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

648 6,250,000.[1] Greater Rumania had ceased to exist.

668 **THE FLIGHT OF THE KING.** The territorial losses and the disintegration of Greater Rumania were only the outward signs of internal decay. The vigour and strength of the people, however, were not yet broken. The cession of Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina aroused feelings which fortified the popular movement. Demonstrations were held in all the big Rumanian towns demanding the abdication of Carol and the creation of a truly democratic government. At the same time territorial concessions to Hungary were opposed; and when it became known that the Vienna Award was to be accepted, in spite of the vigorous protests of almost all well-known Rumanian statesmen, police and soldiers had to be employed against thousands of indignant demonstrators in order to maintain 'peace and order'.

Popular discontent and fury against the king were cleverly exploited by the Right Wing. The Iron Guard, whose opposition to his personal rule was well known, turned the popular feeling to good account. They were the loudest in demanding the abdication of Carol, but naturally not in order to enable the formation of a democratic regime. This

131 162 [1] The remaining territory covered an area of less than 80,000 square miles; the population had shrunk to about 14,000,000. Official Rumanian figures state that Rumania's population in 1942 was over 16,000,000, of which over 13,000,000 lived on the land (Wallachia, 6,200,000; Moldavia, 2,800,000; Bessarabia, 2,700,000; Bukovina, 800,000; Dobrudja (without Southern Dobrudja), 500,000; Rumanian Transylvania, 2,400,000; Banat, 1,000,000).

TERRITORIAL LOSSES

728 In 1940 Rumania suffered serious loss of territory. First in August, Bessarabia and the Northern Bucovina were occupied by the Russians, then a few weeks later Northern Transylvania was given to Hungary by the Vienna Award, following which the Southern Dobruja was ceded to Bulgaria by the Treaty of Craiova. However, in 1941, Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina were regained, so that the loss of these territories was of only temporary significance.

[151] [16]

Territory	*Area sq. km.*	*Population in millions*	*Date of Loss*
Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina	50,000	3.3	*August*, 1940
Northern Transylvania	43,700	2.75	*Sept.*, 1940
Southern Dobruja	7,700	0.38	*Sept.*, 1940

The temporary loss of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina had serious repercussions on the economic situation of the country, which were of wider effect than might be supposed from the limited time of the annexation, because of the loss of the harvests of both 1940 and 1941, the "scorched earth" policy of the Russians and the dislocation of the transport system caused by the necessary re-conversion to standard European gauge from the Russian gauge.

The cession of Northern Transylvania, apart from the mere physical loss of territory and population, caused a severe disruption of the economic system on account of the valuable raw materials involved, and the loss of industry which had been built up on the basis of these raw materials. The capital invested in industry in this area represented some 13 per cent. of total investments in industry in the whole country. The main features were the mineral resources of the Baia Mare district, containing lead, zinc, gold, silver and small quantities of copper, with lead-refining plants attached. In this area deposits of pyrites were fairly considerable and supplied the bulk

728 12.5

[5a]

II.—CLIMATE IN THE CARPATHIANS

132 IN CLIMATE, as in structure, the Carpathian region is related both to Western Europe and to the steppe lands farther east, but it is essentially continental with the characteristic cold winter and hot summer, and usually a maximum of rainfall in June, delayed at Vatra Dornei (Dorna Vatra) until July. Dorohoi (Dorohoiu)—4.2° C.; Cernauţi (Czernowitz) —5.1° C.; and Vatra Dornei—6.4° C., have specially low mean monthly temperatures for January, the last named owing its low figure especially to its height (789 m.) above sea level, a fact which helps to account for its five months (Nov.-March) with mean monthly temperatures below freezing point as against three (Dec.-Feb.) in the other cases. On the Transylvanian side both Cluj and Sibiu (Hermannstadt) also have three months (Dec.-Feb.) with mean monthly temperatures below freezing point. On both sides of the Carpathians the mean monthly temperature is highest in July with figures round about 19.5° C. save in the case of Vatra Dornei which is considerably higher than the other stations named and has a maximum mean temperature of 14.2° C. delayed until July. Out towards the Russian plain the Dec.-Feb. period below freezing point and the January mean monthly temperature approximately correspond, allowing for difference of altitude. Iaşi, at 100 metres, has —3.3° C. in January and Chişinau (Kishinev), at 96 metres, has —4.0° C., but there the summer maximal mean monthly temperatures are higher and later, 21.2° C. at Iaşi and 21.9° C. at Chişinau, both in July with a continuation of these hot conditions into August. Chişinau has mean monthly temperatures below freezing point for four months (Nov.-Feb.). Beneath the south-eastern Carpathians at Focşani there are as before three months of frost, and the highest mean monthly temperature is 21.7° C. for July with a continuation of hot conditions into August. The range of mean monthly temperatures during the year is usually 23° C. to 25° C. but is lower, for lack of prolonged summer heat, at such a place as Vatra Dornei. Differences in temperature related to height-differences are as usual far more marked in summer than in winter in many cases, as in winter the inner valleys of the highlands may have long periods of intense cold if they are narrow and shaded from

●32 the sun's rays and so may be much colder, especially during calm periods which are frequent, than places with southward aspect on the hills above: on occasion a difference of 20° C. has been noted. Places out in the opener lands towards Russia feel the winter cold of the steppe spreading westward, but both these and places in shut-in valleys may be very dry. The high pastures have a good deal of snow in winter and are nearly forsaken at that season but, when the snow melts in spring, growth sets in rapidly, and the change of season is [137] sudden. Out east in the opener lands there is, however, for a while a danger of the sudden recurrence of frost (the Ice Saints in the Russian steppe), a fact which helps to limit the eastward extension of the beech tree almost as much as does the summer heat, for both these conditions are specially harmful to the delicate beech leaves. Roumania is thus on the eastern limit of the general European distribution of the beech which is one of the characteristic plants of western and central Europe and is absent from Russia, save the Crimea and parts of the Caucasus region. It is important to note that winter cold is not an important factor of this distribution as the beech grows on the higher slopes of the Carpathians under severe conditions.

A MONTH with an average of less than 25 mm. (or 1 inch) of rain or the equivalent in snow is very rare save at Cernauţi, Dorohoi, Vatra Dornei and Chişinau in winter especially January. The summer maximum is in June at Dorohoi (102 mm.); at Cernauţi June and July both average 94 mm.; at Vatra Dornei June has 129 and July 135 mm. On the west side of the Carpathians, at Cluj and Sibiu, for example, the June rainfall is the highest (111-114 mm.), and the figures show a tendency to rather more rain in April and May as well as in July and August than on the east side. The annual totals on both sides of the Carpathians in the latitude of most of the places named may be said to vary between 550 and 750 mm. Farther south, on the east side, at Focşani, for example, the June rainfall attains only 82 mm. average, and May and July have 60 mm. and 57 mm. respectively; further, the annual total is just 550 mm. and at Buzau (Buzeu) rather farther south it diminishes to 476 mm., and at Constanţa to 381 mm. At Vatra Dornei it may rain on nearly half the days of the year, at Buzau on hardly a quarter. At Vatra Dornei, moreover, precipitation may be

132 in the form of snow during any month save July or August. Thunderstorms are frequent in the afternoons during June and July but they rarely occur from November to March. Thunderstorm rain is thus a feature of summer in the Carpathians.

ON THE MOUNTAINS the winter anticyclonic calms often give clear skies while the spring and to some extent the summer until July are apt to be cloudy. Air may stream from the anticyclone on the heights to Wallachia and southern Moldavia and the Black Sea, so north-westerly winds are a marked feature in these lower lands in winter. In Transylvania though summer has most rain December is the cloudiest and August the clearest month.

IT IS CUSTOMARY to draw attention to the complete absence of the climatic conditions that are apt to prevail near the Mediterranean Sea. Roumania is emphatically un-Mediterranean in climate. Its relation is with western Europe on the one hand and the Russian steppe on the other. If a period of greater cold or increased precipitation, or both, supervened, the Carpathians could well develop a permanent snow cap, and it has been stated in the last section that there are cirques on some of the heights indicating that this has happened in the past. It would be very interesting to know whether any developments in this direction occurred during the cold, wet period of the west about 700 B.C. On the whole perhaps the indications are that the winters would have been harder rather than wetter to any great extent, but this phase may well have been followed by one in which, before warmer conditions were re-established, there was a lot of rain. During the Pleistocene Age, in one or other, probably in one of the later, of the glacial phases, if not in more, there must have been glaciers in the high lands with enormous amounts of flowing water in the immediately post-glacial stages. On the other hand, if a period of reduced rainfall, and perhaps greater summer heat, supervened, steppe conditions and æolian deposits would easily become a feature of Roumania, and there are abundant indications of their importance in the country at some early periods; loess is widely distributed not only in eastern Wallachia, the southern and eastern Dobrogea and middle Moldavia, but also in some of the drier upland valleys such as that of the upper Olt.

241 It will be seen that structure and climate conspire together
132 to encourage a scheme of summer utilisation of high pastures
221 combined with valley cultivation that was much enriched when the maize plant was introduced, but this was not so long ago, and the older régime was none too prosperous both because of climatic troubles in the highlands and especially the sensitiveness of the wheat plant to abnormal seasons, and because of the hindrances to organisation arising from the diversities of language between governments and
371 subjects. The encouragement of industry was not easy while some lignite and a little coal were the main sources of power, but later on it became possible to use abundant petroleum and natural gas and we have yet to see, in the
565 next generation, what influence they may have. Up to the
241 present, however, a true peasantry survives, and has increased its hold on the soil; it still makes at home a great proportion of what it needs, it still finds that in the hills the maize crop may not ripen, and old communal schemes relating to the high pastures remain important.

VI.—ECONOMIC ROUMANIA

AGRICULTURE.

311 162 MODERN ROUMANIA is essentially an agricultural state, as was the Old Kingdom (43 to 46 per cent of the land being arable and 22 per cent forest, whilst over 80 per cent of the population of 18 millions are agricultural workers), although it has valuable potentialities for the development of industry.

132 241 134 ARRANGED in zones round the bastion of the southern and eastern Carpathian highlands, the main agricultural regions of post-war Roumania exhibit, according to aspect and altitude, a considerable variety of climatic conditions, which is reflected in a varying emphasis in the selection of crops raised. In general, we may say that the continental nature of the climate and the resulting succession from north to south and from highland to lowland of soils, graded from poor ashen-grey podsol in the Carpathians through oak-forest loams to a rich chernoziom in the south-eastern Danube plains, has resulted, wherever the ground is sufficiently level, in a concentration on grain production. The heavier rainfall of the uplands, the relatively great humidity and shelter from the driving winds that sweep across the open plains, coupled with the exposure of less [137] fertile rocks—granites and coarse sandstones—explains the large area of forested land (24.5 per cent, nearly 7¼ million hectares) in those districts that extend into the Carpathian highlands.

243 OF THE 13 odd million hectares of arable land, cereals occupy some 37 to 39 per cent. Production varies greatly from year to year and from district to district. In the old kingdom of Wallachia-Moldavia, maize is by far the heaviest crop, particularly in Oltenia, where the summer rainfall is heavier. It is also the heaviest crop in Transylvania, the cultivated areas under maize, wheat, barley and oats being [262] respectively 4, 3, 2 and 1 million hectares. Maize is the staple crop of the peasant holder almost throughout the country, for it not only provides the bread cakes and the "mamaliga," maize pudding, the main food of the mass of the people, but also fodder for the cattle to eke out the hay in

133 material eroded therefrom being spread out fanwise along
361 the edge of the alluvium. Higher up, small alp-like terraces appear, giving place to precipitous slopes once more where calcareous rocks of Triassic and Jurassic age occur.

● 132 CONCERNING climate and vegetation little need be added to
361 the accounts already given of the Eastern Carpathians as a whole. In the case of climate the most important features to be borne in mind are the risk of late summer storms that limit the ripening period for grain, and the winter snowfall which creates a close season for agriculture.

THE VILLAGE.

361 CORBU has been tentatively classified as a "dispersed" type of village, though it is clear from the photographs (Plate IX) that the narrowness of the valley has rather limited the extent of the dispersion and has given rise to a plan resembling that of the "street village" of Western Europe. Closer examination, however, will reveal a certain looseness of structure, especially where a slight widening of the valley occurs near the confluence of a tributary stream, and it is very probable that if the same village had been founded in a broad flat upland area the houses would have been spread out as in Bilbor (see Plate I).

PEASANT HOUSES.

342 A GROUP of typical Roumanian farmsteads is illustrated in Plate X whilst the plan on page 67 shows in detail the lay-out of the one depicted on page 43. The principal features in each case are clear. The dwelling houses, of which there are frequently two to a farm, can usually be distinguished by their bright colour-washed walls. There is an abundance of local stone, but the crystalline rocks that are nearest to hand are very intractable, and, although they are employed for the foundations, the superstructure is almost invariably of wood. In Lower Borsec, which is just visible in the distance in Plate IX, an outcrop of Travertine provides a much more easily-worked material, and is very freely employed, but its use does not appear to extend into Corbu. The walls of the Corbu houses are usually built of roughly-squared, less frequently of sawn, timber, to which, in the better-class houses, laths are nailed to form a key for

FARMING AROUND CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

AMY R. BURGESS

133 IN THE region of Curtea de Argeş the river flows in a valley of varying width, floored with fine sandy alluvium and bounded by somewhat rounded hills. Some traces of river terraces are discernible.

THE LAND of this region can be divided into four categories: (*a*) arable, (*b*) hay meadows, (*c*) forest, (*d*) high mountain pasture. The arable land is principally on the first terrace, but stretches both down the slope to the valley bottom and up the slope to the second terrace. The hay meadows are above the arable land, spreading upwards towards the [137] forest. The forests comprise 75 per cent of the total area, and consist mainly of timber trees, such as beech and pine, together with a considerable number of walnut trees. The high pastures are above the forest belt and may be as much as fifty kilometres away from the village centre of the commune to which they belong.

423 THE ARABLE land is owned by the peasants, holdings ranging from less than one hectare to fifty hectares, the majority being from two to five hectares. The smallness of the holding [428] is due partly to the laws of inheritance, by which the land is divided between the children on the death of the owner, and partly to the fact that the district is so hilly that only small areas are available for cultivation.

241 476 THE HAY meadows belong to the commune and are both worked and used collectively by the peasants, all necessary organization being in the hands of the mayor and committee.

471 [313] THE FORESTS are largely state-owned, although some portions belong to the commune, in which case the peasants are allowed to cut for their own personal use (house-building, implements, etc.), but not for profit.

[235] THE HIGH pastures belong to the commune; the peasants pay a small fee to the commune for their use (20 lei per head per season for sheep, rather more for cattle).

132 AN IMPORTANT climatic feature affecting agriculture is the shortness of the summer, late spring and early autumn frosts

132 being common at this height (440 metres and upwards). July and August are the hottest months.

THE MEAN annual rainfall for Curtea de Argeş (taken over a period of nine years) is 672 mm. Precipitation occurs all the year round, but the rainiest months are May and June.

243 THE PRINCIPAL crop is maize, from which not only is the staple food "mamaliga" made, but the stems and leaves are used for animal fodder and bedding. Oats and rye are grown for fodder on the larger farms only. Wheat is not grown in the region. Soil and climate are suitable, but at present the peasant possesses very little machinery; harvesting would have to be done with a sickle or scythe and threshing with a flail. It is easier to buy such wheat as is required from the Wallachian Plain.

244 IN ADDITION to the above, every farm, however small, grows various vegetable crops: pumpkins for fodder, tomatoes, paprika, potatoes, onions, runner beans, cabbages, aubergines, often amongst the maize, sometimes as ground crops in the orchards.

246 CULTIVATED FODDER crops are grown only on the larger farms, and consist of clover, lucerne and sometimes a mixture of vetch and oats, and very occasionally turnips.

THE LOWER slopes of the hills form the natural hay meadows of the commune, but occasionally the grass of the orchard is used as rough pasture.

248 HEMP IS grown on the low-lying farms, usually as a boundary crop for the maize. Flax is also grown, but very few sunflowers.

245 AN IMPORTANT aspect of agriculture around Curtea de Argeş is fruit cultivation. Apples, pears and plums are the main crops, with occasional cherries. Every farm, however small, has some fruit trees, sometimes scattered over the whole holding, but more usually in a small orchard. Sufficient apples are grown to allow a considerable export trade to Bucharest. Plums are used for the manufacture of the alcoholic drink tuica in Curtea de Argeş. Recently plum-drying has been tried, and is already being taken up successfully by the more enterprising peasants. Walnuts also are gathered and sold.

133 cally, of the Bulgarian plateau that projects northward to
635 the Danube delta. The northern part is covered by hills, gradually sloping southwards towards the vast wooded but waterless stretches of the Dely-Orman, part of which still lies in Bulgaria.

The Banat and the Crishana form parts of the Hungarian plain and possess the same climatic and agricultural features as the latter. The eastern part of the Banat is mountainous, forming geologically an extension of Transylvania and of the western spurs of the southern Carpathians, while the Crishana is separated from Transylvania on the east by the mountainous mass of the Bihor mountains, reaching to an altitude of 1,800 meters.

Transylvania forms a circular tableland whose mean altitude is from 350 to 600 meters, and forms the essential nucleus of Rumania, both geographically and ethnically. It is encircled to the north, east, and south by the Carpathians, which occasionally reach to an altitude of 2,000 meters in the
[132] north and 2,544 meters in the southern section. Owing to an average annual rainfall of about 35 inches, numerous streams take their rise and drain the region, breaching the mountain rim and thus forming the main ways of egress. The Somesh, Muresh, and Timish, the former two affluents of the Theiss, the latter of the Danube, connect Transylvania with the Hungarian plain and with the Banat, while to the south the river Olt flows through the Red Tower pass to join the Danube and offers the main and easiest way of access into Rumania. The whole region consists of an undulating upland cut up by ranges of hills into valleys, some of which are fairly extensive and fertile, owing to the frequency of
[34] alluvial deposits. The mountains are thickly wooded, about a third of the total area (32.19%) being under forest, and give rise to numerous streams, the presence of which explains the abundance of pasture land and meadows and accounts for the thriving live-stock rearing industry which forms the main source of the wealth of the province. The highlands of the Maramureş, to the north, form part of Transylvania, and are separated from it by the river Somesh.

Bucovina forms a geographic unit with Moldavia and used to form part of that principality prior to its occupation by the

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

by the valleys through which flow the tributaries of /33
the Pruth and Dniester. In the south, beginning near Besarabeasca, extends the Budjak steppe which merges into the sandy soils, salt marshes and lagoons of the delta of the Danube and of the Black Sea coast. The climate of Bessarabia is the same as that /132 ●
of the regions east of the Dniester. The summers are very hot and dry, the winters very cold with icy winds and great snowfalls. Nevertheless, crops 311
grow well in Bessarabia and 61% of the whole area is arable land. The chief products are maize, wheat, tobacco and wine and lately also soya beans. There are few factories and the only source of income for the people, apart from agriculture, is the fishing industry in the south.

The capital of Bessarabia is Kishineff (Chisinau[R]) 361
with a population of over 200,000 (1935). Here are concentrated such industrial enterprises as the province possesses, the most important being flour mills, leather factories and other secondary industries connected with agriculture.

The first colonization of Bessarabia was carried 175
out by the Romans who succeeded in occupying this 635
territory only for a short time. During the great period of migration (seventh to tenth centuries), the province was invaded by a host of tribes. Bessarabia was first occupied by Rumanians in the early fourteenth century and incorporated in Moldavia in 1367. A century and a half later Southern Bessarabia fell to Turkey, but several merchant-colonies were still administered by Genoese and Venetian traders on the Danube delta and the Black Sea coast. In the following centuries Bessarabia was often a battleground for Russian and Turkish armies, who alter-

241 peasant views with suspicion and often hostility all attempts at improvements in traditional
[474] methods. Even the co-operative societies have made less progress than in other Danubian countries. There is need for considerable capital expenditure in grouping small farms into larger units, in providing better buildings, more implements and fertilisers. There is need for diversification of production—more fodder crops and more animal husbandry. Above all, there is need for development in industry and commerce to provide work for the surplus agricultural population.

2. Natural Conditions and Regions

● 132 The climate is of the extreme Continental type, with long hot summers and severe winters. Precipitation is largely concentrated in winter and early summer. During the greater part of the growing and ripening season rains are light, and from time to time serious droughts occur which may ruin the grain crops.

133 The agricultural regions correspond to the natural divisions into plain and hill country—the
311 Danube plain and Bessarabia which comprise the greater part of the territory and produce the bulk of the crops, and the hilly and mountainous land of Transylvania and the Bucovina.

The plain is well-suited for agriculture, the soil over much of it being of the fertile *chernozem* or
[134] black earth type, but the backward methods of farming and the light rainfall keep yields per acre low.

This region is not equally backward in all parts. The Rumanian Banat at the western end of the country, and formerly part of Hungary, is more prosperous and progressive. The population is
[162] not purely Rumanian but includes Swabians and Saxons, descendants of the German stock systematically settled there on medium-sized peasant holdings in the eighteenth century after the cession of the territory to Austria by the Turks. Methods and yields, by Rumanian standards, are good.
[231] The livestock density is higher than the average and the area produces a substantial surplus of pigs. Rural overcrowding is not as marked as elsewhere.

241 Conditions of life and methods of farming are considerably worse in the plain land of the Old
133 Kingdom. Agriculture here is as primitive as in any part of Eastern Europe, depending on an unbroken alternation of wheat and maize cultivation with little subsidiary production. Some wheat is marketed, but the maize is grown largely
[311] for consumption on the farms. So little land is available per head of population that the farm population and working animals (which eat the maize stalks) can be fed only by devoting an excessive acreage to maize.

Bessarabia makes up the remainder of the plain land; conditions of settlement and farming methods are much the same as in the Old Kingdom, but the density of population is lower and there are substantial grain exports.

Given normal yields, every district of the plain area is at least self-sufficient in foodstuffs; indeed parts of it regularly produce large grain surpluses. Transitional areas between the Danube Valley and the Transylvanian plateau, such as the Carpatho-Moldavia and Carpatho-Muntenia areas, may,

[6c]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

I.—A PHYSICAL INTRODUCTION

103 197 101 133 ROUMANIA owes its name to the rustic Latin speech of the Roman provincials of Moesia and Dacia, impressed on the region in a period before language had acquired its later powers of tenacious resistance to fundamental change. It is true that subsequent contacts gave the local language a large number, perhaps even a majority, of Slavonic words, emphasising the country's links with eastern Europe, but the associations with the west were actively revived in the nineteenth century, when there was also a reaction against the connecting of Roumania with its southern and south-western neighbours as a Balkan State as had seemed natural to those impressed by the results of Turkish rule. These varying links of Roumania are understandable from a study of its physical features. The eastern projecting arc of the Carpathian Mountains and the Transylvanian Alps is, physically, as well as in a large measure culturally, an eastward outpost of western Europe standing out as a mighty rampart over against the south Russian steppe and its continuation into the loess-floored Polish platform. The curve from the Transylvanian Alps southward past the Iron Gates also connects them with the Balkan peninsula.

133 CENTRAL EUROPE, farther west, includes broken remnants of old (Permo-carboniferous) mountain systems passing through south Ireland, south Wales and south England as well as through Brittany, the Ardennes and the Vosges to the hills of middle Germany between Hannover and Frankfürt-a-M. Brittany lies mainly at low levels but most of the other elements of this old system have been lifted again into the round-shouldered hills, sometimes with extensive remains of old plains now at considerable heights, and usually with deep-cut stream lines that have often worked their way along fault lines. To the south of this old mountain-system stand the Alps, some of which incorporate the results of refolding of older mountain fragments.

THE GREAT ARC of the Carpathians and Transylvanian Alps shows relationships with both these great schemes. Old, Permo-carboniferous mountain blocks were refolded in the upper Cretaceous and again in the early Tertiary period, in the latter of which the Transylvanian platform, between

133 the Apuseni and Bihor (Bihar)* mountains on the west and the Carpathians on the north-east and east, seems to have been let down. In this process it became outlined against its mountain frame largely by a series of faults and it was subsequently covered by new deposits. The great folding notable in the Alps further west, so active in the mid-Tertiary period, was apparently of short duration in north Roumania, but seems to have been continued on to Pleistocene times in the Transylvanian Alps on the south, with much faulting giving the impressive rise from the south and east to the line of heights. There was also in Tertiary times a great volcanic outburst that added a broad zone of highland on the west flank of the Carpathians from the two Bistriţa rivers southwards to the northern part of the Olt (Alt) valley. In the Pleistocene period earth movements seem to have increased the differencebet ween highlands and lowlands, and they were not uniform, for Pliocene deposits that lie 1,000 to 1,200 metres above sea at Borsec (Borszek) and Bilbor (Gyergyo-Belbor) are at only 500 to 700 metres further north. Again, remnants of the old land surface worn down before the Miocene movements and known to geologists as the Borescu platform, are at 1,200 to 1,300 metres in the Bihor and Apuseni Mountains, but at 2,000 metres in parts of the Transylvanian Alps. These examples suffice to show that these relatively recent movements have been more marked in the south, where, as a result, the contrast between Wallachia below and the mountain wall above is so splendid a feature. It seems that, already before the earth movements of the Pleistocene exaggerated the contrast just named, streams had eaten back through the mountain walls, for example, the Olt, or had linked themselves to and captured streams running between the mountain lines, for example, the Jiu. The Pleistocene period obviously brought great changes both through movements of land-blocks and through its climatic oscillations which were on a grand scale. Gorges were deepened as the mountain wall rose or Wallachia and Moldavia sank, and tributary streams were made to cut most impressive ravines that give the neighbourhood of Sinaia such a romantic character. Cirques near some of the highest hill tops preserve the direct evidence of ice action, but farther down there are few, if any, evidences of hanging

* Strictly speaking, the term Bihor applies only to a small section of these mountains (see Fig. 1) but is often used in a more comprehensive sense.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

133



FIGURE 1. The division near Braşov between the eastern Carpathians and the Transylvanian Alps should be noted. The term "Western Carpathians" is used by Mihailescu to include regions 1-4. The Dobrogea is classed by Mihailescu as a "mountainous region" but is shown here as a "high plateau" because it is of Hercynian age. The numbered regions are: (1) Bihor, (2) Apuseni, (3) Poiana Rusca, (4) Banat, (5) Fagaras, (6) Bucegi, (7) Ceahlau, (8)-(12) Volcanic Mts., (13) Transylvanian Plateau, (14) Moldavo-Bucovinan Plateau, (15) Dobrogea, (16) Oltenia, (17) Giurgeu (Gyurgyo), (18) Ciuc (Cic), (19) Treiscsane.

valleys, and it seems that the topography has been very much adapted since the latter part of the Ice Ages of the Pleistocene. The cutting of ravines is demonstrated magnificently in the case of the Iron Gates of the Danube.

THE above short historical or evolutionary summary of the physical geography may now be supplemented by a more definitely regional survey, the main features of which are illustrated in Fig. 1.

THE CARPATHIAN MOUNTAINS are made up of overlapping arcs, the main series including mainly altered Palaeozoic

133 and Mesozoic rocks, many of which have become crystalline. One of the main arcs forms the axis of the eastern Carpathians from just beyond the Czechoslovakian frontier to the northern border of the Olt basin; some rock west of Sinaia, much farther south, is sometimes considered an outlying part of this arc. The next main axis starts west of Braşov and stretches (with the name of Fagaraş Mountains and sharper relief than the previous arc) westward to the Banat, forming the Transylvanian Alps. In the west a third curve begins south of the last mentioned, in Oltenia, and sweeps around southwards to the Balkan mountain-line. This sweeping curve is heavily cut by faults, and streams working back along fault lines and other weak bands finally tapped the Hungarian basin so that its drainage poured over and deepened the cuttings to form the unique defile of the Kazan with the Iron Gates. The floor on which Pleistocene deposits accumulated in parts of the Hungarian plain lies 100 metres below the level of the rock under the Iron Gates, a sufficient indication that the tapping is a recent affair, as indeed the scenery of the long gorge abundantly testifies by the freshness of its great precipices arising direct from the powerful stream which is in places some 70 metres deep.

On the east side of the eastern Carpathian axis a long belt of Flysch, i.e. Mesozoic and Tertiary folded rocks, forms a subordinate mountain zone of varying width from Poland southwards to the Dambovița valley west of Sinaia.

On the west side of the eastern Carpathian axis a broad zone of volcanic accumulations stretches from the two Bistrița rivers northwards to the north of the Olt basin, but this zone is made less of a barrier by the fact that streams have sawn their way down through even this rock.

The Transylvanian Alps, especially in the zone known as the Fagaraş Mountains, almost reach an alpine height and character, but, even there, the greatest height is only 2,536 metres (8,320 feet) and in the eastern Carpathians the chief peak, Ceahlau (Ciahlau), attains only 1,908 metres (6,260 feet). Permanent snow and ice are therefore unknown at present and water-effects are much more prominent as factors of surface form than ice-effects. The results of block-uplift and faulting strike the observer, and undulating stretches of flowering high pastures dominate steep wooded slopes that bound terraced valleys often of a narrow kind.

133



FIGURE 2. (1) Caliman (Kelemen), (2) Gurghi, (3) Harghita (Hargitta), (4) Ceahlau, (5) Fagaras

133 The prominence of the main axis of the eastern Carpathians north of the Olt basin and the occurrence there of the volcanic belt give to the mountain zone a strength it lacks further south where it is more broken in the zone along which the main axis is buried beneath later formations. When the south-east corner of the arc is turned heights increase and we approach the Transylvanian Alps with their deep-cut southern slopes and especially the through gap of the Olt. The high pastures, to a considerable degree isolated from the valley bottoms, are one of the most important characteristics of the country and have greatly affected its historical and economic evolution. Passes through the eastern and south-eastern Carpathians have also been of great importance for communication between the Russian steppe and the Moldavian platform on the one hand and the Transylvanian and Hungarian basins on the other. It is along these ways, rather than *via* the Danube at the Iron Gates or along detours near them, that movements of culture spread across, eastwards or westwards, in ancient times.

THE BELT east of the Carpathian arcs is generally called Sub-Carpathian and in its structural features it is obviously related to the mountains, but in its denudation it is more akin to the Moldavia-Bucovina-Bessarabia platform generally. This is mainly the result of Pliocene denudation, and there are traces of a higher platform above it, and a lower one beneath, the latter showing that after the main platform was developed there was some uplift and rejuvenation of streams. Considerable areas, especially along the rivers Siret (Sereth) and Prut (Pruth), are loess-covered, but large areas between 47° and 46° N. lat. have Pliocene formations at the surface. To the south again, towards the lower Danube, loess covers most of the country.

THE extent to which a direction parallel or slightly oblique to the Carpathian curve is developed in the drainage system is a feature of the land east of the Carpathians which contrasts markedly with the Wallachian drainage scheme. In Wallachia the long continuance of uplift of the Transylvanian Alps as above mentioned has greatly emphasised the southward slopes and a great number of streams run nearly at right-angles to the mountain axis across a plain covered by loess save in the west (Oltenia). These streams bunch on their way to the Danube and the eastern ones naturally

1:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDI Rumania EDI

133

The road leading down to the Bicaz gorge which the river has cut through Cretaceous rocks just to the south of Ceahlau. *Photo: Miss M. Vines.*

133
361

View looking across the tectonic basin of the upper Olt. *Photo: J. Cross.*

Bilbor—a characteristic "dispersed" settlement in a small intermont basin, most of the floor of which is given over to the production of hay. *Photo: J. E. Dowd.*

facing page 12

133 trend eastwards as they go. Wallachia has a far greater proportion of its surface less than 100 metres above sea level than has Moldavia and the rise to the mountains is far more regular, as one would expect in view of the simple, consequent, character of much of the river system.

THE DOBROGEA beyond the lower Danube is not touched upon in the remainder of these studies, which are concerned with parts of the Carpathian region, but, for the sake of completeness, it should be explained that the Dobrogea is a platform extending northwards from the eastern end of the Balkan Mountains, based on a Permo-carboniferous mountain scheme which has been planed down completely, but these older rocks emerge towards the north though the land is low. The block they form is responsible for the main bends of the lower Danube which turns north when it meets the block and bends east again at the north-western corner of the block. There are considerable areas of loess on the eastern and southern parts of the platform.

TURNING now to the area within the Carpathian arc, the historic Transylvania, we note that the land is almost all more than 300 metres above sea level, a great part being over the 500 metre contour. The Transylvanian platform, at levels between 300 and 1,000 metres, is framed by the Carpathians on the east, the Transylvanian Alps on the south, and the Bihor and Apuseni Mountains on the west, save that in the last direction the westward-flowing Mureş (Maros) river occupies the depression south of the Bihor block and drains most of the platform save the extreme east and south-east, where the upper Olt takes a complex course dictated mainly by structural features. The Someş (Szamos), flowing like the Mureş to the Tisza (Theiss), drains the lowland between the north of the Bihor block and the Carpathians. The chief city of Transylvania, Cluj (Klausenburg, Kolozsvar) is situated below the north-east of the Bihor block. From the western part of this block the land grades down through the Banat of Timişoara (Temesvar) on to the Hungarian frontier and the Tisza.

THE TRANSYLVANIAN platform within its mountainous frame is floored in many parts by Pliocene or late Miocene deposits and true loess is not characteristic. It does, however, occur west of Transylvania in the plains towards the Hungarian frontier.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

133
137

The Visit to Mt. Ceahlau.

One of the most interesting excursions botanically was that made to Mont Ceahlau, which forms part of the Moldavian Carpathians and rises in its most elevated part to just over 1,900 metres.

The mountain itself is formed of Cretaceous Flysch which is much folded; near the summit there were banks of sandstone and excellent examples of conglomerate.

Unfortunately, the mountain was a considerable distance from Borsec, necessitating a start at 6.30 a.m. and a long journey by car. As the same journey had to be made on the homeward route much less time was spent upon this interesting mountain than one would have liked. The ideal would have been to have spent at least one night in the well-appointed alpine "Cabine" upon the summit. With the exception of the climb to the Peştera hut after leaving Sinaia, Ceahlau was the only really typical sub-alpine region visited during our stay in Roumania. As we drove along the



Fig. 3—Profile of Mt. Ceahlau seen from the east (after E. Nyárády)

narrow road by the side of the small tributary stream, to the Durau monastery from which the ascent was made, the following plants were noticed: *Myricaria germanica*, *Petasites albus*, *Salix incana* and the large yellow-flowered *Telekia speciosa*; the three first-named are typical plants found in the neighbourhood of stream beds in such regions, the other had never been seen previously by any member of the Vegetation Group.

133
137

4:Fleure S-5 (... date)1936 EDI Rumania FDI

Near the summit of Ceahlau, showing zone of mountain pine (*Pinus mugo* var *mugo*)—sub-alpine "Krummholzregion." The pine is seen in rounded clumps on the mountain slopes, but covers a large area on the flattened summit (see Vegetation notes).

Photo: W. J. Stover.

[facing page 24]

137 *sitifolia*, *S. aizoides*, *S. aizoon*, *Erysimum Witmanni*, *Phyteuma orbiculare*, *Silene Zawadskii*, *Onobrychis montana var. transilvanica*, *Cerastium alpinum*, *C. lanatum*, *Oxytropus campestris*, *Alsine gerardi*, *Campanula alpina*, *C. carpatica*, *Alyssum repens* (endemic), *Rhinanthus alpinus*, *Rhodiola rosea*, *Sedum atratum*. In the cracks in the rocks where moisture collected were noted *Pinguicula alpina*, *P. vulgaris*, *Saxifraga aizoides*, *S. androsacea*, *Viola biflora*, *Arabis alpina*, *Achillea Schurii*, *Biscutella laevigata*, and *Androsace lactea*.

It was obvious that to make a detailed study of this interesting mountain with its forest, plateau, gullies, scree slopes, etc., and other varying ecological factors, a much longer time would have been necessary than was possible under the conditions of our visit to the country.

The Walk by Way of Bilbor, Paltiniş, Vatra Dornei, etc., and down the Bistrita River by Timber Raft to Broşteni (Brosceni).

133 This interesting excursion was made by a number of the
233 party, and afforded a very good opportunity of seeing the country as some fifty miles were covered on foot in two days. We passed over fine slopes and through delightful valleys with their meadows bedecked with many species of flowering plants. There was time during such a walk only to notice the most salient features of the vegetation. We, however, saw hillsides where sheep were grazed quite to the top, also
[342] a mountain dairy where they were being milked. The temporary shelters for those cropping the hay in the valleys at some distance from their usual habitations were interesting, and the whole family appeared to sleep there and cook their meals till the area had been cleared.

531 During our stay at Vatra Dornei, through the kindness of
346 the mayor and the prefect of the district, we were taken by car over a mountain pass down to Campulung and from thence to the wonderful walled monastery of Moldoviţa (Moldawitza) with fine sixteenth-century frescoes covering
313 its walls. The chief point of interest from a vegetation point of view was the fine spruce forests which we saw and in which felling was in progress, the logs being pushed down the mountain side to timber carts at the bottom. The next day we had evidence of the importance of the lumbering industry

313 as we proceeded down the Bistrița river on a raft of spruce logs to Broșteni. In this way thousands of logs are transported by the current to saw mills lower down the stream. Lumbering was seen *en route* as we passed between slopes covered with fine spruce forests with here and there beech woods and also areas covered with birch.

LEAVING the raft at Broșteni we proceeded to Borsec by car and on the way saw an interesting effect of indiscriminate deforestation. On the slopes far too many trees had been cut down and a huge gully had been formed by a landslide ; a

Gullies and detrital fans resulting from deforestation in Bistrita valley.

house had been completely swept away and near by the soil was level with the top of the fencing round another house (see illustration above).

137 [133] BUDACUL (5,800 feet) was another mountain visited by members of the Vegetation Group. Spruce forest covered the slopes to a height of about 5,000 feet and there were no rocks. The last 500 feet were covered with mosses as well as *Festuca sp.* and the usual three *Vaccinia* with dwarf juniper (*Juniperus nana*). *Veratrum album* and *Hieracium* were the dominant plants in association with those mentioned on the summit, and in the woods below the following occurred : *Chrysanthemum rotundifolium, Scleranthus uncinatus, Scorzonera rosea, Ajuga genevensis, Meum*

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

291

Captain and crew. *Photo: Dr. C. P. Sandgren.*

137
133

Passengers.

These two photographs give a good impression of the gorge-like character of the transverse section of the Bistrita where it is cutting through crystalline schists. *Photo: R. A. Pelham.*

[Facing page 48]

291/462

4:Figure S-5 (no date)1936 EDI Romania EDI

PLATE VIII

133

Shooting the rapids on the Bistrita.

Photo: Dr. H. Crosby.

241

Harvesting by hand on the level Danube plains.

Photo: Romanian Press.

The above illustrations from Slavic Lands issued by the R.S.C.

291

Spinning with a distaff—an occupation symbolical of the traditional life of the Romanian peasantry in the hill country.

Photo: H. J. Sherwell.

Facing page 41

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

VII.—CORBU: A CARPATHIAN VILLAGE

I. THE COMMUNE AND ITS INHABITANTS

Position.

361
133

The village of Corbu is situated in the eastern Carpathians at a height of 700 metres above sea-level. It stands just to the east of the main water divide, and in pre-war days was included within Austro-Hungarian territory, the boundary cutting across the Bistricioara valley a few miles below the village.

The commune sits astride one of the Carpathian passes, the Bistricioara valley linking up with that of the Mureş on the one hand and of the Bistriţa on the other to form a continuous route from Transylvania to the Moldavian Plain. Its position naturally made it the centre of a good deal of fighting during the War, and the blasted spruces on the slopes above the village are grim mementoes of the struggles that took place.

Physical Features.

The physical geography of the commune is comparatively simple. The Bistricioara river, which cuts the commune into two unequal segments, is the principal feature. On either side it receives tributary valleys for the most part normal in profile, though in one or two cases a steep-sided and narrow lower section gives place higher up to somewhat broader, flat-bottomed stretches. Indeed, the upper Bistricioara itself winds its way through a fairly extensive intermont basin of this kind in the commune of Bilbor just before entering that of Corbu.

At one point the main valley is constricted by an outcrop of Porphyry which appears formerly to have extended right across the present course of the Bistricioara. It has been breached, however, leaving a truncated spur running out from the south side of the valley and affording excellent views both up- and down-stream. Largely as a result of deforestation the crystalline schistose and gneissic slopes which rise steeply on either side of the main valley are scored with numerous re-entrants, the masses of detrital

133 361 material eroded therefrom being spread out fanwise along the edge of the alluvium. Higher up, small alp-like terraces appear, giving place to precipitous slopes once more where calcareous rocks of Triassic and Jurassic age occur.

132 361 CONCERNING climate and vegetation little need be added to the accounts already given of the Eastern Carpathians as a whole. In the case of climate the most important features to be borne in mind are the risk of late summer storms that limit the ripening period for grain, and the winter snowfall which creates a close season for agriculture.

THE VILLAGE.

361 CORBU has been tentatively classified as a "dispersed" type of village, though it is clear from the photographs (Plate IX) that the narrowness of the valley has rather limited the extent of the dispersion and has given rise to a plan resembling that of the "street village" of Western Europe. Closer examination, however, will reveal a certain looseness of structure, especially where a slight widening of the valley occurs near the confluence of a tributary stream, and it is very probable that if the same village had been founded in a broad flat upland area the houses would have been spread out as in Bilbor (see Plate I).

PEASANT HOUSES.

342 A GROUP of typical Roumanian farmsteads is illustrated in Plate X whilst the plan on page 67 shows in detail the lay-out of the one depicted on page 43. The principal features in each case are clear. The dwelling houses, of which there are frequently two to a farm, can usually be distinguished by their bright colour-washed walls. There is an abundance of local stone, but the crystalline rocks that are nearest to hand are very intractable, and, although they are employed for the foundations, the superstructure is almost invariably of wood. In Lower Borsec, which is just visible in the distance in Plate IX, an outcrop of Travertine provides a much more easily-worked material, and is very freely employed, but its use does not appear to extend into Corbu. The walls of the Corbu houses are usually built of roughly-squared, less frequently of sawn, timber, to which, in the better-class houses, laths are nailed to form a key for

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

361
133

Corbu—view from top of porphyry spur looking down-stream. Arable land on the valley floor is devoted mainly to the cultivation of maize. On the right in the foreground lucerne is seen stacked on poles. The lower portions of the steep hill-sides have been cleared for hay meadows, but continuous stretches of forest clothe the upper slopes.

Photo: R. A. Pelham.

Corbu—looking upstream towards Borsec.

Photo: R. A. Pelham.

[facing page 64]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

133



Fig. 9

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

PLATE X

241
33

Hay meadows on deforested slopes above the limits of cultivation at Corbu. Although this is the upper section of a valley tributary to that of the Bistricioara, it is much broader than the narrowly constricted lower section.

Photo: R. A. Pelham.

342
361



Typical Roumanian farmsteads in Corbu. The houses are roofed with shingles, the outbuildings with boards. The house in the centre has the characteristic louvre in place of chimney, and its walls are of timber with plaster covering. Hemp is drying on the verandah. The mud caulking in the outbuilding is clearly visible.

Photo: R. A. Pelham.

[facing page 65]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

361
133



This is part of the area mapped in Fig. 11. The photograph is taken from the top of the porphyry spur shown in Fig. 9. *Photo: R. A. Pelham.*

241
342

A peasant holding at Corbu in process of sub-division. A son about to marry is erecting a house (seen on left) on his share of his father's land. The parental farmstead extends across the right-hand half of the picture. A strip of maize is seen in the foreground and a small patch of hemp on the extreme left, close to the new house. For plan of holding see Fig. 11. *Photo: R. A. Pelham.*

[facing page 68]

000 and the Cyrillic script invented for Slavonic purposes came to be used for religion, even in Roumania. Cities and towns were as yet hardly born in central and east-central Europe.

In the tenth and eleventh centuries, as the Dark Ages were passing away in the west, the idea of the city spread eastwards from the Rhine, sometimes under the leadership of the Church, sometimes around a military leader, sometimes through the planting of colonists by a leader. The Magyar kings accepted Christianity and were drawn into this current of activity, and Transylvania was a frontier land that needed to be developed and guarded. A people of transhumant shepherds and lowly cultivators scattered over a mountain territory was as yet too weak to do this or to resist effectively, while it had no reason to attach itself to the Magyar power, which had different linguistic and religious associations. The Magyars established allied Szekler peoples within the arc of the eastern Carpathians, apparently to some extent as a guard for the passes. They also brought in Saxon immigrants to establish cities as well as villages, and the Teutonic knights and Magyar aristocrats also came to add to the complexity. Szekler and Saxon were Roman Catholic, so a religious complication was added to the linguistic one, and this complexity was further increased when the Saxon element became Protestant on a Lutheran basis, while Unitarianism developed among the Magyars, and the Uniate scheme spread in the border zone between Catholic and Orthodox.

133 Beyond the old Dacia, that is outside the Carpathian bastion, the plains of Wallachia and Moldavia long were highways of barbarian warriors, while their lands nearer the hills are floored by large quantities of boulder-strewn outwash from old sub-glacial conditions in the mountains, so that the areas of more cultivable alluvium are, in the hill country, largely
369 riverside zones. The development of a measure of urban life
361 apparently came later here than in Transylvania, and it may owe something to the Saxon ideas expressed in Transylvania, though neither Saxons or Szeklers are present, and the characteristic Saxon house type with its great arched doorway is completely absent, as is the walled town. The Transylvanian Saxon village (note the villages called Cristian near Sibiu and near Braşov) might have a fortified enclosure around its church, a centre of refuge and of authority. How far analogous developments outside the Carpathian arc are due

5z Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl 78

The Transylvanian Alps with Negoiu.

Olt Valley. View of the valley taken from the bridge at Câlimănesti.

133



Curtea de Arges. River terrace in foreground. Pliocene deposits on horizon.

346

Biserica Domneasca, Curtea de Arges (1343), within a fortified enclosure.

[Page 16 B]

THE ARGEŞ DISTRICT

101 133 THE EXTENDED ROUMANIA, that was organised after 1918 includes the old areas of Wallachia, Dobrogea, Moldavia, Bessarabia, Bukovina, Transylvania and Timişoara, of varied allegiance before the World War, but all containing from early historic times onwards a proportion of Roumanian-speaking people. Transylvania is the mountain bastion with the eastern Carpathians as its eastern boundary, the southern Carpathians or Transylvanian Alps as its southern edge, and the western Roumanian Carpathians or Bihor, etc., mountains on its western flank. Its mountainous frame and its hilly interior give it a very decidedly upland character, even if the Olt, the Maroş and the Szamoş, which drain it, have considerable systems of tributary valleys. Outside the bastion to the east Bukovina and Moldavia slope down to the great plain of eastern Europe, of which Bessarabia forms the flank west of the Dniestr. Behind the bastion to the west Timişoara stretches down to the Tisza, and forms the south-eastern flank of the middle Danubian plain. Outside the bastion on the south is Wallachia, sloping down towards the lower Danube, while beyond the considerable barrier formed by the lowest portion of the Danube and to the south-east, is the low plateau area of the Dobrogea.

[113] IN A PREVIOUS study we gave in some measure a picture of rural life in the eastern Carpathians near the border between Transylvania and Moldavia, where the mountains barely reach 1,900 m. (say 6,200 feet), and the highest land is often in great expanses of pasture with deep valleys cut by the rival drainage systems of the two sides, which are separated by a number of passes that may indent the watershed. In the eastern Carpathians Roumanians and Szeklers, respectively Uniate and Roman Catholic, live in adjacent villages, and the former, especially, send flocks and herds to the highland pastures.

121 THIS STUDY is intended to deal more especially with what is thought to be a typical area of rural Wallachia, having an almost entirely Roumanian population attached to the Orthodox Church and living under circumstances differing

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDI Rumania EDI

133



The Olt Valley and the Upper Argeş.

133



Geology of the Area shown in Physical Map.

121 considerably from those of the eastern Carpathians; this area is the district focusing upon Curtea de Argeş.

101 133 WALLACHIA has already been described as the land stretching from the southern Carpathians or Transylvanian Alps to the Danube. The mountains themselves are largely of metamorphosed rock with flanking Miocene deposits; they are about 40 km. wide with the sharp main ridge (rising at Negoiu to 2,544 m. or 8,331 feet) parallel to the long flanks about 11 km. from the northern and 29 km. from the southern edge. Several rivers have worked their valleys out among the mountains in a direction parallel to the ridge and the edges.

133 THERE ARE huge accumulations of pebbly, often deltaic, outwash beyond the south flank of the mountains, the layers sloping southward and giving sunward dip-slopes separated by small northward-facing scarps, the woods of which contrast with the arable lands on the dip-slopes. This pebbly outwash is deeply dissected by southward-flowing consequent streams, some of which rise in it, while others, like the Argeş, penetrate the mountain wall, making a wild narrow gorge. In the deep valleys of the pebbly material houses shelter from the north winds. The Olt has cut right through the mountains and captured a subsequent river of the northern flank, and its way through the mountains is by a deep valley, which is wider in some sections that are more or less "subsequent" and narrower in others that are rather "consequent." At about 20-25 km. southward from the mountain wall the residual hills of loose material that stand out between the consequent valleys milden down; the amount of alluvium and the breadth of the river valleys increase and it becomes possible to bridge the rivers, so it is at about this distance from the mountains that have grown the towns of Ramnicu Valcea on the Olt and Curtea de Argeş on the Argeş. Ramnicu Valcea is at the last narrowing of the Olt before it begins to braid on a broad alluvial plain, and its site is not easily defensible. The Argeş has terraces near the stream on the eastern side at the bridge, and the river has already swung against this bank some 2 km. north of the bridge. This gives defensible positions as well as facilities for bridging, and helps to account for the historic, if somewhat localised, importance of the town of Curtea de Argeş, the focus of the region of which studies were made.

133 361

H. J. F.
E. E. E.

133
361



Plan of Curtea de Argeş. Wooded areas shaded. Heights in metres.

CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

133 361 REFERENCE has already been made to the bridging of the Olt and the Argeş about 20-25 km. from the mountain-edge and to the rise near these bridges of the towns of Ramnicu Valcea and Curtea de Argeş. It has also been explained that terraces on the left bank of the Argeş swing near the river to give an effective bridge-end site capable of defence. Curtea de Argeş is one of the oldest settlements in Muntenia.

[791] AT THE BRIDGE the river is over 420 m. above sea, and from its western end an old trackway, now a main road, follows approximately the 440 m. contour on what appears to be a terrace against which the river swings about 1½-2 km. north of the bridge. Here also gravel reaches, connected with the junction of a brook with the main stream, provide a ford; [778] and at this spot on the east side of the river there is the monastery of royal associations founded in 1510 and celebrated as a place of pilgrimage. Beyond this the road goes on up a tributary valley towards the east. The bridge and town however grew up not at this ford, but at a point farther south, where the north-south residual ridge bounding the Argeş valley on the east sends a spur almost to the actual river but just cut off by a seasonal tributary brook. The end of this spur shows two marked terraces, one just slightly above the river, the other some 12 m. above it and rising, as was said [344] above, to about the 440 m. contour. On the end of the spur is a ruined Roman Catholic church, built for Marghita, wife of Prince Basarab. The Wallachian princes of these days appear to have had a habit of marrying Catholic women. One seems to see faint indications that the site of this church has been to a slight extent developed artificially. In 1390 this church served as a cathedral for Catholics in Wallachia, and the see lasted until 1602, by which time many Catholics had become Orthodox and the Catholic bishopric was removed to Dacau.

[491] REFERENCE has already been made to the north-south road on the terrace, no doubt a modernisation of an old trackway, with the town near the end of the spur and the bridge, and the monastery to the north. Near the end of the spur, and

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl
[Curtea De Arges]

346



Cream-washed and painted church of St. Mary at Curtea de Argeş

133
361
[346]

related to the brook already mentioned, is a spring of some value. Above this, on the terrace, is the nucleus of the town—an Orthodox church (1352) of exceptional dignity and beauty, the Biserica Domneasca, built in a fortified enclosure. This scheme suggests comparisons with such Saxon villages as Cristian, near Sibiu, and several others, though there the church was Catholic. The fortification at Curtea de Argeş is larger than those at such places at Cristian, but it is far from being equivalent to the fortification enclosing the primary nucleus of Sibiu, for that nucleus included church, market places, shops and residences. It seems to have been a widespread rule that where a whole town was not walled there should be at any rate a fortified refuge enclosing the church. In the Slavonic parts of the European plain there were, of old, burgwälle or earthwork refuges, in some cases one for each area of about 120-130 km., or, say, fifty British square miles. These burgwälle sometimes became the nuclei of towns, the Wawel at Krakow being perhaps the best known among many examples. On the Wawel, and in analogous places in many

361 towns, stands a church in a fortified enclosure, and the town
133 has been laid out beyond this. It is possible to infer that a similar process has worked itself out, but to a lesser degree, both in the Saxon villages of Transylvania and in such cases
361 as that of Curtea de Argeş. Here the church-and-castle
491 nucleus is as usual the focus of roads, the principal one of which runs along the terrace as already mentioned. Two others lead down towards the river, one on each side of the fortification, but not exactly to the bridge, the position of which is rather determined by gravel banks where the small seasonal brook referred to above joins the river. Some other roads or trackways branch off in a bunch just east of the nucleus and stretch up into hills of unconsolidated material, their woodland cover increasing with altitude and becoming practically continuous forest at about 600 m. altitude over sea. Where the woods are not continuous there is pasture up to which animals may be drawn every day in summer. One of these roads leads past a little old church of S. Mary and appears to be an old track leading obliquely up the hillside over into the next valley to the east. Along the beginning of this trackway are the homes of numerous craftsmen, especially potters, but we did not get evidence of a guild or zunft of potters. We are not here dealing with quite the same scheme of organisation as that of a trade in a street within a walled town. The main business part of the town has lain between the bridge end and the road on the terrace, 10-20 m. above the river, and the town has been physically constrained to spread along that road. The extension southwards has an interesting eighteenth century house overlooking a square set out quite recently. The extension northwards towards the monastery gives a ribbon of buildings mostly modern.

61 On the whole, one has the impression of a focus of peasant
443 life with fairs and markets and opportunities of sale of craft products, especially pots, to country folk. There is evidence of considerable quite modern growth, and also apparently of growth one to two centuries ago, a growth which it is tempting to associate with agricultural development gathered around the spread of maize and potato, but proof is lacking.

361 Curtea de Argeş owes a great deal of its importance to its
771 religious and princely associations, and both the Biserica Domneasca and the monastery church are important here. The latter, near a ford, may well have more ancient associa-

[Curtea de Arges -- 25 Analyst]

FARMING AROUND CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

AMY R. BURGESS

133 IN THE region of Curtea de Argeş the river flows in a valley of varying width, floored with fine sandy alluvium and bounded by somewhat rounded hills. Some traces of river terraces are discernible.

THE LAND of this region can be divided into four categories: (*a*) arable, (*b*) hay meadows, (*c*) forest, (*d*) high mountain pasture. The arable land is principally on the first terrace, but stretches both down the slope to the valley bottom and up the slope to the second terrace. The hay meadows are above the arable land, spreading upwards towards the [137] forest. The forests comprise 75 per cent of the total area, and consist mainly of timber trees, such as beech and pine, together with a considerable number of walnut trees. The high pastures are above the forest belt and may be as much as fifty kilometres away from the village centre of the commune to which they belong.

423 THE ARABLE land is owned by the peasants, holdings ranging from less than one hectare to fifty hectares, the majority being from two to five hectares. The smallness of the holding [428] is due partly to the laws of inheritance, by which the land is divided between the children on the death of the owner, and partly to the fact that the district is so hilly that only small areas are available for cultivation.

241 476 THE HAY meadows belong to the commune and are both worked and used collectively by the peasants, all necessary organization being in the hands of the mayor and committee.

471 [313] THE FORESTS are largely state-owned, although some portions belong to the commune, in which case the peasants are allowed to cut for their own personal use (house-building, implements, etc.), but not for profit.

[233] THE HIGH pastures belong to the commune; the peasants pay a small fee to the commune for their use (20 lei per head per season for sheep, rather more for cattle).

132 AN IMPORTANT climatic feature affecting agriculture is the shortness of the summer, late spring and early autumn frosts

TRANSHUMANCE IN THE SOUTHERN CARPATHIANS

233 221 IN THE SOUTHERN CARPATHIANS we have a region which still retains its pastoral activities, little disturbed by the social and economic forces which have invaded the pastoralists' domain elsewhere. Few Roumanian villages are without sheep, and in the summer great numbers are taken to the high pastures when these become free of snow. This seasonal migration, or transhumance, is an ancient feature of European life, and a study of its forms and functions in Roumania not only throws light on important aspects of peasant life, but provides valuable comparative material for the study of similar movements in regions like western Britain, where transhumance survives only in a modified way.

SHEEP ARE the pivot of rural economy in these Carpathian lands; the pastoral element pervades all aspects of peasant [291] life—from the traditional costumes of woollen cloth trousers and sheepskin waistcoat to popular poetry and music. But the intimate contact with upland pastures thus ensured has been of deeper significance: it has enabled the Carpathian peoples to preserve their sense of unity when the lowlands were overrun by invaders, while the contacts maintained between summering groups have helped to preserve the Roumanian language and kept its dialectal variations within limits. In a very real sense, the Southern Carpathians are the heart of Roumania.

● 133 PHYSICAL CONDITIONS have, from very remote times, favoured the development and survival of pastoral life. The steepness of the forested valley slopes which isolate the upland core is in strong contrast to the gently undulating platforms which rise above the tree-line, at about 5,000 feet, and terminate in rugged glaciated *monadnocks* which may reach 8,000 feet or more (Negoiu, 2,544 m.). The prolonged erosion of Tertiary times which produced the upland platforms also provided the great masses of unconsolidated material—mostly coarse sands—which now form the extensive foothills stretching half way to the Danube over a width of some sixty miles. Curtea de Argeş is one of the settlements of this foothill belt,

133 dependent for the working out of its economy, as for its setting, upon the high Southern Carpathians.

233 133 While in some parts of Roumania all the sheep must be moved to distant highlands in summer, there are many regions which have sufficient local pasture to keep a certain proportion of stock through the year. This applies to the country around Curtea de Argeş; here the late Tertiary (Pliocene) deposits are provided with frequent terraces. The lower terraces are glacial and may be three in number; higher up the dip-slopes of the coarse sands have often been cleared of the bad forests which still cling to the scarps, while at all levels slips have occurred in the loose materials to produce small mesa-like areas, sparsely covered with grass, juniper and birch, accessible to nimble sheep and goats.* In general, however, such local pasturage is reserved for cows in milk, while young cattle and bullocks, if not required for the many activities of farming and forestry, are sent with the sheep to the high pastures.

We may best examine some of the features of this transhumance by following the sheep in their movements through the year in the valley of the Argeş and its background of high mountains, the Fagaras, extending eastwards from the valley of the Olt. The commune of Corbeni, some seventeen kilometres upstream, provides us with a few figures. Here is the first widening of the Argeş Valley, for the river has left the last range of the Carpathians (1,500 m.) through which it cuts one of the great gorges which characterize this zone, and it is here entering on its braided course through the [137] Miocene and Pliocene deposits to the south. The proportion of forested land in the commune is high (75 per cent), and its 2,500 sheep can be maintained only by extensive transhumance. The summer pastures are from thirty to fifty kilometres distant, the stâne† extending from the forest's upper limit (1,500-1,600 m.) to the scarred rock faces of 471 the high core at 2,000 m. Each commune has its stână, 233 which takes its name from the mountain on which it is situated: it is the property of the commune, but there are certain payments to be made each year for the services of

*Goats tend to be kept only by the poorer peasants; they are naturally not encouraged by the Forestry authorities.

†Stână (singular). The word is applied as here to the summer pastures and also to the huts where the shepherds sleep and make the store the cheese. By extension it is sometimes used for the general economy of transhumant shepherding.

ECONOMICS

GEOGRAPHIC and ETHNOGRAPHIC NOTES.

131 Rumania has an area of 294,967 square kilometers, approximately larger than that of Italy, and owing to its circular form has proportionately to its surface a very short stretch of frontiers, only 2,669 Km.—which are mainly formed by natural features. It is situated between the 43-rd and 49-th degrees north latitude and 20° and 31° east longitude. The highlands of the Maramureş separate Rumania from Czechoslovakia, but there is no clearly defined frontier between Rumania and Poland. The river Dniester constitutes the frontier with Russia for a distance of some 700 Km. To the east Rumania is bounded by the Black Sea for a distance of 277 miles. It is separated from Bulgaria partly by an artificial frontier across the Dobrudja, and partly by the Danube for a distance of about 450 Km. The latter river also provides a partial boundary with Yugoslavia to the south, while to the west the frontier separating Rumania from Yugoslavia and Hungary is drawn through the plain of the river Theiss at about a distance of 30-40 Km. to the east of the latter. The country is divided into the following provinces :—

133 635 *Wallachia*, which is sub-divided by the river Olt into the district of Oltenia to the west and Muntenia to the east, the latter being separated from Moldavia by the river Sereth and its affluent, the Milkov. Oltenia is composed of a wide belt of hilly country bordered by the Danubian plain to the south, which, narrow at its western end, gradually broadens out to the east into the plain of the Baragan, considered to be the granary of Rumania and extending from the river Ialomitsa to the S reth. Wallachia is watered by numerous rivers, which with the exception of the Olt, the source of which is in Transylvania, all rise in the southern Carpathians and flow into the Danube, the largest of them being the Jiu, Argesh, and Ialomitsa.

The Rumanian bank of the Danube, owing to its extreme flatness, is subject to inundations and forms a fringe of marshes and swamps extending along the whole length of the river to a width of some 20 Km. in some places. The

imposing range of the Southern Carpathians, otherwise 133
known as the Transylvanian Alps, shuts off Wallachia on the 635
north from Transylvania, the main means of communication between the two provinces being provided by the Vulcan, Red Tower, Predeal, and Buzau defiles.

Moldavia is divided in almost two halves by the river Sereth which rises in Bucovina and flows southwards until it joins the Danube, receiving in its onward course several tributaries, the most important of which are the Moldova, Suceava, Bistritsa, and Trotush, the valleys of which furnish means of access to Transylvania. Western Moldavia is a hilly region very similar in structure to the Transylvanian basin, while the region between the rivers Sereth and Pruth forms a country of vast rolling plains.

Bessarabia is separated from Moldavia by the river Pruth and is delimitated to the north-east by the river Dniester, which constitutes its frontier with Russia. It is a country of vast, sparsely wooded plains, and is renowned for its orchards and extensive vineyards. The southern portion has a steppe-like appearance, though intersected by numerous lakes. It is deficient both in wood and in spring water, and for a long time this deficiency proved an obstacle to its colonization. Bessarabia originally constituted part of Moldavia, with which it also forms a geographic unit. Its capital, Chişinau, or Kichineff, is a well-built city. It possesses numerous colleges, religious institutes and governmental buildings, which form the relics of the former Russian administration and evoke memories of its past magnificence. Owing to the stoppage of traffic with Odessa, complete stagnation prevails. The Rumanian authorities have avoided the construction of communications in Bessarabia, and Chişinau, though being the second largest town in the kingdom, with a population of 117,016, is practically isolated, for the existing railways laid out by the Russians to suit different requirements, are from the commercial point of view now utterly unpractical for actual necessities. As a result stagnation has set in, and this maintains among the population a regret for the past Russian régime. [489]

The Dobrudja lies to the south of the Danube, and may be regarded as an extension, both geographically and ethnologi-

133 cally, of the Bulgarian plateau that projects northward to
635 the Danube delta. The northern part is covered by hills, gradually sloping southwards towards the vast wooded but waterless stretches of the Dely-Orman, part of which still lies in Bulgaria.

The Banat and the Crishana form parts of the Hungarian plain and possess the same climatic and agricultural features as the latter. The eastern part of the Banat is mountainous, forming geologically an extension of Transylvania and of the western spurs of the southern Carpathians, while the Crishana is separated from Transylvania on the east by the mountainous mass of the Bihor mountains, reaching to an altitude of 1,800 meters.

Transylvania forms a circular tableland whose mean altitude is from 350 to 600 meters, and forms the essential nucleus of Rumania, both geographically and ethnically. It is encircled to the north, east, and south by the Carpathians, which occasionally reach to an altitude of 2,000 meters in the
[132] north and 2,544 meters in the southern section. Owing to an average annual rainfall of about 35 inches, numerous streams take their rise and drain the region, breaching the mountain rim and thus forming the main ways of egress. The Somesh, Muresh, and Timish, the former two affluents of the Theiss, the latter of the Danube, connect Transylvania with the Hungarian plain and with the Banat, while to the south the river Olt flows through the Red Tower pass to join the Danube and offers the main and easiest way of access into Rumania. The whole region consists of an undulating upland cut up by ranges of hills into valleys, some of which are fairly extensive and fertile, owing to the frequency of
[34] alluvial deposits. The mountains are thickly wooded, about a third of the total area (32.19%) being under forest, and give rise to numerous streams, the presence of which explains the abundance of pasture land and meadows and accounts for the thriving live-stock rearing industry which forms the main source of the wealth of the province. The highlands of the Maramureş, to the north, form part of Transylvania, and are separated from it by the river Somesh.

Bucovina forms a geographic unit with Moldavia and used to form part of that principality prior to its occupation by the

GEOGRAPHIC AND ETHNOGRAPHIC NOTES

Austrians in 1775. Bucovina, in spite of its exiguousness in arable land—about one fourth of its surface being devoted to a variety of agricultural crops and orchards—is one of the most advanced agricultural regions of Rumania, maintaining in certain parts of the valleys of the Pruth and Sereth as dense a population as 300 inhabitants per square kilometre. Its forests are better preserved than those of the other provinces of the kingdom, thanks to the careful system administration the Austrians had initiated. They cover [illegible]% of the region and form the main source from which timber is obtained in Rumania, the river Sereth being used largely for floating down the logs to the Danubian port of Galatz, whence they are exported. When the Austrians annexed Bucovina in 1775 its population was only 72,000. Thanks to their excellent administration and their efforts to develop the country, its population had surpassed 800,000 when it was reunited to Rumania; the increase was due partly, however, to the Austrian attempt at denationalizing the country by settling Ruthenian immigrants. Cernauţi, better known as Czernowitz, is a modern town, beautifully planned and with all the amenities of a western city. The spirit of its inhabitants is distinctly occidental and reminds one of the mentality of Vienna, the more so, since they have distinct leanings towards Socialism owing to the preponderance of German culture. The town used to be an important centre of traffic between Galicia and Russia, but owing to the loss of its hinterland it seems as though struck with a sudden blight while in full prosperity. It has a population of 111,147, and constitutes the third largest town of Rumania.

Table showing population and area of provinces according to census of 1930.

	Population.	Area (sq. km.)
Wallachia	5,542,467	76,583.
Moldavia	2,413,123	38,058.
Bessarabia	2,865,506	44,422.
Bucovina	845,903	10,442.
Dobrudja	811,332	23,262.
Transylvania	3,217,149	102,200.
Maramureş and Crishana	1,387,675	
Banat	942,072	
Total population	18,025,237	Area .. 294,967.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p. 20

CHAPTER II

THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

131 The Kingdom of Greater Rumania which emerged
161 after the Peace Settlement of 1919 covered an area of about 118,000 square miles, which is more than Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and had a population of about 15,500,000. Greater Rumania comprised the Old Kingdom (Wallachia, Moldavia and the Northern Dobrudja) and the New Territories, namely the Eastern Banat, the Crisana, Maramures, Transylvania, the Bukovina, Bessarabia and the Southern Dobrudja.[1] In relation to the position before 1914 both the territory and population of Rumania had been doubled. Still more important, the Kingdom was transformed from a national State into a multi-national State.[2]

133 The chief geographical features of Greater Rumania were the Carpathian Mountains, which sur-

[1] The Southern Dobrudja was Bulgarian up to the end of the Second Balkan War when it was ceded to Rumania; it was returned to Bulgaria by the Central Powers during the Great War, re-ceded to Rumania in 1919 and ceded again to Bulgaria in 1940.

162 [2] The population of the Old Kingdom in 1915 was about 7,625,000. The population of Greater Rumania in 1920 was 15,541,000 and had risen by 1940 to over 20,000,000 (an average yearly increase of about 233,000). The most numerous of the minorities were the Hungarians and Szekelys of Transylvania and the western provinces; the Jews, living all over Rumania; the Germans, living in the Banat, Transylvania and Bessarabia; Ukrainians and Russians in the Bukovina and Bessarabia; Bulgarians in the Dobrudja, Bessarabia and the Banat; Turks, Tatars, Gypsies, Serbs, Poles, Armenians, Greeks, etc.

3

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

round the highland of Transylvania in the north, /133
east and south; the rolling plains of Wallachia; the Danube, which still is the southern frontier and main line of communication; and the slopes and steppes of Moldavia and Bessarabia.

The massive Carpathians are formed by two mountain ranges: the Eastern Carpathians which, rising west of the Pruth, extend southwards to the region of Brasov; and the Southern Carpathians, with high peaks of over 7,500 ft., which stretch westward and then turn to the south, where they reach the Danube. South of the great bend, formed by the two chains of mountains, lies the famous oil district of Campina and Ploesti, one of the chief economic assets of Rumania. The beautiful southern and eastern slopes of the Carpathians flatten out into the fertile plains of Wallachia and Moldavia, the latter merging in the east with the Bessarabian plateau, and in the north with the valleys and forests of the Bukovina. The Dobrudja, lying east of the Danube, as it turns northward, adds considerably to Rumania's share of the Black Sea coast. North and west of Transylvania lie the mountainous province of Maramures and the lowlands of the Crisana, which, geographically, belong to the Hungarian plain. The south-western tip of Greater Rumania was formed by the Banat, partitioned after the Great War between Yugoslavia and Rumania.

In Wallachia and Moldavia there is much which /133
is purely Balkan. There are the small villages with 361
muddy streets and little one-storied cottages of sun-dried brick, painted white and blue, some with wooden gables gaily decorated. On the great, rolling

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

133 plains an endless sea of ripening wheat and maize
361 dips and rises in the summer breeze.

In the Carpathian valleys and in Transylvania dark forests alternate with fertile, gently rising slopes, irrigated by swift rivers which descend from the high mountains. Old castles and mansions of Hungarian nobles still guard the highways which pass through Rumanian, Hungarian and German villages and the small 'Saxon' towns, some of which have still preserved the atmosphere of mediaeval German townships.

In the Bukovina the civilizing influence of the Austrians is still visible. This small province, with its factories and prosperous farms, is one of the crossroads where east and west meet. In Bessarabia Russian and Ukrainian influences are very strong. The churches and cottages, the peasants' carts and dresses recall the Ukraine east of the Dniester. The Dobrudja, with its undulating uplands and its long, sandy Black Sea shore, offers good grazing for many great flocks of sheep which are driven there in the autumn to escape from the icy winter in the Carpathians. The province is only sparsely populated and has a definitely Balkan character. Fezzes and turbans are still common in the streets of its little towns. The plains west of Transylvania differ little in their aspect from the great Hungarian plains, but here too there is a great diversity of peoples and cultures, all adding to the colourful and often confusing picture of Rumania as it was between the two wars.

162 **THE POPULATION.** The acquisition of the New Territories after the Great War brought many non-

'2: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Oltenia]

Kingdom is Wallachia, which is formed by Oltenia and Muntenia.

OLTENIA. Oltenia is the western part of the principality of Wallachia. Its boundaries are, in the west and north the Carpathians, in the east the River Olt, and in the south the Danube. The province covers an area of about 9,640 square miles and has a population of about 1,900,000. The soil of the sub-Carpathian hills consists of sand and clay and gravel and is well watered by numerous rivulets. Here are some densely populated valleys, bordered by rich forests and grazing grounds. Farther south and extending to the Danube lies the fertile plain composed of the rich 'yellow earth'. Its character is similar to that of the lowlands of Muntenia, but it lies on a higher level and also has a higher rainfall.

The richest district of this fertile province is the *judet*[1] of Dolj in the south-western corner of Oltenia. From here, and the similarly fertile *judets* of Mehedinti and Romanati, also on the northern bank of the Danube, high-quality maize and wheat have been exported for many years. From the hilly country farther north fruit is the chief export. In the mountainous districts forestry provides the main occupation for the local inhabitants. There is much sheep-breeding, for the grassy slopes provide good grazing.

Apart from the Danube the two most important rivers of Oltenia are the Jiu and the Olt; the latter rises in Transylvania and enters Oltenia through the Red Tower Pass. Oltenia is not rich in mineral resources. There is, however, oil at Govora, west of

[1] Administrative unit.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Oltenia]

[Muntenia]

The Danubian ports of Calafat and Corabia handle 361
wheat exports and also have some valuable industries.

MUNTENIA. To the east of the River Olt extends 133
Muntenia, the other province of Wallachia. It [131]
covers an area of about 20,600 square miles and has
a population of about 4,500,000. The southern and [161]
eastern boundaries of the province are formed by
the Danube, the northern frontier by the Carpathians. The land surface and climate of Muntenia
are similar to those of Oltenia, but the hilly region
south of the Carpathians is narrower. The fertile
steppes, Baragan, Burnas, Gavan and Burdeas, are
situated on the northern banks of the Danube which
floods the adjoining districts and forms many lakes
and marshes. The highest peaks of the Carpathians
in Muntenia are the Negoi and the Moldovan, both
over 7,500 ft. The most important of the many rivers
descending from the high mountains are the Dambovita, Jalomita, Arges and Buzau, all of which
eventually flow into the Danube. The endless maize [311]
and wheat fields of Muntenia are covered in summer
with heavy crops and on the steppes great flocks of
sheep find their food. In spite of very dry summers
and icy winters like those of Russia this region is one
of the richest of Rumania and the whole of Europe.

Muntenia differs from all Rumanian provinces in [135]
that, in addition to stock breeding, the raising of
high-quality crops, fishery and forestry, it possesses
a source of wealth which is not found in such abundance in any other part of Europe, the oil fields of
Campina and Ploesti. There the hilly, wooded 361
countryside suddenly changes into a modern in-

8

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bucarest]

[The Dobrudja]

Bucarest is also the chief railway centre of Rumania. 361

Giurgiu on the Danube, south of Bucarest and the terminus of one of the oil pipe-lines from Ploesti, is one of the main Rumanian wheat and oil ports. Another Danubian port, where great quantities of wheat are handled, is Braila with a population of about 70,000.

There are no natural barriers to communications in Muntenia. In the south the chief flow of traffic is carried by the Danube. Rail and road communications from Transylvania pass through the Predeal and a railway line leads over the Danube to the Dobrudja. 505 491 496

THE DOBRUDJA (Dobrogea[R]).[1] Up till 1878 the whole of the Dobrudja belonged to Bulgaria. Ever since, this province has been a bone of contention between Rumania and Bulgaria. The northern part of the Dobrudja was awarded to Rumania in 1878 to compensate her for the loss of Southern Bessarabia to Russia. The southern part of the province was ceded by Bulgaria after her defeat at the hands of her neighbours in the Second Balkan War in 1913. This region was returned to Bulgaria in 1940. 175

Geographically the Dobrudja is the north-eastern corner of the Balkan Peninsula. Its boundaries are in the north and west the Danube and in the east the Black Sea. There are three distinct regions: the delta of the Danube, the forests of Babadag, and farther south the steppe, which is the most fertile 131 133

[1] The letter R, H or G following a geographical term denotes a Rumanian, Hungarian or German name, respectively.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Dobrudja]

131 part of the Dobrudja. The delta of the Danube is
133 formed by the three arms Chilia, Sulina and St George. It includes an area of about 1,000 square miles, in which water and land, marshes, lakes and
[503] islands feed an almost tropical vegetation. The chief communications through the delta are provided by the Sulina canal and by causeways.

311 The steppes of the Southern Dobrudja yield good
135 crops of wheat and maize, and the pastures maintain great herds of sheep. Mineral resources are confined to some unworked coal deposits, valuable copper near Altantepe, and sulphur.

131 The Dobrudja is about 9,300 square miles in all:
161 of this some 2,960 square miles were returned to Bulgaria in 1940. The population of the province as a whole is about 850,000. Its main value to the contesting States lies in the Black Sea stretch of
504 coast. The port of Constanza, the greatest and most
361 important on the western shores of the Black Sea, has modern harbour works built at the beginning of this century and covering an area of 60 hectares. It was through Constanza that Rumanian exports used to pass to France and Great Britain. The docks of Constanza are about 30 ft. deep and can, therefore, be used by large, sea-going ships. The harbour facilities include storage buildings for wheat and oil-tanks with a capacity for over 200,000 cubic metres of fuel, which are fed by the pipe-lines coming from Ploesti. Oil can moreover be pumped straight from the pipe-lines simultaneously into four tankers. Another great advantage is that the port is
361 completely ice-free all the winter. Constanza is the administrative centre of the Dobrudja and also a well-known seaside resort. Rail communications

with the rest of Rumania are provided by the line 361
Constanza-Cernavoda-Bucarest.

MOLDAVIA (Moldova[R]). The second of the two 131
original Rumanian principalities is only half as big 161
as Wallachia and its population is about half. Moldavia covers an area of about 15,280 square miles, and is inhabited by about 2,500,000 Rumanians, Jews, Hungarians, Slavs and Germans.

Owing to its geographical position Moldavia was 175
more exposed to Polish, Russian and also Hungarian influence than Wallachia. After the death of the *voivode* Stephen the Great in 1504, the country became part of the Turkish dominions. From then onwards Moldavia shared the fate of Wallachia. Russian influence, however, naturally made itself felt in greater intensity in Moldavia. The independence of the principality was restored under John Cuza who eventually became the first ruler of the United Principalities.

The western boundaries of Moldavia are formed 131
by the Carpathians. In the south the province borders on Muntenia and in the north on the Bukovina, which originally was part of Moldavia. The eastern frontier is formed by the River Pruth. The 133
western part of Moldavia consists of the slopes of the Carpathian Mountains and the hill region below. Farther east the country flattens out into the plains which are bordered by the valley of the Pruth. The most fertile districts lie on the western bank of the Pruth and in the eastern corner of the province. The hills, which reach heights of 1,800 ft., are wooded. But there is much fertile soil which produces wheat and maize. There are also vineyards

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Moldavia]

133 and good pasture. The Sereth, which waters this region and runs parallel to the Pruth, flows into the Danube below Galati.

135 On the eastern slopes of the Carpathians there are large deposits of oil which have not yet been fully exploited. In the *comitat* Bacau, also in the mountain region of Moldavia, there are some valuable coal and salt mines. The salt mines of Targu-Ocna are the most important in the whole of Rumania.

311 438 The majority of the people of Moldavia are employed on the land. They grow wheat, maize and sugar-beet and tend the vines. Recently, successful experiments have been made with the growing of industrial crops. Timber felling provides another source of income, especially at Targu-Neamt, Piatra-Neamt and Focsani. There are important refineries at Moinesti and Solont, sugar factories at Roman and Ripiceni, and large textile works at Buhusi.

361 The capital and economic centre of Moldavia is the town of Jasi, on the western bank of the Pruth. Its population numbers about 80,000, more than half of them Jews. Jasi, lying on a number of vine-growing hills overlooking the valley of the Pruth, is an old commercial centre, which used to be visited in the middle ages by Genoese, Venetian and Greek [368] merchants. In Jasi, with its wide streets flanked by long rows of one-storied houses, there is the oldest Rumanian University, founded by John Cuza, a famous library containing over 160,000 books, and many other cultural institutions. Jasi has a number of iron and steel works, several clothing factories and is the chief marketing centre for cattle and wine in Moldavia.

[The Banat]

The north-western part of the province is the continuation of the Hungarian plain and is very fertile. To the east and south there are high mountains with rich forests and iron and coal deposits. The mountains of the Banat are forced by the Danube in the area between Bazias and Orsova, cutting a deep narrow valley which, in the Kazan Pass, is only about a hundred yards wide. This is where the Roman emperor Trajan built the second of his bridges over the Lower Danube. This is also one of the most picturesque regions of the Banat and the whole of Rumania, 133 [135]

The Banat has been a strategic and economic outpost of various States and empires. Throughout the times of known history this province was a favourite region for colonization. Romans, Turks, Hungarians and Austrians sought to strengthen the frontiers of their dominions by settling the Banat with peoples on whose loyalty, military and economic abilities they could rely in case of war. In consequence peoples of all races were transplanted to and took root in the Banat. In Roman times the province was fortified in order to protect the settlers who were brought here from all over the empire against the Dacians of Transylvania. During the many Turkish wars the Banat was an important defensive position upon which the Hungarians based their strategy. For over a century and a half, from 1552 to 1718, the Banat was under Turkish rule and went through a period of decay. 175 635

Under the Austrian military administration, which lasted up to 1779, the Banat experienced great prosperity. German settlers from the Rhineland and French-speaking peasants from Lorraine were brought to the Banat by the Empress Maria

7

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Crisana]

in the west and Czechoslovakia in the north. The
162 inhabitants of the Crisana are Rumanians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans and some Slavs. Taken as a whole the province contains a slight Rumanian majority, but there is in the immediate frontier region a fairly homogeneous Hungarian population, which forms a local majority.

133 The western part of the Crisana has the same
311 features as the lowlands of Hungary. The types of agriculture also closely resemble those of the rest of
135 the country on both banks of the Tisza[H] (Theiss[G]). There are wide, flat fields of maize and wheat interspersed with pastures, grazed by horses and longhorn cattle. To the east the country rises and forms a chain of hills which produce good fruit and wine. Beyond are the mountains of Bihor (Bihar[H]) which form the western wall of Transylvania. These mountains are rich in coal, gold, copper, bauxite, asphalt and marble. Consequently this region maintains numerous industrial enterprises. Apart from its mineral resources and good wheat and maize the Crisana is also well known for its horses, cattle, pigs and sheep.

361 The capital of the Crisana is Oradea-Mare
438 (Nagyvarad[H], Grosswardein[G]) in the valley of the Cris (Körös[H], Kreisch[G]). Its population of about 95,000 consists of Hungarians, Rumanians, Jews, Germans and others. Oradea is the junction for five railway lines and commands all the main communications leading from the Hungarian plain to Transylvania. The town is also the seat of many industries and the chief market for the agricultural produce of the province. Arad, on the northern bank of the Mures (Maros[H]), is inhabited by 65,000 people,

6

12. Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

563 leges. In 1919 they accepted the union of Transylvania with the Old Kingdom. In the inter-war period the Germans in Rumania enjoyed a far better treatment than any other minority, and in Transylvania they were by far the most prosperous community. Nevertheless, the pan-German policy of National-Socialism found many supporters in their ranks.

131 648 [161] *Vienna Award.* Before the Vienna Award of 1940 Transylvania covered an area of 24,600 square miles and had a population of over 3,250,000, including 200,000 Jews. The decision of the German and Italian Foreign Ministers in Vienna split Transylvania in two, a measure never before carried out during the eventful history of the principality and certainly harmful and unjust to all the parties concerned. There is no doubt that this 'solution', which has only complicated the Transylvanian question and made its real solution more difficult, was made deliberately in order to make both Hungary and Rumania more dependent on Germany's support.

133 *Geography and Products.* The Transylvanian highlands are surrounded on three sides by the high mountain chains of the Carpathians. In the south-west the border is formed by the 'Western Mountains' (Muntii Apuseni), and in the north-west by the hills which eventually merge into the Hungarian plain. The Rivers Mures, Somes and Tarnava divide the highland in three distinct parts, the steppe, the hills and the forests. Parallel with the outer ring of the Eastern Carpathians there runs a belt of volcanic mountains with many small valleys. In the south-east there is the fertile and hilly district of Trei-

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

Scaune (Haromszek[H]) which also possesses numerous industrial enterprises. Most of the rivers of Transylvania rise in the Eastern Carpathians and flow to the west and south. The Mures, flowing from east to west winds its way between the Carpathians and the 'Western Mountains' near Alba Julia (Gyulafehervar[H], Karlsburg[G]) and descends into the lowlands farther west. The Somes (Szamos[H]) reaches the plains north-west of the Transylvanian highland and eventually flows into the Tisza. Communications with Muntenia and Oltenia go over the mountain passes of Predeal, Bran and the 'Red Tower', with Moldavia over those of Buzau, Ghimes and Bicaz, and with the Bukovina over the Rodna Pass. 133

The climate of Transylvania is not as favourable for the raising of crops as that of Muntenia and the Banat. In the valleys, however, maize, wheat and rye are grown with some success. Stock-breeding is more important than agriculture. But Transylvania is very rich in mineral resources. Apart from coal, gold, copper, salt, bauxite and iron Transylvania possesses the greatest reserves of natural gas in the whole of Europe. The chemically pure methane which is used by many factories for power, as well as for cooking and lighting by many householders, could supply the whole of Transylvania for over a hundred years and make the consumption of coal unnecessary. 311 135

The capital of Transylvania is Cluj (Kolozsvar[H], Klausenburg[G]), with a population of over 105,000, consisting of Hungarians, Germans, Rumanians and Jews. The town is an important rail and road junction and the cultural centre of all the three 361

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Bukovina]

[Bessarabia]

000 small deposits of coal, gold and lead, but the industry of the province is well developed.

361 The capital of the Bukovina is Czernowitz (Cernauti[R]) with over 100,000 inhabitants. The town is situated on a high hill near the Pruth and is a great commercial centre. Here branches of the Austrian banks and some big Viennese businesses remained. The population of Czernowitz, like that of the rest of the province, is very mixed. Economically important as a junction of several trade-routes, Czernowitz has also become a great industrial town during the last fifty years.

648 In June 1940 the Northern Bukovina, including Czernowitz, altogether about 2,260 square miles, was ceded by Rumania to the U.S.S.R. Thereby over 550,000 people, mostly Ukrainians and many Jews, became Soviet citizens.

131 **BESSARABIA.** For over twenty years the province of
161 Bessarabia was the eastern frontier region of Greater Rumania. It covers an area of 17,760 square miles and has a population of 3,000,000.[1] Bessarabia is surrounded by natural frontiers: in the north and east by the River Dniester, in the south by the Black Sea and the Danube, and in the west by the Pruth.

133 The north of Bessarabia is formed by a highland about 1,000 ft. high, consisting of fertile arable land which belongs to the 'black-earth' region of the Ukraine. The central area is hilly country, divided

[1] To which were added 120,000 Polish and Ukrainian villagers transplanted from Eastern Poland by the Soviet authorities shortly before their retreat before the German attack in 1941.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

by the valleys through which flow the tributaries of /133
the Pruth and Dniester. In the south, beginning near Besarabeasca, extends the Budjak steppe which merges into the sandy soils, salt marshes and lagoons of the delta of the Danube and of the Black Sea coast. The climate of Bessarabia is the same as that /132
of the regions east of the Dniester. The summers are very hot and dry, the winters very cold with icy winds and great snowfalls. Nevertheless, crops 311
grow well in Bessarabia and 61% of the whole area is arable land. The chief products are maize, wheat, tobacco and wine and lately also soya beans. There are few factories and the only source of income for the people, apart from agriculture, is the fishing industry in the south.

The capital of Bessarabia is Kishineff (Chisinau[R]) 361
with a population of over 200,000 (1935). Here are concentrated such industrial enterprises as the province possesses, the most important being flour mills, leather factories and other secondary industries connected with agriculture.

The first colonization of Bessarabia was carried 175
out by the Romans who succeeded in occupying this 635
territory only for a short time. During the great period of migration (seventh to tenth centuries), the province was invaded by a host of tribes. Bessarabia was first occupied by Rumanians in the early fourteenth century and incorporated in Moldavia in 1367. A century and a half later Southern Bessarabia fell to Turkey, but several merchant-colonies were still administered by Genoese and Venetian traders on the Danube delta and the Black Sea coast. In the following centuries Bessarabia was often a battleground for Russian and Turkish armies, who alter-

241 peasant views with suspicion and often hostility
[479] all attempts at improvements in traditional methods. Even the co-operative societies have made less progress than in other Danubian countries. There is need for considerable capital expenditure in grouping small farms into larger units, in providing better buildings, more implements and fertilisers. There is need for diversification of production—more fodder crops and more animal husbandry. Above all, there is need for development in industry and commerce to provide work for the surplus agricultural population.

2. Natural Conditions and Regions

132 The climate is of the extreme Continental type, with long hot summers and severe winters. Precipitation is largely concentrated in winter and early summer. During the greater part of the growing and ripening season rains are light, and from time to time serious droughts occur which may ruin the grain crops.

●133 The agricultural regions correspond to the
311 natural divisions into plain and hill country—the Danube plain and Bessarabia which comprise the greater part of the territory and produce the bulk of the crops, and the hilly and mountainous land of Transylvania and the Bucovina.

The plain is well-suited for agriculture, the soil over much of it being of the fertile *chernozem* or
[134] black-earth type, but the backward methods of farming and the light rainfall keep yields per acre low.

This region is not equally backward in all parts. The Rumanian Banat at the western end of the country, and formerly part of Hungary, is more prosperous and progressive. The population is
[162] not purely Rumanian but includes Swabians and Saxons, descendants of the German stock systematically settled there on medium-sized peasant holdings in the eighteenth century after the cession of the territory to Austria by the Turks. Methods and yields, by Rumanian standards, are good.
[231] The livestock density is higher than the average and the area produces a substantial surplus of pigs. Rural overcrowding is not as marked as elsewhere.

241 Conditions of life and methods of farming are
133 considerably worse in the plain land of the Old Kingdom. Agriculture here is as primitive as in any part of Eastern Europe, depending on an unbroken alternation of wheat and maize cultivation with little subsidiary production. Some wheat is marketed, but the maize is grown largely
[311] for consumption on the farms. So little land is available per head of population that the farm population and working animals (which eat the maize stalks) can be fed only by devoting an excessive acreage to maize.

Bessarabia makes up the remainder of the plain land; conditions of settlement and farming methods are much the same as in the Old Kingdom, but the density of population is lower and there are substantial grain exports.

Given normal yields, every district of the plain area is at least self-sufficient in foodstuffs; indeed parts of it regularly produce large grain surpluses. Transitional areas between the Danube Valley and the Transylvanian plateau, such as the Carpatho-Moldavia and Carpatho-Muntenia areas, may,

[6c]

241 however, be slightly deficient in grain, especially
133 in poor years.

The hilly land of Transylvania and the Bucovina
[311] differs markedly from the plain. There is proportionately less arable and much more meadow, grazing and forest land. The soil is poor. Methods are not as primitive as in the plain land of the Old Kingdom, but over-crowding is more serious and output per head is consequently lower. Parts of this region are slightly deficient in grain. Though
[146] the level of food consumption is low, the dietary is more varied than elsewhere in the country, less maize and more meat and dairy produce being eaten.

3. Crops

311 Of the total area of pre-war Rumania, of nearly 30 million hectares (119,000 sq. miles) and twice the area of England and Wales, about 13 million hectares, or 45 per cent. was arable. Permanent meadow, pasture and grazing occupied 14 per cent., while tree and bush crops accounted for a further 2 per cent. The remaining land was non-agricultural, forest and waste land.

273 A very high proportion of the arable—over 80 per cent.—was used for grain growing, principally maize, wheat and barley. Owing to low rainfall, use of poor seed and lack of fertilisers, yields were at a low level and fluctuated widely from year to year.

[43] Out of an average grain production of 11 million tons, 6 millions went into domestic human consumption and 1½ million were exported, the remainder going to fodder, seed and waste. Grain exports have always figured largely in the country's foreign trade. During the twenty years 1920 to 1939 they only once fell below a million tons, and in some years exceeded three million tons. In value, during the decade before the war, they formed, after petroleum products, the main item in exports.

241 No other category of crops compares with grain. Sown fodder crops took barely 5 per cent. of the arable, all other crops, including potatoes, fibres, oilseeds, tobacco and sugar beet, about 8 per cent. Peas, beans and oilseeds were grown in sufficient quantities to provide surpluses for export. Germany established two companies—Solagra in 1934 and Soya A.G. in 1940—which invested large sums in promoting oilseed cultivation. The area under sunflower was raised only slightly, but that under soya rose from nil in 1933 to 103,000 ha. (254,000 acres) in 1939, but the greater part of both crops was located in Bessarabia which Rumania lost to the U.S.S.R. in 1940 (see below).

277 Production of potatoes, vegetables and sugar beet was just sufficient for domestic consumption, but the tobacco crop did not quite meet requirements. Tobacco production had fallen from 20,000 tons in the late nineteen-twenties to 12,000 tons in the years just prior to the war.

Fruit production was undeveloped and there was little organised marketing and processing. Plums were the main crop, but three-quarters of the output was used for making brandy. Apples and other kinds of fruit, and walnuts, were produced in fair quantities, but exports were insignificant, and, owing to low quality and the lack of standardisation, there were no prospects of development.

504
505

cleared without very considerable development. It is probable that not more than about 50 per cent. of the above capacity could be worked. Grain is loaded by land and floating elevators.

[502]

The ports of Brăila and Galați are ice-bound during some winters, ice occurring to a sufficient extent to prevent navigation from the Black Sea between January and mid-March in about 3 years in 10.

D. INLAND WATERWAYS

I. General

133
505
487

In 1937 navigable waterways totalled 2,840 km (1,766 miles) and were divided as follows:—

	Km.	Miles
Danube	1,075	668
Danube tributaries	395	246
Dniester	740	460
Prut	410	255
Mureș	185	115
Bega Canal	35	22

The rivers Dniester, Prut and Mureș have not been adequately regulated for regular traffic, but are used for local traffic and for timber floating.

II. The Danube

1. Traffic

487
505
439

The Danube, Rumania's main traffic artery, carried about 60 per cent. of all import tonnage and some 15 per cent. of all exports in the years immediately before the war. Traffic took two distinct types, first, the traffic in sea-going vessels with an average size of 2,000-2,500 tons proceeding as far as Galați and Brăila via the Sulina mouth, and second, on the river proper, on the Danube above Galați.

The sea-going traffic passing through the Sulina mouth in the years just before the war consisted of about 1·2—1·4 million tons a year of exports from Rumania or other riparian states. By far the most important items were grain and timber. About half the vessels entering the Danube from the sea appear to have been in ballast, the remainder bringing in some 900,000-500,000 tons of imports mainly for Rumania.

Inland-water traffic on the Rumanian sector of the Danube in 1938 (the latest year for which information for all kinds of traffic is available) amounted to 3 million tons. 1·6 million tons consisted of upstream traffic from Rumania to other riparian states, 0·24 million tons of downstream traffic to Rumania, about 1 million tons of Rumanian internal traffic, and about 0·2 million

CHAPTER VIII

487
505
439

of transit traffic (mainly downstream). Traffic with other riparian states was apportioned as follows :—

	From Rumania	*To Rumania*
	'000 tons	
Germany	220	40
Austria	390	20
Czechoslovakia	440	30
Hungary	300	150
Yugoslavia	200	—
Bulgaria	80	3
	1,630	243

The composition of inland-water traffic has been fully analysed only at the Iron Gates, at the western end of the Danube's Rumanian course. In the traffic shown below, the upstream traffic consisted mainly of Rumanian exports, while the downstream traffic was made up of imports and transit traffic in approximately equal proportions.

Traffic in '000 metric tons at the Iron Gates :—

	1938	1939
	Upstream	
Total	1,362·5	1,864·[illegible]
of which (main items only) :		
Timber	20·1	11·[illegible]
Iron	21·1	13·4
Wheat	30·3	300·6
Barley	49·8	68·[illegible]
Maize	25·1	125·[illegible]
Petroleum and its products	787·7	1,046·1
Salt	30·8	31·7
	Downstream	
Total	489·3	771·2
of which (main items only) :		
Iron	77·2	22·2
Timber	67·6	86·5
Wheat	74·4	363·0
Maize and oats	79·6	28·2

505
439
722

Little is known about traffic since Rumania finally joined the Axis in 1941. As a whole, it is below pre-war level as a result of a great decrease in the amount of grain coming forward. This has been partly, but certainly not entirely, counterbalanced by a slight increase in oil traffic, by the probable diversion of rail traffic to the Danube and by military traffic. The most important individual traffics at the present time are as follows :—

(a) Oil shipments from Giurgiu (i) upstream to Italy (50-70,000 tons a month), to Germany (possibly 30-50,000 tons a month), and (ii) downstream to German forces in South Russia (quantity unknown, but may be substantial).

(b) Downstream supplies of (i) coal to Rumanian railways (part only of total supply), and of (ii) military equipment, stores, etc., to South Russia (quantities unknown).

(c) Upstream supplies of (i) some S. Russian products, including grain (perhaps 20,000 tons a month) and possibly iron and manganese ore (quantities unknown), as well as of (ii) some small quantities of Rumanian exports of agricultural products.

2. Navigation

133
502

The Iron Gate Sector of the Danube between Orşova and Turnu Severin, with its rapids and reefs causing violent currents, is particularly difficult for navigation, and the use of specially

[44a]

133 502 trained pilots is compulsory, while the barge tows have to be broken up into smaller units. This sector of the Danube cannot be negotiated at night, which constitutes an enormous hindrance for large-scale traffic. In order to speed up the traffic, the use of suspension railways and locomotives on rails laid along the river bank was introduced before the war, but the system has met with only moderate success.

[503] Navigation in the Maritime sector of the Danube is affected by silting up—particularly in the autumn—and constant dredging has to be carried out in the Sulina branch to maintain sufficient depth for passage of vessels up to Galați. The depth of this sector was 24 ft. in 1939, permitting the entry of vessels of medium draught only. Danube navigation is held up for varying periods between November and March by ice, averaging 30-50 days, and occasionally even for 90 days.

499 There are no permanent bridges on the Danube to connect Rumania with Bulgaria. However, a Rumanian-Bulgarian Commission was established in 1942 to remedy this deficiency by arranging for the construction of a bridge, which will take five years to complete, between Giurgiu and Ruse. In the meantime a ferry system is in use between Giurgiu and Ruse carrying important supplies of oil for the German forces in Greece.

3. River Ports

503 504 There are in all some 38 river ports, of which the most important, all on the Danube (from west to east), are as follows :—

Moldova	Oltenița
Orșova	Brăila
Turnu Severin	Galați
Giurgiu	Sulina

Since the war started considerable improvements have already been made on the Danube. This is of special significance for, though this waterway is of little use for Rumanian internal traffic, since the closing of the sea route between Rumania and North Germany, it has become vitally important for the carrying of bulky transport. As early as 1940 a scheme for the rationisation of Danube traffic was put into operation, and the installations of Giurgiu, the main Danube port for oil transport, were improved.

To avoid congestion at Giurgiu, the Danube ports of New Moldova and Orșova have been enlarged. Internal traffic has been diverted to Oltenița, which is also used for the unloading of incoming traffic. The construction of new harbour installations is being carried out by a German-Rumania company.

4. Organisation of Inland Water Shipping

505 656 [655] Rumanian Danube shipping is under State control, and organisation is carried out by firms which are partly State-owned and partly owned by private individuals. The most important company is the State-owned "N.F.R." (*Navigațiunea Fluvială Română*), and of lesser importance are the privately owned companies "S.R.D." (*S.A.R. de Navigație pe Dunăre*) and "Sind" (*Societa Italiana di Navigazione Danubiana*).

505 648 All Rumanian shipping companies are members of the Danube Shipping Pool, which is under German supervision, headed by the *Deutsche Donauschiffahrtsgruppe*, which is closely connected with the Hermann Goering-Werke für Binnenschiffahrt. The importance of the Danube Pool (exclusive of the Tanker Pool) will be realised when it is borne in mind that between 1932-1937 the freight carried annually by its vessels on the

[44 b]

Bulgaria EE1
Rumania ED1

B 342 233

with straw roofs. They are rarely plastered with mud. In western Sredna Gora, transportable sheep pens are used (Gellert, 1937: 169).

RUMANIA

R 361 175 177 648

In Rumania there exists a marked difference between settlements in the lowlands and those of the Carpathian Mountain region. While topograpny and the presence or absence of such building materials as stone, wood or clay are important factors, political considerations also played a significant role. With the beginning of the 18th century Greek influence became predominant in Moldavia and Wallachia. The Porte set up Greek rulers in these principalities, thus in reality the Rumanians were as much under Turkish dominion, although indirectly, as were the people of the Balkans. It was only after the rebellion of 1821 that Rumanian rulers were reinstated. During all periods of unrest and foreign invasion the mountains and forests served as areas of refuge; the Serbian hajduk has his counterpart in the Rumanian heydoick (Stratilesco, 1907: 30-34).

R 361 R [133]

Location and Types of Settlements. The older settlements were in the nature of hamlets (catîn). These were generally not built on the top of hills, but rather in depressions, on the edge of forests, and away from the military roads (Grothe, 1907: 54). In the hilly regions of Oltenia and Moldavia the villages were located close to a river or on the slope of a hill. Farmsteads are generally spaced fairly far apart, in no definite order. Villages may extend over two or three hills facing one another (Stratilesco, 1907: 205). Villages in the Wallachian plains are located close to the roads. The prevalent type is the road village; buildings are located on either side of the highway which forms the main road of the village. Larger villages may have additional cross-roads (Jänecke, 1918: 7). While mountain villages average a population of 350, the largest being around 700, villages of the plains average 700 and may reach 2000 (Grothe, 1907: 55).

R [491] R [621]

R 342 R [335]

House Types. Due to the scarcity of wood and stone in the plains, buildings are generally constructed of wicker and daub, in which technique the Rumanians are masters. The roof is made first, the walls afterwards. The principle posts are first set into the ground, then the studs of the outer walls and inner partitions are spaced at 1 to 2 foot intervals. After the roof has been formed walls are built up. Mud is kneaded down with the feet, mixed with straw, and shaped into lumps that take the place of bricks. These lumps are then set between the studs and left to dry (Stratilesco, 1907: 208). More often walls are of wickerwork, plastered inside and out with a mixture of mud, straw and cowdung to a thickness of 15-25 centimeters (Jänecke, 1918: 10). The rough walls are smoothed out by applying thinner and thinner layers of mud and cowdung mixture. They are then whitewashed inside and out. Floors of timber are recent; the floor is commonly of tamped earth.

VI.—ECONOMIC ROUMANIA

AGRICULTURE.

311 162 MODERN ROUMANIA is essentially an agricultural state, as was the Old Kingdom (43 to 46 per cent of the land being arable and 22 per cent forest, whilst over 80 per cent of the population of 18 millions are agricultural workers), although it has valuable potentialities for the development of industry.

132 241 134 ARRANGED in zones round the bastion of the southern and eastern Carpathian highlands, the main agricultural regions of post-war Roumania exhibit, according to aspect and altitude, a considerable variety of climatic conditions, which is reflected in a varying emphasis in the selection of crops raised. In general, we may say that the continental nature of the climate and the resulting succession from north to south and from highland to lowland of soils, graded from poor ashen-grey podsol in the Carpathians through oak-forest loams to a rich chernoziom in the south-eastern Danube plains, has resulted, wherever the ground is sufficiently level, in a concentration on grain production. The heavier rainfall of the uplands, the relatively great humidity and shelter from the driving winds that sweep across the open plains, coupled with the exposure of less [137] fertile rocks—granites and coarse sandstones—explains the large area of forested land (24.5 per cent, nearly 7¼ million hectares) in those districts that extend into the Carpathian highlands.

243 OF THE 13 odd million hectares of arable land, cereals occupy some 37 to 39 per cent. Production varies greatly from year to year and from district to district. In the old kingdom of Wallachia-Moldavia, maize is by far the heaviest crop, particularly in Oltenia, where the summer rainfall is heavier. It is also the heaviest crop in Transylvania, the cultivated areas under maize, wheat, barley and oats being [262] respectively 4, 3, 2 and 1 million hectares. Maize is the staple crop of the peasant holder almost throughout the country, for it not only provides the bread cakes and the "mamaliga," maize pudding, the main food of the mass of the people, but also fodder for the cattle to eke out the hay in

'2: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Oltenia]

Kingdom is Wallachia, which is formed by Oltenia and Muntenia. 631

OLTENIA. Oltenia is the western part of the principality of Wallachia. Its boundaries are, in the west and north the Carpathians, in the east the River Olt, and in the south the Danube. The province covers an area of about 9,640 square miles and has a population of about 1,900,000. The soil of the sub-Carpathian hills consists of sand and clay and gravel and is well watered by numerous rivulets. Here are some densely populated valleys, bordered by rich forests and grazing grounds. Farther south and extending to the Danube lies the fertile plain composed of the rich 'yellow earth'. Its character is similar to that of the lowlands of Muntenia, but it lies on a higher level and also has a higher rainfall. 131 133 134 161

The richest district of this fertile province is the *judet*[1] of Dolj in the south-western corner of Oltenia. From here, and the similarly fertile *judets* of Mehedinti and Romanati, also on the northern bank of the Danube, high-quality maize and wheat have been exported for many years. From the hilly country farther north fruit is the chief export. In the mountainous districts forestry provides the main occupation for the local inhabitants. There is much sheep-breeding, for the grassy slopes provide good grazing. 311

Apart from the Danube the two most important rivers of Oltenia are the Jiu and the Olt; the latter rises in Transylvania and enters Oltenia through the Red Tower Pass. Oltenia is not rich in mineral resources. There is, however, oil at Govora, west of 133 135

[1] Administrative unit.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 194-

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Banat]

[The Crisana]

The high quality of the crops in this province, 241
amongst them wheat, maize, rye, oats, and the high 134
standard of animal breeding, have made the Banat known far beyond the borders of Rumania. The fertility of the soil is due partly to the 'black earth' which, in a greater or lesser degree, is a component of all the arable land. Apart from being an important agricultural region, the Banat possesses valuable industries, forests and minerals. Iron ore and coal 316
are mined in the area of Resita and Anina, where 327
there are great iron and steel works which produce 315
railway equipment and armaments. The Danubian port of Orsova, guarding the western entrance to the 'Iron Gates', also has an oil refinery.

The capital of the Banat is Timisoara[R] (Temes- 361
var[H]) on the Bega with a population of 100,000. In Roman times the fortress of Ripensia was situated here. In Hunyadi's time it was a centre of resistance against the Turks, only second in importance to Belgrade. To-day the town is a great rail and road junction with many factories, banks, commercial houses and cultural institutions. Lugoj, on the Timis, with a population of 20,000, and Caransebes, north of the Porta Orientalis which leads through the mountains of the Banat to the Danube, are marketing towns of some importance.

THE CRISANA AND MARAMURES. Geographically the 131
Crisana is the eastern borderland of the Hungarian [161]
plain. The province covers an area of about 8,400 square miles and has a population of just under 1,500,000. The Crisana lies between Transylvania in the east, the River Mures (Maros[H]) in the south; Hungary (as reduced by the Treaty of the Trianon) in the west and Czechoslovakia in the north.

241 peasant views with suspicion and often hostility
all attempts at improvements in traditional
[474] methods. Even the co-operative societies have made less progress than in other Danubian countries. There is need for considerable capital expenditure in grouping small farms into larger units, in providing better buildings, more implements and fertilisers. There is need for diversification of production—more fodder crops and more animal husbandry. Above all, there is need for development in industry and commerce to provide work for the surplus agricultural population.

2. Natural Conditions and Regions

132 The climate is of the extreme Continental type, with long hot summers and severe winters. Precipitation is largely concentrated in winter and early summer. During the greater part of the growing and ripening season rains are light, and from time to time serious droughts occur which may ruin the grain crops.

133 The agricultural regions correspond to the natural divisions into plain and hill country—the
311 Danube plain and Bessarabia which comprise the greater part of the territory and produce the bulk of the crops, and the hilly and mountainous land of Transylvania and the Bucovina.

The plain is well-suited for agriculture, the soil over much of it being of the fertile *chernozem* or
[134] black earth type, but the backward methods of farming and the light rainfall keep yields per acre low.

This region is not equally backward in all parts. The Rumanian Banat at the western end of the country, and formerly part of Hungary, is more prosperous and progressive. The population is
[162] not purely Rumanian but includes Swabians and Saxons, descendants of the German stock systematically settled there, on medium-sized peasant holdings in the eighteenth century after the cession of the territory to Austria by the Turks. Methods and yields, by Rumanian standards, are good.
[231] The livestock density is higher than the average and the area produces a substantial surplus of pigs. Rural overcrowding is not as marked as elsewhere.

241 Conditions of life and methods of farming are
133 considerably worse in the plain land of the Old Kingdom. Agriculture here is as primitive as in any part of Eastern Europe, depending on an unbroken alternation of wheat and maize cultivation with little subsidiary production. Some wheat is marketed, but the maize is grown largely
[311] for consumption on the farms. So little land is available per head of population that the farm population and working animals (which eat the maize stalks) can be fed only by devoting an excessive acreage to maize.

Bessarabia makes up the remainder of the plain land; conditions of settlement and farming methods are much the same as in the Old Kingdom, but the density of population is lower and there are substantial grain exports.

Given normal yields, every district of the plain area is at least self-sufficient in foodstuffs; indeed parts of it regularly produce large grain surpluses. Transitional areas between the Danube Valley and the Transylvanian plateau, such as the Carpatho-Moldavia and Carpatho-Muntenia areas, may,

[60]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

page 67

IV

TOWN, COUNTRY, AND FOREIGN TRADE

Rumanian Industry

INDUSTRY has a Jekyll and Hyde role in the minds of many 433 Rumanians. It is regarded as the potential savior of the economy 178 through its ability to increase national productivity and to absorb surplus agricultural population. At the same time it is accused of exploiting the countryside and of gaining all the rewards. These two views are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Before the First World War industry in the Old Kingdom was relatively undeveloped; the two most important industries were petroleum production and lumbering, both largely financed by foreign capital and both producing principally for export. Industrialization was naturally restricted by the scarcity of local capital and the lack of a trained labor force. Although the economy was predominantly agricultural, the Rumanian government, in 1887, inaugurated a policy of encouraging national industry by means of a high protectionist tariff, partly to avoid the complete destruction of household industries by foreign competition, partly for nationalist reasons.

The acquisition of new territories after the First World War—especially Transylvania with its mineral resources, metallurgical industry, and more highly developed economy—provided additional impulse to industrial expansion. Greater Rumania was moderately [135] well endowed with raw materials: petroleum, fair lignite reserves, some iron, lead, zinc, and salt. Nevertheless, Rumania remained a predominantly agrarian country; in 1930 only 10 per cent of the active population was engaged in industry.

The growth of industry in the Old Kingdom in the first third of 178 the twentieth century is shown by the following figures:[1] 433

	Number of industrial enterprises	*Personnel*	*Horsepower in enterprises*
1901	62,188	168,198	60,744
1930	58,892	279,897	623,442

The decrease in the number of establishments and the increase in horsepower show a concentration of industry in larger undertakings

1. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei romînești*, p. 188.

241 Dry farming is practised to some extent, but is capable of
312 development in the districts of semi-steppe.

CO-OPERATION.

476 ALTHOUGH it is not by any means reduced to a science, as in Belgium and Denmark, for example, co-operation is practised by the Roumanian peasant farmer to an important extent. In Transylvania and Bessarabia, the system has for long been well established, owing to the initiative and encouragement of village priests and schoolmasters. For example, there are community herds of water buffaloes, which tend
474 to prevent deterioration of the breed. The forest industry is in the main run by co-operative societies which control the felling, local distribution and marketing of timber.

IN 1931 there were 5,200 popular co-operative banks, with over 1,150,000 members; 236 forest co-operative societies, with about 341,600 members; 1,600 consumption and supply co-operative societies, with 236,000 members; besides a number of village buying and leasing associations.

241 MUCH has been done, and efforts are continuing by propaganda and instruction, to encourage more up-to-date methods among the peasant farmers and there are a number of schools for primary instruction in agricultural method. Modern farm machinery is loaned by the Ministry of Agriculture to peasants for small fees, stud farms have been established to improve the breed of horses and cattle, and funds have been loaned to the peasant communities for the purchase of stud animals.

INDUSTRY.

● 135 FROM the point of view of power and raw materials for the development of industry, Roumania is also well endowed by nature. True, her supply of coal is negligible, the only deposit worth mention being that of the brown coal basin of Jiul at Lupeni in Oltenia, which is capable of producing about two million tons per annum. (The output in 1933 was in the neighbourhood of 1.4 million metric tons.) It contains much sulphur but is used to some extent in iron smelting. On the other hand, there are very rich stores of mineral oil. The oil-bearing rocks occur in abundance along the outer rim of the Carpathians in lower Miocene deposits which are

135 rich in salts. More accessible than these deposits are those of the sub-Carpathian hill country where upper Tertiary rocks are intensely folded in with salt-bearing Flysch deposits and have become impregnated with oil from the salt formations of the Flysch that has been forced up along lines of folding and fracture. Exploitation is mainly confined to the oil of these Pliocene rocks.

315 THE MAJOR oil-field follows the Carpathian arc from the neighbourhood of Piteşti through Targovişte, Ploeşti in Muntenia and northward through Bacau in Moldavia to the Polish frontier (i.e. within the districts of Dambovița, Prahova, Buzau and Bacau in the Trotuş valley). There is also a small field in the Maramureş district.

THE Prahova district is the most important, producing 65 to 70 per cent of the whole, while Dambovița produces about 25 per cent. Pre-war development of oil industry was mainly in the hands of foreigners. By the 1929 Mining Law equality of Roumanian and foreign capital is provided. By an Act of 1924 the subsoil became the property of the State, which grants new leases for a period of thirty years. The State has acquired oil plot zones as permanent reserves. Oil getting is proceeding on up-to-date lines. Deeper strata are being tapped as the upper one becomes exhausted. Modern wells now reach down to about 1,800 metres. In Prahova and Dambovița State concessions are the most productive and active (e.g. Moveni and Gura-Ocnitsei). The total output of crude oil in 1933 was 7.37 million metric tons, 19.7 of the total oil products being used for home consumption.

NATURAL GAS is also tapped in the oil-fields for gasolene and for domestic lighting and heating. It is largely used in the chemical industry. Transylvania has no oil of importance, but some useful gas-fields. Crude oil is used for steam raising in the metallurgical industry and for generating electricity: it also figures as fuel in the tile and pottery industry. Oil- and petrol-driven machinery is installed in electric factories, in pottery and tile works, and particularly in the alimentary industries.

313 TIMBER, owing to the lack of good communications and to the abundance and lavish use of the forests, remains an important item in the production of power, particularly in

vested in it and the high contribution it is expected to make 315 to the revenue of the State. The average price in lei of 434 petroleum products per ton during the years 1928–31 were 382 as follows, as reported by the Constantsa *Chamber of Commerce Bulletin*: 1928, at 4,080; 1929, at 3,800; 1930, at 2,600; 1931, at 1,031 lei. The following table, which gives quotations of the leading oil shares on the Bucarest stock market, is indicative of the depression which exists:

Average annual quotations

Share	1929	1930	*June* 1931	*June* 1932
Astra Romana ...	2391	1430	500	340
Steaua Romana ...	1234	571	230	135
Speranta	1210	639	380	100
Petrol Block ...	320	176	75	54
Concordia	1286	767	265	250
Creditul Minier ...	690	364	185	90
Redeventa	321	182	65	30
I.R.D.P.	397	143	92	35

The other mineral resources of Rumania are considerable, 135 especially in Transylvania, but no proper geological survey 316 has ever been made, nor have any mines other than salt mines ever been properly exploited. The following figures give the quantities of minerals mined during 1930, the total value of the same being estimated at 10,437 million lei: Lignite, 2,071,057 tons; coal, 298,825 tons; copper, 6,655 tons and 169; iron, 92,517 tons; manganese, 33,528 tons; bauxite, 678 tons; pyrites, 24,264 tons; amber, 107 tons; salt, 304,777 tons; lead and antimony, 984 tons; lead glaze, 194 tons; gold, 2,672 kilograms, silver, 4.418 kilograms.

Lignite is found in extensive beds not only in Transylvania and the Banat but also in the old kingdom. It is mainly used for the railways. The better qualities of coal are found in south-western Transylvania and the Banat. Copper is principally mined at Tulcea, near the mouth of the Danube, and at Ciuc in Transylvania.

'2: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Oltenia]

Kingdom is Wallachia, which is formed by Oltenia and Muntenia. 631

OLTENIA. Oltenia is the western part of the principality of Wallachia. Its boundaries are, in the west and north the Carpathians, in the east the River Olt, and in the south the Danube. The province covers an area of about 9,640 square miles and has a population of about 1,900,000. The soil of the sub-Carpathian hills consists of sand and clay and gravel and is well watered by numerous rivulets. Here are some densely populated valleys, bordered by rich forests and grazing grounds. Farther south and extending to the Danube lies the fertile plain composed of the rich 'yellow earth'. Its character is similar to that of the lowlands of Muntenia, but it lies on a higher level and also has a higher rainfall. 131 133 134 161

The richest district of this fertile province is the *judet*[1] of Dolj in the south-western corner of Oltenia. From here, and the similarly fertile *judets* of Mehedinti and Romanati, also on the northern bank of the Danube, high-quality maize and wheat have been exported for many years. From the hilly country farther north fruit is the chief export. In the mountainous districts forestry provides the main occupation for the local inhabitants. There is much sheep-breeding, for the grassy slopes provide good grazing. 311

Apart from the Danube the two most important rivers of Oltenia are the Jiu and the Olt; the latter rises in Transylvania and enters Oltenia through the Red Tower Pass. Oltenia is not rich in mineral resources. There is, however, oil at Govora, west of 133 135

[1] Administrative unit.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Oltenia]

135 the Olt, copper near Baia de Arama and salt near Ocnele Mari, north of Govora. The peasant population, in spite of the great agricultural wealth of the province, is extremely poor. The people live in small villages near the rivers. The houses are more often than not almost subterranean mud-huts. Agricultural implements are very primitive. The wooden plough is still widely used.

175 Oltenia was the first district of Rumania which was colonized by the Romans. It formed the spearhead, and later the base, for the Roman penetration of Dacia. Among the most interesting relics of Roman times found in Oltenia are the ruins of a bridge built by Trajan and the fort just outside Turnu-Severin. After the Roman withdrawal Oltenia shared the fortunes of Muntenia,[1] and in 1859 joined the Principality of Rumania.

361 The capital and chief industrial and commercial town of Oltenia is Craiova with a population of about 60,000. It is also the road and rail junction linking Bucarest with Oltenia and the western provinces. Turnu-Severin on the Danube is the important port guarding the famous 'Iron Gates'. Here the current of the Danube, passing through a narrow gorge is too strong and the water too shallow for shipping to [503] make headway upstream. A deep channel has therefore been blasted in the rock of the river bed and vessels are towed up it by locomotives on the railway alongside. Before the Great War Turnu-Severin was the frontier town between Rumania and Austria-Hungary. It has still preserved the character of a picturesque oriental marketing centre.

[1] Except that in 1718, after the Austrian occupation of Belgrade, Oltenia was temporarily under Austrian rule.

7

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Oltenia]

[Muntenia]

The Danubian ports of Calafat and Corabia handle 361
wheat exports and also have some valuable industries.

MUNTENIA. To the east of the River Olt extends 133
Muntenia, the other province of Wallachia. It [131]
covers an area of about 20,600 square miles and has
a population of about 4,500,000. The southern and [161]
eastern boundaries of the province are formed by the Danube, the northern frontier by the Carpathians. The land surface and climate of Muntenia are similar to those of Oltenia, but the hilly region south of the Carpathians is narrower. The fertile steppes, Baragan, Burnas, Gavan and Burdeas, are situated on the northern banks of the Danube which floods the adjoining districts and forms many lakes and marshes. The highest peaks of the Carpathians in Muntenia are the Negoi and the Moldovan, both over 7,500 ft. The most important of the many rivers descending from the high mountains are the Dambovita, Jalomita, Arges and Buzau, all of which
eventually flow into the Danube. The endless maize [311]
and wheat fields of Muntenia are covered in summer with heavy crops and on the steppes great flocks of sheep find their food. In spite of very dry summers and icy winters like those of Russia this region is one of the richest of Rumania and the whole of Europe.

Muntenia differs from all Rumanian provinces in [135]
that, in addition to stock breeding, the raising of high-quality crops, fishery and forestry, it possesses a source of wealth which is not found in such abundance in any other part of Europe, the oil fields of
Campina and Ploesti. There the hilly, wooded 361
countryside suddenly changes into a modern in-

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Dobrudja]

131 part of the Dobrudja. The delta of the Danube is
133 formed by the three arms Chilia, Sulina and St George. It includes an area of about 1,000 square miles, in which water and land, marshes, lakes and
[503] islands feed an almost tropical vegetation. The chief communications through the delta are provided by the Sulina canal and by causeways.

311 The steppes of the Southern Dobrudja yield good
•135 crops of wheat and maize, and the pastures maintain great herds of sheep. Mineral resources are confined to some unworked coal deposits, valuable copper near Altantepe, and sulphur.

131 The Dobrudja is about 9,300 square miles in all:
161 of this some 2,960 square miles were returned to Bulgaria in 1940. The population of the province as a whole is about 850,000. Its main value to the contesting States lies in the Black Sea stretch of
504 coast. The port of Constanza, the greatest and most
361 important on the western shores of the Black Sea, has modern harbour works built at the beginning of this century and covering an area of 60 hectares. It was through Constanza that Rumanian exports used to pass to France and Great Britain. The docks of Constanza are about 30 ft. deep and can, therefore, be used by large, sea-going ships. The harbour facilities include storage buildings for wheat and oil-tanks with a capacity for over 200,000 cubic metres of fuel, which are fed by the pipe-lines coming from Ploesti. Oil can moreover be pumped straight from the pipe-lines simultaneously into four tankers. Another great advantage is that the port is
361 completely ice-free all the winter. Constanza is the administrative centre of the Dobrudja and also a well-known seaside resort. Rail communications

7

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Moldavia]

133 and good pasture. The Sereth, which waters this region and runs parallel to the Pruth, flows into the Danube below Galati.

135 On the eastern slopes of the Carpathians there are large deposits of oil which have not yet been fully exploited. In the *comitat* Bacau, also in the mountain region of Moldavia, there are some valuable coal and salt mines. The salt mines of Targu-Ocna are the most important in the whole of Rumania.

311 438 The majority of the people of Moldavia are employed on the land. They grow wheat, maize and sugar-beet and tend the vines. Recently, successful experiments have been made with the growing of industrial crops. Timber felling provides another source of income, especially at Targu-Neamt, Piatra-Neamt and Focsani. There are important refineries at Moinesti and Solont, sugar factories at Roman and Ripiceni, and large textile works at Buhusi.

361 The capital and economic centre of Moldavia is the town of Jasi, on the western bank of the Pruth. Its population numbers about 80,000, more than half of them Jews. Jasi, lying on a number of vine-growing hills overlooking the valley of the Pruth, is an old commercial centre, which used to be visited in the middle ages by Genoese, Venetian and Greek [368] merchants. In Jasi, with its wide streets flanked by long rows of one-storied houses, there is the oldest Rumanian University, founded by John Cuza, a famous library containing over 160,000 books, and many other cultural institutions. Jasi has a number of iron and steel works, several clothing factories and is the chief marketing centre for cattle and wine in Moldavia.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Banat]

The north-western part of the province is 133
the continuation of the Hungarian plain and is very [135]
fertile. To the east and south there are high mountains with rich forests and iron and coal deposits. The mountains of the Banat are forced by the Danube in the area between Bazias and Orsova, cutting a deep narrow valley which, in the Kazan Pass, is only about a hundred yards wide. This is where the Roman emperor Trajan built the second of his bridges over the Lower Danube. This is also one of the most picturesque regions of the Banat and the whole of Rumania,

The Banat has been a strategic and economic 175
outpost of various States and empires. Throughout 635
the times of known history this province was a favourite region for colonization. Romans, Turks, Hungarians and Austrians sought to strengthen the frontiers of their dominions by settling the Banat with peoples on whose loyalty, military and economic abilities they could rely in case of war. In consequence peoples of all races were transplanted to and took root in the Banat. In Roman times the province was fortified in order to protect the settlers who were brought here from all over the empire against the Dacians of Transylvania. During the many Turkish wars the Banat was an important defensive position upon which the Hungarians based their strategy. For over a century and a half, from 1552 to 1718, the Banat was under Turkish rule and went through a period of decay.

Under the Austrian military administration, which lasted up to 1779, the Banat experienced great prosperity. German settlers from the Rhineland and French-speaking peasants from Lorraine were brought to the Banat by the Empress Maria

1

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Crisana]

in the west and Czechoslovakia in the north. The inhabitants of the Crisana are Rumanians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans and some Slavs. Taken as a whole the province contains a slight Rumanian majority, but there is in the immediate frontier region a fairly homogeneous Hungarian population, which forms a local majority.

The western part of the Crisana has the same features as the lowlands of Hungary. The types of agriculture also closely resemble those of the rest of the country on both banks of the Tisza[H] (Theiss[G]). There are wide, flat fields of maize and wheat interspersed with pastures, grazed by horses and longhorn cattle. To the east the country rises and forms a chain of hills which produce good fruit and wine. Beyond are the mountains of Bihor (Bihar[H]) which form the western wall of Transylvania. These mountains are rich in coal, gold, copper, bauxite, asphalt and marble. Consequently this region maintains numerous industrial enterprises. Apart from its mineral resources and good wheat and maize the Crisana is also well known for its horses, cattle, pigs and sheep.

The capital of the Crisana is Oradea-Mare (Nagyvarad[H], Grosswardein[G]) in the valley of the Cris (Körös[H], Kreisch[G]). Its population of about 95,000 consists of Hungarians, Rumanians, Jews, Germans and others. Oradea is the junction for five railway lines and commands all the main communications leading from the Hungarian plain to Transylvania. The town is also the seat of many industries and the chief market for the agricultural produce of the province. Arad, on the northern bank of the Mures (Maros[H]), is inhabited by 65,000 people,

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Crisana]

[Maramures]

mostly Hungarians, and occupies a similarly important position. Here there are numerous factories, including mills, railway shops and locomotive works and textile factories. Satu-Mare (Szatmar[H]), with 60,000 inhabitants, is the largest town in the Northern Crisana. 361 438

After the Great War the Crisana, which was first occupied by the Hungarians in the tenth century and subsequently colonized by them, was awarded to Rumania. Under the Vienna Award of 1940 part of the Crisana was returned to Hungary, with a considerable Rumanian population. 175

By the same decision the province of Maramures (Marmaros[H]) (about 1,350 square miles), inhabited by over 150,000 people, acquired by Rumania in 1918, was returned to Hungary. Geographically Maramures is a continuation of the Czechoslovak province of Ruthenia. It is enclosed on all sides by chains of mountains covered with thick forests whose great density is rare even in the Carpathians, which are famous for their wealth of trees. It is not easily accessible except by a solitary railway line which comes from Transylvania and leads to Ruthenia. The small population consists of Ruthenians, Rumanians, Jews, Slovaks and Hungarians and is typical of the medley of races to be found in quite small areas of this part of Europe. Owing to the mountainous nature of the country there is little agriculture. The chief occupation of the inhabitants is the felling of trees. The most valuable asset of the province is its mineral wealth. There is oil, gold, copper, salt and coal. The capital and only major town of Maramures is Sighet (Marmaros-Sziget[H]) with a large Jewish population. Sighet, a town of 133 162 [496] 313 135 361

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

Scaune (Haromszek[H]) which also possesses numerous industrial enterprises. Most of the rivers of Transylvania rise in the Eastern Carpathians and flow to the west and south. The Mures, flowing from east to west winds its way between the Carpathians and the 'Western Mountains,' near Alba Julia (Gyulafehervar[H], Karlsburg[G]) and descends into the lowlands farther west. The Somes (Szamos[H]) reaches the plains north-west of the Transylvanian highland and eventually flows into the Tisza. Communications with Muntenia and Oltenia go over the mountain passes of Predeal, Bran and the 'Red Tower', with Moldavia over those of Buzau, Ghimes and Bicaz, and with the Bukovina over the Rodna Pass. 133

The climate of Transylvania is not as favourable for the raising of crops as that of Muntenia and the Banat. In the valleys, however, maize, wheat and rye are grown with some success. Stock-breeding is more important than agriculture. But Transylvania is very rich in mineral resources. Apart from coal, gold, copper, salt, bauxite and iron Transylvania possesses the greatest reserves of natural gas in the whole of Europe. The chemically pure methane which is used by many factories for power, as well as for cooking and lighting by many householders, could supply the whole of Transylvania for over a hundred years and make the consumption of coal unnecessary. 311 135

The capital of Transylvania is Cluj (Kolozsvar[H], Klausenburg[G]), with a population of over 105,000, consisting of Hungarians, Germans, Rumanians and Jews. The town is an important rail and road junction and the cultural centre of all the three 361

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Bukovina]

rule. It was occupied by the Russians in 1769. In 1774 the province was given to Austria, under which it remained until 1918. On 23 October the Austrian governor handed over the Bukovina to the Ukrainian inhabitants of the province; but four days later an assembly of Rumanian Bukovinians declared for the union of the province with Rumania and asked the Rumanian government for military assistance. This was forthcoming on 11 November and added to Rumania a territory of about 4,100 square miles with a population of about 870,000 (1930). Of these over 38% were Ukrainians, 34% Rumanians and 21% Germans and German-speaking Jews. The Rumanian administration began by a vigorous policy of Rumanization. The Ukrainians, who under Austrian rule had been well treated, and the Jews, were the chief sufferers, but the Germans, too, were ousted from many of their positions.[1]

More than half of the Bukovina is covered with dense forests of beech;[2] one-fifth consists of pastures; less than a third is arable land. The province borders in the west on the Carpathians, in the south on Moldavia, in the east on Moldavia and Bessarabia and in the north on Poland. The western part of the Bukovina is formed by the slopes of the Carpathians, where manganese and iron ore are found, especially in the region of Jacobeni. To the east stretches the hilly country, covered with pastures, on which good livestock is raised, and fields of maize, wheat and tobacco. Mineral resources are confined to some, small deposits of coal, gold and lead, but the industry of the province is well developed.

[1] The German University of Czernowitz was completely Rumanized soon after the military occupation.

[2] The German name of the province means 'Land of the Beeches'.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

MINERAL RESOURCES. The great and varied wealth /35 of the subsoil of Greater Rumania has been ex- 316 ploited only to a small degree. Apart from gold and silver, which are found in rivers and mined in Transylvania, there are iron-ore deposits estimated at about 30,000,000 tons. The average yearly production, however, amounted to only about 100,000 tons. The important alloy, manganese, found in various parts of the country, copper, zinc, chromium and bauxite all contribute to the mineral wealth of Rumania.

Through the acquisition of the New Territories the coal deposits of Greater Rumania were greatly augmented. The total coal reserves, of which the most important are situated in the western provinces and in Transylvania, were estimated at 722,000,000 tons. The average yearly production, of which two-thirds were brown coal, amounted to between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 tons. A source of power which is not found in any other part of Europe, and which could transform and sustain Rumanian industry for many years, is the great subterranean natural gas reservoir in Transylvania which contains chemically pure methane.

Another source of energy of which only a small 376 fraction has yet been exploited is Rumania's potential water power, estimated at 1,500,000 horsepower, which equals the energy of all the coal, oil and natural gas resources of Rumania taken together.

OIL. The centre of the Rumanian oilfields is the 315 region of Campina and Ploesti which also has the biggest refineries for the production of petrol and aviation spirit. Oil is also found in Oltenia, Moldavia and Maramures. Crude oil was already known

315 pipeline has been completed from a secondary source of supply at Manești to convey this gas to Bucarest to supply both household and industrial requirements.

●135 Iron-ore deposits are small, so that the heavy industries are very largely dependent on imports. A variety of other mineral resources, which are believed to exist in greater abundance than has so far been established, have not yet been fully surveyed.

433 Rumania has a poorly-developed industry, which lags far behind that of western European countries such as Czechoslovakia, though is ahead of all the other south-east European countries, except Hungary. Financially she is a poor country, with very limited capital resources, which has proved a severe hindrance to industrial development and has laid her open to the investment of foreign capital, which has been attracted [457] particularly by the rich mineral oil and forest resources. Skilled labour, also a vital factor in the [464] process of industrialisation, has been lacking, so that the use of foreign technicians has been essential. Other raw-material resources, though adequate to allow the development of a sound and varied industry, are not sufficiently extensive to encourage a very rapid development independent of imported raw materials.

Industrialisation in Rumania did not start until about 1890, and the period of greatest expansion was between 1929 and 1938. The consumption industries were the first to be developed, and of these food industries are the chief, the raw materials being grown on the spot. The growth of such industries as paper, cardboard, printing, soap, chemicals and furniture, etc., followed. The location of industry in the earlier stages was governed not by such factors as the existence of cheap labour, but was built up in those areas richest in raw materials.

MAIN INDUSTRIAL REGIONS

[311] The main industrial region is in the Prahova valley, where the oilfields are to be found, followed by the Reșița district, where the existence of iron ore, coal, manganese, etc., led to the development of metallurgical and engineering facilities, as well as of such auxiliary industries as coal and wood distilleries. Gold, silver, lead, zinc and copper deposits in the Baia Mare region formed the basis for the erection of both metal and chemical factories. The presence of methane gas, salt, gold, silver and stone quarries in and around Turda determined the location of factories for production of cement, limestone, bricks, tiles, porcelain, glass, sulphuric acid, etc. In the rich forest districts of Ferdinand, Nadrag and Hunedoara, where iron ore deposits are also to be found, blast furnaces and metallurgical industries have been established. The textile industry is mainly established in Cisnădia, Piatra Neamț, Bacău and Buhusi. Apart from the regions mentioned, industry is centred in the principal towns—Bucarest, Timișoara, Brașov, Sf. Gheorghe, Arad, Galați, Brăila, Cernăuți, Cluj and Iași.

The following table gives an idea of the relative importance of the various industries, showing the amount of capital invested and value of production in each of the main groups, and also the number of factories and of personnel employed :—

TERRITORIAL LOSSES

728 In 1940 Rumania suffered serious loss of territory. First in August, Bessarabia and the Northern Bucovina were occupied by the Russians, then a few weeks later Northern Transylvania was given to Hungary by the Vienna Award, following which the Southern Dobruja was ceded to Bulgaria by the Treaty of Craiova. However, in 1941, Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina were regained so that the loss of these territories was of only temporary significance.

[151]
[161]

Territory	*Area sq. km.*	*Population in millions*	*Date of Loss*
Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina	50,000	3.3	*August*, 1940
Northern Transylvania	43,700	2.75	*Sept.*, 1940
Southern Dobruja	7,700	0.38	*Sept.*, 1940

The temporary loss of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina had serious repercussions on the economic situation of the country, which were of wider effect than might be supposed from the limited time of the annexation, because of the loss of the harvests of both 1940 and 1941, the "scorched earth" policy of the Russians, and the dislocation of the transport system caused by the necessary re-conversion to standard European gauge from the Russian gauge.

The cession of Northern Transylvania, apart from the mere physical loss of territory and population, caused a severe disruption of the economic system on account of the valuable raw materials involved, and the loss of industry which had been built up on the basis of these raw materials. The capital invested in industry in this area represented some 13 per cent. of total investments in industry in the whole country. The main features were the mineral resources of the Baia Mare district, containing lead, zinc, gold, silver and small quantities of copper, with lead-refining plants attached. In this area deposits of pyrites were fairly considerable and supplied the bulk

728

[5a]

728 of requirements for sulphuric-acid production. Of lesser importance were the salt and coal de-
[135] posits.

The forest resources of Northern Transylvania
[313] are estimated to have accounted for as much as 25 per cent. of pre-war timber production. Apart from timber the food and leather industries
[311] appear to have been the most developed. This area was principally made up of forests and pastures; the arable land provided no surplus
[233] after local needs had been covered. Of livestock losses the most outstanding feature was nearly 2 million sheep.

[496] The railway system, and particularly the railway administration, was severely handicapped by the change of frontiers, which in places cut one part of Rumania off from the other.

Caliacra and Durostor, the two ceded Dobrujan provinces, are mainly agricultural, and though producing a small surplus, contributed little to Rumania's total agricultural output. Of more significance is the cotton-growing area. There are no known mineral deposits, and industry in this area is on a very small scale, relying mainly on handicrafts.

TRANSNISTRIA

727 Transnistria is the name which has been given to the territory lying between the Dniester and the Bug, which was given to Rumania to administer in 1941 subsequent to its capture from the U.S.S.R. by Rumanian and German troops. Transnistria is part of the Southern Ukraine and is mainly agricultural, while such industry as existed has been of no use to the Rumanians on account of the heavy destruction carried out by the Russians. It is probably true to say that this territory has been more of a financial liability than an asset to Rumania on account of the heavy expenditure entailed in repairs, particularly of railways and bridges. Some little advantage has, however, been gained from the harvest of 1942-3.

[56]

315 Two additional pipelines, each of 10 in. diameter, constructed largely of material removed from France, have been built between Ploesti and Giurgiu, each with a capacity of over three quarters of a million tons a year.

New refinery and drilling equipment, which prior to the war Rumania used to import largely from the United States, has now to be obtained from Germany. The financial terms on which this equipment is obtained are unfavourable to Rumania and deliveries are slow.

2. German Influence on the Oil Industry

315 648 473 German pressure upon Rumania to obtain greater supplies of oil has been largely exerted by means of commercial penetration into the oil industry, but there is evidence that Nazi diplomats have laid particular emphasis on the German need for oil, suggesting that larger supplies might be available if production was increased and internal consumption reduced.

German penetration into the Rumanian oil industry began to take aggressive form some time before the war. The Germans first acquired a minority holding in Creditul Minier, then in 1939 secured control of Petrol-Block. The collapse of France afforded further opportunities of encroachment, and through Kontinental Oel A.G. control of Concordia and Colombia was secured; similarly, by assuming arbitrary control of Dutch interests the Germans now direct the policy of Astra-Română, the largest of the producing companies. In all, German influence through financial control now extends to about 50 per cent. of the industry, and 60 per cent. of productive capacity, quite apart from the pressure the Germans can exert through control of transport out of the country. The actual effect of this influence is not easily assessed, modified as it is by Rumania's nationalistic oil legislation—particular privileges are reserved under the new mining laws for companies which can show that 75 per cent. of their capital is in Rumanian hands—and the instinctive aversion of the Government to outside control. It is, however, sufficient to ensure that German requirements have a definite priority, and nationalistic as some parts of the new mining law may be, any measures serving to increase immediate production, under whatever pretext they are taken, are beneficial to Germany's interests. Tables I and II on pages 15 and 16 show the approximate strength of the oil groups by nationalities in 1940 and 1942. 1

3. War-time Restrictions

315 135 Nearly 70 per cent. of Rumanian petroleum consumption is represented by fuel oil, and a theoretical saving could be brought about by the use of coal and natural gas. Coal resources, however, are limited, and in any event a greatly increased use of coal is restricted also by the speed at which locomotives and power plants can be converted from oil to coal burning.

315 434 In November 1942 a petrol-rationing scheme was introduced, and although the allowances were on a liberal scale, the regulations do not appear to have been observed and the scheme as a whole was ineffective. In March 1943 this was admitted by the announcement that the scheme would be more strictly enforced and new ration cards issued. Simultaneously regulations were published concerning the use of taxis, and a time limit of September 1943 was set for the conversion of boiler plant.

In general, attempts to restrict consumption either by the announcement of new regulations

1 [Cf. cat. 315, pp. 15c and 16a-Analyst]

[14b]

I. COAL

A. Consumption, Imports, Deposits

372 375 Coal has not played such a large part in Rumanian economy as it has in that of most European countries because of the abundant mineral oil and timber resources which have been used extensively for fuel, both in industry and for household purposes. The following table shows the percentage consumption of the different types of fuel (average 1937-39) :—

	%
Firewood	28·7
Oil and oil products	26·1
Coal	25·9
Methane and other gases	17·2
Water power	2·1

The railways accounted for 60 per cent. of total coal consumption which was of the order of 2 million tons, the balance being divided between industry, household consumption and bunkers.

●135 Before the war coal reserves, which are predominantly brown coal, were estimated at 2·7 milliard tons brown coal (including lignite), and 48 million tons of hard coal. The more important deposits are located in southern and western Transylvania, while a few of lesser importance are in the northern area which was ceded to Hungary.

316 439 In spite of the limited industrial development of the country and extensive use of oil, coal production is hardly sufficient for current needs, and it has been necessary to import both coal and coke to fill the deficiency.

Pre-war coal imports in metric tons were as follows :—

	Metric Tons
1935	21,000
1936	23,000
1937	28,000

316 439 It is difficult to estimate coal imports since the war, but available evidence suggests that they are in the neighbourhood of 75,000 tons annually or three times as high as the pre-war figure. Owing to the exigencies of war, railway traffic has increased enormously, and the switch-over from oil-burning to coal for industrial and central-heating plants all add to the demands for coal.

135 **Coal Deposits**

The principal coal-producing district is around Petroşani, while the main deposits are as follows:—

Type	*Location*	*Calorific Value*
Anthracite ..	Schela in Gorj district	7,300
Hardcoal* ..	Reşiţa and Anina-Steierdorf	6/7,000
Brown coal and lignite	Jiu valley	6,500
	Comăneşti basin ..	5,200/5,600
	Ialomiţa valley ..	5,000
	Dâmboviţa valley ..	5,000
	Bacău district ..	5,000

* Some is suitable for coking.

B. Tables

1. Coal Production

316 During recent years coal production has been increased in spite of a slight setback in 1940, when with the transfer of N. Transylvania to Hungary a small proportion of the working mines were lost. Further efforts are being made to increase production so that fuel-oil consumption may be reduced. To this end the conversion of central-heating installations, industrial oil-burning plant and oil-fired locomotives to coal burning has been ordered.

A. INTRODUCTION

135 By comparison with Greece or Yugoslavia Rumania has but poor deposits of minerals with the exception of gold, as a producer of which, before the loss of Transylvania she ranked second in Europe to Sweden.

316 Iron-ore output is inadequate to meet the requirements of the steel industry. Bauxite output is on a very small scale, though steps are being taken to increase this and to create an aluminium industry. Production of lead and zinc, though sufficient pre-war to cover requirements, was centred in territory now ceded to Hungary, so that the country has become dependent on imports. Silver and copper production, the latter never other than on a small scale, have also suffered through territorial losses. Attempts have been made during the last few years to develop output of chrome and manganese—manganese for production of ferro-manganese for the iron and steel industry, and chrome, deposits of which appear not to have been worked before 1941, for export to Italy.

135 Deposits of mica and molybdenum have both been recently discovered in small quantities in the Mehedinţi district, and the Germans are particularly interested in production of the former.

B. IRON AND STEEL

327 Full use of the Rumanian iron and steel industry is severely hampered by inadequate supplies of metallurgical coke and of iron ore, both of which have to be imported. Shortage of the former particularly has affected the industry since the outbreak of war, because, due to an insufficient supply of metallurgical coke in German Europe as a whole, Rumania has been unable to import the requisite quantities to maintain output of her blast furnaces. Rumanian plants, however, are new and the steelworks are all open hearth or electric, which means that they are able to produce the qualities most useful for armaments.

1. Iron Ore

316 Shortage of iron ore is the fundamental weakness of the Rumanian iron and steel industry. Though various other concessions have been granted, but not yet in any way developed, only three mines have been regularly exploited, as follows:—

(a) The Ghelari deposits of limonite (47 per cent. to 54 per cent. iron) owned by the State and exploited by the Hunedoara Works.

(b) The Teliuc deposits of limonite (45 per cent. to 52 per cent. iron) and of siderite (28 to 35 per cent. iron), owned and exploited by Titan Nadrag Calan.

(c) The almost exhausted Ocna de Fier deposits of poor quality limonite owned by Reşiţa.

316 439 Rumania has always had to import ore, chiefly from Yugoslavia, and recently from the Russian mines of Krivoi Rog as well. The following table shows Rumanian output and imports of iron ore:

Year	Output	Imports
	000 tons	
1936	107	80
1937	127	96
1938	137	114
1939	143	96
1940	151	52
1941	106	n.a.

[21b]

CHAPTER IV

327 compared with the following annual pre-war figures:

Year	'000 tons
1936	225
1937	241
1938	326
1939	385

4. Iron and Steel Consumption

The limited native iron and steel production which was never sufficient to keep the consuming industries fully supplied, became an increasing impediment with the rapid development of these industries during the last few years. Iron and [439] steel products had therefore to be imported at the rate of 2,300,000 tons a year. The outbreak of war in Europe, and consequent restriction of supplies meant a falling off of imports, so that an acute shortage developed. During 1942 however, the situation improved somewhat in that Germany was reported to have sent a total of 130,000 tons of iron and steel products to Rumania.

5. German Penetration

327 A small degree of penetration into the Ru-
439 manian iron and steel industry has been achieved by the Hermann Göring Werke, which, after the partition of Czechoslovakia, acquired Czech in-
473 terests in Reşiţa amounting to 6 per cent., which were later increased to 20 per cent.

In 1941 a company with 50 per cent. German and the remainder Rumanian capital, was formed to take over the management of Reşiţa and its associated companies. The Malaxa Works later also came under the organisation of this company.

C. LEAD AND ZINC

1. General

328 In pre-war years Rumania was practically
439 self-sufficient in lead but not in zinc, since she possessed no zinc-smelting facilities. Her production of zinc concentrates was exported, mainly to Poland, part of the metal content being re-imported after smelting. Belgium and Poland were her chief suppliers of metallic zinc.

2. Mines and Plant

316 The mining of lead and zinc constituted only a small industry in Rumania. Part of the production, almost 50 per cent. in the case of lead, was obtained incidentally to the working of gold and silver ores. The principal producers were [659] the State-owned mines Baia Sprie, Capnic, Văratec, Valea Roşie, Dealul Crucii, and the Herja mine owned by Phœnix S.A., all are situated in the Baia Mare district in North Transylvania. The Herja ores averaged approximately 8 per cent. lead and 14 per cent. zinc, whilst ores from the other mines averaged only 4 per cent. lead and 10 per cent. zinc.

●135 There are other deposits in the Transylvanian Erzgebirge, where galena and blende are associated with gold occurrences, in the Hunedoara, Banat, and Severin districts, and at Cârlibaba in the Bucovina.

328 Rumania possessed two lead smelters for the treatment of her production of concentrates: the Phœnix plant at Lucaci, with a capacity for about 5,000 tons of crude lead and 3,000 tons of refined lead, and a plant at Feriza belonging to Uzinele Metallurgice din Firiza de Jos. There

[22 a]

328 was no zinc-smelting capacity until 1944 [illegible] Societatea Nationala de Exploatari Miniere si Industriale S.A.R. [illegible] Plant at Copsa Mica with a capacity for [illegible] tons of crude zinc annually. The smelter has thirty retorts fired by natural gas; treating concentrates first roasted at the Phoenix works.

3. Pre-War Production and Trade

Ore production increased over the years 1934-1938; statistics available are conflicting, but it is certain that 1938 production in terms of lead content was not less than 7,000 tons. Smelter production also increased from 4,000 tons to about 7,000 tons and averaged about 5,000 tons over the period. Exports and imports of lead were very small.

Ore production in terms of zinc content varied between approximately 4,000 tons and 8,000 tons. The concentrates were all exported, chiefly to Poland. Metallic zinc was imported almost entirely from Belgium and Poland.

The small output of lead and zinc was of little importance other than to Rumania herself.

4. War-time Development

[728] As practically the whole of the Rumanian lead-zinc industry passed to Hungary when she [439] acquired the Baia Mare district under the Vienna Award, Rumania became largely dependent on imports for the satisfaction of her lead and zinc requirements. However, she retained the Transylvanian Erzgebirge and other areas containing lead-zinc deposits, some of which she is now endeavouring to exploit. For instance, it was reported in December 1942 that deposits in the Banat, near Agadici and in the Hunedoara district, were being developed. The Copsa Mica zinc smelter has remained in Rumanian hands.

D. MICA

316 The Germans are taking considerable interest in 135 the mica deposits discovered in the Mehedinti district, though little is believed to be of high quality. The present annual rate of production is estimated to be about 150 tons.

E. BAUXITE

135 Rumania possesses reserves of bauxite situated in the Bihor Massif, estimated by German experts in 1941 at some 40 million tons. The main deposits are located in the Poiana Crisului, Ropede and Lui Valleys and in the Galbina valley south-east of Bihor. Small deposits exist around Remetea and Beiuci, and in the district around Petrosani and near Turda.

31 Despite the size of her ore reserves, Rumania's production of bauxite has never been important, largely because of its unsuitability for the Bayer process, which is mostly operated in European alumina plants. Pre-war output never exceeded [illegible] tons annually, and was mostly consumed at home in the manufacture of cement and refractory bricks.

Mining operations were carried on before the war by three companies:

(a) *Bauxita S.A.R.*, a subsidiary of the Swiss Aluminium Industrie A.G. Chippis, which owned mines at Dobresti and produced small quantities of bauxite for the Rumanian cement industry.

[22 E]

316 (b) *Alumina S.A.R.*, a subsidiary of the German-controlled Bauxit-Trust A.G. of Zurich, which mined bauxite principally at Bratca in the Jad valley, and also owned concessions at Remetea and Pietroasa.

(c) *Aur S.A.R.*, a subsidiary of the Rumanian Mica Group, owning bauxite properties in the Sohodol region near the railway from Abrud to Turda. It supplied bauxite for the manufacture of cement and at the outbreak of war had reserved stocks for a projected alumina and aluminium plant.

The Dobreşti mines of the Bauxita S.A.R., which are within the present Rumanian frontiers, are producing at the rate of 10,000 tons annually, most of which is delivered to Germany.

F. ALUMINIUM

328 Rumania possessed no aluminium industry before the war although from time to time plans for an alumina-aluminium works were discussed. A few thousand tons of aluminium, [439] mostly in the form of semi-manufactured or finished products, were imported annually, Germany being the principal source of supply.

Aur S.A.R. have been experimenting in the production of alumina in a small pilot plant near Dicio Sân Martin, using the Seailles process which is claimed to be successful in producing alumina from low-grade bauxites of the type mostly found in Rumania.

This company is planning an aluminium reduction works of 20,000 tons capacity with an alumina plant of 60,000 tons. I.G. Farbenindustrie and the Mica group are interested, and the intention is to supply 20,000 tons of alumina annually to Germany. Up to June 1943 these projects had apparently not progressed beyond the experimental stage.

Small tonnages of aluminium, mostly in the form of semi-manufactures, are being imported from Germany, principally for the Rumanian aircraft industry.

G. CHROME

316 Rumania has reserve of chrome ore estimated at 2 million tons, located at Ogradina and Plavişeviţa [135] on the Danube near Orşova. These deposits were not worked before 1941, and the output for 1942 is estimated at 5,000 tons. The ore is low grade, the highest chrome content being 40 per cent Cr_2O_3. Germany is believed to be receiving the greater part of present output.

H. MANGANESE

The pre-war annual output of manganese averaged 40,000 tons (40 per cent. Mn.), and the probable maximum output that could be obtained is 60,000 tons. The ore is located in the Eastern and Southern Carpathians with reserves estimated at 10 million tons, while the principal mines are near Jacobeni. About 30/35,000 tons of manganese ore is available for export, and is now mainly supplied to Italy and Germany, the remainder being used locally in the making of ferro-manganese. The Nitrogen company at Dicio sân Martin are reported to have extended their plant to produce ferro-manganese for supply to Reşiţa iron and steel works, and to Titan Nadrag Calan.

I. COPPER

316 Apart from copper ore recovered as a by-product in the mining of gold ores, there is no copper-mining industry in Rumania. There are however two deposits which have possibilities of future production. They are as follows:—

(a) At Altun-Tepe in the Dobruja, 12 miles south of Tulcea near the Black Sea, is a deposit which is being developed by Credit Minier S.A.R. There are three areas totalling about 5,000 acres and reserves of 400,000 tons of ore averaging 1½ to 3 per cent copper.

In 1940 development was proceeding slowly and it did not appear that production would take place for at least two years.

(b) At Zam, which is about 10 miles from Brad in western Transylvania, there is another deposit. The veins vary from a few inches to a metre in width, and the grade of the ore is from a half to 3 per cent copper. These deposits have been worked on a small scale in the past, but no work is in progress at the present time.

Production of copper ore in Rumania, mainly from operations at various gold mines, is reported to have been 12,420 tons in 1938 and 25,168 tons in 1939.

J. GOLD

1. The most important area for gold mining is in the Apuseni mountain district in Central Transylvania. The principal gold deposits lie within an area bounded by Baia De Aries, Zlatna, Sacaramb and Tebea. The chief mining centre is Brad, the nearby mines of Muşari, Brodisor and Valea Morii providing most of the production. Other mining centres within the area are Sacaramb, Almaş (Neagris), Rosia Montana, Bucium and Stanija.

The gold-bearing veins of the Apuseni district strike in directions between north-west and north-east and vary from a few millimetres to two metres in width. The lengths of the veins range between 300 and 700 metres and some are worked at depths approaching 600 metres from the surface. The ore is said to average 8 to 12 grammes per ton.

The largest producing company is the Societatea Mica with a production in 1940 of 2,090 kilos, and in 1941 of 2,665 kilos. In 1942 the State gold mines of Rosia Montana and Sacaramb produced respectively 150 and 238 kilos of gold.

Production in the Baia Mare district (now Hungarian) represented about one-third of normal ore output.

316 To stimulate gold production in those mines 435 carrying only small values in gold and also to make up for the loss of output entailed by the transfer of the Baia Mare area in Northern Transylvania to Hungary under the Vienna Award, the premium on gold production in Rumania was increased from the 1st January, 1943. In addition to the fixed basic price of 211,111 lei per kilo there is now a premium of 180,186 lei per kilo for ore produced with a gold content of 15 grammes per ton rising to 650,386 lei per kilo for ore with a gold content of 3 grammes per ton or less. This has led to considerable prospecting for new gold deposits in various parts of the country.

K. SILVER

316 Over pre-war years Rumania ranked sixth, or when the Italian production was greater, seventh.

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania CD1

outlined. In the first place it would be slow and costly to carry out. 241
Secondly, it would call for skills which Communist régimes do not 565
possess and foreign scientific information which they boast of despising. Thirdly, they in principle oppose measures for improving small-peasant agriculture, for if they succeeded the peasants would merely become more independent and recalcitrant. They therefore prefer to favor industry and neglect agriculture,[7] calculating that misery on the farms will make the peasants more amenable to collectivization or force them into great slave-labor projects like the Danube-Black Sea canal. In any case, they have not cast Rumania to play an agricultural rôle in the family of Sovietized states. Nature did so, but they are going to improve on nature.

In Stalin's original plans Jugoslavia and probably Bulgaria were 185
destined to remain agricultural in the main and to supply the other 135
members of the family with raw materials. Rumania, although so heavily agricultural, was to be largely industrialized. The reason for this arbitrary allotment of functions is not entirely clear. Rumania has oil and timber, as well as reserves of soft coal and natural gas in Transylvania, all of which can be developed without running counter to economic law. She also has a large reservoir of unskilled labor. But otherwise she is not adapted by natural resources and native skills to proceed with very speedy or very extensive industrialization projects, and she seems especially unsuited to becoming a center of heavy industry in view of the scarcity of her metallurgical reserves. In any case, the improvement and development of agricultural production would be the right preliminary to ambitious enlargements of the industrial plant such as are projected in the new Rumanian Five Year Plan, to end December 31, 1955.

Ana Pauker has called the new Plan "majestic." Its main purpose, 185
she has written,[8] is "the industrialization of the country . . . on a new, advanced technical basis . . . which will insure the success of the Socialist offensive against the capitalist elements." Industrial output is to be increased twofold, with emphasis on what she called "the Stalin method" of developing heavy industry in particular.

[7] Of the Rumanian investment program for 1950, 47 percent was allocated for industry, 20 percent for transportation and 9 percent for agriculture.

[8] *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!*, Bucharest, August 18, 1950.

132 the sun's rays and so may be much colder, especially during calm periods which are frequent, than places with southward aspect on the hills above: on occasion a difference of 20° C. has been noted. Places out in the opener lands towards Russia feel the winter cold of the steppe spreading westward, but both these and places in shut-in valleys may be very dry. The high pastures have a good deal of snow in winter and are nearly forsaken at that season but, when the snow melts in spring, growth sets in rapidly, and the change of season is [137] sudden. Out east in the opener lands there is, however, for a while a danger of the sudden recurrence of frost (the Ice Saints in the Russian steppe), a fact which helps to limit the eastward extension of the beech tree almost as much as does the summer heat, for both these conditions are specially harmful to the delicate beech leaves. Roumania is thus on the eastern limit of the general European distribution of the beech which is one of the characteristic plants of western and central Europe and is absent from Russia, save the Crimea and parts of the Caucasus region. It is important to note that winter cold is not an important factor of this distribution as the beech grows on the higher slopes of the Carpathians under severe conditions.

A MONTH with an average of less than 25 mm. (or 1 inch) of rain or the equivalent in snow is very rare save at Cernauţi, Dorohoi, Vatra Dornei and Chişinau in winter especially January. The summer maximum is in June at Dorohoi (102 mm.); at Cernauţi June and July both average 94 mm.; at Vatra Dornei June has 129 and July 135 mm. On the west side of the Carpathians, at Cluj and Sibiu, for example, the June rainfall is the highest (111-114 mm.), and the figures show a tendency to rather more rain in April and May as well as in July and August than on the east side. The annual totals on both sides of the Carpathians in the latitude of most of the places named may be said to vary between 550 and 750 mm. Farther south, on the east side, at Focşani, for example, the June rainfall attains only 82 mm. average, and May and July have 60 mm. and 57 mm. respectively; further, the annual total is just 550 mm. and at Buzau (Buzeu) rather farther south it diminishes to 476 mm., and at Constanţa to 381 mm. At Vatra Dornei it may rain on nearly half the days of the year, at Buzau on hardly a quarter. At Vatra Dornei, moreover, precipitation may be

III.—NOTES ON THE VEGETATION OF ROUMANIA

137 AFTER a voyage of five days down the Danube where hundreds of miles of its banks were clothed with willows (*Salix cinerea*) and formed our almost sole glimpse of vegetation, the first thing the Vegetation Group did on landing at Giurgiu was to make contact with the flora of Roumania. A walk along the side of the railway parallel to the river revealed the following species: *Xanthium speciosum*, *Trifolium fragiferum*, *T. lappaceum* (an alien possibly transported by rail or ship), *Setaria glauca*, *Datura stramonium*, *Berteroa incana*, *Trigonella procumbens*, *Althaea officinalis*, *Inula brittanica*, *Hibiscus trionum*, *Salvia sylvestris*, *Glycyrrhiza echinatum*, *Amaranthus albus* and many others less worthy of note and mostly belonging to the mid-European element.

DURING our visit to Snagov, where we enjoyed the kind hospitality of the Mayor of Bucureşti (Bukarest), we saw large quantities of *Vallisneria spiralis* growing close to the banks of the lake. Near the old monastery church the following plants were noted: *Xanthium strumarium*, *Astragalus acer*, *Galega officinalis*, *Chenopodium ficifolium*, *Filago arvensis*, *Nepeta pannonica*, etc.

243 BOTH on our way from Giurgiu to Bucureşti by train, and by the roadside on leaving the capital towards Ploeşti, we were reminded of the fact that the maize was the staple crop and it was here seen in the plains growing to perfection in striking contrast to that seen later around Borsec in the narrow valley towards Corbu.

OUR next contact with vegetation was during the motor drive over elevated ground from Sinaia to Dobreşti; here the grass had not been cut in the sub-alpine meadows and the flora was seen to be a very rich one, but time did not permit of its being examined. From Dobreşti, a climb via a fine gorge was made to the alpine Peştera hut. On our way up the gorge large masses of the tall, yellow *Inula helenium* were passed and *Achillea Schurii* (endemic to the Carpathians) was seen on the wet walls of rock, and also *Bruckenthalia spiculifolia*. As more elevated ground was

[237] reached there was little to be seen, the alpine meadows having been closely cropped by sheep. During an early morning walk in the neighbourhood of the hut, more alpine conditions were seen to be prevalent and plants typical of such regions were recorded, such as: *Ranunculus nemorus, Polygala amara, Genista tinctoria, Saxifraga aizoon, Alsine gerardi, Heliosperma quadrifida, Viola declinata* (endemic), *Gentiana nivalis, G. utriculosa, Campanula carpatica, Dianthus gelidus* (endemic), *D. spiculifolius* (endemic), *Pedicularis verticillata, Rhododendron Kotshyi* (endemic), *Sedum atratum, Pleurogyne carinthiaca, Phleum alpinum, Potentilla aurea, Anemone alba, Primula minima, Scorzonera rosea, Loiseleuria procumbens*, etc. Unfortunately a very heavy thunderstorm with torrential rain made it impossible to investigate the flora on the interesting plateau country passed shortly after leaving the Peştera hut on our way down to Bu·teni.

BRAN was our next place of stay and the hill sides round the town proved very interesting floristically. Some 160 common plants were recorded in addition to *Coronilla varia, Impatiens noli-tangere, Actaea spicata, Monotropa hypopitys, Centaurea pseudo-phrygia, Nepeta pannonica, Trifolium alpestre, T. ochroleucum, Chaerophyllum aromaticum, Inula hirta, Erysimum repandum, Galinsoga parviflora, Salvia verticillata, Brunella grandiflora, Linum flavum, Hypericum transylvanicum, Scabiosa ochroleuca, Selinum carvfolium, Bupleurum falcatum, Seseli annuum, Luzula albida*, etc. Above the hotel was a considerable stretch of beech forest intermixed with spruce (*Picea excelsa*); on the lower edge of this was the usual hazel (*Corylus avellana*), alder (*Alnus incana*), Cornelian cherry (*Cornus mas*), hornbeam (*Carpinus betulus*), etc. At the foot of the slope on damp ground were [241] clumps of *Salices* and *Alnus incana*. Around the cottages on the hillsides were patches of potatoes with oats and sometimes a small patch of hemp; some of this freshly cut and being retted in a shallow pit dug in the ground was also noted. Generally speaking, the flora around Bran itself was a very rich one. Close by the hotel the following species of Mycetozoa were seen: *Stemonitis hyperopta* on an old tree stump, *Arcyria denudata*, maturing on soil, and masses of *Mucilago spongiosa* ripening on old sticks.

137 [241] THE JOURNEY to Braşov (Kronstadt) took us along the valley, both sides of which were well cultivated, potatoes, beans, oats, maize being the chief crops; sunflowers and small patches of hemp were also seen. A halt for petrol, a short distance from Bran, provided an opportunity for studying the meadow land vegetation close to the road; the following were noted: *Scilla trilobium, Centaurea scabiosa, Coronilla varia, Hypericum perforatum, Medicago falcata, Peucedanum oreoselinum, Knautia arvensis, Campanula rotundifolium, Helianthemum chamaecistus, Stachys betonica, Dianthus Carthusianorum, Viola tricolor, Senecio aquatica, Trifolium procumbens, Achillea millefolium, Chrysanthemum leucanthemum, Campanula trachelium, C. rapunculus, Cirsium oleracea, Galium verum, G. Mollugo, Geranium pratense, Lathyrus pratensis, Melampyrum nemorosum*, etc.

AT BRAŞOV were seen *Potentilla canescens* and *Silene otites* among many commoner species.

IT WAS NOT until we reached Borsec that we had time to study the vegetation in any detail, and it was somewhat unfortunate that the truly sub-alpine and alpine regions were not within easy reach. The greater part of the mountain sides surrounding Borsec were covered with spruce forests quite to the summits and beech forest was not well represented, being met with as somewhat poor specimens often at a considerable height. These forests proved to be rather deficient in species, botanically.

DURING our walk from Borsec across meadows and up on to the summit of Bukkhavas, it was interesting to see the beech and birch above the limit of the spruce. *Ribes grossularia* was seen in fruit in open spots in the forest. The open summit was covered with *Vaccinium myrtillus* with its usual association; *Scorzonera rosea* was also growing upon the summit. Leaving the mountain and going down towards Bilbor we noted a grassy clearing with a building where cattle had been housed: this as in other cases was covered with a prolific growth of dock (*Rumex sp.*); it invariably accompanied places where mountain dairies had been established. On reaching the valley a fine clump of *Dianthus superbus* was seen.

244 A WALK around the cottages of Old Borsec revealed several vegetable gardens apparently associated with the possibility

244 of supplying the summer visitors with vegetables. Runner beans, potatoes, poppy-seed, cabbages, red beet, onions, lettuce, and carrots were common, and in one garden in addition to the above, red currants, gooseberries, vegetable marrows, fennel, caraway and leeks were growing.

137 THE following plants were noticed in the neighbourhood of Borsec: *Senecio fuchsii, Maianthemum bifolium, Gentiana cruciata, G. asclepiadea, Stachys alpina, Chaerophyllum hirsutum, Dipsacus laciniatus, Trifolium pannonicum, Myosotis sparsiflora, Carduus personata, Campanula cervicaria, Lychnis viscaria, Silene armeria, Dianthus armeria, Dianthus superbus, Salix pentandra, Turritis glabra, Calamagrostis epigeios.*

ONE very interesting area was visited by Capt. Chase, viz. the Red Rocks near Tulgheş (Tölgyes): on account of the number of interesting plants to be found there this area has been preserved under the care of the Botanic Garden of Cluj. Tulgheş is the village which comes next to Corbu and here the mountains rise up from the valley floor of the Bistricioara and are covered with forests, the spruce (*Picea excelsa*) being dominant and reaching quite down to the valley which here has an altitude of about 600 metres. It was noted that sparse deciduous forest occurred above the spruce, the chief trees being the pedunculate oak (*Quercus pedunculata*), hazel (*Corylus avellana*), ash (*Fraxinus excelsior*), hornbeam (*Carpinus betulus*), with scattered examples of lime (*Tilia cordata*) and poplar (*Populus tremula*). Climbing higher, a narrow belt of birch (*Betula verrucosa*) occurred followed by beech (*Fagus silvatica*), with examples of sycamore (*Acer pseudo-platanus*) and lime. Still higher up, as usual, there was summer pasturage for sheep. The conspicuous cliffs, the "Red Rocks," could be seen standing out above the forest, and near them Capt. Chase recorded the following: *Sempervivum hirtum, Arabis arenosa, Phleum montanum, Cytisus leucotrichus, Campanula carpatica, Senecio rupestris, Spiraea ulmifolia, Allium montanum, Libanotis montana, Thalictrum foetidum, Melampyrum saxosum,* and what was one of the chief objects of the visit, plants of the outstanding endemic *Astragalus Romeri* growing in a ravine between the rocks.

133
137

The Visit to Mt. Ceahlau.

One of the most interesting excursions botanically was that made to Mont Ceahlau, which forms part of the Moldavian Carpathians and rises in its most elevated part to just over 1,900 metres.

The mountain itself is formed of Cretaceous Flysch which is much folded; near the summit there were banks of sandstone and excellent examples of conglomerate.

Unfortunately, the mountain was a considerable distance from Borsec, necessitating a start at 6.30 a.m. and a long journey by car. As the same journey had to be made on the homeward route much less time was spent upon this interesting mountain than one would have liked. The ideal would have been to have spent at least one night in the well-appointed alpine "Cabine" upon the summit. With the exception of the climb to the Peştera hut after leaving Sinaia, Ceahlau was the only really typical sub-alpine region visited during our stay in Roumania. As we drove along the



Fig. 3—Profile of Mt. Ceahlau seen from the east (after E. Nyárády)

narrow road by the side of the small tributary stream, to the Durau monastery from which the ascent was made, the following plants were noticed: *Myricaria germanica*, *Petasites albus*, *Salix incana* and the large yellow-flowered *Telekia speciosa*; the three first-named are typical plants found in the neighbourhood of stream beds in such regions, the other had never been seen previously by any member of the Vegetation Group.

137 AFTER passing across the meadows near the monastery we passed successively through three definite zones of vegetation (see Fig. 3):

(*a*) The beech zone (*Fagus silvatica*).
(*b*) The spruce zone (*Picea excelsa*).
(*c*) The zone of mountain pine (*Pinus montana*).

1. THE BEECH ZONE, OR LOWER MOUNTAIN ZONE.

THIS reached up to a height of about 650 metres. The beech here was the dominant tree, the woods were somewhat thin and here and there one occasionally saw a very tall specimen with a perfectly straight bole and practically no branches except at the top. In this area there was also a number of rather weedy-looking birches (*Betula verrucosa*). The principal plants of this zone were *Pyrola uniflora*, *Circaea alpina*, *Impatiens noli-tangere*, *Geranium phaeum*, *Salvia glutinosa*, whilst among the woody elements were *Salix caprea*, *Alnus incana*, *Sorbus aucuparia*, *Sambucus racemosa*, *Corylus avellana*, *Populus tremula*, and *Acer pseudo-platanus*.

2. THE SPRUCE ZONE, OR UPPER MOUNTAIN ZONE.

THIS began at about 650 metres and reached to 1,700 metres, forming a broad belt which appeared to encircle the entire mountain as it could be seen all along the slopes as we mounted somewhat steeply. As is usually the case on mountain slopes the line of demarcation between this zone and the previous one was not at all clearly defined; here and there one intruded into the other as the result of the influence of the ecological factors in a particular area. In this spruce zone two other conifers are said to occur sporadically, viz., the larch (*Larix decidua* forma *carpatica*) and the Scots fir (*Pinus sylvestris*); on our ascent only an occasional example of the latter was seen.

IN the forest and the clearings and on the rocky walls were many plants and one could only notice a few in passing: *Daphne mezereum*, *Lonicera xylosteum*, *Ribes alpinum* and *R. grossularia*, *Allium victorialis*, *Listera ovata*, *Trollius europaeus*, *Aconitum moldavicum*, *Parnassia palustris*, *Linum catharticum*, *Alchemilla vulgaris*, *Epilobium parviflorum*, *Circaea alpina*, *Pyrola rotundifolia*, *P. secunda*, *Gentiana carpatica*, *Geum robertianum*, *Sanicula europaea*, *Centaurea*

137

scabiosa, *Stachys alpina*, *Chrysanthemum rotundifolium*, *Salvia glutinosa*, *Arnica montana*, *Carlina acaulis*, *Lycopodium selago* and *L. clavatum*. In shady places several ferns occurred such as *Asplenium trichomanes*, *Phegopteris robertianum*, *Asplenium viride*, etc.

3. Zone of Mountain Pine (*Pinus montana* Var. *mughus*) or Sub-alpine Zone.

As one emerged from the spruce forests on to the plateau, the dominant feature was the masses of *Pinus montana* sub-species *mughus* with associations of the dwarf juniper (*Juniperus nana*) accompanied by *Vaccinium myrtillus*, *V. vitis-idaea* and *V. uliginosum*. In one instance *V. myrtillus* covered a large slope and peasants were gathering the fruits. Another characteristic plant covering a large area as we passed the path leading up the slopes to the summit of Toaca (1,904 metres) was *Dryas octopetala*, the light feathery fruits making the patch very conspicuous. A species of willow, *Salix Kitaibeliana*, was also noticed. As previously mentioned, the dominant tree of this zone is *Pinus montana*, met with in similar situations on our visits to the High Tatra of the Carpathians in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and to the Julian Alps of Yugoslavia. Its tortuous, flexible branches growing out close to the ground, formed in places an almost impenetrable barrier. Some fine and very old specimens were seen bearing cones, and, from its characteristic features, it obviously belonged to the sub-species *mughus*. As is well seen in the photograph (Plate III), *Pinus montana* occurs either massed in association or in circular, flattened, isolated clumps. Occasionally where sufficient protection was afforded, small spruces were seen.

Where the mountain pine formed a large association it provided sufficient shelter for the development of *Vacciniæ* and mosses, *Vaccinium myrtillus* being dominant and *Hylocomium splendens* the commonest moss. In company with these plants one saw patches of Iceland lichen (*Cetraria islandica*), *Oxalis acetosella*, *Homogyne alpina*, and *Luzula silvatica*.

It was in this sub-alpine region that we found many interesting plants and they may be grouped roughly under the following habitats :

4:Fleure S-5 (... date)1936 EDI Rumania EDI

Near the summit of Cashlau, showing zone of mountain pine (*Pinus montana var mughus*)—sub-alpine "Krummholzregion." The pine is seen in rounded clumps on the mountain slopes, but covers a large area on the flattened summit (see Vegetation notes).

Photo: R. J. Heard.

[facing page 24]

137

(*a*) *Clearings and uncovered areas.*

THE endemic *Primula leucophylla*, *Dentaria glandulosa*, *Soldanella hungarica*, *Veratrum lobelianum*, *Alyssum repens*, *Linum extraxilare*, *Alchemilla montana*, *Scorzonera rosea*, *Silene Zawadskii* (endemic), *Solidago alpestris*, *Erigeron alpinum*, *Doronicum austriacum*, etc. Among the *Gramineae* and *Juncaceae* were seen *Festuca supina*, *Nardus stricta*, *Sesleria caerulea*, *Calamagrostis villosa*, *Luzula silvatica* and *Luzula maxima*.

(*b*) *The sub-alpine meadow.*

ALTHOUGH there was little time to explore the very large area covered by this type of vegetation, several plants of distinctly alpine character were found and are regarded by Roumanian botanists as undoubted glacial relics. We were surprised to see several of these plants at such relatively low altitudes and were quite prepared to find that their occurrence was a loristic peculiarity of Ceahlau. Those noted were: *Pedicularis versicolor*, *Saxifraga oppositifolia*, *Polygonum viviparum*, *Saxifraga androsace*, *Dryas octopetala*, *Cerastium lanatum* and *Lycopodium selago*.

(*c*) *The Tundras.*

THESE occurred in the *Pinus montana* clearings and open slopes and as is usual in such habitats the chief elements were lichens, *Cetraria islandica*, and species of *Cladonia* intermingled with patches of *Vaccinia*. There were large rounded masses of mosses and the only woody element conspicuous in this somewhat dry region was the dwarf juniper (*Juniperus nana*). One could not help in passing comparing this type of vegetation with that seen on our visit to the Scandinavian plateau and also in the neighbourhood of Abisko in Swedish Lapland.

(*d*) *The Rocky Walls.*

AROUND the "Cabine" and still more pronouncedly around the summit of Toaca, where the underlying rocks were covered with a thin bed of humus, we met with our most interesting plants. Here grew, unfortunately overpicked by shepherd lads, Edelweiss (*Leontopodium alpinum*), *Eritrichium Jankae* (endemic), *Gypsophila petrea*, *Hieracium villosum*, *Sempervivum Simonkaianum*, *Saxifraga adscendens*, *S. oppo-*

137 *sitifolia*, *S. aizoides*, *S. aizoon*, *Erysimum Witmanni*, *Phyteuma orbiculare*, *Silene Zawadskii*, *Onobrychis montana var. transilvanica*, *Cerastium alpinum*, *C. lanatum*, *Oxytropus campestris*, *Alsine gerardi*, *Campanula alpina*, *C. carpatica*, *Alyssum repens* (endemic), *Rhinanthus alpinus*, *Rhodiola rosea*, *Sedum atratum*. In the cracks in the rocks where moisture collected were noted *Pinguicula alpina*, *P. vulgaris*, *Saxifraga aizoides*, *S. androsacea*, *Viola biflora*, *Arabis alpina*, *Achillea Schurii*, *Biscutella laevigata*, and *Androsace lactea*.

It was obvious that to make a detailed study of this interesting mountain with its forest, plateau, gullies, scree slopes, etc., and other varying ecological factors, a much longer time would have been necessary than was possible under the conditions of our visit to the country.

The Walk by Way of Bilbor, Paltiniş, Vatra Dornei, etc., and down the Bistrita River by Timber Raft to Broşteni (Brosceni).

133 This interesting excursion was made by a number of the
233 party, and afforded a very good opportunity of seeing the country as some fifty miles were covered on foot in two days. We passed over fine slopes and through delightful valleys with their meadows bedecked with many species of flowering plants. There was time during such a walk only to notice the most salient features of the vegetation. We, however, saw hillsides where sheep were grazed quite to the top, also
[343] a mountain dairy where they were being milked. The temporary shelters for those cropping the hay in the valleys at some distance from their usual habitations were interesting, and the whole family appeared to sleep there and cook their meals till the area had been cleared.

531 During our stay at Vatra Dornei, through the kindness of
341 the mayor and the prefect of the district, we were taken by car over a mountain pass down to Campulung and from thence to the wonderful walled monastery of Moldoviţa (Moldawitza) with fine sixteenth-century frescoes covering
313 its walls. The chief point of interest from a vegetation point of view was the fine spruce forests which we saw and in which felling was in progress, the logs being pushed down the mountain side to timber carts at the bottom. The next day we had evidence of the importance of the lumbering industry

313 as we proceeded down the Bistriţa river on a raft of spruce logs to Broşteni. In this way thousands of logs are transported by the current to saw mills lower down the stream. Lumbering was seen *en route* as we passed between slopes covered with fine spruce forests with here and there beech woods and also areas covered with birch.

LEAVING the raft at Broşteni we proceeded to Borsec by car and on the way saw an interesting effect of indiscriminate deforestation. On the slopes far too many trees had been cut down and a huge gully had been formed by a landslide ; a

Gullies and detrital fans resulting from deforestation in Bistrita valley.

house had been completely swept away and near by the soil was level with the top of the fencing round another house (see illustration above).

137 [133] BUDACUL (5,800 feet) was another mountain visited by members of the Vegetation Group. Spruce forest covered the slopes to a height of about 5,000 feet and there were no rocks. The last 500 feet were covered with mosses as well as *Festuca sp.* and the usual three *Vaccinia* with dwarf juniper (*Juniperus nana*). *Veratrum album* and *Hieracium* were the dominant plants in association with those mentioned on the summit, and in the woods below the following occurred : *Chrysanthemum rotundifolium, Scleranthus uncinatus, Scorzonera rosea, Ajuga genevensis, Meum*

137 *mutellina*, etc. The forester mentioned that beech forest was of no practical value but that hornbeam (*Carpinus betulus*) was sought after because of its hardness.

THE VEGETATION AROUND CORBU.

OF the vegetation around Corbu, the special village studied, little need be said: the hillsides had in many places been denuded of timber for building and domestic purposes throughout the whole length of the village.
THE following zones may be distinguished:

241 1. THE ZONE OF THE VALLEY BOTTOM (BISTRICIOARA).

THIS was devoted to agriculture, but the maize was poor in comparison with that seen on the hot Wallachian plains; patches of barley occurred chiefly on the south-facing slopes, and there were small patches of potatoes and hemp; hay was cut on the meadows near the river and on the lower slopes.

2. THE ZONE OF FOREST.

137 313 SPRUCE was the dominant tree, but on the church side of the village, particularly towards the Borsec end, stretches of Scots pine (*Pinus sylvestris*) had evidently been planted just above the valley floor. This was presumably to retain detritus and to consolidate the soil as they were planted much too closely to have any economic value for timber. Conversation with the forester on Runcul above Tulgheş confirmed this fact and Dr. Pop, the botanist at Cluj, also mentioned that *Larix decidua* var. *polonica* had been planted above Corbu. The schoolmaster said that the valley floor and lower slopes had originally been covered with trees and that wood was very cheap but labour was dear. Timber plays a very great part in the domestic economy of a village like Corbu, being used for building, furniture, carts, looms, winding frames, etc., as well as for fuel.

THE TRAIN JOURNEY FROM TOPLITA (OLAH TOPLICZA) TO CLUJ.

241 137 FINALLY the train journey from Topliţa to Cluj afforded another opportunity for observing the crops grown. All along the railway in the Mureş valley much maize was

241
137

grown with sunflowers round the edges of the fields; little tent-like stacks of hemp were seen drying, and on one occasion a field of tobacco was noticed. The common tree was the false acacia (*Robinia pseudacacia*). Along the stream sides one invariably saw the flowering rush (*Butomus umbellatus*). Vines were seen growing around Rasboeni.

A VERY interesting salt marsh area was noticed before reaching Cluj, large areas being covered with sea aster (*Aster tripolium*) and a species resembling sea lavender (? *Statice gmellini*) recalling the vegetation of the salt marshes on the North Norfolk coast around Blakeney, etc. AT CLUJ we were privileged to visit the fine Botanic Gardens under the guidance of Prof. Emil Pop, and saw the special floras of the various regions of Roumania.

IN CONCLUSION I should like to mention my indebtedness to Miss Vines and Capt. Chase for their observations and lists of plants from various areas which they visited.

HENRY J. HOWARD, F.L.S., F.R.M.S.,

137



FIGURE 6. This illustrates the sharp distinction between the forested highlands and the lowlands, and should be compared with Figures 5 a...

175
178
341

majorities have resulted from the valleyward movement of families that had previously farmed the slopes overlooking these intermont basins.

361 361 AN IMPORTANT distinction between the Roumanians and the rest of the population is seen in the types and distribution of their settlements (see Fig 5). The former, with their customary attachment to highland areas and to pastoral life, are usually associated with a dispersed or loosely agglomerated

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

VI.—ECONOMIC ROUMANIA

AGRICULTURE.

311 162 MODERN ROUMANIA is essentially an agricultural state, as was the Old Kingdom (43 to 46 per cent of the land being arable and 22 per cent forest, whilst over 80 per cent of the population of 18 millions are agricultural workers), although it has valuable potentialities for the development of industry.

132 241 134 ARRANGED in zones round the bastion of the southern and eastern Carpathian highlands, the main agricultural regions of post-war Roumania exhibit, according to aspect and altitude, a considerable variety of climatic conditions, which is reflected in a varying emphasis in the selection of crops raised. In general, we may say that the continental nature of the climate and the resulting succession from north to south and from highland to lowland of soils, graded from poor ashen-grey podsol in the Carpathians through oak-forest loams to a rich chernoziom in the south-eastern Danube plains, has resulted, wherever the ground is sufficiently level, in a concentration on grain production. The heavier rainfall of the uplands, the relatively great humidity and shelter from the driving winds that sweep across the open plains, coupled with the exposure of less fertile rocks—granites and coarse sandstones—explains the large area of forested land (24.5 per cent, nearly 7¼ million hectares) in those districts that extend into the Carpathian highlands. [137]

243 OF THE 13 odd million hectares of arable land, cereals occupy some 37 to 39 per cent. Production varies greatly from year to year and from district to district. In the old kingdom of Wallachia-Moldavia, maize is by far the heaviest crop, particularly in Oltenia, where the summer rainfall is heavier. It is also the heaviest crop in Transylvania, the cultivated areas under maize, wheat, barley and oats being respectively 4, 3, 2 and 1 million hectares. Maize is the staple crop of the peasant holder almost throughout the country, for it not only provides the bread cakes and the "mamaliga," maize pudding, the main food of the mass of the people, but also fodder for the cattle to eke out the hay in [262]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

291

Captain and crew. Photo: Dr. C. P. Sandgren.

137
133

Passengers.

These two photographs give a good impression of the gorge-like character of the transverse section of the Bistrita where it is cutting through crystalline schists. Photo: R. A. Pilbeam.

[facing page 48]

231 considerable admixture of cross-bred Swiss. On the Wallachian plains we find a cross between the Moldavian cattle of the plains and the Hungarian type which gives good milk, is easily fattened for market, and makes a good draught animal. Throughout the Danube plains the powerful water buffalo is important for draught purposes and for milk, and may be seen frequently also in the Transylvanian plains.

FOREST.

137 RICH in ploughland and not ill-provided with pasture, Roumania is fortunate in a third type of land utilisation which brings her vast acreage of mountainous upland into service. Forest covers about one-quarter of the land surface. Its greatest development occurs on the sandstones of the Flysch formation. Coniferous trees clothe the higher slopes above 1,400 metres, particularly on the Moldavian and Bucovinan frontiers of Transylvania. Below the coniferous forest zone with its peaty, acid soils, stretches the zone of beech forest, mixed, on its lower edge, with oak. (It is the beech forest that has given its name to Bucovina.) Here the characteristic soil is the leached, ashen-grey podsol, yielding poor crops in the clearings unless heavily manured. This zone tongues up the valleys into the coniferous zone. It widens to 100 kilometres in the Siret and Olt basins, but narrows in Muntenia, where the high mountains drop abruptly to the agricultural plains. The beech, unfortunately, has little economic value, and to this, with its poor soil, may be attributed the survival of so large a part of the beech forest. Its chief use is for firewood.

THE OAK FOREST on the lower slopes and foot hills, with its relatively rich brown soils, has naturally suffered most at the hands of settlers, and survives to-day mainly on the ridge combs and hill-tops. There are several species of oak, and hornbeam, lime and elm appear here and there in the oak forest with beech and birch on the upper margin of distribution. In Transylvania the lower hill country has been practically cleared of forest.

313 TIMBER is one of the mainstays of life of the peasant. All the constructional work of his village—dwelling house, barns,

FARMING AROUND CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

AMY R. BURGESS

133 IN THE region of Curtea de Argeş the river flows in a valley of varying width, floored with fine sandy alluvium and bounded by somewhat rounded hills. Some traces of river terraces are discernible.

THE LAND of this region can be divided into four categories: (*a*) arable, (*b*) hay meadows, (*c*) forest, (*d*) high mountain pasture. The arable land is principally on the first terrace, but stretches both down the slope to the valley bottom and up the slope to the second terrace. The hay meadows are above the arable land, spreading upwards towards the [137] forest. The forests comprise 75 per cent of the total area, and consist mainly of timber trees, such as beech and pine, together with a considerable number of walnut trees. The high pastures are above the forest belt and may be as much as fifty kilometres away from the village centre of the commune to which they belong.

423 THE ARABLE land is owned by the peasants, holdings ranging from less than one hectare to fifty hectares, the majority being from two to five hectares. The smallness of the holding [428] is due partly to the laws of inheritance, by which the land is divided between the children on the death of the owner, and partly to the fact that the district is so hilly that only small areas are available for cultivation.

241 476 THE HAY meadows belong to the commune and are both worked and used collectively by the peasants, all necessary organization being in the hands of the mayor and committee.

471 [313] THE FORESTS are largely state-owned, although some portions belong to the commune, in which case the peasants are allowed to cut for their own personal use (house-building, implements, etc.), but not for profit.

[233] THE HIGH pastures belong to the commune; the peasants pay a small fee to the commune for their use (20 lei per head per season for sheep, rather more for cattle).

132 AN IMPORTANT climatic feature affecting agriculture is the shortness of the summer, late spring and early autumn frosts

133 dependent for the working out of its economy, as for its setting, upon the high Southern Carpathians.

233 133 WHILE IN some parts of Roumania all the sheep must be moved to distant highlands in summer, there are many regions which have sufficient local pasture to keep a certain proportion of stock through the year. This applies to the country around Curtea de Argeş; here the late Tertiary (Pliocene) deposits are provided with frequent terraces. The lower terraces are glacial and may be three in number; higher up the dip-slopes of the coarse sands have often been cleared of the bad forests which still cling to the scarps, while at all levels slips have occurred in the loose materials to produce small mesa-like areas, sparsely covered with grass, juniper and birch, accessible to nimble sheep and goats.* In general, however, such local pasturage is reserved for cows in milk, while young cattle and bullocks, if not required for the many activities of farming and forestry, are sent with the sheep to the high pastures.

WE MAY best examine some of the features of this transhumance by following the sheep in their movements through the year in the valley of the Argeş and its background of high mountains, the Fagaras, extending eastwards from the valley of the Olt. The commune of Corbeni, some seventeen kilometres upstream, provides us with a few figures. Here is the first widening of the Argeş Valley, for the river has left the last range of the Carpathians (1,500 m.) through which it cuts one of the great gorges which characterize this zone, and it is here entering on its braided course through the [137] Miocene and Pliocene deposits to the south. The proportion of forested land in the commune is high (75 per cent), and its 2,500 sheep can be maintained only by extensive transhumance. The summer pastures are from thirty to fifty kilometres distant, the stâne† extending from the forest's upper limit (1,500-1,600 m.) to the scarred rock faces of the high core at 2,000 m. Each commune has its stână, which takes its name from the mountain on which it is situated: it is the property of the commune, but there are certain payments to be made each year for the services of

471 233

*Goats tend to be kept only by the poorer peasants; they are naturally not encouraged by the Forestry authorities.

†Stână (singular). The word is applied as here to the summer pastures and also to the huts where the shepherds sleep and make the store the cheese. By extension it is sometimes used for the general economy of transhumant shepherding.

B. TIMBER

313 NOTE: *As for other south-eastern European countries, the statistical and other data available on forest conditions is most insufficient. It has, therefore, been necessary to refer to the works of private foresters who differ considerably in their statements and conclusions. The statements which follow are, it is believed, substantially accurate, but must be considered with a certain degree of reserve.*

I. PRE-WAR SITUATION

The forests of Rumania were one of its most important natural resources and of much value to the country's general economic welfare. A large part of the fuel requirements were supplied in wood, in addition to which the country was self-sufficient in its needs for constructional timber, etc., whilst timber exports took third place after grain and oil. The timber industry was, however, over-expanded in relation to the size of the forests, the normal yield of which although able to cover domestic requirements, was not sufficient to meet the heavy extra demands for export. The result was that over many years, up to the outbreak of the present war, the relatively high exports were only made possible by considerably overcutting the forests.

1. Area, Location and Species

●137 According to the last known survey, Rumania's forest land covered about 7.1 million ha. (27,000 sq. miles), of which about 90 per cent., or 6.4 million ha., were stocked—equalling 24 per cent. of the total land surface. As was to be found in all Balkan countries, the forests were dominated by broadleaf species, the area under conifers being only 25 per cent.

The following table shows the division of the stocked forest area by regions and species, in '000 hectares —

17

[31a]

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943 ED1 Rumania ED1

137

	Old Kingdom	Transylvania	Bucovina	Bessarabia	Total	% of Total
Conifers	474	829	312	—	1,615	25
Beech	820	1,528	103	2	2,453	38
Oak species	706	723	6	114	1,549	24
Sundry hard broadleaf* ..	344	141	23	54	562	9
Sundry soft broadleaf† ..	173	61	6	30	270	4
Total	2,517	3,282	450	200	6,449	100

* Including hornbeam, alder, ash, etc.
† Including lime, birch, willow, poplar, etc.

[316]

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943

ED1 Rumania ED1

/37

About 85 per cent. of the forests, representing those that were the best and most extensive, were located in the hills and mountains—particularly in the east and south Carpathians, the

[31c]

●/137 Banat and in west Transylvania; and of these 15 per cent. are not easily accessible and are unremunerative to exploit on account of heavy capital expenditure necessary to build suitable roads and railways. The forests of the plains were of minor importance, especially since they consisted almost entirely of young trees yielding firewood only.

Beech was the principal forest tree, except in the plains, where it gave way to various species of oak. The eastern Carpathians constituted the only predominantly coniferous regions.

[423] The following table shows how the forests were owned and managed; column 1 shows the area in million Hectares, column 2 the equivalent in square miles:—

	I	II	% of Total
State owned	1.9	7.3	30
Owned by communes, churches, etc.	2.0	7.7	30
Owned by companies and private persons.. ..	2.5	9.6	40

About 70 per cent. of the forests were treated as "high forests" (i.e., allowed to grow naturally) and the remainder were under varying forms of "coppice management" (i.e., allowed to grow from roots after cutting, thus producing small timber).

2. Annual Increment and Domestic Consumption

313 439 Chiefly as a result of Rumania's Agrarian Reform policy in 1924 and 1925 of clear-cutting huge forest areas to provide peasants with additional agricultural land, very large volumes of timber became available for the export market, with the result that a wrong impression was created abroad that Rumania was a country with a large export surplus of timber.

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943 ED1 Rumania ED1

313
●137

	Consumption			
	Per capita	Total	Annual growth	Surplus
	solid cu. m.	'000 *solid cu. m.*	'000 *solid cu. m.*	'000 *solid cu. m.*
Firewood	0·50	9,250	12,590	3,340
Timber :—				
Conifers ..	0·17	3,122	3,230	108
Broadleaf ..	0·14	2,660	2,800	140
	0·81	15,032	18,620	3,588

[31f]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDI Rumania EDI

Plate 1

142
292



Roumanian peasants in national costume at the fair at Borsec. The man is wearing trousers of thick, home-woven material and home-made shoes, whilst the woman is wearing modern button boots. The coats are of sheepskin embroidered with coloured wool.

Photo: H. J. Howard.

facing page 13

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

142
291

PLATE IV

Our shepherd guide down mountain side to Paltinis, on journey from Borsec to Vatra Dornei. He was milking sheep at a "stâna."

Photo: H. J. Howard.

233



A mountain shepherd boy playing his wooden pipe near "stâna"—seen on journey to Paltinis.

Photo: H. J. Howard

[Facing page 25]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

PLATE VI

563
142
291

A group of Corbu children. The girls are Roumanians, the boys Gipsies, the broad-headedness of the former contrasting markedly with the narrow-headedness of the latter. *Photo: R. A. Feilman.*

A group of peasants at the Borsec Fair. The girl in the foreground is a Szekler, her costume contrasting with those of the Roumanian women behind. *Photo: Miss M. Odlin.*

[facing page 45]

342 A MARKED FEATURE is the comparative absence of chimneys.
374 The cooking is done in an outhouse, no doubt to minimise the risk of fire, but the dwelling house is generally heated by a stove, the smoke from which passes up through the ceiling in an iron pipe and then escapes into the open air through holes cut in the gable ends or, in the case of a hipped roof, through a small louvre.

345 THE OUTHOUSES are for the most part simple structures and call for no special comment.

511 CLEANLINESS and simplicity are the keynotes of the domestic economy. Household effects are kept down to a minimum, but upon their manufacture an enormous amount of time and skill is lavished, especially in the case of textiles. The skilfully-woven designs on the tapestries and pillows shown Plate XVI are an illustration of such effort.

POPULATION.

161 ACCORDING to the 1930 census Corbu had a population of
563 1,563, distributed among 358 households. The majority of the inhabitants are, of course, Roumanians, for the commune lies right on the fringe of the Szekler country. In spite of having lived in close association with the Roumanians for many generations, however, the Szeklers are easily distinguished by their dress, their physical type (though this is by no means an infallible guide), their adherence to Roman Catholicism, and, of course, their language. Although culturally there is an appreciable difference between the Roumanian and Szekler peasantry, there is to-day an even wider gap between these folk and the Tsiganes or Gipsies who form a much smaller, though very interesting, minority.
[142] Generally speaking, the Roumanians contribute a dark, and the Szeklers a fair, element to the broad-headed population, whereas the Gipsies are for the most part distinctly long-headed and very dark. There is an equally well-marked difference on economic grounds, for both Roumanians and Szeklers are essentially peasants, whereas the Gipsy, being landless, is compelled to seek a livelihood by trading, unless he be either smith or musician, following the traditional pursuits of his forbears (see Plate VI).

342 THE HOUSES occupied by Gipsies, while resembling in style
563 those of the peasants, can usually be recognised by the

342

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDi

PLATE XIII

A Corbu "stâna" occupied by transhumant flocks during the summer season. A deforested portion of the mountain 2,000 feet above the village has been set aside for pasturage. The buildings are very simple. The large hut on the left combines the functions of dairy and dwelling house, the smaller sheds in the compounds being used for milking purposes.

Photo: R. A. Pelham.

342
291
142



Close-up view of dairy showing adult members of "stâna" with their utensils. The man on the left is holding a horn.

Photo: R. A. Pelham.

[facing page 72]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

PLATE XIV

241
142

Woman combing wool for spinning at Corbu by drawing it through iron spikes fixed in a wooden bat-like handle. The boy is holding a distaff. *Photo: H. J. Heward.*

[462]



Woman weaving on primitive home-made wooden loom at Corbu. *Photo: H. J. Heward.*

[facing page 73]

164 Rickets is unknown, and difficult labour among peasant women is rare, though puerperal fever is common. In some instances, if there is a midwife, she is shared by several [847] villages. A law has recently been passed forbidding attempts at abortion, but it is not strictly enforced. There are a good many infant deaths. Maternal morbidity is not high, in [142] spite of the prevalence of puerperal fever. The women as a whole are robust, of good physique and inured to hardship. [757] The French treatment of sepsis by induced (turpentine) abscess is common and is found to be very successful, the fever running its course in 7-8 days, with low mortality rate. [853] Children are breast-fed, feeding bottles being unknown. The feeding continues until the age of one year or longer. Infantile paralysis is unknown in this district, though it does occur in other parts of the country. Rheumatism and arthritis are common.

743 752 A SMALL operating theatre is attached to the hospital[1] for emergency cases like suppurating appendices and ruptured hernia, other cases being sent to the hospitals in larger towns. Small surgical operations are also performed. The table is convenient, in that it can tilt at any angle from head to foot, but it cannot be lowered or raised at will. The only light is a small electric globe high up in the ceiling, with no facilities for lowering. Operations are, however, mostly done in daylight. If necessary, lamps or even candles are requisitioned. A small room for sterilising purposes opens off the theatre.

743 164 THE PAVILION for infectious cases is situated about twenty feet from the main building, in close proximity to the staff house and kitchen. Its beds were empty at the moment of inspection. Scarlet fever is the most common epidemic in this vicinity, and the beds were full one month ago. Epidemics of dysentery and typhoid also occur. Typhus is not known here, though frequent in Bessarabia. Diphtheria is fairly common.

759 THERE[2] ARE a medical doctor and a surgeon in attendance, the latter being only part-time.

743 THE HOME for the incurables[2] was next visited. It is a handsome villa, situated near the main street, but farther from the centre of the town. As before stated, it is a branch of the nerve clinic in Bucharest, and is under the supervision of

1 [in Curtea De Arges -- Analyst]

175 the various families according to their needs. The pastures and forests, however, were kept in the hands of the community.

THE latter part of the thirteenth century was a critical period for these people; the Tatar invasions were over, and the Turkish invasion had not yet begun. Many of the Roumanian peasantry moved out from the mountains and re-established themselves in the foothills of the Carpathians and of the Transylvanian Alps. The pressure from the west was maintained, however, and the Roumanians became organised on a more strictly military basis. Much of the power of the knesi was usurped by the "boyars," a new military aristocracy that arose, whilst the peasants were gradually forced into a serfdom from which they were not emancipated for several centuries. The various kneaseates became united into small states, under the leadership of princes or "voivods," and were welded eventually into the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. The success was short lived, however, for by the end of the fourteenth century Wallachia had fallen under the control of the Turks, and Moldavia soon followed.

THE STRUGGLE against the Turkish invaders was long and bitter; the ways through the mountains needed constant vigilance; the necessity for maintaining a united front against a common foe strengthened the communal spirit; and it is not, therefore, surprising that the alien groups in Transylvania should have preserved their individuality to a remarkable degree. This is particularly noticeable in the case of the Saxons, whose settlements to-day are veritable microcosms of Germanic culture (see Plate V).

[101] ALTHOUGH they originally had a common purpose, these two racial groups of Saxons and Szeklers have remained very different in character, for whereas the Saxons are still very largely confined to the settlements which they established in the early Middle Ages, the political, and to some extent the ethnic, boundaries of the Szeklers have been enlarged from time to time until they now encompass a considerable area of Transylvania.

● 144 OF the early history of the Szeklers we know but little. Racially they appear to differ somewhat from the Magyars of the plain, and to approximate more to the Roumanians in

175
361

FIGURE 4. B — Braşov, C — Cluj, M — Miercurea Ciucului, O — Odorhei, R — Rodna, S — Sibiu, S-G — Sf. Gheorghe, T — Turda, T-M — Targu-Mureş, T-S — Targu-Secuesc. Passes: (1) Olt, (2) Prahova, (3) Oltuz, (4) Ghimeş.

●144 head form, but whether this is due to the persistence of original characteristics or to partial fusion with the Roumanians it is impossible to say. At all events, they are essentially Magyar in culture, and accompanied the Magyars in their conquest of Hungary in the ninth century.

361
175 FIGURE 4 shows that their penetration of Transylvania followed the valleys of the Mureş and its tributaries, which

241 The basis of Rumanian economy is agriculture, in that some 80 per cent. of the population derive their livelihood from the land and agriculture provides a high proportion of the national income. [315] During recent years, however, the expansion of the oil industry has meant that agricultural pro- [439] duce has played a decreasing part in the country's exports, having been superseded by oil, exports of which amounted to 43 per cent. of the total export trade in 1938, compared with 19 per cent. in 1927; while grain exports in 1938 represented 23 per cent. compared with 46 per cent. in 1927.

In spite of the importance of agriculture to national prosperity farming methods are backward and per acre crop yields are among the lowest in Europe. Attention is particularly given to growing cereals, and of these maize is the chief, [231] providing a large surplus for export (apart from the war years). Livestock density is low, which is one of the weaknesses of Rumanian agriculture, the Banat being the only district in which numbers are fairly high, and farming approaches the [439] intensive system. It must be stressed that the relatively large export surplus, which consists of wheat, maize, barley, oilseeds and pulses, livestock, oilcake, etc., is only made possible by ●[146] the very low nutritional level which prevails, and that if this were raised to anything like western European standards exports would be commensurately reduced.

248 Since the war more attention has been paid to 249 the growth of industrial crops such as sunflower, soya, cotton, hemp and flax and the cultivation of rubber-bearing plants has been started following the finding of the *Kok Saghys* plant left by the Russians in Bessarabia. Though some success has been achieved in increasing the areas under textile fibres, and yields have been slightly higher, the hoped for increases in soya and sunflower cultivation have not been achieved due to unfavourable weather conditions and to general wartime dislocation.

313 Rumania's forest resources, though extensive, have suffered severely from a consistent policy of over-exploitation, and, while providing the basis of a fairly important industry during the period between the two wars, have been so depleted that cutting will have to be very restricted for a number of years if they are to be allowed to recover. The loss of Northern Transylvania has affected the timber industry in particular, as a high proportion of the forest resources were located there, and in that district this industry was better developed than elsewhere in the country.

IMPORTANCE OF OIL

315 Oil plays a major part, not only in Rumania's foreign trade, but also in covering her domestic fuel requirements, to a large extent replacing coal, reserves of which are small and of low quality. Since the war and the resulting pressure which Germany has exerted to obtain increased quantities of oil for her armies, (combined with the consistent drop in the rate of production between 1936 and 1941), serious attempts have been made to find alternative sources of fuel. The enormous reserves of natural gas existing in Transylvania, which were exploited only very slightly before the war, are being used increasingly as a source of fuel to supply local industries, and a

A. PRE-WAR CONDITIONS

1. General

241 Agriculture occupies about 80 per cent. of the population of Rumania and contributes the greater part of the national income: but, owing to the importance of the country's mineral-oil production, exports of agricultural products accounted for rather less than half of total exports [439] by value, in the immediate pre-war years.

Total agricultural production, even if there were no exports, would fall seriously short of the real food needs of the country. The poorest are actually underfed, while the majority of the remainder [146] subsist on a diet which, though adequate in quantity, is seriously deficient in quality and nutritional elements.

In her farming Rumania suffers from two interrelated difficulties: rural over-population and low food output per acre. There are 16 agricultural [161] workers per 100 acres of farm land, compared with 6 in Denmark and 3 in Britain. Another aspect of this is the extremely small size of most of the farms—75 per cent. of them are less than 5 hectares (12 acres) in extent. Because there is not enough land to go round, most farming families have to eke out a living on holdings which under any system of general farming would be too small to provide an adequate income.

The position would be less serious if a high per-acre food output were achieved. But in fact the Rumanian output per acre is barely one-quarter of that obtained in countries like Belgium and the Netherlands. Rumania pivots her farming on wheat and maize production but, owing to the extensive methods practised, the few livestock kept, and other reasons, per acre yields are among the lowest in Europe.

It is the over-population and land shortage which are largely responsible for agriculture remaining so backward. Having insufficient land the peasant does not produce much for sale, and so cannot afford to purchase fertilisers, good quality seed or better implements. Nor can he spare many acres for fodder crops, since the bulk of his land is needed to grow the food his family eats. And as he cannot buy fodder, he cannot keep many animals. Thus, while there is some scope for agricultural improvements which would ameliorate the peasants' lot, the pre-requisite of farming progress is to find alternative occupations for the surplus population.

423 The system of land tenure is peasant proprietorship. This was attained under the Land Reform 471 carried through after the first World War. The effect of this was to divide up and transfer to peasant ownership a large area of land formerly worked in big estates. This revolution in land tenure provided a solution for a long-standing social problem, but its effects on production were unfavourable. The large estates had been run by trained managers, with relatively advanced methods and equipment. Their transfer to ill-equipped, backward and uneducated peasants was followed, for a time at least, by a decline in yields, and consequently in total production and exports.

241 Little progress was made in the period between the two wars in remedying the disadvantages of uneconomic farm sizes, and in raising the low standards of farming. For lack of education the

241 133 however, be slightly deficient in grain, especially in poor years.

[311] The hilly land of Transylvania and the Bucovina differs markedly from the plain. There is proportionately less arable and much more meadow, grazing and forest land. The soil is poor. Methods are not as primitive as in the plain land of the Old Kingdom, but over-crowding is more serious and output per head is consequently lower. Parts of this region are slightly deficient in grain. Though [146] the level of food consumption is low, the dietary is more varied than elsewhere in the country, less maize and more meat and dairy produce being eaten.

3. Crops

311 Of the total area of pre-war Rumania, of nearly 30 million hectares (119,000 sq. miles) and twice the area of England and Wales, about 13 million hectares, or 45 per cent. was arable. Permanent meadow, pasture and grazing occupied 14 per cent., while tree and bush crops accounted for a further 2 per cent. The remaining land was non-agricultural, forest and waste land.

243 A very high proportion of the arable—over 80 per cent.—was used for grain growing, principally maize, wheat and barley. Owing to low rainfall, use of poor seed and lack of fertilisers, yields were at a low level and fluctuated widely from year to year.

[439] Out of an average grain production of 11 million tons, 6 millions went into domestic human consumption and 1½ million were exported, the remainder going to fodder, seed and waste. Grain exports have always figured largely in the country's foreign trade. During the twenty years 1920 to 1939 they only once fell below a million tons, and in some years exceeded three million tons. In value, during the decade before the war, they formed, after petroleum products, the main item in exports.

241 No other category of crops compares with grain. Sown fodder crops took barely 5 per cent. of the arable, all other crops, including potatoes, fibres, oilseeds, tobacco and sugar beet, about 8 per cent. Peas, beans and oilseeds were grown in sufficient quantities to provide surpluses for export. Germany established two companies—Solagra in 1934 and Sova A.G. in 1940—which invested large sums in promoting oilseed cultivation. The area [243] under sunflower was raised only slightly, but that under soya rose from nil in 1933 to 103,000 ha. (254,000 acres) in 1939, but the greater part of both crops was located in Bessarabia which Rumania lost to the U.S.S.R. in 1940 (see below).

244 Production of potatoes, vegetables and sugar beet was just sufficient for domestic consumption, but the tobacco crop did not quite meet requirements. Tobacco production had fallen from 20,000 tons in the late nineteen-twenties to 12,000 tons in the years just prior to the war.

[245] Fruit production was undeveloped and there was little organised marketing and processing. Plums were the main crop, but three-quarters of the output was used for making brandy. Apples and other kinds of fruit, and walnuts, were produced in fair quantities, but exports were insignificant, and, owing to low quality and the lack of standardisation, there were no prospects of development.

[7a]

241
654 Alongside this organisation the State ran certain technical services for agriculture, distribution of tested seeds, control of weights and measures, provision of bull and stallion services from its own stud farms. This work, however, remained less developed than in other S.E. European countries.

8. Agricultural Exports

241
231
439 Rumania was the largest grain exporter in Europe. By value, grain accounted for over half the total of agricultural exports. Livestock products, mainly live pigs and cattle, amounted to approximately one-fifth of the total, the remainder consisting of peas, beans, oilseeds, oil and oilcake, eggs and small quantities of fruit. Quantities exported on the average in the years 1935 to 1938 are shown below :—

	*Exports of Principal Agricultural Commodities** *Average* 1935-38 ('000 *metric tons*)
Wheat	686
Maize	543
Barley	297
Peas	21
Beans	43
Oilseeds .. .	108
Vegetable oils ..	5
Oilcake	103
Cattle ('000 head) ..	48
Pigs ('000 head) ..	222
Eggs	10

* Pre-1939 frontiers

241
439 It is of interest to note that, despite German hopes of a development in oilseed cultivation and exports, no increase had been achieved up to the eve of the war. German interest had succeeded in stimulating production and exports of soya beans, but there was no expansion in total oilseed exports owing to a decline in rape seed and to an increase in domestic consumption of oil.

German purchases of Rumanian agricultural exports were increasing in recent pre-war years. In 1939 the territories of Greater Germany took 25 per cent. of the wheat exports, half the feed grain and the bulk of the oilseeds. Italy also took appreciable quantities of grain.

9. Food Consumption

146
962 The Rumanian diet is perhaps the worst-balanced in south-east Europe. The outstanding feature is its high dependence on grain, which provides three-quarters of the calories and 70 per cent. of the protein. In the towns white wheat bread is eaten except by the very poor, whilst in the country wholemeal bread or maize is usual. Over large areas, particularly in the Old Kingdom, maize forms the chief food. (Taking the country as a whole maize consumption is two-thirds higher than wheat.) During the summer months, when work is very heavy, peasant families may eat as much as 3 kg. (6½ lb.) a head daily, almost always in the form of *mámáliga* (a kind of porridge).

The rest of the rural dietary consists chiefly of beans, some potatoes (especially in Transylvania), cabbage, beetroots, carrots, onions and a certain amount of cheese and milk. Consumption of all these foods is much too low by nutritional standards. Meat is rarely eaten, except at Christmas time when a pig is killed—for the rest of the year small amounts of fat salted pork are used, more or less as a flavouring. Some fish is eaten in villages near rivers. Vegetable oils—mainly sunflower—and pig fats are used for cooking; butter is rarely eaten.

146 262 Largely because of its cost, the consumption of sugar is very low, except among the well-to-do in the towns. (To encourage sugar-beet growing, a high price was set by the Government.)

[785] The diet is further impoverished by the long religious fasts—seven weeks before Easter, six weeks before Christmas, two shorter summer periods, plus Wednesdays and Fridays of each week. The diet during the fast includes practically no food of animal origin. Children under 10 years do not normally observe these fasts and, in fact, usually have a better diet during these periods since more milk, eggs and butter are available for them.

The diet, though fairly adequate in energy value, is short of animal protein, fats and calcium; moreover, where maize is the principal cereal lack of vitamin B_2 may be very serious. Various symptoms of vitamin and mineral deficiencies are [165] observed, and the high infant-mortality rate—the highest in Europe—is also partly due to malnutrition. One of the most serious effects of the poor diet is the nervous disease pellagra, caused by this deficiency of the vitamin B_2 factor. In Moldavia, where maize is the staple food, about 5 per cent. [164] of the rural population suffers from pellagra every spring. In the whole country about 3,000 deaths occur each year from this disease (compared with 4,000 in the maize-eating southern states of U.S.A.).

The average annual pre-war food consumption of Rumania is shown in the following table, with comparative figures for the United Kingdom.

Average per Head Consumption

	Rumania		*United Kingdom*	
	Kg.	*Lb.*	*Kg.*	*Lb.*
Wheat and rye	104	229	129	285
Maize	166	365	—	—
Potatoes	50	110	84	185
Sugar	5	11	43	95
Meat	17	37	63	139
Milk	70	123*	94	165*
Butter	1	2	11	24
Pig fat	4	10	5	11
Vegetable oil	1·5	3	—	—
Margarine	—	—	4	10
Calories per day	2,700		3,100	

*Pints

B. WAR-TIME CHANGES

1. Territorial Changes

728 241 311 The net effect of the territorial changes which have occurred since 1939 is the loss of Northern Transylvania to Hungary and of Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. For two seasons' crops, 1940 and 1941, Rumania was without Bessarabia, but in the late summer of 1941 she not only regained Bessarabia but acquired administrative control of the Soviet territory now styled Transnistria, and this has made small contributions to the food supplies of Rumania in 1942-43. Ignoring Transnistria, however, Rumania lost 12 per cent. of her former arable area and grain production. The Transylvanian areas ceded to Hungary, though not rich agriculturally, probably needed only small imports of grain to supplement their own production, while south Dobruja, though a surplus producing area contributed only a fraction to Rumania's total agricultural production. The country's potential agricultural export remains, therefore, substantially what it was before the war.

241 2. Agriculture in War Years

722 Germany, at the outbreak of the war, looked to the Danube countries, and to Rumania in particu-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

of property relations followed a different course from that in the West, and in both countries contact with the West created a steadily increasing crisis which the legislative measures of the nineteenth century did not solve and in some respects exacerbated. In neither case did peasant emancipation lead to the healthy development of small holds but rather to the appearance of the land-hungry cultivator still in a position of dependence on the landowner.[26]

566 423 175

While there were these similarities in Russian and Rumanian social and economic life, and more than a casual parallel in the development of agrarian relations, the political and international positions of the two states were entirely different. This difference explains in part some of the very great divergences in the recent history of these countries.

Political Aspects of the Agrarian Question

Although Rumanian economic and social relations were such as to create a dangerous tension in the countryside, politically, in marked contrast to tsarist Russia, there was relatively little revolutionary activity. This difference has often been attributed to the lethargy and supineness of the Rumanian peasant or to his Daco-Roman stability and love of order and hard work. National qualities may have played some part, though the violence of the 1907 revolt was damaging to many such theories. A more substantial reason would appear to lie in the contrast between the political and international situations of the two states.

[157] 668

Russia, a great empire, was assured of its independence as a nation. Existing institutions were firmly fixed. Russian social reformers could direct their energies toward internal issues without being preoccupied with the question of national survival. For these reasons the climate was favorable to a revolutionary spirit. Quite opposite conditions obtained in Rumania, a newly created state whose position in the community, or anarchy, of nations was by no means secure. Many Rumanians were not as yet included within the country's

26. The sensitivity in Rumania to developments in Russia would suggest the presence of common characteristics. The Russian emancipation of 1861 was followed by Prince Cuza's Act of 1864. There is evidence that the Rumanian rising of 1889 was aroused by a rumor that the tsar had ordered land to be divided among the peasants. The Russian Revolution of 1905 found a reflection in the 1907 revolt in Rumania, and of course the Russian Revolution of 1917 had a direct bearing upon the Rumanian agrarian reforms of 1918–21. The correlation of these events is certainly more than a chronological coincidence. It might be added that Stolypin's program to reform Russian agriculture by creating a class of strong peasant holdings resembles some of the recommendations put forward by the Conservative agrarian expert Constantin Garofid.

874 the use of machinery are carried on at the school. Advisers
242 are sent out to the farms, and seeds and plants, as well as artificial manure, are supplied to the peasants at a very low cost. Machinery is also loaned out cheaply. The average
[157] peasant, however, is very conservative, and progress is slow.

SOME DETAILS OF TWO FARMS: AUGUST 1936

FARM A

423 SIZE: one half-hectare approximately. This farm is situated
241 approximately two miles north of Curtea de Arges.

THE HOLDING consists of a narrow rectangular strip, bounded on one of its long sides by a rough lane and on its short side by the main road. The ground is fairly level and sufficiently above the river to be well drained. (See Plan A for utilization of land and arrangement of buildings.)

Animals

[231] 2 milking cows, 2 calves (at farm), but no oxen (this was unusual).
10 sheep, away on high pastures.
3 pigs, at farm.
10 geese, 6 ducks, 50 hens.

FARM B

SIZE: Five hectares approximately. This farm is situated at Corbeni, several kilometres north of Curtea de Arges, at a point where the river valley widens out and the river braids. The farm is situated on the second terrace. The plot is rectangular, with its narrow side bordered by the road and its long side running parallel to the river, thus giving a well-drained but flat holding. The son of the owner holds a diploma for agriculture and the farm shows every evidence of prosperity. See PLAN B for utilization of land and arrangement of buildings.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

leaders were not in complete agreement. Some desired Carol's immediate proclamation as king, some were hostile to him, and others advocated his entering the regency. Maniu himself was opposed to proclaiming him king until Carol should leave Mme Lupescu and achieve a reconciliation with his wife. "But," he said later, "I could not force my views in face of public opinion." [6]

The newly constituted government was short-lived. When Maniu learned that Mme Lupescu had returned to Rumania contrary to what he believed to be Carol's agreement, he resigned in protest on October 6. A new National Peasant cabinet was formed under the wealthy but colorless Mironescu, without Maniu or Vaida Voevod. Although this cabinet remained in office until the following April, its dismissal was only a matter of time. Carol had announced his desire to create a coalition government, and as soon as the National Peasants had completed a new loan agreement they were removed from office. The second National Peasant government of 1932–33 will be discussed later in connection with the depression.

Maniu's resignation in October, 1930, was a significant event as it marked, when viewed in retrospect, the conclusion of Rumania's brief experiment with responsible government. In so far as his action was a protest against royal irresponsibility and bad faith, Maniu was remaining true, as he did always, to his conception of legality and constitutionality. But as a protest against the king's moral standards it was misdirected. "Bourgeois sexual morality," Mr. Hugh Seton-Watson has said, "is probably less esteemed in Rumania than anywhere else on the Continent. It was not the right issue on which to base the whole conflict between Democracy and Dictatorship." [7]

The episode is inexplicable without some insight into Maniu's personality, which, in its rather cold incorruptibility, was in the sharpest possible contrast to the laxness and opportunism of Rumanian public life. Born in Transylvania in 1873, Iuliu Maniu had studied law in Vienna. He had been attorney of the Uniate Metropolitanate of Blaj and professor of law at the Blaj Theological Academy. As deputy to the Hungarian parliament he had gained a reputation as a stubborn and doughty opponent of Hungarian policy in Transylvania. The clerical atmosphere of Blaj and the parliamentary atmosphere of the Budapest chamber had a lasting influence. Maniu

6. John Gunther, *Inside Europe* (London, 1936), pp. 367–369, includes an unpublished speech by Maniu which was to have been delivered in 1934 and which provides some additional details concerning the National Peasant leader's position on Carol's return.

7. Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918–1941* (2d ed., Cambridge University Press, 1946), p. 204.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

159 was renowned as the man in permanent opposition and as one whose acts were always directed by what he considered to be the judgment of posterity. From the very beginning of postwar politics his strength of character gave him an influence which is otherwise difficult to explain. He has always been a source of tremendous admiration to his followers and of singular exasperation and hatred to his opponents.

Those traits, however, which contributed to Maniu's very considerable stature had two serious disadvantages. His personal probity not only led him into politically untenable positions, such as making a political issue of Mme Lupescu, but was far too elevated for his party to emulate. There was always a noticeable divergence between Maniu's precepts and the activities of rank and file of the party, and while Maniu cannot bear the responsibility for the foibles and shortcomings of his followers, it left him, as leader of the party, open to charges of hypocrisy. A more serious drawback was the negativeness and passivity, though not from weakness, of Maniu's attitude; he was always withdrawing, retiring, and resigning, frequently on occasions which demanded a more positive response. Characteristic of this attitude and showing both an admirable democratic belief in his compatriots, together with the absence of any constructive action, is a speech he delivered later, in February, 1932:

> To-day the nation is deprived of its constitutional rights; we are on the threshold of bankruptcy, both economic and moral; we see anarchy enthroned in men's souls and hatred fomented in the provinces, and in the murmur of this growing dissolution one hardly hears the voice of the national conscience, one and undivided. . . . In such solemn moments you ask for my guidance. I shall offer you none. You have both intelligence and conscience. I pray you to revere the memory of the sufferings which brought about the consummation of the national unity.[8]

165 More, however, was involved in Maniu's resignation than personal differences between two individuals. In effect, the leader of a government which had come into power with a tremendous—and authentic—majority of votes surrendered its authority to a monarch who had assumed the crown only four months earlier. Admittedly, there was nothing unconstitutional in this, since the king had the right to appoint and dismiss ministers, but it did bring out the implicit contradictions in the Rumanian constitution between the powers of the monarch and representative government. More than that, it raises

8. Quoted in G. C. Logio, *Rumania*, pp. 59–60.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

115 and it is illustrative of the nature of Rumanian politics that the National Peasant party had by this time already become an "old" party —had outlived the impulses which had created them. He desired a rearrangement of the political mosaic to give due place to "younger" elements and believed that this required the installation of a disinterested government of "personalities." Besides the knowledge that Carol was counting their days, the National Peasants saw their once impressive popularity draining away, through the depression and their manifest failure to bring about the new Jerusalem.

In by-elections of January, 1931, the government lost a number of seats, and perhaps the only safe conclusion one can draw from Rumanian elections is that the loss of government-held seats means an undeniable fall in public confidence. The customary flurry of rumors presaged the government's overthrow, and indeed its negotiations for a second foreign loan were the condition for its remaining in power, as had been the case with Vintilă Brătianu's government three years [648] before. On March 10 the loan agreement was signed in Paris, and on April 4 Mironescu resigned. Rumania's outstanding diplomat, Titulescu, was recalled from London—a standard procedure during the cabinet crises of these years—to form a coalition government. Both the National Peasants and the Liberals accepted on certain conditions but Iorga, significantly, voted against it and demanded a cabinet of personalities.

On April 18 Carol called upon Iorga, who, with Argetoianu as his capable hatchet man, formed a cabinet of at least some of the talents. Iorga, announcing his program to be hard work and economy, summoned and immediately dismissed the National Peasant chamber. New elections were held, but even with Argetoianu doing his efficient best at the Ministry of the Interior and with an electoral pact with the Liberals, the government bloc of National Union obtained only 48 per cent of votes. The National Peasants of course were forced down to 15 per cent, and Maniu announced his retirement from politics. The Communists' Workers and Peasant Union won five seats, their first representation in the chamber. Incidentally, none of their members was returned from Bessarabia, reputedly the seat of Rumanian communism; all five were from the industrial centers of Transylvania, the Banat, and Bucovina.

Carol's guiding hand is evident in the creation of the Iorga-Argetoianu government, and after its formation he announced his 159 intentions to preside over cabinet meetings once a week. Nicolae Iorga, the internationally known and incredibly voluminous historian, had never commanded any following beyond a coterie of ad-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

mirers. His individualism, or perhaps his vanity, had made him an uncertain political ally, and he took to himself the role of mentor and guardian of the Rumanian national consciousness. His efforts in politics, however, were far less impressive than his output as a historian.[1]

The government's term in office was not edifying.[2] As the economic situation deteriorated, the complete absence of any organized political support made itself felt when all the other parties began a violent press campaign; the Liberals belabored Argetoianu's financial policy as one of bankruptcy; the Transylvanian press threatened a demand for autonomy; the aging Marshal Averescu, bitterly disappointed by Carol's failure to select him as man of the hour, assailed both the government and the king. A crisis rose between Carol and the government over the salaries of state officials. The government, faced by a bad deficit and the failure to obtain an additional loan from France, was attempting to reduce official salaries. Carol opposed this and forced Iorga's resignation on June 6, 1932.

After an unsuccessful effort by Titulescu, the National Peasants, under Vaida Voevod, were recalled for their second term of office. In the elections of July they obtained only 45 per cent of the votes, a great decline from their 80 per cent of 1928, but sufficient to give them the premium. The Iron Guard and other fascist groups showed gains and won some additional seats, primarily in Bessarabia, the region of deepest discontent. An effort was made to bring Maniu out of retirement; he did resume leadership of the party but was unable to reach an understanding with Carol.

The program of the new National Peasant government was along the same lines as its predecessors and included the reintroduction of the administrative decentralization law, which had been revoked by the Iorga government; a modification of the electoral law, which all parties promised to change but which they somehow did not get around to when in power; and a reduction of taxes and expenditures. The party had an initial success in obtaining a Swiss loan of 50 million francs for the payment of back salaries of state officials. In October, however, Vaida Voevod resigned after a disagreement with the influential Titulescu on the question of Rumanian-Soviet nego-

1. For a recent tribute to Iorga, who was assassinated by the Iron Guard in 1940, see John Campbell, "Nicholas Iorga," *The Slavonic and East European Review*, 26, No. 66 (November, 1947), 44–59.

2. For a particularly jaundiced account of the Iorga-Argetoianu administration see G. C. Logio, *Rumania*, pp. 39–52. Logio, as a foreign business man, was especially bitter on the subject of Rumanian business ethics and heartily disliked Carol, "who promulgates rascally laws defrauding the unwary foreign investor and trader."

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 Iron Guard 16 per cent, and the National Christian party (the fu-
665 sion of Goga's and Cuza's nationalist, anti-Semitic parties) 9 per cent. Rumania's curious electoral system had broken down. The Liberals' failure was clearly a loss of confidence. The National Peasants or the Iron Guard seemed the most likely alternatives.

At this point, however, Carol moved in and on December 28, 1937, called upon the Transylvanian poet and lyrical fascist, Octavian Goga, to form a cabinet. Carol's own explanation of this surprising decision, which was in fact the immediate prelude to his personal dictatorship, was that he had no alternative. He could not bring back the Liberals; he did not want the Iron Guard in power, so his only move was to spike the guns of the extreme Right by putting in another but less dynamic Rightist party. There was, of course, another solution: to have called in the National Peasants, but the personal feud between Carol and Maniu precluded that course. There is no evidence, however, that Carol was at all reluctant to take power into his own hands.

Goga was installed with a rather heterogeneous cabinet including Gen. Ion Antonescu and three runaways from the National Peasants, chief of whom was Armand Calinescu. This government had a brief and hectic career, notable chiefly for arousing foreign protests because of its anti-Jewish activities but for little else. On February 10 Carol ended the farce, dismissed Goga, and set up a government of National Union under the Patriarch Miron Cristea, including an assortment of old worthies: Averescu, Vaida Voevod, General Vaitoianu, Mironescu, Iorga, Tătărescu, Argetoianu, Calinescu, and General Antonescu. It was a strange collection when one considers Carol's advocacy of the "younger generation." The period of explicit royal dictatorship had started.

Economic and Agrarian Policy

642 If the drift toward a royal dictatorship was induced by the victories of fascism throughout Europe and by the political conflict within Rumania itself, a third reason was the economic policy pursued after the depression. While much of the dictatorial paraphernalia of these years may be attributed to Carol's personal tastes or to the political desirability of making use of the nationalist and fascist sentiments of the times, a quite separate impulse toward an authoritarian, corporatist society was contained in the economic policy of neoliberalism.

159 Perhaps the clearest illustration of this impulse is to be found

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

in the writings and career of the economist-politician Mihail Manoilescu, a man who never achieved his political ambitions in Rumania but whose unorthodox economic writings have attracted a fair amount of international attention. Trained as an engineer, he became engaged in politics after the First World War as a member of General Averescu's People's party. In 1927 he was arrested by the Liberal government for his efforts to bring Carol back to Rumania; he was later rewarded by being foisted on the Mironescu cabinet as Minister of Industry and Commerce. Although he held a number of cabinet posts in the governments of the 1930's, he did not fare as well under Carol as he had hoped. He was, however, called to the foreign ministry in 1940, and had the unpleasant privilege of signing the Vienna Decree by which Rumania lost Northern Transylvania.[11]

Manoilescu began his political career as a neoliberal and as an opponent of the peasantism (țărănismul) of the radically inclined Peasant party of 1922.[12] At that time he announced democracy to be his ideal and the essential truths of liberalism to be valid and timeless. He criticized the peasantist doctrine, elaborated by Madgearu and Stere, as anachronistic and self-contradictory. Since the land reform had already been achieved, the Peasant party, born too late, had lost its *raison d'être*. Like all opponents of the Peasants, he denied the homogeneity of the peasantry and its ability to act successfully as a class. He deplored the party's current emphasis upon class struggle, as beyond the powers of the peasantry to master and as dangerous to society. As for liberalism, he felt that its historical manifestations—as distinct from its essential principles—had been altogether too limited by an atomistic concept of society, by the passive role assigned to the state, and by the narrow definition of private property. Superficially, in his opposition to peasantism and his reformulation of liberalism, he was not far from the Liberal Duca.

But if one examines his neoliberalism of 1922 and 1923, certain very important differences appear. In the first place, he openly attacked the Rumanian Liberal party and was thus not obliged, as was Duca, to reconcile liberalism to the party of the Brătianus. Unlike Duca, who pleaded for "social harmony," Manoilescu was for a "political equilibrium" of the various independent productive groups which form society; he advocated vertical rather than horizontal parties. The principal difference, however, lay in Manoilescu's em-

11. A brief biography is given in the bibliography of his works: Florin Em. Manoliu, *Bibliographie des travaux du Professeur Mihail Manoilesco* (Bucarest, 1936).

12. His two principal studies in this connection are *Țărănism și democrație* (Bucarest, 1922), and "Neoliberalismul," in *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, a lecture delivered in February, 1923.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665
159

phasis upon economic productivity: "In order to live as a civilized state, Rumania requires the political and social form which will realize its energies to the maximum." [13] This emphasis had a decisive effect upon his whole line of thought. The peasant, because of his relatively low productivity, could not be the dominant factor in Rumanian social and economic life. On the contrary, Manoilescu defended the old Rumanian oligarchy which had been the necessary advance guard in the national awakening. Above all he saw society as a planned work of engineering. "To-morrow the principles of scientific organization will dominate the whole of society and will be applied to the entire system of national production as to a single enterprise." [14]

It was this ideal, and not any "regeneration of liberalism," which marked the real divergence of Manoilescu's neoliberalism from the views of the old Liberal party. This distinction is quite important. As has been seen, the Liberals had taken over nineteenth-century liberalism largely for nationalist reasons. In the course of applying it to Rumania, they had warped it beyond recognition, especially in regard to economic nationalism and state control. Nevertheless, it remained a derivative, if a perverted one, of the liberalism of the nineteenth century. As a result the Liberals were caught in a contradiction between their actual policy and their political philosophy, and it has been noted that the Liberal leaders justified their economic policy on grounds of temporary necessity or because of Rumania's backward condition. Even in their stress upon industry the old Liberals held a somewhat simple view of the exploitation of natural resources coupled with a nationalist desire to have a strong Rumania.[15]

In Manoilescu, on the other hand, economic productivity, that is, industrialization, was the focal point of his thought, and drove him entirely away from liberalism toward a doctrine of corporatism. Manoilescu's best known work, *The Theory of Protection and International Trade*,[16] shows a notable evolution from his articles of the

13. *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, p. 161.

14. *Ţărănism şi democraţie*, p. 50.

15. In this connection it should be noted that Zeletin's neoliberal defense of Rumanian liberalism (see above p. 114) has a rather retrospective air, justifying Rumanian economic policy in terms of the earlier mercantilist behavior of the western European states. Zeletin also wrote a book on *Neoliberalismul*, but his point of view was quite different from Manoilescu's and really referred to the modifications of liberalism mentioned by Duca and appearing in the 1923 Constitution. Zeletin approached the subject in a quasi-Marxist fashion and regarded the development from liberalism to neoliberalism as one of historical necessity. Manoilescu, on the other hand, displays a marked voluntarism.

16. The book was first published in French, *Théorie du protectionnisme et de l'échange international* (Paris, 1929); an English translation appeared in 1931; a

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

early 1920's although many of the changes were implicit in the earlier writings. In 1923 he had wanted to reformulate liberalism to meet contemporary requirements. By 1930 he was attempting a total refutation of the classical theory of international trade as it had come down from Ricardo. The core of his new theory, which he reiterated incessantly, was that "the product of the labor of an industrial workman is almost always exchanged for the product of the labor of several agricultural workmen."[17] From this premise he concluded that international exchange was only to the benefit of the industrial country and furthered the economic domination of the European industrial states.

The economic domination of a country signifies the economic state which allows the produce of the labor of its workmen to be exchanged for the produce of a larger number of workmen of other countries. In the life of nations, as in the life of individuals, wealth never comes only from one's own labor. "Make others work for you" has always been the classical means of becoming wealthy.[18]

If an agricultural country is absolutely unable to produce industrial goods it is obliged to make this disadvantageous exchange, but if it can produce an industrial article—even at a permanently higher cost than a foreign industrial state—it should do so rather than import. Thus, even though it might require the labor of 300 Rumanian workmen to produce a quantity of cloth that could be produced by the labor of 100 British workmen, it would still be advantageous to do so, if, to import the cloth, Rumania was obliged to export a quantity of wheat which had required the labor of 500 workmen. With his theory of permanent protection, Manoilescu was quite critical of those protectionists, such as List, who had gone only halfway and rested their argument on the fostering of infant industries. He demanded protection, however, only for those industries whose "productivity surpasses the average productivity of the country." He opposed autarky, which he thought defensible only as a measure of preparedness for war, and did believe in an international division of labor, but one which was based upon specialization within different branches of the more productive industries.[19]

---

revised and expanded version later appeared in German, *Die nationalen Produktivkräfte und der Aussenhandel* (Berlin, 1937).

17. Manoilescu, *Theory of Protection*, p. vi.

18. *Ibid.*, p. vii.

19. It is unnecessary here to give an account of his quite lengthy effort to provide a mathematical refutation of the principles of free trade. His chief attack was upon

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

page 40

III

AGRICULTURAL POPULATION AND PRODUCTION

121 THE course of Rumanian politics between the wars can be understood only in its economic setting; urgent economic problems constantly demanded the attention of all governments, and at the same time the prevailing poverty and economic backwardness undermined political life and contributed powerfully to the emergence of the dictatorships. This and the following chapter sketch the general features of the economic framework, with particular emphasis upon agriculture and the demographic problem. Industry, commerce, and finance are considered primarily in their relation to the agrarian question.

Population [1]

161 According to the 1930 census, Rumania had a population of
162 18,057,028 persons, the largest of any state in eastern Europe with the exception of Poland. While the density, 61 persons per square kilometer in 1930, was less than that of the more highly industrialized states of western Europe, the population was increasing at a rapid rate. Rumania had one of the highest birth rates in non-Russian Europe as well as the highest death rate. In general, its population pattern resembled that of the other states of eastern Europe, especially Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Ukraine, and was in marked contrast to the stable or declining populations of the West.

163 Eastern Europe is now passing through the phase of great popu-
165 lation growth which began in England and western Europe in the eighteenth century and has since radiated eastward. This phenomenon, one of the most important in European history, appears to have followed a definite sequence: first, a high death rate and a high birth rate, more or less in balance, giving a stable or only slightly expanding population; then the death rate dropped rapidly; finally the birth rate dropped down to or below the death rate. The lag between the fall in the death rate and the subsequent fall in the birth rate produced the great expansion of population. From current evidence

1. More complete statistical information on the population is given in the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

it appears that in eastern Europe the birth rate has begun to decline, 163
but its effect will not be reflected in the population for a number of 165
years.

The decline of the death rate in the West resulted from the numerous social, hygienic, and nutritional improvements gradually introduced and disseminated over the last two centuries, all of which were slow in reaching eastern Europe. The subsequent fall in the Western birth rate appears to have been largely a conscious social restriction and not any decline in "national virility." [2] It generally accompanies a rise in living conditions and has shown a direct correlation with class differences.

The extent to which those factors bringing about the growth of population in the West apply to eastern Europe is not known with certainty. The fall in the eastern European death rate after the middle of the nineteenth century appears to have corresponded with the introduction of some of the social and hygienic improvements from the West, but it may also have resulted from a moderate improvement in internal and external security at a somewhat earlier date.[3]

Birth and death rates for Greater Rumania showed a decline during the interwar years, largely a result of drops in the rural rates. The rural birth rate in 1936, however, was still well above that of the towns (33.8 per thousand as against 21.4). The rate of natural increase, the excess of births over deaths, also displayed a perceptible decline, from over 14 per thousand inhabitants in the early 1920's to about 11 in the late 1930's. The birth rate fell greatly during the Second World War (to a low of 19.9 in 1945) and seems to have increased only slightly in the postwar years. The death rate having remained approximately the same, the rate of growth of Rumania's population has diminished tremendously under the exceptional conditions of the past decade.

Agricultural Overpopulation

While Rumania's over-all density of population is not very high 161
as compared with that of western Europe, most of the people live on the land, and the agricultural population is quite dense. In 1941 the agricultural population of Rumania (minus Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina, Northern Transylvania, and Southern Dobrogea) represented 71.4 per cent of the total population and 94.4 per cent of the

2. Dudley Kirk, *Europe's Population in the Interwar Years* (League of Nations, 1946), p. 38. 113

3. A. M. Carr-Saunders, *World Population: Past Growth and Present Trends* (Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 80.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

161 rural population.[4] There were 94.3 inhabitants of the agricultural population for every 100 hectares of agricultural land in private hands (including arable surface, meadow, vineyards, orchards, and pastures). Agricultural population was densest in the poor mountainous areas, in contrast to total population which was densest in the plains; in the Oltenian and Muntenian Carpathians 121.5 agricultural inhabitants occupied every 100 hectares of agricultural land in private hands, 112.8 in the Moldavian Carpathians and 108.3 in Bucovina.

That the density of Rumania's agricultural population was relatively high is shown in the following table, comparing Rumania (on the basis of earlier and somewhat different statistics) with other eastern European and some of the western European countries:[5]

Country	*Density of population dependent upon agriculture per square kilometer of "arable-equivalent" * agricultural land, ca. 1930.*
RUMANIA	79.7
Old Kingdom	79.9
Bessarabia	69.7
Bucovina	145.9
Transylvania	81.3
Bulgaria	95.4
Greece	86.7
Yugoslavia	100.1
Hungary	63.1
Poland	86.9
Austria	64.2
Czechoslovakia	59.4
Italy	38.4
Germany	52.1
France	28.8
Netherlands	81.7
Denmark	87.5
England and Wales	33.8

* "Arable-equivalent" is a statistical device to achieve a rough comparability between different types of land (arable, pasture, vineyards, etc.) used for agricultural purposes. A hectare of pasture land is clearly not equivalent to a hectare of arable.

The director of the Rumanian Central Institute of Statistics, in interpreting the results of the 1930 census, concluded that "These

113 4. Institutul Central de statistică, *Recensământul agricol al României din 1941* (Bucarest, 1945), Table 21.

5. Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (League of Nations, 1945), pp. 197–204.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

figures permit one to affirm that our country has arrived at the saturation point, and even at an agricultural overpopulation."[6] The term "overpopulation," however, has been subject to numerous interpretations and must be used cautiously.[7] In particular, in Rumania the issue of overpopulation has been too frequently brandished as a political weapon for contending parties.

Surplus population is sometimes defined in terms of an "optimum" population, one that achieves the maximum per capita real income. In such a case overpopulation would mean that a withdrawal of population from the land would increase per capita income since the marginal productivity of the surplus cultivators, given the law of diminishing returns, is less than the average per capita productivity. Apart from the manifold difficulties of determining such an optimum, this approach is somewhat artificial in the case of eastern Europe, where the problem of overpopulation is concerned not with any ideal optimum but with a possible Malthusian nightmare of mass suffocation. To be meaningful in this connection overpopulation must indicate that in some way more people are engaged in agriculture than are required for the type of cultivation prevailing, that they could be withdrawn from the soil without loss in agricultural production, the output of the surplus population being less than the loss occasioned by their presence (soil destruction, irrational holdings, etc.).[8]

It is clear that density alone does not determine overpopulation in this sense, since the Netherlands, for example, had a slightly higher agricultural density than Rumania but with entirely different social and economic consequences because of an intensive form of cultivation. The level of agricultural productivity, expressed in yield per unit of area is also a factor. That is, output per capita (C), which ultimately determines the level of existence, is equivalent to yield per unit of area (Y) divided by the density of agricultural population (D): $C = \frac{Y}{D}$.

Now for purposes of general orientation it is possible to make a rough comparison of this equation for Rumania with that for

6. Sabin Manuila, *Structure et évolution de la population rurale* (Bucarest, 1940), p. 17.

7. For discussions of the definition of overpopulation see Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 55–77; Carr-Saunders, *op. cit.*, pp. 330–331; and "The Problem of Surplus Agricultural Population," *International Journal of Agrarian Affairs, I*, No. 1 (October, 1939); the entire issue is devoted to articles on the question.

8. If overpopulation is not defined in some such sense as this, it is necessary to consider alternative means of employment for the surplus population, unless the surplus is to be physically liquidated. This problem will be discussed presently in connection with town and country relations.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

161 Europe as a whole.[9] If we take Europe to be the norm, $C = \frac{Y}{D}$, then the equivalent equation for Rumania is, very roughly, $.48C = \frac{.69Y}{1.44D}$. That is, Rumania's per capita output in agriculture is only 48 per cent of the European average because the yield is only 69 per cent as great and the density of agricultural population is 44 per cent greater. There are, however, marked regional differences within Rumania. The situation in the Old Kingdom is approximately the same as in Greater Rumania as a whole, but in Bucovina per capita output is only 45 per cent of that for Europe, although yield is 17 per cent above the European average ($.45C = \frac{1.17Y}{2.60D}$) because of the extreme density of the population, over two and a half times that of Europe. On the other hand, in Bessarabia the per capita output is low because of the low yield although the density of agricultural population is only 24 per cent greater than that for Europe ($.45C = \frac{.56Y}{1.24D}$). In Transylvania the per capita output is the highest in Rumania ($.51C = \frac{.74Y}{1.45D}$), a reflection of the generally more advanced level of agriculture in that region which more than compensates for the density of the population.

Some efforts were made in Rumania to calculate the hidden unemployment resulting from overpopulation. In 1933 A. Frunzanescu and C. Vasiliu, after calculating the number of man-days required to carry on a year's agricultural activity in Rumania, estimated that only 43.66 per cent of the potential energy of agricultural labor was actually employed in direct agricultural work, and not over 55 per cent in all farm activities.[10] An investigation of 200 peasant farms of less than 3 hectares and of 100 farms between 3 and 5 hec-

9. See Wilbert E. Moore's work, *op. cit.*, which undertakes to convert European agricultural output and agricultural land into "crop units" and "arable equivalents," statistical devices to render commensurate different kinds of agricultural produce and land. Relying on his basic figures I have used them here in a somewhat different manner. See also Table VII in the Appendix.

10. A. Frunzanescu, *Munca omenească în actuală conjunctura agricolă* (Bucarest, 1935), cited in Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești*, p. 48. Estimating an agricultural working population of 9,990,000 men, women, and children to be equivalent to 7,900,000 men, and assuming 235 working days a year, they arrived at a working potential of 1,865,100,000 man-days per year. They then calculated that the total man-days necessary to achieve the various agricultural works in Rumania required only 814,400,000 man-days.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

tares reached the conclusion that on farms under 3 hectares only 38 per cent of the available labor was being utilized and on farms between 3 and 5 hectares, only 60 per cent.[11]

Other indications of overpopulation during the interwar period were the continued expansion of arable at the expense of meadow and pasture (which is reflected in the decline of the number of cattle between 1921 and 1935 from 34 to 24 per 100 inhabitants), the increasing fragmentation of small properties and the extension of holdings under 3 hectares, and the emigration of peasants' sons to Bucarest, especially from the hilly and mountainous districts.[12] Thus there appears to be ample evidence of crowding, land hunger, and widespread hidden unemployment. What were the causes for this appearance of surplus population?

In a study of agricultural overpopulation, written in 1939, H. M. Conacher suggested that a surplus agrarian population could arise in a variety of ways:

1. Under conditions where the Malthusian theory has come true, and the pressure of population on subsistence is severe, usually through excessive fragmentation of land;

2. Under conditions less severe than in (1), where the cultivation of land has come under the formula of diminishing returns through straining a system of husbandry, and this has gone on over a widening area;

3. In cases where the distribution of returns among the different classes of producers is inequitable, with the result that the laborers are much in the same position as might be reached under (2) if they had been landholders;

4. In cases where, apart from the foregoing causes, a rural economy producing for export suffers from a considerable fall in demand, especially if such an economy has been using up its capital in the soil.[13]

In Rumania all these conditions have contributed in varying measure in the different regions. The first condition, in which pressure of population growth is the primary factor, operates as a tendency throughout most of Rumania, but appears to be of particular importance in Bucovina and the Carpathian districts. In 1941 the agricultural population per 100 hectares reached 164.7 in the *judeţ* of Dâmboviţa in the Wallachian Carpathians, 123.4 in Baia in the

11. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

12. Nicolae M. Dunăre, *Fii de ţărani vânzători ambulanţi în capitală*, Institutul Central de Statistică, Biblioteca Statistică, No. 22 (Bucarest, 1945), p. 6.

13. Contribution by H. M. Conacher in "The Problem of Surplus Agricultural Population," *International Journal of Agrarian Affairs*, *1*, No. 1 (October, 1939), 27.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

161 Moldavian Carpathians, 161.1 in Suceava in Bucovina, and 126.3 in Bihor in western Transylvania. Dwarf holdings of less than 3 hectares are most numerous in these judeţe. The mountainous regions represent an economic dead end; the land is poor and much of it unsuitable for cultivation; the pressure of population has forced the multiplication of dwarf holdings; and social inertia and poverty have limited emigration to less congested areas.

Such extreme population pressure is mainly limited, however, to the mountainous and hilly regions. As has been indicated by the equations already given, agrarian overpopulation for the greater part of Rumania is only in part a demographic problem. The rapid growth of population from the middle of the nineteenth century did not initially cause trouble because of the sparsity of inhabitants in the Danube plain and the great extension of land put under the plough. However, the relatively late emergence of the peasant as a proprietor, the general lack of capital, and the predominant position of large properties under neoserfdom combined to maintain the primacy of extensive grain cultivation. This form of husbandry eventually began to undermine Rumanian agriculture, especially after the expansion of small-scale farming, which was ill-suited to such an emphasis upon cereals. Pasture land was reduced without the substitution of forage crops, livestock declined, and the primitive wheat-maize rotation threatened to deplete even the rich soil of the plains. In the plains regions, then, overpopulation is to some extent the result of the prevailing type and level of agriculture, although the constant increase of population has undoubtedly aggravated the problem.

The fourth way in which a surplus agrarian population arises—through a decline in exports—is only indirectly related to overpopulation and is primarily an economic maladjustment. The general decline of European cereal exports in the face of overseas competition, and particularly the world grain crisis after 1929, intensified the manifestations of overpopulation by depressing the whole agrarian sector of the Rumanian economy. This, however, is a special case.

There remains to be discussed the third way in which a surplus agrarian population arises: through inequitable distribution of returns. In regions dominated by great landowners who control a large part of the soil, the peasants are likely to give the appearance of overpopulation, since they lack sufficient land of their own to support themselves. There is no question that in nineteenth-century Rumania the concentration of land in large estates created land hunger and the symptoms of overpopulation. It should be noted, however, that even by 1907 it was becoming evident that the over-all density of

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

agricultural population in relation to the total agricultural land and the level of production was approaching a critical point.

To what extent was distribution a significant factor in overpopulation after the 1918–21 land reforms? To answer this question it is necessary to attempt an investigation of the effects of these reforms upon distribution.

The Distribution of Land [14]

Although the distribution of agricultural land in Rumania has been, if not the core of the agrarian question, at least the focus of attention, and although innumerable books, pamphlets, and articles have dealt with it, it is still difficult to provide a satisfactory picture of land distribution and impossible to give an exact account of its development in time. The incompleteness and irregularity of statistics, the intrusion of wars and the frequent changes of territorial boundaries, the unsettling effect of the agrarian reforms themselves, and on occasion the warping of figures to fit a political thesis have combined to obscure the real situation.

Before proceeding to an analysis of the available statistics it is necessary to be as clear as possible about the use of certain categories and definitions, since confusion over these has been the source of numerous erroneous conclusions. In particular it is indispensable to know what types of land are being included in the term "agricultural," and whether the distribution of land is on the basis of properties or of farming units.

During the interwar years the Rumanian Central Institute of Statistics came to classify land in the manner shown by the table on the following page (the 1936 areas of the respective types of land are included to indicate their comparative size).[15] Earlier Rumanian statistics frequently employed different classifications, and the inclusion or exclusion of pasture and woodland seriously alters the pattern of land distribution.

The second important distinction is between *properties*, based upon legal ownership of the land, and *exploitations*, defined in 1941 as "the area comprising all the land effectively cultivated under the direction and participation of the head of the exploitation." Exploitations and properties are obviously not identical, since an exploita-

14. For a more detailed discussion of the statistics of Rumanian land distribution see the Appendix.

15. Petre Onica, *Tehnica statisticii agricole*, Institutul Central de Statistică, Biblioteca Statistică, No. 9 (Bucarest, 1945), p. 17.

342 A MARKED FEATURE is the comparative absence of chimneys.
374 The cooking is done in an outhouse, no doubt to minimise the risk of fire, but the dwelling house is generally heated by a stove, the smoke from which passes up through the ceiling in an iron pipe and then escapes into the open air through holes cut in the gable ends or, in the case of a hipped roof, through a small louvre.

345 THE OUTHOUSES are for the most part simple structures and call for no special comment.

511 CLEANLINESS and simplicity are the keynotes of the domestic economy. Household effects are kept down to a minimum, but upon their manufacture an enormous amount of time and skill is lavished, especially in the case of textiles. The skilfully-woven designs on the tapestries and pillows shown Plate XVI are an illustration of such effort.

● POPULATION.

161 ACCORDING to the 1930 census Corbu had a population of
563 1,563, distributed among 358 households. The majority of the inhabitants are, of course, Roumanians, for the commune lies right on the fringe of the Szekler country. In spite of having lived in close association with the Roumanians for many generations, however, the Szeklers are easily distinguished by their dress, their physical type (though this is by no means an infallible guide), their adherence to Roman Catholicism, and, of course, their language. Although culturally there is an appreciable difference between the Roumanian and Szekler peasantry, there is to-day an even wider gap between these folk and the Tsiganes or Gipsies who form a much smaller, though very interesting, minority.
[142] Generally speaking, the Roumanians contribute a dark, and the Szeklers a fair, element to the broad-headed population, whereas the Gipsies are for the most part distinctly long-headed and very dark. There is an equally well-marked difference on economic grounds, for both Roumanians and Szeklers are essentially peasants, whereas the Gipsy, being landless, is compelled to seek a livelihood by trading, unless he be either smith or musician, following the traditional pursuits of his forbears (see Plate VI).

342 THE HOUSES occupied by Gipsies, while resembling in style
563 those of the peasants, can usually be recognised by the

361 tions, but we know of nothing there before 1510. To the
771 existence of the monastery, which is the seat of a bishop, is due the development of a seminary.

161 THE POPULATION in 1930 was 6,831. In 1931 there were 181
163 births, 24 infant deaths (under one year), 20 still-births, and 125 deaths from all causes. Marriages numbered 61 and divorces 4. The birth-rate is thus high, the infant death-rate considerable, but not so high as might be expected; still-births are numerous.

H. J. F.
E. E. E.

1[of Curtea de Arges -- Analyst]

415

BROWN CLAY.
WHITE & GREEN SLIP.

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDI Rumania EDI

MEDICAL CONDITIONS AT CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

361 CURTEA DE ARGEŞ is a small town of 6,831 inhabitants (in 1930), situated in the valley of the River Argeş, at an altitude of 1,400 feet.

[312] A SERIES of wells supply the town with water, there being no system of pipes to supply running water. The drainage system is necessarily of a primitive type, the dry closet type being the one in use.

743 THE TOWN possesses two hospitals:

(1) A general hospital with pavilion for epidemic cases.
(2) Home for incurables—a branch of a nerve clinic in Bucharest.

THE GENERAL HOSPITAL is situated in the centre of the town on a slight eminence, a few yards from the main street. It consists of two wards, one for men and one for women. The cases are mixed, medical and surgical cases being nursed in the same ward. There are fifteen beds for men and fifteen for women. In addition there are two small wards for clean surgical cases, each containing two beds.

THE BEDS are of the usual hospital type, but placed close together about three feet apart. The mattresses and pillows are stuffed with straw and are very hard. The patients wear their own clothes. This being summer, less than one half of the beds were in use. The villagers refuse to come to hospital in summer, when there is work to be done in the [754] fields, unless in cases of stern necessity. A belief in witchcraft and secret remedies is prevalent, so that progress as regards 164 treatment is hampered. Epidemics of dysentery and typhoid are common. Tuberculosis is widespread, and goitre is found in all the villages in this valley. Cretinism in the children is untreated, and most villages contain cases. No medication of the water supply is undertaken. Pulmonary tuberculosis is treated in sanatoria, but other cases of tuberculosis are admitted here. Cancer is also common, but is not dealt with here—the cases are sent to Bucharest for radium treatment.

RUMANIA

162 The preliminary figures of the 1930 census do not give details of the various national minorities inhabiting Rumania, and the more reliable estimate will be found in Winkler's "Racial Statistics," om which the following data are extracted :—

Germans	713,564
Russians	174,293
Jews	778,094
Magyars	1,463,373
Bulgarians	351,328
Yugo-Slavs	52,570
Czechoslovaks	31,884
Ukrainians	500,484
Various	404,104
Total	4,469,694

634 The whole kingdom is administratively divided into 71 departments, but in the case of Transylvania, Maramureş, Crishana, and the Banat the departments created out of these provinces do not correspond exactly with the frontiers of the latter. The density of the population per sq. km. is 63 in the old kingdom, including the Dobrudja, 64 in Bessarabia. 82 in Bucovina, and 54 in Transylvania.

161

163 The birth rate for 1930 was 35 per thousand, while the death rate was 19.4, and the excess of births over deaths reached 278,722, this being the largest figure recorded since the war.

165

162 The total urban population formed 20.13 per cent, while the rural population formed 79.87 per cent. There were 172 towns, some of which must be mere villages, as at least two are shown to possess less than 1,000 inhabitants. The following towns have a population of over 20,000: Bucarest 631,288, Chişinau 117,016, Cernauţi 111,147, Iassi 102,595, Galatz 101,148, Cluj 98,569, Timişoara 91,866, Oradea 82,355, Ploeşti 77,325, Arad 77,225, Braila 68,310, Craiova 63,063, Brasov 59,234, Constantsa 58,258, Satu-Mare 49,917, Sibiu 48,013, Targul-Mureş 38,116, Buzau 36,115,

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p. 20

CHAPTER II

THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

131 The Kingdom of Greater Rumania which emerged
161 after the Peace Settlement of 1919 covered an area of about 118,000 square miles, which is more than Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and had a population of about 15,500,000. Greater Rumania comprised the Old Kingdom (Wallachia, Moldavia and the Northern Dobrudja) and the New Territories, namely the Eastern Banat, the Crisana, Maramures, Transylvania, the Bukovina, Bessarabia and the Southern Dobrudja.[1] In relation to the position before 1914 both the territory and population of Rumania had been doubled. Still more important, the Kingdom was transformed from a national State into a multi-national State.[2]

133 The chief geographical features of Greater Rumania were the Carpathian Mountains, which sur-

[1] The Southern Dobrudja was Bulgarian up to the end of the Second Balkan War when it was ceded to Rumania; it was returned to Bulgaria by the Central Powers during the Great War, re-ceded to Rumania in 1919 and ceded again to Bulgaria in 1940.

162 [2] The population of the Old Kingdom in 1915 was about 7,625,000. The population of Greater Rumania in 1920 was 15,541,000 and had risen by 1940 to over 20,000,000 (an average yearly increase of about 233,000). The most numerous of the minorities were the Hungarians and Szekelys of Transylvania and the western provinces; the Jews, living all over Rumania; the Germans, living in the Banat, Transylvania and Bessarabia; Ukrainians and Russians in the Bukovina and Bessarabia; Bulgarians in the Dobrudja, Bessarabia and the Banat; Turks, Tatars, Gypsies, Serbs, Poles, Armenians, Greeks, etc.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p 30

CHAPTER III

THE PROVINCES

000 *In this chapter each of the provinces of Greater Rumania is described separately and certain practical information is given about each. This will enable the reader, should he visit any province, to know the essential facts about it: it will also make it easier for the student of war to judge the effects of military operations upon each of the several parts of Rumania. The general reader may, however, prefer to complete the story of Rumania as a whole by proceeding to Chapter* IV *and continuing to the end of the book, before reverting to this more detailed chapter.*

THE REGAT

631 Greater Rumania was composed of ten historical and geographical units, which in their turn formed two groups: the Old Kingdom or the 'Regat', representing the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia and the province of Dobrudja; and the New Territories, acquired after the Great War and partly lost in 1940. Of the two groups the New Territories contained both a greater area and a more numerous population than the Regat.[1] Historically and economically the most important and the greatest in area of all the territories of the Old

131
161

[1] The area of the New Territories covered 157,000 square kilometres (about 62,800 square miles), that is, 53 % of the total. The population of the New Territories in 1939 was 9,425,000 compared with just over 9,000,000 of the Old Kingdom. However, over half of all arable land was situated in the Regat.

6

'2: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Oltenia]

Kingdom is Wallachia, which is formed by Oltenia 631
and Muntenia.

OLTENIA. Oltenia is the western part of the prin- /31
cipality of Wallachia. Its boundaries are, in the west /33
and north the Carpathians, in the east the River Olt, /34
and in the south the Danube. The province covers /61
an area of about 9,640 square miles and has a population of about 1,900,000. The soil of the sub-Carpathian hills consists of sand and clay and gravel and is well watered by numerous rivulets. Here are some densely populated valleys, bordered by rich forests and grazing grounds. Farther south and extending to the Danube lies the fertile plain composed of the rich 'yellow earth'. Its character is similar to that of the lowlands of Muntenia, but it lies on a higher level and also has a higher rainfall.

The richest district of this fertile province is the 311
judet[1] of Dolj in the south-western corner of Oltenia. From here, and the similarly fertile *judets* of Mehedinti and Romanati, also on the northern bank of the Danube, high-quality maize and wheat have been exported for many years. From the hilly country farther north fruit is the chief export. In the mountainous districts forestry provides the main occupation for the local inhabitants. There is much sheep-breeding, for the grassy slopes provide good grazing.

Apart from the Danube the two most important /33
rivers of Oltenia are the Jiu and the Olt; the latter rises in Transylvania and enters Oltenia through the Red Tower Pass. Oltenia is not rich in mineral /35
resources. There is, however, oil at Govora, west of

[1] Administrative unit.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Oltenia]

[Muntenia]

The Danubian ports of Calafat and Corabia handle 361
wheat exports and also have some valuable industries.

MUNTENIA. To the east of the River Olt extends 133
Muntenia, the other province of Wallachia. It [131]
covers an area of about 20,600 square miles and has
a population of about 4,500,000. The southern and [161]
eastern boundaries of the province are formed by the Danube, the northern frontier by the Carpathians. The land surface and climate of Muntenia are similar to those of Oltenia, but the hilly region south of the Carpathians is narrower. The fertile steppes, Baragan, Burnas, Gavan and Burdeas, are situated on the northern banks of the Danube which floods the adjoining districts and forms many lakes and marshes. The highest peaks of the Carpathians in Muntenia are the Negoi and the Moldovan, both over 7,500 ft. The most important of the many rivers descending from the high mountains are the Dambovita, Jalomita, Arges and Buzau, all of which eventually flow into the Danube. The endless maize [311]
and wheat fields of Muntenia are covered in summer with heavy crops and on the steppes great flocks of sheep find their food. In spite of very dry summers and icy winters like those of Russia this region is one of the richest of Rumania and the whole of Europe.

Muntenia differs from all Rumanian provinces in [135]
that, in addition to stock breeding, the raising of high-quality crops, fishery and forestry, it possesses a source of wealth which is not found in such abundance in any other part of Europe, the oil fields of Campina and Ploesti. There the hilly, wooded 361
countryside suddenly changes into a modern in-

131 part of the Dobrudja. The delta of the Danube is
133 formed by the three arms Chilia, Sulina and St George. It includes an area of about 1,000 square miles, in which water and land, marshes, lakes and
[503] islands feed an almost tropical vegetation. The chief communications through the delta are provided by the Sulina canal and by causeways.

311 The steppes of the Southern Dobrudja yield good
135 crops of wheat and maize, and the pastures maintain great herds of sheep. Mineral resources are confined to some unworked coal deposits, valuable copper near Altantepe, and sulphur.

131 The Dobrudja is about 9,300 square miles in all:
161 of this some 2,960 square miles were returned to Bulgaria in 1940. The population of the province as a whole is about 850,000. Its main value to the contesting States lies in the Black Sea stretch of
504 coast. The port of Constanza, the greatest and most
361 important on the western shores of the Black Sea, has modern harbour works built at the beginning of this century and covering an area of 60 hectares. It was through Constanza that Rumanian exports used to pass to France and Great Britain. The docks of Constanza are about 30 ft. deep and can, therefore, be used by large, sea-going ships. The harbour facilities include storage buildings for wheat and oil-tanks with a capacity for over 200,000 cubic metres of fuel, which are fed by the pipe-lines coming from Ploesti. Oil can moreover be pumped straight from the pipe-lines simultaneously into four tankers. Another great advantage is that the port is
361 completely ice-free all the winter. Constanza is the administrative centre of the Dobrudja and also a well-known seaside resort. Rail communications

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Dobrudja]
[Moldavia]

with the rest of Rumania are provided by the line 361
Constanza-Cernavoda-Bucarest.

MOLDAVIA (Moldova[R]). The second of the two 131
original Rumanian principalities is only half as big 161
as Wallachia and its population is about half. Moldavia covers an area of about 15,280 square miles, and is inhabited by about 2,500,000 Rumanians, Jews, Hungarians, Slavs and Germans.

Owing to its geographical position Moldavia was 175
more exposed to Polish, Russian and also Hungarian influence than Wallachia. After the death of the *voivode* Stephen the Great in 1504, the country became part of the Turkish dominions. From then onwards Moldavia shared the fate of Wallachia. Russian influence, however, naturally made itself felt in greater intensity in Moldavia. The independence of the principality was restored under John Cuza who eventually became the first ruler of the United Principalities.

The western boundaries of Moldavia are formed 131
by the Carpathians. In the south the province borders on Muntenia and in the north on the Bukovina, which originally was part of Moldavia. The eastern frontier is formed by the River Pruth. The 133
western part of Moldavia consists of the slopes of the Carpathian Mountains and the hill region below. Farther east the country flattens out into the plains which are bordered by the valley of the Pruth. The most fertile districts lie on the western bank of the Pruth and in the eastern corner of the province. The hills, which reach heights of 1,800 ft., are wooded. But there is much fertile soil which produces wheat and maize. There are also vineyards

361 Another important town, and the greatest Ru-
504 manian port on the Danube, is Galati with a popula-
tion of about 75,000. Galati lies about a hundred miles from the Black Sea, but the harbour is so placed that sea-going ships can enter the port through the delta and anchor there all through the ice-free period. From Galati timber, wheat and maize from all over Rumania are sent abroad. Incoming cargoes of industrial goods are unloaded there.

[496] The only line leading directly to Transylvania goes over the Ghimes Pass. The traffic to Bessarabia is carried by four railway lines.

THE NEW TERRITORIES

131 The New Territories, acquired by Rumania after
175 the war of 1914–18 and partly lost since 1940, cover
[161] an area of 62,800 square miles and were inhabited in 1940 by about 10,500,000 people. The Banat, the Crisana, Maramures and Transylvania formed, up to 1918, parts of Hungary; the Bukovina belonged to Austria, and Bessarabia was taken from Russia. Many parts of the New Territories were agriculturally and industrially better developed than the Old Kingdom.

131 **THE BANAT.** The Rumanian part of the Banat covers
161 an area of about 7,400 square miles and has a population of 1,000,000. The province is bordered in the north by the River Mures[R] (Maros[H], Marosch[G]), in the west by the Yugoslav part of the Banat, in the south by the Danube, and in the east by the Car-
000 pathians. The north-western part of the province is

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 194-

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Banat]

[The Crisana]

The high quality of the crops in this province, 241
amongst them wheat, maize, rye, oats, and the high 134
standard of animal breeding, have made the Banat known far beyond the borders of Rumania. The fertility of the soil is due partly to the 'black earth' which, in a greater or lesser degree, is a component of all the arable land. Apart from being an important agricultural region, the Banat possesses valuable industries, forests and minerals. Iron ore and coal 316
are mined in the area of Resita and Anina, where 327
there are great iron and steel works which produce 315
railway equipment and armaments. The Danubian port of Orsova, guarding the western entrance to the 'Iron Gates', also has an oil refinery.

The capital of the Banat is Timisoara[R] (Temesvar[H]) on the Bega with a population of 100,000. In 361
Roman times the fortress of Ripensia was situated here. In Hunyadi's time it was a centre of resistance against the Turks, only second in importance to Belgrade. To-day the town is a great rail and road junction with many factories, banks, commercial houses and cultural institutions. Lugoj, on the Timis, with a population of 20,000, and Caransebes, north of the Porta Orientalis which leads through the mountains of the Banat to the Danube, are marketing towns of some importance.

THE CRISANA AND MARAMURES. Geographically the 131
Crisana is the eastern borderland of the Hungarian [161]
plain. The province covers an area of about 8,400 square miles and has a population of just under 1,500,000. The Crisana lies between Transylvania in the east, the River Mures (Maros[H]) in the south; Hungary (as reduced by the Treaty of the Trianon) in the west and Czechoslovakia in the north.

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1044
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

563 leges. In 1919 they accepted the union of Transylvania with the Old Kingdom. In the inter-war period the Germans in Rumania enjoyed a far better treatment than any other minority, and in Transylvania they were by far the most prosperous community. Nevertheless, the pan-German policy of National-Socialism found many supporters in their ranks.

131 *Vienna Award.* Before the Vienna Award of 1940
648 Transylvania covered an area of 24,600 square miles
[161] and had a population of over 3,250,000, including 200,000 Jews. The decision of the German and Italian Foreign Ministers in Vienna split Transylvania in two, a measure never before carried out during the eventful history of the principality and certainly harmful and unjust to all the parties concerned. There is no doubt that this 'solution', which has only complicated the Transylvanian question and made its real solution more difficult, was made deliberately in order to make both Hungary and Rumania more dependent on Germany's support.

133 *Geography and Products.* The Transylvanian highlands are surrounded on three sides by the high mountain chains of the Carpathians. In the south-west the border is formed by the 'Western Mountains' (Muntii Apuseni), and in the north-west by the hills which eventually merge into the Hungarian plain. The Rivers Mures, Somes and Tarnava divide the highland in three distinct parts, the steppe, the hills and the forests. Parallel with the outer ring of the Eastern Carpathians there runs a belt of volcanic mountains with many small valleys. In the south-east there is the fertile and hilly district of Trei-

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Bukovina]

[Bessarabia]

000 small deposits of coal, gold and lead, but the industry of the province is well developed.

361 The capital of the Bukovina is Czernowitz (Cernauti[R]) with over 100,000 inhabitants. The town is situated on a high hill near the Pruth and is a great commercial centre. Here branches of the Austrian banks and some big Viennese businesses remained. The population of Czernowitz, like that of the rest of the province, is very mixed. Economically important as a junction of several trade-routes, Czernowitz has also become a great industrial town during the last fifty years.

648 In June 1940 the Northern Bukovina, including Czernowitz, altogether about 2,260 square miles, was ceded by Rumania to the U.S.S.R. Thereby over 550,000 people, mostly Ukrainians and many Jews, became Soviet citizens.

131 **BESSARABIA.** For over twenty years the province of
161 Bessarabia was the eastern frontier region of Greater Rumania. It covers an area of 17,760 square miles and has a population of 3,000,000.[1] Bessarabia is surrounded by natural frontiers: in the north and east by the River Dniester, in the south by the Black Sea and the Danube, and in the west by the Pruth.

133 The north of Bessarabia is formed by a highland about 1,000 ft. high, consisting of fertile arable land which belongs to the 'black-earth' region of the Ukraine. The central area is hilly country, divided

[1] To which were added 120,000 Polish and Ukrainian villagers transplanted from Eastern Poland by the Soviet authorities shortly before their retreat before the German attack in 1941.

TERRITORIAL LOSSES

728 In 1940 Rumania suffered serious loss of territory. First in August, Bessarabia and the Northern Bucovina were occupied by the Russians, then a few weeks later Northern Transylvania was given to Hungary by the Vienna Award, following which the Southern Dobruja was ceded to Bulgaria by the Treaty of Craiova. However, in 1941, Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina were regained, so that the loss of these territories was of only temporary significance.

[151]
[161]

Territory	*Area sq. km.*	*Population in millions*	*Date of Loss*
Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina	50,000	3.3	*August*, 1940
Northern Transylvania	43,700	2.75	*Sept.*, 1940
Southern Dobruja	7,700	0.38	*Sept.*, 1940

The temporary loss of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina had serious repercussions on the economic situation of the country, which were of wider effect than might be supposed from the limited time of the annexation, because of the loss of the harvests of both 1940 and 1941, the "scorched earth" policy of the Russians and the dislocation of the transport system caused by the necessary re-conversion to standard European gauge from the Russian gauge.

The cession of Northern Transylvania, apart from the mere physical loss of territory and population, caused a severe disruption of the economic system on account of the valuable raw materials involved, and the loss of industry which had been built up on the basis of these raw materials. The capital invested in industry in this area represented some 13 per cent. of total investments in industry in the whole country. The main features were the mineral resources of the Baia Mare district, containing lead, zinc, gold, silver and small quantities of copper, with lead-refining plants attached. In this area deposits of pyrites were fairly considerable and supplied the bulk

728
13.5

A. PRE-WAR CONDITIONS

1. General

241 Agriculture occupies about 80 per cent. of the population of Rumania and contributes the greater part of the national income: but, owing to the importance of the country's mineral-oil production, exports of agricultural products accounted for rather less than half of total exports by value, in the immediate pre-war years. [439]

Total agricultural production, even if there were no exports, would fall seriously short of the real food needs of the country. The poorest are actually underfed, while the majority of the remainder subsist on a diet which, though adequate in quantity, is seriously deficient in quality and nutritional elements. [146]

In her farming Rumania suffers from two interrelated difficulties: rural over-population and low food output per acre. There are 16 agricultural workers per 100 acres of farm land, compared with 6 in Denmark and 3 in Britain. Another aspect of this is the extremely small size of most of the farms—75 per cent. of them are less than 5 hectares (12 acres) in extent. Because there is not enough land to go round, most farming families have to eke out a living on holdings which under any system of general farming would be too small to provide an adequate income. [161]

The position would be less serious if a high per-acre food output were achieved. But in fact the Rumanian output per acre is barely one-quarter of that obtained in countries like Belgium and the Netherlands. Rumania pivots her farming on wheat and maize production but, owing to the extensive methods practised, the few livestock kept, and other reasons, per acre yields are among the lowest in Europe.

It is the over-population and land shortage which are largely responsible for agriculture remaining so backward. Having insufficient land the peasant does not produce much for sale, and so cannot afford to purchase fertilisers, good quality seed or better implements. Nor can he spare many acres for fodder crops, since the bulk of his land is needed to grow the food his family eats. And as he cannot buy fodder, he cannot keep many animals. Thus, while there is some scope for agricultural improvements which would ameliorate the peasants' lot, the pre-requisite of farming progress is to find alternative occupations for the surplus population.

423 The system of land tenure is peasant proprietorship. This was attained under the Land Reform
471 carried through after the first World War. The effect of this was to divide up and transfer to peasant ownership a large area of land formerly worked in big estates. This revolution in land tenure provided a solution for a long-standing social problem, but its effects on production were unfavourable. The large estates had been run by trained managers, with relatively advanced methods and equipment. Their transfer to ill-equipped, backward and uneducated peasants was followed, for a time at least, by a decline in yields, and consequently in total production and exports.

241 Little progress was made in the period between the two wars in remedying the disadvantages of uneconomic farm sizes, and in raising the low standards of farming. For lack of education the

A. POPULATION

1. General

161

Before discussing the labour situation in Rumania, it is essential to point out that a number of substantial changes have taken place between 1939 and 1942. The results of all these are shown in the table below. The last official census in 1930 showed the total population of Greater Rumania as 18,057,000. Allowing for natural increase, the population for 1939 was probably about 20,000,000.

161
728

In August 1940 the U.S.S.R. occupied Northern Bucovina and Bessarabia with a combined population of 3·67 million, while in July 1941 these areas were regained with a reduced population of 3·30 million, the reduction of ·37 million being due to Russian deportations.

In September 1940 Hungary acquired northern Transylvania, including the provinces of Crişana and Maramureş and a population of 2·75 million. This was followed by a further loss of the southern Dobruja to Bulgaria with a population of 0·38 million. Some 200,000 Germans were repatriated from eastern Rumania, mainly to Poland.

161
728

the northern sections of Transylvania and Crişana to Hungary, though it should be noted that a considerable block of Rumanians, of whom over 200,000 have returned as refugees, were placed within Hungary by the new frontier. The German minority was little affected by the territorial changes, but some 200,000 from Eastern Rumania were "repatriated," mainly to Poland. The remaining 550,000 are situated chiefly in the Banat and in southern Transylvania. The Jewish population was distributed as follows :—

[162]

Bessarabia and Bucovina	300,000
Moldavia	158,000
Muntenia	87,000
Transylvania, Crişana and Maramures ..	180,000

(*See* paragraph on Jewish population on page 56.)

The Bulgarian minority has been returned to Bulgaria partly by the new frontier in the Dobruja and partly by the exchange of Bulgarian and Rumanian nationals which has taken place since 1940.

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943 EDl Rumania EDl

161
728

TABLE SHOWING POPULATION CHANGES BETWEEN 1939-1942

	Losses	Gains	Population
Greater Rumania, 1939	—	—	20,000,000
U.S.S.R	3,670,000	3,300,000	—
Hungary	2,750,000	200,000	—
Bulgaria	380,000	—	—
Germany	200,000	—	—
Natural increase in population, 1939-December 1942	—	400,000	—
Totals	7,000,000	3,000,000	—
Population of Rumania, December, 1942	—	—	16,000,000

[54d]

175 in force in Bukovina and the Russian law, with some specific
671 local rules, was in force in Bessarabia.

175 The population of the newly incorporated provinces was
162 predominantly Romanian but, in view of the long separation from the Old Kingdom, was somewhat different. Moreover, there were also other ethnological groups and a variety of churches and even sects.

The population of Transylvania and Banat, for instance, was divided mainly among the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches. The population of Bukovina and Maramurosh was either of Catholic (Uniates) or Orthodox religion and had an important Jewish minority. In Bessarabia, in addition to the Eastern Orthodox Church, there was a real conglomerate of creeds and and rites, many of them originating back in the 17th century and subsequent reforms of the Russian Orthodox Church.

659 A new Constitution was adopted in 1923. It declared
[642] the principle of freedom of religion which needed to be developed in details and put into effect by special laws. This did not follow immediately but, instead, the Romanian Government carried out, in 1925, the unification and hierarchical reorganization of the Romanian Orthodox Church (see <u>infra</u>).

This step increased the pressure of the numerous other churches and rites practiced within the new frontiers. They intervened seeing that their status be defined and that their relations with the higher church authorities abroad, as well as with the Romanian State and the Orthodox Church, be settled by

795
659

within the new frontiers, there were several orthodox churches governed by various hierarchical authorities, in addition to the Romanian Orthodox Church of the Old Kingdom. This was done by Law No. 1402 of May 6, 1925. It provided not only for the organization and procedure but it also stated that, since the Romanian Orthodox Church is the religion of the great majority of the Romanian people (72.6 percent, according to returns of the census of 1930, in 1930), it is considered, in comparison with the other religions of the country, as the dominant religion. In its relations with the other Orthodox churches, it was declared autocephalous, that is, administratively independent.

[162]

By this law the role of the Romanian Orthodox Church as a national church has been reiterated. The salaries of the clergy were paid by the State out of budgetary appropriations.

As the Law of 1925 was silent on this point, the dioceses of the Orthodox Church were granted the status of legal entities by a separate law of May 3, 1928.

793
659

By th Law No. 1002 of May 4, 1936, Article 21 of the Law of 1925 was amended defining the status of the Orthodox clergy. Since they were paid by the Treasury there was a question as to whether the clergymen were civil employees.

The amendment clearly stated that clergymen enjoy all the rights and benefits of public servants only as far as the pay is concerned, In all other respects (appointment, promotion, discipline, etc) they remained under the rules of church law and the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastic authorities.

793 They were subject to church law and to disciplinary authority
659 of the Synod. At the same time, the amendment provided that the State shall pay, besides the salaries, all the other administrative expenses of the Orthodox church.

3. The Status of the Roman Catholic Church

795 There are two jurisdictions within the Roman Catholic Church in Romania: the Roman Catholics in the strict sense and the so-called Greek Catholics or Uniates.— Both are under the supreme authority of the Holy See and the Uniates are considered a rite within the Roman Catholic Church. It is proper, therefore, to begin the study with the status of the Roman Catholic Church in general.

The Catholic Church appeared for the first time in the Romanian provinces (Moldavia and Wallachia) toward the end of the 14th century and, in fact, it did not have any kind of diocesan organization before the beginning of the 17th century. During this time its organization consisted merely of several Catholic missions. From 1611 until 1919, the Catholic Church was organized into two dioceses: one for Moldavia with a bishop in Iassy and another for Wallachia governed by an archbishop in Bucharest who was also the highest dignitary for Romania.

[162] After 1919, the Catholic population from the provinces incorporated after World War I merged with that of the Old Kingdom and, according to the census of 1930, made up a Catholic minority of 6.8 percent of the total Romanian population. The Catholic Church insisted upon recognition as a National Church and upon

175
795 The Greek Catholic fraction was amalgamated into the hierarchy of the Roman Church and became simply a rite within that church. At the very beginning, this church was organized as a single diocese with the rank of a Bishopric but, later on, the number of dioceses was raised to three. Nevertheless, during a period of approximately 90 years from the time of the union, the Uniate bishops were supervised and controlled by Jesuit monks sent from Rome. In 1855, the Greek Catholic Church was raised to the rank of a Mitropoly and the Jesuitic control was withdrawn.

175
659 Until the Concordat of 1929, the status of this church was based mainly on the provisions of the Act of Union of 1698. Both the Constitution of 1923 and the Law No. 54 of 1928 granted it priority above all the other religious minorities. It has been reorganized since the conclusion of the Concordat and was given all rights and privileges of the Catholic Church. The
[713] highest dignitaries of the Greek Catholic Church were equally senators ex officio of the Romanian Parliament as were those of the Roman Catholic Church. The clergy has been paid by the State. For preparing its clergy the church was maintained three theological academies. The returns of the census of 1930
[162] showed that 7.9 percent of the population of Romania belonged to the Greek Catholic faith.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

It has been held that Bessarabia provided a revolutionary leaven for the rest of Rumania. To a degree this is true. Even before the First World War both socialist and populist theories were transmitted from Russia to Rumania through Bessarabia. The Bessarabian land reform had an effect upon the policy of the nascent Rumanian Peasant party; the exposé de motifs of the Peasant party's reform bill of 1920 argued that the law passed by Sfatul Ţării for Bessarabia made equally extensive measures mandatory for all of Rumania. Mihalache, in defending his bill, pointed out that the Bucarest assembly was unwilling to accept for the Old Kingdom measures they had previously ratified for Bessarabia, and asked whether the impression was to remain that the Bessarabian peasant had achieved more for himself through revolution than had the peasant of the Old Kingdom through the good offices of the parliament.[22]

But the radical influences coming from Bessarabia were less than the contrary influence of Rumania upon Bessarabia. Successive formulations and arrangements regarding Bessarabia progressively reduced the extent of the agrarian reform, took away the administrative autonomy of the province, and extended the centralized administration of Bucarest. As a result, regardless of the original sentiment favoring incorporation in Rumania, Bessarabia was a disaffected area throughout the interwar period, with much the most corrupt administration of any Rumanian province.

2. Bucovina

Bucovina, which had formed the northern portion of the principality of Moldavia, was ceded by the Turks to Austria in 1775. The population was originally largely Rumanian; in 1848 Rumanians numbered 209,000 as against 108,000 Ruthenians. This proportion altered in subsequent decades until by 1910 the Ruthenians were the largest group, though not a majority, outnumbering the Rumanians 305,000 to 233,000. There were also some 102,000 Jews and 66,000 Germans at that date. In general, the Ruthenian population was concentrated in the northern part of Bucovina, the Rumanian in the south.

By the treaty of alliance of August 17, 1916, between the Allies and Rumania, the latter was to receive all of Bucovina to the Prut River. At the time of the peace conference, it was suggested that part of northern Bucovina be included, for ethnic reasons, in eastern Galicia. This suggestion was dropped with the collapse of Galician au-

22. *Proectul legei de improprietărirea ţăranilor*, pp. 29 and 58.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

page 40

III

AGRICULTURAL POPULATION AND PRODUCTION

121 THE course of Rumanian politics between the wars can be understood only in its economic setting; urgent economic problems constantly demanded the attention of all governments, and at the same time the prevailing poverty and economic backwardness undermined political life and contributed powerfully to the emergence of the dictatorships. This and the following chapter sketch the general features of the economic framework, with particular emphasis upon agriculture and the demographic problem. Industry, commerce, and finance are considered primarily in their relation to the agrarian question.

Population [1]

161 According to the 1930 census, Rumania had a population of
● 162 18,057,028 persons, the largest of any state in eastern Europe with the exception of Poland. While the density, 61 persons per square kilometer in 1930, was less than that of the more highly industrialized states of western Europe, the population was increasing at a rapid rate. Rumania had one of the highest birth rates in non-Russian Europe as well as the highest death rate. In general, its population pattern resembled that of the other states of eastern Europe, especially Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Ukraine, and was in marked contrast to the stable or declining populations of the West.

163 Eastern Europe is now passing through the phase of great popu-
165 lation growth which began in England and western Europe in the eighteenth century and has since radiated eastward. This phenomenon, one of the most important in European history, appears to have followed a definite sequence: first, a high death rate and a high birth rate, more or less in balance, giving a stable or only slightly expanding population; then the death rate dropped rapidly; finally the birth rate dropped down to or below the death rate. The lag between the fall in the death rate and the subsequent fall in the birth rate produced the great expansion of population. From current evidence

1. More complete statistical information on the population is given in the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

5 hectares, which the 1918–21 land reforms considered as the basis of Rumanian agriculture in the allotment of land, actually constituted in 1941 only 19.5 per cent of the exploitations (18.4 per cent of the properties), occupying 16.4 per cent of the area of exploitations (16.1 per cent of the area of properties). On the other hand, exploitations under 3 hectares constituted 54.1 per cent of the total number (properties under 3 hectares constituted 58.4 per cent of the total number of properties). 311

2) The largest category of exploitations in terms of area was that between 5 and 10 hectares, i.e., above the average size for all holdings.

3) Despite the agrarian reforms, exploitations over 100 hectares occupied 14.2 per cent of the area; 8 per cent of the area was occupied by properties over 500 hectares.

Regionally, exploitations under one hectare were most numerous in mountainous districts and in industrial areas, where factory workers had small plots of land. Exploitations between one and 3 hectares were most common in the Carpathians and Bucovina. The large holdings were concentrated mainly in the southeast.

The 1941 census also provides the first comprehensive statistical picture of the way in which the land was farmed. More than 58 per cent of all exploitations properly speaking (that is, excluding the minute plots of land of less than one hectare of arable) were cultivated exclusively by family labor; and an additional 24.9 per cent utilized only part of the family's labor (the family also had recourse to other sources of income). Thus, 83 per cent of all exploitations proper were purely family cultivations. Exploitations using no family labor but employing workers, whether on a daily or yearly basis or in return for a piece of land, accounted for only 1.5 per cent of the total, although they covered 12.1 per cent of the land. For the most part these exploitations represented the residues of the expropriated estates. The fourth category, using both family and employed labor, represented intensive peasant farms, and comprised 15.3 per cent of the number of exploitations and 24.8 per cent of the area.

Over 71 per cent of the exploitations were owned by the cultivator, 28 per cent included additional land held in lease or metayage, and less than one per cent of the exploitations were entirely on rented land. If these criteria are combined with those above, the most prevalent form of peasant cultivation, accounting for 41.6 per cent of all exploitations proper, was one owned in its entirety by the cultivator and employing only family labor.

Unfortunately, the information on agricultural labor in 1941 has 311
162

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

311 not been fully organized and published. According to a statistical
162 bulletin issued in 1947, on the 2,300,000 odd agricultural exploitations in 1941, 813,546 "members of families," after completing work on their own holding, worked for others, either for money or for produce. Of these, 748,821 worked in the same village and 64,725 took the road to work in other villages. On September 1, 1940, there were 191,199 permanently hired agricultural workers, of whom 103,-353 were men, 68,325 women, and 19,521 children. As might be expected, the practice of seeking additional work was most extensive in the Carpathian regions of Oltenia and Muntenia, where for every 100 family exploitations, 50 members of families sought work, as against 35.3 for all Rumania. The same area had the least number of permanent hired workers, 4.7 per 100 exploitations as against 8.3 for all Rumania.[20]

311 The general results of the 1941 census, as published thus far, do not correlate size of exploitation with type of labor and holding. However, a special study for the judeţ of Argeş, "which by the variety of the soil and the nature of the exploitations constitutes one of the most representative judeţe of our country," [21] gives such a correlation, which may be a fair sample for all of Rumania. This correlation is what might be expected. Large farms, especially those over 100 hectares, were cultivated mainly by hired labor. Farms between 10 and 50 hectares were most frequently cultivated by a combination of family and hired labor. Peasant farms between 1 and 5 hectares used only family labor, and in about one-third of the cases the labor of the family was not completely utilized. Cultivators with holdings of less than one hectare fell into the class of agricultural laborers.

What conclusions may be drawn from these scattered and not altogether comparable figures regarding: (a) the effect of the agrarian reforms upon the distribution of land; (b) land distribution as a cause of agricultural overpopulation; (c) trends in land distribution during the interwar period?

(a) While there is no doubt that the agrarian reforms of 1918–21 greatly reduced the amount of land held by property owners of over 100 hectares, they did not bring about the virtual disappearance of large landed estates, as was so often proclaimed in the years after the First World War. In 1941 properties over 100 hectares still

20. Institutul Central de Statistică, *Comunicari statistice Nr. 16, 15 ianuarie 1947*, p. 3. In 1930 the Rumanian National Bank estimated that there were 464,000 agricultural workers, 16.7 per cent of the total agricultural active population of 2,773,769. *60 Sate româneşti*, II, 18.

21. Roman Cresin, *Agricultura din Judeţul Argeş* (Bucarest, 1945), p. 11.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

118 and the decline of small shops. Against the increase in personnel em-
433 ployed must be set the growth of population from 5,957,000 in 1899 to 8,791,000 in 1930.

The rate of growth was somewhat slower in Transylvania, which had a more important industry at the beginning of the century than the Old Kingdom:[2]

[162]

	Undertakings	*Personnel*	*Undertakings with less than 20 employees*		*Undertakings with more than 20 employees*	
			No.	*Personnel*	*No.*	*Personnel*
1900	94,112	212,599	93,651	153,223	461	59,376
1930	59,040	269,623	58,000	123,260	1,040	146,363

According to the 1930 census there were 140,948 industrial enterprises in all of Rumania employing 616,743 persons; 130,433 were small shops employing between 1 and 5 persons. The chemical industry, including of course the petroleum industry, had the greatest capital investment, followed by the food, metallurgical, and textile industries. The food industry was most important in terms of value of output, followed by the textile, chemical, and metallurgical industries.

Except for a slump in the depression years, which was overcome by 1934, Rumanian industry experienced a fairly constant growth during the interwar period. The years 1921–26 were spent in recovering from wartime destruction, but by 1938 manufacturing production stood at 177.9 as against 100 for the year 1913:[3]

INDEX OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION (Base: 1913 = 100)

1913	100	1927	118.8	1934	167.8
1921	47.2	1928	131.8	1935	165.2
1922	73.2	1929	136.9	1936	175.0
1923	73.2	1930	132.5	1937	182.0
1924	89.0	1931	140.6	1938	177.9
1925	92.2	1932	111.9		
1926	103.7	1933	136.2		

The recovery and expansion of Rumanian industry after the depression was quite marked; the rate of growth was somewhat above

2. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
3. League of Nations, *Industrialization and Foreign Trade*, p. 137.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

judeţ of Argeş.[26] This plasă was selected and is of interest for a number of reasons. It lay midway between the Carpathians and the Danube Valley and was in the heart of Wallachia. Having closer communications than many regions with roads leading to the capital, it had long been under the commercial influences which have so profoundly affected Rumanian society; it was not a primitive untouched district but was showing the full effect of what the investigators called "Americanization." Its population was almost entirely Rumanian and almost entirely devoted to agriculture. It lay near Răteşti, the family estate of the Brătianus, and Topoloveni, Mihalache's town, and had consequently received a good deal of attention from the parties in their political campaigns. Hence, Dâmbovnicul, if not the average Rumanian plasă, was an excellent representative of an agricultural community of the Old Kingdom and displayed the principal problems peculiar to Rumania.

What were the conditions in this community in the summer of 1939? Over nine-tenths of the population was engaged in agriculture; in the remaining tenth there were more public officials than merchants, tradesmen, or artisans. Of the 9,400 heads of families, about two-thirds (6,681) were cultivators on their own land or estate owners; 772 worked the land in dijma, that is, under the old crop-sharing tenure; 571 were agricultural day laborers, 144 were farm hands, and only 30 were tenants. About 87 per cent of the land was agricultural; forests which had once been extensive had by this time been reduced below the local needs for firewood and timber. Wheat, maize, and oats occupied almost three-fourths of the arable land.

The density of agricultural population was somewhat below the average for Rumania, but there were just under 70 inhabitants dependent upon agriculture per square kilometer of agricultural land. Evidence of overpopulation was seen in the use of practically all the land for cereals, the small size of exploitations, and in the search for auxiliary sources of income. About 23 per cent of the families had less than one hectare of land, and 56 per cent less than 3 hectares. These small holdings were further subdivided into numerous strips; the properties between one and three hectares, for example, were composed on the average of 6 plots of .3 hectares each. For the level of cultivation in this region, 4–5 hectares were the minimum adequate to feed a family of 4–5 members, but only 22 per cent of the properties were over 5 hectares. Competition for land was intense, the terms for land worked in dijma were becoming increasingly severe,

26. Mihai Pop and A. Golopenţia, *Dâmbovnicul, o plasă din sudul Judeţului Argeş* (Bucarest, 1942).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

162 and the investigators found many of the old labor contracts and obli-
311 gations associated with pre-1914 Rumania.

Unable to support themselves in the community, many peasants
511 were seeking temporary work in nearby market towns, and a number
464 traveled as far as Bucarest, a distance of about 70 kilometers. The
exodus in most cases was not permanent, and the peasants after earn-
369 ing some money returned to Dâmbovnicul. This movement to the city
166 was a reflection of the new conditions, which were also seen in the houses and garments of the peasants: houses were no longer built to last generations as was the case in the more isolated districts to the north; the national costume was relegated to Sundays. Birth and death rates were high and the natural increase outran the emigration away from the plasă. The standard of living was very low; many families were undernourished.

A definite differentiation in the peasantry was developing. A few peasants—mostly those who had inherited medium properties—were enlarging their holdings; a few new peasant estates of over 100 hectares had been created. The poorer peasants, including many who had been allotted land, were losing their holdings. Investigations into debts and credit showed that even after the conversion of 1934 about half the households were in debt. Credit provided by the cooperative banks went almost entirely to the larger peasants; in one commune holdings of up to 5 hectares received only 7.9 per cent of the loans. The special political interest shown by the parties in the judeţ of Argeş seemed to have brought no benefits beyond permitting local party stalwarts to obtain extra funds to purchase land from peasants who were in debt or in need of money.

Such, then, was the land of happy peasants with their colorful folkways so picturesquely displayed in the travel literature of the Carolist era.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

162

TABLE 1. POPULATION OF COMPONENT PARTS OF RUMANIA, 1860–1948

	1860 (Census)	1899 (Census)	1912 (Census)	1920 (Estimate Based on 1930 Census)	1930 (Census)	1939 (Based on 1930 Census)	1941 (Census)	1948 (Provisional Census Figures)
Oltenia			1,414,737		1,513,175		1,678,255	1,717,982
Muntenia			3,297,139		4,029,008		4,904,712	4,991,289
Dobrogea			(662,000) [3]		815,475		519,297 [5]	503,217
Moldavia			2,131,827		2,433,596		2,769,380	2,598,258
Total Old Kingdom	3,917,541 [1]	5,956,690 [2]	7,160,682		8,791,254		9,866,644	9,810,746
			(1910)					
Transylvania			(2,977,608)		3,217,988		1,731,038 [6]	3,420,859 [9]
Banat			(968,947)		939,958		957,957	948,596
Crişana-Maramureş			(1,314,409)		1,390,417		643,903 [6]	1,391,672 [9]
		(1897)						
Bessarabia		(1,935,412)			2,864,402		..... [7]	.....
			(1910)					
Bucovina			(807,262)		853,009		336,215 [8]	800,751
Total Greater Rumania				15,541,424 [4]	18,057,028	19,933,802	13,535,757	15,872,624

1. Including districts of Cahul, Ismail, and Bolgrad in Bessarabia, lost in 1879.
2. Including the northern part of Dobrogea.
3. This figure includes the acquisition of Southern Dobrogea in 1913, not included in total figure for Old Kingdom.
4. Showing acquisition of Transylvania, Banat, Crişana and Maramureş, Bucovina, and Bessarabia after First World War, and Southern Dobrogea acquired in Second Balkan War.
5. Showing loss of Southern Dobrogea to Bulgaria, 1940.
6. Showing loss of Northern Transylvania to Hungary, 1940.
7. Showing loss of Bessarabia to U.S.S.R., 1940.
8. Showing loss of Northern Bucovina to U.S.S.R., 1940.
9. Showing recovery of Northern Transylvania, 1945.

SOURCES: *Anuarul statistic al României, 1939–40.*
Recensământul general al României din 1941, 6 aprilie, date sumare provizorii (Bucarest, 1944).
A. Golopenţia and D. C. Georgescu, *Populaţia Republicii Populare Romîne la 25 ianuarie 1948—rezultatele provizorii ale recensământului* (Bucarest, 1948).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

162

TABLE II. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RUMANIA AND SELECTED EUROPEAN STATES

	Area, Population, and Density			Average Annual Interwar Per Cent Growth	Average Vital Rates 1930–31			Reproduction (a) Rates ca. 1930	
	Area (1,000 *km.*²)	*Population* (1,000's)	*Density* (*per km.*²)		*Birth*	*Death*	*Natural Increase*	*Gross*	*Net*
RUMANIA	295.0	18,057	61	1.27	34.2	20.1	14.1	2.16	1.40
Bulgaria	103.0	6,078	59	1.30	30.4	16.5	13.9	1.70	1.20
Greece	130.2	6,205	48	1.93	31.2	17.1	14.1	1.80	1.26
Yugoslavia	247.5	13,934	56	1.43	34.6	19.4	15.2	2.09	1.45
Hungary	93.1	8,688	93	.76	24.6	16.1	8.5	1.34	1.01
Poland	388.6	32,107	83	1.44	31.6	15.6	16.0	1.70	1.25
Ukrainian SSR (1926)	451.6	29,018	64	.53	41.2	18.0	23.2	2.49	1.70
Austria	83.9	6,760	81	.36	16.4	13.8	2.6	.80	.66
Czechoslovakia	140.5	14,730	105	.71	22.1	14.3	7.8	1.22	.95
Italy	310.2	41,177	133	.85	25.8	14.5	11.3	1.39	1.15
Germany	468.8	65,218	139	.67	16.8	11.1	5.7	.80	.70
France	551.0	41,835	76	.44	17.8	16.0	1.8	1.10	.93
Denmark	42.3	3,551	84	.82	18.4	11.1	7.3	1.10	.96
England and Wales	151.1	39,952	264	.49	16.1	11.9	4.2	.93	.81

(a) Since birth and death rates fail to take into account the differences of age and sex in the composition of the population and are therefore not precise measures of the manner in which the population is growing, a more accurate device, the "reproduction rate," is employed. The "gross reproduction rate" measures the extent to which women of childbearing age are replacing themselves with girl babies, in the absence of mortality between birth and the end of the childbearing period. The "net reproduction rate" takes into account the average mortality experience of females between birth and the childbearing years. It is thus a ratio of successive female generations. In both rates 1.00 equals simple replacement. "Thus a net reproduction rate of 2.00 indicates that at current fertility and mortality the population would double in each generation. A rate of 1.00 would ultimately yield a stationary population; a rate of .50 indicates a decline of 50 per cent per generation."

SOURCE: Dudley Kirk, *Europe's Population in the Interwar Years* (League of Nations, 1946), p. 263.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

TABLE III. REGIONAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS IN RUMANIA 162

	Area (1,000 km.²)	Population (1,000's)	Density (per km.²)	Vital Rates, 1930			Reproduction Rates	
				Birth	*Death*	*Increase*	*Gross*	*Net*
RUMANIA	295.0	18,057	61	34.2	20.1	14.1	2.16	1.40
Oltenia	24.1	1,513	63	33.7	20.4	13.3	2.11	1.37
Muntenia	52.5	4,029	77	35.4	20.1	15.3	2.22	1.44
Dobrogea	23.3	815	35	39.2	23.7	15.5	2.70	1.75
Moldavia	38.0	2,434	64	39.9	21.4	18.5	2.48	1.61
Bessarabia	44.4	2,864	64	38.3	20.8	17.5	2.57	1.67
Bucovina	10.4	853	82	31.3	19.0	12.3	1.88	1.22
Transylvania	62.2	3,218	52	30.1	18.5	11.6	2.01	1.30
Banat	18.7	940	50	21.3	18.7	2.6	1.25	.81
Crişana and Maramureş	21.3	1,390	65	28.8	19.1	9.7	1.77	1.15

SOURCE: *Ibid.*

163
165

TABLE IV. VITAL RATES IN RUMANIA

A. The Old Kingdom, 1859–1915

Period	Vital Rates per 1,000 Inhabitants		
	Births	*Deaths*	*Excess of births over deaths*
1859–63	31.3	21.4	9.9
1864–68	33.4	28.2	5.2
1869–73	33.3	28.0	5.3
1874–78	35.4	31.3	4.1
1878–83	42.0	27.7	14.3
1889–93	40.2	30.4	9.8
1894–98	40.7	28.0	12.7
1899–1903	42.1	27.6	14.5
1904–08	40.5	25.7	14.8
1909–13	41.7	25.3	16.4
1914–15	41.3	24.0	17.3

B. Greater Rumania, 1920–46

Year	Vital Rates per 1,000 Inhabitants (U = Urban; R = Rural)		
	Births	*Deaths*	*Excess of births*
1920	34.7	26.7	8.0
U	19.7	18.3	1.4
R	39.0	29.1	9.9
1921	39.4	23.7	15.7
U	22.7	16.3	6.4
R	44.2	25.7	18.5

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

163
165

Year Vital Rates per 1,000 Inhabitants (cont.)

	Births	*Deaths*	*Excess of births*
1937	30.8	19.3	11.5
1938	29.6	19.2	10.4
1939	28.3	18.6	9.7
1940	26.5	19.1	7.4
1941	23.0	19.3	3.7
1942	21.5	19.0	2.5
1943	20.3	16.7	3.6
1944	21.7	19.6	2.1
1945	19.9	19.3	0.6
1946	23.7	18.0	5.7

SOURCES: Sabin Manulla, *Structure et évolution de la population rurale* (Bucarest, 1940), p. 45; Sabin Manulla and D. C. Georgescu, *Populația României* (Bucarest, 1938), pp. 83–84; Institutul Central de Statistică, *Comunicări statistice*, No. 18 (August 15, 1947).

TABLE V. AGRICULTURAL POPULATION, 1941 162

	Total Population	Rural Population	Agricultural Population	Active in Agriculture	Passive in Agriculture
RUMANIA	13,535,757	10,238,255	9,690,428	6,504,291	3,186,132
Plain of Siret and Prut	2,087,892	1,601,094	1,572,169	1,030,235	541,934
Moldavian Carpathians	949,617	747,918	749,741	489,178	260,563
Muntenian and Oltenian Carpathians	2,577,913	2,190,766	2,117,182	1,379,258	737,924
Plain of the Danube	3,781,925	2,377,906	2,354,502	1,576,694	777,808
Dobrogea	519,297	365,585	331,740	210,714	121,026
Bucovina	336,215	266,619	273,545	185,685	87,860
Transylvanian Plateau	1,731,038	1,376,353	1,186,546	819,298	367,248
Western Transylvania	1,601,860	1,312,014	1,104,998	813,229	291,769

SOURCE: Roman Cresin, *Recensământul agricol al României din 1941, date provizorii*, Biblioteca Statistică, No. 10 (Bucarest, 1945), Table 20.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

●162

TABLE VI. AGRICULTURAL POPULATION, 1941: PERCENTAGE AND DENSITY

	Agricultural Population as Per Cent of:		Percentage of Agricultural Population:		Total Population per 100 Ha. Total Area	Agricultural population per 100 Ha. Agricultural Surface (a)	Active per 100 Ha. Agricultural Surface (a)	Active per 100 Ha. Arable Surface (b)
	Total population	*Rural population*	*Active in agriculture*	*Passive in agriculture*				
RUMANIA	71.4	94.4	67.1	32.9	69.5	94.3	63.3	71.9
Plain of Siret and Prut	77.2	98.2	65.5	34.5	81.4	87.7	57.5	64.4
Moldavian Carpathians	79.0	100.2(c)	65.2	34.8	65.7	112.8	75.0	101.0
Muntenian and Oltenian Carpathians	82.1	96.6	65.1	34.9	77.2	121.5	79.2	103.6
Plain of the Danube	61.7	98.1	67.1	32.9	96.7	89.7	60.1	64.7
Dobrogea	63.9	90.7	63.5	36.5	31.2	48.8	31.1	32.4
Bucovina	81.4	102.6(c)	67.9	32.1	47.2	108.3	73.5	84.8
Transylvanian Plateau	68.5	86.2	69.0	31.0	58.1	98.5	68.0	75.0
Western Transylvania	69.0	84.2	73.3	26.7	55.4	84.0	61.8	66.5

(a) Agricultural surface (i.e., arable, meadows, pastures, vineyards, and orchards) in the 1941 census includes only land under private exploitation, or approximately 78 per cent of the total agricultural area of the country.

(b) Arable surface included in the 1941 census represents approximately 87 per cent of the total arable.

(c) The figure of over 100 per cent merely means that part of the urban population was also engaged in agriculture.

SOURCE: *Ibid.*, Table 21.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

TABLE VII. AGRARIAN OVERPOPULATION, BY REGION, IN RUMANIA 162

	1 Population Dependent on Agriculture (1,000's)	2 Output in Crop Units per Ha. / Density of Agricultural Population		3 Output in Crop Units per Cap.	4 Agricultural Production in Crop Units (1,000's)	5 European Output per Ha. / European Density		6 European Output per Cap	7 Standard Population Assuming European per Cap. Output (1,000's)	8 "Surplus" Population Number (1,000's)	9 "Surplus" Population Per Cent
RUMANIA	13,000	$\frac{17}{.80}$	=	21	275,000	$\frac{24}{.56}$	=	43	6,300	6,700	51
Old Kingdom	6,400	$\frac{17}{.80}$	=	21	133,000	$\frac{24}{.56}$	=	43	3,100	3,300	51
Bessarabia	2,400	$\frac{14}{.70}$	=	20	48,000	$\frac{24}{.56}$	=	43	1,100	1,300	54
Bucovina	600	$\frac{28}{1.46}$	=	20	12,000	$\frac{24}{.56}$	=	43	280	320	53
Transylvania	3,600	$\frac{18}{.81}$	=	22	80,000	$\frac{24}{.56}$	=	43	1,900	1,700	48

COMMENT: This table, adapted from the computations made in Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (League of Nations, 1945), can be used only for purposes of general illustration. Output and area are given in terms of "crops units" and "arable equivalent" hectares, statistical devices to make possible a comparison of different types of agricultural land and different agricultural products. Cols. 1 to 4 give the agricultural population of Rumania and its four major regions as of 1930; the total agricultural production; and the relations between output per unit of area, density of population, and per capita output. Col. 7 gives the population which would be required to achieve this total production on the basis of the average European (excluding Russia) per capita output (Col. 6), which in turn is determined by the European output per unit of area and the European density of agricultural population (Col. 5). Col. 8 then shows the resulting "surplus" population, and Col. 9 this surplus as a percentage of the total Rumanian agricultural population.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

to have suffered expropriation, although in Transylvania there were undoubtedly numerous cases where land under that figure was taken. In Bucovina, of the 75,967 hectares expropriated, some 23,000 were reported in 1927 to be either unfit for settlement or held as state-administered forest, and therefore cannot be regarded as having increased peasant holdings. In Bessarabia, all properties over 100 hectares were to have been expropriated; of the 1,845,000 hectares in this category, 1,492,000 were expropriated, and only 1,100,000 distributed to the peasants. 311 423

Finally, forest land is handled ambiguously. In Transylvania about 40 per cent (664,000 hectares) of the area expropriated from large estates was forest; in the Old Kingdom, however, the forests of large landowners—which were not expropriated but which in 1905 amounted to over 800,000 hectares in private ownership alone—were not included in the figures (this seems also to have been the case with the extensive forests of Bucovina). To have made the statistics consistent either all forest properties in all regions should have been included, which would have increased considerably the area shown as remaining to large properties after the reform, or they should have been omitted, which would have reduced the size of the area reported expropriated by nearly 900,000 hectares. In general, then, the conclusions were artificially established and certainly represent an inflated picture of the redistribution of property.

TABLE XVIII. FISCAL CENSUSES ON LANDHOLDINGS, 1923 AND 1928 162

Hectares	1923 Number of Taxpayers	1923 Area (hectares)	1923 Average Size (hectares)	1928 Number of Taxpayers	1928 Area (hectares)	1928 Average Size (hectares)
0–5	3,154,211	5,745,921	1.8	3,408,503	6,653,801	2.0
5–10	458,534	2,618,824	5.7	455,934	3,000,859	6.6
10–50	181,494	2,359,075	13.0	139,807	2,286,413	16.4
50–250	16,557	1,425,053	86.0	13,163	1,308,121	99.4
Over 250	3,168	1,537,046	485.1	1,834	861,299	469.4
Total	3,813,964	13,685,919	3.6	4,019,241	14,110,493	3.5

SOURCE: *60 Sate romînești*, II, 12–15.

COMMENT: Although these tables, prepared by the Ministry of Finance for tax purposes and using different categories of size of landholding, cannot be compared with earlier or later figures, they are of use in showing certain trends in land distribution in the 1920's. The 1928 figure for properties over 250 hectares seems very low, however, since a Ministry of Finance estimate for 1927 (given in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 247) listed 2,597 owners in this category with an area of 1,305,672 hectares.

361

type, whereas the truly compact or nucleated type is found only in regions settled by Saxons and Szeklers (see Fig. 8). It is difficult to determine how far this distinction is ethnographic and how far it is the product of differences between two sharply contrasted environments. Generally speaking, in eastern Transylvania the mountain population is Roumanian and the lower lands are peopled by Saxons and Szeklers, environments which would normally suit the dispersed and compact types respectively. On the other hand, the Roumanian steppe villages which one would expect to be

[162]



FIGURE 7. Although the statistics have had to be taken from two different periods they suggest a close correlation between nationality and religion in this section of the eastern Carpathians. The concentration of Roumanians in the hills and Szeklers in the plains is also very marked.

compact or nucleated differ from those of the Saxons and Szeklers in this important respect: whereas the houses in the latter are often contiguous, those in the former, although closely packed, are almost invariably detached. Even where the amount of space available for building is very limited the Roumanian prefers to surround his house with a garden, and, where ample space prevails, orchards in the foothills and the plain and hay meadows in the highlands tend still further to segregate the dwellings. In small upland basins such as that of Bilbor the "village" may occupy hundreds of

VI.—ECONOMIC ROUMANIA

AGRICULTURE.

311 162 MODERN ROUMANIA is essentially an agricultural state, as was the Old Kingdom (43 to 46 per cent of the land being arable and 22 per cent forest, whilst over 80 per cent of the population of 18 millions are agricultural workers), although it has valuable potentialities for the development of industry.

132 241 134 ARRANGED in zones round the bastion of the southern and eastern Carpathian highlands, the main agricultural regions of post-war Roumania exhibit, according to aspect and altitude, a considerable variety of climatic conditions, which is reflected in a varying emphasis in the selection of crops raised. In general, we may say that the continental nature of the climate and the resulting succession from north to south and from highland to lowland of soils, graded from poor ashen-grey podsol in the Carpathians through oak-forest loams to a rich chernoziom in the south-eastern Danube plains, has resulted, wherever the ground is sufficiently level, in a concentration on grain production. The heavier rainfall of the uplands, the relatively great humidity and shelter from the driving winds that sweep across the open plains, coupled with the exposure of less [137] fertile rocks—granites and coarse sandstones—explains the large area of forested land (24.5 per cent, nearly 7¼ million hectares) in those districts that extend into the Carpathian highlands.

243 OF THE 13 odd million hectares of arable land, cereals occupy some 37 to 39 per cent. Production varies greatly from year to year and from district to district. In the old kingdom of Wallachia-Moldavia, maize is by far the heaviest crop, particularly in Oltenia, where the summer rainfall is heavier. It is also the heaviest crop in Transylvania, the cultivated areas under maize, wheat, barley and oats being [262] respectively 4, 3, 2 and 1 million hectares. Maize is the staple crop of the peasant holder almost throughout the country, for it not only provides the bread cakes and the "mamaliga," maize pudding, the main food of the mass of the people, but also fodder for the cattle to eke out the hay in

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

APPENDICES

1. SOME VITAL STATISTICS OF CORBU

162 In 1928 there were born in Corbu 34 boys and 33 girls, of whom 53 babies belonged to Uniate and 13 to Roman Catholic households, while one was of Orthodox parentage. In 1929 the births included 35 boys and 27 girls, of whom 34 babies belonged to Uniate and 22 to Roman Catholic households, while 4 were of Jewish, one of Orthodox and one of Baptist parentage.

Of the fathers of 57 legitimately born children in 1928 forty-seven were described as peasants, five as labourers, one as joiner, one as baker, one as bootmaker, one as chauffeur.

Of the fathers of 55 legitimately born children in 1929 thirty-four were described as peasants, eleven as labourers, one as joiner, one as bootmaker, one as smith, one as forester ; these apparently do not include the 4 Jewish children.

Apparently the numbers of children in a family were usually 3, 4 or 5, but there was one family of 10 children. There were in the village 415 heads of households, among whom were included a number of widows.

583

2. "DOT," OR MARRIAGE PORTION

A girl of moderate means brings to her home on marriage :

Seven to nine pillows, blankets and sheets ;

At least fifteen towels ;

Four or five carpets or rugs, to adorn the walls ;

Personal clothes dependent on her skill. She will try to have special clothes for the great festivals such as Easter, Christmas, etc. ;

Sheep, cows, and her share of the heritage from her father.

It is said that a girl begins to make her "dot" at the age of 6 years. The proportions of the sexes are approximately equal, and few adults remain unmarried.

668 Bessarabians are popularly called) forming the most back-
177 ward section of the Rumanian people are mentally incapable of appreciating at their true value all the qualities which the Rumanian administration exhibits in its conduct towards populations whose goodwill it has set out to win. For the organs of the Rumanian State are inspired by a high purpose, that of converting these Moldovans of Bessarabia into loyal Rumanians, by inculcating in them a consciousness of the collective national will. When they shall finally see eye to eye with the various cultural missionaries which Bucarest has so far dispatched for their edification, then at last will loyalty and love follow, for loyalty after all is but the consciousness of oneness, and it is this consciousness of oneness that the Bucarest "Kulturträger" are attempting to impress on the Bessarabians.

668 These altruistic efforts, however, seem unavailing, for in January, 1932, a pan-Bessarabian congress of all parties and creeds was held at Kichineff, and delegates resolved to create a united Bessarabian front so as to impose on the Government which had done nothing for this province since its union with Rumania, the taking of certain measures designed to ameliorate the situation. M. Batsaria, a veteran Rumanian journalist, commenting on this congress in the "Adeverul" stated that a member of the cabinet had confided to him that this discontent was not peculiar to Bessarabia, but existed in all the new provinces. An atmosphere, which was in no way favourable to the realization of a complete spiritual unity among the inhabitants of Great Rumania had been created. And so long as the legitimate rights of all were not respected, and their just grievances remained unredressed, so long would unity be unattained.

The Jews.

[162] The Jewish minority numbers some 800,000 souls (accord-
563 ing to Winckler's racial statistics, 778,094) who are mainly
641 concentrated in the urban districts of Bessarabia, Moldavia, Bucovina, and the province of Maramureş. As petty trading, commerce and, to a large extent, banking is in their hands, all the more important towns have a numerous Jewish element in their population. The manifest disinclination of the Rumanians for commerce has permitted the

Austrians in 1775. Bucovina, in spite of its exiguousness in arable land—about one fourth of its surface being devoted to a variety of agricultural crops and orchards—is one of the most advanced agricultural regions of Rumania, maintaining in certain parts of the valleys of the Pruth and Sereth as dense a population as 300 inhabitants per square kilometre. Its forests are better preserved than those of the other provinces of the kingdom, thanks to the careful sylvan administration the Austrians had initiated. They [illegible] 43% of the region and form the main source from which timber is obtained in Rumania, the river Sereth being used largely for floating down the logs to the Danubian port of Galatz, whence they are exported. When the Austrians annexed Bucovina in 1775 its population was only 72,000. Thanks to their excellent administration and their efforts to develop the country, its population had surpassed 800,000 when it was reunited to Rumania; the increase was due partly, however, to the Austrian attempt at denationalizing the country by settling Ruthenian immigrants. Cernauţi, better known as Czernowitz, is a modern town, beautifully planned and with all the amenities of a western city. The spirit of its inhabitants is distinctly occidental and reminds one of the mentality of Vienna, the more so, since they have distinct leanings towards Socialism owing to the preponderance of German culture. The town used to be an important centre of traffic between Galicia and Russia, but owing to the loss of its hinterland it seems as though struck with a sudden blight while in full prosperity. It has a population of 111,147, and constitutes the third largest town of Rumania.

Table showing population and area of provinces according to census of 1930.

	Population.	Area (sq. km.)
Wallachia	5,542,467	76,583.
Moldavia	2,413,123	38,058.
Bessarabia	2,865,506	44,422.
Bucovina	845,903	10,442.
Dobrudja	811,332	23,262.
Transylvania	3,217,149	102,200.
Maramureş and Crishana	1,387,675	
Banat	942,072	
Total population	18,025,237	Area .. 294,967.

RUMANIA

162 The preliminary figures of the 1930 census do not give details of the various national minorities inhabiting Rumania, and the more reliable estimate will be found in Winkler's "Racial Statistics," from which the following data are extracted :—

Germans	713,564
Russians	174,293
Jews	778,094
Magyars	1,463,373
Bulgarians	351,328
Yugo-Slavs	52,570
Czechoslovaks	31,884
Ukrainians	500,484
Various	404,104
Total	4,469,694

634 The whole kingdom is administratively divided into 71 departments, but in the case of Transylvania, Maramureş, Crishana, and the Banat the departments created out of these provinces do not correspond exactly with the frontiers
161 of the latter. The density of the population per sq. km. is 63 in the old kingdom, including the Dobrudja, 64 in Bessarabia. 82 in Bucovina, and 54 in Transylvania.

163 The birth rate for 1930 was 35 per thousand, while the
165 death rate was 19.4, and the excess of births over deaths reached 278,722, this being the largest figure recorded since the war.

162 The total urban population formed 20.13 per cent, while the rural population formed 79.87 per cent. There were 172 towns, some of which must be mere villages, as at least two are shown to possess less than 1,000 inhabitants. The following towns have a population of over 20,000: Bucarest 631,288, Chişinau 117,016, Cernauţi 111,147, Iassi 102,595, Galatz 101,148, Cluj 98,569, Timişoara 91,866, Oradea 82,355, Ploeşti 77,325, Arad 77,225, Braila 68,310, Craiova 63,063, Brasov 59,234, Constantsa 58,258, Satu-Mare 49,917, Sibiu 48,013, Targul-Mureş 38,116, Buzau 36,115,

GEOGRAPHIC AND ETHNOGRAPHIC NOTES

Cetatea Alba 33,495, Focşani 32,799, Botoşani 32,007, 162
Tighina 31,698, Bacau 31,264, Balţi 30,667, Giurgiu 30,348,
Piatra-Neamt 30,211, Bazargic 29,938, Roman 28,948,
Sighet 27,684 (French edition of census gives 27,646), Barlad 26,189, Ismail 26,123, Lugoş 23,674, Targovişte 22,482, Tulcea 20,104, Turda 20,057, Reşiţa 20,008.

COMMERCIAL MORALITY

One can best judge of a country by the mentality of its 439
commercial circles, and it is not therefore amiss to enlarge 452
on this subject prior to analyzing Rumanian finance, for it will be found that State affairs are generally conducted very much after the business methods in vogue. In fact, as we all know, legislation concerning finance and trade is often, if not always, inspired and directed by the views held by the commercial and its allied industrial and banking professions.

An outsider would have expected that in a country like Rumania, practically devoid of liquid assets, every possible safeguard would have been extended to foreign capital so as to attract it, seeing that the country's development and welfare are dependent on it. But instead, post-war Rumanian legislation has been distinctly inimical to the foreign creditors of the country, and has openly favoured and encouraged debtors to repudiate their engagements to such an extent, that finally all operations based on credit have had to be suspended. This has had a disastrous effect on Rumanian commerce, for traders are generally devoid of cash resources and depend entirely on credit for their operations. Importers of foreign goods used to obtain their supplies on a six to nine months credit basis, and were able to extend corresponding facilities to their customers, so that these transactions really corresponded to the granting of a short-term loan to Rumania which was perpetually renewed and which permitted the financing of these operations.

Several laws, amongst which that of the so-called "concordat préventif," finally superseded by the so-termed "judicial liquidation," have rendered commercial opera-

661 for the paper necessary for their pamphlets and newspapers,
477 while the Bratianus' Press organs naturally enjoyed pre-
[289] ferential rates. Another deplorable result of this monopoly was the high cost of books. The same book published in
[212] Bulgaria cost about half as much as in Rumania, and this explains to some extent the high percentage of illiterates in the latter country, which according to the *Lupta* of May 18th, 1932 reached as high a percentage as 70 per cent of the
433 total population. The creation of industries, the raw material of which is not indigenous, is likely in the long run to prove extremely wasteful. They are clearly of a parasitic nature, and their maintenance will not only continue to be a charge on the Revenue but is likely to continue to handicap very seriously Rumania's staple industry, agriculture. The initial costs of installation are necessarily high, for foreign experts have to be called in to set up the machinery, supervise, and train the native workpeople, since there is a lack of experienced workmen. Moreover the stringency of monetary resources and the high rates of interest ruling necessitate a high return on capital that can be secured only by selling the manufactured article at the highest possible price, a level which is usually fixed by the cost of the corresponding foreign article, on which a heavy duty has been imposed. The high prices will forcibly curtail output since the latter is adjusted to the capacity of the local market, the possibilities of which are restrained owing to the low buying power of the peasantry. The more consumption is reduced the more manufacturers will endeavour to recoup themselves by further raising their prices, which can be attained only by increasing the protective duty. Thus a vicious circle is created, to the great disadvantage of the peasantry, who
[162] constitute 80 per cent of the population and who have to defray in the same proportion the expenses of these experimental attempts to industrialize Rumania. It is obvious that the high prices paid by the peasantry for manufactured articles affect adversely the cost of agricultural produce; even the transport rates of the latter stand high in order to compensate for the low preferential rates granted to local manufactures. One need not, therefore, be surprised if Rumanian agriculturalists can no longer market their pro-

BUDGET AND NATIONAL REVENUE

It is obvious that the present administrative machinery is too sumptuous an affair and that Rumania cannot afford to continue to live on such an ostentatious scale. Retrenchment is imperatively needed as well as a rapid return to methods of austerity, however disagreeable these may be to a people who are naturally inclined to profligacy. A drastic economy could be effected by the dismissal of well over 50,000 State functionaries who are superfluous. The *Revista Functionarilor publici*, their mouthpiece and organ, admits that in 1914 the number of State functionaries was 90,334. The war brought about a territorial increase of 216 per cent, so that proportionately the number of functionaries should be 195,133, but by 1930 there were as many as 245,187, or about 50,000 more than necessary. But apparently this total does not disclose the whole truth, for the writer was able to ascertain that while, according to the figures published in the above paper, the Ministries of Public Instruction, Home Affairs, and War had respectively 68,977, 28,894, and 32,630 public officials at the end of 1931, the numbers figuring on their respective pay-lists were 82,821, 31,318, and 33,533. To these enormous armies of officials should be added the staffs employed by the municipalities, etc., which would bring the total number up to nearly half a million. That public opinion is fairly alert on the matter and expects a drastic cutting down may be inferred from the following open letter published in the *Argus* for 16th May, 1932, which is of particular interest from many points of view:

"Rumania has a population of 18 millions, of which only 13 millions are Rumanians by race. Out of the 500,000 public functionaries 99 per cent are Rumanians by race, and a bare 1 per cent is recruited from among Hungarians, Germans, Jews, and Ukrainians. The proportion of the non-Rumanian elements in the public services is therefore infinitesimal, which proves that some 5 millions of people can live without constituting a charge to the budgets of the State, municipalities, and 'régies.' Why should not Rumanian functionaries once dismissed from the public services be able to fend for themselves as do those members of the ethnic minorities who receive no support from the budgets?"

It is admitted publicly that over 100,000 functionaries

[Bucovina]

RACIAL ASPECTS OF ROMANIA'S CASE

162 In the World War small and populous Bucovina withstood for four years the sweep of Russian and Austrian drives over her territory. She emerged greatly transformed, but the extent of this change, especially as regards her population, was only made clear by the Romanian census of 1930 which, coming twenty years after the last Austrian enumeration, assumes the importance of a basic scientific appraisal.

Significantly, that appraisal shows that the Romanians, after 143 years of foreign rule, have retained a relative majority in the province as a whole and an absolute majority in three out of its five counties. The census found less than 1% Russians in Bucovina, about ten times as many Germans and Jews, and almost three times again as many Ruthenians and Ukrainians. Their distribution illustrates the southward migration of Galician farm labor that had theretofore been encouraged by Austria.

The return of Bucovina to Romanian rule, the restoration of her ancient trade with the rich neighboring districts of northern Moldavia and Bessarabia, the endowment of 76,911 of her landless peasantry with 187,300 acres of tiliable land of her own, the improvement of communications, sanitation and education, are all positive Romanian achievements checked only temporarily by the Russian invasion of 1940.

163 Moreover, the Romanian element has gained new strength once freed of the constraints of alien interests. On the extent of this gain the second Romanian census, scheduled for December, 1940, but postponed under the pressure of events, would have supplied a wealth of circumstantial information. But a decided trend is discernible even in the available data,[1] that for the years 1935-37, according to which the two counties with a relatively large foreign population, Cernauti and Storojinet, have had the smallest annual excess of births over deaths, while the three counties with large Romanian majorities have shown the greatest increase. The figures are:

County	Population in % of Total				Annual Increase per 1,000		
	Romanians	Germans	Ruthenians	Jews	1935	1936	1937
Suceava	79.5	8.2	1.7	5.5	10.0	14.7	13.8
Campulung	61.3	20.2	6.7	8.2	11.9	15.1	12.2
Radauti	55.4	11.1	8.7	7.2	10.9	14.5	11.9
Storojinet	33.9	3.3	45.5	9.0	7.0	13.2	10.9
Cernauti	25.7	6.4	44.5	16.7	3.3	5.3	2.9

[1] Anuarul statistic al Romaniei, 1937 si 1938 (Statistical Yearbook of Romania, 1937 and 1938), Bucharest, 1939, p. 86 & seq.

mitted to Russia more extensive rights to Bessarabia than she herself had held at the time by the consent of Moldavia."

The fall of the Czarist règime in 1917, the Red revolution and the establishment of a "democratic" government at Moscow provided the circumstances that enabled the Bessarabians to proclaim the independence of their Moldavian republic and to exercise the recognized right of all peoples to self-determination.

The reunion with Romania is of itself a reaffirmation of the Romanian character of the province. In 1812 it counted from 250,000 to 350,000 inhabitants, mostly Romanian Moldavians. There were one million of them by 1856, and two millions by 1897.[14] During this interval the schools and the Church, the bureaucracy and the judiciary were all used by the Czarist government in a policy of Russification that embraced a program of mass colonization in which Bulgarian, Jewish, German and Ukrainian immigrants were counted upon to alter the Moldavian complexion of the province. The failure of this policy has been attested to by the official returns of the Russian state censuses and confirmed by the Romanian census of 1930. 162

Thus, the 1871 figures[15] compiled under the supervision of K. N. Oberoutchev, a Major General in the imperial army, gave for Bessarabia, exclusive of the three southern counties reunited to Romania in 1856, an absolute Romanian majority:

1871 Census	Total	%
Romanians	692,000	67.4
Ukrainians, Great Russians	162,252	15.8
Jews	93,590	9.1
Germans	33,501	3.5
Others	45,003	4.2
Total Bessarabia	1,026,346	100.0

The Russians, it will be noted, were grouped with the Ukrainians to enhance the importance of the Slav element.

[14] When, as a result of the Crimean War, Russia was obliged to return the three southern Bessarabian counties of Cahul, Ismail and Cetatea Alba to Moldavia, the Treaty of Paris (March 30, 1856) implicitly recognized Moldavia as an independent state when it provided in Art. 21 that "The territory ceded by Russia shall be annexed *to the Principality of Moldavia*, under the suzerainty of the Porte. The inhabitants of this territory shall enjoy *the rights and privileges assured the Principalities* . . ." This territory was subsequently reoccupied by Russia in 1878.

[15] Boldur, op. cit., p. 134.

[16] Id., p. 136.

162 The next Russian census, that of 1897, reported the following findings:

1897 Census	Total	%
Romanians	920,919	47.58
Ukrainians	382,169	19.75
Great Russians	155,774	8.05
Jews	228,168	11.79
Germans	60,206	8.11
Others	188,176	9.72
Total Bessarabia	1,935,412	100.00

This tabulation included the population, numbering 136,087,[14] of the three southern counties of Cahul, Ismail and Cetatea Alba which Russia for the second time had forced from Romania at the Congress of Berlin (1878).[15] It showed an increase of 330% in the Russian and Ukrainian populations from 162,252 to 537,943 in the short span of twenty-six years and proportionately large increases for all other races except the Romanian; it failed, however, to dislodge the Romanian mass from its preponderant position.

These findings, based as they were on the discretion of the census officials in determining the declarer's nationality according to language, have been considered partisan by many authorities insofar as they tended to list as Russians all who declared themselves able to speak Russian. The comparable Romanian data (the 1930 census figures of the population *according to mother tongue*), based on the mandatory provision that the census taker record unchanged the declarations of the inhabitants, are listed by counties on pages 32 and 36 both in actual figures and in percentages. For the province as a whole, the record is:

1930 Census	Total	%
Romanians	1,598,578	55.81
Russians	370,112	12.92
Ukrainians	331,183	11.56
Jews	201,278	7.03
Bulgarians	164,551	5.74
Others	198,705	6.94
Bessarabia	2,864,402	100.00

[14] Anuarul statistic, p. 41.

[15] Tittoni, op. cit., p. 7: "At the Berlin Congress, Russia won Bessarabia, Germany the freedom of navigation on the Danube, Austria-Hungary won Bosnia and Herzegovina; England won Cyprus; France obtained permission to occupy Tunisia. Sacrificed were only Romania, who was forcibly deprived of Bessarabia, and Italy, whose interests in Tunisia were entirely disregarded."

162

A tabulation by counties of the 1930 and 1897 records, with the Russians and Ukrainians listed separately in the first and jointly in the latter, reveals the following shift in the relative position of the several races:

County	Romanians		Russians	Ukrainians	Russians and Ukrainians		Others	
	1930	1897	1930		1930	1897	1930	1897
Orhei	87.3	77.86	3.8	0.9	4.7	8.24	8.0	13.90
Lapusna	77.8	62.90	7.1	0.7	7.8	13.81	14.4	23.29
Soroca	73.6	63.51	8.1	8.2	16.3	20.91	10.1	15.58
Balti	70.1	66.37	12.0	7.6	19.6	18.13	10.3	15.50
Tighina	53.4	45.14	14.7	3.0	17.7	20.35	28.9	34.51
Cahul	51.2	39.09	7.5	0.3	7.8	32.08	41.0	28.23
Ismail	31.9		29.7	4.7	34.4		33.7	
Hotin	35.0	23.87	13.6	41.6	55.2	59.55	9.8	16.58
Cetatea Alba	18.5	16.38	17.3	20.5	37.8	36.36	43.7	47.26
Bessarabia	56.2	47.58	12.3	11.0	23.3	27.8	20.5	24.62

A clear Romanian majority of 56.2% emerges for the province as a whole and is based, as the table shows, on majorities in six out of the nine counties that rise from 51.2% in Cahul to as high as 87.3% in Orhei. Furthermore, there is a relative Romanian majority in the seventh county, Ismail, and a near-equality of the Romanians with the most populous races, the Bulgarians and Ukrainians, in the remaining counties of Cetatea Alba and Hotin respectively.

The most recent Russian statistics show for the whole of the Communist Union in 1939 not more than 58.41% Russians and a multitude of other races. Among the latter are several hundreds of thousands of Romanians removed during the Czarist règime from their Bessarabian homeland to the region between the rivers Dniester and Bug, now (October, 1941) under Romanian military administration. Of these, 185,266 were listed as living in the Moldavian autonomous republic (AMSSR) created October 12, 1924, on the Ukrainian side of the Dniester to undermine the consolidation of Romanian Bessarabia. An exchange across the river of Moldavians and Ukrainians has been advocated as a first move toward Russo-Romanian understanding, the feasibility of which is supported by the Greek-Turkish pact of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, regulating the exchange of their populations, the similar agreement between Bulgaria and Romania bearing on the Dobrudja populations and more re-

•162 cently the Russo-Hungarian accord for the removal of the Hungarian population in northern Bucovina districts then overrun by Russia.

More active as a long-range factor in the evolution of Bessarabia, as indeed of all Romanian provinces, is the biological truth[14] that city populations tend to diminish in the span of a few generations. Since the surrounding rural areas serve as natural reservoirs for city populations, it has been predicted that the migration from village to city will in the course of time alter the present position even more in favor of the Romanians. The conclusion holds for 64 out of the 71 counties whose rural population is 90% Romanian.

[14]Manuila, Dr. Sabin, "Ethnographical Survey of the Population of Romania," Bucharest, 1938, pp. xiv-xv.

175 by the patient genius of the Jewish race."[11] Lastly, it is not to be gainsaid that the Hungarians themselves are comparatively a small race, numbering according to their own partisan census of 1910 only 10,050,575 out of a total population of 20,886,487.[12] And this brings us to our main object, the consideration of the racial structure of Transylvania.

162 Religious, civil, and fiscal censuses of Transylvania under both Austrian and Hungarian domination establish from the beginning the preponderance of the Romanian element. The early censuses of the Romanian Greek-Catholic bishopric (1714, 1733 and 1750) were not complete, counting as they did families, not individuals, and omitting the region of Barsa surrounding the city of Brasov. The 1760 Austrian census, a thorough fiscal record, listed 777,170 Romanians; the 1786 count, showing a *total* population of 1,577,515, afforded the ecclesiastical authorities a basis for reaching the following conclusion as to its racial composition:

Romanians	1,048,416
Hungarians	341,058
Saxons	188,041

For the pre-Dualist era we have the report of A. Fenyes[13] for the whole of Hungary in 1840:

Hungarians	4,812,759	37.4%
Romanians	2,202,542	17.1
Germans	1,273,677	9.9
Serbs	828,365	6.4
Croats	1,315,947	10.2
Slovenes	1,687,256	13.1
Ruthenes	442,903	3.4
Jews	244,035	1.9
hers	72,922	0.6
Total	12,880,406	100.0

[11] Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 429: "One other vital factor in the Hungarian situation must be mentioned,—the economic transformation, which expressed itself on the one hand in the decay of the gentry, the class which had long been Hungary's political backbone, and on the other hand in the virtual capture of industry, banking, commerce and the press by the Jews."

[12] Hungary in 1910 had just elected a new parliament, to which but 8 non-Hungarians had been returned by the aid of "only 194 batallions of infantry and 114 squadrons of cavalry." The census found not more than about 50% Hungarians in all Hungary, as we have seen, and but 31.62% Hungarians in the whole of Transylvania. Yet Count Stephen Tisza felt justified to address parliament as follows: "Our non-Magyar fellow-citizens must first of all reconcile themselves to the fact that they here belong to a national state, which is not a conglomerate of different races, but which one race has conquered and founded, upon which one race has stamped the ineradicable impress of its individuality." (Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 427.)

[13] Seton-Watson, R. W., "Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers," London, 1934, p. 27.

162

We also have a British estimate of 1848 for Transylvania proper:*

Romanians	1,130,000
Hungarians	550,000
Germans	292,000
Others	28,000

Thereafter we are entirely dependent on the official Hungarian figures, showing for Transylvania proper the following evolution:

Year	Romanians	%	Hungarians	%	Germans	%
1850	1,202,000	58.0	585,000	28.2	219,000	10.6
1880	1,184,883	56.8	630,477	30.3	211,748	10.2
1890	1,276,890	56.7	697,945	31.0	217,670	9.7
1900	1,397,282	56.4	814,994	32.9	233,012	9.4
1910	1,472,021	55.0	918,217	34.3	234,085	8.7

That these figures fail to render a true picture has been proved beyond dispute by the discrepancy noted between the annual net increment (the natural excess of births over deaths) of each of the nationalities listed and the reported nationality totals. Further proof is afforded by the Romanian census of 1930 which lists the nationalities in accordance with the statements of the declarers. Thus, for Transylvania (the Banat, Crisana and Maramures included) the last Hungarian figures available, those of 1910, compare as follows with the Romanian data of 1930:

	1910		1930	
Romanians	2,830,040	53.76	3,208,767	57.82
Hungarians	1,664,296	31.62	1,353,288	24.38
Germans	565,116	10.74	544,278	9.81
Jews	.....	.....	178,810	3.22
Others	204,150	3.88	264,663	4.77
Total	5,263,602	100.00	5,549,806	100.00

It is at once evident that the figure for Hungarians had been bolstered in the 1910 count by the inclusion of the Jewish population of Transylvania. For a closer scrutiny of the two censuses here compared, a tabula-

*Exclusive of the Banat of Timisoara, Crisana and Maramures.

162 tion by counties is available," giving the populations found living in 1930 within the identical administrative (county) boundaries to which the Hungarian count of 1910 applied.

The accompanying ethnographic map illustrates in distinctive colors the distribution of the principal nationalities inhabiting Transylvania. It is to be noted, however, that this convenient mode of presentation, while outlining clearly the areas of greatest concentration of each of the nationalities considered, fails to impart any information as to the relative proportion of the various races in any given section; it tends, in fact, to convey the very definite impression that each color zone represented is inhabited exclusively by the nationality to which the color corresponds, obviously an erroneous impression. A reference to the map (page 17) which outlines the administrative boundaries of the Transylvanian counties, serves to locate in the counties of Ciuc, Odorhei and Trei Scaune the great concentration of Hungarians shown in green on the color map. This region, the greatest single minority island in the province, contained in 1930 in addition to the preponderant Szekelys (listed as Hungarians) 62,817 individuals of other races. Similarly, the county of Timis-Torontal, a region which on the color map would seem preponderantly German, while actually representing one of the greatest concentration of Germans in Transylvania, contained in addition to 174,395 Germans 325,048 individuals of other races.

The Award of Vienna

175 The sinuous red line which runs from east to west on the ethnographic map was drawn at Vienna, August 30, 1940, by the Foreign Ministers of the German Reich and the Italian Kingdom, and represents their joint decision as arbiters of the claim of Hungary to Romanian Transylvania. History shows that political and other factors can and do make possible arbitrary settlements; when they do, as in the present instance, the settlement is of the essence of a compromise—a temporary working arrangement.

The Treaty of Trianon created the modern independent kingdom of Hungary. The claim of this kingdom to the territories over which Hungary as a member of the former Dual Monarchy once extended her authority were formulated by her in minute detail and submitted for the careful consideration of the experts of the Versailles peace conference. There is nothing new that Hungary could add today to what, as

*See page 50.

1/1 [technically impossible to reproduce for HB File -- Analyst]

/1:Clark S-4 (no date)1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

162

Census of 1930
Counties of Transylvania, The Banat of Timisoara, Crisana and Maramures

Vienna Award Frontier (solid black line)
County Boundaries (dotted line)

Transylvania

1 Alba
10 Braşov
18 Cluc
19 Cluj
26 Fagaras
30 Hunedoara
38 Mures
40 Nasaud
42 Odorhei
51 Salaj
54 Sibiu
55 Somes
59 Tarnava Mare
60 Tarnava Mica
65 Trei Scaune
67 Turda

The Banat of Timisoara

15 Caras
53 Severin
64 Timis Torontal

Crisana—Maramures

2 Arad
7 Bihor
36 Maramures
52 Satu Mare

175 was then pointed out to her, was in effect but a specious plea for the perpetuation of a 1000-year old injustice."

162 728 That claim had been based mainly on historical, geographical and economic arguments. Whatever effort was made to present it from the viewpoint of the populations whom it would have affected referred in the main to the compact mass of the Szekelys, the twelfth century colonists inhabiting today the exact geographical center of post-War Romania. Romania contended that the cession to Hungary of this mass of aliens would have carried with it an even greater number of Romanians living in the territory separating the Szekelys from Hungary. As long as it will stand, the Award of Vienna will serve to prove the Romanian contention of twenty years ago. In figures the picture is as follows:

Census of 1930
Racial Composition of the Population Ceded to Hungary

County	Romanian	Hungarian	German	Jewish	Others	Total
1. Bihor	136,351	130,127	2,101	20,420	16,549	305,548
2. Ciuc	20,976	120,627	439	2,383	1,381	145,806
3. Cluj	141,607	85,284	2,669	16,057	11,034	256,651
4. Maramures	93,207	11,174	3,239	33,828	20,127	161,575
5. Mures	115,773	121,282	11,271	9,848	11,564	269,738
6. Nasaud*	103,897	7,488	21,211	6,450	6,528	145,574
7. Odorhei	5,430	112,375	454	1,250	2,475	121,984
8. Salaj	192,821	107,662	16,010	13,380	13,474	343,347
9. Satu Mare	178,523	74,191	9,530	23,967	8,664	294,875
10. Somes	169,942	33,870	351	10,546	4,646	219,355
11. Tarnava Mare	270	62	656	7	15	1,010
12. Tarnava Mica	131	1,580	3	42	165	1,921
13. Trei Scaune	17,505	105,834	760	707	2,963	127,769
Total	1,176,433	911,556	68,694	138,885	99,585	2,395,153

*Inclusive of the population, numbering 1,443, of the villages of Cosna and Carlibaba Noua transferred from the County of Nasaud to the County of Campulung, Bukovina, as of September 25, 1925.

The recovery by Hungary of 911,556 of her nationals thus caused Romania to lose a population of 1,176,433 Romanians. (An official 1940 estimate based on current vital statistics lists 978,074 or 37.1% Hungarians and 1,304,903 or 50.2% Romanians in the ceded territory.) The recovered Hungarian population lies broadly in two groups: a central group, mainly Szekelys, as we have seen, in the counties of Ciuc, Odorhei and Trei Scaune, extending also into the county of Mures, or in all 0,118 souls; and a western group in the border counties of Cluj, Salaj, Bihor,

"Letter of A. Millerand, President of the Peace Conference, replying on behalf of the Allies, May 6, 1920.

[cession of territory by Vienna agreement in 1940- --Analyst]

Satu Mare and Maramures, or 408,438 souls. The remainder of 43,000 Hungarians in the territory recently awarded Hungary live scattered over a region containing not less than 274,240 Romanians, besides other races. 162 728

Clearly, a permanent solution of the Hungaro-Romanian problem would have had to recognize this geographical distribution and treat each group on its merits.

The western group of 408,438 Hungarians forms 30.0% of the total population (1,361,996) of the region containing them; the Romanians there number 742,509, or 54.5%, and other nationalities 211,049, or 15.5%. At the preliminary conference* held in the early Summer of 1940 at Turnu Severin between Hungarian and Romanian delegates seeking a direct amicable settlement of the dispute, the Romanian delegation could not fail to point out that by an equitable rectification of the then existing frontier and an exchange of populations a settlement could be reached that would in effect reduce to a minimum the number both of Hungarians in Romania and of Romanians in Hungary. But the Hungarian delegation, instructed to claim the whole of Transylvania, would not entertain a practical and real settlement. As a consequence, 742,509 Romanians and 211,049 other nationalities, or a total of 953,558 non-Hungarians, were turned over to a bitter foster-government to make possible the repatriation of the 408,438 Magyars of Western Transylvania. As beneficiary of a settlement that delivers to her two unwilling aliens for every one of her nationals, Hungary has proved again that she is not interested in the creation of conditions that would insure a firm peace, but in an expansion which, at the cost of her neighbors, will enable her to assume the role of Hapsburg Austria in the East. 648 [728]

The central Hungarian group in Transylvania poses a different problem. This group, non-contiguous with the Hungarian frontier traced in 1920, had even before that date shown but little interest in Hungary, to them a distant country; their concern had mostly been in Moldavia, adjoining and familiar territory where they often sought and found profitable employment. There are thus grounds to doubt that they could find satisfaction in their present position, isolated as it is by the new Vienna boundary from main railway connections, from their natural economic outlet of Brasov and the opportunities of steady employment in Romania. Nor, seemingly, could they find comfort in an embittered atmosphere, in the close everyday contact with the 159,684 Romanians living among them or in the solid block of 273,839 Romanians that divide them in the north from their kinsmen. 162

* [preceeding the Vienna[19] agreement in 1940 - --Analyst]

RACIAL ASPECTS OF ROMANIA'S CASE

162

Table I—Population

Actual figures

COUNTY	TOTAL	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
ROMANIA	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Oltenia	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Dolj	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Gorj	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Mehedinti	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Romanati	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Valcea	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Muntenia	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Arges	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Braila	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Buzau	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Dambovita	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Ialomita	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Ilfov	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Muscel	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Olt	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Prahova	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Rodnitu Sarat	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Teleorman	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Vlasca	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Dobrogea	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Caliacra	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Constanta	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Durostor	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Tulcea	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Moldova	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Baia	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Iasi	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Roman	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Covurlui	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Dorohoi	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Falciu	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Iasi	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Neamt	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Putna	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Roman	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Tecuci	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Tutova	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Vaslui	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Transylvania	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Balti	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Cahul	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Cetatea Alba	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Nistu	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Ismail	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Lapusna	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Orhei	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Soroca	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Tighina	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Bucovina	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Campulung	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Cernauti	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Radauti	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Storojinet	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Suceava	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

Il: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Romania ED1

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

According to Nationality

Actual figures

162

Germans 12	Jews 13	Czechs 14	Albanians 15	Armenians 16	Turks 17	Tatars 18	Cagauzi 19	Gypsies 20	Others 21	Not declared 22	COUNTY 1
13,086	728,115	36,490	6,670	15,846	104,733	32,141	185,700	262,041	56,352	7,134	ROMANIA
											Chisinau
1	3,303	638	127	181	588	-	8	32,209	1,656	391	Dorohoi
-	2,279	360	34	107	78	-	8	8,365	708	39	Hotin
-	108	21	-	1	6	-	-	3,355	83	5	Kilia-Noua
-	396	104	19	64	640	-	-	3,718	161	35	Romanati
-	157	150	8	15	32	-	-	3,106	77	2	Tutova
-	382	28	36	10	23	-	-	3,997	370	26	Vaslui
-	[illegible]	18,889	1,939	2,533	2,168	33	169	75,788	13,137	1,383	Muntenia
-	636	138	70	92	67	-	-	3,067	145	25	Arges
-	6,776	4,733	118	275	605	3	30	3,276	2,670	111	Braila
-	1,015	129	65	59	28	-	3	4,697	177	23	Buzau
-	731	210	68	10	27	-	-	6,350	319	22	Dambovita
-	513	253	116	28	99	-	13	7,228	283	15	Falcoiu
-	70,867	4,461	1,882	4,701	1,147	18	63	17,338	6,633	843	Ilfov
-	30	10	6	1	16	-	-	3,400	253	35	Mehedinti
-	181	60	0	12	7	-	-	2,214	31	16	Olt
-	6,683	322	111	199	73	-	8	7,346	1,719	128	Prahova
-	1,112	71	17	21	10	-	6	4,970	69	5	Romanati Sarat
-	227	181	34	23	145	-	1	4,980	27	9	Teleorman
-	229	146	44	109	137	-	1	6,430	123	30	Vlasca
-	3,795	9,023	309	5,270	106,771	33,092	7,136	11,446	15,489	386	Dobrogea
-	410	1,027	31	1,087	30,430	4,461	6,362	6,378	61	62	Caliacra
-	1,834	4,616	471	3,350	17,116	15,174	752	2,149	1,911	119	Constanta
-	397	253	52	733	40,090	2,080	14	2,037	978	70	Durostor
-	1,146	3,127	35	100	6,034	372	18	1,082	12,500	15	Tulcea
1	108,423	2,750	188	1,387	340	5	204	33,194	6,722	688	Moldova
-	13,945	92	35	150	14	-	15	3,820	401	31	Baia
-	7,570	20	1	10	0	-	4	1,830	1,649	48	Bacau
-	19,553	10	10	191	8	-	14	1,751	341	43	Botosani
-	19,994	2,982	68	573	140	1	71	1,301	1,861	183	Cernauti
-	10,790	1	2	24	15	-	11	601	77	13	Dorohoi
-	3,589	101	4	6	3	-	3	1,887	43	11	Falciu
1	40,199	199	35	192	36	3	36	3,171	1,363	218	Iasi
-	12,955	30	3	30	6	-	-	1,438	329	22	Neamt
-	6,088	186	25	301	42	-	3	2,290	160	30	Putna
-	7,129	10	21	66	77	-	18	3,526	216	38	Roman
-	2,871	116	6	18	10	-	15	3,146	49	7	Tecuci
-	4,132	97	5	16	16	1	51	3,749	127	7	Tutova
-	6,900	20	-	12	3	-	21	3,266	337	76	Vaslui
6	[illegible]	3,044	1,009	1,300	341	16	98,173	13,918	8,970	1,445	Transylvania
-	31,695	75	2	242	7	3	6	7,929	680	60	Bihor
-	4,414	301	-	30	37	-	35,290	1,664	1,166	113	Cluj
-	11,390	190	3	407	7	-	7,870	1,685	358	122	Cluj-Alba Iulia
-	35,981	28	3	6	10	3	2	643	91	112	Alba
1	6,306	601	1,776	73	287	1	13,091	460	5,470	129	Tarnei
3	50,011	478	23	383	34	8	37	3,159	980	422	Lapusna
-	19,999	65	1	42	7	-	1	2,882	270	67	Orasti
-	29,191	10	-	68	10	-	11	980	36	62	Sibiu
-	16,843	88	2	38	7	-	30,343	1,384	330	158	Tighina
12,437	92,693	32	1	360	49	-	38	3,364	2,817	646	Bucovina
100	7,736	7	1	33	5	-	-	807	56	32	Cernauti
-	51,247	13	-	79	30	-	10	112	130	412	Dorohoi
12,246	11,588	1	-	19	3	-	-	352	1,708	40	Radauti
1	13,232	-	-	26	3	-	-	287	685	62	Suceava
-	6,677	2	-	97	-	-	9	606	16	62	Storojinet

RACIAL ASPECTS OF ROMANIA'S CASE

162

Continued

Table 1—Population

COUNTY	TOTAL	Romanians	Hungarians	Germans	Russians	Ruthenians, Ukrainians	Jews, Czech, Slovaks	Bulgarians	Turks, Tatars	Poles
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Transylvania	3,207,968	1,853,719	934,643	250,626	3,559	2,158	668	886	9,139	3,291
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	20,028	7,583	155	70	70	111	211	47
[illegible]	168,125	[illegible]	69,761	33,308	151	161	66	96	289	101
[illegible]	145,806	99,976	1,0,627	619	99	10	10	10	34	60
[illegible]	330,991	206,139	100,759	7,700	652	294	99	106	364	98
[illegible]	86,039	67,375	4,768	10,750	102	6	8	11	21	6
[illegible]	332,118	[illegible]	37,586	9,287	320	697	172	66	1,012	1,001
[illegible]	[illegible]	152,739	123,317	11,283	346	76	90	70	93	99
[illegible]	148,111	101,959	3,676	20,785	218	54	10	30	53	86
[illegible]	139,282	6,362	119,385	694	27	5	5	1	18	27
[illegible]	181,347	112,813	107,662	16,010	320	776	62	17	5,089	59
[illegible]	[illegible]	120,238	9,083	30,909	507	40	76	111	187	150
[illegible]	[illegible]	169,962	33,870	351	145	93	10	58	38	26
Tarnava Mare	161,900	86,903	17,619	58,610	68	3	51	32	217	160
Tarnava Mica	149,68[illegible]	80,604	35,386	24,011	51	6	15	42	119	27
[illegible]	136,122	21,179	109,381	781	102	73	33	20	110	39
[illegible]	181,282	139,315	39,216	762	53	9	11	4	179	230
Banat	939,958	335,893	97,609	225,167	1,098	3,005	46,783	18,912	14,696	592
[illegible]	[illegible]	139,951	1,032	25,654	132	41	9,923	197	7,329	108
[illegible]	[illegible]	151,412	15,818	25,118	495	3,352	1,816	329	3,234	150
Total Timisoara	499,643	189,020	76,[illegible]	174,395	971	680	28,706	9,046	3,314	134
Crisana and Maramures	1,390,617	666,070	238,790	67,289	3,136	23,869	3,171	862	28,380	483
[illegible]	423,669	250,479	82,608	32,202	630	826	1,990	171	11,790	217
[illegible]	519,328	314,109	152,962	1,288	496	495	132	251	11,162	121
Maramures	161,525	95,007	11,176	3,239	73	19,240	10	35	73	93
Satu Mare	286,095	126,515	34,195	9,510	1,149	3,020	61	86	555	85

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

According to Nationality

Continued

162

Rumanian 12	Jews 13	Czechs 14	Albanians 15	Armenians 16	Turks 17	Tatars 18	Gypsies 19	Gypsies 20	Others 21	Not declared 22	COUNTY 1
											Transylvania
-	78,639	185	21	1,941	40	3	3	75,342	1,893	1,374	*Alba*
-	2,995	0	-	16	11	-	-	3,762	66	31	*Braşov*
-	2,610	50	-	23	0	1	-	1,287	229	377	*Cluj*
-	2,583	2	1	96		-	-	934	55	57	*Cluj*
-	17,162	15	6	180	24	-	2	7,869	119	287	*Cluj*
-	662	5	1	3	-	-	-	2,516	15	15	*Fagaras*
-	4,661	3	3	11	10	-	-	5,118	832	118	*Hunedoara*
-	4,950	3	3	95	0		-	11,355	73	101	*Mures*
-	6,119	7	-	17	0	-	-	5,995	46	60	*Nasaud*
-	1,299	-	-	5	-	-	-	2,612	78	23	*Odorhei*
-	11,180	5	-	91	10	-	-	6,100	20	171	*Salaj*
-	1,030	15	-	16	20		1	4,961	165	68	*Sibiu*
-	10,146	-	2	620	1	3	-	5,167	19	41	*Someş*
-	1,081	-	-	3	3	-	-	3,086	35	32	*Turda Mare*
-	1,631	-	-	34	1	-	-	7,573	20	38	*Turda Mica*
-	714	15	-	11	-	-	-	2,029	71	30	*Trei Scaune*
-	2,224	1	-	43	-	-	-	6,176	34	21	*Turda*
											Banat
7	11,348	27	11	34	171	3	-	17,910	6,975	989	*Caraş*
-	507	6	-	1	11	-	-	5,556	6,611	15	*Caraş*
-	2,166	7	5	-	16	1	-	5,321	178	122	*Semeria*
7	8,605	16	10	13	81	2	-	7,042	186	852	*Timiş Torontal*
											Crişana and Maramureş
6	88,879	23	0	100	56	3	1	15,890	338	878	*Arad*
2	9,040	11	-	79	10	2	-	5,884	150	134	*Bihor*
4	21,482	8	3	-	17	-	1	6,006	131	196	*Maramureş*
-	11,610	-	-	-	10	-	-	485	26	122	*Satu Mare*
-	11,987	2	-	2	11	-	-	3,521	45	126	*Someş*

162

RACIAL ASPECTS OF ROMANIA'S CASE

Table II—Population

Percentages

COUNTY	Romanians	Hungarians	Germans	Ruskins	Ruthenians, Ukrainians	Serbs, Croats, Slovenes	Bulgarians	Czechs, Slovaks	Poles	Huzzans	Jews	Greeks	Albanians	Armenians	Turks	Tatars	Gagauts	Gipsies	Others	Not declared
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
ROMANIA	71.9	7.9	4.1	2.3	3.2	0.3	2.0	0.3	0.3	*	4.0	0.1	*	*	0.9	0.1	0.6	1.5	0.3	*
Oltenia	97.5	0.2	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.2	*	*	*	*	–	*	1.8	*	*
Dolj	98.7	0.3	0.3	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.3	*	*	*	*	–	*	1.7	0.2	*
Gorj	97.8	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	–	*	*	–	–	1.8	*	*
Mehedinti	97.7	*	0.3	*	*	0.2	*	*	*	–	0.1	*	*	*	0.1	–	–	1.8	*	*
Romanati	98.4	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	*	*	*	–	–	1.1	*	*
Valcea	97.4	0.2	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	0.2	*	*	*	*	–	–	1.6	0.2	*
Muntenia	93.4	0.8	0.5	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	–	3.1	0.3	*	0.1	*	*	*	1.8	0.2	*
Arges	97.6	0.2	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	–	1.4	*	*
Braila	89.4	0.7	0.5	0.6	*	0.1	0.2	*	*	–	3.1	2.2	*	0.1	0.2	*	*	1.5	1.2	*
Buzau	97.4	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	0.3	*	*	*	*	–	*	1.6	*	*
Dambovita	98.2	0.2	0.1	*	*	0.1	*	*	*	–	0.2	*	*	*	*	–	–	2.1	*	*
Ialomita	96.6	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	0.2	0.1	*	*	*	–	*	2.5	*	*
Iliov	84.5	8.5	1.2	0.4	*	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	–	7.0	0.4	0.1	0.5	0.1	*	*	1.7	0.6	*
Muscel	97.1	0.5	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	*	*	*	–	–	2.3	0.2	*
Olt	98.3	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	*	*	*	–	–	1.2	*	*
Prahova	95.0	0.8	0.7	0.1	*	0.1	*	*	*	–	0.9	*	*	*	*	–	*	1.5	0.4	*
Ramnicu Sarat	96.5	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	0.6	*	*	*	*	–	*	2.7	*	*
Teleorman	98.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	1.4	*	*
Vlasca	97.1	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	2.2	*	*
Dobrogea	44.2	0.3	1.5	3.4	*	0.1	22.7	*	*	–	0.5	1.1	*	0.7	18.5	2.7	0.9	1.4	1.9	*
Caliacra	22.6	0.2	0.5	0.6	*	0.1	48.4	*	*	–	0.2	0.6	*	0.6	22.0	6.7	3.2	2.7	*	*
Constanta	66.2	0.6	3.2	1.5	*	0.1	8.9	*	*	–	0.7	0.8	0.2	1.2	6.2	6.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	*
Durostor	19.7	0.1	*	0.1	*	*	54.2	*	*	–	0.2	0.1	*	0.2	42.2	1.0	*	1.4	0.5	*
Tulcea	62.6	*	1.3	12.2	*	0.2	10.6	*	*	–	0.6	1.7	*	0.2	8.5	0.2	*	0.9	6.2	*
Moldova	99.8	0.9	0.3	0.3	*	*	*	*	0.1	*	4.5	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	1.3	0.3	*
Bacau	88.6	3.2	0.4	0.2	*	*	*	*	0.2	–	4.3	*	*	*	*	–	*	1.5	0.3	*
Baia	91.2	0.1	0.6	0.2	*	*	*	*	0.3	–	4.2	*	*	*	*	–	*	1.2	0.2	*
Botosani	88.2	0.1	0.2	*	0.2	*	*	*	0.2	–	9.0	*	*	*	*	–	*	0.2	0.2	*
Covurlui	83.7	1.1	0.6	1.5	*	0.1	0.2	*	0.2	–	9.5	1.4	*	0.3	*	*	*	0.6	0.3	*
Dorohoi	92.1	*	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	7.0	*	*	*	*	–	*	0.4	*	*
Falciu	94.4	0.2	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	–	3.1	*	*	*	*	–	*	1.6	*	*
Iasi	81.6	0.4	0.4	0.6	*	*	*	*	0.2	*	14.6	*	*	*	*	–	*	1.1	0.6	*
Neamt	90.3	1.2	0.6	0.1	*	*	*	*	0.2	–	6.5	*	*	*	*	–	–	0.7	0.2	*
Putna	83.3	1.1	0.2	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	–	8.5	*	*	0.1	*	–	*	1.2	*	*
Roman	90.7	1.4	0.2	0.1	*	*	*	*	0.1	–	4.7	*	*	*	*	–	*	2.2	0.1	*
Tecuci	94.9	0.7	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	1.2	*	*	*	*	–	*	2.0	*	*
Tutova	93.7	0.2	0.2	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	–	2.9	*	*	*	*	*	*	2.6	*	*
Vaslui	95.4	*	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	–	3.6	*	–	*	*	–	*	2.3	0.2	*
Bessarabia	56.2	*	2.8	12.3	11.0	*	5.7	*	0.3	*	7.2	*	*	*	*	*	3.4	0.5	0.3	*
Balti	70.1	*	0.4	12.0	7.8	*	*	*	0.2	–	8.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.5	0.2	*
Cahul	51.2	*	4.4	7.6	0.3	*	14.6	0.1	*	–	2.3	0.3	–	*	*	–	17.9	0.7	0.6	*
Cetatea Alba	18.5	*	16.3	17.3	30.5	*	30.2	*	*	–	3.5	*	*	0.1	*	*	2.3	0.5	*	*
Hotin	35.0	*	*	13.6	41.8	*	*	*	0.3	–	9.8	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.2	*	*
Ismail	51.9	*	0.4	19.7	4.7	*	18.2	*	0.1	*	2.2	0.2	0.2	*	0.2	*	6.9	0.2	2.4	0.1
Lapusna	77.2	*	0.7	7.1	0.7	*	0.2	*	0.4	*	11.9	0.1	*	0.1	*	*	*	0.7	*	0.1
Orhei	57.3	*	*	3.2	0.2	*	*	*	0.1	–	6.2	*	*	*	*	–	*	0.7	*	*
Soroca	73.6	*	0.1	8.1	2.2	*	*	*	0.3	–	9.2	*	–	*	*	–	*	0.2	*	*
Tighina	65.4	*	3.4	14.7	3.0	*	6.4	*	0.2	–	5.5	*	*	*	*	–	12.2	0.4	0.1	*

*) Less than 0.1.

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

According to Nationality

Continued 162

COUNTY	Rumanians	Hungarians	Germans	Russians	Ruthenians, Ukrainians	Serbs, Croats, Slovenes	Bulgarians	Czechs, Slovaks	Poles	Hutsuls	Jews	Greeks	Albanians	Armenians	Turks	Tatars	Gagauts	Gipsies	Others	Not declared
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
Bucovina	**44.5**	**1.4**	**3.9**	**9.9**	**27.7**	*	*	*	**3.6**	**1.5**	**10.8**	*	*	*	*	–	*	**0.3**	**0.2**	*
Campulung	61.5	0.1	20.8	0.5	6.7	*	*	*	1.8	0.8	8.8	*	*	*	*	–	–	0.2	*	*
Cernauti	35.7	0.8	6.4	1.1	44.6	*	*	0.1	5.0	–	16.7	*	–	*	*	–	*	*	*	0.1
Radauti	65.4	6.4	11.1	0.9	8.7	*	*	*	1.4	7.8	7.8	*	–	*	*	–	–	0.8	1.1	*
Storojinet	33.9	*	5.3	0.9	46.5	*	*	*	4.7	*	9.0	–	–	*	*	–	–	0.2	0.2	*
Suceava	79.5	0.7	8.8	1.0	1.7	*	*	*	2.7	–	5.5	*	–	*	–	–	*	0.5	*	*
Transylvania	**57.6**	**29.9**	**7.9**	**0.1**	*	*	*	**0.3**	*	–	**2.4**	*	*	*	*	*	*	**2.3**	*	*
Alba	81.5	11.3	3.6	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	–	1.4	*	–	*	*	–	–	1.8	*	*
Brasov	46.9	26.6	19.8	0.2	*	*	*	0.2	*	–	1.5	*	–	*	*	*	–	1.8	0.1	0.2
Cluc	16.4	48.7	0.5	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	1.6	*	*	*	–	–	–	0.6	*	*
Clui	60.9	30.1	0.8	0.1	*	*	*	0.8	*	–	5.1	*	*	*	*	–	*	2.5	*	*
Fagaras	78.3	5.5	18.5	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	–	0.5	*	*	*	–	–	–	2.9	*	*
Hunedoara	28.0	11.3	9.5	*	0.1	*	*	0.2	0.2	–	1.4	*	*	*	*	–	–	1.5	0.2	*
Mures	45.8	49.6	2.9	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	–	2.4	*	*	*	*	–	–	3.9	*	*
Odaszud	71.5	7.2	14.4	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	–	4.4	*	–	*	*	–	–	4.1	*	*
Odorhei	4.9	91.0	0.4	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	1.0	–	–	*	–	–	–	2.0	*	*
Salaj	80.5	51.4	4.7	*	0.2	*	*	1.7	*	–	2.9	*	–	*	*	–	–	1.8	*	*
Sibiu	68.0	4.7	29.2	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	–	0.7	*	–	*	*	–	*	2.5	*	*
Somes	77.5	18.4	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	4.8	–	*	0.2	*	*	–	1.7	*	*
Tarnava Mare	44.8	11.8	38.7	*	*	*	*	0.1	0.1	–	0.7	–	–	*	*	–	–	2.6	*	*
Tarnava Mica	83.9	83.6	16.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	1.1	–	–	*	*	–	–	5.1	*	*
Trei Scaune	18.0	80.4	0.8	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	0.5	*	–	*	–	–	–	2.9	*	*
Turda	74.4	21.4	0.4	*	*	*	*	*	0.1	–	1.9	*	–	*	–	–	–	2.2	*	*
Banat	**54.4**	**19.4**	**23.7**	**0.2**	**0.6**	**4.3**	**1.1**	**1.5**	*	*	**1.2**	*	*	*	*	*	–	**1.9**	**0.7**	*
Caras	69.5	2.5	18.8	*	*	4.9	*	3.8	0.2	–	0.3	*	–	*	*	–	–	2.3	5.2	*
Severin	78.8	6.8	9.6	0.2	1.4	0.8	*	1.4	*	–	0.9	*	*	–	*	*	–	2.2	0.1	*
Timis Torontal	37.8	16.4	34.9	0.8	*	6.8	1.9	0.7	*	*	1.7	*	*	*	*	*	–	1.4	*	0.1
Crisana and Maramures	**40.7**	**23.1**	**4.8**	**0.3**	**1.7**	**0.2**	*	**1.7**	*	*	**4.4**	*	*	*	*	*	*	**1.1**	*	*
Arad	61.0	19.5	12.3	0.1	0.2	0.6	*	2.2	*	*	2.1	*	*	*	*	*	–	1.4	*	*
Bihor	61.6	30.0	0.4	*	*	*	*	2.2	*	*	4.3	*	*	*	*	–	*	1.3	*	*
Maramures	67.7	6.9	9.0	*	11.6	*	*	*	*	–	20.9	–	–	*	*	–	–	0.5	*	*
Satu Mare	80.5	16.3	3.2	0.4	1.0	*	*	0.2	*	–	2.1	*	–	*	*	–	–	1.2	*	*

*) *Less than 0.1.*

162
197

Table III—Population

Actual figures

COUNTY	TOTAL	Romanian	Hungarian	German	Russian	Ruthenian, Ukrainian	Serbian, Croat, Slovenian	Bulgarian	Czech, Slovakian
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
ROMANIA	**18,057,028**	**13,180,936**	**1,354,535**	**760,687**	**650,981**	**641,485**	**47,734**	**364,273**	**43,141**
Oltenia	**1,513,175**	**1,493,788**	**2,255**	**3,216**	**679**	**31**	**825**	**877**	**184**
Dolj	485,149	475,587	1,175	1,473	289	8	259	178	83
Gorj	206,339	205,209	153	145	136	2	80	28	19
Mehedinti	303,878	299,868	237	905	86	6	277	65	36
Romanati	271,096	269,013	224	151	47	3	99	64	15
Valcea	246,713	244,111	466	542	114	14	110	42	31
Muntenia	**4,029,088**	**3,884,679**	**32,906**	**21,817**	**10,195**	**587**	**2,938**	**3,424**	**1,177**
Arges	257,378	254,862	504	350	144	28	55	37	21
Braila	219,831	203,900	1,453	939	3,392	18	175	243	32
Buzau	309,405	306,467	457	252	132	26	118	63	23
Dambovita	309,676	304,056	656	346	162	18	368	133	30
Ialomita	293,352	289,490	419	124	482	12	106	150	13
Ilfov	999,562	913,653	24,486	15,769	4,828	354	1,113	2,195	791
Muscel	149,797	148,111	236	112	45	1	30	23	16
Olt	183,595	182,081	332	192	61	2	88	139	12
Prahova	477,750	464,644	3,473	3,378	637	88	504	182	184
Ramnicu Sarat	184,956	182,298	235	80	76	19	43	33	8
Teleorman	347,296	343,898	231	142	51	3	208	133	7
Vlasca	296,612	291,210	478	173	183	18	130	93	60
Dobrogea	**815,475**	**369,110**	**2,077**	**12,439**	**49,867**	**74**	**668**	**183,593**	**64**
Calacra	166,911	38,049	287	474	986	27	174	70,900	7
Constanta	253,093	171,611	1,400	9,548	4,886	25	170	22,167	41
Durostor	211,433	41,690	243	51	819	18	142	71,503	5
Tulcea	184,038	117,760	147	2,366	34,176	4	182	19,023	11
Moldova	**2,433,596**	**2,250,678**	**23,894**	**8,943**	**11,286**	**4,742**	**700**	**1,181**	**249**
Bacau	261,019	235,563	13,999	896	420	69	159	90	48
Baia	157,501	147,335	134	907	1,762	26	32	32	29
Botosani	218,258	196,565	249	667	990	2,330	21	54	13
Covurlui	210,006	186,943	2,027	1,423	3,258	98	174	404	32
Dorohoi	211,354	194,474	75	374	233	1,999	1	30	8
Falciu	115,055	110,676	28	115	134	2	14	32	1
Iasi	275,796	260,214	356	1,176	2,672	108	56	118	52
Neamt	198,223	185,559	1,612	1,191	425	35	23	36	40
Putna	194,105	185,014	2,149	347	280	25	99	107	8
Roman	151,550	144,728	462	442	332	31	31	103	7
Tecuci	156,405	149,467	2,277	183	119	4	36	66	2
Tutova	144,821	140,366	229	200	202	10	49	83	9
Vaslui	139,503	133,774	97	121	459	5	7	26	1
Basarabia	**2,864,402**	**1,998,573**	**747**	**80,568**	**370,112**	**331,183**	**189**	**164,551**	**356**
Balti	286,721	271,023	92	1,456	48,368	32,197	21	51	14
Cahul	196,693	100,777	6	8,630	16,120	680	6	28,175	227
Cetatea Alba	341,176	62,039	107	55,607	64,617	67,590	28	70,891	11
Hotin	392,430	130,959	65	270	47,235	176,940	1	18	7
Ismail	225,509	68,469	123	943	75,303	9,571	27	46,467	7
Lapusna	419,621	325,346	151	2,701	35,266	3,853	61	355	44
Orhei	279,292	245,132	65	119	9,778	4,055	4	49	5
Soroca	316,368	232,080	81	381	26,236	27,295	12	42	26
Tighina	306,592	162,739	57	10,463	47,189	9,202	29	18,503	15
Bucovina	**853,009**	**350,901**	**11,860**	**93,812**	**11,236**	**280,651**	**48**	**114**	**481**
Campulung	94,816	58,499	91	20,876	370	7,292	4	1	33
Cernauti	306,194	66,701	634	30,693	3,364	149,700	30	65	233
Radauti	160,778	83,906	10,281	20,125	3,332	31,315	1	10	62
Storojinet	169,894	48,979	48	10,759	2,989	85,715	6	9	110
Suceava	121,327	92,816	804	11,359	1,181	6,629	4	29	43

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

According to Mother Tongue

Actual figures

162
197

Polish	Yiddish	Greek	Albanian	Armenian	Turkish, Tartar	Gipsy	Others	Not declared	COUNTY
11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	1
38,268	**518,754**	**20,861**	**4,247**	**11,377**	**288,073**	**101,815**	**23,419**	**7,165**	*ROMANIA*
88	**601**	**482**	**93**	**146**	**568**	**8,506**	**1,245**	**100**	**Oltenia**
30	538	195	50	82	59	4,606	700	37	*Dolj*
5	36	16	1	–	4	435	65	5	*Gorj*
–	61	142	3	40	460	1,549	117	30	*Mehedinti*
9	35	104	2	15	31	1,210	72	2	*Romanesti*
44	131	25	37	9	14	706	291	26	*Valcea*
1,633	**19,842**	**5,701**	**1,636**	**4,684**	**2,988**	**22,806**	**8,436**	**1,314**	**Muntenia**
69	176	99	63	49	43	754	100	24	*Arges*
84	3,360	4,097	97	213	453	832	429	64	*Braila*
42	512	78	31	32	30	997	128	17	*Buzau*
36	235	160	64	2	28	3,210	146	26	*Dambovita*
8	184	223	113	18	102	1,822	49	17	*Ialomita*
1,017	13,592	3,468	1,061	4,060	1,133	5,247	5,860	935	*Ilfov*
7	18	25	10	3	10	947	178	25	*Muscel*
7	47	46	7	4	6	578	37	16	*Olt*
330	1,144	230	107	180	35	1,174	1,344	116	*Prahova*
13	427	47	10	18	21	1,604	21	3	*Rimnicu Sarat*
10	67	133	21	13	105	2,240	23	9	*Teleorman*
10	80	95	52	92	122	3,481	121	32	*Vlasca*
119	**1,816**	**7,744**	**494**	**4,904**	**183,018**	**5,620**	**2,581**	**287**	**Dobrogea**
9	217	824	21	980	50,525	3,213	157	59	*Calacra*
94	685	3,892	422	3,065	33,414	788	746	139	*Constanta*
2	216	154	24	690	94,134	1,229	442	71	*Durostor*
14	698	2,874	25	169	4,945	390	1,236	18	*Tulcea*
1,904	**109,654**	**2,835**	**132**	**355**	**635**	**13,598**	**2,306**	**805**	**Moldova**
219	7,910	59	16	55	18	1,224	238	36	*Bacau*
240	5,789	14	2	5	7	1,122	16	49	*Baia*
238	16,219	8	3	32	16	777	30	46	*Botosani*
167	11,099	2,313	35	457	253	352	856	115	*Covurlui*
87	13,837	11	1	15	16	121	28	44	*Dorohoi*
7	2,857	67	2	–	14	1,060	34	12	*Falciu*
411	27,384	78	23	120	85	1,760	703	320	*Iasi*
320	7,948	16	3	19	5	835	126	30	*Neamt*
86	4,577	140	20	82	32	997	112	30	*Putna*
100	4,170	3	21	49	53	942	36	31	*Roman*
20	1,899	66	3	4	35	2,184	32	10	*Tecuci*
45	2,025	70	3	13	78	1,386	46	8	*Tutova*
35	3,980	10	–	4	23	838	49	74	*Vaslui*
3,862	**201,278**	**972**	**1,765**	**448**	**101,356**	**6,520**	**596**	**1,326**	**Bessarabia**
1,159	31,200	31	–	36	13	985	15	60	*Balti*
30	4,354	274	–	10	36,683	805	5	131	*Cahul*
92	11,051	79	–	130	7,899	641	283	111	*Cetatea Alba*
585	35,936	2	–	1	22	263	15	111	*Hotin*
90	5,832	312	1,737	26	16,107	222	25	248	*Ismail*
1,012	48,148	203	26	196	99	1,570	203	387	*Lapusna*
151	19,017	18	–	16	9	792	21	63	*Orhei*
478	29,127	6	–	18	24	494	5	54	*Soroca*
265	16,633	47	2	15	40,500	748	24	161	*Tighina*
28,411	**74,298**	**13**	**2**	**99**	**75**	**232**	**141**	**648**	**Bucovina**
1,647	5,851	3	1	13	4	59	37	35	*Campulung*
13,959	40,102	9	1	41	54	51	74	483	*Cernauti*
2,207	9,421	–	–	5	8	54	10	39	*Radauti*
7,507	13,694	–	–	1	3	13	11	50	*Storojinet*
3,091	5,220	1	–	39	6	55	9	41	*Suceava*

162
197

Table III—Population

Continued

COUNTY	TOTAL	Romanian	Hungarians	German	Russian	Ruthenian, Ukrainian	Serbian, Croat, Slovenian	Bulgarian	Czech, Slovakian
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Transylvania	**3,217,988**	**1,873,691**	**997,653**	**346,587**	**3,337**	**1,272**	**484**	**820**	**8,946**
Alba	212,749	176,852	24,513	7,617	345	44	16	97	158
Brasov	168,125	85,519	46,798	33,592	308	104	54	76	239
Cluc	145,806	18,455	124,971	503	84	18	15	9	34
Cluj	334,991	206,559	109,165	2,964	487	260	48	170	394
Fagaras	86,039	69,685	5,049	10,828	94	3	7	9	9
Hunedoara	332,118	277,705	40,375	7,422	242	492	123	70	717
Mures	289,546	131,825	133,045	11,437	322	57	37	76	66
Nasaud	144,131	106,548	7,174	21,056	206	38	11	39	27
Odorhei	130,282	4,358	123,885	404	24	3	4	1	12
Salaj	343,347	191,144	125,544	8,706	229	112	24	17	5,771
Sibiu	194,619	125,686	9,325	57,215	561	28	69	101	104
Someu	219,355	172,607	34,710	478	147	65	8	52	30
Tarnava Mare	147,994	68,259	18,094	58,970	57	3	35	32	187
Tarnava Mica	149,482	83,506	36,461	24,026	48	5	8	45	107
Trei Scaune	136,122	16,748	117,868	625	125	33	19	23	64
Turda	183,282	137,697	40,676	744	38	7	6	3	147
Banat	**939,958**	**520,041**	**105,584**	**231,862**	**1,497**	**3,991**	**40,877**	**9,870**	**10,945**
Caras	200,929	142,315	5,113	28,622	106	36	10,371	165	5,102
Severin	239,586	187,021	17,048	24,689	459	3,410	1,768	109	2,727
Timis Torontal	499,443	190,705	83,423	177,751	932	455	27,938	9,596	3,116
Crisana and Maramures	**1,396,417**	**839,484**	**377,475**	**63,144**	**1,781**	**19,844**	**1,798**	**443**	**21,619**
Arad	423,649	259,884	96,756	30,005	384	654	1,638	125	10,883
Bihor	510,318	313,404	172,322	2,364	566	253	98	199	10,277
Maramures	161,575	92,611	14,285	3,189	65	17,794	7	22	59
Satu Mare	294,875	173,585	94,112	7,586	766	343	55	97	400

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

According to Mother Tongue

Continued

162
197

Polish	Yiddish	Greek	Albanian	Armenian	Turkish, Tartar	Gipsy	Others	Not declared	COUNTY
11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	1
1,752	**32,008**	**69**	**39**	**187**	**89**	**79,186**	**1,371**	**1,437**	**Transylvania**
16	1,751	1	4	6	7	1,190	69	43	*Alba*
62	615	35	–	14	8	230	187	284	*Brasov*
28	1,417	1	5	6	–	162	42	60	*Ciuc*
49	9,949	9	20	18	21	4,466	94	318	*Cluj*
4	58	1	–	2	1	269	4	16	*Fagaras*
943	2,268	–	5	2	7	1,049	585	113	*Hunedoara*
54	6,344	–	1	6	4	6,061	59	122	*Mures*
21	5,915	8	2	–	4	2,977	32	63	*Nasaud*
9	619	–	–	–	–	403	7	23	*Odorhei*
25	9,501	–	2	4	10	2,107	22	129	*Salaj*
93	691	6	6	7	12	512	113	95	*Sibiu*
13	9,709	–	9	119	11	1,357	16	24	*Someş*
141	511	–	5	2	3	1,629	34	32	*Turnaţe Mare*
18	932	–	–	4	1	4,270	15	38	*Turnaţe Mică*
30	175	8	–	–	–	293	56	55	*Trei Scaune*
216	1,557	–	–	2	–	2,131	36	22	*Turda*
171	**737**	**13**	**46**	**8**	**146**	**8,488**	**6,693**	**443**	**Banat**
80	53	4	–	–	12	2,733	6,143	74	*Caraş*
21	85	1	19	–	67	1,870	146	126	*Severin*
70	619	8	27	5	67	4,085	184	462	*Timiş Torontal*
245	**58,510**	**12**	**29**	**49**	**98**	**5,859**	**250**	**586**	**Crisana and Maramures**
88	1,002	8	8	47	33	1,895	107	132	*Arad*
91	7,497	4	5	–	38	2,894	97	209	*Bihor*
34	33,239	–	7	–	3	124	16	120	*Maramures*
32	16,772	–	–	2	24	946	30	125	*Satu Mare*

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

162
197

Table IV—Population

Percentages

COUNTY	TOTAL	Romanian	Hungarian	German	Russian	Ruthenian, Ukrainian	Serbian, Croat, Slovenian	Bulgarian	Czech, Slovakian	Polish	Yiddish	Greek	Albanian	Armenian	Turkish, Tartar	Gipsy (Romany)	Others	Not declared
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
ROMANIA	**100.0**	**73.9**	**5.6**	**4.2**	**2.5**	**3.6**	**0.3**	**2.0**	**0.2**	**0.2**	**2.9**	**0.1**	*	*	**1.6**	**0.6**	**0.1**	*
Oltenia	**100.0**	**98.7**	**0.1**	**0.2**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	**0.6**	*	*
Dolj	100.0	98.0	0.2	0.3	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.9	0.1	*
Gorj	100.0	98.5	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	0.8	*	*
Mehedinti	100.0	98.7	*	0.3	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	*	*	0.2	0.5	*	*
Romanati	100.0	98.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.4	*	*
Valcea	100.0	98.9	0.2	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.3	0.1	*
Muntenia	**100.0**	**96.4**	**0.8**	**0.5**	**0.3**	*	*	*	*	*	**0.5**	**0.2**	*	**0.1**	*	**0.6**	**0.2**	*
Arges	100.0	98.0	0.2	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.3	*	*
Braila	100.0	92.8	0.7	0.4	1.5	*	*	0.1	*	*	1.5	1.9	*	*	0.2	0.4	0.2	*
Buzau	100.0	99.1	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.2	*	*	*	*	0.3	*	*
Dambovita	100.0	98.2	0.2	0.1	*	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	1.0	*	*
Ialomita	100.0	98.7	0.1	*	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.6	*	*
Ilfov	100.0	91.4	2.4	1.6	0.5	*	0.1	0.2	*	0.1	1.4	0.5	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.5	0.6	*
Muscel	100.0	98.9	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.6	0.1	*
Olt	100.0	99.2	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.5	*	*
Prahova	100.0	97.3	0.7	0.7	0.1	*	0.1	*	*	*	0.2	*	*	*	*	0.8	0.3	*
Ramnicu Sarat	100.0	98.6	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.2	*	*	*	*	0.9	*	*
Teleorman	100.0	98.0	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.6	*	*
Vlasca	100.0	98.2	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	1.2	*	*
Dobrogea	**100.0**	**45.3**	**0.3**	**1.5**	**5.0**	*	*	**22.5**	*	*	**0.2**	**0.9**	*	**0.6**	**22.4**	**0.7**	**0.3**	*
Caliacra	100.0	22.8	0.2	0.3	0.0	*	0.1	48.5	*	*	0.1	0.5	*	0.6	30.5	1.9	*	*
Constanta	100.0	67.8	0.6	3.3	1.9	*	*	8.8	*	*	0.3	1.5	0.3	1.2	15.2	0.5	0.3	*
Durostor	100.0	19.7	0.1	*	0.4	*	*	53.8	*	*	0.1	*	*	0.3	44.5	0.6	0.2	*
Tulcea	100.0	64.0	*	1.3	18.6	*	*	10.3	*	*	0.4	1.6	*	*	2.7	0.2	0.7	*
Moldova	**100.0**	**92.5**	**1.0**	**0.3**	**0.5**	**0.2**	*	*	*	*	**4.5**	**0.1**	*	*	*	**0.6**	*	*
Bacau	100.0	90.2	5.4	0.3	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	3.0	*	*	*	*	0.5	*	*
Baia	100.0	98.5	*	0.6	1.1	*	*	*	*	0.2	3.7	*	*	*	*	0.7	*	*
Botosani	100.0	90.1	0.1	0.3	0.5	1.1	*	*	*	0.1	7.4	*	*	*	*	0.4	*	*
Covurlui	100.0	89.0	1.0	0.7	1.6	*	*	0.2	*	*	5.5	1.1	*	0.8	0.1	0.2	0.4	*
Dorohoi	100.0	98.0	*	0.2	0.1	0.9	*	*	*	*	6.5	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Falciu	100.0	96.2	*	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	2.5	*	*	–	*	0.9	*	*
Iasi	100.0	87.1	0.2	0.4	1.0	*	*	*	*	0.1	9.9	*	*	*	*	0.6	0.3	0.1
Neamt	100.0	95.6	0.3	0.6	0.9	*	*	*	*	0.2	4.0	*	*	*	*	0.4	*	*
Putna	100.0	95.3	1.1	0.2	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	2.4	*	*	*	*	0.5	*	*
Roman	100.0	95.5	0.3	0.3	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	2.8	*	*	*	*	0.6	*	*
Tecuci	100.0	95.6	1.5	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	1.2	*	*	*	*	1.4	*	*
Tutova	100.0	96.9	0.2	0.1	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	1.4	*	*	*	*	1.0	*	*
Vaslui	100.0	96.9	*	*	0.3	*	*	*	*	*	2.9	*	–	*	*	0.6	*	*
Bessarabia	**100.0**	**55.8**	*	**2.8**	**12.9**	**11.6**	*	**5.7**	*	**0.1**	**7.0**	*	*	*	**3.5**	**0.2**	*	*
Balti	100.0	70.1	*	0.4	12.5	8.3	*	*	*	0.3	8.1	*	–	*	*	0.3	*	*
Cahul	100.0	51.2	*	4.4	8.2	0.2	*	14.3	0.1	*	2.2	0.1	–	*	18.6	0.4	*	*
Cetatea Alba	100.0	18.2	*	16.3	18.9	19.8	*	20.5	*	*	5.2	*	–	*	2.5	0.3	*	*
Hotin	100.0	33.4	*	*	12.0	45.1	*	*	*	0.1	9.3	*	–	*	*	*	*	*
Ismail	100.0	30.4	*	0.4	33.4	4.2	*	20.6	*	*	2.6	0.1	0.2	*	7.1	*	*	0.1
Lapusna	100.0	77.5	*	0.8	8.4	0.9	*	*	*	0.2	11.5	*	*	*	*	0.4	*	*
Orhei	100.0	87.8	*	*	3.5	1.5	*	*	*	*	6.8	*	–	*	*	0.3	*	*
Soroca	100.0	72.4	*	0.1	8.3	8.6	*	*	*	0.2	9.2	*	–	*	*	0.2	*	*
Tighina	100.0	53.1	*	3.4	15.4	3.0	*	6.0	*	*	5.4	*	*	*	13.2	0.2	*	*
Bucovina	**100.0**	**41.1**	**1.4**	**11.0**	**1.3**	**32.9**	*	*	*	**3.3**	**8.7**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Campulung	100.0	61.7	*	22.0	0.4	7.7	*	*	*	1.7	6.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Cernauti	100.0	21.3	0.2	10.0	1.1	46.9	*	*	*	4.6	15.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.2
Radauti	100.0	52.6	0.4	12.5	2.1	19.5	*	*	*	1.4	5.9	–	–	*	*	*	*	*
Storojinet	100.0	23.2	*	6.3	1.2	50.5	*	*	*	4.4	8.1	–	–	*	*	*	*	*
Suceava	100.0	76.5	0.7	9.4	1.0	6.5	*	*	*	2.5	4.3	*	–	*	*	*	*	*

*. Less than 0.1.

162
197

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

According to Mother Tongue

Continued

COUNTY	TOTAL	Romanian	Hungarian	German	Russian	Ruthenian, Ukrainian	Serbian, Croat, Slovenian	Bulgarian	Czech, Slovakian	Polish	Yiddish	Greek	Albanian	Armenian	Turkish, Tartar	Gipsy (Romany)	Others	Not declared
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Transylvania	**100.0**	**58.2**	**31.6**	**7.7**	**0.1**	*	*	*	**0.2**	*	**1.6**	*	*	*	*	**0.9**	*	*
Alba	100.0	83.1	11.5	3.6	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	0.2	*	*	*	*	0.6	*	*
Brasov	100.0	60.9	27.8	10.0	0.2	*	*	*	0.1	*	0.4	*	–	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.2
Cluc	100.0	18.7	85.7	0.3	*	*	*	*	*	*	1.0	*	*	*	–	0.1	*	*
Cluj	100.0	61.7	33.6	0.9	0.1	*	*	*	0.1	*	3.0	*	*	*	*	1.3	*	*
Fagaras	100.0	81.0	5.9	12.6	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	0.2	*	*
Hunedoara	100.0	83.0	13.2	2.1	*	0.1	*	*	0.2	0.3	0.7	–	*	*	*	0.5	0.2	*
Mures	100.0	45.5	45.9	3.9	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	2.3	–	*	*	*	2.1	*	*
Nasaud	100.0	73.9	5.0	14.6	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	4.1	*	*	–	*	2.1	*	*
Odorhei	100.0	3.8	96.1	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.5	–	–	–	–	0.3	*	*
Salaj	100.0	56.7	36.6	2.5	*	*	*	*	1.7	*	2.2	–	*	*	*	0.6	*	*
Sibiu	100.0	64.8	4.8	29.4	0.3	*	*	*	*	*	0.4	*	*	*	*	0.3	*	*
Somes	100.0	78.7	13.8	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*	4.4	–	*	*	*	0.6	*	*
Tarnava Mare	100.0	46.1	19.2	32.2	*	*	*	*	0.1	*	0.3	–	*	*	*	1.1	*	*
Tarnava Mica	100.0	65.9	24.4	16.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.8	–	–	*	*	2.3	*	*
Trei Scaune	100.0	18.3	96.6	0.5	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.1	*	–	–	–	0.2	*	*
Turda	100.0	78.1	25.3	0.4	*	*	*	*	*	0.1	0.2	–	–	*	–	1.3	*	*
Banat	**100.0**	**55.3**	**11.2**	**34.6**	**0.2**	**0.4**	**4.3**	**1.1**	**1.3**	*	*	*	*	*	*	**0.9**	**0.7**	*
Caras	100.0	70.8	2.5	14.2	*	*	5.3	*	2.5	*	*	*	–	–	*	1.4	3.1	*
Severin	100.0	78.1	7.1	10.3	0.2	1.4	0.7	*	1.1	*	*	*	*	–	*	0.8	*	*
Timis Torontal	100.0	38.8	16.7	36.6	0.2	*	5.8	1.9	0.8	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	0.8	*	*
Crisana and Maramures	**100.0**	**60.4**	**27.1**	**4.5**	**0.1**	**1.4**	**0.1**	*	**1.6**	*	**4.2**	*	*	*	*	**0.4**	*	*
Arad	100.0	61.3	28.3	41.2	*	0.2	0.4	*	2.6	*	0.2	*	*	*	*	0.4	*	*
Bihor	100.0	61.4	33.3	0.5	0.1	*	*	*	2.0	*	1.5	*	*	–	*	0.6	*	*
Maramures	100.0	57.3	8.8	2.0	*	11.0	*	*	*	*	20.6	–	*	–	*	*	*	*
Satu Mare	100.0	58.9	31.9	2.6	0.3	0.1	*	*	0.1	*	5.7	–	–	*	*	0.3	*	*

*) Less than 0.1.

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

162
795

Actual figures

Table V—Population

COUNTY	TOTAL	Greek-Orthodox	Greek-Catholic	Roman-Catholic	Reformed, Calvinist	Protestant, Lutheran	Unitarian	Armenian-Gregorian
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
ROMANIA	**18,057,028**	**13,108,227**	**1,427,391**	**1,234,151**	**718,786**	**398,759**	**69,257**	**18,005**
Oltenia	**1,513,175**	**1,498,085**	**955**	**6,726**	**622**	**1,309**	**18**	**59**
Dolj	485,149	477,274	289	3,338	328	702	4	38
Gorj	206,339	205,610	85	385	35	60	—	—
Mehedinti	303,878	300,809	155	1,539	39	148	1	4
Romanati	271,096	270,124	129	337	72	70	8	5
Valcea	246,713	244,268	297	1,107	149	329	5	12
Muntenia	**4,829,008**	**3,826,478**	**17,379**	**80,528**	**10,257**	**16,998**	**614**	**3,214**
Arges	257,378	255,153	94	755	206	212	4	35
Braila	219,831	205,740	324	2,717	267	560	13	113
Buzau	309,405	305,969	311	748	156	135	41	25
Dambovita	309,676	306,361	372	1,045	191	248	18	4
Ialomita	293,352	291,205	183	377	182	86	7	6
Ilfov	999,562	844,743	13,166	36,997	7,557	12,409	390	2,838
Muscel	149,797	148,772	62	482	101	75	1	2
Olt	183,595	182,675	39	337	138	79	—	2
Prahova	477,750	458,570	2,545	5,959	1,143	2,964	125	125
Ramnicu Sarat	184,956	182,939	68	246	79	39	8	6
Teleorman	347,294	343,846	63	283	64	78	5	—
Vlasca	298,412	294,505	152	582	173	113	2	58
Dobrogea	**815,475**	**589,218**	**940**	**7,739**	**843**	**7,593**	**83**	**4,202**
Caliacra	166,911	117,356	61	333	151	269	21	761
Constanta	253,093	199,580	689	4,520	537	6,228	44	2,774
Durostor	211,433	114,254	95	124	101	42	16	479
Tulcea	184,038	157,829	95	2,762	54	1,054	2	188
Moldova	**2,452,596**	**2,145,683**	**2,423**	**199,953**	**1,482**	**2,919**	**122**	**974**
Bacau	261,019	197,862	523	67,139	270	310	14	178
Baia	157,501	146,294	189	1,497	11	179	—	6
Botosani	218,258	195,075	165	1,460	36	110	3	93
Covurlui	210,006	182,782	363	4,008	462	722	33	311
Dorohoi	211,354	195,267	53	579	18	94	1	4
Falciu	115,055	105,462	24	5,655	3	35	—	1
Iasi	275,796	226,188	239	6,335	110	433	29	94
Neamt	198,223	179,314	292	4,528	52	532	6	10
Putna	194,105	182,767	385	7,152	230	105	5	188
Roman	151,550	110,900	90	32,462	45	111	3	61
Tecuci	156,405	150,595	57	2,493	75	96	7	16
Tutova	144,821	139,735	35	373	78	139	18	3
Vaslui	139,503	133,442	8	272	17	53	1	3
Bessarabia	**2,864,482**	**2,509,048**	**983**	**13,507**	**727**	**74,870**	**23**	**1,236**
Balti	386,721	345,323	86	3,224	14	1,325	3	127
Cahul	190,693	181,135	1	166	—	8,530	—	15
Cetatea Alba	341,176	269,688	15	2,865	466	52,484	1	408
Hotin	392,430	341,412	81	1,282	4	114	—	4
Ismail	225,509	198,209	47	576	30	658	—	33
Lapusna	419,621	361,110	390	2,112	142	2,263	11	530
Orhei	279,292	257,739	131	353	17	69	3	45
Soroca	316,368	280,252	183	1,175	26	228	2	15
Tighina	306,592	274,180	49	1,754	28	9,199	3	30
Bucovina	**853,009**	**613,358**	**19,266**	**98,347**	**534**	**20,688**	**67**	**139**
Campulung	94,816	64,712	781	16,030	10	5,186	7	8
Cernauti	306,194	205,284	11,466	30,687	103	5,219	47	22
Radauti	160,778	113,503	2,098	26,037	410	4,249	1	8
Storojinet	189,894	132,736	3,271	15,389	5	1,976	10	1
Suceava	121,327	97,124	1,650	10,204	6	4,025	2	103

162
795

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

According to Religion

Actual figures

Armenian-Catholic	Lipovan	Adventist	Baptist	Mosaic	Mohammedan	Others	Atheists	Not declared	COUNTY
10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	1
1,440	57,288	16,102	60,562	756,930	185,486	7,436	6,404	6,686	*ROMANIA*
12	1	695	82	3,523	712	199	88	98	**Oltenia**
—	—	402	38	2,357	133	155	53	38	*Dolj*
—	—	41	—	106	7	1	8	1	*Gorj*
10	1	165	30	456	466	12	12	31	*Mehedinti*
—	—	45	10	197	52	11	14	3	*Romanati*
3	—	42	4	407	54	10	1	26	*Valcea*
74	2,159	5,396	1,187	94,216	3,198	637	1,567	1,141	**Muntenia**
5	—	45	1	671	113	46	15	23	*Arges*
13	1,825	300	107	7,259	462	22	21	88	*Braila*
—	1	230	11	1,697	54	9	1	17	*Buzau*
—	—	463	1	788	95	44	18	28	*Dambovita*
—	304	86	68	542	204	14	78	10	*Ialomita*
52	29	667	620	76,645	1,485	208	998	758	*Ilfov*
—	—	113	43	29	23	54	11	29	*Muscel*
—	—	81	9	195	15	1	2	22	*Olt*
4	—	811	168	4,743	117	130	216	130	*Prahova*
—	—	220	9	1,124	60	24	130	4	*Rimnicu Sarat*
—	—	2,048	104	255	400	77	65	6	*Teleorman*
—	—	332	16	268	165	8	12	26	*Vlasca*
28	17,945	561	1,234	4,831	180,488	197	78	294	**Dobrogea**
4	3	80	10	445	47,067	25	31	94	*Caliacra*
23	2,386	223	852	1,981	33,039	32	27	158	*Constanta*
—	317	249	5	401	95,289	17	12	32	*Durostor*
1	15,239	9	367	1,204	5,093	123	8	10	*Tulcea*
42	2,610	2,977	254	162,268	477	1,232	496	654	**Moldova**
3	—	284	3	14,305	22	9	66	31	*Bacau*
—	1,425	46	—	7,770	8	24	2	48	*Baia*
6	100	368	44	20,092	6	558	108	42	*Botosani*
19	42	166	69	20,617	301	17	80	114	*Covurlui*
—	13	188	81	14,874	12	112	15	48	*Dorohoi*
—	1	96	2	3,627	7	123	8	11	*Falciu*
6	594	211	31	41,120	103	63	48	188	*Iasi*
—	11	183	5	13,214	9	26	18	23	*Neamt*
7	—	81	18	7,054	43	8	30	32	*Putna*
1	146	75	—	7,464	25	136	4	27	*Roman*
—	—	74	—	2,955	9	17	—	11	*Tecuci*
—	8	127	1	4,184	33	58	27	7	*Tutova*
—	276	178	—	4,992	—	184	5	72	*Vaslui*
81	31,344	1,927	18,861	286,958	148	3,836	676	977	**Bessarabia**
38	1,963	92	2,205	31,916	7	343	8	47	*Balti*
—	950	90	1,230	4,444	4	101	—	27	*Cahul*
1	167	175	2,970	11,400	7	219	241	69	*Cetatea Alba*
1	3,809	1,233	7,321	36,132	20	718	224	75	*Hotin*
2	17,055	41	1,718	6,433	22	394	121	170	*Ismail*
22	689	101	698	50,603	60	472	62	336	*Lapusna*
7	781	—	395	19,566	8	117	—	61	*Orhei*
8	3,498	101	983	29,510	12	318	4	52	*Soroca*
2	2,432	94	1,341	16,954	7	354	16	140	*Tighina*
234	3,218	918	1,145	93,101	49	427	997	554	**Bucovina**
4	25	110	29	7,748	3	22	123	22	*Campulung*
121	37	564	227	51,681	35	70	241	390	*Cernauti*
3	2,055	68	261	11,578	7	119	329	52	*Radauti*
99	498	62	336	15,397	4	16	57	37	*Storojinet*
7	603	114	292	6,697	—	200	247	53	*Suceava*

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

162
795

Table V—Population

Continued

COUNTY	TOTAL	Greek-Orthodox	Greek-Catholic	Roman-Catholic	Reformed, Calvinist	Protestant, Lutheran	Unitarian	Armenian-Gregorian
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Transylvania	**3,217,988**	**892,176**	**1,991,527**	**613,724**	**497,861**	**264,766**	**67,832**	**91**
Alba	212,749	108,590	67,258	7,225	15,946	7,007	2,580	2
Brasov	168,125	82,040	4,042	16,681	42,765	46,675	2,324	9
Ciuc	145,806	1,879	20,072	118,533	1,947	257	85	15
Cluj	334,991	64,543	142,993	28,716	72,739	2,601	3,495	9
Fagaras	86,039	47,487	22,093	1,642	2,506	11,141	312	2
Hunedoara	332,118	213,235	61,386	30,318	15,086	3,328	1,559	5
Mures	289,546	41,919	93,897	35,037	87,713	11,319	7,651	5
Nasaud	144,131	19,960	86,746	3,371	5,153	22,331	35	—
Odorhei	130,282	4,777	1,443	45,035	48,759	1,002	26,882	—
Salaj	343,347	15,183	180,608	41,757	87,350	1,172	50	2
Sibiu	194,619	101,129	24,746	7,832	4,250	54,052	373	1
Someş	219,355	32,881	139,317	6,955	28,005	238	78	19
Tarnava Mare	147,994	54,169	15,369	6,696	9,186	58,005	2,934	13
Tarnava Mica	149,482	24,826	60,906	6,828	24,817	29,264	3,009	10
Trei Scaune	136,122	19,911	3,119	49,139	55,250	1,105	6,277	4
Turda	183,282	60,606	77,532	7,457	26,389	269	8,188	5
Banat	**939,950**	**527,293**	**33,672**	**321,436**	**20,937**	**13,980**	**149**	**33**
Caras	200,929	141,162	10,336	43,211	1,265	917	23	1
Severin	239,586	180,643	9,459	35,731	7,367	1,282	31	4
Timis Torontal	499,443	205,488	13,877	242,494	12,305	11,781	95	28
Crisana and Maramures	**1,390,417**	**511,887**	**258,246**	**212,691**	**177,522**	**15,649**	**349**	**57**
Arad	422,649	230,576	17,766	112,097	23,180	13,546	109	49
Bihor	510,318	253,942	54,438	52,899	107,269	1,531	162	3
Maramures	161,575	8,449	104,132	10,409	2,935	137	37	—
Satu Mare	294,875	12,880	173,910	37,286	44,138	455	41	5

162
795

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

According to Religion

Continued

Armenian-Catholic	Lipovan	Adventist	Baptist	Mosaic	Mohammedan	Others	Atheists	Not declared	COUNTY
10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	1
									Transylvania
965	—	2,933	10,296	81,563	135	798	1,329	1,652	*Alba*
2	—	16	630	3,101	12	21	123	36	*Braşov*
1	—	141	148	2,778	12	110	36	313	*Ciuc*
239	—	94	96	2,525	3	—	5	54	*Cluj*
39	—	475	1,178	17,655	35	41	118	354	*Cluj*
—	—	231	114	645	1	36	11	18	*Fagaraş*
1	—	193	1,888	4,829	13	88	77	112	*Hunedoara*
13	—	542	472	10,497	14	101	209	162	*Mureş*
2	—	29	30	6,375	5	5	20	69	*Năsăud*
1	—	180	607	1,404	—	16	123	33	*Odorhei*
4	—	46	7,881	17,754	10	141	252	137	*Solnoc*
—	—	67	405	1,237	20	35	84	97	*Sibiu*
539	—	111	427	10,619	5	13	68	78	*Someş*
—	—	213	200	1,104	3	23	32	57	*Turnu Mare*
119	—	394	469	1,705	2	36	58	39	*Turnu Roşu*
—	—	37	245	949	—	6	28	52	*Trei Scaune*
3	—	164	296	2,233	—	34	83	21	*Turda*
									Banat
—	8	143	6,779	14,945	193	183	453	665	*Caraş*
—	—	95	3,046	725	14	83	59	72	*Severin*
—	—	58	2,267	2,329	80	46	152	137	*Timiş Torontal*
—	8	70	1,457	10,987	99	54	242	456	
									Crisana and Maramures
4	3	1,457	20,773	97,287	91	725	1,010	681	*Arad*
2	3	436	9,017	10,021	41	215	436	135	*Bihor*
1	—	254	11,087	27,807	24	439	233	209	*Maramureş*
—	—	710	289	34,089	11	39	179	119	*Satu Mare*
1	—	32	380	25,370	15	12	162	188	

RACIAL ASPECTS OF ROMANIA'S CASE

162
795

Table VI—Population

Percentages

COUNTY	TOTAL	Greek-Orthodox	Greek-Catholic	Roman-Catholic	Reformed, Calvinist	Protestant, Lutheran	Unitarian	Armenian-Gregorian	Armenian-Catholic	Lipovan	Adventist	Baptist	Mosaic	Mohammedan	Other	Atheist	Not declared
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
ROMANIA	**100.0**	**72.6**	**7.9**	**6.8**	**3.9**	**2.2**	**0.4**	*	*	**0.3**	*	**0.3**	**4.2**	**1.9**	*	*	*
Oltenia	**100.0**	**99.0**	*	**0.4**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	**0.3**	*	*	*	*
Dolj	100.0	98.4	*	0.7	*	0.1	*	*	–	–	*	*	0.4	*	*	*	*
Gorj	100.0	99.3	*	0.3	*	*	–	–	–	–	*	–	*	*	*	*	*
Mehedinti	100.0	99.0	*	0.5	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.5	0.2	*	*	*
Romanati	100.0	99.6	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	–	–	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Valcea	100.0	99.0	0.1	0.4	*	0.1	*	*	*	–	*	*	0.3	*	*	*	*
Muntenia	**100.0**	**94.8**	**0.4**	**1.3**	**0.3**	**0.4**	*	*	*	*	**0.1**	*	**2.3**	*	*	*	*
Arges	100.0	99.1	*	0.5	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	0.3	*	*	*	*
Braila	100.0	95.5	0.1	1.8	0.1	0.3	*	*	*	0.3	0.1	*	3.3	0.3	*	*	*
Buzau	100.0	98.8	0.1	0.8	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	*	0.5	*	*	*	*
Dambovita	100.0	98.9	0.1	0.3	*	*	*	*	–	–	0.1	*	0.3	*	*	*	*
Ialomita	100.0	99.5	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	–	0.1	*	*	0.3	*	*	*	*
Ilfov	100.0	84.5	1.3	5.7	0.3	1.3	*	0.5	*	*	*	*	7.7	0.1	*	*	*
Muscel	100.0	99.3	*	0.3	*	*	*	*	–	–	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Olt	100.0	99.5	*	0.3	*	*	–	*	–	–	*	*	0.1	*	*	*	*
Prahova	100.0	98.0	0.5	1.3	0.3	0.6	*	*	*	–	0.3	*	1.0	*	*	*	*
Ramnicu Sarat	100.0	98.9	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	–	–	0.1	*	0.6	*	*	*	*
Teleorman	100.0	99.0	*	*	*	*	*	–	–	–	0.6	*	*	0.1	*	*	*
Vlasca	100.0	99.4	*	0.3	*	*	*	*	–	–	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*
Dobrogea	**100.0**	**72.3**	**0.1**	**0.9**	**0.1**	**0.9**	*	**0.5**	*	**2.2**	*	**0.2**	**0.5**	**22.1**	*	*	*
Caliacra	100.0	70.4	*	0.3	*	0.3	*	0.5	*	*	*	*	0.3	28.8	*	*	*
Constanta	100.0	73.9	0.3	1.8	0.3	1.5	*	1.1	*	0.9	–	0.3	0.8	18.1	*	*	*
Durostor	100.0	54.0	*	*	*	*	*	0.3	–	0.1	–	*	0.3	45.1	*	*	*
Tulcea	100.0	85.3	*	1.5	*	0.6	*	0.1	*	3.5	*	0.3	0.7	8.8	*	*	*
Moldova	**100.0**	**98.2**	*	**4.5**	*	**0.1**	*	*	*	**0.1**	*	*	**0.7**	*	*	*	*
Bacau	100.0	75.8	0.3	18.1	0.1	0.1	*	*	*	–	0.1	*	5.5	*	*	*	*
Baia	100.0	98.9	0.1	1.0	*	0.1	*	*	–	0.9	*	–	4.9	*	*	*	*
Botosani	100.0	89.4	*	0.7	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.3	*	9.3	*	0.3	*	*
Covurlui	100.0	87.0	0.3	1.9	0.3	0.3	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	9.3	*	*	*	*
Dorohoi	100.0	92.4	*	0.3	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	*	7.0	*	*	*	*
Falciu	100.0	91.7	*	4.9	*	*	–	*	–	*	*	*	3.3	0.1	*	*	*
Iasi	100.0	82.0	*	4.3	*	0.3	*	*	*	0.3	*	*	14.9	*	*	*	*
Neamt	100.0	90.8	0.1	2.3	*	0.3	*	*	–	*	*	*	6.7	*	*	*	*
Putna	100.0	94.3	0.3	1.6	0.1	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	3.6	*	*	*	*
Roman	100.0	75.3	*	21.4	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	4.9	*	*	*	*
Tecuci	100.0	96.3	*	1.8	*	*	*	*	–	–	*	*	1.9	*	*	–	*
Tutova	100.0	96.5	*	0.3	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	*	3.9	*	*	*	*
Vaslui	100.0	96.7	*	0.3	*	*	*	*	–	0.3	0.1	–	3.6	–	0.1	*	*
Bessarabia	**100.0**	**87.4**	*	**0.5**	*	**3.4**	*	*	*	**1.1**	*	**0.7**	**7.2**	*	**0.1**	*	*
Balti	100.0	89.3	*	0.4	*	0.3	*	*	*	0.3	*	0.6	8.5	*	*	*	*
Cahul	100.0	92.1	*	*	–	4.3	–	*	–	0.4	*	0.6	4.3	*	*	–	*
Cetatea Alba	100.0	79.0	*	0.8	0.1	16.4	*	0.1	*	*	*	0.9	3.3	*	*	*	*
Hotin	100.0	87.0	*	0.3	*	*	–	*	*	1.0	0.3	1.9	9.3	*	0.3	*	*
Ismail	100.0	87.9	*	0.5	*	0.3	–	*	*	7.6	*	0.3	3.9	*	0.3	*	*
Lapusna	100.0	90.1	*	0.3	*	0.4	*	0.1	*	0.3	*	0.3	10.1	*	0.1	*	*
Orhei	100.0	92.3	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	0.3	–	0.1	7.0	*	*	–	*
Soroca	100.0	88.6	*	0.4	*	*	*	*	*	1.1	*	0.3	9.5	*	0.1	*	*
Tighina	100.0	88.4	*	0.6	*	3.0	*	*	*	0.3	*	0.4	6.5	*	0.1	*	*

*: Less than 0.1.

162
795

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

According to Religion

Continued

COUNTY 1	TOTAL 2	Greek-Orthodox 3	Greek-Catholic 4	Roman-Catholic 5	Reformed, Calvinist 6	Protestant, Lutheran 7	Unitarian 8	Armenian-Gregorian 9	Armenian-Catholic 10	Lipovan 11	Adventist 12	Baptist 13	Mosaic 14	Mohammedan 15	Other 16	Atheists 17	Not declared 18
Bucovina	**100.0**	**71.9**	**2.5**	**11.5**	*	**2.4**	*	*	*	**0.4**	**0.1**	**0.1**	**10.9**	*	*	**0.1**	*
Campulung	100.0	68.8	0.8	16.9	*	1.5	*	*	*	*	0.1	*	9.8	*	*	0.1	*
Cernauti	100.0	67.0	3.7	10.0	*	1.7	*	*	*	*	0.2	*	16.5	*	*	*	0.1
Radauti	100.0	70.6	1.2	16.8	0.8	2.6	*	*	*	1.5	*	0.2	7.9	*	*	0.2	*
Storojinet	100.0	78.1	1.9	9.1	*	1.8	*	*	*	0.3	*	0.2	9.1	*	*	*	*
Suceava	100.0	80.1	1.4	8.4	*	3.2	*	*	*	0.5	*	0.2	5.5	–	0.5	0.5	*
Transylvania	**100.0**	**27.8**	**31.1**	**12.8**	**15.5**	**7.4**	**2.1**	*	*	–	*	**0.3**	**2.5**	*	*	*	*
Alba	100.0	51.9	31.6	3.4	7.5	3.3	1.5	*	*	–	*	0.4	1.5	*	*	*	*
Brasov	100.0	49.8	9.4	9.3	7.6	17.8	1.4	*	*	–	*	*	1.7	*	*	*	0.2
Cluj	100.0	7.3	15.8	61.3	1.8	0.9	*	*	0.2	–	*	*	1.7	*	–	*	*
Claj	100.0	19.3	48.7	8.8	21.7	0.8	1.0	*	*	–	0.1	0.4	5.3	*	*	*	0.1
Fagaras	100.0	56.8	25.7	1.9	9.9	12.9	0.4	*	–	–	0.2	0.1	0.5	*	*	*	*
Hunedoara	100.0	64.9	18.8	9.1	4.5	1.0	0.8	*	*	–	*	0.8	1.8	*	*	*	*
Mures	100.0	14.8	38.4	12.1	30.3	3.9	2.6	*	*	–	0.2	0.2	2.6	*	*	*	*
Nasaud	100.0	13.8	60.9	8.3	3.6	16.4	*	–	*	–	*	*	4.4	*	*	*	*
Odorhei	100.0	3.7	1.1	34.6	57.4	0.8	20.8	–	*	–	0.1	0.8	1.1	–	*	*	*
Salaj	100.0	4.4	58.6	18.9	8.4	0.3	*	*	*	–	*	0.8	4.0	*	*	*	*
Sibiu	100.0	58.0	18.7	4.0	8.3	17.3	0.2	*	–	–	*	0.3	0.8	*	*	*	*
Somes	100.0	15.0	63.6	8.9	17.8	0.1	*	0.3	–	–	*	0.3	4.8	*	*	*	*
Tarnava Mare	100.0	36.8	10.4	4.5	6.8	38.8	8.0	*	–	–	0.1	0.1	0.7	*	*	*	*
Tarnava Mica	100.0	16.6	40.7	4.0	16.0	16.8	3.5	*	*	–	0.3	0.3	1.1	*	*	*	*
Trei Scaune	100.0	14.8	8.9	36.1	40.0	0.8	4.0	*	–	–	*	0.8	0.7	–	*	*	*
Turda	100.0	38.1	48.3	4.1	14.4	0.1	4.4	*	*	–	*	0.2	1.8	–	*	*	*
Banat	**100.0**	**56.1**	**3.6**	**34.3**	**3.3**	**1.5**	*	*	–	*	*	**0.7**	**1.5**	*	*	*	*
Caras	100.0	70.3	6.1	21.5	0.8	0.5	*	*	–	–	*	1.5	0.4	*	*	*	*
Severin	100.0	78.4	5.9	14.9	3.1	0.5	*	*	–	–	*	0.2	1.0	*	*	*	*
Timis Torontal	100.0	41.3	3.8	48.8	3.5	2.4	*	*	–	*	*	0.3	1.8	*	*	*	*
Crisana and Maramures	**100.0**	**36.8**	**28.3**	**15.3**	**12.8**	**1.1**	*	*	*	*	**0.1**	**1.8**	**7.0**	*	*	*	*
Arad	100.0	56.8	4.8	30.5	5.4	3.8	*	*	*	*	0.1	3.1	8.4	*	*	0.1	*
Bihor	100.0	48.6	10.7	10.4	31.0	0.3	*	*	*	–	*	3.8	5.4	*	*	*	*
Maramures	100.0	5.5	64.4	8.4	1.8	*	*	–	–	–	0.4	0.3	21.1	*	*	0.1	*
Satu Mare	100.0	4.4	59.0	18.8	16.0	0.8	*	*	*	–	*	0.1	8.0	*	*	*	*

*) *Less than 0.1.*

RACIAL ASPECTS OF ROMANIA'S CASE

Table

CENSUS

Ethnical composition of the
of the Counties partly or

162

COUNTY CITY TOWNSHIP	TOTAL	Rumanians	Hungarians	Germans	Russians	Ukrainians	Yugoslavs	Bulgars	Czechs, Slovaks	Poles
1. BIHOR County Total	**510,310**	**314,199**	**152,942**	**2,280**	**496**	**493**	**131**	**211**	**11,163**	**131**
Percentages	*100.0*	*61.5*	*30.0*	*0.4*	–	–	–	–	*2.2*	–
A. Cities Total	**102,277**	**27,047**	**56,018**	**1,828**	**356**	**420**	**81**	**139**	**287**	**75**
Percentages	*100.0*	*26.4*	*54.8*	*2.0*	*0.3*	*0.4*	–	*0.1*	*0.3*	–
CITIES:										
Oradea	82,687	23,412	43,630	927	300	414	75	135	228	69
Beius	4,293	2,574	1,121	37	10	2	1	4	26	6
Salonta	15,297	2,061	12,267	54	46	9	5	16	33	–
B. Townships Total	**408,041**	**287,042**	**96,924**	**1,268**	**140**	**68**	**50**	**52**	**10,875**	**56**
Percentages	*100.0*	*70.4*	*23.8*	*0.3*	–	–	–	–	*2.7*	–
TOWNSHIPS:										
Aleud	43,146	34,326	3,434	67	17	10	3	1	3,866	2
Bedin	47,234	40,689	5,286	10	1	3	4	–	3	–
Bellu	20,135	19,181	588	25	1	1	1	–	3	–
Ceica	31,760	30,340	876	15	16	–	3	–	8	8
Centrala	49,538	27,730	20,291	450	22	41	9	43	56	8
Marghita	43,314	19,999	15,020	280	15	9	7	–	4,926	10
Salonta	29,811	21,231	7,447	26	8	1	3	3	579	–
Sacuieni	23,182	3,221	17,618	59	14	2	7	1	708	1
Salard	22,677	8,854	12,522	41	3	–	1	–	490	2
Tilangd	31,609	24,256	6,134	23	23	–	9	–	200	17
Tinca	35,326	27,508	6,675	21	12	1	–	–	19	2
Vascau	30,429	29,727	423	31	6	–	3	–	17	3
2. CIUC County Total	**145,806**	**38,976**	**120,637**	**439**	**99**	**16**	**19**	**10**	**84**	**50**
Percentages	*100.0*	*14.4*	*82.7*	*0.3*	–	–	–	–	–	–
A. Cities Total	**15,163**	**1,320**	**12,798**	**143**	**27**	**9**	**4**	**7**	**20**	**13**
Percentages	*100.0*	*8.1*	*85.8*	*0.9*	*0.2*	–	–	–	*0.1*	–
CITIES:										
Mercurea-Ciuc	4,807	598	3,796	71	9	3	1	3	–	7
Jigodin (Suburb)	1,195	90	1,093	1	4	–	–	–	–	1
Gheorghesi	10,355	632	8,912	71	18	4	3	4	20	5
B. Townships Total	**130,644**	**19,706**	**107,919**	**297**	**72**	**7**	**6**	**3**	**64**	**38**
Percentages	*100.0*	*15.1*	*82.6*	*0.2*	–	–	–	–	–	–
TOWNSHIPS:										
Centrala	32,947	766	31,820	57	11	1	2	–	7	12
Frumoasa	23,521	4,771	17,840	77	27	1	1	3	3	9
Gheorghesi	52,539	12,704	38,461	102	23	4	2	–	22	15
Sanmartin	21,637	1,498	19,798	61	11	1	1	–	2	2
3. CLUJ County Total	**334,991**	**204,139**	**100,739**	**2,788**	**453**	**284**	**69**	**165**	**544**	**98**
Percentages	*100.0*	*60.9*	*30.1*	*0.8*	*0.1*	–	–	–	*0.2*	–
A. Cities Total	**100,348**	**36,033**	**50,572**	**2,316**	**406**	**246**	**54**	**132**	**273**	**78**
Percentages	*100.0*	*35.9*	*47.8*	*2.4*	*0.4*	*0.2*	–	*0.1*	*0.3*	–
CITIES:										
Cluj	100,844	34,895	47,689	2,300	405	244	54	132	262	76
Huedin	5,401	1,137	2,883	16	1	2	–	–	11	2
B. Townships Total	**228,746**	**168,107**	**50,187**	**272**	**47**	**38**	**15**	**34**	**271**	**20**
Percentages	*100.0*	*73.5*	*21.9*	*0.1*	–	–	–	–	*0.1*	–
TOWNSHIPS:										
Borsa	30,516	16,867	2,933	9	3	–	–	1	1	–
Cluj	51,049	32,459	16,043	89	25	24	4	28	30	4
Gilau	26,978	17,828	8,133	19	2	1	1	4	1	–
Hida	29,574	24,757	3,042	19	2	2	1	–	71	1
Huedin	49,509	39,540	8,587	98	8	9	9	1	182	7
Mociu	27,409	18,854	7,253	12	2	–	–	–	3	–
Sarmasul	23,711	17,802	4,192	26	2	2	–	–	1	8
4. MARAMURES County Total	**161,575**	**93,207**	**11,174**	**3,239**	**73**	**19,220**	**10**	**26**	**73**	**55**
Percentages	*100.0*	*57.7*	*6.9*	*2.0*	–	*11.9*	–	–	–	–
A. Cities Total	**27,270**	**9,658**	**5,424**	**161**	**44**	**1,221**	**10**	**26**	**44**	**26**
Percentages	*100.0*	*35.4*	*19.9*	*0.6*	*0.2*	*4.5*	–	*0.1*	*0.2*	–
CITIES:										
Sighet	27,270	9,658	5,424	161	44	1,221	10	26	44	26
Iapa (Suburb)	2,136	3,651	8	–	7	1	–	–	–	–

*) The counties of Tarnava Mare and Tarnava Mica are not listed here, only a small part of their population (1,010 and 1,921 respectively) having been transferred to Hungary.

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

162

VII
OF 1930
urban and rural population
wholly ceded to Hungary.*

Hungarians	Jews	Greeks	Albanians	Armenians	Turks	Tatars	Gagauzes	Gypsies	Other races	Undeclared	COUNTY CITY TOWNSHIP
4	21,983	8	3	7	17	-	1	6,906	181	196	I. BIHOR County Total
-	4.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.3	-	-	*Percentages*
4	18,731	8	3	1	12	-	-	860	111	79	A. Cities Total
-	10.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.1	-	*Percentages*
											CITIES:
4	14,764	5	3	1	5	-	-	571	71	75	Oradea
-	461	5	-	-	2	-	-	-	39	-	Beiuș
-	505	-	-	-	5	-	-	289	1	4	Salonta
-	6,251	-	-	6	6	-	1	5,146	20	117	B. Townships Total
-	1.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.5	-	-	*Percentages*
											TOWNSHIPS:
-	947	-	-	1	-	-	-	463	3	4	Aleșd
-	153	-	-	-	-	-	-	474	6	5	Beiuș
-	133	-	-	-	-	-	-	202	-	-	Belin
-	262	-	-	-	-	-	-	231	-	-	Oșorhei
-	371	-	-	-	1	-	-	300	2	12	Centrale
-	2,233	-	-	4	-	-	-	787	1	23	Marghita
-	88	-	-	-	2	-	-	416	-	5	Salonta
-	892	-	-	-	2	-	-	619	1	37	Secuieni
-	278	-	-	-	-	-	-	269	-	7	Salard
-	425	-	-	-	-	-	1	583	-	18	Tileagd
-	346	-	-	-	-	-	-	736	6	-	Tinca
-	123	-	-	1	-	-	-	68	1	4	Vascau
-	3,383	2	1	94	-	-	-	933	56	57	2. CIUC County Total
-	1.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	-	-	*Percentages*
-	846	1	1	37	-	-	-	89	7	22	A. Cities Total
-	5.0	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	0.0	-	0.1	*Percentages*
											CITIES:
-	253	-	-	17	-	-	-	27	3	17	Mercurea-Ciuc
-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	Egerdin (Suburb)
-	393	1	1	20	-	-	-	62	4	5	Gheorghenî
-	1,537	1	-	57	-	-	-	844	46	35	B. Townships Total
-	1.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	-	-	*Percentages*
											TOWNSHIPS:
-	102	-	-	-	-	-	-	159	9	1	Centrale
-	503	-	-	30	-	-	-	210	4	18	Frumoasa
-	771	1	-	3	-	-	-	400	10	16	Gheorghenî
-	161	-	-	2	-	-	-	75	23	-	Sanmartin
-	17,162	15	6	186	34	-	2	7,869	119	207	3. CLUJ County Total
-	6.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.8	-	-	*Percentages*
-	14,088	14	6	104	21	-	-	1,371	97	243	A. Cities Total
-	13.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.3	-	0.2	*Percentages*
											CITIES:
-	13,062	13	6	102	21	-	-	1,043	97	243	Cluj
-	1,018	1	-	2	-	-	-	328	-	-	Huedin
-	3,083	1	-	82	8	-	2	6,498	22	44	B. Townships Total
-	1.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.8	-	-	*Percentages*
											TOWNSHIPS:
-	349	1	-	22	3	-	-	427	-	-	Borsa
-	424	-	-	4	-	-	2	1,861	11	34	Cluj
-	236	-	-	5	-	-	-	725	-	3	Gilau
-	646	-	-	4	-	-	-	1,026	-	3	Hida
-	618	-	-	1	-	-	-	443	6	-	Huedin
-	607	-	-	10	-	-	-	864	9	4	Mocîu
-	488	-	-	36	-	-	-	1,152	2	-	Sermasel
-	33,828	-	-	7	10	-	-	485	26	122	4. MARAMURES County Total
-	10.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	-	*Percentages*
-	10,526	-	-	5	9	-	-	58	8	40	A. Cities Total
-	30.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	0.1	*Percentages*
											CITIES:
-	10,526	-	-	5	9	-	-	58	8	40	Sighet
-	462	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		7	Iapa (Suburb)

162

Table

Ethnical composition of the
of the Counties partly or

COUNTY CITY TOWNSHIP	TOTAL	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
B. Townships Total	134,305	83,549	5,730	3,078	20	18,099	-	-	29	20
Percentages	*100.0*	*62.2*	*4.3*	*2.3*	-	*13.4*	-	-	-	-
TOWNSHIPS:										
Ise	16,921	31,539	66	20	6	19	-	-	-	3
Sighet	43,706	23,742	4,307	133	12	6,681	-	-	23	11
Vişeu	53,678	26,268	1,148	2,906	11	11,399	-	-	6	15
5. MUREŞ County Total	209,546	132,719	128,317	11,281	234	76	50	79	93	90
Percentages	*100.0*	*63.3*	*60.6*	*5.3*	*0.1*	-	-	-	-	-
A. Cities Total	47,887	11,607	20,957	2,804	199	56	18	73	39	53
Percentages	*100.0*	*24.3*	*54.8*	*6.0*	*0.4*	*0.1*	-	*0.8*	-	-
CITIES:										
Targu-Mureş	38,517	9,795	22,387	632	181	55	16	70	36	9
Reghin	9,390	1,812	3,570	2,222	8	1	-	2	3	3
B. Townships Total	261,799	121,112	97,360	8,439	145	20	32	7	54	87
Percentages	*100.0*	*50.1*	*40.5*	*3.5*	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOWNSHIPS:										
Band	21,173	14,090	5,292	13	1	-	1	-	2	-
Mercurea	32,799	2,440	28,630	23	3	-	1	-	15	3
Miereşa	51,265	16,857	31,645	91	10	2	4	6	12	11
Reciu	18,706	13,952	3,853	17	4	-	-	-	1	-
Reghin	71,114	43,378	18,419	4,090	13	3	13	-	4	18
Toaca	23,877	15,350	2,730	3,000	2	-	1	-	-	-
Topliţa	23,866	14,427	7,082	286	108	15	12	1	30	55
6. NASAUD County Total	146,131	105,010	7,476	20,793	218	54	18	39	53	86
Percentages	*100.0*	*71.8*	*5.2*	*14.4*	*0.2*	-	-	-	-	-
A. Cities Total	17,640	8,535	1,661	4,546	149	39	11	38	20	8
Percentages	*100.0*	*48.4*	*9.5*	*25.8*	*0.8*	*0.2*	-	*0.2*	*0.1*	-
CITIES:										
Bistriţa	14,128	5,666	1,563	4,461	146	38	11	38	21	8
Năsăud	3,512	2,869	98	85	3	1	-	-	4	-
B. Townships Total	126,491	96,475	6,015	16,341	69	15	7	1	38	78
Percentages	*100.0*	*76.7*	*4.8*	*13.0*	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOWNSHIPS:										
Bargau	31,060	20,487	792	6,850	21	3	1	1	8	20
Năsăud	32,596	27,888	1,068	1,922	26	-	-	-	5	-
Rodna	28,584	25,495	1,179	177	18	12	4	-	15	18
Sieu	34,242	20,605	3,476	7,292	4	-	2	-	-	-
7. ODORHEI County Total	130,383	6,382	119,388	664	27	3	5	1	10	27
Percentages	*100.0*	*4.9*	*91.6*	*0.4*	-	-	-	-	-	-
A. Cities Total	8,518	962	6,928	172	10	3	-	1	7	9
Percentages	*100.0*	*11.3*	*81.3*	*2.0*	*0.1*	-	-	-	-	*0.1*
CITY:										
Odorhei	8,518	962	6,928	172	10	3	-	1	7	9
B. Townships Total	121,764	5,420	112,487	492	17	-	5	-	11	18
Percentages	*100.0*	*4.5*	*92.4*	*0.5*	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOWNSHIPS:										
Cristur	30,692	2,317	27,019	107	5	-	1	-	9	-
Ocland	25,316	1,704	22,860	112	1	-	2	-	1	9
Odorhei	37,361	125	36,666	51	8	-	2	-	-	5
Praid	28,615	1,274	25,912	22	3	-	-	-	1	4
8. SALAJ County Total	343,347	192,921	107,663	16,019	328	774	42	17	5,991	89
Percentages	*100.0*	*56.2*	*31.4*	*4.7*	-	*0.2*	-	-	*1.7*	-
A. Cities Total	31,830	10,050	10,488	1,798	89	363	13	12	78	28
Percentages	*100.0*	*31.6*	*33.1*	*5.6*	*0.3*	*1.1*	-	-	*0.2*	-
CITIES:										
Zalau	8,340	2,115	5,614	90	7	16	2	9	18	0
Carei	16,041	5,683	3,637	1,719	80	345	10	1	43	21
Simleul-Silvaniei	7,448	2,340	3,434	19	2	2	1	2	17	1

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

162

VII, Continued

urban and rural population wholly ceded to Hungary.

Rumanian	Jews	Gypsies	Albanians	Armenians	Turks	Tatars	Cossacks	Gypsies	Other races	Undefined	COUNTY CITY TOWNSHIP
-	38,063	-	-	3	1	-	-	427	18	83	B. Townships Total
-	17.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	-	Percentages
											TOWNSHIPS:
-	3,094	-	-	-	-	-	-	179	6	30	Ion
-	6,360	-	-	1	-	-	-	180	10	37	Sighet
-	11,509	-	-	2	-	-	-	127	2	25	Vişeu
-	9,809	3	3	44	4	-	-	11,366	73	105	5. MUREŞ County Total
-	9.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.5	-	-	Percentages
-	6,386	3	3	37	3	-	-	993	37	42	A. Cities Total
-	10.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.1	-	-	Percentages
											CITIES:
-	4,828	2	3	36	3	-	-	480	30	40	Târgu-Mureş
-	1,558	1	-	1	-	-	-	103	7	2	Reghin
-	3,373	-	-	37	1	-	-	10,373	36	61	B. Townships Total
-	1.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.4	-	-	Percentages
											TOWNSHIPS:
-	168	-	-	1	-	-	-	1,098	1	4	Band
-	381	-	-	6	-	-	-	1,193	-	1	Mercurea
-	370	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,533	1	1	Miercurea
-	141	-	-	-	-	-	-	707	1	20	Sacu
-	938	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,596	13	16	Reghin
-	212	-	-	1	-	-	-	1,278	2	1	Tuşa
-	1,468	-	-	9	1	-	-	375	18	8	Topliţa
-	6,509	7	-	87	6	-	-	5,090	44	46	6. NASAUD County Total
-	4.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.1	-	-	Percentages
-	2,996	6	-	8	6	-	-	163	24	28	A. Cities Total
-	14.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	0.1	0.5	Percentages
											CITIES:
-	2,177	6	-	8	6	-	-	131	20	28	Bistriţa
-	419	-	-	-	-	-	-	31	4	-	Nasaud
-	3,743	1	-	79	-	-	-	5,731	20	30	B. Townships Total
-	9.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.4	-	-	Percentages
											TOWNSHIPS:
-	888	1	-	3	-	-	-	3,466	6	13	Bargau
-	1,198	-	-	1	-	-	-	482	1	3	Năsăud
-	236	-	-	14	-	-	-	768	13	3	Rodna
-	813	-	-	11	-	-	-	2,013	-	14	Sieu
-	1,289	-	-	5	-	-	-	2,632	31	20	7. ODORHEI County Total
-	1.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	-	-	Percentages
-	289	-	-	3	-	-	-	123	6	13	A. Cities Total
-	9.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.4	-	0.1	Percentages
											CITY:
-	283	-	-	3	-	-	-	122	6	13	Odorhei
-	1,000	-	-	3	-	-	-	2,510	15	11	B. Townships Total
-	0.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.1	-	-	Percentages
											TOWNSHIPS:
-	421	-	-	-	-	-	-	610	-	3	Cristur
-	15	-	-	1	-	-	-	557	13	1	Orlenci
-	86	-	-	1	-	-	-	398	1	-	Odorhei
-	466	-	-	-	-	-	-	945	1	7	Praid
-	13,590	3	-	91	10	-	-	6,100	26	120	8. SALAJ County Total
-	5.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.8	-	-	Percentages
-	4,264	3	-	15	3	-	-	861	13	61	A. Cities Total
-	19.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.1	-	0.5	Percentages
											CITIES:
-	411	-	-	-	-	-	-	86	1	10	Zalau
-	2,329	3	-	4	2	-	-	186	10	41	Cavi
-	1,526	-	-	11	-	-	-	90	2		Simleul-Silvaniei

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

162

Table

Ethnical composition of the of the Counties partly or

COUNTY CITY TOWNSHIP	TOTAL	Romanians	Hungarians	Germans	Russians	Ukrainians	Yugoslavs	Bulgars	Czechs, Slovaks	Poles
B. Townships Total	**311,517**	**182,763**	**92,977**	**14,222**	**239**	**411**	**29**	**5**	**5,823**	**36**
Percentages	*100.0*	*58.7*	*29.8*	*4.6*	-	*0.1*	-	-	*1.9*	-
TOWNSHIPS:										
Carei	37,367	13,826	9,519	12,364	35	75	14	2	30	12
Cehul-Silvaniei	44,333	30,098	11,389	669	21	-	2	1	11	6
Crasna	30,009	22,470	5,945	5	-	-	-	1	253	-
Jibou	37,535	32,974	2,613	38	8	1	3	-	4	3
Simleul-Silvaniei	44,870	22,627	15,425	42	1	1	-	-	4,876	1
Tasnad	44,388	24,209	16,140	728	149	10	5	-	464	5
Valea-Lui-Mihai	31,487	9,685	18,887	154	21	320	3	1	11	6
Zalau	41,528	26,874	13,059	22	4	4	2	-	174	3
9. SATU MARE County Total	**294,875**	**178,523**	**74,191**	**9,530**	**1,149**	**3,020**	**61**	**84**	**555**	**85**
Percentages	*100.0*	*60.5*	*25.2*	*3.2*	*0.4*	*1.0*	-	-	*0.2*	-
A. Cities Total	**69,526**	**24,314**	**29,139**	**1,190**	**286**	**496**	**26**	**81**	**131**	**64**
Percentages	*100.0*	*35.0*	*41.9*	*1.6*	*0.4*	*0.7*	-	*0.1*	*0.2*	-
CITIES:										
Satu-Mare	51,495	16,251	21,916	939	269	488	34	80	65	54
Baia-Mare	13,904	6,622	4,927	153	13	6	2	1	65	11
Baia-Sprie	4,127	1,441	2,296	8	4	2	-	-	1	1
B. Townships Total	**225,349**	**154,209**	**45,052**	**8,430**	**863**	**2,524**	**25**	**3**	**424**	**19**
Percentages	*100.0*	*68.4*	*20.0*	*3.7*	*0.4*	*1.1*	-	-	*0.2*	-
TOWNSHIPS:										
Arad	29,488	16,875	4,666	6,568	15	21	1	-	11	-
Baia-Mare	35,028	29,973	4,138	34	4	9	6	-	4	1
Marmaturu	15,895	15,048	101	10	1	1	-	-	-	-
Oasiu	28,276	21,509	3,968	21	34	42	2	-	370	3
Satu-Mare	40,860	17,137	19,887	95	282	1,577	10	-	29	3
Seini	25,901	19,453	4,238	547	14	7	2	-	2	3
Somcuta-Mare	25,205	22,138	1,255	31	10	-	1	-	1	1
Ulocea	24,696	12,076	6,799	1,124	503	867	3	3	7	2
10. SOMES County Total	**219,355**	**169,942**	**33,870**	**351**	**145**	**93**	**10**	**58**	**53**	**26**
Percentages	*100.0*	*77.5*	*15.4*	*0.2*	-	-	-	-	-	-
A. Cities Total	**21,718**	**8,979**	**7,171**	**197**	**110**	**91**	**5**	**54**	**28**	**13**
Percentages	*100.0*	*41.3*	*33.0*	*0.9*	*0.5*	*0.4*	-	*0.2*	*0.1*	-
CITIES:										
Dej	13,110	5,965	5,234	131	64	89	1	47	19	11
Gherla	6,608	3,014	1,937	66	45	2	4	7	6	2
B. Townships Total	**197,637**	**160,963**	**26,699**	**154**	**35**	**2**	**5**	**4**	**25**	**13**
Percentages	*100.0*	*81.4*	*13.5*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOWNSHIPS:										
Beclean	37,913	27,235	8,193	46	18	1	1	-	2	3
Dej	53,007	43,230	6,821	37	4	-	3	2	5	3
Garbou	14,335	13,091	157	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Gherla	38,674	28,923	8,527	4	5	1	1	2	5	-
Ileanda	25,371	23,988	250	11	5	-	1	-	4	3
Lapus	28,337	23,896	2,751	55	2	-	-	-	12	4
11. TREI SCAUNI County Total	**136,122**	**21,759**	**109,281**	**781**	**102**	**73**	**33**	**25**	**119**	**50**
Percentages	*100.0*	*16.0*	*80.4*	*0.6*	-	-	-	-	-	-
A. Cities Total	**15,925**	**2,444**	**12,456**	**260**	**22**	**61**	**5**	**19**	**21**	**11**
Percentages	*100.0*	*15.3*	*78.2*	*1.6*	*0.1*	*0.4*	-	*0.1*	*0.1*	-
CITIES:										
Sf. Gheorghe	10,818	2,181	7,826	203	18	61	4	18	17	6
Targul Secuesc	5,107	263	4,630	57	4	-	1	1	4	5
B. Townships Total	**120,197**	**19,315**	**96,825**	**521**	**80**	**12**	**28**	**6**	**98**	**39**
Percentages	*100.0*	*16.1*	*80.6*	*0.4*	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOWNSHIPS:										
Baraolt	16,210	2,260	13,038	105	12	2	-	-	13	2
Covasna	33,985	5,403	27,587	131	51	5	17	-	57	22
Sf. Gheorghe	35,077	8,178	25,377	245	11	4	10	6	26	1
Tg. Secuesc	34,925	3,474	30,923	40	6	1	1	-	2	14

1620

VII, Continued

urban and rural population wholly ceded to Hungary.

Hutsans	Jews	Greeks	Albanians	Armenians	Turks	Tatars	Gagauzi	Gipsies	Other races	Undeclared	COUNTY CITY TOWNSHIP
-	9,114	-	-	76	8	-	-	5,739	13	62	**B. Townships Total**
-	*8.8*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*1.8*	-	-	*Percentages*
											TOWNSHIPS:
-	521	-	-	-	4	-	-	746	1	18	Carei
-	1,502	-	-	5	-	-	-	631	1	7	Cehul-Silvaniei
-	786	-	-	27	-	-	-	521	-	1	Crasna
-	1,259	-	-	35	-	-	-	579	6	12	Jibou
-	838	-	-	1	-	-	-	1,048	-	10	Simleul-Silvaniei
-	1,600	-	-	3	-	-	-	1,067	3	5	Tasnad
-	1,902	-	-	-	4	-	-	488	2	3	Valea-Lui-Mihai
-	706	-	-	5	-	-	-	669	-	6	Zalau
-	23,967	2	-	7	11	-	-	3,321	43	126	**9. SATU MARE County Total**
-	*8.1*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*1.8*	-	-	*Percentages*
-	12,953	2	-	7	4	-	-	829	32	50	**A. Cities Total**
-	*18.0*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*1.8*	-	-	*Percentages*
											CITIES:
-	10,693	2	-	5	4	-	-	642	24	29	Satu-Mare
-	1,952	-	-	2	-	-	-	127	6	17	Baia-Mare
-	308	-	-	-	-	-	-	60	2	4	Baia-Sprie
-	11,014	-	-	-	7	-	-	2,492	11	76	**B. Townships Total**
-	*4.9*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*1.8*	-	-	*Percentages*
											TOWNSHIPS:
-	616	-	-	-	-	-	-	703	-	12	Ardeu
-	668	-	-	-	-	-	-	185	6	-	Baia-Mare
-	621	-	-	-	-	-	-	109	1	3	Manastur
-	2,188	-	-	-	-	-	-	156	1	-	Oasiu
-	1,311	-	-	-	1	-	-	495	2	29	Satu-Mare
-	1,411	-	-	-	-	-	-	211	-	11	Seini
-	1,336	-	-	-	-	-	-	425	1	6	Somcuta-Mare
-	2,883	-	-	-	6	-	-	608	-	15	Ugocsa
-	10,546	-	7	434	1	2	-	3,767	19	41	**10. SOMES County Total**
-	*4.8*	-	-	*0.8*	-	-	-	*1.7*	-	-	*Percentages*
-	4,365	-	-	271	-	2	-	305	11	12	**A. Cities Total**
-	*10.1*	-	-	*1.7*	-	-	-	*1.4*	-	-	*Percentages*
											CITIES:
-	3,346	-	6	5	-	2	-	178	3	9	Dej
-	1,019	-	1	366	-	-	-	127	8	3	Gherla
-	6,181	-	-	53	1	-	-	3,463	8	29	**B. Townships Total**
-	*5.1*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*1.8*	-	-	*Percentages*
											TOWNSHIPS:
-	1,554	-	-	4	-	-	-	850	-	6	Beclean
-	1,685	-	-	12	-	-	-	1,197	1	7	Dej
-	318	-	-	2	-	-	-	165	-	-	Garbou
-	617	-	-	17	-	-	-	563	-	10	Gherla
-	791	-	-	3	1	-	-	307	7	-	Ilenda
-	1,216	-	-	15	-	-	-	380	-	6	Lapus
-	714	15	-	11	-	-	-	2,929	71	89	**11. TREI SCAUNE County Total**
-	*0.8*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*2.3*	-	-	*Percentages*
-	271	-	-	8	-	-	-	232	7	18	**A. Cities Total**
-	*8.5*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*1.4*	-	*0.1*	*Percentages*
											CITIES:
-	281	-	-	1	-	-	-	187	6	9	Sf. Gheorghe
-	90	-	-	7	-	-	-	35	1	9	Targul Secuesc
-	443	15	-	3	-	-	-	2,797	64	41	**B. Townships Total**
-	*0.5*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*2.3*	-	-	*Percentages*
											TOWNSHIPS:
-	50	1	-	-	-	-	-	724	-	3	Baraolt
-	159	3	-	3	-	-	-	522	21	4	Covasna
-	76	6	-	-	-	-	-	1,070	40	27	Sf. Gheorghe
-	58	5	-	-	-	-	-	391	3	7	Tg. Secuesc

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

162

Table VIII
Ethnical Composition of the County Population of Transylvania, the Banat and Crisana-Maramures

The 1910 Hungarian Census and the 1930 Romanian Census Compared

	Census	Total	Romanians	Hungarians	Germans	Jews	Others
Transylvania							
Alba	1910	221,618	171,483	35,262	7,269	3,845	3,759
	1930	212,749	173,401	24,028	7,583	2,995	4,742
Brasov	1910	101,199	35,091	33,869	29,542	1,503	1,194
	1930	168,125	83,948	44,761	33,348	2,438	3,630
Ciuc	1910	145,720	18,032	123,531	1,080	2,357	720
	1930	145,806	20,976	120,627	439	2,383	1,381
Cluj	1910	290,547	164,997	98,944	8,387	12,581	5,638
	1930	334,991	204,139	100,759	2,788	17,163	10,142
Fagaras	1910	95,174	84,436	5,561	3,236	905	1,036
	1930	86,039	67,375	4,768	10,750	442	2,704
Hunedoara	1910	340,125	271,675	47,041	8,101	5,679	7,629
	1930	332,118	272,283	37,584	8,282	4,662	9,307
Mures	1910	219,589	71,909	126,616	8,312	7,550	5,202
	1930	289,546	132,719	123,317	11,283	9,959	12,268
Nasaud	1910	127,843	87,564	3,483	25,609	7,254	3,933
	1930	144,131	103,010	7,476	20,785	6,339	6,521
Odorhei	1910	124,173	2,840	117,145	2,202	1,313	673
	1930	130,282	6,382	119,385	464	1,289	2,762
Salaj	1910	230,140	136,087	77,463	816	9,849	5,925
	1930	343,347	192,821	107,662	16,010	13,380	13,474
Sibiu	1910	176,921	113,672	8,594	49,757	1,365	3,333
	1930	194,619	120,738	9,085	56,999	1,400	6,397
Somes	1910	248,076	185,725	44,000	6,901	7,995	3,455
	1930	219,355	169,942	33,870	351	10,546	4,646
Tarnava Mare	1910	148,826	60,381	17,385	62,224	1,089	7,747
	1930	147,994	66,307	17,419	58,810	1,061	4,397
Tarnava Mica	1910	116,091	55,585	33,136	20,272	1,766	5,332
	1930	149,482	80,604	35,306	24,011	1,631	7,930
Trei Scaune	1910	148,080	22,963	122,296	617	1,222	982
	1930	136,122	21,759	109,381	781	714	3,487
Turda	1910	174,375	125,668	41,982	576	2,648	3,501
	1930	183,282	136,315	39,214	742	2,224	4,787
Total	1910	2,908,497	1,608,108	936,308	234,901	69,121	60,059
	1930	3,217,988	1,852,719	934,642	253,426	78,626	98,575
Banat							
Caras Severin	1910	466,484	336,278	28,669	55,915	4,795	40,827
	1930	440,515	323,063	20,870	48,772	2,763	45,047
Timis Torontal	1910	511,016	174,349	76,128	194,965	8,638	56,936
	1930	499,443	180,020	76,969	174,395	8,485	59,574
Total	1910	977,500	510,627	104,797	250,880	13,433	97,763
	1930	939,958	503,083	97,839	223,167	11,248	104,621
Crisana-Maramures							
Arad	1910	418,320	247,635	111,317	31,995	10,102	17,271
	1930	423,649	258,239	82,488	52,202	9,048	21,672
Bihor	1910	485,903	253,652	184,658	3,458	32,462	11,673
	1930	510,318	314,109	152,942	2,288	21,982	18,997
Maramures	1910	150,468	73,457	20,666	7,839	28,311	20,195
	1930	161,575	93,207	11,174	3,239	33,828	20,127
Satu Mare	1910	307,834	128,241	141,103	7,238	29,468	1,784
	1930	294,875	178,523	74,191	9,530	23,967	8,664
Total	1910	1,362,525	702,985	457,744	50,530	100,343	50,923
	1930	1,390,417	844,078	320,795	67,259	88,825	69,460

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p. 20

CHAPTER II

THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

131 The Kingdom of Greater Rumania which emerged
161 after the Peace Settlement of 1919 covered an area of about 118,000 square miles, which is more than Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and had a population of about 15,500,000. Greater Rumania comprised the Old Kingdom (Wallachia, Moldavia and the Northern Dobrudja) and the New Territories, namely the Eastern Banat, the Crisana, Maramures, Transylvania, the Bukovina, Bessarabia and the Southern Dobrudja.[1] In relation to the position before 1914 both the territory and population of Rumania had been doubled. Still more important, the Kingdom was transformed from a national State into a multi-national State.[2]

133 The chief geographical features of Greater Rumania were the Carpathian Mountains, which sur-

[1] The Southern Dobrudja was Bulgarian up to the end of the Second Balkan War when it was ceded to Rumania; it was returned to Bulgaria by the Central Powers during the Great War, re-ceded to Rumania in 1919 and ceded again to Bulgaria in 1940.

162 [2] The population of the Old Kingdom in 1915 was about 7,625,000. The population of Greater Rumania in 1920 was 15,541,000 and had risen by 1940 to over 20,000,000 (an average yearly increase of about 233,000). The most numerous of the minorities were the Hungarians and Szekelys of Transylvania and the western provinces; the Jews, living all over Rumania; the Germans, living in the Banat, Transylvania and Bessarabia; Ukrainians and Russians in the Bukovina and Bessarabia; Bulgarians in the Dobrudja, Bessarabia and the Banat; Turks, Tatars, Gypsies, Serbs, Poles, Armenians, Greeks, etc.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

133 plains an endless sea of ripening wheat and maize
361 dips and rises in the summer breeze.

In the Carpathian valleys and in Transylvania dark forests alternate with fertile, gently rising slopes, irrigated by swift rivers which descend from the high mountains. Old castles and mansions of Hungarian nobles still guard the highways which pass through Rumanian, Hungarian and German villages and the small 'Saxon' towns, some of which have still preserved the atmosphere of mediaeval German townships.

In the Bukovina the civilizing influence of the Austrians is still visible. This small province, with its factories and prosperous farms, is one of the crossroads where east and west meet. In Bessarabia Russian and Ukrainian influences are very strong. The churches and cottages, the peasants' carts and dresses recall the Ukraine east of the Dniester. The Dobrudja, with its undulating uplands and its long, sandy Black Sea shore, offers good grazing for many great flocks of sheep which are driven there in the autumn to escape from the icy winter in the Carpathians. The province is only sparsely populated and has a definitely Balkan character. Fezzes and turbans are still common in the streets of its little towns. The plains west of Transylvania differ little in their aspect from the great Hungarian plains, but here too there is a great diversity of peoples and cultures, all adding to the colourful and often confusing picture of Rumania as it was between the two wars.

162 **THE POPULATION.** The acquisition of the New Territories after the Great War brought many non-

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

Rumanians under Rumanian rule. Although the great majority of the population was made up of Rumanians, about one-quarter was formed by minorities consisting of more than a dozen nationalities. The majority of the people lived on the land, only one-sixth in towns. Ethnically, the population of Rumania consisted approximately of Rumanians 73%; Hungarians over 8%; Slavs nearly 7%; Jews 5%; Germans over 4%; others 3%. About 82% of the people were engaged in agriculture and forestry. 162

The different nationalities living in Greater Rumania have in many cases preserved all the characteristics of their original race and land; others have absorbed the historical and cultural influences to which Rumania has been subject at various times. Both groups—and they are by no means sharply distinct from each other—have been transformed in the process of history and have influenced their neighbours and the life of the country as a whole. 177

THE RUMANIAN PEASANTS. The Rumanians are a simple and hardy people of peasants, used to oppression and poverty. Throughout centuries the Rumanian peasant was a serf, working all his life to satisfy the *boiar*, the tax-collector or the foreign prince. There have been only very short periods of Rumania's history when the peasant could reap and keep the hard-earned fruits of his labour. To-day, too, his fate follows the familiar pattern, only the present system of exploitation is much more efficient. It is all the more astonishing, therefore, that this people has preserved its optimism and a certain 565

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

garian Kingdom, as by the Habsburgs for their purposes; but it has a very distinctive vitality of its own. 659

The Patriarch of the Rumanian Orthodox Church is a person of great importance in the State and was one of the Council of Regency during the present king's minority. He, the Metropolitans, the Bishops of the Orthodox Church and those of the Rumanian Uniate Church were Senators for life: so were the heads of other Churches having over 200,000 members.[1] 659 793

The village priest, *Popa*, plays a leading part in the life of the Orthodox community. There is great veneration of certain saints—especially the Blessed Virgin and the Saint of the parish—and their ikons. Many of the strongest traditions of the country people are those connected with the seasons, and the Church has christianized many of the old pagan customs. The funeral rites, in particular, only part of which are conducted by the priest, are full of strange symbolism. There is a widespread belief in vampires and other evil spirits and the need of exorcizing them. But though religious practice hovers upon the borderline between faith and superstition, the standard of personal morality among the peasantry is on the whole a high one; the family counts for a great deal and the honour of women is closely guarded. 771 [764]

[1] According to the 1938 census, 13,200,000 belonged to the Orthodox Church (Rumanians, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgars and other Slavs); 2,628,813 were Roman Catholics (Latin Rite, mostly Magyars and Germans, 1,200,000; Greek Rite 1,426,313); 1,195,000 belonged to Protestant Churches (including 400,000 German Lutherans); 1,500,000 were Jews and 260,000 Mohammedans. There were 140,000 'others'. 162

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Banat]

175 Theresa; in order to strengthen the non-Magyar
635 element the settlement of Serbs and Rumanians was also encouraged. Under the governorship of Count Mercy, a friend of the statesman and warrior Prince Eugene of Savoy, the communications of the Banat were greatly improved. Land was brought under cultivation, mining and other industries were developed and commerce given a new impetus. The chief purpose of this policy was the creation of a strong military outpost of the Austrian Empire. The military frontier region was put under a special administration. All men living in this region were exempt from taxes and dues, were given land of their own but had to perform military duties. In 1779 the Banat, with the exception of the frontier region, was incorporated into Hungary. But after the defeat of the Hungarian Revolution in 1849 the province was again administered by the Austrians and eventually returned to Hungary in 1860. After the Great War the eastern half of the Banat became Rumanian, the western part Yugoslav.

162 About 55% of the population are Rumanians. There is a German colony 225,000 strong. These 'Swabians of the Banat', including descendants of French-speaking Lorrainers who up to half a century ago had preserved all their national characteristics but have now become absorbed by their German neighbours, constitute a very strong economic and national force. They are prosperous farmers, craftsmen and industrial workers. The Hungarians, who form more than 10% of the population, have, up to a few years ago, been in the majority in most towns. There are in the Banat many Jews, Serbs and Bulgarians and also a number of Slovaks.

7

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

EDI Rumania EDI

[The Crisana]

in the west and Czechoslovakia in the north. The
162 inhabitants of the Crisana are Rumanians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans and some Slavs. Taken as a whole the province contains a slight Rumanian majority, but there is in the immediate frontier region a fairly homogeneous Hungarian population, which forms a local majority.

133 The western part of the Crisana has the same
311 features as the lowlands of Hungary. The types of agriculture also closely resemble those of the rest of
135 the country on both banks of the Tisza[H] (Theiss[G]). There are wide, flat fields of maize and wheat interspersed with pastures, grazed by horses and longhorn cattle. To the east the country rises and forms a chain of hills which produce good fruit and wine. Beyond are the mountains of Bihor (Bihar[H]) which form the western wall of Transylvania. These mountains are rich in coal, gold, copper, bauxite, asphalt and marble. Consequently this region maintains numerous industrial enterprises. Apart from its mineral resources and good wheat and maize the Crisana is also well known for its horses, cattle, pigs and sheep.

361 The capital of the Crisana is Oradea-Mare
438 (Nagyvarad[H], Grosswardein[G]) in the valley of the Cris (Körös[H], Kreisch[G]). Its population of about 95,000 consists of Hungarians, Rumanians, Jews, Germans and others. Oradea is the junction for five railway lines and commands all the main communications leading from the Hungarian plain to Transylvania. The town is also the seat of many industries and the chief market for the agricultural produce of the province. Arad, on the northern bank of the Mures (Maros[H]), is inhabited by 65,000 people,

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1
[The Crisana]
[Maramures]

mostly Hungarians, and occupies a similarly important position. Here there are numerous factories, including mills, railway shops and locomotive works and textile factories. Satu-Mare (Szatmar[H]), with 60,000 inhabitants, is the largest town in the Northern Crisana. 361 438

After the Great War the Crisana, which was first occupied by the Hungarians in the tenth century and subsequently colonized by them, was awarded to Rumania. Under the Vienna Award of 1940 part of the Crisana was returned to Hungary, with a considerable Rumanian population. 175

By the same decision the province of Maramures (Marmaros[H]) (about 1,350 square miles), inhabited by over 150,000 people, acquired by Rumania in 1918, was returned to Hungary. Geographically Maramures is a continuation of the Czechoslovak province of Ruthenia. It is enclosed on all sides by chains of mountains covered with thick forests whose great density is rare even in the Carpathians, which are famous for their wealth of trees. It is not easily accessible except by a solitary railway line which comes from Transylvania and leads to Ruthenia. The small population consists of Ruthenians, Rumanians, Jews, Slovaks and Hungarians and is typical of the medley of races to be found in quite small areas of this part of Europe. Owing to the mountainous nature of the country there is little agriculture. The chief occupation of the inhabitants is the felling of trees. The most valuable asset of the province is its mineral wealth. There is oil, gold, copper, salt and coal. The capital and only major town of Maramures is Sighet (Marmaros-Sziget[H]) with a large Jewish population. Sighet, a town of 133 162 [496] 313 135 361

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Bukovina]

rule. It was occupied by the Russians in 1769. In 1774 the province was given to Austria, under which it remained until 1918. On 23 October the Austrian governor handed over the Bukovina to the Ukrainian inhabitants of the province; but four days later an assembly of Rumanian Bukovinians declared for the union of the province with Rumania and asked the Rumanian government for military assistance. This was forthcoming on 11 November and added to Rumania a territory of about 4,100 square miles with a population of about 870,000 (1930). Of these over 38% were Ukrainians, 34% Rumanians and 21% Germans and German-speaking Jews. The Rumanian administration began by a vigorous policy of Rumanization. The Ukrainians, who under Austrian rule had been well treated, and the Jews, were the chief sufferers, but the Germans, too, were ousted from many of their positions.[1]

More than half of the Bukovina is covered with dense forests of beech;[2] one-fifth consists of pastures; less than a third is arable land. The province borders in the west on the Carpathians, in the south on Moldavia, in the east on Moldavia and Bessarabia and in the north on Poland. The western part of the Bukovina is formed by the slopes of the Carpathians, where manganese and iron ore are found, especially in the region of Jacobeni. To the east stretches the hilly country, covered with pastures, on which good livestock is raised, and fields of maize, wheat and tobacco. Mineral resources are confined to some small deposits of coal, gold and lead, but the industry of the province is well developed.

[1] The German University of Czernowitz was completely Rumanized soon after the military occupation.

[2] The German name of the province means 'Land of the Beeches'.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

648 6,250,000.[1] Greater Rumania had ceased to exist.

668 **THE FLIGHT OF THE KING.** The territorial losses and the disintegration of Greater Rumania were only the outward signs of internal decay. The vigour and strength of the people, however, were not yet broken. The cession of Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina aroused feelings which fortified the popular movement. Demonstrations were held in all the big Rumanian towns demanding the abdication of Carol and the creation of a truly democratic government. At the same time territorial concessions to Hungary were opposed; and when it became known that the Vienna Award was to be accepted, in spite of the vigorous protests of almost all well-known Rumanian statesmen, police and soldiers had to be employed against thousands of indignant demonstrators in order to maintain 'peace and order'.

Popular discontent and fury against the king were cleverly exploited by the Right Wing. The Iron Guard, whose opposition to his personal rule was well known, turned the popular feeling to good account. They were the loudest in demanding the abdication of Carol, but naturally not in order to enable the formation of a democratic regime. This

131 162 [1] The remaining territory covered an area of less than 80,000 square miles; the population had shrunk to about 14,000,000. Official Rumanian figures state that Rumania's population in 1942 was over 16,000,000, of which over 13,000,000 lived on the land (Wallachia, 6,200,000; Moldavia, 2,800,000; Bessarabia, 2,700,000; Bukovina, 800,000; Dobrudja (without Southern Dobrudja), 500,000; Rumanian Transylvania, 2,400,000; Banat, 1,000,000).

241 peasant views with suspicion and often hostility all attempts at improvements in traditional
[474] methods. Even the co-operative societies have made less progress than in other Danubian countries. There is need for considerable capital expenditure in grouping small farms into larger units, in providing better buildings, more implements and fertilisers. There is need for diversification of production—more fodder crops and more animal husbandry. Above all, there is need for development in industry and commerce to provide work for the surplus agricultural population.

2. Natural Conditions and Regions

132 The climate is of the extreme Continental type, with long hot summers and severe winters. Precipitation is largely concentrated in winter and early summer. During the greater part of the growing and ripening season rains are light, and from time to time serious droughts occur which may ruin the grain crops.

133 The agricultural regions correspond to the natural divisions into plain and hill country—the
311 Danube plain and Bessarabia which comprise the greater part of the territory and produce the bulk of the crops, and the hilly and mountainous land of Transylvania and the Bucovina.

The plain is well-suited for agriculture, the soil over much of it being of the fertile *chernozem* or
[134] black earth type, but the backward methods of farming and the light rainfall keep yields per acre low.

This region is not equally backward in all parts. The Rumanian Banat at the western end of the country, and formerly part of Hungary, is more prosperous and progressive. The population is
●[162] not purely Rumanian but includes Swabians and Saxons, descendants of the German stock systematically settled there on medium-sized peasant holdings in the eighteenth century after the cession of the territory to Austria by the Turks. Methods and yields, by Rumanian standards, are good.
[231] The livestock density is higher than the average and the area produces a substantial surplus of pigs. Rural overcrowding is not as marked as elsewhere.

241 Conditions of life and methods of farming are considerably worse in the plain land of the Old
133 Kingdom. Agriculture here is as primitive as in any part of Eastern Europe, depending on an unbroken alternation of wheat and maize cultivation with little subsidiary production. Some wheat is marketed, but the maize is grown largely
[311] for consumption on the farms. So little land is available per head of population that the farm population and working animals (which eat the maize stalks) can be fed only by devoting an excessive acreage to maize.

Bessarabia makes up the remainder of the plain land. Conditions of settlement and farming methods are much the same as in the Old Kingdom, but the density of population is lower and there are substantial grain exports.

Given normal yields, every district of the plain area is at least self-sufficient in foodstuffs; indeed parts of it regularly produce large grain surpluses. Transitional areas between the Danube Valley and the Transylvanian plateau, such as the Carpatho-Moldavia and Carpatho-Muntenia areas, may,

[6c]

CHAPTER 1

228 in private waters. Supplemented by some 4,000 tons of imported fish, this provided roughly 1 kg. (2.2 lb.) per head of population; but, in fact, almost all the fish was consumed by the 5 million persons living in towns. The principal fish caught were sturgeon, carp, pike, eels and crayfish, the main fishing centres being Brăila, Tulcea and Ismail.

6. Food Industries

256 The chief food and agricultural-processing industries are milling, sugar manufacture, oilseed crushing and tobacco curing. While the milling industry was dispersed widely about the country in more than 15,000 small mills employing altogether over 37,000 persons (at 1930 census), the sugar industry was for the most part concentrated in the plain of the Danube Kingdom. Of the 17 sugar 257 factories employing 7,000 workers only one was in the Transylvanian districts lost to Hungary and five in the areas temporarily lost to the U.S.S.R. 258 The vegetable-oil industry, located chiefly in Bessarabia, was only partly carried on in factories of which there were (on January 1st, 1939) 117 employing 2,020 workers. Among these, 34 were fitted both to extract crude oil and to refine it, six were exclusively refineries, while the remainder produced only crude oil. The rest of the industry consisted of some 2,000 hand, or animal-driven presses mostly owned by individual peasants or by shopkeepers. These primitive presses extracted only a low percentage of oil from the seeds, and consequently the cake—mainly sold for export—had an unusually high oil content. As regard- 277 tobacco, both curing and cigarette manufacture [656] were subject to government licence and control. There were 29 factories (in 1930) employing 9,720 workers, but tobacco cultivation, subsequently declined, so also doubtless did the numbers employed.

7. Agricultural Organisation

452 The history of the organisation of Rumanian 241 farmers is one of not too successful co-operatives 474 becoming transformed more and more into agencies for the execution of Government Control Schemes. [654] For many years there had been throughout the country a network of agricultural credit societies, co-operative in form but in practice directed by the State. These played an important role during the period of the Land Reform in helping the peasants by advances to buy and equip their newly acquired holdings. There was even some co-operative cultivation for a time, until the new peasant-owners could muster sufficient draught animals and implements. Besides this, there have been strong local co-operative unions especially among the [162] minority nationalities—the Hungarians in Transylvania, the Swabian and Saxons in the Banat and the Russian and Polish Jews in the Bucovina.

243 The credit societies revived in importance when 474 after 1933, the Rumanian Government began the organisation of grain marketing. They became 452 the local agents of a Central Marketing Board through which all sales of grain had to be made 654 both for home consumption and for export. Whereas, formerly, grain prices slumped immediately after the harvest, most peasants being obliged to sell their grain quickly, under the new scheme prices were stabilised throughout the year, and this brought a great improvement to peasants' [651] receipts. But the scheme and the societies were also used to collect the peasants' taxes (paid in grain) which did not increase the popularity of co-operation.

241 very largely on the acquisition of tractors and other equipment. Only Germany can provide these requisites and it is of interest that, despite the poor contribution Rumania has hitherto made to Germany's food supplies, the latter has gone some way to assist the attempted reform. Over 4,000 [439] tractors with their ploughs and a variety of other implements have been imported from Germany during the war years. Tractor numbers in Rumania have probably been more than doubled by these imports, but they still represent only the beginnings of mechanisation. They have doubtless been supplied, despite insistent demands for tractors in Germany and elsewhere, in the belief that, if properly applied, they may make some slight increase in available surpluses. Some of these may have been destined for Transnistria to make good the Russian scorching.

6. Food Conditions

511 Food conditions have varied according to local resources, and in the months following the poor crops of 1942, according to the success of local prefects and officials in securing supplementary quantities from the more favoured areas. The [162] greater part of the population is rural, and most families feed themselves with their own home-grown produce. In the earlier years of the war these were able to maintain their consumption standards, but in 1942-43 there must have been a more serious degree of shortage and privation than is usual even after short crops. In the towns there has been a severe curtailment of food supplies, mitigated in individual cases by access to the Black-Market.

262 Urban shortages developed early in 1941 and 434 official rationing cards were introduced in May of 511 that year in Bucarest and brought into use soon after. Sugar and meat were the first commodities to be rationed. The original sugar ration was 375 grammes (13 oz.) per week, but since May 1943 it has been only 125 grammes (4½ oz.). Meat, originally 250 grammes (9 oz.), is still (July 1943) at this level, though for a short time at the end of 1942 it was higher owing probably to the abnormal slaughterings caused by fodder shortages in 1942. Bread was first officially rationed in January 1942 but was preceded by baking regulations requiring maize admixtures in the loaf. The ration of 300

[11a]

A. GENERAL

[162] 439

Although primarily an agricultural country—since about 80 per cent. of her population is rural—Rumania has not been so dependent on the export of agricultural produce as a means of financing her imports as would be expected, oil and oil products having in the years immediately preceding the war accounted for as much as 40 per cent. of total exports.

From the following table it will be seen that the trade balance was consistently favourable from 1930 onwards —

	Imports	*Exports*		*Balance*
		Million lei		
1929 ..	29,028	28,960	—	66[illegible]
1930 ..	23,044	28,522	+	5,478
1931 ..	15,755	22,197	+	6,442
1932 ..	12,011	16,722	+	4,71[illegible]
1933 ..	11,742	14,171	+	2,429
1934 ..	13,209	13,656	+	447
1935 ..	10,848	16,756	+	5,908
1936 ..	12,638	21,703	+	9,06[illegible]
1937 ..	20,285	31,568	+	11,284
1938 ..	18,768	21,533	+	2,765
1939 ..	22,890	26,809	+	3,919
1940 ..	27,500	37,500	+	10,00[illegible]

This favourable trade balance was increased by the earnings of the marine and river fleets. Total earnings of the marine fleet were 110 million lei in

[476]

161
728

the northern sections of Transylvania and Crisana to Hungary, though it [illegible] that a considerable block of Rumanians within [illegible] 200,000 have returned as refugees were placed within Hungary by the [illegible]. The German minority was little affected by the territorial changes, but some 200,000 from Eastern Rumania were "repatriated," mainly to Poland. The remaining 550,000 are situated chiefly in the Banat and in southern Transylvania. The Jewish population was distributed as follows:—

[162]

Bessarabia and Bucovina	300,000
Moldavia	158,000
Muntenia	87,000
Transylvania, Crişana and Maramures	180,000

(*See* paragraph on Jewish population on page 55.)

The Bulgarian minority has been returned to Bulgaria partly by the new frontier in the Dobruja and partly by the exchange of Bulgarian and Rumanian nationals which has taken place since 1940.

[54c]

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943

ED1 Rumania ED1

162

2. Effect of the Population Changes on the Nationality Distribution

In 1930 only 72 per cent. of the total population was of Rumanian origin. The largest minority groups were Hungarians (8 per cent.) Germans (4 per cent.), Jews (4 per cent.), Ukrainians (3·2 per cent.) and Russians (2·3 per cent.).

162
728

As a result of the territorial changes since 1930 over 85 per cent. of the population are now of Rumanian extraction, and there has been a change in the relative importance of the various minorities. The Hungarian minority has been largely reduced by the cession of the province of Maramureş and

[54e]

16. Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943

ED1 Rumania ED1

162
728

As a result of these figures it would appear that the largest minority groups are now the Germans, Russians and Ukrainians.

3. Occupational Distribution

162

There is no satisfactory official occupational breakdown. Though the 1930 census gives an industrial and commercial breakdown figures for agriculture and other occupations are lacking. Using such official figures as are available combined with other unofficial information, the following occupational breakdown (column A) has been drawn up for 1930 taking into account accelerated industrialisation since 1930.

[54f]

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943 EDI Rumania EDI

162

	A	Per cent	B	C	Per cent
Working population	9,300,000	100	[illegible]	[illegible]	100
of which:					
Agriculture	7,200,000	77·5	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Industry and mining	758,000	8·1	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Trade and commerce	378,000	4·1	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Transport	180,000	1·9	[illegible]	[illegible]	1·0
Banking and administration	254,000	2·7	[illegible]	[illegible]	2·3
Others	530,000	5·7	[illegible]	[illegible]	5·2

Columns B and C are estimated for 1942, B allowing for population changes described above and C allowing for population changes described above and for military mobilisation.

[548]

464 722 1941 there were 2,000 unemployed, while in December 1942, it was announced that the Office of Unemployment Statistics had been abolished, as there were no unemployed. Though Rumania's military mobilisation and losses have been extensive, her labour reserves are theoretically still considerable. On the other hand, there is no doubt that both industry and agriculture are suffering a noticeable labour shortage. This is attributable to the low level of mechanisation, internal economic organisation and to the cumbersome administration, so that comparison with western countries is impossible.

1. Agriculture.

464 241 The proportion of the working population engaged in agriculture is extremely high, so that military recruitment has been principally from this source. The structure of Rumanian agriculture, which is mainly peasant farming with a low output per head, has meant that the withdrawal of some 550,000 men has been more serious than it would have been in a country where more up-to-date methods are used, and the remaining labour supply is more mobile. The normal sources of supplementary wartime labour have been drawn on—*i.e.*, the temporary demobilisation of soldiers, employment of children during the summer holidays, and presumably an increased employment of women, although there is no evidence of women having been forcibly transferred to agriculture.

[727] The most valuable supplementary labour, however, has been the employment of Russian prisoners of war, and the demand for their services has exceeded the supply. The number employed in March 1942 was 40,000. These measures to improve the agricultural labour position do not as yet appear to have had much effect.

2. Industry

162 438 178 According to the latest official census figures (relating to the year 1930) 620,000 persons were employed in industry. The following table shows in column 1 the total number employed in the main branches, and in columns 2 and 3 the numbers working in factories employing ten or more people. A comparison between columns 2 and 3 gives an indication of the growing industrialisation of the country.

	1 1930	2 1930	3 1937
Food	122,000	25,200	34,700
Textiles and Clothing	155,000	34,800	70,500
Metallurgy	101,000	32,000	49,500
Timber	94,000	31,000	44,000
Mining	53,000	n.a.	n.a.

Allowing for the increased industrialisation during the years 1930–39, and for the general increase in the total population to some 20,000,000, it is estimated that by 1939 the number of industrial workers in Greater Rumania would have risen to some 750,000.

With the loss of part of the provinces of Transylvania, Crişana and Maramureş, Rumania suffered a fairly considerable loss in industrial workers, so that added to the expulsion of Jews, repatriation of Germans, etc., and military mobilisation, it is estimated that at the end of [464] 1942 the numbers engaged in industry would not exceed 550,000.

As in the case of agriculture, the structure of Rumanian industry tends to prevent a thorough rationalisation and concentration of the available industrial labour.

[55b]

E. THE JEWISH POPULATION

162 The Jewish population of Rumania for 1938 is given as 800,000, and for July, 1942, as 270,000. This reduction came about as follows :—

Total, 1938	800,000
Lost to Hungary	200,000
[728] Taken to Russia from Bessarabia and Bucovina by Russians	130,000
Expelled from Bessarabia and other areas by Rumanians to Transnistria, and deaths from unnatural causes in Rumania	200,000
Total losses	530,000
Total, 1942	270,000

The occupational distribution of the Jews in 1930 :—

			Per cent.
Agriculture			4·1
Industry and trade	32·8	81·1	
Commerce and credit	48·3		
Transport			2·4
Professions and Public Services ..			2·7
Army			1·9
Miscellaneous			7·8

It is calculated that in 1939 at least one-sixth of the industrial and half of the commercial population were Jews. During the war Rumanian policy has been to exclude Jews from business and from commercial and professional activity. This process of Rumanisation, while pursued ruthlessly in the provinces of Bessarabia and Bucovina, has been limited in the more industrial areas such as Bucarest by the simple fact that Rumanian industry and trade are dependent to such an extent on Jewish capital and leadership, and there is no doubt that the shortage of labour in industry has been seriously aggravated by the anti-Jewish policy. The degree of Rumanisation so far achieved is given by the following examples :—

563
661

Bucarest :—

Number of firms employing Jews, November 1940	8,126
Number of firms employing Jews, December 1942	4,301

Such Jews as are deemed necessary for war production are granted labour permits, whereby they may remain in their profession, but are subject to heavy taxation. Jews who are expelled from their normal activity are compulsorily enrolled in the Jewish labour service and employed chiefly on road work, or, alternatively, they are sent to concentration camps.

(*See* also "Note on Jews in Rumania," Part II, Chapter VIII.)

F. WAGES

1. General

465 The average wage (industrial, commercial and agricultural professions) in 1938 was 1,853 lei per month. The highest average wages were found in the mining, food and transport industries, followed by commerce, textiles, skins, glass and stone, while in the metallurgical industry wages were below the average. The most noticeable feature of pre-war Rumanian wage statistics is the great regional variations, the extreme averages being 889 and 3,059 lei per month.

During the war, various attempts at fixing the wage level have failed to keep pace with the rising cost of living. On the whole it would have been surprising if a wage stop could have been successfully applied in Rumania, because of the great

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

shall be communicated in advance of publication to the Ministry of Religious Affairs. 671 793 659

While thus making apparent that the Church was deprived of all liberty of action in areas of moral judgment concerning actions taken by the public authority, the law further stipulated that the salaries of "clergymen and officers of the religious denominations" would be paid in accordance with the regulations governing the civil service. In this fashion it was determined that all clergymen, on the one hand, had the rights accorded to the civil service but, on the other, assumed corresponding obligations—among them an oath of allegiance to the national Constitution.

Subsequently, on August 12, 1950, a decree dealing with the [687] security of the State imposed the death penalty for the following offenses: treason to the nation; rendering "service to the enemy, or causing prejudice to the power of the state"; and procuring or transmitting state secrets to a foreign or an enemy power. The decree was directed primarily against the dignitaries of the Roman Catholic Church, because they were in communion with Rome. On July 6, 1950, another decree had provided a basis for expelling from Rumania the Papal Nuncio, Archbiship O'Hara, and his two assistants, Monsignor Kirk and Monsignor Del Mesti. Most of the Rumanian members of the Nuncio's staff were sentenced to imprisonment. Therewith an initial climax was reached in two years of fierce attack on the Churches and on the Roman Catholic Church in particular.

At this point a more detailed review of the religious situa- 785 tion in Rumania may help to clarify what has happened. Prior 162 to the outbreak of the Second World War, the 70 per cent of Rumanians adhering to the Orthodox Church were affiliated with the Patriarchate of Constantinople but enjoyed ecclesiastical autonomy. This Church, directed by a Holy Synod pre-

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

795 162 sided over by a Patriarch, had 7,833 parishes, fifty-seven religious foundations for men, and twenty-six similar foundations for women. The two Churches in union with Rome served some 3,000,000 persons, slightly more than half of whom practiced according to the Greek rite. Catholics following the Latin rite had fifty-seven religious foundations for men, and eighty-one for women. Those of the Greek rite (usually termed, as we have seen, Uniates) had seven foundations for men, and five for women. Such statistics indicate that the Latin branch, in which the clergy are bound by the law of celibacy, manifested far more interest in monasticism, though the number of parishes available to them (638 in number) was much smaller than the number of those which served Catholics professing the Greek rite. It is therefore evident that any attempt to suppress the religious orders would strike at a vital nerve of Catholic life. Protestants were somewhat fewer than 6 per cent of the population, and the Jews were about the same. One may also note that Protestants were almost equally divided between Lutherans and Calvinists, the first being ethnic Germans and the second ethnic Hungarians residing in territories taken from Hungary at the close of the First World War.

653 795 In outward appearances, the position of the Orthodox Church was not greatly affected by the Communist seizure of power. It is true that changes in the pertinent legislation gave the government, and therewith of course the Communist Party, control over all nominations and elections to Church offices. This meant that all those who exercised authority would come to be snugly tucked under the thumb of the Party. The most notable illustration in Rumania is the Patriarch Justinian, who has not hesitated to declare that the Christian Gospel has much in common with the doctrines of Marx and Lenin. It is hardly necessary to inquire how and why a prelate of his character acquired rank and station. The Orthodox Church was by no

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania ED1

665 ticular," and referring to the workers "as the sole guiding force in
565 the country." [6] Nevertheless he seemed slightly on the defensive over the fact that after having had a free hand longer than any other Party in Eastern Europe the Rumanian Communists had only succeeded in forming to date 6,732 coöperatives of all types (consumer as well as producer coöperatives). He stressed that "mass collectivization" must wait on increased industrialization to supply needed farm machinery. And as if to forestall the jibes of Jugoslav Communists he attacked their achievements in collectivization as not only wrong in substance but as having been produced at a wrong tempo.

241 The hope of basing Communist rule on the dominance of the industrial proletariat over the peasantry seems especially ambitious
[62] in Rumania, where only about five percent of the population are
565 industrial workers and 80 percent are peasants. It is true that agrarian overpopulation exists in Rumania and therefore a gradual shift of some rural elements to city pursuits must occur. The Communist expropriations failed (as the Communists had expected) to solve the agrarian problem because the properties still remaining undivided were insufficient to supply all landless peasants with land or to give those receiving land sufficient acreage to make them self-supporting. Mechanization of agriculture, so much emphasized in the satellite countries, will not solve the problem but will merely aggravate it by increasing the peasant's dependence on a single crop marketed under strict state control. The solution is to raise the standard of living of the peasants. This could be done by improving seeds and livestock, diversifying crops, developing home industries, improving methods of marketing, building roads, providing facilities for local food processing to avoid wastage, and consolidating separated family strips of land into efficient farming units. As rural living standards rise productivity would increase, and this would permit concurrent rises in the living standards of the industrial workers. These objective facts of the Rumanian economic structure rule out any other procedure unless it is frankly based on injustice and is indifferent to human unhappiness on a tremendous scale.

The Communists cannot, however, favor a program like the one

[6] *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!*, Bucharest, August 1, 1949.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

page 40

III

AGRICULTURAL POPULATION AND PRODUCTION

121 THE course of Rumanian politics between the wars can be understood only in its economic setting; urgent economic problems constantly demanded the attention of all governments, and at the same time the prevailing poverty and economic backwardness undermined political life and contributed powerfully to the emergence of the dictatorships. This and the following chapter sketch the general features of the economic framework, with particular emphasis upon agriculture and the demographic problem. Industry, commerce, and finance are considered primarily in their relation to the agrarian question.

Population [1]

161 According to the 1930 census, Rumania had a population of
162 18,057,028 persons, the largest of any state in eastern Europe with the exception of Poland. While the density, 61 persons per square kilometer in 1930, was less than that of the more highly industrialized states of western Europe, the population was increasing at a rapid rate. Rumania had one of the highest birth rates in non-Russian Europe as well as the highest death rate. In general, its population pattern resembled that of the other states of eastern Europe, especially Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Ukraine, and was in marked contrast to the stable or declining populations of the West.

● 163 Eastern Europe is now passing through the phase of great popu-
165 lation growth which began in England and western Europe in the eighteenth century and has since radiated eastward. This phenomenon, one of the most important in European history, appears to have followed a definite sequence: first, a high death rate and a high birth rate, more or less in balance, giving a stable or only slightly expanding population; then the death rate dropped rapidly; finally the birth rate dropped down to or below the death rate. The lag between the fall in the death rate and the subsequent fall in the birth rate produced the great expansion of population. From current evidence

1. More complete statistical information on the population is given in the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

it appears that in eastern Europe the birth rate has begun to decline, but its effect will not be reflected in the population for a number of years.

The decline of the death rate in the West resulted from the numerous social, hygienic, and nutritional improvements gradually introduced and disseminated over the last two centuries, all of which were slow in reaching eastern Europe. The subsequent fall in the Western birth rate appears to have been largely a conscious social restriction and not any decline in "national virility." [2] It generally accompanies a rise in living conditions and has shown a direct correlation with class differences.

The extent to which those factors bringing about the growth of population in the West apply to eastern Europe is not known with certainty. The fall in the eastern European death rate after the middle of the nineteenth century appears to have corresponded with the introduction of some of the social and hygienic improvements from the West, but it may also have resulted from a moderate improvement in internal and external security at a somewhat earlier date.[3]

Birth and death rates for Greater Rumania showed a decline during the interwar years, largely a result of drops in the rural rates. The rural birth rate in 1936, however, was still well above that of the towns (33.8 per thousand as against 21.4). The rate of natural increase, the excess of births over deaths, also displayed a perceptible decline, from over 14 per thousand inhabitants in the early 1920's to about 11 in the late 1930's. The birth rate fell greatly during the Second World War (to a low of 19.9 in 1945) and seems to have increased only slightly in the postwar years. The death rate having remained approximately the same, the rate of growth of Rumania's population has diminished tremendously under the exceptional conditions of the past decade.

Agricultural Overpopulation

While Rumania's over-all density of population is not very high as compared with that of western Europe, most of the people live on the land, and the agricultural population is quite dense. In 1941 the agricultural population of Rumania (minus Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina, Northern Transylvania, and Southern Dobrogea) represented 71.4 per cent of the total population and 94.4 per cent of the

2. Dudley Kirk, *Europe's Population in the Interwar Years* (League of Nations, 1946), p. 38.

3. A. M. Carr-Saunders, *World Population: Past Growth and Present Trends* (Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 80.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

TABLE III. REGIONAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS IN RUMANIA 162 163 165

	Area (1,000 km.²)	Population (1,000's)	Density (per km.²)	Vital Rates, 1930			Reproduction Rates	
				Birth	*Death*	*Increase*	*Gross*	*Net*
RUMANIA	295.0	18,057	61	34.2	20.1	14.1	2.16	1.40
Oltenia	24.1	1,513	63	33.7	20.4	13.3	2.11	1.37
Muntenia	52.5	4,029	77	35.4	20.1	15.3	2.22	1.44
Dobrogea	23.3	815	35	39.2	23.7	15.5	2.70	1.75
Moldavia	38.0	2,434	64	39.9	21.4	18.5	2.48	1.61
Bessarabia	44.4	2,864	64	38.3	20.8	17.5	2.57	1.67
Bucovina	10.4	853	82	31.3	19.0	12.3	1.88	1.22
Transylvania	62.2	3,218	52	30.1	18.5	11.6	2.01	1.30
Banat	18.7	940	50	21.3	18.7	2.6	1.25	.81
Crişana and Maramureş	21.3	1,390	65	28.8	19.1	9.7	1.77	1.15

SOURCE: *Ibid.*

TABLE IV. VITAL RATES IN RUMANIA 163 165

A. The Old Kingdom, 1859–1915

Period	Vital Rates per 1,000 Inhabitants		
	Births	*Deaths*	*Excess of births over deaths*
1859–63	31.3	21.4	9.9
1864–68	33.4	28.2	5.2
1869–73	33.3	28.0	5.3
1874–78	35.4	31.3	4.1
1878–88	42.0	27.7	14.3
1889–93	40.2	30.4	9.8
1894–98	40.7	28.0	12.7
1899–1903	42.1	27.6	14.5
1904–08	40.5	25.7	14.8
1909–13	41.7	25.3	16.4
1914–15	41.3	24.0	17.3

B. Greater Rumania, 1920–46

Year	Vital Rates per 1,000 Inhabitants (U = Urban; R = Rural)		
	Births	*Deaths*	*Excess of births*
1920	34.7	26.7	8.0
U	19.7	18.3	1.4
R	39.0	29.1	9.9
1921	39.4	23.7	15.7
U	22.7	16.3	6.4
R	44.2	25.7	18.5

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

163
165

Year	Vital Rates per 1,000 Inhabitants (cont.) (U = Urban; R = Rural)		
	Births	*Deaths*	*Excess of births*
1922	38.4	23.5	14.9
U	22.5	17.5	5.0
R	42.9	25.3	17.6
1923	37.6	23.0	14.6
U	22.3	17.2	5.1
R	41.8	24.6	17.2
1924	37.9	23.3	14.6
U	22.2	16.8	5.4
R	42.1	25.0	17.1
1925	36.3	21.7	14.6
U	20.7	15.7	5.0
R	40.5	23.3	17.2
1926	35.9	22.0	13.9
U	21.6	17.5	4.1
R	39.7	23.2	16.5
1927	35.2	22.9	12.3
U	21.4	17.4	4.0
R	38.6	24.4	14.4
1928	35.9	20.2	15.7
U	22.3	17.0	5.3
R	39.4	21.1	18.3
1929	34.0	21.4	12.6
U	21.4	18.4	3.0
R	37.3	22.2	15.1
1930	35.0	19.4	15.6
U	23.6	17.7	5.9
R	37.7	19.8	17.9
1931	33.4	20.9	12.5
U	22.3	18.8	3.5
R	36.1	21.4	14.7
1932	35.9	21.7	14.2
U	22.3	18.9	3.4
R	39.1	22.3	16.8
1933	32.0	18.7	13.3
U	20.8	17.2	3.6
R	34.7	19.1	15.6
1934	32.4	20.7	11.7
U	20.9	17.9	3.0
R	35.0	21.3	13.7
1935	30.7	21.1	9.6
U	20.7	19.3	1.4
R	33.0	21.5	11.5
1936	31.5	19.8	11.7
U	21.4	19.4	2.0
R	33.8	19.9	13.9

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

163
165

Year	Vital Rates per 1,000 Inhabitants (cont.)		
	Births	*Deaths*	*Excess of births*
1937	30.8	19.3	11.5
1938	29.6	19.2	10.4
1939	28.3	18.6	9.7
1940	26.5	19.1	7.4
1941	23.0	19.3	3.7
1942	21.5	19.0	2.5
1943	20.3	16.7	3.6
1944	21.7	19.6	2.1
1945	19.9	19.3	0.6
1946	23.7	18.0	5.7

SOURCES: Sabin Manuila, *Structure et évolution de la population rurale* (Bucarest, 1940), p. 45; Sabin Manuila and D. C. Georgescu, *Populația României* (Bucarest, 1938), pp. 83–84; Institutul Central de Statistică, *Comunicări statistice*, No. 18 (August 15, 1947).

TABLE V. AGRICULTURAL POPULATION, 1941

162

	Total Population	Rural Population	Agricultural Population	Active in Agriculture	Passive in Agriculture
RUMANIA	13,535,757	10,238,255	9,690,423	6,504,291	3,186,132
Plain of Siret and Prut	2,087,892	1,601,094	1,572,169	1,030,235	541,934
Moldavian Carpathians	949,617	747,918	749,741	489,178	260,563
Muntenian and Oltenian Carpathians	2,577,913	2,190,766	2,117,182	1,379,258	737,924
Plain of the Danube	3,781,925	2,377,906	2,354,502	1,576,694	777,808
Dobrogea	519,297	365,585	331,740	210,714	121,026
Bucovina	356,215	266,619	273,545	185,685	87,860
Transylvanian Plateau	1,731,088	1,376,353	1,186,546	819,298	367,248
Western Transylvania	1,601,860	1,312,014	1,104,998	813,229	291,769

SOURCE: Roman Cresin, *Recensământul agricol al României din 1941, date provizorii*, Biblioteca Statistică, No. 10 (Bucarest, 1945), Table 20.

361 tions, but we know of nothing there before 1510. To the
771 existence of the monastery, which is the seat of a bishop, is due the development of a seminary.

161 THE POPULATION[2] in 1930 was 6,831. In 1931 there were 181
163 births, 24 infant deaths (under one year), 20 still-births, and 125 deaths from all causes. Marriages numbered 61 and divorces 4. The birth-rate is thus high, the infant death-rate considerable, but not so high as might be expected; still-births are numerous.

H. J. F.
E. E. E.

1[of Curtea de Arges -- Analyst]

415

BROWN CLAY.
WHITE & GREEN SLIP.

RUMANIA

162 The preliminary figures of the 1930 census do not give details of the various national minorities inhabiting Rumania, and the more reliable estimate will be found in Winkler's "Racial Statistics," om which the following data are extracted :—

Germans	713,564
Russians	174,293
Jews	778,094
Magyars	1,463,373
Bulgarians	351,328
Yugo-Slavs	52,570
Czechoslovaks	31,884
Ukrainians	500,484
Various	404,104
Total	4,469,694

634 The whole kingdom is administratively divided into 71 departments, but in the case of Transylvania, Maramureş, Crishana, and the Banat the departments created out of these provinces do not correspond exactly with the frontiers
161 of the latter. The density of the population per sq. km. is 63 in the old kingdom, including the Dobrudja, 64 in Bessarabia. 82 in Bucovina, and 54 in Transylvania.

163 The birth rate for 1930 was 35 per thousand, while the
165 death rate was 19.4, and the excess of births over deaths reached 278,722, this being the largest figure recorded since the war.

162 The total urban population formed 20.13 per cent, while the rural population formed 79.87 per cent. There were 172 towns, some of which must be mere villages, as at least two are shown to possess less than 1,000 inhabitants. The following towns have a population of over 20,000: Bucarest 631,288, Chişinau 117,016, Cernauţi 111,147, Iassi 102,595, Galatz 101,148, Cluj 98,569, Timişoara 91,866, Oradea 82,355, Ploeşti 77,325, Arad 77,225, Braila 68,310, Craiova 63,063, Brasov 59,234, Constantsa 58,258, Satu-Mare 49,917, Sibiu 48,013, Targul-Mureş 38,116, Buzau 36,115,

[Bucovina]

162 In the World War small and populous Bucovina withstood for four years the sweep of Russian and Austrian drives over her territory. She emerged greatly transformed, but the extent of this change, especially as regards her population, was only made clear by the Romanian census of 1930 which, coming twenty years after the last Austrian enumeration, assumes the importance of a basic scientific appraisal.

Significantly, that appraisal shows that the Romanians, after 143 years of foreign rule, have retained a relative majority in the province as a whole and an absolute majority in three out of its five counties. The census found less than 1% Russians in Bucovina, about ten times as many Germans and Jews, and almost three times again as many Ruthenians and Ukrainians. Their distribution illustrates the southward migration of Galician farm labor that had theretofore been encouraged by Austria.

The return of Bucovina to Romanian rule, the restoration of her ancient trade with the rich neighboring districts of northern Moldavia and Bessarabia, the endowment of 76,911 of her landless peasantry with 187,300 acres of tiliable land of her own, the improvement of communications, sanitation and education, are all positive Romanian achievements checked only temporarily by the Russian invasion of 1940.

163 Moreover, the Romanian element has gained new strength once freed of the constraints of alien interests. On the extent of this gain the second Romanian census, scheduled for December, 1940, but postponed under the pressure of events, would have supplied a wealth of circumstantial information. But a decided trend is discernible even in the available data,[1] that for the years 1935-37, according to which the two counties with a relatively large foreign population, Cernauti and Storojinet, have had the smallest annual excess of births over deaths, while the three counties with large Romanian majorities have shown the greatest increase. The figures are:

County	Population in % of Total				Annual Increase per 1,000		
	Romanians	Germans	Ruthenians	Jews	1935	1936	1937
Suceava	79.5	8.2	1.7	5.5	10.0	14.7	13.8
Campulung	61.3	20.2	6.7	8.2	11.9	15.1	12.2
Radauti	55.4	11.1	8.7	7.2	10.9	14.5	11.9
Storojinet	33.9	3.3	45.5	9.0	7.0	13.2	10.9
Cernauti	25.7	6.4	44.5	16.7	3.3	5.3	2.9

[1] Anuarul statistic al Romaniei, 1937 si 1938 (Statistical Yearbook of Romania, 1937 and 1938), Bucharest, 1939, p. 86 & seq.

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDI Rumania EDI

MEDICAL CONDITIONS AT CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

361 161 131 CURTEA DE ARGEŞ is a small town of 6,831 inhabitants (in 1930), situated in the valley of the River Argeş, at an altitude of 1,400 feet.

312 A SERIES of wells supply the town with water, there being no system of pipes to supply running water. The drainage system is necessarily of a primitive type, the dry closet type being the one in use.

743 THE TOWN possesses two hospitals:

(1) A general hospital with pavilion for epidemic cases.

(2) Home for incurables—a branch of a nerve clinic in Bucharest.

THE GENERAL HOSPITAL is situated in the centre of the town on a slight eminence, a few yards from the main street. It consists of two wards, one for men and one for women. The cases are mixed, medical and surgical cases being nursed in the same ward. There are fifteen beds for men and fifteen for women. In addition there are two small wards for clean surgical cases, each containing two beds.

THE BEDS are of the usual hospital type, but placed close together about three feet apart. The mattresses and pillows are stuffed with straw and are very hard. The patients wear their own clothes. This being summer, less than one half of the beds were in use. The villagers refuse to come to hospital in summer, when there is work to be done in the fields, unless in cases of stern necessity. A belief in witchcraft and secret remedies is prevalent, so that progress as regards treatment is hampered. Epidemics of dysentery and typhoid are common. Tuberculosis is widespread, and goitre is found in all the villages in this valley. Cretinism in the children is untreated, and most villages contain cases. No medication of the water supply is undertaken. Pulmonary tuberculosis is treated in sanatoria, but other cases of tuberculosis are admitted here. Cancer is also common, but is not dealt with here—the cases are sent to Bucharest for radium treatment.

754 164

164 Rickets[1] is unknown, and difficult labour among peasant women is rare, though puerperal fever is common. In some instances, if there is a midwife, she is shared by several
[847] villages. A law has recently been passed forbidding attempts at abortion, but it is not strictly enforced. There are a good many infant deaths. Maternal morbidity is not high, in
[142] spite of the prevalence of puerperal fever. The women as a whole are robust, of good physique and inured to hardship.
[757] The French treatment of sepsis by induced (turpentine) abscess is common and is found to be very successful, the fever running its course in 7-8 days, with low mortality rate.
[855] Children are breast-fed, feeding bottles being unknown. The feeding continues until the age of one year or longer. Infantile paralysis is unknown in this district, though it does occur in other parts of the country. Rheumatism and arthritis are common.

743 A SMALL operating theatre is attached to the hospital[1] for
752 emergency cases like suppurating appendices and ruptured hernia, other cases being sent to the hospitals in larger towns. Small surgical operations are also performed. The table is convenient, in that it can tilt at any angle from head to foot, but it cannot be lowered or raised at will. The only light is a small electric globe high up in the ceiling, with no facilities for lowering. Operations are, however, mostly done in daylight. If necessary, lamps or even candles are requisitioned. A small room for sterilising purposes opens off the theatre.

743 THE PAVILION for infectious cases is situated about twenty
164 feet from the main building, in close proximity to the staff house and kitchen. Its beds were empty at the moment of inspection. Scarlet fever is the most common epidemic in this vicinity, and the beds were full one month ago. Epidemics of dysentery and typhoid also occur. Typhus is not known here, though frequent in Bessarabia. Diphtheria is fairly common.

759 THERE[1] ARE a medical doctor and a surgeon in attendance, the latter being only part-time.

743 THE HOME for the incurables[1] was next visited. It is a handsome villa, situated near the main street, but farther from the centre of the town. As before stated, it is a branch of the nerve clinic in Bucharest, and is under the supervision of

1 [In Curtea De Arges -- Analyst]

743 Prof. Dr. Cantacuzene, who visits it two or three times yearly. A doctor is in charge with a Sister of Mercy as nurse and two untrained local nurses, one for the men and one for the women. There are thirty male beds and twenty female
● [764] beds. The cases are mainly paralytic and epileptic, with a certain number of war invalids and diabetics. The beds were mostly empty when seen, as the cases are ambulant.

BATHROOM and lavatory accommodation in both hospitals is necessarily primitive.

759 THERE ARE three other doctors in the town—one for the
744 military, another for the insurance societies, and a third for the direction of general sanitary work, corresponding to a British Medical Officer of Health. The headquarters of the last-named are at the Mayor's office. Medical inspection takes place once a month in the schools, each child being examined thoroughly each time. There are no dentists in the town, extraction of teeth, etc., being performed by the
[751] local doctors. Vaccination is obligatory and is done when the child is one month old. At the age of seven, on entry into school, a second vaccination is required, and in the case of a boy, at the age of 18, when he begins his premilitary service.

758 As REGARDS payment for medical treatment, poor people who cannot afford to pay are treated free, otherwise 10-20 lei is charged for a consultation and 20-30 lei per day in hospital. Most of the patients are insured against sickness by paying regular contributions under State guidance.

759 DOCTORS RECEIVE their training in one of the three centres, Cluj, Bucharest or Jassy. Cluj is considered the best equipped. So far there are no medical text-books in Roumanian. German text-books and German medical traditions are followed at Cluj, while French text-books and French traditions are in use at Bucharest and Jassy. One year is spent in preparation, Chemistry, Physics, etc., being studied. Five years of actual medical work, theoretical and practical, follow. For the past eight years a further course of two years in specialised work at a hospital has been insisted upon.

N. H. S.

[in Curtea De Arges -- Analyst]

146 Largely because of its cost, the consumption of
262 sugar is very low, except among the well-to-do in the towns. (To encourage sugar-beet growing, a high price was set by the Government.)

[785] The diet is further impoverished by the long religious fasts—seven weeks before Easter, six weeks before Christmas, two shorter summer periods, plus Wednesdays and Fridays of each week. The diet during the fast includes practically no food of animal origin. Children under 10 years do not normally observe these fasts and, in fact, usually have a better diet during these periods since more milk, eggs and butter are available for them.

The diet, though fairly adequate in energy value, is short of animal protein, fats and calcium; moreover, where maize is the principal cereal lack of vitamin B_2 may be very serious. Various symptoms of vitamin and mineral deficiencies are
[165] observed, and the high infant-mortality rate—the highest in Europe—is also partly due to malnutrition. One of the most serious effects of the poor diet is the nervous disease pellagra, caused by this deficiency of the vitamin B_2 factor. In Moldavia, where maize is the staple food, about 5 per cent.
[164] of the rural population suffers from pellagra every spring. In the whole country about 3,000 deaths occur each year from this disease (compared with 4,000 in the maize-eating southern states of U.S.A.).

The average annual pre-war food consumption of Rumania is shown in the following table, with comparative figures for the United Kingdom.

Average per Head Consumption

	Rumania		*United Kingdom*	
	Kg	*Lb.*	*Kg*	*Lb*
Wheat and rye	104	229	129	285
Maize	166	365	—	—
Potatoes	50	110	84	185
Sugar	5	11	43	95
Meat	17	37	63	139
Milk	70	123*	94	165*
Butter	1	2	11	24
Pig fat	4	10	5	11
Vegetable oil	1·5	3	—	—
Margarine	—	—	4	10
Calories per day	2,700		3,100	

*Pints

B. WAR-TIME CHANGES

1. Territorial Changes

728 The net effect of the territorial changes which
241 have occurred since 1939 is the loss of Northern Transylvania to Hungary and of Southern Dobruja
311 to Bulgaria. For two seasons, crops 1940 and 1941, Rumania was without Bessarabia, but in the late summer of 1941 she not only regained Bessarabia but acquired administrative control of the Soviet territory now styled Transnistria, and this has made small contributions to the food supplies of Rumania in 1942-43. Ignoring Transnistria, however, Rumania lost 12 per cent. of her former arable area and grain production. The Transylvanian areas ceded to Hungary, though not rich agriculturally, probably needed only small imports of grain to supplement their own production, while south Dobruja, though a surplus producing area, contributed only a fraction to Rumania's total agricultural production. The country's potential agricultural export remains, therefore, substantially what it was before the war.

241 ### 2. Agriculture in War Years

722 Germany, at the outbreak of the war, looked to the Danube countries, and to Rumania in particu-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

page 40

III

AGRICULTURAL POPULATION AND PRODUCTION

121 THE course of Rumanian politics between the wars can be understood only in its economic setting; urgent economic problems constantly demanded the attention of all governments, and at the same time the prevailing poverty and economic backwardness undermined political life and contributed powerfully to the emergence of the dictatorships. This and the following chapter sketch the general features of the economic framework, with particular emphasis upon agriculture and the demographic problem. Industry, commerce, and finance are considered primarily in their relation to the agrarian question.

Population [1]

161 According to the 1930 census, Rumania had a population of
162 18,057,028 persons, the largest of any state in eastern Europe with the exception of Poland. While the density, 61 persons per square kilometer in 1930, was less than that of the more highly industrialized states of western Europe, the population was increasing at a rapid rate. Rumania had one of the highest birth rates in non-Russian Europe as well as the highest death rate. In general, its population pattern resembled that of the other states of eastern Europe, especially Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Ukraine, and was in marked contrast to the stable or declining populations of the West.

163 Eastern Europe is now passing through the phase of great popu-
165 lation growth which began in England and western Europe in the eighteenth century and has since radiated eastward. This phenomenon, one of the most important in European history, appears to have followed a definite sequence: first, a high death rate and a high birth rate, more or less in balance, giving a stable or only slightly expanding population; then the death rate dropped rapidly; finally the birth rate dropped down to or below the death rate. The lag between the fall in the death rate and the subsequent fall in the birth rate produced the great expansion of population. From current evidence

1. More complete statistical information on the population is given in the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

it appears that in eastern Europe the birth rate has begun to decline, 163
but its effect will not be reflected in the population for a number of 165
years.

The decline of the death rate in the West resulted from the numerous social, hygienic, and nutritional improvements gradually introduced and disseminated over the last two centuries, all of which were slow in reaching eastern Europe. The subsequent fall in the Western birth rate appears to have been largely a conscious social restriction and not any decline in "national virility." [2] It generally accompanies a rise in living conditions and has shown a direct correlation with class differences.

The extent to which those factors bringing about the growth of population in the West apply to eastern Europe is not known with certainty. The fall in the eastern European death rate after the middle of the nineteenth century appears to have corresponded with the introduction of some of the social and hygienic improvements from the West, but it may also have resulted from a moderate improvement in internal and external security at a somewhat earlier date.[3]

Birth and death rates for Greater Rumania showed a decline during the interwar years, largely a result of drops in the rural rates. The rural birth rate in 1936, however, was still well above that of the towns (33.8 per thousand as against 21.4). The rate of natural increase, the excess of births over deaths, also displayed a perceptible decline, from over 14 per thousand inhabitants in the early 1920's to about 11 in the late 1930's. The birth rate fell greatly during the Second World War (to a low of 19.9 in 1945) and seems to have increased only slightly in the postwar years. The death rate having remained approximately the same, the rate of growth of Rumania's population has diminished tremendously under the exceptional conditions of the past decade.

Agricultural Overpopulation

While Rumania's over-all density of population is not very high 161
as compared with that of western Europe, most of the people live on the land, and the agricultural population is quite dense. In 1941 the agricultural population of Rumania (minus Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina, Northern Transylvania, and Southern Dobrogea) represented 71.4 per cent of the total population and 94.4 per cent of the

2. Dudley Kirk, *Europe's Population in the Interwar Years* (League of Nations, 1946), p. 38. 113

3. A. M. Carr-Saunders, *World Population: Past Growth and Present Trends* (Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 80.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

434 terials and wooden floors, and it is quite possible that there were other improvements in village conditions which would not appear in statistics.

The depression greatly reduced the Rumanian income, and by 1937 the per capita real income had not yet regained the 1927 level.

[105] In the chapter on population it was seen that Rumania had an extremely high death rate. This was matched by an extraordinarily high infant mortality rate, the highest in Europe. Between 1931 and 1938 infant deaths showed no sign of declining, but ranged between a maximum of 19.2 per 100 living births in 1935 and a minimum of 17.4 in 1933.

511 The low standard of living implicit in the vital statistics is also reflected in the dietary deficiencies of the Rumanian peasant. A number of surveys taken in the 1930's reached the same general conclusions:[26] while the caloric content of the diet was usually adequate, its quality was very poor; an excessive consumption of grains, especially maize in the form of corn meal (*mămăligă*) and not enough animal products or protective foods. Seasonal consumption, as might be expected, varied widely. The prevalence of pellagra has been an obvious indication of an unbalanced diet.

511 Statistics on housing, disease, medical service, education, and illiteracy confirm the impression that the Rumanian peasant had one of the lowest standards of living in Europe. Admittedly, the statistically average Rumanian is an abstraction. Peasants with holdings over 5 hectares lived better and were healthier than peasants on dwarf holdings. The husbandman with an intensively cultivated farm in Ţara Bârsei in Transylvania had about three times the income of the small holder in Dobrogea. Nevertheless, the flat picture of widespread poverty and squalor presented by the statistics is not far from the truth. The colorful costumes and picturesque folk dances of the Rumanian peasantry should not obscure the fact that in 1930 nearly half the population was illiterate and in 1938 one child in five died before it was a year old.

Accompanying this peasant poverty was a marked inequality in the distribution of the total income. Rumanian statistics do not permit an exact estimate of its extent, but it was perfectly obvious to anyone who visited Bucarest. The unmistakable signs of luxury spending

26. D. C. Georgescu, *L'Alimentation de la population rurale en Roumanie* (Bucarest, 1940); W. Aykroyd, I. Alexa, I. Nitulescu, "Étude de l'alimentation des paysans dans la région à pellagre de Moldavie," *Archives roumaines de pathologie expérimentale et de microbiologie* (Paris, 1935); Ioan Claudian, *Alimentaţia poporului român* (Bucarest, 1939).

[113]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

TABLE III. REGIONAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS IN RUMANIA 162 163 165

	Area (1,000 km.²)	Population (1,000's)	Density (per km.²)	Vital Rates, 1930			Reproduction Rates	
				Birth	*Death*	*Increase*	*Gross*	*Net*
RUMANIA	295.0	18,057	61	34.2	20.1	14.1	2.16	1.40
Oltenia	24.1	1,513	63	33.7	20.4	13.3	2.11	1.37
Muntenia	52.5	4,029	77	35.4	20.1	15.3	2.22	1.44
Dobrogea	23.3	815	35	39.2	23.7	15.5	2.70	1.75
Moldavia	38.0	2,434	64	39.9	21.4	18.5	2.48	1.61
Bessarabia	44.4	2,864	64	38.3	20.8	17.5	2.57	1.67
Bucovina	10.4	853	82	31.3	19.0	12.3	1.88	1.22
Transylvania	62.2	3,218	52	30.1	18.5	11.6	2.01	1.30
Banat	18.7	940	50	21.3	18.7	2.6	1.25	.81
Crişana and Maramureş	21.3	1,390	65	28.8	19.1	9.7	1.77	1.15

SOURCE: *Ibid.*

TABLE IV. VITAL RATES IN RUMANIA 163 165

A. The Old Kingdom, 1859–1915

Period	Vital Rates per 1,000 Inhabitants		
	Births	*Deaths*	*Excess of births over deaths*
1859–63	31.3	21.4	9.9
1864–68	33.4	28.2	5.2
1869–73	33.3	28.0	5.3
1874–78	35.4	31.3	4.1
1878–83	42.0	27.7	14.3
1889–93	40.2	30.4	9.8
1894–98	40.7	28.0	12.7
1899–1903	42.1	27.6	14.5
1904–08	40.5	25.7	14.8
1909–13	41.7	25.3	16.4
1914–15	41.3	24.0	17.3

B. Greater Rumania, 1920–46

Year	Vital Rates per 1,000 Inhabitants (U = Urban; R = Rural)		
	Births	*Deaths*	*Excess of births*
1920	34.7	26.7	8.0
U	19.7	18.3	1.4
R	39.0	29.1	9.9
1921	39.4	23.7	15.7
U	22.7	16.3	6.4
R	44.2	25.7	18.5

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

163
165

Year Vital Rates per 1,000 Inhabitants (cont.) (U = Urban; R = Rural)

	Births	*Deaths*	*Excess of births*
1922	38.4	23.5	14.9
U	22.5	17.5	5.0
R	42.9	25.3	17.6
1923	37.6	23.0	14.6
U	22.3	17.2	5.1
R	41.8	24.6	17.2
1924	37.9	23.3	14.6
U	22.2	16.8	5.4
R	42.1	25.0	17.1
1925	36.3	21.7	14.6
U	20.7	15.7	5.0
R	40.5	23.3	17.2
1926	35.9	22.0	13.9
U	21.6	17.5	4.1
R	39.7	23.2	16.5
1927	35.2	22.9	12.3
U	21.4	17.4	4.0
R	38.8	24.4	14.4
1928	35.9	20.2	15.7
U	22.3	17.0	5.3
R	39.4	21.1	18.3
1929	34.0	21.4	12.6
U	21.4	18.4	3.0
R	37.3	22.2	15.1
1930	35.0	19.4	15.6
U	23.6	17.7	5.9
R	37.7	19.8	17.9
1931	33.4	20.9	12.5
U	22.3	18.8	3.5
R	36.1	21.4	14.7
1932	35.9	21.7	14.2
U	22.3	18.9	3.4
R	39.1	22.3	16.8
1933	32.0	18.7	13.3
U	20.8	17.2	3.6
R	34.7	19.1	15.6
1934	32.4	20.7	11.7
U	20.9	17.9	3.0
R	35.0	21.3	13.7
1935	30.7	21.1	9.6
U	20.7	19.3	1.4
R	33.0	21.5	11.5
1936	31.5	19.8	11.7
U	21.4	19.4	2.0
R	33.8	19.9	13.9

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

163
165

Year Vital Rates per 1,000 Inhabitants (cont.)

	Births	*Deaths*	*Excess of births*
1937	30.8	19.3	11.5
1938	29.6	19.2	10.4
1939	28.3	18.6	9.7
1940	26.5	19.1	7.4
1941	23.0	19.3	3.7
1942	21.5	19.0	2.5
1943	20.3	16.7	3.6
1944	21.7	19.6	2.1
1945	19.9	19.3	0.6
1946	23.7	18.0	5.7

SOURCES: Sabin Manuila, *Structure et évolution de la population rurale* (Bucarest, 1940), p. 45; Sabin Manuila and D. C. Georgescu, *Populaţia României* (Bucarest, 1938), pp. 83–84; Institutul Central de Statistică, *Comunicări statistice*, No. 18 (August 15, 1947).

TABLE V. AGRICULTURAL POPULATION, 1941

162

	Total Population	Rural Population	Agricultural Population	Active in Agriculture	Passive in Agriculture
RUMANIA	13,535,757	10,238,255	9,690,423	6,504,291	3,186,132
Plain of Siret and Prut	2,037,892	1,601,094	1,572,169	1,030,235	541,934
Moldavian Carpathians	949,617	747,918	749,741	489,178	260,563
Muntenian and Oltenian Carpathians	2,577,913	2,190,766	2,117,182	1,379,258	737,924
Plain of the Danube	3,781,925	2,377,906	2,354,502	1,576,694	777,808
Dobrogea	519,297	365,585	331,740	210,714	121,026
Bucovina	336,215	266,619	273,545	185,685	87,860
Transylvanian Plateau	1,731,088	1,376,353	1,186,546	819,298	367,248
Western Transylvania	1,601,860	1,312,014	1,104,998	813,229	291,769

SOURCE: Roman Cresin, *Recensământul agricol al României din 1941, date provizorii*, Biblioteca Statistică, No. 10 (Bucarest, 1945), Table 20.

RUMANIA

162 The preliminary figures of the 1930 census do not give details of the various national minorities inhabiting Rumania, and the more reliable estimate will be found in Winkler's "Racial Statistics," om which the following data are extracted:—

Germans	713,564
Russians	174,293
Jews	778,094
Magyars	1,463,373
Bulgarians	351,328
Yugo-Slavs	52,570
Czechoslovaks	31,884
Ukrainians	500,484
Various	404,104
Total	4,469,694

634 The whole kingdom is administratively divided into 71 departments, but in the case of Transylvania, Maramureş, Crishana, and the Banat the departments created out of these provinces do not correspond exactly with the frontiers
161 of the latter. The density of the population per sq. km. is 63 in the old kingdom, including the Dobrudja, 64 in Bessarabia. 82 in Bucovina, and 54 in Transylvania.

163 The birth rate for 1930 was 35 per thousand, while the
165 death rate was 19.4, and the excess of births over deaths reached 278,722, this being the largest figure recorded since the war.

162 The total urban population formed 20.13 per cent, while the rural population formed 79.87 per cent. There were 172 towns, some of which must be mere villages, as at least two are shown to possess less than 1,000 inhabitants. The following towns have a population of over 20,000: Bucarest 631,288, Chişinau 117,016, Cernauţi 111,147, Iassi 102,595, Galatz 101,148, Cluj 98,569, Timişoara 91,866, Oradea 82,355, Ploeşti 77,325, Arad 77,225, Braila 68,310, Craiova 63,063, Brasov 59,234, Constantsa 58,258, Satu-Mare 49,917, Sibiu 48,013, Targul-Mureş 38,116, Buzau 36,115,

146 Largely because of its cost, the consumption of
262 sugar is very low, except among the well-to-do in the towns. (To encourage sugar-beet growing, a high price was set by the Government.)

[785] The diet is further impoverished by the long religious fasts—seven weeks before Easter, six weeks before Christmas, two shorter summer periods, plus Wednesdays and Fridays of each week. The diet during the fast includes practically no food of animal origin. Children under 10 years do not normally observe these fasts and, in fact, usually have a better diet during these periods since more milk, eggs and butter are available for them.

The diet, though fairly adequate in energy value, is short of animal protein, fats and calcium; moreover, where maize is the principal cereal lack of vitamin B_2 may be very serious. Various symptoms of vitamin and mineral deficiencies are
● [165] observed, and the high infant-mortality rate—the highest in Europe—is also partly due to malnutrition. One of the most serious effects of the poor diet is the nervous disease pellagra, caused by this deficiency of the vitamin B_2 factor. In Moldavia, where maize is the staple food, about 5 per cent.
[164] of the rural population suffers from pellagra every spring. In the whole country about 3,000 deaths occur each year from this disease (compared with 4,000 in the maize-eating southern states of U.S.A.).

The average annual pre-war food consumption of Rumania is shown in the following table, with comparative figures for the United Kingdom.

Average per Head Consumption

	Rumania		*United Kingdom*	
	Kg.	*Lb.*	*Kg.*	*Lb.*
Wheat and rye	104	229	129	285
Maize	166	365	—	—
Potatoes	50	110	84	185
Sugar	5	11	43	95
Meat	17	37	63	139
Milk	70	123*	94	165*
Butter	1	2	11	24
Pig fat	4	10	5	11
Vegetable oil	1·5	3	—	—
Margarine	—	—	4	10
Calories per day	2,700		3,100*	

*Pints

B. WAR-TIME CHANGES

1. Territorial Changes

728 The net effect of the territorial changes which
241 have occurred since 1939 is the loss of Northern Transylvania to Hungary and of Southern Dobruja
311 to Bulgaria. For two seasons' crops, 1940 and 1941, Rumania was without Bessarabia, but in the late summer of 1941 she not only regained Bessarabia but acquired administrative control of the Soviet territory now styled Transnistria, and this has made small contributions to the food supplies of Rumania in 1942-43. Ignoring Transnistria, however, Rumania lost 12 per cent. of her former arable area and grain production. The Transylvanian areas ceded to Hungary, though not rich agriculturally, probably needed only small imports of grain to supplement their own production, while south Dobruja, though a surplus producing area, contributed only a fraction to Rumania's total agricultural production. The country's potential agricultural export remains, therefore, substantially what it was before the war.

2. Agriculture in War Years

241 Germany, at the outbreak of the war, looked to
722 the Danube countries, and to Rumania in particu-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

162 and the investigators found many of the old labor contracts and obli-
311 gations associated with pre-1914 Rumania.

Unable to support themselves in the community, many peasants
511 were seeking temporary work in nearby market towns, and a number
464 traveled as far as Bucarest, a distance of about 70 kilometers. The
369 exodus in most cases was not permanent, and the peasants after earn-
ing some money returned to Dâmbovnicul. This movement to the city
166 was a reflection of the new conditions, which were also seen in the houses and garments of the peasants: houses were no longer built to last generations as was the case in the more isolated districts to the north; the national costume was relegated to Sundays. Birth and death rates were high and the natural increase outran the emigration away from the plasă. The standard of living was very low; many families were undernourished.

A definite differentiation in the peasantry was developing. A few peasants—mostly those who had inherited medium properties—were enlarging their holdings; a few new peasant estates of over 100 hectares had been created. The poorer peasants, including many who had been allotted land, were losing their holdings. Investigations into debts and credit showed that even after the conversion of 1934 about half the households were in debt. Credit provided by the cooperative banks went almost entirely to the larger peasants; in one commune holdings of up to 5 hectares received only 7.9 per cent of the loans. The special political interest shown by the parties in the judeţ of Argeş seemed to have brought no benefits beyond permitting local party stalwarts to obtain extra funds to purchase land from peasants who were in debt or in need of money.

Such, then, was the land of happy peasants with their colorful folkways so picturesquely displayed in the travel literature of the Carolist era.

563 would obtain equal grants, while officials would be nomin-
668 ated proportionately to the numbers of each nationality.

Count Bethlen, however, desired to justify the millions spent on the revisionist campaign and demanded the revision of frontiers, namely the retrocession of the Hungarian towns bordering on the frontier (Arad, Oradea-Mare, and Satu Mare). The advisers of King Carol considered that the present frontiers of Rumania were final, and in order that the idea of a personal union be rendered acceptable to the Rumanian people, all reference to a revision of frontiers should be dropped as it was sure to provoke a fiasco, all the more so since the Liberal party was known to be hostile to the idea of a personal union. The Rumanians would accept the scheme only in case Hungary agreed to recognize the actual frontiers without rectification and in exchange for the other concessions. It was on this point that the negotiations came to a standstill. Count Bethlen was bound by engagements towards the revisionist group. According to his conception, only Transylvania was to remain under Rumanian rule as a Duchy, while other parts were to revert to Hungary."

In conclusion the paper stated that "the interview left painful recollections with Count Bethlen who now talks of an alliance with Italy and Austria."

The Dobrudja.

563 If the state of the minorities in Transylvania may be stated
● 166 to be relatively satisfactory, taking into consideration the
657 general shortcomings of the Rumanian administrative system, it is to be regretted that as much cannot be said of
647 the Dobrudja, where both the Turkish and Bulgarian minorities, living in compact masses, have well-founded grievances. One of the main causes of dissatisfaction has been the ill-considered plan of the Rumanian Government to colonize southern Dobrudja with Kutso-Vlachs from Macedonia. Without making any adequate preparations to provide these people with dwellings, food and clothing, it proceeded to billet them in the small cottages of the Bulgarian and Turkish farmers which were barely sufficient for their owners. The newcomers being destitute, had no alternative to that of

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1
Dobrudja

56
166
657
647

a life of rapine, a matter which led to bloody encounters followed by mass arrests of the local population. The latter had been further embittered by the State seizing one-third of their lands, no compensation whatever being given, even in cases of these lands carrying growing crops. Such was the tension that had been created that on the advent of the Maniu government, both M. M. Vaida-Voevod and Mihalache considered it imperative to intervene in order to put a stop to the abuses and the provocations that both Turks and Bulgarians were subjected to. The intercession of the leaders of the National Peasant Party caused extreme ill-feeling in Chauvinist circles which fomented a violent agitation against what was represented as treachery to the Rumanians. This culminated in the assassination of an under-secretary of State by a hot-headed student. The Maniu government had delegated a commission to study on the spot the complaints of the population of the Dobrudja and prepare a report, a summary of which was published in the "Adeverul" of March 4th, 1929. In this we read that "the enterprise of colonizing the Dobrudja had been left without control and had become a means of exploitation and the furthering of personal interests," that the system of quartering the colonists on the Bulgarian and Turkish inhabitants "led to an unbearable state of affairs causing endless conflicts." As for the situation of the colonists, the report shows that the ineptitude of the Rumanian authorities transcends all imagination, "out of 10,000 heads of families only 15 had received monetary help from the government, the lands that were to be allotted to the colonists remained in possession of State functionaries. The colonists had no houses nor timber wherewith to construct them." As a consequence of this report the Maniu Government created a special commissariat for building houses for the colonists, 1,257 of which were built in 1929, 938 during 1930, and 1,200 in the course of 1931, at an average cost of 44,000 lei each.

The situation, unfortunately has not improved, and murders of Turks and Bulgarians by the Kutso-Vlachs are frequent. What is most regrettable is that they are left practically unpunished, as has been the case with the murderer of one of the leaders of the Bulgarian minority, the

RUMANIA

[166] late C. M. Stephanov, who was also a member of the
657 Rumanian Senate. The main cause of the effervescence that
563 still subsists is this ill-advised scheme of planting the destitute
[647] Kutso-Vlachs on the farms of the aboriginal inhabitants, proof of which has been given by M. Georoceanu in a booklet he has published. M. Georoceanu was formerly a member of the Rumanian Senate during M. Maniu's tenure of office.

It may be added that the Bulgarians complain of not
[658] having a single school in their villages, and that when they presented petitions for opening such their signatories had
[659] been prosecuted. Bulgarian priests are no longer allowed to be nominated, and those that still remain are being gradually replaced by Rumanians who officiate naturally in their own language which is not understood by their flocks. A lesser
[204] wrong which receives the condemnation only of the intellectuals, is the ban on Bulgarian newspapers and periodicals. Their introduction into Rumania is prohibited, and though a few months ago the Bucarest press announced that this embargo would be raised, yet as late as April, 1932 the police authorities in the Dobrudja had received no intimation of this commendable measure. It is obvious that all these
563 grievances could easily be removed with a little goodwill on
648 the part of the Rumanian government, and to the westerner
657 it is incomprehensible that the latter should make no effort to safeguard the happiness of hundreds of thousands of human beings whose destiny has been entrusted to its hands. For it is not only the elementary duty of a government to care for its subjects, but in this case even political reasons dictate the following of a more humane and civilized policy. The bulk of the population being Bulgarian, and having for forty years enjoyed an independent existence, is utterly unaccustomed to such maladministration as it is now experiencing. It is therefore natural that it should be soliciting the intercession of the Bulgarian government under whose suzerainty it lived until recently. This is a course that creates friction between the two governments, keeps open an old sore, and embitters and strains relations between Bulgaria and Rumania. The former country would incur every sacrifice in order to ensure Rumania's friendship, and

the price of the quantity of maize grown on it would fetch only 40 lei; nevertheless the peasant owner persisted in cultivating his patch of land because he felt ashamed to allow it to lie fallow, having always been accustomed to cultivate it, and buy the maize he needed instead, for which, however, he would probably have to pay a somewhat higher price than the 40 lei at which he could have sold his own (p. 111). So that, far from exerting an adverse influence on production, the breaking up of the large estates has, on the contrary, proved to be the salvation of the industry, for were it not for the abnegation and attachment of the individual smallholder to his farm, agriculture would have been completely ruined by the policy imposed by the Bratianus. Indeed, one cannot but admire this profound devotion of the peasant to the land and his dogged persistence in carrying on, despite the odds which confronted him and the utter lack of encouragement he met with from the State. We may take it for granted that the small farm of five hectares was more productive than the large estates, even from official statistics. This peculiarity was commented on in the *Cuvantul* of July 23rd, 1927, which at the same time decried the maladministration of the then Finance Minister, M. Vintila Bratianu, and his threat to increase the land tax. That paper contested the official statement that the land tax in Rumania amounted to one gold franc per hectare, as this affirmation would cast a slur on the country. In fact it was estimated that in 1924 the export taxes on cereals had yielded the equivalent of a tax of 8 gold francs per hectare.

The determined perseverance of the peasantry could not undo the harm caused by the erroneous agrarian policy pursued, and the situation could not but grow worse with time.

So that when finally the National Peasant Party assumed power at the end of 1928, the situation had become so hopeless that the Rumanian Government even contemplated organizing a mass emigration to France and her colonies in order to relieve the strain. Early in 1929 the Press, commenting on this unexpected decision of the Government to encourage emigration, admitted that the cause of the disastrous condition agriculture had reached in Rumania could

241 be clearly traced to the carelessness with which the law of
423 land distribution had been drafted, and to the utter neglect
[511] to provide financial means for its rational application, as well
167 as to the export taxes on agricultural produce. The outcome was appalling, as may be judged from an article in the *Cuvantul* in which, after dilating on the causes that had brought about this disaster, it was asserted: "We are obliged to admit that the entire rural population had reached a state of pauperism at a time when we should reasonably have expected it to be thriving, since it had been endowed with lands. It seems a paradox, yet we have only wrecked the old system of production, founded on the unjust system of latifundia, in order to replace serfdom by pauperism. At the time of the large estates the rural worker had no need to emigrate; on the contrary, there was a shortage of labour, and foreign labourers had to be admitted from neighbouring countries. To-day, however, we are forced to direct the rural population abroad so as to save it from starvation; that is the situation we have reached ten years after the enactment of the expropriation laws. . . ." According to the *Adeverul* of March 29th, 1929, the Minister for Agriculture, speaking about the state of that industry, drew a very dark picture and lamented the wretched condition to which agricultural production had fallen. Rumanian agriculture, once the source of wealth and the economic basis of the State, was, he said, on the verge of ruin. The Minister not only condemned the culpable manner in which the land distribution law had been carried out, but also denounced the laxity and incapacity of the functionaries who had been appointed to show the peasants new methods of cultivation. According to him, the so-called model school farms were a positive dis-
241 grace. . . . Apparently matters have not improved since, for
874 as late as March, 1932, one could read in the *Ellenzek*, a paper published in Hungarian at Cluj, that the Hungarian Cultural Association of Transylvania had decided to present a petition to the League of Nations to demand the creation of an agricultural school destined exclusively for sons of Rumanian citizens of Hungarian nationality. One ought not to feel surprise that the Hungarian minority, convinced of the glaring ineptitude of the Rumanian administration, had

B. LABOUR POSITION DURING THE WAR

1. Military Conscription

701 The age limits for mobilisation are 19–50, while youths from 17–18 are liable for pre-military training.

During 1942 there have been several indications of the strain which further mobilisation was putting on Rumania's manpower; for example, in April 1942 the sentences on political prisoners were suspended and they were called into the army, while from July of that year onwards there has been a constant revision of previous exemptions and a tightening of control over the granting of leave and call-up. Military service, which previously had been obligatory for Rumanian citizens only, was made compulsory for all non-nationals* resident in the country, and further a decree was passed mobilising all Rumanians of military age resident abroad.

[563]

It is calculated that it has never been possible for Rumania to have more than 800,000 men properly equipped under arms at one period. The actual strength of the army has fluctuated considerably during the last two years, as has the number on the eastern front, but a reasonable average figure would be 500,000, of which 200,000 on the eastern front.

727 Rumanian casualties are difficult to assess. One estimate at the end of 1941 put casualties
464 at 150,000, while total casualties up to May 1943 have been estimated at 350,000. Military mobilisation will probably have meant a loss of some 800,000 men to the general labour supply.

2. Recruitment for Germany

464 The recruitment of workers for Germany has
167 been on a small scale, which is not surprising, as Rumania's military contribution has been considerable, and the military mobilisation has already reduced the supply of labour needed for the Rumanian armament industry to a minimum. Such labour as might be available for export is unskilled and therefore of less value to Germany. The total number of Rumanian workers in Germany in December, 1942, was estimated at 14,000. Of these 10,000 were young Rumanians 18–19, who were recruited at the end of 1941 to be "trained" in German metallurgical factories, 1,000 are women employed as domestic servants, and the rest are mainly unskilled general workers.

3. Foreign Workers in Rumania

648 In addition to the German administrators and
463 directors, who are in certain of the key positions in Rumanian industry, there is also evidence of skilled German technicians in Rumanian armament factories. In 1942 there was a nucleus of the German Todt organisation, and Italian builders, in the country.

727 About ~~40,000 Russian prisoners~~ of war are employed, chiefly in agriculture, though also in mining and navvying work.

C. GENERAL LABOUR DEVELOPMENTS

464 In 1937 the average unemployment figure was
722 12,000. The dislocation of trade and industry on the outbreak of war temporarily caused a general increase of unemployment, which was rapidly absorbed by the military call-up and increased activity in the armaments industry. In March

* The German minority was already liable for military service, either in the Rumanian or German army and in December, 1942, it was announced that there were 30,000 *Volksdeutsche* in the Rumanian Army.

[55a]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 ED1 Rumania ED1

IV.—PEOPLES AND SETTLEMENTS: EARLY TIMES

131 THE POSITION OF ROUMANIA with its mountain ramparts forming an outpost of central Europe, over against the south Russian steppe on the one hand and the Balkan peninsula on the other, has been emphasised in a brief review of its features and relief and climate. The same fact of position is most important in the study of its human relations throughout history, and here it is necessary to emphasise once more that relations between the south Russian and Hungarian plains in the far past have been carried on *via* the Carpathian passes rather than by the Iron Gates which may well have been impassable until Trajan's engineering feat made a platform along the right bank, and the temporariness of that construction suggests that the grim defile did not remain in use. To what extent some detours not very far away may have been utilised at various periods is a matter for research.

172 174 TOO LITTLE is known concerning Roumania in the Old Stone Age to permit of any useful discussion, but the country was much affected when, in the relatively short Neolithic period heralding the advent of metal, a cultivating population was spreading westward through central Europe. It is a matter for further research to decide to what extent south Russia and to what extent Thrace were routes of this first peasant [177] civilisation in its spread westwards. The earliest agriculturists of Roumania, in their equipment, show relationships or participation of ideas with contemporaries in the Ukraine, in the Balkan peninsula, including Vinça near Belgrade, and Thessaly, and in north Hungary, Roumania yielding specially important material from Cucuteni, near Iaşi, from Erösd in the south-east of Transylvania, and from Tordos in central Transylvania on the upper Olt. The former has yielded figurines that are female and steatopygous, but without the large breasts and general development of fat that occur in some other centres. The pottery is painted, and on the whole it seems that, at this stage, the Ukraine was richer; we may well be dealing with a spread that was to some extent westward, using passes of the south-eastern Carpathians (Fig. 4). At the same time it should be borne in mind that the Olt, the Mureş and several other rivers of Transylvania yielded

172
174

gold, while copper was found in those regions as well, so the desire for these materials may have brought settlers here apart from the general spread of pioneering cultivators which is perhaps better attested further west. In Lower Austria and Moravia the equipment of the very early cultivators includes ornaments of Spondylus shells that in several cases have come from the Mediterranean, indicating already at that primeval stage of the development of civilisation those wide-ranging links which seem so generally to have been, and to be, factors of progress. This thought is further supported by a knowledge that the Roumano-Ukrainian area seems to show links with far-off Elam, north-east of the Persian Gulf.

WE MAY provisionally picture the pioneers of settlement and cultivation as spreading from the south-east some time in the latter half of the third millennium B.C., as yet shifting their villages from time to time, probably because schemes of rotation in land-use and of dung-manuring had not come into operation. They seem to have preferred sites on the Loess as would be expected, because that material is fertile, and usually less wooded than areas of clay subsoil. They apparently met and probably incorporated into their groups remnants of older hunting groups, but they were concerned with cultivation, apparently using especially stone hoes ground into the shape of a shoe-last. Hoe cultivation suggests, by analogy with modern Africa, that a good deal of the work was done by women. The figurines show that great importance was attached to the idea of fertility, symbolised by woman; this is often described as "Worship of the Mother-Goddess," a description that may be correct, or may perhaps give a somewhat too definite impression. That sooner, rather than later, the early cultivators interested themselves in gold washing and in copper seems to stand out fairly clearly. They became considerable artists in pottery, and appear to have built rectangular houses with a porch, partly open, and an inner room. The possible relationship of this (Megaron) scheme to later ones in the Aegean and Greece, leading right on to the classical Greek temple, gives it a great interest; it is widely agreed that the main ideas of the construction of the classical Greek temple were derived from forested lands well to the north. The houses appear to have often been agglomerated, as one would expect, and the group had a rampart-ditch around it. The people used bows

172 and arrows and valued deer-horn for making holders for
174 stone axes and for other purposes. Later, perhaps, hunting became more important, and incised ornament on the pottery became a feature here as it was also further west-north-west.

THERE SEEM indications that, as time passed, aristocratic herders spread among the early cultivators, and they emphasise connections between the Ukrainian steppe and Hungary across the south-eastern Carpathians and down the Mureş. Copper axe-adzes, some with a median hole for the shaft, have been found at various spots, chiefly in Transylvania, as Childe has well shown. It is thought that the hole was punched through the heated metal and not cast. Ornaments and other details suggest that the aristocracy at least had some connections with the Aegean, and bronze was gradually introduced, as a copper-antimony alloy at first. Parvan has emphasised the importance of the Carpathian area in the Bronze Age, with fine workmanship in bronze and gold, and, in the late Bronze Age and the transition to the early Iron Age, the culture connections seem to have been mainly westward, the analogies with north Italian bronze cauldrons being specially noteworthy. There are several indications that in this period, which, in Europe, seems to have been one of dry warm summers, the south Russian steppes were relatively empty. Probably the previous spread across the south-eastern Carpathians had brought westward horsemen, either already armed with the sword or about to learn to make it, a weapon that would suit cavalry better than the axe-adze of older days. In the transition from bronze to iron the Transylvanian Carpathians were thus the eastern limit of an area including Hungary and North Italy, while southward they were linked with Attica. Agriculture had doubtless improved, settlements had become more or less permanent as it is likely that a rotatory scheme of soil use had been evolved; craftsmanship in gold and bronze for luxury objects had reached a high level.

175 THE PICTURE changes again dramatically round about 700 B.C., through two mutually supplementary influences. Firstly, the climates of Denmark and Switzerland became colder and wetter, so probably that of the Carpathians felt the influence of a lowering of the snow-line and an impoverishment of agriculture and craftsmanship. Iron work had

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 ED1 Rumania ED1

IV.—PEOPLES AND SETTLEMENTS: EARLY TIMES

131 THE POSITION OF ROUMANIA with its mountain ramparts forming an outpost of central Europe, over against the south Russian steppe on the one hand and the Balkan peninsula on the other, has been emphasised in a brief review of its features and relief and climate. The same fact of position is most important in the study of its human relations throughout history, and here it is necessary to emphasise once more that relations between the south Russian and Hungarian plains in the far past have been carried on *via* the Carpathian passes rather than by the Iron Gates which may well have been impassable until Trajan's engineering feat made a platform along the right bank, and the temporariness of that construction suggests that the grim defile did not remain in use. To what extent some detours not very far away may have been utilised at various periods is a matter for research.

172 174 TOO LITTLE is known concerning Roumania in the Old Stone Age to permit of any useful discussion, but the country was much affected when, in the relatively short Neolithic period heralding the advent of metal, a cultivating population was spreading westward through central Europe. It is a matter for further research to decide to what extent south Russia and to what extent Thrace were routes of this first peasant [177] civilisation in its spread westwards. The earliest agriculturists of Roumania, in their equipment, show relationships or participation of ideas with contemporaries in the Ukraine, in the Balkan peninsula, including Vinça near Belgrade, and Thessaly, and in north Hungary, Roumania yielding specially important material from Cucuteni, near Iaşi, from Erösd in the south-east of Transylvania, and from Tordos in central Transylvania on the upper Olt. The former has yielded figurines that are female and steatopygous, but without the large breasts and general development of fat that occur in some other centres. The pottery is painted, and on the whole it seems that, at this stage, the Ukraine was richer; we may well be dealing with a spread that was to some extent westward, using passes of the south-eastern Carpathians (Fig. 4). At the same time it should be borne in mind that the Olt, the Mureş and several other rivers of Transylvania yielded

172
174

gold, while copper was found in those regions as well, so the desire for these materials may have brought settlers here apart from the general spread of pioneering cultivators which is perhaps better attested further west. In Lower Austria and Moravia the equipment of the very early cultivators includes ornaments of Spondylus shells that in several cases have come from the Mediterranean, indicating already at that primeval stage of the development of civilisation those wide-ranging links which seem so generally to have been, and to be, factors of progress. This thought is further supported by a knowledge that the Roumano-Ukrainian area seems to show links with far-off Elam, north-east of the Persian Gulf.

WE MAY provisionally picture the pioneers of settlement and cultivation as spreading from the south-east some time in the latter half of the third millennium B.C., as yet shifting their villages from time to time, probably because schemes of rotation in land-use and of dung-manuring had not come into operation. They seem to have preferred sites on the Loess as would be expected, because that material is fertile, and usually less wooded than areas of clay subsoil. They apparently met and probably incorporated into their groups remnants of older hunting groups, but they were concerned with cultivation, apparently using especially stone hoes ground into the shape of a shoe-last. Hoe cultivation suggests, by analogy with modern Africa, that a good deal of the work was done by women. The figurines show that great importance was attached to the idea of fertility, symbolised by woman; this is often described as "Worship of the Mother-Goddess," a description that may be correct, or may perhaps give a somewhat too definite impression. That sooner, rather than later, the early cultivators interested themselves in gold washing and in copper seems to stand out fairly clearly. They became considerable artists in pottery, and appear to have built rectangular houses with a porch, partly open, and an inner room. The possible relationship of this (Megaron) scheme to later ones in the Aegean and Greece, leading right on to the classical Greek temple, gives it a great interest; it is widely agreed that the main ideas of the construction of the classical Greek temple were derived from forested lands well to the north. The houses appear to have often been agglomerated, as one would expect, and the group had a rampart-ditch around it. The people used bows

172 and arrows and valued deer-horn for making holders for
174 stone axes and for other purposes. Later, perhaps, hunting became more important, and incised ornament on the pottery became a feature here as it was also further west-north-west.

THERE SEEM indications that, as time passed, aristocratic herders spread among the early cultivators, and they emphasise connections between the Ukrainian steppe and Hungary across the south-eastern Carpathians and down the Mureş. Copper axe-adzes, some with a median hole for the shaft, have been found at various spots, chiefly in Transylvania, as Childe has well shown. It is thought that the hole was punched through the heated metal and not cast. Ornaments and other details suggest that the aristocracy at least had some connections with the Aegean, and bronze was gradually introduced, as a copper-antimony alloy at first. Parvan has emphasised the importance of the Carpathian area in the Bronze Age, with fine workmanship in bronze and gold, and, in the late Bronze Age and the transition to the early Iron Age, the culture connections seem to have been mainly westward, the analogies with north Italian bronze cauldrons being specially noteworthy. There are several indications that in this period, which, in Europe, seems to have been one of dry warm summers, the south Russian steppes were relatively empty. Probably the previous spread across the south-eastern Carpathians had brought westward horsemen, either already armed with the sword or about to learn to make it, a weapon that would suit cavalry better than the axe-adze of older days. In the transition from bronze to iron the Transylvanian Carpathians were thus the eastern limit of an area including Hungary and North Italy, while southward they were linked with Attica. Agriculture had doubtless improved, settlements had become more or less permanent as it is likely that a rotatory scheme of soil use had been evolved; craftsmanship in gold and bronze for luxury objects had reached a high level.

175 THE PICTURE changes again dramatically round about 700 B.C., through two mutually supplementary influences. Firstly, the climates of Denmark and Switzerland became colder and wetter, so probably that of the Carpathians felt the influence of a lowering of the snow-line and an impoverishment of agriculture and craftsmanship. Iron work had

Churches and Religion Romania

1. Digest

I. Prior to 1919

●175
795
179]

The available evidence indicate that Christianity had been well established on the territory of the present day Romania in the second century. The region designated as Dacia, a province of the Roman Empire, had, between 106 and the end of the third century, an organized church with an established hierarchy. A bishop of "Gothic Dacia", (the name of this region after the withdrawal of the Roman legions) took part at the first Ecumenical Council at Nicea 325 A.D. Also, a Gothic Dacian bishop is mentioned among those present at the second Ecumenical Council of Constantinople, 381 A. D. We do not possess any particular information concerning the Christianity in this region from the 5th until the 13th century. This was the period of barbarian invasion which destroyed organized social life and forced the great majority of the population to seek refuge in the mountains.

The available informations for the beginning of the 13th century show the church of that region as being a part of the Eastern Orthodox Church. From that time on and until the second half of the 19th century the Romanian Eastern Orthodox Church was under the ecumenical Patriarchy of Constantinople. This applies not only to the canonical and dogmatic matters but also to the investiture (appointment of high dignitaries of the

175
195
[642]

church). The Romanian church has become independendent from this Patriarchy only as a result of a long and complex process which began when the independent Romanian State came into being in 1859 as "the United Romanian Principalities." The first constitution of the kingdom of Romania of 1866 stated (Article 21) that "the Romanian Orthodox Church is independent." But the recognition of its autocephaly by the Patriarchy of Constantinople was declared only in 1885. Nevertheless, the Romanian Church has continued to maintain its unity with the ecumenical church of the East. This relation was, however, confined to the purely religious aspect. The Romanian church considered to be its duty to consult Constantinople Patriarchy on difficult questions of dogmas, cannns, and cults whenever it was necessary.

Thus, it may be observed that the independence of the Romanian church was a consequence of the political independence of the Romanian State. The independence of the church signified the achievements of the sovereignty of the Romanian people and the church organization rendered important help and support to the incipient state.

[793]

The Romanian clergy took part in the government administration and in political life. The clergymen could be elected to the parliaments and seats in some important governmental bodies were reserved to it. This was rather a consituation of the established tradition because in the past the representatives of the clergy had always been counsellors of the "domnitor" (the ruler) and members of the "Sfatul Tarii" (country's Assembly).

000 795 642 115 (the ruler) and members of the "Sfatul Tarii" (country's Assembly). In general, the Romanian Orthodox Church has been since the foundation of the "United Principalities" in 1859 considered the predominant church and had a priority over other churches. This situation continued when the Kingdom of Romania was formed after 1866 (hereafter called Old Kingdom in contrast to Romania after 1919). Nevertheless, the religious practices of other churches were tolerated and undistrubed. The Romanian Orthodox [798] Church did not consider itself universal, was not animated by any spirit of proselytism and was rather passive and tolerant towards other creeds and rites. For this reason and because of the small number of persons professing other religions in the Kingdom of Romania, the situation did not call for any special legislation on freedom of religion prior to World War I.

II. From World War I to the End of World War II

1. General Regime of Churches

651 The necessity for special legislation regulating the status of churches other than the Romanian Orthodox has arisen after World War I.

175 671 The Romanian Kingdom emerged after World War I with an enlarged territory. The newly incorporated provinces were hitherto governed by different laws. Bulgarian law prevailed in Banat and Maramuresh, the same law with some specific provisions was also in force on Transylvania; Austrian law was

175 in force in Bukovina and the Russian law, with some specific
671 local rules, was in force in Bessarabia.

175 The population of the newly incorporated provinces was
162 predominantly Romanian but, in view of the long separation from the Old Kingdom, was somewhat different. Moreover, there were also other ethnological groups and a variety of churches and even sects.

The population of Transylvania and Banat, for instance, was divided mainly among the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches. The population of Bukovina and Maramuresh was either of Catholic (Uniates) or Orthodox religion and had an important Jewish minority. In Bessarabia, in addition to the Eastern Orthodox Church, there was a real conglomerate of creeds and and rites, many of them originating back in the 17th century and subsequent reforms of the Russian Orthodox Church.

659 A new Constitution was adopted in 1923. It declared
[642] the principle of freedom of religion which needed to be developed in details and put into effect by special laws. This did not follow immediately but, instead, the Romanian Government carried out, in 1925, the unification and hierarchical reorganization of the Romanian Orthodox Church (see <u>infra</u>).

This step increased the pressure of the numerous other churches and rites practiced within the new frontiers. They intervened seeing that their status be defined and that their relations with the higher church authorities abroad, as well as with the Romanian State and the Orthodox Church, be settled by

795 part of Northern Bessarabia.

c) Armenian Uniates called also Roman Catholic of Armenian rite.

Each of these churches came under the supremacy of the Pope at a different time and under slightly different conditions. Only the Romanian Greek Catholics are dealt with in the present chapter (for others see infra III, 5).

175 795 779 The union of the Greek Orthodox Romanians by nationality with the Roman Catholic Church was accomplished by an agreement in 1698 between the Vatican and the Orthodox Bishopric of Alba-Julia, ratified later, by the Pope. In joining the Catholic Church, this fraction of the Greek Orthodox Church, however, reserved, among other things, the right to officiate at the services in the Romanian language, and the right of the clergymen to marry. In exchange, the Uniates admitted four dogmatic points of the Catholics, among which the more important were the acceptance of the Pope's supremacy and the Filioque. This union was a result of a compromise accepted by the Holy See in view of circumstances which prevailed in Hungary in particular in Transylvania and Banat in the 17th century. Several political causes contributed to this union. To mention the principal ones, the Hungarian kings endeavored to convert the Romanian minority to Catholicism and thus to detach it from the influence of Romanian Principalities. The spreading of protestantism among the German minority in Transylvania presented a possibility of swaying the Romanians to the same religion.

175
795

The Greek Catholic fraction was amalgamated into the hierarchy of the Roman Church and became simply a rite within that church. At the very beginning, this church was organized as a single diocese with the rank of a Bishopric but, later on, the number of dioceses was raised to three. Nevertheless, during a period of approximately 90 years from the time of the union, the Uniate bishops were supervised and controlled by Jesuit monks sent from Rome. In 1855, the Greek Catholic Church was raised to the rank of a Mitropoly and the Jesuitic control was withdrawn.

115
659

Until the Concordat of 1929, the status of this church was based mainly on the provisions of the Act of Union of 1698. Both the Constitution of 1923 and the Law No. 54 of 1928 granted it priority above all the other religious minorities. It has been reorganized since the conclusion of the Concordat and was given all rights and privileges of the Catholic Church. The [713] highest dignitaries of the Greek Catholic Church were equally senators ex officio of the Romanian Parliament as were those of the Roman Catholic Church. The clergy has been paid by the State. For preparing its clergy the church was maintained three theological academies. The returns of the census of 1930 [162] showed that 7.9 percent of the population of Romania belonged to the Greek Catholic faith.

III. Churches under the Communist Regime

1. Basic Provisions

175
642

Although Romania has been ruled by Soviet Russia since its surrender in August 1944 and is actually governed by a Communist Cabinet appointed by Moscow in March 1945, the beginning of the Communist regime is set as of January 1, 1948, e. g., after the King's abdication and the creation of a People's Republic, since the main revolutionary social reforms have been enacted after that date.

648
798

Romania signed and ratified the Peace Treaty with the Allied Nations (Official Gazette No. 199 of August 30, 1947). According to clear stipulations of the treaty Romania is bound to translate into national legislation its main provisions and apply them strictly. Article 3 of the Peace Treaty reads:

> "Romania shall take all measures necessary to secure to all persons under Romanian jurisdiction, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship..." (Italics supplied.)

The freedom of religious worship was, therefore, considered as a fundamental one and the Romanian Government was supposed to make no discrimination between the different churches of rites of various denominations existent and practiced within its boundaries.

642
798

The first attempt to comply with these provisions was made through the new Romanian Constitution enacted on April 11, 1948.

659
795
798

refused to join the monasteries and convents, were given the choice either to request internment in public poor houses (that is, the old people) or to be trained for a handicraft and afterwards assigned to work by the Office for Distribution of Labor Forces. Each member was obliged to communicate in writing his decision to the Ministry for Religious Affairs within 20 days.

It should be also mentioned that under the Law of November 3, 1948, providing for the nationalization of private hospitals, sanatoria and similar health institutions, a number of important Catholic hospitals were taken over by the government from the Church.

175
795

5. Greek Catholic (Uniate) Churches
(Romanian, Ruthenian, Armenian)

As it was mentioned supra II, 4., there were three Uniate churches in Romania. The origin and status of the so-called Greek Catholics, i.e., Romanian Uniates, was described there. The adherents of this church inhabit Transylvania. The members of Armenian Uniate Church (Roman Catholics of Armenian rite) inhabit also in Transylvania (bishopric in Gherla). The third Uniate church, so-called Greek Ruthenian, embraces only Ukrainian (i.e., Russian) population in Bukovina and Maramuresh. Its origin is dated from the Brest Church Council of 1596 when the prelates of the Orthodox Church then within the confines of Poland accepted the union with the Holy See on conditions similar to those accepted subsequently by the Romanian Church in 1698 (see supra II, 4).

To this Church belonged the Ukrainian population of the northern part of Bukovina and of Galicia--which incorporated in the Soviet Union after World War II--and also the Ukrainian and Belorussian population of these provinces. However, the latter population was officially incorporated into the Russian Church by the decree of Emperor Nicholas I in 1839. 175 795

All three Uniate churches in Romania were until now branches of the Roman Catholic Church and after the Concordat was denounced found themselves in a similar position, i.e., without a regulation by law. The members of all three churches experienced a pressure on the part of the government to induce them to "return", so to speak, to the Orthodox Church and to break with the Holy See. The disbandment of the Uniate parishes or rather their transformation into Orthodox parishes was indirectly stimulated by the Order No. 39,380 of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Official Gazette No. 242 of October 18, 1948). Under the previous decree No. 177 of 1948, if members of a parish select another church they carry with them a part of the assets of the parish proportionate to their number. If 75 percent of the parishioners decide to join another church, the church building is transferred to the newly selected one. The Order No. 39,380 provided that, in counting such members, only the heads of each family are taken into account. Thus the counting was greatly facilitated and expedited. 175 795 659 [425]

No decrees were disclosed dealing especially with the Armenian Uniate Church.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

I

PEASANT AGAINST LANDOWNER

The Peasant Revolt of 1907

●175
668

IN MARCH, 1907, the peasants in northern Moldavia, not far from the Russian frontier, arose in revolt.[1] Initially the uprising was directed, perhaps as a result of anti-Semitic instigation, against certain Jewish tenants renting large estates, but in its rapid extension south and west into Muntenia and along the Danube into Oltenia it became an increasingly violent assault upon all large tenant farmers and absentee landowners. The peasants not only demanded an amelioration of their labor contracts but in some districts seized land and organized revolutionary bands. The poorer peasants, those with insufficient holdings to support themselves, seem to have been the first to revolt, but they were soon joined by the more prosperous villagers. Indeed, subsequent investigations revealed that the active heads of the movement, in so far as it received any direction, had been village leaders, ex-army sergeants, clerks, and schoolteachers.[2]

For a time neither the central authorities in Bucarest nor the local administrations were able to cope with the spreading unrest, but after the dismissal of the Conservatives a Liberal government, perhaps under the threat of foreign intervention by Austria, took vigorous countermeasures. Troops under General Averescu, later a war hero and political figure, descended on the countryside and after some sharp conflicts restored order. Reprisals in districts where there had been peasant violence were extremely severe. It has been estimated that upward of 11,000 peasants were killed in the course of the revolt and its suppression.

Although the uprising lasted less than a month and was completely subdued, it was, and was felt to be, an event of frightening significance. Here was no by-product of foreign invasion, the frequent

[13]

1. For an account of the revolt see Radu Rosetti, *Pentru ce s'au răsculat ţăranii* (Bucarest, 1908). A recent novel by Leo Katz, *Seedtime* (New York, 1947), is based on this uprising. Many aspects of the revolt are obscure, and the dossiers relating to its suppression are reported to have disappeared subsequently from the Ministry of War. In 1948, however, under the auspices of the Groza government, Mihail Roller edited a collection of state documents regarding the 1907 uprising. This new material, which may contain important additional information, was not available when this chapter was written.

2. C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *Neoiobăgia* (Bucarest, 2d ed., n.d.), p. 204.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

●175
668

occasion of many of Rumania's woes, nor a national revolt against an alien dominant class, but the unmistakable sign of a deep cleft within Rumanian society. The explosive culmination of a situation which had been building up during the preceding half-century, it rendered explicit and obvious the political dangers of the unresolved agrarian question. The outbreak had been foreshadowed by local uprisings in 1888, 1889, 1894, and 1900, and a few observers had predicted trouble. On the whole, however, an atmosphere of optimism and complacency had prevailed in the years following Rumania's emergence as a united and independent state. In 1906 the Minister of Domains had proudly declared in the Rumanian senate: "Gentlemen, you know that Rumania is one of the countries in Europe in which the small holding is more widespread than elsewhere, where the relation between the large and the small proprietor is more to the advantage of the latter than even in democratic France." [3]

The brief but intense convulsion of 1907, which in the eyes of terrified contemporaries had threatened Rumania's existence as a state and had nearly become a civil war, broke this complacency and gave rise to some soul searching. Politicians and writers ardently debated the causes of the revolt. Indeed, the stimulus of this unsettling event produced some of the most original social writings that have appeared in Rumania. For those who were unwilling or unable to see the full import of the uprising, it was most simply explained as the result either of "instigation" or of "peasant misery." The Conservatives accused the Liberal party of instigating the revolt to overthrow the Cantacuzino government. Despite the vagaries of Rumanian politics, it seems unlikely that the Liberals, many of whom were large landowners themselves, should wittingly have used such a dangerous device, although there is evidence of Liberal agitation directed against the Jewish *fermiers*.

The Liberals in turn charged that the revolt was the work of foreign revolutionaries: "The Rumanian authorities have discovered that the peasant uprisings are the fruits of a secret propaganda carried on among the peasants by a revolutionary group, in which teachers, priests, and Russian seamen of the cruiser "Potemkin" are taking part." [4] They expelled from the country some 880 persons, in-

3. Quoted in G. D. Creangă, *Grundbesitzverteilung und Bauernfrage in Rumänien*, 3 Teile, in *Staats- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen*, Hefte 129, 140 (Leipzig, 1907, 1909), I, 25.

4. Const. Titel Petrescu, *Socialismul în Romînia* (Bucarest, n.d.), p. 198. In 1905 the Russian cruiser "Potemkin," after the mutiny, eventually sailed to Constanţa, where the crew debarked as political refugees.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

cluding Christian Rakovsky, one of the leaders of the Rumanian socialist movement.

175 668

Although signs of revolutionary activity and organization had been observed in certain districts, and some inflammatory pamphlets from Bessarabia had circulated in Rumania, the spontaneous spread of the revolt and the lack of evidence of careful preparation would argue against any important significance of such activity. The Rumanian socialists, who were in an extremely weak position, opposed the uprising. In 1892 the party program had declared that a backward country like Rumania was in no position to initiate a social revolution, and in 1907 the party advised the peasants against revolting: "Uprisings benefit only the boyars. The peasants afterward become even weaker and more depressed. . . . Peasants, you will not be delivered by uprisings, you will achieve profitable and lasting results not through violence and plundering but through seeking to destroy the political power of the boyars, landowners, and tenants." [5] In any event, the charge of instigation is a superficial one which, if sustained, explains the spark, not the conflagration.

Neither is peasant misery, while clearly a necessary ground for the revolt, a sufficient explanation. Extreme misery "dulls the mind, numbs the soul, destroys energy and the spirit of revolt, and leads to resignation and blind submission—a state of mind diametrically opposed to that which leads to revolt." [6] Moreover, the 1906 harvest had been exceptionally good. The important part played by village leaders and wealthy peasants would indicate that the revolt was more than a simple reaction to misery.

Certain contemporaries, notably G. D. Creangă, Radu Rosetti, Constantin Garoflid, and C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, made more penetrating analyses of the problem. Creangă, by his statistical studies of property holdings, provided concrete evidence of the high percentage of land occupied by great estates. Rosetti, after an extensive historical survey of the agrarian question, concluded that "the latifundia is the enemy," that the true instigators of the rising were not Liberals or foreign agents but the "egoism, greediness, lack of scruple and lack of foresight on the part of the ruling classes both old and new." [7] Garoflid, an agrarian expert and himself a landowner, held that the acknowledged maldistribution of land was a consequence of a basic crisis in the system of agricultural production. The socialist

5. *Ibid.*, p. 196.
6. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *op. cit.*, p. 179.
7. Rosetti, *op. cit.*, p. 624.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 568 Dobrogeanu-Gherea argued that a state of permanent crisis in Rumania was being effected by the impact of Western political and economic forms upon the traditional Rumanian pattern. The result was an unfortunate hybrid, *neoiobăgia* (neoserfdom), the form of liberal-bourgeois institutions superimposed upon a feudal reality. Although Dobrogeanu-Gherea placed excessive trust in neoiobăgia as an all-inclusive explanation, he correctly realized that Rumania's contact with the Western world had a dynamic and by no means simple effect upon the existing economic and social structure.[8]

Economic and Social Roots of the Agrarian Problem[9]

311 An extreme concentration of land in large estates, an excessive fragmentation of small holdings, and the insignificance of medium-sized properties were the most obvious elements of the Rumanian agrarian problem at that time. In 1905 the disparity between large and small holdings probably exceeded that of any state in Europe, including Russia. On the basis of his investigations, which are probably the most accurate available, G. D. Creangă estimated that Rumanian properties were divided in the following manner: in the terminology of the time, small properties (0–10 hectares), comprising over 95 per cent of all properties, covered 40 per cent of the arable and grazing land; medium properties (10–100 hectares), comprising 4 per cent of all properties, occupied 11 per cent; whereas about 5,000 large and latifundiary estates held nearly 50 per cent.[10] If forests, orchards, and vineyards are included, the area covered by large property exceeded 57 per cent. These figures on property do not, of course, include the landless peasants. Creangă estimated that there were at that time about 300,000 peasants without land and

8. For a further analysis of Dobrogeanu-Gherea's ideas in connection with Rumanian Social Democracy, see below, pp. 276–280.

9. More extensive, and in some respects conflicting, discussions of the economic background of the agrarian problem are given in David Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Economic and Social History of the World War" (London; New Haven, Yale University Press, 1930), and Marcel Emerit, *Les Paysans Roumains depuis le traité d'Andrinople jusqu'à la libération des terres (1829–1864)* (Paris, 1937).

10. In numbers the division was as follows:

Size of holdings in hectares	*Number of holdings*	*Area in hectares*
0–10	920,939	3,158,645
10–100	38,723	862,800
Over 100	5,385	3,810,351
	965,047	7,826,796

For more detailed figures on the distribution of property see the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

423 the majority of the peasants were bound as *rumâni* (the most com-
566 mon term for serfs). In its form as in its relatively late flowering the Rumanian servile system more nearly resembled that of Russia than that of western Europe.

The life of the Rumanian serfs was bitter and squalid, as is illustrated by periodic mass flights across the Danube or into Transylvania. Their burdens resulted from their being on the bottom of the social structure of a state first fighting and then subservient to the Ottoman Empire and from the task of supporting, in a relatively self-sufficient economy, the needs of the boyars and their retainers. Although the growing boyar domination was a gradual process and apparently accompanied an internal breakdown of the village community, the act of binding the peasant to the land, carried out as a general measure by Michael the Brave (*ca.* 1558–1601), had, in large part at least, a military and political purpose: to insure a settled population able to provide military supplies. However, while the tax burden and the tributes owing the Turks were transmitted from prince and boyar to the back of the peasant, servile labor obligations, the *clacă*, were relatively light. The population was sparse, and the boyars were not reluctant to grant the peasants land, of which there was an abundance, provided, of course, they paid their tithes in kind.

566 Toward the middle of the eighteenth century two new elements ap-
●175 pear: increasing state legislation, superseding or codifying customary practices, and the growth of commercial activity. The twin action of these two factors becomes ever more important right through the nineteenth century, and on their interrelation hangs much of the agrarian problem. Both were destructive of the old closed society of traditional rights and a relatively static economy; both were introduced from without. Sometimes they reinforced one another in promoting change; sometimes one held the other in check.

Around 1750 the Phanariot prince, Constantin Mavrocordat, formally abolished serfdom in an act anticipating and resembling the Habsburg Emperor Joseph II's emancipation of 1781. Although this act, in principle, relieved the peasant of personal bondage and of being tied to the land, it did not rid him of labor obligations or dues to the boyar for the use of the land he cultivated. Indeed, at about the same time the boyars initiated a persistent and successful effort to increase the number of days of the clacă and to define a working day in terms which greatly exceeded what a peasant could actually accomplish in one day. Simultaneously, they began to estab-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

lish and extend seigneurial monopolies on such activities as milling and the sale of wine. 566 175

Both actions clearly arose from the growing commercial possibilities of these years. The Turks were increasing their imports of grain from the principalities, and despite Turkish restrictions trade was developed with neighboring states. Hence it was in the interest of the boyars to increase the amount of labor available to them and to monopolize profitable commercial undertakings. One direct consequence of this new commercial pressure on the peasant was the revolt led by Tudor Vladimirescu in 1821 "against the boyars who have devoured our rights."

The next step is signalized by the Treaty of Adrianople of 1829, which opened Rumanian ports to world commerce, and the Organic Statutes of 1831–32, which gave the principalities their first constitutional documents. The effect of the first was vastly to accelerate the pace of commercial expansion. At the beginning of the nineteenth century raising livestock had been the principal occupation, but it was now replaced by the cultivation of cereals, for which the acreage nearly doubled in the thirty years betwen 1829 and 1859. This expansion of commerce in cereals continued until by the outbreak of the First World War Rumania ranked fourth among the world's cereal exporters and fifth among the wheat exporters. As a result, the relative value of land steadily increased. As early as 1805 the boyars undertook to limit the peasants' right to pasture, and in 1828 Prince Sturdza announced that the peasants had no right to exploit more than two-thirds of the lord's domain.

This trend was reinforced by the Organic Statutes. Introduced 423 during the period of Russian occupation, these acts attempted to codify, in somewhat different terms for the two principalities, the relations between boyar and peasant. In so far as they reduced arbitrary action and made precise and definite the peasant's obligations, they were to his benefit. This gain, however, was largely canceled by the fact that for the first time the lord of the land was defined as a full proprietor of his estate. The traditional concept of "master of the land" was replaced by legal ownership. In return for set labor obligations and tithes, the peasants were granted use of land not in excess of two-thirds of the estate, the remaining third being totally in the lord's hands.[13] Under this system, while the peasants had life use of

13. The extent of the lord's demesne land—the land actually cultivated under his direction—before the nineteenth century is not certain. Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 21, points out that early village maps show no separate reserve for the master of the land, but

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

423 land, it was not passed on from father to son but reverted to the landowner, who was in turn responsible for providing newly married young cultivators with a holding. In fixing the extent of land to be held by each cultivator, these acts, especially the one for Moldavia, reduced the amount customarily enjoyed for pasturage and restricted the peasants' forest rights. Although the peasant was theoretically free to move, he was in fact tied to his community by a net of regulations.

[433] With a few modifications Rumanian agrarian relations were determined by the Organic Statutes for the next third of a century. Under
566 them, as a contemporary observer remarked, "The principalities took
175 on a new life"; there was a marked increase in economic activity. That
421 the benefits of this activity were not generally shared by the peasants, however, is shown by their continued exodus across neighboring frontiers. They were being forced out of their old semipastoral habits, and the very increase of cereal exports could work to their disadvantage. For example, the entire 1847 wheat crop was sold in advance because of the urgent demands in other European states suffering from food shortages in the late 1840's. As a result of these premature sales, made largely through the boyars, the principalities experienced a food crisis which contributed greatly to the peasant unrest in the turbulent year 1848.

Apart from the abortive attempts at reform during the short-lived Wallachian revolution in 1848 and a moderate revision of the Organic Statutes in 1851, the next major change was the Act of 1864, which paralleled the 1848 emancipation in the Habsburg lands and the Russian emancipation of 1861. This act, promulgated for the united principalities by Prince Cuza, for political and social rather than for economic reasons, abolished the clacă and other servitudes. The peasants obtained full title to the land they had in use, based upon earlier regulations, and the landowners were given a compensation for the loss of their labor. The law followed the now recognized provision that peasant property could not exceed two-thirds of the former lord's estate. The new holdings could not be sold or alienated for a period of thirty years.

By this act, so it seemed, the remnants of the old servile system had been abolished. Possession and use of land were transformed into absolute property rights; the peasant holder was now a free proprietor, owing no servile obligations, and, indeed, the translation of the clacă and other dues into a redemption payment does seem to have dimin-

Emerit, *op. cit.*, p. 45, doubts if there is sufficient evidence to permit a positive declaration that the peasants traditionally had had the use of all the land.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

ished his burdens.[14] Yet a quarter of a century after the Act of 1864 566
there began those peasant disturbances which culminated in the 1907 175
uprising. In some way, as Dobrogeanu-Gherea said, "The year 1864 421
carried in its womb the terrible year 1907."

The connection, however, is not a simple one and is paradoxical in several respects. Between 1864 and 1907 Rumania continued its rapid expansion in agriculture and commerce. Exports of grain, for example, increased from about 1,400,000 tons per year in the early 1880's to nearly 2,500,000 tons in 1905. Hence it is necessary to explain how under such circumstances there should have been growing peasant discontent. Was there, to repeat that old and difficult question, increasing poverty in the midst of expanding national wealth?

In the first place, while the Act of 1864 was passed against the 566
wishes of the boyars, by a coup d'état on the part of Prince Cuza, 175
the administration of the country, especially local administration, 423
was still largely under their control, and they had ample opportunity to twist the provisions of the law to their advantage. Undoubtedly many injustices were committed in its application: often the landowner was able to distribute the worst land to the peasants, holding the best in his own estate; in a number of cases false measuring standards were used, an easy trick in a country lacking basic ground surveys; sometimes the landowner so divided the holdings that the peasants were unable to reach their property without paying a toll. As a cumulative result of these malpractices it is possible that although by the law the peasants were to receive the land they had in use before the reform, they actually received less and of lower quality. Local studies of a few districts indicate that such may have been the case, but statistics are lacking to make a general conclusion.

Another criticism of the law has been that while the peasants' claims to land could not exceed two-thirds of the lord's estate, the excess demand being met by grants of state land, in those regions where the peasants' quota was less the lord was able to retain as absolute property, with no future obligation, well over the minimal one-third. Moreover, under the Organic Statutes the lord was responsible for providing newly married peasants with a holding, while the new act made no adequate provision for subsequent generations. Peasant holdings now became inheritable property to be passed on from father to children. Since the new holdings were virtually inalienable and

14. This point, as in Russia, has been much disputed, and some authors have maintained that the peasants' burdens actually increased. The comparative figures, however, which are provided by Emerit, *op. cit.*, p. 516, if they are accurate and representative, show a considerable falling off of the amount owed by the peasant.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

566
●175
433

since the practice was to distribute land equally among heirs, there was an inevitable tendency, on many peasant holdings at least, toward a progressive subdivision of the property. This tendency has been regarded as one of the worst consequences of the reform: "At the end of three generations, the land distributed by Cuza to the rural workers was dispersed into an impalpable dust."[15] Unquestionably the fragmentation of holdings constituted a major obstacle to the introduction of rational agricultural techniques. Further, the reform did not grant land to a number of peasants, those who previously had not performed the clacă or who were listed as f- e proprietors. Finally, an examination of the size of the lots granted to the peasants reveals that a large number of cultivators did not receive enough land in the first place to enable them to establish a self-supporting holding on the level of cultivation then prevailing.[16]

It is clear, then, that the peasants' gains were limited, that in most cases they were not in a position to set up an independent farm, that the lord was relieved of all future responsibility, and that a n mber of categories of peasants were not taken care of. Such certainly were the drawbacks. The basis of Rumanian agriculture was not really altered. The reform of 1864 neither set Rumanian agriculture on the path of small peasant farming on the western European model—whether that was even theoretically possible, given the general nature of the Rumanian economy, will be discussed later—nor fostered large-scale farming based upon agricultural wage labor in the English or Prussian pattern.

In addition to the limitations of the 1864 reform, two other factors have been adduced to explain growing peasant dissatisfaction: the laws on agricultural contracts of 1866 and 1872, which are said to have reintroduced serfdom, and the land hunger of an increasing population. The immediate effect of the reform was to create a crisis in production and a great decline in the area sown, largely because the peasants preferred to cultivate their new holdings and refused to work for the landowners, who were faced with a serious labor shortage. The boyars attempted to compensate for this by passing special laws governing agricultural contracts, which unquestionably put the peasant at the landowner's mercy in matters regarding the fulfill-

15. Emerit, *op. cit.*, p. 519.

16. The allotments were based on an earlier threefold division of the peasants, determined by the number of oxen they possessed. Though the figures are only approximate, peasants having four oxen received roughly 6 hectares; those with two oxen 4½ hectares; and the so-called "tail-end" peasants, 2½ hectares. At the prevailing level of cultivation it was estimated that only the first class, a rather small minority of the peasantry, could obtain an assured surplus.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

566 ment of labor contracts and even permitted the employment of mili-
tary force to drive the peasant to work. Although the harsher aspects
●175 of these laws were later abandoned, they permanently affected land-
423 lord-peasant relations and did much to justify the term neoserfdom,
"the confirmation of the old servitudes in contractual form."

Yet these laws, while harsh on the peasant once he fell into the power of the landowner, would be significant only on the assumption that the peasants were increasingly obliged to go to the landowner for assistance. That is, the laws of contracts merely accelerated the relapse into a servile system—one lacking the paternalistic protection of the old order—but were not in themselves the cause of a deteriorating situation. Moreover, the peasant uprisings did not occur when the laws were at their harshest but later when some of the worst provisions had been abrogated.

Land hunger, in general, results from an excess of population relative to the amount of land available. As has been noted, at the beginning of the nineteenth century the Rumanian principalities were not thickly settled, though even at the time of the Organic Statutes it was not possible to give adequate grants of arable land to the peasants in the old and relatively thickly settled mountainous districts. By the middle of the century the boyars were invoking population pressure to explain the high cost of land. There is no question that in the second half of the nineteenth century Rumania's population expanded at a very rapid rate.

At the same time, however, the expansion of land under cultivation
311 appears to have been increasing even more rapidly, as the plough was put to untilled pastures, waste, and meadow.[17] The extent to which the peasants were able to benefit from this expansion of cultivated area cannot be estimated with any precision. Undoubtedly much of it took place on large estates under the control of the landowners. To some extent, too, it resulted from the peasants converting their pasture land to arable. The act of 1864 had made no provision for communal pasturing; the small peasant holdings were inadequate for both grain and livestock, and from 1864 there is a notable decline in animal husbandry. It is estimated that whereas in 1860 meadows and pasture comprised 33 per cent of the total surface of Rumania, they were reduced to 17 per cent in the years 1901–5, thus offsetting to a considerable degree the gain in land under cultiva-

17. According to Constantin Garoflid, *Chestia agrară în România* (Bucarest, 1920), p. 128, between 1859 and 1899 the population of Rumania increased by 54 per cent, whereas the area of land under cultivation increased by 85 per cent between 1862 and 1905.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

making greater demands upon both the land and the peasant. Since his profits tended to be in direct proportion to the area he was able to lease, there was a marked inclination to build up vast agricultural trusts, some of which covered more than 100,000 hectares. Although ultimately the large tenant was a consequence rather than a cause of the agrarian problem, he was the focus of hatred and abuse: hated by the peasants because he dealt directly with them, verbally abused by the landowner-politicians who made him their scapegoat. Certainly some of the more spectacular injustices and preposterous labor contracts can be found on lands operated by tenants.

This speculative interest on the part of the tenant in acquiring more land contributed to a rapid rise in rents. Between 1870 and 1906 rents mounted between 100 and 200 per cent for a third of the properties and over 200 per cent for another third. The peasants consequently were obliged to pay more dearly for the use of land. In 1870 they generally retained from two to four parts of the produce of rented land and delivered one part to the landowner or large tenant; by 1906 in over half the cases studied in an investigation, the ratio was one to one.[21]

The rise in the value of land was not accompanied by an equivalent improvement in agricultural techniques. Most of the peasants were both inexperienced in the careful cultivation of small holdings and financially unable to improve their methods, and the large landowners and tenants had little incentive. By the working of the 1864 reform the peasants remained attached to their strip of land, lacking even the free mobility of the farm laborer. They continued to own most of the means of production: over 90 per cent of the draft animals, ploughs, and harrows in Rumania belonged to the peasants.

Under these conditions the distinction between large-scale and small-scale farming was blurred, and it was characteristic of the latifundiary cultivation prevailing in Rumania that the size of an undertaking was not determined by an organized integration of the productive factors of a given area but was rather the arithmetical sum of a large number of peasant cultivations. The peasant, in return for a piece of land, contracted either to cultivate another piece of land for the proprietor or tenant or to share the produce in a form of metayage. Money payments were uncommon except in Moldavia.[22]

21. Creangă, *op. cit.*, II, 18–22.

22. It must be observed, however, that while the great estates did not, in most cases, utilize progressive farming methods, the output of the large farms was consistently higher than that of the peasant holdings. The reasons for this difference have been the occasion of much dispute. Supporters of large-scale cultivation have held that despite

5: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

From a consideration of all these factors the peculiar nature of the Rumanian agrarian crisis emerges. The poorer peasant, who had been forced to go to the landowner or tenant for additional land, was in an increasingly bad bargaining position. The landowners or tenants, in responding to commercial incentives, could increase production with little cost to themselves merely by demanding more of him, since he supplied the implements and draft animals as well as the labor.[23] Clinging to his little plot of ground and doggedly refusing to become a migrant wage laborer, the poor peasant could see no possible relief to his situation except to have more land. On the other hand, the richer peasant, whose land was sufficient to produce a surplus, likewise found himself restricted by the relative monopoly in land, the high rents, and the speculation of the large tenants: the system was an obstacle to the further improvement of his position.[24]

In general, then, the economic background of the 1907 revolt lay not in peasant poverty alone but in the protracted dislocating effect of commerce upon a previously "natural economy" and a society involved in the ambiguities of neoserfdom. This dislocation has occurred in many forms throughout the globe where modern industry and commerce have impinged upon traditional social and economic patterns. The particular form it took in Rumania, increasing agrarian tension in the midst of a flourishing foreign commerce in cereals, was a product not only of economic and demographic factors but of Rumania's particular social structure, which was dominated by a boyar oligarchy.

Socially and economically Rumania resembled tsarist Russia in several ways. As Dobrogeanu-Gherea observed: "We are the only country in Europe, with the exception of Russia, which has the sad privilege of peasant revolts—neither the Western countries superior to us in culture, nor those of the East, such as Serbia and Bulgaria, which are inferior to us, have them." [25] In both countries the history

---

the prevalence of unprogressive latifundiary cultivation, large property was making technical advances and was paving the way toward more scientific farming. Advocates of peasant farming have replied that the large owners had kept the best land to themselves and that the peasants were unable to give adequate attention to their own fields. As one peasant is reported to have said: "Do you think this beautiful maize is mine? It belongs to the Jewish tenant. I haven't even hoed my own once yet, his twice. He didn't allot us the land till late." Creangă, *op. cit.*, I, 14.

23. This curious fact, that under the prevailing agrarian relations prosperity seemed to sharpen social tensions, may explain why the 1907 revolt should have followed the excellent 1906 harvest.

24. This grievance of the richer peasants may serve to explain why the minor uprising of 1888 had been most violent in the district of Ialomița, a sparsely populated region having a comparatively prosperous peasantry, but in which an exceptionally high percentage of the land (69 per cent) was in the hands of large proprietors, who leased out more than 70 per cent of their estates.

25. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

of property relations followed a different course from that in the West, and in both countries contact with the West created a steadily increasing crisis which the legislative measures of the nineteenth century did not solve and in some respects exacerbated. In neither case did peasant emancipation lead to the healthy development of small holds but rather to the appearance of the land-hungry cultivator still in a position of dependence on the landowner.[26]

While there were these similarities in Russian and Rumanian social and economic life, and more than a casual parallel in the development of agrarian relations, the political and international positions of the two states were entirely different. This difference explains in part some of the very great divergences in the recent history of these countries.

Political Aspects of the Agrarian Question

Although Rumanian economic and social relations were such as to create a dangerous tension in the countryside, politically, in marked contrast to tsarist Russia, there was relatively little revolutionary activity. This difference has often been attributed to the lethargy and supineness of the Rumanian peasant or to his Daco-Roman stability and love of order and hard work. National qualities may have played some part, though the violence of the 1907 revolt was damaging to many such theories. A more substantial reason would appear to lie in the contrast between the political and international situations of the two states.

Russia, a great empire, was assured of its independence as a nation. Existing institutions were firmly fixed. Russian social reformers could direct their energies toward internal issues without being preoccupied with the question of national survival. For these reasons the climate was favorable to a revolutionary spirit. Quite opposite conditions obtained in Rumania, a newly created state whose position in the community, or anarchy, of nations was by no means secure. Many Rumanians were not as yet included within the country's

26. The sensitivity in Rumania to developments in Russia would suggest the presence of common characteristics. The Russian emancipation of 1861 was followed by Prince Cuza's Act of 1864. There is evidence that the Rumanian rising of 1889 was aroused by a rumor that the tsar had ordered land to be divided among the peasants. The Russian Revolution of 1905 found a reflection in the 1907 revolt in Rumania, and of course the Russian Revolution of 1917 had a direct bearing upon the Rumanian agrarian reforms of 1918–21. The correlation of these events is certainly more than a chronological coincidence. It might be added that Stolypin's program to reform Russian agriculture by creating a class of strong peasant holdings resembles some of the recommendations put forward by the Conservative agrarian expert Constantin Garofid.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

668 boundaries. Consequently, national aims and ambitions tended to receive first attention from all articulate Rumanians.

175 Whatever may be the answer to the much debated question of Rumanian origins, the two principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, did not make their appearance until the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. After a couple of centuries of precarious independence they fell under the domination of the Ottoman Empire. For a time native princes maintained some degree of internal authority; later Phanariot Greeks became the *hospodars* of the principalities; but the two provinces were not united until 1862, and the remnants of Turkish suzerainty were not shaken off until the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. While the Rumanians did contribute to achieving their national independence, the rise of a united Rumania was largely conditioned by events beyond their control: the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the repulse of Russia in the Crimean War, and the equilibrium established by the Concert of Europe at the Congress of Berlin. Rumania's independence and existence as a national state were thus externally determined, at least in the negative sense of permitting the Rumanians to enjoy some freedom of action in the nineteenth century.

[566] The national progress of Rumania did not correspond with the social or material progress of the peasantry. On the contrary, the high points in Rumanian history from the national point of view often marked a decline in the peasant's status. The process of social differentiation which followed the foundation of the principalities seems to have led to a further subjugation of the peasant to the boyar. Under Michael the Brave, who for a short period ruled over all Rumanian lands, the peasants were definitely bound to the land. The Organic Statutes represented an advance constitutionally but also granted full proprietorship to the boyars and rendered the peasants' tenure even more precarious. To be sure, such a process is not unusual; in a society which is becoming more articulated the emerging ruling elements, which from a national aspect represent an advance by strengthening and organizing the state, may achieve their position at the expense of the more amorphous body of that society.

Because of the weakness and precarious position of the Rumanian state, preoccupation with national prestige outweighed and often ran counter to concern for social reform. In the abortive revolution of 1848 the young revolutionaries, educated in France, were undoubtedly fired by ideals of freedom and the rights of man, but more from desire to create in Rumania a proper modern state than from direct interest in the sufferings of the peasant. The manifestoes issued by the Muntenian revolutionaries promised land but at the same time,

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 partly out of fear of Russian intervention, enjoined the peasants to shun violence and to continue working for the boyars.

Similarly, critics of conditions provoking the 1907 revolt show concern for Rumania's position as a nation. Radu Rosetti, for example, believed the threat of foreign intervention which such an outbreak might produce to be one of the most dangerous features of the peasant uprising. Despite his sympathy for the peasants and desire for reform, he pressed for a strong army and an increase in the village gendarmerie, to prevent a repetition of the disorders of 1907 and to show the peasants that the law would be enforced.[27] The socialist Dobrogeanu-Gherea, approaching the question from a different point of view, was equally anxious to maintain Rumania's independence. Fearing that the many similarities between Rumania and tsarist Russia might lead the latter to "regard the Moldo-Wallachian provinces as an easy prey," [28] he urged that Rumania must be protected from tsarist advances by the introduction and preservation of liberal institutions, completely unlike those of Russia. The populist Constantin Stere flatly stated that Rumania could not afford the "luxury of a revolutionary party," since in Rumania's uncertain position such activity invited foreign intervention.[29]

Consequently, although many economic and social tensions disturbed Rumania, and it was obvious that the boyars would not on their own initiative undertake any reforms likely to change the established order, there was little organized revolutionary activity or even revolutionary thinking. On the other hand, the prevalent sense of national insecurity also made the ruling groups more cautious in the exercise of power. King Carol I, a German prince who had been called to the throne in 1866, could not pretend to be an autocratic tsar. On more than one occasion the king, for reasons of national interest, advocated reform and undertook to soften the obstinacy of the boyars, who were likewise sensitive to real pressure from above or below and frequently showed themselves accommodating and flexible when threatened with serious resistance.

642 Rumania's weak power position led many of its political leaders to seek both political and ideological support from the West. Western political and constitutional forms were adopted wholesale: the Constitution of 1866 was based on Belgium's model, the legal system was taken from the Code Napoléon. Imitation of Western institutions had two different and contrary results. On one level, many

27. Rosetti, *op. cit.*, p. 668.
28. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
29. Constantin Stere, "Socialdemocratism sau poporanism," *Viaţa românească* (January, 1908), p. 50.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

page 22.

II

WAR AND AGRARIAN REFORM, 1913–21

The Balkan and First World Wars

● 175 THE relative calm and the economic revival which followed the 1907 revolt were interrupted shortly by the outbreak of war. Rumania's part in the Second Balkan War was a brief excursion across the Danube into Bulgaria to obtain Southern Dobrogea, but that campaign had an important effect on the agrarian question. Rumanian troops saw in Bulgaria a land of small holdings, without great landowners or large tenants, where the villages were better built and the fields more successfully tilled than in Rumania. The Liberal leader Ion I. C. Brătianu, returning from Bulgaria, published an article in the party organ *Indépendance Roumaine* in the autumn of 1913, in which he advocated a reform of the franchise and an expropriation of large properties to provide the peasants with land. This statement marked an abrupt shift in Liberal party policy, as in the years immediately after 1907 the Liberal leaders had declared themselves opposed to expropriation. Whether Brătianu was reading the signs of the times or whether he was making a calculated political move to oust the Conservatives, then in power, the question of land reform by expropriation had at last been taken up by one of the major political parties.

The Liberals were called to power in December, 1913. Elections were held in February, 1914, and the new Liberal assembly voted for the principle of revising the articles of the Constitution of 1866 relating to the inviolability of property and to the franchise. A constituent assembly, elected in June, 1914, appointed two commissions to prepare the reforms. At this point the First World War broke out and became the exclusive object of attention. The national interest outweighed the social. The constituent assembly was not reconvened until three years later; the commission for land reform met twice, but according to one of its members, "No work was done at all. In 1914—nothing; in 1915—nothing; that was all its preparatory work." [1]

The history of Rumania in the First World War is an exceedingly complex intermingling of international, national, and social cross-currents. When war came Rumania remained neutral, although it had

1. Quoted in Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, p. 98.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

been party to the Triple Alliance (by a treaty which had been kept a complete secret from the Rumanian people). For two years it held this position while the Allies and the Central Powers attempted to outbid one another in promises of territory. The Allies, however, were in the better bargaining position: they could offer the Habsburg lands, Transylvania and Bucovina, as against Russian Bessarabia. The entry of Bulgaria on the side of the Central Powers and the initial successes of the Russian 1916 offensive tipped the balance in favor of the Allies. On August 27, 1916 the government declared war on Austria-Hungary. 175

Rumania immediately met military disaster. The Russian offensive came to a halt, and the anticipated Allied offensive in the Balkans, sufficient to occupy the Bulgarians, failed to materialize. The Rumanian assault on Transylvania was repulsed; the German General Mackensen successfully counterattacked from Bulgaria. With the German occupation of Bucarest in December, 1916, the Rumanian government withdrew to Iaşi, the capital of Moldavia. After a brief period of calm, the entire situation on the Eastern Front was altered by the Russian Revolution.

The February Revolution had an immediate effect upon the Rumanian situation. Russian and Rumanian troops were in close contact on the Moldavian front; the revolutionary ferment spreading among the Russian soldiers, the organization of soldiers' councils, and the agitation for taking over the land could easily have been communicated to the Rumanians. This revolutionary atmosphere, combined with military defeat and the occupation of much of the kingdom by the Germans, rendered the Rumanian government's position extremely precarious. At this critical juncture King Ferdinand [2] visited the front in April, 1917, and made the following declaration to the troops: [3]

> Sons of peasants, who, with your own hands, have defended the soil on which you were born, on which your lives have been passed, I, your King, tell you that besides the great recompense of victory which will assure for every one of you the nation's gratitude, you have earned the right of being masters, in a larger measure, of that soil upon which you fought.
>
> Land will be given you. I, your King, am the first to set the example; and you will also take a larger part in public affairs.

That there was need for such a move to bolster the morale of the troops and to ward off imminent danger of revolution is shown in a

2. King Carol I died in October, 1914, and was succeeded by his nephew Ferdinand I.
3. Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 speech of May 27, 1917 by Professor N. Basilescu, who had been one of the few to foresee the 1907 uprising: "This is the state of mind in the country: disbelief in the government, disbelief in Parliament, disbelief in the constituted authority. . . . Today as yesterday revolution appears to the Rumanian peasant the only possible means for him to resolve the great case between him and the proprietors of estates." [4] The eleventh-hour move by the king, which was supported by both the parties, seems to have been instrumental in averting trouble and in encouraging the troops. In the final Russian offensive of July, 1917, the Rumanian troops made a brave showing against the Germans and fought valiantly at the battles of Mărăşti (July 28) and Mărăşeşti (August 12–19).

175 423 The paternalistic tone of the king's address was also apparent, however, in the steps taken to carry out his proclamation. No peasant delegate participated in the constituent assembly which convened in 1917, and the bill passed by that assembly was simply a compromise worked out by the leaders of the Liberal and Conservative parties. Under Article 19 of the 1866 Constitution, property was inviolable; it could be expropriated only for reasons of public utility, narrowly defined as communications, public health, and national defense. Hence, to expropriate land for the purpose of distributing it to the peasants, it was necessary to amend the constitution.

The 1917 amendment extended the definition of public utility to include expropriation for the purpose of increasing peasant holdings. Cultivable land belonging to the crown and to public and private institutions and all rural properties belonging to foreigners and absentee owners were to be expropriated in their entirety. In addition, 2,000,000 hectares of cultivable land were to be expropriated from private properties (including absentee holdings) of over 100 hectares, the expropriation to be based on a progressive scale which was not defined. Thus, no maximum limit was set to properties. The figure of 2,000,000 hectares was not based on any agricultural criteria but represented a compromise between the amounts proposed by the Liberals and the Conservatives. The chief fault of this amendment was that it was not itself a law for expropriation but only set forth the principles of such a law. Section 5 of the amended Article 19 provided for the promulgation of a law to be passed six months after the national liberation by a two-thirds majority, usually required only for constitutional amendments. If this law were not passed, there would be no land reform.

With the October Revolution, Russia's withdrawal from the war,

4. Quoted in Diaconescu, *Chestiunea țărănească în România*, p. 141.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

and the collapse of the Eastern Front, Rumania was in a hopeless military position, and in March, 1918, it sued for peace. The pro-German Alexandru Marghiloman, who had remained behind in Bucarest, was entrusted with a new government. This government dissolved the constituent assembly, and Marghiloman declared that "the whole agrarian problem must be taken up anew from the beginning."

During the brief term of the Marghiloman government, Constantin Garoflid, Minister of Agriculture, introduced a series of agrarian measures: obligatory leases, the reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture, and the organization of agricultural workers. Garoflid, though a Conservative and a landowner, had long been opposed to the latifundiary system in Rumania and desired to build up a prosperous medium peasantry. He regarded the 1917 amendment as "not a scientific work but an electoral manifesto." Although previously recognizing the need for expropriation, he considered such an extreme measure unsuited to wartime conditions and advocated forced leases of land to the peasants as a temporary solution. Much in Garoflid's program was conducive to a rational development of Rumanian agriculture. He may even have had in mind a progressive series of reforms, but his proposals were open to the criticism that in Rumania a policy advocating such moderation and gradualness most often meant doing nothing at all. His program, however, was not even to be begun.

The collapse of the Central Powers in the autumn of 1918, Rumania's reentry into the war, and the withdrawal of Mackensen's forces again reversed the situation. The Marghiloman government was dismissed and its laws declared null and void. With the breakdown of the Central Powers, chaos spread through eastern Europe. Revolutionary conditions prevailed in Russia, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In Rumania a dry year, combined with the dislocations caused by the war and the German occupation, left the peasants hard pressed for food. The action of the Marghiloman government in dissolving the constituent assembly had increased their doubts in the good faith of any government. Tension was heightened by the revolutionary activity among the Rumanians in the neighboring regions of Transylvania, Bucovina, and Bessarabia, which had been or were shortly to be incorporated in Greater Rumania.

The Agrarian Reforms of 1918–21

Immediately after the armistice, on November 12, 1918, King Ferdinand issued a new proclamation reaffirming his pledge of 1917.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 656 423 Under the pressure of events the government did not bother to follow the formalities prescribed in the 1917 amendment but quickly drafted a decree-law, to be ratified subsequently by the parliament. This decree-law of December 15, 1918, laid down the norms under which land was immediately to be expropriated. Some of the leading provisions were as follows: [5]

a) As in the constitutional amendment, arable crown and mortmain land as well as foreign and absentee properties were completely expropriated.

b) The amount of 2,000,000 hectares was to be expropriated on a sliding scale from private properties of over 100 hectares. This rather arbitrary scale did represent an advance upon the 1917 amendment in limiting all properties to 500 hectares, but it made no provision for geographical differences, relative land hunger, or rational organization of estates. The law based the expropriation on properties rather than on proprietorship, to the benefit of the landowner with multiple holdings. Moreover, the relation between the scale of expropriation and the 2,000,000 hectares to be obtained was not accurately computed, and the expropriation actually fell short by some 450,000 hectares.

c) Compensation for expropriated land was to be based on a number of factors: price of sale in the region for five years prior to 1916, regional level of rent, evaluation by credit institutions, net income per hectares, etc., but was not to exceed twenty times the regional rental rate. Payments to proprietors were to be made by 5 per cent state bonds, redeemable in fifty years. The state was to contribute up to 35 per cent of the cost.

d) Peasant associations were to be created to serve as temporary recipients of the transferred land. The law went into little detail as regards resettlement, which was covered later by the law of 1921.

175 423 185 Ion I. C. Brătianu, who had headed the government on December 14, 1918, resigned on September 27, 1919, in a dispute with the Allies on the peace settlement. King Ferdinand accepted the resignation and formed a nonparty cabinet under General Vaitoianu to hold a general election. This election, virtually the first to be uncontrolled in Rumanian history, produced surprising results. The Liberals lost most of their seats in the Old Kingdom, and after some delay a bloc made up of the newly formed Peasant party and the National party of Transylvania assumed office.

During its brief term this government, with the Transylvanian Vaida-Voevod as Premier and Ion Mihalache as Minister of Agricul-

5. Full summaries of this and the subsequent agrarian law of 1921 are given in Diaconescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 148–334, and Mitrany, *op. cit.*, pp. 111–182.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

ture, introduced a bill for the resettlement of the peasants as well as for an extension of the expropriation. According to Mihalache, the Vaida government sought to make a new agrarian reform which was not based on the limited concept of the constituent assembly at Iaşi.[6] Although this bill was not passed, it is of importance as an early expression of the agrarian program of what was to become the National Peasant party.

The *exposé de motifs* of the bill granted that when promulgated the acts of 1917 and 1918 represented the only workable formulae, given the composition of parliament and the state of the nation, but stated that the incorporation of Bessarabia and the other provinces in Greater Rumania now made imperative further action on behalf of the peasants in the Old Kingdom, since the new provinces were enjoying extensive land reforms. By the terms of this bill expropriation was to be based on the total holdings of a proprietor, not on separate properties, and was extended to include property continuously rented for ten years prior to 1916. Private property in excess of 100 hectares of cultivable land was to be expropriated; in this the framers of the bill consciously followed the provisions of the relatively radical Bessarabian land reform. Exceptions, however, were made for estates organized as farms with a significant capital investment; these were limited to 250 hectares in densely populated regions and to 500 hectares in regions of sparse population. Property remaining after expropriation was not to be leased except to peasant cooperatives. In general, the bill was more radical than its predecessors in the Old Kingdom and represented a peasant point of view, both as regards the expropriation and the organization of agriculture, rather than a political compromise formulated by the landowners to avert peasant revolt.

As soon as the nature of Mihalache's bill became known, the old parties took steps to block it. The Minister of Agriculture was unable to obtain an audience with the king, allegedly as a result of Liberal intrigue. On March 12, 1920, after failing to obtain the king's approval to present the bill as a government measure, Mihalache presented it to the assembly as a private member's bill. At that session he warned: "But it should be known that if parliament has to leave, or if the government has to leave, it is because of a conspiracy by the whole oligarchy of all the boyar political parties." His prediction was realized; on the following day the government, which still held a substantial parliamentary majority, was dismissed by the crown in

6. For the text of this bill and the debate at its introduction, see the pamphlet published by the Federaţia Democraţiei, *Proectul legei de improprietărirea ţăranilor* (Bucarest, 1920).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 what has been called "the most questionable act of King Ferdinand's reign."[7] Although peasant disturbances, general instability, and 185 the inexperience of the Vaida government have been cited as reasons 423 for its downfall, it seems clear that its dismissal stemmed directly from the hostility of the landowners to the proposed agrarian bill.[8] Thus, the effort of the Peasant party to carry through a more radical reform by legal means was defeated.

The new premier, General Averescu, was selected because he was a popular military hero. He immediately ordered new elections and by the usual controls was able to obtain a majority for his People's party. Mihalache was replaced by Constantin Garoflid. Garoflid, as has been seen, was by no means opposed to land reform, but he did not approve of the emphasis upon large-scale expropriation and the creation of a multitude of small holdings. It was his task, however, to complete a measure based upon principles he had always attacked.

423 The second land reform law for the Old Kingdom was promulgated on July 17, 1921. Although primarily concerned with allotting land and resettling the peasants, it also extended expropriation to obtain the 450,000 hectares lacking after the 1918 decree-law. Expropriation was now based on proprietors rather than properties, and the old sliding scale was abandoned in favor of a more elastic measure which took account of regional geographic differences and relative land hunger.[9] Land left to the proprietor was to be determined at once,

[113] 7. R. W. Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians* (Cambridge, 1934), p. 551.

8. The attitude of the landowners at this time is shown in a circular distributed by the Union of Syndicates of Moldavian Landowners: "We, landowners, are firmly determined to oppose by all means, and especially by impeaching before the Court of Cassation, all those provisions of the decree-law of 1918, of the law for communal grazing, and of any future law or decree, which may conflict with the letter of the Constitution regarding the expropriation of land . . . To re-consecrate the intangible right of property, we demand that a law shall be passed which shall punish with hard labor for life whomsoever shall speak of expropriation again." Quoted in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

9. Land was left to the proprietors on the following basis:

	Land cultivated by owner (hectares)	*Land cultivated by owner with important capital investments (hectares)*
In highlands and hills	100	100
In plains, where demand for land was great	150	200
In plains, where demand for land was moderate	200	300
In plains, where demand for land was satisfied	250	500

3 Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

423 185 668

tures of Rumanian policy for the next twenty-five years, and in the international councils Rumania was to stress its role as the European bulwark against bolshevism.[15]

175 423

Agrarian Reform in the New Territories

Thus far only the agrarian reform in the Old Kingdom has been considered, and it does provide the central thread of the agrarian question in the interwar period. But as a result of the war Rumania also acquired Bessarabia from Russia, Bucovina from Austria, and Transylvania from Hungary. The agrarian problems in these three provinces were different in several respects from that of the Old Kingdom; the separate laws passed for each of the provinces further increased the complexity of the Rumanian agrarian situation after the First World War.

1. BESSARABIA

Bessarabia, which had formed a part of the principality of Moldavia, was ceded by the Turks to Russia in 1812 at the Treaty of Bucarest, in return for the evacuation of the remainder of Moldavia and Wallachia.[16] Three southern districts were returned to Moldavia after the Crimean War, but reverted to Russia after the War of 1877. The population was predominantly Rumanian, though large numbers of Ukrainians and Bulgarians inhabited the southern districts. In the last decades of the nineteenth century the tsarist regime undertook to Russify Bessarabia but without marked success. The Moldavian boyars in Bessarabia were notoriously obscurantist, and the province was a "natural breeding ground of such movements as the Black Hundreds." [17]

15. F. Borkenau, in his study, *The Communist International* (London, 1938), p. 99, attaches great importance to the Rumanian agrarian reform in this connection: "The agrarian reform in Rumania was perhaps the strongest single obstacle that opposed the advance of Bolshevism towards the West. It was very far from solving all problems, even for the peasantry, but for a decade it took the sharp edge off them. Revolutionary trends among the proletariat remained, but the proletariat alone was nothing in Rumania, and revolutionism among its members was more of a convulsion than a clearly defined movement."

16. The current Soviet interpretation of this event appears to be that in the eighteenth century the Moldavian and Wallachian boyars had sought the incorporation of the principalities in Russia as the sole means of escaping the Turkish yoke. This act of liberation was taking place during the Turko-Russian war of 1806. The threat of Napoleon, however, forced Tsar Alexander to come to terms with the Turks, so that only Bessarabia was fortunate enough to be liberated and incorporated in the tsarist empire. See A. Dolnik, *Bessarabiya pod vlastyu Rumynskikh boyar, 1918–1940 gg.* (Moscow, 1945), p. 5.

17. R. W. Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 563.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Although the general agrarian structure of Bessarabia resembled that of the Old Kingdom, certain differences developed during the century of Russian control. The emancipation of 1861 corresponded roughly to the Cuza reform, but the allotted land, *nadyel*, was given over not to the peasant but to the peasant commune, the mir. While the Bessarabian allotments at the time of the emancipation were greater than for most parts of Russia, there was, as in Rumania, an increasing land hunger arising from the nature of the reform and the rapidly expanding population. The Stolypin reforms, after the 1905 revolution, worked to increase individual peasant ownership and to break up the mir, but by the outbreak of the war nadyel land still constituted the largest category of property. In Russia after 1907 the sale of land to the peasants by the large landowners was widespread and especially so in Bessarabia. Although a comparison of the pre-1914 distribution of property in Bessarabia with that in Rumania is difficult to make since the Russian returns were based upon distinctions between types of ownership rather than size, the general order of the problem was similar in the two regions.[18]

The history of Bessarabia's incorporation into Rumania is still bitterly controversial. Only the major developments can be sketched here. Immediately after the February Revolution, two political currents began to emerge in Bessarabia, an agrarian-revolutionary (which tended to be hostile to Rumania as a land dominated by boyars) and a nationalist-Moldavian. From July, 1917, the peasants began to seize land, and by the end of the year some two-thirds of the large property had been taken over. A military committee, representative of the Moldavian element, convoked a congress which, on October 21–23, 1917, passed a resolution in favor of the "historical and political autonomy" of Bessarabia and decided to convoke a national council (*Sfatul Ţării*). The situation was utterly disorganized by the October Revolution and the Ukrainian break with the Bolsheviks. The *Sfat*, which was strongly Moldavian nationalist, was opposed to the centralism of the new Bolshevik regime. On December 2, 1917, it announced the formation of a Democratic Moldavian Republic as a self-governing unit in the Federative Democratic Russian Republic.

A crisis was reached in January, 1918, when Rumanian troops, sent to Bessarabia at the request of the Sfat, ousted the Bolshevik Soviets which had gained power in several cities and had attempted to supersede the Sfat. Shortly thereafter, the Sfat proclaimed the independence of the Moldavian republic. When Rumania sued for peace in March, 1918, the Germans favored the Rumanian interest

18. For statistics on land distribution in Bessarabia see the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

●175
423

in Bessarabia. On April 9, 1918, the Sfat by open vote—86 to 3, with 36 delegates abstaining—declared for the union of Bessarabia with Rumania, but with important reservations: the Bessarabian land reform was to be maintained and the province was to have administrative autonomy.[19]

In Bessarabia, unlike the Old Kingdom, the redistribution of land was achieved by the direct action of the peasants. As a consequence, there were doubts, to say the least, among the cultivators as to the desirability of uniting with Rumania. Mihalache reported that the Bessarabian peasants said to him, "We will not unite with Rumania, since Rumania belongs to the *ciocoi*, who have fleeced the peasants."[20] Before Bessarabia was united with Rumania, however, there was a retreat from the first wave of land seizures. The Sfat succeeded in retaining 50 hectares for each proprietor, and subsequently the area was increased to 100 hectares. The land reform law proposed by the Sfat was subsequently ratified in Rumania by the decree-law of December 22, 1918, but 47 of the 73 articles of this decree-law were later modified by the law adopted by the Rumanian assembly in 1920.

The Bessarabian reform as finally drafted expropriated in full: former state and crown domains, mortmain estates, monastic properties (except one-half hectare for each monk), estates belonging to towns (except land reserved for town planning), estates of foreigners, and estates farmed out for five successive years. One million hectares were to be expropriated from private property, including all properties above 100 hectares (multiple holdings were counted as one property). Peasant allotments were set at 6–8 hectares, with complementary lots for peasants lacking the minimum. Compensation was based on rent obtained in the period 1910–14, capitalized at 5½ per cent. The price of the land, in general, was set at 800 lei per hectare, over the protests of the peasants who maintained that they had obtained the land through the revolution. The state assumed 25 per cent of the price. According to official Rumanian statistics, the total area expropriated was about 1,492,000 hectares.[21]

19. The Bessarabian controversy has centered on the actions of the Sfat: whether it was representative and whether its decisions reflected the wishes of the people. In the Soviet view, the Sfat was merely the tool of the landlord counterrevolutionaries, and the ousted Soviets the true representatives of the peasant masses. Dolnik, *op. cit.*, p. 20. There have been doubts as to the validity of the vote of April 9, 1918, and assertions that it was made under Rumanian military pressure. The high number of abstentions and the open vote would lead to the suspicion that it was scarcely an ideal referendum.

20. *Proectul legei de improprietărirea ţăranilor*, (Bucarest, 1920), p. 54. Ciocoi was the peasant's term for the boyar's pack of retainers.

21. For further statistics on the Bessarabian land reform see the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

It has been held that Bessarabia provided a revolutionary leaven for the rest of Rumania. To a degree this is true. Even before the First World War both socialist and populist theories were transmitted from Russia to Rumania through Bessarabia. The Bessarabian land reform had an effect upon the policy of the nascent Rumanian Peasant party; the exposé de motifs of the Peasant party's reform bill of 1920 argued that the law passed by Sfatul Țării for Bessarabia made equally extensive measures mandatory for all of Rumania. Mihalache, in defending his bill, pointed out that the Bucarest assembly was unwilling to accept for the Old Kingdom measures they had previously ratified for Bessarabia, and asked whether the impression was to remain that the Bessarabian peasant had achieved more for himself through revolution than had the peasant of the Old Kingdom through the good offices of the parliament.[22]

But the radical influences coming from Bessarabia were less than the contrary influence of Rumania upon Bessarabia. Successive formulations and arrangements regarding Bessarabia progressively reduced the extent of the agrarian reform, took away the administrative autonomy of the province, and extended the centralized administration of Bucarest. As a result, regardless of the original sentiment favoring incorporation in Rumania, Bessarabia was a disaffected area throughout the interwar period, with much the most corrupt administration of any Rumanian province.

2. BUCOVINA

Bucovina, which had formed the northern portion of the principality of Moldavia, was ceded by the Turks to Austria in 1775. The population was originally largely Rumanian; in 1848 Rumanians numbered 209,000 as against 108,000 Ruthenians. This proportion altered in subsequent decades until by 1910 the Ruthenians were the largest group, though not a majority, outnumbering the Rumanians 305,000 to 233,000. There were also some 102,000 Jews and 66,000 Germans at that date. In general, the Ruthenian population was concentrated in the northern part of Bucovina, the Rumanian in the south.

By the treaty of alliance of August 17, 1916, between the Allies and Rumania, the latter was to receive all of Bucovina to the Prut River. At the time of the peace conference, it was suggested that part of northern Bucovina be included, for ethnic reasons, in eastern Galicia. This suggestion was dropped with the collapse of Galician au-

22. *Proectul legei de improprietărirea țăranilor*, pp. 29 and 58.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 tonomy because of the desire not to increase the number of Ukrainians under Polish rule. The incorporation of Bucovina had none of the turbulence that accompanied Bessarabia's. A general congress met on November 28, 1918, and voted for union with Rumania.

311 Before the First World War, of the cultivable area of Bucovina, holdings over 100 hectares occupied 25 per cent, holdings between 10 and 100 hectares 27 per cent, and small holdings 48 per cent. (If the very extensive forest lands are included the holdings over 100 hectares covered more than 60 per cent of the surface of the province.) Large properties were less dominant than in the Old Kingdom and medium properties much more important, partly because of German colonization and efforts by the Austrian government to foster this category of holding.

423 The decree-law of September 7, 1919, for the Bucovina land reform was ratified by the law of July, 1921, which modified the decree in favor of the landowners and reduced the extent of land to be expropriated. Land reform in Bucovina was made under more peaceful circumstances than elsewhere and was more carefully worked out. The state was given a right to reserve land for general needs, and the landowner was allowed continued use of his land until it was actually taken over. The reform expropriated in full: estates of foreigners and absentees, mortmain estates, estates of persons who had lost their civil rights, and estates farmed out for more than nine years. Expropriation of private properties was on a sliding scale beginning at 100 hectares and permitting a maximum of 250 hectares on properties having considerable inventory and equipment. Scattered properties belonging to the same owner were counted as one. The allotment of land was made in lots of 4–8 hectares, colonization lots of 5 hectares, and complementary lots of not less than ¼ hectare for peasants having less than 4 hectares. Compensation to landowners was approximately the same as in the Old Kingdom, and the state assumed 50 per cent of the cost. The peasant could pay in whole or in part, the remainder becoming a mortgage payable in 50 years at 5 per cent. According to official statistics the total area expropriated in Bucovina was about 76,000 hectares.[23]

3. TRANSYLVANIA

175 The disputed history of Transylvania and the endless controversy that has raged between the Rumanians and the Hungarians

23. For further statistics on the distribution of land in Bucovina and the effects of the land reform see the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

are far too complex for inclusion here. Whatever the origins of the 175
Transylvanian population, at the outbreak of the First World War the Rumanians constituted a majority of the inhabitants of this region; with the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the Transylvanian Rumanians, along with the other ethnic groups in the empire moved to break away. On October 12, 1918, the Rumanian National party of Transylvania drafted a resolution demanding the right of self-determination. A national assembly was called at Alba Iulia on December first and passed a resolution in favor of the union of all Rumanians. The basis of this union was to be:

1) full national liberty for all races;
2) full autonomy for all regions;
3) a democratic regime with general, direct, equal, and secret elections;
4) complete liberty of press, assembly, and association;
5) radical agrarian reform;
6) equitable conditions for industrial workers.

A Governing Council (*Consiliul Dirigent*), under Iuliu Maniu, was established as the temporary administration. The Treaty of Trianon assigned Transylvania and the adjacent regions of Maramureş, Crişana, and the Banat to Rumania.

Servile tenures had been abolished somewhat earlier in Transylvania than in the Old Kingdom, and the relative importance of medium properties reflected the generally higher level of cultivation. [566] 311
Nevertheless, there was a great disparity between large and small properties, a disparity intensified by the national question. The Rumanians were almost entirely peasants, and most of the large estates belonged to Hungarians. Reliable information, however, is lacking regarding the distribution of land either by size of property or by nationality; according to Hungarian critics of Rumanian statistics, no exact figures have ever been available for the land distribution in 1919 in the total area annexed by Rumania.[24] The Rumanians have claimed that they held only 24 per cent of the total area and that 98 per cent of the properties over 100 cadastral yokes (the yoke, used in Transylvania, equals .58 hectares) were held by non-Rumanians. While this claim may have been extreme, Hungarian sources grant that 87 per cent of the owners of properties exceeding 100 yokes were Magyars.

The project for the land reform, prepared in thirty-two sittings 671
of the Governing Council, became a decree-law on September 12, 423

24. C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors* (Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 316, n. 2.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

page 94

VI

THE LIBERAL PERIOD, 1922–28

Survey of Political Events

175
665

RUMANIAN politics did not really "return to normal" until Ion I. C. Brătianu and the National Liberal party took office in January, 1922. The coalition government under Vaida Voevod, which had come in as a result of the first postwar elections in the autumn of 1919, had been arbitrarily ousted by the king in March, 1920,[1] and the war hero General Averescu was called to form a government. Averescu, who had widespread popularity among the troops and was of peasant origin, appears to have played a double role. In 1918 he had formed his People's League as a rallying point against the established corruption and inefficiency of the old parties; he had even engaged in negotiations with the extreme Left.[2] In 1919 he had temporarily joined the Vaida government; on his political campaigns he had promised five hectares of land to every peasant cultivator, a demagogic promise quite impossible of fulfillment. When he came to power, however, as leader of his People's party, it was as the restorer of order, or, as he said, "the last reserve of the Rumanian bourgeoisie."[3]

If the Averescu movement can be said to have had any leading idea at all, it was, as General Cantacuzino put it, that the reforms which were required could not be carried out by the old Liberal party

[113]

1. For the circumstances surrounding the fall of the Vaida government see above, p. 27. According to the Liberals in 1922, the Vaida government collapsed because of a rising bolshevist current: "public opinion demanded General Averescu." *Istoricul Partidului Naţional Liberal de la 1848 şi până astăzi* (Bucarest, 1923), p. 226. While there was doubtless a great deal of social unrest at this time, especially since the Socialists had refused to recognize the 1919 elections, there seems to be no reason to doubt that the downfall of the Vaida government was a direct result of collusion between King Ferdinand and the landowners to check Mihalache's proposed agrarian bill.

2. According to the socialist Titel Petrescu (*Socialismul în România*, p. 314), after the armistice Averescu had consulted with the socialists on the prospects of collaboration and had even discussed the possible overthrow of the monarchy.

3. L. Trotsky and Ch. Rakovsky, *Ocherki politicheskoi rumynii* (Moscow, 1922), p. 126. In a debate in the chamber Mihalache inveighed against Averescu's group: "Your party is a heterogeneous conglomeration, without a program, without a clear vision, and without consistency. Your party is based solely on the popularity of General Averescu, and will last only as long as that popularity endures. . . . You are purely and simply covering troops for the old parties of the ruling classes." Mihalache, *Partidul Ţărănesc în politica ţării* (Bucarest, 1925), pp. 17–18.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

but only by a new and popular force united around a man representing the "principle of discipline."[4] This yearning after discipline and order usually manifested itself in all parties when once they came to power, but was especially noticeable in those men or groups who were in office, not through the operation of the electoral system—however unreliable it may have been—but through some special circumstance. General Radescu, who was Prime Minister in the winter of 1944–45, was the last and most pathetic example. This call for discipline was an attempt to compensate for Rumania's underlying political instability. In most instances it was directed against the Left and the doctrine of class warfare.

Elections were held in May, 1920, and produced, not unexpectedly, a resounding success for Averescu's party, which obtained 209 out of 369 seats in the chamber. Averescu had made an electoral pact with Take Ionescu and had been joined by a splinter group of Transylvanians under the poet and subsequent fascist, Octavian Goga. He was also supported by a number of Conservatives and Liberals who, it was unkindly observed, felt the need of finding new bottles for their old wine. There is also evidence, however, that he did attract a fairly large popular vote from the peasants.[5] The new cabinet included Take Ionescu as Foreign Minister, and Nicolae Titulescu, well known later in the League of Nations, as Minister of Finance. The Conservative landowner Constantin Garoflid was Minister of Agriculture and Domains, and the sinister and cynical Constantin Argetoianu, an accomplished election manipulator, was Minister of the Interior. The position of the National Liberal party at this time is not altogether clear. While Averescu had attacked the Liberals, they were willing to accept his election. Doubtless they were not reluctant to stay in the background until the storms of popular discontent had been subdued.

The two principal actions of the Averescu government were the agrarian reform law of 1921, already discussed, and the suppression of Left-wing activity. In October, 1920, an abortive general strike was crushed, and the socialists who had voted for affiliation with the Third International arrested.[6] Tension aroused by the general strike and its suppression was augmented by a bomb explosion in the Ru-

4. *Ibid.*, p. 18. The position of some of the men in Averescu's group, notably Manoilescu, came to be known as neoliberalism and provided a transition from the policy of the old Liberals to the leading ideas of the Carolist period.

5. Mihalache admitted as much, saying that in 1919 a great many peasants had confused General Averescu with the Peasant party and thought that he was working with the peasants against the landlords. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

6. For further discussion of socialist activities at this time see below, pp. 246–247.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

664 manian senate on December 9, 1920, which killed several persons and led to a temporary state of siege in Bucarest. This type of violence was less characteristic of Rumanian than of Bulgarian or Serbian political life, but was a foreshadowing of the political degeneracy of the 1930's.

665 Having served his purpose as man of the hour, Averescu's position gradually deteriorated in 1921, partly because of blunders in the cabinet but largely because the various groups which had installed him now deserted and turned against him. The Liberals, who had accepted him, withdrew their support and retired from parliament, on the rather disingenuous grounds that the government was not representative and had mishandled the Liberals' land reform. Whatever the occasion, it was apparent that with the passing of the postwar turmoil the Liberals were prepared to resume their traditional leadership. General Averescu resigned on December 17, 1921. Take Ionescu attempted to form a cabinet but failed to obtain a vote of confidence. On January 19, Ion I. C. Brătianu took over the government.

With the exception of an interlude between March, 1926, and June, 1927, the Liberals were in office from 1922 to 1928. They retained a hold on the key administrative and financial posts and exerted a decisive influence over King Ferdinand in his last years. Perhaps their strongest bulwark was the dominating personality of Ion I. C. Brătianu. This masterful old politician, who had fought stubbornly throughout the war and the peace negotiations for the realization of Greater Rumania, ruled his party and the country in an arbitrary patrician manner, and until his death the Liberals were firmly established.

On the other hand, there is little evidence that they commanded extensive popular support during these years, practically none outside the Old Kingdom. Part of their success lay in the failure of the other parties to create or maintain a united and effective opposition. Although the Liberals did resort to crude electoral manipulations and to repressive police measures, usually in connection with periodic Communist scares, they were still an old-fashioned party and had not developed these procedures to the unhappy perfection now so familiar.[7] Under sufficient pressure they preferred to retire rather than to overthrow the constitution. But it required several years for the National party of Transylvania and the Peasant party of the Old Kingdom to form the consolidated opposition which ultimately dislodged them.

[113] 7. A somewhat sensational glimpse of the dark side of the Liberal administration is given in C. G. Costa-Foru's *Aus den Folterkammern Rumäniens* (Vienna, 1925), an exposé of the terrorist methods employed by the Rumanian secret police, the *Siguranja*.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

In March, 1922, the Liberals made an election in which they contrived to win 260 seats, as against 17 in the 1920 elections (General Averescu's party dropped to 11 seats). The opposition parties challenged the validity of the elections and withdrew from parliament.

A sharp controversy arose over the coronation of King Ferdinand on October 15, 1922. The opposition parties contended that the coronation should be sponsored by a coalition of all parties. Despite the fact that the coronation was held in the Transylvanian town of Alba Iulia to celebrate the unity of all Rumanian lands, the Transylvanian National party boycotted the ceremony.[8]

When the Liberals called for the March, 1922, elections they announced that one of the main tasks of the new assembly would be the preparation of a new constitution. Following the coronation, they proceeded to push through this act in the session opening in November. The legality of such a one-party procedure was denied by the opposition as contrary to the guarantees of autonomy in the original contracts made between the representative bodies of the new territories and the government of the Old Kingdom.[9] The opposition parties temporarily attended the parliamentary debates on the constitution, but the tumultuous sessions did not block its passage in March, 1923.

The 1923 Constitution was based on that of 1866, which it followed in many respects.[10] Because of the acquisition of such extensive new territories, a new constitutional document was deemed necessary. The following are some of its more controversial points:[11]

8. It is illustrative of the antagonism created by the centralizing policy of the Liberals that none of the chief figures responsible for the union of the new provinces with the Old Kingdom was present at the Coronation.

9. The arbitrary action of the Liberals was particularly resented in Transylvania, where the National party was undoubtedly the strongest political group. The regional autonomy of the province had already been infringed upon when General Averescu quite illegally abolished the Transylvanian Consiliu Dirigent in 1920.

10. The 1866 Constitution, closely patterned after the Belgian model, had been significantly amended on three occasions before 1923: 1) In 1879, in accordance with the stipulations of the Congress of Berlin, religious beliefs were removed as an obstacle to naturalization. This amendment was introduced to prevent the exclusion of Jews from citizenship. 2) In 1884 the number of electoral colleges for the chamber was reduced from four to three, thus broadening the franchise somewhat for the benefit of the growing urban middle class. 3) In 1914 the Liberals initiated measures for electoral and agrarian reforms. This work, which was delayed by the war, was carried out by the constitutional assembly in Iaşi in 1917. Article 19 was amended to permit land expropriation for purposes of agrarian reform; Articles 57 and 67 established universal suffrage and proportional representation for the chamber.

11. For a French translation of the text with commentary see F. R. and P. Dareste, *Les Constitutions modernes* (4th ed., 6 vols., Paris, 1928–34), II, 355 ff.; for a bibliography of Rumanian commentaries, *ibid.*, III, 223–226. An examination of some of its shortcomings was made by David Mitrany, "The New Rumanian Constitution," *The*

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

6) District and local councils had both elected members and members introduced by the national assembly. The ratio of the two types of members was not fixed (in the original draft of the new constitution, appointed members were limited to one-fifth the total) and permitted an indeterminate amount of central control over local councils. 642

7) The powers of the crown, while confined to those enunciated in the constitution, were considerable and included the right to summon, prorogue, and dissolve the assembly, appoint and dismiss ministers, and sanction or veto laws. In many constitutional monarchies the crown has similar powers, which are formalized or limited by custom; in Rumania the crust of tradition was quite thin and the crown was actually in a position to exert a great deal of influence.

8) "In case of danger to the state, martial law, partial or general, may be established by means of a bill" (Article 128).

In summary, the constitution was relatively brief (138 articles), vague on many points, and left important details to be determined by subsequent laws. There were a number of loopholes whereby civil rights guarantees could be evaded and arbitrary executive action imposed. To be sure, in most constitutions qualifying clauses recognize the state's right to take exceptional measures for its own preservation, but whereas these exceptional measures are usually understood to be applicable only in cases of emergency, the situation in Rumania was such as to make exceptional measures—arrests without warrant, violation of privacy of correspondence, and prolonged states of siege—more or less standard practice. The omissions and evasions in the Rumanian constitution were of less importance than the spirit in which the document was interpreted.

Although the opposition parties hotly attacked the Liberals, denounced the new constitution, and boycotted the assembly, they were by no means united in their actions or purposes; in 1924 and 1925 there was a frequent regrouping of party alignments. The most important question was the course to be taken by the National party of Transylvania. All parties desired to gain the support of this well-organized body; since it had been formed as a regional Rumanian party in opposition to the Magyars, rather than on a social basis, its position in the political system of united Rumania was somewhat ambiguous. In 1920 General Averescu had tried without success to gain its adherence; when Brătianu came to power in 1922 he offered Maniu three portfolios in the cabinet but Maniu refused the offer. 175 665

In June, 1924, it was announced that the National party of Transylvania and the Peasant party ~~had~~ officially united, but shortly

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 665 thereafter they drifted apart again.[13] In January, 1925, the National party of Transylvania temporarily fused with the historian Iorga's National Democratic party (to which Argetoianu now belonged). In May, 1925, a United Opposition, including Iorga's group, Maniu's Transylvanians, and the Peasant party, was temporarily established and demanded the resignation of the government. Averescu did not join the opposition bloc and it was rumored that he had a secret understanding with the Liberals to succeed them. In elections to the newly created Chambers of Agriculture,[14] 44 out of 75 districts were won by the United Opposition, 27 by the government, and 4 by the People's party. The tide seemed to be turning against the Liberals.

One reason the Liberals were able to maintain their position in the face of a growing if uncoordinated opposition during the years from 1922 to 1925 was the perennial fear of bolshevism, which in turn served to weaken or discredit all radical or reformist movements. On 648 the international level Soviet-Rumanian relations were very bad be- 175 cause of the unresolved Bessarabian dispute. A conference held in Vienna in April, 1924, failed to bring any agreement between the two disputants.[15] Each side accused the other of plotting aggression and each took measures which aggravated the tension. The creation in 1924 of a Moldavian Soviet Republic on the left bank of the Dniester and ominous Soviet speeches forecasting the ultimate reunion of all Moldavians increased Rumanian anxiety. At the same time, in February, 1925, Vintilă Brătianu, Minister of Finance and brother of Ion I. C. Brătianu, stated his opposition to returning Wrangel's fleet to the U.S.S.R. because of the danger of a strong Soviet Black Sea fleet, and announced that negotiations were in progress for the cooperation of British, French, and Rumanian capital in the establishment of an armaments and munitions factory in Rumania.[16] Such an announcement obviously matched the Soviet thesis that the Western bourgeois powers were using the eastern European states as advanced bases for an assault upon the U.S.S.R.

13. For a discussion of the union of the Transylvanian National party and the Peasant party see below, pp. 140–141.

14. Chambers of agriculture were established in each district in 1925, with a mixed membership of elected and appointed members. In addition to their agricultural functions, they elected members to the senate. They soon became political instruments and were of very little value in the improvement of agriculture.

113 15. According to Louis Fischer, on the basis of information obtained from Christian Rakovsky, Litvinov and Trotsky were willing to accept the loss of Bessarabia, but Stalin, Rakovsky, and Chicherin were not. The latter hoped that by means of the Bessarabian issue they could "keep Rumania perennially on tenterhooks." Louis Fischer, *Men and Politics* (New York, 1941), pp. 134–135.

16. *Times* (London), February 7, 1925.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

In July, 1924, by order of the Commander of the Second Army Corps, the Communist party in Rumania and its associated organizations were dissolved for having violated state of siege regulations and for endangering the security of the state. 648 175

Bessarabia naturally suffered badly in the conflict; reports of foreign observers in these years present a desolate picture of rotting commerce, depressed agriculture, miserable administration and widespread fear and disaffection. The province had been continuously under martial law since 1919. The Rumanians reported frequent Soviet raids, plots, and instigations to violence; the Russians reported brutally suppressed peasant uprisings. Both were taking place. In the notable rising at Tatar Bunar in 1924, which involved a whole village, there is ample evidence of Communist agitation, yet an entire community does not participate in a revolt without serious occasion. 668 175

Tension was not limited to Bessarabia; in December, 1924, some 400 persons described as Communist terrorists were arrested throughout Rumania. In September, 1925, 28 members of committees of "red" unions were arrested in Bucarest. Disturbances, however, were not solely the result of Left-wing activity. Several anti-Semitic outbreaks occurred, with the usual attacks on synagogues and Jewish shops. On October 27, 1924, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, later the leader of the Iron Guard movement, achieved his first prominence by shooting the chief of police of Iași; he was subsequently acquitted.[17] 665 175

Under these circumstances, in which opposition to the government could so convincingly be depicted as anti-Rumanian, the Liberals, self-appointed guardians of Rumanian patriotism, were somewhat strengthened, whereas the Peasants were continually forced to protest their loyalty and to defend themselves against the charge of bolshevism.

At the beginning of 1926, however, the opposition to the Liberals became more intense. The announcement on December 28, 1925, of Prince Carol's renunciation of his right to the crown in favor of his infant son Michael [18] brought protests from the Transylvanian Nationalists and the Peasants. While expressing their continued loyalty to King Ferdinand, they refrained from voting on the bill of renunciation on the grounds that they had not been consulted on the appointment of the regency which was to govern during Michael's minority. It was widely known that Brătianu and Carol had not got

17. For the origins of the Iron Guard movement see below, pp. 226–228.

18. Carol had gone abroad with Mme Lupescu. Upon King Ferdinand's demand that he return, without her, Carol refused and renounced his right to the throne.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 665 [661] on well together, and it was generally believed that Brătianu had forced the king to exclude Carol.

Communal elections were held in February in an atmosphere of political excitement. The government, for all its electioneering techniques, did badly, especially in the larger towns. It won only one-third of the seats in the Bucarest municipal council. In Bessarabia the United Opposition won all lists. The government was defeated in most Transylvanian towns, notwithstanding its pact with the Magyar party; it won most of the rural Transylvanian communes through official pressure and the aid of the gendarmerie.

175 671 666 In March the Brătianu cabinet reached the end of its four-year term. In the last session of parliament it passed a new electoral law, whose unusual provisions were to make Rumanian elections even less representative of public opinion. Deputies had previously been elected on a proportional basis. According to the new act, modeled on Mussolini's law of January 7, 1923, the party gaining a plurality and at least 40 per cent of the votes was declared the majority party: it was to receive, as a premium, half the seats in the chamber plus a number of the remaining seats corresponding to its percentage of the total vote. Thus, a party gaining 40 per cent of the votes would occupy 70 per cent of the seats in the chamber (50 per cent plus two-fifths of the remaining 50 per cent). The remainder of the seats was divided proportionally among the other parties; a party failing to gain 2 per cent of the total votes obtained no representation.

According to the Liberals, there was nothing extraordinary about this law. A bill for electoral reform had been part of the Liberal program and had been stipulated in the 1923 Constitution.[19] In a country with such a multitude of unstable parties it might be argued that the "premium," as it was called, was a necessary device to give the party in office a sufficiently strong parliamentary majority to enable it to carry on its business.

Nevertheless, given the idiosyncrasies of Rumanian politics, the law had two very unfortunate effects. Since it was the practice for the crown to summon a government, which then proceeded to hold, or "make," elections with the aid of the administrative apparatus, the electoral law increased the opportunity for the selected group to swing the elections in its favor. On the other hand, the failure of a party obtaining less than 2 per cent of the votes to gain any repre-

19. According to Article 138 of the constitution, the current national assembly (i.e., the Liberal majority) could function after the promulgation of the constitution until the expiration of its mandate. During that period an electoral law was to be passed in accordance with the principles laid down in the constitution.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

sentation was a natural incentive for such parties to abandon the parliamentary track altogether. The timing of the law led the opposition parties to charge that it was merely part of the Liberals' plan of grooming General Averescu to replace them, since his party was obviously weak in popular support. There is no question that in 1924 and 1925 Averescu had not cooperated with the other opposition parties but had worked in some measure with the Liberals.

On March 27, 1926, Brătianu resigned amid rumors that he favored General Averescu as his successor. The opposition was still fumbling in its efforts to unite; negotiations between the Transylvanian Nationalists and the Peasant party had broken down again on March 22 over a disagreement on the distribution of cabinet posts. The king, on March 29, consulted the leaders of the Transylvanian National, Peasant, and People's parties and requested a coalition cabinet; apparently the Peasants and the Nationalists agreed. But on the following day, much to their chagrin, King Ferdinand called on General Averescu to form a government.

The reasons for the king's action are not altogether clear. The Nationalists and the Peasants had blundered in not mending their differences earlier and achieving a solid coalition. On the other hand, the king had been responsible for their dismissal in 1920 and was probably quite doubtful of their ability to govern properly and likely to accept the advice of Brătianu. Brătianu of course denied that his party had any agreement with General Averescu but his disclaimer is not convincing. "All we did," he said, "was to prepare the atmosphere in order to bring into power a government which would present a guarantee for the continuity of the work accomplished by us. Apart from this we are the declared opponents of the present government." [20] It was generally believed, and probably correctly, that Brătianu had strongly urged the king to install General Averescu.

Averescu held elections in May. The National party and the Peasants, still unable to achieve fusion, agreed to collaborate in the election. Despite the premium Averescu faced quite a task in overcoming his party's numerical weakness, but he acted resolutely and altogether successfully in one of the more outrageous Rumanian elections. Military officers on active service were appointed as prefects of a number of districts. Circulation of vehicles and persons was strictly controlled. The leaders of the opposition were unable to get in touch with their constituents; even Ion Brătianu was blocked on one trip, and Mihalache was arrested by gendarmes in his own electoral district. Gendarmes supervised public gatherings and were directed to intervene

20. *Times* (London), April 21, 1926.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

661 if anyone attempted "to excite the people." Political manifestoes and
666 slogans required the approval of the prefect. On the day of the election, numerous opposition delegates were arrested and not permitted to supervise the voting or the counting. There was some violence and a few deaths.[21] Averescu, by these means, obtained 52 per cent of the votes, but under the premium he gained 292 out of 387 seats in the chamber, the Opposition block held 69 seats, the Liberals 16, Cuza's League of Christian Defense (an anti-Semitic formation) 10; the socialists and the Communist-sponsored workers' bloc, having obtained less than 2 per cent of the votes, were not represented.

665 After the election the National and Peasant parties continued their
175 efforts to unite. In September delegates of the two parties voted for fusion into a National Peasant party with Maniu as president and Mihalache as vice-president. Iorga, however, declined to vote, and the Peasant leader Dr. Lupu opposed the decision. The fusion was confirmed by the general congress held on October 10.

A new crisis arose with the serious illness of King Ferdinand in November, 1926, and the renewed controversies over the succession, Carol's renunciation, and the regency. The National Peasants, who believed that King Ferdinand had been an instrument of the Liberals, were dissatisfied with the succession and were reluctant to regard Carol's renunciation as final. All parties, however, felt that in the king's failing condition the Averescu cabinet was not sufficiently representative to govern alone. Brătianu sounded opposition leaders on the possibilities of forming a national cabinet. General Averescu made several unsuccessful efforts to achieve a coalition with the National Peasants, perhaps in an effort to free himself from his dependence upon the Liberals. Having failed to create a coalition he was obliged to resign on June 3, 1927.

A new "impartial" cabinet under Prince Barbu Ştirbey (a relative by marriage of the Brătianus and periodically proposed as the head of a caretaker cabinet, the last time in 1945) came to office and included some Liberals and Dr. Lupu, who had split with the National Peasants in February and formed an independent peasant group. After negotiations with the National Peasants, three members of Maniu's party joined the coalition. The principal object of this cabinet, which was in effect a temporary Liberal-National-Peasant coalition, was to preside over new and free elections. However, negotiations between Maniu and Brătianu broke down. Maniu refused Brătianu's proposal for a common list of candidates in the coming election with

21. The electoral abuses were brought up by opposition leaders in parliamentary interpellations after the elections.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

a majority of the seats going to the Liberals. The Liberals resigned from the Ştirbey cabinet on June 21, stating that it had failed in its mission. 665 175

On June 22 the king called Brătianu, who formed an all-Liberal government, with the addition of Dr. Lupu, Argetoianu, and Titulescu, and issued a manifesto: [22]

The mission of the Government headed by M. Barbu Ştirbey to achieve an understanding and collaboration between the various political parties has not succeeded, and because of the differences of views in the midst of the cabinet, the electoral campaign threatened to become the occasion of agitation favoring political passions and subversive currents. In these conditions, a government was required which could be upheld by a solidly organized and experienced party and could assume entire responsibility for the situation. His Majesty the King has entrusted us with this heavy responsibility. We desire the sincere application of the laws guaranteeing the liberty of elections. We will not permit the disturbance of order nor the violation of law, and will not tolerate anarchist tendencies. Closely united with our collaborators in the parties which assure us their co-operation we will carry out our program which the country knows well.

This manifesto is a nice epitome of the Liberals' politics. Presenting themselves as the solid defenders of the law and the constitution, they had actually achieved, with the cooperation of the king, a very neat coup. By breaking the Ştirbey coalition and relying on the king's mistrust of the opposition, Brătianu had driven the National Peasants back into the wilderness without the slightest popular justification. The references to "subversive currents" and "anarchist tendencies," while conjuring up the specter of communism, cannot be taken very seriously unless the whole mass of the peasantry was to be considered subversive. It is not surprising that the National Peasants should have seen all the complicated political maneuvers of those years, including the schisms in their own ranks, as Brătianu machinations.

The Liberals dropped their talk of a national cabinet, and conducted the elections of July 7, 1927, in the usual manner; they won 298 out of 387 seats in the chamber; Dr. Lupu was rewarded for his cooperation with 22 seats. The National Peasants managed to obtain 49; Averescu's People's party and Iorga's group failed to obtain even the minimum of 2 per cent of the votes. The political picture

22. *L'Économiste roumain* (Organ de l'Institut Économique Roumain et de l'Association des Banques Roumaines) (July 1, 1927), p. 171. [113]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665
175

was reverting to a two-party system, in the Rumanian style, with the National Peasants the only significant opponents of the Liberals.

Two deaths, however, were to undermine the position of the Liberals. On July 20, 1927, King Ferdinand died;[23] he was succeeded by the five-year-old Michael under a regency comprising Ferdinand's second son Prince Nicholas, the Patriarch Miron Cristea, and the first president of the Court of Cassation, Buzdugan. All parties recognized the regency but Maniu immediately demanded the resignation of the Liberals and new elections. With the death of Ferdinand, the Carol issue again insinuated itself into the conflict between the National Peasants and the Liberals. The National Peasants maintained a somewhat equivocal attitude toward the regency and while not demanding Carol's return, gave no indication that they would not welcome it. Carol, on his part, was issuing ambiguous statements from abroad, saying that he was making no plans for return but that if the people called him he would not be deaf to their appeal. The government accused the National Peasants of duplicity and prohibited their political meetings. Maniu responded by a call for a popular movement to oust the Liberals by all legal parliamentary and extraparliamentary means. In October, 1927, Mihail Manoilescu, who had been associated with General Averescu's People's party and who was to blossom into a well-known political economist, was arrested by the government on the charge of carrying political letters from Carol to Rumanian opposition leaders. The government brought him to trial, but he was acquitted, much to the Liberals' discomfiture. During the trial the government quoted letters to show that Carol had abdicated of his own will; Manoilescu in his defense maintained that Ferdinand had wanted Carol to return but that efforts at reconciliation had been thwarted by the Brătianus.

On November 24, 1927, Ion I. C. Brătianu died. With his death, following close upon that of the king, the Liberals began to lose their grip, although they remained in power for another year. There was no change in the government; Vintilă Brătianu became head of the cabinet and leader of the party. Although he had been a conscientious minister and had determined the party's economic policy, he lacked the political stature of his elder brother. Feeling the insecurity of his position, he proposed collaboration with the National Peasants, on the basis of an equal division of cabinet posts and a common list in new elections with 55 per cent of the seats going to the Liberals.

23. For a resumé of events after Fedinand's death see "La Situation politique en Roumanie après la mort du roi Ferdinand I," *M.A.B.* (*Mezinárodní Agrární Bureau*) *Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, No. 1 (Prague, 1928), pp. 55–69.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Maniu naturally refused the offer, and Vintilă Brătianu declared his intention to continue as head of the government. 175 665

In the winter and spring of 1927–28, the National Peasants extended their attacks on what they called the usurping government. Maniu embarrassed the government in its efforts to obtain a foreign stabilization loan by declaring on December 22, that his party disapproved of the new budget and that a government without the support of the nation was not in a position to receive foreign loans.[24] In January, 1928, the National Peasants sent representatives abroad, to Paris, London and Berlin, to persuade foreign opinion that the Liberals lacked national approval.

Large protest meetings were held throughout Rumania, climaxed by a massive peasant demonstration in Alba Iulia on May 6. This demonstration aroused great excitement and some apprehension, but it ended in a slightly ludicrous vein. Thousands of peasants came from all over Rumania, though principally from Transylvania, to attend a dramatic denunciation of the Liberals, but at the conclusion of the rally the leaders were at a loss as to what should be done next—a problem that always plagued the Peasant leaders. Some of the more ardent ones wanted to prepare a "March on Rome," and indeed a column of peasants did march off in the direction of Bucarest, but dispersed on the way. Other leaders favored a moderation in sharp contrast to the violence of the oratory, which had blasted the government as the "enemy of the people." Most humiliating, the National Peasants were forced to appeal to the government to provide rail transport to return the peasants to their homes. But despite this touch of *opéra bouffe*, the demonstration was an impressive display of the opposition's ability to call out the peasantry. 175 662

It is quite possible, however, that the government was less worried by the direct threat of these measures than by their effect in increasing the difficulty of obtaining a stabilization loan, the principal preoccupation of Vintilă Brătianu during his year in office and his principal excuse for remaining in power. In the summer of 1928 the loan threatened to be the rock which would wreck the government. In July Vintilă Brătianu convoked the chamber in extraordinary session to report on his negotiations and to get authorization to obtain an external loan of up to $250,000,000. The National Peasant depu-

24. It should be added, however, that Maniu had not blocked discussion or voting on the budget. On December 27 the National Peasant representatives Madgearu and Popovici, while repeating that the Liberal government did not have legal authority to contract foreign loan, stated that if it did succeed the National Peasants would not subsequently refuse to recognize the undertaking, but would respect engagements taken, however unjustifiably, in the name of the state.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 667 ties boycotted the assembly, formed their own gathering, and resolved that laws passed by the Liberal chamber could not bind the Rumanian nation. Vintilă Brătianu tried to persuade the regency that he should remain in office until the loan negotiations were completed. Ultimately, his delays and in particular his request that even after the completion of the negotiations he be permitted to retain office to supervise the application of the loan brought him into conflict with the regents, who were anxious to calm the political situation. Overestimating his position, he resigned on November 3 and dropped the negotiations.

To his surprise his resignation was accepted. The regents consulted Maniu and Averescu on the formation of a coalition cabinet; Maniu would make no agreement except on the basis of new and free elections. The regents requested Titulescu to form a coalition cabinet; Titulescu failed. Finally, the regents were obliged on November 9 to call upon Maniu to form his own cabinet.

Thus ended the long regime of the Brătianus. The combination of two failures contributed to their defeat. Politically they failed to obtain the mass support of the peasants, necessary under universal suffrage, but were unwilling, or unable, to adopt measures to prevent the rise of an effective opposition. Economically, they were unable to restore either the national finances or the condition of agriculture. The stabilization loan and the bad harvest of 1928 directly contributed to their downfall, but the continuing economic uncertainty and instability of the postwar years always gave the opposition a long stick with which to belabor them.

Composition and Political Principles of the Liberals

665 Although the National Liberal party [25] was pleased to trace its origins to the group of young Rumanian intellectuals who had been inspired by the ideals of the French Revolution of 1848, the temper of the Brătianu party in the 1920's bore a far greater resemblance to the rigid and narrowly conceived liberalism of Guizot in the latter years of the July monarchy. In both cases there was the same curious combination of a not unimpressive austerity with the crassest manifestations of the spirit of "enrichissez-vous." The limitations of the Brătianus' conception of political liberty should be evident from

25. This was the party's official title. The word national has usually been omitted in this paper to avoid possible confusion with the term, National Peasant, which indicates the actual fusion of two distinct parties.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

VII

THE PEASANTIST PERIOD, 1928–30

Survey of Political Events

PERHAPS the most disheartening episode in Rumanian history between the wars was the failure of the National Peasant party during its brief term of office after the fall of the Liberals. The period between the formation of the Maniu government in November, 1928, and Maniu's resignation in October, 1930, is a watershed: 1928 was the culmination of a political struggle which had been going on since the end of the First World War; 1930 was the beginning of the long descent into the abyss of 1940 and 1941. The inability of the National Peasants either to relieve the agrarian question or to maintain their political power ended the prospect of a peasant democracy.

When the regents, on November 9, called upon Maniu to form his own government, the National Peasants came into office on a wave of national enthusiasm and optimism. There were widespread rejoicings over the "bloodless revolution"; not only peasants but even business circles and some Liberals were happy to escape from the confining atmosphere of the Brătianu regime. On November 11 Maniu formed an all National Peasant cabinet, including in its important posts: Vaida Voevod at the Interior, G. Mironescu, a wealthy Moldavian who had come from Take Ionescu's party, in the Foreign Office; Ion Mihalache at Agriculture; and Virgil Madgearu at Commerce and Industry. On the following day he announced that "Our first aim will be to give the principles of the Constitution their real meaning and impart a character of strict legality to the working of the administration." [1] He went on to say that he would not disrupt his predecessors' work in the negotiations for a stabilization loan, that he would organize agricultural credit, and give greater power to local institutions. Certain ministries were to be abolished, martial law and censorship to be suspended.

In these initial statements the general aims of the new government are apparent: the primary stress is upon restoring, or rather creating for the first time, a truly constitutional regime. Secondly, the aid of

1. *Times* (London), November 12, 1928.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

was charged with bad faith. The National Peasants reprimanded the 665
offending officials and maintained that such police brutality was an 661
evil inheritance which they were attempting to eradicate. Such incidents are of importance here only in showing the tenacity with which old habits persisted under the new order.

The failure of the economy to rally provided the really vulnerable 665
point for opposition attacks. The stabilization of the currency had 175
given rise to overly sanguine hopes that money would become plentiful—the Bucarest Jockey Club on the strength of it had doubled its bridge points—but much of the funds went to paying old debts. Crops [433]
had been bad in 1927 and 1928, and one of the first tasks of the Maniu government had been to send relief supplies to Bessarabia. The 1929 harvest was excellent, one of the best in the interwar years, but exports were not great, and world grain prices were already beginning the long descent which was to continue until 1934.

The death in October, 1929, of one of the regents, Buzdugan, produced a typical Rumanian crisis. The Liberals contended that the two other regents should select the third member. The National Peasant assembly, however, elected the new regent, Constantin Sarațeanu, thus laying the party open to the same criticism that it had made of the Liberals in the creation of the regency in the first place. Moreover, Maniu seems to have failed to inform some of the Peasant members of the person to be selected and rumors spread, assisted by wishful opposition thinking, that the Transylvanians were forming an inner cabinet in the government. The principal result of the regency affair, however, was to arouse general dissatisfaction over such an arrangement and to increase talk of Carol's return.

In 1930 the situation was even less favorable. Economic improvement failed to round the corner. The opposition press increased its polemics by publishing wild reports of Soviet mobilization on the frontier, Communist uprisings in Bessarabia, and the government's secret intention to devalue the leu. This technique, long familiar in Rumania, was designed to rattle the government into making a false step, and did succeed in driving it to pass a law establishing a prison sentence for persons found guilty of spreading tendentious rumors likely to damage the credit of the state. Under this law the government confiscated several newspapers.

The municipal elections of March, 1930, showed an increase in Liberal strength, as the National Peasants led only by two to one. In May by-elections government candidates were returned in five constituencies, but were defeated in Cernăuți by a Ukrainian Nationalist

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 candidate and in Roman by a fascist. The Communist candidate in
●175 Timişoara polled over 25,000 votes. Here were the seeds of the political upheavals of the next decade.

665 At this point, when the National Peasants still commanded a strong
175 majority but were suffering a perceptible loss of popularity and a
643 slackening of impetus, Carol dramatically returned to Rumania on June 6, 1930. His return was not a surprise, as there had been rumors about it for weeks, so many in fact that the government had forbidden the mention of his name in the press. Maniu, after announcing that the government had sanctioned his return, resigned and was replaced by Mironescu, who annulled the act excluding Carol from the throne. He then resigned and a brief period of confusion ensued. The Liberal party split on the question; Vintilă Brătianu sharply opposed Carol's return and expelled a section of the party under Gheorghe Brătianu, the historian and adopted son of Ion I. C. Brătianu, who had come out for Carol. After two days, during which Marshal Presan attempted unsuccessfully to create a coalition cabinet, Maniu was recalled and formed a new National Peasant government, much the same as his first but with the addition of the economist Manoilescu, who had worked diligently for Carol's return.

The details of Carol's spectacular return are not altogether clear. Apparently the initiative had been his but Maniu had welcomed him.[5] As has already been noted, the National Peasants had never been satisfied with Carol's renunciation of the crown. The disadvantages inherent in the regency, which still had many years to go before Michael reached his majority; the hope of having a king on their side as Ferdinand had been on the Liberals'; the increasing difficulties of the party and the portents of waning popularity; and finally the obvious popular approval of Carol's return—all these combined to make the National Peasants accept the fatal step. At that the party

5. Ten years later Maniu wrote an article in the journal *Timpul* (September 14, 1940), describing his attitude toward Carol's return: "Ever since 1926 I was against Prince Carol's retirement and favored his return, not only in order to satisfy public opinion—which manifested this desire increasingly—but also to insure the continuity of the dynastic order and the normal government of the country. . . . Therefore, in my capacity as Prime Minister I favored the return of Prince Carol, but only under certain well-defined conditions which were to be put into force from the very beginning. However, after only a few weeks of his reign, I realized to my regret that these conditions were not being fulfilled. Thus, among other things the Coronation of King Carol II and of Queen Helen, arranged for the month of September 1930, was indefinitely postponed. Instead, and in defiance of Christian morals, he compromised his reign by leading a life against which I protested unceasingly for ten years. Having arrived at the conclusion that under these conditions I could no longer accept responsibility for Prince Carol's return and for his rule, I resigned, but maintained my attitude of energetic and continuous protest."

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

leaders were not in complete agreement. Some desired Carol's immediate proclamation as king, some were hostile to him, and others advocated his entering the regency. Maniu himself was opposed to proclaiming him king until Carol should leave Mme Lupescu and achieve a reconciliation with his wife. "But," he said later, "I could not force my views in face of public opinion." [6]

The newly constituted government was short-lived. When Maniu learned that Mme Lupescu had returned to Rumania contrary to what he believed to be Carol's agreement, he resigned in protest on October 6. A new National Peasant cabinet was formed under the wealthy but colorless Mironescu, without Maniu or Vaida Voevod. Although this cabinet remained in office until the following April, its dismissal was only a matter of time. Carol had announced his desire to create a coalition government, and as soon as the National Peasants had completed a new loan agreement they were removed from office. The second National Peasant government of 1932–33 will be discussed later in connection with the depression.

Maniu's resignation in October, 1930, was a significant event as it marked, when viewed in retrospect, the conclusion of Rumania's brief experiment with responsible government. In so far as his action was a protest against royal irresponsibility and bad faith, Maniu was remaining true, as he did always, to his conception of legality and constitutionality. But as a protest against the king's moral standards it was misdirected. "Bourgeois sexual morality," Mr. Hugh Seton-Watson has said, "is probably less esteemed in Rumania than anywhere else on the Continent. It was not the right issue on which to base the whole conflict between Democracy and Dictatorship." [7]

The episode is inexplicable without some insight into Maniu's personality, which, in its rather cold incorruptibility, was in the sharpest possible contrast to the laxness and opportunism of Rumanian public life. Born in Transylvania in 1873, Iuliu Maniu had studied law in Vienna. He had been attorney of the Uniate Metropolitanate of Blaj and professor of law at the Blaj Theological Academy. As deputy to the Hungarian parliament he had gained a reputation as a stubborn and doughty opponent of Hungarian policy in Transylvania. The clerical atmosphere of Blaj and the parliamentary atmosphere of the Budapest chamber had a lasting influence. Maniu

6. John Gunther, *Inside Europe* (London, 1936), pp. 367–369, includes an unpublished speech by Maniu which was to have been delivered in 1934 and which provides some additional details concerning the National Peasant leader's position on Carol's return.

7. Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918–1941* (2d ed., Cambridge University Press, 1945), p. 204.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

change, in Rumania as elsewhere, from a paralyzed economic liberalism to increasing controls in commercial, financial, and industrial activity.

King Carol's own role in all these developments is rather elusive. In the intricate game of political maneuvering his shrewdness is seen in the fact that starting from a weak position he not only established himself but drove all other political groups into the wilderness or prison. But for all his adept political manipulations and his flamboyant propaganda there is something unsubstantial about his reign, and nothing seems less real than his dictatorship. While he was not, as king, the frothy playboy the international press had depicted, he did not, either in his ideas or actions, show himself to be a statesman of any magnitude. He had a strong bent for personal rule, to which he attached some rather inconsequential corporatist clichés and an exaltation of the "younger generation." He seems to have had no coherent set of economic ideas beyond a romantic notion of himself as the first peasant, the first laborer, and the first public servant of his realm. The real economic direction came not from Carol but from the increasingly powerful industrialists who came to the fore in the years after the depression.

Survey of Political Events

Between Maniu's resignation in October and the accession of the Liberals in November, 1933, Rumanian political and economic life was more than usually bewildering and confused. The depression was undoubtedly largely responsible for the feeling of panic and uncertainty apparent in the governments of these years. At the same time, the political events were not wholly a reflex of the immediate economic influence but had a certain logic of their own. Rumania's quasi-parliamentary party system was beginning to crumble, extraparliamentary groups were moving into the foreground, and Carol made his first if not successful effort to reorganize political life according to his own lights. These developments proceeded from sources deeper than the depression, though they were intensified by it; they were a part of that profound social crisis which has stricken most of the world in the last thirty years.

The National Peasant cabinet, reconstituted under Mironescu after Maniu's resignation, had a brief and unhappy career. Mironescu was an altogether colorless figure; the government during his term in office was halting and hesitant in its actions, and showed none of the enthusiasm of 1929. Carol was known to feel that the old parties—

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 and it is illustrative of the nature of Rumanian politics that the National Peasant party had by this time already become an "old" party —had outlived the impulses which had created them. He desired a rearrangement of the political mosaic to give due place to "younger" elements and believed that this required the installation of a disinterested government of "personalities." Besides the knowledge that Carol was counting their days, the National Peasants saw their once impressive popularity draining away, through the depression and their manifest failure to bring about the new Jerusalem.

In by-elections of January, 1931, the government lost a number of seats, and perhaps the only safe conclusion one can draw from Rumanian elections is that the loss of government-held seats means an undeniable fall in public confidence. The customary flurry of rumors presaged the government's overthrow, and indeed its negotiations for a second foreign loan were the condition for its remaining in power, as had been the case with Vintilă Brătianu's government three years [648] before. On March 10 the loan agreement was signed in Paris, and on April 4 Mironescu resigned. Rumania's outstanding diplomat, Titulescu, was recalled from London—a standard procedure during the cabinet crises of these years—to form a coalition government. Both the National Peasants and the Liberals accepted on certain conditions but Iorga, significantly, voted against it and demanded a cabinet of personalities.

On April 18 Carol called upon Iorga, who, with Argetoianu as his capable hatchet man, formed a cabinet of at least some of the talents. Iorga, announcing his program to be hard work and economy, summoned and immediately dismissed the National Peasant chamber. New elections were held, but even with Argetoianu doing his efficient best at the Ministry of the Interior and with an electoral pact with the Liberals, the government bloc of National Union obtained only 48 per cent of votes. The National Peasants of course were forced down to 15 per cent, and Maniu announced his retirement from politics. The Communists' Workers and Peasant Union won five seats, their first representation in the chamber. Incidentally, none of their members was returned from Bessarabia, reputedly the seat of Rumanian communism; all five were from the industrial centers of Transylvania, the Banat, and Bucovina.

Carol's guiding hand is evident in the creation of the Iorga-Argetoianu government, and after its formation he announced his 159 intentions to preside over cabinet meetings once a week. Nicolae Iorga, the internationally known and incredibly voluminous historian, had never commanded any following beyond a coterie of ad-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

mirers. His individualism, or perhaps his vanity, had made him an uncertain political ally, and he took to himself the role of mentor and guardian of the Rumanian national consciousness. His efforts in politics, however, were far less impressive than his output as a historian.[1]

The government's term in office was not edifying.[2] As the economic situation deteriorated, the complete absence of any organized political support made itself felt when all the other parties began a violent press campaign; the Liberals belabored Argetoianu's financial policy as one of bankruptcy; the Transylvanian press threatened a demand for autonomy; the aging Marshal Averescu, bitterly disappointed by Carol's failure to select him as man of the hour, assailed both the government and the king. A crisis rose between Carol and the government over the salaries of state officials. The government, faced by a bad deficit and the failure to obtain an additional loan from France, was attempting to reduce official salaries. Carol opposed this and forced Iorga's resignation on June 6, 1932.

After an unsuccessful effort by Titulescu, the National Peasants, under Vaida Voevod, were recalled for their second term of office. In the elections of July they obtained only 45 per cent of the votes, a great decline from their 80 per cent of 1928, but sufficient to give them the premium. The Iron Guard and other fascist groups showed gains and won some additional seats, primarily in Bessarabia, the region of deepest discontent. An effort was made to bring Maniu out of retirement; he did resume leadership of the party but was unable to reach an understanding with Carol.

The program of the new National Peasant government was along the same lines as its predecessors and included the reintroduction of the administrative decentralization law, which had been revoked by the Iorga government; a modification of the electoral law, which all parties promised to change but which they somehow did not get around to when in power; and a reduction of taxes and expenditures. The party had an initial success in obtaining a Swiss loan of 50 million francs for the payment of back salaries of state officials. In October, however, Vaida Voevod resigned after a disagreement with the influential Titulescu on the question of Rumanian-Soviet nego-

1. For a recent tribute to Iorga, who was assassinated by the Iron Guard in 1940, see John Campbell, "Nicholas Iorga," *The Slavonic and East European Review*, 26, No. 66 (November, 1947), 44–59.

2. For a particularly jaundiced account of the Iorga-Argetoianu administration see G. C. Logio, *Rumania*, pp. 89–52. Logio, as a foreign business man, was especially bitter on the subject of Rumanian business ethics and heartily disliked Carol, "who promulgates rascally laws defrauding the unwary foreign investor and trader."

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 tiations,[3] and was replaced by Maniu, with Titulescu as Foreign
175 Minister. On January 8, 1933, Maniu again broke with Carol, and on January 14 Vaida Voevod returned to head the government.[4]

By this time the National Peasants were badly disorganized. With Carol's assistance a definite split in the party leadership between Maniu and Vaida Voevod was developing and was to lead to a rupture in 1934. The government itself had not only lost its peasant enthusiasm but under Vaida Voevod's leadership was rapidly drifting into the political habits of the Liberals. On the first of February
668 oil workers at Ploeşti struck over a wage decision, and a fight en-
665 sued between strikers and troops. At the same time in Bucarest some
175 7,000 workers in the state railway shops went on strike. The government hastily proclaimed martial law in Bucarest, Cernăuţi, Galaţi, Iaşi, Timişoara, Ploeşti, and the oil fields. The Communist party and its affiliates were again dissolved, the government passed laws against antisocial and antistate organizations, and over 200 Communists were arrested throughout Rumania. This brought a protest demonstration from the railway workers, troops were called out, and there was a vicious street fight.

To some extent this tension was a fatal by-product of the deepening depression, and the strikes, while obviously having their roots in the misery of the Rumanian industrial workers, were not confined solely to economic demands. Indeed, since the installation of the Groza regime, the Communists have played up the revolutionary elements of the railway strike and the guiding role of the Communist party in it. Even so, the government all too hastily resorted to the
175 very measures for which it had so long taken the Liberals to task.
665 Moreover, while Vaida Voevod was thus combating labor unrest,

[668] 3. Rumania and Soviet Russia had not resumed diplomatic relations since the First World War because of their inability to reach any agreement on Bessarabia. In January, 1932, the Poles, with French urging, had signed a treaty of friendship and nonaggression with the U.S.S.R. Now Poland and France were pressing Rumania to do the same. Vaida Voevod, apparently without consulting Titulescu, had instructed the Rumanian representative in Warsaw to negotiate with Litvinov. Titulescu had heard of his move and had objected to the manner in which the negotiations were being conducted and especially to the possibility that Bessarabia might be recognized as a subject of dispute. In this disagreement Titulescu was sufficiently influential to squeeze out Vaida Voevod.

4. In this instance the specific difficulty arose over the dismissal of Colonel Marinescu, Prefect of Bucarest. Carol had been installing military officers in a number of civil posts. The National Peasant government undertook to replace them by civilians. Colonel Marinescu, in a circular letter, denied rumors that he was about to be removed and said that since he was appointed by the king, only the king could remove him. Mihalache, Minister of the Interior, then demanded his resignation, and failing to obtain it resigned himself. Maniu supported Mihalache and the cabinet resigned.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

he was on good terms with the up-and-coming Iron Guard. Indeed, a year later he said, under oath, that as early as 1929, when he had been Minister of the Interior, he had been in touch with the Iron Guardists for the purpose of directing their youthful enthusiasm toward less extreme ends and "of drawing the attention of the organization to the necessity of combating Communism."[5] In 1934 Vaida Voevod, after failing to get the National Peasants to accept his "numerus Valachicus"—a device to oust non-Rumanian minorities, especially the Hungarians, from posts in the government and in "nationally important enterprises"—abandoned the party and formed his own hypernationalist, semifascist political group.[6]

In November, 1933, the Vaida government resigned, partly at least because of the king's dissatisfaction with its handling of the increasing fascist activity and its failure to prevent attacks directed against himself, Mme Lupescu, and his entourage.[7] After five years out of power the old Liberals, under Duca, came into office on November 14. Duca, who, like Vaida Voevod, stated that he had tried to "channelize" the energies of the Iron Guard, undertook to dissolve the movement on the eve of the new elections. On December 29 he was assassinated by three Iron Guardists at the Sinaia railway station. After several days' confusion, Gheorghe Tătărescu became head of the Liberal cabinet which was to remain in office until November, 1937.

During these three years of hectic political changes, five main developments are observable:

1) The growing influence of the king. While Carol was unsuccessful in establishing a government of personalities, he was making rapid progress in unraveling the old political fabric and undermining and splitting the leadership of the major parties. He was also increasing his extraparliamentary influence through his camerilla and through his appointees in administrative posts.

2) The increasing paralysis and confusion of the National Peasants. As has been seen already, their decline was more or less implicit in the situation as of 1930, and during the following years the

5. *Patria*, March 31, 1934, quoted in Pătrăşcanu, *Sous trois dictatures*, p. 76.

6. See C. A. Macartney's account of a conversation with Vaida Voevod on the "numerus Valachicus," *Hungary and Her Successors*, p. 326.

7. Although internally Rumanian politics were moving to the Right, the Vaida government did, in July, sign the London Convention defining aggression, to which the U.S.S.R. was also a signatory. This step, which marked a slight improvement in Rumanian-Soviet relations, was a part of the realignment of forces after the rise of Hitler.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 leadership divided, many of the party's most capable men deserted, the party's popularity declined, and an increasing number of peasant supporters were attracted to the Iron Guard.

3) An apparent recovery of the Liberals. The Liberal party had been badly hit by their defeat in 1928 and the schism between Vintilă Brătianu and Gheorghe Brătianu, occasioned by Carol's return. With Vintilă Brătianu's death in 1930 the way was cleared for a gradual reconciliation with the king. The Young Liberals (Gheorghe Brătianu) failed to make any significant headway, and under Duca the old Liberals seemed to be heading for a comeback.

4) The flowering of fascism. The meteoric rise of the Iron Guard was the most spectacular event of those years, and trailing in its wake were a number of less fiery fascist, semi-fascist and anti-Semitic formations of unequal importance. In the party system they served to replace the older coteries, such as Iorga's and Averescu's parties, which were fading from the scene, but in fact they heralded the collapse of parliamentary government.

5) The total impotence of the Left-wing labor movements. They had never been strong in Rumania, but during these three years they were driven from the offensive, however weak, to the defensive. Popular discontent did not, after 1933, swell the ranks of the labor movements but strengthened the Iron Guard.

The Struggle against the Depression

434 439 During these years the economic situation steadily deteriorated. It was estimated that the nominal national income in lei dropped by about 45 per cent between 1929 and 1932.[8] While Rumania was able to maintain a positive balance of trade throughout the depression, the value of exports fell from 29 billion lei in 1929 to 14 billion in 1933 and 1934, even though the weight of exports increased from 7,000,000 metric tons to 8,000,000. Imports fell from 1,102,000 metric tons in 1929 to 467,000 in 1933 (450,000 in 1932). State revenues declined from 36 billion lei in 1929 to 18 billion in 1933.

439 The depression in Rumania had been initiated by the world agricultural crisis in 1929, which produced a tremendous fall in the price of agricultural products, particularly disastrous in the Balkan states because of their inability to compete with the great overseas producers. As industrial commodities fell neither so soon nor so far the resulting price scissors hurt the peasant as agricultural producer

8. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *South-Eastern Europe* (Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 127.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

page 187

IX

THE CAROLIST PERIOD: NEOLIBERALISM, 1934–37

Survey of Political Events

THE term neoliberalism, which may appear a gross misnomer for these singularly unliberal years, is descriptive of two facts: 1) The Liberal party returned to office and, what is more, remained there for the full term of four years, thus repeating its record as the only party under the 1923 Constitution to achieve such a feat of endurance. Nevertheless, the Liberal cabinet of the 1930's was not the same as the party of Ion I. C. and Vintilă Brătianu. Not only did King Carol really hold the leading strings of political power but within the Liberal party itself (not to speak of Gheorghe Brătianu's Young Liberals) there was a growing cleavage between Gheorghe Tătărescu, the head of the government, and Constantin Brătianu, the third of the elder Brătianu brothers, who was party chief. This split did not become open until later, but Tătărescu as a king's man was clearly moving away from the old lines of the Liberals. 2) The leading ideas of the administration at this time have a certain relation to the doctrine of so-called neoliberalism, which was advanced in the 1920's but which at that time was associated with Averescu's People's party.[1] 665

The years 1934 and 1935 were a kind of plateau in the troubled history of the 1930's. The depression leveled off and there was a slow move toward recovery. The political party system, while basically completely unstable, did at least pause from the rapid changes of government which had marked the years 1931–33. King Carol seemed less bent on securing a personal political dictatorship. Even on the international scene there was a temporary, if uneasy, breathing spell. The first impulse of fascism which had brought Hitler to power had not set all of east Europe tumbling as had been feared. Rumania reestablished diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.[2] The Lit- 175 648

1. The People's party was a melange of "regenerated" liberalism combined with an emphasis upon order and discipline, plus a great deal of crass opportunism.

2. Without, however, obtaining a clear statement of recognition of its possession of Bessarabia. For a discussion of this point see Philip E. Mosely, "Is Bessarabia Next?" *Foreign Affairs, 18,* No. 3 (New York, April, 1940), 557–562.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 648 tle Entente remained, the Balkan Entente was formed, and people were heard to say that the Balkans were beginning to mature. It was only a lull before the storm but it was perceptible.

175 661 The political history of these years is relatively uneventful. In the elections of December 20, 1933, the Liberals obtained a handsome majority in the chamber. After Duca's assassination and the creation of a cabinet under Tătărescu, a period of comparative quiet ensued. That this period was not one of tranquillity is shown by the repeated prolongations of the state of martial law, which had been applied after Duca's death and remained in force throughout the Tătărescu administration. In reality an intense tug-of-war was going on between the king and Tătărescu on the one hand and the Iron Guard on the other. It was less a conflict than a competition to gain a monopoly on the increasingly nationalist and extremist atmosphere which was pervading Rumania.

The relations between the Carol regime and the Iron Guard were equivocal, to say the least. Duca, leader of the Liberals, was assassinated by the Iron Guard, and yet the efforts of his successor to control the movement were certainly not convincing.[3] The Guard was officially dissolved but it quickly reappeared in a new guise as the All for the Fatherland party and continued to flourish. Even one of the Liberal members of the cabinet, Iamandi, ascribed the growth of the Iron Guard to the fact that since 1929 successive governments, including the Liberals, had tolerated or halfheartedly encouraged it in the hopes that they could deflect it from its more violent aims and find in it allies for combating communism.

Tătărescu said in 1936 that there was an abyss between the Liberals and the extreme Right, both in methods and concepts, but added, rather obscurely, that only a policy of conciliation was possible in a country where one-third of the population was minorities.[4] He held that the Liberals were tolerant of all parties, if they obeyed the law, but could not permit movements favoring either a red or a white dictatorship. There was all the difference in the world, however, between the earnest and efficient manner in which the government pursued the Communist party,[5] and the obvious indulgence

3. In the trial of the assassins, for example, it was well known that the Guardist leader, Codreanu, was closely implicated in the murder but he was acquitted.

4. *Times* (London), April 24, 1936.

5. It was in 1936 that Ana Pauker, now Rumanian Foreign Minister, was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, along with 18 associates, on the charge of propagating communism. She gained a good deal of publicity at this time because of public criticism of her treatment in prison and because of a newspaper dispute between *Dimineaja* and *Universul* over her trial.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

with which the Iron Guard and the other fascist formations were treated.

By the 1930's the Iron Guard had become the manifestation of a quite powerful current in Rumanian life, a current arising out of the strains and dislocations in the society and intensified by the depression. The government, instead of opposing the current, tried to become master of it, and during these years it took on many of the attitudes and paraphernalia of the extreme Right. Early in its term in office the cabinet pressed for powers to issue decree-laws during parliamentary recess, ostensibly to improve efficiency. In the same year, 1934, the government announced that supervision of telephone calls—wire tapping—was to be extended from international to local and interurban calls. Compulsory labor brigades were introduced in 1936. Carol, for his part, was more and more the flamboyant father of his people. To counter the Iron Guard youth formations he created in 1934 his own youth movement, *Straja Ţării*. Carol's own activities may in part be ascribed to his willful and arbitrary character, his belief that the king should be more than a passive symbol, and his dislike and distrust of the Rumanian party system,[6] but the atmosphere of the time unquestionably nurtured these inclinations.

In 1936 the temporary calm showed signs of breaking and a new element, foreign relations, began to play its decisive role in determining Rumanian politics. It was only a relative change; Rumania has always been exceedingly sensitive to the reverberations of international events, and the rise of the extremist fascist parties in the 1930's was certainly associated with other similar movements elsewhere in Europe. Nevertheless, it may be said that up to 1936 the most important factors in the Rumanian political scene had been internal: the failure of the democratic parties to establish themselves, the long-standing social tensions and the chronic misery of the peasantry, and the personal influence of King Carol and his entourage. These internal forces continued to exert an important influence but the uneasy equilibrium of 1934 and 1935 was broken by the ascendancy of the European fascist states and the mounting international crisis leading to the Second World War.

Titulescu, the strong advocate of the League and of the Versailles system, and at that time advocate of Little Entente-Soviet collaboration, was removed from the Foreign Office in August, 1936. His fall

6. In 1937, in an interview with the journalist Wickham Steed, Carol said that in his own country political parties were sterile and their leaders fit only to criticize. It would be his business as king to discipline them and harness them to constructive work. Notes on the interview are quoted in Pavel Pavel, *Why Rumania Failed* (London, n.d.), p. 142.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 665

In November, 1937, the Liberal government reached the end of its term and resigned. Carol requested Mihalache to form a new cabinet, on the unacceptable condition that he collaborate with Vaida Voevod. On his refusal, Tătărescu was recalled to form a cabinet and prepare for elections. He obtained Iorga's collaboration and made an electoral pact with Vaida Voevod's nationalist group. Then, to the general surprise, it was announced that Maniu and the Iron Guard leader Codreanu (and also Gheorghe Brătianu) had formed a non-aggression pact to insure free elections. This pact in recent years has been loosely used by the Communists to prove Maniu a pro-fascist. Such an interpretation obviously will not hold water, and there is no reason to doubt that his purpose in making the pact was as he defined it: to guarantee that Tătărescu could not employ the usual method of fixing the election. It was not a political agreement nor were joint lists established. It might also be added that the Rumanian Communist party gave its support to the National Peasants even after the pact with the Iron Guard.[9]

Nevertheless, the pact was a blunder. It was bound to have a demoralizing effect upon democratic elements struggling for survival to see an alliance between Maniu and the frank and open enemy of democratic and parliamentary institutions, especially since the National Peasant electoral campaign could not be directed against the Iron Guard. Codreanu certainly had much more to gain from such a pact in being able to associate his name with Maniu's. Above all it showed the National Peasants' own loss of confidence in themselves or their ideas, and was in the sharpest contrast to their refusals to make any deals on the road to power in 1927 and 1928. The defection of some of the outstanding leaders of the party in the following months was a further indication of the disruption of the party.

The pact was, however, successful in its immediate aim; by the balancing of forces which it achieved the elections were relatively free (though they elicited a low turnout of the electorate, a sign, perhaps, of the decline of parliamentarism).[10] For the first time in Rumanian history, and the last, a government in power failed to get the 40 per cent of the votes necessary for the premium. The government obtained 36 per cent, the National Peasants 21 per cent, the

9. *Ibid.*, p. 185.

10. Whereas in the 1928 elections 77.4 per cent of the registered voters actually voted, the percentage dropped off steadily in subsequent elections; in 1937 the figure was only 66 per cent. It is possible, and it has been suggested, that government pressure in 1937 kept people from the polls in some areas. A very interesting analysis of this election is given by C. Enescu, "Semnificaţia alegerilor din decemvrie 1937 în evoluţia politică a neamului românesc," *Sociologie Românească*, 2, Nos. 11-12 (November-December, 1937), pp. 512-526.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 Iron Guard 16 per cent, and the National Christian party (the fusion of Goga's and Cuza's nationalist, anti-Semitic parties) 9 per cent. Rumania's curious electoral system had broken down. The Liberals' failure was clearly a loss of confidence. The National Peasants or the Iron Guard seemed the most likely alternatives.

At this point, however, Carol moved in and on December 28, 1937, called upon the Transylvanian poet and lyrical fascist, Octavian Goga, to form a cabinet. Carol's own explanation of this surprising decision, which was in fact the immediate prelude to his personal dictatorship, was that he had no alternative. He could not bring back the Liberals; he did not want the Iron Guard in power, so his only move was to spike the guns of the extreme Right by putting in another but less dynamic Rightist party. There was, of course, another solution: to have called in the National Peasants, but the personal feud between Carol and Maniu precluded that course. There is no evidence, however, that Carol was at all reluctant to take power into his own hands.

Goga was installed with a rather heterogeneous cabinet including Gen. Ion Antonescu and three runaways from the National Peasants, chief of whom was Armand Calinescu. This government had a brief and hectic career, notable chiefly for arousing foreign protests because of its anti-Jewish activities but for little else. On February 10 Carol ended the farce, dismissed Goga, and set up a government of National Union under the Patriarch Miron Cristea, including an assortment of old worthies: Averescu, Vaida Voevod, General Vaitoianu, Mironescu, Iorga, Tătărescu, Argetoianu, Calinescu, and General Antonescu. It was a strange collection when one considers Carol's advocacy of the "younger generation." The period of explicit royal dictatorship had started.

Economic and Agrarian Policy

642 If the drift toward a royal dictatorship was induced by the victories of fascism throughout Europe and by the political conflict within Rumania itself, a third reason was the economic policy pursued after the depression. While much of the dictatorial paraphernalia of these years may be attributed to Carol's personal tastes or to the political desirability of making use of the nationalist and fascist sentiments of the times, a quite separate impulse toward an authoritarian, corporatist society was contained in the economic policy of neoliberalism.

159 Perhaps the clearest illustration of this impulse is to be found

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

antry. As for the Iron Guard, while its rise was in part fostered by sympathetic politicians and its temporary success after Carol's fall was with the approval of the Germans, it was in its insane way the culmination of a widespread indigenous fascist impulse which had been building up in the interwar years.

The Rumanian Communists, on the other hand, while not altogether without support, enjoyed neither wide popularity (party membership in 1944 was approximately 1,000) nor control of the instruments of power, and they could not, in 1945 at least, have gained the latter without the aid of the Soviet Union. Admittedly, the previous political movements had by 1945 become rather threadbare, either through internal disintegration, senility, or public failure, and one might argue that a break with the past was salutary. But that the Communists were to create the new dispensation was in no way a Rumanian decision. Whatever the merits or shortcomings of communism as such, the Groza government was a Soviet creation. The implications of this fact will be considered shortly.

History of Marxist Parties in Rumania

In the first half of the nineteenth century there were slight signs of pre-Marxist socialism in the Rumanian principalities.[1] Some of Fourier's and Louis Blanc's ideas had been picked up by Rumanian students in Paris, and indeed a short-lived phalanstery was formed at Scaeni near Ploeşti. Marxist socialism, however, came to Rumania by way of Russia. In the 1870's Iaşi, capital of Moldavia, was a meeting place and haven for Russian revolutionaries. In 1879 the first Rumanian socialist newspaper, *Basarabia*, was published; its editorials were along Bakuninist-anarchist lines, with a strange flavor of anti-Semitism. In 1881 the first small socialist group in Iaşi was disbanded by the Rumanian authorities upon the demand of the Russian government.

Between 1887 and 1897 the socialist movement in Rumania revived and developed. Like many currents of foreign thought, Marxism in Rumania was something of a fad. All manner of people employed the terminology. Its political content was loosely defined and combined with anarchist and populist ideas. The intellectual leader of Rumanian socialism was the Russian emigré Constantin Dobrogeanu-

1. For a brief account of the socialist movement in Rumania, *cf.* N. Ghiulea, "Labour Organizations in Rumania," *International Labour Review*, 9, No. 1 (January, 1924), 31–49. C. Titel Petrescu has a lengthy but scrappily organized account in *Socialismul în România*. Trotsky was in Bucarest in 1913; his articles on the Rumanian socialist movement are collected in *Ocherki politicheskoi Rumynii*.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

668 Gherea, whose stream of articles defining Marxism and applying it to
175 Rumania had a lasting influence not only upon Rumanian socialism but upon Rumanian thought in general. In 1884 a socialist study group appeared in Bucarest, and in the following year a newspaper, *Rights of Man*. In 1890 a socialist club began to enter candidates in local and national elections. In 1893 was founded the Rumanian Social Democratic party with a program based upon that of the German Social Democrats. Rumania was recognized as a backward country which could not take the initiative in the socialist movement. The work of the Rumanian socialists was to be preparatory, their tactics moderate and legal. The demands of the program were universal suffrage, administrative decentralization, abolition of the standing army, separation of church and state, equal conditions for women, secularization of schools, equal application of laws, the right of association, limitation of the royal prerogative, a progressive income tax, and an eight-hour day. The program was explicitly antirevolutionary. The new party attempted to organize workers in the few industrial centers of the country, Bucarest, Galaţi, Brăila, and Ploeşti, and to anchor the socialist movement to the nascent trade unions. It also tried in 1897 to spread socialism in the villages, but this effort was immediately suppressed by the Conservative government. For the most part, however, in this period the socialist movement was confined to intellectuals, who had made a good deal of progress toward formulating a program which they felt suitable to Rumania's special needs.

Between 1898 and 1900 the socialists hit a crisis. A section of the party, weary of the political wilderness and seeing no future in isolation, were tempted by the devil, collaboration. In 1899, under their influence, the party changed its name from Social Democrat to National Democrat on the grounds that Rumania was not ripe for socialism. In 1900 Constantin Stere, later the populist leader, split the party by taking a group into the Liberal camp. By the turn of the century the first effort at creating a socialist party had collapsed in confusion and disagreement.

The Russian revolution of 1905 and the significant increase in urban and labor population led to a second revival of socialism. In this phase the party found a broader base of support; it had more contact with the working class and the trade unions, and a talented leader in Christian Rakovsky, a doctor of Bulgarian-Dobrogean origin with international socialist connections. The tactics of the party were still reformist. While labor groups in a few towns sided with the peasants in the 1907 uprising, the Social Democratic party

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

took an altogether negative view and admonished the peasants to retire, as they were only playing into the hands of their adversaries. Nevertheless, in the repression that followed, the Liberal government suppressed the Social Democratic party and expelled Rakovsky from the country as an undesirable alien. He was later readmitted by the Conservative government.

The Rumanian Social Democrats campaigned against the Balkan wars, against Rumania's participation, and against the annexation of the Dobrogean quadrilateral. They came out for a federative republic of all the Balkan states, including Turkey. When the First World War came they maintained their antiwar stand and demanded Balkan neutrality. An inter-Balkan socialist conference held in Bucarest in July, 1915, issued a resolution favoring the German antiwar Socialists, Liebknecht and Luxemburg, and the Russian Left-wing socialists; opposing class collaboration and "social patriotism"; and criticizing the passivity of the Bureau of the Second International. On June 15, 1916, just before Rumania's entry into the war, the workers of Galați demonstrated against Rumanian participation. After Rumania entered the war, the Social Democrats remained opposed but ineffective. Party papers were confiscated, meetings disbanded, and Rakovsky arrested and imprisoned.

A new phase appeared with the outbreak of the 1917 revolution in Russia. On the first of May Russian troops liberated Rakovsky from the prison at Iași, and during the period of complete confusion on the Eastern Front in 1917 and 1918 the Rumanian socialist movement more or less merged with the Russian revolution. Rakovsky himself took an increasingly important part in the Russian revolution, becoming president of the Ukrainian Sovnarkom in 1919. Rumanian Social Democrats, under Mihai Gheorghiu Bujor, formed a Rumanian revolutionary battalion with its headquarters in Odessa. Inside Rumania itself, however, the socialists were repressed, both in Iași, held by the Rumanian government, and in Bucarest, occupied by the Germans.

At the end of the war, in the autumn of 1918, the social situation in Rumania was unsettled, and three years later Rakovsky observed, oversanguinely, that "the prospects of a revolutionary movement were excellent, the position of the administration was critical." [2] Within the country new radical parties sprang up, expressing the widespread dislike of Ion I. C. Brătianu, who was considered responsible for Rumania's involvement in a ruinous war. Externally revolutions were stirring in Austria, Hungary, and Germany. On the other

2. Trotsky and Rakovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

668 hand, the steps taken toward agrarian reform in 1917 and 1918
175 provided a safety valve for peasant unrest. Rumania was among the victorious powers and Brătianu was soon to fight for its territorial rewards. The Bessarabian issue was already introducing a national element into the relations with Bolshevik Russia. At the same time Brătianu took firm measures against signs of social upheaval.

On December 13, 1918, the government harshly repressed a labor manifestation at the National Theater in Bucarest.[3] Social tension continued through 1919 and 1920 and reached a final climax in the abortive general strike of October 20–28, 1920. The strike was set off by the restrictive measures of the Averescu government, which had been called in as a party of discipline and order. The general council of the Social Democratic party and leaders of the labor syndicates had presented the government with demands to respect the right of association, to recognize work councils in industrial establishments, to remove troops from all factories, and to abolish the state of siege and censorship. The government responded by arresting the socialist and labor leaders, including the deputiès to the chamber. The general strike which followed was precipitated by an independent strike of the workers in the railway shops, always the most militant section of Rumanian labor. The strike lasted only seven days and the government had little trouble in breaking it.

After the failure of the general strike the Rumanian socialist movement split, the more radical section forming the Communist party and the moderates the Social Democratic party. Before 1914 the Rumanian socialists had followed the moderate policy of the Second International and were perhaps even more moderate because of Rumania's situation as a backward agrarian state. The war, however, had the effect of associating the party with the more radical section of the international socialist movement. This trend to the Left was not for doctrinal reasons; the Rumanian socialists had not taken a Leninist position. Rather it was because the big Social Democratic parties in the West, in France and Germany, had become involved in the war and because the Russian Marxists, with whom the Rumanian socialist leaders had close personal contacts, were becoming the standard-bearers of militant socialism. Moreover, the antiwar stand of the Rumanian socialists had put them into conflict with the authorities and driven many of them into illegal activity. Finally, the Russian revolution itself produced a wave of enthusiasm which quite

3. According to the socialist leader Moscovici, the demonstration had no revolutionary intent, had occurred more or less by accident, and the socialist leaders had not known of it in advance. Petrescu, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

overpowered any doubts about the "ripeness" of east European countries for the socialist revolution. Thus, such men as Rakovsky and Al. Dobrogeanu-Gherea (the son of the socialist leader), who had been reformists before the war, joined the Communist camp.[4]

According to Rakovsky, the program of the party congress of April, 1919, accepted the basic theses of the Third International, but this trend was opposed by the Social Democratic leaders of Bucovina and Transylvania who were closer to the traditions of Austrian and Hungarian Social Democracy.[5] In 1920 a group of Rumanian delegates was sent to Moscow—solely as observers according to the socialist Petrescu—to examine the situation in Russia and to inform themselves on the principles of the Comintern. This group returned in January, 1921, and it transpired that they had affiliated the Rumanian party with the Third International. A general council met in February, at which the Communists gained control (according to Petrescu, the socialist leaders were in prison as a result of the general strike) and called a general congress for May, 1921. The government now stepped in and arrested for high treason all the delegates to the congress who voted for affiliation, some 70 in number.

After 1921 the Social Democrats and the Communists went their separate ways. In 1922 the Communists attempted to establish a united front in the trade union movement but were defeated. At a general council, the trade unions maintained their political independence; trade union members could belong to any party but party activity within the unions was to be prohibited. In 1925 the General Council of Trade Unions affiliated with the Amsterdam International Federation. The Communists in retaliation set up a "United" Trade Union General Council which never achieved a substantial following but which rendered any trade union activity liable to government repression.

The history of Rumanian Social Democracy between the wars is not inspiring, and the party never achieved a large following. It based itself upon the trade unions, a rather narrow foundation for a political party in Rumania. Moreover, it was never quite clear what the relations between socialism and the trade unions should be. Most of the Social Democratic leaders were trade union officials but in many cases they favored complete separation of political and union activities. There is little evidence that the Socialists had any success

4. This enthusiastic and nondoctrinal support of revolution was of course the cause of later friction when the Third International undertook to impose the Leninist outlook on the member parties.

5. Trotsky and Rakovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

668 in improving labor conditions, partly because of their anxiety lest
● 175 their actions be considered subversive.[6] The Rumanian trade union movement remained weak,[7] legislation passed to assist labor was not applied, and the representatives of industry were successful in impeding labor reforms on the grounds of national interest.[8]

As a political party the Social Democrats had a fundamental handicap. In their interpretation of Marxism they believed that Rumania had not yet reached the stage where it could embark upon or even directly prepare for the socialist revolution. The hopes of the party lay not in Rumania itself but in the advanced states of the West. One of the party leaders, Ilie Moscovici, said in 1923: "Lacking the objective factors—the concentration of capital, sufficient development of industry, and a large proletarian mass—and not having the subjective factors—education and a class conscious proletariat—Rumania suffers all the contradictions of the capitalist regime without having the necessary factors for social transformation."[9] Such a passive outlook, which was admittedly depending upon developments beyond Rumania to realize its ideals, was scarcely likely to win an enthusiastic following. The Social Democrats considered it their principal function to remove the obstacles set by the oligarchy to the free industrial and capitalist development of Rumania, to lift the cultural level of the masses, to bring democracy to Rumania, and to foster international cooperation of labor.

Because of their weak position the Socialists wobbled between maintaining doctrinal purity and collaborating with other parties. They

6. For example, M. Flueraş, in 1926, felt it necessary to explain rather apologetically that the great interest shown by the workers in labor legislation should not be interpreted as a revolutionary tendency. ILO, *Industrial and Labor Information, 17*, No. 7 (February 15, 1926), 231.

7. Trade union membership increased only from 25,000 in 1919 to 42,000 in 1929. Transylvania and the Banat had, in 1929, 25,000 members, the Old Kingdom only 11,000, Bucovina, 6,000, and Bessarabia, 790. *Ibid., 33*, No. 8 (February 24, 1930), 265.

8. In 1934 the Rumanian Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry submitted a memorandum to the Ministry of Labor which said, among other things, "The improvement of the living conditions of workers can only be gradually achieved. Any defiance of this rule must be detrimental to the national economy in that it would bring about both a weakening of the credit of the state and an increase in unemployment, thus leading to a worsening of social conditions. The present limits of economic possibility can only be exceeded by means of an increase of production brought about through the formation of new capital and through an increase in the productive capacity of labor on a sound economic basis." *Ibid., 49*, No. 11 (March 12, 1934), 352. To a degree, of course, this statement was perfectly true. On the other hand, the constant reports of employers' infringements of labor laws, such as the weekly rest act, leave no doubt that their actions were hardly determined by any such general considerations. Cf. *Ibid., 52*, No. 11 (December 10, 1934), 325, report by the Rumanian Chamber of Labor on the application of labor laws.

9. "Lupta de clasă şi transformarea socială," *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, p. 302.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

worked with the National Peasants in the 1926 communal elections in an effort to oust the Liberals, and again in the general elections of 1928 which established the Maniu government. A dissenting splinter group broke away to form an Independent Socialist party, somewhat to the Left of the Social Democrats and advocating collaboration with "legal" Communists. Collaboration between the National Peasants and the Social Democrats ceased shortly after the former came to power. The Socialists charged the Maniu government with betraying the working class; at a party congress held in 1930 collaboration was condemned and the party reaffirmed its independence and single-minded loyalty to the workers.

In the years leading up to the Carolist dictatorship the Social Democrats were altogether ineffective and powerless. They drafted numerous resolutions against fascism and in favor of democracy, but were in no position to do anything about either. In 1935 and 1936, when courted by the Communists, who had adopted the Popular Front, they replied that they were unwilling to sign any agreement with the various Communist-front organizations and that common action was possible only if the Communists came into the open and renounced their illegal activities. In the 1937 elections they refused to have anything to do with the National Peasants because of the pact with Codreanu, and succeeded only in reuniting with the Independent Socialists, an achievement of little consequence.

After the overthrow of the parliamentary regime in 1938, the Social Democrats folded up. The collaborationist spirit again made its appearance. The party reexamined its theoretical principles and altered its definition of the state, which was no longer seen as a class instrument but as "an instrument useful and necessary to all."[10] Two of the Social Democratic leaders, Flueraş and Mirescu, entered the labor commission of the Goga-Cuza government. When Carol replaced the trade unions by corporatist bodies, the General Confederation of Labor was absorbed into the Front of National Rebirth, and one of the Socialist leaders, Grigorovici, became an undersecretary in the Ministry of Labor under the dictatorship.[11]

If the Social Democrats found agrarian Rumania an unpromising

10. This change was expressed in an article by Lotar Rădăceanu in *Gândul Vremii* (March–June, 1938), cited in Pătrăşcanu, *Problemele de bază*, p. 269. Pătrăşcanu was very critical of the theoretical position adopted by Rădăceanu and stated that it cleared the way to accepting the Carolist dictatorship. Still, such facility has its advantages. Rădăceanu is now in the Groza government whereas Pătrăşcanu was discharged from the Ministry of Justice and ousted from the Communist party.

11. Titel Petrescu, while admitting a good deal of opportunism in these actions, defends them as necessary to preserve what rights still remained to labor.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

668
175

environment for their moderate Marxism and their reliance upon the urban working class, the Communists encountered far more serious obstacles. In Rumania the question of communism was completely entangled in the issue of Soviet-Rumanian relations. More than in most European countries communism and high treason were regarded as completely synonymous terms. This national conflict, which the Rumanian Communists could not begin to overcome, dogged their efforts from the start. Rumania's relations with Russia had never been very good; tsarist Russia may have acted as protector of the Balkan Christians, but its own interests in the Black Sea littoral had always been a source of anxiety to the Rumanian principalities. The dispute over Bessarabia, beginning in 1812 and heightened by the territorial transfers of 1856 and 1878, was a constant source of irritation. Because of the Rumanian occupation of Bessarabia in 1918, the Soviet Union and Rumania did not resume full diplomatic relations until 1934.

In addition to this territorial dispute, the Communists faced another difficulty. The Third International was founded in the hope and expectation that the disasters and havoc of the First World War would create sufficient social upheaval to bring about the proletarian revolution. But as has been seen, while revolution threatened to gain the upper hand in many eastern European states, Rumania stood fast and indeed sent troops to put down Bela Kun's Soviet regime in Hungary. As a result Rumania, perhaps more than any state of eastern Europe, regarded itself as the bulwark against bolshevism, both against Soviet territorial advance and against the Communist revolutionary doctrine. All sides were in agreement on the point. Rumanian authors repeatedly referred to the agrarian reform as the most effective protection against communism. At the League of Nations and other international meetings, Rumania exerted a good deal of diplomatic pressure on the grounds of its importance as an outpost against the Soviet Union. For their part the Russians saw in Rumania one of the key points of the *cordon sanitaire*, an advance base for the malevolent capitalist states.

Where were the Communists to find their support in such a country? They sought it among the proletariat, the small peasants, and the national minorities. The proletariat, as the Social Democrats discovered, was too small to be effective, although the Communists did obtain their few nuclei in the industrial centers. As for the small peasants, the Communists, unlike the Social Democrats, tried hard to penetrate the countryside but the land reforms had weakened its revolutionary potentialities. Besides, the Peasant party was much more likely to obtain the support of the peasantry, and did. The

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

Communists did have some success with the minorities (the present leaders of Rumanian communism, Pauker, Luca, and Bodnaras are all from the ethnic minorities), but any success in this direction would only intensify the feeling that they were an antinational and treasonous party.

Finally, the Communists were handicapped by the fact that almost from the outset they were an illegal party and with but occasional relaxations remained so throughout the interwar period. Although most of the Rumanian governments were not averse to having the Communists as a whipping boy, the Communists brought a good deal of their difficulties on their own heads by their tactics, which were devious, disingenuous, and unsuccessful. In 1921 Rakovsky remarked with some bitterness that General Averescu was arresting not only the "illegal" party workers but those working "lawfully."[12] In a similar spirit a Communist pamphlet of 1925, describing the uprising at Tatar Bunar in Bessarabia, castigated the cordon sanitaire and the provocative accusations that the Soviet Union was stirring up trouble, but went on to say, "Not only the free booters of Bucarest, but the capitalists of the whole world are trembling before the convulsions of the proletarian giant. They fear that the red wave rolling out of the East will burst the Dniester dam and flood onward to the coast of the Atlantic Ocean."[13] Although this dual policy of pursuing both legal and illegal activities received a brilliant defense and elaboration in Lenin's pamphlet, *Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, it has probably, in the long run, done the Communists far more harm than good. It may be, as Lenin said, that a good warrior should know all his weapons, legal as well as illegal, parliamentary as well as revolutionary, but such a military plan of campaign should have remained a highly classified document, not a broadside, and was bound to lose effectiveness with repetition. As soon as the enemy became aware of this tactic the Communists were left open to the charge of bad faith no matter what course they followed. In the case of Rumania, of course, they had very little opportunity for any legal activity in their own name, but the efforts to achieve fronts of one complexion or another in the 1920's and 1930's were all unsuccessful.

The Rumanian Communist party got off to an unfortunate start. The arrest in 1921 of the delegates who had voted for affiliation with the Third International deprived it of many of its leaders. Among

12. Ch. Rakovsky, "The Communist Movement in Roumania," *The Communist International*, No. 13 (n.d.), pp. 112–114.

13. *Bessarabia . . . The Roumanian Hell*, published in English by the British Section of the International Class War Prisoners Aid (London, n.d.), p. 13.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

668 175 the active members who took their place was Ana Pauker, a young Jewish schoolteacher from Moldavia who had joined an illegal group in the Social Democratic party in 1918. She had married Marcel Pauker, son of a leading Rumanian publisher.[14] Elected to the Central Committee she became one of the party's most determined fighters. In 1924 when the party was definitely outlawed, she was arrested, but was subsequently released and left the country.

The directives of the Comintern did not facilitate the work of the Rumanian Communists. For example, the resolution on the national question, passed by the Fifth World Congress of the Communist International, stated that under the Versailles system a number of small imperialist states had been created in eastern Europe to fight the proletarian revolution.[15] The states had been formed by the annexation of large territories with foreign populations.

> At the same time the struggle of the oppressed peoples against national oppression has become a struggle against the power of the imperialistic bourgeoisie who were victorious in the world war, since the strengthening of the new imperialist powers means the strengthening of the forces of world imperialism. The importance of the struggle against national oppression is still further augmented by the fact that the nationalities oppressed by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Greece, in their social composition are largely peasants, and the struggle for their national liberation is at the same time the struggle of the peasant masses against foreign landlords and capitalists.

Under these conditions, the resolution declared, the general formula, "The right of every nation to self-determination even to the extent of separation," should be rendered more specific: "The political separation of oppressed peoples from Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Greece." The resolution noted with disapproval that certain Communist parties were falling into deviations on this question, that their slogans were not directed against the states founded on national oppression but toward partial reform and autonomy within existing boundaries.

The resolution was even more specific on the Ukrainian question, an evident example of the overlapping of Soviet and Comintern aims. The congress declared that the Ukrainian national problems in Po-

14. C. G. Costa-Foru, *Aus den Folterkammern Rumäniens*, p. 21; C. Bobrovskaya, "Two Bolshevik Heroines," *The Communist International*, *14*, No. 3 (1937), 988–960.

15. "Resolution of V. World Congress of Comintern on National Question in Central Europe and Balkans," *The Communist International*, New Ser., No. 7 (December, 1924–January, 1925), pp. 93–99.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

land, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia formed one Ukrainian problem 668 demanding a common solution for all three countries. In this case it 175 opposed slogans of autonomy for Carpathian Russia, the western Ukraine, Bessarabia, and Bucovina because they were directed toward forming a coalition with the wealthy strata of the Ukrainian peasantry. The congress, therefore, considered it necessary "for the Communist Parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania to launch the general slogan of separation of the Ukrainian lands from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, and their union with the Soviet Ukraine and through it with the U.S.S.R." As for Transylvania and Dobrogea, the congress merely recommended that these areas be separated from Rumania and made independent regions.

Much of the nationalities program of the congress was admirable, its opposition to the hypernationalism of the Balkan states, its championing of national equality and cultural and educational rights for minorities. But these reform measures were clearly of less importance than the demand for separation. It is difficult to see how a party advocating the loss of Transylvania, Dobrogea, Bessarabia, and Bucovina was going to gain much popularity in Rumania, especially when the majority of the population in these areas (with the exception of Bucovina) and much the greatest number of peasants were Rumanians. With such instructions the Rumanian Communist party was never able to shake off the imputation of being an antinational party.

In addition to handing out such uncomfortable assignments, the Comintern heckled the Rumanian Communists for lapsing into any number of deviations. Because the party had been forced underground, it had been unable to conduct the necessary educational campaign to bolshevize itself, with the result that there were deplorable signs of "ultra-left and right liquidatorial tendencies." [16] The Sixth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in 1926 felt called upon to rebuke the Rumanian Communists and directed them to correct their errors. Specifically the party was to issue a journal, fight the Right-wing deviations, and "struggle against even the smallest sectional manifestations."

At this time the party was troubled by two questions, the trade union issue and a united front against the Liberals. With regard to the "unitary" trade unions and their relations to the Amsterdam Union, the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist party issued the following orders:

16. Al. Badulescu, in a review of the Rumanian party organ *Lupta de Clasă*, *The Communist International*, *4*, No. 18 (October 15, 1927), 311–312.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

668 The duty of mobilizing the working class masses to insure the legality of the unitary trade unions is a primary one for us Communists. Although the unitary trade unions are not by any means a Communist organization and still less a Communist Party organization, as the Social Democrats and the bourgeoisie together maintain, they are the one legal organization based on the class struggle, and it is the duty of the Communists to use all their influence in the unitary and reformist trade unions, in the workshops and factories, for rousing the worker to fight for the legality of the unitary trade unions.

With this approach it is not surprising that the Social Democrats should have complained that wherever the Communists showed an interest in trade union matters, it was disastrous to the unions.

The Sixth Plenum criticized the Rumanian Communist party for its tactical errors in the 1926 communal elections when the party had preached the tactics of the united front of the working class with all opposition bourgeois parties against the Liberal oligarchy. This policy was considered to involve a serious misreading of the Rumanian situation. The error—it was an error in 1926 at any rate—lay in failing to realize that the Liberals were the most highly developed section of the Rumanian bourgeoisie, and that no real anti-Liberal bloc on the side of the opposition parties (i.e., the National Peasants) was possible. The effort to create such a bloc was a serious error, since it "obscures the class-consciousness of the working class, it gives rise to illusions which prevent the crystallization of the one social force which is actually capable of putting an end to the dictatorship of the Liberals: the united front of the proletariat with the broad masses of the peasantry, liberated from the guardianship of the opposition bourgeoisie." In effect this meant that the Communists were not to work with the National Peasants in ousting the Liberals but were rather to attract the peasants away from them.

In terms of the Rumanian situation this tactical directive of the Comintern was absolutely hopeless, although in a negative way it was correct in forecasting the difficulties in ousting the Liberals from their entrenched positions in the Rumanian economy. It must also be admitted that the Communists foresaw the dangers of Carol's return. "The 'Persecution and Exile of Prince Carol,'" said *Lupta de Clasă*, the party organ, "utilized politically by the opposition bourgeoisie can win over petty-bourgeois sections and create the illusion among many workers that a Rumanian 'Mussolini' regime would be in a position to change the miserable conditions of the masses. That Prince Carol is closely associated with the fascist organizations in Rumania is an open secret."

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

As might be expected, the victory of the National Peasants in 1928 caused no rejoicing among the Communists. In later years they wrote of the National Peasants as having come in on a wave of popular protest against the Liberals; but the Communists themselves were hostile to the National Peasants before 1928 and fought with them throughout their term in office. Under the National Peasants Bessarabia remained a center of discontent and international friction; Vaida Voevod courted the Iron Guard as allies against the Communists.

To some extent at least this conflict arose from the fact that the National Peasants came to office at just the time the Comintern went off on an ultra-Left tangent, denouncing socialists as social-fascists, and appeared firmly convinced that the Western powers were preparing an immediate assault upon the Soviet Union.[17] During this period Rumania was considered to have a foremost place in the anti-Soviet plans of the Western imperialists. All the energies of the National Peasants were described as being employed against the U.S.S.R., and even the feeble Rumanian Social Democrats were called warmongers.[18]

The Comintern again felt called upon to rebuke the Rumanian comrades. "In spite of the most savage terror, the Communist Party lives and becomes stronger. The only obstacle in the path to the growth of its influence over the proletariat and the toiling masses lies in the *slow* surmounting of *right opportunist* conceptions in some sections of its work, particularly in the field of the peasant movement." [19] The error here was the old heresy of regarding the peasantry as a social unit and failing to split the poor peasants from the kulaks. Counting on the depression to produce a revolutionary situation—although the swing to the Left had preceded the depression—the Comintern apparently had hopes of bringing social issues to the boil. "The increasing upsurge of the class struggle creates a basis on which the Communist Party could win the trust of the toiling masses, establish its hegemony. . . . With a correct policy the Communist Party can become a factor for the acceleration of the approach of a revolutionary situation." [20]

In retrospect this ultra-Left tactic of the early 1930's must be regarded as a disaster which wrought a great deal of damage. The

17. Of course these suspicions were fed by such events as Maniu's reported request in 1930 that the British survey the Black Sea coast with a view to constructing a strong naval base near Constanța. Pavel Pavel, *Why Rumania Failed*, p. 240.

18. T. Marin, "The Role of Rumania in Intervention against the U.S.S.R.," *The Communist International*, 7, No. 10 (May 15, 1931), 300.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 302.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 303.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

668 175 veering from Right to Left in the Comintern in the 1920's had brought no results but had merely caused the local parties to be regarded as altogether untrustworthy and treacherous political allies. The tactics in 1930 of smearing all non-Communist groups as fascist certainly did nothing to prevent the rise of fascism. It is hard to say how important this was in Rumania. The Rumanian Communist party was clearly on the fringes of politics and failed to make any appreciable headway. By its irresponsible behavior, however, it enabled the parties of the Right to use the Communist label as a means of discrediting all working class activity.

The last effort of the Rumanian Communists to pursue a revolutionary line was the Grivița railway strike of 1933, in which many of the later Communist leaders—Gheorghiu-Dej, Vasile Luca, and Pătrășcanu—were involved and arrested. This strike, which began with economic demands, quickly assumed a political character. Vaida Voevod's National Peasant government violently suppressed it. After that, as Pătrășcanu said, the radicalization of the masses served to fortify the Iron Guard and the labor movement was put on the defensive.

The rise of Hitler and the realization that the fascist onslaught was not necessarily the immediate prelude to the Communist revolution was belatedly met by a shift in the party line, officially inaugurated at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International held in the summer of 1935. Gheorghe Dimitrov, in the leading speeches, criticized the previous practice of calling Social Democrats social-fascists and came out for a popular front of democratic forces against fascism. Reflecting this change was an article by one of the Rumanian Communist leaders, Boris Stefanov.[21] "We are basing ourselves," he said, "upon the undoubted fact that the overwhelming majority of the working population of Rumania and even a considerable section of the bourgeoisie are opposed to fascism." What was required was a concentration of democratic forces, including the bourgeois parties, in an anti-fascist Popular Front. The Social Democrats were requested not to remain aloof and even the National Peasants received moderate praise: "The National Tsaranist (Peasant) Party is one of the biggest mass democratic forces in Rumania. Despite all the waverings and reactionary tendencies of some of its leaders, despite its great sins in the past in its relation to the Ru-

21. Boris Stefanov, "The Concentration of Democratic Forces in Rumania," *The Communist International*, *14*, No. 3 (1937), 943. Stefanov, in 1920, had been one of the members of the general council of the Socialist party who signed the ultimatum for the general strike.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

manian people, the National Peasant Party is nevertheless today one of the most important anti-Fascist forces." Stefanov undertook to refute criticisms that the Communist party was undemocratic, illegal, and antinational. As to the charge that it put forward irredentist slogans aimed at separating the new provinces from Rumania he replied that while the Communist party was against national oppression and for national self-determination it was the sworn enemy of the fascists who were trying to utilize the national issue to tear away Transylvania and Dobrogea and subject them to the fascist yoke. Significantly, even in this reconciliatory mood there was no mention of Bessarabia.

This change of tactics had no important results in the course of Rumanian politics. The Social Democrats remained suspicious and aloof. A Democratic Union was set up in the last years of the Tătărescu cabinet for the purpose of achieving a broad coalition against the extreme Right but, as Pătrăşcanu said, while it was a legal movement it worked "in the ideological cadres of the Communist Party."[22] The Tătărescu government dealt severely with the Communists. In November, 1934, the party, with all its affiliates, was again dissolved; although it had never been reinstated after 1924 its front, the Workers and Peasants bloc, had participated in elections in the early 1930's. In 1936 was held the much publicized trial of nineteen Communists, including Ana Pauker who received a sentence of ten years' imprisonment.

At the time of the 1937 elections the Communists again attempted to create a Popular Front. This effort was foiled by the Maniu-Codreanu pact and by the Social Democrats' refusal to cooperate with either the National Peasants or the Communists. The Communists eventually threw their modicum of support to the National Peasants, a move which was later regarded as a mistake.[23] In retrospect it is indeed lamentable that some sort of Popular Front was not created in 1937, the last relatively free election which Rumania was to enjoy, but certainly the Communists by their previous activity had contributed to rendering such a front impossible and must share the responsibility for the breakdown of Rumanian parliamentary government.

Shortly after the German-Soviet pact, in December, 1939, Boris Stefanov, the same who had ardently supported the Popular Front

22. Pătrăşcanu, *Sous trois dictatures*, p. 110.

23. According to Pătrăşcanu, the Communists should have forced collaboration upon the Social Democrats, who, in his view, could not easily have refused; if the Social Democratic leaders had later tried to break away, they could have been unmasked. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

668 and had denied that the Communist party was antinational, wrote
175 an article in *The Communist International* attacking British and French capital and its attempt to drag Rumania into the imperialist war, insisting that Rumania's interests demanded a treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union (presumably modeled after the Soviet treaties with the Baltic states which involved the establishment of Russian bases and armed forces in these countries) and directing the Rumanian Communists to work for the right of self-determination in the annexed provinces (Bessarabia, Bucovina, Transylvania, and Dobrogea), even if this meant their political separation from Rumania. Although the Soviet Foreign Office publicly denied that Stefanov represented the views of the Soviet government, the article provides some evidence that the Russian interest in Rumania at this time was not limited solely to the recovery of Bessarabia. When this province and Northern Bucovina were taken over in the summer of 1940, the Rumanian Communists naturally defended the action and placed the blame on Carol for his bellicose declaration in the spring that he would fight for these areas. One other event, of importance for the future, occurred in 1940: Ana Pauker, who had been in a Rumanian prison since 1936, was exchanged for two members of the Rumanian parliament who had been picked up in Bessarabia when the Russians moved in.

After Hitler's declaration of war on the Soviet Union, the Rumanian Communists again shifted their tactics and called for resistance to the German aggression, but unlike the Communists in Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia they seem to have achieved very little in the way of partisan activity or sabotage.[24]

The Formation of the Groza Government

In 1944 a four-party bloc headed by Iuliu Maniu for the National Peasants, Constantin Brătianu for the Liberals, C. Titel Petrescu for the Social Democrats, and Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu for the Communists collaborated with King Michael and his intimate advisers in preparing for the coup d'état of August 23 which ousted Marshal Antonescu, expelled the Germans from Bucarest, and brought Rumania to the side of the Allies. Negotiations for a Rumanian capitulation had been carried on sporadically in various neutral capitals since 1943, generally in Maniu's name, and in some cases with the knowledge of Marshal Antonescu and his Foreign Minister Mihai An-

24. In 1944 there was a good deal of vague talk about their deeds of derring-do, but I could never obtain any specific examples.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

tonescu. These negotiations were not successful and were impeded principally by the Rumanians' understandable if unrealistic reluctance to face the fact that they must surrender to the Soviet Union and the Red Army. Their repeated requests for an Anglo-American landing in the Balkans or for some type of Western protection against the foe to the East had no possibility of success, given the strategic and political arrangements arrived at by the Big Three, and could only serve to intensify the suspicions of the Russians, who were in an increasingly powerful position as their forces drove westward into Europe. The coup finally came after a Soviet offensive broke the German lines in northern Moldavia in the summer of 1944. Following the coup a provisional government was formed under General Sanatescu; the four party chiefs were ministers but most of the cabinet posts went to army officers, in the expectation, apparently, that the first days of the government would be far more seriously threatened by conflict with the Germans than proved to be the case.

By the terms of the armistice signed in Moscow on September 12 Rumania was to join the Allies against Germany, supply twelve infantry divisions, intern German and Hungarian forces, and provide free passage for Soviet troops. It was obliged to face three economic obligations: provide for the Allied Command in Rumania, pay to the U.S.S.R. reparations of $300,000,000 over six years, and restore all loot taken by Rumanian troops from the Soviet Union during the war. The 1940 Soviet-Rumanian frontier was reestablished, but the Vienna Award giving northern Transylvania to Hungary was nullified. All persons arrested for favoring the United Nations or for racial reasons were to be released; war criminals were to be arrested; and fascist and Hitlerite formations disbanded. The application of the armistice was to be supervised by an Allied Control Commission operating under the Allied (Soviet) High Command. The term in parenthesis was clearly the ultimate authority

With the arrival of the Russians the Rumanian Communist party took on new life and a new leadership in Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, and Emil Bodnaraş, all of whom had learned their communism the hard way and had spent many years in the Soviet Union.[25] In Rumania as in the other eastern European states a distinction may be made between the purely local Communists, many of whose connections had been primarily with Western Communist parties, and the Moscow-trained group. The difference is somewhat difficult to define, since

25. In the beginning none of the three assumed official posts; Ana Pauker was occupied with high policy, Luca, among other things, edited the party organ *Scânteia* (*The Spark*), and Bodnaraş appears to have been busy preparing his armed squads.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

175 all were Leninists, all disapproved of Social Democratic reformist policies, and all believed in party discipline. Yet there was a difference, which may be illustrated by an example. Communists who had participated in the coup of August 23, were pleased that Rumania had switched sides so facilely and that the country had been spared the devastation of an invasion. Among the people coming from the East, however, there was some disappointment that the state structure had remained intact and they rather regretted that the issue had not been settled by force of arms, which would have cleared the way for immediate Communist reconstruction. This difference in view led to a number of arguments as to whether communism could be created on a rubble heap, an important issue, of course, in the interpretation of Marxism. Those who approached the subject theoretically held to the belief that communism should cap the existing economic structure. The Russian experience, however, seemed to create a different emphasis: once one had achieved power and cleared the political air, communism could proceed to work constructively on the most unpromising type of terrain.

The four-party bloc soon showed signs of strain. Early in October the National Democratic Front was launched, comprising the Communist party, the Social Democratic party, the Ploughmen's Front, the Union of Patriots, as well as representatives of the newly revived trade unions. The Union of Patriots was a rather amorphous body, often called the vestibule to the Communist party, with the apparent purpose of attracting to the National Democratic Front nonproletarian elements, professional men, and intellectuals; it never achieved any particular importance.

The Ploughmen's Front, however, deserves some mention. It was originally founded at Deva in Transylvania in 1933. Its leader was the rather eccentric but prosperous landowner and industrialist, Petru Groza, who had been a minister in Marshal Averescu's People's party cabinets of 1920 and 1926. Initially it seems to have been a straightforward radical peasant movement, rather in the spirit of Mihalache's peasantism of 1920, born in protest against the agricultural debt load resulting from the depression and against the failure of the National Peasants to fulfill their role as spokesmen for the poor cultivator. Its 1933 program was largely a series of peasant demands; three-fourths of the amount of debts to be cancelled, the remaining fourth to be paid over a more or less extended period of time, depending upon the size of the debtor's property; monetary reform to provide more money; reforms in the civil service to prevent nepotism and the holding of multiple posts; the extension of expropri-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

ation to properties over 100 hectares as well as expropriation of forest land; abolition of special privileges to industry, monopolies and cartels; reduction of the cost of the products of state monopolies; abolition of metayage, payment in kind, and labor dues; increased mechanization of agriculture; and a truly democratic regime.[26]

During the period of the attempted Popular Front it collaborated with the Communist party affiliates and strongly opposed the tendency of the peasants to join the Iron Guard.[27] During the 1930's it did not achieve any widespread following except in Transylvania, but during the months immediately after August 23 it made rapid strides throughout Rumania, an expansion that was not altogether artificial but did represent an appeal to peasant dissatisfaction. By 1944, however, it had fallen under the direction of the Communists, who were unquestionably the guiding force in the National Democratic Front, and its later function was largely as the rural arm of the Communist party.

An important feature in the political situation in the months after the armistice was the fact that while the Rumanian state structure in the central Bucarest administration had remained intact, the countryside was politically almost a *tabula rasa*. The six years of dictatorships plus the war had broken up local party organizations and their connections with the party leadership. To a considerable degree the political leaders in Bucarest were generals without armies.[28] This exceptional concentration of all political life in the capital, although there has always been a great deal of centralization, gave a certain advantage to the parties of the Left which could rally the workers in the industrial sections of the capital for demonstrations and processions.

After a three weeks' political crisis, on November 5 a more "politi-

26. For a history of the Ploughmen's Front, cf. Gheorghe Micle, *Răscoala pământului; istoria luptelor politice ale ţăranimii române 1933–1945* (Bucarest, 1945).

27. In 1937, Romulus Zăroni, who was briefly Minister of Agriculture in the Groza government, wrote a simple but very clear and effective pamphlet explaining why the hard-pressed Rumanian peasant should not be tempted by the antidemocratic reaction of the fascists: *De ce nu trebue să fie plugarul român fascist* (Cluj, n.d.).

28. During December, 1944, and January, 1945, I made fairly extensive field trips through Transylvania, Moldavia, and southern Bucovina. The farther I went from Bucarest the less organized were the local branches of the historical parties. In many cases the local Liberal and National Peasant leader had received no word whatsoever from his party's headquarters. The most impressive movement was the rapid expansion of the Ploughmen's Front which was extending its branches up into northern Moldavia and west to Timişoara. At the same time, in villages not far from Deva, its point of origin, there were many peasants who had never heard of the organization. It was my impression that, at that time at least, the growth of the Ploughmen's Front was by no means merely an invention of the National Democratic Front propagandists.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 cal" coalition government was set up, again under General Sanatescu, with ministerial seats going to members of each of the four parties of the democratic bloc. This ministry was short-lived partly because of the vehement objections of the National Democratic Front to the National Peasant Minister of the Interior, N. Penescu. The case of Penescu is a perfect example of the curious political situation at this time. There is no question that the reason why the Communist-inspired National Democratic Front attacked Penescu was because it wanted control of that important ministry for itself. The directness with which Communist parties have gone after the ministry of the interior in all the eastern European states is well known. At the same time, Penescu was in fact violently anti-Soviet and anti-Communist and had indeed organized a section in his ministry to keep watch on the Communist party. That is to say, the Communists would have been quite justified in suspecting Penescu of hostile intentions, but that was not the reason they wanted him removed. In fact, the arguments they employed in the press were altogether disingenuous.

On December 2 the Sanatescu cabinet was replaced by a new government under General Radescu, who had gained a reputation for speaking bluntly to the Germans and being put in a concentration camp. The cabinet was about the same; Radescu took over the Ministry of the Interior, with the Communist Teohari Georgescu as Undersecretary. Petru Groza was Vice-Premier. For a time it appeared as though this ministry would be stable.

In January, 1945, however, two of the leading Rumanian Communists, Ana Pauker and Gheorghiu-Dej, went to Moscow. From all evidence it appears that they were given permission, or were instructed, to carry on their campaign. Shortly after their return, the National Democratic Front announced a bid for power on the basis of its program. By this program Rumania was to make a maximum war effort and to strengthen and democratize the army. There was to be an elimination of fascists, arrest and trial of war criminals, and honest fulfillment of the armistice terms. Above all, an agrarian reform was to be carried through. The Front announced that if it came to office Northern Transylvania would be handed over to Rumania. In February the crisis steadily mounted, with violent press polemics and periodic criticisms from the Soviet radio at the laxness with which the Radescu government was carrying out the armistice conditions. At first the attack was directed against the National Peasants and the Liberals, but when General Radescu rather untactfully indicated his displeasure with the agitation and demands, the Front turned against him. The National Peasant and Liberal papers were suppressed, in

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

one case by a Soviet order, in the other by a strike of the printers' union. Teohari Georgescu refused to take orders from Radescu and demanded that the officials in the Ministry of Interior pay no attention to the general. 175

The crisis reached a climax on February 24 when, at the conclusion of a large National Democratic Front demonstration, the crowd moved into the palace square and headed toward the Ministry of the Interior. Shots were fired, several people were killed, and that night in a rash—and final—broadcast General Radescu roundly abused the Communist leaders Pauker and Luca, and called on the army to stand by him.[29] Certainly Radescu was a greatly provoked man but owing his appointment to an agreement of the four parties he was not in a position to take an independent stand when this coalition broke down under the Communist attack. Moreover, by his rather intemperate language and appeal to the army he left himself open to damaging attacks from the National Democratic Front and the Russians.

The Soviet Union, in the person of Deputy Commissar Andrei Vyshinsky, now stepped in and demanded General Radescu's immediate resignation. After some hesitation King Michael agreed and started consultations for a new cabinet; again Vyshinsky intervened and demanded that a National Democratic Front government under Petru Groza be installed.[30] Meanwhile the Soviet command had taken the necessary precautions. There was at that time only one Rumanian force capable of resisting the National Democratic Front's armed formations—the army. The Russians ordered the Rumanian units stationed in and near Bucarest to be sent to the front, and the capital was denuded of troops. The following weekend witnessed another mass demonstration which was clearly in a position to take over the government forcibly if need be. In the midst of the demonstration it was announced that the king had accepted the Groza government. On March 6, 1945, it was installed, as a coalition of the groups making up the National Democratic Front, and also including an insignificant 175 648 668

29. This riot is to me a particularly discouraging example of the difficulty of writing history *wie es eigentlich gewesen*. This incident, as it later proved, was the event which led to the overthrow of the Radescu government and the installation of the Groza cabinet. I had watched the procession and was in the crowd no more than fifty feet from the first shots. Yet at that time and since I have been unable to discover precisely what happened. I do know that the government had kept Rumanian troops off the street that day to avoid inciting trouble. The crowd did move toward the Ministry of the Interior building, although it showed little signs of direction. The first shots were fired from a small piece and from somewhere in the crowd, but by whom and for what purpose I do not know, although there has been no lack of stories and explanations.

30. An account of Vyshinsky's actions, taken from official American sources, is given in James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York; London, 1947), pp. 50–55.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

dissident National Peasant party and a Liberal fraction under the opportunist Gheorghe Tătărescu, whose government in 1936 had sentenced Ana Pauker to ten years' imprisonment.

Why did the Groza government come to power? This question is difficult to answer, even though many of the facts are reasonably well established, because it involves the intentions behind the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. In the first place, the Groza regime was directly and positively installed by the Soviet Union, in an explicit manner by Vyshinsky, but even before that by the Soviet decision to break up the Radescu government through the National Democratic Front. Although there is no convincing evidence that the National Democratic Front possessed broad popular support, it was not without effective strength in Bucarest. Before it came to office it was able to assemble large crowds of demonstrators, which were really quite impressive despite the tendency of Tass and the Communist press greatly to inflate their numbers. Moreover, it had special squads of armed guards, which had obtained weapons in preparation for the August 23 coup and had subsequently refused to relinquish them, much to the dismay of the National Peasants and Liberals. Nevertheless, they could not have stood up against the Rumanian army had General Radescu been given the opportunity to employ it. In no sense, however, did the National Democratic Front represent the will of the people, although it must be said that at the time there was a general political vacuum in Rumania. It is doubtful whether the historical parties represented the will of the people except in the purely negative sense of being anti-Russian.

In the second place, the U.S.S.R. did not overthrow the Radescu government because the Rumanians were sabotaging the armistice agreement, or to guarantee the lines of communication to the Hungarian front, or because the Radescu government could not maintain order. If the latter was true it was because Radescu had been deprived of the means. This is not to say that the Rumanians of the historical parties were behaving in a manner satisfactory to the Russians. Hatred of Russia among these parties was bitter and profound. There was a constant hope that somehow the Western powers would come to their rescue. Well before the end of the war, and indeed immediately after the armistice, many nonfascist Rumanians expressed the belief that a conflict betwen the Soviet Union and the Western powers was the only hope for Rumania. Nor were the Rumanians altogether reasonable in their fulfillment of the armistice conditions. There were numerous cases where they tried to squirm out of a delivery by means of elaborate legal technicalities in a manner inevitably highly ex-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

asperating to the Soviet authorities. In a word, many Rumanians did not realize the implications of the new situation and were doing everything in their power to avoid the consequences of their military defeat. Undoubtedly this attitude was well known to the Russians; it would have been difficult to have missed it.

Nevertheless, as far as may be judged from the evidence available, conditions in Rumania and the behavior of non-Communist Rumanian politicians were not a primary factor in determining Russian action; Soviet initiative in installing the National Democratic Front government did not arise from Soviet-Rumanian relations but was an aspect of Soviet policy regarding the pattern of the postwar world and Russia's relations with the Western powers, Great Britain, and the United States. It might be well here to review briefly some of the information which has come to light on Rumania's place internationally in the last part of the Second World War. The Soviet Union was certainly interested in preserving its gains made in eastern Europe before Hitler's attack, and as early as 1941 was pressing the British and American governments, without success, for an agreement on postwar territorial boundaries. Soviet frontiers with Rumania were to be those of 1940, i.e., Bessarabia and northern Bucovina being reincorporated in the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet regime desired special facilities for bases in Rumania.[31] On April 2, 1944, however, as Soviet troops advanced into northern Rumania, Molotov gave a reassuring announcement: "The Soviet government declares that it does not pursue the aim of conquering any part of Rumanian territory or of changing the existing social order in Rumania."

In May, 1944, the British government proposed to Russia a division of areas of predominant interest, whereby, "in the main, Rumanian affairs should be the concern of the Soviet Government and the Greek affairs the concern of United Kingdom. This British-Russian understanding would apply only to war conditions and would not affect the rights and responsibilities which each of the three great powers would have to exercise at the peace settlement."[32] On the condition that it be limited to three months' trial and definitely did not establish postwar spheres of influence, President Roosevelt gave

31. Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (2 vols., New York, 1948), II, 1167. In connection with the request for bases in Rumania, one might note that in 1943 the Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain, Maisky, stated that the U.S.S.R. probably would not oppose a Balkan federation, provided it excluded Rumania, another indication, perhaps, of a special status for Rumania in Soviet plans. Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History* (New York, 1948), p. 714.

32. Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 1451–1455. Roosevelt's approval was given without Hull's knowledge and against his wishes.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

page 300

XIV

THE COMMUNIST PERIOD: SINCE 1945

Political Developments

175 WITH the exception of a brief interlude after the Moscow Conference of December, 1945, the evolution of the Groza regime has been steadily toward exclusive political domination by the Communist party, increasing state direction of the economy, and complete absorption of Rumania within the Soviet sphere of control. Several stages are apparent: March-December, 1945, when the Groza government was holding on, with Soviet support, against the nonrecognition of the United States and Great Britain, and the opposition of King Michael and the National Peasant and Liberal parties; January-November, 1946, a period of uneasy and abortive compromise which broke down completely with the holding of national elections; December, 1946–December, 1947, a year spent in liquidating all political opposition and expelling the king; from 1948 on, the consolidation of the Rumanian People's Republic, the inauguration of economic plans, and a turn to collectivization in agriculture.

It is difficult to determine precisely the degree to which this progress was inherent in the Rumanian situation, and to what extent it merely mirrored the intensification of the cold war between the Soviet Union and the West. It was clear at the outset that having come to power through the will of the Russians, lacking extensive popular support, encountering widespread anti-Communist and anti-Soviet sentiment in the other political parties, and confronted by a difficult economic condition which was bound to be bad in the years immediately following the war, the Groza government if it was to maintain itself had every prospect of becoming increasingly dictatorial. At the same time, the phases of increasing severity and political *Gleichschaltung* not only paralleled similar trends in other eastern European states but are closely related to the growing animosity between the Great Powers, an animosity to which the eastern European issue greatly and at points decisively contributed.

At the Potsdam Conference, July 17–August 2, 1945, the American delegation presented its contention that the Yalta Declaration

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

had not been carried out in Rumania and Bulgaria. The immediate Soviet response was, significantly, to condemn the political situation in Greece.[1] There followed lengthy and inconclusive debates in which Stalin at one point stated the problem clearly: "A freely elected government in any of these countries would be anti-Soviet, and that we cannot allow."[2] The Potsdam communiqué showed the failure to reach any real understanding:

> The three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing peace treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of peace treaties with recognized democratic governments in these states will also enable the three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries.

The only concrete gains were declarations that the press would enjoy full freedom to report from these countries and that the work of the Allied Control Commissions would be improved through regular conferences, three-power consultation, and the free movement of the American and British representatives.

The Potsdam Conference did have certain immediate consequences in the Balkans, however. In Bulgaria the elections, which showed every prospect of being rigged, were postponed for a few months. In Rumania King Michael, on the strength of the Potsdam declaration, asked for the resignation of the Groza government as the apparent prerequisite to a peace treaty, and requested the assistance of the three powers in forming a cabinet acceptable to the United States and Great Britain. It was naturally, if incorrectly, assumed by the Russians and the Rumanian Communists that Michael's action was the result of a deep-laid American plan; their reaction was truculent and negative.[3] Groza refused to resign and took a trip to Moscow,

1. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, p. 73.
2. Philip E. Mosely, *Face to Face with Russia*, Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 70 (July–August, 1948), p. 23.
3. Rumanians of various political views at first absolutely refused to believe that there was no American scheme behind King Michael's action, but if persuaded such was the case they showed great alarm at the thought of an undirected situation getting out of hand. As far as I know, American action in Rumania did not extend beyond informing King Michael that the Groza regime was unacceptable, a fact generally known, and indicating approval of measures taken to broaden it. The United States did not have, perhaps unfortunately, a positive, thought-out plan of action.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

where he received full support. An anomalous situation resulted, in which the king declined to sign decrees and the government continued to carry on its business and even attempted to deny the existence of the rupture. There were, however, fleeting and perhaps illusory intimations in September and October of milder behavior and limited political objectives on the part of the regime. Minister of the Interior Georgescu indicated that political prisoners would be liberated; Prime Minister Groza stated that "his government did not intend to apply either collectivization of land or nationalization of banks or industry." Even Ana Pauker declared to an American correspondent that the Rumanian Communist party wanted unity to exist between the people, the government, and the king.[4]

The Rumanian impasse continued to disturb international negotiations. At the unsuccessful London conference, September 11–October 3, 1945, Molotov charged Byrnes with desiring a government in Rumania unfriendly to the Soviet Union and was apparently baffled by the American attitude, as he was reported to have said he wished he could discover what Byrnes wanted so they could negotiate.[5] Byrnes continued to maintain that the present government was not representative and refused, correctly, to accept Molotov's contention that it enjoyed "the support of the overwhelming majority of the population." On the other hand, while Byrnes, in a radio address on October 31, stressed the importance of the Russians having friendly states as neighbors and declared that "America will never join any groups in those countries in hostile intrigues against the Soviet Union," he seems not to have faced the fact that in pressing for free elections the United States was in effect supporting groups hostile to the U.S.S.R.

In Rumania open violence broke out on November 8, when a crowd celebrating King Michael's birthday was dispersed from the palace square by truckloads of Communist workers and fired upon by the Russian-trained Tudor Vladimirescu Division. Although the Groza government made a number of arrests and charged the historical parties with fomenting the outbreak, there is little question that the violence was introduced by the regime and its organized squads. It

4. See her interview with Sam Brewer, *New York Times*, October 19, 1945. In the course of this interview, however, she made two dots on a piece of paper and said: "We are realists . . . this dot is where we are and that one is Communism. When we come to an obstacle on the straight line between them we go around it, but we come back to our original line. We had to deviate to win the war. Now we must deviate to conquer present problems. But Communism is always our ultimate goal." A clear-enough sign, if that were needed, that the Communist party was not renouncing its ends, but not really a forecast of the policy to be followed.

5. Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 would be rather naive, however, to assume that the crowd had gathered merely to felicitate the king; it was a political challenge, in a pattern familiar to Rumania and resorted to when the parliamentary structure collapsed.

The Moscow Conference, December 16–December 26, 1945, gave renewed hopes for continued allied cooperation and for an end to the political stalemate in Rumania. According to its final communiqué, King Michael was to be advised that one National Peasant and one Liberal should be included in the government, provided they were "truly representative members" of the parties, "suitable," and would "work loyally with the government." This reorganized cabinet should declare that free and unfettered elections would be held as soon as possible, elections in which all democratic and antifascist parties could take part; it should give assurances concerning freedom of the press, speech, religion, and association. Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky and the American and British ambassadors to the Soviet Union, Harriman and Clark Kerr, were to form a commission to consult with King Michael and the Groza government on the execution of these tasks. As soon as these conditions had been fulfilled and the required assurances received, the United States and Great Britain would recognize the Rumanian government.

Although this formula had the approval of the three powers, it had little chance of success. From the point of view of the Western powers and the Rumanian opposition, the presence of two members in the cabinet could not be regarded as an adequate concession, so all hopes were necessarily placed upon the forthcoming elections, but it was quite clear by this time that a free and unfettered election was something which the Soviet Union would not permit. At no time could the historical parties of Rumania be regarded as positively friendly to Russia; by 1946, with the experience of the past fifteen months behind them, their hostility was profound.[6] Moreover, since American and British recognition would be given before the actual holding of elections, there was no obvious means of assuring their honesty, nor could there have been unless the Western powers had been willing to force a general showdown with the Soviet Union.

After a delay in which the terms "representative" and "suitable" occasioned some dispute, Mihai Romniceanu, Liberal, and Emil Hațieganu, National Peasant, entered the government. Both agreed

6. For example, in October, 1945, Maniu stated in a declaration that the "present government is a Quisling government imposed by Russia . . . the Soviet government is doing everything possible to keep Groza and Tătărescu in power." This statement was true, of course, but it is difficult to imagine that the Soviet Union would have permitted the exponent of such a view to come to effective power in Rumania.

3: Roberts S-- (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

to "work loyally" but held that their responsibility extended only to seeing that the Moscow agreement was carried out. Although they could scarcely be expected to assume responsibility for the cabinet's other actions, it was clear that no real coalition had been achieved. Groza, on his part, agreed to hold elections "as soon as possible" and to guarantee political rights. On February 4, 1946, the United States and Great Britain, with the explicit understanding that the Groza régime would fulfill the Moscow provisions, recognized the government.

For a time the political atmosphere relaxed somewhat, the opposition parties became active, set up newspapers, and planned their political campaigns. This promising situation did not last long. Soon the government resumed press censorship, political discrimination, arrests, and the terrorizing of anti-Communist politicians. In the spring and summer as violence increased the United States and Great Britain repeatedly protested against the delay in having the elections which they expected to be held in April or May.

The government, however, required time to undermine the strength of the National Peasants and to line up their own forces.[7] In March the Social Democratic party divided on the issue of running a common electoral list with the Communists. Titel Petrescu, leader of the party, was ousted and attempted to set up an Independent Socialist party. The indecision which had haunted the Social Democrats since their inception was now approaching its final and pathetic consequences. Petrescu, who was obviously uncomfortable after March, 1945, had compromised his own position by supporting the Communist drive to power; his belated break merely split the party, and the Left-wingers, opportunists, and Communist agents moved into the government fold. In April Tătărescu's Dissident Liberal party agreed to entering a common list with the Communist-dominated bloc. In July the regime issued two decrees, one abolishing the senate and establishing a unicameral legislature, the second creating a new electoral law which extended the franchise to include women but contained certain provisions facilitating the perversion of the electoral process.

The government finally held elections on November 19, 1946, and in all the unedifying history of Rumanian ballots these more than

7. A vivid eyewitness account of the election campaign is given by Reuben H. Markham, *Rumania under the Soviet Yoke* (Boston, 1949). Markham, who was expelled from Rumania by the Soviet Control Commission for too close association with the National Peasants and for speaking on their behalf, makes no pretense at being a dispassionate observer, but his account of Communist electioneering tactics appears to be substantially correct.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

• 175 held their own. The patently false vote received by the government bloc (the Communists, purged Social Democrats, Tătărescu Liberals, Ploughmen's Front, and National People's party, successor to the Union of Patriots) of 4,766,000, as against 880,000 for the National Peasants and 289,000 for the Liberals, was obtained through a crass combination of preelection press censorship and radio discrimination, terrorism and murder, falsification of electoral registers, multiple voting, and unabashed manipulation of the results.

There is little point in debating whether this election was more or less corrupt and unfree than its predecessors. If, as has generally been the case in Rumania, the perversion of elections is in inverse proportion to the government party's popular support, the Groza regime was clearly obliged to resort to extreme measures in rigging the election if it was to remain in power. But while it is true that a prevailing low standard of electoral ethics had been established by the Liberals in the 1920's and by the more outrageous plebiscites of Carol and Antonescu in the 1930's and 1940's, one should not resort to the rather shabby consolation that "Rumanians do not know the meaning of honest elections." The Communists knew; they had spent the preceding two decades criticizing electoral terrorism. The question is rather whether elections should ever have been regarded as a constructive solution under the prevailing circumstances.

The elections of November, 1946, mark the end of the Allied effort to resolve the Rumanian controversy. Wherein does the responsibility lie? There can be no doubt that the Groza regime and the Russians have the responsibility of breaking an international commitment. The Moscow decision was not faithfully observed in any meaningful interpretation of its terms. This responsibility is not lessened by reference to semantic difficulties, to the assumption that rigged elections aimed at simulating unanimous popular support represent true democracy to the Eastern soul, or that the opposition parties really were regarded as "fascist" by the Communists and hence not within the terms of the Moscow agreement. There may be semantic barriers between East and West but it is a dangerous delusion to take these as examples. The matter was much more simply one of taking the necessary steps to maintain and secure power. If that is the case, why did the Russians and the Rumanian Communists agree to a decision committing them to elections? Perhaps a partial answer is that it would be politically embarrassing to have to admit publicly the truth, that the "overwhelming majority" of the Rumanians really preferred not to have Russia as a neighbor, deeply mistrusted the Soviet regime and any party directed by it.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

control over the situation. Admittedly the postwar attitude to be adopted by the Soviet Union was by no means clearly foreseen in 1944–1945, and as suggested above it may not have been altogether fixed, but if, as it appeared in 1950, any effort at American-Soviet agreement in eastern Europe involved fitting a square peg in a round hole there was not, during the period of uncertainty, even an effort to shave off some of the sharper edges of the peg.

In any event, whatever slight chances there might have been of resolving the Rumanian political crisis, through international agreement and peaceful internal adjustment, had disappeared by the time the elections were held. The National Peasants and Liberals naturally refused to accept the results, and their delegates did not occupy their seats in the parliament. In a formal communiqué of November 25, 1946, Maniu and Brătianu, after enumerating the electoral outrages, concluded: "Our parties consider that they can no longer authorize their representatives to continue to collaborate with the present government, the perpetrator of fraudulent and blood stained elections, with which they can have no solidarity whatsoever." [9] The United States and Great Britain did not accept the elections as representing the opinion of the Rumanian people or as complying with the assurances given by the Groza government.

The peace treaty with Rumania, which had been drafted by the Council of Foreign Ministers in the course of 1946 and was finally signed on February 10, 1947, did not materially alter the situation. Although Article 3 obliged Rumania to secure for all persons "the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press, of publication, of religious worship, of political opinion, and of public meeting," it was in nowise observed.[10]

9. See the annex to the booklet published by the Rumanian National Committee, *Suppression of Human Rights in Rumania* (Washington, D.C., September, 1949), a hostile but heavily documented indictment of the Groza regime.

10. Some of the main points of the treaty, which in general followed the lines of the 1944 armistice, were: frontiers to be as of January 1, 1941, except for the Hungarian frontier which remained as of January 1, 1938; the obligation to repeal and henceforth not to pass any measures discriminating against persons for sympathizing with the United Nations; dissolving and not permitting in the future any organization of a fascist type or other organization conducting propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union or other United Nations; limitation of the army to 120,000 persons; reparations in kind to the U.S.S.R. to the amount of $300,000,000, payable in eight years from September, 1944; guarantee of economic and property rights of United Nations nationals; German assets in Rumania to go to the Soviet Union; free commercial navigation on the Danube for all states; Allied forces to be withdrawn from the country within ninety days of the treaty's coming into force, except for the Soviet right to retain forces necessary to maintain the line of communication with the Soviet Zone in Austria.

3: Roberts S-- (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

115
661

The Groza regime, bolstered by the simulacrum of popular support gained in the elections and faced by an opposition unwilling to accept an unwarranted minority position in parliament, undertook in 1947 to wipe out all unfriendly or doubtful political organizations. In the spring it unleashed a new wave of arrests of opposition leaders, arrests made suddenly, at night, and with no explanation. The Communist Minister of Justice, Pătrăşcanu, expressed his belief that an uprising was being plotted but said "there was no evidence on hand fixing the responsibility upon former Premier Iuliu Maniu as leader of preparations for a revolution." [11] In July a number of National Peasant leaders, including Mihalache, were caught in an attempt to flee the country; the government arrested Maniu and the top party leadership and outlawed the party, an action which apparently evoked no popular response one way or the other.

Amid much publicity the regime, in November, tried Maniu and his followers, primarily on the charge of conspiring with "Anglo-American imperialism"; as the Communist paper, *Scânteia*, remarked, the United States was really the "twentieth defendant." Some damaging evidence was produced at the trial; observers seem generally to agree that certain members of the National Peasant party were shown to have been in contact with American intelligence officers to discuss means of overthrowing the regime.[12] Maniu, the principal defendant, while perfectly frank in his opinion of the government's illegitimacy and admitting attempting to smuggle National Peasants out of the country for the purpose of organizing resistance abroad, maintained that his opposition was within the framework of international agreements concerning Rumania, agreements which the government had flagrantly violated. But since the regime had effectively blocked any possibility of parliamentary opposition, underground planning—whether actually envisaging violence or not—was the only alternative to complete passivity.

The trial itself was conducted in a manner unhappily too familiar these days; the judge, Colonel Petrescu, was reportedly the director general of all prisons and concentration camps under the Antonescu dictatorship. Maniu and Mihalache were sentenced to terms of life imprisonment, the other leaders to terms ranging from one to twenty-five years. Whatever weight one may attach to the demands of *raison*

11. See his interview with W. H. Lawrence, *New York Times*, June 25, 1947.

12. As a matter of fact, as early as the spring of 1945 a number of Rumanians, some of whom had close connections with the Liberal and National Peasant parties, were developing underground plans for ousting the Groza government and sought to enlist American support. The charges of plots against the regime were not pure concoctions, whatever the purpose of the trial may have been.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 *d'état*—and it is obvious that Maniu and Mihalache did represent a threat to the Groza government—it is absurd to regard in any manner their sentences as an act of justice.

While the Maniu trial was in progress, the controlled press raised a clamor against Tătărescu and pointed out, quite correctly, that many anti-Groza elements were being sheltered in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic service. Tătărescu's position had been weakening for some time. In June, 1947, he had circulated a memorandum which contained a fifteen-point proposal for changing internal and external policy: he assailed the government's economic policy, expressed alarm over the country's low economic output, which was still at only 48 per cent of the 1938 level, requested better treatment of foreign capital and less stifling state intervention, and criticized the number of preventive arrests and the poor prison conditions. The Communists were naturally displeased by this note which clearly exceeded the conventions of "criticism and self-criticism." Rumors circulated of Tătărescu's resignation, and in September he was obliged to dismiss several hundred employees in the Foreign Office. On November 5 the parliament passed a vote of no confidence in him; the following day he and the other Dissident Liberal cabinet members were removed from their posts, to be replaced by Ana Pauker at the Foreign Office and Vasile Luca at the Ministry of Finance. (In December Bodnaraş took over the Ministry of War. The real rulers of the country were at last assuming governmental positions.)

Thus ended the political career of an able if unscrupulous man, who had first attracted attention in the early 1920's for his efficient action against the Communists and who had threaded a devious course through Carol's reign. Though disliked and mistrusted by all political groups, he seems to have had a rather Talleyrandian interest in the welfare of Rumania as he saw it.

Plans for the merger of the Social Democratic and Communist parties were announced in the autumn of 1947, though this amalgamation, which was in effect the complete absorption of the Social Democrats within a Leninist-Stalinist organization and ideology, was not completed until the following spring. It seems to have met with the sincere if ineffectual opposition of most of the socialists, some of whom joined Titel Petrescu's Independent Socialist party.[13] The Petrescu faction, however, was subject to increasing attack and

13. For an account of this last, faltering episode in the career of the Social Democratic party, see Valentin Thoma, "Wie es zur Liquidierung des rumänischen Sozialismus kam," *Die Zukunft* (July, 1949).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

●175 charged with illegally distributing political leaflets; on May 6, 1948, Petrescu was arrested and kept in prison without trial.

661 On December 30, 1947, King Michael, an anomalous monarch in a universe of burgeoning people's democracies, was suddenly and rather unexpectedly forced to abdicate. At the time he said his abdication was voluntary but subsequently, after his departure from Rumania, announced that it had been made under duress and he could not regard it as binding. Government propaganda became increasingly unfriendly to the king and listed with great relish the castles, forest land, and industrial shares that reverted to the nation. Following the overthrow of the monarchy the government at once announced the creation of the Rumanian People's Republic (Republica Populară Română) and prepared the draft of a new constitution.

Having thus eliminated the monarchy and all overt political opposition, the Communists then turned to the task of removing disaffected or doubtful elements in their own ranks. In the autumn of 1947 Gheorghiu-Dej, commenting on the rapid growth of the Rumanian Communist party to 710,000 members, had criticized the "low political and ideological level of our cadres and the presence of chauvinism among party members." In the course of a three-day congress of Communists and Social Democrats, assembled in February, 1948, to ratify their unification in a United Workers party, Minister of the Interior Teohari Georgescu launched an attack on the Communist Minister of Justice Pătrăşcanu, whom he charged with falling under bourgeois influence and overestimating the forces of the enemy, the Western powers. Pătrăşcanu was removed from his post and from the Central Committee of the party; later reports have suggested his being a likely candidate for a purge trial such as the other people's democracies have enjoyed.

There had been friction between Pătrăşcanu, a local Communist, and the "Muscovites," Pauker and Luca, since before the installation of the Groza regime. They found him too nationalistic and he was undoubtedly alarmed by the heavy, mechanically brutal tactics of the new order, its complete disregard of the nation's sensitivities, and its absolute subservience to Soviet state demands. Without question, many of the same elements which created Titoism and similar national heresies in the Communist camp were present in the Rumanian party, but because of the basic weakness of the Communist movement in Rumania and the ineluctable dependence upon the Soviet Union they never had a chance of obtaining control.

668 In February, 1948, the Communists concocted a new Democratic Popular Front, comprising the United Workers party; the Plough-

172 and arrows and valued deer-horn for making holders for
174 stone axes and for other purposes. Later, perhaps, hunting became more important, and incised ornament on the pottery became a feature here as it was also further west-north-west.

THERE SEEM indications that, as time passed, aristocratic herders spread among the early cultivators, and they emphasise connections between the Ukrainian steppe and Hungary across the south-eastern Carpathians and down the Mureş. Copper axe-adzes, some with a median hole for the shaft, have been found at various spots, chiefly in Transylvania, as Childe has well shown. It is thought that the hole was punched through the heated metal and not cast. Ornaments and other details suggest that the aristocracy at least had some connections with the Aegean, and bronze was gradually introduced, as a copper-antimony alloy at first. Parvan has emphasised the importance of the Carpathian area in the Bronze Age, with fine workmanship in bronze and gold, and, in the late Bronze Age and the transition to the early Iron Age, the culture connections seem to have been mainly westward, the analogies with north Italian bronze cauldrons being specially noteworthy. There are several indications that in this period, which, in Europe, seems to have been one of dry warm summers, the south Russian steppes were relatively empty. Probably the previous spread across the south-eastern Carpathians had brought westward horsemen, either already armed with the sword or about to learn to make it, a weapon that would suit cavalry better than the axe-adze of older days. In the transition from bronze to iron the Transylvanian Carpathians were thus the eastern limit of an area including Hungary and North Italy, while southward they were linked with Attica. Agriculture had doubtless improved, settlements had become more or less permanent as it is likely that a rotatory scheme of soil use had been evolved; craftsmanship in gold and bronze for luxury objects had reached a high level.

175 THE PICTURE changes again dramatically round about 700 B.C., through two mutually supplementary influences. Firstly, the climates of Denmark and Switzerland became colder and wetter, so probably that of the Carpathians felt the influence of a lowering of the snow-line and an impoverishment of agriculture and craftsmanship. Iron work had

9

175 become widespread further west but had hardly reached our region before local decline set in. Secondly, the Russian steppe had become active once more with moister conditions, and the Scythians spread westward, with iron weapons and bronze-pointed arrowheads, through the Carpathian passes into Transylvania and beyond, as well as into Wallachia, where, however, they do not seem to have got through the Iron Gates, though they very probably spread into Yugoslavia. Scythian graves in Roumania are often poorer than those in South Russia, and no doubt Scythian bands were spreading through the Carpathians as they did through Polish Galicia farther north, and into Wallachia as well as via the Dobrogea into Thrace farther south. The old aristocracy of the previous period was apparently temporarily submerged under the barbarian conquerors who scattered in small groups and melted in due course into the general population. Some time after about 550 B.C. Greek trade came northward *via* the river mouths opening to the Black Sea, and Greek cities attained great strength, but did not really Hellenise Roumanian lands; perhaps the Greeks' idea of themselves as contrasted with the barbarians gives some clue to this.

CELTIC CONQUERORS spread eastward and had great influence in the Roumanian area, the early traces, dating perhaps from the fifth or the fourth century B.C. being important in eastern Transylvania and showing a civilisation using bronze and iron, and adapting ideas of ornament brought from farther west but ultimately derived from the classical world (the La Tène culture). It was apparently especially between 200 B.C. and 100 B.C. that the Celtic La Tène civilisation became dominant in this part of the world. It favoured houses crowded together to the number of nearly a hundred, built of wood, or of reeds and mud, and the clusters or villages were on defensible sites over a river or lake in many cases; there was, as in the previous phase, a large survival of fashions from the very early days of agriculture. Fortresses were built by nobles, and included terraces rising up to the central princely residence, often blocks of stone in the ramparts were kept in position by wooden beams, a scheme of building the Romans found widespread among Celtic-speaking peoples, and called the *murus gallicus;* this scheme has of course regional variations. In the mountains of

175 Roumania one of these fortresses at Gradistea Muncelului was built with enormous labour based on extensive organisation at a height of 4,000 feet above sea level. It was the work of a King Burebista who ruled over a large territory. Celtic conquerors penetrated northern Roumania on their way to the Ukraine, and touched southern Roumania on their way to Asia Minor. They brought to the Carpathians the potter's wheel and eventually made iron fairly common, but gold was apparently less abundant than before. The last feature has long been known for the corresponding phase of culture in the west, and has sometimes, rather too readily, been put down to exhaustion of gold supplies from river sands.

FROM very early times the people of this region maintained the habit of cremating the dead, though the Celtic conquerors and others before them favoured interment. Indeed, we get an impression of persistence of the simple folk with a simple early culture under a long succession of conquerors. The connections with North Italy already important in the phase of transition from bronze to iron, and revived in marked fashion by the Celtic peoples, became Roman connections, and after much difficulty the Roman Empire brought the region into subjection, the Roman province of Dacia occupying most of modern Roumania except Bessarabia. It was under Roman rule from A.D. 107 to A.D. 255 with a lingering of that rule until the official evacuation in A.D. 270-275. The Romans were different from previous conquerors in that they developed regular communications and organised agricultural and military settlement, and in Roumania they found the ground as it were prepared for them by earlier Italian connections with Transylvania mentioned just above. Christianity, in this instance at first of western rather than eastern type was brought into Roumania and the clerical leaders no doubt promoted the persistence of Latin elements in the language and helped the more or less latinised peasantry to maintain itself and its Roman tradition for some centuries after direct Roman rule was withdrawn. In Gaul the bishops in their cities maintained a good deal of the Roman tradition through the Dark Ages when trade routes were cut by the advance of Islam and northern barbarians were giving very inexperienced treatment to the ills of a decayed Roman rule. But in the west so much was maintained that in the end the cities

175 revived with, under the circumstances, the Cathedral as their focus of expression. In Roumania fate worked out things differently. The seventh to the tenth century in east-central Europe saw much forest cutting and planting of villages, and the widespread languages of these settlers belonged to the Slavonic family which may have had its [197] early home in or near Polish Galicia. This linguistic influence penetrated Roumania and combined itself with the Latin heritage to make the later language of the country. Magyars passed through on their way to the Hungarian plain, and [184] Huns and Visigoths had gone that way before. So the local tradition weakened along the valley and lowland ways and kept itself alive in the highlands where still dwell people who are no doubt largely descendants of the primeval cultivators with many waves of culture washed over them but the Roman influence vital still.

346

Bell tower, Borsec.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

V.—PEOPLES AND SETTLEMENTS: THE POST-ROMAN PERIOD

101 MOUNTAIN REGIONS are often regarded as the refuges of conquered peoples and the repositories of cultures that once flourished in the plain, but although the highlands of Roumania have, from time to time, absorbed groups of folk for whom the lowlands offered insufficient security, the population of the Carpathian valleys must not be regarded as racial sweepings from the broad human highways of the Steppe. The long period of invasions that followed the withdrawal of the Roman legions from Dacia led to a concentration of Roumanians within the mountain areas of either Transylvania, whence they spread later to reoccupy the plain, or the Balkans, where their descendants, the Vlachs, still maintain their traditional form of life ; but, since those early days, their numbers in the former region have been considerably diluted by Saxons and Szeklers who have come in not as refugees but as outposts against Tatar and Turk in what for long remained an eastward frontier zone of western Christianity.

175 OUR KNOWLEDGE of events during the Dark Ages is necessarily scanty, but it is clear that settled life on the open grasslands where, indeed, it was possible at all, was subject to constant interruptions. One of these interruptions, the result of Magyar pressure, is of special significance for the history of Roumania from both a political and a cultural point of view. The Magyar invaders of central Europe in the ninth century penetrated far to the west before meeting with any serious resistance. After their defeats at Merseburg in 933 and at Augsburg in 955, however, they fell back towards the Hungarian Plain, and about A.D. 1000 their Szekler advanced guards began to penetrate the hill country of Transylvania. In spite of their comparatively recent Asiatic origin, the Szeklers introduced certain features of western civilisation into their newly-acquired territory, particularly feudalism, which appears to have been the chief concomitant of the Roman Catholicism that they had adopted while in the plain.

175 195

THE spread of Roman Catholicism towards the east brought it into conflict in the eastern Carpathians with the Greek

175 Orthodox Church, which was extending its influence north-
795 westwards. The ensuing struggle continued until the seventeenth century, when a compromise was effected and a new church, the Uniate, arose. Strictly speaking, this was a new branch of Roman Catholicism, for its members recognised the suzerainty of the Pope, although they kept the ritual of the Eastern Church (see Figure 7).

175 THESE contacts with the west were strengthened in the thirteenth century, when groups of Saxon crusaders settled in Transylvania at the invitation of the Magyar kings. They became established first of all near Alba Julia (Karlsburg), in the Mureş valley, and later on in the region of Mediaş (Medgyes) on the Tarnava Mare (Nagy küküllö); in the neighbourhood of Sibiu, which they named Hermannstadt; and near the mines of Rodna in the north. Feeling that the Carpathian frontier to the east and south was still insecure, Andrew II invited the Teutonic Knights to occupy strategic points that were undefended, with the result that Kronstadt (Braşov), commanding the Prahova valley, and Campulung were built. The Teutonic Knights quarrelled with the Magyar king, however, and left this area, which was taken over by the Saxons. The defence of the eastern Carpathians, with their two important passes of Ghimeş (Grymes) and Oituz (Oitoz), was entrusted to the Szeklers (see Figure 4).

BEHIND these frontier posts the Saxons were organised in seven colonies under the authority of a count, and they enjoyed various civil privileges in return for the military duties which they performed. The Szeklers were at first grouped in three colonies of a similar character in the tectonic basin of Treiscaune, but they were dislodged by the Tatars in the thirteenth century and sought refuge in the lowlands of Ciuc and Giurgiu where they are still numerically strong (see Figure 7).

DURING the early Middle Ages, the Roumanians were organised in semi-autonomous local groups, each village being under the charge of a chieftain or "kneas" (*pl.* knesi) who combined the functions of military leader, administrator and judge. Although stock-raising was the main occupation of these villagers, arable farming was also practised, and the meagre stretches of cultivable land were divided up amongst

175 the various families according to their needs. The pastures and forests, however, were kept in the hands of the community.

THE latter part of the thirteenth century was a critical period for these people; the Tatar invasions were over, and the Turkish invasion had not yet begun. Many of the Roumanian peasantry moved out from the mountains and re-established themselves in the foothills of the Carpathians and of the Transylvanian Alps. The pressure from the west was maintained, however, and the Roumanians became organised on a more strictly military basis. Much of the power of the knesi was usurped by the "boyars," a new military aristocracy that arose, whilst the peasants were gradually forced into a serfdom from which they were not emancipated for several centuries. The various kneaseates became united into small states, under the leadership of princes or "voivods," and were welded eventually into the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. The success was short lived, however, for by the end of the fourteenth century Wallachia had fallen under the control of the Turks, and Moldavia soon followed.

THE STRUGGLE against the Turkish invaders was long and bitter; the ways through the mountains needed constant vigilance; the necessity for maintaining a united front against a common foe strengthened the communal spirit; and it is not, therefore, surprising that the alien groups in Transylvania should have preserved their individuality to a remarkable degree. This is particularly noticeable in the case of the Saxons, whose settlements to-day are veritable microcosms of Germanic culture (see Plate V).

[101] ALTHOUGH they originally had a common purpose, these two racial groups of Saxons and Szeklers have remained very different in character, for whereas the Saxons are still very largely confined to the settlements which they established in the early Middle Ages, the political, and to some extent the ethnic, boundaries of the Szeklers have been enlarged from time to time until they now encompass a considerable area of Transylvania.

144 OF the early history of the Szeklers we know but little. Racially they appear to differ somewhat from the Magyars of the plain, and to approximate more to the Roumanians in

175
361



FIGURE 4. B = Braşov, C = Cluj, M = Miercurea Ciucului, O = Odorhei, R = Rodna, S = Sibiu, S-G = Sf. Gheorghe. T = Turda, T-M = Targu-Mureş. T-S = Targu-Sacuesc. Passes: (1) Olt, (2) Prahova, (3) Oituz, (4) Ghimeş.

144

head form, but whether this is due to the persistence of original characteristics or to partial fusion with the Roumanians it is impossible to say. At all events, they are essentially Magyar in culture, and accompanied the Magyars in their conquest of Hungary in the ninth century.

361
175

FIGURE 4 shows that their penetration of Transylvania followed the valleys of the Mureş and its tributaries, which

175
361



FIGURE 5. The distributions shown are only approximate, but they show the broad distinction between the typical Roumanian settlements ("dispersed" and "transitional") of the mountains and foothills and the compact Saxon and Szekler settlements of the Transylvanian lowlands.

175
361
178

led naturally towards the tectonic basins of Treiscaune, Ciuc and Giurgiu, though these were not actually occupied until the thirteenth century. The Szeklers did not, however, displace the indigenous Roumanian population in these lowland areas; neither have they maintained the same degree of "contiguous isolation" as have the Saxons. During the nineteenth century in fact, there has been a steady assimilation of the Roumanian peasantry, some measure of which may be gained from the fact that since the middle of the century a Roumanian majority has been changed into a Szekler majority in 169 communes, whereas the reverse process has been effected in only 98 communes. In the former case, large numbers of Roumanians have adopted the dress and religion of the Szeklers, but the Roumanian

137



FIGURE 6. This illustrates the sharp distinction between the forested highlands and the lowlands, and should be compared with Figures 5 and 7.

175
178
361

majorities have resulted from the valleyward movement of families that had previously farmed the slopes overlooking these intermont basins.

361 361 AN IMPORTANT distinction between the Roumanians and the rest of the population is seen in the types and distribution of their settlements (see Fig 5). The former, with their customary attachment to highland areas and to pastoral life, are usually associated with a dispersed or loosely agglomerated

Celtic forms, Latin and Anglo-Saxon followed one another, but Norman French was unable to oust Anglo-Saxon, though it left a deposit of legal phrases and helped to make English grow towards the remarkable amalgam of Teutonic and Romance elements that it now is, though much of this growth came during the Renaissance. Roumania is in a sense an analogous amalgam of Latinised and Slavonic elements. The survival of the older, Latin, element is an interesting fact.

The Roumanian people, as we may begin to call them, were spread over the Carpathian bastion, using the high pastures in summer, so that contacts were maintained over long distances, independently of adjacent peoples more specially concerned with farming in lowland villages. It is a Roumanian theory, with much probability behind it, that the summer life on the upland pastures has had not a little to do with the survival of the Latin element to such a degree in Roumania, and with the survival of the Roumanian people's consciousness of themselves as distinct from their neighbours. It is noteworthy that groups of Germans, Szeklers, and so on, spreading in the Carpathian bastion later on, when Christianity had come to this part of the world, have not changed their language, nor have they caused their neighbours to change theirs. The resistance to language-change has become too great.

In the days when Latin and Slavonic were, as it were, competing in and around the Carpathian bastion, Christianity was expanding from Rome and Constantinople, with characteristic differences, only some of which concern us here. In the west, Roman cities had grown, often from camps, ere the empire fell, and cities tended to acquire bishops, for whom the Roman tradition was their main link with the larger world. The insistence on the general language (Latin) for religious purposes and the growth in authority and prestige of the Bishop of Rome are thus easy to understand. And the combination gave the bishop's city a prestige that helped to Christianise barbarian conquerors and to spread the idea of the city when a revival began in the tenth and eleventh centuries. In the east there was less spread of the idea of the city northward from Constantinople and the Ægean, save in the case of the cities on a Greek basis in south Russia. Nor was there the same spread of a general language. We accordingly find that the Church consecrated Slavonic forms,

ORIGIN OF THE RUMANIANS.

125 THE Dacians or Getae, who are regarded as the forefathers of the present-day Rumanians, were one of the numerous Thracian tribes, that together with the Illyrians, occupied the extensive lands lying between the Black, Aegean and Adriatic seas, and stretching northwards to the confines of the Russian steppes. Their presence in the Danubian basin as far back as 1400 B.C. has been confirmed by the researches of the late Professor V. Pârvan. In his book, "Dacia," as well as in his latest book "Getica," he shows that the Dacians were in occupation of Transylvania at so early a period as 1500 B.C. and that they had evolved an original art of their own, as may be inferred from the large number of gold ornaments which had been found.

By 700 B.C. they began to be influenced by Greek civilization through the Scythians who invaded the country, and whose rulers were almost completely Hellenized. The influence of the Greek towns on the Black Sea coast likewise contributed in bringing Dacia into the Greek orbit somewhere about the year 300 B.C. The Dacians or Getae occupied a very extensive territory; objects of art attributed to them have been found as far apart as Serbia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, and even in certain parts of Asia Minor, according to the testimony of Professor E. Pittard of Geneva ("La Roumanie," page 28). Excavations, conducted at numerous localities in Rumania have brought to light objects which testify that the Dacians or Getae had attained to a high degree of civilization, and this is further corroborated by the fact that they were able to oppose a determined and prolonged resistance to the Romans. Even before the appearance of the Roman armies in the Balkans, numerous Latin immigrants had already preceded them. The decline of agriculture in the Italian Peninsula, due to the importa-

RUMANIA

175 tion of cereals from the African colonies, and to the employ of slaves on the large estates, had compelled large numbers of Latin farmers to give up their lands on which they could no longer live, and to seek new homesteads across the Adriatic and in southern Gaul. The immigrants seem to have succeeded in imparting a Latin character to the country, and to have imposed their language on the Thracians. Latin settlements, such as the town of Drobeta, or Drubetis, Ratiaria, Oescus and Novae on the Danube arose. Their influence slowly permeated the region and made itself felt even north of the Danube. According to Professor Parvăn: "By Vespasian's time the veterans and the Roman civilians settled in the Danubian provinces as far as the Black Sea are legion . . . Like Gaul during the same period, Dacia must have been full of *italici negotiandi causa consistentes* . . . A statistical review of the hoards found in Dacia shows that the south-eastern parts of the country were covered, in the main, by Greek merchants, while the Romans spread to the west and to the north. From the first century B.C., however, Roman penetration was at once so powerful and so general that *denarii* of the republic became quite frequent in Wallachia and even in Moldavia" ("Dacia," pages 151 and 139). And this diffusion of Roman influence was so persistent that Professor Părvan believes that part of Wallachia must have formed part of the Roman Empire even prior to Trajan's campaign. "It seems that about A.D. 6 that a broad strip of territory north of the river was then incorporated into the Empire as a sort of extended bridgehead to face Ratiaria, Oescus and Novae." "Dacia," page 180.) The latinization of the Thracians was so complete and thorough that this latinized population subsisted long after the irruptions of the Slavs in the Balkan peninsula. When the latter were conquered by the Bulgarians, the latinized remnants of the population were yet so numerous and powerful that they managed to impose, during the eight century, two rulers from amongst their midst, in the persons of Sabinus and Paganus, as heads of the newly-established Bulgarian Empire. Though this is rigorously denied by the Bulgarian historians, who aver that these names had been wrongly

transcribed by Byzantine writers, the fact that after the lapse of yet another four centuries, the Bulgarians, who had then been subjected by the Byzantines, only recovered their independence through the intervention and under the leadership of this latinized population, seems to fully confirm Professor Iorga's contention that the Bulgarian "Tsars" Sabinus and Paganus were of Latin extraction. 175

There are even further reasons for assuming this to be so, because Sabinus followed a pro-Byzantine policy that was strongly resented by the more warlike section of his subjects, those of Bulgarian extraction, who finally overthrew him.

When the Romans had occupied the Balkan peninsula, they found in the Dacians living in the region of the Carpathians and in the lands to the north of the Danube, warlike and restless neighbours, who by their persistent incursions delayed and hampered the work of colonization. Under their king Decebalus, the Dacians in the year 86 A.D. crossed the Danube, defeated the Roman garrisons, and threatened to overrun the whole province of Mysia. The Emperor Domitian himself had to head an army in order to drive out the invaders, and though he pursued the Dacians across the Danube, and followed them to their mountain strongholds in Translyvania, he was unable to subdue them. Soon after his withdrawal, the Dacians renewed their raids, until finally the successor of Domitian, Trajan, decided to put a stop to their annoying tactics. In the course of two arduous campaigns between the years 98 and 106 A.D., the whole of Dacia was occupied and became a Roman province.

Trajan's column in Rome is a striking chronicle of the difficulties encountered in the course of the two campaigns, and forms a vivid commentary on its chief episodes, while the vestiges of the stone bridge across the Danube near the Serbian town of Kladovo, which was then erected and over which Trajan's soldiers had marched to the conquest of Dacia, may be cited as a testimony of the seriousness and thoroughness with which the expeditions had been organized. A considerable colonization by Latin settlers, reinforced intensively by veterans of the Legions—(these

RUMANIA

175 must have been extremely numerous since the Rumanians have derived their word 'batran' = old, from 'veteranus') —followed upon the Roman conquest. Though according to Eutropius (Book VIII, chap. VI)—

"Trajanus victa Dacia, ex toto orbe Romano infinitas eo copias hominum transtulerat, ad agros et urbes colendas," "this infinite host of people" may not have been all of Latin stock, yet their common tongue and dominating culture were certainly Latin. So that if the Rumanian claims of continuity of racial descent from the Romans may seem to be exaggerated, on the other hand it must be admitted that they possess a sure and legitimate basis in claiming continuity of tradition and language from the days of the Roman colony of Dacia.

Vestiges of Roman towns such as those of Ulpia Trajana, Micia, Porolissum, Romula, Apulum, Napoca, and Potaissum, testify to the importance of these settlements, while numerous ruins of roads, temples, palaces and baths, show that an era of prosperity ensued which merited the epithet of "Dacia felix," ascribed to the colony on Roman medals. From the fusion of Dacians with Latin settlers arose the ancestors of the Rumanians, who to this day continue to cherish living memories of the Roman connection in the spoken word they use, and in the name they proudly carry.

The appellations of Wallachs and Wallachia, conferred at times on the Rumanian people and the land they inhabit, seem to have a striking similarity to the term "Wealas" by which Anglo-Saxons in England designated the Romano-Britons. It may be casually remarked that the Anglo-Saxons called the Romans of Gaul, "Galwealas," and the Byzantine Empire, "weala ric." That "wealas" was equivalent to the epithet 'Roman' is also apparent from Aelfric's glossary in which *"jus quiritium"* figures as "Weala sunder riht." So that the name "Wallach" may well constitute yet another proof of the Latin ancestry of the Rumanians, since they seem to have elicited this appellation by Teutonic and Slav tribes who used this term of "Wealas" or "Wallachs" as a generic designation of Latin-speaking peoples. One may yet find further

evidence in support of this contention in the fact that various kindred groups of Latinized Thracians who survived the barbarian invasions in the Balkan peninsula, were all designated by similar terms, namely:—Wallach, Kutso-Wallach, Mauro-Wallach, etc. 175

There is a certain parallelism in the Roman conquests of Britain and of Dacia, for both constituted the most outlying European provinces of the Roman empire, and nevertheless remained to the last amongst the most loyal and attached to the Roman tradition.

If the spread of the Latin language after the conquest was rapid in Britain, since we find the poet Martial boasting that "*dicitur et nostros cantare Britannia versus,*" it seems that the Latinization of the Dacians and Thracians must have progressed at an equally rapid pace; for when the Romans proceeded to plant settlements of latinized races in Britain, we find amongst others, those of Amboglanna (Birdoswald) and Gabrosentis (Drumburgh), both near Hadrian's wall, the first composed of Dacians, and the second of Thracians; while further south we find two other settlements of the latter at Wroxester and at Cirencester. These settlements were not exclusively composed of military in temporary occupation, but had a permanent character, as may be deduced from the inscriptions on altars and tombs which show that these settlers had remained in the same place from a very early period.

In fact, numerous stone effigies of the so-called Thracian horseman have been found all over Britain, which would prove that the contingent of Thracians who settled in Britain was considerable. The withdrawal of the Roman Legions from Dacia in A.D. 271, was in no way followed by a mass exodus of the latinized population, and the situation must have resembled that of Britain in 407 on the same occurrence. As the Roman Britons were able to maintain themselves politically unassisted until 582, when they were overwhelmed in the battle of Deorham, though, even this disaster does not seem to imply that every vestige of Roman influence and culture was extirpated; so, with most of the Latinized Dacians who remained after the departure of the Roman troops and functionaries from

175 Dacia. They were able to preserve a certain vague relation with the Empire, seeking refuge in the mountain fastnesses of the Carpathians whenever the tide of foreign invasions ran high, and returning again to the plains when the ebb set in. The plain country bordering on the Danube, and especially its eastern portion was on the main road of invasions, and must have always been unsafe for settlement. Even when Rumania had secured her independence, this region was almost a desert, and it was at a later period that it was colonized gradually. The Wallachian plain was very sparsely inhabited early in the nineteenth century, while its eastern part, the Baragan, was only colonized after 1860.

The main body of the nation, established in the highlands of Transylvania, Maramureş, and Bucovina, did not have to suffer overmuch from babarian invasions. Slavs and other barbarian tribes overran the country, but the narrowness of its cultivable area did not sufficiently attract the invaders who moved on southwards and crossed the Danube, lured on by the glamour of the rich lands of the Eastern Roman Empire. Small bands of Slavs probably strayed out of their way, and lost themselves in the maze of the mountainous valleys, to be merged finally in the dominating nationality, or have remained in isolated groups, undisturbed and stagnant as the backwater of a stream. Even to-day one comes suddenly on descendants of these invaders of old who may be recognized by their more primitive traits from their more comely Rumanian neighbours.

That the inhabitants of the mountainous regions are the real descendants of the old Daco-Roman population is confirmed by Prof. E. Pittard in his "Roumanie" (p. 33): "The mountaineers are more decidedly brachycephalous than the inhabitants of the plains. They are of higher stature——this type represents the real aboriginal Rumanian type."

The Latinized Dacians who remained behind after the departure of the Roman Legions must have been in preponderating strength since they seem to have exerted a strong civilizing influence on the Goths, if we are to judge

from the writings of Gibbon, who rather heedlessly bestows on them the epithet "degenerate" which they hardly seem to deserve since they were able to curb the fury of the Goths. Nor is there any proof which would justify his imputation of their having renounced their allegiance to Rome. In his "Decline and Fall" (Vol. I, chap XI, p. 226) writing on the relinquishment of Dacia by the Emperor Aurelian, Gibbon states:—"the old country of that name retained, however, a considerable number of its inhabitants who dreaded exile more than a Gothic master. These degenerate Romans continued to serve the empire whose allegiance they had renounced, by introducing among their conquerors the first notions of agriculture, the useful arts, and the conveniences of civilized life. An intercourse of commerce and language was gradually established between the opposite banks of the Danube, and after Dacia became an independent state it often proved the firmest barrier of the empire against the invasions of the savages of the North. A sense of interest attached these more settled barbarians to the alliance of Rome, and a permanent interest very frequently ripens into sincere and useful friendship." The Emperor Constantine, in 330, undertook a campaign in Dacia, at the time overrun by the Goths, and assumed the title of "Restorer of Dacia." The restoration, though brief in the political sense, was not altogether of an ephemeral character however, for it is recorded that the Emperor Justin, himself a Dacian by race, adopted towards the end of his reign his nephew Justinian as his successor, and according to Gibbon (Decline and Fall, Vol. III, p. 36) "drew him from the rustic solitude of Dacia to have him educated (520-527) at Constantinople." . . . . This would indicate that the state of Dacia was very far from being disturbed, and was considered as a by no means unfit place for the residence of even such an ambitious and talented youth as the then heir to the Empire.

In Justinian's reign an expedition was sent across the Danube against the Gepidae who had invaded Dacia. Fortresses along the Danube were reconstructed and enlarged and new ones were built with an eye to the protection

they were in effective occupation of that region, and that 175
they must have successfully withstood for a long period any attempt by other tribes to move towards the Danube. Dr Feher goes even so far as to opine that the ancestors of the Hungarians derived the elements of civilization from these "Proto-Bulgarians," as he calls them.

According to Byzantine chroniclers, Bulgarian suzerainty during the eight and nine centuries extended as far north and west as to include parts of Transylvania. Thus the Bulgarian Khan or "Tsar" Krum is mentioned as having removed the prisoners taken in his Thracian campaigns to "Bulgaria across the Danube." In this respect it would be pertinent to refer to Prof. S. Runciman who asserts that Krum reigned over the Bulgarians of Pannonia prior to becoming the ruler of the Balkan Bulgarians. "How it happened we cannot tell. Probably the Balkan Bulgarians had always kept in touch with their cousins. Since Asperuch's day the Khan of Plisca (the first capital of Bulgaria) had controlled the plains of Wallachia and Moldavia, and the Pannonian Bulgars in Transylvania were not far off; only the Carpathians divided them." (History of the First Bulgarian Empire, p. 51).

The region to the east of the river Theiss is known to have remained for some time under the sway of the Bulgarians. Thus Prof. E. Sayous in his "Histoire Générale des Hongrois" affirms that when the Magyars at the end of the 9th century first invaded Hungary under their leader Arpad, they found the country to the east of the Theiss and Transylvania, in possession of Bulgarians, either alone, or mixed with Wallachs. The country was ruled over by four distinct Bulgarian Kings who were subjected by the Magyars in the 11th century.

This Bulgarian overlordship of Rumania is contested by some Rumanian historians though others admit it. Thus Professor Bogdan, in his book "Romînî şi Bulgari" affirms that between 680 and 1018 the Bulgarians exerted a cultural influence on the Rumanians, who adopted from them their religious and political institutions as well as the Bulgarian language for diplomatic and church use. The Rumanians had been converted to Christianity before the

175 arrival of the Bulgarians in the Balkan peninsula. An inscription is still to be found at Cluj which proves that a branch of the Christian church existed there under Roman domination.

A Latin episcopate had been founded in 535 at Ochrida (Prima Justiniana) for all Illyricum, including lands south of the Danube, as well as Dacia, and it was after the Bulgarians had been converted to Christianity at about 866 that the Rumanians adopted the Bulgaro-Slavonic liturgy for their church. Though Professor Bogdan believes that Bulgarian influence ceased with the fall of the first Bulgarian Empire in 1018, and that subsequently only the results of this Bulgarian influence made itself felt, this seems hardly likely. On the contrary, Bulgarian influence must have been further intensified owing to the migration into Rumania of Bulgarian dignitaries and refugees who at this time sought to escape from the Byzantines.

Professor Bogdan in his work "Luptele Romînilor cu Turcii pana la Mihai Viteazu" states that the Rumanians on the north and south banks of the Danube, overwhelmed by the successive invasions of Goths, Huns, Bulgars, Avars and Slavs, sought refuge in the mountainous valleys, and there, under the authority of the Bulgarians, formed the basis of their future organizations in principalities and duchies. When the Hungarians made their appearance these small states already existed and fell gradually under their rule. Professor P. Constantinescu of Jassi seems to share the same views as to the influence exerted by Bulgaria. In a very interesting booklet entitled "Criptographia si istoria Româneasca," published in 1925, M. Em. Grigoras adduces certain facts which would tend to prove that by the year 1111 the district of Oltenia formed an independent state under the sceptre of a so-called Cosnila Assen, who may well have been a relative of the Assenides of Bulgaria, since it is well established that the founders of that dynasty were very closely connected with the populations of the north bank of the Danube and only succeeded in freeing Bulgaria from the Byzantine mastery in 1186, after receiving substantial help from across the Danube.

It is possible that following on the subjection of the first

Bulgarian empire, the Byzantines may have extended their domination even beyond the Danube, so that the newly formed duchies and principalities acknowledged their suzerainty, and even co-operated with them against an enemy that threatened the security of both. We thus find the Byzantine historian Cinamus, in his narrative of Manuel Comnenus' campaign in 1152–4 against Hungary, stating that the Emperor's army was joined by many Wallachians, to whose Latin origin he alludes. The close co-operation and understanding which obtained among the Wallachians and Bulgarians, and at a later period the Cumanians, is illustrated by the events which led to the restoration of the second Bulgarian Empire in 1186. The revolt was led by the brothers Peter and Assen of Wallach lineage, supported mainly by Wallachs living on the right bank of the Danube, throughout Mysia, and as far south as the Pindus. At first the movement was not successful, and the leaders had to retire to the north of the Danube in order to solicit the help of the kindred populations living there. It was only after summoning them and the Cumanians to their assistance that they succeeded in defeating the Byzantines and securing their independence. As, further, the new Bulgarian rulers assumed the title of "rex Bulgariae et Blachiae," and the bishop of Tirnovo (the then capital of Bulgaria) that of "primus Bulgarorum et Blachorum," one may surmise that there was a very close collaboration between the two peoples. Nikita Akominat, whose writings form the main source of documentation for this period, distinctly indicates that Mysia was peopled mainly by Wallachs, and that the Bulgarians were mostly in Macedonia. What the Byzantines at the time seemed to dread most was the possibility that the Wallachians might unite with the Bulgarians. (Nic. Honiatae, Historia ex recensione Im Bekker Bonnae 1835, p. 488–489).

Prof. Onciul in his "Originele Principatelor Romane," also lays stress on the close co-operation between Bulgarians and Wallachs during this period, and ascribes the weakening of the Wallach element in the regions to the south of the Danube to the relative safety that ensued with the rise of the Bulgarian Empire, which event encouraged

175 many Wallachs to return to their homeland to the north of the Danube.

During the eleventh century the Hungarians engaged in a policy of steady expansion to the east, and came into collision with the Wallachs. It is through Hungarian sources that we first hear of Wallacho-Bulgarian principalities existing on the eastern confines of Hungary, in the Banat and Transylvania. The famous Notarius Regis Belae of Hungary refers to Hungarian victories over a Prince Glad, who is designed as "dux Bulgarorum et Blacorum," and relates that the latter's army was composed of Bulgarians, Wallachs and Cumanians. King Bela also, in an epistle addressed to the Pope, complains of incursions by Bulgarians and Cumanians against which for his protection he found himself compelled to settle the Knights Hospitallers of St John on his eastern frontier near the Danube. In 1233 reference is again made to a Hungarian ruler who had been established in the Banat of Severin, whose subjects were "Valachi schismatici."

The subjection of Bulgaria by the Turks in 1394 was followed by a large immigration of Bulgarian nobles and church dignitaries into Rumania, and Bulgarian influence and culture was further strengthened and gave rise to a period of literary and artistic flowering that recalled, according to Prof. Bogdan, the influence exerted by the Greek *émigrés* in Italy after the taking of Constantinople by the Turks. This is in no way surprising, since the Bulgarians being for centuries direct neighbours of the Byzantines, were able to assimilate to a certain extent their civilization and transmit it to the Rumanians who were further away.

197 Numerous manuscripts dating from the 14th to the 17th
175 centuries, mainly compiled in the chancelleries of the
177 various Wallach princes, testify to the deep influence Bulgaria had exerted during this period. The language in use was not uniform but gradually evolving, which proves that it was not used merely as a standard language, like Latin, but that it was spoken by those who made use of it. This will explain the large admixture of Slav words in the Rumanian tongue, which were derived mainly from

Bulgarian sources. The toponymy also of Rumania reveals a great number of names of Slavo-Bulgarian and Cumanian origin, which can only be explained by the former presence in large numbers of these two peoples in Rumania. Prof. Xenopol, in his "Istoria Romanilor," vol 1, p.71, dilating on the Slavo-Bulgarian toponymy extant in Rumania, expresses the belief that the mere official use of the Slavo-Bulgarian language is not sufficient to explain the adoption of geographical terms in this language, and that their presence must be ascribed to a "connection between people and people." An examination of D. Francescu's "Dictionaru Topograficu şi statistico al Romaniei" (1872) and Dr L. Colescu's "Dictionarul statistic al Romaniei (1914/5) would reveal an astounding number of such names. As regards the nomenclature derived from Cumanian sources, we have, Coman, Comana, Comânae, Comania, (thrice) Comanianca, Comani (twice), Comaniţa, and Comanesti (six times). Similar names are met with in Bulgaria and Macedonia (i.e. Kumanovo) and if we recollect that the Cumanians gave a royal dynasty, that of the Terters, to Bulgaria, it will be understood that this now lost people had exerted a wide-spread influence in the Balkan peninsula.

FROM THE FORMATION OF THE DANUBIAN PRINCIPALITIES TO 1914.

The policy of easterly expansion pursued by the Hungarians forced the first Rumanian political communities which had developed in the relative security of Transylvania to retreat before the continuous pressure exerted by the Hungarians. Many of the Rumanian nobility, however, seem to have passed over to the conqueror in order to safeguard their wealth and privileges at the price of Magyarization, as did the Serbian aristocracy in Bosnia which accepted the faith of their Turkish conquerors so that they might retain their lands. These Magyarized Rumanians of Transylvania gave to Hungary her most heroic figure, that of John Hunyady, as well as one of her great kings, Matthias Corvinus, son of the former.

RUMANIA

175 Towards the end of the thirteenth century we find these Rumanian communities abandoning Transylvania and emerging from the defiles of the Carpathians to settle to the south and east of these mountains, where they appear as the two sister principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia extending gradually their sway to the Danube and the Black Sea.

They had hardly consolidated their rule before the Turks appeared on the Danube, and Wallachia was the first to become tributary to the Sultan in 1391. The greater part of the succeeding five centuries was spent in the effort to maintain a precarious semi-independence. The subjection of Wallachia and Moldavia to the Turks differed essentially however from the submission of the other Balkan states to the same rule. In exchange for the tribute to the Sultans, the native aristocracy remained undisturbed, and continued to enjoy its privileges, one being the right of electing the ruling prince, so that the Rumanian people could continue to develop, having never experienced the abject servitude endured by Bulgaria, Greece or Serbia. The relatively privileged position of the Rumanians may be gauged by the fact that Moslems were not allowed to settle in the principalities nor to erect mosques to the north of the Danube. The history of the next five hundred years is not edifying, for it abounds in sordid intestine rivalries and intrigues, alternating with incursions by Hungarians and Poles. The fleeting appearance of outstanding personalities such as that of Stephen the Great, prince of Moldavia, threw occasionally a brief glimmer on the prevailing darkness. He inflicted a signal defeat on the Turks on the river Racova in 1475, an event that rendered him a conspicuous champion of Christianity, winning for him the praise and benediction of Pope Sixtus IV. It may be said that he was the main factor that brought to a stop the raid of Mohamed II against Central Europe. He endeavoured to create an alliance of Christian Powers to continue the war of liberation against the Turks, but instead of meeting with aid he had to face the hostility of the Poles, who even invaded Moldavia. At the end of his reign, disgusted by the in-

sincerity of his Christian neighbours, Stephen the Great /75 finally came to terms with the Turks, and acknowledged their suzerainty in order to safeguard Moldavia from even greater misfortunes.

Another heroic figure is that of Michael the Brave, who for the brief period of a few years battled incessantly against Turks, Hungarians and Poles, and succeeded in enfranchising and uniting all the Rumanian territories. His exploits fired the imagination of Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbians, all of whom hailed in him the predestined liberator of the Balkan Christians; premature hopes that were to vanish at his untimely assassination in 1601. His military feats are somewhat tarnished by the fact that he introduced serfdom in Rumania, rendering thereby the lot of the hard pressed peasantry even more grievous than before. On his disappearance the Turks further strengthened their hold on the country, and exerted their rule almost without restraint. It may be incidentally noted that Michael the Brave's accession to the dignity of prince was facilitated through the support of Barton, the English Ambassador at Constantinople, though the latter's intercession was not entirely disinterested. The next instance we hear of reference to England relates to a commercial treaty concluded between Peter V of Moldavia, and Queen Elizabeth in 1588.

Two other princes of mark, Matthew Basarab and Basil Lupu, reigned almost simultaneously about the middle of the seventeenth century over Wallachia and Moldavia, and distinguished themselves as legislators and protectors of literature. The coincidence of their rule was most unfortunate, as they wasted their mutual abilities in underhand plots and intrigues to oust each other from their respective territories.

By 1716, the Turks became so predominant in power that they forbade the future election of native princes, finding them too prone to intrigue with the neighbouring Christian powers, and henceforth they appointed Greek Phanariots from amongst their Constantinople subjects to rule over the two principalities. The imposition of alien rulers left a most deplorable impress on the political life of

RUMANIA

175 the country, owing to their addiction to corruption and rapacity. The thrones of the two principalities were put up to auction to the highest bidder, and as the posts, though lucrative, were precarious, their holders sought to recover the money spent in their acquisition by exactions from the unfortunative natives who were literally fleeced in order to satisfy the grasping covetousness of the rulers palmed upon them. As the Turks found that the conferring of these offices was a very profitable business they proceeded to accelerate the rate at which they were filled, until every two or three years new appointments were made. If the princes had come by themselves the evil would have been circumscribed; unfortunately, they were followed by retinues of hungry and greedy retainers who coveted and secured all the ecclesiastical and administrative offices. They acted like veritable harpies, bleeding the country white, and it is not surprising that they should have imparted to the Rumanians, by nature most kindly and hospitable, a sense of intense destestation for the foreigner, that found expression in such popular sayings as the following: "Nici o poamă nu-i amara ca strainatatea'n ţara" (There is no bitterer fruit than the foreigner in the land). "Atunci ii face strainul frate, cand a da din piatra lapte, Si straina suriora, Cand a pocni pusca goala." (You will turn the foreigner into a brother when the stone will yield milk, and the foreigner into a sister when the gun will go off unloaded).

The only counterbalancing advantage the Phanariots brought to Rumania was the dissemination of Western and mainly French culture. The Phanariots had all been reared in a centre which for centuries had been impregnated by French ideas, where the French tongue was spoken by all who claimed to have some refinement. France, in Constantinople, had succeeded to the rôle formerly played by the Venetians and Genoese, and her influence both politically and commercially had been paramount for centuries, and was so fertile, at least culturally, that French is still the predominant tongue to-day in the maritine zone of the Near East.

The Phanariot princes used French in their international

relations, and were usually accompanied by French secre- 175
taries during their stay in the Danubian principalities. Their court receptions were conducted in French, and the native aristocracy came more and more to copy the fashion set them by their rulers. French literature was widely diffused, the youth of the wealthy classes flocked more and more to Paris for their studies, until Rumanian intellectuals became so imbued with French ideas that they began to look on France as their second country. It is regrettable that while slavishly copying the French they did not show more discrimination between good and bad, and failed to assimilate to any great degree those qualities of the French which inspire admiration and respect, but rather tended to copy French superficiality. It may be pleaded in defence of the Rumanians that, owing to their inexperience and naivety, it was natural that they should be impressed by the gloss and tinsel of a civilization rather than by its more solid and austere aspects; all the more so, since being semi-orientals, they would as such be more prone to be struck by what is pompous and ostentatious and to neglect what is more positive and sane. After all, in the social as in the economic field, Gresham's law is always operative—the bad always drives out the good; this is why customs which are worst are those which seem to spread most readily. At any rate such was the strength of French cultural influence in Rumania that the memories of the old Latin connection were completely revived and the sense of her Latinity once more restored after the consciousness of it had been somewhat dimmed by the lengthy connection with Slavo-Bulgarian culture in the middle ages. It is certainly owing to their saturation with French culture that the Rumanians have not been absorbed by the Russians, and for this reason the Phanariots may be pardoned for all the evils they brought in their train, since at the same time they bestowed on Rumania that which safeguarded her most precious possession, the notion of her nationhood. It should be noted, however, that the Phanariots had imparted a particular tone to French culture which they transmitted, which is characteristically Byzantine, and not French, and for this reason it will be vain to search in

175 Rumanian cultural life expressions of that virility and stamina which distinguish the French. The large influx of Greek Phanariots, and their assimilation by the wealthier class of the Rumanian population, resulted in the formation of a distinct group among the people, which, though it constituted the leading class, yet did not possess the essential traits usually the mark of a real nobility. Moral apathy, laxity, inertness . . . these formed, and unfortunately still form, the distinctive traits of this class, and in a sense, differentiate it from the great bulk of the people, which fortunately for itself does possess more virile qualities than its hybrid aristocracy.

The psychical disassociation of the aristocracy from the people is patent, since the former has contributed nothing to the national literature or art, nor to its spiritual development. The aristocratic class has stood haughtily aloof from the masses and even repudiated what kinship there may have been between the two by adopting French for their language, copying servilely French manners and turning their backs provokingly on such native traditions as others would have cherished and revered. The reign of the Phanariots came to a close with the outbreak of the Greek revolution in 1821; the Turks nominating henceforth native princes to the thrones of Wallachia and Moldavia. Their advent was marked by an increased interference of Russia in the affairs of the principalities, until by the treaty of Adrianople (1829) the Tsar virtually assumed the power which the Sultans had hitherto exerted.

During the rule of the Phanariots, the Rumanians suffered other and more serious misfortunes than their depredations. The Turks had countenanced the annexation by Austria of Bucovina in 1775 on the most flimsy of pretences, while in 1812 they ceded Bessarabia to Russia. Owing to the series of wars undertaken by Russia against Turkey, the principalities were repeatedly occupied by Russian troops, who remained in indisputed possession for several years at a time, until the outbreak of the Crimean war, when their place was taken by the Austrians.

The solitary compensation the Rumanians derived from the Russian interventions was the conferring by the latter

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

of a more modern constitution in 1831, known as the "règlement organique," which, though altogether inadequate from the liberal point of view, yet placed the administration on a sounder footing than before. The inspirer of this reform, General Kisseleff, being an enlightened man, would have conferred several privileges on the peasantry whose status was akin to serfdom, but unfortunately he encountered obstinate opposition on the part of the landed aristocracy, who insisted on the maintenance of their feudal privileges and thus proved an obstacle to real reform. At the Congress of Paris (1856) on the close of the Crimean War an attempt was made by the Western Powers to checkmate Russia's expansion policy. She was therefore forced to retrocede the southern part of Bessarabia to Moldavia, and her tutelage over the principalities was abolished. The subject of the union of Wallachia and Moldavia was broached by the Rumanian delegates, and although this proposal met with warm support from France and Italy, and strange to say from Russia also, unfortunately owing to strenuous opposition on the part of England and Austria, the scheme was rejected, though certain concessions to the Rumanian demands were acceded to, amongst others that of the right of permitting Wallachia and Moldavia to assume the title of "United Principalities," a concession that ultimately rendered the attainment of union feasible a few years later, when, thanks to the benevolent attitude of Napoleon III, the two principalities were able to merge into one, a measure that made them better adapted to defend their national integrity.

As it was known that the neighbouring Powers would not countenance such a move, the Rumanians of the two principalities used the subterfuge of electing the same prince in the person of Alexander Cuza, who was finally acknowledged by the Turks, thanks to France's strenuous exertions on behalf of the principalities. His brief reign (1858-1866) forms a landmark in Rumanian history, as it indicates the end of dissensions and intestine rivalries between Wallachia and Moldavia which prepared and maintained that condition of helplessness

175 which had left them at the mercy, first of the Turks, and later of the Russians and Austrians.

Prince Cuza proved a very enlightened and patriotic ruler. Seconded by his able minister Cogalniceanu, he introduced a law making elementary education compulsory and free. He founded the two universities of Bucarest and of Jassy, and improved the status of the peasants, emancipating them from the intolerable burden of their feudal obligations. In order to allot land to the landless peasants, he proceeded to sequestrate monastic properties, and expropriate part of the larger estates belonging to the nobility. By his patronage of the peasantry he brought himself into conflict with the Church and the aristocracy, and as his innovations were counterbalanced by high-handed methods in dealing with his opponents, he displeased even those among his subjects who were more liberal-minded. Finally a conspiracy was hatched and the organizers, breaking one night into the palace, forced him to sign his abdication, and drove him into exile where he died seven years later. It is regrettable that in spite of Prince Cuza's courage in emancipating the peasants, the latter's position became even worse owing to the predominating political influence of the larger landowners, and finally in 1907 a desperate rising occurred, which was suppressed after some 11,000 peasants had been slaughtered.

Some difficulties were raised by interested foreign Powers at the election of Prince Charles of Hohenzollern as Cuza's successor, difficulties which were finally overcome through Napoleon III's friendly attitude. Prince Charles showed himself a sagacious and capable ruler. His early efforts were devoted to the reorganization of the army and the overhauling of the country's finances. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877 left him no choice but to take sides with Russia, as she had intimated that she would force for her army a passage through the principalities. At the siege of Plevna owing to the critical situation of the Russian armies, the Rumanians were at last allowed to intervene effectively in the siege and to secure the capture of the fortress.

Unfortunately Rumania's sacrifices were not fairly requited. At the Congress of Berlin, though Rumania's

independence was recognized, she was forced to hand back once more to Russia the southern part of Bessarabia, and was given in exchange the northern part of the Dobrudja. The Rumanians vehemently protested against what was a double spoliation, committed at their expense and that of their neighbours the Bulgarians, to whom the Dobrudja belonged. The Dobrudja, in its then undeveloped condition, could not be any compensation for the loss of southern Bessarabia, and its annexation, as was feared by Prince Charles and his advisers, might have eventually caused the estrangement of Bulgaria. Russia, however, proved unyielding, and Rumania was forced to bow finally before the inevitable.

Prince Charles was proclaimed King on May 22nd, 1881, and to the end of his reign in 1914, devoted himself to the peaceful consolidation of his country, completely transforming Rumania during this period and making her one of the most prosperous and powerful states in the Near East.

The disillusionment caused by Russia's attitude in 1878, and the personal proclivities of King Charles permitted the latter to bind Rumania to the Central Powers, with which he signed a secret defensive treaty in 1883. It did not imply, however, blind allegiance on Rumania's part, since in 1913 her intervention in the second Balkan war was clearly inimical to the interests of Austria.

Her intererence in that fratricidal struggle brought her some territorial accretion in the form of Southern Dobrudja, a territory mainly inhabited by Bulgarians and Turks. Its obtention was made feasible by the astonishing pigheadedness of certain Bulgarian politicians, who refused to make timely and reasonable concessions to Rumania. It proved, however, of very doubtful value since it alienated Bulgaria's sympathy and provoked the latter's attack during the world war which proved the main cause of Rumania's undoing.

It may be incidentally noted that Bulgaria had always cherished the most friendly feelings towards Rumania, and had never resented the annexation of northern Dobrudja which had been forced on Rumania. These sentiments of goodwill had always been reciprocated by the Rumanians who had welcomed the Bulgarians when fleeing from the

175 Turks, and assisted them to organize and prepare their struggle for independence. Such was the friendliness the Bulgarians displayed towards the Rumanians that on the forced deposition of their first prince Alexander Battenberg, brought about through Russian hostility, Bulgaria's greatest statesman, Stambulov, offered the Bulgarian crown to King Charles, and it is to be deplored that owing to Russia's veto and threat of intervention the offer could not be accepted. For a close co-operation between Rumania and Bulgaria, under the common sceptre of King Charles, would have been tantamount to the creation of a sound bulwark against the underhand schemes and machinations of the Russian and Austrian Empires which were the main cause of all the unrest in the Balkans.

RUMANIA DURING THE GREAT WAR.

The conduct of the foreign policy of Rumania had been considered by King Charles as his special prerogative. His sympathies for the Germans, and his belief in their final victory prompted him to involve Rumania in the war on the side of the Central Powers, all the more so, since he considered himself in honour bound to assist them by the treaty of 1883.

There were other practical reasons which operated in favour of such a policy. The Central Powers occupied a predominant position in Rumania's commerce. Germany, followed by Austria, headed the list of Rumanian exports and imports, the Rumanian state loans had been floated on the Berlin and Vienna stock exchanges, and Rumanian industry had been largely financed by German capital. In spite of these considerations, however, the king failed in his attempt to enlist the support of Rumanian politicians on the side of the Central Powers. Sentimental reasons prevailed. The strong pro-French leanings of the upper classes, and the more popular desire of taking advantage of the struggle in order to free the Rumanians of Transylvania from the intolerable oppression of the Magyars proved decisive.

M. Carp, a former prime-minister, seemed to be the only

175

person of importance who seconded King Charles and openly advocated siding with the Central Powers. In his paper, the "Moldava," he laid stress on the grave danger that a Russian occupation of Constantinople would constitute for Rumania, and advocated a policy that would thrust back Russia from the mouths of the Danube. German propaganda, which had suborned a large number of newspapers, did its utmost to re-awaken the old distrust of Russia, and did not weary of pointing out the precarious situation in which Rumania would find herself after an Entente victory, surrounded as she was on all sides by Slav nations.

The general staff of the army also did not at all approve of the armed intervention of Rumania so long as the Russians had not occupied Bucovina. They insisted on the necessity of the right wing of the Rumanian army being in direct contact with the Russians and Moldavia being thereby protected from a possible direct enemy attack from Bucovina. The shortage of ammunition was a further deterrent to immediate action, and the military must certainly have greatly influenced the attitude of M. Bratianu, the then prime minister, in his policy of procrastination during which he attempted to drive as hard a bargain with the Entente Powers as possible.

King Charles's death in October, 1914, removed a serious obstacle to Rumania's intervention. His nephew and successor, Ferdinand, was more amenable to Entente influences, but the failure of the Dardanelles expedition and the entry of Bulgaria into the war furnished further justification for the pursuit of a policy of expectancy, and it was only in August, 1916, after the Russian government had sent a note to Bucarest threatening to annul the promised territorial acquisitions made by the Entente, and after further assurances had been vouchsafed that the Salonica army would undertake an offensive, and Russian troops would be sent to the Dobrudja to counter a possible Bulgarian attack, that finally, Rumania was coaxed into declaring war.

Military reasons concurred in favour of an attack on Bulgaria; psychological considerations, however, rendered

RUMANIA

175 such a plan almost impossible to carry out, so that the Rumanians decided to invade Transylvania. This move was followed by a Bulgarian onslaught on the Dobrudja, most of which fell rapidly in their possession, thus proving once more that the friendship of a neighbouring nation is a more valuable security than the possession of a strategic frontier. These swift and unexpected Bulgarian successes forced the Rumanians to draw upon their army in Transylvania so as to strengthen their defence in what remained of the Dobrudja. At this critical moment the Entente Powers failed to redeem their promises. The Bavarian troops, especially prepared for the invasion of Rumania, and which the Entente had promised to immobilise by simultaneous attacks on the western front, forced the Carpathians in spite of the desperate defence put up by the Rumanians. Almost at the same time the redoubtable von Mackensen, heading a motley army of Germans, Turks and Bulgarians, the latter released owing to the inactivity of the Salonica army, crossed the Danube, thus sealing the fate of Wallachia. The Germans entered Bucarest on Dec. 6th, 1916, the Rumanians withdrawing to Moldavia to rally and reconstruct their forces.

Undaunted by the misfortunes which had befallen them, the Rumanians set to work to reorganize their army, and by the succeeding summer, under the leadership of General Averescu, were able to secure a great victory at Marasti over the Austro-Germans. Unfortunately, the Bolshevik revolution had demoralized the Russian army, and by August, 1917, the Germans were able to draw troops from their eastern front and to concentrate them against the Rumanian positions. A fierce German attack followed but it was beaten off at Marasesti. The bravery of the Rumanians, however, proved of no avail owing to the defection of Russia, and no alternative was left for them but to initiate negotiations. These were conducted at Buftea and resulted in the peace of Bucarest. (May 7th, 1918.)

The clauses of the treaty were most humiliating to Rumania. Those who harp on the harshness of the Versailles treaty would rectify their judgement if they were to take cognizance of the conditions the "victimized" Germans

imposed on Rumania. The territorial losses Rumania had 175
to suffer were comparatively light as contrasted with the draconian economic clauses of the treaty, and comprised the cession of the entire Dobrudja, and of a district of 2,920 sq. miles along the mountain passes of the Carpathians. Rumania as a solace, was allowed to annex Bessarabia, which had already been abandoned by Russia and had demanded its union with Rumania in March, 1918. The ratification of the treaty was delayed, however, King Ferdinand anticipating an Entente victory which would liberate Rumania from the onerous clauses the Germans sought to impose on her.

The collapse of the Bulgarian front and the victorious Allied offensive in the west soon justified these hopes. The Rumanians thereupon assumed the offensive on Nov. 9th, 1918, re-occupied Wallachia, re-entered Transylvania which had in December, 1918, proclaimed its union with Rumania, marched into Bucovina, the Rumanians of which province had formed a provisional government on Oct. 27th, 1918, and had invoked the assistance of the Rumanian troops, and by April, 1919, reached the line of the river Theiss. Rumania's definite frontiers, however, were to be traced by the diplomats after protracted and unedifying wranglings in Paris.

RUMANIA AND THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

It is usual to accuse the Rumanians of having evinced at 728
the Peace Conference an intolerance and superciliousness that did not at all accord with the services they had rendered to the Allied cause. The Entente Powers alleged that the Rumanians, having concluded a separate peace with the enemy, had thereby forfeited their rights to the territories which had been originally promised them. Besides, President Wilson had taken up a most determined attitude against all secret treaties, and as Rumania's claims were based on them it is easy to understand that immense difficulties were encountered before a settlement was effected.

FOREWORD

175

AT the close of the first World War the Romanian people achieved the unity it had temporarily attained in 1601 under Michael the Brave. In the interval before the outbreak of the second World War new Romania succeeded in bringing about a mutual comprehension among components who had lived for centuries under widely differing administrations and in inaugurating among other reforms a minorities régime far more civilized than that to which the Romanian minority had been subjected in Austria-Hungary and Russia. It will suffice to point out that in Transylvania, for instance, there were in 1940 more Hungarian public schools, more Hungarian newspapers and books than there had been under the crown of St. Stephen and far greater equality of opportunity in business as in politics, and this after the ravages of a war in which Romania's devotion to the Allies had cost her one-tenth of all her population, a loss higher than that of any Allied country.

Romania after 1918 has supported every international effort for peace and a better understanding between nations. In her desire for good relations with her neighbor, Bulgaria, she has even agreed voluntarily to cede southern Dobrudja to the Sofia Government, an action which may well be compared with the cession by Great Britain of the Ionian Isles to Greece a century ago; but for this Romania deserves higher credit, for southern Dobrudja, as I was able to satisfy myself during an extended automobile tour in the Spring of 1940, was in part overwhelmingly Romanian and the Romanian element was conspicuous everywhere, while Balcic was especially dear to Romanian hearts.

Unfortunately, in this era of the glorification of force, Romania's other neighbors took this manifestation of magnanimity for one of weakness. For example, the great generosity of Bucharest to the Hungarians in Transylvania had always been considered by them as a tribute to their superiority, and had increased their traditional scorn for the Wallachs who had been subjected to them so long. And to the world's general astonishment it was the champions of self-determination, the very government which had had its definition of "aggression" accepted by others and had bound itself not to commit "aggression," which made the first unprovoked attack.

RACIAL ASPECTS OF ROMANIA'S CASE

175
648

On June 26, 1940, the Soviet Government delivered an ultimatum at Bucharest demanding the immediate cession of the province of Bessarabia, which had been under Russian domination for a brief century of its existence, as well as of the northernmost districts of Bucovina. Many Romanian patriots counseled resistance and hoped for assistance from the Western democracies; but those with longer memories recalled the non-arrival of the British and French aid solemnly promised in the treaty under which Romania entered the first World War, and the more recent fate of Czechoslovakia. Not merely was aid uncertain and remote, but once the Romanian Army was engaged on the Russian frontier, attacks were certain to follow on the western Transylvanian border. So with a heavy heart Romania yielded to overwhelming force and onte more a blow such as Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland had experienced succeeded in its impact.

Only a month earlier I myself had given a lecture in Romanian in the huge, filled to overflowing Eparchial Hall of the Bessarabian capital, and had thus had recent and vivid experience of the cultural upswing given by the Romanians to a city I had first known in 1919 as a sleepy provincial center, for generations victim of administrative neglect and with even Russian schools few and far between. Some ten years ago I had had the privilege of being present at the dedication of a school in a large Russian village in Bessarabia and had been keenly impressed by the good feeling between Russians and Moldavians evidenced by the ceremony and the celebration afterward.

175
648

The Communist aggression of 1940, establishing Russia at the mouth of the Danube and a step nearer the Dardanelles, affected not merely Romania but the entire continent of Europe, upsetting as it did the balance at a traditional danger spot. It was not merely a warning to Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Turkey that a new campaign of aggression had started, with no more justification than the right of the stronger, but it focussed German attention on that part of the world and evidently led the German strategists to feel that a stronger bulwark against future Russian aggression was needed than would be furnished by the Pruth or the Sereth rivers. The Carpathians were obviously the new line of resistance, and subservient Hungary was only too ready to act as the German tool. It is tragic to reflect that a genuine policy of reconciliation on the Kremlin's part, which by creating a loyal border zone all the way from the White Sea and the Baltic to the Black Sea might even perhaps have prevented this war, was sacrificed to imperialistic ambitions that have since plunged mankind in its bloodiest struggle.

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

FOREWORD

175-648

Anxious to guard against the new Russian move, the Germans gave Romania no credit for her correct attitude in holding aloof from the appeals of Romanian fractions of the Carpathian Ukraine to be annexed to Transylvania, just as later she maintained the same correctness by turning a deaf ear to similar prayers from Romanian communities in the break-up of Yugoslavia. To the Germans also this attitude was merely evidence of weakness, and a weakness of which the Hungarians have never been guilty. Accordingly, Berlin and Rome encouraged the Hungarians by the Vienna Award to seize parts of Transylvania where the Romanians have always been in a majority not contested even by the Hungarian census figures; and Magyar troops not merely occupied the territory, but with the utmost ruthlessness expelled the Romanian intellectual élite whose rights had been guaranteed by the Award, and with their traditional barbarity even put a considerable number of them to death.

Romania had to yield to force, the German-Russian pact still holding. But the next turn of the kaleidoscope, the break between Hitler and Stalin, gave her the cherished chance of recovering her lost provinces of Bessarabia and Bucovina. And here Romania has again given proof of her sense of justice by refraining from lodging claim to territorial expansion east of the Dniester into the Ukraine notwithstanding the hundreds of thousands of Romanians forcibly settled there in the century of Czarist rule over Bessarabia.

Opposed to expansion at the expense of her neighbors, Romania is not less determined to protect her natural and historic limits against encroachment and to bring within them the greater part of such Romanian masses as still live under other règimes. With the recovery of the territory lost in the east, the Romanian nation once more feels free to look with hope to a solution of its western problem. True enough, after a searching inquiry the claims of Hungary to Transylvania had been definitely denied by the concert of Europe in 1920. Nor was the right of Romania to Transylvania thus affirmed on historical grounds alone. In 1920, and doubtless more so today, the right of all peoples to a government of their own choosing and the exercise of this right for the whole by the decision of a majority could not be denied. The Romanians are fortunately able to establish by facts and figures that every historical subdivision of their homeland has an uncontested Romanian majority. The proof consists of the scientific data collected by an American-trained staff during the population census of 1930. Their authenticity rests not only on the fact that nationality was not determined arbitrarily by the

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 648 census taker but by the free statement of each inhabitant; it is confirmed by the consonance of the findings whether taking race, language or religion as criteria, as well as by comparison with the official population statistics of Austria-Hungary and Russia.

121 Inasmuch as the Award of Vienna was necessarily an expedient, I have thought it useful to give here a comprehensive abstract of Romania's racial figures together with historical outlines of her border regions, in the conviction that no lasting solution of European unrest could afford to disregard or minimize the racial realities of the continent's perennial danger zones.

C. U. C.

North Hatley, P. Q.
October 20, 1941.

000 historical and racial truth if the peoples in the invaded areas are to be freed of physical and spiritual terror and assured a peaceful development.

175 Until June, 1940, the population of Romania was divided among seventy-one counties grouped administratively into districts approximating the several historical provinces. This territory corresponded in area to that of the Dacian Kingdom colonized as an imperial province by Rome, 105-271 A.D. To use the current names, the provinces of Moldavia, Bessarabia and Bucovina formed the principality of Moldavia, with the capital at Jassy; while Oltenia and Muntenia formed the principality of Wallachia, with Bucharest as capital. Early in their national evolution the two Romanian states came to feel the influence of the expanding Turkish power. This they recognized by mutual assistance pacts,[1] renouncing their sovereign rights only insofar as they assumed obligations toward the Turks, who in turn guaranteed their liberties and integrity.[2] Still under Turkish suzerainty, Moldavia and Wallachia united on January 24, 1859 to form modern Romania who declared her independence May 10, 1877, when she joined Russia in war against Turkey. By proclamation of her parliament Romania became a Kingdom on May 10, 1881.

Like Italy on May 20, 1882, Romania on October 30, 1883, adhered to the defensive alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary. Like Italy in 1915, Romania in 1916 joined the Allies in the first World War. Toward the conclusion of this war Bessarabia, emerging an autonomous republic from Communist chaos by proclamation of her Diet January 24, 1918, voted the following March 27 to reunite with Romania. Bucovina and Transylvania (with the Banat of Timisoara, Crisana and Maramures), also autonomous since October, 1918,[3] followed suit, the first proclaiming her union at Cernauti November 28, the latter December 1 at Alba Iulia. Thus the integration of the Romanian provinces came about through the exercise by their peoples of the right to self-determination, and not through armed conquest or international negotiation. The peace treaties of Versailles (June 28, 1919), St. Germain (September 10, 1919) and Trianon (June 4, 1920) merely added formal recognition to a factual situation ante-dating them by more than a year.

---

[1] F. C. Nano, "Condica tratatelor si a altor legaminte ale Romaniei, 1354-1937," Bucharest, 1938, p. 7, for treaty between Mircea the Old of Wallachia and Mehmed I of Turkey, 1416 (1418 ?), and p. 28, for treaty between Bogdan III of Moldavia and Selim I, 1511.

[2] N. P. Comnène, "La terre roumaine à travers les ages," Paris and Lausanne, 1919, p. 24.

[3] "The Romanian nation which lives in the (Dual) Monarchy awaits and demands after centuries of suffering the achievement of its inalienable rights in full national life." (Dr. Alexander Vaida-Voevod in the Hungarian Parliament, October 18, 1918.)

Bucovina

ON May 7, 1775, Emperor Joseph II of Austria secured the consent of a Turkey weakened by corruption and endless warfare to the occupation of the northern region of the Romanian principality of Moldavia; he claimed this "strip of land" to improve communications[1] between Galicia, which he had wrested from Poland in 1772, and the imperial province of Transylvania. 175

Bucovina, as the Austrians named their new domain, had had no separate political or administrative life before 1775. It had always been an integral part of Moldavia, and included the early Moldavian capital of Suceava, some of the most famous fifteenth and sixteenth century battlegrounds and the ancient monasteries endowed by the Moldavian princes, the best known among whom, Stephen the Great (1457-1504), lies buried at Putna, county Radauti.

For some years after its annexation Bucovina remained under a military government. In 1786 it was merged with Galicia, an arbitrary administrative measure that had the effect of opening the gates to a slow infiltration of Poles, Jews and Ruthenians in quest for better living conditions. Despite repeated Romanian appeals, it was not until 1848 that Bucovina received administrative autonomy as a Hapsburg duchy. Thereafter, if the status of her Romanian inhabitants differed greatly from that of the Romanians under Hungarian rule, Bucovina was kept advisedly in complete spiritual isolation[2] from the Romanian centers in contiguous Moldavia and Transylvania and efficient precautions were taken to impede the development of Romanian national life.

The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in October, 1918, resulted in the geographical isolation of Bucovina (by the intervening new States of Hungary and Czechoslovakia) from Austria, whose crown land it had been. This forcible political tie once severed, the path was cleared for the reunion with Romania of her 800,000 people and 4,000 square miles of woodland.

---

[1] R. W. Seton-Watson, "A History of the Romanians," Cambridge, 1934, pp. 149-50.

[2] I. Nistor, "Bessarabia and Bukovina," Bucharest, 1939, p. 35: "Whoever in Bukovina held fast to Rumanian sentiments was persecuted and execrated. There was no place in Bukovina for a Rumanian national life and some of the greatest men of the country, like the learned George Popovici and the great historian, Demetrius Onciul, were forced to take refuge in Rumania in order to be able to live and to think as Rumanians."

Bessarabia

175 WHILE Austria was reaching eastward to Galicia through Moldavian Bucovina in 1775, Russia was slowly extending westward from the river Dnieper to the Bug and, by 1792, to the Dniester, thereby becoming a neighbor of Moldavia along the entire course of that river. In her wars with Turkey from 1768 onward Russia had twice invaded the Romanian principalities. The war begun in 1806 afforded her a third opportunity of quartering her armies on Romanian soil.

The Russo-Turkish peace of Bucharest, May 28, 1812, gave Russia the Moldavian territory between the Dniester and the Pruth, and with it control over the Danube delta. This territory had been Moldavian for over 450 years[9] before the advent of Russia on the shores of the Dniester; and while officially it received the name of Bessarabia, after the famous princely family of the Bessaraba, its inhabitants preferred to call themselves Moldavian throughout the period of Russian occupation.

In the cynical pre-Napoleonic era of large-scale grabs the fate of Poland, the Baltic States, and Finland rested with the good pleasure of the Powers. No justification had been thought necessary for writing whole peoples off the map or suppressing liberties long established other than the self-interest of the strongest.[10] At the time of the signature of the Bucharest Treaty the Russian armies had been in Bessarabia six years, and this together with the weakness of declining Turkey was sufficient ground for taking it. Later the Czarist government and its Communist heir sought to justify the rape of Bessarabia on the ground that in 1812 it had been Turkish, not Moldavian, and that therefore Turkey had had a valid right to dispose of it.

The Romanian position in regard to Bessarabia, as in regard to Bucovina, is that Moldavia, a sovereign principality under Turkish suzerainty, had not been consulted, and that Turkey as suzerain could not have trans-

[9] A. Boldur, "La Bessarabie et les relations russo-roumaines," Paris, 1927, p. 54.

[10] Tommaso Tittoni, "Bessarabia, Romania and Italy" (in Romanian), Bucharest, 1927, p. 20: "Russian designs on Bessarabia, first under the form of a protectorate, then of annexation, had in the 19th century the earmarks of conquests. *Quia nominor leo* was their sole justification."

mitted to Russia more extensive rights to Bessarabia than she herself had held at the time by the consent of Moldavia.[11]

The fall of the Czarist règime in 1917, the Red revolution and the establishment of a "democratic" government at Moscow provided the circumstances that enabled the Bessarabians to proclaim the independence of their Moldavian republic and to exercise the recognized right of all peoples to self-determination.

The reunion with Romania is of itself a reaffirmation of the Romanian character of the province. In 1812 it counted from 250,000 to 350,000 inhabitants, mostly Romanian Moldavians. There were one million of them by 1856, and two millions by 1897.[12] During this interval the schools and the Church, the bureaucracy and the judiciary were all used by the Czarist government in a policy of Russification that embraced a program of mass colonization in which Bulgarian, Jewish, German and Ukrainian immigrants were counted upon to alter the Moldavian complexion of the province. The failure of this policy has been attested to by the official returns of the Russian state censuses and confirmed by the Romanian census of 1930. 162

Thus, the 1871 figures[13] compiled under the supervision of K. N. Oberoutchev, a Major General in the imperial army, gave for Bessarabia, exclusive of the three southern counties reunited to Romania in 1856, an absolute Romanian majority:

1871 Census	Total	%
Romanians	692,000	67.4
Ukrainians / Great Russians	162,252	15.8
Jews	93,590	9.1
Germans	33,501	3.5
Others	45,003	4.2
Total Bessarabia	1,026,346	100.0

The Russians, it will be noted, were grouped with the Ukrainians to enhance the importance of the Slav element.

[11] When, as a result of the Crimean War, Russia was obliged to return the three southern Bessarabian counties of Cahul, Ismail and Cetatea Alba to Moldavia, the Treaty of Paris (March 30, 1856) implicitly recognized Moldavia as an independent state when it provided in Art. 21 that "The territory ceded by Russia shall be annexed *to the Principality of Moldavia*, under the suzerainty of the Porte. The inhabitants of this territory shall enjoy *the rights and privileges assured the Principalities* . . ." This territory was subsequently reoccupied by Russia in 1878.

[12] Boldur, op. cit., p. 134.

[13] Id., p. 136.

Transylvania

THE Romanians regard Transylvania as the cradle of their race born from the fusion of the Dacians with the colonists of Rome, 105-275 A.D. Their Daco-Roman origin and their continuous existence thereafter in the shelter which the tableland of Transylvania afforded them against successive barbarian invasions is well recognized today.[11] 175

Most of the invaders left few traces; but the Slavs in the seventh century and the Hungarians (Magyars) in the ninth century had come to stay. With the first the Romanians early established friendly contacts. The latter, checked in their advance westward by Otto the Great at Augsburg in 955 A.D., settled in the Pannonian plain, received Christianity from the Bohemians, and organized a state that was to bring in time increasing pressure on the organized settlements of the autochthonous Romanians in Transylvania. The influence which Hungary was able to exert on this province by 1100 A.D. was thereafter maintained not through her singlehanded effort, but by the colonization of the Carpathian foothills with Szekelys (Szeklers or Siculi) and Saxons (Germans), 1100-1149 A.D. The sweeping medieval privileges accorded the newcomers by Hungarian kings in consideration of their aid in defending Transylvania to the east formed the nucleus of the social inequality that was to prevail there as in Hungary proper until 1848.

Ruthlessly using the power conferred by feudal land tenure and social distinction,[12] the Hungarians and their federates gradually increased the subjection of the mass of the population that was largely Romanian. Partly to escape this subjection, the latter crossed the Carpathians to the south and east where they founded the independent states of Wallachia (about 1290) and Moldavia (1349). Thereafter the nobles among the Transylvanian Romanians found it increasingly expedient to join the privileged class of the Hungarians (John Hunyady and Matthias Corvinus, princes of Transylvania, were of Romanian stock); while the mass of the peasantry was left to shift as best it could under mounting impositions and exactions that culminated in the revolt of 1437.

The Magyars, Saxons and Szekelys answered this attack on their privileges with the proclamation at Kapolna (1438) of a mutual-aid

[11] Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 13.
[12] Id., p. 103.

175 "Union of the Three Nations" through which Transylvania was to be ruled thenceforth to the exclusion of her other nationalities. Characteristically, this narrow class system of exploitation of the masses was tenaciously upheld despite the grave consequences it exerted on the Hungarian state. One searches in vain for evidences of "the power to build up and maintain a state by urban culture rooted in tradition, Christian ethics and ecclesiastical organization," as a recent Hungarian apologist would have us believe.[19] But there is ample proof that the collapse of the Hungarian kingdom before the Turks at Mohacs (1526) was directly traceable to the second in a long series of mass uprisings, that of Dozsa in 1514, which weakened the internal structure of the country.

The eclipse of Hungary under the Turks gave Transylvania, already locally autonomous under the triune règime, the occasion for achieving separate existence in 1538.

Under the Turkish influence extending westward through Hungary toward Vienna and eastward through the Romanian principalities far into the Ukraine and beyond, Transylvania now assumed new importance for Moldavia and Wallachia. "The history of four further centuries was to prove that the two Romanian states must either be drawn into the orbit of a great Danubian empire or, in order to achieve a sure and permanent independence of their own, must attach Transylvania to themselves."[20]

For the purpose of this outline, which is concerned with problems arising out of the independence of Romania through the union of the three Romanian states of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania, it will serve to record that, from 1526 to the Peace of Karlowitz (January 26, 1699), Transylvania existed as an independent Voevodate and that thereafter it remained uninterruptedly a possession of the imperial Hapsburg crown first as a principality and after 1765 as a "Great" principality until 1867.

In that year Emperor Francis Joseph I, his position imperiled by the effects of the disastrous war with Prussia (1866), was obliged to consent to a compromise (Ausgleich) establishing within a Dual Monarchy the equality with Austria of a Hungary enlarged by the cession to her of the whole of Transylvania. It is from this event, as we shall see, that the acute phase of the problem of Transylvania dates.

The incorporation of the imperial province into a Hungary just emerged from long political subjection, instead of prompting the Mag-

[19] John Balogh, editor, in The Hungarian Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 4 (Winter 1940-41), Budapest.
[20] Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

175

yars to extend to the Transylvania populations the newly won liberties for which they had clamored in Vienna in 1848, fired their imagination with the dream of a great Magyar state that would encompass the greater part of Eastern Europe. The mutual checks theretofore imposed by the jealous defense of the privileges rigidly apportioned among Magyars, Szekelys and Saxons now gave way to a unilateral attempt at solving at one stroke all the difficulties confronting the establishment of a homogeneous Hungarian nation by the mass absorption of her non-Hungarian populations.[21]

The practical obstacles to the realization of this scheme have been often described; here it will suffice to point out that these populations were then contiguous to and in close spiritual communion with the main body of their connationals living in independent national states—the Slavs to the south and north, the Germans to the west and the Romanians to the east; that Latin and not Hungarian had been the official language in Hungary before 1800, (the Central Asiatic Magyar or Ural-Altaic dialect of few root-words admittedly being a difficult literary and cultural medium compared with the Romance language of the Romanians, easily understood and freely used by the inhabitants of Transylvania); that the economic structure of Hungary, in contrast to that of the states surrounding her, rested then as now on the control by a few of latifundiary estates worked by peasant-serfs isolated and insulated against modern democratic liberalism;[22] and that Magyardom, while achieving some inroads into the surrounding mass of non-Magyar nationalities, had itself become permeated socially, culturally, artistically and economically

[21]This policy is made clear by the declarations in parliament of her leaders as to what constituted a danger to Hungary (Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 525-26). Said Count Tisza: "A radical franchise constitutes a great danger for our nation. . . . The intellectual standard is a great danger for the Magyars, since a large proportion of the non-Magyars can learn to read and write, and then there will be an end of Magyar supremacy." Also Count Bethlen: "The question of democratization is one of life and death for Transylvania, and threatens the existence of every class of society;" and lastly Count Andrassy, on self-determination, "a dangerous catchword, the realization of which would mean the end of the Hungarian State."

[22]Illyes, Gyula, "Pusztak Nepe," Budapest, 1936, p. 31. The position of labor in twentieth century Hungary is thus described by Seton-Watson (op. cit., p. 429): "The working class was entirely unrepresented in Parliament. Everything was done to hinder the growth of trade unions (as late as 1908 the Government dissolved the federations of iron-workers and timbermen). The imprisonment of strikers was an ordinary occurrence. Meanwhile housing conditions for the labourer actually grew worse. The working day for farms was from 'sunrise to sunset.' Government had devised special measures to prevent harvest strikes, and to supply the big estates with underpaid workers imported from other districts. The Agricultural Law of 1907 even legalised flogging of labourers up to eighteen by the landowner. In 52 per cent. of the Hungarian factories there were children under fourteen working twelve or more hours per day. In the richest county, Bacs-Bodrog (Backa), tuberculosis was rampant and the main certified cause of death. Emigration rose by leaps and bounds owing to bad labour conditions, coupled with political repression. Between 1900 and 1906, 657,000 left Hungary out of a population of 19,000,000; and from 1906 to 1914 the rate exceeded 200,000 a year."

175 by the patient genius of the Jewish race.[32] Lastly, it is not to be gainsaid that the Hungarians themselves are comparatively a small race, numbering according to their own partisan census of 1910 only 10,050,575 out of a total population of 20,886,487.[33] And this brings us to our main object, the consideration of the racial structure of Transylvania.

162 Religious, civil, and fiscal censuses of Transylvania under both Austrian and Hungarian domination establish from the beginning the preponderance of the Romanian element. The early censuses of the Romanian Greek-Catholic bishopric (1714, 1733 and 1750) were not complete, counting as they did families, not individuals, and omitting the region of Barsa surrounding the city of Brasov. The 1760 Austrian census, a thorough fiscal record, listed 777,170 Romanians; the 1786 count, showing a *total* population of 1,577,515, afforded the ecclesiastical authorities a basis for reaching the following conclusion as to its racial composition:

Romanians	1,048,416
Hungarians	341,058
Saxons	188,041

For the pre-Dualist era we have the report of A. Fenyes[34] for the whole of Hungary in 1840:

Hungarians	4,812,759	37.4%
Romanians	2,202,542	17.1
Germans	1,273,677	9.9
Serbs	828,365	6.4
Croats	1,315,947	10.2
Slovenes	1,687,256	13.1
Ruthenes	442,903	3.4
Jews	244,035	1.9
hers	72,922	0.6
Total	12,880,406	100.0

[32]Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 429: "One other vital factor in the Hungarian situation must be mentioned,—the economic transformation, which expressed itself on the one hand in the decay of the gentry, the class which had long been Hungary's political backbone, and on the other hand in the virtual capture of industry, banking, commerce and the press by the Jews."

[33]Hungary in 1910 had just elected a new parliament, to which but 8 non-Hungarians had been returned by the aid of "only 194 batallions of infantry and 114 squadrons of cavalry." The census found not more than about 50% Hungarians in all Hungary, as we have seen, and but 31.62% Hungarians in the whole of Transylvania. Yet Count Stephen Tisza felt justified to address parliament as follows: "Our non-Magyar fellow-citizens must first of all reconcile themselves to the fact that they here belong to a national state, which is not a conglomerate of different races, but which one race has conquered and founded, upon which one race has stamped the ineradicable impress of its individuality." (Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 427.)

[34]Seton-Watson, R. W., "Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers," London, 1934, p. 27.

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

[TRANSYLVANIA]

175

THE CENSUS OF 1930.

ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP OF TRANSYLVANIA.

Red line shows southern boundary of territory awarded to Hungary, August 30, 1940.

opp. p. 16

162 tion by counties is available,* giving the populations found living in 1930 within the identical administrative (county) boundaries to which the Hungarian count of 1910 applied.

The accompanying ethnographic map illustrates in distinctive colors the distribution of the principal nationalities inhabiting Transylvania. It is to be noted, however, that this convenient mode of presentation, while outlining clearly the areas of greatest concentration of each of the nationalities considered, fails to impart any information as to the relative proportion of the various races in any given section; it tends, in fact, to convey the very definite impression that each color zone represented is inhabited exclusively by the nationality to which the color corresponds, obviously an erroneous impression. A reference to the map (page 17) which outlines the administrative boundaries of the Transylvanian counties, serves to locate in the counties of Ciuc, Odorhei and Trei Scaune the great concentration of Hungarians shown in green on the color map. This region, the greatest single minority island in the province, contained in 1930 in addition to the preponderant Szekelys (listed as Hungarians) 62,817 individuals of other races. Similarly, the county of Timis-Torontal, a region which on the color map would seem preponderantly German, while actually representing one of the greatest concentration of Germans in Transylvania, contained in addition to 174,395 Germans 325,048 individuals of other races.

The Award of Vienna

175 The sinuous red line which runs from east to west on the ethnographic map was drawn at Vienna, August 30, 1940, by the Foreign Ministers of the German Reich and the Italian Kingdom, and represents their joint decision as arbiters of the claim of Hungary to Romanian Transylvania. History shows that political and other factors can and do make possible arbitrary settlements; when they do, as in the present instance, the settlement is of the essence of a compromise—a temporary working arrangement.

The Treaty of Trianon created the modern independent kingdom of Hungary. The claim of this kingdom to the territories over which Hungary as a member of the former Dual Monarchy once extended her authority were formulated by her in minute detail and submitted for the careful consideration of the experts of the Versailles peace conference. There is nothing new that Hungary could add today to what, as

*See page 50.

1/1 [technically impossible to reproduce for HQ File -- Analyst]

175 was then pointed out to her, was in effect but a specious plea for the perpetuation of a 1000-year old injustice.[33]

162 That claim had been based mainly on historical, geographical and economic arguments. Whatever effort was made to present it from the viewpoint of the populations whom it would have affected referred in the main to the compact mass of the Szekelys, the twelfth century colonists inhabiting today the exact geographical center of post-War Romania. Romania contended that the cession to Hungary of this mass of aliens would have carried with it an even greater number of Romanians living in the territory separating the Szekelys from Hungary. As long as it will stand, the Award of Vienna will serve to prove the Romanian contention of twenty years ago. In figures the picture is as follows:

Census of 1930
Racial Composition of the Population Ceded to Hungary

County	Romanian	Hungarian	German	Jewish	Others	Total
1. Bihor	136,351	130,127	2,101	20,420	16,549	305,548
2. Ciuc	20,976	120,627	439	2,383	1,381	145,806
3. Cluj	141,607	85,284	2,669	16,057	11,034	256,651
4. Maramures	93,207	11,174	3,239	33,828	20,127	161,575
5. Mures	115,773	121,282	11,271	9,848	11,564	269,738
6. Nasaud*	103,897	7,488	21,211	6,450	6,528	145,574
7. Odorhei	5,430	112,375	454	1,250	2,475	121,984
8. Salaj	192,821	107,662	16,010	13,380	13,474	343,347
9. Satu Mare	178,523	74,191	9,530	23,967	8,664	294,875
10. Somes	169,942	33,870	351	10,546	4,646	219,355
11. Tarnava Mare	270	62	656	7	15	1,010
12. Tarnava Mica	131	1,580	3	42	165	1,921
13. Trei Scaune	17,505	105,834	760	707	2,963	127,769
Total	1,176,433	911,556	68,694	138,885	99,585	2,395,153

*Inclusive of the population, numbering 1,443, of the villages of Cosna and Carlibaba Noua transferred from the County of Nasaud to the County of Campulung, Bukovina, as of September 25, 1925.

The recovery by Hungary of 911,556 of her nationals thus caused Romania to lose a population of 1,176,433 Romanians. (An official 1940 estimate based on current vital statistics lists 978,074 or 37.1% Hungarians and 1,304,903 or 50.2% Romanians in the ceded territory.) The recovered Hungarian population lies broadly in two groups: a central group, mainly Szekelys, as we have seen, in the counties of Ciuc, Odorhei and Trei Scaune, extending also into the county of Mures, or in all 460,118 souls; and a western group in the border counties of Cluj, Salaj, Bihor,

[33]Letter of A. Millerand, President of the Peace Conference, replying on behalf of the Allies, May 6, 1920.

[cession of territory by Vienna agreement in 1940- --Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p 1

RUMANIA & THE RUMANIANS

CHAPTER I

AN HISTORICAL OUTLINE

101 The country known between the two Great Wars as
175 Greater Rumania has had twenty-three centuries of violent and dramatic history. From about 400 B.C., when it was first colonized by Thracian tribes, up to the present day this territory has been the victim of many invasions and the scene of many migrations. It has been conquered and ruled by dozens of races and peoples who have all left their mark upon the country and its inhabitants. To-day the Rumanians form an island of Latinity between the Slavonic peoples and one of the last Asiatic invaders of Europe, the Hungarians. The language and culture of the Rumanians, although containing many elements of Slavonic, Germanic and other origins, are closely related to the civilization of Italy, France and Spain.

175 To the foreigner who visits Rumania for the first time this country and its mixed population seems full of inexplicable and insoluble contradictions. The numerous problems confronting Rumania and the Rumanians in the twentieth century have their roots in the historical development of the past. The issues of the present day cannot be understood or solved unless they are examined in the light of this history. In order to analyse the condition of contemporary Rumania, it is therefore necessary to present a short outline of Rumanian history.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1044
ED1 Rumania ED1

175 **THE ANCIENT RUMANIANS.** The first permanent colonization of Rumania, after the Celtic period which belongs to the twilight before the dawn of history, was carried out by the Dacians who occupied Transylvania, Wallachia and the Banat in the fourth century B.C. Knowing how to exploit the agricultural and mineral wealth of the country the Dacians attained a comparatively high standard of civilization. They were an industrious people, equally skilled in the arts of peace and war. During the last century B.C. the Dacians under King Boirebista rose to the peak of their power. They ruled over a considerable part of South-Eastern Europe. On Boirebista's death this vast empire collapsed. All that remained to the Dacians was the territory which they had first occupied.

The Roman Empire had been seriously disturbed by the growing menace on its north-eastern frontiers. The Emperors Claudius and Domitian were therefore anxious to stabilize their hold upon the Roman provinces in that area. As a preliminary step the provinces at present occupied by the States of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were added to the domains of Rome. The wealth of Dacia and the wish to consolidate the newly conquered Roman provinces tempted the Romans to invade Dacia. King Decebal not only succeeded in defending the country but inflicted several heavy defeats on the Roman legions. He even imposed an annual tribute on the Roman Empire which was paid to him promptly.

While resisting successfully any Roman attempts to subjugate Dacia, Decebal welcomed Roman traders, craftsmen and workers and encouraged the spread of Roman civilization. At the same time he

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

organized the defence of the country from his capital Sarmisegetusa, situated on the edge of the South Carpathian Mountains. 175

Soon after Trajan became emperor, war broke out between him and Decebal. In the years A.D. 100–106 Trajan defeated and conquered the Dacians. The many bridges, military highways and fortresses built by the emperor for this campaign, of which ruins can still be found to-day, show that this Roman conquest was not an easy one.

'DACIA FELIX.' Conquest was followed by systematic colonization. Many military camps, towns and roads were built by the Romans all over Southern Rumania. Colonists from Italy and the vast Roman possessions were brought here to strengthen this outpost of the empire, to cultivate the fertile soil, to develop trade and to spread Roman culture. The majority of the original inhabitants readily adopted Roman rule and civilization, although a minority retreated into mountainous Transylvania, which means 'the country beyond the forest'. There followed, according to one theory, a period of great prosperity during which Dacians and Roman settlers lived peacefully side by side, intermarried and gave birth to a new people; they were the Daco-Rumanians who spoke a Latin dialect, which was the origin of the Rumanian language.

Parallel with this process of Romanization there went great progress in agriculture, trade, transport and mining.[1] Dacia under the rule of Rome was

[1] The salt and gold mines of Transylvania were already exploited by the Romans.

175 prosperous, and the province became known as 'Dacia Felix'—happy Dacia.

THE ROMAN RETREAT. This favourable development in the most exposed province of the Roman Empire was interrupted and its achievements were almost completely destroyed by the pressure of barbarian tribes advancing into Europe from the east. So dangerous was the position of the Roman legions in Dacia, who were unable to stop the continuous raids of the Goths, that the Emperor Aurelian decided to abandon this province. The evacuation of the Roman legions and the Roman administration was completed by about A.D. 275. Most of the Daco-Rumanian population probably remained in the territory between the Danube and the Carpathians.

CENTURIES OF INVASIONS. The retreat of the Romans to the southern banks of the Danube opened the floodgates of invasion. From the third to the tenth century a host of nations passed through Rumania on their way to the west and south.

The spearhead of the barbarians was formed by the Visigoths, a military race, who had no difficulty in subjugating the country. During their short stay in Rumania the Visigoths were converted to the Christian faith. The process of conversion started from Constantinople, and the Rumanians, too, adopted the new creed. Thus the Rumanians, a people of partly Roman origin and Latin speech, remained attached to the Eastern Church, when its separation from the Papacy followed the separation of the Western and Eastern Roman Empires. To-day the great majority of Rumanians belong to the Orthodox Church.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

The Visigoths were conquered by the Huns who, about A.D. 375, broke into Europe from Asia. The Visigoths became their vassals, and when the Huns left Rumania after a short period, they took the Visigoths with them to fight in their wars which devastated a great part of Europe. 175

The flow of peoples who invaded Rumania continued. The next tide brought the Gepides, also a Germanic race. They settled down permanently. The Gepides were engaged in continuous warfare and maintained their supremacy over their neighbours, until their defeat by the Langobards and Avars in the sixth century.

THE SLAVS. The Gepides retired into the Carpathian Mountains. The Avars occupied the vast Danubian plains, which formed their base for expeditions far into Central Europe. Their raids were checked by Charlemagne who expelled them from their western outposts. During this time, that is, in the eighth century, the Gepides fought as auxiliaries of the Avars; soon after the fall of the latter, their name disappears from history.

Before and during the Avar period occurred the great influx of the Slavs into the Danubian and Balkan lands. Besides the Balkans, the Slav tribes settled in considerable numbers in Transylvania. Nearly all the oldest place-names of the East Carpathians are Slavonic, and the Rumanian language contains many Slavonic words.

THE BULGARIAN EMPIRES. The seventh and eighth centuries saw the coming of the Bulgars, a race of Turkish nomads from the east who, however, later

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

175 became absorbed by their Slavonic subjects. In the seventh century the Bulgars were already encamped north of the Danube, in the territory of the modern Rumania. Later they moved the centre of their power across the Danube, where they founded the state afterwards known as Bulgaria, though still ruling over much of modern Rumania.

The first Bulgarian Empire was at the height of its power between 893 and 972 B.C. and its Tsar Boris was one of the great conquerors of that age. This empire was in its turn subdued by Basil II, Emperor of Byzantium, in the eleventh century; the Bulgars and their Rumanian subjects were, however, able to continue to observe their own traditions, except that they were involved with the rest of the Eastern Empire in the final Schism between the Eastern Church and Rome. In the next century the Bulgarian Empire became an independent power once more, and the Bulgarian Tsars began to style themselves 'Emperors of the Vlachs and Bulgars'. The Rumanians are still called Vlachs or Wallachs by their neighbours; then, as now, there were many of them living as nomadic shepherds outside the boundaries of what eventually became known as Rumania. The Vlachs of the Second Bulgarian Empire were those of the Central Balkans and Thessaly, and Greek chroniclers tell of autonomous Vlach chieftains in those parts.

THE MAGYARS. At the close of the ninth century the Magyars crossed the Carpathians, conquered the rising duchies of the Banat and the Crisana and began to settle in the Hungarian plain. During the subsequent decades, their westward advance being

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

checked by Otto the Great, they penetrated Transylvania, subjecting the local population. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries they colonized the east and south of that country with the Szekelys, a people akin to themselves, and with German settlers (the 'Transylvanian Saxons').

THE GREAT CONTROVERSY. The Magyar invasion of Europe was the last important stage in the Migration of Nations. To this time is traced the origins of Rumania as a nation.

Before turning to the creation and development of the two Rumanian principalities, mention must be made of the great controversy which centres round the question of the history of the Rumanians *during* the Migration of Nations. Although this historical controversy may seem of purely theoretical interest, it still plays a prominent part in contemporary politics.

Some historians, mostly Hungarians, hold that at the time of the Roman evacuation of Dacia the Daco-Rumanian population withdrew to the lands south of the Danube. According to this theory they recrossed the river in the thirteenth century and later penetrated into Transylvania, that is, *after* the Hungarians had occupied this territory. This theory is used to support the Hungarian claim to Transylvania.

The contrary theory is that the majority of the Daco-Rumanians remained in the lands between the Carpathians and the Danube after the Roman withdrawal. They were subjugated by numerous invaders, assimilated some of them and always managed to preserve their national character or at least their language, which is the instrument of

2

12: Korinos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

175 national consciousness. In times of danger they retreated into the mountains, just as those Dacians who centuries before wanted to escape the rule of Rome. Owing to the numerous invasions and colonizations, especially of Slavs, a wedge was driven between the Macedo- and Istro-Rumanians, who to-day live in Macedonia and Dalmatia, and the bulk of the Rumanians north of the Danube.

This latter view is put forward by Rumanian writers, who urge in support of it that the Rumanian rite was originally Slavonic and not Greek, as it would have been had the Rumanians immigrated from the south. It is also argued that the Rumanian migration from the north to the south is reflected in the naming of Eastern Wallachia which the Rumanians call 'Muntenia', i.e. 'country of the mountains'—transferring the name of their former home to a country known for its plains. One thing is certain: the two principalities had their origin in Transylvania. Wallachia developed to the south of it, Moldavia to the east.

THE TWO PRINCIPALITIES. Wallachia and Moldavia were created during the second half of the thirteenth and the first half of the fourteenth century. The emergence of the two Rumanian semi-independent States was due to a great extent to a temporary ebb in the movement of peoples. Their rise was furthered by one unfavourable and one favourable circumstance. The ever-increasing pressure of the Hungarians drove many Rumanians from Transylvania into the lands beyond the Carpathians. And the decay of the Slavonic States south and west of the

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

Danube gave the Rumanians an opportunity to consolidate their position. 175

While the formation of the two principalities was the logical result of historical development and the realization of national aspirations nascent since the ninth century, it also led to a considerable weakening of the Rumanian element in Transylvania. Most of the *boiars*[1] migrated to Wallachia and Moldavia and those who remained were quickly absorbed by the Hungarian nobility.[2] For the great majority of the Rumanian population of Transylvania there began a long period of economic, political and national subservience to the Magyars.

The foundation of the two principalities was already overshadowed by the impending conflict between the Turks and the European peoples opposing them, which lasted into the present century and played a decisive part in the history of Rumania. When the two principalities were formed, the Turks had not yet advanced far enough to crush them, as the Hungarians had done with their predecessors in the ninth century.

Nevertheless, the first rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia had to contend with many dangers. It is indeed surprising that the two Rumanian States could be established at all and survive in the face of extreme adversity. They found themselves constantly menaced by all their neighbours. Wallachia was from the outset involved in conflicts with

[1] Landed nobility.

[2] One of the most striking examples is the family of Hunyadi Janos, a Magyar noble of Rumanian descent, who became famous as one of the greatest military leaders against the Turks. His son, Matthias Corvinus, was King of Hungary.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

175 Turkey and Hungary, Moldavia with Hungary, Poland and Turkey. And more than once Wallachia and Moldavia were in different camps fighting each other.

The short periods of relative peace and prosperity were achieved by the Rumanian princes by diplomacy rather than by decisive military victories. This is not strange in view of the great disparity between their resources and those of their major neighbours. Up to the early sixteenth century therefore the most profitable policy was that of balancing one enemy against the other.

Although there was some important progress during the brief intervals of peace, Moldavia and Wallachia could not stem the advance of the Turkish tide. This was prepared by the steady penetration of the principalities by Byzantine trade and institutions which is reflected in the structure of the Rumanian States at that time. The *voivods*[1] copied the absolutism of Constantinople, choosing their counsellors from the clergy and the big landowning families, and treated the country and its inhabitants as their personal property. The economic decline of the peasantry, continuous warfare amongst pretenders to the Rumanian thrones and against Turks, Hungarians and Poles, weakened the country to such a degree that it could not offer successful resistance to the Turks when they resumed their advance to the north.

UNDER TURKISH RULE. The death of Louis of Hungary in the battle of Mohacs against the Turks brought the end of Rumanian semi-independence

[1] Dukes or princes.

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

and the beginning of three centuries of Turkish rule. /75 For with the collapse of Hungary there was no strong opponent of Turkey left south of Vienna.

The Turkish administration of Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldavia was indirect. It relied on the native princes and ruling classes, leaving the Turks themselves free to concentrate upon their main objective, the defeat of Austria. But this did not by any means secure peaceful development for the Rumanians. The *voivods* of Wallachia and Moldavia, and the Hungarian princes of Transylvania, tried to continue the policy of playing off one power against the other. The Hungarians achieved some success with this method; but for the two principalities it resulted in bloody repression and great misery for the people.

The last determined effort to free Moldavia and Wallachia from Turkish vassalage was undertaken by Michael the Brave. Within a few years this man of exceptional ability conquered Wallachia, Transylvania and Moldavia and in 1600 proclaimed himself Prince of all Rumanians. His achievement was of short duration: it failed because he had to fight both the Turks and the supporters of Austria, and because his own power was not founded upon the people but upon part of the landed nobility and the merchants. This brief interval of Michael's success has, however, been remembered by all Rumanians as a symbol of their highest aspiration, the unification of all Rumanians in one state.

THE PHANARIOTS.[1] The general decay of the two principalities in the early seventeenth century

[1] From Phanar, the Greek quarter of Constantinople in which the Oecumenical Patriarchate is situated.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1914
ED1 Rumania ED1

175 opened a new stage which lasted about two hundred years and is no doubt the most miserable and tragic in the history of the Rumanian people. It is forever joined with the name of the Phanariots.

The Greek merchants who had already gained considerable influence in the economic life of the country were soon able to govern it politically also. Owing to their financial power, their connexions at the Turkish Court and their position in the Turkish Empire generally, they were able to make or break a Rumanian ruler. The *voivods* became mere tools in the hands of these merchant-politicians; and in the early eighteenth century the Phanariots instead of financing Rumanian princes secured the office of *hospodar*[1] for themselves.

The rule of the Phanariots, who were of Greek, Albanian and Slavonic origin, was one of complete and ruthless economic exploitation. The office of *hospodar* was sold by the sultan to the highest bidder and the sole motive of the prince was the acquisition of great wealth in the shortest possible time. Nor was there much time for these men to enrich themselves. For the sultan soon perceived the possibilities of this new source of income and consequently auctioned the office very frequently.

During this period the *boiars* became more and more dependent on the *hospodars*. Greek influence penetrated all spheres of activity and led to the adoption of the Greek liturgy. The decline of Slavonic culture, however, favoured the rise of Rumanian art and literature which developed with the growth of the movement for national unity and independence.

[1] Title of Governor of the Principality.

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

THE PEASANTRY. One of the most tragic features of this time is the rapid decline of the Rumanian peasantry both in Transylvania and in the two principalities. 175

The position in Wallachia and Moldavia deteriorated with alarming speed. However great the taxes and tributes imposed upon the country by sultan and *hospodar*, the *boiars* always managed to indemnify themselves by fleecing the peasants. The peasantry was soon reduced to a state of abject slavery. This decay of the peasant class led to disastrous consequences sapping the economic and military strength of the country. Within a few years after 1740 the peasant population of Wallachia, for example, is said to have declined by more than 75%.[1] Conditions in Moldavia were similar, and in some respects worse.

In Transylvania the unfavourable economic position of the peasantry was linked with the repression of national aspirations by the Magyars. The fight for political equality was waged at that time chiefly by the Rumanian lower clergy. But the rigorous feudal system on which the power of the Hungarian nobles rested could not afford to grant any substantial political or economic rights to a people upon whose labour the greater part of their wealth and position depended. In 1784 came a revolt of some Rumanian peasants, led by Horia, Closca and Crisan. They demanded the abolition of serfdom and national equality. The wording of their manifestos is re-

[1] From a consular report by the Austrian General von Bauer who states that there were about 147,000 peasant families in 1741; that during the next four years the number was halved and then halved again; an exaggeration, no doubt, but indicative of the deplorable state of affairs.

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

175 miniscent of the language of the men who, two centuries before them, were at the head of the great peasant risings in Germany and Bohemia. But this local movement, too, failed and was followed by bloody repression.

THE PAWN OF THE POWERS. The weakening of Turkish power after the Napoleonic wars and the rapid growth of capitalism brought South-Eastern Europe into the focus of imperialistic ambitions. Owing to its natural wealth and its geographical position Rumania became a valuable pawn on the chessboard, on which the Great Powers played the game of imperialist expansion in Eastern Europe. The movement of liberation from the Ottoman Empire was exploited by rival powers, the Russian and Habsburg Empires, which posed as protectors of subject peoples. The British, anxious to defeat Russian designs upon Constantinople, were not indifferent to the issue. Germany exported dynasties to the liberated countries.

From the beginning of the eighteenth century the hold of Austria and Russia upon the principalities increased steadily. During the first decades of the nineteenth century the purely Turkish overlordship was replaced by combined Russo-Turkish rule and eventually by Russian predominance.[1] But this period was also marked by the vigorous growth of the national liberation movements in the whole of South-Eastern Europe. In Rumania it found ex-

[1] 1718: Austrian occupation of the Banat and Oltenia; 1775: Bukovina annexed by Austria; 1770: Austro-Russian occupation of both principalities; 1812: Russia takes Bessarabia; 1829: Russia occupies Moldavia and Muntenia; 1854: both under Austrian occupation.

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

pression in the struggle against the foreign Greek rulers and for the union of the two principalities into one State. The revolt of Tudor Vladimirescu[1] in 1820 in Wallachia was the signal for a general rising supported by wide sections of the people. It was of only short duration and failed. But it did succeed in securing the appointment of native princes to the thrones of Wallachia and Moldavia. 175

The country was frequently occupied by foreign troops and made to pay tributes. During the Russian occupation Prince Kisseleff introduced the first Rumanian Constitution[2] which confirmed the absolute power of the *boiars* over the peasants, provided some administrative reforms and laid down that the *hospodars* had to be approved by both Russia and Turkey.

REVOLT AND UNIFICATION. The year 1848 saw the rising tide of revolution sweeping all over Europe. Soon after the outbreak of the revolution in Paris, there was a rising in Rumania which achieved some initial success. Led by intellectuals and middle-class landowners, the rebels voiced demands for social and political reforms and, for the first time, for the union of all Rumanians, including those of Transylvania, in one independent State.

In Transylvania the Rumanian revolutionaries ended by playing into the hands of reaction. Owing to the great national antagonism against the Hungarians and the strong anti-Rumanian attitude of the latter, the Transylvanian Rumanians supported

[1] The Greek war of liberation, too, began in Rumania with the rising of Alexander Ypsilanti who hoped to gain Rumanian support.

[2] The Règlement Organique.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

175 the Austro-Russian campaign against the Hungarian revolution, as did the Croats farther west. They hoped that this would bring them Austrian support and national emancipation. But the defeat of the Hungarian revolution also crushed all chances of realizing the national aspirations of the Transylvanian Rumanians and widened yet further the gulf between the two peoples. In Wallachia and Moldavia the revolt was put down jointly by the Turks and the Russians. The year 1848 brought the clearest proof that the rival imperial powers, however violently opposed to each other, were firmly united in keeping their subject peoples in their place.

But repression only served to strengthen the national liberation movement. In 1856, after the Crimean War, which began with the Russian invasion of Moldavia and Wallachia, the unification of the two principalities assumed the character of an international problem, which was complicated by the conflicting interests of the Powers and was finally solved with the help of the greatly increased French influence in favour of Rumania. The Treaty of Paris in that year restored Southern Bessarabia to Moldavia.[1]

In 1857 Moldavia and Wallachia elected the same *hospodar*, John Cuza, who, in 1861, secured the recognition of the union of the two principalities by all the major countries. From the very outset grave social problems confronted the new State, legacies of centuries of foreign occupation and misrule. The most urgent task was that of land reform, naturally opposed very violently by the *boiars*. By staging a *coup d'état* Cuza assumed dictatorial powers, intro-

[1] For changes of frontiers in 1878 see p. 56.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

duced a radical land reform and legislation for the 175
provision of general public instruction. Cuza's reforms were only partly put into practice when a palace revolution, engineered by some of the *boiars*, and by army officers, deposed him and forced him into exile.

CAROL I.[1] The unificaiton of the two principalities was now achieved. It had been accomplished from above, by the same class, greatly strengthened by Rumanized Greeks and others, who for the past centuries had served foreign rulers and exploited the peasantry. It was based on the very real and strong desire of the whole people to live in a State of its own, but the achievement of this aim was completed as a result of international diplomacy and intrigues at home, not by a genuine national revolution.

The rule of Carol I was the period of the consolidation of the new State. He introduced a constitution based on the Belgian model and after fighting the Russo-Turkish War on Russia's side was recognized by the Powers as the first King of Rumania.

During his reign there was considerable progress 175
in economic life assisted by great investments of 669
foreign capital which enriched many landowners, 565
a number of Rumanian capitalists and the corrupt bureaucracy, who together became organized in the Conservative and Liberal Parties: they ruled Rumania between them. In achieving nominal independence Rumania did not succeed in ridding itself of the old social system, resting on the pre-

[1] Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Prince of Rumania 1866, King 1881.
[i.e. King Carol I (1881-1914) -- Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

175 dominance of a small, wealthy and powerful land-
669 owning class. The situation led in 1907 to one of the
565 bloodiest peasant revolutions of modern times which was put down brutally by General Averescu. Significantly the peasant rising began with pogroms against the Jews who had become very unpopular as the agents of the landowners: it has often been found profitable in Rumania to divert discontent into anti-Semitic channels.

175 In 1913 Rumania joined in the Second Balkan War against Bulgaria and thereby gained the whole of the Dobrudja. During the period preceding the outbreak of the last Great War Rumania became an ally of the Central Powers through a secret Alliance made by King Carol I with Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1883. After the death of Carol and the accession of Ferdinand in 1914 the Rumanian Government remained neutral, until it entered the Great War on the side of the Allies on 27 August 1916.

GREATER RUMANIA. This decision was taken owing to the territorial gains which Russia and the Western Powers offered as an inducement and which were embodied in another Secret Treaty signed on 17 August, and also to the pro-French feeling of the ruling class. As a result, though swiftly defeated and overrun by the Germans and Bulgarians, Rumania was able, after the war, to satisfy her territorial claims against Hungary and Austria, and the weakness of Soviet Russia enabled her to annex Bessarabia. Thanks, therefore, to her Allies, Rumania emerged from the Peace Settlement doubled in area and in population.

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

Before closing this short historical sketch mention must be made of the very remarkable proclamation of King Ferdinand to the troops at the front to whom in April 1917 he promised: 'Land will be given to you.' It is often stated that this promise and the land reform which implemented it was a wise act of statesmanship. It can equally be held that social unrest and dissatisfaction, stimulated by the successful Russian Revolution, had grown to such a degree that it was found necessary to undertake this radical step. 175

Greater Rumania had achieved the unification of the great majority of all Rumanians in one State. But with it the enlarged Kingdom acquired numerous minorities and inherited many grave social problems. The damaging consequences of these are traced in the following chapters. 000

135 the Olt, copper near Baia de Arama and salt near Ocnele Mari, north of Govora. The peasant popula-
511 tion, in spite of the great agricultural wealth of the
361 province, is extremely poor. The people live in small villages near the rivers. The houses are more often than not almost subterranean mud-huts. Agricultural implements are very primitive. The wooden plough is still widely used.

175 Oltenia was the first district of Rumania which was colonized by the Romans. It formed the spearhead, and later the base, for the Roman penetration of Dacia. Among the most interesting relics of Roman times found in Oltenia are the ruins of a bridge built by Trajan and the fort just outside Turnu-Severin. After the Roman withdrawal Oltenia shared the fortunes of Muntenia,[1] and in 1859 joined the Principality of Rumania.

361 The capital and chief industrial and commercial town of Oltenia is Craiova with a population of about 60,000. It is also the road and rail junction linking Bucarest with Oltenia and the western provinces. Turnu-Severin on the Danube is the important port guarding the famous 'Iron Gates'. Here the current of the Danube, passing through a narrow gorge is too strong and the water too shallow for shipping to
[503] make headway upstream. A deep channel has therefore been blasted in the rock of the river bed and vessels are towed up it by locomotives on the railway alongside. Before the Great War Turnu-Severin was the frontier town between Rumania and Austria-Hungary. It has still preserved the character of a picturesque oriental marketing centre.

[1] Except that in 1718, after the Austrian occupation of Belgrade, Oltenia was temporarily under Austrian rule.

8

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bucarest]

[The Dobrudja]

Bucarest is also the chief railway centre of 361
Rumania.

Giurgiu on the Danube, south of Bucarest and the terminus of one of the oil pipe-lines from Ploesti, is one of the main Rumanian wheat and oil ports. Another Danubian port, where great quantities of wheat are handled, is Braila with a population of about 70,000.

There are no natural barriers to communications 505
in Muntenia. In the south the chief flow of traffic 491
is carried by the Danube. Rail and road communica- 496
tions from Transylvania pass through the Predeal and a railway line leads over the Danube to the Dobrudja.

THE DOBRUDJA (Dobrogea[R]).[1] Up till 1878 the 175
whole of the Dobrudja belonged to Bulgaria. Ever since, this province has been a bone of contention between Rumania and Bulgaria. The northern part of the Dobrudja was awarded to Rumania in 1878 to compensate her for the loss of Southern Bessarabia to Russia. The southern part of the province was ceded by Bulgaria after her defeat at the hands of her neighbours in the Second Balkan War in 1913. This region was returned to Bulgaria in 1940.

Geographically the Dobrudja is the north-eastern 131
corner of the Balkan Peninsula. Its boundaries are 133
in the north and west the Danube and in the east the Black Sea. There are three distinct regions: the delta of the Danube, the forests of Babadag, and farther south the steppe, which is the most fertile

[1] The letter R, H or G following a geographical term denotes a Rumanian, Hungarian or German name, respectively.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1
[The Dobrudja]
[Moldavia]

with the rest of Rumania are provided by the line Constanza-Cernavoda-Bucarest. 361

MOLDAVIA (Moldova[R]). The second of the two original Rumanian principalities is only half as big as Wallachia and its population is about half. Moldavia covers an area of about 15,280 square miles, and is inhabited by about 2,500,000 Rumanians, Jews, Hungarians, Slavs and Germans. 131 161

Owing to its geographical position Moldavia was more exposed to Polish, Russian and also Hungarian influence than Wallachia. After the death of the *voivode* Stephen the Great in 1504, the country became part of the Turkish dominions. From then onwards Moldavia shared the fate of Wallachia. Russian influence, however, naturally made itself felt in greater intensity in Moldavia. The independence of the principality was restored under John Cuza who eventually became the first ruler of the United Principalities. 175

The western boundaries of Moldavia are formed by the Carpathians. In the south the province borders on Muntenia and in the north on the Bukovina, which originally was part of Moldavia. The eastern frontier is formed by the River Pruth. The western part of Moldavia consists of the slopes of the Carpathian Mountains and the hill region below. Farther east the country flattens out into the plains which are bordered by the valley of the Pruth. The most fertile districts lie on the western bank of the Pruth and in the eastern corner of the province. The hills, which reach heights of 1,800 ft., are wooded. But there is much fertile soil which produces wheat and maize. There are also vineyards 131 133

7

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Moldavia]
[The Banat]

361 Another important town, and the greatest Ru-
504 manian port on the Danube, is Galati with a popula-
tion of about 75,000. Galati lies about a hundred miles from the Black Sea, but the harbour is so placed that sea-going ships can enter the port through the delta and anchor there all through the ice-free period. From Galati timber, wheat and maize from all over Rumania are sent abroad. Incoming cargoes of industrial goods are unloaded there.

[496] The only line leading directly to Transylvania goes over the Ghimes Pass. The traffic to Bessarabia is carried by four railway lines.

THE NEW TERRITORIES

131 The New Territories, acquired by Rumania after
175 the war of 1914–18 and partly lost since 1940, cover
[161] an area of 62,800 square miles and were inhabited in 1940 by about 10,500,000 people. The Banat, the Crisana, Maramures and Transylvania formed, up to 1918, parts of Hungary; the Bukovina belonged to Austria, and Bessarabia was taken from Russia. Many parts of the New Territories were agriculturally and industrially better developed than the Old Kingdom.

131 THE BANAT. The Rumanian part of the Banat covers
161 an area of about 7,400 square miles and has a popula-
tion of 1,000,000. The province is bordered in the north by the River Mures[R] (Maros[H], Marosch[G]), in the west by the Yugoslav part of the Banat, in the south by the Danube, and in the east by the Car-
000 pathians. The north-western part of the province is

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Banat]

The north-western part of the province is 133
the continuation of the Hungarian plain and is very [135]
fertile. To the east and south there are high mountains with rich forests and iron and coal deposits. The mountains of the Banat are forced by the Danube in the area between Bazias and Orsova, cutting a deep narrow valley which, in the Kazan Pass, is only about a hundred yards wide. This is where the Roman emperor Trajan built the second of his bridges over the Lower Danube. This is also one of the most picturesque regions of the Banat and the whole of Rumania,

The Banat has been a strategic and economic 175
outpost of various States and empires. Throughout 635
the times of known history this province was a favourite region for colonization. Romans, Turks, Hungarians and Austrians sought to strengthen the frontiers of their dominions by settling the Banat with peoples on whose loyalty, military and economic abilities they could rely in case of war. In consequence peoples of all races were transplanted to and took root in the Banat. In Roman times the province was fortified in order to protect the settlers who were brought here from all over the empire against the Dacians of Transylvania. During the many Turkish wars the Banat was an important defensive position upon which the Hungarians based their strategy. For over a century and a half, from 1552 to 1718, the Banat was under Turkish rule and went through a period of decay.

Under the Austrian military administration, which lasted up to 1779, the Banat experienced great prosperity. German settlers from the Rhineland and French-speaking peasants from Lorraine were brought to the Banat by the Empress Maria

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Banat]

175 Theresa; in order to strengthen the non-Magyar
635 element the settlement of Serbs and Rumanians was also encouraged. Under the governorship of Count Mercy, a friend of the statesman and warrior Prince Eugene of Savoy, the communications of the Banat were greatly improved. Land was brought under cultivation, mining and other industries were developed and commerce given a new impetus. The chief purpose of this policy was the creation of a strong military outpost of the Austrian Empire. The military frontier region was put under a special administration. All men living in this region were exempt from taxes and dues, were given land of their own but had to perform military duties. In 1779 the Banat, with the exception of the frontier region, was incorporated into Hungary. But after the defeat of the Hungarian Revolution in 1849 the province was again administered by the Austrians and eventually returned to Hungary in 1860. After the Great War the eastern half of the Banat became Rumanian, the western part Yugoslav.

162 About 55% of the population are Rumanians. There is a German colony 225,000 strong. These 'Swabians of the Banat', including descendants of French-speaking Lorrainers who up to half a century ago had preserved all their national characteristics but have now become absorbed by their German neighbours, constitute a very strong economic and national force. They are prosperous farmers, craftsmen and industrial workers. The Hungarians, who form more than 10% of the population, have, up to a few years ago, been in the majority in most towns. There are in the Banat many Jews, Serbs and Bulgarians and also a number of Slovaks.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Crisana]

[Maramures]

mostly Hungarians, and occupies a similarly important position. Here there are numerous factories, including mills, railway shops and locomotive works and textile factories. Satu-Mare (Szatmar[H]), with 60,000 inhabitants, is the largest town in the Northern Crisana. 361 438

After the Great War the Crisana, which was first occupied by the Hungarians in the tenth century and subsequently colonized by them, was awarded to Rumania. Under the Vienna Award of 1940 part of the Crisana was returned to Hungary, with a considerable Rumanian population. 175

By the same decision the province of Maramures (Marmaros[H]) (about 1,350 square miles), inhabited by over 150,000 people, acquired by Rumania in 1918, was returned to Hungary. Geographically Maramures is a continuation of the Czechoslovak province of Ruthenia. It is enclosed on all sides by chains of mountains covered with thick forests whose great density is rare even in the Carpathians, which are famous for their wealth of trees. It is not easily accessible except by a solitary railway line which comes from Transylvania and leads to Ruthenia. The small population consists of Ruthenians, Rumanians, Jews, Slovaks and Hungarians and is typical of the medley of races to be found in quite small areas of this part of Europe. Owing to the mountainous nature of the country there is little agriculture. The chief occupation of the inhabitants is the felling of trees. The most valuable asset of the province is its mineral wealth. There is oil, gold, copper, salt and coal. The capital and only major town of Maramures is Sighet (Marmaros-Sziget[H]) with a large Jewish population. Sighet, a town of 133 162 [496] 313 135 361

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Maramures]

[Transylvania]

361 about 20,000 people, lies on the upper reaches of the Tisza; it is the centre from which beautifully hand-woven carpets are exported.

175 635 **TRANSYLVANIA** (Ardeal[R], Erdely[H], Siebenbuergen[G]). The citadel of Transylvania, guarded by the high walls of the Carpathians and overlooking the lowlands of the Danube, dominated the map of Greater Rumania during the interval between the two World Wars. The union of Transylvania was the fulfilment of an aspiration which Rumanians had for long wished to realize. But the incorporation of this principality into Greater Rumania brought with it a number of difficult problems which even to-day are far from being solved.

When the Magyars invaded Dacia in the tenth century there was already, according to the Rumanian contention, a substantial Rumanian population in Transylvania which was subjugated by them. Subsequent colonization with Hungarian and German settlers weakened the position of the Rumanians and led many of them to emigrate into the lowlands, south and east of the Carpathians. Transylvania became an autonomous principality within Hungary and was able to maintain its semi-independence even when the Turks advanced to the gates of Vienna. Many Transylvanian princes played a leading part in the long struggle against the Turks, notably those of the Bethlen family. Transylvania under its native Hungarian rulers succeeded in maintaining itself for a long time against both the Austrians and the Turks. But while the consequences of the struggle for independence invariably had to be borne by the majority of the population, economic and

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

political benefits were reaped only by the privileged 175
'nations'—the Hungarian nobles, the Szekelys and 635
the 'Saxons'.

The majority of the Transylvanian Hungarians did not belong to the three ruling 'nations', but, as the nobles depended on their support, they were naturally better off than the Rumanians who were regarded and treated as serfs. The Szekelys, originally free peasants, lost many of their liberties. With the progress of feudal development their position deteriorated steadily and their customs and way of life became similar to those of the mass of non-privileged Hungarians. The 'Saxons', German settlers brought to Transylvania by the Hungarian kings to strengthen the military position of the province, were the third of the ruling 'nations'; they were able to maintain their privileges up to about a hundred years ago. While they often opposed the encroachments upon their rights by the Magyars, the Saxons nevertheless were united with their opponents when it was necessary to prevent the Rumanian majority from obtaining even the most elementary political rights.

From 1526 to 1699 Transylvania was under Turkish suzerainty, but in the latter year, by the Peace of Karlowitz, it was restored to Hungary. From that time until 1848 Transylvania was part of the Hungarian Kingdom. From 1849 till 1860 the principality was administered as one of the lands of the Austrian Crown, but was eventually reunited to Hungary in 1867. By the secret Treaty of 17 August 1917 the Rumanian Government was promised Transylvania and the land as far west as the Tisza by the Allied Powers, as the price of entering the

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

175 635 war on their side. In December 1918, after the collapse of the Dual Monarchy, an assembly of delegates of the Transylvanian Rumanians, meeting in Alba Julia, voted for union with the Rumanian Kingdom, and the province was occupied by Rumanian troops. The incorporation of Transylvania was later recognized and endorsed in the Peace Treaties.

563 *Rumanians.* The Rumanians of Transylvania, who form approximately 60% of the principality's population, are in many respects more advanced than their countrymen in Moldavia and Wallachia. The intensive State policy of Magyarization pursued by Budapest in the nineteenth century led to the strengthening of Rumanian national consciousness. The struggle for economic and political rights, however, never led to anything more than the granting of concessions on paper. From the Rumanian point of view the aims of the Transylvanian Rumanians were fulfilled only with the union of their country with the rest of Rumania in 1918. But, even under the Rumanian regime, the Rumanians of Transylvania were unable to gain economically in twenty years what they were prevented from obtaining during several centuries. Most of them were peasants; some were industrial workers; some became civil servants.

Magyars and Szekelys. The 500,000 Szekelys, inhabiting the eastern part of Transylvania, have still preserved some characteristics which make them distinct from the Hungarians, but politically and economically their position is now very similar to that of the Hungarian population which, in

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

[The Bukovina]

361 peoples of Transylvania. Farther south, on the banks of the Mures, lies Alba Julia, with an old castle, a majestic Gothic church and a chapel in which King Ferdinand was crowned. Sibiu (Hermannstadt[G], Nagyszeben[H]), with a population of 46,000, half of which is German, is an ancient centre of the Transylvanian 'Saxons'. The town is entirely German in character and all the buildings, especially the churches and the market-place, are reminiscent of a little provincial borough in the Middle Ages. Two other places of historical interest are Heltau (Cisnadie[R]) and Michelsberg (Cisnadoara[R]), small German villages with peasant-fortresses built in the thirteenth century. The road to the east, along the foot of the South Carpathian wall, leads to Brasov (Brasso[H], Kronstadt[G]), the most important industrial and economic centre of Transylvania. Although the town has a population of only 60,000, there are numerous factories producing iron and steel, machine-tools, armaments, railway equipment, textiles, and other goods.

● 175 635 THE BUKOVINA (Buchenland[G]). The Bukovina forms the northernmost tip of Greater Rumania. This province of dense forests, gentle hills and fertile pastures has had a long and varied history. In Roman times it was part of Dacia and was subsequently overrun by many barbarian tribes. Soon after the establishment of Moldavia, the Bukovina was conquered by the rulers of that principality and annexed by them. For some time both Moldavia and the Bukovina were governed from the Bukovinian town of Suceava. In the following centuries the Bukovina was first under Polish, then Turkish

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Bukovina]

rule. It was occupied by the Russians in 1769. In 1774 the province was given to Austria, under which it remained until 1918. On 23 October the Austrian governor handed over the Bukovina to the Ukrainian inhabitants of the province; but four days later an assembly of Rumanian Bukovinians declared for the union of the province with Rumania and asked the Rumanian government for military assistance. This was forthcoming on 11 November and added to Rumania a territory of about 4,100 square miles with a population of about 870,000 (1930). Of these over 38% were Ukrainians, 34% Rumanians and 21% Germans and German-speaking Jews. The Rumanian administration began by a vigorous policy of Rumanization. The Ukrainians, who under Austrian rule had been well treated, and the Jews, were the chief sufferers, but the Germans, too, were ousted from many of their positions.[1]

More than half of the Bukovina is covered with dense forests of beech;[2] one-fifth consists of pastures; less than a third is arable land. The province borders in the west on the Carpathians, in the south on Moldavia, in the east on Moldavia and Bessarabia and in the north on Poland. The western part of the Bukovina is formed by the slopes of the Carpathians, where manganese and iron ore are found, especially in the region of Jacobeni. To the east stretches the hilly country, covered with pastures, on which good livestock is raised, and fields of maize, wheat and tobacco. Mineral resources are confined to some small deposits of coal, gold and lead, but the industry of the province is well developed.

[1] The German University of Czernowitz was completely Rumanized soon after the military occupation.

[2] The German name of the province means 'Land of the Beeches'.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

by the valleys through which flow the tributaries of /33
the Pruth and Dniester. In the south, beginning near Besarabeasca, extends the Budjak steppe which merges into the sandy soils, salt marshes and lagoons of the delta of the Danube and of the Black Sea coast. The climate of Bessarabia is the same as that /32
of the regions east of the Dniester. The summers are very hot and dry, the winters very cold with icy winds and great snowfalls. Nevertheless, crops 311
grow well in Bessarabia and 61 % of the whole area is arable land. The chief products are maize, wheat, tobacco and wine and lately also soya beans. There are few factories and the only source of income for the people, apart from agriculture, is the fishing industry in the south.

The capital of Bessarabia is Kishineff (Chisinau[R]) 361
with a population of over 200,000 (1935). Here are concentrated such industrial enterprises as the province possesses, the most important being flour mills, leather factories and other secondary industries connected with agriculture.

The first colonization of Bessarabia was carried 175
out by the Romans who succeeded in occupying this 635
territory only for a short time. During the great period of migration (seventh to tenth centuries), the province was invaded by a host of tribes. Bessarabia was first occupied by Rumanians in the early fourteenth century and incorporated in Moldavia in 1367. A century and a half later Southern Bessarabia fell to Turkey, but several merchant-colonies were still administered by Genoese and Venetian traders on the Danube delta and the Black Sea coast. In the following centuries Bessarabia was often a battleground for Russian and Turkish armies, who alter-

3

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

175 nated in occupying the province. In 1812 Tsarist
635 Russia annexed the whole of Bessarabia. Three provinces in the south of Bessarabia were returned to Moldavia, which was still under Turkish suzerainty, in 1856; but they were again taken by Russia in 1878 and Rumania received the Dobrudja by way of compensation.

In 1917, after the October Revolution in Russia, an assembly of Bessarabians declared the province to be an autonomous part of the Federation of Socialist Republics and adopted the name of 'Moldavian Democratic Republic'. The Representative Council, however, composed of Rumanian and anti-Bolshevik delegates, frightened by the spread of revolution, appealed to the Rumanian Government for military assistance to deal with revolutionary groups in Bessarabia. This help was forthcoming on condition that the province would eventually join Rumania. As an initial step the 'Independent Moldavian Republic' was proclaimed on 24 January 1918. On 5 March General Averescu declared that the Rumanian troops would be withdrawn within two months. In the meantime his government was conducting peace negotiations with the Central Powers, which had occupied part of the Ukraine and were eager to stem the revolutionary tide. They intimated that they would favour the addition of Bessarabia to the Rumanian Kingdom as compensation for its losses to Austria-Hungary.[1]

[1] Part of Wallachia was to be ceded to the Dual Monarchy. The Treaty of Bucarest (May 1918) also provided for the demobilization of the Rumanian Army, except two divisions needed for the occupation of Bessarabia.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

On 8 April 1918 the Representative Council of 635
Bessarabia,[1] *Sfatul Tari*, by 86 votes to 3, 36 dele- 175
gates abstaining, decided to become an autonomous part of Rumania. This step was sanctioned by Germany when the Treaty of Bucarest was signed one month later. In November of the same year, 1918, after the Armistice, it was decided at a session of the Representative Council, attended by only 46 delegates, to declare for the unconditional union of Bessarabia with Rumania. The annexation of Bessarabia was not recognized by the Peace Conference at Paris; and although recognition was promised by the Conference of Ambassadors in 1920, this undertaking was never ratified by all the Powers.

During the following years Bessarabia was treated 635
as a conquered province. All district councils and 661
other organs of local government were abolished. 669
The country was ruled by prefects appointed by and responsible to the central government in Bucarest. The province was strongly garrisoned and lived in a continuous state of siege. All communications over the Dniester were destroyed and anybody caught attempting to cross the frontier was either imprisoned or shot. Between 1918 and 1924 there were a hundred and thirty-five uprisings in Bessarabia, which were suppressed by the military with the utmost violence. In the course of these revolts it is estimated that over thirty thousand Bessarabians were killed, many more executed or sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. The peasant revolt of 1924 in the region around the town of Tatar-Bunar was put down after heavy fighting and the burning of many villages.

[1] The Council was composed of 138 deputies of whom 103 were Rumanian, 13 Ukrainian, 7 Russian, 6 Jewish, 8 Bulgarian, 1 Pole and 1 Armenian.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p 112

CONCLUSION

175
648

This short survey of the different phases of the long and unhappy history of Rumania and the Rumanians discloses a number of factors which, in one form or another and with varying intensity and effect, have decisively contributed to the damaging result of events both upon the land and upon the people. The Rumanians and their country, more than many other nations and States, have on the whole been rather the passive object than an active subject of history.

This involuntary passivity characterized the very emergence of the Rumanian nation and has not yet been overcome. The first attempts to form the basis of a national existence were frustrated, and postponed for many centuries, owing to the invasion of Europe by the Magyars. When the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were eventually created in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the emergence of these two primitive States was chiefly due to the pressure of the Hungarians in Transylvania; it was made possible owing to the decay of the Slavonic States south and west of the Danube. Moldavia and Wallachia during the subsequent centuries were the battle-grounds of Great Powers or were exploited as colonies. The nineteenth century saw the rise of Rumanian nationalism with the aim of the union of all Rumanians in one State. This aspiration was warped and misused by rival empires in order to strengthen their position in South-Eastern Europe. When this union became a reality after the First World War, it was achieved not so

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

much by the Rumanian people as by the intervention of Rumanian and foreign statesmen, whose interests did not coincide with those of the majority of Rumanians. The history of Rumania during the period between the two Great Wars and during the present war is another and more vivid illustration of this passivity of a people, caught in the titanic struggle between Great Powers. 175 648

The economic and political effects of this development can be seen in the exploitation to which the people have been subjected for centuries, chiefly by foreign merchants and trusts, aided and abetted by a greedy and corrupt ruling class, and in the almost suicidal situation into which the nation has been manœuvred in recent times by its short-sighted leaders.

Psychologically, many centuries of political oppression and of economic exploitation have had an even more serious effect in the attitude of many sections of the people to life in general and to their own fate in particular. Generations of Rumanians have been methodically robbed of the fruits of their work for centuries. Their fate was not greatly affected by superficial changes, such as their elevation from serfs to peasants. This explains that they are reluctant to produce more food than they themselves can eat; for it is certain that the money-lender, the tax-collector, their own or some foreign army will take it from them. This fatalism, and the ignorance which their rulers have shown no great enthusiasm to remedy, explain the backwardness of the great masses of the people. But it would be quite wrong to assume that this implies an exhaustion of their latent powers. The Rumanians have often 181

Bulgaria EE1
Rumania ED1

B 342 233 with straw roofs. They are rarely plastered with mud. In western Sredna Gora, transportable sheep pens are used (Gellert, 1937: 169).

RUMANIA

R 361 •175 177 648 In Rumania there exists a marked difference between settlements in the lowlands and those of the Carpathian Mountain region. While topography and the presence or absence of such building materials as stone, wood or clay are important factors, political considerations also played a significant role. With the beginning of the 18th century Greek influence became predominant in Moldavia and Wallachia. The Porte set up Greek rulers in these principalities, thus in reality the Rumanians were as much under Turkish dominion, although indirectly, as were the people of the Balkans. It was only after the rebellion of 1821 that Rumanian rulers were reinstated. During all periods of unrest and foreign invasion the mountains and forests served as areas of refuge; the Serbian hajduk has his counterpart in the Rumanian heydoick (Stratilesco, 1907: 30-34).

R 361 R [133] Location and Types of Settlements. The older settlements were in the nature of hamlets (catŭn). These were generally not built on the top of hills, but rather in depressions, on the edge of forests, and away from the military roads (Grothe, 1907: 54). In the hilly regions of Oltenia and Moldavia the villages were located close to a river or on the slope of a hill. Farmsteads are generally spaced fairly far apart, in no definite order. Villages may extend over two or three hills facing one another (Stratilesco, 1907: 205). R [491] Villages in the Wallachian plains are located close to the roads. The prevalent type is the road village; buildings are located on either side of the highway which forms the main road of the village. Larger villages may have additional cross-roads (Jänecke, 1918: 7). R [621] While mountain villages average a population of 350, the largest being around 700, villages of the plains average 700 and may reach 2000 (Grothe, 1907: 55).

R 342 R [335] House Types. Due to the scarcity of wood and stone in the plains, buildings are generally constructed of wicker and daub, in which technique the Rumanians are masters. The roof is made first, the walls afterwards. The principle posts are first set into the ground, then the studs of the outer walls and inner partitions are spaced at 1 to 2 foot intervals. After the roof has been formed walls are built up. Mud is kneaded down with the feet, mixed with straw, and shaped into lumps that take the place of bricks. These lumps are then set between the studs and left to dry (Stratilesco, 1907: 208). More often walls are of wickerwork, plastered inside and out with a mixture of mud, straw and cowdung to a thickness of 15-25 centimeters (Jänecke, 1918: 10). The rough walls are smoothed out by applying thinner and thinner layers of mud and cowdung mixture. They are then whitewashed inside and out. Floors of timber are recent; the floor is commonly of tamped earth.

The roof is steeper than in the plains and protrudes further over the house. The support is in the form of a collar. The rafters tend to be too widely spaced, which results in slight bending of the battens; but, while it makes for a weaker roof, this results in softer and more pleasing lines. The four corners are not sharp but tend to be rounded (fig. 62). Wooden shingles are almost exclusively used for roof covering. They are about 15 centimeters wide and may be as long as 3 meters. They overlap two to four times. Shorter shingles form 6-10 rows. The smaller shingles may have their ends in the form of swallow tails or other decorative shapes. The ridge shows a special development. On the windward side the first layer of shingles is made to protrude over the ridgepole (fig. 62). These shingles also have excised patterns and are very ornamental. The ridgepoles may extend slightly over the hip and have a small gabled roof, one shingle in height (fig. 62). This provides an opening for the smoke to escape through. Ornamental poles rise at either end of the ridgepole (fig. 61). 342 [335] [531]

Chimneys are lacking and the smoke may escape through openings at the ridge or otherwise through the roof, which then shows all shades of gray to black. In some areas of Oltenia in southwestern Rumania one finds wooden chimneys (fig. 65). These are made of wicker and daub and are covered with shingles. [354] [184]

A special development in the foothills of the Southern Carpathian Mountains is the privy, which is in the form of an annex located at the end of the veranda (fig. 64b). [184] [514]

In general the buildings in the mountain districts show a greater variation than those of the plains. The woodwork is superior, and shows a great deal of inventiveness. The construction, however, is irregular, sloppy and often not functional. Pillars that carry no weight may be very thick, while those that must support much weight may be much too slender (Jänecke, 1918: 35-43). 342 184 [335]

Kulas (fig. 67) are found only in the mountainous regions of Oltenia in the district of Mehedinti, Gorj and Râmnicu-Vâlcea. They were built by the boyars, the wealthy landowners. The oldest ones come from the period when the Rumanian rulers were paying tribute to the sultan. The ground plan is a square 7 by 12 meters in length. The width of the walls is 30-70 centimeters. The kula (fig. 67) may have three or four stories, each about 2.5 meters in height. Each story has one room. The ground floor is used for storage; sometimes a well is built into it, and occasionally there is a subterranean escape passage. The upper floors may also be used for storage, but are mainly living quarters. Windows are generally found only on one side; the other walls are provided with loopholes. On the top floor there is generally an open veranda (čerdak) about 3 meters wide, the roof over which is supported by pillars (fig. 67). The exposure is toward the valley and the south. On the side opposite the čerdak there is a simple wooden balcony under the eaves (fig. 67). Many kulas have a privy tower attached to them. 342 712 [184] [556] [175] [312] [514]

342 712 [531] The stairway, about 1.25 meters wide made of massive logs, is generally on the inside of the buildings; when it is located on the outside it leads onto the wooden balcony. The exterior is white-washed. In addition, the surface is decorated with molded bands around each story division. There may also be a vertical division, thus creating a number of large panels. While these areas are symmetrical, neither they nor the molded bands that enclose them have any relation to the placing of windows or pillars (Jänecke, 1918: 62-63).

342 [175] [563] In 1895 there still existed about 55,000 earth huts (bordei) which were inhabited by the poorest population, generally Gypsies (fig. 63). They are common in the Danubian plain. Over an excavation 1-3 meters deep is placed a gabled roof. The roof is made of boards over which earth is laid. Sometimes reeds are placed over the boards before the earthen cover is added. The entrance is on one of the gabled sides, generally with a southerly exposure, and a window is placed on each gable side (Jänecke, 1918: 4).

343 351 Farm Buildings. In the lowlands the buildings are arranged in no definite order; though generally the house is closest to the road. The corn-house (colar) is either opposite to or at right angles to the house so that it can be watched. The yard and orchard are surrounded by a fence. The simplest fence is made of wickerwork between wooden poles. More often, however, it is made of boards [556] that have intricate excised designs (fig. 60). The wealthy people may add an imposing gateway with a small door. Flower or vegetable [563] gardens are rare, and the latter are called bulgări, since they are [244] generally kept by immigrant Bulgarians who grow all the vegetables [247] for town consumption (Stratilesco, 1907: 233). The farmstead is surrounded by shady trees, and there is generally a plum orchard at [245] the back of the farm buildings (Jänecke, 1918: 8-9).

[184] In the mountain regions the arrangement of the buildings in the yard differs from that of the lowlands. The stables and other buildings are arranged on the border of the yard in a horseshoe form to serve as protection for the house. The yard is usually very small, and has a strong high palisade with a massive gateway, the whole giving the farm a fortress-like appearance (the author points to the presence of bears in summer and wolves in winter) (Jänecke, 1918: 32-35).

343 [184] In the lowlands there are generally not many additional farm buildings in the yard, and this fact is correlated with the pattern of building additional annexes to the house, a more economical and practical procedure. Stables are of the simplest lathwork or wickerwork, covered with a straw roof. Sheds for the storage of straw, hay and cornstalks are absent, for the latter are stacked into tall round piles in the open. The baking oven for summer use, made of mud and bricks, has a hipped roof supported by four pillars.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

642 of these institutions naturally became mere façades to conceal a much cruder reality. Party politics, for example, bore a very superficial re-
665 semblance to those of nineteenth-century England: two principal parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, alternated in office. But the reality behind this two-party system was altogether different. Politics were based on a very narrow franchise,[30] the parties themselves tended to be coteries surrounding a dominant personality or family, and there were constant factions and party splits. Both the Conservatives and the Liberals obtained their support from the landowners, the principal distinction between them being that the Conservatives were usually the explicit spokesmen of the large agrarian interests, whereas the Liberals were increasingly interested in making Rumania a strong modern (i.e., commercial and industrial) state and held the controlling positions in the growing financial institutions.

671 In the field of law the Rumanians demonstrated what Dobrogeanu-Gherea correctly called a "mania for legislation." A flood of laws was
● 177 continually being passed—elegantly rendered by men who had taken their law course at Paris—but with remarkably little effect. Some were inapplicable at the outset, few were administered properly, and most were soon forgotten by all concerned, with no effort made to examine their consequences. Other examples could be cited from the fields of public finance, civil rights, and the press to illustrate the abyss lying between political and constitutional forms and actual practice. The persistence of this dualism right up to the 1940's has undoubtedly had a corrupting effect upon Rumanian politics and society.

566 Notwithstanding these contradictions, which have struck all for-
177 eign observers in the past century, the very introduction of Western paraphernalia had certain important positive effects. A peasant who had been inducted, under universal conscription, into the army, who could read in the press (or have read to him) about agrarian disturbances in Sicily, Ireland, or Russia, or who heard the charges and countercharges of the political parties, however rhetorical these may have been—such a peasant was moving out of the closed circle of the village. This is evidenced in the active role played by ex-army ser-
185 geants, clerks, and schoolteachers in the 1907 uprising. Moreover, the mere existence of constitutional and legal devices, however in-
177 operative they may have been, provided potential channels for change and increased the flexibility of the existing order. Thus, in spite of the fact that changes were apt to prove illusory rather than real,

30. A system of electoral colleges, rather like that of Prussia before 1918, assured a preponderant strength in the assembly to the landowners and the wealthy urban groups.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

that an endless series of palliatives and half-measures would take the place of real reforms, even so vigorous a critic of Rumanian institutions as Dobrogeanu-Gherea held that the presence of liberal institutions set Rumania in favorable contrast to tsarist Russia.[31] 185 177

In short, while economic and social tensions precipitated the 1907 revolt, the political situation prevented it from becoming more than a social eruption. It remained a revolt and not the initial stage of a revolution.

The Aftermath of 1907

The peasant uprising frightened the rulers of Rumania into attempting some measures of reform. A law on agricultural contracts was designed to protect the peasant by regulating agreements between him and the landlord or tenant, by prohibiting certain forms of rent in labor, by instituting communal grazing lands, and by establishing regional committees to fix agricultural wages and rents. This law was never really applied and quickly fell altogether into disuse. The proprietors preferred informal and unwritten agreements, which the law did not cover, and few peasants dared to demand application of the law for fear of being driven from the estate.[32] 656

A second law created a state-supported Rural Office to aid in the transfer of land from large properties to the peasants. Up to the beginning of 1912, however, the Rural Office had bought only 76,000 hectares, had divided up 15,000 hectares, and had sold to the peasants only 6,500 hectares.[33] A third law, by limiting the size of leases to 4,000 hectares of cultivable land, attacked the large agricultural trusts held in lease. A fourth law established cooperatives for renting land. It was probably the most successful; between 1908 and 1916 the land rented by the cooperatives increased from 133,000 hectares to 410,000 hectares.[34]

Although these laws were heralded as introducing a new conception into Rumanian life, *socialism de stat*—state intervention on behalf of the peasants—they really provide only examples of Rumanian legislative escapism. They but scratched the surface of the problem and were "fated to disappear without trace in the quicksand of Rumanian public life." [35] The state socialism proclaimed by the Liberals had very little to do with socialism in any Western sense of the term but more closely resembled the paternalistic policies of mercantilism.

31. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
32. Ilie S. Diaconescu, *Chestiunea țărănească în România* (Bucarest, 1928), p. 115.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 120.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
35. Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 ED1 Rumania ED1

IV.—PEOPLES AND SETTLEMENTS: EARLY TIMES

131 THE POSITION OF ROUMANIA with its mountain ramparts forming an outpost of central Europe, over against the south Russian steppe on the one hand and the Balkan peninsula on the other, has been emphasised in a brief review of its features and relief and climate. The same fact of position is most important in the study of its human relations throughout history, and here it is necessary to emphasise once more that relations between the south Russian and Hungarian plains in the far past have been carried on *via* the Carpathian passes rather than by the Iron Gates which may well have been impassable until Trajan's engineering feat made a platform along the right bank, and the temporariness of that construction suggests that the grim defile did not remain in use. To what extent some detours not very far away may have been utilised at various periods is a matter for research.

172 174 TOO LITTLE is known concerning Roumania in the Old Stone Age to permit of any useful discussion, but the country was much affected when, in the relatively short Neolithic period heralding the advent of metal, a cultivating population was spreading westward through central Europe. It is a matter for further research to decide to what extent south Russia and to what extent Thrace were routes of this first peasant [177] civilisation in its spread westwards. The earliest agriculturists of Roumania, in their equipment, show relationships or participation of ideas with contemporaries in the Ukraine, in the Balkan peninsula, including Vinça near Belgrade, and Thessaly, and in north Hungary, Roumania yielding specially important material from Cucuteni, near Iaşi, from Erösd in the south-east of Transylvania, and from Tordos in central Transylvania on the upper Olt. The former has yielded figurines that are female and steatopygous, but without the large breasts and general development of fat that occur in some other centres. The pottery is painted, and on the whole it seems that, at this stage, the Ukraine was richer; we may well be dealing with a spread that was to some extent westward, using passes of the south-eastern Carpathians (Fig. 4). At the same time it should be borne in mind that the Olt, the Mureş and several other rivers of Transylvania yielded

000 Celtic forms, Latin and Anglo-Saxon followed one another, but Norman French was unable to oust Anglo-Saxon, though it left a deposit of legal phrases and helped to make English grow towards the remarkable amalgam of Teutonic and Romance elements that it now is, though much of this growth came during the Renaissance. Roumania is in a sense an analogous amalgam of Latinised and Slavonic elements. The survival of the older, Latin, element is an interesting fact.

175 The Roumanian people, as we may begin to call them, were spread over the Carpathian bastion, using the high pastures in summer, so that contacts were maintained over long distances, independently of adjacent peoples more specially concerned with farming in lowland villages. It is a Roumanian theory, with much probability behind it, that the summer life on the upland pastures has had not a little to do with the survival of the Latin element to such a degree in Roumania, and with the survival of the Roumanian people's consciousness of themselves as distinct from their neighbours. It is noteworthy that groups of Germans, Szeklers, and so on, spreading in the Carpathian bastion later on, when Christianity had come to this part of the world, have not changed their language, nor have they caused their neighbours to change theirs. The resistance to language-change has become too great.

000 In the days when Latin and Slavonic were, as it were, competing in and around the Carpathian bastion, Christianity was expanding from Rome and Constantinople, with characteristic differences, only some of which concern us here. In the west, Roman cities had grown, often from camps, ere the empire fell, and cities tended to acquire bishops, for whom the Roman tradition was their main link with the larger world. The insistence on the general language (Latin) for religious purposes and the growth in authority and prestige of the Bishop of Rome are thus easy to understand. And the combination gave the bishop's city a prestige that helped to Christianise barbarian conquerors and to spread the idea of the city when a revival began in the tenth and eleventh centuries. In the east there was less spread of the idea of the city northward from Constantinople and the Ægean, save in the case of the cities on a Greek basis in south Russia. Nor was there the same spread of a general language. We accordingly find that the Church consecrated Slavonic forms,

175 many Wallachs to return to their homeland to the north of the Danube.

During the eleventh century the Hungarians engaged in a policy of steady expansion to the east, and came into collision with the Wallachs. It is through Hungarian sources that we first hear of Wallacho-Bulgarian principalities existing on the eastern confines of Hungary, in the Banat and Transylvania. The famous Notarius Regis Belae of Hungary refers to Hungarian victories over a Prince Glad, who is designed as "dux Bulgarorum et Blacorum," and relates that the latter's army was composed of Bulgarians, Wallachs and Cumanians. King Bela also, in an epistle addressed to the Pope, complains of incursions by Bulgarians and Cumanians against which for his protection he found himself compelled to settle the Knights Hospitallers of St John on his eastern frontier near the Danube. In 1233 reference is again made to a Hungarian ruler who had been established in the Banat of Severin, whose subjects were "Valachi schismatici."

The subjection of Bulgaria by the Turks in 1394 was followed by a large immigration of Bulgarian nobles and church dignitaries into Rumania, and Bulgarian influence and culture was further strengthened and gave rise to a period of literary and artistic flowering that recalled, according to Prof. Bogdan, the influence exerted by the Greek *émigrés* in Italy after the taking of Constantinople by the Turks. This is in no way surprising, since the Bulgarians being for centuries direct neighbours of the Byzantines, were able to assimilate to a certain extent their civilization and transmit it to the Rumanians who were further away.

197 Numerous manuscripts dating from the 14th to the 17th
175 centuries, mainly compiled in the chancelleries of the
177 various Wallach princes, testify to the deep influence Bulgaria had exerted during this period. The language in use was not uniform but gradually evolving, which proves that it was not used merely as a standard language, like Latin, but that it was spoken by those who made use of it. This will explain the large admixture of Slav words in the Rumanian tongue, which were derived mainly from

Bulgarian sources. The toponymy also of Rumania reveals a great number of names of Slavo-Bulgarian and Cumanian origin, which can only be explained by the former presence in large numbers of these two peoples in Rumania. Prof. Xenopol, in his "Istoria Romanilor," vol 1, p.71, dilating on the Slavo-Bulgarian toponymy extant in Rumania, expresses the belief that the mere official use of the Slavo-Bulgarian language is not sufficient to explain the adoption of geographical terms in this language, and that their presence must be ascribed to a "connection between people and people." An examination of D. Francescu's "Dictionaru Topograficu şi statistico al Romaniei" (1872) and Dr L. Colescu's "Dictionarul statistic al Romaniei (1914/5) would reveal an astounding number of such names. As regards the nomenclature derived from Cumanian sources, we have, Coman, Comana, Comanae, Comania, (thrice) Comanianca, Comani (twice), Comanița, and Comanesti (six times). Similar names are met with in Bulgaria and Macedonia (i.e. Kumanovo) and if we recollect that the Cumanians gave a royal dynasty, that of the Terters, to Bulgaria, it will be understood that this now lost people had exerted a wide-spread influence in the Balkan peninsula.

FROM THE FORMATION OF THE DANUBIAN PRINCIPALITIES TO 1914.

The policy of easterly expansion pursued by the Hungarians forced the first Rumanian political communities which had developed in the relative security of Transylvania to retreat before the continuous pressure exerted by the Hungarians. Many of the Rumanian nobility, however, seem to have passed over to the conqueror in order to safeguard their wealth and privileges at the price of Magyarization, as did the Serbian aristocracy in Bosnia which accepted the faith of their Turkish conquerors so that they might retain their lands. These Magyarized Rumanians of Transylvania gave to Hungary her most heroic figure, that of John Hunyady, as well as one of her great kings, Matthias Corvinus, son of the former.

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1 Bessarabia

lei which was absorbed by Russia. Through the latter 433
country an annual surplus of over a million tons of cereals was also marketed, as an excellent network of railway lines connected Odessa and the chief towns of Russia with Bessarabia. Further, under the Russian régime credit facilities 452
were obtainable and a capital of some 10 million roubles or 10 milliard lei was at the disposal of the agriculturalists, while now it is reckoned that the Rumanian banks do not dispose of even 1½ milliard lei for this purpose, and in spite of the fact that the present requirements of the population are incomparably greater, since with the breaking up of the large estates, it was indispensable to provide the peasantry with funds wherewith they might buy implements and cattle for their farms.

It would appear that any civilized government, however 489
vague its conception of its duty might be, would have proceeded to endow this province with a network of roads and railways to aid the population by thus facilitating the transport of its produce to the ports, since Odessa, the former outlet, is no longer available for this purpose. But strange to say, the Rumanian authorities have done nothing whatever; though even the construction of a few short connecting lines permitting a partial reorientation of the existing railway tracks and the construction of a grain elevator at the Danubian town of Reni would have gone a long way to relieve the strain. Even the deepening of the bed of the Pruth as far as Ungheni might have provided cheaper transport facilities to a large percentage of the available grain, which was often left to rot in the fields because overland transport charges, in the absence of roads, were found prohibitive.

Even out of mere solicitude for the safety of the State the Rumanian government ought to have provided means of communication whereby its army might in an emergency be concentrated on an ever-exposed frontier, in a region where a perpetual state of war exists. But even this weighty consideration has not sufficed to rouse the Bucarest Government from its self-complacency. There are, of course, persons 668
who would explain the continual agitation brewing in Bess- 177
arabia and the predilection of its inhabitants for Russian rule by the assertion that these dunces of Moldovans (as the

RUMANIA

668 Bessarabians are popularly called) forming the most back-
177 ward section of the Rumanian people are mentally incapable of appreciating at their true value all the qualities which the Rumanian administration exhibits in its conduct towards populations whose goodwill it has set out to win. For the organs of the Rumanian State are inspired by a high purpose, that of converting these Moldovans of Bessarabia into loyal Rumanians, by inculcating in them a consciousness of the collective national will. When they shall finally see eye to eye with the various cultural missionaries which Bucarest has so far dispatched for their edification, then at last will loyalty and love follow, for loyalty after all is but the consciousness of oneness, and it is this consciousness of oneness that the Bucarest "Kulturträger" are attempting to impress on the Bessarabians.

668 These altruistic efforts, however, seem unavailing, for in January, 1932, a pan-Bessarabian congress of all parties and creeds was held at Kichineff, and delegates resolved to create a united Bessarabian front so as to impose on the Government which had done nothing for this province since its union with Rumania, the taking of certain measures designed to ameliorate the situation. M. Batsaria, a veteran Rumanian journalist, commenting on this congress in the "Adeverul" stated that a member of the cabinet had confided to him that this discontent was not peculiar to Bessarabia, but existed in all the new provinces. An atmosphere, which was in no way favourable to the realization of a complete spiritual unity among the inhabitants of Great Rumania had been created. And so long as the legitimate rights of all were not respected, and their just grievances remained unredressed, so long would unity be unattained.

The Jews.

[162] The Jewish minority numbers some 800,000 souls (accord-
563 ing to Winckler's racial statistics, 778,094) who are mainly
641 concentrated in the urban districts of Bessarabia, Moldavia, Bucovina, and the province of Maramureş. As petty trading, commerce and, to a large extent, banking is in their hands, all the more important towns have a numerous Jewish element in their population. The manifest disinclination of the Rumanians for commerce has permitted the

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

Rumanians under Rumanian rule. Although the great majority of the population was made up of Rumanians, about one-quarter was formed by minorities consisting of more than a dozen nationalities. The majority of the people lived on the land, only one-sixth in towns. Ethnically, the population of Rumania consisted approximately of Rumanians 73%; Hungarians over 8%; Slavs nearly 7%; Jews 5%; Germans over 4%; others 3%. About 82% of the people were engaged in agriculture and forestry.

The different nationalities living in Greater Rumania have in many cases preserved all the characteristics of their original race and land; others have absorbed the historical and cultural influences to which Rumania has been subject at various times. Both groups—and they are by no means sharply distinct from each other—have been transformed in the process of history and have influenced their neighbours and the life of the country as a whole.

THE RUMANIAN PEASANTS. The Rumanians are a simple and hardy people of peasants, used to oppression and poverty. Throughout centuries the Rumanian peasant was a serf, working all his life to satisfy the *boiar*, the tax-collector or the foreign prince. There have been only very short periods of Rumania's history when the peasant could reap and keep the hard-earned fruits of his labour. To-day, too, his fate follows the familiar pattern, only the present system of exploitation is much more efficient. It is all the more astonishing, therefore, that this people has preserved its optimism and a certain

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

563 **THE MINORITIES.** The presence of large numbers of
177 non-Rumanians in the new State affected the fate of Rumania decisively. While the leaders of the Transylvanian Rumanians, who had themselves had a long experience of foreign rule, advocated a just and liberal policy, the politicians of the Old Kingdom[1] and especially the Right Wing, persisted in a policy of Rumanization and de-nationalization contrary to the Minority Treaties. In Bessarabia this policy was excused by stressing the danger of the spread of revolutionary movements which threatened the safety of the State, and was carried out by the military. In the territories acquired from Hungary the position of the dominant and dominated sections of the people had been reversed so suddenly and so decisively that the change necessarily had violent consequences. Moreover, here the question of the treatment of minorities was closely interlocked with that of administrative unification. The laws and regulations of the Old Kingdom and of the New Territories[2] had to be equalized. The majority of the civil servants in Transylvania were Hungarians and most of these were replaced by Rumanians from the Old Kingdom. Some of the old officials had to be retained, owing to the shortage of trained personnel, and the doubt about their loyalty to the new regime was exploited to strengthen the case for complete centralization.

[1] [Provinces of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Dobrudja--Analyst]
[2] [Territories acquired after World War I--Analyst]

665 **SOCIAL REFORM.** The problem of social reform was
565 the most urgent and the most hotly contested of all. The Transylvanian National Party under the leadership of Maniu, and the Peasant Party of Mihalache,

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania ED1

659 to intervene to secure the appointment of clergymen, but re-
648 quested that it be informed in each instance. These laws were
794 modified under the rule of the Iron Front, in order to make
793 possible the persecution of the Jews. Christian communions appear, however, not to have been affected.

659 When a pro-Communist government was formed in Ru-
177 mania, the situation changed immediately and radically. The
671 laws adopted in 1928 were repealed by a decree of August 4, 1948. As usual in Soviet-inspired constitutions, freedom of conscience, of religion, and of worship was assured. Freedom was conceded to all creeds to organize and conduct their own ecclesiastical endeavors so long as they did nothing to jeopardize "public security and public order." The last proviso was, as always, the Trojan horse by means of which the conquerors would enter the citadel. For what were public security and order? The government reserved the right to determine; and in this case the "government" was and could only be the local soviet under which a poor cleric was to live and move and have his being. As a matter of fact, the system under which the Rumanian Communist Party functioned was simplicity itself. The list of electors registered in 1946 was kept up to date by striking off the names of all who had in some manner or other manifested hostility to the "people." The possessor of a name thus purged might retain the right to worship wherever he pleased, but was of course deprived of any opportunity to draw a salary from the State or to hold a position of public trust.

671 Indeed, the law went much further. Article 25 provided that
793
659 the Ministry of Religious Affairs shall suspend any decision, instruction, or directive, as well as any order having an ecclesiastical character, whether administrative, cultural, educational, or caritative, or pertaining to endowments, if it is not in keeping with the status of the denomination in the act by which it has been established, or is inimical to public security, public order or morals. Pastoral and circular letters

Bulgaria EE1
Rumania ED1

B 342 233 with straw roofs. They are rarely plastered with mud. In western Sredna Gora, transportable sheep pens are used (Gellert, 1937: 169).

RUMANIA

R 361 175 179 648 In Rumania there exists a marked difference between settlements in the lowlands and those of the Carpathian Mountain region. While topography and the presence or absence of such building materials as stone, wood or clay are important factors, political considerations also played a significant role. With the beginning of the 18th century Greek influence became predominant in Moldavia and Wallachia. The Porte set up Greek rulers in these principalities, thus in reality the Rumanians were as much under Turkish dominion, although indirectly, as were the people of the Balkans. It was only after the rebellion of 1821 that Rumanian rulers were reinstated. During all periods of unrest and foreign invasion the mountains and forests served as areas of refuge; the Serbian hajduk has his counterpart in the Rumanian heydoick (Stratilesco, 1907: 30-34).

R 361 R [133] Location and Types of Settlements. The older settlements were in the nature of hamlets (catun). These were generally not built on the top of hills, but rather in depressions, on the edge of forests, and away from the military roads (Grothe, 1907: 54). In the hilly regions of Oltenia and Moldavia the villages were located close to a river or on the slope of a hill. Farmsteads are generally spaced fairly far apart, in no definite order. Villages may extend over two or three hills facing one another (Stratilesco, 1907: 205). R [491] Villages in the Wallachian plains are located close to the roads. The prevalent type is the road village; buildings are located on either side of the highway which forms the main road of the village. Larger villages may have additional cross-roads (Jänecke, 1918: 7). R [621] While mountain villages average a population of 350, the largest being around 700, villages of the plains average 700 and may reach 2000 (Grothe, 1907: 55).

R 342 R [335] House Types. Due to the scarcity of wood and stone in the plains, buildings are generally constructed of wicker and daub, in which technique the Rumanians are masters. The roof is made first, the walls afterwards. The principle posts are first set into the ground, then the studs of the outer walls and inner partitions are spaced at 1 to 2 foot intervals. After the roof has been formed walls are built up. Mud is kneaded down with the feet, mixed with straw, and shaped into lumps that take the place of bricks. These lumps are then set between the studs and left to dry (Stratilesco, 1907: 208). More often walls are of wickerwork, plastered inside and out with a mixture of mud, straw and cowdung to a thickness of 15-25 centimeters (Jänecke, 1918: 10). The rough walls are smoothed out by applying thinner and thinner layers of mud and cowdung mixture. They are then whitewashed inside and out. Floors of timber are recent; the floor is commonly of tamped earth.

177.10 - 177.88

l: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 EDl Rumania EDl

693 agencies, being subordinate only to the Procurator General, the latter is
642 responsible to the Grand National Assembly, and in the interim between its sessions, to the Presidium (Article 75).

[671] The powers and functions of the Procurator General are specified by Law No. 6 of June 2, 1952, concerning the "Setting up and Organization of the Procuratura of the Rumanian People's Republic." The Procurator General has the right to take part, "with a consultative vote," in the meetings of the Presidium and of the Council of Ministers (Article 4). He is empowered to see to it that the decisions and rules issued by the central and local agencies of state power and administration conform with the laws of the country. Charged with the administration of justice, he supervises the activities of the agencies of penal investigation; he may ask for the dossier at any stage of the investigation, and has the right to "issue compulsory instructions with regard to the development of penal investigation and inquiry and to be present at any act of penal investigation or to carry it out himself" (Article 7, Paragraph a).

642 The Supreme Court, whose chief function is the supervision of the judicial
692 activities of all the courts (Article 72), is elected by the Grand National Assembly for a term of five years (Paragraph 1 of Article 67). The judges, theoretically independent and subject only to the law (Article 70), and the people's assessors are elected in accordance with the provisions of a special law (Paragraph 2 of Article 67). All judicial proceedings are conducted in the Rumanian language, with special provisions for the use of other languages in areas inhabited by compact groups of other nationalities or minorities. Persons not knowing the language in which the judicial proceedings are conducted are constitutionally guaranteed the right to acquaint themselves with the material of the case and the privilege to use their own language in the summation of their case (Article 68).

Unlike the Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme Tribunal of the People's Republic of Rumania, like its Soviet counterpart, has no power of constitutional interpretation and is more of an auxiliary than an independent branch of government.

177. The constitutional provisions regarding the administration of justice, how-
69 ever "progressive" they may sound, conceal the true nature of the Marxist-
692 Leninist concept of justice, which has been adopted by the People's Republic of Rumania as well as by the other countries in the Soviet orbit. The modern principles of penal law (*"nullum crimen sine lege; nulla poena sine lege"*) applied and observed in all civilized countries, have been replaced by the concept of "class-justice." Marxist doctrinaires assert that the purpose of "proletarian class justice" is the maintenance of the regime of the dictatorship of the working class and the complete elimination of all "reactionary" and "anti-democratic" elements.

Although the principle of "class-justice" has not been embodied in the two Rumanian constitutions framed under the regime of popular democracy, it nevertheless has found clear expression in Law No. 5 passed by the Grand

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

National Assembly on June 2, 1952, concerning the "Organization of the Judicature." Article 1 of the Law emphatically states that the function of the judiciary is the defense of the socio-economic structure of the state and of the rights and interests of state institutions and organizations. Furthermore, it is emphasized that the aim of the judiciary is the "education" of the citizens "in the spirit of devotion to the fatherland and in the spirit of the construction of socialism" (Article 2). 177 069 692

The people's assessors perform in practice a much greater function in judicial proceedings than those specified by the Constitution. The Minister of Justice is authorized to detail them from one court to the other whenever circumstances require. Thus, there are actually special teams of "people's judges" which the Ministry of Justice can use in accordance with the political interests of the Party. 692

Article 9 of Law No. 5 of 1952 also authorizes the courts to hear cases outside their seats if this is required "to fulfil the educational purpose of justice." Furthermore, hierarchically superior courts may take away from subordinate courts any case "in order to hear it themselves or have it heard by another court."

The required impartiality of judges is furthermore impaired by limitations imposed by the electoral laws on the right to participate in the election of people's judges. The privilege is restricted to the "democratic" elements only (Article 13, Paragraph 7, of Law No. 5). This is coupled with the provisions confining the nomination of candidates to the United Workers' (Communist) Party or to its affiliated mass organizations (Article 13, Paragraph 1). [666]

In discussing the new role of justice and law, Vasilescu-Alba, a jurist of the Rumanian People's Republic, asserted that "all legal rules, being the expression of the will of the working class, must be understood and interpreted in the light of the class struggle." Justice is thus "an executive organ of the will of the working class." Positive law, when in disagreement with this principle, must make room for the "legal conscience of the proletariat."[3] [565]

The fundamental rights and duties of citizens are enumerated in a special chapter. The primacy of social rights over individual rights is, as in the USSR, both functional and political.[4] Most of the rights and freedoms stipulated by the Constitution are either programmatic, circumscribed by escape clauses, or outright illusory. Thus, for instance, the provision relating to freedom of the press, speech, and assembly, as stated by Article 85, (a word-by-word replica of Article 125 of the Soviet Constitution of 1936), emphatically denies 641

[3] "Statul Poliţienesc" Cronica Românească, October 1, 1950, p. 25.

[4] Professor Boris Mirkine-Guetzevitch, while recognizing the dictatorial character of all the constitutions in the Soviet sphere, makes nevertheless a distinction between the declarations of rights of the Soviet constitutions and those of the satellite constitutions. According to Professor Mirkine, whereas the declarations of the People's Republics establish the "functional" primacy of social rights over individual rights, those of the Soviet republics establish "political" primacy. See Boris Mirkine-Guetzevitch, Les Constitutions Européennes, 2 vol. Paris, 1951.

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

of the Soviet world. It is the first document to reconcile the conflict hitherto existing between the satellite constitutions and two Soviet official theories: the one, relating to the essence and character of the "New Democracies," emphasizes in its latest version the substantial identity of the political and economic structures of the two types of "Soviet" and "popular" democracies; the other, the Soviet theory on constitutional law, supports the thesis that there can be no divergence between constitution and society in a "socially advanced and progressive" state. Previous satellite constitutions, however, in contradiction to Soviet legal theory that the constitution is a mirror reflecting changing reality—the legal crystallization of existing arrangements—did not correspond to the fundamental changes occurring in the state. 642 829

The new Rumanian Constitution,[1] however, assumes to reflect the enormous transformations that have taken place in the political and socio-economic life of the country since March, 1948, when the first Constitution of the People's Republic of Rumania was adopted. In the interval, the means of production, transportation, and banking have been nationalized; the "socialist sector" of agriculture has been widened by the ever-growing influence of the state through the establishment of state farms ("sovchozi") and tractor stations; collectivization of land has been consistently pursued through a policy aiming at the elimination of the "kulak" elements and the support of the lower and middle strata of the peasantry; two monetary reforms have completely changed the financial status of the population—while the leu has been stabilized and pegged to the ruble, the people have been deprived of their savings; the structure and functions of the central and local governmental agencies and of the judiciary has gradually developed along Soviet lines; the opposition has been eliminated and the rank-and-file of the Communist Party purged of "unreliable" or "deviationist" elements. 642 178

The new Constitution, as a whole, very closely approximates to its Soviet prototype. While the Constitution of 1948—advanced as it was at the time from the Soviet legal point of view—preserved some outward manifestations of "bourgeois constitutionalism," particularly in its technique and its neo-latin legal style, the framers of the new Constitution carefully avoided 642

[1] The new Constitution of the People's Republic of Rumania was adopted by the Grand National Assembly on September 24, 1952. It differed little in substance from the original Draft submitted to the Assembly (March 27, 1952) by the Constitutional Commission headed by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, President of the Council of Ministers and Secretary-General of the United Workers' (Communist) Party. Out of the 18,836 "suggestions for amendments" offered by the population, only 34 were accepted. Of these 28 were primarily editorial, 2 changed the composition of the Council of Ministers, one stipulated the tax-levying authority of the Grand National Assembly, and one provided for the inclusion of the initials RPR (Rumanian People's Republic) in the country's emblem. Two amendments, however, were more significant. One eradicated the peasantry's personal property rights, granted in the Draft, to the land and farm implements which they brought into the collectives; the other, seeking to dissipate the democratic world's allegations that the country had obviously become a "Soviet province," purports to establish the principle of complete sovereignty by the inclusion of the provision that Rumania is a "unitary, sovereign, and independent" state. 642

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

and the collapse of the Eastern Front, Rumania was in a hopeless military position, and in March, 1918, it sued for peace. The pro-German Alexandru Marghiloman, who had remained behind in Bucarest, was entrusted with a new government. This government dissolved the constituent assembly, and Marghiloman declared that "the whole agrarian problem must be taken up anew from the beginning." 175 423

During the brief term of the Marghiloman government, Constantin Garoflid, Minister of Agriculture, introduced a series of agrarian measures: obligatory leases, the reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture, and the organization of agricultural workers. Garoflid, though a Conservative and a landowner, had long been opposed to the latifundiary system in Rumania and desired to build up a prosperous medium peasantry. He regarded the 1917 amendment as "not a scientific work but an electoral manifesto." Although previously recognizing the need for expropriation, he considered such an extreme measure unsuited to wartime conditions and advocated forced leases of land to the peasants as a temporary solution. Much in Garoflid's program was conducive to a rational development of Rumanian agriculture. He may even have had in mind a progressive series of reforms, but his proposals were open to the criticism that in Rumania a policy advocating such moderation and gradualness most often meant doing nothing at all. His program, however, was not even to be begun.

The collapse of the Central Powers in the autumn of 1918, Rumania's reentry into the war, and the withdrawal of Mackensen's forces again reversed the situation. The Marghiloman government was dismissed and its laws declared null and void. With the breakdown of the Central Powers, chaos spread through eastern Europe. Revolutionary conditions prevailed in Russia, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In Rumania a dry year, combined with the dislocations caused by the war and the German occupation, left the peasants hard pressed for food. The action of the Marghiloman government in dissolving the constituent assembly had increased their doubts in the good faith of any government. Tension was heightened by the revolutionary activity among the Rumanians in the neighboring regions of Transylvania, Bucovina, and Bessarabia, which had been or were shortly to be incorporated in Greater Rumania. [178]

The Agrarian Reforms of 1918–21

Immediately after the armistice, on November 12, 1918, King Ferdinand issued a new proclamation reaffirming his pledge of 1917. 175 423 656

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

over, the process of incorporating the new provinces into Greater 423
Rumania did tend to level out the differences in the laws. The reform in the Old Kingdom was altered somewhat by the more radical atmosphere in the provinces. On the other hand, the Bessarabian, Bucovinan, and Transylvanian reforms were considerably modified by the time the parliament ratified them in 1921. National interest, as conceived of in Bucarest, demanded equilibrium, if not complete similarity, between the various agrarian laws.

An element of xenophobia, in the form of discrimination against foreign landowners and minorities, also appeared in the agrarian reforms and was the subject of the interminable case of the Hungarian optants, which was before the Council of the League of Nations throughout the 1920's. Unquestionably certain of the expropriation provisions were directed against the non-Rumanian minorities, and in Transylvania and Southern Dobrogea the execution of the reforms had a decidedly nationalist tinge. On the other hand, since the Rumanians in the new provinces usually included the poorest strata of the population, and many of the larger landowners were members of the minorities, it was inevitable that the leveling process of the land reforms should have benefited the Rumanians at the expense of the minorities. In any event, nationalist discrimination was a by-product of the land reforms, not a primary incentive.

At the conclusion of the First World War Rumania, in spite of 178
terrible human and material losses, seemed to be entering a new and promising era. By an extraordinary combination of circumstances a united Greater Rumania had been achieved. The acquired territories with their resources and industry promised to add a new dimension to the Rumanian economy. The passage of the land reforms gave hope for greater social stability and the eventual growth of a prosperous peasant agriculture. The revolutionary fever subsided, the peasants had not revolted, a general strike of workers in 1920 had been successfully suppressed, and although new parties and politicians appeared on the scene, the continuity of the Rumanian monarchy and government stood unique in eastern Europe. But the two basic problems of Rumanian history remained: a weak power position and a backward economy. The first did not present an immediate threat because of the exhaustion of neighboring great powers through war and revolution. The task of adjusting the economy to a more advanced and rapidly changing world economy faced the nation immediately as Rumania began to repair the damage caused by the war.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

page 67

IV

TOWN, COUNTRY, AND FOREIGN TRADE

Rumanian Industry

INDUSTRY has a Jekyll and Hyde role in the minds of many 433 Rumanians. It is regarded as the potential savior of the economy 178 through its ability to increase national productivity and to absorb surplus agricultural population. At the same time it is accused of exploiting the countryside and of gaining all the rewards. These two views are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Before the First World War industry in the Old Kingdom was relatively undeveloped; the two most important industries were petroleum production and lumbering, both largely financed by foreign capital and both producing principally for export. Industrialization was naturally restricted by the scarcity of local capital and the lack of a trained labor force. Although the economy was predominantly agricultural, the Rumanian government, in 1887, inaugurated a policy of encouraging national industry by means of a high protectionist tariff, partly to avoid the complete destruction of household industries by foreign competition, partly for nationalist reasons.

The acquisition of new territories after the First World War—especially Transylvania with its mineral resources, metallurgical industry, and more highly developed economy—provided additional impulse to industrial expansion. Greater Rumania was moderately [135] well endowed with raw materials: petroleum, fair lignite reserves, some iron, lead, zinc, and salt. Nevertheless, Rumania remained a predominantly agrarian country; in 1930 only 10 per cent of the active population was engaged in industry.

The growth of industry in the Old Kingdom in the first third of 178 the twentieth century is shown by the following figures:[1] 433

	Number of industrial enterprises	*Personnel*	*Horsepower in enterprises*
1901	62,188	168,198	60,744
1930	58,892	279,897	623,442

The decrease in the number of establishments and the increase in horsepower show a concentration of industry in larger undertakings

1. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești*, p. 138.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

178 and the decline of small shops. Against the increase in personnel employed must be set the growth of population from 5,957,000 in 1899 to 8,791,000 in 1930.

The rate of growth was somewhat slower in Transylvania, which had a more important industry at the beginning of the century than the Old Kingdom:[2]

[162]

	Undertakings	*Personnel*	*Undertakings with less than 20 employees*		*Undertakings with more than 20 employees*	
			No.	*Personnel*	*No.*	*Personnel*
1900	94,112	212,599	93,651	153,223	461	59,376
1930	59,040	269,623	58,000	123,260	1,040	146,363

According to the 1930 census there were 140,948 industrial enterprises in all of Rumania employing 616,743 persons; 130,433 were small shops employing between 1 and 5 persons. The chemical industry, including of course the petroleum industry, had the greatest capital investment, followed by the food, metallurgical, and textile industries. The food industry was most important in terms of value of output, followed by the textile, chemical, and metallurgical industries.

Except for a slump in the depression years, which was overcome by 1934, Rumanian industry experienced a fairly constant growth during the interwar period. The years 1921–26 were spent in recovering from wartime destruction, but by 1938 manufacturing production stood at 177.9 as against 100 for the year 1913:[3]

INDEX OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION (Base: 1913 = 100)

1913	100	1927	118.8	1934	167.8
1921	47.2	1928	131.8	1935	165.2
1922	73.2	1929	136.9	1936	175.0
1923	73.2	1930	132.5	1937	182.0
1924	89.0	1931	140.6	1938	177.9
1925	92.2	1932	111.9		
1926	103.7	1933	136.2		

The recovery and expansion of Rumanian industry after the depression was quite marked; the rate of growth was somewhat above

2. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
3. League of Nations, *Industrialization and Foreign Trade*, p. 137.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

that for world manufacturing as a whole.[4] This recovery was accompanied by a further concentration of undertakings and an elimination of smaller establishments. The emphasis shifted from consumer goods toward capital goods: between 1927 and 1937 the volume of output of capital goods increased by 57.4 per cent, that of consumer goods by 45 per cent. In 1937 the value of the output of capital goods was only slightly less than that of consumer goods.

433
178

The rapid expansion of industry, especially of the capital goods industries, contrasts strangely with the backward state of Rumanian agriculture and the generally low level of consumption. In fact, however, the expansion of industry was not closely integrated with the development of the whole of the economy, but was the result of very special circumstances. The growth of capital goods industries did not correspond to the development of an internal market: two of the most important items, petroleum and wood, were primarily for export; the rapid growth of the metallurgical industry was caused by increasing state demands, above all for armaments. (In 1938, 70 per cent of the metallurgical output was consumed by the state.) The growth of the consumers goods industries did not lead to an equivalent increase in consumption. Indeed, in 1937 per capita consumption of most consumers goods was below the 1927 level, since the increase in production was matched by a decline in imports. While it is meaningless to consider the development of an industry as "artificial," since industry almost by definition is the essence of artificiality, nevertheless Rumanian industry was a forced growth, aided by high tariff production, state support, and a relatively high degree of cartelization.

In certain respects the precocious maturity of Rumanian industry resembles the development of Rumanian agriculture in the nineteenth century, in that both were molded by external economic forces of the more advanced West. Agriculture was driven into extensive cereal cultivation by the expansion of commerce; industry, instead of developing gradually from commerce and small crafts, rapidly assumed the Western form of large cartelized undertakings. To be sure, there is no reason why Rumanian industrial development should have repeated the historical stages of Western industry; on the contrary, the fact that the West had evolved a high level of industry made it both unnecessary and impossible for Rumanian industry to pursue the same path; but this hurried adoption of alien industrial patterns was bound to lead to economic dislocations.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 95. Rumanian manufacturing in 1936–38 was 45 per cent above that in 1926–29; for world manufacturing as a whole the increase was 38 per cent.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

433
178

What was the effect of this industrial expansion upon Rumanian agriculture? In the first place, it did little to intensify farming, provide it with improved equipment, or lead to the creation of agricultural industries.

With all the accelerated rhythm of the process of industrialization, the cultivation of the soil and the raising of livestock have not received any notable stimulus toward intensification; food industries based upon agricultural produce have not developed; the textile industry, while well advanced, has neglected native textile plants—flax and hemp—it has stimulated the cultivation of cotton only in the last years, and has provided no incentive for improving the quality of wool; the oil industry has been unable to cause an increase in the production of oleaginous plants, and the introduction of the soy bean in recent years is the result solely of the influence of foreign commercial relations. Finally, the rudimentary and insufficient technical investment in agriculture and the minimal importance of chemical fertilizers illustrate the absence of any positive influence in this direction by the metallurgical and chemical industries.[5]

In the second place, industry in the interwar years, while growing rapidly, was in no position to absorb the excess labor force which was accumulating in agriculture in the absence of a more intensive cultivation. Between 1929 and 1938 personnel engaged in manufacturing industries increased by 90,000 or by about 10,000 a year, whereas the annual rural excess has been estimated at between 100,000 and 200,000.[6] Rumanian industry at its existing level was clearly unable to provide much relief to agricultural overpopulation.

It may be concluded, then, that the development of Rumanian industry was of little direct benefit to agriculture, either in improving or intensifying cultivation or in absorbing surplus labor. It has been maintained, on the contrary, that the advance of industry was at the expense of agriculture, a common complaint in most agrarian communities. Two preliminary observations should be made in this connection. In a society which is advancing there is a natural tendency for agriculture to play a relatively smaller part, the proportion of income spent on food is less, and agriculture's share in the total income declines. Moreover, since agricultural supply is less elastic than the supply of industrial products, agriculture is more apt to suffer in the event of price fluctuation. In a depression a price scissors is likely to occur; in the period 1929–39 this effect was very strong in

5. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 190.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

Rumania and undoubtedly served to maintain agriculture in a depressed condition.[7] These, however, are general tendencies which, in theory at least, should adjust themselves in time; in the long run, and on the assumption of mobility in the factors of production, an equilibrium should be reached between agriculture and industry. But apart from such general factors, did the specific form of the development of Rumanian industry work to the disadvantage of agriculture?

A Yugoslav rural health worker, in describing the relations between town and country in the Balkans, concluded that agriculture was losing in the exchange of goods:[8]

> A survey undertaken in several rural countries on the nutritional status of the population showed that there exists undernourishment among a large number of the rural population, and that agricultural products are exported from rural countries without consideration of the nutritional requirements of the people. The reasons are purely commercial. The industrial products imported into the rural countries in exchange serve merely the urban population and industrial establishments from which the farming population derives comparatively small benefit. To cover their money requirements, the farmers owning small holdings are usually compelled to sell the best products of their farms to the town people. Thus they are helping the cities and industries, themselves remaining far in the rear in regard to sanitation, housing, health, and general education.

The Rumanian economist Manoilescu undertook to demonstrate that in the Rumanian trade triangle between countryside, town, and foreign market, the countryside received far less in the way of goods

7. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 80:

(1929 prices = 100)

	Price of agricultural products	*Price of industrial products used by agriculture*	*Relation*
1929	100.0	100.0	100.0
1930	68.2	98.0	69.6
1931	50.8	86.6	58.7
1932	47.7	80.9	59.0
1933	44.9	81.1	55.4
1934	44.1	82.6	53.4
1935	48.4	90.2	53.7
1936	54.0	95.4	56.6
1937	64.6	101.8	63.9
1938	67.1	99.2	67.6
1939	72.7	112.5	64.6

8. Andreya Stampar, "Observations of a Rural Health Worker," quoted in *International Journal of Agrarian Affairs*, *1*, No. 1 (October, 1939), 71.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

page 89

V

POLITICS IN GREATER RUMANIA

THE political history of Rumania since 1922 has been extraordinarily involved and unstable, frequently verging on the absurd but ultimately tragic. Economic circumstances as outlined in the preceding section have contributed to the continuing instability both through the tangle of political issues which they have produced and through the demoralizing effect upon political life of widespread and chronic poverty. Two important qualifications must be made, however. 178

While it is true that the task of finding remedies to Rumania's economic difficulties was forced upon all successive administrations, the governments rarely acted on the basis of purely economic considerations. A strong economic nationalism, in part arising from the desire to defend the acquisitions of Greater Rumania against Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Russian irredentism, determined policy during most of the years after the First World War.[1] 565 665

The unhealthy condition of politics stemmed not merely from the poverty of the peasants but from the fact that they were not really included in the political life of the nation. In 1924 Professor Rădulescu-Motru observed that "The passivity of the peasantry has been the principal cause of Rumania's immorality." [2] Even the Peasant party had its ideological origins in a literary movement, and the leaders of the party were, in the main, professional men and intellectuals. To be sure, in all countries there is a divergence between the direction and active membership of a political party and the mass of the electorate, but it was carried to an extreme in Rumania because of the vast gulf which had existed for centuries between the peasant and his rulers. Parliamentary politics, including even the names of parties, had been copied from the West in the nineteenth century by sections of the ruling groups anxious to modernize Rumania. Since these imported parties had little to do with the great majority of the

1. For a discussion of the effects of national interests upon the economic policy of all the Danubian states in the 1920's see Leo Pasvolsky, *Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States* (New York, 1928). Antonin Basch, *The Danube Basin and the German Economic Sphere* (London, 1944), gives a sympathetic appreciation of the difficulties confronting these states in shaping their economic policy.

2. C. Rădulescu-Motru, *Țărănismul, un suflet și o politică* (Bucarest, 1924), p. 37.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 liberal commercial laws, but with anti-semitism at their base; we have introduced universal suffrage, but with ballot stuffing; we have ruined rural households in order to increase credit institutions, but we have not permitted free competition among these institutions, but have favored some—those belonging to us—and have attacked others—those belonging to our adversaries; we have encouraged national industry, but not for the benefit of the rural population, as would have been right, since they made the sacrifices, but for the benefit of politicians who are pensioners of this national industry; we have centralized the administration of the country, but not in the hands of a trained bureacracy but in the hands of the party and its partisans; in a word, we have aped the European bourgeoisie in form, but at bottom we have persisted in the sycophantic habits of the past. In this way we have transformed political life into a hopeless turmoil.[33]

Economic and Agrarian Policy

665 ●178 The 1911 program of the Rumanian Liberal party stated that "The agrarian question has undoubtedly been the chief preoccupation of the Liberal Government," but, significantly, went on to say, "A country in such geographic conditions and with its natural wealth cannot remain exclusively an agrarian country." [34] The second phrase was to be the dominant theme of the Liberals, and in the guidance of their actual conduct certainly overshadowed whatever agrarian preoccupations they may have had.

In November, 1921, just before its return to power, the party held a general congress and adopted a new program, suitable to the needs of Greater Rumania.[35] Like most political programs it attempted to promise all things to all people. The workers were to have an increased share in the benefits of industry. The agrarian question was seen as not merely one of property relations but of production. Better farming techniques were to be introduced, and the party undertook to encourage agricultural education, expand peasant credit, and organize the sale of agricultural products on a cooperative basis. Measures would be taken to enable the peasant to make use of forest land. As regards general economic policy:

The point of view of the National Liberal Party has long been known: the development of the wealth of the country, principally by labor, initiative, and Rumanian capital. This policy assured the economic inde-

33. C. Rădulescu-Motru, *Țărănismul, un suflet și o politică*, p. 43.
34. *Istoricul Partidului Național-Liberal*, pp. 196–199.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 231–234.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665
178

pendence of Little Rumania; it will assure the economic independence of Greater Rumania. Such a policy does not exclude the collaboration of foreign capital, but it wishes to have relations of sincere collaboration with such capital, not relations that will degenerate into a monopoly, dangerous to the national sovereignty and leaving the Rumanian nation poor in one of the richest lands of Europe.

As in 1911, the 1921 program combined a professed interest in the agrarian sector with a determination to develop the wealth of the nation—i.e., to industrialize—primarily through local initiative and capital.

Facing this optimistic program was the bleak reality of Rumania, devastated by the war but with extensive new territories whose economies were as yet unintegrated. Because of the campaign against Bela Kun's Hungarian Soviet republic in 1919, the war had lasted a year longer than in the West. By 1921 some recovery had been made and the first postwar budget presented, but the principal work of recovery and unification still lay ahead. The Liberals attempted to achieve recovery and industrialization simultaneously; in this effort, which strained Rumania's limited economy, interest in agriculture occupied a second place.

1. UNIFICATION OF THE ECONOMY

Before the First World War, the Old Kingdom, Bessarabia, Bucovina, and Transylvania had belonged to entirely distinct economic organizations, and their amalgamation after the war involved not merely administrative and financial readjustments but a complete reorientation in transport, commerce, and communications. The process of reorganization required a number of years, and indeed was not really completed by the end of the interwar period. Western Transylvania and the Banat suffered from the disruption of their ties with the Hungarian plain, the more so as industry was moved toward eastern Transylvania for reasons of security. Bessarabia seems never to have recovered from the loss of the Russian market for its agricultural produce.

A number of steps toward unification had been made before the Liberals came to office. Administrative centralization began under General Averescu in 1920; the various agrarian reform laws had been coordinated in some measure. In 1920 Russian rubles and Austro-Hungarian crowns had been exchanged for lei. This process was carried forward under the Liberals. The law of February 23, 1923, unified the tax system for the whole of Rumania. Banks of the Old King-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 178

dom, many of which were controlled by the Liberals, extended their influence into the new territories, either by absorbing local banks or by setting up branch offices.[36] The nationalization laws of 1924, which will be discussed presently, increased the participation of the Old Kingdom in the industrial life of the new provinces. These measures evoked threefold criticism: the provinces complained that they were being exploited to the benefit of the Old Kingdom; the minorities, especially the Hungarians, complained that they were suffering discrimination; the opposition parties charged the Liberals with using their official status and banking connections for the personal advantage of party members. Although it is next to impossible to find the core of truth in Rumanian financial scandals, there is little reason to doubt that the acts of unification and centralization were to the advantage of the Old Kingdom as against the provinces, of the Rumanians as against the minorities, and of the Liberal party as against all comers.

Transylvania with its relative wealth was the happy hunting ground for such activities (Bessarabia suffered wretchedly from the administrative centralization, but seems rather to have been a place of exile for unsuccessful administrators and political black sheep). National Bank credits were more generously supplied to Rumanian than to Magyar banks.[37] In 1929 the National Peasant economist, Virgil Madgearu, charged the Liberals with having introduced the law for the nationalization of methane gas for the purpose of gaining control over Transylvanian industries.[38] On the other hand, as Mr. C. A. Macartney has pointed out, the actual effect of "nationalization" upon the minority firms in Transylvania was less than might have been expected because of the generally lax way in which the measure was applied.[39] With respect to taxes there was a general belief among the Transylvanians that they were paying more than their

36. Alfred Bonafous, "Les grandes banques d'affaires de Roumanie," *Revue d'économie politique*, 36 (Paris, 1922), 323–340.

37. C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors*, p. 322.

38. G. C. Logio, *Rumania*, p. 125. According to Madgearu, an exclusive monopoly for the production of methane was given to a Liberal group, who supplied gas to industrialists at excessive prices, forcing them out of the market and leaving it free for rival firms belonging to Liberal confreres.

39. "The 'nationalization' of the minority firms has consisted in the practice of putting in a few Rumanian directors, who are given a packet of free shares or allowed to buy them at a nominal rate. After this, the average Rumanian director has been perfectly content to fill the role of guinea pig, his contribution to the business being to protect it against the Government. As most of these directors are Liberal politicians, they have usually been able to do so effectively. The activities of the 'Special Economic Commissions' have thus, paradoxically enough, been the strongest defence for the minority firms." Macartney, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665
178

share, because of stricter tax collection, and were receiving less in the way of public benefits.

2. RECOVERY

665
652

In tackling the problem of economic recovery the Liberal Minister of Finance, Vintilă Brătianu, adopted a policy of stern but primitive retrenchment. A dogged and truculent nationalism was manifest in the futile effort to revalorize the leu, in the restrictive tariff schedules, and in the suspicious attitude toward the investment of foreign capital. While his policy did achieve some desirable financial housecleaning, it was a strait jacket on the Rumanian economy and signally failed in its major aims. The fault, perhaps, lay not so much with his ideas as such, which did show a sturdy desire that Rumania should stand on its own feet, as with the fact that his goals and technique were not in accord with the potentialities of the Rumanian economy and administration.

One of Vintilă Brătianu's paramount aims was a balanced budget, which he saw as the keystone to the country's economic well-being. Between 1919 and 1922 the budgets, even though they made no provision for servicing the national debts, showed deficits which were covered by new issues of paper currency. He set about to balance the budget by cutting expenses to the bone, by covering expenses solely from the normal resources of the state, and by giving the budget sufficient elasticity to meet the fluctuations of the currency. Beginning with the fiscal year 1922–23 the budget showed a constant surplus of revenues over expenditures. Later reports of the French technical adviser to the National Bank indicate, however, that the announced surpluses in this period were in fact either nonexistent or far smaller than would appear from the accounts.[40] He also succeeded in consolidating part of Rumania's considerable foreign indebtedness by means of a British loan and in arranging for regular means of payment of a portion of the nation's debts.[41] These measures were necessary in clearing up the complete economic chaos of the war years; they did not, however, succeed in really strengthening the economy.

40. According to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Balkan States: I. Economic*, p. 48, somewhat the same thing occurred in all the Balkan states. After 1924 most of them showed a budgetary equilibrium that was, in fact, largely fictitious, partly because of doubtful accounting techniques, and the continued increase of expenditure even after the *de facto* stabilization of the currencies, indicating that the budget equilibrium was dependent upon continued rising prices.

41. V. V. Badulescu, "La Dette publique roumaine," *L'Economiste roumain*, 2, No. 4 (April, 1928), 111–114.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

page 170

VIII

THE CAROLIST PERIOD: DEPRESSION, 1930–38

●175 ALTHOUGH the ten years between 1930 and 1940 were increasingly dominated by the figure of King Carol, and in that sense may be considered as a unit, three more or less distinct phases are observable: a period of confusion and transition from 1930 through 1933, a period of uneasy stability from 1934 to 1937, and a period of crisis from 1938 to 1940. These phases resulted from a complicated intermingling of economic, political, and international circumstances.

[645] On the international level the decade witnessed the return of the most decisive of all factors in Rumanian history: the impact of great power interests, which had been relatively in abeyance during the first years after 1918 with the collapse of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires. As has been seen above, Rumania has been fated throughout its history either to be within the orbit of a great power or caught in a conflict between two or more great powers. Its independence in the nineteenth century had been achieved through a temporary equilibrium of these foreign forces, and the creation of Greater Rumania was possible only because of the power vacuum in eastern Europe. The 1930's saw the revival of Soviet Russia and the hectic ascendency of the Third Reich. The predominance of German influence in the late 1930's and the special turn of events given by the German-Soviet pact of 1939 were of decisive importance in determining the course of Rumanian history.

Internal politics advanced in three stages: a time of political uncertainty accompanied by rapid changes in the government, the breakdown of the older parties, and the burgeoning of new movements; a period of apparent stability during the four years of the Tătărescu administration from the end of 1933 to the end of 1937; a period of royal dictatorship which began with Carol's dissolution of all political parties in 1938 and ended with his abdication and flight after the territorial losses of 1940.

175 Economically, the picture was one of continuous slump until 1934, and then a slow rally accelerating until the outbreak of war in 1939. Industry was the chief gainer; agriculture barely recovered from the losses of the depression. Economic policy underwent a tremendous

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

change, in Rumania as elsewhere, from a paralyzed economic liberalism to increasing controls in commercial, financial, and industrial activity.

King Carol's own role in all these developments is rather elusive. In the intricate game of political maneuvering his shrewdness is seen in the fact that starting from a weak position he not only established himself but drove all other political groups into the wilderness or prison. But for all his adept political manipulations and his flamboyant propaganda there is something unsubstantial about his reign, and nothing seems less real than his dictatorship. While he was not, as king, the frothy playboy the international press had depicted, he did not, either in his ideas or actions, show himself to be a statesman of any magnitude. He had a strong bent for personal rule, to which he attached some rather inconsequential corporatist clichés and an exaltation of the "younger generation." He seems to have had no coherent set of economic ideas beyond a romantic notion of himself as the first peasant, the first laborer, and the first public servant of his realm. The real economic direction came not from Carol but from the increasingly powerful industrialists who came to the fore in the years after the depression.

Survey of Political Events

Between Maniu's resignation in October and the accession of the Liberals in November, 1933, Rumanian political and economic life was more than usually bewildering and confused. The depression was undoubtedly largely responsible for the feeling of panic and uncertainty apparent in the governments of these years. At the same time, the political events were not wholly a reflex of the immediate economic influence but had a certain logic of their own. Rumania's quasi-parliamentary party system was beginning to crumble, extraparliamentary groups were moving into the foreground, and Carol made his first if not successful effort to reorganize political life according to his own lights. These developments proceeded from sources deeper than the depression, though they were intensified by it; they were a part of that profound social crisis which has stricken most of the world in the last thirty years.

The National Peasant cabinet, reconstituted under Mironescu after Maniu's resignation, had a brief and unhappy career. Mironescu was an altogether colorless figure; the government during his term in office was halting and hesitant in its actions, and showed none of the enthusiasm of 1929. Carol was known to feel that the old parties—

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

829
665

2) the distinctly undemocratic implications of this evolution in economic ideas, at least in their Rumanian context.

It would be absurd to suppose that the actual development of Rumanian economic policy was based upon any such theoretical considerations, but there is a reasonably close parallel between the progress of Manoilescu's ideas and the development of the economic and industrial policy of the Rumanian government from that of the old Liberals under Vintilă Brătianu to that of the Liberal government of the 1930's. Although the old Liberals had favored a program of industrialization with state support, it was handled primarily through the private banks, controlled by the Liberals, and was directed chiefly toward extracting natural resources and creating secondary industries. Moreover, the tight-fisted fiscal policy of Vintilă Brătianu had served as a check on economic activity.

178
433

After 1933 industrialization proceeded at a much more rapid tempo and in a somewhat different direction. The private banks after the depression played a less important part in financing industry; the principal initiative was by the National Bank or the state itself, both through state-owned corporations and through the growing importance of the state as consumer of industrial products. Expansion was most extensive in heavy industry; large cartels appeared and there was a notable concentration of industrial activity. Between 1933 and 1938 the number of "large" industrial concerns (i.e., with at least 20 workers and more than 10 horsepower) increased only from 3,487 to 3,767, whereas the installed horsepower increased from 529,965 to 746,789, and the employed personnel from 184,777 to 289,117.[24] The horsepower employed in capital goods industries increased from 287,266 in 1932 to 452,870 in 1937, as contrasted with a more modest increase from 237,442 to 289,666 in consumer goods industries. The output in quantity of capital goods had by 1937 increased by 57.4 per cent over the 1927 level, consumer goods by 45 per cent.[25] The production of steel, which had hit a high of 143,511 metric tons in 1928, and dropped to a low of 103,046 in 1932, rose from 144,766 tons in 1933 to 276,532 in 1938.[26] There was no doubt that the policy was directed toward heavy industry and was having results.

Two important reasons for this industrialization were, of course, the depression and the rearmament program. The collapse of the grain market and the spread of agrarian protectionism among the

24. Madgearu, *Evoluţia economiei romîneşti*, p. 149.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
26. *Breviaire statistique de la Roumanie* (1940), p. 164.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

industrial states naturally stimulated Rumania, as it did the other Balkan states, to create its own industries. The growing international tension in the 1930's led to a heavy demand for arms and munitions. In 1937 the president of the Rumanian union of metallurgical and mineral industries stated that the principal characteristic of the years of recovery had been the large industrial investments, especially for the purpose of creating a powerful armaments industry.[27]

But if the depression and the demand for armaments stimulated industrialization, they in turn assisted in the rise of very powerful industrial interests, which progressively dominated not only the economic but the political scene.[28] These years witnessed the rise of such industrial giants—giants at least in Rumania—as Max Auşnit and Nicolae Malaxa. These men represented a different type of influence from that of the Brătianus. The latter, through their position in the banks, had equated the Liberal party with a policy of industrial advance through the financial institutions, but they were primarily politicians. Auşnit and Malaxa, on the other hand, were primarily industrialists who were able political manipulators but whose field of action was outside the political arena. It might be added that King Carol himself, who operated "outside" politics, was by no means disinterested in industrialization and had a large personal stake in the new industries.[29]

Rumanian industries, and especially the new heavy industry, required both protection and capital. Industrial protection had marked the whole history of Rumanian tariff policy, and even the National Peasant tariff of 1929 did not renounce it. But the new devices, developed as defenses during the depression, became far more potent weapons than any which had existed heretofore. Indeed, they were far more effective in assisting industry than in fulfilling their ostensible function of safeguarding national finances and the currency.[30]

27. Quoted in Pătrăşcanu, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

28. An example is the Skoda scandal of 1935, in which a storm was raised over a contract for armaments made by the National Peasants with the Czech Skoda works in 1930. Although an effort was made to involve some National Peasant ministers in charges of graft, the real cause of the scandal appears to have been that the contract had been made "without regard for the law concerning national armament activity."

29. For obvious reasons it is difficult to ascertain the extent of Carol's industrial interests. According to Pătrăşcanu (*op. cit.*, p. 48), in published reports of enterprises in which he was a shareholder Carol held 30 to 35 per cent of the shares of the Malaxa works, and almost as much in several smaller industries. Four of the largest sugar mills were in his hands, as well as a beer factory. He had important shares in the gold mines and the telephone company and a large control of Banca de Credit Român.

30. Rumania's exchange position and the leu never achieved any stability despite the most elaborate series of measures. I would agree with Antonin Basch's conclusion (*The Danube Basin*, p. 143) that the signal failure of Rumania either to achieve cur-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

642 and a couple of days later, with the agreement of Maniu and Constantin Brătianu, demanded his abdication. Carol fled the country, with Mme Lupescu and Colonel Urdareanu, the core of his camerilla. For Rumania, however, the absurd result was that popular indignation over the loss of Transylvania at the hands of the Axis merely placed in power an ardently pro-Axis government which immediately recognized the Vienna Decree.

Economic and Agrarian Policy

● 178 In the economic sphere the years of the Carolist dictatorship show four important characteristics:

1) a continued emphasis upon industrialization;

2) a reaction against small peasant agriculture and a growing agricultural paternalism;

3) increasing regimentation of the economy, both for economic planning and for military preparedness;

4) the growing dominance of Germany in Rumanian economic life.

The policy of industrialization which had got under way after the depression continued its course of expansion under the dictatorship, with the additional stimulus of the menace of war. After the outbreak of war the restriction of trade channels and raw material imports reduced industrial production somewhat. The loss of territory in 1940 produced, of course, a general dislocation of the economy. Industrial policy, however, was merely the culmination of the whole trend of the Carolist regime.

In the field of agrarian policy there was a noticeable reaction against small peasant holdings and renewed talk of creating a middle peasantry. As has been seen, the policy of all Rumanian governments on this question has been confused and contradictory. The National Peasants in 1929, by relaxing regulations for the transfer of peasant property, had hoped to create more prosperous and self-sustaining holdings, but their action had rather the effect of dispossessing the small peasant. On the other hand, the debt conversions of 1932–34 had the opposite effect and in a negative way were, as Garoflid called them, a new peasant resettlement in that they limited the effect of the economic crisis in weeding out the weaker peasants. The Tătărescu government had attempted to colonize relatively underpopulated areas with medium holdings and by the law of 1937 had tried, ineffectually, to check the subdivision of land.

642 654 Under the Carol dictatorship somewhat more extensive measures

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

In January, 1948, the Statistical Institute of the new Rumanian People's Republic undertook an agrarian census to ascertain the distribution of land after the 1945 reform. Unfortunately, this census does not permit satisfactory comparison with that of 1941. It presents a table, comparing the number of agricultural exploitations in the various categories of size for 1941 and 1948, which shows, as might be expected, a decrease in the number of dwarf holdings under ½ hectare and of large holdings over 20 hectares, and a marked increase in the number of exploitations between 1 and 5 hectares. However, since the amount of area occupied by these categories of exploitations is not given and it is unclear whether the same types of land (especially forests and pastures) are included in both cases, the comparison is not very illuminating and may be misleading.[43] It was obvious, however, that the land reform of 1945 did not, as it could not, create a nation of prosperous small-holders. Indeed, the conclusion reached as to the size of Rumanian exploitations has a very familiar ring: "If 3 hectares represents in general the minimum lot necessary to sustain by farming a household of 4 persons, then more than half of the agricultural exploitations of Rumania fall short of this level and are obliged to have recourse to outside income." [44] To be sure, this sour note was not the one prevailing in 1945 and 1946, when the reform was being pushed through, but anticipated the new agrarian line taken up in 1948.

In judging the 1945 land reform, it is necessary to realize, however, that it was not a Rumanian reform but had its sources in the Soviet Union, and that its immediate aims were political not economic.

---

for hundreds of years, were greatly reduced by the wholesale transfer of nearly the entire able-bodied population to the Soviet Union in the winter of 1944–45. Undoubtedly a high percentage of the Germans had been actively pro-Nazi, but the Soviet order paid no attention to any such criteria.

43. Number of agricultural exploitations (excluding Northern Transylvania):

		1948		1941	
Size of exploitation		*Number*	*Per cent*	*Number*	*Per cent*
Total		2,596,900	100.0	2,303,472	100.0
0–½	hectare	190,169	7.3	277,500	12.0
½–1	"	246,016	9.5	213,088	9.3
1–3	"	933,383	35.9	760,700	33.0
3–5	"	604,540	23.3	441,213	19.2
5–10	"	462,607	17.8	449,716	19.5
10–20	"	122,262	4.7	116,537	5.1
20–50	"	26,607	1.0	27,845	1.2
Over 50	"	11,316	0.4	16,873	0.7

A. Golopenția and P. Onica, *Recensământul agricol din Republica Populară Română, 25 Ianuarie 1948. Rezultate provizorii*, Institutul Central de Statistică (Bucarest, 1948). For further details of the 1948 census see the Appendix. It appears that a good deal more land was included in this census than in 1941.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

423 ●178 Although it was represented as the manifestation of the wishes of the broad masses of the Rumanian peasantry, it seems evident that the main outlines of the law were not drafted in Rumania at all but in Moscow. A comparison of the texts of the Rumanian land reform law with those for the provincial administrations of the Soviet Zone of Germany, passed in the summer of 1945, reveals striking parallels. With the exception of the size of property subject to expropriation (in Germany properties over 100 hectares were to be expropriated), the laws were altogether similar and in certain sections employed identical phrases.[45] Whatever the merits or results of the reform, it was not a local measure but part of a more general agrarian policy being prepared for a much larger area.

In its general lines and intentions the agrarian reform clearly derives from Lenin's interpretation of class relations in a predominantly agrarian society: the need of eradicating the feudal remnants and of gaining the support of the peasantry by fulfilling its desires for land. In its specific context it was an important part of the National Democratic Front's attempt to obtain mass support in its political campaign. As a means of obtaining positive popularity among the peasants it may be doubted whether it was a great success, and there is no satisfactory evidence that it won the Groza government an enthusiastic peasant following. In the first place, it was physically impossible to grant the Rumanian peasant sufficient land to make him a satisfied and prosperous cultivator. Moreover, the peasants have always felt that the land was theirs and they have never shown themselves particularly grateful to those who parceled it out. On the other hand, the Communists' interest in winning over the peasantry should not be understood as merely a desire to gain popularity. The whole purpose of Lenin's peasant policy was to "neutralize" the peasantry at critical junctures in the party's progress so as to make sure it did not become actively hostile. As such a guarantee it was, perhaps, more successful.

The importance of the agrarian reform in eradicating feudal residues was indirect rather than direct. The Communists undoubtedly

45. Cf. *Frankfurter Zeitung*, September 12, 1945, which gives an account of the German laws. Both reforms started with the same formula that agrarian reform was a national, economic, and social necessity. In both laws local committees of poor peasants were to prepare the land lists, peasants with less than 5 hectares were entitled to land, payment could be in money or kind, with a 10 per cent payment the first year, although poor peasants could obtain a three-year moratorium. The price of the lots was the equivalent of one year's produce. New properties could not be sold, mortgaged, leased, or broken up. Farm machinery was to be placed in a common pool. These similarities are obviously no coincidence, and it is certainly unlikely that the German provincial administrations should have copied the Rumanian land reform independently.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

exaggerated the economic importance of the boyars and the extent of their holdings. Nevertheless, a certain boyar spirit still prevailed in Rumania and the fact of land ownership continued to be a mark of prestige.[46] The agrarian reform, in this respect, was probably effective in removing one of the symbols, if not the real source of strength, of Rumania's traditional ruling group.

423 178

As an equalitarian measure the land reform undoubtedly has an emotional appeal. When one has followed the history of the agrarian question in Rumania and the way in which the landed interests held out against the peasants until forced to grudging compromises; when one has seen the peasant humbly removing his *căciulă* as the landowner passed, and has perceived the chasm between the peasant and his rulers, one is moved by a feeling that retributive justice has been done. Retributive justice, however, does not reconstruct a society, solve economic problems, or even guarantee that the peasant will not be burdened with a new master.

The immediate economic effects of the reform were unfavorable but should not be exaggerated. The law was applied in the midst of spring planting, and the carefully planned spontaneity of its execution undoubtedly caused a decline in production. Some well-organized large properties were broken up in the process, but on the whole the output of Rumanian large properties had not been very impressive and much of the land was let out. Their function as guides to improved cultivation could certainly be taken over by model farms.

In its professed aim of creating a prosperous peasant agriculture, the agrarian reform alone could have only marginal value, although it undoubtedly provided a temporary relief for a number of peasants. It did not solve the problems of overpopulation, low productivity, strip farming, and the progressive fragmentation of properties. Although the new allotments were not to be broken up, the reform did, by creating new small holdings, increase the area where fragmentation had been most destructive in the past. Essentially the agrarian reform was only the last step of a process which had been going on in Rumania since 1864—the gradual reduction of estate land and its conversion into peasant holdings. Unfortunately the process had been so slow that it could never be more than a palliative. As the final stage in this conversion the 1945 reform was of much less importance than its predecessor. It should not, however, be considered as merely a last step; for the Communists it was clearly a first step.

46. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe*, p. 137, comments on the persistence of land ownership as a source of prestige and social position in these countries, and on the tendency of the successful tradesman or politician to acquire an estate.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

already enjoys virtually complete control over the country. Moreover, 648
while the Rumanian political and economic structure is steadily approaching, and probably not asymptotically, the Soviet model, the final decision on incorporation will be based—apart from considerations of expediency—on political definitions which a mind not steeped in Leninism-Stalinism would have small chance of foreseeing.[20]

Economic Conditions

Economic developments since 1945 may be divided into two periods: 178
two years, 1945–47, of confusion and distress resulting from the war, Russian withdrawals, severe drought, the agrarian reform, monetary inflation, and the unsettled political situation; since 1947, a period of greater stability, an apparent increase in production, and the beginning of a directed and planned economy. In neither period can one obtain a very satisfactory picture of economic conditions. In the first months there was much administrative disorganization, and the government itself frequently lacked accurate information. The Groza regime has not hesitated from the outset to manipulate statistics for political and propagandistic purposes. Since the tightening of the administration in 1948, Rumania has been as reluctant as the Soviet Union, more reluctant than the other satellites, to publish any measurable economic data. Today, the few figures that appear are given as percentage gains for which it would be exceedingly difficult to supply a reasonably accurate base.

In general, it may be said that Rumania was slower than the other 433
eastern European states to recover from the war, in somewhat the 241
same way it lagged in coming out of the depression. Agricultural production fell off seriously in 1945 and 1946, partly because of the disorganization attendant upon the agrarian reform, but largely because of two years' serious drought. Both the acreage sown and the crop yields, especially in maize, the peasant's source of food, were exceptionally low; in 1946 the level of agricultural production was only 59 per cent of the 1934–38 average.[21] The production of indus-

20. This point is not very important but it is of interest to note that in the exchange of notes leading to Tito's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, after referring to Kardelj's hope, expressed in 1945, that the Yugoslav government would be regarded as the representatives of one of the future Soviet republics, rather scornfully dismissed his "primitive and fallacious reasoning . . . about Yugoslavia as a future constituent part of the USSR." It did not, however, vouchsafe its own authoritative views on the subject. Cf. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute* (London; New York, 1948), p. 39.

21. United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948* (Geneva, 1949), p. 17.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

175
361



FIGURE 5. The distributions shown are only approximate, but they show the broad distinction between the typical Roumanian settlements ("dispersed" and "transitional") of the mountains and foothills and the compact Saxon and Szekler settlements of the Transylvanian lowlands.

175
361
178

led naturally towards the tectonic basins of Treiscaune, Ciuc and Giurgiu, though these were not actually occupied until the thirteenth century. The Szeklers did not, however, displace the indigenous Roumanian population in these lowland areas; neither have they maintained the same degree of "contiguous isolation" as have the Saxons. During the nineteenth century in fact, there has been a steady assimilation of the Roumanian peasantry, some measure of which may be gained from the fact that since the middle of the century a Roumanian majority has been changed into a Szekler majority in 169 communes, whereas the reverse process has been effected in only 26 communes. In the former case, large numbers of Roumanians have adopted the dress and religion of the Szeklers, but the Roumanian

137



FIGURE 6. This illustrates the sharp distinction between the forested highlands and the lowlands, and should be compared with Figures 5 and 7.

175
78
361

majorities have resulted from the valleyward movement of families that had previously farmed the slopes overlooking these intermont basins.

361 361 AN IMPORTANT distinction between the Roumanians and the rest of the population is seen in the types and distribution of their settlements (see Fig 5). The former, with their customary attachment to highland areas and to pastoral life, are usually associated with a dispersed or loosely agglomerated

464 722 1941 there were 2,000 unemployed, while in December 1942, it was announced that the Office of Unemployment Statistics had been abolished, as there were no unemployed. Though Rumania's military mobilisation and losses have been extensive, her labour reserves are theoretically still considerable. On the other hand, there is no doubt that both industry and agriculture are suffering a noticeable labour shortage. This is attributable to the low level of mechanisation, internal economic organisation and to the cumbersome administration, so that comparison with western countries is impossible.

1. Agriculture.

464 241 The proportion of the working population engaged in agriculture is extremely high, so that military recruitment has been principally from this source. The structure of Rumanian agriculture, which is mainly peasant farming with a low output per head, has meant that the withdrawal of some 550,000 men has been more serious than it would have been in a country where more up-to-date methods are used, and the remaining labour supply is more mobile. The normal sources of supplementary wartime labour have been drawn on—*i.e.*, the temporary demobilisation of soldiers, employment of children during the summer holidays, and presumably an increased employment of women, although there is no evidence of women having been forcibly transferred to agriculture.

[727] The most valuable supplementary labour, however, has been the employment of Russian prisoners of war, and the demand for their services has exceeded the supply. The number employed in March 1942 was 40,000. These measures to improve the agricultural labour position do not as yet appear to have had much effect.

2. Industry

162 438 178 According to the latest official census figures (relating to the year 1930) 620,000 persons were employed in industry. The following table shows in column 1 the total number employed in the main branches, and in columns 2 and 3 the numbers working in factories employing ten or more people. A comparison between columns 2 and 3 gives an indication of the growing industrialisation of the country.

	1 1930	2 1930	3 1937
Food	122,000	25,200	34,700
Textiles and Clothing	155,000	34,800	70,500
Metallurgy	101,000	32,000	49,500
Timber..	94,000	31,000	44,000
Mining	53,000	n.a.	n.a.

Allowing for the increased industrialisation during the years 1930–39, and for the general increase in the total population to some 20,000,000, it is estimated that by 1939 the number of industrial workers in Greater Rumania would have risen to some 750,000.

With the loss of part of the provinces of Transylvania, Crişana and Maramureş, Rumania suffered a fairly considerable loss in industrial workers, so that added to the expulsion of Jews, repatriation of Germans, etc., and military mobilisation, it is estimated that at the end of [46A] 1942 the numbers engaged in industry would not exceed 550,000.

As in the case of agriculture, the structure of Rumanian industry tends to prevent a thorough rationalisation and concentration of the available industrial labour.

[55b]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

much by the Rumanian people as by the intervention of Rumanian and foreign statesmen, whose interests did not coincide with those of the majority of Rumanians. The history of Rumania during the period between the two Great Wars and during the present war is another and more vivid illustration of this passivity of a people, caught in the titanic struggle between Great Powers. 175 648

The economic and political effects of this development can be seen in the exploitation to which the people have been subjected for centuries, chiefly by foreign merchants and trusts, aided and abetted by a greedy and corrupt ruling class, and in the almost suicidal situation into which the nation has been manœuvred in recent times by its short-sighted leaders.

Psychologically, many centuries of political oppression and of economic exploitation have had an even more serious effect in the attitude of many sections of the people to life in general and to their own fate in particular. Generations of Rumanians have been methodically robbed of the fruits of their work for centuries. Their fate was not greatly affected by superficial changes, such as their elevation from serfs to peasants. This explains that they are reluctant to produce more food than they themselves can eat; for it is certain that the money-lender, the tax-collector, their own or some foreign army will take it from them. This fatalism, and the ignorance which their rulers have shown no great enthusiasm to remedy, explain the backwardness of the great masses of the people. But it would be quite wrong to assume that this implies an exhaustion of their latent powers. The Rumanians have often 181

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

181 shown that they possess qualities equal to those of other nations, and they still do. These forces are dormant, covered, as it were, by a thick skin which has grown as a result of blows which had to be suffered and could not be parried. If and when the strain becomes too great, and when opportunity comes, then this people may discover its power and, if it be well led, form a healthy State.

669 186 Up to now this* has never happened: the people has never won against its oppressors. And this is a factor which has been ever present in Rumanian history. The peasant revolt which broke out amongst the Rumanians in Transylvania in 1785, four years before the French Revolution, ended in complete defeat. The national movement of Tudor Vladimirescu in 1820 resulted in little more than the appointment of Rumanian, instead of Greek, princes to the thrones of Moldavia and Wallachia. The revolutions of 1848 were speedily crushed by the combined forces of the great empires and, in the case of the Rumanians of Transylvania, were used in the most cunning way to defeat the national movement of another people. The union of Wallachia and Moldavia, one of the most genuine aims of the whole Rumanian people, was achieved in the end less by popular forces than by intrigues and international diplomacy. The Great Peasant Revolt of 1907 was put down by the military and cost thousands of peasants' lives. The Land Reforms of 1917 were accepted by a parliament which contained not one single peasant; and they were carried out by one of the richest landowners of Rumania, who, with his associates, had certainly no intention of applying them in such a way as to diminish the power of his

*[i.e: the formation of a healthy State -- Analyst]

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

666

December, 1950. As a matter of course, only one party appeared on the ballot. Some 80,000 persons appointed to local soviets were duly elected.

181 One of the distinguishing characteristics of this "uprising of the proletariat" was the extreme paucity of Communists. Another was the fact that the population had no democratic tradition to fall back upon. The country had lived under a fascist type of dictatorship without sensing that it had been very differently treated than it would no doubt have been under a liberal regime. When the war was over, most of Antonescu's Iron Men simply transformed themselves into a different metal. We may say without hesitation that opportunism and not conviction made Rumania's transition to Sovietism so absurdly simple. Nobody had believed it possible that a man like Dr. Maniu could be clapped into jail, brought before the courts on a trumped-up charge, and sentenced. But the People's Democracy managed even that, and it was small wonder that the average citizen began to think earnestly about his own throat.

795 As we ponder the evil fortunes which lay ahead for religious confessions in Rumania, it is helpful to bear in mind that this country, the easternmost colony of the Roman Empire, learned to know Christianity as early as the second century of the present era. Congregations formed there were represented at some of the earliest councils of the Church. Subsequently, after wars and invasions had run their course, the Rumanian ecclesiastical establishment was affiliated with the Eastern, or Byzantine, Patriarchate. As a result Greek Orthodoxy became the confession to which the great majority of the people subscribed after the independence of the nation had been achieved in 1878. The Church thus established occupied a position in the life of the country which was not unlike that of the Orthodox Church in Bulgaria. The clergy participated in the official affairs of the nation. In general, exception having been duly

175 revived with, under the circumstances, the Cathedral as their focus of expression. In Roumania fate worked out things differently. The seventh to the tenth century in east-central Europe saw much forest cutting and planting of villages, and the widespread languages of these settlers belonged to the Slavonic family which may have had its [197] early home in or near Polish Galicia. This linguistic influence penetrated Roumania and combined itself with the Latin heritage to make the later language of the country. Magyars passed through on their way to the Hungarian plain, and [184] Huns and Visigoths had gone that way before. So the local tradition weakened along the valley and lowland ways and kept itself alive in the highlands where still dwell people who are no doubt largely descendants of the primeval cultivators with many waves of culture washed over them but the Roman influence vital still.

346

Bell tower, Borsec.

342 Windows are generally double even in the simpler houses, one opening to the inside, the other to the outside. They are always barred and set in a wooden frame (Jänecke, 1918: 27-28).

342 531 The Rumanian house is noteworthy for its exterior decorations. Special attention and much imagination is given to the woodwork. Much art is evident in the pillars supporting the roof over the veranda (fig. 57d), lintels supporting the eaves, the railings of the veranda and the window and door frames. The corners of houses may have designs in low relief. Painted designs may be placed on the wall in great abundance (figs. 57a, 57b). Because of the lesser opportunity of embellishment through woodwork and because whitewashed walls lend themselves well to painting, painting of the exterior is characteristic of the plains. The Rumanian does not shy away from bright colors. Ultramarine is most popular, for it is [789] said to scare away evil spirits. Combinations of red, blue and [B22] yellow are common, and dark green shades are also favored (Jänecke, 1918: 23).

342 The basic difference between the house of the lowlands and [84] those of the mountain region is that the latter are of two-story [341] construction (fig. 64a). Building materials in the mountains are stone and wood rather than wicker and mud. When houses are built on an incline a high stone foundation forms the ground floor (pivnita). This can be used for stables, storage rooms and also as a wine cellar. This form persists even when the terrain is flat. The higher house is appreciated for its better view, greater security and suitability for defense.

While the floor plan often consists of a row of rooms similar to that of the lowlands, a number of changes have taken place. The anteroom with its large hearth is generally left out (fig. 64b). This is due to the fact that the bricks that line the hearth are not available, and the wooden walls are more inflammable than the predominantly mud ones of the plains. Where the hearth is present [354] it is put into a special annex. Instead of the hearth an oven-stove (a combination stove and oven) is used, which permits the main room to be used as living room and sleeping room as well as a kitchen.

The two-room house predominates; due to the absence of the connecting anteroom, each room has a door to the veranda (ŝerdak) (fig. 66). Sometimes the veranda at the top of the stairway is expanded into a hall-like structure (foişor) (fig. 64a) covered by a hipped roof at right angles to the main roof. In summer most activities take place there.

The foundation is made of rocks or of large pebbles from the river. Walls are made of horizontal logs or boards which cross at the corners, each fitting into a notch in the other. A mud or lime plaster is never omitted, and to facilitate this plastering thin laths are nailed diagonally across the beams.

The roof is steeper than in the plains and protrudes further over the house. The support is in the form of a cellar. The rafters tend to be too widely spaced, which results in slight bending of the battens; but, while it makes for a weaker roof, this results in softer and more pleasing lines. The four corners are not sharp but tend to be rounded (fig. 62). Wooden shingles are almost exclusively used for roof covering. They are about 15 centimeters wide and may be as long as 3 meters. They overlap two to four times. Shorter shingles form 6-10 rows. The smaller shingles may have their ends in the form of swallow tails or other decorative shapes. The ridge shows a special development. On the windward side the first layer of shingles is made to protrude over the ridgepole (fig. 62). These shingles also have excised patterns and are very ornamental. The ridgepoles may extend slightly over the hip and have a small gabled roof, one shingle in height (fig. 62). This provides an opening for the smoke to escape through. Ornamental poles rise at either end of the ridgepole (fig. 61). 342 [335] [531]

Chimneys are lacking and the smoke may escape through openings at the ridge or otherwise through the roof, which then shows all shades of gray to black. In some areas of Oltenia in southwestern Rumania one finds wooden chimneys (fig. 65). These are made of wicker and daub and are covered with shingles. [354] [184]

A special development in the foothills of the Southern Carpathian Mountains is the privy, which is in the form of an annex located at the end of the veranda (fig. 64b). [184] [514]

In general the buildings in the mountain districts show a greater variation than those of the plains. The woodwork is superior, and shows a great deal of inventiveness. The construction, however, is irregular, sloppy and often not functional. Pillars that carry no weight may be very thick, while those that must support much weight may be much too slender (Jänecke, 1918: 35-43). 342 184 [335]

Kulas (fig. 67) are found only in the mountainous regions of Oltenia in the district of Mehedinti, Gorj and Râmnicu-Vâlcea. They were built by the boyars, the wealthy landowners. The oldest ones come from the period when the Rumanian rulers were paying tribute to the Sultan. The ground plan is a square 7 by 12 meters in length. The width of the walls is 30-70 centimeters. The kula (fig. 69) may have three or four stories, each about 2.5 meters in height. Each story has one room. The ground floor is used for storage; sometimes a well is built into it, and occasionally there is a subterranean escape passage. The upper floors may also be used for storage, but are mainly living quarters. Windows are generally found only on one side; the other walls are provided with loopholes. On the top floor there is generally an open veranda (ğerdak) about 3 meters wide, the roof over which is supported by pillars (fig. 67). The exposure is toward the valley and the south. On the side opposite the ğerdak there is a simple wooden balcony under the eaves (fig. 67). Many kulas have a privy tower attached to them. 342 712 [184] [556] [175] [312] [514]

342 712 The stairway, about 1.25 meters wide made of massive logs, is generally on the inside of the buildings; when it is located on the outside it leads onto the wooden balcony. The exterior is white-washed. In addition, the surface is decorated with molded bands [531] around each story division. There may also be a vertical division, thus creating a number of large panels. While these areas are symmetrical, neither they nor the molded bands that enclose them have any relation to the placing of windows or pillars (Jänecke, 1918: 62-63).

342 In 1895 there still existed about 55,000 earth huts (bordei) [175] which were inhabited by the poorest population, generally Gypsies [563] (fig. 63). They are common in the Danubian plain. Over an excavation 1-3 meters deep is placed a gabled roof. The roof is made of boards over which earth is laid. Sometimes reeds are placed over the boards before the earthen cover is added. The entrance is on one of the gabled sides, generally with a southerly exposure, and a window is placed on each gable side (Jänecke, 1918: 4).

343 351 Farm Buildings. In the lowlands the buildings are arranged in no definite order; though generally the house is closest to the road. The corn-house (coşar) is either opposite to or at right angles to the house so that it can be watched. The yard and orchard are surrounded by a fence. The simplest fence is made of wickerwork between wooden poles. More often, however, it is made of boards [556] that have intricate excised designs (fig. 60). The wealthy people [563] may add an imposing gateway with a small door. Flower or vegetable [244] gardens are rare, and the latter are called bulgări, since they are [247] generally kept by immigrant Bulgarians who grow all the vegetables [245] for town consumption (Stratilesco, 1907: 233). The farmstead is surrounded by shady trees, and there is generally a plum orchard at the back of the farm buildings (Jänecke, 1918: 8-9).

[184] In the mountain regions the arrangement of the buildings in the yard differs from that of the lowlands. The stables and other buildings are arranged on the border of the yard in a horseshoe form to serve as protection for the house. The yard is usually very small, and has a strong high palisade with a massive gateway, the whole giving the farm a fortress-like appearance (the author points to the presence of bears in summer and wolves in winter) (Jänecke, 1918: 32-35).

343 [184] In the lowlands there are generally not many additional farm buildings in the yard, and this fact is correlated with the pattern of building additional sheds to the house, a more economical and practical procedure. Stables are of the simplest lathwork or wickerwork, covered with a straw roof. Sheds for the storage of straw, hay and cornstalks are absent, for the latter are stacked into tall round piles in the open. The baking oven for summer use, made of mud and bricks, has a hipped roof supported by four pillars.

The only noteworthy building is the corn-house (*gîtule de porumb*) (figs. 59a, 59b), which is found, however, only among the well-to-do. Unlike the house, it is a two-story structure. The lower floor has plastered walls, and serves as stable and cart-shed. The upper story is made of wickerwork, often arranged in interesting patterns, permitting the air to circulate. The attic is used for the storage of food and is reached by a ladder from the outside. The hipped roof is of straw (Jänecke, 1918: 25-27). R 343 [556] R [251] [417]

In the mountain regions stables have only three walls, and animals stay in these half-open shelters even in winter. The imposing corn-house of the plains is rarely found in the mountains. In its place is erected a long narrow building of wickerwork. This rests on short stone pillars about 50 centimeters above the ground and is covered by a shingled roof. Since the ground floor of the house is used for storage there is no need for many additional farm buildings (Jänecke, 1918: 43-45). R [184]

CONCLUSION

Having presented an area by area discussion of the village forms and farmsteads, it is desirable to trace the distribution of certain major elements. Roughly, four types of settlement pattern can be distinguished. They are the village consisting of widely scattered hamlets (Cvijić's Stari Vlah type); the agglomerated village (Cvijić's Timok type); the road village (Cvijić's Mačva type); and the *čiftlik* type, the settlement created by Turkish landowners. The first of these is composed of widely scattered houses in no regular order, grouped into hamlets a number of which constitute a village. It predominates in Slovenia, Western Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, western Serbia, and in the mountain areas of central Bulgaria and Rumania. A variant of this form, characterized by more closely spaced houses within the separate hamlets (Cvijić's Ibar type), exists in the Karst regions behind the Adriatic coast, in Albania and southwestern and western Serbia. Hilly terrain and forested regions are conducive to this scatter, but are not the sole determinants. The Ibar type is associated with greater barrenness of soil and the necessity of conserving arable land. S 361 171 184 S [182] [311]

Agglomerated villages are characterized by crowded houses set in an irregular order along crooked streets. They prevail in eastern and southern Serbia and in southern Macedonia. While they are associated with the necessity of conserving arable land in some of the more barren regions of eastern Serbia, this explanation will not hold for the fertile basins of Kosovo, Kumanovo and Skoplje. Here they are no doubt the result of diffusion from the Aegean coast, as these areas are on communication lines which run up the Vardar and Morava River valleys from the coast toward Beograd. S [311]

The third or Mačva type is that of the more or less planned village lying on both sides of the highway. These villages tend to S 361 171

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

642 of these institutions naturally became mere façades to conceal a much
665 cruder reality. Party politics, for example, bore a very superficial resemblance to those of nineteenth-century England: two principal parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, alternated in office. But the reality behind this two-party system was altogether different. Politics were based on a very narrow franchise,[30] the parties themselves tended to be coteries surrounding a dominant personality or family, and there were constant factions and party splits. Both the Conservatives and the Liberals obtained their support from the landowners, the principal distinction between them being that the Conservatives were usually the explicit spokesmen of the large agrarian interests, whereas the Liberals were increasingly interested in making Rumania a strong modern (i.e., commercial and industrial) state and held the controlling positions in the growing financial institutions.

671 In the field of law the Rumanians demonstrated what Dobrogeanu-
177 Gherea correctly called a "mania for legislation." A flood of laws was continually being passed—elegantly rendered by men who had taken their law course at Paris—but with remarkably little effect. Some were inapplicable at the outset, few were administered properly, and most were soon forgotten by all concerned, with no effort made to examine their consequences. Other examples could be cited from the fields of public finance, civil rights, and the press to illustrate the abyss lying between political and constitutional forms and actual practice. The persistence of this dualism right up to the 1940's has undoubtedly had a corrupting effect upon Rumanian politics and society.

566 Notwithstanding these contradictions, which have struck all for-
177 eign observers in the past century, the very introduction of Western paraphernalia had certain important positive effects. A peasant who had been inducted, under universal conscription, into the army, who could read in the press (or have read to him) about agrarian disturbances in Sicily, Ireland, or Russia, or who heard the charges and countercharges of the political parties, however rhetorical these may have been—such a peasant was moving out of the closed circle of the village. This is evidenced in the active role played by ex-army ser-
185 geants, clerks, and schoolteachers in the 1907 uprising. Moreover,
177 the mere existence of constitutional and legal devices, however inoperative they may have been, provided potential channels for change and increased the flexibility of the existing order. Thus, in spite of the fact that changes were apt to prove illusory rather than real,

30. A system of electoral colleges, rather like that of Prussia before 1918, assured a preponderant strength in the assembly to the landowners and the wealthy urban groups.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

that an endless series of palliatives and half-measures would take the place of real reforms, even so vigorous a critic of Rumanian institutions as Dobrogeanu-Gherea held that the presence of liberal institutions set Rumania in favorable contrast to tsarist Russia.[31]

In short, while economic and social tensions precipitated the 1907 revolt, the political situation prevented it from becoming more than a social eruption. It remained a revolt and not the initial stage of a revolution.

The Aftermath of 1907

The peasant uprising frightened the rulers of Rumania into attempting some measures of reform. A law on agricultural contracts was designed to protect the peasant by regulating agreements between him and the landlord or tenant, by prohibiting certain forms of rent in labor, by instituting communal grazing lands, and by establishing regional committees to fix agricultural wages and rents. This law was never really applied and quickly fell altogether into disuse. The proprietors preferred informal and unwritten agreements, which the law did not cover, and few peasants dared to demand application of the law for fear of being driven from the estate.[32]

A second law created a state-supported Rural Office to aid in the transfer of land from large properties to the peasants. Up to the beginning of 1912, however, the Rural Office had bought only 76,000 hectares, had divided up 15,000 hectares, and had sold to the peasants only 6,500 hectares.[33] A third law, by limiting the size of leases to 4,000 hectares of cultivable land, attacked the large agricultural trusts held in lease. A fourth law established cooperatives for renting land. It was probably the most successful; between 1908 and 1916 the land rented by the cooperatives increased from 133,000 hectares to 410,000 hectares.[34]

Although these laws were heralded as introducing a new conception into Rumanian life, *socialism de stat*—state intervention on behalf of the peasants—they really provide only examples of Rumanian legislative escapism. They but scratched the surface of the problem and were "fated to disappear without trace in the quicksand of Rumanian public life." [35] The state socialism proclaimed by the Liberals had very little to do with socialism in any Western sense of the term but more closely resembled the paternalistic policies of mercantilism.

31. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
32. Ilie S. Diaconescu, *Chestiunea țărănească în România* (Bucarest, 1928), p. 115.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 120.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
35. Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 656 423 Under the pressure of events the government did not bother to follow the formalities prescribed in the 1917 amendment but quickly drafted a decree-law, to be ratified subsequently by the parliament. This decree-law of December 15, 1918, laid down the norms under which land was immediately to be expropriated. Some of the leading provisions were as follows:[5]

a) As in the constitutional amendment, arable crown and mortmain land as well as foreign and absentee properties were completely expropriated.

b) The amount of 2,000,000 hectares was to be expropriated on a sliding scale from private properties of over 100 hectares. This rather arbitrary scale did represent an advance upon the 1917 amendment in limiting all properties to 500 hectares, but it made no provision for geographical differences, relative land hunger, or rational organization of estates. The law based the expropriation on properties rather than on proprietorship, to the benefit of the landowner with multiple holdings. Moreover, the relation between the scale of expropriation and the 2,000,000 hectares to be obtained was not accurately computed, and the expropriation actually fell short by some 450,000 hectares.

c) Compensation for expropriated land was to be based on a number of factors: price of sale in the region for five years prior to 1916, regional level of rent, evaluation by credit institutions, net income per hectares, etc., but was not to exceed twenty times the regional rental rate. Payments to proprietors were to be made by 5 per cent state bonds, redeemable in fifty years. The state was to contribute up to 35 per cent of the cost.

d) Peasant associations were to be created to serve as temporary recipients of the transferred land. The law went into little detail as regards resettlement, which was covered later by the law of 1921.

175 423 185 Ion I. C. Brătianu, who had headed the government on December 14, 1918, resigned on September 27, 1919, in a dispute with the Allies on the peace settlement. King Ferdinand accepted the resignation and formed a nonparty cabinet under General Vaitoianu to hold a general election. This election, virtually the first to be uncontrolled in Rumanian history, produced surprising results. The Liberals lost most of their seats in the Old Kingdom, and after some delay a bloc made up of the newly formed Peasant party and the National party of Transylvania assumed office.

During its brief term this government, with the Transylvanian Vaida-Voevod as Premier and Ion Mihalache as Minister of Agricul-

5. Full summaries of this and the subsequent agrarian law of 1921 are given in Diaconescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 148–334, and Mitrany, *op. cit.*, pp. 121–122.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

ture, introduced a bill for the resettlement of the peasants as well as for an extension of the expropriation. According to Mihalache, the Vaida government sought to make a new agrarian reform which was not based on the limited concept of the constituent assembly at Iaşi.[6] Although this bill was not passed, it is of importance as an early expression of the agrarian program of what was to become the National Peasant party.

The *exposé de motifs* of the bill granted that when promulgated the acts of 1917 and 1918 represented the only workable formulae, given the composition of parliament and the state of the nation, but stated that the incorporation of Bessarabia and the other provinces in Greater Rumania now made imperative further action on behalf of the peasants in the Old Kingdom, since the new provinces were enjoying extensive land reforms. By the terms of this bill expropriation was to be based on the total holdings of a proprietor, not on separate properties, and was extended to include property continuously rented for ten years prior to 1916. Private property in excess of 100 hectares of cultivable land was to be expropriated; in this the framers of the bill consciously followed the provisions of the relatively radical Bessarabian land reform. Exceptions, however, were made for estates organized as farms with a significant capital investment; these were limited to 250 hectares in densely populated regions and to 500 hectares in regions of sparse population. Property remaining after expropriation was not to be leased except to peasant cooperatives. In general, the bill was more radical than its predecessors in the Old Kingdom and represented a peasant point of view, both as regards the expropriation and the organization of agriculture, rather than a political compromise formulated by the landowners to avert peasant revolt.

As soon as the nature of Mihalache's bill became known, the old parties took steps to block it. The Minister of Agriculture was unable to obtain an audience with the king, allegedly as a result of Liberal intrigue. On March 12, 1920, after failing to obtain the king's approval to present the bill as a government measure, Mihalache presented it to the assembly as a private member's bill. At that session he warned: "But it should be known that if parliament has to leave, or if the government has to leave, it is because of a conspiracy by the whole oligarchy of all the boyar political parties." His prediction was realized; on the following day the government, which still held a substantial parliamentary majority, was dismissed by the crown in

6. For the text of this bill and the debate at its introduction, see the pamphlet published by the Federaţia Democraţiei, *Proectul legei de improprietărirea ţăranilor* (Bucarest, 1920).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 what has been called "the most questionable act of King Ferdinand's
185 reign."[7] Although peasant disturbances, general instability, and the inexperience of the Vaida government have been cited as reasons
423 for its downfall, it seems clear that its dismissal stemmed directly from the hostility of the landowners to the proposed agrarian bill.[8] Thus, the effort of the Peasant party to carry through a more radical reform by legal means was defeated.

The new premier, General Averescu, was selected because he was a popular military hero. He immediately ordered new elections and by the usual controls was able to obtain a majority for his People's party. Mihalache was replaced by Constantin Garoflid. Garoflid, as has been seen, was by no means opposed to land reform, but he did not approve of the emphasis upon large-scale expropriation and the creation of a multitude of small holdings. It was his task, however, to complete a measure based upon principles he had always attacked.

423 The second land reform law for the Old Kingdom was promulgated on July 17, 1921. Although primarily concerned with allotting land and resettling the peasants, it also extended expropriation to obtain the 450,000 hectares lacking after the 1918 decree-law. Expropriation was now based on proprietors rather than properties, and the old sliding scale was abandoned in favor of a more elastic measure which took account of regional geographic differences and relative land hunger.[9] Land left to the proprietor was to be determined at once,

[113]

7. R. W. Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians* (Cambridge, 1934), p. 551.

8. The attitude of the landowners at this time is shown in a circular distributed by the Union of Syndicates of Moldavian Landowners: "We, landowners, are firmly determined to oppose by all means, and especially by impeaching before the Court of Cassation, all those provisions of the decree-law of 1918, of the law for communal grazing, and of any future law or decree, which may conflict with the letter of the Constitution regarding the expropriation of land . . . To re-consecrate the intangible right of property, we demand that a law shall be passed which shall punish with hard labor for life whomsoever shall speak of expropriation again." Quoted in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

9. Land was left to the proprietors on the following basis:

	Land cultivated by owner (hectares)	*Land cultivated by owner with important capital investments (hectares)*
In highlands and hills	100	100
In plains, where demand for land was great	150	200
In plains, where demand for land was moderate	200	300
In plains, where demand for land was satisfied	250	500

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

423 permitting the sale of small property, on certain conditions and after five years. Article 122, however, limited purchases to 25 hectares in the hills and 100 hectares in the plains.[11]

423 185 In general, the 1921 law was more carefully drafted than that of 1918 and did attempt to remedy some of the technical errors of previous legislation. The economic effects of these land reforms, which together were reported officially to have expropriated nearly 2,800,000 hectares of land in the Old Kingdom, will be discussed in a later chapter.[12] The acts of 1918 and 1921 were, however, essentially defensive political rather than economic measures. As Mihalache said in his critique of the decree-law of 1918,

> it is not the work of a social concept, not the response to a social ideal, not the work of conviction; under the threat of the events of 1917, it is the continuation of a series of land settlements on the model of 1881 and 1889, it is the over-simplified concept that a new equilibrium between large property and small property must be stabilized in order that there be future peace.

In his opinion, "The ruling class has made only such concessions as were necessary to assure its own existence. The reforms have been a kind of safety valve." [13]

The safety valve, however, was successful. Despite its very precarious position, Rumania passed through the revolutionary storm in eastern Europe without an overthrow of the established order. Several reasons explain this success. A decisive factor, doubtless, was the flexibility of the ruling groups. Notwithstanding the obduracy of many members of the landed oligarchy and in spite of efforts to avoid or delay the reform, the landowners did at least yield sufficiently to prevent an outbreak. Their recalcitrance between 1917 and 1921 was in inverse ratio to the amount of peasant unrest. Moreover, the king, although conservative socially, was able to take the correct 423 steps at two critical moments, in April, 1917, and in November, 1918.

185 Apart from the flexibility of the landowners, certain other forces 668 were at work. Among the Conservatives, the stronghold of the landed interests, there were such men as Garoflid who recognized the failings of Rumanian agriculture and desired to make thorough-going changes, though along lines different from those followed. In the

11. For subsequent modifications, in 1925 and 1929, of these provisions for sale, see below, p. 125 and pp. 156–157.

12. The difficult task of discovering just what the land reforms accomplished in redistributing property is discussed below, pp. 48–49, and in the Appendix.

13. Mihalache, *op. cit.*, pp. 5, 29.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

Liberal party, the primary interest was in the expansion of industry, commerce, and finance, and since 1913 the party had officially stood for expropriation. In several respects the Liberal position was unfortunate since it had neither the reforming zeal of the new Peasant party nor the Conservatives' interest in the improvement of agriculture. The Liberals tended to regard land as a bone to be thrown to the peasants when the howls of the latter seemed menacing or detrimental to the national interest. Such a view was apt to neglect the economic aspects of the agrarian problem and to reduce it to a question of finding more land for distribution. Nevertheless, this Liberal attitude did make for change. Finally, once the question of land reform became the order of the day, the mere pressure of politics led the parties, if only for electoral reasons, to make the appearance of favoring reform.

423 185 668

A second factor was that the land laws, despite delays and omissions, were sufficiently extensive to pacify the peasants. A great deal of land changed hands, and the Rumanian reform was the most far-reaching of all the postwar agrarian measures in eastern Europe (excluding Russia, of course).

A third factor was concern for the national interest, which, as noted above, has usually been of primary importance in determining Rumanian internal policy. Notwithstanding military defeats, enormous human losses, and devastation of land, Rumania emerged from the war a victorious power with doubled population and territory.[14] The mere fact of being victorious and having achieved the national aim of Greater Rumania undoubtedly served to mitigate social tensions. The parties were in agreement in glorifying and protecting the new national unity; since Rumania was surrounded by states from which it had obtained territory, the defense of the new frontiers was a major concern of all postarmistice governments.

The very violence of the Russian Revolution, particularly the Bolshevik Revolution, served to create an opposing reaction in Rumania, heightened by the territorial dispute over Bessarabia. The political parties, including the Peasant party, were exceedingly hostile to bolshevism, which became the ultimate term of abuse in political debates. Mihalache had been sent to Bessarabia during the war to carry on antibolshevist propaganda, and one of his appeals for a more extensive land reform was that in the future the peasants should not be tempted to look beyond Rumania's frontier on the Dniester for better conditions. Fear of Soviet communism was one of the cardinal fea-

14. The area of Rumania in 1915 was 137,900 square kilometers; in 1919, 294,000 square kilometers. Its population in 1913 was 7,625,000; in 1919, 15,500,000.

: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

423 tures of Rumanian policy for the next twenty-five years, and in the
185 international councils Rumania was to stress its role as the European
668 bulwark against bolshevism.[15]

175 *Agrarian Reform in the New Territories*

423 Thus far only the agrarian reform in the Old Kingdom has been considered, and it does provide the central thread of the agrarian question in the interwar period. But as a result of the war Rumania also acquired Bessarabia from Russia, Bucovina from Austria, and Transylvania from Hungary. The agrarian problems in these three provinces were different in several respects from that of the Old Kingdom; the separate laws passed for each of the provinces further increased the complexity of the Rumanian agrarian situation after the First World War.

1. BESSARABIA

Bessarabia, which had formed a part of the principality of Moldavia, was ceded by the Turks to Russia in 1812 at the Treaty of Bucarest, in return for the evacuation of the remainder of Moldavia and Wallachia.[16] Three southern districts were returned to Moldavia after the Crimean War, but reverted to Russia after the War of 1877. The population was predominantly Rumanian, though large numbers of Ukrainians and Bulgarians inhabited the southern districts. In the last decades of the nineteenth century the tsarist regime undertook to Russify Bessarabia but without marked success. The Moldavian boyars in Bessarabia were notoriously obscurantist, and the province was a "natural breeding ground of such movements as the Black Hundreds." [17]

15. F. Borkenau, in his study, *The Communist International* (London, 1938), p. 99, attaches great importance to the Rumanian agrarian reform in this connection: "The agrarian reform in Rumania was perhaps the strongest single obstacle that opposed the advance of Bolshevism towards the West. It was very far from solving all problems, even for the peasantry, but for a decade it took the sharp edge off them. Revolutionary trends among the proletariat remained, but the proletariat alone was nothing in Rumania, and revolutionism among its members was more of a convulsion than a clearly defined movement."

16. The current Soviet interpretation of this event appears to be that in the eighteenth century the Moldavian and Wallachian boyars had sought the incorporation of the principalities in Russia as the sole means of escaping the Turkish yoke. This act of liberation was taking place during the Turko-Russian war of 1806. The threat of Napoleon, however, forced Tsar Alexander to come to terms with the Turks, so that only Bessarabia was fortunate enough to be liberated and incorporated in the tsarist empire. See A. Dolnik, *Bessarabiya pod vlastyu Rumynskikh boyar, 1918–1940 gg.* (Moscow, 1945), p. 5.

17. R. W. Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 563.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241 yield than the small peasant holdings,[39] though there appear to be
311 no satisfactory statistics on this point.

On the other hand, defenders of the agrarian reform and small peasant properties have tended to assume that the Rumanian small holder was on his way to becoming an independent peasant proprietor, a doubtful assumption in view of the prevalence of dwarf holdings and the continued excessive cultivation of cereals. In 1937 G. Ionescu-Sișești and N. Cornățeanu upheld the reform and peasant farming on the following grounds:

The reform was an economic necessity under the conditions of devastation after the First World War; it was only by giving land to the peasants that they were induced to make the great effort necessary for agricultural recovery. Peasant farming became more intensive and less devoted to cereal cultivation. The peasant was better able to withstand agricultural crises, largely because the large farmer lacked his ability to reduce expenses and increase family labor. Finally, peasant agriculture should not be judged in terms of its contribution to the national income but by its ability to "assure the existence of the greatest possible number of citizens." It is therefore erroneous to "establish a comparison between peasant agriculture and the system of large property."[40]

311 The necessity of the agrarian reforms need not be argued, although
185 they could be defined more convincingly as a social than as an economic imperative (i.e., the peasants would have refused to continue to work under the old system). It may also be true that peasant farming cannot be judged by narrow profit-and-loss accounting methods, since it is a manner of living as well as a form of livelihood. But Sișești's and Cornățeanu's supporting arguments do not appear relevant to the actual Rumanian situation. There is no indication that peasant cultivation did become to any significant degree more intensive and varied. The examples they give, taken from a survey of a number of farms between 1930 and 1934, to illustrate the viability of peasant farming are not representative but comprise farms well above the average size for Rumania. Hence the real problem of dwarf holdings is avoided. The argument that small holdings are more resistant to crises because the peasant is able to restrict his consumption and increase family labor is not altogether reassuring in face of the growing pressure of population, regardless of its dubi-

39. M. Gormsen, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

[113] 40. G. Ionescu-Sișești and N. Cornățeanu, *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie et ses conséquences* (Bucarest, 1937), pp. 42–53.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

ous merits from the point of view of social welfare. The effort to ignore the importance of national income as a criterion for judging the advantages of peasant farming is unrealistic, given the existence of a modern Rumanian state with its manifold requirements. Finally, for all their optimism, Sișești and Cornățeanu admit the serious menace of continued subdivision of the land and urge the creation of a "peasant bourgeoisie." They do not indicate, however, what is to become of the poor peasants displaced in such a creation except to appeal for a further expansion of a national industry. The appeal to national industry, as a *deus ex machina*, at once undermines the whole argument for the viability of the Rumanian peasant proprietor.

Actually, such discussions of the merits and defects of peasant agriculture have only a limited relevance in Rumania. For example, in a study of 275 peasant households made in 1938, it was discovered that in general both the gross income per hectare (the total agricultural product of the holding, whether consumed or sold) and the agricultural income per hectare (gross income minus expenses for agriculture—labor payments, inventory, buildings, seed, etc.) tended to be higher on the small (under 3 hectares) than on the larger holdings. This higher net yield would appear to substantiate the contentions of the advocates of small farming.[41] In fact, however, the majority of the small holdings in this investigation operated at a deficit because the consumption needs of the household, largely food and clothing, were greater than the farm could produce. Only 14 per cent of the holdings between 1 and 3 hectares had an agricultural income greater than consumption, whereas in 86 per cent of the cases consumption was greater. Only 30 per cent of the holdings between 3 and 5 hectares had agricultural incomes greater than consumption. On the larger farms, between 10 and 20 hectares, 59 per cent had an agricultural income sufficient to meet consumption needs.[42] Therefore, the relative net incomes of farms of different sizes were of less

41. This higher rate of agricultural income among the small holdings is not, as it might appear, in contradiction to the statement that the cereal yield is higher on large farms than on small. A much smaller proportion of the income of the small holdings is derived from cereals; most of it comes from the sale of animals, fowls, fruits, etc. This, however, does not really represent a turn to intensive farming, since it is conducted on a very primitive level and only reflects the dwarf holder's efforts to maintain himself at a subsistence level.

42. *60 Sate romînești*, II, 292. It should be noted that this investigation did not include large farms but only peasant holdings up to 40 hectares. Moreover, the results of the investigation showed an extremely wide range of variation, both regionally and among farms of the same size. Hence, the sampling may not have been extensive enough to permit confident generalization.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

311
185

importance than the fact that the general level of productivity was so low that a great number of the small farms simply did not produce enough to support themselves.

The effect of the 1918–21 land reforms upon production is also obscured by the numerous other factors which worked to reduce output: the destruction caused by the First World War, the economic policy of the postwar governments, the agrarian crisis and the "price scissors" of the 1930's.[43] While one cannot dismiss the effect of the redistribution of land as of only historical interest, since the leading feature of the 1945 agrarian reform was a further expropriation of large properties, it should be stressed that the reforms of 1918–21 were passed because of a pressing political and social necessity for a redistribution of the land; they were not primarily designed to increase production, and whatever their effect upon yield, it should be regarded as incidental to the aims of the reforms.

In general, it seems fair to say that the redistribution of land in Rumania—except in so far as it contributed to a further extension of uneconomic strip farming—had only a marginal direct effect upon productivity. The decline in yield, even if it was caused by the expropriation of the large estates, was only a modest contribution to the generally low level of Rumanian productivity. A comparison with the yield per hectare in neighboring countries reveals that states with more extensive large properties than Rumania (Hungary and Poland) as well as states in which small holdings predominated (Bulgaria and Yugoslavia) all had a yield well below that of western and central Europe.[44]

If the reforms of 1918–21 failed to bring about a more efficient organization of Rumanian agriculture, what were the principal organizational defects which, by preventing the introduction of more rational techniques, maintained a low level of productivity?

A Danish agricultural economist, M. Gormsen, who came to Rumania in 1939 at the request of the Rumanian government, has made

43. For an extensive discussion of these factors and their effect upon productivity to 1930 see Mitrany, *op. cit.*, pp. 306–331.

44. Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 35, 82.

	Per cent of land held in undertakings of over 50 ha. (*ca.* 1930)	*Yield in crop units per ha.*
Rumania	32.2	17
Hungary	51.3	21
Poland	47.3	18
Bulgaria	1.6	19
Yugoslavia	9.7	17
Europe (excluding U.S.S.R.)		24

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

a useful distinction between "agrarian reforms," which affect the organization of farming, and "agricultural reforms," which seek to improve the techniques.[45] In his opinion the agrarian reforms must be applied first or the agricultural reforms will be fruitless. Moreover, agrarian reforms can be carried out only by some superior body, such as the state, as the result of a conscious act of decision, whereas agricultural reforms are more gradual and can be applied by the farmers themselves. Among the main agrarian reforms indispensable for a prosperous agriculture he would include:

1) The abolition of servile relations—binding the peasant to the land, forced labor, feudal property relations, tithes, and the common utilization of the land. This reform was achieved in principle by the emancipation of 1864.

2) The transformation of estate land into peasant land. This was largely achieved by the reforms of 1918–21. Gormsen feels that a further transfer would yield positive but limited benefits.

3) The consolidation of individual peasant farms and, as a corollary, the partial evacuation of the villages and the establishment of farmhouses on the consolidated holdings. Gormsen regards this as the most important reform still to be carried out in Rumania.

4) The limitation of divisibility and expansion of holdings, to prevent the undoing of consolidation.

5) The introduction of a land register, definite property demarcations, and enclosures if necessary.

Under agricultural reforms he would include all such measures as the rationalization of farming methods; soil, seed, and livestock improvement; organization of agricultural credit and cooperation; the development of experimental stations; and so on.

In Gormsen's opinion, the Rumanian governments between the wars made the very serious mistake of devoting all their attention to efforts, often quite expensive, to introduce agricultural reforms. These were of little permanent value so long as the necessary agrarian reforms had not been made. An example is the complete failure of attempts to establish agricultural credit and peasant cooperatives, which have been the perennial promise of every new Rumanian government.

An effective permanent system of organized credit for peasant agriculture in Rumania does not exist although a number of institutions have been created from time to time to that purpose, as a rule with the assistance of the state or the national bank, but they only worked for a

45. M. Gormsen, *op. cit.*

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

from 2 to 10 billion lei (in quantity from one million to 2.2 million metric tons).

Two qualifications should be made however. The emphasis upon wheat exports and upon the improvement of quality was primarily for the benefit of the middle and large producer, though the maintenance of the price of grain did help agriculture as a whole. In the second place, as has been mentioned in connection with the depression, the premiums on wheat served to extend the area under wheat cultivation, in direct contradiction to the recommendations of agricultural experts, who continued to believe that "peasant agriculture should no longer limit itself, in imitation of the old system, to the culture of cereals; its success will come from a parallel development of the resources of the field and of livestock raising." [35] This contradiction, which shows the absence of any real coherence to the agrarian program of the Liberal government, had two obvious sources: wheat, for all its decline after the First World War, was important commercially and from the point of view of foreign commerce there was a strong incentive to support it. Moreover, the wheat growers were the larger farmers and were in a better position to make felt their wishes than were the small maize-producing peasants.

The government did, however, make certain efforts to increase the variety of agricultural production. The most elaborate was the creation, with the assistance of I. G. Farbenindustrie, of the "Soya" company, which was authorized to import soybeans, distribute them to cultivators, provide equipment, and purchase the entire crop for export to Germany. The area under this crop expanded rapidly, especially in Bessarabia: 1,465 hectares in 1934, 20,411 hectares in 1935, 58,037 hectares in 1936, and 102,000 hectares in 1937. The government through price guarantees and subsidies also furthered the cultivation of sugar beet, tobacco, rice, and textile plants.

These measures to diversify agriculture did not, despite all the publicity given to them, achieve very great importance. They were only a drop in the bucket compared with the vast area under peasant cereal cultivation, and their rate of expansion seemed unlikely to produce any general amelioration for a very long time. Moreover, the introduction of such industrial crops, whose main purpose—almost exclusively so in the case of soya—was for export, shows the persistent if natural effort to solve the agrarian question by a sort of legerdemain. The soybean had been an old favorite, and as early

35. G. Ionescu-Sişeşti and N. Cornăţeanu, *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie et ses conséquences*, p. 79.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

were initiated, at least on paper. The 1938 Constitution, by prohibiting any public discussion of redistribution of property, showed the regime's attitude toward further expropriation as a remedy to the agrarian question. During the interwar years the governments were accustomed to state that large estates had virtually disappeared through the reforms of 1918–21, but after 1938 increased attention was paid to medium and large properties.[4] In the law of December 5, 1938 (amended January 7, 1939) the government established a Bank for the Industrialization and Valorization of Agricultural Products (BINAG), one of the recurrent efforts to provide agricultural credit. It is to be noted, however, that by Article 6 of this law the main credit functions of this bank applied only to farms of over 5 hectares, thus overlooking the majority of the peasantry.[5]

The spirit of the regime is well shown in an article by the agricultural economist Valeriu Bulgariu,[6] who announced that King Carol, "the first farmer in the land," had plans to change completely the existing conditions in agriculture by a twofold effort to organize small farming on rational lines and to encourage owners of medium-sized estates to increase the area of their holdings.

> When the great land division took place after the war, the agrarian reform went too far. . . . It assigned land to a very large number of villagers, and as a result subsequent successive divisions had increased the excessive subdivision of land. Reaction was necessary, and to-day economists and sociologists are in favor of the concentration of scattered property, a policy adopted by the government and all its agents.[7]

The desirability of concentrating peasant holdings was no new discovery, and Carol's regime for all its new direction was not a bit more successful than previous regimes in doing anything about it. The policy of creating larger holdings, also no novelty, was faced as always by the difficulty of creating them without dispossessing peasants in the process. According to Bulgariu,

4. See, for example, Aureliu Lapedatu's article, "A Technical Study in Rumanian Cereals," *Correspondance économique roumaine* (April–June, 1938), pp. 1–28, in which the author discussed the manifest advantages of the large Rumanian farms in the use of technical equipment for rational cultivation.

5. The same thing is to be seen in the case of the cooperatives. According to A. Galan, "General Survey of the Co-operative Movement in Rumania," *Correspondance économique roumaine* (January–May, 1939), pp. 1–65, in 1939 one farmer in three was affiliated with one of the several agricultural cooperatives. Unquestionably the other two-thirds included the poorer peasants.

6. Valeriu Bulgariu, "Agrarian Policy in Rumania," *The Banker*, 49 (March, 1939), 344–348.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 346.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

● 135 The government seeks to facilitate the forming of middle-sized estates of about 10 hectares in area, making them indivisible so that there can be no relapse into sub-dividing. The State has taken to itself the right of acquiring any land which is for sale. It gives preference in its purchase and distribution of land to farms adjoining it, in order that small properties may be enlarged and concentration attained even through private purchase.[8]

The execution of this policy was assigned to BINAG. If property purchased through BINAG could not be sold as a whole within two years, it could be sold in lots of not less than 15 hectares. Sales could be only to Rumanian subjects who undertook to cultivate the land themselves. Such properties could not be broken up and had to be transferred in their entirety. Moreover, such estates could be inherited only as a whole by a single heir. To some extent this law is similar to the German *Erbhofgesetz* of 1933, although it was not as restrictive since it did permit the sale of the land.[9] The aims of this measure were reasonable enough but it was of little use to the small peasant and certainly showed greater interest in the medium holder.

Along with the emphasis upon larger holdings was a rather superficial government paternalism for the peasant. Some of the activities were of value. The studies of village life continued and in several instances produced extremely useful collections of information for an understanding of the agrarian question. The emphasis upon a sociological interpretation of Rumanian peasant life was beneficial in focusing attention upon the realities in Rumania and getting away from the application of quite unsuitable Western political and economic concepts to the local situation. From the scholarly point of view this was all to the good. As a political phenomenon it had a certain danger. Looking at one's fellow countrymen as objects for sociological investigation does not overcome the social chasm between the rulers and the ruled, but may merely put it on a more enlightened basis. It is certainly preferable to dismissing the peasants as "animals who can speak," [10] but it still regards the peasant as object rather than subject.

Other manifestations of Carol's paternalism were of value only in providing employment for his publicity agents. The shabby quality of

[113]

8. *Ibid.*, p. 348.

9. For a discussion of the problem of succession to agricultural property and of recent European legislation in this regard, see M. Tcherkinsky, "The Evolution of the System of Succession to Landed Property in Europe," *International Review of Agriculture*, 32, No. 6 (June, 1941), 165E–196E.

10. I heard this definition defended in dead earnest by a landowner in Bucarest in the winter of 1944.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania E1

the social program of the regime appears in a speech delivered by Calinescu in January, 1939:

> Gentlemen, it is enough to look at all that has been done to improve our workmen's conditions of living. The improvement of the work contract, pensions for old age, new buildings, the organization "Work and Joy." All these were designed to give a social significance to the present regime. . . . Thus a regime with authority was able to accomplish in the field of work problems things which nobody could accomplish in the demagogic regime of the democracies. . . . Also we must point out the activity of social order undertaken amidst the peasantry. Cultural hostels which are intended to develop the sense of solidarity in spiritual and educational matters among the peasants have already given the most wonderful results. And the Social Service, established last year, is the very greatest action that has ever been taken to raise the level of the peasants.[11]

The regime also tried its hand at planning. In the autumn of 1939 it undertook to organize agriculture to guarantee a sufficient output for military and civil requirements. The Minister of Agriculture was required to prepare an annual crop plan, to provide necessary seed, and to requisition labor for farms. More ambitious was a five-year plan drawn up in March, 1940, for the rationalization and intensification of agriculture. The work of the 1921 land reform, which had been dragging on for nearly twenty years, was to be completed. The area under wheat was to be reduced by 800,000 hectares, that under maize by 500,000 hectares. Output, however, was to be maintained by a higher yield. Fallow ground was to be diminished by 300,000 hectares. The surplus area was to be devoted to the cultivation of oil-producing, textile, industrial, and medicinal plants. Vegetable cultivation was to be encouraged with a view to improving peasant diet. The plan also included a program of technical improvements, dam construction, irrigation, and drainage projects. Agricultural laborers were to be given fair wages and assured a decent diet; the price scissors between agricultural and industrial products was to be closed. In all, the plan envisaged spending 600 million lei annually. One cannot say what the plan might have achieved had Carol not fallen and if Rumania had not lost a third of its territory and become involved in the war.

11. Armand Calinescu, *Roumania, the Country of National Renaissance and of Royal Revolution* (no pub., n.d.), a translation of a speech delivered in the Chamber of Deputies on January 28, 1939.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

dustrial economy. Indeed, German economists commenting upon the 1939 agreement argued that Rumania should not undertake a further drive toward industrialization until the state of economic advance called for in the agreement was reached. In fact they claimed that under exchange control the industry of southeastern Europe had developed to such an extent that it had reached the saturation point and that control of investment was necessary.[19]

The agreement did, however, provide for the creation of industries preparing foodstuffs and raw materials for export and also for the development of railways and the armamants industries. That is, the Germans favored industries "organically" connected with Rumania's natural resources but were opposed to the expansion of secondary industry.

It is not necessary to point out the obvious advantage to Germany of this policy nor to go into the array of arguments which Hitler's economists employed to carry their point. But from the Rumanian side one very curious paradox arises, precisely the kind of paradox which runs throughout the history of Rumanian economic policy. The German policy, as shown in the March, 1939, agreement, resembled in many respects that of the National Peasant party and was in definite opposition to the industrial policy of the pro-Axis Manoilescu and of the Carolist regime. This opposition appears quite explicitly in an article by Ernst Wagemann, director of the German Institute for Business Research.

Wagemann, one of the most ardent advocates of Germany's destiny in the Balkans, was quite critical of Manoilescu's economic theory, though not on traditional grounds of free trade.[20] He regarded Manoilescu's policy as doubtful in practice because of the lack of consumer purchasing power in Rumania. Moreover, Manoilescu's emphasis upon increasing labor productivity would intensify rather than improve the problem of surplus population. "For the more labor-productive an industry is, the more capital and the fewer workers it needs . . . The solution of the overpopulation problem is to be sought least of all in the development of highly technical and strictly rationalized or, as Manoilescu says, 'labor productive' industries." [21] Wagemann recommended intensification and diversifica-

19. German Institute for Business Research, *Weekly Report*, Nos. 13–14 (April 6, 1939), p. 42.

20. Ernst Wagemann, "The Pressure of Population as an Economic Force," German Institute for Business Research, *Weekly Report*, Nos. 25/26 and 27/28 (June 29–July 14, 1939). This article is a translation from Wagemann's book, *Der neue Balkan; altes Land, junge Wirtschaft* (Hamburg, 1939).

21. *Ibid.*, Nos. 25/26, p. 3.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

185 tion of agriculture, which would increase yield, diminish surplus population, and, incidentally, supply Germany with agricultural products. As for industry,

> in the Balkan countries the point has not yet been reached where industrial plants can be developed with the resources available within the country. . . . Industrialization must be limited at first to those industries which make use of domestic raw material. Germany, the most important trade partner, can in the long run deliver industrial products, but not raw materials such as cotton. If industrialization includes the first processing of agricultural products and the smelting of mining products, the export is assured.[22]

While Madgearu's appraisal in 1940 of the 1939 agreement may have been cautiously phrased for political reasons, it probably reflects his views. His chief reservations concerned the manner in which the agreement might be carried out but not the principles of the agreement. He was worried lest wheat, which did not receive preference in the agreement, might suffer during the period of reorganization, although he was always in favor of reducing the production of cereals in Rumanian agriculture. More particularly, he was afraid that the system of assuring prices and markets for the peasants cultivating the new specialized crops might—if the peasants were unable to defend themselves through cooperative organization—be to their ultimate disadvantage, since the purchasing societies, which had a monopoly, could dictate prices. Here, of course, he showed a quite realistic awareness of the way in which the best laid plans were usually carried out in Rumania. He also expressed some concern lest the mixed German-Rumanian companies transfer all the benefits to Germany, the stronger partner. Finally, he was not pleased with Ger-

22. *Ibid.*, Nos. 25/26, p. 3, and Nos. 27/28, p. 3. There are several flaws in Wagemann's line of argument. His criticism of Manoilescu's theory in terms of the overpopulation question, or of unemployment, is not relevant to Manoilescu's thesis. Moreover, as Wilbert Moore (*Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe*, p. 115–118) points out, diversification of agriculture also requires increased capital and an improved market structure. While Wagemann attacks Manoilescu's industrialization as failing to solve the overpopulation problem, Moore quite correctly shows that Wagemann's program for increasing agricultural output would scarcely compensate for the growth of population. Wagemann estimated that agricultural production in the Balkans could increase by 50 per cent in the course of a generation. Moore, however, shows that with Rumania's rate of population growth the per capita production in Rumania, using as a base European per capita production, 1931–35 = 100, would rise only from 48 to 55, hardly enough to justify Wagemann's rosy predictions. Moore's conclusion is, I believe, justified: "Wagemann's 'analysis' . . . follows from the official policy and not from a scientific appraisal of the facts."

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

many's increasing monopoly over Rumanian trade and hoped to keep the door open for other markets.[23] 185

Apart from these important qualifications, however, he expressed his approval of Germany's program for Rumania, the intensification of agriculture, the creation of agricultural industries, and the establishment of mixed companies for mining and petroleum. In general, he seems to have regarded Rumania's increasing economic ties with Germany as largely in the nature of things and only secondarily as a result of policy: "This situation is not so much the result of a crystallization of policy as a change in the structure of the Rumanian economy, which gradually with the advance of the process of industrialization diminished the degree of complementarity with a series of countries and increased it with regard to one alone—Germany."[24]

Although it may seem surprising that the German policy embodied in the agreement of March, 1939, should have more in common with the economic aims of a National Peasant than with a pro-Axis corporatist, the reason is obvious. The National Peasants, believing in economic interdependence and the international division of labor, disapproved of fostering Rumanian industry at the expense of agriculture.[25] Germany, for its own reasons, desired the Balkans to increase their agricultural production and to stay away from secondary industries. On the other hand, Manoilescu's industrial ambitions were unwelcome to the Germans because of their similarity to German aims, a case of like poles repelling. This antagonism arising out of an attempt at similarity is a characteristic of Rumanian history. The earlier effort of the Liberals to emulate the West had led to the economic xenophobia of the Brătianus.

The success of the German-Rumanian agreement could have been measured only after a number of years of peaceful development; it may be doubted whether the results anticipated could have been achieved in the five years of the agreement. But such a peaceful period was not to be granted. In the year after the inauguration of the five-year plan Rumania had lost one third of its territory, Carol had fled the country, and Marshal Antonescu had joined Hitler's war against the Soviet Union. The territorial losses alone severely disorganized the economic program. By the loss of Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina, Northern Transylvania, and Southern Dobrogea Rumania was deprived of 34 per cent of its total area, 37 per cent of the arable land, 311 433

23. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești*, pp. 372–374.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 301.

25. For somewhat analogous reasons, at the time of the First World War several Rumanian populists had been pro-German because they saw Germany as the industrial complement to Rumania's agrarian society.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

311 44 per cent of the forest land, 27 per cent of the orchards, and 37
433 per cent of the vineyards. Of the area devoted to wheat (as of 1939) it lost 37 per cent, to maize 30 per cent, to sunflower 75 per cent, to hemp 43 per cent, and 86 per cent of the area devoted to soya. The regions, chiefly Bessarabia, in which the new industrial crops had been most intensively cultivated were lost. Finally, the whole economy was put on a war footing, first for Germany and then for Rumania itself.

185 Notwithstanding all Carol's laws and decrees, no real solutions
433 were found to the agrarian question. It is illuminating to look through the volumes of the *Enciclopedia României*, published in the last years of Carol's reign as a monument to the Rumanian rebirth. Amid all the fanfare of Rumania's marvelous progress and glowing future, the articles on agriculture and land tenure strike a discordant and often deeply pessimistic note.

To be sure, the trend in the 1930's was toward increasing industrialization as the solution to Rumania's economic difficulties, and in the long run, had the war not intervened, this might have brought beneficial results even to agriculture. As it was, however, much of the industrialization was achieved at the expense of agriculture, and for all its expansion it was neither bringing agriculture any great technical improvements nor beginning to absorb the excess agricultural population. The five-year plan and the laws to rationalize land tenure and consolidate holdings might have provided a healthier foundation for agriculture had they been carried out conscientiously, but there is little evidence that they meant anything more than many previous legislative acts which clutter the Rumanian statute books. It is doubtful whether the peasant would have benefited greatly from a plan ordained by divine providence if it had been left to the Carol administration to execute it. With all its attacks on "outworn" parties and its praise for the younger generation, the Carol dictatorship lacked the stature to be a modernizing dictatorship along the lines of Kemal Ataturk's regime. The new German orientation might have benefited Rumanian agriculture, but given the power relations it is more likely that Rumania would have become the object of an efficient colonial policy.

654 Among the social studies undertaken in the period of Carol's dictatorship there was one which makes a fitting conclusion to the Carolist period, and indeed illustrates the failure to master the agrarian question during the interwar years. In the summer and autumn of 1939 a Rumanian research team made a field study of the *plasă* (an administrative unit in a judeţ) Dâmbovnicul, in the south of the

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

aged by five trustees; the Ministry of Agriculture was to supervise its business transactions, and technical and administrative control lay in the hands of the chief of the agricultural district. Members were obliged to conform to the requirements of the government crop plan. It was reported in 1944 that about 200 such associations had been established.[19]

This law did not really represent anything new in Rumania but was merely one of the various measures which had been applied from time to time to overcome the agrarian impasse. It represents, however, a somewhat different approach from that emphasized by either the National Peasants or the Carolist dictatorship. The National Peasants had placed greatest stress upon credit, cooperatives, and diversification of production, with a view to creating the small peasant on the Western model. The Carolist regime, in its activities of 1938 and 1939, was aiming at consolidation and the creation of middle properties. The law of 1942 was an attempt to improve the situation on the basis of existing circumstances, of utilizing in the most efficient way possible the uneconomic system of land holdings. To be sure, all the approaches overlapped somewhat, but in a way the 1942 act was a bridge to the agricultural policy of the post-1945 government.

The Germans, for their own reasons, were anxious to develop Rumanian agriculture as part of the economy of the new order, although their estimate of what could be achieved in Rumanian agriculture was relatively modest. A wartime analysis by some German experts[20] presented a very dismal picture of Rumanian farming as of 1940. According to their report the principal difficulties lay in the low yield resulting from the small size of the majority of the holdings (they noted that most of the large properties were cultivated in metayage) and in the inadequacy of the transport system, both the general network and the village roads. They doubted whether agriculture itself

19. Otto von Franges, "Agricultural Labour Communities in South Eastern Europe," *International Review of Agriculture*, 35 (January–February, 1944), 22E–32E. Von Franges was heartily in favor of these associations, of which similar types had been established in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. In his opinion they corresponded to traditional labor associations of the Balkan peasants and showed an admirable balance between individualism and collectivism, between control and liberty. He sharply contrasted these associations with agricultural cooperatives. The latter, while having a useful function, were obliged to neglect the poorer peasant. The associations, he felt, were the only possible compensation for the fragmentation of peasant properties and the only means of obtaining a decent improvement of productivity until the slow process of consolidation could take place.

20. H. L. Fensch and O. Thiel, *Rumänien, Untersuchung über die Betriebs- und Ernährungswirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse der Landwirtschaft.* (I have seen only a manuscript Rumanian translation of this study.)

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

was in any position to remedy either of these defects. They had hopes, however, that measures—such as those taken in 1942—of compensating for inefficient small holdings by means of common use of machines, purchase of seed, and organization of sale could bring some improvements. They believed that under existing circumstances it would be possible to increase agricultural production by 25 per cent over ten years and that some 40 per cent of the surplus of cereals and vegetables would be available for export to Germany.

The actual course of Rumanian agriculture during the war showed no such progress. The area devoted to cereals fell appreciably between 1940 and 1943 because of the labor shortage, the decline in livestock and equipment, and the price controls which held cereal prices well below industrial prices.[21] Yields fell off in the principal grains, maize and wheat. The total production of cereals dropped from a 1935–39 average of 75.7 million quintals (for the area as of January, 1941) to 61–64 million (38 million in 1942 following an exceptionally severe winter).[22] Because of war needs the area devoted to industrial and food crops increased, in most cases as the result of government support and crop plans. It was still very small, however, compared with that under cereals. In livestock the greatest reduction, as was to be expected, was in horses; cattle increased somewhat; sheep, goats, and pigs remained about the same.

The number of draft animals declined by one-third, though the most serious fall was between 1943 and the beginning of 1945; that is, at the time of the final military collapse when both German and Soviet troops were on Rumanian soil. There was a notable increase in the number of tractors (from 4,170 in 1940 to 8,340 in 1943 and 8,178 in 1945), although in the opinion of the Central Institute of Statistics it did not compensate for the decline in draft animals which were the only feasible form of traction on the small strip farms.[23]

21. Area devoted to cereals, 48 judeţe (area as of January, 1941):

	Millions of hectares
1935–39	7.4
1940	6.8
1941	6.6
1942	6.4
1943	6.6

Source: Institutul Central de Statistică, *Statistica agricolă a României în 1941–1944* (Bucarest, 1947), p. xiii.

22. According to the Central Institute of Statistics, *ibid.*, p. xv, the recorded figures for production may have been well below the actual production because of extensive and often irregular army requisitioning; the wheat crop may have been underestimated by 20 per cent, the maize crop by 10 per cent.

23. Institutul Central de Statistică, *Statistica agricolă a României, Vol. V, Inventarul agricol în Anul 1945* (Bucarest, 1947), p. 14.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

433 The inventory of other agricultural equipment was more or less sta-
241 ble or showed a slight decline.

185 For all the controls and economic collaboration with Germany the Antonescu dictatorship appears to have accomplished nothing for Rumanian agriculture. The relative improvement, at least in terms of total production, which had appeared after the depression was broken by the war. The position of peasant agriculture was clearly deteriorating, and the industrial boom, arising mainly from war demands, was not an adequate compensation.

Although pessimistic voices could be heard in the Carolist dictatorship, the official attitude was optimistic. During the war years, however, there was increasing concern over the manifest failure of Rumanian agriculture to show any improvement. The agricultural census, taken in the spring of 1941, provided ample evidence of the unsatisfactory situation of the peasant. The veteran agricultural economist, Ionescu-Sișești, who had been writing confident articles throughout the interwar period, was quite gloomy in 1943.

> It was anticipated that such a gigantic transformation of property [the 1918–21 reforms] would keep the peasant class in a state of equilibrium for a long time and that the country would benefit from a long period of prosperity because of the distribution of land to the peasants. Unhappily this hope has not been completely realized. Today, when all the claims of the peasants appear satisfied, and there is nothing left to distribute—since a minimum of large and medium property is indispensible—a new peasantry is appearing which threatens to take on a grave character if measures are not adopted in time. The very rapid growth of the population and the advanced fragmentation of properties are engendering this crisis.[24]

His recommendations, however, were largely a recapitulation of the various measures which had been legislated, if not applied with any consequence, in the 1930's: exerting the state's right of preemption, preventing subdivision of properties below a certain minimum, encouraging consolidation, and creating larger colonization holdings. If such steps were taken, he said, "the peasantry will be divided into two categories: on the one hand, peasant proprietors with holdings of an adequate size, on the other, a class of agricultural workers living on the product of their labor on the farms of others.[25] Ionescu-Sișești's hopes were not to be realized. Within a year and a

24. G. Ionescu-Sișești, "Le Nouvel Aspect du problème agraire en Roumanie," *Archives pour la science et la réforme sociales, 16*, Nos. 1–4 (1943), 263.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 267.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

half the Communist party was in power and the last thing it wanted was such a "Stolypinist" situation in the countryside. 433 241 185

From the point of view of dramatic unity, the Antonescu dictatorship would make a convenient terminal point for recent Rumanian history, as the last act of a rake's progress. With a state encompassing virtually all Rumanians, a new constitution, and an extensive land reform, Rumania had entered the interwar period full, it seemed, of high promise. The promise had not been fulfilled, democracy did not flourish, the peasantry remained poor but prolific. The constitutional regime was replaced by a royal dictatorship and then by the *Walpurgisnacht* of the Iron Guard. Finally, Rumania was swept into the war to join Hitler's crusade. History, however, is no respecter of dramatic unity but persists in its devious course.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

000

ier peasants. As a matter of fact, both these contentions were true to a certain degree, as has been seen above in Chapter 3. But the Communists greatly exaggerated the extent both of large estates and of differentiation, and their statistical efforts to prove their point were either inaccurate or patently false.[35]

829
241
185

The adoption of the Popular Front in 1935 led to a corresponding modification in the Communist agrarian policy. While ultimate aims of socialism were not renounced, a distinction was drawn between socialist reforms and reforms designed to restore democracy. The militant revolutionary note of the early pronouncements was dropped. The new policy appears in Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu's study of the basic problems of Rumania, *Problemele de bază ale României*, written during the war but showing the influence of the Popular Front tactic. Pătrăşcanu was no proletarian but the son of a socialist intellectual and himself a lawyer. He was not Moscow-trained, and while his writings were based upon Lenin, they have a certain Western outlook. He led the Rumanian Communist party in 1944, was Minister of Justice in the coalition governments and in the Groza cabinet until the beginning of 1948. His influence in the party diminished steadily after the return of the comrades who had been in Moscow, and he was eventually discharged from his position because he had become "the exponent of bourgeois ideology and detached himself from the masses and from the ideology and principles of the working class."

Much of Pătrăşcanu's analysis of the Rumanian agrarian problem is sound and illuminating, although on many points of fact he obviously relied on the information compiled by the National Peasant economist Virgil Madgearu. He was fully aware, of course, of the unhealthy state of Rumanian agriculture, the persistence of extensive cereal cultivation and low level of productivity, the failure of the 1918–1921 land reforms to establish a prosperous peasantry, the persistence of metayage and other semiservitudes, the proletarization of the poorer peasantry, and the inability of a great number of Rumanian peasants to support themselves on their meager holdings. In trying, however, to adapt this promising material to perfect Marxist-Leninist categories he overtaxed the evidence; he exaggerated the failure of the 1918–1921 reforms to equalize land holdings, he probably gave too much importance to the differentiation between the poor and the rich peasants, and in attempting to demonstrate the

35. Two such examples are S. Timov, "Wird Rumänien agrarsiert oder industrialisiert?" *Agrarprobleme*, International Agrarinstitut Moskau, Band 2, Heft 2 (1929), pp. 310–346; and Tatarow, "Die Agrarkrise in Rumänien," *Agrarprobleme*, Band 4, Heft 2 (1931), pp. 44–80.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

prevalence of agricultural laborers he definitely mishandled his statistics.[36] 829 241 185

Pătrăşcanu was at his best in showing that the optimistic statements of official Rumanian spokesmen during the interwar years were altogether unjustified, and at his worst in reducing the agrarian question to an oversimplified formula. He was too intent upon proving that all difficulties could be laid at the door of Rumanian capitalism, with the support of the moribund but sinister boyar class. There is of course a certain amount of truth in this contention, but it served to distort his analysis. For example, "overpopulation" as a cause of economic misery was obviously unwelcome to him since it put the blame outside the realm of political economy and made it an act of God. He was correct in maintaining that Rumanian officialdom had all too eagerly seized upon overpopulation in recent years as a perfect scapegoat for the prolonged failure to improve agriculture, but it cannot be written off as an unimportant factor. Pătrăşcanu, however, felt obliged to attack it and devoted considerable attention to destroying the "myth" of overpopulation. He distinguished, quite properly, between absolute or biological overpopulation and an overpopulation resulting from economic circumstances. In his view there were three principal causes of this relative, or economic, overpopulation:

1) the existence of large properties, whereby 25,000 families held a quarter of the arable land, thus depriving hundreds of peasants of the possibility of creating a holding (according to the 1930 census 25,000 exploitations of over 50 hectares occupied only 18.8 per cent of the arable surface);

2) under semiservile conditions labor was intensively exploited; consequently one man was driven to accomplish the work on a piece of land which normally would provide a living for three;

3) the extensive use of women and children in place of men on boyar estates produced the appearance of overpopulation.

While these conditions, all of which he associated with the existence of large properties, doubtless had some effect—especially the first—they were certainly not the major reasons for Rumanian agrar- 185 241

36. Virgil Madgearu (*Evoluţia economiei româneşti*, p. 358), making use of some calculations of the agrarian economist Roman Cresin, stated that while small cultivators under 5 hectares had an excess of labor power, middle and large properties required additional labor, evaluated at 190 million days a year. Of this, 40 per cent (around 371,300) was undertaken by paid agricultural laborers, and 60 per cent represented supplementary work performed by the families of small proprietors. Pătrăşcanu, however (*op. cit.*, p. 85), took this figure of 40 per cent of paid agricultural laborers, equated it with the fact that 40 per cent of the arable land in Rumania in 1930 was in holdings over 10 hectares, and gave the quite unjustified impression that in effect agricultural laborers were responsible for the cultivation of all land over 10 hectares.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

●185 ian overpopulation after 1921. Moreover, he granted that Rumanian
strip cultivation and dwarf holdings led to overpopulation because of
241 their economic inefficiency but he went on to say:

> The solution of this aspect of the Rumanian agrarian question cannot be achieved in the framework of small properties, nor in the framework of private property in land. It cannot find a solution either in individual or isolated fashion, but involves structural transformations which concern the whole of Rumanian society, hence far past the restricted limits of the agricultural sector properly speaking.[37]

In a word, for all his criticism of the "myth" of overpopulation Pătrăşcanu really provided no convincing evidence that it was not a real problem, nor could he. This point is important, because the propaganda for the subsequent 1945 agrarian reform was obviously based on similar premises.

In his proposal of remedies, he limited himself to immediate reforms, which were not socialist but which were intended to rid Rumania of fascism and restore a constitutional bourgeois society. For agriculture he advocated the complete expropriation of large properties over 50 hectares, the abolition of servile labor relations, the resettlement of landless peasants and peasants with insufficient land; distribution to the peasants of livestock and equipment obtained from the expropriated estates; cancellation of peasant debts to the banks and to the state. Other economic measures included the nationalization of the Rumanian Bank and the consolidation of the banking structure; state control over cartels and the nationalization of certain combines; an eight-hour day for labor, minimum wages, social security, and protective legislation. For a Communist it was certainly a minimum program.

In explaining this program, Pătrăscanu relied upon the ideas of Lenin of 1900. The whole of the peasantry—while carrying within itself the latent conflict between poor peasant and the kulak—was the adversary of large property, although for a number of different reasons. In some European states peasant solidarity was no longer possible, but in Rumania there still remained a substantial antiboyar spirit common to poor and rich peasant alike.

The Agrarian Reform of 1945

241 Rumanian agriculture was disorganized after the defeat of 1944,
423 although as always the very backwardness of peasant farming re-
185 duced the shock. The war had depleted stocks of grain, draft animals,

37. Pătrăşcanu, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

and equipment. There had been fighting during the spring and summer over a wide strip of Moldavia, and less extended fighting was going on in Transylvania. The German army had retreated, the Red Army had marched through the country. There had been a considerable dislocation of population, and many landowners had fled from their estates in Moldavia and Bucovina.

Despite these unsettled conditions there was initially very little peasant action. There were cases of peasants taking land, primarily from absentee owners or those who had fled the Russian advance. But as late as January, 1945, at Botoşani in northern Moldavia—a region bordering the Soviet Union and which had been under Soviet control since the preceding spring—an agreement was reached, with the approval of the local Soviet commander, whereby landowners who had left their estates could return to them, provided they agreed to operate them personally and not as absentees.[38]

When the National Democratic Front began its drive to power in February, 1945, the calm was broken. In September, 1944, the Rumanian Communist party had put forward a demand, incorporated in the program of the National Democratic Front, for the expropriation of land over 50 hectares. Even before Groza and the Communists came into office peasant committees in the villages began taking over large estates. While this display of zeal, in most instances initiated by local organs of the Ploughmen's Front, was authentic in the sense that it corresponded to the primordial land hunger of the Rumanian peasant, it in no way reflected a revolutionary situation. The peasants in the winter of 1944 were not in a gay frame of mind; they were poor, heartily sick of the war which had cost many of them their sons, not to speak of their horses, cattle, and equipment. They were tired of troops—German, Russian, and Rumanian—marching by and requisitioning. They did not like the old order, they hated the local gendarmes but they were not in a revolutionary frame of mind. They welcomed land but they were not in a rick-burning mood.[39] The premature seizures of land before any law had been passed were merely part of the mock revolution the National Democratic Front was undertaking.

One of the first acts of the Groza government after its tumultuous rise to power was to promulgate a decree-law, on March 22, 1945, for a land reform.[40] According to Article 1 of this law, "Agrarian reform

38. This may seem surprising, but I saw the agreement in the prefecture at Botoşani.

39. Such at least was my impression after traveling though some 30 judeţe in December and January, 1944–45.

40. A text of the law is given in a pamphlet published by the Rumanian Ministry of Information, *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie* (Bucarest, November, 1946).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

241
423
185

is a national, economic, and social necessity for our country. Rumanian agriculture should be based upon sound and productive farms, which are the private property of those who cultivate them."

The stated purposes of the reform were:

a) the enlargement of the cultivable area of existing peasant farms which were less than 5 hectares;

b) the creation of vegetable gardens in the environs of cities, for workers, civil servants, and artisans;

c) the creation of new individual private farms for agricultural laborers without land;

d) the use of certain land for model farms and experimental stations, to be administered by the state.

The following land was to be expropriated:

a) all properties belonging to German citizens and to Rumanian citizens of German ethnic origin who had collaborated with Hitler Germany;

b) the properties of war criminals and those responsible for the "disaster of the country";

c) properties of those who had fled to countries with which Rumania was at war and of those fleeing after August 23, 1944;

d) the land of absenteeists (excluding persons on official business abroad, or absent by necessity, or workers who had gone abroad and who had less than 10 hectares);

e) properties of those who during the last seven years had not cultivated the land themselves (excepting those with less than 10 hectares);

f) properties of those who had volunteered to fight against the United Nations;

g) mortmain lands;

h) lands of private owners in excess of 50 hectares, including arable, orchards, meadows, ponds, marshes, and inundated land. The proprietor was permitted to select which 50 hectares he was to retain but it had to be in one place. Multiple properties and properties of husband and wife were considered as one.

All tractors, threshing machines, sowing machines, and combines found on expropriated land were to pass to the state for the creation of agricultural machine stations. Other equipment and livestock was to go to the state for redistribution to the peasants. Expropriation of inventory and livestock was to be in proportion to the amount of the proprietor's land expropriated.

The law exempted from expropriation rice fields, church and monastic properties, crown lands, and lands belonging to certain specified

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

cultural and philanthropic institutions, urban communes, and co-operatives.

241
423
185

The mayor of each commune was directed to call a general assembly of all peasants having less than 5 hectares. This assembly was to elect a local committee of 7–15 members. These committees, whose actions were to be coordinated by a district committee operating with the Ministry of Agriculture, were to draw up lists of land to be expropriated and of peasants who were entitled to receive land.

Priority in the distribution of land was as follows:

a) cultivators mobilized in the anti-Hitler war;
b) widows, orphans, and invalids of this war;
c) widows, orphans, and invalids of any war;
d) landless peasants;
e) agricultural laborers and peasants who had worked on the land expropriated;
f) peasants with less than 5 hectares.

A necessary condition for all categories, however, was that the recipient lack 5 hectares of land.

Expropriation was without compensation. The price of the new lots was to be equal to the annual average harvest of one hectare, that is, 1,000 kilograms of wheat or 1,200 kilograms of maize. The new proprietors were to pay immediately in money or in kind 10 per cent of the purchase price, the remainder to be paid in ten years for peasants with little land and in twenty years for landless peasants. Landless peasants could obtain a three years' moratorium on the payment of their first installment.

Holdings created under this law could not be divided, sold, leased or mortgaged, either in whole or in part, except in certain special cases, with the authorization of the Ministry of Agriculture. The new land was received without obligations.

Lands expropriated and divided before the promulgation of this law were to be made to conform with its provisions.

By a subsequent administrative regulation certain large properties could be exempted from expropriation, if they were well-organized enterprises, suitable to serve as model farms under the direction of the Ministry of Agriculture; even these farms, however, were not to exceed 150 hectares.

For a number of reasons it is difficult to ascertain the results of the law in terms of the redistribution of land. Expropriation began before the law was promulgated, and although the irregularities in its application were not as great as some of the dispossessed landowners made out, there was a good deal of uncontrolled seizure and redistri-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

341
423
185

bution. A reform carried out so brusquely and through the agency of local peasant committees was bound to be a hectic procedure and not likely to be very accurately recorded. As has been mentioned already the statistics on the 1918–21 reform, even those presented officially, were far from accurate, and there is no reason to believe that the figures on the 1945 reform are a bit more reliable. Indeed, it is quite obvious that some of the figures were rigged for political purposes.

As of January, 1947, according to official announcement, 1,443,911 hectares had been expropriated under the 1945 reform from 143,219 proprietors; 1,057,674 hectares had been distributed to the peasants and 387,565 hectares held as state reserve. Of the 1,114,888 peasants having claims, 796,129 had received land.[41] The average area expropriated was only 10 hectares. Of the number of peasants having claims 72 per cent received land. The average amount received per peasant was about 1.3 hectares. In magnitude this reform—if the figures are at all comparable—by no means equaled the 1918–21 reforms. For roughly the equivalent area (i.e., minus Bessarabia, though including Northern Bucovina and Southern Dobrogea), the first reform had expropriated 4,312,911 hectares, 2,824,962 hectares had been distributed to 1,036,367 peasants, an average of 2.7 hectares per peasant.

The regional results of the 1945 reform correspond to the nature of the terrain, with the notable exception of Transylvania. In the mountainous overpopulated areas the average allotment was very small: 0.6 hectares in the Moldavian Carpathians, 0.7 hectares in the Wallachian Carpathians, and 0.5 hectares in Bucovina. In Dobrogea, which was relatively sparsely settled, the peasants received an average of almost 3 hectares. An interesting feature of the reform is that while in most of the regions the average area of land expropriated was relatively large (over 130 hectares in the Moldavian Plain, 111 hectares in the Danube Plain, 57 hectares in Dobrogea, and 58 hectares in Bucovina) the average area expropriated was only 5.5 hectares in the Transylvanian Plateau and 5 hectares in the Tisa Plain. Of the total number of expropriations over nine-tenths were in Transylvania, although the area expropriated in that province was only about one-half the total. Clearly this meant the expropriation of numerous properties well under 50 hectares and presumably reflects the forced reduction of the German communities in Transylvania.[42]

41. Institutul Central de Statistică, *Communicări statistice, Nr. 17, 15 martie 1947* (Bucarest, 1947), p. 9.

42. The extensive German settlements in Transylvania, many of which had been there

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

In January, 1948, the Statistical Institute of the new Rumanian People's Republic undertook an agrarian census to ascertain the distribution of land after the 1945 reform. Unfortunately, this census does not permit satisfactory comparison with that of 1941. It presents a table, comparing the number of agricultural exploitations in the various categories of size for 1941 and 1948, which shows, as might be expected, a decrease in the number of dwarf holdings under ½ hectare and of large holdings over 20 hectares, and a marked increase in the number of exploitations between 1 and 5 hectares. However, since the amount of area occupied by these categories of exploitations is not given and it is unclear whether the same types of land (especially forests and pastures) are included in both cases, the comparison is not very illuminating and may be misleading.[43] It was obvious, however, that the land reform of 1945 did not, as it could not, create a nation of prosperous small-holders. Indeed, the conclusion reached as to the size of Rumanian exploitations has a very familiar ring: "If 3 hectares represents in general the minimum lot necessary to sustain by farming a household of 4 persons, then more than half of the agricultural exploitations of Rumania fall short of this level and are obliged to have recourse to outside income." [44] To be sure, this sour note was not the one prevailing in 1945 and 1946, when the reform was being pushed through, but anticipated the new agrarian line taken up in 1948.

In judging the 1945 land reform, it is necessary to realize, however, that it was not a Rumanian reform but had its sources in the Soviet Union, and that its immediate aims were political not economic.

---

for hundreds of years, were greatly reduced by the wholesale transfer of nearly the entire able-bodied population to the Soviet Union in the winter of 1944–45. Undoubtedly a high percentage of the Germans had been actively pro-Nazi, but the Soviet order paid no attention to any such criteria.

43. Number of agricultural exploitations (excluding Northern Transylvania):

		1948		*1941*	
Size of exploitation		*Number*	*Per cent*	*Number*	*Per cent*
Total		2,596,900	100.0	2,303,472	100.0
0–½	hectare	190,169	7.3	277,500	12.0
½–1	"	246,016	9.5	213,088	9.3
1–3	"	933,383	35.9	760,700	33.0
3–5	"	604,540	23.3	441,213	19.2
5–10	"	462,607	17.8	449,716	19.5
10–20	"	122,262	4.7	116,537	5.1
20–50	"	26,607	1.0	27,845	1.2
Over 50	"	11,316	0.4	16,873	0.7

A. Golopenţia and P. Onica, *Recensămîntul agricol din Republica Populară Română, 25 Ianuarie 1948. Rezultate provizorii*, Institutul Central de Statistică (Bucarest, 1948). For further details of the 1948 census see the Appendix. It appears that a good deal more land was included in this census than in 1941.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

3: Roberts S-- (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

The Change in Economic and Agrarian Policy

185 With regard to economic policy, the first two years after the war might be regarded as an induced and foreshortened NEP; not a retreat from war communism as the Soviet New Economic Policy had been, but, in form at least, the creation of a transitional economy between the older Rumanian capitalism and the drive toward socialism. This concept is closely related in the Communist mind to the functions of the People's Democracy and is embodied in the Constitution of 1948, though by that time the actual economic policy was moving beyond it.

241 465 For all the fanfare accompanying the 1945 agrarian reform, the organization of Rumanian farming in the first two or three years after its application showed little change. In the planting year 1946/47 much the greater part of the working force was engaged in family farms. About 181,000 persons (2.3 per cent of those active in agriculture) were permanent farm laborers, about 783,000 were engaged in seasonal work, and 1.4 million persons did some work on farms other than their own.[27] Payment for work continued to be a mixture of money and produce, only one-third of the work being paid solely in money.

The type of cultivation was much the same, though there was a retrogression from mixed agriculture. If the figures are comparable, some 61 per cent of the exploitations in 1948 were devoted to cereal cultivation as against 51 per cent in 1941; only 1.2 per cent of the exploitations concentrated on raising livestock as against 12 per cent in 1941, a reflection of the wartime loss of animals and the breaking up of large estates.

About two-thirds of the exploitations obtained their money income through sale of produce, the other third through outside labor. Two-fifths of the exploitations in 1947 were obliged to buy agricultural produce to supplement their own deficient production.

185 241 In 1945 the Groza regime announced that the agrarian reform was but the initial step in a whole series of projected reforms which would transform Rumanian agriculture, but at this time there was no mention of collectivization as the general goal. On the contrary, any mention of collective farming was frowned upon, and the whole emphasis was on assisting the independent peasant. Actually, the list of

27. *Recensământul agricol din Republica Populară Română, 25 Ianuarie 1948*, p. 35. The relation between the last two categories is not clear, but the figures on permanent and seasonal workers are quite similar to those of 1941. See above, p. 52

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

proposed measures was very similar to those brought forward repeatedly by various Rumanian governments in the preceding twenty-five years. Great publicity was given to state-operated agricultural machine stations which were to enable the peasant to mechanize his cultivation; from the beginning, however, this measure was regarded as a powerful potential lever in the hands of the state to direct agriculture. The promise of an agricultural machine industry was also a familiar item of earlier programs. Other recognizable projects were land reclamation, the creation of better experimental stations, improved agricultural education, more credit, a vigorous cooperative movement, development of agricultural industries, a scientific land survey, and the encouragement of animal husbandry.[28]

In 1945 the government created a National Cooperative Institute to assist agriculture, but its principal function appears to have been grain collection.[29] In November, 1946, appeared a new organ, REAZIM, an autonomous administration for developing agriculture, animal husbandry, and the use of agricultural machinery. REAZIM took over most of the state functions for agrarian improvement, rationalizing cultivation, supplying seeds and equipment, executing production plans, and managing agricultural machine stations.

Although many of these projects resembled those proposed by earlier regimes, it was obvious that the Communists had no intention of permitting Rumanian agriculture to proceed in its traditional rut. Even in the first phase of ostentatious silence about collective agriculture, the nature of the reforms, or rather the absence of certain reforms, provided an indication of developments to come. In its plans for agricultural improvement, the regime appears to have laid little stress on the desirability of consolidating holdings in private ownership, and the 1948 census showed the fragmentation of properties to be just as extreme as in 1941. The emphasis was upon increasing cereal output through mechanization rather than upon the intensified and diversified cultivation suitable to peasant farming. When, as a consequence of the 1946–47 famine, poor peasants began to sell their holdings, the government took steps to cancel sales to rich farmers. All these moves showed that it had no intention of fostering the growth of an independent, potentially capitalist peasantry on the

28. See, for example, the two pamphlets outlining the government's plans for intensifying livestock raising and for land reclamation: *Intensificarea creşterii animalelor în cadrul refacerii economice* (Bucarest, 1946), and *Îmbunătăţirile funciare în agricultura românească* (Bucarest, 1946).

29. In 1945 INCOOP was granted 57 billion lei for the collection of grain, of which 13 billion was for deliveries to the U.S.S.R., 8 billion to supply Soviet troops, 1 billion to supply the Rumanian army, and 35 billion for the civil population.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

185 241 Western model, but during this first period, to avoid alienating the peasants, it held its hand.

185 433 A somewhat similar situation obtained in the question of industrial policy, though here official propaganda was much more hostile to exploiting industrialists. So long as the Tătărescu Liberals were in the government, it called for the cooperation of private capital, and the only important step taken in this first phase was the nationalization of the National Bank. As late as March, 1947, Mihail Ralea, Rumanian Minister to the United States, protested against rumors that the government was proceeding against private enterprise and maintained, either disingenuously or without information (Ralea was not a member of the Communist party), that one of the main goals of the Groza regime was to "foster private initiative," to which it granted complete freedom.[30] Nevertheless, in practice the sphere of private industrial activity was increasingly circumscribed and restricted by a number of devices: obstructive action by the workers, appeals to the national interest, or simply charges of inefficiency and sabotage.

439 Perhaps the most significant economic innovation in the months after the armistice was the creation of a number of joint Soviet-Rumanian enterprises. On May 8, 1945, the Rumanian government signed an agreement with the Soviet Union providing for extensive economic collaboration. The U.S.S.R. was to assist Rumanian agriculture by supplying tractors, seed, and agricultural experts. A number of SOVROM companies were set up in the important fields of river and air transport, banking, lumbering, and oil production and refining. (A 1948 trade agreement created two new SOVROM companies for the manufacture of tractors and chemical products.) Participation in the companies was on a 50–50 basis, and the Rumanian state was to grant them special privileges and monopolies. Much of the Soviet capital was quite easily obtained from the German assets in Rumania, awarded to the U.S.S.R. in the Potsdam agreement. These concerns clearly gave the Soviet Union a controlling position at key points in the Rumanian economy.

This form of economic collaboration was reminiscent of the Rumanian-German trade agreement of 1939. The principal difference lay less perhaps in the agreements themselves than in the structure of the Soviet and German economies. Under the German-Rumanian agreement the two economies were seen as complementary, and the major function of Rumania was to provide raw materials; the Germans showed some hostility to the further development of Ru-

30. See his letter to the *New York Times*, March 12, 1947.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

manian industries, especially secondary industries. Both Russia and Rumania, however, are still industrializing economies and there seems to be little evidence, in the Rumanian case at least, of a desire to check the industrialization of the latter.[31] 439

The turning point in the economic policy of the immediate post-war period was the stabilization of the currency in August, 1947, which more or less liquidated the old financial structure and served as a vast economic leveler. On the fifteenth of that month, the leu was devalued (to 150 to the dollar) and the old money was ordered to be exchanged immediately at the rate of one new leu for 20,000 old lei. Peasants were limited to exchanging 5,000,000 lei; workers to 3,000,000; and other persons to 1,500,000. That is, at the official new rate, peasants could receive in exchange $1.67, workers $1.00, and others $0.50. Gold and foreign currency were entitled to full value but had to be declared under penalty of life imprisonment. This drastic measure, which came at a time of continued commodity shortages, inevitably caused widespread hardship. There were numerous reports of resistance by the peasants who felt as usual that they were being sacrificed to the benefit of the towns. The government hurled many charges of speculation and exchange violation, and part of the brutal behavior of the regime in the course of 1947 is to be associated with, if not explained by, this Draconian financial reorganization.[32] 652

Along with the tightening of political control the Groza government now entered a new phase of economic policy marked by the progressive nationalization of industry, collectivization of agriculture, and the beginning of economic plans. In 1947 pressure against private industry consisted primarily in assuming control over certain specific enterprises, supervising industrial activity, and making accusations of sabotage against foreign-owned concerns. At the beginning of 1948 Gheorghiu-Dej launched a general attack on private capital, which dominated industry, banking, and insurance: "Our democratic regime has been very patient with private enterprise, but private owners do not make capital investment, nor do they renew equipment. They transfer capital abroad and openly sabotage reconstruction." In January the concession of the Rumanian match monopoly to the Swedish firm (this concession had been granted at the time of the stabilization loan of 1929) was declared invalid and 185 471

31. See also below, pp. 327–329.

32. A defense of the stabilization, written by the National Bank, is published as "La Réforme monétaire en Roumanie, 15 août 1947," in *Les Archives internationales*, Doc. 664.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

●165 471 annulled. In the following months government administrators were appointed to supervise the British and American-owned oil companies, which action, in effect, put these firms in a state of forcible dissolution. The Rumanian industrialist, Nicolae Malaxa, who had made great efforts to accommodate himself to the Russians and the Groza regime, was unable to ride this new wave and his factories, the most important in the country, were also taken over. While, as has been seen, the Rumanian government has always worked in close conjunction with Rumanian industry—fostering desirable undertakings and even setting up state-owned enterprises—this new advance was under quite different auspices and had a far more ambitious intent.

The decisive step came in June, 1948, with a bill providing for the nationalization of all industrial, mining, banking, insurance, and transport concerns. The law at the outset affected some 1,068 enterprises, including 132 heavy industries, 20 coal mines, 25 oil and natural gas companies, 56 building material companies, 163 textile factories, 15 insurance companies, and 4 shipping concerns. While the law did not, in theory, deny compensation, it was to be based on profits, its amount was to be determined by a government commission, it was to be paid in state bonds, and would not be given to persons who "have enriched themselves illegally or left the country illegally." The motives given for the bill were largely political: the new situation demanded changes in the national economy; the bourgeoisie, which had been disarmed politically, must not be permitted to retain its potent economic weapons.

In November all privately owned health institutions, hospitals, sanatoria, and the film industry were nationalized. In April, 1949, the state took over a new batch of private companies, pharmacies, laboratories, drug and cosmetic factories. Thus, by the end of the year, a significant and certainly decisive sector of the economy was directly controlled and managed by the state.

423 The switch in agrarian policy came at a somewhat later date, though in 1946 and 1947 one finds mounting criticism of the predatory activity of the rich peasants and the sabotage committed by estate owners on the land remaining to them. A foreshadowing of a change in eastern European agriculture was given in a Russian broadcast of February 9, 1948, to Soviet farmers: "Today the governments of the new democracies know that the present small peasant holdings are not a paying proposition and that the peasants' road to wealth lies in co-operation and the uniting of small holdings into large collective estates. . . . The movement for setting up co-operative agri-

culture is growing apace

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

423 tasks. The first was to restrict the kulaks and dislodge them from
565 their position. Then it would be possible "when conditions are ripe,
661 to pass over to the policy of the complete liquidation of the kulaks."[36] He anticipated, of course, that the kulaks would resort to underground struggle, sabotage, and criminal acts in an effort to avert their approaching fate.

●185 The second task was to undertake propaganda convincing the poor
241 and middle peasants of the need to unite in collective farms. When that task had been achieved, when all the land belonged to the collectives in perpetuity, the goal of making the land public property and bringing about the socialist transformation of the countryside would be reached. Gheorghiu-Dej emphasized, however, the necessity of making this transition gradually, by means of persuasion, and with the voluntary support of the peasant. The poor peasants should not be driven into collectives, the middle peasant should not be identified with the kulak, and the whole process must be paced by the development of agricultural machinery, machine tractor stations, and the expansion of the network of consumer and producer cooperatives as broad mass movements.[37] These words of caution presumably reflect the wisdom gained from the Soviet experiment in collectivization.

Gheorghiu-Dej concluded his remarks with the inevitable "self-criticism": in the past the party had not provided a clear political line for work in the countryside and had failed to popularize the notion of uniting the working peasantry into collective farms, and had even ignored or denied this goal.[38] That these so-called errors were the fault of the Rumanian Communists is, of course, nonsense. The party line, emanating from Moscow, had shifted, and in this instance a strong case can be made that the change had been planned long in advance. The Communists could have had no intention of stopping at the stage of small peasant cultivation which had, in any event, reached a cul-de-sac in Rumania.

474 The creation of collective farms got under way in 1949, and by the end of the year, according to the glowing account of a Russian visitor, 56 *kolkhozi* comprising 4,000 peasant families had been estab-

36. As in Russia representatives of the restricted and soon to be liquidated kulak class are not to be admitted to the collective farms.

37. The cooperatives, however, must rid themselves of capitalist elements, must intensify their collaboration with the state trading organs, and must promote the spirit of "socialist emulation" among the peasants.

38. G. Gheorghiu-Dej, "Tasks of the Rumanian Workers Party in the Struggle for the Socialist Reorganization of the Countryside," *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy* (Bucarest, March 15, 1949).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

natural concomitant and hence relevant for an estimate of the Rumanian future is exceptionally difficult; at the present state of our knowledge of Soviet agriculture it would be hazardous to base any Rumanian prediction upon it.[41]

In a curious way, however, this issue resembles the pre-1914 dispute in Rumania between the proponents of estate and peasant farming, and in certain respects the wheel has turned full circle. The collective farmer, with his own tiny personal plot, working on the great farm, delivering what amounts to payments in kind and performing a set number of work days, is obviously reminiscent of his grandfather under neoserfdom, with, of course, a different master and the promise contained in, if not yet realized by, the power of the tractor. Somehow, through all the changes the past century has witnessed, an apparently distinctive eastern European pattern is reasserting itself.

Both the nationalization of industry and the move toward collective agriculture are to be understood within the context of an over-all planned economy, not only for one nation but for all the eastern European satellite states. In the field of planning Rumania lagged a bit behind its neighbors, perhaps because of difficulty in creating an adequate and reliable administrative staff, but is now proceeding along the same path.

In general, after putting through a land reform and obtaining control of the industrial sector of the economy, all these states have inaugurated short-term plans of one or two years to restore their economies from the devastation wrought by the war and to pave the way for the next stage, long-term development programs. The primary aim of all the plans is, naturally, increased industrialization; agricultural development takes second place. In the view of a United Nations study, the plans "appear to aim at the development of more or less self-contained industrial economies in order to minimize their dependence on trade with the outside world. . . . The similarity in the investment pattern in the various countries suggests that the industrial plans were drawn up individually, on a national basis."[42] This presumed element of individuality is rather surprising in view

41. Favorable interpretations of the success of Soviet collectivization may be found in Alexander Baykov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (New York, 1946), and Maurice H. Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development since 1917* (London and New York, 1948). A quite pessimistic view, based on an extensive criticism of Soviet statistics, is given in Naum Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR* (Stanford University Press, 1949).

42. United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*, p. 202.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

B5

of the evidence that the Soviet Union exerts a dominating influence in the whole area.[43] It should be observed, however, that even within the countries the plans "aim at a geographical spread of industrialization throughout their individual areas by concentrating on the industrial development of the most backward regions."[44] Hence, the guiding philosophy seems to be that industrialization per se is the cure all and should therefore be spread as widely as possible. In consequence, less attention appears to be paid to the matter of economic complementarity; certainly the complementarity is not to be based on an agriculture-industry exchange.

In this respect the plans differ sharply in their outlook from Nazi Germany's schemes for southeast Europe with their emphasis upon economic exchange. The Polish economist Oskar Lange has recently stressed this fact as proof of the nonexploitative, anti-imperialist behavior of the Soviet Union. It is hard to say what economic advantages are being lost by this parallel rush to industrialization. There must be a point at which the principle of "socialization in one country" can be driven to an absurdity.

The long-term plans anticipate a steep increase in the rate of capital investment, with an annual increase of gross national product of about 10 per cent. However, employment in industry, for the four or five years of the plans, will increase by only one or 2 per cent of the total population, which itself may rise by some 5 per cent in the same period; the plans will not, in the immediate future, do much to solve the pressing problem of agrarian overpopulation. One reason for the relatively low increase in industrial employment is the concentration on heavy industry, in which the capital per worker employed is comparatively high. The prior development of light industries, which would expand employment, is apparently being avoided, perhaps because such an approach would increase dependence upon imports, perhaps because of the need to strengthen the sinews of war.

When the major Rumanian industries were nationalized in the summer of 1948 the government announced that this act rendered possible the creation of a planned economy. The first plan, a one-

43. One recent article asserts that "according to the secret protocol to the pact for the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance [the Soviet response to the Marshall Plan, established at the beginning of 1949], the Soviet State Planning Committee will 'coordinate' the economic planning of member countries for the next twenty years." "The Peasant in Eastern Europe's Economic Planning," *The World Today* (August, 1949), p. 364.

44. United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*, p. 202.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

year plan for recovery, was inaugurated in 1949. It was to involve the expenditure of 82,000 million lei, including 7,000 million for the completion of work started in 1948, and was to achieve a 40 per cent increase in the level of production over 1948. The capital expenditure was to be invested, percentage-wise, as follows: mining and manufacturing, 47; transportation and roads, 21; agriculture, 9; housing and public services, 21; other, 2. Throughout the year the government issued reports of various portions of the plan being "fulfilled and over-fulfilled," but no absolute quantities were mentioned, only percentage gains over 1948, a singularly uninformative year. In the summer of 1949 the government announced that a budget surplus rendered available several billion additional lei which would be used to begin construction of the Danube–Black Sea Canal.[45] The plan for 1950 appears to be still a preliminary rather than a long-term development program. 185

Viewed abstractly, and hence, as all Leninists know, incompletely, Communism has three aspects which might commend it to the Rumanian situation: its emphasis upon the importance of industry, its equalitarianism, and its insistence that a backward society can make meaningful progress through its own efforts. Previous Rumanian political movements lacked one or more of these aspects. The Liberals and the neoliberals of the Carolist regime saw the desirability of industrialization, but it proved to be largely for the benefit of a narrow oligarchy. The National Peasants were far more democratic but they tended to be, if not hostile to industry, at least opposed to forced industrialization, which was probably the only way to bring industry to Rumania. Feeling that their country was too weak for such an effort, they turned to foreign capital for assistance, but their hopes for international economic progress "in the spirit of Geneva" were blighted by the depression. The Iron Guard had nothing to offer in this connection. The Social Democrats recognized the importance of industry as well as the necessity of achieving a truer democracy in Rumania, but they were unable to see how their socialist goals could be gained in Rumania with its peasant economy.

The Russian Bolsheviks under Lenin's influence achieved a remarkable tour de force in uniting these elements. They were aware 185 668

45. Along with the growing similarity of the Rumanian economy to that of the Soviet Union, there have been a number of reports of forced labor, primarily in connection with the Danube–Black Sea Canal. It may be relevant to note that by a law of January 21, 1939, the Carolist regime established an Administration for the Exploitation of Penal Labor; on May 31, 1945, the Groza regime transferred this administration from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Interior.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

185
668

of the political importance of the peasantry, but refused to accept the rural ideals of populism; they saw the need for industrialization but were not going to let industry fall into the hands of a capitalist oligarchy. Having achieved their revolution they set about to prove that it was possible to achieve socialism in one state, be it a backward state such as Russia. Whether this revolution and this socialism were what Karl Marx had in mind is a different matter.

The question remains, of course, whether the Bolshevik achievement was anything more than a tour de force. One can maintain that it succeeded simply because it has survived and expanded under exceptionally difficult circumstances. On the other hand, the shadow of repression which darkens the Soviet state, the heavy weight of a bureaucracy forming its own hierarchy, and the vast extension of forced labor, under whatever guise, would indicate that the Leninist synthesis did not reveal a magical solution for the economic problems of a backward state and that the Soviet Union has paid dearly for its ambition to build socialism in a single and relatively retarded country.

Aside from these problems of the Soviet economy, the installation of a Communist regime in Rumania involves additional difficulties. The mere fact that the Groza government was externally imposed has stigmatized it as an alien intruder. To say that this is of no moment except to the nationalist middle classes is but casuistry. It is significant that while one may find certain justifications for the Soviet action in Rumania—in the strategic importance of the area, in the pronounced hostility displayed by Rumanian regimes since 1917, in the advantages of coordinating the eastern European states in one large economic region—Soviet and Rumanian Communist apologists unfailingly fall back upon the one explanation which simply is not true, that the Groza government represents and is supported by the overwhelming majority of the Rumanian people. This does not mean that it will be vigorously and permanently resisted; alien domination is an old familiar in eastern Europe, and history tends to overlook the many cases when national independence, crushed to earth, remained there. But it does mean, for the near future at least, the blighting of whatever democratic tendencies may be contained in the theory of communism. Those Rumanian Communists who were known to have a Rumanian rather than a Soviet point of view were dropped from their posts and eliminated from the political scene well before the Titoist heresy became a public issue.

As to the economic prospects, there is, of course, the general advantage of participating in a large economic space. People of nearly all political outlooks have felt that the multitude of small states cre-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

ated in eastern Europe after the First World War did not represent a rational economic solution. The principal, and decisive, differences arose over the nature of the union or federation which should be inaugurated.

185 668

On the other hand, Rumania is now in the position of being a junior partner in a belt-tightening association. There is no question that in blatant contrast to the Soviet political aim of creating an eastern European coprosperity sphere, the actual Soviet activities, largely under the terms of the armistice, have thus far constituted a heavy drain on the Rumanian economy. There is no need to attribute malevolent intentions to this drain. The Russians were badly in need of supplies and equipment to restore their economy, and it is altogether natural that they should have accorded a higher priority to their needs than to Rumania's, and given the power relations they were perfectly able to do so. Unfortunately, this pressure in one form or another, most probably in relation to military requirements, may last for an indefinite period of time.

Ultimately, the development of the Rumanian Communist party and the fate of the People's Republic will depend upon the Soviet Union's relations with the Western powers. The Groza government was installed for reasons of international policy and its future rests with the fruits of that policy.

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania ED1

outlined. In the first place it would be slow and costly to carry out. 241
Secondly, it would call for skills which Communist régimes do not 565
possess and foreign scientific information which they boast of despising. Thirdly, they in principle oppose measures for improving small-peasant agriculture, for if they succeeded the peasants would merely become more independent and recalcitrant. They therefore prefer to favor industry and neglect agriculture,[7] calculating that misery on the farms will make the peasants more amenable to collectivization or force them into great slave-labor projects like the Danube-Black Sea canal. In any case, they have not cast Rumania to play an agricultural rôle in the family of Sovietized states. Nature did so, but they are going to improve on nature.

In Stalin's original plans Jugoslavia and probably Bulgaria were 185
destined to remain agricultural in the main and to supply the other 135
members of the family with raw materials. Rumania, although so heavily agricultural, was to be largely industrialized. The reason for this arbitrary allotment of functions is not entirely clear. Rumania has oil and timber, as well as reserves of soft coal and natural gas in Transylvania, all of which can be developed without running counter to economic law. She also has a large reservoir of unskilled labor. But otherwise she is not adapted by natural resources and native skills to proceed with very speedy or very extensive industrialization projects, and she seems especially unsuited to becoming a center of heavy industry in view of the scarcity of her metallurgical reserves. In any case, the improvement and development of agricultural production would be the right preliminary to ambitious enlargements of the industrial plant such as are projected in the new Rumanian Five Year Plan, to end December 31, 1955.

Ana Pauker has called the new Plan "majestic." Its main purpose, 185
she has written,[8] is "the industrialization of the country . . . on a new, advanced technical basis . . . which will insure the success of the Socialist offensive against the capitalist elements." Industrial output is to be increased twofold, with emphasis on what she called "the Stalin method" of developing heavy industry in particular.

[7] Of the Rumanian investment program for 1950, 47 percent was allocated for industry, 20 percent for transportation and 9 percent for agriculture.

[8] *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!*, Bucharest, August 18, 1950.

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania EDI

185 Output of oil is to be doubled, of iron and steel nearly doubled. Though the socialization of agriculture is of course to be pushed, Mme. Pauker said nothing about class warfare in the villages nor did she emphasize the leading rôle of the industrial proletariat, as had been done by other satellite leaders as well as by her own colleagues in the Central Committee, Georgescu and Luca.

185 Perhaps geography supplies an answer to why Moscow slated
648 Rumania but not Jugoslavia and Bulgaria for industrialization. The latter are more distant from Soviet Russia and would be much more exposed to enemy air attack in case of war. Rumania adjoins the Soviet Union; and although it is true that her oil fields were bombed from North Africa and Italy in the last war, they could be given air protection more easily than could the industrial installations in the other two countries. The same considerations apply, though in less degree, to Hungary; but in any case industrialization there was already considerably advanced. Rumania and Hungary, moreover, were destined in the Soviet planning to remain indefinitely under occupation by Soviet troops.

The favor shown by Soviet planners for developing heavy industry even in situations where it seems particularly unnatural, as in Rumania, is partly inspired, of course, by their desire to proletarianize the population as quickly as possible. But more important, perhaps, it also will increase the dependence of the satellites on the Soviet Union. Where else but in Russia can they hope to dispose of the product?

565 Despite all their adversities, present and planned, the peasants
626 nevertheless remain the great—probably the only—obstacle to Rumania's full Sovietization. All over Southeast Europe farming is more a way of life than an occupation, and nowhere is this truer than in Rumania. Coercion will gradually break the Rumanian peasant of this way of life. As we have seen, however, the régime has so far made no claims to spectacular progress. Evidence that formidable difficulties are being encountered is found in the fact that while Georgescu, Luca and others stress complete proletarianization as the goal and hint at violent methods to attain it, they make excuses for not proceeding faster; and at the same time there continues to be conciliatory talk about getting the "freely given consent of the peasants."

Celtic forms, Latin and Anglo-Saxon followed one another, but Norman French was unable to oust Anglo-Saxon, though it left a deposit of legal phrases and helped to make English grow towards the remarkable amalgam of Teutonic and Romance elements that it now is, though much of this growth came during the Renaissance. Roumania is in a sense an analogous amalgam of Latinised and Slavonic elements. The survival of the older, Latin, element is an interesting fact.

The Roumanian people, as we may begin to call them, were spread over the Carpathian bastion, using the high pastures in summer, so that contacts were maintained over long distances, independently of adjacent peoples more specially concerned with farming in lowland villages. It is a Roumanian theory, with much probability behind it, that the summer life on the upland pastures has had not a little to do with the survival of the Latin element to such a degree in Roumania, and with the survival of the Roumanian people's consciousness of themselves as distinct from their neighbours. It is noteworthy that groups of Germans, Szeklers, and so on, spreading in the Carpathian bastion later on, when Christianity had come to this part of the world, have not changed their language, nor have they caused their neighbours to change theirs. The resistance to language-change has become too great.

In the days when Latin and Slavonic were, as it were, competing in and around the Carpathian bastion, Christianity was expanding from Rome and Constantinople, with characteristic differences, only some of which concern us here. In the west, Roman cities had grown, often from camps, ere the empire fell, and cities tended to acquire bishops, for whom the Roman tradition was their main link with the larger world. The insistence on the general language (Latin) for religious purposes and the growth in authority and prestige of the Bishop of Rome are thus easy to understand. And the combination gave the bishop's city a prestige that helped to Christianise barbarian conquerors and to spread the idea of the city when a revival began in the tenth and eleventh centuries. In the east there was less spread of the idea of the city northward from Constantinople and the Ægean, save in the case of the cities on a Greek basis in south Russia. Nor was there the same spread of a general language. We accordingly find that the Church consecrated Slavonic forms,

POLITICAL PARTIES

Bulgarian Prime Minister Stambuliiski, in order to weld it 665
together and impart to it the driving energy of a revolutionary party. Fortunately for Rumania, its peasantry was led by a man who is remarkable not only for his common sense, but also for his extreme frankness, sincerity and modesty, and who in the midst of unparalleled corruption leads and insists on living a clean life. His devotion to the ideal he serves explains his readiness to relegate himself to the background whenever he believes that his self-effacement can be conducive to the advancement of his party or to the welfare of his country. He grasped the dangers inherent in an extremist policy for a country which had not yet firmly consolidated its various constituent segments, nor secured the spiritual unity of its people, and instead of following the easy course of giving a free rein to the hotheads of his party, he used his authority instead to curb their revolutionary zeal. M. Ion Mihalache, a former teacher by profession, foresaw that the wisest policy was to secure the adherence to the Peasant Party of various groups and public men who by their moral standing might add to its prestige, and by their influence help to exert a restraining force on its revolutionary activities. Such individuals were unfortunately inexistent in the old kingdom with the solitary exception of Prof. Iorga, who for over forty years had been performing the combined functions of a national tribune and a moralist. Mihalache, therefore, had to turn to the newly incorporated provinces, though his decision to co-operate with outsiders and facilitate their access to the government of the country created intense resentment in the old kingdom. Of the new territories, 186
Transylvania alone had been distinguished for its tenacious 665
defence of its nationality under Hungarian rule. It possessed a National party which for fifty years had battled heroically against Magyar despotism, and had been purified and tempered through the endless persecution it had been subjected to. Such a political group was ideally designed to serve as the nucleus of a larger party aiming at the emancipation of the Rumanian people from the oligarchy which persisted in exploiting it both politically and economically. The National Party of Transylvania, though naturally including intellectuals, was mainly a peasant party itself,

[186] 665 since it was a purely Rumanian party and represented proportionately all strata of the population, while Transylvania formed part of Hungary. Those of its adherents who pursued their personal advancement rather than that of their party had deserted it, and on the union of Transylvania with Rumania they joined the ranks of the various political groups of the old kingdom, believing that such conduct would be conducive to more rapid promotion for them. The party had thereby been purged of all doubtful elements, and those who remained could be considered as absolutely devoted to their ideal, namely the emancipation of the Rumanian democracy from a tyranny, which, though no longer Magyar, was to liberal-minded men perhaps even more stifling and more repulsive than that exerted of old [187] from Budapest. The Transylvanian National Party should not be mistaken on account of its name, for a group permeated by narrow nationalistic views; on the contrary, in respect to treatment of racial minorities in Rumania, it aims at securing for them the widest possible autonomy compatible with the maintenance of the Rumanian State. The majority of its rank and file being composed of peasants, its union with the Peasant party of Rumania was an occurrence which was bound to happen, fostered as it was through a community of suffering and an identity of desires. From every point of view the fusion of these two parties may be regarded as the most hopeful portent in Rumanian political life in recent times.

It was particularly felicitous also for the Transylvanian section since it afforded it an opportunity to repudiate the charge of cherishing separatist tendencies. The new group undoubtedly represents the most numerous and sanest elements in Rumania. The predominance of the Transylvanian intellectuals in it is due to the fact that these men are conscious of their civic duties, that they are resolved to serve their less developed peasant brethren and to bear their burdens in common, rather than to hoist themselves up into oligarchic groups intent on exploiting the rural masses. When the intellectuals of the old kingdom learn to subordinate their personal interest to that of their country, they will

RUMANIA

665 equal footing. The development of railway communications was to be achieved by the granting of complete and effective autonomy to the railway administration, and in certain cases even the construction and exploitation of new lines was to be left to private enterprise.

M. Maniu, the leader of the party, has temporarily withdrawn from political life as a sign of protest against the unconstitutional methods adopted by the King. In spite of persistent and recurring demonstrations on the part of his followers, M. Maniu has refused to reconsider his decision, but his post of president of the party is being kept vacant in the belief, that eventually a return to constitutional methods will permit him to emerge from his self-imposed exile in Transylvania and to resume his political activities. The latter region, having evolved under Magyar rule an alert public opinion, has recently been the scene of imposing political manifestations, in the course of which the most profound and touching attachment for M. Maniu has been evinced. The latter has consistently counselled moderation to his followers, expressing his confidence that the King would in time perceive his mistake and return to constitutional methods. The Transylvanians form the better educated and more enlightened section of Rumania's population, and therefore it should not be surprising that they should be both more vigilant and restive. Already voices are raised advocating the abandonment of the passive policy of dignified abstention as prescribed by M. Maniu, and a revision of the tactics hitherto followed is demanded. It is probable that the whole party will come round to this view, as Bucarest has been incapable of either formulating a generous policy or, what is even more difficult, of carrying it into effect. This latent possibility of the appearance of a 186 militant opposition headed by the National Peasant Party is 665 not, it seems, too remote, for the Transylvanians are dissatisfied not only with the present régime, but also with the general attitude adopted towards them by politicians of the old kingdom. In a congress of the Transylvanian section of the party, held at Cluj at the end of March, 1932, M. Vaida-Voevod declared "we clearly see that there exists a conspiracy which premeditates the undermining of the forces of

Transylvania, so that by impoverishing us they may exploit [186] 665 and lord over us."

Both M. M. Maniu and Vaida-Voevod are known for their 665 moderation and circumspection and through the "Patria," 668 the mouthpiece of the Transylvanian section of the party, they have endeavoured to impose silence on their more turbulent followers and on the advocates of militant methods. But if a new political combination is imposed on the country from above, it seems that their hands will be forced and a more combative attitude adopted, which may well be the signal for radical changes in Rumania. The Transylvanian peasantry is far from being prone to allow the Rumanian goverment to ride roughshod over its constitution, and the absence so far, of subversive movements in that province is solely due to the demureness and composure of M. M. Maniu and Vaida-Voevod and should not be taken as indicative of a peaceful disposition. On the contrary, the Press campaign of General Averescu against the present régime has been widely approved and the peasantry is openly expressing sympathy with him. He is in fact becoming a very popular figure. Owing to the severe crisis which the province is traversing, which is more acutely felt than in the old kingdom because from the cultural point of view it is several stages ahead of the latter, it would not require much effort to turn the brewing dissatisfaction into open revolt. Already the peasants are beginning to manifest their disapproval of M. Maniu's attitude, and are more and more insistently demanding that he should abandon his present seclusion and explain the reasons for the passivity he has so far shown. Apparently they believe that the time has come for more drastic methods. A speech from M. Maniu delivered in February, 1932, to a delegation of his party, which went to greet him at his country retreat at Badacin and ask him to resume his duties as leader of the party, is characteristic of the efforts he employs to assuage the militant ardour of his supporters. He refused to accept anew the leadership, and among other things he is reported to have declared: "To-day the nation is deprived of its constitutional rights; we are on the threshold of bankruptcy, both economic and moral; we see anarchy enthroned in men's souls and hatred fomented in the pro-

652 quate means at their disposal they yet succeeded in achieving a certain measure of success, and notwithstanding the tremendous difficulties with which they had to cope. Some of the issues demanding attention were the reorganization of the administrative machinery in the newly-annexed territories, the complete overhauling of means of communication, the readjustment of agriculture, the reconstruction of the oil industry, which had greatly suffered during the war, and the necessity of providing for the needs of the army owing to the exposed geographical position of the country.

RUMANIA'S ECONOMIC POLICY

186 454 Until the advent to power in 1928 of the National Peasant Party under M. Maniu, the policy of the country was inspired by an uncompromising nationalism that tended to the complete exclusion of foreign capital so necessary for the development of Rumania. The chief instigators of this policy were the late brothers John and Vintila Bratianu, who had raised the maxim "prin noi insine" (by ourselves alone) to the sanctity of a religious dogma. The governments that had succeeded each other since the conclusion of the war, with the exception of the one presided over by M. Vaida-Voevod, were either formed by the Bratianu, or so-called Liberal Party, or by some nominees of theirs who were quite amenable to their views, so that a certain sequence in the policy pursued may be detected throughout this period, in spite of the change of persons at the helm of the State, while any divergence in their pronouncements from the original programme may be explained by the desire to allay the mistrust engendered by the Bratianu policy. The principal aim of this policy was the attainment of self-sufficiency through the industrialization of the country. This found expression in extensive legislation dealing with the development of national resources, the chief enactment being the special mining law promulgated in July, 1924.

382 471 315 The subsoil resources had already been declared national property, and the special mining law, which was aimed par-

655 maritime and fluvial shipping companies, the docks, ports, warehouses, and grain elevators of Braila, Galatz, and Constantsa.

661 Laws were drafted aiming at the commercialization and exploitation, either independently or in co-operation with 471 the State, of these State-owned properties, as well as of other 186 national resources. But the purpose which actuated the entire economic legislation enacted by the Bratianu Governments was that of preventing foreign capital from acquiring a dominant position in the country. This policy of restraining the activities of foreign capital by legal restrictions was not due to the fact that Rumania might be imperilled by foreign capital securing a preponderating influence, but mainly because the Bratianu party aimed at reserving for themselves the monopoly of such profits as could be made through the exploitation of the national resources. The direct result of this policy was to sink whatever Rumanian capital existed in big enterprises, while agriculture was entirely neglected, and to deplete completely the liquid assets of the country to such an extent that its credit organization was dislocated.

433 It is sad to record that during the years when there was a 457 plethora of capital seeking investment which could have been easily attracted to Rumania with the object of endowing her with an adequate equipment for the development of her immense resources, such narrow and selfish views should have prevailed among her rulers. Indeed, had the opposite policy been adopted it would have secured prosperity to her even during the lean years which are now upon us. Foreign capital naturally fought shy, and refused to be enticed into enterprises in which it was not allowed to exercise legitimate control, which in many instances would have proved both salutary and indispensable. Rumania's natural wealth certainly provides a basis for industrial activity, there is an abundance of raw material, fuel, as well as a supply of cheap labour, but there is a serious deficiency of capital, which is reflected by the high rates of interest 426 prevalent. Commercial bills were discounted at rates vary- 433 ing between 18 per cent and 30 per cent, and first mortgages 454 were concluded on the basis of an average interest of 20 per

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

duce remuneratively on the basis of present world prices. 433 At first sight it would appear that the simplest solution would be the abandonment of the present policy. An alleviation of the burden imposed on the peasantry would reduce drastically their costs of production and would better enable them to adjust the price of their produce to the prevailing world prices. If capital were withdrawn from industry and applied instead to the improvement of the means of cultivation, or to the diversification and intensification of agricultural production, Rumanian agricultural produce would be in a better position than at present to meet competition in neutral markets. It is true that as a result of the present tendency among industrial states to develop their own agricultural resources, and to curtail imports of agricultural produce by raising their tariff barriers, agrarian countries find it increasingly difficult to market their produce. Yet there is a possibility for the latter to secure regular markets if they would give up in exchange their attempts at general industrialization; and it is surprising that so far no understanding has been arrived at on these lines between industrial and agricultural countries, both parties persisting in a policy that is mutually ruining them. The adherents of the policy [186] of industrialization partly explain their attitude by the necessity of severing all connection with former enemy states like Hungary, since the latter country would use commercial intercourse to further its irredentist propaganda in the territory which has reverted to Rumania. It is also partly explained by the necessity of making the country as self-supporting as possible so as to render it independent of foreign help in case of another war. So military considerations also tend to intensify economic nationalism, and as the military are fairly powerful and can make themselves heard there is little hope of a change in the policy which is being pursued. This policy of economic nationalism seems therefore to be, on the one hand, the direct outcome of the unbridled nationalism actually existing, and on the other, the result of a surreptitious understanding between politicians and profiteers to despoil the public, as the *Cuvantul* points out in the article quoted a little higher.

There are of course men of independent character who 000

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

181 shown that they possess qualities equal to those of other nations, and they still do. These forces are dormant, covered, as it were, by a thick skin which has grown as a result of blows which had to be suffered and could not be parried. If and when the strain becomes too great, and when opportunity comes, then this people may discover its power and, if it be well led, form a healthy State.

669 Up to now this* has never happened: the people
186 has never won against its oppressors. And this is a factor which has been ever present in Rumanian history. The peasant revolt which broke out amongst the Rumanians in Transylvania in 1785, four years before the French Revolution, ended in complete defeat. The national movement of Tudor Vladimirescu in 1820 resulted in little more than the appointment of Rumanian, instead of Greek, princes to the thrones of Moldavia and Wallachia. The revolutions of 1848 were speedily crushed by the combined forces of the great empires and, in the case of the Rumanians of Transylvania, were used in the most cunning way to defeat the national movement of another people. The union of Wallachia and Moldavia, one of the most genuine aims of the whole Rumanian people, was achieved in the end less by popular forces than by intrigues and international diplomacy. The Great Peasant Revolt of 1907 was put down by the military and cost thousands of peasants' lives. The Land Reforms of 1917 were accepted by a parliament which contained not one single peasant; and they were carried out by one of the richest landowners of Rumania, who, with his associates, had certainly no intention of applying them in such a way as to diminish the power of his

* [i.e: the formation of a healthy State -- Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

class over the countryside. The union of all Rumanians in one State was a long-cherished dream. Its realization was only partly due to the actions of the people; Greater Rumania was the result of the greediness of the country's rulers, supported by the anti-Soviet policy of many countries. It carried the seed of its own destruction; and, when disruption came and the popular forces rose to assert their will in 1940, they were again defeated. In place of the royal dictatorship came the dictatorship of Rumanian and German Fascism: in place of partial economic domination by the west came complete domination by Germany. 669 186

One of the greatest barriers to the progress and well-being of Rumania and the Rumanians has been the fact that the geographical position and the wealth of the country have made it the victim of the ambitions of Great Powers. Rumanian governments have sided more often than not with the national enemies of their people and have at best tried to play off one of their foreign protectors against the other. 648

Yet it is exactly the geographical position and the great wealth of Rumania, combined with the hardiness and strength of its inhabitants, which hold out the promise of a happier future. The material and human resources for such a development are abundant. What is necessary is the liberation of these material and human forces under disinterested leadership. If that happens, if the unlucky chain of unsuccessful revolutions is broken; if these forces conquer those of their corrupt rulers, and the unhealthy social system of exploitation and oppression is replaced by the government of the people for the 000

A HISTORICAL OUTLINE

UNTIL 1940 Romania, a strong force for peace, contained within her boundaries all her historical domain and most of her people. In 1940, amid world-wide changes, she saw her racial and territorial unity shattered in a partition involving not less than one-third of her population of 20,000,000 and of her territory of 113,917 square miles. 131

The beneficiaries of this forcible division were Russia and Hungary.[1] 728 On July 3, 1940, following an ultimatum, Russia invaded northern Bucovina, part of the Moldavian county of Dorohoi, and all of Bessarabia, altogether some 17,000 square miles with upward of 3,750,000 inhabitants. On September 13, 1940, following the Vienna arbitration decision of August 30, Hungary occupied half of Romanian Transylvania, again some 17,000 square miles with almost 2,400,000 inhabitants.

The two squeezes from east and west, timed to coincide with the collapse of the last vestiges of the European system of regional guarantees, could not be opposed by Romania. The retirement of her armies from Bucovina and Bessarabia reflected the realities of the situation, but did not imply a renunciation of her historic rights to the lost provinces, nor was this loss ratified formally by her parliament. On the contrary, Premier General Ion Antonescu, several times in his earliest official statements, reasserted Romania's claim to the whole of Transylvania; and less than one year later, on June 22, 1941, he led the Romanian armies in the liberation of Bucovina and Bessarabia. [186]

The problems which the action of Russia and Hungary has restored to an acute phase are as old as the ideologies that give them form. Heretofore, as local problems, they have been allowed to smolder under temporary solutions enforced in high-handed and arbitrary manner. Today, as obstacles to the peace and progress of the world, they have become world problems. As such they require a lasting solution that must accord with 000

[1] A rectification of the frontier of Dobrudja accepted by Romania and Bulgaria as a permanent settlement of the differences between them was effected by the treaty signed at Craiova September 7, 1940. The treaty provided for the return to Bulgaria of the two counties of Caliacra and Durostor ceded by her to Romania at Bucharest, July 27, 1913, at the end of the Balkan wars from which Bulgaria emerged with a net territorial gain of 6,052 sq. mi. Provision was also made for a wide exchange of populations. Bulgaria also undertook to pay Romania one billion lei as indemnity for losses resulting from the territorial transfer and to take over the maintenance of the Romanian graves and battle monuments dating from the 1877-78 war to which Bulgaria owes the restoration of her statehood.

Evidently this is only one of the *façons de parler* which Revai explained are permissible when it is inconvenient to call things "by their real names." Someday naked force will become convenient, and then the peasants will have to give in or starve. Their remarkable toughness is shown by the fact that they have been able to sustain their present position so long. With an egg selling at 2 lei and shoes costing 2,400 lei, a farmer must sell a hundred dozen eggs to get himself a new pair of shoes; and it takes a year's crop of wheat (in a good season at that) for the owner of an average-size farm to pay for a suit of store clothes. Tough as they are, the majority who still stand aside will have to knuckle under eventually and give up their land. Others will be channelled off to work on state construction jobs, and others again will be absorbed into factories. Some doubtless will hold out to the end—angry, bewildered and inarticulate, helpless to do anything but die. Millions died in Russia. 565 626

Nationalism will also continue to be something of a factor, but in Rumania it probably will not give the Communists particular trouble. Rumanians have always considered Russia an enemy of the Rumanian nation. But if nationalism can be held in check in countries with much greater native capacities of resistance, Poland for instance, how much less chance is there for it to remain alive and aggressive here in Rumania—the first of the satellites to come under Soviet occupation, the first to receive a Communist-controlled government imposed by Moscow, the one which today comes closest to being on the same political level as the Ukrainian or the Usbek Soviet Socialist Republic? 186

In March 1950 Patrascanu's name came back into public discussion as a result of reports in *Borba* and other Belgrade journals that he was to be made the chief performer in a spectacular trial on the Rajk and Kostov model. The reason these predictions did not materialize probably was that Moscow did not see pressing reasons to give Rumania any more lessons for the present. If Patrascanu should be tried later for nationalism, Titoism or spying for the West it would be because the people were starving and because when bread is lacking they must be given a circus. It will not indicate that there is (or probably ever has been) a very strong current of inde- 000

113
192

Slovenes EF7
Yugoslavia EF1
Albania EG1
Rumania ED1
Bulgaria EE1

/For the use of special terms associated with the parts of a dwelling or of a non-residential structure, see scattered references in 17: Thurnher, EF6 Serbs file, category 116./

194

NOTES ON PRONUNCIATION

The letters of the Rumanian alphabet have generally the same value as in French, with the following exceptions:

ă and î are pronounced as *u* in *but*
u is pronounced as *oo* in *good*
ş ,, *sh*
ţ ,, *ts*
c ,, *k* when placed before the vowels *a*, *o*, and *u*, and as *ts* before *e* and *i*.

The compound vowel *au* is pronounced as *ow* in *how*.

The definite article *ul* is always placed after masculine substantives.

The Rumanians, the same as the Latin tribe of Samnites, use a 'p' where the Romans used a 'q.'

The unit of currency is the *leu*, plural *lei*.

As place-names occasionally differ in Rumanian from the form which so far has been familiar in English, a table containing the most important ones is given below:

English	*Rumanian*
Akermann	Cetatea Alba
Bender	Tighina
Czernowitz	Cernauţi
Dniester	Nistru
Hermannstadt	Sibiu
Grosswardein	Oradea Mare
Karlsburg	Alba Julia
Khotin	Hotin
Kishineff	Chişinau
Kronstadt	Braşov
Mures	Maroş
Segesvar	Sighişoara
Temesvar	Temişoara
Theiss	Tisa

I.—A PHYSICAL INTRODUCTION

105 ROUMANIA owes its name to the rustic Latin speech of the
197 Roman provincials of Moesia and Dacia, impressed on the
101 region in a period before language had acquired its later
133 powers of tenacious resistance to fundamental change. It is true that subsequent contacts gave the local language a large number, perhaps even a majority, of Slavonic words, emphasising the country's links with eastern Europe, but the associations with the west were actively revived in the nineteenth century, when there was also a reaction against the connecting of Roumania with its southern and south-western neighbours as a Balkan State as had seemed natural to those impressed by the results of Turkish rule. These varying links of Roumania are understandable from a study of its physical features. The eastern projecting arc of the Carpathian Mountains and the Transylvanian Alps is, physically, as well as in a large measure culturally, an eastward outpost of western Europe standing out as a mighty rampart over against the south Russian steppe and its continuation into the loess-floored Polish platform. The curve from the Transylvanian Alps southward past the Iron Gates also connects them with the Balkan peninsula.

133 CENTRAL EUROPE, farther west, includes broken remnants of old (Permo-carboniferous) mountain systems passing through south Ireland, south Wales and south England as well as through Brittany, the Ardennes and the Vosges to the hills of middle Germany between Hannover and Frankfürt-a-M. Brittany lies mainly at low levels but most of the other elements of this old system have been lifted again into the round-shouldered hills, sometimes with extensive remains of old plains now at considerable heights, and usually with deep-cut stream lines that have often worked their way along fault lines. To the south of this old mountain-system stand the Alps, some of which incorporate the results of refolding of older mountain fragments.

THE GREAT ARC of the Carpathians and Transylvanian Alps shows relationships with both these great schemes. Old, Permo-carboniferous mountain blocks were refolded in the upper Cretaceous and again in the early Tertiary period, in the latter of which the Transylvanian platform, between

175 revived with, under the circumstances, the Cathedral as their focus of expression. In Roumania fate worked out things differently. The seventh to the tenth century in east-central Europe saw much forest cutting and planting of villages, and the widespread languages of these settlers belonged to the Slavonic family which may have had its [197] early home in or near Polish Galicia. This linguistic influence penetrated Roumania and combined itself with the Latin heritage to make the later language of the country. Magyars passed through on their way to the Hungarian plain, and [184] Huns and Visigoths had gone that way before. So the local tradition weakened along the valley and lowland ways and kept itself alive in the highlands where still dwell people who are no doubt largely descendants of the primeval cultivators with many waves of culture washed over them but the Roman influence vital still.

346

Bell tower, Borsec.

175 many Wallachs to return to their homeland to the north of the Danube.

During the eleventh century the Hungarians engaged in a policy of steady expansion to the east, and came into collision with the Wallachs. It is through Hungarian sources that we first hear of Wallacho-Bulgarian principalities existing on the eastern confines of Hungary, in the Banat and Transylvania. The famous Notarius Regis Belae of Hungary refers to Hungarian victories over a Prince Glad, who is designed as "dux Bulgarorum et Blacorum," and relates that the latter's army was composed of Bulgarians, Wallachs and Cumanians. King Bela also, in an epistle addressed to the Pope, complains of incursions by Bulgarians and Cumanians against which for his protection he found himself compelled to settle the Knights Hospitallers of St John on his eastern frontier near the Danube. In 1233 reference is again made to a Hungarian ruler who had been established in the Banat of Severin, whose subjects were "Valachi schismatici."

The subjection of Bulgaria by the Turks in 1394 was followed by a large immigration of Bulgarian nobles and church dignitaries into Rumania, and Bulgarian influence and culture was further strengthened and gave rise to a period of literary and artistic flowering that recalled, according to Prof. Bogdan, the influence exerted by the Greek *émigrés* in Italy after the taking of Constantinople by the Turks. This is in no way surprising, since the Bulgarians being for centuries direct neighbours of the Byzantines, were able to assimilate to a certain extent their civilization and transmit it to the Rumanians who were further away.

197 Numerous manuscripts dating from the 14th to the 17th
175 centuries, mainly compiled in the chancelleries of the
177 various Wallach princes, testify to the deep influence Bulgaria had exerted during this period. The language in use was not uniform but gradually evolving, which proves that it was not used merely as a standard language, like Latin, but that it was spoken by those who made use of it. This will explain the large admixture of Slav words in the Rumanian tongue, which were derived mainly from

Bulgarian sources. The toponymy also of Rumania reveals a great number of names of Slavo-Bulgarian and Cumanian origin, which can only be explained by the former presence in large numbers of these two peoples in Rumania. Prof. Xenopol, in his "Istoria Romanilor," vol 1, p.71, dilating on the Slavo-Bulgarian toponymy extant in Rumania, expresses the belief that the mere official use of the Slavo-Bulgarian language is not sufficient to explain the adoption of geographical terms in this language, and that their presence must be ascribed to a "connection between people and people." An examination of D. Francescu's "Dictionaru Topograficu şi statistico al Romaniei" (1872) and Dr L. Colescu's "Dictionarul statistic al Romaniei (1914/5) would reveal an astounding number of such names. As regards the nomenclature derived from Cumanian sources, we have, Coman, Comana, Comanae, Comania, (thrice) Comanianca, Comani (twice), Comaniţa, and Comanesti (six times). Similar names are met with in Bulgaria and Macedonia (i.e. Kumanovo) and if we recollect that the Cumanians gave a royal dynasty, that of the Terters, to Bulgaria, it will be understood that this now lost people had exerted a wide-spread influence in the Balkan peninsula.

FROM THE FORMATION OF THE DANUBIAN PRINCIPALITIES TO 1914.

The policy of easterly expansion pursued by the Hungarians forced the first Rumanian political communities which had developed in the relative security of Transylvania to retreat before the continuous pressure exerted by the Hungarians. Many of the Rumanian nobility, however, seem to have passed over to the conqueror in order to safeguard their wealth and privileges at the price of Magyarization, as did the Serbian aristocracy in Bosnia which accepted the faith of their Turkish conquerors so that they might retain their lands. These Magyarized Rumanians of Transylvania gave to Hungary her most heroic figure, that of John Hunyady, as well as one of her great kings, Matthias Corvinus, son of the former.

162
197

RACIAL ASPECTS OF ROMANIA'S CASE

Table III—Population

Actual figures

COUNTY	TOTAL	Romanian	Hungarians	German	Russian	Ruthenian, Ukrainian	Serbian, Croat, Slovenian	Bulgarian	Czech, Slovakian
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
ROMANIA	**18,057,028**	**13,280,936**	**1,554,535**	**760,487**	**650,981**	**641,485**	**47,734**	**364,373**	**42,141**
Oltenia	**1,513,175**	**1,493,788**	**2,258**	**3,216**	**679**	**31**	**535**	**277**	**184**
Dolj	485,149	475,587	1,175	1,473	289	8	259	178	83
Gorj	206,339	205,209	153	145	136	2	80	28	19
Mehedinti	303,878	299,868	237	905	84	4	277	65	36
Romanati	271,096	269,013	224	151	47	3	99	64	15
Valcea	246,713	244,111	466	542	114	14	110	42	31
Muntenia	**4,029,098**	**3,884,670**	**32,900**	**21,817**	**19,195**	**587**	**2,938**	**3,424**	**1,177**
Arges	257,378	254,862	504	350	144	28	55	37	31
Braila	219,831	203,900	1,453	959	3,392	18	175	243	32
Buzau	309,605	306,667	657	252	132	26	118	63	23
Dambovita	309,676	304,056	656	346	162	18	368	133	30
Ialomita	293,352	289,490	439	124	482	12	106	150	13
Ilfov	999,562	913,653	24,486	15,769	4,828	354	1,113	2,195	791
Muscel	149,797	148,111	236	112	45	1	30	23	16
Olt	185,595	182,081	332	192	61	2	88	139	12
Prahova	477,750	464,644	3,473	3,378	637	88	504	182	184
Ramnicu Sarat	184,956	182,298	235	80	76	19	43	33	8
Teleorman	347,294	343,898	231	142	31	3	208	133	7
Vlasca	296,412	291,210	478	173	185	18	130	93	40
Dobrogea	**818,475**	**349,110**	**2,977**	**12,439**	**40,867**	**74**	**663**	**183,593**	**64**
Caliacra	166,911	38,049	287	474	986	27	174	70,900	7
Constanta	253,093	171,611	1,400	9,548	4,886	25	170	22,167	41
Durostor	211,433	41,690	243	51	819	18	142	71,503	5
Tulcea	184,038	117,760	147	2,366	34,176	4	182	19,023	11
Moldova	**2,433,596**	**2,258,678**	**23,894**	**8,943**	**11,286**	**4,742**	**798**	**1,181**	**249**
Bacau	261,019	235,563	13,999	896	420	69	159	90	48
Baia	157,501	147,335	134	907	1,762	26	32	32	29
Botosani	218,258	196,565	249	667	990	2,330	21	54	13
Covurlui	210,006	186,943	2,027	1,423	3,258	98	174	404	32
Dorohoi	211,354	194,474	73	374	233	1,999	1	30	8
Falciu	115,055	110,676	28	115	134	2	14	32	1
Iasi	275,796	240,214	356	1,176	2,672	108	56	118	52
Neamt	198,223	185,559	1,042	1,191	425	35	23	36	40
Putna	194,105	185,014	2,149	347	280	25	99	107	8
Roman	151,550	144,728	442	682	332	31	31	103	7
Tecuci	156,405	149,467	2,277	183	119	4	34	66	2
Tutova	144,821	140,366	229	350	202	10	83	83	8
Vaslui	139,503	133,774	97	121	459	3	7	26	1
Bessarabia	**2,864,402**	**1,598,573**	**747**	**99,568**	**370,112**	**331,183**	**189**	**164,551**	**256**
Balti	386,721	271,023	92	1,456	48,368	32,197	21	51	14
Cahul	196,693	100,777	6	8,630	16,120	480	6	28,175	227
Cetatea Alba	341,176	62,039	107	55,607	64,617	67,590	28	70,891	11
Hotin	392,430	130,959	65	270	47,235	176,940	1	18	7
Ismail	225,509	68,669	123	943	75,303	9,571	27	46,467	7
Lapusna	419,621	325,346	151	2,701	35,266	3,853	61	355	44
Orhei	279,292	245,132	65	117	9,778	4,055	4	49	5
Soroca	310,368	232,089	81	581	26,236	27,295	12	42	26
Tighina	308,592	162,739	57	10,463	47,189	9,202	29	18,503	15
Bucovina	**853,099**	**359,901**	**11,860**	**93,813**	**11,236**	**280,651**	**45**	**114**	**481**
Campulung	94,816	58,499	91	20,876	370	7,292	4	1	33
Cernauti	306,194	66,701	634	30,693	3,364	149,700	30	65	233
Radauti	160,778	83,906	10,283	20,125	3,332	31,315	1	10	62
Storojinet	169,894	48,979	48	10,759	2,989	85,715	6	9	110
Suceava	121,327	92,816	804	11,359	1,181	6,629	4	29	43

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

According to Mother Tongue

Actual figures

162
197

Polish	Yiddish	Greek	Albanian	Armenian	Turkish, Tartar	Gipsy	Others	Not declared	COUNTY
11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	1
28,265	**518,754**	**20,861**	**4,347**	**11,377**	**288,073**	**101,015**	**23,419**	**7,165**	***ROMANIA***
									Oltenia
88	601	482	93	146	568	8,506	1,245	100	*Dolj*
30	338	195	50	82	59	4,606	700	37	*Gorj*
5	36	10	1	–	4	435	65	5	*Mehedinti*
–	61	142	3	40	460	1,549	117	30	*Romanati*
9	35	104	2	15	31	1,210	72	2	*Romanati*
44	131	25	37	9	14	706	291	26	*Valcea*
									Muntenia
1,633	19,842	8,791	1,436	4,684	3,088	22,886	8,436	1,314	*Arges*
69	176	99	63	49	43	754	100	24	*Braila*
84	3,360	4,097	97	213	453	832	429	94	*Buzau*
42	512	78	31	32	30	997	128	17	*Dambovita*
36	235	160	64	2	28	3,210	146	26	*Dambovita*
8	184	223	113	18	102	1,822	49	17	*Ialomita*
1,017	13,592	3,468	1,061	4,060	1,133	3,347	3,860	935	*Ilfov*
7	18	25	10	3	10	947	178	25	*Muscel*
7	47	46	7	4	6	578	37	16	*Olt*
330	1,144	230	107	180	35	1,174	1,344	116	*Prahova*
13	427	47	10	18	21	1,604	21	3	*Rumnicu Sarat*
10	67	133	21	13	108	2,240	23	9	*Teleorman*
10	80	95	52	92	122	3,481	121	32	*Vlasca*
									Dobrogea
119	1,816	7,744	494	4,904	183,818	5,639	2,581	287	*Caliacra*
9	217	824	23	980	50,525	3,213	157	59	*Constanta*
94	685	3,892	422	3,065	33,414	788	746	139	*Durostor*
2	216	154	24	690	94,154	1,229	442	71	*Durostor*
14	698	2,874	25	169	4,945	390	1,236	18	*Tulcea*
									Moldova
1,984	109,654	2,885	132	888	635	13,998	2,386	805	*Bacau*
219	7,910	59	16	55	18	1,224	238	36	*Baia*
240	5,789	14	2	5	7	1,122	16	49	*Botosani*
238	10,219	8	3	32	16	777	30	46	*Covurlui*
167	11,099	2,313	35	457	253	352	854	115	*Covurlui*
87	13,837	11	1	15	16	121	28	44	*Dorohoi*
7	2,857	67	2	–	14	1,060	34	12	*Putna*
411	27,344	78	23	120	83	1,760	703	320	*Iasi*
320	7,948	16	3	19	5	835	126	30	*Neamt*
86	4,577	140	20	82	32	997	112	30	*Putna*
109	4,170	3	21	49	53	942	36	31	*Roman*
20	1,899	66	3	4	35	2,184	32	10	*Tecuci*
43	2,025	70	3	13	78	1,386	46	8	*Tutova*
35	3,980	10	–	4	23	838	49	74	*Vaslui*
									Besarabia
2,862	201,278	972	1,768	448	191,286	6,520	596	1,326	*Balti*
1,159	31,200	31	–	36	13	985	15	60	*Cahul*
30	4,334	274	–	10	36,683	805	5	131	*Cetatea Alba*
92	11,051	79	–	130	7,899	641	283	111	*Hotin*
585	35,936	2	–	1	22	263	15	111	*Hotin*
90	5,832	312	1,737	26	16,107	222	25	248	*Ismail*
1,012	48,148	203	26	196	99	1,370	203	387	*Lapusna*
151	19,017	18	–	16	9	792	21	63	*Orhei*
478	29,127	6	–	18	24	494	5	54	*Soroca*
265	16,633	47	2	15	40,500	748	24	161	*Tighina*
									Bucovina
28,411	74,288	13	2	99	75	203	141	648	*Campulung*
1,647	5,831	3	1	13	4	39	37	35	*Cernauti*
13,959	40,102	9	1	41	54	51	74	483	*Radauti*
2,207	9,421	–	–	5	8	54	10	39	*Radauti*
7,507	13,694	–	–	1	3	13	11	50	*Suceava*
3,091	5,220	1	–	39	6	35	9	41	*Suceava*

162
197

Table III—Population

Continued

COUNTY	TOTAL	Romanian	Hungarians	German	Russian	Ruthenian, Ukrainian	Serbian, Croat, Slovenian	Bulgarian	Czech, Slovakian
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Transylvania	**3,217,988**	**1,873,691**	**997,683**	**346,587**	**3,357**	**1,272**	**484**	**829**	**8,966**
Alba	212,749	176,852	24,513	7,617	345	44	16	97	158
Brasov	168,125	85,519	46,790	33,592	308	104	54	76	239
Cluc	145,806	18,455	124,971	503	84	18	15	9	34
Clui	334,991	206,539	109,165	2,964	487	260	48	170	394
Fagaras	86,039	69,685	5,049	10,828	94	3	7	9	9
Hunedoara	332,118	277,705	40,375	7,422	242	492	123	70	717
Mures	289,546	131,825	133,045	11,437	322	57	37	76	66
Nasaud	144,131	106,548	7,174	21,056	206	38	11	39	27
Odorhei	130,282	4,388	123,885	404	24	3	4	1	12
Salaj	343,347	191,144	125,544	8,706	229	112	24	17	5,771
Sibiu	194,619	125,686	9,325	57,215	561	28	69	101	104
Somes	219,355	172,607	34,710	478	147	65	8	52	30
Tarnava Mare	147,994	68,259	18,094	58,970	57	3	35	32	187
Tarnava Mica	149,682	83,504	36,461	24,020	48	5	8	45	107
Trei Scaune	136,122	16,748	117,868	625	125	33	19	23	64
Turda	183,282	137,697	40,676	744	38	7	6	3	147
Banat	**939,958**	**520,041**	**105,586**	**231,962**	**1,497**	**3,901**	**48,977**	**9,979**	**18,945**
Caras	200,929	142,315	5,113	29,622	106	36	10,371	165	3,102
Severin	239,586	187,021	17,048	24,689	439	3,410	1,768	109	2,727
Timis Torontal	499,443	190,705	83,423	177,751	932	455	27,938	9,396	3,116
Crisana and Maramures	**1,390,417**	**829,484**	**377,475**	**63,146**	**1,781**	**19,844**	**1,798**	**443**	**21,619**
Arad	423,649	259,884	96,756	50,005	384	654	1,638	125	10,883
Bihor	510,318	313,404	172,322	2,364	346	253	98	199	10,277
Maramures	161,575	92,611	14,285	3,189	65	17,794	7	22	59
Satu Mare	294,875	173,585	94,112	7,586	766	343	55	97	600

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

According to Mother Tongue

Continued

162
197

Polish	Yiddish	Greek	Albanian	Armenian	Turkish, Tartar	Gipsy	Others	Not declared	COUNTY
11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	1
1,752	52,000	69	99	187	89	39,106	1,371	1,437	**Transylvania**
16	1,751	1	4	6	7	1,190	69	43	*Alba*
62	615	35	–	14	8	230	187	284	*Brasov*
28	1,415	1	5	6	–	162	42	60	*Cluc*
69	9,949	9	20	18	21	4,466	94	318	*Cluj*
4	58	1	–	2	1	269	4	16	*Fagaras*
943	2,268	–	5	2	7	1,049	585	113	*Hunedoara*
24	6,344	–	1	6	4	6,061	59	122	*Mures*
21	5,915	8	2	–	4	2,977	32	63	*Nasaud*
9	819	–	–	–	–	403	7	23	*Odorhei*
25	9,501	–	2	4	10	2,107	22	129	*Salaj*
93	691	6	6	2	12	512	113	95	*Sibiu*
13	9,709	–	9	119	11	1,357	16	24	*Somes*
141	511	–	5	2	3	1,629	34	32	*Turnaue Mare*
18	932	–	–	4	1	4,270	15	38	*Turnaue Mica*
30	175	8	–	–	–	293	56	55	*Trei Scaune*
216	1,557	–	–	2	–	2,131	36	22	*Turda*
171	757	13	46	8	146	8,628	6,493	663	**Banat**
80	53	4	–	–	12	2,733	6,143	74	*Caras*
21	85	1	19	–	67	1,870	166	126	*Severin*
70	619	8	27	5	67	4,085	184	462	*Timis Torontal*
245	38,510	12	20	49	98	5,839	250	586	**Crisana and Maramuresu**
88	1,002	8	8	47	33	1,895	107	132	*Arad*
91	7,497	4	3	–	38	2,894	97	209	*Bihor*
34	33,239	–	7	–	3	124	16	120	*Maramuresu*
32	16,772	–	–	2	24	946	30	125	*Satu Mare*

RACIAL ASPECTS OF ROMANIA'S CASE

162
197

Percentages

Table IV—Population

COUNTY	TOTAL	Romanian	Hungarian	German	Russian	Ruthenian, Ukrainian	Serbian, Croat, Slovenian	Bulgarian	Czech, Slovakian	Polish	Yiddish	Greek	Albanian	Armenian	Turkish, Tartar	Gipsy (Romany)	Others	Not declared
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
ROMANIA	**100.0**	**73.0**	**8.6**	**4.2**	**2.5**	**3.6**	**0.3**	**2.0**	**0.2**	**0.2**	**2.9**	**0.1**	*	*	**1.6**	**0.6**	**0.1**	*
Oltenia	**100.0**	**98.7**	**0.1**	**0.2**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	**0.5**	*	*
Dolj	*100.0*	*98.0*	*0.2*	*0.3*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*0.3*	*0.1*	*
Gorj	*100.0*	*99.5*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	*0.3*	*	*
Mehedinti	*100.0*	*98.7*	*	*0.3*	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	*	*	*0.2*	*0.3*	*	*
Romanati	*100.0*	*99.5*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*0.4*	*	*
Valcea	*100.0*	*98.9*	*0.2*	*0.3*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*0.3*	*0.1*	*
Muntenia	**100.0**	**96.4**	**0.8**	**0.5**	**0.3**	*	*	*	*	*	**0.8**	**0.2**	*	**0.1**	*	**0.4**	**0.2**	*
Arges	*100.0*	*99.0*	*0.2*	*0.1*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*0.3*	*	*
Braila	*100.0*	*97.8*	*0.7*	*0.4*	*1.5*	*	*	*0.1*	*	*	*1.5*	*1.9*	*	*	*0.2*	*0.4*	*0.2*	*
Buzau	*100.0*	*99.1*	*0.1*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*0.2*	*	*	*	*	*0.3*	*	*
Dambovita	*100.0*	*98.8*	*0.2*	*0.1*	*	*	*0.1*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*1.0*	*	*
Ialomita	*100.0*	*98.7*	*0.1*	*	*0.2*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*0.8*	*	*
Ilfov	*100.0*	*91.4*	*5.4*	*1.6*	*0.5*	*	*0.1*	*0.2*	*	*0.1*	*1.4*	*0.2*	*0.1*	*0.4*	*0.1*	*0.5*	*0.8*	*
Muscel	*100.0*	*98.9*	*0.2*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*0.6*	*0.1*	*
Olt	*100.0*	*99.1*	*0.2*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*0.2*	*	*
Prahova	*100.0*	*97.3*	*0.7*	*0.7*	*0.1*	*	*0.1*	*	*	*	*0.2*	*	*	*	*	*0.2*	*0.3*	*
Ramnicu Sarat	*100.0*	*98.6*	*0.1*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*0.2*	*	*	*	*	*0.2*	*	*
Teleorman	*100.0*	*99.0*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*0.6*	*	*
Vlasca	*100.0*	*98.8*	*0.2*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*1.0*	*	*
Dobrogea	**100.0**	**45.3**	**0.3**	**1.5**	**5.0**	*	*	**22.5**	*	*	**0.2**	**0.9**	*	**0.6**	**22.4**	**0.7**	**0.3**	*
Caliacra	*100.0*	*29.8*	*0.8*	*0.5*	*0.5*	*0.1*	*48.5*	*	*	*0.1*	*0.5*	*	*0.6*	*30.5*	*1.9*	*	*
Constanta	*100.0*	*67.8*	*0.6*	*3.8*	*1.9*	*	*8.5*	*	*	*0.3*	*1.5*	*0.8*	*1.8*	*15.8*	*0.5*	*0.3*	*
Durostor	*100.0*	*19.7*	*0.1*	*	*0.4*	*	*59.8*	*	*	*0.1*	*	*	*0.2*	*44.5*	*0.6*	*0.8*	*
Tulcea	*100.0*	*64.0*	*	*1.5*	*18.6*	*	*10.5*	*	*	*0.4*	*1.8*	*	*	*2.7*	*0.8*	*0.7*	*
Moldova	**100.0**	**92.5**	**1.0**	**0.3**	**0.5**	**0.2**	*	*	*	*	**4.5**	**0.1**	*	*	*	**0.4**	*	*
Bacau	*100.0*	*90.8*	*5.4*	*0.5*	*0.8*	*	*	*	*	*	*3.0*	*	*	*	*	*0.6*	*	*
Baia	*100.0*	*98.5*	*	*0.6*	*1.1*	*	*	*	*	*0.2*	*5.7*	*	*	*	*	*0.7*	*	*
Botosani	*100.0*	*90.1*	*0.1*	*0.3*	*0.5*	*1.1*	*	*	*	*0.1*	*7.4*	*	*	*	*	*0.4*	*	*
Covurlui	*100.0*	*89.0*	*1.0*	*0.7*	*1.8*	*	*	*0.2*	*	*	*4.5*	*1.1*	*	*0.2*	*0.1*	*0.2*	*0.4*	*
Dorohoi	*100.0*	*98.0*	*	*0.2*	*0.1*	*0.2*	*	*	*	*	*6.4*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Falciu	*100.0*	*96.2*	*	*	*0.1*	*	*	*	*	*	*3.5*	*	*	–	*	*0.2*	*	*
Iasi	*100.0*	*87.1*	*0.2*	*0.4*	*1.0*	*	*	*	*	*0.1*	*9.9*	*	*	*	*	*0.8*	*0.2*	*0.1*
Neamt	*100.0*	*98.6*	*0.2*	*0.6*	*0.2*	*	*	*	*	*0.2*	*4.0*	*	*	*	*	*0.4*	*	*
Putna	*100.0*	*95.2*	*1.1*	*0.2*	*0.1*	*	*	*	*	*	*2.4*	*	*	*	*	*0.2*	*	*
Roman	*100.0*	*96.8*	*0.2*	*0.3*	*0.2*	*	*	*	*	*	*2.2*	*	*	*	*	*0.6*	*	*
Tecuci	*100.0*	*95.6*	*1.6*	*0.1*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*1.2*	*	*	*	*	*1.4*	*	*
Tutova	*100.0*	*96.2*	*0.2*	*0.1*	*0.1*	*	*	*	*	*	*1.4*	*	*	*	*	*1.0*	*	*
Vaslui	*100.0*	*96.2*	*	*	*0.2*	*	*	*	*	*	*2.2*	*	–	*	*	*0.6*	*	*
Bessarabia	**100.0**	**55.8**	*	**2.8**	**12.9**	**11.6**	*	**5.7**	*	**0.1**	**7.0**	*	*	*	**3.5**	**0.2**	*	*
Balti	*100.0*	*70.1*	*	*0.4*	*13.5*	*8.2*	*	*	*	*0.2*	*8.1*	*	–	*	*	*0.2*	*	*
Cahul	*100.0*	*61.2*	*	*4.4*	*8.2*	*0.2*	*	*14.5*	*0.1*	*	*9.2*	*0.1*	–	*	*10.6*	*0.4*	*	*
Cetatea Alba	*100.0*	*18.2*	*	*16.2*	*18.9*	*19.8*	*	*20.8*	*	*	*5.2*	*	–	*	*8.5*	*0.2*	*	*
Hotin	*100.0*	*53.4*	*	*	*12.0*	*45.1*	*	*	*	*0.1*	*0.2*	*	–	*	*	*	*	*
Ismail	*100.0*	*20.4*	*	*0.4*	*32.4*	*4.8*	*	*20.6*	*	*	*2.0*	*0.1*	*0.8*	*	*7.1*	*	*	*0.1*
Lapusna	*100.0*	*77.5*	*	*0.6*	*8.4*	*0.2*	*	*	*	*0.2*	*11.5*	*	*	*	*	*0.4*	*	*
Orhei	*100.0*	*87.8*	*	*	*3.5*	*1.5*	*	*	*	*	*6.2*	*	–	*	*	*0.2*	*	*
Soroca	*100.0*	*78.4*	*	*0.1*	*8.5*	*8.6*	*	*	*	*0.2*	*3.2*	*	–	*	*	*0.2*	*	*
Tighina	*100.0*	*53.1*	*	*3.4*	*16.4*	*5.0*	*	*6.0*	*	*	*5.4*	*	*	*	*13.5*	*0.2*	*	*
Bucovina	**100.0**	**41.1**	**1.4**	**11.0**	**1.3**	**32.9**	*	*	*	**3.3**	**8.7**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Campulung	*100.0*	*61.7*	*	*22.0*	*0.4*	*7.7*	*	*	*	*1.7*	*6.2*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Cernauti	*100.0*	*21.8*	*0.2*	*10.0*	*1.1*	*46.9*	*	*	*	*4.8*	*15.1*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*0.2*
Radauti	*100.0*	*68.6*	*6.4*	*18.4*	*2.1*	*18.8*	*	*	*	*1.4*	*4.2*	–	–	*	*	*	*	*
Storojinet	*100.0*	*29.6*	*	*6.8*	*1.8*	*50.5*	*	*	*	*4.4*	*8.1*	–	–	*	*	*	*	*
Suceava	*100.0*	*76.5*	*0.7*	*9.4*	*1.0*	*4.5*	*	*	*	*2.5*	*4.3*	*	–	*	*	*	*	*

*: Less than 0.1.

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

According to Mother Tongue

Continued

162
197

COUNTY	TOTAL	Romanian	Hungarian	German	Russian	Ruthenian, Ukrainian	Serbian, Croat, Slovenian	Bulgarian	Czech, Slovakian	Polish	Yiddish	Greek	Albanian	Armenian	Turkish, Tartar	Gipsy (Romany)	Others	Not declared
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Transylvania	**100.0**	**58.3**	**31.0**	**7.7**	**0.1**	*	*	*	**0.3**	*	**1.6**	*	*	*	*	**0.9**	*	*
Alba	100.0	83.1	11.5	3.0	0.3	*	*	*	*	*	0.8	*	*	*	*	0.6	*	*
Brasov	100.0	60.9	27.9	30.0	0.3	*	*	*	0.1	*	0.4	*	–	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.3
Cluc	100.0	18.7	80.7	0.5	*	*	*	*	*	*	1.0	*	*	*	–	0.1	*	*
Cluj	100.0	61.7	33.8	0.3	0.1	*	*	*	0.1	*	3.0	*	*	*	*	1.3	*	*
Fagaras	100.0	81.0	6.9	12.6	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	0.3	*	*
Hunedoara	100.0	38.6	18.8	8.8	*	0.1	*	*	0.8	0.3	0.7	–	*	*	*	0.3	0.3	*
Mures	100.0	45.6	45.9	5.9	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	2.3	–	*	*	*	2.1	*	*
Nasaud	100.0	73.9	6.0	14.6	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	4.1	*	*	–	*	2.1	*	*
Odorhei	100.0	3.8	96.1	0.3	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.8	–	–	–	–	0.3	*	*
Salaj	100.0	56.7	36.6	3.8	*	*	*	*	1.7	*	2.3	–	*	*	*	0.6	*	*
Sibiu	100.0	64.8	4.8	29.4	0.3	*	*	*	*	*	0.4	*	*	*	*	0.3	*	*
Somes	100.0	79.7	15.8	0.3	*	*	*	*	*	*	4.4	–	*	*	*	0.6	*	*
Turnava Mare	100.0	46.1	19.8	32.8	*	*	*	*	0.1	*	0.3	–	*	*	*	1.1	*	*
Turnava Mica	100.0	35.0	44.4	18.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.8	–	–	*	*	2.3	*	*
Trei Scaune	100.0	19.3	36.8	0.3	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.1	*	–	–	–	0.2	*	*
Turda	100.0	75.1	23.3	0.4	*	*	*	*	*	0.1	0.3	–	–	*	–	1.3	*	*
Banat	**100.0**	**58.3**	**11.3**	**24.6**	**0.2**	**0.4**	**4.3**	**1.1**	**1.3**	*	*	*	*	*	*	**0.9**	**0.7**	*
Caras	100.0	70.8	2.5	14.3	*	*	5.3	*	2.5	*	*	*	–	–	*	1.4	2.1	*
Severin	100.0	73.1	7.1	10.3	0.3	1.4	0.7	*	1.1	*	*	*	*	–	*	0.8	*	*
Timis Torontal	100.0	58.3	10.7	25.0	0.3	*	5.8	1.9	0.8	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	0.3	*	*
Crisana and Maramures	**100.0**	**60.4**	**27.1**	**4.3**	**0.1**	**1.4**	**0.1**	*	**1.6**	*	**4.3**	*	*	*	*	**0.4**	*	*
Arad	100.0	61.3	26.3	11.3	*	0.3	0.4	*	2.5	*	0.3	*	*	*	*	0.4	*	*
Bihor	100.0	61.4	33.3	0.6	0.1	*	*	*	3.0	*	1.6	*	*	–	*	0.6	*	*
Maramures	100.0	57.3	3.5	3.0	*	11.0	*	*	*	*	20.6	–	*	–	*	*	*	*
Satu Mare	100.0	58.3	31.9	3.8	0.3	0.1	*	*	0.1	*	3.7	–	–	*	*	0.3	*	*

*) Less than 0.1.

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

641 the right and freedom of citizens to write, publish, or otherwise express their views, except such as are in accord with the given party-line. For the exercise of this right, the state places at the disposal of the "working classes and their organizations, printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets (and) communication facilities." Freedom of speech is furthermore restricted by the provisions of the Law for the Defense of Peace, enacted on December 15, 1950. Article 2 of this Law specifically prohibits "propaganda inciting to war, the spreading of tendentious or invented news, of a nature to serve the warmongers, etc. . . ."

[204] Freedom of the press and publication is likewise nonexistent. Two directorates attached to the Council of Ministers are charged with complete supervision over the press, publications of any sort, and their distribution. The Directorate of the Press and Printed Matter, established on May 23, 1949 (Decree No. 218) "authorizes the publication of all printed matter;" the General Directorate of Publishing, Graphic Arts Industry, Book and Press Distribution, established on March 16, 1950 (decree No. 62), "controls the output of publishing houses from the point of view of contents and form." The Communist press is furthermore restricted to the services of the AGERPRESS (the Rumanian Press Agency) which by virtue of Decree No. 217 of May 23, 1949, is the only agency permitted to receive and transmit news. Aside from the nationalization of all printing presses, a governmental decision (Decision No. 69 of the Ministry of the Interior, July 1, 1950) requires the registration with the militia of all hand printing presses, duplicating machines, and "materials needed for the reproduction of printed matter," owned by individuals or associations.

[575] Freedom of assembly is similarly controlled. Excepting the Communist-controlled mass organizations, viz., public organizations, co-operative societies, youth and women's organizations, etc. (Article 86), no independent organization or association is permitted. Anyone attempting to organize or participate in such an organization is liable to prosecution by virtue of Article 86 of the Constitution, prohibiting the organization of or the participation in associations of a "fascist" or "anti-democratic" character. Such participation would furthermore entail "plotting against the internal and external security" of the state, an offense punishable by death under Article 1 of the Law for Punishing Certain Crimes Which Endanger the Security of the State of January 19, 1949.

641 461 The right to work is guaranteed by the "socialist transformation" of the economy and the "elimination of the possibility of economic crises and the abolition of unemployment" (Article 77). The right to rest and leisure is ensured by the reduction of the working hours to eight in factories and offices and to less in the more arduous trades.[6] This right is supplemented by

[6] The constitutional provisions relating to the reduction of working hours are puzzling in the light of the introduction of the piece-work system and norms of production (Labor Code of May 20, 1950) and the adoption of the Soviet model of "Stachanovism" and "voluntary labor."

RUMANIA

[166] late C. M. Stephanov, who was also a member of the
657 Rumanian Senate. The main cause of the effervescence that
563 still subsists is this ill-advised scheme of planting the destitute
[647] Kutso-Vlachs on the farms of the aboriginal inhabitants, proof of which has been given by M. Georoceanu in a booklet he has published. M. Georoceanu was formerly a member of the Rumanian Senate during M. Maniu's tenure of office.

It may be added that the Bulgarians complain of not
[658] having a single school in their villages, and that when they presented petitions for opening such their signatories had
[659] been prosecuted. Bulgarian priests are no longer allowed to be nominated, and those that still remain are being gradually replaced by Rumanians who officiate naturally in their own language which is not understood by their flocks. A lesser
• [204] wrong which receives the condemnation only of the intellectuals, is the ban on Bulgarian newspapers and periodicals. Their introduction into Rumania is prohibited, and though a few months ago the Bucarest press announced that this embargo would be raised, yet as late as April, 1932 the police authorities in the Dobrudja had received no intimation of
563 this commendable measure. It is obvious that all these
648 grievances could easily be removed with a little goodwill on
657 the part of the Rumanian government, and to the westerner it is incomprehensible that the latter should make no effort to safeguard the happiness of hundreds of thousands of human beings whose destiny has been entrusted to its hands. For it is not only the elementary duty of a government to care for its subjects, but in this case even political reasons dictate the following of a more humane and civilized policy. The bulk of the population being Bulgarian, and having for forty years enjoyed an independent existence, is utterly unaccustomed to such maladministration as it is now experiencing. It is therefore natural that it should be soliciting the intercession of the Bulgarian government under whose suzerainty it lived until recently. This is a course that creates friction between the two governments, keeps open an old sore, and embitters and strains relations between Bulgaria and Rumania. The former country would incur every sacrifice in order to ensure Rumania's friendship, and

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

652 should be obtained not through investments but through loans under-
665 taken by the state. In this way Rumania would have full control over the allocation of capital and would not, except for the interest on loans, see the profits from the oil industry go abroad. The petroleum policy of the National Peasants, as formulated in 1929, was even more removed from Stere's recommendations than from the Liberals' policy. It was, however, perfectly consistent with their economic outlook during their term in office.

665 Rumanian transportation and communications had been in no-
652 toriously bad condition since the First World War, and the Liberals'
496 policy of retrenchment had been particularly damaging to the rail-
464 way system. The 1929 stabilization loan allocated $34,000,000 for
471 railway expansion and $9,000,000 to pay off overdue railway debts.
491 By a law passed in July, 1929, the National Peasants transferred the state railways to an autonomous public body, "to be administered
● 206 according to commercial principles."[62] They also undertook to repair and extend the highway network, and abolished the primitive *corvée* which was still being used for road maintenance. In 1930 the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation received a concession for the construction of the Rumanian telephone network.

665 The stabilization loan required a reform of the National Bank and of the state accounting system. In March, 1929, the government passed a series of new statutes for the bank; the principal changes were the abolition of the ceiling on the issue of currency, established by the Liberals' in 1925, and the limitation of the influence of the state in the appointment of directors. The bank was given somewhat greater independence from state control and powers to maintain the newly achieved stability of the currency. In July, 1929, the government passed a law reforming the state accounting system and the organization of the budget. There was no doubt that Rumanian state finances needed reform and modernization. The accounting system had been that of France of 1860, plus the accretion of a number of purely Rumanian practices, with the result that the actual condition of government finances at any given time was never known with any exactness. The new law, in reorganizing the preparation of the budget, exerted more stringent control over the expenditures of various ministries. While this law was well intended, its actual results in rationalizing Rumanian finance methods seem to have been very

62. Madgearu, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 50. The organization of Rumanian railways after 1918 had been altogether hectic. In 1925 the Liberals had given some autonomy to the railways; this policy was reversed by the People's party in February, 1927, and reestablished by the Liberals in August of that year.

505 648 It is a cardinal principle of the Statute that the customs dues levied on goods must not be higher than the duties levied at frontier stations of the country concerned. The cost of improvements [651] was to be met by navigation dues, these being assessed on the tonnage of ships, and not based on the goods transported.

Bratislava was fixed as the Headquarters for the Commission for the first five years, and it was laid down that thereafter, for five-year periods, other Danube towns were to be selected in rotation.

Since the outbreak of this war, Germany has virtually controlled the Danube, has abolished the C.I.D., and set up the "Consulting Committee for Danube Affairs above Brăila."

C.E.D. (European Danube Commission)

This Commission was constituted under the Treaty of Paris in 1856 with Austria, France, [503] Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey as members, for the express purpose of dredging the mouths of the Danube below Isaccea, and leaving the various channels free from all obstructions to navigation. It was apparently expected that this preliminary task would take two years, and the life of the Commission was originally fixed for that period; but, by a series of later treaties, it was kept in being up to the outbreak of the Great War.

In 1918 the Central Powers set up their own Danube Commission, membership naturally being restricted to those Powers and their allies.

By the Treaty of Versailles the European Commission was reconstituted with Great Britain, France, Italy and Rumania as provisional members; and by the Convention of July 21st, 1921, was placed on a more permanent basis. The provisional membership of the four countries was confirmed and all the powers of the original Commission restored. A proviso added that any nation whose commercial interests in that part of the river warranted their being represented on the Commission could be admitted. In fact, no country was admitted under this proviso until the inclusion of Germany in August, 1938.

In August, 1938, an arrangement was signed at Sinaia relative to the exercise of the Powers of the C.E.D. In effect the Powers of the Commission were transferred to the Rumanian Government who were to set up a "Maritime Danube Board." This board, under Article 5, was "to be responsible for the preparation and execution of plans for works on the maritime Danube and at the mouths for levying dues and dispensing of the yield thereof."

In September, 1940, Germany summoned a conference at Vienna for the purpose of regulating Danube shipping anew, and eliminating Great Britain and France from membership of the Commission.

[113] [For further information see *La Commission Européenne du Danube et son Œuvre de 1856 à 1931* (Paris 1931); Treaty of Versailles, Articles 331-339, 346-353; Treaty Series No. 38 (1939) Cmd. 6068, and Treaty Series 38 (1939), Cmd. 6069.]

E. TELECOMMUNICATIONS

I. Pre-War Situation

1. Telegraph and Telephones

206 The telegraph system of Rumania was controlled by the Ministry of Communications, the telephone by the Societatea Română de Telefoane, a subsidiary of the International Telephone and

[45b]

CHAPTER VIII

206 Telegraph Co., of New York. The telegraph system covered the whole country, while the telephone was sufficiently extensive to supply about a quarter of the villages with official telephones, which were available for public use. The following figures (January 1940) show the comparative development of telegraph and telephone systems in Rumania and Great Britain :—

	Rumania	*Great Britain*
Number of telephones for every 100 of the population . .	·81	7·06
Miles of telegraph wire for every 100 of the population	·24	·5

After 1930 when the Societatea Română de Telefoane took over from the Government, the telephone system made remarkable progress. Just before the war about 74 per cent. of the subscribers were attached to automatic exchanges. 17 of the largest towns were equipped with these exchanges (Bucarest had two), material being supplied by the International Standard Company. Small towns and country districts had manual exchanges. The system in general was overhead wire, but there was an important 12-channel underground cable taking carrier from Bucarest to Ploeşti with extensions to Buzău and Braşov.

Bucarest had an extensive system of external telephone connections. It communicated with Berlin and Vienna, Sofia and Ruse (Bulgaria), Paris, London, Athens, Warsaw, Prague, Istanbul, Belgrade and Budapest.

The telegraph system in Rumania covered the whole country but although not in as bad a condition as the telegraph system of Bulgaria, it suffered from being entirely divorced from the telephone system, and in 1937 it was proposed that it should be thoroughly reorganised. It is not known whether this reorganisation was ever carried out.

206 Rumania was connected by telegraph to Prague, Istanbul, Odessa and Belgrade.

2. Submarine Cables

There was a submarine telegraph cable from Constanța to Kilvos, which was used on the Bucarest—Istanbul telegraph circuit.

3. Wireless

207 Rumania was fairly well equipped with wireless stations, but after the Government took them over from "Air France," who originally installed them, their working became less efficient. At the beginning of the war there were three broadcasting stations, of which the most powerful was the Radio Rumania, a 150-kW station at Brașov; 14 wireless stations for civil airlines, and a number of radio beacons, government and commercial stations and police wireless stations.

II. War-time Developments

1. Telegraph and Telephones

206 722 It was reported in 1941 that the Germans had laid a telephone cable from Berlin to Bucarest through Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

2. Wireless

207 722 In May 1942 it was reported that the wireless headquarters in S.E. Europe for the "Lufthansa" was at Bucarest. Budapest, Venice, Rome, Belgrade, Zagreb and Sofia are all controlled from this headquarters. An internal Rumanian network for purely military purposes is also worked from Bucarest.

It was learnt in 1943 that there was a plan for the construction of four new medium-wave transmitters to replace existing stations. The new stations were to be at Iași and Timișoara and in Bucarest and Transylvania. A new 50-kW. short-wave transmitter for foreign broadcasts is also planned.

206 Rumania was connected by telegraph to Prague, Istanbul, Odessa and Belgrade.

2. Submarine Cables

There was a submarine telegraph cable from Constanța to Kilvos, which was used on the Bucarest—Istanbul telegraph circuit.

3. Wireless.

● 207 Rumania was fairly well equipped with wireless stations, but after the Government took them over from "Air France," who originally installed them, their working became less efficient. At the beginning of the war there were three broadcasting stations, of which the most powerful was the Radio Rumania, a 150-kW station at Brașov; 14 wireless stations for civil airlines, and a number of radio beacons, government and commercial stations and police wireless stations.

II. War-time Developments

1. Telegraph and Telephones

206 722 It was reported in 1941 that the Germans had laid a telephone cable from Berlin to Bucarest through Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

2. Wireless

207 722 In May 1942 it was reported that the wireless headquarters in S.E. Europe for the "Lufthansa" was at Bucarest. Budapest, Venice, Rome, Belgrade, Zagreb and Sofia are all controlled from this headquarters. An internal Rumanian network for purely military purposes is also worked from Bucarest.

It was learnt in 1943 that there was a plan for the construction of four new medium-wave transmitters to replace existing stations. The new stations were to be at Iași and Timișoara and in Bucarest and Transylvania. A new 50-kW. short-wave transmitter for foreign broadcasts is also planned.

659 interpretation of Article of the Concordat dealing with the use of property which did not alter or restrict the original provisions.

[208] In any event, the Concordat granted the Catholic Church unlimited possibilities of religious propaganda since it provided that the Romanian Government would not oppose the establishment of new Catholic parishes whenever this would be requested by a minmum of 400 worshippers or even less.

According to these provisions and those of the Law No.54 of 1928, the Catholic Church has been treated as a national church on equal footing with the Romanian Orthodox Church. The Concordat ruled also on the status of the Armenian, Greek-Ruthenian and Greek Catholic Churches in Romania insofar as they were considered as Catholic rites. Some specific information on the two last named denomination are given in the next chapter.

4. The Greek Catholic Church

795 It must be borne in mind that in addition to the Roman Catholic Church in the strict sense there were three churches in Romania which, though originated as Church of the Eastern Christian Orthodoxy were, in the long run, united with the Roman Catholic Church under the supremacy of the Pope.

These churches generally called Uniates were as follows:

a) Romanian Uniates called in Romania Greek Catholics.

b) Russian or, rather, Ukrainian Uniates, called in Romania Greek Ruthenians, mostly inhabitants of Bukovina and

12: Kosmos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

The Iron Guard was originally part of the Mol- 668
davian and Bessarabian anti-Semitic movement led by Professor Cuza. Amongst his pupils was Codreanu who formed the 'Legion of the Archangel Michael', a terrorist organization modelled on the Fascist and Nazi pattern and supported by Germany and Italy. Codreanu began his political career with the assassination of the prefect of police of Jasi, the blackmail of Jews and the persecution of progressive organizations. His adherents were poor students of the type which in Germany formed the core of the Nazi movement, the lower clergy, army officers and civil servants. His anti-Semitic and anti-Bolshevik slogans sounded attractive to certain big business men, high army officers and the higher clergy who gave him their support. The king regarded the Iron 643
Guard with favour, for it seemed an excellent 668
weapon for weakening the country's democratic forces and preparing the way for his own, undisguised dictatorship. Accordingly the crimes of the Iron Guard were not punished and the activities of her adherents remained unchecked.

In order to exploit the international situation, 643
which was only too favourable for dictatorship, 208
Carol began with an intensive propaganda, taking the slogans of Fascism, National Socialism and the Iron Guard, and laying particular stress upon his desire to rule with the help of the young generation. The schools and universities were militarized and the defence of the country made one of the daily watchwords. By ruling with non-party cabinets and 643
playing off one party against the other Carol under- 662
mined the strength of the Liberals and the adherents of Maniu and Mihalache. From both parties he

661 for the paper necessary for their pamphlets and newspapers,
477 while the Bratianus' Press organs naturally enjoyed pre-
[289] ferential rates. Another deplorable result of this monopoly was the high cost of books. The same book published in
[212] Bulgaria cost about half as much as in Rumania, and this explains to some extent the high percentage of illiterates in the latter country, which according to the *Lupta* of May 18th, 1932 reached as high a percentage as 70 per cent of the
433 total population. The creation of industries, the raw material of which is not indigenous, is likely in the long run to prove extremely wasteful. They are clearly of a parasitic nature, and their maintenance will not only continue to be a charge on the Revenue but is likely to continue to handicap very seriously Rumania's staple industry, agriculture. The initial costs of installation are necessarily high, for foreign experts have to be called in to set up the machinery, supervise, and train the native workpeople, since there is a lack of experienced workmen. Moreover the stringency of monetary resources and the high rates of interest ruling necessitate a high return on capital that can be secured only by selling the manufactured article at the highest possible price, a level which is usually fixed by the cost of the corresponding foreign article, on which a heavy duty has been imposed. The high prices will forcibly curtail output since the latter is adjusted to the capacity of the local market, the possibilities of which are restrained owing to the low buying power of the peasantry. The more consumption is reduced the more manufacturers will endeavour to recoup themselves by further raising their prices, which can be attained only by increasing the protective duty. Thus a vicious circle is created, to the great disadvantage of the peasantry, who
[162] constitute 80 per cent of the population and who have to defray in the same proportion the expenses of these experimental attempts to industrialize Rumania. It is obvious that the high prices paid by the peasantry for manufactured articles affect adversely the cost of agricultural produce; even the transport rates of the latter stand high in order to compensate for the low preferential rates granted to local manufactures. One need not, therefore, be surprised if Rumanian agriculturalists can no longer market their pro-

6

12: Korinos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

793 The poor clergy are very active in politics and
661 public affairs generally. Their influence, and even more that of the bishops, has not infrequently been
• [212] abused to further private interests.[1] The majority of the Rumanians are only semi-literate and depend for their information and guidance on the priests.
871 Education has been the weak point of almost all the Rumanian governments. But those Rumanians whose parents have been able to give them a good education have proved that this highly intelligent and gifted people can achieve success in all fields of science and the arts.

563 **THE HUNGARIANS AND THE SZEKELYS.** The Hungarians and Szekelys, most of whom came under Rumanian rule after the Great War, live chiefly in Transylvania and the western provinces of Greater Rumania. The forefathers of the Szekelys were brought to these territories by the Hungarian kings and charged with the task of defending and securing the Kingdom's frontiers. The Hungarian nobles and Szekelys were two of the 'Three Ruling Nations' of Transylvania.[2] They were supported and encouraged by their kin in Hungary proper, given many privileges in the economic, political and cultural spheres. Thanks to all this they were able

[1] One blatant example of this occurred about ten years ago when a shepherd, who claimed to have 'visions' and prophetic power was built up into a holy figure. The simple peasants flocked to see and hear him, bringing many gifts. The State railways organized special travel facilities and this enriched many officials and members of the clergy.

[2] The three 'united' or 'recognized nations' of Transylvania were the Hungarian nobility, the Szekelys and the Saxons.

241 It will be seen that structure and climate conspire together
132 to encourage a scheme of summer utilisation of high pastures
221 combined with valley cultivation that was much enriched when the maize plant was introduced, but this was not so long ago, and the older régime was none too prosperous both because of climatic troubles in the highlands and especially the sensitiveness of the wheat plant to abnormal seasons, and because of the hindrances to organisation arising from the diversities of language between governments and
371 subjects. The encouragement of industry was not easy while some lignite and a little coal were the main sources of power, but later on it became possible to use abundant petroleum and natural gas and we have yet to see, in the
565 next generation, what influence they may have. Up to the
241 present, however, a true peasantry survives, and has increased its hold on the soil; it still makes at home a great proportion of what it needs, it still finds that in the hills the maize crop may not ripen, and old communal schemes relating to the high pastures remain important.

233 TRANSHUMANCE has long played a prominent part in the
221 pastoral life of the Carpathians, for agriculturally the region is marginal and it is not very unusual for the maize crop, which covers an astonishingly large proportion of the arable land, to fail to mature. Before the late war the flocks of the eastern Carpathians used to winter in the plains of Moldavia, Bessarabia, the Dobrogea and south Russia, more rarely in Transylvania. During the nineteenth century, however, many Roumanian shepherds stayed in the plain and formed the nuclei of small permanent Roumanian colonies outside the boundaries of Transylvania.

423 DURING the last few centuries there have been considerable
311 changes in schemes of land holding. In the late eighteenth century the scattered possessions of the landlord class were consolidated into Latifundia. In the first half of the nineteenth century arable farming was extended into the Danubian plain and on the rich lands between Siret and Prut—in areas, that is to say, which had not been previously cultivated. This development progressed with the rise of an export trade in cereals to feed the industrial populations of the west. It is interesting to note that much of this newly-developed territory in Wallachia was organised on the system of métayage, the new colonists from the hills becoming tenants on a produce-sharing basis.

IN CONNECTION with this development, many of the Roumanian transhumant herdsmen gave up their pastoral life and settled as agriculturists or went into commerce. After 1918 the large estates were broken up and plots of land were given to the peasantry. This was the occasion for the return to Transylvania of some of the former emigrants who had gone to Wallachia and Moldavia, but naturally many features of the old life have disappeared, e.g. the July fairs that were formerly held high up in the mountains and did much to preserve the cultural heritage of the pastoral people.

[221] BUT, if large-scale seasonal migrations over long distances have declined, the short distance movements still play a vital part in the rural economy of the eastern Carpathians and fortunately have not as yet been divested of all their old-time ritual.

313 church, fencing, roofing, flooring, is of timber, and also many of his household utensils: water-buckets, jugs, spoons, etc.

IT IS very unfortunate that the most lucrative type of timber should be the most inaccessible. Timber from the great stands of pine has to take the slow and tortuous route down the rivers in rafts (see Plates VII and VIII) to the Danube and Black Sea. Afforestation has not reached a high stage of development as yet. The trees are propagated by naturally-sown seeds, and there are very few nurseries. Where the clearings are made, the stumps are left in the ground to add to the difficulties of the hay harvester.

221 WE MAY sum up the tale of Roumania's agricultural assets by saying that she is well endowed by nature as regards soils and climatic conditions for the wide-spread production of grain, fruit and vegetables; that natural pasture, whether upland or lowland, is seasonal and insufficient for a satisfactory development of cattle raising, though much may be done by an intensified cultivation of fodder crops. The increased provision of communal grazing for the peasants has been a useful step. Conditions are better for sheep, which are more adaptable than cattle and are better able to stand the rigours of the hard winter. Transhumance is everywhere practised with these animals: those of the great plains moving from the Danube lowlands in the spring to the hill pastures in the summer. Local transhumance of cattle, sheep and pigs from villages of the upland valleys to the high dairies is the rule.

LAND TENURE.

241 423 AGRICULTURAL CONDITIONS, past and present, and the marketing of the products of land-utilisation are so closely bound up with conditions of land tenure that it is relevant to include here a short summary of those conditions.

IN THE PERIOD immediately preceding the outbreak of the Great War, 50 per cent of the land of Old Roumania was in large holdings (over 250 acres), and in the Bucovina, where the Roumanian peasants' holdings were pitiably small, 60 per cent. About 40 per cent of the holdings were of less than twenty-five acres. In Old Roumania and Transylvania the average was only eight acres per family, in the grain lands of Bessarabia eleven, but in the Bucovina uplands

241



FIGURE 11. A = Joinery mill. B = Smithy (Plate XII). C = Wool-combing shed. D = Saw-mill. E = Gipsy colony. F = Holding in process of subdivision. Numbers refer to position and direction of camera: (1) Plate XII (lower), (2) Plate XI (lower), (3) Plate XI (upper).

246

in the Bistricioara valley in the early part of July, the peasants then working up the hillsides to the higher meadows where the hay-making is completed about the third week in September. What is not needed in the village byres is stacked on the lower slopes near the sheep pens in which the animals are housed during the winter months.

221

TRANSHUMANCE.

TRANSHUMANCE forms an essential supplement to arable farming in Corbu, for the cultivable land is too valuable to be used for grazing purposes except for a short time after the harvest, whilst the produce of the hay meadows is required for winter feed.

221 SCATTERED over the commune are eight "stâne" or
233 temporary summer settlements which are all situated be-
[342] ween 400 and 800 metres above the village. The stâna itself is a simple affair, consisting of a log hut which affords living accommodation for the shepherds and acts as a dairy and store-house, together with the folds into which the animals are driven for milking. The one illustrated had a population of three men and two boys, all Roumanians, 350 sheep and 20 cows, as well as a few pigs, the only animals left in the village being the one or two milch cows retained at each farm for family needs and the draught animals (see Plate XIII).

234 THE change from winter to spring takes place very rapidly
221 during the second fortnight of April, and the ascent to the dairies is made at the end of that month or early in May. Before the animals are taken up the milk yield of the cows is tested in order to determine the apportionment of the cheese made therefrom, but the ewes' milk cheese is distributed on the basis of the number of sheep belonging to each peasant. Shortly after the ascent the village priest performs
[233] the ceremony of blessing each stâna in turn, and before the end of May the sheep are sheared by peasants who go up specially for the purpose, the wool being brought down to the village on horseback.

233 SINCE the summer pastures are communal property their
221 administration is in the hands of an assembly of heads of
476 families which assesses the rent to be paid for the season—generally 12-15 lei for a sheep and 50 lei for a cow. The money thus received forms a fund from which the shepherds are paid for their services. Each peasant makes personal arrangements with the senior shepherd as to the amount of cheese he will require for household purposes, any surplus going into a common stock which is marketed at the end of the season. Any disputes that arise are settled by arbitration in the presence of the mayor when the shepherds return to the village. This takes place during the latter part of October, the descent of each group being celebrated by minor festivities at which the shepherds are the guests of honour. The general feast held when all are down marks the official end of the season's activities.

221
476 UPON their return to the village the cows are immediately stabled, but each peasant splits up his sheep into two groups,

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

3. DOMESTIC ANIMALS

422 The following figures were collected for two households (August 1933),
231 one smaller and one larger:

Farm A	Farm B
3 milch cows, two on high pastures, one at the farm	7 milch cows, six on high pastures, one at the farm
No draught oxen	2 draught oxen
1 calf	5 calves
2 horses	2 horses
30 sheep	50 sheep
2 pigs	4 pigs
15 fowls	21 fowls
15 beehives, near house	4 or 5 beehives, away from house in lower pastures

Housing for geese was usually available, and several flocks with six to eight geese in each were noticed on the road. A few turkeys were observed, also a few large guinea fowl in a farm in a tributary valley. There were doves at the priest's house.

The Forestry control forbids the keeping of goats.

4. THE FARMING CALENDAR

221 Late April, early May.—Prepare soil, sow maize and potatoes, harrow hayfields.

Early May.—Sheep and some cattle and pigs go up to the high pastures.

Late May.—Peasants shear sheep on high pastures.

Early June.—Weeding and first hilling-up of maize by work with a hoe when plants are 15-20 cm. high.

Late June.—Second weeding and hilling-up of maize. General tidying-up before hay harvest.

Early July.—First cut of hay in the lower lands.

July, August and first three weeks of September.—Hay harvest. Peasants make temporary shelters when harvesting in remote spots. Hay on hills mostly stacked near the shelters used for sheep during part of the winter. Beside this is a hut for the man in charge.

September 25-October 10th.—Maize harvest.

Third week of October.—Potatoes lifted.

October.—Stock brought down from high pastures and sorted out among owners by means of earmarks.

October until first serious snow.—Sheep may be kept in remote pastures that have not been much used or reaped.

Thence until May.—Some sheep on lower hills near shelters with hay (see above, July, August). Some sheep folded on lowland fields to fertilise them. No artificial manure. Hay used as fodder. Lambing on lowland fields near homesteads.

241 PAID AGRICULTURAL labour is very rare; the work of the farm is done entirely by the peasant and his family, including women. Modern machinery is still almost unknown, so that agricultural practice is rather that of the garden than that of the field in our Western sense.

PLOUGHING IS done with a wooden plough tipped with iron and ox drawn. Sowing is done largely by hand, while intermediate operations, such as hilling the maize, are done with a hoe of the form illustrated on page 59. Harvesting, if not done by "pulling" (e.g. flax), or picking (e.g. fruit), is done by means of a sickle (maize) or scythe (hay).

[242] AMONG SOME farmers some idea of rotation of crops is understood, but only very imperfectly; in many cases it is not practised at all, the same plot of land being used for maize year after year.

ARTIFICIAL FERTILIZERS are seldom used, peasants depending for renewal of fertility upon animal manure and ploughing in and burning the stubble. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the yield is low and crops poor in quality.

[22] SOWING BEGINS at the end of April or the beginning of May (oats) and continues until the middle of June. Harvesting begins as soon after July 20th as possible and continues until the end of October, when the last of the maize is gathered.

231 ANIMALS PLAY an important part in the agricultural economy of the Rumanian peasant. Every holding possesses sheep, particularly milking ewes, milking cows, draught oxen, perhaps a horse or horses, pigs, together with geese and fowls. Few holdings are without one or two hives of bees. Occasionally on a very small holding (less than one hectare) milking cows are replaced by goats. During the summer (from the beginning of May until the end of August) the sheep and such cattle as are not needed at the farm for draught or milking purposes are sent up to the high pastures. Pigs are sometimes sent up with them, but not goats. During this time the animals left are either fed on fodder crops at the farm or are sent out daily to pasture on a portion of the hay meadows set aside for that purpose. On being brought down from the mountains the animals are pastured for a short time on the hay meadows from which the crop has already been taken. They are then brought back to their

231

Animals

5 milking cows, 2 at farm, 3 with calves away on the high pastures.
2 draught oxen.
2 bulls.
100 sheep, away on high pastures.
2 horses.
3 pigs.
30 goats at farm.
Large number of poultry (fowls and geese) impossible to estimate.
2 hives of bees in flower garden.

221

AGRICULTURAL CALENDAR

April.	Preparation of ground, sowing of oats and vetch. Sheep go up to low hill pastures.
May.	Sowing of maize, potatoes, beans. May 1st, sheep go to high pastures.
June.	Sowing of fodder crops; all sowing finished by middle of month.
July.	Early part of month, first cutting of hay, making and collecting. July 20th, beginning of harvest, i.e. flax, cherries, oats and barley.
August.	Middle of month, second cutting of hay, oat harvest, plum harvest, followed by apple and walnut harvest. Harvesting and retting of hemp. Some ploughing of grain stubble. August 31st, sheep return from high pastures to low hill pastures.
September.	Beginning of maize harvest, sheep penned on maize stubble as soon as possible.
October.	End of maize harvest according to season.
November to March.	Sheep penned on maize fields, cattle kept in sheds and fed on hay and fodder crops.

A. R. B.

412

Mould for hay fork

TRANSHUMANCE IN THE SOUTHERN CARPATHIANS

233 221 IN THE SOUTHERN CARPATHIANS we have a region which still retains its pastoral activities, little disturbed by the social and economic forces which have invaded the pastoralists' domain elsewhere. Few Roumanian villages are without sheep, and in the summer great numbers are taken to the high pastures when these become free of snow. This seasonal migration, or transhumance, is an ancient feature of European life, and a study of its forms and functions in Roumania not only throws light on important aspects of peasant life, but provides valuable comparative material for the study of similar movements in regions like western Britain, where transhumance survives only in a modified way.

SHEEP ARE the pivot of rural economy in these Carpathian lands; the pastoral element pervades all aspects of peasant [291] life—from the traditional costumes of woollen cloth trousers and sheepskin waistcoat to popular poetry and music. But the intimate contact with upland pastures thus ensured has been of deeper significance: it has enabled the Carpathian peoples to preserve their sense of unity when the lowlands were overrun by invaders, while the contacts maintained between summering groups have helped to preserve the Roumanian language and kept its dialectal variations within limits. In a very real sense, the Southern Carpathians are the heart of Roumania.

133 PHYSICAL CONDITIONS have, from very remote times, favoured the development and survival of pastoral life. The steepness of the forested valley slopes which isolate the upland core is in strong contrast to the gently undulating platforms which rise above the tree-line, at about 5,000 feet, and terminate in rugged glaciated *monadnocks* which may reach 8,000 feet or more (Negoiu, 2,544 m.). The prolonged erosion of Tertiary times which produced the upland platforms also provided the great masses of unconsolidated material—mostly coarse sands—which now form the extensive foothills stretching half way to the Danube over a width of some sixty miles. Curtea de Argeş is one of the settlements of this foothill belt,

471 the shepherds and cheese-maker. These dues, amounting to
233 some 10 or 20 lei per sheep, are worked out each year by a committee which regulates the financial side of the transhumant economy.

234 EACH STÂNĂ[1] has its baciu or cheese-maker, who is paid by
233 the commune. In some districts this scheme is varied by arrangements which must represent modifications of the
471 old economy of collective shepherding. Occasionally a large farmer may be proprietor of a stână and may possess enough sheep to run his own pasturing, in which case he may either hire a cheese-maker or fill that rôle in person. Or he may let his stână to the highest bidder, who pays in cheese obtained from the flock. From this it is a short step to the emergence of the middleman who, possessing no sheep himself, rents a pasture and guarantees to return an agreed quantity of cheese per sheep to those who send him their stock.

233 BEGINNING OUR account with the descent from the mountains,
● 221 we find that the uppermost pastures are abandoned by the last day of August, and the return downhill takes place during the first fortnight in September, being normally completed by September 14th (The Feast of the Cross). The sheep are driven to the local pastures until the maize crop is gathered, when they are penned on the stubble. Movement uphill begins about the middle of April and is completed by May 1st in an average year, St. George's Day (April 23rd) being a central date. Each peasant is responsible for driving his own sheep, using recognized tracks which tend to follow the watersheds. The sheep thus avoid the deep valley-crossings and can avail themselves of occasional natural clearings for temporary halts in a journey which may last a week. These are points of some importance in connection with the study of ridgeway roads generally.

342 THE SHEPHERD'S hut is a log-cabin erected on a single foundation-course of boulders. It is roofed with shingles or long planks; the gable is boarded above the level of the eaves, and a gap at the apex serves in place of chimney. Scarcely any metal is used in the construction of these summer dwellings, which serve as dairies and storehouses in addition to providing shelter and sleeping-places for the shepherds.
000 The furniture is of the simplest, but much ingenuity is

1 [for explanation see footnote 50 pp. 49, cat. 116 -- Analyst]

241

*Production of Principal Crops**
Average 1935-38
('000 metric tons)

Wheat	3,077
Rye	430
Barley	1,071
Oats	604
Maize	5,215
Potatoes ..	2,010
Sugar beet† ..	570
Peas	45
Beans	236
Tobacco ..	12
Sunflower seed	177
Soya beans ..	42
Rape seed ..	48

* Pre 1939 frontiers.
† This produced 110,000 m. tons of raw sugar.

4. Livestock

231 One of the chief weaknesses of Rumanian agriculture is the low density of livestock. Numbers of cattle per 100 acres of farm land are less than half those of this country and Germany; about half the farms possess no cows. A large proportion of the cattle, moreover, are draught animals which require land to feed them but which yield little saleable produce. Moreover, the annual milk yield per cow averages less than 1,350 litres (300 gallons) as compared with over 700 gallons in Denmark. [234]

Of pigs, the numbers and quality compare even less favourably with those of other countries. Only in the Banat district is there an approach to an interlocking of grain production with pig-raising. Sheep are an important source of income to the peasants of the Transylvanian mountains—a region where water buffaloes are kept as draught animals since they require no sustenance other than a daily cold bath and a few maize stalks.

Livestock numbers in 1938, and the production of livestock products in 1935-38, were as follows:—

*Livestock Numbers**
'000 head

Horses	2,158
Cattle	4,161
(including cows)	(2,030)
Buffaloes ..	165
Sheep	12,768
Goats	399
Pigs	3,165
Poultry ..	34,666

* Pre-1939 frontiers.

*Production of Livestock Products**
Average 1935-38
('000 metric tons)

[234]

Milk‡	3,000
Butter	20
Cheese	30
Beef and veal ..	120
Mutton and lamb	20
Pork	152
Poultry meat ..	60

* Pre-1939 frontiers.
‡ Cows, buffaloes, sheep and goats.

5. Fish

228 All fishing along the Danube, including the mouths of the delta, and along the western shores of the Black Sea coast, is controlled by the State Fisheries Administration. The total annual catch in State-owned waters averaged 15,000 tons in the years immediately preceding the war, of which fresh-water fish contributed more than two-thirds. This does not, however, represent the total catch, as fairly large quantities were caught [656]

CHAPTER 1

228 in private waters. Supplemented by some 4,000 tons of imported fish, this provided nearly 1 kg. (2·2 lb.) per head of population, but, in fact, almost all the fish was consumed by the 5 million persons living in towns. The principal fish caught were sturgeon, carp, pike, eels and crayfish, the main fishing centres being Brăila, Tulcea and Ismail.

6. Food Industries

256 The chief food and agricultural-processing industries are milling, sugar manufacture, oilseed crushing and tobacco curing. While the milling industry was dispersed widely about the country in more than 15,000 small mills employing altogether over 37,000 persons (at 1930 census), the sugar industry was for the most part concentrated in the plain of the Great Kingdom. Of the 17 sugar 257 factories employing 10,000 workers, only one was in the Transylvanian districts lost to Hungary and five in the areas temporarily lost to the U.S.S.R. The vegetable-oil industry, located chiefly in 258 Bessarabia, was only partly carried on in factories, of which there were (on January 1st, 1930) 217, employing 2,026 workers. Among these, 34 were fitted both to extract crude oil and to refine it, six were exclusively refineries, while the remainder produced only crude oil. The rest of the industry consisted of some 2,000 hand, or animal-driven presses mostly owned by individual peasants or by shopkeepers. These primitive presses extracted only a low percentage of oil from the seeds, and consequently the cake—mainly sold for export—had an unusually high oil content. As regards 277 tobacco, both curing and cigarette manufacture [656] were subject to government licence and control. There were 29 factories (in 1930) employing 9,720 workers, but tobacco cultivation subsequently declined, so also doubtless did the numbers employed.

7. Agricultural Organisation

452 The history of the organisation of Rumanian 241 farmers is one of not too successful co-operatives 474 becoming transformed more and more into agencies for the execution of Government Control Schemes. [654] For many years there had been throughout the country a network of agricultural credit societies, co-operative in form but in practice directed by the State. *These played an important rôle during the* period of the Land Reform in helping the peasants by advances to buy and equip their newly acquired holdings. There was even some co-operative cultivation for a time, until the new peasant-owners could muster sufficient draught animals and implements. Besides this, there have been strong local co-operative unions especially among the [162] minority nationalities—the Hungarians in Transylvania, the Swabian and Saxons in the Banat and the Russian and Polish Jews in the Bucovina.

243 The credit societies revived in importance when, 474 after 1933, the Rumanian Government began the organisation of grain marketing. They became 452 the local agents of a Central Marketing Board 654 through which all sales of grain had to be made both for home consumption and for export. Whereas formerly grain prices slumped immediately after the harvest, most peasants, being obliged to sell their grain quickly, under the new scheme prices were stabilised throughout the year, and this brought a great improvement to peasants' [65] receipts. But the scheme and the societies were also used to collect the peasants' taxes (paid in grain) which did not increase the popularity of co-operation.

[8a]

CHAPTER I

722 more than half the normal, but the efforts in 1943 to recover to a more average crop may have [249] succeeded.

3. Fish

[228] The general food shortage in Rumania gave a great fillip to the fishing industry. In the 12 months April 1942 to March 1943, some 40,000 tons of fish were caught in State waters besides 13,000 tons in rented and private waters. This is almost double the largest pre-war catch. During 1942 some 6,000 tons were salted down for winter use. In order to promote and introduce better organisation into the fishing industry a German-Rumanian Company has been established, the "Marea-Neagrã," which will devote special attention to developing the Black Sea fisheries.

4. Agricultural Exports

439 The pre-war level of grain exports was well maintained in 1939; wheat in particular was 249 preminent with over a million tons. The exports of 1940, however, showed an immediate reflection of territorial changes and war shortages. Total grain exports in that year barely reached a million tons compared with the pre-war average of about 1·6 million tons. The following year showed a still sharper decline, wheat reaching only 5,000 tons and maize 120,000 tons. In 1942, despite the recovery of Bessarabia, it is most unlikely that even this level was maintained.

439 Oilseed exports, despite direct German interven- 249 tion aiming at an expansion of the crop, also fell below pre-war levels. Sunflower-seed exports, the principal oilseed, fell from an average of 30,000 tons in 1935-38 to 12,000 tons in 1940 and to 5,000 tons in 1941. Exports following the 1942 crop, though probably better, were not at all commensurate with the increased production, for a serious shortage of edible oil and fat had meanwhile developed in Rumania owing to decreased supplies of 'pig fat' and to the retention by the peasants of their seed for consumption at home, or for disposal on the Black Market.

5. Administrative Control

241 Not even the most complete and efficient system of administrative control could have assured the 656 country's food supplies and exports at normal 435 levels during these three unfavourable years, but it is clear that Rumania's food difficulties have been aggravated by mistakes in economic policy and inadequate control measures. Bureaucratic methods of handling the peasants aroused antagonism and resistance. Supplies of tested seed and other farm requisites were not made available in time. On the collection and supply side, too much power was left in the hands of local prefects. But the most serious shortcoming of the official administration was the failure to establish a price control, and an appropriate relationship between agricultural prices and the cost of the things farmers buy. (In the absence of effective discipline this ratio needs to be strongly in the producers' favour if production and marketing of foodstuffs is to be maintained.) Prices of consumers' goods rose rapidly, owing to shortages, while the Government pegged the prices of farm produce at comparatively low levels. Consequently, the peasants curtailed production and sought better prices by selling much of their produce through Black Market channels. The mistake was officially admitted in the autumn of 1941 when grain prices were more than doubled, but the position still remained unfavourable to

113
• 231
233
235

Yugoslavia EF1
Albania EG1
Rumania ED1 •
Bulgaria EE1
Slovenes EF7

/For information on the types of shelter provided for domesticated animals (including cattle), see scattered references in 17: Thurnher, EF6 Serbs file, category 116./

245

Moldavia, where the spring and copious early summer rains and the luminous late summer provide advantageous conditions. The use of American stocks, resistant to the phylloxera, has proved successful particularly in Moldavia. Bessarabia supplies about 40 per cent of the acreage under vines, and Wallachia about 23 per cent. The quality of the wine is much below the quality of the grapes, the peasant finding the production of ţuica, a spirit simply distilled from the ubiquitous plum, a less difficult and exacting undertaking. There is no export of wine worth mentioning.

231 BEFORE the Great War the rearing of animals, which had played an important part in the economy of Roumania in the early nineteenth century (providing an export to Turkey of sheep and horses from the lower Danube lands and of army horses to Prussia) had been giving way rapidly to grain cultivation. Since the War, however, the number of sheep, cattle and horses has increased, in spite of the great losses in the areas overrun by the enemy. The subdivision of the land into small holdings has been a factor in the increase of animals, for every peasant aims at having a few sheep, a couple of cows and a pig or two. In Transylvania, the development of cattle breeding had been scientifically encouraged, breeds peculiarly suited to various districts being improved. There are three types of permanent pasture in Roumania—the flood plain pastures of the Baltea and of the wider valleys in general, available for grazing in the winter and spring, the permanent meadows of the plains, which can be grazed only in the spring before the summer drought sets in, and the high pastures in the forest clearings, available during the summer months. The provision of winter fodder where the flood plains are not available is a serious problem, and one to which the Ministry of Agriculture is turning serious attention, for the cultivation of fodder crops is very little developed. Hay is harvested painfully one to three times in the year in the rich alpine pastures of the Carpathian valleys and is eked out in the peasant communities with maize stalks and straw. The small mountain cattle are the best milkers but of not much service for draught or for butchers' meat. The sheep is far more important in the peasant economy, providing cheese, wool for the domestic loom and mutton—for the most part dried. In Transylvania the cattle are mainly of the Hungarian steppe type with a

231 considerable admixture of cross-bred Swiss. On the Wallachian plains we find a cross between the Moldavian cattle of the plains and the Hungarian type which gives good milk, is easily fattened for market, and makes a good draught animal. Throughout the Danube plains the powerful water buffalo is important for draught purposes and for milk, and may be seen frequently also in the Transylvanian plains.

FOREST.

137 RICH in ploughland and not ill-provided with pasture, Roumania is fortunate in a third type of land utilisation which brings her vast acreage of mountainous upland into service. Forest covers about one-quarter of the land surface. Its greatest development occurs on the sandstones of the Flysch formation. Coniferous trees clothe the higher slopes above 1,400 metres, particularly on the Moldavian and Bucovinan frontiers of Transylvania. Below the coniferous forest zone with its peaty, acid soils, stretches the zone of beech forest, mixed, on its lower edge, with oak. (It is the beech forest that has given its name to Bucovina.) Here the characteristic soil is the leached, ashen-grey podsol, yielding poor crops in the clearings unless heavily manured. This zone tongues up the valleys into the coniferous zone. It widens to 100 kilometres in the Siret and Olt basins, but narrows in Muntenia, where the high mountains drop abruptly to the agricultural plains. The beech, unfortunately, has little economic value, and to this, with its poor soil, may be attributed the survival of so large a part of the beech forest. Its chief use is for firewood.

THE OAK FOREST on the lower slopes and foot hills, with its relatively rich brown soils, has naturally suffered most at the hands of settlers, and survives to-day mainly on the ridge combs and hill-tops. There are several species of oak, and hornbeam, lime and elm appear here and there in the oak forest with beech and birch on the upper margin of distribution. In Transylvania the lower hill country has been practically cleared of forest.

313 TIMBER is one of the mainstays of life of the peasant. All the constructional work of his village—dwelling house, barns,

233
231 the main flock being taken direct to the sheds on the foothills where they are fed on the hay gathered during the summer, whereas the remainder are grazed on the maize stubble until about Christmas. By then the weather becomes rather severe, and although sheep are better able than cows to withstand the rigours of a continental winter they are all kept in sheds during the early months of the year.

SURPLUS ANIMALS are disposed of at the autumn fairs at Tulgheş or Topliţa where they are bought up by dealers for conveyance to Italy or Czechoslovakia.

III. OTHER OCCUPATIONS

TEXTILES.

291 THE OUTSTANDING FEATURE of the Carpathian villages is the
286 remarkably high standard of peasant craftsmanship. The degree of artistic expression revealed in their clothing is particularly striking, and although best seen on festive occasions it is scarcely less noticeable in their ordinary working garb. Wool, flax and hemp are the traditional fibres used, but imported cotton yarn is beginning to displace linen for some of the lighter summer garments. Most of the dyestuffs are obtained from local plants, for example, red
[286] from the leaves of the wild crab apple, yellow from the osier, black from the alder or birch and fawn from the walnut, but imported dyes are beginning to be employed. The mordant used is salt, but colours other than black fix themselves in wool without salt treatment.

462 SPINNING with a distaff is the normal occupation of the women in their leisure time during the summer, very little knitting being done at all. The other processes of combing, weaving and dyeing are also undertaken by the women, as is the embroidering of dresses and household linen, but the embroidering of the sheepskin waistcoats which are worn by both sexes is done by one or two men who specialise in this craft (see Plate XV).

LEATHER.

295 ALTHOUGH still made in the village, the old type of laced shoe with its characteristically pointed toe is being displaced

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 ED1 Rumania ED1

3. DOMESTIC ANIMALS

422 The following figures were collected for two households (August 1933),
231 one smaller and one larger :

Farm A	Farm B
3 milch cows, two on high pastures, one at the farm	7 milch cows, six on high pastures, one at the farm
No draught oxen	2 draught oxen
1 calf	5 calves
2 horses	2 horses
30 sheep	50 sheep
2 pigs	4 pigs
15 fowls	21 fowls
15 beehives, near house	4 or 5 beehives, away from house in lower pastures

Housing for geese was usually available, and several flocks with six to eight geese in each were noticed on the road. A few turkeys were observed, also a few large guinea fowl in a farm in a tributary valley. There were doves at the priest's house.

The Forestry control forbids the keeping of goats.

4. THE FARMING CALENDAR

221 Late April, early May.—Prepare soil, sow maize and potatoes, harrow hayfields.

Early May.—Sheep and some cattle and pigs go up to the high pastures.

Late May.—Peasants shear sheep on high pastures.

Early June.—Weeding and first hilling-up of maize by work with a hoe when plants are 15-20 cm. high.

Late June.—Second weeding and hilling-up of maize. General tidying-up before hay harvest.

Early July.—First cut of hay in the lower lands.

July, August and first three weeks of September.—Hay harvest. Peasants make temporary shelters when harvesting in remote spots. Hay on hills mostly stacked near the shelters used for sheep during part of the winter. Beside this is a hut for the man in charge.

September 25-October 10th.—Maize harvest.

Third week of October.—Potatoes lifted.

October.—Stock brought down from high pastures and sorted out among owners by means of earmarks.

October until first serious snow.—Sheep may be kept in remote pastures that have not been much used or reaped.

Thence until May.—Some sheep on lower hills near shelters with hay (see above, July, August). Some sheep folded on lowland fields to fertilise them. No artificial manure. Hay used as fodder. Lambing on lowland fields near homesteads.

241 PAID AGRICULTURAL labour is very rare; the work of the farm is done entirely by the peasant and his family, including women. Modern machinery is still almost unknown, so that agricultural practice is rather that of the garden than that of the field in our Western sense.

PLOUGHING IS done with a wooden plough tipped with iron and ox drawn. Sowing is done largely by hand, while intermediate operations, such as hilling the maize, are done with a hoe of the form illustrated on page 59. Harvesting, if not done by "pulling" (e.g. flax), or picking (e.g. fruit), is done by means of a sickle (maize) or scythe (hay).

[242] AMONG SOME farmers some idea of rotation of crops is understood, but only very imperfectly; in many cases it is not practised at all, the same plot of land being used for maize year after year.

ARTIFICIAL FERTILIZERS are seldom used, peasants depending for renewal of fertility upon animal manure and ploughing in and burning the stubble. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the yield is low and crops poor in quality.

[22] SOWING BEGINS at the end of April or the beginning of May (oats) and continues until the middle of June. Harvesting begins as soon after July 20th as possible and continues until the end of October, when the last of the maize is gathered.

231 ANIMALS PLAY an important part in the agricultural economy of the Rumanian peasant. Every holding possesses sheep, particularly milking ewes, milking cows, draught oxen, perhaps a horse or horses, pigs, together with geese and fowls. Few holdings are without one or two hives of bees. Occasionally on a very small holding (less than one hectare) milking cows are replaced by goats. During the summer (from the beginning of May until the end of August) the sheep and such cattle as are not needed at the farm for draught or milking purposes are sent up to the high pastures. Pigs are sometimes sent up with them, but not goats. During this time the animals left are either fed on fodder crops at the farm or are sent out daily to pasture on a portion of the hay meadows set aside for that purpose. On being brought down from the mountains the animals are pastured for a short time on the hay meadows from which the crop has already been taken. They are then brought back to their

231 owner's farm, where the cows are kept in sheds, and the sheep, which are more hardy, are penned on the arable land, particularly on the maize stubble. Both sheep and cattle are fed on fodder crops during the winter. The surplus animals are sold at the autumn fair, and form a source of revenue.

176 WHILST ON the high pastures the sheep are clipped twice, 369 and the wool is divided amongst the peasants in proportion [234] to the number of animals sent up. The cheese is usually shared by the owners of the animals in the same way, the mayor and his committee being responsible for the correct apportionment. In the Valley of the Argeş co-operative dealers from Bucharest frequently buy the cheese "in bulk" direct from the commune, and the monetary value is shared between the owners of the animals.

231 OXEN ARE used almost exclusively for draught purposes, the numbers kept in this district being somewhat in excess of the farmers' requirements, owing to their use for lumbering (see below).

241 PEASANT FARMING in the Valley of the Argeş is no longer [369] entirely on a subsistence basis. Two factors have tended to [438] modify it. Firstly, the position of the valley, opening as it does directly on the Wallachian Plain, with its rich grain lands and containing the capital Bucharest, has allowed commercial intercourse to develop. The Argeş peasant no longer cultivates wheat; he does not mind if his maize crop is good enough for fodder only, for he can buy both wheat and maize from the plain. Further, he finds a ready market and so a money income in Bucharest for his surplus fruit, 313 particularly apples, and cheese. Secondly, the forests form a valuable asset to the peasant. During the winter felling takes place in the upper basin of the Argeş; in spring and summer the timber is transported, and work in the State mill in Curtea goes on all the year round. Practically every household has somebody working in the timber trade, and the money so earned (as much as 100 lei per day for a man supplying his own yoke of oxen) reduces the dependence of the family on the farm.

874 AT CURTEA DE ARGEŞ is the School of Agriculture, Regina 242 Elizabeta. Although only a small percentage of its pupils is local, it is gradually influencing the farming of the neighbourhood. Experiments in cultivation, plant breeding and

the use of machinery are carried on at the school. Advisers are sent out to the farms, and seeds and plants, as well as artificial manure, are supplied to the peasants at a very low cost. Machinery is also loaned out cheaply. The average peasant, however, is very conservative, and progress is slow.

SOME DETAILS OF TWO FARMS: AUGUST 1936

FARM A

SIZE: one half-hectare approximately. This farm is situated approximately two miles north of Curtea de Argeş.

THE HOLDING consists of a narrow rectangular strip, bounded on one of its long sides by a rough lane and on its short side by the main road. The ground is fairly level and sufficiently above the river to be well drained. (See Plan A for utilization of land and arrangement of buildings.)

Animals

2 milking cows, 2 calves (at farm), but no oxen (this was unusual).
10 sheep, away on high pastures.
3 pigs, at farm.
10 geese, 6 ducks, 50 hens.

FARM B

SIZE: Five hectares approximately. This farm is situated at Corbeni, several kilometres north of Curtea de Argeş, at a point where the river valley widens out and the river braids. The farm is situated on the second terrace. The plot is rectangular, with its narrow side bordered by the road and its long side running parallel to the river, thus giving a well-drained but flat holding. The son of the owner holds a diploma for agriculture and the farm shows every evidence of prosperity. See PLAN B for utilization of land and arrangement of buildings.

231

Animals

5 milking cows, 2 at farm, 3 with calves away on the high pastures.
2 draught oxen.
2 bulls.
100 sheep, away on high pastures.
2 horses.
3 pigs.
30 goats at farm.
Large number of poultry (fowls and geese) impossible to estimate.
2 hives of bees in flower garden.

221

AGRICULTURAL CALENDAR

April.	Preparation of ground, sowing of oats and vetch. Sheep go up to low hill pastures.
May.	Sowing of maize, potatoes, beans. May 1st, sheep go to high pastures.
June.	Sowing of fodder crops; all sowing finished by middle of month.
July.	Early part of month, first cutting of hay, making and collecting. July 20th, beginning of harvest, i.e. flax, cherries, oats and barley.
August.	Middle of month, second cutting of hay, oat harvest, plum harvest, followed by apple and walnut harvest. Harvesting and retting of hemp. Some ploughing of grain stubble. August 31st, sheep return from high pastures to low hill pastures.
September.	Beginning of maize harvest, sheep penned on maize stubble as soon as possible.
October.	End of maize harvest according to season.
November to March.	Sheep penned on maize fields, cattle kept in sheds and fed on hay and fodder crops.

A. R. B.

412

Mould for hay fork

RUMANIA

243 The following were the average prices of the principal cereals at the port of Constantsa per ton during the years 1928–1931, according to the bulletin of the Constantsa Chamber of Commerce:

		1928	1929	1930	1931
Barley	...	5,900	4,580	2,430	1,600
Oats	...	3,400	2,440	1,800	1,520
Maize	...	5,280	4,010	2,600	1,800
Wheat	...	5,280	4,010	2,600	2,550

241 433 If it be remembered that the value of the agricultural production of Rumania constitutes about 60 to 65 per cent of the whole national revenue, it is easy to realize what a terrible strain such a sudden and brusque diminution in the resources of the country is likely to throw on the entire structure of its economic and social life. For the period of 1926–28 the national revenue was computed at 171 milliard lei, of which 110 milliards were derived from agriculture. According to the *Argus* of February 13th, 1932, this last figure for 1931 had declined to 46.5 milliards.

245 Among the 613,614 hectares occupied by orchards and vineyards, some 209,321 hectares are planted with plum trees which yield an annual average crop of about 5 million quintals of fruit, the yields for the years 1928–30 being respectively 28, 9.5, and 14.6 quintals per hectare. The vine is also very extensively cultivated, 239,825 hectares being planted with it. In 1930 the amount of wine obtained from the grapes grown attained about 8,385,374 hectoliters, about half of which was produced in Bessarabia.

241 231 The position of the livestock population in a country of small farmsteads like Rumania is liable to exert a great influence on agriculture, for not only are horses and horned cattle used as draught animals, but their manure is the only kind of fertiliser applied to the fields, so that the gradual reconstitution of the livestock situation after the serious damages inflicted on it during the war is a reassuring sign. The recovery would have been much more rapid if the export taxes on cattle and meat had not discouraged the cattle breeders by unduly restraining exports. The following

figures show the livestock population during the pre-war 241
period and for the years 1926 and 1930: 231

Livestock.	Pre-war figures for all regions forming part of present-day Rumania.	1926.	1930.
Horses and donkeys ...	2,678,000	1,890,000	1,818,560
Horned cattle ...	6,760,000	4,992,000	4,011,141
Sheep and goats ...	15,250,000	14,059,000	12,273,347
Pigs	4,634,000	3,168,000	2,322,971

BANKING

The meagre capital resources of Rumania proved inade- 453
quate to the task allotted to them after the war and the general dislocation it had caused. Banks were called upon to finance the reparation of the damage suffered in the territories of the old kingdom, to advance moneys to the rural population which had just been endowed with land, and to furnish capital for the execution of the policy of industrialization to which the country had committed itself. The banks were subjected to a heavy strain, but owing to the financial assistance they received from foreign banking firms this was somewhat relieved. Unfortunately, very often less circumspection than the situation called for was shown in the granting of credits, for in many cases other considerations than those obtaining in Western countries prevailed, and as a result several banking firms were put in jeopardy through immobilization of too great a share of their assets in industrial undertakings.

The report of the experts on the liquidation of the Bank Dacia, of Iassi, published in the *Argus* on June 17th, 1931, is sufficiently enlightening on the subject. This bank, the total capital of which was only 20 million lei, had invested 70 millions in industrial enterprises, and the managers were blamed for not having asked for the winding-up of the bank when they no longer disposed of even one-third of the capital, as was stipulated in the statutes.

According to official statistics, at the end of 1929 there were in existence 1,097 banks, with a paid-up capital of 11,180 million lei. The great majority, however, were very small concerns which hardly deserve the preten-

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

241 ploughing was very superficial. Apart from a few small regions the whole of Greater Rumania's agri-
433 culture was extensive and not intensive. That is, crops were harvested year after year without regard to the soil and without any attempt to preserve its fertility. This is one of the reasons for the fact that in spite of much higher soil fertility the average yield per acre in Greater Rumania was far below that in Great Britain.[1]

In addition to the growing of grains and potatoes, the production of industrial crops was begun in the nineteen-thirties and has since made considerable progress, especially that of oil-seeds, flax, cotton, soya beans and sugar-beet. The development of fodder production has made little progress, owing to a decrease in livestock.

231 LIVESTOCK. Rumanian livestock, especially horses, were well known and eagerly bought during the last
483 century. The country was famous for its hardy and fast geldings and exported many horses to Germany, Denmark and Austria-Hungary. From 1886 onwards, when Hungary closed her frontiers to the import of Rumanian livestock, there began a rapid

[1] Average yield in cwt. per acre in the year 1937–8:

	Rumania	Gt Britain	Germany	Greece
Wheat	9·8	16·0	18·0	8·2
Barley	5·1	13·2	17·0	9·0
Oats	5·2	16·3	26·0	7·9
Rye	8·2	13·3	13·3	7·9
Maize	7·5	—	—	10·1
Potatoes	43·0	121·0	152·0	68·0
Flax	3·1	12·0	5·0	—

(From the Statistical Records of the League of Nations.)

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

decline which during the Great War assumed very 231 serious proportions. Within a short period the Old 433 Kingdom lost more than half of its total livestock. These losses were only partly made good by the acquisition of the New Territories.

In 1921 Greater Rumania had about 1,700,000 horses of which more than half were in the New Territories. There are two main races, both much smaller and lighter and more short-lived than the heavy type of English cart-horse. The horse of the plains, similar to and often crossed with the Hungarian horse, is found in Muntenia and in the western provinces, the Russian horse in Bessarabia and in the Bukovina. The mountain horse is small and tough and is chiefly used for the carrying of loads.

Cattle breeding has been one of the weakest points of Rumanian agriculture for some time. Although Greater Rumania by the acquisition of territories from Hungary and Austria obtained some high-class cattle, there was on the whole a decline both in quality and in quantity.[1] The decline in quality is due to the widespread use of cows as draught-animals and to inbreeding. The import of good foreign stock has been on an insufficient scale to improve this position, although some regions in Transylvania and the Banat have been able to maintain their good stock. The decline in numbers is due to the increase of meat exports and the absence of any planned breeding policy. The consumption [262] of both milk and meat amongst the peasants is extremely low.

[1] 1921: 5,700,000; 1932: 4,400,000. It is safe to assume that this downward trend continued.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

•231 For the majority of Rumania's peasants the most
433 valuable of all animals are his sheep, of which Greater Rumania possessed about 12,000,000. Both the wool and the meat of Rumanian sheep are, however, of a lower quality than those of Great Britain or New Zealand. Sheep's milk, and the cheese made from it, supplement the monotonous diet of the peasant.

[439] Of the 3,000,000 pigs in Greater Rumania most were kept in the New Territories and a large proportion of the country's pork production was exported. Apart from the Rumanian Mangalita, English Berkshires were bred in great numbers.

241 Considered as a whole the agriculture of Greater Rumania, favoured by good climatic conditions and great soil fertility, remained undeveloped owing to the general economic conditions. The peasantry did not possess the necessary implements, buildings or animals which could have secured profitable ex-
[452] ploitation of the soil. Financial help was difficult to obtain, and the loans that were granted were ruinous to the peasant, owing to the high rate of interest.
[453] Co-operatives were few. Some agricultural banks and associations confined to the German colonists in the Banat and in Transylvania were the only ones
[435] which succeeded. Agricultural prices were low and the peasant was often forced to sell his produce before the harvest to export trusts which dominated
[654] the market. The only assistance given by the government consisted in loans and seeds at reduced prices for the growing of certain crops, such as soya beans, for export in order to fulfil international trade
[439] agreements. During the last fifteen years Germany secured an ever greater influence upon Rumania's agriculture and took most of its exports.

241 The basis of Rumanian economy is agriculture, in that some 80 per cent. of the population derive their livelihood from the land and agriculture provides a high proportion of the national income. [315] During recent years, however, the expansion of the oil industry has meant that agricultural produce [439] has played a decreasing part in the country's exports, having been superseded by oil, exports of which amounted to 43 per cent. of the total export trade in 1938, compared with 19 per cent. in 1927; while grain exports in 1938 represented 23 per cent. compared with 46 per cent. in 1927.

In spite of the importance of agriculture to national prosperity farming methods are backward and per acre crop yields are among the lowest in Europe. Attention is particularly given to growing cereals, and of these maize is the chief, providing a large surplus for export (apart from [231] the war years). Livestock density is low, which is one of the weaknesses of Rumanian agriculture, the Banat being the only district in which numbers are fairly high, and farming approaches the [439] intensive system. It must be stressed that the relatively large export surplus, which consists of wheat, maize, barley, oilseeds and pulses, livestock, oilcake, etc., is only made possible by the very low nutritional level which prevails, and [146] that if this were raised to anything like western European standards exports would be commensurately reduced.

248 Since the war more attention has been paid to
249 the growth of industrial crops such as sunflower, soya, cotton, hemp and flax, and the cultivation of rubber-bearing plants has been started following the finding of the *Kok Saghys* plant left by the Russians in Bessarabia. Though some success has been achieved in increasing the areas under textile fibres, and yields have been slightly higher, the hoped for increases in soya and sunflower cultivation have not been achieved due to unfavourable weather conditions and to general wartime dislocation.

313 Rumania's forest resources, though extensive, have suffered severely from a consistent policy of over-exploitation, and, while providing the basis of a fairly important industry during the period between the two wars, have been so depleted that cutting will have to be very restricted for a number of years if they are to be allowed to recover. The loss of Northern Transylvania has affected the timber industry in particular, as a high proportion of the forest resources were located there, and in that district this industry was better developed than elsewhere in the country.

IMPORTANCE OF OIL

315 Oil plays a major part, not only in Rumania's foreign trade, but also in covering her domestic fuel requirements, to a large extent replacing coal, reserves of which are small and of low quality. Since the war and the resulting pressure which Germany has exerted to obtain increased quantities of oil for her armies, (combined with the consistent drop in the rate of production between 1936 and 1941), serious attempts have been made to find alternative sources of fuel. The enormous reserves of natural gas existing in Transylvania, which were exploited only very slightly before the war, are being used increasingly as a source of fuel to supply local industries, and a

241 peasant views with suspicion and often hostility all attempts at improvements in traditional [474] methods. Even the co-operative societies have made less progress than in other Danubian countries. There is need for considerable capital expenditure in grouping small farms into larger units, in providing better buildings, more implements and fertilisers. There is need for diversification of production—more fodder crops and more animal husbandry. Above all, there is need for development in industry and commerce to provide work for the surplus agricultural population.

2. Natural Conditions and Regions

132 The climate is of the extreme Continental type, with long hot summers and severe winters. Precipitation is largely concentrated in winter and early summer. During the greater part of the growing and ripening season rains are light, and from time to time serious droughts occur which may ruin the grain crops.

133 The agricultural regions correspond to the natural divisions into plain and hill country—the 311 Danube plain and Bessarabia which comprise the greater part of the territory and produce the bulk of the crops, and the hilly and mountainous land of Transylvania and the Bucovina.

The plain is well-suited for agriculture, the soil over much of it being of the fertile *chernozem* or [134] black earth type, but the backward methods of farming and the light rainfall keep yields per acre low.

This region is not equally backward in all parts. The Rumanian Banat at the western end of the country, and formerly part of Hungary, is more prosperous and progressive. The population is [162] not purely Rumanian but includes Swabians and Saxons, descendants of the German stock systematically settled there on medium-sized peasant holdings in the eighteenth century after the cession of the territory to Austria by the Turks. Methods and yields, by Rumanian standards, are good. [231] The livestock density is higher than the average and the area produces a substantial surplus of pigs. Rural overcrowding is not as marked as elsewhere.

241 Conditions of life and methods of farming are considerably worse in the plain land of the Old 133 Kingdom. Agriculture here is as primitive as in any part of Eastern Europe, depending on an unbroken alternation of wheat and maize cultivation with little subsidiary production. Some wheat is marketed, but the maize is grown largely [311] for consumption on the farms. So little land is available per head of population that the farm population and working animals (which eat the maize stalks) can be fed only by devoting an excessive acreage to maize.

Bessarabia makes up the remainder of the plain land; conditions of settlement and farming methods are much the same as in the Old Kingdom, but the density of population is lower and there are substantial grain exports.

Given normal yields, every district of the plain area is at least self-sufficient in foodstuffs; indeed parts of it regularly produce large grain surpluses. Transitional areas between the Danube Valley and the Transylvanian plateau, such as the Carpatho-Moldavia and Carpatho-Muntenia areas, may,

[6c]

241

*Production of Principal Crops**
Average 1935-38
('000 metric tons)

Wheat ...	3,077
Rye	430
Barley	1,071
Oats	604
Maize	5,215
Potatoes ..	2,010
Sugar beet† ..	570
Peas	45
Beans	230
Tobacco ..	12
Sunflower seed	177
Soya beans ..	42
Rape seed ..	48

* Pre 1939 frontiers.
† This produced 110,000 m. tons of raw sugar

4. Livestock

231 One of the chief weaknesses of Rumanian agriculture is the low density of livestock. Numbers of cattle per 100 acres of farm land are less than half those of this country and Germany; about half the farms possess no cows. A large proportion of the cattle, moreover, are draught animals which require land to feed them but which yield little saleable produce. Moreover, the annual milk yield per cow averages less than 1,350 litres (300 gallons) as compared with over 700 gallons in Denmark. [234]

Of pigs, the numbers and quality compare even less favourably with those of other countries. Only in the Banat district is there an approach to an interlocking of grain production with pig-raising. Sheep are an important source of income to the peasants of the Transylvanian mountains—a region where water buffaloes are kept as draught animals since they require no sustenance other than a daily cold bath and a few maize stalks.

Livestock numbers in 1938, and the production of livestock products in 1935-38, were as follows:—

*Livestock Numbers**
'000 head

Horses	2,158
Cattle	4,161
(including cows)	(2,030)
Buffaloes ..	165
Sheep	12,768
Goats	399
Pigs	3,165
Poultry	34,600

* Pre-1939 frontiers.

*Production of Livestock Products**
Average 1935-38
('000 metric tons)

[234]

Milk‡	3,000
Butter	20
Cheese	30
Beef and veal ..	120
Mutton and lamb	20
Pork	152
Poultry meat ..	60

* Pre-1939 frontiers.
‡ Cows, buffaloes, sheep and goats.

5. Fish

228 All fishing along the Danube, including the mouths of the delta, and along the western shores of the Black Sea coast, is controlled by the State Fisheries Administration. The total annual catch in State-owned waters averaged 15,000 tons in the years immediately preceding the war, of which fresh-water fish contributed more than two-thirds. This does not, however, represent the total catch, as fairly large quantities were caught [656]

[76]

241 654 Alongside this organisation the State ran certain technical services for agriculture, distribution of tested seeds, control of weights and measures, provision of bull and stallion services from its own stud farms. This work, however, remained less developed than in other S.E. European countries.

8. Agricultural Exports

241 231 439 Rumania was the largest grain exporter in Europe. By value, grain accounted for over half the total of agricultural exports. Livestock products, mainly live pigs and cattle, amounted to approximately one-fifth of the total, the remainder consisting of peas, beans, oilseeds, oil and oilcake, eggs and small quantities of fruit. Quantities exported on the average in the years 1935 to 1938 are shown below :—

	*Exports of Principal Agricultural Commodities** *Average 1935-38* ('000 *metric tons*)
Wheat	686
Maize	543
Barley	297
Peas	21
Beans	43
Oilseeds	108
Vegetable oils ..	5
Oilcake	103
Cattle ('000 head) ..	48
Pigs ('000 head) ..	322
Eggs	10

* Pre-1939 frontiers.

241 439 It is of interest to note that, despite German hopes of a development in oilseed cultivation and exports, no increase had been achieved up to the eve of the war. German interest had succeeded in stimulating production and exports of soya beans, but there was no expansion in total oilseed exports owing to a decline in rape seed and to an increase in domestic consumption of oil.

German purchases of Rumanian agricultural exports were increasing in recent pre-war years. In 1939 the territories of Greater Germany took 25 per cent. of the wheat exports, half the feed grain and the bulk of the oilseeds. Italy also took appreciable quantities of grain.

9. Food Consumption

146 262 The Rumanian diet is perhaps the worst-balanced in south-east Europe. The outstanding feature is its high dependence on grain, which provides three-quarters of the calories and 70 per cent. of the protein. In the towns white wheat bread is eaten except by the very poor, whilst in the country wholemeal bread or maize is usual. Over large areas, particularly in the Old Kingdom, maize forms the chief food. (Taking the country as a whole maize consumption is two-thirds higher than wheat.) During the summer months, when work is very heavy, peasant families may eat as much as 3 kg. (6½ lb.) a head daily, almost always in the form of *mámáliga* (a kind of porridge).

The rest of the rural dietary consists chiefly of beans, some potatoes (especially in Transylvania), cabbage, beetroots, carrots, onions and a certain amount of cheese and milk. Consumption of all these foods is much too low by nutritional standards. Meat is rarely eaten, except at Christmas time when a pig is killed—for the rest of the year small amounts of fat salted pork are used, more or less as a flavouring. Some fish is eaten in villages near rivers. Vegetable oils—mainly sunflower—and pig fats are used for cooking; butter is rarely eaten.

241 722 lar, for grain, oilseeds and livestock products to provide the balance of food and fodder requirements which she could not obtain from her own agriculture. The normal grain surpluses and the potential output of sunflower and other oilseeds appeared sufficiently large to provide a solid basis for these expectations. Owing, however, to wartime dislocations of economic life, to the absence of adequate administrative control of farming, to the lack of co-operation by the peasants, and, above all, to a succession of unfavourable seasons, these hopes have been almost entirely falsified.

Firstly, in 1940, Rumania lost Bessarabia, her principal surplus region, to the U.S.S.R., and with it all that year's crops. When she regained it in 1941 she obtained no surplus out of that harvest, and, because of disorganisation, little in 1942. In rump Rumania, in 1940 and 1941, the grain harvests were substantially below the average owing to reduced sowings (partly caused by mobilisation) and to disappointing yields. A determined effort was made by propaganda and the release of labour to bring sowings back to normal for the 1942 season. But the early onset of an unusually severe winter again reduced the sowings, while a serious drought in the summer of 1942 reduced the yields.

722 [243] There was a deficiency in wheat sowings of over a million hectares, while grain yields were barely 60 per cent. of the average. The out-turn of the year was consequently worse than that of the two preceding years. Wheat and rye yielded only 1·3 million tons compared with an average for the territory of 3·6 million tons. The maize crop was a little less than 3 million tons compared with an average of 4·7 million tons. The total grain production was about 5·5 million tons, a quantity inadequate to meet the requirements of food and fodder at any approach to normal levels.

[247] Other crops were more successful in 1942, but they could not appreciably offset the disastrous grain results. The potato crop reached an average level for the first time during the war years, and part of it was used to stretch the deficient wheat for bread making. There was also a good crop of beans and peas, largely because, as their prices were not controlled, they were very remunerative crops. The sunflower crop, though sowings failed to reach the ambitious target and yields were only 90 per cent. of normal, was of record dimensions. Soya, rape and sugar beet declined, however, from earlier levels. (A significant supplementary supply of sugar is now being obtained from Transnistria.)

[231] These for the most part poor crop results, besides curtailing the supplies available for human consumption and exports, also brought about a reduction in livestock numbers at the end of 1942. Livestock numbers may, however, have increased somewhat in 1940 and 1941, for it was reported that peasants held back more grain than usual in those years for livestock feeding. If this is true, numbers would now probably be little different from those of pre-war years.

[241] Crop prospects for 1943 point to a more normal result. The winter of 1942-43 was late and mild, making it possible to sow a near-average acreage of winter crops. Preparatory work for spring sowings was also done in good time, and on the whole the weather subsequently has not been unfavourable.

722 249 Tobacco cultivation appears to have declined in the war years, principally because the prices were even more unattractive than those of grain. In 1942 the area sown was reported to be little

CHAPTER VI

248 sack and rope requirements; and a hemp and flax office has been established with a capital of 20 million lei and a credit of 500 million to distribute seed and manure, and to rent and finance retting and scutching plants. This office, which is the only purchaser of these fibres, is to make no profits, and prices are to be fixed. Fifteen up-to-date plants are to be erected in 1943 in the hemp-growing areas.

[439] Although Rumania normally had little or no export balance, Germany in 1942 demanded 15,000 tons of the 20,000 tons available. How much of this was actually delivered is not known, but the shortage of hemp and other fibres has led to amazing competition between the various industries for the remaining supplies, and a hemp rope and sack factory is to be built at Chișinău [288] in Bessarabia, where the shortage of these goods is particularly acute.

4. Flax

Flax appears to be the only crop grown on a smaller area in 1943 than in 1941 and 1942, when 20,000 ha. (49,400 acres) were planted, as compared with 15,000 ha. (37,000 acres) in 1938 and 12,000 ha. (29,600 acres) in 1939. Preference, apparently, is to be given to hemp. The pre-war output was about 10,000 tons, but no reliable figures are available since 1939. Normally, there was no appreciable export of flax, but as with other fibres, the Germans appear to have been persistent in their demands. The Rumanian company, Fuiorul Cotonese, in which German capital participates, is to build flax-retting tanks at Cereteni (in the district of Dolj) and Zimnicea (in the district of Teleorman).

5. Rayon and Staple Fibre

288 There were two plants erected before the war, the "Apretura" at Popești-Leordeni and the Viscosa Românescă at Lupeni, the combined daily capacity of which was 12 tons of rayon and 6 tons of staple fibre. (Approximately 4,200 tons rayon and 2,100 tons of staple fibre annually.) There has been but little expansion since, and the present annual production is estimated at 4,400 tons rayon and 2,600 tons staple fibre. Imports [439] from Italy have been 450 tons in 1940, and 2,500 in 1941. Germany promised substantial quantities, but it is doubtful whether they fully materialised. Applications for permission to erect a new pulp mill have been made by both German and Italian interests, but it seems that the Germans objected to Snia Viscosa's being granted a concession and obtained it themselves later.

6. Silk

231 Although Rumania is within the orbit of the silk belt, output is small, reaching a maximum of 20 tons of cocoons in pre-war years, and 35 tons of reeled silk were imported, principally from Italy. Silkworm breeding is located in the Banat, and in common with the drive for increased silk production in German Europe, Rumania has made efforts to increase silkworm breeding.

288 In 1937 about 5,000 workers were engaged in silk weaving (probably including artificial silk); this number was increased to 7,336 in 1941. It is reported that the cocoon crop is now delivered to the Air and Marine Ministries, presumably for making cartridge bags, etc.

7. Other Fibres

248 Raw jute imports averaged about 5,500 tons annually before the war, and in addition there 439 were smaller imports of jute cloth and bags

113	Yugoslavia EF1
231	Albania EG1
233	Rumania ED1
235	Bulgaria EE1
	Slovenes EF7

/For information on the types of shelter provided for domesticated animals (including cattle), see scattered references in 17: Thurnher, EF6 Serbs file, category 116./

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

142
291

PLATE IV

Our shepherd guide down mountain side to Paltinis, on journey from Borsec to Vatra Dornei. He was milking sheep at a "stâna."

Photo: H. J. Sward.

233



A mountain shepherd boy playing his wooden pipe near "stâna"—seen on journey to Paltinis.

Photo: H. J. Sward

[Facing page 25]

137 *sitifolia*, *S. aizoides*, *S. aizoon*, *Erysimum Witmanni*, *Phyteuma orbiculare*, *Silene Zawadskii*, *Onobrychis montana var. transilvanica*, *Cerastium alpinum*, *C. lanatum*, *Oxytropus campestris*, *Alsine gerardi*, *Campanula alpina*, *C. carpatica*, *Alyssum repens* (endemic), *Rhinanthus alpinus*, *Rhodiola rosea*, *Sedum atratum*. In the cracks in the rocks where moisture collected were noted *Pinguicula alpina*, *P. vulgaris*, *Saxifraga aizoides*, *S. androsacea*, *Viola biflora*, *Arabis alpina*, *Achillea Schurii*, *Biscutella laevigata*, and *Androsace lactea*.

It was obvious that to make a detailed study of this interesting mountain with its forest, plateau, gullies, scree slopes, etc., and other varying ecological factors, a much longer time would have been necessary than was possible under the conditions of our visit to the country.

The Walk by Way of Bilbor, Paltiniş, Vatra Dornei, etc., and down the Bistrita River by Timber Raft to Broşteni (Brosceni).

133 This interesting excursion was made by a number of the
233 party, and afforded a very good opportunity of seeing the country as some fifty miles were covered on foot in two days. We passed over fine slopes and through delightful valleys with their meadows bedecked with many species of flowering plants. There was time during such a walk only to notice the most salient features of the vegetation. We, however, saw hillsides where sheep were grazed quite to the top, also
[342] a mountain dairy where they were being milked. The temporary shelters for those cropping the hay in the valleys at some distance from their usual habitations were interesting, and the whole family appeared to sleep there and cook their meals till the area had been cleared.

531 During our stay at Vatra Dornei, through the kindness of
346 the mayor and the prefect of the district, we were taken by car over a mountain pass down to Campulung and from thence to the wonderful walled monastery of Moldoviţa (Moldawitza) with fine sixteenth-century frescoes covering
313 its walls. The chief point of interest from a vegetation point of view was the fine spruce forests which we saw and in which felling was in progress, the logs being pushed down the mountain side to timber carts at the bottom. The next day we had evidence of the importance of the lumbering industry

233 221 TRANSHUMANCE has long played a prominent part in the pastoral life of the Carpathians, for agriculturally the region is marginal and it is not very unusual for the maize crop, which covers an astonishingly large proportion of the arable land, to fail to mature. Before the late war the flocks of the eastern Carpathians used to winter in the plains of Moldavia, Bessarabia, the Dobrogea and south Russia, more rarely in Transylvania. During the nineteenth century, however, many Roumanian shepherds stayed in the plain and formed the nuclei of small permanent Roumanian colonies outside the boundaries of Transylvania.

423 311 DURING the last few centuries there have been considerable changes in schemes of land holding. In the late eighteenth century the scattered possessions of the landlord class were consolidated into Latifundia. In the first half of the nineteenth century arable farming was extended into the Danubian plain and on the rich lands between Siret and Prut—in areas, that is to say, which had not been previously cultivated. This development progressed with the rise of an export trade in cereals to feed the industrial populations of the west. It is interesting to note that much of this newly-developed territory in Wallachia was organised on the system of métayage, the new colonists from the hills becoming tenants on a produce-sharing basis.

IN CONNECTION with this development, many of the Roumanian transhumant herdsmen gave up their pastoral life and settled as agriculturists or went into commerce. After 1918 the large estates were broken up and plots of land were given to the peasantry. This was the occasion for the return to Transylvania of some of the former emigrants who had gone to Wallachia and Moldavia, but naturally many features of the old life have disappeared, e.g. the July fairs that were formerly held high up in the mountains and did much to preserve the cultural heritage of the pastoral people.

[221] BUT, if large-scale seasonal migrations over long distances have declined, the short distance movements still play a vital part in the rural economy of the eastern Carpathians and fortunately have not as yet been divested of all their old-time ritual.

221 233 [342] SCATTERED over the commune are eight "stâne" or temporary summer settlements which are all situated between 400 and 800 metres above the village. The stâna itself is a simple affair, consisting of a log hut which affords living accommodation for the shepherds and acts as a dairy and store-house, together with the folds into which the animals are driven for milking. The one illustrated had a population of three men and two boys, all Roumanians, 350 sheep and 20 cows, as well as a few pigs, the only animals left in the village being the one or two milch cows retained at each farm for family needs and the draught animals (see Plate XIII).

234 221 THE change from winter to spring takes place very rapidly during the second fortnight of April, and the ascent to the dairies is made at the end of that month or early in May. Before the animals are taken up the milk yield of the cows is tested in order to determine the apportionment of the cheese made therefrom, but the ewes' milk cheese is distributed on the basis of the number of sheep belonging to each peasant. Shortly after the ascent the village priest performs the ceremony of blessing each stâna in turn, and before the end of May the sheep are sheared by peasants who go up specially for the purpose, the wool being brought down to the village on horseback.

233 221 476 SINCE the summer pastures are communal property their administration is in the hands of an assembly of heads of families which assesses the rent to be paid for the season—generally 12-15 lei for a sheep and 50 lei for a cow. The money thus received forms a fund from which the shepherds are paid for their services. Each peasant makes personal arrangements with the senior shepherd as to the amount of cheese he will require for household purposes, any surplus going into a common stock which is marketed at the end of the season. Any disputes that arise are settled by arbitration in the presence of the mayor when the shepherds return to the village. This takes place during the latter part of October, the descent of each group being celebrated by minor festivities at which the shepherds are the guests of honour. The general feast held when all are down marks the official end of the season's activities.

221 476 UPON their return to the village the cows are immediately stabled, but each peasant splits up his sheep into two groups,

233
231 the main flock being taken direct to the sheds on the foothills where they are fed on the hay gathered during the summer, whereas the remainder are grazed on the maize stubble until about Christmas. By then the weather becomes rather severe, and although sheep are better able than cows to withstand the rigours of a continental winter they are all kept in sheds during the early months of the year.

SURPLUS ANIMALS are disposed of at the autumn fairs at Tulgheş or Topliţa where they are bought up by dealers for conveyance to Italy or Czechoslovakia.

III. OTHER OCCUPATIONS

TEXTILES.

291 THE OUTSTANDING FEATURE of the Carpathian villages is the
286 remarkably high standard of peasant craftsmanship. The degree of artistic expression revealed in their clothing is particularly striking, and although best seen on festive occasions it is scarcely less noticeable in their ordinary working garb. Wool, flax and hemp are the traditional fibres used, but imported cotton yarn is beginning to displace linen for some of the lighter summer garments. Most of the dyestuffs are obtained from local plants, for example, red
[384] from the leaves of the wild crab apple, yellow from the osier, black from the alder or birch and fawn from the walnut, but imported dyes are beginning to be employed. The mordant used is salt, but colours other than black fix themselves in wool without salt treatment.

462 SPINNING with a distaff is the normal occupation of the women in their leisure time during the summer, very little knitting being done at all. The other processes of combing, weaving and dyeing are also undertaken by the women, as is the embroidering of dresses and household linen, but the embroidering of the sheepskin waistcoats which are worn by both sexes is done by one or two men who specialise in this craft (see Plate XV).

LEATHER.

295 ALTHOUGH still made in the village, the old type of laced shoe with its characteristically pointed toe is being displaced

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1-39 EDI Rumania EDI

FARMING AROUND CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

AMY R. BURGESS

133 IN THE region of Curtea de Argeş the river flows in a valley of varying width, floored with fine sandy alluvium and bounded by somewhat rounded hills. Some traces of river terraces are discernible.

THE LAND of this region can be divided into four categories: (*a*) arable, (*b*) hay meadows, (*c*) forest, (*d*) high mountain pasture. The arable land is principally on the first terrace, but stretches both down the slope to the valley bottom and up the slope to the second terrace. The hay meadows are above the arable land, spreading upwards towards the [137] forest. The forests comprise 75 per cent of the total area, and consist mainly of timber trees, such as beech and pine, together with a considerable number of walnut trees. The high pastures are above the forest belt and may be as much as fifty kilometres away from the village centre of the commune to which they belong.

423 THE ARABLE land is owned by the peasants, holdings ranging from less than one hectare to fifty hectares, the majority being from two to five hectares. The smallness of the holding [428] is due partly to the laws of inheritance, by which the land is divided between the children on the death of the owner, and partly to the fact that the district is so hilly that only small areas are available for cultivation.

241 476 THE HAY meadows belong to the commune and are both worked and used collectively by the peasants, all necessary organization being in the hands of the mayor and committee.

471 [313] THE FORESTS are largely state-owned, although some portions belong to the commune, in which case the peasants are allowed to cut for their own personal use (house-building, implements, etc.), but not for profit.

[233] THE HIGH pastures belong to the commune; the peasants pay a small fee to the commune for their use (20 lei per head per season for sheep, rather more for cattle).

132 AN IMPORTANT climatic feature affecting agriculture is the shortness of the summer, late spring and early autumn frosts

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

TRANSHUMANCE IN THE SOUTHERN CARPATHIANS

233 221 IN THE SOUTHERN CARPATHIANS we have a region which still retains its pastoral activities, little disturbed by the social and economic forces which have invaded the pastoralists' domain elsewhere. Few Roumanian villages are without sheep, and in the summer great numbers are taken to the high pastures when these become free of snow. This seasonal migration, or transhumance, is an ancient feature of European life, and a study of its forms and functions in Roumania not only throws light on important aspects of peasant life, but provides valuable comparative material for the study of similar movements in regions like western Britain, where transhumance survives only in a modified way.

SHEEP ARE the pivot of rural economy in these Carpathian lands; the pastoral element pervades all aspects of peasant [291] life—from the traditional costumes of woollen cloth trousers and sheepskin waistcoat to popular poetry and music. But the intimate contact with upland pastures thus ensured has been of deeper significance: it has enabled the Carpathian peoples to preserve their sense of unity when the lowlands were overrun by invaders, while the contacts maintained between summering groups have helped to preserve the Roumanian language and kept its dialectal variations within limits. In a very real sense, the Southern Carpathians are the heart of Roumania.

133 PHYSICAL CONDITIONS have, from very remote times, favoured the development and survival of pastoral life. The steepness of the forested valley slopes which isolate the upland core is in strong contrast to the gently undulating platforms which rise above the tree-line, at about 5,000 feet, and terminate in rugged glaciated *monadnocks* which may reach 8,000 feet or more (Negoiu, 2,544 m.). The prolonged erosion of Tertiary times which produced the upland platforms also provided the great masses of unconsolidated material—mostly coarse sands—which now form the extensive foothills stretching half way to the Danube over a width of some sixty miles. Curtea de Argeş is one of the settlements of this foothill belt,

133 dependent for the working out of its economy, as for its setting, upon the high Southern Carpathians.

233 133 WHILE IN some parts of Roumania all the sheep must be moved to distant highlands in summer, there are many regions which have sufficient local pasture to keep a certain proportion of stock through the year. This applies to the country around Curtea de Argeş; here the late Tertiary (Pliocene) deposits are provided with frequent terraces. The lower terraces are glacial and may be three in number; higher up the dip-slopes of the coarse sands have often been cleared of the bad forests which still cling to the scarps, while at all levels slips have occurred in the loose materials to produce small mesa-like areas, sparsely covered with grass, juniper and birch, accessible to nimble sheep and goats.* In general, however, such local pasturage is reserved for cows in milk, while young cattle and bullocks, if not required for the many activities of farming and forestry, are sent with the sheep to the high pastures.

WE MAY best examine some of the features of this transhumance by following the sheep in their movements through the year in the valley of the Argeş and its background of high mountains, the Fagaras, extending eastwards from the valley of the Olt. The commune of Corbeni, some seventeen kilometres upstream, provides us with a few figures. Here is the first widening of the Argeş Valley, for the river has left the last range of the Carpathians (1,500 m.) through which it cuts one of the great gorges which characterize this zone, and it is here entering on its braided course through the [137] Miocene and Pliocene deposits to the south. The proportion of forested land in the commune is high (75 per cent), and its 2,500 sheep can be maintained only by extensive transhumance. The summer pastures are from thirty to fifty kilometres distant, the stâne† extending from the forest's upper limit (1,500-1,600 m.) to the scarred rock faces of 471 the high core at 2,000 m. Each commune has its stână, 233 which takes its name from the mountain on which it is situated: it is the property of the commune, but there are certain payments to be made each year for the services of

*Goats tend to be kept only by the poorer peasants; they are naturally not encouraged by the Forestry authorities.

†Stână (singular). The word is applied as here to the summer pastures and also to the huts where the shepherds sleep and make the store the cheese. By extension it is sometimes used for the general economy of transhumant shepherding.

471 the shepherds and cheese-maker. These dues, amounting to
233 some 10 or 20 lei per sheep, are worked out each year by a committee which regulates the financial side of the transhumant economy.

234 EACH STÂNĂ has its baciu or cheese-maker, who is paid by
233 the commune. In some districts this scheme is varied by arrangements which must represent modifications of the
471 old economy of collective shepherding. Occasionally a large farmer may be proprietor of a stână and may possess enough sheep to run his own pasturing, in which case he may either hire a cheese-maker or fill that rôle in person. Or he may let his stână to the highest bidder, who pays in cheese obtained from the flock. From this it is a short step to the emergence of the middleman who, possessing no sheep himself, rents a pasture and guarantees to return an agreed quantity of cheese per sheep to those who send him their stock.

233 BEGINNING OUR account with the descent from the mountains,
221 we find that the uppermost pastures are abandoned by the last day of August, and the return downhill takes place during the first fortnight in September, being normally completed by September 14th (The Feast of the Cross). The sheep are driven to the local pastures until the maize crop is gathered, when they are penned on the stubble. Movement uphill begins about the middle of April and is completed by May 1st in an average year, St. George's Day (April 23rd) being a central date. Each peasant is responsible for driving his own sheep, using recognized tracks which tend to follow the watersheds. The sheep thus avoid the deep valley-crossings and can avail themselves of occasional natural clearings for temporary halts in a journey which may last a week. These are points of some importance in connection with the study of ridgeway roads generally.

342 THE SHEPHERD'S hut is a log-cabin erected on a single foundation-course of boulders. It is roofed with shingles or long planks; the gable is boarded above the level of the eaves, and a gap at the apex serves in place of chimney. Scarcely any metal is used in the construction of these summer dwellings, which serve as dairies and storehouses in addition to providing shelter and sleeping-places for the shepherds.
000 The furniture is of the simplest, but much ingenuity is

1 [for explanation see footnote 50 pp. 49, Cat. 116 -- Analyst]

352 The furniture[1] is of the simplest, but much ingenuity is displayed in contriving hinges, benches, and so on, the devices used having an air of ancient custom about them. Nearly all the woodwork could be done with the axe (see
354 p. 47). A simple crane, the probable prototype of the iron
372 hearth-crane as we know it in Britain, allows the pot to be suspended at the desired distance from the open wood fire, which burns on a rough hearth towards the centre of the stamped earth floor. A certain sanctity attaches to the fire: it is not allowed to go out, and much ceremony accompanies its lighting. The "living fire" (*focul vin*) should be prepared on arrival at the head stână[2] of the commune's pasturage, by means of two sticks rubbed together, and the operation should be performed by a pure youth, otherwise the flocks will fare badly. The fire must then be carried to the other huts. We were not able to observe this custom, but the shepherd-boy at the Stână Găujoara, situated to the north of the watershed some fifteen miles south-west of Sibiu, was persuaded to show us how the fire was lit. Here the more familiar "flint-and-steel" method was used, but in place of flint the sparks were obtained from a piece of quartz, a substitution which suggests one reason for the common ceremonial use of quartz by ancient man in Europe.

●233 In the Carpathians, as in Europe generally, there is much
462 variation in the personnel of the transhumant shepherds, but the exclusion of women in some areas is a feature for which
000 parallels cannot readily be adduced. In Norway it is the women who take the flocks to the summer pastures, an arrangement which is natural where the men are fishers. The same scheme is found in parts of the Central Plateau of France, where the men cannot be spared from their work in the fields, and the same appears to have held for the Scottish Highlands. Switzerland offers the best example of mass transhumance, and the movements formerly practised in Wales and in Ireland, though simpler and less regular, seem to have involved men, women and children. The *hafodty*, described by Welsh writers early last century, was a cowhouse with a fire at one end, but no chimney, and, except that the whole was stone-built, the assemblage of pens and shelters must have closely resembled the Roumanian. In Wales, too, ewes were milked and sheep's cheese made into the nineteenth century.

In the Carpathians, while some stâne are inhabited by

1 [In the shepherd's hut -- Analyst]
2 [For explanatory footnote see 51 pp. 49, Cat. 116 -- Analyst]

462 In the Carpathians, while some stâne are inhabited by
● 233 families of shepherds, others have men only, and purely "feminine" stâne are not unknown. There appear to be regional differences based perhaps on the varying requirements of the lowland crops, and all forms are said to be of some antiquity; it cannot be shown that the "masculine" stâne represent an older type than those where both sexes
[834] take part, or vice versa. But it is significant that in some parts there is a definite *tabu* against women, and the shepherds must have no relations with them in the prescribed season, from the arrival at the stână to July 20th (St. Eloi). In the areas we visited, while the shepherds were exclusively male, women from the villages occasionally ride up with messages or food, and may stay at the hut for a day or two.

234 On reaching the pastures, to resume, the sheep are divided
233 into separate flocks—milkers and non-milkers, lambs and wethers. Only the milkers are kept in the immediate neighbourhood of the stână, the rest being driven uphill or to the shelter of the forest's edge, according to their requirements. Two milkings are usual, about 6 o'clock morning and evening. The sheep are driven into the *strunga*, a fenced enclosure near the hut, where the shepherd-boy introduces them one by one into a narrow roofed exit at which the milkers sit. The milk is forthwith poured into a copper cauldron over which the *baciu*[2] stands at the fireside, stirring
[326] the contents with the peeled, spiked top of a spruce. The copper pot is tinned inside, this work being done by the gipsies. Into the simmering milk the *baciu* throws a pinch of rennet, and then works the curds into a thick pulp. A simple press—a canvas bag twisted with a tourniquet and weighted with a stone—next comes into use, and after three days salt is added and the cheese is finally kneaded and stored in a sheepskin which has been specially prepared by drying and scraping. This is cheese of the first quality (brânză), a poorer quality (urdă) being obtained from the whey left in the copper after taking out the curds. The urdă is often stored in small skins, e.g. rabbit, or in containers made of bark or hollowed branches. Much of the cheese in these days is bought by co-operative societies.

262 It is the duty of the *baciu*,[2] further, to prepare food for the shepherds. Onions, beans and paprika make vegetable soup, and maize-bread and cheese complete a diet which may be varied now and again with smoked mutton. Another task

1 [for explanatory footnote see pp.47, ct. 116 - - Analyst]
2 [cheese maker of the Stâna -52- Analyst]

Another task

devolving on the shepherds is the shearing, which is done twice in the summer, but they are spared the "dipping" regulations, which British shepherds find so irksome. For the rest there is much to be done to keep the flocks healthy and safe from wolves, to look after the dogs, to carry water and cut wood. In rare moments of leisure the shepherd will be found blowing his simple pipe, or singing songs, or carving a stick with his versatile knife, cutting out those ancient geometric patterns which are the common heritage of peasant Europe.

E. E. E.



A Beetle

A reaping glove

728 of requirements for sulphuric-acid production.
[135] Of lesser importance were the salt and coal deposits.

The forest resources of Northern Transylvania
[313] are estimated to have accounted for as much as 25 per cent. of pre-war timber production. Apart from timber the food and leather industries appear to have been the most developed. This
[311] area was principally made up of forests and pastures; the arable land provided no surplus after local needs had been covered. Of livestock
[233] losses the most outstanding feature was nearly 2 million sheep.

[496] The railway system, and particularly the railway administration, was severely handicapped by the change of frontiers, which in places cut one part of Rumania off from the other.

Caliacra and Durostor, the two ceded Dobrujan provinces, are mainly agricultural, and though producing a small surplus, contributed little to Rumania's total agricultural output. Of more significance is the cotton-growing area. There are no known mineral deposits, and industry in this area is on a very small scale, relying mainly on handicrafts.

TRANSNISTRIA

727 Transnistria is the name which has been given to the territory lying between the Dniester and the Bug, which was given to Rumania to administer in 1941 subsequent to its capture from the U.S.S.R. by Rumanian and German troops. Transnistria is part of the Southern Ukraine and is mainly agricultural, while such industry as existed has been of no use to the Rumanians on account of the heavy destruction carried out by the Russians. It is probably true to say that this territory has been more of a financial liability than an asset to Rumania on account of the heavy expenditure entailed in repairs, particularly of railways and bridges. Some little advantage has, however, been gained from the harvest of 1942-3.

288 31st December. There appears to be a good deal of passive resistance and hoarding.

Cotton spindles had increased from 35,600 in 1927 to 250,000 in 1938, and altogether there were 18 mills of some importance. Power looms in 1938 are believed to have amounted to about 16,000. The apparent disproportion of spindle compared with loom capacity was due to Rumania being a fairly important buyer of foreign yarns, imports being 23,000 tons in 1936, 27,000 in 1937, 14,000 in 1938 and 15,000 in 1939. About 70 per cent. of these yarns were of coarse cotton, called "peasants' yarns," for use in the handicraft industry only, and imported mainly from Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy and Great Britain.

2. Wool

236 Rumania, which had the largest wool-growing industry in S.E. Europe, was also the most important consumer. Production of raw wool in 1938 was about 20,000 tons (greasy) and imports were about 1,000 tons, and of wool yarn about 2,500 tons. On account of its coarse quality, not much more than one-third of the domestic wool clip is ordinarily used in the mechanised industry, the bulk being consumed in village handicraft. Since the war and subsequent loss of territory, the sheep population of Rumania is believed to have declined by some 25 to 30 per cent., and all imports have ceased, so that the industry is now entirely dependent upon the reduced domestic clip.

[233]

288 Rumania was never a large importer of woollen cloth, and the weaving industry was always more highly developed than the spinning. The output of cloth in 1936 and 1937 being 6,000 tons and 6,600 tons respectively. In 1938, there were 127,000 mechanised spindles and 4,300 looms, the chief mill centres, in order of importance, being at Buhusi (district of Neamţi), Braşov, Timişoara, Bacău, Bucarest and Sibiu.

655 Both the raw material and the woollen-textile
236 industry are nominally under strict Government
288 control, as by a decree in April 1942, the numbers of sheep and lambs and the quantity of shorn wool must be declared each year, and the wool itself must be surrendered to collecting centres at specified dates. As the due date for the 1942 collection had to be extended month by month up till January 10th, 1943, and all penalties abrogated, the success of the scheme appears to have been doubtful. No wool can be bought or sold except by permit of the Ministry of National Economy, and distribution to the mills is entrusted to an organisation known as "OFIL" (*Oficiul Lânei*), a company with a capital of 10 million lei, and including all firms concerned in the preparation of wool.

3. Hemp

248 In 1937 the area under hemp, which is grown chiefly in the Banat, was 50,000 ha. (123,000 acres) and the outturn 27,000 tons, most of which was consumed internally. Exact details of wartime plantings are not known, but are reported as 45,000 ha. (112,000 acres) and 32,500 ha. (80,300 acres) in 1941 and 1942, and the yield at about 21,000 and 20,000 tons respectively. For 1943, farmers have been urged to plant more hemp—the "national textile"—in order to cover clothing.

[29c]

221 SCATTERED over the commune are eight "stâne" or
233 temporary summer settlements which are all situated be-
[342] ween 400 and 800 metres above the village. The stâna itself is a simple affair, consisting of a log hut which affords living accommodation for the shepherds and acts as a dairy and store-house, together with the folds into which the animals are driven for milking. The one illustrated had a population of three men and two boys, all Roumanians, 350 sheep and 20 cows, as well as a few pigs, the only animals left in the village being the one or two milch cows retained at each farm for family needs and the draught animals (see Plate XIII).

234 THE change from winter to spring takes place very rapidly
221 during the second fortnight of April, and the ascent to the dairies is made at the end of that month or early in May. Before the animals are taken up the milk yield of the cows is tested in order to determine the apportionment of the cheese made therefrom, but the ewes' milk cheese is distributed on the basis of the number of sheep belonging to each peasant. Shortly after the ascent the village priest performs
[23] the ceremony of blessing each stâna in turn, and before the end of May the sheep are sheared by peasants who go up specially for the purpose, the wool being brought down to the village on horseback.

233 SINCE the summer pastures are communal property their
221 administration is in the hands of an assembly of heads of
476 families which assesses the rent to be paid for the season—generally 12-15 lei for a sheep and 50 lei for a cow. The money thus received forms a fund from which the shepherds are paid for their services. Each peasant makes personal arrangements with the senior shepherd as to the amount of cheese he will require for household purposes, any surplus going into a common stock which is marketed at the end of the season. Any disputes that arise are settled by arbitration in the presence of the mayor when the shepherds return to the village. This takes place during the latter part of October, the descent of each group being celebrated by minor festivities at which the shepherds are the guests of honour. The general feast held when all are down marks the official end of the season's activities.

221 UPON their return to the village the cows are immediately
476 stabled, but each peasant splits up his sheep into two groups,

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDI Rumania EDI

PLATE VIII

234

Early morning at a Stână. Time about 5-6 a.m. Milking the sheep.

Early morning at a Stână, [illegible] being released after milking.

[page 326]

231 owner's farm, where the cows are kept in sheds, and the sheep, which are more hardy, are penned on the arable land, particularly on the maize stubble. Both sheep and cattle are fed on fodder crops during the winter. The surplus animals are sold at the autumn fair, and form a source of revenue.

276 [236] [234] WHILST ON the high pastures the sheep are clipped twice, and the wool is divided amongst the peasants in proportion to the number of animals sent up. The cheese is usually shared by the owners of the animals in the same way, the mayor and his committee being responsible for the correct apportionment. In the Valley of the Argeş co-operative dealers from Bucharest frequently buy the cheese "in bulk" direct from the commune, and the monetary value is shared between the owners of the animals.

231 OXEN ARE used almost exclusively for draught purposes, the numbers kept in this district being somewhat in excess of the farmers' requirements, owing to their use for lumbering (see below).

241 [369] [438] PEASANT FARMING in the Valley of the Argeş is no longer entirely on a subsistence basis. Two factors have tended to modify it. Firstly, the position of the valley, opening as it does directly on the Wallachian Plain, with its rich grain lands and containing the capital Bucharest, has allowed commercial intercourse to develop. The Argeş peasant no longer cultivates wheat; he does not mind if his maize crop is good enough for fodder only, for he can buy both wheat and maize from the plain. Further, he finds a ready market and so a money income in Bucharest for his surplus fruit, 313 particularly apples, and cheese. Secondly, the forests form a valuable asset to the peasant. During the winter felling takes place in the upper basin of the Argeş; in spring and summer the timber is transported, and work in the State mill in Curtea goes on all the year round. Practically every household has somebody working in the timber trade, and the money so earned (as much as 100 lei per day for a man supplying his own yoke of oxen) reduces the dependence of the family on the farm.

874 242 AT CURTEA DE ARGEŞ is the School of Agriculture, Regina Elizabeta. Although only a small percentage of its pupils is local, it is gradually influencing the farming of the neighbourhood. Experiments in cultivation, plant breeding and

471 the shepherds and cheese-maker. These dues, amounting to
233 some 10 or 20 lei per sheep, are worked out each year by a committee which regulates the financial side of the transhumant economy.

234 EACH STÂNĂ has its baciu or cheese-maker, who is paid by
233 the commune. In some districts this scheme is varied by arrangements which must represent modifications of the
471 old economy of collective shepherding. Occasionally a large farmer may be proprietor of a stână and may possess enough sheep to run his own pasturing, in which case he may either hire a cheese-maker or fill that rôle in person. Or he may let his stână to the highest bidder, who pays in cheese obtained from the flock. From this it is a short step to the emergence of the middleman who, possessing no sheep himself, rents a pasture and guarantees to return an agreed quantity of cheese per sheep to those who send him their stock.

233 BEGINNING OUR account with the descent from the mountains,
221 we find that the uppermost pastures are abandoned by the last day of August, and the return downhill takes place during the first fortnight in September, being normally completed by September 14th (The Feast of the Cross). The sheep are driven to the local pastures until the maize crop is gathered, when they are penned on the stubble. Movement uphill begins about the middle of April and is completed by May 1st in an average year, St. George's Day (April 23rd) being a central date. Each peasant is responsible for driving his own sheep, using recognized tracks which tend to follow the watersheds. The sheep thus avoid the deep valley-crossings and can avail themselves of occasional natural clearings for temporary halts in a journey which may last a week. These are points of some importance in connection with the study of ridgeway roads generally.

342 THE SHEPHERD'S hut is a log-cabin erected on a single foundation-course of boulders. It is roofed with shingles or long planks; the gable is boarded above the level of the eaves, and a gap at the apex serves in place of chimney. Scarcely any metal is used in the construction of these summer dwellings, which serve as dairies and storehouses in addition to providing shelter and sleeping-places for the shepherds.
000 The furniture is of the simplest, but much ingenuity is

1 [for explanation see footnote 50 pp. 49, cat. 116 -- Analyst]

462 In the Carpathians, while some stâne are inhabited by
233 families of shepherds, others have men only, and purely "feminine" stâne are not unknown. There appear to be regional differences based perhaps on the varying requirements of the lowland crops, and all forms are said to be of some antiquity; it cannot be shown that the "masculine" stâne represent an older type than those where both sexes
[834] take part, or vice versa. But it is significant that in some parts there is a definite *tabu* against women, and the shepherds must have no relations with them in the prescribed season, from the arrival at the stână to July 20th (St. Eloi). In the areas we visited, while the shepherds were exclusively male, women from the villages occasionally ride up with messages or food, and may stay at the hut for a day or two.

● 234 On reaching the pastures, to resume, the sheep are divided
233 into separate flocks—milkers and non-milkers, lambs and wethers. Only the milkers are kept in the immediate neighbourhood of the stână, the rest being driven uphill or to the shelter of the forest's edge, according to their requirements. Two milkings are usual, about 6 o'clock morning and evening. The sheep are driven into the *strunga*, a fenced enclosure near the hut, where the shepherd-boy introduces them one by one into a narrow roofed exit at which the milkers sit. The milk is forthwith poured into a copper cauldron over which the *baciu*[2] stands at the fireside, stirring
[326] the contents with the peeled, spiked top of a spruce. The copper pot is tinned inside, this work being done by the gipsies. Into the simmering milk the *baciu* throws a pinch of rennet, and then works the curds into a thick pulp. A simple press—a canvas bag twisted with a tourniquet and weighted with a stone—next comes into use, and after three days salt is added and the cheese is finally kneaded and stored in a sheepskin which has been specially prepared by drying and scraping. This is cheese of the first quality (brânză), a poorer quality (urdă) being obtained from the whey left in the copper after taking out the curds. The urdă is often stored in small skins, e.g. rabbit, or in containers made of bark or hollowed branches. Much of the cheese in these days is bought by co-operative societies.

262 It is the duty of the *baciu*,[2] further, to prepare food for the shepherds. Onions, beans and paprika make vegetable soup, and maize-bread and cheese complete a diet which may be varied now and again with smoked mutton. Another task

1 [For explanatory footnote see pp.49, Ct. 116 -- Analyst]
2 [cheese maker of the Stâna -52- Analyst]

241

*Production of Principal Crops**
Average 1935-38
('000 metric tons)

Wheat ..	3,077
Rye	430
Barley	1,071
Oats	604
Maize	5,215
Potatoes ..	2,010
Sugar beet† ..	570
Peas	43
Beans	230
Tobacco ..	12
Sunflower seed	177
Soya beans ..	42
Rape seed ..	48

* Pre 1939 frontiers.
† This produced 110,000 m. tons of raw sugar.

4. Livestock

231 One of the chief weaknesses of Rumanian agriculture is the low density of livestock. Numbers of cattle per 100 acres of farm land are less than half those of this country and Germany; about half the farms possess no cows. A large proportion of the cattle, moreover, are draught animals which require land to feed them but which yield little saleable produce. Moreover, the annual milk yield per cow averages less than 1,350 litres (300 gallons) as compared with over 700 gallons in Denmark. [234]

Of pigs, the numbers and quality compare even less favourably with those of other countries. Only in the Banat district is there an approach to an interlocking of grain production with pig-raising. Sheep are an important source of income to the peasants of the Transylvanian mountains, a region where water buffaloes are kept as draught animals since they require no sustenance other than a daily cold bath and a few maize stalks.

Livestock numbers in 1938, and the production of livestock products in 1935-38, were as follows :—

*Livestock Numbers**
'000 head

Horses	2,158
Cattle	4,161
(including cows)	(2,030)
Buffaloes ..	165
Sheep	12,768
Goats	399
Pigs	3,165
Poultry ..	34,666

* Pre-1939 frontiers.

*Production of Livestock Products**
Average 1935-38
('000 metric tons)

[234]

Milk‡	3,000
Butter	20
Cheese	30
Beef and veal ..	120
Mutton and lamb	20
Pork	152
Poultry meat ..	60

* Pre-1939 frontiers.
‡ Cows, buffaloes, sheep and goats.

5. Fish

228 All fishing along the Danube, including the mouths of the delta, and along the western shores of the Black Sea coast, is controlled by the State Fisheries Administration. The total annual catch in State-owned waters averaged 15,000 tons in the years immediately preceding the war, of which fresh-water fish contributed more than two-thirds. This does not, however, represent the total catch, as fairly large quantities were caught [656]

76]

262 grammes (10½ oz.) daily was available on five days
434 of the week only; on the other two days maize
511 meal only (for *mămăliga*) could be bought. The bread ration was reduced to 250 grammes in June 1942 and maize meal itself was rationed in August. The number of breadless days has varied, while barley, flour or potatoes have at times been offered in place of maizemeal. The bread mixture has also included varying proportions of maize, barley, potato and other flours. The allowance in June 1943 was 2500 grammes of bread on five days and 1,000 grammes (35 oz.) of maize flour or potato flour on each of the remaining two days. All these quantities apply to Bucarest only. Other towns show variants of these regulations, depending on local supplies.

234 The most serious shortage in Bucarest, and
435 possibly in other towns, appears to be milk.
511 Owing to the depletion of surrounding herds, following the high cost and scarcity of fodder, only a small part of the former supply now arrives. Some milk, as with all products, is diverted to the Black Market, and official mistakes in price policy at various times have caused temporary gluts or stoppages in food supplies. Other livestock products and edible oil are also chronically short in the towns.

7. Food Prices

435 In spite of official attempts to protect con-
565 sumers from increases, retail prices and the cost of
511 living have risen almost to the same extent as producers' and wholesale prices. Taking autumn 1936 as 100, the cost of living was 330 and the cost of food 350 in the spring of 1943. These increases have been severely felt by the working and lower-middle classes. Official measures were taken to allewiate the situation of civil servants by the setting up of stores and canteens with reduced prices, some of the goods being supplied from Transnistria. Likewise firms with over 50 employees were ordered to supply them with essential foodstuffs at low prices. Persons with more ample resources make use of the Black Market on which all the ordinary foodstuffs are obtainable, usually at only two to three times the official prices, the moderate character of these illegal prices being itself another illustration of the large quantities available through these channels, due to the laxity of control.

113	Yugoslavia EF1
231	Albania EG1
233	Rumania ED1
235	Bulgaria EE1
	Slovenes EF7

/For information on the types of shelter provided for domesticated animals (including cattle), see scattered references in 17: Thurnher, EF6 Serbs file, category 116./

221 SCATTERED over the commune are eight "stâne" or
233 temporary summer settlements which are all situated be-
[342] ween 400 and 800 metres above the village. The stâna itself is a simple affair, consisting of a log hut which affords living accommodation for the shepherds and acts as a dairy and store-house, together with the folds into which the animals are driven for milking. The one illustrated had a population of three men and two boys, all Roumanians, 350 sheep and 20 cows, as well as a few pigs, the only animals left in the village being the one or two milch cows retained at each farm for family needs and the draught animals (see Plate XIII).

234 THE change from winter to spring takes place very rapidly
221 during the second fortnight of April, and the ascent to the dairies is made at the end of that month or early in May. Before the animals are taken up the milk yield of the cows is tested in order to determine the apportionment of the cheese made therefrom, but the ewes' milk cheese is distributed on the basis of the number of sheep belonging to each peasant. Shortly after the ascent the village priest performs
[23] the ceremony of blessing each stâna in turn, and before the end of May the sheep are sheared by peasants who go up specially for the purpose, the wool being brought down to the village on horseback.

233 SINCE the summer pastures are communal property their
221 administration is in the hands of an assembly of heads of
476 families which assesses the rent to be paid for the season—generally 12-15 lei for a sheep and 50 lei for a cow. The money thus received forms a fund from which the shepherds are paid for their services. Each peasant makes personal arrangements with the senior shepherd as to the amount of cheese he will require for household purposes, any surplus going into a common stock which is marketed at the end of the season. Any disputes that arise are settled by arbitration in the presence of the mayor when the shepherds return to the village. This takes place during the latter part of October, the descent of each group being celebrated by minor festivities at which the shepherds are the guests of honour. The general feast held when all are down marks the official end of the season's activities.

221
476 UPON their return to the village the cows are immediately stabled, but each peasant splits up his sheep into two groups,

231 owner's farm, where the cows are kept in sheds, and the sheep, which are more hardy, are penned on the arable land, particularly on the maize stubble. Both sheep and cattle are fed on fodder crops during the winter. The surplus animals are sold at the autumn fair, and form a source of revenue.

476 236 [234] WHILST ON the high pastures the sheep are clipped twice, and the wool is divided amongst the peasants in proportion to the number of animals sent up. The cheese is usually shared by the owners of the animals in the same way, the mayor and his committee being responsible for the correct apportionment. In the Valley of the Argeş co-operative dealers from Bucharest frequently buy the cheese "in bulk" direct from the commune, and the monetary value is shared between the owners of the animals.

291 OXEN ARE used almost exclusively for draught purposes, the numbers kept in this district being somewhat in excess of the farmers' requirements, owing to their use for lumbering (see below).

241 [369] [438] PEASANT FARMING in the Valley of the Argeş is no longer entirely on a subsistence basis. Two factors have tended to modify it. Firstly, the position of the valley, opening as it does directly on the Wallachian Plain, with its rich grain lands and containing the capital Bucharest, has allowed commercial intercourse to develop. The Argeş peasant no longer cultivates wheat; he does not mind if his maize crop is good enough for fodder only, for he can buy both wheat and maize from the plain. Further, he finds a ready market and so a money income in Bucharest for his surplus fruit, 313 particularly apples, and cheese. Secondly, the forests form a valuable asset to the peasant. During the winter felling takes place in the upper basin of the Argeş; in spring and summer the timber is transported, and work in the State mill in Curtea goes on all the year round. Practically every household has somebody working in the timber trade, and the money so earned (as much as 100 lei per day for a man supplying his own yoke of oxen) reduces the dependence of the family on the farm.

874 242 AT CURTEA DE ARGEŞ is the School of Agriculture, Regina Elizabeta. Although only a small percentage of its pupils is local, it is gradually influencing the farming of the neighbourhood. Experiments in cultivation, plant breeding and

Another task

devolving on the shepherds is the shearing, which is done twice in the summer, but they are spared the "dipping" regulations, which British shepherds find so irksome. For the rest there is much to be done to keep the flocks healthy and safe from wolves, to look after the dogs, to carry water and cut wood. In rare moments of leisure the shepherd will be found blowing his simple pipe, or singing songs, or carving a stick with his versatile knife, cutting out those ancient geometric patterns which are the common heritage of peasant Europe.

E. E. E.

A Beetle

A reaping glove

A. TEXTILES AND TEXTILE FIBRES

248 In the years preceding the war, Rumania had been making efforts, with some success, to reduce the degree of her previous dependence on imports of textile fibres. The cotton crop of fair average quality, though still far short of the expanded mill capacity, was gradually increasing, while [236] indigenous wool supplies—though chiefly of coarse quality—were in the main enough for peasant clothing. Home-grown crops of hemp and flax were sufficient for internal needs, while jute, coir and hard hemps were imported to complete the requirements of industrial fibres.

248 439 The cessation of imports and loss of territory to her neighbours have entirely changed the supply picture, and combined with demands by Germany for imports have greatly reduced the textile "standard of living."

1. Cotton

With the development of her processing industry, Rumania had increased raw cotton imports and was successfully encouraging domestic cotton production. By 1938, imports at some 21,000 tons were about five times larger than those of 1932, and the domestic crop yield, less than 20 tons in 1932, had risen to about 600 tons. The principal sources of raw cotton were Egypt, the U.S.A., and Great Britain.

With the outbreak of war, Rumanian imports generally were curtailed, the combined total of raw cotton and cotton materials being 14,700 tons in 1940, and 13,800 tons in 1941. Thereafter, Rumania was dependent on such supplies as she could obtain by barter, lower grade cotton from Turkey and Italy and cotton and staple fibre union cloth from Italy.

248 Since 1938 the Rumanian cotton crop has continued to increase, though it is still very short of normal requirements; while the cession of some 8,000 ha. (20,000 acres) of cotton land to Bulgaria in 1940, and unfavourable weather conditions, tended to restrict the cotton-growing programme.

Prior to the territorial changes of 1940, cotton was grown close to the Danube at Craiova, and especially in the Southern Dobruja. With the cession of most of this land to Bulgaria, cotton is now mostly grown on the north bank of the Danube, at Banloc near Timişoara in the Banat and in the districts of Teleorman, Vlasca and Ialomiţa. The crop in 1939 was 2,200 tons from less than 10,000 ha. (24,000 acres) and in 1942 was estimated at 5,000 tons from about 20,000 ha. (50,000 acres). A further increase in area has been planned, but the harvest, particularly in the north, is largely dependent upon climatic conditions. The type of cotton now produced is considered superior to Indian, and similar in quality to American.

288 The chief mill centres are at Arad, Bucarest, Cluj, Iaşi, Lugoj and Timişoara; of these, Cluj is the only one to have been affected by the transfer of territory. Cotton supplies are dis- [655] tributed under the direction of the Department of Industry and Trade by "Romacotin," which also has a monopoly of purchase from producers at prices fixed by the General Price Commissariat. Cotton may be sold only to these Government agencies to whom it has to be delivered by

[29b]

288 31st December. There appears to be a good deal of passive resistance and hoarding.

Cotton spindles had increased from 35,600 in 1927 to 250,000 in 1938, and altogether there were 18 mills of some importance. Power looms in 1938 are believed to have amounted to about 16,000. The apparent disproportion of spindle compared with loom capacity was due to Rumania being a fairly important buyer of foreign yarns, imports being 23,000 tons in 1936, 27,000 in 1937, 14,000 in 1938 and 15,000 in 1939. About 70 per cent. of these yarns were of coarse cotton, called "peasants' yarns," for use in the handicraft industry only, and imported mainly from Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy and Great Britain.

2. Wool

236 Rumania, which had the largest wool-growing industry in S.E. Europe, was also the most important consumer. Production of raw wool in 1938 was about 20,000 tons (greasy) and imports were about 1,000 tons, and of wool yarn about 2,500 tons. On account of its coarse quality, not much more than one-third of the domestic wool clip is ordinarily used in the mechanised industry, the bulk being consumed in village handicraft. Since the war and subsequent loss of territory, [233] the sheep population of Rumania is believed to have declined by some 25 to 30 per cent., and all imports have ceased, so that the industry is now entirely dependent upon the reduced domestic clip.

288 Rumania was never a large importer of woollen cloth, and the weaving industry was always more highly developed than the spinning. The output of cloth in 1936 and 1937 being 6,000 tons and 6,600 tons respectively. In 1938, there were 127,000 mechanised spindles and 4,300 looms, the chief mill centres, in order of importance, being at Buhusi (district of Neamţi), Braşov, Timişoara, Bacău, Bucarest and Sibiu.

655 Both the raw material and the woollen-textile
236 industry are nominally under strict Government
288 control, as by a decree in April 1942, the numbers of sheep and lambs and the quantity of shorn wool must be declared each year, and the wool itself must be surrendered to collecting centres at specified dates. As the due date for the 1942 collection had to be extended month by month up till January 10th, 1943, and all penalties abrogated, the success of the scheme appears to have been doubtful. No wool can be bought or sold except by permit of the Ministry of National Economy, and distribution to the mills is entrusted to an organisation known as "OFIL" (*Oficiul Lânei*), a company with a capital of 10 million lei, and including all firms concerned in the preparation of wool.

3. Hemp

248 In 1937 the area under hemp, which is grown chiefly in the Banat, was 50,000 ha. (123,000 acres) and the outturn 27,000 tons, most of which was consumed internally. Exact details of wartime plantings are not known, but are reported as 45,000 ha. (112,000 acres) and 32,500 ha. (80,300 acres) in 1941 and 1942, and the yield at about 21,000 and 20,000 tons respectively. For 1943, farmers have been urged to plant more hemp—the "national textile"—in order to cover clothing.

383
[439]

The figures of imports in 1938 in metric tons were as follows :—

Motor tyres	807
Motor tubes	69
Rubber footwear	221
Soft rubber (unvulcanised) ..	32
Rubber solution	27
Miscellaneous	173

4. Synthetic Rubber

It is planned to erect a plant with a capacity of 3,000 tons per annum in co-operation with German interest and using natural gas as the raw material. There is a second plan by independent interests to erect another plant at Ploesti using natural gas or oil as a starting point. Both these projects, however, are as yet in their initial stages and Rumania is, at present, entirely dependent on Germany for supplies of synthetic rubber.

[249]

5. Cultivation of Rubber-bearing Plants

Rumania has been experimenting with the planting of *Kok Saghyz* or Russian dandelion. During 1942 an area of 180 hectares (450 acres) was planted, which it is estimated will eventually yield between 20 and 30 tons of rubber. It is planned to increase the planted area in 1943, but it will be some time before any results of these measures will help substantially to alleviate the Rumanian supply position.

[439]

6. Present Position (July, 1943)

Although Rumania has sufficient manufacturing capacity to supply most of her essential needs, she lacks supplies of raw materials. The industry is dependent upon Germany for supplies of synthetic rubber and some of her essential requirements of manufactured goods for her armed forces, such as aircraft tyres and some heavy truck tyres, are also being supplied by Germany.

C. HIDES, SKINS AND LEATHER

(1) Pre-War Period

1. General

237

Rumania's plentiful supply of livestock places her in a comparatively favourable position for hides, skins and leather and the pre-war slaughterings were approximately as follows :—

	'000 *Head*
Cattle	487
Calves	500
Horses	100
Buffaloes	32
Sheep	1,374
Goats	100
Pigs	798

Of the leather producable from the above animals, cattle, horse and buffalo are the most important, being used to a large extent in the manufacture of sole leather, which is the backbone of the industry.

237
439

Rumania is not entirely self-supporting, although home-production enables her to restrict imports to a minimum. Imports and exports in 1937 were as follows :—

	Imports	*Exports*
	Tons	
Hides of cattle (including calf and horse)	2,030	Nil.
Other hides and skins (including sheep and pig skins)	340	557
Leather (including waste)	62	416

[35b]

CHAPTER VII

237 [439] The imported hides are in all probability largely heavy hides needed for sole leather. Those designated as "other hides and skins" are not important in tonnage, and exports are almost certainly all sheep and pig. The exports of leather are not very important, as they consist almost entirely of leather waste.

Total supplies of leather, available from internal slaughterings of cattle, calves, horses and buffaloes together with net imports, would be about 12,000 tons, of which 10/11,000 tons are derived from local hides and skins.

Part of the sheepskins were dewoolled and turned into leather, the wool being sold separately but a considerable number of skins was used as fleece-lined jackets by the peasants. The total quantity of leather from the locally-slaughtered sheep would, however, not exceed 750/1,000 tons.

Unlike Western countries, the pigs in Rumania are flayed, and the skins tanned, so that the pigskin industry is certainly of material value, although not of major importance, compared with Rumania's total leather production.

2. Manufacture

295 Rumania's leather trade made rapid strides in pre-war years and, as the bulk of the leather was made into footwear, an important increase in this production was noticeable. Although no official statistics are available, it is estimated that Rumania produced 4/5,000,000 pairs of leather shoes in 1936 and, in addition, considerable quantities of peasants' footwear were manufactured in country districts.

The industry at that time consisted of about 20 machine shoe factories, six of which were owned and controlled by tanneries, mainly centred in Cluj, Timisoara, Bucarest and Oradea. In addition, numerous small shops existed throughout the country in which shoes were made by hand. With the loss of Northern Transylvania the machine-shoe centres of Cluj and Oradea went to Hungary.

3. Tanning Materials

282 [439] Rumania has in the past relied on other countries for practically all her tanning materials and extracts. She used to import about 5,000 tons of different extracts, about 50 per cent. of which were re-exported from the U.K., probably quebracho and wattle extract. Yugoslavia supplied her with about 4,000 tons of extract, presumably oak and chestnut.

(B.) War-time Developments

1. General

Though Rumania has suffered during the war from a leather shortage, partly on account of reduced internal production, but more especially because of the increased requirements for the Armed Forces, this shortage has not been so severe as in most European countries.

It has been reported that the leather production in 1940 was 9,200 tons, but that the supply of raw hides fell from 19,000 tons pre-war to 11,000 tons in 1941. This is a severe drop, even assuming that the 19,000 tons included imported hides. A substantial decline in the available supplies of leather has, however, certainly taken place owing to the curtailment of imports, to clandestine slaughterings, and to exports of live cattle to the Axis.

An indication of the extent of supplies allocated for Army needs was contained in an official announcement that 68 per cent. of all untanned

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

making greater demands upon both the land and the peasant. Since his profits tended to be in direct proportion to the area he was able to lease, there was a marked inclination to build up vast agricultural trusts, some of which covered more than 100,000 hectares. Although ultimately the large tenant was a consequence rather than a cause of the agrarian problem, he was the focus of hatred and abuse: hated by the peasants because he dealt directly with them, verbally abused by the landowner-politicians who made him their scapegoat. Certainly some of the more spectacular injustices and preposterous labor contracts can be found on lands operated by tenants. 311

This speculative interest on the part of the tenant in acquiring more land contributed to a rapid rise in rents. Between 1870 and 1906 rents mounted between 100 and 200 per cent for a third of the properties and over 200 per cent for another third. The peasants consequently were obliged to pay more dearly for the use of land. In 1870 they generally retained from two to four parts of the produce of rented land and delivered one part to the landowner or large tenant; by 1906 in over half the cases studied in an investigation, the ratio was one to one.[21] 566 428 175 241

The rise in the value of land was not accompanied by an equivalent improvement in agricultural techniques. Most of the peasants were both inexperienced in the careful cultivation of small holdings and financially unable to improve their methods, and the large landowners and tenants had little incentive. By the working of the 1864 reform the peasants remained attached to their strip of land, lacking even the free mobility of the farm laborer. They continued to own most of the means of production: over 90 per cent of the draft animals, ploughs, and harrows in Rumania belonged to the peasants.

Under these conditions the distinction between large-scale and small-scale farming was blurred, and it was characteristic of the latifundiary cultivation prevailing in Rumania that the size of an undertaking was not determined by an organized integration of the productive factors of a given area but was rather the arithmetical sum of a large number of peasant cultivations. The peasant, in return for a piece of land, contracted either to cultivate another piece of land for the proprietor or tenant or to share the produce in a form of metayage. Money payments were uncommon except in Moldavia.[22]

21. Creangă, *op. cit.*, II, 18-22.

22. It must be observed, however, that while the great estates did not, in most cases, utilize progressive farming methods, the output of the large farms was consistently higher than that of the peasant holdings. The reasons for this difference have been the occasion of much dispute. Supporters of large-scale cultivation have held that despite

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

more marked in the plains than in the mountains. However, the evolution of the two categories of peasant households—those which had received land under the reform and those which had not—was quite different. Holdings which had been either created or supplemented by allotments under the agrarian reform had a much lower resistance to the process of fragmentation of land than the nonallotted holdings; sale of holdings was more frequent among peasants who had received land by the reform.[28] The conclusion is that the agrarian reforms had not established the new properties on a firm basis, which would enable the poor peasant to maintain himself, and had only temporarily checked a tendency toward inequality in the village.

In general, the unequal distribution of land, as a purely economic factor, was not the primary cause for the agrarian difficulties of the interwar period. For a more complete explanation of these difficulties it is necessary to turn to the question of agricultural productivity and the relations of agriculture to the whole of the Rumanian economy.

Agricultural Production[29]

During the interwar years Rumanian agriculture was still largely devoted to the cultivation of cereal crops, which in 1938 occupied 82.1 per cent of the total arable surface:[30]

	In 1,000 hectares	*Per cent of arable*
Total arable	13,873.8	100.0
Cereals	11,387.3	82.1
Wheat	3,926.9	28.3
Maize	5,033.6	36.3
Barley	1,250.8	9.0
Oats	648.7	4.7
Rye	473.3	3.4
Alimentary plants	494.3	3.6
Industrial plants	487.6	3.5
Forage crops	734.3	5.3
Fallow	770.3	5.6

A slight shift in emphasis occurred during this period; the percentage of arable land under cereals dropped from 87 to 82 per cent, although the area under the principal grains, wheat and maize, in-

28. *60 Sate romînești*, II, 33, 41.

29. Statistical material supporting and illustrating the conclusions of this section is included in the Appendix.

30. *Statistica agricolă a României în 1938*, p. 2.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

24 creased. Certain industrial plants, such as sunflower and soybean, showed a rapid rate of growth, especially in the second half of the 1930's, but they represented a very small percentage of the total acreage.

Considerable regional variations corresponded to differences in soil and terrain. Cereal cultivation was most widespread in the Old Kingdom and Bessarabia, especially in the plains of the Siret, Prut, and Danube rivers, and in Dobrogea; it was of much less importance in the Carpathian regions, Transylvania and Bucovina. In a few districts, of which the most notable was Tara Bârsei in southeastern Transylvania, the peasants carried on an intensive cultivation and had a standard of production well above the average for the country.

In the village investigations of 1938 it was discovered that cereal cultivation was predominant in all categories of holdings. It was most extensive in properties between 5 and 25 hectares, but even on dwarf holdings of under one hectare more than half the land was devoted to cereals.

With respect to the general volume of production, maize, which the peasants preferred to cultivate and which formed the major element in their diet, rose above the pre-1914 level, but wheat, which had been grown principally by large cultivators, never achieved the prewar level. Exports of both wheat and maize declined greatly below the prewar level.

PRODUCTION AND EXPORT OF CEREALS, 1909–39 [31]

(1909–13 production and export = 100)

[439]

	Wheat		*Maize*	
	Production	*Export*	*Production*	*Export*
1909–13 (1919 boundaries)	100	100	100	100
1928–32	67.7	15.9	104.1	58.1
1933–37	70.3	19.3	101.7	42.8
1935–39	88.7	39.8	108.8	32.5

The slump in cereal production was primarily the result of low yield per hectare, since by 1924 the area under cultivation had recovered from the immediate postwar decline and surpassed the average area cultivated between 1909 and 1913.

31. U.S. Department of Agriculture, "Wartime Agricultural Surpluses of the Danube Basin," *Foreign Agriculture*, 4, No. 12 (December, 1940), 712.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

INDEX OF AREA, YIELD, AND PRODUCTION OF CEREALS[32] 241 311 [433]

(1909–13 = 100)

	1909–13	1920	1922	1924	1925	1926	1933–37
Area	100	84.4	94.5	101.2	103.5	102.8	114.3
Yield	100	86.7	77.5	60.0	71.7	99.2	81.7
Production	100	72.9	73.6	60.6	74.6	101.6	93.1

In the discussion of overpopulation it was seen that the productivity per hectare in Rumania was exceedingly low. For the four-year period 1928–32 the Rumanian wheat yield was below that of any Balkan state except Greece, averaging 9.5 quintals per hectare, as contrasted with a French yield of 14.8 and a Danish yield of 29.4 quintals per hectare during the same years. Although the Rumanian peasant has been more successful with maize, his output of that grain is also very low. This low rate of yield has been the most striking symptom of the unhealthy condition of Rumanian agriculture. The records of the past half century give little evidence of improvement, and there has been a noticeable decline in comparison with the pre-1914 figures.

Technical and material factors provide an immediate explanation for Rumania's poor output, but beyond these are more general causes which inhibit the improvement of agriculture and the introduction of more efficient techniques. On the whole, physical conditions in Rumania do not prevent a satisfactory agriculture. The hilly regions are somewhat deficient in humus but the soil of the plains is unusually fertile. The plains are exposed to extremes of rainfall and temperature, and the irregularity of the rainfall, the most serious threat to crops, is conducive to a wide fluctuation in output. Nevertheless, these conditions would present no serious obstacle to an increase in production if farming methods were adapted to the soil and climate.[33]

The principal material reasons for the low productivity are the extremely limited use of manure and fertilizers, absence of which is causing gradual depletion of the soil, even in the best plains regions; the lack of moisture-conserving measures; a primitive crop-rotation system; the low quality of livestock; backward techniques of cultivation and the shortage of agricultural equipment; and the prevalence of strip farming. The two last points require additional explanation.

32. League of Nations, *Agricultural Production in Continental Europe* (1943), p. 73.
33. U.S. Department of Agriculture, *op. cit.*, p. 715.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

241
311

The low level of productivity is clearly a function of the investment in agricultural inventory, which is exceptionally small in Rumania:[34]

	Value of agricultural inventory in lei/hectare	*Average production of wheat in kilograms/hectare*
Rumania	1,000	860
Bulgaria	2,000	1,320
Poland	3,000	1,440
Germany	15,000	2,070
Switzerland	42,000	2,250

While there is a great dearth of investment in agricultural equipment, there is also an overinvestment in certain items because of the large number of small holdings, each with its primitive inventory. According to the 1941 census on agricultural equipment—the first adequate estimate—though there was less than one plough to every two exploitations, there was one plough for every seven hectares of arable land. But since one plough was capable, according to Rumanian estimates, of turning over fifteen hectares, there were about twice as many ploughs as were necessary in terms of technical requirements.[35]

The division of agricultural exploitations into numerous small plots or strips is, of course, intimately related to the question of agrarian reform and to the pressure of population, although strip farming was prevalent before 1918. The agrarian reforms contributed to its extension, not only because they omitted any provisions for consolidation, but also because the land of the expropriated estates was usually divided into a number of small, narrow strips of land of from ½ to 5 hectares, which were given either to landless peasants or to those with inadequate holdings. These strips were often several kilometers away from the peasant's village or his other holdings. In 1941 the average area of all exploitations was 4.5 hectares, with an average of 5 plots per exploitation. Frequently these plots

34. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

35. Census of agricultural equipment, 1941 (*Recensământul agricol din 1941*, p. 56):

	Number	*Number per 100 exploitations*	*Number per 100 hectares arable land*
Ploughs	1,083,018	48.0	14.5
Harrows	752,063	33.3	10.0
Seed drills	58,589	2.6	0.8
Reapers	39,345	1.7	0.5
Tractors	8,416	0.4	0.1
Carts	1,191,254	52.7	15.7

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

of less than one hectare were several hundred meters long and only 5 to 10 meters wide. The strips were at a great distance from one another, some authorities estimating the average distance to be from 4 to 7 kilometers.[36] The division of farming units into such small strips is obviously an impediment to any rationalization of agriculture.

Primitive techniques and irrational organization of holdings, while directly responsible for low productivity, are really manifestations rather than causes of the stagnation of Rumanian agriculture. What has inhibited the introduction of technical and organizational improvements? Poverty and "lack of capital" merely describe the situation; they do not explain it. Nor can this stagnation be ascribed to the natural inertia of a primitive agricultural society: the Rumanian economy has been in the midst of a dynamic process of change for over a century.

The fall in yield after the agrarian reforms of 1918–21 naturally raised the question whether the expropriation of the large estates was responsible for the critical state of Rumanian farming. This question is likely to be misleading if it is reduced to a comparison of the theoretical merits of large scale and peasant agriculture. Criticism that the agrarian reforms are responsible for the decline in agricultural productivity is apt to assume that the pre-1914 estates were well-organized large farms, whereas for the most part they were latifundiary cultivations, farmed out to the peasants who cultivated them with their own animals and equipment.[37] To be sure, some of the large farms were relatively well managed (although the yield even on the big estates was low in comparison with western European standards), and it may be that certain other controls employed by the large farms—notably the selection of seed and the regulation of the date at which sowing should begin [38]—were sufficient to account for the higher yield of the large properties. During the interwar years, as before 1914, large farms continued to have a higher cereal

36. M. Gormsen, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

37. For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, in a study of Rumanian agriculture, cites the great annual fluctuation in the wheat yield, a result of the variation in rainfall, as an example of the inability of the small peasant to take appropriate moisture conservation measures. "Managers of the large estates knew how to overcome this handicap to a considerable extent." U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, *op. cit.*, p. 715. A comparison of pre-1914 yields, however, indicates that while the yield of large properties was higher than that of small properties, the fluctuation in yield was practically the same for both categories. Cf. Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

38. Doreen Warriner, *The Economics of Peasant Farming* (Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 153.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241 yield than the small peasant holdings,[39] though there appear to be
311 no satisfactory statistics on this point.

On the other hand, defenders of the agrarian reform and small peasant properties have tended to assume that the Rumanian small holder was on his way to becoming an independent peasant proprietor, a doubtful assumption in view of the prevalence of dwarf holdings and the continued excessive cultivation of cereals. In 1937 G. Ionescu-Sișești and N. Cornățeanu upheld the reform and peasant farming on the following grounds:

The reform was an economic necessity under the conditions of devastation after the First World War; it was only by giving land to the peasants that they were induced to make the great effort necessary for agricultural recovery. Peasant farming became more intensive and less devoted to cereal cultivation. The peasant was better able to withstand agricultural crises, largely because the large farmer lacked his ability to reduce expenses and increase family labor. Finally, peasant agriculture should not be judged in terms of its contribution to the national income but by its ability to "assure the existence of the greatest possible number of citizens." It is therefore erroneous to "establish a comparison between peasant agriculture and the system of large property."[40]

311 The necessity of the agrarian reforms need not be argued, although
185 they could be defined more convincingly as a social than as an economic imperative (i.e., the peasants would have refused to continue to work under the old system). It may also be true that peasant farming cannot be judged by narrow profit-and-loss accounting methods, since it is a manner of living as well as a form of livelihood. But Sișești's and Cornățeanu's supporting arguments do not appear relevant to the actual Rumanian situation. There is no indication that peasant cultivation did become to any significant degree more intensive and varied. The examples they give, taken from a survey of a number of farms between 1930 and 1934, to illustrate the viability of peasant farming are not representative but comprise farms well above the average size for Rumania. Hence the real problem of dwarf holdings is avoided. The argument that small holdings are more resistant to crises because the peasant is able to restrict his consumption and increase family labor is not altogether reassuring in face of the growing pressure of population, regardless of its dubi-

39. M. Gormsen, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

[113] 40. G. Ionescu-Sișești and N. Cornățeanu, *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie et ses conséquences* (Bucarest, 1937), pp. 42–53.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

Rumania and undoubtedly served to maintain agriculture in a depressed condition.[7] These, however, are general tendencies which, in theory at least, should adjust themselves in time; in the long run, and on the assumption of mobility in the factors of production, an equilibrium should be reached between agriculture and industry. But apart from such general factors, did the specific form of the development of Rumanian industry work to the disadvantage of agriculture?

A Yugoslav rural health worker, in describing the relations between town and country in the Balkans, concluded that agriculture was losing in the exchange of goods:[8]

> A survey undertaken in several rural countries on the nutritional status of the population showed that there exists undernourishment among a large number of the rural population, and that agricultural products are exported from rural countries without consideration of the nutritional requirements of the people. The reasons are purely commercial. The industrial products imported into the rural countries in exchange serve merely the urban population and industrial establishments from which the farming population derives comparatively small benefit. To cover their money requirements, the farmers owning small holdings are usually compelled to sell the best products of their farms to the town people. Thus they are helping the cities and industries, themselves remaining far in the rear in regard to sanitation, housing, health, and general education.

The Rumanian economist Manoilescu undertook to demonstrate that in the Rumanian trade triangle between countryside, town, and foreign market, the countryside received far less in the way of goods

7. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 80:

(1929 prices = 100)

	Price of agricultural products	*Price of industrial products used by agriculture*	*Relation*
1929	100.0	100.0	100.0
1930	68.2	98.0	69.6
1931	50.8	86.6	58.7
1932	47.7	80.9	59.0
1933	44.9	81.1	55.4
1934	44.1	82.6	53.4
1935	48.4	90.2	53.7
1936	54.0	95.4	56.6
1937	64.6	101.8	63.9
1938	67.1	99.2	67.6
1939	72.7	112.5	64.6

8. Andreya Stampar, "Observations of a Rural Health Worker," quoted in *International Journal of Agrarian Affairs, 1*, No. 1 (October, 1939), 71.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

438 and services than it gave, the difference being gained by the towns.[9]
433 According to these views, trade relations were actually detrimental
241 to the rural areas, which were being drained by the towns and industries.

It is not necessary here to discuss the theoretical question whether there is any absolute disadvantage to the countryside in its commerce with the towns. If during a period of change toward industrialization the countryside's position declines in relation to the town, it is quite possible for a number of other factors—which may be "short term" or even noneconomic—to convert this relative disadvantage into an absolute loss in income. Such factors may include the inelasticity of agricultural supply, the immobility of agricultural labor, and the increase in agricultural population. Finally, governmental and political policies may favor industry at the expense of agriculture. This last point requires further elucidation, as it was quite important in
651 Rumania.
433 Rumanian industry was created in the shelter of high protective tariffs, which undoubtedly served to increase the costs of agriculture and to benefit industry at its expense. These tariffs have been justified by the "infant industries" argument, and in part they were brought about by the agricultural protectionist policy of the European industrial states. But the combination of protectionism and the development of cartels did give industry a monopolistic position in the internal Rumanian market which worked to the disadvantage of agriculture. In addition to tariff protection, Rumania had a long tradition of direct encouragements to industry—such as exemptions from taxation and special transport rates—which persisted in the interwar period and were expanded in the 1930's.

433 The protective tariffs, by restricting foreign imports, had the
651 effect of bringing in foreign capital for investment in local industry.
457 But while foreign capital has been of great importance in the development of Rumania's larger industries and in the creation of its transportation system, the effect on the total economy has been somewhat one-sided, partly because the capital was naturally attracted to industries working for export: "Without depreciating the influence of foreign capital in stimulating industrialization, it is to be underlined that the benefits of invested foreign capital do not for the most part serve to create purchasing power in the national market

[113] 9. M. Manoilescu, "Das wirtschaftliche und soziale Dreieck der Agrarstaaten: die Stadt, das Dorf, das Ausland," *Internationale Agrarrundschau*, No. 6 (Berlin, 1940), also cited in Hugo Böker, "Agriculture's Share in the National Income and the Agricultural Situation," *International Review of Agriculture, 32*, No. 1 (January, 1941), 22. For a discussion of M. Manoilescu's views, see below, pp. 193–197.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

capital. At least three-fourths of the personnel and two-thirds of the 665
boards of directors were to be Rumanians. Since the subsoil had been 656
nationalized under the constitution, all mines and oil wells were in the form of concessions which would ultimately revert without indemnity to the state, although existing enterprises were to be guaranteed their holdings for a period of fifty years. Because of its importance to the oil industry, the mining law created the greatest stir and the most complaint from foreign investors.

The Liberals' suspicion of foreign capital was not altogether 665
groundless; pre-1914 foreign investments in the Balkans, while of 241
vital importance to their development, were entangled in the play of power politics. In view of subsequent actions in other states and in Rumania itself, the 1924 laws must be considered as quite mild. But at the time they were regarded as inhospitable and evoked formal protests from abroad and lavish criticism at home. Essentially, however, the question was not whether the Liberals were justified in their suspicions nor whether the opposition was right in charging the Liberals with personal greed, but whether Rumania was in a position at that time to develop at the desired rate without the benefit of foreign capital. From the subsequent turn of events it would appear it was not. The limitation of foreign capital, together with the stringent monetary policy and the impediments to agriculture united in stifling the economy. When the People's party took office in 1926 it promised better relations with foreign capital, and when the Brătianus returned in 1927 their tone underwent a change. Foreign observers spoke of Vintilă Brătianu's more cooperative attitude, and *L'Économiste roumain*, his faithful echo, wrote hopefully of increased foreign interest in Rumanian enterprises.

4. AGRARIAN POLICY

The general economic program of the Liberals did not make for a constructive agrarian policy. Not only was agriculture relegated to second place in the attentions of the administration but several of the courses pursued were directly inimical to it. The encouragement of industry was at the expense of agriculture; the commercial and financial policy impeded the rehabilitation of farming after the war and the dislocations of the agrarian reform.

Of course, many of agriculture's woes were not the fault of the Liberal policy. As has been seen in the preceding chapter, the underlying sources of the agrarian problem are numerous and deep-rooted. Rumania, for all its natural resources, was a poor country and no government could have established a flourishing peasantry overnight.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 Nevertheless it may be said that Liberal policy harmed rather than
241 aided agriculture. The more important question, however, is whether the sacrifices exacted from agriculture were more than balanced by benefits to the whole of the economy. Final judgment of Liberal economic policy must rest on this question, which will be examined presently.

Liberal neglect of Rumanian agriculture was criticized by Constantin Garoflid, Minister of Agriculture in the Averescu cabinet of 1926: "It is not normal that our country should possess a *Crédit Industriel*, while agriculture is deprived of a financial institution when its needs are at their greatest." [49] The limited supplies of capital were directed by the government and the banks into industrial channels where they were promised better returns. Indeed, facilities for agricultural credit were less than before the First World War.[50] The absence of credit, only in part a consequence of policy, drove the peasants to the usurers and into chronic indebtedness. The handling of payments and compensation for land transferred in the agrarian reforms served to drain money from the agricultural sector of the economy. Peasants were urged to make full payment as rapidly as possible, while the funds received were not devoted to the amortization of the long-term bonds owing to the expropriated landowners but became a source of revenue for the state.[51]

[651] A serious drag on agriculture was the tariff policy pursued by the Liberals. The import tariffs, especially the duties on agricultural implements and textiles, raised the operating costs of the peasant.[52] Even more crippling were the export duties which primarily affected agricultural products, the chief Rumanian export. On some occasions these duties equalled 50 per cent of the value of the product.[53] They were not only a heavy burden on agriculture but completely disorganized the grain trade. Since the smaller peasants were producing primarily for their own consumption, the export duties did not affect them directly, but as the tariffs were aimed at maintaining a low cost of living they affected those particular commodities which the small peasant did supply to the local market.

Against these disadvantages, the Liberal party offered very little

49. *L'Économiste roumain*, 2, No. 5 (May, 1926), 160. During his short term in office Garoflid attempted to establish such an institution but was unable to put it into effect.

50. Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, p. 425.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 421.

52. The duty on ploughs was 20–30 per cent ad valorem, that on imported sacks was about 50 per cent.

53. Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 436.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

in the way of concrete benefits. Liberal agrarian policy can be divided under two heads: measures taken in supplementing or amending the agrarian reforms and measures for the improvement of agriculture. 665 241

Of the land reforms, only that for Translyvania had provided for the expropriation of forest land. Article 132 of the 1923 Constitution approved the principle of expropriating forest land in the Old Kingdom, Bessarabia, and Bucovina for firewood and construction purposes. The law implementing this article was published on July 1, 1924. Where woodland was needed and was not available from state holdings, it could be expropriated from private owners leaving them a minimum of 100 hectares. Communal woodlands were to be created, the exploitation of which was to be under the control of the state.[54] 423

By the law of March 13, 1925, and the executive regulation of April 15, which abrogated Articles 120–124 of the 1921 law, the Liberals, to safeguard peasant holdings, considerably stiffened requirements for the sale and purchase of agricultural property. The state was given the right of preemption on lands received not only under the 1918–21 reforms but under earlier distributions of state domain. If this right were not exerted, purchases could be made only on the following conditions: 423 665 656 241 671

1. The purchaser was to be a Rumanian citizen, a cultivator of the land or a graduate of an agricultural school, and residing and working in the commune in which the holding was situated.

2. Holdings could be sold in minimum blocs of 2 hectares in the plains and 1 hectare in the hills.

3. Sales could be made only five years after their owner had received definite title to his property following full payment of its price.

4. The purchaser could not own more than 25 hectares of cultivated land, including the area to be purchased. Houses and gardens, up to one hectare, could not be mortgaged or sold; land up to 25 hectares could be mortgaged only to certain authorized institutions.

The detailed instructions in the accompanying administrative regulation made the act of sale quite complicated by requiring numerous forms, proofs of domicile, and evidence of proper ownership. While the Liberals did not make peasant land inalienable they did render the process of transfer slower and more difficult and extended the state's rights of preemption to a large proportion of peasant properties. This law was in harmony with the tight-laced spirit of the Liberals in 1924–25 and showed the same restrictive view of property as the mining law of 1924. Historically, the reversion toward inalien-

54. See Diaconescu, *Chestiunea jărănească în România*, pp. 266–272, for analysis of the text of the law.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

423 665 656 241 671 ability was an aftermath of nearly all the land reform measures. It is characteristic of the liberalism of the Liberal party that it should have feared—though perhaps correctly—the consequences of free and uninhibited sales of land.[55]

665 241 The Liberals, in the law of April 14, 1925, instituted chambers of agriculture, modeled on the chambers of commerce, and united in a Union of Chambers of Agriculture. At first sight these organs appeared to have very important functions: to be the official representatives of agricultural interests, to give advice on agricultural legislation, to supervise agricultural schools, to collaborate with the administration in the application of laws, to improve livestock, to aid in the advancement of agricultural techniques, to prepare statistics, and to organize fairs. They were also to elect members to the senate.

Unhappily, the chambers accomplished very little. Their budgets depended upon the Ministry of Agriculture, and they were not supplied with sufficient funds to carry out the work delegated to them.[56] They were not even representative of the whole of the peasantry. Each chamber was composed of 17 elected members and 11 appointed functionaries. But since only proprietors with a minimum of 3 hectares of arable land, or tenants with 10 hectares were permitted to vote for members, a large percentage of the poor peasants was not represented at all.[57] (In 1930, 52 per cent of the peasant farms were of less than 3 hectares.) Worst of all, the chambers, with their right to elect senators, became hopelessly entangled in politics. Under the law creating them, the government could dissolve the chambers for serious irregularities or bad faith in the accomplishment of their legal work or for activities against the interests of the state. Inevitably, the chambers were repeatedly dissolved on any pretext for the purpose of facilitating the election of senators.

665 656 241 In May, 1928, the Liberals passed a law for the classification of cereals, designed to improve the quality of grain destined for export and to reduce the number of middlemen between producer and foreign consumer. There had been frequent complaints of the inferior quality of exported Rumanian grain and the presence of an excessive amount

55. In 1911 the Liberal program has spoken of the desirability of creating a medium property by natural selection, that is, by the purchase and sale of land. The 1924 law certainly represents a retreat from that position. On the other hand, as will be seen below, the National Peasants revised the 1925 law, for the purpose of permitting "natural selection," but with unfortunate results for the poorer peasants.

56. F. E. Manoliou, *La Reconstruction économique et financière de la Roumanie et les partis politiques* (Paris, 1931), p. 159.

57. Filip Chefner, "Camerile agricole in România," *M.A.B.: Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, 2 (1926), 36.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

of impurities. An improvement was undoubtedly desirable. Yet the 665 low quality of exported grain was but a symptom of the generally bad 656 condition of agriculture. Attacking the problem at the level of exports 241 was indicative of the Liberals' attitude. The opposition sharply criticized the law as missing the point: "We are not suffering from a commercial crisis," said Mihalache, "but from a crisis of production. The problem of production must be solved first." [58]

In July, 1928, shortly before the Liberals fell they passed a cooperative code which had little effect except to reorganize previous cooperative organizations and to increase the direct control of the state. On the whole, as has been mentioned, the cooperative movement was and remained weak and ineffectual. In 1923–24 the National Bank granted 600 millions of lei credit to the whole of the cooperative movement, whereas private bankers received 7,500 millions. [652]

A "battle for production" was inaugurated in 1928 by the Minister of Agriculture, Argetoianu, and in March an agricultural congress voted a resolution which is striking in its complete emphasis upon technical improvements: better seeds, more rational crop rotation, more fertilizers, the expansion of experimental stations. The resolution opposed a further extension of the area under wheat and recommended an effort to raise the output per hectare. In no case, however, did it penetrate to the level of agrarian reforms, as defined in the preceding chapter, but was wholly occupied with desiderata, which were simple enough to call for but very difficult to achieve.

These final efforts of 1928 were, however, of little import, as they were in large part a belated effort to meet the challenge of the opposition which was on the point of coming to power.

It is not easy to judge the successes and failures of the Liberals' economic policy. It seemed easier immediately after their defeat to see their errors and particularly their shortcomings in the agrarian question. But with the failure of subsequent administrations to improve agriculture or to provide a stable economy the nature of the Liberal failure becomes less obvious. Moreover, many of the economic practices of the Brătianus, regarded as heretical at the time, have become generalized not only in the Balkans but throughout Europe; state-supported industrialization has become a commonplace and has received a substantial body of theoretical justification. Yet with all these added qualifications, it may be concluded that the Liberal policy failed.

58. Quoted in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 452.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 firm the supposition that the principles of the Peasant party itself were unstable. The evolution traced here was to be carried even farther when the National Peasants came to power in 1928.

Economic and Agrarian Policy

[113] A fair illustration of the economic interests of the National Peasant government is to be found in Virgil Madgearu's little book, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, published in 1930. Of the 63 pages of text, 14 are devoted to agriculture, 22 to the exploitation of state enterprises and the reform of the mining law, ten to foreign trade policy, and eleven to the improvement of transport. The fact that the booklet was published in England and designed for foreign readers merely underlines the preoccupation with affairs other than agricultural. As has been seen, this broadening of interests was the result of the pressing demands of financial, monetary, and commercial matters in 1928–30, but also of the internal trend away from a purely agrarian outlook.

665 The most striking feature of the agrarian policy of the National
●241 Peasant government was the things it neglected to do or even to consider doing. While the party's attitude toward further redistribution of land had become increasingly moderate, nevertheless in 1926 the program of the united party called for expropriation of properties over 100 hectares. Not a step was taken toward carrying out this measure. To be sure, many reasons militated against such a move. Agriculture was still in the process of readjustment from the previous reforms. Expropriation would undoubtedly have caused a political furor since the mere passage of time was serving to consolidate the previous reform, with all its shortcomings and abuses. Moreover, since the 1917 act was entered in the constitution, it could be modified only by a constitutional amendment, which was forbidden under a regency. Quite obviously, however, the National Peasant party by 1928 was not the radical agrarian movement which had attempted to introduce the reform bill under the Vaida government of 1920.

A second omission was the failure to take any active steps toward the consolidation of peasant strips, a measure which was virtually a precondition for any effective improvement of agriculture. Again, this would have been unsettling and peasant support for this particular reform was by no means certain.

665 The only serious measure taken in connection with agricultural
241 property relations was an act passed in 1929 which amended the
671 Liberals' law of 1925 concerning the alienation of allotments obtained

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

through the agrarian reforms.[45] The new law, which was designed to facilitate the transfer of land and to further a "process of selection among the peasant cultivators," abolished certain of the restrictions and delays imposed by the Liberals and greatly simplified the procedure of sale, although maintaining safeguards to keep land in the hands of actual cultivators and limiting purchases to Rumanian citizens having not over 25 hectares of land.

The idea that a "process of selection" would enable peasants with "superior competitive efficiency" to create prosperous holdings has had considerable popularity not only in Rumania but in other eastern European states.[46] For such a process to have beneficial consequences, however, it is necessary, first, that superior efficiency on tiny holdings will actually result in sufficient capital accumulation to buy out less efficient peasants, and, second, that the peasants displaced in the process have some alternative means of employment. Otherwise the poorer peasants would be reduced to a landless proletariat and the land taken over by the wealthier peasants. Such seems to have been the effect of the National Peasants' law, although it was not the sole cause; the survey of sixty Rumanian villages made in 1938 reported that the law of 1929 had intensified the differentiation in the peasantry by building up the category of middle peasants on the one hand and of increasing the agricultural proletariat on the other.[47] It was this law perhaps more than any other single act which gave

45. See above, p. 125.

46. Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe*, p. 105, cites a Greek author (C. Evelpedis, *La Réforme agraire en Grèce*, Athens, 1926), as an advocate of this view. In Rumania the alienation of peasant property has had a tangled political history in which at one time or another almost all political parties have reversed their positions. Up to the 1918–21 reforms, official policy tended toward inalienability, whereas the older reformers, such as Dobrogeanu-Gherea and Garoflid, demanded alienation as a necessary step to creating an independent peasantry. The Liberals in 1911 came out for a "process of selection," but in 1925 they restricted the transfer of land. The Peasant party, on the contrary, in 1921 was for government control of all sales, whereas in 1929 it moved toward freer purchase. The Communists, it may be added, roundly condemned the National Peasants for their 1929 law, but Lenin, in his agrarian writings before the Russian revolution, was strongly for alienation. The Communist position is seen in Pătrăşcanu's interpretation of the 1929 law: "From the point of view of opening a way for capitalism in the villages and of differentiation within the rural strata, the measure represented an advance in comparison with the past. But what was the cost of this progress? The land of the poorest and economically most feeble layers of the peasants quickly became the principal object, the prey on which urban banking capital and the village bourgeoisie threw themselves." Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, *Sous trois dictatures* (Paris, 1946), p. 106.

47. *60 Sate româneşti*, II, 6. The depression doubtless intensified this effect. During the 1946 famine in Moldavia the same thing occurred: peasants who had obtained land under the 1945 reform began to sell to the larger peasants at such a rate that the government was obliged to pass a law nullifying these sales.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

regime. New institutions were set up to provide credit suitable to agriculture's particular wants. It was hoped that these would stimulate the influx of foreign capital "to satisfy the needs of agricultural financing." [52] In its form the new law was better adjusted to the needs of agriculture, but the depression completely halted the desired flow of capital. It may be doubted if this law was of primary benefit to the poor peasant, who was of necessity a bad risk and whose impoverished condition prevented him from employing credit profitably.[53]

In addition to these financial measures, the National Peasants passed acts for the organization and reform of agricultural instruction intended to spread and popularize better agricultural techniques and to prevent trained agriculturalists from being completely absorbed by the bureaucracy; a law of July, 1929, for the reclamation of the inundated region of the Danube; measures for leasing agricultural machinery to cultivators and developing seed selection stations; and a law to promote systematic colonization in areas of sparse population. These measures, while desirable in themselves, could be of only marginal benefit.

Although the National Peasants' concern with agriculture is shown by the fact that the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture in 1929 was double that of any of the preceding postwar years,[54] the general results are somewhat flat and uninspiring. According to Madgearu ten years later, the National Peasants, because of the difficult circumstances under which they had received the stabilization loan and because of the increasingly unfavorable international economic situation, had been unable to carry out all their financial plans but had been forced to limit themselves to certain priority tasks: assuring the liquidity of the National Bank's portfolio, liquidating the state's floating debt, reconstructing the railways, and making certain productive investments. "The necessary means were lacking to create an agricultural mortgage bank." [55]

Doubtless, financial difficulties and the lack of capital were important obstacles, and the depression washed away what might have been promising beginnings toward improvement in agricultural finan-

52. Madgearu, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 9.

53. Manoliou, *op. cit.*, p. 242, was of the opinion that certain measures of inspection and control, included in the law to safeguard the credit societies, would have the effect of discouraging the small cultivator and diminishing his productive efforts.

54. According to Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 453, after the First World War the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture had not exceeded 33,500,000 gold lei until the advent of the National Peasants. In 1929 it reached the figure of 73,500,000 gold lei.

55. Madgearu, *Evoluţia economiei româneşti*, p. 306.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

241 665 656 cial organization. But the agrarian policy had other defects. In the first place, the National Peasants fell into the old Rumanian fallacy of counting too greatly upon an act of legislation to cure any problem.[56] Much more serious however was the fact that while the National Peasants had an agrarian policy it was scarcely a peasant policy. The measures actually taken were not of the kind that could greatly help the poor peasant. The modifications of the party programs between 1921 and 1926 foreshadowed this attitude, but even so the more far-reaching parts of the 1926 program were not carried out.

665 241 652 Measures intended to benefit agriculture were not, however, limited to agricultural legislation. The new tariff policy inaugurated by the National Peasants on August 1, 1929, was specifically designed to assist the farmer. The National Peasants had consistently attacked the Liberals' (and the People's party's) tariff policy, which was highly protectionist, raised the cost of agricultural equipment, and was "in its technical structure a feeble instrument of negotiation for securing markets for our export products." [57] The new tariff was, as Madgearu announced, based on the recommendations of the Geneva Conference of 1927. It created a more elastic customs system to permit commercial conventions with other states. Duties on goods were divided into two groups: 1) irreducible minimum duties for goods produced within the country and requiring protection; these could not be reduced through convention; 2) duties on all other articles, which could be reduced through mutual arrangement with other states. Even before signing any customs conventions the government reduced the duties on agricultural equipment.

In thus lowering the cost of imported agricultural equipment as well as in reducing tariffs on articles of mass consumption, the 1929 tariff undoubtedly benefited the peasant. As to the protection of industry, "it was in general calculated so as not to exceed the difference by which the conditions of local production were more difficult than conditions of foreign production, and only for branches of industry which had the possibility of sound development in the country." [58] The tariffs did not renounce industrial protection but tried

56. Note, for example, Madgearu's remark, "Up to 1929 agricultural instruction in Rumania was based on no uniform principle, nor was it adapted to the situation, since its organization was not based on legislation which could solve the problem as a whole." *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 12. Clearly the real reasons for Rumania's lack of adequate agricultural education were not to be found in the absence of a uniform legal code.

57. Madgearu, *ibid.*, p. 39.

58. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei romînești*, p. 221.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

to protect only those industries showing "natural" promise of development and to promote the necessary rationalization of those industries which had been permitted to become inefficient behind the Liberal tariff. 665 241 652

Throughout Madgearu's exposition of the 1929 tariff there is an evident desire to increase international cooperation and trade, and an altogether friendly attitude toward the great capitalist powers—an attitude quite different from Vintilă Brătianu's cautious and rather grudging admission of the need for increased trade and foreign capital. This attitude is most clearly shown in the laws of 1929 modifying the Liberal acts of 1924 on mines and the commercialization of state-owned enterprises.[59] The National Peasants criticized the 1924 laws as chauvinistic and failing to promote the exploitation of natural resources. "The aggressive nationalist policy exemplified in the Mining Act of 1924, which did so much harm to the country, bringing it into a state of financial and economic disorganization, could not continue without grave consequences for our economic future. A policy of sincere co-operation with international capital is the only means of improving the situation."[60] The new laws threw open the doors to foreign capital. With the exception of requiring that 75 per cent of the personnel (both administrative and subordinate) be Rumanians, no restrictions were placed on the percentage of foreign capital in the companies or upon the nationality of directors and chief officials. 457 665 652 [671]

These laws were in marked contrast not only to the attitude of the Liberals but also to the policy recommended by Constantin Stere in 1921.[61] Stere, with his hostility to "vagabond capital" and the menace of imperialist great powers, opposed foreign capital investments in the Rumanian petroleum industry, since all profits passed beyond the frontiers. Nor was foreign capital concerned with satisfying the needs of the population but only with raking in a profit. He was, however, aware that without foreign capital the resources simply could not be developed. He disapproved of the Liberals' policy of "nationalizing" petroleum and creating concessions with a majority of Rumanian capital. Having no confidence in the Liberal plutocracy's willingness or ability to defend the nation's interests, Stere advocated state operation of the petroleum industry. Foreign capital 652 665

59. A detailed comparison of Liberal and National Peasant policy on this question, from a pro-Liberal position, is given by Alexandre G. Georgesco, *Le Régime juridique et financière des capitaux étrangers en Roumanie* (Paris, 1932).

60. Madgearu, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 30.

61. C. Stere, *Naţionalizarea Industriei de Petrol: Cuvântare rostită în şedinţa Adunării deputaţilor din 28 Martie 1921* (Bucarest, 1921).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

from 2 to 10 billion lei (in quantity from one million to 2.2 million metric tons).

Two qualifications should be made however. The emphasis upon wheat exports and upon the improvement of quality was primarily for the benefit of the middle and large producer, though the maintenance of the price of grain did help agriculture as a whole. In the second place, as has been mentioned in connection with the depression, the premiums on wheat served to extend the area under wheat cultivation, in direct contradiction to the recommendations of agricultural experts, who continued to believe that "peasant agriculture should no longer limit itself, in imitation of the old system, to the culture of cereals; its success will come from a parallel development of the resources of the field and of livestock raising." [35] This contradiction, which shows the absence of any real coherence to the agrarian program of the Liberal government, had two obvious sources: wheat, for all its decline after the First World War, was important commercially and from the point of view of foreign commerce there was a strong incentive to support it. Moreover, the wheat growers were the larger farmers and were in a better position to make felt their wishes than were the small maize-producing peasants.

The government did, however, make certain efforts to increase the variety of agricultural production. The most elaborate was the creation, with the assistance of I. G. Farbenindustrie, of the "Soya" company, which was authorized to import soybeans, distribute them to cultivators, provide equipment, and purchase the entire crop for export to Germany. The area under this crop expanded rapidly, especially in Bessarabia: 1,465 hectares in 1934, 20,411 hectares in 1935, 58,037 hectares in 1936, and 102,000 hectares in 1937. The government through price guarantees and subsidies also furthered the cultivation of sugar beet, tobacco, rice, and textile plants.

These measures to diversify agriculture did not, despite all the publicity given to them, achieve very great importance. They were only a drop in the bucket compared with the vast area under peasant cereal cultivation, and their rate of expansion seemed unlikely to produce any general amelioration for a very long time. Moreover, the introduction of such industrial crops, whose main purpose—almost exclusively so in the case of soya—was for export, shows the persistent if natural effort to solve the agrarian question by a sort of legerdemain. The soybean had been an old favorite, and as early

35. G. Ionescu-Sişeşti and N. Cornăţeanu, *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie et ses conséquences*, p. 79.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241 as 1910 Dobrogeanu-Gherea had some harsh words to say of the
433 men who thought it could magically solve the deep-rooted ills of Ru-
654 manian agriculture.[36]

The Tătărescu government, following precedent, also reorganized agricultural credit and the cooperative system, set up more experimental stations, and devoted funds to the raising of better livestock and the purchase of tractors, but those measures seem to have been only of marginal benefit.

423 The government did try in the law of March, 1937, for the encouragement of agriculture to grapple with the problem of land tenure. It regulated the transfer and mortgage of rural lands and undertook to enforce the indivisibility of property as a means of preventing the progressive subdivision of peasant holdings. The effort was unsuccessful. The two-hectare minimum, which in any case was too small for a self-subsistent holding, was not observed; the prohibition extended only to properties obtained from the state or with the state's assistance. An attempt was also made to promote the consolidation of peasant properties, but this met with too great opposition in the chamber and was dropped.[37] The government also exerted its right of preemption on sales of agricultural land for the purpose of providing land for the peasants but its achievements were insignificant. Between April 1, 1934, and August 1, 1938, of the 326,200 hectares put on sale the government used its right of preemption on only 12,250 hectares, 3.8 per cent of the total.[38]

241 In brief, if the position of agriculture was somewhat better in the
654 years of the Tătărescu regime than in the depression it was largely
656 a consequence of general economic recovery. Agriculture did benefit from the protective measures applied and extended by the government, although part of these benefits was lost by the continued depreciation of the leu, and some efforts were made to raise the level of agriculture and diversify production. Nevertheless, the government's chief interest was industry and commerce and the principal benefits to agriculture were those which corresponded to this interest. The desperate problem of the millions of small peasants owning less than 3 hectares, unable to support themselves and their families, dividing their land into smaller and smaller fragments, suffering from pellagra —this problem was scarcely touched.

654 It must be said, however, that in the 1930's there was a notable
511

36. C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *Neoiobăgia*, p. 254.

37. Valeriu Bulgariu, "Divizibilitatea proprietăţii ţărăneşti," *Probleme agrare* (Bucarest, 1946), pp. 77–97.

38. G. Ionescu-Sişeşti, "Le Nouvel Aspect du problème agraire en Roumanie," *Archives pour la science et la réforme sociales*, 16, Nos. 1–4 (1948), 264.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

manian peasant,[17] under his dictatorship the overriding concerns were mobilizing agriculture for the war, compensating for the lost territories (though part of these were regained after 1941), and maintaining production against the drain on manpower and the requisitioning of equipment and livestock for military purposes. The majority of acts were specific war measures: price controls, export controls, laws against agricultural sabotage and speculation, control of livestock, state requisitioning of cereals, crop planning, and the mobilization of agricultural labor. Most of the measures had been initiated in Carol's reign under the trade agreement with Germany and the five-year plan for agriculture, but the war intensified them and put them on a directly military footing. By necessity there was an increase in the mobilization of agricultural labor. Field commandos and labor gangs were sent about the country under the supervision of gendarmes and rural agents of the Ministry of Agriculture.

An attempt was made to compensate for the shortage of manpower and livestock by increasing agricultural equipment, largely through import from Germany. If the figures are to be trusted imports in 1941 and 1942 were quite extensive:[18]

	1941	*1942*
Tractors with ploughs	1,000	2,814
Animal-drawn ploughs	20,000	40,000
Sowing drills	4,000	1,400
Harvesters	2,000	2,230
Hoes	10,000	30,000
Harrows	4,000	9,200
Threshers	200	250

By a law of June 22, 1942, for the organization of agricultural associations, the government attempted to overcome the disadvantages of small strip farming by means reminiscent of the Iorga law of 1931. By this act a group of at least fifteen cultivators residing in the same commune could constitute an agricultural association, authorized to purchase farm machinery, seeds, fertilizers, etc., sell produce in common, purchase or lease land, and obtain credit. The association was not an independent body however. It was to be man-

17. According to an admiring German biography, Antonescu first attracted attention during the 1907 uprising when, as a young lieutenant, he succeeded, without firing a shot, in persuading a crowd of rebellious peasants to disband.

18. Brief accounts of the measures undertaken up to 1948 are given by N. D. Cornăţeanu, "International Chronicle of Agriculture: Rumania," *International Review of Agriculture*, *32* (Rome, July–August, 1941), 247E–254E; and *34* (April, 1943), 156E–164E.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

156 aged by five trustees; the Ministry of Agriculture was to supervise
241 its business transactions, and technical and administrative control lay in the hands of the chief of the agricultural district. Members were obliged to conform to the requirements of the government crop plan. It was reported in 1944 that about 200 such associations had been established.[19]

This law did not really represent anything new in Rumania but was merely one of the various measures which had been applied from time to time to overcome the agrarian impasse. It represents, however, a somewhat different approach from that emphasized by either the National Peasants or the Carolist dictatorship. The National Peasants had placed greatest stress upon credit, cooperatives, and diversification of production, with a view to creating the small peasant on the Western model. The Carolist regime, in its activities of 1938 and 1939, was aiming at consolidation and the creation of middle properties. The law of 1942 was an attempt to improve the situation on the basis of existing circumstances, of utilizing in the most efficient way possible the uneconomic system of land holdings. To be sure, all the approaches overlapped somewhat, but in a way the 1942 act was a bridge to the agricultural policy of the post-1945 government.

311 The Germans, for their own reasons, were anxious to develop Ru-
185 manian agriculture as part of the economy of the new order, although their estimate of what could be achieved in Rumanian agriculture was relatively modest. A wartime analysis by some German experts[20] presented a very dismal picture of Rumanian farming as of 1940. According to their report the principal difficulties lay in the low yield resulting from the small size of the majority of the holdings (they noted that most of the large properties were cultivated in metayage) and in the inadequacy of the transport system, both the general network and the village roads. They doubted whether agriculture itself

19. Otto von Franges, "Agricultural Labour Communities in South Eastern Europe," *International Review of Agriculture, 35* (January–February, 1944), 22E–32E. Von Franges was heartily in favor of these associations, of which similar types had been established in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. In his opinion they corresponded to traditional labor associations of the Balkan peasants and showed an admirable balance between individualism and collectivism, between control and liberty. He sharply contrasted these associations with agricultural cooperatives. The latter, while having a useful function, were obliged to neglect the poorer peasant. The associations, he felt, were the only possible compensation for the fragmentation of peasant properties and the only means of obtaining a decent improvement of productivity until the slow process of consolidation could take place.

20. H. L. Fensch and O. Thiel, *Rumänien, Untersuchung über die Betriebs- und Ernährungswirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse der Landwirtschaft.* (I have seen only a manuscript Rumanian translation of this study.)

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

was in any position to remedy either of these defects. They had hopes, however, that measures—such as those taken in 1942—of compensating for inefficient small holdings by means of common use of machines, purchase of seed, and organization of sale could bring some improvements. They believed that under existing circumstances it would be possible to increase agricultural production by 25 per cent over ten years and that some 40 per cent of the surplus of cereals and vegetables would be available for export to Germany.

The actual course of Rumanian agriculture during the war showed no such progress. The area devoted to cereals fell appreciably between 1940 and 1943 because of the labor shortage, the decline in livestock and equipment, and the price controls which held cereal prices well below industrial prices.[21] Yields fell off in the principal grains, maize and wheat. The total production of cereals dropped from a 1935–39 average of 75.7 million quintals (for the area as of January, 1941) to 61–64 million (38 million in 1942 following an exceptionally severe winter).[22] Because of war needs the area devoted to industrial and food crops increased, in most cases as the result of government support and crop plans. It was still very small, however, compared with that under cereals. In livestock the greatest reduction, as was to be expected, was in horses; cattle increased somewhat; sheep, goats, and pigs remained about the same.

The number of draft animals declined by one-third, though the most serious fall was between 1943 and the beginning of 1945; that is, at the time of the final military collapse when both German and Soviet troops were on Rumanian soil. There was a notable increase in the number of tractors (from 4,170 in 1940 to 8,340 in 1943 and 8,178 in 1945), although in the opinion of the Central Institute of Statistics it did not compensate for the decline in draft animals which were the only feasible form of traction on the small strip farms.[23]

21. Area devoted to cereals, 48 judeţe (area as of January, 1941):

	Millions of hectares
1935–39	7.4
1940	6.8
1941	6.6
1942	6.4
1943	6.6

Source: Institutul Central de Statistică, *Statistica agricolă a României în 1941–1944* (Bucarest, 1947), p. xiii.

22. According to the Central Institute of Statistics, *ibid.*, p. xv, the recorded figures for production may have been well below the actual production because of extensive and often irregular army requisitioning; the wheat crop may have been underestimated by 20 per cent, the maize crop by 10 per cent.

23. Institutul Central de Statistică, *Statistica agricolă a României, Vol. V, Inventarul agricol în Anul 1945* (Bucarest, 1947), p. 14.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

433 The inventory of other agricultural equipment was more or less sta-
● 241 ble or showed a slight decline.
185 For all the controls and economic collaboration with Germany the Antonescu dictatorship appears to have accomplished nothing for Rumanian agriculture. The relative improvement, at least in terms of total production, which had appeared after the depression was broken by the war. The position of peasant agriculture was clearly deteriorating, and the industrial boom, arising mainly from war demands, was not an adequate compensation.

Although pessimistic voices could be heard in the Carolist dictatorship, the official attitude was optimistic. During the war years, however, there was increasing concern over the manifest failure of Rumanian agriculture to show any improvement. The agricultural census, taken in the spring of 1941, provided ample evidence of the unsatisfactory situation of the peasant. The veteran agricultural economist, Ionescu-Sișești, who had been writing confident articles throughout the interwar period, was quite gloomy in 1943.

> It was anticipated that such a gigantic transformation of property [the 1918–21 reforms] would keep the peasant class in a state of equilibrium for a long time and that the country would benefit from a long period of prosperity because of the distribution of land to the peasants. Unhappily this hope has not been completely realized. Today, when all the claims of the peasants appear satisfied, and there is nothing left to distribute—since a minimum of large and medium property is indispensible—a new peasantry is appearing which threatens to take on a grave character if measures are not adopted in time. The very rapid growth of the population and the advanced fragmentation of properties are engendering this crisis.[24]

His recommendations, however, were largely a recapitulation of the various measures which had been legislated, if not applied with any consequence, in the 1930's: exerting the state's right of preemption, preventing subdivision of properties below a certain minimum, encouraging consolidation, and creating larger colonization holdings. If such steps were taken, he said, "the peasantry will be divided into two categories: on the one hand, peasant proprietors with holdings of an adequate size, on the other, a class of agricultural workers living on the product of their labor on the farms of others.[25] Ionescu-Sișești's hopes were not to be realized. Within a year and a

24. G. Ionescu-Sișești, "Le Nouvel Aspect du problème agraire en Roumanie," *Archives pour la science et la réforme sociales*, 16, Nos. 1–4 (1943), 263.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 267.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

half the Communist party was in power and the last thing it wanted was such a "Stolypinist" situation in the countryside. 433 241 185

From the point of view of dramatic unity, the Antonescu dictatorship would make a convenient terminal point for recent Rumanian history, as the last act of a rake's progress. With a state encompassing virtually all Rumanians, a new constitution, and an extensive land reform, Rumania had entered the interwar period full, it seemed, of high promise. The promise had not been fulfilled, democracy did not flourish, the peasantry remained poor but prolific. The constitutional regime was replaced by a royal dictatorship and then by the *Walpurgisnacht* of the Iron Guard. Finally, Rumania was swept into the war to join Hitler's crusade. History, however, is no respecter of dramatic unity but persists in its devious course.

E: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

000

ier peasants. As a matter of fact, both these contentions were true to a certain degree, as has been seen above in Chapter 3. But the Communists greatly exaggerated the extent both of large estates and of differentiation, and their statistical efforts to prove their point were either inaccurate or patently false.[35]

829 ●241 185

The adoption of the Popular Front in 1935 led to a corresponding modification in the Communist agrarian policy. While ultimate aims of socialism were not renounced, a distinction was drawn between socialist reforms and reforms designed to restore democracy. The militant revolutionary note of the early pronouncements was dropped. The new policy appears in Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu's study of the basic problems of Rumania, *Problemele de bază ale României*, written during the war but showing the influence of the Popular Front tactic. Pătrăşcanu was no proletarian but the son of a socialist intellectual and himself a lawyer. He was not Moscow-trained, and while his writings were based upon Lenin, they have a certain Western outlook. He led the Rumanian Communist party in 1944, was Minister of Justice in the coalition governments and in the Groza cabinet until the beginning of 1948. His influence in the party diminished steadily after the return of the comrades who had been in Moscow, and he was eventually discharged from his position because he had become "the exponent of bourgeois ideology and detached himself from the masses and from the ideology and principles of the working class."

Much of Pătrăşcanu's analysis of the Rumanian agrarian problem is sound and illuminating, although on many points of fact he obviously relied on the information compiled by the National Peasant economist Virgil Madgearu. He was fully aware, of course, of the unhealthy state of Rumanian agriculture, the persistence of extensive cereal cultivation and low level of productivity, the failure of the 1918–1921 land reforms to establish a prosperous peasantry, the persistence of metayage and other semiservitudes, the proletarization of the poorer peasantry, and the inability of a great number of Rumanian peasants to support themselves on their meager holdings. In trying, however, to adapt this promising material to perfect Marxist-Leninist categories he overtaxed the evidence; he exaggerated the failure of the 1918–1921 reforms to equalize land holdings, he probably gave too much importance to the differentiation between the poor and the rich peasants, and in attempting to demonstrate the

35. Two such examples are S. Timov, "Wird Rumänien agrarsiert oder industrialisiert?" *Agrarprobleme*, International Agrarinstitut Moskau, Band 2, Heft 2 (1929), pp. 310–346; and Tatarow, "Die Agrarkrise in Rumänien," *Agrarprobleme*, Band 4, Heft 2 (1931), pp. 44–80.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

prevalence of agricultural laborers he definitely mishandled his statistics.[36] 829

Pătrăşcanu was at his best in showing that the optimistic statements of official Rumanian spokesmen during the interwar years were altogether unjustified, and at his worst in reducing the agrarian question to an oversimplified formula. He was too intent upon proving that all difficulties could be laid at the door of Rumanian capitalism, with the support of the moribund but sinister boyar class. There is of course a certain amount of truth in this contention, but it served to distort his analysis. For example, "overpopulation" as a cause of economic misery was obviously unwelcome to him since it put the blame outside the realm of political economy and made it an act of God. He was correct in maintaining that Rumanian officialdom had all too eagerly seized upon overpopulation in recent years as a perfect scapegoat for the prolonged failure to improve agriculture, but it cannot be written off as an unimportant factor. Pătrăşcanu, however, felt obliged to attack it and devoted considerable attention to destroying the "myth" of overpopulation. He distinguished, quite properly, between absolute or biological overpopulation and an overpopulation resulting from economic circumstances. In his view there were three principal causes of this relative, or economic, overpopulation:

1) the existence of large properties, whereby 25,000 families held a quarter of the arable land, thus depriving hundreds of peasants of the possibility of creating a holding (according to the 1930 census 25,000 exploitations of over 50 hectares occupied only 18.8 per cent of the arable surface);

2) under semiservile conditions labor was intensively exploited; consequently one man was driven to accomplish the work on a piece of land which normally would provide a living for three;

3) the extensive use of women and children in place of men on boyar estates produced the appearance of overpopulation.

While these conditions, all of which he associated with the existence of large properties, doubtless had some effect—especially the first—they were certainly not the major reasons for Rumanian agrar-

36. Virgil Madgearu (*Evoluţia economiei româneşti*, p. 358), making use of some calculations of the agrarian economist Roman Cresin, stated that while small cultivators under 5 hectares had an excess of labor power, middle and large properties required additional labor, evaluated at 190 million days a year. Of this, 40 per cent (around 371,300) was undertaken by paid agricultural laborers, and 60 per cent represented supplementary work performed by the families of small proprietors. Pătrăşcanu, however (*op. cit.*, p. 85), took this figure of 40 per cent of paid agricultural laborers, equated it with the fact that 40 per cent of the arable land in Rumania in 1930 was in holdings over 10 hectares, and gave the quite unjustified impression that in effect agricultural laborers were responsible for the cultivation of all land over 10 hectares.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

185 ian overpopulation after 1921. Moreover, he granted that Rumanian strip cultivation and dwarf holdings led to overpopulation because of
● 241 their economic inefficiency but he went on to say:

> The solution of this aspect of the Rumanian agrarian question cannot be achieved in the framework of small properties, nor in the framework of private property in land. It cannot find a solution either in individual or isolated fashion, but involves structural transformations which concern the whole of Rumanian society, hence far past the restricted limits of the agricultural sector properly speaking.[37]

In a word, for all his criticism of the "myth" of overpopulation Pătrăşcanu really provided no convincing evidence that it was not a real problem, nor could he. This point is important, because the propaganda for the subsequent 1945 agrarian reform was obviously based on similar premises.

In his proposal of remedies, he limited himself to immediate reforms, which were not socialist but which were intended to rid Rumania of fascism and restore a constitutional bourgeois society. For agriculture he advocated the complete expropriation of large properties over 50 hectares, the abolition of servile labor relations, the resettlement of landless peasants and peasants with insufficient land; distribution to the peasants of livestock and equipment obtained from the expropriated estates; cancellation of peasant debts to the banks and to the state. Other economic measures included the nationalization of the Rumanian Bank and the consolidation of the banking structure; state control over cartels and the nationalization of certain combines; an eight-hour day for labor, minimum wages, social security, and protective legislation. For a Communist it was certainly a minimum program.

In explaining this program, Pătrăscanu relied upon the ideas of Lenin of 1900. The whole of the peasantry—while carrying within itself the latent conflict between poor peasant and the kulak—was the adversary of large property, although for a number of different reasons. In some European states peasant solidarity was no longer possible, but in Rumania there still remained a substantial antiboyar spirit common to poor and rich peasant alike.

The Agrarian Reform of 1945

241 Rumanian agriculture was disorganized after the defeat of 1944,
423 although as always the very backwardness of peasant farming re-
185 duced the shock. The war had depleted stocks of grain, draft animals,

37. Pătrăşcanu, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

and equipment. There had been fighting during the spring and summer over a wide strip of Moldavia, and less extended fighting was going on in Transylvania. The German army had retreated, the Red Army had marched through the country. There had been a considerable dislocation of population, and many landowners had fled from their estates in Moldavia and Bucovina.

Despite these unsettled conditions there was initially very little peasant action. There were cases of peasants taking land, primarily from absentee owners or those who had fled the Russian advance. But as late as January, 1945, at Botoşani in northern Moldavia—a region bordering the Soviet Union and which had been under Soviet control since the preceding spring—an agreement was reached, with the approval of the local Soviet commander, whereby landowners who had left their estates could return to them, provided they agreed to operate them personally and not as absentees.[38]

When the National Democratic Front began its drive to power in February, 1945, the calm was broken. In September, 1944, the Rumanian Communist party had put forward a demand, incorporated in the program of the National Democratic Front, for the expropriation of land over 50 hectares. Even before Groza and the Communists came into office peasant committees in the villages began taking over large estates. While this display of zeal, in most instances initiated by local organs of the Ploughmen's Front, was authentic in the sense that it corresponded to the primordial land hunger of the Rumanian peasant, it in no way reflected a revolutionary situation. The peasants in the winter of 1944 were not in a gay frame of mind; they were poor, heartily sick of the war which had cost many of them their sons, not to speak of their horses, cattle, and equipment. They were tired of troops—German, Russian, and Rumanian—marching by and requisitioning. They did not like the old order, they hated the local gendarmes but they were not in a revolutionary frame of mind. They welcomed land but they were not in a rick-burning mood.[39] The premature seizures of land before any law had been passed were merely part of the mock revolution the National Democratic Front was undertaking.

One of the first acts of the Groza government after its tumultuous rise to power was to promulgate a decree-law, on March 22, 1945, for a land reform.[40] According to Article 1 of this law, "Agrarian reform

38. This may seem surprising, but I saw the agreement in the prefecture at Botoşani.

39. Such at least was my impression after traveling though some 30 judeţe in December and January, 1944–45.

40. A text of the law is given in a pamphlet published by the Rumanian Ministry of Information, *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie* (Bucarest, November, 1946).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

241
423
185

is a national, economic, and social necessity for our country. Rumanian agriculture should be based upon sound and productive farms, which are the private property of those who cultivate them."

The stated purposes of the reform were:

a) the enlargement of the cultivable area of existing peasant farms which were less than 5 hectares;

b) the creation of vegetable gardens in the environs of cities, for workers, civil servants, and artisans;

c) the creation of new individual private farms for agricultural laborers without land;

d) the use of certain land for model farms and experimental stations, to be administered by the state.

The following land was to be expropriated:

a) all properties belonging to German citizens and to Rumanian citizens of German ethnic origin who had collaborated with Hitler Germany;

b) the properties of war criminals and those responsible for the "disaster of the country";

c) properties of those who had fled to countries with which Rumania was at war and of those fleeing after August 23, 1944;

d) the land of absenteeists (excluding persons on official business abroad, or absent by necessity, or workers who had gone abroad and who had less than 10 hectares);

e) properties of those who during the last seven years had not cultivated the land themselves (excepting those with less than 10 hectares);

f) properties of those who had volunteered to fight against the United Nations;

g) mortmain lands;

h) lands of private owners in excess of 50 hectares, including arable, orchards, meadows, ponds, marshes, and inundated land. The proprietor was permitted to select which 50 hectares he was to retain but it had to be in one place. Multiple properties and properties of husband and wife were considered as one.

All tractors, threshing machines, sowing machines, and combines found on expropriated land were to pass to the state for the creation of agricultural machine stations. Other equipment and livestock was to go to the state for redistribution to the peasants. Expropriation of inventory and livestock was to be in proportion to the amount of the proprietor's land expropriated.

The law exempted from expropriation rice fields, church and monastic properties, crown lands, and lands belonging to certain specified

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

cultural and philanthropic institutions, urban communes, and co-operatives. 241 423 185

The mayor of each commune was directed to call a general assembly of all peasants having less than 5 hectares. This assembly was to elect a local committee of 7–15 members. These committees, whose actions were to be coordinated by a district committee operating with the Ministry of Agriculture, were to draw up lists of land to be expropriated and of peasants who were entitled to receive land.

Priority in the distribution of land was as follows:

a) cultivators mobilized in the anti-Hitler war;
b) widows, orphans, and invalids of this war;
c) widows, orphans, and invalids of any war;
d) landless peasants;
e) agricultural laborers and peasants who had worked on the land expropriated;
f) peasants with less than 5 hectares.

A necessary condition for all categories, however, was that the recipient lack 5 hectares of land.

Expropriation was without compensation. The price of the new lots was to be equal to the annual average harvest of one hectare, that is, 1,000 kilograms of wheat or 1,200 kilograms of maize. The new proprietors were to pay immediately in money or in kind 10 per cent of the purchase price, the remainder to be paid in ten years for peasants with little land and in twenty years for landless peasants. Landless peasants could obtain a three years' moratorium on the payment of their first installment.

Holdings created under this law could not be divided, sold, leased or mortgaged, either in whole or in part, except in certain special cases, with the authorization of the Ministry of Agriculture. The new land was received without obligations.

Lands expropriated and divided before the promulgation of this law were to be made to conform with its provisions.

By a subsequent administrative regulation certain large properties could be exempted from expropriation, if they were well-organized enterprises, suitable to serve as model farms under the direction of the Ministry of Agriculture; even these farms, however, were not to exceed 150 hectares.

For a number of reasons it is difficult to ascertain the results of the law in terms of the redistribution of land. Expropriation began before the law was promulgated, and although the irregularities in its application were not as great as some of the dispossessed landowners made out, there was a good deal of uncontrolled seizure and redistri-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241
423
185

bution. A reform carried out so brusquely and through the agency of local peasant committees was bound to be a hectic procedure and not likely to be very accurately recorded. As has been mentioned already the statistics on the 1918–21 reform, even those presented officially, were far from accurate, and there is no reason to believe that the figures on the 1945 reform are a bit more reliable. Indeed, it is quite obvious that some of the figures were rigged for political purposes.

As of January, 1947, according to official announcement, 1,448,911 hectares had been expropriated under the 1945 reform from 143,219 proprietors; 1,057,674 hectares had been distributed to the peasants and 387,565 hectares held as state reserve. Of the 1,114,888 peasants having claims, 796,129 had received land.[41] The average area expropriated was only 10 hectares. Of the number of peasants having claims 72 per cent received land. The average amount received per peasant was about 1.3 hectares. In magnitude this reform—if the figures are at all comparable—by no means equaled the 1918–21 reforms. For roughly the equivalent area (i.e., minus Bessarabia, though including Northern Bucovina and Southern Dobrogea), the first reform had expropriated 4,312,911 hectares, 2,824,962 hectares had been distributed to 1,036,367 peasants, an average of 2.7 hectares per peasant.

The regional results of the 1945 reform correspond to the nature of the terrain, with the notable exception of Transylvania. In the mountainous overpopulated areas the average allotment was very small: 0.6 hectares in the Moldavian Carpathians, 0.7 hectares in the Wallachian Carpathians, and 0.5 hectares in Bucovina. In Dobrogea, which was relatively sparsely settled, the peasants received an average of almost 3 hectares. An interesting feature of the reform is that while in most of the regions the average area of land expropriated was relatively large (over 130 hectares in the Moldavian Plain, 111 hectares in the Danube Plain, 57 hectares in Dobrogea, and 58 hectares in Bucovina) the average area expropriated was only 5.5 hectares in the Transylvanian Plateau and 5 hectares in the Tisa Plain. Of the total number of expropriations over nine-tenths were in Transylvania, although the area expropriated in that province was only about one-half the total. Clearly this meant the expropriation of numerous properties well under 50 hectares and presumably reflects the forced reduction of the German communities in Transylvania.[42]

41. Institutul Central de Statistică, *Communicări statistice, Nr. 17, 15 martie 1947* (Bucarest, 1947), p. 9.

42. The extensive German settlements in Transylvania, many of which had been there

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

In January, 1948, the Statistical Institute of the new Rumanian People's Republic undertook an agrarian census to ascertain the distribution of land after the 1945 reform. Unfortunately, this census does not permit satisfactory comparison with that of 1941. It presents a table, comparing the number of agricultural exploitations in the various categories of size for 1941 and 1948, which shows, as might be expected, a decrease in the number of dwarf holdings under ½ hectare and of large holdings over 20 hectares, and a marked increase in the number of exploitations between 1 and 5 hectares. However, since the amount of area occupied by these categories of exploitations is not given and it is unclear whether the same types of land (especially forests and pastures) are included in both cases, the comparison is not very illuminating and may be misleading.[43] It was obvious, however, that the land reform of 1945 did not, as it could not, create a nation of prosperous small-holders. Indeed, the conclusion reached as to the size of Rumanian exploitations has a very familiar ring: "If 3 hectares represents in general the minimum lot necessary to sustain by farming a household of 4 persons, then more than half of the agricultural exploitations of Rumania fall short of this level and are obliged to have recourse to outside income." [44] To be sure, this sour note was not the one prevailing in 1945 and 1946, when the reform was being pushed through, but anticipated the new agrarian line taken up in 1948.

In judging the 1945 land reform, it is necessary to realize, however, that it was not a Rumanian reform but had its sources in the Soviet Union, and that its immediate aims were political not economic.

---

for hundreds of years, were greatly reduced by the wholesale transfer of nearly the entire able-bodied population to the Soviet Union in the winter of 1944–45. Undoubtedly a high percentage of the Germans had been actively pro-Nazi, but the Soviet order paid no attention to any such criteria.

43. Number of agricultural exploitations (excluding Northern Transylvania):

	1948		1941	
Size of exploitation	*Number*	*Per cent*	*Number*	*Per cent*
Total	2,596,900	100.0	2,303,472	100.0
0–½ hectare	190,169	7.3	277,500	12.0
½–1 "	246,016	9.5	213,088	9.3
1–3 "	933,383	35.9	760,700	33.0
3–5 "	604,540	23.3	441,213	19.2
5–10 "	462,607	17.8	449,716	19.5
10–20 "	122,262	4.7	116,537	5.1
20–50 "	26,607	1.0	27,845	1.3
Over 50 "	11,316	0.4	16,873	0.7

A. Golopenţia and P. Onica, *Recensământul agricol din Republica Populară Română, 25 Ianuarie 1948. Rezultate provizorii*, Institutul Central de Statistică (Bucarest, 1948). For further details of the 1948 census see the Appendix. It appears that a good deal more land was included in this census than in 1941.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

already enjoys virtually complete control over the country. Moreover, 648
while the Rumanian political and economic structure is steadily approaching, and probably not asymptotically, the Soviet model, the final decision on incorporation will be based—apart from considerations of expediency—on political definitions which a mind not steeped in Leninism-Stalinism would have small chance of foreseeing.[20]

Economic Conditions

Economic developments since 1945 may be divided into two periods: 178
two years, 1945–47, of confusion and distress resulting from the war, Russian withdrawals, severe drought, the agrarian reform, monetary inflation, and the unsettled political situation; since 1947, a period of greater stability, an apparent increase in production, and the beginning of a directed and planned economy. In neither period can one obtain a very satisfactory picture of economic conditions. In the first months there was much administrative disorganization, and the government itself frequently lacked accurate information. The Groza regime has not hesitated from the outset to manipulate statistics for political and propagandistic purposes. Since the tightening of the administration in 1948, Rumania has been as reluctant as the Soviet Union, more reluctant than the other satellites, to publish any measurable economic data. Today, the few figures that appear are given as percentage gains for which it would be exceedingly difficult to supply a reasonably accurate base.

In general, it may be said that Rumania was slower than the other 433
eastern European states to recover from the war, in somewhat the 241
same way it lagged in coming out of the depression. Agricultural production fell off seriously in 1945 and 1946, partly because of the disorganization attendant upon the agrarian reform, but largely because of two years' serious drought. Both the acreage sown and the crop yields, especially in maize, the peasant's source of food, were exceptionally low; in 1946 the level of agricultural production was only 59 per cent of the 1934–38 average.[21] The production of indus-

20. This point is not very important but it is of interest to note that in the exchange of notes leading to Tito's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, after referring to Kardelj's hope, expressed in 1945, that the Yugoslav government would be regarded as the representatives of one of the future Soviet republics, rather scornfully dismissed his "primitive and fallacious reasoning . . . about Yugoslavia as a future constituent part of the USSR." It did not, however, vouchsafe its own authoritative views on the subject. Cf. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute* (London; New York, 1948), p. 39.

21. United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948* (Geneva, 1949), p. 17.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

433 trial and food crops fell successively in 1945 and 1946, and it is to
● 241 be noted that the soybean, so extensively advertised in the 1930's, virtually disappeared as a crop when the peasants were left to their own devices.

The absence of accumulated stocks of grain, the large deliveries to Russia under the armistice, and the failure of the maize harvest in 1946 produced a disastrous and tragic famine, above all in Moldavia, in the winter and spring of 1947. Relief shipments had to be brought in from abroad, including substantial assistance from the United States.

The livestock position, while improving over the situation immediately after the war, was still weak by 1948. There were, in that year, 30 horses and 138 oxen (including buffaloes) per 100 agricultural exploitations as against 56 and 150 respectively in 1941; in terms of cultivation, there were 21 draft animals per 100 hectares of arable land in 1948 as against 27 in 1941. The quantity of agricultural equipment showed less diminution: an increase in the total number over 1941 was matched by a slight decline in the amount of equipment per exploitation, a result presumably of the increase in small holdings after the 1945 reform.[22]

Rumanian industry, which had expanded under wartime demands, registered a decline in 1944 and 1945, but a slight recovery in 1946. According to the Ministry of Finance, total industrial production was 80 per cent of the 1941 level in 1944, 60 per cent in 1945, and 77 per cent in the first ten months of 1946.[23] The chemical, metallurgical, and food industries were the most severely hit. The petroleum industry, which appears to be facing an exhaustion of the tapped fields, had already showed signs of decline before the war; in 1947 the output of crude petroleum was 3.8 million tons as against 8.7 million in 1936 and 5.8 million in 1940.

433 In addition to the slump in agricultural and industrial production,
C48 the Rumanian economy suffered from the flow of goods to the Soviet Union. The total value of Rumanian wealth transferred officially or unofficially, as restitution, reparations, or war booty has been the

22. A. Golopenţia and P. Onica, *Recensământul agricol din Republica Populară Română, 25 Ianuarie 1948. Rezultate provizorii*, Institutul Central de Statistică (Bucarest, 1948).

23. Rumanian Ministry of Finance, *Expunere de motive la bugetul 1947/48*, p. 338. The validity of these figures is uncertain, and they may represent an inflated estimate. Tătărescu is reported to have said in 1947 that after two years of the Groza regime the general level of production was only 48 per cent of the 1938 output. *New York Times*, June 6, 1947.

3: Roberts S-- (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

The Change in Economic and Agrarian Policy

185 With regard to economic policy, the first two years after the war might be regarded as an induced and foreshortened NEP; not a retreat from war communism as the Soviet New Economic Policy had been, but, in form at least, the creation of a transitional economy between the older Rumanian capitalism and the drive toward socialism. This concept is closely related in the Communist mind to the functions of the People's Democracy and is embodied in the Constitution of 1948, though by that time the actual economic policy was moving beyond it.

241 465 For all the fanfare accompanying the 1945 agrarian reform, the organization of Rumanian farming in the first two or three years after its application showed little change. In the planting year 1946/47 much the greater part of the working force was engaged in family farms. About 181,000 persons (2.3 per cent of those active in agriculture) were permanent farm laborers, about 783,000 were engaged in seasonal work, and 1.4 million persons did some work on farms other than their own.[27] Payment for work continued to be a mixture of money and produce, only one-third of the work being paid solely in money.

The type of cultivation was much the same, though there was a retrogression from mixed agriculture. If the figures are comparable, some 61 per cent of the exploitations in 1948 were devoted to cereal cultivation as against 51 per cent in 1941; only 1.2 per cent of the exploitations concentrated on raising livestock as against 12 per cent in 1941, a reflection of the wartime loss of animals and the breaking up of large estates.

About two-thirds of the exploitations obtained their money income through sale of produce, the other third through outside labor. Two-fifths of the exploitations in 1947 were obliged to buy agricultural produce to supplement their own deficient production.

185 241 In 1945 the Groza regime announced that the agrarian reform was but the initial step in a whole series of projected reforms which would transform Rumanian agriculture, but at this time there was no mention of collectivization as the general goal. On the contrary, any mention of collective farming was frowned upon, and the whole emphasis was on assisting the independent peasant. Actually, the list of

27. *Recensământul agricol din Republica Populară Română, 25 Ianuarie 1948*, p. 85. The relation between the last two categories is not clear, but the figures on permanent and seasonal workers are quite similar to those of 1941. See above, p. 52

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

proposed measures was very similar to those brought forward repeatedly by various Rumanian governments in the preceding twenty-five years. Great publicity was given to state-operated agricultural machine stations which were to enable the peasant to mechanize his cultivation; from the beginning, however, this measure was regarded as a powerful potential lever in the hands of the state to direct agriculture. The promise of an agricultural machine industry was also a familiar item of earlier programs. Other recognizable projects were land reclamation, the creation of better experimental stations, improved agricultural education, more credit, a vigorous cooperative movement, development of agricultural industries, a scientific land survey, and the encouragement of animal husbandry.[28]

In 1945 the government created a National Cooperative Institute to assist agriculture, but its principal function appears to have been grain collection.[29] In November, 1946, appeared a new organ, REAZIM, an autonomous administration for developing agriculture, animal husbandry, and the use of agricultural machinery. REAZIM took over most of the state functions for agrarian improvement, rationalizing cultivation, supplying seeds and equipment, executing production plans, and managing agricultural machine stations.

Although many of these projects resembled those proposed by earlier regimes, it was obvious that the Communists had no intention of permitting Rumanian agriculture to proceed in its traditional rut. Even in the first phase of ostentatious silence about collective agriculture, the nature of the reforms, or rather the absence of certain reforms, provided an indication of developments to come. In its plans for agricultural improvement, the regime appears to have laid little stress on the desirability of consolidating holdings in private ownership, and the 1948 census showed the fragmentation of properties to be just as extreme as in 1941. The emphasis was upon increasing cereal output through mechanization rather than upon the intensified and diversified cultivation suitable to peasant farming. When, as a consequence of the 1946–47 famine, poor peasants began to sell their holdings, the government took steps to cancel sales to rich farmers. All these moves showed that it had no intention of fostering the growth of an independent, potentially capitalist peasantry on the

28. See, for example, the two pamphlets outlining the government's plans for intensifying livestock raising and for land reclamation: *Intensificarea creşterii animalelor în cadrul refacerii economice* (Bucarest, 1946), and *Îmbunătăţirile funciare în agricultura românească* (Bucarest, 1946).

29. In 1945 INCOOP was granted 57 billion lei for the collection of grain, of which 13 billion was for deliveries to the U.S.S.R., 8 billion to supply Soviet troops, 1 billion to supply the Rumanian army, and 35 billion for the civil population.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

185 Western model, but during this first period, to avoid alienating the
241 peasants, it held its hand.

A somewhat similar situation obtained in the question of industrial
185 policy, though here official propaganda was much more hostile to
433 exploiting industrialists. So long as the Tătărescu Liberals were in the government, it called for the cooperation of private capital, and the only important step taken in this first phase was the nationalization of the National Bank. As late as March, 1947, Mihail Ralea, Rumanian Minister to the United States, protested against rumors that the government was proceeding against private enterprise and maintained, either disingenuously or without information (Ralea was not a member of the Communist party), that one of the main goals of the Groza regime was to "foster private initiative," to which it granted complete freedom.[30] Nevertheless, in practice the sphere of private industrial activity was increasingly circumscribed and restricted by a number of devices: obstructive action by the workers, appeals to the national interest, or simply charges of inefficiency and sabotage.

439 Perhaps the most significant economic innovation in the months after the armistice was the creation of a number of joint Soviet-Rumanian enterprises. On May 8, 1945, the Rumanian government signed an agreement with the Soviet Union providing for extensive economic collaboration. The U.S.S.R. was to assist Rumanian agriculture by supplying tractors, seed, and agricultural experts. A number of SOVROM companies were set up in the important fields of river and air transport, banking, lumbering, and oil production and refining. (A 1948 trade agreement created two new SOVROM companies for the manufacture of tractors and chemical products.) Participation in the companies was on a 50–50 basis, and the Rumanian state was to grant them special privileges and monopolies. Much of the Soviet capital was quite easily obtained from the German assets in Rumania, awarded to the U.S.S.R. in the Potsdam agreement. These concerns clearly gave the Soviet Union a controlling position at key points in the Rumanian economy.

This form of economic collaboration was reminiscent of the Rumanian-German trade agreement of 1939. The principal difference lay less perhaps in the agreements themselves than in the structure of the Soviet and German economies. Under the German-Rumanian agreement the two economies were seen as complementary, and the major function of Rumania was to provide raw materials; the Germans showed some hostility to the further development of Ru-

30. See his letter to the *New York Times*, March 12, 1947.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

tasks. The first was to restrict the kulaks and dislodge them from their position. Then it would be possible "when conditions are ripe, to pass over to the policy of the complete liquidation of the kulaks."[36] He anticipated, of course, that the kulaks would resort to underground struggle, sabotage, and criminal acts in an effort to avert their approaching fate.

The second task was to undertake propaganda convincing the poor and middle peasants of the need to unite in collective farms. When that task had been achieved, when all the land belonged to the collectives in perpetuity, the goal of making the land public property and bringing about the socialist transformation of the countryside would be reached. Gheorghiu-Dej emphasized, however, the necessity of making this transition gradually, by means of persuasion, and with the voluntary support of the peasant. The poor peasants should not be driven into collectives, the middle peasant should not be identified with the kulak, and the whole process must be paced by the development of agricultural machinery, machine tractor stations, and the expansion of the network of consumer and producer cooperatives as broad mass movements.[37] These words of caution presumably reflect the wisdom gained from the Soviet experiment in collectivization.

Gheorghiu-Dej concluded his remarks with the inevitable "self-criticism": in the past the party had not provided a clear political line for work in the countryside and had failed to popularize the notion of uniting the working peasantry into collective farms, and had even ignored or denied this goal.[38] That these so-called errors were the fault of the Rumanian Communists is, of course, nonsense. The party line, emanating from Moscow, had shifted, and in this instance a strong case can be made that the change had been planned long in advance. The Communists could have had no intention of stopping at the stage of small peasant cultivation which had, in any event, reached a cul-de-sac in Rumania.

The creation of collective farms got under way in 1949, and by the end of the year, according to the glowing account of a Russian visitor, 56 *kolkhozi* comprising 4,000 peasant families had been estab-

36. As in Russia representatives of the restricted and soon to be liquidated kulak class are not to be admitted to the collective farms.

37. The cooperatives, however, must rid themselves of capitalist elements, must intensify their collaboration with the state trading organs, and must promote the spirit of "socialist emulation" among the peasants.

38. G. Gheorghiu-Dej, "Tasks of the Rumanian Workers Party in the Struggle for the Socialist Reorganization of the Countryside," *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy* (Bucarest, March 15, 1949).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

TABLE XXVI. COMPARISON OF DISTRIBUTION OF EXPLOITATIONS BY SIZE IN 1941 AND 1948 (EXCLUDING NORTHERN TRANSYLVANIA) 311

Categories of Size (hectares)	1941 Number	1941 Per Cent	1948 Number	1948 Per Cent
0–0.5	277,500	12.0	190,169	7.3
0.5–1	212,088	9.2	246,016	9.5
1–3	760,700	33.0	922,358	35.9
3–5	441,218	19.2	604,540	23.3
5–10	448,716	19.5	462,607	17.8
10–20	116,537	5.1	122,362	4.7
20–50	27,845	1.2	26,607	1.0
Over 50	16,872	0.7	11,316	0.4
Total	2,305,472	100.0	2,586,900	100.0

SOURCE: *Ibid.*, p. 20.

COMMENT: Although the geographic regions covered in these two tables are the same, the comparison sheds little light and may be misleading, because the amount of land included in each category is not given. In 1941, according to the census of that year, the 2,300,000 exploitations occupied only 10,418,000 hectares, of which about three-fourths was arable. According to the 1948 census the 2,600,000 exploitations occupied approximately 17,000,000 hectares, of which less than one-half was arable. Because of this great difference in the amount of land involved, it would be fallacious to use these tables as a demonstration of the effects of the 1945 agrarian reform.

TABLE XXVII. PRINCIPAL BRANCHES OF AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY

A. Percentage of Arable Devoted to Different Crops 241

	Cereals	Wheat	Maize	Barley	Oats	Rye	Alimentary Plants	Industrial Plants	Forage Crops	Fallow
1921–25	87.1	25.5	31.7	15.6	11.3	2.5	3.3	2.2	4.2	3.2
1926–30	85.4	24.4	34.7	14.4	6.8	2.5	3.5	3.1	5.1	3.1
1931–35	83.9	24.0	36.8	13.4	6.2	2.9	3.6	2.8	5.5	4.2
1936	83.3	24.6	37.7	11.6	5.9	3.0	3.6	3.5	5.6	3.8
1937	82.4	25.7	36.5	10.3	5.6	3.3	3.7	3.6	5.2	5.1
1938	82.1	28.3	36.3	9.0	4.7	3.4	3.6	3.5	5.3	5.5

SOURCE: *Statistica agricolă a României la 1938*, pp. xiv–xv.

B. Distribution of Agricultural Exploitations According to Type of Farming

	Percentage of Total Number of Exploitations 1941	1948
Cereals	50.7	60.7
Animal husbandry	12.5	1.3
Viticulture	1.4	1.3
Fruits	0.7	0.7
Mixed, and other	34.7	36.1

SOURCE: *Recensământul agricol din 1941; Recensământul agricol din Republica Populară Română.*

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

● 241
311

TABLE XXVIII. PERCENTAGE OF LAND DEVOTED TO DIFFERENT CROPS ACCORDING TO SIZE OF PROPERTY, 1938

	Size of Property (hectares)						
	0.1–1	1–2	2–5	5–10	10–25	Over 25	Total
Cereals	51.97	61.61	64.61	72.94	78.14	80.42	68.05
Alimentary plants	4.21	2.89	2.17	2.27	2.75	2.40	2.75
Intercropped plants	2.64	2.26	1.56	1.14	0.86	0.80	1.35
Forage crops	4.27	6.02	7.50	5.00	2.97	3.06	5.06
Industrial plants	1.12	1.77	2.46	1.84	1.29	1.44	1.72
Fallow	0.90	1.77	2.52	2.46	1.90	0.71	1.90
Natural meadow	10.58	7.90	5.26	8.42	8.12	7.62	8.11
Pasture	0.25	1.09	1.67	1.97	1.70	2.22	1.73
Orchards	5.80	1.75	1.19	0.77	0.76	0.88	1.00
Vineyards	10.28	4.61	3.91	2.45	2.90	0.79	3.22
Forests	5.60	2.82	3.61	2.67	3.96	25.43	7.19
Barren	0.35	0.59	0.35	0.98	0.49	0.52	0.42
Not utilized	3.16	1.56	2.02	1.83	3.07	3.96	2.47

SOURCE: *69 Sate romînesti*, II, 97.

COMMENT: These figures were reached through a sampling investigation of some 60 villages.

243

TABLE XXIX. PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL GRAINS

	Output in 1,000 Quintals				Area Covered
	Wheat	Maize	Barley	Oats	
1921–25	24,277	38,518	12,080	9,118	71 *judeje*, frontiers as of January, 1938
1926–30	30,388	46,071	10,180	11,067	
1931–35	28,285	50,972	12,122	6,525	
1936	35,051	56,120	16,119	9,471	
1937	30,090	44,500	9,402	5,128	
1938	44,124	52,351	8,222	4,005	
1938–39	32,980	39,020	5,500	4,010	40 *judeje*, frontiers as of January, 1941
1940	32,720	37,082	4,982	3,707	
1941	19,082	32,072	3,911	3,300	
1942	8,540	21,816	2,526	3,572	
1943	28,297	22,286	5,165	4,126	
1944	26,020	22,640	3,021	3,012	
1945	10,086	18,198	2,441	2,324	
1945	12,745	18,198	2,278	2,527	58 *judeje*, postwar frontiers
1946	14,087	19,040	2,204	2,528	

SOURCES: *Statistica agricolă a României în 1938*, p. xvii; *Statistica agricolă a României în 1941–1944*, p. xiii; *Expunere de motive la bugetul general al statului* (Bucarest, 1946, 1947).

241 132 221 It will be seen that structure and climate conspire together to encourage a scheme of summer utilisation of high pastures combined with valley cultivation that was much enriched when the maize plant was introduced, but this was not so long ago, and the older régime was none too prosperous both because of climatic troubles in the highlands and especially the sensitiveness of the wheat plant to abnormal seasons, and because of the hindrances to organisation arising from the diversities of language between governments and 371 subjects. The encouragement of industry was not easy while some lignite and a little coal were the main sources of power, but later on it became possible to use abundant petroleum and natural gas and we have yet to see, in the 565 next generation, what influence they may have. Up to the 241 present, however, a true peasantry survives, and has increased its hold on the soil; it still makes at home a great proportion of what it needs, it still finds that in the hills the maize crop may not ripen, and old communal schemes relating to the high pastures remain important.

137 reached there was little to be seen, the alpine meadows having been closely cropped by sheep. During an early morning walk in the neighbourhood of the hut, more alpine conditions were seen to be prevalent and plants typical of such regions were recorded, such as: *Ranunculus nemorus*, *Polygala amara*, *Genista tinctoria*, *Saxifraga aizoon*, *Alsine gerardi*, *Heliosperma quadrifida*, *Viola declinata* (endemic), *Gentiana nivalis*, *G. utriculosa*, *Campanula carpatica*, *Dianthus gelidus* (endemic), *D. spiculifolius* (endemic), *Pedicularis verticillata*, *Rhododendron Kotshyi* (endemic), *Sedum atratum*, *Pleurogyne carinthiaca*, *Phleum alpinum*, *Potentilla aurea*, *Anemone alba*, *Primula minima*, *Scorzonera rosea*, *Loiseleuria procumbens*, etc. Unfortunately a very heavy thunderstorm with torrential rain made it impossible to investigate the flora on the interesting plateau country passed shortly after leaving the Peştera hut on our way down to Bu-teni.

BRAN was our next place of stay and the hill sides round the town proved very interesting floristically. Some 160 common plants were recorded in addition to *Coronilla varia*, *Impatiens noli-tangere*, *Actaea spicata*, *Monotropa hypopitys*, *Centaurea pseudo-phrygia*, *Nepeta pannonica*, *Trifolium alpestre*, *T. ochroleucum*, *Chaerophyllum aromaticum*, *Inula hirta*, *Erysimum repandum*, *Galinsoga parviflora*, *Salvia verticillata*, *Brunella grandiflora*, *Linum flavum*, *Hypericum transylvanicum*, *Scabiosa ochroleuca*, *Selinum carvifolium*, *Bupleurum falcatum*, *Seseli annuum*, *Luzula albida*, etc. Above the hotel was a considerable stretch of beech forest intermixed with spruce (*Picea excelsa*); on the lower edge of this was the usual hazel (*Corylus avellana*), alder (*Alnus incana*), Cornelian cherry (*Cornus mas*), hornbeam (*Carpinus betulus*), etc. At the foot of the slope on damp ground were [241] clumps of *Salices* and *Alnus incana*. Around the cottages on the hillsides were patches of potatoes with oats and sometimes a small patch of hemp; some of this freshly cut and being retted in a shallow pit dug in the ground was also noted. Generally speaking, the flora around Bran itself was a very rich one. Close by the hotel the following species of Mycetozoa were seen: *Stemonitis hyperopta* on an old tree stump, *Arcyria denudata*, maturing on soil, and masses of *Mucilago spongiosa* ripening on old sticks.

137 [241] THE JOURNEY to Brașov (Kronstadt) took us along the valley, both sides of which were well cultivated, potatoes, beans, oats, maize being the chief crops; sunflowers and small patches of hemp were also seen. A halt for petrol, a short distance from Bran, provided an opportunity for studying the meadow land vegetation close to the road; the following were noted: *Scilla trilobium*, *Centaurea scabiosa*, *Coronilla varia*, *Hypericum perforatum*, *Medicago falcata*, *Peucedanum oreoselinum*, *Knautia arvensis*, *Campanula rotundifolium*, *Helianthemum chamaecistus*, *Stachys betonica*, *Dianthus Carthusianorum*, *Viola tricolor*, *Senecio aquatica*, *Trifolium procumbens*, *Achillea millefolium*, *Chrysanthemum leucanthemum*, *Campanula trachelium*, *C. rapunculus*, *Cirsium oleracea*, *Galium verum*, *G. Mollugo*, *Geranium pratense*, *Lathyrus pratensis*, *Melampyrum nemorosum*, etc.

AT BRAȘOV were seen *Potentilla canescens* and *Silene otites* among many commoner species.

IT WAS NOT until we reached Borsec that we had time to study the vegetation in any detail, and it was somewhat unfortunate that the truly sub-alpine and alpine regions were not within easy reach. The greater part of the mountain sides surrounding Borsec were covered with spruce forests quite to the summits and beech forest was not well represented, being met with as somewhat poor specimens often at a considerable height. These forests proved to be rather deficient in species, botanically.

DURING our walk from Borsec across meadows and up on to the summit of Bukkhavas, it was interesting to see the beech and birch above the limit of the spruce. *Ribes grossularia* was seen in fruit in open spots in the forest. The open summit was covered with *Vaccinium myrtillus* with its usual association; *Scorzonera rosea* was also growing upon the summit. Leaving the mountain and going down towards Bilbor we noted a grassy clearing with a building where cattle had been housed: this as in other cases was covered with a prolific growth of dock (*Rumex sp.*); it invariably accompanied places where mountain dairies had been established. On reaching the valley a fine clump of *Dianthus superbus* was seen.

244 A WALK around the cottages of Old Borsec revealed several vegetable gardens apparently associated with the possibility

137 *mutellina*, etc. The forester mentioned that beech forest was of no practical value but that hornbeam (*Carpinus betulus*) was sought after because of its hardness.

THE VEGETATION AROUND CORBU.

OF the vegetation around Corbu, the special village studied, little need be said: the hillsides had in many places been denuded of timber for building and domestic purposes throughout the whole length of the village.
THE following zones may be distinguished:

●241 1. THE ZONE OF THE VALLEY BOTTOM (BISTRICIOARA).
THIS was devoted to agriculture, but the maize was poor in comparison with that seen on the hot Wallachian plains; patches of barley occurred chiefly on the south-facing slopes, and there were small patches of potatoes and hemp; hay was cut on the meadows near the river and on the lower slopes.

2. THE ZONE OF FOREST.
137 SPRUCE was the dominant tree, but on the church side of the
313 village, particularly towards the Borsec end, stretches of Scots pine (*Pinus sylvestris*) had evidently been planted just above the valley floor. This was presumably to retain detritus and to consolidate the soil as they were planted much too closely to have any economic value for timber. Conversation with the forester on Runcul above Tulghes confirmed this fact and Dr. Pop, the botanist at Cluj, also mentioned that *Larix decidua* var. *polonica* had been planted above Corbu. The schoolmaster said that the valley floor and lower slopes had originally been covered with trees and that wood was very cheap but labour was dear. Timber plays a very great part in the domestic economy of a village like Corbu, being used for building, furniture, carts, looms, winding frames, etc., as well as for fuel.

THE TRAIN JOURNEY FROM TOPLITA (OLAH TOPLICZA) TO CLUJ.

241 FINALLY the train journey from Toplita to Cluj afforded
137 another opportunity for observing the crops grown. All along the railway in the Mureş valley much maize was

241
137

grown with sunflowers round the edges of the fields; little tent-like stacks of hemp were seen drying, and on one occasion a field of tobacco was noticed. The common tree was the false acacia (*Robinia pseudacacia*). Along the stream sides one invariably saw the flowering rush (*Butomus umbellatus*). Vines were seen growing around Rasboeni.

A VERY interesting salt marsh area was noticed before reaching Cluj, large areas being covered with sea aster (*Aster tripolium*) and a species resembling sea lavender (? *Statice gmelini*) recalling the vegetation of the salt marshes on the North Norfolk coast around Blakeney, etc. AT CLUJ we were privileged to visit the fine Botanic Gardens under the guidance of Prof. Emil Pop, and saw the special floras of the various regions of Roumania.

IN CONCLUSION I should like to mention my indebtedness to Miss Vines and Capt. Chase for their observations and lists of plants from various areas which they visited.

HENRY J. HOWARD, F.L.S., F.R.M.S.,

VI.—ECONOMIC ROUMANIA

Agriculture.

311 162 Modern Roumania is essentially an agricultural state, as was the Old Kingdom (43 to 46 per cent of the land being arable and 22 per cent forest, whilst over 80 per cent of the population of 18 millions are agricultural workers), although it has valuable potentialities for the development of industry.

132 ●24 134 Arranged in zones round the bastion of the southern and eastern Carpathian highlands, the main agricultural regions of post-war Roumania exhibit, according to aspect and altitude, a considerable variety of climatic conditions, which is reflected in a varying emphasis in the selection of crops raised. In general, we may say that the continental nature of the climate and the resulting succession from north to south and from highland to lowland of soils, graded from poor ashen-grey podsol in the Carpathians through oak-forest loams to a rich chernoziom in the south-eastern Danube plains, has resulted, wherever the ground is sufficiently level, in a concentration on grain production. The heavier rainfall of the uplands, the relatively great humidity and shelter from the driving winds that sweep across the open plains, coupled with the exposure of less [137] fertile rocks—granites and coarse sandstones—explains the large area of forested land (24.5 per cent, nearly 7½ million hectares) in those districts that extend into the Carpathian highlands.

243 Of the 13 odd million hectares of arable land, cereals occupy some 37 to 39 per cent. Production varies greatly from year to year and from district to district. In the old kingdom of Wallachia-Moldavia, maize is by far the heaviest crop, particularly in Oltenia, where the summer rainfall is heavier. It is also the heaviest crop in Transylvania, the cultivated areas under maize, wheat, barley and oats being [262] respectively 4, 3, 2 and 1 million hectares. Maize is the staple crop of the peasant holder almost throughout the country, for it not only provides the bread cakes and the "mamaliga," maize pudding, the main food of the mass of the people, but also fodder for the cattle to eke out the hay in

PLATE VIII

291.
462

133



Shooting the rapids on the Bistrita.

Photo: Dr. H. Gundy.



Harvesting by hand on the level Danube plains.

Photo: Romanian Press.

The above illustrations from Gerky Studio issued by the R.R.C.

291

Spinning with a distaff—an occupation symbolical of the traditional life of the Roumanian peasantry in the hill country.

Photo: H. J. Shepard.

•241

[facing page 49]

313 church, fencing, roofing, flooring, is of timber, and also many of his household utensils: water-buckets, jugs, spoons, etc.

It is very unfortunate that the most lucrative type of timber should be the most inaccessible. Timber from the great stands of pine has to take the slow and tortuous route down the rivers in rafts (see Plates VII and VIII) to the Danube and Black Sea. Afforestation has not reached a high stage of development as yet. The trees are propagated by naturally-sown seeds, and there are very few nurseries. Where the clearings are made, the stumps are left in the ground to add to the difficulties of the hay harvester.

221 We may sum up the tale of Roumania's agricultural assets by saying that she is well endowed by nature as regards soils and climatic conditions for the wide-spread production of grain, fruit and vegetables; that natural pasture, whether upland or lowland, is seasonal and insufficient for a satisfactory development of cattle raising, though much may be done by an intensified cultivation of fodder crops. The increased provision of communal grazing for the peasants has been a useful step. Conditions are better for sheep, which are more adaptable than cattle and are better able to stand the rigours of the hard winter. Transhumance is everywhere practised with these animals: those of the great plains moving from the Danube lowlands in the spring to the hill pastures in the summer. Local transhumance of cattle, sheep and pigs from villages of the upland valleys to the high dairies is the rule.

Land Tenure.

241 423 Agricultural conditions, past and present, and the marketing of the products of land-utilisation are so closely bound up with conditions of land tenure that it is relevant to include here a short summary of those conditions.

In the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the Great War, 50 per cent of the land of Old Roumania was in large holdings (over 250 acres), and in the Bucovina, where the Roumanian peasants' holdings were pitiably small, 60 per cent. About 40 per cent of the holdings were of less than twenty-five acres. In Old Roumania and Transylvania the average was only eight acres per family, in the grain lands of Bessarabia eleven, but in the Bucovina uplands

241
423 only three and a half. But 50 per cent of the registered large holdings were farmed in small parcels by peasants who paid rent largely in kind or in services to absentee landlords or large tenant holders, mainly Jews, to whom the land had been farmed out. Such an arrangement often meant a considerable return to the landowner or direct farmer at the
213 expense of the peasant labourer. On the large holdings wheat was the main crop, only about 14 per cent of the maize in Old Roumania being grown on large holdings. There are a number of reasons for this. First, more capital is required for the cultivation of wheat; wheat seed grain costs ten times as much as maize for an equal area; then, in the higher lands, where the smaller holdings are to be found, the heavier rainfall and shorter growing period is more conducive to maize cultivation than to that of wheat. Again, the traditional staple food of the peasant is the easily prepared "mamaliga" or maize pudding, and the difficulty of persuading a peasant people to change their habits of life is well known, also the heavy animal fodder provided by maize is an important consideration for the peasant. And lastly, where the maintenance of life is dependent on an adequate winter store, the peasant is more concerned with securing that tangible store than with providing a cash crop with which to acquire luxuries. The large farmer, on the other hand, was mainly concerned in producing a surplus crop of wheat for export.

423 BETWEEN 1916 and 1926 a great redistribution of land in the interest of the peasants took place both in Old Roumania and in the newly-acquired territories. Such a redistribution in a land with important ethnical minorities has naturally given rise to much discontent among the dispossessed landlords and as naturally forms the basis of much political discussion and unrest and endless propaganda by all parties. But we are only concerned here with the economic results of the redistribution.

423 IT MUST be recognised that the change from large- to small-
241 scale farming, however advantageous to the peasant against whom the scales had always been weighted in the past, means a change in the character of the land cultivation, and though farming methods even on the large farms cannot be said to have been very enlightened, a certain amount of

423 capital expenditure on the provision of machinery, artificial
241 manures and so forth had been possible, and labour was cheap and available when required. With the small holding, these advantages can be acquired only by means of a highly-organised co-operative system and a controlled credit organisation, and there is no doubt that there has been a set-back in productiveness of large sections of the land. The large holders have been greatly handicapped in the exploitation of their land, moreover, first by government restrictions in the matter of wheat export, and second, by the great slump in wheat prices, probably also by inclement weather conditions. As a result there has been a drop of over 12 per cent in 1933 in the acreage under wheat and a corresponding rise in that under maize and barley.

241 To GET the best out of Roumanian agricultural land, im-
312 proved communications is one of the first essentials, for the removal of surplus crops, for the supply of artificial manures, particularly nitrates, and for the spread of agricultural education. The Roumanian peasant is backward in farming methods and requires help, both educational and financial, in such matters as seed selection and manuring. He uses too light a plough to get the best results from the soil and for the conservation of moisture in the soil. A system of irrigation would be of immense benefit not only in the plains but also in the valleys of the uplands. Of course, lacking the great reservoirs of water in snowfield and glacier and lake with which Switzerland and Austria are endowed, the perennial irrigation which is common in those lands cannot be so easily obtained, though much more utilisation might be made of the streams if the peasantry were more enlightened in their use. Large-scale irrigation works would necessitate the construction of reservoirs in the major river valleys to store the surplus rains of spring and early summer and the snow melt. Control of the streams is a very urgent matter, for the amount of damage they cause, in the sudden floods to which they are liable, to roads, bridges and to arable land is enormous. One of the great difficulties that the engineers have to deal with, and this may also be an important consideration in reservoir construction, is the friability of the rock material in most of the foot-hill country of the Carpathians. (This was illustrated very forcibly in a journey by car from Vatra Dornei through the Campulung district.)

241 Dry farming is practised to some extent, but is capable of
312 development in the districts of semi-steppe.

CO-OPERATION.

476 ALTHOUGH it is not by any means reduced to a science, as in Belgium and Denmark, for example, co-operation is practised by the Roumanian peasant farmer to an important extent. In Transylvania and Bessarabia, the system has for long been well established, owing to the initiative and encouragement of village priests and schoolmasters. For example, there are community herds of water buffaloes, which tend
474 to prevent deterioration of the breed. The forest industry is in the main run by co-operative societies which control the felling, local distribution and marketing of timber.

IN 1931 there were 5,200 popular co-operative banks, with over 1,150,000 members; 236 forest co-operative societies, with about 341,600 members; 1,600 consumption and supply co-operative societies, with 236,000 members; besides a number of village buying and leasing associations.

241 MUCH has been done, and efforts are continuing by propaganda and instruction, to encourage more up-to-date methods among the peasant farmers and there are a number of schools for primary instruction in agricultural method. Modern farm machinery is loaned by the Ministry of Agriculture to peasants for small fees, stud farms have been established to improve the breed of horses and cattle, and funds have been loaned to the peasant communities for the purchase of stud animals.

INDUSTRY.

135 FROM the point of view of power and raw materials for the development of industry, Roumania is also well endowed by nature. True, her supply of coal is negligible, the only deposit worth mention being that of the brown coal basin of Jiul at Lupeni in Oltenia, which is capable of producing about two million tons per annum. (The output in 1933 was in the neighbourhood of 1.4 million metric tons.) It contains much sulphur but is used to some extent in iron smelting. On the other hand, there are very rich stores of mineral oil. The oil-bearing rocks occur in abundance along the outer rim of the Carpathians in lower Miocene deposits which are

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 ED1 Rumania ED1

PLATE X

241
133

Hay meadows on deforested slopes above the limits of cultivation at Corbu. Although this is the upper section of a valley tributary to that of the Bistricioara, it is much broader than the narrowly constricted lower section.

Photo: R. A. Pelham.

342
361

Typical Rumanian farmsteads in Corbu. The houses are roofed with shingles, the outbuildings with boards. The house in the centre has the characteristic hearth in place of chimney, and its walls are of timber with plaster covering. Hemp is drying on the verandah. The mud caulking in the outbuilding is clearly visible.

Photo: R. A. Pelham.

[facing page 65]

342 absence of small fields, although a vegetable garden is a
563 normal feature. Most of them are grouped together in a small colony on a piece of steeply-sloping ground near the western end of the village that could not be used for agricultural purposes, thus emphasising the fact that they constitute an exotic element living on the outskirts of the community (see Plate XII and Fig. 11).

311 There is no emigration from Corbu, but the tendency is to extend cultivation by forest-cutting. A good deal of land in the Bistricioara valley is still available.

II. FARMING ACTIVITIES

The Land and Inheritance.

428 Farming in Corbu is carried on essentially for subsistence
241 rather than for profit. Large-scale cultivation with its attendant economies would in any case be difficult in such an environment, but it is rendered impossible by a land tenure system, intimately bound up with laws of inheritance, which permits the subdivision of land from generation to generation. On the death of the father the widow receives a quarter of the estate, the remainder being divided equally amongst all the children. Alternatively, the latter take over their portion on marriage, but the result in each case is the same—the peasant holdings not only decrease in size but portions of the same holding may be widely separated. For it does not even follow that all the land surrounding a farmstead necessarily belongs to the family residing there. It did, of course, when the holding was first formed, but marriage has in most cases added complications. A portion of the holding, for example, may belong to a married daughter living elsewhere in the village and her husband will then come periodically to cultivate it as part of his estate. Much time is wasted in this way, so wherever possible an interchange of plots is arranged, especially where the parties to the marriage belong to different villages.

423 In a register covering about 207 hectares of privately owned land there were 133 parcels registered, sometimes more than one in the name of a particular person. Of the 133, 56 were less than one hectare each, but at least 8 of these parcels were accessories to other holdings and those owners

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

361
133



This is part of the area mapped in Fig. 11. The photograph is taken from the top of the porphyry spur shown in Fig. 6. *Photo: R. A. Pelham.*

241
342

A peasant holding at Corbu in process of sub-division. A son about to marry is erecting a house (left on left) on his share of his father's land. The parental homestead extends across the right-hand half of the picture. A strip of maize is seen in the foreground and a small patch of hemp on the extreme left, close to the new house. For plan of holding see Fig. 11. *Photo: R. A. Pelham.*

[facing page 68]

423 dealt with a considerably larger area. Forty-six holdings were between one and two, 18 between two and three, 8 between three and four, 3 between four and five, and 2 larger (8.8 and 19.5) hectares in extent. These holdings do not necessarily represent the whole of the land owned by a peasant.

LAND UTILISATION.

311 BROADLY SPEAKING, the land within the commune may be divided into three categories: the alluvium of the Bistricioara valley and the lower portions of its tributary valleys which is devoted to arable farming; the deforested lower slopes of the valley sides, together with the broad upper portions of some of the tributary valleys and odd patches of level ground here and there which are reserved for hay; and the rest, which is forest with the exception of the small high-altitude clearings that provide summer pasturage for the transhumant flocks and herds.

311 423 ABOUT 58 per cent of the land belongs to the state, 37 per cent to the commune, and the rest, comprising about 400 hectares, is owned by the peasants. These 400 hectares represent the arable land of the commune, whilst the state lands are entirely forest. The commune lands include a certain amount of forest, together with the hay meadows and summer pastures. The law tries to make peasants plant trees to replace those that they cut down.

CROPS.

241 [262] IN the arable area the outstanding crop is maize, from which "mamaliga," the staple food of the peasants, is made. It is sown at the beginning of May, two hillings, separated by an interval of three or four weeks, are made during June, and the crop is harvested between September 25th and October 10th. Potatoes, hemp, flax, lucerne (of which three cuttings are usually made), a little rye, sunflowers and vegetables are grown, mostly in very small patches, giving the impression of garden, rather than field, cultivation. Occasionally a small orchard adds further variety to the general pattern.

246 THE HAY CROP is of vital importance, as in all mountain communities of this kind throughout Europe. It is harvested

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

241



FIGURE 11. A — Joinery mill. B — Smithy (Plate XII). C — Wool-combing shed. D — Saw-mill. E — Gipsy colony. F — Holding in process of subdivision. Numbers refer to position and direction of camera: (1) Plate XII (lower), (2) Plate XI (lower), (3) Plate XI (upper).

246 in the Bistricioara valley in the early part of July, the peasants then working up the hillsides to the higher meadows where the hay-making is completed about the third week in September. What is not needed in the village byres is stacked on the lower slopes near the sheep pens in which the animals are housed during the winter months.

221 TRANSHUMANCE.

TRANSHUMANCE forms an essential supplement to arable farming in Corbu, for the cultivable land is too valuable to be used for grazing purposes except for a short time after the harvest, whilst the produce of the hay meadows is required for winter feed.

5: Fleure S-5 (no date) i-39 EDI Rumania EDI

FARMING AROUND CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

AMY R. BURGESS

133 IN THE region of Curtea de Argeş the river flows in a valley of varying width, floored with fine sandy alluvium and bounded by somewhat rounded hills. Some traces of river terraces are discernible.

THE LAND of this region can be divided into four categories: (*a*) arable, (*b*) hay meadows, (*c*) forest, (*d*) high mountain pasture. The arable land is principally on the first terrace, but stretches both down the slope to the valley bottom and up the slope to the second terrace. The hay meadows are above the arable land, spreading upwards towards the [137] forest. The forests comprise 75 per cent of the total area, and consist mainly of timber trees, such as beech and pine, together with a considerable number of walnut trees. The high pastures are above the forest belt and may be as much as fifty kilometres away from the village centre of the commune to which they belong.

423 THE ARABLE land is owned by the peasants, holdings ranging from less than one hectare to fifty hectares, the majority being from two to five hectares. The smallness of the holding [428] is due partly to the laws of inheritance, by which the land is divided between the children on the death of the owner, and partly to the fact that the district is so hilly that only small areas are available for cultivation.

241 476 THE HAY meadows belong to the commune and are both worked and used collectively by the peasants, all necessary organization being in the hands of the mayor and committee.

471 [313] THE FORESTS are largely state-owned, although some portions belong to the commune, in which case the peasants are allowed to cut for their own personal use (house-building, implements, etc.), but not for profit.

[233] THE HIGH pastures belong to the commune; the peasants pay a small fee to the commune for their use (20 lei per head per season for sheep, rather more for cattle).

132 AN IMPORTANT climatic feature affecting agriculture is the shortness of the summer, late spring and early autumn frosts

●241 PAID AGRICULTURAL labour is very rare; the work of the farm is done entirely by the peasant and his family, including women. Modern machinery is still almost unknown, so that agricultural practice is rather that of the garden than that of the field in our Western sense.

PLOUGHING IS done with a wooden plough tipped with iron and ox drawn. Sowing is done largely by hand, while intermediate operations, such as hilling the maize, are done with a hoe of the form illustrated on page 59. Harvesting, if not done by "pulling" (e.g. flax), or picking (e.g. fruit), is done by means of a sickle (maize) or scythe (hay).

[242] AMONG SOME farmers some idea of rotation of crops is understood, but only very imperfectly; in many cases it is not practised at all, the same plot of land being used for maize year after year.

ARTIFICIAL FERTILIZERS are seldom used, peasants depending for renewal of fertility upon animal manure and ploughing in and burning the stubble. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the yield is low and crops poor in quality.

[221] SOWING BEGINS at the end of April or the beginning of May (oats) and continues until the middle of June. Harvesting begins as soon after July 20th as possible and continues until the end of October, when the last of the maize is gathered.

231 ANIMALS PLAY an important part in the agricultural economy of the Rumanian peasant. Every holding possesses sheep, particularly milking ewes, milking cows, draught oxen, perhaps a horse or horses, pigs, together with geese and fowls. Few holdings are without one or two hives of bees. Occasionally on a very small holding (less than one hectare) milking cows are replaced by goats. During the summer (from the beginning of May until the end of August) the sheep and such cattle as are not needed at the farm for draught or milking purposes are sent up to the high pastures. Pigs are sometimes sent up with them, but not goats. During this time the animals left are either fed on fodder crops at the farm or are sent out daily to pasture on a portion of the hay meadows set aside for that purpose. On being brought down from the mountains the animals are pastured for a short time on the hay meadows from which the crop has already been taken. They are then brought back to their

291 owner's farm, where the cows are kept in sheds, and the sheep, which are more hardy, are penned on the arable land, particularly on the maize stubble. Both sheep and cattle are fed on fodder crops during the winter. The surplus animals are sold at the autumn fair, and form a source of revenue.

476 [236] [234] WHILST ON the high pastures the sheep are clipped twice, and the wool is divided amongst the peasants in proportion to the number of animals sent up. The cheese is usually shared by the owners of the animals in the same way, the mayor and his committee being responsible for the correct apportionment. In the Valley of the Argeş co-operative dealers from Bucharest frequently buy the cheese "in bulk" direct from the commune, and the monetary value is shared between the owners of the animals.

291 OXEN ARE used almost exclusively for draught purposes, the numbers kept in this district being somewhat in excess of the farmers' requirements, owing to their use for lumbering (see below).

241 [369] [438] PEASANT FARMING in the Valley of the Argeş is no longer entirely on a subsistence basis. Two factors have tended to modify it. Firstly, the position of the valley, opening as it does directly on the Wallachian Plain, with its rich grain lands and containing the capital Bucharest, has allowed commercial intercourse to develop. The Argeş peasant no longer cultivates wheat; he does not mind if his maize crop is good enough for fodder only, for he can buy both wheat and maize from the plain. Further, he finds a ready market and so a money income in Bucharest for his surplus fruit, 313 particularly apples, and cheese. Secondly, the forests form a valuable asset to the peasant. During the winter felling takes place in the upper basin of the Argeş; in spring and summer the timber is transported, and work in the State mill in Curtea goes on all the year round. Practically every household has somebody working in the timber trade, and the money so earned (as much as 100 lei per day for a man supplying his own yoke of oxen) reduces the dependence of the family on the farm.

874 242 AT CURTEA DE ARGEŞ is the School of Agriculture, Regina Elizabeta. Although only a small percentage of its pupils is local, it is gradually influencing the farming of the neighbourhood. Experiments in cultivation, plant breeding and

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

874 the use of machinery are carried on at the school. Advisers
242 are sent out to the farms, and seeds and plants, as well as artificial manure, are supplied to the peasants at a very low cost. Machinery is also loaned out cheaply. The average
[157] peasant, however, is very conservative, and progress is slow.

SOME DETAILS OF TWO FARMS: AUGUST 1936

FARM A

423 SIZE: one half-hectare approximately. This farm is situated
241 approximately two miles north of Curtea de Argeş.

THE HOLDING consists of a narrow rectangular strip, bounded on one of its long sides by a rough lane and on its short side by the main road. The ground is fairly level and sufficiently above the river to be well drained. (See Plan A for utilization of land and arrangement of buildings.)

Animals

[231] 2 milking cows, 2 calves (at farm), but no oxen (this was unusual).
10 sheep, away on high pastures.
3 pigs, at farm.
10 geese, 6 ducks, 50 hens.

FARM B

SIZE: Five hectares approximately. This farm is situated at Corbeni, several kilometres north of Curtea de Argeş, at a point where the river valley widens out and the river braids. The farm is situated on the second terrace. The plot is rectangular, with its narrow side bordered by the road and its long side running parallel to the river, thus giving a well-drained but flat holding. The son of the owner holds a diploma for agriculture and the farm shows every evidence of prosperity. See PLAN B for utilization of land and arrangement of buildings.

SMALL PEASANT HOLDING

(Farm A)

241
423



A. House
B. Loom
C. Plum trees

Approximate length 250 m.
Approximate breadth 20m.

Not drawn to scale

Main road. Curtea de Argeş ⟶

Drawn by A. R. Burgess

5; Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDI Rumania EDI

241
423

PLAN OF LARGE HOLDING

(Farm B)

Approximately 5 hectares
Not drawn to scale.



be a determination in government circles to go a long way to satisfy most of the just demands of the minorities and to avoid as much as possible giving cause for irritation; at least Professor Iorga's declarations in the Rumanian Chamber on Dec. 14th, 1931, can be regarded as inspired by a spirit of sincerity and goodwill that constitutes a sure basis for an understanding. Among other things he affirmed: "We have no desire to create hypocritical Rumanians out of minoritarians, for he who renounces his past and sells his soul in order to secure advantages, is no gain to the people to which he transfers his allegiance, but rather a corrosive poison for the soul of that people. We must not frighten the minorities by an oppressive policy on the part of the Rumanian State, and by an absence of fraternal sentiments on their behalf amongst the Rumanian people; for it is not by such means that we shall consolidate our position, but rather by collaborating with the minorities and by respecting their most elementary rights."

Both the Hungarian and the German minorities constitute extremely valuable elements for furthering the general progress of the country, because, standing culturally higher than the Rumanian element in all domains of activity they can serve as examples to the latter. This is particularly noticeable in farming; the German villages especially constituting veritable model farms which have powerfully contributed to the general dissemination of the more advanced agricultural methods used in Transylvania.

This intercourse between these three peoples has reacted very favourably on the Rumanians of Transylvania, who from every point of view stand at a much higher level than their brethren of the old kingdom. In fact, however unpalatable this truth may be to the latter, it must be frankly declared that the main chance of a regeneration in Rumanian political life can come only through a larger participation in it of the Transylvanians, who certainly have a clearer conception of their civic duties than is prevalent south of the Carpathians. The marked pre-eminence of the Transylvanians over other sections of the Rumanian people must be ascribed to their having been in contact with Germans and Hungarians, though the latter by their oppressive methods

neglecting the peasants; on the contrary, they saw in them a numerous and profitable crowd of clients for the banks, the majority of which were under their control. The less pecuniary aid the peasant obtained from the State, the greater would be his need of the private bank or usurer. And so well did the latter entangle the peasants in their tentacles that within ten years of the enactment of the Land Distribuion Act the debts contracted by the peasants had surpassed the value of their lands. Thus the much-belauded agrarian revolution in Rumania was threatened with complete failure, and so another revolutionary measure had to be passed, the strangely-termed "law for the sanitation of agrarian debts," in order to save the peasantry from being dispossessed of their land.

The *Argus* of 13th February, 1932, published the following table which shows how the land was actually distributed:

Area of properties.	Total hectares.	Percentage of area.	Number of proprietors.	Percentage of total. Owners.	Average area of farm for each category.
Up to 5 hectares ...	6,280,993	43.60	3,731,403	84.20	1.94
5 to 10 hectares ...	2,919,863	20.20	435,715	11,30	6.70
10 to 50 hectares ...	2,392,689	16.60	148,860	3.90	16.07
50 to 250 hectares ...	1,505,257	10.40	18,122	0.50	83.08
Over 250 hectares ...	1,305,670	9.10	2,597	0.10	502.00
Total ...	14,404,462,	100.00	3,836,757	100.00	3.75

As one hectare sown to wheat yields approximately 1,200 kg. of wheat, and the average price of wheat during 1931 was about 2.25 lei, the revenue per hectare may be reckoned at about 2,700 lei. As the average holding of 84 per cent of the peasantry is about 2 hectares, the paper assumed that the revenue of each peasant household amounted approximately to some 5,400 lei, or about 160 gold francs. For the year 1931 the total revenue from agriculture was computed at 46,500 million lei, of which 21 milliards were derived from the cattle-rearing industry, 21 milliards from cereals, and 4½ milliards from other plants. Other crops were even less profitable; thus the average price of maize was 1.50 lei per kg. and the yield 1,500 kg. per hectare, so that the revenue per hectare amounted to 2,250 lei, and the figures for barley were respectively 2 lei, 1,400 kg., and 2,800 lei.

AGRICULTURE

It was the policy of imposing export taxes on all agricultural produce, which despoiled the peasantry of all the legitimate profit they should have made on the marketing of their grain, and which not only tended to discourage them from increasing the area under cultivation but prevented them from consolidating their position as independent farmers. Indeed, had not the Rumanian peasant been unduly burdened with taxes during the years following the conclusion of the war, when cereals fetched highly remunerative prices, he would undoubtedly have been able to make sufficient money to equip himself with the necessary instruments and cattle for his farm, avoided running into debt, and he would even have been able to constitute a small reserve on which to draw in the lean years. But these possibilities were frustrated by the culpable negligence of his rulers. And yet there were plenty of men who clearly foresaw and foretold the disastrous outcome for agriculture of such negligence, and protested against this system as well as against the undue partiality accorded by Government circles to industry in general. Certain organs of the Press continued for years to warn the public, and to deprecate the disastrous policy that was being followed. But it was in vain, the Bratianus would accept no counsel from anyone. The *Argus* on October 21st, 1926, commenting on this theme, drew the following conclusions:

"From the above-cited appreciations one may infer that on one hand the prices obtained by the producers are below those they secured before the war, while on the other hand the prices of the articles they need for their upkeep are at about 70 per cent above the pre-war level. In spite of these facts all these taxes which burden production are being maintained, and agriculture is placed not only in an impossible situation for developing itself but in a state of inferiority when compared with that of other countries which export cereals."

In another article published by the same paper on October 10th, 1926, we find a similar pessimistic strain: "From the above figures it becomes obvious that agriculturalists instead of making a profit have lost money, both this year and in previous years of drought. Such a result has completely discouraged them, especially the 101 younger among them..."

000 previous years of drought. Such a result has completely discouraged them, especially the younger among them. . . ."

489 241 And it was not only the export taxes which impeded the development of agriculture, but also the deplorable state of the whole transport system. The shortage and deficiencies of the latter would have been very easily remedied with foreign aid, but the Bratianus were deaf to all such suggestions, though the imperative necessity of eliminating these defects was daily insisted on in the Press. Here is yet another excerpt from the *Argus* of October 8th, 1926, and it will be found both apposite and illuminating on this subject:

"So long as the Railway Administration does not dispose of adequate funds to obtain the necessary rolling stock, nothing can be done. Without locomotives, without trucks, without warehouses, a transport system is helpless in a country like ours, which cannot develop without exports. In order to stimulate and encourage the production of our soil, the subject of the re-establishment of our means of communication by land and water ought to be constantly in the minds of our governing circles. We have paid no heed to this truth during the eight years following the war, and as a result, if we except Russia, our country is the hindermost in Eastern Europe as far as transport is concerned. For this reason, in almost all railway stations quantities of grain remain for months waiting for trucks, to the immense prejudice of the producers and the merchants. The capital which is thus immobilized for so long a time, when interest rates are soaring fantastically, the warehouse dues, the loss in quantity and quality of the cereals through exposure and theft, are some of the factors which are contributing to the ruin of our agriculture and of our commerce in cereals. . . ."

651 241 To these complaints and remonstrances, however, the Government turned a deaf ear, and it even went farther and threatened to impose still heavier burdens on this harassed industry by an increase in the land tax. The injustice of this contemplated measure was exposed at length by Dr Ernest Ene in the *Argus*, who marshalled figures and facts to prove that, in comparison with other industries, agriculture had so far been treated as a Cinderella, although it had furnished

to the State a very notable portion of its revenues. According to the figures cited, the total value of the products of industry during 1924 was about 20,000,000,000 lei, while the taxes derived from industry amounted to 488,858,000 lei only. But even this yield was only apparent, for the preferential rates granted for the transport of local industrial products and other subsidies more than absorbed this sum. Agriculture, on the other hand, with an output amounting to 60,000 million lei, contributed revenue to the extent of 7,000 million lei to the State, of which more than 761 millions was in the form of the land tax. Another writer in the *Argus* of November 26th, 1926, is equally indignant at this threatened increase in the land tax, and finds that the 8,000 million lei which the peasantry contributed indirectly to the State revenue, mainly through the export taxes, is already a disproportionate burden. In fact by 1929 agriculture, including cattle rearing, was reckoned to contribute 122 milliard lei to the national revenue, which was calculated to amount to a total of 175 milliards. The remissness the Government displayed towards the agricultural population was bound to have yet further regrettable results, namely, the decrease in the quantity and quality of the yield of cereals. Devoid of means, the small farmers (whose average holdings amounted to less than 5 hectares and represented 60 per cent of the cultivated area and 90 per cent of the rural population) were unable to buy decent seed grain, so that the quality of the cereals grown deteriorated and the yield per hectare steadily decreased. This fact was persistently pointed out by intelligent agriculturalists in the Press. Commenting on the increasing deterioration of the maize crop, a writer in the *Argus* of November 10th, 1926, stated: "The average yield of maize per hectare for the last five years has sunk to 10 hectoliters, while in the United States it is 22.7 and individual farmers who apply more rational methods obtain more than 40 hectoliters. . . . It should be noted that both the climate and the soil of the U.S. are far inferior to ours. . . ." Yet another agricultural engineer, in a series of articles published in the *Argus* in November, 1926, asserted that if good seed corn were distributed to the peasantry there would be an immense increase in the yield

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

244 of at least 30 per cent in three years, which would represent an increment of 20,000 million lei to the national income, and the writer proceeded to show how erroneous it was to continue following a policy of encouraging industry, since the latter could never yield similar results in so short a time no matter what amount of capital was invested in it. He further enlarged on the necessity of creating a system of credit institutions which would offer loans to the peasantry, for the latter had been completely abandoned to themselves, and he stigmatized the attitude of the Government in this respect as "a policy of complete economic aberration."

241 423 There are many who attribute the decadence of agriculture in Rumania to the Agrarian Reform, but this is an altogether gratuitous conclusion, though in a particular sense their assertion is correct. One may, for instance, take it for granted that had the large landowners subsisted, owing to their political influence they would never have allowed the Bratianu Governments to institute such legislation as rendered the marketing of agricultural produce impossible on a remunerative basis. Indeed the cultivation of the soil had ceased to be a profitable one even as early as 1924, and large farmers employing paid labour could not make enough out of their produce to cover their outlay plus the normal rent of their farms. This was exposed at length in the *Argus* of July 29th, 1926, and the paper attributed to this cause the decrease in the area sown with wheat in Moldavia and Bessarabia, where the best corn lands in Rumania are to be found. One could further infer from the arguments invoked that it was only the smallholder who could persevere in such a disadvantageous occupation as agriculture, because he neither stinted his efforts nor valued at its true worth the amount of labour he expended on his own land, such being the traditional attitude of the peasant. M. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, in his informative book "Neoiobâgia," relates how the peasantry persisted in cultivating their land in the neighbourhood of Ploeşti after 1907, when owing to the development of the oil industry the price of land had increased to such an extent as to render agriculture an uneconomical occupation. Thus, while a pogon[1] of land was let at 50 lei,

[1] One pogon is equivalent to 5,012 sq. metres.

the price of the quantity of maize grown on it would fetch only 40 lei; nevertheless the peasant owner persisted in cultivating his patch of land because he felt ashamed to allow it to lie fallow, having always been accustomed to cultivate it, and buy the maize he needed instead, for which, however, he would probably have to pay a somewhat higher price than the 40 lei at which he could have sold his own (p. 111). So that, far from exerting an adverse influence on production, the breaking up of the large estates has, on the contrary, proved to be the salvation of the industry, for were it not for the abnegation and attachment of the individual smallholder to his farm, agriculture would have been completely ruined by the policy imposed by the Bratianus. Indeed, one cannot but admire this profound devotion of the peasant to the land and his dogged persistence in carrying on, despite the odds which confronted him and the utter lack of encouragement he met with from the State. We may take it for granted that the small farm of five hectares was more productive than the large estates, even from official statistics. This peculiarity was commented on in the *Cuvantul* of July 23rd, 1927, which at the same time decried the maladministration of the then Finance Minister, M. Vintila Bratianu, and his threat to increase the land tax. That paper contested the official statement that the land tax in Rumania amounted to one gold franc per hectare, as this affirmation would cast a slur on the country. In fact it was estimated that in 1924 the export taxes on cereals had yielded the equivalent of a tax of 8 gold francs per hectare.

The determined perseverance of the peasantry could not undo the harm caused by the erroneous agrarian policy pursued, and the situation could not but grow worse with time.

So that when finally the National Peasant Party assumed power at the end of 1928, the situation had become so hopeless that the Rumanian Government even contemplated organizing a mass emigration to France and her colonies in order to relieve the strain. Early in 1929 the Press, commenting on this unexpected decision of the Government to encourage emigration, admitted that the cause of the disastrous condition agriculture had reached in Rumania could

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

241 be clearly traced to the carelessness with which the law of
413 land distribution had been drafted, and to the utter neglect
[51] to provide financial means for its rational application, as well
167 as to the export taxes on agricultural produce. The outcome was appalling, as may be judged from an article in the *Cuvantul* in which, after dilating on the causes that had brought about this disaster, it was asserted: "We are obliged to admit that the entire rural population had reached a state of pauperism at a time when we should reasonably have expected it to be thriving, since it had been endowed with lands. It seems a paradox, yet we have only wrecked the old system of production, founded on the unjust system of latifundia, in order to replace serfdom by pauperism. At the time of the large estates the rural worker had no need to emigrate; on the contrary, there was a shortage of labour, and foreign labourers had to be admitted from neighbouring countries. To-day, however, we are forced to direct the rural population abroad so as to save it from starvation; that is the situation we have reached ten years after the enactment of the expropriation laws. . . ." According to the *Adeverul* of March 29th, 1929, the Minister for Agriculture, speaking about the state of that industry, drew a very dark picture and lamented the wretched condition to which agricultural production had fallen. Rumanian agriculture, once the source of wealth and the economic basis of the State, was, he said, on the verge of ruin. The Minister not only condemned the culpable manner in which the land distribution law had been carried out, but also denounced the laxity and incapacity of the functionaries who had been appointed to show the peasants new methods of cultivation. According to him, the so-called model school farms were a positive dis-
241 grace. . . . Apparently matters have not improved since, for
874 as late as March, 1932, one could read in the *Ellenzek*, a paper published in Hungarian at Cluj, that the Hungarian Cultural Association of Transylvania had decided to present a petition to the League of Nations to demand the creation of an agricultural school destined exclusively for sons of Rumanian citizens of Hungarian nationality. One ought not to feel surprise that the Hungarian minority, convinced of the glaring ineptitude of the Rumanian administration, had

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

241
874
658
871

at last been compelled to assume at its own expense the professional training of its youth.

It is sad to record that even in educational institutions the remissness which has characterized Rumanian administration has not been adequately grappled with, and it is not surprising that the laxity manifested in this particular domain should appear especially odious to the national minorities in Rumania, which have a different moral conception of life than that of the predominating nationality. That there is much to be done in this department is obvious to all, owing to the persistence of the complaints. A storm of indignation was raised by the scandalous condition of the College of Salonta, in Transylvania, in which some 400 Hungarian and Rumanian students were being educated. Of this number of students, 50 per cent were incapacitated, owing to the disgusting lack of hygiene prevailing, and the anarchic system on which it was conducted. The parents of the students had to petition the Minister of Education to obtain amelioration of the methods in vogue, and the details exposed were so revolting that the *Cuvantul* of March 28th, 1929, commenting on them, more or less admitted that such facts justified the opprobrious epithet of "putrid Wallachs" conferred on the latter by the Hungarians.

241
565

From this it may be deduced that agriculture had already been ruined through the culpable remissness of Rumania's rulers before the present crisis made itself felt. The country was caught like some disabled ship by the economic hurricane which suddenly sprang up, and materially it is suffering intensely, because in its battered condition it finds it difficult to weather the storm. Fortunately, the peasantry has been used to a life of suffering and hard toil; the peasants are patient and long-suffering to an extent inconceivable in the West. Docile and good-humoured, they put up with a situation that a Westerner would long since have found intolerable and against which he would have revolted. Poverty-stricken and unguided, the peasant has not only been left to provide the means wherewith to develop his farm, but at the same time he has been forced to supply from his own scanty resources the needs of the urban populations and the bulk of the funds requisite for carrying on the administration

241 565 of the State. It is this utter lack of consideration for this hard-pressed mass of humanity that raises the indignation of the foreign observer against those who, through the cruel irony of fate, have been called upon to look after the destinies of this luckless people. The selfishness, incapacity, and corruption of which they have given proof can only be compared to that moral disintegration existing under the Tsarist régime, and one should not feel surprise if finally the same developments supervene. The rural population is absolutely sick of the present system and has lost all faith in its politicians.

An important meeting was held early in 1932 at Focşani [668] by fruit-growers and viticulturists, who may be considered to represent the more intelligent classes of the rural population, and the prevalent opinion expressed by the delegates was to the effect that no alleviation could be expected so long as the present system was maintained, and that Bolshevism held out better prospects. This did not cause any alarm, and passed almost unheeded, save for some mild criticism from one of the veterans of journalism in Rumania, M. Batsaria, who, in an article which appeared in the *Adeverul* on January 20th, 1932, admitted that this attitude was significant, yet opined that it was not aimed against the Crown, which at the time was being very roughly handled by General Averescu in the Press campaign the latter had just launched.

241 433 In spite of the culpable neglect with which agriculture has always been treated, the industry remains Rumania's mainstay and sole hope of survival. The whole social life of the country, even its future existence, depends on the normal development of agriculture, which provides not only the food, but also the raw materials for the more promising sections of the country's budding industries, and the means wherewith Rumania can pay for the indispensable articles she imports from abroad, as well as for the payment of interest on her public debt. It is a matter of grave concern, therefore, that the average yield of cereals per hectare should have steadily diminished in the last nine years and sunk below the pre-war average of 1,130 kg. per hectare. If nothing be done to remedy this evil Rumania,

owing to the natural increase of her population, will in a 241
couple of years have no more wheat available for export, [423]
and in ten or twelve years it will be the same with maize. It is imperative, therefore, for the Government to take without delay the steps necessary to increase the yield. This can only be done if the State will undertake to provide selected seed corn, to establish rural banks to enable the peasantry to obtain advances of funds at cheap rates in order to buy machinery and implements, and to create model farms in which more modern methods of cultivation might be demonstrated practically. If grain elevators were also constructed in important agricultural centres, and adequate storage accommodation made available, it would be easy to advance money to farmers on the security of the cereals they could store as a pledge. And if Rumania decided to return to 241
methods of legality and offer safeguards to foreign capital 454
there would be no difficulty whatever in obtaining all the capital she requires for financing such operations, as they would then prove perfectly sound. It is this utter lack of capital which has handicapped the development of agriculture since the war, for the smallholder had to pay usurious rates of interest (40 to 60 per cent being current), while prior to the war large owners could obtain advances from the banks on very reasonable terms. It would be altogether 423
unjustifiable, therefore, to assert, as some people allege, 241
that the breaking up of the large estates had led to the 454
decline of agriculture. On the contrary, it is this measure which has permitted agriculture to survive, for owing to the systematic diversion of capital from agriculture to industry, the owners of the large estates would have found themselves in a worse fix than the smallholders if they had continued to exist and therefore required advances for the maintenance of their estates, as was formerly their wont. Without liquid assets they would have found themselves utterly unable to carry on the cultivation of those large estates, while the smallholder, by dint of hard work and privation, has man- 241
aged to keep his patch of land under the plough. Some 423
persons may retort that, if the breaking up of the large 426
estates had proved to be a practical operation, the rural population would not have run into debt to the extent of

M

241 423 426 some 80 milliard lei, and obliged the Government to pass the law decreeing the conversion of agrarian debts, in order to save the peasantry from the predicament of being dispossessed of their land by their creditors. The large owners, however, were in as bad a plight and perhaps worse off, for when the legislation concerning the cancellation of agrarian debts was under discussion in the Chamber, the director of the *Argus* suggested that Ministers and deputies should be excluded from being among the beneficiaries of the proposed law, so that they should not be accused later of having passed such a revolutionary measure mainly for self-interested motives. His suggestion was not supported, a fact which would tend to prove that large owners were perhaps more insistent on the adoption of this measure than smallholders, to many of whom it has proved highly prejudicial.

That the agrarian revolution did not solely profit the peasantry, and that others took advantage of it to appropriate lands to which they had no right, and that the latter were more insistent on the voting of the law for the conversion of agrarian debts, is an undisputed fact. This is proved also by an interview published by the *Adeverul* on September 9th, 1930, in which Prof. Iorga was reported to have said: "When the expropriation of the large estates was carried out many mistakes and injustices were committed. Real cultivators were not endowed with land in order that in their place land should be bestowed on various political partisans, electoral agents, and others who had nothing in common with the land or agriculture. Having thus secured the land, they set about to increase their holdings by buying up with borrowed money adjoining tracks, and started exploiting them on American methods. But their calculations were erroneous, because with us agriculture is not profitable except for the owner who himself cultivates his land. This category of landowners should not be assimilated with the peasantry, and the State should not assume charge of their debts." This wise recommendation, however, was not followed, and large owners were permitted to a certain extent to take advantage of the law of conversion of agrarian debts.

241 426 453 That it was absolutely indispensable to extend some help to the peasantry no one will dispute, but this law of con-

version of agrarian debts will probably do more harm than 241
good in the long run, not only because it has undermined 426
confidence and ruined the banks, but also on account of the 453
adverse effects it will have on agriculture itself, for it brings no relief to the peasant in the way of obtaining the credit facilities he needs, but on the contrary it renders borrowing now almost impossible. Prior to the promulgation of this law both banking institutions and private persons who had lent money to peasants were ready to help them, if by so doing they could recover part of their debts; there was a certain sense of solidarity between creditor and debtor; now, however, that the law has arbitrarily stepped in between them and settled their relations, practically ruining the creditors, the latter have no longer the means nor any interest to assist their debtors. Another disastrous outcome of the law is the loss of all the savings which the more industrious among the peasantry may have had, and which naturally were placed in the keeping of the rural banks now rendered insolvent. It is calculated that these sums amount to some 6 milliard lei. This law, therefore, instead of encouraging the more progressive peasants, has ruined them and reduced them to the level of the more indolent. Another drawback in this law is that it subjects all land, the owners of which take advantage of its clauses, to a certain legal servitude for 30 years, precluding the owners from mortgaging it and contracting loans, although the securing of fresh credit constitutes their most pressing need. It may be taken for granted that, in consequence of this law, the area sown will be considerably less in extent this year, owing to the impossibility for the peasants to obtain timely advances for cultivating their fields, and also to the discouragement of the most enterprising among them, who lost their capital through the failure of the banks.

This law, if not repealed, will be yet another obstacle to the creation of a rural mortgage bank, of which the country is in such dire need, for peasants taking advantage of the conversion law cannot mortgage their holdings. The necessary preliminary for the normal working of such an institution would be the creation of cadastral registration, which is non-existent in the country. If the Rumanian Government

241 really intended to revert to a régime of legality and to the
426 granting of adequate security to foreign capital, there would
453 be hardly any difficulties in its obtaining the necessary aid from abroad in order to permit the establishment of such an institution, and in order to save time it would be politic on its part if without further delay it took the requisite steps to prepare a cadastral register or ground-book. Such measures of self-aid would prove more efficacious than the solicitation at international conferences of preferential rates for Rumanian agricultural produce. For they would help to convince foreign investors that Rumania had at last decided to put her house in order, a decision which, if seriously taken, would probably cause foreign capital to come to her aid and bring to her corresponding or equal advantages to those she would derive from the obtaining of the preferential rates for which she is now craving as a favour from industrial States. There are no insuperable obstacles to the salving of Rumanian agriculture. All that is needed is cheap credit and the lowering of the cost of industrial products used by
241 the peasantry. These *desiderata* may be secured whenever
461 the Government decides to change its methods and adopt as its guiding principles honesty, retrenchment, and austerity. After all, the peasants have done more than their share, and no greater effort can be demanded of them. One who has witnessed the long heartbreak of endless and often unrequited labour that has been their lot, and the fortitude with which they have faced the apathy the State has so far shown towards them, can have no doubts as to the response a little encouragement would evoke from them. Without decent seed grain, and with the most primitive implements, it was but natural that the yield per hectare should decrease. Nevertheless, the steady although small increase of the area under cultivation is a convincing proof that the peasants have never stinted their labour and that they are determined to persist to the extreme limits of human endurance in their efforts to wrest a bare subsistence from the soil. The following table will be found to confirm fully what has been stated
241 above, namely, that while the area cultivated has been
433 maintained, the yield per hectare is on the whole diminishing:

AGRICULTURE

	Average for 5 years 1922—1926		1927		1928		1929		1930		1931	
	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.
Wheat	2,506	24,250	3,116	28,220	2,814	31,440	2,864	28,800	3,055	36,000	3,486	38,800
Rye	257	2,250	277	2,470	319	2,910	316	3,400	391	4,500	407	3,600
Oats	1,197	9,830	1,185	8,420	1,304	9,800	1,200	13,600	1,067	11,900	871	6,700
Barley	1,628	12,180	1,749	12,310	2,190	15,110	2,000	20,400	1,975	22,700	1,919	14,100
Maize	3,592	40,790	3,947	35,320	4,626	27,530	4,790	60,800	4,426	45,200	4,754	82,000
Total	9,351	90,002	10,176	86,850	11,252	86,790	10,944	136,300	10,934	121,100	11,417	124,800

AVERAGE CROP YIELDS IN QUINTALS PER HECTARE

		Average for 1911/15	Average for 1921/26	Average for 1926/30	1929	1930	1931
Wheat	...	11.9	8.7	9.8	9.9	11.6	10.6
Rye	...	9.0	7.9	10.1	10.8	11.9	8.7
Oats	...	9.2	7 7	10.1	11.2	10.6	7.7
Barley	...	10.5	7.8	10.4	12.3	12.8	7.4
Maize	...	13.6	10.7	10.6	13.2	10.2	13.7

The above figures show that there is a vast scope for an improvement, for in Central European countries the average yield of wheat per hectare is about 20 quintals and in Denmark and Great Britain higher yields are common with a much poorer soil than that of Rumania.

241 ●
311
433

RUMANIA

241 The following table indicates the proportions of lands de-
311 voted to the various cultures and the distribution among the different provinces, according to official statistics for the year 1930:

Arable land in:	Area in hectares.	Percentage of total.
Old Kingdom	6,515,995	22.09
Bessarabia	2,915,941	9.88
Bucovina	311,616	1.06
Transylvania	3,113,500	10.55
Total of arable lands ...	12,857,112	43.58
Meadows and pastures ...	4,084,475	13.75
Orchards and Vineyards ...	613,614	2.08
Forests	7,134,200	24.18
Unproductive lands, roads, sites of buildings, rivers, mines, etc.	4,837,399	16.41
Total Area	29,496,700	100.00

From the above it will be seen that there is little scope for bringing more land under cultivation, and that an expansion in the output must be sought by improving the method of cultivation. Of course there is a vast expanse of marshes along the Danube which may be reclaimed—the total area of these is computed at two million hectares—and if they were turned to account they would considerably augment the arable area. It may be added that similar works of reclamation have been undertaken in Bulgaria and Greece and have been reported to be remunerative.

241 Besides cereals, industrial plants such as hemp, colza,
249 sun-flower, tobacco, sugar-beet are grown, some 399,506 hectares being sown with them. The sugar-beet industry is sufficiently developed to provide for the total requirements of the country and to allow even for an export surplus. There are 14 sugar refineries, with invested capital of 3,300 million lei and occupying some 15,000 workmen. It was reported in the *Argus* of February 20th, 1932, which took up the defence of the industry and emphasized the necessity of granting it adequate protection (since it prevented some 700 million lei from being annually remitted abroad), that the State
[65D] obtained a revenue of 13.70 lei per kg., or 42 per cent of the official price at which sugar was sold; that agriculturalists obtained 20 per cent, merchants 5 per cent, manufacturing and packing accounted for the remaining 33 per cent. But when expenses were deducted the net profit available to the

refineries did not exceed 1.65 lei per kg. The total consumption of sugar, averaging 100,000,000 kgs. per annum, would thus yield a net profit of 165 million lei, which represented a return of 5 per cent on the invested capital. The cultivation of beet-sugar was reported to be considerably more profitable to the peasant than wheat, for while one hectare sown with wheat yielded 1,200 kgs., which would fetch 2,700 lei, one hectare sown with sugar-beet produced 20,000 kgs., which was bought by the refineries for 16,000 lei. 241 249

Though the actual production of cereals surpasses that of the pre-war period, the quantity exported shows a considerable diminution. Transylvania and Bucovina do not produce enough grain for their needs, and cover their requirements by imports. The relative values of the various cereals, as well as the quantities available for export from the 1929 harvest and those consumed locally or used for seed, are given below: 243

Crop	Total interior consumption in quintals.	Quantities available for export in quintals.	Total production in quintals.	Total value in million lei
Wheat	... 25,600,000	2,400,000	28,000,000	19,600
Rye	... 2,100,000	1,300,000	3,400,000	2,049
Oats	... 8,000,000	5,600,000	13,600,000	5,169
Barley	... 7,600,000	22,800,000	30,400,000	12,768
Maize	... 34,000,000	26,800,000	60,800,000	30,400
Total	... 77,300,000	58,900,000	136,200,000	69,975

Of the available quantity for export only about half was shipped, viz., 28,000,000 quintals, while from the harvest of 1930 the quantity exported was 29,500,000 quintals.

The harvests of the last three years were abundant, and their respective yields in quantity differed but little. Owing, however, to the catastrophic fall in prices, the sums at which they were marketed varied considerably.

	Total production of all cerials.	Total estimated value in lei.
1929	136,200,000 quintals	69,975,000,000
1930	121,100,000 ,,	28,905,000,000
1931	124,800,000 ,,	24,311,000,000

RUMANIA

243 The following were the average prices of the principal cereals at the port of Constantsa per ton during the years 1928–1931, according to the bulletin of the Constantsa Chamber of Commerce:

		1928	1929	1930	1931
Barley	...	5,900	4,580	2,430	1,800
Oats	...	3,400	2,440	1,800	1,520
Maize	...	5,280	4,010	2,600	1,800
Wheat	...	5,280	4,010	2,600	2,550

241 433 If it be remembered that the value of the agricultural production of Rumania constitutes about 60 to 65 per cent of the whole national revenue, it is easy to realize what a terrible strain such a sudden and brusque diminution in the resources of the country is likely to throw on the entire structure of its economic and social life. For the period of 1926–28 the national revenue was computed at 171 milliard lei, of which 110 milliards were derived from agriculture. According to the *Argus* of February 13th, 1932, this last figure for 1931 had declined to 46.5 milliards.

245 Among the 613,614 hectares occupied by orchards and vineyards, some 209,321 hectares are planted with plum trees which yield an annual average crop of about 5 million quintals of fruit, the yields for the years 1928–30 being respectively 28, 9.5, and 14.6 quintals per hectare. The vine is also very extensively cultivated, 239,825 hectares being planted with it. In 1930 the amount of wine obtained from the grapes grown attained about 8,385,374 hectoliters, about half of which was produced in Bessarabia.

241 231 The position of the livestock population in a country of small farmsteads like Rumania is liable to exert a great influence on agriculture, for not only are horses and horned cattle used as draught animals, but their manure is the only kind of fertiliser applied to the fields, so that the gradual reconstitution of the livestock situation after the serious damages inflicted on it during the war is a reassuring sign. The recovery would have been much more rapid if the export taxes on cattle and meat had not discouraged the cattle breeders by unduly restraining exports. The following

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

figures show the livestock population during the pre-war period and for the years 1926 and 1930: 241 231

Livestock.	Pre-war figures for all regions forming part of present-day Rumania.	1926.	1930.
Horses and donkeys ...	2,678,000	1,890,000	1,818,560
Horned cattle ...	6,760,000	4,992,000	4,011,141
Sheep and goats ...	15,250,000	14,059,000	12,273,347
Pigs	4,634,000	3,168,000	2,322,971

BANKING

The meagre capital resources of Rumania proved inadequate to the task allotted to them after the war and the general dislocation it had caused. Banks were called upon to finance the reparation of the damage suffered in the territories of the old kingdom, to advance moneys to the rural population which had just been endowed with land, and to furnish capital for the execution of the policy of industrialization to which the country had committed itself. The banks were subjected to a heavy strain, but owing to the financial assistance they received from foreign banking firms this was somewhat relieved. Unfortunately, very often less circumspection than the situation called for was shown in the granting of credits, for in many cases other considerations than those obtaining in Western countries prevailed, and as a result several banking firms were put in jeopardy through immobilization of too great a share of their assets in industrial undertakings. 453

The report of the experts on the liquidation of the Bank Dacia, of Iassi, published in the *Argus* on June 17th, 1931, is sufficiently enlightening on the subject. This bank, the total capital of which was only 20 million lei, had invested 70 millions in industrial enterprises, and the managers were blamed for not having asked for the winding-up of the bank when they no longer disposed of even one-third of the capital, as was stipulated in the statutes.

According to official statistics, at the end of 1929 there were in existence 1,097 banks, with a paid-up capital of 11,180 million lei. The great majority, however, were very small concerns which hardly deserve the preten-

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Banat]

[The Crisana]

The high quality of the crops in this province, 241K
amongst them wheat, maize, rye, oats, and the high 134
standard of animal breeding, have made the Banat known far beyond the borders of Rumania. The fertility of the soil is due partly to the 'black earth' which, in a greater or lesser degree, is a component of all the arable land. Apart from being an important agricultural region, the Banat possesses valuable industries, forests and minerals. Iron ore and coal 316
are mined in the area of Resita and Anina, where 327
there are great iron and steel works which produce 315
railway equipment and armaments. The Danubian port of Orsova, guarding the western entrance to the 'Iron Gates', also has an oil refinery.

The capital of the Banat is Timisoara[R] (Temes- 361
var[H]) on the Bega with a population of 100,000. In Roman times the fortress of Ripensia was situated here. In Hunyadi's time it was a centre of resistance against the Turks, only second in importance to Belgrade. To-day the town is a great rail and road junction with many factories, banks, commercial houses and cultural institutions. Lugoj, on the Timis, with a population of 20,000, and Caransebes, north of the Porta Orientalis which leads through the mountains of the Banat to the Danube, are marketing towns of some importance.

THE CRISANA AND MARAMURES. Geographically the 131
Crisana is the eastern borderland of the Hungarian [161]
plain. The province covers an area of about 8,400 square miles and has a population of just under 1,500,000. The Crisana lies between Transylvania in the east, the River Mures (Maros[H]) in the south; Hungary (as reduced by the Treaty of the Trianon) in the west and Czechoslovakia in the north.

8

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

565 provide their holders with a fair income, and a con-
471 siderable part of the rural population remained
423 landless. Worst of all, those peasants who did obtain land were given neither implements nor sufficient financial help which could have enabled them to make a decent living. Neither of the measures which are essential to the success of peasant proprietorship —State aid in money, machinery and technical advice; or the creation of large-scale co-operative [641] societies and banks—were carried out. Undoubtedly the extension of the franchise in 1923 to all men of 21 and the land reforms greatly strengthened the position of the peasantry in the State. But, actually, it was widespread discontent with the working of the agrarian reform that stimulated the organization of the National Peasant Party.

423 CROPS. The great devastation of Rumania during
• 241 the First World War and the effects of the land reform resulted in a great reduction of the country's agricultural production during the immediate post- [439] war period.[1] Whereas the Old Kingdom alone in 1913 had grown 2,200,000 tons of wheat, of which 1,150,000 tons were exported, and over 3,100,000 tons of maize, of which 1,000,000 tons were exported, the production figures for Greater Rumania in 1921 were for wheat 2,140,000 tons, and for maize 2,810,000 tons. This great decrease is all the more striking in view of the fact that the amount of arable

[1] In Transylvania and the neighbouring territories, taken from Hungary, some of the great *latifundias* had been well and scientifically worked with modern agricultural machinery. There were some conscientious landowners among the Magyar nobility as well as absentee landlords who neglected their peasantry.

12: Kosmos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

land in 1921 was about twice as much as in 1913. No doubt the breaking up of the big estates contributed to the spectacular fall in agricultural production. But it need not have done. It was no fault of the peasants that they could not obtain the implements, seeds and financial help which would have enabled them to work the land profitably. The big landowners who were compensated for their losses by State bonds, controlled the banks which granted agricultural loans at high rates of interest. They obtained interest on the State bonds they held. And all this had to be paid for by the peasant. The peasant, now nominal owner of a small strip of land, insufficient for the upkeep of his family, was burdened with the payment of taxes, dues and interest on his mortgaged property. He was, in fact, often worse off than if he had possessed no land at all. This crushing financial burden, more effective than the bondage of feudal times, led to a great migration of peasants to the towns. This resulted in many fields remaining unworked and an increase in the ranks of the unemployed.

The recovery in the production of crops was slow. By 1936 the wheat harvest rose to 3,500,000 tons, and that of maize to 5,610,000 tons. Exports, however, were still far below those of the Old Kingdom in 1913.[1] The higher yields were due to an increase of the area under seed and not to better working methods. The soil of Greater Rumania is extremely fertile, especially in the lowlands of the Danube, in Moldavia and in Bessarabia. But the implements used were, and still are, primitive. Wooden ploughs are still common. Manure was hardly used, the

[1] 1936: wheat 610,000 tons, maize 771,000 tons.

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

241 433 ploughing was very superficial. Apart from a few small regions the whole of Greater Rumania's agriculture was extensive and not intensive. That is, crops were harvested year after year without regard to the soil and without any attempt to preserve its fertility. This is one of the reasons for the fact that in spite of much higher soil fertility the average yield per acre in Greater Rumania was far below that in Great Britain.[1]

In addition to the growing of grains and potatoes, the production of industrial crops was begun in the nineteen-thirties and has since made considerable progress, especially that of oil-seeds, flax, cotton, soya beans and sugar-beet. The development of fodder production has made little progress, owing to a decrease in livestock.

231 483 LIVESTOCK. Rumanian livestock, especially horses, were well known and eagerly bought during the last century. The country was famous for its hardy and fast geldings and exported many horses to Germany, Denmark and Austria-Hungary. From 1886 onwards, when Hungary closed her frontiers to the import of Rumanian livestock, there began a rapid

[1] Average yield in cwt. per acre in the year 1937–8:

	Rumania	Gt Britain	Germany	Greece
Wheat	9·8	16·0	18·0	8·2
Barley	5·1	13·2	17·0	9·0
Oats	5·2	16·3	26·0	7·9
Rye	8·2	13·3	13·3	7·9
Maize	7·5	—	—	10·1
Potatoes	43·0	121·0	152·0	68·0
Flax	3·1	12·0	5·0	—

(From the Statistical Records of the League of Nations.)

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

231 For the majority of Rumania's peasants the most
433 valuable of all animals are his sheep, of which Greater Rumania possessed about 12,000,000. Both the wool and the meat of Rumanian sheep are, however, of a lower quality than those of Great Britain or New Zealand. Sheep's milk, and the cheese made from it, supplement the monotonous diet of the peasant.

[439] Of the 3,000,000 pigs in Greater Rumania most were kept in the New Territories and a large proportion of the country's pork production was exported. Apart from the Rumanian Mangalita, English Berkshires were bred in great numbers.

• 241 Considered as a whole the agriculture of Greater Rumania, favoured by good climatic conditions and great soil fertility, remained undeveloped owing to the general economic conditions. The peasantry did not possess the necessary implements, buildings or animals which could have secured profitable ex-
[452] ploitation of the soil. Financial help was difficult to obtain, and the loans that were granted were ruinous to the peasant, owing to the high rate of interest.
[453] Co-operatives were few. Some agricultural banks and associations confined to the German colonists in the Banat and in Transylvania were the only ones
[435] which succeeded. Agricultural prices were low and the peasant was often forced to sell his produce before the harvest to export trusts which dominated
[454] the market. The only assistance given by the government consisted in loans and seeds at reduced prices for the growing of certain crops, such as soya beans, for export in order to fulfil international trade
[439] agreements. During the last fifteen years Germany secured an ever greater influence upon Rumania's agriculture and took most of its exports.

148 Both the political and the economic life of
241 Rumania was subject to complete German domination. The agriculture of the country had to supply the German and Rumanian armies in the field. The area of arable land was feverishly enlarged so as to provide more food. This met with considerable success. In 1941 the country produced almost as much wheat as the whole of Greater Rumania in 1935. Exports almost reached the pre-1940 level.[1] By 1943 the area under wheat had been increased to 3,000,000 hectares and that under maize to 4,000,000 hectares. Even more important is the extension of the land used for the growing of rape seeds[2] and of oil-bearing plants.[2] Rumanian agriculture served a double purpose: the provision of food for the Rumanian and German armies and the supply of Germany's war industry with valuable raw material. The introduction of the soya bean into Rumania, the delivery of thousands of iron ploughs, tractors and other agricultural machinery from Germany only served to further this aim. Exploitation of the peasantry was the immediate consequence; but, if the ploughs and machinery remain when the Germans have gone, Rumanian agriculture is bound to benefit.

433 OIL AND INDUSTRY. The output of the chemical, textile and heavy industries were increased considerably. Consumer goods, however, are scarce and very expensive. The yearly production of oil has not

[439] [1] Export of wheat in 1940, 379,000 tons; in 1941, 2,500 tons; export of maize in 1940, 564,000 tons; in 1941, 117,000 tons. Both have since risen.

[2] 1942: 350,000 hectares grew rape seeds and 600,000 hectares oil-bearing seeds.

●241 The basis of Rumanian economy is agriculture, in that some 80 per cent. of the population derive their livelihood from the land and agriculture provides a high proportion of the national income. [315] During recent years, however, the expansion of the oil industry has meant that agricultural produce has played a decreasing part in the country's [439] exports, having been superseded by oil, exports of which amounted to 43 per cent. of the total export trade in 1938, compared with 19 per cent. in 1927; while grain exports in 1938 represented 23 per cent. compared with 46 per cent. in 1927.

In spite of the importance of agriculture to national prosperity farming methods are backward and per acre crop yields are among the lowest in Europe. Attention is particularly given to growing cereals, and of these maize is the chief, [231] providing a large surplus for export (apart from the war years). Livestock density is low, which is one of the weaknesses of Rumanian agriculture, the Banat being the only district in which numbers are fairly high, and farming approaches the [439] intensive system. It must be stressed that the relatively large export surplus, which consists of wheat, maize, barley, oilseeds and pulses, livestock, oilcake, etc., is only made possible by the very low nutritional level which prevails, and [146] that if this were raised to anything like western European standards exports would be commensurately reduced.

248 Since the war more attention has been paid to
249 the growth of industrial crops such as sunflower, soya, cotton, hemp and flax, and the cultivation of rubber-bearing plants has been started following the finding of the *Kok Saghys* plant left by the Russians in Bessarabia. Though some success has been achieved in increasing the areas under textile fibres, and yields have been slightly higher, the hoped for increases in soya and sunflower cultivation have not been achieved due to unfavourable weather conditions and to general wartime dislocation.

313 Rumania's forest resources, though extensive, have suffered severely from a consistent policy of over-exploitation, and, while providing the basis of a fairly important industry during the period between the two wars, have been so depleted that cutting will have to be very restricted for a number of years if they are to be allowed to recover. The loss of Northern Transylvania has affected the timber industry in particular, as a high proportion of the forest resources were located there, and in that district this industry was better developed than elsewhere in the country.

IMPORTANCE OF OIL

315 Oil plays a major part, not only in Rumania's foreign trade, but also in covering her domestic fuel requirements, to a large extent replacing coal, reserves of which are small and of low quality. Since the war and the resulting pressure which Germany has exerted to obtain increased quantities of oil for her armies, (combined with the consistent drop in the rate of production between 1936 and 1941), serious attempts have been made to find alternative sources of fuel. The enormous reserves of natural gas existing in Transylvania, which were exploited only very slightly before the war, are being used increasingly as a source of fuel to supply local industries, and a

A. PRE-WAR CONDITIONS

1. General

241 Agriculture occupies about 80 per cent. of the population of Rumania and contributes the greater part of the national income: but, owing to the importance of the country's mineral-oil production, exports of agricultural products accounted for rather less than half of total exports by value, in the immediate pre-war years. [439]

Total agricultural production, even if there were no exports, would fall seriously short of the real food needs of the country. The poorest are actually underfed, while the majority of the remainder subsist on a diet which, though adequate in quantity, is seriously deficient in quality and nutritional elements. [146]

In her farming Rumania suffers from two interrelated difficulties: rural over-population and low food output per acre. There are 16 agricultural workers per 100 acres of farm land, compared with 6 in Denmark and 3 in Britain. Another aspect of this is the extremely small size of most of the farms—75 per cent. of them are less than 5 hectares (12 acres) in extent. Because there is not enough land to go round, most farming families have to eke out a living on holdings which under any system of general farming would be too small to provide an adequate income. [161]

The position would be less serious if a high per-acre food output were achieved. But in fact the Rumanian output per acre is barely one-quarter of that obtained in countries like Belgium and the Netherlands. Rumania pivots her farming on wheat and maize production but, owing to the extensive methods practised, the few livestock kept, and other reasons, per acre yields are among the lowest in Europe.

It is the over-population and land shortage which are largely responsible for agriculture remaining so backward. Having insufficient land the peasant does not produce much for sale, and so cannot afford to purchase fertilisers, good quality seed or better implements. Nor can he spare many acres for fodder crops, since the bulk of his land is needed to grow the food his family eats. And as he cannot buy fodder, he cannot keep many animals. Thus, while there is some scope for agricultural improvements which would ameliorate the peasants' lot, the pre-requisite of farming progress is to find alternative occupations for the surplus population.

423 The system of land tenure is peasant proprietorship. This was attained under the Land Reform 471 carried through after the first World War. The effect of this was to divide up and transfer to peasant ownership a large area of land formerly worked in big estates. This revolution in land tenure provided a solution for a long-standing social problem, but its effects on production were unfavourable. The large estates had been run by trained managers, with relatively advanced methods and equipment. Their transfer to ill-equipped, backward and uneducated peasants was followed, for a time at least, by a decline in yields, and consequently in total production and exports.

241 Little progress was made in the period between the two wars in remedying the disadvantages of uneconomic farm sizes, and in raising the low standards of farming. For lack of education the

241 peasant views with suspicion and often hostility all attempts at improvements in traditional [474] methods. Even the co-operative societies have made less progress than in other Danubian countries. There is need for considerable capital expenditure in grouping small farms into larger units, in providing better buildings, more implements and fertilisers. There is need for diversification of production—more fodder crops and more animal husbandry. Above all, there is need for development in industry and commerce to provide work for the surplus agricultural population.

2. Natural Conditions and Regions

132 The climate is of the extreme Continental type, with long hot summers and severe winters. Precipitation is largely concentrated in winter and early summer. During the greater part of the growing and ripening season rains are light, and from time to time serious droughts occur which may ruin the grain crops.

133 The agricultural regions correspond to the natural divisions into plain and hill country—the 311 Danube plain and Bessarabia which comprise the greater part of the territory and produce the bulk of the crops, and the hilly and mountainous land of Transylvania and the Bucovina.

The plain is well-suited for agriculture, the soil over much of it being of the fertile *chernozem* or [134] black earth type, but the backward methods of farming and the light rainfall keep yields per acre low.

This region is not equally backward in all parts. The Rumanian Banat at the western end of the country, and formerly part of Hungary, is more prosperous and progressive. The population is [162] not purely Rumanian but includes Swabians and Saxons, descendants of the German stock systematically settled there on medium-sized peasant holdings in the eighteenth century after the cession of the territory to Austria by the Turks. Methods and yields, by Rumanian standards, are good. [231] The livestock density is higher than the average and the area produces a substantial surplus of pigs. Rural overcrowding is not as marked as elsewhere.

241 Conditions of life and methods of farming are considerably worse in the plain land of the Old 133 Kingdom. Agriculture here is as primitive as in any part of Eastern Europe, depending on an unbroken alternation of wheat and maize cultivation with little subsidiary production. Some wheat is marketed, but the maize is grown largely [311] for consumption on the farms. So little land is available per head of population that the farm population and working animals (which eat the maize stalks) can be fed only by devoting an excessive acreage to maize.

Bessarabia makes up the remainder of the plain land; conditions of settlement and farming methods are much the same as in the Old Kingdom, but the density of population is lower and there are substantial grain exports.

Given normal yields, every district of the plain area is at least self-sufficient in foodstuffs; indeed parts of it regularly produce large grain surpluses. Transitional areas between the Danube Valley and the Transylvanian plateau, such as the Carpatho-Moldavia and Carpatho-Munteria areas, may,

[6c]

241 133 however, be slightly deficient in grain, especially in poor years.

[311] The hilly land of Transylvania and the Bucovina differs markedly from the plain. There is proportionately less arable and much more meadow, grazing and forest land. The soil is poor. Methods are not as primitive as in the plain land of the Old Kingdom, but over-crowding is more serious and output per head is consequently lower. Parts of this region are slightly deficient in grain. Though [146] the level of food consumption is low, the dietary is more varied than elsewhere in the country, less maize and more meat and dairy produce being eaten.

3. Crops

311 Of the total area of pre-war Rumania, of nearly 30 million hectares (119,000 sq. miles) and twice the area of England and Wales), about 13 million hectares, or 45 per cent. was arable. Permanent meadow, pasture and grazing occupied 14 per cent., while tree and bush crops accounted for a further 2 per cent. The remaining land was non-agricultural, forest and waste land.

243 A very high proportion of the arable—over 80 per cent.—was used for grain growing, principally maize, wheat and barley. Owing to low rainfall, use of poor seed and lack of fertilisers, yields were at a low level and fluctuated widely from year to year.

[439] Out of an average grain production of 11 million tons, 6 millions went into domestic human consumption and 1½ million were exported, the remainder going to fodder, seed and waste. Grain exports have always figured largely in the country's foreign trade. During the twenty years 1920 to 1939 they only once fell below a million tons, and in some years exceeded three million tons. In value, during the decade before the war, they formed, after petroleum products, the main item in exports.

241 No other category of crops compares with grain. Sown fodder crops took barely 5 per cent. of the arable, all other crops, including potatoes, fibres, oilseeds, tobacco and sugar beet, about 8 per cent. Peas, beans and oilseeds were grown in sufficient quantities to provide surpluses for export. Germany established two companies—Solagra in 1934 and Soya A.G. in 1940—which invested large sums in promoting oilseed cultivation. The area 249 under sunflower was raised only slightly, but that under soya rose from nil in 1933 to 103,000 ha. (254,000 acres) in 1939, but the greater part of both crops was located in Bessarabia which Rumania lost to the U.S.S.R. in 1940 (see below).

244 Production of potatoes, vegetables and sugar 247 beet was just sufficient for domestic consumption, but the tobacco crop did not quite meet requirements. Tobacco production had fallen from 20,000 tons in the late nineteen-twenties to 12,000 tons in the years just prior to the war.

245 Fruit production was undeveloped and there was little organised marketing and processing. Plums were the main crop, but three-quarters of the output was used for making brandy. Apples and other kinds of fruit, and walnuts, were produced in fair quantities, but exports were insignificant, and, owing to low quality and the lack of standardisation, there were no prospects of development.

●241

*Production of Principal Crops**
Average 1935-38
('000 *metric tons*)

Wheat ..	3,077
Rye	430
Barley	1,071
Oats	604
Maize	5,215
Potatoes ..	2,010
Sugar beet† ..	570
Peas	45
Beans	236
Tobacco ..	12
Sunflower seed	177
Soya beans ..	42
Rape seed ..	48

* Pre 1939 frontiers.
† This produced 110,000 m. tons of raw sugar.

4. Livestock

231 One of the chief weaknesses of Rumanian agriculture is the low density of livestock. Numbers of cattle per 100 acres of farm land are less than half those of this country and Germany; about half the farms possess no cows. A large proportion of the cattle, moreover, are draught animals which require land to feed them but which yield little saleable produce. Moreover, the annual milk [234] yield per cow averages less than 1,350 litres (300 gallons) as compared with over 700 gallons in Denmark.

Of pigs, the numbers and quality compare even less favourably with those of other countries. Only in the Banat district is there an approach to an interlocking of grain production with pig-raising. Sheep are an important source of income to the peasants of the Transylvanian mountains, a region where water buffaloes are kept as draught animals since they require no sustenance other than a daily cold bath and a few maize stalks.

Livestock numbers in 1938, and the production of livestock products in 1935-38, were as follows:—

*Livestock Numbers**
'000 *head*

Horses	2,158
Cattle	4,161
(including cows)	(2,030)
Buffaloes ..	165
Sheep	12,768
Goats	399
Pigs	3,165
Poultry ..	34,660

* Pre-1939 frontiers.

*Production of Livestock Products**
Average 1935-38
('000 *metric tons*)

[234]

Milk‡	3,000
Butter	20
Cheese	30
Beef and veal ..	120
Mutton and lamb	20
Pork	152
Poultry meat ..	60

* Pre-1939 frontiers.
‡ Cows, buffaloes, sheep and goats.

5. Fish

228 All fishing along the Danube, including the [656] mouths of the delta, and along the western shores of the Black Sea coast, is controlled by the State Fisheries Administration. The total annual catch in State-owned waters averaged 15,000 tons in the years immediately preceding the war, of which fresh-water fish contributed more than two-thirds. This does not, however, represent the total catch, as fairly large quantities were caught

CHAPTER I

228 in private waters. Supplemented by some 4,000 tons of imported fish, this provided nearly 1 kg. (2·2 lb.) per head of population, but, in fact, almost all the fish was consumed by the 5 million persons living in towns. The principal fish caught were sturgeon, carp, pike, eels and crayfish, the main fishing centres being Brăila, Tulcea and Ismail.

6. Food Industries

256 The chief food and agricultural-processing industries are milling, sugar manufacture, oilseed crushing and tobacco curing. While the milling industry was dispersed widely about the country in more than 15,000 small mills employing altogether over 37,000 persons (at 1930 census), the sugar industry was for the most part concentrated in the plain of the Old Kingdom. Of the 17 sugar 257 factories employing 10,000 workers, only one was in the Transylvanian districts lost to Hungary and five in the areas temporarily lost to the U.S.S.R. 258 The vegetable-oil industry, located chiefly in Bessarabia, was only partly carried on in factories, of which there were (on January 1st, 1939) 117, employing 2,020 workers. Among these, 34 were fitted both to extract crude oil and to refine it, six were exclusively refineries, while the remainder produced only crude oil. The rest of the industry consisted of some 2,000 hand, or animal-driven presses mostly owned by individual peasants or by shopkeepers. These primitive presses extracted only a low percentage of oil from the seeds, and consequently the cake—mainly sold for export—had an unusually high oil content. As regards 277 tobacco, both curing and cigarette manufacture were subject to government licence and control. [656] There were 29 factories (in 1930) employing 9,720 workers, but tobacco cultivation subsequently declined, so also doubtless did the numbers employed.

7. Agricultural Organisation

452 The history of the organisation of Rumanian ● 241 farmers is one of not too successful co-operatives 474 becoming transformed more and more into agencies for the execution of Government Control Schemes. [654] For many years there had been throughout the country a network of agricultural credit societies, co-operative in form but in practice directed by the State. These played an important rôle during the period of the Land Reform in helping the peasants by advances to buy and equip their newly acquired holdings. There was even some co-operative cultivation for a time, until the new peasant-owners could muster sufficient draught animals and implements. Besides this, there have been strong local co-operative unions especially among the [162] minority nationalities—the Hungarians in Transylvania, the Swabian and Saxons in the Banat and the Russian and Polish Jews in the Bucovina.

243 The credit societies revived in importance when, 474 after 1933, the Rumanian Government began the organisation of grain marketing. They became 452 the local agents of a Central Marketing Board through which all sales of grain had to be made 654 both for home consumption and for export. Whereas formerly grain prices slumped immediately after the harvest, most peasants, being obliged to sell their grain quickly, under the new scheme prices were stabilised throughout the year, and this brought a great improvement to peasants' [651] receipts. But the scheme and the societies were also used to collect the peasants' taxes (paid in grain) which did not increase the popularity of co-operation.

[8a]

241
654

Alongside this organisation the State ran certain technical services for agriculture, distribution of tested seeds, control of weights and measures, provision of bull and stallion services from its own stud farms. This work, however, remained less developed than in other S.E. European countries.

8. Agricultural Exports

241
231
439

Rumania was the largest grain exporter in Europe. By value, grain accounted for over half the total of agricultural exports. Livestock products, mainly live pigs and cattle, amounted to approximately one-fifth of the total, the remainder consisting of peas, beans, oilseeds, oil and oilcake, eggs and small quantities of fruit. Quantities exported on the average in the years 1935 to 1938 are shown below :—

	*Exports of Principal Agricultural Commodities** *Average* 1935-38 ('000 *metric tons*)
Wheat	686
Maize	543
Barley	297
Peas	21
Beans	43
Oilseeds	108
Vegetable oils ..	5
Oilcake	103
Cattle ('000 head) ..	48
Pigs ('000 head) ..	222
Eggs	10

* Pre-1939 frontiers.

241
439

It is of interest to note that, despite German hopes of a development in oilseed cultivation and exports, no increase had been achieved up to the eve of the war. German interest had succeeded in stimulating production and exports of soya beans, but there was no expansion in total oilseed exports owing to a decline in rape seed and to an increase in domestic consumption of oil.

German purchases of Rumanian agricultural exports were increasing in recent pre-war years. In 1939 the territories of Greater Germany took 25 per cent. of the wheat exports, half the feed grain and the bulk of the oilseeds. Italy also took appreciable quantities of grain.

9. Food Consumption

146
262

The Rumanian diet is perhaps the worst-balanced in south-east Europe. The outstanding feature is its high dependence on grain, which provides three-quarters of the calories and 70 per cent. of the protein. In the towns white wheat bread is eaten except by the very poor, whilst in the country wholemeal bread or maize is usual. Over large areas, particularly in the Old Kingdom, maize forms the chief food. (Taking the country as a whole maize consumption is two-thirds higher than wheat.) During the summer months, when work is very heavy, peasant families may eat as much as 3 kg. (6½ lb.) a head daily, almost always in the form of *mămăligă* (a kind of porridge).

The rest of the rural dietary consists chiefly of beans, some potatoes (especially in Transylvania), cabbage, beetroots, carrots, onions and a certain amount of cheese and milk. Consumption of all these foods is much too low by nutritional standards. Meat is rarely eaten, except at Christmas time when a pig is killed—for the rest of the year small amounts of fat salted pork are used, more or less as a flavouring. Some fish is eaten in villages near rivers. Vegetable oils—mainly sunflower—and pig fats are used for cooking; butter is rarely eaten.

146 Largely because of its cost, the consumption of
262 sugar is very low, except among the well-to-do in the towns. (To encourage sugar-beet growing, a high price was set by the Government.)

[785] The diet is further impoverished by the long religious fasts—seven weeks before Easter, six weeks before Christmas, two shorter summer periods, plus Wednesdays and Fridays of each week. The diet during the fast includes practically no food of animal origin. Children under 10 years do not normally observe these fasts and, in fact, usually have a better diet during these periods since more milk, eggs and butter are available for them.

The diet, though fairly adequate in energy value, is short of animal protein, fats and calcium; moreover, where maize is the principal cereal lack of vitamin B_2 may be very serious. Various symptoms of vitamin and mineral deficiencies are
[165] observed, and the high infant-mortality rate—the highest in Europe—is also partly due to malnutrition. One of the most serious effects of the poor diet is the nervous disease pellagra, caused by this deficiency of the vitamin B_2 factor. In Moldavia, where maize is the staple food, about 5 per cent.
[164] of the rural population suffers from pellagra every spring. In the whole country about 3,000 deaths occur each year from this disease (compared with 4,000 in the maize-eating southern states of U.S.A.).

The average annual pre-war food consumption of Rumania is shown in the following table, with comparative figures for the United Kingdom.

Average per Head Consumption

	Rumania		*United Kingdom*	
	Kg.	*Lb.*	*Kg.*	*Lb.*
Wheat and rye..	104	229	129	285
Maize	166	365	—	—
Potatoes ..	50	110	84	185
Sugar	5	11	43	95
Meat	17	37	63	139
Milk	70	123*	94	165*
Butter	1	2	11	24
Pig fat	4	10	5	11
Vegetable oil ..	1·5	3	—	—
Margarine ..	—	—	4	10
Calories per day	2,700		3,100	

*Pints

B. WAR-TIME CHANGES

1. Territorial Changes

728 The net effect of the territorial changes which
●241 have occurred since 1939 is the loss of Northern
311 Transylvania to Hungary and of Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. For two seasons' crops, 1940 and 1941, Rumania was without Bessarabia, but in the late summer of 1941 she not only regained Bessarabia but acquired administrative control of the Soviet territory now styled Transnistria, and this has made small contributions to the food supplies of Rumania in 1942-43. Ignoring Transnistria, however, Rumania lost 12 per cent. of her former arable area and grain production. The Transylvanian areas ceded to Hungary, though not rich agriculturally, probably needed only small imports of grain to supplement their own production, while south Dobruja, though a surplus producing area, contributed only a fraction to Rumania's total agricultural production. The country's potential agricultural export remains, therefore, substantially what it was before the war.

2. Agriculture in War Years

2412 Germany, at the outbreak of the war, looked to
722 the Danube countries, and to Rumania in partica-

241 722 lar, for grain, oilseeds and livestock products to provide the balance of food and fodder requirements which she could not obtain from her own agriculture. The normal grain surpluses and the potential output of sunflower and other oilseeds appeared sufficiently large to provide a solid basis for these expectations. Owing, however, to wartime dislocations of economic life, to the absence of adequate administrative control of farming, to the lack of co-operation by the peasants, and, above all, to a succession of unfavourable seasons, these hopes have been almost entirely falsified.

Firstly, in 1940, Rumania lost Bessarabia, her principal surplus region, to the U.S.S.R., and with it all that year's crops. When she regained it in 1941 she obtained no surplus out of that harvest, and, because of disorganisation, little in 1942. In rump Rumania, in 1940 and 1941, the grain harvests were substantially below the average owing to reduced sowings (partly caused by mobilisation) and to disappointing yields. A determined effort was made by propaganda and the release of labour to bring sowings back to normal for the 1942 season. But the early onset of an unusually severe winter again reduced the sowings, while a serious drought in the summer of 1942 reduced the yields.

722 [243] There was a deficiency in wheat sowings of over a million hectares, while grain yields were barely 60 per cent. of the average. The out-turn of the year was consequently worse than that of the two preceding years. Wheat and rye yielded only 1·3 million tons compared with an average for the territory of 3·6 million tons. The maize crop was a little less than 3 million tons compared with an average of 4·7 million tons. The total grain production was about 5·5 million tons, a quantity inadequate to meet the requirements of food and fodder at any approach to normal levels.

[241] Other crops were more successful in 1942, but they could not appreciably offset the disastrous grain results. The potato crop reached an average level for the first time during the war years, and part of it was used to stretch the deficient wheat for bread making. There was also a good crop of beans and peas, largely because, as their prices were not controlled, they were very remunerative crops. The sunflower crop, though sowings failed to reach the ambitious target and yields were only 60 per cent. of normal, was of record dimensions. Soya, rape and sugar beet declined, however, from earlier levels. (A significant supplementary supply of sugar is now being obtained from Transnistria.)

[231] These for the most part poor crop results, besides curtailing the supplies available for human consumption and exports, also brought about a reduction in livestock numbers at the end of 1942. Livestock numbers may, however, have increased somewhat in 1940 and 1941, for it was reported that peasants held back more grain than usual in those years for livestock feeding. If this is true, numbers would now probably be little different from those of pre-war years.

[241] Crop prospects for 1943 point to a more normal result. The winter of 1942-43 was late and mild, making it possible to sow a near-average acreage of winter crops. Preparatory work for spring sowings was also done in good time, and on the whole the weather subsequently has not been unfavourable.

722 249 Tobacco cultivation appears to have declined in the war years, principally because the prices were even more unattractive than those of grain. In 1942 the area sown was reported to be little

CHAPTER I

more than half the normal, but the efforts in 1943 to recover to a more average crop may have succeeded.

3. Fish

The general food shortage in Rumania gave a great fillip to the fishing industry. In the 12 months April 1942 to March 1943, some 40,000 tons of fish were caught in State waters besides 23,000 tons in rented and private waters. This is almost double the largest pre-war catch. During 1942 some 6,000 tons were salted down for winter use. In order to promote and introduce better organisation into the fishing industry a German-Rumanian Company has been established, the "Marea-Neagrâ," which will devote special attention to developing the Black Sea fisheries.

4. Agricultural Exports

The pre-war level of grain exports was well maintained in 1939; wheat in particular was prominent with over a million tons. The exports of 1940, however, showed an immediate reflection of territorial changes and war shortages. Total grain exports in that year barely reached a million tons compared with the pre-war average of about 1·6 million tons. The following year showed a still sharper decline, wheat reaching only 5,000 tons and maize 120,000 tons. In 1942, despite the recovery of Bessarabia, it is most unlikely that even this level was maintained.

Oilseed exports, despite direct German intervention aiming at an expansion of the crop, also fell below pre-war levels. Sunflower-seed exports, the principal oilseed, fell from an average of 30,000 tons in 1935-38 to 12,000 tons in 1940 and to 5,000 tons in 1942. Exports following the 1942 crop, though probably better, were not at all commensurate with the increased production, for a serious shortage of edible oil and fat had meanwhile developed in Rumania owing to decreased supplies of pig fat and to the retention by the peasants of their seed for consumption at home, or for disposal on the Black Market.

5. Administrative Control

Not even the most complete and efficient system of administrative control could have assured the country's food supplies and exports at normal levels during these three unfavourable years, but it is clear that Rumania's food difficulties have been aggravated by mistakes in economic policy and inadequate control measures. Bureaucratic methods of handling the peasants aroused antagonism and resistance. Supplies of tested seed and other farm requisites were not made available in time. On the collection and supply side, too much power was left in the hands of local prefects. But the most serious shortcoming of the official administration was the failure to establish a price control, and an appropriate relationship between agricultural prices and the cost of the things farmers buy. (In the absence of effective discipline this ratio needs to be strongly in the producers' favour if production and marketing of foodstuffs is to be maintained.) Prices of consumers' goods rose rapidly, owing to shortages, while the Government pegged the prices of farm produce at comparatively low levels. Consequently, the peasants curtailed production and sought better prices by selling much of their produce through Black Market channels. The mistake was officially admitted in the autumn of 1941 when grain prices were more than doubled, but the position still remained unfavourable to

[10a]

241 656 435 the peasants and the reduced 1942 sowings both of grain and of sugar-beet indicated continued dissatisfaction. Finally, by the spring of 1943 a wiser ratio was reached, agricultural prices being four times as high as in 1939 and wholesale prices in general three and a half times as high. Nevertheless, this very considerable measure of inflation [458] has shaken public confidence in the value of money so that peasants increasingly resort to barter transactions.

[655] In the hope of obtaining better control over grain supplies the Government in the autumn of 1941 nationalised the grain trade, later they relaxed this to the extent of leaving the export business to a few selected firms and the internal collection to the Army and to the National Institute of Co-operation. This body handled the pre-war grain marketing scheme, and their [563] activities—because of the expulsion of Jews from wholesale and retail trade—have recently developed rapidly in the supply of seeds to peasants (80,000 tons of seed distributed in 1942) as well as consumers' goods to peasants and townspeople. But it still proved difficult to extract enough food from the peasants to feed the towns. For the 1943 harvest detailed regulations were made concerning the quantities the peasant might keep for seed, for his family and for his animals, and threshing operations were subjected to inspection. Yet these rules could not in practice be administered.

423 471 It is now generally agreed in Rumania that the smallness of the holdings has been a principal obstacle to effective organisation of agriculture in war-time, and that a change to larger units of production is needed. Any approach to collectivisation on the Soviet model, however, would be regarded as contradictory to the land reform policy and a threat to the Rumanian State. The official policy, though it has not yet taken its final form, is to maintain private property but to proceed no further with expropriation and division of large estates, and to maintain existing medium holdings by prohibiting their sub-division for inheritance or other reasons. Schemes for the consolidation of strips are also contemplated for a more opportune moment. Further, in order to 474 increase production and to improve the peasants' methods and standards of life, communal farming associations, known as *obştii*, are to be formed. In these associations, farming equipment is to be pooled so that the small-holder would have the same resources as the large farmer. Each *obştie* is to embrace a village and perform all the functions of a co-operative, including joint purchase and sale, use of breeding animals, processing of crops, etc. Villages which are prepared to form themselves into *obştii* and to undertake to work the land according to State directions, are promised tractors, seed and breeding stock without payment. In this way it is hoped that some of the advantages of collectivisation may be achieved while retaining those of individual ownership. But, unless accompanied by far-reaching industrial development, the plan can but aggravate rural unemployment. It is not known how this innovation has been received by the peasants. It was reported in April 1943 that 270 of these communal associations had been formed—an insignificant number—and it is believed that the Government is allocating to them some of the tractors imported from Germany in the war years.*

241 The success of the *obştii* plan, and indeed of any plan for up-grading Rumanian agriculture, depends

* In June, 1943, a temporary ban was placed on the formation of any new *obştii*, because there was insufficient agricultural machinery to supply to them.

[106]

211 very largely on the acquisition of tractors and other equipment. Only Germany can provide these requisites and it is of interest that, despite the poor contribution Rumania has hitherto made to Germany's food supplies, the latter has gone some way to assist the attempted reform. Over 4,000 [439] tractors with their ploughs and a variety of other implements have been imported from Germany during the war years. Tractor numbers in Rumania have probably been more than doubled by these imports, but they still represent only the beginnings of mechanisation. They have doubtless been supplied, despite insistent demands for tractors in Germany and elsewhere, in the belief that, if properly applied, they may make some slight increase in available surpluses. Some of these may have been destined for Transnistria to make good the Russian scorching.

6. Food Conditions

511 Food conditions have varied according to local resources, and in the months following the poor crops of 1942, according to the success of local prefects and officials in securing supplementary quantities from the more favoured areas. The [162] greater part of the population is rural, and most families feed themselves with their own home-grown produce. In the earlier years of the war these were able to maintain their consumption standards, but in 1942-43 there must have been a more serious degree of shortage and privation than is usual even after short crops. In the towns there has been a severe curtailment of food supplies, mitigated in individual cases by access to the Black Market.

262 Urban shortages developed early in 1941 and 434 official rationing cards were introduced in May of 511 that year in Bucarest and brought into use soon after. Sugar and meat were the first commodities to be rationed. The original sugar ration was 375 grammes (13 oz.) per week, but since May 1943 it has been only 125 grammes (4½ oz.). Meat, originally 250 grammes (9 oz.), is still (July 1943) at this level, though for a short time at the end of 1942 it was higher owing probably to the abnormal slaughterings caused by fodder shortages in 1942. Bread was first officially rationed in January 1942, but was preceded by baking regulations requiring maize admixtures in the loaf. The ration of 300

464 722 1941 there were 2,000 unemployed, while in December 1940, it was announced that the Office of Unemployment Statistics had been abolished, as there were no unemployed. Though Rumania's military mobilisation and losses have been extensive, her labour reserves are theoretically still considerable. On the other hand, there is no doubt that both industry and agriculture are suffering a noticeable labour shortage. This is attributable to the low level of mechanisation, internal economic organisation and to the cumbersome administration, so that comparison with western countries is impossible.

1. Agriculture.

464 241 The proportion of the working population engaged in agriculture is extremely high, so that military recruitment has been principally from this source. The structure of Rumanian agriculture, which is mainly peasant farming with a low output per head, has meant that the withdrawal of some 550,000 men has been more serious than it would have been in a country where more up-to-date methods are used, and the remaining labour supply is more mobile. The normal sources of supplementary wartime labour have been drawn on—*i.e.*, the temporary demobilisation of soldiers, employment of children during the summer holidays, and presumably an increased employment of women, although there is no evidence of women having been forcibly transferred to agriculture.

[727] The most valuable supplementary labour, however, has been the employment of Russian prisoners of war, and the demand for their services has exceeded the supply. The number employed in March 1942 was 40,000. These measures to improve the agricultural labour position do not as yet appear to have had much effect.

2. Industry.

162 438 178 According to the latest official census figures (relating to the year 1930) 620,000 persons were employed in industry. The following table shows in column 1 the total number employed in the main branches, and in columns 2 and 3 the numbers working in factories employing ten or more people. A comparison between columns 2 and 3 gives an indication of the growing industrialisation of the country.

	1 1930	2 1930	3 1937
Food	122,000	25,200	34,700
Textiles and Clothing	155,000	34,800	70,500
Metallurgy	101,000	32,000	49,500
Timber..	94,000	31,000	44,000
Mining	53,000	n.a.	n.a.

Allowing for the increased industrialisation during the years 1930–39, and for the general increase in the total population to some 20,000,000, it is estimated that by 1939 the number of industrial workers in Greater Rumania would have risen to some 750,000.

With the loss of part of the provinces of Transylvania, Crisana and Maramures, Rumania suffered a fairly considerable loss in industrial workers, so that added to the expulsion of Jews, repatriation of Germans, etc., and military mobilisation, it is estimated that at the end of [464] 1942 the numbers engaged in industry would not exceed 530,000.

As in the case of agriculture, the structure of Rumanian industry tends to prevent a thorough rationalisation and concentration of the available industrial labour.

[55b]

465 discrepancy in wage levels throughout the country which would involve separate wage boards for each area. All the fixed rates quoted below, with the exception of those in the metallurgical trade, are given for the country as a whole. In view of the regional variations in wage rates, the application of a fixed uniform wage is obviously impossible. This therefore suggests that the given rates are intended to apply to the districts with the highest wage-rate level, and that suitable reductions will be made in other areas, as for the metallurgical industry. The general wage level is estimated to have risen by as much as 200 per cent. since 1939. A general decree in August, 1942, fixed minimum wages at (lei per month) :—

Men	*Women*	*Children*
5,200	3,800	2,300

2. Agriculture

465 241 Up till April 1942 agricultural wages were determined by free negotiation in the different regions and showed great variations. In April 1942 a decree was passed fixing rates for hired labour. A margin of 10 per cent. was granted to allow for local cost of living differences. The following rates (in lei per day) were fixed for the

[57a]

465
241

different seasons in 1942, the employee also receiving food :—

Period	Men	Women	Juveniles*
Spring—June 15th	75	50	40
Summer—Sept. 1st	100	75	50
Autumn and winter	60	40	30
Average for 1937†	40	32	22

(i.e. official money wages have almost doubled and food is now supplied.)

* 14-18 years. † Without food.

465
647

3. Civil Service

In August, 1941, the average monthly wage for a civil servant was 2,200-4,000 lei (presumably for non-administrative grades). Beyond this there is no information on actual rates paid, except for a reference in December 1942 to "Ministry Advisers," whose wages were 72,000 lei per month. However, there are frequent references to increased wages for state officials, and especially of increased family allowances, e.g. in October 1941 the allowance per month for children of civil servants was 500 lei per child. By October 1942 it had been increased to 750 lei per child for families living in the country, and 1,000 lei per child for families living in the town.

[57b]

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania EDI

advertise to the Rumanian masses, most of whom had never heard his name. On March 8, therefore, Groza was told to ask Stalin for northern Transylvania, and by return telegram he received it as a "present." The Nazis had not yet been expelled from Budapest, so there was nobody there for Moscow to take into account. The Western Allies were not consulted. As a matter of fact, they had no objection to the return of at least most of Transylvania to Rumania, but would have preferred that it be done after study as to whether or not there should be frontier rectifications in favor of Hungarian ethnic groups; and they certainly would have considered it more suitable that the transfer be made after agreement among the Allies rather than unilaterally by one of them.

The steps by which the Communist-dominated Rumanian Government became an absolute Communist dictatorship need not be detailed here.[3] In the beginning there certainly were some non-Communist elements which favored a clean sweep of the old order even though the representatives of the new order were Communists and protégés of the hated Russians. Seizure of the large properties still left in Rumania after the land reforms following the First World War was popular in principle. Rumanian régimes of the inter-war period had not been noted for efficiency or probity, and the Communists hastened to identify all Rumanian statesmen who held democratic beliefs and had a Western orientation with the "old gang" of profiteers and politicians who had mocked the Constitution in the dissolute days of King Carol and had ended by taking Rumania into the war as the ally of the Nazis. The fact that Maniu, the country's leading statesman, was famous for his incorruptibility and stubborn devotion to the Constitution did not deter Communist propaganda from picturing him also as a corrupt relic of the old dictatorial order. The Socialists were, of course, completely outbid by Communist promises of pie in the sky.

But although these tactics had some success at first the only one of them that was based on anything substantial, the gift of land to

[3] For a fuller outline of the postwar evolution in Rumania as well as other parts of Eastern Europe, and of relevant negotiations (if they can be called that) between the Soviets and the Western Powers, see Campbell, *op. cit.*, also volumes for 1947–48 and 1948–49 in the same series by the same author, and the volume for 1949 by Richard P. Stebbins.

8: Ammoeg 3-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania ED1

the peasants, was a boomerang. The land reforms of 1919–21 had distributed about 14 million acres among about 1,400,000 peasants. The new Communist expropriations distributed an additional 2,750,000 acres among about 1,100,000 peasants. It has been calculated that as a result more than half of the land holdings in Rumania consisted of less than seven and a half acres per family. Most farms of this size were insufficient to support independent farmers. Now this may have been as the Communists planned, for it enabled them to point out the advantages of collectivization to peasants who lacked even the minimum of tools and draft animals to cultivate their small private holdings. But when they did so they lost the popularity they had gained, both with peasants who worked ancestral lands and with those who had just shared in the expropriated estates.

665
241
423

The Communists thus felt it necessary to make their political position more secure, in particular to head off their natural rivals in the countryside, the formidable National Peasant Party headed by Maniu. In December 1945 a correspondent of the London *Times* had written critically of Maniu's "rigidity" and unwillingness to accept a modern "radical policy," and had blamed his "unbending attitude" for the "inevitable" political crisis. Less than a year later (October 18, 1946) the same or another correspondent of the *Times* reported from Bucharest that Maniu was "more popular than ever in his long career." The dispatch continued: "His past mistakes and weaknesses are forgotten. He stands now not for any program or ideology but for the idea of national independence. He is the symbol of the Rumanian nation."

As the Rumanian nation was to be destroyed, Maniu had to be destroyed.

This was the period for dealing with peasant rivals to the Communists in all the agrarian satellite states. In Bulgaria, the leader of the Peasant Party, Petkov, was arrested in June 1947 and hanged in September. In Poland, the leader of the Peasant Party, Mikolajczyk, was harried from the political scene and in October 1947 was forced to flee to London. In Hungary, the Soviets had made the mistake of permitting free elections and had lost them to Nagy's Smallholders Party; but they had stipulated that regardless of the

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania ED1

665 565 ticular," and referring to the workers "as the sole guiding force in the country." * Nevertheless he seemed slightly on the defensive over the fact that after having had a free hand longer than any other Party in Eastern Europe the Rumanian Communists had only succeeded in forming to date 6,732 coöperatives of all types (consumer as well as producer coöperatives). He stressed that "mass collectivization" must wait on increased industrialization to supply needed farm machinery. And as if to forestall the jibes of Jugoslav Communists he attacked their achievements in collectivization as not only wrong in substance but as having been produced at a wrong tempo.

241 [162] 565 The hope of basing Communist rule on the dominance of the industrial proletariat over the peasantry seems especially ambitious in Rumania, where only about five percent of the population are industrial workers and 80 percent are peasants. It is true that agrarian overpopulation exists in Rumania and therefore a gradual shift of some rural elements to city pursuits must occur. The Communist expropriations failed (as the Communists had expected) to solve the agrarian problem because the properties still remaining undivided were insufficient to supply all landless peasants with land or to give those receiving land sufficient acreage to make them self-supporting. Mechanization of agriculture, so much emphasized in the satellite countries, will not solve the problem but will merely aggravate it by increasing the peasant's dependence on a single crop marketed under strict state control. The solution is to raise the standard of living of the peasants. This could be done by improving seeds and livestock, diversifying crops, developing home industries, improving methods of marketing, building roads, providing facilities for local food processing to avoid wastage, and consolidating separated family strips of land into efficient farming units. As rural living standards rise productivity would increase, and this would permit concurrent rises in the living standards of the industrial workers. These objective facts of the Rumanian economic structure rule out any other procedure unless it is frankly based on injustice and is indifferent to human unhappiness on a tremendous scale.

The Communists cannot, however, favor a program like the one

* *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!*, Bucharest, August 1, 1949.

8: Armsrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania EU1

outlined. In the first place it would be slow and costly to carry out. Secondly, it would call for skills which Communist régimes do not possess and foreign scientific information which they boast of despising. Thirdly, they in principle oppose measures for improving small-peasant agriculture, for if they succeeded the peasants would merely become more independent and recalcitrant. They therefore prefer to favor industry and neglect agriculture,[7] calculating that misery on the farms will make the peasants more amenable to collectivization or force them into great slave-labor projects like the Danube-Black Sea canal. In any case, they have not cast Rumania to play an agricultural rôle in the family of Sovietized states. Nature did so, but they are going to improve on nature.

In Stalin's original plans Jugoslavia and probably Bulgaria were destined to remain agricultural in the main and to supply the other members of the family with raw materials. Rumania, although so heavily agricultural, was to be largely industrialized. The reason for this arbitrary allotment of functions is not entirely clear. Rumania has oil and timber, as well as reserves of soft coal and natural gas in Transylvania, all of which can be developed without running counter to economic law. She also has a large reservoir of unskilled labor. But otherwise she is not adapted by natural resources and native skills to proceed with very speedy or very extensive industrialization projects, and she seems especially unsuited to becoming a center of heavy industry in view of the scarcity of her metallurgical reserves. In any case, the improvement and development of agricultural production would be the right preliminary to ambitious enlargements of the industrial plant such as are projected in the new Rumanian Five Year Plan, to end December 31, 1955.

Ana Pauker has called the new Plan "majestic." Its main purpose, she has written,[8] is "the industrialization of the country . . . on a new, advanced technical basis . . . which will insure the success of the Socialist offensive against the capitalist elements." Industrial output is to be increased twofold, with emphasis on what she called "the Stalin method" of developing heavy industry in particular.

[7] Of the Rumanian investment program for 1950, 47 percent was allocated for industry, 20 percent for transportation and 9 percent for agriculture.

[8] *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!*, Bucharest, August 18, 1950.

241 PAID AGRICULTURAL labour is very rare; the work of the farm is done entirely by the peasant and his family, including women. Modern machinery is still almost unknown, so that agricultural practice is rather that of the garden than that of the field in our Western sense.

PLOUGHING is done with a wooden plough tipped with iron and ox drawn. Sowing is done largely by hand, while intermediate operations, such as hilling the maize, are done with a hoe of the form illustrated on page 59. Harvesting, if not done by "pulling" (e.g. flax), or picking (e.g. fruit), is done by means of a sickle (maize) or scythe (hay).

[242] AMONG SOME farmers some idea of rotation of crops is understood, but only very imperfectly; in many cases it is not practised at all, the same plot of land being used for maize year after year.

ARTIFICIAL FERTILIZERS are seldom used, peasants depending for renewal of fertility upon animal manure and ploughing in and burning the stubble. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the yield is low and crops poor in quality.

[221] SOWING BEGINS at the end of April or the beginning of May (oats) and continues until the middle of June. Harvesting begins as soon after July 20th as possible and continues until the end of October, when the last of the maize is gathered.

231 ANIMALS PLAY an important part in the agricultural economy of the Rumanian peasant. Every holding possesses sheep, particularly milking ewes, milking cows, draught oxen, perhaps a horse or horses, pigs, together with geese and fowls. Few holdings are without one or two hives of bees. Occasionally on a very small holding (less than one hectare) milking cows are replaced by goats. During the summer (from the beginning of May until the end of August) the sheep and such cattle as are not needed at the farm for draught or milking purposes are sent up to the high pastures. Pigs are sometimes sent up with them, but not goats. During this time the animals left are either fed on fodder crops at the farm or are sent out daily to pasture on a portion of the hay meadows set aside for that purpose. On being brought down from the mountains the animals are pastured for a short time on the hay meadows from which the crop has already been taken. They are then brought back to their

231 owner's farm, where the cows are kept in sheds, and the sheep, which are more hardy, are penned on the arable land, particularly on the maize stubble. Both sheep and cattle are fed on fodder crops during the winter. The surplus animals are sold at the autumn fair, and form a source of revenue.

476 WHILST ON the high pastures the sheep are clipped twice,
[234] and the wool is divided amongst the peasants in proportion
[234] to the number of animals sent up. The cheese is usually shared by the owners of the animals in the same way, the mayor and his committee being responsible for the correct apportionment. In the Valley of the Argeş co-operative dealers from Bucharest frequently buy the cheese "in bulk" direct from the commune, and the monetary value is shared between the owners of the animals.

231 OXEN ARE used almost exclusively for draught purposes, the numbers kept in this district being somewhat in excess of the farmers' requirements, owing to their use for lumbering (see below).

241 PEASANT FARMING in the Valley of the Argeş is no longer
[369] entirely on a subsistence basis. Two factors have tended to
[438] modify it. Firstly, the position of the valley, opening as it does directly on the Wallachian Plain, with its rich grain lands and containing the capital Bucharest, has allowed commercial intercourse to develop. The Argeş peasant no longer cultivates wheat; he does not mind if his maize crop is good enough for fodder only, for he can buy both wheat and maize from the plain. Further, he finds a ready market and so a money income in Bucharest for his surplus fruit,
313 particularly apples, and cheese. Secondly, the forests form a valuable asset to the peasant. During the winter felling takes place in the upper basin of the Argeş; in spring and summer the timber is transported, and work in the State mill in Curtea goes on all the year round. Practically every household has somebody working in the timber trade, and the money so earned (as much as 100 lei per day for a man supplying his own yoke of oxen) reduces the dependence of the family on the farm.

874 AT CURTEA DE ARGEŞ is the School of Agriculture, Regina
242 Elizabeta. Although only a small percentage of its pupils is local, it is gradually influencing the farming of the neighbourhood. Experiments in cultivation, plant breeding and

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

874 the use of machinery are carried on at the school. Advisers
242 are sent out to the farms, and seeds and plants, as well as artificial manure, are supplied to the peasants at a very low cost. Machinery is also loaned out cheaply. The average
[157] peasant, however, is very conservative, and progress is slow.

SOME DETAILS OF TWO FARMS: AUGUST 1936

FARM A

423 SIZE: one half-hectare approximately. This farm is situated
241 approximately two miles north of Curtea de Argeş.

THE HOLDING consists of a narrow rectangular strip, bounded on one of its long sides by a rough lane and on its short side by the main road. The ground is fairly level and sufficiently above the river to be well drained. (See Plan A for utilization of land and arrangement of buildings.)

Animals

[231] 2 milking cows, 2 calves (at farm), but no oxen (this was unusual).
10 sheep, away on high pastures.
3 pigs, at farm.
10 geese, 6 ducks, 50 hens.

FARM B

SIZE: Five hectares approximately. This farm is situated at Corbeni, several kilometres north of Curtea de Argeş, at a point where the river valley widens out and the river braids. The farm is situated on the second terrace. The plot is rectangular, with its narrow side bordered by the road and its long side running parallel to the river, thus giving a well-drained but flat holding. The son of the owner holds a diploma for agriculture and the farm shows every evidence of prosperity. See PLAN B for utilization of land and arrangement of buildings.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241
311

TABLE XXVIII. PERCENTAGE OF LAND DEVOTED TO DIFFERENT CROPS ACCORDING TO SIZE OF PROPERTY, 1938

	Size of Property (hectares)						
	0.1–1	*1–3*	*3–5*	*5–10*	*10–25*	*Over 25*	*Total*
Cereals	51.37	62.61	64.61	72.94	73.14	50.42	66.05
Alimentary plants	4.21	2.89	2.17	2.27	2.75	2.40	2.75
Intercropped plants	2.44	2.56	1.86	1.14	0.86	0.90	1.35
Forage crops	4.27	6.88	7.88	5.00	3.97	3.06	5.08
Industrial plants	1.12	1.77	2.44	1.94	1.29	1.44	1.78
Fallow	0.90	1.77	2.38	2.46	1.90	0.71	1.90
Natural meadow	10.88	7.90	5.86	8.42	8.12	7.63	8.11
Pasture	0.25	1.09	1.87	1.87	1.70	2.22	1.78
Orchards	3.50	1.73	1.19	0.77	0.76	0.83	1.00
Vineyards	10.29	4.61	2.91	3.43	2.99	0.79	3.22
Forests	5.60	3.88	3.61	2.67	3.96	25.49	7.18
Barren	0.18	0.39	0.28	0.26	0.49	0.52	0.42
Not utilized	3.16	1.88	2.02	1.83	3.07	3.96	2.47

SOURCE: *69 Sate romînesti*, II, 97.

COMMENT: These figures were reached through a sampling investigation of some 60 villages.

243

TABLE XXIX. PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL GRAINS

	Output in 1,000 Quintals				Area Covered
	Wheat	*Maize*	*Barley*	*Oats*	
1921–25	24,277	35,618	12,068	8,118	71 *judeţe*, frontiers as of January, 1938
1926–30	30,198	48,071	18,189	11,047	
1931–35	26,288	53,972	12,122	6,558	
1936	35,031	56,120	16,119	8,471	
1937	38,009	46,860	9,468	5,158	
1938	48,194	52,521	8,222	4,606	
1935–39	25,960	39,520	5,500	4,010	40 *judeţe*, frontiers as of January, 1941
1940	18,738	37,422	4,968	3,707	
1941	19,962	36,472	3,911	3,330	
1942	8,549	21,816	2,238	3,073	
1943	22,297	22,268	3,165	4,336	
1944	26,529	32,649	3,921	3,502	
1945	10,985	18,188	2,441	2,384	
1945	12,745	18,186	3,276	3,567	88 *judeţe*, postwar frontiers
1946	16,097	10,640	2,584	2,828	

SOURCES: *Statistica agricolă a României în 1939*, p. xvii; *Statistica agricolă a României în 1941–1944*, p. xiii; *Expunere de motive la bugetul general al statului* (Bucarest, 1946, 1947).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

248

TABLE XXX. WHEAT AND MAIZE YIELDS, 1892–1946

Yield in Quintals per Hectare

	Old Kingdom		Rumania	
	Wheat	*Maize*	*Wheat*	*Maize*
1891–95	10.9	9.7		
1896–1900	8.9	9.6		
1901–1905	12.5	8.8		
1906–1910	11.3	11.6		
1911	12.5	14.1		
1912	11.8	12.3		
1913	14.1	14.2		
1914	6.0	12.2		
1915	12.8	10.9		
1921	10.1	8.5	8.6	8.1
1922	10.2	9.0	9.5	8.9
1923	10.7	12.3	10.3	11.3
1924	6.8	10.9	8.1	10.9
1925	9.5	11.1	8.6	10.5
1926	8.5	13.3	9.1	14.4
1927	8.4	7.4	8.5	8.4
1928	9.1	5.6	9.3	6.2
1929	8.5	12.4	9.9	13.3
1930	12.5	10.3	11.6	10.2
1931	12.4	13.1	10.6	12.7
1932	5.2	12.1	5.1	12.5
1933	9.3	9.8	10.4	9.4
1934	6.2	9.1	6.7	9.6
1935	7.2	11.0	7.6	10.4
1936	10.0	9.9	10.2	10.7
1937	10.3	8.1	10.7	9.6
1938	13.4	8.6	12.5	10.4
1939			11.7	13.7
1940			6.4	10.4
1941			8.7	10.9
1942			5.5	6.5
1943			10.7	7.9
1944			11.4	12.8
1945			5.7	5.0
1946			5.9	2.9

SOURCES: *Statistica agricolă a României în 1938*, pp. 41, 96; Traian Săvulescu, *Problema alimentării populației* (Bucarest, 1947), Annex 1.

III.—NOTES ON THE VEGETATION OF ROUMANIA

137 AFTER a voyage of five days down the Danube where hundreds of miles of its banks were clothed with willows (*Salix cinerea*) and formed our almost sole glimpse of vegetation, the first thing the Vegetation Group did on landing at Giurgiu was to make contact with the flora of Roumania. A walk along the side of the railway parallel to the river revealed the following species: *Xanthium speciosum*, *Trifolium fragiferum*, *T. lappaceum* (an alien possibly transported by rail or ship), *Setaria glauca*, *Datura stramonium*, *Berteroa incana*, *Trigonella procumbens*, *Althaea officinalis*, *Inula brittanica*, *Hibiscus trionum*, *Salvia sylvestris*, *Glycyrrhiza echinatum*, *Amaranthus albus* and many others less worthy of note and mostly belonging to the mid-European element.

DURING our visit to Snagov, where we enjoyed the kind hospitality of the Mayor of Bucureşti (Bukarest), we saw large quantities of *Vallisneria spiralis* growing close to the banks of the lake. Near the old monastery church the following plants were noted: *Xanthium strumarium*, *Astragalus acer*, *Galega officinalis*, *Chenopodium ficifolium*, *Filago arvensis*, *Nepeta pannonica*, etc.

243 BOTH on our way from Giurgiu to Bucureşti by train, and by the roadside on leaving the capital towards Ploeşti, we were reminded of the fact that the maize was the staple crop and it was here seen in the plains growing to perfection in striking contrast to that seen later around Borsec in the narrow valley towards Corbu.

OUR next contact with vegetation was during the motor drive over elevated ground from Sinaia to Dobreşti; here the grass had not been cut in the sub-alpine meadows and the flora was seen to be a very rich one, but time did not permit of its being examined. From Dobreşti, a climb via a fine gorge was made to the alpine Peştera hut. On our way up the gorge large masses of the tall, yellow *Inula helenium* were passed and *Achillea Schurii* (endemic to the Carpathians) was seen on the wet walls of rock, and also *Bruckenthalia spiculifolia*. As more elevated ground was

VI.—ECONOMIC ROUMANIA

Agriculture.

311 162 Modern Roumania is essentially an agricultural state, as was the Old Kingdom (43 to 46 per cent of the land being arable and 22 per cent forest, whilst over 80 per cent of the population of 18 millions are agricultural workers), although it has valuable potentialities for the development of industry.

132 24 134 Arranged in zones round the bastion of the southern and eastern Carpathian highlands, the main agricultural regions of post-war Roumania exhibit, according to aspect and altitude, a considerable variety of climatic conditions, which is reflected in a varying emphasis in the selection of crops raised. In general, we may say that the continental nature of the climate and the resulting succession from north to south and from highland to lowland of soils, graded from poor ashen-grey podsol in the Carpathians through oak-forest loams to a rich chernoziom in the south-eastern Danube plains, has resulted, wherever the ground is sufficiently level, in a concentration on grain production. The heavier rainfall of the uplands, the relatively great humidity and shelter from the driving winds that sweep across the open plains, coupled with the exposure of less fertile rocks—granites and coarse sandstones—explains the [137] large area of forested land (24.5 per cent, nearly 7½ million hectares) in those districts that extend into the Carpathian highlands.

243 Of the 13 odd million hectares of arable land, cereals occupy some 37 to 39 per cent. Production varies greatly from year to year and from district to district. In the old kingdom of Wallachia-Moldavia, maize is by far the heaviest crop, particularly in Oltenia, where the summer rainfall is heavier. It is also the heaviest crop in Transylvania, the cultivated areas under maize, wheat, barley and oats being [262] respectively 4, 3, 2 and 1 million hectares. Maize is the staple crop of the peasant holder almost throughout the country, for it not only provides the bread cakes and the "mamaliga," maize pudding, the main food of the mass of the people, but also fodder for the cattle to eke out the hay in

243
372]

the winter; moreover, the annual life of this cereal is short, freeing the ground for other uses. In the plains, the maize stalks are used for fuel. The proportion of land devoted to maize has therefore increased since the agrarian reforms and the expropriation of much of the land of the large landowners.

THIS CONCENTRATION on maize production by the peasant farmer has its dangers, besides handicapping the country from the point of view of export. In a succession of dry summers a poor maize crop has a disastrous result where there are no root crops and no winter wheat to fall back on. The cultivation of potatoes and lucerne is being encouraged, but peasant farming is backward throughout the kingdom, though less so in Transylvania and the Bucovina than in the Old Kingdom.

THE MOST intensive maize cultivation is found in the departments of Gorj and Valcea and Muşcel in Oltenia (the sheltered valleys of foothill country of Oltenia) and that of Bacau in the upper Trotuş basin of Moldavia. In these districts, where the annual rainfall is in the neighbourhood of 600 mm., with an early summer rain maximum and a dry autumn, over 50 per cent of the agricultural land cultivated is under maize; but, with the exception of the Black Sea coastlands, the bulk of Roumania has only between 30 and 50 per cent of the cultivable land under cultivation devoted to maize. True, in the higher valleys of the Carpathians, the maize not infrequently fails to ripen, owing to the early onset of cool weather, but early ripening species of maize are sown in the Carpathian valleys. Again, a dry spring and early summer is a grave menace to the crop. It is unfortunate that the least nourishing and latest ripening type of maize is, owing to its high yield, that most favoured by the Vlachian peasant.

WHEAT.

IT IS only in Transylvania that wheat assumes a rôle approaching in importance in the peasant agricultural régime to that of maize. It was being cultivated, however, before the War on an increasing scale, on the large estates of Muntenia, where the steppe type of climate and rich soil conditions (chernoziom on loess and the black and brown

243 soils of the oak forest) prevail, and where the low rainfall is inimical to maize cultivation. Wheat is an important crop also on the well-drained soils of the Tertiary loess-covered plateau, on which chernoziom also develops, between the Prut and Siret. Here, below 1,000 feet, wheat is extensively grown, for here again the climate approximates to the steppe type. Grain began to be exported from the Danube plain depression in appreciable quantities only in 1833, the year of the great Russian famine, but in thirty years it had taken the place of grazing land and meadow over all the Black Earth region. The breaking up of the large estates, however, and the unsettled conditions during and since the War have checked the development of large-scale wheat production for export. After the War, the production of grain of all sorts fell off heavily as a result partly of a heavy tax imposed on grain export, partly of uneconomic farming due to the subdivision of estates, partly of the Government's taking over the marketing of wheat and rye and fixing prices for those commodities—a policy which discouraged production of these crops by the peasants, who concentrated on the production of maize, with barley and oats for home consumption in the wetter highlands. In any case, the yield of wheat in regions of steppe climate varies enormously from year to year with the winter and spring precipitation, and even during the period of normal progress in the decade preceding the War the export varied between nearly 2 million tons and less than 200,000. In spite of the rich soils, the yield per acre is small judged by western European standards.

BARLEY does very well as a peasant fodder crop in the dry south-east of the Old Kingdom, and is a crop of some importance in Transylvania (1½ to 2 million hectares). In Moldavia and Oltenia under moister conditions, the high starch content makes it useful for brewing, and it is grown mainly on the larger estates.

248 HEMP AND FLAX are grown, the latter decreasingly, by the peasants for use in domestic textile industry. Imported cotton yarn has largely taken the place of linen.

245 As regards the vine—the best grapes for wine are produced in small holdings in the hill country of Transylvania (chiefly produced by the Saxon communities), Wallachia and

241
423 only three and a half. But 50 per cent of the registered large holdings were farmed in small parcels by peasants who paid rent largely in kind or in services to absentee landlords or large tenant holders, mainly Jews, to whom the land had been farmed out. Such an arrangement often meant a considerable return to the landowner or direct farmer at the
213 expense of the peasant labourer. On the large holdings wheat was the main crop, only about 14 per cent of the maize in Old Roumania being grown on large holdings. There are a number of reasons for this. First, more capital is required for the cultivation of wheat; wheat seed grain costs ten times as much as maize for an equal area; then, in the higher lands, where the smaller holdings are to be found, the heavier rainfall and shorter growing period is more conducive to maize cultivation than to that of wheat. Again, the traditional staple food of the peasant is the easily prepared "mamaliga" or maize pudding, and the difficulty of persuading a peasant people to change their habits of life is well known, also the heavy animal fodder provided by maize is an important consideration for the peasant. And lastly, where the maintenance of life is dependent on an adequate winter store, the peasant is more concerned with securing that tangible store than with providing a cash crop with which to acquire luxuries. The large farmer, on the other hand, was mainly concerned in producing a surplus crop of wheat for export.

423 Between 1916 and 1926 a great redistribution of land in the interest of the peasants took place both in Old Roumania and in the newly-acquired territories. Such a redistribution in a land with important ethnical minorities has naturally given rise to much discontent among the dispossessed landlords and as naturally forms the basis of much political discussion and unrest and endless propaganda by all parties. But we are only concerned here with the economic results of the redistribution.

423 It must be recognised that the change from large- to small-
241 scale farming, however advantageous to the peasant against whom the scales had always been weighted in the past, means a change in the character of the land cultivation, and though farming methods even on the large farms cannot be said to have been very enlightened, a certain amount of

132 being common at this height (440 metres and upwards). July and August are the hottest months.

THE MEAN annual rainfall for Curtea de Argeş (taken over a period of nine years) is 672 mm. Precipitation occurs all the year round, but the rainiest months are May and June.

243 THE PRINCIPAL crop is maize, from which not only is the staple food "mamaliga" made, but the stems and leaves are used for animal fodder and bedding. Oats and rye are grown for fodder on the larger farms only. Wheat is not grown in the region. Soil and climate are suitable, but at present the peasant possesses very little machinery; harvesting would have to be done with a sickle or scythe and threshing with a flail. It is easier to buy such wheat as is required from the Wallachian Plain.

244 IN ADDITION to the above, every farm, however small, grows various vegetable crops: pumpkins for fodder, tomatoes, paprika, potatoes, onions, runner beans, cabbages, aubergines, often amongst the maize, sometimes as ground crops in the orchards.

246 CULTIVATED FODDER crops are grown only on the larger farms, and consist of clover, lucerne and sometimes a mixture of vetch and oats, and very occasionally turnips.

THE LOWER slopes of the hills form the natural hay meadows of the commune, but occasionally the grass of the orchard is used as rough pasture.

248 HEMP IS grown on the low-lying farms, usually as a boundary crop for the maize. Flax is also grown, but very few sunflowers.

245 AN IMPORTANT aspect of agriculture around Curtea de Argeş is fruit cultivation. Apples, pears and plums are the main crops, with occasional cherries. Every farm, however small, has some fruit trees, sometimes scattered over the whole holding, but more usually in a small orchard. Sufficient apples are grown to allow a considerable export trade to Bucharest. Plums are used for the manufacture of the alcoholic drink tuica in Curtea de Argeş. Recently plum-drying has been tried, and is already being taken up successfully by the more enterprising peasants. Walnuts also are gathered and sold.

refineries did not exceed 1.65 lei per kg. The total consumption of sugar, averaging 100,000,000 kgs. per annum, would thus yield a net profit of 165 million lei, which represented a return of 5 per cent on the invested capital. The cultivation of beet-sugar was reported to be considerably more profitable to the peasant than wheat, for while one hectare sown with wheat yielded 1,200 kgs., which would fetch 2,700 lei, one hectare sown with sugar-beet produced 20,000 kgs., which was bought by the refineries for 16,000 lei.

Though the actual production of cereals surpasses that of the pre-war period, the quantity exported shows a considerable diminution. Transylvania and Bucovina do not produce enough grain for their needs, and cover their requirements by imports. The relative values of the various cereals, as well as the quantities available for export from the 1929 harvest and those consumed locally or used for seed, are given below:

Crop	Total interior consumption in quintals.	Quantities available for export in quintals.	Total production in quintals.	Total value in million lei.
Wheat	... 25,600,000	2,400,000	28,000,000	19,600
Rye	... 2,100,000	1,300,000	3,400,000	2,049
Oats	... 8,000,000	5,600,000	13,600,000	5,169
Barley	... 7,600,000	22,800,000	30,400,000	12,768
Maize	... 34,000,000	26,800,000	60,800,000	30,400
Total	... 77,300,000	58,900,000	136,200,000	69,975

Of the available quantity for export only about half was shipped, viz., 28,000,000 quintals, while from the harvest of 1930 the quantity exported was 29,500,000 quintals.

The harvests of the last three years were abundant, and their respective yields in quantity differed but little. Owing, however, to the catastrophic fall in prices, the sums at which they were marketed varied considerably.

	Total production of all cerials.	Total estimated value in lei.
1929	136,200,000 quintals	69,975,000,000
1930	121,100,000 ,,	28,905,000,000
1931	124,800,000 ,,	24,311,000,000

RUMANIA

243 The following were the average prices of the principal cereals at the port of Constantsa per ton during the years 1928–1931, according to the bulletin of the Constantsa Chamber of Commerce:

		1928	1929	1930	1931
Barley	...	5,900	4,580	2,430	1,800
Oats	...	3,400	2,440	1,800	1,520
Maize	...	5,280	4,010	2,600	1,800
Wheat	...	5,280	4,010	2,600	2,550

241 433 If it be remembered that the value of the agricultural production of Rumania constitutes about 60 to 65 per cent of the whole national revenue, it is easy to realize what a terrible strain such a sudden and brusque diminution in the resources of the country is likely to throw on the entire structure of its economic and social life. For the period of 1926–28 the national revenue was computed at 171 milliard lei, of which 110 milliards were derived from agriculture. According to the *Argus* of February 13th, 1932, this last figure for 1931 had declined to 46.5 milliards.

245 Among the 613,614 hectares occupied by orchards and vineyards, some 209,321 hectares are planted with plum trees which yield an annual average crop of about 5 million quintals of fruit, the yields for the years 1928–30 being respectively 28, 9.5, and 14.6 quintals per hectare. The vine is also very extensively cultivated, 239,825 hectares being planted with it. In 1930 the amount of wine obtained from the grapes grown attained about 8,385,374 hectoliters, about half of which was produced in Bessarabia.

241 231 The position of the livestock population in a country of small farmsteads like Rumania is liable to exert a great influence on agriculture, for not only are horses and horned cattle used as draught animals, but their manure is the only kind of fertiliser applied to the fields, so that the gradual reconstitution of the livestock situation after the serious damages inflicted on it during the war is a reassuring sign. The recovery would have been much more rapid if the export taxes on cattle and meat had not discouraged the cattle breeders by unduly restraining exports. The following

241 however, be slightly deficient in grain, especially
133 in poor years.

The hilly land of Transylvania and the Bucovina
[311] differs markedly from the plain. There is proportionately less arable and much more meadow, grazing and forest land. The soil is poor. Methods are not as primitive as in the plain land of the Old Kingdom, but over-crowding is more serious and output per head is consequently lower. Parts of this region are slightly deficient in grain. Though
[146] the level of food consumption is low, the dietary is more varied than elsewhere in the country, less maize and more meat and dairy produce being eaten.

3. Crops

311 Of the total area of pre-war Rumania, of nearly 30 million hectares (119,000 sq. miles) and twice the area of England and Wales), about 13 million hectares, or 45 per cent. was arable. Permanent meadow, pasture and grazing occupied 14 per cent., while tree and bush crops accounted for a further 2 per cent. The remaining land was non-agricultural, forest and waste land.

●243 A very high proportion of the arable—over 80 per cent.—was used for grain growing, principally maize, wheat and barley. Owing to low rainfall, use of poor seed and lack of fertilisers, yields were at a low level and fluctuated widely from year to year.

[439] Out of an average grain production of 11 million tons, 6 millions went into domestic human consumption and 1½ million were exported, the remainder going to fodder, seed and waste. Grain exports have always figured largely in the country's foreign trade. During the twenty years 1920 to 1939 they only once fell below a million tons, and in some years exceeded three million tons. In value, during the decade before the war, they formed, after petroleum products, the main item in exports.

241 No other category of crops compares with grain. Sown fodder crops took barely 5 per cent. of the arable, all other crops, including potatoes, fibres, oilseeds, tobacco and sugar beet, about 8 per cent. Peas, beans and oilseeds were grown in sufficient quantities to provide surpluses for export. Germany established two companies—Solagra in 1934 and Soya A.G. in 1940—which invested large sums in promoting oilseed cultivation. The area
249 under sunflower was raised only slightly, but that under soya rose from nil in 1933 to 103,000 ha. (254,000 acres) in 1939, but the greater part of both crops was located in Bessarabia which Rumania lost to the U.S.S.R. in 1940 (see below).

244 Production of potatoes, vegetables and sugar
247 beet was just sufficient for domestic consumption, but the tobacco crop did not quite meet requirements. Tobacco production had fallen from 20,000 tons in the late nineteen-twenties to 12,000 tons in the years just prior to the war.

245 Fruit production was undeveloped and there was little organised marketing and processing. Plums were the main crop, but three-quarters of the output was used for making brandy. Apples and other kinds of fruit, and walnuts, were produced in fair quantities, but exports were insignificant, and, owing to low quality and the lack of standardisation, there were no prospects of development.

CHAPTER 1

228 in private waters. Supplemented by some 4,000 tons of imported fish, this provided nearly 1 kg. (2·2 lb.) per head of population, but, in fact, almost all the fish was consumed by the 5 million persons living in towns. The principal fish caught were sturgeon, carp, pike, eels and crayfish, the main fishing centres being Brăila, Tulcea and Ismail.

6. Food Industries

256 The chief food and agricultural-processing industries are milling, sugar manufacture, oilseed crushing and tobacco curing. While the milling industry was dispersed widely about the country in more than 15,000 small mills employing altogether over 37,000 persons (at 1930 census), the sugar industry was for the most part concentrated in the plain of the Old Kingdom. Of the 17 sugar 257 factories employing 10,000 workers, only one was in the Transylvanian districts lost to Hungary and five in the areas temporarily lost to the U.S.S.R. The vegetable-oil industry, located chiefly in 258 Bessarabia, was only partly carried on in factories, of which there were (on January 1st, 1939) 117, employing 2,026 workers. Among these, 34 were fitted both to extract crude oil and to refine it, six were exclusively refineries, while the remainder produced only crude oil. The rest of the industry consisted of some 2,000 hand, or animal-driven presses mostly owned by individual peasants or by shopkeepers. These primitive presses extracted only a low percentage of oil from the seeds, and consequently the cake—mainly sold for export—had an unusually high oil content. As regards 277 tobacco, both curing and cigarette manufacture [656] were subject to government licence and control. There were 29 factories (in 1930) employing 9,720 workers, but tobacco cultivation subsequently declined, so also doubtless did the numbers employed.

7. Agricultural Organisation

452 The history of the organisation of Rumanian 241 farmers is one of not too successful co-operatives 474 becoming transformed more and more into agencies for the execution of Government Control Schemes. [654] For many years there had been throughout the country a network of agricultural credit societies, co-operative in form but in practice directed by the State. These played an important rôle during the period of the Land Reform in helping the peasants by advances to buy and equip their newly acquired holdings. There was even some co-operative cultivation for a time, until the new peasant-owners could muster sufficient draught animals and implements. Besides this, there have been strong local co-operative unions especially among the [162] minority nationalities—the Hungarians in Transylvania, the Swabian and Saxons in the Banat and the Russian and Polish Jews in the Bucovina.

243 The credit societies revived in importance when, 474 after 1933, the Rumanian Government began the organisation of grain marketing. They became 452 the local agents of a Central Marketing Board through which all sales of grain had to be made 654 both for home consumption and for export. Whereas formerly grain prices slumped immediately after the harvest, most peasants, being obliged to sell their grain quickly, under the new scheme prices were stabilised throughout the year, and this brought a great improvement to peasants' [651] receipts. But the scheme and the societies were also used to collect the peasants' taxes (paid in grain) which did not increase the popularity of co-operation.

241 722 lar, for grain, oilseeds and livestock products to provide the balance of food and fodder requirements which she could not obtain from her own agriculture. The normal grain surpluses and the potential output of sunflower and other oilseeds appeared sufficiently large to provide a solid basis for these expectations. Owing, however, to wartime dislocations of economic life, to the absence of adequate administrative control of farming, to the lack of co-operation by the peasants, and, above all, to a succession of unfavourable seasons, these hopes have been almost entirely falsified.

Firstly, in 1940, Rumania lost Bessarabia, her principal surplus region, to the U.S.S.R., and with it all that year's crops. When she regained it in 1941 she obtained no surplus out of that harvest, and, because of disorganisation, little in 1942. In rump Rumania, in 1940 and 1941, the grain harvests were substantially below the average owing to reduced sowings (partly caused by mobilisation) and to disappointing yields. A determined effort was made by propaganda and the release of labour to bring sowings back to normal for the 1942 season. But the early onset of an unusually severe winter again reduced the sowings, while a serious drought in the summer of 1942 reduced the yields.

722 [243] There was a deficiency in wheat sowings of over a million hectares, while grain yields were barely 60 per cent. of the average. The out-turn of the year was consequently worse than that of the two preceding years. Wheat and rye yielded only 1·3 million tons compared with an average for the territory of 3·6 million tons. The maize crop was a little less than 3 million tons compared with an average of 4·7 million tons. The total grain production was about 5·5 million tons, a quantity inadequate to meet the requirements of food and fodder at any approach to normal levels.

[241] Other crops were more successful in 1942, but they could not appreciably offset the disastrous grain results. The potato crop reached an average level for the first time during the war years, and part of it was used to stretch the deficient wheat for bread making. There was also a good crop of beans and peas, largely because, as their prices were not controlled, they were very remunerative crops. The sunflower crop, though sowings failed to reach the ambitious target and yields were only 60 per cent. of normal, was of record dimensions. Soya, rape and sugar beet declined, however, from earlier levels. (A significant supplementary supply of sugar is now being obtained from Transnistria.)

[231] These for the most part poor crop results, besides curtailing the supplies available for human consumption and exports, also brought about a reduction in livestock numbers at the end of 1942. Livestock numbers may, however, have increased somewhat in 1940 and 1941, for it was reported that peasants held back more grain than usual in those years for livestock feeding. If this is true, numbers would now probably be little different from those of pre-war years.

[241] Crop prospects for 1943 point to a more normal result. The winter of 1942-43 was late and mild, making it possible to sow a near-average acreage of winter crops. Preparatory work for spring sowings was also done in good time, and on the whole the weather subsequently has not been unfavourable.

722 249 Tobacco cultivation appears to have declined in the war years, principally because the prices were even more unattractive than those of grain. In 1942 the area sown was reported to be little

CHAPTER I

722 more than half the normal, but the efforts in 1943
[249] to recover to a more average crop may have succeeded.

3. Fish

[228] The general food shortage in Rumania gave a great fillip to the fishing industry. In the 12 months April 1942 to March 1943, some 40,000 tons of fish were caught in State waters besides 13,000 tons in rented and private waters. This is almost double the largest pre-war catch. During 1942 some 6,000 tons were salted down for winter use. In order to promote and introduce better organisation into the fishing industry a German-Rumanian Company has been established, the "Mares-Neagrâ," which will devote special attention to developing the Black Sea fisheries.

4. Agricultural Exports

439 The pre-war level of grain exports was well
243 maintained in 1939; wheat in particular was prominent with over a million tons. The exports of 1940, however, showed an immediate reflection of territorial changes and war shortages. Total grain exports in that year barely reached a million tons compared with the pre-war average of about 1·6 million tons. The following year showed a still sharper decline, wheat reaching only 5,000 tons and maize 120,000 tons. In 1942, despite the recovery of Bessarabia, it is most unlikely that even this level was maintained.

439 Oilseed exports, despite direct German interven-
249 tion aiming at an expansion of the crop, also fell below pre-war levels. Sunflower-seed exports, the principal oilseed, fell from an average of 30,000 tons in 1935-38 to 12,000 tons in 1940 and to 5,000 tons in 1941. Exports following the 1942 crop, though probably better, were not at all commensurate with the increased production, for a serious shortage of edible oil and fat had meanwhile developed in Rumania owing to decreased supplies of pig fat and to the retention by the peasants of their seed for consumption at home, or for disposal on the Black Market.

5. Administrative Control

241 Not even the most complete and efficient system
656 of administrative control could have assured the country's food supplies and exports at normal
435 levels during these three unfavourable years, but it is clear that Rumania's food difficulties have been aggravated by mistakes in economic policy and inadequate control measures. Bureaucratic methods of handling the peasants aroused antagonism and resistance. Supplies of tested seed and other farm requisites were not made available in time. On the collection and supply side, too much power was left in the hands of local prefects. But the most serious shortcoming of the official administration was the failure to establish a price control, and an appropriate relationship between agricultural prices and the cost of the things farmers buy. (In the absence of effective discipline this ratio needs to be strongly in the producers' favour if production and marketing of foodstuffs is to be maintained.) Prices of consumers' goods rose rapidly, owing to shortages, while the Government pegged the prices of farm produce at comparatively low levels. Consequently, the peasants curtailed production and sought better prices by selling much of their produce through Black Market channels. The mistake was officially admitted in the autumn of 1941 when grain prices were more than doubled, but the position still remained unfavourable to

137 [241] THE JOURNEY to Braşov (Kronstadt) took us along the valley, both sides of which were well cultivated, potatoes, beans, oats, maize being the chief crops; sunflowers and small patches of hemp were also seen. A halt for petrol, a short distance from Bran, provided an opportunity for studying the meadow land vegetation close to the road; the following were noted: *Scilla trilobium*, *Centaurea scabiosa*, *Coronilla varia*, *Hypericum perforatum*, *Medicago falcata*, *Peucedanum oreoselinum*, *Knautia arvensis*, *Campanula rotundifolium*, *Helianthemum chamaecistus*, *Stachys betonica*, *Dianthus Carthusianorum*, *Viola tricolor*, *Senecio aquatica*, *Trifolium procumbens*, *Achillea millefolium*, *Chrysanthemum leucanthemum*, *Campanula trachelium*, *C. rapunculus*, *Cirsium oleracea*, *Galium verum*, *G. Mollugo*, *Geranium pratense*, *Lathyrus pratensis*, *Melampyrum nemorosum*, etc.

AT BRAŞOV were seen *Potentilla canescens* and *Silene otites* among many commoner species.

IT WAS NOT until we reached Borsec that we had time to study the vegetation in any detail, and it was somewhat unfortunate that the truly sub-alpine and alpine regions were not within easy reach. The greater part of the mountain sides surrounding Borsec were covered with spruce forests quite to the summits and beech forest was not well represented, being met with as somewhat poor specimens often at a considerable height. These forests proved to be rather deficient in species, botanically.

DURING our walk from Borsec across meadows and up on to the summit of Bukkhavas, it was interesting to see the beech and birch above the limit of the spruce. *Ribes grossularia* was seen in fruit in open spots in the forest. The open summit was covered with *Vaccinium myrtillus* with its usual association; *Scorzonera rosea* was also growing upon the summit. Leaving the mountain and going down towards Bilbor we noted a grassy clearing with a building where cattle had been housed: this as in other cases was covered with a prolific growth of dock (*Rumex sp.*); it invariably accompanied places where mountain dairies had been established. On reaching the valley a fine clump of *Dianthus superbus* was seen.

● 244 A WALK around the cottages of Old Borsec revealed several vegetable gardens apparently associated with the possibility

244 of supplying the summer visitors with vegetables. Runner beans, potatoes, poppy-seed, cabbages, red beet, onions, lettuce, and carrots were common, and in one garden in addition to the above, red currants, gooseberries, vegetable marrows, fennel, caraway and leeks were growing.

137 THE following plants were noticed in the neighbourhood of Borsec: *Senecio fuchsii, Maianthemum bifolium, Gentiana cruciata, G. asclepiadea, Stachys alpina, Chaerophyllum hirsutum, Dipsacus laciniatus, Trifolium pannonicum, Myosotis sparsiflora, Carduus personata, Campanula cervicaria, Lychnis viscaria, Silene armeria, Dianthus armeria, Dianthus superbus, Salix pentandra, Turritis glabra, Calamagrostis epigeios.*

ONE very interesting area was visited by Capt. Chase, viz. the Red Rocks near Tulgheş (Tölgyes): on account of the number of interesting plants to be found there this area has been preserved under the care of the Botanic Garden of Cluj. Tulgheş is the village which comes next to Corbu and here the mountains rise up from the valley floor of the Bistricioara and are covered with forests, the spruce (*Picea excelsa*) being dominant and reaching quite down to the valley which here has an altitude of about 600 metres. It was noted that sparse deciduous forest occurred above the spruce, the chief trees being the pedunculate oak (*Quercus pedunculata*), hazel (*Corylus avellana*), ash (*Fraxinus excelsior*), hornbeam (*Carpinus betulus*), with scattered examples of lime (*Tilia cordata*) and poplar (*Populus tremula*). Climbing higher, a narrow belt of birch (*Betula verrucosa*) occurred followed by beech (*Fagus silvatica*), with examples of sycamore (*Acer pseudo-platanus*) and lime. Still higher up, as usual, there was summer pasturage for sheep. The conspicuous cliffs, the "Red Rocks," could be seen standing out above the forest, and near them Capt. Chase recorded the following: *Sempervivum hirtum, Arabis arenosa, Phleum montanum, Cytisus leucotrichus, Campanula carpatica, Senecio rupestris, Spiraea ulmifolia, Allium montanum, Libanotis montana, Thalictrum foetidum, Melampyrum saxosum,* and what was one of the chief objects of the visit, plants of the outstanding endemic *Astragalus Romeri* growing in a ravine between the rocks.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 ED1 Rumania ED1

543 5. THINGS SEEN AT BORSEC FAIR, AUGUST 20TH

[286] 1. MATERIAL BY THE YARD.

Cotton: Prints, calicoes, zephyrs, ginghams, men's shirtings.
Wool: Coloured serges, rough grey and brown woollen material (very thick) for men's and women's winter clothing.
Artificial Silk: In plain colours, Crêpe de Chine in plain colours, a very few printed silks.
Lace: Coarse white lace edgings (from Nottingham).

[291] 2. CLOTHING.

Men's: Trousers, coats, waistcoats, cloth caps, embroidered lambskin waistcoats, braces.

Women's: Knitted and crocheted wool caps and berets, patent leather belts. Printed cotton and artificial silk pieces for head coverings. Ribbons.

Children's: Babies' knitted woollen garments. Modern-style dresses in artificial silk with machine-made embroidery. Socks and stockings of cotton and wool hand-knitted in Roumania. Artificial silk stockings manufactured from yarn imported from Switzerland and France.

[295] 3. BOOTS AND SHOES FOR MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

Field boots and heavy nailed boots for men.
Manufactured boots and shoes for women and children.
Ready-made peasant shoes of leather.
Ready-made peasant shoes of leather with rubber attached to sole.
Ready-made peasant shoes made from old motor tyres.
Shoes of plaited felt of all sizes for women and children.
Shoes of knitted coarse wool with straps.
Pieces of leather of correct size for making the peasant shoes and leather thongs for lacing them.
Leather and mohair laces for using with the manufactured boots and shoes.

[415] 4. POTTERY.

Large brown glazed earthenware pots only. No other pottery of any kind was seen in the fair.

[285] 5. BASKETS, ETC.

Hand-made of rushes gathered by the peasants who make them. Some colour introduced into the larger baskets; strong, neat weaving. Also a few big hats as worn in the fields by the Hungarian peasant women.

● 244 6. GREENGROCERY.

Turnips, potatoes, yellow beans, cabbages, gherkins, carrots, onions, tomatoes, ardei, lemons, apples, pears, Indian corn, water melons, cantaloupes.

342



A small house in Curtea de Argeş of similar type to Mayor's house.

●244 There was a large garden, mostly at the ground
343 being given to growing maize and vegetable marrows, though there were various small fruit-trees. The open space in front of the house had a summer kitchen. These out-door kitchens are used by almost all the peasants where an open space or yard of any sort provides available space (see illustration opposite).[1]

342 THE SECOND HOUSE which we visited and examined is illustrated facing page 29 (B).[2] This shows a well-built structure and represents the type which is more common in the town itself. The walls, which are whitewashed, are of brick and rubble and have an average thickness of 32 cm. There is a good shingled roof with good carved wooden decoration under the eave. The floor of the terrace is earth, and the entire structure of the balcony is of wood, without paint or stain. The end of the house has a pleasing finish in the form of a moulded cornice and pilasters (B).

THIS HOUSE is occupied by two families; the men, both being potters, share the potter's table (two wheels) in the lower house.

1 [See pp. 306 (HRAF pagination) -- Analyst]

2 [See pp. 286 (HRAF pagination) -- Analyst]

132 being common at this height (440 metres and upwards). July and August are the hottest months.

THE MEAN annual rainfall for Curtea de Argeş (taken over a period of nine years) is 672 mm. Precipitation occurs all the year round, but the rainiest months are May and June.

243 THE PRINCIPAL crop is maize, from which not only is the staple food "mamaliga" made, but the stems and leaves are used for animal fodder and bedding. Oats and rye are grown for fodder on the larger farms only. Wheat is not grown in the region. Soil and climate are suitable, but at present the peasant possesses very little machinery; harvesting would have to be done with a sickle or scythe and threshing with a flail. It is easier to buy such wheat as is required from the Wallachian Plain.

244 IN ADDITION to the above, every farm, however small, grows various vegetable crops: pumpkins for fodder, tomatoes, paprika, potatoes, onions, runner beans, cabbages, aubergines, often amongst the maize, sometimes as ground crops in the orchards.

246 CULTIVATED FODDER crops are grown only on the larger farms, and consist of clover, lucerne and sometimes a mixture of vetch and oats, and very occasionally turnips.

THE LOWER slopes of the hills form the natural hay meadows of the commune, but occasionally the grass of the orchard is used as rough pasture.

248 HEMP IS grown on the low-lying farms, usually as a boundary crop for the maize. Flax is also grown, but very few sunflowers.

245 AN IMPORTANT aspect of agriculture around Curtea de Argeş is fruit cultivation. Apples, pears and plums are the main crops, with occasional cherries. Every farm, however small, has some fruit trees, sometimes scattered over the whole holding, but more usually in a small orchard. Sufficient apples are grown to allow a considerable export trade to Bucharest. Plums are used for the manufacture of the alcoholic drink tuica in Curtea de Argeş. Recently plum-drying has been tried, and is already being taken up successfully by the more enterprising peasants. Walnuts also are gathered and sold.

241 however, be slightly deficient in grain, especially
133 in poor years.

The hilly land of Transylvania and the Bucovina
[311] differs markedly from the plain. There is proportionately less arable and much more meadow, grazing and forest land. The soil is poor. Methods are not as primitive as in the plain land of the Old Kingdom, but over-crowding is more serious and output per head is consequently lower. Parts of this region are slightly deficient in grain. Though
[146] the level of food consumption is low, the dietary is more varied than elsewhere in the country, less maize and more meat and dairy produce being eaten.

3. Crops

311 Of the total area of pre-war Rumania, of nearly 30 million hectares (119,000 sq. miles) and twice the area of England and Wales), about 13 million hectares, or 45 per cent. was arable. Permanent meadow, pasture and grazing occupied 14 per cent., while tree and bush crops accounted for a further 2 per cent. The remaining land was non-agricultural, forest and waste land.

243 A very high proportion of the arable—over 80 per cent.—was used for grain growing, principally maize, wheat and barley. Owing to low rainfall, use of poor seed and lack of fertilisers, yields were at a low level and fluctuated widely from year to year.

[439] Out of an average grain production of 11 million tons, 6 millions went into domestic human consumption and 1½ million were exported, the remainder going to fodder, seed and waste. Grain exports have always figured largely in the country's foreign trade. During the twenty years 1920 to 1939 they only once fell below a million tons, and in some years exceeded three million tons. In value, during the decade before the war, they formed, after petroleum products, the main item in exports.

241 No other category of crops compares with grain. Sown fodder crops took barely 5 per cent. of the arable, all other crops, including potatoes, fibres, oilseeds, tobacco and sugar beet, about 8 per cent. Peas, beans and oilseeds were grown in sufficient quantities to provide surpluses for export. Germany established two companies—Solagra in 1934 and Soya A.G. in 1940—which invested large sums in promoting oilseed cultivation. The area
249 under sunflower was raised only slightly, but that under soya rose from nil in 1933 to 103,000 ha. (254,000 acres) in 1939, but the greater part of both crops was located in Bessarabia which Rumania lost to the U.S.S.R. in 1940 (see below).

244 Production of potatoes, vegetables and sugar
247 beet was just sufficient for domestic consumption, but the tobacco crop did not quite meet requirements. Tobacco production had fallen from 20,000 tons in the late nineteen-twenties to 12,000 tons in the years just prior to the war.

245 Fruit production was undeveloped and there was little organised marketing and processing. Plums were the main crop, but three-quarters of the output was used for making brandy. Apples and other kinds of fruit, and walnuts, were produced in fair quantities, but exports were insignificant, and, owing to low quality and the lack of standardisation, there were no prospects of development.

342 712 [531] The stairway, about 1.25 meters wide made of massive logs, is generally on the inside of the buildings; when it is located on the outside it leads onto the wooden balcony. The exterior is white-washed. In addition, the surface is decorated with molded bands around each story division. There may also be a vertical division, thus creating a number of large panels. While these areas are symmetrical, neither they nor the molded bands that enclose them have any relation to the placing of windows or pillars (JÄnecke, 1918: 62-63).

342 [175] [563] In 1895 there still existed about 55,000 earth huts (bordei) which were inhabited by the poorest population, generally Gypsies (fig. 63). They are common in the Danubian plain. Over an excavation 1-3 meters deep is placed a gabled roof. The roof is made of boards over which earth is laid. Sometimes reeds are placed over the boards before the earthen cover is added. The entrance is on one of the gabled sides, generally with a southerly exposure, and a window is placed on each gable side (JÄnecke, 1918: 4).

343 351 Farm Buildings. In the lowlands the buildings are arranged in no definite order; though generally the house is closest to the road. The corn-house (coşar) is either opposite to or at right angles to the house so that it can be watched. The yard and orchard are surrounded by a fence. The simplest fence is made of wickerwork between wooden poles. More often, however, it is made of boards [556] that have intricate excised designs (fig. 60). The wealthy people may add an imposing gateway with a small door. Flower or vegetable [563] gardens are rare, and the latter are called bulgări, since they are [244] generally kept by immigrant Bulgarians who grow all the vegetables [247] for town consumption (Stratilesco, 1907: 233). The farmstead is surrounded by shady trees, and there is generally a plum orchard at [245] the back of the farm buildings (JÄnecke, 1918: 8-9).

[184] In the mountain regions the arrangement of the buildings in the yard differs from that of the lowlands. The stables and other buildings are arranged on the border of the yard in a horseshoe form to serve as protection for the house. The yard is usually very small, and has a strong high palisade with a massive gateway, the whole giving the farm a fortress-like appearance (the author points to the presence of bears in summer and wolves in winter) (JÄnecke, 1918: 32-35).

343 [184] In the lowlands there are generally not many additional farm buildings in the yard, and this fact is correlated with the pattern of building additional annexes to the house, a more economical and practical procedure. Stables are of the simplest lathwork or wickerwork, covered with a straw roof. Sheds for the storage of straw, hay and cornstalks are absent, for the latter are stacked into tall round piles in the open. The baking oven for summer use, made of mud and bricks, has a hipped roof supported by four pillars.

243 soils of the oak forest) prevail, and where the low rainfall is inimical to maize cultivation. Wheat is an important crop also on the well-drained soils of the Tertiary loess-covered plateau, on which chernoziom also develops, between the Prut and Siret. Here, below 1,000 feet, wheat is extensively grown, for here again the climate approximates to the steppe type. Grain began to be exported from the Danube plain depression in appreciable quantities only in 1833, the year of the great Russian famine, but in thirty years it had taken the place of grazing land and meadow over all the Black Earth region. The breaking up of the large estates, however, and the unsettled conditions during and since the War have checked the development of large-scale wheat production for export. After the War, the production of grain of all sorts fell off heavily as a result partly of a heavy tax imposed on grain export, partly of uneconomic farming due to the subdivision of estates, partly of the Government's taking over the marketing of wheat and rye and fixing prices for those commodities—a policy which discouraged production of these crops by the peasants, who concentrated on the production of maize, with barley and oats for home consumption in the wetter highlands. In any case, the yield of wheat in regions of steppe climate varies enormously from year to year with the winter and spring precipitation, and even during the period of normal progress in the decade preceding the War the export varied between nearly 2 million tons and less than 200,000. In spite of the rich soils, the yield per acre is small judged by western European standards.

BARLEY does very well as a peasant fodder crop in the dry south-east of the Old Kingdom, and is a crop of some importance in Transylvania (1½ to 2 million hectares). In Moldavia and Oltenia under moister conditions, the high starch content makes it useful for brewing, and it is grown mainly on the larger estates.

248 HEMP AND FLAX are grown, the latter decreasingly, by the peasants for use in domestic textile industry. Imported cotton yarn has largely taken the place of linen.

● 245 As regards the vine—the best grapes for wine are produced in small holdings in the hill country of Transylvania (chiefly produced by the Saxon communities), Wallachia and

245 Moldavia, where the spring and copious early summer rains and the luminous late summer provide advantageous conditions. The use of American stocks, resistant to the phylloxera, has proved successful particularly in Moldavia. Bessarabia supplies about 40 per cent of the acreage under vines, and Wallachia about 23 per cent. The quality of the wine is much below the quality of the grapes, the peasant finding the production of tuica, a spirit simply distilled from the ubiquitous plum, a less difficult and exacting undertaking. There is no export of wine worth mentioning.

231 Before the Great War the rearing of animals, which had played an important part in the economy of Roumania in the early nineteenth century (providing an export to Turkey of sheep and horses from the lower Danube lands and of army horses to Prussia) had been giving way rapidly to grain cultivation. Since the War, however, the number of sheep, cattle and horses has increased, in spite of the great losses in the areas overrun by the enemy. The subdivision of the land into small holdings has been a factor in the increase of animals, for every peasant aims at having a few sheep, a couple of cows and a pig or two. In Transylvania, the development of cattle breeding had been scientifically encouraged, breeds peculiarly suited to various districts being improved. There are three types of permanent pasture in Roumania—the flood plain pastures of the Baltea and of the wider valleys in general, available for grazing in the winter and spring, the permanent meadows of the plains, which can be grazed only in the spring before the summer drought sets in, and the high pastures in the forest clearings, available during the summer months. The provision of winter fodder where the flood plains are not available is a serious problem, and one to which the Ministry of Agriculture is turning serious attention, for the cultivation of fodder crops is very little developed. Hay is harvested painfully one to three times in the year in the rich alpine pastures of the Carpathian valleys and is eked out in the peasant communities with maize stalks and straw. The small mountain cattle are the best milkers but of not much service for draught or for butchers' meat. The sheep is far more important in the peasant economy, providing cheese, wool for the domestic loom and mutton—for the most part dried. In Transylvania the cattle are mainly of the Hungarian steppe type with a

132 being common at this height (440 metres and upwards). July and August are the hottest months.

THE MEAN annual rainfall for Curtea de Argeş (taken over a period of nine years) is 672 mm. Precipitation occurs all the year round, but the rainiest months are May and June.

243 THE PRINCIPAL crop is maize, from which not only is the staple food "mamaliga" made, but the stems and leaves are used for animal fodder and bedding. Oats and rye are grown for fodder on the larger farms only. Wheat is not grown in the region. Soil and climate are suitable, but at present the peasant possesses very little machinery; harvesting would have to be done with a sickle or scythe and threshing with a flail. It is easier to buy such wheat as is required from the Wallachian Plain.

244 IN ADDITION to the above, every farm, however small, grows various vegetable crops: pumpkins for fodder, tomatoes, paprika, potatoes, onions, runner beans, cabbages, aubergines, often amongst the maize, sometimes as ground crops in the orchards.

246 CULTIVATED FODDER crops are grown only on the larger farms, and consist of clover, lucerne and sometimes a mixture of vetch and oats, and very occasionally turnips.

THE LOWER slopes of the hills form the natural hay meadows of the commune, but occasionally the grass of the orchard is used as rough pasture.

248 HEMP IS grown on the low-lying farms, usually as a boundary crop for the maize. Flax is also grown, but very few sunflowers.

245 AN IMPORTANT aspect of agriculture around Curtea de Argeş is fruit cultivation. Apples, pears and plums are the main crops, with occasional cherries. Every farm, however small, has some fruit trees, sometimes scattered over the whole holding, but more usually in a small orchard. Sufficient apples are grown to allow a considerable export trade to Bucharest. Plums are used for the manufacture of the alcoholic drink tuica in Curtea de Argeş. Recently plum-drying has been tried, and is already being taken up successfully by the more enterprising peasants. Walnuts also are gathered and sold.

RUMANIA

243 The following were the average prices of the principal cereals at the port of Constantsa per ton during the years 1928–1931, according to the bulletin of the Constantsa Chamber of Commerce:

		1928	1929	1930	1931
Barley	...	5,900	4,580	2,420	1,900
Oats	...	3,400	2,440	1,800	1,520
Maize	...	5,280	4,010	2,600	1,800
Wheat	...	5,280	4,010	2,600	2,550

241 433 If it be remembered that the value of the agricultural production of Rumania constitutes about 60 to 65 per cent of the whole national revenue, it is easy to realize what a terrible strain such a sudden and brusque diminution in the resources of the country is likely to throw on the entire structure of its economic and social life. For the period of 1926–28 the national revenue was computed at 171 milliard lei, of which 110 milliards were derived from agriculture. According to the *Argus* of February 13th, 1932, this last figure for 1931 had declined to 46.5 milliards.

245 Among the 613,614 hectares occupied by orchards and vineyards, some 209,321 hectares are planted with plum trees which yield an annual average crop of about 5 million quintals of fruit, the yields for the years 1928–30 being respectively 28, 9.5, and 14.6 quintals per hectare. The vine is also very extensively cultivated, 239,825 hectares being planted with it. In 1930 the amount of wine obtained from the grapes grown attained about 8,385,374 hectoliters, about half of which was produced in Bessarabia.

241 231 The position of the livestock population in a country of small farmsteads like Rumania is liable to exert a great influence on agriculture, for not only are horses and horned cattle used as draught animals, but their manure is the only kind of fertiliser applied to the fields, so that the gradual reconstitution of the livestock situation after the serious damages inflicted on it during the war is a reassuring sign. The recovery would have been much more rapid if the export taxes on cattle and meat had not discouraged the cattle breeders by unduly restraining exports. The following

241 however, be slightly deficient in grain, especially
133 in poor years.

The hilly land of Transylvania and the Bucovina
[311] differs markedly from the plain. There is proportionately less arable and much more meadow, grazing and forest land. The soil is poor. Methods are not as primitive as in the plain land of the Old Kingdom, but over-crowding is more serious and output per head is consequently lower. Parts of this region are slightly deficient in grain. Though
[146] the level of food consumption is low, the dietary is more varied than elsewhere in the country, less maize and more meat and dairy produce being eaten.

3. Crops

311 Of the total area of pre-war Rumania, of nearly 30 million hectares (116,000 sq. miles) and twice the area of England and Wales), about 13 million hectares, or 45 per cent. was arable. Permanent meadow, pasture and grazing occupied 14 per cent., while tree and bush crops accounted for a further 2 per cent. The remaining land was non-agricultural, forest and waste land.

243 A very high proportion of the arable—over 80 per cent.—was used for grain growing, principally maize, wheat and barley. Owing to low rainfall, use of poor seed and lack of fertilisers, yields were at a low level and fluctuated widely from year to year.

[439] Out of an average grain production of 11 million tons, 6 millions went into domestic human consumption and 1½ million were exported, the remainder going to fodder, seed and waste. Grain exports have always figured largely in the country's foreign trade. During the twenty years 1920 to 1939 they only once fell below a million tons, and in some years exceeded three million tons. In value, during the decade before the war, they formed, after petroleum products, the main item in exports.

241 No other category of crops compares with grain. Sown fodder crops took barely 5 per cent. of the arable, all other crops, including potatoes, fibres, oilseeds, tobacco and sugar beet, about 8 per cent. Peas, beans and oilseeds were grown in sufficient quantities to provide surpluses for export. Germany established two companies—Solagra in 1934 and Soya A.G. in 1940—which invested large sums in promoting oilseed cultivation. The area
249 under sunflower was raised only slightly, but that under soya rose from nil in 1933 to 103,000 ha. (254,000 acres) in 1939, but the greater part of both crops was located in Bessarabia which Rumania lost to the U.S.S.R. in 1940 (see below).

244 Production of potatoes, vegetables and sugar
247 beet was just sufficient for domestic consumption, but the tobacco crop did not quite meet requirements. Tobacco production had fallen from 20,000 tons in the late nineteen-twenties to 12,000 tons in the years just prior to the war.

245 Fruit production was undeveloped and there was little organised marketing and processing. Plums were the main crop, but three-quarters of the output was used for making brandy. Apples and other kinds of fruit, and walnuts, were produced in fair quantities, but exports were insignificant, and, owing to low quality and the lack of standardisation, there were no prospects of development.

342 712 The stairway, about 1.25 meters wide made of massive logs, is generally on the inside of the buildings; when it is located on the outside it leads unto the wooden balcony. The exterior is white-washed. In addition, the surface is decorated with molded bands [531] around each story division. There may also be a vertical division, thus creating a number of large panels. While these areas are symmetrical, neither they nor the molded bands that enclose them have any relation to the placing of windows or pillars (Jänecke, 1918: 62-63).

342 [175] [563] In 1895 there still existed about 55,000 earth huts (bordei) which were inhabited by the poorest population, generally Gypsies (fig. 63). They are common in the Danubian plain. Over an excavation 1-3 meters deep is placed a gabled roof. The roof is made of boards over which earth is laid. Sometimes reeds are placed over the boards before the earthen cover is added. The entrance is on one of the gabled sides, generally with a southerly exposure, and a window is placed on each gable side (Jänecke, 1918: 4).

343 351 Farm Buildings. In the lowlands the buildings are arranged in no definite order; though generally the house is closest to the road. The corn-house (coşar) is either opposite to or at right angles to the house so that it can be watched. The yard and orchard are surrounded by a fence. The simplest fence is made of wickerwork between wooden poles. More often, however, it is made of boards [556] that have intricate excised designs (fig. 66). The wealthy people may add an imposing gateway with a small door. Flower or vegetable [563] gardens are rare, and the latter are called bulgări, since they are [244] generally kept by immigrant Bulgarians who grow all the vegetables [247] for town consumption (Stratilesco, 1907: 233). The farmstead is surrounded by shady trees, and there is generally a plum orchard at [245] the back of the farm buildings (Jänecke, 1918: 8-9).

[184] In the mountain regions the arrangement of the buildings in the yard differs from that of the lowlands. The stables and other buildings are arranged on the border of the yard in a horseshoe form to serve as protection for the house. The yard is usually very small, and has a strong high palisade with a massive gateway, the whole giving the farm a fortress-like appearance (the author points to the presence of bears in summer and wolves in winter) (Jänecke, 1918: 32-35).

343 [184] In the lowlands there are generally not many additional farm buildings in the yard, and this fact is correlated with the pattern of building additional annexes to the house, a more economical and practical procedure. Stables are of the simplest lathwork or wickerwork, covered with a straw roof. Sheds for the storage of straw, hay and cornstalks are absent, for the latter are stacked into tall round piles in the open. The baking oven for summer use, made of mud and bricks, has a hipped roof supported by four pillars.

423 dealt with a considerably larger area. Forty-six holdings were between one and two, 18 between two and three, 8 between three and four, 3 between four and five, and 2 larger (8.8 and 19.5) hectares in extent. These holdings do not necessarily represent the whole of the land owned by a peasant.

LAND UTILISATION.

311 BROADLY SPEAKING, the land within the commune may be divided into three categories: the alluvium of the Bistricioara valley and the lower portions of its tributary valleys which is devoted to arable farming; the deforested lower slopes of the valley sides, together with the broad upper portions of some of the tributary valleys and odd patches of level ground here and there which are reserved for hay; and the rest, which is forest with the exception of the small high-altitude clearings that provide summer pasturage for the transhumant flocks and herds.

311 423 ABOUT 58 per cent of the land belongs to the state, 37 per cent to the commune, and the rest, comprising about 400 hectares, is owned by the peasants. These 400 hectares represent the arable land of the commune, whilst the state lands are entirely forest. The commune lands include a certain amount of forest, together with the hay meadows and summer pastures. The law tries to make peasants plant trees to replace those that they cut down.

CROPS.

241 [262] IN the arable area the outstanding crop is maize, from which "mamaliga," the staple food of the peasants, is made. It is sown at the beginning of May, two hillings, separated by an interval of three or four weeks, are made during June, and the crop is harvested between September 25th and October 10th. Potatoes, hemp, flax, lucerne (of which three cuttings are usually made), a little rye, sunflowers and vegetables are grown, mostly in very small patches, giving the impression of garden, rather than field, cultivation. Occasionally a small orchard adds further variety to the general pattern.

246 THE HAY CROP is of vital importance, as in all mountain communities of this kind throughout Europe. It is harvested

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

241



FIGURE 11. A = Joinery mill. B = Smithy (Plate XII). C = Wool-combing shed. D = Saw-mill. E = Gipsy colony. F = Holding in process of subdivision. Numbers refer to position and direction of camera: (1) Plate XII (lower), (2) Plate XI (lower), (3) Plate XI (upper).

246

in the Bistricioara valley in the early part of July, the peasants then working up the hillsides to the higher meadows where the hay-making is completed about the third week in September. What is not needed in the village byres is stacked on the lower slopes near the sheep pens in which the animals are housed during the winter months.

221

TRANSHUMANCE.

TRANSHUMANCE forms an essential supplement to arable farming in Corbu, for the cultivable land is too valuable to be used for grazing purposes except for a short time after the harvest, whilst the produce of the hay meadows is required for winter feed.

132 being common at this height (440 metres and upwards). July and August are the hottest months.

THE MEAN annual rainfall for Curtea de Arges (taken over a period of nine years) is 672 mm. Precipitation occurs all the year round, but the rainiest months are May and June.

243 THE PRINCIPAL crop is maize, from which not only is the staple food "mamaliga" made, but the stems and leaves are used for animal fodder and bedding. Oats and rye are grown for fodder on the larger farms only. Wheat is not grown in the region. Soil and climate are suitable, but at present the peasant possesses very little machinery; harvesting would have to be done with a sickle or scythe and threshing with a flail. It is easier to buy such wheat as is required from the Wallachian Plain.

244 IN ADDITION to the above, every farm, however small, grows various vegetable crops: pumpkins for fodder, tomatoes, paprika, potatoes, onions, runner beans, cabbages, aubergines, often amongst the maize, sometimes as ground crops in the orchards.

246 CULTIVATED FODDER crops are grown only on the larger farms, and consist of clover, lucerne and sometimes a mixture of vetch and oats, and very occasionally turnips.

THE LOWER slopes of the hills form the natural hay meadows of the commune, but occasionally the grass of the orchard is used as rough pasture.

248 HEMP IS grown on the low-lying farms, usually as a boundary crop for the maize. Flax is also grown, but very few sunflowers.

245 AN IMPORTANT aspect of agriculture around Curtea de Arges is fruit cultivation. Apples, pears and plums are the main crops, with occasional cherries. Every farm, however small, has some fruit trees, sometimes scattered over the whole holding, but more usually in a small orchard. Sufficient apples are grown to allow a considerable export trade to Bucharest. Plums are used for the manufacture of the alcoholic drink tuica in Curtea de Arges. Recently plum-drying has been tried, and is already being taken up successfully by the more enterprising peasants. Walnuts also are gathered and sold.

342 712 The stairway, about 1.25 meters wide made of massive logs, is generally on the inside of the buildings; when it is located on the outside it leads onto the wooden balcony. The exterior is white-washed. In addition, the surface is decorated with molded bands [531] around each story division. There may also be a vertical division, thus creating a number of large panels. While these areas are symmetrical, neither they nor the molded bands that enclose them have any relation to the placing of windows or pillars (Jänecke, 1918: 62-63).

342 [175] [563] In 1895 there still existed about 35,000 earth huts (bordei) which were inhabited by the poorest population, generally Gypsies (fig. 63). They are common in the Danubian plain. Over an excavation 1-3 meters deep is placed a gabled roof. The roof is made of boards over which earth is laid. Sometimes reeds are placed over the boards before the earthen cover is added. The entrance is on one of the gabled sides, generally with a southerly exposure, and a window is placed on each gable side (Jänecke, 1918: 4).

343 351 Farm Buildings. In the lowlands the buildings are arranged in no definite order; though generally the house is closest to the road. The corn-house (coŝar) is either opposite to or at right angles to the house so that it can be watched. The yard and orchard are surrounded by a fence. The simplest fence is made of wickerwork between wooden poles. More often, however, it is made of boards [556] that have intricate excised designs (fig. 60). The wealthy people may add an imposing gateway with a small door. Flower or vegetable [563] gardens are rare, and the latter are called bulgări, since they are [244] generally kept by immigrant Bulgarians who grow all the vegetables for town consumption (Stratilesco, 1907: 233). The farmstead is [247] surrounded by shady trees, and there is generally a plum orchard at [245] the back of the farm buildings (Jänecke, 1918: 8-9).

[184] In the mountain regions the arrangement of the buildings in the yard differs from that of the lowlands. The stables and other buildings are arranged on the border of the yard in a horseshoe form to serve as protection for the house. The yard is usually very small, and has a strong high palisade with a massive gateway, the whole giving the farm a fortress-like appearance (the author points to the presence of bears in summer and wolves in winter) (Jänecke, 1918: 32-35).

343 [184] In the lowlands there are generally not many additional farm buildings in the yard, and this fact is correlated with the pattern of building additional annexes to the house, a more economical and practical procedure. Stables are of the simplest lathwork or wickerwork, covered with a straw roof. Sheds for the storage of straw, hay and cornstalks are absent, for the latter are stacked into tall round piles in the open. The baking oven for summer use, made of mud and bricks, has a hipped roof supported by four pillars.

243 soils of the oak forest) prevail, and where the low rainfall is inimical to maize cultivation. Wheat is an important crop also on the well-drained soils of the Tertiary loess-covered plateau, on which chernoziom also develops, between the Prut and Siret. Here, below 1,000 feet, wheat is extensively grown, for here again the climate approximates to the steppe type. Grain began to be exported from the Danube plain depression in appreciable quantities only in 1833, the year of the great Russian famine, but in thirty years it had taken the place of grazing land and meadow over all the Black Earth region. The breaking up of the large estates, however, and the unsettled conditions during and since the War have checked the development of large-scale wheat production for export. After the War, the production of grain of all sorts fell off heavily as a result partly of a heavy tax imposed on grain export, partly of uneconomic farming due to the subdivision of estates, partly of the Government's taking over the marketing of wheat and rye and fixing prices for those commodities—a policy which discouraged production of these crops by the peasants, who concentrated on the production of maize, with barley and oats for home consumption in the wetter highlands. In any case, the yield of wheat in regions of steppe climate varies enormously from year to year with the winter and spring precipitation, and even during the period of normal progress in the decade preceding the War the export varied between nearly 2 million tons and less than 200,000. In spite of the rich soils, the yield per acre is small judged by western European standards.

BARLEY does very well as a peasant fodder crop in the dry south-east of the Old Kingdom, and is a crop of some importance in Transylvania (1½ to 2 million hectares). In Moldavia and Oltenia under moister conditions, the high starch content makes it useful for brewing, and it is grown mainly on the larger estates.

● 248 HEMP AND FLAX are grown, the latter decreasingly, by the peasants for use in domestic textile industry. Imported cotton yarn has largely taken the place of linen.

245 As regards the vine—the best grapes for wine are produced in small holdings in the hill country of Transylvania (chiefly produced by the Saxon communities), Wallachia and

132 being common at this height (440 metres and upwards). July and August are the hottest months.

THE MEAN annual rainfall for Curtea de Argeş (taken over a period of nine years) is 672 mm. Precipitation occurs all the year round, but the rainiest months are May and June.

243 THE PRINCIPAL crop is maize, from which not only is the staple food "mamaliga" made, but the stems and leaves are used for animal fodder and bedding. Oats and rye are grown for fodder on the larger farms only. Wheat is not grown in the region. Soil and climate are suitable, but at present the peasant possesses very little machinery; harvesting would have to be done with a sickle or scythe and threshing with a flail. It is easier to buy such wheat as is required from the Wallachian Plain.

244 IN ADDITION to the above, every farm, however small, grows various vegetable crops: pumpkins for fodder, tomatoes, paprika, potatoes, onions, runner beans, cabbages, aubergines, often amongst the maize, sometimes as ground crops in the orchards.

246 CULTIVATED FODDER crops are grown only on the larger farms, and consist of clover, lucerne and sometimes a mixture of vetch and oats, and very occasionally turnips.

THE LOWER slopes of the hills form the natural hay meadows of the commune, but occasionally the grass of the orchard is used as rough pasture.

248 HEMP IS grown on the low-lying farms, usually as a boundary crop for the maize. Flax is also grown, but very few sunflowers.

245 AN IMPORTANT aspect of agriculture around Curtea de Argeş is fruit cultivation. Apples, pears and plums are the main crops, with occasional cherries. Every farm, however small, has some fruit trees, sometimes scattered over the whole holding, but more usually in a small orchard. Sufficient apples are grown to allow a considerable export trade to Bucharest. Plums are used for the manufacture of the alcoholic drink tuica in Curtea de Argeş. Recently plum-drying has been tried, and is already being taken up successfully by the more enterprising peasants. Walnuts also are gathered and sold.

241 The basis of Rumanian economy is agriculture, in that some 80 per cent. of the population derive their livelihood from the land and agriculture provides a high proportion of the national income. [315] During recent years, however, the expansion of the oil industry has meant that agricultural pro- [439] duce has played a decreasing part in the country's exports, having been superseded by oil, exports of which amounted to 43 per cent. of the total export trade in 1938, compared with 19 per cent. in 1927; while grain exports in 1938 represented 23 per cent. compared with 46 per cent. in 1927.

In spite of the importance of agriculture to national prosperity farming methods are backward and per acre crop yields are among the lowest in Europe. Attention is particularly given to growing cereals, and of these maize is the chief, [231] providing a large surplus for export (apart from the war years). Livestock density is low, which is one of the weaknesses of Rumanian agriculture, the Banat being the only district in which numbers are fairly high, and farming approaches the [439] intensive system. It must be stressed that the relatively large export surplus, which consists of wheat, maize, barley, oilseeds and pulses, livestock, oilcake, etc., is only made possible by the very low nutritional level which prevails, and [146] that if this were raised to anything like western European standards exports would be commensurately reduced.

248 249 Since the war more attention has been paid to the growth of industrial crops such as sunflower, soya, cotton, hemp and flax, and the cultivation of rubber-bearing plants has been started following the finding of the *Kok Saghyz* plant left by the Russians in Bessarabia. Though some success has been achieved in increasing the areas under textile fibres, and yields have been slightly higher, the hoped for increases in soya and sunflower cultivation have not been achieved due to unfavourable weather conditions and to general wartime dislocation.

313 Rumania's forest resources, though extensive, have suffered severely from a consistent policy of over-exploitation, and, while providing the basis of a fairly important industry during the period between the two wars, have been so depleted that cutting will have to be very restricted for a number of years if they are to be allowed to recover. The loss of Northern Transylvania has affected the timber industry in particular, as a high proportion of the forest resources were located there, and in that district this industry was better developed than elsewhere in the country.

IMPORTANCE OF OIL

315 Oil plays a major part, not only in Rumania's foreign trade, but also in covering her domestic fuel requirements, to a large extent replacing coal, reserves of which are small and of low quality. Since the war and the resulting pressure which Germany has exerted to obtain increased quantities of oil for her armies, (combined with the consistent drop in the rate of production between 1936 and 1941), serious attempts have been made to find alternative sources of fuel. The enormous reserves of natural gas existing in Transylvania, which were exploited only very slightly before the war, are being used increasingly as a source of fuel to supply local industries, and a

A. TEXTILES AND TEXTILE FIBRES

248 In the years preceding the war, Rumania had been making efforts, with some success, to reduce the degree of her previous dependence on imports of textile fibres. The cotton crop of fair average quality, though still far short of the expanded mill capacity, was gradually increasing, while [236] indigenous wool supplies—though chiefly of coarse quality—were in the main enough for peasant clothing. Home-grown crops of hemp and flax were sufficient for internal needs, while jute, coir and hard hemps were imported to complete the requirements of industrial fibres.

248 439 The cessation of imports and loss of territory to her neighbours have entirely changed the supply picture, and combined with demands by Germany for imports have greatly reduced the textile "standard of living."

1. Cotton

With the development of her processing industry, Rumania had increased raw cotton imports and was successfully encouraging domestic cotton production. By 1938, imports at some 21,000 tons were about five times larger than those of 1932, and the domestic crop yield, less than 20 tons in 1932, had risen to about 600 tons. The principal sources of raw cotton were Egypt, the U.S.A., and Great Britain.

With the outbreak of war, Rumanian imports generally were curtailed, the combined total of raw cotton and cotton materials being 14,700 tons in 1940, and 13,800 tons in 1941. Thereafter, Rumania was dependent on such supplies as she could obtain by barter, lower grade cotton from Turkey and Italy and cotton and staple fibre union cloth from Italy.

248 Since 1938 the Rumanian cotton crop has continued to increase, though it is still very short of normal requirements, while the cession of some 8,000 ha. (20,000 acres) of cotton land to Bulgaria in 1940, and unfavourable weather conditions, tended to restrict the cotton-growing programme.

Prior to the territorial changes of 1940, cotton was grown close to the Danube at Craiova, and especially in the Southern Dobruja. With the cession of most of this land to Bulgaria, cotton is now mostly grown on the north bank of the Danube, at Banloc near Timişoara in the Banat and in the districts of Teleorman, Vlasca and Ialomiţa. The crop in 1939 was 2,200 tons from less than 10,000 ha. (24,000 acres) and in 1942 was estimated at 5,000 tons from about 20,000 ha. (50,000 acres). A further increase in area has been planned, but the harvest, particularly in the north, is largely dependent upon climatic conditions. The type of cotton now produced is considered superior to Indian, and similar in quality to American.

288 The chief mill centres are at Arad, Bucarest, Cluj, Iaşi, Lugoj and Timişoara; of these, Cluj is the only one to have been affected by the transfer of territory. Cotton supplies are dis- [655] tributed under the direction of the Department of Industry and Trade by "Romacotin," which also has a monopoly of purchase from producers at prices fixed by the General Price Commissariat. Cotton may be sold only to those Government agencies to whom it has to be delivered by

288 31st December. There appears to be a good deal of passive resistance and hoarding.

Cotton spindles had increased from 35,600 in 1927 to 250,000 in 1938, and altogether there were 18 mills of some importance. Power looms in 1938 are believed to have amounted to about 16,000. The apparent disproportion of spindle compared with loom capacity was due to Rumania being a fairly important buyer of foreign yarns, imports being 23,000 tons in 1936, 27,000 in 1937, 14,000 in 1938 and 15,000 in 1939. About 70 per cent. of these yarns were of coarse cotton, called "peasants' yarns," for use in the handicraft industry only, and imported mainly from Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy and Great Britain.

2. Wool

236 Rumania, which had the largest wool-growing industry in S.E. Europe, was also the most important consumer. Production of raw wool in 1938 was about 20,000 tons (greasy) and imports were about 1,000 tons, and of wool yarn about 2,500 tons. On account of its coarse quality, not much more than one-third of the domestic wool clip is ordinarily used in the mechanised industry, the bulk being consumed in village handicraft. Since the war and subsequent loss of territory, the sheep population of Rumania is believed to have declined by some 25 to 30 per cent., and all imports have ceased, so that the industry is now entirely dependent upon the reduced domestic clip.

[233]

288 Rumania was never a large importer of woollen cloth, and the weaving industry was always more highly developed than the spinning. The output of cloth in 1936 and 1937 being 6,000 tons and 6,600 tons respectively. In 1938, there were 127,000 mechanised spindles and 4,300 looms, the chief mill centres, in order of importance, being at Bubuni (district of Neamţi), Braşov, Timişoara, Bacău, Bucarest and Sibiu.

655 236 288 Both the raw material and the woollen-textile industry are nominally under strict Government control, as by a decree in April 1942, the numbers of sheep and lambs and the quantity of shorn wool must be declared each year, and the wool itself must be surrendered to collecting centres at specified dates. As the due date for the 1942 collection had to be extended month by month up till January 10th, 1943, and all penalties abrogated, the success of the scheme appears to have been doubtful. No wool can be bought or sold except by permit of the Ministry of National Economy, and distribution to the mills is entrusted to an organisation known as "OPIL" (*Oficiul Lânei*), a company with a capital of 10 million lei, and including all firms concerned in the preparation of wool.

3. Hemp

248 In 1937 the area under hemp, which is grown chiefly in the Banat, was 50,000 ha. (123,000 acres) and the outturn 27,000 tons, most of which was consumed internally. Exact details of wartime plantings are not known, but are reported as 45,000 ha. (112,000 acres) and 32,500 ha. (80,300 acres) in 1941 and 1942, and the yield at about 21,000 and 20,000 tons respectively. For 1943, farmers have been urged to plant more hemp—the "national textile"—in order to cover clothing.

[29c]

CHAPTER VI

248 sack and rope requirements; and a hemp and flax office has been established with a capital of 20 million lei and a credit of 500 million to distribute seed and manure, and to rent and finance retting and scutching plants. This office, which is the only purchaser of these fibres, is to make no profits, and prices are to be fixed. Fifteen up-to-date plants are to be erected in 1943 in the hemp-growing areas.

[439] Although Rumania normally had little or no export balance, Germany in 1941 demanded 15,000 tons of the 20,000 tons available. How much of this was actually delivered is not known, but the shortage of hemp and other fibres has led to amazing competition between the various industries for the remaining supplies, and a hemp rope and sack factory is to be built at Chisinau [218] in Bessarabia, where the shortage of these goods is particularly acute.

4. Flax

Flax appears to be the only crop grown on a smaller area in 1943 than in 1941 and 1942, when 20,000 ha. (49,400 acres) were planted, as compared with 15,000 ha. (37,000 acres) in 1938 and 12,000 ha. (29,600 acres) in 1939. Preference, apparently, is to be given to hemp. The pre-war output was about 10,000 tons, but no reliable figures are available since 1939. Normally, there was no appreciable export of flax, but as with other fibres, the Germans appear to have been persistent in their demands. The Rumanian company, Fusural Cotonese, in which German capital participates, is to build flax-retting tanks at Ceretori (in the district of Dolj) and Zimnicea (in the district of Teleorman).

5. Rayon and Staple Fibre

288 There were two plants erected before the war the "Aprotura" at Popesti-Leordeni and the Viscose Romanesch at Lupeni, the combined daily capacity of which was 12 tons of rayon and 6 tons of staple fibre. (Approximately 4,800 tons rayon and 2,100 tons of staple fibre annually.) There has been but little expansion since, and the present annual production is estimated at 4,400 tons rayon and 2,600 tons staple fibre. Imports [439] from Italy have been 450 tons in 1940, and 2,500 in 1941. Germany promised substantial quantities, but it is doubtful whether they fully materialised. Applications for permission to erect a new pulp mill have been made by both German and Italian interests, but it seems that the Germans objected to Snia Viscosa's being granted a concession and obtained it themselves later.

6. Silk

231 Although Rumania is within the orbit of the silk belt, output is small, reaching a maximum of 20 tons of cocoons in pre-war years, and 35 tons of reeled silk were imported, principally from Italy. Silkworm breeding is located in the Banat, and in common with the drive for increased silk production in German Europe, Rumania has made efforts to increase silkworm breeding.

288 In 1937 about 5,000 workers were engaged in silk weaving (probably including artificial silk); this number was increased to 7,336 in 1941. It is reported that the cocoon crop is now delivered to the Air and Marine Ministries, presumably for making cartridge bags, etc.

7. Other Fibres

248 Raw jute imports averaged about 5,500 tons
439 annually before the war, and in addition there were smaller imports of jute cloth and bags.

[30 a]

248 439 Paper, and paper mixed with hemp, are now used to substitute jute.

Although a comparatively large producer of soft hemp, Rumania normally needed to import about 2,500 tons of other hemps for special purposes, and the sources of these imports have been severed since her entry into the war.

Comparatively negligible amounts of sisal were also imported in peacetime.

288 291 434 **5. Clothes Rationing**

Unlike almost all other Enemy and Occupied countries, Rumania possesses no official clothing-ration card, although purchases are restricted to a specific number of garments per year. Since 1940 the Government, anxious to avoid the necessity for a card rationing system, has adopted various means in an endeavour to overcome the shortage of textiles, particularly of cotton and wool.

Standardisation of fabrics and fixed prices were introduced in 1940, but clothing of standardised material was frequently unobtainable since the price did not leave the retailer a profit.

Army demands soon called for a great increase in clothing production, thereby reducing the stocks and greatly raising prices of civilian clothing—those for overcoats rose by 300 per cent. and for knitted goods by 400 per cent.—and the difficulty of importing raw materials soon reacted on the industry, so that by 1941 the textile shortage, particularly of bed linen, had become serious. Later in the same year, the Ministry of Supply blocked the sale of all semi-manufactured or manufactured blankets.

Early in 1942 the Government requested the public to purchase only necessities, ordering the industry at the same time to use cotton allocations for the manufacture of standardised bed linen and clothing only. Later in 1942 it was decreed that the annual allotment of garments per head of the population was two suits ... frocks, one overcoat, three shirts, 12 handkerchiefs, three pairs of socks or stockings, one sheet, three towels. The sale of standard cloth was restricted to three metres per person per annum. For this arrangement, however, clothing coupons were not issued and purchasers were requested to produce their identity cards and a signed certificate of need if the purchase exceeded 500 lei.

291 435 Non-standard articles are still obtainable, but their exorbitant prices make them accessible to a limited section of the public only. Retailers are known to have refused the sale of standard cloth even when displayed, in order to secure, if possible, the higher profit margin for non-standard goods.

[565] The members of the public most severely affected by clothing shortage and high prices are industrial workers and the poorer urban population. Though the large firms are supposed by law to supply their employees with clothing (as well as food) at cheap prices, it is thought that this is not being widely practised.

Prices of all materials for men's garments have risen to such an extent that people cannot afford to buy even such goods as are available in the shops.

248 656 To counteract shortage of clothing fibres, peasants are being encouraged by the Government to increase cultivation of flax and hemp for production of the rough cloth suitable for peasant clothing.

RUMANIA

241 The following table indicates the proportions of lands de-
311 voted to the various cultures and the distribution among the different provinces, according to official statistics for the year 1930:

Arable land in:	Area in hectares.	Percentage of total.
Old Kingdom	6,815,896	22.99
Bessarabia	2,915,941	9.83
Bucovina	311,616	1.06
Transylvania	3,113,500	10.55
Total of arable lands ...	12,857,112	43.38
Meadows and pastures ...	4,054,475	13.75
Orchards and Vineyards ...	612,614	2.08
Forests	7,124,200	24.13
Unproductive lands, roads, sites of buildings, rivers, mines, etc.	4,827,399	16.41
Total Area	29,496,780	100.00

From the above it will be seen that there is little scope for bringing more land under cultivation, and that an expansion in the output must be sought by improving the method of cultivation. Of course there is a vast expanse of marshes along the Danube which may be reclaimed—the total area of these is computed at two million hectares—and if they were turned to account they would considerably augment the arable area. It may be added that similar works of reclamation have been undertaken in Bulgaria and Greece and have been reported to be remunerative.

241 Besides cereals, industrial plants such as hemp, colza,
● 249 sun-flower, tobacco, sugar-beet are grown, some 399,506 hectares being sown with them. The sugar-beet industry is sufficiently developed to provide for the total requirements of the country and to allow even for an export surplus. There are 14 sugar refineries, with invested capital of 3,300 million lei and occupying some 15,000 workmen. It was reported in the *Argus* of February 20th, 1932, which took up the defence of the industry and emphasized the necessity of granting it adequate protection (since it prevented some 700 million lei from being annually remitted abroad), that the State
[651] obtained a revenue of 13.70 lei per kg., or 42 per cent of the official price at which sugar was sold; that agriculturalists obtained 20 per cent, merchants 5 per cent, manufacturing and packing accounted for the remaining 33 per cent. But when expenses were deducted the net profit available to the

refineries did not exceed 1.65 lei per kg. The total consumption of sugar, averaging 100,000,000 kgs. per annum, would thus yield a net profit of 165 million lei, which represented a return of 5 per cent on the invested capital. The cultivation of beet-sugar was reported to be considerably more profitable to the peasant than wheat, for while one hectare sown with wheat yielded 1,200 kgs., which would fetch 2,700 lei, one hectare sown with sugar-beet produced 20,000 kgs., which was bought by the refineries for 16,000 lei. 241 249

Though the actual production of cereals surpasses that of the pre-war period, the quantity exported shows a considerable diminution. Transylvania and Bucovina do not produce enough grain for their needs, and cover their requirements by imports. The relative values of the various cereals, as well as the quantities available for export from the 1929 harvest and those consumed locally or used for seed, are given below: 243

Crop	Total interior consumption in quintals.	Quantities available for export in quintals.	Total production in quintals.	Total value in million lei.
Wheat ...	25,600,000	2,400,000	28,000,000	19,600
Rye ...	2,100,000	1,300,000	3,400,000	2,049
Oats ...	6,000,000	5,600,000	12,000,000	5,160
Barley ...	7,600,000	22,800,000	30,400,000	12,768
Maize ...	34,000,000	26,000,000	60,000,000	30,400
Total ...	77,300,000	58,900,000	136,200,000	69,975

Of the available quantity for export only about half was shipped, viz., 28,000,000 quintals, while from the harvest of 1930 the quantity exported was 29,500,000 quintals.

The harvests of the last three years were abundant, and their respective yields in quantity differed but little. Owing, however, to the catastrophic fall in prices, the sums at which they were marketed varied considerably.

	Total production of all cereals.	Total estimated value in lei.
1929	136,200,000 quintals	69,975,000,000
1930	121,100,000 ,,	28,900,000,000
1931	124,800,000 ,,	24,311,000,000

241 The basis of Rumanian economy is agriculture, in that some 80 per cent. of the population derive their livelihood from the land and agriculture provides a high proportion of the national income. [315] During recent years, however, the expansion of the oil industry has meant that agricultural pro- [439] duce has played a decreasing part in the country's exports, having been superseded by oil, exports of which amounted to 43 per cent. of the total export trade in 1938, compared with 19 per cent. in 1927; while grain exports in 1938 represented 23 per cent. compared with 46 per cent. in 1927.

In spite of the importance of agriculture to national prosperity farming methods are backward and per acre crop yields are among the lowest in Europe. Attention is particularly given to growing cereals, and of these maize is the chief, [231] providing a large surplus for export (apart from the war years). Livestock density is low, which is one of the weaknesses of Rumanian agriculture, the Banat being the only district in which numbers are fairly high, and farming approaches the [439] intensive system. It must be stressed that the relatively large export surplus, which consists of wheat, maize, barley, oilseeds and pulses, livestock, cheese, etc., is only made possible by the very low nutritional level which prevails, and [244] that if this were raised to anything like western European standards exports would be commensurately reduced.

248 Since the war more attention has been paid to
● 249 the growth of industrial crops such as sunflower, soya, cotton, hemp and flax, and the cultivation of rubber-bearing plants has been started following the finding of the *Kok Saghyz* plant left by the Russians in Bessarabia. Though some success has been achieved in increasing the areas under textile fibres, and yields have been slightly higher, the hoped for increases in soya and sunflower cultivation have not been achieved due to unfavourable weather conditions and to general wartime dislocation.

313 Rumania's forest resources, though extensive, have suffered severely from a consistent policy of over-exploitation, and, while providing the basis of a fairly important industry during the period between the two wars, have been so depleted that cutting will have to be very restricted for a number of years if they are to be allowed to recover. The loss of Northern Transylvania has affected the timber industry in particular, as a high proportion of the forest resources were located there, and in that district this industry was better developed than elsewhere in the country.

IMPORTANCE OF OIL

315 Oil plays a major part, not only in Rumania's foreign trade, but also in covering her domestic fuel requirements, to a large extent replacing coal, reserves of which are small and of low quality. Since the war and the resulting pressure which Germany has exerted to obtain increased quantities of oil for her armies, (combined with the consistent drop in the rate of production between 1936 and 1941), serious attempts have been made to find alternative sources of fuel. The enormous reserves of natural gas existing in Transylvania, which were exploited only very slightly before the war, are being used increasingly as a source of fuel to supply local industries, and a

241 133 however, be slightly deficient in grain, especially in poor years.

[311] The hilly land of Transylvania and the Bucovina differs markedly from the plain. There is proportionately less arable and much more meadow, grazing and forest land. The soil is poor. Methods are not as primitive as in the plain land of the Old Kingdom, but over-crowding is more serious and output per head is consequently lower. Parts of this region are slightly deficient in grain. Though [446] the level of food consumption is low, the dietary is more varied than elsewhere in the country, less maize and more meat and dairy produce being eaten.

3. Crops

311 Of the total area of pre-war Romania, of nearly 30 million hectares (114,000 sq. miles) and twice the area of England and Wales, about 13 million hectares, or 45 per cent. was arable. Permanent meadow, pasture and grazing occupied 14 per cent., while tree and bush crops accounted for a further 2 per cent. The remaining land was non-agricultural, forest and waste land.

243 A very high proportion of the arable—over 80 per cent.—was used for grain growing, principally maize, wheat and barley. Owing to low rainfall, use of poor seed and lack of fertilisers, yields were at a low level and fluctuated widely from year to year.

[439] Out of an average grain production of 11 million tons, 6 millions went into domestic human consumption and 1½ million were exported, the remainder going to fodder, seed and waste. Grain exports have always figured largely in the country's foreign trade. During the twenty years 1920 to 1939 they only once fell below a million tons, and in some years exceeded three million tons. In value, during the decade before the war, they formed, after petroleum products, the main item in exports.

241 No other category of crops compares with grain. Seven fodder crops took barely 5 per cent. of the arable, all other crops, including potatoes, fibres, oilseeds, tobacco and sugar beet, about 8 per cent. Peas, beans and oilseeds were grown in sufficient quantities to provide surpluses for export. Germany established two companies—Solagra in 1934 and Soya A.G. in 1940—which invested large sums in promoting oilseed cultivation. The area 249 under sunflower was raised only slightly, but that under soya rose from nil in 1933 to 103,000 ha. (254,000 acres) in 1939; but the greater part of both crops was located in Bessarabia which Romania lost to the U.S.S.R. in 1940 (see below).

244 Production of potatoes, vegetables and sugar 247 beet was just sufficient for domestic consumption, but the tobacco crop did not quite meet requirements. Tobacco production had fallen from 20,000 tons in the late nineteen-twenties to 11,000 tons in the years just prior to the war.

245 Fruit production was undeveloped and there was little organised marketing and processing. Plums were the main crop, but three-quarters of the output was used for making brandy. Apples and other kinds of fruit, and walnuts, were produced in fair quantities, but exports were insignificant, and, owing to low quality and the lack of standardisation, there were no prospects of development.

241 722 ter, for grain, oilseeds and livestock products to provide the balance of food and fodder requirements which she could not obtain from her own agriculture. The annual grain surpluses and the potential output of sunflower and other oilseeds appeared sufficiently large to provide a solid basis for these expectations. Owing, however, to wartime dislocations of economic life, to the absence of adequate administrative control of farming, to the lack of co-operation by the peasants, and, above all, to a succession of unfavourable seasons, these hopes have been almost entirely falsified.

Firstly, in 1940, Rumania lost Bessarabia, her principal surplus region, to the U.S.S.R., and with it all that year's crop. When she regained it in 1941 she obtained no surplus out of that harvest, and, because of disorganisation, little in 1942. In rump Rumania, in 1940 and 1941, the grain harvests were substantially below the average owing to reduced sowings (partly caused by mobilisation) and to disappointing yields. A determined effort was made by propaganda and the release of labour to bring sowings back to normal for the 1942 season. But the early onset of an unusually severe winter again reduced the sowings, while a serious drought in the summer of 1942 reduced the yields.

722 [243] There was a deficiency in wheat sowings of over a million hectares, while grain yields were barely 60 per cent. of the average. The out-turn of the year was consequently worse than that of the two preceding years. Wheat and rye yielded only 1·3 million tons compared with an average for the territory of 3·6 million tons. The maize crop was a little less than 3 million tons compared with an average of 4·7 million tons. The total grain production was about 5·5 million tons, a quantity inadequate to meet the requirements of food and fodder at any approach to normal levels.

[241] Other crops were more successful in 1942, but they could not appreciably offset the disastrous grain results. The potato crop reached an average level for the first time during the war years, and part of it was used to stretch the deficient wheat for bread making. There was also a good crop of beans and peas, largely because, as their prices were not controlled, they were very remunerative crops. The sunflower crop, though sowings failed to reach the ambitious target and yields were only 60 per cent. of normal, was of record dimensions. Soya, rape and sugar beet declined, however, from earlier levels. (A significant supplementary supply of sugar is now being obtained from Transnistria.)

[231] These for the most part poor crop results, besides curtailing the supplies available for human consumption and exports, also brought about a reduction in livestock numbers at the end of 1942. Livestock numbers may, however, have increased somewhat in 1940 and 1941, for it was reported that peasants held back more grain than usual in those years for livestock feeding. If this is true, numbers would now probably be little different from those of pre-war years.

[241] Crop prospects for 1943 point to a more normal result. The winter of 1942-43 was late and mild, making it possible to sow a near-average acreage of winter crops. Preparatory work for spring sowings was also done in good time, and on the whole the weather subsequently has not been unfavourable.

722 249 Tobacco cultivation appears to have declined in the war years, principally because the prices were even more unattractive than those of grain. In 1942 the area sown was reported to be little

CHAPTER I

more than half the normal, but the efforts in 1943 to recover to a more average crop may have succeeded.

3. Fish

The general food shortage in Rumania gave a great fillip to the fishing industry. In the 12 months April 1942 to March 1943, some 40,000 tons of fish were caught in State waters besides 13,000 tons in rented and private waters. This is almost double the largest pre-war catch. During 1942 some 6,000 tons were salted down for winter use. In order to promote and introduce better organisation into the fishing industry a German-Rumanian Company has been established, the "Marea-Neagrâ," which will devote special attention to developing the Black Sea fisheries.

4. Agricultural Exports

The pre-war level of grain exports was well maintained in 1939; wheat in particular was prominent with over a million tons. The exports of 1940, however, showed an immediate reduction of territorial changes and war shortages. Total grain exports in that year barely reached a million tons compared with the pre-war average of about 1·6 million tons. The following year showed a still sharper decline, wheat reaching only 5,000 tons and maize 120,000 tons. In 1942, despite the recovery of Bessarabia, it is most unlikely that even this level was maintained.

Oilseed exports, despite direct German intervention aiming at an expansion of the crop, also fell below pre-war levels. Sunflower-seed exports, the principal oilseed, fell from an average of 30,000 tons in 1935-38 to 12,000 tons in 1940 and to 5,000 tons in 1941. Exports following the 1942 crop, though probably better, were not at all commensurate with the increased production, for a serious shortage of edible oil and fat had meanwhile developed in Rumania owing to decreased supplies of pig fat and to the retention by the peasants of their seed for consumption at home, or for disposal on the Black Market.

5. Administrative Control

Not even the most complete and efficient system of administrative control could have assured the country's food supplies and exports at normal levels during these three unfavourable years, but it is clear that Rumania's food difficulties have been aggravated by mistakes in economic policy and inadequate control measures. Bureaucratic methods of handling the peasants aroused antagonism and resistance. Supplies of tested seed and other farm requisites were not made available in time. On the collection and supply side, too much power was left in the hands of local prefects. But the most serious shortcoming of the official administration was the failure to establish a price control, and an appropriate relationship between agricultural prices and the cost of the things farmers buy. (In the absence of effective discipline this ratio needs to be strongly in the producers' favour if production and marketing of foodstuffs is to be maintained.) Prices of consumers' goods rose rapidly, owing to shortages, while the Government pegged the prices of farm produce at comparatively low levels. Consequently, the peasants curtailed production and sought better prices by selling much of their produce through Black Market channels. The mistake was officially admitted in the autumn of 1941 when grain prices were more than doubled, but the position still remained unfavourable to

383
[439]

The figures of imports in 1936 in metric tons were as follows :—

Motor tyres	807
Motor tubes	60
Rubber footwear	641
Soft rubber (unvulcanised) ..	30
Rubber solution	27
Miscellaneous	873

4. Synthetic Rubber

It is planned to erect a plant with a capacity of 3,000 tons per annum in co-operation with German interest and using natural gas as the raw material. There is a second plan by independent interests to erect another plant at Ploesti using natural gas or oil as a starting point. Both these projects, however, are as yet in their initial stages and Romania is, at present, entirely dependent on Germany for supplies of synthetic rubber.

[249]

5. Cultivation of Rubber-bearing Plants

Romania has been experimenting with the planting of *Kok Saghyz* or Russian dandelion. During 1940 an area of 180 hectares (450 acres) was planted, which it is estimated will eventually yield between 20 and 30 tons of rubber. It is planned to increase the planted area in 1943, but it will be some time before any results of these measures will help substantially to alleviate the Romanian supply position.

[439]

6. Present Position (July, 1943)

Although Romania has sufficient manufacturing capacity to supply most of her essential needs, she lacks supplies of raw materials. The industry is dependent upon Germany for supplies of synthetic rubber and some of her essential requirements of manufactured goods for her armed forces, such as aircraft tyres and some heavy truck tyres, are also being supplied by Germany.

C. HIDES, SKINS AND LEATHER

(1.) Pre-War Period

1. General

237

Romania's plentiful supply of livestock places her in a comparatively favourable position for hides, skins and leather and the pre-war slaughterings were approximately as follows :—

	'000 Head
Cattle	467
Calves	906
Horses	100
Buffaloes	32
Sheep	1,374
Goats	300
Pigs	796

Of the leather producable from the above animals, cattle, horse and buffalo are the most important, being used to a large extent in the manufacture of sole leather, which is the backbone of the industry.

237
439

Romania is not entirely self-supporting, although home-production enables her to restrict imports to a minimum. Imports and exports in 1937 were as follows :—

	Imports	*Exports*
	tons	
Hides of cattle (including calf and horse) ..	2,037	Nil.
Other hides and skins (including sheep and pig skins)	341	358
Leather (including waste) ..	92	416

[35b]

RUMANIA EDI

The hipped roof is rather flat and made of corn straw or reed, about 40 centimeters thick. The frame is often of the collar type, horizontal beams supporting opposing rafters (figs. 60a, 64). Pan tiles appear only in isolated instances. In 1918 sheet iron was becoming popular because it was economical and saved time and effort. It was generally painted red-brown. Chimneys are usually inadequate or lacking (JÜnecke, 1918: 11). 342 [335] [327]

Every house has an open veranda (prispa) on at least one side which may or may not have a low banister. It is slightly elevated from the ground and is protected by an extension of the eaves. While many Moldavian houses consist of only one room, even the smallest house in Wallachia has an anteroom (tinda). Here the main room is called odaia and has a special stove that is heated by a flue from the hearth in the anteroom. Often an additional odaia is added on the other side of the anteroom forming a symmetrical three-room house. Sometimes additional units are built onto the house on one or both of the narrow sides (figs. 57c, 58). The roof is extended over them in the form of a catslide (fig. 57a). These units are used for storage of agricultural tools, stables, summer kitchens, etc. If two are not sufficient, three or more units may be added. The prispa may be extended alongside the annex; or, when the annex protrudes in front of the house, the prispa may stop at the annex wall (fig. 57c). Occasionally a large house may have two parallel rows of rooms. However, this arrangement complicates the roof construction, which in this case is generally unsuccessful (JÜnecke, 1918: 11-16). [341] [354]

The interior is very simple. The anteroom serves for the storage of house implements; maize is kept in wooden boxes and placed along the wall, and there is also a small handmill for grinding maize. A large oven with a hearth in front of it is located at the wall opposite the door (figs. 57c, 58). The anteroom has no ceiling. When two odaias are present one is used for both living and sleeping quarters, while the other is used for the storage of blankets, carpets etc. It is somewhat of a guest-room. [251] [353] [364]

In the Rumanian house special attention has been given to the hearth and stove, and the whole house can be said to have been built around the hearth. The hearth is the showpiece of the room. Arched over the hearth is a decorated mantel on which cooking utensils are placed. Niches on either side of the hearth are provided for the same purpose. Because of the inflammability of the straw roof, the chimney is of brick (these are the only bricks in the house and are made by the peasants themselves). The stoves in the living room are of unusual construction. The most spectacular of these are the columnar stoves which are not only beautiful but also effective. To the main part of the stove have been added graceful clay pipes which are either arranged symmetrically or placed on one side. The better ones resemble organs. The rest of the stove is also made of clay bricks set in mud mortar and covered with a layer of plaster of a lime and sand mixture. Decoration of clay or plaster may be added. These stoves are generally built by Gypsies. 354

The only noteworthy building is the corn-house (pătule de porumb) (figs. 59a, 59b), which is found, however, only among the well-to-do. Unlike the house, it is a two-story structure. The lower floor has plastered walls, and serves as stable and cart-shed. The upper story is made of wickerwork, often arranged in interesting patterns, permitting the air to circulate. The attic is used for the storage of feed and is reached by a ladder from the outside. The hipped roof is of straw (Jänecke, 1918: 25-27). R 343 [556] R [251] [417]

In the mountain regions stables have only three walls, and animals stay in these half-open shelters even in winter. The imposing corn-house of the plains is rarely found in the mountains. In its place is erected a long narrow building of wickerwork. This rests on short stone pillars about 50 centimeters above the ground and is covered by a shingled roof. Since the ground floor of the house is used for storage there is no need for many additional farm buildings (Jänecke, 1918: 43-45). R [184]

CONCLUSION

Having presented an area by area discussion of the village forms and farmsteads, it is desirable to trace the distribution of certain major elements. Roughly, four types of settlement pattern can be distinguished. They are the village consisting of widely scattered hamlets (Cvijić's Stari Vlah type); the agglomerated village (Cvijić's Timok type); the road village (Cvijić's Mačva type); and the çiflik type, the settlement created by Turkish landowners. The first of these is composed of widely scattered houses in no regular order, grouped into hamlets a number of which constitute a village. It predominates in Slovenia, Western Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, western Serbia, and in the mountain areas of central Bulgaria and Rumania. A variant of this form, characterized by more closely spaced houses within the separate hamlets (Cvijić's Ibar type), exists in the Karst regions behind the Adriatic coast, in Albania and southwestern and western Serbia. Hilly terrain and forested regions are conducive to this scatter, but are not the sole determinants. The Ibar type is associated with greater barrenness of soil and the necessity of conserving arable land. S 361 171 184 S [182] [311]

Agglomerated villages are characterized by crowded houses set in an irregular order along crooked streets. They prevail in eastern and southern Serbia and in southern Macedonia. While they are associated with the necessity of conserving arable land in some of the more barren regions of eastern Serbia, this explanation will not hold for the fertile basins of Kosovo, Kumanovo and Skoplje. Here they are no doubt the result of diffusion from the Aegean coast, as these areas are on communication lines which run up the Vardar and Morava River valleys from the coast toward Beograd. S [311]

The third or Mačva type is that of the more or less planned village lying on both sides of the highway. These villages tend to S 361 171

Sa Tlaxtre S-S (no date)1939 EDI Romania EDI

PLATE VI

343
252

Sy Fleure S-5 (no date)M030 EDI Rumania EDI

PLATE X.

313

Kampana, Fanery. As the logs pass down the "chanel" a man on the chanel platform sees that logs of even lengths are lot out to side of "chanel" for loading on to the cranks seen on left hand side. Photo by H. J. Shand

252
342

The Angry Blondes. Visit to Fanery cranks (Kampana). Inside of fanery hut, showing large open sides for cranking cranks. Huge logs of wood were being hauled on a crane beneath. These were dragged cranks for the hydraulic pulls of cranks the sides of the hut. Photo by H. J. Shand

[page 40 b]

433 infancy. The mass of the people—the peasants—still supply
[294] their own modest wants almost entirely. The women make, in their own homes, the garments required by the household for summer and winter, using home-spun wool and home-woven cotton. A village expert fashions the leather embroidered coats worn by men and women alike. In the mountains, often the foot-gear is still of local manufacture. (Hats and shoes are mainly imported from the town, how-
342 ever.) Houses are made of locally-felled and sawn timber, and all the household utensils and furniture, except the crockery, are made in the village.

● 256 THERE is little accumulated capital in the country, and it is
273 natural that modern industrial developments should tend to be based on local raw materials and traditional skill. Home-grown wheat, maize and barley feed the flour-milling and brewing industries which are well developed. There are about 400 large flour mills, steam driven and capable of producing graded flour. These are mainly in the Old Kingdom and grind wheat chiefly. The wheat districts of Bessarabia and Bucovina have a number of modern mills, as well as a large number of windmills, but the maize districts still use the old-fashioned water-mills, which can only grind coarse meal. The brewing industry has been encouraged by the government, partly with the idea of reducing the consumption of the potent alcoholic beverage, "ţuica", which the peasants distil from plums. Most of the breweries are either in Bucureşti and Iaşi or in one of the larger Saxon towns of Transylvania. Potato and maize spirit are made on a large scale, particularly in Transylvania, for export.

323 FOR POTTERY MAKING the Dobrogea supplies a good kaolin, but the industry has not reached a high stage of development, although the ancient peasant pottery has much merit in form and decoration. This is due in part to lack of suitable fuel for the furnaces.

339 WITH the acquisition of Transylvania, Roumania has become independent in the matter of that most important constructional commodity, cement.

288 THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY is still backward. The post-war development is chiefly in the Banat, where, under protection, silk, artificial silk, cotton and wool have made

543 through a corner of the fair-ground as it begins its journey northwards. The fair-ground extends from the bridgehead, where in former times there must have been a ford, southwards for an indefinite distance between river and railway. A tributary stream which joins the Argeş at the bridge is named, after the fair, Valea *Târgul*. From the bridge a lane winds southwards to the rows of buildings and sheds which
●256 constitute the permanent nucleus of the fair. Here is the corn mill, perhaps once dependent on power from the river, but now driven by electricity. We may note in passing that among the many survivals in the Carpathians is the horizontal water-wheel, used here as in Norway to turn corn mills. The mill consists of a log-hut erected directly over a stream
543 or a branch of a river. The sale of cereals, chiefly maize, is
443 also conducted by the mill, at the entrance to the fair, and there are stores of building materials, fruit, rock-salt and charcoal.

Rows of permanent open-sided sheds face each other along the "main street" of the fair, and are hired for the duration by merchants and caterers. Other goods—mostly those brought by peasants—are displayed in improvised booths or exposed on the ground by the wayside. Further on, the inevitable amusements are concentrated in a corner of their own, the stalls in this section increasing in number throughout the week, until pleasure becomes the chief business by the last days of the fair. This is the natural culmination of events which begin with the sale of cattle in the opening days; the "order of the fair" is a traditional feature of such gatherings everywhere.

543 But in Roumania there is another element which contributes
326 to the variety of the fair—the gipsies who pitch their camps
563 behind the booths and hawk trinkets or unobtrusively engage in metal-work and wood-carving. They appear to keep apart from the rest. To them the food-stallholders bring their copper pots, used for boiling fat, for retinning, while the peasants drive up the draught oxen which may need to be reshod. The tinning is done over an improvised hearth and a handful of charcoal; the shoeing—by the bridge-head—requires somewhat more elaborate equipment in the shape of
[735] a forge and a post and ropes for felling the oxen. Finally, squatting by the wayside, or actively exhibiting their sores, there are the beggars and cripples, who complete the human picture.

CHAPTER I

228 in private waters. Supplemented by some 4,000 tons of imported fish, this provided nearly 1 kg. (2·2 lb.) per head of population, but, in fact, almost all the fish was consumed by the 5 million persons living in towns. The principal fish caught were sturgeon, carp, pike, eels and crayfish, the main fishing centres being Braila, Tulcea and Ismail.

6. Food Industries

256 The chief food and agricultural-processing industries are milling, sugar manufacture, oilseed crushing and tobacco curing. While the milling industry was dispersed widely about the country in more than 15,000 small mills employing altogether over 37,000 persons (at 1930 census), the sugar industry was for the most part concentrated in the plain of the Old Kingdom. Of the 17 sugar 257 factories employing 10,000 workers, only one was in the Transylvanian districts lost to Hungary and five in the areas temporarily lost to the U.S.S.R. The vegetable-oil industry, located chiefly in 258 Bessarabia, was only partly carried on in factories, of which there were (on January 1st, 1939) 117, employing 2,020 workers. Among these, 34 were fitted both to extract crude oil and to refine it, six were exclusively refineries, while the remainder produced only crude oil. The rest of the industry consisted of some 2,000 hand, or animal-driven presses mostly owned by individual peasants or by shopkeepers. These primitive presses extracted only a low percentage of oil from the seeds, and consequently the cake—mainly sold for export—had an unusually high oil content. As regards 277 tobacco, both curing and cigarette manufacture [656] were subject to government licence and control. There were 29 factories (in 1930) employing 9,720 workers, but tobacco cultivation subsequently declined, so also doubtless did the numbers employed.

7. Agricultural Organisation

452 The history of the organisation of Rumanian 241 farmers is one of not too successful co-operatives 474 becoming transformed more and more into agencies for the execution of Government Control Schemes. [654] For many years there had been throughout the country a network of agricultural credit societies, co-operative in form but in practice directed by the State. These played an important rôle during the period of the Land Reform in helping the peasants by advances to buy and equip their newly acquired holdings. There was even some co-operative cultivation for a time, until the new peasant-owners could muster sufficient draught animals and implements. Besides this, there have been strong local co-operative unions especially among the [162] minority nationalities—the Hungarians in Transylvania, the Swabian and Saxons in the Banat and the Russian and Polish Jews in the Bucovina.

243 The credit societies revived in importance when, 474 after 1933, the Rumanian Government began the organisation of grain marketing. They became 452 the local agents of a Central Marketing Board 654 through which all sales of grain had to be made both for home consumption and for export. Whereas formerly grain prices slumped immediately after the harvest, most peasants, being obliged to sell their grain quickly, under the new scheme prices were stabilised throughout the year, and this brought a great improvement to peasants' [651] receipts. But the scheme and the societies were also used to collect the peasants' taxes (paid in grain) which did not increase the popularity of co-operation.

543
[25]

7. Confectionery, etc.

Gingerbread (all shapes).

Sweets: Packets of sweets, sweet-stuffs in various shapes. Dolls, ladies, hearts, diamonds, all with rough pieces of mirror inset.

[524]

8. Toys.

The only toys for children seen were gaily-coloured thin rubber balls (large), also small wooden flutes similar to those used by shepherds.

[322]

9. Carved Wooden Articles.

Wooden cigarette-holders; various sizes, some grotesquely large.

Mirrors with flower-borders carved in high relief.

Match-stands, cigarette stands, wooden boxes.

Large pipes (for playing jokes). Powder is secreted in the mouth-piece and is puffed into the face when the pipe is blown.

10. Articles for the Home.

[285]

Blankets patterned in red and natural wool.

Rug-strips made of pieces of cotton and woollen waste pieces of material.

[415]

Modern cooking tins and saucepans, enamelled dishes and all sorts of "Household Helps," which attracted crowds of peasant women, e.g. egg and tomato slices, vegetable cutters, pastry moulds, etc.

Strainers with wooden frame and wire base, the wire coloured in tartan and other patterns.

Alarm clocks, boot polish in tins, soap, hempen rope and string.

[301]

11. Cheap Jewellery, etc.

Rings, brooches, neck and watch chains. Necklaces of coloured pearl and glass beads. Spectacles of plain and tinted glass. Jewelled combs for wearing in the hair. Studs, fancy buttons, thimbles, all kinds of plain and fancy pins. Mirrors.

CHAPTER I

228 in private waters. Supplemented by some 4,000 tons of imported fish, this provided nearly 1 kg. (2·2 lb.) per head of population, but, in fact, almost all the fish was consumed by the 5 million persons living in towns. The principal fish caught were sturgeon, carp, pike, eels and crayfish, the main fishing centres being Brăila, Tulcea and Isaccea.

6. Food Industries

256 The chief food and agricultural-processing industries are milling, sugar manufacture, oilseed crushing and tobacco curing. While the milling industry was dispersed widely about the country in more than 15,000 small mills employing altogether over 37,000 persons (at 1930 census), the sugar industry was for the most part concentrated in the plain of the Old Kingdom. Of the 17 sugar 257 factories employing 12,000 workers, only one was in the Transylvanian districts lost to Hungary and five in the areas temporarily lost to the U.S.S.R. The vegetable-oil industry, located chiefly in 258 Bessarabia, was only partly carried on in factories, of which there were (on January 1st, 1939) 117, employing 2,026 workers. Among these, 34 were fitted both to extract crude oil and to refine it, six were exclusively refineries, while the remainder produced only crude oil. The rest of the industry consisted of some 2,000 hand, or animal-driven presses mostly owned by individual peasants or by shopkeepers. These primitive presses extracted only a low percentage of oil from the seeds, and consequently the cake—mainly sold for export—had an unusually high oil content. As regards 277 tobacco, both curing and cigarette manufacture [656] were subject to government licence and control. There were 29 factories (in 1930) employing 9,720 workers, but tobacco cultivation subsequently declined, so also doubtless did the numbers employed.

7. Agricultural Organisation

452 The history of the organisation of Rumanian 241 farmers is one of not too successful co-operatives 474 becoming transformed more and more into agencies for the execution of Government Control Schemes. For many years there had been throughout the [654] country a network of agricultural credit societies, co-operative in form but in practice directed by the State. These played an important rôle during the period of the Land Reform in helping the peasants by advances to buy and equip their newly acquired holdings. There was even some co-operative cultivation for a time, until the new peasant-owners could muster sufficient draught animals and implements. Besides this, there have been strong local co-operative unions especially among the [162] minority nationalities—the Hungarians in Transylvania, the Swabian and Saxons in the Banat and the Russian and Polish Jews in the Bucovina.

243 The credit societies revived in importance when, 474 after 1933, the Rumanian Government began the organisation of grain marketing. They became 452 the local agents of a Central Marketing Board through which all sales of grain had to be made 654 both for home consumption and for export. Whereas formerly grain prices slumped immediately after the harvest, most peasants, being obliged to sell their grain quickly, under the new scheme prices were stabilised throughout the year, and this brought a great improvement to peasants' [651] receipts. But the scheme and the societies were also used to collect the peasants' taxes (paid in grain) which did not increase the popularity of co-operation.

CHAPTER I

228 in private waters. Supplemented by some 4,000 tons of imported fish, this provided nearly 1 kg. (2·2 lb.) per head of population, but, in fact, almost all the fish was consumed by the 5 million persons living in towns. The principal fish caught were sturgeon, carp, pike, eels and crayfish, the main fishing centres being Brăila, Tulcea and Isaccea.

6. Food Industries

256 The chief food and agricultural-processing industries are milling, sugar manufacture, oilseed crushing and tobacco curing. While the milling industry was dispersed widely about the country in more than 15,000 small mills employing altogether over 37,000 persons (at 1930 census), the sugar industry was for the most part concentrated in the plain of the Old Kingdom. Of the 17 sugar 257 factories employing 10,000 workers, only one was in the Transylvanian districts lost to Hungary and five in the areas temporarily lost to the U.S.S.R. 258 The vegetable-oil industry, located chiefly in Bessarabia, was only partly carried on in factories, of which there were (on January 1st, 1939) 117, employing 2,026 workers. Among these, 34 were fitted both to extract crude oil and to refine it, six were exclusively refineries, while the remainder produced only crude oil. The rest of the industry consisted of some 2,000 hand- or animal-driven presses mostly owned by individual peasants or by shopkeepers. These primitive presses extracted only a low percentage of oil from the seeds, and consequently the cake—mainly sold for export—had an unusually high oil content. As regards 277 tobacco, both curing and cigarette manufacture [656] were subject to government licence and control. There were 29 factories (in 1930) employing 9,730 workers, but tobacco cultivation subsequently declined, so also doubtless did the numbers employed.

7. Agricultural Organisation

452 The history of the organisation of Rumanian 241 farmers is one of not too successful co-operatives 474 becoming transformed more and more into agencies for the execution of Government Control Schemes. [654] For many years there had been throughout the country a network of agricultural credit societies, co-operative in form but in practice directed by the State. These played an important rôle during the period of the Land Reform in helping the peasants by advances to buy and equip their newly acquired holdings. There was even some co-operative cultivation for a time, until the new peasant-owners could muster sufficient draught animals and implements. Besides this, there have been strong local co-operative unions especially among the [162] minority nationalities—the Hungarians in Transylvania, the Swabian and Saxon in the Banat and the Russian and Polish Jews in the Bucovina.

243 The credit societies revived in importance when 474 after 1933, the Rumanian Government began the 452 organisation of grain marketing. They became 654 the local agents of a Central Marketing Board through which all sales of grain had to be made both for home consumption and for export. Whereas formerly grain prices slumped immediately after the harvest, most peasants, being obliged to sell their grain quickly, under the new scheme prices were stabilised throughout the year, and this brought a great improvement to peasants' [651] receipts. But the scheme and the societies were also used to collect the peasants' taxes (paid in grain) which did not increase the popularity of co-operation.

5

VI.—ECONOMIC ROUMANIA

Agriculture.

311 162 Modern Roumania is essentially an agricultural state, as was the Old Kingdom (43 to 46 per cent of the land being arable and 22 per cent forest, whilst over 80 per cent of the population of 18 millions are agricultural workers), although it has valuable potentialities for the development of industry.

132 24 134 Arranged in zones round the bastion of the southern and eastern Carpathian highlands, the main agricultural regions of post-war Roumania exhibit, according to aspect and altitude, a considerable variety of climatic conditions, which is reflected in a varying emphasis in the selection of crops raised. In general, we may say that the continental nature of the climate and the resulting succession from north to south and from highland to lowland of soils, graded from poor ashen-grey podsol in the Carpathians through oak-forest loams to a rich chernozjom in the south-eastern Danube plains, has resulted, wherever the ground is sufficiently level, in a concentration on grain production. The heavier rainfall of the uplands, the relatively great humidity and shelter from the driving winds that sweep across the open plains, coupled with the exposure of less [137] fertile rocks—granites and coarse sandstones—explains the large area of forested land (24.5 per cent, nearly 7½ million hectares) in those districts that extend into the Carpathian highlands.

243 Of the 13 odd million hectares of arable land, cereals occupy some 37 to 39 per cent. Production varies greatly from year to year and from district to district. In the old kingdom of Wallachia-Moldavia, maize is by far the heaviest crop, particularly in Oltenia, where the summer rainfall is heavier. It is also the heaviest crop in Transylvania, the cultivated areas under maize, wheat, barley and oats being [262] respectively 4, 3, 2 and 1 million hectares. Maize is the staple crop of the peasant holder almost throughout the country, for it not only provides the bread cakes and the "mamaliga," maize pudding, the main food of the mass of the people, but also fodder for the cattle to eke out the hay in

423 dealt with a considerably larger area. Forty-six holdings were between one and two, 18 between two and three, 8 between three and four, 3 between four and five, and 2 larger (8.8 and 19.5) hectares in extent. These holdings do not necessarily represent the whole of the land owned by a peasant.

LAND UTILISATION.

311 BROADLY SPEAKING, the land within the commune may be divided into three categories: the alluvium of the Bistricioara valley and the lower portions of its tributary valleys which is devoted to arable farming; the deforested lower slopes of the valley sides, together with the broad upper portions of some of the tributary valleys and odd patches of level ground here and there which are reserved for hay; and the rest, which is forest with the exception of the small high-altitude clearings that provide summer pasturage for the transhumant flocks and herds.

311 ABOUT 58 per cent of the land belongs to the state, 37 per
423 cent to the commune, and the rest, comprising about 400 hectares, is owned by the peasants. These 400 hectares represent the arable land of the commune, whilst the state lands are entirely forest. The commune lands include a certain amount of forest, together with the hay meadows and summer pastures. The law tries to make peasants plant trees to replace those that they cut down.

CROPS.

241 IN the arable area the outstanding crop is maize, from which
[262] "mamaliga," the staple food of the peasants, is made. It is sown at the beginning of May, two hillings, separated by an interval of three or four weeks, are made during June, and the crop is harvested between September 25th and October 10th. Potatoes, hemp, flax, lucerne (of which three cuttings are usually made), a little rye, sunflowers and vegetables are grown, mostly in very small patches, giving the impression of garden, rather than field, cultivation. Occasionally a small orchard adds further variety to the general pattern.

246 THE HAY CROP is of vital importance, as in all mountain communities of this kind throughout Europe. It is harvested

462 In the Carpathians, while some stâne are inhabited by
233 families of shepherds, others have men only, and purely "feminine" stâne are not unknown. There appear to be regional differences based perhaps on the varying requirements of the lowland crops, and all forms are said to be of some antiquity; it cannot be shown that the "masculine" stâne represent an older type than those where both sexes take part, or vice versa. But it is significant that in some parts there is a definite *tabu* against women, and the shepherds must have no relations with them in the prescribed season, from the arrival at the stână to July 20th (St. Eloi). In the areas we visited, while the shepherds were exclusively male, women from the villages occasionally ride up with messages or food, and may stay at the hut for a day or two.

On reaching the pastures, to resume, the sheep are divided into separate flocks—milkers and non-milkers, lambs and wethers. Only the milkers are kept in the immediate neighbourhood of the stână, the rest being driven uphill or to the shelter of the forest's edge, according to their requirements. Two milkings are usual, about 6 o'clock morning and evening. The sheep are driven into the *strunga*, a fenced enclosure near the hut, where the shepherd-boy introduces them one by one into a narrow roofed exit at which the milkers sit. The milk is forthwith poured into a copper cauldron over which the *baciu* stands at the fireside, stirring the contents with the peeled, spiked top of a spruce. The copper pot is tinned inside, this work being done by the gipsies. Into the simmering milk the *baciu* throws a pinch of rennet, and then works the curds into a thick pulp. A simple press—a canvas bag twisted with a tourniquet and weighted with a stone—next comes into use, and after three days salt is added and the cheese is finally kneaded and stored in a sheepskin which has been specially prepared by drying and scraping. This is cheese of the first quality (brânză), a poorer quality (urdă) being obtained from the whey left in the copper after taking out the curds. The urdă is often stored in small skins, e.g. rabbit, or in containers made of bark or hollowed branches. Much of the cheese in these days is bought by co-operative societies.

262 It is the duty of the *baciu*,[2] further, to prepare food for the shepherds. Onions, beans and paprika make vegetable soup, and maize-bread and cheese complete a diet which may be varied now and again with smoked mutton. Another task

1 [For explanatory footnote see pp. 49, Ct. 116 - - Analyst]
2 [cheese maker of the Stâna. -52- Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

565 ease of behaviour, a keen sense for music and popular art and a dogged belief in its capacity to achieve progress.

The life of the Rumanian peasant is simple and [262] hard. His main nourishment consists of *Mamaliga*, a dish prepared of maize-flour, similar to the Italian *Polenta*. This forms his staple diet; meat and other [272] luxuries are very rare indeed. The national drink is *Tuica* (brewed from plum juice). The Rumanian [291] men are dressed in white trousers and a long white tunic fastened by a belt, a short jacket, and a fur cap or hat. Footwear, if any, consists of simple leather sandals strapped to the legs, called *Opinci*, similar to those of the Greek and Yugoslav peasants. In the comparatively rich regions short boots are worn. Gay embroidery, whose colouring and pattern vary according to districts, adorns all garments, especially the women's shirts and headcloths, and the aprons [342] which they wear fore and aft. In contrast to their gay dress the houses of the Rumanian peasants are usually small, badly built cottages of sun-dried brick and straw, whitewashed and occasionally [346] decorated with woodwork. The churches too are built in a similar fashion except in the mountain districts where stone and wood are used.

795 **RELIGION.** Most Rumanians belong to the Orthodox Church, but many Transylvanian Rumanians are Uniates, that is, Catholics of the Byzantine Rite. They form a link between the Latin and Orthodox 659 Churches. The Rumanian Orthodox Church is strongly national. The Uniate Church was used in the past by the Hungarian rulers of Transylvania as a means of assimilating the Rumanians in the Hun-

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

decline which during the Great War assumed very 231
serious proportions. Within a short period the Old 433
Kingdom lost more than half of its total livestock. These losses were only partly made good by the acquisition of the New Territories.

In 1921 Greater Rumania had about 1,700,000 horses of which more than half were in the New Territories. There are two main races, both much smaller and lighter and more short-lived than the heavy type of English cart-horse. The horse of the plains, similar to and often crossed with the Hungarian horse, is found in Muntenia and in the western provinces, the Russian horse in Bessarabia and in the Bukovina. The mountain horse is small and tough and is chiefly used for the carrying of loads.

Cattle breeding has been one of the weakest points of Rumanian agriculture for some time. Although Greater Rumania by the acquisition of territories from Hungary and Austria obtained some high-class cattle, there was on the whole a decline both in quality and in quantity.[1] The decline in quality is due to the widespread use of cows as draught-animals and to inbreeding. The import of good foreign stock has been on an insufficient scale to improve this position, although some regions in Transylvania and the Banat have been able to maintain their good stock. The decline in numbers is due to the increase of meat exports and the absence of any planned breeding policy. The consumption [262] of both milk and meat amongst the peasants is extremely low.

[1] 1921: 5,700,000; 1932: 4,400,000. It is safe to assume that this downward trend continued.

241
654 Alongside this organisation the State ran certain technical services for agriculture, distribution of tested seeds, control of weights and measures, provision of bull and stallion services from its own stud farms. This work, however, remained less developed than in other S.E. European countries.

8. Agricultural Exports

241
231
439 Rumania was the largest grain exporter in Europe. By value, grain accounted for over half the total of agricultural exports. Livestock products, mainly live pigs and cattle, amounted to approximately one-fifth of the total, the remainder consisting of peas, beans, oilseeds, oil and oilcake, eggs and small quantities of fruit. Quantities exported on the average in the years 1935 to 1938 are shown below :—

*Exports of Principal Agricultural Commodities**
Average 1935-38
('000 *metric tons*)

Wheat	686
Maize	543
Barley	297
Peas	21
Beans	43
Oilseeds	108
Vegetable oils ..	5
Oilcake	103
Cattle ('000 head) ..	48
Pigs ('000 head) ..	222
Eggs	10

* Pre-1930 frontiers.

241
439 It is of interest to note that, despite German hopes of a development in oilseed cultivation and exports, no increase had been achieved up to the eve of the war. German interest had succeeded in stimulating production and exports of soya beans, but there was no expansion in total oilseed exports owing to a decline in rape seed and to an increase in domestic consumption of oil.

German purchases of Rumanian agricultural exports were increasing in recent pre-war years. In 1939 the territories of Greater Germany took 25 per cent. of the wheat exports, half the feed grain and the bulk of the oilseeds. Italy also took appreciable quantities of grain.

9. Food Consumption

146
262 The Rumanian diet is perhaps the worst-balanced in south-east Europe. The outstanding feature is its high dependence on grain, which provides three-quarters of the calories and 70 per cent. of the protein. In the towns white wheat bread is eaten except by the very poor, whilst in the country wholemeal bread or maize is usual. Over large areas, particularly in the Old Kingdom, maize forms the chief food. (Taking the country as a whole maize consumption is two-thirds higher than wheat.) During the summer months, when work is very heavy, peasant families may eat as much as 3 kg. (6½ lb.) a head daily, almost always in the form of *mămăligă* (a kind of porridge).

The rest of the rural dietary consists chiefly of beans, some potatoes (especially in Transylvania), cabbage, beetroots, carrots, onions and a certain amount of cheese and milk. Consumption of all these foods is much too low by nutritional standards. Meat is rarely eaten, except at Christmas time when a pig is killed—for the rest of the year small amounts of fat salted pork are used, more or less as a flavouring. Some fish is eaten in villages near rivers. Vegetable oils—mainly sunflower—and pig fats are used for cooking; butter is rarely eaten.

146 Largely because of its cost, the consumption of
262 sugar is very low, except among the well-to-do in the towns. (To encourage sugar-beet growing, a high price was set by the Government.)

[785] The diet is further impoverished by the long religious fasts—seven weeks before Easter, six weeks before Christmas, two shorter summer periods, plus Wednesdays and Fridays of each week. The diet during the fast includes practically no food of animal origin. Children under 10 years do not normally observe these fasts and, in fact, usually have a better diet during these periods since more milk, eggs and butter are available for them.

The diet, though fairly adequate in energy value, is short of animal protein, fats and calcium; moreover, where maize is the principal cereal lack of vitamin B_2 may be very serious. Various symptoms of vitamin and mineral deficiencies are
[165] observed, and the high infant-mortality rate—the highest in Europe—is also partly due to malnutrition. One of the most serious effects of the poor diet is the nervous disease pellagra, caused by this deficiency of the vitamin B_2 factor. In Moldavia, where maize is the staple food, about 5 per cent.
[164] of the rural population suffers from pellagra every spring. In the whole country about 3,000 deaths occur each year from this disease (compared with 4,000 in the maize-eating southern states of U.S.A.).

The average annual pre-war food consumption of Rumania is shown in the following table, with comparative figures for the United Kingdom.

Average per Head Consumption

	Rumania		*United Kingdom*	
	Kg.	*Lb.*	*Kg.*	*Lb.*
Wheat and rye	104	229	129	285
Maize	166	365	—	—
Potatoes	50	110	84	185
Sugar	5	11	43	95
Meat	17	37	63	139
Milk	70	123*	94	165*
Butter	1	2	11	24
Pig fat	4	10	5	11
Vegetable oil	1·5	3	—	—
Margarine	—	—	4	10
Calories per day	2,700		3,100	

*Pints

B. WAR-TIME CHANGES

1. Territorial Changes

728 The net effect of the territorial changes which
241 have occurred since 1939 is the loss of Northern Transylvania to Hungary and of Southern Dobruja
311 to Bulgaria. For two seasons' crops, 1940 and 1941, Rumania was without Bessarabia, but in the late summer of 1941 she not only regained Bessarabia but acquired administrative control of the Soviet territory now styled Transnistria, and this has made small contributions to the food supplies of Rumania in 1942-43. Ignoring Transnistria, however, Rumania lost 12 per cent. of her former arable area and grain production. The Transylvanian areas ceded to Hungary, though not rich agriculturally, probably needed only small imports of grain to supplement their own production, while south Dobruja, though a surplus producing area, contributed only a fraction to Rumania's total agricultural production. The country's potential agricultural export remains, therefore, substantially what it was before the war.

241 2. Agriculture in War Years

722 Germany, at the outbreak of the war, looked to the Danube countries, and to Rumania in particu-

241 very largely on the acquisition of tractors and other equipment. Only Germany can provide these requisites and it is of interest that, despite the poor contribution Rumania has hitherto made to Germany's food supplies, the latter has gone some way to assist the attempted reform. Over 4,000 [439] tractors with their ploughs and a variety of other implements have been imported from Germany during the war years. Tractor numbers in Rumania have probably been more than doubled by these imports, but they still represent only the beginnings of mechanisation. They have doubtless been supplied, despite insistent demands for tractors in Germany and elsewhere, in the belief that, if properly applied, they may make some slight increase in available surpluses. Some of these may have been destined for Transnistria to make good the Russian scorching.

6. Food Conditions

511 Food conditions have varied according to local resources, and in the months following the poor crops of 1942, according to the success of local prefects and officials in securing supplementary quantities from the more favoured areas. The [162] greater part of the population is rural, and most families feed themselves with their own home-grown produce. In the earlier years of the war these were able to maintain their consumption standards, but in 1942-43 there must have been a more serious degree of shortage and privation than is usual even after short crops. In the towns there has been a severe curtailment of food supplies, mitigated in individual cases by access to the Black Market.

262 Urban shortages developed early in 1941 and 434 official rationing cards were introduced in May of 511 that year in Bucarest and brought into use soon after. Sugar and meat were the first commodities to be rationed. The original sugar ration was 375 grammes (13 oz.) per week, but since May 1943 it has been only 125 grammes (4½ oz.). Meat, originally 250 grammes (9 oz.), is still (July 1943) at this level, though for a short time at the end of 1942 it was higher owing probably to the abnormal slaughterings caused by fodder shortages in 1942. Bread was first officially rationed in January 1942, but was preceded by baking regulations requiring maize admixtures in the loaf. The ration of 300

[11a]

262 grammes (10½ oz.) daily was available on five days
434 of the week only; on the other two days maize
511 meal only (for *mămăligă*) could be bought. The bread ration was reduced to 250 grammes in June 1942 and maize meal itself was rationed in August. The number of breadless days has varied, while barley, flour or potatoes have at times been offered in place of maizemeal. The bread mixture has also included varying proportions of maize, barley, potato and other flours. The allowance in June 1943 was 250 grammes of bread on five days and 1,000 grammes (35 oz.) of maize flour or potato flour on each of the remaining two days. All these quantities apply to Bucarest only. Other towns show variants of these regulations, depending on local supplies.

234 The most serious shortage in Bucarest, and
435 possibly in other towns, appears to be milk.
511 Owing to the depletion of surrounding herds following the high cost and scarcity of fodder only a small part of the former supply now arrives. Some milk, as with all products, is diverted to the Black Market, and official mistakes in price policy at various times have caused temporary shifts or stoppages in food supplies. Other livestock products and edible oil are also chronically short in the towns.

7. Food Prices

435 In spite of official attempts to protect con-
565 sumers from increases, retail prices and the cost of
511 living have risen almost to the same extent as producers' and wholesale prices. Taking autumn 1936 as 100, the cost of living was 330 and the cost of food 350 in the spring of 1943. These increases have been severely felt by the working and lower-middle classes. Official measures were taken to alleviate the situation of civil servants by the setting up of stores and canteens with reduced prices, some of the goods being supplied from Transnistria. Likewise firms with over 50 employees were ordered to supply them with essential foodstuffs at low prices. Persons with more ample resources make use of the Black Market on which all the ordinary foodstuffs are obtainable usually at only two to three times the official prices, the moderate character of these illegal prices being itself another illustration of the large quantities available through these channels due to the laxity of control.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

565 ease of behaviour, a keen sense for music and popular art and a dogged belief in its capacity to achieve progress.

The life of the Rumanian peasant is simple and [262] hard. His main nourishment consists of *Mamaliga*, a dish prepared of maize-flour, similar to the Italian *Polenta*. This forms his staple diet; meat and other [272] luxuries are very rare indeed. The national drink is *Tuica* (brewed from plum juice). The Rumanian [291] men are dressed in white trousers and a long white tunic fastened by a belt, a short jacket, and a fur cap or hat. Footwear, if any, consists of simple leather sandals strapped to the legs, called *Opinci*, similar to those of the Greek and Yugoslav peasants. In the comparatively rich regions short boots are worn. Gay embroidery, whose colouring and pattern vary according to districts, adorns all garments, especially the women's shirts and headcloths, and the aprons [342] which they wear fore and aft. In contrast to their gay dress the houses of the Rumanian peasants are usually small, badly built cottages of sun-dried brick and straw, whitewashed and occasionally [346] decorated with woodwork. The churches too are built in a similar fashion except in the mountain districts where stone and wood are used.

795 **RELIGION.** Most Rumanians belong to the Orthodox Church, but many Transylvanian Rumanians are Uniates, that is, Catholics of the Byzantine Rite. They form a link between the Latin and Orthodox 659 Churches. The Rumanian Orthodox Church is strongly national. The Uniate Church was used in the past by the Hungarian rulers of Transylvania as a means of assimilating the Rumanians in the Hun-

433 infancy. The mass of the people—the peasants—still supply
[294] their own modest wants almost entirely. The women make, in their own homes, the garments required by the household for summer and winter, using home-spun wool and home-woven cotton. A village expert fashions the leather embroidered coats worn by men and women alike. In the mountains, often the foot-gear is still of local manufacture. (Hats and shoes are mainly imported from the town, how-
342 ever.) Houses are made of locally-felled and sawn timber, and all the household utensils and furniture, except the crockery, are made in the village.

256 THERE is little accumulated capital in the country, and it is
273 natural that modern industrial developments should tend to be based on local raw materials and traditional skill. Home-grown wheat, maize and barley feed the flour-milling and brewing industries which are well developed. There are about 400 large flour mills, steam driven and capable of producing graded flour. These are mainly in the Old Kingdom and grind wheat chiefly. The wheat districts of Bessarabia and Bucovina have a number of modern mills, as well as a large number of windmills, but the maize districts still use the old-fashioned water-mills, which can only grind coarse meal. The brewing industry has been encouraged by the government, partly with the idea of reducing the consumption of the potent alcoholic beverage, "ţuica", which the peasants distil from plums. Most of the breweries are either in Bucureşti and Iaşi or in one of the larger Saxon towns of Transylvania. Potato and maize spirit are made on a large scale, particularly in Transylvania, for export.

323 FOR POTTERY MAKING the Dobrogea supplies a good kaolin, but the industry has not reached a high stage of development, although the ancient peasant pottery has much merit in form and decoration. This is due in part to lack of suitable fuel for the furnaces.

339 WITH the acquisition of Transylvania, Roumania has become independent in the matter of that most important constructional commodity, cement.

288 THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY is still backward. The post-war development is chiefly in the Banat, where, under protection, silk, artificial silk, cotton and wool have made

CHAPTER 1

228 in private waters. Supplemented by some 2,000 tons of imported fish, this provided a total of 1 lb. (2.2 lb. per head of population), but, in fact, almost all the fish was consumed by the small urban persons living in towns. The principal fish caught were sturgeon, carp, pike, eels and crayfish, the main fishing centres being Brăila, Tulcea and Ismail.

6. Food Industries

256 The chief food and agricultural-processing industries are milling, sugar manufacture, oilseed crushing and tobacco curing. While the milling industry was dispersed widely about the country in more than 15,000 small mills employing altogether over 37,000 persons (at 1930 census), the sugar industry was for the most part concentrated in the plain of the Kingdom. Of the 17 sugar 257 factories employing [illegible] workers, only one was in the Transylvanian districts lost to Hungary and five in the areas temporarily lost to the U.S.S.R. The vegetable-oil industry, located chiefly in 258 Bessarabia, was only partly carried on in factories, of which there were (on January 1st, 1930) 127 employing 2,026 workers. Among these, 34 were fitted both to extract crude oil and to refine it, six were exclusively refineries, while the remainder produced only crude oil. The rest of the industry consisted of some 2,000 hand, or animal-driven presses mostly owned by individual peasants or by shopkeepers. These primitive presses extracted only a low percentage of oil from the seeds, and consequently the cake—mainly sold for export—had an unusually high oil content. As regards 277 tobacco, both curing and cigarette manufacture [656] were subject to government licence and control. There were 29 factories (in 1930) employing 9,720 workers, but tobacco cultivation subsequently declined, so also doubtless did the numbers employed.

7. Agricultural Organisation

452 The history of the organisation of Rumanian 241 farmers is one of not too successful co-operatives 474 becoming transformed more and more into agencies for the execution of Government Control Schemes. [654] For many years there had been throughout the country a network of agricultural credit societies, co-operative in form but in practice directed by the State. These played an important role during the period of the Land Reform in helping the peasants by advances to buy and equip their newly acquired holdings. There was even some co-operative cultivation for a time, until the new peasant-owners could muster sufficient draught animals and implements. Besides this, there have been strong local co-operative unions especially among the [162] minority nationalities—the Hungarians in Transylvania, the Swabian and Saxons in the Banat and the Russian and Polish Jews in the Bucovina.

243 The credit societies revived in importance when 474 after 1933, the Rumanian Government began the organisation of grain marketing. They became 452 the local agents of a Central Marketing Board through which all sales of grain had to be made 654 both for home consumption and for export. Whereas formerly grain prices slumped immediately after the harvest, most peasants being obliged to sell their grain quickly, under the new scheme prices were stabilised throughout the year, and this brought a great improvement to peasants' [651] receipts. But the scheme and the societies were also used to collect the peasants' taxes (paid in grain) which did not increase the popularity of co-operation.

[8a]

2. Fertilisers

387 Since the consumption of chemical fertilisers in Rumania is one of the lowest among the European countries, their production is comparatively small.

Synthetic nitrogen compounds are manufactured by the S.A. Nitrogen at Dicio San Martin, where the company has a small Fauser synthetic ammonia plant and a calcium cyanamide works. No recent reliable data exists regarding output, but before the war the Fauser plant is stated to have treated 200 metric tons of nitrogen annually, and the production of cyanamide amounted to about 500 metric tons. The quantity of superphosphate manufactured averaged about 8,000 tons before the war. Owing to the cutting-off of supplies of rock phosphate, production of superphosphate is now probably nil. There was no domestic production of potash salts, and pre-war imports were very small.

3. Wood-Distillation Products

314 This industry is almost entirely controlled by
385 Margina Reşiţa destilarile de lemn unite S.A.R., Timisoara. Prior to the outbreak of the war about 170,000 tons of beech wood were worked per year. The following is a list of some of the products obtained, showing the average annual tonnage produced:—

Wood charcoal	31,000
Methanol	2,000
Calcium acetate	1,400
Acetic acid	50
Formaldehyde	130
Acetone and derivatives ..	1,100

4. Soap and Glycerine

388 Rumania is an important producer of sunflower,
389 rape and pumpkin seeds, and has, therefore, an ample supply of oil for her soap industry. The production of soap amounts to 33,000 tons and is in the hands of several factories, the only one of which is of striking importance being Stella S.A. of Bucarest. Glycerine production, which is a by-product of the soap industry, amounted to 350 tons, most of which was utilised by the explosives industry. Since the war the quality of the soap has markedly deteriorated. Though the present ration of 250 grams per head per month is a fairly generous one, it is not fully met and distribution is very bad. The production of glycerine is estimated to have fallen to about 200 tons, while imports amounted to 160 tons in 1941 compared with an average of about 240 tons in 1936-1938.

5. Paints and Varnish

386 The paint and varnish industry, in which some 60 small firms are engaged, is sufficiently well developed to meet,—under normal conditions—the greater part of Rumanian requirements in this particular sphere. The industry is, however, still dependent to some extent on imports of oil paints.

6. Pharmaceuticals

278 Production of pharmaceuticals is on a very small scale, being sufficient to meet only about one-third of requirements; the remainder being covered by imports, mainly from Germany.

7. Explosives

389 The explosives industry is quite inadequate to cover wartime requirements, and these have to be

543 443 WE HAVE classified the chief items observed at the fair between August 11th and 15th, 1936.

1. *Livestock.* Draught oxen, cows and calves, pigs and piglets. A few horses and goats. No sheep or fowl. The bargaining for cattle is completed when the buyer contrives to thrust a piece of silver into the hand of the seller. Acceptance of the earnest is followed by a hand-clasp.

[391] 2. *Agricultural Implements and Metal-work.*—It is said that gipsy-made metal tools were formerly displayed, but what little metal-work is now sold is factory-made and comes mostly from Czechoslovakia—cow-bells (of sheet-metal), horse-bells (of cast-metal), knives, etc. Hay-forks are gipsy-made, as are washing tubs and cradles, hollowed out of split tree trunks. Kitchen spoons are hand-carved. Wooden saddles and gipsy-made baskets and brooms may come under this head.

3. *Fruits and Vegetables.*—Tomatoes, potatoes, sweet-corn, onions, garlic, peppers, cabbage, water-melons, gherkins, aubergines, pears, apples, plums, blackberries. Also eggs and cheese.

[323] 4. *Pottery.*—The chief local craft is naturally well represented. The vessels, displayed on the ground, vary greatly in size, decoration and purpose; but they are all of brown clay, usually with simple floral patterns and debased geometrical designs in burnt sienna, yellow and green: vessels with or without lids, with or without handles, with or without spouts, glazed inside, outside, or both, in size ranging from salt-and-pepper stands to large waterpots. We find the old device of making pots in imitation of birds and animals.

[282] 5. *Leatherwork.*—Several booths display white leather sheepskin waistcoats, having the wool inside and the outside decorated with applied strips of thin orange-dyed leather embroidered usually by machine stitching, but occasionally by hand. These waistcoats are made at Curtea de Argeş. Leather belts, 4 to 6 inches wide, are machine-stitched but hand-tooled; they have buckle fastenings. Bridles and saddlery. Knotted leather thongs for whips. Hempen ropes for halters are sold in this section, too. Ready-made boots and shoes. The bulk of the shoes for sale, however, are made of rubber, in the shape of the traditional pointed shoe of skin. Most of them are cut from old motor tyres, but others are now made from specially manufactured rubber strips which repeat the patterns of the tyres.

433 The alimentary industry includes the important sections of sugar-refining, milling, alcohol distillation, and brewing.

[288] The textile industries have shown the greatest expansion, owing to the excessive protection they have enjoyed. The woollen industry is capable now of producing excellent cloths, most of the yarn being supplied by the local spinning mills, which employ wools produced in the country.

The artificial silk and cotton mills obtain their yarn from abroad, practically duty free, and are able to supply about three-fourths of the local requirements. Only the better qualities of cottons are imported, while foreign silks are practically excluded by the prohibitive duty imposed on them.

The knitting industry has also secured a complete control of the market, and no foreign knitted articles are imported.

[313] The lumber industry was some time ago one of the most prosperous in the country. Until 1925 its output was about 3,200,000 cubic metres of timber, out of which some two million cubic metres were exported annually. Since 1930 the demand has fallen off very considerably, and huge stocks have accumulated, and as prices have dropped the sawmills are registering immense losses. Thus one well-known timber firm, the Foresta, had sustained a loss of 250 million lei during 1930, and it may be said that actually all the timber industry is in a very precarious condition, owing to its inability to cope with Russian competition.

[282] The leather industry obtains all its raw material locally, and its production of sole leather and uppers is sufficient for the home requirements. Even gloves, leather cases, etc., are manufactured locally, and only a very limited quantity of fine and superior leather is now being imported.

000 The following table shows a detailed list of imports during 1930:

CHAPTER VII

237 [439] The imported hides are in all probability largely heavy hides needed for sole leather. Those designated as "other hides and skins" are not important in tonnage, and exports are almost certainly all sheep and pig. The exports of leather are not very important, as they consist almost entirely of leather waste.

Total supplies of leather, available from internal slaughterings of cattle, calves, horses and buffaloes together with net imports, would be about 12,000 tons, of which 10,11,000 tons are derived from local hides and skins.

Part of the sheepskins were dewoolled and turned into leather, the wool being sold separately but a considerable number of skins was used as fleece lined jackets by the peasants. The total quantity of leather from the locally slaughtered sheep would, however, not exceed 750/1,000 tons.

Unlike Western countries, the pigs in Rumania are flayed, and the skins tanned, so that the pigskin industry is certainly of material value, although not of major importance, compared with Rumania's total leather production.

2. Manufactures

295 Rumania's leather trade made rapid strides in pre-war years and, as the bulk of the leather was made into footwear, an important increase in this production was noticeable. Although no official statistics are available, it is estimated that Rumania produced 4/5,000,000 pairs of leather shoes in 1936 and, in addition, considerable quantities of peasants' footwear were manufactured in country districts.

The industry at that time consisted of about 20 machine shoe factories, six of which were owned and controlled by tanneries, mainly centred in Cluj, Timişoara, Bucarest and Oradea. In addition, numerous small shops existed throughout the country in which shoes were made by hand. With the loss of Northern Transylvania the machine-shoe centres of Cluj and Oradea went to Hungary.

3. Tanning Materials

282 [439] Rumania has in the past relied on other countries for practically all her tanning materials and extracts. She used to import about 8,000 tons of different extracts, about 50 per cent. of which were re-exported from the U.K., probably quebracho and wattle extract. Yugoslavia supplied her with about 2,000 tons of extract, presumably oak and chestnut.

(ii.) War-time Developments

1. General

Though Rumania has suffered during the war from a leather shortage, partly on account of reduced internal production, but more especially because of the increased requirements for the Armed Forces, this shortage has not been so severe as in most European countries.

It has been reported that the leather production in 1940 was 9,200 tons, but that the supply of raw hides fell from 19,000 tons pre-war to 11,000 tons in 1941. This is a severe drop, even assuming that the 19,000 tons included imported hides. A substantial decline in the available supplies of leather has, however, certainly taken place owing to the curtailment of imports, to clandestine slaughterings, and to exports of live cattle to the Axis.

An indication of the extent of supplies allocated for Army need was contained in an official announcement that 68 per cent. of all untanned

282 cattle hides collected in September, October and November, 1941, were for this purpose. The remaining 32 per cent., plus the horsehides, pigskins and goatskins, could be used for civilian purposes. The result was that very soon insufficient sole leather was available for civilians, and repairs to footwear became difficult.

282 656 At present 80 per cent. of the cattle hides weighing over 16 kilos (35 lb.), and 20 per cent. of the hides weighing less than 16 kilos, are reserved for the Army. This leaves the civilians very short of sole leather, normally manufactured from heavy hides.

At the end of 1941, the Ministry of Supply ordered the registration of all leather stocks, and thereafter leather could not be sold without a permit. The entire purchasing and control of raw hides and skins and also the distribution of leather was placed in the hands of the "ORAP" (*Oficiul Român de Aprovizionare şi Distribuire a Produselor de Piellărie*).

In the autumn of 1941 private dealings in sheep- and lambskins were forbidden, the Army Supply Minister having sole right of disposal. Owing to the comparatively important domestic output such a measure should not have been necessary, but was due to the Rumanian, and probably German, demands for warm clothing on the Russian front. Evidence received in 1942 shows that 80 per cent. of the skins are now reserved for the Army.

In July, 1942, leather transmission-belting, etc., was brought under control and made subject to certain restrictions.

295 434 Civilian rationing of footwear was introduced early in 1942 and new shoes could be sold only against permits issued to persons declaring possession of only one other pair of serviceable shoes. Repair cards were also issued. Requisition cards for new shoes are limited to one a year, and repair cards to one every four months. Children under 14 years of age can obtain two requisition cards yearly for new footwear.

The issue of permits does not, however, guarantee footwear supplies, and only about 50 per cent. of repair or purchase demands appear to be met.

The above regulations have been slightly modified from time to time, but remain intrinsically the same. The production of footwear of substitute materials, such as wooden soles, soles of artificial leather, leather waste, buna, etc., has gradually increased.

295 435 Despite the various government regulations the footwear Black Market flourished, and while the average pre-war price for a pair of men's shoes was 800 lei, in October, 1941, the official prices were fixed at about 1,500 lei for a standard pair of men's shoes and about 1,200 lei for a standard pair of women's shoes. In March, 1942, however, the Black Market price for men's shoes was 7/8,000 lei a pair, and this has now gradually risen to 10/12,000 lei. Complete soleing and heeling of men's footwear costs 1,250 lei officially, and women's 1,000 lei. The official price of soleing leather is 530 lei per kilo, whereas the Black Market price is 34,000 lei.

2. Tanning Materials

282 439 Before the war Rumania never made use of her own barks for tanning, as it was more economical to import extracts from overseas. During the war she has made attempts to employ her oak, chestnut, spruce and pine barks for tanning materials, but

282
439

without much success, and has therefore reverted to her former practice of importing tan.

In February 1942 it was reported that with imports from Italy, Turkey and Croatia Rumania had an eight months' supply in hand.

Under the 1942/43 Italo-Rumanian agreement Italy is providing her with 1,750 tons of chestnut extract, 1,000 tons of sumach and 735 tons of other materials. Turkey also agreed to supply her in 1942 with 1,000 tons of valex and 2,500 tons of valonea.

339

D. BUILDING MATERIALS AND CEMENT

The building materials industry in Rumania is on a small scale and not highly mechanised employing a total of 16,000 workers in 1937, while the value of production in that year amounted to 1·6 milliard lei, about 2½ per cent. of total industrial production. In the decade before the war cement, which is the most important branch of this industry, had a steadily increased output reaching in 1939 a total of 531,000 tons, with a 800,000 ton capacity. Small quantities had to be imported.

The most important cement firms are at Cernavodă, Turda, Dudeşti, and Fieni. Since the war, due to limited building activity, consumption of cement has decreased, and was reported to have been 314,000 tons for the first ten months of 1942 the bulk of which was used for military requirements.

[727]
339
656

After the recapture of Northern Bucovina and Bessarabia in mid-1941, a considerable amount of repair work had to be undertaken as a result of war destruction; but at the beginning of 1942 due to raw material and labour shortage all further reconstruction in these two provinces was forbidden. Later, in February, 1943, a decree

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDI Rumania EDI

342
323



Curtea de Argeș. A house in Potters' Street. Notice jars, etc., drying in the sun ready for baking.
Photo by H. J. Howard

280

Women separating hemp fibres from the stems after they have been retted and dried.

[page 32a]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 ED1 Rumania ED1

543 5. THINGS SEEN AT BORSEC FAIR, AUGUST 20TH

[286] 1. MATERIAL BY THE YARD.

Cotton: Prints, calicoes, zephyrs, ginghams, men's shirtings.
Wool: Coloured serges, rough grey and brown woollen material (very thick) for men's and women's winter clothing.
Artificial Silk: In plain colours, Crêpe de Chine in plain colours, a very few printed silks.
Lace: Coarse white lace edgings (from Nottingham).

[291] 2. CLOTHING.

Men's: Trousers, coats, waistcoats, cloth caps, embroidered lambskin waistcoats, braces.

Women's: Knitted and crocheted wool caps and berets, patent leather belts. Printed cotton and artificial silk pieces for head coverings. Ribbons.

Children's: Babies' knitted woollen garments. Modern-style dresses in artificial silk with machine-made embroidery. Socks and stockings of cotton and wool hand-knitted in Roumania. Artificial silk stockings manufactured from yarn imported from Switzerland and France.

[295] 3. BOOTS AND SHOES FOR MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

Field boots and heavy nailed boots for men.
Manufactured boots and shoes for women and children.
Ready-made peasant shoes of leather.
Ready-made peasant shoes of leather with rubber attached to sole.
Ready-made peasant shoes made from old motor tyres.
Shoes of plaited felt of all sizes for women and children.
Shoes of knitted coarse wool with straps.
Pieces of leather of correct size for making the peasant shoes and leather thongs for lacing them.
Leather and mohair laces for using with the manufactured boots and shoes.

[415] 4. POTTERY.

Large brown glazed earthenware pots only. No other pottery of any kind was seen in the fair.

[295] 5. BASKETS, ETC.

Hand-made of rushes gathered by the peasants who make them. Some colour introduced into the larger baskets; strong, neat weaving. Also a few big hats as worn in the fields by the Hungarian peasant women.

244 6. GREENGROCERY.

Turnips, potatoes, yellow beans, cabbages, gherkins, carrots, onions, tomatoes, ardei, lemons, apples, pears, Indian corn, water melons, cantaloupes.

543

[25] 7. CONFECTIONERY, ETC.

Gingerbread (all shapes).

Sweets: Packets of sweets, sweet-stuffs in various shapes. Dolls, ladies, hearts, diamonds, all with rough pieces of mirror inset.

[524] 8. TOYS.

The only toys for children seen were gaily-coloured thin rubber balls (large), also small wooden flutes similar to those used by shepherds.

[322] 9. CARVED WOODEN ARTICLES.

Wooden cigarette-holders; various sizes, some grotesquely large.

Mirrors with flower-borders carved in high relief.

Match-stands, cigarette stands, wooden boxes.

Large pipes (for playing jokes). Powder is secreted in the mouth-piece and is puffed into the face when the pipe is blown.

10. ARTICLES FOR THE HOME.

[285] Blankets patterned in red and natural wool.

Rug-strips made of pieces of cotton and woollen waste pieces of material.

[415] Modern cooking tins and saucepans, enamelled dishes and all sorts of "Household Helps," which attracted crowds of peasant women, e.g. egg and tomato slices, vegetable cutters, pastry moulds, etc.

Strainers with wooden frame and wire base, the wire coloured in tartan and other patterns.

Alarm clocks, boot polish in tins, soap, hempen rope and string.

[301] 11. CHEAP JEWELLERY, ETC.

Rings, brooches, neck and watch chains. Necklaces of coloured pearl and glass beads. Spectacles of plain and tinted glass. Jewelled combs for wearing in the hair. Studs, fancy buttons, thimbles, all kinds of plain and fancy pins. Mirrors.

233
231 the main flock being taken direct to the sheds on the foothills where they are fed on the hay gathered during the summer, whereas the remainder are grazed on the maize stubble until about Christmas. By then the weather becomes rather severe, and although sheep are better able than cows to withstand the rigours of a continental winter they are all kept in sheds during the early months of the year.

SURPLUS ANIMALS are disposed of at the autumn fairs at Tulgheş or Topliţa where they are bought up by dealers for conveyance to Italy or Czechoslovakia.

III. OTHER OCCUPATIONS

TEXTILES.

291 THE OUTSTANDING FEATURE of the Carpathian villages is the
286 remarkably high standard of peasant craftsmanship. The degree of artistic expression revealed in their clothing is particularly striking, and although best seen on festive occasions it is scarcely less noticeable in their ordinary working garb. Wool, flax and hemp are the traditional fibres used, but imported cotton yarn is beginning to displace linen for some of the lighter summer garments. Most of the dyestuffs are obtained from local plants, for example, red
[386] from the leaves of the wild crab apple, yellow from the osier, black from the alder or birch and fawn from the walnut, but imported dyes are beginning to be employed. The mordant used is salt, but colours other than black fix themselves in wool without salt treatment.

462 SPINNING with a distaff is the normal occupation of the women in their leisure time during the summer, very little knitting being done at all. The other processes of combing, weaving and dyeing are also undertaken by the women, as is the embroidering of dresses and household linen, but the embroidering of the sheepskin waistcoats which are worn by both sexes is done by one or two men who specialise in this craft (see Plate XV).

LEATHER.

295 ALTHOUGH still made in the village, the old type of laced shoe with its characteristically pointed toe is being displaced

543

5. THINGS SEEN AT BORSEC FAIR, AUGUST 20TH

[286] 1. MATERIAL BY THE YARD.

Cotton: Prints, calicoes, zephyrs, ginghams, men's shirtings.
Wool: Coloured serges, rough grey and brown woollen material (very thick) for men's and women's winter clothing.
Artificial Silk: In plain colours, Crêpe de Chine in plain colours, a very few printed silks.
Lace: Coarse white lace edgings (from Nottingham).

[291] 2. CLOTHING.

Men's: Trousers, coats, waistcoats, cloth caps, embroidered lambskin waistcoats, braces.

Women's: Knitted and crocheted wool caps and berets, patent leather belts. Printed cotton and artificial silk pieces for head coverings. Ribbons.

Children's: Babies' knitted woollen garments. Modern-style dresses in artificial silk with machine-made embroidery. Socks and stockings of cotton and wool hand-knitted in Roumania. Artificial silk stockings manufactured from yarn imported from Switzerland and France.

[295] 3. BOOTS AND SHOES FOR MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

Field boots and heavy nailed boots for men.
Manufactured boots and shoes for women and children.
Ready-made peasant shoes of leather.
Ready-made peasant shoes of leather with rubber attached to sole.
Ready-made peasant shoes made from old motor tyres.
Shoes of plaited felt of all sizes for women and children.
Shoes of knitted coarse wool with straps.
Pieces of leather of correct size for making the peasant shoes and leather thongs for lacing them.
Leather and mohair laces for using with the manufactured boots and shoes.

[415] 4. POTTERY.

Large brown glazed earthenware pots only. No other pottery of any kind was seen in the fair.

[295] 5. BASKETS, ETC.

Hand-made of rushes gathered by the peasants who make them. Some colour introduced into the larger baskets; strong, neat weaving. Also a few big hats as worn in the fields by the Hungarian peasant women.

244 6. GREENGROCERY.

Turnips, potatoes, yellow beans, cabbages, gherkins, carrots, onions, tomatoes, ardei, lemons, apples, pears, Indian corn, water melons, cantaloupes.

543
443
[286]

6. *Woven Goods.*—Here the high skill and craftsmanship of the Carpathian peasant is most obviously illustrated. Woollen cloths are the commonest, carded wool also being offered for sale. Linen, silk and hempen stuffs are displayed, the finer materials often having gold or silver threads woven into them; they are made up into blouses, skirts, veils and belts. Some machine-made cotton goods also for sale.

[531]

7. *Embroidered Goods.*—Velvet waistcoats with gold embroidery and bead work. Linen or woollen cloths are embroidered with wool, silk, or mercerised cotton. Round sequins, thought to betray Turkish influence, are very popular.

8. *Carpets.*—Locally woven carpets of traditional colours and designs far outnumber machine-made copies of Persian carpets.

9. *Food and Confectionery.*—Bread, doughnuts, sausages, fish, gingerbread, sweets. Sugar dolls, hearts, circles, diamonds and other shapes. Sugar rosaries. Drinks are hawked by Turkish itinerants. The restaurants and drinking booths have gipsy fiddlers.

10. *Cheap Jewellery.*—Trinkets, mirrors, beads, combs, buttons, studs, pins, rings, brooches, etc.

543
517

11. *Entertainments.*—The fat woman and the one-minute photographer, shooting ranges, cock-shies, games of chance, fortune-telling. The merry-go-round is driven by five men, who push it round on a high wooden platform fixed to the central axis, with the accompaniment of peasant music. Other bands supply music for the dancing which takes place under the trees.

543
443

APART FROM the gipsy goods and the articles offered in the permanent booths, the goods displayed vary from day to day as different groups of peasants come in from the country. There is a constant coming and going of bullock carts over the bridge, bringing in stock and peasant products for sale. The normal limit of influence exerted by the fair is some 25 kilometres.

E. E. E.

412



Hoe.
Blade the size of an English spade. See page 41.

[Page 59]

433 infancy. The mass of the people—the peasants—still supply
[294] their own modest wants almost entirely. The women make, in their own homes, the garments required by the household for summer and winter, using home-spun wool and home-woven cotton. A village expert fashions the leather embroidered coats worn by men and women alike. In the mountains, often the foot-gear is still of local manufacture. (Hats and shoes are mainly imported from the town, how-
342 ever.) Houses are made of locally-felled and sawn timber, and all the household utensils and furniture, except the crockery, are made in the village.

256 THERE is little accumulated capital in the country, and it is
273 natural that modern industrial developments should tend to be based on local raw materials and traditional skill. Home-grown wheat, maize and barley feed the flour-milling and brewing industries which are well developed. There are about 400 large flour mills, steam driven and capable of producing graded flour. These are mainly in the Old Kingdom and grind wheat chiefly. The wheat districts of Bessarabia and Bucovina have a number of modern mills, as well as a large number of windmills, but the maize districts still use the old-fashioned water-mills, which can only grind coarse meal. The brewing industry has been encouraged by the government, partly with the idea of reducing the consumption of the potent alcoholic beverage, "ţuica", which the peasants distil from plums. Most of the breweries are either in Bucureşti and Iaşi or in one of the larger Saxon towns of Transylvania. Potato and maize spirit are made on a large scale, particularly in Transylvania, for export.

323 FOR POTTERY MAKING the Dobrogea supplies a good kaolin, but the industry has not reached a high stage of development, although the ancient peasant pottery has much merit in form and decoration. This is due in part to lack of suitable fuel for the furnaces.

339 WITH the acquisition of Transylvania, Roumania has become independent in the matter of that most important constructional commodity, cement.

288 THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY is still backward. The post-war development is chiefly in the Banat, where, under protection, silk, artificial silk, cotton and wool have made

288 progress. The production of cocoons is in the neighbourhood of half a million pounds weight per annum. The production of boots and shoes is sufficient to supply the home market, but the quality is poor.

FOREIGN TRADE.

ROUMANIA produces in bulk for export three things: timber, grain and oil. The market for timber is the eastern Mediterranean and chiefly Egypt. Where good rail communications are lacking, the timber is moved from the forested Carpathians by water. Much is floated down the various tributaries of the Siret to Galaţi and the Black Sea. It is unfortunate that up-stream transport to western markets for this bulky commodity should be so difficult, 439 while in the Levant it has to meet the severe competition of cheap Russian timber. In the up-stream markets there has been keen competition from Jugoslavia and Poland. Cheap rail freights and abatement of export tax are means taken to combat the retrogression of the trade.

WITH REGARD to trade in grain, Roumania suffers in common with all grain-surplus producing countries. Before the War the lower Danube and Black Sea grain trade was closely linked with the demand for British coal in the Mediterranean countries, the return cargo ensuring cheap freights for a more or less regular supply. The slump in the British coal trade, the check on production brought about by the break up of large estates, a series of bad harvests, and finally a world slump in grain prices, which reduced the export price of wheat below that of the home market, all these factors have been at work in reducing the wheat trade of Roumania and producing a consistent decrease in the average value per ton. Poor transport facilities and port equipment have also acted adversely in the moving of timber and grain.

THE EXPORT of petroleum increased from 2.8 million tons in 1929 to 5.6 million tons in 1933, drilling activities having increased, especially in the Dambovița district. The port of Constanța has been considerably improved by the installation of 10-inch pipe-lines, the construction of oil reservoirs, the fitting of special hose-handling cranes and the doubling of the railway track between Cernavoda and Constanța.

RUMANIA

433 The alimentary industry includes the important sections of sugar-refining, milling, alcohol distillation, and brewing.

[288] The textile industries have shown the greatest expansion, owing to the excessive protection they have enjoyed. The woollen industry is capable now of producing excellent cloths, most of the yarn being supplied by the local spinning mills, which employ wools produced in the country.

The artificial silk and cotton mills obtain their yarn from abroad, practically duty free, and are able to supply about three-fourths of the local requirements. Only the better qualities of cottons are imported, while foreign silks are practically excluded by the prohibitive duty imposed on them.

The knitting industry has also secured a complete control of the market, and no foreign knitted articles are imported.

[313] The lumber industry was some time ago one of the most prosperous in the country. Until 1925 its output was about 3,200,000 cubic metres of timber, out of which some two million cubic metres were exported annually. Since 1930 the demand has fallen off very considerably, and huge stocks have accumulated, and as prices have dropped the sawmills are registering immense losses. Thus one well-known timber firm, the Foresta, had sustained a loss of 250 million lei during 1930, and it may be said that actually all the timber industry is in a very precarious condition, owing to its inability to cope with Russian competition.

[282] The leather industry obtains all its raw material locally, and its production of sole leather and uppers is sufficient for the home requirements. Even gloves, leather cases, etc., are manufactured locally, and only a very limited quantity of fine and superior leather is now being imported.

000 The following table shows a detailed list of imports during 1930:

A. TEXTILES AND TEXTILE FIBRES

248 In the years preceding the war, Rumania had been making efforts, with some success, to reduce the degree of her previous dependence on imports of textile fibres. The cotton crop of fair average quality, though still far short of the expanded [236] mill capacity, was gradually increasing, while indigenous wool supplies—though chiefly of coarse quality—were in the main enough for peasant clothing. Home-grown crops of hemp and flax were sufficient for internal needs, while jute, coir and hard hemps were imported to complete the requirements of industrial fibres.

248 439 The cessation of imports and loss of territory to her neighbours have entirely changed the supply picture, and combined with demands by Germany for imports have greatly reduced the textile "standard of living."

1. Cotton

With the development of her processing industry, Rumania had increased raw cotton imports and was successfully encouraging domestic cotton production. By 1938, imports at some 21,000 tons were about five times larger than those of 1932, and the domestic crop yield, less than 20 tons in 1932, had risen to about 600 tons. The principal sources of raw cotton were Egypt, the U.S.A., and Great Britain.

With the outbreak of war, Rumanian imports generally were curtailed, the combined total of raw cotton and cotton materials being 14,700 tons in 1940, and 13,800 tons in 1941. Thereafter, Rumania was dependent on such supplies as she could obtain by barter, lower grade cotton from Turkey and Italy and cotton and staple fibre union cloth from Italy.

248 Since 1938 the Rumanian cotton crop has continued to increase, though it is still very short of normal requirements, while the cession of some 8,000 ha. (20,000 acres) of cotton land to Bulgaria in 1940, and unfavourable weather conditions, tended to restrict the cotton-growing programme.

Prior to the territorial changes of 1940, cotton was grown close to the Danube at Craiova, and especially in the Southern Dobruja. With the cession of most of this land to Bulgaria, cotton is now mostly grown on the north bank of the Danube, at Banloc near Timişoara in the Banat and in the districts of Teleorman, Vlasca and Ialomiţa. The crop in 1939 was 2,200 tons from less than 10,000 ha. (24,000 acres) and in 1942 was estimated at 5,000 tons from about 20,000 ha. (50,000 acres). A further increase in area has been planned, but the harvest, particularly in the north, is largely dependent upon climatic conditions. The type of cotton now produced is considered superior to Indian, and similar in quality to American.

●288 The chief mill centres are at Arad, Bucarest, Cluj, Iaşi, Lugoj and Timişoara; of these, Cluj is the only one to have been affected by the transfer of territory. Cotton supplies are dis- [655] tributed under the direction of the Department of Industry and Trade by "Romacotin," which also has a monopoly of purchase from producers at prices fixed by the General Price Commissariat. Cotton may be sold only to these Government agencies to whom it has to be delivered by

288 31st December. There appears to be a good deal of passive resistance and hoarding.

Cotton spindles had increased from 35,600 in 1927 to 250,000 in 1938, and altogether there were 18 mills of some importance. Power looms in 1938 are believed to have amounted to about 16,000. The apparent disproportion of spindle compared with loom capacity was due to Rumania being a fairly important buyer of foreign yarns, imports being 23,000 tons in 1936, 27,000 in 1937, 14,000 in 1938 and 15,000 in 1939. About 70 per cent. of these yarns were of coarse cotton, called "peasants' yarns," for use in the handicraft industry only, and imported mainly from Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy and Great Britain.

2. Wool

236 Rumania, which had the largest wool-growing industry in S.E. Europe, was also the most important consumer. Production of raw wool in 1938 was about 20,000 tons (greasy) and imports were about 1,000 tons, and of wool yarn about 2,500 tons. On account of its coarse quality, not much more than one-third of the domestic wool clip is ordinarily used in the mechanised industry, the bulk being consumed in village handicraft. Since the war and subsequent loss of territory, [233] the sheep population of Rumania is believed to have declined by some 25 to 30 per cent., and all imports have ceased, so that the industry is now entirely dependent upon the reduced domestic clip.

288 Rumania was never a large importer of woollen cloth, and the weaving industry was always more highly developed than the spinning. The output of cloth in 1936 and 1937 being 6,000 tons and 6,600 tons respectively. In 1938, there were 127,000 mechanised spindles and 4,300 looms, the chief mill centres, in order of importance, being at Buhuşi (district of Neamţi), Braşov, Timişoara, Bacău, Bucarest and Sibiu.

655 Both the raw material and the woollen-textile
236 industry are nominally under strict Government
control, as by a decree in April 1942, the numbers
288 of sheep and lambs and the quantity of shorn wool must be declared each year, and the wool itself must be surrendered to collecting centres at specified dates. As the due date for the 1942 collection had to be extended month by month up till January 10th 1943, and all penalties abrogated, the success of the scheme appears to have been doubtful. No wool can be bought or sold except by permit of the Ministry of National Economy, and distribution to the mills is entrusted to an organisation known as "OFIL" (*Oficiul Lânei*), a company with a capital of 10 million lei, and including all firms concerned in the preparation of wool.

3. Hemp

248 In 1937 the area under hemp, which is grown chiefly in the Banat, was 50,000 ha. (123,000 acres) and the outturn 27,000 tons, most of which was consumed internally. Exact details of wartime plantings are not known, but are reported as 45,000 ha. (112,000 acres) and 32,500 ha. (80,300 acres) in 1941 and 1942, and the yield at about 21,000 and 20,000 tons respectively. For 1943, farmers have been urged to plant more hemp—the "national textile"—in order to cover clothing.

[29c]

CHAPTER VI

248 sack and rope requirements; and a hemp and flax office has been established with a capital of 20 million lei and a credit of 500 million to distribute seed and manure, and to rent and finance retting and scutching plants. This office, which is the only purchaser of these fibres, is to make no profits, and prices are to be fixed. Fifteen up-to-date plants are to be erected in 1943 in the hemp-growing areas.

[439] Although Rumania normally had little or no export balance, Germany in 1942 demanded 15,000 tons of the 20,000 tons available. How much of this was actually delivered is not known, but the shortage of hemp and other fibres has led to amazing competition between the various industries for the remaining supplies, and a hemp rope and sack factory is to be built at Chişinău [288] in Bessarabia, where the shortage of these goods is particularly acute.

4. Flax

Flax appears to be the only crop grown on a smaller area in 1943 than in 1941 and 1942, when 20,000 ha. (49,400 acres) were planted, as compared with 15,000 ha. (37,000 acres) in 1938 and 12,000 ha. (29,600 acres) in 1939. Preference, apparently, is to be given to hemp. The pre-war output was about 10,000 tons, but no reliable figures are available since 1939. Normally, there was no appreciable export of flax, but as with other fibres, the Germans appear to have been persistent in their demands. The Rumanian company Fuiorul Cotonese, in which German capital participates, is to build flax-retting tanks at Cereteni (in the district of Dolj) and Zimnicea (in the district of Teleorman).

5. Rayon and Staple Fibre

288 There were two plants erected before the war, the "Apretura" at Popeşti-Leordeni and the Viscosa Românească at Lupeni, the combined daily capacity of which was 12 tons of rayon and 6 tons of staple fibre. (Approximately 4,200 tons rayon and 2,100 tons of staple fibre annually.) There has been but little expansion since, and the present annual production is estimated at 4,400 [439] tons rayon and 2,600 tons staple fibre. Imports from Italy have been 450 tons in 1940, and 2,500 in 1941. Germany promised substantial quantities, but it is doubtful whether they fully materialised. Applications for permission to erect a new pulp mill have been made by both German and Italian interests, but it seems that the Germans objected to Snia Viscosa's being granted a concession and obtained it themselves later.

6. Silk

231 Although Rumania is within the orbit of the silk belt, output is small, reaching a maximum of 20 tons of cocoons in pre-war years, and 35 tons of reeled silk were imported, principally from Italy. Silkworm breeding is located in the Banat and in common with the drive for increased silk production in German Europe, Rumania has made efforts to increase silkworm breeding.

288 In 1937 about 5,000 workers were engaged in silk weaving (probably including artificial silk); this number was increased to 7,336 in 1941. It is reported that the cocoon crop is now delivered to the Air and Marine Ministries, presumably for making cartridge bags, etc.

7. Other Fibres

248 Raw jute imports averaged about 5,500 tons
439 annually before the war, and in addition there were smaller imports of jute cloth and bags

248 439 Paper, and paper mixed with hemp, are now used to substitute jute.

Although a comparatively large producer of soft hemp, Rumania normally needed to import about 2,300 tons of other hemps for special purposes, and the sources of these imports have been severed since her entry into the war.

Comparatively negligible amounts of coir were also imported in peacetime.

●288 291 434 **8. Clothes Rationing**

Unlike almost all other Enemy and Occupied countries, Rumania possesses no official clothes-ration card, although purchases are restricted to a specific number of garments per year. Since 1940 the Government, anxious to avoid the necessity for a card rationing system, has adopted various means in an endeavour to overcome the shortage of textiles, particularly of cotton and wool.

Standardisation of fabrics and fixed prices were introduced in 1940, but clothing of standardised material was frequently unobtainable since the price did not leave the retailer a profit.

Army demands soon called for a great increase in clothing production, thereby reducing the stocks and greatly raising prices of civilian clothing—those for overcoats rose by 300 per cent. and for knitted goods by 400 per cent.—and the difficulty of importing raw materials soon reacted on the industry, so that by 1941 the textile shortage, particularly of bed linen, had become serious. Later in the same year, the Ministry of supply blocked the sale of all semi-manufactured or manufactured blankets.

Early in 1942 the Government requested the public to purchase only necessities, ordering the industry at the same time to use cotton allocations for the manufacture of standardised bed linen and clothing only. Later in 1942 it was decreed that the annual allotment of garments per head of the population was two suits or frocks, one overcoat, three shirts, 12 handkerchiefs, three pairs of socks or stockings, one sheet, three towels. The sale of standard cloth was restricted to three metres per person per annum. For this arrangement, however, clothing coupons were not issued and purchasers were requested to produce their identity cards and a signed certificate of need if the purchase exceeded 300 lei.

291 435 Non-standard articles are still obtainable, but their exorbitant prices make them accessible to a limited section of the public only. Retailers are known to have refused the sale of standard cloth even when displayed, in order to secure, if possible, the higher profit margin for non-standard goods.

[565] The members of the public most severely affected by clothing shortage and high prices are industrial workers and the poorer urban population. Though the large firms are supposed by law to supply their employees with clothing (as well as food) at cheap prices, it is thought that this is not being widely practised.

Prices of all materials for men's garments have risen to such an extent that people cannot afford to buy even such goods as are available in the shops.

248 656 To counteract shortage of clothing fibres, peasants are being encouraged by the Government to increase cultivation of flax and hemp for production of the rough cloth suitable for peasant clothing.

[30b]

CHAPTER XI

463 438 industrial labour. One-third of all workers engaged in industry are independent artisans, on whom the community is dependent for its services, but who do not play any important part in war production. In certain of the larger armament works German controllers have effected a considerable degree of rationalisation.

3. Mining

316 727 There is a shortage of miners; Russian prisoners of war have been employed in mining during 1942. Many miners were reported to have been included in the territory transferred to Hungary.

4. Armament Works

719 464 There is a general shortage of labour in metal and engineering factories, particularly of skilled labour. A 12-hour day was legalised at the beginning of 1942, but it is doubtful if in fact a 12-hour day is ever worked.

5. Timber

313 464 There is a shortage of labour, both for lumbering and for timber manufacture.

6. Textiles and Clothing

464 288 294 The total number of workers in these industries has probably fallen considerably, due to reduction of available raw materials. The delivery of supplies to individual mills seems to be somewhat erratic, and there is evidence of considerable part-time work: for instance in a survey of some 43 factories in December, 1942, 11 were working full time, 21 on a reduced scale, and 11 at a very reduced scale.

7. Building

499 712 464 The extent of fortification building and general road and rail construction in Rumania is unknown, but in the second half of 1942 there was evidence of a scarcity of general labour for such projects, and of Russian prisoners of war working on rail construction.

438 464 [759] In the other branches of occupation, transport services, etc., there is no evidence of labour shortage apart from doctors, many of whom have been mobilised for the army.

D. CONTROL OF LABOUR

1. The Youth Labour Service

466 883 A youth labour service founded on the German model was established in March 1941. The leaders were trained in Germany, but it was only in April 1942 that the labour camps began to function. Youths are called up in their 19th–20th year, and the period of service lasts 7 months.

(*See* Part II, Chapter V.B. for further details.)

2. Civil Mobilisation

466 A general civil mobilisation decree was passed in May 1941 by which (1) employment cards were introduced, (2) men and women aged 20-57 were liable to compulsory employment if not employed.

Two subsequent decrees were published in March and May 1943, one for the reorganisation of agriculture, forestry and fishing, and the second for the reorganisation of industry. Each of these decrees gave full powers to the appropriate authorities for the mobilisation and transfer of labour.

In addition to the general labour decrees which have so far had little influence on the labour situation, there have been regional decrees applying to individual localities, e.g. in Bessarabia, in February 1942 all the inhabitants aged 12-70 were called upon for compulsory agricultural labour unless already employed.

+ That the extreme [illegible]
Rumania is

not approved by the public may also be seen from the following excerpts culled from an article published by the same paper on May 15th, 1932: "There is a profound difference between industries which utilize local raw materials and such pseudo-industries which import from abroad semi-manufactured materials and finish them off in this country. . . . The importation of semi-manufactured goods is in the great majority of cases carried on solely to evade the Customs tariffs, and if we do not see things as they are, this is on account of private interests, for the sake of which we allow a prejudicial system to continue to function. . . ."

The *Argus*, too, several times attempted to call public attention to the nefarious results of the policy of bolstering up artificial industries, and especially in the case of the textile industry, on which it wrote as follows: "Why are clothing materials so costly? Because our protected textile industry sells its products at the same price as the goods imported from abroad. The encouragement given to the textile industry has resulted in increasing the cost of wearing apparel because industrialists are not content with a reasonable profit, and as a result a woollen suit to-day is a luxury. When our Custom tariff is to be revised the interests of industrialists alone should not be considered, but also those of the consumers."

As one may infer from the above, this policy of industrialization was a wild scheme which materialized on a large scale, chiefly because various politicians had been directly interested in the manufacturing concerns which had been started.

The case of the paper industry may be cited as an example. All the paper mills belonged to or were controlled by friends or relatives of the Bratianus. In order to secure big profits an import duty of 50 per cent was placed on paper, creating thereby a virtual monopoly of the paper trade on behalf of the owners of the mills. As they could dictate their will to the Chamber, the high duty was maintained in spite of the protest of the Opposition. For not only the public at large suffered by the high price of such an essential commodity as paper, but political interests were equally affected. Opposition parties had to pay high prices

661 for the paper necessary for their pamphlets and newspapers,
477 while the Bratianus' Press organs naturally enjoyed pre-
[289] ferential rates. Another deplorable result of this monopoly was the high cost of books. The same book published in
[212] Bulgaria cost about half as much as in Rumania, and this explains to some extent the high percentage of illiterates in the latter country, which according to the *Lupta* of May 18th, 1932 reached as high a percentage as 70 per cent of the
433 total population. The creation of industries, the raw material of which is not indigenous, is likely in the long run to prove extremely wasteful. They are clearly of a parasitic nature, and their maintenance will not only continue to be a charge on the Revenue but is likely to continue to handicap very seriously Rumania's staple industry, agriculture. The initial costs of installation are necessarily high, for foreign experts have to be called in to set up the machinery, supervise, and train the native workpeople, since there is a lack of experienced workmen. Moreover the stringency of monetary resources and the high rates of interest ruling necessitate a high return on capital that can be secured only by selling the manufactured article at the highest possible price, a level which is usually fixed by the cost of the corresponding foreign article, on which a heavy duty has been imposed. The high prices will forcibly curtail output since the latter is adjusted to the capacity of the local market, the possibilities of which are restrained owing to the low buying power of the peasantry. The more consumption is reduced the more manufacturers will endeavour to recoup themselves by further raising their prices, which can be attained only by increasing the protective duty. Thus a vicious circle is created, to the great disadvantage of the peasantry, who
[162] constitute 80 per cent of the population and who have to defray in the same proportion the expenses of these experimental attempts to industrialize Rumania. It is obvious that the high prices paid by the peasantry for manufactured articles affect adversely the cost of agricultural produce; even the transport rates of the latter stand high in order to compensate for the low preferential rates granted to local manufactures. One need not, therefore, be surprised if Rumanian agriculturalists can no longer market their pro-

C. PAPER AND PULP

289
313

With a normal consumption of only 3·3 kg. (7¼ lb.) of paper and board per head of the population, compared with 37 kg. (81·4 lb.) in Great Britain, Rumania is one of the smallest consumers in Europe. The country's requirements in ordinary grades of paper and board are well covered by about thirteen paper mills, some of which also manufacture both chemical and mechanical wood pulp.

Newsprint requirements are met by home production.

Pre-war (1936) production of chemical pulp was 37,000 tons and of mechanical wood pulp 9,000 tons, while the output of paper in the same year was 48,000 tons, and of cardboard 10,000 tons.

[439] Small imports of sulphate pulp normally came from Sweden, and of mechanical wood pulp from Austria.

In 1940 the production of paper rose to 105,150 tons, of which little more than half was sold internally and about 90 per cent. came from mills in the Rumanian Paper Cartel.

By the early part of 1942 a critical situation had arisen due to scarcity of fuel and raw materials.

The principal pulp and paper mills having four or five machines each and an annual capacity each of 24 30,000 tons of paper are as follows:—

(a) Fabrica de Celuloză Zărnești S.A., Brașov.
(b) "Letea" Fabrica de Hârtie Bacău.
(c) Fabrica de Hârtie "Bușteni" (C. & S. Schiel) at Bușteni.

The remaining mills, about ten in number, are much smaller, and three of them, with a combined capacity of 6/7,000 tons per annum, have come under Hungarian ownership following the Vienna Award.

Zărnești Cellulose Mill is of primary importance as the main source of chemical wood pulp for domestic consumption and export, and it is believed that this factory is now making special bleached cellulose for the manufacture of explosives. Elaborate machinery imported from Germany was installed with fair promptitude.

The utilisation of reeds from the Danube delta has not yet (July, 1943) begun, although much publicity has been given to this project in the local and German press, but a concession has been granted to a German-Rumanian Society, "Delta A.G." The Zărnești and Bușteni Paper Mills are participating and investigations are under way. A similar concession asked for by the Snia Viscosa concern in Italy is said to have been refused.

[434] In 1942 consumption of paper in the first half of the year amounted to over 90 per cent. of production, but in the second half-year the Cabinet imposed fresh restrictions on consumption in order to remedy the increasing shortage.

[439] There is a considerable trade with the Italian Government in bitumenised cardboard for walling and roofing military huttments, and it is believed that a part of these are imported from Scandinavia and exported (after bitumenising) to Italy and the U.S.S.R. for the Italian Expeditionary Forces. It is also likely that since the bombing raids on Italy, extra demands have been made for repair purposes.

[33 b]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

531
291
462

[Plate I-facing title page]

4;Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

142
291

PLATE IV

Our shepherd guide down mountain side to Paltinis, on journey from Borsec to Vatra Dornei. He was milking sheep at a "stâna."

Photo: H. J. Howard.

233



A mountain shepherd boy playing his wooden pipe near "stâna"—seen on journey to Paltinis.

Photo: H. J. Howard

[Facing page 25]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

PLATE VI

563
142
291

A group of Corbu children. The girls are Roumanians, the boys Gipsies, the broad-headedness of the former contrasting markedly with the narrow-headedness of the latter. *Photo: R. A. Pelham.*

A group of peasants at the Borsec Fair. The girl in the foreground is a Szekler, her costume contrasting with those of the Roumanian women behind. *Photo: Miss M. Odlin.*

[facing page 45]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

291

Captain and crew. *Photo: Dr. C. P. Sandgrass.*

137
133

Passengers.

These two photographs give a good impression of the gorge-like character of the transverse section of the Bistrita where it is cutting through crystalline schists. *Photo: R. A. Pelham.*

[facing page 48]

4-Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDI Rumania EDI

291
462

133



Shooting the rapids on the Bistrita.

Photo: Dr. H. Ormsby.

241

Harvesting by hand on the level Danube plains.

Photo: Roumanian Press.

291

Spinning with a distaff—an occupation symbolical of the traditional life of the Roumanian peasantry in the hill country.

Photo: N. I. Record.

[facing page 134]

233
231 the main flock being taken direct to the sheds on the foothills where they are fed on the hay gathered during the summer, whereas the remainder are grazed on the maize stubble until about Christmas. By then the weather becomes rather severe, and although sheep are better able than cows to withstand the rigours of a continental winter they are all kept in sheds during the early months of the year.

SURPLUS ANIMALS are disposed of at the autumn fairs at Tulgheş or Topliţa where they are bought up by dealers for conveyance to Italy or Czechoslovakia.

III. OTHER OCCUPATIONS

TEXTILES.

291 286 THE OUTSTANDING FEATURE of the Carpathian villages is the remarkably high standard of peasant craftsmanship. The degree of artistic expression revealed in their clothing is particularly striking, and although best seen on festive occasions it is scarcely less noticeable in their ordinary working garb. Wool, flax and hemp are the traditional fibres used, but imported cotton yarn is beginning to displace linen for some of the lighter summer garments. Most of the dyestuffs are obtained from local plants, for example, red from the leaves of the wild crab apple, yellow from the osier, [286] black from the alder or birch and fawn from the walnut, but imported dyes are beginning to be employed. The mordant used is salt, but colours other than black fix themselves in wool without salt treatment.

462 SPINNING with a distaff is the normal occupation of the women in their leisure time during the summer, very little knitting being done at all. The other processes of combing, weaving and dyeing are also undertaken by the women, as is the embroidering of dresses and household linen, but the embroidering of the sheepskin waistcoats which are worn by both sexes is done by one or two men who specialise in this craft (see Plate XV).

LEATHER.

295 ALTHOUGH still made in the village, the old type of laced shoe with its characteristically pointed toe is being displaced

342

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDI Rumania EDI

A Corbu "stâna" occupied by transhumant flocks during the summer season. A deforested portion of the mountain 2,000 feet above the village has been set aside for pasturage. The buildings are very simple. The large hut on the left combines the functions of dairy and dwelling house, the smaller sheds in the compounds being used for milking purposes.

Photo. R. A. Pelham.

342
291
142



Close-up view of dairy showing adult members of "stâna" with their utensils. The man on the left is holding a horn.

Photo: R. A. Pelham.

[facing page 72]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

PLATE XIV

291
142

Woman combing wool for spinning at Corbu by drawing it through iron spikes fixed in a wooden bat-like handle. The boy is holding a distaff. *Photo: H. J. Howard.*

[46]



Woman weaving on primitive home-made wooden loom at Corbu. *Photo: H. J. Howard.*

[facing page 73]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1930 EDl Rumania EDl

291
531

WOMAN'S SHEEPSKIN COAT

Front

Back

MAN'S SHEEPSKIN COAT

Front

Back

[facing page 76]

4:Fleur S-5 (no date)1936 EDI Rumania EDI

291
531

Woman's embroidered blouse.
Photo. Mrs. A. Perkins

Roumanian peasant at Bran in the Transylvanian Alps. Photo. H. J. Hinrichs

583
531



Portion of girl's dowry, showing elaborately embroidered pillows and bed-covers.
Photo. Mrs. G. L. Maxwell

Plate XVI.

[facing page 77]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

543

5. THINGS SEEN AT BORSEC FAIR, AUGUST 20TH

[286] 1. MATERIAL BY THE YARD.

Cotton: Prints, calicoes, zephyrs, ginghams, men's shirtings.
Wool: Coloured serges, rough grey and brown woollen material (very thick) for men's and women's winter clothing.
Artificial Silk: In plain colours, Crêpe de Chine in plain colours, a very few printed silks.
Lace: Coarse white lace edgings (from Nottingham).

[291] 2. CLOTHING.

Men's: Trousers, coats, waistcoats, cloth caps, embroidered lambskin waistcoats, braces.

Women's: Knitted and crocheted wool caps and berets, patent leather belts. Printed cotton and artificial silk pieces for head coverings. Ribbons.

Children's: Babies' knitted woollen garments. Modern-style dresses in artificial silk with machine-made embroidery. Socks and stockings of cotton and wool hand-knitted in Roumania. Artificial silk stockings manufactured from yarn imported from Switzerland and France.

[295] 3. BOOTS AND SHOES FOR MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

Field boots and heavy nailed boots for men.
Manufactured boots and shoes for women and children.
Ready-made peasant shoes of leather.
Ready-made peasant shoes of leather with rubber attached to sole.
Ready-made peasant shoes made from old motor tyres.
Shoes of plaited felt of all sizes for women and children.
Shoes of knitted coarse wool with straps.
Pieces of leather of correct size for making the peasant shoes and leather thongs for lacing them.
Leather and mohair laces for using with the manufactured boots and shoes.

[415] 4. POTTERY.

Large brown glazed earthenware pots only. No other pottery of any kind was seen in the fair.

[295] 5. BASKETS, ETC.

Hand-made of rushes gathered by the peasants who make them. Some colour introduced into the larger baskets; strong, neat weaving. Also a few big hats as worn in the fields by the Hungarian peasant women.

244 6. GREENGROCERY.

Turnips, potatoes, yellow beans, cabbages, gherkins, carrots, onions, tomatoes, ardei, lemons, apples, pears, Indian corn, water melons, cantaloupes.

NOTES ON THE HOUSES IN CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

342 THE SMALL TOWN of Curtea de Argeş has from time to time suffered destruction from fire, in consequence of which there is very little to be found in the way of early buildings.

The oldest house in the town is that occupied by the present mayor and his family, and they claim that their ancestors have held the property since about 1630, when it was built.

The illustration (op. p. 28) shows it to be a well-built brick structure with a fairly steep roof of dark brown shingles. The brickwork is whitewashed and is very solidly constructed. The present family uses the entire first floor as their dwelling-house. At some recent period part of the ground floor was converted into a restaurant. The spacious rooms under the balcony are used partly for the purpose of a store and the mayor has a private office there.

353 THE DWELLING has a peculiar and individual charm. The furniture is mostly in the traditional peasant style, and much of it is similar to that found in the simple houses, but shows a superior workmanship and quality. The bed, as in the living-room of every peasant, has retained its traditional place in this house, though in this case its purpose to-day is that of a divan or sofa. The coverings and cushions, hand-embroidered, and the woven wall-hangings round the bed, are such as may be seen throughout the countryside, though richer in the materials used and more artistic than most of those to be seen in the peasants' cottages, where often the primary colours are used with little attempt to grade the design by the use of intermediate shades. Small decorated patterns are to be found on the walls. The large living-room has an elaborate and beautifully-painted ceiling—a thing rarely found in the [336] country houses. Modern sanitation, water-supply, etc., have [291] been put into the house. The women of the present family choose to maintain peasant tradition in dress.

342 The spacious balcony, approached from the courtyard, serves for reception of guests in summer. Here meals are taken, and a good many of the household occupations are carried on.

2 [see pp. 28a (HRAF paginat...) -- Analyst]

TRANSHUMANCE IN THE SOUTHERN CARPATHIANS

233 221 IN THE SOUTHERN CARPATHIANS we have a region which still retains its pastoral activities, little disturbed by the social and economic forces which have invaded the pastoralists' domain elsewhere. Few Roumanian villages are without sheep, and in the summer great numbers are taken to the high pastures when these become free of snow. This seasonal migration, or transhumance, is an ancient feature of European life, and a study of its forms and functions in Roumania not only throws light on important aspects of peasant life, but provides valuable comparative material for the study of similar movements in regions like western Britain, where transhumance survives only in a modified way.

SHEEP ARE the pivot of rural economy in these Carpathian lands; the pastoral element pervades all aspects of peasant [291] life—from the traditional costumes of woollen cloth trousers and sheepskin waistcoat to popular poetry and music. But the intimate contact with upland pastures thus ensured has been of deeper significance: it has enabled the Carpathian peoples to preserve their sense of unity when the lowlands were overrun by invaders, while the contacts maintained between summering groups have helped to preserve the Roumanian language and kept its dialectal variations within limits. In a very real sense, the Southern Carpathians are the heart of Roumania.

133 PHYSICAL CONDITIONS have, from very remote times, favoured the development and survival of pastoral life. The steepness of the forested valley slopes which isolate the upland core is in strong contrast to the gently undulating platforms which rise above the tree-line, at about 5,000 feet, and terminate in rugged glaciated *monadnocks* which may reach 8,000 feet or more (Negoiu, 2,544 m.). The prolonged erosion of Tertiary times which produced the upland platforms also provided the great masses of unconsolidated material—mostly coarse sands—which now form the extensive foothills stretching half way to the Danube over a width of some sixty miles. Curtea de Argeş is one of the settlements of this foothill belt,

5₁ Fleure S-5 (no da. EDI Rumania EDI

291
531

Two peasants at the fair. Curtea de Argeș.

A hand-embroidered peasant blouse. The back is as richly decorated as the front. Peasant woman at Curtea de Argeș.

Curtea de Argeș. Peasants in their richly embroidered coloured costumes arriving at the fair.
Photos by H. J. Howard

[page 54-a]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

565 ease of behaviour, a keen sense for music and popular art and a dogged belief in its capacity to achieve progress.

The life of the Rumanian peasant is simple and [262] hard. His main nourishment consists of *Mamaliga*, a dish prepared of maize-flour, similar to the Italian *Polenta*. This forms his staple diet; meat and other [272] luxuries are very rare indeed. The national drink is *Tuica* (brewed from plum juice). The Rumanian [291] men are dressed in white trousers and a long white tunic fastened by a belt, a short jacket, and a fur cap or hat. Footwear, if any, consists of simple leather sandals strapped to the legs, called *Opinci*, similar to those of the Greek and Yugoslav peasants. In the comparatively rich regions short boots are worn. Gay embroidery, whose colouring and pattern vary according to districts, adorns all garments, especially the women's shirts and headcloths, and the aprons [342] which they wear fore and aft. In contrast to their gay dress the houses of the Rumanian peasants are usually small, badly built cottages of sun-dried brick and straw, whitewashed and occasionally [346] decorated with woodwork. The churches too are built in a similar fashion except in the mountain districts where stone and wood are used.

795 **RELIGION.** Most Rumanians belong to the Orthodox Church, but many Transylvanian Rumanians are Uniates, that is, Catholics of the Byzantine Rite. They form a link between the Latin and Orthodox 659 Churches. The Rumanian Orthodox Church is strongly national. The Uniate Church was used in the past by the Hungarian rulers of Transylvania as a means of assimilating the Rumanians in the Hun-

248 439 Paper, and paper mixed with hemp, are now used to substitute jute.

Although a comparatively large producer of soft hemp, Rumania normally needed to import about 2,300 tons of other hemps for special purposes, and the sources of these imports have been severed since her entry into the war.

Comparatively negligible amounts of coir were also imported in peacetime.

288 ●291 434 **8. Clothes Rationing**

Unlike almost all other Enemy and Occupied countries, Rumania possesses no official clothes-ration card, although purchases are restricted to a specific number of garments per year. Since 1940 the Government, anxious to avoid the necessity for a card rationing system, has adopted various means in an endeavour to overcome the shortage of textiles, particularly of cotton and wool.

Standardisation of fabrics and fixed prices were introduced in 1940, but clothing of standardised material was frequently unobtainable since the price did not leave the retailer a profit.

Army demands soon called for a great increase in clothing production, thereby reducing the stocks and greatly raising prices of civilian clothing—those for overcoats rose by 300 per cent. and for knitted goods by 400 per cent.—and the difficulty of importing raw materials soon reacted on the industry, so that by 1941 the textile shortage, particularly of bed linen, had become serious. Later in the same year, the Ministry of Supply blocked the sale of all semi-manufactured or manufactured blankets.

Early in 1942 the Government requested the public to purchase only necessities, ordering the industry at the same time to use cotton allocations for the manufacture of standardised bed linen and clothing only. Later in 1942 it was decreed that the annual allotment of garments per head of the population was two suits or frocks, one overcoat, three shirts, 12 handkerchiefs, three pairs of socks or stockings, one sheet, three towels. The sale of standard cloth was restricted to three metres per person per annum. For this arrangement, however, clothing coupons were not issued and purchasers were requested to produce their identity cards and a signed certificate of need if the purchase exceeded 300 lei.

291 435 Non-standard articles are still obtainable, but their exorbitant prices make them accessible to a limited section of the public only. Retailers are known to have refused the sale of standard cloth even when displayed, in order to secure, if possible, the higher profit margin for non-standard goods.

[565] The members of the public most severely affected by clothing shortage and high prices are industrial workers and the poorer urban population. Though the large firms are supposed by law to supply their employees with clothing (as well as food) at cheap prices, it is thought that this is not being widely practised.

Prices of all materials for men's garments have risen to such an extent that people cannot afford to buy even such goods as are available in the shops.

248 656 To counteract shortage of clothing fibres, peasants are being encouraged by the Government to increase cultivation of flax and hemp for production of the rough cloth suitable for peasant clothing.

[30b]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDI

Plate 1

142
292



Roumanian peasants in national costume at the fair at Borsec. The man is wearing trousers of thick, home-woven material and home-made shoes, whilst the woman is wearing modern button boots. The coats are of sheepskin embroidered with coloured wool.

Photo: H. J. Hassel.

facing page 13

433 infancy. The mass of the people—the peasants—still supply
[294] their own modest wants almost entirely. The women make, in their own homes, the garments required by the household for summer and winter, using home-spun wool and home-woven cotton. A village expert fashions the leather embroidered coats worn by men and women alike. In the mountains, often the foot-gear is still of local manufacture. (Hats and shoes are mainly imported from the town, how-
342 ever.) Houses are made of locally-felled and sawn timber, and all the household utensils and furniture, except the crockery, are made in the village.

256 THERE is little accumulated capital in the country, and it is
273 natural that modern industrial developments should tend to be based on local raw materials and traditional skill. Home-grown wheat, maize and barley feed the flour-milling and brewing industries which are well developed. There are about 400 large flour mills, steam driven and capable of producing graded flour. These are mainly in the Old Kingdom and grind wheat chiefly. The wheat districts of Bessarabia and Bucovina have a number of modern mills, as well as a large number of windmills, but the maize districts still use the old-fashioned water-mills, which can only grind coarse meal. The brewing industry has been encouraged by the government, partly with the idea of reducing the consumption of the potent alcoholic beverage, "ţuica", which the peasants distil from plums. Most of the breweries are either in Bucureşti and Iaşi or in one of the larger Saxon towns of Transylvania. Potato and maize spirit are made on a large scale, particularly in Transylvania, for export.

323 FOR POTTERY MAKING the Dobrogea supplies a good kaolin, but the industry has not reached a high stage of development, although the ancient peasant pottery has much merit in form and decoration. This is due in part to lack of suitable fuel for the furnaces.

339 WITH the acquisition of Transylvania, Roumania has become independent in the matter of that most important constructional commodity, cement.

288 THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY is still backward. The post-war development is chiefly in the Banat, where, under protection, silk, artificial silk, cotton and wool have made

CHAPTER XI

463 industrial labour. One-third of all workers en-
438 gaged in industry are independent artisans, on whom the community is dependent for its services, but who do not play any important part in war production. In certain of the larger armament works German controllers have effected a considerable degree of rationalisation.

3. Mining

316 There is a shortage of miners; Russian prisoners
727 of war have been employed in mining during 1942. Many miners were reported to have been included in the territory transferred to Hungary.

4. Armament Works

719 There is a general shortage of labour in metal
464 and engineering factories, particularly of skilled labour. A 12-hour day was legalised at the beginning of 1942, but it is doubtful if in fact a 12-hour day is ever worked.

5. Timber

313 There is a shortage of labour, both for lumbering
464 and for timber manufacture.

6. Textiles and Clothing

464 The total number of workers in these industries
288 has probably fallen considerably, due to reduction of available raw materials. The delivery of supplies
294 to individual mills seems to be somewhat erratic, and there is evidence of considerable part-time work, for instance in a survey of some 43 factories, in December, 1942, 11 were working full time, 21 on a reduced scale, and 11 at a very reduced scale.

7. Building

499 The extent of fortification building and general
712 road and rail construction in Rumania is unknown,
464 but in the second half of 1942 there was evidence of a scarcity of general labour for such projects, and of Russian prisoners of war working on rail construction.

438 In the other branches of occupation, transport
464 services, etc., there is no evidence of labour
[759] shortage, apart from doctors, many of whom have been mobilised for the army.

D. CONTROL OF LABOUR

1. The Youth Labour Service

466 A youth labour service founded on the German
883 model was established in March 1941. The leaders were trained in Germany, but it was only in April 1942 that the labour camps began to function. Youths are called up in their 19th–20th year, and the period of service lasts 7 months.

(*See* Part II, Chapter V.B. for further details.)

2. Civil Mobilisation

466 A general civil mobilisation decree was passed in May 1941 by which (1) employment cards were introduced; (2) men and women aged 20-57 were liable to compulsory employment if not employed.

Two subsequent decrees were published in March and May 1943, one for the reorganisation of agriculture, forestry and fishing, and the second for the reorganisation of industry. Each of these decrees gave full powers to the appropriate authorities for the mobilisation and transfer of labour.

In addition to the general labour decrees which have so far had little influence on the labour situation, there have been regional decrees applying to individual localities, e.g. in Bessarabia, in February 1942, all the inhabitants aged 12-70 were called upon for compulsory agricultural labour unless already employed.

233
231 the main flock being taken direct to the sheds on the foothills where they are fed on the hay gathered during the summer, whereas the remainder are grazed on the maize stubble until about Christmas. By then the weather becomes rather severe, and although sheep are better able than cows to withstand the rigours of a continental winter they are all kept in sheds during the early months of the year.

SURPLUS ANIMALS are disposed of at the autumn fairs at Tulgheş or Topliţa where they are bought up by dealers for conveyance to Italy or Czechoslovakia.

III. OTHER OCCUPATIONS

TEXTILES.

291 THE OUTSTANDING FEATURE of the Carpathian villages is the
286 remarkably high standard of peasant craftsmanship. The degree of artistic expression revealed in their clothing is particularly striking, and although best seen on festive occasions it is scarcely less noticeable in their ordinary working garb. Wool, flax and hemp are the traditional fibres used, but imported cotton yarn is beginning to displace linen for some of the lighter summer garments. Most of the dyestuffs are obtained from local plants, for example, red
[286] from the leaves of the wild crab apple, yellow from the osier, black from the alder or birch and fawn from the walnut, but imported dyes are beginning to be employed. The mordant used is salt, but colours other than black fix themselves in wool without salt treatment.

462 SPINNING with a distaff is the normal occupation of the women in their leisure time during the summer, very little knitting being done at all. The other processes of combing, weaving and dyeing are also undertaken by the women, as is the embroidering of dresses and household linen, but the embroidering of the sheepskin waistcoats which are worn by both sexes is done by one or two men who specialise in this craft (see Plate XV).

LEATHER.

295 ALTHOUGH still made in the village, the old type of laced shoe with its characteristically pointed toe is being displaced

295 by imported boots and shoes, whilst socks and stockings bought at the local fairs are beginning to be preferred to the traditional method of bandaging the feet (see Appendix V).

WOOD.

313 THE most characteristic of the other local occupations are concerned with wood. Each peasant is allowed a certain amount of timber annually, the cutting of which is arranged by the Forestry Co-operative Society, but for every tree [531] felled a new one has to be planted. Among the men of the village the making of wooden spoons, jugs and plates, often elaborately carved, is a favourite pursuit, though it is being threatened by cheap imported metal goods, so that in this, as in other ways, a rapid transition from medieval to modern conditions seems likely to occur in the near future.

THE GREEK CATHOLIC PRIEST.

793 ALTHOUGH primarily concerned with the spiritual welfare of his flock, the Greek Catholic (Uniate) priest in Corbu, as elsewhere in Roumania, is intimately bound up with the economic life of the community. Following the rule of the Eastern and Uniate Churches for their secular clergy with a cure of souls, the priest is married and depends to a considerable extent upon his land for his maintenance. He is often trusted with public and private business on behalf of the commune and its members. To him the peasants may bring their maize to be ground, their sunflower seeds to be crushed, their timber to be sawn and their cloth to be scoured. The water of the Bistricioara that runs past the priest's house is harnessed to provide power at Corbu for these operations, and from the services he thus renders to the villagers the priest gets part of his income.

IV. THE FUTURE

CTO IT IS CLEAR from the foregoing account that Corbu is a mountain community that is rapidly approaching a crisis in its history. The old economic self-sufficiency is being underfhined by the insidious influence of the journeyman, and the cheapness of the new wares that he is introducing will tend to increase the amount of leisure that the peasant already enjoys by releasing labour that he has hitherto expended on

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 ED1 Rumania ED1

543

5. THINGS SEEN AT BORSEC FAIR, AUGUST 20TH

[286] 1. MATERIAL BY THE YARD.

Cotton: Prints, calicoes, zephyrs, ginghams, men's shirtings.
Wool: Coloured serges, rough grey and brown woollen material (very thick) for men's and women's winter clothing.
Artificial Silk: In plain colours, Crêpe de Chine in plain colours, a very few printed silks.
Lace: Coarse white lace edgings (from Nottingham).

[291] 2. CLOTHING.

Men's: Trousers, coats, waistcoats, cloth caps, embroidered lambskin waistcoats, braces.

Women's: Knitted and crocheted wool caps and berets, patent leather belts. Printed cotton and artificial silk pieces for head coverings. Ribbons.

Children's: Babies' knitted woollen garments. Modern-style dresses in artificial silk with machine-made embroidery. Socks and stockings of cotton and wool hand-knitted in Roumania. Artificial silk stockings manufactured from yarn imported from Switzerland and France.

[295] 3. BOOTS AND SHOES FOR MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

Field boots and heavy nailed boots for men.
Manufactured boots and shoes for women and children.
Ready-made peasant shoes of leather.
Ready-made peasant shoes of leather with rubber attached to sole.
Ready-made peasant shoes made from old motor tyres.
Shoes of plaited felt of all sizes for women and children.
Shoes of knitted coarse wool with straps.
Pieces of leather of correct size for making the peasant shoes and leather thongs for lacing them.
Leather and mohair laces for using with the manufactured boots and shoes.

[415] 4. POTTERY.

Large brown glazed earthenware pots only. No other pottery of any kind was seen in the fair.

[295] 5. BASKETS, ETC.

Hand-made of rushes gathered by the peasants who make them. Some colour introduced into the larger baskets; strong, neat weaving. Also a few big hats as worn in the fields by the Hungarian peasant women.

244 6. GREENGROCERY.

Turnips, potatoes, yellow beans, cabbages, gherkins, carrots, onions, tomatoes, ardei, lemons, apples, pears, Indian corn, water melons, cantaloupes.

CHAPTER VII

237 [439] The imported hides are in all probability largely heavy hides needed for sole leather. Those designated as "other hides and skins" are not important in tonnage, and exports are almost certainly all sheep and pig. The exports of leather are not very important, as they consist almost entirely of leather waste.

Total supplies of leather, available from internal slaughterings of cattle, calves, horses and buffaloes, together with net imports, would be about 12,000 tons, of which 10/11,000 tons are derived from local hides and skins.

Part of the sheepskins were dewoolled and turned into leather, the wool being sold separately but a considerable number of skins was used as fleece-lined jackets by the peasants. The total quantity of leather from the locally slaughtered sheep would, however, not exceed 750/1,000 tons.

Unlike Western countries, the pigs in Rumania are flayed, and the skins tanned, so that the pigskin industry is certainly of material value, although not of major importance, compared with Rumania's total leather production.

2. Manufactures

295 Rumania's leather trade made rapid strides in pre-war years and, as the bulk of the leather was made into footwear, an important increase in this production was noticeable. Although no official statistics are available, it is estimated that Rumania produced 4/5,000,000 pairs of leather shoes in 1936 and, in addition, considerable quantities of peasants' footwear were manufactured in country districts.

The industry at that time consisted of about 20 machine shoe factories, six of which were owned and controlled by tanneries, mainly centred in Cluj, Timişoara, Bucarest and Oradea. In addition, numerous small shops existed throughout the country in which shoes were made by hand. With the loss of Northern Transylvania the machine-shoe centres of Cluj and Oradea went to Hungary.

3. Tanning Materials

282 [439] Rumania has in the past relied on other countries for practically all her tanning materials and extracts. She used to import about 8,000 tons of different extracts, about 50 per cent. of which were re-exported from the U.K., probably quebracho and wattle extract. Yugoslavia supplied her with about 2,000 tons of extract, presumably oak and chestnut.

(ii.) War-time Developments

1. General

Though Rumania has suffered during the war from a leather shortage, partly on account of reduced internal production, but more especially because of the increased requirements for the Armed Forces, this shortage has not been so severe as in most European countries.

It has been reported that the leather production in 1940 was 9,200 tons, but that the supply of raw hides fell from 19,000 tons pre-war to 11,000 tons in 1941. This is a severe drop, even assuming that the 19,000 tons included imported hides. A substantial decline in the available supplies of leather has, however, certainly taken place owing to the curtailment of imports, to clandestine slaughterings, and to exports of live cattle to the Axis.

An indication of the extent of supplies allocated for Army needs was contained in an official announcement that 68 per cent. of all untanned

282 cattle hides collected in September, October and November, 1941, were for this purpose. The remaining 32 per cent., plus the horsehides, pigskins and goatskins, could be used for civilian purposes. The result was that very soon insufficient sole leather was available for civilians, and repairs to footwear became difficult.

282 656 At present 80 per cent. of the cattle hides weighing over 16 kilos (35 lb.), and 20 per cent. of the hides weighing less than 16 kilos, are reserved for the Army. This leaves the civilians very short of sole leather, normally manufactured from heavy hides.

At the end of 1941, the Ministry of Supply ordered the registration of all leather stocks, and thereafter leather could not be sold without a permit. The entire purchasing and control of raw hides and skins and also the distribution of leather was placed in the hands of the "ORAP" (*Oficiul Român de Aprovizionare şi Distribuire a Produselor de Pielărie*).

In the autumn of 1941 private dealings in sheep- and lambskins were forbidden, the Army Supply Minister having sole right of disposal. Owing to the comparatively important domestic output such a measure should not have been necessary, but was due to the Rumanian, and probably German, demands for warm clothing on the Russian front. Evidence received in 1942 shows that 80 per cent. of the skins are now reserved for the Army.

In July, 1942, leather transmission-belting, etc., was brought under control and made subject to certain restrictions.

295 434 Civilian rationing of footwear was introduced early in 1942 and new shoes could be sold only against permits issued to persons declaring possession of only one other pair of serviceable shoes. Repair cards were also issued. Requisition cards for new shoes are limited to one a year, and repair cards to one every four months. Children under 14 years of age can obtain two requisition cards yearly for new footwear.

The issue of permits does not, however, guarantee footwear supplies, and only about 50 per cent. of repair or purchase demands appear to be met.

The above regulations have been slightly modified from time to time, but remain intrinsically the same. The production of footwear of substitute materials, such as wooden soles, soles of artificial leather, leather waste, buna, etc., has gradually increased.

295 435 Despite the various government regulations the footwear Black Market flourished, and while the average pre-war price for a pair of men's shoes was 800 lei, in October, 1941, the official prices were fixed at about 1,500 lei for a standard pair of men's shoes and about 1,200 lei for a standard pair of women's shoes. In March, 1942, however, the Black Market price for men's shoes was 7/8,000 lei a pair, and this has now gradually risen to 10/12,000 lei. Complete soleing and heeling of men's footwear costs 1,250 lei officially, and women's 1,000 lei. The official price of soleing leather is 530 lei per kilo, whereas the Black Market price is 34,000 lei.

2. Tanning Materials

282 439 Before the war Rumania never made use of her own barks for tanning, as it was more economical to import extracts from overseas. During the war she has made attempts to employ her oak, chestnut, spruce and pine barks for tanning materials, but

543

[257] 7. CONFECTIONERY, ETC.

Gingerbread (all shapes).

Sweets: Packets of sweets, sweet-stuffs in various shapes. Dolls, ladies, hearts, diamonds, all with rough pieces of mirror inset.

[524] 8. TOYS.

The only toys for children seen were gaily-coloured thin rubber balls (large), also small wooden flutes similar to those used by shepherds.

[322] 9. CARVED WOODEN ARTICLES.

Wooden cigarette-holders; various sizes, some grotesquely large.

Mirrors with flower-borders carved in high relief.

Match-stands, cigarette stands, wooden boxes.

Large pipes (for playing jokes). Powder is secreted in the mouth-piece and is puffed into the face when the pipe is blown.

10. ARTICLES FOR THE HOME.

[285] Blankets patterned in red and natural wool.

Rug-strips made of pieces of cotton and woollen waste pieces of material.

[415] Modern cooking tins and saucepans, enamelled dishes and all sorts of "Household Helps," which attracted crowds of peasant women, e.g. egg and tomato slices, vegetable cutters, pastry moulds, etc.

Strainers with wooden frame and wire base, the wire coloured in tartan and other patterns.

Alarm clocks, boot polish in tins, soap, hempen rope and string.

[301] 11. CHEAP JEWELLERY, ETC.

Rings, brooches, neck and watch chains. Necklaces of coloured pearl and glass beads. Spectacles of plain and tinted glass. Jewelled combs for wearing in the hair. Studs, fancy buttons, thimbles, all kinds of plain and fancy pins. Mirrors.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 Dobrogeanu-Gherea argued that a state of permanent crisis in Rumania was being effected by the impact of Western political and economic forms upon the traditional Rumanian pattern. The result was an unfortunate hybrid, *neoiobăgia* (neoserfdom), the form of liberal-bourgeois institutions superimposed upon a feudal reality. Although Dobrogeanu-Gherea placed excessive trust in neoiobăgia as an all-inclusive explanation, he correctly realized that Rumania's contact with the Western world had a dynamic and by no means simple effect upon the existing economic and social structure.[8]

Economic and Social Roots of the Agrarian Problem[9]

● 311 An extreme concentration of land in large estates, an excessive fragmentation of small holdings, and the insignificance of medium-sized properties were the most obvious elements of the Rumanian agrarian problem at that time. In 1905 the disparity between large and small holdings probably exceeded that of any state in Europe, including Russia. On the basis of his investigations, which are probably the most accurate available, G. D. Creangă estimated that Rumanian properties were divided in the following manner: in the terminology of the time, small properties (0–10 hectares), comprising over 95 per cent of all properties, covered 40 per cent of the arable and grazing land; medium properties (10–100 hectares), comprising 4 per cent of all properties, occupied 11 per cent; whereas about 5,000 large and latifundiary estates held nearly 50 per cent.[10] If forests, orchards, and vineyards are included, the area covered by large property exceeded 57 per cent. These figures on property do not, of course, include the landless peasants. Creangă estimated that there were at that time about 300,000 peasants without land and

8. For a further analysis of Dobrogeanu-Gherea's ideas in connection with Rumanian Social Democracy, see below, pp. 276–280.

9. More extensive, and in some respects conflicting, discussions of the economic background of the agrarian problem are given in David Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Economic and Social History of the World War" (London; New Haven, Yale University Press, 1930), and Marcel Emerit, *Les Paysans Roumains depuis le traité d'Andrinople jusqu'à la libération des terres (1829–1864)* (Paris, 1937).

10. In numbers the division was as follows:

Size of holdings in hectares	*Number of holdings*	*Area in hectares*
0–10	920,939	3,158,645
10–100	38,723	862,800
Over 100	5,385	3,810,351
	965,047	7,826,796

For more detailed figures on the distribution of property see the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

another 200,000 who held property jointly and were not included in his computations. 311

On the assumption that a holding of less than 3 hectares was totally inadequate, at the Rumanian level of production, to provide a family with even the bare means of subsistence, Creangă concluded that over 60 per cent of the peasant cultivators (landless peasants plus those with less than 3 hectares), "for the most part heads of families, find themselves in unconditional dependence upon landowners and tenants." [11] If peasants owning between 3 and 5 hectares —holdings certainly on the margin of subsistence—are included, it appears that nearly 85 per cent of the peasants were unable to earn a secure living from the produce of their soil and had to seek additional income elsewhere. 511

The concentration of land in great estates does not, of course, necessarily imply an agrarian crisis; English and Prussian agriculture developed successfully on large properties. Nor does the peasant's need to go beyond his own holding to earn a living necessarily spell misery for him. The reason the large estate appeared at this time to be the central feature of the Rumanian agrarian problem lies in the particular development of rural property and labor relations in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Unfortunately, the background of Rumanian agrarian history is still extremely obscure. The original social function and source of privilege of the landowning nobles, the boyars, have been the subject of several notable but inconclusive controversies among Rumanian scholars. It is not certain when and to what degree the mass of Rumanian cultivators were reduced to a servile status. Evidence provided by villages of *răzeşi* and *moşneni*—free peasant communities with a form of common landholding, which have survived as relics in the hilly districts—suggests that they at one time were a prevalent form of rural organization, but scientific investigation of these villages has been undertaken only in recent years.[12] There is no question, however, that by the eighteenth century the boyars—and the monasteries—had come to control a great deal of the land, to which 423 566

11. Creangă, *op. cit.*, I, 189.

12. The term *boier* has been the popular, if historically inaccurate, name for all large landowners. The problem of ascertaining the boyar's original role resembles in some respects the confusion in Russian history between allodial hereditary landowners and the nobility of service. The villages of free peasants (răzeşi in Moldavia and moşneni in Wallachia) pose, in respect to their nature and origins, questions similar to those relating to the Russian *mir* and the South Slav *zadruga*. Illuminating discussions of these points may be found in H. H. Stahl's article, "Organizarea socială a ţărănimii," in *Enciclopedia Romîniei* (4 vols., Bucarest, n.d.), I, 559–576, and in his recent book, *Sociologia satului devălmaş romînesc* (Bucarest, 1946), I.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

566 ment of labor contracts and even permitted the employment of mili-
175 tary force to drive the peasant to work. Although the harsher aspects
of these laws were later abandoned, they permanently affected land-
423 lord-peasant relations and did much to justify the term neoserfdom, "the confirmation of the old servitudes in contractual form."

Yet these laws, while harsh on the peasant once he fell into the power of the landowner, would be significant only on the assumption that the peasants were increasingly obliged to go to the landowner for assistance. That is, the laws of contracts merely accelerated the relapse into a servile system—one lacking the paternalistic protection of the old order—but were not in themselves the cause of a deteriorating situation. Moreover, the peasant uprisings did not occur when the laws were at their harshest but later when some of the worst provisions had been abrogated.

Land hunger, in general, results from an excess of population relative to the amount of land available. As has been noted, at the beginning of the nineteenth century the Rumanian principalities were not thickly settled, though even at the time of the Organic Statutes it was not possible to give adequate grants of arable land to the peasants in the old and relatively thickly settled mountainous districts. By the middle of the century the boyars were invoking population pressure to explain the high cost of land. There is no question that in the second half of the nineteenth century Rumania's population expanded at a very rapid rate.

At the same time, however, the expansion of land under cultivation
• 311 appears to have been increasing even more rapidly, as the plough was put to untilled pastures, waste, and meadow.[17] The extent to which the peasants were able to benefit from this expansion of cultivated area cannot be estimated with any precision. Undoubtedly much of it took place on large estates under the control of the landowners. To some extent, too, it resulted from the peasants converting their pasture land to arable. The act of 1864 had made no provision for communal pasturing; the small peasant holdings were inadequate for both grain and livestock, and from 1864 there is a notable decline in animal husbandry. It is estimated that whereas in 1860 meadows and pasture comprised 33 per cent of the total surface of Rumania, they were reduced to 17 per cent in the years 1901–5, thus offsetting to a considerable degree the gain in land under cultiva-

17. According to Constantin Garofild, *Chestia agrard la România* (Bucarest, 1920), p. 128, between 1859 and 1899 the population of Rumania increased by 54 per cent, whereas the area of land under cultivation increased by 85 per cent between 1862 and 1905.

3: Ro. erts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

•311 tion.[18] Hence it may be concluded that much of the expansion of the arable either took place outside the peasant lands or at the expense of pasture. Against this, however, was the periodic doling out of state land, which, while only a palliative, did serve to balance in some measure the growing pressure of population.[19]

The most that may be said is that the growth of population was beginning to become an important element, one that would become increasingly troublesome in the twentieth century, and that while the plight of the Rumanian peasant at this time cannot really be attributed to rural overpopulation, the ratio of land to labor was shifting to his disadvantage. Given this tendency plus the fact that many peasants never had enough land to begin with, one can see how the landowners, controlling much of the land and armed with the laws on agricultural contracts, were able to preserve a quasi-servile system of social and labor relations.

Another development contributing greatly to social friction in the countryside was the increase, from the middle of the nineteenth century on, of absenteeism on the great estates, as the landowners found it pleasanter to live abroad or to engage in politics in Bucarest. By 1900, 56 per cent of the area of properties over 50 hectares and more than 72 per cent on the vast estates over 5,000 hectares were being leased, for the most part not to individual peasants but to large tenants.

The effects of absenteeism were particularly unfortunate in Rumania. To some extent the tenant may have been performing a useful entrepreneurial function in initiating economic activity,[20] but in most cases he merely sublet the greater part of the land to the peasants, who cultivated it in the old manner. The tenant was inclined to regard his lease, which was usually for a short term, as a speculative venture to provide quick gains not by improved cultivation but by

18. Ministère de l'Agriculture, de l'Industrie, du Commerce et des Domaines, *La Roumanie, 1866–1906* (Bucarest, 1907), pp. 267–268.

19. According to Creangă, *op. cit.*, I, 80, the state, in addition to some 572,000 hectares granted in 1864, had parceled out approximately 980,000 hectares by 1905.

It is apparently impossible to make a comparison of the average size of peasant properties at these two dates. The average size of the peasant allotments in 1864 was about 3.8 hectares, whereas by the end of the century the average size of peasant properties under 10 hectares was 3.4 hectares. But the first figure does not include peasant properties already held in full ownership in 1864.

20. The entrepreneurial character of the tenant is reflected in the fact that the larger the lease the higher was the percentage of foreign tenants. The problem of foreign tenants was closely associated with Rumanian anti-Semitism, and it was the common charge that Jewish tenants were grinding the peasant and ruining the country. While Jewish tenants were important on the largest estates of Moldavia, the great majority of tenants (78 per cent) were Rumanians.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

making greater demands upon both the land and the peasant. Since his profits tended to be in direct proportion to the area he was able to lease, there was a marked inclination to build up vast agricultural trusts, some of which covered more than 100,000 hectares. Although ultimately the large tenant was a consequence rather than a cause of the agrarian problem, he was the focus of hatred and abuse: hated by the peasants because he dealt directly with them, verbally abused by the landowner-politicians who made him their scapegoat. Certainly some of the more spectacular injustices and preposterous labor contracts can be found on lands operated by tenants.

This speculative interest on the part of the tenant in acquiring more land contributed to a rapid rise in rents. Between 1870 and 1906 rents mounted between 100 and 200 per cent for a third of the properties and over 200 per cent for another third. The peasants consequently were obliged to pay more dearly for the use of land. In 1870 they generally retained from two to four parts of the produce of rented land and delivered one part to the landowner or large tenant; by 1906 in over half the cases studied in an investigation, the ratio was one to one.[21]

The rise in the value of land was not accompanied by an equivalent improvement in agricultural techniques. Most of the peasants were both inexperienced in the careful cultivation of small holdings and financially unable to improve their methods, and the large landowners and tenants had little incentive. By the working of the 1864 reform the peasants remained attached to their strip of land, lacking even the free mobility of the farm laborer. They continued to own most of the means of production: over 90 per cent of the draft animals, ploughs, and harrows in Rumania belonged to the peasants.

Under these conditions the distinction between large-scale and small-scale farming was blurred, and it was characteristic of the latifundiary cultivation prevailing in Rumania that the size of an undertaking was not determined by an organized integration of the productive factors of a given area but was rather the arithmetical sum of a large number of peasant cultivations. The peasant, in return for a piece of land, contracted either to cultivate another piece of land for the proprietor or tenant or to share the produce in a form of metayage. Money payments were uncommon except in Moldavia.[22]

21. Creangă, *op. cit.*, II, 18-22.

22. It must be observed, however, that while the great estates did not, in most cases, utilize progressive farming methods, the output of the large farms was consistently higher than that of the peasant holdings. The reasons for this difference have been the occasion of much dispute. Supporters of large-scale cultivation have held that despite

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 tonomy because of the desire not to increase the number of Ukrainians under Polish rule. The incorporation of Bucovina had none of the turbulence that accompanied Bessarabia's. A general congress met on November 28, 1918, and voted for union with Rumania.

311 Before the First World War, of the cultivable area of Bucovina, holdings over 100 hectares occupied 25 per cent, holdings between 10 and 100 hectares 27 per cent, and small holdings 48 per cent. (If the very extensive forest lands are included the holdings over 100 hectares covered more than 60 per cent of the surface of the province.) Large properties were less dominant than in the Old Kingdom and medium properties much more important, partly because of German colonization and efforts by the Austrian government to foster this category of holding.

423 The decree-law of September 7, 1919, for the Bucovina land reform was ratified by the law of July, 1921, which modified the decree in favor of the landowners and reduced the extent of land to be expropriated. Land reform in Bucovina was made under more peaceful circumstances than elsewhere and was more carefully worked out. The state was given a right to reserve land for general needs, and the landowner was allowed continued use of his land until it was actually taken over. The reform expropriated in full: estates of foreigners and absentees, mortmain estates, estates of persons who had lost their civil rights, and estates farmed out for more than nine years. Expropriation of private properties was on a sliding scale beginning at 100 hectares and permitting a maximum of 250 hectares on properties having considerable inventory and equipment. Scattered properties belonging to the same owner were counted as one. The allotment of land was made in lots of 4–8 hectares, colonization lots of 5 hectares, and complementary lots of not less than ¼ hectare for peasants having less than 4 hectares. Compensation to landowners was approximately the same as in the Old Kingdom, and the state assumed 50 per cent of the cost. The peasant could pay in whole or in part, the remainder becoming a mortgage payable in 50 years at 5 per cent. According to official statistics the total area expropriated in Bucovina was about 76,000 hectares.[23]

3. TRANSYLVANIA

175 The disputed history of Transylvania and the endless controversy that has raged between the Rumanians and the Hungarians

23. For further statistics on the distribution of land in Bucovina and the effects of the land reform see the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

are far too complex for inclusion here. Whatever the origins of the 175
Transylvanian population, at the outbreak of the First World War the Rumanians constituted a majority of the inhabitants of this region; with the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the Transylvanian Rumanians, along with the other ethnic groups in the empire moved to break away. On October 12, 1918, the Rumanian National party of Transylvania drafted a resolution demanding the right of self-determination. A national assembly was called at Alba Iulia on December first and passed a resolution in favor of the union of all Rumanians. The basis of this union was to be:

1) full national liberty for all races;
2) full autonomy for all regions;
3) a democratic regime with general, direct, equal, and secret elections;
4) complete liberty of press, assembly, and association;
5) radical agrarian reform;
6) equitable conditions for industrial workers.

A Governing Council (*Consiliul Dirigent*), under Iuliu Maniu, was established as the temporary administration. The Treaty of Trianon assigned Transylvania and the adjacent regions of Maramureş, Crişana, and the Banat to Rumania.

Servile tenures had been abolished somewhat earlier in Transyl- [566]
vania than in the Old Kingdom, and the relative importance of medium properties reflected the generally higher level of cultivation. 311 ●
Nevertheless, there was a great disparity between large and small properties, a disparity intensified by the national question. The Rumanians were almost entirely peasants, and most of the large estates belonged to Hungarians. Reliable information, however, is lacking regarding the distribution of land either by size of property or by nationality; according to Hungarian critics of Rumanian statistics, no exact figures have ever been available for the land distribution in 1919 in the total area annexed by Rumania.[24] The Rumanians have claimed that they held only 24 per cent of the total area and that 98 per cent of the properties over 100 cadastral yokes (the yoke, used in Transylvania, equals .58 hectares) were held by non-Rumanians. While this claim may have been extreme, Hungarian sources grant that 87 per cent of the owners of properties exceeding 100 yokes were Magyars.

The project for the land reform, prepared in thirty-two sittings 671
of the Governing Council, became a decree-law on September 12, 423

24. C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors* (Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 316, n. 2.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

agricultural population in relation to the total agricultural land and the level of production was approaching a critical point.

To what extent was distribution a significant factor in overpopulation after the 1918–21 land reforms? To answer this question it is necessary to attempt an investigation of the effects of these reforms upon distribution.

The Distribution of Land [14]

Although the distribution of agricultural land in Rumania has been, if not the core of the agrarian question, at least the focus of attention, and although innumerable books, pamphlets, and articles have dealt with it, it is still difficult to provide a satisfactory picture of land distribution and impossible to give an exact account of its development in time. The incompleteness and irregularity of statistics, the intrusion of wars and the frequent changes of territorial boundaries, the unsettling effect of the agrarian reforms themselves, and on occasion the warping of figures to fit a political thesis have combined to obscure the real situation.

Before proceeding to an analysis of the available statistics it is necessary to be as clear as possible about the use of certain categories and definitions, since confusion over these has been the source of numerous erroneous conclusions. In particular it is indispensable to know what types of land are being included in the term "agricultural," and whether the distribution of land is on the basis of properties or of farming units.

During the interwar years the Rumanian Central Institute of Statistics came to classify land in the manner shown by the table on the following page (the 1936 areas of the respective types of land are included to indicate their comparative size).[15] Earlier Rumanian statistics frequently employed different classifications, and the inclusion or exclusion of pasture and woodland seriously alters the pattern of land distribution.

The second important distinction is between *properties*, based upon legal ownership of the land, and *exploitations*, defined in 1941 as "the area comprising all the land effectively cultivated under the direction and participation of the head of the exploitation." Exploitations and properties are obviously not identical, since an exploita-

14. For a more detailed discussion of the statistics of Rumanian land distribution see the Appendix.

15. Petre Onica, *Tehnica statisticii agricole*, Institutul Central de Statistică, Biblioteca Statistică, No. 9 (Bucarest, 1945), p. 17.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

311

				Hectares (in 1936)	Per Cent
Total area 29,505,000 hectares	A. Agricultural area	1.	Arable	13,940,000	47.3
		a.	Cereals	11,609,000	
		b.	Alimentary plants	532,000	
		c.	Industrial plants	493,000	
		d.	Cultivated or artificial meadows (forage crops)	783,000	
		e.	Fallow	523,000	
		2.	Natural meadows	1,410,000	4.7
		3.	Grazing and pasture	2,448,000	8.3
		4.	Vineyards	328,000	1.1
		5.	Orchards	233,000	0.8
	B. Nonagricultural area	1.	Woods and forests	6,449,000	21.9
		2.	Occupied land (yards, houses, streets and roads, cities, industrial and commercial land) and nonproductive	4,697,000	15.9

tion may be held on lease or in metayage. The statistics always show some difference between the two; in most cases large properties are more extensive than large exploitations, an indication that a portion of the large properties is being leased. A secondary distinction between privately owned and state or publicly owned properties is also important, and here again Rumanian statistics are often inconsistent.

Although official accounts of the results of the 1918–21 land reforms were issued by the Rumanian government, they are not a very reliable guide to the effect of these reforms on the distribution of agricultural property. About 6,000,000 hectares were reported to have been expropriated, of which about 3,900,000 hectares were distributed to some 1,393,000 peasants, or 69.5 per cent of those having a claim to land.[16] But while the land reform was supposed to have been completed around 1929–30, in 1940 it was officially announced that the reform was not yet terminated: 3,900 estates were still in possession of land which was to have been expropriated; 434,000 hectares of expropriated land had not even been surveyed for distribution; 440,000 hectares had not yet been divided; 900 law cases re-

113

16. Alexander Nasta, "La Réforme agraire en Roumanie," report presented to the Fourteenth Congress of the International Congress of Agriculture (Bucarest, June 7–10, 1929), p. 16; Biblioteca de Sociologie, Etică şi Politică, condusă de D. Gusti, *60 Sate româneşti* (5 vols., Bucarest, 1941–43), II, 10.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

garding the agrarian reform still awaited adjudication.[17] This belated but damaging announcement naturally throws in doubt many of the earlier statistics which painfully calculated the final effects of the reform to two decimals.

Similarly, it is not possible to make any satisfactory comparisons between prereform and postreform figures, even for the Old Kingdom. The official estimates of the post-1921 situation, which have been generally used in most studies of Rumanian agriculture, are suspect: they merely subtracted from Creangă's estimate of large properties in 1905 the amount of land presumed to have been expropriated and added it to the area of small properties, a method taking no account of twenty years' unofficial changes in property relations. The results were naturally most impressive: large property had been reduced from 40 per cent of the agricultural area to 10 per cent, whereas small peasant properties, which had previously covered about 60 per cent of the land, now accounted for 90 per cent. This was undoubtedly an inflated estimate of the consequences of the reform.

Statistics available for the years between 1921 and 1945 do not, unfortunately, altogether clarify the picture. Between 1921 and 1929 there was both a progressive resettlement of peasants on land acquired through the reforms and a natural division and dispersion of properties through inheritance and, to a lesser degree, through sale. The only sources to give an indication of the results of these developments are some fiscal censuses prepared by the Ministry of Finance. Since these were gathered for tax purposes and employ different categories for dividing land holdings, they are not comparable with other available figures on land distribution. A comparison of the 1923 and 1928 censuses does, however, indicate certain trends. The number of agricultural taxpayers increased more rapidly than the extension of arable land, indicating an increasing density of agricultural population and a reduction of the average size of holdings from 3.6 hectares to 3.5 hectares.[18] There was a marked decline in the area of properties over 250 hectares, partly as a result of the continued application of the land reforms, although the increase in average size of properties between 50 and 250 hectares might mean that some of the land of large properties was falling into the hands of the larger peasant owners. The area of properties under 10 hectares and especially of those under 5 hectares increased greatly.

17. Quoted in Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 77, n. 1.

18. These censuses are discussed in *60 Sate romînești*, II, 12–15 and are given in the Appendix below.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

● 311 Although this increase may have been to some extent the result of the subdivision of holdings through inheritance, it was largely the reflection of allotments granted under the reform, since the situation in Bessarabia, which had completed its reform at an early date, was almost stationary, while there was a marked increase in the area of small properties in Transylvania, where the reform had been more gradually applied.

Only a very general summary of the distribution of land was published after the 1930 census, and even this summary is sufficiently ambiguous to prevent a comparison with earlier or later figures. According to this census, exploitations over 100 hectares in size still occupied almost 28 per cent of the total agricultural area (presumably also including some forest land) and nearly 15 per cent of the arable, the difference resulting from the high percentage of nonarable land possessed by large properties. Exploitations of less than 3 hectares, which amounted to 52 per cent of the total number, occupied less than 13 per cent of the total area and 16.5 per cent of the arable. Exploitations between 10 and 100 hectares occupied almost 25 per cent of the total agricultural area and over 25 per cent of the arable, a marked increase over the prewar situation in the Old Kingdom. This change reflects in part, however, the inclusion in the 1930 census of Transylvania and Bucovina, where medium holdings had been more numerous. In general, this census would show that large properties had not been reduced to the extent called for by the agrarian reforms, that holdings under 3 hectares still constituted the majority of the exploitations, and that medium holdings had increased in number and extent, although the agrarian reforms had made no provision for them.

The census of 1941 was the first careful attempt to analyze the distribution of land. Although its usefulness for present purposes is impaired by the omission of Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina, Northern Transylvania, and Southern Dobrogea, which had been lost in 1940, its summary results are the best information available. This census, which covered only individual and private exploitations, comprising 52 per cent of the total area of Rumania at that date, appears to show to an even greater extent the characteristics noted in the 1930 summary:

1) The group of exploitations and properties [19] between 3 and

19. The number of properties and exploitations were not identical for all categories; there were more properties than exploitations in holdings below 3 hectares and above 20 hectares, and more exploitations between 3 and 20 hectares. These differences merely reflect the fact that agricultural exploitations are not based solely on properties but also involve the use of property through lease or metayage.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

5 hectares, which the 1918–21 land reforms considered as the basis of Rumanian agriculture in the allotment of land, actually constituted in 1941 only 19.5 per cent of the exploitations (18.4 per cent of the properties), occupying 16.4 per cent of the area of exploitations (16.1 per cent of the area of properties). On the other hand, exploitations under 3 hectares constituted 54.1 per cent of the total number (properties under 3 hectares constituted 58.4 per cent of the total number of properties). 311

2) The largest category of exploitations in terms of area was that between 5 and 10 hectares, i.e., above the average size for all holdings.

3) Despite the agrarian reforms, exploitations over 100 hectares occupied 14.2 per cent of the area; 8 per cent of the area was occupied by properties over 500 hectares.

Regionally, exploitations under one hectare were most numerous in mountainous districts and in industrial areas, where factory workers had small plots of land. Exploitations between one and 3 hectares were most common in the Carpathians and Bucovina. The large holdings were concentrated mainly in the southeast.

The 1941 census also provides the first comprehensive statistical picture of the way in which the land was farmed. More than 58 per cent of all exploitations properly speaking (that is, excluding the minute plots of land of less than one hectare of arable) were cultivated exclusively by family labor; and an additional 24.9 per cent utilized only part of the family's labor (the family also had recourse to other sources of income). Thus, 83 per cent of all exploitations proper were purely family cultivations. Exploitations using no family labor but employing workers, whether on a daily or yearly basis or in return for a piece of land, accounted for only 1.5 per cent of the total, although they covered 12.1 per cent of the land. For the most part these exploitations represented the residues of the expropriated estates. The fourth category, using both family and employed labor, represented intensive peasant farms, and comprised 15.3 per cent of the number of exploitations and 24.8 per cent of the area.

Over 71 per cent of the exploitations were owned by the cultivator, 28 per cent included additional land held in lease or metayage, and less than one per cent of the exploitations were entirely on rented land. If these criteria are combined with those above, the most prevalent form of peasant cultivation, accounting for 41.6 per cent of all exploitations proper, was one owned in its entirety by the cultivator and employing only family labor.

Unfortunately, the information on agricultural labor in 1941 has 311 162

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

311 162 not been fully organized and published. According to a statistical bulletin issued in 1947, on the 2,300,000 odd agricultural exploitations in 1941, 813,546 "members of families," after completing work on their own holding, worked for others, either for money or for produce. Of these, 748,821 worked in the same village and 64,725 took the road to work in other villages. On September 1, 1940, there were 191,199 permanently hired agricultural workers, of whom 103,-353 were men, 68,325 women, and 19,521 children. As might be expected, the practice of seeking additional work was most extensive in the Carpathian regions of Oltenia and Muntenia, where for every 100 family exploitations, 50 members of families sought work, as against 35.3 for all Rumania. The same area had the least number of permanent hired workers, 4.7 per 100 exploitations as against 8.3 for all Rumania.[20]

311 The general results of the 1941 census, as published thus far, do not correlate size of exploitation with type of labor and holding. However, a special study for the judeţ of Argeş, "which by the variety of the soil and the nature of the exploitations constitutes one of the most representative judeţe of our country," [21] gives such a correlation, which may be a fair sample for all of Rumania. This correlation is what might be expected. Large farms, especially those over 100 hectares, were cultivated mainly by hired labor. Farms between 10 and 50 hectares were most frequently cultivated by a combination of family and hired labor. Peasant farms between 1 and 5 hectares used only family labor, and in about one-third of the cases the labor of the family was not completely utilized. Cultivators with holdings of less than one hectare fell into the class of agricultural laborers.

What conclusions may be drawn from these scattered and not altogether comparable figures regarding: (a) the effect of the agrarian reforms upon the distribution of land; (b) land distribution as a cause of agricultural overpopulation; (c) trends in land distribution during the interwar period?

(a) While there is no doubt that the agrarian reforms of 1918–21 greatly reduced the amount of land held by property owners of over 100 hectares, they did not bring about the virtual disappearance of large landed estates, as was so often proclaimed in the years after the First World War. In 1941 properties over 100 hectares still

20. Institutul Central de Statistică, *Comunicari statistice Nr. 16, 15 ianuarie 1947*, p. 3. In 1930 the Rumanian National Bank estimated that there were 464,000 agricultural workers, 16.7 per cent of the total agricultural active population of 2,778,769. *60 Sate româneşti*, II, 18.

21. Roman Cresin, *Agricultura din Judeţul Argeş* (Bucarest, 1945), p. 11.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

occupied over 16 per cent of the privately owned land.[22] The extent of leasing and cultivation in metayage decreased considerably, however, and reflected the reduction of differences in the size of properties. As has been seen in the first chapter, before the First World War leasing and subleasing in a variety of forms was extremely widespread in the Old Kingdom. While the 1941 statistics do not present a clear picture of the exact amount of land let out, 71.8 per cent of the exploitations proper were owned by their cultivators, and only 0.4 per cent were cultivated entirely by tenants or in metayage. Of the 225,890 hectares covered by the census in the judeţ of Argeş, only 21,591 were rented. Properties in Argeş let out by their owners in rent or in metayage comprised 9.5 per cent of the total area of properties and 16.2 per cent of the arable terrain. These percentages are somewhat higher than the estimate made by the Rumanian Ministry of Finance in 1927 that 8.4 per cent of the land (based on taxpayers) in the Old Kingdom was let out.[23]

The agrarian reforms were not successful, however, in creating a satisfactory peasant agriculture based upon small properties of between 3 and 5 hectares.[24] In 1941 over 58 per cent of the properties were below 3 hectares, a perilous minimum for a self-sustaining cultivation; properties between 3 and 5 hectares amounted to only 18.4 per cent of the total number and covered only 16 per cent of the area. The reasons for this failure will be discussed shortly.

(b) The unequal distribution of land was not a primary cause of agrarian overpopulation during the interwar period. The 1941 census does not provide decisive evidence on this question, as it covered only a little over half the total area of Rumania in its 1941 frontiers. It included, however, over 87 per cent of the total arable, and is therefore fairly reliable as regards cultivable land. According to this census, the average size of all properties under 5 hectares was

22. This figure, it must be repeated, is not comparable with the pre-1914 figures. In the first place, geographical area is not the same. Moreover, Creangă in his 1905 estimate included state and public properties and grazing land but excluded forests. The 1941 census included whatever forest and grazing land was owned privately but omitted communal and state controlled pastures and forests.

23. Quoted in Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, p. 246.

24. In 1945 the Danish agricultural economist, M. Gormsen, who had been employed by the Rumanian government, stated that in its practical consequences, "the transformation of estate land into peasant land in Rumania in 1918–1921 meant in spite of everything only the continuation on a much larger scale of the old short-sighted policy of the past. This policy consisted in leaving as little land as possible to the peasants without taking into consideration whether it was sufficient or not for a rational and independent peasant agriculture." M. Gormsen, *Short Introduction to the Principal Structural Problems of the Agriculture in Roumania* (Bucarest, 1945), p. 40.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

31| 2.0 hectares. If all land in excess of 100 hectares were distributed to properties below 5 hectares, their average size would rise to 2.7 hectares; if all property in excess of 50 hectares, the average size would be 2.9 hectares. (This computation does not, of course, take into account regional differences in land distribution, which would considerably reduce the gains to small properties unless the farm population were far more mobile than it has been in the past.) Actually, the increase in arable would be less than the figures indicate because a fairly large proportion of big properties was forest land. In Argeş, for example, although it has more forest land than most judeţe, forests accounted for 57.1 per cent of the land of exploitations over 100 hectares, and 40. 9 per cent of the land of exploitations between 50 and 100 hectares.[25] According to a sampling of a number of villages throughout Rumania, 26 per cent of the land of properties over 25 hectares was forest.[26]

In short, while a further redistribution of the land would have some effect in increasing the size of peasant holdings and would provide a temporary relief for a number of peasants, it could not in itself remedy, even temporarily, the more fundamental problems connected with agricultural overpopulation. This point must be born in mind in connection with the land reform of 1945, to be discussed in a later chapter.

(c) While the changes in land distribution during the interwar period are not altogether clear, one principal development is discernible. Properties between 3 and 5 hectares, which are statistically the average size, failed to become the predominant type of holding. Instead, there appears to have been an increase in the number of submarginal holdings under 3 hectares and in the extent of medium peasant properties between 5 and 20 hectares. In the judeţ of Argeş, the renting of supplementary land was most widespread in exploitations between 5 and 10 hectares and between 10 and 20 hectares, a fact which would indicate relative economic strength. In 1940, Madgearu observed that after 1929 there had been a strengthening of middle properties on the one hand and the formation of an agricultural proletariat on the other.[27]

The investigation of sixty villages in 1938 showed in what way land reform contributed to this development. According to this sampling, the initial effect of the agrarian reform had been a leveling of the difference between poor and rich peasant households, an effect

25. Roman Cresin, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
26. *60 Sate romînesti*, II, 49.
27. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

more marked in the plains than in the mountains. However, the evolution of the two categories of peasant households—those which had received land under the reform and those which had not—was quite different. Holdings which had been either created or supplemented by allotments under the agrarian reform had a much lower resistance to the process of fragmentation of land than the nonallotted holdings; sale of holdings was more frequent among peasants who had received land by the reform.[28] The conclusion is that the agrarian reforms had not established the new properties on a firm basis, which would enable the poor peasant to maintain himself, and had only temporarily checked a tendency toward inequality in the village.

In general, the unequal distribution of land, as a purely economic factor, was not the primary cause for the agrarian difficulties of the interwar period. For a more complete explanation of these difficulties it is necessary to turn to the question of agricultural productivity and the relations of agriculture to the whole of the Rumanian economy.

Agricultural Production[29]

During the interwar years Rumanian agriculture was still largely devoted to the cultivation of cereal crops, which in 1938 occupied 82.1 per cent of the total arable surface:[30]

	In 1,000 hectares	*Per cent of arable*
Total arable	13,873.8	100.0
Cereals	11,387.3	82.1
Wheat	3,926.9	28.3
Maize	5,033.6	36.3
Barley	1,250.8	9.0
Oats	648.7	4.7
Rye	478.3	3.4
Alimentary plants	494.3	3.6
Industrial plants	487.6	3.5
Forage crops	734.3	5.3
Fallow	770.3	5.6

A slight shift in emphasis occurred during this period; the percentage of arable land under cereals dropped from 87 to 82 per cent, although the area under the principal grains, wheat and maize, in-

28. *60 Sate românești*, II, 33, 41.

29. Statistical material supporting and illustrating the conclusions of this section is included in the Appendix.

30. *Statistica agricolă a României în 1938*, p. 2.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

INDEX OF AREA, YIELD, AND PRODUCTION OF CEREALS[32] 241 311 [433]

(1909–13 = 100)

	1909–13	1920	1922	1924	1925	1926	1933–37
Area	100	84.4	94.5	101.2	103.5	102.8	114.3
Yield	100	86.7	77.5	60.0	71.7	99.2	81.7
Production	100	72.9	73.6	60.6	74.6	101.6	93.1

In the discussion of overpopulation it was seen that the productivity per hectare in Rumania was exceedingly low. For the four-year period 1928–32 the Rumanian wheat yield was below that of any Balkan state except Greece, averaging 9.5 quintals per hectare, as contrasted with a French yield of 14.8 and a Danish yield of 29.4 quintals per hectare during the same years. Although the Rumanian peasant has been more successful with maize, his output of that grain is also very low. This low rate of yield has been the most striking symptom of the unhealthy condition of Rumanian agriculture. The records of the past half century give little evidence of improvement, and there has been a noticeable decline in comparison with the pre-1914 figures.

Technical and material factors provide an immediate explanation for Rumania's poor output, but beyond these are more general causes which inhibit the improvement of agriculture and the introduction of more efficient techniques. On the whole, physical conditions in Rumania do not prevent a satisfactory agriculture. The hilly regions are somewhat deficient in humus but the soil of the plains is unusually fertile. The plains are exposed to extremes of rainfall and temperature, and the irregularity of the rainfall, the most serious threat to crops, is conducive to a wide fluctuation in output. Nevertheless, these conditions would present no serious obstacle to an increase in production if farming methods were adapted to the soil and climate.[33]

The principal material reasons for the low productivity are the extremely limited use of manure and fertilizers, absence of which is causing gradual depletion of the soil, even in the best plains regions; the lack of moisture-conserving measures; a primitive crop-rotation system; the low quality of livestock; backward techniques of cultivation and the shortage of agricultural equipment; and the prevalence of strip farming. The two last points require additional explanation.

32. League of Nations, *Agricultural Production in Continental Europe* (1943), p. 73.
33. U.S. Department of Agriculture, *op. cit.*, p. 715.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241
311

The low level of productivity is clearly a function of the investment in agricultural inventory, which is exceptionally small in Rumania:[34]

	Value of agricultural inventory in lei/hectare	*Average production of wheat in kilograms/hectare*
Rumania	1,000	860
Bulgaria	2,000	1,320
Poland	3,000	1,440
Germany	15,000	2,070
Switzerland	42,000	2,250

While there is a great dearth of investment in agricultural equipment, there is also an overinvestment in certain items because of the large number of small holdings, each with its primitive inventory. According to the 1941 census on agricultural equipment—the first adequate estimate—though there was less than one plough to every two exploitations, there was one plough for every seven hectares of arable land. But since one plough was capable, according to Rumanian estimates, of turning over fifteen hectares, there were about twice as many ploughs as were necessary in terms of technical requirements.[35]

The division of agricultural exploitations into numerous small plots or strips is, of course, intimately related to the question of agrarian reform and to the pressure of population, although strip farming was prevalent before 1918. The agrarian reforms contributed to its extension, not only because they omitted any provisions for consolidation, but also because the land of the expropriated estates was usually divided into a number of small, narrow strips of land of from ½ to 5 hectares, which were given either to landless peasants or to those with inadequate holdings. These strips were often several kilometers away from the peasant's village or his other holdings. In 1941 the average area of all exploitations was 4.5 hectares, with an average of 5 plots per exploitation. Frequently these plots

34. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

35. Census of agricultural equipment, 1941 (*Recensămîntul agricol din 1941*, p. 56):

	Number	*Number per 100 exploitations*	*Number per 100 hectares arable land*
Ploughs	1,083,018	48.0	14.5
Harrows	752,063	33.3	10.0
Seed drills	58,589	2.6	0.8
Reapers	39,345	1.7	0.5
Tractors	8,416	0.4	0.1
Carts	1,191,254	52.7	15.7

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

of less than one hectare were several hundred meters long and only 5 to 10 meters wide. The strips were at a great distance from one another, some authorities estimating the average distance to be from 4 to 7 kilometers.[36] The division of farming units into such small strips is obviously an impediment to any rationalization of agriculture. 241 311

Primitive techniques and irrational organization of holdings, while directly responsible for low productivity, are really manifestations rather than causes of the stagnation of Rumanian agriculture. What has inhibited the introduction of technical and organizational improvements? Poverty and "lack of capital" merely describe the situation; they do not explain it. Nor can this stagnation be ascribed to the natural inertia of a primitive agricultural society: the Rumanian economy has been in the midst of a dynamic process of change for over a century.

The fall in yield after the agrarian reforms of 1918–21 naturally raised the question whether the expropriation of the large estates was responsible for the critical state of Rumanian farming. This question is likely to be misleading if it is reduced to a comparison of the theoretical merits of large scale and peasant agriculture. Criticism that the agrarian reforms are responsible for the decline in agricultural productivity is apt to assume that the pre-1914 estates were well-organized large farms, whereas for the most part they were latifundiary cultivations, farmed out to the peasants who cultivated them with their own animals and equipment.[37] To be sure, some of the large farms were relatively well managed (although the yield even on the big estates was low in comparison with western European standards), and it may be that certain other controls employed by the large farms—notably the selection of seed and the regulation of the date at which sowing should begin [38]—were sufficient to account for the higher yield of the large properties. During the interwar years, as before 1914, large farms continued to have a higher cereal

36. M. Gormsen, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

37. For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, in a study of Rumanian agriculture, cites the great annual fluctuation in the wheat yield, a result of the variation in rainfall, as an example of the inability of the small peasant to take appropriate moisture conservation measures. "Managers of the large estates knew how to overcome this handicap to a considerable extent." U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, *op. cit.*, p. 715. A comparison of pre-1914 yields, however, indicates that while the yield of large properties was higher than that of small properties, the fluctuation in yield was practically the same for both categories. Cf. Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 271. [113]

38. Doreen Warriner, *The Economics of Peasant Farming* (Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 153.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241 yield than the small peasant holdings,[39] though there appear to be
311 no satisfactory statistics on this point.

On the other hand, defenders of the agrarian reform and small peasant properties have tended to assume that the Rumanian small holder was on his way to becoming an independent peasant proprietor, a doubtful assumption in view of the prevalence of dwarf holdings and the continued excessive cultivation of cereals. In 1937 G. Ionescu-Sişeşti and N. Cornăţeanu upheld the reform and peasant farming on the following grounds:

The reform was an economic necessity under the conditions of devastation after the First World War; it was only by giving land to the peasants that they were induced to make the great effort necessary for agricultural recovery. Peasant farming became more intensive and less devoted to cereal cultivation. The peasant was better able to withstand agricultural crises, largely because the large farmer lacked his ability to reduce expenses and increase family labor. Finally, peasant agriculture should not be judged in terms of its contribution to the national income but by its ability to "assure the existence of the greatest possible number of citizens." It is therefore erroneous to "establish a comparison between peasant agriculture and the system of large property."[40]

311 The necessity of the agrarian reforms need not be argued, although
185 they could be defined more convincingly as a social than as an economic imperative (i.e., the peasants would have refused to continue to work under the old system). It may also be true that peasant farming cannot be judged by narrow profit-and-loss accounting methods, since it is a manner of living as well as a form of livelihood. But Sişeşti's and Cornăţeanu's supporting arguments do not appear relevant to the actual Rumanian situation. There is no indication that peasant cultivation did become to any significant degree more intensive and varied. The examples they give, taken from a survey of a number of farms between 1930 and 1934, to illustrate the viability of peasant farming are not representative but comprise farms well above the average size for Rumania. Hence the real problem of dwarf holdings is avoided. The argument that small holdings are more resistant to crises because the peasant is able to restrict his consumption and increase family labor is not altogether reassuring in face of the growing pressure of population, regardless of its dubi-

39. M. Gormsen, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

[113] 40. G. Ionescu-Sişeşti and N. Cornăţeanu, *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie et ses conséquences* (Bucarest, 1937), pp. 42–53.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

ous merits from the point of view of social welfare. The effort to ignore the importance of national income as a criterion for judging the advantages of peasant farming is unrealistic, given the existence of a modern Rumanian state with its manifold requirements. Finally, for all their optimism, Sișești and Cornățeanu admit the serious menace of continued subdivision of the land and urge the creation of a "peasant bourgeoisie." They do not indicate, however, what is to become of the poor peasants displaced in such a creation except to appeal for a further expansion of a national industry. The appeal to national industry, as a *deus ex machina*, at once undermines the whole argument for the viability of the Rumanian peasant proprietor.

311 185

Actually, such discussions of the merits and defects of peasant agriculture have only a limited relevance in Rumania. For example, in a study of 275 peasant households made in 1938, it was discovered that in general both the gross income per hectare (the total agricultural product of the holding, whether consumed or sold) and the agricultural income per hectare (gross income minus expenses for agriculture—labor payments, inventory, buildings, seed, etc.) tended to be higher on the small (under 3 hectares) than on the larger holdings. This higher net yield would appear to substantiate the contentions of the advocates of small farming.[41] In fact, however, the majority of the small holdings in this investigation operated at a deficit because the consumption needs of the household, largely food and clothing, were greater than the farm could produce. Only 14 per cent of the holdings between 1 and 3 hectares had an agricultural income greater than consumption, whereas in 86 per cent of the cases consumption was greater. Only 30 per cent of the holdings between 3 and 5 hectares had agricultural incomes greater than consumption. On the larger farms, between 10 and 20 hectares, 59 per cent had an agricultural income sufficient to meet consumption needs.[42] Therefore, the relative net incomes of farms of different sizes were of less

113

41. This higher rate of agricultural income among the small holdings is not, as it might appear, in contradiction to the statement that the cereal yield is higher on large farms than on small. A much smaller proportion of the income of the small holdings is derived from cereals; most of it comes from the sale of animals, fowls, fruits, etc. This, however, does not really represent a turn to intensive farming, since it is conducted on a very primitive level and only reflects the dwarf holder's efforts to maintain himself at a subsistence level.

42. *60 Sate românești*, II, 292. It should be noted that this investigation did not include large farms but only peasant holdings up to 40 hectares. Moreover, the results of the investigation showed an extremely wide range of variation, both regionally and among farms of the same size. Hence, the sampling may not have been extensive enough to permit confident generalization.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

311
185

importance than the fact that the general level of productivity was so low that a great number of the small farms simply did not produce enough to support themselves.

The effect of the 1918–21 land reforms upon production is also obscured by the numerous other factors which worked to reduce output: the destruction caused by the First World War, the economic policy of the postwar governments, the agrarian crisis and the "price scissors" of the 1930's.[43] While one cannot dismiss the effect of the redistribution of land as of only historical interest, since the leading feature of the 1945 agrarian reform was a further expropriation of large properties, it should be stressed that the reforms of 1918–21 were passed because of a pressing political and social necessity for a redistribution of the land; they were not primarily designed to increase production, and whatever their effect upon yield, it should be regarded as incidental to the aims of the reforms.

In general, it seems fair to say that the redistribution of land in Rumania—except in so far as it contributed to a further extension of uneconomic strip farming—had only a marginal direct effect upon productivity. The decline in yield, even if it was caused by the expropriation of the large estates, was only a modest contribution to the generally low level of Rumanian productivity. A comparison with the yield per hectare in neighboring countries reveals that states with more extensive large properties than Rumania (Hungary and Poland) as well as states in which small holdings predominated (Bulgaria and Yugoslavia) all had a yield well below that of western and central Europe.[44]

If the reforms of 1918–21 failed to bring about a more efficient organization of Rumanian agriculture, what were the principal organizational defects which, by preventing the introduction of more rational techniques, maintained a low level of productivity?

A Danish agricultural economist, M. Gormsen, who came to Rumania in 1939 at the request of the Rumanian government, has made

43. For an extensive discussion of these factors and their effect upon productivity to 1930 see Mitrany, *op. cit.*, pp. 306–331.

44. Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 35, 82.

	Per cent of land held in undertakings of over 50 ha. (*ca.* 1930)	*Yield in crop units per ha.*
Rumania	32.2	17
Hungary	51.3	21
Poland	47.3	18
Bulgaria	1.6	19
Yugoslavia	9.7	17
Europe (excluding U.S.S.R.)		24

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

a useful distinction between "agrarian reforms," which affect the organization of farming, and "agricultural reforms," which seek to improve the techniques.[45] In his opinion the agrarian reforms must be applied first or the agricultural reforms will be fruitless. Moreover, agrarian reforms can be carried out only by some superior body, such as the state, as the result of a conscious act of decision, whereas agricultural reforms are more gradual and can be applied by the farmers themselves. Among the main agrarian reforms indispensable for a prosperous agriculture he would include:

1) The abolition of servile relations—binding the peasant to the land, forced labor, feudal property relations, tithes, and the common utilization of the land. This reform was achieved in principle by the emancipation of 1864.

2) The transformation of estate land into peasant land. This was largely achieved by the reforms of 1918–21. Gormsen feels that a further transfer would yield positive but limited benefits.

3) The consolidation of individual peasant farms and, as a corollary, the partial evacuation of the villages and the establishment of farmhouses on the consolidated holdings. Gormsen regards this as the most important reform still to be carried out in Rumania.

4) The limitation of divisibility and expansion of holdings, to prevent the undoing of consolidation.

5) The introduction of a land register, definite property demarcations, and enclosures if necessary.

Under agricultural reforms he would include all such measures as the rationalization of farming methods; soil, seed, and livestock improvement; organization of agricultural credit and cooperation; the development of experimental stations; and so on.

In Gormsen's opinion, the Rumanian governments between the wars made the very serious mistake of devoting all their attention to efforts, often quite expensive, to introduce agricultural reforms. These were of little permanent value so long as the necessary agrarian reforms had not been made. An example is the complete failure of attempts to establish agricultural credit and peasant cooperatives, which have been the perennial promise of every new Rumanian government.

An effective permanent system of organized credit for peasant agriculture in Rumania does not exist although a number of institutions have been created from time to time to that purpose, as a rule with the assistance of the state or the national bank, but they only worked for a

45. M. Gormsen, *op. cit.*

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

many's increasing monopoly over Rumanian trade and hoped to keep 185
the door open for other markets.[23]

Apart from these important qualifications, however, he expressed his approval of Germany's program for Rumania, the intensification of agriculture, the creation of agricultural industries, and the establishment of mixed companies for mining and petroleum. In general, he seems to have regarded Rumania's increasing economic ties with Germany as largely in the nature of things and only secondarily as a result of policy: "This situation is not so much the result of a crystallization of policy as a change in the structure of the Rumanian economy, which gradually with the advance of the process of industrialization diminished the degree of complementarity with a series of countries and increased it with regard to one alone—Germany." [24]

Although it may seem surprising that the German policy embodied in the agreement of March, 1939, should have more in common with the economic aims of a National Peasant than with a pro-Axis corporatist, the reason is obvious. The National Peasants, believing in economic interdependence and the international division of labor, disapproved of fostering Rumanian industry at the expense of agriculture.[25] Germany, for its own reasons, desired the Balkans to increase their agricultural production and to stay away from secondary industries. On the other hand, Manoilescu's industrial ambitions were unwelcome to the Germans because of their similarity to German aims, a case of like poles repelling. This antagonism arising out of an attempt at similarity is a characteristic of Rumanian history. The earlier effort of the Liberals to emulate the West had led to the economic xenophobia of the Brătianus.

The success of the German-Rumanian agreement could have been measured only after a number of years of peaceful development; it may be doubted whether the results anticipated could have been achieved in the five years of the agreement. But such a peaceful period was not to be granted. In the year after the inauguration of the five-year plan Rumania had lost one third of its territory, Carol had fled the country, and Marshal Antonescu had joined Hitler's war against the Soviet Union. The territorial losses alone severely disorganized 311 ●
the economic program. By the loss of Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina, 433
Northern Transylvania, and Southern Dobrogea Rumania was deprived of 34 per cent of its total area, 37 per cent of the arable land,

23. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești*, pp. 372–374.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 301.

25. For somewhat analogous reasons, at the time of the First World War several Rumanian populists had been pro-German because they saw Germany as the industrial complement to Rumania's agrarian society.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951. ED1 Rumania ED1

311 433 44 per cent of the forest land, 27 per cent of the orchards, and 37 per cent of the vineyards. Of the area devoted to wheat (as of 1939) it lost 37 per cent, to maize 30 per cent, to sunflower 75 per cent, to hemp 43 per cent, and 86 per cent of the area devoted to soya. The regions, chiefly Bessarabia, in which the new industrial crops had been most intensively cultivated were lost. Finally, the whole economy was put on a war footing, first for Germany and then for Rumania itself.

185 433 Notwithstanding all Carol's laws and decrees, no real solutions were found to the agrarian question. It is illuminating to look through the volumes of the *Enciclopedia României*, published in the last years of Carol's reign as a monument to the Rumanian rebirth. Amid all the fanfare of Rumania's marvelous progress and glowing future, the articles on agriculture and land tenure strike a discordant and often deeply pessimistic note.

To be sure, the trend in the 1930's was toward increasing industrialization as the solution to Rumania's economic difficulties, and in the long run, had the war not intervened, this might have brought beneficial results even to agriculture. As it was, however, much of the industrialization was achieved at the expense of agriculture, and for all its expansion it was neither bringing agriculture any great technical improvements nor beginning to absorb the excess agricultural population. The five-year plan and the laws to rationalize land tenure and consolidate holdings might have provided a healthier foundation for agriculture had they been carried out conscientiously, but there is little evidence that they meant anything more than many previous legislative acts which clutter the Rumanian statute books. It is doubtful whether the peasant would have benefited greatly from a plan ordained by divine providence if it had been left to the Carol administration to execute it. With all its attacks on "outworn" parties and its praise for the younger generation, the Carol dictatorship lacked the stature to be a modernizing dictatorship along the lines of Kemal Ataturk's regime. The new German orientation might have benefited Rumanian agriculture, but given the power relations it is more likely that Rumania would have become the object of an efficient colonial policy.

654 Among the social studies undertaken in the period of Carol's dictatorship there was one which makes a fitting conclusion to the Carolist period, and indeed illustrates the failure to master the agrarian question during the interwar years. In the summer and autumn of 1939 a Rumanian research team made a field study of the *plasă* (an administrative unit in a judeţ) Dâmbovnicul, in the south of the

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

judeţ of Argeş.[26] This plasă was selected and is of interest for a number of reasons. It lay midway between the Carpathians and the Danube Valley and was in the heart of Wallachia. Having closer communications than many regions with roads leading to the capital, it had long been under the commercial influences which have so profoundly affected Rumanian society; it was not a primitive untouched district but was showing the full effect of what the investigators called "Americanization." Its population was almost entirely Rumanian and almost entirely devoted to agriculture. It lay near Răteşti, the family estate of the Brătianus, and Topoloveni, Mihalache's town, and had consequently received a good deal of attention from the parties in their political campaigns. Hence, Dâmbovnicul, if not the average Rumanian plasă, was an excellent representative of an agricultural community of the Old Kingdom and displayed the principal problems peculiar to Rumania.

What were the conditions in this community in the summer of 1939? Over nine-tenths of the population was engaged in agriculture; in the remaining tenth there were more public officials than merchants, tradesmen, or artisans. Of the 9,400 heads of families, about two-thirds (6,681) were cultivators on their own land or estate owners; 772 worked the land in dijma, that is, under the old crop-sharing tenure; 571 were agricultural day laborers, 144 were farm hands, and only 30 were tenants. About 87 per cent of the land was agricultural; forests which had once been extensive had by this time been reduced below the local needs for firewood and timber. Wheat, maize, and oats occupied almost three-fourths of the arable land.

The density of agricultural population was somewhat below the average for Rumania, but there were just under 70 inhabitants dependent upon agriculture per square kilometer of agricultural land. Evidence of overpopulation was seen in the use of practically all the land for cereals, the small size of exploitations, and in the search for auxiliary sources of income. About 23 per cent of the families had less than one hectare of land, and 56 per cent less than 3 hectares. These small holdings were further subdivided into numerous strips; the properties between one and three hectares, for example, were composed on the average of 6 plots of .3 hectares each. For the level of cultivation in this region, 4–5 hectares were the minimum adequate to feed a family of 4–5 members, but only 22 per cent of the properties were over 5 hectares. Competition for land was intense, the terms for land worked in dijma were becoming increasingly severe,

26. Mihai Pop and A. Golopenţia, *Dâmbovnicul, o plasă din sudul Judeţului Argeş* (Bucarest, 1942).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

162 and the investigators found many of the old labor contracts and obli-
311 gations associated with pre-1914 Rumania.

Unable to support themselves in the community, many peasants
511 were seeking temporary work in nearby market towns, and a number
464 traveled as far as Bucarest, a distance of about 70 kilometers. The
369 exodus in most cases was not permanent, and the peasants after earn-
166 ing some money returned to Dâmbovnicul. This movement to the city was a reflection of the new conditions, which were also seen in the houses and garments of the peasants: houses were no longer built to last generations as was the case in the more isolated districts to the north; the national costume was relegated to Sundays. Birth and death rates were high and the natural increase outran the emigration away from the plasă. The standard of living was very low; many families were undernourished.

A definite differentiation in the peasantry was developing. A few peasants—mostly those who had inherited medium properties—were enlarging their holdings; a few new peasant estates of over 100 hectares had been created. The poorer peasants, including many who had been allotted land, were losing their holdings. Investigations into debts and credit showed that even after the conversion of 1934 about half the households were in debt. Credit provided by the cooperative banks went almost entirely to the larger peasants; in one commune holdings of up to 5 hectares received only 7.9 per cent of the loans. The special political interest shown by the parties in the judeţ of Argeş seemed to have brought no benefits beyond permitting local party stalwarts to obtain extra funds to purchase land from peasants who were in debt or in need of money.

Such, then, was the land of happy peasants with their colorful folkways so picturesquely displayed in the travel literature of the Carolist era.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

56 aged by five trustees; the Ministry of Agriculture was to supervise
241 its business transactions, and technical and administrative control lay in the hands of the chief of the agricultural district. Members were obliged to conform to the requirements of the government crop plan. It was reported in 1944 that about 200 such associations had been established.[19]

This law did not really represent anything new in Rumania but was merely one of the various measures which had been applied from time to time to overcome the agrarian impasse. It represents, however, a somewhat different approach from that emphasized by either the National Peasants or the Carolist dictatorship. The National Peasants had placed greatest stress upon credit, cooperatives, and diversification of production, with a view to creating the small peasant on the Western model. The Carolist regime, in its activities of 1938 and 1939, was aiming at consolidation and the creation of middle properties. The law of 1942 was an attempt to improve the situation on the basis of existing circumstances, of utilizing in the most efficient way possible the uneconomic system of land holdings. To be sure, all the approaches overlapped somewhat, but in a way the 1942 act was a bridge to the agricultural policy of the post-1945 government.

● 311 The Germans, for their own reasons, were anxious to develop Ru-
185 manian agriculture as part of the economy of the new order, although their estimate of what could be achieved in Rumanian agriculture was relatively modest. A wartime analysis by some German experts[20] presented a very dismal picture of Rumanian farming as of 1940. According to their report the principal difficulties lay in the low yield resulting from the small size of the majority of the holdings (they noted that most of the large properties were cultivated in metayage) and in the inadequacy of the transport system, both the general network and the village roads. They doubted whether agriculture itself

19. Otto von Franges, "Agricultural Labour Communities in South Eastern Europe," *International Review of Agriculture, 35* (January–February, 1944), 22E–32E. Von Franges was heartily in favor of these associations, of which similar types had been established in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. In his opinion they corresponded to traditional labor associations of the Balkan peasants and showed an admirable balance between individualism and collectivism, between control and liberty. He sharply contrasted these associations with agricultural cooperatives. The latter, while having a useful function, were obliged to neglect the poorer peasant. The associations, he felt, were the only possible compensation for the fragmentation of peasant properties and the only means of obtaining a decent improvement of productivity until the slow process of consolidation could take place.

20. H. L. Fensch and O. Thiel, *Rumänien, Untersuchung über die Betriebs- und Ernährungswirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse der Landwirtschaft.* (I have seen only a manuscript Rumanian translation of this study.)

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

was in any position to remedy either of these defects. They had hopes, however, that measures—such as those taken in 1942—of compensating for inefficient small holdings by means of common use of machines, purchase of seed, and organization of sale could bring some improvements. They believed that under existing circumstances it would be possible to increase agricultural production by 25 per cent over ten years and that some 40 per cent of the surplus of cereals and vegetables would be available for export to Germany.

The actual course of Rumanian agriculture during the war showed no such progress. The area devoted to cereals fell appreciably between 1940 and 1943 because of the labor shortage, the decline in livestock and equipment, and the price controls which held cereal prices well below industrial prices.[21] Yields fell off in the principal grains, maize and wheat. The total production of cereals dropped from a 1935–39 average of 75.7 million quintals (for the area as of January, 1941) to 61–64 million (38 million in 1942 following an exceptionally severe winter).[22] Because of war needs the area devoted to industrial and food crops increased, in most cases as the result of government support and crop plans. It was still very small, however, compared with that under cereals. In livestock the greatest reduction, as was to be expected, was in horses; cattle increased somewhat; sheep, goats, and pigs remained about the same.

The number of draft animals declined by one-third, though the most serious fall was between 1943 and the beginning of 1945; that is, at the time of the final military collapse when both German and Soviet troops were on Rumanian soil. There was a notable increase in the number of tractors (from 4,170 in 1940 to 8,340 in 1943 and 8,178 in 1945), although in the opinion of the Central Institute of Statistics it did not compensate for the decline in draft animals which were the only feasible form of traction on the small strip farms.[23]

21. Area devoted to cereals, 48 judeţe (area as of January, 1941):

	Millions of hectares
1935–39	7.4
1940	6.8
1941	6.6
1942	6.4
1943	6.6

Source: Institutul Central de Statistică, *Statistica agricolă a României în 1941–1944* (Bucarest, 1947), p. xiii.

22. According to the Central Institute of Statistics, *ibid.*, p. xv, the recorded figures for production may have been well below the actual production because of extensive and often irregular army requisitioning; the wheat crop may have been underestimated by 20 per cent, the maize crop by 10 per cent.

23. Institutul Central de Statistică, *Statistica agricolă a României, Vol. V, Inventarul agricol în Anul 1945* (Bucarest, 1947), p. 14.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

● 311

TABLE VIII. DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE OLD KINGDOM, 1907

Categories (hectares)	Number of Holdings	Per Cent of Total Properties	Area (hectares)	Per Cent of Total Area
0–½ ha.	62,832	6.60	26,426	0.34
½–1	81,039	8.50	72,757	0.98
1–2	147,900	15.20	237,029	3.01
2–3	131,630	13.60	337,000	4.30
3–4	172,446	17.90	631,964	8.08
4–5	148,717	15.40	711,033	9.08
5–7	131,145	13.50	743,486	9.50
7–10	45,230	4.70	393,950	5.05
Total, 0–10 ha.	920,939	95.40	3,153,645	40.29
10–50	36,318	3.70	695,953	8.89
50–100	2,405	0.26	166,847	2.13
100–500	3,314	0.41	816,385	10.43
500–1,000	1,122	0.13	803,084	10.26
1,000–3,000	771	0.09	1,236,420	15.80
3,000–5,000	112	0.01	434,367	5.55
Over 5,000	66	0.00	520,095	6.65
Total	965,047	100.00	7,826,796	100.00

SOURCE: G. D. Creangă, *Grundbesitzverteilung und Bauernfrage in Rumänien*, in *Staats- und sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen*, Heft 129 (Leipzig, 1907), p. 93.

COMMENT: This table includes private properties, land owned by religious and other public foundations, state land, and crown domains. With regard to type of land, it includes arable, meadows, and pasture, but not vineyards, orchards, or forests. Creangă estimated that there were in Rumania some 74,000 hectares of orchards and 98,000 hectares of vineyards, belonging mostly to small holders, and 2,422,000 hectares of forest (not including swamp land), belonging almost entirely to large proprietors, either public or private. His figure for the area of holdings under 10 hectares is too low, as it was based on data from 1896, and about 153,000 hectares of state land were distributed to the peasants between 1897 and 1905.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

TABLE IX. LEASING OF AGRICULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE OLD KINGDOM, 1907

Category of Property (hectares)	Amount Leased (hectares)	Percentage of Land Leased
50–100	40,184	24.09
100–500	409,608	50.17
500–1,000	467,819	58.28
1,000–3,000	721,198	58.33
3,000–5,000	318,628	73.36
Over 5,000	376,708	72.43
Total over 50 ha.	2,334,145	56.86

SOURCE: *Ibid.*, p. 140.

TABLE X. DISTRIBUTION OF LAND BY FARM UNITS IN THE OLD KINGDOM, 1918

Categories of Farms (hectares)	Number	Percentage of Total Number	Total Area Covered (hectares)	Percentage of Total Area	Average of the Category (hectares)
0–2	476,649	42.0	572,169	9.7	1.20
2–5	441,336	39.0	1,546,311	26.5	3.50
5–10	161,550	14.3	1,118,409	19.2	7.34
10–25	42,996	3.8	622,174	10.7	14.47
25–50	5,697	0.5	193,128	3.3	33.91
50–100	1,554	0.1	107,182	1.8	68.96
100–500	2,377	0.2	587,549	10.1	247.50
Over 500	1,043	0.1	1,093,699	18.7	1,047.10
	1,133,202	100.0	5,840,621	100.0	5.15

Categories of Farms	Owner-cultivated		Tenant-cultivated	
	Area (hectares)	*Per Cent*	*Area (hectares)*	*Per Cent*
0–2	421,712	73.7	150,457	26.3
2–5	1,045,525	67.6	500,786	32.4
5–10	647,518	57.9	470,891	42.1
10–25	396,764	63.8	225,410	36.2
25–50	141,263	73.1	51,865	26.9
50–100	74,408	69.4	32,774	30.6
100–500	281,871	48.0	305,678	52.0
Over 500	495,860	45.3	597,839	54.7
	3,504,921	60.0	2,335,700	40.0

SOURCE: Rumanian Ministry of Agriculture, *Agricultorii şi repartizarea pămîntului cultivat în 1913* (Bucarest, 1915), quoted in David Mitrany, *The Land and*

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

113 *the Peasant in Rumania* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 241–242.

COMMENT: Unfortunately this table and Table VIII, on the distribution of properties, appear to defy comparison, and in certain important respects they are in serious contradiction. The total area for properties is some 2,000,000 hectares larger than that for farms. Probably a large part of this difference is attributable to grazing lands and fallow, which are not included in the statistics for farms. According to figures for 1905, pasture and fallow amounted to about 1,400,000 hectares. L. Colescu, *Progresele economice ale României îndeplinite sub domnia M.S. Regelui Carol I, 1866–1906* (Bucarest, 1907), p. 51. Owner-cultivated farms under 100 hectares are given as some 1,300,000 hectares less than properties under 100 hectares (2,727,000 hectares as against 4,016,000 hectares). It seems impossible to explain this difference either by the absence of grazing land, which belonged mainly to large properties, or by mutual interleasing among peasants, which could scarcely have achieved such a magnitude. The figure for farms over 100 hectares is some 2,100,000 hectares less than that for properties over 100 hectares (1,681,000 hectares as against 3,810,000 hectares). This difference is to be explained by the absence of grazing land in the farm statistics, by the fact that land was leased from the large estates to peasant farms, and by the sale of estate land between 1907 and 1913, but the relative importance of these factors is not clear. The total area leased from properties over 100 hectares is given by Creangă at about 2,300,000 hectares; the total farm area under tenant cultivation, for both large and small farms, is about 2,336,000 hectares, but this similarity is misleading because the figure for leased properties presumably includes grazing land.

The only point in mentioning these inconsistencies—especially in statistics which are known to be of uncertain reliability—is that repeated attempts have been made to reach too definite conclusions through a collation of these tables or a selected part thereof.

● 31

TABLE XI. PRE-1914 DISTRIBUTION OF LAND IN BESSARABIA

A. By Type of Property

Categories		Number of Properties	Total Area (hectares)	Average Area (hectares)	Per Cent of Total Area
1. Private individual properties	Nobles	1,474	818,744	555.4	20.1
	Priests	126	4,308	34.2	0.1
	Merchants, etc.	1,944	253,867	—	6.7
	Peasants	7,718	135,384	17.5	3.2
	Foreigners	13	30,390	2,337.6	0.8
	Various	10,102	94,157	9.0	2.3
	Large owners	275	169,416	616.3	4.8
		21,652	1,506,266	69.4	36.8
2. Joint holdings		540	201,591	373.3	4.9
3. Nadyel lands		2,209	2,111,940	956.0	50.7
4. State domains		—	53,648	—	1.3
5. Churches and monasteries		—	204,190	—	5.0
6. Town properties		—	23,600	—	0.6
7. Private institutions		—	30,362	—	0.7
		24,401	4,131,597	166.3	100.0

SOURCE: E. Giurgea in *Buletinul Statistic*, No. 2 (1919), pp. 324–327, quoted in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

311

B. By Size of Property

Properties (hectares)	Area	Per Cent of Total Area	Number of Proprietors	Per Cent of Total Number
0–10	2,156,827	51.6	285,663	98.4
10–100	180,984	4.3		
Over 100	1,844,539	44.1	4,480	1.6
	4,182,350	100.0	290,143	100.0

SOURCE: Alexander Nasta, "La Réforme agraire en Roumanie," report presented to the Fourteenth Congress of the International Congress of Agriculture (Bucarest, June 7–10, 1929).

COMMENT: These figures must be regarded as very approximate, since they involve, among other things, a translation of Russian returns which were based upon types of ownership rather than size. The number of proprietors in Table B, which is much greater than the number of properties in Table A, includes the peasants cultivating nadyel (allotted) land, which had been granted to the peasant commune rather than to the individual under the Russian emancipation.

TABLE XII. PRE-1914 DISTRIBUTION OF LAND IN BUCOVINA

A. Distribution of Total Area

Categories (hectares)	Number of Properties	Per Cent	Area (hectares)	Per Cent
0–10	191,737	96.27	270,730	25.92
10–100	6,606	3.32	134,115	12.84
100–500	585	0.29	130,939	12.53
Over 500	257	0.12	508,674	48.71
	199,185	100.00	1,044,458	100.00

SOURCE: Livius Lazar, *La Mise en oeuvre de la réforme agraire*, p. 64, quoted in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

B. Distribution of Agricultural Land (Arable, Meadows, and Pasture, but Excluding Forests)

Categories (hectares)	Area (hectares)	Per Cent
0–10	264,678	48
10–100	152,094	27
Over 100	140,560	25
	557,327	100

SOURCE: Ifor L. Evans, *The Agrarian Revolution in Roumania* (Cambridge, 1924), p. 87, from information provided by Rumanian authorities in Bucovina.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

311

TABLE XIII. PREREFORM DISTRIBUTION OF LAND IN TRANSYLVANIA

Category (hectares)	Number of Owners	Per Cent	Area (hectares)	Per Cent
0–10	843,448	87.6	2,536,738	34
10–100	113,887	11.8	2,153,117	29
Over 100	4,601	0.6	2,751,457	37
	961,936	100.0	7,441,312	100

SOURCE: Nasta, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

COMMENT: The reliability of this official estimate is extremely doubtful. The table appears to be only an approximate conversion into hectares of figures compiled in cadastral yokes by the provisional Transylvanian government in 1919. The reliability of the latter compilation has been challenged. According to Hungarian critics "no exact figures are or ever have been available for the land distribution in 1919 in the total area annexed by Rumania." C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors* (Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 316, n. 2.

311
423

TABLE XIV. LAND EXPROPRIATED UNDER THE AGRARIAN REFORMS OF 1918 AND 1921, AS OF 1927

	Old Kingdom (hectares)	Transylvania (hectares)	Bucovina (hectares)	Bessarabia (hectares)	Total (hectares)
Arable	2,269,192.27	470,389.56	48,544.64	1,210,627.20	3,998,753.67
Meadow	27,386.94	80,745.60	9,742.63	—	117,875.17
Pasture	442,988.68	398,257.50	8,296.69	—	849,542.87
Forests	19,156.10	663,967.24	8,420.54	198,404.60	889,948.48
Orchards, Vineyards	2,466.18	12,114.07	—	—	14,580.25
Building land, farmyards, etc.	360.11	14,006.35	357.16	—	14,723.62
Barren	14,851.15	24,328.71	605.69	82,888.44	122,673.99
Total	2,776,401.43	1,663,809.08	75,967.35	1,491,920.24	6,008,098.05

SOURCE: Nasta, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

COMMENT: Despite the confident calculation to two decimal places, the accuracy of this table is rather uncertain. In 1937 the figure given for the total amount of expropriated land was somewhat less: 5,811,827 hectares. G. Ionescu-Sişeşti and N. Cornăţeanu, *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie et ses conséquences* (Bucarest, 1937), p. 36. In 1940 it was officially announced that 3,900 estates were still in possession of land which was to have been expropriated. Moreover, there seems to have been a good deal of circumvention of the expropriation laws through the reconstitution of estates by a variety of semilegal or illegal means. According to Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 223, the Ministry of Agriculture confirmed that in the steppe region of the Bărăgan newly formed estates, running up to 3,000 hectares, could be found.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

TABLE XV. DISPOSITION OF LAND EXPROPRIATED UNDER AGRARIAN REFORMS OF 1918 AND 1921, AS OF 1927

	Old Kingdom (hectares)	Transylvania (hectares)	Bucovina (hectares)	Bessarabia (hectares)
Distributed to peasants	2,037,293.04	451,653.96	42,832.25	1,098,045.50
Communal pastures	524,720.87	418,361.43	5,831.85	—
Communal forests	—	484,805.24	4,377.72	—
Forests administered by state to be distributed	21,027.90	179,162.00	8,523.84	198,404.60
Land unfit for distribution	17,677.44	36,442.78	605.69	82,888.44
Reserved for general needs	175,682.18	93,383.62	13,796.00	112,581.70
Total expropriated	2,776,401.43	1,663,809.03	75,967.35	1,491,920.24

311 ● 423

SOURCE: Nasta, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

COMMENT: The reliability of this table depends upon that of Table XIV.

TABLE XVI. LAND RECEIVED BY THE PEASANTS UNDER THE AGRARIAN REFORMS OF 1918 AND 1921

A. As of 1927

	Number of Peasants Entitled to Land	Number of Peasants Receiving Land	Area Distributed (hectares)	Area Distributed as Communal Pasture (hectares)	Area Distributed as Communal Forests (hectares)
Old Kingdom	1,053,628	630,113	2,037,293.04	524,720.87	—
Transylvania	490,528	310,583	451,653.96	418,361.43	484,805.24
Bucovina	77,911	71,266	42,832.25	5,831.85	4,377.72
Bessarabia	357,016	357,016	1,098,045.50	—	—
Total	1,979,083	1,368,978	3,629,824.75	948,914.15	489,182.96

SOURCE: *Ibid.*

B. As of 1938

	Number of Peasants with Right to Land	Number Receiving Land		Land Distributed (hectares)	Average Area per Peasant Receiving Land under Reform
		Number	*Per Cent of those with right*		
Old Kingdom	1,075,330	648,843	60.3	2,266,740	3.4
Transylvania	490,528	310,583	63.3	489,043	1.6
Bucovina	82,608	76,941	93.2	49,179	0.6
Bessarabia	357,016	357,016	100.0	1,098,045	3.1
Total	2,005,477	1,393,383	69.5	3,923,007	2.8

SOURCE: *60 Sate romînești* (5 vols., Bucarest, 1941–43), II, 10.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

● 311
423

TABLE XVII. DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL PROPERTY FOLLOWING THE AGRARIAN REFORMS OF 1918 AND 1921, AS OF 1927

Before the Reform:

	Small Property (under 100 ha.)	Per Cent	Large Property (over 100 ha.)	Per Cent
Old Kingdom	4,593,148	57.5	3,397,851	42.5
Bessarabia	2,837,811	55.9	1,844,539	44.1
Transylvania	4,689,855	63.0	2,751,457	37.0
Bucovina	405,000	78.0	115,000	22.0
	12,025,814		8,108,847	

or:

Small Property: 12,025,814 ha. or 59.77%
Large Property: 8,108,847 ha. or 40.23%
20,134,661 ha.

After the Reform:

	Small Property	Per-Cent	Large Property	Per Cent
Old Kingdom	7,369,549	92.22	621,450	7.78
Bessarabia	3,829,731	91.57	352,619	8.43
Transylvania	6,353,664	85.38	1,087,648	14.62
Bucovina	480,967	92.49	39,033	7.51
	18,033,911		2,100,750	

or:

Small Property: 18,033,911 ha. or 89.56%
Large Property: 2,100,750 ha. or 10.44%
20,134,661 ha.

SOURCE: Nasta, *op. cit.*, pp. 26–27.

COMMENT: Although these figures have been used as the basis for most studies of Rumanian agriculture, they are misleading and incorrect. The area estimated as having been expropriated from properties over 100 hectares (Table XIV) was simply subtracted from estimates of the prereform extent of such property and added to the estimates of properties under 100 hectares. The results are naturally quite impressive but unacceptable. The prewar figures for the Old Kingdom were based upon G. D. Creangă's estimate for 1905 (Table VIII) (except that the figure for properties under 10 hectares was taken from the somewhat higher estimate of the Ministry of Finance for 1905, a justified substitution). An estimated reduction of properties over 100 hectares between 1905 and 1918 (amounting to 412,500 hectares) was added to the 1905 figure for those below 10 hectares. As a result of this method of computation, the total area of medium properties, between 10 and 100 hectares, is assumed not to have changed at all between 1905 and 1927. All the land expropriated is considered to have been transferred to the small peasants, when, in fact, of the 2,776,000 hectares reported expropriated in the Old Kingdom, only 2,037,000 hectares of arable had been distributed to the peasants by 1927, and 525,000 hectares of communal grazing land established.

It has already been noted that the accuracy of estimates of prereform land distribution in Transylvania was doubtful. Only properties of over 100 hectares are reported

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

to have suffered expropriation, although in Transylvania there were undoubtedly numerous cases where land under that figure was taken. In Bucovina, of the 75,967 hectares expropriated, some 23,000 were reported in 1927 to be either unfit for settlement or held as state-administered forest, and therefore cannot be regarded as having increased peasant holdings. In Bessarabia, all properties over 100 hectares were to have been expropriated; of the 1,845,000 hectares in this category, 1,492,000 were expropriated, and only 1,100,000 distributed to the peasants. 311 423

Finally, forest land is handled ambiguously. In Transylvania about 40 per cent (664,000 hectares) of the area expropriated from large estates was forest; in the Old Kingdom, however, the forests of large landowners—which were not expropriated but which in 1905 amounted to over 800,000 hectares in private ownership alone—were not included in the figures (this seems also to have been the case with the extensive forests of Bucovina). To have made the statistics consistent either all forest properties in all regions should have been included, which would have increased considerably the area shown as remaining to large properties after the reform, or they should have been omitted, which would have reduced the size of the area reported expropriated by nearly 900,000 hectares. In general, then, the conclusions were artificially established and certainly represent an inflated picture of the redistribution of property.

TABLE XVIII. FISCAL CENSUSES ON LANDHOLDINGS, 1923 AND 1928 162

Hectares	1923 Number of Taxpayers	1923 Area (hectares)	1923 Average Size (hectares)	1928 Number of Taxpayers	1928 Area (hectares)	1928 Average Size (hectares)
0–5	3,154,211	5,745,921	1.8	3,408,508	6,658,801	2.0
5–10	458,534	2,618,824	5.7	455,934	3,000,859	6.6
10–50	181,494	2,359,075	13.0	139,807	2,286,413	16.4
50–250	16,557	1,425,053	86.0	13,163	1,308,121	99.4
Over 250	3,168	1,537,046	485.1	1,834	861,299	469.4
Total	3,813,964	13,685,919	3.6	4,019,241	14,110,493	3.5

SOURCE: *60 Sate romînești*, II, 12–15.

COMMENT: Although these tables, prepared by the Ministry of Finance for tax purposes and using different categories of size of landholding, cannot be compared with earlier or later figures, they are of use in showing certain trends in land distribution in the 1920's. The 1928 figure for properties over 250 hectares seems very low, however, since a Ministry of Finance estimate for 1927 (given in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 247) listed 2,597 owners in this category with an area of 1,305,672 hectares.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

TABLE XIX. DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND ACCORDING TO SIZE OF EXPLOITATION, 1930 CENSUS

Categories of Exploitations (hectares)	Exploitations		Total Area		Cultivated Area	
	Number	*Per Cent*	*Hectares*	*Per Cent*	*Hectares*	*Per Cent*
0–1	610,000	18.6	320,000	1.6	275,000	2.1
1–3	1,100,000	33.5	2,200,000	11.1	1,850,000	14.4
3–5	750,000	22.9	3,015,000	15.3	2,475,000	19.3
0–5	2,460,000	75.0	5,535,000	28.0	4,600,000	35.8
5–10	560,000	17.1	3,955,000	20.0	3,110,000	24.2
10–20	180,000	5.5	2,360,000	12.0	1,715,000	13.3
20–50	55,000	1.7	1,535,000	7.8	1,015,000	7.9
50–100	12,800	0.4	895,000	4.5	540,000	4.2
100–500	9,500	0.3	2,095,000	10.6	920,000	7.2
Over 500	2,700	0.1	3,375,000	17.1	950,000	7.4
Total	3,280,000	100.0	19,750,000	100.0	12,850,000	100.0

SOURCE: Institutul Central de Statistică, *Statistica agricolă a României în 1938* (Bucarest, 1939), p. 94.

COMMENT: This table, the only general summary published for the 1930 census, presents certain difficulties. The figure for the total cultivated area corresponds with the 12,857,112 hectares of arable (cereals, artificial meadows, fallow, alimentary and industrial crops) reported under cultivation in 1930. It is less easy to determine what the 19,750,000 hectares include. Since in 1930 arable land plus grazing, orchards, and vineyards amounted to only 17,525,000 hectares, the figure must include some 2,000,000 of the 7,134,000 hectares of forest land. Some sources (e.g., *Bréviaire statistique de la Roumanie, 1940*) state that the 1930 figures refer to properties rather than exploitations.

TABLE XX. DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL PROPERTIES AND EXPLOITATIONS ACCORDING TO SIZE, 1941 CENSUS

Category of Size (hectares)	Properties		Exploitations		Extent of Properties		Extent of Exploitations	
	Number	*Per Cent*	*Number*	*Per Cent*	*Hectares*	*Per Cent*	*Hectares*	*Per Cent*
Total	2,257,050	100.0	2,263,963	100.0	10,419,000	100.0	10,419,570	100.0
Under 0.1			83,815	3.7				
0.1–0.5			172,709	7.6				
0.5–1.0			211,337	9.3				
Total under 1	524,549	23.3	467,861	20.6	230,000	2.2	190,883	1.8
1–3	792,969	35.1	757,546	33.5	1,559,000	15.0	1,446,627	13.9
3–5	415,921	18.4	439,919	19.5	1,680,000	16.1	1,704,211	16.4

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

311

Category of Size (hectares)	Properties		Exploitations		Extent of Properties		Extent of Exploitations	
	Number	*Per Cent*	*Number*	*Per Cent*	*Hectares*	*Per Cent*	*Hectares*	*Per Cent*
5–10	881,444	16.9	448,188	19.8	2,707,000	26.0	3,072,676	29.5
10–20	100,932	4.5	115,481	5.1	1,340,000	12.9	1,489,895	14.3
20–50	31,479	1.4	26,167	1.1	883,000	8.5	713,360	6.8
50–100	4,891	0.2	4,789	0.2	315,000	3.0	317,842	3.1
100–200	2,544	0.1	2,099	0.1	349,000	3.3		
200–500	1,690	0.1	1,286	0.1	521,000	5.0	1,484,076	14.2
Over 500	631	0.0	527	0.0	835,000	8.0		

SOURCE: Roman Cresin, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

COMMENT: This census, which did not cover Northern Transylvania, Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina, or Southern Dobrogea, was limited to land in private cultivation and did not include state, public, or communal holdings. It did, however, include forests and other nonagricultural land if these were in private hands.

The area covered by the census comprised a little over half the total area of Rumania:

Type of Terrain	Total Area (1,000 ha.)	Area Covered in Census (1,000 ha.)	Difference	
			In 1,000 hectares	*In per cent*
Arable	8,578	7,486	1,090	12.7
Meadow	1,069	831	238	22.3
Pasture	2,209	368	1,841	83.3
Vineyards	209	167	42	20.1
Orchards	195	145	50	25.6
Forest	4,789	803	3,986	83.2
Other land	2,476	387	2,089	84.4
Total	19,525	10,187	9,338	47.8

The difference of 9,338,000 hectares between the total area and the area covered by the census was accounted for as follows:

	Hectares
Individual exploitations omitted from the census but included subsequently, and in Table XX	232,000
Communal pastures	1,600,000
State forests	1,500,000
Forests belonging to various institutions	*ca.* 2,500,000
Lakes, ponds, etc. from the floodable regions of the Danube	*ca.* 900,000
Areas occupied by communications, cities, industries, etc.	*ca.* 1,000,000
State farms, land belonging to Ministry of Agriculture, crown domains, and undeclared areas	*ca.* 1,600,000
	9,332,000

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

● 311
464

TABLE XXI. DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL EXPLOITATIONS ACCORDING TO USE OF LABOR, 1941

	Number	Per Cent	Per Cent	Area (hectares)	Per Cent	Per Cent	Average Size (hectares)
General total	2,258,530	100.0		10,187,003	100.0		4.51
Dwarf exploitations (a)	471,618	20.9		818,965	8.1		0.68
Exploitations remaining after leasing (b)	54,882	2.4		45,856	0.4		0.83
Exploitations proper (c)	1,732,030	76.7	100.0	9,822,182	96.5	100.0	5.67
Exploitations worked by hired labor only	25,466	—	1.5	1,188,015	—	12.1	46.65
Exploitations worked by family and hired labor	265,906	—	15.3	2,438,642	—	24.8	9.17
Exploitations worked by family labor only	1,009,031	—	58.3	4,667,089	—	47.5	4.63
Exploitations worked by only part of family labor	431,627	—	24.9	1,528,436	—	15.6	3.54

(a) Very small exploitations cultivated by peasants with little or no land; exploitations not the principal occupation of the cultivator.

(b) Land remaining after the proprietor has rented out more than 80 per cent of the total property, the remainder representing only limited agricultural activity—a few animals, a garden, etc.

(c) Exploitations of at least two hectares, or one hectare of arable, or 0.5 hectares of land devoted to vineyards, orchards, etc.

SOURCE: *Ibid.*, pp. 24–25.

TABLE XXII. DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL EXPLOITATIONS ACCORDING TO USE OF LABOR AND TYPE OF TENURE, 1941

	Number	Per Cent of Total	Per Cent of Subgroup
Total exploitations proper	1,732,030	100.0	—
A. Worked by hired labor only	25,466	1.5	100.0
1. On own land	16,294	0.9	64.0
2. On own and rented land	4,716	0.3	18.5
3. On rented land only	4,456	0.3	17.5

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

311
464

	Number	Per Cent of Total	Per Cent of Subgroup
B. Worked by hired and family labor	265,906	15.3	100.0
1. On own land	192,674	11.1	72.5
2. On own and rented land	70,775	4.1	26.6
3. On rented land only	2,457	0.1	0.9
C. Worked by family labor only	1,009,031	58.3	100.0
1. On own land	720,013	41.6	71.4
2. On own and rented land (a)	289,018	16.7	28.6
D. Worked by part of family labor	431,627	24.9	100.0
1. On own land	315,167	18.2	73.0
2. On own and rented land (a)	116,460	6.7	27.0

(a) Peasant exploitations using family labor on rented land only were too infrequent to warrant inclusion as a separate category.

SOURCE: *Ibid.*, p. 28.

TABLE XXIII. PREVALENCE OF TYPES OF CULTIVATION (BY PERCENTAGE) ACCORDING TO SIZE OF EXPLOITATION IN THE JUDEŢ OF ARGEŞ, 1941 311

	Total	Categories of Size (hectares)									
		Under 0.1	*.1–.5*	*.5–1*	*1–3*	*3–5*	*5–10*	*10–20*	*20–50*	*50–100*	*Over 100*
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total exploitations proper	70.5	1.9	3.0	10.9	78.9	99.8	99.9	99.8	100.0	97.5	97.6
A. With hired labor only	1.3	—	—	0.1	0.3	0.9	2.2	7.3	23.4	53.7	97.6
B. With hired and family labor	11.7	0.1	0.1	0.6	6.8	14.9	25.9	50.6	65.9	43.8	—
C. With family labor only	30.9	0.2	1.0	3.9	34.6	47.4	47.0	27.2	8.1	—	—
D. With part of family labor	26.6	1.6	1.9	6.3	37.2	36.6	24.8	14.7	2.6	—	—
Remaining after leasing	1.2	23.4	5.0	1.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.2	—	2.5(a)	2.4(a)
Holdings of agricultural workers with little land	24.3	33.3	73.8	78.7	19.3	—	—	—	—	—	—
Holdings of agricultural workers without land	0.5	15.5	2.4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Dwarf exploitations whose cultivator has nonagricultural occupation	3.5	25.9	15.8	9.1	1.5	—	—	—	—	—	—

(a) The unexplained presence of exploitations of over 50 hectares in the category "Remaining after leasing" (i.e., remaining after 80 per cent of the property has been let out) presumably indicates a few large properties of little agricultural value, since according to the census this category was unimportant agriculturally.

SOURCE: Roman Cresin, *Agricultura din judeţul Argeş* (Bucarest, 1945), p. 11.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

● 311
423

TABLE XXIV. EXPROPRIATION AND REDISTRIBUTION OF LAND UNDER 1945 AGRARIAN REFORM, AS OF JANUARY 8, 1947

Regions	Number of Proprietors Expropriated	Area Expropriated (hectares)	Area Distributed (hectares)	Area Reserved by the State (hectares)	Peasants	
					Having right to land	*Having received land*
RUMANIA	143,219	1,443,911	1,057,674	387,565	1,114,888	796,129
Plains of Siret and Prut	1,542	196,130	162,486	33,644	196,608	160,334
Moldavian Carpathians	349	47,529	32,615	14,914	87,542	50,171
Muntenian and Oltenian Carpathians	1,802	115,065	71,214	51,851	178,618	99,088
Danube Plain	2,787	309,886	241,213	68,673	248,720	220,181
Dobrogea	1,122	62,333	52,089	3,562	34,795	18,165
Bucovina	79	4,610	4,412	198	17,707	8,518
Transylvanian Plateau	62,157	345,598	215,956	129,642	206,054	123,938
Tisa Plain	73,381	362,760	277,689	85,071	142,849	115,737

SOURCE: Institutul Central de Statistică, *Comunicări statistice*, No. 17 (March 15, 1947), p. 9.

TABLE XXV. DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL PROPRIETORSHIP AND EXPLOITATIONS AFTER 1945 AGRARIAN REFORM, AS OF JANUARY, 25, 1948

Categories of Size (hectares)	Proprietors		Exploitations	
	Number	*Per Cent*	*Number*	*Per Cent*
0–0.5	901,016	16.4	233,153	7.5
0.5–1	1,100,852	20.0	296,321	9.6
1–2	1,472,785	26.8	1,106,754	35.7
2–3	838,286	15.2		
3–5	697,318	12.7	707,001	22.8
5–10	363,678	6.6	551,090	17.8
10–20	88,335	1.6	153,516	5.0
20–50	23,698	0.4	34,222	1.1
Over 50	15,170	0.3	14,120	0.5
Total	5,501,138	100.0	3,096,177	100.0

SOURCE: A. Golopenţia and P. Onica, *Recensământul agricol din Republica Populară Română, 25 ianuarie 1948, rezultate provizorii* (Bucarest, 1948), pp. 11–16.

COMMENT: The value of this census is greatly reduced by the failure to publish the amount of land comprised in the various categories of properties and exploitations. Of a total area of 23,730,000 hectares, 20,661,000 were declared as properties and 19,199,000 hectares as exploitations (of which 94 per cent were declared as owned by the cultivator). The fact that there were 1.8 proprietors to each exploitation (5,501,000 proprietors and 3,096,000 exploitations) is explained, presumably, by the numerous cases of joint proprietorship: husband and wife, parents and children, etc.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

TABLE XXVI. COMPARISON OF DISTRIBUTION OF EXPLOITATIONS BY SIZE IN 1941 AND 1948 (EXCLUDING NORTHERN TRANSYLVANIA) 311

Categories of Size (hectares)	1941 Number	1941 Per Cent	1948 Number	1948 Per Cent
0–0.5	277,500	12.0	190,169	7.3
0.5–1	218,068	9.3	246,016	9.5
1–3	760,700	33.0	933,383	35.9
3–5	441,213	19.2	604,540	23.3
5–10	449,716	19.5	462,607	17.8
10–20	116,537	5.1	122,262	4.7
20–50	27,845	1.2	26,607	1.0
Over 50	16,873	0.7	11,316	0.4
Total	2,308,472	100.0	2,596,900	100.0

SOURCE: *Ibid.*, p. 20.

COMMENT: Although the geographic regions covered in these two tables are the same, the comparison sheds little light and may be misleading, because the amount of land included in each category is not given. In 1941, according to the census of that year, the 2,300,000 exploitations occupied only 10,419,000 hectares, of which about three-fourths was arable. According to the 1948 census the 2,600,000 exploitations occupied approximately 17,000,000 hectares, of which less than one-half was arable. Because of this great difference in the amount of land involved, it would be fallacious to use these tables as a demonstration of the effects of the 1945 agrarian reform.

TABLE XXVII. PRINCIPAL BRANCHES OF AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY

A. Percentage of Arable Devoted to Different Crops 241

	Cereals	Wheat	Maize	Barley	Oats	Rye	Alimentary Plants	Industrial Plants	Forage Crops	Fallow
1921–25	87.1	25.5	31.7	15.6	11.3	2.5	3.3	2.2	4.2	3.2
1926–30	85.4	24.4	34.7	14.4	8.8	2.5	3.3	3.1	5.1	3.1
1931–35	83.9	24.0	36.8	13.4	6.2	2.9	3.6	2.8	5.5	4.2
1936	83.3	24.6	37.7	11.6	5.8	3.0	3.8	3.5	5.6	3.8
1937	82.4	25.7	36.5	10.8	5.6	3.3	3.7	3.6	5.2	5.1
1938	82.1	28.3	36.3	9.0	4.7	3.4	3.6	3.5	5.3	5.5

SOURCE: *Statistica agricolă a Romîniei la 1938*, pp. xiv–xv.

B. Distribution of Agricultural Exploitations According to Type of Farming

	Percentage of Total Number of Exploitations 1941	1948
Cereals	50.7	60.7
Animal husbandry	12.5	1.2
Viticulture	1.4	1.3
Fruits	0.7	0.7
Mixed, and other	34.7	36.1

SOURCES: *Recensămîntul agricol din 1941; Recensămîntul agricol din Republica Populară Romînă.*

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241
311

TABLE XXVIII. PERCENTAGE OF LAND DEVOTED TO DIFFERENT CROPS ACCORDING TO SIZE OF PROPERTY, 1938

	Size of Property (hectares)						
	0.1–1	*1–3*	*3–5*	*5–10*	*10–25*	*Over 25*	*Total*
Cereals	51.37	62.61	64.61	72.94	73.14	50.42	66.05
Alimentary plants	4.21	3.59	3.17	2.27	2.75	2.40	2.75
Intercropped plants	2.64	2.36	1.86	1.14	0.86	0.90	1.35
Forage crops	4.27	6.63	7.58	5.00	3.97	3.06	5.03
Industrial plants	1.12	1.77	2.46	1.84	1.29	1.44	1.73
Fallow	0.90	1.77	2.33	2.46	1.90	0.71	1.90
Natural meadow	10.53	7.90	5.36	3.42	3.12	7.62	5.11
Pasture	0.25	1.09	1.67	1.87	1.70	2.22	1.73
Orchards	5.50	1.75	1.19	0.77	0.76	0.53	1.00
Vineyards	10.29	4.61	3.91	3.43	2.99	0.79	3.22
Forests	5.60	3.83	3.61	2.67	3.95	25.43	7.18
Barren	0.15	0.59	0.23	0.38	0.49	0.52	0.42
Not utilized	3.16	1.56	2.02	1.83	3.07	3.96	2.47

SOURCE: *60 Sate romînești*, II, 97.

COMMENT: These figures were reached through a sampling investigation of some 60 villages.

243

TABLE XXIX. PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL GRAINS

	Output in 1,000 Quintals				Area Covered
	Wheat	*Maize*	*Barley*	*Oats*	
1921–25	24,377	35,513	12,063	9,118	71 *judeţe*, frontiers as of January, 1938
1925–30	30,138	46,071	19,139	11,047	
1931–35	26,285	53,672	13,122	6,553	
1936	35,031	56,120	16,119	8,471	
1937	38,096	46,560	9,463	5,158	
1938	49,124	52,281	8,232	4,605	
1935–39	25,960	39,020	5,500	4,010	40 *judeţe*, frontiers as of January, 1941
1940	13,758	37,432	4,963	3,707	
1941	19,862	38,472	3,911	3,330	
1942	8,549	21,816	3,323	3,372	
1943	23,287	22,283	5,165	4,526	
1944	26,529	32,649	3,821	3,502	
1945	10,885	13,138	2,441	2,334	
1945	12,745	18,196	3,376	3,567	58 *judeţe*, postwar frontiers
1946	16,087	10,040	2,334	2,823	

SOURCES: *Statistica agricolă a României în 1938*, p. xvii; *Statistica agricolă a României în 1941–1944*, p. xiii; *Expunere de motive la bugetul general al statului* (Bucarest, 1946, 1947).

233 221 TRANSHUMANCE has long played a prominent part in the pastoral life of the Carpathians, for agriculturally the region is marginal and it is not very unusual for the maize crop, which covers an astonishingly large proportion of the arable land, to fail to mature. Before the late war the flocks of the eastern Carpathians used to winter in the plains of Moldavia, Bessarabia, the Dobrogea and south Russia, more rarely in Transylvania. During the nineteenth century, however, many Roumanian shepherds stayed in the plain and formed the nuclei of small permanent Roumanian colonies outside the boundaries of Transylvania.

423 311 DURING the last few centuries there have been considerable changes in schemes of land holding. In the late eighteenth century the scattered possessions of the landlord class were consolidated into Latifundia. In the first half of the nineteenth century arable farming was extended into the Danubian plain and on the rich lands between Siret and Prut—in areas, that is to say, which had not been previously cultivated. This development progressed with the rise of an export trade in cereals to feed the industrial populations of the west. It is interesting to note that much of this newly-developed territory in Wallachia was organised on the system of métayage, the new colonists from the hills becoming tenants on a produce-sharing basis.

IN CONNECTION with this development, many of the Roumanian transhumant herdsmen gave up their pastoral life and settled as agriculturists or went into commerce. After 1918 the large estates were broken up and plots of land were given to the peasantry. This was the occasion for the return to Transylvania of some of the former emigrants who had gone to Wallachia and Moldavia, but naturally many features of the old life have disappeared, e.g. the July fairs that were formerly held high up in the mountains and did much to preserve the cultural heritage of the pastoral people.

[221] BUT, if large-scale seasonal migrations over long distances have declined, the short distance movements still play a vital part in the rural economy of the eastern Carpathians and fortunately have not as yet been divested of all their old-time ritual.

VI.—ECONOMIC ROUMANIA

AGRICULTURE.

311 162 MODERN ROUMANIA is essentially an agricultural state, as was the Old Kingdom (43 to 46 per cent of the land being arable and 22 per cent forest, whilst over 80 per cent of the population of 18 millions are agricultural workers), although it has valuable potentialities for the development of industry.

132 241 134 ARRANGED in zones round the bastion of the southern and eastern Carpathian highlands, the main agricultural regions of post-war Roumania exhibit, according to aspect and altitude, a considerable variety of climatic conditions, which is reflected in a varying emphasis in the selection of crops raised. In general, we may say that the continental nature of the climate and the resulting succession from north to south and from highland to lowland of soils, graded from poor ashen-grey podsol in the Carpathians through oak-forest loams to a rich chernoziom in the south-eastern Danube plains, has resulted, wherever the ground is sufficiently level, in a concentration on grain production. The heavier rainfall of the uplands, the relatively great humidity and shelter from the driving winds that sweep across the open plains, coupled with the exposure of less [137] fertile rocks—granites and coarse sandstones—explains the large area of forested land (24.5 per cent, nearly 7¼ million hectares) in those districts that extend into the Carpathian highlands.

243 OF THE 13 odd million hectares of arable land, cereals occupy some 37 to 39 per cent. Production varies greatly from year to year and from district to district. In the old kingdom of Wallachia-Moldavia, maize is by far the heaviest crop, particularly in Oltenia, where the summer rainfall is heavier. It is also the heaviest crop in Transylvania, the cultivated areas under maize, wheat, barley and oats being [262] respectively 4, 3, 2 and 1 million hectares. Maize is the staple crop of the peasant holder almost throughout the country, for it not only provides the bread cakes and the "mamaliga," maize pudding, the main food of the mass of the people, but also fodder for the cattle to eke out the hay in

342 absence of small fields, although a vegetable garden is a
563 normal feature. Most of them are grouped together in a small colony on a piece of steeply-sloping ground near the western end of the village that could not be used for agricultural purposes, thus emphasising the fact that they constitute an exotic element living on the outskirts of the community (see Plate XII and Fig. 11).

311 THERE is no emigration from Corbu, but the tendency is to extend cultivation by forest-cutting. A good deal of land in the Bistricioara valley is still available.

II. FARMING ACTIVITIES

THE LAND AND INHERITANCE.

428 FARMING in Corbu is carried on essentially for subsistence
241 rather than for profit. Large-scale cultivation with its attendant economies would in any case be difficult in such an environment, but it is rendered impossible by a land tenure system, intimately bound up with laws of inheritance, which permits the subdivision of land from generation to generation. On the death of the father the widow receives a quarter of the estate, the remainder being divided equally amongst all the children. Alternatively, the latter take over their portion on marriage, but the result in each case is the same—the peasant holdings not only decrease in size but portions of the same holding may be widely separated. For it does not even follow that all the land surrounding a farmstead necessarily belongs to the family residing there. It did, of course, when the holding was first formed, but marriage has in most cases added complications. A portion of the holding, for example, may belong to a married daughter living elsewhere in the village and her husband will then come periodically to cultivate it as part of his estate. Much time is wasted in this way, so wherever possible an interchange of plots is arranged, especially where the parties to the marriage belong to different villages.

423 IN a register covering about 207 hectares of privately owned land there were 133 parcels registered, sometimes more than one in the name of a particular person. Of the 133, 56 were less than one hectare each, but at least 8 of these parcels were accessories to other holdings and those owners

423 dealt with a considerably larger area. Forty-six holdings were between one and two, 18 between two and three, 8 between three and four, 3 between four and five, and 2 larger (8.8 and 19.5) hectares in extent. These holdings do not necessarily represent the whole of the land owned by a peasant.

LAND UTILISATION.

311 BROADLY SPEAKING, the land within the commune may be divided into three categories: the alluvium of the Bistricioara valley and the lower portions of its tributary valleys which is devoted to arable farming; the deforested lower slopes of the valley sides, together with the broad upper portions of some of the tributary valleys and odd patches of level ground here and there which are reserved for hay; and the rest, which is forest with the exception of the small high-altitude clearings that provide summer pasturage for the transhumant flocks and herds.

311 423 ABOUT 58 per cent of the land belongs to the state, 37 per cent to the commune, and the rest, comprising about 400 hectares, is owned by the peasants. These 400 hectares represent the arable land of the commune, whilst the state lands are entirely forest. The commune lands include a certain amount of forest, together with the hay meadows and summer pastures. The law tries to make peasants plant trees to replace those that they cut down.

CROPS.

241 [262] IN the arable area the outstanding crop is maize, from which "mamaliga," the staple food of the peasants, is made. It is sown at the beginning of May, two hillings, separated by an interval of three or four weeks, are made during June, and the crop is harvested between September 25th and October 10th. Potatoes, hemp, flax, lucerne (of which three cuttings are usually made), a little rye, sunflowers and vegetables are grown, mostly in very small patches, giving the impression of garden, rather than field, cultivation. Occasionally a small orchard adds further variety to the general pattern.

246 THE HAY CROP is of vital importance, as in all mountain communities of this kind throughout Europe. It is harvested

133 cally, of the Bulgarian plateau that projects northward to
635 the Danube delta. The northern part is covered by hills, gradually sloping southwards towards the vast wooded but waterless stretches of the Dely-Orman, part of which still lies in Bulgaria.

The Banat and the Crishana form parts of the Hungarian plain and possess the same climatic and agricultural features as the latter. The eastern part of the Banat is mountainous, forming geologically an extension of Transylvania and of the western spurs of the southern Carpathians, while the Crishana is separated from Transylvania on the east by the mountainous mass of the Bihor mountains, reaching to an altitude of 1,800 meters.

Transylvania forms a circular tableland whose mean altitude is from 350 to 600 meters, and forms the essential nucleus of Rumania, both geographically and ethnically. It is encircled to the north, east, and south by the Carpathians, which occasionally reach to an altitude of 2,000 meters in the
[132] north and 2,544 meters in the southern section. Owing to an average annual rainfall of about 35 inches, numerous streams take their rise and drain the region, breaching the mountain rim and thus forming the main ways of egress. The Somesh, Muresh, and Timish, the former two affluents of the Theiss, the latter of the Danube, connect Transylvania with the Hungarian plain and with the Banat, while to the south the river Olt flows through the Red Tower pass to join the Danube and offers the main and easiest way of access into Rumania. The whole region consists of an undulating upland cut up by ranges of hills into valleys, some of which are fairly extensive and fertile, owing to the frequency of
[311] alluvial deposits. The mountains are thickly wooded, about a third of the total area (32.19%) being under forest, and give rise to numerous streams, the presence of which explains the abundance of pasture land and meadows and accounts for the thriving live-stock rearing industry which forms the main source of the wealth of the province. The highlands of the Maramureş, to the north, form part of Transylvania, and are separated from it by the river Somesh.

Bucovina forms a geographic unit with Moldavia and used to form part of that principality prior to its occupation by the

Austrians in 1775. Bucovina, in spite of its exiguousness in arable land—about one fourth of its surface being devoted to a variety of agricultural crops and orchards—is one of the most advanced agricultural regions of Rumania, maintaining in certain parts of the valleys of the Pruth and Sereth as dense a population as 300 inhabitants per square kilometre. Its forests are better preserved than those of the other provinces of the kingdom, thanks to the careful sylvan administration the Austrians had initiated. They cover 43% of the region and form the main source from which timber is obtained in Rumania, the river Sereth being used largely for floating down the logs to the Danubian port of Galatz, whence they are exported. When the Austrians annexed Bucovina in 1775 its population was only 72,000. Thanks to their excellent administration and their efforts to develop the country, its population had surpassed 800,000 when it was reunited to Rumania; the increase was due partly, however, to the Austrian attempt at denationalizing the country by settling Ruthenian immigrants. Cernauţi, better known as Czernowitz, is a modern town, beautifully planned and with all the amenities of a western city. The spirit of its inhabitants is distinctly occidental and reminds one of the mentality of Vienna, the more so, since they have distinct leanings towards Socialism owing to the preponderance of German culture. The town used to be an important centre of traffic between Galicia and Russia, but owing to the loss of its hinterland it seems as though struck with a sudden blight while in full prosperity. It has a population of 111,147, and constitutes the third largest town of Rumania.

Table showing population and area of provinces according to census of 1930.

	Population.	Area (sq. km.)
Wallachia	5,542,467	76,583.
Moldavia	2,413,123	38,058.
Bessarabia	2,865,506	44,422.
Bucovina	845,903	10,442.
Dobrudja	811,332	23,262.
Transylvania	3,217,149	102,200.
Maramureş and Crishana	1,387,675	
Banat	942,072	
Total population	18,025,237	Area .. 294,967.

neglecting the peasants; on the contrary, they saw in them a numerous and profitable crowd of clients for the banks, the majority of which were under their control. The less pecuniary aid the peasant obtained from the State, the greater would be his need of the private bank or usurer. And so well did the latter entangle the peasants in their tentacles that within ten years of the enactment of the Land Distribuion Act the debts contracted by the peasants had surpassed the value of their lands. Thus the much-belauded agrarian revolution in Rumania was threatened with complete failure, and so another revolutionary measure had to be passed, the strangely-termed "law for the sanitation of agrarian debts," in order to save the peasantry from being dispossessed of their land.

The *Argus* of 13th February, 1932, published the following table which shows how the land was actually distributed:

Area of properties.	Total hectares.	Percentage of area.	Number of proprietors.	Percentage of total. Owners.	Average area of farm for each category.
Up to 5 hectares ...	6,280,993	43.60	3,731,403	84.20	1.94
5 to 10 hectares ...	2,919,863	20.20	435,715	11.30	6.70
10 to 50 hectares ...	2,392,689	16.60	148,860	3.90	16.07
50 to 250 hectares ...	1,505,257	10.40	18,122	0.50	83.06
Over 250 hectares ...	1,305,670	9.10	2,597	0.10	502.00
Total ...	14,404,462,	100.00	3,836,757	100.00	3.75

As one hectare sown to wheat yields approximately 1,200 kg. of wheat, and the average price of wheat during 1931 was about 2.25 lei, the revenue per hectare may be reckoned at abouf 2,700 lei. As the average holding of 84 per cent of the peasantry is about 2 hectares, the paper assumed that the revenue of each peasant household amounted approximately to some 5,400 lei, or about 160 gold francs. For the year 1931 the total revenue from agriculture was computed at 46,500 million lei, of which 21 milliards were derived from the cattle-rearing industry, 21 milliards from cereals, and 4½ milliards from other plants. Other crops were even less profitable; thus the average price of maize was 1.50 lei per kg. and the yield 1,500 kg. per hectare, so that the revenue per hectare amounted to 2,250 lei, and the figures for barley were respectively 2 lei, 1,400 kg., and 2,800 lei.

	Average for 5 years 1922—1926		1927		1928		1929		1930		1931	
	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.
Wheat	2,806	24,250	3,118	26,320	2,814	31,440	2,664	28,000	3,055	36,000	3,466	36,800
Rye	287	2,280	277	2,470	319	2,910	310	3,400	391	4,500	407	3,600
Oats	1,197	9,530	1,185	8,420	1,304	9,800	1,200	13,600	1,087	11,600	871	6,700
Barley	1,668	13,180	1,749	13,310	2,190	15,110	2,000	30,400	1,975	23,700	1,919	14,100
Maize	3,593	40,790	3,847	35,330	4,626	27,530	4,790	60,800	4,426	45,200	4,754	63,600
Total	9,551	90,003	10,176	85,850	11,253	86,790	10,944	136,200	10,934	121,100	11,417	124,800

AVERAGE CROP YIELDS IN QUINTALS PER HECTARE

		Average for 1911/15	Average for 1921/26	Average for 1926/30	1929	1930	1931
Wheat	...	11.9	8.7	9.8	9.9	11.6	10.6
Rye	...	9.0	7.9	10.1	10.8	11.9	8.7
Oats	...	9.2	7 7	10.1	11.2	10.6	7.7
Barley	...	10.5	7.6	10.4	13.3	12.0	7.4
Maize	...	13.6	10.7	10.6	13.3	10.2	13.7

The above figures show that there is a vast scope for an improvement, for in Central European countries the average yield of wheat per hectare is about 20 quintals and in Denmark and Great Britain higher yields are common with a much poorer soil than that of Rumania.

241
310
433

RUMANIA

241 The following table indicates the proportions of lands de-
311 voted to the various cultures and the distribution among the different provinces, according to official statistics for the year 1930:

Arable land in:	Area in hectares.	Percentage of total.
Old Kingdom	6,515,995	22.09
Bessarabia	2,915,941	9.88
Bucovina	311,616	1.[illegible]
Transylvania	3,113,500	10.55
Total of arable lands ...	12,857,112	43.58
Meadows and pastures ...	4,054,475	13.75
Orchards and Vineyards ...	613,614	2.08
Forests	7,134,200	24.18
Unproductive lands, roads, sites of buildings, rivers, mines, etc.	4,837,399	16.41
Total Area	29,496,700	100.00

From the above it will be seen that there is little scope for bringing more land under cultivation, and that an expansion in the output must be sought by improving the method of cultivation. Of course there is a vast expanse of marshes along the Danube which may be reclaimed—the total area of these is computed at two million hectares—and if they were turned to account they would considerably augment the arable area. It may be added that similar works of reclamation have been undertaken in Bulgaria and Greece and have been reported to be remunerative.

241 Besides cereals, industrial plants such as hemp, colza,
249 sun-flower, tobacco, sugar-beet are grown, some 399,506 hectares being sown with them. The sugar-beet industry is sufficiently developed to provide for the total requirements of the country and to allow even for an export surplus. There are 14 sugar refineries, with invested capital of 3,300 million lei and occupying some 15,000 workmen. It was reported in the *Ar*[illegible]*s* of February 20th, 1932, which took up the defence of the industry and emphasized the necessity of granting it adequate protection (since it prevented some 700 million lei from being annually remitted abroad), that the State
[651] obtained a revenue of 13.70 lei per kg., or 42 per cent of the official price at which sugar was sold; that agriculturalists obtained 20 per cent, merchants 5 per cent, manufacturing and packing accounted for the remaining 33 per cent. But when expenses were deducted the net profit available to the

'2: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Oltenia]

Kingdom is Wallachia, which is formed by Oltenia 631
and Muntenia.

OLTENIA. Oltenia is the western part of the prin- /31
cipality of Wallachia. Its boundaries are, in the west /33
and north the Carpathians, in the east the River Olt, /34
and in the south the Danube. The province covers 161
an area of about 9,640 square miles and has a population of about 1,900,000. The soil of the sub-Carpathian hills consists of sand and clay and gravel and is well watered by numerous rivulets. Here are some densely populated valleys, bordered by rich forests and grazing grounds. Farther south and extending to the Danube lies the fertile plain composed of the rich 'yellow earth'. Its character is similar to that of the lowlands of Muntenia, but it lies on a higher level and also has a higher rainfall.

The richest district of this fertile province is the 311
judet[1] of Dolj in the south-western corner of Oltenia. From here, and the similarly fertile *judets* of Mehedinti and Romanati, also on the northern bank of the Danube, high-quality maize and wheat have been exported for many years. From the hilly country farther north fruit is the chief export. In the mountainous districts forestry provides the main occupation for the local inhabitants. There is much sheep-breeding, for the grassy slopes provide good grazing.

Apart from the Danube the two most important /33
rivers of Oltenia are the Jiu and the Olt; the latter rises in Transylvania and enters Oltenia through the Red Tower Pass. Oltenia is not rich in mineral /35
resources. There is, however, oil at Govora, west of

[1] Administrative unit.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Oltenia]

[Muntenia]

The Danubian ports of Calafat and Corabia handle 361
wheat exports and also have some valuable industries.

MUNTENIA. To the east of the River Olt extends 133
Muntenia, the other province of Wallachia. It [131]
covers an area of about 20,600 square miles and has
a population of about 4,500,000. The southern and [161]
eastern boundaries of the province are formed by the Danube, the northern frontier by the Carpathians. The land surface and climate of Muntenia are similar to those of Oltenia, but the hilly region south of the Carpathians is narrower. The fertile steppes, Baragan, Burnas, Gavan and Burdeas, are situated on the northern banks of the Danube which floods the adjoining districts and forms many lakes and marshes. The highest peaks of the Carpathians in Muntenia are the Negoi and the Moldovan, both over 7,500 ft. The most important of the many rivers descending from the high mountains are the Dambovita, Jalomita, Arges and Buzau, all of which eventually flow into the Danube. The endless maize [311]
and wheat fields of Muntenia are covered in summer with heavy crops and on the steppes great flocks of sheep find their food. In spite of very dry summers and icy winters like those of Russia this region is one of the richest of Rumania and the whole of Europe.

Muntenia differs from all Rumanian provinces in [135]
that, in addition to stock breeding, the raising of high-quality crops, fishery and forestry, it possesses a source of wealth which is not found in such abundance in any other part of Europe, the oil fields of Campina and Ploesti. There the hilly, wooded 361
countryside suddenly changes into a modern in-

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Dobrudja]

131 part of the Dobrudja. The delta of the Danube is
133 formed by the three arms Chilia, Sulina and St George. It includes an area of about 1,000 square miles, in which water and land, marshes, lakes and
[503] islands feed an almost tropical vegetation. The chief communications through the delta are provided by the Sulina canal and by causeways.

• 311 The steppes of the Southern Dobrudja yield good
135 crops of wheat and maize, and the pastures maintain great herds of sheep. Mineral resources are confined to some unworked coal deposits, valuable copper near Altantepe, and sulphur.

131 The Dobrudja is about 9,300 square miles in all:
161 of this some 2,960 square miles were returned to Bulgaria in 1940. The population of the province as a whole is about 850,000. Its main value to the contesting States lies in the Black Sea stretch of
504 coast. The port of Constanza, the greatest and most
361 important on the western shores of the Black Sea, has modern harbour works built at the beginning of this century and covering an area of 60 hectares. It was through Constanza that Rumanian exports used to pass to France and Great Britain. The docks of Constanza are about 30 ft. deep and can, therefore, be used by large, sea-going ships. The harbour facilities include storage buildings for wheat and oil-tanks with a capacity for over 200,000 cubic metres of fuel, which are fed by the pipe-lines coming from Ploesti. Oil can moreover be pumped straight from the pipe-lines simultaneously into four tankers. Another great advantage is that the port is
361 completely ice-free all the winter. Constanza is the administrative centre of the Dobrudja and also a well-known seaside resort. Rail communications

1

7

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Moldavia]

133 and good pasture. The Sereth, which waters this region and runs parallel to the Pruth, flows into the Danube below Galati.

135 On the eastern slopes of the Carpathians there are large deposits of oil which have not yet been fully exploited. In the *comitat* Bacau, also in the mountain region of Moldavia, there are some valuable coal and salt mines. The salt mines of Targu-Ocna are the most important in the whole of Rumania.

•311 The majority of the people of Moldavia are
438 employed on the land. They grow wheat, maize and sugar-beet and tend the vines. Recently, successful experiments have been made with the growing of industrial crops. Timber felling provides another source of income, especially at Targu-Neamt, Piatra-Neamt and Focsani. There are important refineries at Moinesti and Solont, sugar factories at Roman and Ripiceni, and large textile works at Buhusi.

361 The capital and economic centre of Moldavia is the town of Jasi, on the western bank of the Pruth. Its population numbers about 80,000, more than half of them Jews. Jasi, lying on a number of vine-growing hills overlooking the valley of the Pruth, is an old commercial centre, which used to be visited in the middle ages by Genoese, Venetian and Greek
[368] merchants. In Jasi, with its wide streets flanked by long rows of one-storied houses, there is the oldest Rumanian University, founded by John Cuza, a famous library containing over 160,000 books, and many other cultural institutions. Jasi has a number of iron and steel works, several clothing factories and is the chief marketing centre for cattle and wine in Moldavia.

7

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

EDI Rumania EDI

[The Crisana]

in the west and Czechoslovakia in the north. The
162 inhabitants of the Crisana are Rumanians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans and some Slavs. Taken as a whole the province contains a slight Rumanian majority, but there is in the immediate frontier region a fairly homogeneous Hungarian population, which forms a local majority.

133 The western part of the Crisana has the same
311 features as the lowlands of Hungary. The types of agriculture also closely resemble those of the rest of
135 the country on both banks of the Tisza[H] (Theiss[G]). There are wide, flat fields of maize and wheat interspersed with pastures, grazed by horses and longhorn cattle. To the east the country rises and forms a chain of hills which produce good fruit and wine. Beyond are the mountains of Bihor (Bihar[H]) which form the western wall of Transylvania. These mountains are rich in coal, gold, copper, bauxite, asphalt and marble. Consequently this region maintains numerous industrial enterprises. Apart from its mineral resources and good wheat and maize the Crisana is also well known for its horses, cattle, pigs and sheep.

361 The capital of the Crisana is Oradea-Mare
438 (Nagyvarad[H], Grosswardein[G]) in the valley of the Cris (Körös[H], Kreisch[G]). Its population of about 95,000 consists of Hungarians, Rumanians, Jews, Germans and others. Oradea is the junction for five railway lines and commands all the main communications leading from the Hungarian plain to Transylvania. The town is also the seat of many industries and the chief market for the agricultural produce of the province. Arad, on the northern bank of the Mures (Maros[H]), is inhabited by 65,000 people,

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

Scaune (Haromszek[H]) which also possesses numerous industrial enterprises. Most of the rivers of Transylvania rise in the Eastern Carpathians and flow to the west and south. The Mures, flowing from east to west winds its way between the Carpathians and the 'Western Mountains' near Alba Julia (Gyulafehervar[H], Karlsburg[G]) and descends into the lowlands farther west. The Somes (Szamos[H]) reaches the plains north-west of the Transylvanian highland and eventually flows into the Tisza. Communications with Muntenia and Oltenia go over the mountain passes of Predeal, Bran and the 'Red Tower', with Moldavia over those of Buzau, Ghimes and Bicaz, and with the Bukovina over the Rodna Pass. 133

The climate of Transylvania is not as favourable for the raising of crops as that of Muntenia and the Banat. In the valleys, however, maize, wheat and rye are grown with some success. Stock-breeding is more important than agriculture. But Transylvania is very rich in mineral resources. Apart from coal, gold, copper, salt, bauxite and iron Transylvania possesses the greatest reserves of natural gas in the whole of Europe. The chemically pure methane which is used by many factories for power, as well as for cooking and lighting by many householders, could supply the whole of Transylvania for over a hundred years and make the consumption of coal unnecessary. 311 135

The capital of Transylvania is Cluj (Kolozsvar[H], Klausenburg[G]), with a population of over 105,000, consisting of Hungarians, Germans, Rumanians and Jews. The town is an important rail and road junction and the cultural centre of all the three 361

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Bukovina]

rule. It was occupied by the Russians in 1769. In 1774 the province was given to Austria, under which it remained until 1918. On 23 October the Austrian governor handed over the Bukovina to the Ukrainian inhabitants of the province; but four days later an assembly of Rumanian Bukovinians declared for the union of the province with Rumania and asked the Rumanian government for military assistance. This was forthcoming on 11 November and added to Rumania a territory of about 4,100 square miles with a population of about 870,000 (1930). Of these over 38% were Ukrainians, 34% Rumanians and 21% Germans and German-speaking Jews. The Rumanian administration began by a vigorous policy of Rumanization. The Ukrainians, who under Austrian rule had been well treated, and the Jews, were the chief sufferers, but the Germans, too, were ousted from many of their positions.[1]

More than half of the Bukovina is covered with dense forests of beech;[2] one-fifth consists of pastures; less than a third is arable land. The province borders in the west on the Carpathians, in the south on Moldavia, in the east on Moldavia and Bessarabia and in the north on Poland. The western part of the Bukovina is formed by the slopes of the Carpathians, where manganese and iron ore are found, especially in the region of Jacobeni. To the east stretches the hilly country, covered with pastures, on which good livestock is raised, and fields of maize, wheat and tobacco. Mineral resources are confined to some small deposits of coal, gold and lead, but the industry of the province is well developed.

[1] The German University of Czernowitz was completely Rumanized soon after the military occupation.

[2] The German name of the province means 'Land of the Beeches'.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

by the valleys through which flow the tributaries of /133
the Pruth and Dniester. In the south, beginning near Besarabeasca, extends the Budjak steppe which merges into the sandy soils, salt marshes and lagoons of the delta of the Danube and of the Black Sea coast. The climate of Bessarabia is the same as that /132
of the regions east of the Dniester. The summers are very hot and dry, the winters very cold with icy winds and great snowfalls. Nevertheless, crops 311
grow well in Bessarabia and 61% of the whole area is arable land. The chief products are maize, wheat, tobacco and wine and lately also soya beans. There are few factories and the only source of income for the people, apart from agriculture, is the fishing industry in the south.

The capital of Bessarabia is Kishineff (Chisinau[R]) 361
with a population of over 200,000 (1935). Here are concentrated such industrial enterprises as the province possesses, the most important being flour mills, leather factories and other secondary industries connected with agriculture.

The first colonization of Bessarabia was carried 175
out by the Romans who succeeded in occupying this 635
territory only for a short time. During the great period of migration (seventh to tenth centuries), the province was invaded by a host of tribes. Bessarabia was first occupied by Rumanians in the early fourteenth century and incorporated in Moldavia in 1367. A century and a half later Southern Bessarabia fell to Turkey, but several merchant-colonies were still administered by Genoese and Venetian traders on the Danube delta and the Black Sea coast. In the following centuries Bessarabia was often a battleground for Russian and Turkish armies, who alter-

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p 59

CHAPTER IV

ECONOMIC WEALTH OF THE COUNTRY

Greater Rumania was primarily an agricultural 433
country, but its industry held an important place 511
in the economy of South-Eastern Europe. With its fertile soil, great reserves of mineral resources and considerable water-power Rumania could have been one of the richest countries in Europe. But while the land was full of natural wealth the standard of living of the people remained a low one. Only a small part of Rumania's resources was exploited, and an even smaller part for the benefit of her inhabitants.

About three-fifths of the area of the Kingdom 311
were arable land and pastures, and over four-fifths 433
of her population were employed in agriculture, forestry and in the fishing industry. The unbalanced state of Rumania's economy in the period between the two wars is shown by the fact that in spite of the predominantly agricultural character of the country, Rumanian industry, employing only one-twentieth of the population, was responsible for half of the total production as expressed in value. Approximately two-thirds of all income from exports were also derived from industrial products, chiefly oil, of which Rumania is the foremost European exporter.

One million workers and employees, or one- 455
twentieth of the population, contributing one-half of the total yearly value of production: this is one very significant aspect of the economic struc-

315 pipeline has been completed from a secondary source of supply at Manești to convey this gas to Bucarest to supply both household and industrial requirements.

135 Iron-ore deposits are small, so that the heavy industries are very largely dependent on imports. A variety of other mineral resources, which are believed to exist in greater abundance than has so far been established, have not yet been fully surveyed.

433 Rumania has a poorly-developed industry, which lags far behind that of western European countries such as Czechoslovakia, though is ahead of all the other south-east European countries, except Hungary. Financially she is a poor country, with very limited capital resources, which has proved a severe hindrance to industrial development and has laid her open to the investment of foreign capital, which has been attracted [457] particularly by the rich mineral oil and forest resources. Skilled labour, also a vital factor in the [464] process of industrialisation, has been lacking, so that the use of foreign technicians has been essential. Other raw-material resources, though adequate, to allow the development of a sound and varied industry, are not sufficiently extensive to encourage a very rapid development independent of imported raw materials.

Industrialisation in Rumania did not start until about 1890, and the period of greatest expansion was between 1929 and 1938. The consumption industries were the first to be developed, and of these food industries are the chief, the raw materials being grown on the spot. The growth of such industries as paper, cardboard, printing, soap, chemicals and furniture, etc., followed. The location of industry in the earlier stages was governed not by such factors as the existence of cheap labour, but was built up in those areas richest in raw materials.

MAIN INDUSTRIAL REGIONS

[311] The main industrial region is in the Prahova valley, where the oilfields are to be found, followed by the Reșița district, where the existence of iron ore, coal, manganese, etc., led to the development of metallurgical and engineering facilities, as well as of such auxiliary industries as coal and wood distilleries. Gold, silver, lead, zinc and copper deposits in the Baia Mare region formed the basis for the erection of both metal and chemical factories. The presence of methane gas, salt, gold, silver and stone quarries in and around Turda determined the location of factories for production of cement, limestone, bricks, tiles, porcelain, glass, sulphuric acid, etc. In the rich forest districts of Ferdinand, Nadrag and Hunedoara, where iron ore deposits are also to be found, blast furnaces and metallurgical industries have been established. The textile industry is mainly established in Cisnădia, Piatra Neamț, Bacău and Buhuș. Apart from the regions mentioned, industry is centred in the principal towns—Bucarest, Timișoara, Brașov, Sf. Gheorghe, Arad, Galați, Brăila, Cernăuți, Cluj and Iași.

The following table gives an idea of the relative importance of the various industries, showing the amount of capital invested and value of production in each of the main groups, and also the number of factories and of personnel employed —

[3c]

728 of requirements for sulphuric-acid production. Of lesser importance were the salt and coal de-
[135] posits.

The forest resources of Northern Transylvania are estimated to have accounted for as much as
[313] 25 per cent. of pre-war timber production. Apart from timber the food and leather industries
appear to have been the most developed. This
[311] area was principally made up of forests and pastures; the arable land provided no surplus
after local needs had been covered. Of livestock
[233] losses the most outstanding feature was nearly 2 million sheep.

[496] The railway system, and particularly the railway administration, was severely handicapped by the change of frontiers, which in places cut one part of Rumania off from the other.

Caliacra and Durostor, the two ceded Dobrujan provinces, are mainly agricultural, and though producing a small surplus, contributed little to Rumania's total agricultural output. Of more significance is the cotton-growing area. There are no known mineral deposits, and industry in this area is on a very small scale, relying mainly on handicrafts.

TRANSNISTRIA

727 Transnistria is the name which has been given to the territory lying between the Dniester and the Bug, which was given to Rumania to administer in 1941 subsequent to its capture from the U.S.S.R. by Rumanian and German troops. Transnistria is part of the Southern Ukraine and is mainly agricultural, while such industry as existed has been of no use to the Rumanians on account of the heavy destruction carried out by the Russians. It is probably true to say that this territory has been more of a financial liability than an asset to Rumania on account of the heavy expenditure entailed in repairs, particularly of railways and bridges. Some little advantage has, however, been gained from the harvest of 1942-3.

241 peasant views with suspicion and often hostility all attempts at improvements in traditional methods. Even the co-operative societies have [474] made less progress than in other Danubian countries. There is need for considerable capital expenditure in grouping small farms into larger units, in providing better buildings, more implements and fertilisers. There is need for diversification of production—more fodder crops and more animal husbandry. Above all, there is need for development in industry and commerce to provide work for the surplus agricultural population.

2. Natural Conditions and Regions

132 The climate is of the extreme Continental type, with long hot summers and severe winters. Precipitation is largely concentrated in winter and early summer. During the greater part of the growing and ripening season rains are light, and from time to time serious droughts occur which may ruin the grain crops.

133 The agricultural regions correspond to the natural divisions into plain and hill country—the ●311 Danube plain and Bessarabia which comprise the greater part of the territory and produce the bulk of the crops, and the hilly and mountainous land of Transylvania and the Bucovina.

The plain is well-suited for agriculture, the soil over much of it being of the fertile *chernozem* or [134] black earth type, but the backward methods of farming and the light rainfall keep yields per acre low.

This region is not equally backward in all parts. The Rumanian Banat at the western end of the country, and formerly part of Hungary, is more prosperous and progressive. The population is [162] not purely Rumanian but includes Swabians and Saxons, descendants of the German stock systematically settled there on medium-sized peasant holdings in the eighteenth century after the cession of the territory to Austria by the Turks. Methods and yields, by Rumanian standards, are good. [231] The livestock density is higher than the average and the area produces a substantial surplus of pigs. Rural overcrowding is not as marked as elsewhere.

241 Conditions of life and methods of farming are 133 considerably worse in the plain land of the Old Kingdom. Agriculture here is as primitive as in any part of Eastern Europe, depending on an unbroken alternation of wheat and maize cultivation with little subsidiary production. Some wheat is marketed, but the maize is grown largely [311] for consumption on the farms. So little land is available per head of population that the farm population and working animals (which eat the maize stalks) can be fed only by devoting an excessive acreage to maize.

Bessarabia makes up the remainder of the plain land; conditions of settlement and farming methods are much the same as in the Old Kingdom, but the density of population is lower and there are substantial grain exports.

Given normal yields, every district of the plain area is at least self-sufficient in foodstuffs; indeed parts of it regularly produce large grain surpluses. Transitional areas between the Danube Valley and the Transylvanian plateau, such as the Carpatho-Moldavia and Carpatho-Muntenia areas, may,

[6c]

241 133 however, be slightly deficient in grain, especially in poor years.

[311] The hilly land of Transylvania and the Bucovina differs markedly from the plain. There is proportionately less arable and much more meadow, grazing and forest land. The soil is poor. Methods are not as primitive as in the plain land of the Old Kingdom, but over-crowding is more serious and output per head is consequently lower. Parts of this region are slightly deficient in grain. Though [146] the level of food consumption is low, the dietary is more varied than elsewhere in the country, less maize and more meat and dairy produce being eaten.

3. Crops

311 Of the total area of pre-war Rumania, of nearly 30 million hectares (110,000 sq. miles) and twice the area of England and Wales) about 13 million hectares, or 45 per cent. was arable. Permanent meadow, pasture and grazing occupied 14 per cent., while tree and bush crops accounted for a further 2 per cent. The remaining land was non-agricultural, forest and waste land.

243 A very high proportion of the arable—over 80 per cent.—was used for grain growing, principally maize, wheat and barley. Owing to low rainfall, use of poor seed and lack of fertilisers, yields were at a low level and fluctuated widely from year to year.

[439] Out of an average grain production of 11 million tons, 6 millions went into domestic human consumption and 1½ million were exported, the remainder going to fodder, seed and waste. Grain exports have always figured largely in the country's foreign trade. During the twenty years 1920 to 1939 they only once fell below a million tons, and in some years exceeded three million tons. In value, during the decade before the war, they formed, after petroleum products, the main item in exports.

241 No other category of crops compares with grain. Sown fodder crops took barely 5 per cent. of the arable, all other crops, including potatoes, fibres, oilseeds, tobacco and sugar beet, about 8 per cent. Peas, beans and oilseeds were grown in sufficient quantities to provide surpluses for export. Germany established two companies—Solagra in 1934 and Soya A.G. in 1940—which invested large sums in promoting oilseed cultivation. The area [144] under sunflower was raised only slightly, but that under soya rose from nil in 1933 to 103,000 ha. (254,000 acres) in 1939, but the greater part of both crops was located in Bessarabia which Rumania lost to the U.S.S.R. in 1940 (see below).

244 Production of potatoes, vegetables and sugar 247 beet was just sufficient for domestic consumption, but the tobacco crop did not quite meet requirements. Tobacco production had fallen from 20,000 tons in the late nineteen-twenties to 12,000 tons in the years just prior to the war.

248 Fruit production was undeveloped and there was little organised marketing and processing. Plums were the main crop, but three-quarters of the output was used for making brandy. Apples and other kinds of fruit, and walnuts, were produced in fair quantities, but exports were insignificant, and, owing to low quality and the lack of standardisation, there were no prospects of development.

146 Largely because of its cost, the consumption of
262 sugar is very low, except among the well-to-do in the towns. (To encourage sugar-beet growing, a high price was set by the Government.)

[785] The diet is further impoverished by the long religious fasts—seven weeks before Easter, six weeks before Christmas, two shorter summer periods, plus Wednesdays and Fridays of each week. The diet during the fast includes practically no food of animal origin. Children under 10 years do not normally observe these fasts and, in fact, usually have a better diet during these periods since more milk, eggs and butter are available for them.

The diet, though fairly adequate in energy value, is short of animal protein, fats and calcium; moreover, where maize is the principal cereal lack of vitamin B_2 may be very serious. Various symptoms of vitamin and mineral deficiencies are
[165] observed, and the high infant mortality rate—the highest in Europe—is also partly due to malnutrition. One of the most serious effects of the poor diet is the nervous disease pellagra, caused by this deficiency of the vitamin B_2 factor. In Moldavia, where maize is the staple food, about 5 per cent.
[164] of the rural population suffers from pellagra every spring. In the whole country about 3,000 deaths occur each year from this disease (compared with 4,000 in the maize-eating southern states of U.S.A.).

The average annual pre-war food consumption of Rumania is shown in the following table, with comparative figures for the United Kingdom.

Average per Head Consumption

	Rumania		*United Kingdom*	
	Kg.	*Lb.*	*Kg.*	*Lb.*
Wheat and rye	104	229	129	285
Maize	166	365	—	—
Potatoes	50	110	84	185
Sugar	5	11	43	95
Meat	17	37	63	139
Milk	70	123*	94	165*
Butter	1	2	11	24
Pig fat	4	10	5	11
Vegetable oil	1·5	3	—	—
Margarine	—	—	4	10
Calories per day	2,700		3,100	

*Pints

B. WAR-TIME CHANGES

1. Territorial Changes

728 The net effect of the territorial changes which
241 have occurred since 1939 is the loss of Northern
●311 Transylvania to Hungary and of Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. For two seasons' crops, 1940 and 1941, Rumania was without Bessarabia, but in the late summer of 1941 she not only regained Bessarabia but acquired administrative control of the Soviet territory now styled Transnistria, and this has made small contributions to the food supplies of Rumania in 1942-43. Ignoring Transnistria, however, Rumania lost 12 per cent. of her former arable area and grain production. The Transylvanian areas ceded to Hungary, though not rich agriculturally, probably needed only small imports of grain to supplement their own production, while south Dobruja, though a surplus producing area, contributed only a fraction to Rumania's total agricultural production. The country's potential agricultural export remains, therefore, substantially what it was before the war.

2. Agriculture in War Years

241 ~~Germany~~, at the outbreak of the war, looked to
722 the Danube countries, and to Rumania in particu-

423 capital expenditure on the provision of machinery, artificial
241 manures and so forth had been possible, and labour was cheap and available when required. With the small holding, these advantages can be acquired only by means of a highly-organised co-operative system and a controlled credit organisation, and there is no doubt that there has been a set-back in productiveness of large sections of the land. The large holders have been greatly handicapped in the exploitation of their land, moreover, first by government restrictions in the matter of wheat export, and second, by the great slump in wheat prices, probably also by inclement weather conditions. As a result there has been a drop of over 12 per cent in 1933 in the acreage under wheat and a corresponding rise in that under maize and barley.

241 To GET the best out of Roumanian agricultural land, im-
312 proved communications is one of the first essentials, for the removal of surplus crops, for the supply of artificial manures, particularly nitrates, and for the spread of agricultural education. The Roumanian peasant is backward in farming methods and requires help, both educational and financial, in such matters as seed selection and manuring. He uses too light a plough to get the best results from the soil and for the conservation of moisture in the soil. A system of irrigation would be of immense benefit not only in the plains but also in the valleys of the uplands. Of course, lacking the great reservoirs of water in snowfield and glacier and lake with which Switzerland and Austria are endowed, the perennial irrigation which is common in those lands cannot be so easily obtained, though much more utilisation might be made of the streams if the peasantry were more enlightened in their use. Large-scale irrigation works would necessitate the construction of reservoirs in the major river valleys to store the surplus rains of spring and early summer and the snow melt. Control of the streams is a very urgent matter, for the amount of damage they cause, in the sudden floods to which they are liable, to roads, bridges and to arable land is enormous. One of the great difficulties that the engineers have to deal with, and this may also be an important consideration in reservoir construction, is the friability of the rock material in most of the foot-hill country of the Carpathians. (This was illustrated very forcibly in a journey by car from Vatra Dornei through the Campulung district.)

241 Dry farming is practised to some extent, but is capable of
312 development in the districts of semi-steppe.

CO-OPERATION.

476 ALTHOUGH it is not by any means reduced to a science, as in Belgium and Denmark, for example, co-operation is practised by the Roumanian peasant farmer to an important extent. In Transylvania and Bessarabia, the system has for long been well established, owing to the initiative and encouragement of village priests and schoolmasters. For example, there are community herds of water buffaloes, which tend
477 to prevent deterioration of the breed. The forest industry is in the main run by co-operative societies which control the felling, local distribution and marketing of timber.

IN 1931 there were 5,200 popular co-operative banks, with over 1,150,000 members; 236 forest co-operative societies, with about 341,600 members; 1,600 consumption and supply co-operative societies, with 236,000 members; besides a number of village buying and leasing associations.

241 MUCH has been done, and efforts are continuing by propaganda and instruction, to encourage more up-to-date methods among the peasant farmers and there are a number of schools for primary instruction in agricultural method. Modern farm machinery is loaned by the Ministry of Agriculture to peasants for small fees, stud farms have been established to improve the breed of horses and cattle, and funds have been loaned to the peasant communities for the purchase of stud animals.

INDUSTRY.

135 FROM the point of view of power and raw materials for the development of industry, Roumania is also well endowed by nature. True, her supply of coal is negligible, the only deposit worth mention being that of the brown coal basin of Jiul at Lupeni in Oltenia, which is capable of producing about two million tons per annum. (The output in 1933 was in the neighbourhood of 1.4 million metric tons.) It contains much sulphur but is used to some extent in iron smelting. On the other hand, there are very rich stores of mineral oil. The oil-bearing rocks occur in abundance along the outer rim of the Carpathians in lower Miocene deposits which are

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDI Rumania EDI

MEDICAL CONDITIONS AT CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

CURTEA DE ARGEŞ is a small town of 6,831 inhabitants (in 1930), situated in the valley of the River Argeş, at an altitude of 1,400 feet.

A SERIES of wells supply the town with water, there being no system of pipes to supply running water. The drainage system is necessarily of a primitive type, the dry closet type being the one in use.

THE TOWN possesses two hospitals:

(1) A general hospital with pavilion for epidemic cases.

(2) Home for incurables—a branch of a nerve clinic in Bucharest.

THE GENERAL HOSPITAL is situated in the centre of the town on a slight eminence, a few yards from the main street. It consists of two wards, one for men and one for women. The cases are mixed, medical and surgical cases being nursed in the same ward. There are fifteen beds for men and fifteen for women. In addition there are two small wards for clean surgical cases, each containing two beds.

THE BEDS are of the usual hospital type, but placed close together about three feet apart. The mattresses and pillows are stuffed with straw and are very hard. The patients wear their own clothes. This being summer, less than one half of the beds were in use. The villagers refuse to come to hospital in summer, when there is work to be done in the fields, unless in cases of stern necessity. A belief in witchcraft and secret remedies is prevalent, so that progress as regards treatment is hampered. Epidemics of dysentery and typhoid are common. Tuberculosis is widespread, and goitre is found in all the villages in this valley. Cretinism in the children is untreated, and most villages contain cases. No medication of the water supply is undertaken. Pulmonary tuberculosis is treated in sanatoria, but other cases of tuberculosis are admitted here. Cancer is also common, but is not dealt with here—the cases are sent to Bucharest for radium treatment.

543 THE FAIRS at Curtea de Argeş are held twice a year, each
527 lasting about a week and ending respectively on August 15th
443 (Assumption) and October 25th (St. Demetri). The association with Christian festivals is a widespread feature (the word "fair" is derived from *feriæ*, feast), the fairs attracting the crowds which gather for the festivals. It can sometimes be shown that the time and place of meeting are older than Christianity and that the periodic pagan assemblies later received the sanction of the Church. The fair, at any rate, satisfies a deep peasant instinct for worship, the exchange of goods and social intercourse.

THE AUGUST fair at Curtea corresponds with the early harvests of fruit—especially the plum—and, formerly, with the cereal harvests (buckwheat and millets) which maize replaced. It is probably connected in origin with the Lammas fairs of the West. The first of August, in the ancient Celtic calendar, marked the beginning of autumn and was celebrated as a harvest festival. In Ireland the day is still called Lewy's Fair, and is traditionally associated with the lighting of fires, with games and the making of marriage matches. Lammas fair is the largest of the year in some Irish towns.

THE OCTOBER fair would seem to derive its importance primarily from the return of the stock from the mountain pastures, when cheese and wool and surplus animals can be exchanged. A feature of the October fair is the high proportion of sheep and goats among the stock offered for sale. In the French Alps, too, the autumn stock fairs are the most important of the year. The maize harvest has by this time been gathered even in the Carpathian valleys, where winter sets in early. But whatever the position may once have been, the fairs are now more concerned with goods than with stock.

543 CURTEA FAIR-GROUND is situated on the flood plain, on waste ground kept free of permanent habitations by the danger of spring floods. The scarp leading to the first river-terrace rises steeply behind and is planted with trees which provide
● [312] some shelter for peasants and animals. Here, too, under the scarp, is the well which supplies the needs of man and beast.
[496] The main railway—terminus of the line downstream to Pitesti—has extensive sidings on the first terrace immediately behind, while the branch (timber) line to Cumpana runs

The roof is steeper than in the plains and protrudes further over the house. The support is in the form of a collar. The rafters tend to be too widely spaced, which results in slight bending of the battens; but, while it makes for a weaker roof, this results in softer and more pleasing lines. The four corners are not sharp but tend to be rounded (fig. 62). Wooden shingles are almost exclusively used for roof covering. They are about 15 centimeters wide and may be as long as 3 meters. They overlap two to four times. Shorter shingles form 6-10 rows. The smaller shingles may have their ends in the form of swallow tails or other decorative shapes. The ridge shows a special development. On the windward side the first layer of shingles is made to protrude over the ridgepole (fig. 62). These shingles also have excised patterns and are very ornamental. The ridgepoles may extend slightly over the hip and have a small gabled roof, one shingle in height (fig. 62). This provides an opening for the smoke to escape through. Ornamental poles rise at either end of the ridgepole (fig. 61). 342 [335] [531]

Chimneys are lacking and the smoke may escape through openings at the ridge or otherwise through the roof, which then shows all shades of gray to black. In some areas of Oltenia in southwestern Rumania one finds wooden chimneys (fig. 65). These are made of wicker and daub and are covered with shingles. [354] [184]

A special development in the foothills of the Southern Carpathian Mountains is the privy, which is in the form of an annex located at the end of the veranda (fig. 645). [184] [514]

In general the buildings in the mountain districts show a greater variation than those of the plains. The woodwork is superior, and shows a great deal of inventiveness. The construction, however, is irregular, sloppy and often not functional. Pillars that carry no weight may be very thick, while those that must support much weight may be much too slender (Jänecke, 1918: 35-43). 342 184 [335]

Kulas (fig. 67) are found only in the mountainous regions of Oltenia in the district of Mehedinti, Gorj and Râmnicu-Vâlcea. They were built by the boyars, the wealthy landowners. The oldest ones come from the period when the Rumanian rulers were paying tribute to the sultan. The ground plan is a square 7 by 12 meters in length. The width of the walls is 30-70 centimeters. The kula (fig. 67) may have three or four stories, each about 2.5 meters in height. Each story has one room. The ground floor is used for storage; sometimes a well is built into it, and occasionally there is a subterranean escape passage. The upper floors may also be used for storage, but are mainly living quarters. Windows are generally found only on one side; the other walls are provided with loopholes. On the top floor there is generally an open veranda (čerdak) about 3 meters wide, the roof over which is supported by pillars (fig. 67). The exposure is toward the valley and the south. On the side opposite the čerdak there is a simple wooden balcony under the eaves (fig. 67). Many kulas have a privy tower attached to them. 342 712 [184] [556] [175] [312] [514]

137 *sitifolia*, *S. aizoides*, *S. aizoon*, *Erysimum Witmanni*, *Phyteuma orbiculare*, *Silene Zawadskii*, *Onobrychis montana var. transilvanica*, *Cerastium alpinum*, *C. lanatum*, *Oxytropus campestris*, *Alsine gerardi*, *Campanula alpina*, *C. carpatica*, *Alyssum repens* (endemic), *Rhinanthus alpinus*, *Rhodiola rosea*, *Sedum atratum*. In the cracks in the rocks where moisture collected were noted *Pinguicula alpina*, *P. vulgaris*, *Saxifraga aizoides*, *S. androsacea*, *Viola biflora*, *Arabis alpina*, *Achillea Schurii*, *Biscutella laevigata*, and *Androsace lactea*.

It was obvious that to make a detailed study of this interesting mountain with its forest, plateau, gullies, scree slopes, etc., and other varying ecological factors, a much longer time would have been necessary than was possible under the conditions of our visit to the country.

The Walk by Way of Bilbor, Paltiniş, Vatra Dornei, etc., and down the Bistrita River by Timber Raft to Broşteni (Brosceni).

133 This interesting excursion was made by a number of the party, and afforded a very good opportunity of seeing the country as some fifty miles were covered on foot in two days. We passed over fine slopes and through delightful valleys with their meadows bedecked with many species of flowering plants. There was time during such a walk only to notice the most salient features of the vegetation. We, however, saw hillsides where sheep were grazed quite to the top, also a mountain dairy where they were being milked. The [343] temporary shelters for those cropping the hay in the valleys at some distance from their usual habitations were interesting, and the whole family appeared to sleep there and cook their meals till the area had been cleared.

531 During our stay at Vatra Dornei, through the kindness of 341 the mayor and the prefect of the district, we were taken by car over a mountain pass down to Campulung and from thence to the wonderful walled monastery of Moldoviţa (Moldawitza) with fine sixteenth-century frescoes covering 313 its walls. The chief point of interest from a vegetation point of view was the fine spruce forests which we saw and in which felling was in progress, the logs being pushed down the mountain side to timber carts at the bottom. The next day we had evidence of the importance of the lumbering industry

313 as we proceeded down the Bistriţa river on a raft of spruce logs to Broşteni. In this way thousands of logs are transported by the current to saw mills lower down the stream. Lumbering was seen *en route* as we passed between slopes covered with fine spruce forests with here and there beech woods and also areas covered with birch.

LEAVING the raft at Broşteni we proceeded to Borsec by car and on the way saw an interesting effect of indiscriminate deforestation. On the slopes far too many trees had been cut down and a huge gully had been formed by a landslide ; a

Gullies and detrital fans resulting from deforestation in Bistrita valley.

house had been completely swept away and near by the soil was level with the top of the fencing round another house (see illustration above).

137 [133] BUDACUL (5,800 feet) was another mountain visited by members of the Vegetation Group. Spruce forest covered the slopes to a height of about 5,000 feet and there were no rocks. The last 500 feet were covered with mosses as well as *Festuca sp.* and the usual three *Vaccinia* with dwarf juniper (*Juniperus nana*). *Veratrum album* and *Hieracium* were the dominant plants in association with those mentioned on the summit, and in the woods below the following occurred : *Chrysanthemum rotundifolium*, *Scleranthus uncinatus*, *Scorzonera rosea*, *Ajuga genevensis*, *Meum*

137 *mutellina*, etc. The forester mentioned that beech forest was of no practical value but that hornbeam (*Carpinus betulus*) was sought after because of its hardness.

THE VEGETATION AROUND CORBU.

OF the vegetation around Corbu, the special village studied, little need be said: the hillsides had in many places been denuded of timber for building and domestic purposes throughout the whole length of the village.
THE following zones may be distinguished:

241 1. THE ZONE OF THE VALLEY BOTTOM (BISTRICIOARA).

THIS was devoted to agriculture, but the maize was poor in comparison with that seen on the hot Wallachian plains; patches of barley occurred chiefly on the south-facing slopes, and there were small patches of potatoes and hemp; hay was cut on the meadows near the river and on the lower slopes.

2. THE ZONE OF FOREST.

137 313 SPRUCE was the dominant tree, but on the church side of the village, particularly towards the Borsec end, stretches of Scots pine (*Pinus sylvestris*) had evidently been planted just above the valley floor. This was presumably to retain detritus and to consolidate the soil as they were planted much too closely to have any economic value for timber. Conversation with the forester on Runcul above Tulghes confirmed this fact and Dr. Pop, the botanist at Cluj, also mentioned that *Larix decidua* var. *polonica* had been planted above Corbu. The schoolmaster said that the valley floor and lower slopes had originally been covered with trees and that wood was very cheap but labour was dear. Timber plays a very great part in the domestic economy of a village like Corbu, being used for building, furniture, carts, looms, winding frames, etc., as well as for fuel.

THE TRAIN JOURNEY FROM TOPLITA (OLAH TOPLICZA) TO CLUJ.

241 137 FINALLY the train journey from Toplița to Cluj afforded another opportunity for observing the crops grown. All along the railway in the Mureș valley much maize was

231 considerable admixture of cross-bred Swiss. On the Wallachian plains we find a cross between the Moldavian cattle of the plains and the Hungarian type which gives good milk, is easily fattened for market, and makes a good draught animal. Throughout the Danube plains the powerful water buffalo is important for draught purposes and for milk, and may be seen frequently also in the Transylvanian plains.

FOREST.

137 RICH in ploughland and not ill-provided with pasture, Roumania is fortunate in a third type of land utilisation which brings her vast acreage of mountainous upland into service. Forest covers about one-quarter of the land surface. Its greatest development occurs on the sandstones of the Flysch formation. Coniferous trees clothe the higher slopes above 1,400 metres, particularly on the Moldavian and Bucovinan frontiers of Transylvania. Below the coniferous forest zone with its peaty, acid soils, stretches the zone of beech forest, mixed, on its lower edge, with oak. (It is the beech forest that has given its name to Bucovina.) Here the characteristic soil is the leached, ashen-grey podsol, yielding poor crops in the clearings unless heavily manured. This zone tongues up the valleys into the coniferous zone. It widens to 100 kilometres in the Siret and Olt basins, but narrows in Muntenia, where the high mountains drop abruptly to the agricultural plains. The beech, unfortunately, has little economic value, and to this, with its poor soil, may be attributed the survival of so large a part of the beech forest. Its chief use is for firewood.

THE OAK FOREST on the lower slopes and foot hills, with its relatively rich brown soils, has naturally suffered most at the hands of settlers, and survives to-day mainly on the ridge combs and hill-tops. There are several species of oak, and hornbeam, lime and elm appear here and there in the oak forest with beech and birch on the upper margin of distribution. In Transylvania the lower hill country has been practically cleared of forest.

313 TIMBER is one of the mainstays of life of the peasant. All the constructional work of his village—dwelling house, barns,

313 church, fencing, roofing, flooring, is of timber, and also many of his household utensils: water-buckets, jugs, spoons, etc.

It is very unfortunate that the most lucrative type of timber should be the most inaccessible. Timber from the great stands of pine has to take the slow and tortuous route down the rivers in rafts (see Plates VII and VIII) to the Danube and Black Sea. Afforestation has not reached a high stage of development as yet. The trees are propagated by naturally-sown seeds, and there are very few nurseries. Where the clearings are made, the stumps are left in the ground to add to the difficulties of the hay harvester.

221 We may sum up the tale of Roumania's agricultural assets by saying that she is well endowed by nature as regards soils and climatic conditions for the wide-spread production of grain, fruit and vegetables; that natural pasture, whether upland or lowland, is seasonal and insufficient for a satisfactory development of cattle raising, though much may be done by an intensified cultivation of fodder crops. The increased provision of communal grazing for the peasants has been a useful step. Conditions are better for sheep, which are more adaptable than cattle and are better able to stand the rigours of the hard winter. Transhumance is everywhere practised with these animals: those of the great plains moving from the Danube lowlands in the spring to the hill pastures in the summer. Local transhumance of cattle, sheep and pigs from villages of the upland valleys to the high dairies is the rule.

Land Tenure.

241 Agricultural conditions, past and present, and the marketing of the products of land-utilisation are so closely bound up with conditions of land tenure that it is relevant to include here a short summary of those conditions.

In the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the Great War, 50 per cent of the land of Old Roumania was in large holdings (over 250 acres), and in the Bucovina, where the Roumanian peasants' holdings were pitiably small, 60 per cent. About 40 per cent of the holdings were of less than twenty-five acres. In Old Roumania and Transylvania the average was only eight acres per family, in the grain lands of Bessarabia eleven, but in the Bucovina uplands

135 rich in salts. More accessible than these deposits are those of the sub-Carpathian hill country where upper Tertiary rocks are intensely folded in with salt-bearing Flysch deposits and have become impregnated with oil from the salt formations of the Flysch that has been forced up along lines of folding and fracture. Exploitation is mainly confined to the oil of these Pliocene rocks.

315 THE MAJOR oil-field follows the Carpathian arc from the neighbourhood of Piteşti through Targovişte, Ploeşti in Muntenia and northward through Bacau in Moldavia to the Polish frontier (i.e. within the districts of Dambovița, Prahova, Buzau and Bacau in the Trotuş valley). There is also a small field in the Maramureş district.

THE Prahova district is the most important, producing 65 to 70 per cent of the whole, while Dambovița produces about 25 per cent. Pre-war development of oil industry was mainly in the hands of foreigners. By the 1929 Mining Law equality of Roumanian and foreign capital is provided. By an Act of 1924 the subsoil became the property of the State, which grants new leases for a period of thirty years. The State has acquired oil plot zones as permanent reserves. Oil getting is proceeding on up-to-date lines. Deeper strata are being tapped as the upper one becomes exhausted. Modern wells now reach down to about 1,800 metres. In Prahova and Dambovița State concessions are the most productive and active (e.g. Moveni and Gura-Ocnitsei). The total output of crude oil in 1933 was 7.37 million metric tons, 19.7 of the total oil products being used for home consumption.

NATURAL GAS is also tapped in the oil-fields for gasolene and for domestic lighting and heating. It is largely used in the chemical industry. Transylvania has no oil of importance, but some useful gas-fields. Crude oil is used for steam raising in the metallurgical industry and for generating electricity: it also figures as fuel in the tile and pottery industry. Oil- and petrol-driven machinery is installed in electric factories, in pottery and tile works, and particularly in the alimentary industries.

313 TIMBER, owing to the lack of good communications and to the abundance and lavish use of the forests, remains an important item in the production of power, particularly in

313 the small industries of the remoter upland districts. It is particularly important in the wood and pulp and paper industries, and in the small textile and pottery works. Charcoal is still used for smelting.

377 ELECTRICITY is mainly generated thermally, in spite of the great potentialities of water-power provided by the rivers from the Carpathians, not to mention the Danube current. Lack of natural reservoirs in snow-field, glacier and lake means that exploitation of the hydro-electric resources would entail enormous capital expenditure in the construction of reservoirs. The sum total of direct water-power used must, however, be very great, for the number of water-wheels is legion.

17 SALT is another asset of real importance. Like the mineral oil, it is found in greatest abundance, and is most accessible, in the upper Tertiary deposits of the sub-Carpathians, in the region of greatest disturbance. Sometimes it is exposed in cliffs, sometimes it is covered with thin layers of loam. Salt mines are being worked at Slanic, at Targu-Ocna (Tergu Ocnei) in the Trotuş basin, and at Ocnele-Mare (Ocna) on
316 the Olt. In 1932 the amount extracted was 288,000 metric tons, of which 240,500 tons were for home consumption, the rest being exported to the Balkan countries and to Russia. Salt mining and marketing are state monopolies.

IN iron ore Roumania is not rich, the output being only about 90,000 tons per annum. The most important deposits lie in the mountains of the Banat and in the Poiana Ruscai (Ruszka) massif farther north, between the Mureş and the Bistra (Bisztra) tributary of the Timiş (Temes). The Reciţa (Reciţa Montana) district in the Banat mountains, opening towards Hungary, has foundries and steel works employing about 15,000 hands.

WITH the recent rise in the price of gold, the mining of that metal, which formerly was almost negligible, has become more active, and the output reached nearly 4,000 kgs. in 1933. The ore is mined in the Trachyte massif of the Bihor.

433 IN SPITE of considerable advantages in natural resources, and solicitous nursing on the part of the State, particularly in the Old Kingdom, industry in Roumania is still in its

295 by imported boots and shoes, whilst socks and stockings bought at the local fairs are beginning to be preferred to the traditional method of bandaging the feet (see Appendix V).

WOOD.

312 THE most characteristic of the other local occupations are concerned with wood. Each peasant is allowed a certain amount of timber annually, the cutting of which is arranged by the Forestry Co-operative Society, but for every tree [531] felled a new one has to be planted. Among the men of the village the making of wooden spoons, jugs and plates, often elaborately carved, is a favourite pursuit, though it is being threatened by cheap imported metal goods, so that in this, as in other ways, a rapid transition from medieval to modern conditions seems likely to occur in the near future.

THE GREEK CATHOLIC PRIEST.

793 ALTHOUGH primarily concerned with the spiritual welfare of his flock, the Greek Catholic (Uniate) priest in Corbu, as elsewhere in Roumania, is intimately bound up with the economic life of the community. Following the rule of the Eastern and Uniate Churches for their secular clergy with a cure of souls, the priest is married and depends to a considerable extent upon his land for his maintenance. He is often trusted with public and private business on behalf of the commune and its members. To him the peasants may bring their maize to be ground, their sunflower seeds to be crushed, their timber to be sawn and their cloth to be scoured. The water of the Bistricioara that runs past the priest's house is harnessed to provide power at Corbu for these operations, and from the services he thus renders to the villagers the priest gets part of his income.

IV. THE FUTURE

0790 IT IS CLEAR from the foregoing account that Corbu is a mountain community that is rapidly approaching a crisis in its history. The old economic self-sufficiency is being undermined by the insidious influence of the journeyman, and the cheapness of the new wares that he is introducing will tend to increase the amount of leisure that the peasant already enjoys by releasing labour that he has hitherto expended on

FARMING AROUND CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

AMY R. BURGESS

133 IN THE region of Curtea de Argeş the river flows in a valley of varying width, floored with fine sandy alluvium and bounded by somewhat rounded hills. Some traces of river terraces are discernible.

THE LAND of this region can be divided into four categories: (*a*) arable, (*b*) hay meadows, (*c*) forest, (*d*) high mountain pasture. The arable land is principally on the first terrace, but stretches both down the slope to the valley bottom and up the slope to the second terrace. The hay meadows are above the arable land, spreading upwards towards the [137] forest. The forests comprise 75 per cent of the total area, and consist mainly of timber trees, such as beech and pine, together with a considerable number of walnut trees. The high pastures are above the forest belt and may be as much as fifty kilometres away from the village centre of the commune to which they belong.

423 THE ARABLE land is owned by the peasants, holdings ranging from less than one hectare to fifty hectares, the majority being from two to five hectares. The smallness of the holding [428] is due partly to the laws of inheritance, by which the land is divided between the children on the death of the owner, and partly to the fact that the district is so hilly that only small areas are available for cultivation.

241 476 THE HAY meadows belong to the commune and are both worked and used collectively by the peasants, all necessary organization being in the hands of the mayor and committee.

471 [313] THE FORESTS are largely state-owned, although some portions belong to the commune, in which case the peasants are allowed to cut for their own personal use (house-building, implements, etc.), but not for profit.

[233] THE HIGH pastures belong to the commune; the peasants pay a small fee to the commune for their use (20 lei per head per season for sheep, rather more for cattle).

132 AN IMPORTANT climatic feature affecting agriculture is the shortness of the summer, late spring and early autumn frosts

313



Kumpana. Forestry. Logs, etc., lying by stream-side ready to be dealt with. *Photo by H. J. Howard*

Forestry. Kumpana. A kind of barrage where logs are let through into shoots graded as regards size. They are then rolled down to side of railway and rolled up inclines on to the trucks. *Photo by H. J. Howard*

[page 40a]

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDI Rumania EDI

PLATE X

●313



Kumpana. Forestry. As the logs pass down the "shoots" a man on the elevated platform sees that logs of even lengths are let out at side of "shoot" for loading on to the trucks seen on left-hand side. *Photo by H. J. Howard*

252
342

The Argeş District. Visit to Forestry section (Kumpana). Inside of forestry hut, showing large open stove for cooking meals. Huge logs of wood were being burnt on a stone hearth. There were sleeping benches for the lumber-jacks all round the sides of the hut. *Photo by H. J. Howard*

[page 406]

231 owner's farm, where the cows are kept in sheds, and the sheep, which are more hardy, are penned on the arable land, particularly on the maize stubble. Both sheep and cattle are fed on fodder crops during the winter. The surplus animals are sold at the autumn fair, and form a source of revenue.

876 [236] [234] WHILST ON the high pastures the sheep are clipped twice, and the wool is divided amongst the peasants in proportion to the number of animals sent up. The cheese is usually shared by the owners of the animals in the same way, the mayor and his committee being responsible for the correct apportionment. In the Valley of the Argeş co-operative dealers from Bucharest frequently buy the cheese "in bulk" direct from the commune, and the monetary value is shared between the owners of the animals.

231 OXEN ARE used almost exclusively for draught purposes, the numbers kept in this district being somewhat in excess of the farmers' requirements, owing to their use for lumbering (see below).

241 [369] [438] PEASANT FARMING in the Valley of the Argeş is no longer entirely on a subsistence basis. Two factors have tended to modify it. Firstly, the position of the valley, opening as it does directly on the Wallachian Plain, with its rich grain lands and containing the capital Bucharest, has allowed commercial intercourse to develop. The Argeş peasant no longer cultivates wheat; he does not mind if his maize crop is good enough for fodder only, for he can buy both wheat and maize from the plain. Further, he finds a ready market and so a money income in Bucharest for his surplus fruit, particularly apples, and cheese. Secondly, the forests form a valuable asset to the peasant. During the winter felling takes place in the upper basin of the Argeş; in spring and summer the timber is transported, and work in the State mill in Curtea goes on all the year round. Practically every household has somebody working in the timber trade, and the money so earned (as much as 100 lei per day for a man supplying his own yoke of oxen) reduces the dependence of the family on the farm.

● 313

874 242 AT CURTEA DE ARGEŞ is the School of Agriculture, Regina Elizabeta. Although only a small percentage of its pupils is local, it is gradually influencing the farming of the neighbourhood. Experiments in cultivation, plant breeding and

RUMANIA

433 The alimentary industry includes the important sections of sugar-refining, milling, alcohol distillation, and brewing.

[288] The textile industries have shown the greatest expansion, owing to the excessive protection they have enjoyed. The woollen industry is capable now of producing excellent cloths, most of the yarn being supplied by the local spinning mills, which employ wools produced in the country.

The artificial silk and cotton mills obtain their yarn from abroad, practically duty free, and are able to supply about three-fourths of the local requirements. Only the better qualities of cottons are imported, while foreign silks are practically excluded by the prohibitive duty imposed on them.

The knitting industry has also secured a complete control of the market, and no foreign knitted articles are imported.

[313] The lumber industry was some time ago one of the most prosperous in the country. Until 1925 its output was about 3,200,000 cubic metres of timber, out of which some two million cubic metres were exported annually. Since 1930 the demand has fallen off very considerably, and huge stocks have accumulated, and as prices have dropped the sawmills are registering immense losses. Thus one well-known timber firm, the Foresta, had sustained a loss of 250 million lei during 1930, and it may be said that actually all the timber industry is in a very precarious condition, owing to its inability to cope with Russian competition.

[282] The leather industry obtains all its raw material locally, and its production of sole leather and uppers is sufficient for the home requirements. Even gloves, leather cases, etc., are manufactured locally, and only a very limited quantity of fine and superior leather is now being imported.

000 The following table shows a detailed list of imports during 1930:

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1
[The Crisana]
[Maramures]

mostly Hungarians, and occupies a similarly important position. Here there are numerous factories, including mills, railway shops and locomotive works and textile factories. Satu-Mare (Szatmar[H]), with 60,000 inhabitants, is the largest town in the Northern Crisana. 361 438

After the Great War the Crisana, which was first occupied by the Hungarians in the tenth century and subsequently colonized by them, was awarded to Rumania. Under the Vienna Award of 1940 part of the Crisana was returned to Hungary, with a considerable Rumanian population. 175

By the same decision the province of Maramures (Marmaros[H]) (about 1,350 square miles), inhabited by over 150,000 people, acquired by Rumania in 1918, was returned to Hungary. Geographically Maramures is a continuation of the Czechoslovak province of Ruthenia. It is enclosed on all sides by chains of mountains covered with thick forests whose great density is rare even in the Carpathians, which are famous for their wealth of trees. It is not easily accessible except by a solitary railway line which comes from Transylvania and leads to Ruthenia. The small population consists of Ruthenians, Rumanians, Jews, Slovaks and Hungarians and is typical of the medley of races to be found in quite small areas of this part of Europe. Owing to the mountainous nature of the country there is little agriculture. The chief occupation of the inhabitants is the felling of trees. The most valuable asset of the province is its mineral wealth. There is oil, gold, copper, salt and coal. The capital and only major town of Maramures is Sighet (Marmaros-Sziget[H]) with a large Jewish population. Sighet, a town of 133 162 [496] 313 135 361

241 The basis of Rumanian economy is agriculture in that some 80 per cent. of the population derive their livelihood from the land and agriculture provides a high proportion of the national income. [315] During recent years, however, the expansion of the oil industry has meant that agricultural pro- [439] duce has played a decreasing part in the country's exports, having been superseded by oil, exports of which amounted to 48 per cent. of the total export trade in 1938, compared with 19 per cent. in 1927; while grain exports in 1938 represented 23 per cent. compared with 46 per cent. in 1927.

In spite of the importance of agriculture to national prosperity farming methods are backward and per acre crop yields are among the lowest in Europe. Attention is particularly given to growing cereals, and of these maize is the chief, [231] providing a large surplus for export (apart from the war years). Livestock density is low, which is one of the weaknesses of Rumanian agriculture, the Banat being the only district in which numbers are fairly high, and farming approaches the [439] intensive system. It must be stressed that the relatively large export surplus, which consists of wheat, maize, barley, oilseeds and pulses, livestock, oilcake, etc., is only made possible by [146] the very low nutritional level which prevails, and that if this were raised to anything like western European standards exports would be commensurately reduced.

248 Since the war more attention has been paid to 249 the growth of industrial crops such as sunflower, soya, cotton, hemp and flax, and the cultivation of rubber-bearing plants has been started following the finding of the *Kok Saghys* plant left by the Russians in Bessarabia. Though some success has been achieved in increasing the areas under textile fibres, and yields have been slightly higher, the hoped for increases in sova and sunflower cultivation have not been achieved due to unfavourable weather conditions and to general wartime dislocation.

●313 Rumania's forest resources, though extensive, have suffered severely from a consistent policy of over-exploitation, and, while providing the basis of a fairly important industry during the period between the two wars, have been so depleted that cutting will have to be very restricted for a number of years if they are to be allowed to recover. The loss of Northern Transylvania has affected the timber industry in particular, as a high proportion of the forest resources were located there, and in that district this industry was better developed than elsewhere in the country.

IMPORTANCE OF OIL

315 Oil plays a major part, not only in Rumania's foreign trade, but also in covering her domestic fuel requirements, to a large extent replacing coal, reserves of which are small and of low quality. Since the war and the resulting pressure which Germany has exerted to obtain increased quantities of oil for her armies, (combined with the consistent drop in the rate of production between 1936 and 1941), serious attempts have been made to find alternative sources of fuel. The enormous reserves of natural gas existing in Transylvania, which were exploited only very slightly before the war, are being used increasingly as a source of fuel to supply local industries, and a

728 of requirements for sulphuric-acid production. Of lesser importance were the salt and coal de-
[135] posits.

The forest resources of Northern Transylvania are estimated to have accounted for as much as
[313] 25 per cent. of pre-war timber production. Apart from timber the food and leather industries appear to have been the most developed. This
[311] area was principally made up of forests and pastures; the arable land provided no surplus after local needs had been covered. Of livestock
[233] losses the most outstanding feature was nearly 2 million sheep.

[496] The railway system, and particularly the railway administration, was severely handicapped by the change of frontiers, which in places cut one part of Rumania off from the other.

Caliacra and Durostor, the two ceded Dobrujan provinces, are mainly agricultural, and though producing a small surplus, contributed little to Rumania's total agricultural output. Of more significance is the cotton-growing area. There are no known mineral deposits, and industry in this area is on a very small scale, relying mainly on handicrafts.

TRANSNISTRIA

727 Transnistria is the name which has been given to the territory lying between the Dniester and the Bug, which was given to Rumania to administer in 1941 subsequent to its capture from the U.S.S.R. by Rumanian and German troops. Transnistria is part of the Southern Ukraine and is mainly agricultural, while such industry as existed has been of no use to the Rumanians on account of the heavy destruction carried out by the Russians. It is probably true to say that this territory has been more of a financial liability than an asset to Rumania on account of the heavy expenditure entailed in repairs, particularly of railways and bridges. Some little advantage has, however, been gained from the harvest of 1942-3.

B. TIMBER

313 NOTE: *All for other south-eastern European countries, the statistical and other data available on forest conditions is most insufficient. It has, therefore, been necessary to refer to the works of private foresters who differ considerably in their statements and conclusions. The statements which follow are, it is believed, substantially accurate, but must be considered with a certain degree of reserve.*

I. PRE-WAR SITUATION

The forests of Rumania were one of its most important natural resources and of much value to the country's general economic welfare. A large part of the fuel requirements were supplied in wood, in addition to which the country was self-sufficient in its needs for constructional timber, etc., whilst timber exports took third place after grain and oil. The timber industry was, however, over-expanded in relation to the size of the forests, the normal yield of which although able to cover domestic requirements, was not sufficient to meet the heavy extra demands for export. The result was that over many years up to the outbreak of the present war, the relatively high exports were only made possible by considerably overcutting the forests.

1. Area, Location and Species

137 According to the last known survey, Rumania's forest land covered about 7.1 million ha. (27,000 sq. miles), of which about 90 per cent., or 6.4 million ha., were stocked—equalling 22 per cent. of the total land surface. As was to be found in all Balkan countries, the forests were dominated by broadleaf species, the area under conifers being only 25 per cent.

The following table shows the division of the stocked forest area by regions and species, in '000 hectares :—

137 Banat and in west Transylvania; and of these 15 per cent. are not easily accessible and are unremunerative to exploit on account of heavy capital expenditure necessary to build suitable roads and railways. The forests of the plains were of minor importance, especially since they consisted almost entirely of young trees yielding firewood only.

Beech was the principal forest tree, except in the plains, where it gave way to various species of oak. The eastern Carpathians constituted the only predominantly coniferous regions.

[423] The following table shows how the forests were owned and managed; column 1 shows the area in million Hectares, column 2 the equivalent in square miles:—

	I	II	% of Total
State owned	1.9	7.3	30
Owned by communes, churches, etc.	2.0	7.7	30
Owned by companies and private persons.. ..	2.5	9.6	40

About 70 per cent. of the forests were treated as "high forests" (i.e., allowed to grow naturally) and the remainder were under varying forms of "coppice management" (i.e., allowed to grow from roots after cutting, thus producing small timber).

2. Annual Increment and Domestic Consumption

313 439 Chiefly as a result of Rumania's Agrarian Reform policy in 1924 and 1925 of clear-cutting huge forest areas to provide peasants with additional agricultural land, very large volumes of timber became available for the export market, with the result that a wrong impression was created abroad that Rumania was a country with a large export surplus of timber.

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943
ED1 Rumania ED1

313 According to V. Sabau, a leading Rumanian forester, the country's estimated domestic consumption and total forest growth in the early 1930's were :—

[31e]

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943 ED1 Rumania ED1

313
137

	Consumption			
	Per capita	Total	Annual growth	Surplus
	solid cu. m.	'000 *solid cu. m.*	'000 *solid cu. m.*	'000 *solid cu. m.*
Firewood	0·50	9,250	12,500	3,340
Timber :—				
Conifers ..	0·17	3,122	3,230	108
Broadleaf ..	0·14	2,660	2,800	140
	0·81	15,032	18,620	3,588

[31f]

313
[439]

CHAPTER VI

From this it appears that there was a surplus for export of only about 248,000 cubic metres of timber, but about 3.3 million cubic metres of firewood.

The figures for firewood growth and consumption include branches and other unmerchantable parts of the tree (*Reisholz*). Growth of these was about 3.6 million cubic metres, and although it is not known what quantity of these were included in consumption, this is not thought to be large, as such wood is mostly left in the forests. It was considered, therefore, that the greater part of the firewood surplus consisted of branches, etc., not sufficiently merchantable to be regarded as available for export.

If *Reisholz* is excluded, net merchantable growth was about 15 million cubic metres consisting of about 9 million cubic metres firewood and 6 million cubic metres timber :—

		'000 *cubic metres*
Conifers	..	3,230
Broadleaf*	..	11,787
		15,017

* Of which (in '000 cubic metres) beech 5,641 ; oak 2,933 ; and sundry 3,212.

3. Annual Cut

As far as can be ascertained, average annual felling, in millions of solid cubic metres, over a number of years was as follows :—

		Annual cut	*Of which Conifers*
1920/21	..	16.3	3.3
1922/26	..	20.7	5.8
1927/30	..	19.3	5.6
1931/37	..	17.2	4.4

This is equivalent to an average annual cut over the period 1920/1937 of 18.4 million cubic metres, an excess of 3.4 million cubic metres over net growth, or an exploitation of 120 per cent. per annum. The result of this over-exploitation was that by 1936 a large area, estimated to be as much as 3 million ha., was considered unsuitable for further production.

The conifers particularly were overcut, to the extent of an average of 50 per cent. of their growth. This was principally due to the heavy export demand for these, but can be explained in part by the fact that much of the Rumanian beech yields poor quality timber suitable only for firewood. This is shown more clearly in the details of cut by species for 1930 (the only available figures of such cutting) reproduced in Table 1 on page 33. No details of cut by trade categories are known for any year, but after firewood the largest individual item was sawlogs.

4. Timber Industry

After 1920, with the help of foreign capital, the sawmill industry was considerably over-expanded compared with the normal yield of the forests, and by 1928 there were estimated to be 570 mills in operation, which consumed in that year more than 12 million cubic metres of logs. Subsequently, as a result of world economic conditions and increasing competition on the European markets from the U.S.S.R., sawmilling activity, and with it forest exploitation, declined to some extent; but the industry was nevertheless still over-developed up to the outbreak of war.

In 1938 there were 713 timber concerns employing 43,326 people, of which 478 were sawmills with 37,693 employees; the balance consisted mostly of joinery works, furniture factories, and

1 [Cf. table, cat. 313, p. 31 f - Analyst]
2 L. c., p. 33 a -- Analyst]

[32 a]

●313 cooperage and boxmaking plants. The distribution of these is shown in Table II although separation of the sawmills from the other industries is not possible. There were also three match factories, which covered internal requirements, and four wood-distillation plants, two of which, situated at Margina and Resita, appeared to be relatively large concerns.

5. Exports

313 439 Rumania's timber exports between 1935 and 1938 averaged 1.8 million cubic metres per annum, which was 5 per cent. of total European exports, and gave her the leading place among south-east European countries. Almost 90 per cent. of total exports were conifers, whilst, as the following table shows, sawn goods made up by far the greater part —

Categories	*Average annual exports 1935–38 (in '000 cubic metres)*	%
Sawn goods	1,280	71
Firewood	222	12
Hewn goods	113	6
Sawlogs	71	4
Boxboard, etc	37	2
Pitwood	34	2
Pulpwood	26	1½
Sleepers	21	1½
Total	1,801	100

Exports were made to many countries, including South America, but the most important customers were Hungary, Germany, U.K., Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Greece. Trade with Germany in the immediate years prior to the war was tending to increase.

6. Employment

313 [+64] It was estimated by a qualified expert that the forests gave direct or indirect employment to 750,000 people (about 10 per cent. of the total labour force) in forest work, transport of forest produce and in the timber industry and trade. At least 250,000 were engaged in actual forestry work, but this number probably included part-time and seasonal workers.

7. Transport

[505] [497] Water transport played but a small part in the carriage of timber, carrying only about 700,000 cubic metres per annum. By far the greater reliance was placed on transport by railways, and some 10 million cubic metres were carried by this service each year.

II. PRESENT SITUATION

Under war conditions Rumania has been faced with increasing difficulties for her supply of timber, and as most of the quantities now made available are required for home consumption, she has very little significance as an exporter.

The forest area lost by the cession of part of Transylvania is estimated to be about 1.4 million ha., and as this area accounted for 25 per cent. of pre-war production its loss is of serious consequence. It is estimated that under existing circumstances the maximum annual cut that is possible, if the present forest area is to be maintained, is 12 million cubic metres.

About 210 timber-processing concerns, of which 178 were sawmills, were also lost with Northern Transylvania, but in view of the over-expansion of the timber industry these losses are probably of less serious consequence.

●313 Present fellings are not known, but a considerable shortage of forest workers and draught animals, coupled with poor transport conditions generally, are making it impossible to fell and to distribute sufficient timber to meet all home demands. These have been considerably increased by the need for timber for military purposes both in the country and at the front, and for reconstruction work in the war-damaged areas of Bessarabia, Bucovina and Transnistria. The result is a heavy and at times serious shortage of supplies.

[439] Exports, which had already fallen to about 562,000 cubic metres in 1940, further declined after the loss of Transylvania and were only some 210,000 cubic metres in 1941, but of these about 180,000 cubic metres were old accumulated stocks of sawn goods which were sold to Germany and the U.S.S.R. at the beginning of that year. No information has yet been received concerning 1942 exports, but the increasing difficulties of production make it unlikely that these were of any importance, and probably did not exceed 50,000 cubic metres.

[656] The forests are now placed under Government control and many decrees have been published regulating and defining the quantities and dimensions of trees that may be felled. Maximum prices have been fixed for all classes of timber, and a strict rationing of firewood introduced, whilst in 1942 an export embargo was placed on several categories of timber, principally soft woods.

After the cession of Northern Transylvania, German forestry experts visited the country to advise on proper forestry methods, and although there is no real evidence of what was decided, there are indications that the country is now more forestry-minded, and that more regard is being paid to reafforestation and other necessary work. These are, however, long-term policies and can have very little immediate effect or improvement on the country's present difficult situation.

TABLES

1. Details of Cut and Ownership, 1930

[423]

Timber	*State*	*Communes*	*Private*	*Total*
	(in '000 *solid cubic metres*)			
Conifers ..	570	2,450	2,850	5,870
Beech ..	1,080	300	480	1,860
Oak, etc. ..	350	390	520	1,260
Firewood ..	2,820	2,130	6,930	11,880
Total ..	4,820	5,270	10,780	20,870

2. Distribution of Timber Industry, 1938

	Units	*Personnel*
Total timber industry ..	713	43,326
of which:		
Sawmills	478	37,693
Distribution of total timber industry by administrative regions:—		
Olt	18	1,756
Bucegi	159	7,177
Marea	3	38
Dunarea de Jos ..	29	932
Nistru	3	109
Prut	67	6,222
Suceava	110	6,555
Mureş	155	9,196
Someş	83	7,163
Timiş	86	4,178

C. PAPER AND PULP

289
313

With a normal consumption of only 3·3 kg. (7¼ lb.) of paper and board per head of the population compared with 37 kg. (81·4 lb.) in Great Britain, Rumania is one of the smallest consumers in Europe. The country's requirements in ordinary grades of paper and board are well covered by about thirteen paper mills, some of which also manufacture both chemical and mechanical wood pulp.

Newsprint requirements are met by home production.

Pre-war (1936) production of chemical pulp was 37,000 tons and of mechanical wood pulp 6,000 tons, while the output of paper in the same year was 48,000 tons, and of cardboard 10,000 tons.

[439] Small imports of sulphate pulp normally came from Sweden, and of mechanical wood pulp from Austria.

In 1940 the production of paper rose to 105,150 tons, of which little more than half was sold internally and about 90 per cent. came from mills in the Rumanian Paper Cartel.

By the early part of 1942 a critical situation had arisen due to scarcity of fuel and raw materials.

The principal pulp and paper mills having four or five machines each and an annual capacity each of 24,30,000 tons of paper are as follows:—

(a) Fabrica de Celuloză Zărnești S.A., Brașov.
(b) "Letea" Fabrica de Hârtie Bacău.
(c) Fabrica de Hârtie "Bușteni" (C. & S. Schiel) at Bușteni.

The remaining mills, about ten in number, are much smaller, and three of them, with a combined capacity of 6,7,000 tons per annum, have come under Hungarian ownership following the Vienna Award.

Zărnești Cellulose Mill is of primary importance as the main source of chemical wood pulp for domestic consumption and export, and it is believed that this factory is now making special bleached cellulose for the manufacture of explosives. Elaborate machinery imported from Germany was installed with fair promptitude.

The utilisation of reeds from the Danube delta has not yet (July 1943) begun, although much publicity has been given to this project in the local and German press, but a concession has been granted to a German-Rumanian Society, "Delta A.G." The Zărnești and Bușteni Paper Mills are participating and investigations are under way. A similar concession asked for by the Snia Viscosa concern in Italy is said to have been refused.

[434] In 1942 consumption of paper in the first half of the year amounted to over 90 per cent. of production, but in the second half-year the Cabinet imposed fresh restrictions on consumption in order to remedy the increasing shortage.

There is a considerable trade with the Italian Government in bitumenised cardboard for walling and roofing military huts, and it is believed
[439] that a part of these are imported from Scandinavia and exported (after bitumenising) to Italy and the U.S.S.R. for the Italian Expeditionary Forces. It is also likely that, since the bombing raids on Italy, extra demands have been made for repair purposes.

[33 b]

CHAPTER XI

463 industrial labour. One-third of all workers en-
438 gaged in industry are independent artisans, on whom the community is dependent for its services but who do not play any important part in war production. In certain of the larger armament works German controllers have effected a considerable degree of rationalisation.

3. Mining

316 There is a shortage of miners; Russian prisoners
727 of war have been employed in mining during 1942. Many miners were reported to have been included in the territory transferred to Hungary.

4. Armament Works

719 There is a general shortage of labour in metal
464 and engineering factories, particularly of skilled labour. A 12-hour day was legalised at the beginning of 1942, but it is doubtful if in fact a 12-hour day is ever worked.

5. Timber

313 There is a shortage of labour, both for lumbering
464 and for timber manufacture.

6. Textiles and Clothing

464 The total number of workers in these industries
288 has probably fallen considerably, due to reduction
294 of available raw materials. The delivery of supplies to individual mills seems to be somewhat erratic, and there is evidence of considerable part-time work, for instance in a survey of some 43 factories in December, 1942, 11 were working full time, 21 on a reduced scale, and 11 at a very reduced scale.

7. Building

499 The extent of fortification building and general
712 road and rail construction in Rumania is unknown,
464 but in the second half of 1942 there was evidence of a scarcity of general labour for such projects, and of Russian prisoners of war working on rail construction.

438 In the other branches of occupation, transport
464 services, etc., there is no evidence of labour
[759] shortage, apart from doctors, many of whom have been mobilised for the army.

D. CONTROL OF LABOUR

1. The Youth Labour Service

466 A youth labour service founded on the German
883 model was established in March 1941. The leaders were trained in Germany, but it was only in April 1942 that the labour camps began to function. Youths are called up in their 19th–20th year, and the period of service lasts 7 months.

(*See* Part II, Chapter V.B. for further details.)

2. Civil Mobilisation

466 A general civil mobilisation decree was passed in May 1941 by which (1) employment cards were introduced; (2) men and women aged 20–57 were liable to compulsory employment if not employed.

Two subsequent decrees were published in March and May 1943, one for the reorganisation of agriculture, forestry and fishing, and the second for the reorganisation of industry. Each of these decrees gave full powers to the appropriate authorities for the mobilisation and transfer of labour.

In addition to the general labour decrees which have so far had little influence on the labour situation there have been regional decrees applying to individual localities, e.g. in Bessarabia, in February 1942 all the inhabitants aged 22–55 were called upon for compulsory agricultural labour unless already employed.

2. Fertilisers

387 Since the consumption of chemical fertilisers in Rumania is one of the lowest among the European countries, their production is comparatively small.

Synthetic nitrogen compounds are manufactured by the S.A. Nitrogen at Dicio San Martin, where the company has a small Fauser synthetic ammonia plant and a calcium cyanamide works. No recent reliable data exists regarding output, but before the war the Fauser plant is stated to have treated 200 metric tons of nitrogen annually, and the production of cyanamide amounted to about 500 metric tons. The quantity of superphosphate manufactured averaged about 8,000 tons before the war. Owing to the cutting-off of supplies of rock phosphate, production of superphosphate is now probably nil. There was no domestic production of potash salts, and pre-war imports were very small.

3. Wood-Distillation Products

314 385 This industry is almost entirely controlled by Marzina Reşiţa destilariile de lemn unite S.A.R., Timisoara. Prior to the outbreak of the war about 170,000 tons of beech wood were worked per year. The following is a list of some of the products obtained, showing the average annual tonnage produced :—

Wood charcoal	31,000
Methanol	2,000
Calcium acetate	1,400
Acetic acid	50
Formaldehyde	130
Acetone and derivatives ..	1,100

4. Soap and Glycerine

388 389 Rumania is an important producer of sunflower, rape and pumpkin seeds, and has, therefore, an ample supply of oil for her soap industry. The production of soap amounts to 33,000 tons and is in the hands of several factories, the only one of which is of striking importance being Stella S.A. of Bucarest. Glycerine production, which is a by-product of the soap industry, amounted to 350 tons, most of which was utilised by the explosives industry. Since the war the quality of the soap has markedly deteriorated. Though the present ration of 250 grams per head per month is a fairly generous one, it is not fully met and distribution is very bad. The production of glycerine is estimated to have fallen to about 200 tons, while imports amounted to 100 tons in 1941 compared with an average of about 240 tons in 1936-1938.

5. Paints and Varnish

386 The paint and varnish industry, in which some 60 small firms are engaged, is sufficiently well developed to meet—under normal conditions—the greater part of Rumanian requirements in this particular sphere. The industry is, however, still dependent to some extent on imports of oil paints.

6. Pharmaceuticals

278 Production of pharmaceuticals is on a very small scale, being sufficient to meet only about one-third of requirements, the remainder being covered by imports, mainly from Germany.

7. Explosives

339 The explosives industry is quite inadequate to cover wartime requirements, and these have to be

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

year. While the principal Rumanian imports were manufactured goods—textiles, iron and steel products, and machinery—the nature of these imports does show a fairly important shift between 1920 and 1938. Increasing imports of raw materials and semifinished goods (from 2 to 20 per cent of total value of imports) and a decline in finished manufactured goods (from 88 to 74 per cent) reflect the move toward industrialization. Rumania's principal exports were agricultural products (chiefly grain), timber, and petroleum products.[15] During the interwar years petroleum became the most important export, replacing cereals, which never regained their pre-1914 position. 439

The significance of petroleum in Rumania commerce was, of course, very great; Rumania had a more favorable balance of trade than the other Balkan states, thanks largely to its oil shipments. In addition to its importance as an export the oil industry provided the state in normal years with nearly one-third of its revenue, not including benefits to the railways which were state-operated. But while petroleum meant a great deal to Rumania's balance of trade, its importance to the whole economy should not be overemphasized. A large part of the industry was owned by foreigners, and a considerable proportion of the proceeds from exports did not reach the country in terms of foreign exchange. Moreover, the petroleum industry, being something of a lucky windfall and detached from the rest of the Rumanian economy, did not greatly influence the pattern of exports, though it added to their total value. Except for oil, Rumania's exports resembled those of the other eastern European agrarian states, with perhaps a greater emphasis upon cereals. 439 315

What were the disadvantages of this form of commerce which should have driven Rumanian governments to strain the economy in an effort to industrialize? In recent years there has been a widespread reaction against the classical theory of the international division of labor and an increasing belief that agricultural countries are trading at a disadvantage, regardless of the doctrine of comparative costs. This reaction has taken a number of forms, ranging from a reaffirmation of Friedrich List's ideas to an advocacy of economic autarky. Without becoming involved in the theory of international trade, one may observe at least three concrete ways in which the principle of international division of labor fails to satisfy an agrarian state. 439

In the first place, the existing international division of labor and

15. In 1928–30 the principal exports, in percentage of total value of exports, were: grain, 29.2; livestock, 6.0; timber, 14.3; petroleum, 33.0.

135 rich in salts. More accessible than these deposits are those of the sub-Carpathian hill country where upper Tertiary rocks are intensely folded in with salt-bearing Flysch deposits and have become impregnated with oil from the salt formations of the Flysch that has been forced up along lines of folding and fracture. Exploitation is mainly confined to the oil of these Pliocene rocks.

●315 THE MAJOR oil-field follows the Carpathian arc from the neighbourhood of Piteşti through Targovişte, Ploeşti in Muntenia and northward through Bacau in Moldavia to the Polish frontier (i.e. within the districts of Damboviţa, Prahova, Buzau and Bacau in the Trotuş valley). There is also a small field in the Maramureş district.

THE Prahova district is the most important, producing 65 to 70 per cent of the whole, while Damboviţa produces about 25 per cent. Pre-war development of oil industry was mainly in the hands of foreigners. By the 1929 Mining Law equality of Roumanian and foreign capital is provided. By an Act of 1924 the subsoil became the property of the State, which grants new leases for a period of thirty years. The State has acquired oil plot zones as permanent reserves. Oil getting is proceeding on up-to-date lines. Deeper strata are being tapped as the upper one becomes exhausted. Modern wells now reach down to about 1,800 metres. In Prahova and Damboviţa State concessions are the most productive and active (e.g. Moveni and Gura-Ocnitsei). The total output of crude oil in 1933 was 7.37 million metric tons, 19.7 of the total oil products being used for home consumption.

NATURAL GAS is also tapped in the oil-fields for gasolene and for domestic lighting and heating. It is largely used in the chemical industry. Transylvania has no oil of importance, but some useful gas-fields. Crude oil is used for steam raising in the metallurgical industry and for generating electricity: it also figures as fuel in the tile and pottery industry. Oil- and petrol-driven machinery is installed in electric factories, in pottery and tile works, and particularly in the alimentary industries.

313 TIMBER, owing to the lack of good communications and to the abundance and lavish use of the forests, remains an important item in the production of power, particularly in

652 quate means at their disposal they yet succeeded in achieving a certain measure of success, and notwithstanding the tremendous difficulties with which they had to cope. Some of the issues demanding attention were the reorganization of the administrative machinery in the newly-annexed territories, the complete overhauling of means of communication, the readjustment of agriculture, the reconstruction of the oil industry, which had greatly suffered during the war, and the necessity of providing for the needs of the army owing to the exposed geographical position of the country.

RUMANIA'S ECONOMIC POLICY

186 454 Until the advent to power in 1928 of the National Peasant Party under M. Maniu, the policy of the country was inspired by an uncompromising nationalism that tended to the complete exclusion of foreign capital so necessary for the development of Rumania. The chief instigators of this policy were the late brothers John and Vintila Bratianu, who had raised the maxim "prin noi insine" (by ourselves alone) to the sanctity of a religious dogma. The governments that had succeeded each other since the conclusion of the war, with the exception of the one presided over by M. Vaida-Voevod, were either formed by the Bratianu, or so-called Liberal Party, or by some nominees of theirs who were quite amenable to their views, so that a certain sequence in the policy pursued may be detected throughout this period, in spite of the change of persons at the helm of the State, while any divergence in their pronouncements from the original programme may be explained by the desire to allay the mistrust engendered by the Bratianu policy. The principal aim of this policy was the attainment of self-sufficiency through the industrialization of the country. This found expression in extensive legislation dealing with the development of national resources, the chief enactment being the special mining law promulgated in July, 1924.

382 471 315 The subsoil resources had already been declared national property, and the special mining law, which was aimed par-

ticularly at the oil industry, prescribed the manner in which they were to be exploited. The development of these resources was to be entrusted to corporations or "régies" in which the Government as well as private capital, both Rumanian and foreign, would participate, but in such a way as to permit of the majority of shares being controlled by the Rumanian Government. At the same time[1] laws were enacted for increasing the utilization of methane gas (C.H.4) which was already in use both for lighting and heating purposes in Transylvania, and which is available as a large source of industrial power, its output being calculated to amount to as much as 2,000 million cubic metres per annum, the consumption of which for 1930 reached over 503 million c. metres. The methods used by the Liberal Party to secure a mainhold of the supplies of methane gas are particularly illuminating of the mentality of the leaders of that party, as they were revealed by M. Madgearu in the Rumanian Chamber in 1929. An exclusive monopoly was conferred on a group of "Liberals," who supplied the gas to industrialists at arbitrary prices so as to force the latter out of the market and leave this to rival firms belonging to adepts of the "Liberal" Party. All the efforts of the Liberal Party to promote the nationalization of this gas were aimed at securing the economic mastery of Transylvanian industries. A similar law was also passed dealing with water power, the reserves of which are estimated at 5,206,225 H.P., of which amount 735,425 h.p. represent 50 per cent of the force produced at the Iron Gates by the Danube, 1,422,465 h.p. by the tributaries of the Theiss, 2,164,748 h.p. by the Danube tributaries between the Timish and the Sereth, and the remaining 884,665 h.p. by the Sereth and its tributaries. Of all this potential force only about 52,000 h.p. is actually in use. The State owned practically the totality of the railway lines, most of the extensive fisheries in the marshes and delta of the Danube, the salt mines of Ocnele Mari, Slanic, Uioara and Targu Ocna, which are exploited as a State monopoly and assure to it a revenue of some 700 million lei per annum, over 75 per cent of the entire vast timberlands, several coal and iron mines, the gold mines in the Bihor mountains, the annual output of which is about 2,500 to 3,000 kilogrammes

471 315 382 375 471 665 376 471 665 655

[1] July, 1924--Analyst

The following table shows a detailed list of imports during 1930:

INDUSTRY 439

Imports	Tons.	Percentage of total bulk.	Value in 1,000 lei.	Percentage of total value.
Livestock	296	0.04	16,439	0.07
Animal food products	10,240	1.32	221,872	0.98
Furs	120	0.02	244,046	1.08
Leather and leather goods ...	3,309	0.43	485,519	2.15
Wool, hair and goods ...	5,907	0.76	1,365,991	9.06
Natural silk and goods ...	47	0.01	86,746	0.39
Various animal substances ...	3,977	0.51	156,554	0.70
Cereals and derivatives ...	29,802	3.85	306,702	1.36
Seeds	4,133	0.54	113,976	0.51
Vegetable oils	2,331	0.30	96,980	0.43
Vegetables, flowers, etc. ...	9,713	1.26	221,084	0.98
Fruit and groceries	33,315	4.31	818,244	3.63
Beverages	240	0.03	8,422	0.04
Sugar and confectionery ...	1,248	0.16	16,975	0.07
Vegetable textiles	49,592	6.41	6,702,290	29.73
Timber and derivatives ...	13,538	1.75	146,850	0.65
Paper and derivatives ...	13.561	1.75	524,469	2.34
Rubber celluloid & derivatives	8,183	1.05	740,386	3.28
Mineral waters and salts ...	900	0.13	8,355	0.04
Glassware	2,464	0.32	161,939	0.72
Earths, stones and derivatives	83,542	10.80	473,880	2.10
Fuel (mineral) and derivatives	180,841	23.37	302,589	1.34
Iron and ironware	236,723	30.59	3,442,482	15.28
Apparatus, machines & motors	34,604	4.47	2,836,640	12.58
Vehicles	8,539	1.10	638,734	2.83
Metals and metalloids other than iron	12,473	1.61	868,706	3.86
Toys	215	0.03	40,836	0.18
Musical instruments ...	472	0.06	139,055	0.62
Optical instruments	126	0.01	101,446	0.45
Watches and clocks	153	0.02	77,480	0.34
Jewellery	73	0.01	41,410	0.18
Chemicals and medicines ...	14,673	1.89	606,471	2.69
Perfumery	47	0.01	48,744	0.21
Colours and varnishes ...	7,620	0.89	373,402	1.66
Explosives	728	0.99	105,215	0.47
Totals	7,737,745	100.00	22,540,929	100.00

OIL & MINING INDUSTRIES

In spite of the continuous increase in the output of crude oil (the output for 1931 amounting to 48 million barrels), the industry is facing a most critical situation owing to the Russian competition and low world prices, excessive transport charges, and high taxation. Notwithstanding these adverse factors, however, the output of oil is steadily increasing, Rumania now being the fourth largest producer of petroleum, as may be seen from the following table: 315 382

RUMANIA

315
382

Production in millions of barrels

	1931	1930	1929
U.S.A.	856	898	1007
Russia	158	135	99
Venezuela	118	137	137
Rumania	48	42	35
Persia	47	45	42

315 According to a report published by the *Adeverul* of Janu-
382 ary 21st, 1932, of which a summary is given below, there
651 are no signs of an early improvement:

"The recent abrogation of the law extending certain subsidies to small producers has created much dissatisfaction, for this enactment, while rescinding the advantages already granted, maintained taxes recently imposed. Only a few of the producers who possessed refineries of their own had so far been able to secure the subsidies that the law had allocated to them, and that only indirectly, as they have been simply credited with these sums, which they will eventually be allowed to use against payment of taxes to the State. As the situation of the public finances is unsatisfactory, one can scarcely hope that these subsidies will be paid out shortly to the rest of the producers.

Another question which preoccupies the industry is the
315 marketing of the heavy oil residues, the output of which in
382 1930 amounted to 1,959,371 metric tons. Though this residue constitutes an excellent fuel, its manipulation is difficult and necessitates a large expenditure for the construction of special receptacles. Some companies, in order to get rid of their accumulated big stocks, had recourse to a new method, that of destroying them by fire. This is a disastrous solution for all concerned, and many members of the industrial community affirm that the problem could be solved if our railway administration would reduce its transport charges, so as to permit the marketing of this product abroad at the prevailing world prices. As the railway administration, however, refuses to make concessions in the matter, the oil companies see no other solution than to construct a new special pipe-line to Constantsa, though this scheme meets with violent opposition from railway circles. . . ."

OIL AND MINING INDUSTRIES

The above article shows how erroneous were the views of the late V. Bratianu in decreeing the nationalization of the oil deposits in order to prevent foreign companies from sharing in the development of the oil industry. The native producers, being without adequate capital resources, have been unable to take advantage of the benefits the mining law meant to reserve for them. They have undoubtedly contributed in increasing the crude oil output, but on the other hand, not possessing the means either to provide for its refining or its marketing, they have only contributed towards creating a glut on the market which is disastrous to themselves, but which unfortunately also affects adversely, though to a lesser degree, the foreign companies in Rumania. 315 382

Yet it could easily have been foreseen that an increase in the crude oil output would necessitate the expenditure of large sums of money for the construction of refineries, storage tanks, pipe-lines, tank-wagons, etc., all of which would have to be secured from abroad, seeing that the financial resources of Rumania were utterly inadequate to cope with the demands which were made on them from all sides. The [487] scheme for the construction of a second pipe-line from the oil-fields to Constantsa, mooted by the companies, has been definitely rejected owing to the intervention of the railway administration, which naturally wanted to reserve as much as possible of the transport of the oil for itself. It has offered to grant increased transport facilities for oil, but it is very doubtful whether it will be able to fulfil its promises, because the bridge over the Danube at Cernavoda carries only a single track and its carrying capacity is limited. The construction of a second pipe-line to Constantsa therefore seems to be indispensable. The one already existing between Ploeşti and Constantsa has a total length of 320 km. Some 3,000 tons of oil may be pumped through it in 24 hours, and in 1931 the total quantity of motor oil conveyed through this pipe-line amounted to 753,000 tons. Another pipe-line exists between Ploeşti and Giurgiu, on the Danube, 180 km. in length, but the main port by which petroleum products are exported is Constantsa. In 1931, 3,926,247 tons were shipped from that port.

The principal oilfields extend in a semi-circular strip on the

315 southern slopes of the bend of the Carpathians, where the
382 mountains gradually merge into the plains of Wallachia and Moldavia. About two-thirds of the production is secured from the regions of Moreni and Ochiuri, the basins of the rivers Prahova and Dombovitsa furnishing almost 90 per cent of the total yield. There are minor fields farther east in the neighbourhood of Buzau, and also in Moldavia in the region of Bacau. The main oil refineries are situated at Ploeşti. The capital invested in the oil industry is estimated at 11 milliard lei, 60 per cent of which is Rumanian. The number of workmen employed in the industry is about 30,000. The output of crude oil for the years 1928–30 was:

Year	*Tons*	*Estimated value in lei*
1928	4,282,377	7,345,923,066
1929	4,836,974	7,441,204,190
1930	5,792,311	6,552,118,582

About half of the yield was from oilfields owned by the State. The ratio for 1930 was 3,083,468 tons from State-
[47] owned oilfields, or 53.20 per cent, and 2,708,843 tons, or 46.80 per cent, from privately-owned oilfields. The quantities produced were distributed per region as follows: Prahova, 4,275,721 tons; Dambovița, 1,390,215 tons; Buzau, 61,225 tons; Bacau, 65,150 tons.

Of the total output for 1930, some 1,602,757 tons were consumed locally. At the end of June, 1932, it was reported that the total monthly output had attained about 543,000 tons, the average monthly production of the principal companies being as follows: Astra Romana, 109,464 tons; Steaua Romana, 83,667 tons; Concordia, 78,974 tons; Creditul Minier, 27,760 tons; Romano-Americana, 33,800 tons; Phoenix, 65,286 tons; Prahova, 20,878 tons; and Columbia, 17,564 tons.

315 Prices of petroleum products having dropped to the extent
484 of 75 per cent since 1928, the Rumanian oil industry is pass-
232 ing through an era of grave depression which is causing a very serious repercussion on the whole economic life of the country, taking into account the great amount of capital in-

vested in it and the high contribution it is expected to make to the revenue of the State. The average price in lei of petroleum products per ton during the years 1928–31 were as follows, as reported by the Constantsa *Chamber of Commerce Bulletin*: 1928, at 4,080; 1929, at 3,800; 1930, at 2,600; 1931, at 1,031 lei. The following table, which gives quotations of the leading oil shares on the Bucarest stock market, is indicative of the depression which exists:

Average annual quotations

Share	1929	1930	*June* 1931	*June* 1932
Astra Romana ...	2391	1430	500	340
Steaua Romana ...	1234	571	230	135
Speranța	1210	639	380	100
Petrol Block ...	320	176	75	54
Concordia	1286	767	265	250
Creditul Minier ...	690	364	185	90
Redevența	321	182	65	30
I.R.D.P.	397	143	92	35

The other mineral resources of Rumania are considerable, especially in Transylvania, but no proper geological survey has ever been made, nor have any mines other than salt mines ever been properly exploited. The following figures give the quantities of minerals mined during 1930, the total value of the same being estimated at 10,437 million lei: Lignite, 2,071,057 tons; coal, 298,825 tons; copper, 6,655 tons and 169; iron, 92,517 tons; manganese, 33,528 tons; bauxite, 678 tons; pyrites, 24,264 tons; amber, 107 tons; salt, 304,777 tons; lead and antimony, 984 tons; lead glaze, 194 tons; gold, 2,672 kilograms, silver, 4.418 kilograms.

Lignite is found in extensive beds not only in Transylvania and the Banat but also in the old kingdom. It is mainly used for the railways. The better qualities of coal are found in south-western Transylvania and the Banat. Copper is principally mined at Tulcea, near the mouth of the Danube, and at Ciuc in Transylvania.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Banat]

[The Crisana]

The high quality of the crops in this province, 241
amongst them wheat, maize, rye, oats, and the high 134
standard of animal breeding, have made the Banat known far beyond the borders of Rumania. The fertility of the soil is due partly to the 'black earth' which, in a greater or lesser degree, is a component of all the arable land. Apart from being an important agricultural region, the Banat possesses valuable industries, forests and minerals. Iron ore and coal 316
are mined in the area of Resita and Anina, where 327
there are great iron and steel works which produce 315
railway equipment and armaments. The Danubian port of Orsova, guarding the western entrance to the 'Iron Gates', also has an oil refinery.

The capital of the Banat is Timisoara[R] (Temesvar[H]) on the Bega with a population of 100,000. In 361
Roman times the fortress of Ripensia was situated here. In Hunyadi's time it was a centre of resistance against the Turks, only second in importance to Belgrade. To-day the town is a great rail and road junction with many factories, banks, commercial houses and cultural institutions. Lugoj, on the Timis, with a population of 20,000, and Caransebes, north of the Porta Orientalis which leads through the mountains of the Banat to the Danube, are marketing towns of some importance.

THE CRISANA AND MARAMURES. Geographically the 131
Crisana is the eastern borderland of the Hungarian [161]
plain. The province covers an area of about 8,400 square miles and has a population of just under 1,500,000. The Crisana lies between Transylvania in the east, the River Mures (Maros[H]) in the south; Hungary (as reduced by the Treaty of the Trianon) in the west and Czechoslovakia in the north.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

MINERAL RESOURCES. The great and varied wealth of the subsoil of Greater Rumania has been exploited only to a small degree. Apart from gold and silver, which are found in rivers and mined in Transylvania, there are iron-ore deposits estimated at about 30,000,000 tons. The average yearly production, however, amounted to only about 100,000 tons. The important alloy, manganese, found in various parts of the country, copper, zinc, chromium and bauxite all contribute to the mineral wealth of Rumania. 135 316

Through the acquisition of the New Territories the coal deposits of Greater Rumania were greatly augmented. The total coal reserves, of which the most important are situated in the western provinces and in Transylvania, were estimated at 722,000,000 tons. The average yearly production, of which two-thirds were brown coal, amounted to between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 tons. A source of power which is not found in any other part of Europe, and which could transform and sustain Rumanian industry for many years, is the great subterranean natural gas reservoir in Transylvania which contains chemically pure methane.

Another source of energy of which only a small fraction has yet been exploited is Rumania's potential water power, estimated at 1,500,000 horsepower, which equals the energy of all the coal, oil and natural gas resources of Rumania taken together. 376

OIL. The centre of the Rumanian oilfields is the region of Campina and Ploesti which also has the biggest refineries for the production of petrol and aviation spirit. Oil is also found in Oltenia, Moldavia and Maramures. Crude oil was already known 315

3

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

•315 in the sixteenth century when the peasants used it as lubricant and medicine and the *boiars* as fuel. In 1815 the British representative in Bucarest drew attention to the oil deposits of Muntenia, and in 1844 the first concession for their exploitation was granted by Prince Bibescu to two Russians. By 1857 the first refinery had been established in Ploesti and in the same year Bucarest became the first town whose streets were lit by oil-lamps. From that time the exploitation of Rumania's oil resources made rapid progress.

The yearly production rose from 50,000 tons in 1890 to 1,885,000 tons in 1913. The destruction of the oil wells by British engineers during the last war retarded the progress of the industry for many years. By the middle of the nineteen-twenties the pre-war record had been exceeded and production reached the record figure of over 8,500,000 tons in 1934. It decreased to about 6,250,000 tons in 1939. The estimate for 1943 was 5,000,000 tons. The export of oil and oil-products was one of the chief sources of the nation's income. The greatest quantity of oil was exported in 1936 (nearly 7,000,000 tons). The average figure was between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 per year.

315 471 Before the Great War a considerable part of Rumania's oil industry was financed and owned by German companies. After the Peace Settlement the position changed in favour of French, American and British interests. By 1938 nine-tenths of all Rumanian oil was controlled by the British 'Royal Dutch Shell' directly or through subsidiary companies. In 1936 the published net profits of the industry amounted to 57%. Half of the 200 million dollars of foreign investments in Rumania was

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

employed in the oil industry. The control of this 315
great source of energy by British and American 471
companies was challenged by Germany, which needed Rumania's oil for the prosecution of her imperialist aims. To-day Rumania is Germany's chief source of natural oil.

INDUSTRY AND TRADE. The industry of the Old 433
Kingdom was hardly developed when, with the annexation of the New Territories, Rumania acquired territories comparatively rich in industrial enterprises, especially the Banat, parts of Transylvania and the Bukovina. Thereby the industrial capacity of Greater Rumania was more than double that of the Old Kingdom. Production, however, was by no means doubled. Trade and industry improved in the years 1925–9 during which considerable capital-imports were effected. The great economic crisis of the next two years hit Rumania very hard and was finally surmounted only in 1936, when the figures for production exceeded those of 1929 by 30%.

The most important Rumanian enterprises were the food, chemical, textile and metallurgical industries. The textile industry increased its output, the number of workers employed as well as the value of its production; but most branches of Rumanian industry increased only the amount and the value of their production, reducing their wage bill and the number of workers partly through the introduction of machinery.

The heavy industry, producing armaments and 433
railway equipment, was controlled by several foreign 471
groups, amongst them Schneider-Creusot, Skoda and Vickers. German capital was invested in the

241 The basis of Rumanian economy is agriculture, in that some 80 per cent. of the population derive their livelihood from the land and agriculture provides a high proportion of the national income. [315] During recent years, however, the expansion of the oil industry has meant that agricultural pro- [439] duce has played a decreasing part in the country's exports, having been superseded by oil, exports of which amounted to 43 per cent. of the total export trade in 1938, compared with 19 per cent. in 1927; while grain exports in 1938 represented 23 per cent. compared with 46 per cent. in 1927.

In spite of the importance of agriculture to national prosperity farming methods are backward and per acre crop yields are among the lowest in Europe. Attention is particularly given to growing cereals, and of these maize is the chief, [231] providing a large surplus for export (apart from the war years). Livestock density is low, which is one of the weaknesses of Rumanian agriculture, the Banat being the only district in which numbers are fairly high, and farming approaches the [439] intensive system. It must be stressed that the relatively large export surplus, which consists of wheat, maize, barley, oilseeds and pulses, livestock, oilcake, etc., is only made possible by [146] the very low nutritional level which prevails, and that if this were raised to anything like western European standards exports would be commensurately reduced.

248 Since the war more attention has been paid to
249 the growth of industrial crops such as sunflower, soya, cotton, hemp and flax, and the cultivation of rubber-bearing plants has been started following the finding of the *Kok Saghys* plant left by the Russians in Bessarabia. Though some success has been achieved in increasing the areas under textile fibres, and yields have been slightly higher, the hoped for increases in soya and sunflower cultivation have not been achieved due to unfavourable weather conditions and to general wartime dislocation.

313 Rumania's forest resources, though extensive, have suffered severely from a consistent policy of over-exploitation, and, while providing the basis of a fairly important industry during the period between the two wars, have been so depleted that cutting will have to be very restricted for a number of years if they are to be allowed to recover. The loss of Northern Transylvania has affected the timber industry in particular, as a high proportion of the forest resources were located there, and in that district this industry was better developed than elsewhere in the country.

IMPORTANCE OF OIL

315 Oil plays a major part, not only in Rumania's foreign trade, but also in covering her domestic fuel requirements, to a large extent replacing coal, reserves of which are small and of low quality. Since the war and the resulting pressure which Germany has exerted to obtain increased quantities of oil for her armies, (combined with the consistent drop in the rate of production between 1936 and 1941), serious attempts have been made to find alternative sources of fuel. The enormous reserves of natural gas existing in Transylvania, which were exploited only very slightly before the war, are being used increasingly as a source of fuel to supply local industries, and a

●315 pipeline has been completed from a secondary source of supply at Manești to convey this gas to Bucarest to supply both household and industrial requirements.

135 Iron-ore deposits are small, so that the heavy industries are very largely dependent on imports. A variety of other mineral resources, which are believed to exist in greater abundance than has so far been established, have not yet been fully surveyed.

433 Rumania has a poorly-developed industry, which lags far behind that of western European countries such as Czechoslovakia, though is ahead of all the other south-east European countries, except Hungary. Financially she is a poor country, with very limited capital resources, which has proved a severe hindrance to industrial development and has laid her open to the investment of foreign capital, which has been attracted [457] particularly by the rich mineral oil and forest resources. Skilled labour, also a vital factor in the [464] process of industrialisation, has been lacking, so that the use of foreign technicians has been essential. Other raw-material resources, though adequate to allow the development of a sound and varied industry, are not sufficiently extensive to encourage a very rapid development independent of imported raw materials.

Industrialisation in Rumania did not start until about 1890, and the period of greatest expansion was between 1929 and 1938. The consumption industries were the first to be developed, and of these food industries are the chief, the raw materials being grown on the spot. The growth of such industries as paper, cardboard, printing, soap, chemicals and furniture, etc., followed. The location of industry in the earlier stages was governed not by such factors as the existence of cheap labour, but was built up in those areas richest in raw materials.

MAIN INDUSTRIAL REGIONS

[311] The main industrial region is in the Prahova valley, where the oilfields are to be found, followed by the Reșița district, where the existence of iron ore, coal, manganese, etc., led to the development of metallurgical and engineering facilities, as well as of such auxiliary industries as coal and wood distilleries. Gold, silver, lead, zinc and copper deposits in the Baia Mare region formed the basis for the erection of both metal and chemical factories. The presence of methane gas, salt, gold, silver and stone quarries in and around Turda determined the location of factories for production of cement, limestone, bricks, tiles, porcelain, glass, sulphuric acid, etc. In the rich forest districts of Ferdinand, Nadrag and Hunedoara, where iron ore deposits are also to be found, blast furnaces and metallurgical industries have been established. The textile industry is mainly established in Cisnădia, Piatra Neamț, Bacău and Buhuși. Apart from the regions mentioned, industry is centred in the principal towns—Bucarest, Timișoara, Brașov, Sf. Gheorghe, Arad, Galați, Brăila, Cernăuți, Cluj and Iași.

The following table gives an idea of the relative importance of the various industries, showing the amount of capital invested and value of production in each of the main groups, and also the number of factories and of personnel employed :—

[3c]

●315


RUMANIA
Crude-Oil Production 1920-1942
Millions of tons
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1920
1922
1924
1926
1928
1930
1932
1934
1936
1938
1940
1942

[oil]

A. INTRODUCTION

1. General

315 Both in peace and in war, the Rumanian oil industry has played an important part in the economy of the nation. Although the numbers directly employed in the industry are comparatively small—some 40,000 men—its importance to the nation can be gauged by the fact that the 4·5 million tons of oil exported in 1938 represented a value of 9·3 milliard lei, or 43 per cent. of the total export trade of 21½ milliard lei. Not only was oil the backbone of the country's foreign trade, but the industrial and general internal economy of the country is probably more dependent on oil than any other country in Europe.

War has not lessened the importance of her oil resources to Rumania—her industries and transport remain equally dependent on oil; her normal oil export trade has gone, but the Axis [439] are greedy for every drop of oil which they can extract from Rumania, and from Rumanian wells comes almost one-third of all the liquid fuel which has to keep the wheels of Axis Europe turning. In 1940, oil exports represented 63 per cent. of the value of Rumanian exports, and whereas in 1938 30 per cent. of Germany's imports from Rumania consisted of oil, in 1940 this had risen to 56 per cent. It is undoubtedly true to say that of all the raw materials coming from outside her own borders on which German war economy is dependent, Rumanian oil is one of the most vital.

2. Historical

The first commercial oil production in the world took place in Rumania in 1854, when 275 tons were produced. From that date until 1936, with the exception of the years of the Great War, production gradually increased to a peak figure of 8·7 million tons or 3½ per cent. of world production.

The trend of production over the last 20 years is shown on the graph on the opposite page.

Although in 1942 the downward trend since 1936 may have been halted, or even reversed, this has been only by dint of a special effort to increase production and possibly uneconomic exploitation. In 1937 Rumanian geologists estimated that the country's oil reserves would be exhausted within ten years, and although declining production may be due in large part to the natural exhaustion of known fields, it is also due to the restrictions of the antiquated mining laws. These tended to curb normal expansion, and made exploratory drilling in non-proven areas so unattractive as not to be a commercial proposition, with the consequence that exploration, by which alone production could, in the long run be maintained, was neglected. These mining laws have been superseded by a new law passed in July 1942, the main provisions of which are for the express purpose of encouraging new production by the removal of the restrictions set upon prospecting in new areas. The reserves which, under the 1937 law, the State insisted on maintaining, are now sacrificed, concessions are now granted on the basis of geological structures rather than surface areas and wasteful competition is eliminated in their exploitation. The law empowers the Government to demand the modernisation of refining and drilling equipment.

[13b]

B. THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

1. Oil Production

315 There are four districts in which oil production is centred. Prahova, Dâmboviţa, Buzău and Bacău, while the town of Ploeşti is the hub of the oil industry. In 1938 out of a total production of 6·6 million tons, the Prahova district produced 3·98 million tons—2·78 from private and 1·2 from State concessions; Dâmboviţa produced 2·54 million tons, two-thirds of which came from State concessions; Buzău and Bacău produced only some 40,000 tons each. In 1941 Prahova production had dropped from 3·9 to 3·4 million tons; Dâmboviţa from 2·5 to 1·7 million tons, production from Buzău and from Bacău remaining unchanged.

[382] The wells are connected by pipeline with the refineries, all but three of which are in Ploeşti; even at the time of peak production in 1936 Rumanian refining capacity was sufficient to take care of all the crude oil production of the country. The total refinery capacity in 1938 was over 10 million tons including nearly 2 million tons of cracking capacity, but of the total capacity probably not more than half is of modern design.

2. Consumption and Exports

315 439 The following table indicates internal consumption and exports in 1938, when crude production was 6·6 million tons. Exports were made to all countries in Europe including over 700,000 tons to Germany, over 500,000 tons each to the United Kingdom and to Italy, nearly 300,000 tons each to France and Czechoslovakia, and some 400,000 tons to North Africa, of which 280,000 tons to Egypt.

1938

Internal Consumption and Exports

	Internal Consumption	*Exports*	
	'000 *tons*		
Crude oil	—	336	
Motor spirit	154	1,586	
Kerosine	182	827	74% via Constanţa.
Gas/Diesel oil	117	755	
Fuel oil	1,001	917	20% via Giurgiu.
Special fuel oil*	131	—	
Lubricants	24	41	
Wax, asphalt, etc.	64	30	

* Mainly for central heating.

315 Nearly 70 per cent. of internal consumption was therefore represented by fuel and special fuel oil, and this figure shows the extent to which industrial and domestic plant have been built up on the basis of burning fuel oil, and the dependence of the country on adequate supplies of fuel oil for its essential services. In this dependence will be seen some explanation of the fact that Rumania is one of the few countries in the world whose internal consumption of oil for non-military purposes has not declined in war-time.

The main consumers of fuel oil and special fuel oil were as follows:—

	Tons
Railways	195,000
Shipping Services	90,000
Industries	419,000
Power Stations	160,000
Central Heating	148,000
Agriculture and Peasant Mills	19,000

CHAPTER II

3. Transport

315 For the transport of oil both for internal consumption and for export, Rumania relied largely upon railways, and except between the wells and the refineries, only a relatively small proportion was transported by pipeline. The three main pipelines were State-owned and were laid mainly for the transport of oil for export: one for white products from Ploeşti to Constanţa with a capacity of 810,000 tons per annum, and two lines for crude and heavy residue from Ploeşti to Giurgiu with a combined capacity of 300,000 tons per annum.

The total quantity of oil through three lines in 1938 was 800,000 tons: 13 per cent. of the exports from Constanţa and 17 per cent. of those from Giurgiu were handled in this way as well as the internal transport of some 184,000 tons of crude oil. The Rumanian fleet of 8,000 tank cars was ample to handle all the oil transported by rail. [497]

The main channel for exports was Constanţa on the Black Sea, through which 3·3 million tons were exported in 1938, as compared with only 935,000 tons through Giurgiu for transport up the Danube.

C. THE INDUSTRY IN WAR-TIME

1. General

315 722 The war has completely altered the orientation of the Rumanian oil industry: normal export trade routes through Constanţa and the Mediterranean were cut and exports to most countries in Continental Europe came under German control as soon as the Germans were astride the Danube at Belgrade, and the main railways through Poland and Yugoslavia. Not only were normal export channels disrupted, but the Rumanian oil industry lost the services of all its foreign technical experts, and could no longer get from the United States supplies of drilling and refinery equipment on which it had very largely relied.

The inevitable result of all this was that in spite of the urgent need for increased production and all German efforts to obtain this, the downward production trend was not halted in 1941, and only 5.483 million tons were produced. That year was, however, one of abnormal difficulties owing to the necessity for reorganising the industry on a war-time basis, rapidly rising prices of almost everything but oil, shortage of man-power owing to Rumanian mobilisation, the difficulty of getting equipment, and above all an abnormally severe winter which hampered transport so severely that production had to be restricted for lack of storage. By dint of continuous German pressure and increased control of the industry, production in 1942 probably reached 5.6 million tons.

Internal consumption has, however, not decreased and is thought to be running at a rate of 2 million tons a year, which leaves between 3 and 3½ million tons available for the Axis and neutral countries in Europe. Italy gets approximately one million tons a year, Germany two million tons, and small quantities go to Switzerland, Sweden and Turkey.

315 439 Except during the winter months when navigation on the Danube is suspended, the majority of exports to Italy go by pipeline to Giurgiu and thence by barge to river ports in Yugoslavia or Hungary for transhipment to Italy by rail-tank car. One of the results of the reorientation of Rumania's oil export trade has been the greatly increased use made of the river port of Giurgiu.

[14a]

315 Two additional pipelines, each of 10 in. diameter, constructed largely of material removed from France, have been built between Ploeşti and Giurgiu, each with a capacity of over three quarters of a million tons a year.

New refinery and drilling equipment, which prior to the war Rumania used to import largely from the United States, has now to be obtained from Germany. The financial terms on which this equipment is obtained are unfavourable to Rumania and deliveries are slow.

2. German Influence on the Oil Industry

315 German pressure upon Rumania to obtain
648 greater supplies of oil has been largely exerted by
473 means of commercial penetration into the oil industry, but there is evidence that Nazi diplomats have laid particular emphasis on the German need for oil, suggesting that larger supplies might be available if production was increased and internal consumption reduced.

German penetration into the Rumanian oil industry began to take aggressive form some time before the war. The Germans first acquired a minority holding in Creditul Minier, then in 1939 secured control of Petrol-Block. The collapse of France afforded further opportunities of encroachment, and through Kontinental Oel A.G. control of Concordia and Colombia was secured; similarly, by assuming arbitrary control of Dutch interests the Germans now direct the policy of Astra-Română, the largest of the producing companies. In all, German influence through financial control now extends to about 50 per cent. of the industry and 60 per cent. of productive capacity, quite apart from the pressure the Germans can exert through control of transport out of the country. The actual effect of this influence is not easily assessed, modified as it is by Rumania's nationalistic oil legislation—particular privileges are reserved under the new mining laws for companies which can show that 75 per cent. of their capital is in Rumanian hands—and the instinctive aversion of the Government to outside control. It is, however, sufficient to ensure that German requirements have a definite priority, and nationalistic as some parts of the new mining law may be, any measures serving to increase immediate production, under whatever pretext they are taken, are beneficial to Germany's interests. Tables I and II on pages 15 and 16 show the approximate strength of the oil groups by nationalities in 1940 and 1942.[1]

3. War-time Restrictions

315 Nearly 70 per cent. of Rumanian petroleum
135 consumption is represented by fuel oil, and a theoretical saving could be brought about by the use of coal and natural gas. Coal resources, however, are limited, and in any event a greatly increased use of coal is restricted also by the speed at which locomotives and power plants can be converted from oil to coal burning.

315 In November 1942 a petrol-rationing scheme
434 was introduced, and although the allowances were on a liberal scale, the regulations do not appear to have been observed and the scheme as a whole was ineffective. In March 1943 this was admitted by the announcement that the scheme would be more strictly enforced and new ration cards issued. Simultaneously regulations were published concerning the use of taxis, and a time limit of September 1943 was set for the conversion of boiler plant.

In general, attempts to restrict consumption either by the announcement of new regulations

[1] [Cf. Cat. 315, pp. 15c and 16a - Analyst]

[14b]

315
434

or the enforcement of old, have lately been more determined.

These measures, however, are unlikely to result in a saving of more than a quarter of a million tons a year, and rationing regulations and restrictions are probably less severe in Rumania than elsewhere in Europe.

D. NATURAL GAS

3'5

In addition to the supplies of liquid fuel derived from her oil wells, Rumania has considerable resources of natural gas. Production of gas in the Ploeşti oilfield area in the years before the war was used mainly for the making of gasolene, for gas lift in wells, for heating purposes in field and refinery, and for household use. There was no surplus for use outside the Ploeşti district.

Of much greater importance than these supplies of casing-head gas are Rumania's resources of methane natural gas from Mănesti and Transylvania. While the Mănesti gas deposits were known before the war, the extent of the reserves there had not been determined.

In Transylvania the reserves are estimated at not less than [illegible] million cubic metres. Pro-

[15a]

3:5 duction has been going on since before the last war and has been restricted to the amount that can be used by consumers over the 200-mile pipeline network extending as far south as Brasov. 1941 consumption amounted to 300 million cubic metres (or 35 million cubic feet a day), equivalent to approximately 280,000 tons of oil. Industry consumed some 85 per cent. of this, the remaining 15 per cent. being used for domestic purposes.

A law passed in November 1942 laid down the conditions for the supply of natural gas to Bucarest. The State, the National Methane Co., State Railways, Gas and Electricity Supply Co. and the Municipality of Bucarest in conjunction are made responsible for the supply of gas to the capital, where public utilities will be the first to be supplied. Pipeline material was supplied by Germany, and gas has now been piped from Manesti to Bucarest, and it is hoped that it may replace fuel oil to the extent of 120,000 tons in the first year of operation in the capital. It is planned eventually to link up the Transylvanian deposits by pipeline with Bucarest via Manesti, when the combined production of the two gas sources will permit an annual consumption of some 500,000,000 cubic metres, or the equivalent of 400,000 tons of oil.

315
439

TABLE I

APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF OIL GROUPS BY NATIONALITIES IN 1939

	Capital		Fixed Assets		Production*	
	In millions of lei	Per cent.	In millions of lei	Per cent.	Thousands of tons	Per cent.
Anglo-French-Belgian 8 large companies 14 small companies	9,893	64·72	30,089	64·83	4,253	67·09
American 1 large company 1 small company	1,913	12·51	5,513	11·88	900	14·20
Italian 1 large company 1 small company	386	2·53	1,256	2·71	335	6·29
German	77	0·50	525	1·13	51	0·80
Rumanian 2 large companies 33 small companies	3,017	19·74	9,024	19·44	800	12·62
Total	15,286		46,411		6,339	

* The production figures shown in this Table appear to be those for 1939.

[15c]

CHAPTER II

•315
439

TABLE II

APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF OIL GROUPS BY NATIONALITIES IN 1942

	Capital		Fixed Assets		Production*	
	In millions of lei	Per cent	In millions of lei	Per cent	Thousands of tons	Per cent
German group owns, controls or directs	3,431	22·45	11,207	24·28	1,487	23·46
American	5,795	37·91	13,288	28·03	2,301	37·44
Vacuum Oil	6	[illegible]	87	0·10	—	—
British	912	5·97	3,835	8·26	640	10·10
Unirea						
Anglo-French	2,387	15·62	8,107	17·47	740	11·67
Steaua Romana						
Anglo-French-Belgian	660	4·3[illegible]	2,600	5·6[illegible]	[illegible]	2·2[illegible]
14 small companies						
Italian	386	2·5[illegible]	1,256	2·71	235	3·7[illegible]
Rumanian	1,700	11·12	5,667	12·86	531	8·[illegible]
Total	15,186		46,436		6,330	

* The production figures shown in this table would appear to be those for [illegible]

[16a]

●315
473
439

TABLE III

PRINCIPAL RUMANIAN OIL COMPANIES, 1942

Name	Founded	Capital (mill. lei)	1940 Crude Production (tons)	Controlling interest
Astra Română	1910	2,542	1,173,256	Royal Dutch Shell
Concordia	1907	2,030	793,626	Kontinental Oel A.G.
Româno-Americana	1904	1,500	727,345	Standard Oil of New Jersey
Steaua Română	1895	1,500	640,920	French, Rumanian, British
Unirea	1921	720	652,000	General Mining Corporation
Columbia	1905	380	585,193	Kontinental Oel A.G.
Creditul Minier	1919	605	292,166	Rumanian
Prahova	1920	330	271,947	A.G.I.P. (Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli)
I.R.D.P. (Industria Romana de Petrol)	1920	120	117,925	Sudostchemie Hand. A.G. German
Petrolul Românesc	1920	120	83,377	Creditul Minier, Rumanian
Starnaphtha	1926	60	55,530	French
Foraj Lemoine	1923	44	42,658	Rumanian, Franco-Belgian
Redevenţa	1918	300	28,474	Rumanian
Foraky Românească	1922	50	25,958	German
Sondrum	1921	100	17,982	French
Petrol Block	1918	470	—	German (refining company)

TABLE IV

PRINCIPAL RUMANIAN REFINERIES

382
473

Name	Location	Annual Capacity (tons)	Cracking Capacity (tons)
Astra Română	Ploeşti	1,750,000	600,000
Steaua Română	Câmpina	1,500,000	350,000
Concordia	Ploeşti	1,300,000	200,000
Română-Americano	Ploeşti	1,100,000	350,000
Phoenix Unirea Orion	Ploeşti	800,000	150,000
Standard Petrol Block	Ploeşti	550,000	150,000
Creditul Minier	Brazi	530,000	150,000
Colombia	Ploeşti	485,000	200,000
Unirea Speranţa	Ploeşti	400,000	—
Redevenţa	Ploeşti	230,000	—
Prahova	Bucarest	200,000	—
Lumina (Petrolumina)	Ploeşti	140,000	—
Noris	Ploeşti	50,000	—

313 the small industries of the remoter upland districts. It is particularly important in the wood and pulp and paper industries, and in the small textile and pottery works. Charcoal is still used for smelting.

377 ELECTRICITY is mainly generated thermally, in spite of the great potentialities of water-power provided by the rivers from the Carpathians, not to mention the Danube current. Lack of natural reservoirs in snow-field, glacier and lake means that exploitation of the hydro-electric resources would entail enormous capital expenditure in the construction of reservoirs. The sum total of direct water-power used must, however, be very great, for the number of water-wheels is legion.

317 SALT is another asset of real importance. Like the mineral oil, it is found in greatest abundance, and is most accessible, in the upper Tertiary deposits of the sub-Carpathians, in the region of greatest disturbance. Sometimes it is exposed in cliffs, sometimes it is covered with thin layers of loam. Salt mines are being worked at Slanic, at Targu-Ocna (Tergu Ocnei) in the Trotuş basin, and at Ocnele-Mare (Ocna) on
●316 the Olt. In 1932 the amount extracted was 288,000 metric tons, of which 240,500 tons were for home consumption, the rest being exported to the Balkan countries and to Russia. Salt mining and marketing are state monopolies.

IN iron ore Roumania is not rich, the output being only about 90,000 tons per annum. The most important deposits lie in the mountains of the Banat and in the Poiana Ruscai (Ruszka) massif farther north, between the Mureş and the Bistra (Bisztra) tributary of the Timiş (Temes). The Reciţa (Reciţa Montana) district in the Banat mountains, opening towards Hungary, has foundries and steel works employing about 15,000 hands.

WITH the recent rise in the price of gold, the mining of that metal, which formerly was almost negligible, has become more active, and the output reached nearly 4,000 kgs. in 1933. The ore is mined in the Trachyte massif of the Bihor.

433 IN SPITE of considerable advantages in natural resources, and solicitous nursing on the part of the State, particularly in the Old Kingdom, industry in Roumania is still in its

vested in it and the high contribution it is expected to make 315 to the revenue of the State. The average price in lei of 434 petroleum products per ton during the years 1928–31 were 382 as follows, as reported by the Constantsa *Chamber of Commerce Bulletin*: 1928, at 4,080; 1929, at 3,800; 1930, at 2,600; 1931, at 1,031 lei. The following table, which gives quotations of the leading oil shares on the Bucarest stock market, is indicative of the depression which exists:

Average annual quotations

Share	1929	1930	*June* 1931	*June* 1932
Astra Romana ...	2391	1430	500	340
Steaua Romana ...	1234	571	230	135
Speranta	1210	639	380	100
Petrol Block ...	320	176	75	54
Concordia	1286	767	265	250
Creditul Minier ...	690	364	185	90
Redeventa	321	182	65	30
I.R.D.P.	397	143	92	35

The other mineral resources of Rumania are considerable, 135 especially in Transylvania, but no proper geological survey 316 has ever been made, nor have any mines other than salt mines ever been properly exploited. The following figures give the quantities of minerals mined during 1930, the total value of the same being estimated at 10,437 million lei: Lignite, 2,071,057 tons; coal, 298,825 tons; copper, 6,655 tons and 169; iron, 92,517 tons; manganese, 33,528 tons; bauxite, 678 tons; pyrites, 24,264 tons; amber, 107 tons; salt, 304,777 tons; lead and antimony, 984 tons; lead glaze, 194 tons; gold, 2,672 kilograms, silver, 4.418 kilograms.

Lignite is found in extensive beds not only in Transylvania and the Banat but also in the old kingdom. It is mainly used for the railways. The better qualities of coal are found in south-western Transylvania and the Banat. Copper is principally mined at Tulcea, near the mouth of the Danube, and at Ciuc in Transylvania.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Banat]

[The Crisana]

The high quality of the crops in this province, 241
amongst them wheat, maize, rye, oats, and the high 134
standard of animal breeding, have made the Banat known far beyond the borders of Rumania. The fertility of the soil is due partly to the 'black earth' which, in a greater or lesser degree, is a component of all the arable land. Apart from being an important agricultural region, the Banat possesses valuable industries, forests and minerals. Iron ore and coal 316
are mined in the area of Resita and Anina, where 327
there are great iron and steel works which produce 315
railway equipment and armaments. The Danubian port of Orsova, guarding the western entrance to the 'Iron Gates', also has an oil refinery.

The capital of the Banat is Timisoara[R] (Temesvar[H]) on the Bega with a population of 100,000. In 361
Roman times the fortress of Ripensia was situated here. In Hunyadi's time it was a centre of resistance against the Turks, only second in importance to Belgrade. To-day the town is a great rail and road junction with many factories, banks, commercial houses and cultural institutions. Lugoj, on the Timis, with a population of 20,000, and Caransebes, north of the Porta Orientalis which leads through the mountains of the Banat to the Danube, are marketing towns of some importance.

THE CRISANA AND MARAMURES. Geographically the 131
Crisana is the eastern borderland of the Hungarian [161]
plain. The province covers an area of about 8,400 square miles and has a population of just under 1,500,000. The Crisana lies between Transylvania in the east, the River Mures (Maros[H]) in the south; Hungary (as reduced by the Treaty of the Trianon) in the west and Czechoslovakia in the north.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

MINERAL RESOURCES. The great and varied wealth /35 of the subsoil of Greater Rumania has been exploited only to a small degree. 316 Apart from gold and silver, which are found in rivers and mined in Transylvania, there are iron-ore deposits estimated at about 30,000,000 tons. The average yearly production, however, amounted to only about 100,000 tons. The important alloy, manganese, found in various parts of the country, copper, zinc, chromium and bauxite all contribute to the mineral wealth of Rumania.

Through the acquisition of the New Territories the coal deposits of Greater Rumania were greatly augmented. The total coal reserves, of which the most important are situated in the western provinces and in Transylvania, were estimated at 722,000,000 tons. The average yearly production, of which two-thirds were brown coal, amounted to between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 tons. A source of power which is not found in any other part of Europe, and which could transform and sustain Rumanian industry for many years, is the great subterranean natural gas reservoir in Transylvania which contains chemically pure methane.

Another source of energy of which only a small 376 fraction has yet been exploited is Rumania's potential water power, estimated at 1,500,000 horsepower, which equals the energy of all the coal, oil and natural gas resources of Rumania taken together.

OIL. The centre of the Rumanian oilfields is the 315 region of Campina and Ploesti which also has the biggest refineries for the production of petrol and aviation spirit. Oil is also found in Oltenia, Moldavia and Maramures. Crude oil was already known

I. COAL

A. Consumption, Imports, Deposits

372 375 Coal has not played such a large part in Rumanian economy as it has in that of most European countries because of the abundant mineral oil and timber resources which have been used extensively for fuel, both in industry and for household purposes. The following table shows the percentage consumption of the different types of fuel (average 1937-39) :—

	%
Firewood	28·7
Oil and oil products	26·1
Coal	25·9
Methane and other gases	17·2
Water power	2·1

The railways accounted for 60 per cent. of total coal consumption which was of the order of 2 million tons, the balance being divided between industry, household consumption and bunkers.

135 Before the war coal reserves, which are predominantly brown coal, were estimated at 2·7 milliard tons brown coal (including lignite), and 48 million tons of hard coal. The more important deposits are located in southern and western Transylvania, while a few of lesser importance are in the northern area which was ceded to Hungary.

316 439 In spite of the limited industrial development of the country and extensive use of oil, coal production is hardly sufficient for current needs, and it has been necessary to import both coal and coke to fill the deficiency.

Pre-war coal imports in metric tons were as follows :—

	Metric Tons
1935	21,000
1936	23,000
1937	28,000

316 439 It is difficult to estimate coal imports since the war, but available evidence suggests that they are in the neighbourhood of 75,000 tons annually or three times as high as the pre-war figure. Owing to the exigencies of war, railway traffic has increased enormously, and the switch-over from oil-burning to coal for industrial and central-heating plants all add to the demands for coal.

135 **Coal Deposits**

The principal coal-producing district is around Petroşani, while the main deposits are as follows:—

Type	*Location*	*Calorific Value*
Anthracite ..	Schela in Gorj district	7,300
Hardcoal* ..	Reşiţa and Anina-Steierdorf	6/7,000
Brown coal and lignite	Jiu valley	6,500
	Comăneşti basin ..	5,200/5,600
	Ialomiţa valley ..	5,000
	Dâmboviţa valley ..	5,000
	Bacău district ..	5,000

* Some is suitable for coking.

B. Tables

1. Coal Production

316 During recent years coal production has been increased in spite of a slight setback in 1940, when with the transfer of N. Transylvania to Hungary a small proportion of the working mines were lost. Further efforts are being made to increase production so that fuel-oil consumption may be reduced. To this end the conversion of central-heating installations, industrial oil-burning plant and oil-fired locomotives to coal burning has been ordered.

316

COAL PRODUCTION

	Brown Coal	%	Hard Coal	%	Lignite	%	Anthracite	%	Total
1930 ..	1,799,877	75·9	298,825	12·6	271,180	11·5	—	—	2,369,882
1935 ..	1,453,394	74·7	261,085	13·4	213,367	11·0	17,207	0·9	1,945,053
1938 ..	1,822,128	76·1	290,575	12·3	274,8[illegible]	11·5	3,265	0·1	2,390,538
1939 ..	1,904,834	77·4	282,006	11·4	237,710	11·1	4,400	0·1	2,428,950
1940 ..	2,384,586*	—	260,985†	—	—	—	—	—	2,645,571
1941 ..	2,317,138*	—	229,703†	—	—	—	—	—	2,546,841

* Including lignite. † Including anthracite.

2. Location of Collieries

LOCATION OF PRINCIPAL COLLIERIES IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE

	Annual Production		
	Coke	Briquettes	Coal
1. *"Petroşani" S.A. Română pentru Exploatarea Minelor de Cărbuni*—			
Pits at Petrilla and Aninoasa near Lupeni	—	—	1,500,000
At Petrilla there are also a low-temperature carbonisation plant capable of producing 20,000 tons annually and briquetting plant capable of producing	—	100,000	—
2. *Uzinele de Fier şi Domeniile din Reşiţa S.A.*—			
Pits at Anina, produce coal similar to Pecz (Hungary) coal; modern installations	—	—	200,000
Washeries, briquette factory and coke ovens	86,000	50,000	—
The *Doman* mines near Reşiţa produce coal similar to Pecz (Hungary) coal	—	—	50,000
The *Secul* mines near Reşiţa produce coking coal	—	—	25,000
3. *"Creditul Carbonifer" S.A. Minsera*, near Comăneşti, produce—	—	60,000	200,000
4. *"Lonea" S.A.R. pentru exploatarea minelor de cărbuni* owns collieries in Hunedoara basin in Jiu valley and produces ..	—	—	100,000
5. There are also a number of smaller colliery companies and a small mine at Gorj producing anthracite	—	—	3,000

[17d]

CHAPTER III

316
439

3. Coke Imports and Production

	Imports	*Production**
	in '000 tons	
1936	39	78
1937	49	78
1938	63	86
1939	55	88
1940	54	86
1941	n.a.	90

* Including gas coke.

Of the total coke available annually—140,000 tons—100,000 tons were consumed by blast-furnaces and iron-works, the remaining 40,000 by other industries.

II. ELECTRIC POWER

A. General

377
371

Being an agricultural country, Rumania, like the other countries of South Eastern Europe, is not extensively developed from the electrical point of view. The most important high-tension transmission lines are located in the neighbourhood of the Prahova oilfields and of Bucarest, but though these two areas are interconnected by means of lines operating at 120 and 60 kV, there is no national grid. There are a few other high or medium-tension lines which mostly connect power stations owned by industrial concerns. The majority of generating stations giving a public supply are quite isolated from each other.

1. Sources of Power

Rumania's potential water-power resources are high. It is estimated that 24,000 million kWh could be obtained annually from the economically

A. INTRODUCTION

135 By comparison with Greece or Yugoslavia Rumania has but poor deposits of minerals, with the exception of gold, as a producer of which, before the loss of Transylvania, she ranked second in Europe to Sweden.

●316 Iron-ore output is inadequate to meet the requirements of the steel industry. Bauxite output is on a very small scale, though steps are being taken to increase this and to create an aluminium industry. Production of lead and zinc, though sufficient pre-war to cover requirements, was centred in territory now ceded to Hungary, so that the country has become dependent on imports. Silver and copper production, the latter never other than on a small scale, have also suffered through territorial losses. Attempts have been made during the last few years to develop output of chrome and manganese—manganese for production of ferro-manganese for the iron and steel industry, and chrome, deposits of which appear not to have been worked before 1941, for export to Italy.

135 Deposits of mica and molybdenum have both been recently discovered in small quantities in the Mehedinți district, and the Germans are particularly interested in production of the former.

B. IRON AND STEEL

327 Full use of the Rumanian iron and steel industry is severely hampered by inadequate supplies of metallurgical coke and of iron ore, both of which have to be imported. Shortage of the former particularly has affected the industry since the outbreak of war, because, due to an insufficient supply of metallurgical coke in German Europe as a whole, Rumania has been unable to import the requisite quantities to maintain output of her blast-furnaces. Rumanian plants, however, are new and the steelworks are all open-hearth or electric, which means that they are able to produce the qualities most useful for armaments.

1. Iron Ore

316 Shortage of iron ore is the fundamental weakness of the Rumanian iron and steel industry. Though various other concessions have been granted, but not yet in any way developed, only three mines have been regularly exploited, as follows:—

(a) The Ghelari deposits of limonite (47 per cent. to 54 per cent. iron) owned by the State and exploited by the Hunedoara Works.

(b) The Teliuc deposits of limonite (48 per cent. to 52 per cent. iron) and of siderite (28 to 35 per cent iron), owned and exploited by Titan Nadrag Calan.

(c) The almost exhausted Ocna de Fier deposits of poor quality limonite owned by Reșița.

316 439 Rumania has always had to import ore, chiefly from Yugoslavia, and recently from the Russian mines of Krivoi Rog as well. The following table shows Rumanian output and imports of iron ore.

Year	*Output*	*Imports*
	'000 tons	
1936	107	80
1937	127	90
1938	137	114
1939	143	90
1940	151	52
1941	106	n.a.

[21b]

CHAPTER IV

327 compared with the following annual pre-war figures:

Year	*'000 tons*
1936	225
1937	241
1938	326
1939	385

4. Iron and Steel Consumption

The limited native iron and steel production, which was never sufficient to keep the consuming industries fully supplied, became an increasing impediment with the rapid development of these industries during the last few years. Iron and steel products had therefore to be imported at [439] the rate of 2,300,000 tons a year. The outbreak of war in Europe, and consequent restriction of supplies meant a falling off of imports, so that an acute shortage developed. During 1942 however, the situation improved somewhat in that Germany was reported to have sent a total of 130,000 tons of iron and steel products to Rumania.

5. German Penetration

327 A small degree of penetration into the Ru-
439 manian iron and steel industry has been achieved
473 by the Hermann Göring Werke, which, after the partition of Czechoslovakia, acquired Czech interests in Reşiţa amounting to 6 per cent., which were later increased to 20 per cent.

In 1941 a company with 50 per cent. German and the remainder Rumanian capital, was formed to take over the management of Reşiţa and its associated companies. The Malaxa Works later also came under the organisation of this company.

C. LEAD AND ZINC

1. General

328 In pre-war years Rumania was practically
439 self-sufficient in lead but not in zinc, since she possessed no zinc-smelting facilities. Her production of zinc concentrates was exported, mainly to Poland, part of the metal content being re-imported after smelting. Belgium and Poland were her chief suppliers of metallic zinc.

2. Mines and Plant

●316 The mining of lead and zinc constituted only a small industry in Rumania. Part of the production, almost 50 per cent. in the case of lead, was obtained incidentally to the working of gold and silver ores. The principal producers were [659] the State-owned mines Baia Sprie, Capnic, Văratec, Valea Roşie, Dealul Crucii, and the Herja mine owned by Phœnix S.A.; all are situated in the Baia Mare district in North Transylvania. The Herja ores averaged approximately 8 per cent. lead and 14 per cent. zinc, whilst ores from the other mines averaged only 4 per cent. lead and 10 per cent. zinc.

135 There are other deposits in the Transylvanian Erzgebirge, where galena and blende are associated with gold occurrences, in the Hunedoara, Banat, and Severin districts, and at Cârlibaba in the Bucovina.

328 Rumania possessed two lead smelters for the treatment of her production of concentrates: the Phœnix plant at Lucaci, with a capacity for about 5,000 tons of crude lead and 3,000 tons of refined lead, and a plant at Feriza belonging to Uzinele Metallurgica din Firiza de Jos. There

[22 a]

328 was no zinc-smelting capacity until 1940, when the "Sonemin" concern (Societatea Nationala de Exploatări Miniere şi Industriale S.A.R.) erected a plant at Copşa Mica with a capacity for 6,000 tons of crude zinc annually. The smelter has three retorts fired by natural gas, treating concentrates first roasted at the Phœnix works.

3. Pre-War Production and Trade

Ore production increased over the years 1934-1938, statistics available are conflicting, but it is certain that 1938 production in terms of lead content was not less than 7,000 tons. Smelter production also increased from 4,000 tons to about 7,000 tons, and averaged about 5,000 tons over the period. Exports and imports of lead were very small.

Ore production in terms of zinc content varied between approximately 4,000 tons and 8,000 tons. The concentrates were all exported, chiefly to Poland. Metallic zinc was imported almost entirely from Belgium and Poland.

The small output of lead and zinc was of little importance other than to Rumania herself.

4. War-time Development

[728] [439] As practically the whole of the Rumanian lead-zinc industry passed to Hungary when she acquired the Baia Mare district under the Vienna Award, Rumania became largely dependent on imports for the satisfaction of her lead and zinc requirements. However, she retained the Transylvanian Erzgebirge and other areas containing lead-zinc deposits, some of which she is now endeavouring to exploit. For instance, it was reported in December 1942 that deposits in the Banat, near Agadici, and in the Hunedoara district, were being developed. The Copşa Mica zinc smelter has remained in Rumanian hands.

D. MICA

316 135 The Germans are taking considerable interest in the mica deposits discovered in the Mehedinţi district, though little is believed to be of high quality. The present annual rate of production is estimated to be about 150 tons.

E. BAUXITE

135 Rumania possessed reserves of bauxite situated in the Bihor Massif and estimated by German experts in 1939 at some 40 million tons. The main deposits are located in the Poiana, Crisul Repede and Jad Valleys, and in the Galbina valley south-east of Beiuş. Small deposits exist around Remetea and Bratca, in the district around Piatra and near Turda.

316 Despite the size of her ore reserves, Rumania's production of bauxite has never been important, largely because of its unsuitability for the Bayer process, which is mostly operated in European alumina plants. Pre-war ouput never exceeded 10,000 tons annually, and was mostly consumed at home in the manufacture of cement and refractory bricks.

Mining operations were carried on before the war by three companies :—

(a) *Bauxita S.A.R.*, a subsidiary of the Swiss Aluminium Industrie A.G. Chippis which owned mines at Dobreşti and produced small quantities of bauxite for the Rumanian cement industry.

[226]

●316 (b) *Alumina S.A.R.*, a subsidiary of the German-controlled Bauxit-Trust A.G. of Zurich, which mined bauxite principally at Bratca in the Jad valley, and also owned concessions at Remetea and Pietroasa.

(c) *Aur S.A.R.*, a subsidiary of the Rumanian Mica Group, owning bauxite properties in the Sohodol region near the railway from Abrud to Turda. It supplied bauxite for the manufacture of cement and at the outbreak of war had reserved stocks for a projected alumina and aluminium plant.

The Dobreşti mines of the Bauxita S.A.R., which are within the present Rumanian frontiers, are producing at the rate of 10,000 tons annually, most of which is delivered to Germany.

F. ALUMINIUM

328 Rumania possessed no aluminium industry before the war although from time to time plans for an alumina-aluminium works were discussed. A few thousand tons of aluminium, mostly in the form of semi-manufactured or finished products, were imported annually, Germany being the principal source of supply. [439]

Aur S.A.R. have been experimenting in the production of alumina in a small pilot plant near Dicio Sân Martin, using the Seailles process which is claimed to be successful in producing alumina from low-grade bauxites of the type mostly found in Rumania.

This company is planning an aluminium reduction works of 20,000 tons capacity with an alumina plant of 60,000 tons. I.G. Farbenindustrie and the Mica group are interested, and the intention is to supply 20,000 tons of alumina annually to Germany. Up to June 1943 these projects had apparently not progressed beyond the experimental stage.

Small tonnages of aluminium, mostly in the form of semi-manufactures, are being imported from Germany, principally for the Rumanian aircraft industry.

G. CHROME

316 Rumania has reserve of chrome ore estimated at 2 million tons, located at Ogradina and Plavişeviţa on the Danube near Orşova. These deposits were not worked before 1941, and the output for 1942 is estimated at 5,000 tons. The ore is low grade, the highest chrome content being 40 per cent. Cr_2O_3. Germany is believed to be receiving the greater part of present output. [135]

H. MANGANESE

The pre-war annual output of manganese averaged 40,000 tons (40 per cent. Mn.), and the probable maximum output that could be obtained is 60,000 tons. The ore is located in the Eastern and Southern Carpathians with reserves estimated at 10 million tons, while the principal mines are near Jacobeni. About 30/35,000 tons of manganese ore is available for export, and is now mainly supplied to Italy and Germany, the remainder being used locally in the making of ferro-manganese. The Nitrogen company at Dicio sân Martin are reported to have extended their plant to produce ferro-manganese for supply to Reşiţa iron and steel works, and to Titan Nadrag Calan.

I. COPPER

316 135 Apart from copper ore recovered as a by-product in the mining of gold ores there is no copper-mining industry in Rumania. There are, however, two deposits which have possibilities of future production. They are as follows:-

(a) At Altun-Tepe in the Dobruja, 12 miles south of Tulcea near the Black Sea, is a deposit which is being developed by Credited Minier S.A.R. There are three areas totalling about 5,000 acres and reserves of 400,000 tons of ore averaging 1½ to 3 per cent. copper.

In 1940 development was proceeding very slowly, and it did not appear then that any production would take place for at least two years.

(b) At Zam, which is about 19 miles from Brad in western Transylvania, there is another deposit. The veins vary from a centimetre to a metre in width, and the grade of ore ranges from a half to 3 per cent. copper. These deposits have been worked on a small scale in the past, but no work is in progress at the present time.

Production of copper ore in Rumania, mainly from operations at various gold mines, is reported to have been 12,420 tons in 1938, and 25,168 tons in 1939.

J. GOLD

The most important area for gold-mining is in the Apuseni mountain district in Central Transylvania. The principal gold deposits lie within an area bounded by Baia De Arieş, Zlatna, Sacaramb and Tebea. The chief mining centre is Brad, the nearby mines of Muşari, Brodisor and Valea Morii providing most of the production. Other mining centres within the area are Sacaramb, Almaş (Neagris), Roşia Montana, Bucium and Stanija.

The gold-bearing veins of the Apuseni district strike in directions between north-west and north-east and vary from a few millimetres to two metres in width. The lengths of the veins range between 300 and 700 metres and some are worked at depths approaching 600 metres from the surface. The ore is said to average 8 to 12 grammes per ton.

The largest producing company is the Societatea Mica with a production in 1940 of 2,096 kilos, and in 1941 of 2,665 kilos. In 1942, the State gold mines of Roşia Montana and Sacaramb produced respectively 150 and 238 kilos of gold.

Production in the Baia Mare district (now Hungarian) represented about one-third of normal ore output.

316 435 To stimulate gold production in those mines carrying only small values in gold, and also to make up for the loss of output entailed by the transfer of the Baia Mare area in Northern Transylvania to Hungary under the Vienna Award, the premium on gold production in Rumania was increased from the 1st January, 1943. In addition to the fixed basic price of 211,111 lei per kilo, there is now a premium of 189,180 lei per kilo for ore produced with a gold content of 15 grammes per ton rising to 656,380 lei per kilo for ore with a gold content of 3 grammes per ton or less. This has led to considerable prospecting for new gold deposits in various parts of the country.

K. SILVER

316 Over pre-war years Rumania ranked sixth, or when the Italian production was greater seventh,

[23b]

CHAPTER IV

316 among European producers of silver. Although imports and exports of silver were irregular, and show no marked trend, it seems certain that production was adequate to meet requirements. Imports were mainly in the form of coinage, minted in London and Paris.

1. Mines and Plant

There were no mines exploited exclusively for silver and the output was to a considerable extent closely related to that of gold, with which it frequently occurs in association with copper and/or lead, zinc, pyrites, etc. Hence the geographical distribution of the main silver-producing areas was almost identical with that of gold. There were two principal districts, the "Triangle of Gold" around Brad, Abrud, Zlatna in the province of Alba, and the Baia Mare district.

The larger gold mines were all considerable producers of silver, although the very largest silver producers, the Herja, and the State-owned Baia Sprie mine both in the (Baia Mare district) were only insignificant gold producers.

328 The Rumanian production of argentiferous ores was treated by refineries at Baia Mare and Zlatna and at the Phœnix refinery at Satu Mare, all of which are in the area ceded to Hungary.

2. Pre-War Production

Silver production increased at a much higher rate than gold production over pre-war years; 1937 silver output was nearly double that of 1935, and more than four times as great as that of 1932. However, there was a considerable fall from 824,480 in 1937 to 502,890 troy ounces (metal in ore), in 1938.

3. War-time Developments

728 316 A Rumanian authority has estimated that with the loss of the Baia Mare (Nagybanya) area under the Vienna Award, Rumania was deprived of as much as 87 per cent. of her silver production. Efforts are being made, however, to increase production from the considerable deposits still remaining under Rumanian control. Increased premiums are also being paid on silver mined as from the 1st January, 1943.

463 industrial labour. One-third of all workers en-
438 gaged in industry are independent artisans, on whom the community is dependent for its services, but who do not play any important part in war production. In certain of the larger armament works German controllers have effected a considerable degree of rationalisation.

3. Mining

316 There is a shortage of miners: Russian prisoners
727 of war have been employed in mining during 1942. Many miners were reported to have been included in the territory transferred to Hungary.

4. Armament Works

719 There is a general shortage of labour in metal
464 and engineering factories, particularly of skilled labour. A 12-hour day was legalised at the beginning of 1942, but it is doubtful if in fact a 12-hour day is ever worked.

5. Timber

313 There is a shortage of labour, both for lumbering
464 and for timber manufacture.

6. Textiles and Clothing

464 The total number of workers in these industries
288 has probably fallen considerably, due to reduction
294 of available raw materials. The delivery of supplies to individual mills seems to be somewhat erratic, and there is evidence of considerable part-time work, for instance in a survey of some 43 factories, in December, 1942, 11 were working full time, 21 on a reduced scale, and 11 at a very reduced scale.

7. Building

499 The extent of fortification building and general
712 road and rail construction in Rumania is unknown,
464 but in the second half of 1942 there was evidence of a scarcity of general labour for such projects, and of Russian prisoners of war working on rail construction.

438 In the other branches of occupation, transport
464 services, etc., there is no evidence of labour
[759] shortage, apart from doctors, many of whom have been mobilised for the army.

D. CONTROL OF LABOUR

1. The Youth Labour Service

466 A youth labour service founded on the German
883 model was established in March 1941. The leaders were trained in Germany, but it was only in April 1942 that the labour camps began to function. Youths are called up in their 19th–20th year, and the period of service lasts 7 months.

(*See* Part II, Chapter V.B. for further details.)

2. Civil Mobilisation

466 A general civil mobilisation decree was passed in May 1941 by which (1) employment cards were introduced; (2) men and women aged 20–57 were liable to compulsory employment if not employed.

Two subsequent decrees were published in March and May 1943, one for the reorganisation of agriculture, forestry and fishing, and the second for the reorganisation of industry. Each of these decrees gave full powers to the appropriate authorities for the mobilisation and transfer of labour.

In addition to the general labour decrees which have so far had little influence on the labour situation, there have been regional decrees applying to individual localities, e.g. in Bessarabia, in February 1942, all the inhabitants aged 22–70 were called upon for compulsory agricultural labour unless already employed.

313 the small industries of the remoter upland districts. It is particularly important in the wood and pulp and paper industries, and in the small textile and pottery works. Charcoal is still used for smelting.

377 ELECTRICITY is mainly generated thermally, in spite of the great potentialities of water-power provided by the rivers from the Carpathians, not to mention the Danube current. Lack of natural reservoirs in snow-field, glacier and lake means that exploitation of the hydro-electric resources would entail enormous capital expenditure in the construction of reservoirs. The sum total of direct water-power used must, however, be very great, for the number of water-wheels is legion.

317 SALT is another asset of real importance. Like the mineral oil, it is found in greatest abundance, and is most accessible, in the upper Tertiary deposits of the sub-Carpathians, in the region of greatest disturbance. Sometimes it is exposed in cliffs, sometimes it is covered with thin layers of loam. Salt mines are being worked at Slanic, at Targu-Ocna (Tergu Ocnei) in the Trotuş basin, and at Ocnele-Mare (Ocna) on
316 the Olt. In 1932 the amount extracted was 288,000 metric tons, of which 240,500 tons were for home consumption, the rest being exported to the Balkan countries and to Russia. Salt mining and marketing are state monopolies.

IN iron ore Roumania is not rich, the output being only about 90,000 tons per annum. The most important deposits lie in the mountains of the Banat and in the Poiana Ruscai (Ruszka) massif farther north, between the Mureş and the Bistra (Bisztra) tributary of the Timiş (Temes). The Reciţa (Reciţa Montana) district in the Banat mountains, opening towards Hungary, has foundries and steel works employing about 15,000 hands.

WITH the recent rise in the price of gold, the mining of that metal, which formerly was almost negligible, has become more active, and the output reached nearly 4,000 kgs. in 1933. The ore is mined in the Trachyte massif of the Bihor.

433 IN SPITE of considerable advantages in natural resources, and solicitous nursing on the part of the State, particularly in the Old Kingdom, industry in Roumania is still in its

A. THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

381 Though the chemical industry of Rumania ranks lowest among the chief industries on the basis of production value, it is better and more comprehensively developed than in the other south-east European countries. Production is chiefly confined to heavy chemicals manufactured largely from indigenous raw materials. Most of the factories are situated in Valachia, Transylvania, and around Timişoara in the Banat.

1. Acids and Alkalis

385 ●317 Rumania produced annually 45,000 metric tons of sulphuric acid, which was sufficient to cover the pre-war requirements of the country, which were mostly for the refining of mineral oil. The manufacture was in the hands of some six firms, of which the chief producer was the Mărăşeşti S.A.R., with plants at Mărăşeşti, Valea Călugărească and Braşov. Three of the smaller plants producing sulphuric acid with a total annual capacity of 18,000 tons, representing 35 per cent. of the total, were acquired by Hungary. The necessary sulphur was obtained from Rumanian pyrites mines located at Baia Mare and Baia Sprie in N. Transylvania, acquired by Hungary in 1940. Since that date supplies have been derived from Fundul Moldovei, Zam, Sacaramb and Altan Tepe, though not in sufficient quantities to cover requirements. Shortage of sulphuric acid has been partly eased by imports from Italy.

The alkali production is normally sufficient to yield a surplus for export. Rock salt, of which there is an important domestic production, forms the basis of the alkali industry.

Salt Production

	metric tons
1939	374,000
1940	323,000
1941*	267,000

* Reduced 1941 production is due to loss of salt mines to Hungary at Ocna Sugatag, Ocna Dejului and elsewhere.

385 Soda ash is made solely by the Solvay Company at Ocna-Mureşului, where the annual capacity of the plant is estimated at 50,000 metric tons. Caustic soda is made by the Solvay Company and by S. A. Nitrogen at Dicio Sân Martin. Production of alkali in 1939 and 1942 (estimated) was :—

	1939	1942
Soda ash ..	38,000	40,000
Caustic soda ..	11,800	15,000

Requirements of hydrochloric acid were about 3,000 to 3,500 metric tons a year, and were completely met by home production. Production of sodium sulphate, a by-product in the manufacture of hydrochloric acid, amounted to 2,650 metric tons in 1939.

The most important sulphate made in Rumania before the war was that of copper, production of which averaged 5,700 metric tons between 1933 and 1936, increasing to 12,400 tons in 1937. The chief producers were the Mărăşeşti and the Phœnix chemical works (the latter in ceded territory).

[439] There is at present an acute shortage of copper sulphate, the loss of which as a fungicide is particularly felt. Germany is reported to have supplied small quantities in return for exports of copper scrap.

543

[25] 7. CONFECTIONERY, ETC.

Gingerbread (all shapes).

Sweets: Packets of sweets, sweet-stuffs in various shapes. Dolls, ladies, hearts, diamonds, all with rough pieces of mirror inset.

[524] 8. TOYS.

The only toys for children seen were gaily-coloured thin rubber balls (large), also small wooden flutes similar to those used by shepherds.

[322] 9. CARVED WOODEN ARTICLES.

Wooden cigarette-holders; various sizes, some grotesquely large.

Mirrors with flower-borders carved in high relief.

Match-stands, cigarette stands, wooden boxes.

Large pipes (for playing jokes). Powder is secreted in the mouth-piece and is puffed into the face when the pipe is blown.

10. ARTICLES FOR THE HOME.

[285] Blankets patterned in red and natural wool.

Rug-strips made of pieces of cotton and woollen waste pieces of material.

[415] Modern cooking tins and saucepans, enamelled dishes and all sorts of "Household Helps," which attracted crowds of peasant women, e.g. egg and tomato slices, vegetable cutters, pastry moulds, etc.

Strainers with wooden frame and wire base, the wire coloured in tartan and other patterns.

Alarm clocks, boot polish in tins, soap, hempen rope and string.

[301] 11. CHEAP JEWELLERY, ETC.

Rings, brooches, neck and watch chains. Necklaces of coloured pearl and glass beads. Spectacles of plain and tinted glass. Jewelled combs for wearing in the hair. Studs, fancy buttons, thimbles, all kinds of plain and fancy pins. Mirrors.

113
333
● 323

Slovenes EF7
Yugoslavia EF1
Albania EG1
Rumania ED1 ●
Bulgaria EE1

/For additional miscellaneous bits of information on the use of brick, stone, tiles and masonry in building construction, see scattered references in 17: Thurnher, EF6 Serbs file, category 116./

433 infancy. The mass of the people—the peasants—still supply
[294] their own modest wants almost entirely. The women make, in their own homes, the garments required by the household for summer and winter, using home-spun wool and home-woven cotton. A village expert fashions the leather embroidered coats worn by men and women alike. In the mountains, often the foot-gear is still of local manufacture. (Hats and shoes are mainly imported from the town, how-
342 ever.) Houses are made of locally-felled and sawn timber, and all the household utensils and furniture, except the crockery, are made in the village.

256 THERE is little accumulated capital in the country, and it is
273 natural that modern industrial developments should tend to be based on local raw materials and traditional skill. Home-grown wheat, maize and barley feed the flour-milling and brewing industries which are well developed. There are about 400 large flour mills, steam driven and capable of producing graded flour. These are mainly in the Old Kingdom and grind wheat chiefly. The wheat districts of Bessarabia and Bucovina have a number of modern mills, as well as a large number of windmills, but the maize districts still use the old-fashioned water-mills, which can only grind coarse meal. The brewing industry has been encouraged by the government, partly with the idea of reducing the consumption of the potent alcoholic beverage, "ţuica", which the peasants distil from plums. Most of the breweries are either in Bucureşti and Iaşi or in one of the larger Saxon towns of Transylvania. Potato and maize spirit are made on a large scale, particularly in Transylvania, for export.

● 323 FOR POTTERY MAKING the Dobrogea supplies a good kaolin, but the industry has not reached a high stage of development, although the ancient peasant pottery has much merit in form and decoration. This is due in part to lack of suitable fuel for the furnaces.

339 WITH the acquisition of Transylvania, Roumania has become independent in the matter of that most important constructional commodity, cement.

288 THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY is still backward. The post-war development is chiefly in the Banat, where, under protection, silk, artificial silk, cotton and wool have made

353

(House B.)
Curtea de Arges. The interior of the potter's house—his bedroom. Large unbaked pots were standing on the floor.

Photo by H. J. Howard

(House A.)
Curtea de Arges. Primitive arrangement for winding warp lengths on balcony of house measured up by M. Tatton and R. Jones

323

(House B.)
Curtea de Arges. The potter's kiln in his back yard. A primitive affair of sticks, poles and clay.

Photo by H. J. Howard

(House A.)
Curtea de Arges. Part of trousseau. Rugs, blankets, cushions, bed-covers, etc. *Listed by Miss R. Jones.*

Photo by H. J. Howard

PLATE V

[Page 30 a]

342 THE CHARACTER of this house is of the simplest. The walls are
352 whitewashed, the floors bare, and there is practically no furniture other than wooden beds and tables. The stoves are of porcelain, and wood or charcoal is used as fuel. The usual
● 323 practice is for potters to share a kiln with their neighbours. The one illustrated here was the property of this particular house and was placed in its yard (Plate IV, B).

[463] THE FIGURES given by the mayor show that there are 101 potters in Curtea de Argeş. We visited a good number and found that most of them live and work under conditions similar to those illustrated here. The potters for the most part occupy houses in one area of the town. A fine clay is found locally and can be had for nothing, but it must be collected by the potter himself. This clay he stores in his house (see upper plan on page 29).

THE POTS vary in design within a limited range. They are mostly of a buff colour, with the main part of the outside unglazed. The inside is glazed brown and the rim is usually covered with a bright green glaze, which makes the pots very attractive; some pots have splashes of green in parts or all over them. Most of the pots are marketed locally and can be bought at a low price. The pot is often made porous so that evaporation may keep the water cool. Pots are sent to other
[438] places near Curtea, but are not sufficiently strong, we were informed, for long-distance transport.

341 NEW DEVELOPMENT in housing is making steady progress. Some houses are still being constructed on the traditional lines, half brick half timber, and the "eye" in the roof, which is common in the older houses, is not necessarily omitted in the modern roof; tiles, however, are replacing the shingle. The wooden balcony is disappearing in the larger type of house and is being replaced by a brick verandah. These brick verandahs are built with ornate columns, sometimes with elaborate capitals. The classical influence is, in fact, strong, for some houses have a pediment, and in one ambitious dwelling the capitals were gilded and the pediments contained gilded decorations. The simple wooden window frames are now little used, and are replaced by elaborate mullions. Wall decorations in elaborate stucco or stencil work and ornamental details on doors are a common feature of the new houses. Most of the new houses are detached and stand in their own gardens. M. E. T.

1 [See pp. 286, HRIF pagination - Analyst]

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDI Rumania EDI

342
323



Curtea de Arges. A house in Potters' Street. Notice jars, etc., drying in the sun ready for baking.
Photo by H. J. Howard

280

Women separating hemp fibres from the stems after they have been retted and dried.

874 THE TECHNICAL or Trade School is one of forty such schools in the country. The Minister of Education has ordered this number to be doubled. The boys come from all districts and can go on to a higher grade Trade School. There is a still higher grade of school in Roumania called the Academy, from which pupils are turned out as teachers.

IN THIS TRADE School at Curtea de Argeş the boys live in and pay an inclusive fee of 4,500 lei per annum; those attending as day boys pay only 760 lei per annum. Two-thirds of these fees must be paid at the beginning of the session; the cost of material is not included.

Boys can enter between the ages of 11 and 15; the number taken is 100. They are divided into four classes. The subjects taught are Woodwork, Pottery and Tailoring. In woodwork, when the boys leave they are considered to have qualified in all the processes of house-building and furnishing. [323] In pottery, the chief industry of this town, the *traditional* shapes, colouring and decoration (mostly of ships) are charming, but *modern* designs and shapes are less good and often tasteless.

[353] THE CLASSROOMS are airy and heated by stoves. The boys sit in couples. The walls are hung with pictures of Roumanian history and of architectural interest, e.g. York Minster, Notre Dame, the Forum, etc. Each room has a religious picture. The woodwork room is large; each bench has a wooden vice; the wood is neatly stacked on a large shelf a few feet from the roof. Few tools were seen, as they were being prepared for next session. There is a room set apart for exhibiting the work done. All articles are for sale, and the pupil gets most of the money. Both the french polishing and the chip carving reach an excellent standard.

[7[illegible]] THE MILITARY SERVICE required from boys attending Trade Schools is of one year's duration only. There are in the country five Higher Trade Schools—at Bucureşti, Braşov, Craiova, Iassi and Turgul Mureş.

N. H. S.

543 443 WE HAVE classified the chief items observed at the fair between August 11th and 15th, 1936.

1. *Livestock.* Draught oxen, cows and calves, pigs and piglets. A few horses and goats. No sheep or fowl. The bargaining for cattle is completed when the buyer contrives to thrust a piece of silver into the hand of the seller. Acceptance of the earnest is followed by a hand-clasp.

[391] 2. *Agricultural Implements and Metal-work.*—It is said that gipsy-made metal tools were formerly displayed, but what little metal-work is now sold is factory-made and comes mostly from Czechoslovakia—cow-bells (of sheet-metal), horse-bells (of cast-metal), knives, etc. Hay-forks are gipsy-made, as are washing tubs and cradles, hollowed out of split tree trunks. Kitchen spoons are hand-carved. Wooden saddles and gipsy-made baskets and brooms may come under this head.

3. *Fruits and Vegetables.*—Tomatoes, potatoes, sweet-corn, onions, garlic, peppers, cabbage, water-melons, gherkins, aubergines, pears, apples, plums, blackberries. Also eggs and cheese.

[323] 4. *Pottery.*—The chief local craft is naturally well represented. The vessels, displayed on the ground, vary greatly in size, decoration and purpose; but they are all of brown clay, usually with simple floral patterns and debased geometrical designs in burnt sienna, yellow and green: vessels with or without lids, with or without handles, with or without spouts, glazed inside, outside, or both, in size ranging from salt-and-pepper stands to large waterpots. We find the old device of making pots in imitation of birds and animals.

[282] 5. *Leatherwork.*—Several booths display white leather sheepskin waistcoats, having the wool inside and the outside decorated with applied strips of thin orange-dyed leather embroidered usually by machine stitching, but occasionally by hand. These waistcoats are made at Curtea de Argeş. Leather belts, 4 to 6 inches wide, are machine-stitched but hand-tooled; they have buckle fastenings. Bridles and saddlery. Knotted leather thongs for whips. Hempen ropes for halters are sold in this section, too. Ready-made boots and shoes. The bulk of the shoes for sale, however, are made of rubber, in the shape of the traditional pointed shoe of skin. Most of them are cut from old motor tyres, but others are now made from specially manufactured rubber strips which repeat the patterns of the tyres.

339 656 came into force forbidding construction throughout the country for the duration of the war of private buildings requiring either iron, steel girders, sheet-iron or other sheet-metal roofing.

In 1942 production of bricks and tiles was reported to have been sufficient to meet the reduced requirements. During the war period there have been considerable exports of asphalt and tarred board for roofing, the latter mainly to Italy. 439

E. GLASS

323 The glass industry employed 6,000 workers in 1937 in 19 glass factories and 20 glassware factories, the most important of which were the Vitrometan Fabrica de Sticlarie S.A. of Mediaş and the Fabrica de Sticlarie Turda S.A. of Turda, both producing sheet-glass and hollow-ware.

Production did not cover the requirements of specialised types, which were imported from Germany and Czechoslovakia. During the war period window-pane production has been adequate for requirements and small quantities have been manufactured for Germany; while under the 1942 Turco-Rumanian Trade Agreement Rumania agreed to supply both window-panes and glassware.

F. CERAMICS

The ceramic industry employed 1,600 workers in 1937 in 33 factories, and the value of production was 112 million lei. Most of the raw materials for this industry are found in the country, and there has been no difficulty in supplying these during the war period. Apart from the mechanised industry, ceramics are produced in normal times on a comparatively large scale by the peasants. The principal factories are the Nitrogen S.A. in Tărnăveni, the Crinul S.A. in Timişoara and the Uzinele Ceramice S.A. in Ploeşti.

462 In the Carpathians, while some stâne are inhabited by
233 families of shepherds, others have men only, and purely "feminine" stâne are not unknown. There appear to be regional differences based perhaps on the varying requirements of the lowland crops, and all forms are said to be of some antiquity; it cannot be shown that the "masculine" stâne represent an older type than those where both sexes
[834] take part, or vice versa. But it is significant that in some parts there is a definite *tabu* against women, and the shepherds must have no relations with them in the prescribed season, from the arrival at the stână to July 20th (St. Eloi). In the areas we visited, while the shepherds were exclusively male, women from the villages occasionally ride up with messages or food, and may stay at the hut for a day or two.

234 On reaching the pastures, to resume, the sheep are divided
233 into separate flocks—milkers and non-milkers, lambs and wethers. Only the milkers are kept in the immediate neighbourhood of the stână, the rest being driven uphill or to the shelter of the forest's edge, according to their requirements. Two milkings are usual, about 6 o'clock morning and evening. The sheep are driven into the *strunga*, a fenced enclosure near the hut, where the shepherd-boy introduces them one by one into a narrow roofed exit at which the milkers sit. The milk is forthwith poured into a copper cauldron over which the *baciu*[1] stands at the fireside, stirring
● [326] the contents with the peeled, spiked top of a spruce. The copper pot is tinned inside, this work being done by the gipsies. Into the simmering milk the *baciu* throws a pinch of rennet, and then works the curds into a thick pulp. A simple press—a canvas bag twisted with a tourniquet and weighted with a stone—next comes into use, and after three days salt is added and the cheese is finally kneaded and stored in a sheepskin which has been specially prepared by drying and scraping. This is cheese of the first quality (brânză), a poorer quality (urdă) being obtained from the whey left in the copper after taking out the curds. The urdă is often stored in small skins, e.g. rabbit, or in containers made of bark or hollowed branches. Much of the cheese in these days is bought by co-operative societies.

262 It is the duty of the *baciu*,[2] further, to prepare food for the shepherds. Onions, beans and paprika make vegetable soup, and maize-bread and cheese complete a diet which may be varied now and again with smoked mutton. Another task

1 [For explanatory footnote see pp.49, Ct. 116 - - Analyst]
2 [cheese maker of the Stâna -52- Analyst]

543 through a corner of the fair-ground as it begins its journey northwards. The fair-ground extends from the bridgehead, where in former times there must have been a ford, southwards for an indefinite distance between river and railway. A tributary stream which joins the Argeş at the bridge is named, after the fair, Valea *Tărgul*. From the bridge a lane winds southwards to the rows of buildings and sheds which
256 constitute the permanent nucleus of the fair. Here is the corn mill, perhaps once dependent on power from the river, but now driven by electricity. We may note in passing that among the many survivals in the Carpathians is the horizontal water-wheel, used here as in Norway to turn corn mills. The mill consists of a log-hut erected directly over a stream
543 or a branch of a river. The sale of cereals, chiefly maize, is
443 also conducted by the mill, at the entrance to the fair, and there are stores of building materials, fruit, rock-salt and charcoal.

Rows of permanent open-sided sheds face each other along the "main street" of the fair, and are hired for the duration by merchants and caterers. Other goods—mostly those brought by peasants—are displayed in improvised booths or exposed on the ground by the wayside. Further on, the inevitable amusements are concentrated in a corner of their own, the stalls in this section increasing in number throughout the week, until pleasure becomes the chief business by the last days of the fair. This is the natural culmination of events which begin with the sale of cattle in the opening days; the "order of the fair" is a traditional feature of such gatherings everywhere.

543 But in Roumania there is another element which contributes
●326 to the variety of the fair—the gipsies who pitch their camps
563 behind the booths and hawk trinkets or unobtrusively engage in metal-work and wood-carving. They appear to keep apart from the rest. To them the food-stallholders bring their copper pots, used for boiling fat, for retinning, while the peasants drive up the draught oxen which may need to be reshod. The tinning is done over an improvised hearth and a handful of charcoal; the shoeing—by the bridge-head—requires somewhat more elaborate equipment in the shape of
[735] a forge and a post and ropes for felling the oxen. Finally, squatting by the wayside, or actively exhibiting their sores, there are the beggars and cripples, who complete the human picture.

when foreigners are received, and to maintain internal order." 661

The Reşiţa Affair.

The Reşiţa is the largest metallurgical establishment of Rumania, and being in close proximity to the iron and coal mines of the Banat, is susceptible of rapid development. Its shares, which fetched 809 lei in 1929, have dropped to 402 in 1930, 205 in June, 1931, and 130 lei in 1932. The "Epoca" of 24th Oct., 1930, reported the following details on the management which may partially explain this depreciation, but at any rate they serve to show on what principles limited companies are generally run in Rumania :- 661 327

"We published during May details as to the amount of directors' remuneration distributed. This amounted to 83 million lei, while 86 millions were distributed among the shareholders. The director, Prince Barbu Stirbey, received over 10 millions annually. In other countries such particulars would have created consternation. With us nothing happened, because Stirbey's dictature is all-powerful. Today the Reşiţa is at the mercy of the Credit Anstallt, of Vienna, owing to the manner the Company was administered, the interest of the shareholders being always the last consideration. Secret conventions were signed by Prince Stirbey who drew tens of millions of lei annually for travelling expenses. The ordinary revenue was insufficient to face such wastefulness, even with the 200% subsidy furnished by the State, and therefore recourse to loans from the Credit Anstallt was necessary, the Reşiţa being on the threshold of bankruptcy. The great Viennese bank has put a stop to the scandalous remuneration received by Stirbey and has increasingly taken control of the Company."

Prince Stirbey was one of the leading pillars of the Liberal party and took a prominent part in exiling the (then) Crown Prince Carol from the country. The Reşiţa seems to be associated with scandal. In 1921 it was disclosed that some eighty deputies and senators had received shares in the concern in order to support interests inimical to the Rumanian State, and these disclosures provoked at the time tumultuous debates in the Chamber. 661

through a spirit of ill-conceived emulation. According to 433
official statistics there were in 1929 a total of 3,736 industrial 471
establishments, with an invested capital of 40,284 million lei, and employing 201,184 workpeople. Of these firms 1391 were in the old kingdom and 1789 in the Banat and Transylvania. The continuous fall in the purchasing power of the population, the lack of adequate working capital, which forces these industries to borrow money at high rates of interest owing to the prevailing monetary stringency, the disorganization of credit, the diminution of State purchases, and the non-payment by the State for the goods ordered by it from these industrial firms, have placed most of them in jeopardy, and it is very doubtful whether they will be able to survive the present crisis unless the State intervenes further on their behalf.

The following table sets forth the data concerning the various branches of industry operating during the year 1929:

Industry.	Number of establishments.	Capital (million lei.)	H.P. used.	Annual value of output in million lei.	Workpeople employed.
Metallurgical	448	6,444	84,775	8,443	40,236
Electrotechnical	12	83	2,026	208	839
Timber	787	3,457	73,827	5,362	41,656
Food and Aliments	1,004	11,686	126,336	15,312	25,644
Textile	516	5,515	40,421	8,448	35,963
Leather goods	211	1,406	15,117	2,614	7,925
Glassware	35	505	2,500	602	4,218
Building materials ...	296	2,085	52,981	1,573	13,963
Pottery	32	119	683	104	834
Chemical	248	6,131	69,326	11,011	19,238
Paper and Graphic Arts ...	147	2,128	29,971	2,447	10,668

The metallurgical industries have been developed to such [32]
an extent that practically all the current implements, from pails and wire to railway locomotives and waggons, as well as agricultural machinery, are locally produced in sufficient quantities for the requirements of the local market.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Banat]

[The Crisana]

The high quality of the crops in this province, 241
amongst them wheat, maize, rye, oats, and the high 134
standard of animal breeding, have made the Banat known far beyond the borders of Rumania. The fertility of the soil is due partly to the 'black earth' which, in a greater or lesser degree, is a component of all the arable land. Apart from being an important agricultural region, the Banat possesses valuable industries, forests and minerals. Iron ore and coal 316
are mined in the area of Resita and Anina, where 327
there are great iron and steel works which produce 315
railway equipment and armaments. The Danubian port of Orsova, guarding the western entrance to the 'Iron Gates', also has an oil refinery.

The capital of the Banat is Timisoara[R] (Temesvar[H]) on the Bega with a population of 100,000. In 361
Roman times the fortress of Ripensia was situated here. In Hunyadi's time it was a centre of resistance against the Turks, only second in importance to Belgrade. To-day the town is a great rail and road junction with many factories, banks, commercial houses and cultural institutions. Lugoj, on the Timis, with a population of 20,000, and Caransebes, north of the Porta Orientalis which leads through the mountains of the Banat to the Danube, are marketing towns of some importance.

THE CRISANA AND MARAMURES. Geographically the 131
Crisana is the eastern borderland of the Hungarian [161]
plain. The province covers an area of about 8,400 square miles and has a population of just under 1,500,000. The Crisana lies between Transylvania in the east, the River Mures (Maros[H]) in the south; Hungary (as reduced by the Treaty of the Trianon) in the west and Czechoslovakia in the north.

A. INTRODUCTION

135 By comparison with Greece or Yugoslavia Rumania has but poor deposits of minerals, with the exception of gold, as a producer of which, before the loss of Transylvania, she ranked second in Europe to Sweden.

316 Iron-ore output is inadequate to meet the requirements of the steel industry. Bauxite output is on a very small scale, though steps are being taken to increase this and to create an aluminium industry. Production of lead and zinc, though sufficient pre-war to cover requirements, was centred in territory now ceded to Hungary, so that the country has become dependent on imports. Silver and copper production, the latter never other than on a small scale, have also suffered through territorial losses. Attempts have been made during the last few years to develop output of chrome and manganese—manganese for production of ferro-manganese for the iron and steel industry, and chrome, deposits of which appear not to have been worked before 1941, for export to Italy.

135 Deposits of mica and molybdenum have both been recently discovered in small quantities in the Mehedinţi district, and the Germans are particularly interested in production of the former.

B. IRON AND STEEL

●327 Full use of the Rumanian iron and steel industry is severely hampered by inadequate supplies of metallurgical coke and of iron ore, both of which have to be imported. Shortage of the former particularly has affected the industry since the outbreak of war, because, due to an insufficient supply of metallurgical coke in German Europe as a whole, Rumania has been unable to import the requisite quantities to maintain output of her blast-furnaces. Rumanian plants, however, are new and the steelworks are all open-hearth or electric, which means that they are able to produce the qualities most useful for armaments.

1. Iron Ore

316 Shortage of iron ore is the fundamental weakness of the Rumanian iron and steel industry. Though various other concessions have been granted, but not yet in any way developed, only three mines have been regularly exploited, as follows:—

(a) The Ghelari deposits of limonite (47 per cent. to 54 per cent. iron) owned by the State and exploited by the Hunedoara Works.

(b) The Teliuc deposits of limonite (48 per cent. to 52 per cent. iron) and of siderite (28 to 35 per cent iron), owned and exploited by Titan Nadrag Calan.

(c) The almost exhausted Ocna de Fier deposits of poor quality limonite-owned by Reşiţa.

316 439 Rumania has always had to import ore, chiefly from Yugoslavia, and recently from the Russian mines of Krivoi Rog as well. The following table shows Rumanian output and imports of iron ore

Year	*Output* (000 tons)	*Imports*
1936	107	Nil
1937	127	90
1938	137	114
1939	143	90
1940	151	52
1941	106	n.a.

[21 b]

2. Pig-Iron Production

●327 Rumania had nine blast-furnaces, as under —

Company	*No. of Furnaces*	*Annual Capacity '000 tons*
Reşiţa	2	120
Hunedoara	4	90
Titan Nadrag Calan ..	1	25
Vlahiţa*	2	4
Total	9	239

*In Hungarian territory as a result of the Vienna Award

The full operation of these furnaces is rendered impossible by lack of metallurgical coke. Only Reşiţa possesses coke-ovens, and its production is no more than 80,000 tons a year—insufficient for its own needs. The blast-furnaces of Titan Nadrag Calan and of Vlahiţa are charcoal-burning, but charcoal has now become as rare as coke. These difficulties helped to keep pre-war pig-iron production far beneath capacity, as the following table illustrates :—

Year	*'000 tons*
1936	96
1937	116
1938	107
1939	115

3. Steel Production

Rumania's annual steel capacity is about 500,000 tons of ingots and castings. The principal producers are as follows :—

Company	*Annual Capacity '000 tons*
Reşiţa	210
Hunedoara State Works	200
Titan Nadrag Calan ..	100
Malaxa	65
Others	25
Total	500

All this capacity is open-hearth or electric and therefore requires large supplies of scrap (100 per cent. scrap can be used for electric blast furnaces, and for open-hearth anything between 30 and 70 per cent. scrap). As Rumania is predominantly an agricultural country, native scrap production is small, usually amounting only to about 150,000 tons per annum. Thus scrap had [232] to be imported, as follows :—

Year	*'000 tons*
1936	37
1937	44
1938	74
1939	43
1940	6

Imports almost stopped on the outbreak of war and the situation became serious, but has to a certain extent been retrieved by the collection of battlefield scrap from Bessarabia and Transnistria, with the result that production of crude steel in 1942 should have been about 350,000 ton-

[21c]

CHAPTER IV

●327 compared with the following annual pre-war figures:

Year	'000 tons
1936	225
1937	241
1938	326
1939	385

4. Iron and Steel Consumption

The limited native iron and steel production, which was never sufficient to keep the consuming industries fully supplied, became an increasing impediment with the rapid development of these industries during the last few years. Iron and steel products had therefore to be imported at the rate of 2,300,000 tons a year. The outbreak of war in Europe, and consequent restriction of supplies meant a falling off of imports, so that an acute shortage developed. During 1942 however, the situation improved somewhat in that Germany was reported to have sent a total of 130,000 tons of iron and steel products to Rumania. [439]

5. German Penetration

327 A small degree of penetration into the Rumanian iron and steel industry has been achieved
439 by the Hermann Göring Werke, which, after the partition of Czechoslovakia, acquired Czech in-
473 terests in Reşiţa amounting to 6 per cent., which were later increased to 20 per cent.

In 1941 a company with 50 per cent. German and the remainder Rumanian capital, was formed to take over the management of Reşiţa and its associated companies. The Malaxa Works later also came under the organisation of this company.

C. LEAD AND ZINC

1. General

328 In pre-war years Rumania was practically
439 self-sufficient in lead but not in zinc, since she possessed no zinc-smelting facilities. Her production of zinc concentrates was exported, mainly to Poland, part of the metal content being re-imported after smelting. Belgium and Poland were her chief suppliers of metallic zinc.

2. Mines and Plant

316 The mining of lead and zinc constituted only a small industry in Rumania. Part of the production, almost 50 per cent. in the case of lead, was obtained incidentally to the working of gold and silver ores. The principal producers were
[659] the State-owned mines Baia Sprie, Capnic Văratec, Valea Roşie, Dealul Crucii, and the Herja mine owned by Phœnix S.A., all are situated in the Baia Mare district in North Transylvania. The Herja ores averaged approximately 8 per cent. lead and 14 per cent. zinc, whilst ores from the other mines averaged only 4 per cent. lead and 10 per cent. zinc.

135 There are other deposits in the Transylvanian Erzgebirge, where galena and blende are associated with gold occurrences, in the Hunedoara, Banat, and Severin districts, and at Cârlibaba in the Bucovina.

328 Rumania possessed two lead smelters for the treatment of her production of concentrates: the Phœnix plant at Lucaci, with a capacity for about 5,000 tons of crude lead and 3,000 tons of refined lead, and a plant at Feriza belonging to Uzinele Metalurgica din Firiza de Jos. There

[22 a]

RUMANIA ED I

The hipped roof is rather flat and made of corn straw or reed, about 40 centimeters thick. The frame is often of the collar type, horizontal beams supporting opposing rafters (figs. 60a, 64). Pan tiles appear only in isolated instances. In 1918 sheet iron was becoming popular because it was economical and saved time and effort. It was generally painted red-brown. Chimneys are usually inadequate or lacking (Jänecke, 1918: 11). 342 [335] [327]

Every house has an open veranda (prispa) on at least one side which may or may not have a low banister. It is slightly elevated from the ground and is protected by an extension of the eaves. While many Moldavian houses consist of only one room, even the smallest house in Wallachia has an anteroom (tinda). Here the main room is called odaia and has a special stove that is heated by a flue from the hearth in the anteroom. Often an additional odaia is added on the other side of the anteroom forming a symmetrical three-room house. Sometimes additional units are built onto the house on one or both of the narrow sides (figs. 57c, 58). The roof is extended over them in the form of a cutslide (fig. 57a). These units are used for storage of agricultural tools, stables, summer kitchens, etc. If two are not sufficient, three or more units may be added. The prispa may be extended alongside the annex; or, when the annex protrudes in front of the house, the prispa may stop at the annex wall (fig. 57c). Occasionally a large house may have two parallel rows of rooms. However, this arrangement complicates the roof construction, which in this case is generally unsuccessful (Jänecke, 1918: 11-16). [341] [354]

The interior is very simple. The anteroom serves for the storage of house implements; maize is kept in wooden boxes and placed along the wall, and there is also a small handmill for grinding maize. A large oven with a hearth in front of it is located at the wall opposite the door (figs. 57c, 58). The anteroom has no ceiling. When two odaias are present one is used for both living and sleeping quarters, while the other is used for the storage of blankets, carpets etc. It is somewhat of a guest-room. [251] [353] [354]

In the Rumanian house special attention has been given to the hearth and stove, and the whole house can be said to have been built around the hearth. The hearth is the showpiece of the room. Arched over the hearth is a decorated mantel on which cooking utensils are placed. Niches on either side of the hearth are provided for the same purpose. Because of the inflammability of the straw roof, the chimney is of brick (these are the only bricks in the house and are made by the peasants themselves). The stoves in the living room are of unusual construction. The most spectacular of these are the columnar stoves which are not only beautiful but also effective. To the main part of the stove have been added graceful clay pipes which are either arranged symmetrically or placed on one side. The better ones resemble organs. The rest of the stove is also made of clay bricks set in mud mortar and covered with a layer of plaster of a lime and sand mixture. Decoration of clay or plaster may be added. These stoves are generally built by Gypsies. 354

CHAPTER IV

327 compared with the following annual pre-war figures:

Year	'000 tons
1936	225
1937	241
1938	326
1939	385

4. Iron and Steel Consumption

The limited native iron and steel production, which was never sufficient to keep the consuming industries fully supplied, became an increasing impediment with the rapid development of these industries during the last few years. Iron and steel products had therefore to be imported at the rate of 2/300,000 tons a year. The outbreak of war in Europe, and consequent restriction of supplies meant a falling off of imports, so that an acute shortage developed. During 1942, however, the situation improved somewhat in that Germany was reported to have sent a total of 130,000 tons of iron and steel products to Rumania.

[439]

5. German Penetration

327 A small degree of penetration into the Rumanian iron and steel industry has been achieved
439 by the Hermann Göring Werke, which, after the partition of Czechoslovakia, acquired Czech in-
473 terests in Reşiţa amounting to 6 per cent., which were later increased to 20 per cent.

In 1941 a company with 50 per cent. German and the remainder Rumanian capital, was formed to take over the management of Reşiţa and its associated companies. The Malaxa Works later also came under the organisation of this company.

C. LEAD AND ZINC

1. General

328 In pre-war years Rumania was practically
439 self-sufficient in lead but not in zinc, since she possessed no zinc-smelting facilities. Her production of zinc concentrates was exported, mainly to Poland, part of the metal content being re-imported after smelting. Belgium and Poland were her chief suppliers of metallic zinc.

2. Mines and Plant

316 The mining of lead and zinc constituted only a small industry in Rumania. Part of the production, almost 50 per cent. in the case of lead, was obtained incidentally to the working of gold and silver ores. The principal producers were the State-owned mines Baia Sprie, Capnic, Văratec, Valea Roşie, Dealul Crucii, and the Herja mine owned by Phœnix S.A.; all are situated in the Baia Mare district in North Transylvania. The Herja ores averaged approximately 8 per cent. lead and 14 per cent. zinc, whilst ores from the other mines averaged only 4 per cent. lead and 10 per cent. zinc.

[659]

135 There are other deposits in the Transylvanian Erzgebirge, where galena and blende are associated with gold occurrences, in the Hunedoara, Banat, and Severin districts, and at Cârlibaba in the Bucovina.

328 Rumania possessed two lead smelters for the treatment of her production of concentrates: the Phœnix plant at Lucaci, with a capacity for about 5,000 tons of crude lead and 3,000 tons of refined lead, and a plant at Feriza belonging to Uzinele Metallurgica din Firiza de Jos. There

[22 a]

●328 was no zinc-smelting capacity until 1940 when the "Sonemin" concern (Societatea Nationala de Exploatari Miniere si Industriale S.A.R.) erected a plant at Copsa Mica with a capacity for 6,000 tons of crude zinc annually. The smelter has three retorts fired by natural gas, treating concentrates first roasted at the Phoenix works.

3. Pre-War Production and Trade

Ore production increased over the years 1934-1938, statistics available are conflicting, but it is certain that 1938 production in terms of lead content was not less than 7,000 tons. Smelter production also increased from 4,000 tons to about 7,000 tons, and averaged about 5,000 tons over the period. Exports and imports of lead were very small.

Ore production in terms of zinc content varied between approximately 4,000 tons and 8,000 tons. The concentrates were all exported, chiefly to Poland. Metallic zinc was imported almost entirely from Belgium and Poland.

The small output of lead and zinc was of little importance other than to Rumania herself.

4. War-time Development

[728] [439] As practically the whole of the Rumanian lead-zinc industry passed to Hungary when she acquired the Baia Mare district under the Vienna Award, Rumania became largely dependent on imports for the satisfaction of her lead and zinc requirements. However, she retained the Transylvanian Erzgebirge and other areas containing lead-zinc deposits, some of which she is now endeavouring to exploit. For instance, it was reported in December 1942 that deposits in the Banat, near Agadici, and in the Hunedoara district, were being developed. The Copsa Mica zinc smelter has remained in Rumanian hands.

D. MICA

316 135 The Germans are taking considerable interest in the mica deposits discovered in the Mehedinti district, though little is believed to be of high quality. The present annual rate of production is estimated to be about 150 tons.

E. BAUXITE

135 Rumania possessed reserves of bauxite situated in the Bihor Massif and estimated by German experts in 1939 at some 40 million tons. The main deposits are located in the Poiana, Cristul Repede and Jad Valleys, and in the Galbina valley south-east of Beius. Small deposits exist around Remetea and Bratca, in the district around Pietroasa and near Turda.

316 Despite the size of her ore reserves, Rumania's production of bauxite has never been important, largely because of its unsuitability for the Bayer process, which is mostly operated in European alumina plants. Pre-war ouput never exceeded 10,000 tons annually, and was mostly consumed at home in the manufacture of cement and refractory bricks.

Mining operations were carried on before the war by three companies:—

(a) *Bauxita S.A.R.*, a subsidiary of the Swiss Aluminium Industrie A.G. Chippis, which owned mines at Dobresti and produced small quantities of bauxite for the Rumanian cement industry.

[226]

316 (b) *Alumina S.A.R.*, a subsidiary of the German-controlled Bauxit-Trust A.G. of Zurich, which mined bauxite principally at Bratca in the Jad valley, and also owned concessions at Remetea and Pietroasa.

(c) *Aur S.A.R.*, a subsidiary of the Rumanian Mica Group, owning bauxite properties in the Sohodol region near the railway from Abrud to Turda. It supplied bauxite for the manufacture of cement and at the outbreak of war had reserved stocks for a projected alumina and aluminium plant.

The Dobreşti mines of the Bauxita S.A.R., which are within the present Rumanian frontiers, are producing at the rate of 10,000 tons annually, most of which is delivered to Germany.

F. ALUMINIUM

● 328 Rumania possessed no aluminium industry before the war although from time to time plans for an alumina-aluminium works were discussed. A few thousand tons of aluminium, [439] mostly in the form of semi-manufactured or finished products, were imported annually, Germany being the principal source of supply.

Aur S.A.R. have been experimenting in the production of alumina in a small pilot plant near Dicio San Martin, using the Seailles process which is claimed to be successful in producing alumina from low-grade bauxites of the type mostly found in Rumania.

This company is planning an aluminium reduction works of 20,000 tons capacity with an alumina plant of 60,000 tons. I.G. Farbenindustrie and the Mica group are interested, and the intention is to supply 20,000 tons of alumina annually to Germany. Up to June 1943 these projects had apparently not progressed beyond the experimental stage.

Small tonnages of aluminium, mostly in the form of semi-manufactures, are being imported from Germany, principally for the Rumanian aircraft industry.

G. CHROME

316 Rumania has reserve of chrome ore estimated at 2 million tons, located at Ogradina and Plavişeviţa [135] on the Danube near Orşova. These deposits were not worked before 1941, and the output for 1942 is estimated at 5,000 tons. The ore is low grade, the highest chrome content being 40 per cent. Cr_2O_3. Germany is believed to be receiving the greater part of present output.

H. MANGANESE

The pre-war annual output of manganese averaged 40,000 tons (40 per cent. Mn.), and the probable maximum output that could be obtained is 60,000 tons. The ore is located in the Eastern and Southern Carpathians with reserves estimated at 10 million tons, while the principal mines are near Jacobeni. About 30/35,000 tons of manganese ore is available for export, and is now mainly supplied to Italy and Germany, the remainder being used locally in the making of ferro-manganese. The Nitrogen company at Dicio san Martin are reported to have extended their plant to produce ferro-manganese for supply to Reşiţa iron and steel works, and to Titan Nadrag Calan.

328 The Rumanian production of argentiferous ores was treated by refineries at Baia Mare and Zlatna and at the Phœnix refinery at Satu Mare, all of which are in the area ceded to Hungary.

2. Pre-War Production

Silver production increased at a much higher rate than gold production over pre-war years; 1937 silver output was nearly double that of 1935, and more than four times as great as that of 1932. However, there was a considerable fall from 824,480 in 1937 to 502,890 troy ounces (metal in ore), in 1938.

3. War-time Developments

328 316 A Rumanian authority has estimated that with the loss of the Baia Mare (Nagybanya) area under the Vienna Award, Rumania was deprived of as much as 87 per cent. of her silver production. Efforts are being made, however, to increase production from the considerable deposits still remaining under Rumanian control. Increased premiums are also being paid on silver mined as from the 1st January, 1943.

333
342

Yugoslavia EF1
Albania EG1
Rumania ED1
Bulgaria EE1

/For the special terminological usage of "cylindrical tiles" in house construction, see 17: Thurnher, EF6 Serbs file, category 116, p. 87./

113
333
323

Slovenes EF7
Yugoslavia EF1
Albania EG1
Rumania ED1
Bulgaria EE1

/For additional miscellaneous bits of information on the use of brick, stone, tiles and masonry in building construction, see scattered references in 17: Thurnher, EF6 Serbs file, category 116./

Bulgaria EE1
Rumania ED1

B
342
233

with straw roofs. They are rarely plastered with mud. In western Sredna Gora, transportable sheep pens are used (Gellert, 1937: 169).

RUMANIA

R
361
175
177
648

In Rumania there exists a marked difference between settlements in the lowlands and those of the Carpathian Mountain region. While topography and the presence or absence of such building materials as stone, wood or clay are important factors, political considerations also played a significant role. With the beginning of the 18th century Greek influence became predominant in Moldavia and Wallachia. The Porte set up Greek rulers in these principalities, thus in reality the Rumanians were as much under Turkish dominion, although indirectly, as were the people of the Balkans. It was only after the rebellion of 1821 that Rumanian rulers were reinstated. During all periods of unrest and foreign invasion the mountains and forests served as areas of refuge; the Serbian hajduk has his counterpart in the Rumanian heydoick (Stratilesco, 1907: 30-34).

R
361
R
[133]
R
[491]
R
[621]

Location and Types of Settlements. The older settlements were in the nature of hamlets (catun). These were generally not built on the top of hills, but rather in depressions, on the edge of forests, and away from the military roads (Grothe, 1907: 54). In the hilly regions of Oltenia and Moldavia the villages were located close to a river or on the slope of a hill. Farmsteads are generally spaced fairly far apart, in no definite order. Villages may extend over two or three hills facing one another (Stratilesco, 1907: 205). Villages in the Wallachian plains are located close to the roads. The prevalent type is the road village; buildings are located on either side of the highway which forms the main road of the village. Larger villages may have additional cross-roads (Jänecke, 1918: 7). While mountain villages average a population of 350, the largest being around 700, villages of the plains average 700 and may reach 2000 (Grothe, 1907: 55).

R
342
R
[335]

House Types. Due to the scarcity of wood and stone in the plains, buildings are generally constructed of wicker and daub, in which technique the Rumanians are masters. The roof is made first, the walls afterwards. The principle posts are first set into the ground, then the studs of the outer walls and inner partitions are spaced at 1 to 2 foot intervals. After the roof has been formed walls are built up. Mud is kneaded down with the feet, mixed with straw, and shaped into lumps that take the place of bricks. These lumps are then set between the studs and left to dry (Stratilesco, 1907: 208). More often walls are of wickerwork, plastered inside and out with a mixture of mud, straw and cowdung to a thickness of 15-25 centimeters (Jänecke, 1918: 10). The rough walls are smoothed out by applying thinner and thinner layers of mud and cowdung mixture. They are then whitewashed inside and out. Floors of timber are recent; the floor is commonly of tamped earth.

RUMANIA EDI

The hipped roof is rather flat and made of corn straw or reed, about 40 centimeters thick. The frame is often of the collar type, horizontal beams supporting opposing rafters (figs. 60a, 64). Pan tiles appear only in isolated instances. In 1918 sheet iron was becoming popular because it was economical and saved time and effort. It was generally painted red-brown. Chimneys are usually inadequate or lacking (Jünecke, 1918: 11). 342 [335] [327]

Every house has an open veranda (prispa) on at least one side which may or may not have a low banister. It is slightly elevated from the ground and is protected by an extension of the eaves. While many Moldavian houses consist of only one room, even the smallest house in Wallachia has an anteroom (tinda). Here the main room is called odaia and has a special stove that is heated by a flue from the hearth in the anteroom. Often an additional odaia is added on the other side of the anteroom forming a symmetrical three-room house. Sometimes additional units are built onto the house on one or both of the narrow sides (figs. 57c, 58). The roof is extended over them in the form of a catalide (fig. 57a). These units are used for storage of agricultural tools, stables, summer kitchens, etc. If two are not sufficient, three or more units may be added. The prispa may be extended alongside the annex; or, when the annex protrudes in front of the house, the prispa may stop at the annex wall (fig. 57c). Occasionally a large house may have two parallel rows of rooms. However, this arrangement complicates the roof construction, which in this case is generally unsuccessful (Jünecke, 1918: 11-16). [341] [354]

The interior is very simple. The anteroom serves for the storage of house implements; maize is kept in wooden boxes and placed along the wall, and there is also a small handmill for grinding maize. A large oven with a hearth in front of it is located at the wall opposite the door (figs. 57c, 58). The anteroom has no ceiling. When two odaias are present one is used for both living and sleeping quarters, while the other is used for the storage of blankets, carpets etc. It is somewhat of a guest-room. [251] [353] [364]

In the Rumanian house special attention has been given to the hearth and stove, and the whole house can be said to have been built around the hearth. The hearth is the showpiece of the room. Arched over the hearth is a decorated mantel on which cooking utensils are placed. Niches on either side of the hearth are provided for the same purpose. Because of the inflammability of the straw roof, the chimney is of brick (these are the only bricks in the house and are made by the peasants themselves). The stoves in the living room are of unusual construction. The most spectacular of these are the columnar stoves which are not only beautiful but also effective. To the main part of the stove have been added graceful clay pipes which are either arranged symmetrically or placed on one side. The better ones resemble organs. The rest of the stove is also made of clay bricks set in mud mortar and covered with a layer of plaster of a lime and sand mixture. Decoration of clay or plaster may be added. These stoves are generally built by Gypsies. 354

The roof is steeper than in the plains and protrudes further over the house. The support is in the form of a collar. The rafters tend to be too widely spaced, which results in slight bending of the battens; but, while it makes for a weaker roof, this results in softer and more pleasing lines. The four corners are not sharp but tend to be rounded (fig. 62). Wooden shingles are almost exclusively used for roof covering. They are about 15 centimeters wide and may be as long as 3 meters. They overlap two to four times. Shorter shingles form 6-10 rows. The smaller shingles may have their ends in the form of swallow tails or other decorative shapes. The ridge shows a special development. On the windward side the first layer of shingles is made to protrude over the ridgepole (fig. 62). These shingles also have excised patterns and are very ornamental. The ridgepoles may extend slightly over the hip and have a small gabled roof, one shingle in height (fig. 62). This provides an opening for the smoke to escape through. Ornamental poles rise at either end of the ridgepole (fig. 61). 342 [335] [531]

Chimneys are lacking and the smoke may escape through openings at the ridge or otherwise through the roof, which then shows all shades of gray to black. In some areas of Oltenia in southwestern Rumania one finds wooden chimneys (fig. 65). These are made of wicker and daub and are covered with shingles. [354] [184]

A special development in the foothills of the Southern Carpathian Mountains is the privy, which is in the form of an annex located at the end of the veranda (fig. 64b). [184] [514]

In general the buildings in the mountain districts show a greater variation than those of the plains. The woodwork is superior, and shows a great deal of inventiveness. The construction, however, is irregular, sloppy and often not functional. Pillars that carry no weight may be very thick, while those that must support much weight may be much too slender (Jänecke, 1918: 35-43). 342 184 [335]

Kulas (fig. 67) are found only in the mountainous regions of Oltenia in the district of Mehedinti, Gorj and Râmnicu-Vâlcea. They were built by the boyars, the wealthy landowners. The oldest ones come from the period when the Rumanian rulers were paying tribute to the sultan. The ground plan is a square 7 by 12 meters in length. The width of the walls is 30-70 centimeters. The kula (fig. 67) may have three or four stories, each about 2.5 meters in height. Each story has one room. The ground floor is used for storage; sometimes a well is built into it, and occasionally there is a subterranean escape passage. The upper floors may also be used for storage, but are mainly living quarters. Windows are generally found only on one side; the other walls are provided with loopholes. On the top floor there is generally an open veranda (ferdak) about 3 meters wide, the roof over which is supported by pillars (fig. 67). The exposure is toward the valley and the south. On the side opposite the ferdak there is a simple wooden balcony under the eaves (fig. 67). Many kulas have a privy tower attached to them. 342 712 [184] [556] [175] [312] [514]

NOTES ON THE HOUSES IN CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

342 THE SMALL TOWN of Curtea de Argeş has from time to time suffered destruction from fire, in consequence of which there is very little to be found in the way of early buildings.

The oldest house in the town is that occupied by the present mayor and his family, and they claim that their ancestors have held the property since about 1630, when it was built.

The illustration (op. p. 28) shows it to be a well-built brick structure with a fairly steep roof of dark brown shingles. The brickwork is whitewashed and is very solidly constructed. The present family uses the entire first floor as their dwelling-house. At some recent period part of the ground floor was converted into a restaurant. The spacious rooms under the balcony are used partly for the purpose of a store and the mayor has a private office there.

353 THE DWELLING has a peculiar and individual charm. The furniture is mostly in the traditional peasant style, and much of it is similar to that found in the simple houses, but shows a superior workmanship and quality. The bed, as in the living-room of every peasant, has retained its traditional place in this house, though in this case its purpose to-day is that of a divan or sofa. The coverings and cushions, hand-embroidered, and the woven wall-hangings round the bed, are such as may be seen throughout the countryside, though richer in the materials used and more artistic than most of those to be seen in the peasants' cottages, where often the primary colours are used with little attempt to grade the design by the use of intermediate shades. Small decorated patterns are to be found on the walls. The large living-room has an elaborate and beautifully-painted ceiling—a thing rarely found in the [336] country houses. Modern sanitation, water-supply, etc., have [291] been put into the house. The women of the present family choose to maintain peasant tradition in dress.

342 The spacious balcony, approached from the courtyard, serves for reception of guests in summer. Here meals are taken, and a good many of the household occupations are carried on.

2 [See pp. 28a (HRAF paging system) -- Analyst]

433 infancy. The mass of the people—the peasants—still supply
[294] their own modest wants almost entirely. The women make, in their own homes, the garments required by the household for summer and winter, using home-spun wool and home-woven cotton. A village expert fashions the leather embroidered coats worn by men and women alike. In the mountains, often the foot-gear is still of local manufacture. (Hats and shoes are mainly imported from the town, how-
342 ever.) Houses are made of locally-felled and sawn timber, and all the household utensils and furniture, except the crockery, are made in the village.

256 THERE is little accumulated capital in the country, and it is
273 natural that modern industrial developments should tend to be based on local raw materials and traditional skill. Home-grown wheat, maize and barley feed the flour-milling and brewing industries which are well developed. There are about 400 large flour mills, steam driven and capable of producing graded flour. These are mainly in the Old Kingdom and grind wheat chiefly. The wheat districts of Bessarabia and Bucovina have a number of modern mills, as well as a large number of windmills, but the maize districts still use the old-fashioned water-mills, which can only grind coarse meal. The brewing industry has been encouraged by the government, partly with the idea of reducing the consumption of the potent alcoholic beverage, "ţuica", which the peasants distil from plums. Most of the breweries are either in Bucureşti and Iaşi or in one of the larger Saxon towns of Transylvania. Potato and maize spirit are made on a large scale, particularly in Transylvania, for export.

323 FOR POTTERY MAKING the Dobrogea supplies a good kaolin, but the industry has not reached a high stage of development, although the ancient peasant pottery has much merit in form and decoration. This is due in part to lack of suitable fuel for the furnaces.

339 WITH the acquisition of Transylvania, Roumania has become independent in the matter of that most important constructional commodity, cement.

288 THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY is still backward. The post-war development is chiefly in the Banat, where, under protection, silk, artificial silk, cotton and wool have made

282
439

without much success, and was therefore reverted to her former practice of importing tannin.

In February 1942 it was reported that with imports from Italy, Turkey and Croatia, Rumania had an eight months' supply in hand.

Under the 1942/43 Italo-Rumanian agreement Italy is providing her with 1,750 tons of chestnut extract, 1,000 tons of sumach and 735 tons of other materials. Turkey also agreed to supply her in 1942 with 1,000 tons of valex and 2,500 tons of valonea.

D. BUILDING MATERIALS AND CEMENT

339

The building materials industry in Rumania is on a small scale and not highly mechanised, employing a total of 16,000 workers in 1937, while the value of production in that year amounted to 1·6 milliard lei, about 2½ per cent. of total industrial production. In the decade before the war cement, which is the most important branch of this industry, had a steadily increased output reaching in 1939 a total of 531,000 tons, with a 800,000 ton capacity. Small quantities had to be imported.

The most important cement firms are at Cetate, Vodă, Turda, Dudești, and Fieni. Since the war, due to limited building activity, consumption of cement has decreased, and was reported to have been 314,000 tons for the first ten months of 1942, the bulk of which was used for military requirements.

[727]
339
656

After the recapture of Northern Bucovina and Bessarabia in mid-1941, a considerable amount of repair work had to be undertaken as a result of war destruction; but at the beginning of 1942, due to raw material and labour shortage, all further reconstruction in these two provinces was forbidden. Later, in February, 1943, it was

[37a]

339 [656] came into force forbidding construction throughout the country for the duration of the war of private buildings requiring either iron, steel girders, sheet-iron or other sheet-metal roofing.

In 1942 production of bricks and tiles was reported to have been sufficient to meet the reduced requirements. During the war period there have been considerable exports of asphalt and tarred board for roofing, the latter mainly to Italy. [439]

E. GLASS

323 The glass industry employed 6,000 workers in 1937 in 19 glass factories and 20 glassware factories, the most important of which were the Vitrometan Fabrica de Sticlarie S.A. of Mediaş and the Fabrica de Sticlarie Turda S.A. of Turda, both producing sheet-glass and hollow-ware.

Production did not cover the requirements of specialised types, which were imported from Germany and Czechoslovakia. During the war period window-pane production has been adequate for requirements and small quantities have been manufactured for Germany; while under the 1942 Turco-Rumanian Trade Agreement Rumania agreed to supply both window-panes and glassware.

F. CERAMICS

The ceramic industry employed 1,600 workers in 1937 in 33 factories, and the value of production was 112 million lei. Most of the raw materials for this industry are found in the country, and there has been no difficulty in supplying these during the war period. Apart from the mechanised industry, ceramics are produced in normal times on a comparatively large scale by the peasants. The principal factories are the Nitrogen S.A. in Tărnăveni, the Crisul S.A. in Timişoara and the Uzinele Ceramice S.A. in Ploeşti.

342 THE CHARACTER of this house is of the simplest. The walls are
352 whitewashed, the floors bare, and there is practically no furniture other than wooden beds and tables. The stoves are of porcelain, and wood or charcoal is used as fuel. The usual
323 practice is for potters to share a kiln with their neighbours. The one illustrated here was the property of this particular house and was placed in its yard (Plate IV, B).

[463] THE FIGURES given by the mayor show that there are 101 potters in Curtea de Argeş. We visited a good number and found that most of them live and work under conditions similar to those illustrated here. The potters for the most part occupy houses in one area of the town. A fine clay is found locally and can be had for nothing, but it must be collected by the potter himself. This clay he stores in his house (see upper plan on page 29).

THE POTS vary in design within a limited range. They are mostly of a buff colour, with the main part of the outside unglazed. The inside is glazed brown and the rim is usually covered with a bright green glaze, which makes the pots very attractive; some pots have splashes of green in parts or all over them. Most of the pots are marketed locally and can be bought at a low price. The pot is often made porous so that evaporation may keep the water cool. Pots are sent to other
[438] places near Curtea, but are not sufficiently strong, we were informed, for long-distance transport.

● 341 NEW DEVELOPMENT in housing is making steady progress. Some houses are still being constructed on the traditional lines, half brick half timber, and the "eye" in the roof, which is common in the older houses, is not necessarily omitted in the modern roof; tiles, however, are replacing the shingle. The wooden balcony is disappearing in the larger type of house and is being replaced by a brick verandah. These brick verandahs are built with ornate columns, sometimes with elaborate capitals. The classical influence is, in fact, strong, for some houses have a pediment, and in one ambitious dwelling the capitals were gilded and the pediments contained gilded decorations. The simple wooden window frames are now little used, and are replaced by elaborate mullions. Wall decorations in elaborate stucco or stencil work and ornamental details on doors are a common feature of the new houses. Most of the new houses are detached and stand in their own gardens.

M. E. T.

1 [See pp. 286, HRAF pagination -- Analyst]

RUMANIA ED1

The hipped roof is rather flat and made of corn straw or reed, about 40 centimeters thick. The frame is often of the collar type, horizontal beams supporting opposing rafters (figs. 60a, 64). Pan tiles appear only in isolated instances. In 1918 sheet iron was becoming popular because it was economical and saved time and effort. It was generally painted red-brown. Chimneys are usually inadequate or lacking (Jänecke, 1918: 11). 342 [335] [327]

Every house has an open veranda (prispa) on at least one side which may or may not have a low banister. It is slightly elevated from the ground and is protected by an extension of the eaves. While many Moldavian houses consist of only one room, even the smallest house in Wallachia has an anteroom (tinda). Here the main room is called odaia and has a special stove that is heated by a flue from the hearth in the anteroom. Often an additional odaia is added on the other side of the anteroom forming a symmetrical three-room house. Sometimes additional units are built onto the house on one or both of the narrow sides (figs. 57c, 58). The roof is extended over them in the form of a catalide (fig. 57a). These units are used for storage of agricultural tools, stables, summer kitchens, etc. If two are not sufficient, three or more units may be added. The prispa may be extended alongside the annex; or, when the annex protrudes in front of the house, the prispa may stop at the annex wall (fig. 57c). Occasionally a large house may have two parallel rows of rooms. However, this arrangement complicates the roof construction, which in this case is generally unsuccessful (Jänecke, 1918: 11-16). [341] [354]

The interior is very simple. The anteroom serves for the storage of house implements; maize is kept in wooden boxes and placed along the wall, and there is also a small handmill for grinding maize. A large oven with a hearth in front of it is located at the wall opposite the door (figs. 57c, 58). The anteroom has no ceiling. When two odaias are present one is used for both living and sleeping quarters, while the other is used for the storage of blankets, carpets etc. It is somewhat of a guest-room. [251] [353] [354]

In the Rumanian house special attention has been given to the hearth and stove, and the whole house can be said to have been built around the hearth. The hearth is the showpiece of the room. Arched over the hearth is a decorated mantel on which cooking utensils are placed. Niches on either side of the hearth are provided for the same purpose. Because of the inflammability of the straw roof, the chimney is of brick (these are the only bricks in the house and are made by the peasants themselves). The stoves in the living room are of unusual construction. The most spectacular of these are the columnar stoves which are not only beautiful but also effective. To the main part of the stove have been added graceful clay pipes which are either arranged symmetrically or placed on one side. The better ones resemble organs. The rest of the stove is also made of clay bricks set in mud mortar and covered with a layer of plaster of a lime and sand mixture. Decoration of clay or plaster may be added. These stoves are generally built by Gypsies. 354

342 Windows are generally double even in the simpler houses, one opening to the inside, the other to the outside. They are always barred and set in a wooden frame (Jänecke, 1918: 27-28).

342 531 The Rumanian house is noteworthy for its exterior decorations. Special attention and much imagination is given to the woodwork. Much art is evident in the pillars supporting the roof over the veranda (fig. 57d), lintels supporting the eaves, the railings of the veranda and the window and door frames. The corners of houses may have designs in low relief. Painted designs may be placed on the wall in great abundance (figs. 57a, 57b). Because of the lesser opportunity of embellishment through woodwork and because whitewashed walls lend themselves well to painting, painting of the exterior is characteristic of the plains. The Rumanian does not shy [789] away from bright colors. Ultramarine is most popular, for it is said to scare away evil spirits. Combinations of red, blue and [822] yellow are common, and dark green shades are also favored (Jänecke, 1918: 23).

342 [184] [341] The basic difference between the house of the lowlands and those of the mountain region is that the latter are of two-story construction (fig. 64a). Building materials in the mountains are stone and wood rather than wicker and mud. When houses are built on an incline a high stone foundation forms the ground floor (pivnita). This can be used for stables, storage rooms and also as a wine cellar. This form persists even when the terrain is flat. The higher house is appreciated for its better view, greater security and suitability for defense.

While the floor plan often consists of a row of rooms similar to that of the lowlands, a number of changes have taken place. The anteroom with its large hearth is generally left out (fig. 64b). This is due to the fact that the bricks that line the hearth are not available, and the wooden walls are more inflammable than the predominantly mud ones of the plains. Where the hearth is present [354] it is put into a special annex. Instead of the hearth an oven-stove (a combination stove and oven) is used, which permits the main room to be used as living room and sleeping room as well as a kitchen.

The two-room house predominates; due to the absence of the connecting anteroom, each room has a door to the veranda (čerdak) (fig. 66). Sometimes the veranda at the top of the stairway is expanded into a hall-like structure (foişor) (fig. 64a) covered by a hipped roof at right angles to the main roof. In summer most activities take place there.

The foundation is made of rocks or of large pebbles from the river. Walls are made of horizontal logs or boards which cross at the corners, each fitting into a notch in the other. A mud or lime plaster is never omitted, and to facilitate this plastering thin laths are nailed diagonally across the beams.

17: Thurnher E-4 (no date) 1956 EF6 Serbs EF6
Yugoslavia EF1
Albania EG1
Rumania ED1
Bulgaria EE1

TYPES DES VILLAGES

Échelle de 1:8.000.000

Villages à maisons disséminées

Villages à maisons concentrées

SYA RB 102 361 341

[P.86-R]

342
343
351

Rumania ED1

/For information on the construction and form of houses, yards and farm buildings, see 17: Thurnher, EF6 Serbs file, category 116, pp. 74-79, passim and 86O-86Q./

342
343
351

Yugoslavia EF1
Albania EG1
Rumania ED1
Bulgaria EE1

/For general information on houses and farm buildings, see 17: Thurnher, EF6 Serbs file, category 116, pp. 79-86./

333
● 342

Yugoslavia EF1
Albania EG1
Rumania ED1 ●
Bulgaria EE1

/For the special terminological usage of "cylindrical tiles" in house construction, see 17: Thurnher, EF6 Serbs file, category 116, p. 87./

137 *sitifolia, S. aizoides, S. aizoon, Erysimum Witmanni, Phyteuma orbiculare, Silene Zawadskii, Onobrychis montana var. transilvanica, Cerastium alpinum, C. lanatum, Oxytropus campestris, Alsine gerardi, Campanula alpina, C. carpatica, Alyssum repens* (endemic), *Rhinanthus alpinus, Rhodiola rosea, Sedum atratum.* In the cracks in the rocks where moisture collected were noted *Pinguicula alpina, P. vulgaris, Saxifraga aizoides, S. androsacea, Viola biflora, Arabis alpina, Achillea Schurii, Biscutella laevigata,* and *Androsace lactea.*

It was obvious that to make a detailed study of this interesting mountain with its forest, plateau, gullies, scree slopes, etc., and other varying ecological factors, a much longer time would have been necessary than was possible under the conditions of our visit to the country.

The Walk by Way of Bilbor, Paltiniş, Vatra Dornei, etc., and down the Bistrita River by Timber Raft to Broşteni (Brosceni).

133 This interesting excursion was made by a number of the
233 party, and afforded a very good opportunity of seeing the country as some fifty miles were covered on foot in two days. We passed over fine slopes and through delightful valleys with their meadows bedecked with many species of flowering plants. There was time during such a walk only to notice the most salient features of the vegetation. We, however, saw hillsides where sheep were grazed quite to the top, also
[343] a mountain dairy where they were being milked. The temporary shelters for those cropping the hay in the valleys at some distance from their usual habitations were interesting, and the whole family appeared to sleep there and cook their meals till the area had been cleared.

531 During our stay at Vatra Dornei, through the kindness of
346 the mayor and the prefect of the district, we were taken by car over a mountain pass down to Campulung and from thence to the wonderful walled monastery of Moldoviţa (Moldawitza) with fine sixteenth-century frescoes covering
313 its walls. The chief point of interest from a vegetation point of view was the fine spruce forests which we saw and in which felling was in progress, the logs being pushed down the mountain side to timber carts at the bottom. The next day we had evidence of the importance of the lumbering industry

342

A plan of this farmstead is shown in Fig. 10, with which it should be compared.

German Farms in Oltchia

[facing page 42]

433 infancy. The mass of the people—the peasants—still supply
[294] their own modest wants almost entirely. The women make, in their own homes, the garments required by the household for summer and winter, using home-spun wool and home-woven cotton. A village expert fashions the leather embroidered coats worn by men and women alike. In the mountains, often the foot-gear is still of local manufacture. (Hats and shoes are mainly imported from the town, how-
342 ever.) Houses are made of locally-felled and sawn timber, and all the household utensils and furniture, except the crockery, are made in the village.

256 THERE is little accumulated capital in the country, and it is
273 natural that modern industrial developments should tend to be based on local raw materials and traditional skill. Home-grown wheat, maize and barley feed the flour-milling and brewing industries which are well developed. There are about 400 large flour mills, steam driven and capable of producing graded flour. These are mainly in the Old Kingdom and grind wheat chiefly. The wheat districts of Bessarabia and Bucovina have a number of modern mills, as well as a large number of windmills, but the maize districts still use the old-fashioned water-mills, which can only grind coarse meal. The brewing industry has been encouraged by the government, partly with the idea of reducing the consumption of the potent alcoholic beverage, "ţuica", which the peasants distil from plums. Most of the breweries are either in Bucureşti and Iaşi or in one of the larger Saxon towns of Transylvania. Potato and maize spirit are made on a large scale, particularly in Transylvania, for export.

323 FOR POTTERY MAKING the Dobrogea supplies a good kaolin, but the industry has not reached a high stage of development, although the ancient peasant pottery has much merit in form and decoration. This is due in part to lack of suitable fuel for the furnaces.

339 WITH the acquisition of Transylvania, Roumania has become independent in the matter of that most important constructional commodity, cement.

288 THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY is still backward. The post-war development is chiefly in the Banat, where, under protection, silk, artificial silk, cotton and wool have made

133 361 material eroded therefrom being spread out fanwise along the edge of the alluvium. Higher up, small alp-like terraces appear, giving place to precipitous slopes once more where calcareous rocks of Triassic and Jurassic age occur.

132 361 CONCERNING climate and vegetation little need be added to the accounts already given of the Eastern Carpathians as a whole. In the case of climate the most important features to be borne in mind are the risk of late summer storms that limit the ripening period for grain, and the winter snowfall which creates a close season for agriculture.

THE VILLAGE.

361 CORBU has been tentatively classified as a "dispersed" type of village, though it is clear from the photographs (Plate IX) that the narrowness of the valley has rather limited the extent of the dispersion and has given rise to a plan resembling that of the "street village" of Western Europe. Closer examination, however, will reveal a certain looseness of structure, especially where a slight widening of the valley occurs near the confluence of a tributary stream, and it is very probable that if the same village had been founded in a broad flat upland area the houses would have been spread out as in Bilbor (see Plate I).

PEASANT HOUSES.

342 A GROUP of typical Roumanian farmsteads is illustrated in Plate X whilst the plan on page 67 shows in detail the lay-out of the one depicted on page 43. The principal features in each case are clear. The dwelling houses, of which there are frequently two to a farm, can usually be distinguished by their bright colour-washed walls. There is an abundance of local stone, but the crystalline rocks that are nearest to hand are very intractable, and, although they are employed for the foundations, the superstructure is almost invariably of wood. In Lower Borsec, which is just visible in the distance in Plate IX, an outcrop of Travertine provides a much more easily-worked material, and is very freely employed, but its use does not appear to extend into Corbu. The walls of the Corbu houses are usually built of roughly-squared, less frequently of sawn, timber, to which, in the better-class houses, laths are nailed to form a key for

361



FIGURE 8. The amorphous plan of Corbu contrasts strongly with the more orderly and compact village of the plain. Cristian is near Brașov.

342 the plaster with which the exterior is then coated. In the poorer houses the gaps between the timbers are merely caulked with clay before a colour-wash is applied.

THE most popular type of roofing material is shingles, which is a welcome contrast to the sheet iron of the plain, though perhaps less picturesque than the steeply-pitched roofs of thatch that are a feature of other mountainous parts of the country. On some of the houses, usually those of the poorer inhabitants, shingles are replaced by longer boards which sometimes extend from ridge to eaves, all three types being illustrated in Plate X.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDI Rumania EDI

PLATE X

241
133

Hay meadows on deforested slopes above the limits of cultivation at Corbu. Although this is the upper section of a valley tributary to that of the Bistricioara, it is much broader than the narrowly constricted lower section.

Photo: R. A. Pelham.

342
361



Typical Rumanian farmsteads in Corbu. The houses are roofed with shingles, the outbuildings with boards. The house in the centre has the characteristic louvre in place of chimney, and its walls are of timber with plaster covering. Hemp is drying on the veranda. The mud caulking in the outbuilding is clearly visible.

Photo: R. A. Pelham.

[facing page 65]

A MARKED FEATURE is the comparative absence of chimneys. The cooking is done in an outhouse, no doubt to minimise the risk of fire, but the dwelling house is generally heated by a stove, the smoke from which passes up through the ceiling in an iron pipe and then escapes into the open air through holes cut in the gable ends or, in the case of a hipped roof, through a small louvre.

THE OUTHOUSES are for the most part simple structures and call for no special comment.

CLEANLINESS and simplicity are the keynotes of the domestic economy. Household effects are kept down to a minimum, but upon their manufacture an enormous amount of time and skill is lavished, especially in the case of textiles. The skilfully-woven designs on the tapestries and pillows shown Plate XVI are an illustration of such effort.

POPULATION.

ACCORDING to the 1930 census Corbu had a population of 1,563, distributed among 358 households. The majority of the inhabitants are, of course, Roumanians, for the commune lies right on the fringe of the Szekler country. In spite of having lived in close association with the Roumanians for many generations, however, the Szeklers are easily distinguished by their dress, their physical type (though this is by no means an infallible guide), their adherence to Roman Catholicism, and, of course, their language. Although culturally there is an appreciable difference between the Roumanian and Szekler peasantry, there is to-day an even wider gap between these folk and the Tsiganes or Gipsies who form a much smaller, though very interesting, minority. Generally speaking, the Roumanians contribute a dark, and the Szeklers a fair, element to the broad-headed population, whereas the Gipsies are for the most part distinctly long-headed and very dark. There is an equally well-marked difference on economic grounds, for both Roumanians and Szeklers are essentially peasants, whereas the Gipsy, being landless, is compelled to seek a livelihood by trading, unless he be either smith or musician, following the traditional pursuits of his forbears (see Plate VI).

THE HOUSES occupied by Gipsies, while resembling in style those of the peasants, can usually be recognised by the

CORBU

PLAN OF PEASANT FARMSTEAD

342



Fig. 10

342 absence of small fields, although a vegetable garden is a
563 normal feature. Most of them are grouped together in a small colony on a piece of steeply-sloping ground near the western end of the village that could not be used for agricultural purposes, thus emphasising the fact that they constitute an exotic element living on the outskirts of the community (see Plate XII and Fig. 11).

311 THERE is no emigration from Corbu, but the tendency is to extend cultivation by forest-cutting. A good deal of land in the Bistricioara valley is still available.

II. FARMING ACTIVITIES

THE LAND AND INHERITANCE.

428 FARMING in Corbu is carried on essentially for subsistence
241 rather than for profit. Large-scale cultivation with its attendant economies would in any case be difficult in such an environment, but it is rendered impossible by a land tenure system, intimately bound up with laws of inheritance, which permits the subdivision of land from generation to generation. On the death of the father the widow receives a quarter of the estate, the remainder being divided equally amongst all the children. Alternatively, the latter take over their portion on marriage, but the result in each case is the same—the peasant holdings not only decrease in size but portions of the same holding may be widely separated. For it does not even follow that all the land surrounding a farmstead necessarily belongs to the family residing there. It did, of course, when the holding was first formed, but marriage has in most cases added complications. A portion of the holding, for example, may belong to a married daughter living elsewhere in the village and her husband will then come periodically to cultivate it as part of his estate. Much time is wasted in this way, so wherever possible an interchange of plots is arranged, especially where the parties to the marriage belong to different villages.

423 IN a register covering about 207 hectares of privately owned land there were 133 parcels registered, sometimes more than one in the name of a particular person. Of the 133, 56 were less than one hectare each, but at least 8 of these parcels were accessories to other holdings and those owners

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

361
133



This is part of the area mapped in Fig. 11. The photograph is taken from the top of the porphyry spur shown in Fig. 9. *Photo: R. A. Pelham.*

241
342



A peasant holding at Corbu in process of sub-division. A son about to marry is erecting a house (seen on left) on his share of his father's land. The parental farmstead extends across the right-hand half of the picture. A strip of maize is seen in the foreground and a small patch of hemp on the extreme left, close to the new house. For plan of holding see Fig. 11. *Photo: R. A. Pelham.*

[facing page 68]

4:FTeure S-5 (no date)1936 EDI Rumania EDI

PLATE XII

342

A Gipsy smith and his family. The building on the left is the forge.

361
342

The Gipsy colony in Corbu. The houses are clustered together on a steep slope and although resembling in style those of the Roumanian peasants are easily distinguished therefrom by not having any arable land attached.

Photo: R. A. Pelham.

[facing page 69]

221 SCATTERED over the commune are eight "stâne" or
233 temporary summer settlements which are all situated be-
[342] ween 400 and 800 metres above the village. The stâna itself is a simple affair, consisting of a log hut which affords living accommodation for the shepherds and acts as a dairy and store-house, together with the folds into which the animals are driven for milking. The one illustrated had a population of three men and two boys, all Roumanians, 350 sheep and 20 cows, as well as a few pigs, the only animals left in the village being the one or two milch cows retained at each farm for family needs and the draught animals (see Plate XIII).

234 THE change from winter to spring takes place very rapidly
221 during the second fortnight of April, and the ascent to the dairies is made at the end of that month or early in May. Before the animals are taken up the milk yield of the cows is tested in order to determine the apportionment of the cheese made therefrom, but the ewes' milk cheese is distributed on the basis of the number of sheep belonging to each peasant. Shortly after the ascent the village priest performs
[23] the ceremony of blessing each stâna in turn, and before the end of May the sheep are sheared by peasants who go up specially for the purpose, the wool being brought down to the village on horseback.

233 SINCE the summer pastures are communal property their
221 administration is in the hands of an assembly of heads of
476 families which assesses the rent to be paid for the season—generally 12-15 lei for a sheep and 50 lei for a cow. The money thus received forms a fund from which the shepherds are paid for their services. Each peasant makes personal arrangements with the senior shepherd as to the amount of cheese he will require for household purposes, any surplus going into a common stock which is marketed at the end of the season. Any disputes that arise are settled by arbitration in the presence of the mayor when the shepherds return to the village. This takes place during the latter part of October, the descent of each group being celebrated by minor festivities at which the shepherds are the guests of honour. The general feast held when all are down marks the official end of the season's activities.

221 UPON their return to the village the cows are immediately
476 stabled, but each peasant splits up his sheep into two groups,

342

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

A Corbu "stâna" occupied by transhumant flocks during the summer season. A deforested portion of the mountain 2,000 feet above the village has been set aside for pasturage. The buildings are very simple. The large hut on the left combines the functions of dairy and dwelling house, the smaller sheds in the compounds being used for milking purposes.

Photo. R. A. Pelham.

342
291
142



Close-up view of dairy showing adult members of "stâna" with their utensils. The man on the left is holding a horn.

Photo: R. A. Pelham.

[facing page 72]

NOTES ON THE HOUSES IN CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

342 THE SMALL TOWN of Curtea de Argeş has from time to time suffered destruction from fire, in consequence of which there is very little to be found in the way of early buildings.

The oldest house in the town is that occupied by the present mayor and his family, and they claim that their ancestors have held the property since about 1630, when it was built.

The illustration (op. p. 28) shows it to be a well-built brick structure with a fairly steep roof of dark brown shingles. The brickwork is whitewashed and is very solidly constructed. The present family uses the entire first floor as their dwelling-house. At some recent period part of the ground floor was converted into a restaurant. The spacious rooms under the balcony are used partly for the purpose of a store and the mayor has a private office there.

353 THE DWELLING has a peculiar and individual charm. The furniture is mostly in the traditional peasant style, and much of it is similar to that found in the simple houses, but shows a superior workmanship and quality. The bed, as in the living-room of every peasant, has retained its traditional place in this house, though in this case its purpose to-day is that of a divan or sofa. The coverings and cushions, hand-embroidered, and the woven wall-hangings round the bed, are such as may be seen throughout the countryside, though richer in the materials used and more artistic than most of those to be seen in the peasants' cottages, where often the primary colours are used with little attempt to grade the design by the use of intermediate shades. Small decorated patterns are to be found on the walls. The large living-room has an elaborate and beautifully-painted ceiling—a thing rarely found in the [336] country houses. Modern sanitation, water-supply, etc., have [291] been put into the house. The women of the present family choose to maintain peasant tradition in dress.

342 The spacious balcony, approached from the courtyard, serves for reception of guests in summer. Here meals are taken, and a good many of the household occupations are carried on.

[see pp. 28a (HRAF pagination) -- Analyst]

S: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDI Rumania EDI

●342



PLAN OF MAYOR'S HOUSE - CURTEA de ARGES

Measured by the Mayor and Miss Tatton *Drawn by M. Tatton*

THE EXTENSION shown on the left includes a kitchen, laundry and servants' quarters, added to meet the needs of the present family. Below these rooms are stables and storeplaces. There are several small houses in the town, all among the older buildings, which follow a similar plan. We examined about thirty houses in Curtea, and give below descriptions of two of these, which are typical. In addition, numerous photographs were taken, which illustrate how the houses vary in detail.

THE FIRST DWELLING is of a very common type found on the outskirts of the town. We singled out this one for its added

342

The House of the Mayor, Curtea de Argeş

352

The interior of the Mayor's salon, Curtea de Argeş

[Page 28a]

PLATE IV

347

Note. The walls of the house are 85 cm. in thickness; the rooms 2 metres 15 cm. high; windows 60 cm. in width and 90 cm. high; the balcony is a metre 85 cm. above the ground.
(House A). *Photo by H. J. Howard.*

House in Potters' Street, Curtea de Argeş, showing how the potter has used his art in the decoration of his own house. Plaques and tiles of pottery let in plaster of side of house. Plaques and tiles of pottery are let in plaster of front balcony.
(House B). *Photo by H. J. Howard*

34

323

(B) House in Potters' Street, Curtea de Argeş.
For photo see page 29.

It being Sunday the potter was not actually at work, but was wearing his finely embroidered shirt.
(House B.) *Photo by H. J. Howard*

[page 286]

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

342



House B

—Ground Floor Plan—

Drawn by M. Tatton

A House in the Potters' Street (see illustrations opposite).



House B

—First Floor Plan—

Drawn by M. Tatton

A House in the Potters' Street

342



Plan of small house of illustration in top left-hand corner of facing page 29.

Plans drawn by Margaret Tatton and measured in cooperation with Rachael Jones.

interest in that its present occupants were busy over the forthcoming marriage of their daughter (age sixteen), and had many lovely things in the way of embroideries, clothes, cushion covers, etc., part of the bride's dowry, which we examined. The interior of the room on the right shows the girl's own bed, covered with the things she has made and embroidered to take to her future home. (House A, Plate IV.)

THESE WERE NOTED as follows: 10 pillows (ornamental), 12 sheets, 6 woven rugs for wall or floor, 2 woollen bed-covers (like long blankets), 4 woven bed-covers (patterned), 6 woven bed-covers(plain), and 20 towels (decorated). In addition, she was embroidering her own dresses and under-garments. Much of the work was quite fine and well done. We were informed that this dowry was a fair average one for a girl from this type of home.*

342 THE HOUSE ITSELF, which was built about fifty years ago, had brick and plaster walls, whitewashed throughout. Many of the houses are colour-washed, bright blue being a popular colour. The floors were of wood, as were also the steps leading up to the balcony. Chickens were housed in the vault under the left room. There was a large garden, most of the ground

* Inventory by Rachel Jones.

1 [see pp. 30 on (HRAF pagination) -- Analyst]

342

A small house in Curtea de Arges of similar type to Mayor's house.

being given to growing maize and vegetable marrows, though there were various small fruit-trees. The open space in front of the house had a summer kitchen. These out-door kitchens are used by almost all the peasants where an open space or yard of any sort provides available space (see illustration opposite).

THE SECOND HOUSE which we visited and examined is illustrated facing page 29 (B). This shows a well-built structure and represents the type which is more common in the town itself. The walls, which are whitewashed, are of brick and rubble and have an average thickness of 32 cm. There is a good shingled roof with good carved wooden decoration under the eave. The floor of the terrace is earth, and the entire structure of the balcony is of wood, without paint or stain. The end of the house has a pleasing finish in the form of a moulded cornice and pilasters (B).

THIS HOUSE is occupied by two families; the men, both being potters, share the potter's table (two wheels) in the lower house.

[See pp. 30 b (HRAF pagination) -- Analyst]

[See pp. 28 b (HRAF pagination) -- Analyst]

342 THE CHARACTER of this house is of the simplest. The walls are
352 whitewashed, the floors bare, and there is practically no furniture other than wooden beds and tables. The stoves are of porcelain, and wood or charcoal is used as fuel. The usual
023 practice is for potters to share a kiln with their neighbours. The one illustrated here was the property of this particular house and was placed in its yard (Plate IV, B).

[463] THE FIGURES given by the mayor show that there are 101 potters in Curtea de Argeş. We visited a good number and found that most of them live and work under conditions similar to those illustrated here. The potters for the most part occupy houses in one area of the town. A fine clay is found locally and can be had for nothing, but it must be collected by the potter himself. This clay he stores in his house (see upper plan on page 29).

THE POTS vary in design within a limited range. They are mostly of a buff colour, with the main part of the outside unglazed. The inside is glazed brown and the rim is usually covered with a bright green glaze, which makes the pots very attractive; some pots have splashes of green in parts or all over them. Most of the pots are marketed locally and can be bought at a low price. The pot is often made porous so that evaporation may keep the water cool. Pots are sent to other
[438] places near Curtea, but are not sufficiently strong, we were informed, for long-distance transport.

341 NEW DEVELOPMENT in housing is making steady progress. Some houses are still being constructed on the traditional lines, half brick half timber, and the "eye" in the roof, which is common in the older houses, is not necessarily omitted in the modern roof; tiles, however, are replacing the shingle. The wooden balcony is disappearing in the larger type of house and is being replaced by a brick verandah. These brick verandahs are built with ornate columns, sometimes with elaborate capitals. The classical influence is, in fact, strong, for some houses have a pediment, and in one ambitious dwelling the capitals were gilded and the pediments contained gilded decorations. The simple wooden window frames are now little used, and are replaced by elaborate mullions. Wall decorations in elaborate stucco or stencil work and ornamental details on doors are a common feature of the new houses. Most of the new houses are detached and stand in their own gardens. M. E. T.

1 [See pl. 28b, half page ... n. last]

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

342
323



Curtea de Argeș. A house in Potters' Street. Notice jars, etc., drying in the sun ready for baking.
Photo by H. J. Howard

28 377

Women separating hemp fibres from the stems after they have been retted and dried.

[page 32a]

PLATE X

313

Kumpana. Forestry. As the logs pass down the "chute" a man on the elevated platform sees that logs of even lengths are let out to side of "chute" for loading on to the trucks seen on left-hand side. *Photo by H. J. Howard*

252
342

The Argeş District. Visit to Forestry section (Kumpana). Inside of forestry hut, showing large open stove for cooking meals. Huge logs of wood were being burnt on a stone hearth. There were sleeping bunks for the bamboo-poles all round the sides of the hut. *Photo by H. J. Howard*

[page 40 b]

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDI Rumania EDI

342
352

Interior of Stînă Găujoara. *Drawn by P. Stinson, after E. E. Evans*

Interior of Stînă Cîrbuncle. *Drawn by P. Stinson, after E. de Martonne*

See page 51

471 the shepherds and cheese-maker. These dues, amounting to
233 some 10 or 20 lei per sheep, are worked out each year by a committee which regulates the financial side of the transhumant economy.

234 EACH STÂNĂ[1] has its baciu or cheese-maker, who is paid by
233 the commune. In some districts this scheme is varied by arrangements which must represent modifications of the
471 old economy of collective shepherding. Occasionally a large farmer may be proprietor of a stână and may possess enough sheep to run his own pasturing, in which case he may either hire a cheese-maker or fill that rôle in person. Or he may let his stână to the highest bidder, who pays in cheese obtained from the flock. From this it is a short step to the emergence of the middleman who, possessing no sheep himself, rents a pasture and guarantees to return an agreed quantity of cheese per sheep to those who send him their stock.

233 BEGINNING OUR account with the descent from the mountains,
221 we find that the uppermost pastures are abandoned by the last day of August, and the return downhill takes place during the first fortnight in September, being normally completed by September 14th (The Feast of the Cross). The sheep are driven to the local pastures until the maize crop is gathered, when they are penned on the stubble. Movement uphill begins about the middle of April and is completed by May 1st in an average year, St. George's Day (April 23rd) being a central date. Each peasant is responsible for driving his own sheep, using recognized tracks which tend to follow the watersheds. The sheep thus avoid the deep valley-crossings and can avail themselves of occasional natural clearings for temporary halts in a journey which may last a week. These are points of some importance in connection with the study of ridgeway roads generally.

● 342 THE SHEPHERD'S hut is a log-cabin erected on a single foundation-course of boulders. It is roofed with shingles or long planks; the gable is boarded above the level of the eaves, and a gap at the apex serves in place of chimney. Scarcely any metal is used in the construction of these summer dwellings, which serve as dairies and storehouses in addition to providing shelter and sleeping-places for the shepherds.
○○○ The furniture is of the simplest, but much ingenuity is

1 [for explanation see footnote 50 pp. 49, cat. 116 -- Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

565 ease of behaviour, a keen sense for music and popular art and a dogged belief in its capacity to achieve progress.

The life of the Rumanian peasant is simple and [262] hard. His main nourishment consists of *Mamaliga*, a dish prepared of maize-flour, similar to the Italian *Polenta*. This forms his staple diet; meat and other [272] luxuries are very rare indeed. The national drink is *Tuica* (brewed from plum juice). The Rumanian [291] men are dressed in white trousers and a long white tunic fastened by a belt, a short jacket, and a fur cap or hat. Footwear, if any, consists of simple leather sandals strapped to the legs, called *Opinci*, similar to those of the Greek and Yugoslav peasants. In the comparatively rich regions short boots are worn. Gay embroidery, whose colouring and pattern vary according to districts, adorns all garments, especially the women's shirts and headcloths, and the aprons [342] which they wear fore and aft. In contrast to their gay dress the houses of the Rumanian peasants are usually small, badly built cottages of sun-dried brick and straw, whitewashed and occasionally [346] decorated with woodwork. The churches too are built in a similar fashion except in the mountain districts where stone and wood are used.

795 **RELIGION.** Most Rumanians belong to the Orthodox Church, but many Transylvanian Rumanians are Uniates, that is, Catholics of the Byzantine Rite. They form a link between the Latin and Orthodox 659 Churches. The Rumanian Orthodox Church is strongly national. The Uniate Church was used in the past by the Hungarian rulers of Transylvania as a means of assimilating the Rumanians in the Hun-

Bulgaria EE1
Rumania ED1

B 342 233 with straw roofs. They are rarely plastered with mud. In western Sredna Gora, transportable sheep pens are used (Gellert, 1937: 189).

RUMANIA

R 34 175 177 648 In Rumania there exists a marked difference between settlements in the lowlands and those of the Carpathian Mountain region. While topography and the presence or absence of such building materials as stone, wood or clay are important factors, political considerations also played a significant role. With the beginning of the 18th century Greek influence became predominant in Moldavia and Wallachia. The Porte set up Greek rulers in these principalities, thus in reality the Rumanians were as much under Turkish dominion, although indirectly, as were the people of the Balkans. It was only after the rebellion of 1821 that Rumanian rulers were reinstated. During all periods of unrest and foreign invasion the mountains and forests served as areas of refuge; the Serbian haiduk has his counterpart in the Rumanian hardoich (Stratilesco, 1907: 30-34).

R 361 R [133] Location and Types of Settlements. The older settlements were in the nature of hamlets (catin). These were generally not built on the top of hills, but rather in depressions, on the edge of forests, and away from the military roads (Grothe, 1907: 54). In the hilly regions of Oltenia and Moldavia the villages were located close to a river or on the slope of a hill. Farmsteads are generally spaced fairly far apart, in no definite order. Villages may extend over two or three hills facing one another (Stratilesco, 1907: 205). R [491] Villages in the Wallachian plains are located close to the roads. The prevalent type is the road village; buildings are located on either side of the highway which forms the main road of the village. Larger villages may have additional cross-roads (Jänecke, 1918: 7). R [621] While mountain villages average a population of 350, the largest being around 700, villages of the plains average 700 and may reach 2000 (Grothe, 1907: 55).

R 342 R [335] House Types. Due to the scarcity of wood and stone in the plains, buildings are generally constructed of wicker and daub, in which technique the Rumanians are masters. The roof is made first, the walls afterwards. The principle posts are first set into the ground, then the studs of the outer walls and inner partitions are spaced at 1 to 2 foot intervals. After the roof has been formed walls are built up. Mud is kneaded down with the feet, mixed with straw, and shaped into lumps that take the place of bricks. These lumps are then set between the studs and left to dry (Stratilesco, 1907: 208). More often walls are of wickerwork, plastered inside and out with a mixture of mud, straw and cowdung to a thickness of 15-25 centimeters (Jänecke, 1918: 10). The rough walls are smoothed out by applying thinner and thinner layers of mud and cowdung mixture. They are then whitewashed inside and out. Floors of timber are recent; the floor is commonly of tamped earth.

RUMANIA EDI

The hipped roof is rather flat and made of corn straw or reed, about 40 centimeters thick. The frame is often of the collar type, horizontal beams supporting opposing rafters (figs. 60a, 64). Pan tiles appear only in isolated instances. In 1918 sheet iron was becoming popular because it was economical and saved time and effort. It was generally painted red-brown. Chimneys are usually inadequate or lacking (Jünecke, 1918: 11). 342 [335] [327]

Every house has an open veranda (prispa) on at least one side which may or may not have a low banister. It is slightly elevated from the ground and is protected by an extension of the eaves. While many Moldavian houses consist of only one room, even the smallest house in Wallachia has an anteroom (tinda). Here the main room is called odaia and has a special stove that is heated by a flue from the hearth in the anteroom. Often an additional odaia is added on the other side of the anteroom forming a symmetrical three-room house. Sometimes additional units are built onto the house on one or both of the narrow sides (figs. 57c, 58). The roof is extended over them in the form of a catelide (fig. 57a). These units are used for storage of agricultural tools, stables, summer kitchens, etc. If two are not sufficient, three or more units may be added. The prispa may be extended alongside the annex; or, when the annex protrudes in front of the house, the prispa may stop at the annex wall (fig. 57c). Occasionally a large house may have two parallel rows of rooms. However, this arrangement complicates the roof construction, which in this case is generally unsuccessful (Jünecke, 1918: 11-16). [341] [354]

The interior is very simple. The anteroom serves for the storage of house implements; maize is kept in wooden boxes and placed along the wall, and there is also a small handmill for grinding maize. A large oven with a hearth in front of it is located at the wall opposite the door (figs. 57c, 58). The anteroom has no ceiling. When two odaias are present one is used for both living and sleeping quarters, while the other is used for the storage of blankets, carpets etc. It is somewhat of a guest-room. [251] [353] [354]

In the Rumanian house special attention has been given to the hearth and stove, and the whole house can be said to have been built around the hearth. The hearth is the showpiece of the room. Arched over the hearth is a decorated mantel on which cooking utensils are placed. Niches on either side of the hearth are provided for the same purpose. Because of the inflammability of the straw roof, the chimney is of brick (these are the only bricks in the house and are made by the peasants themselves). The stoves in the living room are of unusual construction. The most spectacular of these are the columnar stoves which are not only beautiful but also effective. To the main part of the stove have been added graceful clay pipes which are either arranged symmetrically or placed on one side. The better ones resemble organs. The rest of the stove is also made of clay bricks set in mud mortar and covered with a layer of plaster of a lime and sand mixture. Decoration of clay or plaster may be added. These stoves are generally built by Gypsies. 354

342 Windows are generally double even in the simpler houses, one opening to the inside, the other to the outside. They are always barred and set in a wooden frame (Jänecke, 1918: 27-28).

342 531 The Rumanian house is noteworthy for its exterior decorations. Special attention and much imagination is given to the woodwork. Much art is evident in the pillars supporting the roof over the veranda (fig. 57d), lintels supporting the eaves, the railings of the veranda and the window and door frames. The corners of houses may have designs in low relief. Painted designs may be placed on the wall in great abundance (figs. 57a, 57b). Because of the lesser opportunity of embellishment through woodwork and because whitewashed walls lend themselves well to painting, painting of the exterior is characteristic of the plains. The Rumanian does not shy away from bright colors. Ultramarine is most popular, for it is [789] said to scare away evil spirits. Combinations of red, blue and [822] yellow are common, and dark green shades are also favored (Jänecke, 1918: 23).

342 The basic difference between the house of the lowlands and [184] those of the mountain region is that the latter are of two-story [341] construction (fig. 64a). Building materials in the mountains are stone and wood rather than wicker and mud. When houses are built on an incline a high stone foundation forms the ground floor (pivnita). This can be used for stables, storage rooms and also as a wine cellar. This form persists even when the terrain is flat. The higher house is appreciated for its better view, greater security and suitability for defense.

While the floor plan often consists of a row of rooms similar to that of the lowlands, a number of changes have taken place. The anteroom with its large hearth is generally left out (fig. 64b). This is due to the fact that the bricks that line the hearth are not available, and the wooden walls are more inflammable than the predominantly mud ones of the plains. Where the hearth is present it is put into a special annex. Instead of the hearth an oven-stove [354] (a combination stove and oven) is used, which permits the main room to be used as living room and sleeping room as well as a kitchen.

The two-room house predominates; due to the absence of the connecting anteroom, each room has a door to the veranda (fordak) (fig. 66). Sometimes the veranda at the top of the stairway is expanded into a hall-like structure (foisor) (fig. 64a) covered by a hipped roof at right angles to the main roof. In summer most activities take place there.

The foundation is made of rocks or of large pebbles from the river. Walls are made of horizontal logs or boards which cross at the corners, each fitting into a notch in the other. A mud or lime plaster is never omitted, and to facilitate this plastering thin laths are nailed diagonally across the beams.

The roof is steeper than in the plains and protrudes further over the house. The support is in the form of a collar. The rafters tend to be too widely spaced, which results in slight bending of the battens; but, while it makes for a weaker roof, this results in softer and more pleasing lines. The four corners are not sharp but tend to be rounded (fig. 62). Wooden shingles are almost exclusively used for roof covering. They are about 15 centimeters wide and may be as long as 3 meters. They overlap two to four times. Shorter shingles form 6-10 rows. The smaller shingles may have their ends in the form of swallow tails or other decorative shapes. The ridge shows a special development. On the windward side the first layer of shingles is made to protrude over the ridgepole (fig. 62). These shingles also have excised patterns and are very ornamental. The ridgepoles may extend slightly over the hip and have a small gabled roof, one shingle in height (fig. 62). This provides an opening for the smoke to escape through. Ornamental poles rise at either end of the ridgepole (fig. 61). 342 [335] [531]

Chimneys are lacking and the smoke may escape through openings at the ridge or otherwise through the roof, which then shows all shades of gray to black. In some areas of Oltenia in southwestern Rumania one finds wooden chimneys (fig. 65). These are made of wicker and daub and are covered with shingles. [354] [184]

A special development in the foothills of the Southern Carpathian Mountains is the privy, which is in the form of an annex located at the end of the veranda (fig. 64b). [184] [514]

In general the buildings in the mountain districts show a greater variation than those of the plains. The woodwork is superior, and shows a great deal of inventiveness. The construction, however, is irregular, sloppy and often not functional. Pillars that carry no weight may be very thick, while those that must support much weight may be much too slender (Jänecke, 1918: 35-43). 342 184 [335]

Kulas (fig. 67) are found only in the mountainous regions of Oltenia in the district of Mehedinti, Gorj and Rămnicu-Vâlcea. They were built by the boyars, the wealthy landowners. The oldest ones come from the period when the Rumanian rulers were paying tribute to the sultan. The ground plan is a square 7 by 12 meters in length. The width of the walls is 30-70 centimeters. The kula (fig. 67) may have three or four stories, each about 2.5 meters in height. Each story has one room. The ground floor is used for storage; sometimes a well is built into it, and occasionally there is a subterranean escape passage. The upper floors may also be used for storage, but are mainly living quarters. Windows are generally found only on one side; the other walls are provided with loopholes. On the top floor there is generally an open veranda (Serdak) about 3 meters wide, the roof over which is supported by pillars (fig. 67). The exposure is toward the valley and the south. On the side opposite the Serdak there is a simple wooden balcony under the eaves (fig. 67). Many kulas have a privy tower attached to them. 342 712 [184] [556] [175] [312] [514]

342 712 [531] The stairway, about 1.25 meters wide made of massive logs, is generally on the inside of the buildings; when it is located on the outside it leads onto the wooden balcony. The exterior is white-washed. In addition, the surface is decorated with molded bands around each story division. There may also be a vertical division, thus creating a number of large panels. While these areas are symmetrical, neither they nor the molded bands that enclose them have any relation to the placing of windows or pillars (Jänecke, 1918: 62-63).

342 [175] [563] In 1895 there still existed about 55,000 earth huts (bordei) which were inhabited by the poorest population, generally Gypsies (fig. 63). They are common in the Danubian plain. Over an excavation 1-3 meters deep is placed a gabled roof. The roof is made of boards over which earth is laid. Sometimes reeds are placed over the boards before the earthen cover is added. The entrance is on one of the gabled sides, generally with a southerly exposure, and a window is placed on each gable side (Jänecke, 1918: 4).

343 351 Farm Buildings. In the lowlands the buildings are arranged in no definite order; though generally the house is closest to the road. The corn-house (coşar) is either opposite to or at right angles to the house so that it can be watched. The yard and orchard are surrounded by a fence. The simplest fence is made of wickerwork between wooden poles. More often, however, it is made of boards [556] that have intricate excised designs (fig. 60). The wealthy people may add an imposing gateway with a small door. Flower or vegetable [563] gardens are rare, and the latter are called bulgări, since they are [244] generally kept by immigrant Bulgarians who grow all the vegetables [247] for town consumption (Stratilesco, 1907: 233). The farmstead is surrounded by shady trees, and there is generally a plum orchard at [245] the back of the farm buildings (Jänecke, 1918: 8-9).

[184] In the mountain regions the arrangement of the buildings in the yard differs from that of the lowlands. The stables and other buildings are arranged on the border of the yard in a horseshoe form to serve as protection for the house. The yard is usually very small, and has a strong high palisade with a massive gateway, the whole giving the farm a fortress-like appearance (the author points to the presence of bears in summer and wolves in winter) (Jänecke, 1918: 32-35).

343 [184] In the lowlands there are generally not many additional farm buildings in the yard, and this fact is correlated with the pattern of building additional annexes to the house, a more economical and practical procedure. Stables are of the simplest lathwork or wickerwork, covered with a straw roof. Sheds for the storage of straw, hay and cornstalks are absent, for the latter are stacked into tall round piles in the open. The baking oven for summer use, made of mud and bricks, has a hipped roof supported by four pillars.

342

RUMANIA



Fig. 57a House of the Lowlands

Fig. 57b Side View of Fig. 57a

Fig. 57c Floor Plan of Fig. 57a
A) Anteroom, B) Living Room
C) Storage Room, D) Veranda



[531]

Fig. 57d Woodwork on the Veranda



Fig. 58 House with two Annexes. A) Anteroom, B) Living Room, C) Fireplace, D) Veranda, E) Stable, F) Chicken Coop

[P 86-0]

RUMANIA

343
531

Fig. 59a Corn-house



Fig. 60 Fence with Excised Designs



Fig. 59b Front View of Fig. 59a

Fig. 61 Decorations at End of Ridgepole

343

Fig. 62 Arrangement of Shingles at Ridgepole

• [342]

Fig. 59c Floor Plan of Fig. 59a
A) Stable
B) Cart-shed

Fig. 63 Semi-subterranean House of the Danube Plain

[P. 86-P]

RUMANIA

342

Fig. 64a Mountain House



Fig. 65 Chimney in Oltenia



Fig. 66 Floor Plan of Mountain House



Fig. 64b Floor Plan of Fig. 64a
A) Living Room, B) Veranda
C) Foisor, D) Privy



Fig. 67 Kula

[P 86-Q]

342
343
351

Rumania ED1

/For information on the construction and form of houses, yards and farm buildings, see 17: Thurnher, EF6 Serbs file, category 116, pp. 74-79, passim and 86O-86Q./

342
343
351

Yugoslavia EF1
Albania EG1
Rumania ED1
Bulgaria EE1

/For general information on houses and farm buildings, see 17: Thurnher, EF6 Serbs file, category 116, pp. 79-86./

342 A MARKED FEATURE is the comparative absence of chimneys.
374 The cooking is done in an outhouse, no doubt to minimise the risk of fire, but the dwelling house is generally heated by a stove, the smoke from which passes up through the ceiling in an iron pipe and then escapes into the open air through holes cut in the gable ends or, in the case of a hipped roof, through a small louvre.

● 345 THE OUTHOUSES are for the most part simple structures and call for no special comment.

511 CLEANLINESS and simplicity are the keynotes of the domestic economy. Household effects are kept down to a minimum, but upon their manufacture an enormous amount of time and skill is lavished, especially in the case of textiles. The skilfully-woven designs on the tapestries and pillows shown Plate XVI are an illustration of such effort.

POPULATION.

161 ACCORDING to the 1930 census Corbu had a population of
563 1,563, distributed among 358 households. The majority of the inhabitants are, of course, Roumanians, for the commune lies right on the fringe of the Szekler country. In spite of having lived in close association with the Roumanians for many generations, however, the Szeklers are easily distinguished by their dress, their physical type (though this is by no means an infallible guide), their adherence to Roman Catholicism, and, of course, their language. Although culturally there is an appreciable difference between the Roumanian and Szekler peasantry, there is to-day an even wider gap between these folk and the Tsiganes or Gipsies who form a much smaller, though very interesting, minority.
[142] Generally speaking, the Roumanians contribute a dark, and the Szeklers a fair, element to the broad-headed population, whereas the Gipsies are for the most part distinctly long-headed and very dark. There is an equally well-marked difference on economic grounds, for both Roumanians and Szeklers are essentially peasants, whereas the Gipsy, being landless, is compelled to seek a livelihood by trading, unless he be either smith or musician, following the traditional pursuits of his forbears (see Plate VI).

342 THE HOUSES occupied by Gipsies, while resembling in style
563 those of the peasants, can usually be recognised by the

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

PLATE VI

343
252



Outdoor Summer-Kitchen

342

A small house in Curtea de Argeş of similar type to Mayor's house.

244
343 being given to growing maize and vegetable marrows, though there were various small fruit-trees. The open space in front of the house had a summer kitchen. These out-door kitchens are used by almost all the peasants where an open space or yard of any sort provides available space (see illustration opposite).[2]

342 THE SECOND HOUSE which we visited and examined is illustrated facing page 29 (B).[2] This shows a well-built structure and represents the type which is more common in the town itself. The walls, which are whitewashed, are of brick and rubble and have an average thickness of 32 cm. There is a good shingled roof with good carved wooden decoration under the eave. The floor of the terrace is earth, and the entire structure of the balcony is of wood, without paint or stain. The end of the house has a pleasing finish in the form of a moulded cornice and pilasters (B).

THIS HOUSE is occupied by two families; the men, both being potters, share the potter's table (two wheels) in the lower house.

[See pp. 30 b (HRAF pagination) -- Analyst]

2 [See pp. 28 b (HRAF pagination) -- Analyst]

342 712 [531] The stairway, about 1.25 meters wide made of massive logs, is generally on the inside of the buildings; when it is located on the outside it leads onto the wooden balcony. The exterior is white-washed. In addition, the surface is decorated with molded bands around each story division. There may also be a vertical division, thus creating a number of large panels. While these areas are symmetrical, neither they nor the molded bands that enclose them have any relation to the placing of windows or pillars (Jänecke, 1918: 62-63).

342 [175] [563] In 1895 there still existed about 55,000 earth huts (bordei) which were inhabited by the poorest population, generally Gypsies (fig. 63). They are common in the Danubian plain. Over an excavation 1-3 meters deep is placed a gabled roof. The roof is made of boards over which earth is laid. Sometimes reeds are placed over the boards before the earthen cover is added. The entrance is on one of the gabled sides, generally with a southerly exposure, and a window is placed on each gable side (Jänecke, 1918: 4).

343 351 Farm Buildings. In the lowlands the buildings are arranged in no definite order; though generally the house is closest to the road. The corn-house (coşar) is either opposite to or at right angles to the house so that it can be watched. The yard and orchard are surrounded by a fence. The simplest fence is made of wickerwork between wooden poles. More often, however, it is made of boards that have intricate excised designs (fig. 60). The wealthy people may add an imposing gateway with a small door. Flower or vegetable gardens are rare, and the latter are called bulgări, since they are generally kept by immigrant Bulgarians who grow all the vegetables for town consumption (Stratilesco, 1907: 233). The farmstead is surrounded by shady trees, and there is generally a plum orchard at the back of the farm buildings (Jänecke, 1918: 8-9).

[556] [563] [244] [247] [245]

[184] In the mountain regions the arrangement of the buildings in the yard differs from that of the lowlands. The stables and other buildings are arranged on the border of the yard in a horseshoe form to serve as protection for the house. The yard is usually very small, and has a strong high palisade with a massive gateway, the whole giving the farm a fortress-like appearance (the author points to the presence of bears in summer and wolves in winter) (Jänecke, 1918: 32-35).

343 [184] In the lowlands there are generally not many additional farm buildings in the yard, and this fact is correlated with the pattern of building additional annexes to the house, a more economical and practical procedure. Stables are of the simplest lathwork or wickerwork, covered with a straw roof. Sheds for the storage of straw, hay and cornstalks are absent, for the latter are stacked into tall round piles in the open. The baking oven for summer use, made of mud and bricks, has a hipped roof supported by four pillars.

The only noteworthy building is the corn-house (pătule de porumb) (figs. 59a, 59b), which is found, however, only among the well-to-do. Unlike the house, it is a two-story structure. The lower floor has plastered walls, and serves as stable and cart-shed. The upper story is made of wickerwork, often arranged in interesting patterns, permitting the air to circulate. The attic is used for the storage of food and is reached by a ladder from the outside. The hipped roof is of straw (Jänecke, 1918: 25-27). R 343 [556] R [251] [417]

In the mountain regions stables have only three walls, and animals stay in these half-open shelters even in winter. The imposing corn-house of the plains is rarely found in the mountains. In its place is erected a long narrow building of wickerwork. This rests on short stone pillars about 50 centimeters above the ground and is covered by a shingled roof. Since the ground floor of the house is used for storage there is no need for many additional farm buildings (Jänecke, 1918: 43-45). R [184]

CONCLUSION

Having presented an area by area discussion of the village forms and farmsteads, it is desirable to trace the distribution of certain major elements. Roughly, four types of settlement pattern can be distinguished. They are the village consisting of widely scattered hamlets (Cvijić's Stari Vlah type); the agglomerated village (Cvijić's Timok type); the road village (Cvijić's Mačva type); and the čiflik type, the settlement created by Turkish landowners. The first of these is composed of widely scattered houses in no regular order, grouped into hamlets a number of which constitute a village. It predominates in Slovenia, Western Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, western Serbia, and in the mountain areas of central Bulgaria and Rumania. A variant of this form, characterized by more closely spaced houses within the separate hamlets (Cvijić's Ibar type), exists in the Karst regions behind the Adriatic coast, in Albania and southwestern and western Serbia. Hilly terrain and forested regions are conducive to this scatter, but are not the sole determinants. The Ibar type is associated with greater barrenness of soil and the necessity of conserving arable land. S 361 171 184 S [182] [311]

Agglomerated villages are characterized by crowded houses set in an irregular order along crooked streets. They prevail in eastern and southern Serbia and in southern Macedonia. While they are associated with the necessity of conserving arable land in some of the more barren regions of eastern Serbia, this explanation will not hold for the fertile basins of Kosovo, Kumanovo and Skoplje. Here they are no doubt the result of diffusion from the Aegean coast, as these areas are on communication lines which run up the Vardar and Morava River valleys from the coast toward Beograd. S [311]

The third or Mačva type is that of the more or less planned village lying on both sides of the highway. These villages tend to S 361 171

RUMANIA

343
531

Fig. 59a Corn-house



Fig. 60 Fence with Excised Designs



Fig. 59b Front View of Fig. 59a



Fig. 61 Decorations at End of Ridgepole

343

Fig. 62 Arrangement of Shingles at Ridgepole



[342]

Fig. 59c Floor Plan of Fig. 59a
A) Stable
B) Cart-shed

5

Fig. 63 Semi-subterranean House of the Danube Plain

[P. 86-P]

137 *sitifolia*, *S. aizoides*, *S. aizoon*, *Erysimum Witmanni*, *Phyteuma orbiculare*, *Silene Zawadskii*, *Onobrychis montana var. transilvanica*, *Cerastium alpinum*, *C. lanatum*, *Oxytropus campestris*, *Alsine gerardi*, *Campanula alpina*, *C. carpatica*, *Alyssum repens* (endemic), *Rhinanthus alpinus*, *Rhodiola rosea*, *Sedum atratum*. In the cracks in the rocks where moisture collected were noted *Pinguicula alpina*, *P. vulgaris*, *Saxifraga aizoides*, *S. androsacea*, *Viola biflora*, *Arabis alpina*, *Achillea Schurii*, *Biscutella laevigata*, and *Androsace lactea*.

It was obvious that to make a detailed study of this interesting mountain with its forest, plateau, gullies, scree slopes, etc., and other varying ecological factors, a much longer time would have been necessary than was possible under the conditions of our visit to the country.

The Walk by Way of Bilbor, Paltiniş, Vatra Dornei, etc., and down the Bistrita River by Timber Raft to Broşteni (Brosceni).

133 This interesting excursion was made by a number of the party, and afforded a very good opportunity of seeing the country as some fifty miles were covered on foot in two days. We passed over fine slopes and through delightful valleys with their meadows bedecked with many species of flowering plants. There was time during such a walk only to notice the most salient features of the vegetation. We, however, saw hillsides where sheep were grazed quite to the top, also a mountain dairy where they were being milked. The 313 temporary shelters for those cropping the hay in the valleys at some distance from their usual habitations were interesting, and the whole family appeared to sleep there and cook their meals till the area had been cleared.

531 During our stay at Vatra Dornei, through the kindness of 341 the mayor and the prefect of the district, we were taken by car over a mountain pass down to Campulung and from thence to the wonderful walled monastery of Moldoviţa (Moldawitza) with fine sixteenth-century frescoes covering 313 its walls. The chief point of interest from a vegetation point of view was the fine spruce forests which we saw and in which felling was in progress, the logs being pushed down the mountain side to timber carts at the bottom. The next day we had evidence of the importance of the lumbering industry

175 revived with, under the circumstances, the Cathedral as their focus of expression. In Roumania fate worked out things differently. The seventh to the tenth century in east-central Europe saw much forest cutting and planting of villages, and the widespread languages of these settlers belonged to the Slavonic family which may have had its [197] early home in or near Polish Galicia. This linguistic influence penetrated Roumania and combined itself with the Latin heritage to make the later language of the country. Magyars passed through on their way to the Hungarian plain, and [184] Huns and Visigoths had gone that way before. So the local tradition weakened along the valley and lowland ways and kept itself alive in the highlands where still dwell people who are no doubt largely descendants of the primeval cultivators with many waves of culture washed over them but the Roman influence vital still.

● 346

Bell tower, Borsec.

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

346

[Curtea de Arges, the Cathedral (1510)]

[cover page]

133



Curtea de Arges. River terrace in foreground. Pliocene deposits on horizon.

346

Biserica Domneasca, Curtea de Arges (1343), within a fortified enclosure.

CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

REFERENCE has already been made to the bridging of the Olt and the Argeş about 20-25 km. from the mountain-edge and to the rise near these bridges of the towns of Ramnicu Valcea and Curtea de Argeş. It has also been explained that terraces on the left bank of the Argeş swing near the river to give an effective bridge-end site capable of defence. Curtea de Argeş is one of the oldest settlements in Muntenia.

AT THE BRIDGE the river is over 420 m. above sea, and from its western end an old trackway, now a main road, follows approximately the 440 m. contour on what appears to be a terrace against which the river swings about 1½-2 km. north of the bridge. Here also gravel reaches, connected with the junction of a brook with the main stream, provide a ford; and at this spot on the east side of the river there is the monastery of royal associations founded in 1510 and celebrated as a place of pilgrimage. Beyond this the road goes on up a tributary valley towards the east. The bridge and town however grew up not at this ford, but at a point farther south, where the north-south residual ridge bounding the Argeş valley on the east sends a spur almost to the actual river but just cut off by a seasonal tributary brook. The end of this spur shows two marked terraces, one just slightly above the river, the other some 12 m. above it and rising, as was said above, to about the 440 m. contour. On the end of the spur is a ruined Roman Catholic church, built for Marghita, wife of Prince Basarab. The Wallachian princes of these days appear to have had a habit of marrying Catholic women. One seems to see faint indications that the site of this church has been to a slight extent developed artificially. In 1390 this church served as a cathedral for Catholics in Wallachia, and the see lasted until 1602, by which time many Catholics had become Orthodox and the Catholic bishopric was removed to Dacau.

REFERENCE has already been made to the north-south road on the terrace, no doubt a modernisation of an old trackway, with the town near the end of the spur and the bridge, and the monastery to the north. Near the end of the spur, and

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl
[Curtea De Arges]

346



Cream-washed and painted church of St. Mary at Curtea de Argeş

133
361
[346]

related to the brook already mentioned, is a spring of some value. Above this, on the terrace, is the nucleus of the town—an Orthodox church (1352) of exceptional dignity and beauty, the Biserica Domneasca, built in a fortified enclosure. This scheme suggests comparisons with such Saxon villages as Cristian, near Sibiu, and several others, though there the church was Catholic. The fortification at Curtea de Argeş is larger than those at such places at Cristian, but it is far from being equivalent to the fortification enclosing the primary nucleus of Sibiu, for that nucleus included church, market places, shops and residences. It seems to have been a widespread rule that where a whole town was not walled there should be at any rate a fortified refuge enclosing the church. In the Slavonic parts of the European plain there were, of old, burgwälle or earthwork refuges, in some cases one for each area of about 120-130 km., or, say, fifty British square miles. These burgwälle sometimes became the nuclei of towns, the Wawel at Krakow being perhaps the best known among many examples. On the Wawel, and in analogous places in many

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 ED1 Rumania ED1

EDUCATION IN CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

871 368 In the town there are five primary schools—three mixed, one for girls and one for boys. In the latter there is a kindergarten class for children between five and seven. There are two vocational secondary schools, the Theological College and the Technical School; these are for boys only. The nearest lycée for girls is at Piteşti, 37 kilometres away. Boys also must leave the town for ordinary secondary education.

872 The kindergarten was founded in 1928 by the Orthodox National Society of Roumanian Women. There is a special local committee of management. The room used is large; part of it serves as a cloakroom and for washing; the children use the same playground and offices as the boys.

[876] There are two teachers and about fifty-five children. Careful records of the progress of each child are kept. The children work in groups in low chairs at tables; no individual work is taken. Froebel's principles are followed, but Dr. Montessori's sense-training apparatus is used and Dr. Decroby's principles of teaching arithmetic are adopted.

Interesting handwork is taken: paper-cutting pictures, modelling in clay and in paper, lace, crochet, etc. The first twenty minutes of each morning are set apart for the care of plants and animals and of the classroom. Speech training, physical exercises, free-play and singing are taught; as the school has no musical instrument, much depends on the musical ability of the mistress. The training is similar to that of primary school teachers; the salary is fixed by the local committee.

[346] The primary school for girls that we visited is housed in a large building of one storey, standing in its own grounds; it contains, all leading out of a central hall, four large and lofty classrooms, a teachers' small-room and an art room; there are no cloakrooms, the children hang their clothes on stands in the classrooms. These rooms are rather bare, but very light; they are heated by a big porcelain stove and the desks take three children. In summer classes are held in the garden. The

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

565 ease of behaviour, a keen sense for music and popular art and a dogged belief in its capacity to achieve progress.

The life of the Rumanian peasant is simple and [262] hard. His main nourishment consists of *Mamaliga*, a dish prepared of maize-flour, similar to the Italian *Polenta*. This forms his staple diet; meat and other [272] luxuries are very rare indeed. The national drink is *Tuica* (brewed from plum juice). The Rumanian [291] men are dressed in white trousers and a long white tunic fastened by a belt, a short jacket, and a fur cap or hat. Footwear, if any, consists of simple leather sandals strapped to the legs, called *Opinci*, similar to those of the Greek and Yugoslav peasants. In the comparatively rich regions short boots are worn. Gay embroidery, whose colouring and pattern vary according to districts, adorns all garments, especially the women's shirts and headcloths, and the aprons [342] which they wear fore and aft. In contrast to their gay dress the houses of the Rumanian peasants are usually small, badly built cottages of sun-dried brick and straw, whitewashed and occasionally [346] decorated with woodwork. The churches too are built in a similar fashion except in the mountain districts where stone and wood are used.

795 **RELIGION.** Most Rumanians belong to the Orthodox Church, but many Transylvanian Rumanians are Uniates, that is, Catholics of the Byzantine Rite. They form a link between the Latin and Orthodox 659 Churches. The Rumanian Orthodox Church is strongly national. The Uniate Church was used in the past by the Hungarian rulers of Transylvania as a means of assimilating the Rumanians in the Hun-

●349

Brasov—the Market Place. Behind the shops rises the mediæval Gothic church, which contrasts strikingly with the churches of the Greek Orthodox communities. *Photo: Dr. C. F. Snodgrass.*

361



Cristian (formerly Neustadt), a typical Saxon compact village near Brasov. The individual farmsteads are packed closely together and present a somewhat forbidding appearance from the road. The well laid-out area in the foreground is the cemetery. *Photo: Roumanian Press*

[facing page 44]

342
343
351

Yugoslavia EF1
Albania EG1
Rumania ED1
Bulgaria EE1

/For general information on houses and farm buildings, see 17: Thurnher, EF6 Serbs file, category 116, pp. 79-86./

342
343
351

Rumania ED1

/For information on the construction and form of houses, yards and farm buildings, see 17: Thurnher, EF6 Serbs file, category 116, pp. 74-79, passim and 86O-86Q./

342 712 [531] The stairway, about 1.25 meters wide made of massive logs, is generally on the inside of the buildings; when it is located on the outside it leads onto the wooden balcony. The exterior is white-washed. In addition, the surface is decorated with molded bands around each story division. There may also be a vertical division, thus creating a number of large panels. While these areas are symmetrical, neither they nor the molded bands that enclose them have any relation to the placing of windows or pillars (Jänecke, 1918: 62-63).

342 [175] [563] In 1895 there still existed about 55,000 earth huts (bordei) which were inhabited by the poorest population, generally Gypsies (fig. 63). They are common in the Danubian plain. Over an excavation 1-3 meters deep is placed a gabled roof. The roof is made of boards over which earth is laid. Sometimes reeds are placed over the boards before the earthen cover is added. The entrance is on one of the gabled sides, generally with a southerly exposure, and a window is placed on each gable side (Jänecke, 1918: 4).

343 •351 Farm Buildings. In the lowlands the buildings are arranged in no definite order; though generally the house is closest to the road. The corn-house (coşar) is either opposite to or at right angles to the house so that it can be watched. The yard and orchard are surrounded by a fence. The simplest fence is made of wickerwork between wooden poles. More often, however, it is made of boards [556] that have intricate excised designs (fig. 80). The wealthy people may add an imposing gateway with a small door. Flower or vegetable [563] gardens are rare, and the latter are called bulgări, since they are [244] generally kept by immigrant Bulgarians who grow all the vegetables for town consumption (Stratilesco, 1907: 233). The farmstead is [247] surrounded by shady trees, and there is generally a plum orchard at the back of the farm buildings (Jänecke, 1918: 8-9). [245]

[184] In the mountain regions the arrangement of the buildings in the yard differs from that of the lowlands. The stables and other buildings are arranged on the border of the yard in a horseshoe form to serve as protection for the house. The yard is usually very small, and has a strong high palisade with a massive gateway, the whole giving the farm a fortress-like appearance (the author points to the presence of bears in summer and wolves in winter) (Jänecke, 1918: 32-35).

343 [184] In the lowlands there are generally not many additional farm buildings in the yard, and this fact is correlated with the pattern of building additional annexes to the house, a more economical and practical procedure. Stables are of the simplest lathwork or wickerwork, covered with a straw roof. Sheds for the storage of straw, hay and cornstalks are absent, for the latter are stacked into tall round piles in the open. The baking oven for summer use, made of mud and bricks, has a hipped roof supported by four pillars.

342

The House of the Mayor, Curtea de Argeş

352



The interior of the Mayor's mine, Curtea de Argeş

[Page 28a]

342 THE CHARACTER of this house is of the simplest. The walls are
352 whitewashed, the floors bare, and there is practically no furniture other than wooden beds and tables. The stoves are of porcelain, and wood or charcoal is used as fuel. The usual practice is for potters to share a kiln with their neighbours. The one illustrated here was the property of this particular house and was placed in its yard (Plate IV, B).

[463] THE FIGURES given by the mayor show that there are 101 potters in Curtea de Argeş. We visited a good number and found that most of them live and work under conditions similar to those illustrated here. The potters for the most part occupy houses in one area of the town. A fine clay is found locally and can be had for nothing, but it must be collected by the potter himself. This clay he stores in his house (see upper plan on page 29).

THE POTS vary in design within a limited range. They are mostly of a buff colour, with the main part of the outside unglazed. The inside is glazed brown and the rim is usually covered with a bright green glaze, which makes the pots very attractive; some pots have splashes of green in parts or all over them. Most of the pots are marketed locally and can be bought at a low price. The pot is often made porous so that evaporation may keep the water cool. Pots are sent to other
[438] places near Curtea, but are not sufficiently strong, we were informed, for long-distance transport.

341 NEW DEVELOPMENT in housing is making steady progress. Some houses are still being constructed on the traditional lines, half brick half timber, and the "eye" in the roof, which is common in the older houses, is not necessarily omitted in the modern roof; tiles, however, are replacing the shingle. The wooden balcony is disappearing in the larger type of house and is being replaced by a brick verandah. These brick verandahs are built with ornate columns, sometimes with elaborate capitals. The classical influence is, in fact, strong, for some houses have a pediment, and in one ambitious dwelling the capitals were gilded and the pediments contained gilded decorations. The simple wooden window frames are now little used, and are replaced by elaborate mullions. Wall decorations in elaborate stucco or stencil work and ornamental details on doors are a common feature of the new houses. Most of the new houses are detached and stand in their own gardens. M. E. T.

1 [See p. 28 b, half page ... M. last]

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDI Rumania EDI

342
352

Interior of Stână Gâujoara. *Drawn by P. Sinzan, after E. E. Ionescu*

Interior of Stână Cîrbunele. *Drawn by P. Sinzan, after E. de Martonne*

See page 51

352 The furniture[1] is of the simplest, but much ingenuity is displayed in contriving hinges, benches, and so on, the devices used having an air of ancient custom about them. Nearly all the woodwork could be done with the axe (see
354 p. 47). A simple crane, the probable prototype of the iron
372 hearth-crane as we know it in Britain, allows the pot to be suspended at the desired distance from the open wood fire, which burns on a rough hearth towards the centre of the stamped earth floor. A certain sanctity attaches to the fire: it is not allowed to go out, and much ceremony accompanies its lighting. The "living fire" (*focul vin*) should be prepared on arrival at the head stână[2] of the commune's pasturage, by means of two sticks rubbed together, and the operation should be performed by a pure youth, otherwise the flocks will fare badly. The fire must then be carried to the other huts. We were not able to observe this custom, but the shepherd-boy at the Stână Găujoara, situated to the north of the watershed some fifteen miles south-west of Sibiu, was persuaded to show us how the fire was lit. Here the more familiar "flint-and-steel" method was used, but in place of flint the sparks were obtained from a piece of quartz, a substitution which suggests one reason for the common ceremonial use of quartz by ancient man in Europe.

233 In the Carpathians, as in Europe generally, there is much
462 variation in the personnel of the transhumant shepherds, but the exclusion of women in some areas is a feature for which
000 parallels cannot readily be adduced. In Norway it is the women who take the flocks to the summer pastures, an arrangement which is natural where the men are fishers. The same scheme is found in parts of the Central Plateau of France, where the men cannot be spared from their work in the fields, and the same appears to have held for the Scottish Highlands. Switzerland offers the best example of mass transhumance, and the movements formerly practised in Wales and in Ireland, though simpler and less regular, seem to have involved men, women and children. The *hafodty*, described by Welsh writers early last century, was a cowhouse with a fire at one end, but no chimney, and, except that the whole was stone-built, the assemblage of pens and shelters must have closely resembled the Roumanian. In Wales, too, ewes were milked and sheep's cheese made into the nineteenth century.

In the Carpathians, while some stâne are inhabited by

1 [In the shepherd's hut -- Analyst]
2 [For explanatory footnote see pp. 49, cat. 116 -- Analyst]

NOTES ON THE HOUSES IN CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

342 THE SMALL TOWN of Curtea de Argeş has from time to time suffered destruction from fire, in consequence of which there is very little to be found in the way of early buildings.

The oldest house in the town is that occupied by the present mayor and his family, and they claim that their ancestors have held the property since about 1630, when it was built.

The illustration (op. p. 28) shows it to be a well-built brick structure with a fairly steep roof of dark brown shingles. The brickwork is whitewashed and is very solidly constructed. The present family uses the entire first floor as their dwelling-house. At some recent period part of the ground floor was converted into a restaurant. The spacious rooms under the balcony are used partly for the purpose of a store and the mayor has a private office there.

353 THE DWELLING has a peculiar and individual charm. The furniture is mostly in the traditional peasant style, and much of it is similar to that found in the simple houses, but shows a superior workmanship and quality. The bed, as in the living-room of every peasant, has retained its traditional place in this house, though in this case its purpose to-day is that of a divan or sofa. The coverings and cushions, hand-embroidered, and the woven wall-hangings round the bed, are such as may be seen throughout the countryside, though richer in the materials used and more artistic than most of those to be seen in the peasants' cottages, where often the primary colours are used with little attempt to grade the design by the use of intermediate shades. Small decorated patterns are to be found on the walls. The large living-room has an elaborate and beautifully-painted ceiling—a thing rarely found in the [336] country houses. Modern sanitation, water-supply, etc., have [291] been put into the house. The women of the present family choose to maintain peasant tradition in dress.

342 The spacious balcony, approached from the courtyard, serves for reception of guests in summer. Here meals are taken, and a good many of the household occupations are carried on.

[see pp. 28a (HRAF pagination) -- Analyst]

353



(House B.)
Curtea de Arges. The interior of the potter's house—his bedroom. Large unbaked pots were standing on the floor.

Photo by H. J. Howard



(House A.)
Curtea de Arges. Primitive arrangement for winding warp lengths on balcony of house measured up by M. Tatton and R. Jones

323

(House B.)
Curtea de Arges. The potter's kiln in his back yard. A primitive affair of sticks, poles and clay.

Photo by H. J. Howard

(House A.)
Curtea de Arges. Part of trousseau. Rugs, blankets, cushions, bed-covers, etc. *Listed by Miss R. Jones.*

Photo by H. J. Howard

[page 30 a]

874 THE TECHNICAL or Trade School is one of forty such schools in the country. The Minister of Education has ordered this number to be doubled. The boys come from all districts and can go on to a higher grade Trade School. There is a still higher grade of school in Roumania called the Academy, from which pupils are turned out as teachers.

IN THIS TRADE School at Curtea de Argeş the boys live in and pay an inclusive fee of 4,500 lei per annum; those attending as day boys pay only 760 lei per annum. Two-thirds of these fees must be paid at the beginning of the session; the cost of material is not included.

Boys can enter between the ages of 11 and 15; the number taken is 100. They are divided into four classes. The subjects taught are Woodwork, Pottery and Tailoring. In woodwork, when the boys leave they are considered to have qualified in all the processes of house-building and furnishing. [32] In pottery, the chief industry of this town, the *traditional* shapes, colouring and decoration (mostly of ships) are charming, but *modern* designs and shapes are less good and often tasteless.

[33] THE CLASSROOMS are airy and heated by stoves. The boys sit in couples. The walls are hung with pictures of Roumanian history and of architectural interest, e.g. York Minster, Notre Dame, the Forum, etc. Each room has a religious picture. The woodwork room is large; each bench has a wooden vice; the wood is neatly stacked on a large shelf a few feet from the roof. Few tools were seen, as they were being prepared for next session. There is a room set apart for exhibiting the work done. All articles are for sale, and the pupil gets most of the money. Both the french polishing and the chip carving reach an excellent standard.

[34] THE MILITARY SERVICE required from boys attending Trade Schools is of one year's duration only. There are in the country five Higher Trade Schools—at Bucureşti, Braşov, Craiova, Iassi and Turgul Mureş.

N. H. S.

RUMANIA ED I

The hipped roof is rather flat and made of corn straw or reed, about 40 centimeters thick. The frame is often of the collar type, horizontal beams supporting opposing rafters (figs. 60a, 64). Pan tiles appear only in isolated instances. In 1918 sheet iron was becoming popular because it was economical and saved time and effort. It was generally painted red-brown. Chimneys are usually inadequate or lacking (Jänecke, 1918: 11). 342 [335] [327]

Every house has an open veranda (prispa) on at least one side which may or may not have a low banister. It is slightly elevated from the ground and is protected by an extension of the eaves. While many Moldavian houses consist of only one room, even the smallest house in Wallachia has an anteroom (tinda). Here the main room is called odaia and has a special stove that is heated by a flue from the hearth in the anteroom. Often an additional odaia is added on the other side of the anteroom forming a symmetrical three-room house. Sometimes additional units are built onto the house on one or both of the narrow sides (figs. 57c, 58). The roof is extended over them in the form of a catalide (fig. 57a). These units are used for storage of agricultural tools, stables, summer kitchens, etc. If two are not sufficient, three or more units may be added. The prispa may be extended alongside the annex; or, when the annex protrudes in front of the house, the prispa may stop at the annex wall (fig. 57c). Occasionally a large house may have two parallel rows of rooms. However, this arrangement complicates the roof construction, which in this case is generally unsuccessful (Jänecke, 1918: 11-16). [341] [354]

The interior is very simple. The anteroom serves for the storage of house implements; maize is kept in wooden boxes and placed along the wall, and there is also a small handmill for grinding maize. A large oven with a hearth in front of it is located at the wall opposite the door (figs. 57c, 58). The anteroom has no ceiling. When two odaias are present one is used for both living and sleeping quarters, while the other is used for the storage of blankets, carpets etc. It is somewhat of a guest-room. [251] [353] [354]

In the Rumanian house special attention has been given to the hearth and stove, and the whole house can be said to have been built around the hearth. The hearth is the showpiece of the room. Arched over the hearth is a decorated mantel on which cooking utensils are placed. Niches on either side of the hearth are provided for the same purpose. Because of the inflammability of the straw roof, the chimney is of brick (these are the only bricks in the house and are made by the peasants themselves). The stoves in the living room are of unusual construction. The most spectacular of these are the columnar stoves which are not only beautiful but also effective. To the main part of the stove have been added graceful clay pipes which are either arranged symmetrically or placed on one side. The better ones resemble organs. The rest of the stove is also made of clay bricks set in mud mortar and covered with a layer of plaster of a lime and sand mixture. Decoration of clay or plaster may be added. These stoves are generally built by Gypsies. 354

352 The furniture[1] is of the simplest, but much ingenuity is displayed in contriving hinges, benches, and so on, the devices used having an air of ancient custom about them. Nearly all the woodwork could be done with the axe (see
●354 p. 47). A simple crane, the probable prototype of the iron
372 hearth-crane as we know it in Britain, allows the pot to be suspended at the desired distance from the open wood fire, which burns on a rough hearth towards the centre of the stamped earth floor. A certain sanctity attaches to the fire: it is not allowed to go out, and much ceremony accompanies its lighting. The "living fire" (*focul vin*) should be prepared on arrival at the head stână[2] of the commune's pasturage, by means of two sticks rubbed together, and the operation should be performed by a pure youth, otherwise the flocks will fare badly. The fire must then be carried to the other huts. We were not able to observe this custom, but the shepherd-boy at the Stână Găujoara, situated to the north of the watershed some fifteen miles south-west of Sibiu, was persuaded to show us how the fire was lit. Here the more familiar "flint-and-steel" method was used, but in place of flint the sparks were obtained from a piece of quartz, a substitution which suggests one reason for the common ceremonial use of quartz by ancient man in Europe.

233 In the Carpathians, as in Europe generally, there is much
462 variation in the personnel of the transhumant shepherds, but the exclusion of women in some areas is a feature for which
000 parallels cannot readily be adduced. In Norway it is the women who take the flocks to the summer pastures, an arrangement which is natural where the men are fishers. The same scheme is found in parts of the Central Plateau of France, where the men cannot be spared from their work in the fields, and the same appears to have held for the Scottish Highlands. Switzerland offers the best example of mass transhumance, and the movements formerly practised in Wales and in Ireland, though simpler and less regular, seem to have involved men, women and children. The *hafodty*, described by Welsh writers early last century, was a cowhouse with a fire at one end, but no chimney, and, except that the whole was stone-built, the assemblage of pens and shelters must have closely resembled the Roumanian. In Wales, too, ewes were milked and sheep's cheese made into the nineteenth century.

In the Carpathians, while some stâne are inhabited by

1 [In the shepherd's hut -- Analyst]
2 [for explanatory footnote see pp. 49, cat. 116 -- Analyst]

RUMANIA ED I

The hipped roof is rather flat and made of corn straw or reed, about 40 centimeters thick. The frame is often of the collar type, horizontal beams supporting opposing rafters (figs. 60a, 64). Pan tiles appear only in isolated instances. In 1918 sheet iron was becoming popular because it was economical and saved time and effort. It was generally painted red-brown. Chimneys are usually inadequate or lacking (Jänecke, 1918: 11). 342 [335] [327]

Every house has an open veranda (prispa) on at least one side which may or may not have a low banister. It is slightly elevated from the ground and is protected by an extension of the eaves. While many Moldavian houses consist of only one room, even the smallest house in Wallachia has an anteroom (tinda). Here the main room is called odaia and has a special stove that is heated by a flue from the hearth in the anteroom. Often an additional odaia is added on the other side of the anteroom forming a symmetrical three-room house. Sometimes additional units are built onto the house on one or both of the narrow sides (figs. 57c, 58). The roof is extended over them in the form of a catelide (fig. 57a). These units are used for storage of agricultural tools, stables, summer kitchens, etc. If two are not sufficient, three or more units may be added. The prispa may be extended alongside the annex; or, when the annex protrudes in front of the house, the prispa may stop at the annex wall (fig. 57c). Occasionally a large house may have two parallel rows of rooms. However, this arrangement complicates the roof construction, which in this case is generally unsuccessful (Jänecke, 1918: 11-16). [341] [354]

The interior is very simple. The anteroom serves for the storage of house implements; maize is kept in wooden boxes and placed along the wall, and there is also a small handmill for grinding maize. A large oven with a hearth in front of it is located at the wall opposite the door (figs. 57c, 58). The anteroom has no ceiling. When two odaias are present one is used for both living and sleeping quarters, while the other is used for the storage of blankets, carpets etc. It is somewhat of a guest-room. [251] [353] [354]

In the Rumanian house special attention has been given to the hearth and stove, and the whole house can be said to have been built around the hearth. The hearth is the showpiece of the room. Arched over the hearth is a decorated mantel on which cooking utensils are placed. Niches on either side of the hearth are provided for the same purpose. Because of the inflammability of the straw roof, the chimney is of brick (these are the only bricks in the house and are made by the peasants themselves). The stoves in the living room are of unusual construction. The most spectacular of these are the columnar stoves which are not only beautiful but also effective. To the main part of the stove have been added graceful clay pipes which are either arranged symmetrically or placed on one side. The better ones resemble organs. The rest of the stove is also made of clay bricks set in mud mortar and covered with a layer of plaster of a lime and sand mixture. Decoration of clay or plaster may be added. These stoves are generally built by Gypsies. 354

342 Windows are generally double even in the simpler houses, one opening to the inside, the other to the outside. They are always barred and set in a wooden frame (Jänecke, 1918: 27-28).

342 531 The Rumanian house is noteworthy for its exterior decorations. Special attention and much imagination is given to the woodwork. Much art is evident in the pillars supporting the roof over the veranda (fig. 57d), lintels supporting the eaves, the railings of the veranda and the window and door frames. The corners of houses may have designs in low relief. Painted designs may be placed on the wall in great abundance (figs. 57a, 57b). Because of the lesser opportunity of embellishment through woodwork and because whitewashed walls lend themselves well to painting, painting of the exterior is characteristic of the plains. The Rumanian does not shy away from bright colors. Ultramarine is most popular, for it is said to scare away evil spirits. Combinations of red, blue and yellow are common, and dark green shades are also favored (Jänecke, 1918: 23). [989] [822]

342 [184] [341] The basic difference between the house of the lowlands and those of the mountain region is that the latter are of two-story construction (fig. 64a). Building materials in the mountains are stone and wood rather than wicker and mud. When houses are built on an incline a high stone foundation forms the ground floor (pivnita). This can be used for stables, storage rooms and also as a wine cellar. This form persists even when the terrain is flat. The higher house is appreciated for its better view, greater security and suitability for defense.

While the floor plan often consists of a row of rooms similar to that of the lowlands, a number of changes have taken place. The anteroom with its large hearth is generally left out (fig. 64b). This is due to the fact that the bricks that line the hearth are not available, and the wooden walls are more inflammable than the predominantly mud ones of the plains. Where the hearth is present it is put into a special annex. Instead of the hearth an oven-stove (a combination stove and oven) is used, which permits the main room to be used as living room and sleeping room as well as a kitchen. [354]

The two-room house predominates; due to the absence of the connecting anteroom, each room has a door to the veranda (Serdak) (fig. 66). Sometimes the veranda at the top of the stairway is expanded into a hall-like structure (foisor) (fig. 64a) covered by a hipped roof at right angles to the main roof. In summer most activities take place there.

The foundation is made of rocks or of large pebbles from the river. Walls are made of horizontal logs or boards which cross at the corners, each fitting into a notch in the other. A mud or lime plaster is never omitted, and to facilitate this plastering thin laths are nailed diagonally across the beams.

The roof is steeper than in the plains and protrudes further over the house. The support is in the form of a collar. The rafters tend to be too widely spaced, which results in slight bending of the battens; but, while it makes for a weaker roof, this results in softer and more pleasing lines. The four corners are not sharp but tend to be rounded (fig. 62). Wooden shingles are almost exclusively used for roof covering. They are about 15 centimeters wide and may be as long as 3 meters. They overlap two to four times. Shorter shingles form 6-10 rows. The smaller shingles may have their ends in the form of swallow tails or other decorative shapes. The ridge shows a special development. On the windward side the first layer of shingles is made to protrude over the ridgepole (fig. 62). These shingles also have excised patterns and are very ornamental. The ridgepoles may extend slightly over the hip and have a small gabled roof, one shingle in height (fig. 62). This provides an opening for the smoke to escape through. Ornamental poles rise at either end of the ridgepole (fig. 61). 342 [335] [531]

Chimneys are lacking and the smoke may escape through openings at the ridge or otherwise through the roof, which then shows all shades of gray to black. In some areas of Oltenia in southwestern Rumania one finds wooden chimneys (fig. 65). These are made of wicker and daub and are covered with shingles. [354] [184]

A special development in the foothills of the Southern Carpathian Mountains is the privy, which is in the form of an annex located at the end of the veranda (fig. 64b). [184] [514]

In general the buildings in the mountain districts show a greater variation than those of the plains. The woodwork is superior, and shows a great deal of inventiveness. The construction, however, is irregular, sloppy and often not functional. Pillars that carry no weight may be very thick, while those that must support much weight may be much too slender (Jänecke, 1918: 35-43). 342 184 [335]

Kulas (fig. 67) are found only in the mountainous regions of Oltenia in the district of Mehedinti, Gorj and Râmnicu-Vâlcea. They were built by the boyars, the wealthy landowners. The oldest ones come from the period when the Rumanian rulers were paying tribute to the sultan. The ground plan is a square 7 by 12 meters in length. The width of the walls is 30-70 centimeters. The kula (fig. 67) may have three or four stories, each about 2.5 meters in height. Each story has one room. The ground floor is used for storage; sometimes a well is built into it, and occasionally there is a subterranean escape passage. The upper floors may also be used for storage, but are mainly living quarters. Windows are generally found only on one side; the other walls are provided with loopholes. On the top floor there is generally an open veranda (ardak) about 3 meters wide, the roof over which is supported by pillars (fig. 67). The exposure is toward the valley and the south. On the side opposite the ardak there is a simple wooden balcony under the eaves (fig. 67). Many kulas have a privy tower attached to them. 342 712 [184] [556] [175] [312] [514]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Muntenia]

[Bucarest]

361 dustrial region with the tall wooden towers above the oil wells and the circular oil containers attached to the refineries. Campina and Ploesti are similar to the towns which sprang up during the American gold rushes. Great modern buildings stand next to primitive huts; fast American cars overtake peasant carts; rich speculators rub shoulders with shabby workers. These are towns in which extreme wealth and abject poverty live side by side.

BUCAREST. A similar, if somewhat more westernized, atmosphere reigns in Bucarest, the capital of Muntenia and of the whole of Rumania. Bucarest, which its more prosperous citizens like to call the 'Paris of the Balkans', has almost 1,000,000 inhabitants, and it has in many respects assumed the character of an American city. With ultra-modern buildings, wide thoroughfares bordered by shady alleys, and fast taxis the centre of Bucarest resembles the most modern of western cities. But the typical features of the Balkans have survived. Narrow little streets, quaint Orthodox churches, horse-carriages and hawkers are plentiful. Bucarest is the greatest industrial town of Rumania. Many factories of all [366] descriptions are situated here. All the great commercial houses and banks, both Rumanian and foreign, have their head offices in Bucarest. The capital's importance is enhanced by its key position as a centre of communications. The main trunk road from Transylvania passing through the Predeal Pass, Sinaia, Campina and Ploesti links up in Bucarest with the roads leading south to the Danube, east to the Danube and the Black Sea and west to Oltenia.

8

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bucarest]

[The Dobrudja]

Bucarest is also the chief railway centre of Rumania. 361

Giurgiu on the Danube, south of Bucarest and the terminus of one of the oil pipe-lines from Ploesti, is one of the main Rumanian wheat and oil ports. Another Danubian port, where great quantities of wheat are handled, is Braila with a population of about 70,000.

There are no natural barriers to communications in Muntenia. In the south the chief flow of traffic is carried by the Danube. Rail and road communications from Transylvania pass through the Predeal and a railway line leads over the Danube to the Dobrudja. 505 491 496

THE DOBRUDJA (Dobrogea[R]).[1] Up till 1878 the whole of the Dobrudja belonged to Bulgaria. Ever since, this province has been a bone of contention between Rumania and Bulgaria. The northern part of the Dobrudja was awarded to Rumania in 1878 to compensate her for the loss of Southern Bessarabia to Russia. The southern part of the province was ceded by Bulgaria after her defeat at the hands of her neighbours in the Second Balkan War in 1913. This region was returned to Bulgaria in 1940. 175

Geographically the Dobrudja is the north-eastern corner of the Balkan Peninsula. Its boundaries are in the north and west the Danube and in the east the Black Sea. There are three distinct regions: the delta of the Danube, the forests of Babadag, and farther south the steppe, which is the most fertile 131 133

[1] The letter R, H or G following a geographical term denotes a Rumanian, Hungarian or German name, respectively.

mostly Hungarians, and occupies a similarly important position. Here there are numerous factories, including mills, railway shops and locomotive works and textile factories. Satu-Mare (Szatmar[H]), with 60,000 inhabitants, is the largest town in the Northern Crisana. 361 432

After the Great War the Crisana, which was first occupied by the Hungarians in the tenth century and subsequently colonized by them, was awarded to Rumania. Under the Vienna Award of 1940 part of the Crisana was returned to Hungary, with a considerable Rumanian population. 175

By the same decision the province of Maramures (Marmaros[H]) (about 1,350 square miles), inhabited by over 150,000 people, acquired by Rumania in 1918, was returned to Hungary. Geographically Maramures is a continuation of the Czechoslovak province of Ruthenia. It is enclosed on all sides by chains of mountains covered with thick forests whose great density is rare even in the Carpathians, which are famous for their wealth of trees. It is not easily accessible except by a solitary railway line which comes from Transylvania and leads to Ruthenia. The small population consists of Ruthenians, Rumanians, Jews, Slovaks and Hungarians and is typical of the medley of races to be found in quite small areas of this part of Europe. Owing to the mountainous nature of the country there is little agriculture. The chief occupation of the inhabitants is the felling of trees. The most valuable asset of the province is its mineral wealth. There is oil, gold, copper, salt and coal. The capital and only major town of Maramures is Sighet (Marmaros-Sziget[H]) with a large Jewish population. Sighet, a town of 133 162 [496] 313 135 361

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 194-

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

Scaune (Haromszek[H]) which also possesses numerous industrial enterprises. Most of the rivers of Transylvania rise in the Eastern Carpathians and flow to the west and south. The Mures, flowing from east to west winds its way between the Carpathians and the 'Western Mountains' near Alba Julia (Gyulafehervar[H], Karlsburg[G]) and descends into the lowlands farther west. The Somes (Szamos[H]) reaches the plains north-west of the Transylvanian highland and eventually flows into the Tisza. Communications with Muntenia and Oltenia go over the mountain passes of Predeal, Bran and the 'Red Tower', with Moldavia over those of Buzau, Ghimes and Bicaz, and with the Bukovina over the Rodna Pass. 133

The climate of Transylvania is not as favourable for the raising of crops as that of Muntenia and the Banat. In the valleys, however, maize, wheat and rye are grown with some success. Stock-breeding is more important than agriculture. But Transylvania is very rich in mineral resources. Apart from coal, gold, copper, salt, bauxite and iron Transylvania possesses the greatest reserves of natural gas in the whole of Europe. The chemically pure methane which is used by many factories for power, as well as for cooking and lighting by many householders, could supply the whole of Transylvania for over a hundred years and make the consumption of coal unnecessary. 311 135

The capital of Transylvania is Cluj (Kolozsvar[H], Klausenburg[G]), with a population of over 105,000, consisting of Hungarians, Germans, Rumanians and Jews. The town is an important rail and road junction and the cultural centre of all the three 361

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Bukovina]

[Bessarabia]

000 small deposits of coal, gold and lead, but the industry of the province is well developed.

361 The capital of the Bukovina is Czernowitz (Cernauti[R]) with over 100,000 inhabitants. The town is situated on a high hill near the Pruth and is a great commercial centre. Here branches of the Austrian banks and some big Viennese businesses remained. The population of Czernowitz, like that of the rest of the province, is very mixed. Economically important as a junction of several trade-routes, Czernowitz has also become a great industrial town during the last fifty years.

648 In June 1940 the Northern Bukovina, including Czernowitz, altogether about 2,260 square miles, was ceded by Rumania to the U.S.S.R. Thereby over 550,000 people, mostly Ukrainians and many Jews, became Soviet citizens.

131 **BESSARABIA.** For over twenty years the province of
161 Bessarabia was the eastern frontier region of Greater Rumania. It covers an area of 17,760 square miles and has a population of 3,000,000.[1] Bessarabia is surrounded by natural frontiers: in the north and east by the River Dniester, in the south by the Black Sea and the Danube, and in the west by the Pruth.

133 The north of Bessarabia is formed by a highland about 1,000 ft. high, consisting of fertile arable land which belongs to the 'black-earth' region of the Ukraine. The central area is hilly country, divided

[1] To which were added 120,000 Polish and Ukrainian villagers transplanted from Eastern Poland by the Soviet authorities shortly before their retreat before the German attack in 1941.

Bulgaria EE1
Rumania ED1

B
342
233

with straw roofs. They are rarely plastered with mud. In western Sredna Gora, transportable sheep pens are used (Gellert, 1937: 169).

RUMANIA

R
361
175
177
648

In Rumania there exists a marked difference between settlements in the lowlands and those of the Carpathian Mountain region. While topography and the presence or absence of such building materials as stone, wood or clay are important factors, political considerations also played a significant role. With the beginning of the 18th century Greek influence became predominant in Moldavia and Wallachia. The Porte set up Greek rulers in these principalities, thus in reality the Rumanians were as much under Turkish dominion, although indirectly, as were the people of the Balkans. It was only after the rebellion of 1821 that Rumanian rulers were reinstated. During all periods of unrest and foreign invasion the mountains and forests served as areas of refuge; the Serbian hajduk has his counterpart in the Rumanian hordeick (Stratilesco, 1907: 30-34).

R
361
R
[133]
R
[491]
R
[621]

Location and Types of Settlements. The older settlements were in the nature of hamlets (catûn). These were generally not built on the top of hills, but rather in depressions, on the edge of forests, and away from the military roads (Grothe, 1907: 54). In the hilly regions of Oltenia and Moldavia the villages were located close to a river or on the slope of a hill. Farmsteads are generally spaced fairly far apart, in no definite order. Villages may extend over two or three hills facing one another (Stratilesco, 1907: 205). Villages in the Wallachian plains are located close to the roads. The prevalent type is the road village; buildings are located on either side of the highway which forms the main road of the village. Larger villages may have additional cross-roads (Jänecke, 1918: 7). While mountain villages average a population of 350, the largest being around 700, villages of the plains average 700 and may reach 2000 (Grothe, 1907: 55).

R
342
R
[335]

House Types. Due to the scarcity of wood and stone in the plains, buildings are generally constructed of wicker and daub, in which technique the Rumanians are masters. The roof is made first, the walls afterwards. The principle posts are first set into the ground, then the studs of the outer walls and inner partitions are spaced at 1 to 2 foot intervals. After the roof has been formed walls are built up. Mud is kneaded down with the feet, mixed with straw, and shaped into lumps that take the place of bricks. These lumps are then set between the studs and left to dry (Stratilesco, 1907: 208). More often walls are of wickerwork, plastered inside and out with a mixture of mud, straw and cowdung to a thickness of 15-25 centimeters (Jänecke, 1918: 10). The rough walls are smoothed out by applying thinner and thinner layers of mud and cowdung mixture. They are then whitewashed inside and out. Floors of timber are recent; the floor is commonly of tamped earth.

17: Thurnher E-4 (no date) 1956 EF6 Serbs EF6
Yugoslavia EF1
Albania EG1
Rumania ED1
Bulgaria EE1

J. Cvijic
La Péninsule balkanique : Géographie humaine. — IV
Alpes de Transylvanie
Belgrade
Bucarest
Mer Noire
Mer Ionienne
Mer Egée
Adriatique
Hongrie
Bulgarie
Roumanie
Albanie
Yugoslavie
Grèce
Turquie
Turquie d'Asie
Constantinople
Salonique
Athènes
Sofia
Zagreb
Sarajevo
Skopje
Tirana
Bucarest
Belgrade
Budapest
Vienne
Prague
Varsovie
Kiev
Odessa
Sébastopol
Smyrne
Rhodes
Crète
Chypre
Alexandrie
Le Caire
Tripoli
Tunis
Malte
Sicile
Naples
Rome
Florence
Milan
Turin
Venise
Trieste
Munich
Stuttgart
Francfort
Berlin
Leipzig
Dresde
Cracovie
Lwow
Kishinev
Tiflis
Erzerum
Trabzon
Ankara
Konya
Adana
Alep
Damas
Beyrouth
Jérusalem
Alexandrie
Le Caire
Port-Said
Suez

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

133

The road leading down to the Bicaz gorge which the river has cut through Cretaceous rocks just to the south of Ceahlau.

Photo: Miss M. Vines.

133
361



View looking across the tectonic basin of the upper Olt.

Photo: J. Cross.

Bilbor—a characteristic "dispersed" settlement in a small intermont basin, most of the floor of which is given over to the production of hay.

Photo: J. E. Duvid.

facing page 12

175
361

FIGURE 4. B = Brasov, C = Cluj, M = Miercurea Ciucului, O = Odorhei, R = Rodna, S = Sibiu, S-G = Sf. Gheorghe, T = Turda, T-M = Targu-Mureş, T-S = Targu-Secuesc. Passes: (1) Olt, (2) Prahova, (3) Oltuz, (4) Gilmeş.

144

head form, but whether this is due to the persistence of original characteristics or to partial fusion with the Roumanians it is impossible to say. At all events, they are essentially Magyar in culture, and accompanied the Magyars in their conquest of Hungary in the ninth century.

361
175

FIGURE 4 shows that their penetration of Transylvania followed the valleys of the Mureş and its tributaries, which

175
361



FIGURE 5. The distributions shown are only approximate, but they show the broad distinction between the typical Roumanian settlements ("dispersed" and "transitional") of the mountains and foothills and the compact Saxon and Szekler settlements of the Transylvanian lowlands.

175
361
178

led naturally towards the tectonic basins of Treiscaune, Ciuc and Giurgiu, though these were not actually occupied until the thirteenth century. The Szeklers did not, however, displace the indigenous Roumanian population in these lowland areas; neither have they maintained the same degree of "contiguous isolation" as have the Saxons. During the nineteenth century in fact, there has been a steady assimilation of the Roumanian peasantry, some measure of which may be gained from the fact that since the middle of the century a Roumanian majority has been changed into a Szekler majority in 169 communes, whereas the reverse process has been effected in only 26 communes. In the former case, large numbers of Roumanians have adopted the dress and religion of the Szeklers, but the Roumanian

137

PICTURE 6. This illustrates the sharp distinction between the forested highlands and the lowlands, and should be compared with Figures 5 a... ..

175
178
361

majorities have resulted from the valleyward movement of families that had previously farmed the slopes overlooking these innermost basins.

361 361 AN IMPORTANT distinction between the Roumanians and the rest of the population is seen in the types and distribution of their settlements (see Fig 8). The former, with their customary attachment to highland areas and to pastoral life, are usually associated with a dispersed or loosely agglomerated

361 type, whereas the truly compact or nucleated type is found only in regions settled by Saxons and Szeklers (see Fig. 8). It is difficult to determine how far this distinction is ethnographic and how far it is the product of differences between two sharply contrasted environments. Generally speaking, in eastern Transylvania the mountain population is Roumanian and the lower lands are peopled by Saxons and Szeklers, environments which would normally suit the dispersed and compact types respectively. On the other hand, the Roumanian steppe villages which one would expect to be

[162]



FIGURE 7. Although the statistics have had to be taken from two different periods they suggest a close correlation between nationality and religion in this section of the eastern Carpathians. The concentration of Roumanians in the hills and Szeklers in the plains is also very marked.

compact or nucleated differ from those of the Saxons and Szeklers in this important respect: whereas the houses in the latter are often contiguous, those in the former, although closely packed, are almost invariably detached. Even where the amount of space available for building is very limited the Roumanian prefers to surround his house with a garden, and, where ample space prevails, orchards in the foothills and the plain and hay meadows in the highlands tend still further to segregate the dwellings. In small upland basins such as that of Bilbor the "village" may occupy hundreds of

● 3 6 acres, each house, apart from a small agglomeration around the church, being separated from its neighbours by what is almost an unfriendly distance.

THE most typical Roumanian settlement, then, is one that may be broadly described as "scattered," with a tendency towards dispersion in the mountains and nucleation in the plains. It is one that admirably suits the varied geographical conditions of the country, for it is essentially elastic and capable of adaptation to almost any environment. We shall have an opportunity of studying one more fully in Chapter VII.

IN the Eastern Carpathians it is generally true to say that on the west of the main water-divide all settlements above 800 metres are of the dispersed type, except where they command passes, whereas those on the floor of the tectonic basins are nucleated. The former, of course, are mainly inhabited by Roumanians, the latter by Szeklers. The intermediate zone, which would normally be characterised by villages of the "scattered" type, has become largely depopulated owing chiefly to erosion that has followed unregulated deforestation of the lower slopes (see page 27). Even on the floors of the basins, where the population density is greatest, villages are tending to desert the river banks and to become concentrated at the foot of the slopes on account of the flooding that has resulted from the increased run-off. Huge detrital fans are another by-product of the same process, and are seriously impinging upon the already limited stretches of cultivable land.

ON the Moldavian side of the water-divide the more characteristic form of "scattered" village prevails, though giving place in the plain to a more compact type, and higher up, where opportunity allows, to dispersion. Although there are several small highland areas of relatively flat land in the eastern Carpathians, there is nothing to compare with the great stretches of plateau in the western Carpathians, which have been cleared of forest and utilised for the cultivation of grain crops at an altitude which in the former will support only pastoral activities. And although permanent villages (of the dispersed type) are found as high as 1,200 metres in the Bihor, the only habitations at a corresponding height in the eastern Carpathians are the dairies of the transhumant shepherds that are occupied only during the summer months.

349

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

PLATE V

Brasov—the Market Place. Behind the shops rises the mediæval Gothic church, which contrasts strikingly with the churches of the Greek Orthodox communities. *Photo: Dr. C. P. Snodgrass.*

361



Cristian (formerly Neustadt), a typical Saxon compact village near Brasov. The individual farmsteads are packed closely together and present a somewhat forbidding appearance from the road. The well laid-out area in the foreground is the cemetery. *Photo: Roumanian Press*

[facing page 44]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

VII.—CORBU: A CARPATHIAN VILLAGE

I. THE COMMUNE AND ITS INHABITANTS

Position.

361
133

The village of Corbu is situated in the eastern Carpathians at a height of 700 metres above sea-level. It stands just to the east of the main water divide, and in pre-war days was included within Austro-Hungarian territory, the boundary cutting across the Bistricioara valley a few miles below the village.

The commune sits astride one of the Carpathian passes, the Bistricioara valley linking up with that of the Mureş on the one hand and of the Bistriţa on the other to form a continuous route from Transylvania to the Moldavian Plain. Its position naturally made it the centre of a good deal of fighting during the War, and the blasted spruces on the slopes above the village are grim mementoes of the struggles that took place.

Physical Features.

The physical geography of the commune is comparatively simple. The Bistricioara river, which cuts the commune into two unequal segments, is the principal feature. On either side it receives tributary valleys for the most part normal in profile, though in one or two cases a steep-sided and narrow lower section gives place higher up to somewhat broader, flat-bottomed stretches. Indeed, the upper Bistricioara itself winds its way through a fairly extensive intermont basin of this kind in the commune of Bilbor just before entering that of Corbu.

At one point the main valley is constricted by an outcrop of Porphyry which appears formerly to have extended right across the present course of the Bistricioara. It has been breached, however, leaving a truncated spur running out from the south side of the valley and affording excellent views both up- and down-stream. Largely as a result of deforestation the crystalline schistose and gneissic slopes which rise steeply on either side of the main valley are scored with numerous re-entrants, the masses of detrital

material eroded therefrom being spread out fanwise along the edge of the alluvium. Higher up, small alp-like terraces appear, giving place to precipitous slopes once more where calcareous rocks of Triassic and Jurassic age occur.

CONCERNING climate and vegetation little need be added to the accounts already given of the Eastern Carpathians as a whole. In the case of climate the most important features to be borne in mind are the risk of late summer storms that limit the ripening period for grain, and the winter snowfall which creates a close season for agriculture.

THE VILLAGE.

CORBU has been tentatively classified as a "dispersed" type of village, though it is clear from the photographs (Plate IX) that the narrowness of the valley has rather limited the extent of the dispersion and has given rise to a plan resembling that of the "street village" of Western Europe. Closer examination, however, will reveal a certain looseness of structure, especially where a slight widening of the valley occurs near the confluence of a tributary stream, and it is very probable that if the same village had been founded in a broad flat upland area the houses would have been spread out as in Bilbor (see Plate I).

PEASANT HOUSES.

A GROUP of typical Roumanian farmsteads is illustrated in Plate X whilst the plan on page 67 shows in detail the lay-out of the one depicted on page 43. The principal features in each case are clear. The dwelling houses, of which there are frequently two to a farm, can usually be distinguished by their bright colour-washed walls. There is an abundance of local stone, but the crystalline rocks that are nearest to hand are very intractable, and, although they are employed for the foundations, the superstructure is almost invariably of wood. In Lower Borsec, which is just visible in the distance in Plate IX, an outcrop of Travertine provides a much more easily-worked material, and is very freely employed, but its use does not appear to extend into Corbu. The walls of the Corbu houses are usually built of roughly-squared, less frequently of sawn, timber, to which, in the better-class houses, laths are nailed to form a key for

361



FIGURE 8. The amorphous plan of Corbu contrasts strongly with the more orderly and compact village of the plain. Cristian is near Brașov.

the plaster with which the exterior is then coated. In the poorer houses the gaps between the timbers are merely caulked with clay before a colour-wash is applied.

THE most popular type of roofing material is shingles, which is a welcome contrast to the sheet iron of the plain, though perhaps less picturesque than the steeply-pitched roofs of thatch that are a feature of other mountainous parts of the country. On some of the houses, usually those of the poorer inhabitants, shingles are replaced by longer boards which sometimes extend from ridge to eaves, all three types being illustrated in Plate X.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

361
133

Corbu—view from top of porphyry spur looking down-stream. Arable land on the valley floor is devoted mainly to the cultivation of maize. On the right in the foreground lucerne is seen stacked on poles. The lower portions of the steep hill-sides have been cleared for hay meadows, but continuous stretches of forest clothe the upper slopes. *Photo: R. A. Pelham.*

Corbu—looking upstream towards Borsec. *Photo: R. A. Pelham.*

[facing page 64]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

PLATE X

241
133

Hay meadows on deforested slopes above the limits of cultivation at Corbu. Although this is the upper section of a valley tributary to that of the Bistricioara, it is much broader than the narrowly constricted lower section.

Photo: R. A. Pelham.

342
361



Typical Roumanian farmsteads in Corbu. The houses are roofed with shingles, the outbuildings with boards. The house in the centre has the characteristic louvre in place of chimney, and its walls are of timber with plaster covering. Hemp is drying on the verandah. The mud caulking in the outbuilding is clearly visible.

Photo: R. A. Pelham.

[facing page 65]

361
133



This is part of the area mapped in Fig. 11. The photograph is taken from the top of the porphyry spur shown in Fig. 9. *Photo: R. A. Pelham.*

241
342



A peasant holding at Corbu in process of sub-division. A son about to marry is erecting a house (seen on left) on his share of his father's land. The parental farmstead extends across the right-hand half of the picture. A strip of maize is seen in the foreground and a small patch of hemp on the extreme left, close to the new house. For plan of holding see Fig. 11. *Photo: R. A. Pelham.*

[facing page 68]

4:FTeure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

PLATE XII

342

A Gipsy smith and his family. The building on the left is the forge.



The Gipsy colony in Corbu. The houses are clustered together on a steep slope and although resembling in style those of the Roumanian peasants are easily distinguished therefrom by not having any arable land attached.

Photo: R. A. Pelham.

[facing page 69]

000 and the Cyrillic script invented for Slavonic purposes came to be used for religion, even in Roumania. Cities and towns were as yet hardly born in central and east-central Europe.

In the tenth and eleventh centuries, as the Dark Ages were passing away in the west, the idea of the city spread eastwards from the Rhine, sometimes under the leadership of the Church, sometimes around a military leader, sometimes through the planting of colonists by a leader. The Magyar kings accepted Christianity and were drawn into this current of activity, and Transylvania was a frontier land that needed to be developed and guarded. A people of transhumant shepherds and lowly cultivators scattered over a mountain territory was as yet too weak to do this or to resist effectively, while it had no reason to attach itself to the Magyar power, which had different linguistic and religious associations. The Magyars established allied Szekler peoples within the arc of the eastern Carpathians, apparently to some extent as a guard for the passes. They also brought in Saxon immigrants to establish cities as well as villages, and the Teutonic knights and Magyar aristocrats also came to add to the complexity. Szekler and Saxon were Roman Catholic, so a religious complication was added to the linguistic one, and this complexity was further increased when the Saxon element became Protestant on a Lutheran basis, while Unitarianism developed among the Magyars, and the Uniate scheme spread in the border zone between Catholic and Orthodox.

133 Beyond the old Dacia, that is outside the Carpathian bastion, the plains of Wallachia and Moldavia long were highways of barbarian warriors, while their lands nearer the hills are floored by large quantities of boulder-strewn outwash from old sub-glacial conditions in the mountains, so that the areas of more cultivable alluvium are, in the hill country, largely
369 riverside zones. The development of a measure of urban life
361 apparently came later here than in Transylvania, and it may owe something to the Saxon ideas expressed in Transylvania, though neither Saxons or Szeklers are present, and the characteristic Saxon house type with its great arched doorway is completely absent, as is the walled town. The Transylvanian Saxon village (note the villages called Cristian near Sibiu and near Braşov) might have a fortified enclosure around its church, a centre of refuge and of authority. How far analogous developments outside the Carpathian arc are due

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

369
:61

o imitation of the Saxon, and how far they are independent levelopments of a natural and comparatively simple idea, it would be difficult to decide. It is at any rate interesting that the old town of Curtea de Argeş shows clearly as its nucleus a fortified enclosure around its splendid old church of the fourteenth century, the Biserica Domneasca.

H. J. F.



121 considerably from those of the eastern Carpathians; this area is the district focusing upon Curtea de Argeş.

101 133 WALLACHIA has already been described as the land stretching from the southern Carpathians or Transylvanian Alps to the Danube. The mountains themselves are largely of metamorphosed rock with flanking Miocene deposits; they are about 40 km. wide with the sharp main ridge (rising at Negoiu to 2,544 m. or 8,331 feet) parallel to the long flanks about 11 km. from the northern and 29 km. from the southern edge. Several rivers have worked their valleys out among the mountains in a direction parallel to the ridge and the edges.

133 THERE ARE huge accumulations of pebbly, often deltaic, outwash beyond the south flank of the mountains, the layers sloping southward and giving sunward dip-slopes separated by small northward-facing scarps, the woods of which contrast with the arable lands on the dip-slopes. This pebbly outwash is deeply dissected by southward-flowing consequent streams, some of which rise in it, while others, like the Argeş, penetrate the mountain wall, making a wild narrow gorge. In the deep valleys of the pebbly material houses shelter from the north winds. The Olt has cut right through the mountains and captured a subsequent river of the northern flank, and its way through the mountains is by a deep valley, which is wider in some sections that are more or less "subsequent" and narrower in others that are rather "consequent." At about 20-25 km. southward from the mountain wall the residual hills of loose material that stand out between the consequent valleys milden down; the amount of alluvium and the breadth of the river valleys increase and it becomes possible to bridge the rivers, so it is at about this distance from the mountains that have grown the towns of Ramnicu Valcea on the Olt and Curtea de Argeş on the Argeş. Ramnicu Valcea is at the last narrowing of the Olt before it begins to braid on a broad alluvial plain, and its site is not easily defensible. The Argeş has terraces near the stream on the eastern side at the bridge, and the river has already swung against this bank some 2 km. north of the bridge. This gives defensible positions as well as facilities for bridging, and helps to account for the historic, if somewhat localised, importance of the town of Curtea de Argeş, the focus of the region of which studies were made.

133 361

H. J. F.
E. E. E.

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

133
361

Plan of Curtea de Argeş. Wooded areas shaded. Heights in metres.

CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

133 261 REFERENCE has already been made to the bridging of the Olt and the Argeş about 20-25 km. from the mountain-edge and to the rise near these bridges of the towns of Ramnicu Valcea and Curtea de Argeş. It has also been explained that terraces on the left bank of the Argeş swing near the river to give an effective bridge-end site capable of defence. Curtea de Argeş is one of the oldest settlements in Muntenia.

[491] AT THE BRIDGE the river is over 420 m. above sea, and from its western end an old trackway, now a main road, follows approximately the 440 m. contour on what appears to be a terrace against which the river swings about 1½-2 km. north of the bridge. Here also gravel reaches, connected with the junction of a brook with the main stream, provide a ford; [778] and at this spot on the east side of the river there is the monastery of royal associations founded in 1510 and celebrated as a place of pilgrimage. Beyond this the road goes on up a tributary valley towards the east. The bridge and town however grew up not at this ford, but at a point farther south, where the north-south residual ridge bounding the Argeş valley on the east sends a spur almost to the actual river but just cut off by a seasonal tributary brook. The end of this spur shows two marked terraces, one just slightly above the river, the other some 12 m. above it and rising, as was said [346] above, to about the 440 m. contour. On the end of the spur is a ruined Roman Catholic church, built for Marghita, wife of Prince Basarab. The Wallachian princes of these days appear to have had a habit of marrying Catholic women. One seems to see faint indications that the site of the church has been to a slight extent developed artificially. In 1390 this church served as a cathedral for Catholics in Wallachia, and the see lasted until 1602, by which time many Catholics had become Orthodox and the Catholic bishopric was removed to Dacau.

[491] REFERENCE has already been made to the north-south road on the terrace, no doubt a modernisation of an old trackway, with the town near the end of the spur and the bridge, and the monastery to the north. Near the end of the spur, and

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl
[Curtea De Arges]

346



Cream-washed and painted church of St. Mary at Curtea de Argeş

33
361
[346]

related to the brook already mentioned, is a spring of some value. Above this, on the terrace, is the nucleus of the town—an Orthodox church (1352) of exceptional dignity and beauty, the Biserica Domneasca, built in a fortified enclosure. This scheme suggests comparisons with such Saxon villages as Cristian, near Sibiu, and several others, though there the church was Catholic. The fortification at Curtea de Argeş is larger than those at such places at Cristian, but it is far from being equivalent to the fortification enclosing the primary nucleus of Sibiu, for that nucleus included church, market places, shops and residences. It seems to have been a widespread rule that where a whole town was not walled there should be at any rate a fortified refuge enclosing the church. In the Slavonic parts of the European plain there were, of old, burgwälle or earthwork refuges, in some cases one for each area of about 120-130 km., or, say, fifty British square miles. These burgwälle sometimes became the nuclei of towns, the Wawel at Krakow being perhaps the best known among many examples. On the Wawel, and in analogous places in many

361 towns, stands a church in a fortified enclosure, and the town
133 has been laid out beyond this. It is possible to infer that a similar process has worked itself out, but to a lesser degree, both in the Saxon villages of Transylvania and in such cases as that of Curtea de Argeş. Here the church-and-castle nucleus is as usual the focus of roads, the principal one of which runs along the terrace as already mentioned. Two others lead down towards the river, one on each side of the fortification, but not exactly to the bridge, the position of which is rather determined by gravel banks where the small seasonal brook referred to above joins the river. Some other roads or trackways branch off in a bunch just east of the nucleus and stretch up into hills of unconsolidated material, their woodland cover increasing with altitude and becoming practically continuous forest at about 600 m. altitude over sea. Where the woods are not continuous there is pasture up to which animals may be drawn every day in summer. One of these roads leads past a little old church of S. Mary and appears to be an old track leading obliquely up the hill and over into the next valley to the east. Along the beginning of this trackway are the homes of numerous craftsmen, especially potters, but we did not get evidence of a guild or zunft of potters. We are not here dealing with quite the same scheme of organisation as that of a trade in a street within a walled town. The main business part of the town has lain between the bridge end and the road on the terrace, 10-20 m. above the river, and the town has been physically constrained to spread along that road. The extension southwards has an interesting eighteenth century house overlooking a square set out quite recently. The extension northwards towards the monastery gives a ribbon of buildings mostly modern.

On the whole, one has the impression of a focus of peasant
443 life with fairs and markets and opportunities of sale of craft products, especially pots, to country folk. There is evidence of considerable quite modern growth, and also apparently of growth one to two centuries ago, a growth which it is tempting to associate with agricultural development gathered around the spread of maize and potato, but proof is lacking.

361 Curtea de Argeş owes a great deal of its importance to its
771 religious and princely associations, and both the Biserica Domneasca and the monastery church are important here. The latter, near a ford, may well have more ancient associa-

Curtea de Arges -- 25 Analyst]

361 tions, but we know of nothing there before 1510. To the
771 existence of the monastery, which is the seat of a bishop, is due the development of a seminary.

161 THE POPULATION[2] in 1930 was 6,831. In 1931 there were 181
163 births, 24 infant deaths (under one year), 20 still-births, and 125 deaths from all causes. Marriages numbered 61 and divorces 4. The birth-rate is thus high, the infant death-rate considerable, but not so high as might be expected; still-births are numerous.

H. J. F.
E. E. E.

1[of Curtea de Arges -- Analyst]

415

BROWN CLAY.
WHITE & GREEN SLIP.

MEDICAL CONDITIONS AT CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

361 [161] [131] CURTEA DE ARGEŞ is a small town of 6,831 inhabitants (in 1930), situated in the valley of the River Argeş, at an altitude of 1,400 feet.

[32] A SERIES of wells supply the town with water, there being no system of pipes to supply running water. The drainage system is necessarily of a primitive type, the dry closet type being the one in use.

743 THE TOWN possesses two hospitals:

(1) A general hospital with pavilion for epidemic cases.

(2) Home for incurables—a branch of a nerve clinic in Bucharest.

THE GENERAL HOSPITAL is situated in the centre of the town on a slight eminence, a few yards from the main street. It consists of two wards, one for men and one for women. The cases are mixed, medical and surgical cases being nursed in the same ward. There are fifteen beds for men and fifteen for women. In addition there are two small wards for clean surgical cases, each containing two beds.

THE BEDS are of the usual hospital type, but placed close together about three feet apart. The mattresses and pillows are stuffed with straw and are very hard. The patients wear their own clothes. This being summer, less than one half of the beds were in use. The villagers refuse to come to hospital in summer, when there is work to be done in the [754] fields, unless in cases of stern necessity. A belief in witchcraft 164 and secret remedies is prevalent, so that progress as regards treatment is hampered. Epidemics of dysentery and typhoid are common. Tuberculosis is widespread, and goitre is found in all the villages in this valley. Cretinism in the children is untreated, and most villages contain cases. No medication of the water supply is undertaken. Pulmonary tuberculosis is treated in sanatoria, but other cases of tuberculosis are admitted here. Cancer is also common, but is not dealt with here—the cases are sent to Bucharest for radium treatment.

3

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

round the highland of Transylvania in the north, /33
east and south; the rolling plains of Wallachia; the Danube, which still is the southern frontier and main line of communication; and the slopes and steppes of Moldavia and Bessarabia.

The massive Carpathians are formed by two mountain ranges: the Eastern Carpathians which, rising west of the Pruth, extend southwards to the region of Brasov; and the Southern Carpathians, with high peaks of over 7,500 ft., which stretch westward and then turn to the south, where they reach the Danube. South of the great bend, formed by the two chains of mountains, lies the famous oil district of Campina and Ploesti, one of the chief economic assets of Rumania. The beautiful southern and eastern slopes of the Carpathians flatten out into the fertile plains of Wallachia and Moldavia, the latter merging in the east with the Bessarabian plateau, and in the north with the valleys and forests of the Bukovina. The Dobrudja, lying east of the Danube, as it turns northward, adds considerably to Rumania's share of the Black Sea coast. North and west of Transylvania lie the mountainous province of Maramures and the lowlands of the Crisana, which, geographically, belong to the Hungarian plain. The south-western tip of Greater Rumania was formed by the Banat, partitioned after the Great War between Yugoslavia and Rumania.

In Wallachia and Moldavia there is much which /33
is purely Balkan. There are the small villages with 361
muddy streets and little one-storied cottages of sun-dried brick, painted white and blue, some with wooden gables gaily decorated. On the great, rolling

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

133 plains an endless sea of ripening wheat and maize
• 361 dips and rises in the summer breeze.

In the Carpathian valleys and in Transylvania dark forests alternate with fertile, gently rising slopes, irrigated by swift rivers which descend from the high mountains. Old castles and mansions of Hungarian nobles still guard the highways which pass through Rumanian, Hungarian and German villages and the small 'Saxon' towns, some of which have still preserved the atmosphere of mediaeval German townships.

In the Bukovina the civilizing influence of the Austrians is still visible. This small province, with its factories and prosperous farms, is one of the crossroads where east and west meet. In Bessarabia Russian and Ukrainian influences are very strong. The churches and cottages, the peasants' carts and dresses recall the Ukraine east of the Dniester. The Dobrudja, with its undulating uplands and its long, sandy Black Sea shore, offers good grazing for many great flocks of sheep which are driven there in the autumn to escape from the icy winter in the Carpathians. The province is only sparsely populated and has a definitely Balkan character. Fezzes and turbans are still common in the streets of its little towns. The plains west of Transylvania differ little in their aspect from the great Hungarian plains, but here too there is a great diversity of peoples and cultures, all adding to the colourful and often confusing picture of Rumania as it was between the two wars.

162 THE POPULATION. The acquisition of the New Territories after the Great War brought many non-

135 the Olt, copper near Baia de Arama and salt near Ocnele Mari, north of Govora. The peasant population, in spite of the great agricultural wealth of the province, is extremely poor. The people live in small villages near the rivers. The houses are more often than not almost subterranean mud-huts. Agricultural implements are very primitive. The wooden plough is still widely used.

511 361

175 Oltenia was the first district of Rumania which was colonized by the Romans. It formed the spearhead, and later the base, for the Roman penetration of Dacia. Among the most interesting relics of Roman times found in Oltenia are the ruins of a bridge built by Trajan and the fort just outside Turnu-Severin. After the Roman withdrawal Oltenia shared the fortunes of Muntenia,[1] and in 1859 joined the Principality of Rumania.

361 The capital and chief industrial and commercial town of Oltenia is Craiova with a population of about 60,000. It is also the road and rail junction linking Bucarest with Oltenia and the western provinces. Turnu-Severin on the Danube is the important port guarding the famous 'Iron Gates'. Here the current of the Danube, passing through a narrow gorge is too strong and the water too shallow for shipping to [503] make headway upstream. A deep channel has therefore been blasted in the rock of the river bed and vessels are towed up it by locomotives on the railway alongside. Before the Great War Turnu-Severin was the frontier town between Rumania and Austria-Hungary. It has still preserved the character of a picturesque oriental marketing centre.

[1] Except that in 1718, after the Austrian occupation of Belgrade, Oltenia was temporarily under Austrian rule.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Oltenia]
[Muntenia]

The Danubian ports of Calafat and Corabia handle 361
wheat exports and also have some valuable industries.

MUNTENIA. To the east of the River Olt extends 133
Muntenia, the other province of Wallachia. It [131]
covers an area of about 20,600 square miles and has
a population of about 4,500,000. The southern and [161]
eastern boundaries of the province are formed by the Danube, the northern frontier by the Carpathians. The land surface and climate of Muntenia are similar to those of Oltenia, but the hilly region south of the Carpathians is narrower. The fertile steppes, Baragan, Burnas, Gavan and Burdeas, are situated on the northern banks of the Danube which floods the adjoining districts and forms many lakes and marshes. The highest peaks of the Carpathians in Muntenia are the Negoi and the Moldovan, both over 7,500 ft. The most important of the many rivers descending from the high mountains are the Dambovita, Jalomita, Arges and Buzau, all of which
eventually flow into the Danube. The endless maize [311]
and wheat fields of Muntenia are covered in summer with heavy crops and on the steppes great flocks of sheep find their food. In spite of very dry summers and icy winters like those of Russia this region is one of the richest of Rumania and the whole of Europe.

Muntenia differs from all Rumanian provinces in [135]
that, in addition to stock breeding, the raising of high-quality crops, fishery and forestry, it possesses a source of wealth which is not found in such abundance in any other part of Europe, the oil fields of
Campina and Ploesti. There the hilly, wooded 361
countryside suddenly changes into a modern in-

361 dustrial region with the tall wooden towers above the oil wells and the circular oil containers attached to the refineries. Campina and Ploesti are similar to the towns which sprang up during the American gold rushes. Great modern buildings stand next to primitive huts; fast American cars overtake peasant carts; rich speculators rub shoulders with shabby workers. These are towns in which extreme wealth and abject poverty live side by side.

BUCAREST. A similar, if somewhat more westernized, atmosphere reigns in Bucarest, the capital of Muntenia and of the whole of Rumania. Bucarest, which its more prosperous citizens like to call the 'Paris of the Balkans', has almost 1,000,000 inhabitants, and it has in many respects assumed the character of an American city. With ultra-modern buildings, wide thoroughfares bordered by shady alleys, and fast taxis the centre of Bucarest resembles the most modern of western cities. But the typical features of the Balkans have survived. Narrow little streets, quaint Orthodox churches, horse-carriages and hawkers are plentiful. Bucarest is the greatest industrial town of Rumania. Many factories of all [366] descriptions are situated here. All the great commercial houses and banks, both Rumanian and foreign, have their head offices in Bucarest. The capital's importance is enhanced by its key position as a centre of communications. The main trunk road from Transylvania passing through the Predeal Pass, Sinaia, Campina and Ploesti links up in Bucarest with the roads leading south to the Danube, east to the Danube and the Black Sea and west to Oltenia.

8

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bucarest]

[The Dobrudja]

Bucarest is also the chief railway centre of 361
Rumania.

Giurgiu on the Danube, south of Bucarest and the terminus of one of the oil pipe-lines from Ploesti, is one of the main Rumanian wheat and oil ports. Another Danubian port, where great quantities of wheat are handled, is Braila with a population of about 70,000.

There are no natural barriers to communications 505
in Muntenia. In the south the chief flow of traffic 491
is carried by the Danube. Rail and road communica- 496
tions from Transylvania pass through the Predeal and a railway line leads over the Danube to the Dobrudja.

THE DOBRUDJA (Dobrogea[R]).[1] Up till 1878 the 175
whole of the Dobrudja belonged to Bulgaria. Ever since, this province has been a bone of contention between Rumania and Bulgaria. The northern part of the Dobrudja was awarded to Rumania in 1878 to compensate her for the loss of Southern Bessarabia to Russia. The southern part of the province was ceded by Bulgaria after her defeat at the hands of her neighbours in the Second Balkan War in 1913. This region was returned to Bulgaria in 1940.

Geographically the Dobrudja is the north-eastern 131
corner of the Balkan Peninsula. Its boundaries are 133
in the north and west the Danube and in the east the Black Sea. There are three distinct regions: the delta of the Danube, the forests of Babadag, and farther south the steppe, which is the most fertile

[1] The letter R, H or G following a geographical term denotes a Rumanian, Hungarian or German name, respectively.

131 part of the Dobrudja. The delta of the Danube is
133 formed by the three arms Chilia, Sulina and St George. It includes an area of about 1,000 square miles, in which water and land, marshes, lakes and
[503] islands feed an almost tropical vegetation. The chief communications through the delta are provided by the Sulina canal and by causeways.

311 The steppes of the Southern Dobrudja yield good
135 crops of wheat and maize, and the pastures maintain great herds of sheep. Mineral resources are confined to some unworked coal deposits, valuable copper near Altantepe, and sulphur.

131 The Dobrudja is about 9,300 square miles in all:
161 of this some 2,960 square miles were returned to Bulgaria in 1940. The population of the province as a whole is about 850,000. Its main value to the contesting States lies in the Black Sea stretch of
504 coast. The port of Constanza, the greatest and most
361 important on the western shores of the Black Sea, has modern harbour works built at the beginning of this century and covering an area of 60 hectares. It was through Constanza that Rumanian exports used to pass to France and Great Britain. The docks of Constanza are about 30 ft. deep and can, therefore, be used by large, sea-going ships. The harbour facilities include storage buildings for wheat and oil-tanks with a capacity for over 200,000 cubic metres of fuel, which are fed by the pipe-lines coming from Ploesti. Oil can moreover be pumped straight from the pipe-lines simultaneously into four tankers. Another great advantage is that the port is
361 completely ice-free all the winter. Constanza is the administrative centre of the Dobrudja and also a well-known seaside resort. Rail communications

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Dobrudja]
[Moldavia]

with the rest of Rumania are provided by the line 361
Constanza-Cernavoda-Bucarest.

MOLDAVIA (Moldova[R]). The second of the two 131
original Rumanian principalities is only half as big 161
as Wallachia and its population is about half. Moldavia covers an area of about 15,280 square miles, and is inhabited by about 2,500,000 Rumanians, Jews, Hungarians, Slavs and Germans.

Owing to its geographical position Moldavia was 175
more exposed to Polish, Russian and also Hungarian influence than Wallachia. After the death of the *voivode* Stephen the Great in 1504, the country became part of the Turkish dominions. From then onwards Moldavia shared the fate of Wallachia. Russian influence, however, naturally made itself felt in greater intensity in Moldavia. The independence of the principality was restored under John Cuza who eventually became the first ruler of the United Principalities.

The western boundaries of Moldavia are formed 131
by the Carpathians. In the south the province borders on Muntenia and in the north on the Bukovina, which originally was part of Moldavia. The eastern frontier is formed by the River Pruth. The 133
western part of Moldavia consists of the slopes of the Carpathian Mountains and the hill region below. Farther east the country flattens out into the plains which are bordered by the valley of the Pruth. The most fertile districts lie on the western bank of the Pruth and in the eastern corner of the province. The hills, which reach heights of 1,800 ft., are wooded. But there is much fertile soil which produces wheat and maize. There are also vineyards

7

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Moldavia]

133 and good pasture. The Sereth, which waters this region and runs parallel to the Pruth, flows into the Danube below Galati.

135 On the eastern slopes of the Carpathians there are large deposits of oil which have not yet been fully exploited. In the *comitat* Bacau, also in the mountain region of Moldavia, there are some valuable coal and salt mines. The salt mines of Targu-Ocna are the most important in the whole of Rumania.

311 The majority of the people of Moldavia are
438 employed on the land. They grow wheat, maize and sugar-beet and tend the vines. Recently, successful experiments have been made with the growing of industrial crops. Timber felling provides another source of income, especially at Targu-Neamt, Piatra-Neamt and Focsani. There are important refineries at Moinesti and Solont, sugar factories at Roman and Ripiceni, and large textile works at Buhusi.

361 The capital and economic centre of Moldavia is the town of Jasi, on the western bank of the Pruth. Its population numbers about 80,000, more than half of them Jews. Jasi, lying on a number of vine-growing hills overlooking the valley of the Pruth, is an old commercial centre, which used to be visited in the middle ages by Genoese, Venetian and Greek
[368] merchants. In Jasi, with its wide streets flanked by long rows of one-storied houses, there is the oldest Rumanian University, founded by John Cuza, a famous library containing over 160,000 books, and many other cultural institutions. Jasi has a number of iron and steel works, several clothing factories and is the chief marketing centre for cattle and wine in Moldavia.

361 Another important town, and the greatest Ru-
504 manian port on the Danube, is Galati with a popula-
tion of about 75,000. Galati lies about a hundred miles from the Black Sea, but the harbour is so placed that sea-going ships can enter the port through the delta and anchor there all through the ice-free period. From Galati timber, wheat and maize from all over Rumania are sent abroad. Incoming cargoes of industrial goods are unloaded there.

[496] The only line leading directly to Transylvania goes over the Ghimes Pass. The traffic to Bessarabia is carried by four railway lines.

THE NEW TERRITORIES

131 The New Territories, acquired by Rumania after
175 the war of 1914–18 and ~~partly lost~~ since 1940, cover
[161] an area of 62,800 square miles and were inhabited in 1940 by about 10,500,000 people. The Banat, the Crisana, Maramures and Transylvania formed, up to 1918, parts of Hungary; the Bukovina belonged to Austria, and Bessarabia was taken from Russia. Many parts of the New Territories were agriculturally and industrially better developed than the Old Kingdom.

131 **THE BANAT.** The Rumanian part of the Banat covers
161 an area of about 7,400 square miles and has a popula-
tion of 1,000,000. The province is bordered in the north by the River Mures[R] (Maros[H], Marosch[G]), in the west by the Yugoslav part of the Banat, in the south by the Danube, and in the east by the Car-
000 pathians. The north-western part of the province is

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 194-

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Banat]

[The Crisana]

The high quality of the crops in this province, 241
amongst them wheat, maize, rye, oats, and the high 134
standard of animal breeding, have made the Banat known far beyond the borders of Rumania. The fertility of the soil is due partly to the 'black earth' which, in a greater or lesser degree, is a component of all the arable land. Apart from being an important agricultural region, the Banat possesses valuable industries, forests and minerals. Iron ore and coal 316
are mined in the area of Resita and Anina, where 327
there are great iron and steel works which produce 315
railway equipment and armaments. The Danubian port of Orsova, guarding the western entrance to the 'Iron Gates', also has an oil refinery.

The capital of the Banat is Timisoara[R] (Temesvar[H]) on the Bega with a population of 100,000. In 361
Roman times the fortress of Ripensia was situated here. In Hunyadi's time it was a centre of resistance against the Turks, only second in importance to Belgrade. To-day the town is a great rail and road junction with many factories, banks, commercial houses and cultural institutions. Lugoj, on the Timis, with a population of 20,000, and Caransebes, north of the Porta Orientalis which leads through the mountains of the Banat to the Danube, are marketing towns of some importance.

THE CRISANA AND MARAMURES. Geographically the 131
Crisana is the eastern borderland of the Hungarian [161]
plain. The province covers an area of about 8,400 square miles and has a population of just under 1,500,000. The Crisana lies between Transylvania in the east, the River Mures (Maros[H]) in the south; Hungary (as reduced by the Treaty of the Trianon) in the west and Czechoslovakia in the north.

7

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Crisana]

in the west and Czechoslovakia in the north. The inhabitants of the Crisana are Rumanians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans and some Slavs. Taken as a whole the province contains a slight Rumanian majority, but there is in the immediate frontier region a fairly homogeneous Hungarian population, which forms a local majority.

The western part of the Crisana has the same features as the lowlands of Hungary. The types of agriculture also closely resemble those of the rest of the country on both banks of the Tisza[H] (Theiss[G]). There are wide, flat fields of maize and wheat interspersed with pastures, grazed by horses and longhorn cattle. To the east the country rises and forms a chain of hills which produce good fruit and wine. Beyond are the mountains of Bihor (Bihar[H]) which form the western wall of Transylvania. These mountains are rich in coal, gold, copper, bauxite, asphalt and marble. Consequently this region maintains numerous industrial enterprises. Apart from its mineral resources and good wheat and maize the Crisana is also well known for its horses, cattle, pigs and sheep.

The capital of the Crisana is Oradea-Mare (Nagyvarad[H], Grosswardein[G]) in the valley of the Cris (Körös[H], Kreisch[G]). Its population of about 95,000 consists of Hungarians, Rumanians, Jews, Germans and others. Oradea is the junction for five railway lines and commands all the main communications leading from the Hungarian plain to Transylvania. The town is also the seat of many industries and the chief market for the agricultural produce of the province. Arad, on the northern bank of the Mures (Maros[H]), is inhabited by 65,000 people,

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Maramures]

[Transylvania]

361 about 20,000 people, lies on the upper reaches of the Tisza; it is the centre from which beautifully hand-woven carpets are exported.

175 **TRANSYLVANIA** (Ardeal[R], Erdely[H], Siebenbuergen[G]). The citadel of Transylvania, guarded by the
635 high walls of the Carpathians and overlooking the lowlands of the Danube, dominated the map of Greater Rumania during the interval between the two World Wars. The union of Transylvania was the fulfilment of an aspiration which Rumanians had for long wished to realize. But the incorporation of this principality into Greater Rumania brought with it a number of difficult problems which even to-day are far from being solved.

When the Magyars invaded Dacia in the tenth century there was already, according to the Rumanian contention, a substantial Rumanian population in Transylvania which was subjugated by them. Subsequent colonization with Hungarian and German settlers weakened the position of the Rumanians and led many of them to emigrate into the lowlands, south and east of the Carpathians. Transylvania became an autonomous principality within Hungary and was able to maintain its semi-independence even when the Turks advanced to the gates of Vienna. Many Transylvanian princes played a leading part in the long struggle against the Turks, notably those of the Bethlen family. Transylvania under its native Hungarian rulers succeeded in maintaining itself for a long time against both the Austrians and the Turks. But while the consequences of the struggle for independence invariably had to be borne by the majority of the population, economic and

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

[The Bukovina]

361 peoples of Transylvania. Farther south, on the banks of the Mures, lies Alba Julia, with an old castle, a majestic Gothic church and a chapel in which King Ferdinand was crowned. Sibiu (Hermannstadt[G], Nagyszeben[H]), with a population of 46,000, half of which is German, is an ancient centre of the Transylvanian 'Saxons'. The town is entirely German in character and all the buildings, especially the churches and the market-place, are reminiscent of a little provincial borough in the Middle Ages. Two other places of historical interest are Heltau (Cisnadie[R]) and Michelsberg (Cisnadoara[R]), small German villages with peasant-fortresses built in the thirteenth century. The road to the east, along the foot of the South Carpathian wall, leads to Brasov (Brasso[H], Kronstadt[G]), the most important industrial and economic centre of Transylvania. Although the town has a population of only 60,000, there are numerous factories producing iron and steel, machine-tools, armaments, railway equipment, textiles, and other goods.

175 THE BUKOVINA (Buchenland[G]). The Bukovina
635 forms the northernmost tip of Greater Rumania. This province of dense forests, gentle hills and fertile pastures has had a long and varied history. In Roman times it was part of Dacia and was subsequently overrun by many barbarian tribes. Soon after the establishment of Moldavia, the Bukovina was conquered by the rulers of that principality and annexed by them. For some time both Moldavia and the Bukovina were governed from the Bukovinian town of Suceava. In the following centuries the Bukovina was first under Polish, then Turkish

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Bukovina]

[Bessarabia]

000 small deposits of coal, gold and lead, but the industry of the province is well developed.

361 The capital of the Bukovina is Czernowitz (Cernauti[R]) with over 100,000 inhabitants. The town is situated on a high hill near the Pruth and is a great commercial centre. Here branches of the Austrian banks and some big Viennese businesses remained. The population of Czernowitz, like that of the rest of the province, is very mixed. Economically important as a junction of several trade-routes, Czernowitz has also become a great industrial town during the last fifty years.

648 In June 1940 the Northern Bukovina, including Czernowitz, altogether about 2,260 square miles, was ceded by Rumania to the U.S.S.R. Thereby over 550,000 people, mostly Ukrainians and many Jews, became Soviet citizens.

131 **BESSARABIA.** For over twenty years the province of
161 Bessarabia was the eastern frontier region of Greater Rumania. It covers an area of 17,760 square miles and has a population of 3,000,000.[1] Bessarabia is surrounded by natural frontiers: in the north and east by the River Dniester, in the south by the Black Sea and the Danube, and in the west by the Pruth.

133 The north of Bessarabia is formed by a highland about 1,000 ft. high, consisting of fertile arable land which belongs to the 'black-earth' region of the Ukraine. The central area is hilly country, divided

[1] To which were added 120,000 Polish and Ukrainian villagers transplanted from Eastern Poland by the Soviet authorities shortly before their retreat before the German attack in 1941.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

by the valleys through which flow the tributaries of /33
the Pruth and Dniester. In the south, beginning near Besarabeasca, extends the Budjak steppe which merges into the sandy soils, salt marshes and lagoons of the delta of the Danube and of the Black Sea coast. The climate of Bessarabia is the same as that /32
of the regions east of the Dniester. The summers are very hot and dry, the winters very cold with icy winds and great snowfalls. Nevertheless, crops 311
grow well in Bessarabia and 61% of the whole area is arable land. The chief products are maize, wheat, tobacco and wine and lately also soya beans. There are few factories and the only source of income for the people, apart from agriculture, is the fishing industry in the south.

The capital of Bessarabia is Kishineff (Chisinau[R]) 361
with a population of over 200,000 (1935). Here are concentrated such industrial enterprises as the province possesses, the most important being flour mills, leather factories and other secondary industries connected with agriculture.

The first colonization of Bessarabia was carried 175
out by the Romans who succeeded in occupying this 635
territory only for a short time. During the great period of migration (seventh to tenth centuries), the province was invaded by a host of tribes. Bessarabia was first occupied by Rumanians in the early fourteenth century and incorporated in Moldavia in 1367. A century and a half later Southern Bessarabia fell to Turkey, but several merchant-colonies were still administered by Genoese and Venetian traders on the Danube delta and the Black Sea coast. In the following centuries Bessarabia was often a battleground for Russian and Turkish armies, who alter-

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Muntenia]

[Bucarest]

361 dustrial region with the tall wooden towers above the oil wells and the circular oil containers attached to the refineries. Campina and Ploesti are similar to the towns which sprang up during the American gold rushes. Great modern buildings stand next to primitive huts; fast American cars overtake peasant carts; rich speculators rub shoulders with shabby workers. These are towns in which extreme wealth and abject poverty live side by side.

BUCAREST. A similar, if somewhat more westernized, atmosphere reigns in Bucarest, the capital of Muntenia and of the whole of Rumania. Bucarest, which its more prosperous citizens like to call the 'Paris of the Balkans', has almost 1,000,000 inhabitants, and it has in many respects assumed the character of an American city. With ultra-modern buildings, wide thoroughfares bordered by shady alleys, and fast taxis the centre of Bucarest resembles the most modern of western cities. But the typical features of the Balkans have survived. Narrow little streets, quaint Orthodox churches, horse-carriages and hawkers are plentiful. Bucarest is the greatest industrial town of Rumania. Many factories of all [366] descriptions are situated here. All the great commercial houses and banks, both Rumanian and foreign, have their head offices in Bucarest. The capital's importance is enhanced by its key position as a centre of communications. The main trunk road from Transylvania passing through the Predeal Pass, Sinaia, Campina and Ploesti links up in Bucarest with the roads leading south to the Danube, east to the Danube and the Black Sea and west to Oltenia.

Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 ED1 Rumania ED1

EDUCATION IN CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

871 868 IN THE TOWN there are five primary schools—three mixed, one for girls and one for boys. In the latter there is a kindergarten class for children between five and seven. There are two vocational secondary schools, the Theological College and the Technical School; these are for boys only. The nearest lycée for girls is at Piteşti, 37 kilometres away. Boys also must leave the town for ordinary secondary education.

872 The kindergarten was founded in 1928 by the Orthodox National Society of Roumanian Women. There is a special local committee of management. The room used is large; part of it serves as a cloakroom and for washing; the children use the same playground and offices as the boys.

[876] THERE ARE two teachers and about fifty-five children. Careful records of the progress of each child are kept. The children work in groups in low chairs at tables; no individual work is taken. Froebel's principles are followed, but Dr. Montessori's sense-training apparatus is used and Dr. Decroby's principles of teaching arithmetic are adopted.

INTERESTING HANDWORK is taken: paper-cutting pictures, modelling in clay and in paper, lace, crochet, etc. The first twenty minutes of each morning are set apart for the care of plants and animals and of the classroom. Speech training, physical exercises, free-play and singing are taught; as the school has no musical instrument, much depends on the musical ability of the mistress. The training is similar to that of primary school teachers; the salary is fixed by the local committee.

[346] THE PRIMARY SCHOOL for girls that we visited is housed in a large building of one storey, standing in its own grounds; it contains, all leading out of a central hall, four large and lofty classrooms, a teachers' small-room and an art room; there are no cloakrooms, the children hang their clothes on stands in the classrooms. These rooms are rather bare, but very light; they are heated by a big porcelain stove and the desks take three children. In summer classes are held in the garden. The

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Moldavia]

133 and good pasture. The Sereth, which waters this region and runs parallel to the Pruth, flows into the Danube below Galati.

135 On the eastern slopes of the Carpathians there are large deposits of oil which have not yet been fully exploited. In the *comitat* Bacau, also in the mountain region of Moldavia, there are some valuable coal and salt mines. The salt mines of Targu-Ocna are the most important in the whole of Rumania.

311 438 The majority of the people of Moldavia are employed on the land. They grow wheat, maize and sugar-beet and tend the vines. Recently, successful experiments have been made with the growing of industrial crops. Timber felling provides another source of income, especially at Targu-Neamt, Piatra-Neamt and Focsani. There are important refineries at Moinesti and Solont, sugar factories at Roman and Ripiceni, and large textile works at Buhusi.

361 The capital and economic centre of Moldavia is the town of Jasi, on the western bank of the Pruth. Its population numbers about 80,000, more than half of them Jews. Jasi, lying on a number of vine-growing hills overlooking the valley of the Pruth, is an old commercial centre, which used to be visited in the middle ages by Genoese, Venetian and Greek [368] merchants. In Jasi, with its wide streets flanked by long rows of one-storied houses, there is the oldest Rumanian University, founded by John Cuza, a famous library containing over 160,000 books, and many other cultural institutions. Jasi has a number of iron and steel works, several clothing factories and is the chief marketing centre for cattle and wine in Moldavia.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

162 and the investigators found many of the old labor contracts and obli-
311 gations associated with pre-1914 Rumania.

Unable to support themselves in the community, many peasants
511 were seeking temporary work in nearby market towns, and a number
464 traveled as far as Bucarest, a distance of about 70 kilometers. The
exodus in most cases was not permanent, and the peasants after earn-
● 369 ing some money returned to Dâmbovnicul. This movement to the city
166 was a reflection of the new conditions, which were also seen in the houses and garments of the peasants: houses were no longer built to last generations as was the case in the more isolated districts to the north; the national costume was relegated to Sundays. Birth and death rates were high and the natural increase outran the emigration away from the plasă. The standard of living was very low; many families were undernourished.

A definite differentiation in the peasantry was developing. A few peasants—mostly those who had inherited medium properties—were enlarging their holdings; a few new peasant estates of over 100 hectares had been created. The poorer peasants, including many who had been allotted land, were losing their holdings. Investigations into debts and credit showed that even after the conversion of 1934 about half the households were in debt. Credit provided by the cooperative banks went almost entirely to the larger peasants; in one commune holdings of up to 5 hectares received only 7.9 per cent of the loans. The special political interest shown by the parties in the judeţ of Argeş seemed to have brought no benefits beyond permitting local party stalwarts to obtain extra funds to purchase land from peasants who were in debt or in need of money.

Such, then, was the land of happy peasants with their colorful folkways so picturesquely displayed in the travel literature of the Carolist era.

000 and the Cyrillic script invented for Slavonic purposes came to be used for religion, even in Roumania. Cities and towns were as yet hardly born in central and east-central Europe.

In the tenth and eleventh centuries, as the Dark Ages were passing away in the west, the idea of the city spread eastwards from the Rhine, sometimes under the leadership of the Church, sometimes around a military leader, sometimes through the planting of colonists by a leader. The Magyar kings accepted Christianity and were drawn into this current of activity, and Transylvania was a frontier land that needed to be developed and guarded. A people of transhumant shepherds and lowly cultivators scattered over a mountain territory was as yet too weak to do this or to resist effectively, while it had no reason to attach itself to the Magyar power, which had different linguistic and religious associations. The Magyars established allied Szekler peoples within the arc of the eastern Carpathians, apparently to some extent as a guard for the passes. They also brought in Saxon immigrants to establish cities as well as villages, and the Teutonic knights and Magyar aristocrats also came to add to the complexity. Szekler and Saxon were Roman Catholic, so a religious complication was added to the linguistic one, and this complexity was further increased when the Saxon element became Protestant on a Lutheran basis, while Unitarianism developed among the Magyars, and the Uniate scheme spread in the border zone between Catholic and Orthodox.

133 Beyond the old Dacia, that is outside the Carpathian bastion, the plains of Wallachia and Moldavia long were highways of barbarian warriors, while their lands nearer the hills are floored by large quantities of boulder-strewn outwash from old sub-glacial conditions in the mountains, so that the areas of more cultivable alluvium are, in the hill country, largely
369 riverside zones. The development of a measure of urban life
361 apparently came later here than in Transylvania, and it may owe something to the Saxon ideas expressed in Transylvania, though neither Saxons or Szeklers are present, and the characteristic Saxon house type with its great arched doorway is completely absent, as is the walled town. The Transylvanian Saxon village (note the villages called Cristian near Sibiu and near Braşov) might have a fortified enclosure around its church, a centre of refuge and of authority. How far analogous developments outside the Carpathian arc are due

369
561

o imitation of the Saxon, and how far they are independent levelopments of a natural and comparatively simple idea, it would be difficult to decide. It is at any rate interesting that the old town of Curtea de Argeş shows clearly as its nucleus a fortified enclosure around its splendid old church of the fourteenth century, the Biserica Domneasca.

H. J. F.



361 towns, stands a church in a fortified enclosure, and the town
133 has been laid out beyond this. It is possible to infer that a similar process has worked itself out, but to a lesser degree, both in the Saxon villages of Transylvania and in such cases
361 as that of Curtea de Argeş. Here the church-and-castle
471 nucleus is as usual the focus of roads, the principal one of which runs along the terrace as already mentioned. Two others lead down towards the river, one on each side of the fortification, but not exactly to the bridge, the position of which is rather determined by gravel banks where the small seasonal brook referred to above joins the river. Some other roads or trackways branch off in a bunch just east of the nucleus and stretch up into hills of unconsolidated material, their woodland cover increasing with altitude and becoming practically continuous forest at about 600 m. altitude over sea. Where the woods are not continuous there is pasture up to which animals may be drawn every day in summer. One of these roads leads past a little old church of S. Mary and appears to be an old track leading obliquely up the hillside over into the next valley to the east. Along the beginning of this trackway are the homes of numerous craftsmen, especially potters, but we did not get evidence of a guild or zunft of potters. We are not here dealing with quite the same scheme of organisation as that of a trade in a street within a walled town. The main business part of the town has lain between the bridge end and the road on the terrace, 10-20 m. above the river, and the town has been physically constrained to spread along that road. The extension southwards has an interesting eighteenth century house overlooking a square set out quite recently. The extension northwards towards the monastery gives a ribbon of buildings mostly modern.

367 On the whole, one has the impression of a focus of peasant
443 life with fairs and markets and opportunities of sale of craft products, especially pots, to country folk. There is evidence of considerable quite modern growth, and also apparently of growth one to two centuries ago, a growth which it is tempting to associate with agricultural development gathered around the spread of maize and potato, but proof is lacking.

361 Curtea de Argeş owes a great deal of its importance to its
771 religious and princely associations, and both the Biserica Domneasca and the monastery church are important here. The latter, near a ford, may well have more ancient associa-

[Curtea de Arges -- 25 Analyst]

231 owner's farm, where the cows are kept in sheds, and the sheep, which are more hardy, are penned on the arable land, particularly on the maize stubble. Both sheep and cattle are fed on fodder crops during the winter. The surplus animals are sold at the autumn fair, and form a source of revenue.

476 [236] [234] WHILST ON the high pastures the sheep are clipped twice, and the wool is divided amongst the peasants in proportion to the number of animals sent up. The cheese is usually shared by the owners of the animals in the same way, the mayor and his committee being responsible for the correct apportionment. In the Valley of the Argeş co-operative dealers from Bucharest frequently buy the cheese "in bulk" direct from the commune, and the monetary value is shared between the owners of the animals.

231 OXEN ARE used almost exclusively for draught purposes, the numbers kept in this district being somewhat in excess of the farmers' requirements, owing to their use for lumbering (see below).

241 [369] [438] PEASANT FARMING in the Valley of the Argeş is no longer entirely on a subsistence basis. Two factors have tended to modify it. Firstly, the position of the valley, opening as it does directly on the Wallachian Plain, with its rich grain lands and containing the capital Bucharest, has allowed commercial intercourse to develop. The Argeş peasant no longer cultivates wheat; he does not mind if his maize crop is good enough for fodder only, for he can buy both wheat and maize from the plain. Further, he finds a ready market and so a money income in Bucharest for his surplus fruit, 313 particularly apples, and cheese. Secondly, the forests form a valuable asset to the peasant. During the winter felling takes place in the upper basin of the Argeş; in spring and summer the timber is transported, and work in the State mill in Curtea goes on all the year round. Practically every household has somebody working in the timber trade, and the money so earned (as much as 100 lei per day for a man supplying his own yoke of oxen) reduces the dependence of the family on the farm.

874 242 AT CURTEA DE ARGEŞ is the School of Agriculture, Regina Elizabeta. Although only a small percentage of its pupils is local, it is gradually influencing the farming of the neighbourhood. Experiments in cultivation, plant breeding and

241 IT WILL be seen that structure and climate conspire together
132 to encourage a scheme of summer utilisation of high pastures
221 combined with valley cultivation that was much enriched when the maize plant was introduced, but this was not so long ago, and the older régime was none too prosperous both because of climatic troubles in the highlands and especially the sensitiveness of the wheat plant to abnormal seasons, and because of the hindrances to organisation arising from the diversities of language between governments and
371 subjects. The encouragement of industry was not easy while some lignite and a little coal were the main sources of power, but later on it became possible to use abundant petroleum and natural gas and we have yet to see, in the
565 next generation, what influence they may have. Up to the
241 present, however, a true peasantry survives, and has increased its hold on the soil; it still makes at home a great proportion of what it needs, it still finds that in the hills the maize crop may not ripen, and old communal schemes relating to the high pastures remain important.

CHAPTER III

316
439

3. Coke Imports and Production

	Imports	*Production**
	in '000 tons	
1936	39	78
1937	49	78
1938	63	86
1939	55	88
1940	54	86
1941	n.a.	90

* Including gas coke.

Of the total coke available annually—140,000 tons—100,000 tons were consumed by blast-furnaces and iron-works, the remaining 40,000 by other industries.

II. ELECTRIC POWER

A. General

377
371

Being an agricultural country, Rumania, like the other countries of South Eastern Europe, is not extensively developed from the electrical point of view. The most important high-tension transmission lines are located in the neighbourhood of the Prahova oilfields and of Bucarest, but though these two areas are interconnected by means of lines operating at 120 and 60 kV, there is no national grid. There are a few other high or medium-tension lines which mostly connect power stations owned by industrial concerns. The majority of generating stations giving a public supply are quite isolated from each other.

1. Sources of Power

Rumania's potential water-power resources are high. It is estimated that 24,000 million kWh could be obtained annually from the economically

377
377

exploitable water-courses, necessitating the installation of 5,500,000 kW of plant. The water-power developed so far however, amounts to about 50,000 kW. This failure to exploit the available water power is mainly attributable to the abundance of native fuel oil and low-grade coal, and to the high initial capital costs which hydro-electric development entails. In 1938, therefore, about 63 per cent. of the plant installed in Rumanian public-supply stations was of a thermal type, 25 per cent. was Diesel and only 12 per cent. hydro-electric. By 1940 the percentages were 66 : 17 : 17. The table below gives figures of total capacity and output of both public and industrial stations in recent years.

2. Present Output and Utilisation

It is estimated that in 1942 output did not exceed 1,130 million kWh from a total-installed capacity of about 806,000 kW. (These totals include capacity and output of those stations in Bessarabia and N. Bucovina which were regained in 1941.)

The following table shows the probable consumption of electric power in 1942 by the various consumer groups:

	Millions of kWh Consumed	*% of Total Output*
Industrial	791·0	70·0
Household uses and private lighting ..	124·3	11·0
Public lighting ..	17·0	1·5
Agriculture	5·6	0·5
Transmission losses ..	192·1	17·0
	1,130·0	100·0

377 The above list contains only the most important industrial stations, most of which also supply public requirements in their areas.

C. TRANSMISSION SYSTEM

1. Bucarest Area

Doiceşti hydro-electric station is connected with Bucarest by a 120-kV line 70 miles long. The line passes through Doiceşti, north of Târgovişte, and thence to Bucarest via Chitilla. At Doiceşti some power is stepped down to 60 kV and is transmitted to Bucarest via Ploeşti.

Schitu Goleşti thermal station, also 70 miles north of Bucarest, is connected with Doiceşti by a 60-kV line.

2. Prahova Area

The Concordia Petroleum Company owns an extensive distribution network. Its power stations supply not only the installations on the Prahova oilfields, but also the communities of Braşov, Buşteni, Sinaia, Câmpina, Ploeşti and other centres. The Gura Ocniţei station of this company is connected to Floreşti station (owned by Steaua Electrică S.A.R.), by 60-kV lines, which also interconnect with the Doiceşti transformer station of the Bucarest system. Other lines operated at 60 kV run between Floreşti and Ploeşti, and between Floreşti and Bucarest. Floreşti is linked with the Câmpina and Sinaia stations of the Concordia Company by 25-kV lines, which pass northwards to Braşov.

3. Sibiu Area

The industrial generating station Dicio Sân Martin is the chief source of electric current. It is linked with Sibiu by a 60-kV line, and with the other small stations in this and the surrounding areas by lines at lower voltages.

D. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

377 An official decree published in August, 1942, ordered the electrification of the Rumanian State Railways, and at that same time the economies which would result from the dev-lop-

377 ment for this purpose of hydro-electric power in place of the coal, which is at present used, were pointed out. A scheme providing for the construction both of hydro-electric stations, and of thermal reserve stations for this purpose has been prepared, and includes initially the carrying out of the "Bicaz" project on the River Bistriţa, near Tarcău. At this place a dam is to be built to form a regulating reservoir, the water from which will serve to irrigate areas at present uncultivated. In a normal year, a total output of 400-600 million kWh. is expected. Apart from supplying the requirements of the railways, power will be used in the exploitation of local raw materials and to facilitate the development of the following industries:

- Wood pulp.
- Artificial silk.
- Electro-chemistry.
- Electro-metallurgy.

Work on the Bicaz dam is to begin in the near future. The first sections of railway track to be electrified are:—

- Bucarest-Ploeşti (59 km.—37 miles).
- Ploeşti-Braşov (111 km.—69 miles, of which Ploeşti-Braşov is double-track).
- Braşov-Sighişoara (129 km.—80 miles).

Up till the beginning of 1943, however, none of these projects appeared to have been begun.

The Rumanian Government is also reconsidering the much-discussed plan for the exploitation of the Danube Rapids at the Iron Gates, where the river enters Rumanian territory. If the work is carried out it will be supervised by a Rumanian-Bulgarian-German concern. The eventual output from this site should reach 3,000 million kWh. per annum, requiring an installed capacity of about 6-700,000 kW. (The largest station yet built in Europe is that on the Dnieper, having an installed capacity of 560,000 kW.) The output from the proposed station will supply the needs of South Rumania (including the railways), North Bulgaria and perhaps also East Serbia.

The important oil-field station of Grozăvesti in Bucarest has been adapted to use natural gas, and is believed to have been extended.

[19c]

243
372]

the winter; moreover, the annual life of this cereal is short, freeing the ground for other uses. In the plains, the maize stalks are used for fuel. The proportion of land devoted to maize has therefore increased since the agrarian reforms and the expropriation of much of the land of the large landowners.

THIS CONCENTRATION on maize production by the peasant farmer has its dangers, besides handicapping the country from the point of view of export. In a succession of dry summers a poor maize crop has a disastrous result where there are no root crops and no winter wheat to fall back on. The cultivation of potatoes and lucerne is being encouraged, but peasant farming is backward throughout the kingdom, though less so in Transylvania and the Bucovina than in the Old Kingdom.

THE MOST intensive maize cultivation is found in the departments of Gorj and Valcea and Muşcel in Oltenia (the sheltered valleys of foothill country of Oltenia) and that of Bacau in the upper Trotuş basin of Moldavia. In these districts, where the annual rainfall is in the neighbourhood of 600 mm., with an early summer rain maximum and a dry autumn, over 50 per cent of the agricultural land cultivated is under maize; but, with the exception of the Black Sea coastlands, the bulk of Roumania has only between 30 and 50 per cent of the cultivable land under cultivation devoted to maize. True, in the higher valleys of the Carpathians, the maize not infrequently fails to ripen, owing to the early onset of cool weather, but early ripening species of maize are sown in the Carpathian valleys. Again, a dry spring and early summer is a grave menace to the crop. It is unfortunate that the least nourishing and latest ripening type of maize is, owing to its high yield, that most favoured by the Vlachian peasant.

WHEAT.

IT IS only in Transylvania that wheat assumes a rôle approaching in importance in the peasant agricultural régime to that of maize. It was being cultivated, however, before the War on an increasing scale, on the large estates of Muntenia, where the steppe type of climate and rich soil conditions (chernoziom on loess and the black and brown

352 The furniture[1] is of the simplest, but much ingenuity is displayed in contriving hinges, benches, and so on, the devices used having an air of ancient custom about them. Nearly all the woodwork could be done with the axe (see
354 p. 47). A simple crane, the probable prototype of the iron
●372 hearth-crane as we know it in Britain, allows the pot to be suspended at the desired distance from the open wood fire, which burns on a rough hearth towards the centre of the stamped earth floor. A certain sanctity attaches to the fire: it is not allowed to go out, and much ceremony accompanies its lighting. The "living fire" (*focul vin*) should be prepared on arrival at the head stână[2] of the commune's pasturage, by means of two sticks rubbed together, and the operation should be performed by a pure youth, otherwise the flocks will fare badly. The fire must then be carried to the other huts. We were not able to observe this custom, but the shepherd-boy at the Stână Găujoara, situated to the north of the watershed some fifteen miles south-west of Sibiu, was persuaded to show us how the fire was lit. Here the more familiar "flint-and-steel" method was used, but in place of flint the sparks were obtained from a piece of quartz, a substitution which suggests one reason for the common ceremonial use of quartz by ancient man in Europe.

233 In the Carpathians, as in Europe generally, there is much
462 variation in the personnel of the transhumant shepherds, but the exclusion of women in some areas is a feature for which
000 parallels cannot readily be adduced. In Norway it is the women who take the flocks to the summer pastures, an arrangement which is natural where the men are fishers. The same scheme is found in parts of the Central Plateau of France, where the men cannot be spared from their work in the fields, and the same appears to have held for the Scottish Highlands. Switzerland offers the best example of mass transhumance, and the movements formerly practised in Wales and in Ireland, though simpler and less regular, seem to have involved men, women and children. The *hafodty*, described by Welsh writers early last century, was a cowhouse with a fire at one end, but no chimney, and, except that the whole was stone-built, the assemblage of pens and shelters must have closely resembled the Roumanian. In Wales, too, ewes were milked and sheep's cheese made into the nineteenth century.

In the Carpathians, while some stâne are inhabited by

1 [In the shepherd's hut -- Analyst]
2 [for explanatory footnote see 51 pp. 49, Cat. 116 -- Analyst]

I. COAL

A. Consumption, Imports, Deposits

372 375 Coal has not played such a large part in Romanian economy as it has in that of most European countries because of the abundant mineral oil and timber resources which have been used extensively for fuel, both in industry and for household purposes. The following table shows the percentage consumption of the different types of fuel (average 1937-39) :—

	%
Firewood	28·7
Oil and oil products	26·1
Coal	25·9
Methane and other gases	17·2
Water power	2·1

The railways accounted for 60 per cent. of total coal consumption which was of the order of 2 million tons, the balance being divided between industry, household consumption and bunkers.

135 Before the war coal reserves, which are predominantly brown coal, were estimated at 2·7 milliard tons brown coal (including lignite), and 48 million tons of hard coal. The more important deposits are located in southern and western Transylvania, while a few of lesser importance are in the northern area which was ceded to Hungary.

316 429 In spite of the limited industrial development of the country and extensive use of oil, coal production is hardly sufficient for current needs, and it has been necessary to import both coal and coke to fill the deficiency.

Pre-war coal imports in metric tons were as follows :—

	Metric Tons
1935	21,000
1936	23,000
1937	28,000

A MARKED FEATURE is the comparative absence of chimneys. The cooking is done in an outhouse, no doubt to minimise the risk of fire, but the dwelling house is generally heated by a stove, the smoke from which passes up through the ceiling in an iron pipe and then escapes into the open air through holes cut in the gable ends or, in the case of a hipped roof, through a small louvre.

THE OUTHOUSES are for the most part simple structures and call for no special comment.

CLEANLINESS and simplicity are the keynotes of the domestic economy. Household effects are kept down to a minimum, but upon their manufacture an enormous amount of time and skill is lavished, especially in the case of textiles. The skilfully-woven designs on the tapestries and pillows shown Plate XVI are an illustration of such effort.

POPULATION.

ACCORDING to the 1930 census Corbu had a population of 1,563, distributed among 358 households. The majority of the inhabitants are, of course, Roumanians, for the commune lies right on the fringe of the Szekler country. In spite of having lived in close association with the Roumanians for many generations, however, the Szeklers are easily distinguished by their dress, their physical type (though this is by no means an infallible guide), their adherence to Roman Catholicism, and, of course, their language. Although culturally there is an appreciable difference between the Roumanian and Szekler peasantry, there is to-day an even wider gap between these folk and the Tsiganes or Gipsies who form a much smaller, though very interesting, minority. Generally speaking, the Roumanians contribute a dark, and the Szeklers a fair, element to the broad-headed population, whereas the Gipsies are for the most part distinctly long-headed and very dark. There is an equally well-marked difference on economic grounds, for both Roumanians and Szeklers are essentially peasants, whereas the Gipsy, being landless, is compelled to seek a livelihood by trading, unless he be either smith or musician, following the traditional pursuits of his forbears (see Plate VI).

THE HOUSES occupied by Gipsies, while resembling in style those of the peasants, can usually be recognised by the

ticularly at the oil industry, prescribed the manner in which 471
they were to be exploited. The development of these re- 315
sources was to be entrusted to corporations or "régies" in 382
which the Government as well as private capital, both Rumanian and foreign, would participate, but in such a way as to permit of the majority of shares being controlled by the Rumanian Government. At the same time laws were 375
enacted for increasing the utilization of methane gas (C.H.4) 471
which was already in use both for lighting and heating 665
purposes in Transylvania, and which is available as a large source of industrial power, its output being calculated to amount to as much as 2,000 million cubic metres per annum, the consumption of which for 1930 reached over 503 million c. metres. The methods used by the Liberal Party to secure a mainhold of the supplies of methane gas are particularly illuminating of the mentality of the leaders of that party, as they were revealed by M. Madgearu in the Rumanian Chamber in 1929. An exclusive monopoly was conferred on a group of "Liberals," who supplied the gas to industrialists at arbitrary prices so as to force the latter out of the market and leave this to rival firms belonging to adepts of the "Liberal" Party. All the efforts of the Liberal Party to promote the nationalization of this gas were aimed at securing the economic mastery of Transylvanian industries. A 376
similar law was also passed dealing with water power, the 471
reserves of which are estimated at 5,206,225 H.P., of which 665
amount 735,425 h.p. represent 50 per cent of the force produced at the Iron Gates by the Danube, 1,422,465 h.p. by the tributaries of the Theiss, 2,164,748 h.p. by the Danube tributaries between the Timish and the Sereth, and the remaining 884,665 h.p. by the Sereth and its tributaries. Of all this potential force only about 52,000 h.p. is actually in use. The State owned practically the totality of the railway 655
lines, most of the extensive fisheries in the marshes and delta of the Danube, the salt mines of Ocnele Mari, Slanic, Uioara and Targu Ocna, which are exploited as a State monopoly and assure to it a revenue of some 700 million lei per annum, over 75 per cent of the entire vast timberlands, several coal and iron mines, the gold mines in the Bihor mountains, the annual output of which is about 2,500 to 3,000 kilogrammes

1 July, 1924--Analyst

I. COAL

A. Consumption, Imports, Deposits

372 375 Coal has not played such a large part in Rumanian economy as it has in that of most European countries because of the abundant mineral oil and timber resources which have been used extensively for fuel, both in industry and for household purposes. The following table shows the percentage consumption of the different types of fuel (average 1937-39) :—

	%
Firewood	28·7
Oil and oil products	26·1
Coal	25·9
Methane and other gases	17·2
Water power	2·1

The railways accounted for 60 per cent. of total coal consumption which was of the order of 2 million tons, the balance being divided between industry, household consumption and bunkers.

135 Before the war coal reserves, which are predominantly brown coal, were estimated at 2·7 milliard tons brown coal (including lignite), and 48 million tons of hard coal. The more important deposits are located in southern and western Transylvania, while a few of lesser importance are in the northern area which was ceded to Hungary.

316 439 In spite of the limited industrial development of the country and extensive use of oil, coal production is hardly sufficient for current needs, and it has been necessary to import both coal and coke to fill the deficiency.

Pre-war coal imports in metric tons were as follows :—

	Metric Tons
1935	21,000
1936	23,000
1937	28,000

ticularly at the oil industry, prescribed the manner in which 471
they were to be exploited. The development of these re- 315
sources was to be entrusted to corporations or "régies" in 382
which the Government as well as private capital, both Rumanian and foreign, would participate, but in such a way as to permit of the majority of shares being controlled by the Rumanian Government. At the same time laws were 375
enacted for increasing the utilization of methane gas (C.H.4) 471
which was already in use both for lighting and heating 665
purposes in Transylvania, and which is available as a large source of industrial power, its output being calculated to amount to as much as 2,000 million cubic metres per annum, the consumption of which for 1930 reached over 503 million c. metres. The methods used by the Liberal Party to secure a mainhold of the supplies of methane gas are particularly illuminating of the mentality of the leaders of that party, as they were revealed by M. Madgearu in the Rumanian Chamber in 1929. An exclusive monopoly was conferred on a group of "Liberals," who supplied the gas to industrialists at arbitrary prices so as to force the latter out of the market and leave this to rival firms belonging to adepts of the "Liberal" Party. All the efforts of the Liberal Party to promote the nationalization of this gas were aimed at securing the economic mastery of Transylvanian industries. A 376
similar law was also passed dealing with water power, the 471
reserves of which are estimated at 5,206,225 H.P., of which 665
amount 735,425 h.p. represent 50 per cent of the force produced at the Iron Gates by the Danube, 1,422,465 h.p. by the tributaries of the Theiss, 2,164,748 h.p. by the Danube tributaries between the Timish and the Sereth, and the remaining 884,665 h.p. by the Sereth and its tributaries. Of all this potential force only about 52,000 h.p. is actually in use. The State owned practically the totality of the railway 655
lines, most of the extensive fisheries in the marshes and delta of the Danube, the salt mines of Ocnele Mari, Slanic, Uioara and Targu Ocna, which are exploited as a State monopoly and assure to it a revenue of some 700 million lei per annum, over 75 per cent of the entire vast timberlands, several coal and iron mines, the gold mines in the Bihor mountains, the annual output of which is about 2,500 to 3,000 kilogrammes

[July, 1924--Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

MINERAL RESOURCES. The great and varied wealth /35 of the subsoil of Greater Rumania has been exploited only to a small degree. 316 Apart from gold and silver, which are found in rivers and mined in Transylvania, there are iron-ore deposits estimated at about 30,000,000 tons. The average yearly production, however, amounted to only about 100,000 tons. The important alloy, manganese, found in various parts of the country, copper, zinc, chromium and bauxite all contribute to the mineral wealth of Rumania.

Through the acquisition of the New Territories the coal deposits of Greater Rumania were greatly augmented. The total coal reserves, of which the most important are situated in the western provinces and in Transylvania, were estimated at 722,000,000 tons. The average yearly production, of which two-thirds were brown coal, amounted to between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 tons. A source of power which is not found in any other part of Europe, and which could transform and sustain Rumanian industry for many years, is the great subterranean natural gas reservoir in Transylvania which contains chemically pure methane.

Another source of energy of which only a small 376 fraction has yet been exploited is Rumania's potential water power, estimated at 1,500,000 horsepower, which equals the energy of all the coal, oil and natural gas resources of Rumania taken together.

OIL. The centre of the Rumanian oilfields is the 315 region of Campina and Ploesti which also has the biggest refineries for the production of petrol and aviation spirit. Oil is also found in Oltenia, Moldavia and Maramures. Crude oil was already known

313 the small industries of the remoter upland districts. It is particularly important in the wood and pulp and paper industries, and in the small textile and pottery works. Charcoal is still used for smelting.

●377 ELECTRICITY is mainly generated thermally, in spite of the great potentialities of water-power provided by the rivers from the Carpathians, not to mention the Danube current. Lack of natural reservoirs in snow-field, glacier and lake means that exploitation of the hydro-electric resources would entail enormous capital expenditure in the construction of reservoirs. The sum total of direct water-power used must, however, be very great, for the number of water-wheels is legion.

317 SALT is another asset of real importance. Like the mineral oil, it is found in greatest abundance, and is most accessible, in the upper Tertiary deposits of the sub-Carpathians, in the region of greatest disturbance. Sometimes it is exposed in cliffs, sometimes it is covered with thin layers of loam. Salt mines are being worked at Slanic, at Targu-Ocna (Tergu Ocnei) in the Trotuş basin, and at Ocnele-Mare (Ocna) on
316 the Olt. In 1932 the amount extracted was 288,000 metric tons, of which 240,500 tons were for home consumption, the rest being exported to the Balkan countries and to Russia. Salt mining and marketing are state monopolies.

IN iron ore Roumania is not rich, the output being only about 90,000 tons per annum. The most important deposits lie in the mountains of the Banat and in the Poiana Ruscai (Ruszka) massif farther north, between the Mureş and the Bistra (Bisztra) tributary of the Timiş (Temes). The Reciţa (Reciţa Montana) district in the Banat mountains, opening towards Hungary, has foundries and steel works employing about 15,000 hands.

WITH the recent rise in the price of gold, the mining of that metal, which formerly was almost negligible, has become more active, and the output reached nearly 4,000 kgs. in 1933. The ore is mined in the Trachyte massif of the Bihor.

433 IN SPITE of considerable advantages in natural resources, and solicitous nursing on the part of the State, particularly in the Old Kingdom, industry in Roumania is still in its

CHAPTER III

316
439

3. Coke Imports and Production

	Imports	*Production**
	in '000 tons	
1936	39	78
1937	49	78
1938	63	86
1939	55	88
1940	54	86
1941	n.a.	90

* Including gas coke.

Of the total coke available annually—140,000 tons—100,000 tons were consumed by blast-furnaces and iron-works, the remaining 40,000 by other industries.

II. ELECTRIC POWER

A. General

●377
371

Being an agricultural country, Rumania, like the other countries of South Eastern Europe, is not extensively developed from the electrical point of view. The most important high-tension transmission lines are located in the neighbourhood of the Prahova oilfields and of Bucarest, but though these two areas are interconnected by means of lines operating at 120 and 60 kV, there is no national grid. There are a few other high or medium-tension lines which mostly connect power stations owned by industrial concerns. The majority of generating stations giving a public supply are quite isolated from each other.

1. Sources of Power

Rumania's potential water-power resources are high. It is estimated that 24,000 million kWh could be obtained annually from the economically

377
371

exploitable water-courses, necessitating the installation of 5,500,000 kW of plant. The water power developed so far, however, amounts to about 50,000 kW. This failure to exploit the available water power is mainly attributable to the abundance of native fuel oil and low-grade coal, and to the high initial capital costs which hydro-electric development entails. In 1938, therefore, about 63 per cent. of the plant installed in Rumanian public-supply stations was of a thermal type, 25 per cent. was Diesel and only 12 per cent. hydro-electric. By 1940 the percentages were 66 : 17 : 17. The table below gives figures of total capacity and output of both public and industrial stations in recent years.

2. Present Output and Utilisation

It is estimated that in 1942 output did not exceed 1,130 million kWh from a total-installed capacity of about 506,000 kW. (These totals include capacity and output of those stations in Bessarabia and N. Bucovina which were regained in 1941.)

The following table shows the probable consumption of electric power in 1942 by the various consumer groups:

	Millions of kWh Consumed	*% of Total Output*
Industrial	791·0	70·0
Household uses and private lighting ..	124·3	11·0
Public lighting ..	17·0	1·5
Agriculture	5·6	0·5
Transmission losses ..	192·1	17·0
	1,130·0	100·0

● 377

INSTALLED CAPACITY AND OUTPUT OF PUBLIC AND INDUSTRIAL STATIONS

Year	Public Stations		Industrial Stations		Total	
	Installed Capacity '000 kW	Output in million kWh	Installed Capacity '000 kW	Output in million kWh	Installed Capacity '000 kW	Output in million kWh
1933 ..	212	325	160	268	372	593
1935 ..	217	415	218	452	435	867
1937 ..	261	537	248	540	509	1,077
1938 ..	262	568	248	580	510	1,148
1939 ..	285	582	260	630	545	1,212
1940* ..	241	548	259	617	491	1,165

* Allowance made for the loss of N. Transylvania, S. Dobruja, Bessarabia and N. Bucovina.

B. Generating Stations

As will be seen from the following list of Public Supply Plants which it is believed includes all stations with an installed capacity of 5,000 kW and over, only eight of the power stations have a capacity of more than 10,000 kW.

1. Public Supply Plants

Location	Installed Capacity (kW)	Type (Thermal or Hydro)
Bucarest : Grotăveşti	85,000	Steam
Câmpina	28,150	Steam
Gura-Ocniţei	20,450	Steam
Dobreşti	20,000	Hydro
Schitu-Goleşti	19,200	Steam
Bucarest : Filaret	16,250	Diesel
Gălma	10,700	Hydro
Sinaia	10,500	Hydro
Timişoara	9,675	87% Steam, 13% Hydro
Arad	7,840	Steam
Cernăuţi	7,675	80% Steam, 20% Diesel
Brăila	7,630	83% Steam, 17% Diesel
Floreşti	6,300	Steam
Oradea*	6,280	Steam
Sibiu	6,250	Diesel
Braşov	5,800	Steam
Galaţi	5,000	Steam
Constanţa	5,000	Steam

* This plant is now in Hungarian territory.

[18c]

377

2. Industrial Generating Plants

Location	Installed Capacity (kW)	Type	Owner
Dicio São Martin ..	24,000	Steam	Nitrogen S.A.
Lupeni-Vulcan ..	19,200	Steam	Petroşani S.A.R.
Anina	11,780	Steam	Uzinele de Fier şi Domeniile din Reşiţa
Turda	9,400	Steam	Fabrica de Ciment din Turda S.A.
Domniţa Maria ..	9,150	68% Steam, 17% Diesel, 15% Hydro	Letea S.A.R.
Reşiţa	8,700	52% Steam, 48% Gas	Uzinele de Fier şi Domeniile din Reşiţa
Aghires, Cluj* ..	8,400	Steam	Sorecani S.A.
Schela Moreni ..	7,750	77% Steam, 23% Gas	Astra Romana

* Now in Hungary.

[19a]

●377 The above list contains only the most important industrial stations, most of which also supply public requirements in their areas.

C. TRANSMISSION SYSTEM

1. Bucarest Area

Dobreşti hydro-electric station is connected with Bucarest by a 120-kV line 70 miles long. This line passes through Doicesti, north of Târgovişte, and thence to Bucarest via Chitilla. At Doicesti some power is stepped down to 60 kV and is transmitted to Bucarest via Ploeşti.

Schitu Goleşti thermal station, also 70 miles north of Bucarest, is connected with Doicesti by a 60-kV line.

2. Prahova Area

The Concordia Petroleum Company owns an extensive distribution network. Its power stations supply not only the installations on the Prahova oilfields, but also the communities of Brasov, Buşteni, Sinaia, Câmpina, Ploeşti and other centres. The Gura Ocniţei station of this company is connected to Floreşti station (owned by Steaua Electrică S.A.R.), by 60-kV lines, which also interconnect with the Doicesti transformer station of the Bucarest system. Other lines operated at 60 kV run between Floreşti and Ploeşti, and between Floreşti and Bucarest. Floreşti is linked with the Câmpina and Sinaia stations of the Concordia Company by 25-kV lines, which pass northwards to Brasov.

3. Sibiu Area

The industrial generating station Dicio Sân Martin is the chief source of electric current. It is linked with Sibiu by a 60-kV line, and with the other small stations in this and the surrounding areas by lines at lower voltages.

D. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

377 An official decree published in August, 1942,
371 ordered the electrification of the Rumanian State Railways, and at that same time the economies which would result from the develop-

[196]

377
371

ment for this purpose of hydro-electric power in place of the coal, which is at present used, were pointed out. A scheme providing for the construction both of hydro-electric stations and of thermal reserve stations for this purpose has been prepared, and includes initially the carrying out of the "Bicaz" project on the River Bistrița, near Tarcău. At this place a dam is to be built to form a regulating reservoir, the water from which will serve to irrigate areas at present uncultivated. In a normal year, a total output of 400-600 million kWh. is expected. Apart from supplying the requirements of the railways, power will be used in the exploitation of local raw materials and to facilitate the development of the following industries:

Wood pulp.
Artificial silk.
Electro-chemistry.
Electro-metallurgy.

Work on the Bicaz dam is to begin in the near future. The first sections of railway track to be electrified are:—

Bucarest-Ploești (59 km.—37 miles).

Ploești-Brașov (111 km.—69 miles, of which Ploești-Brașov is double-track).

Brașov-Sighișoara (129 km.—80 miles).

Up till the beginning of 1943, however, none of these projects appeared to have been begun.

The Rumanian Government is also reconsidering the much-discussed plan for the exploitation of the Danube Rapids at the Iron Gates, where the river enters Rumanian territory. If the work is carried out it will be supervised by a Rumanian-Bulgarian-German concern. The eventual output from this site should reach 3,000 million kWh. per annum, requiring an installed capacity of about 6-700,000 kW. (The largest station yet built in Europe is that on the Dnieper, having an installed capacity of 560,000 kW.) The output from the proposed station will supply the needs of South Rumania (including the railways), North Bulgaria and perhaps also East Serbia.

The important oil-field station of Grozăvesti in Bucarest has been adapted to use natural gas, and is believed to have been extended.

[19c]

A. THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

●381 Though the chemical industry of Rumania ranks lowest among the chief industries on the basis of production value, it is better and more comprehensively developed than in the other south-east European countries. Production is chiefly confined to heavy chemicals manufactured largely from indigenous raw materials. Most of the factories are situated in Valachia, Transylvania, and around Timişoara in the Banat.

1. Acids and Alkalis

385 317 Rumania produced annually 45,000 metric tons of sulphuric acid, which was sufficient to cover the pre-war requirements of the country, which were mostly for the refining of mineral oil. The manufacture was in the hands of some six firms, of which the chief producer was the Mărăşeşti S.A.R., with plants at Mărăşeşti, Valea Călugărească and Braşov. Three of the smaller plants producing sulphuric acid with a total annual capacity of 18,000 tons, representing 35 per cent. of the total, were acquired by Hungary. The necessary sulphur was obtained from Rumanian pyrites mines located at Baia Mare and Baia Sprie in N. Transylvania, acquired by Hungary in 1940. Since that date supplies have been derived from Fundul Moldovei, Zam, Sacaramb and Altan Tepe, though not in sufficient quantities to cover requirements. Shortage of sulphuric acid has been partly eased by imports from Italy.

The alkali production is normally sufficient to yield a surplus for export. Rock salt, of which there is an important domestic production, forms the basis of the alkali industry.

Salt Production

	metric tons
1939	374,000
1940	323,000
1941*	267,000

* Reduced 1941 production is due to loss of salt mines to Hungary at Ocna Sugatag, Ocna Dejului and elsewhere.

385 Soda ash is made solely by the Solvay Company at Ocna-Mureşului, where the annual capacity of the plant is estimated at 50,000 metric tons. Caustic soda is made by the Solvay Company and by S. A. Nitrogen at Dicio Sân Martin. Production of alkali in 1939 and 1942 (estimated) was :—

	1939	1942
Soda ash ..	38,000	40,000
Caustic soda ..	11,800	15,000

Requirements of hydrochloric acid were about 3,000 to 3,500 metric tons a year, and were completely met by home production. Production of sodium sulphate, a by-product in the manufacture of hydrochloric acid, amounted to 2,650 metric tons in 1939.

The most important sulphate made in Rumania before the war was that of copper, production of which averaged 5,700 metric tons between 1933 and 1936, increasing to 12,400 tons in 1937. The chief producers were the Mărăşeşti and the Phœnix chemical works (the latter in ceded territory).

[439] There is at present an acute shortage of copper sulphate, the loss of which as a fungicide is particularly felt. Germany is reported to have supplied small quantities in return for exports of copper scrap.

652 quate means at their disposal they yet succeeded in achieving a certain measure of success, and notwithstanding the tremendous difficulties with which they had to cope. Some of the issues demanding attention were the reorganization of the administrative machinery in the newly-annexed territories, the complete overhauling of means of communication, the readjustment of agriculture, the reconstruction of the oil industry, which had greatly suffered during the war, and the necessity of providing for the needs of the army owing to the exposed geographical position of the country.

RUMANIA'S ECONOMIC POLICY

186 454 Until the advent to power in 1928 of the National Peasant Party under M. Maniu, the policy of the country was inspired by an uncompromising nationalism that tended to the complete exclusion of foreign capital so necessary for the development of Rumania. The chief instigators of this policy were the late brothers John and Vintila Bratianu, who had raised the maxim "prin noi însine" (by ourselves alone) to the sanctity of a religious dogma. The governments that had succeeded each other since the conclusion of the war, with the exception of the one presided over by M. Vaida-Voevod, were either formed by the Bratianu, or so-called Liberal Party, or by some nominees of theirs who were quite amenable to their views, so that a certain sequence in the policy pursued may be detected throughout this period, in spite of the change of persons at the helm of the State, while any divergence in their pronouncements from the original programme may be explained by the desire to allay the mistrust engendered by the Bratianu policy. The principal aim of this policy was the attainment of self-sufficiency through the industrialization of the country. This found expression in extensive legislation dealing with the development of national resources, the chief enactment being the special mining law promulgated in July, 1924.

382 471 315 The subsoil resources had already been declared national property, and the special mining law, which was aimed par-

ticularly at the oil industry, prescribed the manner in which 471
they were to be exploited. The development of these re- 315
sources was to be entrusted to corporations or "régies" in 382
which the Government as well as private capital, both
Rumanian and foreign, would participate, but in such a
way as to permit of the majority of shares being controlled
by the Rumanian Government. At the same time[1] laws were 375
enacted for increasing the utilization of methane gas (C.H.4) 471
which was already in use both for lighting and heating 665
purposes in Transylvania, and which is available as a large
source of industrial power, its output being calculated to
amount to as much as 2,000 million cubic metres per annum,
the consumption of which for 1930 reached over 503 million
c. metres. The methods used by the Liberal Party to secure
a mainhold of the supplies of methane gas are particularly
illuminating of the mentality of the leaders of that party, as
they were revealed by M. Madgearu in the Rumanian Cham-
ber in 1929. An exclusive monopoly was conferred on a
group of "Liberals," who supplied the gas to industrialists
at arbitrary prices so as to force the latter out of the market
and leave this to rival firms belonging to adepts of the
"Liberal" Party. All the efforts of the Liberal Party to
promote the nationalization of this gas were aimed at secur-
ing the economic mastery of Transylvanian industries. A 376
similar law was also passed dealing with water power, the 471
reserves of which are estimated at 5,206,225 H.P., of which 665
amount 735,425 h.p. represent 50 per cent of the force pro-
duced at the Iron Gates by the Danube, 1,422,465 h.p. by
the tributaries of the Theiss, 2,164,748 h.p. by the Danube
tributaries between the Timish and the Sereth, and the re-
maining 884,665 h.p. by the Sereth and its tributaries. Of
all this potential force only about 52,000 h.p. is actually in
use. The State owned practically the totality of the railway 655
lines, most of the extensive fisheries in the marshes and delta
of the Danube, the salt mines of Ocnele Mari, Slanic, Uioara
and Targu Ocna, which are exploited as a State monopoly
and assure to it a revenue of some 700 million lei per annum,
over 75 per cent of the entire vast timberlands, several coal
and iron mines, the gold mines in the Bihor mountains, the
annual output of which is about 2,500 to 3,000 kilogrammes

[1] [July, 1924--Analyst]

The following table shows a detailed list of imports during 1930:

439

INDUSTRY

Imports	Tons.	Percentage of total bulk.	Value in 1,000 lei.	Percentage of total value.
Livestock	296	0.04	16,439	0.07
Animal food products	10,240	1.32	221,872	0.98
Furs	120	0.02	244,046	1.08
Leather and leather goods ...	3,309	0.43	485,519	2.15
Wool, hair and goods ...	5,907	0.76	1,365,991	9.06
Natural silk and goods ...	47	0.01	86,746	0.39
Various animal substances ...	3,977	0.51	156,554	0.70
Cereals and derivatives ...	29,802	3.85	306,702	1.36
Seeds	4,133	0.54	113,976	0.51
Vegetable oils	2,331	0.30	96,980	0.43
Vegetables, flowers, etc. ...	9,713	1.26	221,084	0.98
Fruit and groceries	33,315	4.31	818,244	3.63
Beverages	240	0.03	8,422	0.04
Sugar and confectionery ...	1,248	0.16	16,975	0.07
Vegetable textiles	49,592	6.41	6,702,290	29.73
Timber and derivatives ...	13,538	1.75	146,850	0.65
Paper and derivatives ...	13.561	1.75	524,469	2.34
Rubber celluloid & derivatives	8,183	1.05	740,386	3.28
Mineral waters and salts ...	900	0.13	8,355	0.04
Glassware	2,464	0.32	161,939	0.72
Earths, stones and derivatives	83,542	10.80	473,880	2.10
Fuel (mineral) and derivatives	180,841	23.37	302,589	1.34
Iron and ironware	236,723	30.59	3,442,482	15.28
Apparatus, machines & motors	34,604	4.47	2,836,640	12.58
Vehicles	8,539	1.10	638,734	2.83
Metals and metalloids other than iron	12,473	1.61	868,706	3.86
Toys	215	0.03	40,836	0.18
Musical instruments ...	472	0.06	139,055	0.62
Optical instruments	126	0.01	101,446	0.45
Watches and clocks	153	0.02	77,480	0.34
Jewellery	73	0.01	41,410	0.18
Chemicals and medicines ...	14,673	1.89	606,471	2.69
Perfumery	47	0.01	48,744	0.21
Colours and varnishes ...	7,620	0.89	373,402	1.66
Explosives	728	0.99	105,215	0.47
Totals	7,737,745	100.00	22,540,929	100.00

OIL & MINING INDUSTRIES

In spite of the continuous increase in the output of crude oil (the output for 1931 amounting to 48 million barrels), the industry is facing a most critical situation owing to the Russian competition and low world prices, excessive transport charges, and high taxation. Notwithstanding these adverse factors, however, the output of oil is steadily increasing, Rumania now being the fourth largest producer of petroleum, as may be seen from the following table:

315
382

N

RUMANIA

315
382

Production in millions of barrels

	1931	1930	1929
U.S.A.	856	898	1007
Russia	158	135	99
Venezuela	118	137	137
Rumania	48	42	35
Persia	47	45	42

315 According to a report published by the *Adeverul* of Janu-
382 ary 21st, 1932, of which a summary is given below, there
651 are no signs of an early improvement:

"The recent abrogation of the law extending certain subsidies to small producers has created much dissatisfaction, for this enactment, while rescinding the advantages already granted, maintained taxes recently imposed. Only a few of the producers who possessed refineries of their own had so far been able to secure the subsidies that the law had allocated to them, and that only indirectly, as they have been simply credited with these sums, which they will eventually be allowed to use against payment of taxes to the State. As the situation of the public finances is unsatisfactory, one can scarcely hope that these subsidies will be paid out shortly to the rest of the producers.

315 Another question which preoccupies the industry is the
382 marketing of the heavy oil residues, the output of which in 1930 amounted to 1,959,371 metric tons. Though this residue constitutes an excellent fuel, its manipulation is difficult and necessitates a large expenditure for the construction of special receptacles. Some companies, in order to get rid of their accumulated big stocks, had recourse to a new method, that of destroying them by fire. This is a disastrous solution for all concerned, and many members of the industrial community affirm that the problem could be solved if our railway administration would reduce its transport charges, so as to permit the marketing of this product abroad at the prevailing world prices. As the railway administration, however, refuses to make concessions in the matter, the oil companies see no other solution than to construct a new special pipe-line to Constantsa, though this scheme meets with violent opposition from railway circles. . . ."

OIL AND MINING INDUSTRIES

The above article shows how erroneous were the views of the late V. Bratianu in decreeing the nationalization of the oil deposits in order to prevent foreign companies from sharing in the development of the oil industry. The native producers, being without adequate capital resources, have been unable to take advantage of the benefits the mining law meant to reserve for them. They have undoubtedly contributed in increasing the crude oil output, but on the other hand, not possessing the means either to provide for its refining or its marketing, they have only contributed towards creating a glut on the market which is disastrous to themselves, but which unfortunately also affects adversely, though to a lesser degree, the foreign companies in Rumania. 315 382

Yet it could easily have been foreseen that an increase in the crude oil output would necessitate the expenditure of large sums of money for the construction of refineries, storage tanks, pipe-lines, tank-wagons, etc., all of which would have to be secured from abroad, seeing that the financial resources of Rumania were utterly inadequate to cope with the demands which were made on them from all sides. The [489] scheme for the construction of a second pipe-line from the oil-fields to Constantsa, mooted by the companies, has been definitely rejected owing to the intervention of the railway administration, which naturally wanted to reserve as much as possible of the transport of the oil for itself. It has offered to grant increased transport facilities for oil, but it is very doubtful whether it will be able to fulfil its promises, because the bridge over the Danube at Cernavoda carries only a single track and its carrying capacity is limited. The construction of a second pipe-line to Constantsa therefore seems to be indispensable. The one already existing between Ploeşti and Constantsa has a total length of 320 km. Some 3,000 tons of oil may be pumped through it in 24 hours, and in 1931 the total quantity of motor oil conveyed through this pipe-line amounted to 753,000 tons. Another pipe-line exists between Ploeşti and Giurgiu, on the Danube, 180 km. in length, but the main port by which petroleum products are exported is Constantsa. In 1931, 3,926,247 tons were shipped from that port.

The principal oilfields extend in a semi-circular strip on the

315 southern slopes of the bend of the Carpathians, where the
382 mountains gradually merge into the plains of Wallachia and Moldavia. About two-thirds of the production is secured from the regions of Moreni and Ochiuri, the basins of the rivers Prahova and Dombovitsa furnishing almost 90 per cent of the total yield. There are minor fields farther east in the neighbourhood of Buzau, and also in Moldavia in the region of Bacau. The main oil refineries are situated at Ploeşti. The capital invested in the oil industry is estimated at 11 milliard lei, 60 per cent of which is Rumanian. The number of workmen employed in the industry is about 30,000. The output of crude oil for the years 1928–30 was:

Year	*Tons*	*Estimated value in lei*
1928	4,282,377	7,345,923,066
1929	4,836,974	7,441,204,190
1930	5,792,311	6,552,118,582

About half of the yield was from oilfields owned by the State. The ratio for 1930 was 3,083,468 tons from State-
[47] owned oilfields, or 53.20 per cent, and 2,708,843 tons, or 46.80 per cent, from privately-owned oilfields. The quantities produced were distributed per region as follows: Prahova, 4,275,721 tons; Dambovița, 1,390,215 tons; Buzau, 61,225 tons; Bacau, 65,150 tons.

Of the total output for 1930, some 1,602,757 tons were consumed locally. At the end of June, 1932, it was reported that the total monthly output had attained about 543,000 tons, the average monthly production of the principal companies being as follows: Astra Romana, 109,464 tons; Steaua Romana, 83,667 tons; Concordia, 78,974 tons; Creditul Minier, 27,760 tons; Romano-Americana, 33,800 tons; Phoenix, 65,286 tons; Prahova, 20,878 tons; and Columbia, 17,564 tons.

315 Prices of petroleum products having dropped to the extent
484 of 75 per cent since 1928, the Rumanian oil industry is pass-
232 ing through an era of grave depression which is causing a very serious repercussion on the whole economic life of the country, taking into account the great amount of capital in-

vested in it and the high contribution it is expected to make to the revenue of the State. The average price in lei of petroleum products per ton during the years 1928–31 were as follows, as reported by the Constantsa *Chamber of Commerce Bulletin*: 1928, at 4,080; 1929, at 3,800; 1930, at 2,600; 1931, at 1,031 lei. The following table, which gives quotations of the leading oil shares on the Bucarest stock market, is indicative of the depression which exists:

Average annual quotations

Share	1929	1930	*June* 1931	*June* 1932
Astra Romana ...	2391	1430	500	340
Steaua Romana ...	1234	571	230	135
Speranța	1210	639	380	100
Petrol Block ...	320	176	75	54
Concordia	1286	767	265	250
Creditul Minier ...	690	364	185	90
Redevența	321	182	65	30
I.R.D.P.	397	143	92	35

The other mineral resources of Rumania are considerable, especially in Transylvania, but no proper geological survey has ever been made, nor have any mines other than salt mines ever been properly exploited. The following figures give the quantities of minerals mined during 1930, the total value of the same being estimated at 10,437 million lei: Lignite, 2,071,057 tons; coal, 298,825 tons; copper, 6,655 tons and 169; iron, 92,517 tons; manganese, 33,528 tons; bauxite, 678 tons; pyrites, 24,264 tons; amber, 107 tons; salt, 304,777 tons; lead and antimony, 984 tons; lead glaze, 194 tons; gold, 2,672 kilograms, silver, 4.418 kilograms.

Lignite is found in extensive beds not only in Transylvania and the Banat but also in the old kingdom. It is mainly used for the railways. The better qualities of coal are found in south-western Transylvania and the Banat. Copper is principally mined at Tulcea, near the mouth of the Danube, and at Ciuc in Transylvania.

B. THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

1. Oil Production

315 There are four districts in which oil production is centred. Prahova, Dâmboviţa, Buzău and Bacău, while the town of Ploeşti is the hub of the oil industry. In 1938 out of a total production of 6·6 million tons, the Prahova district produced 3·98 million tons—2·78 from private and 1·2 from State concessions; Dâmboviţa produced 2·54 million tons, two-thirds of which came from State concessions; Buzău and Bacău produced only some 40,000 tons each. In 1941 Prahova production had dropped from 3·9 to 3·4 million tons; Dâmboviţa from 2·5 to 1·7 million tons, production from Buzău and from Bacău remaining unchanged.

[382] The wells are connected by pipeline with the refineries, all but three of which are in Ploeşti; even at the time of peak production in 1936 Rumanian refining capacity was sufficient to take care of all the crude oil production of the country. The total refinery capacity in 1938 was over 10 million tons including nearly 2 million tons of cracking capacity, but of the total capacity probably not more than half is of modern design.

2. Consumption and Exports

315 439 The following table indicates internal consumption and exports in 1938, when crude production was 6·6 million tons. Exports were made to all countries in Europe including over 700,000 tons to Germany, over 500,000 tons each to the United Kingdom and to Italy, nearly 300,000 tons each to France and Czechoslovakia, and some 400,000 tons to North Africa, of which 280,000 tons to Egypt.

1938

Internal Consumption and Exports

	Internal Consumption	*Exports*	
	'000 tons		
Crude oil ..	—	336	
Motor spirit ..	154	1,586	
Kerosine ..	182	827	74% via Constanţa.
Gas/Diesel oil ..	117	755	
Fuel oil	1,001	917	20% via Giurgiu.
Special fuel oil*	131	—	
Lubricants ..	24	41	
Wax, asphalt, etc.	64	30	

* Mainly for central heating.

315 Nearly 70 per cent. of internal consumption was therefore represented by fuel and special fuel oil, and this figure shows the extent to which industrial and domestic plant have been built up on the basis of burning fuel oil, and the dependence of the country on adequate supplies of fuel oil for its essential services. In this dependence will be seen some explanation of the fact that Rumania is one of the few countries in the world whose internal consumption of oil for non-military purposes has not declined in war-time.

The main consumers of fuel oil and special fuel oil were as follows:—

	Tons
Railways	195,000
Shipping Services	90,000
Industries	419,000
Power Stations..	160,000
Central Heating	148,000
Agriculture and Peasant Mills	19,000

[13c]

315
473
439

TABLE III

PRINCIPAL RUMANIAN OIL COMPANIES, 1942

Name	Founded	Capital (mill. lei)	1940 Crude Production (tons)	Controlling interest
Astra Română	1910	2,542	1,173,256	Royal Dutch Shell
Concordia	1907	2,030	793,626	Kontinental Oel A.G.
Româno-Americana	1904	1,500	727,345	Standard Oil of New Jersey
Steaua Română	1895	1,500	640,920	French, Rumanian, British
Unirea	1921	720	652,000	General Mining Corporation
Columbia	1905	380	585,193	Kontinental Oel A.G.
Creditul Minier	1919	605	292,166	Rumanian
Prahova	1920	330	271,947	A.G.I.P. (Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli)
I.R.D.P. (Industria Romana de Petrol)	1920	120	117,925	Sudostchemie Hand. A.G. German
Petrolul Românesc	1920	120	83,377	Creditul Minier, Rumanian
Starnaphtha	1926	60	55,530	French
Foraj Lemoine	1923	44	42,658	Rumanian, Franco-Belgian
Redevenţa	1918	300	28,474	Rumanian
Foraky Româneasca ..	1922	50	25,958	German
Sondrum	1921	100	17,982	French
Petrol Block	1918	470	—	German (refining company)

TABLE IV

PRINCIPAL RUMANIAN REFINERIES

382
473

Name	Location	Annual Capacity (tons)	Cracking Capacity (tons)
Astra Română	Ploeşti	1,750,000	600,000
Steaua Română	Câmpina	1,500,000	350,000
Concordia	Ploeşti	1,300,000	200,000
Română-Americano	Ploeşti	1,100,000	350,000
Phoenix Unirea Orion	Ploeşti	800,000	150,000
Standard Petrol Block	Ploeşti	550,000	150,000
Creditul Minier	Brazi	530,000	150,000
Colombia	Ploeşti	485,000	260,000
Unirea Speranţa	Ploeşti	400,000	—
Redevenţa	Ploeşti	230,000	—
Prahova	Bucarest	200,000	—
Lumina (Petrolmina)	Ploeşti	140,000	—
Noris	Ploeşti	50,000	—

389 met by the Axis. The chief products made in the country are mining explosives and nitro-cellulose powder.

B. THE RUBBER INDUSTRY

•383 Taking Axis Europe as a whole, the Rumanian rubber industry is of little importance. There is manufacturing capacity for motor tyres located at Floresti and at a much smaller plant at Brasov. The total number of workers employed in normal years was about 4–5,000, a large number of these being engaged on footwear manufacture, which was the chief product of the industry.

1. Raw Materials

Rumanian requirements of raw rubber had been increasing steadily in pre-war years until in 1938 they amounted to over 2,000 tons all of which were imported from British Malaya and the Netherlands Indies. It is probable that several firms produced reclaimed rubber for use in their own factories. Some of the scrap for this purpose would be of domestic origin. Import figures in metric tons were :— [439]

	1936	1937	1938
Crude rubber	1,273	1,835	2,066
Reclaim	181	214	33
Waste and scrap	305	581	506

Rumania had a small production of soft carbon black of the type suitable for miscellaneous uses, but there was no production of the hard carbon black necessary for tyre manufacture. This and other requirements of rubber chemicals would normally be obtained from the U.S.A., the U.K. and Germany. Supplies of sulphur were imported from Italy and Germany.

2. Principal Factories

The Rumania rubber industry comprises a large number of concerns producing footwear and general rubber goods, in addition to two factories concerned mainly with tyre manufacture. The larger tyre plant is owned by Banloc A.G., a company founded in 1937 with a capital of 200 million lei and supplied with technical assistance by Goodrich, U.S.A. The plant, located at Floreşti, was only completed in 1939. Its estimated raw rubber requirements were 2,500 tons per annum, and it has the capacity to produce 6,000 motor and truck tyres monthly, sufficient to cover 75 per cent. of normal Rumanian requirements. This capacity included some plant for making aircraft tyres. The other plant which produces tyres is on a much smaller scale, and is owned by Fabrica de Cauciuc at Braşov, with a normal capacity of 10–20 truck tyres daily.

According to the latest information, both these tyre plants were still in production at the beginning of 1943, when Banloc were reported to be producing between 100 and 200 motor tyres daily with technical assistance from Continental, Hanover, while the Braşov plant was producing 12 to 15 lorry tyres daily with technical assistance from Semperit, Vienna.

3. Imports

383 439 The chief item of imports in pre-war years was motor tyres, amounting to between 800 and 900 tons per annum. Since at that time Rumania possessed virtually no capacity for producing any of her own requirements, this figure approximately represents normal domestic needs. Footwear requirements, on the other hand, were normally almost covered by the large and expanding domestic output, so that imports were unimportant.

[35a]

383
[439]

The figures of imports in 1938 in metric tons were as follows :—

Motor tyres	867
Motor tubes	60
Rubber footwear	221
Soft rubber (unvulcanised) ..	32
Rubber solution	27
Miscellaneous	173

4. Synthetic Rubber

It is planned to erect a plant with a capacity of 3,000 tons per annum in co-operation with German interest and using natural gas as the raw material. There is a second plan by independent interests to erect another plant at Ploesti using natural gas or oil as a starting point. Both these projects, however, are as yet in their initial stages and Rumania is, at present, entirely dependent on Germany for supplies of synthetic rubber.

[249]

5. Cultivation of Rubber-bearing Plants

Rumania has been experimenting with the planting of *Kok Saghys* or Russian dandelion. During 1942 an area of 180 hectares (450 acres) was planted, which it is estimated will eventually yield between 20 and 30 tons of rubber. It is planned to increase the planted area in 1943, but it will be some time before any results of these measures will help substantially to alleviate the Rumanian supply position.

[439]

6. Present Position (July, 1943)

Although Rumania has sufficient manufacturing capacity to supply most of her essential needs, she lacks supplies of raw materials. The industry is dependent upon Germany for supplies of synthetic rubber and some of her essential requirements of manufactured goods for her armed forces, such as aircraft tyres and some heavy truck tyres, are also being supplied by Germany.

C. HIDES, SKINS AND LEATHER

(I.) Pre-War Period

1. General

237

Rumania's plentiful supply of livestock places her in a comparatively favourable position for hides, skins and leather and the pre-war slaughterings were approximately as follows :—

	'000 Head
Cattle	487
Calves	500
Horses	100
Buffaloes	32
Sheep	1,374
Goats	100
Pigs	708

Of the leather produceable from the above animals, cattle, horse and buffalo are the most important, being used to a large extent in the manufacture of sole leather, which is the backbone of the industry.

237
439

Rumania is not entirely self-supporting, although home-production enables her to restrict imports to a minimum. Imports and exports in 1937 were as follows :—

	Imports	*Exports*
	tons	
Hides of cattle (including calf and horse)	2,930	Nil.
Other hides and skins (including sheep and pig skins) ..	340	558
Leather (including waste)	92	416

[35b]

A. THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

381 Though the chemical industry of Rumania ranks lowest among the chief industries on the basis of production value, it is better and more comprehensively developed than in the other south-east European countries. Production is chiefly confined to heavy chemicals manufactured largely from indigenous raw materials. Most of the factories are situated in Valachia, Transylvania, and around Timişoara in the Banat.

1. Acids and Alkalis

●385 317 Rumania produced annually 45,000 metric tons of sulphuric acid, which was sufficient to cover the pre-war requirements of the country, which were mostly for the refining of mineral oil. The manufacture was in the hands of some six firms, of which the chief producer was the Mărăşeşti S.A.R., with plants at Mărăşeşti, Valea Călugăreascĕ and Braşov. Three of the smaller plants producing sulphuric acid with a total annual capacity of 18,000 tons, representing 35 per cent. of the total, were acquired by Hungary. The necessary sulphur was obtained from Rumanian pyrites mines located at Baia Mare and Baia Sprie in N. Transylvania, acquired by Hungary in 1940. Since that date supplies have been derived from Fundul Moldovei, Zam, Sacaramb and Altan Tepe, though not in sufficient quantities to cover requirements. Shortage of sulphuric acid has been partly eased by imports from Italy.

The alkali production is normally sufficient to yield a surplus for export. Rock salt, of which there is an important domestic production, forms the basis of the alkali industry.

Salt Production

			metric tons
1939	..	..	374,000
1940	..	..	323,000
1941*	..	..	267,000

* Reduced 1941 production is due to loss of salt mines to Hungary at Ocna Sugatag, Ocna Dejului and elsewhere.

385 Soda ash is made solely by the Solvay Company at Ocna-Mureşului, where the annual capacity of the plant is estimated at 50,000 metric tons. Caustic soda is made by the Solvay Company and by S. A. Nitrogen at Dicio Sân Martin. Production of alkali in 1939 and 1942 (estimated) was :—

		1939	1942
Soda ash	..	38,000	40,000
Caustic soda	..	11,800	15,000

Requirements of hydrochloric acid were about 3,000 to 3,500 metric tons a year, and were completely met by home production. Production of sodium sulphate, a by-product in the manufacture of hydrochloric acid, amounted to 2,650 metric tons in 1939.

The most important sulphate made in Rumania before the war was that of copper, production of which averaged 5,700 metric tons between 1933 and 1936, increasing to 12,400 tons in 1937. The chief producers were the Mărăşeşti and the Phœnix chemical works (the latter in ceded territory).

[439] There is at present an acute shortage of copper sulphate, the loss of which as a fungicide is particularly felt. Germany is reported to have supplied small quantities in return for exports of copper scrap.

2. Fertilisers

387 Since the consumption of chemical fertilisers in Rumania is one of the lowest among the European countries, their production is comparatively small.

Synthetic nitrogen compounds are manufactured by the S.A. Nitrogen at Dicio São Martin, where the company has a small Fauser synthetic ammonia plant and a calcium cyanamide works. No recent reliable data exists regarding output, but before the war the Fauser plant is stated to have treated 200 metric tons of nitrogen annually, and the production of cyanamide amounted to about 500 metric tons. The quantity of superphosphate manufactured averaged about 8,000 tons before the war. Owing to the cutting-off of supplies of rock phosphate, production of superphosphate is now probably nil. There was no domestic production of potash salts, and pre-war imports were very small.

3. Wood-Distillation Products

314 385 This industry is almost entirely controlled by Margina Reşiţa destilariile de lemn unite S.A.R., Timişoara. Prior to the outbreak of the war about 170,000 tons of beech wood were worked per year. The following is a list of some of the products obtained, showing the average annual tonnage produced :—

Wood charcoal	31,000
Methanol	2,000
Calcium acetate	1,400
Acetic acid	50
Formaldehyde	130
Acetone and derivatives ..	1,100

4. Soap and Glycerine

388 389 Rumania is an important producer of sunflower, rape and pumpkin seeds, and has, therefore, an ample supply of oil for her soap industry. The production of soap amounts to 33,000 tons and is in the hands of several factories, the only one of which is of striking importance being Stella S.A. of Bucarest. Glycerine production, which is a by-product of the soap industry, amounted to 350 tons, most of which was utilised by the explosives industry. Since the war the quality of the soap has markedly deteriorated. Though the present ration of 250 grams per head per month is a fairly generous one, it is not fully met and distribution is very bad. The production of glycerine is estimated to have fallen to about 200 tons, while imports amounted to 160 tons in 1941 compared with an average of about 240 tons in 1936-1938.

5. Paints and Varnish

386 The paint and varnish industry, in which some 60 small firms are engaged, is sufficiently well developed to meet—under normal conditions—the greater part of Rumanian requirements in this particular sphere. The industry is, however, still dependent to some extent on imports of oil paints.

6. Pharmaceuticals

278 Production of pharmaceuticals is on a very small scale, being sufficient to meet only about one-third of requirements, the remainder being covered by imports, mainly from Germany.

7. Explosives

339 The explosives industry is quite inadequate to cover wartime requirements, and these have to be

[34c]

233
231 the main flock being taken direct to the sheds on the foothills where they are fed on the hay gathered during the summer, whereas the remainder are grazed on the maize stubble until about Christmas. By then the weather becomes rather severe, and although sheep are better able than cows to withstand the rigours of a continental winter they are all kept in sheds during the early months of the year.

SURPLUS ANIMALS are disposed of at the autumn fairs at Tulgheş or Topliţa where they are bought up by dealers for conveyance to Italy or Czechoslovakia.

III. OTHER OCCUPATIONS

TEXTILES.

291 THE OUTSTANDING FEATURE of the Carpathian villages is the
286 remarkably high standard of peasant craftsmanship. The degree of artistic expression revealed in their clothing is particularly striking, and although best seen on festive occasions it is scarcely less noticeable in their ordinary working garb. Wool, flax and hemp are the traditional fibres used, but imported cotton yarn is beginning to displace linen for some of the lighter summer garments. Most of the dyestuffs are obtained from local plants, for example, red from the leaves of the wild crab apple, yellow from the osier, [284] black from the alder or birch and fawn from the walnut, but imported dyes are beginning to be employed. The mordant used is salt, but colours other than black fix themselves in wool without salt treatment.

462 SPINNING with a distaff is the normal occupation of the women in their leisure time during the summer, very little knitting being done at all. The other processes of combing, weaving and dyeing are also undertaken by the women, as is the embroidering of dresses and household linen, but the embroidering of the sheepskin waistcoats which are worn by both sexes is done by one or two men who specialise in this craft (see Plate XV).

LEATHER.

295 ALTHOUGH still made in the village, the old type of laced shoe with its characteristically pointed toe is being displaced

2. Fertilisers

387 Since the consumption of chemical fertilisers in Rumania is one of the lowest among the European countries, their production is comparatively small.

Synthetic nitrogen compounds are manufactured by the S.A. Nitrogen at Dicio San Martin, where the company has a small Fauser synthetic ammonia plant and a calcium cyanamide works. No recent reliable data exists regarding output, but before the war the Fauser plant is stated to have treated 200 metric tons of nitrogen annually, and the production of cyanamide amounted to about 500 metric tons. The quantity of superphosphate manufactured averaged about 8,000 tons before the war. Owing to the cutting-off of supplies of rock phosphate, production of superphosphate is now probably nil. There was no domestic production of potash salts, and pre-war imports were very small.

3. Wood-Distillation Products

314 This industry is almost entirely controlled by
385 Societatea Reşiţa destilarile de lemn unite S.A.R., Timişoara. Prior to the outbreak of the war about 170,000 tons of beech wood were worked per year. The following is a list of some of the products obtained, showing the average annual tonnage produced :—

Wood charcoal	31,000
Methanol	2,000
Calcium acetate	1,400
Acetic acid	50
Formaldehyde	130
Acetone and derivatives ..	1,100

4. Soap and Glycerine

388 Rumania is an important producer of sunflower,
389 rape and pumpkin seeds, and has, therefore, an ample supply of oil for her soap industry. The production of soap amounts to 33,000 tons and is in the hands of several factories, the only one of which is of striking importance being Stella S.A. of Bucarest. Glycerine production, which is a by-product of the soap industry, amounted to 350 tons, most of which was utilised by the explosives industry. Since the war the quality of the soap has markedly deteriorated. Though the present ration of 250 grams per head per month is a fairly generous one, it is not fully met and distribution is very bad. The production of glycerine is estimated to have fallen to about 200 tons, while imports amounted to 100 tons in 1941 compared with an average of about 240 tons in 1936-1938.

5. Paints and Varnish

386 The paint and varnish industry, in which some 60 small firms are engaged, is sufficiently well developed to meet—under normal conditions—the greater part of Rumanian requirements in this particular sphere. The industry is, however, still dependent to some extent on imports of oil paints.

6. Pharmaceuticals

278 Production of pharmaceuticals is on a very small scale, being sufficient to meet only about one-third of requirements, the remainder being covered by imports, mainly from Germany.

7. Explosives

389 The explosives industry is quite inadequate to cover wartime requirements, and these have to be

2. Fertilisers

387 Since the consumption of chemical fertilisers in Rumania is one of the lowest among the European countries, their production is comparatively small.

Synthetic nitrogen compounds are manufactured by the S.A. Nitrogen at Dicio-San Martin, where the company has a small Fauser synthetic ammonia plant and a calcium cyanamide works. No recent reliable data exists regarding output, but before the war the Fauser plant is stated to have treated 200 metric tons of nitrogen annually, and the production of cyanamide amounted to about 500 metric tons. The quantity of superphosphate manufactured averaged about 8,000 tons before the war. Owing to the cutting-off of supplies of rock phosphate, production of superphosphate is now probably nil. There was no domestic production of potash salts, and pre-war imports were very small.

3. Wood-Distillation Products

314 385 This industry is almost entirely controlled by Societatea Regia destilarilor de lemn unite S.A.R., Timisoara. Prior to the outbreak of the war about 170,000 tons of beech wood were worked per year. The following is a list of some of the products obtained, showing the average annual tonnage produced :—

Wood charcoal	31,000
Methanol	2,000
Calcium acetate	1,400
Acetic acid	50
Formaldehyde	130
Acetone and derivatives ..	1,100

4. Soap and Glycerine

388 389 Rumania is an important producer of sunflower, rape and pumpkin seeds, and has, therefore, an ample supply of oil for her soap industry. The production of soap amounts to 33,000 tons and is in the hands of several factories, the only one of which is of striking importance being Stella S.A. of Bucarest. Glycerine production, which is a by-product of the soap industry, amounted to 350 tons, most of which was utilised by the explosives industry. Since the war the quality of the soap has markedly deteriorated. Though the present ration of 250 grams per head per month is a fairly generous one, it is not fully met and distribution is very bad. The production of glycerine is estimated to have fallen to about 200 tons, while imports amounted to 160 tons in 1941 compared with an average of about 240 tons in 1936-1938.

5. Paints and Varnish

386 The paint and varnish industry, in which some 60 small firms are engaged, is sufficiently well developed to meet—under normal conditions—the greater part of Rumanian requirements in this particular sphere. The industry is, however, still dependent to some extent on imports of oil paints.

6. Pharmaceuticals

278 Production of pharmaceuticals is on a very small scale, being sufficient to meet only about one-third of requirements, the remainder being covered by imports, mainly from Germany.

7. Explosives

389 The explosives industry is quite inadequate to cover wartime requirements, and these have to be

2. Fertilisers

387 Since the consumption of chemical fertilisers in Rumania is one of the lowest among the European countries, their production is comparatively small.

Synthetic nitrogen compounds are manufactured by the S.A. Nitrogen at Dicio San Martin, where the company has a small Fauser synthetic ammonia plant and a calcium cyanamide works. No recent reliable data exists regarding output, but before the war the Fauser plant is stated to have treated 200 metric tons of nitrogen annually, and the production of cyanamide amounted to about 900 metric tons. The quantity of superphosphate manufactured averaged about 8,000 tons before the war. Owing to the cutting-off of supplies of rock phosphate, production of superphosphate is now probably nil. There was no domestic production of potash salts, and pre-war imports were very small.

3. Wood-Distillation Products

314 This industry is almost entirely controlled by
385 Marzina Resita destilarile de lemn unite S.A.R., Timisoara. Prior to the outbreak of the war about 170,000 tons of beech wood were worked per year. The following is a list of some of the products obtained, showing the average annual tonnage produced :—

Wood charcoal	..	..	31,000
Methanol	..	..	2,000
Calcium acetate	..	..	1,400
Acetic acid	..	..	50
Formaldehyde	..	..	130
Acetone and derivatives		..	1,100

4. Soap and Glycerine

388 Rumania is an important producer of sunflower,
389 rape and pumpkin seeds, and has, therefore, an ample supply of oil for her soap industry. The production of soap amounts to 33,000 tons and is in the hands of several factories, the only one of which is of striking importance being Stella S.A. of Bucarest. Glycerine production, which is a by-product of the soap industry, amounted to 350 tons, most of which was utilised by the explosives industry. Since the war the quality of the soap has markedly deteriorated. Though the present ration of 250 grams per head per month is a fairly generous one, it is not fully met and distribution is very bad. The production of glycerine is estimated to have fallen to about 200 tons, while imports amounted to 180 tons in 1941 compared with an average of about 240 tons in 1936-1938.

5. Paints and Varnish

386 The paint and varnish industry, in which some 60 small firms are engaged, is sufficiently well developed to meet—under normal conditions—the greater part of Rumanian requirements in this particular sphere. The industry is, however, still dependent to some extent on imports of oil paints.

6. Pharmaceuticals

278 Production of pharmaceuticals is on a very small scale, being sufficient to meet only about one-third of requirements, the remainder being covered by imports, mainly from Germany.

7. Explosives

389 The explosives industry is quite inadequate to cover wartime requirements, and these have to be

2. Fertilisers

387 Since the consumption of chemical fertilisers in Rumania is one of the lowest among the European countries, their production is comparatively small.

Synthetic nitrogen compounds are manufactured by the S.A. Nitrogen at Dicio São Martin, where the company has a small Fauser synthetic ammonia plant and a calcium cyanamide works. No recent reliable data exists regarding output, but before the war the Fauser plant is stated to have treated 200 metric tons of nitrogen annually, and the production of cyanamide amounted to about 500 metric tons. The quantity of superphosphate manufactured averaged about 8,000 tons before the war. Owing to the cutting-off of supplies of rock phosphate, production of superphosphate is now probably nil. There was no domestic production of potash salts, and pre-war imports were very small.

3. Wood-Distillation Products

314 This industry is almost entirely controlled by
385 Margina Reșița Fabricile de lemn unite S.A.R., Timisoara. Prior to the outbreak of the war about 170,000 tons of beech wood were worked per year. The following is a list of some of the products obtained, showing the average annual tonnage produced :—

Wood charcoal	31,000
Methanol	2,000
Calcium acetate	1,400
Acetic acid	50
Formaldehyde	130
Acetone and derivatives ..	1,100

4. Soap and Glycerine

388 Rumania is an important producer of sunflower,
389 rape and pumpkin seeds, and has, therefore, an ample supply of oil for her soap industry. The production of soap amounts to 33,000 tons and is in the hands of several factories, the only one of which is of striking importance being Stella S.A. of Bucarest. Glycerine production, which is a by-product of the soap industry, amounted to 330 tons, most of which was utilised by the explosives industry. Since the war the quality of the soap has markedly deteriorated. Though the present ration of 250 grams per head per month is a fairly generous one, it is not fully met and distribution is very bad. The production of glycerine is estimated to have fallen to about 200 tons, while imports amounted to 160 tons in 1941 compared with an average of about 240 tons in 1936-1938.

5. Paints and Varnish

386 The paint and varnish industry, in which some 60 small firms are engaged, is sufficiently well developed to meet—under normal conditions—the greater part of Rumanian requirements in this particular sphere. The industry is, however, still dependent to some extent on imports of oil paints.

6. Pharmaceuticals

278 Production of pharmaceuticals is on a very small scale, being sufficient to meet only about one-third of requirements, the remainder being covered by imports, mainly from Germany.

7. Explosives

389 The explosives industry is quite inadequate to cover wartime requirements, and these have to be

●389 met by the Axis. The chief products made in the country are mining explosives and nitro-cellulose powder.

B. THE RUBBER INDUSTRY

383 Taking Axis Europe as a whole, the Rumanian rubber industry is of little importance. There is manufacturing capacity for motor tyres located at Floresti and at a much smaller plant at Brasov. The total number of workers employed in normal years was about 4–5,000, a large number of these being engaged on footwear manufacture, which was the chief product of the industry.

1. Raw Materials

Rumanian requirements of raw rubber had been increasing steadily in pre-war years until in 1938 they amounted to over 2,000 tons all of which were imported from British Malaya and the Netherlands Indies. It is probable that several firms produced reclaimed rubber for use in their own factories. Some of the scrap for this purpose would be of domestic origin. Import figures in metric tons were :—

[439]

	1936	1937	1938
Crude rubber	1,275	1,835	2,000
Reclaim	181	214	33
Waste and scrap	305	581	500

Rumania had a small production of soft carbon black of the type suitable for miscellaneous uses, but there was no production of the hard carbon black necessary for tyre manufacture. This and other requirements of rubber chemicals would normally be obtained from the U.S.A., the U.K. and Germany. Supplies of sulphur were imported from Italy and Germany.

2. Principal Factories

The Rumania rubber industry comprises a large number of concerns producing footwear and general rubber goods, in addition to two factories concerned mainly with tyre manufacture. The larger tyre plant is owned by Banloc A.G., a company founded in 1937 with a capital of 200 million lei and supplied with technical assistance by Goodrich, U.S.A. The plant, located at Floreşti, was only completed in 1939. Its estimated raw rubber requirements were 1,500 tons per annum, and it has the capacity to produce 6,000 motor and truck tyres monthly, sufficient to cover 75 per cent. of normal Rumanian requirements. This capacity included some plant for making aircraft tyres. The other plant which produces tyres is on a much smaller scale, and is owned by Fabrica de Caucuc at Brasov, with a normal capacity of 10–20 truck tyres daily.

According to the latest information, both these tyre plants were still in production at the beginning of 1943, when Banloc were reported to be producing between 100 and 200 motor tyres daily with technical assistance from Continental, Hanover, while the Brasov plant was producing 12 to 15 lorry tyres daily with technical assistance from Semperit, Vienna.

3. Imports

383 439 The chief item of imports in pre-war years was motor tyres, amounting to between 800 and 900 tons per annum. Since at that time Rumania possessed virtually no capacity for producing any of her own requirements, this figure approximately represents normal domestic needs. Footwear requirements, on the other hand, were normally almost covered by the large and expanding domestic output, so that imports were unimportant.

543 443 WE HAVE classified the chief items observed at the fair between August 11th and 15th, 1936.

1. *Livestock.* Draught oxen, cows and calves, pigs and piglets. A few horses and goats. No sheep or fowl. The bargaining for cattle is completed when the buyer contrives to thrust a piece of silver into the hand of the seller. Acceptance of the earnest is followed by a hand-clasp.

[391] 2. *Agricultural Implements and Metal-work.*—It is said that gipsy-made metal tools were formerly displayed, but what little metal-work is now sold is factory-made and comes mostly from Czechoslovakia—cow-bells (of sheet-metal), horse-bells (of cast-metal), knives, etc. Hay-forks are gipsy-made, as are washing tubs and cradles, hollowed out of split tree trunks. Kitchen spoons are hand-carved. Wooden saddles and gipsy-made baskets and brooms may come under this head.

3. *Fruits and Vegetables.*—Tomatoes, potatoes, sweet-corn, onions, garlic, peppers, cabbage, water-melons, gherkins, aubergines, pears, apples, plums, blackberries. Also eggs and cheese.

[323] 4. *Pottery.*—The chief local craft is naturally well represented. The vessels, displayed on the ground, vary greatly in size, decoration and purpose; but they are all of brown clay, usually with simple floral patterns and debased geometrical designs in burnt sienna, yellow and green: vessels with or without lids, with or without handles, with or without spouts, glazed inside, outside, or both, in size ranging from salt-and-pepper stands to large waterpots. We find the old device of making pots in imitation of birds and animals.

[282] 5. *Leatherwork.*—Several booths display white leather sheepskin waistcoats, having the wool inside and the outside decorated with applied strips of thin orange-dyed leather embroidered usually by machine stitching, but occasionally by hand. These waistcoats are made at Curtea de Arges. Leather belts, 4 to 6 inches wide, are machine-stitched but hand-tooled; they have buckle fastenings. Bridles and saddlery. Knotted leather thongs for whips. Hempen ropes for halters are sold in this section, too. Ready-made boots and shoes. The bulk of the shoes for sale, however, are made of rubber, in the shape of the traditional pointed shoe of skin. Most of them are cut from old motor tyres, but others are now made from specially manufactured rubber strips which repeat the patterns of the tyres.

A. GENERAL ENGINEERING

1. General

392 The general engineering industries of Rumania are comparatively small, though to meet the increased demand for engineering products development has been appreciable during the last decade.

[439] Rumania is most dependent on imports for her supplies of better class types of engineering equipment, such as machine tools, and whilst receiving technical assistance from Germany, has during 1942 and 1943 been purchasing engineering equipment in increasingly large quantities from Sweden.

391 The rougher classes of engineering products, such as nails, screws, rivets, chains and wire are produced in Rumania and there are a few firms such as Acta S.A.R., and Industria de Optica

Română S.A.R., both in Bucarest, which make precision mechanical instruments; and "Flexodo" Prima Fabrica Română de garnituri pentru frane S.A., also in Bucarest, which specialises in brakes, couplings and transmission equipment. Small tools are made by a few firms, but the quality is indifferent.

The largest individual firms in Rumania concerned with general engineering production are Reşiţa, Malaxa, Lemaitre, Vulcan and Fraţii Schiel, all of whom undertake diverse production including locomotive and wagon manufacture and structural engineering and boiler construction.

Rumanian firms, such as Uzinele Metalurgice Ploeşti and Concordia S.A.R. of Ploeşti, produce certain types of oil-well machinery and equipment, but the bulk of requirements, particularly of the more specialised types, have to be imported. Before the war the U.S.A. were the principal suppliers, but since the war Rumania has become dependent on Germany for this type of machinery, and in view of the importance of oil to Germany her requirements probably receive a high priority.

2. Agricultural Machinery

Rumanian agricultural methods are backward, and the degree of mechanisation is low, caused by lack of purchasing power of the peasants and the high percentage of small holdings, which make the use of modern equipment impracticable. For this reason the production of agricultural machinery has not been very highly developed, though there has been some expansion since 1927—production of implements has trebled between 1927 and 1937. Production of agricultural machines, however, declined by about 60 per cent during the same period. Between

391 407 Between 1935 and 1937 the average annual internal sale of agricultural implements amounted to some 6,000 tons, of which two-thirds were home produced and the remainder imported. The average annual internal sale of agricultural machines during this period was 3,300 tons, of which only a fifth were home produced. Germany was the main supplier of agricultural machinery before the war, and since the outbreak of war, has continued to be so.

[437] Agricultural tractors in particular have been imported in increased quantities and it is believed that during the period 1940–1942, inclusive, some 4,000 units were imported, from Germany, as well as a few hundred from Italy.

Agricultural implements are produced in small quantities by about 15 general engineering firms, while the chief firms producing agricultural machinery are as follows :—

16: Great Britain . /G-4 (no date) 1943 EDl Rumania EDl

391
407

Name of Firm	Location	Type of Product
1. Uzinele de Fier şi Domeniile din Reşiţa S.A.	Bocşa-Romana	Threshing machines, sifters and selectors for cleaning corn, harrows, seed-sowing machines, ploughs, etc., small agricultural implements
2. Schramm, Hüttl and Schmidt, S.A.	Topleţ (district Severin)	Threshing machines, harrows, sifters and selectors for cleaning corn, ploughs, seed-sowing machines
3. Fabricile de Maşini And. Rieger, S.A.	Sibiu	Threshing machines, harrows, sifters and selectors for cleaning corn, ploughs, etc.

[25e]

A. GENERAL ENGINEERING

1. General

392 The general engineering industries of Rumania are comparatively small, though to meet the increased demand for engineering products development has been appreciable during the last decade.

[439] Rumania is most dependent on imports for her supplies of better class types of engineering equipment, such as machine tools, and whilst receiving technical assistance from Germany, has during 1942 and 1943 been purchasing engineering equipment in increasingly large quantities from Sweden.

391 The rougher classes of engineering products, such as nails, screws, rivets, chains and wire are produced in Rumania and there are a few firms, such as Acta S.A.R., and Industria de Optica

398 439 Germany has, during the war period, continued to export motor vehicles to Rumania, and the industry has continued to be engaged on repair and assembly work, parts being supplied by Germany.

5. Electrical Industry

393 439 The electrical industry is small and mainly concerned with the manufacture of accumulators and cables, the former probably being largely a matter of assembly from parts supplied by the German A.F.A. company (Accumulatoren Fabrik A.G., of Berlin and Hagen). Imports in 1937, about 60 per cent. of which came from Germany and Austria, amounted to 20·9 million R.M. (716·87 million lei) which compared with a domestic output in that year of 11 million R.M. (417·3 million lei).

393 The following are the main factories engaged on production of electrical equipment :—

[26c]

●393

Firm	Location	Product
1. Tudor S.A.R.	Bucarest ..	Accumulators and batteries
2. Fabrica Românească de Becuri Tungsram S.A.R.	Bucarest ..	Electric bulbs
3. Lumen S.A.R.	Bucarest ..	Electric bulbs (daily capacity, 7,000 bulbs)
4. Electrostar S.A.	Bucarest ..	Electric bulbs (daily capacity, 6,000 bulbs)
5. Standard Fabrica de Telefoane și Radio S.A.	Bucarest ..	Production and repair of telephone, telegraph and radio apparatus, and production of electric cables
6. Industria Sârmei S.A.	Câmpia Turzii	Cables
7. Uz. de Fier din Reșița S.A. ..	Reșița ..	Electric motors

[26 d]

393
439 Present requirements for the Armed Forces for such articles as wireless, field-telephones, etc., and electrical equipment for the oil companies are imported from Germany, as are civilian requirements, though imports for the latter by no means cover the demand. Sweden and Switzerland both supply small quantities of electrical goods of various types.

B. ARMAMENTS

1. General Development

719 Rumanian armament works were for many years badly organised and equipped. In 1936 the Government made the first serious attempt to organise the industry, and selected some eight engineering works for conversion to extensive war production, particularly of shells. Much of this and of subsequent expansion of the industry was carried out under the supervision of foreign concerns, notably Schneider, Skoda and the Ceskoslovenska Zbrojovka, who were not only responsible for equipping the Rumanian works, but also for providing technical and trained personnel.

By 1939 and 1940 a number of new factories came into production, and others either increased their output or adapted their organisation to war production. Despite this expansion, however, the present-day (1943) level of production cannot fulfil the whole of the needs of the Armed Forces, and Rumania has been forced to import war material from Germany, France, Switzerland and elsewhere.

The industry suffers from a lack of certain essential raw materials and of facilities for the production of machine tools, power units and other important engineering components, for which the Rumanians are largely dependent on their already hard-pressed Allies.

391 Română S.A.R., both in Bucarest, which make precision mechanical instruments; and "Flexodo" Prima Fabrica Română de garnituri pentru frane S.A., also in Bucarest, which specialises in brakes, couplings and transmission equipment. Small tools are made by a few firms, but the quality is indifferent.

397 394 The largest individual firms in Rumania concerned with general engineering production are Reşiţa, Malaxa, Lemaitre, Vulcan and Fraţii Schiel, all of whom undertake diverse production, including locomotive and wagon manufacture and structural engineering and boiler construction.

391 439 Rumanian firms, such as Uzinele Metalurgice Ploeşti and Concordia S.A.R. of Ploeşti, produce certain types of oil-well machinery and equipment, but the bulk of requirements, particularly of the more specialised types, have to be imported. Before the war the U.S.A. were the principal suppliers, but since the war Rumania has become dependent on Germany for this type of machinery, and in view of the importance of oil to Germany, her requirements probably receive a high priority.

2. Agricultural Machinery

457 Rumanian agricultural methods are backward, and the degree of mechanisation is low, caused by lack of purchasing power of the peasants and the high percentage of small holdings, which make the use of modern equipment impracticable. For this reason the production of agricultural machinery has not been very highly developed, though there has been some expansion since 1927—production of implements has trebled between 1927 and 1937. Production of agricultural machines, however, declined by about 60 per cent. during the same period. Between

CHAPTER V

399 the Ministry of Air and Marine, but reverted in 1938 to the states of a private company. The original intention was to build airframes and engines, but in practice only four types of airframes were built, equipped with imported engines of British or French design. Output was about eight aircraft monthly. The factory is situated in Bucarest, in a two-storied building on a site of about 100 yards square, and is so hemmed in that no expansion is possible. Early in 1939 there was a proposal to build a branch factory at Târgul Ocna in Moldavia for the manufacture of aircraft parts and the construction of engines and motor-cycles, but this does not appear to have been carried into effect.

The company was reported in 1942 to be under German management. Very little information is available about its present activities, but it is believed to employ about 1,000 workers and to be engaged in repair work, as well as the manufacture of sledges and skis for the Rumanian Army.

(c) *I.C.A.R.* (*Intreprinderile pentru Construcţii Aeronautice Române S.A.*). This concern was established in 1931. Its factory in Bucarest produced only ten or twelve Messerschmitt aircraft in a period of three years. Early in 1942 successive increases of capital, from 14.2 to 45 million lei, appeared to foreshadow a possible development of the company's operations, but as yet there is no sign of any such development.

Present activities are believed to consist of aircraft repair, the construction of a few aircraft for the Rumanian Air Force, and the manufacture of tubes for a Berlin firm.

C. SHIPBUILDING

●396 In spite of her Black Sea Coast, the navigable rivers Danube, Dniester and Prut and other streams navigable to some extent to small craft, Rumania has never been a shipbuilding country of any importance.

From a shipbuilding and repairing point of view Galaţi has always been and still is the most

396 important centre, followed by Constanța, Turnu Severin and Brăila in that order, though prior to the war Galați and Turnu Severin were the only ports with yards capable of building anything larger than barges, lighters and small river craft.

Until construction was started on a dry dock at Galați in 1937 there was no dry dock in the whole country. This dock should by now be in use, excavations having been completed in 1942. Constanța has a floating dock (475' × 77') with a lift of 8,000 tons; Galați two, one of 200, and one of 300 tons lift, and Brăila one for small craft of 100 tons lift.

Prior to the war, the largest ships built were a river steamer of 420 tons and barges up to 1,700 tons at Galați, where 500/800 men were employed. Turnu Severin, employing 100 men, had a building capacity of 1,500 tons per annum in 1933, but this figure covered a number of small ships and barges.

In view of the microscopic size of the navy—some half-dozen ships, of which the largest was a destroyer leader and the rest mainly river craft—and a merchant marine of about the same number of sea-going ships, Rumania's neglect of shipbuilding is not surprising. The war, however, has made a considerable difference. Yards are being expanded under German and Italian influence and a very considerable amount of money is being put into shipyards and their plant. In 1942 an arrangement was concluded by the Santiere Navale at Galați with the Hermann Göring Werke for "assistance in technical matters and in the conduct of the company," and the capital of the company was raised from 50 million to 550 million lei. In 1941 two or three tugs of between 600 and 1,000 tons were built as well as two, possibly three, U-boats completed for Rumania under supervision of Deschimag and Krupp technicians. These had been laid down pre-war with Dutch help. The construction of a large number of Tank Landing Craft, Siebel Ferries, Invasion barges, Motor Torpedo boats and possibly some small Italian U-boats has been achieved, all from pre-fabricated parts sent from Germany and Italy.

5

[28b]

391 Românâ S.A.R., both in Bucarest, which make precision mechanical instruments; and "Flexodo" Prima Fabrica Românâ de garnituri pentru frane S.A., also in Bucarest, which specialises in brakes, couplings and transmission equipment. Small tools are made by a few firms, but the quality is indifferent.

397 394 The largest individual firms in Rumania concerned with general engineering production are Reşiţa, Malaxa, Lemaitre, Vulcan and Fraţii Schiel, all of whom undertake diverse production, including locomotive and wagon manufacture, and structural engineering and boiler construction.

391 439 Rumanian firms, such as Uzinele Metalurgice Ploeşti and Concordia S.A.R. of Ploeşti, produce certain types of oil-well machinery and equipment, but the bulk of requirements, particularly of the more specialised types, have to be imported. Before the war the U.S.A. were the principal suppliers, but since the war Rumania has become dependent on Germany for this type of machinery, and in view of the importance of oil to Germany, her requirements probably receive a high priority.

2. Agricultural Machinery

467 Rumanian agricultural methods are backward, and the degree of mechanisation is low, caused by lack of purchasing power of the peasants and the high percentage of small holdings, which make the use of modern equipment impracticable. For this reason the production of agricultural machinery has not been very highly developed, though there has been some expansion since 1927—production of implements has trebled between 1927 and 1937. Production of agricultural machines, however, declined by about 60 per cent. during the same period. Between

397 **3. Locomotives and Rolling Stock**

The locomotive and rolling-stock industry was small, only two companies, the Bucarest branch of the Malaxa works, and the Reşiţa Iron and Steel works, at Reşiţa, building main-line steam locomotives, while three Companies built main-line wagons, namely, Malaxa, the Astra Works at Braşov and Arad, and the Franco-Romana works in Braila. The Astra works also built narrow-gauge locomotives.

The capacity of the Malaxa plant at Bucarest was probably about 80 main-line locomotives a year; the capacity of the Reşiţa works is not known, but was probably about equivalent to that of Malaxa. The total pre-war capacity of the Rumanian locomotive industry may therefore be estimated at about 150 main-line steam models a year.

With regard to wagon-building capacity, it is believed that Malaxa could build between 800 and 1,000 main-line 20-ton wagons a year, and the Astra plant about 2,500; the capacity of the Franco-Romana works is not known.

In June, 1942, both Malaxa and Reşiţa were stated to have received orders for the German Class "50" locomotive, one report indicating that deliveries were to begin in the summer of 1943. There has recently been some indication that these locomotives are actually under construction, although there is no information regarding the rate of production. The Reşiţa works and also Astra, are believed to have been constructing narrow-gauge locomotives for the Rumanian State Forestry Department.

There is little information regarding wagon production in Rumania since the alliance with

CHAPTER V

397 Germany. It is, however, believed that tank wagons have been built to German order by the Astra Works at Braşov, and that narrow-gauge rolling-stock for the State Forestry Department has been under construction at Braşov.

4. Motor Vehicles

398 439 In spite of the gradual industrialisation which was taking place in Rumania in the early 1930's, by 1935 there was no motor-vehicle industry so that the country was entirely dependent on imports. The Government, therefore, to combat the steady decline in the number of motor vehicles which had been taking place since 1930, issued a decree in 1935, offering special facilities to foreign manufacturers who would establish assembly plants. At the same time the establishment of a domestic manufacturing industry was contemplated, a plan which does not appear to have been realised.

CHAPTER V

397 Germany. It is, however, believed that tank wagons have been built to German order by the Astra Works at Braşov, and that narrow-gauge rolling-stock for the State Forestry Department has been under construction at Braşov.

4. Motor Vehicles

●398 439 In spite of the gradual industrialisation which was taking place in Rumania in the early 1930's, by 1935 there was no motor-vehicle industry, so that the country was entirely dependent on imports. The Government, therefore, to combat the steady decline in the number of motor vehicles which had been taking place since 1930, issued a decree in 1935, offering special facilities to foreign manufacturers who would establish assembly plants. At the same time the establishment of a domestic manufacturing industry was contemplated, a plan which does not appear to have been realised.

398 Following this decree the whole of the motor-car
439 assembly industry, which was then built up, was dominated by American manufacturers, the three main assembly plants all in Bucarest, being —

Ford Romana S.A.R., for assembly of Ford motor vehicles of all types.

Leonida S.A., for assembly of Chevrolet cars, and representatives for General Motors.

Saral S.A.R., for assembly of Chrysler cars and others such as Dodge, De Soto and Plymouth and Fargo trucks.

From 1938 onwards several firms were established by German companies, including :—

Románo-Germaná S.A.R., for repairs and servicing of vehicles.

Skoda Industrialá Románá S.A.R., for the import and sale of Skoda products, and for assembly and repair work.

Tatra Románá S.A.R., representatives of the Ringhoffer-Tatra-Werke A.G., Prague.

Demag Románá S.A., agents for Demag motors of Duisburg.

With the establishment of these and other affiliated German firms the automobile assembly industry gradually passed into German hands, a process which was completed in 1940 when the Americans withdrew from the country.

398 As a result of the establishment of all these firms, the number of motor vehicles increased, and in 1938 there were 34,000 vehicles of all descriptions in the country. The estimated total number of lorries in civilian use on July 1st, 1943, was 9,600, of which 6,500 with up to 3 tons capacity and the remainder over 3 tons.

398
439 Germany has, during the war period, continued to export motor vehicles to Rumania, and the industry has continued to be engaged on repair and assembly work, parts being supplied by Germany.

5. Electrical Industry

393
439 The electrical industry is small and mainly concerned with the manufacture of accumulators and cables, the former probably being largely a matter of assembly from parts supplied by the German A.F.A. company (Accumulatoren Fabrik A.G., of Berlin and Hagen). Imports in 1937, about 60 per cent. of which came from Germany and Austria, amounted to 20·9 million R.M. (716·87 million lei) which compared with a domestic output in that year of 11 million R.M. (417·3 million lei).

393 The following are the main factories engaged on production of electrical equipment :—

[26c]

719

2. Small Arms and Mortars

The principal small arms factory is the Cugir branch of the Copşa Mica şi Cugir Company, which was developed by Zbrojovka of Brno and came into full-scale production in 1938. Apart from the small arms section, which specialises in the ZB 30 type of machine gun, there is also a small arms ammunition plant, and a branch at Copşa Mica which was designed for the production of various types and calibres of artillery and shells.

The production of trench mortars is almost entirely confined to the Voina works at Braşov, which specialises in the Brandt 60 mm. and 81 mm. types. Vulcan of Bucarest also is believed to be engaged on similar work, but on a smaller scale. The Braşov works produce mortar bombs also, but the filling is carried out at Satu-Lung.

3. Artillery Production

Artillery or artillery-component production is believed to be carried out by some five or six firms. The Astra-Vagoane works at Braşov was taken over by the Reşiţa Iron and Steel concern in 1936 for the assembly and finishing of various types, including the 37 mm. A.Tk. gun and the 75 mm. A.A. gun, the barrels being received in the rough state from Reşiţa. There are also facilities for the manufacture, assembly and (it is believed) filling, of various types and calibres of shells. Certain tank components may also be made.

The parent company at Reşiţa, in which Skoda is believed to have an interest, manufactures guns and carriages up to 150 mm. calibre and shell cases. There is an important branch at Oraştie for filling and assembling shells. The Concordia works at Ploeşti was converted by Schneider in 1939 for the production of 37 and 47 mm. A.Tk. guns in addition to various calibres of shells and cartridge cases. The Malaxa factory in Bucarest is also engaged on gun production, but is probably of more importance as a shell producer, particularly as it also possesses an important shell filling and assembly plant at Tohanul Vechiu. The branch at Brăila is believed to have been turned over to gun and shell manufacture in recent years. According to reports, both this works and that in Bucarest produce tanks or tank components.

Apart from the shell and filling plants already mentioned, both the State Pyrotechnical Institute and the State Military Arsenal in Bucarest are important shell and small arms ammunition producers. A new works at Avrig, which was still under construction in July 1941 was to be one of the leading shell-filling and assembly plants in Rumania, accounting for some 40 per cent. of the total output. There are a number of metal-works, such as Metrom and Farola of Braşov, Laromet of Bucarest and Costinescu of Sinaia, which add a valuable contribution by supplying components to the main shell producers.

Despite its many shortcomings, the Rumanian armament industry has in recent years become one of the most important in S.E. Europe.

399

4. Aircraft Industry

Rumania before the war possessed a small but active aircraft industry capable of producing about 500 aircraft yearly, which was, however, to a great extent, dependent upon foreign suppliers of aero-engines and aircraft components. There were three airframe factories, one of which also produced engines, output of the latter being sufficient to equip about two-thirds of the aircraft built in the country.

[27a]

[399] In the middle of 1942, under German influence, the Rumanian Government proceeded to rationalise the industry, and a Board was set up to control the country's most important armaments and aircraft factories. Under this scheme German managers or supervisors went into the aircraft factories and their main activity has since been the repair of damaged aircraft, though some new production continues. For instance, in August 1942 it was reported that an order for 200 I.A.R. fighter aircraft with 1,200 h.p. engines had been placed on behalf of the Rumanian Air Force.

[439] Rumania is still buying Italian (Savoia Marchetti) aircraft, German gliders, and various components from Germany and Switzerland.

Apart from the aircraft factories listed below, facilities for complete overhauls of airframes and engines exist at the Aviation Arsenal in Bucarest, and it has been reported that a former jute factory in Bucarest is now utilised for repair work, and that the Asam-Pipera works, also in Bucarest, are repairing engines.

Information regarding the number of workers engaged in the aircraft industry is too fragmentary to enable any estimate of their total number to be made.

[655] The main producing companies are as follows :—

(*a*) *I.A.R.* (*Industria Aeronautică Română*), the principal Rumanian aircraft company, is State-owned. It has a factory at Brașov (87 miles N.N.E. of Bucarest) for the manufacture of aircraft and aero-engines, and also produces high-precision tools of a very good quality. The factory occupies a site of some 125 acres, adjoining an airfield about 3 or 4 miles north-east of the central station of Brașov. It is a well-equipped plant and possessed considerable stocks of tools and raw materials at the beginning of the war.

The aircraft, produced before the war at a rate of about 8 monthly, consisted mainly of Potez 25 and I.A.R. 15 and 16 single-seater fighters and an I.A.R. type of four-seater commercial aircraft. The engine department produced under licence, at the rate of 25 monthly, an adaptation of the Gnôme-et-Rhône 14N. A licence was also held for Jumo 211 engines, but none of these appear to have been built.

[439] Since the war this factory has been under German control, exercised through a branch of the Hermann Göring Works. The main types of aircraft produced are I.A.R. 80 and 101 single-engined fighters and the Potez 63. Engine production appears to range between 20 and 30 a month, though the German management is trying to double that figure. Airframe output recently appears to have been about 20 monthly. In addition, a good deal of repair work is done for Germany.

The company depends largely upon imported components. It has a propeller department which, about the end of 1941, was transferred to a former paper factory in Azuga; its output, however, does not appear to have been equal to requirements, for in July, 1942, propellers were being imported from Germany.

(*b*) *S.E.T.* (*Societatea pentru Exploatări Tehnice Industria Națională Aeronautica S.A.R.*,) known up till September 1938 as I.N.A., i.e., *Industria Națională Aeronautică S.A.R.* This company was founded in 1937, sponsored by

[27 b]

CHAPTER V

399 the Ministry of Air and Marine, but reverted in 1938 to the status of a private company. The original intention was to build airframes and engines, but in practice only four types of airframes were built, equipped with imported engines of British or French design. Output was about eight aircraft monthly. The factory is situated in Bucarest, in a two-storied building on a site of about 100 yards square, and is so hemmed in that no expansion is possible. Early in 1939 there was a proposal to build a branch factory at Târgul Ocna in Moldavia for the manufacture of aircraft parts and the construction of engines and motor-cycles, but this does not appear to have been carried into effect.

The company was reported in 1942 to be under German management. Very little information is available about its present activities, but it is believed to employ about 1,000 workers and to be engaged in repair work, as well as the manufacture of sledges and skis for the Rumanian Army.

(c) *I.C.A.R.* (*Intreprinderile pentru Construcţii. Aeronautice Române S.A.*). This concern was established in 1931. Its factory in Bucarest produced only ten or twelve Messerschmitt aircraft in a period of three years. Early in 1942 successive increases of capital, from 14.2 to 45 million lei, appeared to foreshadow a possible development of the company's operations, but as yet there is no sign of any such development.

Present activities are believed to consist of aircraft repair, the construction of a few aircraft for the Rumanian Air Force, and the manufacture of tubes for a Berlin firm.

C. SHIPBUILDING

396 In spite of her Black Sea Coast, the navigable rivers Danube, Dniester and Prut and other streams navigable to some extent to small craft, Rumania has never been a shipbuilding country of any importance.

From a shipbuilding and repairing point of view Galaţi has always been and still is the most

[28 a]

391 Română S.A.R., both in Bucarest, which make precision mechanical instruments; and "Flexodo" Prima Fabrica Română de garnituri pentru frane S.A., also in Bucarest, which specialises in brakes, couplings and transmission equipment. Small tools are made by a few firms, but the quality is indifferent.

397 394 The largest individual firms in Rumania concerned with general engineering production are Reşiţa, Malaxa, Lemaitre, Vulcan and Fraţii Schiel, all of whom undertake diverse production, including locomotive and wagon manufacture, and structural engineering and boiler construction.

391 439 Rumanian firms, such as Uzinele Metalurgice Ploeşti and Concordia S.A.R. of Ploeşti, produce certain types of oil-well machinery and equipment, but the bulk of requirements, particularly of the more specialised types, have to be imported. Before the war the U.S.A. were the principal suppliers, but since the war Rumania has become dependent on Germany for this type of machinery, and in view of the importance of oil to Germany, her requirements probably receive a high priority.

2. Agricultural Machinery

407 Rumanian agricultural methods are backward, and the degree of mechanisation is low, caused by lack of purchasing power of the peasants and the high percentage of small holdings, which make the use of modern equipment impracticable. For this reason the production of agricultural machinery has not been very highly developed, though there has been some expansion since 1927—production of implements has trebled between 1927 and 1937. Production of agricultural machines, however, declined by about 60 per cent. during the same period. Between

391
407

Between 1935 and 1937 the average annual internal sale of agricultural implements amounted to some [illegible] tons, of which two-thirds were home produced and the remainder imported. The average annual internal sale of agricultural machines during this period was 3,300 tons, of which only a fifth were home produced. Germany was the main supplier of agricultural machinery before the war, and since the outbreak of war, has continued to be so.

[437] Agricultural tractors in particular have been imported in increased quantities and it is believed that during the period 1940–1942, inclusive, some 4,000 units were imported, from Germany, as well as a few hundred from Italy.

Agricultural implements are produced in small quantities by about 15 general engineering firms, while the chief firms producing agricultural machinery are as follows:—

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943 EDI Rumania EDI

391
407

	Name of Firm	Location	Type of Product
1	Uzinele de Fier şi Domeniile din Reşiţa S.A.	Bocşa-Romana	Threshing machines, sifters and selectors for cleaning corn, harrows, seed-sowing machines, ploughs, etc., small agricultural implements
2	Schramm, Hüttl and Schmidt, S.A.	Topleţ (district Severin)	Threshing machines, harrows, sifters and selectors for cleaning corn, ploughs, seed-sowing machines
3	Fabricile de Maşini And. Rieger S.A.	Sibiu	Threshing machines, harrows, sifters and selectors for cleaning corn, ploughs, etc.

[25e]

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

231

Animals

5 milking cows, 2 at farm, 3 with calves away on the high pastures.
2 draught oxen.
2 bulls.
100 sheep, away on high pastures.
2 horses.
3 pigs.
30 goats at farm.
Large number of poultry (fowls and geese) impossible to estimate.
2 hives of bees in flower garden.

221

AGRICULTURAL CALENDAR

April.	Preparation of ground, sowing of oats and vetch. Sheep go up to low hill pastures.
May.	Sowing of maize, potatoes, beans. May 1st, sheep go to high pastures.
June.	Sowing of fodder crops; all sowing finished by middle of month.
July.	Early part of month, first cutting of hay, making and collecting. July 20th, beginning of harvest, i.e. flax, cherries, oats and barley.
August.	Middle of month, second cutting of hay, oat harvest, plum harvest, followed by apple and walnut harvest. Harvesting and retting of hemp. Some ploughing of grain stubble. August 31st, sheep return from high pastures to low hill pastures.
September.	Beginning of maize harvest, sheep penned on maize stubble as soon as possible.
October.	End of maize harvest according to season.
November to March.	Sheep penned on maize fields, cattle kept in sheds and fed on hay and fodder crops.

A. R. B.

412

Mould for hay fork

543
443
[286]

6. *Woven Goods.*—Here the high skill and craftsmanship of the Carpathian peasant is most obviously illustrated. Woollen cloths are the commonest, carded wool also being offered for sale. Linen, silk and hempen stuffs are displayed, the finer materials often having gold or silver threads woven into them; they are made up into blouses, skirts, veils and belts. Some machine-made cotton goods also for sale.

[531]

7. *Embroidered Goods.*—Velvet waistcoats with gold embroidery and bead work. Linen or woollen cloths are embroidered with wool, silk, or mercerised cotton. Round sequins, thought to betray Turkish influence, are very popular.

8. *Carpets.*—Locally woven carpets of traditional colours and designs far outnumber machine-made copies of Persian carpets.

9. *Food and Confectionery.*—Bread, doughnuts, sausages, fish, gingerbread, sweets. Sugar dolls, hearts, circles, diamonds and other shapes. Sugar rosaries. Drinks are hawked by Turkish itinerants. The restaurants and drinking booths have gipsy fiddlers.

10. *Cheap Jewellery.*—Trinkets, mirrors, beads, combs, buttons, studs, pins, rings, brooches, etc.

543
517

11. *Entertainments.*—The fat woman and the one-minute photographer, shooting ranges, cock-shies, games of chance, fortune-telling. The merry-go-round is driven by five men, who push it round on a high wooden platform fixed to the central axis, with the accompaniment of peasant music. Other bands supply music for the dancing which takes place under the trees.

543
443

APART FROM the gipsy goods and the articles offered in the permanent booths, the goods displayed vary from day to day as different groups of peasants come in from the country. There is a constant coming and going of bullock carts over the bridge, bringing in stock and peasant products for sale. The normal limit of influence exerted by the fair is some 25 kilometres.

E. E. E.

412



Hoe.
Blade the size of an English spade. See page 41.

543 5. THINGS SEEN AT BORSEC FAIR, AUGUST 20TH

[286] 1. MATERIAL BY THE YARD.

Cotton: Prints, calicoes, zephyrs, ginghams, men's shirtings.
Wool: Coloured serges, rough grey and brown woollen material (very thick) for men's and women's winter clothing.
Artificial Silk: In plain colours, Crêpe de Chine in plain colours, a very few printed silks.
Lace: Coarse white lace edgings (from Nottingham).

[291] 2. CLOTHING.

Men's: Trousers, coats, waistcoats, cloth caps, embroidered lambskin waistcoats, braces.

Women's: Knitted and crocheted wool caps and berets, patent leather belts. Printed cotton and artificial silk pieces for head coverings. Ribbons.

Children's: Babies' knitted woollen garments. Modern-style dresses in artificial silk with machine-made embroidery. Socks and stockings of cotton and wool hand-knitted in Roumania. Artificial silk stockings manufactured from yarn imported from Switzerland and France.

[295] 3. BOOTS AND SHOES FOR MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

Field boots and heavy nailed boots for men.
Manufactured boots and shoes for women and children.
Ready-made peasant shoes of leather.
Ready-made peasant shoes of leather with rubber attached to sole.
Ready-made peasant shoes made from old motor tyres.
Shoes of plaited felt of all sizes for women and children.
Shoes of knitted coarse wool with straps.
Pieces of leather of correct size for making the peasant shoes and leather thongs for lacing them.
Leather and mohair laces for using with the manufactured boots and shoes.

[415] 4. POTTERY.

Large brown glazed earthenware pots only. No other pottery of any kind was seen in the fair.

[295] 5. BASKETS, ETC.

Hand-made of rushes gathered by the peasants who make them. Some colour introduced into the larger baskets; strong, neat weaving. Also a few big hats as worn in the fields by the Hungarian peasant women.

244 6. GREENGROCERY.

Turnips, potatoes, yellow beans, cabbages, gherkins, carrots, onions, tomatoes, ardei, lemons, apples, pears, Indian corn, water melons, cantaloupes.

543

[257] 7. CONFECTIONERY, ETC.

Gingerbread (all shapes).

Sweets: Packets of sweets, sweet-stuffs in various shapes. Dolls, ladies, hearts, diamonds, all with rough pieces of mirror inset.

[524] 8. TOYS.

The only toys for children seen were gaily-coloured thin rubber balls (large), also small wooden flutes similar to those used by shepherds.

[322] 9. CARVED WOODEN ARTICLES.

Wooden cigarette-holders; various sizes, some grotesquely large.

Mirrors with flower-borders carved in high relief.

Match-stands, cigarette stands, wooden boxes.

Large pipes (for playing jokes). Powder is secreted in the mouth-piece and is puffed into the face when the pipe is blown.

10. ARTICLES FOR THE HOME.

[285] Blankets patterned in red and natural wool.

Rug-strips made of pieces of cotton and woollen waste pieces of material.

[415] Modern cooking tins and saucepans, enamelled dishes and all sorts of "Household Helps," which attracted crowds of peasant women, e.g. egg and tomato slices, vegetable cutters, pastry moulds, etc.

Strainers with wooden frame and wire base, the wire coloured in tartan and other patterns.

Alarm clocks, boot polish in tins, soap, hempen rope and string.

[301] 11. CHEAP JEWELLERY, ETC.

Rings, brooches, neck and watch chains. Necklaces of coloured pearl and glass beads. Spectacles of plain and tinted glass. Jewelled combs for wearing in the hair. Studs, fancy buttons, thimbles, all kinds of plain and fancy pins. Mirrors.

361 tions, but we know of nothing there before 1510. To the
771 existence of the monastery, which is the seat of a bishop, is due the development of a seminary.

161 THE POPULATION[1] in 1930 was 6,831. In 1931 there were 181
163 births, 24 infant deaths (under one year), 20 still-births, and 125 deaths from all causes. Marriages numbered 61 and divorces 4. The birth-rate is thus high, the infant death-rate considerable, but not so high as might be expected; still-births are numerous.

H. J. F.
E. E. E.

1[of Curtea de Arges -- Analyst]

415

BROWN CLAY.
WHITE & GREEN SLIP.

Another task

233 [236] devolving on the shepherds is the shearing, which is done twice in the summer, but they are spared the "dipping" regulations, which British shepherds find so irksome. For the rest there is much to be done to keep the flocks healthy and safe from wolves, to look after the dogs, to carry water [57] and cut wood. In rare moments of leisure the shepherd will be found blowing his simple pipe, or singing songs, or carving a stick with his versatile knife, cutting out those ancient geometric patterns which are the common heritage of peasant Europe.

E. E. E.

415



A Beetle

A reaping glove

415
44:

PLATE XII

Curtea de Arges. Pots were sold at the local fair. They had been made in the village. Cart for packing and bringing pots shown in background.

[page 54 b]

The only noteworthy building is the corn-house (pătule de porumb) (figs. 59a, 59b), which is found, however, only among the well-to-do. Unlike the house, it is a two-story structure. The lower floor has plastered walls, and serves as stable and cart-shed. The upper story is made of wickerwork, often arranged in interesting patterns, permitting the air to circulate. The attic is used for the storage of feed and is reached by a ladder from the outside. The hipped roof is of straw (JÄnecke, 1918: 25-27).

R 343 [556] R [251] [417]

In the mountain regions stables have only three walls, and animals stay in these half-open shelters even in winter. The imposing corn-house of the plains is rarely found in the mountains. In its place is erected a long narrow building of wickerwork. This rests on short stone pillars about 50 centimeters above the ground and is covered by a shingled roof. Since the ground floor of the house is used for storage there is no need for many additional farm buildings (JÄnecke, 1918: 43-45).

R [184]

CONCLUSION

Having presented an area by area discussion of the village forms and farmsteads, it is desirable to trace the distribution of certain major elements. Roughly, four types of settlement pattern can be distinguished. They are the village consisting of widely scattered hamlets (Cvijić's Stari Vlah type); the agglomerated village (Cvijić's Timok type); the road village (Cvijić's Mačva type); and the čiflik type, the settlement created by Turkish landowners. The first of these is composed of widely scattered houses in no regular order, grouped into hamlets a number of which constitute a village. It predominates in Slovenia, Western Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, western Serbia, and in the mountain areas of central Bulgaria and Rumania. A variant of this form, characterized by more closely spaced houses within the separate hamlets (Cvijić's Ibar type), exists in the Karst regions behind the Adriatic coast, in Albania and southwestern and western Serbia. Hilly terrain and forested regions are conducive to this scatter, but are not the sole determinants. The Ibar type is associated with greater barrenness of soil and the necessity of conserving arable land.

S 361 171 184 S [182] [311]

Agglomerated villages are characterized by crowded houses set in an irregular order along crooked streets. They prevail in eastern and southern Serbia and in southern Macedonia. While they are associated with the necessity of conserving arable land in some of the more barren regions of eastern Serbia, this explanation will not hold for the fertile basins of Kosovo, Kumanovo and Skoplje. Here they are no doubt the result of diffusion from the Aegean coast, as these areas are on communication lines which run up the Vardar and Morava River valleys from the coast toward Beograd.

S [311]

The third or Mačva type is that of the more or less planned village lying on both sides of the highway. These villages tend to

S 361 171

659 amendment; namely, by Law 62 of March 2, 1948. Its main provisions were as follows:

[421] All reorganized denominations were ordered to take detailed inventory of their assets and communicate it to the Ministry of Religious Affairs in order to enable the latter to exert an easier control over their material resources. Further, the denominations were obliged to hold religious services every time the Government so ordered.

[793] The heads of the Churches, elected or appointed, shall be recognized only upon taking of an oath of allegiance to the newly established People's Republic. By this oath they promised not only to obey the laws, but also to enforce them, to compel their subordinates to obey them and defend the Republic against "any enemies from within or without."

[421] Finally, the Ministry of Religious Affairs was empowered to control and verify all assets and revenues of all kinds belonging to any church, as well as the use made of them.

It is clear that by this amendment the Government took quite a different attitude towards the church. Its existence is justified in the eyes of the government and protected only insofar as the church organizations enforce the law of the country and defend its political order. This amounts rather to bestowing executive and police powers upon the churches and to force upon them to practice political discriminations instead of religion.

There is a novel provision according to which the Government is entitled to control the use made by the churches of their

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

423 land, it was not passed on from father to son but reverted to the landowner, who was in turn responsible for providing newly married young cultivators with a holding. In fixing the extent of land to be held by each cultivator, these acts, especially the one for Moldavia, reduced the amount customarily enjoyed for pasturage and restricted the peasants' forest rights. Although the peasant was theoretically free to move, he was in fact tied to his community by a net of regulations.

[433] With a few modifications Rumanian agrarian relations were determined by the Organic Statutes for the next third of a century. Under
566 them, as a contemporary observer remarked, "The principalities took
175 on a new life"; there was a marked increase in economic activity. That
421 the benefits of this activity were not generally shared by the peasants, however, is shown by their continued exodus across neighboring frontiers. They were being forced out of their old semipastoral habits, and the very increase of cereal exports could work to their disadvantage. For example, the entire 1847 wheat crop was sold in advance because of the urgent demands in other European states suffering from food shortages in the late 1840's. As a result of these premature sales, made largely through the boyars, the principalities experienced a food crisis which contributed greatly to the peasant unrest in the turbulent year 1848.

Apart from the abortive attempts at reform during the short-lived Wallachian revolution in 1848 and a moderate revision of the Organic Statutes in 1851, the next major change was the Act of 1864, which paralleled the 1848 emancipation in the Habsburg lands and the Russian emancipation of 1861. This act, promulgated for the united principalities by Prince Cuza, for political and social rather than for economic reasons, abolished the clacă and other servitudes. The peasants obtained full title to the land they had in use, based upon earlier regulations, and the landowners were given a compensation for the loss of their labor. The law followed the now recognized provision that peasant property could not exceed two-thirds of the former lord's estate. The new holdings could not be sold or alienated for a period of thirty years.

By this act, so it seemed, the remnants of the old servile system had been abolished. Possession and use of land were transformed into absolute property rights; the peasant holder was now a free proprietor, owing no servile obligations, and, indeed, the translation of the clacă and other dues into a redemption payment does seem to have dimin-

Emerit, *op. cit.*, p. 45, doubts if there is sufficient evidence to permit a positive declaration that the peasants traditionally had had the use of all the land.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

ished his burdens.[14] Yet a quarter of a century after the Act of 1864 there began those peasant disturbances which culminated in the 1907 uprising. In some way, as Dobrogeanu-Gherea said, "The year 1864 carried in its womb the terrible year 1907."

The connection, however, is not a simple one and is paradoxical in several respects. Between 1864 and 1907 Rumania continued its rapid expansion in agriculture and commerce. Exports of grain, for example, increased from about 1,400,000 tons per year in the early 1880's to nearly 2,500,000 tons in 1905. Hence it is necessary to explain how under such circumstances there should have been growing peasant discontent. Was there, to repeat that old and difficult question, increasing poverty in the midst of expanding national wealth?

In the first place, while the Act of 1864 was passed against the wishes of the boyars, by a coup d'état on the part of Prince Cuza, the administration of the country, especially local administration, was still largely under their control, and they had ample opportunity to twist the provisions of the law to their advantage. Undoubtedly many injustices were committed in its application: often the landowner was able to distribute the worst land to the peasants, holding the best in his own estate; in a number of cases false measuring standards were used, an easy trick in a country lacking basic ground surveys; sometimes the landowner so divided the holdings that the peasants were unable to reach their property without paying a toll. As a cumulative result of these malpractices it is possible that although by the law the peasants were to receive the land they had in use before the reform, they actually received less and of lower quality. Local studies of a few districts indicate that such may have been the case, but statistics are lacking to make a general conclusion.

Another criticism of the law has been that while the peasants' claims to land could not exceed two-thirds of the lord's estate, the excess demand being met by grants of state land, in those regions where the peasants' quota was less the lord was able to retain as absolute property, with no future obligation, well over the minimal one-third. Moreover, under the Organic Statutes the lord was responsible for providing newly married peasants with a holding, while the new act made no adequate provision for subsequent generations. Peasant holdings now became inheritable property to be passed on from father to children. Since the new holdings were virtually inalienable and

14. This point, as in Russia, has been much disputed, and some authors have maintained that the peasants' burdens actually increased. The comparative figures, however, which are provided by Emerit, *op. cit.*, p. 516, if they are accurate and representative, show a considerable falling off of the amount owed by the peasant.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

3. DOMESTIC ANIMALS

422 231 The following figures were collected for two households (August 1933), one smaller and one larger :

Farm A	Farm B
3 milch cows, two on high pastures, one at the farm	7 milch cows, six on high pastures, one at the farm
No draught oxen	2 draught oxen
1 calf	5 calves
2 horses	2 horses
30 sheep	50 sheep
2 pigs	4 pigs
15 fowls	21 fowls
15 beehives, near house	4 or 5 beehives, away from house in lower pastures

Housing for geese was usually available, and several flocks with six to eight geese in each were noticed on the road. A few turkeys were observed, also a few large guinea fowl in a farm in a tributary valley. There were doves at the priest's house.

The Forestry control forbids the keeping of goats.

4. THE FARMING CALENDAR

221 Late April, early May.—Prepare soil, sow maize and potatoes, harrow hayfields.

Early May.—Sheep and some cattle and pigs go up to the high pastures.

Late May.—Peasants shear sheep on high pastures.

Early June.—Weeding and first hilling-up of maize by work with a hoe when plants are 15-20 cm. high.

Late June.—Second weeding and hilling-up of maize. General tidying-up before hay harvest.

Early July.—First cut of hay in the lower lands.

July, August and first three weeks of September.—Hay harvest. Peasants make temporary shelters when harvesting in remote spots. Hay on hills mostly stacked near the shelters used for sheep during part of the winter. Beside this is a hut for the man in charge.

September 25-October 10th.—Maize harvest.

Third week of October.—Potatoes lifted.

October.—Stock brought down from high pastures and sorted out among owners by means of earmarks.

October until first serious snow.—Sheep may be kept in remote pastures that have not been much used or reaped.

Thence until May.—Some sheep on lower hills near shelters with hay (see above, July, August). Some sheep folded on lowland fields to fertilise them. No artificial manure. Hay used as fodder. Lambing on lowland fields near homesteads.

113, 423, 474 Rumania ED1

[For information pertaining cooperative farms and collectivization, see 5: Free Europe Committee, El Europe, category 116, pp. 65, 68-71. -- Analyst]

659
425

in particular the Roman Catholic Church, were already deprived of their funds. This was a result of practices supported by legal provisions.

[423]

In the first place, it refers to land. Agricultural land still possessed by the church after the land reform of 1919 was in fact taken away in direct violation of the law.

[671]

Article 8 of Law No. 187 of March 23, 1945, on agrarian reform provided that:

> "agricultural land belonging to monasteries, mitropolies, bishoprics, parishes as well as clerical endowments are excepted, from expropriation, and left in the ownership of the present title holders."

Likewise, certain categories of land, such as vineyards and forests, were generally exempted from expropriation. Nevertheless, most of Catholic landed property, including forests, vineyards, etc., were commandeered early in 1945 and thereafter seized by various "local committees" and, eventually, divided into small holdings. The remainder was seized in its entirety in February 1949 without compensation. This time the Government did not even take pains to issue a decree legalizing the actual seizure.

[454]

The "Sacred Fund" of the Catholic Church (see supra) also lost its value. It was composed almost exclusively of governmental bonds and were given after 1919 to the religious Catholic bodies in Transylvania as compensation for estates expropriated at that time. The terrific inflation of 1944-1947, swept out their value. Then, just before the monetary stabilization of August 14, 1947 government bonds were compulsorily called in and paid for in inflated lei, only an insignificant part of which was exchanged after the monetary stabilization for new currency.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

another 200,000 who held property jointly and were not included 311
in his computations.

On the assumption that a holding of less than 3 hectares was to- 511
tally inadequate, at the Rumanian level of production, to provide a family with even the bare means of subsistence, Creangă concluded that over 60 per cent of the peasant cultivators (landless peasants plus those with less than 3 hectares), "for the most part heads of families, find themselves in unconditional dependence upon landowners and tenants." [11] If peasants owning between 3 and 5 hectares —holdings certainly on the margin of subsistence—are included, it appears that nearly 85 per cent of the peasants were unable to earn a secure living from the produce of their soil and had to seek additional income elsewhere.

The concentration of land in great estates does not, of course, necessarily imply an agrarian crisis; English and Prussian agriculture developed successfully on large properties. Nor does the peasant's need to go beyond his own holding to earn a living necessarily spell misery for him. The reason the large estate appeared at this time to be the central feature of the Rumanian agrarian problem lies in the particular development of rural property and labor relations in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Unfortunately, the background of Rumanian agrarian history is 423
still extremely obscure. The original social function and source of 566
privilege of the landowning nobles, the boyars, have been the subject of several notable but inconclusive controversies among Rumanian scholars. It is not certain when and to what degree the mass of Rumanian cultivators were reduced to a servile status. Evidence provided by villages of *răzeşi* and *moşneni*—free peasant communities with a form of common landholding, which have survived as relics in the hilly districts—suggests that they at one time were a prevalent form of rural organization, but scientific investigation of these villages has been undertaken only in recent years.[12] There is no question, however, that by the eighteenth century the boyars—and the monasteries—had come to control a great deal of the land, to which

11. Creangă, *op. cit.*, I, 189.

12. The term *boier* has been the popular, if historically inaccurate, name for all large landowners. The problem of ascertaining the boyar's original role resembles in some respects the confusion in Russian history between allodial hereditary landowners and the nobility of service. The villages of free peasants (răzeşi in Moldavia and moşneni in Wallachia) pose, in respect to their nature and origins, questions similar to those relating to the Russian *mir* and the South Slav *zadruga*. Illuminating discussions of these points may be found in H. H. Stahl's article, "Organizarea socială a ţărănimii," in *Enciclopedia României* (4 vols., Bucarest, n.d.), I, 559–576, and in his recent book, *Sociologia satului devălmaş românesc* (Bucarest, 1946), I.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

423 566 the majority of the peasants were bound as *rumâni* (the most common term for serfs). In its form as in its relatively late flowering the Rumanian servile system more nearly resembled that of Russia than that of western Europe.

The life of the Rumanian serfs was bitter and squalid, as is illustrated by periodic mass flights across the Danube or into Transylvania. Their burdens resulted from their being on the bottom of the social structure of a state first fighting and then subservient to the Ottoman Empire and from the task of supporting, in a relatively self-sufficient economy, the needs of the boyars and their retainers. Although the growing boyar domination was a gradual process and apparently accompanied an internal breakdown of the village community, the act of binding the peasant to the land, carried out as a general measure by Michael the Brave (*ca.* 1558–1601), had, in large part at least, a military and political purpose: to insure a settled population able to provide military supplies. However, while the tax burden and the tributes owing the Turks were transmitted from prince and boyar to the back of the peasant, servile labor obligations, the *clacă*, were relatively light. The population was sparse, and the boyars were not reluctant to grant the peasants land, of which there was an abundance, provided, of course, they paid their tithes in kind.

566 175 Toward the middle of the eighteenth century two new elements appear: increasing state legislation, superseding or codifying customary practices, and the growth of commercial activity. The twin action of these two factors becomes ever more important right through the nineteenth century, and on their interrelation hangs much of the agrarian problem. Both were destructive of the old closed society of traditional rights and a relatively static economy; both were introduced from without. Sometimes they reinforced one another in promoting change; sometimes one held the other in check.

Around 1750 the Phanariot prince, Constantin Mavrocordat, formally abolished serfdom in an act anticipating and resembling the Habsburg Emperor Joseph II's emancipation of 1781. Although this act, in principle, relieved the peasant of personal bondage and of being tied to the land, it did not rid him of labor obligations or dues to the boyar for the use of the land he cultivated. Indeed, at about the same time the boyars initiated a persistent and successful effort to increase the number of days of the clacă and to define a working day in terms which greatly exceeded what a peasant could actually accomplish in one day. Simultaneously, they began to estab-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

lish and extend seigneurial monopolies on such activities as milling and the sale of wine. 566

Both actions clearly arose from the growing commercial possibilities of these years. The Turks were increasing their imports of grain from the principalities, and despite Turkish restrictions trade was developed with neighboring states. Hence it was in the interest of the boyars to increase the amount of labor available to them and to monopolize profitable commercial undertakings. One direct consequence of this new commercial pressure on the peasant was the revolt led by Tudor Vladimirescu in 1821 "against the boyars who have devoured our rights."

The next step is signalized by the Treaty of Adrianople of 1829, which opened Rumanian ports to world commerce, and the Organic Statutes of 1831–32, which gave the principalities their first constitutional documents. The effect of the first was vastly to accelerate the pace of commercial expansion. At the beginning of the nineteenth century raising livestock had been the principal occupation, but it was now replaced by the cultivation of cereals, for which the acreage nearly doubled in the thirty years betwen 1829 and 1859. This expansion of commerce in cereals continued until by the outbreak of the First World War Rumania ranked fourth among the world's cereal exporters and fifth among the wheat exporters. As a result, the relative value of land steadily increased. As early as 1805 the boyars undertook to limit the peasants' right to pasture, and in 1828 Prince Sturdza announced that the peasants had no right to exploit more than two-thirds of the lord's domain.

This trend was reinforced by the Organic Statutes. Introduced 423 ● during the period of Russian occupation, these acts attempted to codify, in somewhat different terms for the two principalities, the relations between boyar and peasant. In so far as they reduced arbitrary action and made precise and definite the peasant's obligations, they were to his benefit. This gain, however, was largely canceled by the fact that for the first time the lord of the land was defined as a full proprietor of his estate. The traditional concept of "master of the land" was replaced by legal ownership. In return for set labor obligations and tithes, the peasants were granted use of land not in excess of two-thirds of the estate, the remaining third being totally in the lord's hands.[13] Under this system, while the peasants had life use of

13. The extent of the lord's demesne land—the land actually cultivated under his direction—before the nineteenth century is not certain. Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 21, points out that early village maps show no separate reserve for the master of the land, but

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

423 land, it was not passed on from father to son but reverted to the landowner, who was in turn responsible for providing newly married young cultivators with a holding. In fixing the extent of land to be held by each cultivator, these acts, especially the one for Moldavia, reduced the amount customarily enjoyed for pasturage and restricted the peasants' forest rights. Although the peasant was theoretically free to move, he was in fact tied to his community by a net of regulations.

[433] With a few modifications Rumanian agrarian relations were determined by the Organic Statutes for the next third of a century. Under
566 them, as a contemporary observer remarked, "The principalities took
175 on a new life"; there was a marked increase in economic activity. That
421 the benefits of this activity were not generally shared by the peasants, however, is shown by their continued exodus across neighboring frontiers. They were being forced out of their old semipastoral habits, and the very increase of cereal exports could work to their disadvantage. For example, the entire 1847 wheat crop was sold in advance because of the urgent demands in other European states suffering from food shortages in the late 1840's. As a result of these premature sales, made largely through the boyars, the principalities experienced a food crisis which contributed greatly to the peasant unrest in the turbulent year 1848.

Apart from the abortive attempts at reform during the short-lived Wallachian revolution in 1848 and a moderate revision of the Organic Statutes in 1851, the next major change was the Act of 1864, which paralleled the 1848 emancipation in the Habsburg lands and the Russian emancipation of 1861. This act, promulgated for the united principalities by Prince Cuza, for political and social rather than for economic reasons, abolished the clacă and other servitudes. The peasants obtained full title to the land they had in use, based upon earlier regulations, and the landowners were given a compensation for the loss of their labor. The law followed the now recognized provision that peasant property could not exceed two-thirds of the former lord's estate. The new holdings could not be sold or alienated for a period of thirty years.

By this act, so it seemed, the remnants of the old servile system had been abolished. Possession and use of land were transformed into absolute property rights; the peasant holder was now a free proprietor, owing no servile obligations—and, indeed, the translation of the clacă and other dues into a redemption payment does seem to have dimin-

Emerit, *op. cit.*, p. 45, doubts if there is sufficient evidence to permit a positive declara- [illegible] that the peasants traditionally had had the use of all the land.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

ished his burdens.[14] Yet a quarter of a century after the Act of 1864 566
there began those peasant disturbances which culminated in the 1907 175
uprising. In some way, as Dobrogeanu-Gherea said, "The year 1864 421
carried in its womb the terrible year 1907."

The connection, however, is not a simple one and is paradoxical in several respects. Between 1864 and 1907 Rumania continued its rapid expansion in agriculture and commerce. Exports of grain, for example, increased from about 1,400,000 tons per year in the early 1880's to nearly 2,500,000 tons in 1905. Hence it is necessary to explain how under such circumstances there should have been growing peasant discontent. Was there, to repeat that old and difficult question, increasing poverty in the midst of expanding national wealth?

In the first place, while the Act of 1864 was passed against the 566
wishes of the boyars, by a coup d'état on the part of Prince Cuza, 17
the administration of the country, especially local administration, 42
was still largely under their control, and they had ample opportunity to twist the provisions of the law to their advantage. Undoubtedly many injustices were committed in its application: often the landowner was able to distribute the worst land to the peasants, holding the best in his own estate; in a number of cases false measuring standards were used, an easy trick in a country lacking basic ground surveys; sometimes the landowner so divided the holdings that the peasants were unable to reach their property without paying a toll. As a cumulative result of these malpractices it is possible that although by the law the peasants were to receive the land they had in use before the reform, they actually received less and of lower quality. Local studies of a few districts indicate that such may have been the case, but statistics are lacking to make a general conclusion.

Another criticism of the law has been that while the peasants' claims to land could not exceed two-thirds of the lord's estate, the excess demand being met by grants of state land, in those regions where the peasants' quota was less the lord was able to retain as absolute property, with no future obligation, well over the minimal one-third. Moreover, under the Organic Statutes the lord was responsible for providing newly married peasants with a holding, while the new act made no adequate provision for subsequent generations. Peasant holdings now became inheritable property to be passed on from father to children. Since the new holdings were virtually inalienable and

14. This point, as in Russia, has been much disputed, and some authors have maintained that the peasants' burdens actually increased. The comparative figures, however, which are provided by Emerit, *op. cit.*, p. 516, if they are accurate and representative, show a considerable falling off of the amount owed by the peasant.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

566
175
●423

since the practice was to distribute land equally among heirs, there was an inevitable tendency, on many peasant holdings at least, toward a progressive subdivision of the property. This tendency has been regarded as one of the worst consequences of the reform: "At the end of three generations, the land distributed by Cuza to the rural workers was dispersed into an impalpable dust." [15] Unquestionably the fragmentation of holdings constituted a major obstacle to the introduction of rational agricultural techniques. Further, the reform did not grant land to a number of peasants, those who previously had not performed the clacă or who were listed as free proprietors. Finally, an examination of the size of the lots granted to the peasants reveals that a large number of cultivators did not receive enough land in the first place to enable them to establish a self-supporting holding on the level of cultivation then prevailing.[16]

It is clear, then, that the peasants' gains were limited, that in most cases they were not in a position to set up an independent farm, that the lord was relieved of all future responsibility, and that a number of categories of peasants were not taken care of. Such certainly were the drawbacks. The basis of Rumanian agriculture was not really altered. The reform of 1864 neither set Rumanian agriculture on the path of small peasant farming on the western European model—whether that was even theoretically possible, given the general nature of the Rumanian economy, will be discussed later—nor fostered large-scale farming based upon agricultural wage labor in the English or Prussian pattern.

In addition to the limitations of the 1864 reform, two other factors have been adduced to explain growing peasant dissatisfaction: the laws on agricultural contracts of 1866 and 1872, which are said to have reintroduced serfdom, and the land hunger of an increasing population. The immediate effect of the reform was to create a crisis in production and a great decline in the area sown, largely because the peasants preferred to cultivate their new holdings and refused to work for the landowners, who were faced with a serious labor shortage. The boyars attempted to compensate for this by passing special laws governing agricultural contracts, which unquestionably put the peasant at the landowner's mercy in matters regarding the fulfill-

15. Emerit, *op. cit.*, p. 519.

16. The allotments were based on an earlier threefold division of the peasants, determined by the number of oxen they possessed. Though the figures are only approximate, peasants having four oxen received roughly 6 hectares; those with two oxen 4½ hectares; and the so-called "tail-end" peasants, 2½ hectares. At the prevailing level of cultivation it was estimated that only the first class, a rather small minority of the peasantry, could obtain an assured surplus.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

566 ment of labor contracts and even permitted the employment of mili-
175 tary force to drive the peasant to work. Although the harsher aspects
of these laws were later abandoned, they permanently affected land-
423 lord-peasant relations and did much to justify the term neoserfdom, "the confirmation of the old servitudes in contractual form."

Yet these laws, while harsh on the peasant once he fell into the power of the landowner, would be significant only on the assumption that the peasants were increasingly obliged to go to the landowner for assistance. That is, the laws of contracts merely accelerated the relapse into a servile system—one lacking the paternalistic protection of the old order—but were not in themselves the cause of a deteriorating situation. Moreover, the peasant uprisings did not occur when the laws were at their harshest but later when some of the worst provisions had been abrogated.

Land hunger, in general, results from an excess of population relative to the amount of land available. As has been noted, at the beginning of the nineteenth century the Rumanian principalities were not thickly settled, though even at the time of the Organic Statutes it was not possible to give adequate grants of arable land to the peasants in the old and relatively thickly settled mountainous districts. By the middle of the century the boyars were invoking population pressure to explain the high cost of land. There is no question that in the second half of the nineteenth century Rumania's population expanded at a very rapid rate.

At the same time, however, the expansion of land under cultivation
311 appears to have been increasing even more rapidly, as the plough was put to untilled pastures, waste, and meadow.[17] The extent to which the peasants were able to benefit from this expansion of cultivated area cannot be estimated with any precision. Undoubtedly much of it took place on large estates under the control of the landowners. To some extent, too, it resulted from the peasants converting their pasture land to arable. The act of 1864 had made no provision for communal pasturing; the small peasant holdings were inadequate for both grain and livestock, and from 1864 there is a notable decline in animal husbandry. It is estimated that whereas in 1860 meadows and pasture comprised 33 per cent of the total surface of Rumania, they were reduced to 17 per cent in the years 1901–5, thus offsetting to a considerable degree the gain in land under cultiva-

17. According to Constantin Garofild, *Chestia agrară în România* (Bucarest, 1920), p. 128, between 1859 and 1899 the population of Rumania increased by 54 per cent, whereas the area of land under cultivation increased by 85 per cent between 1862 and 1905.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

making greater demands upon both the land and the peasant. Since 311
his profits tended to be in direct proportion to the area he was able to lease, there was a marked inclination to build up vast agricultural trusts, some of which covered more than 100,000 hectares. Although ultimately the large tenant was a consequence rather than a cause of the agrarian problem, he was the focus of hatred and abuse: hated by the peasants because he dealt directly with them, verbally abused by the landowner-politicians who made him their scapegoat. Certainly some of the more spectacular injustices and preposterous labor contracts can be found on lands operated by tenants.

This speculative interest on the part of the tenant in acquiring 566
more land contributed to a rapid rise in rents. Between 1870 and 423
1906 rents mounted between 100 and 200 per cent for a third of the 175
properties and over 200 per cent for another third. The peasants 241
consequently were obliged to pay more dearly for the use of land. In 1870 they generally retained from two to four parts of the produce of rented land and delivered one part to the landowner or large tenant; by 1906 in over half the cases studied in an investigation, the ratio was one to one.[21]

The rise in the value of land was not accompanied by an equivalent improvement in agricultural techniques. Most of the peasants were both inexperienced in the careful cultivation of small holdings and financially unable to improve their methods, and the large landowners and tenants had little incentive. By the working of the 1864 reform the peasants remained attached to their strip of land, lacking even the free mobility of the farm laborer. They continued to own most of the means of production: over 90 per cent of the draft animals, ploughs, and harrows in Rumania belonged to the peasants.

Under these conditions the distinction between large-scale and small-scale farming was blurred, and it was characteristic of the latifundiary cultivation prevailing in Rumania that the size of an undertaking was not determined by an organized integration of the productive factors of a given area but was rather the arithmetical sum of a large number of peasant cultivations. The peasant, in return for a piece of land, contracted either to cultivate another piece of land for the proprietor or tenant or to share the produce in a form of metayage. Money payments were uncommon except in Moldavia.[22]

21. Creangă, *op. cit.*, II, 18–22.

22. It must be observed, however, that while the great estates did not, in most cases, utilize progressive farming methods, the output of the large farms was consistently higher than that of the peasant holdings. The reasons for this difference have been the occasion of much dispute. Supporters of large-scale cultivation have held that despite

ɔ: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

From a consideration of all these factors the peculiar nature of the Rumanian agrarian crisis emerges. The poorer peasant, who had been forced to go to the landowner or tenant for additional land, was in an increasingly bad bargaining position. The landowners or tenants, in responding to commercial incentives, could increase production with little cost to themselves merely by demanding more of him, since he supplied the implements and draft animals as well as the labor.[23] Clinging to his little plot of ground and doggedly refusing to become a migrant wage laborer, the poor peasant could see no possible relief to his situation except to have more land. On the other hand, the richer peasant, whose land was sufficient to produce a surplus, likewise found himself restricted by the relative monopoly in land, the high rents, and the speculation of the large tenants: the system was an obstacle to the further improvement of his position.[24]

In general, then, the economic background of the 1907 revolt lay not in peasant poverty alone but in the protracted dislocating effect of commerce upon a previously "natural economy" and a society involved in the ambiguities of neoserfdom. This dislocation has occurred in many forms throughout the globe where modern industry and commerce have impinged upon traditional social and economic patterns. The particular form it took in Rumania, increasing agrarian tension in the midst of a flourishing foreign commerce in cereals, was a product not only of economic and demographic factors but of Rumania's particular social structure, which was dominated by a boyar oligarchy.

Socially and economically Rumania resembled tsarist Russia in several ways. As Dobrogeanu-Gherea observed: "We are the only country in Europe, with the exception of Russia, which has the sad privilege of peasant revolts—neither the Western countries superior to us in culture, nor those of the East, such as Serbia and Bulgaria, which are inferior to us, have them." [25] In both countries the history

---

the prevalence of unprogressive latifundiary cultivation, large property was making technical advances and was paving the way toward more scientific farming. Advocates of peasant farming have replied that the large owners had kept the best land to themselves and that the peasants were unable to give adequate attention to their own fields. As one peasant is reported to have said: "Do you think this beautiful maize is mine? It belongs to the Jewish tenant. I haven't even hoed my own once yet, his twice. He didn't allot us the land till late." Creangă, *op. cit.*, I, 14.

23. This curious fact, that under the prevailing agrarian relations prosperity seemed to sharpen social tensions, may explain why the 1907 revolt should have followed the excellent 1906 harvest.

24. This grievance of the richer peasants may serve to explain why the minor uprising of 1888 had been most violent in the district of Ialomiţa, a sparsely populated region having a comparatively prosperous peasantry, but in which an exceptionally high percentage of the land (69 per cent) was in the hands of large proprietors, who leased out more than 70 per cent of their estates.

25. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

of property relations followed a different course from that in the West, and in both countries contact with the West created a steadily increasing crisis which the legislative measures of the nineteenth century did not solve and in some respects exacerbated. In neither case did peasant emancipation lead to the healthy development of small holds but rather to the appearance of the land-hungry cultivator still in a position of dependence on the landowner.[26]

While there were these similarities in Russian and Rumanian social and economic life, and more than a casual parallel in the development of agrarian relations, the political and international positions of the two states were entirely different. This difference explains in part some of the very great divergences in the recent history of these countries.

Political Aspects of the Agrarian Question

Although Rumanian economic and social relations were such as to create a dangerous tension in the countryside, politically, in marked contrast to tsarist Russia, there was relatively little revolutionary activity. This difference has often been attributed to the lethargy and supineness of the Rumanian peasant or to his Daco-Roman stability and love of order and hard work. National qualities may have played some part, though the violence of the 1907 revolt was damaging to many such theories. A more substantial reason would appear to lie in the contrast between the political and international situations of the two states.

Russia, a great empire, was assured of its independence as a nation. Existing institutions were firmly fixed. Russian social reformers could direct their energies toward internal issues without being preoccupied with the question of national survival. For these reasons the climate was favorable to a revolutionary spirit. Quite opposite conditions obtained in Rumania, a newly created state whose position in the community, or anarchy, of nations was by no means secure. Many Rumanians were not as yet included within the country's

26. The sensitivity in Rumania to developments in Russia would suggest the presence of common characteristics. The Russian emancipation of 1861 was followed by Prince Cuza's Act of 1864. There is evidence that the Rumanian rising of 1889 was aroused by a rumor that the tsar had ordered land to be divided among the peasants. The Russian Revolution of 1905 found a reflection in the 1907 revolt in Rumania, and of course the Russian Revolution of 1917 had a direct bearing upon the Rumanian agrarian reforms of 1918–21. The correlation of these events is certainly more than a chronological coincidence. It might be added that Stolypin's program to reform Russian agriculture by creating a class of strong peasant holdings resembles some of the recommendations put forward by the Conservative agrarian expert Constantin Garoflid.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 speech of May 27, 1917 by Professor N. Basilescu, who had been one of the few to foresee the 1907 uprising: "This is the state of mind in the country: disbelief in the government, disbelief in Parliament, disbelief in the constituted authority. . . . Today as yesterday revolution appears to the Rumanian peasant the only possible means for him to resolve the great case between him and the proprietors of estates." [4] The eleventh-hour move by the king, which was supported by both the parties, seems to have been instrumental in averting trouble and in encouraging the troops. In the final Russian offensive of July, 1917, the Rumanian troops made a brave showing against the Germans and fought valiantly at the battles of Mărăşti (July 28) and Mărăşeşti (August 12–19).

175 The paternalistic tone of the king's address was also apparent, 423 however, in the steps taken to carry out his proclamation. No peasant delegate participated in the constituent assembly which convened in 1917, and the bill passed by that assembly was simply a compromise worked out by the leaders of the Liberal and Conservative parties. Under Article 19 of the 1866 Constitution, property was inviolable; it could be expropriated only for reasons of public utility, narrowly defined as communications, public health, and national defense. Hence, to expropriate land for the purpose of distributing it to the peasants, it was necessary to amend the constitution.

The 1917 amendment extended the definition of public utility to include expropriation for the purpose of increasing peasant holdings. Cultivable land belonging to the crown and to public and private institutions and all rural properties belonging to foreigners and absentee owners were to be expropriated in their entirety. In addition, 2,000,000 hectares of cultivable land were to be expropriated from private properties (including absentee holdings) of over 100 hectares, the expropriation to be based on a progressive scale which was not defined. Thus, no maximum limit was set to properties. The figure of 2,000,000 hectares was not based on any agricultural criteria but represented a compromise between the amounts proposed by the Liberals and the Conservatives. The chief fault of this amendment was that it was not itself a law for expropriation but only set forth the principles of such a law. Section 5 of the amended Article 19 provided for the promulgation of a law to be passed six months after the national liberation by a two-thirds majority, usually required only for constitutional amendments. If this law were not passed, there would be no land reform.

With the October Revolution, Russia's withdrawal from the war,

4. Quoted in Diaconescu, *Chestiunea țărănească în România*, p. 141.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

and the collapse of the Eastern Front, Rumania was in a hopeless military position, and in March, 1918, it sued for peace. The pro-German Alexandru Marghiloman, who had remained behind in Bucarest, was entrusted with a new government. This government dissolved the constituent assembly, and Marghiloman declared that "the whole agrarian problem must be taken up anew from the beginning."

During the brief term of the Marghiloman government, Constantin Garoflid, Minister of Agriculture, introduced a series of agrarian measures: obligatory leases, the reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture, and the organization of agricultural workers. Garoflid, though a Conservative and a landowner, had long been opposed to the latifundiary system in Rumania and desired to build up a prosperous medium peasantry. He regarded the 1917 amendment as "not a scientific work but an electoral manifesto." Although previously recognizing the need for expropriation, he considered such an extreme measure unsuited to wartime conditions and advocated forced leases of land to the peasants as a temporary solution. Much in Garoflid's program was conducive to a rational development of Rumanian agriculture. He may even have had in mind a progressive series of reforms, but his proposals were open to the criticism that in Rumania a policy advocating such moderation and gradualness most often meant doing nothing at all. His program, however, was not even to be begun.

The collapse of the Central Powers in the autumn of 1918, Rumania's reentry into the war, and the withdrawal of Mackensen's forces again reversed the situation. The Marghiloman government was dismissed and its laws declared null and void. With the breakdown of the Central Powers, chaos spread through eastern Europe. Revolutionary conditions prevailed in Russia, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In Rumania a dry year, combined with the dislocations caused by the war and the German occupation, left the peasants hard pressed for food. The action of the Marghiloman government in dissolving the constituent assembly had increased their doubts in the good faith of any government. Tension was heightened by the revolutionary activity among the Rumanians in the neighboring regions of Transylvania, Bucovina, and Bessarabia, which had been or were shortly to be incorporated in Greater Rumania.

The Agrarian Reforms of 1918–21

Immediately after the armistice, on November 12, 1918, King Ferdinand issued a new proclamation reaffirming his pledge of 1917.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 Under the pressure of events the government did not bother to follow
656 the formalities prescribed in the 1917 amendment but quickly drafted
●423 a decree-law, to be ratified subsequently by the parliament. This decree-law of December 15, 1918, laid down the norms under which land was immediately to be expropriated. Some of the leading provisions were as follows: [8]

a) As in the constitutional amendment, arable crown and mortmain land as well as foreign and absentee properties were completely expropriated.

b) The amount of 2,000,000 hectares was to be expropriated on a sliding scale from private properties of over 100 hectares. This rather arbitrary scale did represent an advance upon the 1917 amendment in limiting all properties to 500 hectares, but it made no provision for geographical differences, relative land hunger, or rational organization of estates. The law based the expropriation on properties rather than on proprietorship, to the benefit of the landowner with multiple holdings. Moreover, the relation between the scale of expropriation and the 2,000,000 hectares to be obtained was not accurately computed, and the expropriation actually fell short by some 450,000 hectares.

c) Compensation for expropriated land was to be based on a number of factors: price of sale in the region for five years prior to 1916, regional level of rent, evaluation by credit institutions, net income per hectares, etc., but was not to exceed twenty times the regional rental rate. Payments to proprietors were to be made by 5 per cent state bonds, redeemable in fifty years. The state was to contribute up to 35 per cent of the cost.

d) Peasant associations were to be created to serve as temporary recipients of the transferred land. The law went into little detail as regards resettlement, which was covered later by the law of 1921.

175 Ion I. C. Brătianu, who had headed the government on Decem-
423 ber 14, 1918, resigned on September 27, 1919, in a dispute with the
185 Allies on the peace settlement. King Ferdinand accepted the resignation and formed a nonparty cabinet under General Vaitoianu to hold a general election. This election, virtually the first to be uncontrolled in Rumanian history, produced surprising results. The Liberals lost most of their seats in the Old Kingdom, and after some delay a bloc made up of the newly formed Peasant party and the National party of Transylvania assumed office.

During its brief term this government, with the Transylvanian Vaida-Voevod as Premier and Ion Mihalache as Minister of Agricul-

8. Full summaries of this and the subsequent agrarian law of 1921 are given in Diaconescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 148–334, and Mitrany, *op. cit.*, pp. 111–182.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

ture, introduced a bill for the resettlement of the peasants as well as for an extension of the expropriation. According to Mihalache, the Vaida government sought to make a new agrarian reform which was not based on the limited concept of the constituent assembly at Iaşi.[6] Although this bill was not passed, it is of importance as an early expression of the agrarian program of what was to become the National Peasant party.

The *exposé de motifs* of the bill granted that when promulgated the acts of 1917 and 1918 represented the only workable formulae, given the composition of parliament and the state of the nation, but stated that the incorporation of Bessarabia and the other provinces in Greater Rumania now made imperative further action on behalf of the peasants in the Old Kingdom, since the new provinces were enjoying extensive land reforms. By the terms of this bill expropriation was to be based on the total holdings of a proprietor, not on separate properties, and was extended to include property continuously rented for ten years prior to 1916. Private property in excess of 100 hectares of cultivable land was to be expropriated; in this the framers of the bill consciously followed the provisions of the relatively radical Bessarabian land reform. Exceptions, however, were made for estates organized as farms with a significant capital investment; these were limited to 250 hectares in densely populated regions and to 500 hectares in regions of sparse population. Property remaining after expropriation was not to be leased except to peasant cooperatives. In general, the bill was more radical than its predecessors in the Old Kingdom and represented a peasant point of view, both as regards the expropriation and the organization of agriculture, rather than a political compromise formulated by the landowners to avert peasant revolt.

As soon as the nature of Mihalache's bill became known, the old parties took steps to block it. The Minister of Agriculture was unable to obtain an audience with the king, allegedly as a result of Liberal intrigue. On March 12, 1920, after failing to obtain the king's approval to present the bill as a government measure, Mihalache presented it to the assembly as a private member's bill. At that session he warned: "But it should be known that if parliament has to leave, or if the government has to leave, it is because of a conspiracy by the whole oligarchy of all the boyar political parties." His prediction was realized; on the following day the government, which still held a substantial parliamentary majority, was dismissed by the crown in

6. For the text of this bill and the debate at its introduction, see the pamphlet published by the Federaţia Democraţiei, *Proiectul legei de improprietărirea ţăranilor* (Bucarest, 1920).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 what has been called "the most questionable act of King Ferdinand's
185 reign."[7] Although peasant disturbances, general instability, and the inexperience of the Vaida government have been cited as reasons
● 423 for its downfall, it seems clear that its dismissal stemmed directly from the hostility of the landowners to the proposed agrarian bill.[8] Thus, the effort of the Peasant party to carry through a more radical reform by legal means was defeated.

The new premier, General Averescu, was selected because he was a popular military hero. He immediately ordered new elections and by the usual controls was able to obtain a majority for his People's party. Mihalache was replaced by Constantin Garoflid. Garoflid, as has been seen, was by no means opposed to land reform, but he did not approve of the emphasis upon large-scale expropriation and the creation of a multitude of small holdings. It was his task, however, to complete a measure based upon principles he had always attacked.

423 The second land reform law for the Old Kingdom was promulgated on July 17, 1921. Although primarily concerned with allotting land and resettling the peasants, it also extended expropriation to obtain the 450,000 hectares lacking after the 1918 decree-law. Expropriation was now based on proprietors rather than properties, and the old sliding scale was abandoned in favor of a more elastic measure which took account of regional geographic differences and relative land hunger.[9] Land left to the proprietor was to be determined at once,

[113]

7. R. W. Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians* (Cambridge, 1934), p. 551.

8. The attitude of the landowners at this time is shown in a circular distributed by the Union of Syndicates of Moldavian Landowners: "We, landowners, are firmly determined to oppose by all means, and especially by impeaching before the Court of Cassation, all those provisions of the decree-law of 1918, of the law for communal grazing, and of any future law or decree, which may conflict with the letter of the Constitution regarding the expropriation of land . . . To re-consecrate the intangible right of property, we demand that a law shall be passed which shall punish with hard labor for life whomsoever shall speak of expropriation again." Quoted in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

9. Land was left to the proprietors on the following basis:

	Land cultivated by owner (hectares)	*Land cultivated by owner with important capital investments (hectares)*
In highlands and hills	100	100
In plains, where demand for land was great	150	200
In plains, where demand for land was moderate	200	300
In plains, where demand for land was satisfied	250	500

3: Reports S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

but land to be expropriated was not to be taken over until it could be utilized. Thus expropriation was to be gradual, keeping pace with resettlement. 423

The 1921 law established a list of priorities of claims to receive land, determined primarily by war service rather than by economic considerations. Land to be distributed was divided into complementary lots for peasants with less than 5 hectares, full lots of 5 hectares, and colonization lots of 7 hectares. Provisions for grazing land had been made by a special act of September 24, 1920; these were supplemented by Article 23 of the law of 1921. Nothing was done with respect to woodlands and forest.

The problem of compensation created much confusion. The acts of 1917 and 1918 had merely limited compensation to not more than twenty times the regional rent for 1916. With the decline of the leu after the war, this compensation was deemed inadequate, and the 1921 law raised the rate to forty times the 1916 regional rent. Half the price was to be paid by the state. The peasants' payments were to extend over a period of twenty years, on condition of a 20 per cent payment at the outset.

The scattered distribution of peasant holdings in uneconomic strips was one of the chief hindrances to rational cultivation. Garoflid had always regarded consolidation as indispensable for a more productive agriculture, and Article 136 of the 1921 law stated that measures for consolidating holdings would be provided for in a special act. This act, however, never appeared, and scattered strips remained characteristic of Rumanian farming. One reason for inaction on such an important issue was that the peasants themselves were not striving for consolidation as they were for more land. Mihalache, while granting that "none of us could be against consolidation on principle," feared that the dangers of misapplication under existing circumstances were greater than the probable benefits.[10]

A related problem was the practice of dividing holdings equally among heirs. The law of 1864 had made peasant allotments inalienable but had not prevented their fragmentation through inheritance. Article 126 of the 1921 law limited the splitting of allotted land by succession to a minimum of two hectares in the plains and one hectare in the hills and highlands. Article 127 permitted the owner of a property to leave it to only one heir, with a money payment to the others. Under Article 133 a landowner was allowed to declare indivisible an area up to 50 hectares. Article 120 reversed previous practice by

10. I. Mihalache, *Dreptul țăranilor la pământ, islazuri și paduri* (Bucarest, 1922), pp. 129–130.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

423 permitting the sale of small property, on certain conditions and after five years. Article 122, however, limited purchases to 25 hectares in the hills and 100 hectares in the plains.[11]

423 185 In general, the 1921 law was more carefully drafted than that of 1918 and did attempt to remedy some of the technical errors of previous legislation. The economic effects of these land reforms, which together were reported officially to have expropriated nearly 2,800,000 hectares of land in the Old Kingdom, will be discussed in a later chapter.[12] The acts of 1918 and 1921 were, however, essentially defensive political rather than economic measures. As Mihalache said in his critique of the decree-law of 1918,

> it is not the work of a social concept, not the response to a social ideal, not the work of conviction; under the threat of the events of 1917, it is the continuation of a series of land settlements on the model of 1881 and 1889, it is the over-simplified concept that a new equilibrium between large property and small property must be stabilized in order that there be future peace.

In his opinion, "The ruling class has made only such concessions as were necessary to assure its own existence. The reforms have been a kind of safety valve."[13]

The safety valve, however, was successful. Despite its very precarious position, Rumania passed through the revolutionary storm in eastern Europe without an overthrow of the established order. Several reasons explain this success. A decisive factor, doubtless, was the flexibility of the ruling groups. Notwithstanding the obduracy of many members of the landed oligarchy and in spite of efforts to avoid or delay the reform, the landowners did at least yield sufficiently to prevent an outbreak. Their recalcitrance between 1917 and 1921 was in inverse ratio to the amount of peasant unrest. Moreover, the king, although conservative socially, was able to take the correct 423 steps at two critical moments, in April, 1917, and in November, 1918.

186 Apart from the flexibility of the landowners, certain other forces 668 were at work. Among the Conservatives, the stronghold of the landed interests, there were such men as Garoflid who recognized the failings of Rumanian agriculture and desired to make thorough-going changes, though along lines different from those followed. In the

11. For subsequent modifications, in 1925 and 1929, of these provisions for sale, see below, p. 125 and pp. 156–157.

12. The difficult task of discovering just what the land reforms accomplished in redistributing property is discussed below, pp. 48–49, and in the Appendix.

13. Mihalache, *op. cit.*, pp. 5, 29.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

Liberal party, the primary interest was in the expansion of industry, commerce, and finance, and since 1913 the party had officially stood for expropriation. In several respects the Liberal position was unfortunate since it had neither the reforming zeal of the new Peasant party nor the Conservatives' interest in the improvement of agriculture. The Liberals tended to regard land as a bone to be thrown to the peasants when the howls of the latter seemed menacing or detrimental to the national interest. Such a view was apt to neglect the economic aspects of the agrarian problem and to reduce it to a question of finding more land for distribution. Nevertheless, this Liberal attitude did make for change. Finally, once the question of land reform became the order of the day, the mere pressure of politics led the parties, if only for electoral reasons, to make the appearance of favoring reform.

423 185 668

A second factor was that the land laws, despite delays and omissions, were sufficiently extensive to pacify the peasants. A great deal of land changed hands, and the Rumanian reform was the most far-reaching of all the postwar agrarian measures in eastern Europe (excluding Russia, of course).

A third factor was concern for the national interest, which, as noted above, has usually been of primary importance in determining Rumanian internal policy. Notwithstanding military defeats, enormous human losses, and devastation of land, Rumania emerged from the war a victorious power with doubled population and territory.[14] The mere fact of being victorious and having achieved the national aim of Greater Rumania undoubtedly served to mitigate social tensions. The parties were in agreement in glorifying and protecting the new national unity; since Rumania was surrounded by states from which it had obtained territory, the defense of the new frontiers was a major concern of all postarmistice governments.

The very violence of the Russian Revolution, particularly the Bolshevik Revolution, served to create an opposing reaction in Rumania, heightened by the territorial dispute over Bessarabia. The political parties, including the Peasant party, were exceedingly hostile to bolshevism, which became the ultimate term of abuse in political debates. Mihalache had been sent to Bessarabia during the war to carry on antibolshevist propaganda, and one of his appeals for a more extensive land reform was that in the future the peasants should not be tempted to look beyond Rumania's frontier on the Dniester for better conditions. Fear of Soviet communism was one of the cardinal fea-

14. The area of Rumania in 1915 was 137,900 square kilometers; in 1919, 294,000 square kilometers. Its population in 1913 was 7,625,000; in 1919, 15,500,000.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

423 tures of Rumanian policy for the next twenty-five years, and in the
185 international councils Rumania was to stress its role as the European
668 bulwark against bolshevism.[15]

175 *Agrarian Reform in the New Territories*

423 Thus far only the agrarian reform in the Old Kingdom has been considered, and it does provide the central thread of the agrarian question in the interwar period. But as a result of the war Rumania also acquired Bessarabia from Russia, Bucovina from Austria, and Transylvania from Hungary. The agrarian problems in these three provinces were different in several respects from that of the Old Kingdom; the separate laws passed for each of the provinces further increased the complexity of the Rumanian agrarian situation after the First World War.

1. BESSARABIA

Bessarabia, which had formed a part of the principality of Moldavia, was ceded by the Turks to Russia in 1812 at the Treaty of Bucarest, in return for the evacuation of the remainder of Moldavia and Wallachia.[16] Three southern districts were returned to Moldavia after the Crimean War, but reverted to Russia after the War of 1877. The population was predominantly Rumanian, though large numbers of Ukrainians and Bulgarians inhabited the southern districts. In the last decades of the nineteenth century the tsarist regime undertook to Russify Bessarabia but without marked success. The Moldavian boyars in Bessarabia were notoriously obscurantist, and the province was a "natural breeding ground of such movements as the Black Hundreds." [17]

15. F. Borkenau, in his study, *The Communist International* (London, 1938), p. 99, attaches great importance to the Rumanian agrarian reform in this connection: "The agrarian reform in Rumania was perhaps the strongest single obstacle that opposed the advance of Bolshevism towards the West. It was very far from solving all problems, even for the peasantry, but for a decade it took the sharp edge off them. Revolutionary trends among the proletariat remained, but the proletariat alone was nothing in Rumania, and revolutionism among its members was more of a convulsion than a clearly defined movement."

16. The current Soviet interpretation of this event appears to be that in the eighteenth century the Moldavian and Wallachian boyars had sought the incorporation of the principalities in Russia as the sole means of escaping the Turkish yoke. This act of liberation was taking place during the Turko-Russian war of 1806. The threat of Napoleon, however, forced Tsar Alexander to come to terms with the Turks, so that only Bessarabia was fortunate enough to be liberated and incorporated in the tsarist empire. See A. Dolnik, *Bessarabiya pod vlastyu Rumynskikh boyar, 1918–1940 gg.* (Moscow, 1945), p. 5.

17. R. W. Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 563.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Although the general agrarian structure of Bessarabia resembled that of the Old Kingdom, certain differences developed during the century of Russian control. The emancipation of 1861 corresponded roughly to the Cuza reform, but the allotted land, *nadyel*, was given over not to the peasant but to the peasant commune, the mir. While the Bessarabian allotments at the time of the emancipation were greater than for most parts of Russia, there was, as in Rumania, an increasing land hunger arising from the nature of the reform and the rapidly expanding population. The Stolypin reforms, after the 1905 revolution, worked to increase individual peasant ownership and to break up the mir, but by the outbreak of the war nadyel land still constituted the largest category of property. In Russia after 1907 the sale of land to the peasants by the large landowners was widespread and especially so in Bessarabia. Although a comparison of the pre-1914 distribution of property in Bessarabia with that in Rumania is difficult to make since the Russian returns were based upon distinctions between types of ownership rather than size, the general order of the problem was similar in the two regions.[18]

The history of Bessarabia's incorporation into Rumania is still bitterly controversial. Only the major developments can be sketched here. Immediately after the February Revolution, two political currents began to emerge in Bessarabia, an agrarian-revolutionary (which tended to be hostile to Rumania as a land dominated by boyars) and a nationalist-Moldavian. From July, 1917, the peasants began to seize land, and by the end of the year some two-thirds of the large property had been taken over. A military committee, representative of the Moldavian element, convoked a congress which, on October 21–23, 1917, passed a resolution in favor of the "historical and political autonomy" of Bessarabia and decided to convoke a national council (*Sfatul Țării*). The situation was utterly disorganized by the October Revolution and the Ukrainian break with the Bolsheviks. The *Sfat*, which was strongly Moldavian nationalist, was opposed to the centralism of the new Bolshevik regime. On December 2, 1917, it announced the formation of a Democratic Moldavian Republic as a self-governing unit in the Federative Democratic Russian Republic.

A crisis was reached in January, 1918, when Rumanian troops, sent to Bessarabia at the request of the Sfat, ousted the Bolshevik Soviets which had gained power in several cities and had attempted to supersede the Sfat. Shortly thereafter, the Sfat proclaimed the independence of the Moldavian republic. When Rumania sued for peace in March, 1918, the Germans favored the Rumanian interest

18. For statistics on land distribution in Bessarabia see the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175
●423

in Bessarabia. On April 9, 1918, the Sfat by open vote—86 to 3, with 36 delegates abstaining—declared for the union of Bessarabia with Rumania, but with important reservations: the Bessarabian land reform was to be maintained and the province was to have administrative autonomy.[19]

In Bessarabia, unlike the Old Kingdom, the redistribution of land was achieved by the direct action of the peasants. As a consequence, there were doubts, to say the least, among the cultivators as to the desirability of uniting with Rumania. Mihalache reported that the Bessarabian peasants said to him, "We will not unite with Rumania, since Rumania belongs to the *ciocoi*, who have fleeced the peasants." [20] Before Bessarabia was united with Rumania, however, there was a retreat from the first wave of land seizures. The Sfat succeeded in retaining 50 hectares for each proprietor, and subsequently the area was increased to 100 hectares. The land reform law proposed by the Sfat was subsequently ratified in Rumania by the decree-law of December 22, 1918, but 47 of the 73 articles of this decree-law were later modified by the law adopted by the Rumanian assembly in 1920.

The Bessarabian reform as finally drafted expropriated in full: former state and crown domains, mortmain estates, monastic properties (except one-half hectare for each monk), estates belonging to towns (except land reserved for town planning), estates of foreigners, and estates farmed out for five successive years. One million hectares were to be expropriated from private property, including all properties above 100 hectares (multiple holdings were counted as one property). Peasant allotments were set at 6–8 hectares, with complementary lots for peasants lacking the minimum. Compensation was based on rent obtained in the period 1910–14, capitalized at 5½ per cent. The price of the land, in general, was set at 800 lei per hectare, over the protests of the peasants who maintained that they had obtained the land through the revolution. The state assumed 25 per cent of the price. According to official Rumanian statistics, the total area expropriated was about 1,492,000 hectares.[21]

19. The Bessarabian controversy has centered on the actions of the Sfat: whether it was representative and whether its decisions reflected the wishes of the people. In the Soviet view, the Sfat was merely the tool of the landlord counterrevolutionaries, and the ousted Soviets the true representatives of the peasant masses. Dolnik, *op. cit.*, p. 20. There have been doubts as to the validity of the vote of April 9, 1918, and assertions that it was made under Rumanian military pressure. The high number of abstentions and the open vote would lead to the suspicion that it was scarcely an ideal referendum.

20. *Proectul legei de improprietărirea țăranilor*, (Bucarest, 1920), p. 54. Ciocoi was the peasant's term for the boyar's pack of retainers.

21. For further statistics on the Bessarabian land reform see the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

It has been held that Bessarabia provided a revolutionary leaven for the rest of Rumania. To a degree this is true. Even before the First World War both socialist and populist theories were transmitted from Russia to Rumania through Bessarabia. The Bessarabian land reform had an effect upon the policy of the nascent Rumanian Peasant party; the exposé de motifs of the Peasant party's reform bill of 1920 argued that the law passed by Sfatul Ţării for Bessarabia made equally extensive measures mandatory for all of Rumania. Mihalache, in defending his bill, pointed out that the Bucarest assembly was unwilling to accept for the Old Kingdom measures they had previously ratified for Bessarabia, and asked whether the impression was to remain that the Bessarabian peasant had achieved more for himself through revolution than had the peasant of the Old Kingdom through the good offices of the parliament.[22] 175 423

But the radical influences coming from Bessarabia were less than the contrary influence of Rumania upon Bessarabia. Successive formulations and arrangements regarding Bessarabia progressively reduced the extent of the agrarian reform, took away the administrative autonomy of the province, and extended the centralized administration of Bucarest. As a result, regardless of the original sentiment favoring incorporation in Rumania, Bessarabia was a disaffected area throughout the interwar period, with much the most corrupt administration of any Rumanian province.

2. BUCOVINA

Bucovina, which had formed the northern portion of the principality of Moldavia, was ceded by the Turks to Austria in 1775. The population was originally largely Rumanian; in 1848 Rumanians numbered 209,000 as against 108,000 Ruthenians. This proportion altered in subsequent decades until by 1910 the Ruthenians were the largest group, though not a majority, outnumbering the Rumanians 305,000 to 233,000. There were also some 102,000 Jews and 66,000 Germans at that date. In general, the Ruthenian population was concentrated in the northern part of Bucovina, the Rumanian in the south. 176 [162]

By the treaty of alliance of August 17, 1916, between the Allies and Rumania, the latter was to receive all of Bucovina to the Prut River. At the time of the peace conference, it was suggested that part of northern Bucovina be included, for ethnic reasons, in eastern Galicia. This suggestion was dropped with the collapse of Galician au-

22. *Proectul legei de impropriştăriree ţăranilor*, pp. 29 and 58.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 tonomy because of the desire not to increase the number of Ukrainians under Polish rule. The incorporation of Bucovina had none of the turbulence that accompanied Bessarabia's. A general congress met on November 28, 1918, and voted for union with Rumania.

311 Before the First World War, of the cultivable area of Bucovina, holdings over 100 hectares occupied 25 per cent, holdings between 10 and 100 hectares 27 per cent, and small holdings 48 per cent. (If the very extensive forest lands are included the holdings over 100 hectares covered more than 60 per cent of the surface of the province.) Large properties were less dominant than in the Old Kingdom and medium properties much more important, partly because of German colonization and efforts by the Austrian government to foster this category of holding.

● 423 The decree-law of September 7, 1919, for the Bucovina land reform was ratified by the law of July, 1921, which modified the decree in favor of the landowners and reduced the extent of land to be expropriated. Land reform in Bucovina was made under more peaceful circumstances than elsewhere and was more carefully worked out. The state was given a right to reserve land for general needs, and the landowner was allowed continued use of his land until it was actually taken over. The reform expropriated in full: estates of foreigners and absentees, mortmain estates, estates of persons who had lost their civil rights, and estates farmed out for more than nine years. Expropriation of private properties was on a sliding scale beginning at 100 hectares and permitting a maximum of 250 hectares on properties having considerable inventory and equipment. Scattered properties belonging to the same owner were counted as one. The allotment of land was made in lots of 4–8 hectares, colonization lots of 5 hectares, and complementary lots of not less than ¼ hectare for peasants having less than 4 hectares. Compensation to landowners was approximately the same as in the Old Kingdom, and the state assumed 50 per cent of the cost. The peasant could pay in whole or in part, the remainder becoming a mortgage payable in 50 years at 5 per cent. According to official statistics the total area expropriated in Bucovina was about 76,000 hectares.[23]

3. TRANSYLVANIA

175 The disputed history of Transylvania and the endless controversy that has raged between the Rumanians and the Hungarians

23. For further statistics on the distribution of land in Bucovina and the effects of the land reform see the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

are far too complex for inclusion here. Whatever the origins of the 175
Transylvanian population, at the outbreak of the First World War the Rumanians constituted a majority of the inhabitants of this region; with the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the Transylvanian Rumanians, along with the other ethnic groups in the empire moved to break away. On October 12, 1918, the Rumanian National party of Transylvania drafted a resolution demanding the right of self-determination. A national assembly was called at Alba Iulia on December first and passed a resolution in favor of the union of all Rumanians. The basis of this union was to be:

1) full national liberty for all races;
2) full autonomy for all regions;
3) a democratic regime with general, direct, equal, and secret elections;
4) complete liberty of press, assembly, and association;
5) radical agrarian reform;
6) equitable conditions for industrial workers.

A Governing Council (*Consiliul Dirigent*), under Iuliu Maniu, was established as the temporary administration. The Treaty of Trianon assigned Transylvania and the adjacent regions of Maramureş, Crişana, and the Banat to Rumania.

Servile tenures had been abolished somewhat earlier in Transylvania than in the Old Kingdom, and the relative importance of medium properties reflected the generally higher level of cultivation. 311
Nevertheless, there was a great disparity between large and small properties, a disparity intensified by the national question. The Rumanians were almost entirely peasants, and most of the large estates belonged to Hungarians. Reliable information, however, is lacking regarding the distribution of land either by size of property or by nationality; according to Hungarian critics of Rumanian statistics, no exact figures have ever been available for the land distribution in 1919 in the total area annexed by Rumania.[24] The Rumanians have claimed that they held only 24 per cent of the total area and that 98 per cent of the properties over 100 cadastral yokes (the yoke, used in Transylvania, equals .58 hectares) were held by non-Rumanians. While this claim may have been extreme, Hungarian sources grant that 87 per cent of the owners of properties exceeding 100 yokes were Magyars.

The project for the land reform, prepared in thirty-two sittings 671
of the Governing Council, became a decree-law on September 12, 423

24. C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors* (Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 316, n. 2.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

671 1919, and was subsequently ratified by the law of July 23, 1921. In
423 Transylvania, where economic life was more advanced and extensive cereal cultivation played a less dominant role than in the Old Kingdom, the agrarian reform while radical in intent was more broadly conceived and had numerous exceptions and exemptions. It expropriated in full: estates of foreigners, estates of certain public and private institutions, estates which had been leased for more than twelve consecutive years, and any estate land of more than 500 cadastral yokes. Below 500 yokes, land was expropriated on a sliding scale down to an exempted minimum of 200 yokes. If, however, further land were needed, property below 200 yokes could be expropriated. Multiple holdings by one proprietor were considered one. The size of allotments was not fixed. The order of preference was determined primarily by war service rather than by land need, but peasants owning more than 5 yokes were not to receive land until other demands had been satisfied. The Transylvanian reform went beyond the others in its provisions for communal woodlands, which were not created for the Old Kingdom, Bessarabia, and Bucovina until a law for the expropriation of forests was passed in 1924. Compensation for expropriated land was subject to less rigid limits and the payment to the landowner was prompter. According to official statistics about 1,664,000 hectares were expropriated in Transylvania.[25]

423 The Rumanian land reforms, in the years 1918–21, did not, then, represent a unified program but varied considerably, depending upon geographical differences, previous agrarian conditions, and political circumstances. The reforms in Bessarabia and Transylvania reflected the more revolutionary spirit in those provinces; the complexities of the Transylvanian law and the attempt to relate it to the whole economy correspond to the generally higher level of Transylvanian agriculture and the presence of a nascent industry.

Notwithstanding these differences, however, which make it impossible to give a simple summary of the agrarian reform, the laws have certain common features: they were all based on expropriation in the "public interest" for the purpose of increasing peasant properties and communal pastures; although the decline of the leu in the 1920's almost destroyed the value of the compensation, the reforms were not planned as confiscations; and despite economic provisions of varying merit, the laws were not primarily economic reforms but social measures designed to appease the peasants' land hunger. More-

25. For further statistics on the effects of the reform in Transylvania see the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

over, the process of incorporating the new provinces into Greater Rumania did tend to level out the differences in the laws. The reform in the Old Kingdom was altered somewhat by the more radical atmosphere in the provinces. On the other hand, the Bessarabian, Bucovinan, and Transylvanian reforms were considerably modified by the time the parliament ratified them in 1921. National interest, as conceived of in Bucarest, demanded equilibrium, if not complete similarity, between the various agrarian laws.

An element of xenophobia, in the form of discrimination against foreign landowners and minorities, also appeared in the agrarian reforms and was the subject of the interminable case of the Hungarian optants, which was before the Council of the League of Nations throughout the 1920's. Unquestionably certain of the expropriation provisions were directed against the non-Rumanian minorities, and in Transylvania and Southern Dobrogea the execution of the reforms had a decidedly nationalist tinge. On the other hand, since the Rumanians in the new provinces usually included the poorest strata of the population, and many of the larger landowners were members of the minorities, it was inevitable that the leveling process of the land reforms should have benefited the Rumanians at the expense of the minorities. In any event, nationalist discrimination was a by-product of the land reforms, not a primary incentive.

At the conclusion of the First World War Rumania, in spite of terrible human and material losses, seemed to be entering a new and promising era. By an extraordinary combination of circumstances a united Greater Rumania had been achieved. The acquired territories with their resources and industry promised to add a new dimension to the Rumanian economy. The passage of the land reforms gave hope for greater social stability and the eventual growth of a prosperous peasant agriculture. The revolutionary fever subsided, the peasants had not revolted, a general strike of workers in 1920 had been successfully suppressed, and although new parties and politicians appeared on the scene, the continuity of the Rumanian monarchy and government stood unique in eastern Europe. But the two basic problems of Rumanian history remained: a weak power position and a backward economy. The first did not present an immediate threat because of the exhaustion of neighboring great powers through war and revolution. The task of adjusting the economy to a more advanced and rapidly changing world economy faced the nation immediately as Rumania began to repair the damage caused by the war.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

in the way of concrete benefits. Liberal agrarian policy can be divided under two heads: measures taken in supplementing or amending the agrarian reforms and measures for the improvement of agriculture.

Of the land reforms, only that for Translyvania had provided for the expropriation of forest land. Article 132 of the 1923 Constitution approved the principle of expropriating forest land in the Old Kingdom, Bessarabia, and Bucovina for firewood and construction purposes. The law implementing this article was published on July 1, 1924. Where woodland was needed and was not available from state holdings, it could be expropriated from private owners leaving them a minimum of 100 hectares. Communal woodlands were to be created, the exploitation of which was to be under the control of the state.[54]

By the law of March 13, 1925, and the executive regulation of April 15, which abrogated Articles 120–124 of the 1921 law, the Liberals, to safeguard peasant holdings, considerably stiffened requirements for the sale and purchase of agricultural property. The state was given the right of preemption on lands received not only under the 1918–21 reforms but under earlier distributions of state domain. If this right were not exerted, purchases could be made only on the following conditions:

1. The purchaser was to be a Rumanian citizen, a cultivator of the land or a graduate of an agricultural school, and residing and working in the commune in which the holding was situated.

2. Holdings could be sold in minimum blocs of 2 hectares in the plains and 1 hectare in the hills.

3. Sales could be made only five years after their owner had received definite title to his property following full payment of its price.

4. The purchaser could not own more than 25 hectares of cultivated land, including the area to be purchased. Houses and gardens, up to one hectare, could not be mortgaged or sold; land up to 25 hectares could be mortgaged only to certain authorized institutions.

The detailed instructions in the accompanying administrative regulation made the act of sale quite complicated by requiring numerous forms, proofs of domicile, and evidence of proper ownership. While the Liberals did not make peasant land inalienable they did render the process of transfer slower and more difficult and extended the state's rights of preemption to a large proportion of peasant properties. This law was in harmony with the tight-laced spirit of the Liberals in 1924–25 and showed the same restrictive view of property as the mining law of 1924. Historically, the reversion toward inalien-

54. See Diaconescu, *Chestiunea țărănească în România*, pp. 266–272, for analysis of the text of the law.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

423 665 656 241 671 ability was an aftermath of nearly all the land reform measures. It is characteristic of the liberalism of the Liberal party that it should have feared—though perhaps correctly—the consequences of free and uninhibited sales of land.[55]

665 241 The Liberals, in the law of April 14, 1925, instituted chambers of agriculture, modeled on the chambers of commerce, and united in a Union of Chambers of Agriculture. At first sight these organs appeared to have very important functions: to be the official representatives of agricultural interests, to give advice on agricultural legislation, to supervise agricultural schools, to collaborate with the administration in the application of laws, to improve livestock, to aid in the advancement of agricultural techniques, to prepare statistics, and to organize fairs. They were also to elect members to the senate.

Unhappily, the chambers accomplished very little. Their budgets depended upon the Ministry of Agriculture, and they were not supplied with sufficient funds to carry out the work delegated to them.[56] They were not even representative of the whole of the peasantry. Each chamber was composed of 17 elected members and 11 appointed functionaries. But since only proprietors with a minimum of 3 hectares of arable land, or tenants with 10 hectares were permitted to vote for members, a large percentage of the poor peasants was not represented at all.[57] (In 1930, 52 per cent of the peasant farms were of less than 3 hectares.) Worst of all, the chambers, with their right to elect senators, became hopelessly entangled in politics. Under the law creating them, the government could dissolve the chambers for serious irregularities or bad faith in the accomplishment of their legal work or for activities against the interests of the state. Inevitably, the chambers were repeatedly dissolved on any pretext for the purpose of facilitating the election of senators.

665 656 241 In May, 1928, the Liberals passed a law for the classification of cereals, designed to improve the quality of grain destined for export and to reduce the number of middlemen between producer and foreign consumer. There had been frequent complaints of the inferior quality of exported Rumanian grain and the presence of an excessive amount

55. In 1911 the Liberal program has spoken of the desirability of creating a medium property by natural selection, that is, by the purchase and sale of land. The 1924 law certainly represents a retreat from that position. On the other hand, as will be seen below, the National Peasants revised the 1925 law, for the purpose of permitting "natural selection," but with unfortunate results for the poorer peasants.

56. F. E. Manoliou, *La Reconstruction économique et financière de la Roumanie et les partis politiques* (Paris, 1931), p. 159.

57. Filip Chefner, "Camerile agricole în România," *M.A.B.: Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, 2 (1926), 36.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241 as 1910 Dobrogeanu-Gherea had some harsh words to say of the
433 men who thought it could magically solve the deep-rooted ills of Ru-
654 manian agriculture.[36]

The Tătărescu government, following precedent, also reorganized agricultural credit and the cooperative system, set up more experimental stations, and devoted funds to the raising of better livestock and the purchase of tractors, but those measures seem to have been only of marginal benefit.

● 423 The government did try in the law of March, 1937, for the encouragement of agriculture to grapple with the problem of land tenure. It regulated the transfer and mortgage of rural lands and undertook to enforce the indivisibility of property as a means of preventing the progressive subdivision of peasant holdings. The effort was unsuccessful. The two-hectare minimum, which in any case was too small for a self-subsistent holding, was not observed; the prohibition extended only to properties obtained from the state or with the state's assistance. An attempt was also made to promote the consolidation of peasant properties, but this met with too great opposition in the chamber and was dropped.[37] The government also exerted its right of preemption on sales of agricultural land for the purpose of providing land for the peasants but its achievements were insignificant. Between April 1, 1934, and August 1, 1938, of the 326,200 hectares put on sale the government used its right of preemption on only 12,250 hectares, 3.8 per cent of the total.[38]

241 In brief, if the position of agriculture was somewhat better in the
654 years of the Tătărescu regime than in the depression it was largely
656 a consequence of general economic recovery. Agriculture did benefit from the protective measures applied and extended by the government, although part of these benefits was lost by the continued depreciation of the leu, and some efforts were made to raise the level of agriculture and diversify production. Nevertheless, the government's chief interest was industry and commerce and the principal benefits to agriculture were those which corresponded to this interest. The desperate problem of the millions of small peasants owning less than 3 hectares, unable to support themselves and their families, dividing their land into smaller and smaller fragments, suffering from pellagra —this problem was scarcely touched.

654 It must be said, however, that in the 1930's there was a notable
511

36. C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *Neoiobăgia*, p. 254.

37. Valeriu Bulgariu, "Divizibilitatea proprietăţii ţărăneşti," *Problema agrară* (Bucarest, 1946), pp. 77–97.

38. G. Ionescu-Sişeşti, "Le Nouvel Aspect du problème agraire en Roumanie," *Archives pour la science et la réforme sociales*, *16*, Nos. 1–4 (1948), 264.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

185 ian overpopulation after 1921. Moreover, he granted that Rumanian
strip cultivation and dwarf holdings led to overpopulation because of
241 their economic inefficiency but he went on to say:

> The solution of this aspect of the Rumanian agrarian question cannot be achieved in the framework of small properties, nor in the framework of private property in land. It cannot find a solution either in individual or isolated fashion, but involves structural transformations which concern the whole of Rumanian society, hence far past the restricted limits of the agricultural sector properly speaking.[37]

In a word, for all his criticism of the "myth" of overpopulation Pătrăşcanu really provided no convincing evidence that it was not a real problem, nor could he. This point is important, because the propaganda for the subsequent 1945 agrarian reform was obviously based on similar premises.

In his proposal of remedies, he limited himself to immediate reforms, which were not socialist but which were intended to rid Rumania of fascism and restore a constitutional bourgeois society. For agriculture he advocated the complete expropriation of large properties over 50 hectares, the abolition of servile labor relations, the resettlement of landless peasants and peasants with insufficient land; distribution to the peasants of livestock and equipment obtained from the expropriated estates; cancellation of peasant debts to the banks and to the state. Other economic measures included the nationalization of the Rumanian Bank and the consolidation of the banking structure; state control over cartels and the nationalization of certain combines; an eight-hour day for labor, minimum wages, social security, and protective legislation. For a Communist it was certainly a minimum program.

In explaining this program, Pătrăscanu relied upon the ideas of Lenin of 1900. The whole of the peasantry—while carrying within itself the latent conflict between poor peasant and the kulak—was the adversary of large property, although for a number of different reasons. In some European states peasant solidarity was no longer possible, but in Rumania there still remained a substantial antiboyar spirit common to poor and rich peasant alike.

The Agrarian Reform of 1945

241 Rumanian agriculture was disorganized after the defeat of 1944,
● 423 although as always the very backwardness of peasant farming re-
185 duced the shock. The war had depleted stocks of grain, draft animals,

37. Pătrăşcanu, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

and equipment. There had been fighting during the spring and summer over a wide strip of Moldavia, and less extended fighting was going on in Transylvania. The German army had retreated, the Red Army had marched through the country. There had been a considerable dislocation of population, and many landowners had fled from their estates in Moldavia and Bucovina.

Despite these unsettled conditions there was initially very little peasant action. There were cases of peasants taking land, primarily from absentee owners or those who had fled the Russian advance. But as late as January, 1945, at Botoşani in northern Moldavia—a region bordering the Soviet Union and which had been under Soviet control since the preceding spring—an agreement was reached, with the approval of the local Soviet commander, whereby landowners who had left their estates could return to them, provided they agreed to operate them personally and not as absentees.[38]

When the National Democratic Front began its drive to power in February, 1945, the calm was broken. In September, 1944, the Rumanian Communist party had put forward a demand, incorporated in the program of the National Democratic Front, for the expropriation of land over 50 hectares. Even before Groza and the Communists came into office peasant committees in the villages began taking over large estates. While this display of zeal, in most instances initiated by local organs of the Ploughmen's Front, was authentic in the sense that it corresponded to the primordial land hunger of the Rumanian peasant, it in no way reflected a revolutionary situation. The peasants in the winter of 1944 were not in a gay frame of mind; they were poor, heartily sick of the war which had cost many of them their sons, not to speak of their horses, cattle, and equipment. They were tired of troops—German, Russian, and Rumanian—marching by and requisitioning. They did not like the old order, they hated the local gendarmes but they were not in a revolutionary frame of mind. They welcomed land but they were not in a rick-burning mood.[39] The premature seizures of land before any law had been passed were merely part of the mock revolution the National Democratic Front was undertaking.

One of the first acts of the Groza government after its tumultuous rise to power was to promulgate a decree-law, on March 22, 1945, for a land reform.[40] According to Article 1 of this law, "Agrarian reform

38. This may seem surprising, but I saw the agreement in the prefecture at Botoşani.

39. Such at least was my impression after traveling though some 30 judeţe in December and January, 1944–45.

40. A text of the law is given in a pamphlet published by the Rumanian Ministry of Information, *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie* (Bucarest, November, 1946).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

241
423
185

is a national, economic, and social necessity for our country. Rumanian agriculture should be based upon sound and productive farms, which are the private property of those who cultivate them."

The stated purposes of the reform were:

a) the enlargement of the cultivable area of existing peasant farms which were less than 5 hectares;

b) the creation of vegetable gardens in the environs of cities, for workers, civil servants, and artisans;

c) the creation of new individual private farms for agricultural laborers without land;

d) the use of certain land for model farms and experimental stations, to be administered by the state.

The following land was to be expropriated:

a) all properties belonging to German citizens and to Rumanian citizens of German ethnic origin who had collaborated with Hitler Germany;

b) the properties of war criminals and those responsible for the "disaster of the country";

c) properties of those who had fled to countries with which Rumania was at war and of those fleeing after August 23, 1944;

d) the land of absenteeists (excluding persons on official business abroad, or absent by necessity, or workers who had gone abroad and who had less than 10 hectares);

e) properties of those who during the last seven years had not cultivated the land themselves (excepting those with less than 10 hectares);

f) properties of those who had volunteered to fight against the United Nations;

g) mortmain lands;

h) lands of private owners in excess of 50 hectares, including arable, orchards, meadows, ponds, marshes, and inundated land. The proprietor was permitted to select which 50 hectares he was to retain but it had to be in one place. Multiple properties and properties of husband and wife were considered as one.

All tractors, threshing machines, sowing machines, and combines found on expropriated land were to pass to the state for the creation of agricultural machine stations. Other equipment and livestock was to go to the state for redistribution to the peasants. Expropriation of inventory and livestock was to be in proportion to the amount of the proprietor's land expropriated.

The law exempted from expropriation rice fields, church and monastic properties, crown lands, and lands belonging to certain specified

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

cultural and philanthropic institutions, urban communes, and co-operatives.

241
423
185

The mayor of each commune was directed to call a general assembly of all peasants having less than 5 hectares. This assembly was to elect a local committee of 7–15 members. These committees, whose actions were to be coordinated by a district committee operating with the Ministry of Agriculture, were to draw up lists of land to be expropriated and of peasants who were entitled to receive land.

Priority in the distribution of land was as follows:

a) cultivators mobilized in the anti-Hitler war;

b) widows, orphans, and invalids of this war;

c) widows, orphans, and invalids of any war;

d) landless peasants;

e) agricultural laborers and peasants who had worked on the land expropriated;

f) peasants with less than 5 hectares.

A necessary condition for all categories, however, was that the recipient lack 5 hectares of land.

Expropriation was without compensation. The price of the new lots was to be equal to the annual average harvest of one hectare, that is, 1,000 kilograms of wheat or 1,200 kilograms of maize. The new proprietors were to pay immediately in money or in kind 10 per cent of the purchase price, the remainder to be paid in ten years for peasants with little land and in twenty years for landless peasants. Landless peasants could obtain a three years' moratorium on the payment of their first installment.

Holdings created under this law could not be divided, sold, leased or mortgaged, either in whole or in part, except in certain special cases, with the authorization of the Ministry of Agriculture. The new land was received without obligations.

Lands expropriated and divided before the promulgation of this law were to be made to conform with its provisions.

By a subsequent administrative regulation certain large properties could be exempted from expropriation, if they were well-organized enterprises, suitable to serve as model farms under the direction of the Ministry of Agriculture; even these farms, however, were not to exceed 150 hectares.

For a number of reasons it is difficult to ascertain the results of the law in terms of the redistribution of land. Expropriation began before the law was promulgated, and although the irregularities in its application were not as great as some of the dispossessed landowners made out, there was a good deal of uncontrolled seizure and redistri-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241
423
185

bution. A reform carried out so brusquely and through the agency of local peasant committees was bound to be a hectic procedure and not likely to be very accurately recorded. As has been mentioned already the statistics on the 1918–21 reform, even those presented officially, were far from accurate, and there is no reason to believe that the figures on the 1945 reform are a bit more reliable. Indeed, it is quite obvious that some of the figures were rigged for political purposes.

As of January, 1947, according to official announcement, 1,443,911 hectares had been expropriated under the 1945 reform from 143, 219 proprietors; 1,057,674 hectares had been distributed to the peasants and 387,565 hectares held as state reserve. Of the 1,114,888 peasants having claims, 796,129 had received land.[41] The average area expropriated was only 10 hectares. Of the number of peasants having claims 72 per cent received land. The average amount received per peasant was about 1.3 hectares. In magnitude this reform—if the figures are at all comparable—by no means equaled the 1918–21 reforms. For roughly the equivalent area (i.e., minus Bessarabia, though including Northern Bucovina and Southern Dobrogea), the first reform had expropriated 4,312,911 hectares, 2,824,962 hectares had been distributed to 1,036,367 peasants, an average of 2.7 hectares per peasant.

The regional results of the 1945 reform correspond to the nature of the terrain, with the notable exception of Transylvania. In the mountainous overpopulated areas the average allotment was very small: 0.6 hectares in the Moldavian Carpathians, 0.7 hectares in the Wallachian Carpathians, and 0.5 hectares in Bucovina. In Dobrogea, which was relatively sparsely settled, the peasants received an average of almost 3 hectares. An interesting feature of the reform is that while in most of the regions the average area of land expropriated was relatively large (over 130 hectares in the Moldavian Plain, 111 hectares in the Danube Plain, 57 hectares in Dobrogea, and 58 hectares in Bucovina) the average area expropriated was only 5.5 hectares in the Transylvanian Plateau and 5 hectares in the Tisa Plain. Of the total number of expropriations over nine-tenths were in Transylvania, although the area expropriated in that province was only about one-half the total. Clearly this meant the expropriation of numerous properties well under 50 hectares and presumably reflects the forced reduction of the German communities in Transylvania.[42]

41. Institutul Central de Statistică, *Communicări statistice, Nr. 17, 15 martie 1947* (Bucarest, 1947), p. 9.

42. The extensive German settlements in Transylvania, many of which had been there

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

In January, 1948, the Statistical Institute of the new Rumanian People's Republic undertook an agrarian census to ascertain the distribution of land after the 1945 reform. Unfortunately, this census does not permit satisfactory comparison with that of 1941. It presents a table, comparing the number of agricultural exploitations in the various categories of size for 1941 and 1948, which shows, as might be expected, a decrease in the number of dwarf holdings under ½ hectare and of large holdings over 20 hectares, and a marked increase in the number of exploitations between 1 and 5 hectares. However, since the amount of area occupied by these categories of exploitations is not given and it is unclear whether the same types of land (especially forests and pastures) are included in both cases, the comparison is not very illuminating and may be misleading.[43] It was obvious, however, that the land reform of 1945 did not, as it could not, create a nation of prosperous small-holders. Indeed, the conclusion reached as to the size of Rumanian exploitations has a very familiar ring: "If 3 hectares represents in general the minimum lot necessary to sustain by farming a household of 4 persons, then more than half of the agricultural exploitations of Rumania fall short of this level and are obliged to have recourse to outside income." [44] To be sure, this sour note was not the one prevailing in 1945 and 1946, when the reform was being pushed through, but anticipated the new agrarian line taken up in 1948.

In judging the 1945 land reform, it is necessary to realize, however, that it was not a Rumanian reform but had its sources in the Soviet Union, and that its immediate aims were political not economic.

---

for hundreds of years, were greatly reduced by the wholesale transfer of nearly the entire able-bodied population to the Soviet Union in the winter of 1944–45. Undoubtedly a high percentage of the Germans had been actively pro-Nazi, but the Soviet order paid no attention to any such criteria.

43. Number of agricultural exploitations (excluding Northern Transylvania):

		1948		1941	
Size of exploitation		*Number*	*Per cent*	*Number*	*Per cent*
Total		2,596,900	100.0	2,303,472	100.0
0–½	hectare	190,169	7.3	277,500	12.0
½–1	"	246,016	9.5	213,088	9.3
1–3	"	933,383	35.9	760,700	33.0
3–5	"	604,540	23.3	441,213	19.2
5–10	"	462,607	17.8	449,716	19.5
10–20	"	122,262	4.7	116,537	5.1
20–50	"	26,607	1.0	27,845	1.2
Over 50	"	11,316	0.4	16,873	0.7

A. Golopenţia and P. Onica, *Recensămîntul agricol din Republica Populară Romînă, 25 Ianuarie 1948. Rezultate provizorii*, Institutul Central de Statistică (Bucarest, 1948). For further details of the 1948 census see the Appendix. It appears that a good deal more land was included in this census than in 1941.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

423
178

Although it was represented as the manifestation of the wishes of the broad masses of the Rumanian peasantry, it seems evident that the main outlines of the law were not drafted in Rumania at all but in Moscow. A comparison of the texts of the Rumanian land reform law with those for the provincial administrations of the Soviet Zone of Germany, passed in the summer of 1945, reveals striking parallels. With the exception of the size of property subject to expropriation (in Germany properties over 100 hectares were to be expropriated), the laws were altogether similar and in certain sections employed identical phrases.[45] Whatever the merits or faults of the reform, it was not a local measure but part of a more general agrarian policy being prepared for a much larger area.

In its general lines and intentions the agrarian reform clearly derives from Lenin's interpretation of class relations in a predominantly agrarian society: the need of eradicating the feudal remnants and of gaining the support of the peasantry by fulfilling its desires for land. In its specific context it was an important part of the National Democratic Front's attempt to obtain mass support in its political campaign. As a means of obtaining positive popularity among the peasants it may be doubted whether it was a great success, and there is no satisfactory evidence that it won the Groza government an enthusiastic peasant following. In the first place, it was physically impossible to grant the Rumanian peasant sufficient land to make him a satisfied and prosperous cultivator. Moreover, the peasants have always felt that the land was theirs and they have never shown themselves particularly grateful to those who parceled it out. On the other hand, the Communists' interest in winning over the peasantry should not be understood as merely a desire to gain popularity. The whole purpose of Lenin's peasant policy was to "neutralize" the peasantry at critical junctures in the party's progress so as to make sure it did not become actively hostile. As such a guarantee it was, perhaps, more successful.

The importance of the agrarian reform in eradicating feudal residues was indirect rather than direct. The Communists undoubtedly

45. Cf. *Frankfurter Zeitung*, September 12, 1945, which gives an account of the German laws. Both reforms started with the same formula that agrarian reform was a national, economic, and social necessity. In both laws local committees of poor peasants were to prepare the land lists, peasants with less than 5 hectares were entitled to land, payment could be in money or kind, with a 10 per cent payment the first year, although poor peasants could obtain a three-year moratorium. The price of the lots was the equivalent of one year's produce. New properties could not be sold, mortgaged, leased, or broken up. Farm machinery was to be placed in a common pool. These similarities are obviously no coincidence, and it is certainly unlikely that the German provincial administrations should have copied the Rumanian land reform independently.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

exaggerated the economic importance of the boyars and the extent of their holdings. Nevertheless, a certain boyar spirit still prevailed in Rumania and the fact of land ownership continued to be a mark of prestige.[46] The agrarian reform, in this respect, was probably effective in removing one of the symbols, if not the real source of strength, of Rumania's traditional ruling group.

423 178

As an equalitarian measure the land reform undoubtedly has an emotional appeal. When one has followed the history of the agrarian question in Rumania and the way in which the landed interests held out against the peasants until forced to grudging compromises; when one has seen the peasant humbly removing his *căciulă* as the landowner passed, and has perceived the chasm between the peasant and his rulers, one is moved by a feeling that retributive justice has been done. Retributive justice, however, does not reconstruct a society, solve economic problems, or even guarantee that the peasant will not be burdened with a new master.

The immediate economic effects of the reform were unfavorable but should not be exaggerated. The law was applied in the midst of spring planting, and the carefully planned spontaneity of its execution undoubtedly caused a decline in production. Some well-organized large properties were broken up in the process, but on the whole the output of Rumanian large properties had not been very impressive and much of the land was let out. Their function as guides to improved cultivation could certainly be taken over by model farms.

In its professed aim of creating a prosperous peasant agriculture, the agrarian reform alone could have only marginal value, although it undoubtedly provided a temporary relief for a number of peasants. It did not solve the problems of overpopulation, low productivity, strip farming, and the progressive fragmentation of properties. Although the new allotments were not to be broken up, the reform did, by creating new small holdings, increase the area where fragmentation had been most destructive in the past. Essentially the agrarian reform was only the last step of a process which had been going on in Rumania since 1864—the gradual reduction of estate land and its conversion into peasant holdings. Unfortunately the process had been so slow that it could never be more than a palliative. As the final stage in this conversion the 1945 reform was of much less importance than its predecessor. It should not, however, be considered as merely a last step; for the Communists it was clearly a first step.

46. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe*, p. 187, comments on the persistence of land ownership as a source of prestige and social position in these countries, and on the tendency of the successful tradesman or politician to acquire an estate.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

165 471 annulled. In the following months government administrators were appointed to supervise the British and American-owned oil companies, which action, in effect, put these firms in a state of forcible dissolution. The Rumanian industrialist, Nicolae Malaxa, who had made great efforts to accommodate himself to the Russians and the Groza regime, was unable to ride this new wave and his factories, the most important in the country, were also taken over. While, as has been seen, the Rumanian government has always worked in close conjunction with Rumanian industry—fostering desirable undertakings and even setting up state-owned enterprises—this new advance was under quite different auspices and had a far more ambitious intent.

The decisive step came in June, 1948, with a bill providing for the nationalization of all industrial, mining, banking, insurance, and transport concerns. The law at the outset affected some 1,068 enterprises, including 132 heavy industries, 20 coal mines, 25 oil and natural gas companies, 56 building material companies, 163 textile factories, 15 insurance companies, and 4 shipping concerns. While the law did not, in theory, deny compensation, it was to be based on profits, its amount was to be determined by a government commission, it was to be paid in state bonds, and would not be given to persons who "have enriched themselves illegally or left the country illegally." The motives given for the bill were largely political: the new situation demanded changes in the national economy; the bourgeoisie, which had been disarmed politically, must not be permitted to retain its potent economic weapons.

In November all privately owned health institutions, hospitals, sanatoria, and the film industry were nationalized. In April, 1949, the state took over a new batch of private companies, pharmacies, laboratories, drug and cosmetic factories. Thus, by the end of the year, a significant and certainly decisive sector of the economy was directly controlled and managed by the state.

● 423 The switch in agrarian policy came at a somewhat later date, though in 1946 and 1947 one finds mounting criticism of the predatory activity of the rich peasants and the sabotage committed by estate owners on the land remaining to them. A foreshadowing of a change in eastern European agriculture was given in a Russian broadcast of February 9, 1948, to Soviet farmers: "Today the governments of the new democracies know that the present small peasant holdings are not a paying proposition and that the peasants' road to wealth lies in co-operation and the uniting of small holdings into large collective estates. . . . The movement for setting up co-operative agri-
culture is growing apace

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

culture is growing apace."[33] Nevertheless, in the spring of 1948 Gheorghiu-Dej was denying rumors that the land would be taken back from the peasants, and a decree in March permitted peasants possessing more land than they could till to employ day laborers.[34] 000 423 656 665

By the summer, however, the government was emphasizing the need of "sharpening the class struggle in the countryside, organizing agricultural laborers, and fighting the rich peasant." It introduced progressive scales of taxation and forced grain delivery aimed at preventing accumulation of grain or wealth by kulak or estate owner and ultimately undermining their economic position. It set up "village information offices" with instructions to "unmask all the dishonest kulaks and inform the farmers of their duties."

On March 2, 1949, the regime, on the simple sweeping charge of sabotage and failure to comply with regulations, seized the land, livestock, and inventory which had been left to the large landowners under the 1945 reform. In this action, carried out abruptly and without prior notification, some 17,000 families were evicted from their homes at night and sent to various resettlement areas. The government now directed all its energies against the rich peasants.[35] Lenin's dictum that "Small-scale exploitation generates capitalism and the bourgeoisie constantly, daily, hourly, in an elemental way, and on a mass scale," again made its appearance and became the leitmotiv for innumerable articles.

Embroidering on this theme, Gheorghiu-Dej marked out the party line for 1949. In 1945 the landlords had been liquidated as a class, but this act fostered small-scale economic activity in agriculture. "It follows that the complete victory of socialism is impossible so long as private property in the means of production, in the towns and in the countryside, including private property in land, continues to exist." The Communist party, therefore, had a number of important 423 565 661

33. *East Europe* (February 19, 1948).

34. *Ibid.* (April 1, 1948).

35. The distinction between poor, middle, and rich peasant, or kulak, is not based on size of holding or amount of wealth alone and seems to take on different meanings under different political circumstances. In simplest terms, the rich peasant is one who hires labor or charges rent for machinery and equipment; the middle peasant uses only family labor but produces enough, or more than enough, to support his household; the poor peasant is unable to support himself on his holding and is on the verge of drifting into the agricultural proletariat. In 1941, 12 per cent of the land in Rumania was farmed solely by paid labor, and 24.8 per cent by a mixture of paid and family labor. The first category, in the main, represented the properties of estate owners, the second the holdings of the richer peasants. In 1948, according to Gheorghiu-Dej, 57 per cent of the rural population belonged to the small peasantry and 33 per cent to the middle peasantry.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

423 tasks. The first was to restrict the kulaks and dislodge them from
565 their position. Then it would be possible "when conditions are ripe,
661 to pass over to the policy of the complete liquidation of the kulaks."[36] He anticipated, of course, that the kulaks would resort to underground struggle, sabotage, and criminal acts in an effort to avert their approaching fate.

185 The second task was to undertake propaganda convincing the poor
241 and middle peasants of the need to unite in collective farms. When that task had been achieved, when all the land belonged to the collectives in perpetuity, the goal of making the land public property and bringing about the socialist transformation of the countryside would be reached. Gheorghiu-Dej emphasized, however, the necessity of making this transition gradually, by means of persuasion, and with the voluntary support of the peasant. The poor peasants should not be driven into collectives, the middle peasant should not be identified with the kulak, and the whole process must be paced by the development of agricultural machinery, machine tractor stations, and the expansion of the network of consumer and producer cooperatives as broad mass movements.[37] These words of caution presumably reflect the wisdom gained from the Soviet experiment in collectivization.

Gheorghiu-Dej concluded his remarks with the inevitable "self-criticism": in the past the party had not provided a clear political line for work in the countryside and had failed to popularize the notion of uniting the working peasantry into collective farms, and had even ignored or denied this goal.[38] That these so-called errors were the fault of the Rumanian Communists is, of course, nonsense. The party line, emanating from Moscow, had shifted, and in this instance a strong case can be made that the change had been planned long in advance. The Communists could have had no intention of stopping at the stage of small peasant cultivation which had, in any event, reached a cul-de-sac in Rumania.

474 The creation of collective farms got under way in 1949, and by the end of the year, according to the glowing account of a Russian visitor, 56 *kolkhozi* comprising 4,000 peasant families had been estab-

36. As in Russia representatives of the restricted and soon to be liquidated kulak class are not to be admitted to the collective farms.

37. The cooperatives, however, must rid themselves of capitalist elements, must intensify their collaboration with the state trading organs, and must promote the spirit of "socialist emulation" among the peasants.

38. G. Gheorghiu-Dej, "Tasks of the Rumanian Workers Party in the Struggle for the Socialist Reorganization of the Countryside," *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy* (Bucarest, March 15, 1949).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

311

TABLE XIII. PREREFORM DISTRIBUTION OF LAND IN TRANSYLVANIA

Category (hectares)	Number of Owners	Per Cent	Area (hectares)	Per Cent
0–10	843,448	87.6	2,536,738	34
10–100	113,887	11.8	2,153,117	29
Over 100	4,601	0.6	2,751,457	37
	961,936	100.0	7,441,312	100

SOURCE: Nasta, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

COMMENT: The reliability of this official estimate is extremely doubtful. The table appears to be only an approximate conversion into hectares of figures compiled in cadastral yokes by the provisional Transylvanian government in 1919. The reliability of the latter compilation has been challenged. According to Hungarian critics "no exact figures are or ever have been available for the land distribution in 1919 in the total area annexed by Rumania." C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors* (Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 316, n. 2.

311
423

TABLE XIV. LAND EXPROPRIATED UNDER THE AGRARIAN REFORMS OF 1918 AND 1921, AS OF 1927

	Old Kingdom (hectares)	Transylvania (hectares)	Bucovina (hectares)	Bessarabia (hectares)	Total (hectares)
Arable	2,269,192.27	470,389.56	48,544.64	1,210,627.20	3,998,753.67
Meadow	27,386.94	80,745.60	9,742.63	—	117,875.17
Pasture	442,968.66	398,257.50	8,296.69	—	849,542.87
Forests	19,156.10	663,967.24	8,420.54	196,404.60	889,948.48
Orchards, Vineyards	2,466.18	12,114.07	—	—	14,580.25
Building land, farmyards, etc.	360.11	14,006.35	357.16	—	14,723.62
Barren	14,851.15	24,328.71	605.69	82,888.44	122,673.99
Total	2,776,401.43	1,663,809.06	75,967.35	1,491,920.24	6,008,098.05

SOURCE: Nasta, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

COMMENT: Despite the confident calculation to two decimal places, the accuracy of this table is rather uncertain. In 1937 the figure given for the total amount of expropriated land was somewhat less: 5,811,827 hectares. G. Ionescu-Sișești and N. Cornățeanu, *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie et ses conséquences* (Bucarest, 1937), p. 36. In 1940 it was officially announced that 3,900 estates were still in possession of land which was to have been expropriated. Moreover, there seems to have been a good deal of circumvention of the expropriation laws through the reconstitution of estates by a variety of semilegal or illegal means. According to Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 223, the Ministry of Agriculture confirmed that in the steppe region of the Bărăgan newly formed estates, running up to 3,000 hectares, could be found.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

TABLE XV. DISPOSITION OF LAND EXPROPRIATED UNDER AGRARIAN REFORMS OF 1918 AND 1921, AS OF 1927

	Old Kingdom (hectares)	Transylvania (hectares)	Bucovina (hectares)	Bessarabia (hectares)
Distributed to peasants	2,037,293.04	451,653.96	42,832.25	1,098,045.50
Communal pastures	524,720.87	418,361.43	5,831.85	—
Communal forests	—	484,805.24	4,377.72	—
Forests administered by state to be distributed	21,027.90	179,162.00	8,523.84	198,404.60
Land unfit for distribution	17,677.44	86,442.78	605.69	82,888.44
Reserved for general needs	175,682.18	93,383.62	13,796.00	112,581.70
Total expropriated	2,776,401.43	1,663,809.03	75,967.35	1,491,920.24

311
423

SOURCE: Nasta, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
COMMENT: The reliability of this table depends upon that of Table XIV.

TABLE XVI. LAND RECEIVED BY THE PEASANTS UNDER THE AGRARIAN REFORMS OF 1918 AND 1921

A. As of 1927

	Number of Peasants Entitled to Land	Number of Peasants Receiving Land	Area Distributed (hectares)	Area Distributed as Communal Pasture (hectares)	Area Distributed as Communal Forests (hectares)
Old Kingdom	1,053,628	630,113	2,037,293.04	524,720.87	—
Transylvania	490,528	310,583	451,653.96	418,361.43	484,805.24
Bucovina	77,911	71,266	42,832.25	5,831.85	4,377.72
Bessarabia	357,016	357,016	1,098,045.50	—	—
Total	1,979,083	1,368,978	3,629,824.75	948,914.15	489,182.96

SOURCE: *Ibid.*

B. As of 1938

	Number of Peasants with Right to Land	Number Receiving Land		Land Distributed (hectares)	Average Area per Peasant Receiving Land under Reform
		Number	*Per Cent of those with right*		
Old Kingdom	1,075,330	648,843	60.3	2,286,740	3.4
Transylvania	490,528	310,583	63.3	469,043	1.6
Bucovina	82,606	76,941	93.2	49,179	0.6
Bessarabia	357,016	357,016	100.0	1,098,045	3.1
Total	2,005,477	1,393,383	69.5	3,923,007	2.8

SOURCE: *60 Sate romînesti* (5 vols., Bucarest, 1941–43), II, 10.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

311
● 423

TABLE XVII. DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL PROPERTY FOLLOWING THE AGRARIAN REFORMS OF 1918 AND 1921, AS OF 1927

Before the Reform:

	Small Property (under 100 ha.)	Per Cent	Large Property (over 100 ha.)	Per Cent
Old Kingdom	4,593,148	57.5	3,397,851	42.5
Bessarabia	2,337,811	55.9	1,844,539	44.1
Transylvania	4,689,855	63.0	2,751,457	37.0
Bucovina	405,000	78.0	115,000	22.0
	12,025,814		8,108,847	

or:

Small Property: 12,025,814 ha. or 59.77%
Large Property: 8,108,847 ha. or 40.23%
20,134,661 ha.

After the Reform:

	Small Property	Per-Cent	Large Property	Per Cent
Old Kingdom	7,369,549	92.22	621,450	7.78
Bessarabia	3,829,731	91.57	352,619	8.43
Transylvania	6,353,664	85.38	1,087,648	14.62
Bucovina	480,967	92.49	39,033	7.51
	18,033,911		2,100,750	

or:

Small Property: 18,033,911 ha. or 89.56%
Large Property: 2,100,750 ha. or 10.44%
20,134,661 ha.

SOURCE: Nasta, *op. cit.*, pp. 26–27.

COMMENT: Although these figures have been used as the basis for most studies of Rumanian agriculture, they are misleading and incorrect. The area estimated as having been expropriated from properties over 100 hectares (Table XIV) was simply subtracted from estimates of the prereform extent of such property and added to the estimates of properties under 100 hectares. The results are naturally quite impressive but unacceptable. The prewar figures for the Old Kingdom were based upon G. D. Creangă's estimate for 1905 (Table VIII) (except that the figure for properties under 10 hectares was taken from the somewhat higher estimate of the Ministry of Finance for 1905, a justified substitution). An estimated reduction of properties over 100 hectares between 1905 and 1918 (amounting to 412,500 hectares) was added to the 1905 figure for those below 10 hectares. As a result of this method of computation, the total area of medium properties, between 10 and 100 hectares, is assumed not to have changed at all between 1905 and 1927. All the land expropriated is considered to have been transferred to the small peasants, when, in fact, of the 2,776,000 hectares reported expropriated in the Old Kingdom, only 2,087,000 hectares of arable had been distributed to the peasants by 1927, and 525,000 hectares of communal grazing land established.

It has already been noted that the accuracy of estimates of prereform land distribution in Transylvania was doubtful. Only properties of over 100 hectares are reported

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

to have suffered expropriation, although in Transylvania there were undoubtedly 311
numerous cases where land under that figure was taken. In Bucovina, of the 75,967 423
hectares expropriated, some 23,000 were reported in 1927 to be either unfit for settlement or held as state-administered forest, and therefore cannot be regarded as having increased peasant holdings. In Bessarabia, all properties over 100 hectares were to have been expropriated; of the 1,845,000 hectares in this category, 1,492,000 were expropriated, and only 1,100,000 distributed to the peasants.

Finally, forest land is handled ambiguously. In Transylvania about 40 per cent (664,000 hectares) of the area expropriated from large estates was forest; in the Old Kingdom, however, the forests of large landowners—which were not expropriated but which in 1905 amounted to over 800,000 hectares in private ownership alone—were not included in the figures (this seems also to have been the case with the extensive forests of Bucovina). To have made the statistics consistent either all forest properties in all regions should have been included, which would have increased considerably the area shown as remaining to large properties after the reform, or they should have been omitted, which would have reduced the size of the area reported expropriated by nearly 900,000 hectares. In general, then, the conclusions were artificially established and certainly represent an inflated picture of the redistribution of property.

TABLE XVIII. FISCAL CENSUSES ON LANDHOLDINGS, 1923 AND 1928 162

Hectares	1923 Number of Taxpayers	1923 Area (hectares)	1923 Average Size (hectares)	1928 Number of Taxpayers	1928 Area (hectares)	1928 Average Size (hectares)
0–5	3,154,211	5,745,921	1.8	3,408,503	6,653,801	2.0
5–10	458,534	2,618,824	5.7	455,934	3,000,859	6.6
10–50	181,494	2,359,075	13.0	139,807	2,286,413	16.4
50–250	16,557	1,425,053	86.0	13,163	1,308,121	99.4
Over 250	3,168	1,537,046	485.1	1,834	861,299	469.4
Total	3,813,964	13,685,919	3.6	4,019,241	14,110,493	3.5

SOURCE: *60 Sate romînesti*, II, 12–15.

COMMENT: Although these tables, prepared by the Ministry of Finance for tax purposes and using different categories of size of landholding, cannot be compared with earlier or later figures, they are of use in showing certain trends in land distribution in the 1920's. The 1928 figure for properties over 250 hectares seems very low, however, since a Ministry of Finance estimate for 1927 (given in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 247) listed 2,597 owners in this category with an area of 1,305,672 hectares.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

311
● 423

TABLE XXIV. EXPROPRIATION AND REDISTRIBUTION OF LAND UNDER 1945 AGRARIAN REFORM, AS OF JANUARY 8, 1947

Regions	Number of Proprietors Expropriated	Area Expropriated (hectares)	Area Distributed (hectares)	Area Reserved by the State (hectares)	Peasants	
					Having right to land	*Having received land*
RUMANIA	143,219	1,443,911	1,057,674	387,565	1,114,888	796,129
Plains of Siret and Prut	1,542	196,130	162,486	33,644	196,608	160,334
Moldavian Carpathians	349	47,529	32,615	14,914	87,542	50,171
Muntenian and Oltenian Carpathians	1,802	115,065	71,214	51,851	178,618	99,088
Danube Plain	2,787	309,886	241,213	68,673	248,720	220,181
Dobrogea	1,122	62,333	52,089	3,562	34,795	18,165
Bucovina	79	4,610	4,412	198	17,707	8,518
Transylvanian Plateau	62,157	345,598	215,956	129,642	206,054	123,938
Tisa Plain	73,381	362,760	277,689	85,071	142,849	115,737

SOURCE: Institutul Central de Statistică, *Comunicări statistice*, No. 17 (March 15, 1947), p. 9.

TABLE XXV. DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL PROPRIETORSHIP AND EXPLOITATIONS AFTER 1945 AGRARIAN REFORM, AS OF JANUARY, 25, 1948

Categories of Size (hectares)	Proprietors		Exploitations	
	Number	*Per Cent*	*Number*	*Per Cent*
0–0.5	901,016	16.4	233,153	7.5
0.5–1	1,100,852	20.0	296,321	9.6
1–2	1,472,785	26.8	1,106,754	35.7
2–3	838,294	15.2		
3–5	697,318	12.7	707,001	22.8
5–10	363,679	6.6	531,090	17.2
10–20	88,355	1.6	153,516	5.0
20–50	23,696	0.4	34,222	1.1
Over 50	13,170	0.3	14,120	0.5
Total	5,501,138	100.0	3,096,177	100.0

SOURCE: A. Golopenţia and P. Onica, *Recensămîntul agricol din Republica Populară Romînă, 25 ianuarie 1948, rezultate provizorii* (Bucarest, 1948), pp. 11–16.

COMMENT: The value of this census is greatly reduced by the failure to publish the amount of land comprised in the various categories of properties and exploitations. Of a total area of 23,730,000 hectares, 20,661,000 were declared as properties and 19,199,000 hectares as exploitations (of which 94 per cent were declared as owned by the cultivator). The fact that there were 1.8 proprietors to each exploitation (5,501,000 proprietors and 3,096,000 exploitations) is explained, presumably, by the numerous cases of joint proprietorship: husband and wife, parents and children, etc.

233 221 TRANSHUMANCE has long played a prominent part in the pastoral life of the Carpathians, for agriculturally the region is marginal and it is not very unusual for the maize crop, which covers an astonishingly large proportion of the arable land, to fail to mature. Before the late war the flocks of the eastern Carpathians used to winter in the plains of Moldavia, Bessarabia, the Dobrogea and south Russia, more rarely in Transylvania. During the nineteenth century, however, many Roumanian shepherds stayed in the plain and formed the nuclei of small permanent Roumanian colonies outside the boundaries of Transylvania.

423 311 DURING the last few centuries there have been considerable changes in schemes of land holding. In the late eighteenth century the scattered possessions of the landlord class were consolidated into Latifundia. In the first half of the nineteenth century arable farming was extended into the Danubian plain and on the rich lands between Siret and Prut—in areas, that is to say, which had not been previously cultivated. This development progressed with the rise of an export trade in cereals to feed the industrial populations of the west. It is interesting to note that much of this newly-developed territory in Wallachia was organised on the system of métayage, the new colonists from the hills becoming tenants on a produce-sharing basis.

IN CONNECTION with this development, many of the Roumanian transhumant herdsmen gave up their pastoral life and settled as agriculturists or went into commerce. After 1918 the large estates were broken up and plots of land were given to the peasantry. This was the occasion for the return to Transylvania of some of the former emigrants who had gone to Wallachia and Moldavia, but naturally many features of the old life have disappeared, e.g. the July fairs that were formerly held high up in the mountains and did much to preserve the cultural heritage of the pastoral people.

[221] BUT, if large-scale seasonal migrations over long distances have declined, the short distance movements still play a vital part in the rural economy of the eastern Carpathians and fortunately have not as yet been divested of all their old-time ritual.

313 church, fencing, roofing, flooring, is of timber, and also many of his household utensils: water-buckets, jugs, spoons, etc.

IT IS very unfortunate that the most lucrative type of timber should be the most inaccessible. Timber from the great stands of pine has to take the slow and tortuous route down the rivers in rafts (see Plates VII and VIII) to the Danube and Black Sea. Afforestation has not reached a high stage of development as yet. The trees are propagated by naturally-sown seeds, and there are very few nurseries. Where the clearings are made, the stumps are left in the ground to add to the difficulties of the hay harvester.

221 WE MAY sum up the tale of Roumania's agricultural assets by saying that she is well endowed by nature as regards soils and climatic conditions for the wide-spread production of grain, fruit and vegetables; that natural pasture, whether upland or lowland, is seasonal and insufficient for a satisfactory development of cattle raising, though much may be done by an intensified cultivation of fodder crops. The increased provision of communal grazing for the peasants has been a useful step. Conditions are better for sheep, which are more adaptable than cattle and are better able to stand the rigours of the hard winter. Transhumance is everywhere practised with these animals: those of the great plains moving from the Danube lowlands in the spring to the hill pastures in the summer. Local transhumance of cattle, sheep and pigs from villages of the upland valleys to the high dairies is the rule.

LAND TENURE.

241 423 AGRICULTURAL CONDITIONS, past and present, and the marketing of the products of land-utilisation are so closely bound up with conditions of land tenure that it is relevant to include here a short summary of those conditions.

IN THE PERIOD immediately preceding the outbreak of the Great War, 50 per cent of the land of Old Roumania was in large holdings (over 250 acres), and in the Bucovina, where the Roumanian peasants' holdings were pitiably small, 60 per cent. About 40 per cent of the holdings were of less than twenty-five acres. In Old Roumania and Transylvania the average was only eight acres per family, in the grain lands of Bessarabia eleven, but in the Bucovina uplands

241
423 only three and a half. But 50 per cent of the registered large holdings were farmed in small parcels by peasants who paid rent largely in kind or in services to absentee landlords or large tenant holders, mainly Jews, to whom the land had been farmed out. Such an arrangement often meant a considerable return to the landowner or direct farmer at the
243 expense of the peasant labourer. On the large holdings wheat was the main crop, only about 14 per cent of the maize in Old Roumania being grown on large holdings. There are a number of reasons for this. First, more capital is required for the cultivation of wheat; wheat seed grain costs ten times as much as maize for an equal area; then, in the higher lands, where the smaller holdings are to be found, the heavier rainfall and shorter growing period is more conducive to maize cultivation than to that of wheat. Again, the traditional staple food of the peasant is the easily prepared "mamaliga" or maize pudding, and the difficulty of persuading a peasant people to change their habits of life is well known, also the heavy animal fodder provided by maize is an important consideration for the peasant. And lastly, where the maintenance of life is dependent on an adequate winter store, the peasant is more concerned with securing that tangible store than with providing a cash crop with which to acquire luxuries. The large farmer, on the other hand, was mainly concerned in producing a surplus crop of wheat for export.

423 BETWEEN 1916 and 1926 a great redistribution of land in the interest of the peasants took place both in Old Roumania and in the newly-acquired territories. Such a redistribution in a land with important ethnical minorities has naturally given rise to much discontent among the dispossessed landlords and as naturally forms the basis of much political discussion and unrest and endless propaganda by all parties. But we are only concerned here with the economic results of the redistribution.

423 IT MUST be recognised that the change from large- to small-
241 scale farming, however advantageous to the peasant against whom the scales had always been weighted in the past, means a change in the character of the land cultivation, and though farming methods even on the large farms cannot be said to have been very enlightened, a certain amount of

423 capital expenditure on the provision of machinery, artificial
241 manures and so forth had been possible, and labour was cheap and available when required. With the small holding, these advantages can be acquired only by means of a highly-organised co-operative system and a controlled credit organisation, and there is no doubt that there has been a set-back in productiveness of large sections of the land. The large holders have been greatly handicapped in the exploitation of their land, moreover, first by government restrictions in the matter of wheat export, and second, by the great slump in wheat prices, probably also by inclement weather conditions. As a result there has been a drop of over 12 per cent in 1933 in the acreage under wheat and a corresponding rise in that under maize and barley.

241 To GET the best out of Roumanian agricultural land, im-
312 proved communications is one of the first essentials, for the removal of surplus crops, for the supply of artificial manures, particularly nitrates, and for the spread of agricultural education. The Roumanian peasant is backward in farming methods and requires help, both educational and financial, in such matters as seed selection and manuring. He uses too light a plough to get the best results from the soil and for the conservation of moisture in the soil. A system of irrigation would be of immense benefit not only in the plains but also in the valleys of the uplands. Of course, lacking the great reservoirs of water in snowfield and glacier and lake with which Switzerland and Austria are endowed, the perennial irrigation which is common in those lands cannot be so easily obtained, though much more utilisation might be made of the streams if the peasantry were more enlightened in their use. Large-scale irrigation works would necessitate the construction of reservoirs in the major river valleys to store the surplus rains of spring and early summer and the snow melt. Control of the streams is a very urgent matter, for the amount of damage they cause, in the sudden floods to which they are liable, to roads, bridges and to arable land is enormous. One of the great difficulties that the engineers have to deal with, and this may also be an important consideration in reservoir construction, is the friability of the rock material in most of the foot-hill country of the Carpathians. (This was illustrated very forcibly in a journey by car from Vatra Dornei through the Campulung district.)

342 absence of small fields, although a vegetable garden is a
563 normal feature. Most of them are grouped together in a small colony on a piece of steeply-sloping ground near the western end of the village that could not be used for agricultural purposes, thus emphasising the fact that they constitute an exotic element living on the outskirts of the community (see Plate XII and Fig. 11).

311 THERE is no emigration from Corbu, but the tendency is to extend cultivation by forest-cutting. A good deal of land in the Bistricioara valley is still available.

II. FARMING ACTIVITIES

THE LAND AND INHERITANCE.

428 FARMING in Corbu is carried on essentially for subsistence
241 rather than for profit. Large-scale cultivation with its attendant economies would in any case be difficult in such an environment, but it is rendered impossible by a land tenure system, intimately bound up with laws of inheritance, which permits the subdivision of land from generation to generation. On the death of the father the widow receives a quarter of the estate, the remainder being divided equally amongst all the children. Alternatively, the latter take over their portion on marriage, but the result in each case is the same—the peasant holdings not only decrease in size but portions of the same holding may be widely separated. For it does not even follow that all the land surrounding a farmstead necessarily belongs to the family residing there. It did, of course, when the holding was first formed, but marriage has in most cases added complications. A portion of the holding, for example, may belong to a married daughter living elsewhere in the village and her husband will then come periodically to cultivate it as part of his estate. Much time is wasted in this way, so wherever possible an interchange of plots is arranged, especially where the parties to the marriage belong to different villages.

423 IN a register covering about 207 hectares of privately owned land there were 133 parcels registered, sometimes more than one in the name of a particular person. Of the 133, 56 were less than one hectare each, but at least 8 of these parcels were accessories to other holdings and those owners

423 dealt with a considerably larger area. Forty-six holdings were between one and two, 18 between two and three, 8 between three and four, 3 between four and five, and 2 larger (8.8 and 19.5) hectares in extent. These holdings do not necessarily represent the whole of the land owned by a peasant.

LAND UTILISATION.

311 BROADLY SPEAKING, the land within the commune may be divided into three categories: the alluvium of the Bistricioara valley and the lower portions of its tributary valleys which is devoted to arable farming; the deforested lower slopes of the valley sides, together with the broad upper portions of some of the tributary valleys and odd patches of level ground here and there which are reserved for hay; and the rest, which is forest with the exception of the small high-altitude clearings that provide summer pasturage for the transhumant flocks and herds.

311 ABOUT 58 per cent of the land belongs to the state, 37 per
423 cent to the commune, and the rest, comprising about 400 hectares, is owned by the peasants. These 400 hectares represent the arable land of the commune, whilst the state lands are entirely forest. The commune lands include a certain amount of forest, together with the hay meadows and summer pastures. The law tries to make peasants plant trees to replace those that they cut down.

CROPS.

241 IN the arable area the outstanding crop is maize, from which
[262] "mamaliga," the staple food of the peasants, is made. It is sown at the beginning of May, two hillings, separated by an interval of three or four weeks, are made during June, and the crop is harvested between September 25th and October 10th. Potatoes, hemp, flax, lucerne (of which three cuttings are usually made), a little rye, sunflowers and vegetables are grown, mostly in very small patches, giving the impression of garden, rather than field, cultivation. Occasionally a small orchard adds further variety to the general pattern.

246 THE HAY CROP is of vital importance, as in all mountain communities of this kind throughout Europe. It is harvested

FARMING AROUND CURTEA DE ARGEȘ

AMY R. BURGESS

133 IN THE region of Curtea de Argeș the river flows in a valley of varying width, floored with fine sandy alluvium and bounded by somewhat rounded hills. Some traces of river terraces are discernible.

THE LAND of this region can be divided into four categories: (*a*) arable, (*b*) hay meadows, (*c*) forest, (*d*) high mountain pasture. The arable land is principally on the first terrace, but stretches both down the slope to the valley bottom and up the slope to the second terrace. The hay meadows are above the arable land, spreading upwards towards the [137] forest. The forests comprise 75 per cent of the total area, and consist mainly of timber trees, such as beech and pine, together with a considerable number of walnut trees. The high pastures are above the forest belt and may be as much as fifty kilometres away from the village centre of the commune to which they belong.

● 423 THE ARABLE land is owned by the peasants, holdings ranging from less than one hectare to fifty hectares, the majority being from two to five hectares. The smallness of the holding [428] is due partly to the laws of inheritance, by which the land is divided between the children on the death of the owner, and partly to the fact that the district is so hilly that only small areas are available for cultivation.

241 476 THE HAY meadows belong to the commune and are both worked and used collectively by the peasants, all necessary organization being in the hands of the mayor and committee.

471 [313] THE FORESTS are largely state-owned, although some portions belong to the commune, in which case the peasants are allowed to cut for their own personal use (house-building, implements, etc.), but not for profit.

[233] THE HIGH pastures belong to the commune; the peasants pay a small fee to the commune for their use (20 lei per head per season for sheep, rather more for cattle).

132 AN IMPORTANT climatic feature affecting agriculture is the shortness of the summer, late spring and early autumn frosts

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

the use of machinery are carried on at the school. Advisers are sent out to the farms, and seeds and plants, as well as artificial manure, are supplied to the peasants at a very low cost. Machinery is also loaned out cheaply. The average peasant, however, is very conservative, and progress is slow.

SOME DETAILS OF TWO FARMS: AUGUST 1936

FARM A

SIZE: one half-hectare approximately. This farm is situated approximately two miles north of Curtea de Argeş.

THE HOLDING consists of a narrow rectangular strip, bounded on one of its long sides by a rough lane and on its short side by the main road. The ground is fairly level and sufficiently above the river to be well drained. (See Plan A for utilization of land and arrangement of buildings.)

Animals

2 milking cows, 2 calves (at farm), but no oxen (this was unusual).
10 sheep, away on high pastures.
3 pigs, at farm.
10 geese, 6 ducks, 50 hens.

FARM B

SIZE: Five hectares approximately. This farm is situated at Corbeni, several kilometres north of Curtea de Argeş, at a point where the river valley widens out and the river braids. The farm is situated on the second terrace. The plot is rectangular, with its narrow side bordered by the road and its long side running parallel to the river, thus giving a well-drained but flat holding. The son of the owner holds a diploma for agriculture and the farm shows every evidence of prosperity. See PLAN B for utilization of land and arrangement of buildings.

SMALL PEASANT HOLDING

(Farm A)

241
423



A. House
B. Loom
C. Plum trees

Approximate length 250 m.
Approximate breadth 20m.

Not drawn to scale

Drawn by A. R. Burgess

241
423

PLAN OF LARGE HOLDING

(Farm B)

Approximately 5 hectares
Not drawn to scale.



Drawn by A. R. Burger

still abroad, was summarily dismissed. Peasant risings, a movement for autonomy in Transylvania, and general instability led to the nomination of General Averescu to office, owing to the reputation he enjoyed of being a strong man, having taken an active part in suppressing the peasant rising of 1907.

General Averescu's government passed the enactment dealing with the distribution of land to the peasants, while his Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Take Jonescu, laid the foundation of the Little Entente by concluding alliances with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. General Averescu attempted to open pourparlers with Russia, so as to prepare the recognition of Rumania's right to Bessarabia, and there was a fair chance of his succeeding, but he was baulked of his aim, for the King vetoed his plan.

To M. Titulescu was assigned the task of reorganizing the country's finances. This was deemed to be an intrusion into the special domain of the Bratianus[1] and so by provoking their hostility, brought about Averescu's downfall. M. Take Jonescu was his successor, but he was able to maintain himself in office only for a month. A government constituted by the Bratianu party followed in January, 1922, and remained in power until March, 1926. Owing to the disunion among the Opposition groups the Bratianu party was allowed to carry into effect its nefarious project of securing complete control of the economic resources of Rumania. The whole legislation passed during its tenure of office was of a purely economic character, and under the pretext of consolidating the finances of the country they merely consolidated their own financial dominance.

Popular dissatisfaction was steadily growing in the meanwhile, as instead of relieving the money stringency, the economic policy of the government did nothing but intensify the evil from which the country was suffering. On the other hand the Opposition was closing its ranks and organizing mass demonstrations throughout the country. A monster meeting of peasants was held at Alba-Julia in May, 1925, followed up by vigorous onslaughts against the government. The latter, unable to obtain a foreign loan which would have enabled it to stabilize the currency and relieve

1 [The Liberal Party, headed by John Bratianu--Annotat]

563 Tyrol, or the Ukrainians in Poland, for they at least possess a large number of schools and churches, mainly in communes [658] in which they form the majority of the population. At a time when the Rumanian government has been obliged for reasons of economy to close down several hundreds of schools and colleges, it would not be fair to impugn it for a shortage •[423] of Magyar schools in Transylvania. The burning grievance, of course, remains the agrarian reform, not only because it has dispossessed Hungarian and German owners, but also because the depreciation of the Rumanian currency has practically nullified the paltry compensation they were accorded. Furthermore, religious establishments possessed extensive domains which likewise were expropriated and [659] have thereby lost most of their revenues which formerly were employed in the upkeep of churches, educational missions, and benevolent societies. This naturally constitutes a source of bitter recriminations, for both Hungarians and Germans are inclined to ascribe the treatment meted out to their religious establishments as dictated by the desire of the Rumanians to discourage their cultural activities, and to hinder the normal development of their nationality by depriving it of pecuniary resources. It is a great pity that so far no law has been framed to define the status of minorities in Rumania though this has been persistently promised them. Such an enactment would formulate once and for all the respective privileges and duties of both parties, and there would be no further grounds for recrimination except in the case of a patent violation of its clauses. The National Peasant party had prepared such a scheme which, if enacted, would have gone a long way to settle this vexed question; unfortunately after its abandonment of power it has apparently been forgotten.

With the advent of the Iorga-Argentoianu government the laudable initiative of creating a sub-secretariat for minorities was taken, to which post, M. Brandsch, a member of the German minority was appointed. He seems to have carried out his duty very conscientiously, as he has repeatedly been attacked by the ultra-nationalist press of Bucarest for his disregard of the superior interest of the Rumanian cause, and for overduly favouring the minorities. There seems to

RUMANIA

665 Rumania. The paper concluded by an exhortation addressed
574 to Bessarabians to evict Inculeţ from the political arena of Bessarabia where he had operated as though this region had been an African colony, and the appeal concluded with the hortatory incitation "Eject this putrefaction from Bessarabia."

In spite of the severe financial crisis which afflicted this
661 region, the fiscal agents of the government insisted on
563 collecting taxes even when in years of drought the peasantry
661 was destitute and utterly unable to pay. The methods employed were so barbarous that they provoked several interpellations in the Rumanian Chamber. During its sitting of Dec. 10th, 1926, M. V. Madgearu denounced the abusive and inquisitorial methods by which Bessarabian tax-payers had been sold up and his arraignment was confirmed by similar indictments formulated by a member of the (then) government majority.

423 In October, 1930, a revolt broke out in southern Bess-
563 arabia. The peasants of the village of Baimaklia, near the town of Kagui, revolted and burned down the residence of a
661 big landowner because certain grazing lands were given to him by the State instead of being distributed among the peasants. That similar abuses are current may be inferred from an article in the "Aurora" of June 3rd, 1926, which is headed "The pauperization and humiliation of the Bessarabians," and in which it is related how certain State lands were put up for sale at Balţi, and though the peasantry of six adjoining villages had combined and offered 400,000 lei more than three big landowners, the lands were allocated to the latter, obviously through favouritism. That State functionaries often act with an arbitrariness and brutality
563 inconceivable in a civilized State may be illustrated by
661 the Soroca affair, which is of quite recent occurrence. In January, 1932, six Jewish youths, inhabitants of Soroca, on the Dniester, after coming to terms with the frontier-guards as to the amount of the bribe they would have to pay to be allowed to escape into Russia, and after they had paid 40,000 lei, were ambuscaded and shot down. In order to instil terror into the local population, their bodies were hurled pell-mell on a sledge which was driven by a soldier

AGRICULTURE

As a result of the legislative measures enacted in 1917 and 1921 Rumania, which was a country of vast latifundia, was transformed into one of smallholdings. Fear, rather than generosity or a desire to promote the country's welfare, prompted the initiation of these enactments. The Russian example which was nigh would have proved contagious had a policy of repression been adopted similar to that of 1907, when over 11,000 Rumanian peasants were ruthlessly massacred in their vain attempt to secure more humane treatment at the hands of their landlords. The landed classes had therefore to yield much in order to retain at least a little. Besides, the initiative had already been taken by Bessarabia, prior to her final declaration of union with Rumania in 1918, of enacting the expropriation of the large estates, and Rumania was confronted with the dilemma of following suit or of seeing Bessarabia demand the annulment of the act of union just passed, for it was impossible for the latter to rescind this measure. 423

That no high motives were behind this policy of expropriation may be inferred from the perfunctory manner in which it was applied, and the absence of a rational plan for putting it into operation. In fact, one of the reasons for the sudden dismissal of the first Vaida-Voevod administration in 1920 was apprehension lest Mihalache, the then Minister of Agriculture, would have seen to the thorough and rational execution of the expropriation decrees. It could have been easily foreseen that the peasantry, who until then had been in a state akin to serfdom, were destitute and had not the capital wherewith to exploit the lands that were being allotted them. It was the imperative duty of the State to find the means necessary to endow the peasantry with the indispensable agricultural equipment for the cultivation of their lands. The Governments presided over by the Bratianus, however, were busy reserving the exploitation of the natural resources of the country for their partisans, and the peasants were left to fend for themselves as best they could. The Bratianus 661 would suffer no harm from the fact that the State was 423

neglecting the peasants; on the contrary, they saw in them a
661 numerous and profitable crowd of clients for the banks, the
● 423 majority of which were under their control. The less pecuniary aid the peasant obtained from the State, the greater would be his need of the private bank or usurer. And so well did the latter entangle the peasants in their tentacles that within ten years of the enactment of the Land Distribuion Act the debts contracted by the peasants had surpassed the value of their lands. Thus the much-belauded agrarian revolution in Rumania was threatened with complete failure, and so another revolutionary measure had to be passed, the strangely-termed "law for the sanitation of agrarian debts," in order to save the peasantry from being dispossessed of their land.

311 The *Argus* of 13th February, 1932, published the following
241 table which shows how the land was actually distributed:
434

Area of properties.	Total hectares.	Percentage of area.	Number of proprietors.	Percentage of total. Owners.	Average area of farm for each category.
Up to 5 hectares ...	6,280,993	43.60	3,731,403	84.20	1.94
5 to 10 hectares ...	2,919,863	20.20	435,715	11,30	6.70
10 to 50 hectares ...	2,392,689	16.60	148,860	3.90	16.07
50 to 250 hectares ...	1,505,257	10.40	18,122	0.50	83.06
Over 250 hectares ...	1,305,670	9.10	2,597	0.10	502.00
Total ...	14,404,462,	100.00	3,836,757	100.00	3.75

As one hectare sown to wheat yields approximately 1,200 kg. of wheat, and the average price of wheat during 1931 was about 2.25 lei, the revenue per hectare may be reckoned at about 2,700 lei. As the average holding of 84 per cent of the peasantry is about 2 hectares, the paper assumed that the revenue of each peasant household amounted approximately to some 5,400 lei, or about 160 gold francs. For the
241 year 1931 the total revenue from agriculture was computed
434 at 46,500 million lei, of which 21 milliards were derived from the cattle-rearing industry, 21 milliards from cereals, and 4½ milliards from other plants. Other crops were even less profitable; thus the average price of maize was 1.50 lei per kg. and the yield 1,500 kg. per hectare, so that the revenue per hectare amounted to 2,250 lei, and the figures for barley were respectively 2 lei, 1,400 kg., and 2,800 lei.

of at least 30 per cent in three years, which would represent an increment of 20,000 million lei to the national income, and the writer proceeded to show how erroneous it was to continue following a policy of encouraging industry, since the latter could never yield similar results in so short a time no matter what amount of capital was invested in it. He further enlarged on the necessity of creating a system of credit institutions which would offer loans to the peasantry, for the latter had been completely abandoned to themselves, and he stigmatized the attitude of the Government in this respect as "a policy of complete economic aberration."

There are many who attribute the decadence of agriculture in Rumania to the Agrarian Reform, but this is an altogether gratuitous conclusion, though in a particular sense their assertion is correct. One may, for instance, take it for granted that had the large landowners subsisted, owing to their political influence they would never have allowed the Bratianu Governments to institute such legislation as rendered the marketing of agricultural produce impossible on a remunerative basis. Indeed the cultivation of the soil had ceased to be a profitable one even as early as 1924, and large farmers employing paid labour could not make enough out of their produce to cover their outlay plus the normal rent of their farms. This was exposed at length in the *Argus* of July 29th, 1926, and the paper attributed to this cause the decrease in the area sown with wheat in Moldavia and Bessarabia, where the best corn lands in Rumania are to be found. One could further infer from the arguments invoked that it was only the smallholder who could persevere in such a disadvantageous occupation as agriculture, because he neither stinted his efforts nor valued at its true worth the amount of labour he expended on his own land, such being the traditional attitude of the peasant. M. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, in his informative book "Neoiobâgia," relates how the peasantry persisted in cultivating their land in the neighbourhood of Ploeşti after 1907, when owing to the development of the oil industry the price of land had increased to such an extent as to render agriculture an uneconomical occupation. Thus, while a pogon[1] of land was let at 50 lei,

[1] One pogon is equivalent to 5,012 sq. metres.

the price of the quantity of maize grown on it would fetch only 40 lei; nevertheless the peasant owner persisted in cultivating his patch of land because he felt ashamed to allow it to lie fallow, having always been accustomed to cultivate it, and buy the maize he needed instead, for which, however, he would probably have to pay a somewhat higher price than the 40 lei at which he could have sold his own (p. 111). So that, far from exerting an adverse influence on production, the breaking up of the large estates has, on the contrary, proved to be the salvation of the industry, for were it not for the abnegation and attachment of the individual smallholder to his farm, agriculture would have been completely ruined by the policy imposed by the Bratianus. Indeed, one cannot but admire this profound devotion of the peasant to the land and his dogged persistence in carrying on, despite the odds which confronted him and the utter lack of encouragement he met with from the State. We may take it for granted that the small farm of five hectares was more productive than the large estates, even from official statistics. This peculiarity was commented on in the *Cuvantul* of July 23rd, 1927, which at the same time decried the maladministration of the then Finance Minister, M. Vintila Bratianu, and his threat to increase the land tax. That paper contested the official statement that the land tax in Rumania amounted to one gold franc per hectare, as this affirmation would cast a slur on the country. In fact it was estimated that in 1924 the export taxes on cereals had yielded the equivalent of a tax of 8 gold francs per hectare.

The determined perseverance of the peasantry could not undo the harm caused by the erroneous agrarian policy pursued, and the situation could not but grow worse with time.

So that when finally the National Peasant Party assumed power at the end of 1928, the situation had become so hopeless that the Rumanian Government even contemplated organizing a mass emigration to France and her colonies in order to relieve the strain. Early in 1929 the Press, commenting on this unexpected decision of the Government to encourage emigration, admitted that the cause of the disastrous condition agriculture had reached in Rumania could

241 be clearly traced to the carelessness with which the law of
● 423 land distribution had been drafted, and to the utter neglect
[511] to provide financial means for its rational application, as well
167 as to the export taxes on agricultural produce. The outcome was appalling, as may be judged from an article in the *Cuvantul* in which, after dilating on the causes that had brought about this disaster, it was asserted: "We are obliged to admit that the entire rural population had reached a state of pauperism at a time when we should reasonably have expected it to be thriving, since it had been endowed with lands. It seems a paradox, yet we have only wrecked the old system of production, founded on the unjust system of latifundia, in order to replace serfdom by pauperism. At the time of the large estates the rural worker had no need to emigrate; on the contrary, there was a shortage of labour, and foreign labourers had to be admitted from neighbouring countries. To-day, however, we are forced to direct the rural population abroad so as to save it from starvation; that is the situation we have reached ten years after the enactment of the expropriation laws. . . ." According to the *Adeverul* of March 29th, 1929, the Minister for Agriculture, speaking about the state of that industry, drew a very dark picture and lamented the wretched condition to which agricultural production had fallen. Rumanian agriculture, once the source of wealth and the economic basis of the State, was, he said, on the verge of ruin. The Minister not only condemned the culpable manner in which the land distribution law had been carried out, but also denounced the laxity and incapacity of the functionaries who had been appointed to show the peasants new methods of cultivation. According to him, the so-called model school farms were a positive disgrace. . . . Apparently matters have not improved since, for
241 as late as March, 1932, one could read in the *Ellenzek*, a
874 paper published in Hungarian at Cluj, that the Hungarian Cultural Association of Transylvania had decided to present a petition to the League of Nations to demand the creation of an agricultural school destined exclusively for sons of Rumanian citizens of Hungarian nationality. One ought not to feel surprise that the Hungarian minority, convinced of the glaring ineptitude of the Rumanian administration, had

AGRICULTURE

owing to the natural increase of her population, will in a couple of years have no more wheat available for export, and in ten or twelve years it will be the same with maize. It is imperative, therefore, for the Government to take without delay the steps necessary to increase the yield. This can only be done if the State will undertake to provide selected seed corn, to establish rural banks to enable the peasantry to obtain advances of funds at cheap rates in order to buy machinery and implements, and to create model farms in which more modern methods of cultivation might be demonstrated practically. If grain elevators were also constructed in important agricultural centres, and adequate storage accommodation made available, it would be easy to advance money to farmers on the security of the cereals they could store as a pledge. And if Rumania decided to return to methods of legality and offer safeguards to foreign capital there would be no difficulty whatever in obtaining all the capital she requires for financing such operations, as they would then prove perfectly sound. It is this utter lack of capital which has handicapped the development of agriculture since the war, for the smallholder had to pay usurious rates of interest (40 to 60 per cent being current), while prior to the war large owners could obtain advances from the banks on very reasonable terms. It would be altogether unjustifiable, therefore, to assert, as some people allege, that the breaking up of the large estates had led to the decline of agriculture. On the contrary, it is this measure which has permitted agriculture to survive, for owing to the systematic diversion of capital from agriculture to industry, the owners of the large estates would have found themselves in a worse fix than the smallholders if they had continued to exist and therefore required advances for the maintenance of their estates, as was formerly their wont. Without liquid assets they would have found themselves utterly unable to carry on the cultivation of those large estates, while the smallholder, by dint of hard work and privation, has managed to keep his patch of land under the plough. Some persons may retort that, if the breaking up of the large estates had proved to be a practical operation, the rural population would not have run into debt to the extent of

M

241 some 80 milliard lei, and obliged the Government to pass the
423 law decreeing the conversion of agrarian debts, in order to
426 save the peasantry from the predicament of being dispossessed of their land by their creditors. The large owners, however, were in as bad a plight and perhaps worse off, for when the legislation concerning the cancellation of agrarian debts was under discussion in the Chamber, the director of the *Argus* suggested that Ministers and deputies should be excluded from being among the beneficiaries of the proposed law, so that they should not be accused later of having passed such a revolutionary measure mainly for self-interested motives. His suggestion was not supported, a fact which would tend to prove that large owners were perhaps more insistent on the adoption of this measure than smallholders, to many of whom it has proved highly prejudicial.

That the agrarian revolution did not solely profit the peasantry, and that others took advantage of it to appropriate lands to which they had no right, and that the latter were more insistent on the voting of the law for the conversion of agrarian debts, is an undisputed fact. This is proved also by an interview published by the *Adeverul* on September 9th, 1930, in which Prof. Iorga was reported to have said: "When the expropriation of the large estates was carried out many mistakes and injustices were committed. Real cultivators were not endowed with land in order that in their place land should be bestowed on various political partisans, electoral agents, and others who had nothing in common with the land or agriculture. Having thus secured the land, they set about to increase their holdings by buying up with borrowed money adjoining tracks, and started exploiting them on American methods. But their calculations were erroneous, because with us agriculture is not profitable except for the owner who himself cultivates his land. This category of landowners should not be assimilated with the peasantry, and the State should not assume charge of their debts." This wise recommendation, however, was not followed, and large owners were permitted to a certain extent to take advantage of the law of conversion of agrarian debts.

241 That it was absolutely indispensable to extend some help
426 to the peasantry no one will dispute, but this law of con-
453

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

This state of affairs led to the great and bloody peasant revolt of 1907 which was ruthlessly crushed by the Bratianu government with the help of troops commanded by General Averescu. Yet, even after this the rulers of Rumania were unwilling to carry out reforms which were already overdue. Only in 1917, when the position on the Rumanian front seemed completely hopeless and when the Russian Revolution found more and more adherents among the peasant soldiers, did the government of King Ferdinand decide to carry out a thorough land reform. Although this was the most far-reaching of any measures ever carried out in Rumania, it bore all the marks of a step adopted unwillingly, under the pressure of external events. Although the Bratianu government, composed of many big landowners, consented to carry out the land reform, it was violently opposed by many of the government's supporters. The reforms, as finally applied in the early nineteen-twenties in both the Old Kingdom and in the New Territories, differed considerably from the original plans of 1917. They did, however, bring about important changes. Whereas before the Great War half of all the arable land belonged to a few *boiars*, by 1930 about nine-tenths belonged to small holders and only one-tenth to big landowners.

In Bessarabia many of the big estates remained untouched; land was given to reliable farmers, Germans and Rumanian colonists, but not to the landless who needed it most. In Transylvania the land reform was used to strengthen the Rumanian as against the Magyar elements of the population. But many of the holdings remained too small to

8

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

565 provide their holders with a fair income, and a con-
471 siderable part of the rural population remained
423 landless. Worst of all, those peasants who did obtain land were given neither implements nor sufficient financial help which could have enabled them to make a decent living. Neither of the measures which are essential to the success of peasant proprietorship —State aid in money, machinery and technical advice; or the creation of large-scale co-operative [641] societies and banks—were carried out. Undoubtedly the extension of the franchise in 1923 to all men of 21 and the land reforms greatly strengthened the position of the peasantry in the State. But, actually, it was widespread discontent with the working of the agrarian reform that stimulated the organization of the National Peasant Party.

423 CROPS. The great devastation of Rumania during
241 the First World War and the effects of the land reform resulted in a great reduction of the country's agricultural production during the immediate post- [439] war period.[1] Whereas the Old Kingdom alone in 1913 had grown 2,200,000 tons of wheat, of which 1,150,000 tons were exported, and over 3,100,000 tons of maize, of which 1,000,000 tons were exported, the production figures for Greater Rumania in 1921 were for wheat 2,140,000 tons, and for maize 2,810,000 tons. This great decrease is all the more striking in view of the fact that the amount of arable

[1] In Transylvania and the neighbouring territories, taken from Hungary, some of the great *latifundias* had been well and scientifically worked with modern agricultural machinery. There were some conscientious landowners among the Magyar nobility as well as absentee landlords who neglected their peasantry.

A. PRE-WAR CONDITIONS

1. General

241 Agriculture occupies about 80 per cent. of the population of Rumania and contributes the greater part of the national income: but, owing to the importance of the country's mineral-oil production, exports of agricultural products accounted for rather less than half of total exports by value, in the immediate pre-war years. [439]

Total agricultural production, even if there were no exports, would fall seriously short of the real food needs of the country. The poorest are actually underfed, while the majority of the remainder subsist on a diet which, though adequate in quantity, is seriously deficient in quality and nutritional elements. [146]

In her farming Rumania suffers from two interrelated difficulties: rural over-population and low food output per acre. There are 16 agricultural workers per 100 acres of farm land, compared with 6 in Denmark and 3 in Britain. Another aspect of this is the extremely small size of most of the farms—75 per cent. of them are less than 5 hectares (12 acres) in extent. Because there is not enough land to go round, most farming families have to eke out a living on holdings which under any system of general farming would be too small to provide an adequate income. [161]

The position would be less serious if a high per-acre food output were achieved. But in fact the Rumanian output per acre is barely one-quarter of that obtained in countries like Belgium and the Netherlands. Rumania pivots her farming on wheat and maize production but, owing to the extensive methods practised, the few livestock kept, and other reasons, per acre yields are among the lowest in Europe.

It is the over-population and land shortage which are largely responsible for agriculture remaining so backward. Having insufficient land the peasant does not produce much for sale, and so cannot afford to purchase fertilisers, good quality seed or better implements. Nor can he spare many acres for fodder crops, since the bulk of his land is needed to grow the food his family eats. And as he cannot buy fodder, he cannot keep many animals. Thus, while there is some scope for agricultural improvements which would ameliorate the peasants' lot, the pre-requisite of farming progress is to find alternative occupations for the surplus population.

423 471 The system of land tenure is peasant proprietorship. This was attained under the Land Reform carried through after the first World War. The effect of this was to divide up and transfer to peasant ownership a large area of land formerly worked in big estates. This revolution in land tenure provided a solution for a long-standing social problem, but its effects on production were unfavourable. The large estates had been run by trained managers, with relatively advanced methods and equipment. Their transfer to ill-equipped, backward and uneducated peasants was followed, for a time at least, by a decline in yields, and consequently in total production and exports.

241 Little progress was made in the period between the two wars in remedying the disadvantages of uneconomic farm sizes, and in raising the low standards of farming. For lack of education the

241 the peasants and the reduced 1942 sowings both
656 of grain and of sugar-beet indicated continued
435 dissatisfaction. Finally, by the spring of 1943 a wiser ratio was reached, agricultural prices being four times as high as in 1939 and wholesale prices in general three and a half times as high. Nevertheless, this very considerable measure of inflation
[458] has shaken public confidence in the value of money so that peasants increasingly resort to barter transactions.

[655] In the hope of obtaining better control over grain supplies the Government in the autumn of 1941 nationalised the grain trade, later they relaxed this to the extent of leaving the export business to a few selected firms and the internal collection to the Army and to the National Institute of Co-operation. This body handled the pre-war grain marketing scheme, and their
[563] activities—because of the expulsion of Jews from wholesale and retail trade—have recently developed rapidly in the supply of seeds to peasants (80,000 tons of seed distributed in 1942) as well as consumers' goods to peasants and townspeople. But it still proved difficult to extract enough food from the peasants to feed the towns. For the 1943 harvest detailed regulations were made concerning the quantities the peasant might keep for seed, for his family and for his animals, and threshing operations were subjected to inspection. Yet these rules could not in practice be administered.

423 It is now generally agreed in Rumania that the
471 smallness of the holdings has been a principal obstacle to effective organisation of agriculture in war-time, and that a change to larger units of production is needed. Any approach to collectivisation on the Soviet model, however, would be regarded as contradictory to the land reform policy and a threat to the Rumanian State. The official policy, though it has not yet taken its final form, is to maintain private property but to proceed no further with expropriation and division of large estates, and to maintain existing medium holdings by prohibiting their sub-division for inheritance or other reasons. Schemes for the consolidation of strips are also contemplated for a more opportune moment. Further, in order to
474 increase production and to improve the peasants' methods and standards of life, communal farming associations, known as *obştii*, are to be formed. In these associations, farming equipment is to be pooled so that the small-holder would have the same resources as the large farmer. Each *obştie* is to embrace a village and perform all the functions of a co-operative, including joint purchase and sale, use of breeding animals, processing of crops, etc. Villages which are prepared to form themselves into *obştii* and to undertake to work the land according to State directions, are promised tractors, seed and breeding stock without payment. In this way it is hoped that some of the advantages of collectivisation may be achieved while retaining those of individual ownership. But, unless accompanied by far-reaching industrial development, the plan can but aggravate rural unemployment. It is not known how this innovation has been received by the peasants. It was reported in April 1943 that 270 of these communal associations had been formed—an insignificant number—and it is believed that the Government is allocating to them some of the tractors imported from Germany in the war years.*

241 The success of the *obştii* plan, and indeed of any plan for up-grading Rumanian agriculture, depends

* In June, 1943, a temporary ban was placed on the formation of any new *obştie*, because there was insufficient agricultural machinery to supply to them.

[10b]

137 Banat and in west Transylvania; and of these 15 per cent. are not easily accessible and are unremunerative to exploit on account of heavy capital expenditure necessary to build suitable roads and railways. The forests of the plains were of minor importance, especially since they consisted almost entirely of young trees yielding firewood only.

Beech was the principal forest tree, except in the plains, where it gave way to various species of oak. The eastern Carpathians constituted the only predominantly coniferous regions.

[423] The following table shows how the forests were owned and managed; column 1 shows the area in million Hectares, column 2 the equivalent in square miles :—

	I	II	% of Total
State owned	1.9	7.3	30
Owned by communes, churches, etc.	2.0	7.7	30
Owned by companies and private persons.. ..	2.5	9.6	40

About 70 per cent. of the forests were treated as "high forests" (i.e., allowed to grow naturally) and the remainder were under varying forms of "coppice management" (i.e., allowed to grow from roots after cutting, thus producing small timber).

2. Annual Increment and Domestic Consumption

313 439 Chiefly as a result of Rumania's Agrarian Reform policy in 1924 and 1925 of clear-cutting huge forest areas to provide peasants with additional agricultural land, very large volumes of timber became available for the export market, with the result that a wrong impression was created abroad that Rumania was a country with a large export surplus of timber.

313 Present fellings are not known, but a considerable shortage of forest workers and draught animals, coupled with poor transport conditions generally, are making it impossible to fell and to distribute sufficient timber to meet all home demands. These have been considerably increased by the need for timber for military purposes both in the country and at the front, and for reconstruction work in the war-damaged areas of Bessarabia, Bucovina and Transnistria. The result is a heavy and at times serious shortage of supplies.

[439] Exports, which had already fallen to about 562,000 cubic metres in 1940, further declined after the loss of Transylvania and were only some 210,000 cubic metres in 1941, but of these about 180,000 cubic metres were old accumulated stocks of sawn goods which were sold to Germany and the U.S.S.R. at the beginning of that year. No information has yet been received concerning 1942 exports, but the increasing difficulties of production make it unlikely that these were of any importance, and probably did not exceed 50,000 cubic metres.

[656] The forests are now placed under Government control and many decrees have been published regulating and defining the quantities and dimensions of trees that may be felled. Maximum prices have been fixed for all classes of timber, and a strict rationing of firewood introduced, whilst in 1942 an export embargo was placed on several categories of timber, principally soft woods.

After the cession of Northern Transylvania, German forestry experts visited the country to advise on proper forestry methods, and although there is no real evidence of what was decided, there are indications that the country is now more forestry-minded, and that more regard is being paid to reafforestation and other necessary work. These are, however, long-term policies and can have very little immediate effect or improvement on the country's present difficult situation.

TABLES

1. Details of Cut and Ownership, 1930

[423]

	State	*Communes*	*Private*	*Total*
Timber	(in '000 solid cubic metres)			
Conifers ..	570	2,450	2,850	5,870
Beech ..	1,080	300	480	1,860
Oak, etc. ..	350	390	520	1,260
Firewood ..	2,820	2,130	6,930	11,880
Total ..	4,820	5,270	10,780	20,870

2. Distribution of Timber Industry, 1938

	Units	*Personnel*
Total timber industry ..	713	43,326
of which:		
Sawmills	478	37,693
Distribution of total timber industry by administrative regions:—		
Olt	18	1,756
Bucegi	159	7,177
Marea	3	38
Dunarea de Jos ..	29	932
Nistru	3	109
Prut	67	6,222
Suceava	110	6,555
Mureş	155	9,196
Someş	83	7,163
Timiş	86	4,178

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania EDI

648 advertise to the Rumanian masses, most of whom had never heard
728 his name. On March 8, therefore, Groza was told to ask Stalin for northern Transylvania, and by return telegram he received it as a "present." The Nazis had not yet been expelled from Budapest, so there was nobody there for Moscow to take into account. The Western Allies were not consulted. As a matter of fact, they had no objection to the return of at least most of Transylvania to Rumania, but would have preferred that it be done after study as to whether or not there should be frontier rectifications in favor of Hungarian ethnic groups; and they certainly would have considered it more suitable that the transfer be made after agreement among the Allies rather than unilaterally by one of them.

665 The steps by which the Communist-dominated Rumanian Gov-
668 ernment became an absolute Communist dictatorship need not be detailed here.[3] In the beginning there certainly were some non-Communist elements which favored a clean sweep of the old order even though the representatives of the new order were Communists and protégés of the hated Russians. Seizure of the large properties still left in Rumania after the land reforms following the First World War was popular in principle. Rumanian régimes of the inter-war period had not been noted for efficiency or probity, and the Communists hastened to identify all Rumanian statesmen who held democratic beliefs and had a Western orientation with the "old gang" of profiteers and politicians who had mocked the Constitution in the dissolute days of King Carol and had ended by taking Rumania into the war as the ally of the Nazis. The fact that Maniu, the country's leading statesman, was famous for his incorruptibility and stubborn devotion to the Constitution did not deter Communist propaganda from picturing him also as a corrupt relic of the old dictatorial order. The Socialists were, of course, completely outbid by Communist promises of pie in the sky.

665 But although these tactics had some success at first the only one
241 of them that was based on anything substantial, the gift of land to
423

[3] For a fuller outline of the postwar evolution in Rumania as well as other parts of Eastern Europe, and of relevant negotiations (if they can be called that) between the Soviets and the Western Powers, see Campbell, *op. cit.*, also volumes for 1947–48 and 1948–49 in the same series by the same author, and the volume for 1949 by Richard P. Stebbins.

8: Armstrong 5-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania EDI

the peasants, was a boomerang. The land reforms of 1919–21 had distributed about 14 million acres among about 1,400,000 peasants. The new Communist expropriations distributed an additional 2,750,000 acres among about 1,100,000 peasants. It has been calculated that as a result more than half of the land holdings in Rumania consisted of less than seven and a half acres per family. Most farms of this size were insufficient to support independent farmers. Now this may have been as the Communists planned, for it enabled them to point out the advantages of collectivization to peasants who lacked even the minimum of tools and draft animals to cultivate their small private holdings. But when they did so they lost the popularity they had gained, both with peasants who worked ancestral lands and with those who had just shared in the expropriated estates.

The Communists thus felt it necessary to make their political position more secure, in particular to head off their natural rivals in the countryside, the formidable National Peasant Party headed by Maniu. In December 1945 a correspondent of the London *Times* had written critically of Maniu's "rigidity" and unwillingness to accept a modern "radical policy," and had blamed his "unbending attitude" for the "inevitable" political crisis. Less than a year later (October 18, 1946) the same or another correspondent of the *Times* reported from Bucharest that Maniu was "more popular than ever in his long career." The dispatch continued: "His past mistakes and weaknesses are forgotten. He stands now not for any program or ideology but for the idea of national independence. He is the symbol of the Rumanian nation."

As the Rumanian nation was to be destroyed, Maniu had to be destroyed.

This was the period for dealing with peasant rivals to the Communists in all the agrarian satellite states. In Bulgaria, the leader of the Peasant Party, Petkov, was arrested in June 1947 and hanged in September. In Poland, the leader of the Peasant Party, Mikolajczyk, was harried from the political scene and in October 1947 was forced to flee to London. In Hungary, the Soviets had made the mistake of permitting free elections and had lost them to Nagy's Smallholders Party; but they had stipulated that regardless of the

Article 25[1] provides that: 659 793

"the Ministry of Religious Affairs shall suspend any decision, instruction or directive, as well as any order (of a church authority) having a church administrative, cultural, educational or a charitable character or pertaining to endowments if it is contrary to the status of the denomination, to the act of its establishment, to public security or public order or morals. The pastoral and circular letters shall be communicated in advance to the Ministry of Religious Affairs." (Italics supplied.) 671

The religious denominations and their endowments, associations, etc., must submit a full report on their financial situation for approval and verification by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The law provides that the salaries of clergymen and the officers of the church shall be paid by the State. But, in contrast to the Law No. 1002 of 1936, Article 34 of the Decree No. 177 suggests that these persons are on the same footing with other government employees in all respects. This article reads:

Article 34

Placing on the payroll of the clergymen and officers of the religious denominations shall be done according to the general rules.

The "general rules" of government employment referred to here (Code of Civil Service of 1946) makes clear that everybody who draws salary from the Government treasury enjoys all rights and has all of the duties of a governmental employee.

Several provisions deal with the disposal of property of parishes where a part of the parishioners decided to choose 659 425

[1. Law No. 61, Article 25, 1948 - Analyst]

another denominational jurisdiction. Disregarding the ecclesiastical rules of the denomination, the decree provides that the assets of the parish are transferred to the denomination chosen by the parishioners who leave the parish in proportion to their number as compared with those remaining in the parish. In case 75 percent leave a creed, its entire assets, including the church building, are transferred to that adopted by the parishioners. The implication of this rule is discussed infra under 5. 659 425

The religious denominations may maintain with other countries only such relations as are of a religious nature and they must be carried after approval of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and through the medium of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. These provisions were intended to interrupt direct contact between the Roman Catholic Church in Romania and the Holy See, required by the dogma and organization of the Roman Catholic Church. 659 648 794

Any direct communication by Catholic prelates in Romania with the Holy See could be brought, in view of these provisions, under the provisions of the Decree of August 12, 1950, on state security which threatens with the death penalty:

a) "Treason to the country, rendering service to the enemy or causing prejudice to the power of the state;

b) Procurement and the transmission of state secrets to a foreign or enemy power;. . ."

Unfortunately, there were several instances in which expulsion or conviction was imposed upon the prelates and minister

Christians of old rite: 1 diocese 659

Protestants: 1 bishop and 1 superintendent. 795

The other religious denominations must each have one central organization.

B. Church Property

The general Decree No. 177 on religious denominations grants the recognized denominations and their parishes the status of a legal entity. The institutions, orders, congregations, associations and establishments organized by the Church may, however, obtain such status only upon a special petition in a procedure established for granting the legal entity in general. It may also be observed that under the Law No. 54 of 1928 the status of legal entities was recognized automatically to a broad group of churches enumerated therein as national or historical denominations. The Decree No. 177 does not grant to any denomination automatic recognition by virtue of the law. Recognition of any denomination is within the discretion of the government which is not limited in its decision. Consequently, a denomination must petition to be recognized and only if the recognition is granted, it acquires the status of a legal entity. 659

The most salient point, however, lies in the expressly state right of the Ministry of Religious Affairs "to verify and control" the inventory of all church property and its budget (Articles 29, 30 of Decree No. 177). 425

In addition, it may be borne in mind that some churches,

in particular the Roman Catholic Church, were already deprived of their funds. This was a result of practices supported by legal provisions. 659 425

In the first place, it refers to land. Agricultural land still possessed by the church after the land reform of 1919 was in fact taken away in direct violation of the law. [423]

Article 8 of Law No. 187 of March 23, 1945, on agrarian reform provided that: [671]

> "agricultural land belonging to monasteries, mitropoles, bishoprics, parishes as well as clerical endowments are excepted, from expropriation, and left in the ownership of the present title holders."

Likewise, certain categories of land, such as vineyards and forests, were generally exempted from expropriation. Nevertheless, most of Catholic landed property, including forests, vineyards, etc., were commandeered early in 1945 and thereafter seized by various "local committees" and, eventually, divided into small holdings. The remainder was seized in its entirety in February 1949 without compensation. This time the Government did not even take pains to issue a decree legalizing the actual seizure.

The "Sacred Fund" of the Catholic Church (see supra) also lost its value. It was composed almost exclusively of governmental bonds and were given after 1919 to the religious Catholic bodies in Transylvania as compensation for estates expropriated at that time. The terrific inflation of 1944-1947, swept out their value. Then, just before the monetary stabilization of August 14, 1947 government bonds were compulsorily called in and paid for in inflated lei, only an insignificant part of which was exchanged after the monetary stabilization for new currency. [454]

currency. 000

In this way, most of the material means of the Catholic Church for support of its religous, educational and charitable program disappeared. 659 425

These successive expropriations have been applied to all religious denominations. However, the Russian Church ("Christians of Old Rite" and the parishes included later on in the Ukrainian Vicariate) was exempted from such measures. If the Romanian Orthodox Church possesses today some material means, these were either granted subsequently by the Government or were transferred by the government from the seized assets of other religious denominations. [779]

C. Church and School

The right to establish and run schools of all kinds granted to all religious denominations by the Law No. 54 of 1928 and in particular to the Roman Catholic Church by the Concordat was abolished. The same is true of the right to administer religious instruction in private and public schools. This is the result of a series of decrees. 659 871

The first step toward this goal was to suppress the denominational schools and those supported in some way by churches. The Government started by suppressing all foreign schools existing in Romania by Order No. 191,653 (Official Gazette No. 176 of August 2, 1948). Many of these schools were, to a certain extent, connected with the religious denominations.

The next step was a reform of the school system

659
795
798

subsequently taken by the Government demonstrated that the Decree meant to deprive them of legal protection. The Roman Catholic Church was practically barred from any educational activities and deprived of its funds (see supra III 2, B and C). The expropriation of schools was followed by the disbanding of the Catholic organizations.

The first step was taken through the Orders of the Cabinet No. 1677 and 1679 (Official Gazette No. 299 of December 25, 1948) by which eleven main associations and endowments and all their branches were suppressed and their assets transferred to the State. The same steps were taken by the Order of the Cabinet No. 1770 (Official Gazette No. 10 of January 13, 1949) against additional eleven Roman Catholic and Reformed non-profit organizations and all their branches. [425]

Order of the Cabinet No. 161 (Official Bulletin No. 48 of February 26, 1949) suppressed also sixteen main religious and professional Catholic associations and all their district branches. Their assets were transferred to the Ministry of Interior.

Finally, the Order of the Cabinet No. 810 (Official Bulletin No. 51 of August 1, 1949) suppressed the existing Roman Catholic Orders and Congregations with all their dependent institution, regardless of the form in which they were organized. Herein were included the eleven congregations and four orders of the Catholic Church in Romania. Only two monasteries for monks and three convents for nuns were excepted where the clerical numbers of the disbanded congregations were allowed to continue their monastic life. Those who were not Romanian citizens were summoned to appear before the local police for arranging the formalities concerning their leaving the country. Those who

To this Church belonged the Ukrainian population of the northern part of Bukovina and of Galicia--which incorporated in the Soviet Union after World War II--and also the Ukrainian and Belorussian population of those provinces. However, the latter population was officially incorporated into the Russian Church by the decree of Emperor Nicholas I in 1839. 175 795

All three Uniate churches in Romania were until now branches of the Roman Catholic Church and after the Concordat was denounced found themselves in a similar position, i.e., without a regulation by law. The members of all three churches experienced a pressure on the part of the government to induce them to "return", so to speak, to the Orthodox Church and to break with the Holy See. The disbandment of the Uniate parishes or rather their transformation into Orthodox parishes was indirectly stimulated by the Order No. 39,380 of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Official Gazette No. 242 of October 18, 1948). Under the previous decree No. 177 of 1948, if members of a parish select another church they carry with them a part of the assets of the parish proportionate to their number. If 75 percent of the parishioners decide to join another church, the church building is transferred to the newly selected one. The Order No. 39,380 provided that, in counting such members, only the heads of each family are taken into account. Thus the counting was greatly facilitated and expedited. 175 795 659 [425]

No decrees were disclosed dealing especially with the Armenian Uniate Church.

But the Decree No. 358 (Official Gazette No. 281 of December 2, 1948) suggests that the Greek Catholic Church ceased to be a separate ecclesiastic body in Romania and there may be only separate parishes. The Order reads as follows: 659 775 [611]

Article 1

Subsequent to reverting of the local Greek Catholic Parishes to the Romanian Orthodox Church and in conformity with the Article 13 of Decree 177/1948, its central organization and those provided by its Constitution shall cease to exist.

The Order says that the assets of the Greek Catholic Church shall become the property of the Romanian State, without any compensation, and shall be assigned partly or wholly to the Romanian Orthodox Church or to its various constituent parts. [425]

The Government obviously has made use of the provisions of Article 13 of the Law for Religious Denominations of 1948 to withdraw recognition from this church which, after the denunciation of the Concordat, lacked a definite status.

The wording of this article shows, beyond any doubt, that the Greek Catholic Church has been since July 1948 absorbed by the Romanian Orthodox Church by Administrative Order.

The fate of the Ukranian (Ruthenian) Uniate Church was different. The Concordat of 1927 provided for the establishment of this church of a separate diocese within the Roman Catholic Church with the seat to be designated later. It may be mentioned in this connection that the Uniate churches in Galicia and the northern part of Bukovina-now incorporated in the Soviet Uni[illegible] [illegible]e declared united with the Russian Church

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

There is a deficit of five and a half milliards left over from the years 1930/31, and of 1,100 millions arising from the first three months of the current year. In all, a deficit of six and a half milliard lei, which is entirely due to bad management. 652 617

To these budget deficits should be added some ten milliard lei, owing by the State to various local contractors and industries, the non-payment of which has caused an enormous prejudice to the internal economy of the country, since these enterprises, having all their liquid funds "frozen up," have been obliged to stop their activities and dismiss their staffs, thereby intensifying the crisis. 652

The legislation recently passed by the Government has also had a most unfortunate repercussion on the general situation. Thus the law sanctioning the cancellation of agrarian debts has resulted in the ruin of almost every bank in the country, for, with a few rare exceptions, all have directly or indirectly advanced money to agriculturists, who by this law, promulgated in April, 1932, are dispensed from their obligations to the extent of 50 %, while the remaining 50% is rendered recoverable within 30 years. No compensation whatever is granted by the State to the banks or to private individuals who had been unfortunate enough to have advanced money to the peasants, even on the security of a mortgage. The result is that almost every banking institution and thousands of people have been ruined at one stroke. 652 426

This measure has not met with the general approval even of the peasantry, for the most prosperous and enterprising among them, who naturally had placed their savings in the banks, have thereby lost their money, since all the rural banks have been rendered insolvent. The total cessation of all credit, which has naturally followed the suspension of banking operations in the rural districts, has caused immense loss to the farmers, who can no longer borrow money even for their most pressing needs. Another law, that of the so-styled "Liquidation Judiciaire," completes and intensifies the evils fostered by that of the "Concordat preventif," rendering all commercial debts practically irrecoverable without the condescension of the debtor. Such measures are 648 652

439 tions on a credit basis so hazardous that they have prac-
452 tically ceased, to the great discomfiture of Rumanian merchants, who have seen their activities completely paralysed.

●426 As matters stand, a creditor is at the mercy of his debtor,
452 and if the latter refuses to honour his engagements there is nothing to be done but to accept whatever compromise may
651 be offered, for a recourse to tribunals would be tantamount
686 to a total loss not only of the amount involved, but of the supplementary expenses arising from legal disbursements and inordinately high judicial taxes which unlucky creditors will have to defray.

[439] What is singular is a tax imposed by the State on all bankruptcies to the amount of 20 per cent of the total assets declared, so that this explains, though it can hardly justify, the State's manifest indifference to the undermining of the country's commercial reputation through fraudulent bankruptcies, the frequency of which is positively alarming, for it derives corresponding advantages from this impost on bankruptcies. Instead of attempting to circumscribe this evil it would appear that the State has done much to encourage it, especially where foreigners are involved. Apparently it is actuated by the shortsighted view that the loss of the foreigner is to the benefit of the country in general, since through bankruptcies foreign capital is transferred to its own nationals. At any rate, bankruptcies have been regarded as a means of raising revenue, and the State as a privileged party has always secured its 20 per cent impost plus other legal taxes, and the debtor has usually managed to alienate a good part of his assets so as to safeguard himself in a very satisfactory manner, while the wretched creditor not only gets nothing but usually finds he is being called upon to make further disbursements on account of legal formalities involved. The *Argus* of June 15th and 16th, 1931, commenting on the law of the "Concordat préventif," qualified it as disastrous, and added: "Among the principal obstacles which prevent the development and normalization of our commerce this law stands in the front rank. . . . it has given free rein to the unscrupulous debtor, permitting him to carry out his underhand manœuvres without any risks, to sell the goods he bought with-

out paying for them, spoliating thereby his creditor and underselling and ruining the honest trader."

The paper advocated a revision of the law and demanded that debtors should be obliged to make a composition on the basis of the ratio existing between the assets and the liabilities, or with a variation of only 10 or 20 per cent of this proportion. As matters now stand a dishonourable merchant is entitled to file a demand for a "Concordat préventif" though his assets may far exceed his liabilities. He is then allowed to pay 40 or 60 per cent of his debts, and after they have been thereby considerably reduced is even accorded a delay of several years to pay them off. With such facilities at hand the majority of merchants did not scruple to avail themselves of the opportunity of repudiating their engagements and so getting rich quickly. The consequence is that commerce has been completely dislocated through the complete suppression of credit which naturally followed. The Under-Secretary of Justice in the Iorga-Argentoianu Government, M. N. Lenguceanu, overtly admitted in the *Neamul Romanesc*, September 5th, 1930, that the above-mentioned law "had permitted merchants, 98 per cent of whom were foreigners, overtly to despoil their creditors." Another very serious defect from which Rumanian legislation suffers is the tendency to enact laws with retroactive effect, which permits the invalidation of contracts, thus creating a state of instability that affects most adversely all commercial and financial operations. For how can foreign investors risk their capital in a country where uncertainty and instability have become its distinguishing features?

Senator Marino, on February 26th, 1932, deplored the disrespect shown for contracts, criticized the State for various measures passed undermining confidence, among which was the moratorium of 1919–1920 by which foreigners had lost some 7 milliard lei, and demanded the granting of serious guarantees which would instil confidence once more. Similar pronouncements by public men abound, for the serious consequence of the present policy are obvious to all.

Professor Flinders Petrie once stated (*Contemporary Re-*

000 moval of this stigma on Rumania's honour, but also more weighty considerations concerning her very national existence. In the long run no community, however impervious to contamination, can survive with a stinking cesspool in its midst.

426 The late Minister of Justice, M. Hamangiu, in June, 1931, addressed a circular to the judges reprimanding them for their remissness, and calling upon them to supervise more strictly the carrying out of the law in the case of abuses committed by dishonest merchants and manufacturers. His rescript contained the following passage: "The lack of sanctions against defaulters threatens the security of the country's credit. The gravest infractions are committed in bankruptcy cases. So far the magistracy has been too lenient; this becomes obvious from bankruptcy statistics of the last four years, the returns of which amount to thousands of millions of lei, and compositions are concluded on the basis of payment to the extent of 3 per cent to 8 per cent. What is particularly staggering is the excessive indulgence shown in the repression of penal offences in cases of simple or fraudulent bankruptcy. . . ." The Minister concluded by stating that this could no longer be tolerated, and gave instructions for restricting these abuses.

The opportuneness of radical reform in judicial methods 686 is more than urgent since an unscrupulous debtor by force 696 of chicanery is allowed to postpone the hearing of his case by the courts for years, during which time he not only has every opportunity of alienating his assets by overtly transferring them to relatives and friends, but what is most revolting, he has often the possibility by dexterous manipulation of subordinate officials, of making away with the most incriminating documents which his unsuspecting adversary has submitted to the Court for its enlightenment.

000 The late M. Hamangiu, whose untimely death all friends of Rumania must deplore, was a bosom friend of Prof. Iorga and as such fully recognized the imperative necessity of maintaining a high standard of justice in the country. In this respect he undoubtedly shared the opinion of one of our distinguished historians, Mr. Ramsay Muir, that "in the Western view no people can be called fully civilized until

there is widely diffused among its members the sense of their obligations, not merely to obey the law but to obey it willingly and to co-operate in enforcing and maintaining it. Because the law embodies the common conscience and also the common interest" (*v.* 'Nationalism and Internationalism.')

What hope there may have been for an improvement in this respect has at least for the present vanished with M. Hamangiu's decease, for his successor was nominated mainly with the object of placating public feeling in Transylvania, which region did not possess a single representative in the Iorga-Argentoianu Cabinet. The selection, however, of M. Valer Pop let loose a storm of indignation in independent Transylvanian circles, so that one may take it for granted that he was not the appropriate person for this high post. As the *Patria*, a newspaper of Cluj, wrote in January, 1932, "The men who have recently entered the Government do not represent even a part of the population, nor even a petty clan; they do not even form a part of the *élite* of their profession. . . ." At any rate, he has so far not manifested any inclination to follow the commendable initiative of his predecessor in office. On the contrary, he is responsible for the so-styled law of "judicial liquidation," which intensifies all the evils contained in the law of the "Concordat préventif" which it supplants. In fact this law prolongs indefinitely the liquidation of all ramshackle enterprises which were bound to go bankrupt, and puts off the reimbursement of creditors for an indefinite period without any guarantee whatever for them. The *Argus* of April 24th, 1932, commenting on this, wrote as follows: "Serious commercial circles consider this law as a new, corrected, and aggravated edition of the "Concordat préventif," a direct invitation addressed to traders in general not to pay. Immediately upon the promulgation of the latter law one witnessed a steeplechase of merchants taking advantage of it in order to escape the rigours of the bankruptcy law. We shall now witness the same mass-rush of those who do not wish to pay and who desire to avail themselves of this new law so that they may escape the opprobrium of bankruptcy and the loss of civil rights. . . ." Naturally these laws, which annul formal engagements, have

gradually imbued people with the conviction that engagements and promises need not be considered seriously, and that on the contrary, elusion of obligations is a mundane affair and a fashionable art which should be cultivated assiduously. As a result, not only debtors always find means to avoid paying, but taxpayers also use every possible stratagem to avoid payment of taxes. There are huge arrears of taxes that remain uncollected, every imaginable trick being resorted to by taxpayers in order to escape from their monetary obligations to the State. The present tremendous falling off in the revenue should mainly be ascribed to this reason, as well as to the venality of the tax-collectors, whose leniency is secured by a slight gratification whenever they tend to become over sedulous in the execution of their duties. M. N. Petrascu, a fashionable speaker, while delivering an address at the Rumanian Social Institute in Bucarest on May 18th, 1932, asserted, "we should explain the non-realization of the budgetary revenue forecasts by the fact that our civic consciousness is not sufficiently developed to allow us to understand that by paying our taxes we fulfil an elementary duty; this is also the reason why fiscal frauds have attained extraordinary and unimaginable proportions. . . ."

The utter disregard of contracts and formal engagements can hardly be better illustrated than by the attitude of the State Railways administration in rescinding contracts with metallurgical establishments at Arad, Braila, and Reşiţa, contracts on the basis of which these very workshops were built. Another flagrant case of repudiation of solemn promises by an official organization is that of the municipality of Cluj which, after confirming a contract with the society "Electrobel" for a duration of fifty years, and after the Brussels firm had carried out 80 per cent of the work it had undertaken to perform, was requested by the municipality, hardly one year after signature of contract, to alter its provisions which had received the royal assent and had been unanimously approved and passed by the municipal council. The municipality brazenly demanded a reduction in the time period of the concession originally granted, namely from 50 years to 15, an increase in the royalty payable to the municipality from 3 per cent to 6 per cent, and

the right of the municipality to demand a revision of the 454
price of the electric current supplied by the "Electrobel" 675
whenever and as often as the municipality might think fit!

The "Electrobel" had completed the work contracted for to the extent of 80 per cent and had sunk millions in the undertaking in hand. Naturally it had made its calculations for a return on its capital on the terms of the original contract. If the clauses of the latter are to be so radically and arbitrarily altered it is bound to incur a huge loss. Such treatment meted out to the foreign capitalist has had the result of frightening him away for good, though his aid would have proved of inestimable value in helping Rumania to-day to surmount the difficulties with which she is confronted.

Owners of real property have also been very unjustly hit 675
by a law promulgated in February, 1932, decreeing that all 426
rents should be reduced by 25 per cent to 30 per cent, all 427
existing contracts being rendered void. Most owners were already in a precarious situation, for they had built with borrowed money, and the recent drop in rents made it impossible for them to meet their engagements and pay off their mortgages, and as a consequence of this an immense number of buildings were being sold up for default, as the *Adeverul* for January 21st, 1932 records. This law, therefore, will complete the ruin of another class of the urban population, and will impress on the minds of all intending investors that it is as risky a proceeding to invest one's money in Rumania as in Soviet Russia. Various municipalities are doing their best to attract unwary investors by holding out to them the most alluring prospectuses and dazzling promises, and it would be well to sound a note of warning so that no more British capital be enticed into Rumanian enterprises, which have proved a veritable bottomless pit.

The writer also committed the folly of relying on the relative immutability of the law, as is customary in other European countries, and leased a certain site in a fashionable Rumanian resort for the purpose of constructing certain dwellings and letting them, all buildings to revert to the original owner of the site after the expiration of a ten-year period. The law reducing rents forces down the revenue by

426 675 .427 25 to 30 per cent, but on the other hand, no corresponding increase in the time limit of the lease can be secured, and there is no authority to which one may appeal. Besides, how can one possibly expect to receive more favourable treatment than the banks, which have been ruined by the enforcement of the law cancelling agrarian debts. What is truly surprising is that the Government had been seriously considering the passing of yet another law, cancelling all private urban debts, which, after all, would only have been the natural complement of the agrarian prototype, but this it was prevented from doing by the French financial experts! Rumanian politicians seem to be grievously deficient in the conception of what constitutes right, for otherwise it is impossible to explain the enactment of laws which not only undermine the very foundations of credit but also of property. That this 693 is so may also be inferred from the not very high standing of the judicial administration, which, if the scandals of 1926 be recollected, certainly needs to be overhauled. The then Government of General Averescu, under pressure of an outraged public at the scandalous venality of some judges, was obliged to dismiss several magistrates, including the President of the Bucharest Court, on account of "acts which were found incompatible with the dignity of magistrates," to quote the *Argus* of October 30th and the *Cuvantul* of October 23rd, 1926. Nor can one pass in silence the undignified attitude of the highest magistrate in Rumania, the then President of the highest Court of Appeal, who, setting at naught the findings of the Court, attempted by all imaginable subterfuges and chicanery to evade its verdict, which was unfavourable to him. (See an article headed "When you apply the law, and when it is applied to you" in the *Cuvantul*, October 6th, 1926). . . .

000 Professor Henry Sedgwick, in his "Elements of Politics," opines that "in determining a nation's rank in political civilization no test is more decisive than the degree in which justice, as defined by law, is actually realized in its judicial administration." Judged by this criterion, Rumania must indeed stand very low in the scale of nations, for the law is sadly deficient, as is woefully admitted even by Rumanians themselves. The *Adeverul* of March 3rd, 1932 wrote: "By

655 maritime and fluvial shipping companies, the docks, ports, warehouses, and grain elevators of Braila, Galatz, and Constantsa.

661 Laws were drafted aiming at the commercialization and
471 exploitation, either independently or in co-operation with the State, of these State-owned properties, as well as of other
186 national resources. But the purpose which actuated the entire economic legislation enacted by the Bratianu Governments was that of preventing foreign capital from acquiring a dominant position in the country. The policy of restraining the activities of foreign capital by legal restrictions was not due to the fact that Rumania might be imperilled by foreign capital securing a preponderating influence, but mainly because the Bratianu party aimed at reserving for themselves the monopoly of such profits as could be made through the exploitation of the national resources. The direct result of this policy was to sink whatever Rumanian capital existed in big enterprises, while agriculture was entirely neglected, and to deplete completely the liquid assets of the country to such an extent that its credit organization was dislocated.

433 It is sad to record that during the years when there was a
454 plethora of capital seeking investment which could have been easily attracted to Rumania with the object of endowing her with an adequate equipment for the development of her immense resources, such narrow and selfish views should have prevailed among her rulers. Indeed, had the opposite policy been adopted it would have secured prosperity to her even during the lean years which are now upon us. Foreign capital naturally fought shy, and refused to be enticed into enterprises in which it was not allowed to exercise legitimate control, which in many instances would have proved both salutary and indispensable. Rumania's natural wealth certainly provides a basis for industrial activity, there is an abundance of raw material, fuel, as well as a supply of cheap labour, but there is a serious deficiency of capital, which is reflected by the high rates of interest
426 prevalent. Commercial bills were discounted at rates vary-
433 ing between 18 per cent and 30 per cent, and first mortgages
454 were concluded on the basis of an average interest of 20 per

cent. It can easily be understood that no enterprises could 426
possibly bear the burden of such interests, and that if foreign 433
capital was to be excluded it would be necessary to have 454
recourse to artificial encouragements in order to create and
foster the industries it was contemplated to set up. Protec- 437
tion in its extremest form, therefore, was resorted to, and a 477
tariff wall, the highest in Europe, was erected to protect the
budding of these hot-house industries. In order to start a
new industry the theoretical case for Protection is admittedly
strong. Temporarily the new industry needs help, and even-
tually the country as a whole may gain from its creation,
though in the meantime it has to bear the burden. The im-
mediate effect is to increase the costs of the various articles
produced locally to an extent that places them beyond the
reach of a poor community such as the rural population of
Rumania. The repercussion of an increase in the costs of
articles required by the agrarian population naturally
causes a rise in the costs of production of agricultural pro-
duce, which renders less easy its marketing in neutral mar-
kets in which the Rumanian peasant can neither enjoy nor
demand the favour of a protective duty. So that eventually
protection has proved an arm which has turned against him.
In the case of Rumania, most of the industries which have
been created proved to be clearly detrimental to the State.
Certainly the textile industries, which import the totality of
their raw material in the form of yarn from abroad, confer
no benefit except to their proprietors. The raw material is 651
usually allowed free admission, or pays a very light duty,
while the finished article is sold at a price corresponding to
that of a similar foreign product on which a duty amounting
to as much as 300 per cent is occasionally imposed. Almost
the whole of the difference is pocketed by the manufacturer,
and the native purchaser gets no benefit whatever. On the
contrary, he usually gets an inferior home-made article at
almost the same price as he would pay for a foreign one
generally of better quality. In this arrangement the State is
deprived of a very important source of revenue since it
desists from collecting the tariff dues it would otherwise
have received if, instead of raw materials imported free,
foreign dutiable manufactured articles had been imported.

owing to the natural increase of her population, will in a couple of years have no more wheat available for export, and in ten or twelve years it will be the same with maize. It is imperative, therefore, for the Government to take without delay the steps necessary to increase the yield. This can only be done if the State will undertake to provide selected seed corn, to establish rural banks to enable the peasantry to obtain advances of funds at cheap rates in order to buy machinery and implements, and to create model farms in which more modern methods of cultivation might be demonstrated practically. If grain elevators were also constructed in important agricultural centres, and adequate storage accommodation made available, it would be easy to advance money to farmers on the security of the cereals they could store as a pledge. And if Rumania decided to return to methods of legality and offer safeguards to foreign capital there would be no difficulty whatever in obtaining all the capital she requires for financing such operations, as they would then prove perfectly sound. It is this utter lack of capital which has handicapped the development of agriculture since the war, for the smallholder had to pay usurious rates of interest (40 to 60 per cent being current), while prior to the war large owners could obtain advances from the banks on very reasonable terms. It would be altogether unjustifiable, therefore, to assert, as some people allege, that the breaking up of the large estates had led to the decline of agriculture. On the contrary, it is this measure which has permitted agriculture to survive, for owing to the systematic diversion of capital from agriculture to industry, the owners of the large estates would have found themselves in a worse fix than the smallholders if they had continued to exist and therefore required advances for the maintenance of their estates, as was formerly their wont. Without liquid assets they would have found themselves utterly unable to carry on the cultivation of those large estates, while the smallholder, by dint of hard work and privation, has managed to keep his patch of land under the plough. Some persons may retort that, if the breaking up of the large estates had proved to be a practical operation, the rural population would not have run into debt to the extent of

M

241 423 426 some 80 milliard lei, and obliged the Government to pass the law decreeing the conversion of agrarian debts, in order to save the peasantry from the predicament of being dispossessed of their land by their creditors. The large owners, however, were in as bad a plight and perhaps worse off, for when the legislation concerning the cancellation of agrarian debts was under discussion in the Chamber, the director of the *Argus* suggested that Ministers and deputies should be excluded from being among the beneficiaries of the proposed law, so that they should not be accused later of having passed such a revolutionary measure mainly for self-interested motives. His suggestion was not supported, a fact which would tend to prove that large owners were perhaps more insistent on the adoption of this measure than smallholders, to many of whom it has proved highly prejudicial.

That the agrarian revolution did not solely profit the peasantry, and that others took advantage of it to appropriate lands to which they had no right, and that the latter were more insistent on the voting of the law for the conversion of agrarian debts, is an undisputed fact. This is proved also by an interview published by the *Adeverul* on September 9th, 1930, in which Prof. Iorga was reported to have said: "When the expropriation of the large estates was carried out many mistakes and injustices were committed. Real cultivators were not endowed with land in order that in their place land should be bestowed on various political partisans, electoral agents, and others who had nothing in common with the land or agriculture. Having thus secured the land, they set about to increase their holdings by buying up with borrowed money adjoining tracks, and started exploiting them on American methods. But their calculations were erroneous, because with us agriculture is not profitable except for the owner who himself cultivates his land. This category of landowners should not be assimilated with the peasantry, and the State should not assume charge of their debts." This wise recommendation, however, was not followed, and large owners were permitted to a certain extent to take advantage of the law of conversion of agrarian debts.

241 426 453 That it was absolutely indispensable to extend some help to the peasantry no one will dispute, but this law of con-

version of agrarian debts will probably do more harm than 241
good in the long run, not only because it has undermined 426
confidence and ruined the banks, but also on account of the 453
adverse effects it will have on agriculture itself, for it brings no relief to the peasant in the way of obtaining the credit facilities he needs, but on the contrary it renders borrowing now almost impossible. Prior to the promulgation of this law both banking institutions and private persons who had lent money to peasants were ready to help them, if by so doing they could recover part of their debts; there was a certain sense of solidarity between creditor and debtor; now, however, that the law has arbitrarily stepped in between them and settled their relations, practically ruining the creditors, the latter have no longer the means nor any interest to assist their debtors. Another disastrous outcome of the law is the loss of all the savings which the more industrious among the peasantry may have had, and which naturally were placed in the keeping of the rural banks now rendered insolvent. It is calculated that these sums amount to some 6 milliard lei. This law, therefore, instead of encouraging the more progressive peasants, has ruined them and reduced them to the level of the more indolent. Another drawback in this law is that it subjects all land, the owners of which take advantage of its clauses, to a certain legal servitude for 30 years, precluding the owners from mortgaging it and contracting loans, although the securing of fresh credit constitutes their most pressing need. It may be taken for granted that, in consequence of this law, the area sown will be considerably less in extent this year, owing to the impossibility for the peasants to obtain timely advances for cultivating their fields, and also to the discouragement of the most enterprising among them, who lost their capital through the failure of the banks.

This law, if not repealed, will be yet another obstacle to the creation of a rural mortgage bank, of which the country is in such dire need, for peasants taking advantage of the conversion law cannot mortgage their holdings. The necessary preliminary for the normal working of such an institution would be the creation of cadastral registration, which is non-existent in the country. If the Rumanian Government

really intended to revert to a régime of legality and to the granting of adequate security to foreign capital, there would be hardly any difficulties in its obtaining the necessary aid from abroad in order to permit the establishment of such an institution, and in order to save time it would be politic on its part if without further delay it took the requisite steps to prepare a cadastral register or ground-book. Such measures of self-aid would prove more efficacious than the solicitation at international conferences of preferential rates for Rumanian agricultural produce. For they would help to convince foreign investors that Rumania had at last decided to put her house in order, a decision which, if seriously taken, would probably cause foreign capital to come to her aid and bring to her corresponding or equal advantages to those she would derive from the obtaining of the preferential rates for which she is now craving as a favour from industrial States. There are no insuperable obstacles to the salving of Rumanian agriculture. All that is needed is cheap credit and the lowering of the cost of industrial products used by the peasantry. These *desiderata* may be secured whenever the Government decides to change its methods and adopt as its guiding principles honesty, retrenchment, and austerity. After all, the peasants have done more than their share, and no greater effort can be demanded of them. One who has witnessed the long heartbreak of endless and often unrequited labour that has been their lot, and the fortitude with which they have faced the apathy the State has so far shown towards them, can have no doubts as to the response a little encouragement would evoke from them. Without decent seed grain, and with the most primitive implements, it was but natural that the yield per hectare should decrease. Nevertheless, the steady although small increase of the area under cultivation is a convincing proof that the peasants have never stinted their labour and that they are determined to persist to the extreme limits of human endurance in their efforts to wrest a bare subsistence from the soil. The following table will be found to confirm fully what has been stated above, namely, that while the area cultivated has been maintained, the yield per hectare is on the whole diminishing:

453 tious appellation of "bank," which they bestowed on themselves, for they are mere money-lending firms of very dubious standing. There are only about 12 firms that may be called banks, and these hold between them about one-quarter of the aggregate banking capital. The offices of all these firms is at Bucarest, except that of the Banca Comerţului, which is at Craiova. Besides these private banks there were 4,757 popular banks, with a capital of 7,248 million lei, in operation at the end of 1929. These banks operate mainly in rural districts and are of great help to the peasants, to whom they provide funds and also offer a method for the investment of their savings. They are run on co-operative lines and counted a membership of 1,003,082, the great majority being agriculturalists. The depositors at these banks numbered some 478,315, with a total amount on deposit of 1,417 million lei, while the paid-up capital was 1,801 millions.

426 453 The recent law decreeing the conversion of agrarian debts will completely paralyze the activities of all banks in Rumania, and will work inestimable harm to the peasantry, as credit will be entirely disorganized. The passing of the law caused consternation, and most banks decided to go into liquidation. According to the reports published in the Press of a meeting held at Cluj on May 8th, 1932, at which were present delegates from all the Rumanian banks of Transylvania, it was considered that this was the only course left open to them. It was stated that these banks had a capital of 1,200 millions and deposits amounting to 3,000 millions, so that the law of conversion extinguished at one stroke all the capital of the banks and immobilized for 30 years half of the deposits they had received. The representative of the banks of Cluj stated that "such a stunning blow has not been experienced since the Rumanian banks of Transylvania were founded some sixty years ago. Many cherish the illusion that it is yet possible for the banks to survive. My opinion is that no banking institution in Transylvania will henceforth be able to function. Within three months we shall see the disastrous effects of the law; there is nothing left but to liquidate." The extent to which the banks will be affected can be realized if it be noted that the estimated

amount owed by agriculturalists is some 80 milliard lei. So 426
that even if only half of them availed themselves of the law, 453
this would mean an immediate wiping out of about 20 milliards of capital and the immobilization of another 20 milliards for a period of 30 years. On this half of their debt agriculturists will be paying 4 per cent interest, while the banks which have borrowed the sums they had advanced to the peasants are paying 7 to 10 per cent interest. When it is considered that the total capital and reserves of private banks in Rumania hardly reaches 15 milliards, one can realize what a staggering blow this law will be to the economic life of the country. It is true that over four milliards worth of bills belonging to agriculturalists have been rediscounted by the National Bank of Rumania, and that the State has undertaken to indemnify this bank for the loss it will sustain on this head, yet the balance of the loss caused by this astounding law is so formidable that one wonders how the private banks are to survive the blow. One may also question the capacity of the State to find adequate means wherewith to indemnify the National Bank for its losses, seeing that its own plight is so hopeless that its own officials have been left unpaid for months.

It may be apposite to record the opinion of the members 426
of the legal profession in Transylvania and the Banat concerning this law, which is likely to ruin all the banks in the country. Members of this profession met at Cluj on June 5th, 1932, and passed a resolution in which it was affirmed: "That this law, which permits the confiscation of property and annuls acquired rights, is unconstitutional. That it is contrary to the established principles of thousands of years and overthrows the legal order on which the present social order is established. That in consequence this meeting moves that this law should be abrogated and replaced by another, which, while solving the problem of agrarian debts, should be in conformity with the constitution and with the established principles of justice. . . ."

Even before the passage of the law of conversion of 453
agrarian debts most of the banks were in a precarious condition, owing to the fact that they had sunk a large fraction of their assets in industrial undertakings which, at the

the right of the municipality to demand a revision of the 454
price of the electric current supplied by the "Electrobel" 675
whenever and as often as the municipality might think fit!

The "Electrobel" had completed the work contracted for to the extent of 80 per cent and had sunk millions in the undertaking in hand. Naturally it had made its calculations for a return on its capital on the terms of the original contract. If the clauses of the latter are to be so radically and arbitrarily altered it is bound to incur a huge loss. Such treatment meted out to the foreign capitalist has had the result of frightening him away for good, though his aid would have proved of inestimable value in helping Rumania to-day to surmount the difficulties with which she is confronted.

Owners of real property have also been very unjustly hit 675
by a law promulgated in February, 1932, decreeing that all 426
rents should be reduced by 25 per cent to 30 per cent, all 427
existing contracts being rendered void. Most owners were already in a precarious situation, for they had built with borrowed money, and the recent drop in rents made it impossible for them to meet their engagements and pay off their mortgages, and as a consequence of this an immense number of buildings were being sold up for default, as the *Adeverul* for January 21st, 1932 records. This law, therefore, will complete the ruin of another class of the urban population, and will impress on the minds of all intending investors that it is as risky a proceeding to invest one's money in Rumania as in Soviet Russia. Various municipalities are doing their best to attract unwary investors by holding out to them the most alluring prospectuses and dazzling promises, and it would be well to sound a note of warning so that no more British capital be enticed into Rumanian enterprises, which have proved a veritable bottomless pit.

The writer also committed the folly of relying on the relative immutability of the law, as is customary in other European countries, and leased a certain site in a fashionable Rumanian resort for the purpose of constructing certain dwellings and letting them, all buildings to revert to the original owner of the site after the expiration of a ten-year period. The law reducing rents forces down the revenue by

426 25 to 30 per cent, but on the other hand, no corresponding
675 increase in the time limit of the lease can be secured, and
427 there is no authority to which one may appeal. Besides, how can one possibly expect to receive more favourable treatment than the banks, which have been ruined by the enforcement of the law cancelling agrarian debts. What is truly surprising is that the Government had been seriously considering the passing of yet another law, cancelling all private urban debts, which, after all, would only have been the natural complement of the agrarian prototype, but this it was prevented from doing by the French financial experts! Rumanian politicians seem to be grievously deficient in the conception of what constitutes right, for otherwise it is impossible to explain the enactment of laws which not only undermine the very foundations of credit but also of property. That this
693 is so may also be inferred from the not very high standing of the judicial administration, which, if the scandals of 1926 be recollected, certainly needs to be overhauled. The then Government of General Averescu, under pressure of an outraged public at the scandalous venality of some judges, was obliged to dismiss several magistrates, including the President of the Bucharest Court, on account of "acts which were found incompatible with the dignity of magistrates," to quote the *Argus* of October 30th and the *Cuvantul* of October 23rd, 1926. Nor can one pass in silence the undignified attitude of the highest magistrate in Rumania, the then President of the highest Court of Appeal, who, setting at naught the findings of the Court, attempted by all imaginable subterfuges and chicanery to evade its verdict, which was unfavourable to him. (See an article headed "When you apply the law, and when it is applied to you" in the *Cuvantul*, October 6th, 1926). . . .

000 Professor Henry Sedgwick, in his "Elements of Politics," opines that "in determining a nation's rank in political civilization no test is more decisive than the degree in which justice, as defined by law, is actually realized in its judicial administration." Judged by this criterion, Rumania must indeed stand very low in the scale of nations, for the law is sadly deficient, as is woefully admitted even by Rumanians themselves. The *Adeverul* of March 3rd, 1932 wrote: "By

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

435 ture of Greater Rumania. It illustrates the effects of low agricultural prices and high prices of finished goods upon the position of a predominantly peasant population, which cannot realize an adequate profit from the sale of its produce and is unable to buy manufactured goods. It is important to realize this, as it demonstrates one of the reasons for the inability of the peasants to acquire agricultural machinery and improve their methods of agricultural exploitation.

565 471 **THE LAND REFORMS.** By the beginning of the twentieth century the position of the Rumanian peasantry had reached a stage which could only be compared with that of Tsarist Russia before the abolition of serfdom. Over half of all the arable land was in the hands of a few thousand *boiars*. Most peasants were landless, some possessed small strips of land which were insufficient for the support of a family. Most peasants were still obliged to work for the landlords without pay, and in addition had to [427] pay taxes and other dues. In order to try and increase their income many peasants rented land from the big landowners. But as the landlord was usually the *boiar* for whom the peasant had to do forced labour and to whom he came in time of need for financial help, he soon found that he had often sold his labour power for years in advance. His indebtedness increased with surprising speed; neither his little strip of land nor, indeed, he himself was anything else than part of the *boiar's* property. The position of the peasantry grew even worse when absentee landlordism increased and great trusts managed the running of the big estates.

FARMING AROUND CURTEA DE ARGEȘ

Amy R. Burgess

133 In the region of Curtea de Argeș the river flows in a valley of varying width, floored with fine sandy alluvium and bounded by somewhat rounded hills. Some traces of river terraces are discernible.

The land of this region can be divided into four categories: (*a*) arable, (*b*) hay meadows, (*c*) forest, (*d*) high mountain pasture. The arable land is principally on the first terrace, but stretches both down the slope to the valley bottom and up the slope to the second terrace. The hay meadows are above the arable land, spreading upwards towards the [137] forest. The forests comprise 75 per cent of the total area, and consist mainly of timber trees, such as beech and pine, together with a considerable number of walnut trees. The high pastures are above the forest belt and may be as much as fifty kilometres away from the village centre of the commune to which they belong.

423 The arable land is owned by the peasants, holdings ranging from less than one hectare to fifty hectares, the majority being from two to five hectares. The smallness of the holding [428] is due partly to the laws of inheritance, by which the land is divided between the children on the death of the owner, and partly to the fact that the district is so hilly that only small areas are available for cultivation.

241 476 The hay meadows belong to the commune and are both worked and used collectively by the peasants, all necessary organization being in the hands of the mayor and committee.

471 [313] The forests are largely state-owned, although some portions belong to the commune, in which case the peasants are allowed to cut for their own personal use (house-building, implements, etc.), but not for profit.

[233] The high pastures belong to the commune; the peasants pay a small fee to the commune for their use (20 lei per head per season for sheep, rather more for cattle).

132 An important climatic feature affecting agriculture is the shortness of the summer, late spring and early autumn frosts

648, 665, 642, 433

Rumania EDl

[For the economic and political position of Rumania under Soviet control since the death of Stalin, see 85: Zinner, Rl Soviet Union, category 116, Pp. 157B-163B.]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

PREFACE

121 RUMANIA is economically one of the relatively backward regions of the world. It is not as backward as vast areas of Asia and Africa, but like them it is faced with the problems of an agrarian society in the twentieth century. How are such societies to adapt themselves to the demands and challenges of the industrial world economy? This is perhaps the most interesting and compelling reason for a study of Rumanian politics and agriculture. A further reason is that since the end of the Second World War Rumania has been "behind the Iron Curtain" and has therefore acquired a certain immediate significance as part of the complex of issues dividing the Soviet Union and the United States. Finally, literature in English on Rumania is comparatively limited and unsatisfactory. Hence, this study of a country rather remote from the interests of most Americans may shed some light in a dark corner.

The premise of this book is that an understanding of Rumania's recent history requires familiarity with the depressed status of its peasantry, whose plight has been a chronic source of alarm, anxiety, or despair since the time of Tudor Vladimirescu, who in 1821 raised a popular revolt against the boyars. Discussions I heard in Bucarest in the winter of 1944–45 echoed to a surprising extent the manifestoes of 1848, the debates on the emancipation of 1864, the polemics evoked by the 1907 uprising, and the Peasant party's radical pamphlets of 1920.

[439] To be sure, between 1821 and 1944 Rumania underwent tremendous changes which might make one question whether the same problems were involved. An independent kingdom was created from the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which had formerly acknowledged the Turkish sultan as their suzerain; after the First World War this kingdom doubled its area. World commerce came to Rumania; industry, if not large, expanded rapidly in the twentieth century. The population multiplied many times over. In agriculture itself there were important developments. From a semipastoral land, where stock raising was more important than farming, Rumania became, for a time, one of the great wheat and maize exporters of the world.

Agrarian problems, too, seemed to change during this period. Initially the chief sources of social discontent were servile dues and labor obligations which bore heavily upon the peasant. Later the un-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

423 land, it was not passed on from father to son but reverted to the landowner, who was in turn responsible for providing newly married young cultivators with a holding. In fixing the extent of land to be held by each cultivator, these acts, especially the one for Moldavia, reduced the amount customarily enjoyed for pasturage and restricted the peasants' forest rights. Although the peasant was theoretically free to move, he was in fact tied to his community by a net of regulations.

[433] With a few modifications Rumanian agrarian relations were determined by the Organic Statutes for the next third of a century. Under
566 them, as a contemporary observer remarked, "The principalities took
175 on a new life"; there was a marked increase in economic activity. That
421 the benefits of this activity were not generally shared by the peasants, however, is shown by their continued exodus across neighboring frontiers. They were being forced out of their old semipastoral habits, and the very increase of cereal exports could work to their disadvantage. For example, the entire 1847 wheat crop was sold in advance because of the urgent demands in other European states suffering from food shortages in the late 1840's. As a result of these premature sales, made largely through the boyars, the principalities experienced a food crisis which contributed greatly to the peasant unrest in the turbulent year 1848.

Apart from the abortive attempts at reform during the short-lived Wallachian revolution in 1848 and a moderate revision of the Organic Statutes in 1851, the next major change was the Act of 1864, which paralleled the 1848 emancipation in the Habsburg lands and the Russian emancipation of 1861. This act, promulgated for the united principalities by Prince Cuza, for political and social rather than for economic reasons, abolished the clacă and other servitudes. The peasants obtained full title to the land they had in use, based upon earlier regulations, and the landowners were given a compensation for the loss of their labor. The law followed the now recognized provision that peasant property could not exceed two-thirds of the former lord's estate. The new holdings could not be sold or alienated for a period of thirty years.

By this act, so it seemed, the remnants of the old servile system had been abolished. Possession and use of land were transformed into absolute property rights; the peasant holder was now a free proprietor, owing no servile obligations, and, indeed, the translation of the clacă and other dues into a redemption payment does seem to have dimin-

Emerit, *op. cit.*, p. 48, doubts if there is sufficient evidence to permit a positive declaration that the peasants traditionally had had the use of all the land.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

INDEX OF AREA, YIELD, AND PRODUCTION OF CEREALS[32]

(1909–13 = 100)

	1909–13	1920	1922	1924	1925	1926	1933–37
Area	100	84.4	94.5	101.2	103.5	102.8	114.3
Yield	100	86.7	77.5	60.0	71.7	99.2	81.7
Production	100	72.9	73.6	60.6	74.6	101.6	93.1

In the discussion of overpopulation it was seen that the productivity per hectare in Rumania was exceedingly low. For the four-year period 1928–32 the Rumanian wheat yield was below that of any Balkan state except Greece, averaging 9.5 quintals per hectare, as contrasted with a French yield of 14.8 and a Danish yield of 29.4 quintals per hectare during the same years. Although the Rumanian peasant has been more successful with maize, his output of that grain is also very low. This low rate of yield has been the most striking symptom of the unhealthy condition of Rumanian agriculture. The records of the past half century give little evidence of improvement, and there has been a noticeable decline in comparison with the pre-1914 figures.

Technical and material factors provide an immediate explanation for Rumania's poor output, but beyond these are more general causes which inhibit the improvement of agriculture and the introduction of more efficient techniques. On the whole, physical conditions in Rumania do not prevent a satisfactory agriculture. The hilly regions are somewhat deficient in humus but the soil of the plains is unusually fertile. The plains are exposed to extremes of rainfall and temperature, and the irregularity of the rainfall, the most serious threat to crops, is conducive to a wide fluctuation in output. Nevertheless, these conditions would present no serious obstacle to an increase in production if farming methods were adapted to the soil and climate.[33]

The principal material reasons for the low productivity are the extremely limited use of manure and fertilizers, absence of which is causing gradual depletion of the soil, even in the best plains regions; the lack of moisture-conserving measures; a primitive crop-rotation system; the low quality of livestock; backward techniques of cultivation and the shortage of agricultural equipment; and the prevalence of strip farming. The two last points require additional explanation.

32. League of Nations, *Agricultural Production in Continental Europe* (1943), p. 73.
33. U.S. Department of Agriculture, *op. cit.*, p. 715.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

page 67

IV

TOWN, COUNTRY, AND FOREIGN TRADE

Rumanian Industry

INDUSTRY has a Jekyll and Hyde role in the minds of many Rumanians. It is regarded as the potential savior of the economy through its ability to increase national productivity and to absorb surplus agricultural population. At the same time it is accused of exploiting the countryside and of gaining all the rewards. These two views are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 433 178

Before the First World War industry in the Old Kingdom was relatively undeveloped; the two most important industries were petroleum production and lumbering, both largely financed by foreign capital and both producing principally for export. Industrialization was naturally restricted by the scarcity of local capital and the lack of a trained labor force. Although the economy was predominantly agricultural, the Rumanian government, in 1887, inaugurated a policy of encouraging national industry by means of a high protectionist tariff, partly to avoid the complete destruction of household industries by foreign competition, partly for nationalist reasons.

The acquisition of new territories after the First World War—especially Transylvania with its mineral resources, metallurgical industry, and more highly developed economy—provided additional impulse to industrial expansion. Greater Rumania was moderately well endowed with raw materials: petroleum, fair lignite reserves, some iron, lead, zinc, and salt. Nevertheless, Rumania remained a predominantly agrarian country; in 1930 only 10 per cent of the active population was engaged in industry. [135]

The growth of industry in the Old Kingdom in the first third of the twentieth century is shown by the following figures:[1] 178 433

	Number of industrial enterprises	*Personnel*	*Horsepower in enterprises*
1901	62,188	168,198	60,744
1930	58,892	279,897	623,442

The decrease in the number of establishments and the increase in horsepower show a concentration of industry in larger undertakings

1. Madgearu, *Evoluţia economiei romînesţi*, p. 138.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

and the decline of small shops. Against the increase in personnel employed must be set the growth of population from 5,957,000 in 1899 to 8,791,000 in 1930.

The rate of growth was somewhat slower in Transylvania, which had a more important industry at the beginning of the century than the Old Kingdom: [2]

	Undertakings	*Personnel*	*Undertakings with less than 20 employees*		*Undertakings with more than 20 employees*	
			No.	*Personnel*	*No.*	*Personnel*
1900	94,112	212,599	93,651	153,223	461	59,376
1930	59,040	269,623	58,000	123,260	1,040	146,363

According to the 1930 census there were 140,948 industrial enterprises in all of Rumania employing 616,743 persons; 130,433 were small shops employing between 1 and 5 persons. The chemical industry, including of course the petroleum industry, had the greatest capital investment, followed by the food, metallurgical, and textile industries. The food industry was most important in terms of value of output, followed by the textile, chemical, and metallurgical industries.

Except for a slump in the depression years, which was overcome by 1934, Rumanian industry experienced a fairly constant growth during the interwar period. The years 1921–26 were spent in recovering from wartime destruction, but by 1938 manufacturing production stood at 177.9 as against 100 for the year 1913: [3]

INDEX OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION (Base: 1913 = 100)

1913	100	1927	118.8	1934	167.8
1921	47.2	1928	131.8	1935	165.2
1922	73.2	1929	136.9	1936	175.0
1923	73.2	1930	132.5	1937	182.0
1924	89.0	1931	140.6	1938	177.9
1925	92.2	1932	111.9		
1926	103.7	1933	136.2		

The recovery and expansion of Rumanian industry after the depression was quite marked; the rate of growth was somewhat above

2. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
3. League of Nations, *Industrialization and Foreign Trade*, p. 137.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania ED

that for world manufacturing as a whole.[4] This recovery was accompanied by a further concentration of undertakings and an elimination of smaller establishments. The emphasis shifted from consumer goods toward capital goods: between 1927 and 1937 the volume of output of capital goods increased by 57.4 per cent, that of consumer goods by 45 per cent. In 1937 the value of the output of capital goods was only slightly less than that of consumer goods.

433 178

The rapid expansion of industry, especially of the capital goods industries, contrasts strangely with the backward state of Rumanian agriculture and the generally low level of consumption. In fact, however, the expansion of industry was not closely integrated with the development of the whole of the economy, but was the result of very special circumstances. The growth of capital goods industries did not correspond to the development of an internal market: two of the most important items, petroleum and wood, were primarily for export; the rapid growth of the metallurgical industry was caused by increasing state demands, above all for armaments. (In 1938, 70 per cent of the metallurgical output was consumed by the state.) The growth of the consumers goods industries did not lead to an equivalent increase in consumption. Indeed, in 1937 per capita consumption of most consumers goods was below the 1927 level, since the increase in production was matched by a decline in imports. While it is meaningless to consider the development of an industry as "artificial," since industry almost by definition is the essence of artificiality, nevertheless Rumanian industry was a forced growth, aided by high tariff production, state support, and a relatively high degree of cartelization.

In certain respects the precocious maturity of Rumanian industry resembles the development of Rumanian agriculture in the nineteenth century, in that both were molded by external economic forces of the more advanced West. Agriculture was driven into extensive cereal cultivation by the expansion of commerce; industry, instead of developing gradually from commerce and small crafts, rapidly assumed the Western form of large cartelized undertakings. To be sure, there is no reason why Rumanian industrial development should have repeated the historical stages of Western industry; on the contrary, the fact that the West had evolved a high level of industry made it both unnecessary and impossible for Rumanian industry to pursue the same path; but this hurried adoption of alien industrial patterns was bound to lead to economic dislocations.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 95. Rumanian manufacturing in 1936–38 was 45 per cent above that in 1926–29; for world manufacturing as a whole the increase was 33 per cent.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

433
178

What was the effect of this industrial expansion upon Rumanian agriculture? In the first place, it did little to intensify farming, provide it with improved equipment, or lead to the creation of agricultural industries.

> With all the accelerated rhythm of the process of industrialization, the cultivation of the soil and the raising of livestock have not received any notable stimulus toward intensification; food industries based upon agricultural produce have not developed; the textile industry, while well advanced, has neglected native textile plants—flax and hemp—it has stimulated the cultivation of cotton only in the last years, and has provided no incentive for improving the quality of wool; the oil industry has been unable to cause an increase in the production of oleaginous plants, and the introduction of the soy bean in recent years is the result solely of the influence of foreign commercial relations. Finally, the rudimentary and insufficient technical investment in agriculture and the minimal importance of chemical fertilizers illustrate the absence of any positive influence in this direction by the metallurgical and chemical industries.[5]

In the second place, industry in the interwar years, while growing rapidly, was in no position to absorb the excess labor force which was accumulating in agriculture in the absence of a more intensive cultivation. Between 1929 and 1938 personnel engaged in manufacturing industries increased by 90,000 or by about 10,000 a year, whereas the annual rural excess has been estimated at between 100,000 and 200,000.[6] Rumanian industry at its existing level was clearly unable to provide much relief to agricultural overpopulation.

It may be concluded, then, that the development of Rumanian industry was of little direct benefit to agriculture, either in improving or intensifying cultivation or in absorbing surplus labor. It has been maintained, on the contrary, that the advance of industry was at the expense of agriculture, a common complaint in most agrarian communities. Two preliminary observations should be made in this connection. In a society which is advancing there is a natural tendency for agriculture to play a relatively smaller part, the proportion of income spent on food is less, and agriculture's share in the total income declines. Moreover, since agricultural supply is less elastic than the supply of industrial products, agriculture is more apt to suffer in the event of price fluctuation. In a depression a price scissors is likely to occur; in the period 1929–39 this effect was very strong in

5. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 190.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

Rumania and undoubtedly served to maintain agriculture in a depressed condition.[7] These, however, are general tendencies which, in theory at least, should adjust themselves in time; in the long run, and on the assumption of mobility in the factors of production, an equilibrium should be reached between agriculture and industry. But apart from such general factors, did the specific form of the development of Rumanian industry work to the disadvantage of agriculture?

A Yugoslav rural health worker, in describing the relations between town and country in the Balkans, concluded that agriculture was losing in the exchange of goods:[8]

> A survey undertaken in several rural countries on the nutritional status of the population showed that there exists undernourishment among a large number of the rural population, and that agricultural products are exported from rural countries without consideration of the nutritional requirements of the people. The reasons are purely commercial. The industrial products imported into the rural countries in exchange serve merely the urban population and industrial establishments from which the farming population derives comparatively small benefit. To cover their money requirements, the farmers owning small holdings are usually compelled to sell the best products of their farms to the town people. Thus they are helping the cities and industries, themselves remaining far in the rear in regard to sanitation, housing, health, and general education.

The Rumanian economist Manoilescu undertook to demonstrate that in the Rumanian trade triangle between countryside, town, and foreign market, the countryside received far less in the way of goods

7. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 80:

(1929 prices = 100)

	Price of agricultural products	*Price of industrial products used by agriculture*	*Relation*
1929	100.0	100.0	100.0
1930	68.2	98.0	69.6
1931	50.8	86.6	58.7
1932	47.7	80.9	59.0
1933	44.9	81.1	55.4
1934	44.1	82.6	53.4
1935	48.4	90.2	53.7
1936	54.0	95.4	56.6
1937	64.6	101.8	63.9
1938	67.1	99.2	67.6
1939	72.7	112.5	64.6

8. Andreya Stampar, "Observations of a Rural Health Worker," quoted in *International Journal of Agrarian Affairs, 1*, No. 1 (October, 1939), 71.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

438 and services than it gave, the difference being gained by the towns.[9]
● 433 According to these views, trade relations were actually detrimental
241 to the rural areas, which were being drained by the towns and industries.

It is not necessary here to discuss the theoretical question whether there is any absolute disadvantage to the countryside in its commerce with the towns. If during a period of change toward industrialization the countryside's position declines in relation to the town, it is quite possible for a number of other factors—which may be "short term" or even noneconomic—to convert this relative disadvantage into an absolute loss in income. Such factors may include the inelasticity of agricultural supply, the immobility of agricultural labor, and the increase in agricultural population. Finally, governmental and political policies may favor industry at the expense of agriculture. This last point requires further elucidation, as it was quite important in
651 Rumania.
433 Rumanian industry was created in the shelter of high protective tariffs, which undoubtedly served to increase the costs of agriculture and to benefit industry at its expense. These tariffs have been justified by the "infant industries" argument, and in part they were brought about by the agricultural protectionist policy of the European industrial states. But the combination of protectionism and the development of cartels did give industry a monopolistic position in the internal Rumanian market which worked to the disadvantage of agriculture. In addition to tariff protection, Rumania had a long tradition of direct encouragements to industry—such as exemptions from taxation and special transport rates—which persisted in the interwar period and were expanded in the 1930's.

433 The protective tariffs, by restricting foreign imports, had the
651 effect of bringing in foreign capital for investment in local industry.
457 But while foreign capital has been of great importance in the development of Rumania's larger industries and in the creation of its transportation system, the effect on the total economy has been somewhat one-sided, partly because the capital was naturally attracted to industries working for export: "Without depreciating the influence of foreign capital in stimulating industrialization, it is to be underlined that the benefits of invested foreign capital do not for the most part serve to create purchasing power in the national market

[113] 9. M. Manoilescu, "Das wirtschaftliche und soziale Dreieck der Agrarstaaten: die Stadt, das Dorf, das Ausland," *Internationale Agrarrundschau*, No. 6 (Berlin, 1940), also cited in Hugo Böker, "Agriculture's Share in the National Income and the Agricultural Situation," *International Review of Agriculture, 32*, No. 1 (January, 1941), 22. For a discussion of M. Manoilescu's views, see below, pp. 193–197.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

433 and do not contribute to increasing the supply of capital, since they
651 are exported." [10]

457 A comparison of industrial manufacture, industrial imports, and consumption of manufactured goods between 1927 and 1938 shows
433 that while the percentage of industrial consumption which was provided for by Rumanian industry rose from 63.5 per cent to 78.6 per cent, the total consumption of industrial products dropped from about 93 billion lei in 1927 to 88 billion lei in 1938. That is, the increase in industrial production (from 59 to 69 billion lei) was more than balanced by the fall in industrial imports (from 34 to 19 billion lei).[11]

From this the conclusion might be drawn that Rumanian industrialization, instead of increasing purchasing power, was reducing it. Such indeed was Madgearu's opinion: "It is certain that the position of quasi-monopoly created by the system of protection of the national industry is the principal cause of the state of inferiority into which agriculture in general and peasant agriculture in particular have been driven." [12]

If the desirability of a policy of industrialization is granted, it is clear that since industries do not materialize from thin air and are not created by amiable fairy godmothers energy and resources must be diverted from other fields to the creation of industry, at least during the period of its inception and establishment. But the ultimate effect, presumably, is to raise the whole level of the economy; perhaps the agricultural sector will not advance as rapidly or as far, but in the long run at least the whole community should benefit. If Madgearu's conclusion is correct, such was not the result of Rumanian industrialization; instead, the industrial sector pulled away from the rest of the economy, was not directed to satisfying its needs, and may actually have reduced the over-all power of consumption.

Admittedly, twenty-five years may be too brief a period in which to judge such a development. Moreover, as has been mentioned before, a great many external influences had a powerful effect upon the Rumanian economy. The first years after 1921 were spent in recover-

[113] 10. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 204. In this connection see also Jozo Tomasevich's chapter on "Foreign Economic Relations," in *Yugoslavia*, ed. Robert J. Kerner (Berkeley; Los Angeles, 1949), which expresses substantially the same view regarding the role of foreign investment in Yugoslavia.

11. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

12. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 259. Madgearu's conclusions, however, are not altogether disinterested. As an old National Peasant who had attacked the protectionist policy of the Liberal party and had lowered tariffs when he was Minister of Finance, he was always of the opinion that industrial development in Rumania had been artificially forced and was battening on the peasant.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

433 ing from the very extensive devastations of the war; the agrarian crisis and the world depression hurt agriculture all over the world; the agricultural protectionism of the European industrial states drove the east European nations toward industrial protection; from the middle of the 1930's the increasing menace of war led to a growing demand for heavy industries to supply armaments.

But despite all these external influences, there is still reason to believe that the relation of Rumanian agriculture to industry worked to the disadvantage of the former. Politically, of course, there is abundant evidence that industry was a far more promising source of funds than agriculture, and undoubtedly political and private interests worked to the benefit of industry. In 1927, G. D. Creangă observed, "The situation which before the war existed on the land, where a number of latifundiary owners retained the greater part of the agricultural revenue has now passed into the domain of trade and industry." [13] No doubt Rumania's need for industrialization was often used to camouflage private financial motives; in 1932 an English observer maintained that the high protectionist policy was not really designed to protect Rumania from the ravages of foreign capital but had been introduced "mainly because the Brătianu party aimed at reserving for themselves the monopoly of such profits as could be made through the exploitation of the national resources." [14]

In Rumania one can never be sure that such aims are not dominant. Nevertheless, the tension between industry and agriculture certainly involves more than the personal scramble for wealth and profits. The impulse toward industry was also intimately connected with Rumania's foreign commercial relations.

Commerce

Economic tensions on two levels have already been observed: between the peasant and the estate owner in the countryside, especially before 1914, and between agriculture and industry. Both were in some measure a consequence of Rumania's increasing involvement in the complex of world industry and commerce. It is now necessary to examine these external relations.

439 Rumanian foreign commerce was on a relatively small scale; in 1929, for example, the total value of imports and exports per capita was only one-tenth as great as that for Great Britain in the same

13. Quoted in Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, p. 575.

14. George Clinton Logio, *Rumania, Its History, Politics, and Economics* (Manchester, 1932), p. 126.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

511 —palatial villas and flats in the residential sections, large automobiles, yachting clubs, and Parisian fashions—were in startling contrast to the conditions in the countryside. While the employment of surpluses in unproductive expenditure is a characteristic of undeveloped economies, this tendency was somewhat aggravated in Rumania by the inheritance of boyar extravagance and by the traditional social chasm between the peasant and the ruling groups. To some extent the unequal distribution of income was derived from the pre-1914 oligarchic agrarian society, but a great deal of the actual wealth was gained through industry and finance and through state connections.[27] Unequal distribution was not reduced by the tax structure, which depended largely upon indirect taxes on consumption goods and only to a limited degree upon income taxes.[28]

511 434 The economic importance of this distribution of income is difficult to measure. Obviously a mere leveling out of incomes would not make the Rumanian peasant significantly wealthier. On the other hand, the diversion of the nation's relatively limited surpluses into nonproductive expenditure undoubtedly restricted much-needed investments in agriculture and industry. In general, the social significance of this inequality—its reflection of the deep abyss between town and country—was more important than the immediate economic effects.

● 433 In its broad features the Rumanian economy during the interwar years resembled that of the pre-1914 Old Kingdom. The addition of new territories increased the internal market and provided important resources and industries. With these advantages came the task of unifying the economies of the different provinces and of recovering from the war. On the international level, the situation was less favorable than before; world trade was more restricted, especially after 1931; the industrial states protected their agriculture; the supply of foreign credit was limited and fell off greatly in the depression. For these reasons, plus a mixture of economic and nationalist mo-

27. The importance of politics and government connections in the acquisition of wealth in Rumania is proverbial, partly because the government played such an important role in economic undertakings. In 1939 the capital invested in state economic enterprises was considerably larger than the total capital investment of all private commercial and industrial undertakings. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 360.

28. In 1935/36 22.8 per cent of the total tax revenue came from income and other direct taxes; 12.3 per cent from taxes on property transactions; 12.1 per cent from turnover taxes; 44.9 per cent from consumption taxes; and 7.9 per cent from customs duties. PEP study (Political and Economic Planning), *Economic Development in S.E. Europe* (London, 1945), p. 21.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

433

tives, industrial expansion was fostered and while industry remained relatively small it displayed a rapid rate of growth.

In agriculture, on the contrary, there was general stagnation resulting from the interplay of a number of factors:

1) the growing pressure of population, which tended, in some regions at least, to nullify reforms and kept the per capita income at a low level;

2) the decline in European cereal commerce and the fall in grain prices after 1929;

3) the relative and perhaps absolute disadvantage of agriculture in internal commerce, allocation of capital, and government support;

4) what may be called the "residues" of the old landlord system: the persistence despite the land reforms of strip farming, extensive cereal cultivation, and, in an attenuated form, large estates, metayage, and labor contracts.

A vicious circle resulted. The peasant was unable to obtain credit because agriculture was a poor field for investment and was bound to remain so until it became more productive. Low yields were a function of primitive techniques, which in turn could not be improved without a reform in the organization of farming. The rational organization of farming was thwarted by the pressure of population as well as by government policy.

Despite the agrarian reforms of 1918–21, an independent small peasantry was not established; instead, dwarf holdings, insufficient to sustain a peasant family, predominated. So long as there was no alternative field of employment for peasants driven below the margin of subsistence, the appearance of a larger class of medium peasants by no means compensated for the increasing fragmentation and subdivision of the majority of peasant holdings. On the other hand, industry, which was regarded as a means of raising the level of productivity and of draining off surplus agrarian population, seems to have had the effect of reducing purchasing power and of aggravating tne difficulties of the countryside. In general, one receives the impression that the Rumanian economy in attempting to lift itself by its bootstraps had merely driven the feet through the soles.

To be sure, it is uncertain just how much of this discouraging situation was a consequence of an internal maladjustment. Both in 1929 and in 1938–39 there was some promise of general improvement, but in both cases it was broken off, first by the depression and then by the outbreak of the Second World War. Perhaps under more propitious external circumstances these incipient improvements might

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

● 433 have lasted and led to a general amelioration of the whole economy. It should be observed, however, that in each case the show of prosperity was based on a gamble. In 1929–30 it depended upon a high or rising level of prices, an unrestricted market for agricultural exports, and access to foreign capital. As soon as these conditions disappeared, the peasant as a debtor and Rumania as a debtor nation fell into serious difficulties. Similarly, the improvement in 1938–39 was intimately related to the economic advance of Hitler Germany, which was clearly directed to preparation for war.

The depressed condition of the Rumanian economy, which probably appears bleaker in retrospect with the sad knowledge of the disastrous culmination of the interwar period, had a twofold effect upon political activity. First, the chronic poverty and low level of economic life of the majority of the Rumanian people unquestionably undermined the fragile parliamentary foundations and fostered the survival of the traditional vices of political corruption. While Rumania was poor, its poverty was not simply that of a primitive community: sectors of the economy were advancing rapidly, partly at the expense of agriculture. Consequently, there was a great temptation to snatch at the available wealth through speculation, through monopoly, and through political influence.

Moreover, the obstinacy of the agrarian question and the difficulty of finding a satisfactory way out of the impasse contributed to the multiplicity of parties and programs. That is not to say that the confusion of Rumanian politics can be wholly explained by the economic problem or that the parties can be defined as consistent standard-bearers of different economic schools of thought; Rumanian politics were shot through with opportunism. But the complexity of the factors producing the agrarian problem led to a variety of opinions as to its solution. Since the agrarian reforms had not produced a healthy agriculture, had they gone too far or not far enough, or had they merely been mismanaged? Was further industrialization the ultimate solution, or had the forced growth of industry been responsible for the plight of agriculture? Was foreign capital indispensable to Rumanian recovery or was it a threat to the country's economic independence? Was agrarian overpopulation remediable through higher productivity or was emigration the only answer? [29] The dif-

29. Although the National Peasant party is reported to have contemplated mass emigration in 1929 (Logio, *op. cit.*, p. 165), this solution did not play a very important part in local politics, partly because it so flatly contradicted the ethnic nationalism of Greater Rumania. It has been regarded by some foreign observers, however, as the only adequate solution. Doreen Warriner (*The Economics of Peasant Farming*, p. 199), for example, concluded that "Without a redistribution of farm populations to regions

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

ferent responses to these questions provide at least a thread of mean-433
ing to the welter of political controversies during the interwar period.

---

outside Europe, Europe's farm problem cannot be solved in a way which can be reconciled with economic progress and political stability." Whatever the merits of emigration, it is a rather academic solution, given the increased barriers to immigration since the First World War. It is also doubtful in any event whether it could be on a scale large enough to balance population growth.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

the new territories away from Austria, Hungary, and Russia and 665
into the domestic market. Most important, perhaps, they came to be 652
an important source of fiscal revenue. Since they were payable in gold or foreign currency, they supplied the government with funds for foreign debt payments.[43] Between 1923 and 1926 they yielded a greater revenue than the import duties; the government was naturally reluctant to part with them. They had, however, an altogether depressing effect upon Rumanian commerce and upon agriculture. Since exports were really the sole means by which Rumania could improve its adverse balance of payments, these duties, in their effect of reducing exports, appear to have very little justification.

Export duties were dropped in 1927, and Vintilă Brătianu announced, "The progressive reduction of these taxes until their final suppression forms, as you know, part of our governmental program." At this time he took the position that Rumania was at last ready to move on to a new stage of activity. "If up to the present I have been obliged to perform the work of a doctor in healing the wounds of the past, I hope to be able to resume in the future my profession as engineer—which is to create." [44] Whether or not one accepts his assertion that the Liberals had planned these changes all along, it must be admitted that the Liberals were remarkably adept at reversing themselves and then assuming credit for farsightedness.

To summarize, the Liberals' policy for recovery was only in part successful. Despite an almost puritanical view toward the economy and the desire to improve "through ourselves," their program had a way of destroying on the one hand what it attempted to create with the other. The Brătianus' injunction that Rumania get a firm grip on itself seemed likely to lead to self-strangulation.

3. INDUSTRIALIZATION AND EXPLOITATION OF RESOURCES

665
433●

The Liberals not only tried to bring about economic recovery, they were also intent upon exploiting the natural resources of the country and creating a national industry, primarily by state encouragement. In 1927 Vintilă Brătianu defined the principal factors in the development of the nation's riches as "the state, professional chambers, official bodies, and private action, individually or in association." [45] A law for the encouragement of national industry, already passed in 1912, was extended to the whole of Rumania in 1921. Industries

43. Pasvolsky, *Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States*, p. 452.
44. Vintilă Brătianu, exposé de motifs for the 1928 budget, *L'Économiste roumain*, 3, No. 10 (December 1, 1927), 338.
45. *L'Économiste roumain*, 3, No. 4 (April 1, 1927), 83.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

665 433 covered by this law were permitted to purchase public land at a discount, were exempted from duties on imported machinery, and received reduced transportation rates and cheap fuel. In 1923 the Liberals introduced a National Industrial Credit Association for the purpose of granting credit to manufacturers and of encouraging industrial development; the government owned 20 per cent of its stock, the National Bank 30 per cent, and private investors 50 per cent. Tariffs, as has been mentioned, were designed to protect industry from foreign competitors.

665 656 In their industrial activities the Liberals most clearly demonstrated their suspicion of foreign capital. This suspicion was nothing new. In the 1890's the Liberals, then in opposition, had led a successful campaign against granting concessions to the Standard Oil-Diskonto Gesellschaft consortium.[46] In the 1920's they maintained they were not hostile to foreign capital but would not be dominated by it. In 1923 Vintilă Brătianu protested to a foreign correspondent:

> It would be madness to suppose that we can develop the country without the help of foreign capital. We need it in every form to develop mineral resources, water power, and industry. We also require things which must be paid for in foreign money. But we want this capital to operate within the lines of a general policy which is approved of by the state and which accords to the interests of the country. We do not want the type of investor who comes to exploit the country simply to make money, but one who has a feeling for our national evolution and keeps our interests at heart. We want to be treated as an adult and not as a minor.[47]

[671] Nevertheless, the Brătianus were accused both by the opposition in Rumania and by foreign investors of being economic xenophobes. The accusations are based largely on a series of four "nationalization" laws passed in 1924:[48] a law for the commercial exploitation of state enterprises (June 6, 1924), laws on water power (June 23) and other sources of energy (July 1), and a mining law (July 3).

These laws, which covered a wide range of industrial activities—hydroelectric power, natural gas, petroleum, mines, railroads, river navigation, postal services, telephones and telegraphs, and government monopolies—had generally the same provisions. Invested foreign capital in the enterprises could not exceed 40 per cent; the remaining 60 per cent was to be covered by state and private Rumanian

46. C. G. Rommenhöller, *Gross-Rumänien* (Berlin, 1926), p. 434.
47. *Times* (London), May 19, 1923.
48. A French text of these four laws is given in *L'Économiste roumain*, Nos. 2-6 (1924).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

was charged with bad faith. The National Peasants reprimanded the 665
offending officials and maintained that such police brutality was an 661
evil inheritance which they were attempting to eradicate. Such incidents are of importance here only in showing the tenacity with which old habits persisted under the new order.

The failure of the economy to rally provided the really vulnerable 665
point for opposition attacks. The stabilization of the currency had 175
given rise to overly sanguine hopes that money would become plentiful—the Bucarest Jockey Club on the strength of it had doubled its bridge points—but much of the funds went to paying old debts. Crops [433] ●
had been bad in 1927 and 1928, and one of the first tasks of the Maniu government had been to send relief supplies to Bessarabia. The 1929 harvest was excellent, one of the best in the interwar years, but exports were not great, and world grain prices were already beginning the long descent which was to continue until 1934.

The death in October, 1929, of one of the regents, Buzdugan, produced a typical Rumanian crisis. The Liberals contended that the two other regents should select the third member. The National Peasant assembly, however, elected the new regent, Constantin Sarateanu, thus laying the party open to the same criticism that it had made of the Liberals in the creation of the regency in the first place. Moreover, Maniu seems to have failed to inform some of the Peasant members of the person to be selected and rumors spread, assisted by wishful opposition thinking, that the Transylvanians were forming an inner cabinet in the government. The principal result of the regency affair, however, was to arouse general dissatisfaction over such an arrangement and to increase talk of Carol's return.

In 1930 the situation was even less favorable. Economic improvement failed to round the corner. The opposition press increased its polemics by publishing wild reports of Soviet mobilization on the frontier, Communist uprisings in Bessarabia, and the government's secret intention to devalue the leu. This technique, long familiar in Rumania, was designed to rattle the government into making a false step, and did succeed in driving it to pass a law establishing a prison sentence for persons found guilty of spreading tendentious rumors likely to damage the credit of the state. Under this law the government confiscated several newspapers.

The municipal elections of March, 1930, showed an increase in Liberal strength, as the National Peasants led only by two to one. In May by-elections government candidates were returned in five constituencies, but were defeated in Cernăuţi by a Ukrainian Nationalist

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

829
665

2) the distinctly undemocratic implications of this evolution in economic ideas, at least in their Rumanian context.

It would be absurd to suppose that the actual development of Rumanian economic policy was based upon any such theoretical considerations, but there is a reasonably close parallel between the progress of Manoilescu's ideas and the development of the economic and industrial policy of the Rumanian government from that of the old Liberals under Vintilă Brătianu to that of the Liberal government of the 1930's. Although the old Liberals had favored a program of industrialization with state support, it was handled primarily through the private banks, controlled by the Liberals, and was directed chiefly toward extracting natural resources and creating secondary industries. Moreover, the tight-fisted fiscal policy of Vintilă Brătianu had served as a check on economic activity.

178
433

After 1933 industrialization proceeded at a much more rapid tempo and in a somewhat different direction. The private banks after the depression played a less important part in financing industry; the principal initiative was by the National Bank or the state itself, both through state-owned corporations and through the growing importance of the state as consumer of industrial products. Expansion was most extensive in heavy industry; large cartels appeared and there was a notable concentration of industrial activity. Between 1933 and 1938 the number of "large" industrial concerns (i.e., with at least 20 workers and more than 10 horsepower) increased only from 3,487 to 3,767, whereas the installed horsepower increased from 529,965 to 746,789, and the employed personnel from 184,777 to 289,117.[24] The horsepower employed in capital goods industries increased from 287,266 in 1932 to 452,870 in 1937, as contrasted with a more modest increase from 237,442 to 289,666 in consumer goods industries. The output in quantity of capital goods had by 1937 increased by 57.4 per cent over the 1927 level, consumer goods by 45 per cent.[25] The production of steel, which had hit a high of 143,511 metric tons in 1928, and dropped to a low of 103,046 in 1932, rose from 144,766 tons in 1933 to 276,532 in 1938.[26] There was no doubt that the policy was directed toward heavy industry and was having results.

Two important reasons for this industrialization were, of course, the depression and the rearmament program. The collapse of the grain market and the spread of agrarian protectionism among the

24. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești*, p. 149.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
26. *Breviaire statistique de la Roumanie* (1940), p. 164.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

industrial states naturally stimulated Rumania, as it did the other Balkan states, to create its own industries. The growing international tension in the 1930's led to a heavy demand for arms and munitions. In 1937 the president of the Rumanian union of metallurgical and mineral industries stated that the principal characteristic of the years of recovery had been the large industrial investments, especially for the purpose of creating a powerful armaments industry.[27]

But if the depression and the demand for armaments stimulated industrialization, they in turn assisted in the rise of very powerful industrial interests, which progressively dominated not only the economic but the political scene.[28] These years witnessed the rise of such industrial giants—giants at least in Rumania—as Max Ausnit and Nicolae Malaxa. These men represented a different type of influence from that of the Brătianus. The latter, through their position in the banks, had equated the Liberal party with a policy of industrial advance through the financial institutions, but they were primarily politicians. Ausnit and Malaxa, on the other hand, were primarily industrialists who were able political manipulators but whose field of action was outside the political arena. It might be added that King Carol himself, who operated "outside" politics, was by no means disinterested in industrialization and had a large personal stake in the new industries.[29]

Rumanian industries, and especially the new heavy industry, required both protection and capital. Industrial protection had marked the whole history of Rumanian tariff policy, and even the National Peasant tariff of 1929 did not renounce it. But the new devices, developed as defenses during the depression, became far more potent weapons than any which had existed heretofore. Indeed, they were far more effective in assisting industry than in fulfilling their ostensible function of safeguarding national finances and the currency.[30]

27. Quoted in Pătrăşcanu, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

28. An example is the Skoda scandal of 1935, in which a storm was raised over a contract for armaments made by the National Peasants with the Czech Skoda works in 1930. Although an effort was made to involve some National Peasant ministers in charges of graft, the real cause of the scandal appears to have been that the contract had been made "without regard for the law concerning national armament activity."

29. For obvious reasons it is difficult to ascertain the extent of Carol's industrial interests. According to Pătrăşcanu (*op. cit.*, p. 48), in published reports of enterprises in which he was a shareholder Carol held 30 to 35 per cent of the shares of the Malaxa works, and almost as much in several smaller industries. Four of the largest sugar mills were in his hands, as well as a beer factory. He had important shares in the gold mines and the telephone company and a large control of Banca de Credit Român.

30. Rumania's exchange position and the leu never achieved any stability despite the most elaborate series of measures. I would agree with Antonin Basch's conclusion (*The Danube Basin*, p. 143) that the signal failure of Rumania either to achieve cur-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

from 2 to 10 billion lei (in quantity from one million to 2.2 million metric tons).

Two qualifications should be made however. The emphasis upon wheat exports and upon the improvement of quality was primarily for the benefit of the middle and large producer, though the maintenance of the price of grain did help agriculture as a whole. In the second place, as has been mentioned in connection with the depression, the premiums on wheat served to extend the area under wheat cultivation, in direct contradiction to the recommendations of agricultural experts, who continued to believe that "peasant agriculture should no longer limit itself, in imitation of the old system, to the culture of cereals; its success will come from a parallel development of the resources of the field and of livestock raising." [35] This contradiction, which shows the absence of any real coherence to the agrarian program of the Liberal government, had two obvious sources: wheat, for all its decline after the First World War, was important commercially and from the point of view of foreign commerce there was a strong incentive to support it. Moreover, the wheat growers were the larger farmers and were in a better position to make felt their wishes than were the small maize-producing peasants.

The government did, however, make certain efforts to increase the variety of agricultural production. The most elaborate was the creation, with the assistance of I. G. Farbenindustrie, of the "Soya" company, which was authorized to import soybeans, distribute them to cultivators, provide equipment, and purchase the entire crop for export to Germany. The area under this crop expanded rapidly, especially in Bessarabia: 1,465 hectares in 1934, 20,411 hectares in 1935, 58,037 hectares in 1936, and 102,000 hectares in 1937. The government through price guarantees and subsidies also furthered the cultivation of sugar beet, tobacco, rice, and textile plants.

These measures to diversify agriculture did not, despite all the publicity given to them, achieve very great importance. They were only a drop in the bucket compared with the vast area under peasant cereal cultivation, and their rate of expansion seemed unlikely to produce any general amelioration for a very long time. Moreover, the introduction of such industrial crops, whose main purpose—almost exclusively so in the case of soya—was for export, shows the persistent if natural effort to solve the agrarian question by a sort of legerdemain. The soybean had been an old favorite, and as early

35. G. Ionescu-Sişeşti and N. Cornăţeanu, *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie et ses conséquences*, p. 79.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241 as 1910 Dobrogeanu-Gherea had some harsh words to say of the
433 men who thought it could magically solve the deep-rooted ills of Ru-
654 manian agriculture.[36]

The Tătărescu government, following precedent, also reorganized agricultural credit and the cooperative system, set up more experimental stations, and devoted funds to the raising of better livestock and the purchase of tractors, but those measures seem to have been only of marginal benefit.

423 The government did try in the law of March, 1937, for the encouragement of agriculture to grapple with the problem of land tenure. It regulated the transfer and mortgage of rural lands and undertook to enforce the indivisibility of property as a means of preventing the progressive subdivision of peasant holdings. The effort was unsuccessful. The two-hectare minimum, which in any case was too small for a self-subsistent holding, was not observed; the prohibition extended only to properties obtained from the state or with the state's assistance. An attempt was also made to promote the consolidation of peasant properties, but this met with too great opposition in the chamber and was dropped.[37] The government also exerted its right of preemption on sales of agricultural land for the purpose of providing land for the peasants but its achievements were insignificant. Between April 1, 1934, and August 1, 1938, of the 326,200 hectares put on sale the government used its right of preemption on only 12,250 hectares, 3.8 per cent of the total.[38]

241 In brief, if the position of agriculture was somewhat better in the
654 years of the Tătărescu regime than in the depression it was largely
656 a consequence of general economic recovery. Agriculture did benefit from the protective measures applied and extended by the government, although part of these benefits was lost by the continued depreciation of the leu, and some efforts were made to raise the level of agriculture and diversify production. Nevertheless, the government's chief interest was industry and commerce and the principal benefits to agriculture were those which corresponded to this interest. The desperate problem of the millions of small peasants owning less than 3 hectares, unable to support themselves and their families, dividing their land into smaller and smaller fragments, suffering from pellagra —this problem was scarcely touched.

654 It must be said, however, that in the 1930's there was a notable
511

36. C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *Neoiobăgia*, p. 254.

37. Valeriu Bulgariu, "Divizibilitatea proprietăţii ţărăneşti," *Problema agrară* (Bucarest, 1946), pp. 77–97.

38. G. Ionescu-Sişeşti, "Le Nouvel Aspect du problème agraire en Roumanie," *Archives pour la science et la réforme sociales*, *16*, Nos. 1–4 (1948), 264.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

many's increasing monopoly over Rumanian trade and hoped to keep 185
the door open for other markets.[23]

Apart from these important qualifications, however, he expressed his approval of Germany's program for Rumania, the intensification of agriculture, the creation of agricultural industries, and the establishment of mixed companies for mining and petroleum. In general, he seems to have regarded Rumania's increasing economic ties with Germany as largely in the nature of things and only secondarily as a result of policy: "This situation is not so much the result of a crystallization of policy as a change in the structure of the Rumanian economy, which gradually with the advance of the process of industrialization diminished the degree of complementarity with a series of countries and increased it with regard to one alone—Germany." [24]

Although it may seem surprising that the German policy embodied in the agreement of March, 1939, should have more in common with the economic aims of a National Peasant than with a pro-Axis corporatist, the reason is obvious. The National Peasants, believing in economic interdependence and the international division of labor, disapproved of fostering Rumanian industry at the expense of agriculture.[25] Germany, for its own reasons, desired the Balkans to increase their agricultural production and to stay away from secondary industries. On the other hand, Manoilescu's industrial ambitions were unwelcome to the Germans because of their similarity to German aims, a case of like poles repelling. This antagonism arising out of an attempt at similarity is a characteristic of Rumanian history. The earlier effort of the Liberals to emulate the West had led to the economic xenophobia of the Brătianus.

The success of the German-Rumanian agreement could have been measured only after a number of years of peaceful development; it may be doubted whether the results anticipated could have been achieved in the five years of the agreement. But such a peaceful period was not to be granted. In the year after the inauguration of the five-year plan Rumania had lost one third of its territory, Carol had fled the country, and Marshal Antonescu had joined Hitler's war against the Soviet Union. The territorial losses alone severely disorganized 311
the economic program. By the loss of Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina, 433
Northern Transylvania, and Southern Dobrogea Rumania was deprived of 34 per cent of its total area, 37 per cent of the arable land,

23. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești*, pp. 372–374.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 301.

25. For somewhat analogous reasons, at the time of the First World War several Rumanian populists had been pro-German because they saw Germany as the industrial complement to Rumania's agrarian society.

3 Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

311 44 per cent of the forest land, 27 per cent of the orchards, and 37
433 per cent of the vineyards. Of the area devoted to wheat (as of 1939) it lost 37 per cent, to maize 30 per cent, to sunflower 75 per cent, to hemp 43 per cent, and 86 per cent of the area devoted to soya. The regions, chiefly Bessarabia, in which the new industrial crops had been most intensively cultivated were lost. Finally, the whole economy was put on a war footing, first for Germany and then for Rumania itself.

185 Notwithstanding all Carol's laws and decrees, no real solutions
433 were found to the agrarian question. It is illuminating to look through the volumes of the *Enciclopedia României*, published in the last years of Carol's reign as a monument to the Rumanian rebirth. Amid all the fanfare of Rumania's marvelous progress and glowing future, the articles on agriculture and land tenure strike a discordant and often deeply pessimistic note.

To be sure, the trend in the 1930's was toward increasing industrialization as the solution to Rumania's economic difficulties, and in the long run, had the war not intervened, this might have brought beneficial results even to agriculture. As it was, however, much of the industrialization was achieved at the expense of agriculture, and for all its expansion it was neither bringing agriculture any great technical improvements nor beginning to absorb the excess agricultural population. The five-year plan and the laws to rationalize land tenure and consolidate holdings might have provided a healthier foundation for agriculture had they been carried out conscientiously, but there is little evidence that they meant anything more than many previous legislative acts which clutter the Rumanian statute books. It is doubtful whether the peasant would have benefited greatly from a plan ordained by divine providence if it had been left to the Carol administration to execute it. With all its attacks on "outworn" parties and its praise for the younger generation, the Carol dictatorship lacked the stature to be a modernizing dictatorship along the lines of Kemal Ataturk's regime. The new German orientation might have benefited Rumanian agriculture, but given the power relations it is more likely that Rumania would have become the object of an efficient colonial policy.

654 Among the social studies undertaken in the period of Carol's dictatorship there was one which makes a fitting conclusion to the Carolist period, and indeed illustrates the failure to master the agrarian question during the interwar years. In the summer and autumn of 1939 a Rumanian research team made a field study of the *plasă* (an administrative unit in a judeţ) Dâmbovnicul, in the south of the

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

433 The inventory of other agricultural equipment was more or less sta-
241 ble or showed a slight decline.
185 For all the controls and economic collaboration with Germany the Antonescu dictatorship appears to have accomplished nothing for Rumanian agriculture. The relative improvement, at least in terms of total production, which had appeared after the depression was broken by the war. The position of peasant agriculture was clearly deteriorating, and the industrial boom, arising mainly from war demands, was not an adequate compensation.

Although pessimistic voices could be heard in the Carolist dictatorship, the official attitude was optimistic. During the war years, however, there was increasing concern over the manifest failure of Rumanian agriculture to show any improvement. The agricultural census, taken in the spring of 1941, provided ample evidence of the unsatisfactory situation of the peasant. The veteran agricultural economist, Ionescu-Sișești, who had been writing confident articles throughout the interwar period, was quite gloomy in 1943.

> It was anticipated that such a gigantic transformation of property [the 1918–21 reforms] would keep the peasant class in a state of equilibrium for a long time and that the country would benefit from a long period of prosperity because of the distribution of land to the peasants. Unhappily this hope has not been completely realized. Today, when all the claims of the peasants appear satisfied, and there is nothing left to distribute—since a minimum of large and medium property is indispensible—a new peasantry is appearing which threatens to take on a grave character if measures are not adopted in time. The very rapid growth of the population and the advanced fragmentation of properties are engendering this crisis.[24]

His recommendations, however, were largely a recapitulation of the various measures which had been legislated, if not applied with any consequence, in the 1930's: exerting the state's right of preemption, preventing subdivision of properties below a certain minimum, encouraging consolidation, and creating larger colonization holdings. If such steps were taken, he said, "the peasantry will be divided into two categories: on the one hand, peasant proprietors with holdings of an adequate size, on the other, a class of agricultural workers living on the product of their labor on the farms of others.[25] Ionescu-Sișești's hopes were not to be realized. Within a year and a

24. G. Ionescu-Sișești, "Le Nouvel Aspect du problème agraire en Roumanie," *Archives pour la science et la réforme sociales, 16*, Nos. 1–4 (1943), 263.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 267.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

half the Communist party was in power and the last thing it wanted was such a "Stolypinist" situation in the countryside. 433 241 185

From the point of view of dramatic unity, the Antonescu dictatorship would make a convenient terminal point for recent Rumanian history, as the last act of a rake's progress. With a state encompassing virtually all Rumanians, a new constitution, and an extensive land reform, Rumania had entered the interwar period full, it seemed, of high promise. The promise had not been fulfilled, democracy did not flourish, the peasantry remained poor but prolific. The constitutional regime was replaced by a royal dictatorship and then by the *Walpurgisnacht* of the Iron Guard. Finally, Rumania was swept into the war to join Hitler's crusade. History, however, is no respecter of dramatic unity but persists in its devious course.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

already enjoys virtually complete control over the country. Moreover, 648
while the Rumanian political and economic structure is steadily approaching, and probably not asymptotically, the Soviet model, the final decision on incorporation will be based—apart from considerations of expediency—on political definitions which a mind not steeped in Leninism-Stalinism would have small chance of foreseeing.[20]

Economic Conditions

Economic developments since 1945 may be divided into two periods: 178
two years, 1945–47, of confusion and distress resulting from the war, Russian withdrawals, severe drought, the agrarian reform, monetary inflation, and the unsettled political situation; since 1947, a period of greater stability, an apparent increase in production, and the beginning of a directed and planned economy. In neither period can one obtain a very satisfactory picture of economic conditions. In the first months there was much administrative disorganization, and the government itself frequently lacked accurate information. The Groza regime has not hesitated from the outset to manipulate statistics for political and propagandistic purposes. Since the tightening of the administration in 1948, Rumania has been as reluctant as the Soviet Union, more reluctant than the other satellites, to publish any measurable economic data. Today, the few figures that appear are given as percentage gains for which it would be exceedingly difficult to supply a reasonably accurate base.

In general, it may be said that Rumania was slower than the other 433 ●
eastern European states to recover from the war, in somewhat the 441
same way it lagged in coming out of the depression. Agricultural production fell off seriously in 1945 and 1946, partly because of the disorganization attendant upon the agrarian reform, but largely because of two years' serious drought. Both the acreage sown and the crop yields, especially in maize, the peasant's source of food, were exceptionally low; in 1946 the level of agricultural production was only 59 per cent of the 1934–38 average.[21] The production of indus-

20. This point is not very important but it is of interest to note that in the exchange of notes leading to Tito's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, after referring to Kardelj's hope, expressed in 1945, that the Yugoslav government would be regarded as the representatives of one of the future Soviet republics, rather scornfully dismissed his "primitive and fallacious reasoning . . . about Yugoslavia as a future constituent part of the USSR." It did not, however, vouchsafe its own authoritative views on the subject. Cf. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute* (London; New York, 1948), p. 39.

21. United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948* (Geneva, 1949), p. 17.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

433 241 trial and food crops fell successively in 1945 and 1946, and it is to be noted that the soybean, so extensively advertised in the 1930's, virtually disappeared as a crop when the peasants were left to their own devices.

The absence of accumulated stocks of grain, the large deliveries to Russia under the armistice, and the failure of the maize harvest in 1946 produced a disastrous and tragic famine, above all in Moldavia, in the winter and spring of 1947. Relief shipments had to be brought in from abroad, including substantial assistance from the United States.

The livestock position, while improving over the situation immediately after the war, was still weak by 1948. There were, in that year, 30 horses and 138 oxen (including buffaloes) per 100 agricultural exploitations as against 56 and 150 respectively in 1941; in terms of cultivation, there were 21 draft animals per 100 hectares of arable land in 1948 as against 27 in 1941. The quantity of agricultural equipment showed less diminution: an increase in the total number over 1941 was matched by a slight decline in the amount of equipment per exploitation, a result presumably of the increase in small holdings after the 1945 reform.[22]

Rumanian industry, which had expanded under wartime demands, registered a decline in 1944 and 1945, but a slight recovery in 1946. According to the Ministry of Finance, total industrial production was 80 per cent of the 1941 level in 1944, 60 per cent in 1945, and 77 per cent in the first ten months of 1946.[23] The chemical, metallurgical, and food industries were the most severely hit. The petroleum industry, which appears to be facing an exhaustion of the tapped fields, had already showed signs of decline before the war; in 1947 the output of crude petroleum was 3.8 million tons as against 8.7 million in 1936 and 5.8 million in 1940.

433 648 In addition to the slump in agricultural and industrial production, the Rumanian economy suffered from the flow of goods to the Soviet Union. The total value of Rumanian wealth transferred officially or unofficially, as restitution, reparations, or war booty has been the

22. A. Golopenţia and P. Onica, *Recensământul agricol din Republica Populară Română, 25 Ianuarie 1948. Rezultate provizorii*, Institutul Central de Statistică (Bucarest, 1948).

23. Rumanian Ministry of Finance, *Expunere de motive la bugetul 1947/48*, p. 338. The validity of these figures is uncertain, and they may represent an inflated estimate. Tătărescu is reported to have said in 1947 that after two years of the Groza regime the general level of production was only 48 per cent of the 1938 output. *New York Times*, June 6, 1947.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

subject of a number of heated disputes at international conferences, 433
and it would be very difficult to make a reliable estimate.[24] That the 648
drain was serious is indicated by the fact that as early as 1945 some Rumanian Communists, with more than the average amount of economic insight and less than the usual blind devotion to the Soviet Union, were in despair over the effect of the Russian withdrawals upon the country's economy and their own political position. The glaring contradiction between Russia's efforts to woo Rumania and to secure some measure of popularity for the Communist party and its rather frantic removal of goods and equipment has puzzled many observers. The explanation may simply be that the policy of this monolithic state was not consistent, or rather, that two different policies were here overlapping.

Rumania's foreign trade was greatly reduced after the war; by 439
1948 the value of its exports was only 50 per cent of the 1938 figure (in 1947, 21 per cent), and its imports 69 per cent (in 1947, 57 per cent).[25] The bulk of the trade was with the generally similar economies of the other eastern European states, which were being increasingly linked by a network of trade agreements.

The combination of low output, armistice obligations and war costs, 652
and the general political uncertainty of the postarmistice months led to a fearful inflation. Rumanian currency had never been sound since the First World War and had showed a tendency toward inflation in the 1930's and the war years; between 1945 and the summer of 1947, when a drastic stabilization was achieved, prices rose to dizzying heights. The cost of living index increased from a base of 100 in 1938 to 145.0 in 1940, 413.9 in 1943, 3,678.7 in 1945, 46,140 in December, 1946, and 525,688 in July, 1947.[26]

24. At the time of the Paris Peace Conference the American delegate, Willard L. Thorp, complained that the Rumanian delegation had been of no assistance in supplying information on this point, but he estimated that the total cost to Rumania of its defeat would be about $2,000,000,000. As of 1946 he estimated that about $1,050,000,000 had already been transferred: $325,000,000 for the maintenance of occupation troops, $100,000,000 for reparations based on the 1938 price level, $175,000,000 for property restitution, and $450,000,000 for requisitions. U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin, 15*, No. 379 (October 6, 1946). In July, 1948, General Radescu, in exile in the United States, stated that since Thorp's estimate Rumania had paid an additional $735,000,000. *New York Times*, July 18, 1948. Some attempts have been made to relate these withdrawals to Rumania's national income, but both figures would by necessity be exceedingly uncertain.

25. United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*, Table XVI.

26. Institutul Central de Statistică, *Comunicări statistice, No. 19* (Bucarest, January 31, 1948).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

185 241 Western model, but during this first period, to avoid alienating the peasants, it held its hand.

185 433 A somewhat similar situation obtained in the question of industrial policy, though here official propaganda was much more hostile to exploiting industrialists. So long as the Tătărescu Liberals were in the government, it called for the cooperation of private capital, and the only important step taken in this first phase was the nationalization of the National Bank. As late as March, 1947, Mihail Ralea, Rumanian Minister to the United States, protested against rumors that the government was proceeding against private enterprise and maintained, either disingenuously or without information (Ralea was not a member of the Communist party), that one of the main goals of the Groza regime was to "foster private initiative," to which it granted complete freedom.[30] Nevertheless, in practice the sphere of private industrial activity was increasingly circumscribed and restricted by a number of devices: obstructive action by the workers, appeals to the national interest, or simply charges of inefficiency and sabotage.

439 Perhaps the most significant economic innovation in the months after the armistice was the creation of a number of joint Soviet-Rumanian enterprises. On May 8, 1945, the Rumanian government signed an agreement with the Soviet Union providing for extensive economic collaboration. The U.S.S.R. was to assist Rumanian agriculture by supplying tractors, seed, and agricultural experts. A number of SOVROM companies were set up in the important fields of river and air transport, banking, lumbering, and oil production and refining. (A 1948 trade agreement created two new SOVROM companies for the manufacture of tractors and chemical products.) Participation in the companies was on a 50–50 basis, and the Rumanian state was to grant them special privileges and monopolies. Much of the Soviet capital was quite easily obtained from the German assets in Rumania, awarded to the U.S.S.R. in the Potsdam agreement. These concerns clearly gave the Soviet Union a controlling position at key points in the Rumanian economy.

This form of economic collaboration was reminiscent of the Rumanian-German trade agreement of 1939. The principal difference lay less perhaps in the agreements themselves than in the structure of the Soviet and German economies. Under the German-Rumanian agreement the two economies were seen as complementary, and the major function of Rumania was to provide raw materials; the Germans showed some hostility to the further development of Ru-

30. See his letter to the *New York Times*, March 12, 1947.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

● 433

TABLE XXXI. RUMANIAN INDUSTRY

A. Distribution of Industries with More than Twenty Employees, 1938

	Number	Capital Invested (1,000 *lei*)	Horsepower	Personnel	Salaries (1,000 *lei*)	Value of Output (1,000 *lei*)
Food	974	10,773,000	137,018	38,736	789,919	15,577,444
Textile	640	8,230,382	79,561	74,077	1,798,766	14,691,948
Chemical	397	12,325,308	183,393	28,298	1,196,853	14,154,605
Metallurgic	366	8,466,368	152,147	51,321	1,847,665	11,362,803
Wood	718	2,273,553	64,121	43,326	860,423	3,583,563
Leather	158	1,025,357	13,415	13,366	450,351	3,437,533
Paper	157	3,577,369	53,366	15,222	656,410	3,088,518
Construction materials	258	2,493,447	56,563	15,104	421,624	1,959,621
Electrotechnic	31	199,837	2,958	2,684	94,281	674,620
Glass	39	561,446	3,216	5,691	141,109	527,135
Ceramic	34	143,322	1,031	1,652	39,592	148,948
Total	3,767	50,069,389	746,789	289,117	8,301,610	69,206,738

SOURCE: Virgil Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești după războiul mondial* (Bucarest, 1940), p. 146.

B. Expansion and Concentration of Rumanian Industry, 1927–38

	Number of Enterprises	Horsepower	Personnel	Index of Production (1929 = 100)
1927	4,097	463,436	214,052	85.2
1928	3,966	472,271	206,547	94.9
1929	3,736	497,963	201,184	100.0
1930	3,646	492,715	174,227	97.3
1931	3,524	496,059	152,309	96.7
1932	3,557	514,743	152,198	81.8
1933	3,487	529,963	184,777	100.9
1934	3,509	558,468	208,240	126.0
1935	3,613	582,946	280,717	123.8
1936	3,553	579,543	260,934	131.0
1937	3,512	722,638	278,918	137.4
1938	3,767	746,789	289,117	156.3

SOURCE: *Ibid.*, p. 148.

313 the small industries of the remoter upland districts. It is particularly important in the wood and pulp and paper industries, and in the small textile and pottery works. Charcoal is still used for smelting.

377 ELECTRICITY is mainly generated thermally, in spite of the great potentialities of water-power provided by the rivers from the Carpathians, not to mention the Danube current. Lack of natural reservoirs in snow-field, glacier and lake means that exploitation of the hydro-electric resources would entail enormous capital expenditure in the construction of reservoirs. The sum total of direct water-power used must, however, be very great, for the number of water-wheels is legion.

317 SALT is another asset of real importance. Like the mineral oil, it is found in greatest abundance, and is most accessible, in the upper Tertiary deposits of the sub-Carpathians, in the region of greatest disturbance. Sometimes it is exposed in cliffs, sometimes it is covered with thin layers of loam. Salt mines are being worked at Slanic, at Targu-Ocna (Tergu Ocnei) in the Trotuş basin, and at Ocnele-Mare (Ocna) on 316 the Olt. In 1932 the amount extracted was 288,000 metric tons, of which 240,500 tons were for home consumption, the rest being exported to the Balkan countries and to Russia. Salt mining and marketing are state monopolies.

IN iron ore Roumania is not rich, the output being only about 90,000 tons per annum. The most important deposits lie in the mountains of the Banat and in the Poiana Ruscai (Ruszka) massif farther north, between the Mureş and the Bistra (Bisztra) tributary of the Timiş (Temes). The Reciţa (Reciţa Montana) district in the Banat mountains, opening towards Hungary, has foundries and steel works employing about 15,000 hands.

WITH the recent rise in the price of gold, the mining of that metal, which formerly was almost negligible, has become more active, and the output reached nearly 4,000 kgs. in 1933. The ore is mined in the Trachyte massif of the Bihor.

● 433 IN SPITE of considerable advantages in natural resources, and solicitous nursing on the part of the State, particularly in the Old Kingdom, industry in Roumania is still in its

433 infancy. The mass of the people—the peasants—still supply
[294] their own modest wants almost entirely. The women make, in their own homes, the garments required by the household for summer and winter, using home-spun wool and home-woven cotton. A village expert fashions the leather embroidered coats worn by men and women alike. In the mountains, often the foot-gear is still of local manufacture. (Hats and shoes are mainly imported from the town, how-
342 ever.) Houses are made of locally-felled and sawn timber, and all the household utensils and furniture, except the crockery, are made in the village.

256 THERE is little accumulated capital in the country, and it is
273 natural that modern industrial developments should tend to be based on local raw materials and traditional skill. Home-grown wheat, maize and barley feed the flour-milling and brewing industries which are well developed. There are about 400 large flour mills, steam driven and capable of producing graded flour. These are mainly in the Old Kingdom and grind wheat chiefly. The wheat districts of Bessarabia and Bucovina have a number of modern mills, as well as a large number of windmills, but the maize districts still use the old-fashioned water-mills, which can only grind coarse meal. The brewing industry has been encouraged by the government, partly with the idea of reducing the consumption of the potent alcoholic beverage, "ţuica", which the peasants distil from plums. Most of the breweries are either in Bucureşti and Iaşi or in one of the larger Saxon towns of Transylvania. Potato and maize spirit are made on a large scale, particularly in Transylvania, for export.

323 FOR POTTERY MAKING the Dobrogea supplies a good kaolin, but the industry has not reached a high stage of development, although the ancient peasant pottery has much merit in form and decoration. This is due in part to lack of suitable fuel for the furnaces.

339 WITH the acquisition of Transylvania, Roumania has become independent in the matter of that most important constructional commodity, cement.

288 THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY is still backward. The post-war development is chiefly in the Banat, where, under protection, silk, artificial silk, cotton and wool have made

563 ironically remarked the "Adeverul," "of dealing with
661 the woes of Bessarabia consists of appointing a Minister for Bessarabia at Bucarest, while a Bessarabian whose sole qualification is that of having published a book of poems is nominated to the post of Under-Secretary of State to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. This is the government's conception of putting a stop to the agitation in Bessarabia, but alas ! the satisfaction of two vanities does not mean that the problems appertaining to the region between the Pruth and the Dniester are approaching solution."

In another article the "Adéverul" takes the Government to task for creating fresh sinecures and sarcastically exclaims that Bessarabia must be happy since she has now two ministers. The Government felt constrained to declare that these two new posts would not create a very heavy additional charge on the budget as it had arranged that the Governor of Bessarabia would give up his salary to his new colleague, but the "Adeverul" retorted that if the Governor gave up his salary, he being a general, would draw a pension, so that there would still be an increase in expenditure, all the more so, since a salary had to be provided for the new Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. That the creation of posts for new under secretaries of State is highly unpopular may be seen from a report of a sitting of the Senate early in April, 1932, when Senator Banescu formally demanded the abolition of five such posts declaring that it was a shame to create new charges when the State had not the means wherewith to pay its pensioners. The Opposition was reported to have loudly applauded him, shouting "it is tragic, people are dying of hunger."

433 The dissatisfaction existing in Bessarabia has been intensified through the economic crisis which had become endemic in that province since its separation from Russia, and which the Rumanian authorities so far have done nothing to alleviate or to assuage. Bessarabia was one of the most fertile and productive provinces of the Russian Empire, the latter providing a ready market for Bessarabian produce. Its orchards and vineyards were famous and provided annually some 28,800 tons of fruit of a value of 5 milliard

lei which was absorbed by Russia. Through the latter country an annual surplus of over a million tons of cereals was also marketed, as an excellent network of railway lines connected Odessa and the chief towns of Russia with Bessarabia. Further, under the Russian régime credit facilities were obtainable and a capital of some 10 million roubles or 10 milliard lei was at the disposal of the agriculturalists, while now it is reckoned that the Rumanian banks do not dispose of even 1½ milliard lei for this purpose, and in spite of the fact that the present requirements of the population are incomparably greater, since with the breaking up of the large estates, it was indispensable to provide the peasantry with funds wherewith they might buy implements and cattle for their farms.

It would appear that any civilized government, however vague its conception of its duty might be, would have proceeded to endow this province with a network of roads and railways to aid the population by thus facilitating the transport of its produce to the ports, since Odessa, the former outlet, is no longer available for this purpose. But strange to say, the Rumanian authorities have done nothing whatever; though even the construction of a few short connecting lines permitting a partial reorientation of the existing railway tracks and the construction of a grain elevator at the Danubian town of Reni would have gone a long way to relieve the strain. Even the deepening of the bed of the Pruth as far as Ungheni might have provided cheaper transport facilities to a large percentage of the available grain, which was often left to rot in the fields because overland transport charges, in the absence of roads, were found prohibitive.

Even out of mere solicitude for the safety of the State the Rumanian government ought to have provided means of communication whereby its army might in an emergency be concentrated on an ever-exposed frontier, in a region where a perpetual state of war exists. But even this weighty consideration has not sufficed to rouse the Bucarest Government from its self-complacency. There are, of course, persons who would explain the continual agitation brewing in Bessarabia and the predilection of its inhabitants for Russian rule by the assertion that these dunces of Moldovans (as the

655 maritime and fluvial shipping companies, the docks, ports, warehouses, and grain elevators of Braila, Galatz, and Constantsa.

661 Laws were drafted aiming at the commercialization and exploitation, either independently or in co-operation with
471 the State, of these State-owned properties, as well as of other
186 national resources. But the purpose which actuated the entire economic legislation enacted by the Bratianu Governments was that of preventing foreign capital from acquiring a dominant position in the country. This policy of restraining the activities of foreign capital by legal restrictions was not due to the fact that Rumania might be imperilled by foreign capital securing a preponderating influence, but mainly because the Bratianu party aimed at reserving for themselves the monopoly of such profits as could be made through the exploitation of the national resources. The direct result of this policy was to sink whatever Rumanian capital existed in big enterprises, while agriculture was entirely neglected, and to deplete completely the liquid assets of the country to such an extent that its credit organization was dislocated.

433 It is sad to record that during the years when there was a plethora of capital seeking investment which could have
454 been easily attracted to Rumania with the object of endowing her with an adequate equipment for the development of her immense resources, such narrow and selfish views should have prevailed among her rulers. Indeed, had the opposite policy been adopted it would have secured prosperity to her even during the lean years which are now upon us. Foreign capital naturally fought shy, and refused to be enticed into enterprises in which it was not allowed to exercise legitimate control, which in many instances would have proved both salutary and indispensable. Rumania's natural wealth certainly provides a basis for industrial activity, there is an abundance of raw material, fuel, as well as a supply of cheap labour, but there is a serious deficiency of capital, which is reflected by the high rates of interest
425 prevalent. Commercial bills were discounted at rates vary-
433 ing between 18 per cent and 30 per cent, and first mortgages
454 were concluded on the basis of an average interest of 20 per

cent. It can easily be understood that no enterprises could possibly bear the burden of such interests, and that if foreign capital was to be excluded it would be necessary to have recourse to artificial encouragements in order to create and foster the industries it was contemplated to set up. Protection in its extremest form, therefore, was resorted to, and a tariff wall, the highest in Europe, was erected to protect the budding of these hot-house industries. In order to start a new industry the theoretical case for Protection is admittedly strong. Temporarily the new industry needs help, and eventually the country as a whole may gain from its creation, though in the meantime it has to bear the burden. The immediate effect is to increase the costs of the various articles produced locally to an extent that places them beyond the reach of a poor community such as the rural population of Rumania. The repercussion of an increase in the costs of articles required by the agrarian population naturally causes a rise in the costs of production of agricultural produce, which renders less easy its marketing in neutral markets in which the Rumanian peasant can neither enjoy nor demand the favour of a protective duty. So that eventually protection has proved an arm which has turned against him. In the case of Rumania, most of the industries which have been created proved to be clearly detrimental to the State. Certainly the textile industries, which import the totality of their raw material in the form of yarn from abroad, confer no benefit except to their proprietors. The raw material is usually allowed free admission, or pays a very light duty, while the finished article is sold at a price corresponding to that of a similar foreign product on which a duty amounting to as much as 300 per cent is occasionally imposed. Almost the whole of the difference is pocketed by the manufacturer, and the native purchaser gets no benefit whatever. On the contrary, he usually gets an inferior home-made article at almost the same price as he would pay for a foreign one generally of better quality. In this arrangement the State is deprived of a very important source of revenue since it desists from collecting the tariff dues it would otherwise have received if, instead of raw materials imported free, foreign dutiable manufactured articles had been imported.

661 for the paper necessary for their pamphlets and newspapers,
477 while the Bratianus' Press organs naturally enjoyed pre-
[289] ferential rates. Another deplorable result of this monopoly was the high cost of books. The same book published in
[212] Bulgaria cost about half as much as in Rumania, and this explains to some extent the high percentage of illiterates in the latter country, which according to the *Lupta* of May 18th, 1932 reached as high a percentage as 70 per cent of the
433 total population. The creation of industries, the raw material of which is not indigenous, is likely in the long run to prove extremely wasteful. They are clearly of a parasitic nature, and their maintenance will not only continue to be a charge on the Revenue but is likely to continue to handicap very seriously Rumania's staple industry, agriculture. The initial costs of installation are necessarily high, for foreign experts have to be called in to set up the machinery, supervise, and train the native workpeople, since there is a lack of experienced workmen. Moreover the stringency of monetary resources and the high rates of interest ruling necessitate a high return on capital that can be secured only by selling the manufactured article at the highest possible price, a level which is usually fixed by the cost of the corresponding foreign article, on which a heavy duty has been imposed. The high prices will forcibly curtail output since the latter is adjusted to the capacity of the local market, the possibilities of which are restrained owing to the low buying power of the peasantry. The more consumption is reduced the more manufacturers will endeavour to recoup themselves by further raising their prices, which can be attained only by increasing the protective duty. Thus a vicious circle is created, to the great disadvantage of the peasantry, who
[162] constitute 80 per cent of the population and who have to defray in the same proportion the expenses of these experimental attempts to industrialize Rumania. It is obvious that the high prices paid by the peasantry for manufactured articles affect adversely the cost of agricultural produce; even the transport rates of the latter stand high in order to compensate for the low preferential rates granted to local manufactures. One need not, therefore, be surprised if Rumanian agriculturalists can no longer market their pro-

duce remuneratively on the basis of present world prices. 433 At first sight it would appear that the simplest solution would be the abandonment of the present policy. An alleviation of the burden imposed on the peasantry would reduce drastically their costs of production and would better enable them to adjust the price of their produce to the prevailing world prices. If capital were withdrawn from industry and applied instead to the improvement of the means of cultivation, or to the diversification and intensification of agricultural production, Rumanian agricultural produce would be in a better position than at present to meet competition in neutral markets. It is true that as a result of the present tendency among industrial states to develop their own agricultural resources, and to curtail imports of agricultural produce by raising their tariff barriers, agrarian countries find it increasingly difficult to market their produce. Yet there is a possibility for the latter to secure regular markets if they would give up in exchange their attempts at general industrialization; and it is surprising that so far no understanding has been arrived at on these lines between industrial and agricultural countries, both parties persisting in a policy that is mutually ruining them. The adherents of the policy [185] of industrialization partly explain their attitude by the necessity of severing all connection with former enemy states like Hungary, since the latter country would use commercial intercourse to further its irredentist propaganda in the territory which has reverted to Rumania. It is also partly explained by the necessity of making the country as self-supporting as possible so as to render it independent of foreign help in case of another war. So military considerations also tend to intensify economic nationalism, and as the military are fairly powerful and can make themselves heard there is little hope of a change in the policy which is being pursued. This policy of economic nationalism seems therefore to be, on the one hand, the direct outcome of the unbridled nationalism actually existing, and on the other, the result of a surreptitious understanding between politicians and profiteers to despoil the public, as the *Cuvantul* points out in the article quoted a little higher.

There are of course men of independent character who 000

view this question from another angle, in whose conception political and economic domination have become identified and to whom the policy of economic nationalism appears to offer the best safeguard for their country's independence. Industrialization has also certain partisans, who draw their arguments in its favour from rational grounds. Their most vociferous spokesman appears to be M. Manoilescu, a former Sub-Secretary of State in General Averescu's Cabinet in 1926, and later a member of the National Peasant Government and subsequently that of M. M. Iorga-Argentoianu. He withdrew from this post in order to secure a more stable office, that of the Director of the National Bank. He seems to have made a miscalculation, however, as he fell out with M. Argentoianu, the Minister of Finances, and had to give up his situation, not without protests and a lawsuit. M. Manoilescu was Rumanian delegate at the Second International Economic Conference held in Geneva in 1930, in the course of which he set forth the disadvantages under which agricultural States laboured in comparison with industrial communities, and emphasized the advantages which the former would derive by attempting to industrialize themselves. His arguments were based on the following figures he himself cited: The output of an industrial worker, after making allowances for the cost of raw materials, is roughly 3,600 Swiss francs or 720 dollars per annum. On the other hand, the net output per annum of an agricultural worker cultivating cereals in Central and Eastern Europe is only 600 Swiss francs or 120 dollars, that is six times less. It is easy to deduce from these figures the advantages that a State would derive by abandoning agriculture and diverting the energy of its citizens to industry, especially when one makes light of the attendant difficulties. National income would increase six-fold, and prosperity would *ipso facto* ensue.

M. Manoilescu has recently published a book invoking various specious arguments in favour of the policy of extreme industrialization. He undoubtedly possesses a versatile mind and a surprising ability to twist figures and facts in support of his thesis, a faculty which tallies with the intellectual agility he has displayed in adapting his political con-

241 of the State. It is this utter lack of consideration for this
56 hard-pressed mass of humanity that raises the indignation of the foreign observer against those who, through the cruel irony of fate, have been called upon to look after the destinies of this luckless people. The selfishness, incapacity, and corruption of which they have given proof can only be compared to that moral disintegration existing under the Tsarist régime, and one should not feel surprise if finally the same developments supervene. The rural population is absolutely sick of the present system and has lost all faith in its politicians.

An important meeting was held early in 1932 at Focşani
[668] by fruit-growers and viticulturists, who may be considered to represent the more intelligent classes of the rural population, and the prevalent opinion expressed by the delegates was to the effect that no alleviation could be expected so long as the present system was maintained, and that Bolshevism held out better prospects. This did not cause any alarm, and passed almost unheeded, save for some mild criticism from one of the veterans of journalism in Rumania, M. Batsaria, who, in an article which appeared in the *Adeverul* on January 20th, 1932, admitted that this attitude was significant, yet opined that it was not aimed against the Crown, which at the time was being very roughly handled by General Averescu in the Press campaign the latter had just launched.

241 In spite of the culpable neglect with which agriculture
433 has always been treated, the industry remains Rumania's mainstay and sole hope of survival. The whole social life of the country, even its future existence, depends on the normal development of agriculture, which provides not only the food, but also the raw materials for the more promising sections of the country's budding industries, and the means wherewith Rumania can pay for the indispensable articles she imports from abroad, as well as for the payment of interest on her public debt. It is a matter of grave concern, therefore, that the average yield of cereals per hectare should have steadily diminished in the last nine years and sunk below the pre-war average of 1,130 kg. per hectare. If nothing be done to remedy this evil Rumania,

AGRICULTURE

owing to the natural increase of her population, will in a 241
couple of years have no more wheat available for export, [423]
and in ten or twelve years it will be the same with maize. It
is imperative, therefore, for the Government to take without
delay the steps necessary to increase the yield. This can
only be done if the State will undertake to provide selected
seed corn, to establish rural banks to enable the peasantry
to obtain advances of funds at cheap rates in order to buy
machinery and implements, and to create model farms in
which more modern methods of cultivation might be demon-
strated practically. If grain elevators were also constructed
in important agricultural centres, and adequate storage
accommodation made available, it would be easy to advance
money to farmers on the security of the cereals they could
store as a pledge. And if Rumania decided to return to 241
methods of legality and offer safeguards to foreign capital 454
there would be no difficulty whatever in obtaining all the
capital she requires for financing such operations, as they
would then prove perfectly sound. It is this utter lack of
capital which has handicapped the development of agricul-
ture since the war, for the smallholder had to pay usurious
rates of interest (40 to 60 per cent being current), while prior
to the war large owners could obtain advances from the
banks on very reasonable terms. It would be altogether 423
unjustifiable, therefore, to assert, as some people allege, 241
that the breaking up of the large estates had led to the 454
decline of agriculture. On the contrary, it is this measure
which has permitted agriculture to survive, for owing to the
systematic diversion of capital from agriculture to industry,
the owners of the large estates would have found themselves
in a worse fix than the smallholders if they had continued to
exist and therefore required advances for the maintenance
of their estates, as was formerly their wont. Without liquid
assets they would have found themselves utterly unable to
carry on the cultivation of those large estates, while the
smallholder, by dint of hard work and privation, has man- 241
aged to keep his patch of land under the plough. Some 423
persons may retort that, if the breaking up of the large 420
estates had proved to be a practical operation, the rural
population would not have run into debt to the extent of

M

241 really intended to revert to a régime of legality and to the
426 granting of adequate security to foreign capital, there would
453 be hardly any difficulties in its obtaining the necessary aid from abroad in order to permit the establishment of such an institution, and in order to save time it would be politic on its part if without further delay it took the requisite steps to prepare a cadastral register or ground-book. Such measures of self-aid would prove more efficacious than the solicitation at international conferences of preferential rates for Rumanian agricultural produce. For they would help to convince foreign investors that Rumania had at last decided to put her house in order, a decision which, if seriously taken, would probably cause foreign capital to come to her aid and bring to her corresponding or equal advantages to those she would derive from the obtaining of the preferential rates for which she is now craving as a favour from industrial States. There are no insuperable obstacles to the salving of Rumanian agriculture. All that is needed is cheap credit and the lowering of the cost of industrial products used by
241 the peasantry. These *desiderata* may be secured whenever
461 the Government decides to change its methods and adopt as its guiding principles honesty, retrenchment, and austerity. After all, the peasants have done more than their share, and no greater effort can be demanded of them. One who has witnessed the long heartbreak of endless and often unrequited labour that has been their lot, and the fortitude with which they have faced the apathy the State has so far shown towards them, can have no doubts as to the response a little encouragement would evoke from them. Without decent seed grain, and with the most primitive implements, it was but natural that the yield per hectare should decrease. Nevertheless, the steady although small increase of the area under cultivation is a convincing proof that the peasants have never stinted their labour and that they are determined to persist to the extreme limits of human endurance in their efforts to wrest a bare subsistence from the soil. The following table will be found to confirm fully what has been stated
241 above, namely, that while the area cultivated has been
433 maintained, the yield per hectare is on the whole diminishing:

AGRICULTURE

	Average for 5 years 1922—1926		1927		1928		1929		1930		1931	
	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.	Area sown in 1,000 hectares.	Output in 1,000 quintals.
Wheat	2,806	24,250	3,118	26,320	2,814	31,440	2,664	28,000	3,055	36,000	3,466	36,800
Rye	287	2,280	277	2,470	319	2,910	310	3,400	391	4,600	407	3,600
Oats	1,197	9,530	1,185	8,420	1,304	9,800	1,200	13,600	1,087	11,600	871	6,700
Barley	1,668	13,180	1,749	13,310	2,190	15,110	2,000	30,400	1,975	23,700	1,919	14,100
Maize	3,593	40,790	3,847	35,330	4,626	27,530	4,790	60,800	4,426	45,200	4,754	63,600
Total	9,551	90,003	10,176	85,850	11,253	86,790	10,944	136,200	10,934	121,100	11,417	124,800

AVERAGE CROP YIELDS IN QUINTALS PER HECTARE

		Average for 1911/15	Average for 1921/26	Average for 1926/30	1929	1930	1931
Wheat	...	11.9	8.7	9.8	9.9	11.6	10.6
Rye	...	9.0	7.9	10.1	10.8	11.9	8.7
Oats	...	9.2	7 7	10.1	11.2	10.6	7.7
Barley	...	10.5	7.6	10.4	13.3	12.0	7.4
Maize	...	13.6	10.7	10.6	13.3	10.2	13.7

The above figures show that there is a vast scope for an improvement, for in Central European countries the average yield of wheat per hectare is about 20 quintals and in Denmark and Great Britain higher yields are common with a much poorer soil than that of Rumania.

241
311
433

RUMANIA

243 The following were the average prices of the principal cereals at the port of Constantsa per ton during the years 1928–1931, according to the bulletin of the Constantsa Chamber of Commerce:

		1928	1929	1930	1931
Barley	...	5,900	4,580	2,430	1,800
Oats	...	3,400	2,440	1,800	1,520
Maize	...	5,280	4,010	2,600	1,800
Wheat	...	5,280	4,010	2,600	2,550

241 433 If it be remembered that the value of the agricultural production of Rumania constitutes about 60 to 65 per cent of the whole national revenue, it is easy to realize what a terrible strain such a sudden and brusque diminution in the resources of the country is likely to throw on the entire structure of its economic and social life. For the period of 1926–28 the national revenue was computed at 171 milliard lei, of which 110 milliards were derived from agriculture. According to the *Argus* of February 13th, 1932, this last figure for 1931 had declined to 46.5 milliards.

245 Among the 613,614 hectares occupied by orchards and vineyards, some 209,321 hectares are planted with plum trees which yield an annual average crop of about 5 million quintals of fruit, the yields for the years 1928–30 being respectively 28, 9.5, and 14.6 quintals per hectare. The vine is also very extensively cultivated, 239,825 hectares being planted with it. In 1930 the amount of wine obtained from the grapes grown attained about 8,385,374 hectoliters, about half of which was produced in Bessarabia.

241 231 The position of the livestock population in a country of small farmsteads like Rumania is liable to exert a great influence on agriculture, for not only are horses and horned cattle used as draught animals, but their manure is the only kind of fertiliser applied to the fields, so that the gradual reconstitution of the livestock situation after the serious damages inflicted on it during the war is a reassuring sign. The recovery would have been much more rapid if the export taxes on cattle and meat had not discouraged the cattle breeders by unduly restraining exports. The following

453 best, were hazardous ventures. Runs on the banks were frequent, even State institutions such as the Agricultural Bank saw its deposits shrink from 42 millions in December, 1930 to 17 millions in March, 1931. During 1931 one of the leading Rumanian banks, the old-established firm of Marmorosch Blank and Co., was obliged to suspend payments, and this failure increased the prevailing scepticism which the public had so far entertained as to the solvability of the banks. The following table, showing the respective prices of leading bank stocks, is indicative of the continued depression under which these institutions are labouring and of the absence of any hopefulness at the present time:

FIGURES ARE GIVEN IN LEI.

Bank.	Average annual quotation, 1929.	Average annual quotation, 1930.	Price in June, 1931.	Price in June, 1932.
National Bank	12,782	6,788	4,900	3,525
Marmorosch Blank & Co. ...	1,207	854	710	——
Banca Romaneasca ...	950	676	500	185
Banca Generala Tarii Romanesti	708	360	90	50
Banca de Scont	308	217	90	30
Banca Comertului (Craiova)	889	633	300	90
Banca Comerciala Italiana si Romana	848	706	675	450
Banca de Credit Roman ...	1,058	665	500	175
Banca Agricola	194	100	70	20
Banca Commerciala Romana	1,482	782	500	250

INDUSTRY

433 To the policy of industrialization, adopted not only by Rumania but also by other neighbouring States, may be ascribed a large share of the crisis that Europe is now traversing. For the creation of parasitic as well as redundant industries, which can only exist under the protection of high tariffs, has had as a result the shrinkage of the markets in which Western European industrial products were sold. This in its turn brought about a diminution of the buying power of these latter nations, who so far had constituted the sole customers for the agricultural produce of the Near East.

Another result of the creation of these industries was the burdening of the populations of Near Eastern Europe with

a cumbersome load of indirect taxation disproportionate to 433
their resources, by which these industries had to be supported, and the further handicapping of these rural populations by the obligation imposed on them to purchase all the industrial articles they required at inflated prices, owing to the fact that these local industries were unprofitable and had to recoup themselves by selling their products at excessive prices under the protection of a high customs barrier.

This policy brought about the gradual pauperization of the rural populations, and the dissipation of the exiguous liquid wealth which the agrarian States had sunk in these artificially created industries. Thus the capital so urgently needed for the development of their agriculture was frittered away through the prevalence of the irrational idea that concentration on agriculture necessarily implies an inferior economic status.

Two policies were now open to these agrarian states: either a further intensification of industry, which necessarily would have to be extended to all domains of activity if it was to succeed (a policy that would clearly end in the final adoption of the collectivist or communist system), or the abandonment of industrialization, followed by the concentration of all available resources on agriculture, mining, and on such industries as find their raw materials locally produced. But this latter course can no longer be adopted except with the financial aid and with the moral and economic co-operation of the Western European States, which will have to choose between the narrow-minded pursuit of self-interest, a policy which is tantamount to condemning these industrial communities to slow death by inanition, or that of embarking on a bold programme of economic co-operation which would once more clear the choked-up channels of international intercourse and allow the vivifying stream of trade to circulate. This is the only salutary path, obstructed though it may be by the stumbling-blocks of well-entrenched vested interests, ready to play upon the emotional nature of an intransigent nationalism whenever they deem it to their interest to discredit international co-operation by decrying all foreign intervention as an affront to the national dignity and a menace to national independence.

000 Though the obstacles may seem insuperable, yet actual suffering must have rendered the agrarian States more amenable to reason, so that one may hope with some confidence that they will not spurn a helping hand. To the layman it would appear to be more rational to go to the assistance of over 50,000,000 of potential customers, inhabiting the five mainly agrarian States of South-Eastern Europe, than to dissipate our energy and resources in the attempt to buttress up Germany.[1]

We may as well face the plain truth that in present-day Europe there is no longer room for two mainly industrial States living solely by exports, and that to make this possible it would be indispensable to scrap all protected industries in Europe and institute universal free trade. As this cannot be accomplished, we would act wisely if we abandoned the present task of salvaging Germany. Patronizing has not been a very propitious policy to us. Our friendship for the Japanese has resulted in our loss of the Chinese market and in the emergence of a most formidable rival to our Lancashire cotton industry, and our present quixotic attitude towards Germany, were it to succeed, would bring in its train even greater difficulties.

433 471 The policy of industrialization was adopted by Rumania after the war, when her frontiers had been sufficiently enlarged to provide an apparently large local market. During the pre-war years Rumania used to import from abroad some 85 per cent of the industrial articles she required, and such industries as she possessed were principally those the raw materials of which were locally provided, namely the milling, brewing, sugar-beet, and lumber industries. In 1913 there were only about 45,000 workmen employed in these occupations, and the total capital invested amounted to about 750 million lei. The acquisition of Transylvania and the Banat (where, owing to the presence of minerals and coal, an industry had developed) increased considerably the number of industrial enterprises in Rumania and led to similar industries being set up in the old kingdom

[1] This was the pet scheme of our bankers, owing to which we were forced to go off the gold standard. (See an article by J. A. Hobson in the "Contemporary Review" for November, 1931).

through a spirit of ill-conceived emulation. According to 433● official statistics there were in 1929 a total of 3,736 industrial 471 establishments, with an invested capital of 40,284 million lei, and employing 201,184 workpeople. Of these firms 1391 were in the old kingdom and 1789 in the Banat and Transylvania. The continuous fall in the purchasing power of the population, the lack of adequate working capital, which forces these industries to borrow money at high rates of interest owing to the prevailing monetary stringency, the disorganization of credit, the diminution of State purchases, and the non-payment by the State for the goods ordered by it from these industrial firms, have placed most of them in jeopardy, and it is very doubtful whether they will be able to survive the present crisis unless the State intervenes further on their behalf.

The following table sets forth the data concerning the various branches of industry operating during the year 1929:

Industry.	Number of establishments.	Capital (million lei.)	H.P. used.	Annual value of output in million lei.	Workpeople employed.
Metallurgical	448	6,444	84,775	8,443	40,236
Electrotechnical	12	83	2,026	208	839
Timber	787	3,457	73,827	5,362	41,656
Food and Aliments	1,004	11,686	126,336	15,312	25,644
Textile	516	5,515	40,421	8,448	35,963
Leather goods	211	1,406	15,117	2,614	7,925
Glassware	35	505	2,500	602	4,218
Building materials ...	296	2,085	52,981	1,573	13,963
Pottery	32	119	683	104	834
Chemical	248	6,131	69,326	11,011	19,238
Paper and Graphic Arts ...	147	2,128	29,971	2,447	10,668

The metallurgical industries have been developed to such [32] an extent that practically all the current implements, from pails and wire to railway locomotives and waggons, as well as agricultural machinery, are locally produced in sufficient quantities for the requirements of the local market.

RUMANIA

433 The alimentary industry includes the important sections of sugar-refining, milling, alcohol distillation, and brewing.

[288] The textile industries have shown the greatest expansion, owing to the excessive protection they have enjoyed. The woollen industry is capable now of producing excellent cloths, most of the yarn being supplied by the local spinning mills, which employ wools produced in the country.

The artificial silk and cotton mills obtain their yarn from abroad, practically duty free, and are able to supply about three-fourths of the local requirements. Only the better qualities of cottons are imported, while foreign silks are practically excluded by the prohibitive duty imposed on them.

The knitting industry has also secured a complete control of the market, and no foreign knitted articles are imported.

[313] The lumber industry was some time ago one of the most prosperous in the country. Until 1925 its output was about 3,200,000 cubic metres of timber, out of which some two million cubic metres were exported annually. Since 1930 the demand has fallen off very considerably, and huge stocks have accumulated, and as prices have dropped the sawmills are registering immense losses. Thus one well-known timber firm, the Foresta, had sustained a loss of 250 million lei during 1930, and it may be said that actually all the timber industry is in a very precarious condition, owing to its inability to cope with Russian competition.

[282] The leather industry obtains all its raw material locally, and its production of sole leather and uppers is sufficient for the home requirements. Even gloves, leather cases, etc., are manufactured locally, and only a very limited quantity of fine and superior leather is now being imported.

000 The following table shows a detailed list of imports during 1930:

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p 59

Chapter IV

ECONOMIC WEALTH OF THE COUNTRY

Greater Rumania was primarily an agricultural 433
country, but its industry held an important place 511
in the economy of South-Eastern Europe. With its fertile soil, great reserves of mineral resources and considerable water-power Rumania could have been one of the richest countries in Europe. But while the land was full of natural wealth the standard of living of the people remained a low one. Only a small part of Rumania's resources was exploited, and an even smaller part for the benefit of her inhabitants.

About three-fifths of the area of the Kingdom 311
were arable land and pastures, and over four-fifths 433
of her population were employed in agriculture, forestry and in the fishing industry. The unbalanced state of Rumania's economy in the period between the two wars is shown by the fact that in spite of the predominantly agricultural character of the country, Rumanian industry, employing only one-twentieth of the population, was responsible for half of the total production as expressed in value. Approximately two-thirds of all income from exports were also derived from industrial products, chiefly oil, of which Rumania is the foremost European exporter.

One million workers and employees, or one- 455
twentieth of the population, contributing one-half of the total yearly value of production: this is one very significant aspect of the economic struc-

8

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

565 provide their holders with a fair income, and a con-
471 siderable part of the rural population remained
423 landless. Worst of all, those peasants who did obtain land were given neither implements nor sufficient financial help which could have enabled them to make a decent living. Neither of the measures which are essential to the success of peasant proprietorship —State aid in money, machinery and technical advice; or the creation of large-scale co-operative [641] societies and banks—were carried out. Undoubtedly the extension of the franchise in 1923 to all men of 21 and the land reforms greatly strengthened the position of the peasantry in the State. But, actually, it was widespread discontent with the working of the agrarian reform that stimulated the organization of the National Peasant Party.

423 CROPS. The great devastation of Rumania during
241 the First World War and the effects of the land reform resulted in a great reduction of the country's agricultural production during the immediate post- [439] war period.[1] Whereas the Old Kingdom alone in 1913 had grown 2,200,000 tons of wheat, of which 1,150,000 tons were exported, and over 3,100,000 tons of maize, of which 1,000,000 tons were exported, the production figures for Greater Rumania in 1921 were for wheat 2,140,000 tons, and for maize 2,810,000 tons. This great decrease is all the more striking in view of the fact that the amount of arable

[1] In Transylvania and the neighbouring territories, taken from Hungary, some of the great *latifundias* had been well and scientifically worked with modern agricultural machinery. There were some conscientious landowners among the Magyar nobility as well as absentee landlords who neglected their peasantry.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

land in 1921 was about twice as much as in 1913. No doubt the breaking up of the big estates contributed to the spectacular fall in agricultural production. But it need not have done. It was no fault of the peasants that they could not obtain the implements, seeds and financial help which would have enabled them to work the land profitably. The big landowners who were compensated for their losses by State bonds, controlled the banks which granted agricultural loans at high rates of interest. They obtained interest on the State bonds they held. And all this had to be paid for by the peasant. The peasant, now nominal owner of a small strip of land, insufficient for the upkeep of his family, was burdened with the payment of taxes, dues and interest on his mortgaged property. He was, in fact, often worse off than if he had possessed no land at all. This crushing financial burden, more effective than the bondage of feudal times, led to a great migration of peasants to the towns. This resulted in many fields remaining unworked and an increase in the ranks of the unemployed.

The recovery in the production of crops was slow. By 1936 the wheat harvest rose to 3,500,000 tons, and that of maize to 5,610,000 tons. Exports, however, were still far below those of the Old Kingdom in 1913.[1] The higher yields were due to an increase of the area under seed and not to better working methods. The soil of Greater Rumania is extremely fertile, especially in the lowlands of the Danube, in Moldavia and in Bessarabia. But the implements used were, and still are, primitive. Wooden ploughs are still common. Manure was hardly used, the

[1] 1936: wheat 610,000 tons, maize 771,000 tons.

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

241 ploughing was very superficial. Apart from a few small regions the whole of Greater Rumania's agri-
• 433 culture was extensive and not intensive. That is, crops were harvested year after year without regard to the soil and without any attempt to preserve its fertility. This is one of the reasons for the fact that in spite of much higher soil fertility the average yield per acre in Greater Rumania was far below that in Great Britain.[1]

In addition to the growing of grains and potatoes, the production of industrial crops was begun in the nineteen-thirties and has since made considerable progress, especially that of oil-seeds, flax, cotton, soya beans and sugar-beet. The development of fodder production has made little progress, owing to a decrease in livestock.

231 LIVESTOCK. Rumanian livestock, especially horses,
433 were well known and eagerly bought during the last century. The country was famous for its hardy and fast geldings and exported many horses to Germany, Denmark and Austria-Hungary. From 1886 onwards, when Hungary closed her frontiers to the import of Rumanian livestock, there began a rapid

[1] Average yield in cwt. per acre in the year 1937–8:

	Rumania	Gt Britain	Germany	Greece
Wheat	9·8	16·0	18·0	8·2
Barley	5·1	13·2	17·0	9·0
Oats	5·2	16·3	26·0	7·9
Rye	8·2	13·3	13·3	7·9
Maize	7·5	—	—	10·1
Potatoes	43·0	121·0	152·0	68·0
Flax	3·1	12·0	5·0	—

(From the Statistical Records of the League of Nations.)

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

decline which during the Great War assumed very 231
serious proportions. Within a short period the Old 433
Kingdom lost more than half of its total livestock. These losses were only partly made good by the acquisition of the New Territories.

In 1921 Greater Rumania had about 1,700,000 horses of which more than half were in the New Territories. There are two main races, both much smaller and lighter and more short-lived than the heavy type of English cart-horse. The horse of the plains, similar to and often crossed with the Hungarian horse, is found in Muntenia and in the western provinces, the Russian horse in Bessarabia and in the Bukovina. The mountain horse is small and tough and is chiefly used for the carrying of loads.

Cattle breeding has been one of the weakest points of Rumanian agriculture for some time. Although Greater Rumania by the acquisition of territories from Hungary and Austria obtained some high-class cattle, there was on the whole a decline both in quality and in quantity.[1] The decline in quality is due to the widespread use of cows as draught-animals and to inbreeding. The import of good foreign stock has been on an insufficient scale to improve this position, although some regions in Transylvania and the Banat have been able to maintain their good stock. The decline in numbers is due to the increase of meat exports and the absence of any planned breeding policy. The consumption [262] of both milk and meat amongst the peasants is extremely low.

[1] '1921: 5,700,000; 1932: 4,400,000. It is safe to assume that this downward trend continued.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

231 For the majority of Rumania's peasants the most
433 valuable of all animals are his sheep, of which Greater Rumania possessed about 12,000,000. Both the wool and the meat of Rumanian sheep are, however, of a lower quality than those of Great Britain or New Zealand. Sheep's milk, and the cheese made from it, supplement the monotonous diet of the peasant.

[439] Of the 3,000,000 pigs in Greater Rumania most were kept in the New Territories and a large proportion of the country's pork production was exported. Apart from the Rumanian Mangalita, English Berkshires were bred in great numbers.

241 Considered as a whole the agriculture of Greater Rumania, favoured by good climatic conditions and great soil fertility, remained undeveloped owing to the general economic conditions. The peasantry did not possess the necessary implements, buildings or animals which could have secured profitable ex-
[452] ploitation of the soil. Financial help was difficult to obtain, and the loans that were granted were ruinous to the peasant, owing to the high rate of interest.
[453] Co-operatives were few. Some agricultural banks and associations confined to the German colonists in the Banat and in Transylvania were the only ones
[435] which succeeded. Agricultural prices were low and the peasant was often forced to sell his produce before the harvest to export trusts which dominated
[654] the market. The only assistance given by the government consisted in loans and seeds at reduced prices for the growing of certain crops, such as soya beans, for export in order to fulfil international trade
[439] agreements. During the last fifteen years Germany secured an ever greater influence upon Rumania's agriculture and took most of its exports.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

employed in the oil industry. The control of this 315
great source of energy by British and American 471
companies was challenged by Germany, which needed Rumania's oil for the prosecution of her imperialist aims. To-day Rumania is Germany's chief source of natural oil.

INDUSTRY AND TRADE. The industry of the Old 433
Kingdom was hardly developed when, with the annexation of the New Territories, Rumania acquired territories comparatively rich in industrial enterprises, especially the Banat, parts of Transylvania and the Bukovina. Thereby the industrial capacity of Greater Rumania was more than double that of the Old Kingdom. Production, however, was by no means doubled. Trade and industry improved in the years 1925–9 during which considerable capital-imports were effected. The great economic crisis of the next two years hit Rumania very hard and was finally surmounted only in 1936, when the figures for production exceeded those of 1929 by 30%.

The most important Rumanian enterprises were the food, chemical, textile and metallurgical industries. The textile industry increased its output, the number of workers employed as well as the value of its production; but most branches of Rumanian industry increased only the amount and the value of their production, reducing their wage bill and the number of workers partly through the introduction of machinery.

The heavy industry, producing armaments and 433
railway equipment, was controlled by several foreign 471
groups, amongst them Schneider-Creusot, Skoda and Vickers. German capital was invested in the

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

433 Resita works and in the Copsa-Mica concern. The
471 most important Rumanian group, representing both German and British interests, was that of Malaxa-Auschnitt. The centre of Rumania's heavy industry is the region around Brasov.

The chemical industry, drawing to some extent on the unexported surplus of agricultural produce, developed substantially, thanks especially to attempts to make Rumania independent of imports. This industry, too, was controlled to a great extent by foreign, chiefly German, interests.

433 The textile industry, although handicapped by old-fashioned machinery imported from Germany, was the most prosperous. Production and value of output increased, as did the number of employees, but wages decreased.

433 Rumania's total industrial production was
511 doubled in the years 1924–36, but this was not re-
435 flected by a corresponding improvement in trade or in the standard of living. The general index of wholesale prices fell by almost a third and that of agricultural produce by nearly half; the prices of manufactured goods decreased by only a little over one-sixth. By 1933 the value of exports and imports had fallen to about 25,600 million lei and was only one-third of that of all foreign trade in 1926. Real wages in the period from 1929 to 1939 fell by over one-fifth, while the cost of living in 1939 was indexed at 138 points in relation to 100 points in 1933.

652 By 1937 Rumania's national debt had reached 257 million pounds sterling of which only one-fifth was represented by internal loans. Interest on foreign loans in 1932 amounted to about one-quarter of the country's budget and in 1937 to about 16%.

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

648 Both the political and the economic life of
241 Rumania was subject to complete German domination. The agriculture of the country had to supply the German and Rumanian armies in the field. The area of arable land was feverishly enlarged so as to provide more food. This met with considerable success. In 1941 the country produced almost as much wheat as the whole of Greater Rumania in 1935. Exports almost reached the pre-1940 level.[1] By 1943 the area under wheat had been increased to 3,000,000 hectares and that under maize to 4,000,000 hectares. Even more important is the extension of the land used for the growing of rape seeds[2] and of oil-bearing plants.[2] Rumanian agriculture served a double purpose: the provision of food for the Rumanian and German armies and the supply of Germany's war industry with valuable raw material. The introduction of the soya bean into Rumania, the delivery of thousands of iron ploughs, tractors and other agricultural machinery from Germany only served to further this aim. Exploitation of the peasantry was the immediate consequence; but, if the ploughs and machinery remain when the Germans have gone, Rumanian agriculture is bound to benefit.

433 **OIL AND INDUSTRY.** The output of the chemical, textile and heavy industries were increased considerably. Consumer goods, however, are scarce and very expensive. The yearly production of oil has not

[439] [1] Export of wheat in 1940, 379,000 tons; in 1941, 2,500 tons; export of maize in 1940, 564,000 tons; in 1941, 117,000 tons. Both have since risen.

[2] 1942: 350,000 hectares grew rape seeds and 600,000 hectares oil-bearing seeds.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

reached the high level of 1935 and 1936,[1] but it has maintained an average of over 5,500,000 tons, of which about 3,000,000 tons have been exported, chiefly to Germany. The rest has been used by the Rumanian armed forces and war industry. As in all other occupied countries, Germany acquired all the Rumanian key industries. The *Kontinentale Oel A.G.* was the holding company for all German oil interests in Rumania. This trust controlled and regulated the output and sale of all Rumanian oil. Rumanian and French investments (by arrangements with the Vichy government) were also represented, but they were of minor importance. One of the effects of German control could be seen in the fact that whole districts, less than a hundred miles from Ploesti, suffered from a chronic shortage of lamp-oil.

All the great iron and steel works of Rumania passed under the control of the Nazi *Hermann Goering Werke*. The well-known German chemical trust *I.G. Farben* absorbed all chemical factories in Rumania and erected new ones. The use of the Rumanian economy in Germany's interests has been coupled with a very thorough financial exploitation. Credits have been granted by the Rumanian National Bank to certain enterprises, under German control, for the import of machinery from Germany. At every stage of manufacture, purchase and sale, export and import, there was a handsome profit which ultimately benefited only a small number of big shareholders, who had interests in each of the enterprises connected with the transaction. Bribes

[1] 1935: 8,376,000 tons; 1936: 8,703,000 tons.

315 pipeline has been completed from a secondary source of supply at Manești to convey this gas to Bucarest to supply both household and industrial requirements.

135 Iron-ore deposits are small, so that the heavy industries are very largely dependent on imports. A variety of other mineral resources, which are believed to exist in greater abundance than has so far been established, have not yet been fully surveyed.

433 Rumania has a poorly-developed industry, which lags far behind that of western European countries such as Czechoslovakia, though is ahead of all the other south-east European countries, except Hungary. Financially she is a poor country, with very limited capital resources, which has proved a severe hindrance to industrial development and has laid her open to the investment of foreign capital, which has been attracted [457] particularly by the rich mineral oil and forest [464] resources. Skilled labour, also a vital factor in the process of industrialisation, has been lacking, so that the use of foreign technicians has been essential. Other raw-material resources, though adequate to allow the development of a sound and varied industry, are not sufficiently extensive to encourage a very rapid development independent of imported raw materials.

Industrialisation in Rumania did not start until about 1890, and the period of greatest expansion was between 1929 and 1938. The consumption industries were the first to be developed, and of these food industries are the chief, the raw materials being grown on the spot. The growth of such industries as paper, cardboard, printing, soap, chemicals and furniture, etc., followed. The location of industry in the earlier stages was governed not by such factors as the existence of cheap labour, but was built up in those areas richest in raw materials.

MAIN INDUSTRIAL REGIONS

[311] The main industrial region is in the Prahova valley, where the oilfields are to be found, followed by the Reșița district, where the existence of iron ore, coal, manganese, etc., led to the development of metallurgical and engineering facilities, as well as of such auxiliary industries as coal and wood distilleries. Gold, silver, lead, zinc and copper deposits in the Baia Mare region formed the basis for the erection of both metal and chemical factories. The presence of methane gas, salt, gold, silver and stone quarries in and around Turda determined the location of factories for production of cement, limestone, bricks, tiles, porcelain, glass, sulphuric acid, etc. In the rich forest districts of Ferdinand, Nadrag and Hunedoara, where iron ore deposits are also to be found, blast furnaces and metallurgical industries have been established. The textile industry is mainly established in Cisnădia, Piatra Neamț, Bacău and Buhuși. Apart from the regions mentioned, industry is centred in the principal towns—Bucarest, Timișoara, Brașov, Sf. Gheorghe, Arad, Galați, Brăila, Cernăuți, Cluj and Iași.

The following table gives an idea of the relative importance of the various industries, showing the amount of capital invested and value of production in each of the main groups, and also the number of factories and of personnel employed :—

INTRODUCTION

433

THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES IN 1938

Industry	No. of enterprises	Invested Capital in million lei	Personnel (including workers and managing staff)	Production in million lei
Food	974	10,773·0	38,400	15,577·4
Textiles	640	8,230·3	74,100	14,691·9
Chemicals	397	12,325·3	28,300	14,154·6
Metallurgy	366	8,466·4	51,300	11,362·8
Timber	713	2,273·6	43,300	3,583·5
Leather	158	1,025·3	13,400	3,437·5
Paper	157	3,577·4	15,200	3,088·5
Building materials	258	2,493·4	15,100	1,959·6
Electro-technics	31	199·8	2,700	674·6
Glassware	39	561·4	5,700	527·1
Pottery	34	143·3	1,700	148·9
Total	3,767	50,069·2	289,200	69,206·4

[4a]

RUMANIA AS A GERMAN ALLY

648
433

To Germany Rumania has been an invaluable if expensive ally—invaluable mainly for her oil production, which accounts for one-third of total Axis supplies; expensive because, in order to exploit the country's usefulness to the full, it has been necessary to provide goods, such as oil-well equipment, agricultural machinery, machine tools, etc., all of which she can ill spare on account of the need for them both in her own country and for supply to her other satellites. To ensure smooth working of the oil-well region German troops have been established in the Ploeşti district. Apart fom oil German expectations have come to very little in Rumania—her demands for cereals, soya beans, sunflower-seed, etc., have not been fulfilled due to bad harvests, labour shortage and peasant hoarding, and livestock deliveries have been affected by fodder shortage and illegal slaughterings.

As to further German demands on Rumanian economy, the most outstanding were for manpower in the form of troops for the Eastern front, and the use of the country for transit of troops and war materials to the battle zones. Both these facilities have been of considerable material value to the enemy, though in order to make use of Rumanian troops Germany has had to provide the bulk of the equipment, as Rumanian industry is not adequate to supply more than the barest minimum; and even where she has the available facilities, raw materials are lacking.

[489]

To exploit the country successfully from the transport angle it has been necessary to set up a control organisation to direct transit traffic, and, in addition, to supply and repair locomotives and rolling stock.

GERMAN PENETRATION

648
439

For a great many years, Germany has been the natural supplier of engineering and consumption goods which Rumania was unable to produce for herself, and has provided a ready market for her surplus agricultural produce. Following the coming into power of the Nazi Government, Germany succeeded in acquiring Rumanian trade to an increasing extent at the expense of other countries. With the outbreak of war, Rumania has become even more dependent on Germany as a supplier of manufactured goods in general, and iron and steel products in particular.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

position to utilize credit very effectively, he was burdened with debts. 452
These debts, for the most part, had not been contracted for capital investment in improved agricultural equipment but rather to meet his deficit of net income or to enable him to purchase land.[21] The supply of credit to agriculture was not sufficient to ease this burden. The underlying difficulty, of course, was the general lack of capital in Rumania; the available supply moved toward industry, a more remunerative and less precarious field than agriculture. It is not easy to determine whether credit discrimination in favor of industry was greater than the difference in risk between agriculture and industry. Certainly Rumanian agriculture offered very little security to loans, especially since many of the new allotments of land were legally inalienable.

But just as industry was being consciously fostered, so the diversion of credit away from agriculture was not solely the result of economic factors. For one thing, credit institutions were primarily designed for the benefit of industry; in 1925 the governor of the National Bank remarked that while Rumania had a national bank to help trade and a Society for Industrial Credit to help industry, there was no organized agricultural credit on a similar scale.[22] In any event, by 1938 industry was receiving double the amount of credit going to agriculture, not including foreign credit. Between 1928 and 1938 the National Bank's discounts to industry rose from 32.02 to 55.95 per cent of the total, whereas discounts for agriculture dropped from 22.97 to 4.94 per cent.[23] Under these circumstances it is not surprising that many a peasant was forced to go to the usurer to whom he had to pay exorbitant rates of interest, and went on from year to year falling deeper and deeper into debt.

Standard of Living

Unfortunately, there are no sound official evaluations of the Ru- 434
manian national income. Certain estimates have been made but they can serve only as a rough guide. Colin Clark has put the Rumanian income per head of working population, between the years 1925 and 1934, at 243 international units (i.e., the amount of goods and services that could be purchased for $1 in the United States over the

21. In 1928 the interest charge on debts equalled 10 to 11 per cent of the average gross income on 6,000 farms; after the agrarian depression, in 1931, this rose to 35 per cent. N. Cornăţeanu, "Effects of the Agricultural Crisis on Peasant Farms in Rumania," *International Review of Agriculture, 22,* No. 7 (Rome, 1931), 208E.

22. Quoted in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 424.

23. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 353.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

434 decade 1925–35). In Mr. Clark's opinion, this represented a drop from a pre-1914 level of 298 international units and set Rumania at the bottom of the eastern European states:[24]

INCOME PER HEAD OF WORKING POPULATION, 1925–34 (IN INTERNATIONAL UNITS)

Rumania	243
Bulgaria	284
Yugoslavia	330
Hungary	359
Poland	352
Czechoslovakia	455
Great Britain	1,069

It is very difficult, however, to make a satisfactory comparison of Rumania's national income before and after the First World War because of the addition of new territories which doubled the area and population and because of the depreciation of the leu. A comparison of the per capita consumption of certain manufactured articles in 1913 and 1927 shows a slight improvement:[25]

ANNUAL PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION IN KILOGRAMS

	1913	1927
Sugar	4.59	5.94
Cotton goods	2.26	2.82
Paper	1.41	2.50
Soap	0.20	0.41

On the other hand, the per capita consumption of cotton goods, which is a fairly good measure of the purchasing power of the peasant, showed no steady advance over the last sixty years. Local consumption of cereals, especially of wheat, increased after the agrarian reforms, although at the expense of exports. Peasant housing appears to have improved through the introduction of better building ma-

[113] 24. Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress* (London, 1940), pp. 40, 132. The method used to reach this conclusion was, by necessity, quite complicated. The pre-1914 national income estimate for the Old Kingdom was taken from Dresdener Bank figures; estimates for Bucovina and Transylvania were taken from studies on Austria-Hungary by Walzner and Fellner. The figure for Bessarabia was established arbitrarily. In addition to the task of combining these three estimates, it was necessary to take into account the enormous depreciation of the leu from its pre-1914 level and the change in the level of prices. Given the ultimate uncertainty of Rumanian statistics, it seems impossible to judge the probable accuracy of Mr. Clark's estimate.

25. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

434 terials and wooden floors, and it is quite possible that there were other improvements in village conditions which would not appear in statistics.

The depression greatly reduced the Rumanian income, and by 1937 the per capita real income had not yet regained the 1927 level.

[165] In the chapter on population it was seen that Rumania had an extremely high death rate. This was matched by an extraordinarily high infant mortality rate, the highest in Europe. Between 1931 and 1938 infant deaths showed no sign of declining, but ranged between a maximum of 19.2 per 100 living births in 1935 and a minimum of 17.4 in 1933.

511 The low standard of living implicit in the vital statistics is also reflected in the dietary deficiencies of the Rumanian peasant. A number of surveys taken in the 1930's reached the same general conclusions:[26] while the caloric content of the diet was usually adequate, its quality was very poor; an excessive consumption of grains, especially maize in the form of corn meal (*mămăligă*) and not enough animal products or protective foods. Seasonal consumption, as might be expected, varied widely. The prevalence of pellagra has been an obvious indication of an unbalanced diet.

511 Statistics on housing, disease, medical service, education, and illiteracy confirm the impression that the Rumanian peasant had one of the lowest standards of living in Europe. Admittedly, the statistically average Rumanian is an abstraction. Peasants with holdings over 5 hectares lived better and were healthier than peasants on dwarf holdings. The husbandman with an intensively cultivated farm in Ţara Bârsei in Transylvania had about three times the income of the small holder in Dobrogea. Nevertheless, the flat picture of widespread poverty and squalor presented by the statistics is not far from the truth. The colorful costumes and picturesque folk dances of the Rumanian peasantry should not obscure the fact that in 1930 nearly half the population was illiterate and in 1938 one child in five died before it was a year old.

Accompanying this peasant poverty was a marked inequality in the distribution of the total income. Rumanian statistics do not permit an exact estimate of its extent, but it was perfectly obvious to anyone who visited Bucarest. The unmistakable signs of luxury spending

26. D. C. Georgescu, *L'Alimentation de la population rurale en Roumanie* (Bucarest, 1940); W. Aykroyd, I. Alexa, I. Nitulescu, "Étude de l'alimentation des paysans dans la région à pellagre de Moldavie," *Archives roumaines de pathologie expérimentale et de microbiologie* (Paris, 1935); Ioan Claudian, *Alimentaţia poporului român* (Bucarest, 1939).

[113]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

511 —palatial villas and flats in the residential sections, large automobiles, yachting clubs, and Parisian fashions—were in startling contrast to the conditions in the countryside. While the employment of surpluses in unproductive expenditure is a characteristic of undeveloped economies, this tendency was somewhat aggravated in Rumania by the inheritance of boyar extravagance and by the traditional social chasm between the peasant and the ruling groups. To some extent the unequal distribution of income was derived from the pre-1914 oligarchic agrarian society, but a great deal of the actual wealth was gained through industry and finance and through state connections.[27] Unequal distribution was not reduced by the tax structure, which depended largely upon indirect taxes on consumption goods and only to a limited degree upon income taxes.[28]

511 434 The economic importance of this distribution of income is difficult to measure. Obviously a mere leveling out of incomes would not make the Rumanian peasant significantly wealthier. On the other hand, the diversion of the nation's relatively limited surpluses into nonproductive expenditure undoubtedly restricted much-needed investments in agriculture and industry. In general, the social significance of this inequality—its reflection of the deep abyss between town and country—was more important than the immediate economic effects.

433 In its broad features the Rumanian economy during the interwar years resembled that of the pre-1914 Old Kingdom. The addition of new territories increased the internal market and provided important resources and industries. With these advantages came the task of unifying the economies of the different provinces and of recovering from the war. On the international level, the situation was less favorable than before; world trade was more restricted, especially after 1931; the industrial states protected their agriculture; the supply of foreign credit was limited and fell off greatly in the depression. For these reasons, plus a mixture of economic and nationalist mo-

27. The importance of politics and government connections in the acquisition of wealth in Rumania is proverbial, partly because the government played such an important role in economic undertakings. In 1939 the capital invested in state economic enterprises was considerably larger than the total capital investment of all private commercial and industrial undertakings. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 360.

28. In 1935/36 22.8 per cent of the total tax revenue came from income and other direct taxes; 12.3 per cent from taxes on property transactions; 12.1 per cent from turnover taxes; 44.9 per cent from consumption taxes; and 7.9 per cent from customs duties. PEP study (Political and Economic Planning), *Economic Development in S.E. Europe* (London, 1945), p. 21.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 leadership divided, many of the party's most capable men deserted, the party's popularity declined, and an increasing number of peasant supporters were attracted to the Iron Guard.

3) An apparent recovery of the Liberals. The Liberal party had been badly hit by their defeat in 1928 and the schism between Vintilă Brătianu and Gheorghe Brătianu, occasioned by Carol's return. With Vintilă Brătianu's death in 1930 the way was cleared for a gradual reconciliation with the king. The Young Liberals (Gheorghe Brătianu) failed to make any significant headway, and under Duca the old Liberals seemed to be heading for a comeback.

4) The flowering of fascism. The meteoric rise of the Iron Guard was the most spectacular event of those years, and trailing in its wake were a number of less fiery fascist, semifascist and anti-Semitic formations of unequal importance. In the party system they served to replace the older coteries, such as Iorga's and Averescu's parties, which were fading from the scene, but in fact they heralded the collapse of parliamentary government.

5) The total impotence of the Left-wing labor movements. They had never been strong in Rumania, but during these three years they were driven from the offensive, however weak, to the defensive. Popular discontent did not, after 1933, swell the ranks of the labor movements but strengthened the Iron Guard.

The Struggle against the Depression

●434 439 During these years the economic situation steadily deteriorated. It was estimated that the nominal national income in lei dropped by about 45 per cent between 1929 and 1932.[8] While Rumania was able to maintain a positive balance of trade throughout the depression, the value of exports fell from 29 billion lei in 1929 to 14 billion in 1933 and 1934, even though the weight of exports increased from 7,000,000 metric tons to 8,000,000. Imports fell from 1,102,000 metric tons in 1929 to 467,000 in 1933 (450,000 in 1932). State revenues declined from 36 billion lei in 1929 to 18 billion in 1933.

439 The depression in Rumania had been initiated by the world agricultural crisis in 1929, which produced a tremendous fall in the price of agricultural products, particularly disastrous in the Balkan states because of their inability to compete with the great overseas producers. As industrial commodities fell neither so soon nor so far the resulting price scissors hurt the peasant as agricultural producer

8. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *South-Eastern Europe* (Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 127.

neglecting the peasants; on the contrary, they saw in them a numerous and profitable crowd of clients for the banks, the majority of which were under their control. The less pecuniary aid the peasant obtained from the State, the greater would be his need of the private bank or usurer. And so well did the latter entangle the peasants in their tentacles that within ten years of the enactment of the Land Distribuion Act the debts contracted by the peasants had surpassed the value of their lands. Thus the much-belauded agrarian revolution in Rumania was threatened with complete failure, and so another revolutionary measure had to be passed, the strangely-termed "law for the sanitation of agrarian debts," in order to save the peasantry from being dispossessed of their land.

The *Argus* of 13th February, 1932, published the following table which shows how the land was actually distributed:

Area of properties.	Total hectares.	Percentage of area.	Number of proprietors.	Percentage of total. Owners.	Average area of farm for each category.
Up to 5 hectares ...	6,280,993	43.60	3,731,403	84.20	1.94
5 to 10 hectares ...	2,919,863	20.20	435,715	11,30	6.70
10 to 50 hectares ...	2,392,689	16.60	148,860	3.90	16.07
50 to 250 hectares ...	1,505,257	10.40	18,122	0.50	83.06
Over 250 hectares ...	1,305,670	9.10	2,597	0.10	502.00
Total ...	14,404,462,	100.00	3,836,757	100.00	3.75

As one hectare sown to wheat yields approximately 1,200 kg. of wheat, and the average price of wheat during 1931 was about 2.25 lei, the revenue per hectare may be reckoned at about 2,700 lei. As the average holding of 84 per cent of the peasantry is about 2 hectares, the paper assumed that the revenue of each peasant household amounted approximately to some 5,400 lei, or about 160 gold francs. For the year 1931 the total revenue from agriculture was computed at 46,500 million lei, of which 21 milliards were derived from the cattle-rearing industry, 21 milliards from cereals, and 4½ milliards from other plants. Other crops were even less profitable; thus the average price of maize was 1.50 lei per kg. and the yield 1,500 kg. per hectare, so that the revenue per hectare amounted to 2,250 lei, and the figures for barley were respectively 2 lei, 1,400 kg., and 2,800 lei.

AGRICULTURE

It was the policy of imposing export taxes on all agri- 241
cultural produce, which despoiled the peasantry of all the 434
legitimate profit they should have made on the marketing [651]
of their grain, and which not only tended to discourage 435
them from increasing the area under cultivation but prevented them from consolidating their position as independent farmers. Indeed, had not the Rumanian peasant been unduly burdened with taxes during the years following the conclusion of the war, when cereals fetched highly remunerative prices, he would undoubtedly have been able to make sufficient money to equip himself with the necessary instruments and cattle for his farm, avoided running into debt, and he would even have been able to constitute a small reserve on which to draw in the lean years. But these possibilities were frustrated by the culpable negligence of his rulers. And yet there were plenty of men who clearly foresaw and foretold the disastrous outcome for agriculture of such negligence, and protested against this system as well as against the undue partiality accorded by Government circles to industry in general. Certain organs of the Press continued for years to warn the public, and to deprecate the disastrous policy that was being followed. But it was in vain, the Bratianus would accept no counsel from anyone. The *Argus* on October 21st, 1926, commenting on this theme, drew the following conclusions:

"From the above-cited appreciations one may infer that on one hand the prices obtained by the producers are below those they secured before the war, while on the other hand the prices of the articles they need for their upkeep are at about 70 per cent above the pre-war level. In spite of these facts all these taxes which burden production are being maintained, and agriculture is placed not only in an impossible situation for developing itself but in a state of inferiority when compared with that of other countries which export cereals."

In another article published by the same paper on October 10th, 1926, we find a similar pessimistic strain: "From the above figures it becomes obvious that agriculturalists instead of making a profit have lost money, both this year and in previous years of drought. Such a result has completely discouraged them, especially the younger among them..!"

315 southern slopes of the bend of the Carpathians, where the
382 mountains gradually merge into the plains of Wallachia and Moldavia. About two-thirds of the production is secured from the regions of Moreni and Ochiuri, the basins of the rivers Prahova and Dombovitsa furnishing almost 90 per cent of the total yield. There are minor fields farther east in the neighbourhood of Buzau, and also in Moldavia in the region of Bacau. The main oil refineries are situated at Ploeşti. The capital invested in the oil industry is estimated at 11 milliard lei, 60 per cent of which is Rumanian. The number of workmen employed in the industry is about 30,000. The output of crude oil for the years 1928–30 was:

Year	*Tons*	*Estimated value in lei*
1928	4,282,377	7,345,923,066
1929	4,836,974	7,441,204,190
1930	5,792,311	6,552,118,582

About half of the yield was from oilfields owned by the State. The ratio for 1930 was 3,083,468 tons from State-
[47] owned oilfields, or 53.20 per cent, and 2,708,843 tons, or 46.80 per cent, from privately-owned oilfields. The quantities produced were distributed per region as follows: Prahova, 4,275,721 tons; Dambovița, 1,390,215 tons; Buzau, 61,225 tons; Bacau, 65,150 tons.

Of the total output for 1930, some 1,602,757 tons were consumed locally. At the end of June, 1932, it was reported that the total monthly output had attained about 543,000 tons, the average monthly production of the principal companies being as follows: Astra Romana, 109,464 tons; Steaua Romana, 83,667 tons; Concordia, 78,974 tons; Creditul Minier, 27,760 tons; Romano-Americana, 33,800 tons; Phoenix, 65,286 tons; Prahova, 20,878 tons; and Columbia, 17,564 tons.

315 Prices of petroleum products having dropped to the extent
● 484 of 75 per cent since 1928, the Rumanian oil industry is pass-
382 ing through an era of grave depression which is causing a very serious repercussion on the whole economic life of the country, taking into account the great amount of capital in-

vested in it and the high contribution it is expected to make to the revenue of the State. The average price in lei of petroleum products per ton during the years 1928–31 were as follows, as reported by the Constantsa *Chamber of Commerce Bulletin*: 1928, at 4,080; 1929, at 3,800; 1930, at 2,600; 1931, at 1,031 lei. The following table, which gives quotations of the leading oil shares on the Bucarest stock market, is indicative of the depression which exists:

Average annual quotations

Share	1929	1930	*June* 1931	*June* 1932
Astra Romana ...	2391	1430	500	340
Steaua Romana ...	1234	571	230	135
Speranța	1210	639	380	100
Petrol Block ...	320	176	75	54
Concordia	1286	767	265	250
Creditul Minier ...	690	364	185	90
Redevența	321	182	65	30
I.R.D.P.	397	143	92	35

The other mineral resources of Rumania are considerable, especially in Transylvania, but no proper geological survey has ever been made, nor have any mines other than salt mines ever been properly exploited. The following figures give the quantities of minerals mined during 1930, the total value of the same being estimated at 10,437 million lei: Lignite, 2,071,057 tons; coal, 298,825 tons; copper, 6,655 tons and 169; iron, 92,517 tons; manganese, 33,528 tons; bauxite, 678 tons; pyrites, 24,264 tons; amber, 107 tons; salt, 304,777 tons; lead and antimony, 984 tons; lead glaze, 194 tons; gold, 2,672 kilograms, silver, 4.418 kilograms.

Lignite is found in extensive beds not only in Transylvania and the Banat but also in the old kingdom. It is mainly used for the railways. The better qualities of coal are found in south-western Transylvania and the Banat. Copper is principally mined at Tulcea, near the mouth of the Danube, and at Ciuc in Transylvania.

241 very largely on the acquisition of tractors and other equipment. Only Germany can provide these requisites and it is of interest that, despite the poor contribution Rumania has hitherto made to Germany's food supplies, the latter has gone some way to assist the attempted reform. Over 4,000 [439] tractors with their ploughs and a variety of other implements have been imported from Germany during the war years. Tractor numbers in Rumania have probably been more than doubled by these imports, but they still represent only the beginnings of mechanisation. They have doubtless been supplied, despite insistent demands for tractors in Germany and elsewhere, in the belief that, if properly applied, they may make some slight increase in available surpluses. Some of these may have been destined for Transnistria to make good the Russian scorching.

6. Food Conditions

511 Food conditions have varied according to local resources, and in the months following the poor crops of 1942, according to the success of local prefects and officials in securing supplementary quantities from the more favoured areas. The [162] greater part of the population is rural, and most families feed themselves with their own home-grown produce. In the earlier years of the war these were able to maintain their consumption standards, but in 1942-43 there must have been a more serious degree of shortage and privation than is usual even after short crops. In the towns there has been a severe curtailment of food supplies, mitigated in individual cases by access to the Black Market.

262 Urban shortages developed early in 1941 and 434 official rationing cards were introduced in May of 511 that year in Bucarest and brought into use soon after. Sugar and meat were the first commodities to be rationed. The original sugar ration was 375 grammes (13 oz.) per week, but since May 1943 it has been only 125 grammes (4½ oz.). Meat originally 250 grammes (9 oz.), is still (July 1943) at this level, though for a short time at the end of 1942 it was higher owing probably to the abnormal slaughterings caused by fodder shortages in 1942. Bread was first officially rationed in January 1942, but was preceded by baking regulations requiring maize admixtures in the loaf. The ration of 300

[11a]

262 grammes (10½ oz.) daily was available on five days
434 of the week only; on the other two days maize
511 meal only (for *mămăligă*) could be bought. The bread ration was reduced to 250 grammes in June 1942 and maize meal itself was rationed in August. The number of breadless days has varied, while barley, flour or potatoes have at times been offered in place of maizemeal. The bread mixture has also included varying proportions of maize, barley, potato and other flours. The allowance in June 1943 was 250 grammes of bread on five days and 1 000 grammes (35 oz.) of maize flour or potato flour on each of the remaining two days. All these quantities apply to Bucarest only. Other towns show variants of these regulations, depending on local supplies.

234 The most serious shortage in Bucarest, and
435 possibly in other towns, appears to be milk.
511 Owing to the depletion of surrounding herds, following the high cost and scarcity of fodder, only a small part of the former supply now arrives. Some milk, as with all products, is diverted to the Black Market, and official mistakes in price policy at various times have caused temporary shuts or stoppages in food supplies. Other livestock products and edible oil are also chronically short in the towns.

7. Food Prices

435 In spite of official attempts to protect con-
565 sumers from increases, retail prices and the cost of
511 living have risen almost to the same extent as producers' and wholesale prices. Taking autumn 1936 as 100, the cost of living was 330 and the cost of food 350 in the spring of 1943. These increases have been severely felt by the working and lower-middle classes. Official measures were taken to alleviate the situation of civil servants by the setting up of stores and canteens with reduced prices, some of the goods being supplied from Transnistria. Likewise firms with over 50 employees were ordered to supply them with essential foodstuffs at low prices. Persons with more ample resources make use of the Black Market, on which all the ordinary foodstuffs are obtainable usually at only two to three times the official prices, the moderate character of these illegal prices being itself another illustration of the large quantities available, though these quantities due to the laxity of control.

[11b]

315 Two additional pipelines, each of 10 in. diameter, constructed largely of material removed from France, have been built between Ploesti and Giurgiu, each with a capacity of over three quarters of a million tons a year.

New refinery and drilling equipment, which prior to the war Rumania used to import largely from the United States, has now to be obtained from Germany. The financial terms on which this equipment is obtained are unfavourable to Rumania and deliveries are slow.

2. German Influence on the Oil Industry

315 German pressure upon Rumania to obtain
648 greater supplies of oil has been largely exerted by
473 means of commercial penetration into the oil industry, but there is evidence that Nazi diplomats have laid particular emphasis on the German need for oil, suggesting that larger supplies might be available if production was increased and internal consumption reduced.

German penetration into the Rumanian oil industry began to take aggressive form some time before the war. The Germans first acquired a minority holding in Creditul Minier, then in 1939 secured control of Petrol-Block. The collapse of France afforded further opportunities of encroachment, and through Kontinental Oel A.G. control of Concordia and Colombia was secured; similarly, by assuming arbitrary control of Dutch interests the Germans now direct the policy of Astra-Română, the largest of the producing companies. In all, German influence through financial control now extends to about 50 per cent. of the industry, and 60 per cent. of productive capacity, quite apart from the pressure the Germans can exert through control of transport out of the country. The actual effect of this influence is not easily assessed, modified as it is by Rumania's nationalistic oil legislation—particular privileges are reserved under the new mining laws for companies which can show that 75 per cent. of their capital is in Rumanian hands—and the instinctive aversion of the Government to outside control. It is, however, sufficient to ensure that German requirements have a definite priority, and nationalistic as some parts of the new mining law may be, any measures serving to increase immediate production, under whatever pretext they are taken, are beneficial to Germany's interests. Tables I and II on pages 15 and 16 show the approximate strength of the oil groups by nationalities in 1940 and 1942.

3. War-time Restrictions

315 Nearly 70 per cent. of Rumanian petroleum
135 consumption is represented by fuel oil, and a theoretical saving could be brought about by the use of coal and natural gas. Coal resources, however, are limited, and in any event a greatly increased use of coal is restricted also by the speed at which locomotives and power plants can be converted from oil to coal burning.

315 In November 1942 a petrol-rationing scheme
434 was introduced, and although the allowances were on a liberal scale, the regulations do not appear to have been observed and the scheme as a whole was ineffective. In March 1943 this was admitted by the announcement that the scheme would be more strictly enforced and new ration cards issued. Simultaneously regulations were published concerning the use of taxis, and a time limit of September 1943 was set for the conversion of boiler plant.

In general, attempts to restrict consumption either by the announcement of new regulations

[Cf. cat. 315, pp. 15c and 16a - Analyst]

[14b]

315 or the enforcement of old, have lately been more
434 determined.

These measures, however, are unlikely to result in a saving of more than a quarter of a million tons a year, and rationing regulations and restrictions are probably less severe in Rumania than elsewhere in Europe.

D. NATURAL GAS

315 In addition to the supplies of liquid fuel derived from her oil wells, Rumania has considerable resources of natural gas. Production of gas in the Ploeşti oilfield area in the years before the war was used mainly for the making of gasolene, for gas lift in wells, for heating purposes in field and refinery, and for household use. There was no surplus for use outside the Ploeşti district.

Of much greater importance than these supplies of casing-head gas are Rumania's resources of methane natural gas from Măneşti and Transylvania. While the Măneşti gas deposits were known before the war, the extent of the reserves there had not been determined.

In Transylvania the reserves are estimated at not less than 500,000 million cubic metres. Pro-

248 439 Paper, and paper mixed with hemp, are now used to substitute jute.

Although a comparatively large producer of soft hemp, Rumania normally needed to import about 2,300 tons of other hemps for special purposes, and the sources of these imports have been severed since her entry into the war.

Comparatively negligible amounts of coir were also imported in peacetime.

288 291 434 **8. Clothes Rationing**

Unlike almost all other Enemy and Occupied countries, Rumania possesses no official clothes-ration card, although purchases are restricted to a specific number of garments per year. Since 1940 the Government, anxious to avoid the necessity for a card rationing system, has adopted various means in an endeavour to overcome the shortage of textiles, particularly of cotton and wool.

Standardisation of fabrics and fixed prices were introduced in 1940, but clothing of standardised material was frequently unobtainable since the price did not leave the retailer a profit.

Army demands soon called for a great increase in clothing production, thereby reducing the stocks and greatly raising prices of civilian clothing—those for overcoats rose by 300 per cent. and for knitted goods by 400 per cent.—and the difficulty of importing raw materials soon reacted on the industry, so that by 1941 the textile shortage, particularly of bed linen, had become serious. Later in the same year, the Ministry of Supply blocked the sale of all semi-manufactured or manufactured blankets.

Early in 1942 the Government requested the public to purchase only necessities, ordering the industry at the same time to use cotton allocations for the manufacture of standardised bed linen and clothing only. Later in 1942 it was decreed that the annual allotment of garments per head of the population was two suits or frocks, one overcoat, three shirts, 12 handkerchiefs, three pairs of socks or stockings, one sheet, three towels. The sale of standard cloth was restricted to three metres per person per annum. For this arrangement, however, clothing coupons were not issued and purchasers were requested to produce their identity cards and a signed certificate of need if the purchase exceeded 300 lei.

291 435 Non-standard articles are still obtainable, but their exorbitant prices make them accessible to a limited section of the public only. Retailers are known to have refused the sale of standard cloth even when displayed, in order to secure, if possible, the higher profit margin for non-standard goods.

[565] The members of the public most severely affected by clothing shortage and high prices are industrial workers and the poorer urban population. Though the large firms are supposed by law to supply their employees with clothing (as well as food) at cheap prices, it is thought that this is not being widely practised.

Prices of all materials for men's garments have risen to such an extent that people cannot afford to buy even such goods as are available in the shops.

248 656 To counteract shortage of clothing fibres, peasants are being encouraged by the Government to increase cultivation of flax and hemp for production of the rough cloth suitable for peasant clothing.

[30b]

C. PAPER AND PULP

289
313

With a normal consumption of only 3·3 kg. (7¼ lb.) of paper and board per head of the population, compared with 37 kg. (81·4 lb.) in Great Britain, Rumania is one of the smallest consumers in Europe. The country's requirements in ordinary grades of paper and board are well covered by about thirteen paper mills, some of which also manufacture both chemical and mechanical wood pulp.

Newsprint requirements are met by home production.

Pre-war (1936) production of chemical pulp was 37,000 tons and of mechanical wood pulp 9,000 tons, while the output of paper in the same year was 48,000 tons, and of cardboard 10,000 tons.

[439] Small imports of sulphate pulp normally came from Sweden, and of mechanical wood pulp from Austria.

In 1940 the production of paper rose to 105,150 tons, of which little more than half was sold internally and about 90 per cent. came from mills in the Rumanian Paper Cartel.

By the early part of 1942 a critical situation had arisen due to scarcity of fuel and raw materials.

The principal pulp and paper mills having four or five machines each and an annual capacity each of 24,30,000 tons of paper are as follows:—

(a) Fabrica de Celuloză Zărnești S.A., Brașov.
(b) "Letea" Fabrica de Hârtie Bacău.
(c) Fabrica de Hârtie "Bușteni" (C. & S. Schiel) at Bușteni.

The remaining mills, about ten in number, are much smaller, and three of them, with a combined capacity of 6-7,000 tons per annum, have come under Hungarian ownership following the Vienna Award.

Zărnești Cellulose Mill is of primary importance as the main source of chemical wood pulp for domestic consumption and export, and it is believed that this factory is now making special bleached cellulose for the manufacture of explosives. Elaborate machinery imported from Germany was installed with fair promptitude.

The utilisation of reeds from the Danube delta has not yet (July 1943) begun, although much publicity has been given to this project in the local and German press, but a concession has been granted to a German-Rumanian Society, "Delta A.G." The Zărnești and Bușteni Paper Mills are participating and investigations are under way. A similar concession asked for by the Snia Viscosa concern in Italy is said to have been refused.

[434] In 1942 consumption of paper in the first half of the year amounted to over 90 per cent. of production, but in the second half-year the Cabinet imposed fresh restrictions on consumption in order to remedy the increasing shortage.

There is a considerable trade with the Italian Government in bitumenised cardboard for walling and roofing military hutments, and it is believed that a part of these are imported from Scandinavia [439] and exported (after bitumenising) to Italy and the U.S.S.R. for the Italian Expeditionary Forces. It is also likely that since the bombing raids on Italy extra demands have been made for repair purposes.

[33 b]

282 cattle hides collected in September, October and November, 1941, were for this purpose. The remaining 32 per cent., plus the horsehides, pigskins and goatskins, could be used for civilian purposes. The result was that very soon insufficient sole leather was available for civilians, and repairs to footwear became difficult.

282 656 At present 80 per cent. of the cattle hides weighing over 16 kilos (35 lb.), and 20 per cent. of the hides weighing less than 16 kilos, are reserved for the Army. This leaves the civilians very short of sole leather, normally manufactured from heavy hides.

At the end of 1941, the Ministry of Supply ordered the registration of all leather stocks, and thereafter leather could not be sold without a permit. The entire purchasing and control of raw hides and skins and also the distribution of leather was placed in the hands of the "ORAP" (*Oficiul Român de Aprovizionare şi Distribuire a Produselor de Pielărie*).

In the autumn of 1941 private dealings in sheep and lambskins were forbidden, the Army Supply Minister having sole right of disposal. Owing to the comparatively important domestic output such a measure should not have been necessary, but was due to the Rumanian, and probably German, demands for warm clothing on the Russian front. Evidence received in 1942 shows that 80 per cent. of the skins are now reserved for the Army.

In July, 1942, leather transmission-belting, etc., was brought under control and made subject to certain restrictions.

295 434 Civilian rationing of footwear was introduced early in 1942 and new shoes could be sold only against permits issued to persons declaring possession of only one other pair of serviceable shoes. Repair cards were also issued. Requisition cards for new shoes are limited to one a year, and repair cards to one every four months. Children under 14 years of age can obtain two requisition cards yearly for new footwear.

The issue of permits does not, however, guarantee footwear supplies, and only about 50 per cent. of repair or purchase demands appear to be met.

The above regulations have been slightly modified from time to time, but remain intrinsically the same. The production of footwear of substitute materials, such as wooden soles, soles of artificial leather, leather waste, buna, etc., has gradually increased.

295 435 Despite the various government regulations the footwear Black Market flourished, and while the average pre-war price for a pair of men's shoes was 800 lei, in October, 1941, the official prices were fixed at about 1,500 lei for a standard pair of men's shoes and about 1,200 lei for a standard pair of women's shoes. In March, 1942, however, the Black Market price for men's shoes was 7/8,000 lei a pair, and this has now gradually risen to 10/12,000 lei. Complete soleing and heeling of men's footwear costs 1,250 lei officially, and women's 1,000 lei. The official price of soleing leather is 530 lei per kilo, whereas the Black Market price is 34,000 lei.

2. Tanning Materials

282 439 Before the war Rumania never made use of her own barks for tanning, as it was more economical to import extracts from overseas. During the war she has made attempts to employ her oak, chestnut, spruce and pine barks for tanning materials, but

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

and Rumania as agricultural exporter. The average price per metric ton of Rumanian exports fell in 1934 by 62 per cent of its 1922–30 average, whereas the price of imports fell by only 33 per cent in 1936. Internally agricultural prices dropped to 44 per cent of the 1929 level, industrial prices to 62 per cent.[9] The situation was further aggravated by the inauguration at this time of an agrarian protectionist policy by the European industrial states. After 1928 Germany introduced high agricultural tariffs; Italian grain and flour duties reached prohibitive levels between 1929 and 1931; France imposed heavy tariffs on cereals. 439

In May, 1931, the failure of the Austrian Kredit-Anstalt unleashed the financial crisis which swept across Europe and ended the flow of foreign capital to Rumania. Inevitably, the fall in grain prices, the disappearance of foreign markets for agricultural produce, and the stoppage of foreign credit had a disastrous effect upon the Rumanian economy. State finances, never on a very steady foundation, and having just been reorganized in 1929, were hit by the decline in revenues (direct taxes dropped from 8.6 billion lei in 1930 to 3.4 in 1933), and there was a budget deficit each year between 1930 and 1934.[10]

One peculiarity should be observed in the Rumanian depression. In several respects Rumania was in a better position than the other Balkan states. Because of a series of good harvests in 1929, 1930, and 1931, and because of petroleum exports, it was able to maintain a considerably better balance of trade. Moreover, because of the acquisition of a good deal of foreign capital in the loans of 1929 439 656

9. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești*, p. 80, and *Breviaire Statistique de la Roumanie* (Bucarest, 1940), p. 226: [435]

	Wholesale agricultural prices	*Industrial prices*	*Prices of industrial products required by agriculture*
1929	100	100	100
1930	68.2	92.9	98
1931	50.8	72.0	86.6
1932	47.7	62.2	80.9
1933	44.9	62.2	81.1
1934	44.1	63.4	82.6
1935	48.4	75.2	90.2

10. As a matter of fact, a budgetary deficit in Rumania is a very relative term; many of the so-called budget surpluses of the 1920's were quite fictitious. See Ludovic Iavorschi, *L'Equilibre budgetaire en Roumanie de 1920 à 1932* (Paris, 1933). I doubt if the budget deficits can in any way be regarded as a planned attempt to counter the depression, since all the governments promised balanced budgets and the deficit appeared as the result of altogether undirected and uncontrolled expenditures through a number of channels.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

case of Manoilescu.[33] The trend toward heavy industry was a forced development, carried on by monopolies subsidized and protected by the state—probably the only way in which such industries could have been created in short order. It did not reflect a growing individual domestic demand, as the state was the principal consumer for the new products. The increased industrial production was largely balanced by continued low imports. Thus, over the eleven years from 1927 to 1938, industrial production rose from 59 to 69 billion lei, but total industrial consumption fell from 93 to 88 billion because of a fall in imports from 34 to 19 billion lei.[34]

On the short run at least, and relatively if not absolutely, this forced development was at the expense of agriculture. Funds which might have gone into agriculture went into industry; the peasant as a consumer was obliged to pay high prices for industrial products. The relation between agricultural prices and the price of industrial products necessary to agriculture, which had dropped from an index of 100 in 1929 to 53.4 in 1934, climbed only to 63.9 by 1937. Clearly such a policy was exposed to opposition from an electorate consisting largely of peasants—if the representative parliamentary system functioned. The economic policy of these years by its very nature implied an extension of control over political activity. The Tătărescu regime was the last effort to carry on politics in the traditional manner, through a quiet perversion of the constitutional system, but the growing differences between Tătărescu and the old guard of the

33. An excellent example of the political and social implications of this industrial drive is to be seen in a resolution of a congress of the Rumanian Federation of Manufacturers, held in Bucarest on February 3–6, 1936. The congress considered the industrialization of Rumania necessary not only for the development of the country's natural resources but to provide employment and meet the requirements of national defense and the balance of payments. It demanded a stable system favorable to the development of industry; privileges on tariffs and railway rates; legislation requiring public authorities to obtain all their supplies from Rumanian industry; statutory recognition of agreements between industrialists having the object of "improving production and sales by lawful means." In the field of social legislation the congress demanded that employers should be relieved of all charges which did not correspond "either to the workers' real needs or to the capacity of Rumanian industry." Specifically, it proposed that representation of employers and workers in social insurance schemes should be proportional to the amount shared in their support, the repeal of payments to employees for the first seven days' illness, and the repeal of the employers' civil liability to an insured worker in case of accident. The supervisory rights of the Chambers of Labor should be limited to small manufacturers and they should not be permitted to "tyrannize over employers in large-scale industry." Finally, it demanded that the Federation of Manufacturers be consulted on all laws and regulations affecting industrial life. ILO, *Industrial and Labor Information*, 57, No. 13 (March 30, 1936).

34. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 257. There was, however, a rise in imports between 1934 and 1937 from 13 to 19 billion lei, corresponding to the general economic recovery.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 Liberal party are indicative of the move toward a less inhibited industrial drive.

During the four years, then, between the depression and the inauguration of the Carolist dictatorship, it is possible to find inside Rumania, not to mention the external influences, three quite distinct factors making for the destruction of parliamentary government and the creation of an authoritarian regime:

1) Carol's own personality and his streamlined interpretation of the old-fashioned prerogatives of a monarch;

2) The unrest and growing extremism in broad sections of the population, which was finding a mouthpiece in the Iron Guard;

3) The economic policy of neoliberalism, which not only carried overtones of a more authoritarian state but through the centralization of economic power and control increased the possibilities of creating such a state.

656 While the general atmosphere of these years of neoliberalism re-
435 sembled Manoilescu's teachings in its industrial protectionism, increasing economic nationalism, and growing corporatism, there was an important difference: contrary to Manoilescu's thesis, agricultural protection was maintained and extended. During the years 1935 to 1937 there was a complex system of minimum prices, state purchases, and export bounties for wheat. By the law of 1935 the government paid a minimum price of 35,000 lei for 10 metric tons of wheat weighing 75 kilograms per hectoliter. An export premium financed by a tax on milling, paid 10,000 lei per ten-ton truckload of wheat, and 12,000 lei per truckload of flour. This premium was dropped with the rise in agricultural prices but was reapplied in
[647] 1938. A Wheat Valorization Office was formed to supervise these payments and to improve the quality of wheat. Similar steps were taken for medicinal plants, textile plants, and wool.

439 In 1936 Rumania signed a series of wheat export agreements with
435 Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, and other states. Foreign trade in grains was also assisted by an extremely complicated system of taxing imports to pay for export bounties and permitting the exporter to keep a portion of the free exchange obtained by his exports. In general these measures, which were aimed at maintaining the commercial balance, had a beneficial effect in supporting the price of agricultural products and in increasing exports. Between 1934 and 1937 agricultural prices rose from 44.1 (1929 = 100) to 64.6; the value of agricultural production increased from 42 to 62 billion lei; the value of cereal exports rose

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

from 2 to 10 billion lei (in quantity from one million to 2.2 million metric tons).

Two qualifications should be made however. The emphasis upon wheat exports and upon the improvement of quality was primarily for the benefit of the middle and large producer, though the maintenance of the price of grain did help agriculture as a whole. In the second place, as has been mentioned in connection with the depression, the premiums on wheat served to extend the area under wheat cultivation, in direct contradiction to the recommendations of agricultural experts, who continued to believe that "peasant agriculture should no longer limit itself, in imitation of the old system, to the culture of cereals; its success will come from a parallel development of the resources of the field and of livestock raising." [35] This contradiction, which shows the absence of any real coherence to the agrarian program of the Liberal government, had two obvious sources: wheat, for all its decline after the First World War, was important commercially and from the point of view of foreign commerce there was a strong incentive to support it. Moreover, the wheat growers were the larger farmers and were in a better position to make felt their wishes than were the small maize-producing peasants.

The government did, however, make certain efforts to increase the variety of agricultural production. The most elaborate was the creation, with the assistance of I. G. Farbenindustrie, of the "Soya" company, which was authorized to import soybeans, distribute them to cultivators, provide equipment, and purchase the entire crop for export to Germany. The area under this crop expanded rapidly, especially in Bessarabia: 1,465 hectares in 1934, 20,411 hectares in 1935, 58,037 hectares in 1936, and 102,000 hectares in 1937. The government through price guarantees and subsidies also furthered the cultivation of sugar beet, tobacco, rice, and textile plants.

These measures to diversify agriculture did not, despite all the publicity given to them, achieve very great importance. They were only a drop in the bucket compared with the vast area under peasant cereal cultivation, and their rate of expansion seemed unlikely to produce any general amelioration for a very long time. Moreover, the introduction of such industrial crops, whose main purpose—almost exclusively so in the case of soya—was for export, shows the persistent if natural effort to solve the agrarian question by a sort of legerdemain. The soybean had been an old favorite, and as early

35. G. Ionescu-Sişeşti and N. Cornăţeanu, *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie et ses conséquences*, p. 79.

AGRICULTURE

It was the policy of imposing export taxes on all agri- 244
cultural produce, which despoiled the peasantry of all the 434
legitimate profit they should have made on the marketing [65]
of their grain, and which not only tended to discourage 435
them from increasing the area under cultivation but prevented them from consolidating their position as independent farmers. Indeed, had not the Rumanian peasant been unduly burdened with taxes during the years following the conclusion of the war, when cereals fetched highly remunerative prices, he would undoubtedly have been able to make sufficient money to equip himself with the necessary instruments and cattle for his farm, avoided running into debt, and he would even have been able to constitute a small reserve on which to draw in the lean years. But these possibilities were frustrated by the culpable negligence of his rulers. And yet there were plenty of men who clearly foresaw and foretold the disastrous outcome for agriculture of such negligence, and protested against this system as well as against the undue partiality accorded by Government circles to industry in general. Certain organs of the Press continued for years to warn the public, and to deprecate the disastrous policy that was being followed. But it was in vain, the Bratianus would accept no counsel from anyone. The *Argus* on October 21st, 1926, commenting on this theme, drew the following conclusions:

"From the above-cited appreciations one may infer that on one hand the prices obtained by the producers are below those they secured before the war, while on the other hand the prices of the articles they need for their upkeep are at about 70 per cent above the pre-war level. In spite of these facts all these taxes which burden production are being maintained, and agriculture is placed not only in an impossible situation for developing itself but in a state of inferiority when compared with that of other countries which export cereals."

In another article published by the same paper on October 10th, 1926, we find a similar pessimistic strain: "From the above figures it becomes obvious that agriculturalists instead of making a profit have lost money, both this year and in previous years of drought. Such a result has completely discouraged them, especially the 161 younger among them..!"

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p 59

Chapter IV

ECONOMIC WEALTH OF THE COUNTRY

Greater Rumania was primarily an agricultural 433
country, but its industry held an important place 511
in the economy of South-Eastern Europe. With its fertile soil, great reserves of mineral resources and considerable water-power Rumania could have been one of the richest countries in Europe. But while the land was full of natural wealth the standard of living of the people remained a low one. Only a small part of Rumania's resources was exploited, and an even smaller part for the benefit of her inhabitants.

About three-fifths of the area of the Kingdom 311
were arable land and pastures, and over four-fifths 433
of her population were employed in agriculture, forestry and in the fishing industry. The unbalanced state of Rumania's economy in the period between the two wars is shown by the fact that in spite of the predominantly agricultural character of the country, Rumanian industry, employing only one-twentieth of the population, was responsible for half of the total production as expressed in value. Approximately two-thirds of all income from exports were also derived from industrial products, chiefly oil, of which Rumania is the foremost European exporter.

One million workers and employees, or one- 435
twentieth of the population, contributing one-half of the total yearly value of production: this is one very significant aspect of the economic struc-

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

•435 ture of Greater Rumania. It illustrates the effects of low agricultural prices and high prices of finished goods upon the position of a predominantly peasant population, which cannot realize an adequate profit from the sale of its produce and is unable to buy manufactured goods. It is important to realize this, as it demonstrates one of the reasons for the inability of the peasants to acquire agricultural machinery and improve their methods of agricultural exploitation.

565 471 **THE LAND REFORMS.** By the beginning of the twentieth century the position of the Rumanian peasantry had reached a stage which could only be compared with that of Tsarist Russia before the abolition of serfdom. Over half of all the arable land was in the hands of a few thousand *boiars*. Most peasants were landless, some possessed small strips of land which were insufficient for the support of a family. Most peasants were still obliged to work for the landlords without pay, and in addition had to [427] pay taxes and other dues. In order to try and increase their income many peasants rented land from the big landowners. But as the landlord was usually the *boiar* for whom the peasant had to do forced labour and to whom he came in time of need for financial help, he soon found that he had often sold his labour power for years in advance. His indebtedness increased with surprising speed; neither his little strip of land nor, indeed, he himself was anything else than part of the *boiar's* property. The position of the peasantry grew even worse when absentee landlordism increased and great trusts managed the running of the big estates.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

231 For the majority of Rumania's peasants the most
433 valuable of all animals are his sheep, of which Greater Rumania possessed about 12,000,000. Both the wool and the meat of Rumanian sheep are, however, of a lower quality than those of Great Britain or New Zealand. Sheep's milk, and the cheese made from it, supplement the monotonous diet of the peasant.

[439] Of the 3,000,000 pigs in Greater Rumania most were kept in the New Territories and a large proportion of the country's pork production was exported. Apart from the Rumanian Mangalita, English Berkshires were bred in great numbers.

241 Considered as a whole the agriculture of Greater Rumania, favoured by good climatic conditions and great soil fertility, remained undeveloped owing to the general economic conditions. The peasantry did not possess the necessary implements, buildings or animals which could have secured profitable ex-
[452] ploitation of the soil. Financial help was difficult to obtain, and the loans that were granted were ruinous to the peasant, owing to the high rate of interest.
[453] Co-operatives were few. Some agricultural banks and associations confined to the German colonists in the Banat and in Transylvania were the only ones
[435] which succeeded. Agricultural prices were low and the peasant was often forced to sell his produce before the harvest to export trusts which dominated
[654] the market. The only assistance given by the government consisted in loans and seeds at reduced prices for the growing of certain crops, such as soya beans, for export in order to fulfil international trade
[439] agreements. During the last fifteen years Germany secured an ever greater influence upon Rumania's agriculture and took most of its exports.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

433 Resita works and in the Copsa-Mica concern. The
471 most important Rumanian group, representing both German and British interests, was that of Malaxa-Auschnitt. The centre of Rumania's heavy industry is the region around Brasov.

The chemical industry, drawing to some extent on the unexported surplus of agricultural produce, developed substantially, thanks especially to attempts to make Rumania independent of imports. This industry, too, was controlled to a great extent by foreign, chiefly German, interests.

433 The textile industry, although handicapped by old-fashioned machinery imported from Germany, was the most prosperous. Production and value of output increased, as did the number of employees, but wages decreased.

433 Rumania's total industrial production was
511 doubled in the years 1924–36, but this was not re-
435 flected by a corresponding improvement in trade or in the standard of living. The general index of wholesale prices fell by almost a third and that of agricultural produce by nearly half; the prices of manufactured goods decreased by only a little over one-sixth. By 1933 the value of exports and imports had fallen to about 25,600 million lei and was only one-third of that of all foreign trade in 1926. Real wages in the period from 1929 to 1939 fell by over one-fifth, while the cost of living in 1939 was indexed at 138 points in relation to 100 points in 1933.

652 By 1937 Rumania's national debt had reached 257 million pounds sterling of which only one-fifth was represented by internal loans. Interest on foreign loans in 1932 amounted to about one-quarter of the country's budget and in 1937 to about 16%.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

a worker, working sixty hours a week, would just be 511
sufficient to buy a pair of shoes or four pounds of 465
coffee, while he would have to spend about three months' wages to buy a suit. The workers do not possess any effective trade unions or other organizations which could better their lot, and peasants' co-operatives are few and weak, except those controlled by the State and those of the German Minority. Antonescu, however, recognized the danger threatening him from this quarter and tried to pacify the workers by creating special services which would supply them with their rations. Other sections of the population had to rely on luck. By creating a class of workers which at last had an assured supply of food he hoped to neutralize the most potent elements of Rumanian discontent.

Another indication of the standard of living is 511
supplied by the official price index. From June to 435
December 1940 prices rose by over 137% and, according to the official Rumanian economic gazette, by 372% between August 1939 and October 1943. This fantastic increase of prices brought no corresponding gains to the farmers or agricultural workers, as can be seen from the Rumanian press.[1] While some industrial workers at least got their rations, and in some instances even increased rations,

[1] In December 1943, one of the German papers in Rumania reported that 'the Union of Farmers' Co-operative Societies states that although there was a record harvest last year, the difficult position of the farmers has not improved. A great part of the harvest is still unsold and...the shortage of capital is very much felt...the Union demands that one-third of the difference between the low inland- and the high export-prices be paid to the farmers instead of giving the whole of the overprice to the State and the exporters....Owing to the lack of

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

511 435 the economic position of the rural population appears to be lamentable.

648 722 **THE POLITICAL SCENE.** Both the internal and external policies of Rumania have been shaped by events on the battle fronts, and more particularly by the war on the Eastern front. The fact that Rumania is fighting side by side with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union has had effects upon the national life of which the consequences are inescapable. The artificial stimulation of public opinion against the U.S.S.R., intended to galvanize the people into a fervent nationalism and unreserved support for Antonescu, proved no small embarrassment to him when the tide of battle turned so catastrophically against his Allies. Further, Rumania's position is also anomalous in the extreme. The severest blow which the country suffered during the past decades was the loss of two-fifths of Transylvania to Hungary.[1] Yet Rumania has been fighting in alliance with Hungary against the Soviet Union. At the same time friction between Hungary and Rumania has been one of the gravest problems in the

511 435 credits the farmers are unable to meet their most urgent obligations and, if no solution is found, an agrarian crisis is imminent which must influence the whole national economy.' A Bucarest paper stated in January 1944: '...there are two million farms without milk cows, 160,000 without hogs and 200,000 without even a single chicken. Unfortunately the Ministry of Agriculture with only two and a half per cent of the budget can do little to alleviate the peasants' lot.'

[1] The Czechoslovak President, Dr Benes, stated in London in March 1944 that the Soviet Union would insist on the return of the territories which Hungary stole from her neighbours, including Transylvania.

CHAPTER I

722 more than half the normal, but the efforts in 1943 to recover to a more average crop may have [249] succeeded.

3. Fish

[228] The general food shortage in Rumania gave a great fillip to the fishing industry. In the 12 months April 1942 to March 1943, some 40,000 tons of fish were caught in State waters besides 13,000 tons in rented and private waters. This is almost double the largest pre-war catch. During 1942 some 6,000 tons were salted down for winter use. In order to promote and introduce better organisation into the fishing industry a German-Rumanian Company has been established, the "Marea-Neagră," which will devote special attention to developing the Black Sea fisheries.

4. Agricultural Exports

439 The pre-war level of grain exports was well maintained in 1939; wheat in particular was 243 prominent with over a million tons. The exports of 1940, however, showed an immediate reflection of territorial changes and war shortages. Total grain exports in that year barely reached a million tons compared with the pre-war average of about 1·6 million tons. The following year showed a still sharper decline, wheat reaching only 5,000 tons and maize 120,000 tons. In 1942, despite the recovery of Bessarabia, it is most unlikely that even this level was maintained.

439 Oilseed exports, despite direct German intervention aiming at an expansion of the crop, also fell 249 below pre-war levels. Sunflower-seed exports, the principal oilseed, fell from an average of 30,000 tons in 1935-38 to 12,000 tons in 1940 and to 5,000 tons in 1941. Exports following the 1942 crop, though probably better, were not at all commensurate with the increased production, for a serious shortage of edible oil and fat had meanwhile developed in Rumania owing to decreased supplies of pig fat and to the retention by the peasants of their seed for consumption at home, or for disposal on the Black Market.

5. Administrative Control

241 Not even the most complete and efficient system of administrative control could have assured the 656 country's food supplies and exports at normal 435 levels during these three unfavourable years, but it is clear that Rumania's food difficulties have been aggravated by mistakes in economic policy and inadequate control measures. Bureaucratic methods of handling the peasants aroused antagonism and resistance. Supplies of tested seed and other farm requisites were not made available in time. On the collection and supply side, too much power was left in the hands of local prefects. But the most serious shortcoming of the official administration was the failure to establish a price control, and an appropriate relationship between agricultural prices and the cost of the things farmers buy. (In the absence of effective discipline this ratio needs to be strongly in the producers' favour if production and marketing of foodstuffs is to be maintained.) Prices of consumers' goods rose rapidly, owing to shortages, while the Government pegged the prices of farm produce at comparatively low levels. Consequently, the peasants curtailed production and sought better prices by selling much of their produce through Black Market channels. The mistake was officially admitted in the autumn of 1941 when grain prices were more than doubled, but the position still remained unfavourable to

241 the peasants and the reduced 1942 sowings both
656 of grain and of sugar-beet indicated continued
435 disatisfaction. Finally, by the spring of 1943 a wiser ratio was reached, agricultural prices being four times as high as in 1939 and wholesale prices in general three and a half times as high. Nevertheless, this very considerable measure of inflation
[458] has shaken public confidence in the value of money so that peasants increasingly resort to barter transactions.

[655] In the hope of obtaining better control over grain supplies the Government in the autumn of 1941 nationalised the grain trade, later they relaxed this to the extent of leaving the export business to a few selected firms and the internal collection to the Army and to the National Institute of Co-operation. This body handled the pre-war grain marketing scheme, and their
[563] activities—because of the expulsion of Jews from wholesale and retail trade—have recently developed rapidly in the supply of seeds to peasants (80,000 tons of seed distributed in 1942) as well as consumers' goods to peasants and townspeople. But it still proved difficult to extract enough food from the peasants to feed the towns. For the 1943 harvest detailed regulations were made concerning the quantities the peasant might keep for seed, for his family and for his animals, and threshing operations were subjected to inspection. Yet these rules could not in practice be administered.

423 It is now generally agreed in Rumania that the
471 smallness of the holdings has been a principal obstacle to effective organisation of agriculture in war-time, and that a change to larger units of production is needed. Any approach to collectivisation on the Soviet model, however, would be regarded as contradictory to the land reform policy and a threat to the Rumanian State. The official policy, though it has not yet taken its final form, is to maintain private property but to proceed no further with expropriation and division of large estates, and to maintain existing medium holdings by prohibiting their sub-division for inheritance or other reasons. Schemes for the consolidation of strips are also contemplated for a more opportune moment. Further, in order to
474 increase production and to improve the peasants' methods and standards of life, communal farming associations, known as *obştii*, are to be formed. In these associations, farming equipment is to be pooled so that the small-holder would have the same resources as the large farmer. Each *obştie* is to embrace a village and perform all the functions of a co-operative, including joint purchase and sale, use of breeding animals, processing of crops, etc. Villages which are prepared to form themselves into *obştii* and to undertake to work the land according to State directions, are promised tractors, seed and breeding stock without payment. In this way it is hoped that some of the advantages of collectivisation may be achieved while retaining those of individual ownership. But, unless accompanied by far-reaching industrial development, the plan can but aggravate rural unemployment. It is not known how this innovation has been received by the peasants. It was reported in April 1943 that 270 of these communal associations had been formed—an insignificant number—and it is believed that the Government is allocating to them some of the tractors imported from Germany in the war years.*

241 The success of the *obştii* plan, and indeed of any plan for up-grading Rumanian agriculture, depends

* In June, 1943, a temporary ban was placed on the formation of any new *obştie*, because there was insufficient agricultural machinery to supply to them.

[106]

262 grammes (10½ oz.) daily was available on five days
434 of the week only; on the other two days maize
511 meal only (for *mămăligă*) could be bought. The bread ration was reduced to 250 grammes in June 1942 and maize meal itself was rationed in August. The number of breadless days has varied, while barley, flour or potatoes have at times been offered in place of maizemeal. The bread mixture has also included varying proportions of maize, barley, potato and other flours. The allowance in June 1943 was 250 grammes of bread on five days and 1,000 grammes (35 oz.) of maize flour or potato flour on each of the remaining two days. All these quantities apply to Bucarest only. Other towns show variants of these regulations, depending on local supplies.

234 The most serious shortage in Bucarest and
●435 possibly in other towns, appears to be milk.
511 Owing to the depletion of surrounding herds following the high cost and scarcity of fodder only a small part of the former supply now arrives. Some milk, as with all products, is diverted to the Black Market and official mistakes in price policy at various times have caused temporary gluts or stoppages in food supplies. Other livestock products and edible oil are also chronically short in the towns.

7. Food Prices

435 In spite of official attempts to protect con-
565 sumers from increases, retail prices and the cost of
511 living have risen almost to the same extent as producers and wholesale prices. Taking autumn 1936 as 100, the cost of living was 330 and the cost of food 350 in the spring of 1943. These increases have been severely felt by the working and lower-middle classes. Official measures were taken to alleviate the situation of civil servants by the setting up of stores and canteens with reduced prices, some of the goods being supplied from Transnistria. Likewise firms with over 50 employees were ordered to supply them with essential foodstuffs at low prices. Persons with more ample resources make use of the Black Market on which all the ordinary foodstuffs are obtainable, usually at only two to three times the official prices, the moderate character of these illegal prices being itself another illustration of the large quantities available, though these channels due to the laxity of control.

[11b]

I. COPPER

316 Apart from copper ore recovered as a by-
135 product in the mining of gold ores there is no copper-mining industry in Rumania. There are, however, two deposits which have possibilities of future production. They are as follows:-

(a) At Altan-Tepe in the Dobruja, 12 miles south of Tulcea, near the Black Sea, is a deposit which is being developed by Creditul Minier S.A.R. There are three areas totalling about 5,000 acres and reserves of 400,000 tons of ore averaging 1½ to 3 per cent. copper.

In 1940 development was proceeding very slowly, and it did not appear then that any production would take place for at least two years.

(b) At Zam, which is about 10 miles from Brad in western Transylvania, there is another deposit. The veins vary from a centimetre to a metre in width, and the grade of ore ranges from a half to 3 per cent. copper. These deposits have been worked on a small scale in the past, but no work is in progress at the present time.

Production of copper ore in Rumania, mainly from operations at various gold mines, is reported to have been 12,420 tons in 1938, and 25,168 tons in 1939.

J. GOLD

The most important area for gold-mining is in the Apuseni mountain district in Central Transylvania. The principal gold deposits lie within an area bounded by Baia De Arieş, Zlatna, Sacaramb and Tebea. The chief mining centre is Brad, the nearby-mines of Muşari, Brodisor and Valea Morii providing most of the production. Other mining centres within the area are Sacaramb, Almaş (Neagris), Rosia Montana, Bucium and Stanija.

The gold-bearing veins of the Apuseni district strike in directions between north-west and north-east and vary from a few millimetres to two metres in width. The lengths of the veins range between 300 and 700 metres and some are worked at depths approaching 600 metres from the surface. The ore is said to average 8 to 12 grammes per ton.

The largest producing company is the Societatea Mica with a production in 1940 of 2,096 kilos, and in 1941 of 2,665 kilos. In 1942, the State gold mines of Rosia Montana and Sacaramb produced respectively 150 and 238 kilos of gold.

Production in the Baia Mare district (now Hungarian) represented about one-third of normal ore output.

316 To stimulate gold production in those mines
435 carrying only small values in gold, and also to make up for the loss of output entailed by the transfer of the Baia Mare area in Northern Transylvania to Hungary under the Vienna Award, the premium on gold production in Rumania was increased from the 1st January, 1943. In addition to the fixed basic price of 211,111 lei per kilo, there is now a premium of 189,189 lei per kilo for ore produced with a gold content of 15 grammes per ton rising to 656,389 lei per kilo for ore with a gold content of 3 grammes per ton or less. This has led to considerable prospecting for new gold deposits in various parts of the country.

K. SILVER

316 Over pre-war years Rumania ranked sixth, or when the Italian production was greater seventh,

248 439 Paper, and paper mixed with hemp, are now used to substitute jute.

Although a comparatively large producer of soft hemp, Rumania normally needed to import about 2,300 tons of other hemps for special purposes, and the sources of these imports have been severed since her entry into the war.

Comparatively negligible amounts of coir were also imported in peacetime.

288 291 434 **8. Clothes Rationing**

Unlike almost all other Enemy and Occupied countries, Rumania possesses no official clothes-ration card, although purchases are restricted to a specific number of garments per year. Since 1940 the Government, anxious to avoid the necessity for a card rationing system, has adopted various means in an endeavour to overcome the shortage of textiles, particularly of cotton and wool.

Standardisation of fabrics and fixed prices were introduced in 1940, but clothing of standardised material was frequently unobtainable since the price did not leave the retailer a profit.

Army demands soon called for a great increase in clothing production, thereby reducing the stocks and greatly raising prices of civilian clothing—those for overcoats rose by 300 per cent. and for knitted goods by 400 per cent.—and the difficulty of importing raw materials soon reacted on the industry, so that by 1941 the textile shortage, particularly of bed linen, had become serious. Later in the same year, the Ministry of Supply blocked the sale of all semi-manufactured or manufactured blankets.

Early in 1942 the Government requested the public to purchase only necessities, ordering the industry at the same time to use cotton allocations for the manufacture of standardised bed linen and clothing only. Later in 1942 it was decreed that the annual allotment of garments per head of the population was two suits or frocks, one overcoat, three shirts, 12 handkerchiefs, three pairs of socks or stockings, one sheet, three towels. The sale of standard cloth was restricted to three metres per person per annum. For this arrangement, however, clothing coupons were not issued and purchasers were requested to produce their identity cards and a signed certificate of need if the purchase exceeded 300 lei.

291 435 Non-standard articles are still obtainable, but their exorbitant prices make them accessible to a limited section of the public only. Retailers are known to have refused the sale of standard cloth even when displayed, in order to secure, if possible, the higher profit margin for non-standard goods.

[565] The members of the public most severely affected by clothing shortage and high prices are industrial workers and the poorer urban population. Though the large firms are supposed by law to supply their employees with clothing (as well as food) at cheap prices, it is thought that this is not being widely practised.

Prices of all materials for men's garments have risen to such an extent that people cannot afford to buy even such goods as are available in the shops.

248 656 To counteract shortage of clothing fibres, peasants are being encouraged by the Government to increase cultivation of flax and hemp for production of the rough cloth suitable for peasant clothing.

[30b]

282 cattle hides collected in September, October and November, 1941, were for this purpose. The remaining 32 per cent., plus the horsehides, pigskins and goatskins, could be used for civilian purposes. The result was that very soon insufficient sole leather was available for civilians, and repairs to footwear became difficult.

282 656 At present 80 per cent. of the cattle hides weighing over 16 kilos (35 lb.), and 20 per cent. of the hides weighing less than 16 kilos, are reserved for the Army. This leaves the civilians very short of sole leather, normally manufactured from heavy hides.

At the end of 1941, the Ministry of Supply ordered the registration of all leather stocks, and thereafter leather could not be sold without a permit. The entire purchasing and control of raw hides and skins and also the distribution of leather was placed in the hands of the "ORAP" (*Oficiul Român de Aprovizionare şi Distribuire a Produselor de Piclărie*).

In the autumn of 1941 private dealings in sheep- and lambskins were forbidden, the Army Supply Minister having sole right of disposal. Owing to the comparatively important domestic output such a measure should not have been necessary, but was due to the Rumanian, and probably German, demands for warm clothing on the Russian front. Evidence received in 1942 shows that 80 per cent. of the skins are now reserved for the Army.

In July, 1942, leather transmission-belting, etc., was brought under control and made subject to certain restrictions.

295 434 Civilian rationing of footwear was introduced early in 1942 and new shoes could be sold only against permits issued to persons declaring possession of only one other pair of serviceable shoes. Repair cards were also issued. Requisition cards for new shoes are limited to one a year, and repair cards to one every four months. Children under 14 years of age can obtain two requisition cards yearly for new footwear.

The issue of permits does not, however, guarantee footwear supplies, and only about 50 per cent. of repair or purchase demands appear to be met.

The above regulations have been slightly modified from time to time, but remain intrinsically the same. The production of footwear of substitute materials, such as wooden soles, soles of artificial leather, leather waste, buna, etc., has gradually increased.

295 435 Despite the various government regulations the footwear Black Market flourished, and while the average pre-war price for a pair of men's shoes was 800 lei, in October, 1941, the official prices were fixed at about 1,500 lei for a standard pair of men's shoes and about 1,200 lei for a standard pair of women's shoes. In March, 1942, however, the Black Market price for men's shoes was 7/8,000 lei a pair, and this has now gradually risen to 10/12,000 lei. Complete soleing and heeling of men's footwear costs 1,250 lei officially, and women's 1,000 lei. The official price of soleing leather is 530 lei per kilo, whereas the Black Market price is 34,000 lei.

2. Tanning Materials

282 439 Before the war Rumania never made use of her own barks for tanning, as it was more economical to import extracts from overseas. During the war she has made attempts to employ her oak, chestnut, spruce and pine barks for tanning materials, but

CHAPTER X

652 722 1941, subscriptions were made compulsorily, and in 1942 a Reintegration Tax was levied on all persons who failed to subscribe the amounts allotted to them. In spite of all this the loan had only raised some 18 milliard lei by September, 1942.

A further attempt to borrow from the public was made at the end of 1942, when the Minister of Finance was authorised to issue short term 4 per cent. Treasury Bills to a value not exceeding 10 milliard lei. As with the long term loan, interest from this loan was free from taxation.

In spite of these measures, however, considerable amounts have had to be borrowed direct from the National Bank—partly on account of extra-budgetary credits for non-military purposes, but more especially to finance the war with Russia which—at the beginning at least—was done entirely outside the budget.

In June 1941 when miscellaneous advances to the Government already amounted to 10 milliard lei, the National Bank was authorised to derogate from the provisions of its statutes and to advance any amounts necessary to cover exceptional needs. In this way a further 12 milliard lei credit on this account was put at the disposal of the Government to finance the Russian war. This credit was, however, exhausted by January 1942, but the National Bank's miscellaneous advances continued to rise, reaching nearly 30 milliard lei by June 1942. After June 1942, borrowing on this account fell considerably, only to rise at the end of the year and the beginning of 1943.

4. External Position of the Leu

652 Rumania is still officially on the gold standard, the parity of the leu having been fixed in 1929 at 1 leu=0.009 g. fine gold or 111.111 lei per kg. gold.

This parity has, however, no practical significance, since from 1935 onwards it has been the practice to pay premiums for gold over and above the official price. In order to encourage domestic production of gold additional premiums are paid to domestic gold producers, so that the effective internal price of gold varies, according to the productivity of the mine, from 400,300 lei to 867,500 lei per kg. fine gold. (*See* also section on gold, page 23.) Official dealing in "hard" currencies, too, is done not at parity but at parity plus a premium. From December 1935 to February 1940, the premiums were fixed at 38 per cent., from March 1940 to March 1941 at 107 per cent., and after the latter date at 90 per cent.

652 648 The last reduction of premiums from 107 per cent. to 90 per cent. was made under German pressure, on the grounds that the RM., on which no premium was paid, was undervalued in relation to "hard" currencies. And at the same time as the effective rates for such currencies were lowered (in the case of the $ from 211.65—217.97 to 187.60—196 lei per $), the RM. rate was raised from 50 lei=1 RM. to 60 lei=1 RM., at which level it has since remained.

5. Prices and Price Control

435 As a result of the world depression there was a severe fall in prices during the early 1930's. Both wholesale prices and the cost of living reached their lowest level in the years 1933 and 1934. In the following years there was a gradual recovery, which became increasingly marked after 1939.

The retail price index has increased during the war as follows:—

August, 1939	100.
January, 1940	116.6.

[52 a]

435

June, 1940	137.1.
January, 1941	149.5.
June, 1941	190.9.
January, 1942	200.6.
June, 1942	306.9.
January, 1942	377.6.
March, 1943	403.9.

The less marked rise in 1942 was due principally to the fact that for the first 6 months of the year prices were almost stationary; in the autumn, however, indirect taxes were increased and prices once again rose steeply.

These percentages represent only increases in official prices; the cost of living is in fact considerably higher owing to the prevalence of the Black Market, where prices are very much in excess of the official limits.

The first attempts at price control were made almost immediately after the outbreak of war. In September 1939 an anti-profiteering law was passed, and in November of the same year an anti-speculation law followed which fixed the maximum prices of all articles in general use and limited wholesalers' profits to 10 per cent and retailers' to 12 per cent.

The regulations were further tightened up by the price control laws of March, 1941, and the sabotage law of October, 1940.

Control, however, remained largely ineffective, and in October 1941 a stabilisation law was passed. This law, which borrowed much from the existing German laws, laid down a general price stop. Maximum prices and wages were fixed at the level prevailing on 1st September, 1941, and alterations could be made only with the permission of the Minister of Economics.

In addition the State set up goods distribution centres which, among other functions, supervised producers' prices, profit margins and consumers' prices.

Since August 1942 the supervision of prices has been in the hands of a General Commissariat for Price Control, and the local offices subordinate to it. It is evident that corruption among price-control officials was by no means a negligible factor in the very unsatisfactory development of the control system in general. In the autumn of 1942 it was announced that all existing price controllers were to be dismissed and replaced by members of the teaching, legal and literary professions.

[661]

B. BANKING

I. State and State-Controlled Banks

652 The National Bank of Rumania was set up in 1880 with a capital of 30 million lei, of which one-third was in the hands of the State. By 1929 this had been raised to 600 million lei. Under the present statute the State may not hold more than ten per cent of the capital; the remaining ninety per cent must be held by private shareholders. This bank has the sole right of note issue in the country.

403

From the end of 1936 to the end of 1938 the note circulation rose from 19·6 milliard lei to 34·9 milliard lei. In the next four years, however, the increase was very much greater as the following table shows:—

		Milliard lei
1936—	January	34·1
	June	38·7
1940—	January	48·4
	June	54·2
1941	January	65·7
	June	77·1
1942	January	95·6
	June	98·7
1943—	January	117·6

[52 b]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

804 oats. Hence one quintal of wheat is approximately 3.67 bushels, and a yield of 10 quintals per hectare equals 14.9 bushels per acre. A quintal of corn is about 3.94 bushels, and a yield of 10 quintals per hectare equals 16.0 bushels per acre.

436 Because of the instability of Rumanian money it is difficult to make satisfactory conversions of the *leu* to the dollar. Before the First World War the leu at par was equal to 19.3 cents U.S. gold (old parity), the value of all currencies in the Latin Monetary Union to which Rumania belonged. After the postwar inflation the leu was stabilized in 1929 at 10 milligrams of gold, .900 fine; one leu was equal to .598 U.S. cents. In 1936 the gold content was reduced, and the leu was equal to 1.0127 U.S. cents (new parity). In August, 1947, after a terrific inflation, the leu was restabilized at 6.6 milligrams of gold, or .66 U.S. cents.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

Rumania and undoubtedly served to maintain agriculture in a depressed condition.[7] These, however, are general tendencies which, in theory at least, should adjust themselves in time; in the long run, and on the assumption of mobility in the factors of production, an equilibrium should be reached between agriculture and industry. But apart from such general factors, did the specific form of the development of Rumanian industry work to the disadvantage of agriculture?

A Yugoslav rural health worker, in describing the relations between town and country in the Balkans, concluded that agriculture was losing in the exchange of goods:[8]

> A survey undertaken in several rural countries on the nutritional status of the population showed that there exists undernourishment among a large number of the rural population, and that agricultural products are exported from rural countries without consideration of the nutritional requirements of the people. The reasons are purely commercial. The industrial products imported into the rural countries in exchange serve merely the urban population and industrial establishments from which the farming population derives comparatively small benefit. To cover their money requirements, the farmers owning small holdings are usually compelled to sell the best products of their farms to the town people. Thus they are helping the cities and industries, themselves remaining far in the rear in regard to sanitation, housing, health, and general education.

The Rumanian economist Manoilescu undertook to demonstrate that in the Rumanian trade triangle between countryside, town, and foreign market, the countryside received far less in the way of goods

7. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 80:

(1929 prices = 100)

	Price of agricultural products	*Price of industrial products used by agriculture*	*Relation*
1929	100.0	100.0	100.0
1930	68.2	98.0	69.6
1931	50.8	86.6	58.7
1932	47.7	80.9	59.0
1933	44.9	81.1	55.4
1934	44.1	82.6	53.4
1935	48.4	90.2	53.7
1936	54.0	95.4	56.6
1937	64.6	101.8	63.9
1938	67.1	99.2	67.6
1939	72.7	112.5	64.6

8. Andreya Stampar, "Observations of a Rural Health Worker," quoted in *International Journal of Agrarian Affairs*, *1*, No. 1 (October, 1939), 71.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

●438 and services than it gave, the difference being gained by the towns.[9]
433 According to these views, trade relations were actually detrimental
241 to the rural areas, which were being drained by the towns and industries.

It is not necessary here to discuss the theoretical question whether there is any absolute disadvantage to the countryside in its commerce with the towns. If during a period of change toward industrialization the countryside's position declines in relation to the town, it is quite possible for a number of other factors—which may be "short term" or even noneconomic—to convert this relative disadvantage into an absolute loss in income. Such factors may include the inelasticity of agricultural supply, the immobility of agricultural labor, and the increase in agricultural population. Finally, governmental and political policies may favor industry at the expense of agriculture. This last point requires further elucidation, as it was quite important in
651 Rumania.
433 Rumanian industry was created in the shelter of high protective tariffs, which undoubtedly served to increase the costs of agriculture and to benefit industry at its expense. These tariffs have been justified by the "infant industries" argument, and in part they were brought about by the agricultural protectionist policy of the European industrial states. But the combination of protectionism and the development of cartels did give industry a monopolistic position in the internal Rumanian market which worked to the disadvantage of agriculture. In addition to tariff protection, Rumania had a long tradition of direct encouragements to industry—such as exemptions from taxation and special transport rates—which persisted in the interwar period and were expanded in the 1930's.

433 The protective tariffs, by restricting foreign imports, had the
651 effect of bringing in foreign capital for investment in local industry.
457 But while foreign capital has been of great importance in the development of Rumania's larger industries and in the creation of its transportation system, the effect on the total economy has been somewhat one-sided, partly because the capital was naturally attracted to industries working for export: "Without depreciating the influence of foreign capital in stimulating industrialization, it is to be underlined that the benefits of invested foreign capital do not for the most part serve to create purchasing power in the national market

[113] 9. M. Manoilescu, "Das wirtschaftliche und soziale Dreieck der Agrarstaaten: die Stadt, das Dorf, das Ausland," *Internationale Agrarrundschau*, No. 6 (Berlin, 1940), also cited in Hugo Böker, "Agriculture's Share in the National Income and the Agricultural Situation," *International Review of Agriculture, 32*, No. 1 (January, 1941), 22. For a discussion of M. Manoilescu's views, see below, pp. 193–197.

342 THE CHARACTER of this house is of the simplest. The walls are
352 whitewashed, the floors bare, and there is practically no furniture other than wooden beds and tables. The stoves are of porcelain, and wood or charcoal is used as fuel. The usual
323 practice is for potters to share a kiln with their neighbours. The one illustrated here was the property of this particular house and was placed in its yard (Plate IV, B).

[463] THE FIGURES given by the mayor show that there are 101 potters in Curtea de Argeş. We visited a good number and found that most of them live and work under conditions similar to those illustrated here. The potters for the most part occupy houses in one area of the town. A fine clay is found locally and can be had for nothing, but it must be collected by the potter himself. This clay he stores in his house (see upper plan on page 29).

THE POTS vary in design within a limited range. They are mostly of a buff colour, with the main part of the outside unglazed. The inside is glazed brown and the rim is usually covered with a bright green glaze, which makes the pots very attractive; some pots have splashes of green in parts or all over them. Most of the pots are marketed locally and can be bought at a low price. The pot is often made porous so that evaporation may keep the water cool. Pots are sent to other
[438] places near Curtea, but are not sufficiently strong, we were informed, for long-distance transport.

341 NEW DEVELOPMENT in housing is making steady progress. Some houses are still being constructed on the traditional lines, half brick half timber, and the "eye" in the roof, which is common in the older houses, is not necessarily omitted in the modern roof; tiles, however, are replacing the shingle. The wooden balcony is disappearing in the larger type of house and is being replaced by a brick verandah. These brick verandahs are built with ornate columns, sometimes with elaborate capitals. The classical influence is, in fact, strong, for some houses have a pediment, and in one ambitious dwelling the capitals were gilded and the pediments contained gilded decorations. The simple wooden window frames are now little used, and are replaced by elaborate mullions. Wall decorations in elaborate stucco or stencil work and ornamental details on doors are a common feature of the new houses. Most of the new houses are detached and stand in their own gardens.

M. E. T.

1 [See pp. 286, HRIF pagination -- Analyst]

231 owner's farm, where the cows are kept in sheds, and the sheep, which are more hardy, are penned on the arable land, particularly on the maize stubble. Both sheep and cattle are fed on fodder crops during the winter. The surplus animals are sold at the autumn fair, and form a source of revenue.

476 [236] [234] WHILST ON the high pastures the sheep are clipped twice, and the wool is divided amongst the peasants in proportion to the number of animals sent up. The cheese is usually shared by the owners of the animals in the same way, the mayor and his committee being responsible for the correct apportionment. In the Valley of the Argeş co-operative dealers from Bucharest frequently buy the cheese "in bulk" direct from the commune, and the monetary value is shared between the owners of the animals.

231 OXEN ARE used almost exclusively for draught purposes, the numbers kept in this district being somewhat in excess of the farmers' requirements, owing to their use for lumbering (see below).

241 [369] [438] PEASANT FARMING in the Valley of the Argeş is no longer entirely on a subsistence basis. Two factors have tended to modify it. Firstly, the position of the valley, opening as it does directly on the Wallachian Plain, with its rich grain lands and containing the capital Bucharest, has allowed commercial intercourse to develop. The Argeş peasant no longer cultivates wheat; he does not mind if his maize crop is good enough for fodder only, for he can buy both wheat and maize from the plain. Further, he finds a ready market and so a money income in Bucharest for his surplus fruit, 313 particularly apples, and cheese. Secondly, the forests form a valuable asset to the peasant. During the winter felling takes place in the upper basin of the Argeş; in spring and summer the timber is transported, and work in the State mill in Curtea goes on all the year round. Practically every household has somebody working in the timber trade, and the money so earned (as much as 100 lei per day for a man supplying his own yoke of oxen) reduces the dependence of the family on the farm.

874 242 AT CURTEA DE ARGEŞ is the School of Agriculture, Regina Elizabeta. Although only a small percentage of its pupils is local, it is gradually influencing the farming of the neighbourhood. Experiments in cultivation, plant breeding and

7

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Moldavia]

133 and good pasture. The Sereth, which waters this region and runs parallel to the Pruth, flows into the Danube below Galati.

135 On the eastern slopes of the Carpathians there are large deposits of oil which have not yet been fully exploited. In the *comitat* Bacau, also in the mountain region of Moldavia, there are some valuable coal and salt mines. The salt mines of Targu-Ocna are the most important in the whole of Rumania.

311 438 The majority of the people of Moldavia are employed on the land. They grow wheat, maize and sugar-beet and tend the vines. Recently, successful experiments have been made with the growing of industrial crops. Timber felling provides another source of income, especially at Targu-Neamt, Piatra-Neamt and Focsani. There are important refineries at Moinesti and Solont, sugar factories at Roman and Ripiceni, and large textile works at Buhusi.

361 The capital and economic centre of Moldavia is the town of Jasi, on the western bank of the Pruth. Its population numbers about 80,000, more than half of them Jews. Jasi, lying on a number of vine-growing hills overlooking the valley of the Pruth, is an old commercial centre, which used to be visited in the middle ages by Genoese, Venetian and Greek [368] merchants. In Jasi, with its wide streets flanked by long rows of one-storied houses, there is the oldest Rumanian University, founded by John Cuza, a famous library containing over 160,000 books, and many other cultural institutions. Jasi has a number of iron and steel works, several clothing factories and is the chief marketing centre for cattle and wine in Moldavia.

7

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Crisana]

000 in the west and Czechoslovakia in the north. The
162 inhabitants of the Crisana are Rumanians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans and some Slavs. Taken as a whole the province contains a slight Rumanian majority, but there is in the immediate frontier region a fairly homogeneous Hungarian population, which forms a local majority.

133 The western part of the Crisana has the same
311 features as the lowlands of Hungary. The types of agriculture also closely resemble those of the rest of
135 the country on both banks of the Tisza[H] (Theiss[G]). There are wide, flat fields of maize and wheat interspersed with pastures, grazed by horses and longhorn cattle. To the east the country rises and forms a chain of hills which produce good fruit and wine. Beyond are the mountains of Bihor (Bihar[H]) which form the western wall of Transylvania. These mountains are rich in coal, gold, copper, bauxite, asphalt and marble. Consequently this region maintains numerous industrial enterprises. Apart from its mineral resources and good wheat and maize the Crisana is also well known for its horses, cattle, pigs and sheep.

361 The capital of the Crisana is Oradea-Mare
438 (Nagyvarad[H], Grosswardein[G]) in the valley of the Cris (Körös[H], Kreisch[G]). Its population of about 95,000 consists of Hungarians, Rumanians, Jews, Germans and others. Oradea is the junction for five railway lines and commands all the main communications leading from the Hungarian plain to Transylvania. The town is also the seat of many industries and the chief market for the agricultural produce of the province. Arad, on the northern bank of the Mures (Maros[H]), is inhabited by 65,000 people,

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Crisana]

[Maramures]

mostly Hungarians, and occupies a similarly important position. Here there are numerous factories, including mills, railway shops and locomotive works and textile factories. Satu-Mare (Szatmar[H]), with 60,000 inhabitants, is the largest town in the Northern Crisana. 361 438

After the Great War the Crisana, which was first occupied by the Hungarians in the tenth century and subsequently colonized by them, was awarded to Rumania. Under the Vienna Award of 1940 part of the Crisana was returned to Hungary, with a considerable Rumanian population. 175

By the same decision the province of Maramures (Marmaros[H]) (about 1,350 square miles), inhabited by over 150,000 people, acquired by Rumania in 1918, was returned to Hungary. Geographically Maramures is a continuation of the Czechoslovak province of Ruthenia. It is enclosed on all sides by chains of mountains covered with thick forests whose great density is rare even in the Carpathians, which are famous for their wealth of trees. It is not easily accessible except by a solitary railway line which comes from Transylvania and leads to Ruthenia. The small population consists of Ruthenians, Rumanians, Jews, Slovaks and Hungarians and is typical of the medley of races to be found in quite small areas of this part of Europe. Owing to the mountainous nature of the country there is little agriculture. The chief occupation of the inhabitants is the felling of trees. The most valuable asset of the province is its mineral wealth. There is oil, gold, copper, salt and coal. The capital and only major town of Maramures is Sighet (Marmaros-Sziget[H]) with a large Jewish population. Sighet, a town of 133 162 [496] 313 135 361

464 722 1941 there were 2,000 unemployed, while in December 1942, it was announced that the Office of Unemployment Statistics had been abolished, as there were no unemployed. Though Rumania's military mobilisation and losses have been extensive, her labour reserves are theoretically still considerable. On the other hand, there is no doubt that both industry and agriculture are suffering a noticeable labour shortage. This is attributable to the low level of mechanisation, internal economic organisation and to the cumbersome administration, so that comparison with western countries is impossible.

1. Agriculture.

464 241 The proportion of the working population engaged in agriculture is extremely high, so that military recruitment has been principally from this source. The structure of Rumanian agriculture, which is mainly peasant farming with a low output per head, has meant that the withdrawal of some 550,000 men has been more serious than it would have been in a country where more up-to-date methods are used, and the remaining labour supply is more mobile. The normal sources of supplementary wartime labour have been drawn on—*i.e.*, the temporary demobilisation of soldiers, employment of children during the summer holidays, and presumably an increased employment of women, although there is no evidence of women having been forcibly transferred to agriculture.

[727] The most valuable supplementary labour, however, has been the employment of Russian prisoners of war, and the demand for their services has exceeded the supply. The number employed in March 1942 was 40,000. These measures to improve the agricultural labour position do not as yet appear to have had much effect.

2. Industry

162 438 178 According to the latest official census figures (relating to the year 1930) 620,000 persons were employed in industry. The following table shows in column 1 the total number employed in the main branches, and in columns 2 and 3 the numbers working in factories employing ten or more people. A comparison between columns 2 and 3 gives an indication of the growing industrialisation of the country.

	1 1930	2 1930	3 1937
Food	122,000	25,200	34,700
Textiles and Clothing	155,000	34,800	70,500
Metallurgy	101,000	32,000	49,500
Timber..	94,000	31,000	44,000
Mining	53,000	n.a.	n.a.

Allowing for the increased industrialisation during the years 1930–39, and for the general increase in the total population to some 20,000,000, it is estimated that by 1939 the number of industrial workers in Greater Rumania would have risen to some 750,000.

With the loss of part of the provinces of Transylvania, Crişana and Maramureş, Rumania suffered a fairly considerable loss in industrial workers, so that added to the expulsion of Jews, repatriation of Germans, etc., and military mobilisation, it is estimated that at the end of 1942 the numbers engaged in industry would not exceed 550,000. [464]

As in the case of agriculture, the structure of Rumanian industry tends to prevent a thorough rationalisation and concentration of the available industrial labour.

[55b]

CHAPTER XI

463 438 industrial labour. One-third of all workers engaged in industry are independent artisans, on whom the community is dependent for its services, but who do not play any important part in war production. In certain of the larger armament works German controllers have effected a considerable degree of rationalisation.

3. Mining

316 727 There is a shortage of miners; Russian prisoners of war have been employed in mining during 1942. Many miners were reported to have been included in the territory transferred to Hungary.

4. Armament Works

719 464 There is a general shortage of labour in metal and engineering factories, particularly of skilled labour. A 12-hour day was legalised at the beginning of 1942, but it is doubtful if in fact a 12-hour day is ever worked.

5. Timber

313 464 There is a shortage of labour, both for lumbering and for timber manufacture.

6. Textiles and Clothing

464 288 294 The total number of workers in these industries has probably fallen considerably, due to reduction of available raw materials. The delivery of supplies to individual mills seems to be somewhat erratic, and there is evidence of considerable part-time work, for instance in a survey of some 43 factories, in December, 1942, 11 were working full time, 21 on a reduced scale, and 11 at a very reduced scale.

7. Building

499 712 464 The extent of fortification building and general road and rail construction in Rumania is unknown, but in the second half of 1942 there was evidence of a scarcity of general labour for such projects, and of Russian prisoners of war working on rail construction.

438 464 [759] In the other branches of occupation, transport services, etc., there is no evidence of labour shortage, apart from doctors, many of whom have been mobilised for the army.

D. CONTROL OF LABOUR

1. The Youth Labour Service

466 883 A youth labour service founded on the German model was established in March 1941. The leaders were trained in Germany, but it was only in April 1942, that the labour camps began to function. Youths are called up in their 19th–20th year, and the period of service lasts 7 months.

(*See* Part II, Chapter V.B. for further details.)

2. Civil Mobilisation

466 A general civil mobilisation decree was passed in May 1941 by which (1) employment cards were introduced; (2) men and women aged 20-57 were liable to compulsory employment if not employed.

Two subsequent decrees were published in March and May 1943, one for the reorganisation of agriculture, forestry and fishing, and the second for the reorganisation of industry. Each of these decrees gave full powers to the appropriate authorities for the mobilisation and transfer of labour.

In addition to the general labour decrees which have so far had little influence on the labour situation, there have been regional decrees applying to individual localities, e.g. in Bessarabia, in February 1942, all the inhabitants aged 22-70 were called upon for compulsory agricultural labour unless already employed.

113, 439, 648 Rumania ED1

[For a discussion of the nature, scope and probable future trends (up to 1970) of Soviet economic relations with the East European satellites since World War II, and the degree of inter-satellite economic integration, see 60: Bergson, R1 Soviet Union, category 116, pp. 321-355]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241 creased. Certain industrial plants, such as sunflower and soybean, showed a rapid rate of growth, especially in the second half of the 1930's, but they represented a very small percentage of the total acreage.

Considerable regional variations corresponded to differences in soil and terrain. Cereal cultivation was most widespread in the Old Kingdom and Bessarabia, especially in the plains of the Siret, Prut, and Danube rivers, and in Dobrogea; it was of much less importance in the Carpathian regions, Transylvania and Bucovina. In a few districts, of which the most notable was Ţara Bârsei in southeastern Transylvania, the peasants carried on an intensive cultivation and had a standard of production well above the average for the country.

In the village investigations of 1938 it was discovered that cereal cultivation was predominant in all categories of holdings. It was most extensive in properties between 5 and 25 hectares, but even on dwarf holdings of under one hectare more than half the land was devoted to cereals.

With respect to the general volume of production, maize, which the peasants preferred to cultivate and which formed the major element in their diet, rose above the pre-1914 level, but wheat, which had been grown principally by large cultivators, never achieved the prewar level. Exports of both wheat and maize declined greatly below the prewar level.

PRODUCTION AND EXPORT OF CEREALS, 1909–39 [31]

(1909–13 production and export = 100)

[439]

	Wheat		*Maize*	
	Production	*Export*	*Production*	*Export*
1909–13 (1919 boundaries)	100	100	100	100
1928–32	67.7	15.9	104.1	58.1
1933–37	70.5	19.3	101.7	42.8
1935–39	88.7	39.8	108.8	32.5

The slump in cereal production was primarily the result of low yield per hectare, since by 1924 the area under cultivation had recovered from the immediate postwar decline and surpassed the average area cultivated between 1909 and 1913.

31. U.S. Department of Agriculture, "Wartime Agricultural Surpluses of the Danube Basin," *Foreign Agriculture*, 4, No. 12 (December, 1940), 712.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

433 ing from the very extensive devastations of the war; the agrarian crisis and the world depression hurt agriculture all over the world; the agricultural protectionism of the European industrial states drove the east European nations toward industrial protection; from the middle of the 1930's the increasing menace of war led to a growing demand for heavy industries to supply armaments.

But despite all these external influences, there is still reason to believe that the relation of Rumanian agriculture to industry worked to the disadvantage of the former. Politically, of course, there is abundant evidence that industry was a far more promising source of funds than agriculture, and undoubtedly political and private interests worked to the benefit of industry. In 1927, G. D. Creangă observed, "The situation which before the war existed on the land, where a number of latifundiary owners retained the greater part of the agricultural revenue has now passed into the domain of trade and industry." [13] No doubt Rumania's need for industrialization was often used to camouflage private financial motives; in 1932 an English observer maintained that the high protectionist policy was not really designed to protect Rumania from the ravages of foreign capital but had been introduced "mainly because the Brătianu party aimed at reserving for themselves the monopoly of such profits as could be made through the exploitation of the national resources." [14]

In Rumania one can never be sure that such aims are not dominant. Nevertheless, the tension between industry and agriculture certainly involves more than the personal scramble for wealth and profits. The impulse toward industry was also intimately connected with Rumania's foreign commercial relations.

Commerce

Economic tensions on two levels have already been observed: between the peasant and the estate owner in the countryside, especially before 1914, and between agriculture and industry. Both were in some measure a consequence of Rumania's increasing involvement in the complex of world industry and commerce. It is now necessary to examine these external relations.

● 439 Rumanian foreign commerce was on a relatively small scale; in 1929, for example, the total value of imports and exports per capita was only one-tenth as great as that for Great Britain in the same

[113] 13. Quoted in Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, p. 575.

14. George Clinton Logio, *Rumania, Its History, Politics, and Economics* (Manchester, 1932), p. 126.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

year. While the principal Rumanian imports were manufactured goods—textiles, iron and steel products, and machinery—the nature of these imports does show a fairly important shift between 1920 and 1938. Increasing imports of raw materials and semifinished goods (from 2 to 20 per cent of total value of imports) and a decline in finished manufactured goods (from 88 to 74 per cent) reflect the move toward industrialization. Rumania's principal exports were agricultural products (chiefly grain), timber, and petroleum products.[15] During the interwar years petroleum became the most important export, replacing cereals, which never regained their pre-1914 position. 439

The significance of petroleum in Rumania commerce was, of course, very great; Rumania had a more favorable balance of trade than the other Balkan states, thanks largely to its oil shipments. In addition to its importance as an export the oil industry provided the state in normal years with nearly one-third of its revenue, not including benefits to the railways which were state-operated. But while petroleum meant a great deal to Rumania's balance of trade, its importance to the whole economy should not be overemphasized. A large part of the industry was owned by foreigners, and a considerable proportion of the proceeds from exports did not reach the country in terms of foreign exchange. Moreover, the petroleum industry, being something of a lucky windfall and detached from the rest of the Rumanian economy, did not greatly influence the pattern of exports, though it added to their total value. Except for oil, Rumania's exports resembled those of the other eastern European agrarian states, with perhaps a greater emphasis upon cereals. 439 315

What were the disadvantages of this form of commerce which should have driven Rumanian governments to strain the economy in an effort to industrialize? In recent years there has been a widespread reaction against the classical theory of the international division of labor and an increasing belief that agricultural countries are trading at a disadvantage, regardless of the doctrine of comparative costs. This reaction has taken a number of forms, ranging from a reaffirmation of Friedrich List's ideas to an advocacy of economic autarky. Without becoming involved in the theory of international trade, one may observe at least three concrete ways in which the principle of international division of labor fails to satisfy an agrarian state. 439

In the first place, the existing international division of labor and

15. In 1928–30 the principal exports, in percentage of total value of exports, were: grain, 29.2; livestock, 6.0; timber, 14.3; petroleum, 33.0.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

459 the distribution of industry were determined by a number of historical contingencies and are not an accurate reflection of the allocation of natural resources.[16] In the second place, historical evidence seems to indicate that the international division of labor has not, in fact, been successful in providing the more backward countries with manufactured goods. "Non-industrial countries can profit from such division of labor only to the extent they enjoy a surplus of their production that can be exported in exchange for foreign manufactures. Figures analyzed . . . clearly indicate that in the majority of non-industrial countries this surplus is not large enough to ensure them a plentiful supply of manufactures." [17] In the third place, regardless of the original reasons for a country's backwardness, the mere fact of backwardness in a competitive international system can serve to impede the country's advance toward industrialization.[18]

In addition to these general disadvantages which face undeveloped agrarian countries in world commerce, certain specific factors during the interwar years damaged Rumania's position as an exporter of agricultural products. The overseas cereal exporters, with their vast extent of land and mechanized agriculture, could produce grain more cheaply than Rumania with its peasant husbandry. The agricultural protectionism of the European industrial states had a very serious effect upon Rumania and all the eastern European states. Finally, the world agrarian depression after 1929 greatly reduced the value of Rumanian exports and created a price scissors.[19]

[113]

16. For a defense of the industrialization of agrarian states as a means of achieving a closer correspondence between the distribution of industry and the allocation of natural resources, see S. N. Prokopovicz, *L'Industrialisation des pays agricoles et la structure de l'économie mondiale après la guerre* (Neuchâtel, 1946).

17. League of Nations, *Industrialization and Foreign Trade*, p. 34.

18. K. Mandelbaum, *The Industrialisation of Backward Areas* (Oxford, 1945), p. 4.

19. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Balkan States: I. Economic* (Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 65:

Price per Metric Ton of Rumanian Imports and Exports
(in Swiss francs)

	Exports	*Imports*
1922–30	121.3	815.8
1931	68.5	853.9
1932	57.0	823.4
1933	49.3	768.5
1934	46.5	629.6
1935	49.4	547.0
Percentage fall between 1922–30 average and lowest point, 1931–35	62	33

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

It is obvious, of course, that the real impulse toward industrialization in backward countries has been only in part economic; nationalism and the demands of state security have probably been more important in forming the actual decisions to create national industries. National interests, moreover, have a way of making relative economic differences appear absolute. Thus, if two countries are making economic progress, but one at twice the rate of the other, from the purely economic point of view both countries are gaining and the whole situation is on the positive side of the ledger. But if these two states are also involved in power politics, the relative economic disadvantage of the one state appears, and may in fact prove to be, an absolute loss. Consequently, when power relations enter into the picture, and in the Balkans that is axiomatic, economic disadvantages, which may be only relative or "temporary" in theory, appear much more menacing. 439

For all these reasons, in which economic and national interests are intermingled, foreign commerce or, more broadly, Rumania's economic contact with the West served as a spur to the creation of industry. Since unregulated commerce did not seem to bring this about but rather underlined Rumania's role as an agricultural nation, with all the real and imagined disadvantages that implied, industrialization was forced. While, as has been said before, there is no reason to regard this development as unnatural, that does not mean there was no dislocation. One does not know how Rumania's traditional institutions might have developed if left undisturbed. On the other hand, the superimposition of Western industrial, financial, and commercial organizations and techniques upon the undeveloped Rumanian economy did create a strain, one which is shown clearly in the financial and monetary difficulties that hounded Rumania throughout the interwar period.

Money and Finance

Rumanian finances and monetary policy have been notoriously wobbly. The cause is frequently ascribed to official graft and corruption, of which, no doubt, there was a great deal, some of it theatrically extravagant. Foreign advisers had occasion to be very critical of the use of foreign loans, state speculation in commodities, and laxness in the tax system. These shortcomings, however, were symptoms as well as causes, though they certainly exacerbated the financial troubles and contributed to a generally low standard of official ethics. 457

Before the First World War, Rumania's balance of payments was

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 leadership divided, many of the party's most capable men deserted, the party's popularity declined, and an increasing number of peasant supporters were attracted to the Iron Guard.

3) An apparent recovery of the Liberals. The Liberal party had been badly hit by their defeat in 1928 and the schism between Vintilă Brătianu and Gheorghe Brătianu, occasioned by Carol's return. With Vintilă Brătianu's death in 1930 the way was cleared for a gradual reconciliation with the king. The Young Liberals (Gheorghe Brătianu) failed to make any significant headway, and under Duca the old Liberals seemed to be heading for a comeback.

4) The flowering of fascism. The meteoric rise of the Iron Guard was the most spectacular event of those years, and trailing in its wake were a number of less fiery fascist, semifascist and anti-Semitic formations of unequal importance. In the party system they served to replace the older coteries, such as Iorga's and Averescu's parties, which were fading from the scene, but in fact they heralded the collapse of parliamentary government.

5) The total impotence of the Left-wing labor movements. They had never been strong in Rumania, but during these three years they were driven from the offensive, however weak, to the defensive. Popular discontent did not, after 1933, swell the ranks of the labor movements but strengthened the Iron Guard.

The Struggle against the Depression

434 439 During these years the economic situation steadily deteriorated. It was estimated that the nominal national income in lei dropped by about 45 per cent between 1929 and 1932.[8] While Rumania was able to maintain a positive balance of trade throughout the depression, the value of exports fell from 29 billion lei in 1929 to 14 billion in 1933 and 1934, even though the weight of exports increased from 7,000,000 metric tons to 8,000,000. Imports fell from 1,102,000 metric tons in 1929 to 467,000 in 1933 (450,000 in 1932). State revenues declined from 36 billion lei in 1929 to 18 billion in 1933.

439 The depression in Rumania had been initiated by the world agricultural crisis in 1929, which produced a tremendous fall in the price of agricultural products, particularly disastrous in the Balkan states because of their inability to compete with the great overseas producers. As industrial commodities fell neither so soon nor so far the resulting price scissors hurt the peasant as agricultural producer

8. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *South-Eastern Europe* (Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 127.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

and Rumania as agricultural exporter. The average price per metric ton of Rumanian exports fell in 1934 by 62 per cent of its 1922–30 average, whereas the price of imports fell by only 38 per cent in 1936. Internally agricultural prices dropped to 44 per cent of the 1929 level, industrial prices to 62 per cent.[9] The situation was further aggravated by the inauguration at this time of an agrarian protectionist policy by the European industrial states. After 1928 Germany introduced high agricultural tariffs; Italian grain and flour duties reached prohibitive levels between 1929 and 1931; France imposed heavy tariffs on cereals. 439

In May, 1931, the failure of the Austrian Kredit-Anstalt unleashed the financial crisis which swept across Europe and ended the flow of foreign capital to Rumania. Inevitably, the fall in grain prices, the disappearance of foreign markets for agricultural produce, and the stoppage of foreign credit had a disastrous effect upon the Rumanian economy. State finances, never on a very steady foundation, and having just been reorganized in 1929, were hit by the decline in revenues (direct taxes dropped from 8.6 billion lei in 1930 to 3.4 in 1933), and there was a budget deficit each year between 1930 and 1934.[10]

One peculiarity should be observed in the Rumanian depression. In several respects Rumania was in a better position than the other Balkan states. Because of a series of good harvests in 1929, 1930, and 1931, and because of petroleum exports, it was able to maintain a considerably better balance of trade. Moreover, because of the acquisition of a good deal of foreign capital in the loans of 1929 439 656

9. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei romînești*, p. 80, and *Breviaire Statistique de la Roumanie* (Bucarest, 1940), p. 226: [435]

	Wholesale agricultural prices	*Industrial prices*	*Prices of industrial products required by agriculture*
1929	100	100	100
1930	68.2	92.9	98
1931	50.8	72.0	86.5
1932	47.7	62.2	80.9
1933	44.9	62.2	81.1
1934	44.1	63.4	82.6
1935	48.4	75.2	90.2

10. As a matter of fact, a budgetary deficit in Rumania is a very relative term; many of the so-called budget surpluses of the 1920's were quite fictitious. See Ludovic Iavorschi, *L'Equilibre budgetaire en Roumanie de 1920 à 1932* (Paris, 1933). I doubt if the budget deficits can in any way be regarded as a planned attempt to counter the depression, since all the governments promised balanced budgets and the deficit appeared as the result of altogether undirected and uncontrolled expenditures through a number of channels.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

439 656 and 1931, Rumania was somewhat less pressed financially than the other states, and was indeed the last of the Balkan countries to introduce foreign exchange controls and to declare a partial moratorium on foreign debts.[11]

652 Nevertheless, Rumania was the slowest to show signs of recovery, an indication that something in addition to the general causes for the depression was having an effect. Such was the opinion of the French foreign advisers to the Rumanian National Bank, MM. Rist and Auboin. According to Auboin, in his report of 1935, a distinction should be drawn between the causes of disequilibrium arising from the world crisis and those proper to Rumania itself. In his opinion the first were predominant between 1929 and 1932 in the fall in prices and the disruption of international credit. But local causes became manifest, especially after 1932, despite a certain easing of international conditions. The two principal evils, in his view, were the weaknesses in the whole Rumanian credit system and the unstable budget position, both of which had afflicted Rumania since the First World War. As a financial adviser he was particularly indignant that the Rumanian government should try to enjoy all the benefits and amenities of a modern state through its expenditures but should still rely upon primitive means of organizing state finances: "It is necessary to adopt and apply not merely the methods of expenditure but also the methods of receipt of modern states." [12]

The fall in prices and the reduction of credit presented the Rumanian peasant with a serious debt load which he was in no position to discharge. The advocates of small peasant agriculture have contended that one of the principal advantages of this form of cultivation was the peasant's resistance to crises through his ability to cut expenses, reduce his relations to the market, and live on his own. It is true that debts contracted for agricultural investment were quite small in Rumania as compared with other European states.[13] Never-

11. Rumania introduced exchange controls on February 27, 1932; Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Austria, Bulgaria, and Greece had introduced them between August and October, 1931. Rumania declared a partial moratorium in January, 1933; Greece, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia had done so in 1932.

12. Roger Auboin, *Rapport annuel sur la situation financière et monétaire de la Roumanie* (Bucarest, 1935), p. 36. Auboin was primarily concerned with Rumania's ability to honor its foreign obligations, and hence stressed the need of tightening state finances and creating a sound budget, perhaps at the expense of local requirements. Nevertheless, his, and Rist's, reports are devastating in their picture of the irresponsibility of Rumanian financial administration, its slovenliness, and tendency to make increasingly complex and meaningless regulations.

13. Comparative figures in the International Institute of Agriculture's *Farm Accountancy Statistics for 1928–29* (Rome, 1932), show very little investment and very little debt for Rumanian farms as contrasted with those of other European states. These

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

652 671 farm products, aimed principally at maintaining the prices in the home market by the reduction of various charges and taxes. The Iorga government, however, at once superseded this measure by inaugurating in July, 1931, an export bounty of 10,000 lei for 10,000 kilograms of wheat and 16,000 lei for flour, the cost to be met by a bread tax. The government, however, discovered that it lacked the funds to carry out this measure and discontinued it in 1932. Moreover, it turned out to be largely for the benefit of the export houses rather than the producers and merely tempted Rumanian exporters to engage in wheat dumping. On the other hand the tax on bread, which was to pay the bounty, was borne largely by the peasant consumer.[21] In 1933 and 1934 a different method was tried; the last Vaida Voevod cabinet set up a State Cereal Commission by which the government appeared on the market as a consumer to support wheat prices.

Like debt conversion, the price-supporting measures, which were taken up by the various governments in turn, were not the result of any over-all plan but were simply steps to counteract the depression. In fact, in their effect they ran against all plans for agrarian improvement. The parties, in their programs and writings, had all agreed that the future of Rumanian agriculture lay in intensive farming and in persuading the peasant to abandon extensive cereal cultivation for which his small holding was obviously ill-suited. The bounties on wheat had precisely the opposite effect and led to an even greater emphasis upon cereal production. Between 1930 and 1935 the area under wheat showed a definite, if highly irregular, tendency to rise.

● 439 648 The governments also undertook to obtain more favorable foreign markets. The first effort, under the National Peasants, was by means of collaboration with the other eastern European states in an agrarian bloc. Through the series of conferences in 1930 the agrarian states attempted to create a program of common action to gain preferential treatment from the industrial states for their agricultural products. Although the agrarian bloc pleaded its case at various meetings of the League and at international conferences between 1930 and 1932, it failed to open markets for agriculture. Its requests were opposed by the maritime states and overseas grain producers as contrary to free trade and the most-favored-nation principle. Madgearu, one of the most eloquent spokesmen for the bloc, declared that the agrarian states did not demand permanent preferential treat-

21. Manoilou, *La Reconstruction économique et financière de la Roumanie et les partis politiques*, p. 284.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

439
648

ment but merely assistance to recover from the depression.[22] The whole tenor of international trade policy at that time was against his recommendations, and nothing tangible was achieved. Nor did the various international efforts of 1931–33—the Tardieu Plan, the Stresa Conference, and the London Economic Conference—bring the southeastern European states any substantial benefits in relieving their foreign indebtedness, establishing common economic policy, or providing more favorable foreign markets.

With the failure of international attempts to obtain better markets for its agricultural produce, the Rumanian government was driven toward increasing restrictions and controls. Although Rumania under the Brătianus had pursued a policy of economic nationalism, and was to do so again in the latter half of the 1930's, the commercial and monetary controls imposed by the different cabinets between 1931 and 1933 did not, in their inception at least, appear to be the result of any comprehensive policy but were applied as emergency measures. Many of the steps were taken by Virgil Madgearu, who had been a bitter critic of the Liberals' policy and was later to attack the trend toward increasing protectionism; he repeatedly explained that he was being forced against his wishes into these restrictive measures.

In the spring of 1932 the government introduced foreign exchange controls to preserve the national currency in face of the deteriorating balance of payments and the threat of speculation. Import controls were imposed in December, 1932, and were, according to Madgearu, primarily designed to stimulate exports and only secondarily to restrict imports, although the association of the two was inevitable and followed from the exchange controls.[23] In the summer of 1933 Madgearu declared a moratorium on foreign debts [24] and in the autumn demanded their reduction. In defending these moves he stated that unless markets were opened to Rumanian products the government was left with no alternative but to restrict imports, control exchange, and freeze its foreign obligations. All these moves "served directly or indirectly as an instrument of agricultural protection." [25]

In the same years Rumania was making the first steps toward clear-

22. A. Bussot, "Le Bloc des états agricoles de l'Europe centrale et orientale et son programme," *Revue d'économie politique*, 47 (Paris, 1933), 153.

23. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

24. Under this measure the equivalents of sums due abroad were deposited in lei in the National Bank; they could not be withdrawn from the country but could be invested in Rumania. Part of Rumania's subsequent industrialization was financed by these captive funds.

25. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

439 648 ing agreements and bilateral trade, again in the effort to find markets. In 1931 a trade convention was made with Germany which reduced its duties on Rumanian maize and barley; in 1932 agreements were reached with France for the export of maize and with Germany for meat.

All these steps, however, were defensive efforts to protect agriculture against the depression. It is less easy to find much evidence of attempts to get at the roots of the agrarian question. The different cabinets passed a variety of laws, some of them transparent vote-catchers, others old favorites which each new Rumanian government seemed to pass as a matter of routine. All the cabinets announced their goal of increasing the use of agricultural machinery: the Mironescu government passed an act reducing the import duties on agricultural equipment by two-thirds, the Iorga government in 1932 and the Liberals at the beginning of 1934 granted credits for the purchase of agricultural machinery. To judge from the figures on the consumption of agricultural equipment the results were very slight, at least until 1934 with the beginning of recovery.

The only apparent effort at overcoming the disadvantages inherent in Rumania's system of strip cultivation was a law for the establishment of agricultural associations passed by the Iorga cabinet in July, [671] 1931. By this law cultivators whose separate properties formed an economic whole could combine to cultivate their land more rationally by the introduction of mechanical cultivation, use of fertilizers, selected seeds, and other technical improvements. Funds required by the associations for this purpose could be obtained through the cooperative and agricultural banks, the state to assume 6 per cent interest on the loans on the condition that the association follow a plan approved by the Ministry of Agriculture. Nothing seems to have come of this law, and a very similar semicollective state-sponsored proposal was attempted by the Antonescu regime a decade later.

In general, 1931–33 were years of steady retreat before the onslaught of the depression. In the course of this retreat a number of economic devices were developed, in Rumania as elsewhere, which were to take on increasing importance in the years to follow. To a considerable extent they had been introduced to protect agriculture, but they were soon to find pleasanter and more lucrative employment.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 Liberal party are indicative of the move toward a less inhibited industrial drive.

During the four years, then, between the depression and the inauguration of the Carolist dictatorship, it is possible to find inside Rumania, not to mention the external influences, three quite distinct factors making for the destruction of parliamentary government and the creation of an authoritarian regime

1) Carol's own personality and his streamlined interpretation of the old-fashioned prerogatives of a monarch;

2) The unrest and growing extremism in broad sections of the population, which was finding a mouthpiece in the Iron Guard;

3) The economic policy of neoliberalism, which not only carried overtones of a more authoritarian state but through the centralization of economic power and control increased the possibilities of creating such a state.

656 While the general atmosphere of these years of neoliberalism re-
435 sembled Manoilescu's teachings in its industrial protectionism, increasing economic nationalism, and growing corporatism, there was an important difference: contrary to Manoilescu's thesis, agricultural protection was maintained and extended. During the years 1935 to 1937 there was a complex system of minimum prices, state purchases, and export bounties for wheat. By the law of 1935 the government paid a minimum price of 35,000 lei for 10 metric tons of wheat weighing 75 kilograms per hectoliter. An export premium financed by a tax on milling, paid 10,000 lei per ten-ton truckload of wheat, and 12,000 lei per truckload of flour. This premium was dropped with the rise in agricultural prices but was reapplied in
[647] 1938. A Wheat Valorization Office was formed to supervise these payments and to improve the quality of wheat. Similar steps were taken for medicinal plants, textile plants, and wool.

● 439 In 1936 Rumania signed a series of wheat export agreements with
435 Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, and other states. Foreign trade in grains was also assisted by an extremely complicated system of taxing imports to pay for export bounties and permitting the exporter to keep a portion of the free exchange obtained by his exports. In general these measures, which were aimed at maintaining the commercial balance, had a beneficial effect in supporting the price of agricultural products and in increasing exports. Between 1934 and 1937 agricultural prices rose from 44.1 (1929 = 100) to 64.6; the value of agricultural production increased from 42 to 62 billion lei; the value of cereal exports rose

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

 439

from 2 to 10 billion lei (in quantity from one million to 2.2 million 435
metric tons).

Two qualifications should be made however. The emphasis upon 85
wheat exports and upon the improvement of quality was primarily 439
for the benefit of the middle and large producer, though the maintenance of the price of grain did help agriculture as a whole. In the second place, as has been mentioned in connection with the depression, the premiums on wheat served to extend the area under wheat cultivation, in direct contradiction to the recommendations of agricultural experts, who continued to believe that "peasant agriculture should no longer limit itself, in imitation of the old system, to the culture of cereals; its success will come from a parallel development of the resources of the field and of livestock raising." [35] This contradiction, which shows the absence of any real coherence to the agrarian program of the Liberal government, had two obvious sources: wheat, for all its decline after the First World War, was important commercially and from the point of view of foreign commerce there was a strong incentive to support it. Moreover, the wheat growers were the larger farmers and were in a better position to make felt their wishes than were the small maize-producing peasants.

The government did, however, make certain efforts to increase 241
the variety of agricultural production. The most elaborate was the 433
creation, with the assistance of I. G. Farbenindustrie, of the "Soya" 654
company, which was authorized to import soybeans, distribute them to cultivators, provide equipment, and purchase the entire crop for export to Germany. The area under this crop expanded rapidly, especially in Bessarabia: 1,465 hectares in 1934, 20,411 hectares in 1935, 58,037 hectares in 1936, and 102,000 hectares in 1937. The government through price guarantees and subsidies also furthered the cultivation of sugar beet, tobacco, rice, and textile plants.

These measures to diversify agriculture did not, despite all the publicity given to them, achieve very great importance. They were only a drop in the bucket compared with the vast area under peasant cereal cultivation, and their rate of expansion seemed unlikely to produce any general amelioration for a very long time. Moreover, the introduction of such industrial crops, whose main purpose—almost exclusively so in the case of soya—was for export, shows the persistent if natural effort to solve the agrarian question by a sort of legerdemain. The soybean had been an old favorite, and as early

35. G. Ionescu-Sişeşti and N. Cornăţeanu, *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie et ses conséquences*, p. 79.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

German-Rumanian Economic Relations

439 This plan, however, was but part of a larger scheme which concerned not only Rumania but the Third Reich. In the course of Nazi Germany's economic penetration of southeastern Europe in the 1930's,[12] Rumania was, initially at any rate, better able than the other states to maintain an independent position, partly because it had at least one important export, petroleum, which could be sold on the world market. In the mid-1930's the Rumanian government took definite steps to limit exports to Germany. As late as 1937 Germany's share in Rumania's foreign trade was no greater than it had been in 1929.[13] The German market was, however, important as a purchaser of Rumania's agricultural products. Thus, in 1937 Germany absorbed 61.2 per cent of Rumania's maize exports, 57.4 per cent of the barley, though only 8.3 per cent of the wheat.

Germany was not initially interested in Rumania's grain exports. Indeed the policy of protecting German cereal production, which had started before the Nazis, was not dropped until rather late, and Germany did not import large quantities of bread cereals until 1937.[14] It was, however, very much interested in obtaining fodder and oil plants; it was for this purpose that in 1934 I. G. Farbenindustrie had set up the Soya Company to foster soybean production in Rumania.

After 1937 the picture changed; the economic recession hurt Balkan exports and increased Balkan dependence upon the German market. The *Anschluss* in the spring of 1938 cast Germany's political shadow over all the Balkans, and a rash of German publications announced the Reich's destiny in *Südosteuropa*. German dominance was increased with the Munich decision and the failure of the Anglo-French economic drive in southeastern Europe to achieve any important countereffect. In Rumania the shift in the international political balance, more than purely economic penetration, led to

12. For an account of Germany's trade policy which brings out some of the benefits to the Balkan states see H. W. Arndt, *The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen-Thirties* (Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 176–206; Antonin Basch, *The Danube Basin*, pp. 165–213, emphasizes the sinister aspects of the German advance.

13. Rumania's trade with Germany between 1929 and 1938 in per cent of total values was as follows:

	1929	*1930*	*1931*	*1932*	*1933*	*1934*	*1935*	*1936*	*1937*	*1938* (*including Austria*)
Imports	24.1	25.1	29.1	23.6	18.6	15.5	23.8	36.1	28.9	36.8
Exports	27.6	18.8	11.5	12.5	10.6	16.6	16.7	17.8	19.2	26.5

(In 1937, Austria had provided 8.5 per cent of Rumania's imports and absorbed 6.8 per cent of its exports.)

14. Basch, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

Germany's growing economic influence. By 1938 Germany and Austria absorbed 26.5 per cent of Rumania's exports, but even in the German-Rumanian agreement of December, 1938, the Rumanians were able to block German efforts to increase substantially the clearing rate of the reichsmark. 439

A new stage was reached, however, in the German-Rumanian agreement of March 23, 1939, which really did tie Rumania's economy to that of Germany.[15] By this treaty, which was to run for five years, very close economic collaboration was envisaged, involving German assistance in the internal development of the Rumanian economy. The principal aim of this treaty, which emphasized the complementary nature of the two economies, was to expand and diversify Rumanian agricultural production. Germany was to assist in promoting the cultivation of agricultural products of interest to its economy, especially foodstuffs, oilseeds, and textile plants. New industries were to be established for processing agricultural products. Mixed Rumanian-German companies, in which Germany was to supply the machinery, were to exploit mineral and petroleum resources. The treaty also made provision for mutual collaboration in various industries, road, rail and water transport, and public enterprises. Rumanian and German banks were to collaborate on methods of financing the activities contemplated under the plan. Finally, the agreement provided that Germany would supply armaments and munitions to Rumania.[16] 648

In assessing the significance of this agreement, as well as Germany's increasing economic monopoly in the Balkans, it is necessary to distinguish between the actual effects under the international circumstances and its merits as a purely economic program. In actual fact, of course, Germany's economic activities in the Balkans proved to be part of its over-all task of preparing a war economy, and it could be maintained that to overlook the military premise behind Germany's actions is to miss the essential point. Certainly Germany's primary concern was to obtain in southeastern Europe a source of vegetable and mineral raw materials to assist in creating an economy secure from blockade. At the same time, Germany appears to have regarded

15. According to Grigore Gafencu, at that time Rumanian Foreign Minister, this economic agreement was designed to appease Hitler, who had displayed an ominous irritation over Carol's assault on the Iron Guard in the autumn of 1938. See his book, *Last Days of Europe* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 23–25.

16. For a discussion of this agreement from the German side, cf. Anton Reithinger, "Grossdeutschland und Südosteuropa im Lichte der Statistik," *Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv*, 29 (1939), 129–139, and German Institute for Business Research, "The German-Rumanian Trade Treaty," *Weekly Report*, Nos. 13–14 (April 6, 1939).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

manian peasant,[17] under his dictatorship the overriding concerns were mobilizing agriculture for the war, compensating for the lost territories (though part of these were regained after 1941), and maintaining production against the drain on manpower and the requisitioning of equipment and livestock for military purposes. The majority of acts were specific war measures: price controls, export controls, laws against agricultural sabotage and speculation, control of livestock, state requisitioning of cereals, crop planning, and the mobilization of agricultural labor. Most of the measures had been initiated in Carol's reign under the trade agreement with Germany and the five-year plan for agriculture, but the war intensified them and put them on a directly military footing. By necessity there was an increase in the mobilization of agricultural labor. Field commandos and labor gangs were sent about the country under the supervision of gendarmes and rural agents of the Ministry of Agriculture.

An attempt was made to compensate for the shortage of manpower and livestock by increasing agricultural equipment, largely through import from Germany. If the figures are to be trusted imports in 1941 and 1942 were quite extensive:[18]

	1941	*1942*
Tractors with ploughs	1,000	2,814
Animal-drawn ploughs	20,000	40,000
Sowing drills	4,000	1,400
Harvesters	2,000	2,230
Hoes	10,000	30,000
Harrows	4,000	9,200
Threshers	200	250

By a law of June 22, 1942, for the organization of agricultural associations, the government attempted to overcome the disadvantages of small strip farming by means reminiscent of the Iorga law of 1931. By this act a group of at least fifteen cultivators residing in the same commune could constitute an agricultural association, authorized to purchase farm machinery, seeds, fertilizers, etc., sell produce in common, purchase or lease land, and obtain credit. The association was not an independent body however. It was to be man-

17. According to an admiring German biography, Antonescu first attracted attention during the 1907 uprising when, as a young lieutenant, he succeeded, without firing a shot, in persuading a crowd of rebellious peasants to disband.

18. Brief accounts of the measures undertaken up to 1943 are given by N. D. Cornăţeanu, "International Chronicle of Agriculture: Rumania," *International Review of Agriculture, 32* (Rome, July–August, 1941), 247E–254E; and *34* (April, 1943), 156E–164E.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

subject of a number of heated disputes at international conferences, 433
and it would be very difficult to make a reliable estimate.[24] That the 648
drain was serious is indicated by the fact that as early as 1945 some Rumanian Communists, with more than the average amount of economic insight and less than the usual blind devotion to the Soviet Union, were in despair over the effect of the Russian withdrawals upon the country's economy and their own political position. The glaring contradiction between Russia's efforts to woo Rumania and to secure some measure of popularity for the Communist party and its rather frantic removal of goods and equipment has puzzled many observers. The explanation may simply be that the policy of this monolithic state was not consistent, or rather, that two different policies were here overlapping.

Rumania's foreign trade was greatly reduced after the war; by 439 ●
1948 the value of its exports was only 50 per cent of the 1938 figure (in 1947, 21 per cent), and its imports 69 per cent (in 1947, 57 per cent).[25] The bulk of the trade was with the generally similar economies of the other eastern European states, which were being increasingly linked by a network of trade agreements.

The combination of low output, armistice obligations and war costs, 652
and the general political uncertainty of the postarmistice months led to a fearful inflation. Rumanian currency had never been sound since the First World War and had showed a tendency toward inflation in the 1930's and the war years; between 1945 and the summer of 1947, when a drastic stabilization was achieved, prices rose to dizzying heights. The cost of living index increased from a base of 100 in 1938 to 145.0 in 1940, 413.9 in 1943, 3,678.7 in 1945, 46,140 in December, 1946, and 525,688 in July, 1947.[26]

24. At the time of the Paris Peace Conference the American delegate, Willard L. Thorp, complained that the Rumanian delegation had been of no assistance in supplying information on this point, but he estimated that the total cost to Rumania of its defeat would be about $2,000,000,000. As of 1946 he estimated that about $1,050,000,000 had already been transferred: $325,000,000 for the maintenance of occupation troops, $100,000,000 for reparations based on the 1938 price level, $175,000,000 for property restitution, and $450,000,000 for requisitions. U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin, 15*, No. 379 (October 6, 1946). In July, 1948, General Radescu, in exile in the United States, stated that since Thorp's estimate Rumania had paid an additional $735,000,000. *New York Times*, July 18, 1948. Some attempts have been made to relate these withdrawals to Rumania's national income, but both figures would by necessity be exceedingly uncertain.

25. United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*, Table XVI.

26. Institutul Central de Statistică, *Comunicări statistice, No. 19* (Bucarest, January 31, 1948).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

185 241 Western model, but during this first period, to avoid alienating the peasants, it held its hand.

185 433 A somewhat similar situation obtained in the question of industrial policy, though here official propaganda was much more hostile to exploiting industrialists. So long as the Tătărescu Liberals were in the government, it called for the cooperation of private capital, and the only important step taken in this first phase was the nationalization of the National Bank. As late as March, 1947, Mihail Ralea, Rumanian Minister to the United States, protested against rumors that the government was proceeding against private enterprise and maintained, either disingenuously or without information (Ralea was not a member of the Communist party), that one of the main goals of the Groza regime was to "foster private initiative," to which it granted complete freedom.[30] Nevertheless, in practice the sphere of private industrial activity was increasingly circumscribed and restricted by a number of devices: obstructive action by the workers, appeals to the national interest, or simply charges of inefficiency and sabotage.

●439 Perhaps the most significant economic innovation in the months after the armistice was the creation of a number of joint Soviet-Rumanian enterprises. On May 8, 1945, the Rumanian government signed an agreement with the Soviet Union providing for extensive economic collaboration. The U.S.S.R. was to assist Rumanian agriculture by supplying tractors, seed, and agricultural experts. A number of SOVROM companies were set up in the important fields of river and air transport, banking, lumbering, and oil production and refining. (A 1948 trade agreement created two new SOVROM companies for the manufacture of tractors and chemical products.) Participation in the companies was on a 50–50 basis, and the Rumanian state was to grant them special privileges and monopolies. Much of the Soviet capital was quite easily obtained from the German assets in Rumania, awarded to the U.S.S.R. in the Potsdam agreement. These concerns clearly gave the Soviet Union a controlling position at key points in the Rumanian economy.

This form of economic collaboration was reminiscent of the Rumanian-German trade agreement of 1939. The principal difference lay less perhaps in the agreements themselves than in the structure of the Soviet and German economies. Under the German-Rumanian agreement the two economies were seen as complementary, and the major function of Rumania was to provide raw materials; the Germans showed some hostility to the further development of Ru-

30. See his letter to the *New York Times*, March 12, 1947.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

manian industries, especially secondary industries. Both Russia and Rumania, however, are still industrializing economies and there seems to be little evidence, in the Rumanian case at least, of a desire to check the industrialization of the latter.[31] 439

The turning point in the economic policy of the immediate post-war period was the stabilization of the currency in August, 1947, which more or less liquidated the old financial structure and served as a vast economic leveler. On the fifteenth of that month, the leu was devalued (to 150 to the dollar) and the old money was ordered to be exchanged immediately at the rate of one new leu for 20,000 old lei. Peasants were limited to exchanging 5,000,000 lei; workers to 3,000,000; and other persons to 1,500,000. That is, at the official new rate, peasants could receive in exchange $1.67, workers $1.00, and others $0.50. Gold and foreign currency were entitled to full value but had to be declared under penalty of life imprisonment. This drastic measure, which came at a time of continued commodity shortages, inevitably caused widespread hardship. There were numerous reports of resistance by the peasants who felt as usual that they were being sacrificed to the benefit of the towns. The government hurled many charges of speculation and exchange violation, and part of the brutal behavior of the regime in the course of 1947 is to be associated with, if not explained by, this Draconian financial reorganization.[32] 652

Along with the tightening of political control the Groza government now entered a new phase of economic policy marked by the progressive nationalization of industry, collectivization of agriculture, and the beginning of economic plans. In 1947 pressure against private industry consisted primarily in assuming control over certain specific enterprises, supervising industrial activity, and making accusations of sabotage against foreign-owned concerns. At the beginning of 1948 Gheorghiu-Dej launched a general attack on private capital, which dominated industry, banking, and insurance: "Our democratic regime has been very patient with private enterprise, but private owners do not make capital investment, nor do they renew equipment. They transfer capital abroad and openly sabotage reconstruction." In January the concession of the Rumanian match monopoly to the Swedish firm (this concession had been granted at the time of the stabilization loan of 1929) was declared invalid and 185 471

31. See also below, pp. 327–329.

32. A defense of the stabilization, written by the National Bank, is published as "La Réforme monétaire en Roumanie, 15 août 1947," in *Les Archives internationales*, Doc. 554.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

TABLE XXXII. RUMANIAN FOREIGN COMMERCE: BALANCE OF TRADE

439

	Imports (metric tons)	Value (1,000 *lei*)	Exports (metric tons)	Value (1,000 *lei*)		Difference (1,000 *lei*)
Average 1901–05	534,822	298,923	3,034,871	360,651	+	61,728
Average 1906–10	805,574	408,939	3,504,380	501,274	+	92,335
Average 1911–15	1,002,056	526,969	3,765,234	605,320	+	78,351
1919	413,939	3,762,300	109,140	104,385	—	3,657,915
1920	304,685	6,980,290	1,467,118	3,447,848	—	3,532,442
1921	615,451	12,145,405	2,713,188	8,263,009	—	3,882,396
1922	583,668	12,325,966	4,069,963	14,039,296	+	1,713,930
1923	699,124	19,516,026	4,900,734	24,594,129	+	5,078,103
1924	825,754	26,264,582	4,833,419	28,361,044	+	2,096,462
1925	899,925	29,912,645	4,663,992	29,126,824	—	785,821
1926	924,442	37,195,415	6,117,781	38,264,805	+	1,069,390
1927	1,006,069	32,852,131	7,337,087	38,110,810	+	4,258,679
1928	952,808	31,540,956	5,886,405	27,029,728	—	4,611,228
1929	1,101,992	29,628,038	7,064,619	28,960,005	—	668,033
1930	805,233	23,044,163	9,214,754	28,522,028	+	5,477,865
1931	560,366	15,754,569	10,047,002	22,196,914	+	6,442,345
1932	449,980	12,011,325	9,056,959	16,721,593	+	4,710,268
1933	446,962	11,741,850	8,777,730	14,170,828	+	2,428,978
1934	635,868	13,208,543	8,854,096	13,655,734	+	447,191
1935	533,268	10,847,530	9,276,009	16,756,223	+	5,908,693
1936	630,643	12,637,698	10,548,913	21,703,391	+	9,065,693
1937	709,415	20,284,748	9,637,497	31,568,357	+	11,283,609
1938	820,608	18,767,830	7,409,084	21,532,580	+	2,764,750
1939	739,089	22,890,474	7,564,146	26,809,349	+	3,918,875

SOURCE: *Bréviaire statistique de la Roumanie, 1940*, p. 188.

TABLE XXXIII. RUMANIAN FOREIGN COMMERCE: IMPORTS

Value of Imports, by Per Cent

	Animals	*Food*	*Raw materials and semifinished*	*Finished goods*	*Gold and silver*
1920	—	10.4	1.9	87.6	—
1921	—	9.8	3.2	87.0	—
1922	—	11.0	4.8	84.1	—
1923	—	10.8	4.3	85.3	—
1924	—	7.7	5.4	86.9	—
1925	—	8.1	6.1	85.8	—
1926	0.1	5.7	7.0	87.0	0.2
1927	0.2	6.0	10.1	83.7	—
1928	—	6.5	9.7	83.8	—

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

● 439

TABLE XXXIII. RUMANIAN FOREIGN COMMERCE: IMPORTS (*cont.*)

Value of Imports, by Per Cent

	Animals	*Food*	*Raw materials and semifinished*	*Finished goods*	*Gold and silver*
1929	—	6.9	10.6	80.5	—
1930	0.1	6.4	10.6	83.0	—
1931	—	7.2	9.9	82.7	0.2
1932	—	7.4	10.3	77.6	4.7
1933	—	6.9	12.6	80.5	—
1934	—	5.3	14.3	80.3	—
1935	—	6.6	14.1	79.5	—
1936	0.1	5.1	14.5	80.2	—
1937	—	4.4	17.5	77.5	0.6
1938	—	4.9	20.2	74.4	0.4

SOURCE: N. Georgescu Roegen, *Comerțul exterior al României în perioada 1920–1938*, quoted in Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

TABLE XXXIV. RUMANIAN FOREIGN COMMERCE: EXPORTS

Value of Exports, by Per Cent

	Animal	*Vegetable*	*Cereals (as per cent of total vegetable)*	*Wood (as per cent of total vegetable)*	*Mineral (almost entirely petroleum)*	*Other*
1919	4.4	28.4	—	—	66.8	0.4
1920	1.3	78.9	85.2	4.6	19.6	0.2
1921	12.8	62.8	80.3	9.1	24.1	0.4
1922	15.0	63.9	59.9	29.0	20.1	0.9
1923	9.0	76.0	65.2	21.9	14.1	0.8
1924	14.7	71.4	60.6	27.4	13.0	0.9
1925	20.8	56.5	44.9	38.8	21.5	1.2
1926	14.0	59.6	61.7	26.1	25.8	0.5
1927	10.4	68.3	73.1	17.7	20.5	0.8
1928	12.9	54.9	51.5	32.8	31.1	1.1
1929	12.4	52.5	58.9	30.8	34.2	0.9
1930	11.6	50.5	69.4	21.5	37.4	0.5
1931	12.0	55.2	71.6	19.4	32.1	0.7
1932	8.3	47.0	72.9	15.7	44.1	0.6
1933	6.8	36.3	63.5	19.8	56.3	0.6
1934	9.5	36.8	48.1	29.7	53.6	0.5
1935	9.7	37.6	52.1	23.1	52.1	0.5
1936	10.6	47.3	66.6	16.4	41.6	0.4
1937	9.3	48.7	66.2	18.4	41.7	0.3
1938	10.6	44.8	54.5	25.5	44.2	0.4

SOURCE: *Anuarul statistic, 1939–40*, pp. 577, 590–598.

288 progress. The production of cocoons is in the neighbourhood of half a million pounds weight per annum. The production of boots and shoes is sufficient to supply the home market, but the quality is poor.

FOREIGN TRADE.

ROUMANIA produces in bulk for export three things: timber, grain and oil. The market for timber is the eastern Mediterranean and chiefly Egypt. Where good rail communications are lacking, the timber is moved from the forested Carpathians by water. Much is floated down the various tributaries of the Siret to Galaţi and the Black Sea. It is unfortunate that up-stream transport to western 439 markets for this bulky commodity should be so difficult, while in the Levant it has to meet the severe competition of cheap Russian timber. In the up-stream markets there has been keen competition from Jugoslavia and Poland. Cheap rail freights and abatement of export tax are means taken to combat the retrogression of the trade.

WITH REGARD to trade in grain, Roumania suffers in common with all grain-surplus producing countries. Before the War the lower Danube and Black Sea grain trade was closely linked with the demand for British coal in the Mediterranean countries, the return cargo ensuring cheap freights for a more or less regular supply. The slump in the British coal trade, the check on production brought about by the break up of large estates, a series of bad harvests, and finally a world slump in grain prices, which reduced the export price of wheat below that of the home market, all these factors have been at work in reducing the wheat trade of Roumania and producing a consistent decrease in the average value per ton. Poor transport facilities and port equipment have also acted adversely in the moving of timber and grain.

THE EXPORT of petroleum increased from 2.8 million tons in 1929 to 5.6 million tons in 1933, drilling activities having increased, especially in the Dambovița district. The port of Constanța has been considerably improved by the installation of 10-inch pipe-lines, the construction of oil reservoirs, the fitting of special hose-handling cranes and the doubling of the railway track between Cernavoda and Constanța.

647 465 661 are certainly no insuperable obstacles to the removal of what constitutes a drain on the strength and probity of the country, which is being visibly weakened in every sphere of administration.

The following article, which was published in the "Lupta" of Dec. 17th, 1931, is instructive as to the manner in which public functionaries behave in order to supplement the scanty salary they draw from the State and which generally does not suffice to keep them alive.

647 651 ● 489 661 It is obvious that no civilized State would tolerate methods which in Rumania are benevolently winked at. There is no doubt that the evil could easily be remedied if functionaries were decently paid. The increased outlay for the State which this would involve would be largely compensated by a more conscientious performance of duty by the administrative staff. For instance, it is well known that owing to the high duties in force, smuggling on a colossal scale is being carried on with the connivance of officials, with the result that the State is defrauded of millions. M. V. Madgearu, former Minister of Finances, openly admits it in his book "Rumania's New Economic Policy," published in English, on page 39 of which we come across this astounding statement: "It has been shown that while pre-war Rumania imported about 70,000 kilos of natural silk, united Rumania registered the importation of only 1,000 kilos in 1927. It is well understood that the rest has been imported through smuggling." On a rough computation this item alone would account for an annual loss of some 50 million lei to the revenue.

But, apparently, blackmail is even more lucrative than smuggling, according to the article referred to in the "Lupta":—

647 651 661 "Truly, *smuggling* constitutes a source of big revenues for the State. Not bona-fide smuggling which involves the introduction of goods into the country without the disbursement of duties. This latter sort of smuggling is never discovered, or if discovered is rapidly hushed up with the connivance of the ablest pillars of the Ministry. The principal sources of revenue from smuggling are derived from the hypothetical variety, when for instance an anony-

GEOGRAPHIC AND ETHNOGRAPHIC NOTES

Cetatea Alba 33,495, Focşani 32,799, Botoşani 32,007, 162
Tighina 31,698, Bacau 31,264, Balţi 30,667, Giurgiu 30,348, Piatra-Neamt 30,211, Bazargic 29,938, Roman 28,948, Sighet 27,684 (French edition of census gives 27,646), Barlad 26,189, Ismail 26,123, Lugoş 23,674, Targovişte 22,482, Tulcea 20,104, Turda 20,057, Reşiţa 20,008.

COMMERCIAL MORALITY

One can best judge of a country by the mentality of its 439 ●
commercial circles, and it is not therefore amiss to enlarge 452
on this subject prior to analyzing Rumanian finance, for it will be found that State affairs are generally conducted very much after the business methods in vogue. In fact, as we all know, legislation concerning finance and trade is often, if not always, inspired and directed by the views held by the commercial and its allied industrial and banking professions.

An outsider would have expected that in a country like Rumania, practically devoid of liquid assets, every possible safeguard would have been extended to foreign capital so as to attract it, seeing that the country's development and welfare are dependent on it. But instead, post-war Rumanian legislation has been distinctly inimical to the foreign creditors of the country, and has openly favoured and encouraged debtors to repudiate their engagements to such an extent, that finally all operations based on credit have had to be suspended. This has had a disastrous effect on Rumanian commerce, for traders are generally devoid of cash resources and depend entirely on credit for their operations. Importers of foreign goods used to obtain their supplies on a six to nine months credit basis, and were able to extend corresponding facilities to their customers, so that these transactions really corresponded to the granting of a short-term loan to Rumania which was perpetually renewed and which permitted the financing of these operations.

Several laws, amongst which that of the so-called "concordat préventif," finally superseded by the so-termed "judicial liquidation," have rendered commercial opera-

439 tions on a credit basis so hazardous that they have prac-
452 tically ceased, to the great discomfiture of Rumanian merchants, who have seen their activities completely paralysed.

426 As matters stand, a creditor is at the mercy of his debtor,
452 and if the latter refuses to honour his engagements there is nothing to be done but to accept whatever compromise may
651 be offered, for a recourse to tribunals would be tantamount
686 to a total loss not only of the amount involved, but of the supplementary expenses arising from legal disbursements and inordinately high judicial taxes which unlucky creditors will have to defray.

[439] What is singular is a tax imposed by the State on all bankruptcies to the amount of 20 per cent of the total assets declared, so that this explains, though it can hardly justify, the State's manifest indifference to the undermining of the country's commercial reputation through fraudulent bankruptcies, the frequency of which is positively alarming, for it derives corresponding advantages from this impost on bankruptcies. Instead of attempting to circumscribe this evil it would appear that the State has done much to encourage it, especially where foreigners are involved. Apparently it is actuated by the shortsighted view that the loss of the foreigner is to the benefit of the country in general, since through bankruptcies foreign capital is transferred to its own nationals. At any rate, bankruptcies have been regarded as a means of raising revenue, and the State as a privileged party has always secured its 20 per cent impost plus other legal taxes, and the debtor has usually managed to alienate a good part of his assets so as to safeguard himself in a very satisfactory manner, while the wretched creditor not only gets nothing but usually finds he is being called upon to make further disbursements on account of legal formalities involved. The *Argus* of June 15th and 16th, 1931, commenting on the law of the "Concordat préventif," qualified it as disastrous, and added: "Among the principal obstacles which prevent the development and normalization of our commerce this law stands in the front rank. . . , it has given free rein to the unscrupulous debtor, permitting him to carry out his underhand manœuvres without any risks, to sell the goods he bought with-

cent. It can easily be understood that no enterprises could possibly bear the burden of such interests, and that if foreign capital was to be excluded it would be necessary to have recourse to artificial encouragements in order to create and foster the industries it was contemplated to set up. Protection in its extremest form, therefore, was resorted to, and a tariff wall, the highest in Europe, was erected to protect the budding of these hot-house industries. In order to start a new industry the theoretical case for Protection is admittedly strong. Temporarily the new industry needs help, and eventually the country as a whole may gain from its creation, though in the meantime it has to bear the burden. The immediate effect is to increase the costs of the various articles produced locally to an extent that places them beyond the reach of a poor community such as the rural population of Rumania. The repercussion of an increase in the costs of articles required by the agrarian population naturally causes a rise in the costs of production of agricultural produce, which renders less easy its marketing in neutral markets in which the Rumanian peasant can neither enjoy nor demand the favour of a protective duty. So that eventually protection has proved an arm which has turned against him. In the case of Rumania, most of the industries which have been created proved to be clearly detrimental to the State. Certainly the textile industries, which import the totality of their raw material in the form of yarn from abroad, confer no benefit except to their proprietors. The raw material is usually allowed free admission, or pays a very light duty, while the finished article is sold at a price corresponding to that of a similar foreign product on which a duty amounting to as much as 300 per cent is occasionally imposed. Almost the whole of the difference is pocketed by the manufacturer, and the native purchaser gets no benefit whatever. On the contrary, he usually gets an inferior home-made article at almost the same price as he would pay for a foreign one generally of better quality. In this arrangement the State is deprived of a very important source of revenue since it desists from collecting the tariff dues it would otherwise have received if, instead of raw materials imported free, foreign dutiable manufactured articles had been imported.

+ That the extreme [illegible]
Rumania is

not approved by the public may also be seen from the following excerpts culled from an article published by the same paper on May 15th, 1932: "There is a profound difference between industries which utilize local raw materials and such pseudo-industries which import from abroad semi-manufactured materials and finish them off in this country. . . . The importation of semi-manufactured goods is in the great majority of cases carried on solely to evade the Customs tariffs, and if we do not see things as they are, this is on account of private interests, for the sake of which we allow a prejudicial system to continue to function. . . ." 651 661 47

The *Argus*, too, several times attempted to call public attention to the nefarious results of the policy of bolstering up artificial industries, and especially in the case of the textile industry, on which it wrote as follows: "Why are clothing materials so costly? Because our protected textile industry sells its products at the same price as the goods imported from abroad. The encouragement given to the textile industry has resulted in increasing the cost of wearing apparel because industrialists are not content with a reasonable profit, and as a result a woollen suit to-day is a luxury. When our Custom tariff is to be revised the interests of industrialists alone should not be considered, but also those of the consumers."

As one may infer from the above, this policy of industrialization was a wild scheme which materialized on a large scale, chiefly because various politicians had been directly interested in the manufacturing concerns which had been started. 661 651 289 477

The case of the paper industry may be cited as an example. All the paper mills belonged to or were controlled by friends or relatives of the Bratianus. In order to secure big profits an import duty of 50 per cent was placed on paper, creating thereby a virtual monopoly of the paper trade on behalf of the owners of the mills. As they could dictate their will to the Chamber, the high duty was maintained in spite of the protest of the Opposition. For not only the public at large suffered by the high price of such an essential commodity as paper, but political interests were equally affected. Opposition parties had to pay high prices

652 the loans concluded in 1929 and 1931, and some 930 millions are for the service of the internal debt.

The national revenue for the years 1926–1928 was computed at an average of 171 milliard lei annually, of which 110 milliards, or 64 per cent, were contributed by agriculture. The revenue *per capita* was computed at 9,709 for 1927, 11,324 for 1928, 10,400 for 1929, 7,875 for 1930, and at only 5,523 lei for 1931, the fall recorded being due to the drop in the prices of raw materials. State expenditure, as represented by the budget for 1931, absorbs approximately 25 per cent of the national revenue, but this is not the only expenditure which has to be faced. Thus for the year 1930, the last year for which complete figures are available, enabling us to form a true estimate of the total social expenditure incurred, we have:

Budgets of the State and of the Autonomous Administrations: 59,908,750,553 lei.

Budgets of the Communes, Municipalities, and Departments: 10,156,051,778 lei.

These sums represent a total charge *per capita* of 3,920 lei, while the national revenue was estimated at a *per capita* charge of 7,875 lei. This amounts to a charge of approximately 50 per cent for social expenditure, an altogether disproportionately heavy burden which largely accounts for the catastrophic decrease in the revenue, and points to the
•439 gradual pauperization of the country. This inference may
652 also be drawn from the fact of the steady diminution of imports, which have declined enormously since 1927, not only in value but also in bulk, which proves that the buying power of the people has been gravely impaired, as may be seen from the following figures, the diminution in quantity indicating that the fall was in no way due to the drop in prices:

		Value	*Tons*
Imports for 1927	...	33,428 million lei	1,008,069
,, 1930	...	22,541 ,,	773,745
,, 1931	...	15,858 ,,	564,338

TRADE

139 Pre-War Rumania was known as one of the chief grain-exporting countries. She occupied the third and occasionally the second place for maize, attaining and sometimes surpassing the one million ton figure of the United States, while for wheat she ranked fifth, coming immediately after the U.S. In spite of the fact that other countries have vastly increased their agricultural production, yet in 1931 Rumania still came second in the exports of maize and fifth in those of wheat, though after 1928 cereals no longer formed the largest group of her exports, for petroleum and its derivatives came to rank first, attaining 33.26 per cent of the value, and 40.80 per cent of the bulk of exports in 1929, as against 30.63 per cent and 24.37 per cent respectively for cereals. The following table sets out the distribution of exports during the last three years:

	1929		1930		1931	
Products	Quantity Tons.	Value in millions of Lei.	Quantity Tons.	Value in millions of Lei.	Quantity Tons.	Value in millions of Lei.
Animal	95,439	3596	121,999	3,303	119,877	2,685
Vegetal	3,910,333	15,202	5,055,770	14,404	5,126,764	12,145
Mineral	3,024.947	9,887	4,018,709	10,668	4,788 231	8,149
Combined	32,403	260	17,942	148	18,316	959

The group of vegetal products includes also timber, the exports of which amounted in 1929 to 4,679 million lei and represented 16.17 per cent of the total exports and 28.02 per cent of their bulk. Timber exports have steadily declined in value, falling to 3,094 million lei in 1930, and to 2,368 millions in 1931. The main export products of Rumania being petroleum, cereals, and timber, she is exposed to suffer more than any other nation from the Russian policy of dumping, since the principal goods exported by Russia are of an identical kind. As Russia's policy is to expand her exports to the utmost in order to secure the necessary foreign credits wherewith to buy the requisite machinery for her industrial equipment, it is to be feared that this Russian competition will be likely to cause immense prejudice to Rumania, who,

for reasons easily understood, is incapable of competing 439 against her northern neighbour. Having to face likewise in the grain trade the formidable competition of the trans-oceanic countries which have industrialized their agricultural production, Rumania finds herself to-day in a most unenviable position, which explains why she is so desperately anxious to conclude preferential agreements with European industrial countries, so that she may have the possibility of disposing of her products at better prices than those at which similar Russian goods are being offered.

In order to market the 1931 harvest the Rumanian Government was obliged to grant a subsidy of 1,000 lei per ton of cereals exported, but after paying about one milliard lei in subsidies, it found that the system constituted too great a strain on its resources and the subsidy was suddenly suspended, many exporters not even receiving their due. The real ratio of exchange between raw materials and manufactured articles, which has lately shifted so markedly in favour of the latter, is another powerful factor which, added to her difficulties in exporting her produce, is making for the industrialization of Rumania.

As this policy of industrialization, which has been followed [439] since the conclusion of the war, has not given the expected 471 results, its continued pursuit and intensification can only be persisted in through State intervention, which is also growingly exerted in organizing the exports. Control of exchanges, the clearing system, quotas, and inter-state barter are all gradual stages leading to the ultimate elimination of individual initiative in commercial intercourse and its substitution by collectivist methods. From this stage to the adoption of integral communism is an easy transition, and in view of the close proximity of the Russian example no surprise should be shown if it be imitated not only by Rumania, but by other Near Eastern States, if no other way of escape out of their present difficulties be offered them. The prospect of these States adopting Bolshevism is quite within the domain of possibilities, and this can hardly constitute a very reassuring portent for our Western democracies.

The visit of Ismet Pasha to Moscow in April, 1932, for the 648 purpose of seeing at close quarters how the Communist

administrative machinery worked, should serve as an eye-opener to the sceptic. Already, early in June, the Constantinople *Journal d'Orient* has announced that Ismet was intent on applying Russian methods to agriculture in Turkey, and that his Government had decided to create a textile industry on the Russian model and with Russian help. Subsequently the Turkish Press has announced that Russian experts had arrived to choose sites for the proposed works. For this reason it is to be deeply regretted that at the recent Grain Conferences, held in Paris and Rome, the delegates of the British Government did not adopt a more sympathetic attitude towards the views set forth not only by Rumania but also by her neighbouring countries, all of which are faced with the same difficulties. Their demand for preferential treatment with regard to their cereals may run counter to the 'most favoured nation' clause, yet there are methods by which such difficulties as may arise from such complications can eventually be circumvented, and the agreement reached between Rumania and France on May 26th, 1932, which grants the former country a total annual quota of 80,000 tons of wheat with a 40 per cent reduction in duties, is a case in point. This agreement brought into force automatically the long-talked-of preferential treaty with Germany,[1] which gives to Rumania an annual quota of some 200,000 to 250,000 tons of maize and of 400,000 to 500,000 teons of barley, with a 60 per cent reduction for the former and one of 50 per cent for the latter, and also secures for Rumania the right to export to Germany 7,000 head of cattle and 70,000 pigs per annum. Of course Rumania has had to grant corresponding advantages to Germany for certain of her industrial products, so that, taking into account that Great Britain is the largest grain-importing country, importing on an average three or four times as much as Germany, it would seem that it would be to our advantage and within our means to conclude similar arrangements. In 1931 we imported a total of 222 million bushels, of which 50 millions came from Canada, 39 from the Argentine, and 21 from the

[1] In August, 1932, a trade agreement between Italy and Rumania was signed, both countries making mutual concessions in their tariffs.

United States. At first sight it would appear that ample scope exists for the provision of a market for the cereals of the Danubian countries, provided that the latter would agree to grant corresponding facilities to our manufacturers. If our delegates at the grain conferences, instead of turning down all proposals on this head emanating from these countries, had demanded a *quid pro quo*, they would have done better work. Such an arrangement would seem more advantageous to us than the policy of subsidizing wheat growing in our country since, to quote the Rt. Hon. Viscount Astor, "the world price of wheat for 1939 was 25s. per quarter, but the average cost of producing it in England was stated by many farmers to be 45s. to 55s. . . . the subsidy on wheat will cost from £3 to 5 millions . . . it would be cheaper for us to have this land derelict and to give every landlord £1 per acre, every farmer £2 per acre, and every labourer £2 per week to sit at home and smoke his pipe in idleness than to pay the quota scheme at recent prices. . . ." (*v. Nineteenth Century and After*, March, 1932.) On the whole it would certainly be more profitable if our dairy and cattle-rearing industry received cheap grain from the Danubian countries, the acquisition of which would offer our manufacturers the possibility of placing in those countries an increasing share of their manufactured products, rather than to proceed with the economically unsound policy of subsidizing grain growing in this country, and thereby intensifying the existing glut of agricultural produce in the world markets.

At any rate, if we abstain from assisting the Danubian countries, the force of circumstances will compel them either to seek the realization of the Mittel Europa scheme, or to adopt a distinctly Bolshevik economic policy, and it must be admitted that neither of these contingencies would be to our advantage. Besides the agreements with France and Germany, Rumania concluded in May, 1932, a temporary arrangement with Argentina concerning the export of maize, both countries agreeing to prohibit their exports if prices fell below an agreed figure, which for Argentina was fixed at 5 pesos per quintal, and for Rumania at 33 French francs per quintal. As these countries export respectively eight

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

439 million and two million tons, or 75 per cent and 20 per cent of the total quantity of maize exported (for the world), it seems that there is a possibility for them to stabilize effectively its price at a reasonable figure.

Rumania still remains an essentially agricultural country in spite of the development of her petroleum industry, and as such she will continue to import from abroad the essential semi-manufactured goods for her artificially-created industry, subsisting solely by Protection, and in addition a limited quantity of better quality articles which cannot be manufactured locally, as well as machinery necessary for the equipment of her industries. Germany continues to be (as during the pre-war period) the country to which Rumania sells and from which she buys most; Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Italy being the next best purveyors as well as customers. Rumania therefore continues to be in close commercial relations with the countries of Central Europe, owing to her geographical propinquity to these States, and the facilities afforded for traffic by the Danube waterway and the main railway lines which connect Central Europe with Rumania.

The following table shows the relative importance of foreign countries in Rumania's export and import trade for 1930:

TRADE

439

EXPORTS TO:—

Country	Tons.	Value in 1,000 Lei.	Percentage of total.
England	995,362	3,230,452	11.33
Austria	425,175	2,588,535	9.07
Czechoslovakia	308,552	1,985,011	6.96
Germany	1,438,698	5,363,396	18.80
Hungary	1,187,651	2,127,371	7.46
Italy	1,260,742	3,674,836	12.88
Poland	95,499	452,250	1.58
France	607,302	1,958,980	—
Greece	218,049	696,169	—
Yugoslavia	242,750	509,558	1.79
Bulgaria	142,554	363,246	—
Holland	453,576	1,356,742	—
Egypt	544,911	1,194,361	—
Belgium	284,881	905,519	—

IMPORTS FROM:—

Country	Tons.	Value in 1,000 Lei.	Percentage of total.
England	54,303	1,873,712	8.13
Austria	41,412	2,678,949	11.63
Czechoslovakia ...	138,236	3,370,354	14.63
Germany	135,911	5,776,751	25.07
Hungary	60,817	908,111	3.94
Italy	38,367	1,825,419	7.92
Poland	134,675	983,301	4.27
France	—	—	—
Greece	—	—	—
Yugoslavia	23,532	79,600	0.34
Bulgaria	—	—	—
Holland	—	—	—
Egypt	—	—	—
Belgium	—	—	—

An examination of the above figures will readily convince the reader that Rumania, which exports 90 per cent of its cereals and 75 per cent of its oil, outside the Danubian countries, can find little inducement to participate in such a scheme as that of the Danubian economic federation proposed by France. Even members of the Government paid lip-service to M. Tardieu's plan, and if there was no outspoken criticism of it this was due mainly to the desire to avoid hurting French susceptibilities. The promised financial 439 648

439 aid was the only attractive feature of the scheme, and if this
648 plan materializes it may be taken for granted that the pecuniary assistance implied is the reason for its acceptance, and even then it is clearly indicated that such co-operation between the Danubian countries is to serve only as a prelude to a vaster project, namely that of a European Customs Union. A few figures will, however, show that this plan is not practicable. Thus Austria in 1930 imported 765,600 tons and Czechoslovakia 592,600 tons of cereals, while Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia annually disposed of 3,350,000 tons on an average during the years 1928–1930, or about two million tons more than the two industrial countries of the Danube basin could absorb, for the quantity of cereals these two countries buy from other than the Danubian States is infinitesimal. They likewise import 90 per cent of the meat they require from Hungary, Poland, and Rumania, so that the available margin for an increase on this item is also very limited. Concerning petroleum, Rumania exported in 1930 a total of 3,850,000 tons, of which only 1,150,000 tons were absorbed by Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, so that she had to dispose of the rest elsewhere. Apparently there is no inducement whatever for Rumania to join this proposed Danubian Union, and it is only the bait of financial aid and the desire not to ruffle France that will induce her to adopt a benevolent attitude towards it. In fact Rumania will be adversely affected, for she can only increase her sales to the other Danubian countries to a very limited extent, while she will be obliged to extend a preferential tariff to Austrian and Czechoslovakian manufactured goods which, on the one hand, will injure her own industry, and on the other, will affect adversely the import of manufactured goods of other countries, since they will have to pay higher duties than those on the corresponding Austrian and Czechoslovakian articles. It is certain, now that the preferential treaty with Germany has come into force, that the latter country will not regard with equanimity the realization of a Danubian Customs Union, which is likely to debar her from the advantages her trade arrangement with Rumania actu-
000 ally confers on her. All these considerations go to show that

The following table shows a detailed list of imports during 1930:

INDUSTRY

439

Imports	Tons.	Percentage of total bulk.	Value in 1,000 lei.	Percentage of total value.
Livestock	296	0.04	16,439	0.07
Animal food products	10,240	1.32	221,872	0.98
Furs	120	0.02	244,046	1.08
Leather and leather goods ...	3,309	0.43	485,519	2.15
Wool, hair and goods ...	5,907	0.76	1,365,991	9.06
Natural silk and goods ...	47	0.01	86,746	0.39
Various animal substances ...	3,977	0.51	156,554	0.70
Cereals and derivatives ...	29,802	3.85	306,702	1.36
Seeds	4,133	0.54	113,976	0.51
Vegetable oils	2,331	0.30	96,980	0.43
Vegetables, flowers, etc. ...	9,713	1.26	221,084	0.98
Fruit and groceries	33,315	4.31	818,244	3.63
Beverages	240	0.03	8,422	0.04
Sugar and confectionery ...	1,248	0.16	16,975	0.07
Vegetable textiles	49,592	6.41	6,702,290	29.73
Timber and derivatives ...	13,538	1.75	146,850	0.65
Paper and derivatives ...	13.561	1.75	524,469	2.34
Rubber celluloid & derivatives	8,183	1.05	740,386	3.28
Mineral waters and salts ...	900	0.13	8,355	0.04
Glassware	2,464	0.32	161,939	0.72
Earths, stones and derivatives	83,542	10.80	473,880	2.10
Fuel (mineral) and derivatives	180,841	23.37	302,589	1.34
Iron and ironware	236,723	30.59	3,442,482	15.28
Apparatus, machines & motors	34,604	4.47	2,836,640	12.58
Vehicles	8,539	1.10	638,734	2.83
Metals and metalloids other than iron	12,473	1.61	868,706	3.86
Toys	215	0.03	40,836	0.18
Musical instruments ...	472	0.06	139,055	0.62
Optical instruments	126	0.01	101,446	0.45
Watches and clocks	153	0.02	77,480	0.34
Jewellery	73	0.01	41,410	0.18
Chemicals and medicines ...	14,673	1.89	606,471	2.69
Perfumery	47	0.01	48,744	0.21
Colours and varnishes ...	7,620	0.89	373,402	1.66
Explosives	728	0.99	105,215	0.47
Totals	7,737,745	100.00	22,540,929	100.00

OIL & MINING INDUSTRIES

In spite of the continuous increase in the output of crude oil (the output for 1931 amounting to 48 million barrels), the industry is facing a most critical situation owing to the Russian competition and low world prices, excessive transport charges, and high taxation. Notwithstanding these adverse factors, however, the output of oil is steadily increasing, Rumania now being the fourth largest producer of petroleum, as may be seen from the following table:

315
382

8

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

565 provide their holders with a fair income, and a con-
471 siderable part of the rural population remained
423 landless. Worst of all, those peasants who did obtain land were given neither implements nor sufficient financial help which could have enabled them to make a decent living. Neither of the measures which are essential to the success of peasant proprietorship —State aid in money, machinery and technical advice; or the creation of large-scale co-operative [641] societies and banks—were carried out. Undoubtedly the extension of the franchise in 1923 to all men of 21 and the land reforms greatly strengthened the position of the peasantry in the State. But, actually, it was widespread discontent with the working of the agrarian reform that stimulated the organization of the National Peasant Party.

423 CROPS. The great devastation of Rumania during
241 the First World War and the effects of the land reform resulted in a great reduction of the country's agricultural production during the immediate post- [439] war period.[1] Whereas the Old Kingdom alone in 1913 had grown 2,200,000 tons of wheat, of which 1,150,000 tons were exported, and over 3,100,000 tons of maize, of which 1,000,000 tons were exported, the production figures for Greater Rumania in 1921 were for wheat 2,140,000 tons, and for maize 2,810,000 tons. This great decrease is all the more striking in view of the fact that the amount of arable

[1] In Transylvania and the neighbouring territories, taken from Hungary, some of the great *latifundias* had been well and scientifically worked with modern agricultural machinery. There were some conscientious landowners among the Magyar nobility as well as absentee landlords who neglected their peasantry.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

231 For the majority of Rumania's peasants the most
433 valuable of all animals are his sheep, of which Greater Rumania possessed about 12,000,000. Both the wool and the meat of Rumanian sheep are, however, of a lower quality than those of Great Britain or New Zealand. Sheep's milk, and the cheese made from it, supplement the monotonous diet of the peasant.

[439] Of the 3,000,000 pigs in Greater Rumania most were kept in the New Territories and a large proportion of the country's pork production was exported. Apart from the Rumanian Mangalita, English Berkshires were bred in great numbers.

241 Considered as a whole the agriculture of Greater Rumania, favoured by good climatic conditions and great soil fertility, remained undeveloped owing to the general economic conditions. The peasantry did not possess the necessary implements, buildings or animals which could have secured profitable ex-
[452] ploitation of the soil. Financial help was difficult to obtain, and the loans that were granted were ruinous to the peasant, owing to the high rate of interest.
[453] Co-operatives were few. Some agricultural banks and associations confined to the German colonists in the Banat and in Transylvania were the only ones
[435] which succeeded. Agricultural prices were low and the peasant was often forced to sell his produce before the harvest to export trusts which dominated
[654] the market. The only assistance given by the government consisted in loans and seeds at reduced prices for the growing of certain crops, such as soya beans, for export in order to fulfil international trade
[439] agreements. During the last fifteen years Germany secured an ever greater influence upon Rumania's agriculture and took most of its exports.

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

563 steel works of Resita and Copsa Mica, with a capital
471 of six million pounds sterling, and many other factories also passed under German control. In the
[439] fight against Franco-British and American capital in Rumania, Germany was favoured by the fact that 50% of Rumania's imports were German, and 36% of the country's exports went to Germany (1938). By 1940 the latter had reached about 70% of the total.

563 This underground activity of the German
668 minority, combined with the pro-Fascist leanings of the majority of the ruling classes, who feared to lose their privileges and were only too glad to join in the Anti-Bolshevik[1] crusade, and the corruption reigning in the army and all branches of the government apparatus, sapped the strength of the country economically, politically and morally. It had become an easy prey for the imperialism of Hitler.

661 [1] Especially savage measures were taken against workers' and intellectuals' progressive organizations, which were made illegal and had to go underground. Their members, if caught, were court-martialled and imprisoned.

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

648 Both the political and the economic life of
241 Rumania was subject to complete German domination. The agriculture of the country had to supply the German and Rumanian armies in the field. The area of arable land was feverishly enlarged so as to provide more food. This met with considerable success. In 1941 the country produced almost as much wheat as the whole of Greater Rumania in 1935. Exports almost reached the pre-1940 level.[1] By 1943 the area under wheat had been increased to 3,000,000 hectares and that under maize to 4,000,000 hectares. Even more important is the extension of the land used for the growing of rape seeds[2] and of oil-bearing plants.[2] Rumanian agriculture served a double purpose: the provision of food for the Rumanian and German armies and the supply of Germany's war industry with valuable raw material. The introduction of the soya bean into Rumania, the delivery of thousands of iron ploughs, tractors and other agricultural machinery from Germany only served to further this aim. Exploitation of the peasantry was the immediate consequence; but, if the ploughs and machinery remain when the Germans have gone, Rumanian agriculture is bound to benefit.

433 **OIL AND INDUSTRY.** The output of the chemical, textile and heavy industries were increased considerably. Consumer goods, however, are scarce and very expensive. The yearly production of oil has not

[439] [1] Export of wheat in 1940, 379,000 tons; in 1941, 2,500 tons; export of maize in 1940, 564,000 tons; in 1941, 117,000 tons. Both have since risen.

[2] 1942: 350,000 hectares grew rape seeds and 600,000 hectares oil-bearing seeds.

241 The basis of Rumanian economy is agriculture, in that some 80 per cent. of the population derive their livelihood from the land and agriculture provides a high proportion of the national income. [315] During recent years, however, the expansion of the oil industry has meant that agricultural produce has played a decreasing part in the country's [439] exports, having been superseded by oil, exports of which amounted to 43 per cent. of the total export trade in 1938, compared with 19 per cent. in 1927; while grain exports in 1938 represented 23 per cent. compared with 46 per cent. in 1927.

In spite of the importance of agriculture to national prosperity farming methods are backward and per acre crop yields are among the lowest in Europe. Attention is particularly given to growing cereals, and of these maize is the chief, [231] providing a large surplus for export (apart from the war years). Livestock density is low, which is one of the weaknesses of Rumanian agriculture, the Banat being the only district in which numbers are fairly high, and farming approaches the [439] intensive system. It must be stressed that the relatively large export surplus, which consists of wheat, maize, barley, oilseeds and pulses, livestock, oilcake, etc., is only made possible by [146] the very low nutritional level which prevails, and that if this were raised to anything like western European standards exports would be commensurately reduced.

248 Since the war more attention has been paid to 249 the growth of industrial crops such as sunflower, soya, cotton, hemp and flax and the cultivation of rubber-bearing plants has been started following the finding of the *Kok Saghys* plant left by the Russians in Bessarabia. Though some success has been achieved in increasing the areas under textile fibres, and yields have been slightly higher, the hoped for increases in soya and sunflower cultivation have not been achieved due to unfavourable weather conditions and to general wartime dislocation.

313 Rumania's forest resources, though extensive, have suffered severely from a consistent policy of over-exploitation and while providing the basis of a fairly important industry during the period between the two wars, have been so depleted that cutting will have to be very restricted for a number of years if they are to be allowed to recover. The loss of Northern Transylvania has affected the timber industry in particular, as a high proportion of the forest resources were located there, and in that district this industry was better developed than elsewhere in the country.

IMPORTANCE OF OIL

315 Oil plays a major part, not only in Rumania's foreign trade, but also in covering her domestic fuel requirements, to a large extent replacing coal, reserves of which are small and of low quality. Since the war and the resulting pressure which Germany has exerted to obtain increased quantities of oil for her armies (combined with the consistent drop in the rate of production between 1936 and 1941), serious attempts have been made to find alternative sources of fuel. The enormous reserves of natural gas existing in Transylvania, which were exploited only very slightly before the war, are being used increasingly as a source of fuel to supply local industries, and a

RUMANIA AS A GERMAN ALLY

648 To Germany Rumania has been an invaluable
433 il expensive ally—invaluable mainly for her oil production, which accounts for one-third of total Axis supplies; expensive because, in order to exploit the country's usefulness to the full, it has been necessary to provide goods, such as oil-well equipment, agricultural machinery, machine tools, etc., all of which she can ill spare on account of the need for them both in her own country and for supply to her other satellites. To ensure smooth working of the oil-well region German troops have been established in the Ploeşti district. Apart fom oil German expectations have come to very little in Rumania—her demands for cereals, soya beans, sunflower-seed, etc., have not been fulfilled due to bad harvests, labour shortage and peasant hoarding, and livestock deliveries have been affected by fodder shortage and illegal slaughterings.

As to further German demands on Rumanian economy, the most outstanding were for manpower in the form of troops for the Eastern front, and the use of the country for transit of troops and war materials to the battle zones. Both these facilities have been of considerable material value to the enemy, though in order to make use of Rumanian troops Germany has had to provide the bulk of the equipment, as Rumanian industry is not adequate to supply more than the barest minimum; and even where she has the available facilities, raw materials are lacking.

[489] To exploit the country successfully from the transport angle it has been necessary to set up a control organisation to direct transit traffic, and, in addition, to supply and repair locomotives and rolling stock.

GERMAN PENETRATION

648 For a great many years, Germany has been
●439 the natural supplier of engineering and consumption goods which Rumania was unable to produce for herself, and has provided a ready market for her surplus agricultural produce. Following the coming into power of the Nazi Government, Germany succeeded in acquiring Rumanian trade to an increasing extent at the expense of other countries. With the outbreak of war, Rumania has become even more dependent on Germany as a supplier of manufactured goods in general, and iron and steel products in particular.

[46]

648
439

In 1940 an economic agreement was signed between the two countries, by which in exchange for raw materials a ten-year plan for the development of Rumanian economy was formed. Germany agreed to the following main conditions :—

(1) The granting of extensive long-term credits.

(2) The supply of tools and machines for agricultural development.

(3) The provision of technical and financial aid for industry.

(4) The provision of extensive supplies for the development of the transport system.

(5) To put technical experts at Rumania's disposal.

(6) To make capital available for the development of industry and the banking system.

457
471

Germany has exploited Rumania's dependence on her to the full by providing the minimum of goods, so that she owes her an ever-increasing sum in the clearing. German financial interests have gained tremendous impetus since the removal of British and American competition, together with the acquisition of the actual interests of occupied countries, such as France, Holland, and Czechoslovakia. To cite the most important example, in the oil industry German capital has increased from 0.5 per cent. of total investments in 1939 to about 38 per cent. in 1942, while in the heavy industry the Hermann Goeringwerke have achieved a footing in the main engineering firms of Reşita and Malaxa, as well as in the aircraft industry and in the shipbuilding yards at Galati. The motor-vehicle assembly industry is almost entirely in the hands of the German companies, and German capital is to be found in the banks, in the timber and textile industries, in a number of transport and trading companies, and behind the attempted expansion of the mineral resources.

ITALIAN PENETRATION

There is also some considerable Italian financial penetration in Rumanian industry, though on nothing like the same scale as German; it is mainly confined to the oil, building, timber and textile industries and to various cereal export companies.

[4c]

A. PRE-WAR CONDITIONS

1. General

241 Agriculture occupies about 80 per cent. of the population of Rumania and contributes the greater part of the national income but, owing to the importance of the country's mineral-oil production, exports of agricultural products ac- [439] counted for rather less than half of total exports by value, in the immediate pre-war years.

Total agricultural production, even if there were no exports, would fail seriously short of the real food needs of the country. The poorest are actually [146] underfed, while the majority of the remainder subsist on a diet which, though adequate in quantity, is seriously deficient in quality and nutritional elements.

In her farming Rumania suffers from two inter-related difficulties: rural over-population and low [161] food output per acre. There are 16 agricultural workers per 100 acres of farm land, compared with 6 in Denmark and 3 in Britain. Another aspect of this is the extremely small size of most of the farms—75 per cent. of them are less than 5 hectares (12 acres) in extent. Because there is not enough land to go round, most farming families have to eke out a living on holdings which under any system of general farming would be too small to provide an adequate income.

The position would be less serious if a high per-acre food output were achieved. But in fact the Rumanian output per acre is barely one-quarter of that obtained in countries like Belgium and the Netherlands. Rumania pivots her farming on wheat and maize production but, owing to the extensive methods practised, the few livestock kept, and other reasons, per acre yields are among the lowest in Europe.

It is the over-population and land shortage which are largely responsible for agriculture remaining so backward. Having insufficient land the peasant does not produce much for sale, and so cannot afford to purchase fertilisers, good quality seed or better implements. Nor can he spare many acres for fodder crops, since the bulk of his land is needed to grow the food his family eats. And as he cannot buy fodder, he cannot keep many animals. Thus, while there is some scope for agricultural improvements which would ameliorate the peasants' lot, the pre-requisite of farming progress is to find alternative occupations for the surplus population.

423 The system of land tenure is peasant proprietor-
471 ship. This was attained under the Land Reform carried through after the first World War. The effect of this was to divide up and transfer to peasant ownership a large area of land formerly worked in big estates. This revolution in land tenure provided a solution for a long-standing social problem, but its effects on production were unfavourable. The large estates had been run by trained managers with relatively advanced methods and equipment. Their transfer to ill-equipped, backward and uneducated peasants was followed, for a time at least, by a decline in yields, and consequently in total production and exports.

241 Little progress was made in the period between the two wars in remedying the disadvantages of uneconomic farm sizes, and in raising the low standards of farming. For lack of education the

241 however, be slightly deficient in grain, especially
133 in poor years.

The hilly land of Transylvania and the Bucovina
[311] differs markedly from the plain. There is proportionately less arable and much more meadow, grazing and forest land. The soil is poor. Methods are not as primitive as in the plain land of the Old Kingdom, but over-crowding is more serious and output per head is consequently lower. Parts of this region are slightly deficient in grain. Though
[146] the level of food consumption is low, the dietary is more varied than elsewhere in the country, less maize and more meat and dairy produce being eaten.

3. Crops

311 Of the total area of pre-war Rumania, of nearly 30 million hectares (119,000 sq. miles) and twice the area of England and Wales, about 13 million hectares, or 45 per cent. was arable. Permanent meadow, pasture and grazing occupied 14 per cent., while tree and bush crops accounted for a further 2 per cent. The remaining land was non-agricultural, forest and waste land.

243 A very high proportion of the arable—over 80 per cent.—was used for grain growing, principally maize, wheat and barley. Owing to low rainfall, use of poor seed and lack of fertilisers, yields were at a low level and fluctuated widely from year to year.

[439] Out of an average grain production of 11 million tons, 6 millions went into domestic human consumption and 1½ million were exported, the remainder going to fodder, seed and waste. Grain exports have always figured largely in the country's foreign trade. During the twenty years 1920 to 1939 they only once fell below a million tons, and in some years exceeded three million tons. In value, during the decade before the war, they formed, after petroleum products, the main item in exports.

241 No other category of crops compares with grain. Sown fodder crops took barely 5 per cent. of the arable, all other crops, including potatoes, fibres, oilseeds, tobacco and sugar beet, about 8 per cent. Peas, beans and oilseeds were grown in sufficient quantities to provide surpluses for export. Germany established two companies—Solagra in 1934 and Soya A.G. in 1940—which invested large sums in promoting oilseed cultivation. The area
[74] under sunflower was raised only slightly, but that under soya rose from nil in 1933 to 103,000 ha. (254,000 acres) in 1939, but the greater part of both crops was located in Bessarabia which Rumania lost to the U.S.S.R. in 1940 (see below).

244 Production of potatoes, vegetables and sugar
241 beet was just sufficient for domestic consumption, but the tobacco crop did not quite meet requirements. Tobacco production had fallen from 20,000 tons in the late-nineteen-twenties to 12,000 tons in the years just prior to the war.

[12] Fruit production was undeveloped and there was little organised marketing and processing. Plums were the main crop, but three-quarters of the output was used for making brandy. Apples and other kinds of fruit, and walnuts, were produced in fair quantities, but exports were insignificant, and, owing to low quality and the lack of standardisation, there were no prospects of development.

241
654 Alongside this organisation the State ran certain technical services for agriculture, distribution of tested seeds, control of weights and measures, provision of bull and stallion services from its own stud farms. This work, however, remained less developed than in other S.E. European countries.

8. Agricultural Exports

241
231
439 Rumania was the largest grain exporter in Europe. By value, grain accounted for over half the total of agricultural exports. Livestock products, mainly live pigs and cattle, amounted to approximately one-fifth of the total, the remainder consisting of peas, beans, oilseeds, oil and oilcake, eggs and small quantities of fruit. Quantities exported on the average in the years 1935 to 1938 are shown below :—

	*Exports of Principal Agricultural Commodities** *Average* 1935-38 ('000 *metric tons*)
Wheat	686
Maize	543
Barley	297
Peas	21
Beans	43
Oilseeds	108
Vegetable oils ..	5
Oilcake	103
Cattle ('000 head) ..	48
Pigs ('000 head) ..	222
Eggs	10

* Pre-1939 frontiers.

241
439 It is of interest to note that, despite German hopes of a development in oilseed cultivation and exports, no increase had been achieved up to the eve of the war. German interest had succeeded in stimulating production and exports of soya beans, but there was no expansion in total oilseed exports owing to a decline in rape seed and to an increase in domestic consumption of oil.

German purchases of Rumanian agricultural exports were increasing in recent pre-war years. In 1939 the territories of Greater Germany took 25 per cent. of the wheat exports, half the feed grain and the bulk of the oilseeds. Italy also took appreciable quantities of grain.

9. Food Consumption

146
962 The Rumanian diet is perhaps the worst-balanced in south-east Europe. The outstanding feature is its high dependence on grain, which provides three-quarters of the calories and 70 per cent. of the protein. In the towns white wheat bread is eaten except by the very poor, whilst in the country wholemeal bread or maize is usual. Over large areas, particularly in the Old Kingdom, maize forms the chief food. (Taking the country as a whole maize consumption is two-thirds higher than wheat.) During the summer months, when work is very heavy, peasant families may eat as much as 3 kg. (6½ lb.) a head daily, almost always in the form of *mămăligă* (a kind of porridge).

The rest of the rural dietary consists chiefly of beans, some potatoes (especially in Transylvania), cabbage, beetroots, carrots, onions and a certain amount of cheese and milk. Consumption of all these foods is much too low by nutritional standards. Meat is rarely eaten, except at Christmas time when a pig is killed—for the rest of the year small amounts of fat salted pork are used, more or less as a flavouring. Some fish is eaten in villages near rivers. Vegetable oils—mainly sunflower—and pig fats are used for cooking; butter is rarely eaten.

CHAPTER I

722 more than half the normal, but the efforts in 1943
[249] to recover to a more average crop may have succeeded.

3. Fish

[208] The general food shortage in Rumania gave a great fillip to the fishing industry. In the 12 months April 1941 to March 1943, some 40,000 tons of fish were caught in State waters besides 13,000 tons in rented and private waters. This is almost double the largest pre-war catch. During 1941 some 6,000 tons were salted down for winter use. In order to promote and introduce better organisation into the fishing industry a German-Rumanian Company has been established, the "Marea-Neagrâ," which will devote special attention to developing the Black Sea fisheries.

4. Agricultural Exports

439 The pre-war level of grain exports was well
243 maintained in 1939; wheat in particular was prominent with over a million tons. The exports of 1940, however, showed an immediate reflection of territorial changes and war shortages. Total grain exports in that year barely reached a million tons compared with the pre-war average of about 1·6 million tons. The following year showed a still sharper decline, wheat reaching only 5,000 tons and maize 120,000 tons. In 1942, despite the recovery of Bessarabia, it is most unlikely that even this level was maintained.

439 Oilseed exports, despite direct German interven-
249 tion aiming at an expansion of the crop, also fell below pre-war levels. Sunflower-seed exports, the principal oilseed, fell from an average of 30,000 tons in 1935-38 to 12,000 tons in 1940 and to 5,000 tons in 1941. Exports following the 1942 crop, though probably better, were not at all commensurate with the increased production, for a serious shortage of edible oil and fat had meanwhile developed in Rumania owing to decreased supplies of pig fat and to the retention by the peasants of their seed for consumption at home, or for disposal on the Black Market.

5. Administrative Control

2411 Not even the most complete and efficient system
656 of administrative control could have assured the country's food supplies and exports at normal
435 levels during these three unfavourable years, but it is clear that Rumania's food difficulties have been aggravated by mistakes in economic policy and inadequate control measures. Bureaucratic methods of handling the peasants aroused antagonism and resistance. Supplies of tested seed and other farm requisites were not made available in time. On the collection and supply side, too, much power was left in the hands of local prefects. But the most serious shortcoming of the official administration was the failure to establish a price control, and an appropriate relationship between agricultural prices and the cost of the things farmers buy. (In the absence of effective discipline this ratio needs to be strongly in the producers' favour if production and marketing of foodstuffs is to be maintained.) Prices of consumers' goods rose rapidly, owing to shortages, while the Government pegged the prices of farm produce at comparatively low levels. Consequently, the peasants curtailed production and sought better prices by selling much of their produce through Black Market channels. The mistake was officially admitted in the autumn of 1941 when grain prices were more than doubled, but the position still remained unfavourable to

[10a]

211 very largely on the acquisition of tractors and other equipment. Only Germany can provide these requisites and it is of interest that, despite the poor contribution Rumania has hitherto made to Germany's food supplies, the latter has gone some way to assist the attempted reform. Over 4,000 [437] tractors with their ploughs and a variety of other implements have been imported from Germany during the war years. Tractor numbers in Rumania have probably been more than doubled by these imports, but they still represent only the beginnings of mechanisation. They have doubtless been supplied, despite insistent demands for tractors in Germany and elsewhere, in the belief that, if properly applied, they may make some slight increase in available surpluses. Some of these may have been destined for Transnistria to make good the Russian scorching.

6. Food Conditions

511 Food conditions have varied according to local resources, and in the months following the poor crops of 1942, according to the success of local prefects and officials in securing supplementary quantities from the more favoured areas. The greater part of the population is rural, and most [162] families feed themselves with their own home-grown produce. In the earlier years of the war these were able to maintain their consumption standards, but in 1942-43 there must have been a more serious degree of shortage and privation than is usual even after short crops. In the towns there has been a severe curtailment of food supplies, mitigated in individual cases by access to the Black Market.

262 Urban shortages developed early in 1941 and 434 official rationing cards were introduced in May of 511 that year in Bucarest and brought into use soon after. Sugar and meat were the first commodities to be rationed. The original sugar ration was 375 grammes (13 oz.) per week, but since May 1943 it has been only 125 grammes (4½ oz.). Meat originally 250 grammes (9 oz.), is still (July 1943) at this level, though for a short time at the end of 1942 it was higher owing probably to the abnormal slaughterings caused by fodder shortages in 1942. Bread was first officially rationed in January 1942, but was preceded by baking regulations requiring maize admixtures in the loaf. The ration of *pro*

[11a]

[oil]

A. INTRODUCTION

1. General

315 Both in peace and in war, the Rumanian oil industry has played an important part in the economy of the nation. Although the numbers directly employed in the industry are comparatively small—some 40,000 men—its importance to the nation can be gauged by the fact that the 4·5 million tons of oil exported in 1938 represented a value of 9·3 milliard lei, or 43 per cent. of the total export trade of 21½ milliard lei. Not only was oil the backbone of the country's foreign trade, but the industrial and general internal economy of the country is probably more dependent on oil than any other country in Europe.

War has not lessened the importance of her oil resources to Rumania—her industries and transport remain equally dependent on oil; her normal oil export trade has gone, but the Axis are greedy for every drop of oil which they can extract from Rumania, and from Rumanian wells comes almost one-third of all the liquid fuel which has to keep the wheels of Axis Europe turning. In 1940, oil exports represented 63 per cent. of the value of Rumanian exports, and whereas in 1938 30 per cent. of Germany's imports from Rumania consisted of oil, in 1940 this had risen to 56 per cent. It is undoubtedly true to say that of all the raw materials coming from outside her own borders on which German war economy is dependent, Rumanian oil is one of the most vital.

[439]

2. Historical

The first commercial oil production in the world took place in Rumania in 1854, when 275 tons were produced. From that date until 1936, with the exception of the years of the Great War, production gradually increased to a peak figure of 8·7 million tons or 3½ per cent. of world production.

The trend of production over the last 20 years is shown on the graph on the opposite page.

Although in 1942 the downward trend since 1936 may have been halted, or even reversed, this has been only by dint of a special effort to increase production and possibly uneconomic exploitation. In 1937 Rumanian geologists estimated that the country's oil reserves would be exhausted within ten years, and although declining production may be due in large part to the natural exhaustion of known fields, it is also due to the restrictions of the antiquated mining laws. These tended to curb normal expansion, and made exploratory drilling in non-proven areas so unattractive as not to be a commercial proposition, with the consequence that exploration, by which alone production could, in the long run be maintained, was neglected. These mining laws have been superseded by a new law passed in July 1942, the main provisions of which are for the express purpose of encouraging new production by the removal of the restrictions set upon prospecting in new areas. The reserves which, under the 1937 law, the State insisted on maintaining, are now sacrificed, concessions are now granted on the basis of geological structures rather than surface areas and wasteful competition is eliminated in their exploitation. The law empowers the Government to demand the modernisation of refining and drilling equipment.

[ILO p.12 ... Ar. 5 ?]

[13b]

8. THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

1. Oil Production

315 There are four districts in which oil production is centred. Prahova, Dâmboviţa, Buzău and Bacău, while the town of Ploeşti is the hub of the oil industry. In 1938 out of a total production of 6·6 million tons, the Prahova district produced 3·98 million tons—2·78 from private and 1·2 from State concessions; Dâmboviţa produced 2·54 million tons, two-thirds of which came from State concessions; Buzău and Bacău produced only some 40,000 tons each. In 1941 Prahova production had dropped from 3·9 to 3·4 million tons; Dâmboviţa from 2·5 to 1·7 million tons, production from Buzău and from Bacău remaining unchanged.

[332] The wells are connected by pipeline with the refineries, all but three of which are in Ploeşti; even at the time of peak production in 1936 Rumanian refining capacity was sufficient to take care of all the crude oil production of the country. The total refinery capacity in 1938 was over 10 million tons including nearly 2 million tons of cracking capacity, but of the total capacity probably not more than half is of modern design.

2. Consumption and Exports

315 [339] The following table indicates internal consumption and exports in 1938, when crude production was 6·6 million tons. Exports were made to all countries in Europe including over 700,000 tons to Germany, over 500,000 tons each to the United Kingdom and to Italy, nearly 300,000 tons each to France and Czechoslovakia, and some 400,000 tons to North Africa, of which 280,000 tons to Egypt.

1938

Internal Consumption and Exports

	Internal Consumption	*Exports*	
	'000 *tons*		
Crude oil	—	336	
Motor spirit	154	1,586	
Kerosine	182	827	74% via Constanţa
Gas/Diesel oil	117	755	
Fuel oil	1,001	917	20% via Giurgiu
Special fuel oil*	131	—	
Lubricants	24	41	
Wax, asphalt, etc.	64	30	

* Mainly for central heating.

315 Nearly 70 per cent. of internal consumption was therefore represented by fuel and special fuel oil, and this figure shows the extent to which industrial and domestic plant have been built up on the basis of burning fuel oil, and the dependence of the country on adequate supplies of fuel oil for its essential services. In this dependence will be seen some explanation of the fact that Rumania is one of the few countries in the world whose internal consumption of oil for non-military purposes has not declined in war-time.

The main consumers of fuel oil and special fuel oil were as follows:—

	Tons
Railways	195,000
Shipping Services	90,000
Industries	419,000
Power Stations	160,000
Central Heating	148,000
Agriculture and Peasant Mills	19,000

CHAPTER II

3. Transport

315 For the transport of oil both for internal consumption and for export, Rumania relied largely upon railways, and except between the wells and the refineries, only a relatively small proportion was transported by pipeline. The three main pipelines were State-owned and were laid mainly for the transport of oil for export: one for white products from Ploeşti to Constanţa with a capacity of 810,000 tons per annum, and two lines for crude and heavy residue from Ploeşti to Giurgiu with a combined capacity of 300,000 tons per annum.

The total quantity of oil through three lines in 1938 was 800,000 tons; 13 per cent. of the exports from Constanţa and 17 per cent. of those from Giurgiu were handled in this way as well as the internal transport of some 184,000 tons of crude oil. The Rumanian fleet of 8,000 tank cars was ample to handle all the oil transported by rail. [497]

The main channel for exports was Constanţa on the Black Sea, through which 3·3 million tons were exported in 1938, as compared with only 935,000 tons through Giurgiu for transport up the Danube.

C. THE INDUSTRY IN WAR-TIME

1. General

315 722 The war has completely altered the orientation of the Rumanian oil industry: normal export trade routes through Constanţa and the Mediterranean were cut and exports to most countries in Continental Europe came under German control as soon as the Germans were astride the Danube at Belgrade, and the main railways through Poland and Yugoslavia. Not only were normal export channels disrupted, but the Rumanian oil industry lost the services of all its foreign technical experts, and could no longer get from the United States supplies of drilling and refinery equipment on which it had very largely relied.

The inevitable result of all this was that in spite of the urgent need for increased production and all German efforts to obtain this, the downward production trend was not halted in 1941, and only 5.483 million tons were produced. That year was, however, one of abnormal difficulties owing to the necessity for reorganising the industry on a war-time basis, rapidly rising prices of almost everything but oil, shortage of man-power owing to Rumanian mobilisation, the difficulty of getting equipment, and above all an abnormally severe winter which hampered transport so severely that production had to be restricted for lack of storage. By dint of continuous German pressure and increased control of the industry, production in 1942 probably reached 5.6 million tons.

Internal consumption has, however, not decreased and is thought to be running at a rate of 2-million tons a year, which leaves between 3 and 3½ million tons available for the Axis and neutral countries in Europe. Italy gets approximately one million tons a year, Germany two million tons, and small quantities go to Switzerland, Sweden and Turkey.

315 439 Except during the winter months when navigation on the Danube is suspended, the majority of exports to Italy go by pipeline to Giurgiu and thence by barge to river ports in Yugoslavia or Hungary for transhipment to Italy by rail-tank car. One of the results of the reorientation of Rumania's oil export trade has been the greatly increased use made of the river port of Giurgiu.

[14a]

TABLE I

APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF OIL GROUPS BY NATIONALITIES IN 1940

	Capital		Fixed Assets		Production*	
	In millions of lei	Per cent.	In millions of lei	Per cent.	Thousands of tons	Per cent.
Anglo-French-Belgian .. 8 large companies 14 small companies	9,893	64·72	30,089	64·83	4,253	67·09
American .. .. 1 large company 1 small company	1,913	12·51	5,513	11·88	900	14·20
Italian .. .. .. 1 large company 1 small company	386	2·53	1,259	2·71	335	6·29
German	77	0·50	525	1·13	51	0·80
Rumanian .. .. 2 large companies 33 small companies	3,017	19·74	9,024	19·44	800	12·62
Total	15,286		46,416		6,339	

* The production figures shown in this Table appear to be those for 1939.

CHAPTER II

315
439

TABLE II

APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF OIL GROUPS BY NATIONALITIES IN 1942

	Capital		Fixed Assets		Production*	
	In millions of lei	Per cent	In millions of lei	Per cent	Thousands of tons	Per cent
German group owns, controls or directs	3.431	22·45	11.207	24·28	1.487	23·46
American	5.795	37·91	13.288	28·63	2.361	37·24
Vacuum Oil	6	(0·03)	82	0·19	—	—
British	912	5·97	3.835	8·26	640	10·10
Unirea						
Anglo-French	2.387	15·61	8.107	17·47	740	11·67
Steaua Romana						
Anglo-French-Belgian ..	899	4·38	2.060	5·06	145	2·29
14 small companies						
Italian	386	2·53	1.259	2·71	335	5·28
Rumanian	1,700	11·12	5.967	12·86	631	9·96
Total	15,186		46.410		6.339	

* The production figures shown in this Table would appear to be those for 1939

[16a]

315
473
439

TABLE III

PRINCIPAL RUMANIAN OIL COMPANIES, 1942

Name	Founded	Capital (mill. lei)	1940 Crude Production (tons)	Controlling interest
Astra Română	1910	2,542	1,173,256	Royal Dutch Shell
Concordia	1907	2,030	793,626	Kontinental Oel A.G.
Româno-Americana	1904	1,500	727,345	Standard Oil of New Jersey
Steaua Română	1895	1,500	640,920	French, Rumanian, British
Unirea	1921	720	652,000	General Mining Corporation
Columbia	1905	380	585,193	Kontinental Oel A.G.
Creditul Minier	1919	605	292,166	Rumanian
Prahova	1920	330	271,947	A.G.I.P. (Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli)
I.R.D.P. (Industria Romana de Petrol)	1920	120	117,925	Sudostchemie Hand. A.G. German
Petrolul Românesc	1920	120	83,377	Creditul Minier, Rumanian
Starnaphtha	1926	60	55,530	French
Foraj Lemoine	1923	44	42,658	Rumanian, Franco-Belgian
Redevenţa	1918	300	28,474	Rumanian
Foraky Românească ..	1922	50	25,958	German
Sondrum	1921	100	17,982	French
Petrol Block	1918	470	—	German (refining company)

382
473

TABLE IV

PRINCIPAL RUMANIAN REFINERIES

Name	Location	Annual Capacity (tons)	Cracking Capacity (tons)
Astra Română	Ploeşti	1,750,000	600,000
Steaua Română	Câmpina	1,500,000	350,000
Concordia	Ploeşti	1,300,000	200,000
Română-Americana	Ploeşti	1,100,000	350,000
Phoenix Unirea Orion ..	Ploeşti	800,000	150,000
Standard Petrol Block ..	Ploeşti	550,000	150,000
Creditul Minier	Brazi	530,000	150,000
Colombia	Ploeşti	485,000	260,000
Unirea Speranţa	Ploeşti	400,000	—
Redevenţa	Ploeşti	230,000	—
Prahova	Bucarest	200,000	—
Lumina (Petrolmina) ..	Ploeşti	140,000	—
Noris	Ploeşti	50,000	—

I. COAL

A. Consumption, Imports, Deposits

372 375 Coal has not played such a large part in Rumanian economy as it has in that of most European countries, because of the abundant mineral oil and timber resources which have been used extensively for fuel, both in industry and for household purposes. The following table shows the percentage consumption of the different types of fuel (average 1937-39):—

	%
Firewood	28·7
Oil and oil products	26·1
Coal	25·9
Methane and other gases	17·2
Water power	2·1

The railways accounted for 60 per cent. of total coal consumption which was of the order of 2 million tons, the balance being divided between industry, household consumption and bunkers.

135 Before the war coal reserves, which are predominantly brown coal, were estimated at 2·7 milliard tons brown coal (including lignite), and 48 million tons of hard coal. The more important deposits are located in southern and western Transylvania, while a few of lesser importance are in the northern area which was ceded to Hungary.

316 439 In spite of the limited industrial development of the country and extensive use of oil, coal production is hardly sufficient for current needs, and it has been necessary to import both coal and coke to fill the deficiency.

Pre-war coal imports in metric tons were as follows :—

	Metric Tons
1935	21,000
1936	23,000
1937	28,000

316 439 It is difficult to estimate coal imports since the war, but available evidence suggests that they are in the neighbourhood of 75,000 tons annually or three times as high as the pre-war figure. Owing to the exigencies of war, railway traffic has increased enormously, and the switch-over from oil-burning to coal for industrial and central-heating plants all add to the demands for coal.

135 **Coal Deposits**

The principal coal-producing district is around Petroşani, while the main deposits are as follows:—

Type	*Location*	*Calorific Value*
Anthracite ..	Schela in Gorj district	7,300
Hardcoal* ..	Reşiţa and Anina-Steierdorf	6/7,000
Brown coal and lignite	Jiu valley	6,500
	Comăneşti basin ..	5,200/5,600
	Ialomiţa valley ..	5,000
	Dâmboviţa valley ..	5,000
	Bacău district ..	5,000

* Some is suitable for coking

B. Tables

1. Coal Production

316 During recent years coal production has been increased in spite of a slight setback in 1940, when with the transfer of N. Transylvania to Hungary a small proportion of the working mines were lost. Further efforts are being made to increase production so that fuel-oil consumption may be reduced. To this end the conversion of central-heating installations, industrial oil-burning plant and oil-fired locomotives to coal burning has been ordered.

CHAPTER III

316
439

3. Coke Imports and Production

	Imports	*Production**
	in '000 tons	
1936	39	78
1937	49	78
1938	63	86
1939	55	88
1940	54	86
1941	n.a.	90

* Including gas coke.

Of the total coke available annually—140,000 tons—100,000 tons were consumed by blast-furnaces and iron-works, the remaining 40,000 by other industries.

II. ELECTRIC POWER

A. General

377
371

Being an agricultural country, Rumania, like the other countries of South Eastern Europe, is not extensively developed from the electrical point of view. The most important high-tension transmission lines are located in the neighbourhood of the Prahova oilfields and of Bucarest, but though these two areas are interconnected by means of lines operating at 120 and 60 kV, there is no national grid. There are a few other high or medium-tension lines which mostly connect power stations owned by industrial concerns. The majority of generating stations giving a public supply are quite isolated from each other.

1. Sources of Power

Rumania's potential water-power resources are high. It is estimated that 24,000 million kWh could be obtained annually from the economically

[18a]

A. INTRODUCTION

135 By comparison with Greece or Yugoslavia Rumania has but poor deposits of minerals, with the exception of gold, as a producer of which, before the loss of Transylvania, she ranked second in Europe to Sweden.

316 Iron-ore output is inadequate to meet the requirements of the steel industry. Bauxite output is on a very small scale, though steps are being taken to increase this and to create an aluminium industry. Production of lead and zinc, though sufficient pre-war to cover requirements, was centred in territory now ceded to Hungary, so that the country has become dependent on imports. Silver and copper production, the latter never other than on a small scale, have also suffered through territorial losses. Attempts have been made during the last few years to develop output of chrome and manganese—manganese for production of ferro-manganese for the iron and steel industry, and chrome, deposits of which appear not to have been worked before 1941, for export to Italy.

135 Deposits of mica and molybdenum have both been recently discovered in small quantities in the Mehedinţi district, and the Germans are particularly interested in production of the former.

B. IRON AND STEEL

327 Full use of the Rumanian iron and steel industry is severely hampered by inadequate supplies of metallurgical coke and of iron ore, both of which have to be imported. Shortage of the former particularly has affected the industry since the outbreak of war, because, due to an insufficient supply of metallurgical coke in German Europe as a whole, Rumania has been unable to import the requisite quantities to maintain output of her blast-furnaces. Rumanian plants, however, are new and the steelworks are all open-hearth or electric, which means that they are able to produce the qualities most useful for armaments.

1. Iron Ore

316 Shortage of iron ore is the fundamental weakness of the Rumanian iron and steel industry. Though various other concessions have been granted, but not yet in any way developed, only three mines have been regularly exploited, as follows:—

(a) The Ghelari deposits of limonite (47 per cent. to 54 per cent. iron) owned by the State and exploited by the Hunedoara Works.

(b) The Teliuc deposits of limonite (48 per cent. to 52 per cent. iron) and of siderite (28 to 35 per cent iron), owned and exploited by Titan Nadrag Calan.

(c) The, almost exhausted Ocna de Fier deposits of poor quality limonite owned by Reşiţa.

316 439 Rumania has always had to import ore, chiefly from Yugoslavia, and recently from the Russian mines of Krivoi Rog as well. The following table shows Rumanian output and imports of iron ore.

Year	*Output*	*Imports*
	000 tons	
1936	107	80
1937	127	90
1938	137	114
1939	143	90
1940	151	52
1941	106	n.a.

[21b]

2. Pig-Iron Production

327 Rumania had nine blast-furnaces, as under :—

Company	*No. of Furnaces*	*Annual Capacity '000 tons*
Reşiţa	2	120
Hunedoara	4	90
Titan Nadrag Calan ..	1	25
Vlahiţa*	2	4
Total	9	239

*In Hungarian territory as a result of the Vienna Award.

The full operation of these furnaces is rendered impossible by lack of metallurgical coke. Only Reşiţa possesses coke ovens, and its production is no more than 80,000 tons a year—insufficient for its own needs. The blast-furnaces of Titan Nadrag Calan and of Vlahiţa are charcoal-burning, but charcoal has now become as rare as coke. These difficulties helped to keep pre-war pig-iron production far beneath capacity, as the following table illustrates :—

Year	*'000 tons*
1936	96
1937	116
1938	107
1939	115

3. Steel Production

Rumania's annual steel capacity is about 500,000 tons of ingots and castings. The principal producers are as follows :—

Company	*Annual Capacity '000 tons*
Reşiţa	210
Hunedoara State Works	200
Titan Nadrag Calan ..	100
Malaxa	65
Others	25
Total	500

All this capacity is open-hearth or electric and therefore requires large supplies of scrap (100 per cent. scrap can be used for electric blast furnaces, and for open-hearth anything between 30 and 70 per cent. scrap). As Rumania is predominantly an agricultural country, native scrap production is small, usually amounting only to about 150,000 tons per annum. Thus scrap had to be imported, as follows :—

Year	*'000 tons*
1936	37
1937	24
1938	74
1939	43
1940	6

Imports almost stopped on the outbreak of war and the situation became serious, but has to a certain extent been retrieved by the collection of battlefield scrap from Bessarabia and Transnistria, with the result that production of crude steel in 1942 should have been about 350,000 ton-

[21c]

CHAPTER IV

327 compared with the following annual pre-war figures:

Year	'000 tons
1936	225
1937	241
1938	326
1939	385

4. Iron and Steel Consumption

The limited native iron and steel production, which was never sufficient to keep the consuming industries fully supplied, became an increasing impediment with the rapid development of these industries during the last few years. Iron and steel products had therefore to be imported at the rate of 2,300,000 tons a year. The outbreak of war in Europe, and consequent restriction of supplies meant a falling off of imports, so that an acute shortage developed. During 1942, however, the situation improved somewhat in that Germany was reported to have sent a total of 130,000 tons of iron and steel products to Rumania.

[439]

5. German Penetration

327 A small degree of penetration into the Rumanian iron and steel industry has been achieved
439 by the Hermann Göring Werke which, after the partition of Czechoslovakia, acquired Czech in-
473 terests in Reşiţa amounting to 6 per cent., which were later increased to 20 per cent.

In 1941 a company with 50 per cent. German and the remainder Rumanian capital, was formed to take over the management of Reşiţa and its associated companies. The Malaxa Works later also came under the organisation of this company.

C. LEAD AND ZINC

1. General

328 In pre-war years Rumania was practically
439 self-sufficient in lead but not in zinc, since she possessed no zinc-smelting facilities. Her production of zinc concentrates was exported, mainly to Poland, part of the metal content being re-imported after smelting. Belgium and Poland were her chief suppliers of metallic zinc.

2. Mines and Plant

316 The mining of lead and zinc constituted only a small industry in Rumania. Part of the production, almost 50 per cent. in the case of lead, was obtained incidentally to the working of gold and silver ores. The principal producers were
[659] the State-owned mines Baia Sprie, Capnic, Văratec, Valea Roşie, Dealul Crucii, and the Herja mine owned by Phœnix S.A.; all are situated in the Baia Mare district in North Transylvania. The Herja ores averaged approximately 8 per cent. lead and 14 per cent. zinc, whilst ores from the other mines averaged only 4 per cent. lead and 10 per cent. zinc.

135 There are other deposits in the Transylvanian Erzgebirge, where galena and blende are associated with gold occurrences, in the Hunedoara, Banat, and Severin districts, and at Cârlibaba in the Bucovina.

328 Rumania possessed two lead smelters for the treatment of her production of concentrates: the Phœnix plant at Lucaci, with a capacity for about 5,000 tons of crude lead and 3,000 tons of refined lead, and a plant at Feriza belonging to Uzinele Metallurgica din Firiza de Jos. There

[22 a]

328 was no zinc-smelting capacity until 1940, when the "Sonemin" concern (Societatea Nationala de Exploatări Miniere și Industriale S.A.R.) erected a plant at Copșa Mica with a capacity for 6,000 tons of crude zinc annually. The smelter has three retorts fired by natural gas, treating concentrates first roasted at the Phœnix works.

3. Pre-War Production and Trade

Ore production increased over the years 1934-1938, statistics available are conflicting, but it is certain that 1938 production in terms of lead content was not less than 7,000 tons. Smelter production also increased from 4,000 tons to about 7,000 tons, and averaged about 5,000 tons over the period. Exports and imports of lead were very small.

Ore production in terms of zinc content varied between approximately 4,000 tons and 8,000 tons. The concentrates were all exported, chiefly to Poland. Metallic zinc was imported almost entirely from Belgium and Poland.

The small output of lead and zinc was of little importance other than to Rumania herself.

4. War-time Development

[728] As practically the whole of the Rumanian lead-zinc industry passed to Hungary when she [439] acquired the Baia Mare district under the Vienna Award, Rumania became largely dependent on imports for the satisfaction of her lead and zinc requirements. However, she retained the Transylvanian Erzgebirge and other areas containing lead-zinc deposits, some of which she is now endeavouring to exploit. For instance, it was reported in December 1942 that deposits in the Banat, near Agadici, and in the Hunedoara district, were being developed. The Copșa Mica zinc smelter has remained in Rumanian hands.

D. MICA

316 The Germans are taking considerable interest in 135 the mica deposits discovered in the Mehedinți district, though little is believed to be of high quality. The present annual rate of production is estimated to be about 150 tons.

E. BAUXITE

135 Rumania possessed reserves of bauxite situated in the Bihor Massif and estimated by German experts in 1939 at some 40 million tons. The main deposits are located in the Poiana, Crisul Repede and Jad Valleys, and in the Galbina valley south-east of Beiuș. Small deposits exist around Remetea and Bratca, in the district around Petroasa and near Turda.

31 Despite the size of her ore reserves, Rumania's production of bauxite has never been important, largely because of its unsuitability for the Bayer process, which is mostly operated in European alumina plants. Pre-war ouput never exceeded 10,000 tons annually, and was mostly consumed at home in the manufacture of cement and refractory bricks.

Mining operations were carried on before the war by three companies:

(a) *Bauxita S.A.R.*, a subsidiary of the Swiss Aluminium Industrie A.G. Chippis, which owned mines at Dobrești and produced small quantities of bauxite for the Rumanian cement industry.

[22b]

316 (b) *Alumina S.A.R.*, a subsidiary of the German-controlled Bauxit-Trust A.G. of Zurich, which mined bauxite principally at Bratca in the Jad valley, and also owned concessions at Remetea and Pietroasa.

(c) *Aur S.A.R.*, a subsidiary of the Rumanian Mica Group, owning bauxite properties in the Sohodol region near the railway from Abrud to Turda. It supplied bauxite for the manufacture of cement and at the outbreak of war had reserved stocks for a projected alumina and aluminium plant.

The Dobreşti mines of the Bauxita S.A.R., which are within the present Rumanian frontiers, are producing at the rate of 10,000 tons annually, most of which is delivered to Germany.

F. ALUMINIUM

328 Rumania possessed no aluminium industry before the war although from time to time plans for an alumina-aluminium works were discussed. A few thousand tons of aluminium, mostly in the form of semi-manufactured or finished products, were imported annually, Germany being the principal source of supply.

[439]

Aur S.A.R. have been experimenting in the production of alumina in a small pilot plant near Dicio Sân Martin, using the Seailles process which is claimed to be successful in producing alumina from low-grade bauxites of the type mostly found in Rumania.

This company is planning an aluminium reduction works of 20,000 tons capacity with an alumina plant of 60,000 tons. I.G. Farbenindustrie and the Mica group are interested, and the intention is to supply 20,000 tons of alumina annually to Germany. Up to June 1943 these projects had apparently not progressed beyond the experimental stage.

Small tonnages of aluminium, mostly in the form of semi-manufactures, are being imported from Germany, principally for the Rumanian aircraft industry.

G. CHROME

316 Rumania has reserve of chrome ore estimated at 2 million tons, located at Ogradina and Plavişeviţa on the Danube near Orşova. These deposits were not worked before 1941, and the output for 1942 is estimated at 5,000 tons. The ore is low grade, the highest chrome content being 40 per cent. Cr_2O_3. Germany is believed to be receiving the greater part of present output.

[135]

H. MANGANESE

The pre-war annual output of manganese averaged 40,000 tons (40 per cent. Mn.), and the probable maximum output that could be obtained is 60,000 tons. The ore is located in the Eastern and Southern Carpathians with reserves estimated at 10 million tons, while the principal mines are near Jacobeni. About 30/35,000 tons of manganese ore is available for export, and is now mainly supplied to Italy and Germany, the remainder being used locally in the making of ferro-manganese. The Nitrogen company at Dicio sân Martin are reported to have extended their plant to produce ferro-manganese for supply to Reşiţa iron and steel works, and to Titan Nadrag Calan.

[23a]

A. GENERAL ENGINEERING

1. General

392 The general engineering industries of Rumania are comparatively small, though to meet the increased demand for engineering products development has been appreciable during the last decade.

[439] Rumania is most dependent on imports for her supplies of better class types of engineering equipment, such as machine tools, and whilst receiving technical assistance from Germany, has during 1942 and 1943 been purchasing engineering equipment in increasingly large quantities from Sweden.

391 The rougher classes of engineering products, such as nails, screws, rivets, chains and wire are produced in Rumania and there are a few firms, such as Acta S.A.R., and Industria de Optica

391 Română S.A.R., both in Bucarest, which make precision mechanical instruments; and "Flexodo" Prima Fabrica Română de garnituri pentru frane S.A., also in Bucarest, which specialises in brakes, couplings and transmission equipment. Small tools are made by a few firms, but the quality is indifferent.

397 394 The largest individual firms in Rumania concerned with general engineering production are Reşiţa, Malaxa, Lemaitre, Vulcan and Fraţii Schiel, all of whom undertake diverse production, including locomotive and wagon manufacture, and structural engineering and boiler construction.

391 439 Rumanian firms, such as Uzinele Metalurgice Ploeşti and Concordia S.A.R. of Ploeşti, produce certain types of oil-well machinery and equipment, but the bulk of requirements, particularly of the more specialised types, have to be imported. Before the war the U.S.A. were the principal suppliers, but since the war Rumania has become dependent on Germany for this type of machinery, and in view of the importance of oil to Germany, her requirements probably receive a high priority.

2. Agricultural Machinery

457 Rumanian agricultural methods are backward, and the degree of mechanisation is low, caused by lack of purchasing power of the peasants and the high percentage of small holdings, which make the use of modern equipment impracticable. For this reason the production of agricultural machinery has not been very highly developed, though there has been some expansion since 1927—production of implements has trebled between 1927 and 1937. Production of agricultural machines, however, declined by about 60 per cent. during the same period. Between

391
407

Between 1935 and 1937 the average annual internal sale of agricultural implements amounted to some 6,000 tons, of which two-thirds were home produced and the remainder imported. The average annual internal sale of agricultural machines during this period was 3,300 tons, of which only a fifth were home produced. Germany was the main supplier of agricultural machinery before the war, and since the outbreak of war, has continued to be so.

[439] Agricultural tractors in particular have been imported in increased quantities and it is believed that during the period 1940–1942, inclusive, some 4,000 units were imported, from Germany, as well as a few hundred from Italy.

Agricultural implements are produced in small quantities by about 15 general engineering firms, while the chief firms producing agricultural machinery are as follows :—

CHAPTER V

397 Germany. It is, however, believed that tank wagons have been built to German order by the Astra Works at Braşov, and that narrow-gauge rolling-stock for the State Forestry Department has been under construction at Braşov.

398 439 **4. Motor Vehicles**

In spite of the gradual industrialisation which was taking place in Rumania in the early 1930's, by 1935 there was no motor-vehicle industry, so that the country was entirely dependent on imports. The Government, therefore, to combat the steady decline in the number of motor vehicles which had been taking place since 1930, issued a decree in 1935, offering special facilities to foreign manufacturers who would establish assembly plants. At the same time the establishment of a domestic manufacturing industry was contemplated, a plan which does not appear to have been realised.

[26 a]

398 Following this decree the whole of the motor-car assembly industry, which was then built up, was
●439 dominated by American manufacturers, the three main assembly plants all in Bucarest, being :—

Ford Romana S.A.R., for assembly of Ford motor vehicles of all types.

Leonida S.A., for assembly of Chevrolet cars, and representatives for General Motors.

Sural S.A.R., for assembly of Chrysler cars and others such as Dodge, De Soto and Plymouth and Fargo trucks.

From 1938 onwards several firms were established by German companies, including :—

Romano-Germana S.A.R., for repairs and servicing of vehicles.

Skoda Industriala Romana S.A.R., for the import and sale of Skoda products, and for assembly and repair work.

Tatra Romana S.A.R., representatives of the Ringhoffer-Tatra-Werke A.G., Prague.

Demag Romana S.A., agents for Demag motors of Duisburg.

With the establishment of these and other affiliated German firms the automobile assembly industry gradually passed into German hands, a process which was completed in 1940 when the Americans withdrew from the country.

398 As a result of the establishment of all these firms, the number of motor vehicles increased, and in 1938 there were 34,000 vehicles of all descriptions in the country. The estimated total number of lorries in civilian use on July 1st, 1943, was 9,000, of which 6,500 with up to 3 tons capacity and the remainder over 3 tons.

5

398
439

Germany has, during the war period, continued to export motor vehicles to Rumania, and the industry has continued to be engaged on repair and assembly work, parts being supplied by Germany.

5. Electrical Industry

393
439

The electrical industry is small and mainly concerned with the manufacture of accumulators and cables, the former probably being largely a matter of assembly from parts supplied by the German A.F.A. company (Accumulatoren Fabrik A.G., of Berlin and Hagen). Imports in 1937, about 60 per cent. of which came from Germany and Austria, amounted to 20·9 million R.M. (716·87 million lei) which compared with a domestic output in that year of 11 million R.M. (417·3 million lei).

393

The following are the main factories engaged on production of electrical equipment :—

[26c]

393 439 Present requirements for the Armed Forces for such articles as wireless, field-telephones, etc., and electrical equipment for the oil companies are imported from Germany, as are civilian requirements, though imports for the latter by no means cover the demand. Sweden and Switzerland both supply small quantities of electrical goods of various types.

B. ARMAMENTS

1. General Development

719 Rumanian armament works were for many years badly organised and equipped. In 1936 the Government made the first serious attempt to organise the industry, and selected some eight engineering works for conversion to extensive war production, particularly of shells. Much of this and of subsequent expansion of the industry was carried out under the supervision of foreign concerns, notably Schneider, Skoda and the Ceskoslovenska Zbrojovka, who were not only responsible for equipping the Rumanian works, but also for providing technical and trained personnel.

By 1939 and 1940 a number of new factories came into production, and others either increased their output or adapted their organisation to war production. Despite this expansion, however, the present-day (1943) level of production cannot fulfil the whole of the needs of the Armed Forces, and Rumania has been forced to import war material from Germany, France, Switzerland and elsewhere.

The industry suffers from a lack of certain essential raw materials and of facilities for the production of machine tools, power units and other important engineering components, for which the Rumanians are largely dependent on their already hard-pressed Allies.

[26e]

399 In the middle of 1942, under German influence, the Rumanian Government proceeded to rationalise the industry, and a Board was set up to control the country's most important armaments and aircraft factories. Under this scheme German managers or supervisors went into the aircraft factories and their main activity has since been the repair of damaged aircraft, though some new production continues. For instance, in August 1942 it was reported that an order for 200 I.A.R. fighter aircraft with 1,200 h.p. engines had been placed on behalf of the Rumanian Air Force.

[439] Rumania is still buying Italian (Savoia Marchetti) aircraft, German gliders, and various components from Germany and Switzerland.

Apart from the aircraft factories listed below, facilities for complete overhauls of airframes and engines exist at the Aviation Arsenal in Bucarest, and it has been reported that a former jute factory in Bucarest is now utilised for repair work, and that the Asam-Pipera works, also in Bucarest, are repairing engines.

Information regarding the number of workers engaged in the aircraft industry is too fragmentary to enable any estimate of their total number to be made.

[655] The main producing companies are as follows :—

(*a*) *I.A.R.* (*Industria Aeronautică Română*), the principal Rumanian aircraft company, is State-owned. It has a factory at Brașov (87 miles N.N.E. of Bucarest) for the manufacture of aircraft and aero-engines, and also produces high-precision tools of a very good quality. The factory occupies a site of some 125 acres, adjoining an airfield about 3 or 4 miles north-east of the central station of Brașov. It is a well-equipped plant and possessed considerable stocks of tools and raw materials at the beginning of the war.

The aircraft, produced before the war at a rate of about 8 monthly, consisted mainly of Potez 25 and I.A.R. 15 and 16 single-seater fighters and an I.A.R. type of four-seater commercial aircraft. The engine department produced under licence, at the rate of 25 monthly, an adaptation of the Gnôme-et-Rhône 14N. A licence was also held for Jumo 211 engines, but none of these appear to have been built.

[439] Since the war this factory has been under German control, exercised through a branch of the Hermann Göring Works. The main types of aircraft produced are I.A.R. 80 and 101 single-engined fighters and the Potez 63. Engine production appears to range between 20 and 30 a month, though the German management is trying to double that figure. Airframe output recently appears to have been about 20 monthly. In addition, a good deal of repair work is done for Germany.

The company depends largely upon imported components. It has a propeller department which, about the end of 1941, was transferred to a former paper factory in Azuga ; its output, however, does not appear to have been equal to requirements, for in July, 1942, propellers were being imported from Germany.

(*b*) *S.E.T.* (*Societatea pentru Exploatări Tehnice Industria Națională Aeronautica S.A.R.*) known up till September 1938 as I.N.A., i.e., *Industria Națională Aeronautică S.A.R.* This company was founded in 1937, sponsored by

[27 b]

A. TEXTILES AND TEXTILE FIBRES

248 In the years preceding the war, Rumania had been making efforts, with some success, to reduce the degree of her previous dependence on imports of textile fibres. The cotton crop of fair average quality, though still far short of the expanded mill capacity, was gradually increasing, while [236] indigenous wool supplies—though chiefly of coarse quality—were in the main enough for peasant clothing. Home-grown crops of hemp and flax were sufficient for internal needs, while jute, coir and hard hemps were imported to complete the requirements of industrial fibres.

248 The cessation of imports and loss of territory to her neighbours have entirely changed the 439 supply picture, and combined with demands by Germany for imports have greatly reduced the textile "standard of living."

1. Cotton

With the development of her processing industry, Rumania had increased raw cotton imports and was successfully encouraging domestic cotton production. By 1938, imports at some 21,000 tons were about five times larger than those of 1932, and the domestic crop yield, less than 20 tons in 1932, had risen to about 600 tons. The principal sources of raw cotton were Egypt, the U.S.A., and Great Britain.

With the outbreak of war, Rumanian imports generally were curtailed, the combined total of raw cotton and cotton materials being 14,700 tons in 1940, and 13,800 tons in 1941. Thereafter, Rumania was dependent on such supplies as she could obtain by barter, lower grade cotton from Turkey and Italy and cotton and staple fibre union cloth from Italy.

248 Since 1938 the Rumanian cotton crop has continued to increase, though it is still very short of normal requirements, while the cession of some 8,000 ha. (20,000 acres) of cotton land to Bulgaria in 1940, and unfavourable weather conditions, tended to restrict the cotton-growing programme.

Prior to the territorial changes of 1940, cotton was grown close to the Danube at Craiova, and especially in the Southern Dobruja. With the cession of most of this land to Bulgaria, cotton is now mostly grown on the north bank of the Danube, at Banloc near Timişoara in the Banat and in the districts of Teleorman, Vlasca and Ialomiţa. The crop in 1939 was 2,200 tons from less than 10,000 ha. (24,000 acres) and in 1942 was estimated at 5,000 tons from about 20,000 ha. (50,000 acres). A further increase in area has been planned, but the harvest, particularly in the north, is largely dependent upon climatic conditions. The type of cotton now produced is considered superior to Indian, and similar in quality to American.

288 The chief mill centres are at Arad, Bucarest, Cluj, Iaşi, Lugoj and Timişoara; of these, Cluj is the only one to have been affected by the transfer of territory. Cotton supplies are dis- [655] tributed under the direction of the Department of Industry and Trade by "Romacotin," which also has a monopoly of purchase from producers at prices fixed by the General Price Commissariat. Cotton may be sold only to these Government agencies to whom it has to be delivered by

CHAPTER VI

248 sack and rope requirements; and a hemp and flax office has been established with a capital of 20 million lei and a credit of 500 million to distribute seed and manure, and to rent and finance retting and scutching plants. This office, which is the only purchaser of these fibres, is to make no profits, and prices are to be fixed. Fifteen up-to-date plants are to be erected in 1943 in the hemp-growing areas.

[439] Although Rumania normally had little or no export balance, Germany in 1942 demanded 15,000 tons of the 20,000 tons available. How much of this was actually delivered is not known, but the shortage of hemp and other fibres has led to amazing competition between the various industries for the remaining supplies, and a hemp rope and sack factory is to be built at Chişinău [288] in Bessarabia, where the shortage of these goods is particularly acute.

4. Flax

Flax appears to be the only crop grown on a smaller area in 1943 than in 1941 and 1942, when 20,000 ha. (49,400 acres) were planted, as compared with 15,000 ha. (37,000 acres) in 1938 and 12,000 ha. (29,600 acres) in 1939. Preference, apparently, is to be given to hemp. The pre-war output was about 10,000 tons, but no reliable figures are available since 1939. Normally, there was no appreciable export of flax, but as with other fibres, the Germans appear to have been persistent in their demands. The Rumanian company, Fuiorul Cotonese, in which German capital participates, is to build flax-retting tanks at Cereteni (in the district of Dolj) and Zimnicea (in the district of Teleorman).

5. Rayon and Staple Fibre

288 There were two plants erected before the war, the "Apretura" at Popeşti-Leordeni and the Viscosa Românească at Lupeni, the combined daily capacity of which was 12 tons of rayon and 6 tons of staple fibre. (Approximately 4,200 tons rayon and 2,100 tons of staple fibre annually.) There has been but little expansion since, and the present annual production is estimated at 4,400 tons rayon and 2,600 tons staple fibre. Imports [439] from Italy have been 450 tons in 1940, and 2,500 in 1941. Germany promised substantial quantities, but it is doubtful whether they fully materialised. Applications for permission to erect a new pulp mill have been made by both German and Italian interests, but it seems that the Germans objected to Snia Viscosa's being granted a concession and obtained it themselves later.

6. Silk

231 Although Rumania is within the orbit of the silk belt, output is small, reaching a maximum of 20 tons of cocoons in pre-war years, and 35 tons of reeled silk were imported, principally from Italy. Silkworm breeding is located in the Banat, and in common with the drive for increased silk production in German Europe, Rumania has made efforts to increase silkworm breeding.

288 In 1937 about 5,000 workers were engaged in silk weaving (probably including artificial silk); this number was increased to 7,336 in 1941. It is reported that the cocoon crop is now delivered to the Air and Marine Ministries, presumably for making cartridge bags, etc.

7. Other Fibres

248 Raw jute imports averaged about 5,500 tons
439 annually before the war, and in addition there were smaller imports of jute cloth and bags

248 439 Paper, and paper mixed with hemp, are now used to substitute jute.

Although a comparatively large producer of soft hemp, Rumania normally needed to import about 2,300 tons of other hemps for special purposes, and the sources of these imports have been severed since her entry into the war.

Comparatively negligible amounts of coir were also imported in peacetime.

288 291 434 **8. Clothes Rationing**

Unlike almost all other Enemy and Occupied countries, Rumania possesses no official clothes-ration card, although purchases are restricted to a specific number of garments per year. Since 1940 the Government, anxious to avoid the necessity for a card rationing system, has adopted various means in an endeavour to overcome the shortage of textiles, particularly of cotton and wool.

Standardisation of fabrics and fixed prices were introduced in 1940, but clothing of standardised material was frequently unobtainable since the price did not leave the retailer a profit.

Army demands soon called for a great increase in clothing production, thereby reducing the stocks and greatly raising prices of civilian clothing—those for overcoats rose by 300 per cent. and for knitted goods by 400 per cent.—and the difficulty of importing raw materials soon reacted on the industry, so that by 1941 the textile shortage, particularly of bed linen, had become serious. Later in the same year, the Ministry of Supply blocked the sale of all semi-manufactured or manufactured blankets.

Early in 1942 the Government requested the public to purchase only necessities, ordering the industry at the same time to use cotton allocations for the manufacture of standardised bed linen and clothing only. Later in 1942 it was decreed that the annual allotment of garments per head of the population was two suits or frocks, one overcoat, three shirts, 12 handkerchiefs, three pairs of socks or stockings, one sheet, three towels. The sale of standard cloth was restricted to three metres per person per annum. For this arrangement, however, clothing coupons were not issued and purchasers were requested to produce their identity cards and a signed certificate of need if the purchase exceeded 300 lei.

291 435 Non-standard articles are still obtainable, but their exorbitant prices make them accessible to a limited section of the public only. Retailers are known to have refused the sale of standard cloth even when displayed, in order to secure, if possible, the higher profit margin for non-standard goods.

[565] The members of the public most severely affected by clothing shortage and high prices are industrial workers and the poorer urban population. Though the large firms are supposed by law to supply their employees with clothing (as well as food) at cheap prices, it is thought that this is not being widely practised.

Prices of all materials for men's garments have risen to such an extent that people cannot afford to buy even such goods as are available in the shops.

248 656 To counteract shortage of clothing fibres, peasants are being encouraged by the Government to increase cultivation of flax and hemp for production of the rough cloth suitable for peasant clothing.

[30b]

137 Banat and in west Transylvania; and of these 15 per cent. are not easily accessible and are unremunerative to exploit on account of heavy capital expenditure necessary to build suitable roads and railways. The forests of the plains were of minor importance, especially since they consisted almost entirely of young trees yielding firewood only.

Beech was the principal forest tree, except in the plains, where it gave way to various species of oak. The eastern Carpathians constituted the only predominantly coniferous regions.

[423] The following table shows how the forests were owned and managed; column 1 shows the area in million Hectares, column 2 the equivalent in square miles :—

	I	II	% of Total
State owned	1.9	7.3	30
Owned by communes, churches, etc.	2.0	7.7	30
Owned by companies and private persons. . ..	2.5	9.6	40

About 70 per cent. of the forests were treated as "high forests" (i.e., allowed to grow naturally) and the remainder were under varying forms of "coppice management" (i.e., allowed to grow from roots after cutting, thus producing small timber).

2. Annual Increment and Domestic Consumption

313 439 Chiefly as a result of Rumania's Agrarian Reform policy in 1924 and 1925 of clear-cutting huge forest areas to provide peasants with additional agricultural land, very large volumes of timber became available for the export market, with the result that a wrong impression was created abroad that Rumania was a country with a large export surplus of timber.

[31d]

313
[439]

CHAPTER VI

From this it appears that there was a surplus for export of only about 248,000 cubic metres of timber, but about 3.3 million cubic metres of firewood.

The figures for firewood growth and consumption include branches and other unmerchantable parts of the tree (*Reisholz*). Growth of these was about 3.6 million cubic metres, and although it is not known what quantity of these were included in consumption, this is not thought to be large, as such wood is mostly left in the forests. It was considered, therefore, that the greater part of the firewood surplus consisted of branches, etc., not sufficiently merchantable to be regarded as available for export.

If *Reisholz* is excluded, net merchantable growth was about 15 million cubic metres consisting of about 9 million cubic metres firewood and 6 million cubic metres timber :—

	'000 *cubic metres*
Conifers ..	3,230
Broadleaf* ..	11,787
	15,017

* Of which (in '000 cubic metres) beech 5,641 ; oak 2,033 ; and sundry 3,212.

3. Annual Cut

As far as can be ascertained, average annual felling, in millions of solid cubic metres, over a number of years was as follows :—

	Annual cut	*Of which Conifers*
1920/21 ..	16.3	3.3
1922/26 ..	20.7	5.8
1927/30 ..	19.3	5.6
1931/37 ..	17.2	4.4

This is equivalent to an average annual cut over the period 1920/1937 of 18.4 million cubic metres, an excess of 3.4 million cubic metres over net growth, or an exploitation of 120 per cent. per annum. The result of this over-exploitation was that by 1936 a large area, estimated to be as much as 3 million ha., was considered unsuitable for further production.

The conifers particularly were overcut, to the extent of an average of 50 per cent. of their growth. This was principally due to the heavy export demand for these, but can be explained in part by the fact that much of the Rumanian beech yields poor quality timber suitable only for firewood. This is shown more clearly in the details of cut by species for 1930 (the only available figures of such cutting) reproduced in Table 1 on page 33. No details of cut by trade categories are known for any year, but after firewood the largest individual item was sawlogs.

4. Timber Industry

After 1920, with the help of foreign capital, the sawmill industry was considerably over-expanded compared with the normal yield of the forests, and by 1928 there were estimated to be 570 mills in operation, which consumed in that year more than 12 million cubic metres of logs. Subsequently, as a result of world economic conditions and increasing competition on the European markets from the U.S.S.R., sawmilling activity, and with it forest exploitation, declined to some extent; but the industry was nevertheless still over-developed up to the outbreak of war.

In 1938 there were 713 timber concerns employing 43,326 people, of which 478 were sawmills with 37,693 employees ; the balance consisted mostly of joinery works, furniture factories, and

[Cf. table, cat. 313, p. 31 f - Analyst]
[i.e., p. 33 a -- Analyst]
[32 a]

313 cooperage and boxmaking plants. The distribution of these is shown in Table II, although separation of the sawmills from the other industries is not possible. There were also three match factories, which covered internal requirements, and four wood-distillation plants, two of which, situated at Margina and Resita, appeared to be relatively large concerns.

5. Exports

313 Rumania's timber exports between 1935 and 1938 averaged 1·8 million cubic metres per annum, which was 5 per cent. of total European exports, and gave her the leading place among south-east European countries. Almost 90 per cent. of total exports were conifers, whilst, as the following table shows, sawn goods made up by far the greater part:—

Categories	*Average annual exports 1935–38 (in 1000 cubic metres)*	
Sawn goods	1,280	71
Firewood	222	12
Hewn goods	113	6
Sawlogs	71	4
Boxboard, etc	37	2
Pitwood	34	2
Pulpwood	26	1½
Sleepers	21	1½
Total	1,801	100

Exports were made to many countries, including South America, but the most important customers were Hungary, Germany, U.K., Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Greece. Trade with Germany in the immediate years prior to the war was tending to increase.

6. Employment

313 It was estimated by a qualified expert that the [+64] forests gave direct or indirect employment to 750,000 people (about 10 per cent. of the total labour force) in forest work, transport of forest produce and in the timber industry and trade. At least 250,000 were engaged in actual forestry work, but this number probably included part-time and seasonal workers.

7. Transport

[505] Water transport played but a small part in [497] the carriage of timber, carrying only about 700,000 cubic metres per annum. By far the greater reliance was placed on transport by railways, and some 10 million cubic metres were carried by this service each year.

II. PRESENT SITUATION

Under war conditions Rumania has been faced with increasing difficulties for her supply of timber, and as most of the quantities now made available are required for home consumption, she has very little significance as an exporter.

The forest area lost by the cession of part of Transylvania is estimated to be about 1·4 million ha., and as this area accounted for 25 per cent. of pre-war production its loss is of serious consequence. It is estimated that under existing circumstances the maximum annual cut that is possible, if the present forest area is to be maintained, is 12 million cubic metres.

About 210 timber-processing concerns, of which 178 were sawmills, were also lost with Northern Transylvania, but in view of the over-expansion of the timber industry these losses are probably of less serious consequence.

313 Present fellings are not known, but a considerable shortage of forest workers and draught animals, coupled with poor transport conditions generally, are making it impossible to fell and to distribute sufficient timber to meet all home demands. These have been considerably increased by the need for timber for military purposes both in the country and at the front, and for reconstruction work in the war-damaged areas of Bessarabia, Bucovina and Transnistria. The result is a heavy and at times serious shortage of supplies.

[439] Exports, which had already fallen to about 562,000 cubic metres in 1940, further declined after the loss of Transylvania and were only some 210,000 cubic metres in 1941, but of these about 180,000 cubic metres were old accumulated stocks of sawn goods which were sold to Germany and the U.S.S.R. at the beginning of that year. No information has yet been received concerning 1942 exports, but the increasing difficulties of production make it unlikely that these were of any importance, and probably did not exceed 50,000 cubic metres.

[656] The forests are now placed under Government control and many decrees have been published regulating and defining the quantities and dimensions of trees that may be felled. Maximum prices have been fixed for all classes of timber, and a strict rationing of firewood introduced, whilst in 1942 an export embargo was placed on several categories of timber, principally soft woods.

After the cession of Northern Transylvania, German forestry experts visited the country to advise on proper forestry methods, and although there is no real evidence of what was decided, there are indications that the country is now more forestry-minded, and that more regard is being paid to reafforestation and other necessary work. These are, however, long-term policies and can have very little immediate effect or improvement on the country's present difficult situation.

TABLES

1. Details of Cut and Ownership, 1930

[423]

	State	*Communes*	*Private*	*Total*
Timber	(in '000 solid cubic metres)			
Conifers ..	570	2,450	2,850	5,870
Beech ..	1,080	300	480	1,860
Oak, etc. ..	350	390	520	1,260
Firewood ..	2,820	2,130	6,930	11,880
Total ..	4,820	5,270	10,780	20,870

2. Distribution of Timber Industry, 1938

	Units	*Personnel*
Total timber industry ..	713	43,326
of which:		
Sawmills	478	37,693
Distribution of total timber industry by administrative regions:—		
Olt	18	1,756
Bucegi	159	7,177
Marea	3	38
Dunarea de Jos ..	29	932
Nistru	3	109
Prut	67	6,222
Suceava	110	6,555
Mureş	155	9,196
Someş	83	7,163
Timiş	86	4,178

C. PAPER AND PULP

289
313

With a normal consumption of only 3·3 kg. (7¼ lb.) of paper and board per head of the population, compared with 37 kg. (81·4 lb.) in Great Britain, Rumania is one of the smallest consumers in Europe. The country's requirements in ordinary grades of paper and board are well covered by about thirteen paper mills, some of which also manufacture both chemical and mechanical wood pulp.

Newsprint requirements are met by home production.

Pre-war (1936) production of chemical pulp was 37,000 tons and of mechanical wood pulp 9,000 tons while the output of paper in the same year was 48,000 tons, and of cardboard 10,000 tons.

[439] Small imports of sulphate pulp normally came from Sweden, and of mechanical wood pulp from Austria.

In 1940 the production of paper rose to 105,150 tons, of which little more than half was sold internally and about 90 per cent. came from mills in the Rumanian Paper Cartel.

By the early part of 1942 a critical situation had arisen due to scarcity of fuel and raw materials.

The principal pulp and paper mills having four or five machines each and an annual capacity each of 24,30,000 tons of paper are as follows:—

(a) Fabrica de Celuloză Zărnești S.A., Brașov.
(b) "Letea" Fabrica de Hârtie Bacău.
(c) Fabrica de Hârtie "Bușteni" (C. & S. Schiel) at Bușteni.

The remaining mills, about ten in number, are much smaller, and three of them, with a combined capacity of 6,7,000 tons per annum, have come under Hungarian ownership following the Vienna Award.

Zărnești Cellulose Mill is of primary importance as the main source of chemical wood pulp for domestic consumption and export, and it is believed that this factory is now making special bleached cellulose for the manufacture of explosives. Elaborate machinery imported from Germany was installed with fair promptitude.

The utilisation of reeds from the Danube delta has not yet (July 1943) begun, although much publicity has been given to this project in the local and German press, but a concession has been granted to a German-Rumanian Society, "Delta A.G." The Zărnești and Bușteni Paper Mills are participating and investigations are under way. A similar concession asked for by the Snia Viscosa concern in Italy is said to have been refused.

[434] In 1942 consumption of paper in the first half of the year amounted to over 90 per cent. of production, but in the second half-year the Cabinet imposed fresh restrictions on consumption in order to remedy the increasing shortage.

[439] There is a considerable trade with the Italian Government in bitumenised cardboard for walling and roofing military huts, and it is believed that a part of these are imported from Scandinavia (and exported after bitumenising) to Italy and the U.S.S.R. for the Italian Expeditionary Forces. It is also likely that since the bombing raids on Italy extra demands have been made for repair purposes.

A. THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

381 Though the chemical industry of Rumania ranks lowest among the chief industries on the basis of production value, it is better and more comprehensively developed than in the other south-east European countries. Production is chiefly confined to heavy chemicals manufactured largely from indigenous raw materials. Most of the factories are situated in Valachia, Transylvania, and around Timişoara in the Banat.

1. Acids and Alkalis

385 317 Rumania produced annually 45,000 metric tons of sulphuric acid, which was sufficient to cover the pre-war requirements of the country, which were mostly for the refining of mineral oil. The manufacture was in the hands of some six firms, of which the chief producer was the Mărăşeşti S.A.R., with plants at Mărăşeşti, Valea Călugăreasca and Braşov. Three of the smaller plants producing sulphuric acid with a total annual capacity of 18,000 tons, representing 35 per cent. of the total, were acquired by Hungary. The necessary sulphur was obtained from Rumanian pyrites mines located at Baia Mare and Baia Sprie in N. Transylvania, acquired by Hungary in 1940. Since that date supplies have been derived from Fundul Moldovei, Zam, Sacaramb and Altan Tepe, though not in sufficient quantities to cover requirements. Shortage of sulphuric acid has been partly eased by imports from Italy.

The alkali production is normally sufficient to yield a surplus for export. Rock salt, of which there is an important domestic production, forms the basis of the alkali industry.

Salt Production

	metric tons
1939	374,000
1940	323,000
1941*	267,000

* Reduced 1941 production is due to loss of salt mines to Hungary at Ocna Sugatag, Ocna Dejului and elsewhere.

385 Soda ash is made solely by the Solvay Company at Ocna-Mureşului, where the annual capacity of the plant is estimated at 50,000 metric tons. Caustic soda is made by the Solvay Company and by S. A. Nitrogen at Dicio Sân Martin. Production of alkali in 1939 and 1942 (estimated) was :—

	1939	1942
Soda ash ..	38,000	40,000
Caustic soda ..	11,800	15,000

Requirements of hydrochloric acid were about 3,000 to 3,500 metric tons a year, and were completely met by home production. Production of sodium sulphate, a by-product in the manufacture of hydrochloric acid, amounted to 2,650 metric tons in 1939.

The most important sulphate made in Rumania before the war was that of copper, production of which averaged 5,700 metric tons between 1933 and 1936, increasing to 12,400 tons in 1937. The chief producers were the Mărăşeşti and the Phœnix chemical works (the latter in ceded territory).

[439] There is at present an acute shortage of copper sulphate, the loss of which as a fungicide is particularly felt. Germany is reported to have supplied small quantities in return for exports of copper scrap.

389 met by the Axis. The chief products made in the country are mining explosives and nitro-cellulose powder.

B. THE RUBBER INDUSTRY

383 Taking Axis Europe as a whole, the Rumanian rubber industry is of little importance. There is manufacturing capacity for motor tyres located at Floresti and at a much smaller plant at Brasov. The total number of workers employed in normal years was about 4–5,000, a large number of these being engaged on footwear manufacture, which was the chief product of the industry.

1. Raw Materials

Rumanian requirements of raw rubber had been increasing steadily in pre-war years until in 1938 they amounted to over 2,000 tons all of which were imported from British Malaya and the Netherlands Indies. It is probable that several firms produced reclaimed rubber for use in their own factories. Some of the scrap for this purpose would be of domestic origin. Import figures in metric tons were —

[439]

	1936	1937	1938
Crude rubber	1,273	1,835	2,060
Reclaim	181	214	33
Waste and scrap	305	581	500

Rumania had a small production of soft carbon black of the type suitable for miscellaneous uses, but there was no production of the hard carbon black necessary for tyre manufacture. This and other requirements of rubber chemicals would normally be obtained from the U.S.A., the U.K. and Germany. Supplies of sulphur were imported from Italy and Germany.

2. Principal Factories

The Rumania rubber industry comprises a large number of concerns producing footwear and general rubber goods, in addition to two factories concerned mainly with tyre manufacture. The larger tyre plant is owned by Banloc A.G., a company founded in 1937 with a capital of 200 million lei and supplied with technical assistance by Goodrich, U.S.A. The plant, located at Floreşti, was only completed in 1939. Its estimated raw rubber requirements were 1,500 tons per annum, and it has the capacity to produce 6,000 motor and truck tyres monthly, sufficient to cover 75 per cent. of normal Rumanian requirements. This capacity included some plant for making aircraft tyres. The other plant which produces tyres is on a much smaller scale, and is owned by Fabrica de Cauciuc at Braşov, with a normal capacity of 10–20 truck tyres daily.

According to the latest information, both these tyre plants were still in production at the beginning of 1943, when Banloc were reported to be producing between 100 and 200 motor tyres daily with technical assistance from Continental, Hanover, while the Braşov plant was producing 12 to 15 lorry tyres daily with technical assistance from Semperit, Vienna.

3. Imports

383 439 The chief item of imports in pre-war years was motor tyres, amounting to between 800 and 900 tons per annum. Since at that time Rumania possessed virtually no capacity for producing any of her own requirements, this figure approximately represents normal domestic needs. Footwear requirements, on the other hand, were normally almost covered by the large and expanding domestic output, so that imports were unimportant.

[35a]

383
[439]

The figures of imports in 1938 in metric tons were as follows —

Motor tyres	807
Motor tubes	60
Rubber footwear	221
Soft rubber (unvulcanised)	32
Rubber solution	27
Miscellaneous	173

4. Synthetic Rubber

It is planned to erect a plant with a capacity of 3,000 tons per annum in co-operation with German interest and using natural gas as the raw material. There is a second plan by independent interests to erect another plant at Ploeşti using natural gas or oil as a starting point. Both these projects, however, are as yet in their initial stages and Rumania is, at present, entirely dependent on Germany for supplies of synthetic rubber.

[249]

5. Cultivation of Rubber-bearing Plants

Rumania has been experimenting with the planting of *Kok Saghys* or Russian dandelion. During 1942 an area of 180 hectares (450 acres) was planted, which it is estimated will eventually yield between 20 and 30 tons of rubber. It is planned to increase the planted area in 1943, but it will be some time before any results of these measures will help substantially to alleviate the Rumanian supply position.

[439]

6. Present Position (July, 1943)

Although Rumania has sufficient manufacturing capacity to supply most of her essential needs, she lacks supplies of raw materials. The industry is dependent upon Germany for supplies of synthetic rubber and some of her essential requirements of manufactured goods for her armed forces, such as aircraft tyres and some heavy truck tyres, are also being supplied by Germany.

C. HIDES, SKINS AND LEATHER

(i.) Pre-War Period

1. General

237

Rumania's plentiful supply of livestock places her in a comparatively favourable position for hides, skins and leather and the pre-war slaughterings were approximately as follows —

	'000 Head
Cattle	487
Calves	500
Horses	100
Buffaloes	32
Sheep	1,374
Goats	100
Pigs	768

Of the leather produceable from the above animals, cattle, horse and buffalo are the most important, being used to a large extent in the manufacture of sole leather, which is the backbone of the industry.

237
439

Rumania is not entirely self-supporting, although home-production enables her to restrict imports to a minimum. Imports and exports in 1937 were as follows —

	Imports	*Exports*
	tons	
Hides of cattle (including calf and horse)	2,030	Nil.
Other hides and skins (including sheep and pig skins)	341	558
Leather (including waste)	62	410

[35b]

CHAPTER VII

237 [439] The imported hides are in all probability largely heavy hides needed for sole leather. Those designated as "other hides and skins" are not important in tonnage, and exports are almost certainly all sheep and pig. The exports of leather are not very important, as they consist almost entirely of leather waste.

Total supplies of leather, available from internal slaughterings of cattle, calves, horses and buffaloes together with net imports, would be about 12,000 tons, of which 10,11,000 tons are derived from local hides and skins.

Part of the sheepskins were dewoolled and turned into leather, the wool being sold separately but a considerable number of skins was used as fleece-lined jackets by the peasants. The total quantity of leather from the locally slaughtered sheep would, however, not exceed 750/1,000 tons.

Unlike Western countries, the pigs in Rumania are flayed, and the skins tanned, so that the pigskin industry is certainly of material value, although not of major importance, compared with Rumania's total leather production.

2. Manufactures

295 Rumania's leather trade made rapid strides in pre-war years and, as the bulk of the leather was made into footwear, an important increase in this production was noticeable. Although no official statistics are available, it is estimated that Rumania produced 4/5,000,000 pairs of leather shoes in 1936 and, in addition, considerable quantities of peasants' footwear were manufactured in country districts.

The industry at that time consisted of about 20 machine shoe factories, six of which were owned and controlled by tanneries, mainly centred in Cluj, Timişoara, Bucarest and Oradea. In addition, numerous small shops existed throughout the country in which shoes were made by hand. With the loss of Northern Transylvania the machine-shoe centres of Cluj and Oradea went to Hungary.

3. Tanning Materials

282 [439] Rumania has in the past relied on other countries for practically all her tanning materials and extracts. She used to import about 8,000 tons of different extracts, about 50 per cent. of which were re-exported from the U.K., probably quebracho and wattle extract. Yugoslavia supplied her with about 2,000 tons of extract, presumably oak and chestnut.

(ii.) War-time Developments

1. General

Though Rumania has suffered during the war from a leather shortage, partly on account of reduced internal production, but more especially because of the increased requirements for the Armed Forces, this shortage has not been so severe as in most European countries.

It has been reported that the leather production in 1940 was 9,200 tons, but that the supply of raw hides fell from 19,000 tons pre-war to 11,000 tons in 1941. This is a severe drop, even assuming that the 19,000 tons included imported hides. A substantial decline in the available supplies of leather has, however, certainly taken place owing to the curtailment of imports, to clandestine slaughterings, and to exports of live cattle to the Axis.

An indication of the extent of supplies allocated for Army need- was contained in an official announcement that 68 per cent. of all untanned

282 cattle hides collected in September, October and November, 1941, were for this purpose. The remaining 32 per cent., plus the horsehides, pigskins and goatskins, could be used for civilian purposes. The result was that very soon insufficient sole leather was available for civilians, and repairs to footwear became difficult.

282 656 At present 80 per cent. of the cattle hides weighing over 16 kilos (35 lb.), and 20 per cent. of the hides weighing less than 16 kilos, are reserved for the Army. This leaves the civilians very short of sole leather, normally manufactured from heavy hides.

At the end of 1941, the Ministry of Supply ordered the registration of all leather stocks, and thereafter leather could not be sold without a permit. The entire purchasing and control of raw hides and skins and also the distribution of leather was placed in the hands of the "ORAP" (*Oficiul Român de Aprovizionare și Distribuire a Produselor de Piclărie*).

In the autumn of 1941 private dealings in sheep and lambskins were forbidden, the Army Supply Minister having sole right of disposal. Owing to the comparatively important domestic output such a measure should not have been necessary, but was due to the Rumanian, and probably German, demands for warm clothing on the Russian front. Evidence received in 1942 shows that 80 per cent. of the skins are now reserved for the Army.

In July, 1942, leather transmission-belting, etc., was brought under control and made subject to certain restrictions.

295 434 Civilian rationing of footwear was introduced early in 1942 and new shoes could be sold only against permits issued to persons declaring possession of only one other pair of serviceable shoes. Repair cards were also issued. Requisition cards for new shoes are limited to one a year, and repair cards to one every four months. Children under 14 years of age can obtain two requisition cards yearly for new footwear.

The issue of permits does not, however, guarantee footwear supplies, and only about 50 per cent. of repair or purchase demands appear to be met.

The above regulations have been slightly modified from time to time, but remain intrinsically the same. The production of footwear of substitute materials, such as wooden soles, soles of artificial-leather, leather waste, buna, etc., has gradually increased.

295 435 Despite the various government regulations the footwear Black Market flourished, and while the average pre-war price for a pair of men's shoes was 800 lei, in October, 1941, the official prices were fixed at about 1,500 lei for a standard pair of men's shoes and about 1,200 lei for a standard pair of women's shoes. In March, 1942, however, the Black Market price for men's shoes was 7/8,000 lei a pair, and this has now gradually risen to 10/12,000 lei. Complete soleing and heeling of men's footwear costs 1,250 lei officially, and women's 1,000 lei. The official price of soleing leather is 530 lei per kilo, whereas the Black Market price is 34,000 lei.

2. Tanning Materials

282 439 Before the war Rumania never made use of her own barks for tanning, as it was more economical to import extracts from overseas. During the war she has made attempts to employ her oak, chestnut, spruce and pine barks for tanning materials, but

282
439

without much success, and [illegible] to her former practice of importing [illegible]

In February 1942 it was reported [illegible] imports from Italy, Turkey and Croatia. Rumania had an eight months' supply in hand.

Under the 1942-43 Italo-Rumanian [illegible] Italy is providing her with 1,750 tons of chestnut extract, 1,000 tons of sumach and 738 tons [illegible] other materials. Turkey also agreed to supply [illegible] in 1942 with 1,000 tons of valex and 2,500 tons [illegible] valonea.

D. BUILDING MATERIALS AND CEMENT

339

The building materials industry in Rumania, on a small scale and not highly mechanised, employing a total of 16,000 workers in 1937, with the value of production in that year amounting to 1·6 milliard lei, about 2½ per cent of total industrial production. In the decade before the war cement, which is the most important branch of this industry, had a steadily increased output reaching in 1939 a total of 531,000 tons, with a 800,000 ton capacity. Small quantities had to be imported.

The most important cement firms are at [illegible], Vodă, Turda, Dudeşti, and Fieni. Since the war due to limited building activity consumption of cement has decreased, and was reported to have been 314,000 tons for the first ten months of 1942, the bulk of which was used for military requirements.

[727]
339
656

After the recapture of Northern Bucovina and Bessarabia in mid-1941, a considerable amount of repair work had to be undertaken [illegible] of war destruction; but, at the beginning of 1942, due to raw material and labour shortage, further reconstruction in these two provinces was forbidden. Later, in February 1943, [illegible]

339 [656] came into force forbidding construction throughout the country for the duration of the war of private buildings requiring either iron, steel girders, sheet-iron or other sheet-metal roofing.

In 1942 production of bricks and tiles was reported to have been sufficient to meet the reduced requirements. During the war period there have been considerable exports of asphalt and tarred board for roofing, the latter mainly to Italy. 439]

E. GLASS

323 The glass industry employed 6,000 workers in 1937 in 19 glass factories and 20 glassware factories, the most important of which were the Vitrometan Fabrica de Sticlarie S.A. of Mediaş and the Fabrica de Sticlarie Turda S.A. of Turda, both producing sheet-glass and hollow-ware.

Production did not cover the requirements of specialised types, which were imported from Germany and Czechoslovakia. During the war period window-pane production has been adequate for requirements and small quantities have been manufactured for Germany; while under the 1942 Turco-Rumanian Trade Agreement Rumania agreed to supply both window-panes and glassware.

F. CERAMICS

The ceramic industry employed 1,600 workers in 1937 in 33 factories, and the value of production was 112 million lei. Most of the raw materials for this industry are found in the country, and there has been no difficulty in supplying these during the war period. Apart from the mechanised industry, ceramics are produced in normal times on a comparatively large scale by the peasants. The principal factories are the Nitrogen S.A. in Tărnăveni, the Crinul S.A. in Timişoara and the Uzinele Ceramice S.A. in Ploeşti.

CHAPTER VIII

497 and for passenger travel are severely limited. However, unless there is severe destruction in the later stages of the war, in the long run the Rumanians are bound to benefit from the capital investment in railways, and from the new construction and improvements which have been carried out to meet Axis needs. These improvements though planned long ago, could never have been carried out with the limited financial and technical resources previously available, and could not have been executed so quickly but for German assistance.

B. ROADS

491 Rumania's road system was, by Western European standards, very poorly developed before the war, there being only one International motor road which formed the continuation of the route from Hungary via Oradea Mare—Cluj—Sibiu—Braşov—Bucarest—Giurgiu and a branch line Bucarest—Olenița. Apart from this one major road, the system consists of untarred roads, many of which are in a poor state of repair.

The total length of the road system was reported early in 1943 to be 82,098 km. (51,010 miles), with only 12 per cent. in good state of repair, 22 per cent. being mediocre and the remainder in bad condition. Ownership of the total network is divided as follows :—

State roads	.. 11,465 km.	(7,118 miles)
Provincial roads	.. 26,181 km.	(16,272 miles)
Communal roads	.. 44,452 km.	(27,620 miles)

in 1936 there were some 34,000 cars registered.

The development of the road system has long been the dream of Rumanian propagandists, particularly as a stimulus to tourist traffic, but before the war no large-scale development could be embarked upon because of the lack of available capital.

499 Since the war, work has been started on an ambitious programme of road development, the objects of which are to improve communications between urban systems and to link the system with the International road network.

An Italo-Rumanian road company has started work on the Rumanian sector of one of the future trans-European roads, Trieste—Beograd—Turnu Severin—Bucarest—Constanța, while under a five-year plan, with an expenditure of 75 md. lei, some 5,000 km. (3,100 miles) of road are to be modernised with the help of German and Italian contractors.

C. SHIPPING

1. Introduction

505 A high percentage of Rumania's foreign trade 459 is water-borne (55 per cent. in 1937), as not only is she situated on the Black Sea, but the Danube traverses the full west to east length of the country, forming an important traffic route and link with Central Europe.

The following table shows comparative tonnages for sea and river traffic in 1937 and 1938 :—

	1937	1938
	'000 *metric tons*	
Sea :		
Imports	622	540
Exports	6,918	5,222
River		
Imports	1,890	1,568
Exports	3,161	2,688

As a result of the cutting-off of overseas markets since 1940 an increasing share of the country's

505 trade is carried on the Danube to European markets, Germany in particular, and, with the
439 exception of an exceedingly limited traffic with Turkey, and a few intermittent shipments of oil to enemy ports in the Aegean Sea, Rumania's foreign sea-borne trade has been brought virtually to a standstill.

In addition to traffic in the Black Sea with U.S.S.R., Bulgarian and Turkish ports, Rumania in pre-war days had important commercial relations with most European and other countries overseas, the trade routes being via the Dardanelles, Mediterranean, Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar.

2. Mercantile Marine

505 All merchant-shipping activities are controlled
[652] by the Ministry of Air and Marine. Rumania's ocean-going mercantile marine in 1939 was constituted as follows :—

		G.R.T.
6	cargo and passenger motor vessels	27,061
16	cargo steamers	67,103
3	steam tankers	14,737
25	Total	108,991

[655] Of the 19 cargo steamers and tankers, 11 were oil-fired and 8 coal burners. Fourteen of these vessels were owned by the Rumanian State Maritime Service (*Serviciul Maritim Român*), the principal shipping company in Rumania, whilst the three tankers belonged to the Steaua Romana Petroleum Company of Bucarest. The remainder were privately owned.

[648] Consequent upon her entry into the war Rumania's mercantile marine came under Axis control and most of her vessels are trading for German and Italian account, partly in the Adriatic and Aegean, and partly in the Black Sea.

A statement of Rumania's estimated non-tanker merchant-shipping resources on the 30th April, 1943, follows :—

ESTIMATED RUMANIAN MERCANTILE MARINE RESOURCES (NON-TANKER) UNDER AXIS CONTROL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA AT 30TH APRIL, 1943.

Tonnage Category	*No. of Vessels*	*Total G.R.T.*
100-499	3	578
500-999	—	—
1,000	2	2,798
2,000	2	4,286
3,000	3	10,170
4,000	—	—
5,000	2	11,305
6,000	3	20,220
Aggregate ..	15	50,147

[723] As to her tanker tonnage, two vessels aggregating 11,705 G.R.T. were seized and are now in Allied service, whilst the third, of 3,032 G.R.T., was sunk in December, 1941, in the Aegean Sea.

3. Ports

504 The chief ports for sea-going vessels are Constanta on the Black Sea and Brăila and Galați on the Danube, which both handle river shipping as well.

[42b]

504
505

cleared without very considerable development. It is probable that not more than about 50 per cent. of the above capacity could be worked. Grain is loaded by land and floating elevators.

[502]

The ports of Brăila and Galați are ice-bound during some winters, ice occurring to a sufficient extent to prevent navigation from the Black Sea between January and mid-March in about 3 years in 10.

D. INLAND WATERWAYS

I. General

133
505
487

In 1937 navigable waterways totalled 2,846 km (1,766 miles) and were divided as follows:—

	Km	*Miles*
Danube	1,075	668
Danube tributaries	395	246
Dniester	740	460
Prut	410	255
Mureș	185	115
Bega Canal	35	22

The rivers Dniester, Prut and Mureș have not been adequately regulated for regular traffic, but are used for local traffic and for timber floating.

II. The Danube

1. Traffic

487
505
439

The Danube, Rumania's main traffic artery, carried about 60 per cent. of all import tonnage and some 15 per cent. of all exports in the years immediately before the war. Traffic was of two distinct types, first, the traffic in sea-going vessels with an average size of 2,000–2,500 tons proceeding as far as Galați and Brăila via the Sulina mouth and second, on the river proper on the Danube above Galați.

The sea-going traffic passing through the Sulina mouth in the years just before the war consisted of about 1·2—1·4 million tons a year of exports from Rumania or other riparian states. By far the most important items were grain and timber. About half the vessels entering the Danube from the sea appear to have been in ballast, the remainder bringing in some 300,000–500,000 tons of imports mainly for Rumania.

Inland-water traffic on the Rumanian sector of the Danube in 1936 (the latest year for which information for all kinds of traffic is available) amounted to 3 million tons. 1·6 million tons consisted of upstream traffic from Rumania to other riparian states, 0·24 million tons of downstream traffic to Rumania, about 1 million tons of Rumanian internal traffic and about 0·2 million

[43 e]

CHAPTER VIII

487
505
439

of transit traffic mainly downstream) [illegible] with other riparian states was apportioned as follows —

	From Rumania	*To Rumania*
	'000 tons	
Germany	220	46
Austria	390	20
Czechoslovakia	440	30
Hungary	300	150
Yugoslavia	200	[illegible]
Bulgaria	80	3
	1,630	243

The composition of inland-water traffic has been fully analysed only at the Iron Gates, at the western end of the Danube's Rumanian course. In the traffic shown below, the upstream traffic consisted mainly of Rumanian exports, while the downstream traffic was made up of imports and transit traffic in approximately equal proportions.

Traffic in '000 metric tons at the Iron Gates —

	1938	1939
	Upstream	
Total	1,362·5	1,864
of which (main items only):		
Timber	20·1	11·[illegible]
Iron	21·1	13·4
Wheat	30·3	300·6
Barley	49·8	68
Maize	25·1	125·[illegible]
Petroleum and its products	787·7	1,046·1
Salt	30·8	31·7
	Downstream	
Total	489·3	771·2
of which (main items only):		
Iron	77·2	22·2
Timber	67·6	86·5
Wheat	74·4	363·0
Maize and oats	79·6	28·2

505
439
722

Little is known about traffic since Rumania finally joined the Axis in 1941. As a whole, it is below pre-war level as a result of a great decrease in the amount of grain coming forward. This has been partly, but certainly not entirely, counterbalanced by a slight increase in oil traffic, by the probable diversion of rail traffic to the Danube and by military traffic. The most important individual traffics at the present time are as follows —

(a) Oil shipments from Giurgiu (i) upstream to Italy (50-70,000 tons a month), to Germany (possibly, 30-50,000 tons a month), and (ii) downstream to German forces in South Russia (quantity unknown, but may be substantial).

(b) Downstream supplies of (i) coal to Rumanian railways (part only of total supply), and of (ii) military equipment, stores, etc., to South Russia (quantities unknown).

(c) Upstream supplies of (i) some S. Russian products, including grain (perhaps 20,000 tons a month) and possibly iron and manganese ore (quantities unknown), as well as of (ii) some small quantities of Rumanian exports of agricultural products.

2. Navigation

133
502

The Iron Gate Sector of the Danube between Orsova and Turnu Severin, with its rapids and reefs causing violent currents, is particularly difficult for navigation, and the use of specially

[44a]

A. GENERAL

[162] ●439 Although primarily an agricultural country, since about 80 per cent. of her population is rural, Rumania has not been so dependent on the export of agricultural produce as a means of financing her imports as would be expected, oil and oil products having in the years immediately preceding the war accounted for as much as 40 per cent. of total exports.

From the following table it will be seen that the trade balance was consistently favourable from 1930 onwards :—

	Imports	*Exports*	*Balance*
		Million lei	
1929 ..	29,628	28,960	— 668
1930 ..	23,044	28,522	+ 5,478
1931 ..	15,755	22,197	+ 6,442
1932 ..	12,011	16,722	+ 4,711
1933 ..	11,742	14,171	+ 2,429
1934 ..	13,209	13,656	+ 447
1935 ..	10,848	16,756	+ 5,908
1936 ..	12,638	21,703	+ 9,066
1937 ..	20,285	31,568	+ 11,284
1938 ..	18,768	21,533	+ 2,765
1939 ..	22,890	26,809	+ 3,919
1940 ..	27,500	37,500	+ 10,000

This favourable trade balance was increased by the earnings of the marine and river fleets. Total earnings of the marine fleet were 110 million lei in

[476]

439

1932, rising to 186 million in 1937 and 202 million in 1938, of which about two-thirds were derived from freightage. Total earnings of the river fleet were 74 million lei in 1932, 146 million in 1937 and 116 million in 1938. Pilotage through the Iron Gate rapids added another 47 million lei in 1938.

B. CHIEF IMPORTS AND THEIR SOURCES

Between 1921 and 1936 imports of the main deficiency commodities—textile fibres and their manufactures, iron and steel and manufactures thereof, machinery, other base metals and their manufactures, and vehicles, varied but little in their relationship to all imports, these five groups of commodities accounted for about 70 per cent. of the value of all imports.

By 1939, however, iron and steel had assumed chief importance, and these five classes now constituted 80 per cent. of all imports.

In the period 1937-9, when the trade of most of the world was declining, all these classes, with the exception of textiles, showed increased imports, an indication of the progressive industrialisation of the country.

The following table shows the major commodities imported in 1938 with their values, and a breakdown into main sub-classes with their leading sources, values and the shares of such trade for the most important countries :—

[47c]

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943 EDl Rumania EDl

439

Chief Commodities	*Total value* 1938 (*Million lei*)	*Chief sources* (*value in million lei in brackets*)
1. Iron and Steel	**4,060**	
Semi-manufactures	842	Germany (321); Hungary (156); Czechoslovakia (122); France (104); Belgium (8)
Tubes	524	Germany (163); Czechoslovakia (122); Hungary (120); France (62); U.K. (17); Belgium (17)
Tool steel	136	Czechoslovakia (86); Germany (47)
Scrap iron and steel	209	Holland (76); France (57); Belgium (30)
Ferro-alloys	51	Czechoslovakia (13); Germany (8); Poland (6); Yugoslavia (6)
Iron ore	34	Yugoslavia (34)
Manufactures	2,116	Czechoslovakia (668); Germany (605); U.K. (158); U.S.A. (80); Hungary (41); France (38); Sweden (32)
2. Textile Fibres and Manufactures	**3,731**	
Cotton yarn	1,184	Czechoslovakia (318); Germany (307); Italy (257); U.K. (213); France (60)
Raw cotton	897	Egypt (623); Turkey (148); U.K. (20); U.S.A. (26); Belgium (28)
Cotton piecegoods	240	Czechoslovakia (90); Germany (61); Italy (39); Switzerland (31); U.K. (16)
Wool yarn	393	Germany (257); Italy (73); Czechoslovakia (14); U.K. (6)
Wool, washed combed	340	France (149); U.K. (106); Belgium (73)
Wool, raw	23	Argentine (14); Australia (5); U.K. (3)
3. Machinery and Apparatus	**3,558**	
Industrial machinery	1,371	Germany (740); Czechoslovakia (242); U.S.A. (160); U.K. (111); Switzerland (40)
Machine tools	522	Germany (418); Belgium (36); Czechoslovakia (24); France (11); Switzerland (11)
Agricultural implements	242	Germany (123); Hungary (46); U.S.A. (40); Czechoslovakia (16)
Electro-technical apparatus	1,117	Germany (635); Belgium (113); U.K. (110); Hungary (73); France (50); Holland (35)
Engines, boilers, etc.	280	Germany (95); Switzerland (42); Hungary (36); U.S.A. (24); France (18)

[47d]

CHAPTER IX

439

Chief Commodities	Total value 1938 (Million lei)	Chief sources (value in million lei in brackets)
4. Other Base Metals and Manufactures	**1,476**	
Copper, unwrought	264	Belgium (174); Yugoslavia (38); U.K. (23); U.S.A. (8)
Copper, scrap	41	U.K. (23); Belgium (13)
Copper manufactures	805	France (262); Belgium (205); Germany (126); U.K. (80)
Zinc, unwrought	53	Belgium (41); Poland (6)
Zinc, other	19	Germany (7); Belgium (3); Poland (3)
Tin, unwrought	48	U.K. (32); Belgium (5); France (5); U.S.A. (5)
Tin, other	9	U.K. (4); Germany (2)
Aluminium, unwrought	23	U.K. (8); Germany (8); France (3), Yugoslavia (2)
Aluminium, other	58	Germany (21); U.K. (13); Italy (9)
5. Vehicles	**1,456**	
Lorries	534	Germany (315); France (182)
Motor cars, private	297	U.S.A. (152); Germany (98); Belgium (30)
Motor car chassis	256	U.S.A. (125); Germany (59); Belgium (42); France (25)
Aircraft	142	Holland (40); U.S.A. (36); U.K. (27); Germany (26)
Motor car parts	94	U.S.A. (39); Germany (33); Belgium (9)
Bicycles	39	Germany (39)
6. Chemical Products	**620**	
Medicaments	269	Germany (182); France (38); Hungary (25); Switzerland (14)
For Textile Industry	34	Germany (22); Switzerland (11)
7. Fruit and Colonial Produce	**525**	
Citrus fruits	171	Palestine (90); Italy (46); Greece (20); Syria (15)
Olives	125	Greece (113); Turkey (12)
Coffee	84	Germany (27); U.K. (14); Denmark (13); Holland (12)
Cocoa	42	Denmark (37); Holland (2); U.K. (2)
Tea	22	U.K. (8); Holland (7); Denmark (2)
8. Rubber, Celluloid and other Vegetable Gums	**424**	
Rubber, raw	100	U.K. (67); Holland (15); Denmark (9)
Rubber manufactures	216	Germany (56); Italy (37); U.K. (28); U.S.A. (13)
Celluloid and manufactures	26	Germany (23)
Gums, etc.	54	Greece (26); France (8); U.K. (7)
9. Earth Stone and Manufactures	**380**	
Glass manufactures	99	Germany (74); Hungary (8); Czechoslovakia (5)
Pottery manufactures	93	Germany (57); Czechoslovakia (26); Hungary (6)
Refractory bricks	79	Germany (60); Czechoslovakia (18)
Coke	68	Germany (24); Poland (22); Czechoslovakia (22)
Coal	25	Turkey (10); Germany (7); U.K. (7)

Total of above classes .. 17,350 million lei, over 90 per cent. of *total imports* of 18,768 million lei.

[48a]

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943

ED1 Rumania ED1

439

16. Notes on Imports

1. *Iron and Steel and their Manufactures.*—In 1935 expenditure was merely 1·9 milliard lei, or 17 per cent. of all imports; by 1939, however, this proportion at 6·76 milliard lei had increased to 30 per cent. of all import trade. As a rule, Czechoslovakia and Germany each supplied about one-third of the total class; in 1939 France, Italy and Holland were of next importance as against the previous usual order of Hungary, France and U.K.

2. *Textile Fibres and Manufactures.*—Expenditure in this field declined heavily to 3·6 milliard lei in 1939 (21 per cent. of all imports) compared with 5·8 milliard lei in 1937 (29 per cent. of total import trade).

Raw materials constituted one-third of the whole

[486]

439

class and yarns more than one-half. Of the raw materials, cotton accounted for about two-thirds and wool one-quarter, while of the yarns two-thirds were cotton and less than one-quarter was woollen.

The import of piecegoods was small by comparison with the rest of the class, reflecting the growing importance of the weaving industry to the country.

3. With a short interval from 1930 to 1932 values of imported *machinery* increased progressively up to 1939, when a record payment of 4·3 milliard lei was made. The proportion of such purchases to total imports had remained about 19 per cent. for many years. Normally industrial machinery constituted two-fifths of the whole

439

class, electro-technical apparatus one-third and machine-tools one-seventh.

Germany provided 60 per cent. and Czechoslovakia 8 per cent. up to 1939, when Germany's share increased to 66 per cent. and Czechoslovakia's fell to 5 per cent.

4. *Base Metals other than Iron and Steel.*—In 1934 a progressive demand began which reached 1·7 milliard lei in 1939; throughout the period between 7 per cent. and 8 per cent. of all imports were of this class.

Three-quarters of this trade was in copper in all forms. Belgium provided one-third, France one-fifth, U.K. one-eighth and Germany one-tenth.

5. *Vehicles.*—In 1937 imports were valued at ·9 milliard lei, four times higher than in 1933; in 1939 they were eight times as high at 1·8 milliard lei. The most spectacular increase was in heavy motor transport vehicles which leapt from ·08 milliard to ·90 milliard lei between 1937 and 1938.

[49 a]

439

Normally the field had been shared by Germany with 40 per cent., U.S.A. 25 per cent. and France 17 per cent.; in 1919, however, Czechoslovakia and Germany each provided 33 per cent., U.S.A. 17 per cent. and France nearly 9 per cent.

C. CHIEF EXPORTS AND THEIR DESTINATIONS

From 1921 to 1927 cereals were by far the most important export, rising steadily from 4 milliard to 10 milliard lei. Only once in the following years i.e. in 1931, did cereal exports exceed in value those of petroleum and its products, which lately averaged over 40 per cent. of total exports.

In the early years after the last war timber ranked second among exports, but the development of the petroleum industry lowered it to third. The other classes in the following table have not changed in relative importance for many years.

439

Chief Commodities	Total value 1938 (Millions lei)	Chief destinations (value in millions lei in brackets)
1. Materials for Heat, Light, etc.	**9,313**	
Benzine	4,401	Germany (1,055); France (506); U.K. (555); Czechoslovakia (330); Spain (255); Switzerland (210); Belgium (152); Hungary (30); Greece (125); Italy (124); Tunis (122)
Kerosene	1,748	Germany (209); U.K. (204); Egypt (207); Italy (112); Hungary (104); Czechoslovakia (92)
Gas oil	1,377	U.K. (208); Italy (201); Greece (180); Germany (173); Egypt (143); Turkey (36); Yugoslavia (28)
Mazout	1,030	Italy (334); Germany (166); Hungary (53); Egypt (152); Spain (40); Greece (7)
Crude petroleum	535	Czechoslovakia (278); Italy (118); Hungary (95); France (54); Yugoslavia (47)
2. Cereals and Pulses	**5,258**	
Wheat	3,337	Germany (1,169); Czechoslovakia (513); U.K. (420); Greece (422); Belgium (215); Switzerland (196); France (88); Spain (86); Holland (78); Gibraltar (75)
Maize	827	U.K. (166); Greece (169); Germany (122); Czechoslovakia (88); Holland (57); Belgium (46)
Barley	638	Germany (530); Greece (42); Switzerland (24)
Pulses	287	Germany (55); France (56); Greece (26); Belgium (25); Italy (22); U.K. (22)
3. Timber	**2,465**	
Constructional timber	1,940	Germany (432); Hungary (426); Greece (240); Egypt (234); Palestine (118); Syria (118); Turkey (64); U.K. (53); U.S.A. (40); Italy (37); Cyprus (28); Czechoslovakia (20)
Boxes, cases, etc.	162	Palestine (152); Cyprus (7)
Firewood	125	Hungary (88); Germany (23); Italy (12)
4. Livestock	**1,221**	
Swine	795	Germany (470); Czechoslovakia (100); Greece (108); Italy (7)
Cattle (all kinds)	208	Greece (112); Palestine (110); Italy (46); Germany (27)
Poultry	70	Germany (38); Palestine (27); Italy (5)
Horses	46	Germany (27); Czechoslovakia (12)
5. Seeds	**1,098**	
Clover, vetch, etc	148	Germany (92); Belgium (17); Denmark (11)
Sunflower	216	Italy (83); Czechoslovakia (40); Holland (32); Poland (49)
Colza, rape	169	Italy (102); Czechoslovakia (42); U.K. (18); Germany (5)
Pumpkin	75	Italy (30); Germany (43); Poland (11)
Other oilseeds	463	Germany (402); France (22); Czechoslovakia (18)

[49-]

CHAPTER IX

439

Chief Commodities	*Total value 1938 (Million lei)*	*Chief destinations (value in million lei in brackets)*
6. Edible Animal Products	**638**	
Eggs	338	U.K. (317); Germany (19)
Fresh meat, mainly pork	49	Germany (40); Italy (5)
Meat, prepared, tinned, etc.	68	U.K. (29); U.S.A. (17); Czechoslovakia (13)
Poultry/game, dead	151	Germany (66); Switzerland (57); U.K. (15)
Lard	28	Czechoslovakia (23); Germany (4)
7. Fruit and Colonial Produce	**370**	
Nuts	217	Germany (123); U.K. (29); Poland (24); Czechoslovakia (17)
Pip fruits	96	Germany (56); Czechoslovakia (31)
Plums, all kinds	29	Germany (11); Poland (11)
8. Vegetables, Flowers, etc.	**361**	Denmark (148); Czechoslovakia (44); Germany (36); U.K. (24); Hungary (22)
9. Hides, Skins, etc.	**203**	
Sheep and goat, all qualities	176	U.S.A. (135); Poland (34)
Total of above classes	20,927 million lei, over 95 per cent. of *total exports* of 21,532 million lei	

[50 a]

439

10. Notes

1. *Materials for Heat, Light, etc.*—Though only the most important consumers are shown in the table, nearly all European countries were purchasers.

2. *Cereals and Pulses.*—The figures for one year are but small guide to an export dependent upon harvests in buyers' and sellers' countries, but there never has been any doubt as to Rumania's importance as a European granary. Wheat was normally about one-half and maize one-sixth of the class, and Germany usually bought about one-third of the whole export, which lately ranged between 25 per cent. and 33 per cent. of all exports.

3. *Timber.*—This lost much of its importance between 1925 and 1933, when exports fell to 1 milliard lei. The recovery was gradual, though steady. Exports accounted in recent years for between 9 per cent. and 11 per cent. of total exports.

4. *Livestock* increased in value from 1.3 milliard lei in 1937 to 1.8 milliard in 1939, representing a rise from 4.2 per cent. to 6.7 per cent. of all exports. Pigs consistently composed half the class and cattle one quarter.

5. *Seeds* at 1.1. milliard lei in 1938 maintained the class at 5 per cent. of total export trade. Oilseeds represented three-quarters of the class and of these Germany bought more than half.

6. *Edible Animal Products* increased 50 per cent. in value from 1938 to 1939, reaching a total of 958 million lei, of which nearly one-half was eggs and one-quarter fresh meat (chiefly pork). While the sales of these two commodities were advancing year by year, those of poultry and lard steadily declined.

In 1939 Germany displaced U.K. as the best buyer.

D. WARTIME CHANGES

439
722

Inclusion in the blockade area and consequent severance from former overseas markets has made Rumania increasingly dependent on Germany, both as a market for her exports and as a supplier of essential raw materials and machinery.

Rumania's export surplus has been very considerably reduced during the war period. The

[50b]

439
722

chief pre-war exports have all suffered. Agricultural produce particularly has been affected, as a result of poor harvests. The export of wheat and maize, which averaged a total of 1.32 million tons between 1935 and 1938, did not amount to 100,000 tons from the 1942 harvest. Timber exports, which ranked third before the war, have dwindled to less than 5 per cent. of the quantities exported in 1937 and 1938.

Oil exports now take first place, amounting to 63 per cent. of the 1940 total by value, though, due to reduced production, the total tonnage available is below that of the peak years immediately preceding the war.

Germany's participation in Rumania's foreign trade has increased from 23 per cent. in 1937 to 46 per cent. in 1940 and during 1941 and 1942 had increased to approximately 70 per cent. of both imports and exports. German exports, however, by no means balance her imports, so that there is an ever mounting clearing balance in Rumania's favour, which was reported to amount to 30 milliard lei in December, 1942, and which causes considerable anxiety in Rumanian financial circles. However, in June 1942 an agreement was signed between the two countries by which war essential trade has to be maintained irrespective of the state of the clearing.

The chief products imported from Germany are agricultural and other machinery, iron and steel semi-manufactured and finished products, and chemicals.

Oil has become Rumania's principal export to Germany, representing in 1940 about 58 per cent. of the total value.

Italy takes second place in Rumania's foreign trade, accounting in 1941 for 11.8 per cent. of Rumanian exports and 16.1 per cent. of imports. Trade is regulated by agreements renewed annually and petroleum products constitute the principal Rumanian export, other commodities being agricultural products and livestock, both in small quantities. Italian exports in return include textiles, sulphur, fruit and military supplies.

Trade with other European countries has been on a very reduced scale. Agreements were concluded with Slovakia, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark and Finland, the exchanges following obvious lines.

[50 c]

RUMANIA:— IMPORTS & EXPORTS BY COMMODITIES

439



[Facing p. 50]

RUMANIA — IMPORTS & EXPORTS BY COUNTRIES.

439

TOTAL EXPORTS
(Average 1937-39)
26.6 Milliard Lei

TOTAL IMPORTS
(Average 1937-39)
[illegible] Milliard Lei

[Facing p.51]

against this national misfortune, the greatest which has be-000 fallen us, and by every sacrifice to wash off this stain on our character, so that we may re-establish Rumania's credit. . ."

Prof. Basilescu's appeal unfortunately fell on deaf ears and caused no reaction whatever. The writer, too, was naïve enough to entertain the belief that by throwing a stone into the turbid pool of Rumanian consciousness it would be possible to impart some movement to its stagnant waters. He therefore, some years ago, published a booklet of social essays containing some of the quintessence of our western social thought, as well as a short criticism of the misgovernment from which Rumania was and is suffering. In order to ensure the distribution of the booklet it was sold for the benefit of a Rumanian educational institute, but, as happened with Prof. Basilescu's campaign, it evoked no response whatever in the hidebound consciousness of the Rumanian intelligentsia.[1] Rumanians cannot plead that they have not been put on their guard as to the inevitable consequences of their shortcomings. Both native and foreign observers have repeatedly admonished them and urged them to mend their ways before it was too late; so that the crisis they are traversing to-day may with some justification be diagnosed as of their own making.

There is no country which has been the cause of greater [440] disillusionment and bitterness to the British investor or exporter than Rumania, and the writer, who has largely shared this experience, feels in duty bound to his fellow countrymen to counsel total abstinence from participation in Rumanian enterprises so long as the present system endures. These practices have cast a slur on the mercantile classes, and educated Rumanians have shown a tendency to avoid following a commercial career, leaving this field of activity to alien elements, to the great detriment of the country, which is thus deprived of the opportunity of building up an independent middle-class, whose steadying effect on the general life of the community and in the formation of an enlightened public opinion would be invaluable.

So it is not merely financial reasons that press for the re-

[1] This was published in Rumanian, under the title: "Essays, Social and Scientific" by the Bucarest publishing firm of Datina Romaneasca.

361 towns, stands a church in a fortified enclosure, and the town
133 has been laid out beyond this. It is possible to infer that a similar process has worked itself out, but to a lesser degree, both in the Saxon villages of Transylvania and in such cases
361 as that of Curtea de Argeş. Here the church-and-castle
491 nucleus is as usual the focus of roads, the principal one of which runs along the terrace as already mentioned. Two others lead down towards the river, one on each side of the fortification, but not exactly to the bridge, the position of which is rather determined by gravel banks where the small seasonal brook referred to above joins the river. Some other roads or trackways branch off in a bunch just east of the nucleus and stretch up into hills of unconsolidated material, their woodland cover increasing with altitude and becoming practically continuous forest at about 600 m. altitude over sea. Where the woods are not continuous there is pasture up to which animals may be drawn every day in summer. One of these roads leads past a little old church of S. Mary and appears to be an old track leading obliquely up the hill and over into the next valley to the east. Along the beginning of this trackway are the homes of numerous craftsmen, especially potters, but we did not get evidence of a guild or zunft of potters. We are not here dealing with quite the same scheme of organisation as that of a trade in a street within a walled town. The main business part of the town has lain between the bridge end and the road on the terrace, 10-20 m. above the river, and the town has been physically constrained to spread along that road. The extension southwards has an interesting eighteenth century house overlooking a square set out quite recently. The extension northwards towards the monastery gives a ribbon of buildings mostly modern.

367 On the whole, one has the impression of a focus of peasant
443 life with fairs and markets and opportunities of sale of craft products, especially pots, to country folk. There is evidence of considerable quite modern growth, and also apparently of growth one to two centuries ago, a growth which it is tempting to associate with agricultural development gathered around the spread of maize and potato, but proof is lacking.

361 Curtea de Argeş owes a great deal of its importance to its
771 religious and princely associations, and both the Biserica Domneasca and the monastery church are important here. The latter, near a ford, may well have more ancient associa-

[In Curtea de Argeş -- 25 Analyst]

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

THE FAIR

In agricultural communities it is customary for the exchange of goods to be concentrated at certain periodic gatherings known as fairs. The countryman has little time to spare for commerce, and where an element of pastoral nomadism is present, as in Roumania, the times of meeting will be closely restricted. Fairs tend, in Europe, to be held in summer; frequently at the beginning and end of summer—in May and November—when the year's routine is broken by seasonal changes of activity. They are often well developed in regions of pastoral nomadism, where they serve as social centres and may be regarded as temporary market towns. The weekly *suq* in Morocco, for example is an essential feature of the economic and social life of the country, which has recently been studied by Mr. Fogg.

In Europe, where the market town is an ancient product of rural society, fairs usually supplement the functions of established towns, although in origin they are thought to be much older than urban life. They have been described as parasite towns brought into being to meet the periodic needs of country dwellers, but such a description fails to reveal their significance.

The subject of fairs in its social and economic aspects has scarcely received the attention it merits in the history of Europe. It is true that the great fairs of the Middle Ages, such as those of Champagne and Flanders, have often been described, but they were "commodity fairs," concerned with the exchange of goods over wide areas and frequented by merchants from all parts of Europe. As is well known, the *foci* of these great fairs moved eastwards into Germany in the sixteenth century, and again in the nineteenth century into Russia, where Nijni Novgorod has held an exceptional position for over a century. In central Asia, as in Africa (cf. the annual *mouggar* of South Morocco), much commerce is still conducted at such commodity fairs. While the development of communications and of means of exchange has undermined the large fairs in Europe, the local fair is still an active institution.

415
44:

PLATE XII

Curtea de Argeș. Pots were sold at the local fair. They had been made in the village. Cart for packing and bringing pots shown in background.

[page 54 b]

543 527 443

THE FAIRS at Curtea de Argeş are held twice a year, each lasting about a week and ending respectively on August 15th (Assumption) and October 25th (St. Demetri). The association with Christian festivals is a widespread feature (the word "fair" is derived from *feriæ*, feast), the fairs attracting the crowds which gather for the festivals. It can sometimes be shown that the time and place of meeting are older than Christianity and that the periodic pagan assemblies later received the sanction of the Church. The fair, at any rate, satisfies a deep peasant instinct for worship, the exchange of goods and social intercourse.

THE AUGUST fair at Curtea corresponds with the early harvests of fruit—especially the plum—and, formerly, with the cereal harvests (buckwheat and millets) which maize replaced. It is probably connected in origin with the Lammas fairs of the West. The first of August, in the ancient Celtic calendar, marked the beginning of autumn and was celebrated as a harvest festival. In Ireland the day is still called Lewy's Fair, and is traditionally associated with the lighting of fires, with games and the making of marriage matches. Lammas fair is the largest of the year in some Irish towns.

THE OCTOBER fair would seem to derive its importance primarily from the return of the stock from the mountain pastures, when cheese and wool and surplus animals can be exchanged. A feature of the October fair is the high proportion of sheep and goats among the stock offered for sale. In the French Alps, too, the autumn stock fairs are the most important of the year. The maize harvest has by this time been gathered even in the Carpathian valleys, where winter sets in early. But whatever the position may once have been, the fairs are now more concerned with goods than with stock.

543 CURTEA FAIR-GROUND is situated on the flood plain, on waste ground kept free of permanent habitations by the danger of spring floods. The scarp leading to the first river-terrace rises steeply behind and is planted with trees which provide
[312] some shelter for peasants and animals. Here, too, under the scarp, is the well which supplies the needs of man and beast.
[496] The main railway—terminus of the line downstream to Pitesti—has extensive sidings on the first terrace immediately behind, while the branch (timber) line to Cumpana runs

543 through a corner of the fair-ground as it begins its journey northwards. The fair-ground extends from the bridgehead, where in former times there must have been a ford, southwards for an indefinite distance between river and railway. A tributary stream which joins the Argeş at the bridge is named, after the fair, Valea *Tîrgul*. From the bridge a lane winds southwards to the rows of buildings and sheds which
256 constitute the permanent nucleus of the fair. Here is the corn mill, perhaps once dependent on power from the river, but now driven by electricity. We may note in passing that among the many survivals in the Carpathians is the horizontal water-wheel, used here as in Norway to turn corn mills. The mill consists of a log-hut erected directly over a stream
543 or a branch of a river. The sale of cereals, chiefly maize, is
443 also conducted by the mill, at the entrance to the fair, and there are stores of building materials, fruit, rock-salt and charcoal.

Rows of permanent open-sided sheds face each other along the "main street" of the fair, and are hired for the duration by merchants and caterers. Other goods—mostly those brought by peasants—are displayed in improvised booths or exposed on the ground by the wayside. Further on, the inevitable amusements are concentrated in a corner of their own, the stalls in this section increasing in number throughout the week, until pleasure becomes the chief business by the last days of the fair. This is the natural culmination of events which begin with the sale of cattle in the opening days; the "order of the fair" is a traditional feature of such gatherings everywhere.

543 But in Roumania there is another element which contributes
326 to the variety of the fair—the gipsies who pitch their camps
563 behind the booths and hawk trinkets or unobtrusively engage in metal-work and wood-carving. They appear to keep apart from the rest. To them the food-stallholders bring their copper pots, used for boiling fat, for retinning, while the peasants drive up the draught oxen which may need to be reshod. The tinning is done over an improvised hearth and a handful of charcoal; the shoeing—by the bridge-head—requires somewhat more elaborate equipment in the shape of
[735] a forge and a post and ropes for felling the oxen. Finally, squatting by the wayside, or actively exhibiting their sores, there are the beggars and cripples, who complete the human picture.

543 443 WE HAVE classified the chief items observed at the fair between August 11th and 15th, 1936.

1. *Livestock.* Draught oxen, cows and calves, pigs and piglets. A few horses and goats. No sheep or fowl. The bargaining for cattle is completed when the buyer contrives to thrust a piece of silver into the hand of the seller. Acceptance of the earnest is followed by a hand-clasp.

[391] 2. *Agricultural Implements and Metal-work.*—It is said that gipsy-made metal tools were formerly displayed, but what little metal-work is now sold is factory-made and comes mostly from Czechoslovakia—cow-bells (of sheet-metal), horse-bells (of cast-metal), knives, etc. Hay-forks are gipsy-made, as are washing tubs and cradles, hollowed out of split tree trunks. Kitchen spoons are hand-carved. Wooden saddles and gipsy-made baskets and brooms may come under this head.

3. *Fruits and Vegetables.*—Tomatoes, potatoes, sweet-corn, onions, garlic, peppers, cabbage, water-melons, gherkins, aubergines, pears, apples, plums, blackberries. Also eggs and cheese.

[323] 4. *Pottery.*—The chief local craft is naturally well represented. The vessels, displayed on the ground, vary greatly in size, decoration and purpose; but they are all of brown clay, usually with simple floral patterns and debased geometrical designs in burnt sienna, yellow and green: vessels with or without lids, with or without handles, with or without spouts, glazed inside, outside, or both, in size ranging from salt-and-pepper stands to large waterpots. We find the old device of making pots in imitation of birds and animals.

[282] 5. *Leatherwork.*—Several booths display white leather sheepskin waistcoats, having the wool inside and the outside decorated with applied strips of thin orange-dyed leather embroidered usually by machine stitching, but occasionally by hand. These waistcoats are made at Curtea de Argeş. Leather belts, 4 to 6 inches wide, are machine-stitched but hand-tooled; they have buckle fastenings. Bridles and saddlery. Knotted leather thongs for whips. Hempen ropes for halters are sold in this section, too. Ready-made boots and shoes. The bulk of the shoes for sale, however, are made of rubber, in the shape of the traditional pointed shoe of skin. Most of them are cut from old motor tyres, but others are now made from specially manufactured rubber strips which repeat the patterns of the tyres.

543
443
[286]

6. *Woven Goods.*—Here the high skill and craftsmanship of the Carpathian peasant is most obviously illustrated. Woollen cloths are the commonest, carded wool also being offered for sale. Linen, silk and hempen stuffs are displayed, the finer materials often having gold or silver threads woven into them; they are made up into blouses, skirts, veils and belts. Some machine-made cotton goods also for sale.

[531]

7. *Embroidered Goods.*—Velvet waistcoats with gold embroidery and bead work. Linen or woollen cloths are embroidered with wool, silk, or mercerised cotton. Round sequins, thought to betray Turkish influence, are very popular.

8. *Carpets.*—Locally woven carpets of traditional colours and designs far outnumber machine-made copies of Persian carpets.

9. *Food and Confectionery.*—Bread, doughnuts, sausages, fish, gingerbread, sweets. Sugar dolls, hearts, circles, diamonds and other shapes. Sugar rosaries. Drinks are hawked by Turkish itinerants. The restaurants and drinking booths have gipsy fiddlers.

10. *Cheap Jewellery.*—Trinkets, mirrors, beads, combs, buttons, studs, pins, rings, brooches, etc.

543
517

11. *Entertainments.*—The fat woman and the one-minute photographer, shooting ranges, cock-shies, games of chance, fortune-telling. The merry-go-round is driven by five men, who push it round on a high wooden platform fixed to the central axis, with the accompaniment of peasant music. Other bands supply music for the dancing which takes place under the trees.

543
443

Apart from the gipsy goods and the articles offered in the permanent booths, the goods displayed vary from day to day as different groups of peasants come in from the country. There is a constant coming and going of bullock carts over the bridge, bringing in stock and peasant products for sale. The normal limit of influence exerted by the fair is some 25 kilometres.

E. E. E.

412



Hoe.
Blade the size of an English spade. See page 41.

[Page 59]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

457 conditioned by the fact that it was an agricultural country developing with the aid of foreign capital. A positive balance of trade was usually devoted to covering the invisible exports—interest on state borrowings and returns on foreign capital invested in the country. Under postwar circumstances, the fairly stable situation which had obtained before 1914 was thrown out of equilibrium as a consequence of war losses, the incurrence of war debts, and the decline in cereal exports. German investments, which had been of major importance before the war, were cut off and were not replaced by an equivalent influx from the West. Despite Rumania's generally favorable balance of trade, the balance of payments was negative.

458 Rumania's financial position was further weakened by the chronic
653 instability of the leu. Following the First World War the leu depreciated until 1927. It was legally stabilized in 1929 with the aid of an international loan of $100 million. This effort, however, was wrecked by the depression and the collapse of central European finance in 1931. In the 1930's Rumania, though at a somewhat later date than the other Balkan states, was forced to introduce exchange controls and suspend a considerable portion of the foreign debt payment. The gradual move toward increasing financial and commercial controls was largely a consequence of exchange difficulties. Despite the relatively favorable commercial position, Rumania was even less successful than the other Balkan states in achieving monetary stability, and the value of the leu continued to decline. By 1939 the Rumanian monetary situation was altogether chaotic, and the diversity of the rates of the leu made it impossible to ascertain the real value of the money.[20]

It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze the tortuous course of Rumanian financial and monetary policy, which was extremely complicated, subject to frequent change, and not successful in achieving its aims. In general, the financial field showed Rumanian administration at its worst. While the real difficulty was basically that of an immature economy attempting to catch up with a world economy —itself in serious crisis—the fact that Rumania, although in a somewhat better commercial position than the other Balkan states, was even less successful in its financial policy must be attributed largely to the political circumstances of the 1930's.

● 452 To some extent Rumania's financial vicissitudes by-passed the peasant in so far as he was leading a self-subsistent, nonmonetary life. He was principally affected in his requirements for credit. Although, as has been mentioned above, the Rumanian peasant was not in a

20. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 825.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

position to utilize credit very effectively, he was burdened with debts. 452
These debts, for the most part, had not been contracted for capital investment in improved agricultural equipment but rather to meet his deficit of net income or to enable him to purchase land.[21] The supply of credit to agriculture was not sufficient to ease this burden. The underlying difficulty, of course, was the general lack of capital in Rumania; the available supply moved toward industry, a more remunerative and less precarious field than agriculture. It is not easy to determine whether credit discrimination in favor of industry was greater than the difference in risk between agriculture and industry. Certainly Rumanian agriculture offered very little security to loans, especially since many of the new allotments of land were legally inalienable.

But just as industry was being consciously fostered, so the diversion of credit away from agriculture was not solely the result of economic factors. For one thing, credit institutions were primarily designed for the benefit of industry; in 1925 the governor of the National Bank remarked that while Rumania had a national bank to help trade and a Society for Industrial Credit to help industry, there was no organized agricultural credit on a similar scale.[22] In any event, by 1938 industry was receiving double the amount of credit going to agriculture, not including foreign credit. Between 1928 and 1938 the National Bank's discounts to industry rose from 32.02 to 55.95 per cent of the total, whereas discounts for agriculture dropped from 22.97 to 4.94 per cent.[23] Under these circumstances it is not surprising that many a peasant was forced to go to the usurer to whom he had to pay exorbitant rates of interest, and went on from year to year falling deeper and deeper into debt.

Standard of Living

Unfortunately, there are no sound official evaluations of the Rumanian national income. Certain estimates have been made but they can serve only as a rough guide. Colin Clark has put the Rumanian income per head of working population, between the years 1925 and 1934, at 243 international units (i.e., the amount of goods and services that could be purchased for $1 in the United States over the 434

21. In 1928 the interest charge on debts equalled 10 to 11 per cent of the average gross income on 6,000 farms; after the agrarian depression, in 1931, this rose to 35 per cent. N. Cornăţeanu, "Effects of the Agricultural Crisis on Peasant Farms in Rumania," *International Review of Agriculture*, 22, No. 7 (Rome, 1931), 208E.

22. Quoted in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 424.

23. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 353.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

656 rise to the charge that the National Peasants really represented the
665 richer peasants and the village bourgeoisie.[48]
671 A similar attitude appears in the other principal agrarian measures of the National Peasants; the law for the organization of cooperation, of March 28, 1929, and the law for the organization of rural mortgages and agricultural credit of July 29, 1929. These laws were acclaimed at the time as proof of the government's concern for the peasant, but they need not be considered in great detail here.[49] Laws for credit and cooperation are hardy perennials in Rumanian legislative history, but none of them appears to have accomplished much. These particular laws were quickly blighted by the onset of the depression.

474 The law for the organization of cooperation abrogated the act passed by the Liberal government in July, 1928, which the National Peasants thought gave the state too much control over the cooperative movement. The new code was designed to broaden the legal frame "to offer the cooperatives the freedom of movement which every economic enterprise needs if it is to develop in the present economic world."[50] Notwithstanding this effort to assure greater autonomy and independence, a foreign observer concluded in 1930 that even the new regime had not abandoned the idea that the cooperatives were a government maid of all work.[51] The real difficulty, as has been mentioned before, was that the poor peasant, that is, the average Rumanian, had very little to offer in a cooperative movement. Until the level of the peasantry was raised above the margin of subsistence, the cooperative movement was bound to be a name rather than a reality and to be altogether dependent upon the state for financial support and direction.

● 452 The law for the organization of rural mortgages and agricultural credit was intended to improve the channels supplying credit to agriculture, which had been seriously undernourished during the Liberal

48. This charge is given some weight when one considers Madgearu's remark, made in 1930: "With farms of medium size, limited to 25 hectares, the agricultural credit granted will be used in a more economical way and will bear fruit in a degree hitherto unknown in our agrarian organization." *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 11. In a country where 75 per cent of all agricultural holdings were under 5 hectares, and 92 per cent under 10 hectares, reference to farms of medium size could have only an extremely limited application.

49. Analyses of the law for the organization of cooperatives may be found in Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, pp. 409–411, and in F. E. Manoliou, *La Réconstruction économique et financière de la Roumanie et les partis politiques*, pp. 236–237, and of the law for the reorganization of agricultural credit in Manoliou, pp. 239–243.

50. From the exposé de motifs, cited in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 409.

51. "Rumania: The State as Co-operator," *Yearbook of Agricultural Co-operation, 1930*, pp. 404–428.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

regime. New institutions were set up to provide credit suitable to agriculture's particular wants. It was hoped that these would stimulate the influx of foreign capital "to satisfy the needs of agricultural financing." [52] In its form the new law was better adjusted to the needs of agriculture, but the depression completely halted the desired flow of capital. It may be doubted if this law was of primary benefit to the poor peasant, who was of necessity a bad risk and whose impoverished condition prevented him from employing credit profitably.[53]

In addition to these financial measures, the National Peasants passed acts for the organization and reform of agricultural instruction intended to spread and popularize better agricultural techniques and to prevent trained agriculturalists from being completely absorbed by the bureaucracy; a law of July, 1929, for the reclamation of the inundated region of the Danube; measures for leasing agricultural machinery to cultivators and developing seed selection stations; and a law to promote systematic colonization in areas of sparse population. These measures, while desirable in themselves, could be of only marginal benefit.

Although the National Peasants' concern with agriculture is shown by the fact that the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture in 1929 was double that of any of the preceding postwar years,[54] the general results are somewhat flat and uninspiring. According to Madgearu ten years later, the National Peasants, because of the difficult circumstances under which they had received the stabilization loan and because of the increasingly unfavorable international economic situation, had been unable to carry out all their financial plans but had been forced to limit themselves to certain priority tasks: assuring the liquidity of the National Bank's portfolio, liquidating the state's floating debt, reconstructing the railways, and making certain productive investments. "The necessary means were lacking to create an agricultural mortgage bank." [55]

Doubtless, financial difficulties and the lack of capital were important obstacles, and the depression washed away what might have been promising beginnings toward improvement in agricultural finan-

52. Madgearu, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 9.

53. Manoliou, *op. cit.*, p. 242, was of the opinion that certain measures of inspection and control, included in the law to safeguard the credit societies, would have the effect of discouraging the small cultivator and diminishing his productive efforts.

54. According to Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 453, after the First World War the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture had not exceeded 33,500,000 gold lei until the advent of the National Peasants. In 1929 it reached the figure of 73,500,000 gold lei.

55. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei romînești*, p. 306.

lei which was absorbed by Russia. Through the latter 433
country an annual surplus of over a million tons of cereals was also marketed, as an excellent network of railway lines connected Odessa and the chief towns of Russia with Bessarabia. Further, under the Russian régime credit facilities 452
were obtainable and a capital of some 10 million roubles or 10 milliard lei was at the disposal of the agriculturalists, while now it is reckoned that the Rumanian banks do not dispose of even 1½ milliard lei for this purpose, and in spite of the fact that the present requirements of the population are incomparably greater, since with the breaking up of the large estates, it was indispensable to provide the peasantry with funds wherewith they might buy implements and cattle for their farms.

It would appear that any civilized government, however 489
vague its conception of its duty might be, would have proceeded to endow this province with a network of roads and railways to aid the population by thus facilitating the transport of its produce to the ports, since Odessa, the former outlet, is no longer available for this purpose. But strange to say, the Rumanian authorities have done nothing whatever; though even the construction of a few short connecting lines permitting a partial reorientation of the existing railway tracks and the construction of a grain elevator at the Danubian town of Reni would have gone a long way to relieve the strain. Even the deepening of the bed of the Pruth as far as Ungheni might have provided cheaper transport facilities to a large percentage of the available grain, which was often left to rot in the fields because overland transport charges, in the absence of roads, were found prohibitive.

Even out of mere solicitude for the safety of the State the Rumanian government ought to have provided means of communication whereby its army might in an emergency be concentrated on an ever-exposed frontier, in a region where a perpetual state of war exists. But even this weighty consideration has not sufficed to rouse the Bucarest Government from its self-complacency. There are, of course, persons 668
who would explain the continual agitation brewing in Bess- 177
arabia and the predilection of its inhabitants for Russian rule by the assertion that these dunces of Moldovans (as the

GEOGRAPHIC AND ETHNOGRAPHIC NOTES

Cetatea Alba 33,495, Focşani 32,799, Botoşani 32,007, 162
Tighina 31,698, Bacau 31,264, Balţi 30,667, Giurgiu 30,348, Piatra-Neamt 30,211, Bazargic 29,938, Roman 28,948, Sighet 27,684 (French edition of census gives 27,646), Barlad 26,189, Ismail 26,123, Lugoş 23,674, Targovişte 22,482, Tulcea 20,104, Turda 20,057, Reşiţa 20,008.

COMMERCIAL MORALITY

One can best judge of a country by the mentality of its 439
commercial circles, and it is not therefore amiss to enlarge 452
on this subject prior to analyzing Rumanian finance, for it will be found that State affairs are generally conducted very much after the business methods in vogue. In fact, as we all know, legislation concerning finance and trade is often, if not always, inspired and directed by the views held by the commercial and its allied industrial and banking professions.

An outsider would have expected that in a country like Rumania, practically devoid of liquid assets, every possible safeguard would have been extended to foreign capital so as to attract it, seeing that the country's development and welfare are dependent on it. But instead, post-war Rumanian legislation has been distinctly inimical to the foreign creditors of the country, and has openly favoured and encouraged debtors to repudiate their engagements to such an extent, that finally all operations based on credit have had to be suspended. This has had a disastrous effect on Rumanian commerce, for traders are generally devoid of cash resources and depend entirely on credit for their operations. Importers of foreign goods used to obtain their supplies on a six to nine months credit basis, and were able to extend corresponding facilities to their customers, so that these transactions really corresponded to the granting of a short-term loan to Rumania which was perpetually renewed and which permitted the financing of these operations.

Several laws, amongst which that of the so-called "concordat préventif," finally superseded by the so-termed "judicial liquidation," have rendered commercial opera-

tions on a credit basis so hazardous that they have practically ceased, to the great discomfiture of Rumanian merchants, who have seen their activities completely paralysed.

As matters stand, a creditor is at the mercy of his debtor, and if the latter refuses to honour his engagements there is nothing to be done but to accept whatever compromise may be offered, for a recourse to tribunals would be tantamount to a total loss not only of the amount involved, but of the supplementary expenses arising from legal disbursements and inordinately high judicial taxes which unlucky creditors will have to defray.

What is singular is a tax imposed by the State on all bankruptcies to the amount of 20 per cent of the total assets declared, so that this explains, though it can hardly justify, the State's manifest indifference to the undermining of the country's commercial reputation through fraudulent bankruptcies, the frequency of which is positively alarming, for it derives corresponding advantages from this impost on bankruptcies. Instead of attempting to circumscribe this evil it would appear that the State has done much to encourage it, especially where foreigners are involved. Apparently it is actuated by the shortsighted view that the loss of the foreigner is to the benefit of the country in general, since through bankruptcies foreign capital is transferred to its own nationals. At any rate, bankruptcies have been regarded as a means of raising revenue, and the State as a privileged party has always secured its 20 per cent impost plus other legal taxes, and the debtor has usually managed to alienate a good part of his assets so as to safeguard himself in a very satisfactory manner, while the wretched creditor not only gets nothing but usually finds he is being called upon to make further disbursements on account of legal formalities involved. The *Argus* of June 15th and 16th, 1931, commenting on the law of the "Concordat préventif," qualified it as disastrous, and added: "Among the principal obstacles which prevent the development and normalization of our commerce this law stands in the front rank. . . . it has given free rein to the unscrupulous debtor, permitting him to carry out his underhand manœuvres without any risks, to sell the goods he bought with-

out paying for them, spoliating thereby his creditor and underselling and ruining the honest trader."

The paper advocated a revision of the law and demanded that debtors should be obliged to make a composition on the basis of the ratio existing between the assets and the liabilities, or with a variation of only 10 or 20 per cent of this proportion. As matters now stand a dishonourable merchant is entitled to file a demand for a "Concordat préventif" though his assets may far exceed his liabilities. He is then allowed to pay 40 or 60 per cent of his debts, and after they have been thereby considerably reduced is even accorded a delay of several years to pay them off. With such facilities at hand the majority of merchants did not scruple to avail themselves of the opportunity of repudiating their engagements and so getting rich quickly. The consequence is that commerce has been completely dislocated through the complete suppression of credit which naturally followed. The Under-Secretary of Justice in the Iorga-Argentoianu Government, M. N. Lenguceanu, overtly admitted in the *Neamul Romanesc*, September 5th, 1930, that the above-mentioned law "had permitted merchants, 98 per cent of whom were foreigners, overtly to despoil their creditors." Another very serious defect from which Rumanian legislation suffers is the tendency to enact laws with retroactive effect, which permits the invalidation of contracts, thus creating a state of instability that affects most adversely all commercial and financial operations. For how can foreign investors risk their capital in a country where uncertainty and instability have become its distinguishing features?

Senator Marino, on February 26th, 1932, deplored the disrespect shown for contracts, criticized the State for various measures passed undermining confidence, among which was the moratorium of 1919–1920 by which foreigners had lost some 7 milliard lei, and demanded the granting of serious guarantees which would instil confidence once more. Similar pronouncements by public men abound, for the serious consequence of the present policy are obvious to all.

Professor Flinders Petrie once stated (*Contemporary Re-*

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

000 down after heavy fighting and the burning of many villages.

635 563 [452] The political situation[1] in Bessarabia was partly the cause and partly the effect of economic conditions. Agricultural credit for those peasants who had received land was non-existent. Communications were neglected and allowed to fall into complete decay. There was only a small amount of trade, which was largely in the hands of the Jews. This encouraged the spread of anti-Semitic propaganda which was fostered by the Government. The Ukrainian and Russian population was deprived of all cultural rights. The German minority was the best treated, but even the Rumanians of Bessarabia were regarded by the central government with suspicion.

635 648 Following a demand by the Soviet government, which had never recognized the annexation of Bessarabia, Bessarabia was ceded by Rumania to the U.S.S.R. in June 1940. When Rumania joined Germany in the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina were again occupied by Rumanian troops.

[1] [i.e: the frequency of popular uprisings -- Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

231 For the majority of Rumania's peasants the most
433 valuable of all animals are his sheep, of which Greater Rumania possessed about 12,000,000. Both the wool and the meat of Rumanian sheep are, however, of a lower quality than those of Great Britain or New Zealand. Sheep's milk, and the cheese made from it, supplement the monotonous diet of the peasant.

[439] Of the 3,000,000 pigs in Greater Rumania most were kept in the New Territories and a large proportion of the country's pork production was exported. Apart from the Rumanian Mangalita, English Berkshires were bred in great numbers.

241 Considered as a whole the agriculture of Greater Rumania, favoured by good climatic conditions and great soil fertility, remained undeveloped owing to the general economic conditions. The peasantry did not possess the necessary implements, buildings or animals which could have secured profitable ex-
[452] ploitation of the soil. Financial help was difficult to obtain, and the loans that were granted were ruinous to the peasant, owing to the high rate of interest.
[453] Co-operatives were few. Some agricultural banks and associations confined to the German colonists in the Banat and in Transylvania were the only ones
[435] which succeeded. Agricultural prices were low and the peasant was often forced to sell his produce before the harvest to export trusts which dominated
[654] the market. The only assistance given by the government consisted in loans and seeds at reduced prices for the growing of certain crops, such as soya beans, for export in order to fulfil international trade
[439] agreements. During the last fifteen years Germany secured an ever greater influence upon Rumania's agriculture and took most of its exports.

CHAPTER I

228 in private waters. Supplemented by some 4,000 tons of imported fish, this provided nearly 1 kg. (2·2 lb.) per head of population, but, in fact, almost all the fish was consumed by the 5 million persons living in towns. The principal fish caught were sturgeon, carp, pike, eels and crayfish, the main fishing centres being Brăila, Tulcea and Ismail.

6. Food Industries

256 The chief food and agricultural-processing industries are milling, sugar manufacture, oilseed crushing and tobacco curing. While the milling industry was dispersed widely about the country in more than 15,000 small mills employing altogether over 37,000 persons (at 1930 census), the sugar industry was for the most part concentrated in the plain of the Old Kingdom. Of the 17 sugar 257 factories employing 4,000 workers, only one was in the Transylvanian districts lost to Hungary and five in the areas temporarily lost to the U.S.S.R. 258 The vegetable-oil industry, located chiefly in Bessarabia, was only partly carried on in factories, of which there were (on January 1st, 1930) 117, employing 2,026 workers. Among these, 34 were fitted both to extract crude oil and to refine it, six were exclusively refineries, while the remainder produced only crude oil. The rest of the industry consisted of some 2,000 hand, or animal-driven presses mostly owned by individual peasants or by shopkeepers. These primitive presses extracted only a low percentage of oil from the seeds, and consequently the cake—mainly sold for export—had an unusually high oil content. As regards 277 tobacco, both curing and cigarette manufacture [656] were subject to government licence and control. There were 29 factories (in 1930) employing 9,720 workers, but tobacco cultivation subsequently declined, so also doubtless did the numbers employed.

7. Agricultural Organisation

452 The history of the organisation of Rumanian 241 farmers is one of not too successful co-operatives 474 becoming transformed more and more into agencies for the execution of Government Control Schemes. [654] For many years there had been throughout the country a network of agricultural credit societies, co-operative in form but in practice directed by the State. These played an important rôle during the period of the Land Reform in helping the peasants by advances to buy and equip their newly acquired holdings. There was even some co-operative cultivation for a time, until the new peasant-owners could muster sufficient draught animals and implements. Besides this, there have been strong local co-operative unions especially among the [162] minority nationalities—the Hungarians in Transylvania, the Swabian and Saxons in the Banat and the Russian and Polish Jews in the Bucovina.

243 The credit societies revived in importance when 474 after 1933, the Rumanian Government began the organisation of grain marketing. They became 452 the local agents of a Central Marketing Board through which all sales of grain had to be made 654 both for home consumption and for export. Whereas formerly grain prices slumped immediately after the harvest, most peasants, being obliged to sell their grain quickly, under the new scheme prices were stabilised throughout the year, and this brought a great improvement to peasants' [651] receipts. But the scheme and the societies were also used to collect the peasants' taxes (paid in grain) which did not increase the popularity of co-operation.

[8a]

241 423 426 some 80 milliard lei, and obliged the Government to pass the law decreeing the conversion of agrarian debts, in order to save the peasantry from the predicament of being dispossessed of their land by their creditors. The large owners, however, were in as bad a plight and perhaps worse off, for when the legislation concerning the cancellation of agrarian debts was under discussion in the Chamber, the director of the *Argus* suggested that Ministers and deputies should be excluded from being among the beneficiaries of the proposed law, so that they should not be accused later of having passed such a revolutionary measure mainly for self-interested motives. His suggestion was not supported, a fact which would tend to prove that large owners were perhaps more insistent on the adoption of this measure than smallholders, to many of whom it has proved highly prejudicial.

That the agrarian revolution did not solely profit the peasantry, and that others took advantage of it to appropriate lands to which they had no right, and that the latter were more insistent on the voting of the law for the conversion of agrarian debts, is an undisputed fact. This is proved also by an interview published by the *Adeverul* on September 9th, 1930, in which Prof. Iorga was reported to have said: "When the expropriation of the large estates was carried out many mistakes and injustices were committed. Real cultivators were not endowed with land in order that in their place land should be bestowed on various political partisans, electoral agents, and others who had nothing in common with the land or agriculture. Having thus secured the land, they set about to increase their holdings by buying up with borrowed money adjoining tracks, and started exploiting them on American methods. But their calculations were erroneous, because with us agriculture is not profitable except for the owner who himself cultivates his land. This category of landowners should not be assimilated with the peasantry, and the State should not assume charge of their debts." This wise recommendation, however, was not followed, and large owners were permitted to a certain extent to take advantage of the law of conversion of agrarian debts.

241 426 453 That it was absolutely indispensable to extend some help to the peasantry no one will dispute, but this law of con-

version of agrarian debts will probably do more harm than 241
good in the long run, not only because it has undermined 426
confidence and ruined the banks, but also on account of the 453
adverse effects it will have on agriculture itself, for it brings no relief to the peasant in the way of obtaining the credit facilities he needs, but on the contrary it renders borrowing now almost impossible. Prior to the promulgation of this law both banking institutions and private persons who had lent money to peasants were ready to help them, if by so doing they could recover part of their debts; there was a certain sense of solidarity between creditor and debtor; now, however, that the law has arbitrarily stepped in between them and settled their relations, practically ruining the creditors, the latter have no longer the means nor any interest to assist their debtors. Another disastrous outcome of the law is the loss of all the savings which the more industrious among the peasantry may have had, and which naturally were placed in the keeping of the rural banks now rendered insolvent. It is calculated that these sums amount to some 6 milliard lei. This law, therefore, instead of encouraging the more progressive peasants, has ruined them and reduced them to the level of the more indolent. Another drawback in this law is that it subjects all land, the owners of which take advantage of its clauses, to a certain legal servitude for 30 years, precluding the owners from mortgaging it and contracting loans, although the securing of fresh credit constitutes their most pressing need. It may be taken for granted that, in consequence of this law, the area sown will be considerably less in extent this year, owing to the impossibility for the peasants to obtain timely advances for cultivating their fields, and also to the discouragement of the most enterprising among them, who lost their capital through the failure of the banks.

This law, if not repealed, will be yet another obstacle to the creation of a rural mortgage bank, of which the country is in such dire need, for peasants taking advantage of the conversion law cannot mortgage their holdings. The necessary preliminary for the normal working of such an institution would be the creation of cadastral registration, which is non-existent in the country. If the Rumanian Government

241 really intended to revert to a régime of legality and to the
426 granting of adequate security to foreign capital, there would
453 be hardly any difficulties in its obtaining the necessary aid from abroad in order to permit the establishment of such an institution, and in order to save time it would be politic on its part if without further delay it took the requisite steps to prepare a cadastral register or ground-book. Such measures of self-aid would prove more efficacious than the solicitation at international conferences of preferential rates for Rumanian agricultural produce. For they would help to convince foreign investors that Rumania had at last decided to put her house in order, a decision which, if seriously taken, would probably cause foreign capital to come to her aid and bring to her corresponding or equal advantages to those she would derive from the obtaining of the preferential rates for which she is now craving as a favour from industrial States. There are no insuperable obstacles to the salving of Rumanian agriculture. All that is needed is cheap credit and the lowering of the cost of industrial products used by
241 the peasantry. These *desiderata* may be secured whenever
461 the Government decides to change its methods and adopt as its guiding principles honesty, retrenchment, and austerity. After all, the peasants have done more than their share, and no greater effort can be demanded of them. One who has witnessed the long heartbreak of endless and often unrequited labour that has been their lot, and the fortitude with which they have faced the apathy the State has so far shown towards them, can have no doubts as to the response a little encouragement would evoke from them. Without decent seed grain, and with the most primitive implements, it was but natural that the yield per hectare should decrease. Nevertheless, the steady although small increase of the area under cultivation is a convincing proof that the peasants have never stinted their labour and that they are determined to persist to the extreme limits of human endurance in their efforts to wrest a bare subsistence from the soil. The following table will be found to confirm fully what has been stated
241 above, namely, that while the area cultivated has been
433 maintained, the yield per hectare is on the whole diminishing:

figures show the livestock population during the pre-war period and for the years 1926 and 1930: 241 231

Livestock.	Pre-war figures for all regions forming part of present-day Rumania	1926.	1930.
Horses and donkeys ...	2,678,000	1,890,000	1,818,560
Horned cattle ...	6,760,000	4,992,000	4,011,141
Sheep and goats ...	15,250,000	14,059,000	12,273,347
Pigs	4,634,000	3,168,000	2,322,971

BANKING

The meagre capital resources of Rumania proved inadequate to the task allotted to them after the war and the general dislocation it had caused. Banks were called upon to finance the reparation of the damage suffered in the territories of the old kingdom, to advance moneys to the rural population which had just been endowed with land, and to furnish capital for the execution of the policy of industrialization to which the country had committed itself. The banks were subjected to a heavy strain, but owing to the financial assistance they received from foreign banking firms this was somewhat relieved. Unfortunately, very often less circumspection than the situation called for was shown in the granting of credits, for in many cases other considerations than those obtaining in Western countries prevailed, and as a result several banking firms were put in jeopardy through immobilization of too great a share of their assets in industrial undertakings. 453

The report of the experts on the liquidation of the Bank Dacia, of Iassi, published in the *Argus* on June 17th, 1931, is sufficiently enlightening on the subject. This bank, the total capital of which was only 20 million lei, had invested 70 millions in industrial enterprises, and the managers were blamed for not having asked for the winding-up of the bank when they no longer disposed of even one-third of the capital, as was stipulated in the statutes.

According to official statistics, at the end of 1929 there were in existence 1,097 banks, with a paid-up capital of 11,180 million lei. The great majority, however, were very small concerns which hardly deserve the preten-

453 tious appellation of "bank," which they bestowed on themselves, for they are mere money-lending firms of very dubious standing. There are only about 12 firms that may be called banks, and these hold between them about one-quarter of the aggregate banking capital. The offices of all these firms is at Bucarest, except that of the Banca Comerţului, which is at Craiova. Besides these private banks there were 4,757 popular banks, with a capital of 7,248 million lei, in operation at the end of 1929. These banks operate mainly in rural districts and are of great help to the peasants, to whom they provide funds and also offer a method for the investment of their savings. They are run on co-operative lines and counted a membership of 1,003,082, the great majority being agriculturalists. The depositors at these banks numbered some 478,315, with a total amount on deposit of 1,417 million lei, while the paid-up capital was 1,801 millions.

426 453 The recent law decreeing the conversion of agrarian debts will completely paralyze the activities of all banks in Rumania, and will work inestimable harm to the peasantry, as credit will be entirely disorganized. The passing of the law caused consternation, and most banks decided to go into liquidation. According to the reports published in the Press of a meeting held at Cluj on May 8th, 1932, at which were present delegates from all the Rumanian banks of Transylvania, it was considered that this was the only course left open to them. It was stated that these banks had a capital of 1,200 millions and deposits amounting to 3,000 millions, so that the law of conversion extinguished at one stroke all the capital of the banks and immobilized for 30 years half of the deposits they had received. The representative of the banks of Cluj stated that "such a stunning blow has not been experienced since the Rumanian banks of Transylvania were founded some sixty years ago. Many cherish the illusion that it is yet possible for the banks to survive. My opinion is that no banking institution in Transylvania will henceforth be able to function. Within three months we shall see the disastrous effects of the law; there is nothing left but to liquidate." The extent to which the banks will be affected can be realized if it be noted that the estimated

amount owed by agriculturalists is some 80 milliard lei. So 426
that even if only half of them availed themselves of the law, 463
this would mean an immediate wiping out of about 20 milliards of capital and the immobilization of another 20 milliards for a period of 30 years. On this half of their debt agriculturists will be paying 4 per cent interest, while the banks which have borrowed the sums they had advanced to the peasants are paying 7 to 10 per cent interest. When it is considered that the total capital and reserves of private banks in Rumania hardly reaches 15 milliards, one can realize what a staggering blow this law will be to the economic life of the country. It is true that over four milliards worth of bills belonging to agriculturalists have been rediscounted by the National Bank of Rumania, and that the State has undertaken to indemnify this bank for the loss it will sustain on this head, yet the balance of the loss caused by this astounding law is so formidable that one wonders how the private banks are to survive the blow. One may also question the capacity of the State to find adequate means wherewith to indemnify the National Bank for its losses, seeing that its own plight is so hopeless that its own officials have been left unpaid for months.

It may be apposite to record the opinion of the members 426
of the legal profession in Transylvania and the Banat concerning this law, which is likely to ruin all the banks in the country. Members of this profession met at Cluj on June 5th, 1932, and passed a resolution in which it was affirmed: "That this law, which permits the confiscation of property and annuls acquired rights, is unconstitutional. That it is contrary to the established principles of thousands of years and overthrows the legal order on which the present social order is established. That in consequence this meeting moves that this law should be abrogated and replaced by another, which, while solving the problem of agrarian debts, should be in conformity with the constitution and with the established principles of justice. . . ."

Even before the passage of the law of conversion of 453
agrarian debts most of the banks were in a precarious condition, owing to the fact that they had sunk a large fraction of their assets in industrial undertakings which, at the

453 best, were hazardous ventures. Runs on the banks were frequent, even State institutions such as the Agricultural Bank saw its deposits shrink from 42 millions in December, 1930 to 17 millions in March, 1931. During 1931 one of the leading Rumanian banks, the old-established firm of Marmorosch Blank and Co., was obliged to suspend payments, and this failure increased the prevailing scepticism which the public had so far entertained as to the solvability of the banks. The following table, showing the respective prices of leading bank stocks, is indicative of the continued depression under which these institutions are labouring and of the absence of any hopefulness at the present time:

FIGURES ARE GIVEN IN LEI.

Bank.	Average annual quotation, 1929.	Average annual quotation, 1930.	Price in June, 1931.	Price in June, 1932.
National Bank	12,782	6,788	4,900	3,525
Marmorosch Blank & Co. ...	1,207	854	710	——
Banca Romaneasca ...	950	676	500	185
Banca Generala Tarii Romanesti	708	360	90	50
Banca de Scont	308	217	90	30
Banca Comertului (Craiova)	889	633	300	90
Banca Comerciala Italiana si Romana	848	706	675	450
Banca de Credit Roman ...	1,058	665	500	175
Banca Agricola	194	100	70	20
Banca Commerciala Romana	1,182	782	500	250

INDUSTRY

433 To the policy of industrialization, adopted not only by Rumania but also by other neighbouring States, may be ascribed a large share of the crisis that Europe is now traversing. For the creation of parasitic as well as redundant industries, which can only exist under the protection of high tariffs, has had as a result the shrinkage of the markets in which Western European industrial products were sold. This in its turn brought about a diminution of the buying power of these latter nations, who so far had constituted the sole customers for the agricultural produce of the Near East.

Another result of the creation of these industries was the burdening of the populations of Near Eastern Europe with

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

231 For the majority of Rumania's peasants the most
433 valuable of all animals are his sheep, of which Greater Rumania possessed about 12,000,000. Both the wool and the meat of Rumanian sheep are, however, of a lower quality than those of Great Britain or New Zealand. Sheep's milk, and the cheese made from it, supplement the monotonous diet of the peasant.

[439] Of the 3,000,000 pigs in Greater Rumania most were kept in the New Territories and a large proportion of the country's pork production was exported. Apart from the Rumanian Mangalita, English Berkshires were bred in great numbers.

241 Considered as a whole the agriculture of Greater Rumania, favoured by good climatic conditions and great soil fertility, remained undeveloped owing to the general economic conditions. The peasantry did not possess the necessary implements, buildings or animals which could have secured profitable ex-
[452] ploitation of the soil. Financial help was difficult to obtain, and the loans that were granted were ruinous to the peasant, owing to the high rate of interest.
[453] Co-operatives were few. Some agricultural banks and associations confined to the German colonists in the Banat and in Transylvania were the only ones
[435] which succeeded. Agricultural prices were low and the peasant was often forced to sell his produce before the harvest to export trusts which dominated
[254] the market. The only assistance given by the government consisted in loans and seeds at reduced prices for the growing of certain crops, such as soya beans, for export in order to fulfil international trade
[439] agreements. During the last fifteen years Germany secured an ever greater influence upon Rumania's agriculture and took most of its exports.

435

June, 1940	137.1.
January, 1941	149.5.
June, 1941	160.9.
January, 1942	260.6.
June, 1942	306.9.
January, 1943	377.6.
March, 1943	403.9.

The less marked rise in 1942 was due principally to the fact that for the first 6 months of the year prices were almost stationary; in the autumn, however, indirect taxes were increased and prices once again rose steeply.

These percentages represent only increases in official prices; the cost of living is in fact considerably higher owing to the prevalence of the Black Market, where prices are very much in excess of the official limits.

The first attempts at price control were made almost immediately after the outbreak of war. In September 1939 an anti-profiteering law was passed, and in November of the same year an anti-speculation law followed, which fixed the maximum prices of all articles in general use and limited wholesalers' profits to 10 per cent. and retailers' to 12 per cent.

The regulations were further tightened up by the price control laws of March, 1941, and the sabotage law of October, 1940.

Control, however, remained largely ineffective, and in October 1941 a stabilisation law was passed. This law, which borrowed much from the existing German laws, laid down a general price stop. Maximum prices and wages were fixed at the level prevailing on 1st September, 1941, and alterations could be made only with the permission of the Minister of Economics.

In addition the State set up goods distribution centres which, among other functions, supervised producers' prices, profit margins and consumers' prices.

Since August 1942 the supervision of prices has been in the hands of a General Commissariat for Price Control, and the local offices subordinate to it. It is evident that corruption among price-control officials was by no means a negligible [661] factor in the very unsatisfactory development of the control system in general. In the autumn of 1942 it was announced that all existing price controllers were to be dismissed and replaced by members of the teaching, legal and literary professions.

B. BANKING

1. State and State-Controlled Banks

652 The National Bank of Rumania was set up in 1880 with a capital of 30 million lei, of which one-
453 third was in the hands of the State. By 1929 this had been raised to 600 million lei. Under the present statute the State may not hold more than ten per cent. of the capital; the remaining ninety per cent. must be held by private shareholders. This bank has the sole right of note issue for the country.

From the end of 1930 to the end of 1938 the note circulation rose from 19·6 milliard lei to 34·9 milliard lei. In the next four years, however, the increase was very much greater as the following table shows:—

	Milliard lei
1930—January	34·1
June	38·7
1940—January	48·4
June	54·2
1941—January	65·7
June	77·1
1942—January	95·6
June	98·7
1943—January	117·0

[52 b]

652 453 This was largely due to the advances of the National Bank both to exporters with claims on the Rumanian-German clearing, and for the maintenance of German troops stationed in the country (see below).

Among the fairly numerous other State or State-controlled banks, two of the most important are the Central Savings Bank and the National Institute for Industrial Credit. This latter was founded in 1923, but its size and scope have been greatly extended since the outbreak of war, and it is now entrusted with the so-called "Rumanisation" of industry.

2. Commercial Banks

453 There are six important commercial banks in Rumania—viz., Banca Românească, Banca de Credit Român, Banca Comercială Română, Societatea Bancara Română, Banca Commerciala Italiana şi Română, Banca Chrissoveloni—and a fairly large number of other smaller banks. In the big banks there were considerable French, German, Italian and, to a lesser extent, British interests.

The position of the banks was very seriously affected by the collapse of the Österreichische Creditanstalt in 1931.

Between 1930 and 1934 current account deposits in commercial banks fell from 18·2 milliard lei to 7·9 milliard lei and time deposits from 35·1 milliard lei to 10·4 milliard lei, representing a 64 per cent. fall in total deposits. In subsequent years there was a recovery and now inflation contributes a large share to the further increase in deposits. Deposits in commercial banks with a capital of more than 60 milliard lei rose from 10·6 milliard lei at the end of 1934 to 28·8 milliard lei in August, 1942.

In May 1934 a law was passed affecting domestic and foreign banks operating in the country. According to this law a Supreme Banking Council was set up to supervise all banks; minimum capital was fixed according to the locality in which the bank operated; rates of interest were fixed and conditions of liquidity laid down. This law is still in operation, but certain of its provisions have been relaxed since the outbreak of war—the first time in February 1942, and a second time early in 1943. The alterations principally concerned the proportions of deposits to capital—in each case the maximum limit for deposits being increased.

As a result of the activities of the Supreme Banking Council a large number of small banks has ceased to operate and the banking system in general has been put on a much sounder footing.

3. German Infiltration and Financial Exploitation

453 648 Apart from penetration into other branches of industry, there has been a considerable amount of buying up of shares by Germans in Rumanian banks and insurance companies. Already before the war the Societatea Bancara Romana was controlled by the Dresdner Bank, while the Commerzbank and the Deutsche Bank had a minority holding in the Banca Comercială Română. This latter holding was increased in 1941 to 60 per cent., and in the same year the *Reichskreditgesellschaft* acquired a minority holding in the Banca de Credit Român, and the Berliner Handelgesellschaft in the Banca Chrissoveloni. In 1942 the Bank der Deutschen Arbeit acquired a holding in the Bukarester Handelsbank. Thus, since the Banca Commerciala Italiana şi Romana is a subsidiary of the Banca Commerciala Milan, five out of the six important banks are to a greater or lesser extent Axis-controlled. In addition there are

453 648 456 648

certain fairly important *Volksdeutsche* saving banks operating in Rumania.

In the case of insurance, too, German companies had considerable interests in Rumanian companies even before the war. These interests have been greatly increased, the most important acquisitions being a majority holding in the Dorna Vatra company acquired by Jauch und Hübener in 1941, a similar holding in the "Franco-Romana" taken over from French hands by the Nordstern Versicherungs A.G. in the same year, and a holding taken over from French hands by a Viennese company in the "Nationala" General Insurance Company—also in 1941.

652 648 722

Though the great increases in budgetary expenditure since 1939 can be attributed indirectly to Germany, the chief instruments of German financial exploitation have taken the form of advances from the Rumanian National Bank for the maintenance of German troops in the country, and for the clearing (i.e. forcing the Rumanian National Bank to make advances to Rumanian exporters whose exports were not balanced by corresponding imports from Germany).

4. Advances for Maintenance of German Troops

It was originally agreed that 1 milliard lei per month should be advanced—against an equivalent RM. credit in Berlin—to the German troops in Rumania. In fact, however, the Germans drew sums in excess of this amount, and continued to do so even after the majority of troops had left the country.

In October 1941, therefore, the National Bank refused to grant any further advances of lei for the use of the German troops. The Germans, however, brought pressure to bear by refusing to honour Rumanian invoices for goods they had received, and by borrowing from the banks through the medium of the firms whch they controlled. The situation appears to have remained unchanged until January 1942, when it seems that a new agreement was reached, the National Bank once again undertaking to advance a fixed monthly sum, and in addition to make up arrears in payment. It is reported that towards the end of 1942 the National Bank had advanced some 40 milliard lei on this account.

5. The German-Rumanian Clearing

In addition to this German debt there is a further one of probably at least equal magnitude which has accrued in the clearing.

Precise figures of the actual German clearing debt to Rumania are not available and estimates vary very greatly. The amount of the debt at the end of 1942 has been variously reported at anything between 30 milliard and 100 milliard lei.

It is, therefore, reasonable to assume a minimum clearing debt at the end of 1942 of 30 milliard lei, and a minimum total debt (clearing and advances in the National Bank to the German military authorities) of 70 milliard lei—or approximately £117,000,000.

It is, however, quite possible that there is some justification for the German claim to the effect that clearing and similar debts are not wholy indicative of German commercial practices, inasmuch as certain German exports are made against long-term credits which do not enter into the clearing until several years have elapsed. In the case of Rumania, Germany is known to have granted in recent years two credits of RM. 600 million each (36 milliard lei), but it is not known to what extent actual production for the German export market made it possible for Rumanian importers to utilise these facilities.

[53b]

in particular the Roman Catholic Church, were already deprived of their funds. This was a result of practices supported by legal provisions. 659 425

In the first place, it refers to land. Agricultural land still possessed by the church after the land reform of 1919 was in fact taken away in direct violation of the law. [423]

Article 8 of Law No. 187 of March 23, 1945, on agrarian reform provided that: [671]

> "agricultural land belonging to monasteries, mitropoles, bishoprics, parishes as well as clerical endowments are excepted, from expropriation, and left in the ownership of the present title holders."

Likewise, certain categories of land, such as vineyards and forests, were generally exempted from expropriation. Nevertheless, most of Catholic landed property, including forests, vineyards, etc., were commandeered early in 1945 and thereafter seized by various "local committees" and, eventually, divided into small holdings. The remainder was seized in its entirety in February 1949 without compensation. This time the Government did not even take pains to issue a decree legalizing the actual seizure.

The "Sacred Fund" of the Catholic Church (see supra) also lost its value. It was composed almost exclusively of governmental bonds and were given after 1919 to the religious Catholic bodies in Transylvania as compensation for estates expropriated at that time. The terrific inflation of 1944-1947, swept out their value. Then, just before the monetary stabilization of August 14, 1947 government bonds were compulsorily called in and paid for in inflated lei, only an insignificant part of which was exchanged after the monetary stabilization for new currency. [454]

the Ministries for Education and for Religious Affairs nor are they obliged in the least to send the curricula for approval (Article 73). 794 659

Consequently, the Christian Church of the Old Rite is not under the control of the Ministry for Religious Affairs with reference to its organization and cult as other denominations are. 795 659

Nor are its assets and financial status checked upon by the government authorities as are the assets of other denominations. Finally, it is permitted to establish and manage denominational schools independent of any kind of supervision exercised by the Department of Education. No other denomination has such a right. [454]

It may be assumed that the Soviets have taken a special interest in this denomination and therefore its status-as any other matter of interest for the Soviets-is not subject to Romanian law.

out paying for them, spoliating thereby his creditor and underselling and ruining the honest trader."

The paper advocated a revision of the law and demanded that debtors should be obliged to make a composition on the basis of the ratio existing between the assets and the liabilities, or with a variation of only 10 or 20 per cent of this proportion. As matters now stand a dishonourable merchant is entitled to file a demand for a "Concordat préventif" though his assets may far exceed his liabilities. He is then allowed to pay 40 or 60 per cent of his debts, and after they have been thereby considerably reduced is even accorded a delay of several years to pay them off. With such facilities at hand the majority of merchants did not scruple to avail themselves of the opportunity of repudiating their engagements and so getting rich quickly. The consequence is that commerce has been completely dislocated through the complete suppression of credit which naturally followed. The Under-Secretary of Justice in the Iorga-Argentoianu Government, M. N. Lenguceanu, overtly admitted in the *Neamul Romanesc*, September 5th, 1930, that the above-mentioned law "had permitted merchants, 98 per cent of whom were foreigners, overtly to despoil their creditors." Another very serious defect from which Rumanian legislation suffers is the tendency to enact laws with retroactive effect, which permits the invalidation of contracts, thus creating a state of instability that affects most adversely all commercial and financial operations. For how can foreign investors risk their capital in a country where uncertainty and instability have become its distinguishing features?

Senator Marino, on February 26th, 1932, deplored the disrespect shown for contracts, criticized the State for various measures passed undermining confidence, among which was the moratorium of 1919–1920 by which foreigners had lost some 7 milliard lei, and demanded the granting of serious guarantees which would instil confidence once more. Similar pronouncements by public men abound, for the serious consequence of the present policy are obvious to all.

Professor Flinders Petrie once stated (*Contemporary Re-*

gradually imbued people with the conviction that engagements and promises need not be considered seriously, and that on the contrary, elusion of obligations is a mundane affair and a fashionable art which should be cultivated assiduously. As a result, not only debtors always find means to avoid paying, but taxpayers also use every possible stratagem to avoid payment of taxes. There are huge arrears of taxes that remain uncollected, every imaginable trick being resorted to by taxpayers in order to escape from their monetary obligations to the State. The present tremendous falling off in the revenue should mainly be ascribed to this reason, as well as to the venality of the tax-collectors, whose leniency is secured by a slight gratification whenever they tend to become over sedulous in the execution of their duties. M. N. Petrascu, a fashionable speaker, while delivering an address at the Rumanian Social Institute in Bucarest on May 18th, 1932, asserted, "we should explain the non-realization of the budgetary revenue forecasts by the fact that our civic consciousness is not sufficiently developed to allow us to understand that by paying our taxes we fulfil an elementary duty; this is also the reason why fiscal frauds have attained extraordinary and unimaginable proportions. . . ."

The utter disregard of contracts and formal engagements can hardly be better illustrated than by the attitude of the State Railways administration in rescinding contracts with metallurgical establishments at Arad, Braila, and Reşiţa, contracts on the basis of which these very workshops were built. Another flagrant case of repudiation of solemn promises by an official organization is that of the municipality of Cluj which, after confirming a contract with the society "Electrobel" for a duration of fifty years, and after the Brussels firm had carried out 80 per cent of the work it had undertaken to perform, was requested by the municipality, hardly one year after signature of contract, to alter its provisions which had received the royal assent and had been unanimously approved and passed by the municipal council. The municipality brazenly demanded a reduction in the time period of the concession originally granted, namely from 50 years to 15, an increase in the royalty payable to the municipality from 3 per cent to 6 per cent, and

the right of the municipality to demand a revision of the 454
price of the electric current supplied by the "Electrobel" 675
whenever and as often as the municipality might think fit!

The "Electrobel" had completed the work contracted for to the extent of 80 per cent and had sunk millions in the undertaking in hand. Naturally it had made its calculations for a return on its capital on the terms of the original contract. If the clauses of the latter are to be so radically and arbitrarily altered it is bound to incur a huge loss. Such treatment meted out to the foreign capitalist has had the result of frightening him away for good, though his aid would have proved of inestimable value in helping Rumania to-day to surmount the difficulties with which she is confronted.

Owners of real property have also been very unjustly hit 675
by a law promulgated in February, 1932, decreeing that all 426
rents should be reduced by 25 per cent to 30 per cent, all 427
existing contracts being rendered void. Most owners were already in a precarious situation, for they had built with borrowed money, and the recent drop in rents made it impossible for them to meet their engagements and pay off their mortgages, and as a consequence of this an immense number of buildings were being sold up for default, as the *Adeverul* for January 21st, 1932 records. This law, therefore, will complete the ruin of another class of the urban population, and will impress on the minds of all intending investors that it is as risky a proceeding to invest one's money in Rumania as in Soviet Russia. Various municipalities are doing their best to attract unwary investors by holding out to them the most alluring prospectuses and dazzling promises, and it would be well to sound a note of warning so that no more British capital be enticed into Rumanian enterprises, which have proved a veritable bottomless pit.

The writer also committed the folly of relying on the relative immutability of the law, as is customary in other European countries, and leased a certain site in a fashionable Rumanian resort for the purpose of constructing certain dwellings and letting them, all buildings to revert to the original owner of the site after the expiration of a ten-year period. The law reducing rents forces down the revenue by

652 quate means at their disposal they yet succeeded in achieving a certain measure of success, and notwithstanding the tremendous difficulties with which they had to cope. Some of the issues demanding attention were the reorganization of the administrative machinery in the newly-annexed territories, the complete overhauling of means of communication, the readjustment of agriculture, the reconstruction of the oil industry, which had greatly suffered during the war, and the necessity of providing for the needs of the army owing to the exposed geographical position of the country.

RUMANIA'S ECONOMIC POLICY

186 454 Until the advent to power in 1928 of the National Peasant Party under M. Maniu, the policy of the country was inspired by an uncompromising nationalism that tended to the complete exclusion of foreign capital so necessary for the development of Rumania. The chief instigators of this policy were the late brothers John and Vintila Bratianu, who had raised the maxim "prin noi însine" (by ourselves alone) to the sanctity of a religious dogma. The governments that had succeeded each other since the conclusion of the war, with the exception of the one presided over by M. Vaida-Voevod, were either formed by the Bratianu, or so-called Liberal Party, or by some nominees of theirs who were quite amenable to their views, so that a certain sequence in the policy pursued may be detected throughout this period, in spite of the change of persons at the helm of the State, while any divergence in their pronouncements from the original programme may be explained by the desire to allay the mistrust engendered by the Bratianu policy. The principal aim of this policy was the attainment of self-sufficiency through the industrialization of the country. This found expression in extensive legislation dealing with the development of national resources, the chief enactment being the special mining law promulgated in July, 1924.

382 471 315 The subsoil resources had already been declared national property, and the special mining law, which was aimed par-

655 maritime and fluvial shipping companies, the docks, ports, warehouses, and grain elevators of Braila, Galatz, and Constantsa.

661 Laws were drafted aiming at the commercialization and exploitation, either independently or in co-operation with
471 the State, of these State-owned properties, as well as of other
186 national resources. But the purpose which actuated the entire economic legislation enacted by the Bratianu Governments was that of preventing foreign capital from acquiring a dominant position in the country. This policy of restraining the activities of foreign capital by legal restrictions was not due to the fact that Rumania might be imperilled by foreign capital securing a preponderating influence, but mainly because the Bratianu party aimed at reserving for themselves the monopoly of such profits as could be made through the exploitation of the national resources. The direct result of this policy was to sink whatever Rumanian capital existed in big enterprises, while agriculture was entirely neglected, and to deplete completely the liquid assets of the country to such an extent that its credit organization was dislocated.

433 It is sad to record that during the years when there was a
457 plethora of capital seeking investment which could have been easily attracted to Rumania with the object of endowing her with an adequate equipment for the development of her immense resources, such narrow and selfish views should have prevailed among her rulers. Indeed, had the opposite policy been adopted it would have secured prosperity to her even during the lean years which are now upon us. Foreign capital naturally fought shy, and refused to be enticed into enterprises in which it was not allowed to exercise legitimate control, which in many instances would have proved both salutary and indispensable. Rumania's natural wealth certainly provides a basis for industrial activity, there is an abundance of raw material, fuel, as well as a supply of cheap labour, but there is a serious deficiency of capital, which is reflected by the high rates of interest
426 prevalent. Commercial bills were discounted at rates vary-
433 ing between 18 per cent and 30 per cent, and first mortgages
454 were concluded on the basis of an average interest of 20 per

cent. It can easily be understood that no enterprises could possibly bear the burden of such interests, and that if foreign capital was to be excluded it would be necessary to have recourse to artificial encouragements in order to create and foster the industries it was contemplated to set up. Protection in its extremest form, therefore, was resorted to, and a tariff wall, the highest in Europe, was erected to protect the budding of these hot-house industries. In order to start a new industry the theoretical case for Protection is admittedly strong. Temporarily the new industry needs help, and eventually the country as a whole may gain from its creation, though in the meantime it has to bear the burden. The immediate effect is to increase the costs of the various articles produced locally to an extent that places them beyond the reach of a poor community such as the rural population of Rumania. The repercussion of an increase in the costs of articles required by the agrarian population naturally causes a rise in the costs of production of agricultural produce, which renders less easy its marketing in neutral markets in which the Rumanian peasant can neither enjoy nor demand the favour of a protective duty. So that eventually protection has proved an arm which has turned against him. In the case of Rumania, most of the industries which have been created proved to be clearly detrimental to the State. Certainly the textile industries, which import the totality of their raw material in the form of yarn from abroad, confer no benefit except to their proprietors. The raw material is usually allowed free admission, or pays a very light duty, while the finished article is sold at a price corresponding to that of a similar foreign product on which a duty amounting to as much as 300 per cent is occasionally imposed. Almost the whole of the difference is pocketed by the manufacturer, and the native purchaser gets no benefit whatever. On the contrary, he usually gets an inferior home-made article at almost the same price as he would pay for a foreign one generally of better quality. In this arrangement the State is deprived of a very important source of revenue since it desists from collecting the tariff dues it would otherwise have received if, instead of raw materials imported free, foreign dutiable manufactured articles had been imported.

AGRICULTURE

owing to the natural increase of her population, will in a couple of years have no more wheat available for export, and in ten or twelve years it will be the same with maize. It is imperative, therefore, for the Government to take without delay the steps necessary to increase the yield. This can only be done if the State will undertake to provide selected seed corn, to establish rural banks to enable the peasantry to obtain advances of funds at cheap rates in order to buy machinery and implements, and to create model farms in which more modern methods of cultivation might be demonstrated practically. If grain elevators were also constructed in important agricultural centres, and adequate storage accommodation made available, it would be easy to advance money to farmers on the security of the cereals they could store as a pledge. And if Rumania decided to return to methods of legality and offer safeguards to foreign capital there would be no difficulty whatever in obtaining all the capital she requires for financing such operations, as they would then prove perfectly sound. It is this utter lack of capital which has handicapped the development of agriculture since the war, for the smallholder had to pay usurious rates of interest (40 to 60 per cent being current), while prior to the war large owners could obtain advances from the banks on very reasonable terms. It would be altogether unjustifiable, therefore, to assert, as some people allege, that the breaking up of the large estates had led to the decline of agriculture. On the contrary, it is this measure which has permitted agriculture to survive, for owing to the systematic diversion of capital from agriculture to industry, the owners of the large estates would have found themselves in a worse fix than the smallholders if they had continued to exist and therefore required advances for the maintenance of their estates, as was formerly their wont. Without liquid assets they would have found themselves utterly unable to carry on the cultivation of those large estates, while the smallholder, by dint of hard work and privation, has managed to keep his patch of land under the plough. Some persons may retort that, if the breaking up of the large estates had proved to be a practical operation, the rural population would not have run into debt to the extent of

241 [423] 241 454 423 241 454 241 423 420

M

453
648
456
648

certain fairly important *Volksdeutsche* saving banks operating in Rumania.

In the case of insurance, too, German companies had considerable interests in Rumanian companies even before the war. These interests have been greatly increased, the most important acquisitions being a majority holding in the Dorna Vatra company acquired by Jauch und Hübener in 1941, a similar holding in the "Franco-Romana" taken over from French hands by the Nordstern Versicherungs A.G. in the same year, and a holding taken over from French hands by a Viennese company in the "Nationala" General Insurance Company—also in 1941.

652
648
722

Though the great increases in budgetary expenditure since 1939 can be attributed indirectly to Germany, the chief instruments of German financial exploitation have taken the form of advances from the Rumanian National Bank for the maintenance of German troops in the country, and for the clearing (i.e. forcing the Rumanian National Bank to make advances to Rumanian exporters whose exports were not balanced by corresponding imports from Germany).

4. Advances for Maintenance of German Troops

It was originally agreed that 1 milliard lei per month should be advanced—against an equivalent RM. credit in Berlin—to the German troops in Rumania. In fact, however, the Germans drew sums in excess of this amount, and continued to do so even after the majority of troops had left the country.

In October 1941, therefore, the National Bank refused to grant any further advances of lei for the use of the German troops. The Germans, however, brought pressure to bear by refusing to honour Rumanian invoices for goods they had received, and by borrowing from the banks through the medium of the firms which they controlled. The situation appears to have remained unchanged until January 1942, when it seems that a new agreement was reached, the National Bank once again undertaking to advance a fixed monthly sum, and in addition to make up arrears in payment. It is reported that towards the end of 1942 the National Bank had advanced some 40 milliard lei on this account.

5. The German-Rumanian Clearing

In addition to this German debt there is a further one of probably at least equal magnitude which has accrued in the clearing.

Precise figures of the actual German clearing debt to Rumania are not available and estimates vary very greatly. The amount of the debt at the end of 1942 has been variously reported at anything between 30 milliard and 100 milliard lei.

It is, therefore, reasonable to assume a minimum clearing debt at the end of 1942 of 30 milliard lei, and a minimum total debt (clearing and advances in the National Bank to the German military authorities) of 70 milliard lei—or approximately £117,000,000.

It is, however, quite possible that there is some justification for the German claim to the effect that clearing and similar debts are not wholly indicative of German commercial practices, inasmuch as certain German exports are made against long-term credits which do not enter into the clearing until several years have elapsed. In the case of Rumania, Germany is known to have granted in recent years two credits of RM. 600 million each (36 milliard lei), but it is not known to what extent actual production for the German export market made it possible for Rumanian importers to utilise these facilities.

[53b]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

438 and services than it gave, the difference being gained by the towns.[9]
433 According to these views, trade relations were actually detrimental
241 to the rural areas, which were being drained by the towns and industries.

It is not necessary here to discuss the theoretical question whether there is any absolute disadvantage to the countryside in its commerce with the towns. If during a period of change toward industrialization the countryside's position declines in relation to the town, it is quite possible for a number of other factors—which may be "short term" or even noneconomic—to convert this relative disadvantage into an absolute loss in income. Such factors may include the inelasticity of agricultural supply, the immobility of agricultural labor, and the increase in agricultural population. Finally, governmental and political policies may favor industry at the expense of agriculture. This last point requires further elucidation, as it was quite important in
651 Rumania.
433 Rumanian industry was created in the shelter of high protective tariffs, which undoubtedly served to increase the costs of agriculture and to benefit industry at its expense. These tariffs have been justified by the "infant industries" argument, and in part they were brought about by the agricultural protectionist policy of the European industrial states. But the combination of protectionism and the development of cartels did give industry a monopolistic position in the internal Rumanian market which worked to the disadvantage of agriculture. In addition to tariff protection, Rumania had a long tradition of direct encouragements to industry—such as exemptions from taxation and special transport rates—which persisted in the interwar period and were expanded in the 1930's.

433 The protective tariffs, by restricting foreign imports, had the
651 effect of bringing in foreign capital for investment in local industry.
● 457 But while foreign capital has been of great importance in the development of Rumania's larger industries and in the creation of its transportation system, the effect on the total economy has been somewhat one-sided, partly because the capital was naturally attracted to industries working for export: "Without depreciating the influence of foreign capital in stimulating industrialization, it is to be underlined that the benefits of invested foreign capital do not for the most part serve to create purchasing power in the national market

[113] 9. M. Manoilescu, "Das wirtschaftliche und soziale Dreieck der Agrarstaaten: die Stadt, das Dorf, das Ausland," *Internationale Agrarrundschau*, No. 6 (Berlin, 1940), also cited in Hugo Böker, "Agriculture's Share in the National Income and the Agricultural Situation," *International Review of Agriculture, 32*, No. 1 (January, 1941), 22. For a discussion of M. Manoilescu's views, see below, pp. 193–197.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

433 and do not contribute to increasing the supply of capital, since they
651 are exported." [10]

457 A comparison of industrial manufacture, industrial imports, and
433 consumption of manufactured goods between 1927 and 1938 shows that while the percentage of industrial consumption which was provided for by Rumanian industry rose from 63.5 per cent to 78.6 per cent, the total consumption of industrial products dropped from about 93 billion lei in 1927 to 88 billion lei in 1938. That is, the increase in industrial production (from 59 to 69 billion lei) was more than balanced by the fall in industrial imports (from 34 to 19 billion lei).[11]

From this the conclusion might be drawn that Rumanian industrialization, instead of increasing purchasing power, was reducing it. Such indeed was Madgearu's opinion: "It is certain that the position of quasi-monopoly created by the system of protection of the national industry is the principal cause of the state of inferiority into which agriculture in general and peasant agriculture in particular have been driven." [12]

If the desirability of a policy of industrialization is granted, it is clear that since industries do not materialize from thin air and are not created by amiable fairy godmothers energy and resources must be diverted from other fields to the creation of industry, at least during the period of its inception and establishment. But the ultimate effect, presumably, is to raise the whole level of the economy; perhaps the agricultural sector will not advance as rapidly or as far, but in the long run at least the whole community should benefit. If Madgearu's conclusion is correct, such was not the result of Rumanian industrialization; instead, the industrial sector pulled away from the rest of the economy, was not directed to satisfying its needs, and may actually have reduced the over-all power of consumption.

Admittedly, twenty-five years may be too brief a period in which to judge such a development. Moreover, as has been mentioned before, a great many external influences had a powerful effect upon the Rumanian economy. The first years after 1921 were spent in recover-

[103] 10. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 204. In this connection see also Joso Tomasevich's chapter on "Foreign Economic Relations," in *Yugoslavia*, ed. Robert J. Kerner (Berkeley; Los Angeles, 1949), which expresses substantially the same view regarding the role of foreign investment in Yugoslavia.

11. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

12. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 259. Madgearu's conclusions, however, are not altogether disinterested. As an old National Peasant who had attacked the protectionist policy of the Liberal party and had lowered tariffs when he was Minister of Finance, he was always of the opinion that industrial development in Rumania had been artificially forced and was battening on the peasant.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

It is obvious, of course, that the real impulse toward industrialization in backward countries has been only in part economic; nationalism and the demands of state security have probably been more important in forming the actual decisions to create national industries. National interests, moreover, have a way of making relative economic differences appear absolute. Thus, if two countries are making economic progress, but one at twice the rate of the other, from the purely economic point of view both countries are gaining and the whole situation is on the positive side of the ledger. But if these two states are also involved in power politics, the relative economic disadvantage of the one state appears, and may in fact prove to be, an absolute loss. Consequently, when power relations enter into the picture, and in the Balkans that is axiomatic, economic disadvantages, which may be only relative or "temporary" in theory, appear much more menacing. 439

For all these reasons, in which economic and national interests are intermingled, foreign commerce or, more broadly, Rumania's economic contact with the West served as a spur to the creation of industry. Since unregulated commerce did not seem to bring this about but rather underlined Rumania's role as an agricultural nation, with all the real and imagined disadvantages that implied, industrialization was forced. While, as has been said before, there is no reason to regard this development as unnatural, that does not mean there was no dislocation. One does not know how Rumania's traditional institutions might have developed if left undisturbed. On the other hand, the superimposition of Western industrial, financial, and commercial organizations and techniques upon the undeveloped Rumanian economy did create a strain, one which is shown clearly in the financial and monetary difficulties that hounded Rumania throughout the interwar period.

Money and Finance

Rumanian finances and monetary policy have been notoriously wobbly. The cause is frequently ascribed to official graft and corruption, of which, no doubt, there was a great deal, some of it theatrically extravagant. Foreign advisers had occasion to be very critical of the use of foreign loans, state speculation in commodities, and laxness in the tax system. These shortcomings, however, were symptoms as well as causes, though they certainly exacerbated the financial troubles and contributed to a generally low standard of official ethics. 457

Before the First World War, Rumania's balance of payments was

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

conditioned by the fact that it was an agricultural country developing with the aid of foreign capital. A positive balance of trade was usually devoted to covering the invisible exports—interest on state borrowings and returns on foreign capital invested in the country. Under postwar circumstances, the fairly stable situation which had obtained before 1914 was thrown out of equilibrium as a consequence of war losses, the incurrence of war debts, and the decline in cereal exports. German investments, which had been of major importance before the war, were cut off and were not replaced by an equivalent influx from the West. Despite Rumania's generally favorable balance of trade, the balance of payments was negative.

Rumania's financial position was further weakened by the chronic instability of the leu. Following the First World War the leu depreciated until 1927. It was legally stabilized in 1929 with the aid of an international loan of $100 million. This effort, however, was wrecked by the depression and the collapse of central European finance in 1931. In the 1930's Rumania, though at a somewhat later date than the other Balkan states, was forced to introduce exchange controls and suspend a considerable portion of the foreign debt payment. The gradual move toward increasing financial and commercial controls was largely a consequence of exchange difficulties. Despite the relatively favorable commercial position, Rumania was even less successful than the other Balkan states in achieving monetary stability, and the value of the leu continued to decline. By 1939 the Rumanian monetary situation was altogether chaotic, and the diversity of the rates of the leu made it impossible to ascertain the real value of the money.[20]

It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze the tortuous course of Rumanian financial and monetary policy, which was extremely complicated, subject to frequent change, and not successful in achieving its aims. In general, the financial field showed Rumanian administration at its worst. While the real difficulty was basically that of an immature economy attempting to catch up with a world economy —itself in serious crisis—the fact that Rumania, although in a somewhat better commercial position than the other Balkan states, was even less successful in its financial policy must be attributed largely to the political circumstances of the 1930's.

To some extent Rumania's financial vicissitudes by-passed the peasant in so far as he was leading a self-subsistent, nonmonetary life. He was principally affected in his requirements for credit. Although, as has been mentioned above, the Rumanian peasant was not in a

20. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

to protect only those industries showing "natural" promise of development and to promote the necessary rationalization of those industries which had been permitted to become inefficient behind the Liberal tariff.

Throughout Madgearu's exposition of the 1929 tariff there is an evident desire to increase international cooperation and trade, and an altogether friendly attitude toward the great capitalist powers—an attitude quite different from Vintilă Brătianu's cautious and rather grudging admission of the need for increased trade and foreign capital. This attitude is most clearly shown in the laws of 1929 modifying the Liberal acts of 1924 on mines and the commercialization of state-owned enterprises.[59] The National Peasants criticized the 1924 laws as chauvinistic and failing to promote the exploitation of natural resources. "The aggressive nationalist policy exemplified in the Mining Act of 1924, which did so much harm to the country, bringing it into a state of financial and economic disorganization, could not continue without grave consequences for our economic future. A policy of sincere co-operation with international capital is the only means of improving the situation."[60] The new laws threw open the doors to foreign capital. With the exception of requiring that 75 per cent of the personnel (both administrative and subordinate) be Rumanians, no restrictions were placed on the percentage of foreign capital in the companies or upon the nationality of directors and chief officials.

These laws were in marked contrast not only to the attitude of the Liberals but also to the policy recommended by Constantin Stere in 1921.[61] Stere, with his hostility to "vagabond capital" and the menace of imperialist great powers, opposed foreign capital investments in the Rumanian petroleum industry, since all profits passed beyond the frontiers. Nor was foreign capital concerned with satisfying the needs of the population but only with raking in a profit. He was, however, aware that without foreign capital the resources simply could not be developed. He disapproved of the Liberals' policy of "nationalizing" petroleum and creating concessions with a majority of Rumanian capital. Having no confidence in the Liberal plutocracy's willingness or ability to defend the nation's interests, Stere advocated state operation of the petroleum industry. Foreign capital

59. A detailed comparison of Liberal and National Peasant policy on this question, from a pro-Liberal position, is given by Alexandre G. Georgescu, *Le Régime juridique et financière des capitaux étrangers en Roumanie* (Paris, 1932).

60. Madgearu, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 30.

61. C. Stere, *Naţionalizarea Industriei de Petrol: Cuvântare rostită în şedinţa Adunării deputaţilor din 28 Martie 1921* (Bucarest, 1921).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

industrial states naturally stimulated Rumania, as it did the other Balkan states, to create its own industries. The growing international tension in the 1930's led to a heavy demand for arms and munitions. In 1937 the president of the Rumanian union of metallurgical and mineral industries stated that the principal characteristic of the years of recovery had been the large industrial investments, especially for the purpose of creating a powerful armaments industry.[27]

But if the depression and the demand for armaments stimulated industrialization, they in turn assisted in the rise of very powerful industrial interests, which progressively dominated not only the economic but the political scene.[28] These years witnessed the rise of such industrial giants—giants at least in Rumania—as Max Ausnit and Nicolae Malaxa. These men represented a different type of influence from that of the Brătianus. The latter, through their position in the banks, had equated the Liberal party with a policy of industrial advance through the financial institutions, but they were primarily politicians. Ausnit and Malaxa, on the other hand, were primarily industrialists who were able political manipulators but whose field of action was outside the political arena. It might be added that King Carol himself, who operated "outside" politics, was by no means disinterested in industrialization and had a large personal stake in the new industries.[29]

Rumanian industries, and especially the new heavy industry, required both protection and capital. Industrial protection had marked the whole history of Rumanian tariff policy, and even the National Peasant tariff of 1929 did not renounce it. But the new devices, developed as defenses during the depression, became far more potent weapons than any which had existed heretofore. Indeed, they were far more effective in assisting industry than in fulfilling their ostensible function of safeguarding national finances and the currency.[30]

27. Quoted in Pătrăşcanu, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

28. An example is the Skoda scandal of 1935, in which a storm was raised over a contract for armaments made by the National Peasants with the Czech Skoda works in 1930. Although an effort was made to involve some National Peasant ministers in charges of graft, the real cause of the scandal appears to have been that the contract had been made "without regard for the law concerning national armament activity."

29. For obvious reasons it is difficult to ascertain the extent of Carol's industrial interests. According to Pătrăşcanu (*op. cit.*, p. 48), in published reports of enterprises in which he was a shareholder Carol held 30 to 35 per cent of the shares of the Malaxa works, and almost as much in several smaller industries. Four of the largest sugar mills were in his hands, as well as a beer factory. He had important shares in the gold mines and the telephone company and a large control of Banca de Credit Român.

30. Rumania's exchange position and the leu never achieved any stability despite the most elaborate series of measures. I would agree with Antonin Basch's conclusion (*The Danube Basin*, p. 143) that the signal failure of Rumania either to achieve cur-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

656 To the protective tariffs, which were greatly increased in the 1930's, 457 was added the system of import quotas and restrictions, plus a 12 per cent tax for all imports. Together these provided a high protective wall for the development of the national industry. Their effectiveness is shown by the fact that between 1933 and 1938 the percentage of imports of manufactured and semimanufactured goods dropped markedly, whereas that of machines and raw materials rose sharply.[31]

Protection alone, however, was not the only device employed to aid the expansion of industry; other forms of assistance included exemptions from taxation, state subsidies, special transport rates, the obligatory use of certain locally produced goods, and monopolies granted to industries considered nationally desirable.

652 Since the inflow of new foreign capital stopped during the depression, the supply of capital for industry had to come largely from internal sources. In part this was achieved through the tariffs, which diverted purchases toward local industry, and by the increasing state expenditures for armaments, which amounted to a tax on the public. In 1934 a 12 per cent tax on the construction of new buildings was imposed in an effort to divert investment toward industry and away from nonproductive expenditures. To a considerable extent the foreign funds frozen in Rumania at the time of the depression were subsequently employed in industrialization.[32]

The political implications of this economic policy—which was by no means a plan but rather the result of the depression and the deepening international tensions plus the steady pressure of interested industrial groups—were very similar to those observed above in the

---

rency stability or a price equilibrium, despite the relatively favorable balance of trade and rich resources, may be laid to bad management and political reasons, to which one could add that in many cases the measures taken were employed for purposes quite different from those for which they were presumably intended.

31. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 252. Madgearu took a selected group of key imports and calculated their volume by percentage as follows:

	In per cent of total imports	
	1930	*1938*
Raw materials	5.86	12.62
Semifabricated	23.01	7.58
Machines	1.27	4.00
Manufactured goods	13.02	8.34

32. Oscar Jaszi, "The Economic Crisis in the Danubian States," *Social Research* (February, 1935), pp. 98–116, attributed a major role to captive capital in the creation of Rumanian industry. According to Madgearu (*op. cit.*, p. 353), foreign credit continued to serve those industries created by international capital, but in his opinion the most important source of industrial credit was the National Bank.

RUMANIA

652 The first pressing task which the Government had to face[1] was the unification of the currency. It was decreed that the
457 roubles circulating in Bessarabia, and the Austro-Hungarian crowns hitherto used in Transylvania, Banat, and Bucovina, were to be exchanged against Rumanian lei, at the rate of one lei per rouble and one lei per two crowns. It had been roughly estimated that the amount needed for the conversion of these roubles and crowns would be approximately 2,500 million lei. Unfortunately, owing to the dilatory fashion in which the redemption of these foreign currencies proceeded, it became possible for smugglers and speculators to introduce into the country huge sums of these notes from the adjoining States, since the announced rate of exchange in Rumania was far above the intrinsic value of these notes in their respective countries of origin. Of course, this vast fraud was only rendered possible through the connivance of politicians and functionaries, but it resulted in a net loss to the State of some 5,000 million lei. For the conversion of these roubles and crowns, instead of the 2,500 million lei originally estimated, absorbed a sum of over 7,000 million lei. A similar fraud was perpetrated in the case of the notes issued by the Banca Generala during the Austro-German occupation. Further quantities were introduced clandestinely into the country from Germany. Though the original notes had been re-stamped by the Rumanian Government, this proved no deterrent to the smugglers, who with great ease proceeded to forge the Rumanian special stamp and affix it to their notes before putting them into circulation. These notes of the Banca Generala were secured by sums deposited in the Reichsbank, but, owing to the depreciation of the mark, the Germans took advantage to contest the Rumanian claim for the return of these deposits, offering as a pretext that they were in marks and had therefore become worthless.

The unification of the currency was completed by the end of 1921, the State assuming thereby a formidable financial burden which very seriously undermined the stability of its currency. Besides the loss caused by the redemption of these unsecured notes, the State had to reckon with the forfeiture of 315 million gold lei belonging to the reserves of

[1] [after World War II -- Analyst]

the National Bank which had been removed during the War for safety to Moscow, and which the Bolsheviks now refused to return. 652 457

Another factor which further militated against a quick recovery was the state of utter destitution in which the Germans had left that part of the country which they had occupied, and which they had taken care to despoil of everything of value that was removable. Production being utterly disorganized, the requirements of the population had to be satisfied by mass import from abroad, which necessarily caused a drain on the exiguous gold reserves. This, coupled with the fiduciary increase necessitated by the redemption of the roubles, crowns, and banknotes issued by the Austro-Germans, depreciated steadily the Rumanian currency between 1919 and 1926.

Yet another cause which retarded the economic recuperation of the country was the agrarian reform, which during its initial stages naturally disorganized production, and imposed on the State a huge load of debt due to the necessity of providing funds wherewith the former owners of the land might be at least partially indemnified. All these causes contributed to the inflation of the fiduciary circulation, which from 4,431 million lei at the end of 1919 passed gradually to 20,126 millions in 1926, causing a corresponding depreciation of the leu, which, from its pre-war parity of five leu to the dollar, passed to 55 in 1920, 86 in 1921, 150 in 1922, and to as much as 220 in 1926. Since that date it has steadily improved until its stabilization in February, 1929, when the rate was fixed at 167 to the dollar or 31 lei to one Swiss franc, or 81.359 lei to the (gold) pound. This instability of the currency that had lasted until 1929, had created an atmosphere of uncertainty extremely detrimental to commerce and industry, and had seriously retarded their revival. And the precariousness of the situation was further accentuated by the serious budgetary deficits during the years 1919–1922. If it be remembered that during these years Rumania was confronted by other serious problems, the solution of which demanded an immense outlay incommensurate with the resources of the country, it must be admitted in fairness to the Rumanians that in spite of the very inade- 652 458 652

a policy of drift has so far been practised. The alarming 647
falling-off in the revenue receipts is nevertheless a disquiet- 651
ing sign which ought to impress sufficiently the Rumanian authorities, and rouse them from their apathy, if they are to avoid the disaster they are heading for. For the drying up of the revenue is not entirely due to fraud, but also to the gradual pauperization of the masses. The *Cuvantul* of December 29th, 1928 wrote as follows:

"There is no country where fiscal fraud is so intensely 657
practised as in Rumania . . . though fraud is due partly to the unjust distribution of the fiscal charges. A sane fiscal policy should take into consideration that the ratepayer is poor. We should not be far wrong if we affirmed that at least 80 per cent of the population are in debt. If these 80 per cent of the population toil in order to pay off their debts, or only the interest on their debts, how can the State expect to raise from them what it needs for the public services? . . ."

Rumania's main source of income is her export trade. All
other items are of secondary importance and can hardly off- 457
set the important payments she is obliged to make on behalf of her indebtedness abroad. During the years 1930 to 1931 there was an excess of exports over imports which enabled her to meet her payments abroad, all the more so since foreign capital invested in Rumania is no longer productive and therefore next to no interest on it is being actually remitted. On the contrary, it may be said that, owing to the crisis, foreign enterprises in Rumania require financial aid which is being supplied from abroad, a process which helps to offset the total of foreign payments Rumania has to make. An automatic equilibrium has therefore been attained which allows Rumania to face her payments abroad without drawing on her gold reserves or necessitating her to have recourse to foreign borrowing, and this situation will be maintained so long as she continues to have plentiful harvests as those of 1930 and 1931 and her population remains in its present state of poverty, which prevents it from purchasing foreign articles, a state of things which explains the present excessively low figure of imports. Of course these recent years cannot be taken as representative of normal times, and for this purpose a table showing the balance of payments during

RUMANIA

451 1925 has been prepared. The figures for 1929 and 1930 are those of the reports prepared for the League of Nations. These should be taken as approximate estimates. There seems to be a serious error in the item of transports, and probably a much larger income must have been derived from transit traffic than is indicated, for the total receipts of the railways for 1929 and 1930 amounted respectively to 12,375 and 11,291 millions.

Figures are stated in millions of lei.

Net Income from	1925	1929	1930
Excess of exports over imports ...	nil	nil	5985
Foreigners and foreign legations ...	1000	700	600
Transports	500	129	75
Professional and other services... ...	150	314	204
Emigrant remittances	600	1000	860
Interest on Rumanian capital abroad	150	130	140
Fresh foreign capital invested in Rumania	4500	—	4135
Reparations	—	681	274
Government receipts	—	70	64
Excess of proceeds of loans and advances over the purchase abroad of Rumanian bonds	—	15095	1622
Totals	6900	18119	13959
Net Outgoings			
Excess of imports over exports ...	786	449	—
Expenses of Rumanians and Rumanian Legations abroad	700	672	586
Insurances and Services	100	92	91
Dividends and interest on private capital invested in Rumania	7550	2860	2931
Interest on State Debt...	3210[1]	2930	3918
Earnings of foreigners remitted abroad	150	—	—
Totals	12496	7003	7526
Balances	−5596	+11116	+6433

[1] The 1925 figure includes the amount of the sinking fund.

BUDGET AND NATIONAL REVENUE

From the above it may be seen that Rumania, in order to meet her foreign debt payments, requires that her favourable trade balance should attain 7½ milliards and even further expand. The surplus of 1929 is to be attributed to the proceeds of the loan floated during that year. The surplus of 1930 is ascribable not only to the inflow of foreign capital but also to the very substantial excess of exports over imports. As an even more important excess of exports over imports was registered in 1931 (6,226 millions), that a considerable inflow of money followed upon the conclusion of a loan in Paris, and as, further, there was little or no outflow of money on account of foreign private capital invested in the country, it may be safely surmized that the balance of payments for 1931 must have shown an even more favourable result than that of the preceding year. 457

Owing to the deplorable plight of the Exchequer and its inability to find the means wherewith to pay the salaries of State officials, the view has been gaining ground that the State ought to suspend the payment of its debt service. The majority of the Press have widely approved and encouraged this idea, which is becoming exceedingly popular, as might be naturally supposed in a community which has deliberately fostered contempt for all engagements. Both public and Press, taking into consideration the default of adjoining States, find that it would be quite natural for Rumania to follow in their footsteps, since she has been equally affected by the present crisis. The fact that Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, and Hungary have been obliged to suspend their foreign payments abroad because they are unable to secure the requisite foreign currencies while Rumania, at least for the present, is not faced with any difficulties concerning the question of transfer, is entirely lost sight of. Even newspapers closely connected with the Government have joined in this campaign, and seeing that former Ministers like M. Junian, of the National Peasant Party, have openly indicated this measure as a panacea for the evils from which the country is suffering, it may be that eventually the question may be raised by the Government and foreign bondholders sounded on the subject. Should such be the case this delicate question will require to be handled with great tact and 652 457

457 suavity, as the susceptibilities of France have to be carefully
652 considered, for her political support is necessary to Rumania, and the latter cannot afford to jeopardize it for the sake of such transient monetary relief as the suspension of her public debt service might afford. Should this contingency arise and foreign bondholders be confronted with a demand for an alleviation in the charge of the actual debt (a revision of which may be justifiable to a certain extent, because the fall in world prices has increased the burden of the world's debts by at least 30 per cent, and has therefore correspondingly improved the position of creditors), then it would be well if British bondholders would keep in mind that the depreciation in sterling has already effected this readjustment so far as *they* are concerned. In fact this fall in sterling has brought about an annual saving of some 450 to 500 million
000 lei to the Rumanian Exchequer. This matter is alluded to because in recent negotiations, British delegates have meekly accepted the same terms as were offered to other creditor States, the currency of which had not sustained a loss of some 30 per cent of its intrinsic value. The agreement reached on the Bulgarian loans issued under the auspices of the League of Nations may be taken as an example. French and American creditors will be receiving 50 per cent of the stipulated interest in francs and dollars, while the British investor will be receiving this 50 per cent in his depreciated currency, so that in reality he will be receiving only 35 per cent. At first sight it would seem that our official delegates might have stood up and insisted on equality of treatment with other countries and not contented themselves with a settlement which is distinctly more favourable to others. They might also have seized this opportunity and done something for the commercial debts due to our of foreign credits, and under pressure from French bankers, has been obliged to use her slender monetary resources for nationals, which are 'frozen hard,' because Bulgaria, devoid the payment of her State rather than of her private debts. This unilateral way of meeting obligations is certainly not to our advantage as a nation, for these commercial debts owing to our exporters constitute their capital, and so long as they are deprived of this money they must find it impossible to finance other exports from this country.

finance other exports from this country.* The total amount of private foreign capital invested in Rumania is estimated at some 28,300 million lei, according to the figures supplied to the League of Nations for 1930, but it seems to have been somewhat underestimated, judging from the amount of interest annually payable on foreign investments, which has always been computed at a much higher figure than 2860 or 2931 millions for 1929 and 1930 as is the case of the above-mentioned report.

The following table gives particulars of the Public Debt on January 1st, 1932, totalling 175,559,644,622 lei, of which 162,182,471,062 represent the external debt payable in foreign currency. The *per capita* indebtedness would therefore amount to 9,753 lei, on the basis of a population of 18 millions.

PUBLIC DEBT IN LEI

	Nominal amount.	Amount outstanding.
Pre-war loan	1,725,812,000	410,337,300
National Loan 1916 5%	400,000,000	354,194,800
District Railways Loan	39,000,000	23,678,413
Non-redeemable Loans:		
4% 1900 Brasov Schools	963,500	963,500
5% 1910 Pasturages	20,000,000	20,000,000
4% 1912 Mortmain	34,894,487	10,541,849
Union Loan 5% 1919	1,143,143,800	1,030,607,500
Reconstruction 5% 1920	2,730,911,000	2,477,280,000
,, ,, ,, (unblocked) ...	315,000,000	306,899,000
Expropriation Loan 5% 1922 redeemable ...	6,500,000,000	6,500,000,000
,, ,, ,, ,, non-redeemable	800,000,000	800,000,000
,, Mortgage Debt	560,000,000	560,000,000

DEBTS DEVOLVING FROM THE PEACE TREATIES

Annuities owing to Arad-Temiscara Rly. ...	11,843,765	8,796,616
Pre-war Austro-Hungarian loans stamped in Rumania	146,089,353	146,089,353
Rumanian quota of 3½% 1897 Hungarian Loan	37,926,002	37,926,002
Austrian Loan for Rly. Cernauti—N. Sulita	2,306,800	2,306,800
Loans of Bucovina 4% 1894 and 1910 ...	6,242,600	6,242,600

FLOATING DEBTS

Internal Treasury Bonds	687,652,430	687,652,430

*Our exporters to countries which have placed restrictions on exchange operations suffer yet from another disability, in so far as what available foreign exchange there may be is granted to local importers of raw materials in order that the native industry may not be stinted of its supplies. Naturally there is no foreign exchange left for importers of manufactured goods after the former have been supplied.

457
152

RUMANIA

	Currency.	Nominal amount.	Outstanding amount of debt on Jan. 1st, 1932, in foreign currency.	Amount in lei.
PUBLIC DEBT IN FOREIGN CURRENCIES.				
Unified Stock 4% Paris Agreement	Gold Francs	433,000,000	290,256,540	9,363,095,467
,, ,, 5% ,, ,, ...	,, ,,	87,000,000	69,165,170	2,231,130,054
,, ,, 4½% London ,, ...	,, lei	60,000,000	57,343,670	1,849,792,107
,, ,, 4% Berl ,, ...	,, ,,	425,000,000	118,551,225	3,824,225,416
,, ,, 1889, 4%	,, ,,	21,000,000	6,475,680	208,892,485
,, ,, 4½%	,, ,,	133,500,000	77,092,795	2,486,859,381
,, ,, 5%	,, ,,	57,000,000	18,172,590	586,211,408
,, ,, Consolidated 1922. London 4%	£ sterling	35,000,000	25,774,730	20,970,062,581
,, ,, ...	,,	2,500,000	1,613,760	1,312,938,998
,, ,, 6% 1925	Italian Lire	41,145,300	27,619,200	242,993,721
,, ,, 5% 1926 (for purchase of private rys)	£ sterling	680,315	646,115	525,672,702
,, ,, ,, ,, (,, ,, of Maramures rys) ...	,,	8,630	8,280	6,736,525
,, ,, ,, ,, (,, ,, of Arad-Cenad rys) ...	,,	111,890	107,410	87,387,702
,, ,, ,, ,, (,, ,, of Somes rys)	,,	148,740	139,710	113,666,658
WAR DEBTS.				
War Debt to Great Britain	£ sterling	31,295,000	30,395,000	24,729,068,050
,, ,, ,, U.S.A.	Dollars	122,506,260	119,806,260	26,029,210,555
,, ,, ,, Italy	Italian Lire	247,500,000	173,500,000	1,526,453,000
,, ,, ,, France	Gold Francs	924,105,350	659,562,566	21,276,169,270
,, damages, Petroleum, 1916	£ sterling	16,475,818	15,361,050	12,497,596,670
DEBTS OF RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILISATION.				
Loan 7% 1926	Italian Lire	200,000,000	165,495,566	1,456,029,989
,, ,, 1929 Stabilisation	£ sterling	2,000,000	1,945,500	1,582,839,345
,, ,, ,, ,, ...	Dollars	69,000,000	67,172,200	11,229,848,396
,, ,, ,, ,, ...	French Francs	561,638,000	546,320,600	3,587,399,930
,, 7½% 1919 Reconstruction	,, ,,	1,325,000,000	1,322,250,000	8,660,737,500

457 652

DEBTS DEVOLVING FROM THE PEACE TREATIES.	Currency.	Nominal amount.	Outstanding amount of debt on Jan. 1st, 1932, in foreign currency.	Amount in lei.
Perpetual Stock 4%	Fl. gold	143,884,877	47,482,009	3,829,186,649
4½% 1913 Hungarian amort.	Gold Crowns	35,368,996	9,903,318	335,434,323
Perpetual 1910 Hungarian 4%	,, ,,	63,195,660	17,694,784	599,338,286
4½% Stock 1914 Amort.	,, ,,	103,436,037	28,962,090	980,972,066
Annuities to Ry. Cos.	French Francs	30,555,500	23,860,596	156,286,909
Agrarian "A" Optants	Crowns	25,735,728	16,979,987	575,127,472
Rys. St. E.G.	French Francs	71,941,574	17,077,230	550,877,285
Loans, liberated in Crowns and Florins	Swiss ,,	42,500,000	42,500,000	1,370,965,000
VARIOUS				
Rumanian quota of Danube Com. Loan	Gold Francs	2,125,000	1,087,500	35,080,575
Relief Bonds, England	£ sterling	3,703,012	2,976,575	2,421,711,654
,, ,, Australia	,,	201,982	162,358	132,093,333
,, ,, Denmark	Danish Crowns	201,982	154,785	6.934,810
,, ,, France	French Francs	824,761	662,964	4,342,415
,, ,, Norway	Norv. Crowns	84,159	64,493	2,889,504
,, ,, Norway	£ sterling	3,366	2,580	2,099,265
,, ,, Sweden	Swed. Crowns	151,486	116,088	5,201,108
,, ,, Switzerland	Swiss Francs	269,310	206,380	6,657,406
William Pyton and Anne du Pont Pey, New York	Dollars	548,911	152,600	25,511,668
G. & D. Perkins, New York	,,	543,297	152,600	25,511,668
Paul Stuppel, New York	,,	1,260,291	314,990	52,660,028
Cie Franc. d'Etudes et d'Entr. Coloniales	£ sterling	19,614	4,355	3,543,387
Marché Central de Cuirs, Peaux et Laines	,,	17,269	4,815	3,917,862
Bca d'Italia Roma	Italian Lire	13,731,200	1,716,400	15,100,887
New York Trust Co., New York	£ sterling	2,107	948	771,669
Heirs of Anton Dimou	,,	9,854	2,457	1,998,990
Co-op. Wholesale Society, Manchester	,,	991,023	740,818	602,722,523
Banque Belgo-Helvetique, Brussels	Belg. Francs	63,454,655	12,814,660	59,516,510

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

and smaller profits were the reward of Rumanian officials and business men.[1]

How far the natural resources of Rumania have suffered under this intensive exploitation will probably become apparent only after the war. Its effects on the people of Rumania, however, can be gauged already. The cost of living in 1941 was three times as high as in 1934, and in January 1943 it was reported to be 50% higher than one year before. These are official Rumanian figures, based on maximum prices and maximum wages which are only fictitious. In fact many goods, although rationed, could be obtained only on the black market and at phenomenal prices. The general inflation led to a levelling-up of wages; but wages remained far behind prices. The workers, therefore, were worse off than before, although, theoretically, they obtained improved wages. A Swiss report in August 1943 showed that the monthly earnings of

[1] In January 1944 the Rumanian Government, according to a German paper published in Rumania, 'decided to put at the disposal of the Ministry of Finance a credit of three milliard lei for a new campaign for the modernisation of petroleum installations in Rumania. The Rumanian National Bank has granted a loan of one hundred million Reichsmarks to a number of oil companies for the same purpose. This sum will be used for the import of machinery from Germany... these companies have also been put in charge of the supply of the capital with natural gas'. At about the same time one of the mouthpieces of the Nazi war economy declared quite frankly: 'The practical purpose of the Rumanian export trade policy is to ensure an adequate supply of raw materials for the home industry. In order to stimulate import the concerns in question were permitted... to open up new industries in foreign countries for the purpose of supplying raw materials and half finished goods to the vitally necessary war industries in Rumania.

315 pipeline has been completed from a secondary source of supply at Manești to convey this gas to Bucarest to supply both household and industrial requirements.

135 Iron-ore deposits are small, so that the heavy industries are very largely dependent on imports. A variety of other mineral resources, which are believed to exist in greater abundance than has so far been established, have not yet been fully surveyed.

433 Rumania has a poorly-developed industry, which lags far behind that of western European countries such as Czechoslovakia, though is ahead of all the other south-east European countries, except Hungary. Financially she is a poor country, with very limited capital resources, which has proved a severe hindrance to industrial development and has laid her open to the investment of foreign capital, which has been attracted particularly by the rich mineral oil and forest resources. Skilled labour, also a vital factor in the process of industrialisation, has been lacking, so that the use of foreign technicians has been essential. Other raw-material resources, though adequate to allow the development of a sound and varied industry, are not sufficiently extensive to encourage a very rapid development independent of imported raw materials.

[45] [464]

Industrialisation in Rumania did not start until about 1890, and the period of greatest expansion was between 1929 and 1938. The consumption industries were the first to be developed, and of these food industries are the chief, the raw materials being grown on the spot. The growth of such industries as paper, cardboard, printing, soap, chemicals and furniture, etc., followed. The location of industry in the earlier stages was governed not by such factors as the existence of cheap labour, but was built up in those areas richest in raw materials.

MAIN INDUSTRIAL REGIONS

[311] The main industrial region is in the Prahova valley, where the oilfields are to be found, followed by the Reșița district, where the existence of iron ore, coal, manganese, etc., led to the development of metallurgical and engineering facilities, as well as of such auxiliary industries as coal and wood distilleries. Gold, silver, lead, zinc and copper deposits in the Baia Mare region formed the basis for the erection of both metal and chemical factories. The presence of methane gas, salt, gold, silver and stone quarries in and around Turda determined the location of factories for production of cement, limestone, bricks, tiles, porcelain, glass, sulphuric acid, etc. In the rich forest districts of Ferdinand, Nadrag and Hunedoara, where iron ore deposits are also to be found, blast furnaces and metallurgical industries have been established. The textile industry is mainly established in Cisnădia, Piatra Neamț, Bacău and Buhusi. Apart from the regions mentioned, industry is centred in the principal towns—Bucarest, Timișoara, Brașov, Sf. Gheorghe, Arad, Galați, Brăila, Cernăuți, Cluj and Iași.

The following table gives an idea of the relative importance of the various industries, showing the amount of capital invested and value of production in each of the main groups, and also the number of factories and of personnel employed :—

[3c]

648
439

In 1940 an economic agreement was signed between the two countries, by which in exchange for raw materials a ten-year plan for the development of Rumanian economy was formed. Germany agreed to the following main conditions —

(1) The granting of extensive long-term credits.

(2) The supply of tools and machines for agricultural development.

(3) The provision of technical and financial aid for industry.

(4) The provision of extensive supplies for the development of the transport system.

(5) To put technical experts at Rumania's disposal.

(6) To make capital available for the development of industry and the banking system.

457
471

Germany has exploited Rumania's dependence on her to the full by providing the minimum of goods, so that she owes her an ever-increasing sum in the clearing. German financial interests have gained tremendous impetus since the removal of British and American competition, together with the acquisition of the actual interests of occupied countries, such as France, Holland, and Czechoslovakia. To cite the most important example, in the oil industry German capital has increased from 0.5 per cent. of total investments in 1939 to about 38 per cent. in 1942, while in the heavy industry the Hermann Goeringwerke have achieved a footing in the main engineering firms of Reşita and Malaxa, as well as in the aircraft industry and in the shipbuilding yards at Galaţi. The motor-vehicle assembly industry is almost entirely in the hands of the German companies, and German capital is to be found in the banks, in the timber and textile industries, in a number of transport and trading companies, and behind the attempted expansion of the mineral resources.

ITALIAN PENETRATION

There is also some considerable Italian financial penetration in Rumanian industry, though on nothing like the same scale as German; it is mainly confined to the oil, building, timber and textile industries and to various cereal export companies.

[4c]

the National Bank which had been removed during the War for safety to Moscow, and which the Bolsheviks now refused to return. 652 457

Another factor which further militated against a quick recovery was the state of utter destitution in which the Germans had left that part of the country which they had occupied, and which they had taken care to despoil of everything of value that was removable. Production being utterly disorganized, the requirements of the population had to be satisfied by mass import from abroad, which necessarily caused a drain on the exiguous gold reserves. This, coupled with the fiduciary increase necessitated by the redemption of the roubles, crowns, and banknotes issued by the Austro-Germans, depreciated steadily the Rumanian currency between 1919 and 1926.

Yet another cause which retarded the economic recuperation of the country was the agrarian reform, which during its initial stages naturally disorganized production, and imposed on the State a huge load of debt due to the necessity of providing funds wherewith the former owners of the land might be at least partially indemnified. All these causes contributed to the inflation of the fiduciary circulation, which from 4,431 million lei at the end of 1919 passed gradually to 20,126 millions in 1926, causing a corresponding depreciation of the leu, which, from its pre-war parity of five leu to the dollar, passed to 55 in 1920, 86 in 1921, 150 in 1922, and to as much as 220 in 1926. Since that date it has steadily improved until its stabilization in February, 1929, when the rate was fixed at 167 to the dollar or 31 lei to one Swiss franc, or 81.359 lei to the (gold) pound. This instability of the currency that had lasted until 1929, had created an atmosphere of uncertainty extremely detrimental to commerce and industry, and had seriously retarded their revival. And the precariousness of the situation was further accentuated by the serious budgetary deficits during the years 1919–1922. If it be remembered that during these years Rumania was confronted by other serious problems, the solution of which demanded an immense outlay incommensurate with the resources of the country, it must be admitted in fairness to the Rumanians that in spite of the very inade- 652 458 652

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

conditioned by the fact that it was an agricultural country developing with the aid of foreign capital. A positive balance of trade was usually devoted to covering the invisible exports—interest on state borrowings and returns on foreign capital invested in the country. Under postwar circumstances, the fairly stable situation which had obtained before 1914 was thrown out of equilibrium as a consequence of war losses, the incurrence of war debts, and the decline in cereal exports. German investments, which had been of major importance before the war, were cut off and were not replaced by an equivalent influx from the West. Despite Rumania's generally favorable balance of trade, the balance of payments was negative.

Rumania's financial position was further weakened by the chronic instability of the leu. Following the First World War the leu depreciated until 1927. It was legally stabilized in 1929 with the aid of an international loan of $100 million. This effort, however, was wrecked by the depression and the collapse of central European finance in 1931. In the 1930's Rumania, though at a somewhat later date than the other Balkan states, was forced to introduce exchange controls and suspend a considerable portion of the foreign debt payment. The gradual move toward increasing financial and commercial controls was largely a consequence of exchange difficulties. Despite the relatively favorable commercial position, Rumania was even less successful than the other Balkan states in achieving monetary stability, and the value of the leu continued to decline. By 1939 the Rumanian monetary situation was altogether chaotic, and the diversity of the rates of the leu made it impossible to ascertain the real value of the money.[20]

It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze the tortuous course of Rumanian financial and monetary policy, which was extremely complicated, subject to frequent change, and not successful in achieving its aims. In general, the financial field showed Rumanian administration at its worst. While the real difficulty was basically that of an immature economy attempting to catch up with a world economy —itself in serious crisis—the fact that Rumania, although in a somewhat better commercial position than the other Balkan states, was even less successful in its financial policy must be attributed largely to the political circumstances of the 1930's.

To some extent Rumania's financial vicissitudes by-passed the peasant in so far as he was leading a self-subsistent, nonmonetary life. He was principally affected in his requirements for credit. Although, as has been mentioned above, the Rumanian peasant was not in a

20. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 825.

241 the peasants and the reduced 1942 sowings both
656 of grain and of sugar-beet indicated continued
435 dissatisfaction. Finally, by the spring of 1943 a wiser ratio was reached, agricultural prices being four times as high as in 1939 and wholesale prices in general three and a half times as high. Nevertheless, this very considerable measure of inflation
[458] has shaken public confidence in the value of money so that peasants increasingly resort to barter transactions.

[655] In the hope of obtaining better control over grain supplies the Government in the autumn of 1941 nationalised the grain trade, later they relaxed this to the extent of leaving the export business to a few selected firms and the internal collection to the Army and to the National Institute of Co-operation. This body handled the pre-war grain marketing scheme, and their
[563] activities—because of the expulsion of Jews from wholesale and retail trade—have recently developed rapidly in the supply of seeds to peasants (80,000 tons of seed distributed in 1942) as well as consumers' goods to peasants and townspeople. But it still proved difficult to extract enough food from the peasants to feed the towns. For the 1943 harvest detailed regulations were made concerning the quantities the peasant might keep for seed, for his family and for his animals, and threshing operations were subjected to inspection. Yet these rules could not in practice be administered.

423 It is now generally agreed in Rumania that the
471 smallness of the holdings has been a principal obstacle to effective organisation of agriculture in war-time, and that a change to larger units of production is needed. Any approach to collectivisation on the Soviet model, however, would be regarded as contradictory to the land reform policy and a threat to the Rumanian State. The official policy, though it has not yet taken its final form, is to maintain private property but to proceed no further with expropriation and division of large estates, and to maintain existing medium holdings by prohibiting their sub-division for inheritance or other reasons. Schemes for the consolidation of strips are also contemplated for a more opportune moment. Further, in order to
474 increase production and to improve the peasants' methods and standards of life, communal farming associations, known as *obştii*, are to be formed. In these associations, farming equipment is to be pooled so that the small-holder would have the same resources as the large farmer. Each *obştie* is to embrace a village and perform all the functions of a co-operative, including joint purchase and sale, use of breeding animals, processing of crops, etc. Villages which are prepared to form themselves into *obştii* and to undertake to work the land according to State directions, are promised tractors, seed and breeding stock without payment. In this way it is hoped that some of the advantages of collectivisation may be achieved while retaining those of individual ownership. But, unless accompanied by far-reaching industrial development, the plan can but aggravate rural unemployment. It is not known how this innovation has been received by the peasants. It was reported in April 1943 that 270 of these communal associations had been formed—an insignificant number—and it is believed that the Government is allocating to them some of the tractors imported from Germany in the war years.*

241 The success of the *obştii* plan, and indeed of any plan for up-grading Rumanian agriculture, depends

* In June, 1943, a temporary ban was placed on the formation of any new *obştie*, because there was insufficient agricultural machinery to supply to them.

[10b]

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

641 the right and freedom of citizens to write, publish, or otherwise express their views, except such as are in accord with the given party-line. For the exercise of this right, the state places at the disposal of the "working classes and their organizations, printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets (and) communication facilities." Freedom of speech is furthermore restricted by the provisions of the Law for the Defense of Peace, enacted on December 15, 1950. Article 2 of this Law specifically prohibits "propaganda inciting to war, the spreading of tendentious or invented news, of a nature to serve the warmongers, etc. . . ."

[204] Freedom of the press and publication is likewise nonexistent. Two directorates attached to the Council of Ministers are charged with complete supervision over the press, publications of any sort, and their distribution. The Directorate of the Press and Printed Matter, established on May 23, 1949 (Decree No. 218) "authorizes the publication of all printed matter;" the General Directorate of Publishing, Graphic Arts Industry, Book and Press Distribution, established on March 16, 1950 (decree No. 62), "controls the output of publishing houses from the point of view of contents and form." The Communist press is furthermore restricted to the services of the AGERPRESS (the Rumanian Press Agency) which by virtue of Decree No. 217 of May 23, 1949, is the only agency permitted to receive and transmit news. Aside from the nationalization of all printing presses, a governmental decision (Decision No. 69 of the Ministry of the Interior, July 1, 1950) requires the registration with the militia of all hand printing presses, duplicating machines, and "materials needed for the reproduction of printed matter," owned by individuals or associations.

[515] Freedom of assembly is similarly controlled. Excepting the Communist-controlled mass organizations, viz., public organizations, co-operative societies, youth and women's organizations, etc. (Article 86), no independent organization or association is permitted. Anyone attempting to organize or participate in such an organization is liable to prosecution by virtue of Article 86 of the Constitution, prohibiting the organization of or the participation in associations of a "fascist" or "anti-democratic" character. Such participation would furthermore entail "plotting against the internal and external security" of the state, an offense punishable by death under Article 1 of the Law for Punishing Certain Crimes Which Endanger the Security of the State of January 19, 1949.

641 461 The right to work is guaranteed by the "socialist transformation" of the economy and the "elimination of the possibility of economic crises and the abolition of unemployment" (Article 77). The right to rest and leisure is ensured by the reduction of the working hours to eight in factories and offices and to less in the more arduous trades.[5] This right is supplemented by

[5] The constitutional provisions relating to the reduction of working hours are puzzling in the light of the introduction of the piece-work system and norms of production (Labor Code of May 20, 1950) and the adoption of the Soviet model of "Stachanovism" and "voluntary labor."

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

the establishment of rest-homes, sanatoria, and cultural establishments (Article 78). The right to maintenance in old age and in case of sickness or disability is ensured by the development of social insurance and free medical service (Article 79). The right to education is ensured by universal, compulsory, and free elementary education and by the system of state scholarships awarded to deserving students (Article 80).[6] Equality of rights in all spheres of economic, political, and cultural activity is guaranteed to all citizens irrespective of their nationality, sex, or race. Any transgression of these provisions by the manifestation of race-hatred, chauvinism, or discrimination is punishable by law (Article 81).[7]

641 461

Some distinction was made at the beginning with regard to the German ethnic group, which had actively collaborated with Nazi Germany. The original decision to expel the Germans from the country, however, was officially changed in December, 1948, when the Rumanian Communist Party decided to replace the denunciation of the German minority as a whole and encourage instead the class struggle within its ranks. The resolution of the Party maintained that the "struggle against their own bourgeoisie . . . (would) open a new perspective to the German working population of Rumania, working alongside the Rumanian people and other nationalities."[8]

641 563

Whereas at the beginning Zionism enjoyed a tremendous popularity and even received latent, if not active, support from the Communist-dominated government during the Jewish-Anglo-Arab disturbances in Palestine, the above quoted resolution on the national question also declared:

> "Zionism of any color is a political nationalist and reactionary movement of the Jewish bourgeoisie, which tries to isolate the Jewish working people from the other peoples and to hinder them in their struggle against capitalism in the ranks of the anti-imperialist camp."

Notwithstanding the legal and constitutional provisions relating to the defense of the rights of nationalities and minorities,[9] the official policies of the Communist Party in regard to these questions have been based on the tenets of Leninism-Stalinism. While the development of national cultures and the use of national languages in all the fields of cultural and political endeavors are encouraged, the guiding principle is that of "socialism." "Na-

---

[6] The system of education underwent drastic changes. See "The Perversion of Education in Rumania" published by the Rumanian National Committee, Washington, D.C., July, 1950.

[7] See Law No. 86 of February 7, 1945 (Statute for Nationalities) and Law No. 630 of August 6, 1945, in the Yearbook on Human Rights for 1946, United Nations, (1947) 248–49 and 249–51, respectively.

[8] La Roumanie Nouvelle, Bucharest, No. 14, December 30, 1948.

[9] As an apparent concession to the Hungarian minority in Rumania, the Constitution also provides for the establishment of a Magyar Autonomous Region (Articles 19–21) in the territory inhabited by compact Magyar and Székely population, including the districts of Ciuc, Gheorgheni, Odorhei, Reghin, Sangiorgiu de Padure, Sft. Gheorghe, Targu-Mures, Targu-Secuesc and Toplita. 563

554 districts. Thus in the Banat, and Transylvania, the Germans
563 and Magyars dominate commerce and industry and Magyar influence has been so powerful that it has practically assimilated the Jews. In the lower Danubian ports and at Constantsa, it is the Greeks and Armenians who form the largest section of the commercial community, though in certain Danubian ports the Jewish element predominates.

461 These facts would tend unequivocally to show that the Rumanians do not possess the necessary perseverance that is indispensable for those who desire to engage in commerce. It would appear, too, that the French educational system which they have adopted helps to foster a contempt for all occupations which are not purely intellectual, and for these reasons Rumanians who claim to have received some degree of education look askance on all manual work. This appar-
565 ent aversion for commerce explains to a certain extent the absence of a Rumanian middle class, an absence which ought to be remedied, for the country is deprived of a useful steadying element which is indispensable for its normal development. As things are, it possesses a small superficial leading class, that cannot be said to compensate by its quality for its lack of quantity, and a huge mass of almost illiterate peasants that lags far behind. The example of
565 Russia proves the danger that exists for a community which
563 shows such an unstable equilibrium of classes. A solution of the problem would consist in attracting the Jews from the occupations to which they have hitherto been restricted. The Jewish problem in Russia has been solved by adapting the Jews to industry and agriculture. An exceedingly instructive and interesting article entitled "Soviet Russia solves the Jewish Problem," from the pen of Mr Wm. Zukerman, and published in the "Contemporary Review" for Dec., 1931, may well supply useful hints for Rumania. There is no doubt that if the Jews in Rumania enjoyed greater freedom of action they would not concentrate all their activities on commerce, and they would thereby offer to Rumanians more possibilities and better opportunities to engage in trade than they now possess.

RUMANIA

000 no better than a pig." If we take into consideration that according to L. T. Hobhouse "the whole system of moral tradition governing the life of a society is evolved from the practical impulses and feelings at work in the past and present," we may easily comprehend that the aspects of social life as revealed by current events in Rumania, show a natural process which could not be altered or deflected except by titanic efforts of re-education. We have no right, therefore, to blame the Rumanians for what we may consider to be grave lapses, but which they prefer to interpret differently, for after all, as A. R. Wallace affirms in his "Social Environment and Moral Progress," "morality is not wholly due to any inherent perception of right or wrong conduct, but is to some extent a matter of convention varying with the degree and kind of social development attained." And this opinion is confirmed by L. T. Hobhouse, who, in his book "Morals in Evolution" states "the instinctive in human morality is by no means an unfailing power implanted by nature in all men to distinguish right from wrong." 461 Rumanian youth continues to cherish the traditional 585 Phanariot ambition of enriching itself through access to a public post; other careers are neglected and looked askance at. They are left to the more enterprising Jewish element, which owing to its energy and capacity has taken complete control of Rumanian trade and banking. Through the neglect of the commercial professions, Rumanians have hampered the formation of a middle class which, more than any other element, is conducive to the creation of stability 647 and a vigilant public opinion. The public functionary class 465 is an unstable element, and as it enjoys no security of office 661 but depends for its tenure on the favours of politicians in power, it naturally follows that it easily lends itself to corruption, and all the more so seeing that it is disgracefully underpaid. In a lettter published by the "Argus" on 16th May, 1932, it was averred that the number of public functionaries amounted to 500,000. (Including the staff employed by municipalities). The number could easily be halved, and the administration would stand to gain both in efficiency and thoroughness by such a reduction. Greece, with a population amounting to one-third that of Rumania, had a

241 really intended to revert to a régime of legality and to the
426 granting of adequate security to foreign capital, there would
453 be hardly any difficulties in its obtaining the necessary aid from abroad in order to permit the establishment of such an institution, and in order to save time it would be politic on its part if without further delay it took the requisite steps to prepare a cadastral register or ground-book. Such measures of self-aid would prove more efficacious than the solicitation at international conferences of preferential rates for Rumanian agricultural produce. For they would help to convince foreign investors that Rumania had at last decided to put her house in order, a decision which, if seriously taken, would probably cause foreign capital to come to her aid and bring to her corresponding or equal advantages to those she would derive from the obtaining of the preferential rates for which she is now craving as a favour from industrial States. There are no insuperable obstacles to the salving of Rumanian agriculture. All that is needed is cheap credit and the lowering of the cost of industrial products used by
241 the peasantry. These *desiderata* may be secured whenever
461 the Government decides to change its methods and adopt as its guiding principles honesty, retrenchment, and austerity. After all, the peasants have done more than their share, and no greater effort can be demanded of them. One who has witnessed the long heartbreak of endless and often unrequited labour that has been their lot, and the fortitude with which they have faced the apathy the State has so far shown towards them, can have no doubts as to the response a little encouragement would evoke from them. Without decent seed grain, and with the most primitive implements, it was but natural that the yield per hectare should decrease. Nevertheless, the steady although small increase of the area under cultivation is a convincing proof that the peasants have never stinted their labour and that they are determined to persist to the extreme limits of human endurance in their efforts to wrest a bare subsistence from the soil. The following table will be found to confirm fully what has been stated
241 above, namely, that while the area cultivated has been
433 maintained, the yield per hectare is on the whole diminishing:

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

531
291
462

[Plate I-facing title page]

291
462

4:Figure S-5 (no date)1936 EDI Rumania EDI

PLATE VIII

133



Shooting the rapids on the Bistrita.

Photo: Dr. H. Orwitz.

241

Harvesting by hand on the level Danube plains.

Photo: Roumanian Press.

291

Spinning with a distaff—an occupation symbolical of the traditional life of the Roumanian peasantry in the hill country.

Photo: H. J. Howard.

[Facing page 461]

233
231 the main flock being taken direct to the sheds on the foothills where they are fed on the hay gathered during the summer; whereas the remainder are grazed on the maize stubble until about Christmas. By then the weather becomes rather severe, and although sheep are better able than cows to withstand the rigours of a continental winter they are all kept in sheds during the early months of the year.

SURPLUS ANIMALS are disposed of at the autumn fairs at Tulgheş or Toplița where they are bought up by dealers for conveyance to Italy or Czechoslovakia.

III. OTHER OCCUPATIONS

TEXTILES.

291 THE OUTSTANDING FEATURE of the Carpathian villages is the
286 remarkably high standard of peasant craftsmanship. The degree of artistic expression revealed in their clothing is particularly striking, and although best seen on festive occasions it is scarcely less noticeable in their ordinary working garb. Wool, flax and hemp are the traditional fibres used, but imported cotton yarn is beginning to displace linen for some of the lighter summer garments. Most of the dyestuffs are obtained from local plants, for example, red
[386] from the leaves of the wild crab apple, yellow from the osier, black from the alder or birch and fawn from the walnut, but imported dyes are beginning to be employed. The mordant used is salt, but colours other than black fix themselves in wool without salt treatment.

● 462 SPINNING with a distaff is the normal occupation of the women in their leisure time during the summer, very little knitting being done at all. The other processes of combing, weaving and dyeing are also undertaken by the women, as is the embroidering of dresses and household linen, but the embroidering of the sheepskin waistcoats which are worn by both sexes is done by one or two men who specialise in this craft (see Plate XV).

LEATHER.

295 ALTHOUGH still made in the village, the old type of laced shoe with its characteristically pointed toe is being displaced

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

PLATE XIV

291
142

Woman combing wool for spinning at Corbu by drawing it through iron spikes fixed in a wooden bat-like handle. The boy is holding a distaff. *Photo: H. J. Howard.*

[46]



Woman weaving on primitive home-made wooden loom at Corbu. *Photo: H. J. Howard.*

[facing page 73]

352 The furniture[1] is of the simplest, but much ingenuity is displayed in contriving hinges, benches, and so on, the devices used having an air of ancient custom about them. Nearly all the woodwork could be done with the axe (see
354 p. 47). A simple crane, the probable prototype of the iron
372 hearth-crane as we know it in Britain, allows the pot to be suspended at the desired distance from the open wood fire, which burns on a rough hearth towards the centre of the stamped earth floor. A certain sanctity attaches to the fire: it is not allowed to go out, and much ceremony accompanies its lighting. The "living fire" (*focul vin*) should be prepared on arrival at the head stână[2] of the commune's pasturage, by means of two sticks rubbed together, and the operation should be performed by a pure youth, otherwise the flocks will fare badly. The fire must then be carried to the other huts. We were not able to observe this custom, but the shepherd-boy at the Stână Găujoara, situated to the north of the watershed some fifteen miles south-west of Sibiu, was persuaded to show us how the fire was lit. Here the more familiar "flint-and-steel" method was used, but in place of flint the sparks were obtained from a piece of quartz, a substitution which suggests one reason for the common ceremonial use of quartz by ancient man in Europe.

233 In the Carpathians, as in Europe generally, there is much
● 462 variation in the personnel of the transhumant shepherds, but the exclusion of women in some areas is a feature for which
000 parallels cannot readily be adduced. In Norway it is the women who take the flocks to the summer pastures, an arrangement which is natural where the men are fishers. The same scheme is found in parts of the Central Plateau of France, where the men cannot be spared from their work in the fields, and the same appears to have held for the Scottish Highlands. Switzerland offers the best example of mass transhumance, and the movements formerly practised in Wales and in Ireland, though simpler and less regular, seem to have involved men, women and children. The *hafodty*, described by Welsh writers early last century, was a cowhouse with a fire at one end, but no chimney, and, except that the whole was stone-built, the assemblage of pens and shelters must have closely resembled the Roumanian. In Wales, too, ewes were milked and sheep's cheese made into the nineteenth century.

In the Carpathians, while some stâne are inhabited by

1 [In the shepherd's hut -- Analyst]
2 [For explanatory footnote see 51 pp. 49, Cat. 116 -- Analyst]

462 In the Carpathians, while some stâne are inhabited by
233 families of shepherds, others have men only, and purely "feminine" stâne are not unknown. There appear to be regional differences based perhaps on the varying requirements of the lowland crops, and all forms are said to be of some antiquity; it cannot be shown that the "masculine" stâne represent an older type than those where both sexes
[834] take part, or vice versa. But it is significant that in some parts there is a definite *tabu* against women, and the shepherds must have no relations with them in the prescribed season, from the arrival at the stână to July 20th (St. Eloi). In the areas we visited, while the shepherds were exclusively male, women from the villages occasionally ride up with messages or food, and may stay at the hut for a day or two.

234 On reaching the pastures, to resume, the sheep are divided
233 into separate flocks—milkers and non-milkers, lambs and wethers. Only the milkers are kept in the immediate neighbourhood of the stână, the rest being driven uphill or to the shelter of the forest's edge, according to their requirements. Two milkings are usual, about 6 o'clock morning and evening. The sheep are driven into the *stranga*, a fenced enclosure near the hut, where the shepherd-boy introduces them one by one into a narrow roofed exit at which the milkers sit. The milk is forthwith poured into a copper cauldron over which the *bacin*[2] stands at the fireside, stirring
[326] the contents with the peeled, spiked top of a spruce. The copper pot is tinned inside, this work being done by the gipsies. Into the simmering milk the *bacin* throws a pinch of rennet, and then works the curds into a thick pulp. A simple press—a canvas bag twisted with a tourniquet and weighted with a stone—next comes into use, and after three days salt is added and the cheese is finally kneaded and stored in a sheepskin which has been specially prepared by drying and scraping. This is cheese of the first quality (brânză), a poorer quality (urdă) being obtained from the whey left in the copper after taking out the curds. The urdă is often stored in small skins, e.g. rabbit, or in containers made of bark or hollowed branches. Much of the cheese in these days is bought by co-operative societies.

262 It is the duty of the *bacin*[2], further, to prepare food for the shepherds. Onions, beans and paprika make vegetable soup, and maize-bread and cheese complete a diet which may be varied now and again with smoked mutton. Another task

1 [For explanatory footnote see pp. 47, Ct. 116 - - Analyst]
2 [cheese maker of the Stâna - 52 - Analyst]

342 THE CHARACTER of this house is of the simplest. The walls are
352 whitewashed, the floors bare, and there is practically no furniture other than wooden beds and tables. The stoves are of porcelain, and wood or charcoal is used as fuel. The usual
023 practice is for potters to share a kiln with their neighbours. The one illustrated here was the property of this particular house and was placed in its yard (Plate IV, B).

[463] THE FIGURES given by the mayor show that there are 101 potters in Curtea de Argeş. We visited a good number and found that most of them live and work under conditions similar to those illustrated here. The potters for the most part occupy houses in one area of the town. A fine clay is found locally and can be had for nothing, but it must be collected by the potter himself. This clay he stores in his house (see upper plan on page 29).

THE POTS vary in design within a limited range. They are mostly of a buff colour, with the main part of the outside unglazed. The inside is glazed brown and the rim is usually covered with a bright green glaze, which makes the pots very attractive; some pots have splashes of green in parts or all over them. Most of the pots are marketed locally and can be bought at a low price. The pot is often made porous so that evaporation may keep the water cool. Pots are sent to other
[438] places near Curtea, but are not sufficiently strong, we were informed, for long-distance transport.

341 NEW DEVELOPMENT in housing is making steady progress. Some houses are still being constructed on the traditional lines, half brick half timber, and the "eye" in the roof, which is common in the older houses, is not necessarily omitted in the modern roof; tiles, however, are replacing the shingle. The wooden balcony is disappearing in the larger type of house and is being replaced by a brick verandah. These brick verandahs are built with ornate columns, sometimes with elaborate capitals. The classical influence is, in fact, strong, for some houses have a pediment, and in one ambitious dwelling the capitals were gilded and the pediments contained gilded decorations. The simple wooden window frames are now little used, and are replaced by elaborate mullions. Wall decorations in elaborate stucco or stencil work and ornamental details on doors are a common feature of the new houses. Most of the new houses are detached and stand in their own gardens. M. E. T.

1 [See pp. 28 b, HRIF pag nat ... Newly st]

B. LABOUR POSITION DURING THE WAR

1. Military Conscription

701 The age limits for mobilisation are 19–50, while youths from 17–18 are liable for pre-military training.

During 1942 there have been several indications of the strain which further mobilisation was putting on Rumania's manpower; for example, in April 1942 the sentences on political prisoners were suspended and they were called into the army, while from July of that year onwards there has been a constant revision of previous exemptions and a tightening of control over the granting of leave and call-up. Military service, which previously had been obligatory for Rumanian citizens only, was made compulsory for all non-nationals* resident in the country, and further a decree was passed mobilising all Rumanians of military age resident abroad.

[563]

It is calculated that it has never been possible for Rumania to have more than 800,000 men properly equipped under arms at one period. The actual strength of the army has fluctuated considerably during the last two years, as has the number on the eastern front, but a reasonable average figure would be 500,000, of which 200,000 on the eastern front.

727 Rumanian casualties are difficult to assess. One estimate at the end of 1941 put casualties
464 at 150,000, while total casualties up to May 1943 have been estimated at 350,000. Military mobilisation will probably have meant a loss of some 800,000 men to the general labour supply.

2. Recruitment for Germany

464 The recruitment of workers for Germany has been on a small scale, which is not surprising, as
167 Rumania's military contribution has been considerable, and the military mobilisation has already reduced the supply of labour needed for the Rumanian armament industry to a minimum. Such labour as might be available for export is unskilled and therefore of less value to Germany. The total number of Rumanian workers in Germany in December, 1942, was estimated at 14,000. Of these 10,000 were young Rumanians 18–19, who were recruited at the end of 1941 to be "trained" in German metallurgical factories, 1,000 are women employed as domestic servants, and the rest are mainly unskilled general workers.

3. Foreign Workers in Rumania

648 In addition to the German administrators and
463 directors, who are in certain of the key positions in Rumanian industry, there is also evidence of skilled German technicians in Rumanian armament factories. In 1942 there was a nucleus of the German Todt organisation, and Italian builders, in the country.

727 About ~~40,000 Russian prisoners~~ of war are employed, chiefly in agriculture, though also in mining and navvying work.

C. GENERAL LABOUR DEVELOPMENTS

464 In 1937 the average unemployment figure was 12,000. The dislocation of trade and industry on
722 the outbreak of war temporarily caused a general increase of unemployment, which was rapidly absorbed by the military call-up and increased activity in the armaments industry. In March

* The German minority was already liable for military service, either in the Rumanian or German army and in December, 1942, it was announced that there were 30,000 *Volksdeutsche* in the Rumanian Army.

[55a]

CHAPTER XI

463 438 industrial labour. One-third of all workers engaged in industry are independent artisans, on whom the community is dependent for its services but who do not play any important part in war production. In certain of the larger armament works German controllers have effected a considerable degree of rationalisation.

3. Mining

316 727 There is a shortage of miners; Russian prisoners of war have been employed in mining during 1942. Many miners were reported to have been included in the territory transferred to Hungary.

4. Armament Works

719 464 There is a general shortage of labour in metal and engineering factories, particularly of skilled labour. A 12-hour day was legalised at the beginning of 1942, but it is doubtful if in fact a 12-hour day is ever worked.

5. Timber

313 464 There is a shortage of labour, both for lumbering and for timber manufacture.

6. Textiles and Clothing

464 288 294 The total number of workers in these industries has probably fallen considerably, due to reduction of available raw materials. The delivery of supplies to individual mills seems to be somewhat erratic, and there is evidence of considerable part-time work, for instance in a survey of some 43 factories in December, 1942, 11 were working full time, 21 on a reduced scale, and 11 at a very reduced scale.

7. Building

499 712 464 The extent of fortification building and general road and rail construction in Rumania is unknown, but in the second half of 1942 there was evidence of a scarcity of general labour for such projects, and of Russian prisoners of war working on rail construction.

438 464 [759] In the other branches of occupation, transport services, etc., there is no evidence of labour shortage, apart from doctors, many of whom have been mobilised for the army.

D. CONTROL OF LABOUR

1. The Youth Labour Service

466 883 A youth labour service founded on the German model was established in March 1941. The leaders were trained in Germany, but it was only in April 1942 that the labour camps began to function. Youths are called up in their 19th–20th year, and the period of service lasts 7 months.

(*See* Part II, Chapter V.B. for further details.)

2. Civil Mobilisation

466 A general civil mobilisation decree was passed in May 1941 by which (1) employment cards were introduced; (2) men and women aged 20–57 were liable to compulsory employment if not employed.

Two subsequent decrees were published in March and May 1943, one for the reorganisation of agriculture, forestry and fishing, and the second for the reorganisation of industry. Each of these decrees gave full powers to the appropriate authorities for the mobilisation and transfer of labour.

In addition to the general labour decrees which have so far had little influence on the labour situation, there have been regional decrees applying to individual localities, e.g. in Bessarabia in February 1942 all the inhabitants aged 22–70 were called upon for compulsory agricultural labour unless already employed.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

652 should be obtained not through investments but through loans under-
665 taken by the state. In this way Rumania would have full control over the allocation of capital and would not, except for the interest on loans, see the profits from the oil industry go abroad. The petroleum policy of the National Peasants, as formulated in 1929, was even more removed from Stere's recommendations than from the Liberals' policy. It was, however, perfectly consistent with their economic outlook during their term in office.

665 Rumanian transportation and communications had been in no-
652 toriously bad condition since the First World War, and the Liberals'
496 policy of retrenchment had been particularly damaging to the rail-
●464 way system. The 1929 stabilization loan allocated $34,000,000 for
471 railway expansion and $9,000,000 to pay off overdue railway debts.
491 By a law passed in July, 1929, the National Peasants transferred the state railways to an autonomous public body, "to be administered
206 according to commercial principles." [62] They also undertook to repair and extend the highway network, and abolished the primitive *corvée* which was still being used for road maintenance. In 1930 the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation received a concession for the construction of the Rumanian telephone network.

665 The stabilization loan required a reform of the National Bank and of the state accounting system. In March, 1929, the government passed a series of new statutes for the bank; the principal changes were the abolition of the ceiling on the issue of currency, established by the Liberals' in 1925, and the limitation of the influence of the state in the appointment of directors. The bank was given somewhat greater independence from state control and powers to maintain the newly achieved stability of the currency. In July, 1929, the government passed a law reforming the state accounting system and the organization of the budget. There was no doubt that Rumanian state finances needed reform and modernization. The accounting system had been that of France of 1860, plus the accretion of a number of purely Rumanian practices, with the result that the actual condition of government finances at any given time was never known with any exactness. The new law, in reorganizing the preparation of the budget, exerted more stringent control over the expenditures of various ministries. While this law was well intended, its actual results in rationalizing Rumanian finance methods seem to have been very

62. Madgearu, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 50. The organization of Rumanian railways after 1918 had been altogether hectic. In 1925 the Liberals had given some autonomy to the railways; this policy was reversed by the People's party in February, 1927, and reestablished by the Liberals in August of that year.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

162 and the investigators found many of the old labor contracts and obli-
311 gations associated with pre-1914 Rumania.

Unable to support themselves in the community, many peasants
511 were seeking temporary work in nearby market towns, and a number
● 464 traveled as far as Bucarest, a distance of about 70 kilometers. The
exodus in most cases was not permanent, and the peasants after earn-
369 ing some money returned to Dâmbovnicul. This movement to the city
166 was a reflection of the new conditions, which were also seen in the houses and garments of the peasants: houses were no longer built to last generations as was the case in the more isolated districts to the north; the national costume was relegated to Sundays. Birth and death rates were high and the natural increase [illegible] than the emigration away from the plasă. The standard of living was very low; many families were undernourished.

A definite differentiation in the peasantry was developing. A few peasants—mostly those who had inherited medium properties—were enlarging their holdings; a few new peasant estates of over 100 hectares had been created. The poorer peasants, including many who had been allotted land, were losing their holdings. Investigations into debts and credit showed that even after the conversion of 1934 about half the households were in debt. Credit provided by the cooperative banks went almost entirely to the larger peasants; in one commune holdings of up to 5 hectares received only 7.9 per cent of the loans. The special political interest shown by the parties in the judeţ of Argeş seemed to have brought no benefits beyond permitting local party stalwarts to obtain extra funds to purchase land from peasants who were in debt or in need of money.

Such, then, was the land of happy peasants with their colorful folkways so picturesquely displayed in the travel literature of the Carolist era.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

311
464

TABLE XXI. DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL EXPLOITATIONS ACCORDING TO USE OF LABOR, 1941

	Number	Per Cent	Per Cent	Area (hectares)	Per Cent	Per Cent	Average Size (hectares)
General total	2,258,530	100.0		10,187,003	100.0		4.51
Dwarf exploitations (a)	471,616	20.9		318,965	3.1		0.68
Exploitations remaining after leasing (b)	54,882	2.4		45,856	0.4		0.83
Exploitations proper (c)	1,732,030	76.7	100.0	9,822,182	96.5	100.0	5.67
Exploitations worked by hired labor only	25,466	—	1.5	1,188,015	—	12.1	46.65
Exploitations worked by family and hired labor	265,906	—	15.3	2,438,642	—	24.8	9.17
Exploitations worked by family labor only	1,009,031	—	58.3	4,667,069	—	47.5	4.63
Exploitations worked by only part of family labor	431,627	—	24.9	1,528,436	—	15.6	3.54

(a) Very small exploitations cultivated by peasants with little or no land; exploitations not the principal occupation of the cultivator.

(b) Land remaining after the proprietor has rented out more than 80 per cent of the total property, the remainder representing only limited agricultural activity—a few animals, a garden, etc.

(c) Exploitations of at least two hectares, or one hectare of arable, or 0.5 hectares of land devoted to vineyards, orchards, etc.

SOURCE: *Ibid.*, pp. 24–25.

TABLE XXII. DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL EXPLOITATIONS ACCORDING TO USE OF LABOR AND TYPE OF TENURE, 1941

	Number	Per Cent of Total	Per Cent of Subgroup
Total exploitations proper	1,732,030	100.0	—
A. Worked by hired labor only	25,466	1.5	100.0
1. On own land	16,294	0.9	64.0
2. On own and rented land	4,716	0.3	18.5
3. On rented land only	4,456	0.3	17.5

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

	Number	Per Cent of Total	Per Cent of Subgroup
B. Worked by hired and family labor	265,906	15.3	100.0
1. On own land	192,674	11.1	72.5
2. On own and rented land	70,775	4.1	26.6
3. On rented land only	2,457	0.1	0.9
C. Worked by family labor only	1,009,031	58.3	100.0
1. On own land	720,013	41.6	71.4
2. On own and rented land (a)	289,018	16.7	28.6
D. Worked by part of family labor	431,627	24.9	100.0
1. On own land	315,167	18.2	73.0
2. On own and rented land (a)	116,460	6.7	27.0

(a) Peasant exploitations using family labor on rented land only were too infrequent to warrant inclusion as a separate category.

SOURCE: *Ibid.*, p. 28.

TABLE XXIII. PREVALENCE OF TYPES OF CULTIVATION (BY PERCENTAGE) ACCORDING TO SIZE OF EXPLOITATION IN THE JUDEŢ OF ARGEŞ, 1941 311

	Total	Categories of Size (hectares)									
		Under 0.1	*.1–.5*	*.5–1*	*1–3*	*3–5*	*5–10*	*10–20*	*20–50*	*50–100*	*Over 100*
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total exploitations proper	70.5	1.9	3.0	10.9	78.9	99.8	99.9	99.8	100.0	97.5	97.6
A. With hired labor only	1.3	—	—	0.1	0.3	0.9	2.2	7.3	23.4	53.7	97.6
B. With hired and family labor	11.7	0.1	0.1	0.6	6.8	14.9	25.9	50.6	65.9	43.8	—
C. With family labor only	30.9	0.2	1.0	3.9	34.6	47.4	47.0	27.2	8.1	—	—
D. With part of family labor	26.6	1.6	1.9	6.3	37.2	36.6	24.8	14.7	2.6	—	—
Remaining after leasing	1.2	23.4	5.0	1.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.2	—	2.5(a)	2.4(a)
Holdings of agricultural workers with little land	24.3	33.3	73.8	78.7	19.3	—	—	—	—	—	—
Holdings of agricultural workers without land	0.5	15.5	2.4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Dwarf exploitations whose cultivator has nonagricultural occupation	3.5	25.9	15.8	9.1	1.5	—	—	—	—	—	—

(a) The unexplained presence of exploitations of over 50 hectares in the category "Remaining after leasing" (i.e., remaining after 80 per cent of the property has been let out) presumably indicates a few large properties of little agricultural value, since according to the census this category was unimportant agriculturally.

SOURCE: Roman Cresin, *Agricultura din judeţul Argeş* (Bucarest, 1945), p. 11.

315 pipeline has been completed from a secondary source of supply at Manești to convey this gas to Bucarest to supply both household and industrial requirements.

135 Iron-ore deposits are small, so that the heavy industries are very largely dependent on imports. A variety of other mineral resources, which are believed to exist in greater abundance than has so far been established, have not yet been fully surveyed.

433 Rumania has a poorly-developed industry, which lags far behind that of western European countries such as Czechoslovakia, though is ahead of all the other south-east European countries, except Hungary. Financially she is a poor country, with very limited capital resources, which has proved a severe hindrance to industrial development and has laid her open to the investment of foreign capital, which has been attracted particularly by the rich mineral oil and forest resources. Skilled labour, also a vital factor in the process of industrialisation, has been lacking, so that the use of foreign technicians has been essential. Other raw-material resources, though adequate to allow the development of a sound and varied industry, are not sufficiently extensive to encourage a very rapid development independent of imported raw materials.

[457]

[464]

Industrialisation in Rumania did not start until about 1890, and the period of greatest expansion was between 1929 and 1938. The consumption industries were the first to be developed, and of these food industries are the chief, the raw materials being grown on the spot. The growth of such industries as paper, cardboard, printing, soap, chemicals and furniture, etc., followed. The location of industry in the earlier stages was governed not by such factors as the existence of cheap labour, but was built up in those areas richest in raw materials.

MAIN INDUSTRIAL REGIONS

[311] The main industrial region is in the Prahova valley, where the oilfields are to be found, followed by the Reșița district, where the existence of iron ore, coal, manganese, etc., led to the development of metallurgical and engineering facilities, as well as of such auxiliary industries as coal and wood distilleries. Gold, silver, lead, zinc and copper deposits in the Baia Mare region formed the basis for the erection of both metal and chemical factories. The presence of methane gas, salt, gold, silver and stone quarries in and around Turda determined the location of factories for production of cement, limestone, bricks, tiles, porcelain, glass, sulphuric acid, etc. In the rich forest districts of Ferdinand, Nadrag and Hunedoara, where iron ore deposits are also to be found, blast furnaces and metallurgical industries have been established. The textile industry is mainly established in Cîmnădia, Piatra Neamț, Bacău and Buhuși. Apart from the regions mentioned, industry is centred in the principal towns—Bucarest, Timișoara, Brașov, Sf. Gheorghe, Arad, Galați, Brăila, Cernăuți, Cluj and Iași.

The following table gives an idea of the relative importance of the various industries, showing the amount of capital invested and value of production in each of the main groups, and also the number of factories and of personnel employed :—

313 cooperage and boxmaking plants. The distribution of these is shown in Table II, although separation of the sawmills from the other industries is not possible. There were also three match factories, which covered internal requirements, and four wood-distillation plants, two of which, situated at Margina and Resita appeared to be relatively large concerns.

5. Exports

313 439 Rumania's timber exports between 1935 and 1938 averaged 1.8 million cubic metres per annum, which was 5 per cent. of total European exports, and gave her the leading place among south-east European countries. Almost 90 per cent. of total exports were conifers, whilst, as the following table shows, sawn goods made up by far the greater part:—

Categories	*Average annual exports 1935/38 (in '000 cubic metres)*	
Sawn goods	1,280	71
Firewood	222	12
Hewn goods	113	6
Sawlogs	71	4
Boxboard, etc	37	2
Pitwood	31	2
Pulpwood	26	1½
Sleepers	21	1½
Total	1,801	100

Exports were made to many countries, including South America, but the most important customers were Hungary, Germany, U.K., Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Greece. Trade with Germany in the immediate years prior to the war was tending to increase.

6. Employment

313 [464] It was estimated by a qualified expert that the forests gave direct or indirect employment to 750,000 people (about 10 per cent. of the total labour force) in forest work, transport of forest produce and in the timber industry and trade. At least 250,000 were engaged in actual forestry work, but this number probably included part-time and seasonal workers.

7. Transport

[505] [497] Water transport played but a small part in the carriage of timber, carrying only about 700,000 cubic metres per annum. By far the greater reliance was placed on transport by railways, and some 10 million cubic metres were carried by this service each year.

II. PRESENT SITUATION

Under war conditions Rumania has been faced with increasing difficulties for her supply of timber, and as most of the quantities now made available are required for home consumption, she has very little significance as an exporter.

The forest area lost by the cession of part of Transylvania is estimated to be about 1.4 million ha., and as this area accounted for 25 per cent. of pre-war production its loss is of serious consequence. It is estimated that under existing circumstances the maximum annual cut that is possible, if the present forest area is to be maintained, is 12 million cubic metres.

About 210 timber-processing concerns, of which 178 were sawmills, were also lost with Northern Transylvania, but in view of the over-expansion of the timber industry these losses are probably of less serious consequence.

[32b]

B. LABOUR POSITION DURING THE WAR

1. Military Conscription

701 The age limits for mobilisation are 19–50, while youths from 17–18 are liable for pre-military training.

During 1942 there have been several indications of the strain which further mobilisation was putting on Rumania's manpower; for example, in April 1942 the sentences on political prisoners were suspended and they were called into the army, while from July of that year onwards there has been a constant revision of previous exemptions and a tightening of control over the granting of leave and call-up. Military service, which previously had been obligatory for Rumanian citizens only, was made compulsory for all non-nationals* resident in the country, and further a decree was passed mobilising all Rumanians of military age resident abroad.

[563]

It is calculated that it has never been possible for Rumania to have more than 800,000 men properly equipped under arms at one period. The actual strength of the army has fluctuated considerably during the last two years, as has the number on the eastern front, but a reasonable average figure would be 500,000, of which 200,000 on the eastern front.

727 Rumanian casualties are difficult to assess. One estimate at the end of 1941 put casualties at 150,000, while total casualties up to May 1943 have been estimated at 350,000. Military mobilisation will probably have meant a loss of some 800,000 men to the general labour supply.

464

2. Recruitment for Germany

464 The recruitment of workers for Germany has been on a small scale, which is not surprising, as
167 Rumania's military contribution has been considerable, and the military mobilisation has already reduced the supply of labour needed for the Rumanian armament industry to a minimum. Such labour as might be available for export is unskilled and therefore of less value to Germany. The total number of Rumanian workers in Germany in December, 1942, was estimated at 14,000. Of these 10,000 were young Rumanians 18–19, who were recruited at the end of 1941 to be "trained" in German metallurgical factories, 1,000 are women employed as domestic servants, and the rest are mainly unskilled general workers.

3. Foreign Workers in Rumania

648 In addition to the German administrators and
463 directors, who are in certain of the key positions in Rumanian industry, there is also evidence of skilled German technicians in Rumanian armament factories. In 1942 there was a nucleus of the German Todt organisation, and Italian builders in the country.

727 About ~~40,000 Russian prisoners~~ of war are employed, chiefly in agriculture, though also in mining and navvying work.

C. GENERAL LABOUR DEVELOPMENTS

464 In 1937 the average unemployment figure was
722 12,000. The dislocation of trade and industry on the outbreak of war temporarily caused a general increase of unemployment, which was rapidly absorbed by the military call-up and increased activity in the armaments industry. In March

* The German minority was already liable for military service, either in the Rumanian or German army and in December, 1942, it was announced that there were 30,000 *Volksdeutsche* in the Rumanian Army.

[55a]

464 722 1941 there were 2,000 unemployed, while in December 1942, it was announced that the Office of Unemployment Statistics had been abolished, as there were no unemployed. Though Rumania's military mobilisation and losses have been extensive, her labour reserves are theoretically still considerable. On the other hand, there is no doubt that both industry and agriculture are suffering a noticeable labour shortage. This is attributable to the low level of mechanisation, internal economic organisation and to the cumbersome administration, so that comparison with western countries is impossible.

1. Agriculture.

464 241 The proportion of the working population engaged in agriculture is extremely high, so that military recruitment has been principally from this source. The structure of Rumanian agriculture, which is mainly peasant farming with a low output per head, has meant that the withdrawal of some 550,000 men has been more serious than it would have been in a country where more up-to-date methods are used, and the remaining labour supply is more mobile. The normal sources of supplementary wartime labour have been drawn on—*i.e.*, the temporary demobilisation of soldiers, employment of children during the summer holidays, and presumably an increased employment of women, although there is no evidence of women having been forcibly transferred to agriculture.

[727] The most valuable supplementary labour, however, has been the employment of Russian prisoners of war, and the demand for their services has exceeded the supply. The number employed in March 1942 was 40,000. These measures to improve the agricultural labour position do not as yet appear to have had much effect.

2. Industry

162 138 178 According to the latest official census figures (relating to the year 1930) 620,000 persons were employed in industry. The following table shows in column 1 the total number employed in the main branches, and in columns 2 and 3 the numbers working in factories employing ten or more people. A comparison between columns 2 and 3 gives an indication of the growing industrialisation of the country.

	1 1930	2 1930	3 1937
Food	122,000	25,200	34,700
Textiles and Clothing	155,000	34,800	70,500
Metallurgy	101,000	32,000	49,500
Timber..	94,000	31,000	44,000
Mining	53,000	n.a.	n.a.

Allowing for the increased industrialisation during the years 1930–39, and for the general increase in the total population to some 20,000,000, it is estimated that by 1939 the number of industrial workers in Greater Rumania would have risen to some 750,000.

With the loss of part of the provinces of Transylvania, Crişana and Maramureş, Rumania suffered a fairly considerable loss in industrial workers, so that added to the expulsion of Jews, repatriation of Germans, etc., and military mobilisation, it is estimated that at the end of [464] 1942 the numbers engaged in industry would not exceed 550,000.

As in the case of agriculture, the structure of Rumanian industry tends to prevent a thorough rationalisation and concentration of the available industrial labour.

[55b]

CHAPTER XI

463 industrial labour. One-third of all workers en-
438 gaged in industry are independent artisans, on whom the community is dependent for its services, but who do not play any important part in war production. In certain of the larger armament works German controllers have effected a considerable degree of rationalisation.

3. Mining

316 There is a shortage of miners; Russian prisoners
727 of war have been employed in mining during 1942. Many miners were reported to have been included in the territory transferred to Hungary.

4. Armament Works

719 There is a general shortage of labour in metal
464 and engineering factories, particularly of skilled labour. A 12-hour day was legalised at the beginning of 1942, but it is doubtful if in fact a 12-hour day is ever worked.

5. Timber

313 There is a shortage of labour, both for lumbering
464 and for timber manufacture.

6. Textiles and Clothing

464 The total number of workers in these industries
288 has probably fallen considerably, due to reduction of available raw materials. The delivery of supplies
294 to individual mills seems to be somewhat erratic, and there is evidence of considerable part-time work, for instance in a survey of some 43 factories in December, 1942, 11 were working full time, 21 on a reduced scale, and 11 at a very reduced scale.

7. Building

499 The extent of fortification building and general
712 road and rail construction in Rumania is unknown, but in the second half of 1942 there was evidence
464 of a scarcity of general labour for such projects, and of Russian prisoners of war working on rail construction.

438 In the other branches of occupation, transport
464 services, etc., there is no evidence of labour shortage, apart from doctors, many of whom have
[759] been mobilised for the army.

D. CONTROL OF LABOUR

1. The Youth Labour Service

466 A youth labour service founded on the German
883 model was established in March 1941. The leaders were trained in Germany, but it was only in April 1942 that the labour camps began to function. Youths are called up in their 19th–20th year, and the period of service lasts 7 months.

(*See* Part II, Chapter V.B. for further details.)

2. Civil Mobilisation

466 A general civil mobilisation decree was passed in May 1941 by which (1) employment cards were introduced; (2) men and women aged 20–57 were liable to compulsory employment if not employed.

Two subsequent decrees were published in March and May 1943, one for the reorganisation of agriculture, forestry and fishing, and the second for the reorganisation of industry. Each of these decrees gave full powers to the appropriate authorities for the mobilisation and transfer of labour.

In addition to the general labour decrees which have so far had little influence on the labour situation, there have been regional decrees applying to individual localities, e.g. in Bessarabia, in February 1942, all the inhabitants aged 12–70 were called upon for compulsory agricultural labour unless already employed.

3: Roberts S-- (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

The Change in Economic and Agrarian Policy

185 With regard to economic policy, the first two years after the war might be regarded as an induced and foreshortened NEP; not a retreat from war communism as the Soviet New Economic Policy had been, but, in form at least, the creation of a transitional economy between the older Rumanian capitalism and the drive toward socialism. This concept is closely related in the Communist mind to the functions of the People's Democracy and is embodied in the Constitution of 1948, though by that time the actual economic policy was moving beyond it.

241 465 For all the fanfare accompanying the 1945 agrarian reform, the organization of Rumanian farming in the first two or three years after its application showed little change. In the planting year 1946/47 much the greater part of the working force was engaged in family farms. About 181,000 persons (2.3 per cent of those active in agriculture) were permanent farm laborers, about 783,000 were engaged in seasonal work, and 1.4 million persons did some work on farms other than their own.[27] Payment for work continued to be a mixture of money and produce, only one-third of the work being paid solely in money.

The type of cultivation was much the same, though there was a retrogression from mixed agriculture. If the figures are comparable, some 61 per cent of the exploitations in 1948 were devoted to cereal cultivation as against 51 per cent in 1941; only 1.2 per cent of the exploitations concentrated on raising livestock as against 12 per cent in 1941, a reflection of the wartime loss of animals and the breaking up of large estates.

About two-thirds of the exploitations obtained their money income through sale of produce, the other third through outside labor. Two-fifths of the exploitations in 1947 were obliged to buy agricultural produce to supplement their own deficient production.

185 241 In 1945 the Groza regime announced that the agrarian reform was but the initial step in a whole series of projected reforms which would transform Rumanian agriculture, but at this time there was no mention of collectivization as the general goal. On the contrary, any mention of collective farming was frowned upon, and the whole emphasis was on assisting the independent peasant. Actually, the list of

27. *Recensământul agricol din Republica Populară Română, 25 Ianuarie 1948*, p. 35. The relation between the last two categories is not clear, but the figures on permanent and seasonal workers are quite similar to those of 1941. See above, p. 52

000 no better than a pig." If we take into consideration that according to L. T. Hobhouse "the whole system of moral tradition governing the life of a society is evolved from the practical impulses and feelings at work in the past and present," we may easily comprehend that the aspects of social life as revealed by current events in Rumania, show a natural process which could not be altered or deflected except by titanic efforts of re-education. We have no right, therefore, to blame the Rumanians for what we may consider to be grave lapses, but which they prefer to interpret differently, for after all, as A. R. Wallace affirms in his "Social Environment and Moral Progress,", "morality is not wholly due to any inherent perception of right or wrong conduct, but is to some extent a matter of convention varying with the degree and kind of social development attained." And this opinion is confirmed by L. T. Hobhouse, who, in his book "Morals in Evolution" states "the instinctive in human morality is by no means an unfailing power implanted by nature in all men to distinguish right from wrong." Rumanian youth continues to cherish the traditional 461 585 Phanariot ambition of enriching itself through access to a public post; other careers are neglected and looked askance at. They are left to the more enterprising Jewish element, which owing to its energy and capacity has taken complete control of Rumanian trade and banking. Through the neglect of the commercial professions, Rumanians have hampered the formation of a middle class which, more than any other element, is conducive to the creation of stability 647 and a vigilant public opinion. The public functionary class 465 is an unstable element, and as it enjoys no security of office but depends for its tenure on the favours of politicians in 661 power, it naturally follows that it easily lends itself to corruption, and all the more so seeing that it is disgracefully underpaid. In a lettter published by the "Argus" on 16th May, 1932, it was averred that the number of public functionaries amounted to 500,000. (Including the staff employed by municipalities). The number could easily be halved, and the administration would stand to gain both in efficiency and thoroughness by such a reduction. Greece, with a population amounting to one-third that of Rumania, had a

total of only 43,943 functionaries (exclusive of those employed by municipalities. Even this figure was considered excessive, and a decree was enacted prohibiting for a series of years the creation of fresh posts and the nomination of new functionaries to vacant posts in order that their number might be reduced. In Rumania such a measure is hardly likely to be enacted, for every politician must have the possibility of providing the more important of his electors with sinecures, for otherwise how would he induce them to vote for him? This is how the principle of public solidarity is understood and applied ! Amongst us, state functionaries are considered as the servants of the public, in fact their function is revealed by the appellation under which they are designated; they are, in fact as well as in name, public servants. Rumanian functionaries are, one must admit, on the whole both courteous and obliging, especially to strangers, but such services as are rendered must be requited. Since the State barely remunerates them, it is obvious they have to secure their means of livelihood somewhere. Of course no tariff is posted up in Government offices as to the amount of pecuniary compensation expected for the services demanded; *that* is a matter left to the discretion of the person soliciting the service, but a solatium of some sort has to be given to the functionary, as otherwise you will be made to feel the tediousness of waiting in a usually stuffy office. It is not surprising that such methods have gradually evinced probity from amongst the administrative personnel and made room for a venality which is occasionally exhibited so brazenly as to impel such an attentive observer as Mr Charles Wood to declare " there is nobody and nothing in Rumania who and which cannot be bought with money." (Contemporary Review, February, 1921.) Though the country teems with acts of maladministration there are yet many excellent, honest and plodding functionaries, who are all the more meritorious since they are neither properly remunerated nor encouraged for their loyal service to the State. This proves that if the Civil Service was placed beyond the withering influence of politics, stability of occupation guaranteed, and decent remuneration offered, a remedy for the ills which afflict Rumania would easily be devised. There

647 are certainly no insuperable obstacles to the removal of what
465 constitutes a drain on the strength and probity of the country,
661 which is being visibly weakened in every sphere of administration.

The following article, which was published in the "Lupta" of Dec. 17th, 1931, is instructive as to the manner in which public functionaries behave in order to supplement the scanty salary they draw from the State and which generally does not suffice to keep them alive.

647 It is obvious that no civilized State would tolerate methods
651 which in Rumania are benevolently winked at. There is no
499 doubt that the evil could easily be remedied if functionaries were decently paid. The increased outlay for the State
661 which this would involve would be largely compensated by a more conscientious performance of duty by the administrative staff. For instance, it is well known that owing to the high duties in force, smuggling on a colossal scale is being carried on with the connivance of officials, with the result that the State is defrauded of millions. M. V. Madgearu, former Minister of Finances, openly admits it in his book "Rumania's New Economic Policy," published in English, on page 39 of which we come across this astounding statement: "It has been shown that while pre-war Rumania imported about 70,000 kilos of natural silk, united Rumania registered the importation of only 1,000 kilos in 1927. It is well understood that the rest has been imported through smuggling." On a rough computation this item alone would account for an annual loss of some 50 million lei to the revenue.

But, apparently, blackmail is even more lucrative than smuggling, according to the article referred to in the "Lupta":—

647 "Truly, *smuggling* constitutes a source of big revenues for
651 the State. Not bona-fide smuggling which involves the
661 introduction of goods into the country without the disbursement of duties. This latter sort of smuggling is never discovered, or if discovered is rapidly hushed up with the connivance of the ablest pillars of the Ministry. The principal sources of revenue from smuggling are derived from the hypothetical variety, when for instance an anony-

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

511 capital had been imported, had come to an abrupt end only a few years later. The prices of agricultural produce continued to fall and manufactured goods became comparatively more expensive. While the value of money decreased[1] and the general level of the standard of living deteriorated up to about 1930, there was a slight improvement in the period following the recovery from the general crisis.

661 **CORRUPTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION.** The lot of the people, however, did not improve. The Rumanians, to whom their government had promised an era of prosperity and national splendour, soon found that the promise held good only for some privileged classes who had not been badly off before. The whole country was ruled by a small clique which had secured the allegiance of a host of civil servants. These officials were badly paid and relied on bribes to swell their income. Before elections the voters were promised reductions of taxation and official positions. But taxes became heavier each year and the new officials' greed had to be satisfied whenever one came in touch with the State apparatus. Identification papers of every description had to be secured before a citizen could go about his business. And in order to obtain these documents one had to visit innumerable offices, fill up innumerable forms and bribe a dozen officials. Arrests were made by the underpaid police for the sole purpose of obtaining money. Officials in all positions looked upon bribes as a legitimate source of income.

The poor peasantry and the minorities were

465 [1] Level wages in 1930 were: in Rumania 39; in Britain 100.

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

471 and smaller profits were the reward of Rumanian officials and business men.[1]

511 How far the natural resources of Rumania have suffered under this intensive exploitation will probably become apparent only after the war. Its effects on the people of Rumania, however, can be gauged already. The cost of living in 1941 was three times as high as in 1934, and in January 1943 it was reported to be 50% higher than one year before. These are official Rumanian figures, based on maximum prices and maximum wages which are 511 only fictitious. In fact many goods, although 465 rationed, could be obtained only on the black market and at phenomenal prices. The general inflation led to a levelling-up of wages; but wages remained far behind prices. The workers, therefore, were worse off than before, although, theoretically, they obtained improved wages. A Swiss report in August 1943 showed that the monthly earnings of

457 [1] In January 1944 the Rumanian Government, according to a German paper published in Rumania, 'decided to put at the disposal of the Ministry of Finance a credit of three milliard lei for a new campaign for the modernisation of petroleum installations in Rumania. The Rumanian National Bank has granted a loan of one hundred million Reichsmarks to a number of oil companies for the same purpose. This sum will be used for the import of machinery from Germany . . . these companies have also been put in charge of the supply of the capital with natural gas'. At about the same time one of the mouthpieces of the Nazi war economy declared quite frankly: 'The practical purpose of the Rumanian export trade policy is to ensure an adequate supply of raw materials for the home industry. In order to stimulate import the concerns in question were permitted . . . to open up new industries in foreign countries for the purpose of supplying raw materials and half finished goods to the vitally necessary war industries in Rumania.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

a worker, working sixty hours a week, would just be 511
sufficient to buy a pair of shoes or four pounds of 465
coffee, while he would have to spend about three months' wages to buy a suit. The workers do not possess any effective trade unions or other organizations which could better their lot, and peasants' co-operatives are few and weak, except those controlled by the State and those of the German Minority. Antonescu, however, recognized the danger threatening him from this quarter and tried to pacify the workers by creating special services which would supply them with their rations. Other sections of the population had to rely on luck. By creating a class of workers which at last had an assured supply of food he hoped to neutralize the most potent elements of Rumanian discontent.

Another indication of the standard of living is 511
supplied by the official price index. From June to 435
December 1940 prices rose by over 137% and, according to the official Rumanian economic gazette, by 372% between August 1939 and October 1943. This fantastic increase of prices brought no corresponding gains to the farmers or agricultural workers, as can be seen from the Rumanian press.[1] While some industrial workers at least got their rations, and in some instances even increased rations,

[1] In December 1943, one of the German papers in Rumania reported that 'the Union of Farmers' Co-operative Societies states that although there was a record harvest last year, the difficult position of the farmers has not improved. A great part of the harvest is still unsold and...the shortage of capital is very much felt...the Union demands that one-third of the difference between the low inland- and the high export-prices be paid to the farmers instead of giving the whole of the overprice to the State and the exporters....Owing to the lack of

E. THE JEWISH POPULATION

162 The Jewish population of Rumania for 1938 is given as 800,000, and for July, 1942, as 270,000. This reduction came about as follows :—

Total, 1938	800,000
Lost to Hungary	200,000
[728] Taken to Russia from Bessarabia and Bucovina by Russians	130,000
Expelled from Bessarabia and other areas by Rumanians to Transnistria, and deaths from unnatural [621] causes in Rumania	200,000
Total losses	530,000
Total, 1942	270,000

The occupational distribution of the Jews in 1930 :—

		Per cent.
Agriculture		4·1
Industry and trade	32·8	81·1
Commerce and credit	48·3	
Transport		2·4
Professions and Public Services ..		2·7
Army		1·9
Miscellaneous		7·8

It is calculated that in 1939 at least one-sixth of the industrial and half of the commercial population were Jews. During the war Rumanian policy 563 has been to exclude Jews from business and from 661 commercial and professional activity. This process of Rumanisation, while pursued ruthlessly in the provinces of Bessarabia and Bucovina, has been limited in the more industrial areas such as Bucarest by the simple fact that Rumanian industry and trade are dependent to such an extent on Jewish capital and leadership, and there is no doubt that the shortage of labour in industry has been seriously aggravated by the anti-Jewish policy. The degree of Rumanisation so far achieved is given by the following examples :—

Bucarest :—

Number of firms employing Jews, November 1940	8,126
Number of firms employing Jews, December 1942	4,301

Such Jews as are deemed necessary for war production are granted labour permits, whereby they may remain in their profession, but are subject to heavy taxation. Jews who are expelled from their normal activity are compulsorily enrolled in the Jewish labour service and employed chiefly on road work, or, alternatively, they are sent to concentration camps.

(*See* also "Note on Jews in Rumania," Part II, Chapter VIII.)

F. WAGES

1. General

465 The average wage (industrial, commercial and agricultural professions) in 1938 was 1,833 lei per month. The highest average wages were found in the mining, food and transport industries, followed by commerce, textiles, skins, glass and stone, while in the metallurgical industry wages were below the average. The most noticeable feature of pre-war Rumanian wage statistics is the great regional variations, the extreme averages being 889 and 3,059 lei per month.

During the war, various attempts at fixing the wage level have failed to keep pace with the rising cost of living. On the whole it would have been surprising if a wage stop could have been successfully applied in Rumania, because of the great

[56b]

465

discrepancy in wage levels throughout the country which would involve separate wage boards for each area. All the fixed rates quoted below, with the exception of those in the metallurgical trade, are given for the country as a whole. In view of the regional variations in wage rates, the application of a fixed uniform wage is obviously impossible. This therefore suggests that the given rates are intended to apply to the districts with the highest wage-rate level, and that suitable reductions will be made in other areas, as for the metallurgical industry. The general wage level is estimated to have risen by as much as 200 per cent. since 1939. A general decree in August, 1942, fixed minimum wages at (lei per month) :—

Men	*Women*	*Children*
5,100	3,800	2,300

2. Agriculture

465
241

Up till April 1942 agricultural wages were determined by free negotiation in the different regions and showed great variations. In April 1942 a decree was passed fixing rates for hired labour. A margin of 10 per cent. was granted to allow for local cost of living differences. The following rates (in lei per day) were fixed for the

465
241

different seasons in 1942, the employee also receiving food :—

Period	Men	Women	Juveniles*
Spring—June 15th	75	50	40
Summer—Sept. 1st	100	75	50
Autumn and winter	60	40	30
Average for 1937†	40	32	21

(i.e. official money wages have almost doubled and food is now supplied.)

* 16-18 years. † Without food.

4.5
647

3. Civil Service

In August, 1941, the average monthly wage for a civil servant was 2,800-4,000 lei (presumably for non-administrative grades). Beyond this there is no information on actual rates paid, except for a reference in December 1942 to "Ministry Advisers," whose wages were 72,000 lei per month. However, there are frequent references to increased wages for state officials, and especially of increased family allowances, e.g. in October 1941 the allowance per month for children of civil servants was 500 lei per child. By October 1942 it had been increased to 750 lei per child for families living in the country, and 1,000 lei per child for families living in the town.

[57b]

465

SUMMARY OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON INDUSTRIAL WAGES

Date	Industry	Category of Worker	Wage	Remarks
August 1942	General	Skilled	*Lei per month* 4,100–5,100	See remarks on variations of the "general wage"
		Unskilled	2,300–2,800	
October 1942	Metallurgy	Skilled (2 years' employment after training) ..	*Lei per hour* 30–75	Industrial areas were divided into four classes, according to their cost of living and general wage level. The given wages are for class I, i.e. with highest cost of living. Class II = 4 per cent. less; class III = 12 per cent. less; class IV = 20 per cent. less
		Industrial (over 21) ..	28–42	
		Unskilled (over 18) ..	26–32	
		Women	20 per cent. less in each category	
December 1942	Textiles		*Lei per month (fixed minimum)*	
		Men	5,100	
		Women	3,825	
		Juveniles (14–18)	2,550	
December 1942	Oil ..		*Lei per hour*	*Women*
		"Master" men	50–122	40
		Specialised workers, men	34–98	28
		Industrial workers, men ..	28–85	22
		Industrial workers (under 18)	22–40	18
		Unskilled workers, men ..	26–47	21
		Unskilled workers (under 18)	21–36	17
October 1942	Building ..		*Lei per day*	
		Master stonework builder	600	
		Labourer	400	
		Youth	200	
		Master joiner or carpenter	600	
		Workman	400	

NOTE.—Of the above listed categories, wages for the textile industry doubled between 1939 and 1942; for general workers, metallurgy and the oil industry they trebled, and for building were quadrupled.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

From a consideration of all these factors the peculiar nature of the Rumanian agrarian crisis emerges. The poorer peasant, who had been forced to go to the landowner or tenant for additional land, was in an increasingly bad bargaining position. The landowners or tenants, in responding to commercial incentives, could increase production with little cost to themselves merely by demanding more of him, since he supplied the implements and draft animals as well as the labor.[23] Clinging to his little plot of ground and doggedly refusing to become a migrant wage laborer, the poor peasant could see no possible relief to his situation except to have more land. On the other hand, the richer peasant, whose land was sufficient to produce a surplus, likewise found himself restricted by the relative monopoly in land, the high rents, and the speculation of the large tenants: the system was an obstacle to the further improvement of his position.[24]

In general, then, the economic background of the 1907 revolt lay not in peasant poverty alone but in the protracted dislocating effect of commerce upon a previously "natural economy" and a society involved in the ambiguities of neoserfdom. This dislocation has occurred in many forms throughout the globe where modern industry and commerce have impinged upon traditional social and economic patterns. The particular form it took in Rumania, increasing agrarian tension in the midst of a flourishing foreign commerce in cereals, was a product not only of economic and demographic factors but of Rumania's particular social structure, which was dominated by a boyar oligarchy.

Socially and economically Rumania resembled tsarist Russia in several ways. As Dobrogeanu-Gherea observed: "We are the only country in Europe, with the exception of Russia, which has the sad privilege of peasant revolts—neither the Western countries superior to us in culture, nor those of the East, such as Serbia and Bulgaria, which are inferior to us, have them." [25] In both countries the history

---

the prevalence of unprogressive latifundiary cultivation, large property was making technical advances and was paving the way toward more scientific farming. Advocates of peasant farming have replied that the large owners had kept the best land to themselves and that the peasants were unable to give adequate attention to their own fields. As one peasant is reported to have said: "Do you think this beautiful maize is mine? It belongs to the Jewish tenant. I haven't even hoed my own once yet, his twice. He didn't allot us the land till late." Creangă, *op. cit.*, I, 14.

23. This curious fact, that under the prevailing agrarian relations prosperity seemed to sharpen social tensions, may explain why the 1907 revolt should have followed the excellent 1906 harvest.

24. This grievance of the richer peasants may serve to explain why the minor uprising of 1888 had been most violent in the district of Ialomița, a sparsely populated region having a comparatively prosperous peasantry, but in which an exceptionally high percentage of the land (69 per cent) was in the hands of large proprietors, who leased out more than 70 per cent of their estates.

25. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

463 438 industrial labour. One-third of all workers engaged in industry are independent artisans, on whom the community is dependent for its services, but who do not play any important part in war production. In certain of the larger armament works German controllers have effected a considerable degree of rationalisation.

3. Mining

316 727 There is a shortage of miners; Russian prisoners of war have been employed in mining during 1942. Many miners were reported to have been included in the territory transferred to Hungary.

4. Armament Works

719 464 There is a general shortage of labour in metal and engineering factories, particularly of skilled labour. A 12-hour day was legalised at the beginning of 1942, but it is doubtful if in fact a 12-hour day is ever worked.

5. Timber

313 464 There is a shortage of labour, both for lumbering and for timber manufacture.

6. Textiles and Clothing

464 288 294 The total number of workers in these industries has probably fallen considerably, due to reduction of available raw materials. The delivery of supplies to individual mills seems to be somewhat erratic, and there is evidence of considerable part-time work, for instance in a survey of some 43 factories in December, 1942, 11 were working full time, 21 on a reduced scale, and 11 at a very reduced scale.

7. Building

499 712 464 The extent of fortification building and general road and rail construction in Rumania is unknown, but in the second half of 1942 there was evidence of a scarcity of general labour for such projects, and of Russian prisoners of war working on rail construction.

438 464 [759] In the other branches of occupation, transport services, etc., there is no evidence of labour shortage, apart from doctors, many of whom have been mobilised for the army.

D. CONTROL OF LABOUR

1. The Youth Labour Service

466 883 A youth labour service founded on the German model was established in March 1941. The leaders were trained in Germany, but it was only in April 1942 that the labour camps began to function. Youths are called up in their 19th–20th year, and the period of service lasts 7 months.

(*See* Part II, Chapter V.B. for further details.)

2. Civil Mobilisation

466 A general civil mobilisation decree was passed in May 1941 by which (1) employment cards were introduced; (2) men and women aged 20-57 were liable to compulsory employment if not employed.

Two subsequent decrees, were published in March and May 1943, one for the reorganisation of agriculture, forestry and fishing, and the second for the reorganisation of industry. Each of these decrees gave full powers to the appropriate authorities for the mobilisation and transfer of labour.

In addition to the general labour decrees which have so far had little influence on the labour situation, there have been regional decrees applying to individual localities, e.g. in Bessarabia, in February 1942, all the inhabitants aged 12-70 were called upon for compulsory agricultural labour unless already employed.

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania ED1

C69 by reason of them outrage and blows and threats and imprisonment
738 and, it may be, destitution. These things truly mean glorifying the Lord
733 Jesus. They will prove that we desire to insure for ourselves, even in this day of passing suffering, an eternal meed of renown which will be beyond weight or measure.

[697] The men who signed this Letter all have witnessed to the faith they thus professed. And in their company stand devoid
•466 of eloquence but not of holiness and fidelity, the many, many thousands, chosen from amidst the humble and the poor, who have suffered persecution and enslavement in Vhalitza or in the region between the Danube and the Black Sea. In order that we may understand their ordeal, let me quote from eyewitness accounts of the camps built to house those who toil at digging a canal in the Dobrouja:

> Approximately 30,000 prisoners are stationed there. The majority of them are intellectuals. They are digging a canal between the Danube and the Black Sea, or are building roads, bridges, and so forth. Practically all the work is done by hand in the same manner and with the same methods as those which were employed for the erection of the Egyptian pyramids. The food is very poor. As a rule, the daily menu consists of corn meal with a soup made of onions or beans. The sanitary conditions are indescribable, and for this reason the death toll is extremely high. Prisoners work more than twelve hours a day. Some of them were sentenced by the courts. Others were not. But this makes no difference, for even those who did receive sentences are not released when their terms are over.

000 The Uniate Churches are not among the great religious bodies of the world. But we might well pause in reverence while passing their temples of worship to commemorate those who in far-off countries have so nobly and sacrificially clung to their faith. Such a tribute would by no means preclude one from bearing in mind that others, too, have felt the crushing weight of Ru-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

652 should be obtained not through investments but through loans under-
665 taken by the state. In this way Rumania would have full control over the allocation of capital and would not, except for the interest on loans, see the profits from the oil industry go abroad. The petroleum policy of the National Peasants, as formulated in 1929, was even more removed from Stere's recommendations than from the Liberals' policy. It was, however, perfectly consistent with their economic outlook during their term in office.

665 Rumanian transportation and communications had been in no-
652 toriously bad condition since the First World War, and the Liberals'
496 policy of retrenchment had been particularly damaging to the rail-
464 way system. The 1929 stabilization loan allocated $34,000,000 for
● 471 railway expansion and $9,000,000 to pay off overdue railway debts.
491 By a law passed in July, 1929, the National Peasants transferred the
206 state railways to an autonomous public body, "to be administered according to commercial principles." [62] They also undertook to repair and extend the highway network, and abolished the primitive *corvée* which was still being used for road maintenance. In 1930 the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation received a concession for the construction of the Rumanian telephone network.

665 The stabilization loan required a reform of the National Bank and of the state accounting system. In March, 1929, the government passed a series of new statutes for the bank; the principal changes were the abolition of the ceiling on the issue of currency, established by the Liberals' in 1925, and the limitation of the influence of the state in the appointment of directors. The bank was given somewhat greater independence from state control and powers to maintain the newly achieved stability of the currency. In July, 1929, the government passed a law reforming the state accounting system and the organization of the budget. There was no doubt that Rumanian state finances needed reform and modernization. The accounting system had been that of France of 1860, plus the accretion of a number of purely Rumanian practices, with the result that the actual condition of government finances at any given time was never known with any exactness. The new law, in reorganizing the preparation of the budget, exerted more stringent control over the expenditures of various ministries. While this law was well intended, its actual results in rationalizing Rumanian finance methods seem to have been very

62. Madgearu, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 50. The organization of Rumanian railways after 1918 had been altogether hectic. In 1925 the Liberals had given some autonomy to the railways; this policy was reversed by the People's party in February, 1927, and reestablished by the Liberals in August of that year.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

manian industries, especially secondary industries. Both Russia and Rumania, however, are still industrializing economies and there seems to be little evidence, in the Rumanian case at least, of a desire to check the industrialization of the latter.[31] 439

The turning point in the economic policy of the immediate post-war period was the stabilization of the currency in August, 1947, which more or less liquidated the old financial structure and served as a vast economic leveler. On the fifteenth of that month, the leu was devalued (to 150 to the dollar) and the old money was ordered to be exchanged immediately at the rate of one new leu for 20,000 old lei. Peasants were limited to exchanging 5,000,000 lei; workers to 3,000,000; and other persons to 1,500,000. That is, at the official new rate, peasants could receive in exchange $1.67, workers $1.00, and others $0.50. Gold and foreign currency were entitled to full value but had to be declared under penalty of life imprisonment. This drastic measure, which came at a time of continued commodity shortages, inevitably caused widespread hardship. There were numerous reports of resistance by the peasants who felt as usual that they were being sacrificed to the benefit of the towns. The government hurled many charges of speculation and exchange violation, and part of the brutal behavior of the regime in the course of 1947 is to be associated with, if not explained by, this Draconian financial reorganization.[32] 652

Along with the tightening of political control the Groza government now entered a new phase of economic policy marked by the progressive nationalization of industry, collectivization of agriculture, and the beginning of economic plans. In 1947 pressure against private industry consisted primarily in assuming control over certain specific enterprises, supervising industrial activity, and making accusations of sabotage against foreign-owned concerns. At the beginning of 1948 Gheorghiu-Dej launched a general attack on private capital, which dominated industry, banking, and insurance: "Our democratic regime has been very patient with private enterprise, but private owners do not make capital investment, nor do they renew equipment. They transfer capital abroad and openly sabotage reconstruction." In January the concession of the Rumanian match monopoly to the Swedish firm (this concession had been granted at the time of the stabilization loan of 1929) was declared invalid and 185 471

31. See also below, pp. 327–329.

32. A defense of the stabilization, written by the National Bank, is published as "La Réforme monétaire en Roumanie, 15 août 1947," in *Les Archives internationales*, Doc. 664.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

165 annulled. In the following months government administrators were
● 471 appointed to supervise the British and American-owned oil companies, which action, in effect, put these firms in a state of forcible dissolution. The Rumanian industrialist, Nicolae Malaxa, who had made great efforts to accommodate himself to the Russians and the Groza regime, was unable to ride this new wave and his factories, the most important in the country, were also taken over. While, as has been seen, the Rumanian government has always worked in close conjunction with Rumanian industry—fostering desirable undertakings and even setting up state-owned enterprises—this new advance was under quite different auspices and had a far more ambitious intent.

The decisive step came in June, 1948, with a bill providing for the nationalization of all industrial, mining, banking, insurance, and transport concerns. The law at the outset affected some 1,068 enterprises, including 132 heavy industries, 20 coal mines, 25 oil and natural gas companies, 56 building material companies, 163 textile factories, 15 insurance companies, and 4 shipping concerns. While the law did not, in theory, deny compensation, it was to be based on profits, its amount was to be determined by a government commission, it was to be paid in state bonds, and would not be given to persons who "have enriched themselves illegally or left the country illegally." The motives given for the bill were largely political: the new situation demanded changes in the national economy; the bourgeoisie, which had been disarmed politically, must not be permitted to retain its potent economic weapons.

In November all privately owned health institutions, hospitals, sanatoria, and the film industry were nationalized. In April, 1949, the state took over a new batch of private companies, pharmacies, laboratories, drug and cosmetic factories. Thus, by the end of the year, a significant and certainly decisive sector of the economy was directly controlled and managed by the state.

423 The switch in agrarian policy came at a somewhat later date, though in 1946 and 1947 one finds mounting criticism of the predatory activity of the rich peasants and the sabotage committed by estate owners on the land remaining to them. A foreshadowing of a change in eastern European agriculture was given in a Russian broadcast of February 9, 1948, to Soviet farmers: "Today the governments of the new democracies know that the present small peasant holdings are not a paying proposition and that the peasants' road to wealth lies in co-operation and the uniting of small holdings into large collective estates. . . . The movement for setting up co-operative agri-
culture is growing apace

FARMING AROUND CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

AMY R. BURGESS

133 IN THE region of Curtea de Argeş the river flows in a valley of varying width, floored with fine sandy alluvium and bounded by somewhat rounded hills. Some traces of river terraces are discernible.

THE LAND of this region can be divided into four categories: (*a*) arable, (*b*) hay meadows, (*c*) forest, (*d*) high mountain pasture. The arable land is principally on the first terrace, but stretches both down the slope to the valley bottom and up the slope to the second terrace. The hay meadows are above the arable land, spreading upwards towards the [137] forest. The forests comprise 75 per cent of the total area, and consist mainly of timber trees, such as beech and pine, together with a considerable number of walnut trees. The high pastures are above the forest belt and may be as much as fifty kilometres away from the village centre of the commune to which they belong.

423 THE ARABLE land is owned by the peasants, holdings ranging from less than one hectare to fifty hectares, the majority being from two to five hectares. The smallness of the holding [428] is due partly to the laws of inheritance, by which the land is divided between the children on the death of the owner, and partly to the fact that the district is so hilly that only small areas are available for cultivation.

241 476 THE HAY meadows belong to the commune and are both worked and used collectively by the peasants, all necessary organization being in the hands of the mayor and committee.

471 [313] THE FORESTS are largely state-owned, although some portions belong to the commune, in which case the peasants are allowed to cut for their own personal use (house-building, implements, etc.), but not for profit.

[233] THE HIGH pastures belong to the commune; the peasants pay a small fee to the commune for their use (20 lei per head per season for sheep, rather more for cattle).

132 AN IMPORTANT climatic feature affecting agriculture is the shortness of the summer, late spring and early autumn frosts

133 dependent for the working out of its economy, as for its setting, upon the high Southern Carpathians.

233 133 While in some parts of Roumania all the sheep must be moved to distant highlands in summer, there are many regions which have sufficient local pasture to keep a certain proportion of stock through the year. This applies to the country around Curtea de Argeş; here the late Tertiary (Pliocene) deposits are provided with frequent terraces. The lower terraces are glacial and may be three in number; higher up the dip-slopes of the coarse sands have often been cleared of the bad forests which still cling to the scarps, while at all levels slips have occurred in the loose materials to produce small mesa-like areas, sparsely covered with grass, juniper and birch, accessible to nimble sheep and goats.* In general, however, such local pasturage is reserved for cows in milk, while young cattle and bullocks, if not required for the many activities of farming and forestry, are sent with the sheep to the high pastures.

We may best examine some of the features of this transhumance by following the sheep in their movements through the year in the valley of the Argeş and its background of high mountains, the Fagaras, extending eastwards from the valley of the Olt. The commune of Corbeni, some seventeen kilometres upstream, provides us with a few figures. Here is the first widening of the Argeş Valley, for the river has left the last range of the Carpathians (1,500 m.) through which it cuts one of the great gorges which characterize this zone, and it is here entering on its braided course through the [137] Miocene and Pliocene deposits to the south. The proportion of forested land in the commune is high (75 per cent), and its 2,500 sheep can be maintained only by extensive transhumance. The summer pastures are from thirty to fifty kilometres distant, the stâne† extending from the forest's upper limit (1,500-1,600 m.) to the scarred rock faces of 471 the high core at 2,000 m. Each commune has its stână, 233 which takes its name from the mountain on which it is situated: it is the property of the commune, but there are certain payments to be made each year for the services of

*Goats tend to be kept only by the poorer peasants; they are naturally not encouraged by the Forestry authorities.

†Stână (singular). The word is applied as here to the summer pastures and also to the huts where the shepherds sleep and make the store the cheese. By extension it is sometimes used for the general economy of transhumant shepherding.

471 the shepherds and cheese-maker. These dues, amounting to
233 some 10 or 20 lei per sheep, are worked out each year by a committee which regulates the financial side of the transhumant economy.

234 EACH STÂNĂ has its baciu or cheese-maker, who is paid by
233 the commune. In some districts this scheme is varied by arrangements which must represent modifications of the
471 old economy of collective shepherding. Occasionally a large farmer may be proprietor of a stână and may possess enough sheep to run his own pasturing, in which case he may either hire a cheese-maker or fill that rôle in person. Or he may let his stână to the highest bidder, who pays in cheese obtained from the flock. From this it is a short step to the emergence of the middleman who, possessing no sheep himself, rents a pasture and guarantees to return an agreed quantity of cheese per sheep to those who send him their stock.

233 BEGINNING OUR account with the descent from the mountains,
221 we find that the uppermost pastures are abandoned by the last day of August, and the return downhill takes place during the first fortnight in September, being normally completed by September 14th (The Feast of the Cross). The sheep are driven to the local pastures until the maize crop is gathered, when they are penned on the stubble. Movement uphill begins about the middle of April and is completed by May 1st in an average year, St. George's Day (April 23rd) being a central date. Each peasant is responsible for driving his own sheep, using recognized tracks which tend to follow the watersheds. The sheep thus avoid the deep valley-crossings and can avail themselves of occasional natural clearings for temporary halts in a journey which may last a week. These are points of some importance in connection with the study of ridgeway roads generally.

342 THE SHEPHERD'S hut is a log-cabin erected on a single foundation-course of boulders. It is roofed with shingles or long planks; the gable is boarded above the level of the eaves, and a gap at the apex serves in place of chimney. Scarcely any metal is used in the construction of these summer dwellings, which serve as dairies and storehouses in addition to providing shelter and sleeping-places for the shepherds.
000 The furniture is of the simplest, but much ingenuity is

1 [for explanation see footnote 50 p. 49, cat. 116 -- Analyst]

652 quate means at their disposal they yet succeeded in achieving a certain measure of success, and notwithstanding the tremendous difficulties with which they had to cope. Some of the issues demanding attention were the reorganization of the administrative machinery in the newly-annexed territories, the complete overhauling of means of communication, the readjustment of agriculture, the reconstruction of the oil industry, which had greatly suffered during the war, and the necessity of providing for the needs of the army owing to the exposed geographical position of the country.

RUMANIA'S ECONOMIC POLICY

186 454 Until the advent to power in 1928 of the National Peasant Party under M. Maniu, the policy of the country was inspired by an uncompromising nationalism that tended to the complete exclusion of foreign capital so necessary for the development of Rumania. The chief instigators of this policy were the late brothers John and Vintila Bratianu, who had raised the maxim "prin noi însine" (by ourselves alone) to the sanctity of a religious dogma. The governments that had succeeded each other since the conclusion of the war, with the exception of the one presided over by M. Vaida-Voevod, were either formed by the Bratianu, or so-called Liberal Party, or by some nominees of theirs who were quite amenable to their views, so that a certain sequence in the policy pursued may be detected throughout this period, in spite of the change of persons at the helm of the State, while any divergence in their pronouncements from the original programme may be explained by the desire to allay the mistrust engendered by the Bratianu policy. The principal aim of this policy was the attainment of self-sufficiency through the industrialization of the country. This found expression in extensive legislation dealing with the development of national resources, the chief enactment being the special mining law promulgated in July, 1924.

382 471 315 The subsoil resources had already been declared national property, and the special mining law, which was aimed par-

ticularly at the oil industry, prescribed the manner in which they were to be exploited. The development of these resources was to be entrusted to corporations or "régies" in which the Government as well as private capital, both Rumanian and foreign, would participate, but in such a way as to permit of the majority of shares being controlled by the Rumanian Government. At the same time[1] laws were enacted for increasing the utilization of methane gas (C.H.4) which was already in use both for lighting and heating purposes in Transylvania, and which is available as a large source of industrial power, its output being calculated to amount to as much as 2,000 million cubic metres per annum, the consumption of which for 1930 reached over 503 million c. metres. The methods used by the Liberal Party to secure a mainhold of the supplies of methane gas are particularly illuminating of the mentality of the leaders of that party, as they were revealed by M. Madgearu in the Rumanian Chamber in 1929. An exclusive monopoly was conferred on a group of "Liberals," who supplied the gas to industrialists at arbitrary prices so as to force the latter out of the market and leave this to rival firms belonging to adepts of the "Liberal" Party. All the efforts of the Liberal Party to promote the nationalization of this gas were aimed at securing the economic mastery of Transylvanian industries. A similar law was also passed dealing with water power, the reserves of which are estimated at 5,206,225 H.P., of which amount 735,425 h.p. represent 50 per cent of the force produced at the Iron Gates by the Danube, 1,422,465 h.p. by the tributaries of the Theiss, 2,164,748 h.p. by the Danube tributaries between the Timish and the Sereth, and the remaining 884,665 h.p. by the Sereth and its tributaries. Of all this potential force only about 52,000 h.p. is actually in use. The State owned practically the totality of the railway lines, most of the extensive fisheries in the marshes and delta of the Danube, the salt mines of Ocnele Mari, Slanic, Uioara and Targu Ocna, which are exploited as a State monopoly and assure to it a revenue of some 700 million lei per annum, over 75 per cent of the entire vast timberlands, several coal and iron mines, the gold mines in the Bihor mountains, the annual output of which is about 2,500 to 3,000 kilogrammes

471 315 332 375 471 666 376 471 665 655

[1] July, 1924--Analyst

655 maritime and fluvial shipping companies, the docks, ports, warehouses, and grain elevators of Braila, Galatz, and Constantsa.

661 Laws were drafted aiming at the commercialization and exploitation, either independently or in co-operation with 471 the State, of these State-owned properties, as well as of other 186 national resources. But the purpose which actuated the entire economic legislation enacted by the Bratianu Governments was that of preventing foreign capital from acquiring a dominant position in the country. This policy of restraining the activities of foreign capital by legal restrictions was not due to the fact that Rumania might be imperilled by foreign capital securing a preponderating influence, but mainly because the Bratianu party aimed at reserving for themselves the monopoly of such profits as could be made through the exploitation of the national resources. The direct result of this policy was to sink whatever Rumanian capital existed in big enterprises, while agriculture was entirely neglected, and to deplete completely the liquid assets of the country to such an extent that its credit organization was dislocated.

433 It is sad to record that during the years when there was a 454 plethora of capital seeking investment which could have been easily attracted to Rumania with the object of endowing her with an adequate equipment for the development of her immense resources, such narrow and selfish views should have prevailed among her rulers. Indeed, had the opposite policy been adopted it would have secured prosperity to her even during the lean years which are now upon us. Foreign capital naturally fought shy, and refused to be enticed into enterprises in which it was not allowed to exercise legitimate control, which in many instances would have proved both salutary and indispensable. Rumania's natural wealth certainly provides a basis for industrial activity, there is an abundance of raw material, fuel, as well as a supply of cheap labour, but there is a serious deficiency of capital, which is reflected by the high rates of interest 426 prevalent. Commercial bills were discounted at rates vary- 433 ing between 18 per cent and 30 per cent, and first mortgages 454 were concluded on the basis of an average interest of 20 per

for reasons easily understood, is incapable of competing 439
against her northern neighbour. Having to face likewise in the grain trade the formidable competition of the trans-oceanic countries which have industrialized their agricultural production, Rumania finds herself to-day in a most unenviable position, which explains why she is so desperately anxious to conclude preferential agreements with European industrial countries, so that she may have the possibility of disposing of her products at better prices than those at which similar Russian goods are being offered.

In order to market the 1931 harvest the Rumanian Government was obliged to grant a subsidy of 1,000 lei per ton of cereals exported, but after paying about one milliard lei in subsidies, it found that the system constituted too great a strain on its resources and the subsidy was suddenly suspended, many exporters not even receiving their due. The real ratio of exchange between raw materials and manufactured articles, which has lately shifted so markedly in favour of the latter, is another powerful factor which, added to her difficulties in exporting her produce, is making for the industrialization of Rumania.

As this policy of industrialization, which has been followed [439]
since the conclusion of the war, has not given the expected
results, its continued pursuit and intensification can only be 471
persisted in through State intervention, which is also growingly exerted in organizing the exports. Control of exchanges, the clearing system, quotas, and inter-state barter are all gradual stages leading to the ultimate elimination of individual initiative in commercial intercourse and its substitution by collectivist methods. From this stage to the adoption of integral communism is an easy transition, and in view of the close proximity of the Russian example no surprise should be shown if it be imitated not only by Rumania, but by other Near Eastern States, if no other way of escape out of their present difficulties be offered them. The prospect of these States adopting Bolshevism is quite within the domain of possibilities, and this can hardly constitute a very reassuring portent for our Western democracies.

The visit of Ismet Pasha to Moscow in April, 1932, for the 648
purpose of seeing at close quarters how the Communist

RUMANIA

000 Though the obstacles may seem insuperable, yet actual suffering must have rendered the agrarian States more amenable to reason, so that one may hope with some confidence that they will not spurn a helping hand. To the layman it would appear to be more rational to go to the assistance of over 50,000,000 of potential customers, inhabiting the five mainly agrarian States of South-Eastern Europe, than to dissipate our energy and resources in the attempt to buttress up Germany.[1]

We may as well face the plain truth that in present-day Europe there is no longer room for two mainly industrial States living solely by exports, and that to make this possible it would be indispensable to scrap all protected industries in Europe and institute universal free trade. As this cannot be accomplished, we would act wisely if we abandoned the present task of salvaging Germany. Patronizing has not been a very propitious policy to us. Our friendship for the Japanese has resulted in our loss of the Chinese market and in the emergence of a most formidable rival to our Lancashire cotton industry, and our present quixotic attitude towards Germany, were it to succeed, would bring in its train even greater difficulties.

433 471 The policy of industrialization was adopted by Rumania after the war, when her frontiers had been sufficiently enlarged to provide an apparently large local market. During the pre-war years Rumania used to import from abroad some 85 per cent of the industrial articles she required, and such industries as she possessed were principally those the raw materials of which were locally provided, namely the milling, brewing, sugar-beet, and lumber industries. In 1913 there were only about 45,000 workmen employed in these occupations, and the total capital invested amounted to about 750 million lei. The acquisition of Transylvania and the Banat (where, owing to the presence of minerals and coal, an industry had developed) increased considerably the number of industrial enterprises in Rumania and led to similar industries being set up in the old kingdom

[1] This was the pet scheme of our bankers, owing to which we were forced to go off the gold standard. (See an article by J. A. Hobson in the "Contemporary Review" for November, 1931).

through a spirit of ill-conceived emulation. According to official statistics there were in 1929 a total of 3,736 industrial establishments, with an invested capital of 40,284 million lei, and employing 201,184 workpeople. Of these firms 1391 were in the old kingdom and 1789 in the Banat and Transylvania. The continuous fall in the purchasing power of the population, the lack of adequate working capital, which forces these industries to borrow money at high rates of interest owing to the prevailing monetary stringency, the disorganization of credit, the diminution of State purchases, and the non-payment by the State for the goods ordered by it from these industrial firms, have placed most of them in jeopardy, and it is very doubtful whether they will be able to survive the present crisis unless the State intervenes further on their behalf.

The following table sets forth the data concerning the various branches of industry operating during the year 1929:

Industry.	Number of establishments.	Capital (million lei.)	H.P. used.	Annual value of output in million lei.	Workpeople employed.
Metallurgical	448	6,444	84,775	8,443	40,236
Electrotechnical	12	83	2,026	208	839
Timber	787	3,457	73,827	5,362	41,656
Food and Aliments	1,004	11,686	126,336	15,312	25,644
Textile	516	5,515	40,421	8,448	35,963
Leather goods	211	1,406	15,117	2,614	7,925
Glassware	35	505	2,500	602	4,218
Building materials ...	296	2,085	32,981	1,573	13,963
Pottery	32	119	683	104	834
Chemical	248	6,131	69,326	11,011	19,238
Paper and Graphic Arts ...	147	2,128	29,971	2,447	10,668

The metallurgical industries have been developed to such an extent that practically all the current implements, from pails and wire to railway locomotives and waggons, as well as agricultural machinery, are locally produced in sufficient quantities for the requirements of the local market.

315 southern slopes of the bend of the Carpathians, where the
382 mountains gradually merge into the plains of Wallachia and Moldavia. About two-thirds of the production is secured from the regions of Moreni and Ochiuri, the basins of the rivers Prahova and Dombovitsa furnishing almost 90 per cent of the total yield. There are minor fields farther east in the neighbourhood of Buzau, and also in Moldavia in the region of Bacau. The main oil refineries are situated at Ploeşti. The capital invested in the oil industry is estimated at 11 milliard lei, 60 per cent of which is Rumanian. The number of workmen employed in the industry is about 30,000. The output of crude oil for the years 1928–30 was:

Year	*Tons*	*Estimated value in lei*
1928	4,282,377	7,345,923,066
1929	4,836,974	7,441,204,190
1930	5,792,311	6,552,118,582

About half of the yield was from oilfields owned by the State. The ratio for 1930 was 3,083,468 tons from State-
[47] owned oilfields, or 53.20 per cent, and 2,708,843 tons, or 46.80 per cent, from privately-owned oilfields. The quantities produced were distributed per region as follows: Prahova, 4,275,721 tons; Dambovița, 1,390,215 tons; Buzau, 61,225 tons; Bacau, 65,150 tons.

Of the total output for 1930, some 1,602,757 tons were consumed locally. At the end of June, 1932, it was reported that the total monthly output had attained about 543,000 tons, the average monthly production of the principal companies being as follows: Astra Romana, 109,464 tons; Steaua Romana, 83,667 tons; Concordia, 78,974 tons; Creditul Minier, 27,760 tons; Romano-Americana, 33,800 tons; Phoenix, 65,286 tons; Prahova, 20,878 tons; and Columbia, 17,564 tons.

315 Prices of petroleum products having dropped to the extent
84 of 75 per cent since 1928, the Rumanian oil industry is pass-
382 ing through an era of grave depression which is causing a very serious repercussion on the whole economic life of the country, taking into account the great amount of capital in-

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

435 ture of Greater Rumania. It illustrates the effects of low agricultural prices and high prices of finished goods upon the position of a predominantly peasant population, which cannot realize an adequate profit from the sale of its produce and is unable to buy manufactured goods. It is important to realize this, as it demonstrates one of the reasons for the inability of the peasants to acquire agricultural machinery and improve their methods of agricultural exploitation.

565 471 THE LAND REFORMS. By the beginning of the twentieth century the position of the Rumanian peasantry had reached a stage which could only be compared with that of Tsarist Russia before the abolition of serfdom. Over half of all the arable land was in the hands of a few thousand *boiars*. Most peasants were landless, some possessed small strips of land which were insufficient for the support of a family. Most peasants were still obliged to work for the landlords without pay, and in addition had to [427] pay taxes and other dues. In order to try and increase their income many peasants rented land from the big landowners. But as the landlord was usually the *boiar* for whom the peasant had to do forced labour and to whom he came in time of need for financial help, he soon found that he had often sold his labour power for years in advance. His indebtedness increased with surprising speed; neither his little strip of land nor, indeed, he himself was anything else than part of the *boiar's* property. The position of the peasantry grew even worse when absentee landlordism increased and great trusts managed the running of the big estates.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

This state of affairs led to the great and bloody peasant revolt of 1907 which was ruthlessly crushed by the Bratianu government with the help of troops commanded by General Averescu. Yet, even after this the rulers of Rumania were unwilling to carry out reforms which were already overdue. Only in 1917, when the position on the Rumanian front seemed completely hopeless and when the Russian Revolution found more and more adherents among the peasant soldiers, did the government of King Ferdinand decide to carry out a thorough land reform. Although this was the most far-reaching of any measures ever carried out in Rumania, it bore all the marks of a step adopted unwillingly, under the pressure of external events. Although the Bratianu government, composed of many big landowners, consented to carry out the land reform, it was violently opposed by many of the government's supporters. The reforms, as finally applied in the early nineteen-twenties in both the Old Kingdom and in the New Territories, differed considerably from the original plans of 1917. They did, however, bring about important changes. Whereas before the Great War half of all the arable land belonged to a few *boiars*, by 1930 about nine-tenths belonged to small holders and only one-tenth to big landowners.

565 471 669 423

In Bessarabia many of the big estates remained untouched; land was given to reliable farmers, Germans and Rumanian colonists, but not to the landless who needed it most. In Transylvania the land reform was used to strengthen the Rumanian as against the Magyar elements of the population. But many of the holdings remained too small to

471 565 423

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1344
ED1 Rumania ED1

565 provide their holders with a fair income, and a con-
471 siderable part of the rural population remained
423 landless. Worst of all, those peasants who did obtain land were given neither implements nor sufficient financial help which could have enabled them to make a decent living. Neither of the measures which are essential to the success of peasant proprietorship —State aid in money, machinery and technical advice; or the creation of large-scale co-operative
[641] societies and banks—were carried out. Undoubtedly the extension of the franchise in 1923 to all men of 21 and the land reforms greatly strengthened the position of the peasantry in the State. But, actually, it was widespread discontent with the working of the agrarian reform that stimulated the organization of the National Peasant Party.

423 CROPS. The great devastation of Rumania during
241 the First World War and the effects of the land reform resulted in a great reduction of the country's agricultural production during the immediate post-
[439] war period.[1] Whereas the Old Kingdom alone in 1913 had grown 2,200,000 tons of wheat, of which 1,150,000 tons were exported, and over 3,100,000 tons of maize, of which 1,000,000 tons were exported, the production figures for Greater Rumania in 1921 were for wheat 2,140,000 tons, and for maize 2,810,000 tons. This great decrease is all the more striking in view of the fact that the amount of arable

[1] In Transylvania and the neighbouring territories, taken from Hungary, some of the great *latifundias* had been well and scientifically worked with modern agricultural machinery. There were some conscientious landowners among the Magyar nobility as well as absentee landlords who neglected their peasantry.

315 in the sixteenth century when the peasants used it as lubricant and medicine and the *boiars* as fuel. In 1815 the British representative in Bucarest drew attention to the oil deposits of Muntenia, and in 1844 the first concession for their exploitation was granted by Prince Bibescu to two Russians. By 1857 the first refinery had been established in Ploesti and in the same year Bucarest became the first town whose streets were lit by oil-lamps. From that time the exploitation of Rumania's oil resources made rapid progress.

The yearly production rose from 50,000 tons in 1890 to 1,885,000 tons in 1913. The destruction of the oil wells by British engineers during the last war retarded the progress of the industry for many years. By the middle of the nineteen-twenties the pre-war record had been exceeded and production reached the record figure of over 8,500,000 tons in 1934. It decreased to about 6,250,000 tons in 1939. The estimate for 1943 was 5,000,000 tons. The export of oil and oil-products was one of the chief sources of the nation's income. The greatest quantity of oil was exported in 1936 (nearly 7,000,000 tons). The average figure was between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 per year.

315 471 Before the Great War a considerable part of Rumania's oil industry was financed and owned by German companies. After the Peace Settlement the position changed in favour of French, American and British interests. By 1938 nine-tenths of all Rumanian oil was controlled by the British 'Royal Dutch Shell' directly or through subsidiary companies. In 1936 the published net profits of the industry amounted to 57%. Half of the 200 million dollars of foreign investments in Rumania was

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

employed in the oil industry. The control of this great source of energy by British and American companies was challenged by Germany, which needed Rumania's oil for the prosecution of her imperialist aims. To-day Rumania is Germany's chief source of natural oil.

INDUSTRY AND TRADE. The industry of the Old Kingdom was hardly developed when, with the annexation of the New Territories, Rumania acquired territories comparatively rich in industrial enterprises, especially the Banat, parts of Transylvania and the Bukovina. Thereby the industrial capacity of Greater Rumania was more than double that of the Old Kingdom. Production, however, was by no means doubled. Trade and industry improved in the years 1925–9 during which considerable capital-imports were effected. The great economic crisis of the next two years hit Rumania very hard and was finally surmounted only in 1936, when the figures for production exceeded those of 1929 by 30%.

The most important Rumanian enterprises were the food, chemical, textile and metallurgical industries. The textile industry increased its output, the number of workers employed as well as the value of its production; but most branches of Rumanian industry increased only the amount and the value of their production, reducing their wage bill and the number of workers partly through the introduction of machinery.

The heavy industry, producing armaments and railway equipment, was controlled by several foreign groups, amongst them Schneider-Creusot, Skoda and Vickers. German capital was invested in the

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

433 Resita works and in the Copsa-Mica concern. The
471 most important Rumanian group, representing both German and British interests, was that of Malaxa-Auschnitt. The centre of Rumania's heavy industry is the region around Brasov.

The chemical industry, drawing to some extent on the unexported surplus of agricultural produce, developed substantially, thanks especially to attempts to make Rumania independent of imports. This industry, too, was controlled to a great extent by foreign, chiefly German, interests.

433 The textile industry, although handicapped by old-fashioned machinery imported from Germany, was the most prosperous. Production and value of output increased, as did the number of employees, but wages decreased.

433 Rumania's total industrial production was
511 doubled in the years 1924–36, but this was not re-
435 flected by a corresponding improvement in trade or in the standard of living. The general index of wholesale prices fell by almost a third and that of agricultural produce by nearly half; the prices of manufactured goods decreased by only a little over one-sixth. By 1933 the value of exports and imports had fallen to about 25,600 million lei and was only one-third of that of all foreign trade in 1926. Real wages in the period from 1929 to 1939 fell by over one-fifth, while the cost of living in 1939 was indexed at 138 points in relation to 100 points in 1933.

652 By 1937 Rumania's national debt had reached 257 million pounds sterling of which only one-fifth was represented by internal loans. Interest on foreign loans in 1932 amounted to about one-quarter of the country's budget and in 1937 to about 16%.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

especially hard hit by this rampant corruption. The 661
moneyed classes, on the other hand, were well satisfied with this state of affairs which guaranteed the continuance of their rule.

The position of the minorities was unenviable. 563
In theory all non-Rumanians had the same rights 641
and duties as the Rumanians. In practice, however, things were very different. The official language was Rumanian and anybody not able to speak Rumanian was handicapped from the beginning when dealing with the authorities. It was very difficult for members of a minority to obtain schooling in their native language, for although there were some Hungarian and German schools they had to be financed by the respective communities and the fees to be paid were high. A public career for a member of a minority was very rare indeed and non-Rumanians had always to expect unfavourable treatment at the hands of the authorities. The Jews, many of whom were denied Rumanian citizenship and had to pay from time to time for the right to live in the country, were worse off than the rest. Often in addition to being persecuted for their origin they could be victimized for having a Hungarian name and speaking German as their native language.

The mass of the Rumanians did not gain by this 661
discrimination ostensibly made in their favour. At 565
best the half-educated sons of peasants could secure some minor position in the State machinery.

The economic life of the country was dominated 471
by all-powerful monopolies. The oil and heavy industries were in the hands of a few foreign and Rumanian shareholders and the enormous profits were divided between a few industrialists, ministers

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

471 of State and foreign concessionaires. State-monopolies, such as the manufacture and sale of explosives, tobacco, etc., were often leased to foreign trusts. Road building, for example, was in the hands of a Swedish company. So was the manufacture of matches sold by the State. The whole telephone system was installed and operated by a subsidiary of the American financial trust of Morgans. Nine-tenths of the oil industry were in British hands, the armaments works of Transylvania were controlled by British, French, Czech and German interests. The newly developed chemical industry of the country soon passed into German hands. As for agriculture, the export of produce was effectively controlled by several banks who were partly or wholly owned by foreign financial houses. During the nineteen-thirties pharmaceutical goods were imported almost exclusively from Germany.

665 565 THE GOVERNMENT. The most powerful of all political parties were the Liberals who were entrenched in influential positions of the administration, the army, finance and industry. Led traditionally by a member of the Bratianu family, whose name at one time was almost synonymous with that of Rumania, the Liberal Party was able to rule the country directly or indirectly up to a very short time ago. Her adherents had very little in common with the Liberals of the West, representing, as they did, the Right Wing of the numerically weak but financially 665 and politically powerful Rumanian bourgeoisie. An 666 electoral law introduced by the Liberal Government in 1926 stipulated that the party which had secured 40% of the votes should obtain 60% of all parlia-

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

forced into these organizations by social and economic pressure. Combatant units, armed and trained, consisted of youths who learned the Nazi doctrine in their schools. Financial assistance came from the German banks in Rumania: they supported the transactions of the 'Association for Export to Germany', which secured a virtual monopoly in the export trade of grain, cattle and pigs to Germany and Italy, as well as the hemp-growing scheme, which met with considerable success in the Banat. 563 668

Similarly the German papers published in Rumania soon passed under Nazi control. Their information was received from news agencies in Germany which also supplied them with commentaries and feature articles. Naturally the Rumanian Fascists were supported by the German-Rumanian Nazis who acted as go-betweens and agents of their masters in the Reich.[1]

The pro-Nazi Germans of Rumania who had always possessed good economic, industrial and financial connexions were able to render valuable assistance in the economic penetration of the country by German trusts. In 1933, for example, the fusion of several chemical firms in the Banat and in Wallachia brought them entirely under German control. That they produced semi-finished material for explosives enhanced their value. The iron and 563 471

[1] The outrages of the Iron Guard, such as the desecration of Jewish synagogues and cemeteries, destruction of Jewish shops, political murder and blackmail, were aided and abetted by the German Nazi agents. A series of fires and bomb-explosions in Timisoara in November 1938, as well as other terrorist acts, were committed by members of the Iron Guard jointly with some German youths who were known to the public but escaped punishment. 648

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

563 steel works of Resita and Copsa Mica, with a capital
• 471 of six million pounds sterling, and many other factories also passed under German control. In the
[439] fight against Franco-British and American capital in Rumania, Germany was favoured by the fact that 50% of Rumania's imports were German, and 36% of the country's exports went to Germany (1938). By 1940 the latter had reached about 70% of the total.

563 This underground activity of the German
668 minority, combined with the pro-Fascist leanings of the majority of the ruling classes, who feared to lose their privileges and were only too glad to join in the Anti-Bolshevik[1] crusade, and the corruption reigning in the army and all branches of the government apparatus, sapped the strength of the country economically, politically and morally. It had become an easy prey for the imperialism of Hitler.

661 [1] Especially savage measures were taken against workers' and intellectuals' progressive organizations, which were made illegal and had to go underground. Their members, if caught, were court-martialled and imprisoned.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

reached the high level of 1935 and 1936,[1] but it has maintained an average of over 5,500,000 tons, of which about 3,000,000 tons have been exported, chiefly to Germany. The rest has been used by the Rumanian armed forces and war industry. As in all other occupied countries, Germany acquired all the Rumanian key industries. The *Kontinentale Oel A.G.* was the holding company for all German oil interests in Rumania. This trust controlled and regulated the output and sale of all Rumanian oil. Rumanian and French investments (by arrangements with the Vichy government) were also represented, but they were of minor importance. One of the effects of German control could be seen in the fact that whole districts, less than a hundred miles from Ploesti, suffered from a chronic shortage of lamp-oil.

All the great iron and steel works of Rumania passed under the control of the Nazi *Hermann Goering Werke*. The well-known German chemical trust *I.G. Farben* absorbed all chemical factories in Rumania and erected new ones. The use of the Rumanian economy in Germany's interests has been coupled with a very thorough financial exploitation. Credits have been granted by the Rumanian National Bank to certain enterprises, under German control, for the import of machinery from Germany. At every stage of manufacture, purchase and sale, export and import, there was a handsome profit which ultimately benefited only a small number of big shareholders, who had interests in each of the enterprises connected with the transaction. Bribes

[1] 1935: 8,376,000 tons; 1936: 8,703,000 tons.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

471 and smaller profits were the reward of Rumanian officials and business men.[1]

511 How far the natural resources of Rumania have suffered under this intensive exploitation will probably become apparent only after the war. Its effects on the people of Rumania, however, can be gauged already. The cost of living in 1941 was three times as high as in 1934, and in January 1943 it was reported to be 50% higher than one year before. These are official Rumanian figures, based on maximum prices and maximum wages which are 511 only fictitious. In fact many goods, although 465 rationed could be obtained only on the black market and at phenomenal prices. The general inflation led to a levelling-up of wages, but wages remained far behind prices. The workers, therefore, were worse off than before, although, theoretically, they obtained improved wages A Swiss report in August 1943 showed that the monthly earnings of

457 [1] In January 1944 the Rumanian Government, according to a German paper published in Rumania, 'decided to put at the disposal of the Ministry of Finance a credit of three milliard lei for a new campaign for the modernisation of petroleum installations in Rumania. The Rumanian National Bank has granted a loan of one hundred million Reichsmarks to a number of oil companies for the same purpose. This sum will be used for the import of machinery from Germany... these companies have also been put in charge of the supply of the capital with natural gas'. At about the same time one of the mouthpieces of the Nazi war economy declared quite frankly: 'The practical purpose of the Rumanian export trade policy is to ensure an adequate supply of raw materials for the home industry. In order to stimulate import the concerns in question were permitted... to open up new industries in foreign countries for the purpose of supplying raw materials and half finished goods to the vitally necessary war industries in Rumania.

648
439

In 1940 an economic agreement was signed between the two countries, by which in exchange for raw materials a ten-year plan for the development of Rumanian economy was formed. Germany agreed to the following main conditions —

(1) The granting of extensive long-term credits.

(2) The supply of tools and machines for agricultural development.

(3) The provision of technical and financial aid for industry.

(4) The provision of extensive supplies for the development of the transport system.

(5) To put technical experts at Rumania's disposal.

(6) To make capital available for the development of industry and the banking system.

457
471

Germany has exploited Rumania's dependence on her to the full by providing the minimum of goods, so that she owes her an ever-increasing sum in the clearing. German financial interests have gained tremendous impetus since the removal of British and American competition, together with the acquisition of the actual interests of occupied countries, such as France, Holland, and Czechoslovakia. To cite the most important example, in the oil industry German capital has increased from 0.5 per cent. of total investments in 1939 to about 38 per cent. in 1942, while in the heavy industry the Hermann Goeringwerke have achieved a footing in the main engineering firms of Resita and Malaxa, as well as in the aircraft industry and in the shipbuilding yards at Galati. The motor-vehicle assembly industry is almost entirely in the hands of the German companies, and German capital is to be found in the banks, in the timber and textile industries, in a number of transport and trading companies, and behind the attempted expansion of the mineral resources.

ITALIAN PENETRATION

There is also some considerable Italian financial penetration in Rumanian industry, though on nothing like the same scale as German; it is mainly confined to the oil, building, timber and textile industries and to various cereal export companies.

[4c]

A. PRE-WAR CONDITIONS

1. General

241 Agriculture occupies about 80 per cent. of the population of Rumania and contributes the greater part of the national income, but owing to the importance of the country's mineral-oil production, exports of agricultural products accounted for rather less than half of total exports by value, in the immediate pre-war years. [439]

Total agricultural production, even if there were no exports, would fall seriously short of the real food needs of the country. The poorest are actually underfed, while the majority of the remainder subsist on a diet which, though adequate in quantity, is seriously deficient in quality and nutritional elements. [146]

In her farming Rumania suffers from two interrelated difficulties: rural over-population and low food output per acre. There are 16 agricultural workers per 100 acres of farm land, compared with 6 in Denmark and 3 in Britain. Another aspect of this is the extremely small size of most of the farms—75 per cent. of them are less than 5 hectares (12 acres) in extent. Because there is not enough land to go round, most farming families have to eke out a living on holdings which, under any system of general farming would be too small to provide an adequate income. [161]

The position would be less serious if a high per-acre food output were achieved. But in fact the Rumanian output per acre is barely one-quarter of that obtained in countries like Belgium and the Netherlands. Rumania pivots her farming on wheat and maize production but, owing to the extensive methods practised, the few livestock kept, and other reasons, per acre yields are among the lowest in Europe.

It is the over-population and land shortage which are largely responsible for agriculture remaining so backward. Having insufficient land the peasant does not produce much for sale, and so cannot afford to purchase fertilisers, good quality seed or better implements. Nor can he spare many acres for fodder crops, since the bulk of his land is needed to grow the food his family eats. And as he cannot buy fodder, he cannot keep many animals. Thus, while there is some scope for agricultural improvements which would ameliorate the peasants' lot, the pre-requisite of farming progress is to find alternative occupations for the surplus population.

423 The system of land tenure is peasant proprietorship. This was attained under the Land Reform ●471 carried through after the first World War. The effect of this was to divide up and transfer to peasant ownership a large area of land formerly worked in big estates. This revolution in land tenure provided a solution for a long-standing social problem, but its effects on production were unfavourable. The large estates had been run by trained managers, with relatively advanced methods and equipment. Their transfer to ill-equipped, backward and uneducated peasants was followed, for a time at least, by a decline in yields, and consequently in total production and exports.

241 Little progress was made in the period between the two wars in remedying the disadvantages of uneconomic farm sizes, and in raising the low standards of farming. For lack of education the

241 the peasants and the reduced 1942 sowings both
656 of grain and of sugar-beet indicated continued
435 dissatisfaction. Finally, by the spring of 1943 a wiser ratio was reached, agricultural prices being four times as high as in 1939 and wholesale prices in general three and a half times as high. Nevertheless, this very considerable measure of inflation
[453] has shaken public confidence in the value of money so that peasants increasingly resort to barter transactions.

[655] In the hope of obtaining better control over grain supplies the Government in the autumn of 1941 nationalised the grain trade; later they relaxed this to the extent of leaving the export business to a few selected firms and the internal collection to the Army and to the National Institute of Co-operation. This body handled the pre-war grain marketing scheme, and their
[563] activities—because of the expulsion of Jews from wholesale and retail trade—have recently developed rapidly in the supply of seeds to peasants (80,000 tons of seed distributed in 1942) as well as consumers' goods to peasants and townspeople. But it still proved difficult to extract enough food from the peasants to feed the towns. For the 1943 harvest detailed regulations were made concerning the quantities the peasant might keep for seed, for his family and for his animals, and threshing operations were subjected to inspection. Yet these rules could not in practice be administered.

423 It is now generally agreed in Rumania that the
471 smallness of the holdings has been a principal obstacle to effective organisation of agriculture in war-time, and that a change to larger units of production is needed. Any approach to collectivisation on the Soviet model, however, would be regarded as contradictory to the land reform policy and a threat to the Rumanian State. The official policy, though it has not yet taken its final form, is to maintain private property but to proceed no further with expropriation and division of large estates, and to maintain existing medium holdings by prohibiting their sub-division for inheritance or other reasons. Schemes for the consolidation of strips are also contemplated for a more opportune moment. Further, in order to
474 increase production and to improve the peasants' methods and standards of life, communal farming associations, known as *obştii*, are to be formed. In these associations farming equipment is to be pooled so that the small-holder would have the same resources as the large farmer. Each *obştie* is to embrace a village and perform all the functions of a co-operative, including joint purchase and sale, use of breeding animals, processing of crops, etc. Villages which are prepared to form themselves into *obştii* and to undertake to work the land according to State directions, are promised tractors, seed and breeding stock without payment. In this way it is hoped that some of the advantages of collectivisation may be achieved while retaining those of individual ownership. But, unless accompanied by far-reaching industrial development, the plan can but aggravate rural unemployment. It is not known how this innovation has been received by the peasants. It was reported in April 1943 that 270 of these communal associations had been formed—an insignificant number—and it is believed that the Government is allocating to them some of the tractors imported from Germany in the war years.*

241 The success of the *obştii* plan, and indeed of any plan for up-grading Rumanian agriculture, depends

* In June, 1943 a temporary ban was placed on the formation of any new *obştie*, because there was insufficient agricultural machinery to supply to them.

[10b]

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

sentative of all democratic elements of the population." Later, 648
at the Moscow Conference, the Western powers declared that 642
they would believe such a government existed as soon as representatives of two political parties other than the Rumanian 666
Workers' Party had been named to ministerial posts, and as soon as satisfactory guarantees had been given that freedom of speech and assembly as well as the right to vote without constraint had been assured. Dr. Groza complied by appointing the two desired ministers to the Cabinet without portfolio and by announcing that free elections would be held soon; but, as was to be anticipated in view of the fact that the Russian Army held the country in an iron grip, the Rumanian Workers' Party received 90-odd per cent of the vote. The ministers without portfolio promptly resigned, and there was nothing the Western powers could do about it save to register an emphatic protest. This they did in language suitably designed for the occasion.

The elections referred to were held on November 19, 1946. [687]
Almost precisely a year later the leader of the principal opposition party, Dr. Juliu Maniu, was sentenced to life imprisonment for high treason. Unquestionably this able and farsighted man, who had served the government and the people of Rumania well over many years and had been identified with every movement for reform and justice, was the foremost of the nation's citizens. King Michael abdicated on December 30 of [642]
the same year and fled from his native land. Thereupon the "People's Republic" was proclaimed, and every source of potential opposition to it was ferreted out and suppressed. A Constitution of the usual kind was adopted on April 13, 1948.
Now no obstacle barred the way for putting the Soviet paradise [471]
plan into effect. The principal productive enterprises were declared the property of the State, and this likewise became the sole arbiter of the educational system. Collective farming was introduced. A novelty was that new elections were held during

315 Two additional pipelines, each of 10 in. diameter, constructed largely of material removed from France, have been built between Ploesti and Giurgiu, each with a capacity of over three quarters of a million tons a year.

New refinery and drilling equipment, which prior to the war Rumania used to import largely from the United States, has now to be obtained from Germany. The financial terms on which this equipment is obtained are unfavourable to Rumania and deliveries are slow.

2. German Influence on the Oil Industry

315 German pressure upon Rumania to obtain
648 greater supplies of oil has been largely exerted by means of commercial penetration into the oil
473 industry, but there is evidence that Nazi diplomats have laid particular emphasis on the German need for oil, suggesting that larger supplies might be available if production was increased and internal consumption reduced.

German penetration into the Rumanian oil industry began to take aggressive form some time before the war. The Germans first acquired a minority holding in Creditul Minier, then in 1939 secured control of Petrol-Block. The collapse of France afforded further opportunities of encroachment, and through Kontinental Oel A.G. control of Concordia and Colombia was secured; similarly, by assuming arbitrary control of Dutch interests the Germans now direct the policy of Astra-Română, the largest of the producing companies. In all, German influence through financial control now extends to about 50 per cent. of the industry, and 60 per cent. of productive capacity, quite apart from the pressure the Germans can exert through control of transport out of the country. The actual effect of this influence is not easily assessed, modified as it is by Rumania's nationalistic oil legislation—particular privileges are reserved under the new mining laws for companies which can show that 75 per cent. of their capital is in Rumanian hands—and the instinctive aversion of the Government to outside control. It is, however, sufficient to ensure that German requirements have a definite priority, and nationalistic as some parts of the new mining law may be, any measures serving to increase immediate production, under whatever pretext they are taken, are beneficial to Germany's interests. Tables I and II on pages 15 and 16 show the approximate strength of the oil groups by nationalities in 1940 and 1942.

3. War-time Restrictions

315 Nearly 70 per cent. of Rumanian petroleum
135 consumption is represented by fuel oil, and a theoretical saving could be brought about by the use of coal and natural gas. Coal resources, however, are limited, and in any event a greatly increased use of coal is restricted also by the speed at which locomotives and power plants can be converted from oil to coal burning.

315 In November 1942 a petrol-rationing scheme
434 was introduced, and although the allowances were on a liberal scale, the regulations do not appear to have been observed and the scheme as a whole was ineffective. In March 1943 this was admitted by the announcement that the scheme would be more strictly enforced and new ration cards issued. Simultaneously regulations were published concerning the use of taxis, and a time limit of September 1943 was set for the conversion of boiler plant.

In general, attempts to restrict consumption either by the announcement of new regulations

[Cf. Cat. 315, pp. 15c and 16a - Analyst]

[14b]

315
●473
439

TABLE III

PRINCIPAL RUMANIAN OIL COMPANIES, 1942

Name	Founded	Capital (mill. lei)	1940 Crude Production (tons)	Controlling interest
Astra Română	1910	2,542	1,173,256	Royal Dutch Shell
Concordia	1907	2,030	793,026	Kontinental Oel A.G.
Româno-Americana	1904	1,500	727,345	Standard Oil of New Jersey
Steaua Română	1895	1,500	640,920	French, Rumanian, British
Unirea	1921	720	652,000	General Mining Corporation
Columbia	1905	380	585,193	Kontinental Oel A.G.
Creditul Minier	1919	605	292,166	Rumanian
Prahova	1920	330	271,947	A.G.I.P. (Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli)
I.R.D.P. (Industria Romana de Petrol)	1920	120	117,925	Sudostchemie Hand A.G. German
Petrolul Românesc	1920	120	83,377	Creditul Minier, Rumanian
Starnaphtha	1926	60	55,530	French
Foraj Lemoine	1923	44	42,658	Rumanian, Franco-Belgian
Redevenţa	1918	300	28,474	Rumanian
Foraky Româneasca	1922	50	25,958	German
Sondrum	1921	100	17,982	French
Petrol Block	1918	470	—	German (refining company)

382
473

TABLE IV

PRINCIPAL RUMANIAN REFINERIES

Name	Location	Annual Capacity (tons)	Cracking Capacity (tons)
Astra Română	Ploeşti	1,750,000	600,000
Steaua Română	Câmpina	1,500,000	350,000
Concordia	Ploeşti	1,300,000	200,000
Română-Americano	Ploeşti	1,100,000	350,000
Phoenix Unirea Orion	Ploeşti	800,000	150,000
Standard Petrol Block	Ploeşti	550,000	150,000
Creditul Minier	Brazi	530,000	150,000
Colombia	Ploeşti	485,000	260,000
Unirea Speranţa	Ploeşti	400,000	—
Redevenţa	Ploeşti	230,000	—
Prahova	Bucarest	200,000	—
Lumina (Petrolinina)	Ploeşti	140,000	—
Nons	Ploeşti	50,000	—

CHAPTER IV

327 compared with the following annual pre-war figures

Year	'000 tons
1936	225
1937	241
1938	326
1939	385

4. Iron and Steel Consumption

The limited native iron and steel production, which was never sufficient to keep the consuming industries fully supplied, became an increasing impediment with the rapid development of these industries during the last few years. Iron and steel products had therefore to be imported at the rate of 2,300,000 tons a year. The outbreak of war in Europe, and consequent restriction of supplies meant a falling off of imports, so that an acute shortage developed. [439] During 1942, however, the situation improved somewhat in that Germany was reported to have sent a total of 130,000 tons of iron and steel products to Rumania.

5. German Penetration

327 A small degree of penetration into the Rumanian iron and steel industry has been achieved 439 by the Hermann Göring Werke, which, after the partition of Czechoslovakia, acquired Czech interests in Reşiţa amounting to 6 per cent., which 473 were later increased to 20 per cent.

In 1941 a company with 50 per cent. German and the remainder Rumanian capital, was formed to take over the management of Reşiţa and its associated companies. The Malaxa Works later also came under the organisation of this company.

C. LEAD AND ZINC

1. General

328 In pre-war years Rumania was practically 439 self-sufficient in lead but not in zinc, since she possessed no zinc-smelting facilities. Her production of zinc concentrates was exported, mainly to Poland, part of the metal content being re-imported after smelting. Belgium and Poland were her chief suppliers of metallic zinc.

2. Mines and Plant

316 The mining of lead and zinc constituted only a small industry in Rumania. Part of the production, almost 50 per cent. in the case of lead, was obtained incidentally to the working of gold and silver ores. The principal producers were [655] the State-owned mines Baia Sprie, Capnic, Văratec, Valea Roşie, Dealul Crucii, and the Herja mine owned by Phœnix S.A., all are situated in the Baia Mare district in North Transylvania. The Herja ores averaged approximately 8 per cent. lead and 14 per cent. zinc, whilst ores from the other mines averaged only 4 per cent. lead and 10 per cent. zinc.

135 There are other deposits in the Transylvanian Erzgebirge, where galena and blende are associated with gold occurrences, in the Hunedoara, Banat, and Severin districts, and at Cârlibaba in the Bucovina.

328 Rumania possessed two lead smelters for the treatment of her production of concentrates: the Phœnix plant at Lucaci, with a capacity for about 5,000 tons of crude lead and 3,000 tons of refined lead, and a plant at Feriza belonging to Uzinele Metallurgica din Firiza de Jos. There

[22a]

113, 423, 474 Rumania EDl

[For information pertaining cooperative farms and collectivization, see 5: Free Europe Committee, El Europe, category 116, pp. 65, 68-71. -- Analyst]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

656 rise to the charge that the National Peasants really represented the
665 richer peasants and the village bourgeoisie.[48]

671 A similar attitude appears in the other principal agrarian measures of the National Peasants; the law for the organization of cooperation, of March 28, 1929, and the law for the organization of rural mortgages and agricultural credit of July 29, 1929. These laws were acclaimed at the time as proof of the government's concern for the peasant, but they need not be considered in great detail here.[49] Laws for credit and cooperation are hardy perennials in Rumanian legislative history, but none of them appears to have accomplished much. These particular laws were quickly blighted by the onset of the depression.

●474 The law for the organization of cooperation abrogated the act passed by the Liberal government in July, 1928, which the National Peasants thought gave the state too much control over the cooperative movement. The new code was designed to broaden the legal frame "to offer the cooperatives the freedom of movement which every economic enterprise needs if it is to develop in the present economic world."[50] Notwithstanding this effort to assure greater autonomy and independence, a foreign observer concluded in 1930 that even the new regime had not abandoned the idea that the cooperatives were a government maid of all work.[51] The real difficulty, as has been mentioned before, was that the poor peasant, that is, the average Rumanian, had very little to offer in a cooperative movement. Until the level of the peasantry was raised above the margin of subsistence, the cooperative movement was bound to be a name rather than a reality and to be altogether dependent upon the state for financial support and direction.

452 The law for the organization of rural mortgages and agricultural credit was intended to improve the channels supplying credit to agriculture, which had been seriously undernourished during the Liberal

48. This charge is given some weight when one considers Madgearu's remark, made in 1930: "With farms of medium size, limited to 25 hectares, the agricultural credit granted will be used in a more economical way and will bear fruit in a degree hitherto unknown in our agrarian organization." *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 11. In a country where 75 per cent of all agricultural holdings were under 5 hectares, and 92 per cent under 10 hectares, reference to farms of medium size could have only an extremely limited application.

49. Analyses of the law for the organization of cooperatives may be found in Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, pp. 409–411, and in F. E. Manoliou, *La Réconstruction économique et financière de la Roumanie et les partis politiques*, pp. 236–237, and of the law for the reorganization of agricultural credit in Manoliou, pp. 239–243.

50. From the exposé de motifs, cited in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 409.

51. "Rumania: The State as Co-operator," *Yearbook of Agricultural Co-operation, 1930*, pp. 404–428.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

423 tasks. The first was to restrict the kulaks and dislodge them from
565 their position. Then it would be possible "when conditions are ripe,
661 to pass over to the policy of the complete liquidation of the kulaks."[36] He anticipated, of course, that the kulaks would resort to underground struggle, sabotage, and criminal acts in an effort to avert their approaching fate.

185 The second task was to undertake propaganda convincing the poor
241 and middle peasants of the need to unite in collective farms. When that task had been achieved, when all the land belonged to the collectives in perpetuity, the goal of making the land public property and bringing about the socialist transformation of the countryside would be reached. Gheorghiu-Dej emphasized, however, the necessity of making this transition gradually, by means of persuasion, and with the voluntary support of the peasant. The poor peasants should not be driven into collectives, the middle peasant should not be identified with the kulak, and the whole process must be paced by the development of agricultural machinery, machine tractor stations, and the expansion of the network of consumer and producer cooperatives as broad mass movements.[37] These words of caution presumably reflect the wisdom gained from the Soviet experiment in collectivization.

Gheorghiu-Dej concluded his remarks with the inevitable "self-criticism": in the past the party had not provided a clear political line for work in the countryside and had failed to popularize the notion of uniting the working peasantry into collective farms, and had even ignored or denied this goal.[38] That these so-called errors were the fault of the Rumanian Communists is, of course, nonsense. The party line, emanating from Moscow, had shifted, and in this instance a strong case can be made that the change had been planned long in advance. The Communists could have had no intention of stopping at the stage of small peasant cultivation which had, in any event, reached a cul-de-sac in Rumania.

● 474 The creation of collective farms got under way in 1949, and by the end of the year, according to the glowing account of a Russian visitor, 56 *kolkhozi* comprising 4,000 peasant families had been estab-

36. As in Russia representatives of the restricted and soon to be liquidated kulak class are not to be admitted to the collective farms.

37. The cooperatives, however, must rid themselves of capitalist elements, must intensify their collaboration with the state trading organs, and must promote the spirit of "socialist emulation" among the peasants.

38. G. Gheorghiu-Dej, "Tasks of the Rumanian Workers Party in the Struggle for the Socialist Reorganization of the Countryside," *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy* (Bucarest, March 15, 1949).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

lished; in addition, 55,000 households had joined producer cooperatives.[39] By the official account these collectives, which took on such spontaneously peasant names as the Red Tractor, the Red Field, the Victory of Socialism, and the New Way were organized through the voluntary action of the peasants. 474

Take, for example, the collective farm, "1907," set up in August, 1949, in the commune of Căldăraşti, Judeţ Buzău, as described by the enthusiastic reporter of the Communist paper, *România Liberă*.[40] Thirty-seven families had united their land, livestock, and equipment and had received the government's permission to establish a collective. The peasants brought with them 13 carts, 7 horses, 7 oxen, 6 ploughs, and 3 harrows. On the day of its inauguration the collective received from the state one tractor, 2 tractor-drawn ploughs, one threshing machine, one electric generator, 6 iron ploughs, one seeder, 74 hoes, and 107 pitchforks. It also received advice on an agricultural plan from the provisional judeţ committee. The collective possessed 151 hectares of land, of which 88 had previously belonged to the peasants, the remainder coming from the state. Six hectares were to be distributed among the peasant households for garden plots, most of the rest were to be devoted to a three-year rotation schedule of mixed crops. Such, in the prospectus at least, was the promising new life awaiting the multitude of poor peasants who would now leave behind them the undeniable poverty and squalor of their earlier small-holder existence.

It is too early to say what relation this promise is likely to bear to future reality in the Rumanian countryside. Public information from Rumania is so scanty and unreliable that one cannot ascertain how the peasants are reacting to this new departure. In principle, at least, collectivization is supposed to be wholly voluntary and there is to be no bullying of the middle peasants. But since the return to the peasant is to be based upon work performed rather than upon the amount of land he contributed, it is difficult to see what incentive the middle peasant will have for joining a collective unless its aggregate output is exceptionally high. There have been reports, moreover, of armed peasant resistance, especially in the Banat, a region of comparatively large and prosperous farms.

It is also too soon to tell what effect collectivization will have upon the level of agricultural output, peasant income, and the whole of the economy. As has been stressed throughout this study, something

39. I. Rukhadze, "Rumanian Village Yesterday and Today," *New Times*, No. 3 (1950), p. 27.

40. *România Liberă*, August 11, 1949.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

474 unquestionably had to be done to pull Rumanian agriculture out of its ever-deepening rut; many of the criticisms raised by the Communists against the earlier order are largely valid. The attempt to create a prosperous small holder, specializing in intensive cultivation, made little headway between the wars. The richer peasant seems to have been gaining at the expense of the submerged mass of marginal producers, though he was not as wealthy nor nearly as responsible for the poor peasants' plight as Communist propaganda has made out. So long as cereals were to be the major crop, cultivation on a scale large enough to permit the amalgamation of strips and the use of mechanized equipment seemed to be called for. In brief, given the political impossibility and undesirability of returning to the old privately owned great estates and the failure of small-holding to prosper, some type of cooperative or collective agriculture would appear to be at least a partial answer to the agrarian problem.

Beyond this, however, one is inevitably faced with the Soviet example: the kolkhozi are now the inspiration of the Rumanian planners and probably provide the best clue, if one could interpret it, to the future of the Rumanian peasant. Here, of course, certain doubts present themselves. On the dark side of the picture stand the vast misery occasioned by the tempestuous collectivization of the first five-year plan, the widespread peasant resistance leading to the catastrophic destruction of livestock, the forcible uprooting not only of kulaks but of many smaller peasants, and the obvious fact that the step was taken not for the immediate benefit of the peasant but to increase and assure deliveries of grain for the towns and for export and to check any resurgence of capitalism in the countryside. It might be said that many of these hardships need not be repeated in the Rumanian case, that the transformation now can be more gradual and less jolting, and that increased grain deliveries would be more than matched by the greater efficiency of mechanized agriculture, by the removal of excess population to the rapidly industrializing towns, and ultimately by the vastly higher productivity of an industrial economy.

Unhappily, the evidence is by no means clear that such has been the result in the Soviet Union, at least to the present. The surplus which was obtained seems to have been at the direct expense of the peasant, since agricultural productivity did not increase to the degree anticipated (especially when the costs of the new agricultural machinery are deducted); peasant income ten years after collectivization was still lower than before. The task of sifting out what was exceptional and temporary in the Soviet experience and what was a

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

natural concomitant and hence relevant for an estimate of the Rumanian future is exceptionally difficult; at the present state of our knowledge of Soviet agriculture it would be hazardous to base any Rumanian prediction upon it.[41]

In a curious way, however, this issue resembles the pre-1914 dispute in Rumania between the proponents of estate and peasant farming, and in certain respects the wheel has turned full circle. The collective farmer, with his own tiny personal plot, working on the great farm, delivering what amounts to payments in kind and performing a set number of work days, is obviously reminiscent of his grandfather under neoserfdom, with, of course, a different master and the promise contained in, if not yet realized by, the power of the tractor. Somehow, through all the changes the past century has witnessed, an apparently distinctive eastern European pattern is reasserting itself.

Both the nationalization of industry and the move toward collective agriculture are to be understood within the context of an over-all planned economy, not only for one nation but for all the eastern European satellite states. In the field of planning Rumania lagged a bit behind its neighbors, perhaps because of difficulty in creating an adequate and reliable administrative staff, but is now proceeding along the same path.

In general, after putting through a land reform and obtaining control of the industrial sector of the economy, all these states have inaugurated short-term plans of one or two years to restore their economies from the devastation wrought by the war and to pave the way for the next stage, long-term development programs. The primary aim of all the plans is, naturally, increased industrialization; agricultural development takes second place. In the view of a United Nations study, the plans "appear to aim at the development of more or less self-contained industrial economies in order to minimize their dependence on trade with the outside world. . . . The similarity in the investment pattern in the various countries suggests that the industrial plans were drawn up individually, on a national basis."[42] This presumed element of individuality is rather surprising in view

41. Favorable interpretations of the success of Soviet collectivization may be found in Alexander Baykov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (New York, 1946), and Maurice H. Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development since 1917* (London and New York, 1948). A quite pessimistic view, based on an extensive criticism of Soviet statistics, is given in Naum Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR* (Stanford University Press, 1949).

42. United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*, p. 202.

241 Dry farming is practised to some extent, but is capable of
312 development in the districts of semi-steppe.

CO-OPERATION.

476 ALTHOUGH it is not by any means reduced to a science, as in Belgium and Denmark, for example, co-operation is practised by the Roumanian peasant farmer to an important extent. In Transylvania and Bessarabia, the system has for long been well established, owing to the initiative and encouragement of village priests and schoolmasters. For example, there are community herds of water buffaloes, which tend
● 474 to prevent deterioration of the breed. The forest industry is in the main run by co-operative societies which control the felling, local distribution and marketing of timber.

IN 1931 there were 5,200 popular co-operative banks, with over 1,150,000 members; 236 forest co-operative societies, with about 341,600 members; 1,600 consumption and supply co-operative societies, with 236,000 members; besides a number of village buying and leasing associations.

241 MUCH has been done, and efforts are continuing by propaganda and instruction, to encourage more up-to-date methods among the peasant farmers and there are a number of schools for primary instruction in agricultural method. Modern farm machinery is loaned by the Ministry of Agriculture to peasants for small fees, stud farms have been established to improve the breed of horses and cattle, and funds have been loaned to the peasant communities for the purchase of stud animals.

INDUSTRY.

135 FROM the point of view of power and raw materials for the development of industry, Roumania is also well endowed by nature. True, her supply of coal is negligible, the only deposit worth mention being that of the brown coal basin of Jiul at Lupeni in Oltenia, which is capable of producing about two million tons per annum. (The output in 1933 was in the neighbourhood of 1.4 million metric tons.) It contains much sulphur but is used to some extent in iron smelting. On the other hand, there are very rich stores of mineral oil. The oil-bearing rocks occur in abundance along the outer rim of the Carpathians in lower Miocene deposits which are

241 peasant views with suspicion and often hostility all attempts at improvements in traditional
[474] methods. Even the co-operative societies have made less progress than in other Danubian countries. There is need for considerable capital expenditure in grouping small farms into larger units, in providing better buildings, more implements and fertilisers. There is need for diversification of production—more fodder crops and more animal husbandry. Above all, there is need for development in industry and commerce to provide work for the surplus agricultural population.

2. Natural Conditions and Regions

132 The climate is of the extreme Continental type, with long hot summers and severe winters. Precipitation is largely concentrated in winter and early summer. During the greater part of the growing and ripening season rains are light, and from time to time serious droughts occur which may ruin the grain crops.

133 The agricultural regions correspond to the natural divisions into plain and hill country—the
311 Danube plain and Bessarabia which comprise the greater part of the territory and produce the bulk of the crops, and the hilly and mountainous land of Transylvania and the Bucovina.

The plain is well-suited for agriculture, the soil over much of it being of the fertile *chernozem* or
[134] black earth type, but the backward methods of farming and the light rainfall keep yields per acre low.

This region is not equally backward in all parts. The Rumanian Banat at the western end of the country, and formerly part of Hungary, is more prosperous and progressive. The population is
[162] not purely Rumanian but includes Swabians and Saxons, descendants of the German stock systematically settled there on medium-sized peasant holdings in the eighteenth century after the cession of the territory to Austria by the Turks. Methods and yields, by Rumanian standards, are good.
[231] The livestock density is higher than the average and the area produces a substantial surplus of pigs. Rural overcrowding is not as marked as elsewhere.

241 Conditions of life and methods of farming are considerably worse in the plain land of the Old
133 Kingdom. Agriculture here is as primitive as in any part of Eastern Europe, depending on an unbroken alternation of wheat and maize cultivation with little subsidiary production. Some wheat is marketed, but the maize is grown largely
[311] for consumption on the farms. So little land is available per head of population that the farm population and working animals (which eat the maize stalks) can be fed only by devoting an excessive acreage to maize.

Bessarabia makes up the remainder of the plain land; conditions of settlement and farming methods are much the same as in the Old Kingdom, but the density of population is lower and there are substantial grain exports.

Given normal yields, every district of the plain area is at least self-sufficient in foodstuffs; indeed parts of it regularly produce large grain surpluses. Transitional areas between the Danube Valley and the Transylvanian plateau, such as the Carpatho-Moldavia and Carpatho-Muntenia areas, may,

[6c]

CHAPTER 1

228 in private waters. Supplemented by some 4,000 tons of imported fish, this provided nearly 1 kg. (2·2 lb.) per head of population, but, in fact, almost all the fish was consumed by the 5 million persons living in towns. The principal fish caught were sturgeon, carp, pike, eels and crayfish, the main fishing centres being Brăila, Tulcea and Ismail.

6. Food Industries

256 The chief food and agricultural-processing industries are milling, sugar manufacture, oilseed crushing and tobacco curing. While the milling industry was dispersed widely about the country in more than 15,000 small mills employing altogether over 37,000 persons (at 1930 census), the sugar industry was for the most part concentrated in the plain of the Old Kingdom. Of the 17 sugar 257 factories employing 10,000 workers, only one was in the Transylvanian districts lost to Hungary, and five in the areas temporarily lost to the U.S.S.R. The vegetable-oil industry, located chiefly in 258 Bessarabia, was only partly carried on in factories of which there were (on January 1st, 1930) 117 employing 2,020 workers. Among these, 34 were fitted both to extract crude oil and to refine it, six were exclusively refineries, while the remainder produced only crude oil. The rest of the industry consisted of some 2,000 hand, or animal-driven presses mostly owned by individual peasants or by shopkeepers. These primitive presses extracted only a low percentage of oil from the seeds, and consequently the cake—mainly sold for export—had an unusually high oil content. As regards 277 tobacco, both curing and cigarette manufacture [656] were subject to government licence and control. There were 29 factories (in 1930) employing 9,720 workers, but tobacco cultivation subsequently declined, so also doubtless did the numbers employed.

7. Agricultural Organisation

452 The history of the organisation of Rumanian 241 farmers is one of not too successful co-operatives 474 becoming transformed more and more into agencies for the execution of Government Control Schemes. [654] For many years there had been throughout the country a network of agricultural credit societies, co-operative in form but in practice directed by the State. These played an important rôle during the period of the Land Reform in helping the peasants by advances to buy and equip their newly acquired holdings. There was even some co-operative cultivation for a time, until the new peasant-owners could muster sufficient draught animals and implements. Besides this, there have been strong local co-operative unions especially among the [162] minority nationalities—the Hungarians in Transylvania, the Swabian and Saxons in the Banat and the Russian and Polish Jews in the Bucovina.

243 The credit societies revived in importance when 474 after 1933, the Rumanian Government began to 452 organisation of grain marketing. They became 654 the local agents of a Central Marketing Board through which all sales of grain had to be made both for home consumption and for export. Whereas formerly grain prices slumped immediately after the harvest, most peasants, being obliged to sell their grain quickly, under the new scheme prices were stabilised throughout the year, and this brought a great improvement to peasants' [651] receipts. But the scheme and the societies were also used to collect the peasants' taxes (paid in grain) which did not increase the popularity of co-operation.

241 the peasants and the reduced 1942 sowings both
656 of grain and of sugar-beet indicated continued
435 dissatisfaction. Finally, by the spring of 1943 a wiser ratio was reached, agricultural prices being four times as high as in 1939 and wholesale prices in general three and a half times as high. Nevertheless, this very considerable measure of inflation
[453] has shaken public confidence in the value of money so that peasants increasingly resort to barter transactions.

[655] In the hope of obtaining better control over grain supplies the Government in the autumn of 1941 nationalised the grain trade, later they relaxed this to the extent of leaving the export business to a few selected firms and the internal collection to the Army and to the National Institute of Co-operation. This body handled the pre-war grain marketing scheme, and their
[563] activities—because of the expulsion of Jews from wholesale and retail trade—have recently developed rapidly in the supply of seeds to peasants (80,000 tons of seed distributed in 1942) as well as consumers' goods to peasants and townspeople. But it still proved difficult to extract enough food from the peasants to feed the towns. For the 1943 harvest detailed regulations were made concerning the quantities the peasant might keep for seed, for his family and for his animals, and threshing operations were subjected to inspection. Yet these rules could not in practice be administered.

423 It is now generally agreed in Rumania that the
471 smallness of the holdings has been a principal obstacle to effective organisation of agriculture in war-time, and that a change to larger units of production is needed. Any approach to collectivisation on the Soviet model, however, would be regarded as contradictory to the land reform policy and a threat to the Rumanian State. The official policy, though it has not yet taken its final form, is to maintain private property but to proceed no further with expropriation and division of large estates, and to maintain existing medium holdings by prohibiting their sub-division for inheritance or other reasons. Schemes for the consolidation of strips are also contemplated for a more opportune moment. Further, in order to
●474 increase production and to improve the peasants' methods and standards of life, communal farming associations, known as *obştie*, are to be formed. In these associations farming equipment is to be pooled so that the small-holder would have the same resources as the large farmer. Each *obştie* is to embrace a village and perform all the functions of a co-operative, including joint purchase and sale, use of breeding animals, processing of crops, etc. Villages which are prepared to form themselves into *obştii* and to undertake to work the land according to State directions, are promised tractors, seed and breeding stock without payment. In this way it is hoped that some of the advantages of collectivisation may be achieved while retaining those of individual ownership. But, unless accompanied by far-reaching industrial development, the plan can but aggravate rural unemployment. It is not known how this innovation has been received by the peasants. It was reported in April 1943 that 270 of these communal associations had been formed—an insignificant number—and it is believed that the Government is allocating to them some of the tractors imported from Germany in the war years.*

241 The success of the *obştie* plan, and indeed of any plan for up-grading Rumanian agriculture, depends

* In June, 1943, a temporary ban was placed on the formation of any new *obştie*, because there was insufficient agricultural machinery to supply to them.

[106]

241 Dry farming is practised to some extent, but is capable of
312 development in the districts of semi-steppe.

CO-OPERATION.

476 ALTHOUGH it is not by any means reduced to a science, as in Belgium and Denmark, for example, co-operation is practised by the Roumanian peasant farmer to an important extent. In Transylvania and Bessarabia, the system has for long been well established, owing to the initiative and encouragement of village priests and schoolmasters. For example, there are community herds of water buffaloes, which tend
477 to prevent deterioration of the breed. The forest industry is in the main run by co-operative societies which control the felling, local distribution and marketing of timber.

IN 1931 there were 5,200 popular co-operative banks, with over 1,150,000 members; 236 forest co-operative societies, with about 341,600 members; 1,600 consumption and supply co-operative societies, with 236,000 members; besides a number of village buying and leasing associations.

241 MUCH has been done, and efforts are continuing by propaganda and instruction, to encourage more up-to-date methods among the peasant farmers and there are a number of schools for primary instruction in agricultural method. Modern farm machinery is loaned by the Ministry of Agriculture to peasants for small fees, stud farms have been established to improve the breed of horses and cattle, and funds have been loaned to the peasant communities for the purchase of stud animals.

INDUSTRY.

135 FROM the point of view of power and raw materials for the development of industry, Roumania is also well endowed by nature. True, her supply of coal is negligible, the only deposit worth mention being that of the brown coal basin of Jiul at Lupeni in Oltenia, which is capable of producing about two million tons per annum. (The output in 1933 was in the neighbourhood of 1.4 million metric tons.) It contains much sulphur but is used to some extent in iron smelting. On the other hand, there are very rich stores of mineral oil. The oil-bearing rocks occur in abundance along the outer rim of the Carpathians in lower Miocene deposits which are

221 233 [342] SCATTERED over the commune are eight "stâne" or temporary summer settlements which are all situated between 400 and 800 metres above the village. The stâna itself is a simple affair, consisting of a log hut which affords living accommodation for the shepherds and acts as a dairy and store-house, together with the folds into which the animals are driven for milking. The one illustrated had a population of three men and two boys, all Roumanians, 350 sheep and 20 cows, as well as a few pigs, the only animals left in the village being the one or two milch cows retained at each farm for family needs and the draught animals (see Plate XIII).

234 221 THE change from winter to spring takes place very rapidly during the second fortnight of April, and the ascent to the dairies is made at the end of that month or early in May. Before the animals are taken up the milk yield of the cows is tested in order to determine the apportionment of the cheese made therefrom, but the ewes' milk cheese is distributed on the basis of the number of sheep belonging to each peasant. Shortly after the ascent the village priest performs the ceremony of blessing each stâna in turn, and before the end of May the sheep are sheared by peasants who go up specially for the purpose, the wool being brought down to the village on horseback.

233 221 476 SINCE the summer pastures are communal property their administration is in the hands of an assembly of heads of families which assesses the rent to be paid for the season—generally 12-15 lei for a sheep and 50 lei for a cow. The money thus received forms a fund from which the shepherds are paid for their services. Each peasant makes personal arrangements with the senior shepherd as to the amount of cheese he will require for household purposes, any surplus going into a common stock which is marketed at the end of the season. Any disputes that arise are settled by arbitration in the presence of the mayor when the shepherds return to the village. This takes place during the latter part of October, the descent of each group being celebrated by minor festivities at which the shepherds are the guests of honour. The general feast held when all are down marks the official end of the season's activities.

221 476 UPON their return to the village the cows are immediately stabled, but each peasant splits up his sheep into two groups,

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1-39 EDI Rumania EDI

FARMING AROUND CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

AMY R. BURGESS

133 IN THE region of Curtea de Argeş the river flows in a valley of varying width, floored with fine sandy alluvium and bounded by somewhat rounded hills. Some traces of river terraces are discernible.

THE LAND of this region can be divided into four categories: (*a*) arable, (*b*) hay meadows, (*c*) forest, (*d*) high mountain pasture. The arable land is principally on the first terrace, but stretches both down the slope to the valley bottom and up the slope to the second terrace. The hay meadows are above the arable land, spreading upwards towards the [137] forest. The forests comprise 75 per cent of the total area, and consist mainly of timber trees, such as beech and pine, together with a considerable number of walnut trees. The high pastures are above the forest belt and may be as much as fifty kilometres away from the village centre of the commune to which they belong.

423 THE ARABLE land is owned by the peasants, holdings ranging from less than one hectare to fifty hectares, the majority being from two to five hectares. The smallness of the holding [428] is due partly to the laws of inheritance, by which the land is divided between the children on the death of the owner, and partly to the fact that the district is so hilly that only small areas are available for cultivation.

241 476 THE HAY meadows belong to the commune and are both worked and used collectively by the peasants, all necessary organization being in the hands of the mayor and committee.

471 [313] THE FORESTS are largely state-owned, although some portions belong to the commune, in which case the peasants are allowed to cut for their own personal use (house-building, implements, etc.), but not for profit.

[233] THE HIGH pastures belong to the commune; the peasants pay a small fee to the commune for their use (20 lei per head per season for sheep, rather more for cattle).

132 AN IMPORTANT climatic feature affecting agriculture is the shortness of the summer, late spring and early autumn frosts

231 owner's farm, where the cows are kept in sheds, and the sheep, which are more hardy, are penned on the arable land, particularly on the maize stubble. Both sheep and cattle are fed on fodder crops during the winter. The surplus animals are sold at the autumn fair, and form a source of revenue.

WHILST ON the high pastures the sheep are clipped twice, and the wool is divided amongst the peasants in proportion to the number of animals sent up. The cheese is usually shared by the owners of the animals in the same way, the mayor and his committee being responsible for the correct apportionment. In the Valley of the Argeş co-operative dealers from Bucharest frequently buy the cheese "in bulk" direct from the commune, and the monetary value is shared between the owners of the animals.

231 OXEN ARE used almost exclusively for draught purposes, the numbers kept in this district being somewhat in excess of the farmers' requirements, owing to their use for lumbering (see below).

241 PEASANT FARMING in the Valley of the Argeş is no longer entirely on a subsistence basis. Two factors have tended to modify it. Firstly, the position of the valley, opening as it does directly on the Wallachian Plain, with its rich grain lands and containing the capital Bucharest, has allowed commercial intercourse to develop. The Argeş peasant no longer cultivates wheat; he does not mind if his maize crop is good enough for fodder only, for he can buy both wheat and maize from the plain. Further, he finds a ready market and so a money income in Bucharest for his surplus fruit, particularly apples, and cheese. Secondly, the forests form a valuable asset to the peasant. During the winter felling takes place in the upper basin of the Argeş; in spring and summer the timber is transported, and work in the State mill in Curtea goes on all the year round. Practically every household has somebody working in the timber trade, and the money so earned (as much as 100 lei per day for a man supplying his own yoke of oxen) reduces the dependence of the family on the farm.

874 AT CURTEA DE ARGEŞ is the School of Agriculture, Regina Elizabeta. Although only a small percentage of its pupils is local, it is gradually influencing the farming of the neighbourhood. Experiments in cultivation, plant breeding and

cent. It can easily be understood that no enterprises could possibly bear the burden of such interests, and that if foreign capital was to be excluded it would be necessary to have recourse to artificial encouragements in order to create and foster the industries it was contemplated to set up. Protection in its extremest form, therefore, was resorted to, and a tariff wall, the highest in Europe, was erected to protect the budding of these hot-house industries. In order to start a new industry the theoretical case for Protection is admittedly strong. Temporarily the new industry needs help, and eventually the country as a whole may gain from its creation, though in the meantime it has to bear the burden. The immediate effect is to increase the costs of the various articles produced locally to an extent that places them beyond the reach of a poor community such as the rural population of Rumania. The repercussion of an increase in the costs of articles required by the agrarian population naturally causes a rise in the costs of production of agricultural produce, which renders less easy its marketing in neutral markets in which the Rumanian peasant can neither enjoy nor demand the favour of a protective duty. So that eventually protection has proved an arm which has turned against him. In the case of Rumania, most of the industries which have been created proved to be clearly detrimental to the State. Certainly the textile industries, which import the totality of their raw material in the form of yarn from abroad, confer no benefit except to their proprietors. The raw material is usually allowed free admission, or pays a very light duty, while the finished article is sold at a price corresponding to that of a similar foreign product on which a duty amounting to as much as 300 per cent is occasionally imposed. Almost the whole of the difference is pocketed by the manufacturer, and the native purchaser gets no benefit whatever. On the contrary, he usually gets an inferior home-made article at almost the same price as he would pay for a foreign one generally of better quality. In this arrangement the State is deprived of a very important source of revenue since it desists from collecting the tariff dues it would otherwise have received if, instead of raw materials imported free, foreign dutiable manufactured articles had been imported.

426
433
454
439
477
651

+ That the extreme Pro-Tariff [illegible] Rumania is

not approved by the public may also be seen from the following excerpts culled from an article published by the same paper on May 15th, 1932: "There is a profound difference between industries which utilize local raw materials and such pseudo-industries which import from abroad semi-manufactured materials and finish them off in this country. . . . The importation of semi-manufactured goods is in the great majority of cases carried on solely to evade the Customs tariffs, and if we do not see things as they are, this is on account of private interests, for the sake of which we allow a prejudicial system to continue to function. . . ." 651 661 4?

The *Argus*, too, several times attempted to call public attention to the nefarious results of the policy of bolstering ~~up~~ artificial industries, and especially in the case of the textile industry, on which it wrote as follows: "Why are clothing materials so costly? Because our protected textile industry sells its products at the same price as the goods imported from abroad. The encouragement given to the textile industry has resulted in increasing the cost of wearing apparel because industrialists are not content with a reasonable profit, and as a result a woollen suit to-day is a luxury. When our Custom tariff is to be revised the interests of industrialists alone should not be considered, but also those of the consumers."

As one may infer from the above, this policy of industrialization was a wild scheme which materialized on a large scale, chiefly because various politicians had been directly interested in the manufacturing concerns which had been started. 661 [651] 287 477

The case of the paper industry may be cited as an example. All the paper mills belonged to or were controlled by friends or relatives of the Bratianus. In order to secure big profits an import duty of 50 per cent was placed on paper, creating thereby a virtual monopoly of the paper trade on behalf of the owners of the mills. As they could dictate their will to the Chamber, the high duty was maintained in spite of the protest of the Opposition. For not only the public at large suffered by the high price of such an essential commodity as paper, but political interests were equally affected. Opposition parties had to pay high prices

RUMANIA

for the paper necessary for their pamphlets and newspapers, while the Bratianus' Press organs naturally enjoyed preferential rates. Another deplorable result of this monopoly was the high cost of books. The same book published in Bulgaria cost about half as much as in Rumania, and this explains to some extent the high percentage of illiterates in the latter country, which according to the *Lupta* of May 18th, 1932 reached as high a percentage as 70 per cent of the total population. The creation of industries, the raw material of which is not indigenous, is likely in the long run to prove extremely wasteful. They are clearly of a parasitic nature, and their maintenance will not only continue to be a charge on the Revenue but is likely to continue to handicap very seriously Rumania's staple industry, agriculture. The initial costs of installation are necessarily high, for foreign experts have to be called in to set up the machinery, supervise, and train the native workpeople, since there is a lack of experienced workmen. Moreover the stringency of monetary resources and the high rates of interest ruling necessitate a high return on capital that can be secured only by selling the manufactured article at the highest possible price, a level which is usually fixed by the cost of the corresponding foreign article, on which a heavy duty has been imposed. The high prices will forcibly curtail output since the latter is adjusted to the capacity of the local market, the possibilities of which are restrained owing to the low buying power of the peasantry. The more consumption is reduced the more manufacturers will endeavour to recoup themselves by further raising their prices, which can be attained only by increasing the protective duty. Thus a vicious circle is created, to the great disadvantage of the peasantry, who constitute 80 per cent of the population and who have to defray in the same proportion the expenses of these experimental attempts to industrialize Rumania. It is obvious that the high prices paid by the peasantry for manufactured articles affect adversely the cost of agricultural produce; even the transport rates of the latter stand high in order to compensate for the low preferential rates granted to local manufactures. One need not, therefore, be surprised if Rumanian agriculturalists can no longer market their pro-

000 AN IMPROVED world situation with regard to oil would benefit Roumania very greatly, for the oil industry may fairly be said to be the one industry of the country which has developed to the stage of maturity.

TRANSPORT.

489 THE TRANSPORT of the country is organised, where it is organised, from the standpoints of trade, administration and defence, but from all these standpoints re-orientation has been necessary since the acquisition of new territories, and so far achievement has only been very partial. In measuring the extent of progress the great engineering difficulties and immense cost of construction in so mountainous a country where disastrous floods are a common feature must not be forgotten.

● 487 THE OLD KINGDOM developed its lines of communication as a purely agricultural country with a grain and timber surplus for export. Its natural markets were the industrialised countries of west-central and western Europe, where grain and timber could be exchanged for manufactured goods. The Danube river seems at first sight to offer the natural line of communication to the west, but its swift current has always been an obstacle to up-stream traffic, especially before the days of high-powered river-craft, and the still greater obstacles of the Iron Gate reefs and the Klissura gorges and cataracts have always prevented the full use of the waterway. Through the gorges of the Banat, Trajan's hanging road is replaced by the fine metalled Szecheny road built by Hungarian engineers a hundred years ago, but there is no railway along the river except for the small stretch between Orşova and Turnu Severin, the marsh and lagoon and loose sand of the lower Danube valley present conditions that have from early times diverted traffic away from the almost bridgeless river. From Roman times the Cerna and Timiş valley route has been the more important western exit from the lower Danube plains. The Roman bridge at Turnu Severin gave access to the Jiu basin and the Valcan (Vulkan) pass. Both these are important railway routes to-day.

AN ALTERNATIVE to the up-stream route, and one which gives full advantage to bulk cargoes utilising the Danube, is that via the Black Sea and Mediterranean, and thus we

487 find that, in spite of the classical importance of the Danube valley as the link between the Orient and the west of Europe, the Black Sea ports drew the trade of the Lower Danube and Siret basins and established a traffic with the Mediterranean and north-western lands which increased in importance until the Great War. A two-way traffic in Danube grain and British coal gave a great advantage to British merchants and British shipping, the only other shipping engaged in the lower Danube traffic, that under the Greek flag, coming a long way behind. Partly as a result of the cessation of her Mediterranean coal trade, and partly as a result of energetic development of Greek, Italian (carrying mail) and Roumanian shipping lines (the last two subsidised), Great Britain in 1933 stood fourth on the list, being outstripped [505] by Roumania itself, which has recently purchased a couple of 8,000 ton Hamburg-America liners. Braila and Galaţi, the two grain ports of Wallachia and Moldavia (which, with a depth of 20 to 24 feet, can accommodate 6,000 ton ocean-going steamers) have up-to-date equipment, the former catering mainly for the Prut river traffic of Bessarabia and the latter for the larger Wallachian hinterland. 504 A large number of small grain ports on the Danube remain so far with but primitive equipment. Constanţa, on the Black Sea, has received most of the attention of the Government, in the form of petrol basins, pipe-lines, dredging, etc. It is, of course, a rail port and has thus the advantage over the ports of Braila and Galaţi when the Danube and Prut are frozen, as they usually are from December or January till March, or in summer when the water is low. Over a period of forty-seven years there were only eleven years when the rivers remained open.

THE SIRET, which debouches at Braila, is unfortunately unnavigable, and can only be used for floating timber, which is shipped in ocean-going vessels at Galaţi. The port of Sulina and the channel between that port and Braila, entirely under the administration of the European Commission of the Danube, has recently been much improved, and traffic on the Sulina arm has accordingly improved too. It is, however, feared that, in spite of the extension of the moles, the persistent silting at the Sulina outlet will render necessary the diversion of the Sulina cut to an outlet five miles to the south.

504
505

cleared without very considerable development. It is probable that not more than about 50 per cent. of the above capacity could be worked. Grain is loaded by land and floating elevators.

[502]

The ports of Brăila and Galați are ice-bound during some winters, ice occurring to a sufficient extent to prevent navigation from the Black Sea between January and mid-March in about 3 years in 10.

D. INLAND WATERWAYS

I. General

133
505
487

In 1937 navigable waterways totalled 2,840 km (1,766 miles) and were divided as follows :—

	Km.	*Miles*
Danube	1,073	668
Danube tributaries	395	246
Dniester	740	460
Prut	410	255
Mureș	185	115
Bega Canal	35	22

The rivers Dniester, Prut and Mureș have not been adequately regulated for regular traffic, but are used for local traffic and for timber floating.

II. The Danube

1. Traffic

487
505
439

The Danube, Rumania's main traffic artery, carried about 60 per cent. of all import tonnage and some 15 per cent. of all exports in the years immediately before the war. Traffic is of two distinct types; first, the traffic in sea-going vessels with an average size of 2,000-2,500 tons proceeding as far as Galați and Brăila via the Sulina mouth, and second, on the river proper, on the Danube above Galați.

The sea-going traffic passing through the Sulina mouth in the years just before the war consisted of about 1·2—1·4 million tons a year of exports from Rumania or other riparian states. By far the most important items were grain and timber. About half the vessels entering the Danube from the sea appear to have been in ballast: the remainder bringing in some 300,000-500,000 tons of imports mainly for Rumania.

Inland-water traffic on the Rumanian sector of the Danube in 1936 (the latest year for which information for all kinds of traffic is available) amounted to 3 million tons. 1·6 million tons consisted of upstream traffic from Rumania to other riparian states, 0·24 million tons of downstream traffic to Rumania, about 1 million tons of Rumanian internal traffic, and about 0·2 million

[432]

CHAPTER VIII

487
505
439

of transit traffic (mainly downstream). Traffic with other riparian states was apportioned as follows :—

	From Rumania	*To Rumania*
	'000 tons	
Germany ..	220	40
Austria ..	390	20
Czechoslovakia ..	440	30
Hungary ..	300	150
Yugoslavia ..	200	—
Bulgaria ..	80	3
	1,630	243

The composition of inland-water traffic has been fully analysed only at the Iron Gates, at the western end of the Danube's Rumanian course. In the traffic shown below, the upstream traffic consisted mainly of Rumanian exports, while the downstream traffic was made up of imports and transit traffic in approximately equal proportions.

Traffic in '000 metric tons at the Iron Gates :—

	1938	1939
	Upstream	
Total	1,362·5	1,864·0
of which (main items only) :		
Timber	20·1	11·9
Iron	21·1	13·4
Wheat	30·3	300·6
Barley	49·8	68·0
Maize	25·1	125·3
Petroleum and its products	787·7	1,046·1
Salt	30·8	31·7
	Downstream	
Total	489·3	771·2
of which (main items only) :		
Iron	77·2	22·2
Timber	67·6	86·5
Wheat	74·4	363·0
Maize and oats	79·6	28·2

505
439
722

Little is known about traffic since Rumania finally joined the Axis in 1941. As a whole, it is below pre-war level as a result of a great decrease in the amount of grain coming forward. This has been partly, but certainly not entirely, counter-balanced by a slight increase in oil traffic, by the probable diversion of rail traffic to the Danube and by military traffic. The most important individual traffics at the present time are as follows :—

(*a*) Oil shipments from Giurgiu (i) upstream to Italy (50-70,000 tons a month), to Germany (possibly 30-50,000 tons a month), and (ii) downstream to German forces in South Russia (quantity unknown, but may be substantial).

(*b*) Downstream supplies of (i) coal to Rumanian railways (part only of total supply), and of (ii) military equipment, stores, etc., to South Russia (quantities unknown).

(*c*) Upstream supplies of (i) some S. Russian products, including grain (perhaps 20,000 tons a month) and possibly iron and manganese ore (quantities unknown), as well as of (ii) some small quantities of Rumanian exports of agricultural products.

2. Navigation

133
502

The Iron Gate Sector of the Danube between Orşova and Turnu Severin, with its rapids and reefs causing violent currents, is particularly difficult for navigation, and the use of specially

000 AN IMPROVED world situation with regard to oil would benefit Roumania very greatly, for the oil industry may fairly be said to be the one industry of the country which has developed to the stage of maturity.

TRANSPORT.

489 THE TRANSPORT of the country is organised, where it is organised, from the standpoints of trade, administration and defence, but from all these standpoints re-orientation has been necessary since the acquisition of new territories, and so far achievement has only been very partial. In measuring the extent of progress the great engineering difficulties and immense cost of construction in so mountainous a country where disastrous floods are a common feature must not be forgotten.

487 THE OLD KINGDOM developed its lines of communication as a purely agricultural country with a grain and timber surplus for export. Its natural markets were the industrialised countries of west-central and western Europe, where grain and timber could be exchanged for manufactured goods. The Danube river seems at first sight to offer the natural line of communication to the west, but its swift current has always been an obstacle to up-stream traffic, especially before the days of high-powered river-craft, and the still greater obstacles of the Iron Gate reefs and the Klissura gorges and cataracts have always prevented the full use of the waterway. Through the gorges of the Banat, Trajan's hanging road is replaced by the fine metalled Szecheny road built by Hungarian engineers a hundred years ago, but there is no railway along the river except for the small stretch between Orşova and Turnu Severin, the marsh and lagoon and loose sand of the lower Danube valley present conditions that have from early times diverted traffic away from the almost bridgeless river. From Roman times the Cerna and Timiş valley route has been the more important western exit from the lower Danube plains. The Roman bridge at Turnu Severin gave access to the Jiu basin and the Valcan (Vulkan) pass. Both these are important railway routes to-day.

AN ALTERNATIVE to the up-stream route, and one which gives full advantage to bulk cargoes utilising the Danube, is that via the Black Sea and Mediterranean, and thus we

lei which was absorbed by Russia. Through the latter 433
country an annual surplus of over a million tons of cereals was also marketed, as an excellent network of railway lines connected Odessa and the chief towns of Russia with Bessarabia. Further, under the Russian régime credit facilities 452
were obtainable and a capital of some 10 million roubles or 10 milliard lei was at the disposal of the agriculturalists, while now it is reckoned that the Rumanian banks do not dispose of even 1½ milliard lei for this purpose, and in spite of the fact that the present requirements of the population are incomparably greater, since with the breaking up of the large estates, it was indispensable to provide the peasantry with funds wherewith they might buy implements and cattle for their farms.

It would appear that any civilized government, however 489
vague its conception of its duty might be, would have proceeded to endow this province with a network of roads and railways to aid the population by thus facilitating the transport of its produce to the ports, since Odessa, the former outlet, is no longer available for this purpose. But strange to say, the Rumanian authorities have done nothing whatever; though even the construction of a few short connecting lines permitting a partial reorientation of the existing railway tracks and the construction of a grain elevator at the Danubian town of Reni would have gone a long way to relieve the strain. Even the deepening of the bed of the Pruth as far as Ungheni might have provided cheaper transport facilities to a large percentage of the available grain, which was often left to rot in the fields because overland transport charges, in the absence of roads, were found prohibitive.

Even out of mere solicitude for the safety of the State the Rumanian government ought to have provided means of communication whereby its army might in an emergency be concentrated on an ever-exposed frontier, in a region where a perpetual state of war exists. But even this weighty consideration has not sufficed to rouse the Bucarest Government from its self-complacency. There are, of course, persons 668
who would explain the continual agitation brewing in Bess- 177
arabia and the predilection of its inhabitants for Russian rule by the assertion that these dunces of Moldovans (as the

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

imposing range of the Southern Carpathians, otherwise 133
known as the Transylvanian Alps, shuts off Wallachia on the 635
north from Transylvania, the main means of communication between the two provinces being provided by the Vulcan, Red Tower, Predeal, and Buzau defiles.

Moldavia is divided in almost two halves by the river Sereth which rises in Bucovina and flows southwards until it joins the Danube, receiving in its onward course several tributaries, the most important of which are the Moldova, Suceava, Bistritsa, and Trotush, the valleys of which furnish means of access to Transylvania. Western Moldavia is a hilly region very similar in structure to the Transylvanian basin, while the region between the rivers Sereth and Pruth forms a country of vast rolling plains.

Bessarabia is separated from Moldavia by the river Pruth and is delimitated to the north-east by the river Dniester, which constitutes its frontier with Russia. It is a country of vast, sparsely wooded plains, and is renowned for its orchards and extensive vineyards. The southern portion has a steppe-like appearance, though intersected by numerous lakes. It is deficient both in wood and in spring water, and for a long time this deficiency proved an obstacle to its colonization. Bessarabia originally constituted part of Moldavia, with which it also forms a geographic unit. Its capital, Chişinau, or Kichineff, is a well-built city. It possesses numerous colleges, religious institutes and governmental buildings, which form the relics of the former Russian administration and evoke memories of its past magnificence. Owing to the stoppage of traffic with Odessa, complete stagnation prevails. The Rumanian authorities have avoided the construction of communications in Bessarabia, and Chişinau, though being the second largest town in the kingdom, with a population of 117,016, is practically isolated, for the existing railways laid out by the Russians to suit different requirements, are from the commercial point of view now utterly unpractical for actual necessities. As a result stagnation has set in, and this maintains among the population a regret for the past Russian régime. [489]

The Dobrudja lies to the south of the Danube, and may be regarded as an extension, both geographically and ethnologi-

000 previous years of drought. Such a result has completely discouraged them, especially the younger among them. . . ."

489 And it was not only the export taxes which impeded the
241 development of agriculture, but also the deplorable state of the whole transport system. The shortage and deficiencies of the latter would have been very easily remedied with foreign aid, but the Bratianus were deaf to all such suggestions, though the imperative necessity of eliminating these defects was daily insisted on in the Press. Here is yet another excerpt from the *Argus* of October 8th, 1926, and it will be found both apposite and illuminating on this subject:

"So long as the Railway Administration does not dispose of adequate funds to obtain the necessary rolling stock, nothing can be done. Without locomotives, without trucks, without warehouses, a transport system is helpless in a country like ours, which cannot develop without exports. In order to stimulate and encourage the production of our soil, the subject of the re-establishment of our means of communication by land and water ought to be constantly in the minds of our governing circles. We have paid no heed to this truth during the eight years following the war, and as a result, if we except Russia, our country is the hindermost in Eastern Europe as far as transport is concerned. For this reason, in almost all railway stations quantities of grain remain for months waiting for trucks, to the immense prejudice of the producers and the merchants. The capital which is thus immobilized for so long a time, when interest rates are soaring fantastically, the warehouse dues, the loss in quantity and quality of the cereals through exposure and theft, are some of the factors which are contributing to the ruin of our agriculture and of our commerce in cereals. . . ."

651 To these complaints and remonstrances, however, the
241 Government turned a deaf ear, and it even went farther and threatened to impose still heavier burdens on this harassed industry by an increase in the land tax. The injustice of this contemplated measure was exposed at length by Dr Ernest Ene in the *Argus*, who marshalled figures and facts to prove that, in comparison with other industries, agriculture had so far been treated as a Cinderella, although it had furnished

OIL AND MINING INDUSTRIES

The above article shows how erroneous were the views of the late V. Bratianu in decreeing the nationalization of the oil deposits in order to prevent foreign companies from sharing in the development of the oil industry. The native producers, being without adequate capital resources, have been unable to take advantage of the benefits the mining law meant to reserve for them. They have undoubtedly contributed in increasing the crude oil output, but on the other hand, not possessing the means either to provide for its refining or its marketing, they have only contributed towards creating a glut on the market which is disastrous to themselves, but which unfortunately also affects adversely, though to a lesser degree, the foreign companies in Rumania. 315 382

Yet it could easily have been foreseen that an increase in the crude oil output would necessitate the expenditure of large sums of money for the construction of refineries, storage tanks, pipe-lines, tank-wagons, etc., all of which would have to be secured from abroad, seeing that the financial resources of Rumania were utterly inadequate to cope with the demands which were made on them from all sides. The [489] scheme for the construction of a second pipe-line from the oil-fields to Constantsa, mooted by the companies, has been definitely rejected owing to the intervention of the railway administration, which naturally wanted to reserve as much as possible of the transport of the oil for itself. It has offered to grant increased transport facilities for oil, but it is very doubtful whether it will be able to fulfil its promises, because the bridge over the Danube at Cernavoda carries only a single track and its carrying capacity is limited. The construction of a second pipe-line to Constantsa therefore seems to be indispensable. The one already existing between Ploeşti and Constantsa has a total length of 320 km. Some 3,000 tons of oil may be pumped through it in 24 hours, and in 1931 the total quantity of motor oil conveyed through this pipe-line amounted to 753,000 tons. Another pipe-line exists between Ploeşti and Giurgiu, on the Danube, 180 km. in length, but the main port by which petroleum products are exported is Constantsa. In 1931, 3,926,247 tons were shipped from that port.

The principal oilfields extend in a semi-circular strip on the

RUMANIA AS A GERMAN ALLY

648 433 To Germany Rumania has been an invaluable if expensive ally—invaluable mainly for her oil production, which accounts for one-third of total Axis supplies; expensive because, in order to exploit the country's usefulness to the full, it has been necessary to provide goods, such as oil-well equipment, agricultural machinery, machine tools, etc., all of which she can ill spare on account of the need for them both in her own country and for supply to her other satellites. To ensure smooth working of the oil-well region German troops have been established in the Ploeşti district. Apart fom oil German expectations have come to very little in Rumania—her demands for cereals, soya beans, sunflower-seed, etc., have not been fulfilled due to bad harvests, labour shortage and peasant hoarding, and livestock deliveries have been affected by fodder shortage and illegal slaughterings.

As to further German demands on Rumanian economy, the most outstanding were for manpower in the form of troops for the Eastern front, and the use of the country for transit of troops and war materials to the battle zones. Both these facilities have been of considerable material value to the enemy, though in order to make use of Rumanian troops Germany has had to provide the bulk of the equipment, as Rumanian industry is not adequate to supply more than the barest minimum; and even where she has the available facilities, raw materials are lacking.

[489] To exploit the country successfully from the transport angle it has been necessary to set up a control organisation to direct transit traffic, and, in addition, to supply and repair locomotives and rolling stock.

GERMAN PENETRATION

648 439 For a great many years, Germany has been the natural supplier of engineering and consumption goods which Rumania was unable to produce for herself, and has provided a ready market for her surplus agricultural produce. Following the coming into power of the Nazi Government, Germany succeeded in acquiring Rumanian trade to an increasing extent at the expense of other countries. With the outbreak of war, Rumania has become even more dependent on Germany as a supplier of manufactured goods in general, and iron and steel products in particular.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

652 should be obtained not through investments but through loans under-
665 taken by the state. In this way Rumania would have full control over the allocation of capital and would not, except for the interest on loans, see the profits from the oil industry go abroad. The petroleum policy of the National Peasants, as formulated in 1929, was even more removed from Stere's recommendations than from the Liberals' policy. It was, however, perfectly consistent with their economic outlook during their term in office.

665 Rumanian transportation and communications had been in no-
652 toriously bad condition since the First World War, and the Liberals'
496 policy of retrenchment had been particularly damaging to the rail-
464 way system. The 1929 stabilization loan allocated $34,000,000 for
471 railway expansion and $9,000,000 to pay off overdue railway debts.
491 By a law passed in July, 1929, the National Peasants transferred the state railways to an autonomous public body, "to be administered
206 according to commercial principles." [62] They also undertook to repair and extend the highway network, and abolished the primitive *corvée* which was still being used for road maintenance. In 1930 the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation received a concession for the construction of the Rumanian telephone network.

665 The stabilization loan required a reform of the National Bank and of the state accounting system. In March, 1929, the government passed a series of new statutes for the bank; the principal changes were the abolition of the ceiling on the issue of currency, established by the Liberals' in 1925, and the limitation of the influence of the state in the appointment of directors. The bank was given somewhat greater independence from state control and powers to maintain the newly achieved stability of the currency. In July, 1929, the government passed a law reforming the state accounting system and the organization of the budget. There was no doubt that Rumanian state finances needed reform and modernization. The accounting system had been that of France of 1860, plus the accretion of a number of purely Rumanian practices, with the result that the actual condition of government finances at any given time was never known with any exactness. The new law, in reorganizing the preparation of the budget, exerted more stringent control over the expenditures of various ministries. While this law was well intended, its actual results in rationalizing Rumanian finance methods seem to have been very

62. Madgearu, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 50. The organization of Rumanian railways after 1918 had been altogether hectic. In 1925 the Liberals had given some autonomy to the railways; this policy was reversed by the People's party in February, 1927, and reestablished by the Liberals in August of that year.

496 499 ROUMANIA has had a hard and costly task in the restoration of her railways and rolling stock to pre-War efficiency. This has been accomplished, and, in addition, steps have been taken towards the re-orientation of communications necessitated by the change of frontiers. A new line is under construction to link Braşov in Transylvania with Buzau and so with the Danube and Black Sea ports. It should play an important rôle in the movement of timber. The Olt valley line from Sibiu is being linked with that which runs from Bucureşti up the Argeş valley to shorten the journey from Bucureşti to Arad and western Europe. It is planned also to link up the Reciţa iron district with the Jiu valley coal field and bring both into closer communication with the capital.

491 ALTHOUGH there has been great progress in the reconstruction and improvement of the railways, road transport is still frankly bad. Only about 17 per cent of the roadways of the country are metalled and can be described as in fairly good condition. The bulk of the roads are mere dirt tracks, which vary in their resistance to frost and rain according to whether they lie on the dusty chernoziom, the loose brown soils or the more cohesive and better-drained podsol.

HILDA ORMSBY, D.Sc. (Econ.)

CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

133 REFERENCE has already been made to the bridging of the Olt and the Argeş about 20-25 km. from the mountain-edge and to the rise near these bridges of the towns of Ramnicu Valcea and Curtea de Argeş. It has also been explained that terraces on the left bank of the Argeş swing near the river to give an effective bridge-end site capable of defence. Curtea de Argeş is one of the oldest settlements in Muntenia.

AT THE BRIDGE the river is over 420 m. above sea, and from its western end an old trackway, now a main road, follows approximately the 440 m. contour on what appears to be a terrace against which the river swings about 1½-2 km. north of the bridge. Here also gravel reaches, connected with the junction of a brook with the main stream, provide a ford; and at this spot on the east side of the river there is the monastery of royal associations founded in 1510 and celebrated as a place of pilgrimage. Beyond this the road goes on up a tributary valley towards the east. The bridge and town however grew up not at this ford, but at a point farther south, where the north-south residual ridge bounding the Argeş valley on the east sends a spur almost to the actual river but just cut off by a seasonal tributary brook. The end of this spur shows two marked terraces, one just slightly above the river, the other some 12 m. above it and rising, as was said above, to about the 440 m. contour. On the end of the spur is a ruined Roman Catholic church, built for Marghita, wife of Prince Basarab. The Wallachian princes of these days appear to have had a habit of marrying Catholic women. One seems to see faint indications that the site of this church has been to a slight extent developed artificially. In 1390 this church served as a cathedral for Catholics in Wallachia, and the see lasted until 1602, by which time many Catholics had become Orthodox and the Catholic bishopric was removed to Dacau.

REFERENCE has already been made to the north-south road on the terrace, no doubt a modernisation of an old trackway, with the town near the end of the spur and the bridge, and the monastery to the north. Near the end of the spur, and

361 towns, stands a church in a fortified enclosure, and the town
133 has been laid out beyond this. It is possible to infer that a similar process has worked itself out, but to a lesser degree, both in the Saxon villages of Transylvania and in such cases as that of Curtea de Argeş. Here the church-and-castle nucleus is as usual the focus of roads, the principal one of which runs along the terrace as already mentioned. Two others lead down towards the river, one on each side of the fortification, but not exactly to the bridge, the position of which is rather determined by gravel banks where the small seasonal brook referred to above joins the river. Some other roads or trackways branch off in a bunch just east of the nucleus and stretch up into hills of unconsolidated material, their woodland cover increasing with altitude and becoming practically continuous forest at about 600 m. altitude over sea. Where the woods are not continuous there is pasture up to which animals may be drawn every day in summer. One of these roads leads past a little old church of S. Mary and appears to be an old track leading obliquely up the hill and over into the next valley to the east. Along the beginning of this trackway are the homes of numerous craftsmen, especially potters, but we did not get evidence of a guild or zunft of potters. We are not here dealing with quite the same scheme of organisation as that of a trade in a street within a walled town. The main business part of the town has lain between the bridge end and the road on the terrace, 10-20 m. above the river, and the town has been physically constrained to spread along that road. The extension southwards has an interesting eighteenth century house overlooking a square set out quite recently. The extension northwards towards the monastery gives a ribbon of buildings mostly modern.

61 On the whole, one has the impression of a focus of peasant
443 life with fairs and markets and opportunities of sale of craft products, especially pots, to country folk. There is evidence of considerable quite modern growth, and also apparently of growth one to two centuries ago, a growth which it is tempting to associate with agricultural development gathered around the spread of maize and potato, but proof is lacking.

361 Curtea de Argeş owes a great deal of its importance to its
771 religious and princely associations, and both the Biserica Domneasca and the monastery church are important here. The latter, near a ford, may well have more ancient associa-

[Curtea de Arges--, 25 Analyst]

496 secure a decent share of the traffic, but apparently this is
505 being diverted to the Danube route. In fact the "Commission Internationale du Danube" reported that the river-borne traffic in 1931 had reached the highest figure since the end of the war. This was due not only to the abundant harvests of 1931, but also to increased petroleum transport from both Rumania and Russia to Central Europe. Certain singular anomalies were recorded in this river-borne traffic, namely, that while grain was conveyed from Russia up to Vienna and Ratisbonne, Hungarian grain was being carried downstream for shipment via Sulina to Antwerp and Hamburg.

In order to attract Polish traffic, the Rumanian Government some years ago proposed to create free zones at Galatz, Braila, and Constantsa. A bridge, also, was to be constructed across the Danube between Giurgiu and Rustchuk, the Polish Government even offering to defray half the expenses, but for the present all these schemes seem to have been shelved.

COMMUNICATIONS

491 In a report made by the Minister of Public Works and published by the *Adeverul* in its issue of January 14th, 1932, the following details were given respecting the length and state of the roads.

The state of the roads is lamentable; most of these arteries are impassable, and a superficial reparation would prove useless. The following table will give an approximate idea of their condition:

	Length in Kilometers
Roads paved in stone	
Good condition	16,118
Medium condition	27,961
Bad condition	14,949
Roads laid in gravel	9,318
Natural unlaid roads...	33,636
Total	101,982

COMMUNICATIONS

Out of this total, 58,028 are nominally laid in stone, but of these only 16,118 kms. can be reckoned as good. The rest may be divided into two categories: 27,961 kms. requiring reparation, and 14,909 kms. requiring complete reconstruction. A good network of roads answering the requirements of the country would necessitate the construction of 2,000 kms. of permanent surface roads (paved with granite), 9,000 kms. of semi-permanent or macadamized, while the remaining 59,000 kms. of the existing network should be completely overhauled every six or seven years. 491

The requisite sum for the construction of this mileage on the basis of present prices would be 40 milliard lei, and the annual outlay for its maintenance may be reckoned at 1,380 million lei.

It was reported that owing to lack of resources the Minister contemplated the adoption of a system of conscript labour, similar to that introduced into Bulgaria, in order to carry on the work of repairing the roads and of constructing 300 to 400 kms. annually, especially in Bessarabia, which was utterly devoid of semi-metalled trunk roads.

The lack of roads in Bessarabia has been one of the standing grievances of the population against the Bucarest Government, for along with the absence of railways, it is next door to impossible to convey agricultural produce to market. 494 One might have thought that steps would have been taken at least to deepen the channel of the Pruth, from its mouth to Ungheni (near Iassi), which would have served as an excellent water avenue for heavy traffic, but such a plan has not proved attractive; on the other hand, a scheme for the construction of a canal to connect Bucarest with the Danube was much to the front during recent years, though no foreign group so far has found the conditions offered by the Government acceptable. 503

The natural unlaid roads, of which the total length is 33,636 kms., usually become impassable in the rainy season even for ox-carts, and as many districts possess only such natural tracks, they are practically cut off for considerable periods from the rest of the country. 491

G

RUMANIA

491 A contract was recently signed with a Swedish firm for the laying of 570 kms. of permanent and 180 kms. of semi-permanent roads by the end of 1936, but this is far from satisfying even the most urgent requirements of the country. As matters stand now there is some probability that the contract will be cancelled, for it was found out that during the winter of 1931 the roads which so far had been constructed had undergone serious deterioration through the frost. In the discussion which ensued in the Chamber the Minister of Communications accused his predecessor in office of having been bribed, and in support of this charge he adduced the fact that, while the Government delegate who was despatched to Paris to sign the contract with the company had been instructed to accept as maximum prices 618 lei per square metre for the permanent roads, and 330 lei per square metre for the semi-permanent, he exceeded his instructions and signed the contract on the basis of 740 and 426 lei respectively, thereby causing the State to lose a sum of five hundred million lei.

The accusation of bribery was denied by those involved, but it was decided that the contract would have to be revised and the matter submitted to the Law-Courts. This Swedish company is related to the Kreuger & Toll groups, and it is more than likely that the contract will now lapse.

491 The following data concerning the highways and their distribution among the different provinces, also of their condition at the beginning of 1930, is found in the statistical bulletin for that year:

Province.	Roads laid in stone. Good.	Medium.	Bad.	Roads in gravel.	Natural unlaid roads.
Old Kingdom	13,043.722	13,607.486	5,897.907	5,043.919	12,848.255
Transylvania	4,511.625	10,558.301	6,180.164	3,504.744	19,565.426
Bucovina	444.095	923.923	809.304	444.373	665.603
Bessarabia	165.851	384.281	166.640	370.378	7,089.472
Total for all Rumania in kilometres	18,165.293	25,473.991	13,054.015	9,363.414	40,188.756

8

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bucarest]

[The Dobrudja]

Bucarest is also the chief railway centre of Rumania. 361

Giurgiu on the Danube, south of Bucarest and the terminus of one of the oil pipe-lines from Ploesti, is one of the main Rumanian wheat and oil ports. Another Danubian port, where great quantities of wheat are handled, is Braila with a population of about 70,000.

There are no natural barriers to communications in Muntenia. In the south the chief flow of traffic is carried by the Danube. Rail and road communications from Transylvania pass through the Predeal and a railway line leads over the Danube to the Dobrudja. 505 491 496

THE DOBRUDJA (Dobrogea[R]).[1] Up till 1878 the whole of the Dobrudja belonged to Bulgaria. Ever since, this province has been a bone of contention between Rumania and Bulgaria. The northern part of the Dobrudja was awarded to Rumania in 1878 to compensate her for the loss of Southern Bessarabia to Russia. The southern part of the province was ceded by Bulgaria after her defeat at the hands of her neighbours in the Second Balkan War in 1913. This region was returned to Bulgaria in 1940. 175

Geographically the Dobrudja is the north-eastern corner of the Balkan Peninsula. Its boundaries are in the north and west the Danube and in the east the Black Sea. There are three distinct regions: the delta of the Danube, the forests of Babadag, and farther south the steppe, which is the most fertile 131 133

[1] The letter R, H or G following a geographical term denotes a Rumanian, Hungarian or German name, respectively.

497 722 and for passenger travel are severely limited. However, unless there is severe destruction in the later stages of the war, in the long run the Rumanians are bound to benefit from the capital investment in railways, and from the new construction and improvements which have been carried out to meet Axis needs. These improvements though planned long ago, could never have been carried out with the limited financial and technical resources previously available, and could not have been executed so quickly but for German assistance.

B. ROADS

491 Rumania's road system was, by Western European standards, very poorly developed before the war, there being only one International motor road which formed the continuation of the route from Hungary via Oradea Mare—Cluj—Sibiu—Brașov—Bucarest—Giurgiu and a branch line Bucarest—Olenița. Apart from this one major road, the system consists of untarred roads, many of which are in a poor state of repair.

The total length of the road system was reported early in 1943 to be 82,098 km. (51,010 miles), with only 12 per cent. in good state of repair, 22 per cent. being mediocre and the remainder in bad condition. Ownership of the total network is divided as follows :—

State roads ..	11,465 km.	(7,118 miles)
Provincial roads ..	26,181 km.	(16,272 miles)
Communal roads ..	44,452 km.	(27,620 miles)

in 1936 there were some 34,000 cars registered.

The development of the road system has long been the dream of Rumanian propagandists, particularly as a stimulus to tourist traffic, but before the war no large-scale development could be embarked upon because of the lack of available capital.

499 Since the war, work has been started on an ambitious programme of road development, the objects of which are to improve communications between urban systems and to link the system with the International road network.

An Italo-Rumanian road company has started work on the Rumanian sector of one of the future trans-European roads, Trieste—Beograd—Turnu Severin—Bucarest—Constanța, while under a five-year plan, with an expenditure of 75 md. lei, some 5,000 km. (3,100 miles) of road are to be modernised with the help of German and Italian contractors.

C. SHIPPING

1. Introduction

505 439 A high percentage of Rumania's foreign trade is water-borne (55 per cent. in 1937), as not only is she situated on the Black Sea, but the Danube traverses the full west to east length of the country, forming an important traffic route and link with Central Europe.

The following table shows comparative tonnages for sea and river traffic in 1937 and 1938 :—

	1937	1938
	'000 *metric tons*	
Sea :		
Imports	622	540
Exports	6,918	5,222
River :		
Imports	1,890	1,568
Exports	3,161	2,688

As a result of the cutting-off of overseas markets since 1940 an increasing share of the country's

[42a]

Bulgaria EE1
Rumania ED1

B 342 233 with straw roofs. They are rarely plastered with mud. In western Sredna Gora, transportable sheep pens are used (Gellert, 1937: 169).

RUMANIA

R 361 175 177 648 In Rumania there exists a marked difference between settlements in the lowlands and those of the Carpathian Mountain region. While topograpny and the presence or absence of such building materials as stone, wood or clay are important factors, political considerations also played a significant role. With the beginning of the 18th century Greek influence became predominant in Moldavia and Wallachia. The Porte set up Greek rulers in these principalities, thus in reality the Rumanians were as much under Turkish dominion, although indirectly, as were the people of the Balkans. It was only after the rebellion of 1821 that Rumanian rulers were reinstated. During all periods of unrest and foreign invasion the mountains and forests served as areas of refuge; the Serbian hajduk has his counterpart in the Rumanian heydoick (Stratilesco, 1907: 30-34).

R 361 R [133] R [491] R [621] Location and Types of Settlements. The older settlements were in the nature of hamlets (catun). These were generally not built on the top of hills, but rather in depressions, on the edge of forests, and away from the military roads (Grothe, 1907: 54). In the hilly regions of Oltenia and Moldavia the villages were located close to a river or on the slope of a hill. Farmsteads are generally spaced fairly far apart, in no definite order. Villages may extend over two or three hills facing one another (Stratilesco, 1907: 205). Villages in the Wallachian plains are located close to the roads. The prevalent type is the road village; buildings are located on either side of the highway which forms the main road of the village. Larger villages may have additional cross-roads (Jänecke, 1918: 7). While mountain villages average a population of 350, the largest being around 700, villages of the plains average 700 and may reach 2000 (Grothe, 1907: 55).

R 342 R [335] House Types. Due to the scarcity of wood and stone in the plains, buildings are generally constructed of wicker and daub, in which technique the Rumanians are masters. The roof is made first, the walls afterwards. The principle posts are first set into the ground, then the studs of the outer walls and inner partitions are spaced at 1 to 2 foot intervals. After the roof has been formed walls are built up. Mud is kneaded down with the feet, mixed with straw, and shaped into lumps that take the place of bricks. These lumps are then set between the studs and left to dry (Stratilesco, 1907: 208). More often walls are of wickerwork, plastered inside and out with a mixture of mud, straw and cowdung to a thickness of 15-25 centimeters (Jänecke, 1918: 10). The rough walls are smoothed out by applying thinner and thinner layers of mud and cowdung mixture. They are then whitewashed inside and out. Floors of timber are recent; the floor is commonly of tamped earth.

CHAPTER VIII

496 8. Bucarest—Oltenița, a port station on the Danube.

9. Bucarest—Giurgiu, an important Danube port opposite Ruse (Bulgaria).

10. Arad—Oradea—Satu Mare—Halmeu—Câmpulung pe Tisa—Sighet—Valea Visaului—Vișeul de Sus—Borșa.

11. Satu Mare—Baia Mare—Jibou—Dej—Apahida.

12. Dej—Beclean—Ilva Mica—Vatra Dornei—Dărmănești.

3. Staff

497 In 1938 the personnel of the Rumanian State Railways was as follows :—

General and Divisional Headquarters	8,037
Maintenance and Supervision of Permanent Way	13,730
Engine Crews	4,705
Sheds and Workshops	7,584
Main Workshops	21,260
Stations	20,947
Train Staff	6,081
Various	2,322
Total	84,666

4. Locomotives and Rolling-Stock

493 In 1939 there were 3,383 standard-gauge locomotives (2,899 tender type and 484 tank type). As regards narrow-gauge locomotives, figures for 1939 are not available, but in 1938, there were 108 (17 tender type and 91 tank type). Railcars in 1938 totalled 236, of which 8 were steam-operated.

ROLLING-STOCK 1938

(1939 *figures, where available, in brackets*)

	Standard Gauge	*Narrow Gauge*
Total No. of Wagons	62,487	920
Ordinary Wagons	52,107 (53,320)	917 (881)
of which covered	22,670 (23,233)	227 (153)
open	29,437 (30,097)	790 (728)
Special Wagons	1,666	3
of which Tank (state owned)	1,142	3
Privately owned	8,714	—
of which oil tank	8,613	—
Passenger Coaches	3,711 (3,449)	137 (150)

In view of the importance of the oil traffic, it should be noted that there were about 10,000 tank wagons (8,500 owned by the oil companies and 1,500 by the railways).

Coal is the principal fuel used by the railways, consumption of various fuels in 1938 being :—

Coal	944,000 tons.
Brown Coal	501,000 tons.
Heavy Oil	233,000 tons.
Petrol	7,000 tons.
Wood Fuel	19,000 cubic metres.

5. Traffic

497 The following figures relate to the year 1938—

(a) *Goods (Standard and Narrow-Gauge Lines)*

No. of tons	*Tons—km.*	*Average Haul per Ton—km.*
27,680,179	5,795,047	209

The principal goods normally conveyed by the Rumanian State Railways are petroleum and petroleum products, coal, firewood, timber, grain and building materials.

[40a]

COMMUNICATIONS

Out of this total, 58,028 are nominally laid in stone, but of 491 these only 16,118 kms. can be reckoned as good. The rest may be divided into two categories: 27,961 kms. requiring reparation, and 14,909 kms. requiring complete reconstruction. A good network of roads answering the requirements of the country would necessitate the construction of 2,000 kms. of permanent surface roads (paved with granite), 9,000 kms. of semi-permanent or macadamized, while the remaining 59,000 kms. of the existing network should be completely overhauled every six or seven years.

The requisite sum for the construction of this mileage on the basis of present prices would be 40 milliard lei, and the annual outlay for its maintenance may be reckoned at 1,380 million lei.

It was reported that owing to lack of resources the Minister contemplated the adoption of a system of conscript labour, similar to that introduced into Bulgaria, in order to carry on the work of repairing the roads and of constructing 300 to 400 kms. annually, especially in Bessarabia, which was utterly devoid of semi-metalled trunk roads.

The lack of roads in Bessarabia has been one of the standing grievances of the population against the Bucarest Government, for along with the absence of railways, it is next door to impossible to convey agricultural produce to market. 494 One might have thought that steps would have been taken 503 at least to deepen the channel of the Pruth, from its mouth to Ungheni (near Iassi), which would have served as an excellent water avenue for heavy traffic, but such a plan has not proved attractive; on the other hand, a scheme for the construction of a canal to connect Bucarest with the Danube was much to the front during recent years, though no foreign group so far has found the conditions offered by the Government acceptable.

The natural unlaid roads, of which the total length is 491 33,636 kms., usually become impassable in the rainy season even for ox-carts, and as many districts possess only such natural tracks, they are practically cut off for considerable periods from the rest of the country.

o

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

652 should be obtained not through investments but through loans under-
665 taken by the state. In this way Rumania would have full control over the allocation of capital and would not, except for the interest on loans, see the profits from the oil industry go abroad. The petroleum policy of the National Peasants, as formulated in 1929, was even more removed from Stere's recommendations than from the Liberals' policy. It was, however, perfectly consistent with their economic outlook during their term in office.

665 Rumanian transportation and communications had been in no-
652 toriously bad condition since the First World War, and the Liberals'
496 policy of retrenchment had been particularly damaging to the rail-
464 way system. The 1929 stabilization loan allocated $34,000,000 for
471 railway expansion and $9,000,000 to pay off overdue railway debts.
491 By a law passed in July, 1929, the National Peasants transferred the state railways to an autonomous public body, "to be administered
206 according to commercial principles." [62] They also undertook to repair and extend the highway network, and abolished the primitive *corvée* which was still being used for road maintenance. In 1930 the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation received a concession for the construction of the Rumanian telephone network.

665 The stabilization loan required a reform of the National Bank and of the state accounting system. In March, 1929, the government passed a series of new statutes for the bank; the principal changes were the abolition of the ceiling on the issue of currency, established by the Liberals' in 1925, and the limitation of the influence of the state in the appointment of directors. The bank was given somewhat greater independence from state control and powers to maintain the newly achieved stability of the currency. In July, 1929, the government passed a law reforming the state accounting system and the organization of the budget. There was no doubt that Rumanian state finances needed reform and modernization. The accounting system had been that of France of 1860, plus the accretion of a number of purely Rumanian practices, with the result that the actual condition of government finances at any given time was never known with any exactness. The new law, in reorganizing the preparation of the budget, exerted more stringent control over the expenditures of various ministries. While this law was well intended, its actual results in rationalizing Rumanian finance methods seem to have been very

62. Madgearu, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 50. The organization of Rumanian railways after 1918 had been altogether hectic. In 1925 the Liberals had given some autonomy to the railways; this policy was reversed by the People's party in February, 1927, and reestablished by the Liberals in August of that year.

496 499 ROUMANIA has had a hard and costly task in the restoration of her railways and rolling stock to pre-War efficiency. This has been accomplished, and, in addition, steps have been taken towards the re-orientation of communications necessitated by the change of frontiers. A new line is under construction to link Braşov in Transylvania with Buzau and so with the Danube and Black Sea ports. It should play an important rôle in the movement of timber. The Olt valley line from Sibiu is being linked with that which runs from Bucureşti up the Argeş valley to shorten the journey from Bucureşti to Arad and western Europe. It is planned also to link up the Reciţa iron district with the Jiu valley coal field and bring both into closer communication with the capital.

491 ALTHOUGH there has been great progress in the reconstruction and improvement of the railways, road transport is still frankly bad. Only about 17 per cent of the roadways of the country are metalled and can be described as in fairly good condition. The bulk of the roads are mere dirt tracks, which vary in their resistance to frost and rain according to whether they lie on the dusty chernoziom, the loose brown soils or the more cohesive and better-drained podsol.

HILDA ORMSBY, D.Sc. (Econ.)

543 527 443 THE FAIRS at Curtea de Argeş are held twice a year, each lasting about a week and ending respectively on August 15th (Assumption) and October 25th (St. Demetri). The association with Christian festivals is a widespread feature (the word "fair" is derived from *feriæ*, feast), the fairs attracting the crowds which gather for the festivals. It can sometimes be shown that the time and place of meeting are older than Christianity and that the periodic pagan assemblies later received the sanction of the Church. The fair, at any rate, satisfies a deep peasant instinct for worship, the exchange of goods and social intercourse.

THE AUGUST fair at Curtea corresponds with the early harvests of fruit—especially the plum—and, formerly, with the cereal harvests (buckwheat and millets) which maize replaced. It is probably connected in origin with the Lammas fairs of the West. The first of August, in the ancient Celtic calendar, marked the beginning of autumn and was celebrated as a harvest festival. In Ireland the day is still called Lewy's Fair, and is traditionally associated with the lighting of fires, with games and the making of marriage matches. Lammas fair is the largest of the year in some Irish towns.

THE OCTOBER fair would seem to derive its importance primarily from the return of the stock from the mountain pastures, when cheese and wool and surplus animals can be exchanged. A feature of the October fair is the high proportion of sheep and goats among the stock offered for sale. In the French Alps, too, the autumn stock fairs are the most important of the year. The maize harvest has by this time been gathered even in the Carpathian valleys, where winter sets in early. But whatever the position may once have been, the fairs are now more concerned with goods than with stock.

543 CURTEA FAIR-GROUND is situated on the flood plain, on waste ground kept free of permanent habitations by the danger of spring floods. The scarp leading to the first river-terrace rises steeply behind and is planted with trees which provide [312] some shelter for peasants and animals. Here, too, under the scarp, is the well which supplies the needs of man and beast. [496] The main railway—terminus of the line downstream to Pitesti—has extensive sidings on the first terrace immediately behind, while the branch (timber) line to Cumpana runs

RUMANIA

THE RAILWAYS AND COMMUNICATIONS

● 49% The Rumanian railways may be said to consist of three different systems interconnected by a few single lines, which are inadequate for the purpose. These three groups consist of:

(1) The railways of the old kingdom, mainly radiating from Bucarest, and aiming at feeding the traffic of the Danubian ports and Constantsa;

(2) The railways of Transylvania, directed towards Budapest.

(3) The lines of Bessarabia, directed towards Odessa.

At the suspension of hostilities the railways were in a complete state of dislocation, the Austro-Germans having destroyed a large number of bridges on their withdrawal and left behind them only fifty locomotives. The railway tracks in Bessarabia, having formed part of the Russian railway system, were of wider gauge than the normal, so that the lines had to be re-laid and the rolling stock replaced. At first sight it would seem that there was an imperative need to connect western Transylvania with Oltenia by prolonging the railway line along the River Jiu, facilitate central Transylvania's access to the sea by linking up Braşov with Buzau, connect northern Transylvania with Bucovina via Vatra Dornei, and join up Bessarabia on the one hand with Moldavia, and on the other with the Danube mouths, so as to provide this province with a new outlet in place of the Russian port of Odessa. In 1912 a vast programme of railway construction had been elaborated by Al. Coltescu, then director-general of the railways. This comprised the construction of new lines which are of essential importance even to-day, namely:

(1) Extending the line ending at Curtea de Argeş to Jiblea, on the River Olt, thereby shortening the distance between Bucarest and western Transylvania by several hours.

(2) Constructing a new direct line from Craiova via Caracal, Rosiori de Vede, and Vida to Bucarest, and prolonging it to Urziceni and thence either to Buzau or Faurei.

(3) Prolonging the line along the river Jiu and linking it up with the Transylvanian system at Petroşani.

(4) Constructing a line from Tecuciu to Faurei and Giurgeni, the latter at the mouth of the Ialomitsa river, building a bridge over the Danube at Harşova, and connecting the latter with Constantsa.

(5) Terminating the line Medjidia-Tulcea, via Babadag.

Owing to the war this plan had not been carried out, so that a very extensive amount of construction remained to be undertaken, the more so since, besides the lines enumerated above, several important lines had to be constructed in Transylvania in order to provide more direct communication between Cluj and Brasov.

It was roughly estimated that an outlay of some forty milliard lei would be required for the carrying out of the construction of the new lines considered indispensable for the normal development of traffic, but as this sum could not be raised locally, and as the economic policy pursued by Rumania since 1919 precluded the raising of so large a sum abroad, not more than one hundred kilometres have been constructed since 1923. This is an astounding policy in view of the paramount importance of railway communications, both from the point of view of the development as well as that of the defence of the country. Actually all idea of new construction has been abandoned, and the justification given is that the railways cannot be run economically; but this is entirely due to the prevailing mismanagement, and sufficient evidence will be offered in support of this statement. After spending vast sums for the construction of the line Braşov–Buzau, all work has been suspended, and no new lines are expected to be opened for traffic in the near future except some 45 kms. between Chişinau and Sachaidache.

At the end of 1931 the railway system consisted of 11,133 kms. of track, but all this was single track, with the exception of 203 kms. of double track connecting Bucarest via Ploeşti with Campina, and Ploeşti with Buzau. This total of 11,133 kms. also includes 716 kms. of narrow-gauge railways.

The railway lines in the new provinces were laid out to suit different requirements than those actually prevailing,

496 and the unification of the whole system can only be realized by the construction of connecting lines between what so far has been three distinct systems. The laying of double tracks on trunk lines is also imperatively needed in certain sections, such as that of Constantsa-Feteşti. Several offers by foreign groups were made for the reorganization of the railways, but the Rumanian Government would not agree to the stipulations set forth by foreign capitalists, namely, that they should exercise control over the expenditure and that they should be guaranteed repayment. It is indeed strange that financiers should be expected to advance funds without adequate security, especially to an administration which has been characterized by disorder and waste, and that to an extent surpassing what is customary even in Rumania. The methods employed in running the railway system are generally indicative of the chaotic manner in which the whole machinery of government is being run, and will serve to show that there is little hope for real improvement so long as there is no outside control.

496 661 The whole railway system had been endowed with an autonomous administration in 1925 by the Bratianu Government, but, as was to be expected, the chief purpose of the initiators of this measure was to create as many "cushy jobs" for the veterans of the party as possible, so that instead of a simplification and co-ordination there ensued a complication bordering on chaos. The disorder rendered control difficult, or well nigh impossible, and has facilitated fraud to an unprecedented extent. No year has passed without discoveries being made of sensational embezzlements perpetrated to the detriment of the railway administration, through which the latter was despoiled of important sums. Even as late as March, 1932, the Press was publishing details of a fresh scandal through which the State railways had been defrauded of several millions. The *Cuvantul* of May 15th, 1932, related that the chief cashier of the railways at Brasov had embezzled over a million lei. On September 7th, 1927, the *Argus* published an article by a former Minister of Communications in which the latter stated that "he estimated the loss suffered by the railways through lack of control to be about 25 per cent of their gross revenue," and he referred

to methods of fraud applied on a wholesale scale at Galatz 496 by which the railways had been systematically defrauded. 661 For instance, whole truckloads of timber forwarded from Bucovina and destined for Giurgiu, on their arrival at Galatz were fraudulently diverted to another destination, so that the consignee at Giurgiu had to be indemnified by the railway administration for the loss of his goods. In another article, published two days later, the writer enlarged on the lack of co-ordination among the different departments of this administration and the total absence of reliable data on which to form an estimate of the situation, a state of affairs that was positively chaotic. As an illustration of this he cited the fact "that while the Under-Secretary of State affirmed that the year 1926 showed a deficit of one milliard and a half lei, the General Manager of the Railways averred on the contrary that there was a surplus of 200 millions"!

Another paper, the *Cuvantul*, which had undertaken a vigorous campaign against the disgraceful disorder prevailing on the railways, referred in its issue of July 24th, 1927, to the following statement of the Under-Secretary of State for Communications: "It is enough to say that according to the accounts there ought to be one milliard and a half of cash, but instead I am 500 millions in debt. This situation is due to the fact that the profit and loss accounts of preceding years have not yet been closed." The *Cuvantul* proceeded to compliment the Under-Secretary for his outspokenness and to condemn M. V. Bratianu for having deliberately misled the public by affirming that the working of the railways was quite normal and that it had been carried on at a profit for the State. Both the *Argus* and the *Cuvantul* continued to publish articles emphasizing the necessity of foreign loans being obtained so that the railway system might be properly reorganized, and laying stress on the disastrous consequences for the country arising from the actual disorganization. According to these articles, the lines were in complete decay and were almost useless. "The rails of one-fourth of the track were so worn out that it was a miracle that trains could run on them. The number of rotten sleepers exceeded imagination. There were three times less locomotives than the normal average, and the railway junctions were

496 661 continually blocked up. . . ." On October 27th, 1927, the *Cuvantul* related how extensive frauds were found to have been committed by higher railway officials in Transylvania, and that the affair was being hushed up so that these persons might not be incriminated.

On March 3rd, 1928, the same paper enlarged on the collapse of the railway bridge over the Milcov, near Focşani, the construction of which had been entrusted to a favourite of M. V. Bratianu who, so far, instead of being punished, had been appointed to another post. The *Argus* of February 20th, 1929, in an article entitled "What has been done with the Railways?" cites the following facts: "It was decided to illuminate the railway cars with methane gas, and lamps and instruments were bought for this purpose. All these remain unused in the warehouses because it has since been found out that methane gas could not be used for such a purpose. . . . Lathes of a value of 40 millions were ordered; this is a quantity likely to suffice for a period of ten to fifteen years. . . . There are some 280 trucks loaded with corrugated iron. As the annual requirements of the railway administration are about two to three truckloads, this stock is likely to last a century. . . ."

497 661 With the advent of the National Peasant Party to power a slight improvement set in, but it was too much to expect that a system which had become traditional could be altered in the course of a few years. The *Cuvantul* of March 31st, 1929, commenting on the resignation of the general manager of the railways, declared that this was a good beginning. "So far our railways were not an institution for furthering travel and facilitating transport, but a counting-house for the sale, at exorbitant prices, of all kinds of manufactures of the various industrial firms associated with the Liberal Party. . . ." In previous articles the *Cuvantul* had described how the railway administration, being under the control of partisans of the Liberal Party, the latter had done everything in its power to promote the interests of members of that party to the detriment of those of the State. The carelessness and remissness of the railway administration may be gauged by the fact that it positively discouraged traffic on its own lines, and diverted it to foreign countries

497 to we understand why the railway administration has not
661 yet excluded lignite from among the fuels of which it makes use. . . ." A close examination of the items of the expenditure would probably reveal undue liberality under certain heads. Thus the total expenditure for 1930 amounted to 12,577,602,209 lei, of which 2,700 millions were devoted to the upkeep and repair of rolling stock, 746 millions to the upkeep of the lines, 1,830 millions to fuel, 6,743 millions to salaries, wages, etc.

496 Out of the proceeds of the 1929 loan, some 4,751 million lei were earmarked for the reconditioning of the railways. The sum was to be employed for the renewal of the tracks, the purchase of rolling stock, the construction of new lines, and for the improvement and enlargement of workshops. Expenditure on this last item was exceedingly ill-advised, for the railway administration had entered into engagements with certain foreign firms, on the strength of which the latter had built repair-shops, such as the "Astra" Company at Arad, the "Lemaître" workshops at Reşiţa, and the Franco-Romana Co. at Braila. In 1929 there still remained four outstanding contracts expiring in 1935, and guaranteeing a yearly expenditure of 640 millions for constructing locomotives, and two other contracts expiring in 1939 which provided for the repairing of locomotives, of a value of 335 millions. As soon as the railway administration was able to use its new workshops it proceeded to disregard these contracts, and as a result these private firms had to close down and dismiss their workmen. The *Argus* of 11th May, 1932 denounces the railway administration for its indefensible attitude in the following terms:

"These industries have suffered immense losses. Their staff had to be dismissed, and they have been rendered incapable of meeting their engagements. All of them will put in claims for damages, and we can hardly doubt that Justice, taking into consideration the contracts made with the railways, will be found to pronounce in their favour. Who is to pay the damages? Naturally the State, which is also going to lose the taxes which it would have raised on the contracts had they been carried out. But the greatest loss consists in

the loss of confidence which this stupid policy of disregarding legal engagements entails for the State and its administrations." 496

The *Dreptatea* of May 19th, 1932, gives an example of the prevailing favouritism in the granting of contracts by the railway administration. Thus tenders were invited for the renovation of the signalling apparatus on the line Feteşti–Cernavoda in August, 1931, but as the administration desired to favour a certain firm no contract was passed, but finally the order was placed with this particular firm at a price of eleven million lei when other firms had undertaken to do the work for only six and a half millions. Naturally the *Dreptatea* takes the Director-General, M. Ionescu, to task for his attitude, and declares that no one should wonder if the railway administration runs into deficits every year. An additional cause for the losses incurred is the overstaffing of the administration, and especially the numerous sinecures that have been created for the benefit of persons enjoying official protection. A few years ago it was impossible to find out how the administration was being run, for no proper balance sheets had been drawn up for years. Fortunately, a British expert has been invited to supervise the accounts, so that data are now available up to date. But this is obviously an inadequate measure, and the railways will become a paying concern capable of responding to the necessities of the country only when and if they are placed under foreign control, or under the management of some capable and honest Rumanian effectively shielded by foreign influence from all interference by political circles. . . . The slovenly methods so far employed in the railway administration have hampered not only the internal development of the country but have also prevented it from increasing its revenues from traffic transit across Rumania; for the country controls two big trade routes, namely that from Poland and the Baltic States towards the Black Sea and the Near East, which used to be one of the great trade routes of old, and that from Central Europe through Transylvania to Constantsa. 496 661

There are two alternatives to the latter, namely the Danube and that through Yugoslavia, so that if the Rumanian railways were properly managed they could easily 496 505

496 secure a decent share of the traffic, but apparently this is
505 being diverted to the Danube route. In fact the "Commission Internationale du Danube" reported that the river-borne traffic in 1931 had reached the highest figure since the end of the war. This was due not only to the abundant harvests of 1931, but also to increased petroleum transport from both Rumania and Russia to Central Europe. Certain singular anomalies were recorded in this river-borne traffic, namely, that while grain was conveyed from Russia up to Vienna and Ratisbonne, Hungarian grain was being carried downstream for shipment via Sulina to Antwerp and Hamburg.

In order to attract Polish traffic, the Rumanian Government some years ago proposed to create free zones at Galatz, Braila, and Constantsa. A bridge, also, was to be constructed across the Danube between Giurgiu and Rustchuk, the Polish Government even offering to defray half the expenses, but for the present all these schemes seem to have been shelved.

COMMUNICATIONS

491 In a report made by the Minister of Public Works and published by the *Adeverul* in its issue of January 14th, 1932, the following details were given respecting the length and state of the roads.

The state of the roads is lamentable; most of these arteries are impassable, and a superficial reparation would prove useless. The following table will give an approximate idea of their condition:

	Length in Kilometers
Roads paved in stone	
Good condition	16,118
Medium condition	27,961
Bad condition	14,949
Roads laid in gravel	9,318
Natural unlaid roads...	33,636
Total	101,982

CZECHOSLOVAKIA
POLAND
RUSSIA
HUNGARY
MARAMURESH
BUCOVINA
BESSARABIA
MOLDAVIA
CRISHANA
TRANSYLVANIA
BANAT
YUGOSLAVIA
WALLACHIA
BUCAREST
DOBRUDJA
BLACK SEA
BULGARIA
VARNA
BELGRADE
ODESSA
FRONTIERS
MAIN RAILWAY LINES

8

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bucarest]

[The Dobrudja]

Bucarest is also the chief railway centre of Rumania. 361

Giurgiu on the Danube, south of Bucarest and the terminus of one of the oil pipe-lines from Ploesti, is one of the main Rumanian wheat and oil ports. Another Danubian port, where great quantities of wheat are handled, is Braila with a population of about 70,000.

There are no natural barriers to communications in Muntenia. In the south the chief flow of traffic is carried by the Danube. Rail and road communications from Transylvania pass through the Predeal and a railway line leads over the Danube to the Dobrudja. 505 491 496

THE DOBRUDJA (Dobrogea[R]).[1] Up till 1878 the whole of the Dobrudja belonged to Bulgaria. Ever since, this province has been a bone of contention between Rumania and Bulgaria. The northern part of the Dobrudja was awarded to Rumania in 1878 to compensate her for the loss of Southern Bessarabia to Russia. The southern part of the province was ceded by Bulgaria after her defeat at the hands of her neighbours in the Second Balkan War in 1913. This region was returned to Bulgaria in 1940. 175

Geographically the Dobrudja is the north-eastern corner of the Balkan Peninsula. Its boundaries are in the north and west the Danube and in the east the Black Sea. There are three distinct regions: the delta of the Danube, the forests of Babadag, and farther south the steppe, which is the most fertile 131 133

[1] The letter R, H or G following a geographical term denotes a Rumanian, Hungarian or German name, respectively.

361 Another important town, and the greatest Ru-
manian port on the Danube, is Galati with a popula-
504 tion of about 75,000. Galati lies about a hundred miles from the Black Sea, but the harbour is so placed that sea-going ships can enter the port through the delta and anchor there all through the ice-free period. From Galati timber, wheat and maize from all over Rumania are sent abroad. Incoming cargoes of industrial goods are unloaded there.

[496] The only line leading directly to Transylvania goes over the Ghimes Pass. The traffic to Bessarabia is carried by four railway lines.

THE NEW TERRITORIES

131 The New Territories, acquired by Rumania after
175 the war of 1914–18 and partly lost since 1940, cover
[161] an area of 62,800 square miles and were inhabited in 1940 by about 10,500,000 people. The Banat, the Crisana, Maramures and Transylvania formed, up to 1918, parts of Hungary; the Bukovina belonged to Austria, and Bessarabia was taken from Russia. Many parts of the New Territories were agriculturally and industrially better developed than the Old Kingdom.

131 **THE BANAT.** The Rumanian part of the Banat covers
161 an area of about 7,400 square miles and has a population of 1,000,000. The province is bordered in the north by the River Mures[R] (Maros[H], Marosch[G]), in the west by the Yugoslav part of the Banat, in the south by the Danube, and in the east by the Car-
000 pathians. The north-western part of the province is

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Crisana]

[Maramures]

mostly Hungarians, and occupies a similarly important position. Here there are numerous factories, including mills, railway shops and locomotive works and textile factories. Satu-Mare (Szatmar[H]), with 60,000 inhabitants, is the largest town in the Northern Crisana. 361 438

After the Great War the Crisana, which was first occupied by the Hungarians in the tenth century and subsequently colonized by them, was awarded to Rumania. Under the Vienna Award of 1940 part of the Crisana was returned to Hungary, with a considerable Rumanian population. 175

By the same decision the province of Maramures (Marmaros[H]) (about 1,350 square miles), inhabited by over 150,000 people, acquired by Rumania in 1918, was returned to Hungary. Geographically Maramures is a continuation of the Czechoslovak province of Ruthenia. It is enclosed on all sides by chains of mountains covered with thick forests whose great density is rare even in the Carpathians, which are famous for their wealth of trees. It is not easily accessible except by a solitary railway line which comes from Transylvania and leads to Ruthenia. The small population consists of Ruthenians, Rumanians, Jews, Slovaks and Hungarians and is typical of the medley of races to be found in quite small areas of this part of Europe. Owing to the mountainous nature of the country there is little agriculture. The chief occupation of the inhabitants is the felling of trees. The most valuable asset of the province is its mineral wealth. There is oil, gold, copper, salt and coal. The capital and only major town of Maramures is Sighet (Marmaros-Sziget[H]) with a large Jewish population. Sighet, a town of 133 162 [496] 313 135 361

728 of requirements for sulphuric-acid production. Of lesser importance were the salt and coal de-
[135] posits.

The forest resources of Northern Transylvania
[313] are estimated to have accounted for as much as 25 per cent. of pre-war timber production. Apart from timber the food and leather industries
[311] appear to have been the most developed. This area was principally made up of forests and pastures; the arable land provided no surplus
[233] after local needs had been covered. Of livestock losses the most outstanding feature was nearly 2 million sheep.

[496] The railway system, and particularly the railway administration, was severely handicapped by the change of frontiers, which in places cut one part of Rumania off from the other.

Caliacra and Durostor, the two ceded Dobrujan provinces, are mainly agricultural, and though producing a small surplus, contributed little to Rumania's total agricultural output. Of more significance is the cotton-growing area. There are no known mineral deposits, and industry in this area is on a very small scale, relying mainly on handicrafts.

TRANSNISTRIA

727 Transnistria is the name which has been given to the territory lying between the Dniester and the Bug, which was given to Rumania to administer in 1941 subsequent to its capture from the U.S.S.R. by Rumanian and German troops. Transnistria is part of the Southern Ukraine and is mainly agricultural, while such industry as existed has been of no use to the Rumanians on account of the heavy destruction carried out by the Russians. It is probably true to say that this territory has been more of a financial liability than an asset to Rumania on account of the heavy expenditure entailed in repairs, particularly of railways and bridges. Some little advantage has, however, been gained from the harvest of 1942-3.

A. RAILWAYS

I. Pre-War Conditions

496

1. Communications

Before the outbreak of the present war, the Rumanian State Railways' system was as follows:

	km.	miles
Total	11,375	7,053
of which:		
Standard gauge ..	10,715	6,643
Narrow gauge ..	660	410

More than half of this mileage had been acquired following the 1914–18 war, when

5,324 km. (3,299 miles) in Transylvania
1,234 km. (765 miles) in Bessarabia
555 km. (344 miles) in Northern Bucovina

were transferred to Rumania. As a break of gauge existed between the railways of old Rumania and those in the former Russian State of Bessarabia, conversion to the 4ft. 8½in. gauge had to be undertaken. Short sections of line are owned by 17 private companies, but all the lines of any importance are State-owned.

[655]

Rumania was relatively well furnished with railway communications. The length of railway line per 100 sq. km. in 1936 was 3.8 km. (6.3 miles per 100 sq. miles), the same as in Yugoslavia, while in Bulgaria it was 3.2 km. (5.1 miles per 100 sq. miles), and the commercial requirements of the country were adequately served thereby. Since the 1914–18 war, the difficulties connected with the unification of three different systems of railway (Hungarian, Russian and Rumanian) were gradually overcome, and with the conversion of the Russian-gauge track in Bessarabia, the railway organisation became more or less standardised. Three of Rumania's five frontiers were crossed by main lines and the other two by branch lines.

1. *Polish Frontier*

This was crossed by the main Bucarest-Cernăuţi line at Cernăuţi, and was formerly the direct line for through traffic from Bucarest to Warsaw, but the conversions of the railway system in Russo-Poland from standard to 5 ft. gauge in the autumn of 1939, rendered through traffic to Warsaw by this district route impossible without transhipment.

2. *Hungarian Frontier*

The main lines Bucarest—Arad—Curtici and Bucarest—Oradea—Episcopia Bihor provided direct communication between Bucarest and Western Europe via Budapest.

3. *Yugoslavian Frontiers*

Through traffic from Bucarest to Western Europe via Italy and the Simplon Tunnel was served by the main-line route, Bucarest—Timişoara—Jimbolia.

4. *Bulgarian Frontier*

The only direct railway connection between Bucarest and Sofia was by a roundabout route from Bucarest through the Dobruja. The shortest route was by train to Giurgiu, whence ferry steamers cross the Danube to the Bulgarian railway at Ruse.

5. *Russian Frontier*

There was only one frontier crossing, at Tighina—Tiraspol, served by the main line to Iaşi,

496 whence there was a slow train service to Tighina. Change of gauge took place at Tighina and Tiraspol, necessitating transhipment of both passenger and goods traffic at one or other of these points.

From a strategic point of view, the railway system of Rumania suffered from three main disabilities :—

(a) Out of the total of 11,375 km. (7,053 miles) only 491 km. (304 miles) were double tracked.

(b) The railway system of the country was originally constructed to serve the needs of Rumania and Hungary individually, and on account of topographical and political difficulties communications between the two countries were limited to the minimum requirements. As a result, communications across the Carpathian Mountains were quite inadequate, consisting only of three single-line railways.

(c) The railway system of Transylvania was constructed with a view to the defence of the old Hungarian eastern frontier along the Carpathians, and is, in consequence, particularly ill-adapted for north-to-south movements.

[655] The Rumanaian State Railways (*Regia Autonomă a Căilor Ferate Române*—in short C.F.R.), set up in 1929, was directed by an Administrative Council in Bucarest, consisting of 11 members, including a representative of the Minister of Communications. In addition, there was a delegate of the Minister of War and a Government Commissioner with an advisory voice and the right to veto all decisions of the Council. For administrative and maintenance purposes, the railways were divided up into four separate Managing Directions at Bucarest, Timişoara, Cluj and Iaşi.

2. Principal Routes

The principal railway routes are set out below :—

1. Jimbolia (Yugoslav frontier)—Timişoara—Craiova—Bucarest, of comparatively recent reconstruction and relatively well maintained.

2. Curtici—Arad—Vintul-de-Jos—Sighişoara—Braşov—Bucarest, which is a main route from the Hungarian frontier.

3. Episcopia Bihor—Cluj—Teiuş—Sighişoara—Braşov—Bucarest, a main route from the Hungarian frontier Episcopia Bihor (Budapest and Vienna) to Bucarest, using, between Teiuş and Bucarest, the same line as route 2.

4. Orăşeni—Cernăuţi—Paşcani—Adjud—Mărăşeşti—Buzau—Ploeşti—Bucarest. This was formerly the direct route between Bucarest and Warsaw, and is a natural route for traffic between Eastern and Central Rumania (including the oilfields) and Eastern and Northern Germany.

5. Chişinău—Iaşi—Tecuci—Buzău—Bucarest. This line, as from Iaşi, was reconstructed a few years ago.

6. Chişinău—Reni—Galaţi—Brăila—Buzău—Bucarest.

7. Constanţa—Feteşti—Ciulniţa—Bucarest. This line, connecting Bucarest with the Black Sea port of Constanţa, was reconstructed a few years ago.

CHAPTER VIII

496 8. Bucarest—Oltenița, a port station on the Danube.

9. Bucarest—Giurgiu, an important Danube port opposite Ruse (Bulgaria).

10. Arad—Oradea—Satu Mare—Halmeu—Câmpulung pe Tisa—Sighet—Valea Visaului—Vișeul de Sus—Borșa.

11. Satu Mare—Baia Mare—Jibou—Dej—Apahida.

12. Dej—Beclean—Ilva Mica—Vatra Dornei—Dărmănești.

3. Staff

497 In 1938 the personnel of the Rumanian State Railways was as follows :—

General and Divisional Headquarters	8,037
Maintenance and Supervision of Permanent Way	13,730
Engine Crews	4,705
Sheds and Workshops	7,584
Main Workshops	21,260
Stations	20,947
Train Staff	6,081
Various	2,322
Total	84,666

4. Locomotives and Rolling-Stock

493 In 1939 there were 3,383 standard-gauge locomotives (2,899 tender type and 484 tank type). As regards narrow-gauge locomotives, figures for 1939 are not available, but in 1938, there were 108 (17 tender type and 91 tank type). Railcars in 1938 totalled 236, of which 8 were steam-operated.

ROLLING-STOCK 1938

(1939 *figures, where available, in brackets*)

	Standard Gauge	*Narrow Gauge*
Total No. of Wagons	62,487	920
Ordinary Wagons	52,107 (53,320)	917 (881)
of which covered	22,670 (23,233)	127 (153)
open	29,437 (30,097)	790 (728)
Special Wagons	1,666	3
of which Tank (state owned)	1,142	3
Privately owned	8,714	—
of which oil tank	8,613	—
Passenger Coaches	3,711 (3,449)	137 (150)

In view of the importance of the oil traffic, it should be noted that there were about 10,000 tank wagons (8,500 owned by the oil companies and 1,500 by the railways).

Coal is the principal fuel used by the railways, consumption of various fuels in 1938 being :—

Coal	944,000 tons.
Brown Coal	501,000 tons.
Heavy Oil	233,000 tons.
Petrol	7,000 tons.
Wood Fuel	19,000 cubic metres.

5. Traffic

497 The following figures relate to the year 1938—

(*a*) *Goods* (*Standard and Narrow-Gauge Lines*)

No. of tons	*Tons—km.*	*Average Haul per Ton—km.*
27,680,179	5,795,041	209

The principal goods normally conveyed by the Rumanian State Railways are petroleum and petroleum products, coal, firewood, timber, grain and building materials.

[40a]

(b) *Passengers*

497 In 1938, 48.7 million passengers were carried over a total distance of 3,765 million km. (2,339 million miles) for an average journey of 77 km. (48 miles).

II. War-time Changes

1. Territorial Changes

496 722 Few railways have so far undergone greater changes, both on account of territorial transfers and alterations in traffic flows as a result of the war than the Rumanian State Railways. Firstly, in 1940 the system suffered considerable dismemberment, in June 1,665 km. (1,032 miles) of standard and 65 km. (40 miles) of narrow gauge in Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina were taken over by the U.S.S.R.; then in September the Vienna Award resulted in the transfer of a large part of Transylvania, including 1,750 km. (985 miles) of standard and 355 km. (220 miles) of narrow gauge line to Hungary, and 70 km. (43 miles) of the Southern Dobruja line were ceded to Bulgaria. Following the German attack on the U.S.S.R. in June, 1941, the Bessarabian and Northern Bucovina lines were recovered in the early autumn of that year and, at the beginning of 1942, the Germans placed the control and operation of the railways in the newly created province of Transnistria in the hands of the Rumanian State Railways. The Transnistrian system consists in essence of the Odessa-Zhmerinka section of the Odessa-Kiev-Lwow main line and all branches (including the Zhmerinka-Mogilev line) on both sides as far as the Dniester (frontier with Rumania) in the west, and the Bug (frontier with the Ukraine) in the east.

Apart from Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina and Transnistria, the Rumanian State Railways have not so far suffered any substanti direct physical damage. The Russians on their occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina in June 1940 at once converted all lines from the standard European to the Russian gauge, a task which was made easier by the fact that the system had, prior to 1920, been Russian gauge. The Russians, in spite of the resultant difference in gauge, insisted on taking over all standard-gauge locomotives and rolling-stock formerly in use in the territories, even where this had already been withdrawn by the Rumanians. The Russians during their subsequent evacuation of these provinces, and also of Transnistria, withdrew or destroyed virtually all their locomotives and rolling-stock, and on the whole effectively damaged or destroyed the track, bridges, stations and equipment. The Rumanians, therefore, found themselves faced with the task of reconstructing and reconverting back to standard gauge the lines taken over, and of providing the necessary locomotives, rolling stock equipment and staff to work the traffic. The Transnistrian system from the railway point of view represented a liability rather than an asset.

It was not until the end of 1941 that the lines in Bessarabia and Bucovina were all re-opened, and until early in 1942 that traffic was being worked to and from Transnistria. The Transnistrian system possesses a measure of autonomy, believed in practice to be mainly legal and financial, but for practical purposes the lines are operated as an integral part of the Rumanian system. The transfer of the Transylvanian lines to Hungary and the Southern Dobruja line to Bulgaria were effected without any physical damage and, as far as is known, no locomotives or rolling-stock were handed over by the Rumanians in either case. The change was primarily administrative, but

496 normal traffic was disorganised for several weeks
722 owing to troop movements, the transfer of population, evacuation of equipment and other problems incidental to the transfer of the territory.

497 All these changes of necessity caused considerable problems, particularly administrative
722 and considerably affected traffic working. Of the four Divisions in 1939, most of the Cluj Division including Cluj itself and the Tunel-Cluj-Oradea section of the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Cluj-Oradea-Budapest main line, together with part of the Timişoara Division, were transferred to Hungary. Half of the Cernăuţi Division, including Cernăuţi itself and a section of the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Cernăuţi-Lwow main line, was transferred to the U.S.S.R., and parts of the Bucarest Division were transferred to all three countries. The operation of the system was reorganised and centralised under a military directorate in Bucarest, to which German liaison officers have been attached to co-ordinate working and ensure that all German requirements are met. While these officers must presumably have certain powers, and there are also German officers—thought to be equivalent to R.T.O.—at the more important junctions and traffic centres, there is no evidence that the Rumanian State Railways have ever been under direct German control, or that their autonomy has been seriously impaired.

The Rumanian Authorities have had to cope with all these territorial changes and resultant administrative problems during a period when traffic was both considerably heavier than, and the flows entirely different from, before the war. The closing of the sea routes between Rumania and Germany in September 1939—and since June 1940 largely with Italy and the Northern Mediterranean coast—resulted in the transfer to the Danube or to the direct rail routes, of all traffic between Rumania and Germany, Italy and the rest of Europe. Owing to the closing of the Bucarest - Ploeşti - Cernăuţi - Lwow - Przemysl - Cracow-Silesia main line from September 1939 to December 1941 (except for a trickle of traffic for a few months) on account of the occupation of Eastern Poland by the U.S.S.R., the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Braşov-Copşa Mică-Teiuş-Cluj-Oradea or Teiuş-Arad-Curtici, and Ploeşti-Bucarest-Orşova-Timişoara lines were called upon to handle all this traffic. An exception was that sent via the Danube, which had to be rail-hauled to and from the Danube ports, particularly Giurgiu and Orşova. Oil has been, apart possibly from military movements, the most important single traffic; and, in general, German traffic has been sent via the Ploeşti-Teiuş-Oradea and Arad routes and Italian traffic via the Bucarest-Timişoara route.

From early in 1941 when the Germans began to move into the Balkans, first for the Yugoslav/Greek and then the Russian campaign, the Rumanian railways have had to carry in addition large numbers of troops and quantities of supplies. During the Yugoslav campaign when all routes to Greece and Bulgaria via this latter country were closed, the only all-rail route (apart from ferries over the Danube) into Bulgaria was that via the Cernăvodă Bridge and the Dobruja. Rumania served an important rôle as a base for the attack on the Ukraine, and as the German front moved eastwards the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Buzău-Cernăuţi, Buzau-Galaţi-Teghina and Bucarest-Constanţa lines became important as supply routes to the Eastern Front.

2. New Construction and Improvements of the Railway System

499 The lines, which with the exception of the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Câmpina and Ploeşti-Buzău sec-

496 661 continually blocked up. . . ." On October 27th, 1927, the *Cuvantul* related how extensive frauds were found to have been committed by higher railway officials in Transylvania, and that the affair was being hushed up so that these persons might not be incriminated.

On March 3rd, 1928, the same paper enlarged on the collapse of the railway bridge over the Milcov, near Focşani, the construction of which had been entrusted to a favourite of M. V. Bratianu who, so far, instead of being punished, had been appointed to another post. The *Argus* of February 20th, 1929, in an article entitled "What has been done with the Railways?" cites the following facts: "It was decided to illuminate the railway cars with methane gas, and lamps and instruments were bought for this purpose. All these remain unused in the warehouses because it has since been found out that methane gas could not be used for such a purpose. . . . Lathes of a value of 40 millions were ordered; this is a quantity likely to suffice for a period of ten to fifteen years. . . . There are some 280 trucks loaded with corrugated iron. As the annual requirements of the railway administration are about two to three truckloads, this stock is likely to last a century. . . ."

497 661 With the advent of the National Peasant Party to power a slight improvement set in, but it was too much to expect that a system which had become traditional could be altered in the course of a few years. The *Cuvantul* of March 31st, 1929, commenting on the resignation of the general manager of the railways, declared that this was a good beginning. "So far our railways were not an institution for furthering travel and facilitating transport, but a counting-house for the sale, at exorbitant prices, of all kinds of manufactures of the various industrial firms associated with the Liberal Party. . . ." In previous articles the *Cuvantul* had described how the railway administration, being under the control of partisans of the Liberal Party, the latter had done everything in its power to promote the interests of members of that party to the detriment of those of the State. The carelessness and remissness of the railway administration may be gauged by the fact that it positively discouraged traffic on its own lines, and diverted it to foreign countries

by a policy of high rates. Thus in January, 1927, the *Argus* complained that timber exports from Bucovina, instead of being forwarded for shipment via Galatz, were being diverted to Dantzig because (owing to the new rates) the cost of transport for one truckload of timber to the first port amounted to 9,500 lei, while the freightage to the second port cost only 4,400 lei. In another article the complaints of the Transylvanian industrialists were aired, and these likewise complained that owing to high rates and lack of trucks they were losing their foreign trade. It was affirmed that only one-fifth of the number of trucks necessary for Transylvania had been allotted to that region, and that the shortage was made more acutely felt owing to the manifest favouritism attending the allocation of trucks. Moreover, trucks which had been slightly injured were not repaired promptly but shunted on to sidings, where they were left to rot and fall to pieces.

The neglect with which the traffic requirements of Transylvania were treated led industrialists of that region to the conclusion that this was a deliberate policy so that their rivals in the old kingdom might be protected from the influx of goods from Transylvania. (*Argus*, November 27th, 1926.)

A policy of excessive transport rates has been applied, which has wrought incredible harm to the railways by reducing traffic and fostering the development of motor road transport, which is rapidly increasing. The latter is proving a formidable rival to the railways, and competition has become so keen that the railway administration has thought of making use of motor railcars on some lines in order to provide increased services and attract some of the traffic it has lost back again, but though this scheme was mooted several years ago it was only recently that an order for a few steam railcars was given to a Birmingham firm.

In fact the railway administration has since 1927 shown a loss every year. Thus 1927 showed a deficit of 1,278,395,915 lei, 1928 of 1,625,634,902, 1929 of 981,635,257, 1930 of 1,286,001,744, while for 1931, according to the *Adeverul* of January 28th, 1932, it was reported that the deficit would be the largest so far recorded, for while expenditure had re-

447 mained stationary, the revenue was inferior by some 1,600 million lei. Since then it has been announced that the deficit had attained 2,000 millions, and that the year 1932 would [652] also close with an equally large deficit. One of the causes of these huge deficits is that the State never pays its debts to the railway administration, in spite of the formal undertakings it assumed when the 1929 loan was floated. On the other hand the State insists on the railway administration paying into the State Treasury the savings it has effected by the reduction of the salaries of its officials. At the end of March, 1929, M. Vidrighin, a former director of the railways, published in the *Argus* a series of articles which explain some of the reasons why the exploitation of the railways is carried on at a loss. He thus pointed out that there are about four and a half millions of persons who make regular use of the railways, but of these some 800,000 are deputies, officials, pensioners, and military, who benefit by great reductions in the current fares, as do their families. So that some 1,200,000 persons, or about one-third of the regular users of the railways, are carried at a loss. Further, the law encouraging national industries provides that raw materials needed for them are to be carried to the factories at a rebate of 30 per cent, while goods despatched from these factories are to enjoy a 45 per cent reduction from the usual tariff. Thus a large part of the goods transported is handled at a loss. Losses are also incurred on official transport, which is mainly gratuitous.

To make good these losses the administration had hit on the simple contrivance of increasing the rates on goods as well as passenger fares, which expedient has resulted in a steady decrease in revenue. Thus in 1929 the total revenue amounted to 12,375,669,870 lei, in 1930 it had decreased to 11,291,600,463, and for 1931 it is reported that the revenue would again decrease by another 1,600 million lei. Passenger rates were so abnormally high that peasants could scarcely afford to travel by rail. For example, for a distance of 40 kms. a peasant would have to disburse 60 lei, a sum which it would have taken him two days to earn. To put a stop to the decrease in the traffic a drastic reduction of 40 to 60 per cent in the transport rates was recommended again

in the *Argus* of 14th May, 1932, and statistics were quoted 497
to show that since 1927 freight rates had increased by 112.5 per cent, and these charges, which were estimated in 1929 to represent 5.2 per cent of the value of the goods handled, represented in 1931 as high a percentage as 10.2. Owing to the high transport charges there was a serious falling off in traffic; thus while 18,191,860 tons had been carried in 1930, there were only 16,403,536 tons handled in 1931. The *Argus* of 24th and 25th January, 1932 affirmed that railway charges on grain exported averaged 20 per cent of its value, while the cost of carrying timber often reached 40 per cent of its value.

A further reason why the railway administration cannot 497
even cover its expenses is the high price which it has had to 661
pay for its coal. So far it seems to have been under the tutelage and grip of the "Liberal" Party, the partisans of which forced it to buy the bulk of its coal at exorbitant prices from mines which belonged to them. Thus the *Cuvantul* of December 29th, 1928, affirmed that these "Liberal" companies received annually some two milliard lei for supplying coals at the extravagant price of 1,643 lei per ton. The *Lupta*, in an article published on May 14th or 15th, 1932, asserted that while in Rumania expenditure on fuel amounts to 14½ per cent of the total expenses of the railways, Germany expended only 6 per cent on this head, Poland 8 per cent, and Italy, a country totally deprived of coal, spends only 9½ per cent. The paper also complained that expenditure for the upkeep of rolling stock was inordinately high, amounting to 30.6 per cent. in Rumania, as against 12.7 per cent in Germany, 14.7 per cent in Austria, and 17.7 per cent in Poland.

The *Argus* of 24th April, 1932, relates how political influences are being exerted to bring pressure to bear on the railway administration so that it should place orders for a supply of lignite from mines in the valley of the Jiu, at a cost of some 100 millions per annum. This fuel was shown to be useless, and had to be burned mixed up with crude oil in the locomotives. Its purchase constitutes a downright waste, "but when repeated and weighty interventions are resorted

497 to we understand why the railway administration has not
661 yet excluded lignite from among the fuels of which it makes use. . . ." A close examination of the items of the expenditure would probably reveal undue liberality under certain heads. Thus the total expenditure for 1930 amounted to 12,577,602,209 lei, of which 2,700 millions were devoted to the upkeep and repair of rolling stock, 746 millions to the upkeep of the lines, 1,830 millions to fuel, 6,743 millions to salaries, wages, etc.

496 Out of the proceeds of the 1929 loan, some 4,751 million lei were earmarked for the reconditioning of the railways. The sum was to be employed for the renewal of the tracks, the purchase of rolling stock, the construction of new lines, and for the improvement and enlargement of workshops. Expenditure on this last item was exceedingly ill-advised, for the railway administration had entered into engagements with certain foreign firms, on the strength of which the latter had built repair-shops, such as the "Astra" Company at Arad, the "Lemaître" workshops at Reşiţa, and the Franco-Romana Co. at Braila. In 1929 there still remained four outstanding contracts expiring in 1935, and guaranteeing a yearly expenditure of 640 millions for constructing locomotives, and two other contracts expiring in 1939 which provided for the repairing of locomotives, of a value of 335 millions. As soon as the railway administration was able to use its new workshops it proceeded to disregard these contracts, and as a result these private firms had to close down and dismiss their workmen. The *Argus* of 11th May, 1932 denounces the railway administration for its indefensible attitude in the following terms:

"These industries have suffered immense losses. Their staff had to be dismissed, and they have been rendered incapable of meeting their engagements. All of them will put in claims for damages, and we can hardly doubt that Justice, taking into consideration the contracts made with the railways, will be found to pronounce in their favour. Who is to pay the damages? Naturally the State, which is also going to lose the taxes which it would have raised on the contracts had they been carried out. But the greatest loss consists in

CHAPTER II

3. Transport

315 For the transport of oil both for internal consumption and for export, Rumania relied largely upon railways, and except between the wells and the refineries, only a relatively small proportion was transported by pipeline. The three main pipelines were State-owned and were laid mainly for the transport of oil for export: one for white products from Ploeşti to Constanţa with a capacity of 810,000 tons per annum, and two lines for crude and heavy residue from Ploeşti to Giurgiu with a combined capacity of 300,000 tons per annum.

The total quantity of oil through three lines in 1938 was 800,000 tons; 13 per cent. of the exports from Constanţa and 27 per cent. of those from Giurgiu were handled in this way as well as the internal transport of some 184,000 tons of crude [497] oil. The Rumanian fleet of 8,000 tank cars was ample to handle all the oil transported by rail.

The main channel for exports was Constanţa on the Black Sea, through which 3·3 million tons were exported in 1938, as compared with only 935,000 tons through Giurgiu for transport up the Danube.

C. THE INDUSTRY IN WAR-TIME

1. General

315 722 The war has completely altered the orientation of the Rumanian oil industry: normal export trade routes through Constanţa and the Mediterranean were cut and exports to most countries in Continental Europe came under German control as soon as the Germans were astride the Danube at Belgrade, and the main railways through Poland and Yugoslavia. Not only were normal export channels disrupted, but the Rumanian oil industry lost the services of all its foreign technical experts, and could no longer get from the United States supplies of drilling and refinery equipment on which it had very largely relied.

The inevitable result of all this was that in spite of the urgent need for increased production and all German efforts to obtain this, the downward production trend was not halted in 1941, and only 5.483 million tons were produced. That year was, however, one of abnormal difficulties owing to the necessity for reorganising the industry on a war-time basis, rapidly rising prices of almost everything but oil, shortage of man-power owing to Rumanian mobilisation, the difficulty of getting equipment, and above all an abnormally severe winter which hampered transport so severely that production had to be restricted for lack of storage. By dint of continuous German pressure and increased control of the industry, production in 1942 probably reached 5.6 million tons.

Internal consumption has, however, not decreased and is thought to be running at a rate of 2 million tons a year, which leaves between 3 and 3½ million tons available for the Axis and neutral countries in Europe. Italy gets approximately one million tons a year, Germany two million tons, and small quantities go to Switzerland, Sweden and Turkey.

315 439 Except during the winter months when navigation on the Danube is suspended, the majority of exports to Italy go by pipeline to Giurgiu and thence by barge to river ports in Yugoslavia or Hungary for transhipment to Italy by rail-tank car. One of the results of the reorientation of Rumania's oil export trade has been the greatly increased use made of the river port of Giurgiu.

[14a]

313 cooperage and boxmaking plants. The distribution of these is shown in Table II, although separation of the sawmills from the other industries is not possible. There were also three match factories, which covered internal requirements, and four wood-distillation plants, two of which, situated at Margina and Resita, appeared to be relatively large concerns.

5. Exports

313 439 Rumania's timber exports between 1935 and 1938 averaged 1·8 million cubic metres per annum, which was 5 per cent. of total European exports, and gave her the leading place among south-east European countries. Almost 90 per cent. of total exports were conifers, whilst, as the following table shows, sawn goods made up by far the greater part:—

Categories	*Average annual exports 1935–38 (in '000 cubic metres)*	
Sawn goods	1,280	71
Firewood	222	12
Hewn goods	113	6
Sawlogs	71	4
Boxboard, etc	37	2
Pitwood	31	2
Pulpwood	26	1½
Sleepers	21	1½
Total	1,801	100

Exports were made to many countries, including South America, but the most important customers were Hungary, Germany, U.K., Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Greece. Trade with Germany in the immediate years prior to the war was tending to increase.

6. Employment

313 [+64] It was estimated by a qualified expert that the forests gave direct or indirect employment to 750,000 people (about 10 per cent. of the total labour force) in forest work, transport of forest produce and in the timber industry and trade. At least 250,000 were engaged in actual forestry work, but this number probably included part-time and seasonal workers.

7. Transport

[505] [497] Water transport played but a small part in the carriage of timber, carrying only about 700,000 cubic metres per annum. By far the greater reliance was placed on transport by railways, and some 10 million cubic metres were carried by this service each year.

II. PRESENT SITUATION

Under war conditions Rumania has been faced with increasing difficulties for her supply of timber, and as most of the quantities now made available are required for home consumption, she has very little significance as an exporter.

The forest area lost by the cession of part of Transylvania is estimated to be about 1.4 million ha., and as this area accounted for 25 per cent. of pre-war production its loss is of serious consequence. It is estimated that under existing circumstances the maximum annual cut that is possible, if the present forest area is to be maintained, is 12 million cubic metres.

About 210 timber-processing concerns, of which 178 were sawmills, were also lost with Northern Transylvania, but in view of the over-expansion of the timber industry these losses are probably of less serious consequence.

CHAPTER VIII

496 8. Bucarest—Oltenița, a port station on the Danube.

9. Bucarest—Giurgiu, an impertant Danube port opposite Ruse (Bulgaria).

10. Arad—Oradea—Satu Mare—Halmeu—Câmpulung pe Tisa—Sighet—Valea Vinului—Vișeul de Sus—Borșa.

11. Satu Mare—Baia Mare—Jibou—Dej—Apahida.

12. Dej—Beclean—Ilva Mica—Vatra Dornei—Dărmănești.

3. Staff

497 In 1938 the personnel of the Rumanian State Railways was as follows :—

General and Divisional Headquarters	8,037
Maintenance and Supervision of Permanent Way	13,730
Engine Crews	4,705
Sheds and Workshops	7,584
Main Workshops	21,260
Stations	20,947
Train Staff	6,081
Various	2,322
Total	84,666

4. Locomotives and Rolling-Stock

493 In 1939 there were 3,383 standard-gauge locomotives (2,899 tender type and 484 tank type). As regards narrow-gauge locomotives, figures for 1939 are not available, but in 1938, there were 108 (17 tender type and 91 tank type). Railcars in 1938 totalled 236, of which 8 were steam-operated.

ROLLING-STOCK 1938

(1939 *figures, where available, in brackets*)

	Standard Gauge	*Narrow Gauge*
Total No. of Wagons	62,487	920
Ordinary Wagons	52,107 (53,320)	917 (881)
of which covered	22,670 (23,233)	127 (153)
open	29,437 (30,097)	790 (728)
Special Wagons	1,666	3
of which Tank (state owned)	1,142	3
Privately owned	8,714	—
of which oil tank	8,613	—
Passenger Coaches	3,711 (3,449)	137 (150)

In view of the importance of the oil traffic, it should be noted that there were about 10,000 tank wagons (8,500 owned by the oil companies and 1,500 by the railways).

Coal is the principal fuel used by the railways, consumption of various fuels in 1938 being :—

Coal	944,000 tons.
Brown Coal	501,000 tons.
Heavy Oil	233,000 tons.
Petrol	7,000 tons.
Wood Fuel	19,000 cubic metres.

5. Traffic

497 The following figures relate to the year 1938—

(a) *Goods (Standard and Narrow-Gauge Lines)*

No. of tons	*Tons—km.*	*Average Haul per Ton—km.*
27,680,179	5,795,042	209

The principal goods normally conveyed by the Rumanian State Railways are petroleum and petroleum products, coal, firewood, timber, grain and building materials.

[40a]

(b) *Passengers*

●497 In 1938, 48.7 million passengers were carried over a total distance of 3,765 million km. (2,339 million miles) for an average journey of 77 km. (48 miles).

II. War-time Changes

1. Territorial Changes

496 722 Few railways have so far undergone greater changes, both on account of territorial transfers and alterations in traffic flows as a result of the war than the Rumanian State Railways. Firstly, in 1940 the system suffered considerable dismemberment, in June 1,665 km. (1,032 miles) of standard and 65 km. (40 miles) of narrow gauge in Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina were taken over by the U.S.S.R.; then in September the Vienna Award resulted in the transfer of a large part of Transylvania, including 1,750 km. (985 miles) of standard and 355 km. (220 miles) of narrow gauge line to Hungary, and 70 km. (43 miles) of the Southern Dobruja line were ceded to Bulgaria. Following the German attack on the U.S.S.R. in June, 1941, the Bessarabian and Northern Bucovina lines were recovered in the early autumn of that year and, at the beginning of 1942, the Germans placed the control and operation of the railways in the newly created province of Transnistria in the hands of the Rumanian State Railways. The Transnistrian system consists in essence of the Odessa-Zhmerinka section of the Odessa-Kiev-Lwow main line and all branches (including the Zhmerinka-Mogilev line) on both sides as far as the Dniester (frontier with Rumania) in the west, and the Bug (frontier with the Ukraine) in the east.

Apart from Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina and Transnistria, the Rumanian State Railways have not so far suffered any substantial direct physical damage. The Russians on their occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina in June 1940 at once converted all lines from the standard European to the Russian gauge, a task which was made easier by the fact that the system had, prior to 1920, been Russian gauge. The Russians, in spite of the resultant difference in gauge, insisted on taking over all standard-gauge locomotives and rolling-stock formerly in use in the territories, even where this had already been withdrawn by the Rumanians. The Russians during their subsequent evacuation of these provinces, and also of Transnistria, withdrew or destroyed virtually all their locomotives and rolling-stock, and on the whole effectively damaged or destroyed the track, bridges, stations and equipment. The Rumanians, therefore, found themselves faced with the task of reconstructing and reconverting back to standard gauge the lines taken over, and of providing the necessary locomotives, rolling stock equipment and staff to work the traffic. The Transnistrian system from the railway point of view represented a liability rather than an asset.

It was not until the end of 1941 that the lines in Bessarabia and Bucovina were all re-opened, and until early in 1942 that traffic was being worked to and from Transnistria. The Transnistrian system possesses a measure of autonomy, believed in practice to be mainly legal and financial, but for practical purposes the lines are operated as an integral part of the Rumanian system. The transfer of the Transylvanian lines to Hungary and the Southern Dobruja line to Bulgaria were effected without any physical damage and, as far as is known, no locomotives or rolling-stock were handed over by the Rumanians in either case. The change was primarily administrative, but

[40b]

496 normal traffic was disorganised for several weeks
722 owing to troop movements, the transfer of population, evacuation of equipment and other problems incidental to the transfer of the territory.

●497 All these changes of necessity caused considerable problems, particularly administrative
722 and considerably affected traffic working. Of the four Divisions in 1939, most of the Cluj Division including Cluj itself and the Tunel-Cluj-Oradea section of the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Cluj-Oradea-Budapest main line, together with part of the Timişoara Division, were transferred to Hungary. Half of the Cernăuţi Division, including Cernăuţi itself and a section of the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Cernăuţi-Lwow main line, was transferred to the U.S.S.R., and parts of the Bucarest Division were transferred to all three countries. The operation of the system was reorganised and centralised under a military directorate in Bucarest, to which German liaison officers have been attached to co-ordinate working and ensure that all German requirements are met. While these officers must presumably have certain powers, and there are also German officers—thought to be equivalent to R.T.O.—at the more important junctions and traffic centres, there is no evidence that the Rumanian State Railways have ever been under direct German control, or that their autonomy has been seriously impaired.

The Rumanian Authorities have had to cope with all these territorial changes and resultant administrative problems during a period when traffic was both considerably heavier than, and the flows entirely different from, before the war. The closing of the sea routes between Rumania and Germany in September 1939—and since June 1940 largely with Italy and the Northern Mediterranean coast—resulted in the transfer to the Danube or to the direct rail routes, of all traffic between Rumania and Germany, Italy and the rest of Europe. Owing to the closing of the Bucarest - Ploeşti - Cernăuţi - Lwow - Przemysl - Cracow-Silesia main line from September 1939 to December 1941 (except for a trickle of traffic for a few months) on account of the occupation of Eastern Poland by the U.S.S.R., the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Braşov-Copşa Mică-Teiuş-Cluj-Oradea or Teiuş-Arad-Curtici, and Ploeşti-Bucarest-Orşova-Timişoara lines were called upon to handle all this traffic. An exception was that sent via the Danube, which had to be rail-hauled to and from the Danube ports, particularly Giurgiu and Orşova. Oil has been, apart possibly from military movements, the most important single traffic; and, in general, German traffic has been sent via the Ploeşti-Teiuş-Oradea and Arad routes and Italian traffic via the Bucarest-Timişoara route.

From early in 1941 when the Germans began to move into the Balkans, first for the Yugoslav/Greek and then the Russian campaign, the Rumanian railways have had to carry in addition large numbers of troops and quantities of supplies. During the Yugoslav campaign when all routes to Greece and Bulgaria via this latter country were closed, the only all-rail route (apart from ferries over the Danube) into Bulgaria was that via the Cernavodă Bridge and the Dobruja. Rumania served an important rôle as a base for the attack on the Ukraine, and as the German front moved eastwards the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Buzău-Cernăuţi, Buzau-Galaţi-Teghina and Bucarest-Constanţa lines became important as supply routes to the Eastern Front.

2. New Construction and Improvements of the Railway System

499 The lines, which with the exception of the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Câmpina and Ploeşti-Buzău sec-

[41 a]

499 tions, were virtually all single track, were never designed or equipped to carry traffic on this scale. An elaborate programme of new construction and improvement works, certain features of which had been contemplated by the Rumanians for some years, was put in hand to increase the capacity of the various routes. On the routes to the west, the doubling of the Câmpina-Braşov section was pressed forward rapidly and completed by January, 1941, and work is also reported to be in hand on the doubling of sections of the Braşov-Sighişoara-Copşa Mică-Teiuş line. On the routes to the east, the Ploeşti-Buzău double-track section has been extended as far as Adjud on the Cernăuţi line and N. Filipescu on the Galaţi-Tighina line. In addition, extra sidings and new passing loops have been built, and improved signalling and telegraph and telephone circuits have been installed to increase the capacity of the single-track sections. A considerable mileage of line has also been relaid with heavier rails to permit of the use of more powerful locomotives. Work is also in hand on the construction of a number of new lines, including a new line 202 km. (125 miles) long from Bucarest via Videle-Roşiori-Caracal to Craiova, to shorten and relieve the existing route via Piteşti; new lines from Bumbeşti to Livăseni and Deva to Văcău; a new line from Ploeşti to Târgoviste and certain new routes in Bessarabia. Work on several of these lines is understood to be well advanced, and the Bumbeşti-Livăseni and Bucarest-Caracal-Craiova lines are, according to the latest evidence, likely to be completed in the autumn of 1943. Also the long-projected train-ferry between Giurgiu and Ruse was finally brought into use in June, 1941.

497 722 In spite of the relief granted by these improvements, the heavy volume of oil, military and other urgent traffic could be worked only by severe restrictions on ordinary passenger and freight traffic. The restrictions have inevitably varied from time to time and been most severe during periods of heavy military movements and during the winter when the weather has made operating difficult. Passenger-train services are more or less on a skeleton basis, and are at about one-third of pre-war level; yet the principal long-distance trains still carry restaurant and sleeping-cars. Certain restrictions ahve been imposed on travel and the restrictions on freight traffic have had serious economic consequences, particularly on the distribution of firewood. The shortage of locomotives and wagons, particularly since the recovery of Bessarabia and Northern-Bucovina and the taking over of Transnistria, has been acute. In the early part of the war the tank-wagon position was very difficult, but this has been eased by the construction of new vehicles by Germany, and by German requisitioning of wagons from the occupied countries; but apart from this the wagon position has been continually difficult, though a factor of considerable assistance has been that many of the military and supply movements have been into or through Rumania from Germany, and in consequence the Rumanian State Railways have not had to supply the wagons for these trains. The locomotive position has been met by the transfer of locomotives into Rumania by Germany; in addition to German locomotives, requisitioned French locomotives are said to be stationed at various sheds in Rumania.

The Rumanian State Railways are now in an anomalous position. Although a large programme of new construction and improvements has been carried out, heavy claims are being made on the system by Axis war traffic, with the result that the facilities available for ordinary commercial traffic

CHAPTER VIII

497 722 and for passenger travel are severely limited. However, unless there is severe destruction in the later stages of the war, in the long run the Rumanians are bound to benefit from the capital investment in railways, and from the new construction and improvements which have been carried out to meet Axis needs. These improvements though planned long ago, could never have been carried out with the limited financial and technical resources previously available, and could not have been executed so quickly but for German assistance.

B. ROADS

491 Rumania's road system was, by Western European standards, very poorly developed before the war, there being only one International motor road which formed the continuation of the route from Hungary via Oradea Mare—Cluj—Sibiu—Braşov—Bucarest—Giurgiu and a branch line Bucarest—Olenița. Apart from this one major road, the system consists of untarred roads, many of which are in a poor state of repair.

The total length of the road system was reported early in 1943 to be 82,098 km. (51,016 miles), with only 12 per cent. in good state of repair, 22 per cent. being mediocre and the remainder in bad condition. Ownership of the total network is divided as follows :—

State roads	.. 11,465 km.	(7,118 miles)
Provincial roads	.. 26,181 km.	(16,272 miles)
Communal roads	.. 44,452 km.	(27,620 miles)

in 1936 there were some 34,000 cars registered.

The development of the road system has long been the dream of Rumanian propagandists, particularly as a stimulus to tourist traffic, but before the war no large-scale development could be embarked upon because of the lack of available capital.

499 Since the war, work has been started on an ambitious programme of road development, the objects of which are to improve communications between urban systems and to link the system with the International road network.

An Italo-Rumanian road company has started work on the Rumanian sector of one of the future trans-European roads, Trieste—Beograd—Turnu Severin—Bucarest—Constanța, while under a five-year plan, with an expenditure of 75 md. lei, some 5,000 km. (3,100 miles) of road are to be modernised with the help of German and Italian contractors.

C. SHIPPING

1. Introduction

505 439 A high percentage of Rumania's foreign trade is water-borne (55 per cent. in 1937), as not only is she situated on the Black Sea, but the Danube traverses the full west to east length of the country forming an important traffic route and link with Central Europe.

The following table shows comparative tonnages for sea and river traffic in 1937 and 1938 :—

	1937	1938
	'000 *metric tons*	
Sea :		
Imports	622	540
Exports	6,918	5,222
River :		
Imports	1,890	1,568
Exports	3,161	2,688

As a result of the cutting-off of overseas markets since 1940 an increasing share of the country's

496 499 ROUMANIA has had a hard and costly task in the restoration of her railways and rolling stock to pre-War efficiency. This has been accomplished, and, in addition, steps have been taken towards the re-orientation of communications necessitated by the change of frontiers. A new line is under construction to link Braşov in Transylvania with Buzau and so with the Danube and Black Sea ports. It should play an important rôle in the movement of timber. The Olt valley line from Sibiu is being linked with that which runs from Bucureşti up the Argeş valley to shorten the journey from Bucureşti to Arad and western Europe. It is planned also to link up the Reciţa iron district with the Jiu valley coal field and bring both into closer communication with the capital.

491 ALTHOUGH there has been great progress in the reconstruction and improvement of the railways, road transport is still frankly bad. Only about 17 per cent of the roadways of the country are metalled and can be described as in fairly good condition. The bulk of the roads are mere dirt tracks, which vary in their resistance to frost and rain according to whether they lie on the dusty chernoziom, the loose brown soils or the more cohesive and better-drained podsol.

HILDA ORMSBY, D.Sc. (Econ.)

496 normal traffic was disorganised for several weeks
722 owing to troop movements, the transfer of population, evacuation of equipment and other problems incidental to the transfer of the territory.

497 All these changes of necessity caused con-
722 siderable problems, particularly administrative and considerably affected traffic working. Of the four Divisions in 1939, most of the Cluj Division including Cluj itself and the Tunel-Cluj-Oradea section of the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Cluj-Oradea-Budapest main line, together with part of the Timişoara Division, were transferred to Hungary. Half of the Cernăuţi Division, including Cernăuţi itself and a section of the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Cernăuţi-Lwow main line, was transferred to the U.S.S.R., and parts of the Bucarest Division were transferred to all three countries. The operation of the system was reorganised and centralised under a military directorate in Bucarest, to which German liaison officers have been attached to co-ordinate working and ensure that all German requirements are met. While these officers must presumably have certain powers, and there are also German officers—thought to be equivalent to R.T.O.—at the more important junctions and traffic centres, there is no evidence that the Rumanian State Railways have ever been under direct German control, or that their autonomy has been seriously impaired.

The Rumanian Authorities have had to cope with all these territorial changes and resultant administrative problems during a period when traffic was both considerably heavier than, and the flows entirely different from, before the war. The closing of the sea routes between Rumania and Germany in September 1939—and since June 1940 largely with Italy and the Northern Mediterranean coast—resulted in the transfer to the Danube or to the direct rail routes, of all traffic between Rumania and Germany, Italy and the rest of Europe. Owing to the closing of the Bucarest - Ploeşti - Cernăuţi - Lwow - Przemysl - Cracow-Silesia main line from September 1939 to December 1941 (except for a trickle of traffic for a few months) on account of the occupation of Eastern Poland by the U.S.S.R., the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Braşov-Copşa Mică-Teiuş-Cluj-Oradea or Teiuş-Arad-Curtici, and Ploeşti-Bucarest-Orşova-Timişoara lines were called upon to handle all this traffic. An exception was that sent via the Danube, which had to be rail-hauled to and from the Danube ports, particularly Giurgiu and Orşova. Oil has been, apart possibly from military movements, the most important single traffic; and, in general, German traffic has been sent via the Ploeşti-Teiuş-Oradea and Arad routes and Italian traffic via the Bucarest-Timişoara route.

From early in 1941 when the Germans began to move into the Balkans, first for the Yugoslav/Greek and then the Russian campaign, the Rumanian railways have had to carry in addition large numbers of troops and quantities of supplies. During the Yugoslav campaign when all routes to Greece and Bulgaria via this latter country were closed, the only all-rail route (apart from ferries over the Danube) into Bulgaria was that via the Cernavodă Bridge and the Dobruja. Rumania served an important rôle as a base for the attack on the Ukraine, and as the German front moved eastwards the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Buzău-Cernăuţi, Buzau-Galaţi-Teghina and Bucarest-Constanţa lines became important as supply routes to the Eastern Front.

2. New Construction and Improvements of the Railway System

499 The lines, which with the exception of the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Câmpina and Ploeşti-Buzău sec-

[41 a]

●499 tions, were virtually all single track, were never designed or equipped to carry traffic on this scale. An elaborate programme of new construction and improvement works, certain features of which had been contemplated by the Rumanians for some years, was put in hand to increase the capacity of the various routes. On the routes to the west, the doubling of the Câmpina-Brașov section was pressed forward rapidly and completed by January, 1941, and work is also reported to be in hand on the doubling of sections of the Brașov-Sighișoara-Copșa Mică-Teiuș line. On the routes to the east, the Ploești-Buzău double-track section has been extended as far as Adjud on the Cernăuți line and N. Filipescu on the Galați-Tighina line. In addition, extra sidings and new passing loops have been built, and improved signalling and telegraph and telephone circuits have been installed to increase the capacity of the single-track sections. A considerable mileage of line has also been relaid with heavier rails to permit of the use of more powerful locomotives. Work is also in hand on the construction of a number of new lines, including a new line 202 km. (125 miles) long from Bucarest via Videle-Roșiori-Caracal to Craiova, to shorten and relieve the existing route via Pitești; new lines from Bumbești to Livăseni and Deva to Văscău; a new line from Ploești to Târgoviste and certain new routes in Bessarabia. Work on several of these lines is understood to be well advanced, and the Bumbești-Livăseni and Bucarest-Caracal-Craiova lines are, according to the latest evidence, likely to be completed in the autumn of 1943. Also the long-projected train-ferry between Giurgiu and Ruse was finally brought into use in June, 1941.

497 722 In spite of the relief granted by these improvements, the heavy volume of oil, military and other urgent traffic could be worked only by severe restrictions on ordinary passenger and freight traffic. The restrictions have inevitably varied from time to time and been most severe during periods of heavy military movements and during the winter when the weather has made operating difficult. Passenger-train services are more or less on a skeleton basis, and are at about one-third of pre-war level; yet the principal long-distance trains still carry restaurant and sleeping-cars. Certain restrictions ahve been imposed on travel and the restrictions on freight traffic have had serious economic consequences, particularly on the distribution of firewood. The shortage of locomotives and wagons, particularly since the recovery of Bessarabia and Northern-Bucovina and the taking over of Transnistria, has been acute. In the early part of the war the tank-wagon position was very difficult, but this has been eased by the construction of new vehicles by Germany, and by German requisitioning of wagons from the occupied countries; but apart from this the wagon position has been continually difficult, though a factor of considerable assistance has been that many of the military and supply movements have been into or through Rumania from Germany, and in consequence the Rumanian State Railways have not had to supply the wagons for these trains. The locomotive position has been met by the transfer of locomotives into Rumania by Germany; in addition to German locomotives, requisitioned French locomotives are said to be stationed at various sheds in Rumania.

The Rumanian State Railways are now in an anomalous position. Although a large programme of new construction and improvements has been carried out, heavy claims are being made on the system by Axis war traffic, with the result that the facilities available for ordinary commercial traffic

[41b]

497 and for passenger travel are severely limited. However, unless there is severe destruction in the later stages of the war, in the long run the Rumanians are bound to benefit from the capital investment in railways, and from the new construction and improvements which have been carried out to meet Axis needs. These improvements though planned long ago, could never have been carried out with the limited financial and technical resources previously available, and could not have been executed so quickly but for German assistance.

722

B. ROADS

491 Rumania's road system was, by Western European standards, very poorly developed before the war, there being only one International motor road which formed the continuation of the route from Hungary via Oradea Mare—Cluj—Sibiu—Brașov—Bucarest—Giurgiu and a branch line Bucarest—Olenița. Apart from this one major road, the system consists of untarred roads, many of which are in a poor state of repair.

The total length of the road system was reported early in 1943 to be 82,098 km. (51,010 miles), with only 12 per cent. in good state of repair, 22 per cent. being mediocre and the remainder in bad condition. Ownership of the total network is divided as follows :—

State roads ..	11,465 km.	(7,118 miles)
Provincial roads ..	26,181 km.	(16,272 miles)
Communal roads ..	44,452 km.	(27,620 miles)

in 1936 there were some 34,000 cars registered.

The development of the road system has long been the dream of Rumanian propagandists, particularly as a stimulus to tourist traffic, but before the war no large-scale development could be embarked upon because of the lack of available capital.

499 Since the war, work has been started on an ambitious programme of road development, the objects of which are to improve communications between urban systems and to link the system with the International road network.

An Italo-Rumanian road company has started work on the Rumanian sector of one of the future trans-European roads, Trieste—Beograd—Turnu Severin—Bucarest—Constanța, while under a five-year plan, with an expenditure of 75 md. lei, some 5,000 km. (3,100 miles) of road are to be modernised with the help of German and Italian contractors.

C. SHIPPING

1. Introduction

505 A high percentage of Rumania's foreign trade
439 is water-borne (55 per cent. in 1937), as not only is she situated on the Black Sea, but the Danube traverses the full west to east length of the country forming an important traffic route and link with Central Europe.

The following table shows comparative tonnages for sea and river traffic in 1937 and 1938 :—

	1937	1938
	'000 *metric tons*	
Sea :		
Imports	622	540
Exports	6,918	5,222
River :		
Imports	1,890	1,568
Exports	3,161	2,688

As a result of the cutting-off of overseas markets since 1940 an increasing share of the country's

133 502 trained pilots is compulsory, while the barge tows have to be broken up into smaller units. This sector of the Danube cannot be negotiated at night, which constitutes an enormous hindrance for large-scale traffic. In order to speed up the traffic, the use of suspension railways and locomotives on rails laid along the river bank was introduced before the war, but the system has met with only moderate success.

[503] Navigation in the Maritime sector of the Danube is affected by silting up—particularly in the autumn—and constant dredging has to be carried out in the Sulina branch to maintain sufficient depth for passage of vessels up to Galaţi. The depth of this sector was 24 ft. in 1939, permitting the entry of vessels of medium draught only. Danube navigation is held up for varying periods between November and March by ice, averaging 30-50 days, and occasionally even for 90 days.

499 There are no permanent bridges on the Danube to connect Rumania with Bulgaria. However, a Rumanian-Bulgarian Commission was established in 1942 to remedy this deficiency by arranging for the construction of a bridge, which will take five years to complete, between Giurgiu and Ruse. In the meantime a ferry system is in use between Giurgiu and Ruse carrying important supplies of oil for the German forces in Greece.

3. River Ports

503 504 There are in all some 38 river ports, of which the most important, all on the Danube (from west to east), are as follows :—

Moldova	Oltenița
Orşova	Brăila
Turnu Severin	Galaţi
Giurgiu	Sulina

Since the war started considerable improvements have already been made on the Danube. This is of special significance for, though this waterway is of little use for Rumanian internal traffic, since the closing of the sea route between Rumania and North Germany, it has become vitally important for the carrying of bulky transport. As early as 1940 a scheme for the rationisation of Danube traffic was put into operation, and the installations of Giurgiu, the main Danube port for oil transport, were improved.

To avoid congestion at Giurgiu, the Danube ports of New Moldova and Orşova have been enlarged. Internal traffic has been diverted to Oltenița, which is also used for the unloading of incoming traffic. The construction of new harbour installations is being carried out by a German-Rumania company.

4. Organisation of Inland Water Shipping

505 656 [655] Rumanian Danube shipping is under State control, and organisation is carried out by firms which are partly State-owned and partly owned by private individuals. The most important company is the State-owned "N.F.R." (*Navigaţiunea Fluvială Română*), and of lesser importance are the privately owned companies "S.R.D." (*S.A.R. de Navigaţie pe Dunăre*) and "Sind" (*Societa Italiana di Navigazione Danubiana*).

505 648 All Rumanian shipping companies are members of the Danube Shipping Pool, which is under German supervision, headed by the *Deutsche Donauschiffahrtsgruppe*, which is closely connected with the Hermann Goering-Werke für Binnenschiffahrt. The importance of the Danube Pool (exclusive of the Tanker Pool) will be realised when it is borne in mind that between 1932-1937 the freight carried annually by its vessels on the

CHAPTER XI

463 industrial labour. One-third of all workers en-
438 gaged in industry are independent artisans, on whom the community is dependent for its services, but who do not play any important part in war production. In certain of the larger armament works German controllers have effected a considerable degree of rationalisation.

3. Mining

316 There is a shortage of miners; Russian prisoners
727 of war have been employed in mining during 1942. Many miners were reported to have been included in the territory transferred to Hungary.

4. Armament Works

719 There is a general shortage of labour in metal
464 and engineering factories, particularly of skilled labour. A 12-hour day was legalised at the beginning of 1942, but it is doubtful if in fact a 12-hour day is ever worked.

5. Timber

313 There is a shortage of labour, both for lumbering
464 and for timber manufacture.

6. Textiles and Clothing

464 The total number of workers in these industries
288 has probably fallen considerably, due to reduction of available raw materials. The delivery of supplies
294 to individual mills seems to be somewhat erratic, and there is evidence of considerable part-time work, for instance in a survey of some 43 factories, in December, 1942, 11 were working full time, 21 on a reduced scale, and 11 at a very reduced scale.

7. Building

499 The extent of fortification building and general
712 road and rail construction in Rumania is unknown, but in the second half of 1942 there was evidence
464 of a scarcity of general labour for such projects, and of Russian prisoners of war working on rail construction.

438 In the other branches of occupation, transport
464 services, etc., there is no evidence of labour shortage, apart from doctors, many of whom have
[759] been mobilised for the army.

D. CONTROL OF LABOUR

1. The Youth Labour Service

466 A youth labour service founded on the German
883 model was established in March 1941. The leaders were trained in Germany, but it was only in April 1942 that the labour camps began to function. Youths are called up in their 19th–20th year, and the period of service lasts 7 months.

(*See* Part II, Chapter V.B. for further details.)

2. Civil Mobilisation

466 A general civil mobilisation decree was passed in May 1941 by which (1) employment cards were introduced; (2) men and women aged 20-57 were liable to compulsory employment if not employed.

Two subsequent decrees were published in March and May 1943, one for the reorganisation of agriculture, forestry and fishing, and the second for the reorganisation of industry. Each of these decrees gave full powers to the appropriate authorities for the mobilisation and transfer of labour.

In addition to the general labour decrees which have so far had little influence on the labour situation, there have been regional decrees applying to individual localities, e.g. in Bessarabia, in February 1942, all the inhabitants aged 12-70 were called upon for compulsory agricultural labour unless already employed.

504
505

cleared without very considerable development. It is probable that not more than about 50 per cent. of the above capacity could be worked. Grain is loaded by land and floating elevators.

●[502]

The ports of Brăila and Galați are ice-bound during some winters, ice occurring to a sufficient extent to prevent navigation from the Black Sea between January and mid-March in about 3 years in 10.

D. INLAND WATERWAYS

I. General

133
505
487

In 1937 navigable waterways totalled 2,840 km (1,766 miles) and were divided as follows :—

	Km.	*Miles*
Danube	1,075	668
Danube tributaries	395	246
Dniester	740	460
Prut	410	255
Mureș	185	115
Bega Canal.. ..	35	22

The rivers Dniester, Prut and Mureș have not been adequately regulated for regular traffic, but are used for local traffic and for timber floating.

II. The Danube

1. Traffic

487
505
439

The Danube, Rumania's main traffic artery, carried about 60 per cent. of all import tonnage and some 15 per cent. of all exports in the years immediately before the war. Traffic is of two distinct types; first, the traffic in sea-going vessels with an average size of 2,000-2,500 tons proceeding as far as Galați and Brăila via the Sulina mouth, and second, on the river proper, on the Danube above Galați.

The sea-going traffic passing through the Sulina mouth in the years just before the war consisted of about 1·2—1·4 million tons a year of exports from Rumania or other riparian states. By far the most important items were grain and timber. About half the vessels entering the Danube from the sea appear to have been in ballast, the remainder bringing in some 300,000-500,000 tons of imports mainly for Rumania.

Inland-water traffic on the Rumanian sector of the Danube in 1936 (the latest year for which information for all kinds of traffic is available) amounted to 3 million tons. 1·6 million tons consisted of upstream traffic from Rumania to other riparian states, 0·24 million tons of downstream traffic to Rumania, about 1 million tons of Rumanian internal traffic, and about 0·2 million

CHAPTER VIII

487
505
439

of transit traffic (mainly downstream). Traf[illegible] with other riparian states was apportione[illegible] follows :—

	From Rumania	*To Rumania*
	'000 tons	
Germany ..	220	40
Austria	390	20
Czechoslovakia ..	440	30
Hungary ..	300	150
Yugoslavia ..	200	—
Bulgaria	80	3
	1,630	243

The composition of inland-water traffic has been fully analysed only at the Iron Gates, at the western end of the Danube's Rumanian course. In the traffic shown below, the upstream traffic consisted mainly of Rumanian exports, while the downstream traffic was made up of imports and transit traffic in approximately equal proportions.

Traffic in '000 metric tons at the Iron Gates :—

	1938	193[illegible]
	Upstream	
Total	1,362·5	1,864·[illegible]
of which (main items only) :		
Timber	20·1	11·9
Iron	21·1	13·4
Wheat	30·3	300·6
Barley	49·8	68·0
Maize	25·1	125·[illegible]
Petroleum and its products	787·7	1,046·1
Salt	30·8	31·7
	Downstream	
Total	489·3	771·2
of which (main items only) :		
Iron	77·2	22·2
Timber	67·6	86·5
Wheat	74·4	363·0
Maize and oats	79·6	28·2

505
439
722

Little is known about traffic since Rumania finally joined the Axis in 1941. As a whole, it is below pre-war level as a result of a great decrease in the amount of grain coming forward. This has been partly, but certainly not entirely, counterbalanced by a slight increase in oil traffic, by the probable diversion of rail traffic to the Danube and by military traffic. The most important individual traffics at the present time are as follows :—

(*a*) Oil shipments from Giurgiu (i) upstream to Italy (50-70,000 tons a month), to Germany (possibly 30-50,000 tons a month), and (ii) downstream to German forces in South Russia (quantity unknown, but may be substantial).

(*b*) Downstream supplies of (i) coal to Rumanian railways (part only of total supply), and of (ii) military equipment, stores, etc., to South Russia (quantities unknown).

(*c*) Upstream supplies of (i) some S. Russian products, including grain (perhaps 20,000 tons a month) and possibly iron and manganese ore (quantities unknown), as well as of (ii) some small quantities of Rumanian exports of agricultural products.

2. Navigation

133
502

The Iron Gate Sector of the Danube between Orşova and Turnu Severin, with its rapids and reefs causing violent currents, is particularly difficult for navigation, and the use of specially

[44a]

133 trained pilots is compulsory, while the barge tows
●502 have to be broken up into smaller units. This sector of the Danube cannot be negotiated at night, which constitutes an enormous hindrance for large-scale traffic. In order to speed up the traffic, the use of suspension railways and locomotives on rails laid along the river bank was introduced before the war, but the system has met with only moderate success.

[503] Navigation in the Maritime sector of the Danube is affected by silting up—particularly in the autumn—and constant dredging has to be carried out in the Sulina branch to maintain sufficient depth for passage of vessels up to Galaţi. The depth of this sector was 24 ft. in 1939, permitting the entry of vessels of medium draught only. Danube navigation is held up for varying periods between November and March by ice, averaging 30-50 days, and occasionally even for 90 days.

499 There are no permanent bridges on the Danube to connect Rumania with Bulgaria. However, a Rumanian-Bulgarian Commission was established in 1942 to remedy this deficiency by arranging for the construction of a bridge, which will take five years to complete, between Giurgiu and Ruse. In the meantime a ferry system is in use between Giurgiu and Ruse carrying important supplies of oil for the German forces in Greece.

3. River Ports

503 There are in all some 38 river ports, of which the
504 most important, all on the Danube (from west to east), are as follows :—

Moldova	Oltenița
Orşova	Brăila
Turnu Severin	Galaţi
Giurgiu	Sulina

Since the war started considerable improvements have already been made on the Danube. This is of special significance for, though this waterway is of little use for Rumanian internal traffic, since the closing of the sea route between Rumania and North Germany, it has become vitally important for the carrying of bulky transport. As early as 1940 a scheme for the rationisation of Danube traffic was put into operation, and the installations of Giurgiu, the main Danube port for oil transport, were improved.

To avoid congestion at Giurgiu, the Danube ports of New Moldova and Orşova have been enlarged. Internal traffic has been diverted to Oltenița, which is also used for the unloading of incoming traffic. The construction of new harbour installations is being carried out by a German-Rumania company.

4. Organisation of Inland Water Shipping

Rumanian Danube shipping is under State
505 control, and organisation is carried out by firms
656 which are partly State-owned and partly owned
[655] by private individuals. The most important company is the State-owned "N.F.R." (*Navigaţiunea Fluvială Română*), and of lesser importance are the privately owned companies "S.R.D." (*S.A.R. de Navigaţie pe Dunăre*) and "Sind" (*Società Italiana di Navigazione Danubiana*).

505 All Rumanian shipping companies are members
648 of the Danube Shipping Pool, which is under German supervision, headed by the *Deutsche Donauschiffahrtsgruppe*, which is closely connected with the Hermann Goering-Werke für Binnenschiffahrt. The importance of the Danube Pool (exclusive of the Tanker Pool) will be realised when it is borne in mind that between 1932-1937 the freight carried annually by its vessels on the

COMMUNICATIONS

Out of this total, 58,028 are nominally laid in stone, but of 491
these only 16,118 kms. can be reckoned as good. The rest may be divided into two categories: 27,961 kms. requiring reparation, and 14,909 kms. requiring complete reconstruction. A good network of roads answering the requirements of the country would necessitate the construction of 2,000 kms. of permanent surface roads (paved with granite), 9,000 kms. of semi-permanent or macadamized, while the remaining 59,000 kms. of the existing network should be completely overhauled every six or seven years.

The requisite sum for the construction of this mileage on the basis of present prices would be 40 milliard lei, and the annual outlay for its maintenance may be reckoned at 1,380 million lei.

It was reported that owing to lack of resources the Minister contemplated the adoption of a system of conscript labour, similar to that introduced into Bulgaria, in order to carry on the work of repairing the roads and of constructing 300 to 400 kms. annually, especially in Bessarabia, which was utterly devoid of semi-metalled trunk roads.

The lack of roads in Bessarabia has been one of the stand- 494
ing grievances of the population against the Bucarest Government, for along with the absence of railways, it is next door to impossible to convey agricultural produce to market.
One might have thought that steps would have been taken 503
at least to deepen the channel of the Pruth, from its mouth to Ungheni (near Iassi), which would have served as an excellent water avenue for heavy traffic, but such a plan has not proved attractive; on the other hand, a scheme for the construction of a canal to connect Bucarest with the Danube was much to the front during recent years, though no foreign group so far has found the conditions offered by the Government acceptable.

The natural unlaid roads, of which the total length is 491
33,636 kms., usually become impassable in the rainy season even for ox-carts, and as many districts possess only such natural tracks, they are practically cut off for considerable periods from the rest of the country.

G

135 the Olt, copper near Baia de Arama and salt near Ocnele Mari, north of Govora. The peasant population, in spite of the great agricultural wealth of the province, is extremely poor. The people live in small villages near the rivers. The houses are more often than not almost subterranean mud-huts. Agricultural implements are very primitive. The wooden plough is still widely used.

511 361

175 Oltenia was the first district of Rumania which was colonized by the Romans. It formed the spearhead, and later the base, for the Roman penetration of Dacia. Among the most interesting relics of Roman times found in Oltenia are the ruins of a bridge built by Trajan and the fort just outside Turnu-Severin. After the Roman withdrawal Oltenia shared the fortunes of Muntenia,[1] and in 1859 joined the Principality of Rumania.

361 The capital and chief industrial and commercial town of Oltenia is Craiova with a population of about 60,000. It is also the road and rail junction linking Bucarest with Oltenia and the western provinces. Turnu-Severin on the Danube is the important port guarding the famous 'Iron Gates'. Here the current of the Danube, passing through a narrow gorge is too strong and the water too shallow for shipping to make headway upstream. A deep channel has therefore been blasted in the rock of the river bed and vessels are towed up it by locomotives on the railway alongside. Before the Great War Turnu-Severin was the frontier town between Rumania and Austria-Hungary. It has still preserved the character of a picturesque oriental marketing centre.

[503]

[1] Except that in 1718, after the Austrian occupation of Belgrade, Oltenia was temporarily under Austrian rule.

131 part of the Dobrudja. The delta of the Danube is
133 formed by the three arms Chilia, Sulina and St George. It includes an area of about 1,000 square miles, in which water and land, marshes, lakes and
• [503] islands feed an almost tropical vegetation. The chief communications through the delta are provided by the Sulina canal and by causeways.

311 The steppes of the Southern Dobrudja yield good
135 crops of wheat and maize, and the pastures maintain great herds of sheep. Mineral resources are confined to some unworked coal deposits, valuable copper near Altantepe, and sulphur.

131 The Dobrudja is about 9,300 square miles in all:
161 of this some 2,960 square miles were returned to Bulgaria in 1940. The population of the province as a whole is about 850,000. Its main value to the contesting States lies in the Black Sea stretch of
504 coast. The port of Constanza, the greatest and most
361 important on the western shores of the Black Sea, has modern harbour works built at the beginning of this century and covering an area of 60 hectares. It was through Constanza that Rumanian exports used to pass to France and Great Britain. The docks of Constanza are about 30 ft. deep and can, therefore, be used by large, sea-going ships. The harbour facilities include storage buildings for wheat and oil-tanks with a capacity for over 200,000 cubic metres of fuel, which are fed by the pipe-lines coming from Ploesti. Oil can moreover be pumped straight from the pipe-lines simultaneously into four tankers. Another great advantage is that the port is
361 completely ice-free all the winter. Constanza is the administrative centre of the Dobrudja and also a well-known seaside resort. Rail communications

(a) *Constanța*

504
505 Constanța, which is situated on the Black Sea and is Rumania's most modern port, is, in fact, her only port actually on the coast, and before the war was, therefore, of some considerable importance. Since the Russian campaign, however, its significance has dwindled enormously, due to the presence of Russian submarines in the Black Sea and to the curtailment of Rumania's overseas markets, which means that trade is mainly carried on the Danube and by rail.

Exports from Constanța consisted mainly of petroleum products which came by pipe-line from the Ploești district. A considerable portion of the country's general trade, including some cereal export, was also handled here.

[503] Heavy draught ships can anchor in Constanța harbour, but continued dredging is necessary inside the harbour to maintain the various depths. The estimated daily general-cargo discharging capacity of the port is about 7,200 tons. Total capacity for oil storage is about 660,000 tons at and in the vicinity of Constanța.

(b) *Brăila*

Braila, which is situated on the left bank of the Danube, is the normal limit of navigation on the Danube for ocean-going vessels. It is the principal port for grain export and is well equipped with grain-handling facilities, such as silos, elevators, etc. Small quantities of timber are also handled.

The width of the river channel at Brăila is normally 330 yards, though greater during the spring floods.

The estimated daily general-cargo discharging capacity is about 3,000 tons.

Grain is usually loaded into ocean-going vessels by floating elevators, the working capacity of which is estimated to be about 150 tons per hour under normal working conditions.

Total warehouse capacity of all the warehouses in the dock basin section for storing goods is 6,400 tons.

(c) *Galați*

This port is also situated on the left bank of the river Danube and is the chief inland port of entry [712] into Rumania, as well as being the headquarters of the Rumanian navy. It is the centre of the timber export trade, being situated just below the junction of the Siret River down which most of the wood from the Carpathians is floated. It is also well situated for the receipt of timber by rail from the Bucovina and from North Moldavia.

[43c]

133 trained pilots is compulsory, while the barge tows
502 have to be broken up into smaller units. This sector of the Danube cannot be negotiated at night, which constitutes an enormous hindrance for large-scale traffic. In order to speed up the traffic, the use of suspension railways and locomotives on rails laid along the river bank was introduced before the war, but the system has met with only moderate success.

[503] Navigation in the Maritime sector of the Danube is affected by silting up—particularly in the autumn—and constant dredging has to be carried out in the Sulina branch to maintain sufficient depth for passage of vessels up to Galați. The depth of this sector was 24 ft. in 1939, permitting the entry of vessels of medium draught only. Danube navigation is held up for varying periods between November and March by ice, averaging 30-50 days, and occasionally even for 90 days.

499 There are no permanent bridges on the Danube to connect Rumania with Bulgaria. However, a Rumanian-Bulgarian Commission was established in 1942 to remedy this deficiency by arranging for the construction of a bridge, which will take five years to complete, between Giurgiu and Ruse. In the meantime a ferry system is in use between Giurgiu and Ruse carrying important supplies of oil for the German forces in Greece.

3. River Ports

503 There are in all some 38 river ports, of which the
504 most important, all on the Danube (from west to east) are as follows :—

Moldova	Oltenița
Orșova	Brăila
Turnu Severin	Galați
Giurgiu	Sulina

Since the war started considerable improvements have already been made on the Danube. This is of special significance for, though this waterway is of little use for Rumanian internal traffic, since the closing of the sea route between Rumania and North Germany, it has become vitally important for the carrying of bulky transport. As early as 1940 a scheme for the rationisation of Danube traffic was put into operation, and the installations of Giurgiu, the main Danube port for oil transport, were improved.

To avoid congestion at Giurgiu, the Danube ports of New Moldova and Orșova have been enlarged. Internal traffic has been diverted to Oltenița, which is also used for the unloading of incoming traffic. The construction of new harbour installations is being carried out by a German-Rumania company.

4. Organisation of Inland Water Shipping

505 Rumanian Danube shipping is under State
656 control, and organisation is carried out by firms which are partly State-owned and partly owned
[655] by private individuals. The most important company is the State-owned "N.F.R." (*Navigațiunea Fluvială Română*), and of lesser importance are the privately owned companies "S.R.D." (*S.A.R. de Navigație pe Dunăre*) and "Sind" (*Società Italiana di Navigazione Danubiana*).

505 All Rumanian shipping companies are members
648 of the Danube Shipping Pool, which is under German supervision, headed by the *Deutsche Donauschiffahrtsgruppe*, which is closely connected with the Hermann Goering-Werke für Binnenschiffahrt. The importance of the Danube Pool (exclusive of the Tanker Pool) will be realised when it is borne in mind that between 1932-1937 the freight carried annually by its vessels on the

505 648 It is a cardinal principle of the Statute that the customs dues levied on goods must not be higher than the duties levied at frontier stations of the country concerned. The cost of improvements [651] was to be met by navigation dues, these being assessed on the tonnage of ships, and not based on the goods transported.

Bratislava was fixed as the Headquarters for the Commission for the first five years, and it was laid down that thereafter, for five-year periods, other Danube towns were to be selected in rotation.

Since the outbreak of this war, Germany has virtually controlled the Danube, has abolished the C.I.D., and set up the "Consulting Committee for Danube Affairs above Brăila."

C.E.D. (European Danube Commission)

This Commission was constituted under the [503] Treaty of Paris in 1856 with Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey as members, for the express purpose of dredging the mouths of the Danube below Isaccea, and leaving the various channels free from all obstructions to navigation. It was apparently expected that this preliminary task would take two years, and the life of the Commission was originally fixed for that period; but, by a series of later treaties, it was kept in being up to the outbreak of the Great War.

In 1918 the Central Powers set up their own Danube Commission, membership naturally being restricted to those Powers and their allies.

By the Treaty of Versailles the European Commission was reconstituted with Great Britain, France, Italy and Rumania as provisional members; and by the Convention of July 21st, 1921, was placed on a more permanent basis. The provisional membership of the four countries was confirmed and all the powers of the original Commission restored. A proviso added that any nation whose commercial interests in that part of the river warranted their being represented on the Commission could be admitted. In fact, no country was admitted under this proviso until the inclusion of Germany in August, 1938.

In August, 1938, an arrangement was signed at Sinaia relative to the exercise of the Powers of the C.E.D. In effect the Powers of the Commission were transferred to the Rumanian Government who were to set up a "Maritime Danube Board." This board, under Article 5, was "to be responsible for the preparation and execution of plans for works on the maritime Danube and at the mouths for levying dues and dispensing of the yield thereof."

In September, 1940, Germany summoned a conference at Vienna for the purpose of regulating Danube shipping anew, and eliminating Great Britain and France from membership of the Commission.

[113] [For further information see *La Commission Européenne du Danube et son Œuvre de 1856 à 1931* (Paris 1931); Treaty of Versailles, Articles 331-339, 346-353; Treaty Series No. 38 (1939) Cmd. 6068, and Treaty Series 38 (1939), Cmd. 6069.]

E. TELECOMMUNICATIONS

I. Pre-War Situation

1. Telegraph and Telephones

206 The telegraph system of Rumania was controlled by the Ministry of Communications, the telephone by the Societatea Română de Telefoane, a subsidiary of the International Telephone and

[45b]

487 find that, in spite of the classical importance of the Danube valley as the link between the Orient and the west of Europe, the Black Sea ports drew the trade of the Lower Danube and Siret basins and established a traffic with the Mediterranean and north-western lands which increased in importance until the Great War. A two-way traffic in Danube grain and British coal gave a great advantage to British merchants and British shipping, the only other shipping engaged in the lower Danube traffic, that under the Greek flag, coming a long way behind. Partly as a result of the cessation of her Mediterranean coal trade, and partly as a result of energetic development of Greek, Italian (carrying mail) and Roumanian shipping lines (the last two subsidised), Great Britain in 1933 stood fourth on the list, being outstripped 505 by Roumania itself, which has recently purchased a couple of 8,000 ton Hamburg-America liners. Braila and Galaţi, the two grain ports of Wallachia and Moldavia (which, with a depth of 20 to 24 feet, can accommodate 6,000 ton ocean-going steamers) have up-to-date equipment, the former catering mainly for the Prut river traffic of Bessarabia and the latter for the larger Wallachian hinterland. 504 A large number of small grain ports on the Danube remain so far with but primitive equipment. Constanţa, on the Black Sea, has received most of the attention of the Government, in the form of petrol basins, pipe-lines, dredging, etc. It is, of course, a rail port and has thus the advantage over the ports of Braila and Galaţi when the Danube and Prut are frozen, as they usually are from December or January till March, or in summer when the water is low. Over a period of forty-seven years there were only eleven years when the rivers remained open.

THE SIRET, which debouches at Braila, is unfortunately unnavigable, and can only be used for floating timber, which is shipped in ocean-going vessels at Galaţi. The port of Sulina and the channel between that port and Braila, entirely under the administration of the European Commission of the Danube, has recently been much improved, and traffic on the Sulina arm has accordingly improved too. It is, however, feared that, in spite of the extension of the moles, the persistent silting at the Sulina outlet will render necessary the diversion of the Sulina cut to an outlet five miles to the south.

12: Kormos S-4, 3 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Dobrudja]

131 part of the Dobrudja. The delta of the Danube is
133 formed by the three arms Chilia, Sulina and St George. It includes an area of about 1,000 square miles, in which water and land, marshes, lakes and
[503] islands feed an almost tropical vegetation. The chief communications through the delta are provided by the Sulina canal and by causeways.

311 The steppes of the Southern Dobrudja yield good
135 crops of wheat and maize, and the pastures maintain great herds of sheep. Mineral resources are confined to some unworked coal deposits, valuable copper near Altantepe, and sulphur.

131 The Dobrudja is about 9,300 square miles in all:
161 of this some 2,960 square miles were returned to Bulgaria in 1940. The population of the province as a whole is about 850,000. Its main value to the contesting States lies in the Black Sea stretch of
•504 coast. The port of Constanza, the greatest and most
361 important on the western shores of the Black Sea, has modern harbour works built at the beginning of this century and covering an area of 60 hectares. It was through Constanza that Rumanian exports used to pass to France and Great Britain. The docks of Constanza are about 30 ft. deep and can, therefore, be used by large, sea-going ships. The harbour facilities include storage buildings for wheat and oil-tanks with a capacity for over 200,000 cubic metres of fuel, which are fed by the pipe-lines coming from Ploesti. Oil can moreover be pumped straight from the pipe-lines simultaneously into four tankers. Another great advantage is that the port is
361 completely ice-free all the winter. Constanza is the administrative centre of the Dobrudja and also a well-known seaside resort. Rail communications

361 Another important town, and the greatest Ru-
504 manian port on the Danube, is Galati with a population of about 75,000. Galati lies about a hundred miles from the Black Sea, but the harbour is so placed that sea-going ships can enter the port through the delta and anchor there all through the ice-free period. From Galati timber, wheat and maize from all over Rumania are sent abroad. Incoming cargoes of industrial goods are unloaded there.

[496] The only line leading directly to Transylvania goes over the Ghimes Pass. The traffic to Bessarabia is carried by four railway lines.

THE NEW TERRITORIES

131 The New Territories, acquired by Rumania after
175 the war of 1914–18 and partly lost since 1940, cover
[161] an area of 62,800 square miles and were inhabited in 1940 by about 10,500,000 people. The Banat, the Crisana, Maramures and Transylvania formed, up to 1918, parts of Hungary; the Bukovina belonged to Austria, and Bessarabia was taken from Russia. Many parts of the New Territories were agriculturally and industrially better developed than the Old Kingdom.

131 THE BANAT. The Rumanian part of the Banat covers
161 an area of about 7,400 square miles and has a population of 1,000,000. The province is bordered in the north by the River Mures[R] (Maros[H], Marosch[G]), in the west by the Yugoslav part of the Banat, in the south by the Danube, and in the east by the Car-
000 pathians. The north-western part of the province is

505 439 trade is carried on the Danube to European markets, Germany in particular, and, with the exception of an exceedingly limited traffic with Turkey, and a few intermittent shipments of oil to enemy ports in the Aegean Sea, Rumania's foreign sea-borne trade has been brought virtually to a standstill.

In addition to traffic in the Black Sea with U.S.S.R., Bulgarian and Turkish ports, Rumania in pre-war days had important commercial relations with most European and other countries overseas, the trade routes being via the Dardanelles, Mediterranean, Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar.

2. Mercantile Marine

505 [652] All merchant-shipping activities are controlled by the Ministry of Air and Marine. Rumania's ocean-going mercantile marine in 1939 was constituted as follows:—

		G.R.T.
6	cargo and passenger motor vessels	27,061
16	cargo steamers	67,103
3	steam tankers	14,737
25	Total	108,991

[655] Of the 19 cargo steamers and tankers, 11 were oil-fired and 8 coal burners. Fourteen of these vessels were owned by the Rumanian State Maritime Service (*Servicial Maritim Român*), the principal shipping company in Rumania, whilst the three tankers belonged to the Steaua Romana Petroleum Company of Bucarest. The remainder were privately owned.

[648] Consequent upon her entry into the war Rumania's mercantile marine came under Axis control and most of her vessels are trading for German and Italian account, partly in the Adriatic and Aegean, and partly in the Black Sea.

A statement of Rumania's estimated non-tanker merchant-shipping resources on the 30th April, 1943, follows:—

ESTIMATED RUMANIAN MERCANTILE MARINE RESOURCES (NON-TANKER) UNDER AXIS CONTROL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA AT 30TH APRIL, 1943.

Tonnage Category	*No. of Vessels*	*Total G.R.T.*
100/499	3	578
500/999	—	—
1,000	2	2,798
2,000	2	4,986
3,000	3	10,170
4,000	—	—
5,000	2	11,305
6,000	5	20,220
Aggregate ..	15	50,147

[723] As to her tanker tonnage, two vessels aggregating 11,705 G.R.T. were seized and are now in Allied service, whilst the third, of 3,032 G.R.T., was sunk in December, 1941, in the Aegean Sea.

3. Ports

504 The chief ports for sea-going vessels are Constanța on the Black Sea and Brăila and Galați on the Danube, which both handle river shipping as well.

[42b]

504
505 The following table shows the quantities of goods discharged and loaded at these ports in 1938 and 1939. Sea and river traffic at the ports of Braila and Galati are shown separately :—

504
505

Ports		1938		1939	
		'000 metric tons		'000 metric tons	
		Discharged	Loaded	Discharged	Loaded
Constanta		192	3,946	137	3,456
Braila	Sea	93	783	70	726
	River	734	120	—	—
Galati	Sea	75	305	49	421
	River	198	84	—	—

[43 b]

(a) *Constanța*

504
505

Constanța, which is situated on the Black Sea and is Rumania's most modern port, is, in fact, her only port actually on the coast, and before the war was, therefore, of some considerable importance. Since the Russian campaign, however, its significance has dwindled enormously, due to the presence of Russian submarines in the Black Sea and to the curtailment of Rumania's overseas markets, which means that trade is mainly carried on the Danube and by rail.

Exports from Constanța consisted mainly of petroleum products which came by pipe-line from the Ploești district. A considerable portion of the country's general trade, including some cereal export, was also handled here.

[503] Heavy draught ships can anchor in Constanța harbour, but continued dredging is necessary inside the harbour to maintain the various depths. The estimated daily general-cargo discharging capacity of the port is about 7,200 tons. Total capacity for oil storage is about 660,000 tons at and in the vicinity of Constanța.

(b) *Brăila*

Braila, which is situated on the left bank of the Danube, is the normal limit of navigation on the Danube for ocean-going vessels. It is the principal port for grain export and is well equipped with grain-handling facilities, such as silos, elevators, etc. Small quantities of timber are also handled.

The width of the river channel at Brăila is normally 330 yards, though greater during the spring floods.

The estimated daily general-cargo discharging capacity is about 3,000 tons.

Grain is usually loaded into ocean-going vessels by floating elevators, the working capacity of which is estimated to be about 150 tons per hour under normal working conditions.

Total warehouse capacity of all the warehouses in the dock basin section for storing goods is 6,400 tons.

(c) *Galați*

This port is also situated on the left bank of the river Danube and is the chief inland port of entry [712] into Rumania, as well as being the headquarters of the Rumanian navy. It is the centre of the timber export trade, being situated just below the junction of the Siret River down which most of the wood from the Carpathians is floated. It is also well situated for the receipt of timber by rail from the Bucovina and from North Moldavia.

504
505 The estimated daily discharging capacity for general cargo is 7/8,000 tons, but it is, however, unlikely that this quantity (which is much greater than the normal traffic of the port) could be

504
505

cleared without very considerable development. It is probable that not more than about 50 per cent. of the above capacity could be worked. Grain is loaded by land and floating elevators.

[502]

The ports of Brăila and Galați are ice-bound during some winters, ice occurring to a sufficient extent to prevent navigation from the Black Sea between January and mid-March in about 3 years in 10.

D. INLAND WATERWAYS

I. General

133
505
487

In 1937 navigable waterways totalled 2,840 km (1,766 miles) and were divided as follows:—

	Km.	Miles
Danube	1,075	668
Danube tributaries	395	246
Dniester	740	460
Prut	410	255
Mureș	185	115
Bega Canal	35	22

The rivers Dniester, Prut and Mureș have not been adequately regulated for regular traffic, but are used for local traffic and for timber floating.

II. The Danube

1. Traffic

467
505
139

The Danube, Rumania's main traffic artery, carried about 60 per cent. of all import tonnage and some 15 per cent. of all exports in the years immediately before the war. Traffic falls into two distinct types; first, the traffic in sea-going vessels with an average size of 2,000-2,500 tons proceeding as far as Galați and Brăila via the Sulina mouth, and second, on the river proper on the Danube above Galați.

The sea-going traffic passing through the Sulina mouth in the years just before the war consisted of about 1·2—1·4 million tons a year of exports from Rumania or other riparian states. By far the most important items were grain and timber. About half the vessels entering the Danube from the sea appear to have been in ballast, the remainder bringing in some 300,000-500,000 tons of imports mainly for Rumania.

Inland-water traffic on the Rumanian sector of the Danube in 1939 (the latest year for which information for all kinds of traffic is available) amounted to 3·[illegible] million tons. 1·9 million tons consisted of upstream traffic from Rumania to other riparian states, 0·24 million tons of downstream traffic to Rumania, about 1 million tons of Rumanian internal traffic, and about 0·2 million

[432]

133 trained pilots is compulsory, while the barge tows
502 have to be broken up into smaller units. This sector of the Danube cannot be negotiated at night, which constitutes an enormous hindrance for large-scale traffic. In order to speed up the traffic, the use of suspension railways and locomotives on rails laid along the river bank was introduced before the war, but the system has met with only moderate success.

[503] Navigation in the Maritime sector of the Danube is affected by silting up—particularly in the autumn—and constant dredging has to be carried out in the Sulina branch to maintain sufficient depth for passage of vessels up to Galați. The depth of this sector was 24 ft. in 1939, permitting the entry of vessels of medium draught only. Danube navigation is held up for varying periods between November and March by ice, averaging 30-50 days, and occasionally even for 90 days.

499 There are no permanent bridges on the Danube to connect Rumania with Bulgaria. However, a Rumanian-Bulgarian Commission was established in 1942 to remedy this deficiency by arranging for the construction of a bridge, which will take five years to complete, between Giurgiu and Ruse. In the meantime a ferry system is in use between Giurgiu and Ruse carrying important supplies of oil for the German forces in Greece.

3. River Ports

503 There are in all some 38 river ports, of which the
●504 most important, all on the Danube (from west to east), are as follows :—

Moldova	Oltenița
Orșova	Brăila
Turnu Severin	Galați
Giurgiu	Sulina

Since the war started considerable improvements have already been made on the Danube. This is of special significance for, though this waterway is of little use for Rumanian internal traffic, since the closing of the sea route between Rumania and North Germany, it has become vitally important for the carrying of bulky transport. As early as 1940 a scheme for the rationisation of Danube traffic was put into operation, and the installations of Giurgiu, the main Danube port for oil transport, were improved.

To avoid congestion at Giurgiu, the Danube ports of New Moldova and Orșova have been enlarged. Internal traffic has been diverted to Oltenița, which is also used for the unloading of incoming traffic. The construction of new harbour installations is being carried out by a German-Rumania company.

4. Organisation of Inland Water Shipping

505 Rumanian Danube shipping is under State
656 control, and organisation is carried out by firms which are partly State-owned and partly owned
[655] by private individuals. The most important company is the State-owned "N.F.R." (*Navigațiunea Fluvială Română*), and of lesser importance are the privately owned companies "S.R.D." (*S.A.R. de Navigație pe Dunăre*) and "Sind" (*Societa Italiana di Navigazione Danubiana*).

505 All Rumanian shipping companies are members
648 of the Danube Shipping Pool, which is under German supervision, headed by the *Deutsche Donauschiffahrtsgruppe*, which is closely connected with the Hermann Goering-Werke für Binnenschiffahrt. The importance of the Danube Pool (exclusive of the Tanker Pool) will be realised when it is borne in mind that between 1932-1937 the freight carried annually by its vessels on the

[44 b]

487 find that, in spite of the classical importance of the Danube valley as the link between the Orient and the west of Europe, the Black Sea ports drew the trade of the Lower Danube and Siret basins and established a traffic with the Mediterranean and north-western lands which increased in importance until the Great War. A two-way traffic in Danube grain and British coal gave a great advantage to British merchants and British shipping, the only other shipping engaged in the lower Danube traffic, that under the Greek flag, coming a long way behind. Partly as a result of the cessation of her Mediterranean coal trade, and partly as a result of energetic development of Greek, Italian (carrying mail) and Roumanian shipping lines (the last two subsidised), Great Britain in 1933 stood fourth on the list, being outstripped 505 by Roumania itself, which has recently purchased a couple of 8,000 ton Hamburg-America liners. Braila and Galaţi, the two grain ports of Wallachia and Moldavia (which, with a depth of 20 to 24 feet, can accommodate 6,000 ton ocean-going steamers) have up-to-date equipment, the former catering mainly for the Prut river traffic of Bessarabia and the latter for the larger Wallachian hinterland. 504 A large number of small grain ports on the Danube remain so far with but primitive equipment. Constanţa, on the Black Sea, has received most of the attention of the Government, in the form of petrol basins, pipe-lines, dredging, etc. It is, of course, a rail port and has thus the advantage over the ports of Braila and Galaţi when the Danube and Prut are frozen, as they usually are fro December or January till March, or in summer when t water is low. Over a period of forty-seven years there were only eleven years when the rivers remained open.

THE SIRET, which debouches at Braila, is unfortunately unnavigable, and can only be used for floating timber, which is shipped in ocean-going vessels at Galaţi. The port of Sulina and the channel between that port and Braila, entirely under the administration of the European Commission of the Danube, has recently been much improved, and traffic on the Sulina arm has accordingly improved too. It is, however, feared that, in spite of the extension of the moles, the persistent silting at the Sulina outlet will render necessary the diversion of the Sulina cut to an outlet five miles to the south.

the loss of confidence which this stupid policy of disregarding legal engagements entails for the State and its administrations." 496

The *Dreptatea* of May 19th, 1932, gives an example of the prevailing favouritism in the granting of contracts by the railway administration. Thus tenders were invited for the renovation of the signalling apparatus on the line Feteşti-Cernavoda in August, 1931, but as the administration desired to favour a certain firm no contract was passed, but finally the order was placed with this particular firm at a price of eleven million lei when other firms had undertaken to do the work for only six and a half millions. Naturally the *Dreptatea* takes the Director-General, M. Ionescu, to task for his attitude, and declares that no one should wonder if the railway administration runs into deficits every year. An additional cause for the losses incurred is the overstaffing of the administration, and especially the numerous sinecures that have been created for the benefit of persons enjoying official protection. A few years ago it was impossible to find out how the administration was being run, for no proper balance sheets had been drawn up for years. Fortunately, a British expert has been invited to supervise the accounts, so that data are now available up to date. But this is obviously an inadequate measure, and the railways will become a paying concern capable of responding to the necessities of the country only when and if they are placed under foreign control, or under the management of some capable and honest Rumanian effectively shielded by foreign influence from all interference by political circles. . . . The slovenly methods so far employed in the railway administration have hampered not only the internal development of the country but have also prevented it from increasing its revenues from traffic transit across Rumania; for the country controls two big trade routes, namely that from Poland and the Baltic States towards the Black Sea and the Near East, which used to be one of the great trade routes of old, and that from Central Europe through Transylvania to Constantsa. 496 661

There are two alternatives to the latter, namely the Danube and that through Yugoslavia, so that if the Rumanian railways were properly managed they could easily 496 505

496 secure a decent share of the traffic, but apparently this is 505 being diverted to the Danube route. In fact the "Commission Internationale du Danube" reported that the river-borne traffic in 1931 had reached the highest figure since the end of the war. This was due not only to the abundant harvests of 1931, but also to increased petroleum transport from both Rumania and Russia to Central Europe. Certain singular anomalies were recorded in this river-borne traffic, namely, that while grain was conveyed from Russia up to Vienna and Ratisbonne, Hungarian grain was being carried downstream for shipment via Sulina to Antwerp and Hamburg.

In order to attract Polish traffic, the Rumanian Government some years ago proposed to create free zones at Galatz, Braila, and Constantsa. A bridge, also, was to be constructed across the Danube between Giurgiu and Rustchuk, the Polish Government even offering to defray half the expenses, but for the present all these schemes seem to have been shelved.

COMMUNICATIONS

491 In a report made by the Minister of Public Works and published by the *Adeverul* in its issue of January 14th, 1932, the following details were given respecting the length and state of the roads.

The state of the roads is lamentable; most of these arteries are impassable, and a superficial reparation would prove useless. The following table will give an approximate idea of their condition:

	Length in Kilometers
Roads paved in stone	
Good condition	16,118
Medium condition	27,961
Bad condition	14,949
Roads laid in gravel	9,318
Natural unlaid roads...	33,636
Total	101,982

8

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bucarest]

[The Dobrudja]

Bucarest is also the chief railway centre of 361
Rumania.

Giurgiu on the Danube, south of Bucarest and the terminus of one of the oil pipe-lines from Ploesti, is one of the main Rumanian wheat and oil ports. Another Danubian port, where great quantities of wheat are handled, is Braila with a population of about 70,000.

There are no natural barriers to communications 505
in Muntenia. In the south the chief flow of traffic 491
is carried by the Danube. Rail and road communica- 496
tions from Transylvania pass through the Predeal and a railway line leads over the Danube to the Dobrudja.

THE DOBRUDJA (Dobrogea[R]).[1] Up till 1878 the 175
whole of the Dobrudja belonged to Bulgaria. Ever since, this province has been a bone of contention between Rumania and Bulgaria. The northern part of the Dobrudja was awarded to Rumania in 1878 to compensate her for the loss of Southern Bessarabia to Russia. The southern part of the province was ceded by Bulgaria after her defeat at the hands of her neighbours in the Second Balkan War in 1913. This region was returned to Bulgaria in 1940.

Geographically the Dobrudja is the north-eastern 131
corner of the Balkan Peninsula. Its boundaries are 133
in the north and west the Danube and in the east the Black Sea. There are three distinct regions: the delta of the Danube, the forests of Babadag, and farther south the steppe, which is the most fertile

[1] The letter R, H or G following a geographical term denotes a Rumanian, Hungarian or German name, respectively.

313 cooperage and boxmaking plants. The distribution of these is shown in Table II, although separation of the sawmills from the other industries is not possible. There were also three match factories, which covered internal requirements, and four wood-distillation plants, two of which, situated at Margina and Resita, appeared to be relatively large concerns.

5. Exports

313 439 Rumania's timber exports between 1935 and 1938 averaged 1.8 million cubic metres per annum, which was 5 per cent. of total European exports, and gave her the leading place among south-east European countries. Almost 90 per cent. of total exports were conifers, whilst, as the following table shows, sawn goods made up by far the greater part:—

Categories	*Average annual exports 1935-38 (in 1000 cubic metres)*	
Sawn goods	1,280	71
Firewood	222	12
Hewn goods	113	6
Sawlogs	74	4
Boxboard, etc	37	2
Pitwood	31	2
Pulpwood	26	1½
Sleepers	21	1½
Total	1,801	100

Exports were made to many countries, including South America, but the most important customers were Hungary, Germany, U.K., Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Greece. Trade with Germany in the immediate years prior to the war was tending to increase.

6. Employment

313 [464] It was estimated by a qualified expert that the forests gave direct or indirect employment to 750,000 people (about 10 per cent. of the total labour force) in forest work, transport of forest produce and in the timber industry and trade. At least 250,000 were engaged in actual forestry work, but this number probably included part-time and seasonal workers.

7. Transport

[505] [497] Water transport played but a small part in the carriage of timber, carrying only about 700,000 cubic metres per annum. By far the greater reliance was placed on transport by railways, and some 10 million cubic metres were carried by this service each year.

II. PRESENT SITUATION

Under war conditions Rumania has been faced with increasing difficulties for her supply of timber, and as most of the quantities now made available are required for home consumption, she has very little significance as an exporter.

The forest area lost by the cession of part of Transylvania is estimated to be about 1.4 million ha., and as this area accounted for 25 per cent. of pre-war production its loss is of serious consequence. It is estimated that under existing circumstances the maximum annual cut that is possible, if the present forest area is to be maintained, is 12 million cubic metres.

About 220 timber-processing concerns, of which 176 were sawmills, were also lost with Northern Transylvania, but in view of the over-expansion of the timber industry these losses are probably of less serious consequence.

[32 b]

CHAPTER VIII

497 722 and for passenger travel are severely limited. However, unless there is severe destruction in the later stages of the war, in the long run the Rumanians are bound to benefit from the capital investment in railways, and from the new construction and improvements which have been carried out to meet Axis needs. These improvements though planned long ago, could never have been carried out with the limited financial and technical resources previously available, and could not have been executed so quickly but for German assistance.

B. ROADS

491 Rumania's road system was, by Western European standards, very poorly developed before the war, there being only one International motor road which formed the continuation of the route from Hungary via Oradea Mare—Cluj—Sibiu—Braşov—Bucarest—Giurgiu and a branch line Bucarest—Oleniţa. Apart from this one major road, the system consists of untarred roads, many of which are in a poor state of repair.

The total length of the road system was reported early in 1943 to be 82,098 km. (51,010 miles), with only 12 per cent. in good state of repair, 22 per cent. being mediocre and the remainder in bad condition. Ownership of the total network is divided as follows :—

State roads	.. 11,465 km.	(7,118 miles)
Provincial roads	.. 26,181 km.	(16,272 miles)
Communal roads	.. 44,452 km.	(27,620 miles)

In 1936 there were some 34,000 cars registered.

The development of the road system has long been the dream of Rumanian propagandists, particularly as a stimulus to tourist traffic, but before the war no large-scale development could be embarked upon because of the lack of available capital.

499 Since the war, work has been started on an ambitious programme of road development, the objects of which are to improve communications between urban systems and to link the system with the International road network.

An Italo-Rumanian road company has started work on the Rumanian sector of one of the future trans-European roads, Trieste—Beograd—Turnu Severin—Bucarest—Constanţa, while under a five-year plan, with an expenditure of 75 md. lei, some 3,000 km. (3,100 miles) of road are to be modernised with the help of German and Italian contractors.

C. SHIPPING

1. Introduction

505 439 A high percentage of Rumania's foreign trade is water-borne (55 per cent. in 1937), as not only is she situated on the Black Sea, but the Danube traverses the full west to east length of the country forming an important traffic route and link with Central Europe.

The following table shows comparative tonnages for sea and river traffic in 1937 and 1938 :—

	1937	1938
	'000 *metric tons*	
Sea		
Imports	622	540
Exports	6,918	5,222
River		
Imports	1,890	1,568
Exports	3,161	2,688

As a result of the cutting-off of overseas markets since 1940 an increasing share of the country's

[42a]

505 trade is carried on the Danube to European markets, Germany in particular, and, with the 439 exception of an exceedingly limited traffic with Turkey, and a few intermittent shipments of oil to enemy ports in the Aegean Sea, Rumania's foreign sea-borne trade has been brought virtually to a standstill.

In addition to traffic in the Black Sea with U.S.S.R., Bulgarian and Turkish ports, Rumania in pre-war days had important commercial relations with most European and other countries overseas, the trade routes being via the Dardanelles, Mediterranean, Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar.

2. Mercantile Marine

505 All merchant-shipping activities are controlled [652] by the Ministry of Air and Marine. Rumania's ocean-going mercantile marine in 1939 was constituted as follows :—

		G.R.T.
6	cargo and passenger motor vessels	27,061
16	cargo steamers	67,193
3	steam tankers	14,737
25	Total	108,991

[655] Of the 19 cargo steamers and tankers, 11 were oil-fired and 8 coal burners. Fourteen of these vessels were owned by the Rumanian State Maritime Service (*Serviciul Maritim Român*), the principal shipping company in Rumania, whilst the three tankers belonged to the Steaua Romana Petroleum Company of Bucarest. The remainder were privately owned.

[648] Consequent upon her entry into the war Rumania's mercantile marine came under Axis control and most of her vessels are trading for German and Italian account, partly in the Adriatic and Aegean, and partly in the Black Sea.

A statement of Rumania's estimated non-tanker merchant-shipping resources on the 30th April, 1943, follows :—

ESTIMATED RUMANIAN MERCANTILE MARINE RESOURCES (NON-TANKER) UNDER AXIS CONTROL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA AT 30TH APRIL, 1943.

Tonnage Category	*No. of Vessels*	*Total G.R.T.*
100/499	3	578
500/999	—	—
1,000	2	2,798
2,000	2	4,986
3,000	3	10,170
4,000	—	—
5,000	2	11,305
6,000	3	20,220
Aggregate ..	15	50,147

[723] As to her tanker tonnage, two vessels aggregating 11,505 G.R.T. were seized and are now in Allied service, whilst the third, of 3,032 G.R.T., was sunk in December, 1941, in the Aegean Sea.

3. Ports

504 The chief ports for sea-going vessels are Constanta on the Black Sea and Brăila and Galaţi on the Danube, which both handle river shipping as well.

[42b]

504
505 The following table shows the quantities of goods discharged and loaded at these ports in 1938 and 1939. Sea and river traffic at the ports of Braila and Galati are shown separately :—

504
505

Ports		1938		1939	
		'000 metric tons		'000 metric tons	
		Discharged	Loaded	Discharged	Loaded
Constanta		142	1,046	137	3,456
Braila	Sea	63	[illegible]	70	726
	River	234	[illegible]	—	—
Galati	Sea	73	[illegible]	16	421
	River	155	54	—	—

[43 b]

(a) *Constanța*

504
505

Constanța, which is situated on the Black Sea and is Rumania's most modern port, is, in fact, her only port actually on the coast, and before the war was, therefore, of some considerable importance. Since the Russian campaign, however, its significance has dwindled enormously, due to the presence of Russian submarines in the Black Sea and to the curtailment of Rumania's overseas markets, which means that trade is mainly carried on the Danube and by rail.

Exports from Constanța consisted mainly of petroleum products which came by pipe-line from the Ploeşti district. A considerable portion of the country's general trade, including some cereal export, was also handled here.

[503] Heavy draught ships can anchor in Constanța harbour, but continued dredging is necessary inside the harbour to maintain the various depths. The estimated daily general-cargo discharging capacity of the port is about 7,200 tons. Total capacity for oil storage is about 660,000 tons at and in the vicinity of Constanța.

(b) *Brăila*

Brăila, which is situated on the left bank of the Danube, is the normal limit of navigation on the Danube for ocean-going vessels. It is the principal port for grain export and is well equipped with grain-handling facilities, such as silos, elevators, etc. Small quantities of timber are also handled.

The width of the river channel at Brăila is normally 330 yards, though greater during the spring floods.

The estimated daily general-cargo discharging capacity is about 3,000 tons.

Grain is usually loaded into ocean-going vessels by floating elevators, the working capacity of which is estimated to be about 150 tons per hour under normal working conditions.

Total warehouse capacity of all the warehouses in the dock basin section for storing goods is 6,400 tons.

(c) *Galați*

[715] This port is also situated on the left bank of the river Danube and is the chief inland port of entry into Rumania, as well as being the headquarters of the Rumanian navy. It is the centre of the timber export trade, being situated just below the junction of the Siret River down which most of the wood from the Carpathians is floated. It is also well situated for the receipt of timber by rail from the Bucovina and from North Moldavia.

[43c]

504
505 The estimated daily discharging capacity for general cargo is 7,000 tons, but it is, however, unlikely that this quantity (which is much greater than the normal traffic of the port) could be

[43d]

504
505

cleared without very considerable development. It is probable that not more than about 50 per cent. of the above capacity could be worked. Grain is loaded by land and floating elevators.

[502]

The ports of Brăila and Galați are ice-bound during some winters, ice occurring to a sufficient extent to prevent navigation from the Black Sea between January and mid-March in about 3 years in 10.

D. INLAND WATERWAYS

I. General

133
505
487

In 1937 navigable waterways totalled 2,840 km (1,766 miles) and were divided as follows:—

	Km.	Miles
Danube	1,075	668
Danube tributaries	395	246
Dniester	740	460
Prut	410	255
Mureș	185	115
Bega Canal	35	22

The rivers Dniester, Prut and Mureș have not been adequately regulated for regular traffic, but are used for local traffic and for timber floating.

II. The Danube

1. Traffic

487
505
134

The Danube, Rumania's main traffic artery, carried about 60 per cent. of all import tonnage and some 15 per cent. of all exports in the years immediately before the war. Traffic is of two distinct types; first, the traffic in sea-going vessels with an average size of 2,000–2,500 tons proceeding as far as Galați and Brăila via the Sulina mouth, and second, on the river proper, on the Danube above Galați.

The sea-going traffic passing through the Sulina mouth in the years just before the war consisted of about 1·2—1·4 million tons a year of imports from Rumania or other riparian states. By far the most important items were grain and timber. About half the vessels entering the Danube from the sea appear to have been in ballast, the remainder bringing in some [illegible] tons of imports mainly for Rumania.

Inland-water traffic on the Rumanian sector of the Danube in 1936 (the latest year for which information for all kinds of traffic is available) amounted to 3 million tons. 1·6 million tons consisted of upstream traffic from Rumania to other riparian states, 0·24 million tons of downstream traffic to Rumania, about 1 million tons of Rumanian internal traffic, and about 0·2 million

[42]

CHAPTER VIII

487 of transit traffic (mainly downstream). Traf
505 with other riparian states was apportione
439 follows :—

	From Rumania	*To Rumania*
	'000 tons	
Germany	220	40
Austria ..	390	20
Czechoslovakia ..	440	30
Hungary ..	300	150
Yugoslavia ..	200	—
Bulgaria ..	80	3
	1,630	243

The composition of inland-water traffic has been fully analysed only at the Iron Gates, at the western end of the Danube's Rumanian course. In the traffic shown below, the upstream traffic consisted mainly of Rumanian exports, while the downstream traffic was made up of imports and transit traffic in approximately equal proportions.

Traffic in '000 metric tons at the Iron Gates :—

	1938	193[illegible]
	Upstream	
Total	1,362·5	1,864·[illegible]
of which (main items only) :		
Timber	20·1	11·[illegible]
Iron	21·1	13·4
Wheat	30·3	300·6
Barley	49·8	68·[illegible]
Maize	25·1	125·[illegible]
Petroleum and its products	787·7	1,046·1
Salt	30·8	31·7
	Downstream	
Total	489·3	771·2
of which (main items only) :		
Iron	77·2	22·2
Timber	67·6	86·5
Wheat	74·4	363·0
Maize and oats	79·6	28·2

505 Little is known about traffic since Rumania
439 finally joined the Axis in 1941. As a whole, it is
722 below pre-war level as a result of a great decrease in the amount of grain coming forward. This has been partly, but certainly not entirely, counterbalanced by a slight increase in oil traffic, by the probable diversion of rail traffic to the Danube and by military traffic. The most important individual traffics at the present time are as follows :—

(a) Oil shipments from Giurgiu (i) upstream to Italy (50-70,000 tons a month), to Germany (possibly 30-50,000 tons a month), and (ii) downstream to German forces in South Russia (quantity unknown, but may be substantial).

(b) Downstream supplies of (i) coal to Rumanian railways (part only of total supply), and of (ii) military equipment, stores, etc., to South Russia (quantities unknown).

(c) Upstream supplies of (i) some S. Russian products, including grain (perhaps 20,000 tons a month) and possibly iron and manganese ore (quantities unknown), as well as of (ii) some small quantities of Rumanian exports of agricultural products.

2. Navigation

133 The Iron Gate Sector of the Danube between
502 Orşova and Turnu Severin, with its rapids and reefs causing violent currents, is particularly difficult for navigation, and the use of specially

133 trained pilots is compulsory, while the barge tows
502 have to be broken up into smaller units. This sector of the Danube cannot be negotiated at night, which constitutes an enormous hindrance for large-scale traffic. In order to speed up the traffic, the use of suspension railways and locomotives on rails laid along the river bank was introduced before the war, but the system has met with only moderate success.

[503] Navigation in the Maritime sector of the Danube is affected by silting up—particularly in the autumn—and constant dredging has to be carried out in the Sulina branch to maintain sufficient depth for passage of vessels up to Galați. The depth of this sector was 24 ft. in 1939, permitting the entry of vessels of medium draught only. Danube navigation is held up for varying periods between November and March by ice, averaging 30-50 days, and occasionally even for 90 days.

499 There are no permanent bridges on the Danube to connect Rumania with Bulgaria. However, a Rumanian-Bulgarian Commission was established in 1942 to remedy this deficiency by arranging for the construction of a bridge, which will take five years to complete, between Giurgiu and Ruse. In the meantime a ferry system is in use between Giurgiu and Ruse carrying important supplies of oil for the German forces in Greece.

3. River Ports

503 There are in all some 38 river ports, of which the
504 most important, all on the Danube (from west to east) are as follows :—

Moldova	Oltenița
Orșova	Brăila
Turnu Severin	Galați
Giurgiu	Sulina

Since the war started considerable improvements have already been made on the Danube. This is of special significance for, though this waterway is of little use for Rumanian internal traffic, since the closing of the sea route between Rumania and North Germany, it has become vitally important for the carrying of bulky transport. As early as 1940 a scheme for the rationisation of Danube traffic was put into operation, and the installations of Giurgiu, the main Danube port for oil transport, were improved.

To avoid congestion at Giurgiu, the Danube ports of New Moldova and Orșova have been enlarged. Internal traffic has been diverted to Oltenița, which is also used for the unloading of incoming traffic. The construction of new harbour installations is being carried out by a German-Rumania company.

4. Organisation of Inland Water Shipping

505 Rumanian Danube shipping is under State
656 control, and organisation is carried out by firms
[655] which are partly State-owned and partly owned by private individuals. The most important company is the State-owned "N.F.R." (*Navigațiunea Fluvială Română*), and of lesser importance are the privately owned companies "S.R.D." (*S.A.R. de Navigație pe Dunăre*) and "Sind" (*Societa Italiana di Navigazione Danubiana*).

505 All Rumanian shipping companies are members
648 of the Danube Shipping Pool, which is under German supervision, headed by the *Deutsche Donauschiffahrtsgruppe*, which is closely connected with the Hermann Goering-Wérke für Binnenschiffahrt. The importance of the Danube Pool (exclusive of the Tanker Pool) will be realised when it is borne in mind that between 1932-1937 the freight carried annually by its vessels on the

[44 b]

505 648 Danube nearly doubled. The Rumanian river traffic is now in fact under German control, which is enforced through a number of official and semi-official bodies. German transport officers operating in the main river ports are regulating all river shipping.

Working in close collaboration with the German railways and the *Frachleitstelle Südost*, Berlin (the office which controls river and sea navigation) the Rumanian authorities are bound to the orders given by this office, which must immediately receive reports of any transport exceeding 1,000 tons between Rumania and other countries. Oil transports are excepted as these are handled centrally by a special body which collaborates with the Rumanian Railway Administration and with the Danube Shipping Agencies

5. The Inland Fleet

505 At the beginning of 1940, the Rumanian inland fleet consisted of the following craft :—

Passenger boats ..	25	
Tug boats ..	127	
Cargo barges ..	553	with a capacity of 469,546 tons
Tankers ..	66	with a capacity of 41,603 tons

Accurate figures of the Rumanian tonnage park have not been published recently, but press reports at the end of 1942 stated that shipping under the Rumanian flag on the Danube carried only 28 per cent. of Rumania's Danube traffic.

III. Administration of the Danube

505 648 Before the war the administration of the Danube was in the hands of two Commissions, the C.I.D. (International Danube Commission) in charge of the Danube from Brăila to Ulm, a distance of 2,417 km. (1,500 miles), and the C.E.D. (European Danube Commission) in charge of the Danube delta—i.e. from Brăila to the Black Sea—a distance of 171 km. (106 miles) Both these Commissions were established by the Treaty of Paris as long ago as 1856.

[728] After the 1914-18 war, the two Commissions were reconstituted under the Treaty of Versailles, and the constitution, powers and functions of each laid down in Articles 331-339 and 346-353 of that Treaty.

C.I.D. (International Danube Commission)

Under the Treaty of Versailles this Commission was composed of the following riparian States :—

2 members from Bavaria and Württemburg.

1 each from Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria.

In addition, the three non-riparian members of the C.E.D., viz., Great Britain France and Italy, were each allocated one representative.

This Commission was only a provisional one, intended to function pending the creation of a permanent régime. This was accomplished in July, 1921, and under the Statute of the 23rd July of that year, the Powers having representation were identical with those prescribed by the Versailles Treaty.

Article 1 of the Statute provides that the Danube from Ulm to the Black Sea must be free and open to all flags without any discrimination whatsoever. The functions and powers of the C.I.D. are laid down in Articles 9-42, and are concerned with the drawing up of programmes of improved works, the levying of customs dues, police regulations and the control of revenues resulting from customs and navigation dues.

[45a]

505 648 It is a cardinal principle of the Statute that the customs dues levied on goods must not be higher than the duties levied at frontier stations of the country concerned. The cost of improvements [651] was to be met by navigation dues, these being assessed on the tonnage of ships, and not based on the goods transported.

Bratislava was fixed as the Headquarters for the Commission for the first five years, and it was laid down that thereafter, for five-year periods, other Danube towns were to be selected in rotation.

Since the outbreak of this war, Germany has virtually controlled the Danube, has abolished the C.I.D., and set up the "Consulting Committee for Danube Affairs above Brăila."

C.E.D. (European Danube Commission)

This Commission was constituted under the Treaty of Paris in 1856 with Austria, France, [503] Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey as members, for the express purpose of dredging the mouths of the Danube below Isaccea, and leaving the various channels free from all obstructions to navigation. It was apparently expected that this preliminary task would take two years, and the life of the Commission was originally fixed for that period; but, by a series of later treaties, it was kept in being up to the outbreak of the Great War.

In 1918 the Central Powers set up their own Danube Commission, membership naturally being restricted to those Powers and their allies.

By the Treaty of Versailles the European Commission was reconstituted with Great Britain, France, Italy and Rumania as provisional members; and by the Convention of July 21st, 1921, was placed on a more permanent basis. The provisional membership of the four countries was confirmed and all the powers of the original Commission restored. A proviso added that any nation whose commercial interests in that part of the river warranted their being represented on the Commission could be admitted. In fact, no country was admitted under this proviso until the inclusion of Germany in August, 1938.

In August, 1938, an arrangement was signed at Sinaia relative to the exercise of the Powers of the C.E.D. In effect the Powers of the Commission were transferred to the Rumanian Government who were to set up a "Maritime Danube Board." This board, under Article 5, was "to be responsible for the preparation and execution of plans for works on the maritime Danube and at the mouths for levying dues and dispensing of the yield thereof."

In September, 1940, Germany summoned a conference at Vienna for the purpose of regulating Danube shipping anew, and eliminating Great Britain and France from membership of the Commission.

[113] [For further information see *La Commission Européenne du Danube et son Œuvre de 1856 à 1931* (Paris, 1931); Treaty of Versailles, Articles 331-339, 346-353; Treaty Series No. 38 (1939) Cmd. 6068, and Treaty Series 38 (1939), Cmd 6069.]

E. TELECOMMUNICATIONS

I. Pre-War Situation

1. Telegraph and Telephones

206 The telegraph system of Rumania was controlled by the Ministry of Communications, the telephone by the Societatea Română de Telefoane, a subsidiary of the International Telephone and

[45 b]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

another 200,000 who held property jointly and were not included in his computations. 311

On the assumption that a holding of less than 3 hectares was totally inadequate, at the Rumanian level of production, to provide a family with even the bare means of subsistence, Creangă concluded that over 60 per cent of the peasant cultivators (landless peasants plus those with less than 3 hectares), "for the most part heads of families, find themselves in unconditional dependence upon landowners and tenants." [11] If peasants owning between 3 and 5 hectares —holdings certainly on the margin of subsistence—are included, it appears that nearly 85 per cent of the peasants were unable to earn a secure living from the produce of their soil and had to seek additional income elsewhere. 511

The concentration of land in great estates does not, of course, necessarily imply an agrarian crisis; English and Prussian agriculture developed successfully on large properties. Nor does the peasant's need to go beyond his own holding to earn a living necessarily spell misery for him. The reason the large estate appeared at this time to be the central feature of the Rumanian agrarian problem lies in the particular development of rural property and labor relations in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Unfortunately, the background of Rumanian agrarian history is still extremely obscure. The original social function and source of privilege of the landowning nobles, the boyars, have been the subject of several notable but inconclusive controversies among Rumanian scholars. It is not certain when and to what degree the mass of Rumanian cultivators were reduced to a servile status. Evidence provided by villages of *răzeşi* and *moşneni*—free peasant communities with a form of common landholding, which have survived as relics in the hilly districts—suggests that they at one time were a prevalent form of rural organization, but scientific investigation of these villages has been undertaken only in recent years.[12] There is no question, however, that by the eighteenth century the boyars—and the monasteries—had come to control a great deal of the land, to which 423 566

11. Creangă, *op. cit.*, I, 189.

12. The term *boier* has been the popular, if historically inaccurate, name for all large landowners. The problem of ascertaining the boyar's original role resembles in some respects the confusion in Russian history between allodial hereditary landowners and the nobility of service. The villages of free peasants (răzeşi in Moldavia and moşneni in Wallachia) pose, in respect to their nature and origins, questions similar to those relating to the Russian *mir* and the South Slav *zadruga*. Illuminating discussions of these points may be found in H. H. Stahl's article, "Organizarea socială a ţărănimii," in *Enciclopedia României* (4 vols., Bucarest, n.d.), I, 559–576, and in his recent book, *Sociologia satului devălmaş românesc* (Bucarest, 1946), I.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

434 terials and wooden floors, and it is quite possible that there were other improvements in village conditions which would not appear in statistics.

The depression greatly reduced the Rumanian income, and by 1937 the per capita real income had not yet regained the 1927 level.

[105] In the chapter on population it was seen that Rumania had an extremely high death rate. This was matched by an extraordinarily high infant mortality rate, the highest in Europe. Between 1931 and 1938 infant deaths showed no sign of declining, but ranged between a maximum of 19.2 per 100 living births in 1935 and a minimum of 17.4 in 1933.

511 The low standard of living implicit in the vital statistics is also reflected in the dietary deficiencies of the Rumanian peasant. A number of surveys taken in the 1930's reached the same general conclusions:[26] while the caloric content of the diet was usually adequate, its quality was very poor; an excessive consumption of grains, especially maize in the form of corn meal (*mămăligă*) and not enough animal products or protective foods. Seasonal consumption, as might be expected, varied widely. The prevalence of pellagra has been an obvious indication of an unbalanced diet.

511 Statistics on housing, disease, medical service, education, and illiteracy confirm the impression that the Rumanian peasant had one of the lowest standards of living in Europe. Admittedly, the statistically average Rumanian is an abstraction. Peasants with holdings over 5 hectares lived better and were healthier than peasants on dwarf holdings. The husbandman with an intensively cultivated farm in Ţara Bârsei in Transylvania had about three times the income of the small holder in Dobrogea. Nevertheless, the flat picture of widespread poverty and squalor presented by the statistics is not far from the truth. The colorful costumes and picturesque folk dances of the Rumanian peasantry should not obscure the fact that in 1930 nearly half the population was illiterate and in 1938 one child in five died before it was a year old.

Accompanying this peasant poverty was a marked inequality in the distribution of the total income. Rumanian statistics do not permit an exact estimate of its extent, but it was perfectly obvious to anyone who visited Bucarest. The unmistakable signs of luxury spending

26. D. C. Georgescu, *L'Alimentation de la population rurale en Roumanie* (Bucarest, 1940); W. Aykroyd, I. Alexa, I. Nitulescu, "Étude de l'alimentation des paysans dans la région à pellagre de Moldavie," *Archives roumaines de pathologie expérimentale et de microbiologie* (Paris, 1935); Ioan Claudian, *Alimentaţia poporului român* (Bucarest, 1939).

[113]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

511 —palatial villas and flats in the residential sections, large automobiles, yachting clubs, and Parisian fashions—were in startling contrast to the conditions in the countryside. While the employment of surpluses in unproductive expenditure is a characteristic of undeveloped economies, this tendency was somewhat aggravated in Rumania by the inheritance of boyar extravagance and by the traditional social chasm between the peasant and the ruling groups. To some extent the unequal distribution of income was derived from the pre-1914 oligarchic agrarian society, but a great deal of the actual wealth was gained through industry and finance and through state connections.[27] Unequal distribution was not reduced by the tax structure, which depended largely upon indirect taxes on consumption goods and only to a limited degree upon income taxes.[28]

511 434 The economic importance of this distribution of income is difficult to measure. Obviously a mere leveling out of incomes would not make the Rumanian peasant significantly wealthier. On the other hand, the diversion of the nation's relatively limited surpluses into nonproductive expenditure undoubtedly restricted much-needed investments in agriculture and industry. In general, the social significance of this inequality—its reflection of the deep abyss between town and country—was more important than the immediate economic effects.

433 In its broad features the Rumanian economy during the interwar years resembled that of the pre-1914 Old Kingdom. The addition of new territories increased the internal market and provided important resources and industries. With these advantages came the task of unifying the economies of the different provinces and of recovering from the war. On the international level, the situation was less favorable than before; world trade was more restricted, especially after 1931; the industrial states protected their agriculture; the supply of foreign credit was limited and fell off greatly in the depression. For these reasons, plus a mixture of economic and nationalist mo-

27. The importance of politics and government connections in the acquisition of wealth in Rumania is proverbial, partly because the government played such an important role in economic undertakings. In 1939 the capital invested in state economic enterprises was considerably larger than the total capital investment of all private commercial and industrial undertakings. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 360.

28. In 1935/36 22.8 per cent of the total tax revenue came from income and other direct taxes; 12.3 per cent from taxes on property transactions; 12.1 per cent from turnover taxes; 44.9 per cent from consumption taxes; and 7.9 per cent from customs duties. PEP study (Political and Economic Planning), *Economic Development in S.E. Europe* (London, 1945), p. 21.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241 as 1910 Dobrogeanu-Gherea had some harsh words to say of the
433 men who thought it could magically solve the deep-rooted ills of Ru-
654 manian agriculture.[36]

The Tătărescu government, following precedent, also reorganized agricultural credit and the cooperative system, set up more experimental stations, and devoted funds to the raising of better livestock and the purchase of tractors, but those measures seem to have been only of marginal benefit.

423 The government did try in the law of March, 1937, for the encouragement of agriculture to grapple with the problem of land tenure. It regulated the transfer and mortgage of rural lands and undertook to enforce the indivisibility of property as a means of preventing the progressive subdivision of peasant holdings. The effort was unsuccessful. The two-hectare minimum, which in any case was too small for a self-subsistent holding, was not observed; the prohibition extended only to properties obtained from the state or with the state's assistance. An attempt was also made to promote the consolidation of peasant properties, but this met with too great opposition in the chamber and was dropped.[37] The government also exerted its right of preemption on sales of agricultural land for the purpose of providing land for the peasants but its achievements were insignificant. Between April 1, 1934, and August 1, 1938, of the 326,200 hectares put on sale the government used its right of preemption on only 12,250 hectares, 3.8 per cent of the total.[38]

241 In brief, if the position of agriculture was somewhat better in the
654 years of the Tătărescu regime than in the depression it was largely
656 a consequence of general economic recovery. Agriculture did benefit from the protective measures applied and extended by the government, although part of these benefits was lost by the continued depreciation of the leu, and some efforts were made to raise the level of agriculture and diversify production. Nevertheless, the government's chief interest was industry and commerce and the principal benefits to agriculture were those which corresponded to this interest. The desperate problem of the millions of small peasants owning less than 3 hectares, unable to support themselves and their families, dividing their land into smaller and smaller fragments, suffering from pellagra —this problem was scarcely touched.

654 It must be said, however, that in the 1930's there was a notable

● 511

36. C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *Neoiobăgia*, p. 254.

37. Valeriu Bulgariu, "Divizibilitatea proprietaţii ţărăneşti," *Problema agrară* (Bucarest, 1946), pp. 77–97.

38. G. Ionescu-Sişeşti, "Le Nouvel Aspect du problème agraire en Roumanie," *Archives pour la science et la réforme sociales*, *16*, Nos. 1–4 (1943), 264.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

increase in scientific investigations of village life—sociological studies undertaken by Professor Gusti and his students, farm accountancy studies, examinations of rural health and diet—which brought into clear light the deplorable living conditions of the peasants. It was at this time too that the factor of overpopulation was brought into prominence, although as early as 1907 Constantin Garoflid had warned of its approach. Unfortunately, the real fact of overpopulation was too easily employed as a scapegoat, and one finds a growing tendency from the middle of the 1930's to place upon it all the responsibility for the plight of the peasant.

654
511

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

162 and the investigators found many of the old labor contracts and obli-
311 gations associated with pre-1914 Rumania.

Unable to support themselves in the community, many peasants
511 were seeking temporary work in nearby market towns, and a number
464 traveled as far as Bucarest, a distance of about 70 kilometers. The
exodus in most cases was not permanent, and the peasants after earn-
369 ing some money returned to Dâmbovnicul. This movement to the city
166 was a reflection of the new conditions, which were also seen in the houses and garments of the peasants: houses were no longer built to last generations as was the case in the more isolated districts to the north; the national costume was relegated to Sundays. Birth and death rates were high and the natural increase outran the emigration away from the plasă. The standard of living was very low; many families were undernourished.

A definite differentiation in the peasantry was developing. A few peasants—mostly those who had inherited medium properties—were enlarging their holdings; a few new peasant estates of over 100 hectares had been created. The poorer peasants, including many who had been allotted land, were losing their holdings. Investigations into debts and credit showed that even after the conversion of 1934 about half the households were in debt. Credit provided by the cooperative banks went almost entirely to the larger peasants; in one commune holdings of up to 5 hectares received only 7.9 per cent of the loans. The special political interest shown by the parties in the judeţ of Argeş seemed to have brought no benefits beyond permitting local party stalwarts to obtain extra funds to purchase land from peasants who were in debt or in need of money.

Such, then, was the land of happy peasants with their colorful folkways so picturesquely displayed in the travel literature of the Carolist era.

342 A MARKED FEATURE is the comparative absence of chimneys.
374 The cooking is done in an outhouse, no doubt to minimise the risk of fire, but the dwelling house is generally heated by a stove, the smoke from which passes up through the ceiling in an iron pipe and then escapes into the open air through holes cut in the gable ends or, in the case of a hipped roof, through a small louvre.

345 THE OUTHOUSES are for the most part simple structures and call for no special comment.

511 CLEANLINESS and simplicity are the keynotes of the domestic economy. Household effects are kept down to a minimum, but upon their manufacture an enormous amount of time and skill is lavished, especially in the case of textiles. The skilfully-woven designs on the tapestries and pillows shown Plate XVI are an illustration of such effort.

POPULATION.

161 ACCORDING to the 1930 census Corbu had a population of
563 1,563, distributed among 358 households. The majority of the inhabitants are, of course, Roumanians, for the commune lies right on the fringe of the Szekler country. In spite of having lived in close association with the Roumanians for many generations, however, the Szeklers are easily distinguished by their dress, their physical type (though this is by no means an infallible guide), their adherence to Roman Catholicism, and, of course, their language. Although culturally there is an appreciable difference between the Roumanian and Szekler peasantry, there is to-day an even wider gap between these folk and the Tsiganes or Gipsies who form a much smaller, though very interesting, minority.
142 Generally speaking, the Roumanians contribute a dark, and the Szeklers a fair, element to the broad-headed population, whereas the Gipsies are for the most part distinctly long-headed and very dark. There is an equally well-marked difference on economic grounds, for both Roumanians and Szeklers are essentially peasants, whereas the Gipsy, being landless, is compelled to seek a livelihood by trading, unless he be either smith or musician, following the traditional pursuits of his forbears (see Plate VI).

347 THE HOUSES occupied by Gipsies, while resembling in style
563 those of the peasants, can usually be recognised by the

the price of the quantity of maize grown on it would fetch only 40 lei; nevertheless the peasant owner persisted in cultivating his patch of land because he felt ashamed to allow it to lie fallow, having always been accustomed to cultivate it, and buy the maize he needed instead, for which, however, he would probably have to pay a somewhat higher price than the 40 lei at which he could have sold his own (p. 111). So that, far from exerting an adverse influence on production, the breaking up of the large estates has, on the contrary, proved to be the salvation of the industry, for were it not for the abnegation and attachment of the individual smallholder to his farm, agriculture would have been completely ruined by the policy imposed by the Bratianus. Indeed, one cannot but admire this profound devotion of the peasant to the land and his dogged persistence in carrying on, despite the odds which confronted him and the utter lack of encouragement he met with from the State. We may take it for granted that the small farm of five hectares was more productive than the large estates, even from official statistics. This peculiarity was commented on in the *Cuvantul* of July 23rd, 1927, which at the same time decried the maladministration of the then Finance Minister, M. Vintila Bratianu, and his threat to increase the land tax. That paper contested the official statement that the land tax in Rumania amounted to one gold franc per hectare, as this affirmation would cast a slur on the country. In fact it was estimated that in 1924 the export taxes on cereals had yielded the equivalent of a tax of 8 gold francs per hectare.

The determined perseverance of the peasantry could not undo the harm caused by the erroneous agrarian policy pursued, and the situation could not but grow worse with time.

So that when finally the National Peasant Party assumed power at the end of 1928, the situation had become so hopeless that the Rumanian Government even contemplated organizing a mass emigration to France and her colonies in order to relieve the strain. Early in 1929 the Press, commenting on this unexpected decision of the Government to encourage emigration, admitted that the cause of the disastrous condition agriculture had reached in Rumania could

241 be clearly traced to the carelessness with which the law of
423 land distribution had been drafted, and to the utter neglect
[511] to provide financial means for its rational application, as well
167 as to the export taxes on agricultural produce. The outcome was appalling, as may be judged from an article in the *Cuvantul* in which, after dilating on the causes that had brought about this disaster, it was asserted: "We are obliged to admit that the entire rural population had reached a state of pauperism at a time when we should reasonably have expected it to be thriving, since it had been endowed with lands. It seems a paradox, yet we have only wrecked the old system of production, founded on the unjust system of latifundia, in order to replace serfdom by pauperism. At the time of the large estates the rural worker had no need to emigrate; on the contrary, there was a shortage of labour, and foreign labourers had to be admitted from neighbouring countries. To-day, however, we are forced to direct the rural population abroad so as to save it from starvation; that is the situation we have reached ten years after the enactment of the expropriation laws. . . ." According to the *Adeverul* of March 29th, 1929, the Minister for Agriculture, speaking about the state of that industry, drew a very dark picture and lamented the wretched condition to which agricultural production had fallen. Rumanian agriculture, once the source of wealth and the economic basis of the State, was, he said, on the verge of ruin. The Minister not only condemned the culpable manner in which the land distribution law had been carried out, but also denounced the laxity and incapacity of the functionaries who had been appointed to show the peasants new methods of cultivation. According to him, the so-called model school farms were a positive dis-
241 grace. . . . Apparently matters have not improved since, for
as late as March, 1932, one could read in the *Ellenzek*, a
874 paper published in Hungarian at Cluj, that the Hungarian Cultural Association of Transylvania had decided to present a petition to the League of Nations to demand the creation of an agricultural school destined exclusively for sons of Rumanian citizens of Hungarian nationality. One ought not to feel surprise that the Hungarian minority, convinced of the glaring ineptitude of the Rumanian administration, had

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Oltenia]

135 the Olt, copper near Baia de Arama and salt near Ocnele Mari, north of Govora. The peasant population, in spite of the great agricultural wealth of the province, is extremely poor. The people live in small villages near the rivers. The houses are more often than not almost subterranean mud-huts. Agricultural implements are very primitive. The wooden plough is still widely used.

511 361

175 Oltenia was the first district of Rumania which was colonized by the Romans. It formed the spearhead, and later the base, for the Roman penetration of Dacia. Among the most interesting relics of Roman times found in Oltenia are the ruins of a bridge built by Trajan and the fort just outside Turnu-Severin. After the Roman withdrawal Oltenia shared the fortunes of Muntenia,[1] and in 1859 joined the Principality of Rumania.

361 The capital and chief industrial and commercial town of Oltenia is Craiova with a population of about 60,000. It is also the road and rail junction linking Bucarest with Oltenia and the western provinces. Turnu-Severin on the Danube is the important port guarding the famous 'Iron Gates'. Here the current of the Danube, passing through a narrow gorge is too strong and the water too shallow for shipping to [503] make headway upstream. A deep channel has therefore been blasted in the rock of the river bed and vessels are towed up it by locomotives on the railway alongside. Before the Great War Turnu-Severin was the frontier town between Rumania and Austria-Hungary. It has still preserved the character of a picturesque oriental marketing centre.

[1] Except that in 1718, after the Austrian occupation of Belgrade, Oltenia was temporarily under Austrian rule.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p 59

CHAPTER IV

ECONOMIC WEALTH OF THE COUNTRY

Greater Rumania was primarily an agricultural 433
country, but its industry held an important place 511
in the economy of South-Eastern Europe. With its fertile soil, great reserves of mineral resources and considerable water-power Rumania could have been one of the richest countries in Europe. But while the land was full of natural wealth the standard of living of the people remained a low one. Only a small part of Rumania's resources was exploited, and an even smaller part for the benefit of her inhabitants.

About three-fifths of the area of the Kingdom 311
were arable land and pastures, and over four-fifths 433
of her population were employed in agriculture, forestry and in the fishing industry. The unbalanced state of Rumania's economy in the period between the two wars is shown by the fact that in spite of the predominantly agricultural character of the country, Rumanian industry, employing only one-twentieth of the population, was responsible for half of the total production as expressed in value. Approximately two-thirds of all income from exports were also derived from industrial products, chiefly oil, of which Rumania is the foremost European exporter.

One million workers and employees, or one- 455
twentieth of the population, contributing one-half of the total yearly value of production: this is one very significant aspect of the economic struc-

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

433 Resita works and in the Copsa-Mica concern. The
471 most important Rumanian group, representing both German and British interests, was that of Malaxa-Auschnitt. The centre of Rumania's heavy industry is the region around Brasov.

The chemical industry, drawing to some extent on the unexported surplus of agricultural produce, developed substantially, thanks especially to attempts to make Rumania independent of imports. This industry, too, was controlled to a great extent by foreign, chiefly German, interests.

433 The textile industry, although handicapped by old-fashioned machinery imported from Germany, was the most prosperous. Production and value of output increased, as did the number of employees, but wages decreased.

433 Rumania's total industrial production was
511 doubled in the years 1924–36, but this was not re-
435 flected by a corresponding improvement in trade or in the standard of living. The general index of wholesale prices fell by almost a third and that of agricultural produce by nearly half; the prices of manufactured goods decreased by only a little over one-sixth. By 1933 the value of exports and imports had fallen to about 25,600 million lei and was only one-third of that of all foreign trade in 1926. Real wages in the period from 1929 to 1939 fell by over one-fifth, while the cost of living in 1939 was indexed at 138 points in relation to 100 points in 1933.

652 By 1937 Rumania's national debt had reached 257 million pounds sterling of which only one-fifth was represented by internal loans. Interest on foreign loans in 1932 amounted to about one-quarter of the country's budget and in 1937 to about 16%.

12: Kosmos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

government had the majority of the people behind it, Maniu was handicapped by sabotage on the part of the bureaucracy, the banks and the great industrialists. Moreover he found it very difficult to work with the Regency Council, especially in such a critical time, as very frequently it could not reach a unanimous decision.

All these circumstances seemed to make the restoration of Carol inevitable. Maniu therefore arranged for the return of Carol to Rumania, but made his accession to the throne conditional upon several undertakings, amongst which was a royal promise to respect the Constitution. Carol returned by plane on 8 June 1930 and was proclaimed King, his son Michael being unceremoniously relegated to the position of Crown Prince. Many high hopes were pinned on Carol whose youth and intelligence were held to be qualities which should make him a good ruler. But the head-strong young monarch, with his ideas of personal rule, soon disillusioned those who had enabled him to return. Before long Maniu resigned and the first period of Carol's personal regime began.

THE PEOPLE. During all these years the people of Rumania had hoped for an improvement of their position. After the first few years of adjustment to the changes consequent upon the World War, it had become apparent that all misfortunes could not be blamed upon the war. The Agrarian Reform which was to have cured all ills had turned out to be a very questionable blessing. The recovery of industry which had a promising start in the middle twenties, when considerable amounts of foreign

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

•511 capital had been imported, had come to an abrupt end only a few years later. The prices of agricultural produce continued to fall and manufactured goods became comparatively more expensive. While the value of money decreased[1] and the general level of the standard of living deteriorated up to about 1930, there was a slight improvement in the period following the recovery from the general crisis.

661 **CORRUPTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION.** The lot of the people, however, did not improve. The Rumanians, to whom their government had promised an era of prosperity and national splendour, soon found that the promise held good only for some privileged classes who had not been badly off before. The whole country was ruled by a small clique which had secured the allegiance of a host of civil servants. These officials were badly paid and relied on bribes to swell their income. Before elections the voters were promised reductions of taxation and official positions. But taxes became heavier each year and the new officials' greed had to be satisfied whenever one came in touch with the State apparatus. Identification papers of every description had to be secured before a citizen could go about his business. And in order to obtain these documents one had to visit innumerable offices, fill up innumerable forms and bribe a dozen officials. Arrests were made by the underpaid police for the sole purpose of obtaining money. Officials in all positions looked upon bribes as a legitimate source of income.

The poor peasantry and the minorities were

465 [1] Level wages in 1930 were: in Rumania 39; in Britain 100.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

471 and smaller profits were the reward of Rumanian officials and business men.[1]

511 How far the natural resources of Rumania have suffered under this intensive exploitation will probably become apparent only after the war. Its effects on the people of Rumania, however, can be gauged already. The cost of living in 1941 was three times as high as in 1934, and in January 1943 it was reported to be 50% higher than one year before. These are official Rumanian figures, based on maximum prices and maximum wages which are only fictitious. In fact many goods, although rationed could be obtained only on the black market and at phenomenal prices. The general inflation led to a levelling-up of wages; but wages remained far behind prices. The workers, therefore, were worse off than before, although, theoretically, they obtained improved wages. A Swiss report in August 1943 showed that the monthly earnings of

511 465

457 [1] In January 1944 the Rumanian Government, according to a German paper published in Rumania, 'decided to put at the disposal of the Ministry of Finance a credit of three milliard lei for a new campaign for the modernisation of petroleum installations in Rumania. The Rumanian National Bank has granted a loan of one hundred million Reichsmarks to a number of oil companies for the same purpose. This sum will be used for the import of machinery from Germany... these companies have also been put in charge of the supply of the capital with natural gas'. At about the same time one of the mouthpieces of the Nazi war economy declared quite frankly: 'The practical purpose of the Rumanian export trade policy is to ensure an adequate supply of raw materials for the home industry. In order to stimulate import the concerns in question were permitted... to open up new industries in foreign countries for the purpose of supplying raw materials and half finished goods to the vitally necessary war industries in Rumania.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

a worker, working sixty hours a week, would just be 511
sufficient to buy a pair of shoes or four pounds of 465
coffee, while he would have to spend about three months' wages to buy a suit. The workers do not possess any effective trade unions or other organizations which could better their lot, and peasants' co-operatives are few and weak, except those controlled by the State and those of the German Minority. Antonescu, however, recognized the danger threatening him from this quarter and tried to pacify the workers by creating special services which would supply them with their rations. Other sections of the population had to rely on luck. By creating a class of workers which at last had an assured supply of food he hoped to neutralize the most potent elements of Rumanian discontent.

Another indication of the standard of living is 511
supplied by the official price index. From June to 435
December 1940 prices rose by over 137% and, according to the official Rumanian economic gazette, by 372% between August 1939 and October 1943. This fantastic increase of prices brought no corresponding gains to the farmers or agricultural workers, as can be seen from the Rumanian press.[1] While some industrial workers at least got their rations, and in some instances even increased rations,

[1] In December 1943, one of the German papers in Rumania reported that 'the Union of Farmers' Co-operative Societies states that although there was a record harvest last year, the difficult position of the farmers has not improved. A great part of the harvest is still unsold and...the shortage of capital is very much felt...the Union demands that one-third of the difference between the low inland- and the high export-prices be paid to the farmers instead of giving the whole of the overprice to the State and the exporters....Owing to the lack of

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

511 435 the economic position of the rural population appears to be lamentable.

648 722 **THE POLITICAL SCENE.** Both the internal and external policies of Rumania have been shaped by events on the battle fronts, and more particularly by the war on the Eastern front. The fact that Rumania is fighting side by side with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union has had effects upon the national life of which the consequences are inescapable. The artificial stimulation of public opinion against the U.S.S.R., intended to galvanize the people into a fervent nationalism and unreserved support for Antonescu, proved no small embarrassment to him when the tide of battle turned so catastrophically against his Allies. Further, Rumania's position is also anomalous in the extreme. The severest blow which the country suffered during the past decades was the loss of two-fifths of Transylvania to Hungary.[1] Yet Rumania has been fighting in alliance with Hungary against the Soviet Union. At the same time friction between Hungary and Rumania has been one of the gravest problems in the

511 435 credits the farmers are unable to meet their most urgent obligations and, if no solution is found, an agrarian crisis is imminent which must influence the whole national economy.' A Bucarest paper stated in January 1944: '...there are two million farms without milk cows, 160,000 without hogs and 200,000 without even a single chicken. Unfortunately the Ministry of Agriculture with only two and a half per cent of the budget can do little to alleviate the peasants' lot.'

[1] The Czechoslovak President, Dr Benes, stated in London in March 1944 that the Soviet Union would insist on the return of the territories which Hungary stole from her neighbours, including Transylvania.

241 very largely on the acquisition of tractors and other equipment. Only Germany can provide these requisites and it is of interest that, despite the poor contribution Rumania has hitherto made to Germany's food supplies, the latter has gone some way to assist the attempted reform. Over 4,000 [439] tractors with their ploughs and a variety of other implements have been imported from Germany during the war years. Tractor numbers in Rumania have probably been more than doubled by these imports, but they still represent only the beginnings of mechanisation. They have doubtless been supplied, despite insistent demands for tractors in Germany and elsewhere, in the belief that, if properly applied, they may make some slight increase in available surpluses. Some of these may have been destined for Transnistria to make good the Russian scorching.

6. Food Conditions

511 Food conditions have varied according to local resources, and in the months following the poor crops of 1942, according to the success of local prefects and officials in securing supplementary quantities from the more favoured areas. The [162] greater part of the population is rural, and most families feed themselves with their own home-grown produce. In the earlier years of the war these were able to maintain their consumption standards, but in 1942-43 there must have been a more serious degree of shortage and privation than is usual even after short crops. In the towns there has been a severe curtailment of food-supplies, mitigated in individual cases by access to the Black Market.

262 Urban shortages developed early in 1941 and 434 official rationing cards were introduced in May of 511 that year in Bucarest and brought into use soon after. Sugar and meat were the first commodities to be rationed. The original sugar ration was 375 grammes (13 oz.) per week, but since May 1943 it has been only 125 grammes (4½ oz.). Meat, originally 250 grammes (9 oz.), is still (July 1943) at this level, though for a short time at the end of 1942 it was higher owing probably to the abnormal slaughterings caused by fodder shortages in 1942. Bread was first officially rationed in January 1942, but was preceded by baking regulations requiring maize admixtures in the loaf. The ration of 300

[11a]

262 grammes (10½ oz.) daily was available on five days
434 of the week only; on the other two days maize
511 meal only (for *mămăligă*) could be bought. The bread ration was reduced to 250 grammes in June 1942 and maize meal itself was rationed in August. The number of breadless days has varied, while barley, flour or potatoes have at times been offered in place of maizemeal. The bread mixture has also included varying proportions of maize, barley, potato and other flours. The allowance in June 1943 was 250 grammes of bread on five days and 1 000 grammes (35 oz.) of maize flour or potato flour on each of the remaining two days. All these quantities apply to Bucarest only. Other towns show variants of these regulations, depending on local supplies.

234 The most serious shortage in Bucarest, and
435 possibly in other towns, appears to be milk.
511 Owing to the depletion of surrounding herds following the high cost and scarcity of fodder, only a small part of the former supply now arrives. Some milk, as with all products, is diverted to the Black Market, and official mistakes in price policy at various times have caused temporary shifts or stoppages of food supplies. Other livestock products and edible oil are also chronically short in the towns.

7. Food Prices

435 In spite of official attempts to protect con-
565 sumers from increases, retail prices and the cost of
511 living have risen almost to the same extent as producers' and wholesale prices. Taking autumn 1939 as 100, the cost of living was 330 and the cost of food 350 in the spring of 1943. These increases have been severely felt by the working and lower-middle classes. Official measures were taken to alleviate the situation of civil servants by the setting up of stores and canteens with reduced prices, some of the goods being supplied from Transnistria. Likewise firms with over 50 employees were ordered to supply them with essential foodstuffs at low prices. Persons with more ample resources make use of the Black Market on which all the ordinary foodstuffs are obtainable, usually at only two to three times the official prices, the moderate character of these illegal prices being itself another illustration of the large quantities available, through, these channels, due to the laxity of control.

[11b]

113
513

Yugoslavia EF1
Slovenes EF7
Albania EG1
Rumania ED1
Bulgaria EE1

/For general information on sleeping quarters in the house, see scattered references in 17: Thurnher, EF6 Serbs file, category 116./

The roof is steeper than in the plains and protrudes further over the house. The support is in the form of a collar. The rafters tend to be too widely spaced, which results in slight bending of the battens; but, while it makes for a weaker roof, this results in softer and more pleasing lines. The four corners are not sharp but tend to be rounded (fig. 62). Wooden shingles are almost exclusively used for roof covering. They are about 13 centimeters wide and may be as long as 3 meters. They overlap two to four times. Shorter shingles form 6-10 rows. The smaller shingles may have their ends in the form of swallow tails or other decorative shapes. The ridge shows a special development. On the windward side the first layer of shingles is made to protrude over the ridgepole (fig. 62). These shingles also have excised patterns and are very ornamental. The ridgepoles may extend slightly over the hip and have a small gabled roof, one shingle in height (fig. 62). This provides an opening for the smoke to escape through. Ornamental poles rise at either end of the ridgepole (fig. 61). 342 [335] [531]

Chimneys are lacking and the smoke may escape through openings at the ridge or otherwise through the roof, which then shows all shades of gray to black. In some areas of Oltenia in southwestern Rumania one finds wooden chimneys (fig. 65). These are made of wicker and daub and are covered with shingles. [354] [184]

A special development in the foothills of the Southern Carpathian Mountains is the privy, which is in the form of an annex located at the end of the veranda (fig. 64b). [184] [514]

In general the buildings in the mountain districts show a greater variation than those of the plains. The woodwork is superior, and shows a great deal of inventiveness. The construction, however, is irregular, sloppy and often not functional. Pillars that carry no weight may be very thick, while those that must support much weight may be much too slender (Jänecke, 1918: 35-43). 342 184 [335]

Kulas (fig. 67) are found only in the mountainous regions of Oltenia in the district of Mehedinti, Gorj and Râmnicu-Vâlcea. They were built by the boyars, the wealthy landowners. The oldest ones come from the period when the Rumanian rulers were paying tribute to the sultan. The ground plan is a square 7 by 12 meters in length. The width of the walls is 30-70 centimeters. The kula (fig. 67) may have three or four stories, each about 2.5 meters in height. Each story has one room. The ground floor is used for storage; sometimes a well is built into it, and occasionally there is a subterranean escape passage. The upper floors may also be used for storage, but are mainly living quarters. Windows are generally found only on one side; the other walls are provided with loopholes. On the top floor there is generally an open veranda (ğerdak) about 3 meters wide, the roof over which is supported by pillars (fig. 67). The exposure is toward the valley and the south. On the side opposite the ğerdak there is a simple wooden balcony under the eaves (fig. 67). Many kulas have a privy tower attached to them. 342 712 [184] [556] [175] [312] [514]

Another task

devolving on the shepherds is the shearing, which is done twice in the summer, but they are spared the "dipping" regulations, which British shepherds find so irksome. For the rest there is much to be done to keep the flocks healthy and safe from wolves, to look after the dogs, to carry water and cut wood. In rare moments of leisure the shepherd will be found blowing his simple pipe, or singing songs, or carving a stick with his versatile knife, cutting out those ancient geometric patterns which are the common heritage of peasant Europe.

E. E. E.



A Beetle

A reaping glove

543
443
[286]

6. *Woven Goods.*—Here the high skill and craftsmanship of the Carpathian peasant is most obviously illustrated. Woollen cloths are the commonest, carded wool also being offered for sale. Linen, silk and hempen stuffs are displayed, the finer materials often having gold or silver threads woven into them; they are made up into blouses, skirts, veils and belts. Some machine-made cotton goods also for sale.

[531]

7. *Embroidered Goods.*—Velvet waistcoats with gold embroidery and bead work. Linen or woollen cloths are embroidered with wool, silk, or mercerised cotton. Round sequins, thought to betray Turkish influence, are very popular.

8. *Carpets.*—Locally woven carpets of traditional colours and designs far outnumber machine-made copies of Persian carpets.

9. *Food and Confectionery.*—Bread, doughnuts, sausages, fish, gingerbread, sweets. Sugar dolls, hearts, circles, diamonds and other shapes. Sugar rosaries. Drinks are hawked by Turkish itinerants. The restaurants and drinking booths have gipsy fiddlers.

10. *Cheap Jewellery.*—Trinkets, mirrors, beads, combs, buttons, studs, pins, rings, brooches, etc.

543
●517

11. *Entertainments.*—The fat woman and the one-minute photographer, shooting ranges, cock-shies, games of chance, fortune-telling. The merry-go-round is driven by five men, who push it round on a high wooden platform fixed to the central axis, with the accompaniment of peasant music. Other bands supply music for the dancing which takes place under the trees.

543
443

APART FROM the gipsy goods and the articles offered in the permanent booths, the goods displayed vary from day to day as different groups of peasants come in from the country. There is a constant coming and going of bullock carts over the bridge, bringing in stock and peasant products for sale. The normal limit of influence exerted by the fair is some 25 kilometres.

E. E. E.

412



Hoe.
Blade the size of an English spade. See page 41.

[Page 59]

543

[257] 7. CONFECTIONERY, ETC.

Gingerbread (all shapes).

Sweets: Packets of sweets, sweet-stuffs in various shapes. Dolls, ladies, hearts, diamonds, all with rough pieces of mirror inset.

[524] 8. TOYS.

The only toys for children seen were gaily-coloured thin rubber balls (large), also small wooden flutes similar to those used by shepherds.

[322] 9. CARVED WOODEN ARTICLES.

Wooden cigarette-holders; various sizes, some grotesquely large.

Mirrors with flower-borders carved in high relief.

Match-stands, cigarette stands, wooden boxes.

Large pipes (for playing jokes). Powder is secreted in the mouth-piece and is puffed into the face when the pipe is blown.

10. ARTICLES FOR THE HOME.

[285] Blankets patterned in red and natural wool.

Rug-strips made of pieces of cotton and woollen waste pieces of material.

[415] Modern cooking tins and saucepans, enamelled dishes and all sorts of "Household Helps," which attracted crowds of peasant women, e.g. egg and tomato slices, vegetable cutters, pastry moulds, etc.

Strainers with wooden frame and wire base, the wire coloured in tartan and other patterns.

Alarm clocks, boot polish in tins, soap, hempen rope and string.

[301] 11. CHEAP JEWELLERY, ETC.

Rings, brooches, neck and watch chains. Necklaces of coloured pearl and glass beads. Spectacles of plain and tinted glass. Jewelled combs for wearing in the hair. Studs, fancy buttons, thimbles, all kinds of plain and fancy pins. Mirrors.

543 THE FAIRS at Curtea de Arges are held twice a year, each
527 lasting about a week and ending respectively on August 15th
443 (Assumption) and October 25th (St. Demetri). The association with Christian festivals is a widespread feature (the word "fair" is derived from *feriæ*, feast), the fairs attracting the crowds which gather for the festivals. It can sometimes be shown that the time and place of meeting are older than Christianity and that the periodic pagan assemblies later received the sanction of the Church. The fair, at any rate, satisfies a deep peasant instinct for worship, the exchange of goods and social intercourse.

THE AUGUST fair at Curtea corresponds with the early harvests of fruit—especially the plum—and, formerly, with the cereal harvests (buckwheat and millets) which maize replaced. It is probably connected in origin with the Lammas fairs of the West. The first of August, in the ancient Celtic calendar, marked the beginning of autumn and was celebrated as a harvest festival. In Ireland the day is still called Lewy's Fair, and is traditionally associated with the lighting of fires, with games and the making of marriage matches. Lammas fair is the largest of the year in some Irish towns.

THE OCTOBER fair would seem to derive its importance primarily from the return of the stock from the mountain pastures, when cheese and wool and surplus animals can be exchanged. A feature of the October fair is the high proportion of sheep and goats among the stock offered for sale. In the French Alps, too, the autumn stock fairs are the most important of the year. The maize harvest has by this time been gathered even in the Carpathian valleys, where winter sets in early. But whatever the position may once have been, the fairs are now more concerned with goods than with stock.

543 CURTEA FAIR-GROUND is situated on the flood plain, on waste ground kept free of permanent habitations by the danger of spring floods. The scarp leading to the first river-terrace rises steeply behind and is planted with trees which provide
[312] some shelter for peasants and animals. Here, too, under the scarp, is the well which supplies the needs of man and beast.
[496] The main railway—terminus of the line downstream to Pitesti—has extensive sidings on the first terrace immediately behind, while the branch (timber) line to Cumpana runs

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

531
291
462

[Plate I-facing title page]

137 *sitifolia, S. aizoides, S. aizoon, Erysimum Witmanni, Phyteuma orbiculare, Silene Zawadskii, Onobrychis montana var. transilvanica, Cerastium alpinum, C. lanatum, Oxytropus campestris, Alsine gerardi, Campanula alpina, C. carpatica, Alyssum repens* (endemic), *Rhinanthus alpinus, Rhodiola rosea, Sedum atratum.* In the cracks in the rocks where moisture collected were noted *Pinguicula alpina, P. vulgaris, Saxifraga aizoides, S. androsacea, Viola biflora, Arabis alpina, Achillea Schurii, Biscutella laevigata,* and *Androsace lactea.*

It was obvious that to make a detailed study of this interesting mountain with its forest, plateau, gullies, scree slopes, etc., and other varying ecological factors, a much longer time would have been necessary than was possible under the conditions of our visit to the country.

The Walk by Way of Bilbor, Paltiniş, Vatra Dornei, etc., and down the Bistrita River by Timber Raft to Broşteni (Brosceni).

133 This interesting excursion was made by a number of the
233 party, and afforded a very good opportunity of seeing the country as some fifty miles were covered on foot in two days. We passed over fine slopes and through delightful valleys with their meadows bedecked with many species of flowering plants. There was time during such a walk only to notice the most salient features of the vegetation. We, however, saw hillsides where sheep were grazed quite to the top, also
[343] a mountain dairy where they were being milked. The temporary shelters for those cropping the hay in the valleys at some distance from their usual habitations were interesting, and the whole family appeared to sleep there and cook their meals till the area had been cleared.

531 During our stay at Vatra Dornei, through the kindness of
346 the mayor and the prefect of the district, we were taken by car over a mountain pass down to Campulung and from thence to the wonderful walled monastery of Moldoviţa (Moldawitza) with fine sixteenth-century frescoes covering
313 its walls. The chief point of interest from a vegetation point of view was the fine spruce forests which we saw and in which felling was in progress, the logs being pushed down the mountain side to timber carts at the bottom. The next day we had evidence of the importance of the lumbering industry

295 by imported boots and shoes, whilst socks and stockings bought at the local fairs are beginning to be preferred to the traditional method of bandaging the feet (see Appendix V).

WOOD.

312 THE most characteristic of the other local occupations are concerned with wood. Each peasant is allowed a certain amount of timber annually, the cutting of which is arranged by the Forestry Co-operative Society, but for every tree [53] felled a new one has to be planted. Among the men of the village the making of wooden spoons, jugs and plates, often elaborately carved, is a favourite pursuit, though it is being threatened by cheap imported metal goods, so that in this, as in other ways, a rapid transition from medieval to modern conditions seems likely to occur in the near future.

THE GREEK CATHOLIC PRIEST.

793 ALTHOUGH primarily concerned with the spiritual welfare of his flock, the Greek Catholic (Uniate) priest in Corbu, as elsewhere in Roumania, is intimately bound up with the economic life of the community. Following the rule of the Eastern and Uniate Churches for their secular clergy with a cure of souls, the priest is married and depends to a considerable extent upon his land for his maintenance. He is often trusted with public and private business on behalf of the commune and its members. To him the peasants may bring their maize to be ground, their sunflower seeds to be crushed, their timber to be sawn and their cloth to be scoured. The water of the Bistricioara that runs past the priest's house is harnessed to provide power at Corbu for these operations, and from the services he thus renders to the villagers the priest gets part of his income.

IV. THE FUTURE

070 IT IS CLEAR from the foregoing account that Corbu is a mountain community that is rapidly approaching a crisis in its history. The old economic self-sufficiency is being undermined by the insidious influence of the journeyman, and the cheapness of the new wares that he is introducing will tend to increase the amount of leisure that the peasant already enjoys by releasing labour that he has hitherto expended on

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDI Rumania EDI

291
531

WOMAN'S SHEEPSKIN COAT

Front

Back

MAN'S SHEEPSKIN COAT

Front

Back

[facing page 76]

4:Fleur‹ S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

291
531

Woman's embroidered blouse.
Photo: Miss C. A. Perkins.

Roumanian peasant at Bran in the Transylvanian Alps. Photo: H. I. Hurwitz.

583
531



Portion of girl's dowry, showing elaborately embroidered pillows and bed-covers.
Photo: Miss G. I. Mackrogh.

Plate XVI.

[facing page 77]

291
●531

Two peasants at the fair. Curtea de Arges.

A hand-embroidered peasant's blouse. The back is as richly decorated as the front. (Peasant woman at Curtea de Arges.

Curtea de Arges. Peasants in their richly embroidered coloured costumes arriving at the fair.

Photo by H. J. Howard

[page 54a]

543
443
[286]

6. *Woven Goods.*—Here the high skill and craftsmanship of the Carpathian peasant is most obviously illustrated. Woollen cloths are the commonest, carded wool also being offered for sale. Linen, silk and hempen stuffs are displayed, the finer materials often having gold or silver threads woven into them; they are made up into blouses, skirts, veils and belts. Some machine-made cotton goods also for sale.

[531]

7. *Embroidered Goods.*—Velvet waistcoats with gold embroidery and bead work. Linen or woollen cloths are embroidered with wool, silk, or mercerised cotton. Round sequins, thought to betray Turkish influence, are very popular.

8. *Carpets.*—Locally woven carpets of traditional colours and designs far outnumber machine-made copies of Persian carpets.

9. *Food and Confectionery.*—Bread, doughnuts, sausages, fish, gingerbread, sweets. Sugar dolls, hearts, circles, diamonds and other shapes. Sugar rosaries. Drinks are hawked by Turkish itinerants. The restaurants and drinking booths have gipsy fiddlers.

10. *Cheap Jewellery.*—Trinkets, mirrors, beads, combs, buttons, studs, pins, rings, brooches, etc.

543
517

11. *Entertainments.*—The fat woman and the one-minute photographer, shooting ranges, cock-shies, games of chance, fortune-telling. The merry-go-round is driven by five men, who push it round on a high wooden platform fixed to the central axis, with the accompaniment of peasant music. Other bands supply music for the dancing which takes place under the trees.

543
443

APART FROM the gipsy goods and the articles offered in the permanent booths, the goods displayed vary from day to day as different groups of peasants come in from the country. There is a constant coming and going of bullock carts over the bridge, bringing in stock and peasant products for sale. The normal limit of influence exerted by the fair is some 25 kilometres.

E. E. E.

412



Hoe.
Blade the size of an English spade. See page 41.

342 Windows are generally double even in the simpler houses, one opening to the inside, the other to the outside. They are always barred and set in a wooden frame (Jänecke, 1918: 27-28).

342 531 The Rumanian house is noteworthy for its exterior decorations. Special attention and much imagination is given to the woodwork. Much art is evident in the pillars supporting the roof over the veranda (fig. 57d), lintels supporting the eaves, the railings of the veranda and the window and door frames. The corners of houses may have designs in low relief. Painted designs may be placed on the wall in great abundance (figs. 57a, 57b). Because of the lesser opportunity of embellishment through woodwork and because whitewashed walls lend themselves well to painting, painting of the exterior is characteristic of the plains. The Rumanian does not shy [789] away from bright colors. Ultramarine is most popular, for it is [822] said to scare away evil spirits. Combinations of red, blue and yellow are common, and dark green shades are also favored (Jänecke, 1918: 23).

342 [184] [341] The basic difference between the house of the lowlands and those of the mountain region is that the latter are of two-story construction (fig. 64a). Building materials in the mountains are stone and wood rather than wicker and mud. When houses are built on an incline a high stone foundation forms the ground floor (pivnita). This can be used for stables, storage rooms and also as a wine cellar. This form persists even when the terrain is flat. The higher house is appreciated for its better view, greater security and suitability for defense.

While the floor plan often consists of a row of rooms similar to that of the lowlands, a number of changes have taken place. The anteroom with its large hearth is generally left out (fig. 64b). This is due to the fact that the bricks that line the hearth are not available, and the wooden walls are more inflammable than the predominantly mud ones of the plains. Where the hearth is present [354] it is put into a special annex. Instead of the hearth an oven-stove (a combination stove and oven) is used, which permits the main room to be used as living room and sleeping room as well as a kitchen.

The two-room house predominates; due to the absence of the connecting anteroom, each room has a door to the veranda (čerdak) (fig. 66). Sometimes the veranda at the top of the stairway is expanded into a hall-like structure (foişor) (fig. 64a) covered by a hipped roof at right angles to the main roof. In summer most activities take place there.

The foundation is made of rocks or of large pebbles from the river. Walls are made of horizontal logs or boards which cross at the corners, each fitting into a notch in the other. A mud or lime plaster is never omitted, and to facilitate this plastering thin laths are nailed diagonally across the beams.

The roof is steeper than in the plains and protrudes further over the house. The support is in the form of a collar. The rafters tend to be too widely spaced, which results in slight bending of the battens; but, while it makes for a weaker roof, this results in softer and more pleasing lines. The four corners are not sharp but tend to be rounded (fig. 62). Wooden shingles are almost exclusively used for roof covering. They are about 15 centimeters wide and may be as long as 3 meters. They overlap two to four times. Shorter shingles form 6-10 rows. The smaller shingles may have their ends in the form of swallow tails or other decorative shapes. The ridge shows a special development. On the windward side the first layer of shingles is made to protrude over the ridgepole (fig. 62). These shingles also have excised patterns and are very ornamental. The ridgepoles may extend slightly over the hip and have a small gabled roof, one shingle in height (fig. 62). This provides an opening for the smoke to escape through. Ornamental poles rise at either end of the ridgepole (fig. 61). 342 [335] [531]

Chimneys are lacking and the smoke may escape through openings at the ridge or otherwise through the roof, which then shows all shades of gray to black. In some areas of Oltenia in southwestern Rumania one finds wooden chimneys (fig. 65). These are made of wicker and daub and are covered with shingles. [354] [184]

A special development in the foothills of the Southern Carpathian Mountains is the privy, which is in the form of an annex located at the end of the veranda (fig. 64b). [184] [514]

In general the buildings in the mountain districts show a greater variation than those of the plains. The woodwork is superior, and shows a great deal of inventiveness. The construction, however, is irregular, sloppy and often not functional. Pillars that carry no weight may be very thick, while those that must support much weight may be much too slender (Jänecke, 1918: 35-43). 342 184 [335]

Kulas (fig. 67) are found only in the mountainous regions of Oltenia in the district of Mehedinti, Gorj and Râmnicu-Vâlcea. They were built by the boyars, the wealthy landowners. The oldest ones come from the period when the Rumanian rulers were paying tribute to the sultan. The ground plan is a square 7 by 12 meters in length. The width of the walls is 30-70 centimeters. The kula (fig. 67) may have three or four stories, each about 2.5 meters in height. Each story has one room. The ground floor is used for storage; sometimes a well is built into it, and occasionally there is a subterranean escape passage. The upper floors may also be used for storage, but are mainly living quarters. Windows are generally found only on one side; the other walls are provided with loopholes. On the top floor there is generally an open veranda (ğerdak) about 3 meters wide, the roof over which is supported by pillars (fig. 67). The exposure is toward the valley and the south. On the side opposite the ğerdak there is a simple wooden balcony under the eaves (fig. 67). Many kulas have a privy tower attached to them. 342 712 [184] [556] [175] [312] [514]

342 712 The stairway, about 1.25 meters wide made of massive logs, is generally on the inside of the buildings; when it is located on the outside it leads onto the wooden balcony. The exterior is white-washed. In addition, the surface is decorated with molded bands [531] around each story division. There may also be a vertical division, thus creating a number of large panels. While these areas are symmetrical, neither they nor the molded bands that enclose them have any relation to the placing of windows or pillars (Jänecke, 1918: 62-63).

342 [175] [563] In 1893 there still existed about 55,000 earth huts (bordei) which were inhabited by the poorest population, generally Gypsies (fig. 63). They are common in the Danubian plain. Over an excavation 1-3 meters deep is placed a gabled roof. The roof is made of boards over which earth is laid. Sometimes reeds are placed over the boards before the earthen cover is added. The entrance is on one of the gabled sides, generally with a southerly exposure, and a window is placed on each gable side (Jänecke, 1918: 4).

343 351 Farm Buildings. In the lowlands the buildings are arranged in no definite order; though generally the house is closest to the road. The corn-house (coşar) is either opposite to or at right angles to the house so that it can be watched. The yard and orchard are surrounded by a fence. The simplest fence is made of wickerwork between wooden poles. More often, however, it is made of boards [556] that have intricate excised designs (fig. 60). The wealthy people [563] may add an imposing gateway with a small door. Flower or vegetable gardens are rare, and the latter are called bulgări, since they are [244] generally kept by immigrant Bulgarians who grow all the vegetables [247] for town consumption (Stratilesco, 1907: 233). The farmstead is surrounded by shady trees, and there is generally a plum orchard at [245] the back of the farm buildings (Jänecke, 1918: 8-9).

[184] In the mountain regions the arrangement of the buildings in the yard differs from that of the lowlands. The stables and other buildings are arranged on the border of the yard in a horseshoe form to serve as protection for the house. The yard is usually very small, and has a strong high palisade with a massive gateway, the whole giving the farm a fortress-like appearance (the author points to the presence of bears in summer and wolves in winter) (Jänecke, 1918: 32-35).

343 [184] In the lowlands there are generally not many additional farm buildings in the yard, and this fact is correlated with the pattern of building additional annexes to the house, a more economical and practical procedure. Stables are of the simplest lathwork or wickerwork, covered with a straw roof. Sheds for the storage of straw, hay and cornstalks are absent, for the latter are stacked into tall round piles in the open. The baking oven for summer use, made of mud and bricks, has a hipped roof supported by four pillars.

17.Thurnher E-4 (no date) 1956 EF6 Serbs
Rumania ED1

342

R U M A N I A

Fig. 57a House of the Lowlands

Fig. 57b Side View of Fig. 57a



Fig. 57c Floor Plan of Fig. 57a
A) Anteroom, B) Living Room
C) Storage Room, D) Veranda



[531]

Fig. 57d Woodwork on the Veranda



Fig. 58 House with two Annexes. A) Anteroom, B) Living Room, C) Fireplace, D) Veranda, E) Stable, F) Chicken Coop

[P.86-0]

R U M A N I A

343
•531



Fig. 59a Corn-house



Fig. 60 Fence with Excised Designs



Fig. 59b Front View of Fig. 59a



Fig. 61 Decorations at End of Ridgepole

343

Fig. 62 Arrangement of Shingles at Ridgepole



[342]

Fig. 59c Floor Plan of Fig. 59a
A) Stable
B) Cart-shed

Fig. 63 Semi-subterranean House of the Danube Plain

[P. 86-P]

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

543

5. THINGS SEEN AT BORSEC FAIR, AUGUST 20TH

[286] 1. MATERIAL BY THE YARD.

Cotton: Prints, calicoes, zephyrs, ginghams, men's shirtings.
Wool: Coloured serges, rough grey and brown woollen material (very thick) for men's and women's winter clothing.
Artificial Silk: In plain colours, Crêpe de Chine in plain colours, a very few printed silks.
Lace: Coarse white lace edgings (from Nottingham).

[291] 2. CLOTHING.

Men's: Trousers, coats, waistcoats, cloth caps, embroidered lambskin waistcoats, braces.

Women's: Knitted and crocheted wool caps and berets, patent leather belts. Printed cotton and artificial silk pieces for head coverings. Ribbons.

Children's: Babies' knitted woollen garments. Modern-style dresses in artificial silk with machine-made embroidery. Socks and stockings of cotton and wool hand-knitted in Roumania. Artificial silk stockings manufactured from yarn imported from Switzerland and France.

[295] 3. BOOTS AND SHOES FOR MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

Field boots and heavy nailed boots for men.
Manufactured boots and shoes for women and children.
Ready-made peasant shoes of leather.
Ready-made peasant shoes of leather with rubber attached to sole.
Ready-made peasant shoes made from old motor tyres.
Shoes of plaited felt of all sizes for women and children.
Shoes of knitted coarse wool with straps.
Pieces of leather of correct size for making the peasant shoes and leather thongs for lacing them.
Leather and mohair laces for using with the manufactured boots and shoes.

[415] 4. POTTERY.

Large brown glazed earthenware pots only. No other pottery of any kind was seen in the fair.

[295] 5. BASKETS, ETC.

Hand-made of rushes gathered by the peasants who make them. Some colour introduced into the larger baskets; strong, neat weaving. Also a few big hats as worn in the fields by the Hungarian peasant women.

244 6. GREENGROCERY.

Turnips, potatoes, yellow beans, cabbages, gherkins, carrots, onions, tomatoes, ardei, lemons, apples, pears, Indian corn, water melons, cantaloupes.

543

[257] 7. CONFECTIONERY, ETC.

Gingerbread (all shapes).

Sweets: Packets of sweets, sweet-stuffs in various shapes. Dolls, ladies, hearts, diamonds, all with rough pieces of mirror inset.

[524] 8. TOYS.

The only toys for children seen were gaily-coloured thin rubber balls (large), also small wooden flutes similar to those used by shepherds.

[322] 9. CARVED WOODEN ARTICLES.

Wooden cigarette-holders; various sizes, some grotesquely large.

Mirrors with flower-borders carved in high relief.

Match-stands, cigarette stands, wooden boxes.

Large pipes (for playing jokes). Powder is secreted in the mouth-piece and is puffed into the face when the pipe is blown.

10. ARTICLES FOR THE HOME.

[285] Blankets patterned in red and natural wool.

Rug-strips made of pieces of cotton and woollen waste pieces of material.

[415] Modern cooking tins and saucepans, enamelled dishes and all sorts of "Household Helps," which attracted crowds of peasant women, e.g. egg and tomato slices, vegetable cutters, pastry moulds, etc.

Strainers with wooden frame and wire base, the wire coloured in tartan and other patterns.

Alarm clocks, boot polish in tins, soap, hempen rope and string.

[301] 11. CHEAP JEWELLERY, ETC.

Rings, brooches, neck and watch chains. Necklaces of coloured pearl and glass beads. Spectacles of plain and tinted glass. Jewelled combs for wearing in the hair. Studs, fancy buttons, thimbles, all kinds of plain and fancy pins. Mirrors.

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

THE FAIR

In agricultural communities it is customary for the exchange of goods to be concentrated at certain periodic gatherings known as fairs. The countryman has little time to spare for commerce, and where an element of pastoral nomadism is present, as in Roumania, the times of meeting will be closely restricted. Fairs tend, in Europe, to be held in summer; frequently at the beginning and end of summer—in May and November—when the year's routine is broken by seasonal changes of activity. They are often well developed in regions of pastoral nomadism, where they serve as social centres and may be regarded as temporary market towns. The weekly *suq* in Morocco, for example is an essential feature of the economic and social life of the country, which has recently been studied by Mr. Fogg.

In Europe, where the market town is an ancient product of rural society, fairs usually supplement the functions of established towns, although in origin they are thought to be much older than urban life. They have been described as parasite towns brought into being to meet the periodic needs of country dwellers, but such a description fails to reveal their significance.

The subject of fairs in its social and economic aspects has scarcely received the attention it merits in the history of Europe. It is true that the great fairs of the Middle Ages, such as those of Champagne and Flanders, have often been described, but they were "commodity fairs," concerned with the exchange of goods over wide areas and frequented by merchants from all parts of Europe. As is well known, the *foci* of these great fairs moved eastwards into Germany in the sixteenth century, and again in the nineteenth century into Russia, where Nijni Novgorod has held an exceptional position for over a century. In central Asia, as in Africa (cf. the annual *mouggar* of South Morocco), much commerce is still conducted at such commodity fairs. While the development of communications and of means of exchange has undermined the large fairs in Europe, the local fair is still an active institution.

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

●543

PLAN OF THE FAIR. *Drawn by P. Stinson after E. E. Evans.*

1. Bridge.
2. Shoeing-smith.
3. Tinker.
4. Stations.
5. Stores for salt, maize and fruit.
6. Timber.
7. Mill.
8. Weighing machine and toll office.
9. Pens.
10. Enclosures for animals.
11. Food stalls.
12. Gipsy camp.
13. Skirts and rugs.
14. Shirts and waistcoats.
15. Leather goods.
16. Factory goods and trinkets.
17. Well and passenger carts.
18. Restaurants.
19. Amusements.
20. Dancing.

[page 55]

●543 527 443 THE FAIRS at Curtea de Argeş are held twice a year, each lasting about a week and ending respectively on August 15th (Assumption) and October 25th (St. Demetri). The association with Christian festivals is a widespread feature (the word "fair" is derived from *feriæ*, feast), the fairs attracting the crowds which gather for the festivals. It can sometimes be shown that the time and place of meeting are older than Christianity and that the periodic pagan assemblies later received the sanction of the Church. The fair, at any rate, satisfies a deep peasant instinct for worship, the exchange of goods and social intercourse.

THE AUGUST fair at Curtea corresponds with the early harvests of fruit—especially the plum—and, formerly, with the cereal harvests (buckwheat and millets) which maize replaced. It is probably connected in origin with the Lammas fairs of the West. The first of August, in the ancient Celtic calendar, marked the beginning of autumn and was celebrated as a harvest festival. In Ireland the day is still called Lewy's Fair, and is traditionally associated with the lighting of fires, with games and the making of marriage matches. Lammas fair is the largest of the year in some Irish towns.

THE OCTOBER fair would seem to derive its importance primarily from the return of the stock from the mountain pastures, when cheese and wool and surplus animals can be exchanged. A feature of the October fair is the high proportion of sheep and goats among the stock offered for sale. In the French Alps, too, the autumn stock fairs are the most important of the year. The maize harvest has by this time been gathered even in the Carpathian valleys, where winter sets in early. But whatever the position may once have been, the fairs are now more concerned with goods than with stock.

543 CURTEA FAIR-GROUND is situated on the flood plain, on waste ground kept free of permanent habitations by the danger of spring floods. The scarp leading to the first river-terrace rises steeply behind and is planted with trees which provide [312] some shelter for peasants and animals. Here, too, under the scarp, is the well which supplies the needs of man and beast. [496] The main railway—terminus of the line downstream to Pitesti—has extensive sidings on the first terrace immediately behind, while the branch (timber) line to Cumpana runs

543 through a corner of the fair-ground as it begins its journey northwards. The fair-ground extends from the bridgehead, where in former times there must have been a ford, southwards for an indefinite distance between river and railway. A tributary stream which joins the Argeş at the bridge is named, after the fair, Valea *Târgul*. From the bridge a lane winds southwards to the rows of buildings and sheds which
256 constitute the permanent nucleus of the fair. Here is the corn mill, perhaps once dependent on power from the river, but now driven by electricity. We may note in passing that among the many survivals in the Carpathians is the horizontal water-wheel, used here as in Norway to turn corn mills. The mill consists of a log-hut erected directly over a stream
543 or a branch of a river. The sale of cereals, chiefly maize, is
443 also conducted by the mill, at the entrance to the fair, and there are stores of building materials, fruit, rock-salt and charcoal.

Rows of permanent open-sided sheds face each other along the "main street" of the fair, and are hired for the duration by merchants and caterers. Other goods—mostly those brought by peasants—are displayed in improvised booths or exposed on the ground by the wayside. Further on, the inevitable amusements are concentrated in a corner of their own, the stalls in this section increasing in number throughout the week, until pleasure becomes the chief business by the last days of the fair. This is the natural culmination of events which begin with the sale of cattle in the opening days; the "order of the fair" is a traditional feature of such gatherings everywhere.

543 But in Roumania there is another element which contributes
326 to the variety of the fair—the gipsies who pitch their camps
563 behind the booths and hawk trinkets or unobtrusively engage in metal-work and wood-carving. They appear to keep apart from the rest. To them the food-stallholders bring their copper pots, used for boiling fat, for retinning, while the peasants drive up the draught oxen which may need to be reshod. The tinning is done over an improvised hearth and a handful of charcoal; the shoeing—by the bridge-head—requires somewhat more elaborate equipment in the shape of
[735] a forge and a post and ropes for felling the oxen. Finally, squatting by the wayside, or actively exhibiting their sores, there are the beggars and cripples, who complete the human picture.

●543 443 WE HAVE classified the chief items observed at the fair between August 11th and 15th, 1936.

1. *Livestock.* Draught oxen, cows and calves, pigs and piglets. A few horses and goats. No sheep or fowl. The bargaining for cattle is completed when the buyer contrives to thrust a piece of silver into the hand of the seller. Acceptance of the earnest is followed by a hand-clasp.

[391] 2. *Agricultural Implements and Metal-work.*—It is said that gipsy-made metal tools were formerly displayed, but what little metal-work is now sold is factory-made and comes mostly from Czechoslovakia—cow-bells (of sheet-metal), horse-bells (of cast-metal), knives, etc. Hay-forks are gipsy-made, as are washing tubs and cradles, hollowed out of split tree trunks. Kitchen spoons are hand-carved. Wooden saddles and gipsy-made baskets and brooms may come under this head.

3. *Fruits and Vegetables.*—Tomatoes, potatoes, sweet-corn, onions, garlic, peppers, cabbage, water-melons, gherkins, aubergines, pears, apples, plums, blackberries. Also eggs and cheese.

[323] 4. *Pottery.*—The chief local craft is naturally well represented. The vessels, displayed on the ground, vary greatly in size, decoration and purpose; but they are all of brown clay, usually with simple floral patterns and debased geometrical designs in burnt sienna, yellow and green: vessels with or without lids, with or without handles, with or without spouts, glazed inside, outside, or both, in size ranging from salt-and-pepper stands to large waterpots. We find the old device of making pots in imitation of birds and animals.

[282] 5. *Leatherwork.*—Several booths display white leather sheepskin waistcoats, having the wool inside and the outside decorated with applied strips of thin orange-dyed leather embroidered usually by machine stitching, but occasionally by hand. These waistcoats are made at Curtea de Arges. Leather belts, 4 to 6 inches wide, are machine-stitched but hand-tooled; they have buckle fastenings. Bridles and saddlery. Knotted leather thongs for whips. Hempen ropes for halters are sold in this section, too. Ready-made boots and shoes. The bulk of the shoes for sale, however, are made of rubber, in the shape of the traditional pointed shoe of skin. Most of them are cut from old motor tyres, but others are now made from specially manufactured rubber strips which repeat the patterns of the tyres.

543 443 [286] 6. *Woven Goods.*—Here the high skill and craftsmanship of the Carpathian peasant is most obviously illustrated. Woollen cloths are the commonest, carded wool also being offered for sale. Linen, silk and hempen stuffs are displayed, the finer materials often having gold or silver threads woven into them; they are made up into blouses, skirts, veils and belts. Some machine-made cotton goods also for sale.

[531] 7. *Embroidered Goods.*—Velvet waistcoats with gold embroidery and bead work. Linen or woollen cloths are embroidered with wool, silk, or mercerised cotton. Round sequins, thought to betray Turkish influence, are very popular.

8. *Carpets.*—Locally woven carpets of traditional colours and designs far outnumber machine-made copies of Persian carpets.

9. *Food and Confectionery.*—Bread, doughnuts, sausages, fish, gingerbread, sweets. Sugar dolls, hearts, circles, diamonds and other shapes. Sugar rosaries. Drinks are hawked by Turkish itinerants. The restaurants and drinking booths have gipsy fiddlers.

10. *Cheap Jewellery.*—Trinkets, mirrors, beads, combs, buttons, studs, pins, rings, brooches, etc.

543 517 11. *Entertainments.*—The fat woman and the one-minute photographer, shooting ranges, cock-shies, games of chance, fortune-telling. The merry-go-round is driven by five men, who push it round on a high wooden platform fixed to the central axis, with the accompaniment of peasant music. Other bands supply music for the dancing which takes place under the trees.

543 443 APART FROM the gipsy goods and the articles offered in the permanent booths, the goods displayed vary from day to day as different groups of peasants come in from the country. There is a constant coming and going of bullock carts over the bridge, bringing in stock and peasant products for sale. The normal limit of influence exerted by the fair is some 25 kilometres.

E. E. E.

412



Hoe.
Blade the size of an English spade. See page 41.

[Page 59]

THE ETHNIC MINORITIES AND THEIR GRIEVANCES

Jewish element to gain a place of importance in the life of the 563
community, which has unfortunately provoked the resent- 641
ment and jealousy of their Christian co-nationals and created a Jewish problem in Rumania. To counteract their economic influence they were refused political rights by the Rumanian Constitution of 1866, and though the Congress of Berlin obtained the abolition of this law, such obstacles were placed in the way of Jews wishing to acquire naturalization that only a few hundreds succeeded in obtaining this privilege by 1914. According to the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities which Rumania finally signed, the Rumanian nationality is conferred on all Jews in Rumania. The Jews have not 665
followed the example of the Magyars and Germans, who
have created political parties of their own, yet prejudice 563
against them is pretty strong and has led to the formation of political groups which are purely anti-Semitic. The supporters of anti-Semitism are mainly recruited among students, and the universities have often been the scenes of ruthless and barbarous acts of violence. The leaders of the anti-Semitic leagues are unscrupulous individuals, who by pandering to the lowest instincts of the mob see a way to secure personal advantages for themselves. Thus the chief henchman of Cuza, the anti-Semitic leader, an individual named Codreanu, gained notoriety by shooting the Police Prefect of Jassi while the latter was doing his duty in suppressing a pogrom that had been organized in the capital of Moldavia.

The Jewish problem is purely economic, and this is the 554
reason why student circles are so anxious to impose the 565
" numerus clausus " in the Rumanian universities. They wish to eliminate potential rivals in the liberal professions as far as they possibly can. In many of these the Jewish element has certainly distinguished itself, especially in law and in medicine. Rumanian youth feels that the prominent position Jews hold in society is a serious obstacle to its advancement, and the methods adopted to eliminate this hindrance are certainly not always commendable. It should be added, however, that where Jews do not exist other races occupy their place, so that it is always the non-Rumanian elements which fill the more lucrative posts in the urban

554 districts. Thus in the Banat, and Transylvania, the Germans
563 and Magyars dominate commerce and industry and Magyar influence has been so powerful that it has practically assimilated the Jews. In the lower Danubian ports and at Constantsa, it is the Greeks and Armenians who form the largest section of the commercial community, though in certain Danubian ports the Jewish element predominates.

461 These facts would tend unequivocally to show that the Rumanians do not possess the necessary perseverance that is indispensable for those who desire to engage in commerce. It would appear, too, that the French educational system which they have adopted helps to foster a contempt for all occupations which are not purely intellectual, and for these reasons Rumanians who claim to have received some degree of education look askance on all manual work. This appar-
565 ent aversion for commerce explains to a certain extent the absence of a Rumanian middle class, an absence which ought to be remedied, for the country is deprived of a useful steadying element which is indispensable for its normal development. As things are, it possesses a small superficial leading class, that cannot be said to compensate by its quality for its lack of quantity, and a huge mass of almost illiterate peasants that lags far behind. The example of
565 Russia proves the danger that exists for a community which
563 shows such an unstable equilibrium of classes. A solution of the problem would consist in attracting the Jews from the occupations to which they have hitherto been restricted. The Jewish problem in Russia has been solved by adapting the Jews to industry and agriculture. An exceedingly instructive and interesting article entitled "Soviet Russia solves the Jewish Problem," from the pen of Mr Wm. Zukerman, and published in the "Contemporary Review" for Dec., 1931, may well supply useful hints for Rumania. There is no doubt that if the Jews in Rumania enjoyed greater freedom of action they would not concentrate all their activities on commerce, and they would thereby offer to Rumanians more possibilities and better opportunities to engage in trade than they now possess.

The roof is steeper than in the plains and protrudes further over the house. The support is in the form of a collar. The rafters tend to be too widely spaced, which results in slight bending of the battens; but, while it makes for a weaker roof, this results in softer and more pleasing lines. The four corners are not sharp but tend to be rounded (fig. 62). Wooden shingles are almost exclusively used for roof covering. They are about 15 centimeters wide and may be as long as 3 meters. They overlap two to four times. Shorter shingles form 6-10 rows. The smaller shingles may have their ends in the form of swallow tails or other decorative shapes. The ridge shows a special development. On the windward side the first layer of shingles is made to protrude over the ridgepole (fig. 62). These shingles also have excised patterns and are very ornamental. The ridgepoles may extend slightly over the hip and have a small gabled roof, one shingle in height (fig. 62). This provides an opening for the smoke to escape through. Ornamental poles rise at either end of the ridgepole (fig. 61). 342 [335] [531]

Chimneys are lacking and the smoke may escape through openings at the ridge or otherwise through the roof, which then shows all shades of gray to black. In some areas of Oltenia in southwestern Rumania one finds wooden chimneys (fig. 65). These are made of wicker and daub and are covered with shingles. [354] [184]

A special development in the foothills of the Southern Carpathian Mountains is the privy, which is in the form of an annex located at the end of the veranda (fig. 64b). [184] [514]

In general the buildings in the mountain districts show a greater variation than those of the plains. The woodwork is superior, and shows a great deal of inventiveness. The construction, however, is irregular, sloppy and often not functional. Pillars that carry no weight may be very thick, while those that must support much weight may be much too slender (Jänecke, 1918: 35-43). 342 184 [335]

Kulas (fig. 67) are found only in the mountainous regions of Oltenia in the district of Mehedinti, Gorj and Râmnicu-Vâlcea. They were built by the boyars, the wealthy landowners. The oldest ones come from the period when the Rumanian rulers were paying tribute to the sultan. The ground plan is a square 7 by 12 meters in length. The width of the walls is 30-70 centimeters. The kula (fig. 67) may have three or four stories, each about 2.5 meters in height. Each story has one room. The ground floor is used for storage; sometimes a well is built into it, and occasionally there is a subterranean escape passage. The upper floors may also be used for storage, but are mainly living quarters. Windows are generally found only on one side; the other walls are provided with loopholes. On the top floor there is generally an open veranda (čerdak) about 3 meters wide, the roof over which is supported by pillars (fig. 67). The exposure is toward the valley and the south. On the side opposite the čerdak there is a simple wooden balcony under the eaves (fig. 67). Many kulas have a privy tower attached to them. 342 712 [184] [556] [175] [312] [514]

342 712 [531] The stairway, about 1.25 meters wide made of massive logs, is generally on the inside of the buildings; when it is located on the outside it leads onto the wooden balcony. The exterior is white-washed. In addition, the surface is decorated with molded bands around each story division. There may also be a vertical division, thus creating a number of large panels. While these areas are symmetrical, neither they nor the molded bands that enclose them have any relation to the placing of windows or pillars (Jänecke, 1918: 62-63).

342 [175] [563] In 1895 there still existed about 55,000 earth huts (bordei) which were inhabited by the poorest population, generally Gypsies (fig. 63). They are common in the Danubian plain. Over an excavation 1-3 meters deep is placed a gabled roof. The roof is made of boards over which earth is laid. Sometimes reeds are placed over the boards before the earthen cover is added. The entrance is on one of the gabled sides, generally with a southerly exposure, and a window is placed on each gable side (Jänecke, 1918: 4).

343 351 Farm Buildings. In the lowlands the buildings are arranged in no definite order; though generally the house is closest to the road. The corn-house (coşar) is either opposite to or at right angles to the house so that it can be watched. The yard and orchard are surrounded by a fence. The simplest fence is made of wickerwork between wooden poles. More often, however, it is made of boards [556] that have intricate excised designs (fig. 60). The wealthy people may add an imposing gateway with a small door. Flower or vegetable [563] gardens are rare, and the latter are called bulgări, since they are [244] generally kept by immigrant Bulgarians who grow all the vegetables [247] for town consumption (Stratilesco, 1907: 233). The farmstead is surrounded by shady trees, and there is generally a plum orchard at [245] the back of the farm buildings (Jänecke, 1918: 8-9).

[184] In the mountain regions the arrangement of the buildings in the yard differs from that of the lowlands. The stables and other buildings are arranged on the border of the yard in a horseshoe form to serve as protection for the house. The yard is usually very small, and has a strong high palisade with a massive gateway, the whole giving the farm a fortress-like appearance (the author points to the presence of bears in summer and wolves in winter) (Jänecke, 1918: 32-35).

343 [184] In the lowlands there are generally not many additional farm buildings in the yard, and this fact is correlated with the pattern of building additional annexes to the house, a more economical and practical procedure. Stables are of the simplest lathwork or wickerwork, covered with a straw roof. Sheds for the storage of straw, hay and cornstalks are absent, for the latter are stacked into tall round piles in the open. The baking oven for summer use, made of mud and bricks, has a hipped roof supported by four pillars.

The only noteworthy building is the corn-house (pătule de porumb) (figs. 59a, 59b), which is found, however, only among the well-to-do. Unlike the house, it is a two-story structure. The lower floor has plastered walls, and serves as stable and cart-shed. The upper story is made of wickerwork, often arranged in interesting patterns, permitting the air to circulate. The attic is used for the storage of food and is reached by a ladder from the outside. The hipped roof is of straw (Jänecke, 1918: 25-27). R 343 [556] R [251] [417]

In the mountain regions stables have only three walls, and animals stay in these half-open shelters even in winter. The imposing corn-house of the plains is rarely found in the mountains. In its place is erected a long narrow building of wickerwork. This rests on short stone pillars about 50 centimeters above the ground and is covered by a shingled roof. Since the ground floor of the house is used for storage there is no need for many additional farm buildings (Jänecke, 1918: 43-45). R [184]

CONCLUSION

Having presented an area by area discussion of the village forms and farmsteads, it is desirable to trace the distribution of certain major elements. Roughly, four types of settlement pattern can be distinguished. They are the village consisting of widely scattered hamlets (Cvijić's Stari Vlah type); the agglomerated village (Cvijić's Timok type); the road village (Cvijić's Mačva type); and the čiflik type, the settlement created by Turkish landowners. The first of these is composed of widely scattered houses in no regular order, grouped into hamlets a number of which constitute a village. It predominates in Slovenia, Western Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, western Serbia, and in the mountain areas of central Bulgaria and Rumania. A variant of this form, characterized by more closely spaced houses within the separate hamlets (Cvijić's Ibar type), exists in the Karst regions behind the Adriatic coast, in Albania and southwestern and western Serbia. Hilly terrain and forested regions are conducive to this scatter, but are not the sole determinants. The Ibar type is associated with greater barrenness of soil and the necessity of conserving arable land. S 361 171 184 S [182] [311]

Agglomerated villages are characterized by crowded houses set in an irregular order along crooked streets. They prevail in eastern and southern Serbia and in southern Macedonia. While they are associated with the necessity of conserving arable land in some of the more barren regions of eastern Serbia, this explanation will not hold for the fertile basins of Kosovo, Kumanovo and Skoplje. Here they are no doubt the result of diffusion from the Aegean coast, as these areas are on communication lines which run up the Vardar and Morava River valleys from the coast toward Beograd. S [311]

The third or Mačva type is that of the more or less planned village lying on both sides of the highway. These villages tend to S 361 171

641 563 tional culture" from the Leninist-Stalinist point of view is a culture *national only in form* and *socialist in content* and aims at the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat.[10]

In fact, this principle has been legally formulated in Paragraph (j) of Article 17 of the new Rumanian Constitution according to which the state

> "ensures the development of the culture of the Rumanian people and of the culture of the national minorities, *socialist in content, national in form.*" (emphasis supplied)

641 [562] Women are given equal rights with men in all spheres of cultural, economic, or political activities. The institution of marriage and the family is protected by the state, which grants aid to mothers of large families and unmarried mothers (Article 83). Freedom of conscience and religious worship is guaranteed. The school is separated from the church; except for the training of the personnel of the religious denominations, no congregation may open or maintain [798] institutions of general study (Article 84). The constitutional provisions relating to freedom of conscience are rendered practically meaningless by virtue of Decree No. 177, Establishing General Regulations for Religious Cults, of August 3, 1948, and the Law on the Organization of the Ministry of Cults, of February 5, 1949. According to the Decree, all religious cults must be recognized by the Presidium, which must approve the statute of organization of the respective cult. The Ministry of Cults, the organ through which the Party exercises its control over religious denominations, is empowered to "supervise and control all religious cults and their institutions, and the special religious education for the training of all personnel of religious cults, the property and funds of any nature belonging to cults, as well as to confirm (or deny) the appointment of the entire permanent and temporary staff of religious cults, and to act as intermediary for relations and exchanges of information between cults in the country and abroad" (Article 1 of the Law for the Organization of the Ministry of Cults). The implementation of these provisions has resulted in the unequivocal subserviency of the cults to the regime.[11]

641 The inviolability of the home, the privacy of correspondence (Article 88) and of the citizen is guaranteed. No person may be placed under arrest without the decision of a court or "of the procurator" (Article 87). This assurance of the inviolability of the person is subject to the exclusive privilege of the Party or of its affiliated organizations to nominate candidates in the election of judges and the arresting power of the Prosecutor General, which is independent of the courts. Since there can be no writ of habeas corpus against the Procurator General—always a loyal servant of the Party—it evidently follows that extrajudicial arrest of any individual is within his discretion (see Article 8 of Law No. 6 of June 2, 1952).

Hand-in-hand with the rights enumerated above, the Constitution specifies

---

[10] J. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (1942) 207.

[11] For details see "Persecution of Religion in Rumania" published by the Rumanian National Committee, Washington, D. C., 1949.

563 Rumania ED1

[For information on the Ukrainians in Rumania, 1918-1940, see: 8: Fedenko, RD1 Ukraine, cat. 116, pp. 58-59. -- Analyst]

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

the establishment of rest-homes, sanatoria, and cultural establishments (Article 78). The right to maintenance in old age and in case of sickness or disability is ensured by the development of social insurance and free medical service (Article 79). The right to education is ensured by universal, compulsory, and free elementary education and by the system of state scholarships awarded to deserving students (Article 80).[6] Equality of rights in all spheres of economic, political, and cultural activity is guaranteed to all citizens irrespective of their nationality, sex, or race. Any transgression of these provisions by the manifestation of race-hatred, chauvinism, or discrimination is punishable by law (Article 81).[7] 641 461

Some distinction was made at the beginning with regard to the German ethnic group, which had actively collaborated with Nazi Germany. The original decision to expel the Germans from the country, however, was officially changed in December, 1948, when the Rumanian Communist Party decided to replace the denunciation of the German minority as a whole and encourage instead the class struggle within its ranks. The resolution of the Party maintained that the "struggle against their own bourgeoisie . . . (would) open a new perspective to the German working population of Rumania, working alongside the Rumanian people and other nationalities."[8] 641 563

Whereas at the beginning Zionism enjoyed a tremendous popularity and even received latent, if not active, support from the Communist-dominated government during the Jewish-Anglo-Arab disturbances in Palestine, the above quoted resolution on the national question also declared:

> "Zionism of any color is a political nationalist and reactionary movement of the Jewish bourgeoisie, which tries to isolate the Jewish working people from the other peoples and to hinder them in their struggle against capitalism in the ranks of the anti-imperialist camp."

Notwithstanding the legal and constitutional provisions relating to the defense of the rights of nationalities and minorities,[9] the official policies of the Communist Party in regard to these questions have been based on the tenets of Leninism-Stalinism. While the development of national cultures and the use of national languages in all the fields of cultural and political endeavors are encouraged, the guiding principle is that of "socialism." "Na-

---

[6] The system of education underwent drastic changes. See "The Perversion of Education in Rumania" published by the Rumanian National Committee, Washington, D.C., July, 1950.

[7] See Law No. 86 of February 7, 1945 (Statute for Nationalities) and Law No. 630 of August 6, 1945, in the Yearbook on Human Rights for 1946, United Nations, (1947) 248–49 and 249–51, respectively.

[8] La Roumanie Nouvelle, Bucharest, No. 14, December 30, 1948.

[9] As an apparent concession to the Hungarian minority in Rumania, the Constitution also provides for the establishment of a Magyar Autonomous Region (Articles 19–21) in the territory inhabited by compact Magyar and Székely population, including the districts of Ciuc, Gheorgheni, Odorhei, Reghin, Sangiorgiu de Padure, Sft. Gheorghe, Targu-Mures, Targu-Secuesc and Toplita. 563

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

641 tional culture" from the Leninist-Stalinist point of view is a culture *national*
● 563 *only in form* and *socialist in content* and aims at the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat.[10]

In fact, this principle has been legally formulated in Paragraph (j) of Article 17 of the new Rumanian Constitution according to which the state

> "ensures the development of the culture of the Rumanian people and of the culture of the national minorities, *socialist in content, national in form.*" (emphasis supplied)

641 Women are given equal rights with men in all spheres of cultural, economic,
[563] or political activities. The institution of marriage and the family is protected by the state, which grants aid to mothers of large families and unmarried mothers (Article 83). Freedom of conscience and religious worship is guaranteed. The school is separated from the church; except for the training of the personnel of the religious denominations, no congregation may open or maintain
[798] institutions of general study (Article 84). The constitutional provisions relating to freedom of conscience are rendered practically meaningless by virtue of Decree No. 177, Establishing General Regulations for Religious Cults, of August 3, 1948, and the Law on the Organization of the Ministry of Cults, of February 5, 1949. According to the Decree, all religious cults must be recognized by the Presidium, which must approve the statute of organization of the respective cult. The Ministry of Cults, the organ through which the Party exercises its control over religious denominations, is empowered to "supervise and control all religious cults and their institutions, and the special religious education for the training of all personnel of religious cults, the property and funds of any nature belonging to cults, as well as to confirm (or deny) the appointment of the entire permanent and temporary staff of religious cults, and to act as intermediary for relations and exchanges of information between cults in the country and abroad" (Article 1 of the Law for the Organization of the Ministry of Cults). The implementation of these provisions has resulted in the unequivocal subserviency of the cults to the regime.[11]

641 The inviolability of the home, the privacy of correspondence (Article 88) and of the citizen is guaranteed. No person may be placed under arrest without the decision of a court or "of the procurator" (Article 87). This assurance of the inviolability of the person is subject to the exclusive privilege of the Party or of its affiliated organizations to nominate candidates in the election of judges and the arresting power of the Prosecutor General, which is independent of the courts. Since there can be no writ of habeas corpus against the Procurator General—always a loyal servant of the Party—it evidently follows that extrajudicial arrest of any individual is within his discretion (see Article 8 of Law No. 6 of June 2, 1952).

Hand-in-hand with the rights enumerated above, the Constitution specifies

---

[10] J. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (1942) 207.

[11] For details see "Persecution of Religion in Rumania" published by the Rumanian National Committee, Washington, D. C., 1949.

Churches and Religion Romania

795
563

6. The Christians of Old Rite

The name "Christians of Old Rite" is applied to a group of dissenters who originally belonged to the Muscovite Orthodox Church, broke away from it to some extent in the 17th century and, because of persecution, left Russia and settled at various times on the territory of the present day Romania. They are generally called in Russian raskolniki (shismatics) staroobriadtsi (old believers or followers of the old rite), and in Romanian Lipovani (from the name of Bessarabian town Lipova) or muscali. They Russians by nationality of the great Russian Branch and in the new place of settlement up to the present time preserved their language, dress, habits and customs. The schism was the result of the revision of the church books undertaken in the middle of the 17th century by Moscow Patriarch Nicon. The idea of the reform was to eliminate from the liturgical books in circulation in Russia erroneous deviations from the books used in other Eastern Orthodox Churches and correct in the same some local departure from the established ritual. "The Christians of the Old Rite" are the descendants of those Russians who refused to accept these corrections and stubbornly adherred to the practices hitherto customary in the Russian Church. Originally, there were no dogmatic or canonical differences. But with the time those adhering to the old customs became divided into a large number os sects, some of which went very far from the teachings of the Orthodox Church and even Christianity. There are among them sects which completely deny priesthood, sacraments

and any obligation toward the State including taxes and military service. In any event, those who settled abroad broke away from any administration connection with the Moscow hierarchy but did not join any other established Eastern Orthodox Church. Only a part of those remaining in Russia reunited with the official Russian Orthodox Church in the 1830's. These are the so-called "edinovertsi." 795 563

However, those who settled in the Romanian Eastern provinces and their descendants continued their life in religious communities separately from the Romanian society and from the Russian Church. As they were opposed to any assimilation or unification with the Romanian Orthodox Church, they have been treated as a separate religious denomination. The religious tolerance has been granted by documents several times.

This church succeeded in organizing closed religious communities in parishes, in building churches, establishing monasteries and in some sects even establishing a certain hierarchy. But the movement did not have its own Divinity Schools and many sects were not willing to train the priests in Romanian or Russian schools. [793]

After the enactment of the Law No. 54 of 1928, the dignitaries of the Church of the Old Rite prepared a Constitution and by-laws and submitted it to the Romanian Government for approval in order to become recognized as a denomination. Up until 1942 they repeatedly tried to get this recognition and thus transform a de facto tolerance into the de jure recognition. Because of political reasons and suspicions of disloyalty, this status has never been granted. 795 659

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

668 economy. It is something like a cancerous growth in an organism which arises from some chronic irritation, takes on a life of its own, displays great dynamism for a time, and ultimately is destructive of the body which produced it. If such an analogy be fair, it is necessary not to confuse an analysis of the unsolved problem with a justification of the fascist response, or to regard fascism as an inexplicable evil possessing the body of an innocent.

In its resort to the nonrational, fascism makes an appeal to the spontaneous, the organic, the primitive, and the mythical, to the instinctive rather than the logical aspects of human and social experience. From these it gains its emotional force and appeal. At the same time, the appeal to the natural and the traditional is itself an artificial and somewhat self-conscious act; the effort to reinvoke the spontaneous is itself not a wholly spontaneous act. Thus, fascism does not originate in the lowest and most backward strata of society but is usually in its initial stages an intellectual movement. In its origins at least it is not the creation of a nation or a social group which is at the bottom of the heap, but rather appears among those nations, social groups, or individuals which have advanced to the extent of being aware of their position and at the same time of being resentful and frustrated.

● 563 668 Conditions favorable to the various manifestations of fascism were certainly not lacking in Rumania. The struggle to achieve an independent national existence, the prolonged insecurity as a small state, the effort not only to escape the shadow of the great powers but to maintain a position in the scrambling of the Balkan states—all these led to an intense political nationalism which easily boiled over into chauvinism. The ethnic confusion of southeastern Europe and especially Rumania's sense of isolation in the "great sea of Slavs" produced a strong ethnic nationalism. Anti-Semitism had been endemic in Rumania since its appearance as an independent state; the Congress of Berlin had obliged the new Rumanian government to amend the constitution to grant Jews citizenship. The Jewish problem in Rumania was not a simple one. Especially in Moldavia there had been a rapid influx of Jews, largely from Russian Poland, in the nineteenth century; the population of the urban centers was largely Jewish; most of the commercial activities were carried on by the Jews. This situation, combined with Rumanian nationalism and the desire for self-assertion, produced the perfect atmosphere for anti-Semitism. The national literary movement at the end of the nineteenth century had a strong anti-Semitic tone. Professor Cuza, the Rumanians liked

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

to say, was preaching the gospel of anti-Semitism while Hitler was still an infant.

But if nationalism and anti-Semitism are the constant handmaids of fascism, they do not wholly describe it. The element in fascism giving it its significance to the twentieth century is its response to the challenge of industrialism. It is for this reason that of the various political currents of pre-1914 Rumania populism had the closest affinity to some of the later manifestations of Rumanian fascism.[1] The populist response to this challenge, for all the specific rational arguments it may have advanced regarding the economic advantages of peasant farming, was fundamentally negative in its idealization of the unspoiled peasant and in its hostility to industry and the capitalist Golgotha. To these it added a strong cultural nationalism, a tendency to anti-Semitism, and that special characteristic of later fascism, a hatred of Marxism. To be sure, fascism is not generally anti-industrial. The tensions of contemporary industrial society impinge in different ways on different countries. But in the case of Rumania, with its particular position vis-à-vis industrial society, the fascist response in its most characteristic form involved this negation and an exaltation of the peasant.

During the interwar period Rumanian fascism developed in two phases. A number of fascist groups appeared immediately after the First World War, principally among students and the military, as a part of the general social turmoil brought about by the war. At that time fascism developed its leadership but did not become a mass movement. A second phase appeared with the depression; fascism broadened its influence and in the course of the 1930's increasingly dominated the political horizon. It took innumerable forms in Rumania: as an element in a larger political party, as a conscious imitation of foreign fascism, or as an authentic Rumanian fascist movement. In the first case, various manifestations of fascism, such as extreme chauvinism or anti-Semitism, appeared as a tendency in one of the established parties and often led to a schism. The defections of Octavian Goga and later of Vaida Voevod from the National Peasants may be taken as examples. In those cases where it took the form of an imitation of foreign fascism it was merely following the Rumanian practice of borrowing from the more developed European states.

An interesting example of borrowed fascism was the short-lived Fascia Națională Română, which began as a student organization

1. See above, p. 147.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

PLATE VI

563
142
291

A group of Corbu children. The girls are Roumanians, the boys Gipsies, the broad-headedness of the former contrasting markedly with the narrow-headedness of the latter. *Photo: R. A. Fellows.*

A group of peasants at the Borsec Fair. The girl in the foreground is a Szekler, her costume contrasting with those of the Roumanian women behind. *Photo: Miss M. Odlin.*

[facing page 45]

342 374 A MARKED FEATURE is the comparative absence of chimneys. The cooking is done in an outhouse, no doubt to minimise the risk of fire, but the dwelling house is generally heated by a stove, the smoke from which passes up through the ceiling in an iron pipe and then escapes into the open air through holes cut in the gable ends or, in the case of a hipped roof, through a small louvre.

343 THE OUTHOUSES are for the most part simple structures and call for no special comment.

511 CLEANLINESS and simplicity are the keynotes of the domestic economy. Household effects are kept down to a minimum, but upon their manufacture an enormous amount of time and skill is lavished, especially in the case of textiles. The skilfully-woven designs on the tapestries and pillows shown Plate XVI are an illustration of such effort.

POPULATION.

161 563 ACCORDING to the 1930 census Corbu had a population of 1,563, distributed among 358 households. The majority of the inhabitants are, of course, Roumanians, for the commune lies right on the fringe of the Szekler country. In spite of having lived in close association with the Roumanians for many generations, however, the Szeklers are easily distinguished by their dress, their physical type (though this is by no means an infallible guide), their adherence to Roman Catholicism, and, of course, their language. Although culturally there is an appreciable difference between the Roumanian and Szekler peasantry, there is to-day an even wider gap between these folk and the Tsiganes or Gipsies who form a much smaller, though very interesting, minority. [142] Generally speaking, the Roumanians contribute a dark, and the Szeklers a fair, element to the broad-headed population, whereas the Gipsies are for the most part distinctly long-headed and very dark. There is an equally well-marked difference on economic grounds, for both Roumanians and Szeklers are essentially peasants, whereas the Gipsy, being landless, is compelled to seek a livelihood by trading, unless he be either smith or musician, following the traditional pursuits of his forbears (see Plate VI).

342 563 THE HOUSES occupied by Gipsies, while resembling in style those of the peasants, can usually be recognised by the

342 absence of small fields, although a vegetable garden is a
563 normal feature. Most of them are grouped together in a small colony on a piece of steeply-sloping ground near the western end of the village that could not be used for agricultural purposes, thus emphasising the fact that they constitute an exotic element living on the outskirts of the community (see Plate XII and Fig. 11).

311 THERE is no emigration from Corbu, but the tendency is to extend cultivation by forest-cutting. A good deal of land in the Bistricioara valley is still available.

II. FARMING ACTIVITIES

THE LAND AND INHERITANCE.

428 FARMING in Corbu is carried on essentially for subsistence
241 rather than for profit. Large-scale cultivation with its attendant economies would in any case be difficult in such an environment, but it is rendered impossible by a land tenure system, intimately bound up with laws of inheritance, which permits the subdivision of land from generation to generation. On the death of the father the widow receives a quarter of the estate, the remainder being divided equally amongst all the children. Alternatively, the latter take over their portion on marriage, but the result in each case is the same—the peasant holdings not only decrease in size but portions of the same holding may be widely separated. For it does not even follow that all the land surrounding a farmstead necessarily belongs to the family residing there. It did, of course, when the holding was first formed, but marriage has in most cases added complications. A portion of the holding, for example, may belong to a married daughter living elsewhere in the village and her husband will then come periodically to cultivate it as part of his estate. Much time is wasted in this way, so wherever possible an interchange of plots is arranged, especially where the parties to the marriage belong to different villages.

423 IN a register covering about 207 hectares of privately owned land there were 133 parcels registered, sometimes more than one in the name of a particular person. Of the 133, 56 were less than one hectare each, but at least 8 of these parcels were accessories to other holdings and those owners

543 through a corner of the fair-ground as it begins its journey northwards. The fair-ground extends from the bridgehead, where in former times there must have been a ford, southwards for an indefinite distance between river and railway. A tributary stream which joins the Argeş at the bridge is named, after the fair, Valea *Tărgul*. From the bridge a lane winds southwards to the rows of buildings and sheds which
256 constitute the permanent nucleus of the fair. Here is the corn mill, perhaps once dependent on power from the river, but now driven by electricity. We may note in passing that among the many survivals in the Carpathians is the horizontal water-wheel, used here as in Norway to turn corn mills. The mill consists of a log-hut erected directly over a stream
543 or a branch of a river. The sale of cereals, chiefly maize, is
443 also conducted by the mill, at the entrance to the fair, and there are stores of building materials, fruit, rock-salt and charcoal.

Rows of permanent open-sided sheds face each other along the "main street" of the fair, and are hired for the duration by merchants and caterers. Other goods—mostly those brought by peasants—are displayed in improvised booths or exposed on the ground by the wayside. Further on, the inevitable amusements are concentrated in a corner of their own, the stalls in this section increasing in number throughout the week, until pleasure becomes the chief business by the last days of the fair. This is the natural culmination of events which begin with the sale of cattle in the opening days; the "order of the fair" is a traditional feature of such gatherings everywhere.

543 But in Roumania there is another element which contributes
326 to the variety of the fair—the gipsies who pitch their camps
● 563 behind the booths and hawk trinkets or unobtrusively engage in metal-work and wood-carving. They appear to keep apart from the rest. To them the food-stallholders bring their copper pots, used for boiling fat, for retinning, while the peasants drive up the draught oxen which may need to be reshod. The tinning is done over an improvised hearth and a handful of charcoal; the shoeing—by the bridge-head—requires somewhat more elaborate equipment in the shape of
[735] a forge and a post and ropes for felling the oxen. Finally, squatting by the wayside, or actively exhibiting their sores, there are the beggars and cripples, who complete the human picture.

scales against a popular government as was the case with 665
General Averescu's party in 1926. Dr Lupu refutes the imputation levelled against him of being an opportunist and has declared on a memorable occasion that the maxim "the wolf may change his skin but not his habits," was wrongly applied to him. His subsequent conduct, however, belied to a certain extent this solemn declaration which he made in October, 1926. It is to be hoped that he may dispel such misgivings as may exist and show himself in action as staunch a friend of the peasantry as he is in speech. Though his advocacy of inflation and of non-payment of the State's foreign debts is a policy that does not inspire overmuch confidence in his political discernment.

The Socialist and Communist Parties.—These are altogether insignificant and unlikely to exert in influence on the destinies of the country so long as they fail to attract the peasantry within their orbit. . . . A vigorous and well-organized peasant group such as the existing National Peasant party is the safest barrier against Communism.

The Minority Parties.—These have been constituted as a means of defence of the cultural life of the various national minorities in Rumania. Once the cultural life of these finds its desiderata satisfied, the representatives of the minorities would probably be absorbed by the Rumanian political parties, as there would remain no reason for their continuing a separate political existence.

So long, however, as the legitimate aspirations of these are not satisfied, their political representatives will not scruple to strike bargains with any reactionary force through whose patronage they may hope to snatch some particles of the rights which are being denied them. It is surprising that Bucarest politicians should be so obtuse as to fail to perceive how indispensable it is to grant satisfaction to the minorities if they are really intent on effectively disarming reaction in Rumania which so far has found in these groups an ever-ready and potent support.

Anti-Semite organizations presided over by M. A. C. Cuza.—Among these the most important is the L.A.N.C. 665 563
group (Christian League for National Defence). One may judge of the moral standing of this individual by an article

665 published in the "Cuvantul" of May 29th, 1927, in which it
563 was reported that the ecclesiastical authorities of Bucovina as well as those of Jassy had refused to collaborate with M. Cuza, because he had converted the club-house of his party at Jassy into a brothel. The paper proceeded to give various unsavoury, as well as pungent, details of the regulations prevailing in this "Christian" League club—regulations, which, according to the "Cuvantul" had been drafted by M. Cuza himself, to the immense benefit of the institution and its "pensionnaires." According to this paper this document serves as a striking testimonial to the organizing capacity possessed by this . . . . gentleman. M. Cuza has been elected as a deputy and early in October, 1931, he delivered a violent diatribe against the League of Nations; a very inconsiderate proceeding seeing that Rumania's salvation may well depend on the League and the aid of international finance.

THE ETHNIC MINORITIES AND THEIR GRIEVANCES

563 Rumania shares with Czechoslovakia and Esthonia the distinction of treating her ethnic minorities with a spirit of tolerance that speaks much in favour of the Rumanian people, who, as most impartial observers will admit, are distinguished by their kindliness and good humour. Most of the complaints one hears of, and they are numerous, arise mainly from the general maladministration from which all sections of the community suffer, and for this reason it is not the Hungarians, nor the Germans, nor the Bulgarians of the Dobrudja who are most vociferous in their lamentations, but strange to say, the Rumanians of Bessarabia. A whole book could easily be written on their tribulations, and as their woes are representative in an intensified form of those endured by other sections of the community, it may be judicious to dwell on them rather than on grievances specifically formulated by Magyars or Bulgarians, as one will thus avoid the imputation of partiality for the latter.

563 Without wishing to cast any disparaging reflections on
642 Rumania one cannot help deploring the failure to take

regional differences into account. The persistent endeavour 642
to create a strong centralization has been accompanied by 563
parallel attempts to choke all natural expression of local life, contributing thereby to the drying up of the springs of national vitality and instilling in the mass of the people a spirit of apathy or of scarcely disguised hostility. Had the reverse policy been adopted, there is little doubt that the various provinces would have fostered local institutions on their own lines, and would have given a better structure to the whole system of administration by providing it with a backbone of local interest and control which it otherwise will continue to lack. At any rate it becomes daily more obvious that the decision taken at Versailles to transfer high-cultured communities completely out of harmony with Rumanian methods to Rumanian rule, without securing for them a certain degree of autonomy, was particularly unfelicitous for their members.

Whenever general elections are impending, the ethnic 66
minorities are solicited by the various Rumanian parties for their votes, in exchange for which they secure assurances 563
that their aspirations will be completely satisfied. The election over, however, these alluring promises are forgotten, as are also similar electoral pledges made to Rumanian electors. If the hopes of the ethnic minorities were not elated every now and then by such extravagant engagements they would feel less keenly the injustice that had been inflicted on them. As matters stand, Rumanian parliamentary candidates at election time serve to keep this wound open, which, with a little more skilful handling on their part, would have had a better chance of healing.

The main grounds for complaints in the case of Hungarians 563
and Germans is the subject of their language. They find that a too exclusive use of the Rumanian tongue is insisted on in the various administrations as well as in the Tribunals, and that their children do not enjoy the same facilities to pursue their studies in their vernacular as when Transylvania formed a part of Hungary. All this is true, but it cannot be gainsaid that the Hungarian and German minorities are infinitely better off than is the German minority in the Italian

563 Tyrol, or the Ukrainians in Poland, for they at least possess a large number of schools and churches, mainly in communes [658] in which they form the majority of the population. At a time when the Rumanian government has been obliged for reasons of economy to close down several hundreds of schools and colleges, it would not be fair to impugn it for a shortage [423] of Magyar schools in Transylvania. The burning grievance, of course, remains the agrarian reform, not only because it has dispossessed Hungarian and German owners, but also because the depreciation of the Rumanian currency has practically nullified the paltry compensation they were accorded. Furthermore, religious establishments possessed extensive domains which likewise were expropriated and [659] have thereby lost most of their revenues which formerly were employed in the upkeep of churches, educational missions, and benevolent societies. This naturally constitutes a source of bitter recriminations, for both Hungarians and Germans are inclined to ascribe the treatment meted out to their religious establishments as dictated by the desire of the Rumanians to discourage their cultural activities, and to hinder the normal development of their nationality by depriving it of pecuniary resources. It is a great pity that so far no law has been framed to define the status of minorities in Rumania though this has been persistently promised them. Such an enactment would formulate once and for all the respective privileges and duties of both parties, and there would be no further grounds for recrimination except in the case of a patent violation of its clauses. The National Peasant party had prepared such a scheme which, if enacted, would have gone a long way to settle this vexed question; unfortunately after its abandonment of power it has apparently been forgotten.

With the advent of the Iorga-Argentoianu government the laudable initiative of creating a sub-secretariat for minorities was taken, to which post, M. Brandsch, a member of the German minority was appointed. He seems to have carried out his duty very conscientiously, as he has repeatedly been attacked by the ultra-nationalist press of Bucarest for his disregard of the superior interest of the Rumanian cause, and for overduly favouring the minorities. There seems to

be a determination in government circles to go a long way to satisfy most of the just demands of the minorities and to avoid as much as possible giving cause for irritation; at least Professor Iorga's declarations in the Rumanian Chamber on Dec. 14th, 1931, can be regarded as inspired by a spirit of sincerity and goodwill that constitutes a sure basis for an understanding. Among other things he affirmed: "We have no desire to create hypocritical Rumanians out of minoritarians, for he who renounces his past and sells his soul in order to secure advantages, is no gain to the people to which he transfers his allegiance, but rather a corrosive poison for the soul of that people. We must not frighten the minorities by an oppressive policy on the part of the Rumanian State, and by an absence of fraternal sentiments on their behalf amongst the Rumanian people; for it is not by such means that we shall consolidate our position, but rather by collaborating with the minorities and by respecting their most elementary rights." 563

Both the Hungarian and the German minorities constitute extremely valuable elements for furthering the general progress of the country, because, standing culturally higher than the Rumanian element in all domains of activity they can serve as examples to the latter. This is particularly noticeable in farming; the German villages especially constituting veritable model farms which have powerfully contributed to the general dissemination of the more advanced agricultural methods used in Transylvania. [241]

This intercourse between these three peoples has reacted very favourably on the Rumanians of Transylvania, who from every point of view stand at a much higher level than their brethren of the old kingdom. In fact, however unpalatable this truth may be to the latter, it must be frankly declared that the main chance of a regeneration in Rumanian political life can come only through a larger participation in it of the Transylvanians, who certainly have a clearer conception of their civic duties than is prevalent south of the Carpathians. The marked pre-eminence of the Transylvanians over other sections of the Rumanian people must be ascribed to their having been in contact with Germans and Hungarians, though the latter by their oppressive methods

563 did little to foster their civic development at the time when Transylvania formed a part of their kingdom, and this has been most lucidly exposed by Dr Seton-Watson in his book, " Corruption and Reform in Hungary." Nevertheless, this intercourse, whatever its momentary drawbacks may have been in the past, has influenced very favourably the Rumanian element, a matter that would seem to confirm once more the theory of Professor Wm. McDougall that " the development of the group spirit in general and of national self-consciousness in particular is favoured by, and indeed dependent upon, conditions similar to those which develop the self-consciousness of individuals, by intuition, by conflict, by compulsion, and by co-operation." (V. "The Group Mind," page 165.)

563 662 In general, it may be admitted that the minorities have been more favoured by the Bucarest Government than the Rumanian majority of Transylvania, for the latter, except during the time the Maniu Government was in power, was always in the ranks of the Opposition, and as such it could not reckon on obtaining any bounties, while the support of the minorities was very often secured by the dispensation of various privileges. Even in the economic field the minorities could reckon on a certain financial support which Budapest generously granted to their industrial and banking firms, while corresponding Rumanian establishments in Transylvania were stinted of all help from Bucarest because it was the policy of the Bratianus to stifle every enterprise that had not come within the orbit of the Liberal party, and for this purpose they did not hesitate to employ the most unscrupulous methods.

563 668 The Magyar minority is undoubtedly better off than the Rumanians of Transylvania from many points of view, and this is the reason why all Magyar propositions for offering the Hungarian throne to King Carol II have not been viewed favourably at Bucarest. It is felt that the Rumanian population has not yet been able to rise overmuch, from both the cultural as well as the economic point of view, and that it is still dominated by the Magyars. It is felt also that a personal union with Hungary under the common sceptre of a Rumanian King would mean the consolidation of the

THE ETHNIC MINORITIES AND THEIR GRIEVANCES

supremacy which the Magyar still retains, and such an 563
eventuality is fraught with danger for the Rumanian element 668
in general, as it would tend to recreate a state of affairs similar to that existing before the war. Hungarian advances purporting to bring about the realization of such an eventuality have so far been coldly received, even those made by Count Bethlen to King Carol in person at Temişoara have not evoked a hearty response among Rumanians, either of Transylvania or of the old kingdom. The Magyar pre- 666
ponderance in urban districts of Transylvania became 563
evident by the criticism with which the alteration of the law concerning the election of advisers in the Chambers of Commerce was met in 1929, when all these posts became elective instead of being partially nominatival. It was then reported that in the town of Cluj the Rumanians could count on only 20% in the commercial, and on only 30% in the industrial section of the Chamber, and it was proclaimed that measures ought to be taken to remedy the position of inferiority in which the Rumanian element had been placed, all the more so, since in other commercial and industrial centres, the position of the Rumanians was even worse than at Cluj.

Concerning these reported pourparlers for a personal union 563
between Hungary and Rumania, it may be of interest to 668
record what a Hungarian paper, the "Friss Hirek," published at Cluj, had to say on the meeting which took place at Temişoara between Count Bethlen and King Carol in 1932. In its issue of May 8th, 1932, dilating on this interview it stated among other things:—

"The negotiations concerning the personal union met with complete success and were based on the granting of independence to Transylvania under the leadership of Prince Michael, whose seat would be at Cluj, common Ministers for Foreign Affairs, War, and Finance. These matters were definitely agreed to. King Carol was to take up his residence for six months at Budapest and for six months at Bucarest.

The independence of Transylvania satisfied Count Bethlen as it would solve the minority problem. Transylvanians would enjoy equal rights and the various denominations

563 would obtain equal grants, while officials would be nomin-
664 ated proportionately to the numbers of each nationality.

Count Bethlen, however, desired to justify the millions spent on the revisionist campaign and demanded the revision of frontiers, namely the retrocession of the Hungarian towns bordering on the frontier (Arad, Oradea-Mare, and Satu Mare). The advisers of King Carol considered that the present frontiers of Rumania were final, and in order that the idea of a personal union be rendered acceptable to the Rumanian people, all reference to a revision of frontiers should be dropped as it was sure to provoke a fiasco, all the more so since the Liberal party was known to be hostile to the idea of a personal union. The Rumanians would accept the scheme only in case Hungary agreed to recognize the actual frontiers without rectification and in exchange for the other concessions. It was on this point that the negotiations came to a standstill. Count Bethlen was bound by engagements towards the revisionist group. According to his conception, only Transylvania was to remain under Rumanian rule as a Duchy, while other parts were to revert to Hungary."

In conclusion the paper stated that "the interview left painful recollections with Count Bethlen who now talks of an alliance with Italy and Austria."

The Dobrudja.

563 If the state of the minorities in Transylvania may be stated
166 to be relatively satisfactory, taking into consideration the
657 general shortcomings of the Rumanian administrative
647 system, it is to be regretted that as much cannot be said of the Dobrudja, where both the Turkish and Bulgarian minorities, living in compact masses, have well-founded grievances. One of the main causes of dissatisfaction has been the ill-considered plan of the Rumanian Government to colonize southern Dobrudja with Kutso-Vlachs from Macedonia. Without making any adequate preparations to provide these people with dwellings, food and clothing, it proceeded to billet them in the small cottages of the Bulgarian and Turkish farmers which were barely sufficient for their owners. The newcomers being destitute, had no alternative to that of

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1
Dobrudja

563
166
657
647

a life of rapine, a matter which led to bloody encounters followed by mass arrests of the local population. The latter had been further embittered by the State seizing one-third of their lands, no compensation whatever being given, even in cases of these lands carrying growing crops. Such was the tension that had been created that on the advent of the Maniu government, both M. M. Vaida-Voevod and Mihalache considered it imperative to intervene in order to put a stop to the abuses and the provocations that both Turks and Bulgarians were subjected to. The intercession of the leaders of the National Peasant Party caused extreme ill-feeling in Chauvinist circles which fomented a violent agitation against what was represented as treachery to the Rumanians. This culminated in the assassination of an under-secretary of State by a hot-headed student. The Maniu government had delegated a commission to study on the spot the complaints of the population of the Dobrudja and prepare a report, a summary of which was published in the "Adeverul" of March 4th, 1929. In this we read that "the enterprise of colonizing the Dobrudja had been left without control and had become a means of exploitation and the furthering of personal interests," that the system of quartering the colonists on the Bulgarian and Turkish inhabitants "led to an unbearable state of affairs causing endless conflicts." As for the situation of the colonists, the report shows that the ineptitude of the Rumanian authorities transcends all imagination, "out of 10,000 heads of families only 15 had received monetary help from the government, the lands that were to be allotted to the colonists remained in possession of State functionaries. The colonists had no houses nor timber wherewith to construct them." As a consequence of this report the Maniu Government created a special commissariat for building houses for the colonists, 1,257 of which were built in 1929, 938 during 1930, and 1,200 in the course of 1931, at an average cost of 44,000 lei each.

The situation, unfortunately has not improved, and murders of Turks and Bulgarians by the Kutso-Vlachs are frequent. What is most regrettable is that they are left practically unpunished, as has been the case with the murderer of one of the leaders of the Bulgarian minority, the

RUMANIA

[166] late C. M. Stephanov, who was also a member of the
657 Rumanian Senate. The main cause of the effervescence that
563 still subsists is this ill-advised scheme of planting the destitute
[647] Kutso-Vlachs on the farms of the aboriginal inhabitants, proof of which has been given by M. Georoceanu in a booklet he has published. M. Georoceanu was formerly a member of the Rumanian Senate during M. Maniu's tenure of office.

It may be added that the Bulgarians complain of not
[658] having a single school in their villages, and that when they presented petitions for opening such their signatories had
[659] been prosecuted. Bulgarian priests are no longer allowed to be nominated, and those that still remain are being gradually replaced by Rumanians who officiate naturally in their own language which is not understood by their flocks. A lesser
[204] wrong which receives the condemnation only of the intellectuals, is the ban on Bulgarian newspapers and periodicals. Their introduction into Rumania is prohibited, and though a few months ago the Bucarest press announced that this embargo would be raised, yet as late as April, 1932 the police authorities in the Dobrudja had received no intimation of this commendable measure. It is obvious that all these
563 grievances could easily be removed with a little goodwill on
648 the part of the Rumanian government, and to the westerner
657 it is incomprehensible that the latter should make no effort to safeguard the happiness of hundreds of thousands of human beings whose destiny has been entrusted to its hands. For it is not only the elementary duty of a government to care for its subjects, but in this case even political reasons dictate the following of a more humane and civilized policy. The bulk of the population being Bulgarian, and having for forty years enjoyed an independent existence, is utterly unaccustomed to such maladministration as it is now experiencing. It is therefore natural that it should be soliciting the intercession of the Bulgarian government under whose suzerainty it lived until recently. This is a course that creates friction between the two governments, keeps open an old sore, and embitters and strains relations between Bulgaria and Rumania. The former country would incur every sacrifice in order to ensure Rumania's friendship, and

it is most regrettable that Rumania, on account of this consti- 563
tutional impassibility from which she suffers, should neglect 657
the accomplishment of a simple duty that would simul- 648
taneously ensure the pacification of a province and the friendship of a neighbouring State. Even Sir Ian Hamilton in one of his books extended this advice to Rumania: "If she values her life let her make it up with Bulgaria whilst she is in the gate." (The Friends of England, p. 130). But so far this soldierly exhortation has not been heeded.

Bessarabia.

"Twelve years of Rumanian rule has alienated Bess- 563
arabia more than a century of Russian administration," 647
declared Constantine Stere, the veteran Bessarabian politician who may be considered as the mouthpiece of the population of that hapless region. If one wishes indeed, to form an idea of what the combined evils of corruption, ineptitude, nepotism, and inefficiency can bring upon a land he should visit Bessarabia. It is a standing disgrace, a festering sore, a danger point that will cause a fresh conflagration the moment the Russians across the Dniester can divert their attention from their economic plans to engage in world politics. Such is the desperation of the local population, their utter aversion to Rumanian misrule, the pessimism with which they regard every scheme emanating from Bucarest, that if the Russians would decide to cross the Dniester they would be hailed as liberators.

Not that the Bessarabians cherish any particular affection for the Russians and for communistic dogmas, but because there is after all a limit to human endurance to evils arising from such glaring maladministration. There is no hope for any amelioration; the Bucarest administration has demonstrated its incapacity to reform itself, and the only hope there may be of placating Bessarabia is the granting of a regional autonomy that may save her from casting longing glances at Bolshevik Russia across the Dniester. As the writer does not wish to be accused of exaggeration or of being imbued with unfriendly feelings towards Rumania, he will proceed to give a description of the position in Bessarabia by an interpolation of various excerpts culled from newspapers that he

F

RUMANIA

563 bought at random during his brief stays in Rumania. These
647 quotations have not been specially selected and they may be considered as generally descriptive of what is being said on Bessarabia in the Rumanian press. If one were to study the latter assiduously there is no doubt that a vast quantity of incriminating matter could easily be adduced to form a most damning indictment of the incapacity of Rumanian governments.

661 "Lupta," Dec. 8th, 1931 :—After the union, the men who
563 were most compromised were dispatched there to work for
647 the spiritual unification of the nation; at any rate they were individuals utterly incapable of understanding the ideal or the scope of the mission which had been confided to them. The administrative authorities were constituted entirely of the scum of the political parties of the old kingdom. It is to these social dregs that the errand of infusing into the Bessarabians a sentiment of confidence in us was entrusted. How they fulfilled this mission, how they alienated even those who trusted us, is well known. Bessarabia was and remains a sort of land of promise for those desirous to grow rich quick . . . not by honest means . . . after a self-imposed exile accepted solely for this purpose. Enrichment being the sole initial and final aim of these propagandists sent out from the old kingdom, they inaugurate a state of affairs which conforms with their pursuits. Persecutions of all sorts, inquisitorial constraints of all manifestations of collective and individual liberty. All corners of Bessarabia were represented as fertile for the culture of Bolshevism. For thirteen years we have heard of nothing else concerning this province save terrorist plots and communist actions all purporting to aim at the dissolution of the Rumanian State. Those interested, created purposely a state of affairs that completely denaturalized existing facts and finally succeeded in imposing their conception on "the administrative machinery of Bessarabia," &c. The paper concludes by relating how workmen and intellectuals are persecuted, imprisoned, subjected to all sorts of vexations by the Rumanian authorities at Kichineff and at other urban centres.

The "Cuvantul" of Feb. 20th, 1929, designates Bessarabia as "the sick man of Rumania." The Bratianu

1 [Bessarabia with Rumania—Analyst] 2 [illegible—Analyst]

régime had consummated Bessarabia's ruin, and its people were dying of hunger. The irruption of the Rumanian army was not the triumphal arrival of a liberator but the invasion of a hunger-stricken horde. The requisitions for obtaining supplies both for the army and for the population of Moldavia, on account of the haste and disorder with which they were carried out, assumed the aspect of revolting spoliations and led the natives to ask "what sort of brothers are these hogs and these robbers?" 563 647 661

"Our army's attitude was both offensive and aggressive, in conformity with the usages of war, in short, that of an army of occupation in an enemy country. When the time came to organize the civil administration of Bessarabia, very few of the regular functionaries agreed to be transferred to a remote and unsafe province. . . . Adventurers, those who had nothing to lose and who were under the threat of being dismissed or imprisoned, accepted to join in this "campaign to Siberia" in the hope of being rehabilitated or of becoming rich. For a long time the transfer of a civil functionary to Bessarabia was considered as a redoubtable disciplinary sanction. . . . ."

"The Bessarabians have found out what elements we can contribute to the restoration of their former material prosperity. These are poverty, demoralization, political debauchery, a decade of violence, fraud and illegality. Hence the permanent hostility with which they regard us; a state of irritability which is maintained owing to the prevailing wretchedness."

The main responsibility for this astounding state of affairs should be ascribed to the Bratianus, who inaugurated and maintained this system for ten years. When finally they were ejected from office, their Bessarabian partisans began to quarrel among themselves and attack most virulently their former regional leader, M. Inculeţ. They started a paper called "The Voice of Bessarabia" in 1929, in which their former leaders were denounced as vulgar and dangerous adventurers, robbers and criminals. As for their former local chief Inculeţ, he was accused of having retired to Jassi in order to enjoy in peace the thousands of millions he had accumulated by a triple betrayal of Russia, Bessarabia, and 665 576

RUMANIA

665 Rumania. The paper concluded by an exhortation addressed
574 to Bessarabians to evict Inculeţ from the political arena of Bessarabia where he had operated as though this region had been an African colony, and the appeal concluded with the hortatory incitation "Eject this putrefaction from Bessarabia."

661 In spite of the severe financial crisis which afflicted this region, the fiscal agents of the government insisted on
563 collecting taxes even when in years of drought the peasantry
661 was destitute and utterly unable to pay. The methods employed were so barbarous that they provoked several interpellations in the Rumanian Chamber. During its sitting of Dec. 10th, 1926, M. V. Madgearu denounced the abusive and inquisitorial methods by which Bessarabian tax-payers had been sold up and his arraignment was confirmed by similar indictments formulated by a member of the (then) government majority.

423 In October, 1930, a revolt broke out in southern Bess-
563 arabia. The peasants of the village of Baimaklia, near the town of Kagui, revolted and burned down the residence of a
661 big landowner because certain grazing lands were given to him by the State instead of being distributed among the peasants. That similar abuses are current may be inferred from an article in the "Aurora" of June 3rd, 1926, which is headed "The pauperization and humiliation of the Bessarabians," and in which it is related how certain State lands were put up for sale at Balţi, and though the peasantry of six adjoining villages had combined and offered 400,000 lei more than three big landowners, the lands were allocated to the latter, obviously through favouritism. That State functionaries often act with an arbitrariness and brutality
563 inconceivable in a civilized State may be illustrated by
661 the Soroca affair, which is of quite recent occurrence. In January, 1932, six Jewish youths, inhabitants of Soroca, on the Dniester, after coming to terms with the frontier-guards as to the amount of the bribe they would have to pay to be allowed to escape into Russia, and after they had paid 40,000 lei, were ambuscaded and shot down. In order to instil terror into the local population, their bodies were hurled pell-mell on a sledge which was driven by a soldier

sitting on the corpses through the streets of Soroca and conveyed to the mortuary. Such barbarous conduct naturally aroused bitter indignation which was re-echoed in the Bucarest press and was qualified "as a premeditated massacre," and the Rumanian Government was severely censured for providing Russia by such acts, good motives for anti-Rumanian propaganda. ("Adeverul" 10th Jan. 1932.) Such cases do not seem to be rare, for the same journal in its issue for the 20th Jan. reports the perpetration of a similar outrage at Balţi, when two persons were shot down by the frontier guards after they had secured their tacit permission to cross into Soviet Russia. It is obvious that if Russia exerts such a magnetic attraction on the Bessarabians as to incite them to abandon their belongings, disburse considerable sums in tolls, and endanger their lives in order to gain admittance to what they consider a haven of comparative repose, conditions in Bessarabia must be truly unendurable. At any rate the Iorga-Argentoianu Government has not so far shown any disposition to grapple more vigorously than its predecessors in office with this aggravating question of Bessarabian maladministration; on the contrary it has followed meekly in the footsteps of its predecessors. Thus, in the "Adeverul" for Jan. 28th, 1932, we read of a protest of Bessarabian intellectuals who denounced the favouritism shown by the Government for two of its political friends, who, after being munificently supplied with funds, were dispatched to Bessarabia in order to start the publication of a newspaper whose ostensible object was the spreading of Rumanian culture in that province. This dilapidation of government funds in favour of "budgetivorous" persons having no connection whatever with Bessarabia was strongly resented by Bessarabian intellectuals, who deemed themselves the sole persons qualified to carry on such propaganda in what they considered as their private domain. Bucarest governments have always shown themselves incapable of facing grave questions seriously, and one ought not to be surprised at their dalliance with the question of Bessarabia. Their latest device for placating the Bessarabians was to create two new Under-Secretaries of State and fill these posts with natives of Bessarabia. "The new system,"

563 ironically remarked the "Adeverul," "of dealing with
661 the woes of Bessarabia consists of appointing a Minister for Bessarabia at Bucarest, while a Bessarabian whose sole qualification is that of having published a book of poems is nominated to the post of Under-Secretary of State to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. This is the government's conception of putting a stop to the agitation in Bessarabia, but alas ! the satisfaction of two vanities does not mean that the problems appertaining to the region between the Pruth and the Dniester are approaching solution."

In another article the "Adeverul" takes the Government to task for creating fresh sinecures and sarcastically exclaims that Bessarabia must be happy since she has now two ministers. The Government felt constrained to declare that these two new posts would not create a very heavy additional charge on the budget as it had arranged that the Governor of Bessarabia would give up his salary to his new colleague, but the "Adeverul" retorted that if the Governor gave up his salary, he being a general, would draw a pension, so that there would still be an increase in expenditure, all the more so, since a salary had to be provided for the new Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. That the creation of posts for new under secretaries of State is highly unpopular may be seen from a report of a sitting of the Senate early in April, 1932, when Senator Banescu formally demanded the abolition of five such posts declaring that it was a shame to create new charges when the State had not the means wherewith to pay its pensioners. The Opposition was reported to have loudly applauded him, shouting "it is tragic, people are dying of hunger."

433 The dissatisfaction existing in Bessarabia has been intensified through the economic crisis which had become endemic in that province since its separation from Russia, and which the Rumanian authorities so far have done nothing to alleviate or to assuage. Bessarabia was one of the most fertile and productive provinces of the Russian Empire, the latter providing a ready market for Bessarabian produce. Its orchards and vineyards were famous and provided annually some 28,800 tons of fruit of a value of 5 milliard

RUMANIA

668 Bessarabians are popularly called) forming the most back-
177 ward section of the Rumanian people are mentally incapable of appreciating at their true value all the qualities which the Rumanian administration exhibits in its conduct towards populations whose goodwill it has set out to win. For the organs of the Rumanian State are inspired by a high purpose, that of converting these Moldovans of Bessarabia into loyal Rumanians, by inculcating in them a consciousness of the collective national will. When they shall finally see eye to eye with the various cultural missionaries which Bucarest has so far dispatched for their edification, then at last will loyalty and love follow, for loyalty after all is but the consciousness of oneness, and it is this consciousness of oneness that the Bucarest "Kulturträger" are attempting to impress on the Bessarabians.

668 These altruistic efforts, however, seem unavailing, for in January, 1932, a pan-Bessarabian congress of all parties and creeds was held at Kichineff, and delegates resolved to create a united Bessarabian front so as to impose on the Government which had done nothing for this province since its union with Rumania, the taking of certain measures designed to ameliorate the situation. M. Batsaria, a veteran Rumanian journalist, commenting on this congress in the "Adeverul" stated that a member of the cabinet had confided to him that this discontent was not peculiar to Bessarabia, but existed in all the new provinces. An atmosphere, which was in no way favourable to the realization of a complete spiritual unity among the inhabitants of Great Rumania had been created. And so long as the legitimate rights of all were not respected, and their just grievances remained unredressed, so long would unity be unattained.

The Jews.

[162] The Jewish minority numbers some 800,000 souls (accord-
563 ing to Winckler's racial statistics, 778,094) who are mainly
641 concentrated in the urban districts of Bessarabia, Moldavia, Bucovina, and the province of Maramureş. As petty trading, commerce and, to a large extent, banking is in their hands, all the more important towns have a numerous Jewish element in their population. The manifest disinclination of the Rumanians for commerce has permitted the

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1
RWS

Jewish element to gain a place of importance in the life of the 563
community, which has unfortunately provoked the resent- 641
ment and jealousy of their Christian co-nationals and created a Jewish problem in Rumania. To counteract their economic influence they were refused political rights by the Rumanian Constitution of 1866, and though the Congress of Berlin obtained the abolition of this law, such obstacles were placed in the way of Jews wishing to acquire naturalization that only a few hundreds succeeded in obtaining this privilege by 1914. According to the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities which Rumania finally signed, the Rumanian nationality is conferred on all Jews in Rumania. The Jews have not 665
followed the example of the Magyars and Germans, who 563
have created political parties of their own, yet prejudice against them is pretty strong and has led to the formation of political groups which are purely anti-Semitic. The supporters of anti-Semitism are mainly recruited among students, and the universities have often been the scenes of ruthless and barbarous acts of violence. The leaders of the anti-Semitic leagues are unscrupulous individuals, who by pandering to the lowest instincts of the mob see a way to secure personal advantages for themselves. Thus the chief henchman of Cuza, the anti-Semitic leader, an individual named Codreanu, gained notoriety by shooting the Police Prefect of Jassi while the latter was doing his duty in suppressing a pogrom that had been organized in the capital of Moldavia.

The Jewish problem is purely economic, and this is the 554
reason why student circles are so anxious to impose the 563
" numerus clausus " in the Rumanian universities. They wish to eliminate potential rivals in the liberal professions as far as they possibly can. In many of these the Jewish element has certainly distinguished itself, especially in law and in medicine. Rumanian youth feels that the prominent position Jews hold in society is a serious obstacle to its advancement, and the methods adopted to eliminate this hindrance are certainly not always commendable. It should be added, however, that where Jews do not exist other races occupy their place, so that it is always the non-Rumanian elements which fill the more lucrative posts in the urban

554 districts. Thus in the Banat, and Transylvania, the Germans and Magyars dominate commerce and industry and Magyar
563 influence has been so powerful that it has practically assimilated the Jews. In the lower Danubian ports and at Constantsa, it is the Greeks and Armenians who form the largest section of the commercial community, though in certain Danubian ports the Jewish element predominates.

461 These facts would tend unequivocally to show that the Rumanians do not possess the necessary perseverance that is indispensable for those who desire to engage in commerce. It would appear, too, that the French educational system which they have adopted helps to foster a contempt for all occupations which are not purely intellectual, and for these reasons Rumanians who claim to have received some degree of education look askance on all manual work. This appar-
565 ent aversion for commerce explains to a certain extent the absence of a Rumanian middle class, an absence which ought to be remedied, for the country is deprived of a useful steadying element which is indispensable for its normal development. As things are, it possesses a small superficial leading class, that cannot be said to compensate by its quality for its lack of quantity, and a huge mass of almost illiterate peasants that lags far behind. The example of
565 Russia proves the danger that exists for a community which
563 shows such an unstable equilibrium of classes. A solution of the problem would consist in attracting the Jews from the occupations to which they have hitherto been restricted. The Jewish problem in Russia has been solved by adapting the Jews to industry and agriculture. An exceedingly instructive and interesting article entitled "Soviet Russia solves the Jewish Problem," from the pen of Mr Wm. Zukerman, and published in the "Contemporary Review" for Dec., 1931, may well supply useful hints for Rumania. There is no doubt that if the Jews in Rumania enjoyed greater freedom of action they would not concentrate all their activities on commerce, and they would thereby offer to Rumanians more possibilities and better opportunities to engage in trade than they now possess.

563 The Szekelys have found during twenty-two years of Romanian administration that the feudal privileges they had enjoyed under Hungary had cost them a high price to uphold and had yielded little real benefit. Indeed, Hungarian propaganda had inspired them with restlessness in the last two decades. But it cannot be doubted that, had the western boundary been settled in good faith, the Szekelys would have found their right place in the Romanian state, the more so as their ethnic origin has never been conclusively proved."

•

000 The Peace Conference of 1920 had to struggle as best it could with the statistical approximations submitted by Serbia, Austria, Romania and Hungary in recasting the Eastern European map with which we have been familiar until 1939. The nations that from the beginning have attacked that map are to a large extent responsible for the present war. The changes brought about by this war are forced changes. Whether affecting Romania, as they did in Transylvania and Bessarabia, or any of her former friends and allies, they are changes for the worse in every single instance. Were it practicable to poll national European opinion, the Russian not excepted, hardly anyone would be surprised if the restoration of the *status quo ante* were overwhelmingly upheld.

Broadly, this is forecast by the Atlantic Charter when it proclaims "the desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." Broadly this, and no more, is also Romania's desire when, declining to expand beyond her own domain, she struggles to reconstruct her national unity.

Is this reconstruction justifiable? The question may be answered today with statistical certainties. Where there is a Romanian majority, as indeed there is in every Romanian province, "sovereign rights and self-government," the Atlantic Charter asserts, must be "restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." There is general agreement

"Whether they be Huns, Petchenegs, Cabars, Avars, Huno-Avars, Kesaro-Cabars or Gepides, as has been variously contended (Theodorescu, Vasile M., "Transilvania sub Maghiari si Romani," Bucharest, 1941), there is a distinct possibility that while Hungarian-speaking they may not be Hungarians. Historically this supposition is supported by their membership in the "Union of the Three Nations" formed in 1438 with the Hungarians and Saxons. This alliance, adhered to until modern times, argues for a distinct racial identity of Szeklys, the absence of which would have dictated a Union of two, and not of three, nations.

Not less interesting is the argument resting on scientifically conducted blood tests to determine biologically the racial indices of Szeklys, Hungarians and Romanians, the results of which indicate according to Dr. Pierre Ramneantu ("Origine ethnique des Sekiers de Transylvanie" in *Revue de Transylvanie*, Vol. 2, No. 1, Cluj, 1935, pp. 45-59) a pronounced dissimilarity between those of Szeklys and Hungarians and an equally marked resemblance between those of Szeklys and Romanians.

6

12: Koritos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

793 The poor clergy are very active in politics and
661 public affairs generally. Their influence, and even more that of the bishops, has not infrequently been
[212] abused to further private interests.[1] The majority of the Rumanians are only semi-literate and depend for their information and guidance on the priests.
871 Education has been the weak point of almost all the Rumanian governments. But those Rumanians whose parents have been able to give them a good education have proved that this highly intelligent and gifted people can achieve success in all fields of science and the arts.

563 **THE HUNGARIANS AND THE SZEKELYS.** The Hungarians and Szekelys, most of whom came under Rumanian rule after the Great War, live chiefly in Transylvania and the western provinces of Greater Rumania. The forefathers of the Szekelys were brought to these territories by the Hungarian kings and charged with the task of defending and securing the Kingdom's frontiers. The Hungarian nobles and Szekelys were two of the 'Three Ruling Nations' of Transylvania.[2] They were supported and encouraged by their kin in Hungary proper, given many privileges in the economic, political and cultural spheres. Thanks to all this they were able

[1] One blatant example of this occurred about ten years ago when a shepherd, who claimed to have 'visions' and prophetic power was built up into a holy figure. The simple peasants flocked to see and hear him, bringing many gifts. The State railways organized special travel facilities and this enriched many officials and members of the clergy.

[2] The three 'united' or 'recognized nations' of Transylvania were the Hungarian nobility, the Szekelys and the Saxons.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

to develop very favourably. Their villages and towns are well built and neat, their fields well worked. Although by no means rich, these Magyars are generally better off than their Rumanian neighbours. Before the Great War the Magyars of these regions belonged to the dominant section of the population whose leaders controlled all spheres of life. During this period, especially since the eighteen-sixties, the Hungarian Government tried to Magyarize the Rumanians under its rule, using extensive political and economic pressure. This naturally led to great animosity, as the Rumanians resisted these attempts. The reaction came when the position was reversed and the Rumanians became the dominant section of the population. The Rumanian Government's policy towards minorities was anything but democratic; but the Hungarian domination of the Transylvanian Rumanians had even been more effective. Hungarian irredentist movements within Greater Rumania and the revisionist claims of Hungary naturally contributed to a considerable deterioration of relations between the two nations.

THE SLAVS. The main Slav races inhabiting Greater Rumania were the Ukrainians, the Russians and the Bulgarians. The Ukrainians live chiefly in Bessarabia and in the Bukovina where, under Austrian rule, they were on the whole a favoured minority. They and the Russians in these provinces have all the characteristics of their brethren in Poland and the U.S.S.R. Under Rumanian domination they belonged to the worst treated minorities of Europe. The Bulgarians, living in Southern Bessarabia, in the Dobrudja and in the Banat, were in a very

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1914
ED¹ Rumania ED1

563 similar position. Only a small number of Bulgarians in the Banat, famous as first-class market-gardeners and fruit-growers, were comparatively well off. There live in Wallachia and in the Banat a number of Serbs, settled there as frontier guards by the Austrian emperors. Some live in villages of their own, some together with German, Rumanian or Hungarian communities. They have strong ties with Yugoslavia, and have achieved comparative prosperity.

THE JEWS. The Jews, who are to be found in all Rumanian provinces and have big communities in Bessarabia and in the Bukovina, have always been a persecuted and oppressed minority. The brand of anti-Semitism encouraged by almost all Rumanian governments resembles that of Tsarist Russia. [661] Whenever something went wrong in politics or economics the Jews were blamed for it and pogroms were organized, sometimes surpassing in violence those of the Tsarist regime. This traditional anti-Semitism has its roots in the period when wealthy Rumanian absentee landlords let their estates to Jewish agents for management and tax-collection. This was a convenient means of laying the blame for exploitation at the door of the Jews, whilst the *boiars* pocketed the taxes and rents.[1] Jewish influence in Rumanian finance and trade has been very great, as was their share in introducing modern industries into the country. Many Jewish families, especially in Moldavia and Wallachia, can trace their association with Rumania back to the early Phanariots. Others have lived for many years in the

[1] Some of the Jewish managers of estates deserved all that came to them; but the resentment which they caused was frequently visited quite unjustly upon obscure Jews who did no kind of harm to their Gentile neighbours.

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

Bukovina, in Bessarabia and in Transylvania. The majority has, however, immigrated during the last century. Restrictions on their personal freedom, an almost complete denial of political rights, and organized and government-sponsored pogroms are familiar devices which have been used by most Rumanian regimes. These measures are supported by the ruling circles and certain intellectuals in order to divert the attention of the people from the real causes and the real culprits whenever the country passes through a crisis.

563

THE GERMANS. The first German colonists who came to Rumania were brought to Transylvania in the twelfth century and given substantial privileges, including the right of self-government. The 'Saxons' constituted the third of the three privileged and ruling 'nations' of Transylvania. They were originally Rhinelanders who were later converted to Protestantism. After the Turkish wars of the eighteenth century Catholic German peasants from Bavaria and the Lorraine were settled by the Empress Maria Theresa in Western Transylvania and in the Banat. The influence of these Germans, as well as of those brought by Tsarist Russia to Bessarabia, has been very strong indeed. German workers have been foremost in many Rumanian industries, German peasants have taught their neighbours improved methods of agriculture and German traders have done a great deal to modernize Rumanian commerce. But all these achievements of the German colonists have been offset by their treacherous behaviour; the call of 'German blood' appealed to them, and they became one of the most powerful of all Nazi Fifth Columns.

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

175 war on their side. In December 1918, after the
635 collapse of the Dual Monarchy, an assembly of delegates of the Transylvanian Rumanians, meeting in Alba Julia, voted for union with the Rumanian Kingdom, and the province was occupied by Rumanian troops. The incorporation of Transylvania was later recognized and endorsed in the Peace Treaties.

563 *Rumanians.* The Rumanians of Transylvania, who form approximately 60% of the principality's population, are in many respects more advanced than their countrymen in Moldavia and Wallachia. The intensive State policy of Magyarization pursued by Budapest in the nineteenth century led to the strengthening of Rumanian national consciousness. The struggle for economic and political rights, however, never led to anything more than the granting of concessions on paper. From the Rumanian point of view the aims of the Transylvanian Rumanians were fulfilled only with the union of their country with the rest of Rumania in 1918. But, even under the Rumanian regime, the Rumanians of Transylvania were unable to gain economically in twenty years what they were prevented from obtaining during several centuries. Most of them were peasants; some were industrial workers; some became civil servants.

Magyars and Szekelys. The 500,000 Szekelys, inhabiting the eastern part of Transylvania, have still preserved some characteristics which make them distinct from the Hungarians, but politically and economically their position is now very similar to that of the Hungarian population which, in

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

Transylvania is about 500,000[1] strong. Most Hungarians, however, live in the larger villages and in the towns, which during the last century have been Magyarized to a considerable extent. After 1918 the position of the Magyars of Transylvania, compared with that before the Great War, was an unhappy one. There was in practice a discrimination against them and their institutions, which was not unnatural in view of what the Rumanians had suffered at the hands of the Hungarian Government. But the lack of a positive and constructive policy towards the Hungarian minority was just as much due to the revisionist clamour in Hungary and the separatist troubles caused by certain sections of the Hungarian minority, as to the attitude of successive Rumanian governments. 563

Germans. The German minority in Transylvania, about 250,000 strong, consists of two distinct groups: the 'Saxons', settled here in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and later converted to Protestantism; and the 'Aelpler', Catholics from Southern Germany, who immigrated in the eighteenth century. For centuries, and especially when Transylvania was under Austrian rule, these Germans possessed far-reaching privileges which, coupled with their skill and high cultural standard, enabled them to build up a very strong economic position. From the second half of the last century onwards, however, they were subject to a process of Magyarization and deprived of many of their privi-

[1] The total number of people of Hungarian race, including Szekelys, according to the census of 1930, was 1,426,178. By the natural rate of increase they would now number about 2,500,000.

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

563 leges. In 1919 they accepted the union of Transylvania with the Old Kingdom. In the inter-war period the Germans in Rumania enjoyed a far better treatment than any other minority, and in Transylvania they were by far the most prosperous community. Nevertheless, the pan-German policy of National-Socialism found many supporters in their ranks.

131 648 [161] *Vienna Award.* Before the Vienna Award of 1940 Transylvania covered an area of 24,600 square miles and had a population of over 3,250,000, including 200,000 Jews. The decision of the German and Italian Foreign Ministers in Vienna split Transylvania in two, a measure never before carried out during the eventful history of the principality and certainly harmful and unjust to all the parties concerned. There is no doubt that this 'solution', which has only complicated the Transylvanian question and made its real solution more difficult, was made deliberately in order to make both Hungary and Rumania more dependent on Germany's support.

133 *Geography and Products.* The Transylvanian highlands are surrounded on three sides by the high mountain chains of the Carpathians. In the south-west the border is formed by the 'Western Mountains' (Muntii Apuseni), and in the north-west by the hills which eventually merge into the Hungarian plain. The Rivers Mures, Somes and Tarnava divide the highland in three distinct parts, the steppe, the hills and the forests. Parallel with the outer ring of the Eastern Carpathians there runs a belt of volcanic mountains with many small valleys. In the south-east there is the fertile and hilly district of Trei-

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Bukovina]

rule. It was occupied by the Russians in 1769. In 1774 the province was given to Austria, under which it remained until 1918. On 23 October the Austrian governor handed over the Bukovina to the Ukrainian inhabitants of the province; but four days later an assembly of Rumanian Bukovinians declared for the union of the province with Rumania and asked the Rumanian government for military assistance. This was forthcoming on 11 November and added to Rumania a territory of about 4,100 square miles with a population of about 870,000 (1930). Of these over 38% were Ukrainians, 34% Rumanians and 21% Germans and German-speaking Jews. The Rumanian administration began by a vigorous policy of Rumanization. The Ukrainians, who under Austrian rule had been well treated, and the Jews, were the chief sufferers, but the Germans, too, were ousted from many of their positions.[1]

More than half of the Bukovina is covered with dense forests of beech;[2] one-fifth consists of pastures; less than a third is arable land. The province borders in the west on the Carpathians, in the south on Moldavia, in the east on Moldavia and Bessarabia and in the north on Poland. The western part of the Bukovina is formed by the slopes of the Carpathians, where manganese and iron ore are found, especially in the region of Jacobeni. To the east stretches the hilly country, covered with pastures, on which good livestock is raised, and fields of maize, wheat and tobacco. Mineral resources are confined to some small deposits of coal, gold and lead, but the industry of the province is well developed.

[1] The German University of Czernowitz was completely Rumanized soon after the military occupation.

[2] The German name of the province means 'Land of the Beeches'.

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

000 down after heavy fighting and the burning of many villages.

635 563 [452] The political situation[1] in Bessarabia was partly the cause and partly the effect of economic conditions. Agricultural credit for those peasants who had received land was non-existent. Communications were neglected and allowed to fall into complete decay. There was only a small amount of trade, which was largely in the hands of the Jews. This encouraged the spread of anti-Semitic propaganda which was fostered by the Government. The Ukrainian and Russian population was deprived of all cultural rights. The German minority was the best treated, but even the Rumanians of Bessarabia were regarded by the central government with suspicion.

635 648 Following a demand by the Soviet government, which had never recognized the annexation of Bessarabia, Bessarabia was ceded by Rumania to the U.S.S.R. in June 1940. When Rumania joined Germany in the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina were again occupied by Rumanian troops.

[1] [ie: the frequency of popular uprisings -- Analyst]

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

563 177 **THE MINORITIES.** The presence of large numbers of non-Rumanians in the new State affected the fate of Rumania decisively. While the leaders of the Transylvanian Rumanians, who had themselves had a long experience of foreign rule, advocated a just and liberal policy, the politicians of the Old Kingdom[1] and especially the Right Wing, persisted in a policy of Rumanization and de-nationalization contrary to the Minority Treaties. In Bessarabia this policy was excused by stressing the danger of the spread of revolutionary movements which threatened the safety of the State, and was carried out by the military. In the territories acquired from Hungary the position of the dominant and dominated sections of the people had been reversed so suddenly and so decisively that the change necessarily had violent consequences. Moreover, here the question of the treatment of minorities was closely interlocked with that of administrative unification. The laws and regulations of the Old Kingdom and of the New Territories[2] had to be equalized. The majority of the civil servants in Transylvania were Hungarians and most of these were replaced by Rumanians from the Old Kingdom. Some of the old officials had to be retained, owing to the shortage of trained personnel, and the doubt about their loyalty to the new regime was exploited to strengthen the case for complete centralization.

[1] [Provinces of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Dobrudja--Analyst]
[2] [Territories acquired after World War I--Analyst]

665 565 **SOCIAL REFORM.** The problem of social reform was the most urgent and the most hotly contested of all. The Transylvanian National Party under the leadership of Maniu, and the Peasant Party of Mihalache,

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

especially hard hit by this rampant corruption. The 661
moneyed classes, on the other hand, were well satisfied with this state of affairs which guaranteed the continuance of their rule.

The position of the minorities was unenviable. 563
In theory all non-Rumanians had the same rights 641
and duties as the Rumanians. In practice, however, things were very different. The official language was Rumanian and anybody not able to speak Rumanian was handicapped from the beginning when dealing with the authorities. It was very difficult for members of a minority to obtain schooling in their native language, for although there were some Hungarian and German schools they had to be financed by the respective communities and the fees to be paid were high. A public career for a member of a minority was very rare indeed and non-Rumanians had always to expect unfavourable treatment at the hands of the authorities. The Jews, many of whom were denied Rumanian citizenship and had to pay from time to time for the right to live in the country, were worse off than the rest. Often in addition to being persecuted for their origin they could be victimized for having a Hungarian name and speaking German as their native language.

The mass of the Rumanians did not gain by this 661
discrimination ostensibly made in their favour. At 565
best the half-educated sons of peasants could secure some minor position in the State machinery.

The economic life of the country was dominated 471
by all-powerful monopolies. The oil and heavy industries were in the hands of a few foreign and Rumanian shareholders and the enormous profits were divided between a few industrialists, ministers

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

643 found guilty in a libel action. The only immediate
[648] danger, the revisionist claims of Hungary and Bulgaria, was to be eliminated by an even friendlier attitude towards Italy and Germany, and Carol's tour of the European capitals, including London, was intended to reassure the democracies.

643 Beneath the surface, however, the struggle between the Iron Guard and Carol continued. While Carol was on his tour, Codreanu and thirteen of his legionaries were shot by their prison guards. The Minister of the Interior, Calinescu, a former member of the National Peasant Party, who succeeded to the premiership after Miron Cristea's death in March 1939, ordered further repressive measures and was himself assassinated by Iron Guardists in the autumn of the same year.

• 563 668 THE FIFTH COLUMN. Nazi Germany found an extremely fertile soil for its propaganda not only among the Rumanian Fascist parties and some generals and industrialists, but also amongst the many Germans living in Rumania. They were economically prosperous and the best treated of all minorities in Rumania. The most important communities were the settlements in Transylvania and in the Banat. At first Nazi propaganda was not very successful owing to the economically favourable position of these Germans and their comparatively strong religious feeling.[1] But as time went on it had great successes. Under the cloak of cultural associations Nazi cells were formed which soon spread into every German village. Unwilling Germans were

[1] The 'Saxons' are Protestants, the 'Aelpler', also in Transylvania, and the 'Schwaben' of the Banat Roman Catholics.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

forced into these organizations by social and economic pressure. Combatant units, armed and trained, consisted of youths who learned the Nazi doctrine in their schools. Financial assistance came from the German banks in Rumania: they supported the transactions of the 'Association for Export to Germany', which secured a virtual monopoly in the export trade of grain, cattle and pigs to Germany and Italy, as well as the hemp-growing scheme, which met with considerable success in the Banat. 563 648

Similarly the German papers published in Rumania soon passed under Nazi control. Their information was received from news agencies in Germany which also supplied them with commentaries and feature articles. Naturally the Rumanian Fascists were supported by the German-Rumanian Nazis who acted as go-betweens and agents of their masters in the Reich.[1]

The pro-Nazi Germans of Rumania who had always possessed good economic, industrial and financial connexions were able to render valuable assistance in the economic penetration of the country by German trusts. In 1933, for example, the fusion of several chemical firms in the Banat and in Wallachia brought them entirely under German control. That they produced semi-finished material for explosives enhanced their value. The iron and 563 471

[1] The outrages of the Iron Guard, such as the desecration of Jewish synagogues and cemeteries, destruction of Jewish shops, political murder and blackmail, were aided and abetted by the German Nazi agents. A series of fires and bomb-explosions in Timisoara in November 1938, as well as other terrorist acts, were committed by members of the Iron Guard jointly with some German youths who were known to the public but escaped punishment. 648

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

563 steel works of Resita and Copsa Mica, with a capital
471 of six million pounds sterling, and many other factories also passed under German control. In the
[439] fight against Franco-British and American capital in Rumania, Germany was favoured by the fact that 50% of Rumania's imports were German, and 36% of the country's exports went to Germany (1938). By 1940 the latter had reached about 70% of the total.

563 This underground activity of the German
668 minority, combined with the pro-Fascist leanings of the majority of the ruling classes, who feared to lose their privileges and were only too glad to join in the Anti-Bolshevik[1] crusade, and the corruption reigning in the army and all branches of the government apparatus, sapped the strength of the country economically, politically and morally. It had become an easy prey for the imperialism of Hitler.

661 [1] Especially savage measures were taken against workers' and intellectuals' progressive organizations, which were made illegal and had to go underground. Their members, if caught, were court-martialled and imprisoned.

241 the peasants and the reduced 1942 sowings both
656 of grain and of sugar-beet indicated continued
435 dissatisfaction. Finally, by the spring of 1943 a wiser ratio was reached, agricultural prices being four times as high as in 1939 and wholesale prices in general three and a half times as high. Nevertheless, this very considerable measure of inflation
[453] has shaken public confidence in the value of money so that peasants increasingly resort to barter transactions.

[655] In the hope of obtaining better control over grain supplies the Government in the autumn of 1941 nationalised the grain trade, later they relaxed this to the extent of leaving the export business to a few selected firms and the internal collection to the Army and to the National Institute of Co-operation. This body handled the pre-war grain marketing scheme, and their
[563] activities—because of the expulsion of Jews from wholesale and retail trade—have recently developed rapidly in the supply of seeds to peasants (80,000 tons of seed distributed in 1942) as well as consumers' goods to peasants and townspeople. But it still proved difficult to extract enough food from the peasants to feed the towns. For the 1943 harvest detailed regulations were made concerning the quantities the peasant might keep for seed, for his family and for his animals, and threshing operations were subjected to inspection. Yet these rules could not in practice be administered.

423 It is now generally agreed in Rumania that the
471 smallness of the holdings has been a principal obstacle to effective organisation of agriculture in war-time, and that a change to larger units of production is needed. Any approach to collectivisation on the Soviet model, however, would be regarded as contradictory to the land reform policy and a threat to the Rumanian State. The official policy, though it has not yet taken its final form, is to maintain private property but to proceed no further with expropriation and division of large estates, and to maintain existing medium holdings by prohibiting their sub-division for inheritance or other reasons. Schemes for the consolidation of strips are also contemplated for a more opportune moment. Further, in order to
474 increase production and to improve the peasants' methods and standards of life, communal farming associations, known as *obştii*, are to be formed. In these associations, farming equipment is to be pooled so that the small-holder would have the same resources as the large farmer. Each *obştie* is to embrace a village and perform all the functions of a co-operative, including joint purchase and sale, use of breeding animals, processing of crops, etc. Villages which are prepared to form themselves into *obştii* and to undertake to work the land according to State directions, are promised tractors, seed and breeding stock without payment. In this way it is hoped that some of the advantages of collectivisation may be achieved while retaining those of individual ownership. But, unless accompanied by far-reaching industrial development, the plan can but aggravate rural unemployment. It is not known how this innovation has been received by the peasants. It was reported in April 1943 that 270 of these communal associations had been formed—an insignificant number—and it is believed that the Government is allocating to them some of the tractors imported from Germany in the war years.*

241 The success of the *obştii* plan, and indeed of any plan for up-grading Rumanian agriculture, depends

* In June, 1943, a temporary ban was placed on the formation of any new *obştie*, because there was insufficient agricultural machinery to supply to them.

[106]

B. LABOUR POSITION DURING THE WAR

1. Military Conscription

701 The age limits for mobilisation are 19–50, while youths from 17–18 are liable for pre-military training.

During 1942 there have been several indications of the strain which further mobilisation was putting on Rumania's manpower; for example, in April 1942 the sentences on political prisoners were suspended and they were called into the army, while from July of that year onwards there has been a constant revision of previous exemptions and a tightening of control over the granting of leave and call-up. Military service, which previously had been obligatory for Rumanian citizens only, was made compulsory for all non-nationals* resident in the country, and further a decree was passed mobilising all Rumanians of military age resident abroad. [563]

It is calculated that it has never been possible for Rumania to have more than 800,000 men properly equipped under arms at one period. The actual strength of the army has fluctuated considerably during the last two years, as has the number on the eastern front, but a reasonable average figure would be 500,000, of which 200,000 on the eastern front.

727 464 Rumanian casualties are difficult to assess. One estimate at the end of 1941 put casualties at 150,000, while total casualties up to May 1943 have been estimated at 350,000. Military mobilisation will probably have meant a loss of some 800,000 men to the general labour supply.

2. Recruitment for Germany

464 167 The recruitment of workers for Germany has been on a small scale, which is not surprising, as Rumania's military contribution has been considerable, and the military mobilisation has already reduced the supply of labour needed for the Rumanian armament industry to a minimum. Such labour as might be available for export is unskilled and therefore of less value to Germany. The total number of Rumanian workers in Germany in December, 1942, was estimated at 14,000. Of these 10,000 were young Rumanians 18–19, who were recruited at the end of 1941 to be "trained" in German metallurgical factories, 1,000 are women employed as domestic servants, and the rest are mainly unskilled general workers.

3. Foreign Workers in Rumania

648 463 In addition to the German administrators and directors, who are in certain of the key positions in Rumanian industry, there is also evidence of skilled German technicians in Rumanian armament factories. In 1942 there was a nucleus of the German Todt organisation, and Italian builders in the country.

727 About 40,000 ~~Russian prisoners~~ of war are employed, chiefly in agriculture, though also in mining and navvying work.

C. GENERAL LABOUR DEVELOPMENTS

464 722 In 1937 the average unemployment figure was 12,000. The dislocation of trade and industry on the outbreak of war temporarily caused a general increase of unemployment, which was rapidly absorbed by the military call-up and increased activity in the armaments industry. In March

* The German minority was already liable for military service, either in the Rumanian or German army and in December, 1942, it was announced that there were 30,000 *Volksdeutsche* in the Rumanian Army.

E. THE JEWISH POPULATION

162 The Jewish population of Rumania for 1938 is given as 800,000, and for July, 1942, as 270,000. This reduction came about as follows :—

Total, 1938	800,000
Lost to Hungary	200,000
[728] Taken to Russia from Bessarabia and Bucovina by Russians	130,000
[661] Expelled from Bessarabia and other areas by Rumanians to Transnistria, and deaths from unnatural causes in Rumania	200,000
Total losses	530,000
Total, 1942	270,000

The occupational distribution of the Jews in 1930 :—

			Per cent.
Agriculture			4·1
Industry and trade	32·8	81·1	
Commerce and credit	48·3		
Transport			2·4
Professions and Public Services ..			2·7
Army			1·9
Miscellaneous			7·8

It is calculated that in 1939 at least one-sixth of the industrial and half of the commercial population were Jews. During the war Rumanian policy has been to exclude Jews from business and from commercial and professional activity. This process of Rumanisation, while pursued ruthlessly in the provinces of Bessarabia and Bucovina, has been limited in the more industrial areas such as Bucarest by the simple fact that Rumanian industry and trade are dependent to such an extent on Jewish capital and leadership, and there is no doubt that the shortage of labour in industry has been seriously aggravated by the anti-Jewish policy. The degree of Rumanisation so far achieved is given by the following examples :— 563 661

Bucarest :—

Number of firms employing Jews, November 1940	8,126
Number of firms employing Jews, December 1942	4,301

Such Jews as are deemed necessary for war production are granted labour permits, whereby they may remain in their profession, but are subject to heavy taxation. Jews who are expelled from their normal activity are compulsorily enrolled in the Jewish labour service and employed chiefly on road work, or, alternatively, they are sent to concentration camps.

(*See* also "Note on Jews in Rumania," Part II, Chapter VIII.)

F. WAGES

1. General

465 The average wage (industrial, commercial and agricultural professions) in 1938 was 1,853 lei per month. The highest average wages were found in the mining, food and transport industries, followed by commerce, textiles, skins, glass and stone, while in the metallurgical industry wages were below the average. The most noticeable feature of pre-war Rumanian wage statistics is the great regional variations, the extreme averages being 889 and 3,059 lei per month.

During the war, various attempts at fixing the wage level have failed to keep pace with the rising cost of living. On the whole it would have been surprising if a wage stop could have been successfully applied in Rumania, because of the great

342 712 [531] The stairway, about 1.25 meters wide made of massive logs, is generally on the inside of the buildings; when it is located on the outside it leads onto the wooden balcony. The exterior is white-washed. In addition, the surface is decorated with molded bands around each story division. There may also be a vertical division, thus creating a number of large panels. While these areas are symmetrical, neither they nor the molded bands that enclose them have any relation to the placing of windows or pillars (Jänecke, 1918: 62-63).

342 [175] [563] In 1895 there still existed about 55,000 earth huts (bordei) which were inhabited by the poorest population, generally Gypsies (fig. 63). They are common in the Danubian plain. Over an excavation 1-3 meters deep is placed a gabled roof. The roof is made of boards over which earth is laid. Sometimes reeds are placed over the boards before the earthen cover is added. The entrance is on one of the gabled sides, generally with a southerly exposure, and a window is placed on each gable side (Jänecke, 1918: 4).

343 351 Farm Buildings. In the lowlands the buildings are arranged in no definite order; though generally the house is closest to the road. The corn-house (colar) is either opposite to or at right angles to the house so that it can be watched. The yard and orchard are surrounded by a fence. The simplest fence is made of wickerwork between wooden poles. More often, however, it is made of boards [556] that have intricate excised designs (fig. 60). The wealthy people may add an imposing gateway with a small door. Flower or vegetable [563] gardens are rare, and the latter are called bulgări, since they are [244] generally kept by immigrant Bulgarians who grow all the vegetables [247] for town consumption (Stratilesco, 1907: 233). The farmstead is surrounded by shady trees, and there is generally a plum orchard at [245] the back of the farm buildings (Jänecke, 1918: 8-9).

[184] In the mountain regions the arrangement of the buildings in the yard differs from that of the lowlands. The stables and other buildings are arranged on the border of the yard in a horseshoe form to serve as protection for the house. The yard is usually very small, and has a strong high palisade with a massive gateway, the whole giving the farm a fortress-like appearance (the author points to the presence of bears in summer and wolves in winter) (Jänecke, 1918: 32-35).

343 [184] In the lowlands there are generally not many additional farm buildings in the yard, and this fact is correlated with the pattern of building additional annexes to the house, a more economical and practical procedure. Stables are of the simplest lathwork or wickerwork, covered with a straw roof. Sheds for the storage of straw, hay and cornstalks are absent, for the latter are stacked into tall round piles in the open. The baking oven for summer use, made of mud and bricks, has a hipped roof supported by four pillars.

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

642 these "antiquated" forms and sancrosanctly adopted the constitutional tenets of Stalinism.[2]

Compared to the earlier document the new Constitution contains certain features which seem to corroborate the complete Sovietization of the country. In fact, were it not for political expediency in the field of foreign affairs, the incorporation of the People's Republic of Rumania into the USSR as a constituent member would be only a matter of sheer formality, necessitating merely the amending of the USSR Constitution.

[648] Short of this final step, however, the new Rumanian Constitution provides, in an almost unique manner in constitutional law, for the freezing of Rumania's foreign policy by incorporating in the text friendship and alliance with the USSR. Whereas the former Constitution completely failed to mention the USSR, the present document refers to the Soviet Union and the Red Army not less than five times. The USSR is depicted as the liberator of the country, whose friendship ensures "the independence, state sovereignty, development, and flourishing" of Rumania (Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Introductory Chapter and Article 3).

[565] The basic features of the new society are outlined in Chapter I. It defines the People's Republic of Rumania as a "state of the working people of town and countryside" (Article 1). The political foundation of the state is the "alliance of the working class with the working peasantry . . . in which the leading role is held by the working class" (Article 2). Thus, for the first time in a Rumanian constitution, the preponderance of the working class is formally acknowledged. Furthermore, the central strategic position of the Communist Party and its implicit identification with the state is, as in the USSR, legally declared (Article 86). In fact, notwithstanding the discrepancies existing between the constitutions of the people's republics, their main difference from the Stalin Constitution has thus far concerned the legal position of the Party. Whereas Article 126 of the USSR Constitution openly refers to the Party as the vanguard in "the struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system," the satellite constitutions typically make no mention of its role. The Hungarian Constitution of 1949, which until lately was considered as the most advanced, faintly refers to it in Article 56. In reference to the right of organizing, this Article asserts that the state "in fulfilling its tasks . . . bases itself . . . on the working class, led by its *advanced guard* (emphasis supplied) and supported by the democratic unity of the whole people." Even the new Polish Constitution of 1952 fails to acknowledge the exclusive role of the Communist Party. Although the provisions of Article 72 have merely theoretical importance, as

665
642

642 [2] In fact, all component chapters of the Constitution proper—the Social Structure, the Supreme Organ of State Power, the Organs of State Administration, the Local Organs of State Power, the Courts and the Prosecutor's Office, the Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens, the Electoral System, the Arms, Flag and Capital of the Rumanian People's Republic and the Procedure for Amending the Constitution—have an equivalent in the Soviet Constitution. Indeed, some of the articles have been copied verbatim.

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 EDl Rumania EDl

National Assembly on June 2, 1952, concerning the "Organization of the Judicature." Article 1 of the Law emphatically states that the function of the judiciary is the defense of the socio-economic structure of the state and of the rights and interests of state institutions and organizations. Furthermore, it is emphasized that the aim of the judiciary is the "education" of the citizens "in the spirit of devotion to the fatherland and in the spirit of the construction of socialism" (Article 2). 177 669 692

The people's assessors perform in practice a much greater function in judicial proceedings than those specified by the Constitution. The Minister of Justice is authorized to detail them from one court to the other whenever circumstances require. Thus, there are actually special teams of "people's judges" which the Ministry of Justice can use in accordance with the political interests of the Party. 692

Article 9 of Law No. 5 of 1952 also authorizes the courts to hear cases outside their seats if this is required "to fulfil the educational purpose of justice." Furthermore, hierarchically superior courts may take away from subordinate courts any case "in order to hear it themselves or have it heard by another court."

The required impartiality of judges is furthermore impaired by limitations imposed by the electoral laws on the right to participate in the election of people's judges. The privilege is restricted to the "democratic" elements only (Article 13, Paragraph 7, of Law No. 5). This is coupled with the provisions confining the nomination of candidates to the United Workers' (Communist) Party or to its affiliated mass organizations (Article 13, Paragraph 1). [666]

In discussing the new role of justice and law, Vasilescu-Alba, a jurist of the Rumanian People's Republic, asserted that "all legal rules, being the expression of the will of the working class, must be understood and interpreted in the light of the class struggle." Justice is thus "an executive organ of the will of the working class." Positive law, when in disagreement with this principle, must make room for the "legal conscience of the proletariat."[3] [565]

The fundamental rights and duties of citizens are enumerated in a special chapter. The primacy of social rights over individual rights is, as in the USSR, both functional and political.[4] Most of the rights and freedoms stipulated by the Constitution are either programmatic, circumscribed by escape clauses, or outright illusory. Thus, for instance, the provision relating to freedom of the press, speech, and assembly, as stated by Article 85, (a word-by-word replica of Article 125 of the Soviet Constitution of 1936), emphatically denies 641

[3] "Statul Poliţienesc" Cronica Românească, October 1, 1950, p. 25.

[4] Professor Boris Mirkine-Guetzevitch, while recognizing the dictatorial character of all the constitutions in the Soviet sphere, makes nevertheless a distinction between the declarations of rights of the Soviet constitutions and those of the satellite constitutions. According to Professor Mirkine, whereas the declarations of the People's Republics establish the "functional" primacy of social rights over individual rights, those of the Soviet republics establish "political" primacy. See Boris Mirkine-Guetzevitch, Les Constitutions Européennes, 2 vol. Paris, 1951.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

page 89

V

POLITICS IN GREATER RUMANIA

THE political history of Rumania since 1922 has been extraordinarily involved and unstable, frequently verging on the absurd but ultimately tragic. Economic circumstances outlined in the preceding section have contributed to the continuing instability both through the tangle of political issues which they have produced and through the demoralizing effect upon political life of widespread and chronic poverty. Two important qualifications must be made, however.

While it is true that the task of finding remedies to Rumania's economic difficulties was forced upon all successive administrations, the governments rarely acted on the basis of purely economic considerations. A strong economic nationalism, in part arising from the desire to defend the acquisitions of Greater Rumania against Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Russian irredentism, determined policy during most of the years after the First World War.[1]

The unhealthy condition of politics stemmed not merely from the poverty of the peasants but from the fact that they were not really included in the political life of the nation. In 1924 Professor Rădulescu-Motru observed that "The passivity of the peasantry has been the principal cause of Rumania's immorality."[2] Even the Peasant party had its ideological origins in a literary movement, and the leaders of the party were, in the main, professional men and intellectuals. To be sure, in all countries there is a divergence between the direction and active membership of a political party and the mass of the electorate, but it was carried to an extreme in Rumania because of the vast gulf which had existed for centuries between the peasant and his rulers. Parliamentary politics, including even the names of parties, had been copied from the West in the nineteenth century by sections of the ruling groups anxious to modernize Rumania. Since these imported parties had little to do with the great majority of the

1. For a discussion of the effects of national interests upon the economic policy of all the Danubian states in the 1920's see Leo Pasvolsky, *Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States* (New York, 1928). Antonin Basch, *The Danube Basin and the German Economic Sphere* (London, 1944), gives a sympathetic appreciation of the difficulties confronting these states in shaping their economic policy.

2. C. Rădulescu-Motru, *Țărănismul, un suflet și o politică* (Bucarest, 1924), p. 37.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

565 665 inhabitants, they had remained a field for partisan skirmishes among the different factions of the boyars and the growing financial and industrial interests. The limited ambit of politics was not, however, altogether the responsibility of the boyars, though most of them certainly cannot be charged with equalitarian leanings.

829 642 621 Much has been written in Rumania on the primitive state of the peasant, his inability to govern himself, and the necessity for his gradual, supervised initiation into the mysteries of government. While such writings often conceal an *arrière pensée*, they contain one element of truth: the economic role of the peasant, as a relatively self-contained and self-sufficient producer, does confine the orbit of his interests to his village. This limitation of interests has nothing to do with any shortcomings on the part of the peasant, but merely means that his economic and social life does not extend into many of the fields which comprise the necessary activities of modern governments. The immediate and obvious wishes of the peasant—such as more land, more lenient credit, and lower taxes—cannot be the satisfactory basis of a political program unless they can be related to some means of realizing them. The possibility of their direct and immediate fulfillment in Rumania was limited; the indirect measures which could ultimately improve his status—the over-all increase of the nation's productivity and capital—involved questions quite beyond his understanding as a peasant, if not as an individual.

565 In all states there is a gap between the desires of the average voter and the complexities of economic and administrative activity; in Rumania this gap was accentuated by the fact that almost four-fifths of the population was of the peasantry. Moreover, since such a large percentage of the population was devoted to one occupation, there was relatively little scope for the diversified play of economic and social interests in politics such as characterizes a more advanced society. Rumanian writers, regretting the division of their society between a formless mass of peasants and an oligarchic ruling group, have perennially pined for the emergence of a middle class. During the interwar period the base for political activity broadened somewhat through increasing industrialization, through the growth of a more numerous middle peasantry, and through strong regional interests in the new provinces, but the great bulk of the electorate was still the poor peasantry, whose chief historical means of declaring its wishes had been in sporadic and unsuccessful uprisings.

660 Partly for these reasons the extension of the suffrage after the First World War did not lead to political democracy. Politics, which retained a distinctly Phanariot flavor, was the art of taking advan-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

culture is growing apace."[33] Nevertheless, in the spring of 1948 Gheorghiu-Dej was denying rumors that the land would be taken back from the peasants, and a decree in March permitted peasants possessing more land than they could till to employ day laborers.[34]

By the summer, however, the government was emphasizing the need of "sharpening the class struggle in the countryside, organizing agricultural laborers, and fighting the rich peasant." It introduced progressive scales of taxation and forced grain delivery aimed at preventing accumulation of grain or wealth by kulak or estate owner and ultimately undermining their economic position. It set up "village information offices" with instructions to "unmask all the dishonest kulaks and inform the farmers of their duties."

On March 2, 1949, the regime, on the simple sweeping charge of sabotage and failure to comply with regulations, seized the land, livestock, and inventory which had been left to the large landowners under the 1945 reform. In this action, carried out abruptly and without prior notification, some 17,000 families were evicted from their homes at night and sent to various resettlement areas. The government now directed all its energies against the rich peasants.[35] Lenin's dictum that "Small-scale exploitation generates capitalism and the bourgeoisie constantly, daily, hourly, in an elemental way, and on a mass scale," again made its appearance and became the leitmotiv for innumerable articles.

Embroidering on this theme, Gheorghiu-Dej marked out the party line for 1949. In 1945 the landlords had been liquidated as a class, but this act fostered small-scale economic activity in agriculture. "It follows that the complete victory of socialism is impossible so long as private property in the means of production, in the towns and in the countryside, including private property in land, continues to exist." The Communist party, therefore, had a number of important

33. *East Europe* (February 19, 1948).

34. *Ibid.* (April 1, 1948).

35. The distinction between poor, middle, and rich peasant, or kulak, is not based on size of holding or amount of wealth alone and seems to take on different meanings under different political circumstances. In simplest terms, the rich peasant is one who hires labor or charges rent for machinery and equipment; the middle peasant uses only family labor but produces enough, or more than enough, to support his household; the poor peasant is unable to support himself on his holding and is on the verge of drifting into the agricultural proletariat. In 1941, 12 per cent of the land in Rumania was farmed solely by paid labor, and 24.8 per cent by a mixture of paid and family labor. The first category, in the main, represented the properties of estate owners, the second the holdings of the richer peasants. In 1948, according to Gheorghiu-Dej, 57 per cent of the rural population belonged to the small peasantry and 33 per cent to the middle peasantry.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

423 tasks. The first was to restrict the kulaks and dislodge them from
565 their position. Then it would be possible "when conditions are ripe,
661 to pass over to the policy of the complete liquidation of the kulaks."[36] He anticipated, of course, that the kulaks would resort to underground struggle, sabotage, and criminal acts in an effort to avert their approaching fate.

185 The second task was to undertake propaganda convincing the poor
241 and middle peasants of the need to unite in collective farms. When that task had been achieved, when all the land belonged to the collectives in perpetuity, the goal of making the land public property and bringing about the socialist transformation of the countryside would be reached. Gheorghiu-Dej emphasized, however, the necessity of making this transition gradually, by means of persuasion, and with the voluntary support of the peasant. The poor peasants should not be driven into collectives, the middle peasant should not be identified with the kulak, and the whole process must be paced by the development of agricultural machinery, machine tractor stations, and the expansion of the network of consumer and producer cooperatives as broad mass movements.[37] These words of caution presumably reflect the wisdom gained from the Soviet experiment in collectivization.

Gheorghiu-Dej concluded his remarks with the inevitable "self-criticism": in the past the party had not provided a clear political line for work in the countryside and had failed to popularize the notion of uniting the working peasantry into collective farms, and had even ignored or denied this goal.[38] That these so-called errors were the fault of the Rumanian Communists is, of course, nonsense. The party line, emanating from Moscow, had shifted, and in this instance a strong case can be made that the change had been planned long in advance. The Communists could have had no intention of stopping at the stage of small peasant cultivation which had, in any event, reached a cul-de-sac in Rumania.

474 The creation of collective farms got under way in 1949, and by the end of the year, according to the glowing account of a Russian visitor, 56 *kolkhozi* comprising 4,000 peasant families had been estab-

36. As in Russia representatives of the restricted and soon to be liquidated kulak class are not to be admitted to the collective farms.

37. The cooperatives, however, must rid themselves of capitalist elements, must intensify their collaboration with the state trading organs, and must promote the spirit of "socialist emulation" among the peasants.

38. G. Gheorghiu-Dej, "Tasks of the Rumanian Workers Party in the Struggle for the Socialist Reorganization of the Countryside," *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy* (Bucarest, March 15, 1949).

241 It will be seen that structure and climate conspire together
132 to encourage a scheme of summer utilisation of high pastures
221 combined with valley cultivation that was much enriched when the maize plant was introduced, but this was not so long ago, and the older régime was none too prosperous both because of climatic troubles in the highlands and especially the sensitiveness of the wheat plant to abnormal seasons, and because of the hindrances to organisation arising from the diversities of language between governments and
371 subjects. The encouragement of industry was not easy while some lignite and a little coal were the main sources of power, but later on it became possible to use abundant petroleum and natural gas and we have yet to see, in the
565 next generation, what influence they may have. Up to the
241 present, however, a true peasantry survives, and has increased its hold on the soil; it still makes at home a great proportion of what it needs, it still finds that in the hills the maize crop may not ripen, and old communal schemes relating to the high pastures remain important.

554 districts. Thus in the Banat, and Transylvania, the Germans and Magyars dominate commerce and industry and Magyar 563 influence has been so powerful that it has practically assimilated the Jews. In the lower Danubian ports and at Constantsa, it is the Greeks and Armenians who form the largest section of the commercial community, though in certain Danubian ports the Jewish element predominates.

461 These facts would tend unequivocally to show that the Rumanians do not possess the necessary perseverance that is indispensable for those who desire to engage in commerce. It would appear, too, that the French educational system which they have adopted helps to foster a contempt for all occupations which are not purely intellectual, and for these reasons Rumanians who claim to have received some degree of education look askance on all manual work. This appar- 565 ent aversion for commerce explains to a certain extent the absence of a Rumanian middle class, an absence which ought to be remedied, for the country is deprived of a useful steadying element which is indispensable for its normal development. As things are, it possesses a small superficial leading class, that cannot be said to compensate by its quality for its lack of quantity, and a huge mass of almost illiterate peasants that lags far behind. The example of 565 Russia proves the danger that exists for a community which 563 shows such an unstable equilibrium of classes. A solution of the problem would consist in attracting the Jews from the occupations to which they have hitherto been restricted. The Jewish problem in Russia has been solved by adapting the Jews to industry and agriculture. An exceedingly instructive and interesting article entitled "Soviet Russia solves the Jewish Problem," from the pen of Mr Wm. Zukerman, and published in the "Contemporary Review" for Dec., 1931, may well supply useful hints for Rumania. There is no doubt that if the Jews in Rumania enjoyed greater freedom of action they would not concentrate all their activities on commerce, and they would thereby offer to Rumanians more possibilities and better opportunities to engage in trade than they now possess.

INNER GLIMPSES OF THE ADMINISTRATION.

It is with no desire to cast discredit on the Rumanians that 000
the following political happenings related in this chapter are being published, but with the intent of giving, judging from the past, a rough idea of the mentality of the ruling classes and what may be expected of them in the future. It would be utterly unfair if we were to judge them after our western conceptions and by accepting our standard of morality as a criterion. "The moral standards of a people are evolved in correspondence with the practical needs of that people" wrote our distinguished philosopher, the late L. T. Hobhouse, in his remarkable treatise "Mind in Evolution," and the auspices under which Rumania evolved were peculiarly unpropitious if we are to judge from Dr. Seton Watson's weighty pronouncement that "the Phanariot régime reduced the national and religious life of the peninsula to utter stagnation and has left its corroding mark upon the politics of every Balkan nation." ("Europe in the Melting-pot.") And the Phanariot influence was more deep rooted and 565
lasting in Rumania than in any other country in South- 641
Eastern Europe. In all these countries except Rumania it 661
was a transient phenomenon, it was a virus which thought it had inculcated its poison deep within the tissues of the native plant, yet nevertheless, owing to the inherent qualities of the latter, the scourge was tenaciously fought and was being slowly eliminated. But in Rumania, unfortunately, the bane went much deeper, for the Phanariots and their retainers had come in their thousands and settled in the country for good, and their numerous descendants form to-day the *élite* of the ruling classes of the old kingdom. The basic conception of the State held by the Phanariot was that it was the best and shortest avenue to personal advancement and enrichment. He applied and lived by the maxim of his Turkish patron of yore:

"Dovleten mali denŭz
Yemeyen onou domŭz,"

which may be translated by "the goods of the State are as vast as the sea, and he who does not help himself to them is no better than a pig"

RUMANIA

000 no better than a pig." If we take into consideration that according to L. T. Hobhouse "the whole system of moral tradition governing the life of a society is evolved from the practical impulses and feelings at work in the past and present," we may easily comprehend that the aspects of social life as revealed by current events in Rumania, show a natural process which could not be altered or deflected except by titanic efforts of re-education. We have no right, therefore, to blame the Rumanians for what we may consider to be grave lapses, but which they prefer to interpret differently, for after all, as A. R. Wallace affirms in his "Social Environment and Moral Progress," "morality is not wholly due to any inherent perception of right or wrong conduct, but is to some extent a matter of convention varying with the degree and kind of social development attained." And this opinion is confirmed by L. T. Hobhouse, who, in his book "Morals in Evolution" states "the instinctive in human morality is by no means an unfailing power implanted by nature in all men to distinguish right from wrong." 461 Rumanian youth continues to cherish the traditional 565 Phanariot ambition of enriching itself through access to a public post; other careers are neglected and looked askance at. They are left to the more enterprising Jewish element, which owing to its energy and capacity has taken complete control of Rumanian trade and banking. Through the neglect of the commercial professions, Rumanians have hampered the formation of a middle class which, more than any other element, is conducive to the creation of stability 647 and a vigilant public opinion. The public functionary class 465 is an unstable element, and as it enjoys no security of office but depends for its tenure on the favours of politicians in 661 power, it naturally follows that it easily lends itself to corruption, and all the more so seeing that it is disgracefully underpaid. In a lettter published by the "Argus" on 16th May, 1932, it was averred that the number of public functionaries amounted to 500,000. (Including the staff employed by municipalities). The number could easily be halved, and the administration would stand to gain both in efficiency and thoroughness by such a reduction. Greece, with a population amounting to one-third that of Rumania, had a

insatiable passion for the means wherewith they may be secured. 000

Venomous rivalries are engendered and mortal envies excited in the pursuit of such narrow and base aims. Antagonism between political men in Rumania is bitter and uncompromising because they are brought into mutual conflict by personal motives. They are always absorbed in their ambitions and grievances, and they reject all compromise, ready as they are to destroy if possible their opponents, for to them they naturally ascribe the same base motives by which they themselves are impelled. As they are seldom inspired by loyalty and devotion to any higher ideal they cannot recognize that their antagonists may pursue other than purely egoistic motives. Hence the intolerance and bitterness of the feuds among political factions. 662

In such an environment it is the unscrupulous and the unprincipled who float to the top, and by a system of alliances between big business and political bosses that smacks of American methods, the whole machinery of State is attuned to the express purpose of exploiting the masses for the benefit of the oligarchy at the head of affairs. No wonder that such methods check the vitality and the progress of any society within which they should happen unfortunately to appear, all the more so since there is a tendency to perpetuate themselves and become a permanent system. 661 565

Professor E. A. Ross, of Wisconsin, in his "Social Psychology," says: "The men society allows to succeed and to be honoured are taken as models by the rising generation. It is in this that society receives its just punishment when it allows bad men to float to the top. Being imitated by the young, they spread their virus throughout the social body. Not the crook in the alley is the greater menace, but the crook in office." 000

Corruption has been instilled from above and it is hopeless to expect salvation from these upper strata of Rumanian society so far as the old kingdom is concerned. Transylvania, the cradle of the Rumanian people, which fortunately has not been contaminated by the Phanariot taint may perhaps prove the source from which eventually there may be regeneration from below by helping to reopen the sluices and

corner of Europe, has been allowed to become the prey of odious vampires, who have sucked everything dry and have even robbed us of our hope of possible salvation. Nevertheless, Providence hath granted the return of our long expected King," etc.

One is justified in expressing doubts as to the expediency of applying fascist methods in Rumania as one fails to perceive the dominating personality who might control and direct such a policy; one may also ask, where are the indispensable coadjutors to be recruited from? It can hardly be said of King Carol that he has been able to live down his unfortunate reputation so as to assume with some hope of success such a formidable task. As for his likely collaborators who, presumedly, are to be selected from among the Rumanian ruling circles, one need only peruse the posthumous memoirs of the late Rumanian Prime Minister, Marghiloman, in order to be convinced of the utter abjectness of this class. M. Pamfil Seicaru, who may be likened to the late Henry Labouchere of "Truth" for his fearless criticisms, when writing on the boundless vista of putridity disclosed by this compilation, stigmatized in the "Cuvantul" of July 17th, 1927, in the following scathing terms the leading circles of his country :—" These memoirs form a vast archive concerning turpitudes of a whole ruling class . . . the majority of this class which remained in the territory occupied by the enemy openly practised with him . . . while those in Moldavia offered a spectacle of the most trying moral bankruptcy. A parliament of speculating fugitives revealing a criminal insensibility in face of the tragedy of a whole country; one cannot imagine a more sinister divorce between a ruling class and a nation in arms. . . . And who amongst them can indict the others for their subversion of the national ideal? Can the aristocratic fugitive fragment which took refuge in Moldavia or Russia claim to represent a higher standard of morality than the section which remained in the occupied territory meekly to serve the enemy? They both form two aspects of the same filth."

As recently as May 6th, 1932, Octavian Goga, an ex-Minister and presently in intimate relation with the King, who publicly brags of being the successor designate of Prof.

565 Iorga, spoke as follows at Bucau: "The upper class is
641 totally devoid of an ideal, and of a moral mainspring, while the masses are not only tired and exhausted but impregnated by sullen dissatisfaction. The whole body of the State is in a condition of molecular dissolution." And this worthy, who according to the "Dreptatea" of May 19th, 1932, "compensated himself by seizing thirteen million lei on the evacuation of his tenure of the Ministry of the Interior in 1927," a feat which won for him at the time the appropriate name of "Vacuum cleaner," had the effrontery to conclude his oration with an appeal to the youth of the country to rally round him:—"We must change the moral structure of the country, but such a change cannot proceed from the old. We must appeal to the young intellectuals to join in the building of a new structure around us. Their place is not in the building which is tumbling down, but in those which are being built up. Come on, we are sure to win." If, indeed, Carol II has set his heart on saving his country by the help of such sorry individuals, we may well pity Rumania.

PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS:
THE ELECTORAL LAW

646 The present electoral law, which confers a premium on the
660 party which secures 40% of the total votes cast at an election and enables it to secure 70% of the mandates in the Chamber, was due to the initiative of the Bratianus who in 1926 aimed at installing General Averescu in office. They themselves had no need of this law, as at the elections which took place in 1927, 62% of the electors voted for them. It is a law that is favourable to groups devoid of popular support, as they can very easily, when in control of the administrative machinery, so manipulate the elections as to secure the requisite 40% which would confer on them a majority of 70% in the Chamber. So that as long as this law is not repealed there is little chance of a really popular party being elected to office, except if it be entrusted beforehand by the Crown with a mandate to call a general election.

It forms actually the great obstacle to a return to constitutional government, for, thanks to it, any coterie appointed to

at last been compelled to assume at its own expense the professional training of its youth. 241 874

It is sad to record that even in educational institutions the remissness which has characterized Rumanian administration has not been adequately grappled with, and it is not surprising that the laxity manifested in this particular domain should appear especially odious to the national minorities in Rumania, which have a different moral conception of life than that of the predominating nationality. That there is much to be done in this department is obvious to all, owing to the persistence of the complaints. A storm of indignation was raised by the scandalous condition of the College of Salonta, in Transylvania, in which some 400 Hungarian and Rumanian students were being educated. Of this number of students, 50 per cent were incapacitated, owing to the disgusting lack of hygiene prevailing, and the anarchic system on which it was conducted. The parents of the students had to petition the Minister of Education to obtain amelioration of the methods in vogue, and the details exposed were so revolting that the *Cuvantul* of March 28th, 1929, commenting on them, more or less admitted that such facts justified the opprobrious epithet of "putrid Wallachs" conferred on the latter by the Hungarians. 658 871

From this it may be deduced that agriculture had already been ruined through the culpable remissness of Rumania's rulers before the present crisis made itself felt. The country was caught like some disabled ship by the economic hurricane which suddenly sprang up, and materially it is suffering intensely, because in its battered condition it finds it difficult to weather the storm. Fortunately, the peasantry has been used to a life of suffering and hard toil; the peasants are patient and long-suffering to an extent inconceivable in the West. Docile and good-humoured, they put up with a situation that a Westerner would long since have found intolerable and against which he would have revolted. Poverty-stricken and unguided, the peasant has not only been left to provide the means wherewith to develop his farm, but at the same time he has been forced to supply from his own scanty resources the needs of the urban populations and the bulk of the funds requisite for carrying on the administration 241 565

241 565 of the State. It is this utter lack of consideration for this hard-pressed mass of humanity that raises the indignation of the foreign observer against those who, through the cruel irony of fate, have been called upon to look after the destinies of this luckless people. The selfishness, incapacity, and corruption of which they have given proof can only be compared to that moral disintegration existing under the Tsarist régime, and one should not feel surprise if finally the same developments supervene. The rural population is absolutely sick of the present system and has lost all faith in its politicians.

An important meeting was held early in 1932 at Focşani [668] by fruit-growers and viticulturists, who may be considered to represent the more intelligent classes of the rural population, and the prevalent opinion expressed by the delegates was to the effect that no alleviation could be expected so long as the present system was maintained, and that Bolshevism held out better prospects. This did not cause any alarm, and passed almost unheeded, save for some mild criticism from one of the veterans of journalism in Rumania, M. Batsaria, who, in an article which appeared in the *Adeverul* on January 20th, 1932, admitted that this attitude was significant, yet opined that it was not aimed against the Crown, which at the time was being very roughly handled by General Averescu in the Press campaign the latter had just launched.

241 433 In spite of the culpable neglect with which agriculture has always been treated, the industry remains Rumania's mainstay and sole hope of survival. The whole social life of the country, even its future existence, depends on the normal development of agriculture, which provides not only the food, but also the raw materials for the more promising sections of the country's budding industries, and the means wherewith Rumania can pay for the indispensable articles she imports from abroad, as well as for the payment of interest on her public debt. It is a matter of grave concern, therefore, that the average yield of cereals per hectare should have steadily diminished in the last nine years and sunk below the pre-war average of 1,130 kg. per hectare. If nothing be done to remedy this evil Rumania,

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

duced a radical land reform and legislation for the 175
provision of general public instruction. Cuza's reforms were only partly put into practice when a palace revolution, engineered by some of the *boiars*, and by army officers, deposed him and forced him into exile.

CAROL I.[1] The unificaiton of the two principalities was now achieved. It had been accomplished from above, by the same class, greatly strengthened by Rumanized Greeks and others, who for the past centuries had served foreign rulers and exploited the peasantry. It was based on the very real and strong desire of the whole people to live in a State of its own, but the achievement of this aim was completed as a result of international diplomacy and intrigues at home, not by a genuine national revolution.

The rule of Carol I was the period of the consolidation of the new State. He introduced a constitution based on the Belgian model and after fighting the Russo-Turkish War on Russia's side was recognized by the Powers as the first King of Rumania.

During his reign[1] there was considerable progress 175
in economic life assisted by great investments of 669
foreign capital which enriched many landowners, 565
a number of Rumanian capitalists and the corrupt bureaucracy, who together became organized in the Conservative and Liberal Parties: they ruled Rumania between them. In achieving nominal independence Rumania did not succeed in ridding itself of the old social system, resting on the pre-

[1] Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Prince of Rumania 1866, King 1881.
[1] i.e. King Carol I (1881-1914) -- Analyst]

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

175 dominance of a small, wealthy and powerful land-
669 owning class. The situation led in 1907 to one of the
565 bloodiest peasant revolutions of modern times which was put down brutally by General Averescu. Significantly the peasant rising began with pogroms against the Jews who had become very unpopular as the agents of the landowners: it has often been found profitable in Rumania to divert discontent into anti-Semitic channels.

175 In 1913 Rumania joined in the Second Balkan War against Bulgaria and thereby gained the whole of the Dobrudja. During the period preceding the outbreak of the last Great War Rumania became an ally of the Central Powers through a secret Alliance made by King Carol I with Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1883. After the death of Carol and the accession of Ferdinand in 1914 the Rumanian Government remained neutral, until it entered the Great War on the side of the Allies on 27 August 1916.

GREATER RUMANIA. This decision was taken owing to the territorial gains which Russia and the Western Powers offered as an inducement and which were embodied in another Secret Treaty signed on 17 August, and also to the pro-French feeling of the ruling class. As a result, though swiftly defeated and overrun by the Germans and Bulgarians, Rumania was able, after the war, to satisfy her territorial claims against Hungary and Austria, and the weakness of Soviet Russia enabled her to annex Bessarabia. Thanks, therefore, to her Allies, Rumania emerged from the Peace Settlement doubled in area and in population.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

Rumanians under Rumanian rule. Although the great majority of the population was made up of Rumanians, about one-quarter was formed by minorities consisting of more than a dozen nationalities. The majority of the people lived on the land, only one-sixth in towns. Ethnically, the population of Rumania consisted approximately of Rumanians 73%; Hungarians over 8%; Slavs nearly 7%; Jews 5%; Germans over 4%; others 3%. About 82% of the people were engaged in agriculture and forestry. 162

The different nationalities living in Greater Rumania have in many cases preserved all the characteristics of their original race and land; others have absorbed the historical and cultural influences to which Rumania has been subject at various times. Both groups—and they are by no means sharply distinct from each other—have been transformed in the process of history and have influenced their neighbours and the life of the country as a whole. 177

THE RUMANIAN PEASANTS. The Rumanians are a simple and hardy people of peasants, used to oppression and poverty. Throughout centuries the Rumanian peasant was a serf, working all his life to satisfy the *boiar*, the tax-collector or the foreign prince. There have been only very short periods of Rumania's history when the peasant could reap and keep the hard-earned fruits of his labour. To-day, too, his fate follows the familiar pattern, only the present system of exploitation is much more efficient. It is all the more astonishing, therefore, that this people has preserved its optimism and a certain 565

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

565 ease of behaviour, a keen sense for music and popular art and a dogged belief in its capacity to achieve progress.

The life of the Rumanian peasant is simple and [262] hard. His main nourishment consists of *Mamaliga*, a dish prepared of maize-flour, similar to the Italian *Polenta*. This forms his staple diet; meat and other [272] luxuries are very rare indeed. The national drink is *Tuica* (brewed from plum juice). The Rumanian [291] men are dressed in white trousers and a long white tunic fastened by a belt, a short jacket, and a fur cap or hat. Footwear, if any, consists of simple leather sandals strapped to the legs, called *Opinci*, similar to those of the Greek and Yugoslav peasants. In the comparatively rich regions short boots are worn. Gay embroidery, whose colouring and pattern vary according to districts, adorns all garments, especially the women's shirts and headcloths, and the aprons [342] which they wear fore and aft. In contrast to their gay dress the houses of the Rumanian peasants are usually small, badly built cottages of sun-dried brick and straw, whitewashed and occasionally [346] decorated with woodwork. The churches too are built in a similar fashion except in the mountain districts where stone and wood are used.

795 **RELIGION.** Most Rumanians belong to the Orthodox Church, but many Transylvanian Rumanians are Uniates, that is, Catholics of the Byzantine Rite. They form a link between the Latin and Orthodox 659 Churches. The Rumanian Orthodox Church is strongly national. The Uniate Church was used in the past by the Hungarian rulers of Transylvania as a means of assimilating the Rumanians in the Hun-

435 ture of Greater Rumania. It illustrates the effects of low agricultural prices and high prices of finished goods upon the position of a predominantly peasant population, which cannot realize an adequate profit from the sale of its produce and is unable to buy manufactured goods. It is important to realize this, as it demonstrates one of the reasons for the inability of the peasants to acquire agricultural machinery and improve their methods of agricultural exploitation.

565 471 **THE LAND REFORMS.** By the beginning of the twentieth century the position of the Rumanian peasantry had reached a stage which could only be compared with that of Tsarist Russia before the abolition of serfdom. Over half of all the arable land was in the hands of a few thousand *boiars*. Most peasants were landless, some possessed small strips of land which were insufficient for the support of a family. Most peasants were still obliged to work for the landlords without pay, and in addition had to [427] pay taxes and other dues. In order to try and increase their income many peasants rented land from the big landowners. But as the landlord was usually the *boiar* for whom the peasant had to do forced labour and to whom he came in time of need for financial help, he soon found that he had often sold his labour power for years in advance. His indebtedness increased with surprising speed; neither his little strip of land nor, indeed, he himself was anything else than part of the *boiar's* property. The position of the peasantry grew even worse when absentee landlordism increased and great trusts managed the running of the big estates.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

This state of affairs led to the great and bloody peasant revolt of 1907 which was ruthlessly crushed by the Bratianu government with the help of troops commanded by General Averescu. Yet, even after this the rulers of Rumania were unwilling to carry out reforms which were already overdue. Only in 1917, when the position on the Rumanian front seemed completely hopeless and when the Russian Revolution found more and more adherents among the peasant soldiers, did the government of King Ferdinand decide to carry out a thorough land reform. Although this was the most far-reaching of any measures ever carried out in Rumania, it bore all the marks of a step adopted unwillingly, under the pressure of external events. Although the Bratianu government, composed of many big landowners, consented to carry out the land reform, it was violently opposed by many of the government's supporters. The reforms, as finally applied in the early nineteen-twenties in both the Old Kingdom and in the New Territories, differed considerably from the original plans of 1917. They did, however, bring about important changes. Whereas before the Great War half of all the arable land belonged to a few *boiars*, by 1930 about nine-tenths belonged to small holders and only one-tenth to big landowners.

In Bessarabia many of the big estates remained untouched; land was given to reliable farmers, Germans and Rumanian colonists, but not to the landless who needed it most. In Transylvania the land reform was used to strengthen the Rumanian as against the Magyar elements of the population. But many of the holdings remained too small to

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

565 provide their holders with a fair income, and a con-
471 siderable part of the rural population remained
423 landless. Worst of all, those peasants who did obtain land were given neither implements nor sufficient financial help which could have enabled them to make a decent living. Neither of the measures which are essential to the success of peasant proprietorship —State aid in money, machinery and technical advice; or the creation of large-scale co-operative
[641] societies and banks—were carried out. Undoubtedly the extension of the franchise in 1923 to all men of 21 and the land reforms greatly strengthened the position of the peasantry in the State. But, actually, it was widespread discontent with the working of the agrarian reform that stimulated the organization of the National Peasant Party.

423 CROPS. The great devastation of Rumania during
241 the First World War and the effects of the land reform resulted in a great reduction of the country's agricultural production during the immediate post-
[439] war period.[1] Whereas the Old Kingdom alone in 1913 had grown 2,200,000 tons of wheat, of which 1,150,000 tons were exported, and over 3,100,000 tons of maize, of which 1,000,000 tons were exported, the production figures for Greater Rumania in 1921 were for wheat 2,140,000 tons, and for maize 2,810,000 tons. This great decrease is all the more striking in view of the fact that the amount of arable

[1] In Transylvania and the neighbouring territories, taken from Hungary, some of the great *latifundias* had been well and scientifically worked with modern agricultural machinery. There were some conscientious landowners among the Magyar nobility as well as absentee landlords who neglected their peasantry.

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

563 177 **THE MINORITIES.** The presence of large numbers of non-Rumanians in the new State affected the fate of Rumania decisively. While the leaders of the Transylvanian Rumanians, who had themselves had a long experience of foreign rule, advocated a just and liberal policy, the politicians of the Old Kingdom[1] and especially the Right Wing, persisted in a policy of Rumanization and de-nationalization contrary to the Minority Treaties. In Bessarabia this policy was excused by stressing the danger of the spread of revolutionary movements which threatened the safety of the State, and was carried out by the military. In the territories acquired from Hungary the position of the dominant and dominated sections of the people had been reversed so suddenly and so decisively that the change necessarily had violent consequences. Moreover, here the question of the treatment of minorities was closely interlocked with that of administrative unification. The laws and regulations of the Old Kingdom and of the New Territories[2] had to be equalized. The majority of the civil servants in Transylvania were Hungarians and most of these were replaced by Rumanians from the Old Kingdom. Some of the old officials had to be retained, owing to the shortage of trained personnel, and the doubt about their loyalty to the new regime was exploited to strengthen the case for complete centralization.

[1] [Provinces of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Dobrudja--Analyst]
[2] [Territories acquired after World War I--Analyst]

665 565 **SOCIAL REFORM.** The problem of social reform was the most urgent and the most hotly contested of all. The Transylvanian National Party under the leadership of Maniu, and the Peasant Party of Mihalache,

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

who eventually joined forces and formed the National Peasant Party, pressed for the extension and enactment of the agricultural reforms promised in 1917. This was delayed owing to the pressure of the great landed interests who, after the disappearance of the pro-German Conservative Party, had found a new champion in the Liberals. The elections, however, brought a decisive defeat for the Liberals, and King Ferdinand had to entrust the formation of a new government to the victorious Peasant Block. In it were Dr Lupu, who in 1917 had opposed the plans for land reform on the ground that they were inadequate, Vaida-Voevod, a close collaborator of Maniu, and Mihalache, who as Minister of Agriculture proceeded to carry out the land reform.

General Averescu left this new administration within a few days in order to create a new party in opposition to the Peasant Block. Intrigues at court soon secured the fall of the government, which was succeeded by an administration headed by Averescu whose personality was a guarantee that nothing would be done to abrogate the real power of the privileged classes. At the very efficiently 'managed' subsequent elections the General secured 209 out of 369 parliamentary seats. It was obvious that he was dependent on the support of the Liberals and the bureaucracy who preferred, for the time being, not to step into the foreground. Averescu's Minister of Agriculture, Garoflid, was the spokesman of the big landowners and it was he who finally put the land reform into practice. The social structure of the country was not basically altered. Moreover, the transfer of land to the peasants now made it possible

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

665 to blame other factors for whatever might go wrong
565 as there was no *boiar*-class left. The invisible, but
662 much more effective, financial control, continued to assure the rule of the same classes who had governed the country before.

665 Soon the Liberal Party again took over the
648 government. I. Bratianu was the undisputed chief of his party and had the confidence of the king. His whole policy was directed towards the strengthening of the power of the interests he represented. This, combined with his hostility towards the Soviet Union and Hungary had serious consequences which, however, became apparent only several years after his death.

643 **THE MONARCHY.** King Ferdinand, who had been
665 crowned at Alba Julia in 1923, died in 1927. This caused a serious crisis, for two years earlier the Crown Prince Carol had been forced to abdicate in favour of his infant son Michael. After Ferdinand's death a Regency Council of three was appointed to act in the king's name until he came of age. The Regents were naturally strongly influenced by Bratianu, but, when he died in 1928, the leader of the National Peasant Party was entrusted with the formation of a new government. Maniu secured a great electoral victory and his tenure of office was expected to bring about far-reaching changes. The new administration set about solving the minority question and the serious economic problems resulting from the incomplete land reform which instead of bettering had often worsened the lot of the peasants. Unfortunately at that time the world crisis had reached its worst stage. Although his

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

especially hard hit by this rampant corruption. The 661
moneyed classes, on the other hand, were well satisfied with this state of affairs which guaranteed the continuance of their rule.

The position of the minorities was unenviable. 563
In theory all non-Rumanians had the same rights 641
and duties as the Rumanians. In practice, however, things were very different. The official language was Rumanian and anybody not able to speak Rumanian was handicapped from the beginning when dealing with the authorities. It was very difficult for members of a minority to obtain schooling in their native language, for although there were some Hungarian and German schools they had to be financed by the respective communities and the fees to be paid were high. A public career for a member of a minority was very rare indeed and non-Rumanians had always to expect unfavourable treatment at the hands of the authorities. The Jews, many of whom were denied Rumanian citizenship and had to pay from time to time for the right to live in the country, were worse off than the rest. Often in addition to being persecuted for their origin they could be victimized for having a Hungarian name and speaking German as their native language.

The mass of the Rumanians did not gain by this 661
discrimination ostensibly made in their favour. At 565
best the half-educated sons of peasants could secure some minor position in the State machinery.

The economic life of the country was dominated 471
by all-powerful monopolies. The oil and heavy industries were in the hands of a few foreign and Rumanian shareholders and the enormous profits were divided between a few industrialists, ministers

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

471 of State and foreign concessionaires. State-monopolies, such as the manufacture and sale of explosives, tobacco, etc., were often leased to foreign trusts. Road building, for example, was in the hands of a Swedish company. So was the manufacture of matches sold by the State. The whole telephone system was installed and operated by a subsidiary of the American financial trust of Morgans. Nine-tenths of the oil industry were in British hands, the armaments works of Transylvania were controlled by British, French, Czech and German interests. The newly developed chemical industry of the country soon passed into German hands. As for agriculture, the export of produce was effectively controlled by several banks who were partly or wholly owned by foreign financial houses. During the nineteen-thirties pharmaceutical goods were imported almost exclusively from Germany.

445 THE GOVERNMENT. The most powerful of all poli-
565 tical parties were the Liberals who were entrenched in influential positions of the administration, the army, finance and industry. Led traditionally by a member of the Bratianu family, whose name at one time was almost synonymous with that of Rumania, the Liberal Party was able to rule the country directly or indirectly up to a very short time ago. Her adherents had very little in common with the Liberals of the West, representing, as they did, the Right Wing of the numerically weak but financially
445 and politically powerful Rumanian bourgeoisie. An
446 electoral law introduced by the Liberal Government in 1926 stipulated that the party which had secured 40% of the votes should obtain 60% of all parlia-

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p 89

CHAPTER VI

UNDER GERMAN CONTROL

The nineteen-thirties saw an acute sharpening of the conflict between the popular forces and the Rumanian ruling class which was mirrored in all spheres of the country's life. Neither of these two was undivided. On the one side was the majority of the people—the peasants and workers and some intellectuals. On the other the court, the generals, the vast bureaucracy, the professional politicians, industrialists, bankers and big landowners. The peasantry was hardly organized and was split by national divisions, as a part of the non-Rumanian rural population supported Minority parties which were mostly opposed to united action with the corresponding Rumanian parties. The workers' movement suffered from similar divisions and from splits caused by ideological differences. Numerically it was weak owing to the small number of industrial workers. Moreover all workers' organizations were subject to the most severe restrictions.[1] The ruling class of Rumania was united in its determination to prevent any measures harming its interests. The divisions in its ranks were due to differences as to the best means of maintaining its privileged position and to competition between the established section

565
578
445

[1] The most vigorous Left Wing Party were the Communists, whose organizations, though illegal, continued in spite of repressive measures. They were most influential in Bessarabia, the Bukovina and the industrial regions.

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
E⌐1 Rumania ED1

578 of this class and those who wanted to secure this
•565 dominant position for themselves.

665 These divisions were complicated by the personality of King Carol and the attitudes of different sections of the ruling circles to his personal regime. One group put its trust in the royal dictatorship and included supporters of the pro-French and pro-British wing. Many prominent politicians from both great parties were attracted to this camp, the Liberals Tatarescu and Micescu, for example, and the peasant leaders Vaida-Voevod and Calinescu. Another group went over to the extreme Right Wing and supported the Iron Guard and similar but smaller organizations, and these inclined to a pro-German foreign policy. There were naturally some who tried to steer a middle course.[1]

665 Economic and financial considerations played an
648 important and often decisive part in this political alignment. The Liberals had a great interest in a pro-Allied policy as they were closely connected with British, French and American investments in Rumania. The extreme Right Wing counted on support from Germany, which was readily given, and in return it facilitated the growth of Germany's political and economic influence. Both groups had discarded both the cloak and the spirit of democracy, and their leanings towards dictatorship, varying in form but not in substance, facilitated the victory of

[1] C. Bratianu, leader of the Liberals, joined Carol's 'party' but only in order to keep his great industrial and financial interests. Maniu, the leader of the Peasant Party, remained passive. He showed sympathy to the Iron Guard in their opposition to the king's dictatorship and later joined Bratianu in seeking to restrain them: but he retained his pro-French leanings.

262 grammes (10½ oz.) daily was available on five days
434 of the week only; on the other two days maize
511 meal only (for *mămăliga*) could be bought. The bread ration was reduced to 250 grammes in June 1942 and maize meal itself was rationed in August. The number of breadless days has varied, while barley, flour or potatoes have at times been offered in place of maizemeal. The bread mixture has also included varying proportions of maize, barley, potato and other flours. The allowance in June 1943 was 250 grammes of bread on five days and 1 000 grammes (35 oz.) of maize flour or potato flour on each of the remaining two days. All these quantities apply to Bucarest only. Other towns show variants of these regulations, depending on local supplies.

234 The most serious shortage in Bucarest and
435 possibly in other towns, appears to be milk.
511 Owing to the depletion of surrounding herds following the high cost and scarcity of fodder only a small part of the former supply now arrives. Some milk, as with all products, is diverted to the Black Market, and official mistakes in price policy at various times have caused temporary gluts or stoppages in food supplies. Other livestock products and edible oil are also chronically short in the towns.

7. Food Prices

435 In spite of official attempts to protect con-
●565 sumers from increases, retail prices and the cost of
511 living have risen almost to the same extent as producers' and wholesale prices. Taking autumn 1936 as 100, the cost of living was 330 and the cost of food 350 in the spring of 1943. These increases have been severely felt by the working and lower-middle classes. Official measures were taken to alleviate the situation of civil servants by the setting up of stores and canteens with reduced prices, some of the goods being supplied from Transnistria. Likewise firms with over 50 employees were ordered to supply them with essential foodstuffs at low prices. Persons with more ample resources make use of the Black Market on which all the ordinary foodstuffs are obtainable, usually at only two to three times the official prices, the moderate character of these illegal prices being itself another illustration of the large quantities available through these channels, due to the laxity of control.

[11b]

248 439 Paper, and paper mixed with hemp, are now used to substitute jute.

Although a comparatively large producer of soft hemp, Rumania normally needed to import about 2,300 tons of other hemps for special purposes, and the sources of these imports have been severed since her entry into the war.

Comparatively negligible amounts of coir were also imported in peacetime.

288 291 434 **8. Clothes Rationing**

Unlike almost all other Enemy and Occupied countries, Rumania possesses no official clothes-ration card, although purchases are restricted to a specific number of garments per year. Since 1940 the Government, anxious to avoid the necessity for a card rationing system, has adopted various means in an endeavour to overcome the shortage of textiles, particularly of cotton and wool.

Standardisation of fabrics and fixed prices were introduced in 1940, but clothing of standardised material was frequently unobtainable since the price did not leave the retailer a profit.

Army demands soon called for a great increase in clothing production, thereby reducing the stocks and greatly raising prices of civilian clothing—those for overcoats rose by 300 per cent. and for knitted goods by 400 per cent.—and the difficulty of importing raw materials soon reacted on the industry, so that by 1941 the textile shortage, particularly of bed linen, had become serious. Later in the same year, the Ministry of Supply blocked the sale of all semi-manufactured or manufactured blankets.

Early in 1942 the Government requested the public to purchase only necessities, ordering the industry at the same time to use cotton allocations for the manufacture of standardised bed linen and clothing only. Later in 1942 it was decreed that the annual allotment of garments per head of the population was two suits or frocks, one overcoat, three shirts, 12 handkerchiefs, three pairs of socks or stockings, one sheet, three towels. The sale of standard cloth was restricted to three metres per person per annum. For this arrangement, however, clothing coupons were not issued and purchasers were requested to produce their identity cards and a signed certificate of need if the purchase exceeded 300 lei.

291 435 Non-standard articles are still obtainable, but their exorbitant prices make them accessible to a limited section of the public only. Retailers are known to have refused the sale of standard cloth even when displayed, in order to secure, if possible, the higher profit margin for non-standard goods.

●[565] The members of the public most severely affected by clothing shortage and high prices are industrial workers and the poorer urban population. Though the large firms are supposed by law to supply their employees with clothing (as well as food) at cheap prices, it is thought that this is not being widely practised.

Prices of all materials for men's garments have risen to such an extent that people cannot afford to buy even such goods as are available in the shops.

248 656 To counteract shortage of clothing fibres, peasants are being encouraged by the Government to increase cultivation of flax and hemp for production of the rough cloth suitable for peasant clothing.

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania EU1

Anglo-American imperialists and their Titoist agents" would try to disrupt the Party in the future as in the past, and he asked for redoubled revolutionary vigilance against "all deviations from the Party line." 661 665

Those who were not purged were vigorously educated in the same ideas which Dimitrov, Bierut and Revai had brought to the attention of their followers. They were informed that in Rumania as elsewhere one of the touchstones of conformity to the new Moscow line was to be the attitude of the Parties toward the peasants. In the early days of their power, the Rumanian Communists had aimed to make private ownership of land unpopular by proving it unprofitable. As in the other satellites, they had set high tax rates on land, imposed high indirect taxes on salt, matches and other commodities which the peasant could not avoid buying, fixed high prices for manufactured goods in comparison with agricultural produce, offered special favors to peasants who joined collectives and in other ways demonstrated the hazards and costs of independent farming with a view to bringing the peasants to favor collectivization, as it were of their own accord. Minister of the Interior Georgescu signalled the end of this era of persuasion, if it can be called that, in the spring of 1949. 661 665 565

Georgescu joined the ranks of Dimitrov, Bierut and Revai with a contribution to the Cominform journal for June 1, 1949. As an article there would be read abroad as well as at home he used more discreet language than, for instance, Revai had felt necessary in addressing the comrades in Budapest. In the main, however, his definitions and instructions followed the same pattern. There was to be "a sharpening of the class struggle in town and countryside," and he made plain, as Revai had done, that although "the main ally of the working class is the working peasantry" the working class always reserves to itself "the leading rôle." He also agreed that a civil war would not be necessary to bring in the full dictatorship of the proletariat. In Rumania as in Hungary the Soviet Army was always there "to support us." Vasile Luca, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party (Communist), followed soon afterwards with an article speaking of "the ever sharpening class struggle" and "acute class struggle in the countryside in par- 665 565

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania EDI

665 565 ticular," and referring to the workers "as the sole guiding force in the country." * Nevertheless he seemed slightly on the defensive over the fact that after having had a free hand longer than any other Party in Eastern Europe the Rumanian Communists had only succeeded in forming to date 6,732 coöperatives of all types (consumer as well as producer coöperatives). He stressed that "mass collectivization" must wait on increased industrialization to supply needed farm machinery. And as if to forestall the jibes of Jugoslav Communists he attacked their achievements in collectivization as not only wrong in substance but as having been produced at a wrong tempo.

241 565 The hope of basing Communist rule on the dominance of the industrial proletariat over the peasantry seems especially ambitious in Rumania, where only about five percent of the population are industrial workers and 80 percent are peasants. It is true that agrarian overpopulation exists in Rumania and therefore a gradual shift of some rural elements to city pursuits must occur. The Communist expropriations failed (as the Communists had expected) to solve the agrarian problem because the properties still remaining undivided were insufficient to supply all landless peasants with land or to give those receiving land sufficient acreage to make them self-supporting. Mechanization of agriculture, so much emphasized in the satellite countries, will not solve the problem but will merely aggravate it by increasing the peasant's dependence on a single crop marketed under strict state control. The solution is to raise the standard of living of the peasants. This could be done by improving seeds and livestock, diversifying crops, developing home industries, improving methods of marketing, building roads, providing facilities for local food processing to avoid wastage, and consolidating separated family strips of land into efficient farming units. As rural living standards rise productivity would increase, and this would permit concurrent rises in the living standards of the industrial workers. These objective facts of the Rumanian economic structure rule out any other procedure unless it is frankly based on injustice and is indifferent to human unhappiness on a tremendous scale.

The Communists cannot, however, favor a program like the one

* *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!*, Bucharest, August 1, 1949.

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania 201

outlined. In the first place it would be slow and costly to carry out. Secondly, it would call for skills which Communist régimes do not possess and foreign scientific information which they boast of despising. Thirdly, they in principle oppose measures for improving small-peasant agriculture, for if they succeeded the peasants would merely become more independent and recalcitrant. They therefore prefer to favor industry and neglect agriculture,[7] calculating that misery on the farms will make the peasants more amenable to collectivization or force them into great slave-labor projects like the Danube-Black Sea canal. In any case, they have not cast Rumania to play an agricultural rôle in the family of Sovietized states. Nature did so, but they are going to improve on nature.

In Stalin's original plans Jugoslavia and probably Bulgaria were destined to remain agricultural in the main and to supply the other members of the family with raw materials. Rumania, although so heavily agricultural, was to be largely industrialized. The reason for this arbitrary allotment of functions is not entirely clear. Rumania has oil and timber, as well as reserves of soft coal and natural gas in Transylvania, all of which can be developed without running counter to economic law. She also has a large reservoir of unskilled labor. But otherwise she is not adapted by natural resources and native skills to proceed with very speedy or very extensive industrialization projects, and she seems especially unsuited to becoming a center of heavy industry in view of the scarcity of her metallurgical reserves. In any case, the improvement and development of agricultural production would be the right preliminary to ambitious enlargements of the industrial plant such as are projected in the new Rumanian Five Year Plan, to end December 31, 1955.

Ana Pauker has called the new Plan "majestic." Its main purpose, she has written,[8] is "the industrialization of the country . . . on a new, advanced technical basis . . . which will insure the success of the Socialist offensive against the capitalist elements." Industrial output is to be increased twofold, with emphasis on what she called "the Stalin method" of developing heavy industry in particular.

[7] Of the Rumanian investment program for 1950, 47 percent was allocated for industry, 20 percent for transportation and 9 percent for agriculture.

[8] *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!*, Bucharest, August 18, 1950.

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania EDI

Evidently this is only one of the *façons de parler* which Revai explained are permissible when it is inconvenient to call things "by their real names." Someday naked force will become convenient, and then the peasants will have to give in or starve. Their remarkable toughness is shown by the fact that they have been able to sustain their present position so long. With an egg selling at 2 lei and shoes costing 2,400 lei, a farmer must sell a hundred dozen eggs to get himself a new pair of shoes; and it takes a year's crop of wheat (in a good season at that) for the owner of an average-size farm to pay for a suit of store clothes. Tough as they are, the majority who still stand aside will have to knuckle under eventually and give up their land. Others will be channelled off to work on state construction jobs, and others again will be absorbed into factories. Some doubtless will hold out to the end—angry, bewildered and inarticulate, helpless to do anything but die. Millions died in Russia.

Nationalism will also continue to be something of a factor, but in Rumania it probably will not give the Communists particular trouble. Rumanians have always considered Russia an enemy of the Rumanian nation. But if nationalism can be held in check in countries with much greater native capacities of resistance, Poland for instance, how much less chance is there for it to remain alive and aggressive here in Rumania—the first of the satellites to come under Soviet occupation, the first to receive a Communist-controlled government imposed by Moscow, the one which today comes closest to being on the same political level as the Ukrainian or the Usbek Soviet Socialist Republic?

In March 1950 Patrascanu's name came back into public discussion as a result of reports in *Borba* and other Belgrade journals that he was to be made the chief performer in a spectacular trial on the Rajk and Kostov model. The reason these predictions did not materialize probably was that Moscow did not see pressing reasons to give Rumania any more lessons for the present. If Patrascanu should be tried later for nationalism, Titoism or spying for the West it would be because the people were starving and because when bread is lacking they must be given a circus. It will not indicate that there is (or probably ever has been) a very strong current of inde-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

another 200,000 who held property jointly and were not included in his computations. 311

On the assumption that a holding of less than 3 hectares was totally inadequate, at the Rumanian level of production, to provide a family with even the bare means of subsistence, Creangă concluded that over 60 per cent of the peasant cultivators (landless peasants plus those with less than 3 hectares), "for the most part heads of families, find themselves in unconditional dependence upon landowners and tenants." [11] If peasants owning between 3 and 5 hectares —holdings certainly on the margin of subsistence—are included, it appears that nearly 85 per cent of the peasants were unable to earn a secure living from the produce of their soil and had to seek additional income elsewhere. 511

The concentration of land in great estates does not, of course, necessarily imply an agrarian crisis; English and Prussian agriculture developed successfully on large properties. Nor does the peasant's need to go beyond his own holding to earn a living necessarily spell misery for him. The reason the large estate appeared at this time to be the central feature of the Rumanian agrarian problem lies in the particular development of rural property and labor relations in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Unfortunately, the background of Rumanian agrarian history is still extremely obscure. The original social function and source of privilege of the landowning nobles, the boyars, have been the subject of several notable but inconclusive controversies among Rumanian scholars. It is not certain when and to what degree the mass of Rumanian cultivators were reduced to a servile status. Evidence provided by villages of *răzeşi* and *moşneni*—free peasant communities with a form of common landholding, which have survived as relics in the hilly districts—suggests that they at one time were a prevalent form of rural organization, but scientific investigation of these villages has been undertaken only in recent years.[12] There is no question, however, that by the eighteenth century the boyars—and the monasteries—had come to control a great deal of the land, to which 423 566

11. Creangă, *op. cit.*, I, 189.

12. The term *boier* has been the popular, if historically inaccurate, name for all large landowners. The problem of ascertaining the boyar's original role resembles in some respects the confusion in Russian history between allodial hereditary landowners and the nobility of service. The villages of free peasants (răzeşi in Moldavia and moşneni in Wallachia) pose, in respect to their nature and origins, questions similar to those relating to the Russian *mir* and the South Slav *zadruga*. Illuminating discussions of these points may be found in H. H. Stahl's article, "Organizarea socială a ţărănimii," in *Enciclopedia României* (4 vols., Bucarest, n.d.), I, 559–576, and in his recent book, *Sociologia satului devălmaş românesc* (Bucarest, 1946), I.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

423 the majority of the peasants were bound as *rumâni* (the most com-
● 566 mon term for serfs). In its form as in its relatively late flowering the Rumanian servile system more nearly resembled that of Russia than that of western Europe.

The life of the Rumanian serfs was bitter and squalid, as is illustrated by periodic mass flights across the Danube or into Transylvania. Their burdens resulted from their being on the bottom of the social structure of a state first fighting and then subservient to the Ottoman Empire and from the task of supporting, in a relatively self-sufficient economy, the needs of the boyars and their retainers. Although the growing boyar domination was a gradual process and apparently accompanied an internal breakdown of the village community, the act of binding the peasant to the land, carried out as a general measure by Michael the Brave (*ca.* 1558–1601), had, in large part at least, a military and political purpose: to insure a settled population able to provide military supplies. However, while the tax burden and the tributes owing the Turks were transmitted from prince and boyar to the back of the peasant, servile labor obligations, the *clacă*, were relatively light. The population was sparse, and the boyars were not reluctant to grant the peasants land, of which there was an abundance, provided, of course, they paid their tithes in kind.

566 Toward the middle of the eighteenth century two new elements ap-
175 pear: increasing state legislation, superseding or codifying customary practices, and the growth of commercial activity. The twin action of these two factors becomes ever more important right through the nineteenth century, and on their interrelation hangs much of the agrarian problem. Both were destructive of the old closed society of traditional rights and a relatively static economy; both were introduced from without. Sometimes they reinforced one another in promoting change; sometimes one held the other in check.

Around 1750 the Phanariot prince, Constantin Mavrocordat, formally abolished serfdom in an act anticipating and resembling the Habsburg Emperor Joseph II's emancipation of 1781. Although this act, in principle, relieved the peasant of personal bondage and of being tied to the land, it did not rid him of labor obligations or dues to the boyar for the use of the land he cultivated. Indeed, at about the same time the boyars initiated a persistent and successful effort to increase the number of days of the clacă and to define a working day in terms which greatly exceeded what a peasant could actually accomplish in one day. Simultaneously, they began to estab-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

lish and extend seigneurial monopolies on such activities as milling and the sale of wine. 566 175

Both actions clearly arose from the growing commercial possibilities of these years. The Turks were increasing their imports of grain from the principalities, and despite Turkish restrictions trade was developed with neighboring states. Hence it was in the interest of the boyars to increase the amount of labor available to them and to monopolize profitable commercial undertakings. One direct consequence of this new commercial pressure on the peasant was the revolt led by Tudor Vladimirescu in 1821 "against the boyars who have devoured our rights."

The next step is signalized by the Treaty of Adrianople of 1829, which opened Rumanian ports to world commerce, and the Organic Statutes of 1831–32, which gave the principalities their first constitutional documents. The effect of the first was vastly to accelerate the pace of commercial expansion. At the beginning of the nineteenth century raising livestock had been the principal occupation, but it was now replaced by the cultivation of cereals, for which the acreage nearly doubled in the thirty years betwen 1829 and 1859. This expansion of commerce in cereals continued until by the outbreak of the First World War Rumania ranked fourth among the world's cereal exporters and fifth among the wheat exporters. As a result, the relative value of land steadily increased. As early as 1805 the boyars undertook to limit the peasants' right to pasture, and in 1828 Prince Sturdza announced that the peasants had no right to exploit more than two-thirds of the lord's domain.

This trend was reinforced by the Organic Statutes. Introduced 423
during the period of Russian occupation, these acts attempted to codify, in somewhat different terms for the two principalities, the relations between boyar and peasant. In so far as they reduced arbitrary action and made precise and definite the peasant's obligations, they were to his benefit. This gain, however, was largely canceled by the fact that for the first time the lord of the land was defined as a full proprietor of his estate. The traditional concept of "master of the land" was replaced by legal ownership. In return for set labor obligations and tithes, the peasants were granted use of land not in excess of two-thirds of the estate, the remaining third being totally in the lord's hands.[13] Under this system, while the peasants had life use of

13. The extent of the lord's demesne land—the land actually cultivated under his direction—before the nineteenth century is not certain. Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 21, points out that early village maps show no separate reserve for the master of the land, but

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

423 land, it was not passed on from father to son but reverted to the landowner, who was in turn responsible for providing newly married young cultivators with a holding. In fixing the extent of land to be held by each cultivator, these acts, especially the one for Moldavia, reduced the amount customarily enjoyed for pasturage and restricted the peasants' forest rights. Although the peasant was theoretically free to move, he was in fact tied to his community by a net of regulations.

[433] With a few modifications Rumanian agrarian relations were determined by the Organic Statutes for the next third of a century. Under
● 566 them, as a contemporary observer remarked, "The principalities took
175 on a new life"; there was a marked increase in economic activity. That
421 the benefits of this activity were not generally shared by the peasants, however, is shown by their continued exodus across neighboring frontiers. They were being forced out of their old semipastoral habits, and the very increase of cereal exports could work to their disadvantage. For example, the entire 1847 wheat crop was sold in advance because of the urgent demands in other European states suffering from food shortages in the late 1840's. As a result of these premature sales, made largely through the boyars, the principalities experienced a food crisis which contributed greatly to the peasant unrest in the turbulent year 1848.

Apart from the abortive attempts at reform during the short-lived Wallachian revolution in 1848 and a moderate revision of the Organic Statutes in 1851, the next major change was the Act of 1864, which paralleled the 1848 emancipation in the Habsburg lands and the Russian emancipation of 1861. This act, promulgated for the united principalities by Prince Cuza, for political and social rather than for economic reasons, abolished the clacă and other servitudes. The peasants obtained full title to the land they had in use, based upon earlier regulations, and the landowners were given a compensation for the loss of their labor. The law followed the now recognized provision that peasant property could not exceed two-thirds of the former lord's estate. The new holdings could not be sold or alienated for a period of thirty years.

By this act, so it seemed, the remnants of the old servile system had been abolished. Possession and use of land were transformed into absolute property rights; the peasant holder was now a free proprietor, owing no servile obligations, and, indeed, the translation of the clacă and other dues into a redemption payment does seem to have dimin-

[1] Emerit, *op. cit.*, p. 48, doubts if there is sufficient evidence to permit a positive declaration that the peasants traditionally had had the use of all the land.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

ished his burdens.[14] Yet a quarter of a century after the Act of 1864 there began those peasant disturbances which culminated in the 1907 uprising. In some way, as Dobrogeanu-Gherea said, "The year 1864 carried in its womb the terrible year 1907."

The connection, however, is not a simple one and is paradoxical in several respects. Between 1864 and 1907 Rumania continued its rapid expansion in agriculture and commerce. Exports of grain, for example, increased from about 1,400,000 tons per year in the early 1880's to nearly 2,500,000 tons in 1905. Hence it is necessary to explain how under such circumstances there should have been growing peasant discontent. Was there, to repeat that old and difficult question, increasing poverty in the midst of expanding national wealth?

In the first place, while the Act of 1864 was passed against the wishes of the boyars, by a coup d'état on the part of Prince Cuza, the administration of the country, especially local administration, was still largely under their control, and they had ample opportunity to twist the provisions of the law to their advantage. Undoubtedly many injustices were committed in its application: often the landowner was able to distribute the worst land to the peasants, holding the best in his own estate; in a number of cases false measuring standards were used, an easy trick in a country lacking basic ground surveys; sometimes the landowner so divided the holdings that the peasants were unable to reach their property without paying a toll. As a cumulative result of these malpractices it is possible that although by the law the peasants were to receive the land they had in use before the reform, they actually received less and of lower quality. Local studies of a few districts indicate that such may have been the case, but statistics are lacking to make a general conclusion.

Another criticism of the law has been that while the peasants' claims to land could not exceed two-thirds of the lord's estate, the excess demand being met by grants of state land, in those regions where the peasants' quota was less the lord was able to retain as absolute property, with no future obligation, well over the minimal one-third. Moreover, under the Organic Statutes the lord was responsible for providing newly married peasants with a holding, while the new act made no adequate provision for subsequent generations. Peasant holdings now became inheritable property to be passed on from father to children. Since the new holdings were virtually inalienable and

14. This point, as in Russia, has been much disputed, and some authors have maintained that the peasants' burdens actually increased. The comparative figures, however, which are provided by Emerit, *op. cit.*, p. 516, if they are accurate and representative, show a considerable falling off of the amount owed by the peasant.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

566
175
435

since the practice was to distribute land equally among heirs, there was an inevitable tendency, on many peasant holdings at least, toward a progressive subdivision of the property. This tendency has been regarded as one of the worst consequences of the reform: "At the end of three generations, the land distributed by Cuza to the rural workers was dispersed into an impalpable dust."[15] Unquestionably the fragmentation of holdings constituted a major obstacle to the introduction of rational agricultural techniques. Further, the reform did not grant land to a number of peasants, those who previously had not performed the clacă or who were listed as f- .e proprietors. Finally, an examination of the size of the lots granted to the peasants reveals that a large number of cultivators did not receive enough land in the first place to enable them to establish a self-supporting holding on the level of cultivation then prevailing.[16]

It is clear, then, that the peasants' gains were limited, that in most cases they were not in a position to set up an independent farm, that the lord was relieved of all future responsibility, and that a n mber of categories of peasants were not taken care of. Such certainly were the drawbacks. The basis of Rumanian agriculture was not really altered. The reform of 1864 neither set Rumanian agriculture on the path of small peasant farming on the western European model—whether that was even theoretically possible, given the general nature of the Rumanian economy, will be discussed later—nor fostered large-scale farming based upon agricultural wage labor in the English or Prussian pattern.

In addition to the limitations of the 1864 reform, two other factors have been adduced to explain growing peasant dissatisfaction: the laws on agricultural contracts of 1866 and 1872, which are said to have reintroduced serfdom, and the land hunger of an increasing population. The immediate effect of the reform was to create a crisis in production and a great decline in the area sown, largely because the peasants preferred to cultivate their new holdings and refused to work for the landowners, who were faced with a serious labor shortage. The boyars attempted to compensate for this by passing special laws governing agricultural contracts, which unquestionably put the peasant at the landowner's mercy in matters regarding the fulfill-

15. Emerit, *op. cit.*, p. 519.

16. The allotments were based on an earlier threefold division of the peasants, determined by the number of oxen they possessed. Though the figures are only approximate, peasants having four oxen received roughly 6 hectares; those with two oxen 4½ hectares; and the so-called "tail-end" peasants, 2½ hectares. At the prevailing level of cultivation it was estimated that only the first class, a rather small minority of the peasantry, could obtain an assured surplus.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

566 175 423

ment of labor contracts and even permitted the employment of military force to drive the peasant to work. Although the harsher aspects of these laws were later abandoned, they permanently affected landlord-peasant relations and did much to justify the term neoserfdom, "the confirmation of the old servitudes in contractual form."

Yet these laws, while harsh on the peasant once he fell into the power of the landowner, would be significant only on the assumption that the peasants were increasingly obliged to go to the landowner for assistance. That is, the laws of contracts merely accelerated the relapse into a servile system—one lacking the paternalistic protection of the old order—but were not in themselves the cause of a deteriorating situation. Moreover, the peasant uprisings did not occur when the laws were at their harshest but later when some of the worst provisions had been abrogated.

Land hunger, in general, results from an excess of population relative to the amount of land available. As has been noted, at the beginning of the nineteenth century the Rumanian principalities were not thickly settled, though even at the time of the Organic Statutes it was not possible to give adequate grants of arable land to the peasants in the old and relatively thickly settled mountainous districts. By the middle of the century the boyars were invoking population pressure to explain the high cost of land. There is no question that in the second half of the nineteenth century Rumania's population expanded at a very rapid rate.

311

At the same time, however, the expansion of land under cultivation appears to have been increasing even more rapidly, as the plough was put to untilled pastures, waste, and meadow.[17] The extent to which the peasants were able to benefit from this expansion of cultivated area cannot be estimated with any precision. Undoubtedly much of it took place on large estates under the control of the landowners. To some extent, too, it resulted from the peasants converting their pasture land to arable. The act of 1864 had made no provision for communal pasturing; the small peasant holdings were inadequate for both grain and livestock, and from 1864 there is a notable decline in animal husbandry. It is estimated that whereas in 1860 meadows and pasture comprised 33 per cent of the total surface of Rumania, they were reduced to 17 per cent in the years 1901–5, thus offsetting to a considerable degree the gain in land under cultiva-

17. According to Constantin Garofild, *Chestia agrară în România* (Bucarest, 1920), p. 128, between 1859 and 1899 the population of Rumania increased by 54 per cent, whereas the area of land under cultivation increased by 85 per cent between 1862 and 1905.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

making greater demands upon both the land and the peasant. Since his profits tended to be in direct proportion to the area he was able to lease, there was a marked inclination to build up vast agricultural trusts, some of which covered more than 100,000 hectares. Although ultimately the large tenant was a consequence rather than a cause of the agrarian problem, he was the focus of hatred and abuse: hated by the peasants because he dealt directly with them, verbally abused by the landowner-politicians who made him their scapegoat. Certainly some of the more spectacular injustices and preposterous labor contracts can be found on lands operated by tenants. 311

This speculative interest on the part of the tenant in acquiring more land contributed to a rapid rise in rents. Between 1870 and 1906 rents mounted between 100 and 200 per cent for a third of the properties and over 200 per cent for another third. The peasants consequently were obliged to pay more dearly for the use of land. In 1870 they generally retained from two to four parts of the produce of rented land and delivered one part to the landowner or large tenant; by 1906 in over half the cases studied in an investigation, the ratio was one to one.[21] 566 ● 423 175 241

The rise in the value of land was not accompanied by an equivalent improvement in agricultural techniques. Most of the peasants were both inexperienced in the careful cultivation of small holdings and financially unable to improve their methods, and the large landowners and tenants had little incentive. By the working of the 1864 reform the peasants remained attached to their strip of land, lacking even the free mobility of the farm laborer. They continued to own most of the means of production: over 90 per cent of the draft animals, ploughs, and harrows in Rumania belonged to the peasants.

Under these conditions the distinction between large-scale and small-scale farming was blurred, and it was characteristic of the latifundiary cultivation prevailing in Rumania that the size of an undertaking was not determined by an organized integration of the productive factors of a given area but was rather the arithmetical sum of a large number of peasant cultivations. The peasant, in return for a piece of land, contracted either to cultivate another piece of land for the proprietor or tenant or to share the produce in a form of metayage. Money payments were uncommon except in Moldavia.[22]

21. Creangă, *op. cit.*, II, 18-22.

22. It must be observed, however, that while the great estates did not, in most cases, utilize progressive farming methods, the output of the large farms was consistently higher than that of the peasant holdings. The reasons for this difference have been the occasion of much dispute. Supporters of large-scale cultivation have held that despite

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

of property relations followed a different course from that in the West, and in both countries contact with the West created a steadily increasing crisis which the legislative measures of the nineteenth century did not solve and in some respects exacerbated. In neither case did peasant emancipation lead to the healthy development of small holds but rather to the appearance of the land-hungry cultivator still in a position of dependence on the landowner.[26]

While there were these similarities in Russian and Rumanian social and economic life, and more than a casual parallel in the development of agrarian relations, the political and international positions of the two states were entirely different. This difference explains in part some of the very great divergences in the recent history of these countries.

Political Aspects of the Agrarian Question

Although Rumanian economic and social relations were such as to create a dangerous tension in the countryside, politically, in marked contrast to tsarist Russia, there was relatively little revolutionary activity. This difference has often been attributed to the lethargy and supineness of the Rumanian peasant or to his Daco-Roman stability and love of order and hard work. National qualities may have played some part, though the violence of the 1907 revolt was damaging to many such theories. A more substantial reason would appear to lie in the contrast between the political and international situations of the two states.

Russia, a great empire, was assured of its independence as a nation. Existing institutions were firmly fixed. Russian social reformers could direct their energies toward internal issues without being preoccupied with the question of national survival. For these reasons the climate was favorable to a revolutionary spirit. Quite opposite conditions obtained in Rumania, a newly created state whose position in the community, or anarchy, of nations was by no means secure. Many Rumanians were not as yet included within the country's

26. The sensitivity in Rumania to developments in Russia would suggest the presence of common characteristics. The Russian emancipation of 1861 was followed by Prince Cuza's Act of 1864. There is evidence that the Rumanian rising of 1889 was aroused by a rumor that the tsar had ordered land to be divided among the peasants. The Russian Revolution of 1905 found a reflection in the 1907 revolt in Rumania, and of course the Russian Revolution of 1917 had a direct bearing upon the Rumanian agrarian reforms of 1918–21. The correlation of these events is certainly more than a chronological coincidence. It might be added that Stolypin's program to reform Russian agriculture by creating a class of strong peasant holdings resembles some of the recommendations put forward by the Conservative agrarian expert Constantin Garofid.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

668 boundaries. Consequently, national aims and ambitions tended to receive first attention from all articulate Rumanians.

175 Whatever may be the answer to the much debated question of Rumanian origins, the two principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, did not make their appearance until the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. After a couple of centuries of precarious independence they fell under the domination of the Ottoman Empire. For a time native princes maintained some degree of internal authority; later Phanariot Greeks became the *hospodars* of the principalities; but the two provinces were not united until 1862, and the remnants of Turkish suzerainty were not shaken off until the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. While the Rumanians did contribute to achieving their national independence, the rise of a united Rumania was largely conditioned by events beyond their control: the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the repulse of Russia in the Crimean War, and the equilibrium established by the Concert of Europe at the Congress of Berlin. Rumania's independence and existence as a national state were thus externally determined, at least in the negative sense of permitting the Rumanians to enjoy some freedom of action in the nineteenth century.

[566] The national progress of Rumania did not correspond with the social or material progress of the peasantry. On the contrary, the high points in Rumanian history from the national point of view often marked a decline in the peasant's status. The process of social differentiation which followed the foundation of the principalities seems to have led to a further subjugation of the peasant to the boyar. Under Michael the Brave, who for a short period ruled over all Rumanian lands, the peasants were definitely bound to the land. The Organic Statutes represented an advance constitutionally but also granted full proprietorship to the boyars and rendered the peasants' tenure even more precarious. To be sure, such a process is not unusual; in a society which is becoming more articulated the emerging ruling elements, which from a national aspect represent an advance by strengthening and organizing the state, may achieve their position at the expense of the more amorphous body of that society.

Because of the weakness and precarious position of the Rumanian state, preoccupation with national prestige outweighed and often ran counter to concern for social reform. In the abortive revolution of 1848 the young revolutionaries, educated in France, were undoubtedly fired by ideals of freedom and the rights of man, but more from desire to create in Rumania a proper modern state than from direct interest in the sufferings of the peasant. The manifestoes issued by the Muntenian revolutionaries promised land but at the same time,

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

642 of these institutions naturally became mere façades to conceal a much cruder reality. Party politics, for example, bore a very superficial re-
665 semblance to those of nineteenth-century England: two principal parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, alternated in office. But the reality behind this two-party system was altogether different. Politics were based on a very narrow franchise,[30] the parties themselves tended to be coteries surrounding a dominant personality or family, and there were constant factions and party splits. Both the Conservatives and the Liberals obtained their support from the landowners, the principal distinction between them being that the Conservatives were usually the explicit spokesmen of the large agrarian interests, whereas the Liberals were increasingly interested in making Rumania a strong modern (i.e., commercial and industrial) state and held the controlling positions in the growing financial institutions.

671 In the field of law the Rumanians demonstrated what Dobrogeanu-Gherea correctly called a "mania for legislation." A flood of laws was
177 continually being passed—elegantly rendered by men who had taken their law course at Paris—but with remarkably little effect. Some were inapplicable at the outset, few were administered properly, and most were soon forgotten by all concerned, with no effort made to examine their consequences. Other examples could be cited from the fields of public finance, civil rights, and the press to illustrate the abyss lying between political and constitutional forms and actual practice. The persistence of this dualism right up to the 1940's has undoubtedly had a corrupting effect upon Rumanian politics and society.

566 Notwithstanding these contradictions, which have struck all for-
177 eign observers in the past century, the very introduction of Western paraphernalia had certain important positive effects. A peasant who had been inducted, under universal conscription, into the army, who could read in the press (or have read to him) about agrarian disturbances in Sicily, Ireland, or Russia, or who heard the charges and countercharges of the political parties, however rhetorical these may have been—such a peasant was moving out of the closed circle of the village. This is evidenced in the active role played by ex-army ser-
185 geants, clerks, and schoolteachers in the 1907 uprising. Moreover, the mere existence of constitutional and legal devices, however in-
177 operative they may have been, provided potential channels for change and increased the flexibility of the existing order. Thus, in spite of the fact that changes were apt to prove illusory rather than real,

30. A system of electoral colleges, rather like that of Prussia before 1918, assured a preponderant strength in the assembly to the landowners and the wealthy urban groups.

:3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

are far too complex for inclusion here. Whatever the origins of the 175
Transylvanian population, at the outbreak of the First World War the Rumanians constituted a majority of the inhabitants of this region; with the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the Transylvanian Rumanians, along with the other ethnic groups in the empire moved to break away. On October 12, 1918, the Rumanian National party of Transylvania drafted a resolution demanding the right of self-determination. A national assembly was called at Alba Iulia on December first and passed a resolution in favor of the union of all Rumanians. The basis of this union was to be:

1) full national liberty for all races;
2) full autonomy for all regions;
3) a democratic regime with general, direct, equal, and secret elections;
4) complete liberty of press, assembly, and association;
5) radical agrarian reform;
6) equitable conditions for industrial workers.

A Governing Council (*Consiliul Dirigent*), under Iuliu Maniu, was established as the temporary administration. The Treaty of Trianon assigned Transylvania and the adjacent regions of Maramureş, Crişana, and the Banat to Rumania.

Servile tenures had been abolished somewhat earlier in Transyl- [566]
vania than in the Old Kingdom, and the relative importance of medium properties reflected the generally higher level of cultivation. 311
Nevertheless, there was a great disparity between large and small properties, a disparity intensified by the national question. The Rumanians were almost entirely peasants, and most of the large estates belonged to Hungarians. Reliable information, however, is lacking regarding the distribution of land either by size of property or by nationality; according to Hungarian critics of Rumanian statistics, no exact figures have ever been available for the land distribution in 1919 in the total area annexed by Rumania.[24] The Rumanians have claimed that they held only 24 per cent of the total area and that 98 per cent of the properties over 100 cadastral yokes (the yoke, used in Transylvania, equals .58 hectares) were held by non-Rumanians. While this claim may have been extreme, Hungarian sources grant that 87 per cent of the owners of properties exceeding 100 yokes were Magyars.

The project for the land reform, prepared in thirty-two sittings 671
of the Governing Council, became a decree-law on September 12, 423

24. C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors* (Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 316, n. 2.

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

641 the right and freedom of citizens to write, publish, or otherwise express their views, except such as are in accord with the given party-line. For the exercise of this right, the state places at the disposal of the "working classes and their organizations, printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets (and) communication facilities." Freedom of speech is furthermore restricted by the provisions of the Law for the Defense of Peace, enacted on December 15, 1950. Article 2 of this Law specifically prohibits "propaganda inciting to war, the spreading of tendentious or invented news, of a nature to serve the warmongers, etc. . . ."

[204] Freedom of the press and publication is likewise nonexistent. Two directorates attached to the Council of Ministers are charged with complete supervision over the press, publications of any sort, and their distribution. The Directorate of the Press and Printed Matter, established on May 23, 1949 (Decree No. 218) "authorizes the publication of all printed matter;" the General Directorate of Publishing, Graphic Arts Industry, Book and Press Distribution, established on March 16, 1950 (decree No. 62), "controls the output of publishing houses from the point of view of contents and form." The Communist press is furthermore restricted to the services of the AGERPRESS (the Rumanian Press Agency) which by virtue of Decree No. 217 of May 23, 1949, is the only agency permitted to receive and transmit news. Aside from the nationalization of all printing presses, a governmental decision (Decision No. 69 of the Ministry of the Interior, July 1, 1950) requires the registration with the militia of all hand printing presses, duplicating machines, and "materials needed for the reproduction of printed matter," owned by individuals or associations.

[15] Freedom of assembly is similarly controlled. Excepting the Communist-controlled mass organizations, viz., public organizations, co-operative societies, youth and women's organizations, etc. (Article 86), no independent organization or association is permitted. Anyone attempting to organize or participate in such an organization is liable to prosecution by virtue of Article 86 of the Constitution, prohibiting the organization of or the participation in associations of a "fascist" or "anti-democratic" character. Such participation would furthermore entail "plotting against the internal and external security" of the state, an offense punishable by death under Article 1 of the Law for Punishing Certain Crimes Which Endanger the Security of the State of January 19, 1949.

641 461 The right to work is guaranteed by the "socialist transformation" of the economy and the "elimination of the possibility of economic crises and the abolition of unemployment" (Article 77). The right to rest and leisure is ensured by the reduction of the working hours to eight in factories and offices and to less in the more arduous trades.[5] This right is supplemented by

[5] The constitutional provisions relating to the reduction of working hours are puzzling in the light of the introduction of the piece-work system and norms of production (Labor Code of May 20, 1950) and the adoption of the Soviet model of "Stachanovism" and "voluntary labor."

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

slight. In 1929, 1930, and 1931 there was an increasing disparity between budget revenue forecasts and actual receipts.

Certain late measures of the National Peasants will be considered presently in connection with the depression. But from the above it should be evident that during their brief term in office they passed a great deal of legislation, generally consistent in aim, and definitely reversing the main lines of the Liberals' policy. The most important measures, however, were not in the field of agriculture.

A word might be said on the relation of the National Peasants to foreign agrarian movements. Throughout eastern Europe a strong agrarian current appeared after the First World War. More or less extensive land reforms took place in the belt of states between Soviet Russia and central Europe, and peasant parties of varying political shades made their appearance. In 1921, on the initiative of the Bulgarian Peasant Prime Minister, Alexander Stambuliski, and with the support of the Czech agrarian leaders, Antonin Švehla and Milan Hodža, was formed the International Bureau of Agriculture, known as the Green International. Initially the bureau, which established its headquarters in Prague, was an organization for cooperation among the agrarian parties of the Slavic states of eastern Europe. In 1923, Virgil Madgearu, in discussing the international policy of the Rumanian Peasant party, showed a lukewarm attitude toward the Green International. In his opinion, its purposes were not clearly defined and it displayed a tendency toward Pan-Slavism which would scarcely recommend it to the Rumanians. Above all, he felt that international peasant action had only limited value. "The nation is a decisive factor in determining social progress, since no political party can form itself on an international base. Internationals can be annexes to the development of political action; they cannot become supranational." [63]

The Green International broadened somewhat in the following years. In 1925 Hodža defined the scope of the movement: "We know that agrarian democracy . . . is the strong bond which will create of the peoples an international unity, a formal, organic and psychological unity against which all attacks, whether directed by the imperialist right or the bolshevist left will be shattered." [64] The bureau's secretary Karl Mečir pointed out that the peasantry by their very nature and strong local attachments were not to be organized into a rigid international. The purpose of the movement in his eyes was to

63. *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, p. 86.

64. Milan Hodža, "La Politique étrangère et l'organisation internationale des agriculteurs," *M.A.B.: Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, 8–9 (1925), 22.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 serve as a clearing house to establish common ties and to exchange
575 information.[65] In its general lines it represented an attempt to defend the eastern European peasantry against the more highly organized forces of industrialism and the dynamic inroads of Soviet communism.

In 1926 and 1927 the Rumanian and Finnish Peasant parties joined the Green International. There were no real meetings until 1928, when the bureau was formally constituted. After that annual congresses were held until the movement was engulfed by the depression and the political storms of the 1930's. Eventually it came to include peasant parties from Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Austria, Switzerland, Poland, France, the three Baltic states, and Finland. Although Mihalache had spoken of the rising peasant tide in eastern Europe, and Madgearu and Lupu contributed articles to the later issues of the bulletin of the Green International, it appears to have had no effect upon the course of internal Rumanian politics, and the Rumanians were among the less active members of the bureau.

A far more active, though in its aim unsuccessful, international effort was the agrarian bloc of eastern European states, in which Madgearu played a prominent part. This bloc had its origins in the growing agricultural crisis of 1930. The failure to obtain any favorable action at the first preliminary international conference for concerted economic action (held in Geneva, February 17 to March 24, 1930) led some of the agrarian states of eastern Europe, with the Little Entente at the core, to act together in defense of their interests. A series of conferences at Štrbske Pleso, Bucarest, and Warsaw during the summer of 1930 were attended by representatives from Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. The attempt was made to coordinte the economic policy of the members of the bloc and to obtain better commercial conditions from the industrial states. The failure of the bloc to achieve its aims belongs, however, in the more general framework of the depression.[66]

665 The economic, agrarian, and administrative policy of the National
656 Peasants in 1929 and 1930 has definite homogeneity. A prevailing emphasis upon decentralization and autonomy appears in the administrative reform, in the laws for mines and state enterprises, in the reorganization of the cooperatives. An attempt to relax restric-

65. Karl Mečir, "Le Bureau International Agraire," *M.A.B.: Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, 4 (1926), 26–29.

66. See below, pp. 184–185.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

with which the Iron Guard and the other fascist formations were treated. 175 661

By the 1930's the Iron Guard had become the manifestation of a quite powerful current in Rumanian life, a current arising out of the strains and dislocations in the society and intensified by the depression. The government, instead of opposing the current, tried to become master of it, and during these years it took on many of the attitudes and paraphernalia of the extreme Right. Early in its term in office the cabinet pressed for powers to issue decree-laws during parliamentary recess, ostensibly to improve efficiency. In the same year, 1934, the government announced that supervision of telephone calls—wire tapping—was to be extended from international to local and interurban calls. Compulsory labor brigades were introduced in 1936. Carol, for his part, was more and more the flamboyant father of his people. To counter the Iron Guard youth formations he created in 1934 his own youth movement, *Straja Ţării*. Carol's own activities may in part be ascribed to his willful and arbitrary character, his belief that the king should be more than a passive symbol, and his dislike and distrust of the Rumanian party system,[6] but the atmosphere of the time unquestionably nurtured these inclinations. [575]

In 1936 the temporary calm showed signs of breaking and a new element, foreign relations, began to play its decisive role in determining Rumanian politics. It was only a relative change; Rumania has always been exceedingly sensitive to the reverberations of international events, and the rise of the extremist fascist parties in the 1930's was certainly associated with other similar movements elsewhere in Europe. Nevertheless, it may be said that up to 1936 the most important factors in the Rumanian political scene had been internal: the failure of the democratic parties to establish themselves, the long-standing social tensions and the chronic misery of the peasantry, and the personal influence of King Carol and his entourage. These internal forces continued to exert an important influence but the uneasy equilibrium of 1934 and 1935 was broken by the ascendancy of the European fascist states and the mounting international crisis leading to the Second World War.

Titulescu, the strong advocate of the League and of the Versailles system, and at that time advocate of Little Entente-Soviet collaboration, was removed from the Foreign Office in August, 1936. His fall 648

6. In 1937, in an interview with the journalist Wickham Steed, Carol said that in his own country political parties were sterile and their leaders fit only to criticize. It would be his business as king to discipline them and harness them to constructive work. Notes on the interview are quoted in Pavel Pavel, *Why Rumania Failed* (London, n.d.), p. 142.

THE ETHNIC MINORITIES AND THEIR GRIEVANCES

régime had consummated Bessarabia's ruin, and its people were dying of hunger. The irruption of the Rumanian army was not the triumphal arrival of a liberator but the invasion of a hunger-stricken horde. The requisitions for obtaining supplies both for the army and for the population of Moldavia, on account of the haste and disorder with which they were carried out, assumed the aspect of revolting spoliations and led the natives to ask "what sort of brothers are these hogs and these robbers?"

"Our army's attitude was both offensive and aggressive, in conformity with the usages of war, in short, that of an army of occupation in an enemy country. When the time came to organize the civil administration of Bessarabia, very few of the regular functionaries agreed to be transferred to a remote and unsafe province. . . . Adventurers, those who had nothing to lose and who were under the threat of being dismissed or imprisoned, accepted to join in this "campaign to Siberia" in the hope of being rehabilitated or of becoming rich. For a long time the transfer of a civil functionary to Bessarabia was considered as a redoubtable disciplinary sanction. . . . ."

"The Bessarabians have found out what elements we can contribute to the restoration of their former material prosperity. These are poverty, demoralization, political debauchery, a decade of violence, fraud and illegality. Hence the permanent hostility with which they regard us; a state of irritability which is maintained owing to the prevailing wretchedness."

The main responsibility for this astounding state of affairs should be ascribed to the Bratianus, who inaugurated and maintained this system for ten years. When finally they were ejected from office, their Bessarabian partisans began to quarrel among themselves and attack most virulently their former regional leader, M. Inculeţ. They started a paper called "The Voice of Bessarabia" in 1929, in which their former leaders were denounced as vulgar and dangerous adventurers, robbers and criminals. As for their former local chief Inculeţ, he was accused of having retired to Jassi in order to enjoy in peace the thousands of millions he had accumulated by a triple betrayal of Russia, Bessarabia, and

RUMANIA

665 Rumania. The paper concluded by an exhortation addressed
574 to Bessarabians to evict Inculeţ from the political arena of Bessarabia where he had operated as though this region had been an African colony, and the appeal concluded with the hortatory incitation "Eject this putrefaction from Bessarabia."

661 In spite of the severe financial crisis which afflicted this
563 region, the fiscal agents of the government insisted on
661 collecting taxes even when in years of drought the peasantry was destitute and utterly unable to pay. The methods employed were so barbarous that they provoked several interpellations in the Rumanian Chamber. During its sitting of Dec. 10th, 1926, M. V. Madgearu denounced the abusive and inquisitorial methods by which Bessarabian tax-payers had been sold up and his arraignment was confirmed by similar indictments formulated by a member of the (then) government majority.

423 In October, 1930, a revolt broke out in southern Bess-
563 arabia. The peasants of the village of Baimaklia, near the
661 town of Kagui, revolted and burned down the residence of a big landowner because certain grazing lands were given to him by the State instead of being distributed among the peasants. That similar abuses are current may be inferred from an article in the "Aurora" of June 3rd, 1926, which is headed "The pauperization and humiliation of the Bessarabians," and in which it is related how certain State lands were put up for sale at Balţi, and though the peasantry of six adjoining villages had combined and offered 400,000 lei more than three big landowners, the lands were allocated to the latter, obviously through favouritism. That State functionaries often act with an arbitrariness and brutality
563 inconceivable in a civilized State may be illustrated by
661 the Soroca affair, which is of quite recent occurrence. In January, 1932, six Jewish youths, inhabitants of Soroca, on the Dniester, after coming to terms with the frontier-guards as to the amount of the bribe they would have to pay to be allowed to escape into Russia, and after they had paid 40,000 lei, were ambuscaded and shot down. In order to instil terror into the local population, their bodies were hurled pell-mell on a sledge which was driven by a soldier

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p 89

CHAPTER VI

UNDER GERMAN CONTROL

The nineteen-thirties saw an acute sharpening of the conflict between the popular forces and the Rumanian ruling class which was mirrored in all spheres of the country's life. Neither of these two was undivided. On the one side was the majority of the people—the peasants and workers and some intellectuals. On the other the court, the generals, the vast bureaucracy, the professional politicians, industrialists, bankers and big landowners. The peasantry was hardly organized and was split by national divisions, as a part of the non-Rumanian rural population supported Minority parties which were mostly opposed to united action with the corresponding Rumanian parties. The workers' movement suffered from similar divisions and from splits caused by ideological differences. Numerically it was weak owing to the small number of industrial workers. Moreover all workers' organizations were subject to the most severe restrictions.[1] The ruling class of Rumania was united in its determination to prevent any measures harming its interests. The divisions in its ranks were due to differences as to the best means of maintaining its privileged position and to competition between the established section

565
578
445

[1] The most vigorous Left Wing Party were the Communists, whose organizations, though illegal, continued in spite of repressive measures. They were most influential in Bessarabia, the Bukovina and the industrial regions.

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
E 1 Rumania ED1

578 of this class and those who wanted to secure this
565 dominant position for themselves.

665 These divisions were complicated by the personality of King Carol and the attitudes of different sections of the ruling circles to his personal regime. One group put its trust in the royal dictatorship and included supporters of the pro-French and pro-British wing. Many prominent politicians from both great parties were attracted to this camp, the Liberals Tatarescu and Micescu, for example, and the peasant leaders Vaida-Voevod and Calinescu. Another group went over to the extreme Right Wing and supported the Iron Guard and similar but smaller organizations, and these inclined to a pro-German foreign policy. There were naturally some who tried to steer a middle course.[1]

665 Economic and financial considerations played an
648 important and often decisive part in this political alignment. The Liberals had a great interest in a pro-Allied policy as they were closely connected with British, French and American investments in Rumania. The extreme Right Wing counted on support from Germany, which was readily given, and in return it facilitated the growth of Germany's political and economic influence. Both groups had discarded both the cloak and the spirit of democracy, and their leanings towards dictatorship, varying in form but not in substance, facilitated the victory of

[1] C. Bratianu, leader of the Liberals, joined Carol's 'party' but only in order to keep his great industrial and financial interests. Maniu, the leader of the Peasant Party, remained passive. He showed sympathy to the Iron Guard in their opposition to the king's dictatorship and later joined Bratianu in seeking to restrain them: but he retained his pro-French leanings.

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

APPENDICES

1. SOME VITAL STATISTICS OF CORBU

162 In 1928 there were born in Corbu 34 boys and 33 girls, of whom 53 babies belonged to Uniate and 13 to Roman Catholic households, while one was of Orthodox parentage. In 1929 the births included 35 boys and 27 girls, of whom 34 babies belonged to Uniate and 22 to Roman Catholic households, while 4 were of Jewish, one of Orthodox and one of Baptist parentage.

Of the fathers of 57 legitimately born children in 1928 forty-seven were described as peasants, five as labourers, one as joiner, one as baker, one as bootmaker, one as chauffeur.

Of the fathers of 55 legitimately born children in 1929 thirty-four were described as peasants, eleven as labourers, one as joiner, one as bootmaker, one as smith, one as forester ; these apparently do not include the 4 Jewish children.

Apparently the numbers of children in a family were usually 3, 4 or 5, but there was one family of 10 children. There were in the village 415 heads of households, among whom were included a number of widows.

583

2. "DOT," OR MARRIAGE PORTION

A girl of moderate means brings to her home on marriage :

Seven to nine pillows, blankets and sheets ;

At least fifteen towels ;

Four or five carpets or rugs, to adorn the walls ;

Personal clothes dependent on her skill. She will try to have special clothes for the great festivals such as Easter, Christmas, etc. ;

Sheep, cows, and her share of the heritage from her father.

It is said that a girl begins to make her "dot" at the age of 6 years. The proportions of the sexes are approximately equal, and few adults remain unmarried.

4:Fleur S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

291
531

Woman's embroidered blouse.
Photo: Mrs. C. A. Perkins

Roumanian peasant at Bran in the Transylvanian Alps. Photo: H. T. Howard.

583
531



Portion of girl's dowry, showing elaborately embroidered pillows and bed-covers.
Photo: Mrs. F. Montague.

Plate XVI.

[facing page 77]

342



Plan of small house of illustration in top left-hand corner of facing page 29.

Plans drawn by Margaret Tatton and measured in cooperation with Rachael Jones.

interest in that its present occupants were busy over the forthcoming marriage of their daughter (age sixteen), and had many lovely things in the way of embroideries, clothes, cushion covers, etc., part of the bride's dowry, which we examined. The interior of the room on the right shows the girl's own bed, covered with the things she has made and embroidered to take to her future home. (House A, Plate IV.)

THESE WERE NOTED as follows: 10 pillows (ornamental), 12 sheets, 6 woven rugs for wall or floor, 2 woollen bed-covers (like long blankets), 4 woven bed-covers (patterned), 6 woven bed-covers (plain), and 20 towels (decorated). In addition, she was embroidering her own dresses and under-garments. Much of the work was quite fine and well done. We were informed that this dowry was a fair average one for a girl from this type of home.*

342 THE HOUSE ITSELF, which was built about fifty years ago, had brick and plaster walls, whitewashed throughout. Many of the houses are colour-washed, bright blue being a popular colour. The floors were of wood, as were also the steps leading up to the balcony. Chickens were housed in the vault under the left room. There was a large garden, most of the ground

* Inventory by Rachel Jones.

1 [see pp. 30 on (HRAF pagination) -- Analyst].

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

565 665 inhabitants, they had remained a field for partisan skirmishes among the different factions of the boyars and the growing financial and industrial interests. The limited ambit of politics was not, however, altogether the responsibility of the boyars, though most of them certainly cannot be charged with equalitarian leanings.

829 642 621 Much has been written in Rumania on the primitive state of the peasant, his inability to govern himself, and the necessity for his gradual, supervised initiation into the mysteries of government. While such writings often conceal an *arrière pensée*, they contain one element of truth: the economic role of the peasant, as a relatively self-contained and self-sufficient producer, does confine the orbit of his interests to his village. This limitation of interests has nothing to do with any shortcomings on the part of the peasant, but merely means that his economic and social life does not extend into many of the fields which comprise the necessary activities of modern governments. The immediate and obvious wishes of the peasant—such as more land, more lenient credit, and lower taxes—cannot be the satisfactory basis of a political program unless they can be related to some means of realizing them. The possibility of their direct and immediate fulfillment in Rumania was limited; the indirect measures which could ultimately improve his status—the over-all increase of the nation's productivity and capital—involved questions quite beyond his understanding as a peasant, if not as an individual.

565 In all states there is a gap between the desires of the average voter and the complexities of economic and administrative activity; in Rumania this gap was accentuated by the fact that almost four-fifths of the population was of the peasantry. Moreover, since such a large percentage of the population was devoted to one occupation, there was relatively little scope for the diversified play of economic and social interests in politics such as characterizes a more advanced society. Rumanian writers, regretting the division of their society between a formless mass of peasants and an oligarchic ruling group, have perennially pined for the emergence of a middle class. During the interwar period the base for political activity broadened somewhat through increasing industrialization, through the growth of a more numerous middle peasantry, and through strong regional interests in the new provinces, but the great bulk of the electorate was still the poor peasantry, whose chief historical means of declaring its wishes had been in sporadic and unsuccessful uprisings.

660 Partly for these reasons the extension of the suffrage after the First World War did not lead to political democracy. Politics, which retained a distinctly Phanariot flavor, was the art of taking advan-

Bulgaria EE1
Rumania ED1

B 342 233 with straw roofs. They are rarely plastered with mud. In western Sredna Gora, transportable sheep pens are used (Gellert, 1937: 169).

RUMANIA

R 361 175 177 648 In Rumania there exists a marked difference between settlements in the lowlands and those of the Carpathian Mountain region. While topograpny and the presence or absence of such building materials as stone, wood or clay are important factors, political considerations also played a significant role. With the beginning of the 18th century Greek influence became predominant in Moldavia and Wallachia. The Porte set up Greek rulers in these principalities, thus in reality the Rumanians were as much under Turkish dominion, although indirectly, as were the people of the Balkans. It was only after the rebellion of 1821 that Rumanian rulers were reinstated. During all periods of unrest and foreign invasion the mountains and forests served as areas of refuge; the Serbian hajduk has his counterpart in the Rumanian heydoick (Stratilesco, 1907: 30-34).

R 361 R [133] Location and Types of Settlements. The older settlements were in the nature of hamlets (catûn). These were generally not built on the top of hills, but rather in depressions, on the edge of forests, and away from the military roads (Grothe, 1907: 54). In the hilly regions of Oltenia and Moldavia the villages were located close to a river or on the slope of a hill. Farmsteads are generally spaced fairly far apart, in no definite order. Villages may extend over two or three hills facing one another (Stratilesco, 1907: 205). R [491] Villages in the Wallachian plains are located close to the roads. The prevalent type is the road village; buildings are located on either side of the highway which forms the main road of the village. Larger villages may have additional cross-roads (Jänecke, 1918: 7). R [621] While mountain villages average a population of 350, the largest being around 700, villages of the plains average 700 and may reach 2000 (Grothe, 1907: 55).

R 342 R [335] House Types. Due to the scarcity of wood and stone in the plains, buildings are generally constructed of wicker and daub, in which technique the Rumanians are masters. The roof is made first, the walls afterwards. The principle posts are first set into the ground, then the studs of the outer walls and inner partitions are spaced at 1 to 2 foot intervals. After the roof has been formed walls are built up. Mud is kneaded down with the feet, mixed with straw, and shaped into lumps that take the place of bricks. These lumps are then set between the studs and left to dry (Stratilesco, 1907: 208). More often walls are of wickerwork, plastered inside and out with a mixture of mud, straw and cowdung to a thickness of 15-25 centimeters (Jänecke, 1918: 10). The rough walls are smoothed out by applying thinner and thinner layers of mud and cowdung mixture. They are then whitewashed inside and out. Floors of timber are recent; the floor is commonly of tamped earth.

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania ED1

185 Output of oil is to be doubled, of iron and steel nearly doubled. Though the socialization of agriculture is of course to be pushed, Mme. Pauker said nothing about class warfare in the villages nor did she emphasize the leading rôle of the industrial proletariat, as had been done by other satellite leaders as well as by her own colleagues in the Central Committee, Georgescu and Luca.

185 Perhaps geography supplies an answer to why Moscow slated
648 Rumania but not Jugoslavia and Bulgaria for industrialization. The latter are more distant from Soviet Russia and would be much more exposed to enemy air attack in case of war. Rumania adjoins the Soviet Union; and although it is true that her oil fields were bombed from North Africa and Italy in the last war, they could be given air protection more easily than could the industrial installations in the other two countries. The same considerations apply, though in less degree, to Hungary; but in any case industrialization there was already considerably advanced. Rumania and Hungary, moreover, were destined in the Soviet planning to remain indefinitely under occupation by Soviet troops.

The favor shown by Soviet planners for developing heavy industry even in situations where it seems particularly unnatural, as in Rumania, is partly inspired, of course, by their desire to proletarianize the population as quickly as possible. But more important, perhaps, it also will increase the dependence of the satellites on the Soviet Union. Where else but in Russia can they hope to dispose of the product?

565 Despite all their adversities, present and planned, the peasants
626 nevertheless remain the great—probably the only—obstacle to Rumania's full Sovietization. All over Southeast Europe farming is more a way of life than an occupation, and nowhere is this truer than in Rumania. Coercion will gradually break the Rumanian peasant of this way of life. As we have seen, however, the régime has so far made no claims to spectacular progress. Evidence that formidable difficulties are being encountered is found in the fact that while Georgescu, Luca and others stress complete proletarianization as the goal and hint at violent methods to attain it, they make excuses for not proceeding faster; and at the same time there continues to be conciliatory talk about getting the "freely given consent of the peasants."

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania EDI

Evidently this is only one of the *façons de parler* which Revai explained are permissible when it is inconvenient to call things "by their real names." Someday naked force will become convenient, and then the peasants will have to give in or starve. Their remarkable toughness is shown by the fact that they have been able to sustain their present position so long. With an egg selling at 2 lei and shoes costing 2,400 lei, a farmer must sell a hundred dozen eggs to get himself a new pair of shoes; and it takes a year's crop of wheat (in a good season at that) for the owner of an average-size farm to pay for a suit of store clothes. Tough as they are, the majority who still stand aside will have to knuckle under eventually and give up their land. Others will be channelled off to work on state construction jobs, and others again will be absorbed into factories. Some doubtless will hold out to the end—angry, bewildered and inarticulate, helpless to do anything but die. Millions died in Russia.

Nationalism will also continue to be something of a factor, but in Rumania it probably will not give the Communists particular trouble. Rumanians have always considered Russia an enemy of the Rumanian nation. But if nationalism can be held in check in countries with much greater native capacities of resistance, Poland for instance, how much less chance is there for it to remain alive and aggressive here in Rumania—the first of the satellites to come under Soviet occupation, the first to receive a Communist-controlled government imposed by Moscow, the one which today comes closest to being on the same political level as the Ukrainian or the Usbek Soviet Socialist Republic?

In March 1950 Patrascanu's name came back into public discussion as a result of reports in *Borba* and other Belgrade journals that he was to be made the chief performer in a spectacular trial on the Rajk and Kostov model. The reason these predictions did not materialize probably was that Moscow did not see pressing reasons to give Rumania any more lessons for the present. If Patrascanu should be tried later for nationalism, Titoism or spying for the West it would be because the people were starving and because when bread is lacking they must be given a circus. It will not indicate that there is (or probably ever has been) a very strong current of inde-

631

Census of 1930
The Provinces and Counties of Romania

Muntenia (Wallachia)
3 Arges
9 Braila
11 Buzau
22 Dambovita
31 Ialomita
33 Ilfov
39 Muscel
43 Olt
45 Prahova
48 Ramnicu Sarat
62 Teleorman
71 Vlasca

Oltenia
23 Dolj
28 Gorj
37 Mehedinti
50 Romanati
70 Valcea

Moldavia
4 Bacau
5 Baia
8 Botosani
21 Covurlui
24 Dorohoi
27 Falciu
32 Iasi
41 Neamt
46 Putna
49 Roman
61 Tecuci
68 Tutova
69 Vaslui

Dobrudja
13 Caliacra
20 Constanta
25 Durostor
66 Tulcea

Transylvania
1 Alba
10 Brasov
18 Ciuc
19 Cluj
26 Fagaras
30 Hunedoara
38 Mures
40 Nasaud
42 Odorhei
51 Salaj
54 Sibiu
55 Somes
59 Tarnava Mare
60 Tarnava Mica
65 Trei Scaune
67 Turda

Banat of Timisoara
15 Caras
53 Severin
64 Timis Torontal

Crisana—Maramures
2 Arad
7 Bihor
36 Maramures
52 Satu Mare

Bessarabia
6 Balti
12 Cahul
17 Cetatea Alba
29 Hotin
34 Ismail
35 Lapusna
44 Orhei
56 Soroca
63 Tighina

Bucovina
14 Campulung
16 Cernauti
47 Radauti
57 Storojinet
58 Sucsava

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p 30

CHAPTER III

THE PROVINCES

000 *In this chapter each of the provinces of Greater Rumania is described separately and certain practical information is given about each. This will enable the reader, should he visit any province, to know the essential facts about it: it will also make it easier for the student of war to judge the effects of military operations upon each of the several parts of Rumania. The general reader may, however, prefer to complete the story of Rumania as a whole by proceeding to Chapter* IV *and continuing to the end of the book, before reverting to this more detailed chapter.*

THE REGAT

631 Greater Rumania was composed of ten historical and geographical units, which in their turn formed two groups: the Old Kingdom or the 'Regat', representing the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia and the province of Dobrudja; and the New Territories, acquired after the Great War and partly lost in 1940. Of the two groups the New Territories contained both a greater area and a more numerous population than the Regat.[1] Historically and economically the most important and the greatest in area of all the territories of the Old

131
161

[1] The area of the New Territories covered 157,000 square kilometres (about 62,800 square miles), that is, 53% of the total. The population of the New Territories in 1939 was 9,425,000 compared with just over 9,000,000 of the Old Kingdom. However, over half of all arable land was situated in the Regat.

'2: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Oltenia]

Kingdom is Wallachia, which is formed by Oltenia 631
and Muntenia.

OLTENIA. Oltenia is the western part of the prin- /131
cipality of Wallachia. Its boundaries are, in the west /33
and north the Carpathians, in the east the River Olt, /34
and in the south the Danube. The province covers /161
an area of about 9,640 square miles and has a population of about 1,900,000. The soil of the sub-Carpathian hills consists of sand and clay and gravel and is well watered by numerous rivulets. Here are some densely populated valleys, bordered by rich forests and grazing grounds. Farther south and extending to the Danube lies the fertile plain composed of the rich 'yellow earth'. Its character is similar to that of the lowlands of Muntenia, but it lies on a higher level and also has a higher rainfall.

The richest district of this fertile province is the *judet*[1] of Dolj in the south-western corner of Oltenia. From here, and the similarly fertile *judets* of Mehedinti and Romanati, also on the northern bank of the Danube, high-quality maize and wheat have been exported for many years. From the hilly country farther north fruit is the chief export. In the mountainous districts forestry provides the main occupation for the local inhabitants. There is much sheep-breeding, for the grassy slopes provide good grazing.

Apart from the Danube the two most important /133
rivers of Oltenia are the Jiu and the Olt; the latter rises in Transylvania and enters Oltenia through the Red Tower Pass. Oltenia is not rich in mineral /135
resources. There is, however, oil at Govora, west of

[1] Administrative unit.

RUMANIA

162 The preliminary figures of the 1930 census do not give details of the various national minorities inhabiting Rumania, and the more reliable estimate will be found in Winkler's "Racial Statistics," from which the following data are extracted:—

Germans	713,564
Russians	174,293
Jews	778,094
Magyars	1,463,373
Bulgarians	351,328
Yugo-Slavs	52,570
Czechoslovaks	31,884
Ukrainians	500,484
Various	404,104
Total	4,469,694

634 The whole kingdom is administratively divided into 71 departments, but in the case of Transylvania, Maramureş, Crishana, and the Banat the departments created out of these provinces do not correspond exactly with the frontiers of the latter. The density of the population per sq. km. is 161 63 in the old kingdom, including the Dobrudja, 64 in Bessarabia, 82 in Bucovina, and 54 in Transylvania.

163 The birth rate for 1930 was 35 per thousand, while the 165 death rate was 19.4, and the excess of births over deaths reached 278,722, this being the largest figure recorded since the war.

162 The total urban population formed 20.13 per cent, while the rural population formed 79.87 per cent. There were 172 towns, some of which must be mere villages, as at least two are shown to possess less than 1,000 inhabitants. The following towns have a population of over 20,000: Bucarest 631,288, Chişinau 117,016, Cernauţi 111,147, Iassi 102,595, Galatz 101,148, Cluj 98,569, Timişoara 91,866, Oradea 82,355, Ploeşti 77,325, Arad 77,225, Braila 68,310, Craiova 63,063, Brasov 59,234, Constantsa 58,258, Satu-Mare 49,917, Sibiu 48,013, Targul-Mureş 38,116, Buzau 36,115,

ECONOMICS

GEOGRAPHIC and ETHNOGRAPHIC NOTES.

131 Rumania has an area of 204,967 square kilometers, approximately larger than that of Italy, and owing to its circular form has proportionately to its surface a very short stretch of frontiers, only 2,669 Km.—which are mainly formed by natural features. It is situated between the 43-rd and 49-th degrees north latitude and 20° and 31° east longitude. The highlands of the Maramureş separate Rumania from Czechoslovakia, but there is no clearly defined frontier between Rumania and Poland. The river Dniester constitutes the frontier with Russia for a distance of some 700 Km. To the east Rumania is bounded by the Black Sea for a distance of 277 miles. It is separated from Bulgaria partly by an artificial frontier across the Dobrudja, and partly by the Danube for a distance of about 450 Km. The latter river also provides a partial boundary with Yugoslavia to the south, while to the west the frontier separating Rumania from Yugoslavia and Hungary is drawn through the plain of the river Theiss at about a distance of 30-40 Km. to the east of the latter. The country is divided into the following provinces :—

133 *Wallachia*, which is sub-divided by the river Olt into the
635 district of Oltenia to the west and Muntenia to the east, the latter being separated from Moldavia by the river Sereth and its affluent, the Milkov. Oltenia is composed of a wide belt of hilly country bordered by the Danubian plain to the south, which, narrow at its western end, gradually broadens out to the east into the plain of the Baragan, considered to be the granary of Rumania and extending from the river Ialomitsa to the Sereth. Wallachia is watered by numerous rivers, which with the exception of the Olt, the source of which is in Transylvania, all rise in the southern Carpathians and flow into the Danube, the largest of them being the Jiu, Argesh, and Ialomitsa.

The Rumanian bank of the Danube, owing to its extreme flatness, is subject to inundations and forms a fringe of marshes and swamps extending along the whole length of the river to a width of some 20 Km. in some places. The

imposing range of the Southern Carpathians, otherwise known as the Transylvanian Alps, shuts off Wallachia on the north from Transylvania, the main means of communication between the two provinces being provided by the Vulcan, Red Tower, Predeal, and Buzau defiles. 133 635

Moldavia is divided in almost two halves by the river Sereth which rises in Bucovina and flows southwards until it joins the Danube, receiving in its onward course several tributaries, the most important of which are the Moldova, Suceava, Bistritsa, and Trotush, the valleys of which furnish means of access to Transylvania. Western Moldavia is a hilly region very similar in structure to the Transylvanian basin, while the region between the rivers Sereth and Pruth forms a country of vast rolling plains.

Bessarabia is separated from Moldavia by the river Pruth and is delimitated to the north-east by the river Dniester, which constitutes its frontier with Russia. It is a country of vast, sparsely wooded plains, and is renowned for its orchards and extensive vineyards. The southern portion has a steppe-like appearance, though intersected by numerous lakes. It is deficient both in wood and in spring water, and for a long time this deficiency proved an obstacle to its colonization. Bessarabia originally constituted part of Moldavia, with which it also forms a geographic unit. Its capital, Chişinau, or Kichineff, is a well-built city. It possesses numerous colleges, religious institutes and governmental buildings, which form the relics of the former Russian administration and evoke memories of its past magnificence. Owing to the stoppage of traffic with Odessa, complete stagnation prevails. The Rumanian authorities have avoided the construction of communications in Bessarabia, and Chişinau, though being the second largest town in the kingdom, with a population of 117,016, is practically isolated, for the existing railways laid out by the Russians to suit different requirements, are from the commercial point of view now utterly unpractical for actual necessities. As a result stagnation has set in, and this maintains among the population a regret for the past Russian régime. [489]

The Dobrudja lies to the south of the Danube, and may be regarded as an extension, both geographically and ethnologi-

133 cally, of the Bulgarian plateau that projects northward to
635 the Danube delta. The northern part is covered by hills, gradually sloping southwards towards the vast wooded but waterless stretches of the Dely-Orman, part of which still lies in Bulgaria.

The Banat and the Crishana form parts of the Hungarian plain and possess the same climatic and agricultural features as the latter. The eastern part of the Banat is mountainous, forming geologically an extension of Transylvania and of the western spurs of the southern Carpathians, while the Crishana is separated from Transylvania on the east by the mountainous mass of the Bihor mountains, reaching to an altitude of 1,800 meters.

Transylvania forms a circular tableland whose mean altitude is from 350 to 600 meters, and forms the essential nucleus of Rumania, both geographically and ethnically. It is encircled to the north, east, and south by the Carpathians, which occasionally reach to an altitude of 2,000 meters in the north and 2,544 meters in the southern section. Owing to an [132] average annual rainfall of about 35 inches, numerous streams take their rise and drain the region, breaching the mountain rim and thus forming the main ways of egress. The Somesh, Muresh, and Timish, the former two affluents of the Theiss, the latter of the Danube, connect Transylvania with the Hungarian plain and with the Banat, while to the south the river Olt flows through the Red Tower pass to join the Danube and offers the main and easiest way of access into Rumania. The whole region consists of an undulating upland cut up by ranges of hills into valleys, some of which are fairly extensive and fertile, owing to the frequency of alluvial deposits. The mountains are thickly wooded, about [311] a third of the total area (32.19%) being under forest, and give rise to numerous streams, the presence of which explains the abundance of pasture land and meadows and accounts for the thriving live-stock rearing industry which forms the main source of the wealth of the province. The highlands of the Maramureş, to the north, form part of Transylvania, and are separated from it by the river Somesh.

Bucovina forms a geographic unit with Moldavia and used to form part of that principality prior to its occupation by the

Austrians in 1775. Bucovina, in spite of its exiguousness in arable land—about one fourth of its surface being devoted to a variety of agricultural crops and orchards—is one of the most advanced agricultural regions of Rumania, maintaining in certain parts of the valleys of the Pruth and Sereth as dense a population as 300 inhabitants per square kilometre. Its forests are better preserved than those of the other provinces of the kingdom, thanks to the careful sylvan administration the Austrians had initiated. They cover 43% of the region and form the main source from which timber is obtained in Rumania, the river Sereth being used largely for floating down the logs to the Danubian port of Galatz, whence they are exported. When the Austrians annexed Bucovina in 1775 its population was only 72,000. Thanks to their excellent administration and their efforts to develop the country, its population had surpassed 800,000 when it was reunited to Rumania; the increase was due partly, however, to the Austrian attempt at denationalizing the country by settling Ruthenian immigrants. Cernauţi, better known as Czernowitz, is a modern town, beautifully planned and with all the amenities of a western city. The spirit of its inhabitants is distinctly occidental and reminds one of the mentality of Vienna, the more so, since they have distinct leanings towards Socialism owing to the preponderance of German culture. The town used to be an important centre of traffic between Galicia and Russia, but owing to the loss of its hinterland it seems as though struck with a sudden blight while in full prosperity. It has a population of 111,147, and constitutes the third largest town of Rumania.

Table showing population and area of provinces according to census of 1930.

	Population.	Area (sq. km.)
Wallachia	5,542,467	76,583.
Moldavia	2,413,123	38,058.
Bessarabia	2,865,506	44,422.
Bucovina	845,903	10,442.
Dobrudja	811,332	23,262.
Transylvania	3,217,149	102,200.
Maramureş and Crishana	1,387,675	
Banat	942,072	
Total population	18,025,237	Area .. 294,967.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Banat]

The north-western part of the province is the continuation of the Hungarian plain and is very fertile. To the east and south there are high mountains with rich forests and iron and coal deposits. The mountains of the Banat are forced by the Danube in the area between Bazias and Orsova, cutting a deep narrow valley which, in the Kazan Pass, is only about a hundred yards wide. This is where the Roman emperor Trajan built the second of his bridges over the Lower Danube. This is also one of the most picturesque regions of the Banat and the whole of Rumania, 133 [135]

The Banat has been a strategic and economic outpost of various States and empires. Throughout the times of known history this province was a favourite region for colonization. Romans, Turks, Hungarians and Austrians sought to strengthen the frontiers of their dominions by settling the Banat with peoples on whose loyalty, military and economic abilities they could rely in case of war. In consequence peoples of all races were transplanted to and took root in the Banat. In Roman times the province was fortified in order to protect the settlers who were brought here from all over the empire against the Dacians of Transylvania. During the many Turkish wars the Banat was an important defensive position upon which the Hungarians based their strategy. For over a century and a half, from 1552 to 1718, the Banat was under Turkish rule and went through a period of decay. 175 635

Under the Austrian military administration, which lasted up to 1779, the Banat experienced great prosperity. German settlers from the Rhineland and French-speaking peasants from Lorraine were brought to the Banat by the Empress Maria

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Banat]

175 Theresa; in order to strengthen the non-Magyar
635 element the settlement of Serbs and Rumanians was also encouraged. Under the governorship of Count Mercy, a friend of the statesman and warrior Prince Eugene of Savoy, the communications of the Banat were greatly improved. Land was brought under cultivation, mining and other industries were developed and commerce given a new impetus. The chief purpose of this policy was the creation of a strong military outpost of the Austrian Empire. The military frontier region was put under a special administration. All men living in this region were exempt from taxes and dues, were given land of their own but had to perform military duties. In 1779 the Banat, with the exception of the frontier region, was incorporated into Hungary. But after the defeat of the Hungarian Revolution in 1849 the province was again administered by the Austrians and eventually returned to Hungary in 1860. After the Great War the eastern half of the Banat became Rumanian, the western part Yugoslav.

162 About 55% of the population are Rumanians. There is a German colony 225,000 strong. These 'Swabians of the Banat', including descendants of French-speaking Lorrainers who up to half a century ago had preserved all their national characteristics but have now become absorbed by their German neighbours, constitute a very strong economic and national force. They are prosperous farmers, craftsmen and industrial workers. The Hungarians, who form more than 10% of the population, have, up to a few years ago, been in the majority in most towns. There are in the Banat many Jews, Serbs and Bulgarians and also a number of Slovaks.

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Maramures]

[Transylvania]

361 about 20,000 people, lies on the upper reaches of the Tisza; it is the centre from which beautifully hand-woven carpets are exported.

175 **TRANSYLVANIA** (Ardeal[R], Erdely[H], Siebenbuergen[G]). The citadel of Transylvania, guarded by the
635 high walls of the Carpathians and overlooking the lowlands of the Danube, dominated the map of Greater Rumania during the interval between the two World Wars. The union of Transylvania was the fulfilment of an aspiration which Rumanians had for long wished to realize. But the incorporation of this principality into Greater Rumania brought with it a number of difficult problems which even to-day are far from being solved.

When the Magyars invaded Dacia in the tenth century there was already, according to the Rumanian contention, a substantial Rumanian population in Transylvania which was subjugated by them. Subsequent colonization with Hungarian and German settlers weakened the position of the Rumanians and led many of them to emigrate into the lowlands, south and east of the Carpathians. Transylvania became an autonomous principality within Hungary and was able to maintain its semi-independence even when the Turks advanced to the gates of Vienna. Many Transylvanian princes played a leading part in the long struggle against the Turks, notably those of the Bethlen family. Transylvania under its native Hungarian rulers succeeded in maintaining itself for a long time against both the Austrians and the Turks. But while the consequences of the struggle for independence invariably had to be borne by the majority of the population, economic and

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

political benefits were reaped only by the privileged 175
'nations'—the Hungarian nobles, the Szekelys and 635
the 'Saxons'.

The majority of the Transylvanian Hungarians did not belong to the three ruling 'nations', but, as the nobles depended on their support, they were naturally better off than the Rumanians who were regarded and treated as serfs. The Szekelys, originally free peasants, lost many of their liberties. With the progress of feudal development their position deteriorated steadily and their customs and way of life became similar to those of the mass of non-privileged Hungarians. The 'Saxons', German settlers brought to Transylvania by the Hungarian kings to strengthen the military position of the province, were the third of the ruling 'nations'; they were able to maintain their privileges up to about a hundred years ago. While they often opposed the encroachments upon their rights by the Magyars, the Saxons nevertheless were united with their opponents when it was necessary to prevent the Rumanian majority from obtaining even the most elementary political rights.

From 1526 to 1699 Transylvania was under Turkish suzerainty, but in the latter year, by the Peace of Karlowitz, it was restored to Hungary. From that time until 1848 Transylvania was part of the Hungarian Kingdom. From 1849 till 1860 the principality was administered as one of the lands of the Austrian Crown, but was eventually reunited to Hungary in 1867. By the secret Treaty of 17 August 1917 the Rumanian Government was promised Transylvania and the land as far west as the Tisza by the Allied Powers, as the price of entering the

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

175 war on their side. In December 1918, after the
635 collapse of the Dual Monarchy, an assembly of delegates of the Transylvanian Rumanians, meeting in Alba Julia, voted for union with the Rumanian Kingdom, and the province was occupied by Rumanian troops. The incorporation of Transylvania was later recognized and endorsed in the Peace Treaties.

563 *Rumanians.* The Rumanians of Transylvania, who form approximately 60% of the principality's population, are in many respects more advanced than their countrymen in Moldavia and Wallachia. The intensive State policy of Magyarization pursued by Budapest in the nineteenth century led to the strengthening of Rumanian national consciousness. The struggle for economic and political rights, however, never led to anything more than the granting of concessions on paper. From the Rumanian point of view the aims of the Transylvanian Rumanians were fulfilled only with the union of their country with the rest of Rumania in 1918. But, even under the Rumanian regime, the Rumanians of Transylvania were unable to gain economically in twenty years what they were prevented from obtaining during several centuries. Most of them were peasants; some were industrial workers; some became civil servants.

Magyars and Szekelys. The 500,000 Szekelys, inhabiting the eastern part of Transylvania, have still preserved some characteristics which make them distinct from the Hungarians, but politically and economically their position is now very similar to that of the Hungarian population which, in

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

[The Bukovina]

361 peoples of Transylvania. Farther south, on the banks of the Mures, lies Alba Julia, with an old castle, a majestic Gothic church and a chapel in which King Ferdinand was crowned. Sibiu (Hermannstadt[G], Nagyszeben[H]), with a population of 46,000, half of which is German, is an ancient centre of the Transylvanian 'Saxons'. The town is entirely German in character and all the buildings, especially the churches and the market-place, are reminiscent of a little provincial borough in the Middle Ages. Two other places of historical interest are Heltau (Cisnadie[R]) and Michelsberg (Cisnadoara[R]), small German villages with peasant-fortresses built in the thirteenth century. The road to the east, along the foot of the South Carpathian wall, leads to Brasov (Brasso[H], Kronstadt[G]), the most important industrial and economic centre of Transylvania. Although the town has a population of only 60,000, there are numerous factories producing iron and steel, machine-tools, armaments, railway equipment, textiles, and other goods.

175 **THE BUKOVINA** (Buchenland[G]). The Bukovina
635 forms the northernmost tip of Greater Rumania. This province of dense forests, gentle hills and fertile pastures has had a long and varied history. In Roman times it was part of Dacia and was subsequently overrun by many barbarian tribes. Soon after the establishment of Moldavia, the Bukovina was conquered by the rulers of that principality and annexed by them. For some time both Moldavia and the Bukovina were governed from the Bukovinian town of Suceava. In the following centuries the Bukovina was first under Polish, then Turkish

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Bukovina]

rule. It was occupied by the Russians in 1769. In 1774 the province was given to Austria, under which it remained until 1918. On 23 October the Austrian governor handed over the Bukovina to the Ukrainian inhabitants of the province; but four days later an assembly of Rumanian Bukovinians declared for the union of the province with Rumania and asked the Rumanian government for military assistance. This was forthcoming on 11 November and added to Rumania a territory of about 4,100 square miles with a population of about 870,000 (1930). Of these over 38% were Ukrainians, 34% Rumanians and 21% Germans and German-speaking Jews. The Rumanian administration began by a vigorous policy of Rumanization. The Ukrainians, who under Austrian rule had been well treated, and the Jews, were the chief sufferers, but the Germans, too, were ousted from many of their positions.[1]

More than half of the Bukovina is covered with dense forests of beech;[2] one-fifth consists of pastures; less than a third is arable land. The province borders in the west on the Carpathians, in the south on Moldavia, in the east on Moldavia and Bessarabia and in the north on Poland. The western part of the Bukovina is formed by the slopes of the Carpathians, where manganese and iron ore are found, especially in the region of Jacobeni. To the east stretches the hilly country, covered with pastures, on which good livestock is raised, and fields of maize, wheat and tobacco. Mineral resources are confined to some small deposits of coal, gold and lead, but the industry of the province is well developed.

[1] The German University of Czernowitz was completely Rumanized soon after the military occupation.

[2] The German name of the province means 'Land of the Beeches'.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

by the valleys through which flow the tributaries of /33
the Pruth and Dniester. In the south, beginning near Besarabeasca, extends the Budjak steppe which merges into the sandy soils, salt marshes and lagoons of the delta of the Danube and of the Black Sea coast. The climate of Bessarabia is the same as that /32
of the regions east of the Dniester. The summers are very hot and dry, the winters very cold with icy winds and great snowfalls. Nevertheless, crops 311
grow well in Bessarabia and 61 % of the whole area is arable land. The chief products are maize, wheat, tobacco and wine and lately also soya beans. There are few factories and the only source of income for the people, apart from agriculture, is the fishing industry in the south.

The capital of Bessarabia is Kishineff (Chisinau[R]) 361
with a population of over 200,000 (1935). Here are concentrated such industrial enterprises as the province possesses, the most important being flour mills, leather factories and other secondary industries connected with agriculture.

The first colonization of Bessarabia was carried 175
out by the Romans who succeeded in occupying this 635
territory only for a short time. During the great period of migration (seventh to tenth centuries), the province was invaded by a host of tribes. Bessarabia was first occupied by Rumanians in the early fourteenth century and incorporated in Moldavia in 1367. A century and a half later Southern Bessarabia fell to Turkey, but several merchant-colonies were still administered by Genoese and Venetian traders on the Danube delta and the Black Sea coast. In the following centuries Bessarabia was often a battleground for Russian and Turkish armies, who alter-

3

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

175
635

nated in occupying the province. In 1812 Tsarist Russia annexed the whole of Bessarabia. Three provinces in the south of Bessarabia were returned to Moldavia, which was still under Turkish suzerainty, in 1856; but they were again taken by Russia in 1878 and Rumania received the Dobrudja by way of compensation.

In 1917, after the October Revolution in Russia, an assembly of Bessarabians declared the province to be an autonomous part of the Federation of Socialist Republics and adopted the name of 'Moldavian Democratic Republic'. The Representative Council, however, composed of Rumanian and anti-Bolshevik delegates, frightened by the spread of revolution, appealed to the Rumanian Government for military assistance to deal with revolutionary groups in Bessarabia. This help was forthcoming on condition that the province would eventually join Rumania. As an initial step the 'Independent Moldavian Republic' was proclaimed on 24 January 1918. On 5 March General Averescu declared that the Rumanian troops would be withdrawn within two months. In the meantime his government was conducting peace negotiations with the Central Powers, which had occupied part of the Ukraine and were eager to stem the revolutionary tide. They intimated that they would favour the addition of Bessarabia to the Rumanian Kingdom as compensation for its losses to Austria-Hungary.[1]

[1] Part of Wallachia was to be ceded to the Dual Monarchy. The Treaty of Bucarest (May 1918) also provided for the demobilization of the Rumanian Army, except two divisions needed for the occupation of Bessarabia.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

On 8 April 1918 the Representative Council of 635
Bessarabia,[1] *Sfatul Tari*, by 86 votes to 3, 36 dele- 175
gates abstaining, decided to become an autonomous part of Rumania. This step was sanctioned by Germany when the Treaty of Bucarest was signed one month later. In November of the same year, 1918, after the Armistice, it was decided at a session of the Representative Council, attended by only 46 delegates, to declare for the unconditional union of Bessarabia with Rumania. The annexation of Bessarabia was not recognized by the Peace Conference at Paris; and although recognition was promised by the Conference of Ambassadors in 1920, this undertaking was never ratified by all the Powers.

During the following years Bessarabia was treated 635
as a conquered province. All district councils and 661
other organs of local government were abolished. 669
The country was ruled by prefects appointed by and responsible to the central government in Bucarest. The province was strongly garrisoned and lived in a continuous state of siege. All communications over the Dniester were destroyed and anybody caught attempting to cross the frontier was either imprisoned or shot. Between 1918 and 1924 there were a hundred and thirty-five uprisings in Bessarabia, which were suppressed by the military with the utmost violence. In the course of these revolts it is estimated that over thirty thousand Bessarabians were killed, many more executed or sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. The peasant revolt of 1924 in the region around the town of Tatar-Bunar was put down after heavy fighting and the burning of many villages.

[1] The Council was composed of 138 deputies of whom 103 were Rumanian, 13 Ukrainian, 7 Russian, 6 Jewish, 2 Bulgarian, 1 Pole and 1 Armenian.

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

000 down after heavy fighting and the burning of many villages.

635 563 [452] The political situation ? in Bessarabia was partly the cause and partly the effect of economic conditions. Agricultural credit for those peasants who had received land was non-existent. Communications were neglected and allowed to fall into complete decay. There was only a small amount of trade, which was largely in the hands of the Jews. This encouraged the spread of anti-Semitic propaganda which was fostered by the Government. The Ukrainian and Russian population was deprived of all cultural rights. The German minority was the best treated, but even the Rumanians of Bessarabia were regarded by the central government with suspicion.

635 648 Following a demand by the Soviet government, which had never recognized the annexation of Bessarabia, Bessarabia was ceded by Rumania to the U.S.S.R. in June 1940. When Rumania joined Germany in the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina were again occupied by Rumanian troops.

? [ie: the frequency of popular uprisings -- Analyst]

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

National Assembly on June 2, 1952, concerning the "Organization of the Judicature." Article 1 of the Law emphatically states that the function of the judiciary is the defense of the socio-economic structure of the state and of the rights and interests of state institutions and organizations. Furthermore, it is emphasized that the aim of the judiciary is the "education" of the citizens "in the spirit of devotion to the fatherland and in the spirit of the construction of socialism" (Article 2). 177 69 692

The people's assessors perform in practice a much greater function in judicial proceedings than those specified by the Constitution. The Minister of Justice is authorized to detail them from one court to the other whenever circumstances require. Thus, there are actually special teams of "people's judges" which the Ministry of Justice can use in accordance with the political interests of the Party. 692

Article 9 of Law No. 5 of 1952 also authorizes the courts to hear cases outside their seats if this is required "to fulfil the educational purpose of justice." Furthermore, hierarchically superior courts may take away from subordinate courts any case "in order to hear it themselves or have it heard by another court."

The required impartiality of judges is furthermore impaired by limitations imposed by the electoral laws on the right to participate in the election of people's judges. The privilege is restricted to the "democratic" elements only (Article 13, Paragraph 7, of Law No. 5). This is coupled with the provisions confining the nomination of candidates to the United Workers' (Communist) Party or to its affiliated mass organizations (Article 13, Paragraph 1). [666]

In discussing the new role of justice and law, Vasilescu-Alba, a jurist of the Rumanian People's Republic, asserted that "all legal rules, being the expression of the will of the working class, must be understood and interpreted in the light of the class struggle." Justice is thus "an executive organ of the will of the working class." Positive law, when in disagreement with this principle, must make room for the "legal conscience of the proletariat."[3] [565]

The fundamental rights and duties of citizens are enumerated in a special chapter. The primacy of social rights over individual rights is, as in the USSR, both functional and political.[4] Most of the rights and freedoms stipulated by the Constitution are either programmatic, circumscribed by escape clauses, or outright illusory. Thus, for instance, the provision relating to freedom of the press, speech, and assembly, as stated by Article 85, (a word-by-word replica of Article 125 of the Soviet Constitution of 1936), emphatically denies 641

[3] "Statul Polițienesc" Cronica Românească, October 1, 1950, p. 25.

[4] Professor Boris Mirkine-Guetzevitch, while recognizing the dictatorial character of all the constitutions in the Soviet sphere, makes nevertheless a distinction between the declarations of rights of the Soviet constitutions and those of the satellite constitutions. According to Professor Mirkine, whereas the declarations of the People's Republics establish the "functional" primacy of social rights over individual rights, those of the Soviet republics establish "political" primacy. See Boris Mirkine-Guetzevitch, Les Constitutions Européennes, 2 vol. Paris, 1951.

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

641 the right and freedom of citizens to write, publish, or otherwise express their views, except such as are in accord with the given party-line. For the exercise of this right, the state places at the disposal of the "working classes and their organizations, printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets (and) communication facilities." Freedom of speech is furthermore restricted by the provisions of the Law for the Defense of Peace, enacted on December 15, 1950. Article 2 of this Law specifically prohibits "propaganda inciting to war, the spreading of tendentious or invented news, of a nature to serve the warmongers, etc. . . ."

[204] Freedom of the press and publication is likewise nonexistent. Two directorates attached to the Council of Ministers are charged with complete supervision over the press, publications of any sort, and their distribution. The Directorate of the Press and Printed Matter, established on May 23, 1949 (Decree No. 218) "authorizes the publication of all printed matter;" the General Directorate of Publishing, Graphic Arts Industry, Book and Press Distribution, established on March 16, 1950 (decree No. 62), "controls the output of publishing houses from the point of view of contents and form." The Communist press is furthermore restricted to the services of the AGERPRESS (the Rumanian Press Agency) which by virtue of Decree No. 217 of May 23, 1949, is the only agency permitted to receive and transmit news. Aside from the nationalization of all printing presses, a governmental decision (Decision No. 69 of the Ministry of the Interior, July 1, 1950) requires the registration with the militia of all hand printing presses, duplicating machines, and "materials needed for the reproduction of printed matter," owned by individuals or associations.

[515] Freedom of assembly is similarly controlled. Excepting the Communist-controlled mass organizations, viz., public organizations, co-operative societies, youth and women's organizations, etc. (Article 86), no independent organization or association is permitted. Anyone attempting to organize or participate in such an organization is liable to prosecution by virtue of Article 86 of the Constitution, prohibiting the organization of or the participation in associations of a "fascist" or "anti-democratic" character. Such participation would furthermore entail "plotting against the internal and external security" of the state, an offense punishable by death under Article 1 of the Law for Punishing Certain Crimes Which Endanger the Security of the State of January 19, 1949.

611 The right to work is guaranteed by the "socialist transformation" of
461 the economy and the "elimination of the possibility of economic crises and the abolition of unemployment" (Article 77). The right to rest and leisure is ensured by the reduction of the working hours to eight in factories and offices and to less in the more arduous trades.[5] This right is supplemented by

[5] The constitutional provisions relating to the reduction of working hours are puzzling in the light of the introduction of the piece-work system and norms of production (Labor Code of May 20, 1950) and the adoption of the Soviet model of "Stachanovism" and "voluntary labor."

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

the establishment of rest-homes, sanatoria, and cultural establishments (Article 78). The right to maintenance in old age and in case of sickness or disability is ensured by the development of social insurance and free medical service (Article 79). The right to education is ensured by universal, compulsory, and free elementary education and by the system of state scholarships awarded to deserving students (Article 80).[6] Equality of rights in all spheres of economic, political, and cultural activity is guaranteed to all citizens irrespective of their nationality, sex, or race. Any transgression of these provisions by the manifestation of race-hatred, chauvinism, or discrimination is punishable by law (Article 81).[7]

Some distinction was made at the beginning with regard to the German ethnic group, which had actively collaborated with Nazi Germany. The original decision to expel the Germans from the country, however, was officially changed in December, 1948, when the Rumanian Communist Party decided to replace the denunciation of the German minority as a whole and encourage instead the class struggle within its ranks. The resolution of the Party maintained that the "struggle against their own bourgeoisie . . . (would) open a new perspective to the German working population of Rumania, working alongside the Rumanian people and other nationalities."[8]

Whereas at the beginning Zionism enjoyed a tremendous popularity and even received latent, if not active, support from the Communist-dominated government during the Jewish-Anglo-Arab disturbances in Palestine, the above quoted resolution on the national question also declared:

"Zionism of any color is a political nationalist and reactionary movement of the Jewish bourgeoisie, which tries to isolate the Jewish working people from the other peoples and to hinder them in their struggle against capitalism in the ranks of the anti-imperialist camp."

Notwithstanding the legal and constitutional provisions relating to the defense of the rights of nationalities and minorities,[9] the official policies of the Communist Party in regard to these questions have been based on the tenets of Leninism-Stalinism. While the development of national cultures and the use of national languages in all the fields of cultural and political endeavors are encouraged, the guiding principle is that of "socialism." "Na-

[6] The system of education underwent drastic changes. See "The Perversion of Education in Rumania" published by the Rumanian National Committee, Washington, D.C., July, 1950.

[7] See Law No. 86 of February 7, 1945 (Statute for Nationalities) and Law No. 630 of August 6, 1945, in the Yearbook on Human Rights for 1946, United Nations, (1947) 248–49 and 249–51, respectively.

[8] La Roumanie Nouvelle, Bucharest, No. 14, December 30, 1948.

[9] As an apparent concession to the Hungarian minority in Rumania, the Constitution also provides for the establishment of a Magyar Autonomous Region (Articles 19–21) in the territory inhabited by compact Magyar and Székely population, including the districts of Ciuc, Gheorgheni, Odorhei, Reghin, Sangiorgiu de Padure, Sft. Gheorghe, Targu-Mures, Targu-Secuesc and Toplita.

l: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 EDl Rumania EDl

641 563 tional culture" from the Leninist-Stalinist point of view is a culture *national only in form* and *socialist in content* and aims at the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat.[10]

In fact, this principle has been legally formulated in Paragraph (j) of Article 17 of the new Rumanian Constitution according to which the state

> "ensures the development of the culture of the Rumanian people and of the culture of the national minorities, *socialist in content, national in form.*" (emphasis supplied)

641 [563] Women are given equal rights with men in all spheres of cultural, economic, or political activities. The institution of marriage and the family is protected by the state, which grants aid to mothers of large families and unmarried mothers (Article 83). Freedom of conscience and religious worship is guaranteed. The school is separated from the church; except for the training of the personnel of the religious denominations, no congregation may open or maintain [798] institutions of general study (Article 84). The constitutional provisions relating to freedom of conscience are rendered practically meaningless by virtue of Decree No. 177, Establishing General Regulations for Religious Cults, of August 3, 1948, and the Law on the Organization of the Ministry of Cults, of February 5, 1949. According to the Decree, all religious cults must be recognized by the Presidium, which must approve the statute of organization of the respective cult. The Ministry of Cults, the organ through which the Party exercises its control over religious denominations, is empowered to "supervise and control all religious cults and their institutions, and the special religious education for the training of all personnel of religious cults, the property and funds of any nature belonging to cults, as well as to confirm (or deny) the appointment of the entire permanent and temporary staff of religious cults, and to act as intermediary for relations and exchanges of information between cults in the country and abroad" (Article 1 of the Law for the Organization of the Ministry of Cults). The implementation of these provisions has resulted in the unequivocal subserviency of the cults to the regime.[11]

641 The inviolability of the home, the privacy of correspondence (Article 88) and of the citizen is guaranteed. No person may be placed under arrest without the decision of a court or "of the procurator" (Article 87). This assurance of the inviolability of the person is subject to the exclusive privilege of the Party or of its affiliated organizations to nominate candidates in the election of judges and the arresting power of the Prosecutor General, which is independent of the courts. Since there can be no writ of habeas corpus against the Procurator General—always a loyal servant of the Party—it evidently follows that extrajudicial arrest of any individual is within his discretion (see Article 8 of Law No. 6 of June 2, 1952).

Hand-in-hand with the rights enumerated above, the Constitution specifies

---

[10] J. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (1942) 207.

[11] For details see "Persecution of Religion in Rumania" published by the Rumanian National Committee, Washington, D. C., 1949.

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

the following duties of the citizens. It is the duty of every citizen to: abide by the constitution and the laws in force; safeguard and develop public socialist property; maintain labor discipline; actively contribute to the strengthening of the power of people's democracy; further the economic and cultural advancement of the country (Article 90); serve in the Armed Forces (Article 91); and defend the fatherland (Article 92). 641

The only international connotation in the Constitution is the provision of a "right of asylum" accorded to "foreign citizens persecuted for defending the interests of the working people" (Article 89).

Whatever the merits or shortcomings of this Constitution, it should be borne in mind that a "people's democracy," like the Soviet state, is not a legal state in the true sense of the word. Such constitutions are not truly fundamental laws, in the sense that they do not define or limit the powers of the state and protect rights of the citizens against arbitrary governmental actions. They are not based upon a compromise embodied in rules of law to which all citizens, irrespective of their ideological conceptions or political affiliations, are equally subject. In Marxian terminology, the Soviet state (like that of the People's Republics) is a "class-state," a class dictatorship. The misleading fallacy, however, lies—as the Soviet experience of the last 36 years and the satellite experiences of the last few years show—in the complete identification of the working class with the Communist Party and of the Party itself with its hierarchy. 000

RANDOLPH L. BRAHAM*

---

* Ph.D., The New School for Social Research.

RUMANIA

668 Bessarabians are popularly called) forming the most back-
177 ward section of the Rumanian people are mentally incapable of appreciating at their true value all the qualities which the Rumanian administration exhibits in its conduct towards populations whose goodwill it has set out to win. For the organs of the Rumanian State are inspired by a high purpose, that of converting these Moldovans of Bessarabia into loyal Rumanians, by inculcating in them a consciousness of the collective national will. When they shall finally see eye to eye with the various cultural missionaries which Bucarest has so far dispatched for their edification, then at last will loyalty and love follow, for loyalty after all is but the consciousness of oneness, and it is this consciousness of oneness that the Bucarest "Kulturträger" are attempting to impress on the Bessarabians.

668 These altruistic efforts, however, seem unavailing, for in January, 1932, a pan-Bessarabian congress of all parties and creeds was held at Kichineff, and delegates resolved to create a united Bessarabian front so as to impose on the Government which had done nothing for this province since its union with Rumania, the taking of certain measures designed to ameliorate the situation. M. Batsaria, a veteran Rumanian journalist, commenting on this congress in the "Adeverul" stated that a member of the cabinet had confided to him that this discontent was not peculiar to Bessarabia, but existed in all the new provinces. An atmosphere, which was in no way favourable to the realization of a complete spiritual unity among the inhabitants of Great Rumania had been created. And so long as the legitimate rights of all were not respected, and their just grievances remained unredressed, so long would unity be unattained.

The Jews.

[162] The Jewish minority numbers some 800,000 souls (accord-
563 ing to Winckler's racial statistics, 778,094) who are mainly
641 concentrated in the urban districts of Bessarabia, Moldavia, Bucovina, and the province of Maramureş. As petty trading, commerce and, to a large extent, banking is in their hands, all the more important towns have a numerous Jewish element in their population. The manifest disinclination of the Rumanians for commerce has permitted the

THE ETHNIC MINORITIES AND THEIR GRIEVANCES

Jewish element to gain a place of importance in the life of the 563
community, which has unfortunately provoked the resent- 641
ment and jealousy of their Christian co-nationals and created a Jewish problem in Rumania. To counteract their economic influence they were refused political rights by the Rumanian Constitution of 1866, and though the Congress of Berlin obtained the abolition of this law, such obstacles were placed in the way of Jews wishing to acquire naturalization that only a few hundreds succeeded in obtaining this privilege by 1914. According to the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities which Rumania finally signed, the Rumanian nationality is conferred on all Jews in Rumania. The Jews have not 665
followed the example of the Magyars and Germans, who 563
have created political parties of their own, yet prejudice against them is pretty strong and has led to the formation of political groups which are purely anti-Semitic. The supporters of anti-Semitism are mainly recruited among students, and the universities have often been the scenes of ruthless and barbarous acts of violence. The leaders of the anti-Semitic leagues are unscrupulous individuals, who by pandering to the lowest instincts of the mob see a way to secure personal advantages for themselves. Thus the chief henchman of Cuza, the anti-Semitic leader, an individual named Codreanu, gained notoriety by shooting the Police Prefect of Jassi while the latter was doing his duty in suppressing a pogrom that had been organized in the capital of Moldavia.

The Jewish problem is purely economic, and this is the 554
reason why student circles are so anxious to impose the 563
" numerus clausus " in the Rumanian universities. They wish to eliminate potential rivals in the liberal professions as far as they possibly can. In many of these the Jewish element has certainly distinguished itself, especially in law and in medicine. Rumanian youth feels that the prominent position Jews hold in society is a serious obstacle to its advancement, and the methods adopted to eliminate this hindrance are certainly not always commendable. It should be added, however, that where Jews do not exist other races occupy their place, so that it is always the non-Rumanian elements which fill the more lucrative posts in the urban

INNER GLIMPSES OF THE ADMINISTRATION.

It is with no desire to cast discredit on the Rumanians that 000 the following political happenings related in this chapter are being published, but with the intent of giving, judging from the past, a rough idea of the mentality of the ruling classes and what may be expected of them in the future. It would be utterly unfair if we were to judge them after our western conceptions and by accepting our standard of morality as a criterion. "The moral standards of a people are evolved in correspondence with the practical needs of that people" wrote our distinguished philosopher, the late L. T. Hobhouse, in his remarkable treatise "Mind in Evolution," and the auspices under which Rumania evolved were peculiarly unpropitious if we are to judge from Dr. Seton Watson's weighty pronouncement that" the Phanariot régime reduced the national and religious life of the peninsula to utter stagnation and has left its corroding mark upon the politics of every Balkan nation." ("Europe in the Melting-pot.") And the Phanariot influence was more deep rooted and 565 lasting in Rumania than in any other country in South- 641 ● Eastern Europe. In all these countries except Rumania it 661 was a transient phenomenon, it was a virus which thought it had inculcated its poison deep within the tissues of the native plant, yet nevertheless, owing to the inherent qualities of the latter, the scourge was tenaciously fought and was being slowly eliminated. But in Rumania, unfortunately, the bane went much deeper, for the Phanariots and their retainers had come in their thousands and settled in the country for good, and their numerous descendants form to-day the *élite* of the ruling classes of the old kingdom. The basic conception of the State held by the Phanariot was that it was the best and shortest avenue to personal advancement and enrichment. He applied and lived by the maxim of his Turkish patron of yore:

"Dovleten mali denŭz
Yemeyen onou domŭz,"

which may be translated by "the goods of the State are as vast as the sea, and he who does not help himself to them is no better than a pig.

corner of Europe, has been allowed to become the prey of 642
odious vampires, who have sucked everything dry and have 668
even robbed us of our hope of possible salvation. Nevertheless, Providence hath granted the return of our long expected King," etc.

One is justified in expressing doubts as to the expediency 641
of applying fascist methods in Rumania as one fails to per- 565
ceive the dominating personality who might control and 661
direct such a policy; one may also ask, where are the indispensable coadjutors to be recruited from? It can hardly be said of King Carol that he has been able to live down his unfortunate reputation so as to assume with some hope of success such a formidable task. As for his likely collaborators who, presumedly, are to be selected from among the Rumanian ruling circles, one need only peruse the posthumous memoirs of the late Rumanian Prime Minister, Marghiloman, in order to be convinced of the utter abjectness of this class. M. Pamfil Seicaru, who may be likened to the late Henry Labouchere of "Truth" for his fearless criticisms, when writing on the boundless vista of putridity disclosed by this compilation, stigmatized in the "Cuvantul" of July 17th, 1927, in the following scathing terms the leading circles of his country :—"These memoirs form a vast archive concerning turpitudes of a whole ruling class . . . the majority of this class which remained in the territory occupied by the enemy openly practised with him . . . while those in Moldavia offered a spectacle of the most trying moral bankruptcy. A parliament of speculating fugitives revealing a criminal insensibility in face of the tragedy of a whole country; one cannot imagine a more sinister divorce between a ruling class and a nation in arms. . . . And who amongst them can indict the others for their subversion of the national ideal? Can the aristocratic fugitive fragment which took refuge in Moldavia or Russia claim to represent a higher standard of morality than the section which remained in the occupied territory meekly to serve the enemy? They both form two aspects of the same filth."

As recently as May 6th, 1932, Octavian Goga, an ex- 565
Minister and presently in intimate relation with the King, 641
who publicly brags of being the successor designate of Prof.

565 Iorga, spoke as follows at Bucau: "The upper class is
641 totally devoid of an ideal, and of a moral mainspring, while the masses are not only tired and exhausted but impregnated by sullen dissatisfaction. The whole body of the State is in a condition of molecular dissolution." And this worthy, who according to the "Dreptatea" of May 19th, 1932, "compensated himself by seizing thirteen million lei on the evacuation of his tenure of the Ministry of the Interior in 1927," a feat which won for him at the time the appropriate name of "Vacuum cleaner," had the effrontery to conclude his oration with an appeal to the youth of the country to rally round him :—"We must change the moral structure of the country, but such a change cannot proceed from the old. We must appeal to the young intellectuals to join in the building of a new structure around us. Their place is not in the building which is tumbling down, but in those which are being built up. Come on, we are sure to win." If, indeed, Carol II has set his heart on saving his country by the help of such sorry individuals, we may well pity Rumania.

PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS: THE ELECTORAL LAW

646 The present electoral law, which confers a premium on the
666 party which secures 40% of the total votes cast at an election and enables it to secure 70% of the mandates in the Chamber, was due to the initiative of the Bratianus who in 1926 aimed at installing General Averescu in office. They themselves had no need of this law, as at the elections which took place in 1927, 62% of the electors voted for them. It is a law that is favourable to groups devoid of popular support, as they can very easily, when in control of the administrative machinery, so manipulate the elections as to secure the requisite 40% which would confer on them a majority of 70% in the Chamber. So that as long as this law is not repealed there is little chance of a really popular party being elected to office, except if it be entrusted beforehand by the Crown with a mandate to call a general election.

It forms actually the great obstacle to a return to constitutional government, for, thanks to it, any coterie appointed to

565 provide their holders with a fair income, and a con-
471 siderable part of the rural population remained
landless. Worst of all, those peasants who did obtain
423 land were given neither implements nor sufficient
financial help which could have enabled them to
make a decent living. Neither of the measures which
are essential to the success of peasant proprietorship
—State aid in money, machinery and technical
advice; or the creation of large-scale co-operative
[641] societies and banks—were carried out. Undoubtedly
the extension of the franchise in 1923 to all men of 21
and the land reforms greatly strengthened the posi-
tion of the peasantry in the State. But, actually, it
was widespread discontent with the working of the
agrarian reform that stimulated the organization of
the National Peasant Party.

423 CROPS. The great devastation of Rumania during
241 the First World War and the effects of the land
reform resulted in a great reduction of the country's
agricultural production during the immediate post-
[439] war period.[1] Whereas the Old Kingdom alone in
1913 had grown 2,200,000 tons of wheat, of which
1,150,000 tons were exported, and over 3,100,000
tons of maize, of which 1,000,000 tons were ex-
ported, the production figures for Greater Rumania
in 1921 were for wheat 2,140,000 tons, and for maize
2,810,000 tons. This great decrease is all the more
striking in view of the fact that the amount of arable

[1] In Transylvania and the neighbouring territories, taken from Hungary, some of the great *latifundias* had been well and scientifically worked with modern agricultural machinery. There were some conscientious landowners among the Magyar nobility as well as absentee landlords who neglected their peasantry.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

especially hard hit by this rampant corruption. The 661
moneyed classes, on the other hand, were well satisfied with this state of affairs which guaranteed the continuance of their rule.

The position of the minorities was unenviable. 563
In theory all non-Rumanians had the same rights 641
and duties as the Rumanians. In practice, however, things were very different. The official language was Rumanian and anybody not able to speak Rumanian was handicapped from the beginning when dealing with the authorities. It was very difficult for members of a minority to obtain schooling in their native language, for although there were some Hungarian and German schools they had to be financed by the respective communities and the fees to be paid were high. A public career for a member of a minority was very rare indeed and non-Rumanians had always to expect unfavourable treatment at the hands of the authorities. The Jews, many of whom were denied Rumanian citizenship and had to pay from time to time for the right to live in the country, were worse off than the rest. Often in addition to being persecuted for their origin they could be victimized for having a Hungarian name and speaking German as their native language.

The mass of the Rumanians did not gain by this 661
discrimination ostensibly made in their favour. At 565
best the half-educated sons of peasants could secure some minor position in the State machinery.

The economic life of the country was dominated 471
by all-powerful monopolies. The oil and heavy industries were in the hands of a few foreign and Rumanian shareholders and the enormous profits were divided between a few industrialists, ministers

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

p.418

THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF RUMANIA

642 829 The new Constitution of the People's Republic of Rumania of September, 1952, will in all probability become a landmark in the constitutional history

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 EDl Rumania EDl

of the Soviet world. It is the first document to reconcile the conflict hitherto existing between the satellite constitutions and two Soviet official theories: the one, relating to the essence and character of the "New Democracies," emphasizes in its latest version the substantial identity of the political and economic structures of the two types of "Soviet" and "popular" democracies; the other, the Soviet theory on constitutional law, supports the thesis that there can be no divergence between constitution and society in a "socially advanced and progressive" state. Previous satellite constitutions, however, in contradiction to Soviet legal theory that the constitution is a mirror reflecting changing reality—the legal crystallization of existing arrangements—did not correspond to the fundamental changes occurring in the state. 642 829

The new Rumanian Constitution,[1] however, assumes to reflect the enormous transformations that have taken place in the political and socio-economic life of the country since March, 1948, when the first Constitution of the People's Republic of Rumania was adopted. In the interval, the means of production, transportation, and banking have been nationalized; the "socialist sector" of agriculture has been widened by the ever-growing influence of the state through the establishment of state farms ("sovchozi") and tractor stations; collectivization of land has been consistently pursued through a policy aiming at the elimination of the "kulak" elements and the support of the lower and middle strata of the peasantry; two monetary reforms have completely changed the financial status of the population—while the leu has been stabilized and pegged to the ruble, the people have been deprived of their savings; the structure and functions of the central and local governmental agencies and of the judiciary has gradually developed along Soviet lines; the opposition has been eliminated and the rank-and-file of the Communist Party purged of "unreliable" or "deviationist" elements. 642 178

The new Constitution, as a whole, very closely approximates to its Soviet prototype. While the Constitution of 1948—advanced as it was at the time from the Soviet legal point of view—preserved some outward manifestations of "bourgeois constitutionalism," particularly in its technique and its neo-latin legal style, the framers of the new Constitution carefully avoided 642

[1] The new Constitution of the People's Republic of Rumania was adopted by the Grand National Assembly on September 24, 1952. It differed little in substance from the original Draft submitted to the Assembly (March 27, 1952) by the Constitutional Commission headed by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, President of the Council of Ministers and Secretary-General of the United Workers' (Communist) Party. Out of the 18,836 "suggestions for amendments" offered by the population, only 34 were accepted. Of these 28 were primarily editorial, 2 changed the composition of the Council of Ministers, one stipulated the tax-levying authority of the Grand National Assembly, and one provided for the inclusion of the initials RPR (Rumanian People's Republic) in the country's emblem. Two amendments, however, were more significant. One eradicated the peasantry's personal property rights, granted in the Draft, to the land and farm implements which they brought into the collectives; the other, seeking to dissipate the democratic world's allegations that the country had obviously become a "Soviet province," purports to establish the principle of complete sovereignty by the inclusion of the provision that Rumania is a "unitary, sovereign, and independent" state. 642

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

642 these "antiquated" forms and sancrosanctly adopted the constitutional tenets of Stalinism.[3]

Compared to the earlier document the new Constitution contains certain features which seem to corroborate the complete Sovietization of the country. In fact, were it not for political expediency in the field of foreign affairs, the incorporation of the People's Republic of Rumania into the USSR as a constituent member would be only a matter of sheer formality, necessitating merely the amending of the USSR Constitution.

[648] Short of this final step, however, the new Rumanian Constitution provides, in an almost unique manner in constitutional law, for the freezing of Rumania's foreign policy by incorporating in the text friendship and alliance with the USSR. Whereas the former Constitution completely failed to mention the USSR, the present document refers to the Soviet Union and the Red Army not less than five times. The USSR is depicted as the liberator of the country, whose friendship ensures "the independence, state sovereignty, development, and flourishing" of Rumania (Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Introductory Chapter and Article 3).

[565] The basic features of the new society are outlined in Chapter I. It defines the People's Republic of Rumania as a "state of the working people of town and countryside" (Article 1). The political foundation of the state is the "alliance of the working class with the working peasantry . . . in which the leading role is held by the working class" (Article 2). Thus, for the first time in a Rumanian constitution, the preponderance of the working class is formally acknowledged. Furthermore, the central strategic position of the Communist Party and its implicit identification with the state is, as in the USSR, legally declared (Article 86). In fact, notwithstanding the discrepancies existing between the constitutions of the people's republics, their main difference from the Stalin Constitution has thus far concerned the legal position of the Party. Whereas Article 126 of the USSR Constitution openly refers to the Party as the vanguard in "the struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system," the satellite constitutions typically make no mention of its role. The Hungarian Constitution of 1949, which until lately was considered as the most advanced, faintly refers to it in Article 56. In reference to the right of organizing, this Article asserts that the state "in fulfilling its tasks . . . bases itself . . . on the working class, led by its *advanced guard* (emphasis supplied) and supported by the democratic unity of the whole people." Even the new Polish Constitution of 1952 fails to acknowledge the exclusive role of the Communist Party. Although the provisions of Article 72 have merely theoretical importance, as

665
642

642 [3] In fact, all component chapters of the Constitution proper—the Social Structure, the Supreme Organ of State Power, the Organs of State Administration, the Local Organs of State Power, the Courts and the Prosecutor's Office, the Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens, the Electoral System, the Arms, Flag and Capital of the Rumanian People's Republic and the Procedure for Amending the Constitution—have an equivalent in the Soviet Constitution. Indeed, some of the articles have been copied verbatim.

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

in practice no open opposition is permitted in Poland, they nevertheless "legalize" the existence of other political organizations. 665 642

The constitutional legalization of the Communist Party's exclusive control of state power in Rumania is based on the contention that with the complete eradication of the active opposition in the country the Party no longer needs to hide under the paraphernalia of tactical secrecy. The Party's "legal" control of the state apparatus is assured by its exclusive right to nominate candidates in the elections of deputies to the Grand National Assembly (Article 100). This control is further facilitated by the provisions of the new Electoral Law restricting the right of certain groups of people considered inimical to the regime to participate in the national elections. In this respect, the 1936 Constitution of the USSR (Article 135) is more liberal; it removed all discriminatory provisions—religious, economic, and political—formerly applied against non-Bolsheviks. This distinction is based on the supposition that, unlike the USSR, Rumania as well as the other popular republics, advanced as they are, are still in the presocialistic stage of development, which necessitates an incessant waging of the class-struggle against the "enemies of the working class."

Theoretically, the people exercise their power through duly elected organs, 642 the Grand National Assembly and the People's Councils. These, in turn, appoint the necessary administrative and judiciary bodies, the Presidium, the Council of Ministers, the higher echelon of the judiciary, and the Executive Committees of the People's Councils respectively. Though the constitutional theory of exclusive legislative power in the Grand National Assembly is constantly maintained, Soviet and satellite legislative history reveals the preponderance of the Council of Ministers. While the Council is formally appointed by, and theoretically subordinate to, the Grand National Assembly, its members in reality are chosen by the Central Committee of the United Workers' (Communist) Party from among its leading functionaries. The primary function of the Council of Ministers is to effectuate the policies of the Party through the vast bureaucratic apparatus it controls; that of the Grand National Assembly is the ratification of governmental decrees.

Justice in the People's Republic of Rumania, according to the new Constitution, is administered by the Supreme Court, the Regional Courts, the People's Courts, and the Special Courts. Their main function is the defense of the political regime and the protection of communal property and of the rights of citizens (Article 65). Unless otherwise provided for by law, all judicial cases are tried with the participation of people's assessors (Article 66). [642]

The supreme supervisory power over the observance of law by all central and local governmental organs of state power and administration as well as by all officials and citizens is vested in the Procurator General of the Rumanian People's Republic (Article 73). He is appointed by the Grand National Assembly for a term of five years, and he in turn, appoints his deputies and the procurators of the local units for a term of four years (Article 74). Whereas the organs of the Procurator's Office are independent of all local governmental 693 642

l: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 EDl Rumania EDl

693 agencies, being subordinate only to the Procurator General, the latter is
642 responsible to the Grand National Assembly, and in the interim between its sessions, to the Presidium (Article 75).

[671] The powers and functions of the Procurator General are specified by Law No. 6 of June 2, 1952, concerning the "Setting up and Organization of the Procuratura of the Rumanian People's Republic." The Procurator General has the right to take part, "with a consultative vote," in the meetings of the Presidium and of the Council of Ministers (Article 4). He is empowered to see to it that the decisions and rules issued by the central and local agencies of state power and administration conform with the laws of the country. Charged with the administration of justice, he supervises the activities of the agencies of penal investigation; he may ask for the dossier at any stage of the investigation, and has the right to "issue compulsory instructions with regard to the development of penal investigation and inquiry and to be present at any act of penal investigation or to carry it out himself" (Article 7, Paragraph a).

642 The Supreme Court, whose chief function is the supervision of the judicial activities of all the courts (Article 72), is elected by the Grand National As-
692 sembly for a term of five years (Paragraph 1 of Article 67). The judges, theoretically independent and subject only to the law (Article 70), and the people's assessors are elected in accordance with the provisions of a special law (Paragraph 2 of Article 67). All judicial proceedings are conducted in the Rumanian language, with special provisions for the use of other languages in areas inhabited by compact groups of other nationalities or minorities. Persons not knowing the language in which the judicial proceedings are conducted are constitutionally guaranteed the right to acquaint themselves with the material of the case and the privilege to use their own language in the summation of their case (Article 68).

Unlike the Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme Tribunal of the People's Republic of Rumania, like its Soviet counterpart, has no power of constitutional interpretation and is more of an auxiliary than an independent branch of government.

177. The constitutional provisions regarding the administration of justice, how-
69 ever "progressive" they may sound, conceal the true nature of the Marxist-
692 Leninist concept of justice, which has been adopted by the People's Republic of Rumania as well as by the other countries in the Soviet orbit. The modern principles of penal law (*"nullum crimen sine lege; nulla poena sine lege"*) applied and observed in all civilized countries, have been replaced by the concept of "class-justice." Marxist doctrinaires assert that the purpose of "proletarian class justice" is the maintenance of the regime of the dictatorship of the working class and the complete elimination of all "reactionary" and "anti-democratic" elements.

Although the principle of "class-justice" has not been embodied in the two Rumanian constitutions framed under the regime of popular democracy, it nevertheless has found clear expression in Law No. 5 passed by the Grand

175
195
[642]

church). The Romanian church has become independendent from this Patriarchy only as a result of a long and complex process which began when the independent Romanian State come into being in 1859 as "the United Romanian Principalities." The first constitution of the kingdom of Romania of 1866 stated (Article 21) that "the Romanian Orthodox Church is independent." But the recognition of its autocephaly by the Patriarchy of Constantinople was declared only in 1885. Nevertheless, the Romanian Church has continued to maintain its unity with the ecumenical church of the East. This relation was, however, confined to the purely religious aspect. The Romanian church considered to be its duty to consult Constantinople Patriarchy on difficult questions of dogmas, canons, and cults whenever it was necessary.

Thus, it may be observed that the independence of the Romanian church was a consequence of the political independence of the Romanian State. The independence of the church signified the achievements of the sovereignty of the Romanian people and the church organization rendered important help and support to the incipient state.

[793]

The Romanian clergy took part in the government administration and in political life. The clergymen could be elected to the parliaments and seats in some important governmental bodies were reserved to it. This was rather a consituation of the established tradition because in the past the representatives of the clergy had always been counsellors of the "domnitor" (the ruler) and members of the "Sfatul Tarii" (country's Assembly).

000 795 642 115 (the ruler) and members of the "Sfatul Tarii" (country's Assembly). In general, the Romanian Orthodox Church has been since the foundation of the "United Principalities" in 1859 considered the predominant church and had a prioity over other churches. This situation continued when the Kingdom of Romania was formed after 1866 (hereafter called Old Kingdom in contrast to Romania after 1919). Nevertheless, the religious practices of other churches were tolerated and undistrubed. The Romanian Orthodox [798] Church did not consider itself universal, was not animated by any spirit of proselytism and was rather passive and tolerant towards other creeds and rites. For this reason and because of the small number of persons professing other religions in the Kingdom of Romania, the situation did not call for any special legislation on freedom of religion prior to World War I.

II. From World War I to the End of World War II

1. General Regime of Churches

651 The necessity for special legislation regulating the status of churches other than the Romanian Orthodox has arisen after World War I.

175 671 The Romanian Kingdom emerged after World War I with an enlarged territory. The newly incorporated provinces were hitherto governed by different laws. Bulgarian law prevailed in Banat and Maramurosh, the same law with some specific provisions was also in force on Transylvania; Austrian law was

175 in force in Bukovina and the Russian law, with some specific
671 local rules, was in force in Bessarabia.

175 The population of the newly incorporated provinces was
162 predominantly Romanian but, in view of the long separation from the Old Kingdom, was somewhat different. Moreover, there were also other ethnological groups and a variety of churches and even sects.

The population of Transylvania and Banat, for instance, was divided mainly among the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches. The population of Bukovina and Maramuresh was either of Catholic (Uniates) or Orthodox religion and had an important Jewish minority. In Bessarabia, in addition to the Eastern Orthodox Church, there was a real conglomerate of creeds and and rites, many of them originating back in the 17th century and subsequent reforms of the Russian Orthodox Church.

659 A new Constitution was adopted in 1923. It declared
[642] the principle of freedom of religion which needed to be developed in details and put into effect by special laws. This did not follow immediately but, instead, the Romanian Government carried out, in 1925, the unification and hierarchical reorganization of the Romanian Orthodox Church (see <u>infra</u>).

This step increased the pressure of the numerous other churches and rites practiced within the new frontiers. They intervened seeing that their status be defined and that their relations with the higher church authorities abroad, as well as with the Romanian State and the Orthodox Church, be settled by

III. Churches under the Communist Regime

1. Basic Provisions

175
642

Although Romania has been ruled by Soviet Russia since its surrender in August 1944 and is actually governed by a Communist Cabinet appointed by Moscow in March 1945, the beginning of the Communist regime is set as of January 1, 1948, e. g., after the King's abdication and the creation of a People's Republic, since the main revolutionary social reforms have been enacted after that date.

648
798

Romania signed and ratified the Peace Treaty with the Allied Nations (Official Gazette No. 199 of August 30, 1947). According to clear stipulations of the treaty Romania is bound to translate into national legislation its main provisions and apply them strictly. Article 3 of the Peace Treaty reads:

> "Romania shall take all measures necessary to secure to all persons under Romanian jurisdiction, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship..." (Italics supplied.)

The freedom of religious worship was, therefore, considered as a fundamental one and the Romanian Government was supposed to make no discrimination between the different churches of rites of various denominations existent and practiced within its boundaries.

642
798

The first attempt to comply with these provisions was made through the new Romanian Constitution enacted on April 11, 1948.

642 Article 27 of this fundamental law reads as follows:

798

794

Article 27

Freedom of conscience and freedom of religious worship shall be guaranteed by the State.

Religious creeds shall be free to organize themselves and may freely function provided their ritual and practice are not contrary to the Constitution, public security and morality.

No religious denomination, congregation or community may open or maintain institutions for general education, but may only run special schools for training personnel necessary to the Cult under State control.

The Romanian Orthodox Church is autocephalous and unitary in its organization.

The way of organizing and functioning of the religious creeds will be established by law." (Italics supplied.)

Consequently, three main principles are to be retained:

a) The freedom of religious worship is guaranteed by the State;

b) The organizing and functioning of religious creeds is, with specified exceptions, free;

c) The various creeds are entitled to run special school for training their clergy.

However, these constitutional provisions do not reflect the true situation which will be brought to light only after the analysis of laws later enacted and analyzed in subsequent chapters.

2. The Regime of the Religious Denominations

A. General Survey

659 After World War II. the original law for the regulation of the religious creeds (No. 54 of 1928) suffered only one major

to the curricula approved by the government, an important place is given to three special subjects of "general education", viz., Constitution and law of the Romanian People's Republic, Russian language, and History of Russian Theology. 659 871 793

By the Order No. 42,898 (Official Gazette No. 226 of November 15, 1948) the curricula were approved for the divinity schools of the following denominations: Greek Orthodox, Protestant (including Evangelist, Reformed and Unitarian), Jewish, Baptist, Adventist and Moslems. No mention is made of any curricula for the Roman Catholic Divinity Schools. The same is true of the "Christian Church of Old Rite" but for a different reason (see infra).

3. Status of the Romanian Orthodox Church 659

No new general law on the Romanian Orthodox Church was enacted and it continues to be regulated by the provisions of the Law for the Organization and Unification of May 6, 1925, as amended, since 1947 (see infra). Yet, an interesting question seems to remain open; viz., is it still the dominant church in the State, e. g., the National Church or not? As it has been mentioned previously, the Organic Law of 1925 provided that, since the Greek Orthodox Creed is the religion of the majority of the Romanian people, the Romanian Orthodox Church is dominant in the country. The new amendments of the law of 1925 did not directly affect this provision. But this principle has been taken from the old Constitution of 1923 which, in Article 22, paragraph 4, specifically stressed its role as a 795

659 795 642

national church. The old Constitution has been repealed and replaced by the Constitution of April 11, 1948 and its Article 27, paragraph 4, provides only that "the Romanian Orthodox Church is autocephallous and unitary in its organization." Article 15 of Decree No. 177 of 1948 has similar provisions. However, no mention is made in the new regulation of religious creeds as it was done in the repealed Law No. 54 of 1928 that the Romanian Orthodox Church shall also be directed by its principles, provided they are not contrary to its organic law. 659 795 642

There are strong reasons to believe that the Romanian Orthodox Church is no longer considered a national church since such status is based on the text of an ordinary law which only implemented a constitutional provision no longer in force. According to the new Constitution and more recent legislation, it appears rather that the Orthodox Church is only one of the recognized denominations and is on an equal footing with the others. This treatment could be the result of the revival of the old Russian Church in Romania (infra) that would not accept a second-rank role in a satellite country. 659 795

The contradiction between the new constitution and the Law of 1925 may be explained by the fact that the present government did not yet come to revise all the laws in order to bring them in harmony with the new Constitution. Only the following amendments of the Law of 1925 were enacted thus far.

The Law No. 167 of May 30, 1947, changed the procedure in filling the vacancies in membership of the Diocesan Councils.

3: Roberts S-- (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 partly out of fear of Russian intervention, enjoined the peasants to shun violence and to continue working for the boyars.

Similarly, critics of conditions provoking the 1907 revolt show concern for Rumania's position as a nation. Radu Rosetti, for example, believed the threat of foreign intervention which such an outbreak might produce to be one of the most dangerous features of the peasant uprising. Despite his sympathy for the peasants and desire for reform, he pressed for a strong army and an increase in the village gendarmerie, to prevent a repetition of the disorders of 1907 and to show the peasants that the law would be enforced.[27] The socialist Dobrogeanu-Gherea, approaching the question from a different point of view, was equally anxious to maintain Rumania's independence. Fearing that the many similarities between Rumania and tsarist Russia might lead the latter to "regard the Moldo-Wallachian provinces as an easy prey," [28] he urged that Rumania must be protected from tsarist advances by the introduction and preservation of liberal institutions, completely unlike those of Russia. The populist Constantin Stere flatly stated that Rumania could not afford the "luxury of a revolutionary party," since in Rumania's uncertain position such activity invited foreign intervention.[29]

Consequently, although many economic and social tensions disturbed Rumania, and it was obvious that the boyars would not on their own initiative undertake any reforms likely to change the established order, there was little organized revolutionary activity or even revolutionary thinking. On the other hand, the prevalent sense of national insecurity also made the ruling groups more cautious in the exercise of power. King Carol I, a German prince who had been called to the throne in 1866, could not pretend to be an autocratic tsar. On more than one occasion the king, for reasons of national interest, advocated reform and undertook to soften the obstinacy of the boyars, who were likewise sensitive to real pressure from above or below and frequently showed themselves accommodating and flexible when threatened with serious resistance.

•642 Rumania's weak power position led many of its political leaders to seek both political and ideological support from the West. Western political and constitutional forms were adopted wholesale: the Constitution of 1866 was based on Belgium's model, the legal system was taken from the Code Napoléon. Imitation of Western institutions had two different and contrary results. On one level, many

27. Rosetti, *op. cit.*, p. 668.

28. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

29. Constantin Stere, "Socialdemocratism sau poporanism," *Viaţa romînească* (January, 1908), p. 50.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

642 of these institutions naturally became mere façades to conceal a much cruder reality. Party politics, for example, bore a very superficial re-
665 semblance to those of nineteenth-century England: two principal parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, alternated in office. But the reality behind this two-party system was altogether different. Politics were based on a very narrow franchise,[30] the parties themselves tended to be coteries surrounding a dominant personality or family, and there were constant factions and party splits. Both the Conservatives and the Liberals obtained their support from the landowners, the principal distinction between them being that the Conservatives were usually the explicit spokesmen of the large agrarian interests, whereas the Liberals were increasingly interested in making Rumania a strong modern (i.e., commercial and industrial) state and held the controlling positions in the growing financial institutions.

671 In the field of law the Rumanians demonstrated what Dobrogeanu-Gherea correctly called a "mania for legislation." A flood of laws was
177 continually being passed—elegantly rendered by men who had taken their law course at Paris—but with remarkably little effect. Some were inapplicable at the outset, few were administered properly, and most were soon forgotten by all concerned, with no effort made to examine their consequences. Other examples could be cited from the fields of public finance, civil rights, and the press to illustrate the abyss lying between political and constitutional forms and actual practice. The persistence of this dualism right up to the 1940's has undoubtedly had a corrupting effect upon Rumanian politics and society.

566 Notwithstanding these contradictions, which have struck all for-
177 eign observers in the past century, the very introduction of Western paraphernalia had certain important positive effects. A peasant who had been inducted, under universal conscription, into the army, who could read in the press (or have read to him) about agrarian disturbances in Sicily, Ireland, or Russia, or who heard the charges and countercharges of the political parties, however rhetorical these may have been—such a peasant was moving out of the closed circle of the village. This is evidenced in the active role played by ex-army ser-
185 geants, clerks, and schoolteachers in the 1907 uprising. Moreover, the mere existence of constitutional and legal devices, however in-
177 operative they may have been, provided potential channels for change and increased the flexibility of the existing order. Thus, in spite of the fact that changes were apt to prove illusory rather than real,

30. A system of electoral colleges, rather like that of Prussia before 1918, assured a preponderant strength in the assembly to the landowners and the wealthy urban groups.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

565 665 inhabitants, they had remained a field for partisan skirmishes among the different factions of the boyars and the growing financial and industrial interests. The limited ambit of politics was not, however, altogether the responsibility of the boyars, though most of them certainly cannot be charged with equalitarian leanings.

829 ●642 621 Much has been written in Rumania on the primitive state of the peasant, his inability to govern himself, and the necessity for his gradual, supervised initiation into the mysteries of government. While such writings often conceal an *arrière pensée*, they contain one element of truth: the economic role of the peasant, as a relatively self-contained and self-sufficient producer, does confine the orbit of his interests to his village. This limitation of interests has nothing to do with any shortcomings on the part of the peasant, but merely means that his economic and social life does not extend into many of the fields which comprise the necessary activities of modern governments. The immediate and obvious wishes of the peasant—such as more land, more lenient credit, and lower taxes—cannot be the satisfactory basis of a political program unless they can be related to some means of realizing them. The possibility of their direct and immediate fulfillment in Rumania was limited; the indirect measures which could ultimately improve his status—the over-all increase of the nation's productivity and capital—involved questions quite beyond his understanding as a peasant, if not as an individual.

565 In all states there is a gap between the desires of the average voter and the complexities of economic and administrative activity; in Rumania this gap was accentuated by the fact that almost four-fifths of the population was of the peasantry. Moreover, since such a large percentage of the population was devoted to one occupation, there was relatively little scope for the diversified play of economic and social interests in politics such as characterizes a more advanced society. Rumanian writers, regretting the division of their society between a formless mass of peasants and an oligarchic ruling group, have perennially pined for the emergence of a middle class. During the interwar period the base for political activity broadened somewhat through increasing industrialization, through the growth of a more numerous middle peasantry, and through strong regional interests in the new provinces, but the great bulk of the electorate was still the poor peasantry, whose chief historical means of declaring its wishes had been in sporadic and unsuccessful uprisings.

660 Partly for these reasons the extension of the suffrage after the First World War did not lead to political democracy. Politics, which retained a distinctly Phanariot flavor, was the art of taking advan-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

In March, 1922, the Liberals made an election in which they con- 665
trived to win 260 seats, as against 17 in the 1920 elections (Gen- 175
eral Averescu's party dropped to 11 seats). The opposition parties challenged the validity of the elections and withdrew from parliament.

A sharp controversy arose over the coronation of King Ferdinand on October 15, 1922. The opposition parties contended that the coronation should be sponsored by a coalition of all parties. Despite the fact that the coronation was held in the Transylvanian town of Alba Iulia to celebrate the unity of all Rumanian lands, the Transylvanian National party boycotted the ceremony.[8]

When the Liberals called for the March, 1922, elections they an- 642
nounced that one of the main tasks of the new assembly would be the preparation of a new constitution. Following the coronation, they proceeded to push through this act in the session opening in November. The legality of such a one-party procedure was denied by the opposition as contrary to the guarantees of autonomy in the original contracts made between the representative bodies of the new territories and the government of the Old Kingdom.[9] The opposition parties temporarily attended the parliamentary debates on the constitution, but the tumultuous sessions did not block its passage in March, 1923.

The 1923 Constitution was based on that of 1866, which it followed in many respects.[10] Because of the acquisition of such extensive new territories, a new constitutional document was deemed necessary. The following are some of its more controversial points:[11]

8. It is illustrative of the antagonism created by the centralizing policy of the Liberals that none of the chief figures responsible for the union of the new provinces with the Old Kingdom was present at the Coronation.

9. The arbitrary action of the Liberals was particularly resented in Transylvania, where the National party was undoubtedly the strongest political group. The regional autonomy of the province had already been infringed upon when General Averescu quite illegally abolished the Transylvanian Consiliu Dirigent in 1920.

10. The 1866 Constitution, closely patterned after the Belgian model, had been significantly amended on three occasions before 1923: 1) In 1879, in accordance with the stipulations of the Congress of Berlin, religious beliefs were removed as an obstacle to naturalization. This amendment was introduced to prevent the exclusion of Jews from citizenship. 2) In 1884 the number of electoral colleges for the chamber was reduced from four to three, thus broadening the franchise somewhat for the benefit of the growing urban middle class. 3) In 1914 the Liberals initiated measures for electoral and agrarian reforms. This work, which was delayed by the war, was carried out by the constitutional assembly in Iaşi in 1917. Article 19 was amended to permit land expropriation for purposes of agrarian reform; Articles 57 and 67 established universal suffrage and proportional representation for the chamber.

11. For a French translation of the text with commentary see F. R. and P. Dareste, *Les Constitutions modernes* (4th ed., 6 vols., Paris, 1928–34), II, 855 ff.; for a bibliography of Rumanian commentaries, *ibid.*, III, 223–226. An examination of some of its shortcomings was made by David Mitrany, "The New Rumanian Constitution," *The*

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

642

1) The first article ("The Kingdom of Rumania is a unitary and indivisible state") set the key for the centralist tendency of the constitution, which showed little evidence of the respect for local autonomy demanded by the new provinces.

2) Universal suffrage was limited to males. Article 6 stated that special laws would determine the conditions under which women could exercise political rights, but women did not receive the franchise for national elections until 1946.

3) The usual civil and political liberties were assured, but in many instances the assurances were qualified in such a manner as to permit their infringement, either by reference to state security or to special laws to be passed subsequently. For example, the right of association was guaranteed in Article 29, but the right of association did not imply the right to create legal entities. The conditions under which legal personality could be established were laid down in a separate law. In practice this severely limited the value of association, especially in trade union activities.[12]

4) Rural property could be owned only by Rumanian citizens (Article 18). Subsoil resources belonged to the state (Article 19). The latter article occasioned a great deal of foreign criticism as an example of the Liberals' economic xenophobia; it was also attacked by the peasant representatives as a means of defrauding the owner of land.

5) All power, according to the constitution, was derived from the nation through its delegates. The national assembly was bicameral: a senate and a chamber, the members of which were elected for a term of four years. All legislation had to pass both bodies. The chamber was elected by universal male suffrage, but the senate was composed of elected members and members by right. Senators were elected by citizens over forty years of age and by various professional bodies (municipal councils, chambers of commerce and agriculture, universities, etc.). Senators by right included: the heir to the throne, high church dignitaries, former presidents of the Council of Ministers, certain former senators and deputies who had served long terms, presidents of the supreme court of cassation, certain high military officers, and former presidents of the provincial national assemblies which had preceded the union.

Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, 3d Ser., 6, P. 1 (February, 1924), 110–119.

12. See the article by the International Labor Office, *Freedom of Association, Vol. IV: Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, Bulgaria, Rumania*, Studies and Reports, Ser. A: Industrial Relations, No. 31 (Geneva, 1928), pp. 376–388.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

6) District and local councils had both elected members and members introduced by the national assembly. The ratio of the two types of members was not fixed (in the original draft of the new constitution, appointed members were limited to one-fifth the total) and permitted an indeterminate amount of central control over local councils. 642

7) The powers of the crown, while confined to those enunciated in the constitution, were considerable and included the right to summon, prorogue, and dissolve the assembly, appoint and dismiss ministers, and sanction or veto laws. In many constitutional monarchies the crown has similar powers, which are formalized or limited by custom; in Rumania the crust of tradition was quite thin and the crown was actually in a position to exert a great deal of influence.

8) "In case of danger to the state, martial law, partial or general, may be established by means of a bill" (Article 128).

In summary, the constitution was relatively brief (138 articles), vague on many points, and left important details to be determined by subsequent laws. There were a number of loopholes whereby civil rights guarantees could be evaded and arbitrary executive action imposed. To be sure, in most constitutions qualifying clauses recognize the state's right to take exceptional measures for its own preservation, but whereas these exceptional measures are usually understood to be applicable only in cases of emergency, the situation in Rumania was such as to make exceptional measures—arrests without warrant, violation of privacy of correspondence, and prolonged states of siege—more or less standard practice. The omissions and evasions in the Rumanian constitution were of less importance than the spirit in which the document was interpreted.

Although the opposition parties hotly attacked the Liberals, denounced the new constitution, and boycotted the assembly, they were by no means united in their actions or purposes; in 1924 and 1925 there was a frequent regrouping of party alignments. The most important question was the course to be taken by the National party of Transylvania. All parties desired to gain the support of this well-organized body; since it had been formed as a regional Rumanian party in opposition to the Magyars, rather than on a social basis, its position in the political system of united Rumania was somewhat ambiguous. In 1920 General Averescu had tried without success to gain its adherence; when Brătianu came to power in 1922 he offered Maniu three portfolios in the cabinet but Maniu refused the offer. 175 665

In June, 1924, it was announced that the National party of Transylvania and the Peasant party had officially united, but shortly

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

were faced with a dilemma, partly of their own making. In the narrow 665
political life of the Old Kingdom, with its restricted franchise and small ruling class, the Liberals had been most successful in retaining power for the greater part of Rumania's independent existence; with the Conservatives as a foil they were even able to appear as the supporter of progressive forces, and did indeed attract a number of peasant leaders and socialists into their ranks.

With the agrarian reform, however, and the appearance of a new electorate under universal suffrage, their situation became less comfortable. It was not that they were driven to the Right—on the whole their attitude showed a marked consistency—but that their actual policy now appeared in more obvious contrast to their theoretical principles. After the agrarian reform they could no longer pose as opponents to the boyars; they became quite clearly the advocates of industry as opposed to agriculture. Since the great majority of the population were peasants, universal suffrage was bound to produce mass parties opposed to the financial and industrial domination of the Liberals, whose only defense was a perversion of the electoral process. Under these circumstances, it is rather surprising that the Liberals should have been the agents for the introduction of both the agrarian reform and universal suffrage. Two explanations may be offered. In the first place, the Liberals' initiative in these matters was by no means as great as they proclaimed it to be. They were intelligent enough to see which way the wind was blowing and realized that an attempt to block electoral and agrarian reform would merely produce a violent social upheaval. Their initiative was largely in adapting themselves to the course of events. At the same time, a close examination of their action shows that they attempted to avoid the full implications of these reforms. Their dilatory tactics in the history of the agrarian reform have already been described. The same evasiveness is apparent in their electoral policy.

In 1913 Ion I. C. Brătianu did come out for electoral reform, but 665
his intention seems to have been the unification of all electors in one 666
college rather than three, not universal suffrage. The franchise ap- 642 ●
parently would have been limited to literates, which would have excluded the greater part of the peasantry. In 1914, according to Mihalache,[27] Constantin Brătianu, third brother of Ion I. C. Brătianu and leader of the Liberals in the last decade, declared universal suffrage to be an aberration. The 1917 amendment, passed under the pressure of social unrest, provided for "proportional" representation. The Constitution of 1923 omitted this term, and the electoral law

27. Mihalache, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 of 1926 introduced the system of the majority party premium. In
666 these developments, as Mr. Mitrany has observed, one can detect a
642 "subtle reactionary alchemy."

665 On the other hand, the Liberals' agrarian and electoral policy may not have been altogether opportunistic. There is ample reason to believe that they really regarded western European society as a model for Rumania. Many of them had been trained in Paris and in their personal lives they strove to be as Western as possible. Hence, they probably quite honestly felt that ultimately the western European peasant cultivator who enjoyed the franchise should find his replica in Rumania. Unfortunately, this goal had little to do with present Rumanian realities, and the Liberals were confronted with the alternative of Balkanizing their Western ideals or of being overthrown by them. They chose the former course.

The disparity between liberal theory and Liberal party practices in the post-1918 period appears clearly in a lecture on the "Liberal Doctrine" delivered in 1923 by I. G. Duca, who later became leader of the party on the death of Vintilă Brătianu.[28] After taking pains to refute the prevalent belief that between Rumanian parties there were only differences of persons and ambitions, not of conceptions and doctrines, Duca defined the Liberal credo in the following formula: "Progress in all forms but within the framework of the concept of individual property." Progress, however, could be realized only "through order, through democracy, through nationalism, and through social harmony." By order he meant the avoidance of anarchy, not the absence of change. He defined democracy as government of the people, by the people, and for the people, and in antithesis to demagogy. While opposing excessive or exclusive nationalism, he held that progress was possible only through the developments of national forces; economic nationalism expressed the instinct of self-preservation and was a means "to safeguard the material individuality of each nationality, to prevent its destruction by elements superior in strength or in organization." Collaboration with foreign powers or even with foreign capital was not excluded but it should be on terms which corresponded with national interests. He regarded social harmony as a necessary counterbalance to the doctrine of class struggle.

Duca then went on to show that liberalism was not a rigid doctrine, but had adapted itself to changing circumstances. It had abandoned the classical idea of property as sacred and inviolable and had accepted the principle of property as a social function, allowing for such measures as expropriation and the nationalization of the subsoil. In the field of political economy Rumanian liberalism had

[28] I. G. Duca, "Doctrina Liberală," *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, pp. 103–110.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 Iron Guard 16 per cent, and the National Christian party (the fu-
665 sion of Goga's and Cuza's nationalist, anti-Semitic parties) 9 per cent. Rumania's curious electoral system had broken down. The Liberals' failure was clearly a loss of confidence. The National Peasants or the Iron Guard seemed the most likely alternatives.

At this point, however, Carol moved in and on December 28, 1937, called upon the Transylvanian poet and lyrical fascist, Octavian Goga, to form a cabinet. Carol's own explanation of this surprising decision, which was in fact the immediate prelude to his personal dictatorship, was that he had no alternative. He could not bring back the Liberals; he did not want the Iron Guard in power, so his only move was to spike the guns of the extreme Right by putting in another but less dynamic Rightist party. There was, of course, another solution: to have called in the National Peasants, but the personal feud between Carol and Maniu precluded that course. There is no evidence, however, that Carol was at all reluctant to take power into his own hands.

Goga was installed with a rather heterogeneous cabinet including Gen. Ion Antonescu and three runaways from the National Peasants, chief of whom was Armand Calinescu. This government had a brief and hectic career, notable chiefly for arousing foreign protests because of its anti-Jewish activities but for little else. On February 10 Carol ended the farce, dismissed Goga, and set up a government of National Union under the Patriarch Miron Cristea, including an assortment of old worthies: Averescu, Vaida Voevod, General Vaitoianu, Mironescu, Iorga, Tătărescu, Argetoianu, Calinescu, and General Antonescu. It was a strange collection when one considers Carol's advocacy of the "younger generation." The period of explicit royal dictatorship had started.

Economic and Agrarian Policy

● 642 If the drift toward a royal dictatorship was induced by the victories of fascism throughout Europe and by the political conflict within Rumania itself, a third reason was the economic policy pursued after the depression. While much of the dictatorial paraphernalia of these years may be attributed to Carol's personal tastes or to the political desirability of making use of the nationalist and fascist sentiments of the times, a quite separate impulse toward an authoritarian, corporatist society was contained in the economic policy of neo-liberalism.

159 Perhaps the clearest illustration of this impulse is to be found

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

page 206

X

THE CAROLIST PERIOD: DICTATORSHIP, 1938–40

Survey of Political Events

42 WITH the advent of Carol's personal dictatorship, Rumania's parliamentary government came to an end. The particular party alignments of 1937 and the interplay of personal ambitions and conflicts may have determined the time and to some extent the form of the dictatorship, but the social and economic situation more than paved the way. The fact that Carol could reassert and indeed vastly expand the powers of the monarch on the ground of defending his people against the depredations of politicians illustrates the difficulty of creating a healthy representative regime in a country such as Rumania, where the bulk of the electorate are poverty-stricken peasants who have always been separated by a gulf from their rulers. The only constitutionally minded party which claimed to voice the sentiments of the peasantry, the National Peasant party, proved completely unable to master the situation. In the latter years of the 1930's it had only two alternatives if it was to regain its position: either to outplay the dictatorial movements in rough-and-tumble tactics, which its scruples forbade it from doing, or to recover the massive support which had carried it to power in 1928. It seemed incapable of achieving the latter and its 1937 campaign showed little of the zeal formerly displayed. Some of its most promising younger men, Calinescu, Ghelmegeanu, and Ralea, deserted to the king.

The Carol dictatorship was not merely a relapse into old practices; it was also an advance to a new authoritarian regime. In this it showed the political implications of a policy of forced industrialization in an agrarian society with great social and economic inequalities. If the relation between Carol's dictatorship and the expansion of heavy industry is not as inevitable as the Marxists would have it, it is, nonetheless, not difficult to see that such industrialization when directed from above by a handful of men would be conducive not merely to the perversion of democracy, as in the case of the old Liberals, but to its replacement by an explicit dictatorship. In this respect the advent of Carol's dictatorship is intimately bound to the

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

agrarian problem, which in its broadest sense is the reverse side of 642 the question of industrialization.

On the other hand, the tortuous history of Carol's last three years 661 as king is of less interest here. Internally, it was the confused un- 642 raveling of the peculiar relations between Carol and the Iron Guard, a vicious if ambiguous struggle between two dictatorial movements. Externally, it was the attempt to ride out the rapidly mounting tempest of the Second World War. Carol, who had mastered the internal situation, was ultimately destroyed by outside events. So while the tumultuous events of the years 1938 to 1940 are of the greatest importance to Rumanian history in general, their relevance to the agrarian question is largely external. Unlike the fall of the Liberals in 1928, the collapse of the peasantist *esprit*, and the creation of a dictatorial regime, all of which are causally related to the agrarian question, Carol's fall was a political and diplomatic rather than an economic transition.

Immediately after removing the Goga cabinet and installing under martial law his new Government of National Union, Carol moved rapidly to create his new order. He abolished the 1923 Constitution and on February 20 promulgated a new corporatist constitution, subsequently ratified by a farcical popular referendum. The new constitution greatly augmented the king's powers, dwarfed the role of the legislative bodies, and did away with the party system. Ministers were selected by and responsible solely to the king and had to be of Rumanian nationality for at least three generations. The franchise was limited to citizens over thirty who practiced either agriculture or manual labor, industry or commerce, or intellectual activity; a corporatist concept of the voter replaced universal suffrage. The spirit of organic nationalism pervaded the whole document, stressed the responsibilities of the individual Rumanian to the nation, and circumscribed guarantees of civil rights and liberties. The economic and social outlook of the constitution is shown in Article 7, whereby no Rumanian could advocate by word or letter any changes in the form of the government (all constitutional amendments had to be initiated by the king), the division or distribution of property, exemption from taxes, or class hatred.

At the same time that Carol unseated the old parties by destroying their constitutional base, he attacked the Iron Guard, and in 1938 and 1939 directed an increasingly violent suppression of its formations. The Guard was outlawed, Codreanu was arrested, tried, and imprisoned. In November, 1938, he and thirteen of his followers were shot "while attempting to escape." In September, 1939, the Prime

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

661 Minister, Armand Calinescu, the strongest man in the Carol dic-
642 tatorship and the executor of the campaign against the Guard, was assassinated. His death was followed by murderous mass reprisals against the Legionaries. Carol seemed to be thoroughly the master of his country.[1]

In place of the disbanded parties he concocted in December, 1938, a single body, the Front of National Rebirth. Through 1938 and 1939 he added the various regalia associated with a corporatist state, but there is little evidence that anyone took these trappings seriously. Administrative and political corruption, always healthy plants in Rumania, blossomed in full splendor in these years; public ethics hit a new low.

648 Meanwhile, however, the international situation was closing in and
642 here Carol was caught, as it proved, in a hopeless dilemma. While throughout the 1930's the Rumanian state took on an increasing resemblance to the fascism of the Axis powers, and men of the extreme Right advocated a pro-Axis foreign policy, Rumania, with its interest in maintaining the Versailles system—the guarantor of its territorial integrity—could not be really happy in Axis company. Regardless of internal political developments, and Carol himself repeatedly stressed the difference between internal and external policy, Rumania had strong reason to rely on the Western powers. Germany, however, was clearly in the ascent and the Western powers were pursuing the policy of appeasement. With the collapse of Czechoslovakia after the Munich Conference the Little Entente broke down. In November, 1938, Carol visited both London and Berchtesgaden in an effort to maintain his balance.

The great blow to Rumania's position came with the Soviet-German pact of August, 1939, which forecast common action between the two

1. It is impossible to attempt here to clear up the obscurities in the struggle between Carol and the Iron Guard. Numerous interpretations have been made, of which two might be mentioned. The British correspondent, A. L. Easterman, in his book *King Carol, Hitler, and Lupescu* (London, 1942), was of the opinion that in assuming the dictatorship Carol was fighting fire with fire, that he was really anti-Guardist and anti-German. Under this interpretation he was attempting to preserve Rumania from German advances, and his fight against the Guardists, who are regarded as simple German tools, was a part of this national defense. A more complex interpretation is provided by the Rumanian Communist Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu in *Sous trois dictatures*. Briefly, his thesis is that Carol had given secret support to the Guard on his road to the dictatorship, as a means of destroying the bourgeois-democratic parties, but had turned against it because of the potential social ferment it engendered and because the Guard was explicitly pro-Axis, whereas Carol was attempting to play a noncommittal game. Pătrăşcanu attributed the increasing violence of the measures employed by Carol against the Guard to the simple fact that having set up a dictatorship himself Carol had no weapon against another dictatorial movement except crude police repression.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

great powers of eastern Europe, both of which were interested in revising the Versailles system. By the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement, the Reich recognized the Soviet Union's interest in Bessarabia.[2] 648 642

When war came, Rumania remained neutral, although the German control over the economy, which will be discussed presently, grew steadily. With the fall of France in the summer of 1940 and the disappearance of any hope of effective support from the West, Rumania was left with three unattractive alternatives: isolated neutrality, rapprochement with the U.S.S.R., or entering the German camp. Carol chose the latter course.[3] The corporate state was replaced by a totalitarian regime with the creation of the Party of the Nation, which included the Iron Guard and to which all government and business officials were obliged to belong. Horia Sima, the new leader of the Guard, came into the government.

After the Soviet ultimatum of June 26, resulting in the loss of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, Rumania renounced the Franco-British guarantees, and the active pro-Germans, Gigurtu and Manoilescu, were installed as Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The new direction was accompanied by zealous efforts to emulate the Axis powers through increased anti-Semitic and anti-British measures. The loss of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina set loose other revisionist claims, and at the end of August, under German and Italian auspices, Rumania lost Southern Dobrogea to Bulgaria and Northern Transylvania to Hungary.

At this point Carol's policy of isolating and breaking up the political parties turned against him, and he found himself altogether without support in face of national indignation that a third of the nation's territory had been given up without a sign of resistance. As an eleventh hour prop for his regime he called in, on September 4, General Antonescu, who had been in disgrace for his association with the Guard. Antonescu forced Carol to renounce his dictatorial powers 642

2. Paragraph 3 of the Secret Additional Protocol to the Nonaggression Treaty of August 23, 1939, stated: "With regard to South-eastern Europe, attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterestedness in these areas." U.S. Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941* (Washington, 1948), p. 78.

3. According to ex-Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu, Carol's decision was taken at a crown council meeting on May 29, 1940. *Prelude to the Russian Campaign*, trans. E. Fletcher-Allen (London, 1945), pp. 282–285. Such a decision is not surprising. Neutrality would have saved little except honor. The U.S.S.R. had been indicating, rather obliquely, the desirability of a revision in Bessarabia, and with the fall of France was determined to move quickly. The chances of a Rumanian-Soviet rapprochement were nil. On the other hand, German influence had increased steadily since the fall of Czechoslovakia.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

642 and a couple of days later, with the agreement of Maniu and Constantin Brătianu, demanded his abdication. Carol fled the country, with Mme Lupescu and Colonel Urdareanu, the core of his camerilla. For Rumania, however, the absurd result was that popular indignation over the loss of Transylvania at the hands of the Axis merely placed in power an ardently pro-Axis government which immediately recognized the Vienna Decree.

Economic and Agrarian Policy

175 In the economic sphere the years of the Carolist dictatorship show four important characteristics:

1) a continued emphasis upon industrialization;

2) a reaction against small peasant agriculture and a growing agricultural paternalism;

3) increasing regimentation of the economy, both for economic planning and for military preparedness;

4) the growing dominance of Germany in Rumanian economic life.

The policy of industrialization which had got under way after the depression continued its course of expansion under the dictatorship, with the additional stimulus of the menace of war. After the outbreak of war the restriction of trade channels and raw material imports reduced industrial production somewhat. The loss of territory in 1940 produced, of course, a general dislocation of the economy. Industrial policy, however, was merely the culmination of the whole trend of the Carolist regime.

In the field of agrarian policy there was a noticeable reaction against small peasant holdings and renewed talk of creating a middle peasantry. As has been seen, the policy of all Rumanian governments on this question has been confused and contradictory. The National Peasants in 1929, by relaxing regulations for the transfer of peasant property, had hoped to create more prosperous and self-sustaining holdings, but their action had rather the effect of dispossessing the small peasant. On the other hand, the debt conversions of 1932–34 had the opposite effect and in a negative way were, as Garoflid called them, a new peasant resettlement in that they limited the effect of the economic crisis in weeding out the weaker peasants. The Tătărescu government had attempted to colonize relatively underpopulated areas with medium holdings and by the law of 1937 had tried, ineffectually, to check the subdivision of land.

642 654 Under the Carol dictatorship somewhat more extensive measures

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

were initiated, at least on paper. The 1938 Constitution, by prohibiting any public discussion of redistribution of property, showed the regime's attitude toward further expropriation as a remedy to the agrarian question. During the interwar years the governments were accustomed to state that large estates had virtually disappeared through the reforms of 1918–21, but after 1938 increased attention was paid to medium and large properties.[4] In the law of December 5, 1938 (amended January 7, 1939) the government established a Bank for the Industrialization and Valorization of Agricultural Products (BINAG), one of the recurrent efforts to provide agricultural credit. It is to be noted, however, that by Article 6 of this law the main credit functions of this bank applied only to farms of over 5 hectares, thus overlooking the majority of the peasantry.[5]

The spirit of the regime is well shown in an article by the agricultural economist Valeriu Bulgariu,[6] who announced that King Carol, "the first farmer in the land," had plans to change completely the existing conditions in agriculture by a twofold effort to organize small farming on rational lines and to encourage owners of medium-sized estates to increase the area of their holdings.

> When the great land division took place after the war, the agrarian reform went too far. . . . It assigned land to a very large number of villagers, and as a result subsequent successive divisions had increased the excessive subdivision of land. Reaction was necessary, and to-day economists and sociologists are in favor of the concentration of scattered property, a policy adopted by the government and all its agents.[7]

The desirability of concentrating peasant holdings was no new discovery, and Carol's regime for all its new direction was not a bit more successful than previous regimes in doing anything about it. The policy of creating larger holdings, also no novelty, was faced as always by the difficulty of creating them without dispossessing peasants in the process. According to Bulgariu,

4. See, for example, Aureliu Lapedatu's article, "A Technical Study in Rumanian Cereals," *Correspondance économique roumaine* (April–June, 1938), pp. 1–28, in which the author discussed the manifest advantages of the large Rumanian farms in the use of technical equipment for rational cultivation.

5. The same thing is to be seen in the case of the cooperatives. According to A. Galan, "General Survey of the Co-operative Movement in Rumania," *Correspondance économique roumaine* (January–May, 1939), pp. 1–65, in 1939 one farmer in three was affiliated with one of the several agricultural cooperatives. Unquestionably the other two-thirds included the poorer peasants.

6. Valeriu Bulgariu, "Agrarian Policy in Rumania," *The Banker*, 49 (March, 1939), 344–348.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 346.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

men's Front, which had absorbed the dissident National Peasants to become a united peasant party; the National Popular party, which dissolved itself a year later on the grounds that the intellectuals and representatives of the middle class supporting this artificial organization should henceforth work within the cadres of the "mass parties"; and the Hungarian Popular party, controlled by the Communists but presumably designed to represent the Hungarian minority. On March 28 this bloc conducted and won elections, against a wholly spurious opposition, for a new assembly to vote on the constitution. 668

The Constitution of 1948 closely resembled the 1947 Constitution of the Bulgarian People's Republic and was clearly derived from and inspired by the Soviet Constitution of 1936. Apart from the fact that the latter is concerned with the union of a number of constituent republics, the principal differences reflect the transitional character of the so-called popular democracy. The People's Republic is defined as arising from the struggle against fascism, reaction, and imperialism rather than from the overthrow of landlords and capitalists. Private property is still recognized as one form of ownership of the means of production, though it is circumscribed by the "general interest" and subject to expropriation and nationalization. The Communist party does not have the preeminent status it enjoys in the U.S.S.R. As in the Soviet constitution stress is laid upon the right to work, to have leisure, and to receive an education; civil liberties, freedom of the press and of speech are guaranteed, but clearly for proletarian purposes; the right of association may not be directed against the democratic order established by the constitution. The supreme organ of the state is the unicameral Grand National Assembly, headed by a Presidium; the executive branch of the government is the Council of Ministers.[14] 642

Since the adoption of the constitution there have been few important structural changes in the government but rather a consolidation of the regime, the reorganization of the administration and the army (which apparently now exceeds treaty limits), and a running fight to eliminate the remnants of political opposition and to subdue sporadic uprisings brought about by the extensive new economic activities. A series of well-advertised public trials continued through 1948 and 1949, against Liberals, industrialists, military officers, students, Catholic and Uniate clergy, and Zionists, all categories that might cause the regime trouble or embarrassment. The new legal apparatus, including the addition of "people's assessors" to assure 661 642

14. For a recent study of constitutional developments within the Soviet sphere, see Andrew Gyorgy, *Governments of Danubian Europe* (New York, 1949).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

661 proletarian justice and the introduction of the death penalty for treason, espionage, and economic sabotage, proved an efficient weapon
● 642 in this attack. The creation, announced in January, 1949, of People's Councils as the organs of local government was to provide the basic
[647] unit for the administrative hierarchy and to pave the way to a socialist society. In September, 1949, a State Control Commission was formed "to develop the spirit of responsibility toward public property, to wipe out bureaucracy, to verify the carrying out of government decrees, and to prevent sabotage in the work of building socialism." Avram Bunaciu, Pătrăşcanu's tougher successor at the Ministry of Justice, became head of this commission, which promised to be a very formidable instrument.

642 Along with the consolidation and coordination of the political and administrative apparatus came a marked shift in the party line from what it had been at the end of the war. The original program sought a government friendly to the U.S.S.R. and in which the workers' front would operate in coalition with middle-class parties. After 1947 not only the fact but even the pretense of collaboration was dropped. At the end of that year Gheorghiu-Dej said,

> The resignation of Tătărescu and his group means the removal of the last representatives of the reactionary bourgeoisie from the government; it means that the proletariat and its allies no longer share state power with the representatives of the exploiting classes. . . . The proletarian vanguard, in close alliance with the peasants and the progressive intelligentsia, is the backbone of the government.[15]

By 1949 the People's Democracy was explicitly defined as fulfilling the functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was distinguished from the Soviet form because it was possible, through the assistance of the U.S.S.R., to establish the dictatorship without civil war. In the People's Democracy, unlike the Soviet, the old state apparatus was not immediately smashed; bourgeois elements were retained for a time.

> But only with the establishment of People's Councils—local organs of state power built on broad democratic lines—will the new state apparatus be created, corresponding from top to bottom in every way with the aims and tasks of the new state and adjusted to the tasks of building Socialism. . . . The establishment of the People's Councils signifies

15. *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy* (January 1, 1948). (Published in Belgrade until December, 1948; subsequently in Bucarest.)

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

642

that in form the People's Democracy is approaching the higher form of the dictatorship of the proletariat—the Soviet form.[16]

Vasile Luca even read this view into the earlier tactics of the party, stating that in 1944 the Rumanian Communists had realized that the only road forward was the one mapped by the October revolution: "There was no third path, and there can not be one." [17]

Hence by the beginning of 1950 the Rumanian government was openly recognized as a proletarian dictatorship, well on the way to the Soviet form and in full pursuit of socialism. It might seem from these statements that this program had been planned all along; certainly Georgescu and Luca, in their current stress upon the regime's revolutionary origins, sought to give that impression. Yet there is evidence that this renewed Leftist line of international communism was causing some confusion in the cadres.

For example, an article appearing in 1949 in a Hungarian Communist periodical pronounced the same general line, which is that of all eastern European Communist parties today, but in greater detail.[18] The new People's Democracy was identified with the dictatorship of the proletariat; this identity did not exist at first but was created in the course of a developing struggle, first against fascism and big business but later against all capitalist elements including the rich peasantry. The article was frank in granting that this advance was rendered possible through the initiative and continuing aid of the Soviet Union.

Significantly, however, it went on to say that the Hungarian party did not have a clear view of all this until it received clarification from the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the Cominform in the autumn of 1947 and the summer of 1948. As a consequence, the party membership had fallen into a number of errors: it was inclined to forget that the People's Democracy was really more than just a plebeian variety of bourgeois democracy; it stressed the differences rather than the similarities between the Soviet system and the People's Democracy; it believed that the transition to socialism could be made without the dictatorship of the proletariat, or, if not, that the dic-

16. *Ibid.* (June 1, 1949).

17. *Ibid.* (November 4, 1949). In this same vein Luca proceeded to congratulate the party for wrecking all the coalition cabinets after August, 1944: "Before March 6, 1945 not a single government had been able to consolidate itself. The pressure of the masses led by the Communist Party and the work of the Communist Ministers inside the government brought about the fall of all these governments."

18. This article was translated into English and appears as "The Character of a 'People's Democracy,'" *Foreign Affairs, 28,* No. 1 (October, 1949), 143–152.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

642 tatorship would follow the People's Democracy and was not contained within its form; it believed that power might be shared with the peasants.

But what, it should be asked, was the source of these errors? Surely not an independent, uninformed, "soft" mood on the part of the Hungarian party. The hard line now enunciated was no new discovery; it was the familiar revolutionary message all Communists had been brought up on. Quite obviously all these mistakes were likewise, at an earlier date, the official line emanating from Moscow in support of popular fronts, and while it may be that the Moscow leadership never really subscribed to this line, the article itself would indicate that party membership had been sufficiently indoctrinated in the more moderate tactic that it was now necessary to make a special effort to redirect its views. Given the tight coordination of all Communist parties in the Soviet sphere, there is no reason to doubt that this interpretation also applies to the Rumanian case.

648 On the international level, Rumania's relations deteriorated steadily after 1946; the American and British governments repeatedly wrote notes of protest against the violation of Allied agreements and the peace treaty; the Rumanian government responded sharply with charges of American imperialism and espionage. In 1949 the issue of the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Rumanian violation of human rights was brought before the General Assembly of the United Nations, which recorded its disapproval of the completely uncooperative attitude displayed by these states and resolved to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice for definition and clarification.[19] It was not clear by the end of the year that this action could achieve any important results under existing circumstances.

Since the creation in 1947 of the Cominform, which signalized the return to a hard line, and especially with the transfer of its headquarters to Rumania after the break with Tito, Bucarest has become one of the principal centers of international communism. At the same time the country has been increasingly isolated from the Western world. In April, 1949, even diplomatic representatives were prohibited from traveling in the Banat, Bucovina, Moldavia, or Dobrogea.

It is idle to speculate whether or when Rumania will enter the Soviet Union as a member republic, although rumors anticipating that event have not been lacking in the last two years. It would appear to be a question of relatively little practical importance, since the U.S.S.R.

19. United Nations, *Official Records of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly. Resolutions, 20 September–10 December 1949* (Lake Success, N.Y.).

still abroad, was summarily dismissed. Peasant risings, a movement for autonomy in Transylvania, and general instability led to the nomination of General Averescu to office, owing to the reputation he enjoyed of being a strong man, having taken an active part in suppressing the peasant rising of 1907.

General Averescu's government passed the enactment dealing with the distribution of land to the peasants, while his Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Take Jonescu, laid the foundation of the Little Entente by concluding alliances with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. General Averescu attempted to open pourparlers with Russia, so as to prepare the recognition of Rumania's right to Bessarabia, and there was a fair chance of his succeeding, but he was baulked of his aim, for the King vetoed his plan.

To M. Titulescu was assigned the task of reorganizing the country's finances. This was deemed to be an intrusion into the special domain of the Bratianus[1] and so by provoking their hostility, brought about Averescu's downfall. M. Take Jonescu was his successor, but he was able to maintain himself in office only for a month. A government constituted by the Bratianu party followed in January, 1922, and remained in power until March, 1926. Owing to the disunion among the Opposition groups the Bratianu party was allowed to carry into effect its nefarious project of securing complete control of the economic resources of Rumania. The whole legislation passed during its tenure of office was of a purely economic character, and under the pretext of consolidating the finances of the country they merely consolidated their own financial dominance.

Popular dissatisfaction was steadily growing in the meanwhile, as instead of relieving the money stringency, the economic policy of the government did nothing but intensify the evil from which the country was suffering. On the other hand the Opposition was closing its ranks and organizing mass demonstrations throughout the country. A monster meeting of peasants was held at Alba-Julia in May, 1925, followed up by vigorous onslaughts against the government. The latter, unable to obtain a foreign loan which would have enabled it to stabilize the currency and relieve

[1] [The Liberal Party, headed by John Bratianu.—Annotat.]

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

The elections which followed in May, 1926, were among the 666 most violent which had been witnessed in Rumania. Though 661 the Averescu group had secured the support of the Magyars, Germans, Jews, Bulgarians and Turks by holding out to them the most alluring promises, it in no way felt secure, and therefore had recourse to extensive terrorist methods. Most Opposition leaders were arrested. Opposition leaders like Maniu and Vaida-Voevod were prevented from holding meetings. Mihalache was set upon by gendarmes and beaten at his home at Topoloveni. The Bessarabian leaders, Stere and Halippa, while travelling to Bessarabia were ignominiously thrown out of their train at Floresti, placed under an escort of gendarmes and conveyed on foot to Cetatea-Alba, a distance of 300 kilometers, despite the fact that they were both in a poor state of health at the time. The army and gendarmerie were mobilized and ordered to see to it that Rumanian citizens did their duty (such as it was conceived to be by the government of H.M. King Ferdinand of Rumania). One of the manifestos issued and distributed broadcast by army air-planes at the time read:—"If you trust in the King then you must trust in his government." As for the way royalty in Rumania conceived its duty of 643 guarding the letter and spirit of the Constitution, one may 666 judge by the fact that the King, aware of the violence to be committed, and knowing that as the supreme arbiter in the country he would be besought from all sides to intervene and put a stop to it, could think of nothing better than to elude his responsibilities by betaking himself to his yacht, and cruising on the Danube for a whole week so as not to be importuned by the complaints of his liege subjects!

In spite of the unprecedented violence employed the 666 government obtained only 54% of the total votes cast, but it must be remembered that this percentage included almost the whole of the votes cast by the minorities.

For some time Averescu meekly followed the lead of 642 Bratianu. He surprised nobody, however, when he began 661 to show manifest signs of insubordination, but to no avail.

For the Liberals, knowing the shifty customer with whom they were dealing, had taken their precautions. During their four years of office they had bestowed on most of the

661 state administrations a certain degree of autonomy which,
[642] effectively amputated the central government of many of its prerogatives, and having filled these administrations with their own partisans they still exerted an influence which could, if necessary, paralyse the governments destined to succeed them in office.

In his electoral manifestoes, Averescu had held out to the Rumanians the most seductive inducements, among others that of a flow of foreign capital into the country. Time passed, however, and so, without any sign of an impending materialization of these assurances, the public began to chafe and inveigh against him. The resentment which the Liberals had aroused against themselves was thus deftly diverted on to the heads of their successors. This result having been duly effected, the Liberals emerged from the seclusion they had hitherto voluntarily imposed on themselves, and now appeared on the scene in the guise of indispensable factors for the restoration of the order and legality so grievously compromised by their incompetent henchman! The King was induced to demand General Averescu to form a coalition Ministry, but after a fruitless effort he was summarily dismissed and replaced by Prince Stirbey, who a fortnight later retired, making way for a Bratianu Government, so that the transition might not appear too brusque.

643 King Ferdinand died in July, 1927, and as the crown passed to his grandson, Michael, a boy of six, a Regency Council was nominated. Ferdinand's son, the notorious Prince Carol, had been excluded from the throne owing to Ferdinand's conviction that Rumania's prestige would suffer if a person with Carol's record became King. A similar opinion seems to have been held by our Foreign Office, for when Prince Carol came over to England in 1925 he received a polite but firm request to leave our shores.

665 Unhappily for the Liberals, their leader, John Bratianu, died suddenly in November, 1927. His was a strong willed and dominating personality, capable, but not over scrupulous in the choice of methods. The leadership then passed to his brother, who until then had been Minister of Finance.

665 The rising storm of popular exasperation caused by the
652 financial policy of the Liberal party, which had brought the

671 preparing a system of regional decentralization which would largely have satisfied the desires of the minorities.

662 Having to rely upon an inefficient administrative staff, with the various autonomous State departments still filled with supporters of the Opposition, and the latter hampering and undermining the government's attempt to clear up the mess in which the country had been left, it was hardly possible to expect that the government of M. Maniu could effect the miraculous change that was expected of it. In order to counteract the underhand machinations of its Liberal opponents, who did not scruple even to sap its credit 642 abroad by circulating scurrilous attacks on it among foreign 643 banking institutions, while at home they brought pressure 661 to bear on the Regency (which had been elected at their dictation) to create irritating hindrances to the smooth working of the government's plans, the latter at last allowed itself to be won over to what at the time was a fairly popular view, namely that of permitting the former Crown Prince Carol to return and ascend the throne. His advent was reckoned as likely to strengthen the hands of the Government, for he shared with the National Peasant Party the hostility of the Bratianus. Carol II, however, after his accession to the throne on June 8th, 1930, began to manifest a distinct predilection for autocratic measures. He arbitrarily removed from his post the able Rumanian Minister in Paris, M. Diamandi, a man who had distinguished himself for years by his devoted and brilliant service to his country, and nominated a personal friend whose sole qualification for this important diplomatic post was that he was a racing man. He estranged both M. M. Maniu and Vaida-Voevod by unconstitutionally interfering in the government, and thereby provoked the resignation of both. As he did not yet feel himself strong enough to dissolve the Chamber he allowed the National Peasant Party to form another Cabinet with M. Mironescu at its head, but he imposed on them as colleague an outsider in the person of M. Manoilescu, another personal friend of his. An attempt was made to form a Coalition Cabinet to be presided over by M. Titulescu, but as this failed the Mironescu Cabinet was tolerated for a time because it was conducting negotiations for a loan, and a premature

disclosure of the impending adoption of a dictatoral régime 642 might have influenced them adversely. Once the loan was 643 obtained, and when it was deemed that the favour with 66 which the National Peasant Party was regarded had somewhat subsided, owing to the unpopular budget measures it had adopted, M. Mironescu was forced to resign, and death having removed in the meantime the most determined adversary of the King, M. Vintila Bratianu, the former now proceeded to unfold his plan of action.

M. Titulescu was once more summoned to Bucarest and asked to form a broad Coalition Cabinet; but as the National Peasant Party refused to lend its support to a cabinet which would have contained two royal favourites, Manoilescu and Argentoianu, M. Titulescu wisely abandoned the task and returned to London.

The next step of Carol was an attempt to follow the nefarious example of his brother-in-law, the Serbian monarch, and form a military cabinet, but the Spanish revolution which broke out at the time induced him hastily to alter his plans.

M. Argentoianu, who had in the meantime become the 645 favourite adviser of the King, opted for the dissolution of the Chamber and the formation of a cabinet of "technical" experts to shore up the tottering framework; himself to occupy the two most important posts, those of the Ministry of Finances and of the Interior. The technical capacities of M. Argentoianu are of peculiarly sinister character, judging from what former colleagues of his have to say of his activities. Thus General Averescu, in whose cabinet he held the post of Minister of Finances ad-interim, accuses him of unconstitutionally squandering £1,500,000, of thereby defrauding the State, and rendering himself liable to penalties provided in Art. 326 of the Rumanian penal code, as well as in Art. 3 of the law regarding ministerial responsibilities—infractions that had been established by the Judicial authorities in 1923, if we are to trust General Averescu's affirmations as they were published and reproduced in a series of articles in all the principal Bucarest newspapers during January, 1932. Another ex-Finance Minister, M. Virgil Madgearu, on whose integrity we may rely, likewise

645 accuses him of having caused a loss of 90 million lei to the State in 1921, and further affirms that Argentoianu never offered a satisfactory explanation of the reasons which led him to operate so disadvantageously to the interests of the State, though he had been interpellated several times on the subject in the Chamber. We may surmise, therefore, that the technical capacities of M. Argentoianu, who enjoys the reputation of being an arch cynic, were somewhat deficient from the moral point of view, and in order to compensate for this shortcoming the respectable personality of Prof. Iorga, upon whom the dignity of Prime Minister was foisted, was made use of to complete the Cabinet. We may take it for granted that Prof. Iorga, who is a distinguished historian and man of letters, was, like Plato's model ruler, least eager to rule, for he was engaged in an occupation better than ruling, and led a life finer than that of those wielding authority. But his duty to his former royal pupil, as he conceived it, compelled him to quit his life of contemplation and return to work for the general good in what, according to Plato, is the 'cave.' Prof. Iorga, doubtless, must have lost sight to some extent of the difference between the perfect State, which is unattainable, and the good State which is a present possibility, as expounded respectively in the "Republic" and the "Laws." Otherwise, he would have halted before returning to the darkness of the cave. His presence would have been desirable in such conditions as prevail in the unattainable and ideal perfect State, but such would not be those obtaining in a State with the present possibilities of Rumania.

642 645 It is to this confusion of ideas, as well as to the evident desire to exert even a limited restraining influence on his sovereign, that we must have recourse in order to explain Prof. Iorga's consent to read a royal decree dissolving Parliament and ordering new elections to be held in June, 1931.[1]

[1] In an interview published by the "Echo de Paris," June 29th, 1930, Professor Iorga stated, amongst other things, that "whenever the party spirit overruled the spirit of patriotism he would be found by the side of the King, in order to defend the supreme interests of the nation." Professor Iorga's attachment to the throne is explicable by his traditionalism. As a historian he sees, in his sovereign, the lineal descendant of Stephen the Great, or of Michael the Brave. A non-Rumanian, however, may be dispensed from taking such a view, and excused if he does not hold a very high opinion of a scion of the Hohenzollerns who promulgates rascally laws defrauding the unwary foreign investor and trader.

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

A very unfavourable impression was created by the dismissal of the Chamber controlled by the National Peasant Party, the only standard-bearer of democracy in the country. It is probable that the electorate would have reacted with more spirit if the people had not foreseen that the thwarting of the royal will would have entailed the abolition of even the semblance of a Parliamentary system, and the proclamation of a pure dictatorship. Though not to an overwhelming extent, violence and illegality were pretty freely employed, to judge from the cases reported in the Press, yet in spite of all these artifices and the mass abstention of its opponents the elements supporting the Iorga-Argentoianu Coalition secured only 48% of the total votes cast; a very meagre performance indeed if it be remembered that even the Liberal party figured among its supporters.

That the Iorga-Argentoianu Cabinet did not fulfil the hopes placed in it by the King became obvious when he again summoned M. Titulescu, early in 1932, to Bucarest, and asked him to form a broad coalition cabinet. No real coalition cabinet truly representative of the national will could be formed without the inclusion of the National Peasant Party, and the leaders of the latter, when sounded, replied in a truly dignified manner that so long as constitutional methods were not observed they would abstain from participation. M. Titulescu gave up the mission and once more returned to his ambassadorial duties in London. Even those who by their votes helped the Cabinet to install itself in office seemed to have turned against it, for during a sitting of the Rumanian Senate on December 5th, 1931, M. Pillat, belonging to the Liberal party, delivered the following trenchant criticism on the Cabinet: "When you came to power you had promised three principal things: 1st, reduction of the Budget and a lightening of taxation through economies; 2nd, a redressing of the financial and economic situation and of the agrarian crisis; 3rd, penalties for all abuses. But what has been realised? The policy of feigned economies has not stopped the practice of dissipation, aggravated by fresh injustices. In a time of such poverty you have not only maintained old sinecurist in office but you have created even new ones. Favourites of other régimes who exert cumulative

665 Bratianu, the inspirer of that rabid xenophobia to which may be ascribed the major part of the woes from which the country is suffering to-day. On his death, the conduct of the party was entrusted to M. Duca, but there is a small dissident fraction of the party which is led by M. George 665 Bratianu. The split was due to the fact that the majority of 642 the party was opposed to the return of the present King Carol II, and to their taking up an altogether intransigent attitude on the subject which was considered impolitic by M. G. Bratianu. After M. Vintila Bratianu's death, however, the party's relations with the Crown considerably improved, and it even went so far as to lend its concourse to the election and maintenance in power of the Iorga-Argentoianu Cabinet in order to emphasize its determination to maintain good relations with the King. It changed its tactics as regards the Government after the latter had been in office for a year, and opened a violent campaign aiming at its overthrow, as it considers that this régime is causing much harm to the country, and apprehends that it may be succeeded by yet other political combinations enjoying royal favour, thus perpetuating a system which would tend towards the elimination of political parties from participation in the government of the country.

Speeches made by M. M. Duca and Tatarascu, a prominent member of the party, at a political meeting held at Braila on May 15th, 1932, give a clear indication of the attitude of the party. It was explained at this meeting that the support extended to the Iorga-Argentoianu government was due to the desire to avoid all difficulties to the king, and allow the latter to carry on the experience he wished to initiate without embarrassment. After a year's trial, however, it became obvious that it was imperative to remove this Government which was bringing disaster to the country, to change the methods and system of government, and to revert to constitutional practice.

665 *The National Peasant Party.*—The agrarian reform which had been carried out on the conclusion of the peace led to the emergence of an agrarian political party of ultra-radical tendencies. It formed, however, an amorphous mass that required the demagogic activities of a leader such as the late

665 published in the "Cuvantul" of May 29th, 1927, in which it
563 was reported that the ecclesisatical authorities of Bucovina as well as those of Jassy had refused to collaborate with M. Cuza, because he had converted the club-house of his party at Jassy into a brothel. The paper proceeded to give various unsavoury, as well as pungent, details of the regulations prevailing in this "Christian" League club—regulations, which, according to the "Cuvantul" had been drafted by M. Cuza himself, to the immense benefit of the institution and its "pensionnaires." According to this paper this document serves as a striking testimonial to the organizing capacity possessed by this . . . . gentleman. M. Cuza has been elected as a deputy and early in October, 1931, he delivered a violent diatribe against the League of Nations; a very inconsiderate proceeding seeing that Rumania's salvation may well depend on the League and the aid of international finance.

THE ETHNIC MINORITIES AND THEIR GRIEVANCES

563 Rumania shares with Czechoslovakia and Esthonia the distinction of treating her ethnic minorities with a spirit of tolerance that speaks much in favour of the Rumanian people, who, as most impartial observers will admit, are distinguished by their kindliness and good humour. Most of the complaints one hears of, and they are numerous, arise mainly from the general maladministration from which all sections of the community suffer, and for this reason it is not the Hungarians, nor the Germans, nor the Bulgarians of the Dobrudja who are most vociferous in their lamentations, but strange to say, the Rumanians of Bessarabia. A whole book could easily be written on their tribulations, and as their woes are representative in an intensified form of those endured by other sections of the community, it may be judicious to dwell on them rather than on grievances specifically formulated by Magyars or Bulgarians, as one will thus avoid the imputation of partiality for the latter.

563 Without wishing to cast any disparaging reflections on
642 Rumania one cannot help deploring the failure to take

regional differences into account. The persistent endeavour 642
to create a strong centralization has been accompanied by 563
parallel attempts to choke all natural expression of local life, contributing thereby to the drying up of the springs of national vitality and instilling in the mass of the people a spirit of apathy or of scarcely disguised hostility. Had the reverse policy been adopted, there is little doubt that the various provinces would have fostered local institutions on their own lines, and would have given a better structure to the whole system of administration by providing it with a backbone of local interest and control which it otherwise will continue to lack. At any rate it becomes daily more obvious that the decision taken at Versailles to transfer high-cultured communities completely out of harmony with Rumanian methods to Rumanian rule, without securing for them a certain degree of autonomy, was particularly unfelicitous for their members.

Whenever general elections are impending, the ethnic 66
minorities are solicited by the various Rumanian parties for
their votes, in exchange for which they secure assurances 563
that their aspirations will be completely satisfied. The election over, however, these alluring promises are forgotten, as are also similar electoral pledges made to Rumanian electors. If the hopes of the ethnic minorities were not elated every now and then by such extravagant engagements they would feel less keenly the injustice that had been inflicted on them. As matters stand, Rumanian parliamentary candidates at election time serve to keep this wound open, which, with a little more skilful handling on their part, would have had a better chance of healing.

The main grounds for complaints in the case of Hungarians 563
and Germans is the subject of their language. They find that a too exclusive use of the Rumanian tongue is insisted on in the various administrations as well as in the Tribunals, and that their children do not enjoy the same facilities to pursue their studies in their vernacular as when Transylvania formed a part of Hungary. All this is true, but it cannot be gainsaid that the Hungarian and German minorities are infinitely better off than is the German minority in the Italian

000 letting in the flow of the great body of people to the offices of government.

642 668 But there are those of course who mistrust democracy and who would prefer to seek renovation by other methods. Corruption among the political parties in Serbia prepared the way to the dictatorship. A similar trend has been discernible lately in Rumania, and among the exponents of despotism we find university professors such as M. Paul Negulescu. In his "Treatise of Rumanian administrative law," the second volume of which appeared late in 1930, we read that "most of the politicians being incompetent, and occupying high posts thanks to party influence, sympathize with men of similar mentalities, and look askance at men of independent character. . . . By the intervention of politicians in the administration its personnel is demoralized, as also by the creation of sinecures for party friends." The author proceeds to demonstrate that the authority of the State is compromised by such habits and indicates as a remedy . . . . a Government appointed by the King and responsible solely to him.

Political corruption brings grist to the fascist mill, scandals and incompetence are adduced as justifying the adoption of another system of government. The following article, which appeared in the "Epoca" for Oct. 24th, 1930, a newspaper with conservative traditions, reveals how gravely the system of parliamentary government has been undermined by the dishonest practices of Rumanian politicians :—"The task of reconstruction was incontestably easier for Rumania than for other States. First, owing to the similarity of race, language and religion in the annexed provinces, and secondly, owing to the immense resources possessed by our country.

Thanks to odious and dishonest party politics we have lived through an era of continuous descent into wretchedness more and more acute. Every party that has acceded to office has left behind it an abyss of hopelessness and of ever increasing poverty, empty State coffers, and a growing disgust in the mind of the taxpayer. Political persons speculating on the naivity of the masses have accumulated colossal fortunes which have been placed in safety beyond the danger of possible judicial revisions. This country, blessed in all by the Lord, which ought to have been the most prosperous

corner of Europe, has been allowed to become the prey of 642
odious vampires, who have sucked everything dry and have 668
even robbed us of our hope of possible salvation. Nevertheless, Providence hath granted the return of our long expected King," etc.

One is justified in expressing doubts as to the expediency 641
of applying fascist methods in Rumania as one fails to per- 565
ceive the dominating personality who might control and 661
direct such a policy; one may also ask, where are the indispensable coadjutors to be recruited from? It can hardly be said of King Carol that he has been able to live down his unfortunate reputation so as to assume with some hope of success such a formidable task. As for his likely collaborators who, presumedly, are to be selected from among the Rumanian ruling circles, one need only peruse the posthumous memoirs of the late Rumanian Prime Minister, Marghiloman, in order to be convinced of the utter abjectness of this class. M. Pamfil Seicaru, who may be likened to the late Henry Labouchere of "Truth" for his fearless criticisms, when writing on the boundless vista of putridity disclosed by this compilation, stigmatized in the "Cuvantul" of July 17th, 1927, in the following scathing terms the leading circles of his country:—"These memoirs form a vast archive concerning turpitudes of a whole ruling class . . . the majority of this class which remained in the territory occupied by the enemy openly practised with him . . . while those in Moldavia offered a spectacle of the most trying moral bankruptcy. A parliament of speculating fugitives revealing a criminal insensibility in face of the tragedy of a whole country; one cannot imagine a more sinister divorce between a ruling class and a nation in arms. . . . And who amongst them can indict the others for their subversion of the national ideal? Can the aristocratic fugitive fragment which took refuge in Moldavia or Russia claim to represent a higher standard of morality than the section which remained in the occupied territory meekly to serve the enemy? They both form two aspects of the same filth."

As recently as May 6th, 1932, Octavian Goga, an ex- 565
Minister and presently in intimate relation with the King, 641
who publicly brags of being the successor designate of Prof.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p. 71

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL HISTORY, 1919–39

The crushing defeats which the Rumanians suffered 727
at the hands of the German and Bulgarian armies in 1917, and the provisions of the Treaty of Bucarest, had left the country in a state of utter helplessness and confusion. The only 'compensation' was the annexation of Bessarabia. But in the autumn of 1918, after the collapse of the German, Bulgarian and Austrian fronts in the Balkans and the advance of Allied troops, Rumania re-entered the war. The pro-German government was dismissed and the Francophile leader of the Liberal Party, I. Bratianu, became Prime Minister.

At about the same time the Austro-Hungarian 642
Empire began to disintegrate. Following the 727
example of other minorities, the Rumanians of Transylvania and Hungary formed a National Assembly which, at its session on 1 December 1918 at Alba Julia, voted for the union of Transylvania and the Banat with the Old Kingdom. Among the members of the Directive Council of Transylvania, under the presidency of the peasant leader Maniu, were many politicians who afterwards played a prominent part in Rumanian public life.

The retreat of the German army of occupation 727
from Rumania, which took with it everything it could lay hands on, and the collapse of Austria-Hungary opened a period of great confusion. The former subject-peoples of the Dual Monarchy asserted their national independence while the

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

The new government at once introduced measures which had become familiar in Germany and Italy. All democratic papers and organizations were suppressed, anti-Semitic laws were carried out without delay and the government's storm-troopers ruled the country. In the meantime the Iron Guard gathered strength and prepared to take power. The king recognized the threatening danger, dismissed Goga after only forty-five days, installed the patriarch Miron Cristea as Prime Minister of a government of 'national concentration' and announced a new constitution on the Fascist model. 642 643

All political parties were dissolved and their property confiscated. Representation was to be 'corporative', that is, according to social status, and the age of the franchise raised from 21 to 30. The king, with an advisory Crown Council, had all executive power. This so-called constitution was put to an open and verbal vote and was naturally accepted.[1] The new single-party, the 'Front of National Renaissance', became the only recognized political organization whose membership was obligatory for all officials.

The king's victory seemed complete. The democratic forces were routed and the whole administration was firmly in his hands. The army and a section of the industrialists supported this new regime, which promised them increased powers and incomes. Codreanu, whose many assassinations had been left unpunished, was imprisoned after being found guilty in a libel action.

[1] Only about five thousand people dared to vote against this constitution in February 1938. Maniu demonstrated his protest by leaving the country before polling-day and returning shortly after.

[Lie: Government of 'National Christian Front' of 1937--Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

643 668 648 he had played off one political party against the other in order to strengthen his position. In foreign politics he followed the same tactics. He ended by completely isolating Rumania internationally and undermining her internally.

It may be said in extenuation of his inglorious behaviour, that the dismemberment of Greater Rumania was inevitable, once the whole balance of power had shifted against the Western Allies, whose settlement had created it. But it is at least equally tenable that a democratic and united Rumania, which had succeeded in winning the loyalty of any considerable elements among its minorities, might have held out against the cession of territory to Hungary, by obliging the Hungarians and Germans to use force to effect it at a time when Hitler was anxious to avoid war in the Danubian area. This might have rallied Rumania with Yugoslavia and Greece, who showed a more heroic spirit, to the Allies' camp. In fact, the king's policy only aggravated the internal situation and sharpened the conflict of parties.

642 661 **RUMANIA GOES TO WAR.** General I. Antonescu, having obtained Carol's abdication, pronounced himself 'Conducator', that is, 'Leader', and proclaimed the creation of the 'Legionary State'. His government was composed of generals, leaders of the Iron Guard and civil servants. Codreanu's successor, Horia Sima, became vice-premier and at once organized an unprecedented regime of terror throughout the whole of Rumania. His henchmen assassinated numerous prominent opponents of the Iron Guard. The looting of shops and the beating

[Sept 6, 1940 -- Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

up of Jews became the favourite occupation of the 661
legionaries. The resulting confusion helped many 642
minor officials as well as influential business men in
acquiring valuable property.

But it soon became obvious that the real masters 648
of Rumania were the Germans. In October 1940 642
Antonescu invited German troops into the country
as instructors for the Rumanian Army. German 669
trade delegations began organizing Rumania's economy and German specialists were appointed to important positions in various ministries. Although Antonescu had included the Iron Guard in his government, the struggle for power between him and Horia Sima continued. In January 1941 the Iron Guard, supporting the latter, made a last bid. The legionaries rose in revolt and succeeded in gaining several strong positions in Bucarest and in some provincial towns. The army, however, sided with Antonescu, who was also aided by the Germans, and within a short time the 'Conducator' emerged as victor. He at once proceeded to the establishment of a completely military administration and based his whole regime on the army.

His[1] success in the fight against the Iron Guard 721
was influenced decisively by the German desire to create a stable Rumanian government which would join in the attack on the Soviet Union. Antonescu did not fail his German masters. On 22 June 1941 Rumanian troops, together with German divisions,
crossed the Soviet frontier. Thanks to German 721
support, Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina 727
were re-occupied within a short time. Both provinces were put under a military administration and ruled quite separately from the rest of Rumania.

[1] [i.e. Antonescu -- Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

Crimea and Kharkov in 1941. But they became 721
alarming when the Red Army began the great counter-offensive in the Caucasus and at Stalingrad, where five Rumanian divisions under General Lascar were wiped out or put out of action. In May 1943 Antonescu said the Rumanian losses were 500,000, referring apparently to killed and prisoners only. Since then the great German retreat has probably caused many more Rumanian losses. During 1943 the government's action in sending Rumanian troops beyond the old frontier was repeatedly condemned by the leaders of the opposition—Peasants and Liberals. The Minister of War answered these objections by saying, 'It is lucky for us that the war is so far away. If we had to fight so powerful an opponent on the Dniester or the Pruth, all Rumania would be ruins.' But within a year the avenging fate had not rested on the Pruth.

OPPRESSION AND EXPLOITATION. The effects of 661
Antonescu's dictatorial regime showed themselves in 642
all spheres of Rumanian life. Politically the country was ruled by the army generals and in all other fields by Rumanian and German big business. Military administrators replaced local government in the provinces and the towns. The Rumanian industrialists and bankers found it very profitable to work for the German war economy. Their political enemies were liquidated or driven under-ground. In the economic field their exploitation of the people and of the country's resources was only limited by Germany's interests.

Both the political and the economic life of 000

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe

Bulgaria EE1
Rumania ED1

B
697
466

There is an austere puritanical fanaticism about the regulations which is difficult for an American, inured to doing what he pleases, to comprehend.

Virtually all potential foes of the Communist regime in Bulgaria have been sent to such camps, which means that any person who deviates in the slightest degree from the established Communist norm invites the public prosecutor to get on with incarcerating him. It is difficult to believe that the system is as far-flung and well established as it is; but the Communist authorities themselves have made available a substantial amount of information on its extent. There are at least thirty slave-labor camps in Bulgaria, and it has been estimated that at least 500,000 persons have been confined in them during the seven years of Communist rule. Among the inmates have been whole families—men, women, and children. Before we condemn the Bulgarian Churches for cowardly behavior it may be well to ask what we ourselves might have done in the circumstances.

162]

II

R
648
642
669]

Rumania was not fully subordinated to the Communist Party until the close of 1947. On the eve of the invasion of the country, which had been the only one to lend full support to the Nazi cause, young King Michael overthrew the Iron Front government and its strong man, General Antonescu, by a *coup d'état*. The new Government, in which a general also served as Premier, accepted the terms of armistice. Nevertheless by March 6, 1945, the Communists were unmistakably in control, although a fellow traveler, Dr. Petru Groza, was selected to head a government in which they had the upper hand. At the Potsdam Conference the United States, Great Britain, and Russia agreed to sign a treaty of peace with Rumania as soon as a government should be formed which was "broadly repre-

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania ED1

sentative of all democratic elements of the population." Later, 648
at the Moscow Conference, the Western powers declared that 642
they would believe such a government existed as soon as representatives of two political parties other than the Rumanian 666
Workers' Party had been named to ministerial posts, and as soon as satisfactory guarantees had been given that freedom of speech and assembly as well as the right to vote without constraint had been assured. Dr. Groza complied by appointing the two desired ministers to the Cabinet without portfolio and by announcing that free elections would be held soon; but, as was to be anticipated in view of the fact that the Russian Army held the country in an iron grip, the Rumanian Workers' Party received 90-odd per cent of the vote. The ministers without portfolio promptly resigned, and there was nothing the Western powers could do about it save to register an emphatic protest. This they did in language suitably designed for the occasion.

The elections referred to were held on November 19, 1946. [687]
Almost precisely a year later the leader of the principal opposition party, Dr. Juliu Maniu, was sentenced to life imprisonment for high treason. Unquestionably this able and farsighted man, who had served the government and the people of Rumania well over many years and had been identified with every movement for reform and justice, was the foremost of the nation's citizens. King Michael abdicated on December 30 of [642]
the same year and fled from his native land. Thereupon the "People's Republic" was proclaimed, and every source of potential opposition to it was ferreted out and suppressed. A Constitution of the usual kind was adopted on April 13, 1948.
Now no obstacle barred the way for putting the Soviet paradise [497]
plan into effect. The principal productive enterprises were declared the property of the State, and this likewise became the sole arbiter of the educational system. Collective farming was introduced. A novelty was that new elections were held during

000 The typical articles by Communist leaders provide statistical material appropriate to the various circumstances, but whether they are signed by Signor Togliatti, M. Duclos, President Bierut, Herr Ulbricht or Mme. Ana Pauker they employ the standard vocabulary and are of standard cut. What might be called the ceremonial articles—marking anniversaries, hailing Stalin on his divine birthday, claiming this or that achievement of science or culture for Russia—are uniformly couched in a language of such vulgarity, turgidity, repetitiousness and monotony that they almost surely must emanate from a single brain. Possibly, of course, they merely reveal a uniform barrenness of thought and poverty of expression in Communist literary circles everywhere. If not, the central brain in Bucharest seems to be exhausted after executing so many changes of direction, doubling back so often on past tracks, discovering so many old enemies to be friends and firing the old epithets against so many old friends suddenly discovered to be enemies.

As I read through copies of *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!* for chance statements of interest or indications of shifts of emphasis in the Party line I find myself wondering what would be thought of them by some master polemicist like Bukharin, Radek or another of the old professionals with a subtle mind, a knowledge of history and a feeling for human psychology. What would they have thought of this wearying succession of hammering adjectives as a method of conveying the power and sincerity of a great revolutionary purpose to the far parts of the earth? Certainly it is a convenience for us who fight that purpose that every great pen of the Russian revolution has been stilled by time or Stalin's hangmen.

727 642 The independence which Rumania was supposed to have regained when the Red Army occupied the country in August 1944 was formally guaranteed by the Declaration on Liberated Europe adopted by Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill at Yalta. The same instrument guaranteed the Rumanian people their domestic liberties, including the right to choose their own government. But hardly were the "Big Three" back in their capitals from the Crimea before that independence and those freedoms were clearly jeopardized by the appearance of a Communist-dominated minority government in Bucharest. The manner in which this was accomplished

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania ED1

was as significant as the result. The Soviet Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Vyshinsky, simply flew down to Bucharest from Moscow on February 27, 1945, and gave King Michael the necessary orders. By Vyshinsky's direction the King ignored the representatives of the two largest political organizations in the country, the National Peasant Party headed by Iuliu Maniu and the National Liberal Party headed by Dinu Bratianu, and entrusted power to the man of Vyshinsky's choice, Petru Groza. The United States and Great Britain protested. Informed of the painful impression which his interference in Rumanian domestic politics had created in Western capitals, Vyshinsky commented only: "Let the sparrows twitter."

727
642

Public opinion in the West was not well informed about this development, or indeed about current developments in any of the areas which came under the occupation of the Red Army. Few Western newspapermen were on the spot in Rumania or Bulgaria, and those who were had limited means of communication. So far as American public opinion was concerned, the State Department did not consider it wise, on the eve of the San Francisco Conference, to release the reports of highhanded Soviet actions which it was receiving from those countries. The hope was that when Soviet Russia had assumed her official place in world councils she would become responsive to world opinion and begin behaving like a responsible member of international society. It was considered inadvisable to exacerbate Stalin's feelings by too violent complaints of the farce being made of his Yalta promises at the very moment he was sending Molotov, Gromyko and Sobolev to a great international conference to assume world responsibilities in an organization based on the ideals of the Atlantic Charter and the Moscow Declaration of 1943. The State Department complained about violations of the Yalta Agreement in its notes to the Soviet Government; but officials refrained from stressing their anxiety and anger in comments to the press.

Western protests mounted in urgency as time passed and the Soviet halter, far from being released, was drawn closer around the necks of states occupied by the Red Army. In Rumania, Maniu and Bratianu had refused to submit to the minority control of the Communists and their stool-pigeons. At the time, Maniu in particular was criticized in liberal circles abroad for a lack of "realism"

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania EDI

727 in failing to recognize that new "progressive" forces were at work and in refusing to coöperate with them. In Hungary, Ferenc Nagy's 642 Smallholders Party coöperated with the Communists in a coalition government, and Petkov coöperated in the Fatherland Front in Bulgaria. These were applauded as signs of superior liberalism and farsightedness. In neither case, as we have seen, was the end result satisfactory. It was not different in Rumania. The United States and British Governments made efforts to hold the governments concerned and their Soviet patrons to the terms of the Yalta Agreement. They succeeded only in revealing a distressing lack of power behind the written and verbal messages which their diplomats delivered at the respective foreign offices. To this extent it can be said that they actually damaged the native national forces which they aimed to help.

The Western Powers protested, as mentioned, against Vyshinsky's interference in Rumanian affairs and quite properly refused to recognize the Groza Government. Encouraged by this, King Michael in August 1945 appealed to the three signatories of the Yalta Agreement to help him create a "recognized democratic government." The Agreement provided that if differences arose about how democratic and representative régimes were to be created the three signatories should consult. The American and British Governments demanded that a consultation now take place about Rumania. Moscow replied that no differences existed except with regard to Rumanian domestic affairs and that therefore a consultation would be not only superfluous but highly improper. That was that. Soviet troops were in occupation of Rumania, and the Western Powers did not propose to go to war to replace Mr. Groza with Mr. Maniu. Other protests over other infringements of the Yalta undertaking were similarly rebuffed. It was right in one view to make them "for the record." The immediate result, however, was that the Western democracies lost face and non-Communist elements were weakened.

728 Simultaneously negotiations had been begun looking to the conclusion of peace treaties with Italy and the former Axis satellites. The peace conference opened in Paris on July 29, 1946. One staff member of the American delegation has said that the draft treaties there presented compared unfavorably with even the maligned

661 electoral results a coalition government should be set up, and in this they secured the Ministry of the Interior and thus made ready to stage a coup at the opportune moment. That moment came in May 1947. Maniu's turn came in July 1947. He was arrested, the National Peasant Party was dissolved, and three months later he was put on trial before a military court presided over by Colonel Alexandru Petrescu. This officer had worn many uniforms and (as W. H. Lawrence who covered the trial for *The New York Times* recalled) had once filled the same judicial office under the pro-Nazi Antonescu dictatorship when the prisoners in the dock usually were Jews or were charged with being Communists or anti-Fascists, equally reprehensible in those days. After a two-week trial which travestied anything that we would call a judicial proceeding, Maniu was convicted and given solitary imprisonment for life. With him were sentenced Ion Mihalache, Vice President of the National Peasant Party, and other associates.

By the end of 1947 the Communists had dealt with all political rivals in Eastern Europe who had particular influence with the peasant masses. Whether the peasant leaders temporized or were rigid, collaborated or fought back, their fate was different only in degree: for some death, for some prison, for some exile.

Six weeks after Maniu was sentenced, King Michael, who had struggled to diminish his royal prerogatives to the point where they might be combined with a Communist dictatorship, and who occasionally seemed to be succeeding, was ordered to abdicate and leave
[642] the country. The Rumanian People's Republic was proclaimed December 30, 1947. No political focus of opposition was left—reactionary, bourgeois, agrarian, democratic or Socialist.

665 Moscow even so did not feel that the situation in Rumania was
661 all it should be. A core of nationalist sentiment seemed to remain inside the Communist organization itself, and it was ordered cut out. The man selected to serve as an example was an old Party stalwart and cabinet member, Lucretiu Patrascanu. He had been a Communist member of Parliament in the twenties, a leader of the Communist underground during the war and head of the commission sent to Moscow to negotiate the Rumanian armistice. In the cabinets preceding Groza's he had been Minister of Justice, and Vyshin-

648, 665, 642, 433

Rumania ED1

[For the economic and political position of Rumania under Soviet control since the death of Stalin, see 85: Zinner, R1 Soviet Union, category 116, Pp. 157B-163B.]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 candidate and in Roman by a fascist. The Communist candidate in
175 Timişoara polled over 25,000 votes. Here were the seeds of the political upheavals of the next decade.

665 At this point, when the National Peasants still commanded a strong
175 majority but were suffering a perceptible loss of popularity and a
● 643 slackening of impetus, Carol dramatically returned to Rumania on June 6, 1930. His return was not a surprise, as there had been rumors about it for weeks, so many in fact that the government had forbidden the mention of his name in the press. Maniu, after announcing that the government had sanctioned his return, resigned and was replaced by Mironescu, who annulled the act excluding Carol from the throne. He then resigned and a brief period of confusion ensued. The Liberal party split on the question; Vintilă Brătianu sharply opposed Carol's return and expelled a section of the party under Gheorghe Brătianu, the historian and adopted son of Ion I. C. Brătianu, who had come out for Carol. After two days, during which Marshal Presan attempted unsuccessfully to create a coalition cabinet, Maniu was recalled and formed a new National Peasant government, much the same as his first but with the addition of the economist Manoilescu, who had worked diligently for Carol's return.

The details of Carol's spectacular return are not altogether clear. Apparently the initiative had been his but Maniu had welcomed him.[5] As has already been noted, the National Peasants had never been satisfied with Carol's renunciation of the crown. The disadvantages inherent in the regency, which still had many years to go before Michael reached his majority; the hope of having a king on their side as Ferdinand had been on the Liberals'; the increasing difficulties of the party and the portents of waning popularity; and finally the obvious popular approval of Carol's return—all these combined to make the National Peasants accept the fatal step. At that the party

5. Ten years later Maniu wrote an article in the journal *Timpul* (September 14, 1940), describing his attitude toward Carol's return: "Ever since 1926 I was against Prince Carol's retirement and favored his return, not only in order to satisfy public opinion—which manifested this desire increasingly—but also to insure the continuity of the dynastic order and the normal government of the country. . . . Therefore, in my capacity as Prime Minister I favored the return of Prince Carol, but only under certain well-defined conditions which were to be put into force from the very beginning. However, after only a few weeks of his reign, I realized to my regret that these conditions were not being fulfilled. Thus, among other things the Coronation of King Carol II and of Queen Helen, arranged for the month of September 1930, was indefinitely postponed. Instead, and in defiance of Christian morals, he compromised his reign by leading a life against which I protested unceasingly for ten years. Having arrived at the conclusion that under these conditions I could no longer accept responsibility for Prince Carol's return and for his rule, I resigned, but maintained my attitude of energetic and continuous protest."

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

leaders were not in complete agreement. Some desired Carol's immediate proclamation as king, some were hostile to him, and others advocated his entering the regency. Maniu himself was opposed to proclaiming him king until Carol should leave Mme Lupescu and achieve a reconciliation with his wife. "But," he said later, "I could not force my views in face of public opinion." [6]

The newly constituted government was short-lived. When Maniu learned that Mme Lupescu had returned to Rumania contrary to what he believed to be Carol's agreement, he resigned in protest on October 6. A new National Peasant cabinet was formed under the wealthy but colorless Mironescu, without Maniu or Vaida Voevod. Although this cabinet remained in office until the following April, its dismissal was only a matter of time. Carol had announced his desire to create a coalition government, and as soon as the National Peasants had completed a new loan agreement they were removed from office. The second National Peasant government of 1932–33 will be discussed later in connection with the depression.

Maniu's resignation in October, 1930, was a significant event as it marked, when viewed in retrospect, the conclusion of Rumania's brief experiment with responsible government. In so far as his action was a protest against royal irresponsibility and bad faith, Maniu was remaining true, as he did always, to his conception of legality and constitutionality. But as a protest against the king's moral standards it was misdirected. "Bourgeois sexual morality," Mr. Hugh Seton-Watson has said, "is probably less esteemed in Rumania than anywhere else on the Continent. It was not the right issue on which to base the whole conflict between Democracy and Dictatorship." [7]

The episode is inexplicable without some insight into Maniu's personality, which, in its rather cold incorruptibility, was in the sharpest possible contrast to the laxness and opportunism of Rumanian public life. Born in Transylvania in 1873, Iuliu Maniu had studied law in Vienna. He had been attorney of the Uniate Metropolitanate of Blaj and professor of law at the Blaj Theological Academy. As deputy to the Hungarian parliament he had gained a reputation as a stubborn and doughty opponent of Hungarian policy in Transylvania. The clerical atmosphere of Blaj and the parliamentary atmosphere of the Budapest chamber had a lasting influence. Maniu

6. John Gunther, *Inside Europe* (London, 1936), pp. 367–369, includes an unpublished speech by Maniu which was to have been delivered in 1934 and which provides some additional details concerning the National Peasant leader's position on Carol's return.

7. Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918–1941* (2d ed., Cambridge University Press, 1946), p. 204.

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

The elections which followed in May, 1926, were among the 666
most violent which had been witnessed in Rumania. Though 661
the Averescu group had secured the support of the Magyars, Germans, Jews, Bulgarians and Turks by holding out to them the most alluring promises, it in no way felt secure, and therefore had recourse to extensive terrorist methods. Most Opposition leaders were arrested. Opposition leaders like Maniu and Vaida-Voevod were prevented from holding meetings. Mihalache was set upon by gendarmes and beaten at his home at Topoloveni. The Bessarabian leaders, Stere and Halippa, while travelling to Bessarabia were ignominiously thrown out of their train at Floresti, placed under an escort of gendarmes and conveyed on foot to Cetatea-Alba, a distance of 300 kilometers, despite the fact that they were both in a poor state of health at the time. The army and gendarmerie were mobilized and ordered to see to it that Rumanian citizens did their duty (such as it was conceived to be by the government of H.M. King Ferdinand of Rumania). One of the manifestos issued and distributed broadcast by army air-planes at the time read:—"If you trust in the King then you must trust in his government." As for the way royalty in Rumania conceived its duty of 643
guarding the letter and spirit of the Constitution, one may 666
judge by the fact that the King, aware of the violence to be committed, and knowing that as the supreme arbiter in the country he would be besought from all sides to intervene and put a stop to it, could think of nothing better than to elude his responsibilities by betaking himself to his yacht, and cruising on the Danube for a whole week so as not to be importuned by the complaints of his liege subjects!

In spite of the unprecedented violence employed the 666
government obtained only 54% of the total votes cast, but it must be remembered that this percentage included almost the whole of the votes cast by the minorities.

For some time Averescu meekly followed the lead of 642
Bratianu. He surprised nobody, however, when he began 661
to show manifest signs of insubordination, but to no avail.

For the Liberals, knowing the shifty customer with whom they were dealing, had taken their precautions. During their four years of office they had bestowed on most of the

661 [642] state administrations a certain degree of autonomy which, effectively amputated the central government of many of its prerogatives, and having filled these administrations with their own partisans they still exerted an influence which could, if necessary, paralyse the governments destined to succeed them in office.

In his electoral manifestoes, Averescu had held out to the Rumanians the most seductive inducements, among others that of a flow of foreign capital into the country. Time passed, however, and so, without any sign of an impending materialization of these assurances, the public began to chafe and inveigh against him. The resentment which the Liberals had aroused against themselves was thus deftly diverted on to the heads of their successors. This result having been duly effected, the Liberals emerged from the seclusion they had hitherto voluntarily imposed on themselves, and now appeared on the scene in the guise of indispensable factors for the restoration of the order and legality so grievously compromised by their incompetent henchman! The King was induced to demand General Averescu to form a coalition Ministry, but after a fruitless effort he was summarily dismissed and replaced by Prince Stirbey, who a fortnight later retired, making way for a Bratianu Government, so that the transition might not appear too brusque.

643 King Ferdinand died in July, 1927, and as the crown passed to his grandson, Michael, a boy of six, a Regency Council was nominated. Ferdinand's son, the notorious Prince Carol, had been excluded from the throne owing to Ferdinand's conviction that Rumania's prestige would suffer if a person with Carol's record became King. A similar opinion seems to have been held by our Foreign Office, for when Prince Carol came over to England in 1925 he received a polite but firm request to leave our shores.

665 Unhappily for the Liberals, their leader, John Bratianu, died suddenly in November, 1927. His was a strong willed and dominating personality, capable, but not over scrupulous in the choice of methods. The leadership then passed to his brother, who until then had been Minister of Finance.

665 652 The rising storm of popular exasperation caused by the financial policy of the Liberal party, which had brought the

671 preparing a system of regional decentralization which would largely have satisfied the desires of the minorities.

662 Having to rely upon an inefficient administrative staff, with the various autonomous State departments still filled with supporters of the Opposition, and the latter hampering and undermining the government's attempt to clear up the mess in which the country had been left, it was hardly possible to expect that the government of M. Maniu could effect the miraculous change that was expected of it. In order to counteract the underhand machinations of its Liberal opponents, who did not scruple even to sap its credit 642 abroad by circulating scurrilous attacks on it among foreign 643 banking institutions, while at home they brought pressure 661 to bear on the Regency (which had been elected at their dictation) to create irritating hindrances to the smooth working of the government's plans, the latter at last allowed itself to be won over to what at the time was a fairly popular view, namely that of permitting the former Crown Prince Carol to return and ascend the throne. His advent was reckoned as likely to strengthen the hands of the Government, for he shared with the National Peasant Party the hostility of the Bratianus. Carol II, however, after his accession to the throne on June 8th, 1930, began to manifest a distinct predilection for autocratic measures. He arbitrarily removed from his post the able Rumanian Minister in Paris, M. Diamandi, a man who had distinguished himself for years by his devoted and brilliant service to his country, and nominated a personal friend whose sole qualification for this important diplomatic post was that he was a racing man. He estranged both M. M. Maniu and Vaida-Voevod by unconstitutionally interfering in the government, and thereby provoked the resignation of both. As he did not yet feel himself strong enough to dissolve the Chamber he allowed the National Peasant Party to form another Cabinet with M. Mironescu at its head, but he imposed on them as colleague an outsider in the person of M. Manoilescu, another personal friend of his. An attempt was made to form a Coalition Cabinet to be presided over by M. Titulescu, but as this failed the Mironescu Cabinet was tolerated for a time because it was conducting negotiations for a loan, and a premature

disclosure of the impending adoption of a dictatorial regime 642 might have influenced them adversely. Once the loan was 643 obtained, and when it was deemed that the favour with 66 which the National Peasant Party was regarded had somewhat subsided, owing to the unpopular budget measures it had adopted, M. Mironescu was forced to resign, and death having removed in the meantime the most determined adversary of the King, M. Vintila Bratianu, the former now proceeded to unfold his plan of action.

M. Titulescu was once more summoned to Bucarest and asked to form a broad Coalition Cabinet; but as the National Peasant Party refused to lend its support to a cabinet which would have contained two royal favourites, Manoilescu and Argentoianu, M. Titulescu wisely abandoned the task and returned to London.

The next step of Carol was an attempt to follow the nefarious example of his brother-in-law, the Serbian monarch, and form a military cabinet, but the Spanish revolution which broke out at the time induced him hastily to alter his plans.

M. Argentoianu, who had in the meantime become the 645 favourite adviser of the King, opted for the dissolution of the Chamber and the formation of a cabinet of "technical" experts to shore up the tottering framework; himself to occupy the two most important posts, those of the Ministry of Finances and of the Interior. The technical capacities of M. Argentoianu are of peculiarly sinister character, judging from what former colleagues of his have to say of his activities. Thus General Averescu, in whose cabinet he held the post of Minister of Finances ad-interim, accuses him of unconstitutionally squandering £1,500,000, of thereby defrauding the State, and rendering himself liable to penalties provided in Art. 326 of the Rumanian penal code, as well as in Art. 3 of the law regarding ministerial responsibilities—infractions that had been established by the Judicial authorities in 1923, if we are to trust General Averescu's affirmations as they were published and reproduced in a series of articles in all the principal Bucarest newspapers during January, 1932. Another ex-Finance Minister, M. Virgil Madgearu, on whose integrity we may rely, likewise

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

665 to blame other factors for whatever might go wrong
565 as there was no *boiar*-class left. The invisible, but
662 much more effective, financial control, continued to assure the rule of the same classes who had governed the country before.

665 Soon the Liberal Party again took over the
648 government. I. Bratianu was the undisputed chief of his party and had the confidence of the king. His whole policy was directed towards the strengthening of the power of the interests he represented. This, combined with his hostility towards the Soviet Union and Hungary had serious consequences which, however, became apparent only several years after his death.

643 THE MONARCHY. King Ferdinand, who had been
665 crowned at Alba Julia in 1923, died in 1927. This caused a serious crisis, for two years earlier the Crown Prince Carol had been forced to abdicate in favour of his infant son Michael. After Ferdinand's death a Regency Council of three was appointed to act in the king's name until he came of age. The Regents were naturally strongly influenced by Bratianu, but, when he died in 1928, the leader of the National Peasant Party was entrusted with the formation of a new government. Maniu secured a great electoral victory and his tenure of office was expected to bring about far-reaching changes. The new administration set about solving the minority question and the serious economic problems resulting from the incomplete land reform which instead of bettering had often worsened the lot of the peasants. Unfortunately at that time the world crisis had reached its worst stage. Although his

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

government had the majority of the people behind it, Maniu was handicapped by sabotage on the part of the bureaucracy, the banks and the great industrialists. Moreover he found it very difficult to work with the Regency Council, especially in such a critical time, as very frequently it could not reach a unanimous decision.

All these circumstances seemed to make the restoration of Carol inevitable. Maniu therefore arranged for the return of Carol to Rumania, but made his accession to the throne conditional upon several undertakings, amongst which was a royal promise to respect the Constitution. Carol returned by plane on 8 June 1930 and was proclaimed King, his son Michael being unceremoniously relegated to the position of Crown Prince. Many high hopes were pinned on Carol whose youth and intelligence were held to be qualities which should make him a good ruler. But the head-strong young monarch, with his ideas of personal rule, soon disillusioned those who had enabled him to return. Before long Maniu resigned and the first period of Carol's personal regime began.

THE PEOPLE. During all these years the people of Rumania had hoped for an improvement of their position. After the first few years of adjustment to the changes consequent upon the World War, it had become apparent that all misfortunes could not be blamed upon the war. The Agrarian Reform which was to have cured all ills had turned out to be a very questionable blessing. The recovery of industry which had a promising start in the middle twenties, when considerable amounts of foreign

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

The Iron Guard was originally part of the Mol- 668
davian and Bessarabian anti-Semitic movement led by Professor Cuza. Amongst his pupils was Codreanu who formed the 'Legion of the Archangel Michael', a terrorist organization modelled on the Fascist and Nazi pattern and supported by Germany and Italy. Codreanu began his political career with the assassination of the prefect of police of Jasi, the blackmail of Jews and the persecution of progressive organizations. His adherents were poor students of the type which in Germany formed the core of the Nazi movement, the lower clergy, army officers and civil servants. His anti-Semitic and anti-Bolshevik slogans sounded attractive to certain big business men, high army officers and the higher clergy who gave him their support. The king regarded the Iron 643
Guard with favour, for it seemed an excellent 668
weapon for weakening the country's democratic forces and preparing the way for his own, undisguised dictatorship. Accordingly the crimes of the Iron Guard were not punished and the activities of her adherents remained unchecked.

In order to exploit the international situation, 643
which was only too favourable for dictatorship, 208
Carol began with an intensive propaganda, taking the slogans of Fascism, National Socialism and the Iron Guard, and laying particular stress upon his desire to rule with the help of the young generation. The schools and universities were militarized and the defence of the country made one of the daily watchwords. By ruling with non-party cabinets and 643
playing off one party against the other Carol under- 662
mined the strength of the Liberals and the adherents of Maniu and Mihalache. From both parties he

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ET1 Rumania ED1

662 attracted personalities who were willing to abjure
643 their political faith and serve the Crown.

While continuing to pay lip-service to the League
643 of Nations, he supported the Italian campaign in
648 Abyssinia by sending food and war material to Italy. During the Spanish Civil War propaganda in favour of Franco was allowed and supported, while anything in favour of the Republican cause was banned.[1]

The result of the elections in December 1937, on
643 the eve of Hitler's seizure of Austria, precipitated
665 events. The government of the day, headed by the Liberal Tatarescu, failed to secure the necessary 40% of the votes and resigned.[2] Carol refused to entrust Maniu with the formation of a government; and the Iron Guard had by now assumed such a hostile attitude towards the king that a compromise with them was out of the question. Consequently Carol called the 'National Christian Front' to power, an anti-Semitic and Fascist organization led by the poet Goga and Professor Cuza. Goga became Prime Minister and his cabinet contained former members of the Liberal and Peasant Parties who now went over to the absolutist camp, as well as the future 'Conducator'[3] Antonescu.

[1] General Cantacuzino and several legionaries joined Franco and when two of them were killed their coffins were carried all over Rumania with great processions and interred at the headquarters of the Iron Guard in the presence of German, Italian, Spanish and Japanese representatives. At the same time collectors for the Republican cause were imprisoned. Nevertheless there were many Rumanians fighting for the Republicans in the 'Dimitrov' battalion.

[2] The result was: Government 35·9%, Peasant Party 20·4%, Iron Guard 15·5%, National Christian Front 9·1%.

[3] Leader.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

The new government at once introduced measures which had become familiar in Germany and Italy. All democratic papers and organizations were suppressed, anti-Semitic laws were carried out without delay and the government's storm-troopers ruled the country. In the meantime the Iron Guard gathered strength and prepared to take power. The king recognized the threatening danger, dismissed Goga after only forty-five days, installed the patriarch Miron Cristea as Prime Minister of a government of 'national concentration' and announced a new constitution on the Fascist model. 642 643

All political parties were dissolved and their property confiscated. Representation was to be 'corporative', that is, according to social status, and the age of the franchise raised from 21 to 30. The king, with an advisory Crown Council, had all executive power. This so-called constitution was put to an open and verbal vote and was naturally accepted.[1] The new single-party, the 'Front of National Renaissance', became the only recognized political organization whose membership was obligatory for all officials.

The king's victory seemed complete. The democratic forces were routed and the whole administration was firmly in his hands. The army and a section of the industrialists supported this new regime, which promised them increased powers and incomes. Codreanu, whose many assassinations had been left unpunished, was imprisoned after being found guilty in a libel action.

[1] Only about five thousand people dared to vote against this constitution in February 1938. Maniu demonstrated his protest by leaving the country before polling-day and returning shortly after.

[Lie: Government of National Christian Front of 1937--Analyst]

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

643 [648] found guilty in a libel action. The only immediate danger, the revisionist claims of Hungary and Bulgaria, was to be eliminated by an even friendlier attitude towards Italy and Germany, and Carol's tour of the European capitals, including London, was intended to reassure the democracies.

643 Beneath the surface, however, the struggle between the Iron Guard and Carol continued. While Carol was on his tour, Codreanu and thirteen of his legionaries were shot by their prison guards. The Minister of the Interior, Calinescu, a former member of the National Peasant Party, who succeeded to the premiership after Miron Cristea's death in March 1939, ordered further repressive measures and was himself assassinated by Iron Guardists in the autumn of the same year.

563 668 **THE FIFTH COLUMN.** Nazi Germany found an extremely fertile soil for its propaganda not only among the Rumanian Fascist parties and some generals and industrialists, but also amongst the many Germans living in Rumania. They were economically prosperous and the best treated of all minorities in Rumania. The most important communities were the settlements in Transylvania and in the Banat. At first Nazi propaganda was not very successful owing to the economically favourable position of these Germans and their comparatively strong religious feeling.[1] But as time went on it had great successes. Under the cloak of cultural associations Nazi cells were formed which soon spread into every German village. Unwilling Germans were

[1] The 'Saxons' are Protestants, the 'Aelpler', also in Transylvania, and the 'Schwaben' of the Banat Roman Catholics.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

so-called national and revolutionary movement 668
betrayed its German inspiration by supporting and approving the handing over of Transylvania to Hungary, but opposing the cession of Bessarabia to the U.S.S.R.

The king's Prime Minister, Gigurtu, resigned on 668
4 September and Carol summoned General An- 643
tonescu, who was at the time imprisoned in Bistrita, and charged him with the formation of a new government. This step was all the more remarkable as the German Minister at Bucarest had been able to communicate with Antonescu while he was in prison. Antonescu at once demanded Carol's abdication and obtained it after two days' continuous and heated discussions and negotiations. On 6 September Carol, accompanied by his mistress Mme Lupescu and his aide Udureanu, left Rumania. His son Michael succeeded for the second time to the unstable throne.

Carol's abdication was due to many different 643
factors. The occupation of Bessarabia by the Red 668
Army and the acceptance of the Vienna Award 648
showed how brittle and hollow was his widespread kingdom. Everybody knew how great the king's share in the weakening of the country had been. The ten years of his reign had led to disastrous consequences. The will of the people, voiced for the first time for many years, had a decisive influence on the events leading to the abdication. Another important factor was Hitler's distrust for a man whose country he intended to take under complete domination. The king's renunciation of the British Guarantee was unable to win him Germany's confidence. Since Carol assumed the throne in 1930

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

643 668 648 he had played off one political party against the other in order to strengthen his position. In foreign politics he followed the same tactics. He ended by completely isolating Rumania internationally and undermining her internally.

It may be said in extenuation of his inglorious behaviour, that the dismemberment of Greater Rumania was inevitable, once the whole balance of power had shifted against the Western Allies, whose settlement had created it. But it is at least equally tenable that a democratic and united Rumania, which had succeeded in winning the loyalty of any considerable elements among its minorities, might have held out against the cession of territory to Hungary, by obliging the Hungarians and Germans to use force to effect it at a time when Hitler was anxious to avoid war in the Danubian area. This might have rallied Rumania with Yugoslavia and Greece, who showed a more heroic spirit, to the Allies' camp. In fact, the king's policy only aggravated the internal situation and sharpened the conflict of parties.

642 661 **RUMANIA GOES TO WAR.** General I. Antonescu, having obtained Carol's abdication,[1] pronounced himself 'Conducator', that is, 'Leader', and proclaimed the creation of the 'Legionary State'. His government was composed of generals, leaders of the Iron Guard and civil servants. Codreanu's successor, Horia Sima, became vice-premier and at once organized an unprecedented regime of terror throughout the whole of Rumania. His henchmen assassinated numerous prominent opponents of the Iron Guard. The looting of shops and the beating

7 [Sept 6, 1940 -- Analyst]

* 701 and admirals who had been most intimately associated with Anton-
*648 escu were arrested and several, among them Generals Antonescu,
661 Pantazi, and Vasiliu, were taken to the Soviet Union, where they were questioned and held until their trials in Bucharest in 1946.

With the end of the War the purge went further. Procedures for elimination of war criminals and collaborators were laid down in 1945 and numerous trials were held in 1946. At the same time the size of the army was being cut and many officers were simply dismissed. The Treaty of Paris in 1946 provided that the total military forces of Romania (including land, air, and marine force as well as frontier guards) could not exceed 138,000. The actual number of troops in active service at one time fell as low as 90,000. These were culled from fifteen regular divisions and two Communist divisions which had fought the Germans. The reduction in force was pushed as an ideal opportunity to get rid of political opponents.

The Communist take-over did not occur without resistance. The years from 1945 through 1950 were marked by a series of successively more stringent Communist demands for control.

668 The first prime minister after the coup was General Sanatescu.
643 He was not sufficiently acceptable to the Russians and on December 6, 1944, he was replaced by General Nicolae Radescu, who had been known as an opponent of Antonescu and the Nazis and had spent some time in a concentration camp. Radescu, however, was by no means a pro-Communist or a Communist tool and he also lasted only briefly, being ousted on February 27, 1945 at the demand of Vyshinski, the Russian representative in Romania. A few days later a government was formed by Dr. Petru Groza who also had not been a Communist. He was indeed one of the wealthiest men in Romania and had been something of a collaborator with the Nazis, but he was sufficiently pliable to be used by the Russians for a considerable period. It was not until June 2, 1952, that he was replaced as Prime Minister by a top Communist leader, Gheorghiu-Dej. Groza is still a figurehead in Romanian politics under the title of President of the Presidium.

* 701 With the formation of the Groza government there came the first
*648 major shake-up in the army command. During the succeeding twelve
661 months thousands of officers were removed. General Ion Negulescu, Minister of National Defense, was replaced by General Constantin Rascanu, a man who had been Chief of the Military Police under the Antonescu regime and later was disgraced and sent home from the front for engaging in black market operations. He ingratiated himself with the Communists by leading the group of officers who forced Radescu out of office.

During 1946 the non-Communist officers showed increased resistance to the sovietization of the army and the country. Toward the end of the year the Communists decided upon a further shake-up. Rascanu was discharged as Minister of the Armed Forces and replaced by General Mihail Lascar, former prisoner of war, who had served in the Horia-Closca-Crisan Division. Before that he had fought well on

disclosure of the impending adoption of a dictatoral régime 642 might have influenced them adversely. Once the loan was 643 obtained, and when it was deemed that the favour with 644 which the National Peasant Party was regarded had somewhat subsided, owing to the unpopular budget measures it had adopted, M. Mironescu was forced to resign, and death having removed in the meantime the most determined adversary of the King, M. Vintila Bratianu, the former now proceeded to unfold his plan of action.

M. Titulescu was once more summoned to Bucarest and asked to form a broad Coalition Cabinet; but as the National Peasant Party refused to lend its support to a cabinet which would have contained two royal favourites, Manoilescu and Argentoianu, M. Titulescu wisely abandoned the task and returned to London.

The next step of Carol was an attempt to follow the nefarious example of his brother-in-law, the Serbian monarch, and form a military cabinet, but the Spanish revolution which broke out at the time induced him hastily to alter his plans.

M. Argentoianu, who had in the meantime become the 645 favourite adviser of the King, opted for the dissolution of the Chamber and the formation of a cabinet of "technical" experts to shore up the tottering framework; himself to occupy the two most important posts, those of the Ministry of Finances and of the Interior. The technical capacities of M. Argentoianu are of peculiarly sinister character, judging from what former colleagues of his have to say of his activities. Thus General Averescu, in whose cabinet he held the post of Minister of Finances ad-interim, accuses him of unconstitutionally squandering £1,500,000, of thereby defrauding the State, and rendering himself liable to penalties provided in Art. 326 of the Rumanian penal code, as well as in Art. 3 of the law regarding ministerial responsibilities—infractions that had been established by the Judicial authorities in 1923, if we are to trust General Averescu's affirmations as they were published and reproduced in a series of articles in all the principal Bucarest newspapers during January, 1932. Another ex-Finance Minister, M. Virgil Madgearu, on whose integrity we may rely, likewise

645 accuses him of having caused a loss of 90 million lei to the State in 1921, and further affirms that Argentoianu never offered a satisfactory explanation of the reasons which led him to operate so disadvantageously to the interests of the State, though he had been interpellated several times on the subject in the Chamber. We may surmise, therefore, that the technical capacities of M. Argentoianu, who enjoys the reputation of being an arch cynic, were somewhat deficient from the moral point of view, and in order to compensate for this shortcoming the respectable personality of Prof. Iorga, upon whom the dignity of Prime Minister was foisted, was made use of to complete the Cabinet. We may take it for granted that Prof. Iorga, who is a distinguished historian and man of letters, was, like Plato's model ruler, least eager to rule, for he was engaged in an occupation better than ruling, and led a life finer than that of those wielding authority. But his duty to his former royal pupil, as he conceived it, compelled him to quit his life of contemplation and return to work for the general good in what, according to Plato, is the 'cave.' Prof. Iorga, doubtless, must have lost sight to some extent of the difference between the perfect State, which is unattainable, and the good State which is a present possibility, as expounded respectively in the "Republic" and the "Laws." Otherwise, he would have halted before returning to the darkness of the cave. His presence would have been desirable in such conditions as prevail in the unattainable and ideal perfect State, but such would not be those obtaining in a State with the present possibilities of Rumania.

642 645 It is to this confusion of ideas, as well as to the evident desire to exert even a limited restraining influence on his sovereign, that we must have recourse in order to explain Prof. Iorga's consent to read a royal decree dissolving Parliament and ordering new elections to be held in June, 1931.[1]

[1] In an interview published by the "Echo de Paris," June 29th, 1930, Professor Iorga stated, amongst other things, that "whenever the party spirit overruled the spirit of patriotism he would be found by the side of the King, in order to defend the supreme interests of the nation." Professor Iorga's attachment to the throne is explicable by his traditionalism. As a historian he sees in his sovereign, the lineal descendant of Stephen the Great, or of Michael the Brave. A non-Rumanian, however, may be dispensed from taking such a view, and excused if he does not hold a very high opinion of a scion of the Hohenzollerns who promulgates rascally laws defrauding the unwary foreign investor and trader.

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

A very unfavourable impression was created by the dismissal of the Chamber controlled by the National Peasant Party, the only standard-bearer of democracy in the country. It is probable that the electorate would have reacted with more spirit if the people had not foreseen that the thwarting of the royal will would have entailed the abolition of even the semblance of a Parliamentary system, and the proclamation of a pure dictatorship. Though not to an overwhelming extent, violence and illegality were pretty freely employed, to judge from the cases reported in the Press, yet in spite of all these artifices and the mass abstention of its opponents the elements supporting the Iorga-Argentoianu Coalition secured only 48% of the total votes cast; a very meagre performance indeed if it be remembered that even the Liberal party figured among its supporters. 642 666

That the Iorga-Argentoianu Cabinet did not fulfil the hopes placed in it by the King became obvious when he again summoned M. Titulescu, early in 1932, to Bucarest, and asked him to form a broad coalition cabinet. No real coalition cabinet truly representative of the national will could be formed without the inclusion of the National Peasant Party, and the leaders of the latter, when sounded, replied in a truly dignified manner that so long as constitutional methods were not observed they would abstain from participation. M. Titulescu gave up the mission and once more returned to his ambassadorial duties in London. Even those who by their votes helped the Cabinet to install itself in office seemed to have turned against it, for during a sitting of the Rumanian Senate on December 5th, 1931, M. Pillat, belonging to the Liberal party, delivered the following trenchant criticism on the Cabinet: "When you came to power you had promised three principal things: 1st, reduction of the Budget and a lightening of taxation through economies; 2nd, a redressing of the financial and economic situation and of the agrarian crisis; 3rd, penalties for all abuses. But what has been realised? The policy of feigned economies has not stopped the practice of dissipation, aggravated by fresh injustices. In a time of such poverty you have not only maintained old sinecurist in office but you have created even new ones. Favourites of other régimes who exert cumulative 645 665

645 functions have been left undisturbed. We have a plethora
665 of functionaries drawing starvation wages instead of a body of well-selected officials decently rewarded. You who have no party and no party attachments to satisfy, and who always attacked political parties, might have effected this change easily, but you have not done so. The reductions in the Budget were necessary, yet they ought not to have cut into the very vitals of the country. The financial policy of M. Argentoianu may be qualified as the policy of bankruptcy. No institution, however strong its foundations, can resist it. You have destroyed the schools and disorganized the army by a criminal reduction of credits. In the name of the Liberal party I must affirm that we cannot accept a constitutional theory which, if it be applied, will debilitate our political life, and by the elimination of political parties vitiate the expression of the national will in its essence, expose the Crown dangerously to attack, and even provide the possibility of irremediably compromising it."

871 The indictment with regard to the schools found in the above rebuke refers to the decision taken by the Government
652 to shift on to the municipalities 50 per cent of the educational charges. As the Municipal authorities cannot balance their budgets, and as an example the community of Solca was cited, which with a total annual budget of 430,000 lei would have been obliged to incur an additional expenditure of 400,000 lei in order to provide for the maintenance of its primary school, the deputies admitted that such charges were beyond the resources of the municipalities to bear, and the proposed legislation was at last rejected after a most strenuous opposition from the National Peasant Party supported by the Liberal deputies who had hitherto sided with the Government.

871 Another cause likely to prejudice education in Rumania is the non-payment of salaries to teachers. During the
875 sitting of the Chamber on April 4th, 1932, a case was reported of certain teachers, who are all State functionaries in Rumania, who had not received their pay for seven months. Associations of teachers in various localities have called meetings and have addressed telegrams of protest on the subject to the King. Thus, those of the region of Radauţi on

certain extent, as apparently the new French government will be less inclined to make financial advances. Nevertheless the Cabinet will hesitate to assume the responsibility of openly defaulting, lest such action should be resented by France and to a lesser extent by England, and bring about Rumania's political isolation in face of Russia. So that, strange as it may seem, the dread of the Bolsheviks may contribute to the respect of engagements, the repudiation of which would be applauded by the latter. 648 652

The press organ of General Averescu, the "Indreptarea," in its issues of 12th and 18th May, 1932, contains some interesting comments on the findings of the French experts. It thus affirms that the experts have ascertained that there is a lack of control in the handling of the public funds, that there is a great redundancy of officials, and that huge frauds are committed at the expense of the State revenues. As an example, the case of the revenue from the Customs was given, which was estimated at 1,200 million lei, yet only yielded 400 millions, the balance of 800 millions having been fraudulently diverted to other pockets than that of the State. M. Rist, affirms the "Indreptarea," had recommended a compression of the expenses through the dismissal of a large number of functionaries, and the creation of a control of all payments made to the State so as to eliminate the numerous frauds to which the Budget deficit is principally due. If these reforms were effected, Rumania, according to M. Rist, could fulfil her external obligations. However, the findings of the experts were not likely to enhance the prestige of Rumania in Paris and it hardly seemed likely that the French would now keep their promise made to M. Argentoianu to give pecuniary assistance to Rumania, unless they were allowed to exert a control which would be tantamount to applying to Rumania the status of what in its essence would be a colonial dependency. Such measures, if their acceptance were advocated by the Government, would weaken its prestige to such an extent that it could no longer maintain itself in power, even if it enjoyed royal support. The weakening of its authority was manifested by its decision not to allow the holding of municipal elections which were to take place in 648 652 E 47 648 666 645

RUMANIA

645 June, 1932, a measure which is resented by all political
[666] parties as a formal violation of the constitution.
[664]

From the above it will be clear that whatever popularity the Iorga-Argentoianu Cabinet may have enjoyed, and whatever the hopes to which it may have given rise on its formation, these have now been totally dispelled. This is not without causing a distinct prejudice to Rumania, for undoubtedly, Prof. Iorga is one of the most distinguished Rumanians and represents an immense moral asset for the country. He would have proved an ideal chief for a broad coalition of all political parties, and his presence, owing to his integrity as well as to his erudition would have immensely strengthened the position of such a popularly elected government.

000 Owing to the marked " lipsandry " from which Rumania is suffering, it was an unpardonable mistake on the part of her ruler to expose an eminent personality like that of Prof. Iorga to risk his reputation, and by trading on his sentiments of devotion to the throne to force him to join a team headed by an Argentoianu, who, according to General Averescu, ought to be in the dock, and not on the Ministerial bench.[1]

665 With the passing of time, and with the worsening of the situation, attacks on the present régime have become more virulent. General Averescu, who under Rumania's former kings was often appealed to on difficult circumstances, and who feels that he has been undeservedly ousted by the Iorga-Argentoianu combination, continues his vehement attacks on both Government and King, whom he threatens with the fate of Prince Cuza, deposed forcibly in 1866. Far more significant, however, is the attitude of the National Peasant Party, which so far has maintained a very dignified attitude. All of a sudden on May 15th, 1932, the " Patria," the organ of the Transylvanian section of the party, launched a virulent attack on the régime, denouncing the scandalous exploitation to which Transylvania is being subjected and threatening with a demand for autonomy. This campaign,

[1] In June, 1932, the "Dreptatea" repeatedly accused Argentoianu of having appropriated 20 million lei of public money, of which, 12 millions between May 17th and 31st, and eight millions on June 3rd and 4th, after he had resigned from office.

668 resound from the province across the Carpathians are not isolated. The whole country is agitated by this discontent which may explode at any moment."

The above statements should not be taken as outbursts of spite, for even in official publications, such as the bulletin of the Constantsa Chamber of Commerce, we come across similar pronouncements: "We are facing a complete economic disaster. All the productive forces of the country are exhausted. All private savings lent on credit are lost owing to general insolvency. The State is unable to collect even one fourth of the direct taxes it imposes. We have arrived at this state of affairs owing to the irrational financial policy of post-war governments . . . . . Great mistakes were committed, and this fact should be admitted before we start on the right path. Many of our rulers were incompetent and dissipated, not to say that they acted as profiteers." (February, 1932, p. 23–26.)

645 [652] Since proofs were submitted the following events have occurred in Rumania:

Owing to the growing discontent among public functionaries, pensioners and officers at their not receiving their pay, the King felt constrained to enjoin the Cabinet to satisfy forthwith the legitimate claims of these public servants. The government, unable to comply with this behest, tendered its resignation early in June, whereupon the King once more convoked M. Titulescu to Bucarest, and bade him form a coalition cabinet. M. Titulescu's efforts proved again fruitless; for while the National Peasant Party did not refuse its co-operation, the Liberal Party asked that it should be entrusted with a mandate to form a government, as it pretended to be strong and capable enough to deal singly with the situation.

666 As, however, no party possessed a majority in the Chamber, it was decided to dissolve it, and to appeal to the electorate. M. Vaida-Voevod, who is known to be strongly opposed to gerrymandering, and other electoral abuses in vogue in Rumania, formed a provisional government to supervise the elections. These were held in July, and the

National Peasant Party, though it polled less than 50% of the votes cast, secured 272 seats against 114 won by the Opposition. (The Liberals obtained 28, and the section of the party led by M. G. Bratianu, 14 mandates.) 666

M. Vaida-Voevod having discharged the duty assigned to him retired from office; but as the National Peasant Party possessed a working majority in the newly-elected Chamber, it was called upon to assume power. The Opposition attempted to challenge the right of the National Peasant Party to govern the country owing to the smallness of the poll it secured at the elections, though it was the Liberal party itself, now heading the Opposition, which introduced the law conferring a majority of seats in the Chamber on the party which would poll 40% of the votes. 646

M. Maniu was besought by his partisans to resume once more the premiership, but after several interviews with the King, declared himself unable to do so. He recommended, however, M. Vaida-Voevod to undertake the task, and accordingly a Cabinet headed by the latter was formed which includes both M. Mihalache and M. Madgearu, and other prominent members of the party. The government thus formed proceeded to secure a loan of 50 million swiss francs, wherewith to pay its officials for the time being, and to publish its program, which in the main lines aims at: Reforming the present electoral law, reintroducing administrative decentralization, and reorganizing the railway administration. Equitable treatment of minorities is promised, as well as a modification of the law concerning the conversion of agrarian debts. At the same time State finances are to be reorganized with the co-operation of the League of Nations. 645 652

This last plan, however, will not work out so smoothly, for the Opposition will do its utmost to stir up popular feeling against it. Even when two League delegates arrived in June, 1932, to examine the economic situation, the Press was unanimous in deprecating this public investigation and treating it as an offence against the country's dignity. The most widely read paper, having a daily circulation of some 40,000 copies, appeared with a leading article entitled "the day of shame." 652 648

RUMANIA

[652] the economic crisis which had become endemic, sought to
665 withdraw for a brief period from office in order that popular
661 indignation might be appeased. As it had become obvious, however, that the Opposition, headed by the Transylvanian and peasant groups of the old kingdom aided by the Bessarabians, would sweep the polls and deprive the Bratianu party of the privileges it had arrogated to itself during its last tenure of office, the government manoeuvred to appoint in its stead a political group on whose subservience it could count. The choice fell on General Averescu, who could not pretend to independence of action owing to the numerical weakness of his group, and who was forced to act in leading strings held by the Bratianus on account of his absolute dependence on their support. As a consequence of the prevailing exasperation throughout the country it could be foreseen with certainty that it would be impossible to secure a favourable majority at the election following the exit from office of the Bratianus, even if use was made of the devices habitually employed on such occasions.

666 Before the dissolution of the Chamber, therefore, the
646 Bratianus passed a law reforming the electoral system then in use, which completely altered the very essence of democratic government. By the new system a party obtaining 40% of the total votes cast secured 70% of the seats in the Chamber, and thereby a party which did not possess the support of the majority of the electors might nevertheless secure an imposing majority in the Legislative Chamber. Through the passing of this measure into law, the coming to power of unpopular parties and royal favourites has been made possible, for owing to the malpractices and abuses current at elections, it is relatively easy in Rumania for any person in control of the state-machine to secure the requisite 40% of the votes necessary to ensure him complete domination of the Chamber.

666 In ordinary circumstances there would have been no necessity for this electoral law, since the public has usually a very wholesome respect for whatever party is in power, allowing it to organize the elections to suit its wishes, and permitting it to exert a dominating influence on the polls so that it may be said that the elections are always "made."

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

National Peasant Party, though it polled less than 50% of the votes cast, secured 272 seats against 114 won by the Opposition. (The Liberals obtained 28, and the section of the party led by M. G. Bratianu, 14 mandates.)

M. Vaida-Voevod having discharged the duty assigned to him retired from office; but as the National Peasant Party possessed a working majority in the newly-elected Chamber, it was called upon to assume power. The Opposition attempted to challenge the right of the National Peasant Party to govern the country owing to the smallness of the poll it secured at the elections, though it was the Liberal party itself, now heading the Opposition, which introduced the law conferring a majority of seats in the Chamber on the party which would poll 40% of the votes.

M. Maniu was besought by his partisans to resume once more the premiership, but after several interviews with the King, declared himself unable to do so. He recommended, however, M. Vaida-Voevod to undertake the task, and accordingly a Cabinet headed by the latter was formed which includes both M. Mihalache and M. Madgearu, and other prominent members of the party. The government thus formed proceeded to secure a loan of 50 million swiss francs, wherewith to pay its officials for the time being, and to publish its program, which in the main lines aims at: Reforming the present electoral law, reintroducing administrative decentralization, and reorganizing the railway administration. Equitable treatment of minorities is promised, as well as a modification of the law concerning the conversion of agrarian debts. At the same time State finances are to be reorganized with the co-operation of the League of Nations.

This last plan, however, will not work out so smoothly, for the Opposition will do its utmost to stir up popular feeling against it. Even when two League delegates arrived in June, 1932, to examine the economic situation, the Press was unanimous in deprecating this public investigation and treating it as an offence against the country's dignity. The most widely read paper, having a daily circulation of some 40,000 copies, appeared with a leading article entitled "the day of shame."

565 Iorga, spoke as follows at Bucau: "The upper class is
641 totally devoid of an ideal, and of a moral mainspring, while the masses are not only tired and exhausted but impregnated by sullen dissatisfaction. The whole body of the State is in a condition of molecular dissolution." And this worthy, who according to the "Dreptatea" of May 19th, 1932, "compensated himself by seizing thirteen million lei on the evacuation of his tenure of the Ministry of the Interior in 1927," a feat which won for him at the time the appropriate name of "Vacuum cleaner," had the effrontery to conclude his oration with an appeal to the youth of the country to rally round him :—"We must change the moral structure of the country, but such a change cannot proceed from the old. We must appeal to the young intellectuals to join in the building of a new structure around us. Their place is not in the building which is tumbling down, but in those which are being built up. Come on, we are sure to win." If, indeed, Carol II has set his heart on saving his country by the help of such sorry individuals, we may well pity Rumania.

PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS:
THE ELECTORAL LAW

646 The present electoral law, which confers a premium on the
666 party which secures 40% of the total votes cast at an election and enables it to secure 70% of the mandates in the Chamber, was due to the initiative of the Bratianus who in 1926 aimed at installing General Averescu in office. They themselves had no need of this law, as at the elections which took place in 1927, 62% of the electors voted for them. It is a law that is favourable to groups devoid of popular support, as they can very easily, when in control of the administrative machinery, so manipulate the elections as to secure the requisite 40% which would confer on them a majority of 70% in the Chamber. So that as long as this law is not repealed there is little chance of a really popular party being elected to office, except if it be entrusted beforehand by the Crown with a mandate to call a general election.

It forms actually the great obstacle to a return to constitutional government, for, thanks to it, any coterie appointed to

power by the Crown can install itself in office, with the semblance of popular support, since it is relatively an easy matter for it to win the requisite 40%. It is somewhat surprising that the two main parties have not so far combined to secure the repeal of this law, which is the main instrument by which unpopular governments can be maintained in office, but their attitude may be explained by the fact that each is doubtful in present circumstances of obtaining a clear majority, while if by chance one of them were to be granted a mandate to call a general election it would easily gain a majority through the existing law.

The present law is even unfavourable to the formation of a coalition government, for any one of the constituent parties obtaining 40% of the votes at an election would secure a majority which would dispense it from the obligation of co-operating any longer with other parties. The only way in which the present law could remain operative would be to decide beforehand on the allocation of the seats between the groups forming the coalition, but this is hardly within the bounds of possibilities as each party would insist on securing the largest number of seats for itself, and endless conflicts would be engendered over the allotment of ministerial posts and other functions which would endanger the very existence of the coalition.

Neither is it possible to form a government from among prominent members of the various parties without the participation of the latter, as these would object to being weakened and would react against their former leaders, undermining their prestige and authority, so that in the end such a government would be opposed by the political parties and consequently lose its popularity.

The difficulties inherent in the present electoral law have become obvious through the repeated failures of M. Titulescu to form a Coalition Government and the only explanation we may find for its maintenance is that the King finds in it a useful instrument wherewith to support his nominees in power. In fact, during the (1932) spring session of the Chamber some deputies moved that the law be revised, and the government at first condescended, but later, owing probably to palace influences, the matter was dropped.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 Liberal party are indicative of the move toward a less inhibited industrial drive.

During the four years, then, between the depression and the inauguration of the Carolist dictatorship, it is possible to find inside Rumania, not to mention the external influences, three quite distinct factors making for the destruction of parliamentary government and the creation of an authoritarian regime:

1) Carol's own personality and his streamlined interpretation of the old-fashioned prerogatives of a monarch;

2) The unrest and growing extremism in broad sections of the population, which was finding a mouthpiece in the Iron Guard;

3) The economic policy of neoliberalism, which not only carried overtones of a more authoritarian state but through the centralization of economic power and control increased the possibilities of creating such a state.

656 While the general atmosphere of these years of neoliberalism re-
435 sembled Manoilescu's teachings in its industrial protectionism, increasing economic nationalism, and growing corporatism, there was an important difference: contrary to Manoilescu's thesis, agricultural protection was maintained and extended. During the years 1935 to 1937 there was a complex system of minimum prices, state purchases, and export bounties for wheat. By the law of 1935 the government paid a minimum price of 35,000 lei for 10 metric tons of wheat weighing 75 kilograms per hectoliter. An export premium financed by a tax on milling, paid 10,000 lei per ten-ton truckload of wheat, and 12,000 lei per truckload of flour. This premium was dropped with the rise in agricultural prices but was reapplied in
[647] 1938. A Wheat Valorization Office was formed to supervise these payments and to improve the quality of wheat. Similar steps were taken for medicinal plants, textile plants, and wool.

439 In 1936 Rumania signed a series of wheat export agreements with
435 Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, and other states. Foreign trade in grains was also assisted by an extremely complicated system of taxing imports to pay for export bounties and permitting the exporter to keep a portion of the free exchange obtained by his exports. In general these measures, which were aimed at maintaining the commercial balance, had a beneficial effect in supporting the price of agricultural products and in increasing exports. Between 1934 and 1937 agricultural prices rose from 44.1 (1929 = 100) to 64.6; the value of agricultural production increased from 42 to 62 billion lei; the value of cereal exports rose

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

were initiated, at least on paper. The 1938 Constitution, by prohibiting any public discussion of redistribution of property, showed the regime's attitude toward further expropriation as a remedy to the agrarian question. During the interwar years the governments were accustomed to state that large estates had virtually disappeared through the reforms of 1918–21, but after 1938 increased attention was paid to medium and large properties.[4] In the law of December 5, 1938 (amended January 7, 1939) the government established a Bank for the Industrialization and Valorization of Agricultural Products (BINAG), one of the recurrent efforts to provide agricultural credit. It is to be noted, however, that by Article 6 of this law the main credit functions of this bank applied only to farms of over 5 hectares, thus overlooking the majority of the peasantry.[5]

The spirit of the regime is well shown in an article by the agricultural economist Valeriu Bulgariu,[6] who announced that King Carol, "the first farmer in the land," had plans to change completely the existing conditions in agriculture by a twofold effort to organize small farming on rational lines and to encourage owners of medium-sized estates to increase the area of their holdings.

> When the great land division took place after the war, the agrarian reform went too far. . . . It assigned land to a very large number of villagers, and as a result subsequent successive divisions had increased the excessive subdivision of land. Reaction was necessary, and to-day economists and sociologists are in favor of the concentration of scattered property, a policy adopted by the government and all its agents.[7]

The desirability of concentrating peasant holdings was no new discovery, and Carol's regime for all its new direction was not a bit more successful than previous regimes in doing anything about it. The policy of creating larger holdings, also no novelty, was faced as always by the difficulty of creating them without dispossessing peasants in the process. According to Bulgariu,

4. See, for example, Aureliu Lăpedatu's article, "A Technical Study in Rumanian Cereals," *Correspondance économique roumaine* (April–June, 1938), pp. 1–28, in which the author discussed the manifest advantages of the large Rumanian farms in the use of technical equipment for rational cultivation.

5. The same thing is to be seen in the case of the cooperatives. According to A. Galan, "General Survey of the Co-operative Movement in Rumania," *Correspondance économique roumaine* (January–May, 1939), pp. 1–65, in 1939 one farmer in three was affiliated with one of the several agricultural cooperatives. Unquestionably the other two-thirds included the poorer peasants.

6. Valeriu Bulgariu, "Agrarian Policy in Rumania," *The Banker*, *49* (March, 1939), 344–348.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 346.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

661 proletarian justice and the introduction of the death penalty for treason, espionage, and economic sabotage, proved an efficient weapon
642 in this attack. The creation, announced in January, 1949, of People's Councils as the organs of local government was to provide the basic
[647] unit for the administrative hierarchy and to pave the way to a socialist society. In September, 1949, a State Control Commission was formed "to develop the spirit of responsibility toward public property, to wipe out bureaucracy, to verify the carrying out of government decrees, and to prevent sabotage in the work of building socialism." Avram Bunaciu, Pătrăşcanu's tougher successor at the Ministry of Justice, became head of this commission, which promised to be a very formidable instrument.

642 Along with the consolidation and coordination of the political and administrative apparatus came a marked shift in the party line from what it had been at the end of the war. The original program sought a government friendly to the U.S.S.R. and in which the workers' front would operate in coalition with middle-class parties. After 1947 not only the fact but even the pretense of collaboration was dropped. At the end of that year Gheorghiu-Dej said,

> The resignation of Tătărescu and his group means the removal of the last representatives of the reactionary bourgeoisie from the government; it means that the proletariat and its allies no longer share state power with the representatives of the exploiting classes. . . . The proletarian vanguard, in close alliance with the peasants and the progressive intelligentsia, is the backbone of the government.[15]

By 1949 the People's Democracy was explicitly defined as fulfilling the functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was distinguished from the Soviet form because it was possible, through the assistance of the U.S.S.R., to establish the dictatorship without civil war. In the People's Democracy, unlike the Soviet, the old state apparatus was not immediately smashed; bourgeois elements were retained for a time.

> But only with the establishment of People's Councils—local organs of state power built on broad democratic lines—will the new state apparatus be created, corresponding from top to bottom in every way with the aims and tasks of the new state and adjusted to the tasks of building Socialism. . . . The establishment of the People's Councils signifies

15. *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy* (January 1, 1948). (Published in Belgrade until December, 1948; subsequently in Bucarest.)

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

proposed measures was very similar to those brought forward repeatedly by various Rumanian governments in the preceding twenty-five years. Great publicity was given to state-operated agricultural machine stations which were to enable the peasant to mechanize his cultivation; from the beginning, however, this measure was regarded as a powerful potential lever in the hands of the state to direct agriculture. The promise of an agricultural machine industry was also a familiar item of earlier programs. Other recognizable projects were land reclamation, the creation of better experimental stations, improved agricultural education, more credit, a vigorous cooperative movement, development of agricultural industries, a scientific land survey, and the encouragement of animal husbandry.[28]

In 1945 the government created a National Cooperative Institute to assist agriculture, but its principal function appears to have been grain collection.[29] In November, 1946, appeared a new organ, REAZIM, an autonomous administration for developing agriculture, animal husbandry, and the use of agricultural machinery. REAZIM took over most of the state functions for agrarian improvement, rationalizing cultivation, supplying seeds and equipment, executing production plans, and managing agricultural machine stations.

Although many of these projects resembled those proposed by earlier regimes, it was obvious that the Communists had no intention of permitting Rumanian agriculture to proceed in its traditional rut. Even in the first phase of ostentatious silence about collective agriculture, the nature of the reforms, or rather the absence of certain reforms, provided an indication of developments to come. In its plans for agricultural improvement, the regime appears to have laid little stress on the desirability of consolidating holdings in private ownership, and the 1948 census showed the fragmentation of properties to be just as extreme as in 1941. The emphasis was upon increasing cereal output through mechanization rather than upon the intensified and diversified cultivation suitable to peasant farming. When, as a consequence of the 1946–47 famine, poor peasants began to sell their holdings, the government took steps to cancel sales to rich farmers. All these moves showed that it had no intention of fostering the growth of an independent, potentially capitalist peasantry on the

28. See, for example, the two pamphlets outlining the government's plans for intensifying livestock raising and for land reclamation: *Intensificarea creşterii animalelor în cadrul refacerii economice* (Bucarest, 1946), and *Îmbunătăţirile funciare în agricultura românească* (Bucarest, 1946).

29. In 1945 INCOOP was granted 57 billion lei for the collection of grain, of which 13 billion was for deliveries to the U.S.S.R., 8 billion to supply Soviet troops, 1 billion to supply the Rumanian army, and 35 billion for the civil population.

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

May 7th, 1932, solicited the King's intervention, and demanded that their emoluments, already four months in arrears, should be paid. Those of Balţi appealed to the Press on the same date, complaining that nothing had been paid them during the last five months. A general strike of the members of the teaching profession is being talked about if a remedy is not found. They are incensed by the fact that while public money is being squandered on useless objects and worthless individuals at Bucarest, humble functionaries in the provinces are left to famish. 871 875

The "Adeverul" of Jan. 19th, 1932, takes the Government to task for paying regularly its superior functionaries and neglecting the lower grades as well as its pensioners, and proceeds to relate particulars as astounding as they are scandalous, namely details about famishing teachers who are forced to beg for morsels of bread from their pupils! Such facts are really staggering, and when one recollects that France is generously advancing in instalments a loan of over one hundred million francs for the exclusive purpose of enabling the Rumanian State to pay its functionaries and pensioners, one demands what has become of this money and whether these funds have not again been diverted in the habitual manner to other purposes or pockets than those destined by the original providers of these sums? 652 647 871

The inept waste of public money at this critical period is simply revolting. The press daily reveals cases of gross extravagance and profligacy, while in the Chamber it has been admitted that the State keeps in its employ over 50,000 redundant functionaries. The "Argus" of May 5th, 1932, for instance, points out that the Ministry of Commerce and Industry maintains without any justification a sub-secretariat with a personnel of 116, among whom are twelve solicitors, one architect, one doctor of medicine, 14 chiefs of sections, etc, at an annual cost of 15,176,900 lei to the State, while on April 1st, 1932, the paper condemned at length the waste involved in the maintenance of a Faculty of Medicine at the University of Bucarest with a staff of 400 professors and assistants, while the total number of students matriculated to this faculty reached barely 900. 652 647

The paper likewise affirmed that there was a scandalous

647 652 prodigality displayed in the lavishing of big salaries on certain functionaries occupying inferior posts, salaries which were altogether disproportionate with their functions, and that this form of favouritism was rampant in every administration. These remarks of the "Argus" are certainly not amiss, and it could be added that the faculty of Law has a greater number of Professors than the corresponding faculty of the Paris University. In its issue for the 14th May it criticizes the War Ministry for undertaking the construction of an arch of triumph in Bucarest, a matter which obviously is not one of pressing importance. The same could also be said about the Royal Palace at Bucarest, which is being enlarged and renovated. The "Curentul" of 6th May, 1932, discloses that the State maintains a school of gamekeepers at an annual cost of 1,512,000 lei and demands its prompt closure. In its issue of May 19th, 1932, it virulently condemns the Government for allowing fifty of its parliamentary supporters to undertake a voyage of relaxation to Constantinople, Jerusalem and Cairo, during the Easter holidays of 1932, at the expense of the State. It may be remarked that Rumanian governments often recompense their partisans by attaching them to various missions sent abroad so that they may enjoy free trips. Thus at the recent Balkan Conferences it was remarked that the number of Rumanian delegates often equalled the joint numbers of Albanian, Bulgarian, Greek and Yugo-Slav representatives. The "Dreptatea" of May 19th, 1932, takes the Government to task for not paying its functionaries, yet finding some 800,000 lei for the purchase of books for the public libraries, and delegating to Paris two public functionaries at a cost of 40,000 lei for making the purchase of the said books from a French publishing firm.

The "Argus" of May 6th, 1932, in a leading article insists that this costly and luxurious organization with which the Rumanian State has been endowed should be got rid of, and order and sobriety introduced, for otherwise neither loans nor assistance from without will be of any use. In 1929 and 1931, 24 milliard lei were borrowed; of this sum almost nine milliards were absorbed to cover previous deficits, and yet to-day, assures the "Argus," Rumania is no better off.

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

There is a deficit of five and a half milliards left over from the years 1930/31, and of 1,100 millions arising from the first three months of the current year. In all, a deficit of six and a half milliard lei, which is entirely due to bad management. 652 647

To these budget deficits should be added some ten milliard lei, owing by the State to various local contractors and industries, the non-payment of which has caused an enormous prejudice to the internal economy of the country, since these enterprises, having all their liquid funds "frozen up," have been obliged to stop their activities and dismiss their staffs, thereby intensifying the crisis. 652

The legislation recently passed by the Government has also had a most unfortunate repercussion on the general situation. Thus the law sanctioning the cancellation of agrarian debts has resulted in the ruin of almost every bank in the country, for, with a few rare exceptions, all have directly or indirectly advanced money to agriculturists, who by this law, promulgated in April, 1932, are dispensed from their obligations to the extent of 50 %, while the remaining 50% is rendered recoverable within 30 years. No compensation whatever is granted by the State to the banks or to private individuals who had been unfortunate enough to have advanced money to the peasants, even on the security of a mortgage. The result is that almost every banking institution and thousands of people have been ruined at one stroke. 652 426

This measure has not met with the general approval even of the peasantry, for the most prosperous and enterprising among them, who naturally had placed their savings in the banks, have thereby lost their money, since all the rural banks have been rendered insolvent. The total cessation of all credit, which has naturally followed the suspension of banking operations in the rural districts, has caused immense loss to the farmers, who can no longer borrow money even for their most pressing needs. Another law, that of the so-styled "Liquidation Judiciaire," completes and intensifies the evils fostered by that of the "Concordat preventif," rendering all commercial debts practically irrecoverable without the condescension of the debtor. Such measures are 648 652

RUMANIA

648 indicative of the complete chaos which prevails in the minds
652 of those at the helm of the State, and who, seeing the *impasse* to which they have brought the country, appealed to France to send a mission of financial experts to devise means whereby Rumania may be extricated from the morass in which she has been entangled. This mission, headed by M. Rist, former adviser to the Rumanian National Bank, has arrived at the end of April, 1932, and is preparing a report which apparently is to recommend a drastic curtailment of the government staffs, and a reorganization of the tax-collecting system. Though exceedingly discreet, these advisers could not help expressing their astonishment at the bungling methods obtaining, and several higher officials in the Ministry of Finances have been summarily dismissed in consequence of their gross incompetence. Surprise, too, has been expressed at the number of officials employed in the Ministries
[647] of War and Public Instruction, 33,533 and 82,821 respectively, staffs more numerous than in the corresponding institutions in France, a country noted for its bureaucratism. The activities of these foreign advisers, who, after all, had been invited to come, and who are rendering a signal service to the country, have given rise to an outburst of xenophobia which is truly surprising. The press, with a few rare exceptions has protested against this immixture in the internal affairs of the State, which it pretends to regard as an affront to the national dignity, and has not wearied of insisting that Rumania should desist from paying her external debt service, which absorbs some six milliard lei per annum. Such a solution seems natural for a State which condones the annulment of all pecuniary engagements of the most numerous class of its citizens, as is provided in the law concerning the cancellation of agrarian debts. However, the Government seems unwilling to go so far, and it declares on all occasions that it will fulfil its foreign obligations in spite of the heavy sacrifices this decision may entail. Already it has taken the cue given by the French experts, and promptly dismissed five Under-Secretaries of State, early in May, 1932. The fall of the Tardieu Cabinet, which seemed disposed to extend a loan to Rumania on certain conditions, may now induce the Rumanian government to retrace its steps to a

10: Logic S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

certain extent, as apparently the new French government will be less inclined to make financial advances. Nevertheless the Cabinet will hesitate to assume the responsibility of openly defaulting, lest such action should be resented by France and to a lesser extent by England, and bring about Rumania's political isolation in face of Russia. So that, strange as it may seem, the dread of the Bolsheviks may contribute to the respect of engagements, the repudiation of which would be applauded by the latter.

The press organ of General Averescu, the "Indreptarea," in its issues of 12th and 18th May, 1932, contains some interesting comments on the findings of the French experts. It thus affirms that the experts have ascertained that there is a lack of control in the handling of the public funds, that there is a great redundancy of officials, and that huge frauds are committed at the expense of the State revenues. As an example, the case of the revenue from the Customs was given, which was estimated at 1,200 million lei, yet only yielded 400 millions, the balance of 800 millions having been fraudulently diverted to other pockets than that of the State. M. Rist, affirms the "Indreptarea," had recommended a compression of the expenses through the dismissal of a large number of functionaries, and the creation of a control of all payments made to the State so as to eliminate the numerous frauds to which the Budget deficit is principally due. If these reforms were effected, Rumania, according to M. Rist, could fulfil her external obligations. However, the findings of the experts were not likely to enhance the prestige of Rumania in Paris and it hardly seemed likely that the French would now keep their promise made to M. Argentoianu to give pecuniary assistance to Rumania, unless they were allowed to exert a control which would be tantamount to applying to Rumania the status of what in its essence would be a colonial dependency. Such measures, if their acceptance were advocated by the Government, would weaken its prestige to such an extent that it could no longer maintain itself in power, even if it enjoyed royal support. The weakening of its authority was manifested by its decision not to allow the holding of municipal elections which were to take place in

POLITICS.

POLITICAL PARTIES.

The Liberal or Bratianu Party.—The regular system of party government composed of two great political parties, the Liberal and Conservative, which had ruled alternatively in Rumania during the reign of Charles I, came to a close with the Great War, which brought about the dismemberment of the Conservatives. It was an arrangement based on the "spoils" system, and entailed a change of the majority of state officials with every change of government. This instability of tenure of all posts in the Civil Service necessarily encouraged corruption, but it may be said that it was a political system which for the time being made on the whole for stability and assured to Rumania an immunity from revolts and crimes by which other States of South Eastern Europe had distinguished themselves during the same period. 665 647

It is regrettable that both parties had neglected to create a contented class of peasant proprietors which would have constituted a sound bulwark against the onset of disintegrating forces let loose by the war. Instead, great land and financial monopolies closely connected with the personnel of these two political parties were fostered. 665

The agrarian revolution led to the elimination of the Conservatives, while the Liberal party retained its vigour owing to its grip on the economic life of the country. Owing to the absence of a powerful rival, the Liberal party became the supreme arbiter in the land during the first decade following the conclusion of the war. But, from a political party it had degenerated into a coterie aiming solely at the exploitation of the country for the benefit of its partisans, and, as such, though firmly established in the old kingdom, seeing that it constituted the main avenue by which one could accede to political life, it was unable to extend its influence in the newly incorporated provinces, where, fortunately, other political conceptions prevailed. 661 665

It had identified itself with the Bratianu family, which exerted an autocratic sway over it. After John Bratianu's death, in 1927, the leadership passed to his brother Vintila 665

563 would obtain equal grants, while officials would be nomin-
668 ated proportionately to the numbers of each nationality.

Count Bethlen, however, desired to justify the millions spent on the revisionist campaign and demanded the revision of frontiers, namely the retrocession of the Hungarian towns bordering on the frontier (Arad, Oradea-Mare, and Satu Mare). The advisers of King Carol considered that the present frontiers of Rumania were final, and in order that the idea of a personal union be rendered acceptable to the Rumanian people, all reference to a revision of frontiers should be dropped as it was sure to provoke a fiasco, all the more so since the Liberal party was known to be hostile to the idea of a personal union. The Rumanians would accept the scheme only in case Hungary agreed to recognize the actual frontiers without rectification and in exchange for the other concessions. It was on this point that the negotiations came to a standstill. Count Bethlen was bound by engagements towards the revisionist group. According to his conception, only Transylvania was to remain under Rumanian rule as a Duchy, while other parts were to revert to Hungary."

In conclusion the paper stated that "the interview left painful recollections with Count Bethlen who now talks of an alliance with Italy and Austria."

The Dobrudja.

563 If the state of the minorities in Transylvania may be stated
166 to be relatively satisfactory, taking into consideration the
657 general shortcomings of the Rumanian administrative
647 system, it is to be regretted that as much cannot be said of the Dobrudja, where both the Turkish and Bulgarian minorities, living in compact masses, have well-founded grievances. One of the main causes of dissatisfaction has been the ill-considered plan of the Rumanian Government to colonize southern Dobrudja with Kutso-Vlachs from Macedonia. Without making any adequate preparations to provide these people with dwellings, food and clothing, it proceeded to billet them in the small cottages of the Bulgarian and Turkish farmers which were barely sufficient for their owners. The newcomers being destitute, had no alternative to that of

a life of rapine, a matter which led to bloody encounters followed by mass arrests of the local population. The latter had been further embittered by the State seizing one-third of their lands, no compensation whatever being given, even in cases of these lands carrying growing crops. Such was the tension that had been created that on the advent of the Maniu government, both M. M. Vaida-Voevod and Mihalache considered it imperative to intervene in order to put a stop to the abuses and the provocations that both Turks and Bulgarians were subjected to. The intercession of the leaders of the National Peasant Party caused extreme ill-feeling in Chauvinist circles which fomented a violent agitation against what was represented as treachery to the Rumanians. This culminated in the assassination of an under-secretary of State by a hot-headed student. The Maniu government had delegated a commission to study on the spot the complaints of the population of the Dobrudja and prepare a report, a summary of which was published in the "Adeverul" of March 4th, 1929. In this we read that "the enterprise of colonizing the Dobrudja had been left without control and had become a means of exploitation and the furthering of personal interests," that the system of quartering the colonists on the Bulgarian and Turkish inhabitants "led to an unbearable state of affairs causing endless conflicts." As for the situation of the colonists, the report shows that the ineptitude of the Rumanian authorities transcends all imagination, "out of 10,000 heads of families only 15 had received monetary help from the government, the lands that were to be allotted to the colonists remained in possession of State functionaries. The colonists had no houses nor timber wherewith to construct them." As a consequence of this report the Maniu Government created a special commissariat for building houses for the colonists, 1,257 of which were built in 1929, 938 during 1930, and 1,200 in the course of 1931, at an average cost of 44,000 lei each.

The situation, unfortunately has not improved, and murders of Turks and Bulgarians by the Kutso-Vlachs are frequent. What is most regrettable is that they are left practically unpunished, as has been the case with the murderer of one of the leaders of the Bulgarian minority, the

RUMANIA

[166] late C. M. Stephanov, who was also a member of the
657 Rumanian Senate. The main cause of the effervescence that
563 still subsists is this ill-advised scheme of planting the destitute
[647] Kutso-Vlachs on the farms of the aboriginal inhabitants, proof of which has been given by M. Georoceanu in a booklet he has published. M. Georoceanu was formerly a member of the Rumanian Senate during M. Maniu's tenure of office.

It may be added that the Bulgarians complain of not
[658] having a single school in their villages, and that when they presented petitions for opening such their signatories had
[659] been prosecuted. Bulgarian priests are no longer allowed to be nominated, and those that still remain are being gradually replaced by Rumanians who officiate naturally in their own language which is not understood by their flocks. A lesser
[204] wrong which receives the condemnation only of the intellectuals, is the ban on Bulgarian newspapers and periodicals. Their introduction into Rumania is prohibited, and though a few months ago the Bucarest press announced that this embargo would be raised, yet as late as April, 1932 the police authorities in the Dobrudja had received no intimation of
563 this commendable measure. It is obvious that all these
648 grievances could easily be removed with a little goodwill on
657 the part of the Rumanian government, and to the westerner it is incomprehensible that the latter should make no effort to safeguard the happiness of hundreds of thousands of human beings whose destiny has been entrusted to its hands. For it is not only the elementary duty of a government to care for its subjects, but in this case even political reasons dictate the following of a more humane and civilized policy. The bulk of the population being Bulgarian, and having for forty years enjoyed an independent existence, is utterly unaccustomed to such maladministration as it is now experiencing. It is therefore natural that it should be soliciting the intercession of the Bulgarian government under whose suzerainty it lived until recently. This is a course that creates friction between the two governments, keeps open an old sore, and embitters and strains relations between Bulgaria and Rumania. The former country would incur every sacrifice in order to ensure Rumania's friendship, and

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumanja ED1
Dobrudja
Bessarabia

it is most regrettable that Rumania, on account of this constitutional impassibility from which she suffers, should neglect the accomplishment of a simple duty that would simultaneously ensure the pacification of a province and the friendship of a neighbouring State. Even Sir Ian Hamilton in one of his books extended this advice to Rumania: "If she values her life let her make it up with Bulgaria whilst she is in the gate." (The Friends of England, p. 130). But so far this soldierly exhortation has not been heeded.

Bessarabia.

"Twelve years of Rumanian rule has alienated Bessarabia more than a century of Russian administration," declared Constantine Stere, the veteran Bessarabian politician who may be considered as the mouthpiece of the population of that hapless region. If one wishes indeed, to form an idea of what the combined evils of corruption, ineptitude, nepotism, and inefficiency can bring upon a land he should visit Bessarabia. It is a standing disgrace, a festering sore, a danger point that will cause a fresh conflagration the moment the Russians across the Dniester can divert their attention from their economic plans to engage in world politics. Such is the desperation of the local population, their utter aversion to Rumanian misrule, the pessimism with which they regard every scheme emanating from Bucarest, that if the Russians would decide to cross the Dniester they would be hailed as liberators.

Not that the Bessarabians cherish any particular affection for the Russians and for communistic dogmas, but because there is after all a limit to human endurance to evils arising from such glaring maladministration. There is no hope for any amelioration; the Bucarest administration has demonstrated its incapacity to reform itself, and the only hope there may be of placating Bessarabia is the granting of a regional autonomy that may save her from casting longing glances at Bolshevik Russia across the Dniester. As the writer does not wish to be accused of exaggeration or of being imbued with unfriendly feelings towards Rumania, he will proceed to give a description of the position in Bessarabia by an interpolation of various excerpts culled from newspapers that he

F

323 bought at random during his brief stays in Rumania. These
647 quotations have not been specially selected and they may be considered as generally descriptive of what is being said on Bessarabia in the Rumanian press. If one were to study the latter assiduously there is no doubt that a vast quantity of incriminating matter could easily be adduced to form a most damning indictment of the incapacity of Rumanian governments.

661 "Lupta," Dec. 8th, 1931:—After the union, the men who
563 were most compromised were dispatched there to work for
647 the spiritual unification of the nation; at any rate they were individuals utterly incapable of understanding the ideal or the scope of the mission which had been confided to them. The administrative authorities were constituted entirely of the scum of the political parties of the old kingdom. It is to these social dregs that the errand of infusing into the Bessarabians a sentiment of confidence in us was entrusted. How they fulfilled this mission, how they alienated even those who trusted us, is well known. Bessarabia was and remains a sort of land of promise for those desirous to grow rich quick . . . not by honest means . . . after a self-imposed exile accepted solely for this purpose. Enrichment being the sole initial and final aim of these propagandists sent out from the old kingdom, they inaugurate a state of affairs which conforms with their pursuits. Persecutions of all sorts, inquisitorial constraints of all manifestations of collective and individual liberty. All corners of Bessarabia were represented as fertile for the culture of Bolshevism. For thirteen years we have heard of nothing else concerning this province save terrorist plots and communist actions all purporting to aim at the dissolution of the Rumanian State. Those interested, created purposely a state of affairs that completely denaturalized existing facts and finally succeeded in imposing their conception on "the administrative machinery of Bessarabia," &c. The paper concludes by relating how workmen and intellectuals are persecuted, imprisoned, subjected to all sorts of vexations by the Rumanian authorities at Kichineff and at other urban centres.

The "Cuvantul" of Feb. 20th, 1929, designates Bessarabia as "the sick man of Rumania." The Bratianu

1) Bessarabia with Rumania—Analyst] 2) [illegible]—Analyst]

régime had consummated Bessarabia's ruin, and its people were dying of hunger. The irruption of the Rumanian army was not the triumphal arrival of a liberator but the invasion of a hunger-stricken horde. The requisitions for obtaining supplies both for the army and for the population of Moldavia, on account of the haste and disorder with which they were carried out, assumed the aspect of revolting spoliations and led the natives to ask "what sort of brothers are these hogs and these robbers?"

"Our army's attitude was both offensive and aggressive, in conformity with the usages of war, in short, that of an army of occupation in an enemy country. When the time came to organize the civil administration of Bessarabia, very few of the regular functionaries agreed to be transferred to a remote and unsafe province. . . . Adventurers, those who had nothing to lose and who were under the threat of being dismissed or imprisoned, accepted to join in this "campaign to Siberia" in the hope of being rehabilitated or of becoming rich. For a long time the transfer of a civil functionary to Bessarabia was considered as a redoubtable disciplinary sanction. . . . ."

"The Bessarabians have found out what elements we can contribute to the restoration of their former material prosperity. These are poverty, demoralization, political debauchery, a decade of violence, fraud and illegality. Hence the permanent hostility with which they regard us; a state of irritability which is maintained owing to the prevailing wretchedness."

The main responsibility for this astounding state of affairs should be ascribed to the Bratianus, who inaugurated and maintained this system for ten years. When finally they were ejected from office, their Bessarabian partisans began to quarrel among themselves and attack most virulently their former regional leader, M. Inculeţ. They started a paper called "The Voice of Bessarabia" in 1929, in which their former leaders were denounced as vulgar and dangerous adventurers, robbers and criminals. As for their former local chief Inculeţ, he was accused of having retired to Jassi in order to enjoy in peace the thousands of millions he had accumulated by a triple betrayal of Russia, Bessarabia, and

RUMANIA

000 no better than a pig." If we take into consideration that according to L. T. Hobhouse "the whole system of moral tradition governing the life of a society is evolved from the practical impulses and feelings at work in the past and present," we may easily comprehend that the aspects of social life as revealed by current events in Rumania, show a natural process which could not be altered or deflected except by titanic efforts of re-education. We have no right, therefore, to blame the Rumanians for what we may consider to be grave lapses, but which they prefer to interpret differently, for after all, as A. R. Wallace affirms in his "Social Environment and Moral Progress," "morality is not wholly due to any inherent perception of right or wrong conduct, but is to some extent a matter of convention varying with the degree and kind of social development attained." And this opinion is confirmed by L. T. Hobhouse, who, in his book "Morals in Evolution" states "the instinctive in human morality is by no means an unfailing power implanted by nature in all men to distinguish right from wrong." Rumanian youth continues to cherish the traditional
461 Phanariot ambition of enriching itself through access to a
585 public post; other careers are neglected and looked askance at. They are left to the more enterprising Jewish element, which owing to its energy and capacity has taken complete control of Rumanian trade and banking. Through the neglect of the commercial professions, Rumanians have hampered the formation of a middle class which, more than any other element, is conducive to the creation of stability
647 and a vigilant public opinion. The public functionary class
465 is an unstable element, and as it enjoys no security of office
661 but depends for its tenure on the favours of politicians in power, it naturally follows that it easily lends itself to corruption, and all the more so seeing that it is disgracefully underpaid. In a lettter published by the "Argus" on 16th May, 1932, it was averred that the number of public functionaries amounted to 500,000. (Including the staff employed by municipalities). The number could easily be halved, and the administration would stand to gain both in efficiency and thoroughness by such a reduction. Greece, with a population amounting to one-third that of Rumania, had a

total of only 43,943 functionaries (exclusive of those employed by municipalities. Even this figure was considered excessive, and a decree was enacted prohibiting for a series of years the creation of fresh posts and the nomination of new functionaries to vacant posts in order that their number might be reduced. In Rumania such a measure is hardly likely to be enacted, for every politician must have the possibility of providing the more important of his electors with sinecures, for otherwise how would he induce them to vote for him? This is how the principle of public solidarity is understood and applied! Amongst us, state functionaries are considered as the servants of the public, in fact their function is revealed by the appellation under which they are designated; they are, in fact as well as in name, public servants. Rumanian functionaries are, one must admit, on the whole both courteous and obliging, especially to strangers, but such services as are rendered must be requited. Since the State barely remunerates them, it is obvious they have to secure their means of livelihood somewhere. Of course no tariff is posted up in Government offices as to the amount of pecuniary compensation expected for the services demanded; *that* is a matter left to the discretion of the person soliciting the service, but a solatium of some sort has to be given to the functionary, as otherwise you will be made to feel the tediousness of waiting in a usually stuffy office. It is not surprising that such methods have gradually evinced probity from amongst the administrative personnel and made room for a venality which is occasionally exhibited so brazenly as to impel such an attentive observer as Mr Charles Wood to declare "there is nobody and nothing in Rumania who and which cannot be bought with money." (Contemporary Review, February, 1921.) Though the country teems with acts of maladministration there are yet many excellent, honest and plodding functionaries, who are all the more meritorious since they are neither properly remunerated nor encouraged for their loyal service to the State. This proves that if the Civil Service was placed beyond the withering influence of politics, stability of occupation guaranteed, and decent remuneration offered, a remedy for the ills which afflict Rumania would easily be devised. There

647 are certainly no insuperable obstacles to the removal of what
465 constitutes a drain on the strength and probity of the country,
661 which is being visibly weakened in every sphere of administration.

The following article, which was published in the "Lupta" of Dec. 17th, 1931, is instructive as to the manner in which public functionaries behave in order to supplement the scanty salary they draw from the State and which generally does not suffice to keep them alive.

647 It is obvious that no civilized State would tolerate methods
651 which in Rumania are benevolently winked at. There is no
499 doubt that the evil could easily be remedied if functionaries were decently paid. The increased outlay for the State
661 which this would involve would be largely compensated by a more conscientious performance of duty by the administrative staff. For instance, it is well known that owing to the high duties in force, smuggling on a colossal scale is being carried on with the connivance of officials, with the result that the State is defrauded of millions. M. V. Madgearu, former Minister of Finances, openly admits it in his book "Rumania's New Economic Policy," published in English, on page 39 of which we come across this astounding statement: "It has been shown that while pre-war Rumania imported about 70,000 kilos of natural silk, united Rumania registered the importation of only 1,000 kilos in 1927. It is well understood that the rest has been imported through smuggling." On a rough computation this item alone would account for an annual loss of some 50 million lei to the revenue.

But, apparently, blackmail is even more lucrative than smuggling, according to the article referred to in the "Lupta":—

647 "Truly, *smuggling* constitutes a source of big revenues for
651 the State. Not bona-fide smuggling which involves the
661 introduction of goods into the country without the disbursement of duties. This latter sort of smuggling is never discovered, or if discovered is rapidly hushed up with the connivance of the ablest pillars of the Ministry. The principal sources of revenue from smuggling are derived from the hypothetical variety, when for instance an anony-

mous letter of denunciation reaches the Ministry concerning 647
a commercial or industrial firm. This is immediately followed 651
by a close investigation of the firm's books. Though no 661
trace of contraband may have been found, yet rumours of high fines to be imposed on this firm get into circulation. Its owners make desperate efforts to dissipate them. The firm's bank announces that its overdraft will be suspended until the matter is cleared up. The merchant who cannot wait for a judicial examination of the charge brought against him, nor engage in protracted discussions with the Ministry, finding his credit at the bank has been suspended, endeavours to strike a bargain. He will offer 10%, occasionally even only 1% of the amount of the fine with which he has been threatened. The State pockets 80% of the sum thus offered and the zealous inspector who has "discovered" the reported contraband appropriates the remaining 20%. Why should these sums indeed be rejected? Such tactics, when employed by a clever functionary or inspector, will soon allow him to become the owner of palaces and buildings in the capital. Such is the just reward of labour!"

And in conclusion the "Lupta" advises the Ministry of Finance as to the measures it ought to take to prevent merchants from suffering unduly from the blackmailing activities of its financial inspectors!

That blackmailing and extortion are not unusual practices 647
may be inferred from the following announcement appearing 661
in a Bucarest daily on 15th March, 1929:—"The tribunal of 697
Cluj having received an endless number of complaints and denunciations against Lieut.-Colonel Mihai, of the gendarmery, lately occupying the post of Police-Prefect at Cluj during the Liberal régime, has transmitted them to the judicial procurator. The investigations which are being pursued prove that the charges are well founded and that this Liberal terrorist had extorted moneys through blackmail from high class people while he was police prefect in the capital of Transylvania. Those who suffered most from the exercise of the functions of the accused (sic), were merchants, who, if they failed to deliver to the prefect the sums or goods demanded, were subjected to tortures and heavy fines and were threatened with the closing of their

RUMANIA

647 shops and the confiscation of their goods." The most sensa-
697 tional administrative affair in Rumania was undoubtedly
that of the prison scandals of 1926, which gave rise to lively
661 press comments throughout the continent and thanks to
which the author of these scandals won widespread notoriety.

The following details concerning the methods in vogue in penitentiaries were given by the Bucarest "Socialismul" on May 16, 1926, on the occasion of the reported arrest of the notorious Cernat. . . . . "Directors and warders, seeking to grow rich rapidly, divide among themselves the moneys destined for the prisons. They appropriate both the food and the clothing set apart for those under arrest, they extort money from those better off, receive bribes in exchange for privileges, or force prisoners to work for them. The arrest of Major Cernat, who was appointed Director-General of Prisons while awaiting his appointment as Chief of the State Police Service, is no satisfaction for us. For we know that this man will be as well off in prison as at his home. We know further that in a few weeks or in a few months he will walk out free, with his head erect, for in our well-ordained country a big swindler has never been condemned or imprisoned, indeed it would be a crying injustice were such a thing to happen, since all our rulers have made their fortunes by similar dishonest practices."

697 The "Aurora" of June 3rd, 1926, reported the arrest of the directors of the penitentiaries of Doftana and Galatz, and gave details concerning the sums embezzled by these worthies. The system of imprisonment inaugurated by these clever rogues, however, deserves being enlarged upon as it is both amusing and illuminating. The following lucid and jocund report appeared in the French newspaper "Paris-Midi" on 17th June, 1926:—

"The Thousand and one joys of Rumanian Prisons."

"Bucarest. June 17th. Major Cernat, Director-General of Rumanian prisons, as well as the directors of several other penitentiary establishments, have been arrested. They are accused of failing to carry out their duties and of having shown too great indulgence towards the prisoners. Bucarest newspapers publish astounding details following on the

such methods the conviction is instilled among the humble 000
and meek that sanctions, and punishments as provided by
the law are only destined for them, while the higher classes
are exempt from penalties. . . ."

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION FOLLOWING THE WAR

At the end of the War Rumania was confronted with a 647
series of problems, the magnitude and difficulty of which
might well have strained an economic organization far more [727]
powerful than her own. The assimilation of the various seg-
ments that had belonged to the neighbouring States, of a
total area and population about as large as that of the pre-
war kingdom, was a formidable task that necessarily de-
manded the utmost exertions and self-sacrifice on the part of
the Central Government. The impossibility of recruiting an
adequate administrative staff for the newly-annexed terri-
tories, forced the central authorities to draw on their own of
the old kingdom, with the result that the vacancies created
were filled with inexperienced persons whose appointment
was, according to the prevailing fashion, mainly due to
favouritism. This resulted in a serious lowering of the stan-
dard of the Civil Service, which even during pre-war times
had never been distinguished for its efficiency. There were
plausible arguments for avoiding the enlistment of men of
ex-enemy nationality at times when it was necessary to
guard above all against every subversive movement against
the integrity of the State; but at the same time the pressing
of men into the service of the State who were in no way
proof against the seductions of easily-acquired wealth in-
volved risks that were equally detrimental to the State. On
the one hand it undermined the financial stability of the
State by deflecting from the national exchequer to the
pockets of its servants resources destined for the former;
and on the other hand, these shortcomings of its agents
gravely compromised the prestige of the State in the newly-
annexed regions, where such a system of subornation and
corruption was something of a novelty.

BUDGET AND NATIONAL REVENUE

It is obvious that the present administrative machinery is too sumptuous an affair and that Rumania cannot afford to continue to live on such an ostentatious scale. Retrenchment is imperatively needed as well as a rapid return to methods of austerity, however disagreeable these may be to a people who are naturally inclined to profligacy. A drastic economy could be effected by the dismissal of well over 50,000 State functionaries who are superfluous. The *Revista Functionarilor publici*, their mouthpiece and organ, admits that in 1914 the number of State functionaries was 90,334. The war brought about a territorial increase of 216 per cent, so that proportionately the number of functionaries should be 195,133, but by 1930 there were as many as 245,187, or about 50,000 more than necessary. But apparently this total does not disclose the whole truth, for the writer was able to ascertain that while, according to the figures published in the above paper, the Ministries of Public Instruction, Home Affairs, and War had respectively 68,977, 28,894, and 32,630 public officials at the end of 1931, the numbers figuring on their respective pay-lists were 82,821, 31,318, and 33,533. To these enormous armies of officials should be added the staffs employed by the municipalities, etc., which would bring the total number up to nearly half a million. That public opinion is fairly alert on the matter and expects a drastic cutting down may be inferred from the following open letter published in the *Argus* for 16th May, 1932, which is of particular interest from many points of view:

"Rumania has a population of 18 millions, of which only 13 millions are Rumanians by race. Out of the 500,000 public functionaries 99 per cent are Rumanians by race, and a bare 1 per cent is recruited from among Hungarians, Germans, Jews, and Ukrainians. The proportion of the non-Rumanian elements in the public services is therefore infinitesimal, which proves that some 5 millions of people can live without constituting a charge to the budgets of the State, municipalities, and 'régies.' Why should not Rumanian functionaries once dismissed from the public services be able to fend for themselves as do those members of the ethnic minorities who receive no support from the budgets?"

It is admitted publicly that over 100,000 functionaries

647 could be dismissed without the working of the administra-
652 tive machine being impaired in any way, and several instances are given of the plethora of officials. M. Bratanescu, deputy for Tighina, for example, pointed out in the Chamber that in his town, with a population of 31,698, there were 130 teachers, but as there were not enough children for each to have a full class, whenever an inspector came down, each teacher used to borrow children from the other classes in order to complete the number of his own so that he might escape being reprimanded by the inspector.

652 Another head on which various economies could be
657 effected is pensions, which absorb about one-fifth of the total revenue, and many of which are served out to people who have not the slightest justification for drawing them. The tendency to spend overmuch for the upkeep of the social services is a characteristic trait of Rumania and was noticed and commented on many years ago by one of her distinguished social writers, M. C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, in his work "Neoiobâgia." Referring to the period 1910–1911, he pointed out that the State budget and those of the communes absorbed over one-third of the national revenue, and what remained for the subsistence of the population amounted to 123 gold lei per head, or almost 4,000 lei, a figure closely approximating to the 3,955 lei which, according to the calculations given above, represented the net income per head for
647 1930. The above-cited writer condemned very caustically
652 the profligate methods of the administration as likely to bring the State to ruin:

"By withdrawing annually from production these big sums and lavishing them on a parasitic bureaucracy, the State sets the example of a mad waste . . . by letting the bureaucracy spend extravagantly what the other classes create by hard toil, people form the illusion that this country is very prosperous and that it is easy to live in it comfortably. . . . This hypertrophy of the State organism is one of the most pernicious sicknesses which attack modern societies." (p. 455.)

647 It is indeed a great pity that no political party ever en-
651 deavoured to tackle the problem of thoroughly overhauling the administrative machine of the country, but that instead

a policy of drift has so far been practised. The alarming 647
falling-off in the revenue receipts is nevertheless a disquiet- 651
ing sign which ought to impress sufficiently the Rumanian authorities, and rouse them from their apathy, if they are to avoid the disaster they are heading for. For the drying up of the revenue is not entirely due to fraud, but also to the gradual pauperization of the masses. The *Cuvantul* of December 29th, 1928 wrote as follows:

"There is no country where fiscal fraud is so intensely 657
practised as in Rumania . . . though fraud is due partly to the unjust distribution of the fiscal charges. A sane fiscal policy should take into consideration that the ratepayer is poor. We should not be far wrong if we affirmed that at least 80 per cent of the population are in debt. If these 80 per cent of the population toil in order to pay off their debts, or only the interest on their debts, how can the State expect to raise from them what it needs for the public services? . . ."

Rumania's main source of income is her export trade. All
other items are of secondary importance and can hardly off- 457
set the important payments she is obliged to make on behalf of her indebtedness abroad. During the years 1930 to 1931 there was an excess of exports over imports which enabled her to meet her payments abroad, all the more so since foreign capital invested in Rumania is no longer productive and therefore next to no interest on it is being actually remitted. On the contrary, it may be said that, owing to the crisis, foreign enterprises in Rumania require financial aid which is being supplied from abroad, a process which helps to offset the total of foreign payments Rumania has to make. An automatic equilibrium has therefore been attained which allows Rumania to face her payments abroad without drawing on her gold reserves or necessitating her to have recourse to foreign borrowing, and this situation will be maintained so long as she continues to have plentiful harvests as those of 1930 and 1931 and her population remains in its present state of poverty, which prevents it from purchasing foreign articles, a state of things which explains the present excessively low figure of imports. Of course these recent years cannot be taken as representative of normal times, and for this purpose a table showing the balance of payments during

728 made, that "it is to be hoped that such exaggerated demands will be disallowed at the future Conference. The possession of Arad, with its poignant sentimental associations for the Magyar race, would be a permanent challenge to Hungary and would embitter tenfold her relations with Rumania, which must at the best be strained for many years to come." ("Rumania and the Great War," page 96.)

With regard to Bucovina, Rumania secured more advantageous frontiers than those the Allies had promised to concede her in 1916. She obtained the line of the river Dniester as her northern frontier.

The decision with regard to the Banat was not so favourable for Rumania, for the Yugoslavs insisted on incorporating the western part, which was peopled mainly by Serbs, and they protested against the allotment to another Power of a territory which stretched right up to their capital, Belgrade, and would have placed the latter under a permanent menace from another state. In consequence the experts of the Conference had to adjust the frontier as best they could, guided mainly by the principle of nationality. The arrangement is not particularly auspicious, as a small Yugoslav enclave cuts the railway line Temesvar (Temişoara)—Bazias, and leaves the latter town isolated from Rumania. The various nationalities inhabiting the Banat are, however, so intermingled that it was next to impossible to reach a more satisfactory solution.

THE POST-WAR PERIOD.

661 On Bratianu's[1] resignation, in consequence of the
• 648 presentation of an ultimatum by the Allies in October,
[728] 1919, King Ferdinand formed a Cabinet presided over by General Vaitoanu, with a mandate to call a general election.

A strong majority composed of heterogeneous left groups was returned, out of which a Cabinet presided over by Dr Vaida-Voevod was formed. He entered upon the difficult and ungrateful task of dispelling misunderstandings with the Entente and signing the Peace treaties. No sooner, however, had this been accomplished, than Dr Vaida-Voevod, while

1 [head of Rumanian delegation to the peace conference, acting prime minister, and leader of Liberal Party -- Analyst]

465
241

different seasons in 1942, the employer also receiving food :—

Period	*Men*	*Women*	*Juveniles**
Spring—June 15th	75	50	40
Summer—Sept. 1st	100	75	50
Autumn and winter	60	40	30
Average for 1937†	40	32	21

(i.e. official money wages have almost doubled and food is now supplied.)

* 14-18 years. † Without food.

465
647

3. Civil Service

In August, 1941, the average monthly wage for a civil servant was 2,200-4,000 lei (presumably for non-administrative grades). Beyond this there is no information on actual rates paid, except for a reference in December 1942 to "Ministry Advisers," whose wages were 72,000 lei per month. However, there are frequent references to increased wages for state officials, and especially of increased family allowances, e.g. in October 1941 the allowance per month for children of civil servants was 500 lei per child. By October 1942 it had been increased to 750 lei per child for families living in the country, and 1,000 lei per child for families living in the town.

[57b]

113, 648 ED1 Rumania

[For the text of the Treaty of Guarantee between Poland and Rumania, signed at Geneva, January 15, 1931, see EA1 Poland, 31: Retinger, Category 116, pp. 237-239.]

113, 648

Rumania EDl

[For a discussion of Soviet policy vis-à-vis Rumania, as exemplified in the establishment of the Moldavian Soviet Republic and the annexation of Rumanian Bessarabia, see 21: Kolarz, Rl Soviet Union, category 116, pp. 150-152. Bibliographic notes appear on pp. 161-162.]

648, 665, 642, 433

Rumania ED1

[For the economic and political position of Rumania under Soviet control since the death of Stalin, see 85: Zinner, R1 Soviet Union, category 116, Pp. 157B-163B.]

113, 439, 648 Rumania ED1

[For a discussion of the nature, scope and probable future trends (up to 1970) of Soviet economic relations with the East European satellites since World War II, and the degree of inter-satellite economic integration, see 60: Bergson, R1 Soviet Union, category 116, pp. 321-355]

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

642 these "antiquated" forms and sancrosanctly adopted the constitutional tenets of Stalinism.[2]

Compared to the earlier document the new Constitution contains certain features which seem to corroborate the complete Sovietization of the country. In fact, were it not for political expediency in the field of foreign affairs, the incorporation of the People's Republic of Rumania into the USSR as a constituent member would be only a matter of sheer formality, necessitating merely the amending of the USSR Constitution.

[648] Short of this final step, however, the new Rumanian Constitution provides, in an almost unique manner in constitutional law, for the freezing of Rumania's foreign policy by incorporating in the text friendship and alliance with the USSR. Whereas the former Constitution completely failed to mention the USSR, the present document refers to the Soviet Union and the Red Army not less than five times. The USSR is depicted as the liberator of the country, whose friendship ensures "the independence, state sovereignty, development, and flourishing" of Rumania (Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Introductory Chapter and Article 3).

[565] The basic features of the new society are outlined in Chapter I. It defines the People's Republic of Rumania as a "state of the working people of town and countryside" (Article 1). The political foundation of the state is the "alliance of the working class with the working peasantry . . . in which the leading role is held by the working class" (Article 2). Thus, for the first time in a Rumanian constitution, the preponderance of the working class is formally acknowledged. Furthermore, the central strategic position of the Communist 665 Party and its implicit identification with the state is, as in the USSR, legally 642 declared (Article 86). In fact, notwithstanding the discrepancies existing between the constitutions of the people's republics, their main difference from the Stalin Constitution has thus far concerned the legal position of the Party. Whereas Article 126 of the USSR Constitution openly refers to the Party as the vanguard in "the struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system," the satellite constitutions typically make no mention of its role. The Hungarian Constitution of 1949, which until lately was considered as the most advanced, faintly refers to it in Article 56. In reference to the right of organizing, this Article asserts that the state "in fulfilling its tasks . . . bases itself . . . on the working class, led by its *advanced guard* (emphasis supplied) and supported by the democratic unity of the whole people." Even the new Polish Constitution of 1952 fails to acknowledge the exclusive role of the Communist Party. Although the provisions of Article 72 have merely theoretical importance, as

642 [2] In fact, all component chapters of the Constitution proper—the Social Structure, the Supreme Organ of State Power, the Organs of State Administration, the Local Organs of State Power, the Courts and the Prosecutor's Office, the Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens, the Electoral System, the Arms, Flag and Capital of the Rumanian People's Republic and the Procedure for Amending the Constitution—have an equivalent in the Soviet Constitution. Indeed, some of the articles have been copied verbatim.

III. Churches under the Communist Regime

1. Basic Provisions

175
642

Although Romania has been ruled by Soviet Russia since its surrender in August 1944 and is actually governed by a Communist Cabinet appointed by Moscow in March 1945, the beginning of the Communist regime is set as of January 1, 1948, e. g., after the King's abdication and the creation of a People's Republic, since the main revolutionary social reforms have been enacted after that date.

648
798

Romania signed and ratified the Peace Treaty with the Allied Nations (Official Gazette No. 199 of August 30, 1947). According to clear stipulations of the treaty Romania is bound to translate into national legislation its main provisions and apply them strictly. Article 3 of the Peace Treaty reads:

> "Romania shall take all measures necessary to secure to all persons under Romanian jurisdiction, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship..." (Italics supplied.)

The freedom of religious worship was, therefore, considered as a fundamental one and the Romanian Government was supposed to make no discrimination between the different churches of rites of various denominations existent and practiced within its boundaries.

642
798

The first attempt to comply with these provisions was made through the new Romanian Constitution enacted on April 11, 1948.

another denominational jurisdiction. Disregarding the ecclesia tical rules of the denomination, the decree provides that the assets of the parish are transferred to the denomination chosen by the parishioners who leave the parish in proportion to their number as compared with those remaining in the parish. In case 75 percent leave a creed, its entire assets, including the church building, are transferred to that adopted by the parishioners. The implication of this rule is discussed <u>infra</u> under 5. 659 425

The religious denominations may maintain with other countries only such relations as are of a religious nature and they must be carried after approval of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and through the medium of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. These provisions were intended to interrupt direct contact between the Roman Catholic Church in Romania and the Holy See, required by the dogma and organization of the Roman Catholic Church. 659 648 794

Any direct communication by Catholic prelates in Romania with the Holy See could be brought, in view of these provisions, under the provisions of the Decree of August 12, 1950, on state security which threatens with the death penalty:

a) "Treason to the country, rendering service to the enemy or causing prejudice to the power of the state;

b) Procurement and the transmission of state secrets to a foreign or enemy power;. . ."

Unfortunately, there were several instances in which expulsion or conviction was imposed upon the prelates and minister

of the Roman Catholic Church in connection with these provisions. 659
Reference is made to the case of Archbishop O'Hara, Monsignor 648
Guido Del Mesti and Monsignor J. Kirk expelled on July 6, 1950, and other members of nunciature who were convicted on July 4, 1950, the case of Bishop Augustino Pasche, on September 10, 1951, and four other Catholic priests on September 7, 1951.

By Decree No. 178 (Official Gazette No. 178 of August 4, 659
1948) the Minister of Religious Affairs was reorganized to fit the new tasks and was empowered to exert complete control over all religous denominations in the country.

Later on, by Decree No. 37 (Official Gazette No. 30 of February 5 1949) its administration has been simplified in fulfillment of a general order requiring the dismissal of a number of public servants.

After this reduction in personnel, the Ministry of Religious Affairs concentrated only on control and laic matters and dissolved divisions dealing with some spiritual questions, documentation and studies.

The law for general regulation of the creeds has been, 659
later on, implemented by Decree No. 243 (Official Gazette 217 795
of September 18, 1948) by which the number of dioceses for each recognized creed was strictly fixed on the basis of 750,000 worshippers per diocese, as follows:

Greek Orthodox	17 dioceses
Greek Catholic	2 dioceses
Roman Catholic	2 dioceses

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 thereafter they drifted apart again.[13] In January, 1925, the National
665 party of Transylvania temporarily fused with the historian Iorga's National Democratic party (to which Argetoianu now belonged). In May, 1925, a United Opposition, including Iorga's group, Maniu's Transylvanians, and the Peasant party, was temporarily established and demanded the resignation of the government. Averescu did not join the opposition bloc and it was rumored that he had a secret understanding with the Liberals to succeed them. In elections to the newly created Chambers of Agriculture,[14] 44 out of 75 districts were won by the United Opposition, 27 by the government, and 4 by the People's party. The tide seemed to be turning against the Liberals.

One reason the Liberals were able to maintain their position in the face of a growing if uncoordinated opposition during the years from 1922 to 1925 was the perennial fear of bolshevism, which in turn served to weaken or discredit all radical or reformist movements. On
● 648 the international level Soviet-Rumanian relations were very bad be-
175 cause of the unresolved Bessarabian dispute. A conference held in Vienna in April, 1924, failed to bring any agreement between the two disputants.[15] Each side accused the other of plotting aggression and each took measures which aggravated the tension. The creation in 1924 of a Moldavian Soviet Republic on the left bank of the Dniester and ominous Soviet speeches forecasting the ultimate reunion of all Moldavians increased Rumanian anxiety. At the same time, in February, 1925, Vintilă Brătianu, Minister of Finance and brother of Ion I. C. Brătianu, stated his opposition to returning Wrangel's fleet to the U.S.S.R. because of the danger of a strong Soviet Black Sea fleet, and announced that negotiations were in progress for the cooperation of British, French, and Rumanian capital in the establishment of an armaments and munitions factory in Rumania.[16] Such an announcement obviously matched the Soviet thesis that the Western bourgeois powers were using the eastern European states as advanced bases for an assault upon the U.S.S.R.

13. For a discussion of the union of the Transylvanian National party and the Peasant party see below, pp. 140–141.

14. Chambers of agriculture were established in each district in 1925, with a mixed membership of elected and appointed members. In addition to their agricultural functions, they elected members to the senate. They soon became political instruments and were of very little value in the improvement of agriculture.

113 15. According to Louis Fischer, on the basis of information obtained from Christian Rakovsky, Litvinov and Trotsky were willing to accept the loss of Bessarabia, but Stalin, Rakovsky, and Chicherin were not. The latter hoped that by means of the Bessarabian issue they could "keep Rumania perennially on tenterhooks." Louis Fischer, *Men and Politics* (New York, 1941), pp. 134–135.

16. *Times* (London), February 7, 1925.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

In July, 1924, by order of the Commander of the Second Army Corps, the Communist party in Rumania and its associated organizations were dissolved for having violated state of siege regulations and for endangering the security of the state. 648 175

Bessarabia naturally suffered badly in the conflict; reports of foreign observers in these years present a desolate picture of rotting commerce, depressed agriculture, miserable administration and widespread fear and disaffection. The province had been continuously under martial law since 1919. The Rumanians reported frequent Soviet raids, plots, and instigations to violence; the Russians reported brutally suppressed peasant uprisings. Both were taking place. In the notable rising at Tatar Bunar in 1924, which involved a whole village, there is ample evidence of Communist agitation, yet an entire community does not participate in a revolt without serious occasion. 668 175

Tension was not limited to Bessarabia; in December, 1924, some 400 persons described as Communist terrorists were arrested throughout Rumania. In September, 1925, 28 members of committees of "red" unions were arrested in Bucarest. Disturbances, however, were not solely the result of Left-wing activity. Several anti-Semitic outbreaks occurred, with the usual attacks on synagogues and Jewish shops. On October 27, 1924, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, later the leader of the Iron Guard movement, achieved his first prominence by shooting the chief of police of Iaşi; he was subsequently acquitted.[17] 665 175

Under these circumstances, in which opposition to the government could so convincingly be depicted as anti-Rumanian, the Liberals, self-appointed guardians of Rumanian patriotism, were somewhat strengthened, whereas the Peasants were continually forced to protest their loyalty and to defend themselves against the charge of bolshevism.

At the beginning of 1926, however, the opposition to the Liberals became more intense. The announcement on December 28, 1925, of Prince Carol's renunciation of his right to the crown in favor of his infant son Michael [18] brought protests from the Transylvanian Nationalists and the Peasants. While expressing their continued loyalty to King Ferdinand, they refrained from voting on the bill of renunciation on the grounds that they had not been consulted on the appointment of the regency which was to govern during Michael's minority. It was widely known that Brătianu and Carol had not got

17. For the origins of the Iron Guard movement see below, pp. 226–228.

18. Carol had gone abroad with Mme Lupescu. Upon King Ferdinand's demand that he return, without her, Carol refused and renounced his right to the throne.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

page 170

VIII

THE CAROLIST PERIOD: DEPRESSION, 1930–33

178 ALTHOUGH the ten years between 1930 and 1940 were increasingly dominated by the figure of King Carol, and in that sense may be considered as a unit, three more or less distinct phases are observable: a period of confusion and transition from 1930 through 1933, a period of uneasy stability from 1934 to 1937, and a period of crisis from 1938 to 1940. These phases resulted from a complicated intermingling of economic, political, and international circumstances.

[648] On the international level the decade witnessed the return of the most decisive of all factors in Rumanian history: the impact of great power interests, which had been relatively in abeyance during the first years after 1918 with the collapse of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires. As has been seen above, Rumania has been fated throughout its history either to be within the orbit of a great power or caught in a conflict between two or more great powers. Its independence in the nineteenth century had been achieved through a temporary equilibrium of these foreign forces, and the creation of Greater Rumania was possible only because of the power vacuum in eastern Europe. The 1930's saw the revival of Soviet Russia and the hectic ascendency of the Third Reich. The predominance of German influence in the late 1930's and the special turn of events given by the German-Soviet pact of 1939 were of decisive importance in determining the course of Rumanian history.

Internal politics advanced in three stages: a time of political uncertainty accompanied by rapid changes in the government, the breakdown of the older parties, and the burgeoning of new movements; a period of apparent stability during the four years of the Tătărescu administration from the end of 1933 to the end of 1937; a period of royal dictatorship which began with Carol's dissolution of all political parties in 1938 and ended with his abdication and flight after the territorial losses of 1940.

178 Economically, the picture was one of continuous slump until 1934, and then a slow rally accelerating until the outbreak of war in 1939. Industry was the chief gainer; agriculture barely recovered from the losses of the depression. Economic policy underwent a tremendous

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

115 and it is illustrative of the nature of Rumanian politics that the National Peasant party had by this time already become an "old" party —had outlived the impulses which had created them. He desired a rearrangement of the political mosaic to give due place to "younger" elements and believed that this required the installation of a disinterested government of "personalities." Besides the knowledge that Carol was counting their days, the National Peasants saw their once impressive popularity draining away, through the depression and their manifest failure to bring about the new Jerusalem.

In by-elections of January, 1931, the government lost a number of seats, and perhaps the only safe conclusion one can draw from Rumanian elections is that the loss of government-held seats means an undeniable fall in public confidence. The customary flurry of rumors presaged the government's overthrow, and indeed its negotiations for a second foreign loan were the condition for its remaining in power, as had been the case with Vintilă Brătianu's government three years [648] before. On March 10 the loan agreement was signed in Paris, and on April 4 Mironescu resigned. Rumania's outstanding diplomat, Titulescu, was recalled from London—a standard procedure during the cabinet crises of these years—to form a coalition government. Both the National Peasants and the Liberals accepted on certain conditions but Iorga, significantly, voted against it and demanded a cabinet of personalities.

On April 18 Carol called upon Iorga, who, with Argetoianu as his capable hatchet man, formed a cabinet of at least some of the talents. Iorga, announcing his program to be hard work and economy, summoned and immediately dismissed the National Peasant chamber. New elections were held, but even with Argetoianu doing his efficient best at the Ministry of the Interior and with an electoral pact with the Liberals, the government bloc of National Union obtained only 48 per cent of votes. The National Peasants of course were forced down to 15 per cent, and Maniu announced his retirement from politics. The Communists' Workers and Peasant Union won five seats, their first representation in the chamber. Incidentally, none of their members was returned from Bessarabia, reputedly the seat of Rumanian communism; all five were from the industrial centers of Transylvania, the Banat, and Bucovina.

Carol's guiding hand is evident in the creation of the Iorga-Argetoianu government, and after its formation he announced his 159 intentions to preside over cabinet meetings once a week. Nicolae Iorga, the internationally known and incredibly voluminous historian, had never commanded any following beyond a coterie of ad-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 tiations,[3] and was replaced by Maniu, with Titulescu as Foreign
175 Minister. On January 8, 1933, Maniu again broke with Carol, and on January 14 Vaida Voevod returned to head the government.[4]

By this time the National Peasants were badly disorganized. With Carol's assistance a definite split in the party leadership between Maniu and Vaida Voevod was developing and was to lead to a rupture in 1934. The government itself had not only lost its peasant enthusiasm but under Vaida Voevod's leadership was rapidly drifting into the political habits of the Liberals. On the first of February
668 oil workers at Ploeşti struck over a wage decision, and a fight en-
665 sued between strikers and troops. At the same time in Bucarest some
175 7,000 workers in the state railway shops went on strike. The government hastily proclaimed martial law in Bucarest, Cernăuţi, Galaţi, Iaşi, Timişoara, Ploeşti, and the oil fields. The Communist party and its affiliates were again dissolved, the government passed laws against antisocial and antistate organizations, and over 200 Communists were arrested throughout Rumania. This brought a protest demonstration from the railway workers, troops were called out, and there was a vicious street fight.

To some extent this tension was a fatal by-product of the deepening depression, and the strikes, while obviously having their roots in the misery of the Rumanian industrial workers, were not confined solely to economic demands. Indeed, since the installation of the Groza regime, the Communists have played up the revolutionary elements of the railway strike and the guiding role of the Communist party in it. Even so, the government all too hastily resorted to the
175 very measures for which it had so long taken the Liberals to task.
665 Moreover, while Vaida Voevod was thus combating labor unrest,

● [648] 3. Rumania and Soviet Russia had not resumed diplomatic relations since the First World War because of their inability to reach any agreement on Bessarabia. In January, 1932, the Poles, with French urging, had signed a treaty of friendship and nonaggression with the U.S.S.R. Now Poland and France were pressing Rumania to do the same. Vaida Voevod, apparently without consulting Titulescu, had instructed the Rumanian representative in Warsaw to negotiate with Litvinov. Titulescu had heard of his move and had objected to the manner in which the negotiations were being conducted and especially to the possibility that Bessarabia might be recognized as a subject of dispute. In this disagreement Titulescu was sufficiently influential to squeeze out Vaida Voevod.

4. In this instance the specific difficulty arose over the dismissal of Colonel Marinescu, Prefect of Bucarest. Carol had been installing military officers in a number of civil posts. The National Peasant government undertook to replace them by civilians. Colonel Marinescu, in a circular letter, denied rumors that he was about to be removed and said that since he was appointed by the king, only the king could remove him. Mihalache, Minister of the Interior, then demanded his resignation, and failing to obtain it resigned himself. Maniu supported Mihalache and the cabinet resigned.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

652 671 farm products, aimed principally at maintaining the prices in the home market by the reduction of various charges and taxes. The Iorga government, however, at once superseded this measure by inaugurating in July, 1931, an export bounty of 10,000 lei for 10,000 kilograms of wheat and 16,000 lei for flour, the cost to be met by a bread tax. The government, however, discovered that it lacked the funds to carry out this measure and discontinued it in 1932. Moreover, it turned out to be largely for the benefit of the export houses rather than the producers and merely tempted Rumanian exporters to engage in wheat dumping. On the other hand the tax on bread, which was to pay the bounty, was borne largely by the peasant consumer.[21] In 1933 and 1934 a different method was tried; the last Vaida Voevod cabinet set up a State Cereal Commission by which the government appeared on the market as a consumer to support wheat prices.

Like debt conversion, the price-supporting measures, which were taken up by the various governments in turn, were not the result of any over-all plan but were simply steps to counteract the depression. In fact, in their effect they ran against all plans for agrarian improvement. The parties, in their programs and writings, had all agreed that the future of Rumanian agriculture lay in intensive farming and in persuading the peasant to abandon extensive cereal cultivation for which his small holding was obviously ill-suited. The bounties on wheat had precisely the opposite effect and led to an even greater emphasis upon cereal production. Between 1930 and 1935 the area under wheat showed a definite, if highly irregular, tendency to rise.

439 648 The governments also undertook to obtain more favorable foreign markets. The first effort, under the National Peasants, was by means of collaboration with the other eastern European states in an agrarian bloc. Through the series of conferences in 1930 the agrarian states attempted to create a program of common action to gain preferential treatment from the industrial states for their agricultural products. Although the agrarian bloc pleaded its case at various meetings of the League and at international conferences between 1930 and 1932, it failed to open markets for agriculture. Its requests were opposed by the maritime states and overseas grain producers as contrary to free trade and the most-favored-nation principle. Madgearu, one of the most eloquent spokesmen for the bloc, declared that the agrarian states did not demand permanent preferential treat-

21. Manoilov, *La Reconstruction économique et financière de la Roumanie et les partis politiques*, p. 284.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

ment but merely assistance to recover from the depression.[22] The whole tenor of international trade policy at that time was against his recommendations, and nothing tangible was achieved. Nor did the various international efforts of 1931–33—the Tardieu Plan, the Stresa Conference, and the London Economic Conference—bring the southeastern European states any substantial benefits in relieving their foreign indebtedness, establishing common economic policy, or providing more favorable foreign markets.

439 648

With the failure of international attempts to obtain better markets for its agricultural produce, the Rumanian government was driven toward increasing restrictions and controls. Although Rumania under the Brătianus had pursued a policy of economic nationalism, and was to do so again in the latter half of the 1930's, the commercial and monetary controls imposed by the different cabinets between 1931 and 1933 did not, in their inception at least, appear to be the result of any comprehensive policy but were applied as emergency measures. Many of the steps were taken by Virgil Madgearu, who had been a bitter critic of the Liberals' policy and was later to attack the trend toward increasing protectionism; he repeatedly explained that he was being forced against his wishes into these restrictive measures.

In the spring of 1932 the government introduced foreign exchange controls to preserve the national currency in face of the deteriorating balance of payments and the threat of speculation. Import controls were imposed in December, 1932, and were, according to Madgearu, primarily designed to stimulate exports and only secondarily to restrict imports, although the association of the two was inevitable and followed from the exchange controls.[23] In the summer of 1933 Madgearu declared a moratorium on foreign debts [24] and in the autumn demanded their reduction. In defending these moves he stated that unless markets were opened to Rumanian products the government was left with no alternative but to restrict imports, control exchange, and freeze its foreign obligations. All these moves "served directly or indirectly as an instrument of agricultural protection." [25]

In the same years Rumania was making the first steps toward clear-

22. A. Bussot, "Le Bloc des états agricoles de l'Europe centrale et orientale et son programme," *Revue d'économie politique*, 47 (Paris, 1933), 153.

23. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

24. Under this measure the equivalents of sums due abroad were deposited in lei in the National Bank; they could not be withdrawn from the country but could be invested in Rumania. Part of Rumania's subsequent industrialization was financed by these captive funds.

25. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

439 ing agreements and bilateral trade, again in the effort to find markets.
648 In 1931 a trade convention was made with Germany which reduced its duties on Rumanian maize and barley; in 1932 agreements were reached with France for the export of maize and with Germany for meat.

All these steps, however, were defensive efforts to protect agriculture against the depression. It is less easy to find much evidence of attempts to get at the roots of the agrarian question. The different cabinets passed a variety of laws, some of them transparent vote-catchers, others old favorites which each new Rumanian government seemed to pass as a matter of routine. All the cabinets announced their goal of increasing the use of agricultural machinery: the Mironescu government passed an act reducing the import duties on agricultural equipment by two-thirds, the Iorga government in 1932 and the Liberals at the beginning of 1934 granted credits for the purchase of agricultural machinery. To judge from the figures on the consumption of agricultural equipment the results were very slight, at least until 1934 with the beginning of recovery.

The only apparent effort at overcoming the disadvantages inherent in Rumania's system of strip cultivation was a law for the establishment of agricultural associations passed by the Iorga cabinet in July,
[67] 1931. By this law cultivators whose separate properties formed an economic whole could combine to cultivate their land more rationally by the introduction of mechanical cultivation, use of fertilizers, selected seeds, and other technical improvements. Funds required by the associations for this purpose could be obtained through the cooperative and agricultural banks, the state to assume 6 per cent interest on the loans on the condition that the association follow a plan approved by the Ministry of Agriculture. Nothing seems to have come of this law, and a very similar semicollective state-sponsored proposal was attempted by the Antonescu regime a decade later.

In general, 1931–33 were years of steady retreat before the onslaught of the depression. In the course of this retreat a number of economic devices were developed, in Rumania as elsewhere, which were to take on increasing importance in the years to follow. To a considerable extent they had been introduced to protect agriculture, but they were soon to find pleasanter and more lucrative employment.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

page 187

IX

THE CAROLIST PERIOD: NEOLIBERALISM, 1934–37

Survey of Political Events

THE term neoliberalism, which may appear a gross misnomer for these singularly unliberal years, is descriptive of two facts: 1) The Liberal party returned to office and, what is more, remained there for the full term of four years, thus repeating its record as the only party under the 1923 Constitution to achieve such a feat of endurance. Nevertheless, the Liberal cabinet of the 1930's was not the same as the party of Ion I. C. and Vintilă Brătianu. Not only did King Carol really hold the leading strings of political power but within the Liberal party itself (not to speak of Gheorghe Brătianu's Young Liberals) there was a growing cleavage between Gheorghe Tătărescu, the head of the government, and Constantin Brătianu, the third of the elder Brătianu brothers, who was party chief. This split did not become open until later, but Tătărescu as a king's man was clearly moving away from the old lines of the Liberals. 2) The leading ideas of the administration at this time have a certain relation to the doctrine of so-called neoliberalism, which was advanced in the 1920's but which at that time was associated with Averescu's People's party.[1] 665

The years 1934 and 1935 were a kind of plateau in the troubled history of the 1930's. The depression leveled off and there was a slow move toward recovery. The political party system, while basically completely unstable, did at least pause from the rapid changes of government which had marked the years 1931–33. King Carol seemed less bent on securing a personal political dictatorship. Even on the international scene there was a temporary, if uneasy, breathing spell. The first impulse of fascism which had brought Hitler to power had not set all of east Europe tumbling as had been feared. Rumania reestablished diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.[2] The Lit- 175 648

1. The People's party was a melange of "regenerated" liberalism combined with an emphasis upon order and discipline, plus a great deal of crass opportunism.

2. Without, however, obtaining a clear statement of recognition of its possession of Bessarabia. For a discussion of this point see Philip E. Mosely, "Is Bessarabia Next?" *Foreign Affairs*, 18, No. 3 (New York, April, 1940), 557–562.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 tle Entente remained, the Balkan Entente was formed, and people
648 were heard to say that the Balkans were beginning to mature. It was only a lull before the storm but it was perceptible.

175 The political history of these years is relatively uneventful. In
661 the elections of December 20, 1933, the Liberals obtained a handsome majority in the chamber. After Duca's assassination and the creation of a cabinet under Tătărescu, a period of comparative quiet ensued. That this period was not one of tranquillity is shown by the repeated prolongations of the state of martial law, which had been applied after Duca's death and remained in force throughout the Tătărescu administration. In reality an intense tug-of-war was going on between the king and Tătărescu on the one hand and the Iron Guard on the other. It was less a conflict than a competition to gain a monopoly on the increasingly nationalist and extremist atmosphere which was pervading Rumania.

The relations between the Carol regime and the Iron Guard were equivocal, to say the least. Duca, leader of the Liberals, was assassinated by the Iron Guard, and yet the efforts of his successor to control the movement were certainly not convincing.[3] The Guard was officially dissolved but it quickly reappeared in a new guise as the All for the Fatherland party and continued to flourish. Even one of the Liberal members of the cabinet, Iamandi, ascribed the growth of the Iron Guard to the fact that since 1929 successive governments, including the Liberals, had tolerated or halfheartedly encouraged it in the hopes that they could deflect it from its more violent aims and find in it allies for combating communism.

Tătărescu said in 1936 that there was an abyss between the Liberals and the extreme Right, both in methods and concepts, but added, rather obscurely, that only a policy of conciliation was possible in a country where one-third of the population was minorities.[4] He held that the Liberals were tolerant of all parties, if they obeyed the law, but could not permit movements favoring either a red or a white dictatorship. There was all the difference in the world, however, between the earnest and efficient manner in which the government pursued the Communist party,[5] and the obvious indulgence

3. In the trial of the assassins, for example, it was well known that the Guardist leader, Codreanu, was closely implicated in the murder but he was acquitted.

4. *Times* (London), April 24, 1936.

5. It was in 1936 that Ana Pauker, now Rumanian Foreign Minister, was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, along with 18 associates, on the charge of propagating communism. She gained a good deal of publicity at this time because of public criticism of her treatment in prison and because of a newspaper dispute between *Dimineaja* and *Universul* over her trial.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

with which the Iron Guard and the other fascist formations were treated. 175 661

By the 1930's the Iron Guard had become the manifestation of a quite powerful current in Rumanian life, a current arising out of the strains and dislocations in the society and intensified by the depression. The government, instead of opposing the current, tried to become master of it, and during these years it took on many of the attitudes and paraphernalia of the extreme Right. Early in its term in office the cabinet pressed for powers to issue decree-laws during parliamentary recess, ostensibly to improve efficiency. In the same year, 1934, the government announced that supervision of telephone calls—wire tapping—was to be extended from international to local and interurban calls. Compulsory labor brigades were introduced in 1936. Carol, for his part, was more and more the flamboyant father of his people. To counter the Iron Guard youth formations he created in 1934 his own youth movement, *Straja Țării*. Carol's own activities may in part be ascribed to his willful and arbitrary character, his belief that the king should be more than a passive symbol, and his dislike and distrust of the Rumanian party system,[6] but the atmosphere of the time unquestionably nurtured these inclinations. [575]

In 1936 the temporary calm showed signs of breaking and a new element, foreign relations, began to play its decisive role in determining Rumanian politics. It was only a relative change; Rumania has always been exceedingly sensitive to the reverberations of international events, and the rise of the extremist fascist parties in the 1930's was certainly associated with other similar movements elsewhere in Europe. Nevertheless, it may be said that up to 1936 the most important factors in the Rumanian political scene had been internal: the failure of the democratic parties to establish themselves, the long-standing social tensions and the chronic misery of the peasantry, and the personal influence of King Carol and his entourage. These internal forces continued to exert an important influence but the uneasy equilibrium of 1934 and 1935 was broken by the ascendancy of the European fascist states and the mounting international crisis leading to the Second World War.

Titulescu, the strong advocate of the League and of the Versailles system, and at that time advocate of Little Entente-Soviet collaboration, was removed from the Foreign Office in August, 1936. His fall 648

6. In 1937, in an interview with the journalist Wickham Steed, Carol said that in his own country political parties were sterile and their leaders fit only to criticise. It would be his business as king to discipline them and harness them to constructive work. Notes on the interview are quoted in Pavel Pavel, *Why Rumania Failed* (London, n.d.), p. 142.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

648 appears to have been the consequence of personal differences but presaged a shift in Rumania's international orientation. As Rumania had been one of the principal gainers in the First World War, all the governments up to this time had a similar foreign policy, pro-French and against any treaty revision, which indeed was the only way Rumania could preserve its new territories from Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Soviet claims. When it became clear that the Western powers had lost the initiative, foreign policy became less simple. The extreme Right was vociferously pro-German. Carol personally would have preferred to stay clear of German influence, since only the Western attachment gave promise of guaranteeing all the territories acquired by the war. But if Britain and France weakened, he was inclined to improve his relations with Germany. Rumania's relations with the U.S.S.R. had improved somewhat in the 1930's, but it was a negative improvement—a hope of assurance against Soviet attack. The underlying hostility between the two powers was deep and so pervasive as scarcely to require any discussion. Thus in 1937 Carol stated to Wickham Steed that the chief difficulty of Rumania's position lay in the fact that "the immense weight of Russia was always bearing upon her and she had to withstand it as best she could. Russia was, so to speak, the hereditary enemy. As regards Hitler, he felt admiration for Hitler, whom he did not look upon as a sinister or dangerous man." [7]

665 From 1936 on, as a consequence of this shift in the international balance, the extreme Right became more and more blatant; anti-Semitic activities increased in extent and vileness; university students showed the advantages of their education by attacking Jewish shops; hostility and scorn for the decadent democracies became the vogue; defections from the old parties decreased their strength and added to the forces of the Right.

During this time the National Peasant party, as the principal nonfascist opposition to the government showed little strength or determination. Mihalache did attempt to reinvigorate the peasantist element in the party's ideology and formed a "peasant guard" to protect National Peasant meetings from fascist bullies. In May, [668] 1936, there was a demonstration of some 80,000 peasants in Bucarest, directed against the Liberals, demanding better conditions for peasants and workers and decrying the tolerance shown to the fascists. These efforts, however, had no significant results.[8]

7. Quoted in Pavel Pavel, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

8. According to Pătrăşcanu (*Sous trois dictatures*, p. 114), the National Peasants had planned a large demonstration in November, 1935, but had canceled it upon Carol's promise that the Liberal government was about to fall and that they would succeed it.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

661 Minister, Armand Calinescu, the strongest man in the Carol dic-
642 tatorship and the executor of the campaign against the Guard, was assassinated. His death was followed by murderous mass reprisals against the Legionaries. Carol seemed to be thoroughly the master of his country.[1]

In place of the disbanded parties he concocted in December, 1938, a single body, the Front of National Rebirth. Through 1938 and 1939 he added the various regalia associated with a corporatist state, but there is little evidence that anyone took these trappings seriously. Administrative and political corruption, always healthy plants in Rumania, blossomed in full splendor in these years; public ethics hit a new low.

● 648 Meanwhile, however, the international situation was closing in and
642 here Carol was caught, as it proved, in a hopeless dilemma. While throughout the 1930's the Rumanian state took on an increasing resemblance to the fascism of the Axis powers, and men of the extreme Right advocated a pro-Axis foreign policy, Rumania, with its interest in maintaining the Versailles system—the guarantor of its territorial integrity—could not be really happy in Axis company. Regardless of internal political developments, and Carol himself repeatedly stressed the difference between internal and external policy, Rumania had strong reason to rely on the Western powers. Germany, however, was clearly in the ascent and the Western powers were pursuing the policy of appeasement. With the collapse of Czechoslovakia after the Munich Conference the Little Entente broke down. In November, 1938, Carol visited both London and Berchtesgaden in an effort to maintain his balance.

The great blow to Rumania's position came with the Soviet-German pact of August, 1939, which forecast common action between the two

1. It is impossible to attempt here to clear up the obscurities in the struggle between Carol and the Iron Guard. Numerous interpretations have been made, of which two might be mentioned. The British correspondent, A. L. Easterman, in his book *King Carol, Hitler, and Lupescu* (London, 1942), was of the opinion that in assuming the dictatorship Carol was fighting fire with fire, that he was really anti-Guardist and anti-German. Under this interpretation he was attempting to preserve Rumania from German advances, and his fight against the Guardists, who are regarded as simple German tools, was a part of this national defense. A more complex interpretation is provided by the Rumanian Communist Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu in *Sous trois dictatures*. Briefly, his thesis is that Carol had given secret support to the Guard on his road to the dictatorship, as a means of destroying the bourgeois-democratic parties, but had turned against it because of the potential social ferment it engendered and because the Guard was explicitly pro-Axis, whereas Carol was attempting to play a noncommittal game. Pătrăşcanu attributed the increasing violence of the measures employed by Carol against the Guard to the simple fact that having set up a dictatorship himself Carol had no weapon against another dictatorial movement except crude police repression.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

great powers of eastern Europe, both of which were interested in revising the Versailles system. By the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement, the Reich recognized the Soviet Union's interest in Bessarabia.[2]

When war came, Rumania remained neutral, although the German control over the economy, which will be discussed presently, grew steadily. With the fall of France in the summer of 1940 and the disappearance of any hope of effective support from the West, Rumania was left with three unattractive alternatives: isolated neutrality, rapprochement with the U.S.S.R., or entering the German camp. Carol chose the latter course.[3] The corporate state was replaced by a totalitarian regime with the creation of the Party of the Nation, which included the Iron Guard and to which all government and business officials were obliged to belong. Horia Sima, the new leader of the Guard, came into the government.

After the Soviet ultimatum of June 26, resulting in the loss of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, Rumania renounced the Franco-British guarantees, and the active pro-Germans, Gigurtu and Manoilescu, were installed as Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The new direction was accompanied by zealous efforts to emulate the Axis powers through increased anti-Semitic and anti-British measures. The loss of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina set loose other revisionist claims, and at the end of August, under German and Italian auspices, Rumania lost Southern Dobrogea to Bulgaria and Northern Transylvania to Hungary.

At this point Carol's policy of isolating and breaking up the political parties turned against him, and he found himself altogether without support in face of national indignation that a third of the nation's territory had been given up without a sign of resistance. As an eleventh hour prop for his regime he called in, on September 4, General Antonescu, who had been in disgrace for his association with the Guard. Antonescu forced Carol to renounce his dictatorial powers

2. Paragraph 3 of the Secret Additional Protocol to the Nonaggression Treaty of August 23, 1939, stated: "With regard to South-eastern Europe, attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterestedness in these areas." U.S. Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941* (Washington, 1948), p. 78.

3. According to ex-Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu, Carol's decision was taken at a crown council meeting on May 28, 1940. *Prelude to the Russian Campaign*, trans. E. Fletcher-Allen (London, 1945), pp. 282–285. Such a decision is not surprising. Neutrality would have saved little except honor. The U.S.S.R. had been indicating, rather obliquely, the desirability of a revision in Bessarabia, and with the fall of France was determined to move quickly. The chances of a Rumanian-Soviet rapprochement were nil. On the other hand, German influence had increased steadily since the fall of Czechoslovakia.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

Germany's growing economic influence. By 1938 Germany and Austria absorbed 26.5 per cent of Rumania's exports, but even in the German-Rumanian agreement of December, 1938, the Rumanians were able to block German efforts to increase substantially the clearing rate of the reichsmark.

A new stage was reached, however, in the German-Rumanian agreement of March 23, 1939, which really did tie Rumania's economy to that of Germany.[15] By this treaty, which was to run for five years, very close economic collaboration was envisaged, involving German assistance in the internal development of the Rumanian economy. The principal aim of this treaty, which emphasized the complementary nature of the two economies, was to expand and diversify Rumanian agricultural production. Germany was to assist in promoting the cultivation of agricultural products of interest to its economy, especially foodstuffs, oilseeds, and textile plants. New industries were to be established for processing agricultural products. Mixed Rumanian-German companies, in which Germany was to supply the machinery, were to exploit mineral and petroleum resources. The treaty also made provision for mutual collaboration in various industries, road, rail and water transport, and public enterprises. Rumanian and German banks were to collaborate on methods of financing the activities contemplated under the plan. Finally, the agreement provided that Germany would supply armaments and munitions to Rumania.[16]

In assessing the significance of this agreement, as well as Germany's increasing economic monopoly in the Balkans, it is necessary to distinguish between the actual effects under the international circumstances and its merits as a purely economic program. In actual fact, of course, Germany's economic activities in the Balkans proved to be part of its over-all task of preparing a war economy, and it could be maintained that to overlook the military premise behind Germany's actions is to miss the essential point. Certainly Germany's primary concern was to obtain in southeastern Europe a source of vegetable and mineral raw materials to assist in creating an economy secure from blockade. At the same time, Germany appears to have regarded

15. According to Grigore Gafencu, at that time Rumanian Foreign Minister, this economic agreement was designed to appease Hitler, who had displayed an ominous irritation over Carol's assault on the Iron Guard in the autumn of 1938. See his book, *Last Days of Europe* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 23–25.

16. For a discussion of this agreement from the German side, cf. Anton Reithinger, "Grossdeutschland und Südosteuropa im Lichte der Statistik," *Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv*, 29 (1939), 129–139, and German Institute for Business Research, "The German-Rumanian Trade Treaty," *Weekly Report*, Nos. 13–14 (April 6, 1939).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

648 its activities in Rumania as primarily economic and not, directly at least, as an instrument for political penetration. The Germans did not feel they had Rumania sewed up diplomatically by this agreement.[17]

Although there was this hidden military menace in Germany's actions, Rumania did gain certain short-term advantages from its economic relations with the Third Reich. Contrary to numerous reports Germany was not merely draining Rumania in exchange for aspirins, harmonicas, and cameras. The relations with Germany, aside from the political danger, were certainly not without their disadvantages; there were all the limitations of being tied to a bilateralism with a much more powerful state, difficulties in obtaining certain commodities, and German reluctance to provide materials for secondary industries. In so far as it was possible Rumania struggled to keep the Reich from obtaining a too favorable rate of exchange and to retain as large a share as possible of its exports for the free world market. Nevertheless, Germany did offer a market for Rumanian agricultural products at prices which Rumania could not obtain elsewhere. In the absence of remunerative world prices and the failure of the other great powers to provide any assistance, Germany's policy, whatever its aim, was a benefit *faute de mieux*.[18] The benefits were not unconditional but the comparison should not be made with an ideal and stable system of free world trade, but with the collapsed and paralyzed situation of the 1930's.

As to setting up the German and Rumanian economies as complementary units in a system of regional trade, the most obvious danger was that Germany would in effect reduce Rumania to a colonial status, producing vegetable and mineral raw materials for the German in-

17. Thus Hitler in his letter to Mussolini of August 25, 1939, regarding the Soviet pact, indicated that because of this pact "Rumania is no longer in a situation to take part in a conflict against the Axis" (U.S. Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, p. 81), a clear sign that the Axis leaders had serious doubts whether Rumania, even after the March economic agreement, was on their side. In the German diplomatic correspondence of 1940, the whole concern of the Germans appeared to be that Rumania, which was so important for its vegetable products and petroleum, should not become involved in military and political disturbances.

18. The conclusion of a study by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *South-Eastern Europe, a Political and Economic Survey*, p. 198, stated: "At any rate up till the spring of 1939, the countries of South-Eastern Europe on balance have gained in a material sense and in the short run, by the increase in German purchases. Germany has helped to raise their export prices and to increase their national incomes, and she has not so far taken advantage of her bargaining position to turn the terms of trade in her favor, so that their 'real' incomes have been raised. On the other hand, one of Germany's objects may be to associate the economic systems of these countries so closely with her own as to make it difficult for them to sever their connections in time of war."

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

dustrial economy. Indeed, German economists commenting upon the 1939 agreement argued that Rumania should not undertake a further drive toward industrialization until the state of economic advance called for in the agreement was reached. In fact they claimed that under exchange control the industry of southeastern Europe had developed to such an extent that it had reached the saturation point and that control of investment was necessary.[19]

The agreement did, however, provide for the creation of industries preparing foodstuffs and raw materials for export and also for the development of railways and the armamants industries. That is, the Germans favored industries "organically" connected with Rumania's natural resources but were opposed to the expansion of secondary industry.

It is not necessary to point out the obvious advantage to Germany of this policy nor to go into the array of arguments which Hitler's economists employed to carry their point. But from the Rumanian side one very curious paradox arises, precisely the kind of paradox which runs throughout the history of Rumanian economic policy. The German policy, as shown in the March, 1939, agreement, resembled in many respects that of the National Peasant party and was in definite opposition to the industrial policy of the pro-Axis Manoilescu and of the Carolist regime. This opposition appears quite explicitly in an article by Ernst Wagemann, director of the German Institute for Business Research.

Wagemann, one of the most ardent advocates of Germany's destiny in the Balkans, was quite critical of Manoilescu's economic theory, though not on traditional grounds of free trade.[20] He regarded Manoilescu's policy as doubtful in practice because of the lack of consumer purchasing power in Rumania. Moreover, Manoilescu's emphasis upon increasing labor productivity would intensify rather than improve the problem of surplus population. "For the more labor-productive an industry is, the more capital and the fewer workers it needs . . . The solution of the overpopulation problem is to be sought least of all in the development of highly technical and strictly rationalized or, as Manoilescu says, 'labor productive' industries." [21] Wagemann recommended intensification and diversifica-

19. German Institute for Business Research, *Weekly Report*, Nos. 13–14 (April 6, 1939), p. 42.

20. Ernst Wagemann, "The Pressure of Population as an Economic Force," German Institute for Business Research, *Weekly Report*, Nos. 25/26 and 27/28 (June 29–July 14, 1939). This article is a translation from Wagemann's book, *Der neue Balkan; altes Land, junge Wirtschaft* (Hamburg, 1939).

21. *Ibid.*, Nos. 25/26, p. 5.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

668 for the peculiar venom of the declassés as contrasted with the less fanatical support of the impoverished which arose more specifically from the depression.

It is difficult to obtain reliable evidence concerning the calculated support given to the Iron Guard by interested groups, but there are numerous indications that government ministers in the 1930's, such as Vaida Voevod and Tătărescu, did support the Legion unofficially and did not greatly hamper its activities. Undoubtedly in the vast underworld of Rumanian police life, Siguranța officials found it a useful organization for combating Left-wing labor movements. Perhaps one should not place too great stress upon such Machiavellian motives. It is tempting to see in ministers, police chiefs, and mysterious financial interests absolutely cold and calculating individuals who were not in the slightest affected by the atmosphere of their surroundings. But after all both Vaida Voevod and Duca had said that apart from the battle against communism they had hoped to harness what they felt was constructive in the Iron Guard and divert it to less violent activities. It would seem reasonable to assume that they, too, were moved by some of the same sentiments which impelled the Guardists.

● 648 As to foreign support, there is no question that Hitler regarded
668 Codreanu as his ally, and for good reason. In November, 1937, for example, Codreanu made his celebrated electoral declaration that he was against the Western democracies, against the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente, against the League of Nations, against bolshevism, and in favor of the Rome-Berlin Axis: "Forty-eight hours after our victory we shall have an alliance with Germany and Italy." There is also evidence that in later years, at least, the Germans gave financial support to the Iron Guard, although some of the proofs produced by the Carol dictatorship are suspect. It would be wrong to conclude, however, that the Iron Guard was nothing more than a German fifth column. It was a very significant aspect of Rumanian social and political life.

Rumanian writers of various political beliefs have sought, understandably enough, to prove—by calling the Legion a tool either of the Germans, or of intriguing police chiefs and politicians, or of a class—that it did not represent the Rumanian people. Granted that the Rumanian people are not by nature fascist beasts, nevertheless the Iron Guard cannot be written off as a superficial phenomenon. In its way it was the nemesis of all the false constitutionalism and pseudo-democracy which have been observed in the course of recent Rumanian history.

3. Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

for this it required a degree of stability, not the hectic atmosphere created by Guardist terror squads. Consequently, when Antonescu in December began to take measures to bring the Guard to heel, he had German support, although the Legionaries refused to believe that the Germans would desert their most ardent allies. Antonescu proceeded to disarm their formations and to strengthen the army. Seeing their position undermined, the Guard on January 21, 1941, attempted to revolt. They were suppressed by the army after three days of savage fighting in which they outdid themselves in committing bestial atrocities. On January 27 Antonescu formed a new cabinet composed almost entirely of military officers. The Iron Guard was dissolved, the Legionary state abolished, and a firm military dictatorship under the *Conducator* came into being. Thus fell one of the first fascist movements in Europe and, ironically enough, at just the time Nazi Germany achieved complete predominance in Rumania.

Under the Antonescu dictatorship political life ceased altogether; the army and the Germans were in complete control. A couple of plebiscites provided the necessary stamp of legality and the government, with very few changes, remained in power for the next three years. In June, 1941, Antonescu joined Hitler in the war against the Soviet Union. Maniu and Constantin Brătianu supported the war until the recovery of Bessarabia and Bucovina, though they protested against the dictatorship. After Rumanian troops crossed the Dniester, they dispatched notes of protest to Antonescu demanding Rumania's withdrawal from the war. But by this time he was too deeply involved in the German adventure. In October, 1941, he annexed Transnistria, that part of the Ukraine lying between the Dniester and Bug rivers and including Odessa. Rumanian troops went on and on until they reached Stalingrad. Then began the slow retreat.

Well before his overthrow Antonescu, now a Marshal, realized that the war was lost but was unwilling to take the steps to extricate Rumania, although he permitted envoys of the political parties to establish contact with the Allies. In the absence of effective opposition he was able to maintain power until the Russians, who had been checked in northern Moldavia in the spring of 1944, resumed their offensive in the late summer. With the imminent threat of Rumania becoming a battlefield and being further devastated by increasing American bombing raids, King Michael seized the initiative, arrested him, and sought an armistice.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

one case by a Soviet order, in the other by a strike of the printers' union. Teohari Georgescu refused to take orders from Radescu and demanded that the officials in the Ministry of Interior pay no attention to the general. 175

The crisis reached a climax on February 24 when, at the conclusion of a large National Democratic Front demonstration, the crowd moved into the palace square and headed toward the Ministry of the Interior. Shots were fired, several people were killed, and that night in a rash—and final—broadcast General Radescu roundly abused the Communist leaders Pauker and Luca, and called on the army to stand by him.[29] Certainly Radescu was a greatly provoked man but owing his appointment to an agreement of the four parties he was not in a position to take an independent stand when this coalition broke down under the Communist attack. Moreover, by his rather intemperate language and appeal to the army he left himself open to damaging attacks from the National Democratic Front and the Russians.

The Soviet Union, in the person of Deputy Commissar Andrei Vyshinsky, now stepped in and demanded General Radescu's immediate resignation. After some hesitation King Michael agreed and started consultations for a new cabinet; again Vyshinsky intervened and demanded that a National Democratic Front government under Petru Groza be installed.[30] Meanwhile the Soviet command had taken the necessary precautions. There was at that time only one Rumanian force capable of resisting the National Democratic Front's armed formations—the army. The Russians ordered the Rumanian units stationed in and near Bucarest to be sent to the front, and the capital was denuded of troops. The following weekend witnessed another mass demonstration which was clearly in a position to take over the government forcibly if need be. In the midst of the demonstration it was announced that the king had accepted the Groza government. On March 6, 1945, it was installed, as a coalition of the groups making up the National Democratic Front, and also including an insignificant 175 648 668

29. This riot is to me a particularly discouraging example of the difficulty of writing history *wie es eigentlich gewesen*. This incident, as it later proved, was the event which led to the overthrow of the Radescu government and the installation of the Groza cabinet. I had watched the procession and was in the crowd no more than fifty feet from the first shots. Yet at that time and since I have been unable to discover precisely what happened. I do know that the government had kept Rumanian troops off the street that day to avoid inciting trouble. The crowd did move toward the Ministry of the Interior building, although it showed little signs of direction. The first shots were fired from a small piece and from somewhere in the crowd, but by whom and for what purpose I do not know, although there has been no lack of stories and explanations.

30. An account of Vyshinsky's actions, taken from official American sources, is given in James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York; London, 1947), pp. 50–55.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

668 dissident National Peasant party and a Liberal fraction under the
● 647 opportunist Gheorghe Tătărescu, whose government in 1936 had
175 sentenced Ana Pauker to ten years' imprisonment.

Why did the Groza government come to power? This question is difficult to answer, even though many of the facts are reasonably well established, because it involves the intentions behind the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. In the first place, the Groza regime was directly and positively installed by the Soviet Union, in an explicit manner by Vyshinsky, but even before that by the Soviet decision to break up the Radescu government through the National Democratic Front. Although there is no convincing evidence that the National Democratic Front possessed broad popular support, it was not without effective strength in Bucarest. Before it came to office it was able to assemble large crowds of demonstrators, which were really quite impressive despite the tendency of Tass and the Communist press greatly to inflate their numbers. Moreover, it had special squads of armed guards, which had obtained weapons in preparation for the August 23 coup and had subsequently refused to relinquish them, much to the dismay of the National Peasants and Liberals. Nevertheless, they could not have stood up against the Rumanian army had General Radescu been given the opportunity to employ it. In no sense, however, did the National Democratic Front represent the will of the people, although it must be said that at the time there was a general political vacuum in Rumania. It is doubtful whether the historical parties represented the will of the people except in the purely negative sense of being anti-Russian.

In the second place, the U.S.S.R. did not overthrow the Radescu government because the Rumanians were sabotaging the armistice agreement, or to guarantee the lines of communication to the Hungarian front, or because the Radescu government could not maintain order. If the latter was true it was because Radescu had been deprived of the means. This is not to say that the Rumanians of the historical parties were behaving in a manner satisfactory to the Russians. Hatred of Russia among these parties was bitter and profound. There was a constant hope that somehow the Western powers would come to their rescue. Well before the end of the war, and indeed immediately after the armistice, many nonfascist Rumanians expressed the belief that a conflict betwen the Soviet Union and the Western powers was the only hope for Rumania. Nor were the Rumanians altogether reasonable in their fulfillment of the armistice conditions. There were numerous cases where they tried to squirm out of a delivery by means of elaborate legal technicalities in a manner inevitably highly ex-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

asperating to the Soviet authorities. In a word, many Rumanians did not realize the implications of the new situation and were doing everything in their power to avoid the consequences of their military defeat. Undoubtedly this attitude was well known to the Russians; it would have been difficult to have missed it.

Nevertheless, as far as may be judged from the evidence available, conditions in Rumania and the behavior of non-Communist Rumanian politicians were not a primary factor in determining Russian action; Soviet initiative in installing the National Democratic Front government did not arise from Soviet-Rumanian relations but was an aspect of Soviet policy regarding the pattern of the postwar world and Russia's relations with the Western powers, Great Britain, and the United States. It might be well here to review briefly some of the information which has come to light on Rumania's place internationally in the last part of the Second World War. The Soviet Union was certainly interested in preserving its gains made in eastern Europe before Hitler's attack, and as early as 1941 was pressing the British and American governments, without success, for an agreement on postwar territorial boundaries. Soviet frontiers with Rumania were to be those of 1940, i.e., Bessarabia and northern Bucovina being reincorporated in the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet regime desired special facilities for bases in Rumania.[31] On April 2, 1944, however, as Soviet troops advanced into northern Rumania, Molotov gave a reassuring announcement: "The Soviet government declares that it does not pursue the aim of conquering any part of Rumanian territory or of changing the existing social order in Rumania."

In May, 1944, the British government proposed to Russia a division of areas of predominant interest, whereby, "in the main, Rumanian affairs should be the concern of the Soviet Government and the Greek affairs the concern of United Kingdom. This British-Russian understanding would apply only to war conditions and would not affect the rights and responsibilities which each of the three great powers would have to exercise at the peace settlement."[32] On the condition that it be limited to three months' trial and definitely did not establish postwar spheres of influence, President Roosevelt gave

31. Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (2 vols., New York, 1948), II, 1167. In connection with the request for bases in Rumania, one might note that in 1948 the Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain, Maisky, stated that the U.S.S.R. probably would not oppose a Balkan federation, provided it excluded Rumania, another indication, perhaps, of a special status for Rumania in Soviet plans. Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History* (New York, 1948), p. 714.

32. Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 1451–1455. Roosevelt's approval was given without Hull's knowledge and against his wishes.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

● 648 American approval to the proposal. It is evident that Churchill's move was an attempt to regain the position lost when his plan for an Anglo-American invasion of the Balkans was overruled in 1943; he was clearly interested in securing Greece for Britain's Mediterranean sphere.

When Churchill and Eden visited Moscow in October, 1944, this arrangement was extended even further in establishing the degrees of influence the two powers should enjoy in the various Balkan states. According to former Secretary of State Byrnes, "We knew they had reached the informal understanding that, if the British found it necessary to take military action to quell internal disorders in Greece, the Soviets would not interfere. In return, the British would recognize the right of the Soviets to take the lead in maintaining order in Rumania." [33] The result undoubtedly was, as Hull points out, that "the Russians took it for granted that by the agreement of June 1944, Britain and the United States had assigned them a certain portion of the Balkans, including Rumania and Bulgaria, as their sphere of influence." [34] Hull was correct in his starting assumption that an agreement ostensibly limited to military affairs could too easily lead to political arrangements of a lasting nature. On the other hand, his opposition to spheres of influence and independent political action by one or two of the great powers does not seem to have been wholly consistent, nor would it have been convincing to the Russians, given the evident political action of the United States and Great Britain in Italy where the Russians had very little voice, though Hull maintains they were kept informed. In brief, by the end of 1944 not only did the Russians have considerable reason to believe that Rumania was in their sphere, but Anglo-American political as well as military action in Italy provided them with a precedent for independent action. The first power to make use of the October agreement was Great Britain in its intervention against ELAS during the Greek crisis of December, 1944.[35] Russia, at this time, kept to the bargain; the Soviet press and radio gave no sign of support for the Left-wing Greek partisans.

Such was the state of affairs when, in January, 1945, Russia appears to have given the green light to the Rumanian Communists.

33. Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

34. Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 1458. Sherwood states, however, that Roosevelt sent a cable to Stalin indicating that the United States regarded the Churchill-Stalin conversations as "preliminary" and not committing the American government. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 834.

35. For recent accounts, from different points of view, of the background to the British intervention in Greece, see L. S. Stavrianos, "The Immediate Origin of the Battle of Athens," and W. H. McNeill, "The Outbreak of Fighting in Athens, December 1944," both in *The American Slavic and East European Review*, 8, No. 4 (December, 1949).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

Between this decision, however, and the installation of the Groza cabinet in March the Yalta Conference took place. Although Stalin at Yalta made several pointed remarks to the effect that he "had no intention of criticizing British actions in Greece, nor . . . any intention of interfering in that country,"[36] the agreement signed by the Big Three made no mention of spheres of interest. On the contrary, the declaration regarding liberated areas in Europe seemed wholly in accord with American interests and was, with slight modifications, the same as Roosevelt's proposed text:

> The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of America . . . jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems. . . . The three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require: (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed people; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections. . . .
>
> When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

There is no question that the Soviet action in Rumania at the end of February was scarcely in accord with this declaration. As Byrnes later said, "From the close of the Yalta Conference to the present day it [the declaration on liberated Europe] has been a source of conflict between the Soviet Union and ourselves. But it is the basis on which we have shown the world that Russian actions in eastern Europe have been in violation of Russia's pledged word."[37] Unfortunately, there seems to have been no explicit discussion at Yalta of

36. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference* (New York, 1949), pp. 217-218, 244.
37. Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

the possibilities of a contradiction between this declaration, which is not altogether unambiguous, and the British-Soviet division of spheres of influence.[38]

During the Rumanian crisis the Russian head of the Allied Control Commission refused to consult with the American and British representatives. Molotov informed Ambassador Harriman that "the Radescu Government was unable to maintain order and fulfill the armistice terms and that the Allied Control Council would take the necessary measures and keep the Allies informed,"[39] but presumably after the decisive steps had been taken. Later, in September, 1945, Molotov admitted to Byrnes that Vyshinsky had "helped in the formation of the government," but said that the U.S.S.R. had acted because "there was very serious danger of disorder and civil war."[40] If there was danger of civil war it was only because the Soviet Union had urged the Rumanian Communists to action.

Thus the initial American protests and inquiries had no effect in checking the Russian action and the administration was unwilling to press the issue at this time, partly because the war was still being fought. It refused, however, to recognize the Groza government. The British, while also deploring the Soviet move, were in no position to make a vigorous objection. As Churchill explained in a message to Roosevelt on March 8, 1945:

> We have been hampered in our protest against these developments by the fact that, in order to have the freedom to save Greece, Eden and I at Moscow in October recognized that Russia should have a largely preponderant voice in Rumania and Bulgaria, while we took the lead in Greece. Stalin adhered very strictly to this understanding during the thirty days fighting against the Communists and ELAS in the city of Athens, in spite of the fact that all this was most disagreeable to him and to those around him.[41]

It is reasonable to assume, then, that to the Soviet government the division of southeastern Europe into spheres of influence meant that it was to act in accordance with its interests in Rumania as Great

38. Stalin, in proposing an amendment to the declaration on liberated Europe—"support will be given to the political leaders of these countries who have taken an active part in the struggle against the German invaders"—remarked that Churchill need have no anxiety that this proposal applied to Greece, a fairly clear indication that he would consider the division into spheres of influence the basic agreement.

39. Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

41. Quoted in a statement by James F. Byrnes, *New York Times*, October 18, 1947.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

Britain had in Greece. Consequently, when challenged for having contravened the Yalta agreement—a challenge which might well have been received with some surprise and irritation—it responded either by warping the meaning of the declaration, by maintaining that subsequent investigation of the Groza regime required the united approval of all three powers, or by relying on the overriding priority of military requirements and the ultimate authority of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. It is difficult to see just how Stalin could have accepted the Yalta declaration without mental reservations. Apart from his doubtful record as an advocate of self-government and free elections, there was the undoubted basic dilemma that a popularly elected government would in all probability be anti-Soviet.[42]

Why did the Soviet government act at this particular time? It is possible that a connection exists between the British measures in Greece and Vyshinsky's work in Bucarest. But beyond this the underlying reason, apparently, was the assumption that the war in the Pacific would be more protracted than it proved to be, and hence that the Western Allies would be unable or reluctant to oppose this Soviet move to secure its position in a state which, after all, had been an Axis satellite and was certainly of great strategic importance to the U.S.S.R.[43]

This answer, however, leads to the further question whether the installation of the National Democratic Front government was primarily a security measure to protect Soviet interests in a vital strategic area or represented the first step of a premeditated campaign to communize all eastern Europe. There is, perhaps, no need to develop the arguments for the latter view; subsequent events themselves seem to support it. Even the Communists today hold to that interpretation.[44] There is no evidence, despite the upsurge of Russian nationalism during the war, that the Communists ever renounced their ultimate hopes of a world revolution and a worldwide union of Soviet

42. The same dilemma appeared, of course, in the Polish question. Harry Hopkins, in his last visit to Moscow, stated that the United States would accept any government in Poland which was desired by the Polish people and was at the same time friendly to the Soviet Union. I have yet to find satisfactory evidence that the expression of the popular will, in such a country as Rumania or Poland, would have any likelihood of bringing about a regime friendly to the U.S.S.R. This is not to say that the widespread antipathy may not have had political and historical justification, but merely that the formula of free elections and friendly government involved a contradiction.

43. This, at least, was the most satisfactory explanation I was able to obtain while in Rumania.

44. See below, p. 313.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

• UK republics. Certainly the Soviet political record leaves little doubt that agreements with bourgeois states were to be regarded solely as measures of expediency, not as means of reconciling the antagonisms of the two systems, which by definition were irreconcilable.[45]

Nevertheless, there is some evidence that developments were not all planned in advance in accordance with a secret blueprint, some indication of indecision in the Soviet leadership. In 1944 Ambassador Harriman suggested that elements in the Russian government close to Stalin opposed too close collaboration with the West, but that Stalin liked to have two strings to his bow.[46] Later, in April, 1945, Harriman cabled that he detected three parallel lines of Soviet foreign policy: 1) collaboration with the United States and the United Kingdom in a world organization; 2) creation of a security ring through domination of the border countries; 3) penetration of other countries through their Communist parties.[47] Since it is obvious, and should have been obvious to the Russians, that simultaneous pursuit of all three lines was impossible Stalin may have felt there were alternate paths to follow, that the course had not been set.

Two additional possibilities suggest themselves in this regard: The first is that initially the united front governments of the liberated states of eastern Europe were regarded not—as they later came to be—as mere springboards for exclusive Communist domination but as providing a modus vivendi for the states which had united in fighting Nazi Germany. The second is that the Russians may have regarded Rumania as occupying a special status and that actions taken there did not necessarily apply to the rest of Europe.

With regard to the first possibility, Isaac Deutscher, in his recent biography of Stalin, has suggested that the concept of a people's democracy—a much milder affair in theory than what the Communists had been trained to expect—as distinct from the Soviet system was taken seriously for a time after the war by Soviet political theorists.

45. An even more explicit indication, if it is authentic, of a long-held plan to use united front governments after the war as the first step to achieving a Communist revolution is to be found in a recent biography of Tito, in what purports to be a secret Comintern directive of May 9, 1941, stating that "The Communist world revolution must be presented as a series of measures to achieve 'true democracy.'" The steps to be followed look very much like those which have been taken in eastern Europe since 1945: establishment of a broad coalition government, then its progressive liquidation through arrests, trials in people's courts, etc. Stephen Clissold, *Whirlwind, an Account of Marshal Tito's Rise to Power* (New York, 1949), pp. 238–241. The author informs me that the directive came from the archives of the wartime pro-German Serbian police. Despite its apparent authentication by subsequent events, certain passages in it do not, in my opinion, ring true.

46. Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 1460.

47. Stettinius, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

Stalin may have felt such a form of government would "help him to preserve the condominium of the Big Three." [48]

In 1945 one does find such statements as Stalin's to Harry Hopkins "that Poland would live under the parliamentary system which is like Czechoslovakia, Belgium, and Holland, and that any talk of an intention to Sovietize Poland was stupid . . . the Soviet system was not exportable—it must develop from within on the basis of a set of conditions which were not present in Poland." [49] Now one may regard this statement as a triumph of mendacity or see certain sinister implications in the last phrase, but still there is an impression, for the short run at least, of Stalin's pursuing a noncommunizing line. Moreover, certain events in 1945 are rather difficult to explain on the premise of a fixed intention to sovietize eastern Europe. Why was Hungary permitted to have free elections in 1945, elections which brought in an anti-Communist majority? Even in Rumania, the Soviet presentation to King Michael of its highest award, the Order of Victory, would seem an unnecessarily extravagant gesture if he was to be dethroned at an early date. The inclusion in the Groza government of such a questionable person as Tătărescu, who was not really needed for his technical competence, whom the local Rumanian Communists regarded with great distaste, and whose presence certainly did not greatly reassure business circles, is perhaps best, if rather weirdly, explained by the Soviet determination to have a "bourgeois" politician in the new coalition.[50]

While it is true that Hungary, for a time at least, was permitted to enjoy the fruits of a free election, that Czechoslovakia preserved a relatively independent internal status until 1948, and that Finland, though at one time associated with Hitler, is still free of Communist control, there is little evidence that Rumania would ever have been permitted such freedom, or such a long leash. There is the possibility, suggested above, that Soviet interests in Rumania were more extensive than elsewhere. Historically, tsarist Russia frequently dis-

48. I. Deutscher, *Stalin, a Political Biography* (Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 542-543.

49. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 900.

50. I cannot prove this statement but it was the only plausible explanation I could obtain from some Rumanian Communists who were most embarrassed by Tătărescu's presence in the government. Deutscher, who is bothered by the same problem, cites several other actions which are hard to explain if Stalin had a definite and coherent plan to communize eastern Europe, e.g., Stalin's excessive concern with the Russian-Polish and Polish-German frontiers and the obviously damaging effect to the Communist cause of the reparations burdens placed on the defeated states. Deutscher's conclusion is that Stalin had no master plan but a number of extremely self-contradictory intentions. Deutscher, *op. cit.*, pp. 526-527.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

● 648 played ambitions in Moldavia, the path of approach to Constantinople and the Straits; recent Soviet writings on Bessarabia interpret the "liberation" of that province from the Turks in 1812 as a half-completed freeing of the Moldavian people, frustrated by Napoleon's invasion. As has been noted above [51] the Soviet government in a few chance remarks showed a special concern over Rumania during the war. Since 1947, with the reinforcing of the iron curtain, Rumania appears to have become the most tightly sealed and impenetrable of all the Soviet satellites. Moreover, of all the nations of eastern Europe, Rumania offered perhaps the least promise of voluntary cooperation with the Soviet regime: there were the unresolved territorial conflicts, the absence of any Pan-Slav feeling, and a miserably weak Communist party. Hence even if one assumes, hypothetically, no fixed intention from the beginning to sovietize eastern Europe but only a desire to secure friendly governments and strategic security, Russian action in Rumania was likely to be heavy-handed and arbitrary.

These possibilities are suggested very tentatively; their further implications will be treated briefly in the first section of Chapter XIV. One observation, however, may be made at this point. The two interpretations, a) that the Russians had a blueprint for all of eastern Europe, or b) that there was no such plan but that their actions arose from the play of events, especially from the deterioration of international relations following the war, are not in their practical consequences as far apart as they might seem. In the first place, the term blueprint is misleading in giving an impression of a predetermined course of action. Communist strategy is more likely to be along the lines of a chess game: the very notion of the plan involves the consideration of alternative lines of action, depending in part upon the opponent's response. This Leninist flexibility, which is rather ponderous and mechanical in the Soviet regime's hands, often is forgotten after the fact by the Communists' own proclivity to see all developments as inevitable and foreordained by Stalin's wisdom. Perhaps the only constants are the ultimate goal of world communism and a deep sense of ill-will and hostility toward the Western bourgeois states.

Secondly, even if one assumes the Soviet intention to follow limited objectives, their application in practice immediately encounters some very thorny difficulties. Thus, the Soviet Union wanted friendly states on its western frontiers, since these states in the past had been avenues of invasion. Well enough, but such a state as Rumania has

51. See above, p. 268.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

historically been not only an avenue of invasion into Russia but also a Russian avenue for expansion. As so often is the case in the world of power relations, the Russian attempt to secure what it regarded as its defensive requirements was at the same time a threat to the western European states, not to mention the border states obliged to be friendly. The Soviet demand for security carried with it potentially aggressive implications. 648 ●

Further, even if one supposes that the united front governments were not meant to be merely flimsy covers for a Communist dictatorship, what did they mean, how were they to develop? Surely not toward bourgeois parliamentarianism, to the Russians a retrograde step. The concept of a united front, in the absence of a pressing fascist threat, was purely formal, and as soon as the Communists attempted to give it some content it became suspiciously, if inevitably, like a false façade. Similarly, with respect to elections, a single prearranged list of candidates would be the only means of maintaining the front; otherwise the Communists would feel obliged to rig the ballots to prevent a return to the old rut of bourgeois politics.

Finally, at the end of the war the Big Three coalition was bound to loosen, as coalitions always do when the common enemy has been defeated. But any increase in disputes, when viewed through Marxist-Leninist spectacles, was certainly to be interpreted as a sign of renewed bourgeois perfidy. Hence, it would require relatively little actual friction for the Russians to draw, or anticipate, the most damaging conclusions, which would in turn exacerbate relations and lead to a rapid deterioration of great power cooperation. For all these reasons it appears that the only difference between the two interpretations mentioned above is that if the Russians had from the outset a fixed determination to communize eastern Europe, by force if need be, there was no chance of an amicable settlement with the United States and Great Britain; if they did not have such a plan, there was only a very slight chance.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

tatorship would follow the People's Democracy and was not contained within its form; it believed that power might be shared with the peasants.

But what, it should be asked, was the source of these errors? Surely not an independent, uninformed, "soft" mood on the part of the Hungarian party. The hard line now enunciated was no new discovery; it was the familiar revolutionary message all Communists had been brought up on. Quite obviously all these mistakes were likewise, at an earlier date, the official line emanating from Moscow in support of popular fronts, and while it may be that the Moscow leadership never really subscribed to this line, the article itself would indicate that party membership had been sufficiently indoctrinated in the more moderate tactic that it was now necessary to make a special effort to redirect its views. Given the tight coordination of all Communist parties in the Soviet sphere, there is no reason to doubt that this interpretation also applies to the Rumanian case.

On the international level, Rumania's relations deteriorated steadily after 1946; the American and British governments repeatedly wrote notes of protest against the violation of Allied agreements and the peace treaty; the Rumanian government responded sharply with charges of American imperialism and espionage. In 1949 the issue of the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Rumanian violation of human rights was brought before the General Assembly of the United Nations, which recorded its disapproval of the completely uncooperative attitude displayed by these states and resolved to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice for definition and clarification.[19] It was not clear by the end of the year that this action could achieve any important results under existing circumstances.

Since the creation in 1947 of the Cominform, which signalized the return to a hard line, and especially with the transfer of its headquarters to Rumania after the break with Tito, Bucarest has become one of the principal centers of international communism. At the same time the country has been increasingly isolated from the Western world. In April, 1949, even diplomatic representatives were prohibited from traveling in the Banat, Bucovina, Moldavia, or Dobrogea.

It is idle to speculate whether or when Rumania will enter the Soviet Union as a member republic, although rumors anticipating that event have not been lacking in the last two years. It would appear to be a question of relatively little practical importance, since the U.S.S.R.

19. United Nations, *Official Records of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly. Resolutions, 20 September–10 December 1949* (Lake Success, N.Y.).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

already enjoys virtually complete control over the country. Moreover, while the Rumanian political and economic structure is steadily approaching, and probably not asymptotically, the Soviet model, the final decision on incorporation will be based—apart from considerations of expediency—on political definitions which a mind not steeped in Leninism-Stalinism would have small chance of foreseeing.[20]

Economic Conditions

Economic developments since 1945 may be divided into two periods: two years, 1945–47, of confusion and distress resulting from the war, Russian withdrawals, severe drought, the agrarian reform, monetary inflation, and the unsettled political situation; since 1947, a period of greater stability, an apparent increase in production, and the beginning of a directed and planned economy. In neither period can one obtain a very satisfactory picture of economic conditions. In the first months there was much administrative disorganization, and the government itself frequently lacked accurate information. The Groza regime has not hesitated from the outset to manipulate statistics for political and propagandistic purposes. Since the tightening of the administration in 1948, Rumania has been as reluctant as the Soviet Union, more reluctant than the other satellites, to publish any measurable economic data. Today, the few figures that appear are given as percentage gains for which it would be exceedingly difficult to supply a reasonably accurate base.

In general, it may be said that Rumania was slower than the other eastern European states to recover from the war, in somewhat the same way it lagged in coming out of the depression. Agricultural production fell off seriously in 1945 and 1946, partly because of the disorganization attendant upon the agrarian reform, but largely because of two years' serious drought. Both the acreage sown and the crop yields, especially in maize, the peasant's source of food, were exceptionally low; in 1946 the level of agricultural production was only 59 per cent of the 1934–38 average.[21] The production of indus-

20. This point is not very important but it is of interest to note that in the exchange of notes leading to Tito's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, after referring to Kardelj's hope, expressed in 1945, that the Yugoslav government would be regarded as the representatives of one of the future Soviet republics, rather scornfully dismissed his "primitive and fallacious reasoning . . . about Yugoslavia as a future constituent part of the USSR." It did not, however, vouchsafe its own authoritative views on the subject. Cf. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute* (London; New York, 1948), p. 39.

21. United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948* (Geneva, 1949), p. 17.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

433 trial and food crops fell successively in 1945 and 1946, and it is to
241 be noted that the soybean, so extensively advertised in the 1930's, virtually disappeared as a crop when the peasants were left to their own devices.

The absence of accumulated stocks of grain, the large deliveries to Russia under the armistice, and the failure of the maize harvest in 1946 produced a disastrous and tragic famine, above all in Moldavia, in the winter and spring of 1947. Relief shipments had to be brought in from abroad, including substantial assistance from the United States.

The livestock position, while improving over the situation immediately after the war, was still weak by 1948. There were, in that year, 30 horses and 128 oxen (including buffaloes) per 100 agricultural exploitations as against 56 and 150 respectively in 1941; in terms of cultivation, there were 21 draft animals per 100 hectares of arable land in 1948 as against 27 in 1941. The quantity of agricultural equipment showed less diminution: an increase in the total number over 1941 was matched by a slight decline in the amount of equipment per exploitation, a result presumably of the increase in small holdings after the 1945 reform.[22]

Rumanian industry, which had expanded under wartime demands, registered a decline in 1944 and 1945, but a slight recovery in 1946. According to the Ministry of Finance, total industrial production was 80 per cent of the 1941 level in 1944, 60 per cent in 1945, and 77 per cent in the first ten months of 1946.[23] The chemical, metallurgical, and food industries were the most severely hit. The petroleum industry, which appears to be facing an exhaustion of the tapped fields, had already showed signs of decline before the war; in 1947 the output of crude petroleum was 3.8 million tons as against 8.7 million in 1936 and 5.8 million in 1940.

433 In addition to the slump in agricultural and industrial production,
● 248 the Rumanian economy suffered from the flow of goods to the Soviet Union. The total value of Rumanian wealth transferred officially or unofficially, as restitution, reparations, or war booty has been the

22. A. Golopenția and P. Onica, *Recensământul agricol din Republica Populară Română, 25 Ianuarie 1948. Rezultate provizorii*, Institutul Central de Statistică (Bucarest, 1948).

23. Rumanian Ministry of Finance, *Expunere de motive la bugetul 1947/48*, p. 338. The validity of these figures is uncertain, and they may represent an inflated estimate. Tătărescu is reported to have said in 1947 that after two years of the Groza regime the general level of production was only 48 per cent of the 1938 output. *New York Times*, June 6, 1947.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1981 EDl Rumania EDl

subject of a number of heated disputes at international conferences, 433
and it would be very difficult to make a reliable estimate.[24] That the 648
drain was serious is indicated by the fact that as early as 1945 some Rumanian Communists, with more than the average amount of economic insight and less than the usual blind devotion to the Soviet Union, were in despair over the effect of the Russian withdrawals upon the country's economy and their own political position. The glaring contradiction between Russia's efforts to woo Rumania and to secure some measure of popularity for the Communist party and its rather frantic removal of goods and equipment has puzzled many observers. The explanation may simply be that the policy of this monolithic state was not consistent, or rather, that two different policies were here overlapping.

Rumania's foreign trade was greatly reduced after the war; by 439
1948 the value of its exports was only 50 per cent of the 1938 figure (in 1947, 21 per cent), and its imports 69 per cent (in 1947, 57 per cent).[25] The bulk of the trade was with the generally similar economies of the other eastern European states, which were being increasingly linked by a network of trade agreements.

The combination of low output, armistice obligations and war costs, 652
and the general political uncertainty of the postarmistice months led to a fearful inflation. Rumanian currency had never been sound since the First World War and had showed a tendency toward inflation in the 1930's and the war years; between 1943 and the summer of 1947, when a drastic stabilization was achieved, prices rose to dizzying heights. The cost of living index increased from a base of 100 in 1938 to 145.0 in 1940, 413.9 in 1943, 3,678.7 in 1945, 46,140 in December, 1946, and 525,688 in July, 1947.[26]

24. At the time of the Paris Peace Conference the American delegate, Willard L. Thorp, complained that the Rumanian delegation had been of no assistance in supplying information on this point, but he estimated that the total cost to Rumania of its defeat would be about $2,000,000,000. As of 1946 he estimated that about $1,050,000,000 had already been transferred: $323,000,000 for the maintenance of occupation troops, $100,000,000 for reparations based on the 1938 price level, $175,000,000 for property restitution, and $450,000,000 for requisitions. U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin*, 15, No. 379 (October 6, 1946). In July, 1948, General Radescu, in exile in the United States, stated that since Thorp's estimate Rumania had paid an additional $735,000,000. *New York Times*, July 18, 1948. Some attempts have been made to relate these withdrawals to Rumania's national income, but both figures would by necessity be exceedingly uncertain.

25. United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*, Table XVI.

26. Institutul Central de Statistică, *Comunicări statistice*, No. 19 (Bucarest, January 31, 1948).

still abroad, was summarily dismissed. Peasant risings, a [66] movement for autonomy in Transylvania, and general instability led to the nomination of General Averescu to 642 office, owing to the reputation he enjoyed of being a strong 648 man, having taken an active part in suppressing the peasant rising of 1907.

General Averescu's government passed the enactment [423] dealing with the distribution of land to the peasants, while his Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Take Jonescu, laid the foundation of the Little Entente by concluding alliances with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. General Averescu attempted to open pourparlers with Russia, so as to prepare the recognition of Rumania's right to Bessarabia, and there was a fair chance of his succeeding, but he was baulked of his aim, for the King vetoed his plan.

To M. Titulescu was assigned the task of reorganizing the 652 country's finances. This was deemed to be an intrusion into 665 the special domain of the Bratianus[A], and so by provoking 661 their hostility, brought about Averescu's downfall. M. Take Jonescu was his successor, but he was able to maintain himself in office only for a month. A government constituted by the Bratianu party followed in January, 1922, and remained in power until March, 1926. Owing to the disunion among the Opposition groups the Bratianu party was allowed to carry into effect its nefarious project of securing complete control of the economic resources of Rumania. The whole legislation passed during its tenure of office was of a purely economic character, and under the pretext of consolidating the finances of the country they merely consolidated their own financial dominance.

Popular dissatisfaction was steadily growing in the meanwhile, as instead of relieving the money stringency, the economic policy of the government did nothing but intensify the evil from which the country was suffering. On [664] the other hand the Opposition was closing its ranks and organizing mass demonstrations throughout the country. A monster meeting of peasants was held at Alba-Julia in May, 1925, followed up by vigorous onslaughts against the government. The latter, unable to obtain a foreign loan which would have enabled it to stabilize the currency and relieve

A [The Liberal Party, headed by John Bratianu--Analyst]

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

There is a deficit of five and a half milliards left over from the years 1930/31, and of 1,100 millions arising from the first three months of the current year. In all, a deficit of six and a half milliard lei, which is entirely due to bad management. 652 647

To these budget deficits should be added some ten milliard lei, owing by the State to various local contractors and industries, the non-payment of which has caused an enormous prejudice to the internal economy of the country, since these enterprises, having all their liquid funds "frozen up," have been obliged to stop their activities and dismiss their staffs, thereby intensifying the crisis. 652

The legislation recently passed by the Government has also had a most unfortunate repercussion on the general situation. Thus the law sanctioning the cancellation of agrarian debts has resulted in the ruin of almost every bank in the country, for, with a few rare exceptions, all have directly or indirectly advanced money to agriculturists, who by this law, promulgated in April, 1932, are dispensed from their obligations to the extent of 50 %, while the remaining 50% is rendered recoverable within 30 years. No compensation whatever is granted by the State to the banks or to private individuals who had been unfortunate enough to have advanced money to the peasants, even on the security of a mortgage. The result is that almost every banking institution and thousands of people have been ruined at one stroke. 652 426

This measure has not met with the general approval even of the peasantry, for the most prosperous and enterprising among them, who naturally had placed their savings in the banks, have thereby lost their money, since all the rural banks have been rendered insolvent. The total cessation of all credit, which has naturally followed the suspension of banking operations in the rural districts, has caused immense loss to the farmers, who can no longer borrow money even for their most pressing needs. Another law, that of the so-styled "Liquidation Judiciaire," completes and intensifies the evils fostered by that of the "Concordat preventif," rendering all commercial debts practically irrecoverable without the condescension of the debtor. Such measures are 648 652

648 indicative of the complete chaos which prevails in the minds
652 of those at the helm of the State, and who, seeing the *impasse* to which they have brought the country, appealed to France to send a mission of financial experts to devise means whereby Rumania may be extricated from the morass in which she has been entangled. This mission, headed by M. Rist, former adviser to the Rumanian National Bank, has arrived at the end of April, 1932, and is preparing a report which apparently is to recommend a drastic curtailment of the government staffs, and a reorganization of the tax-collecting system. Though exceedingly discreet, these advisers could not help expressing their astonishment at the bungling methods obtaining, and several higher officials in the Ministry of Finances have been summarily dismissed in consequence of their gross incompetence. Surprise, too, has been expressed at the number of officials employed in the Ministries
[647] of War and Public Instruction, 33,533 and 82,821 respectively, staffs more numerous than in the corresponding institutions in France, a country noted for its bureaucratism. The activities of these foreign advisers, who, after all, had been invited to come, and who are rendering a signal service to the country, have given rise to an outburst of xenophobia which is truly surprising. The press, with a few rare exceptions has protested against this immixture in the internal affairs of the State, which it pretends to regard as an affront to the national dignity, and has not wearied of insisting that Rumania should desist from paying her external debt service, which absorbs some six milliard lei per annum. Such a solution seems natural for a State which condones the annulment of all pecuniary engagements of the most numerous class of its citizens, as is provided in the law concerning the cancellation of agrarian debts. However, the Government seems unwilling to go so far, and it declares on all occasions that it will fulfil its foreign obligations in spite of the heavy sacrifices this decision may entail. Already it has taken the cue given by the French experts, and promptly dismissed five Under-Secretaries of State, early in May, 1932. The fall of the Tardieu Cabinet, which seemed disposed to extend a loan to Rumania on certain conditions, may now induce the Rumanian government to retrace its steps to a

certain extent, as apparently the new French government will be less inclined to make financial advances. Nevertheless the Cabinet will hesitate to assume the responsibility of openly defaulting, lest such action should be resented by France and to a lesser extent by England, and bring about Rumania's political isolation in face of Russia. So that, strange as it may seem, the dread of the Bolsheviks may contribute to the respect of engagements, the repudiation of which would be applauded by the latter.

The press organ of General Averescu, the "Indreptarea," in its issues of 12th and 18th May, 1932, contains some interesting comments on the findings of the French experts. It thus affirms that the experts have ascertained that there is a lack of control in the handling of the public funds, that there is a great redundancy of officials, and that huge frauds are committed at the expense of the State revenues. As an example, the case of the revenue from the Customs was given, which was estimated at 1,200 million lei, yet only yielded 400 millions, the balance of 800 millions having been fraudulently diverted to other pockets than that of the State. M. Rist, affirms the "Indreptarea," had recommended a compression of the expenses through the dismissal of a large number of functionaries, and the creation of a control of all payments made to the State so as to eliminate the numerous frauds to which the Budget deficit is principally due. If these reforms were effected, Rumania, according to M. Rist, could fulfil her external obligations. However, the findings of the experts were not likely to enhance the prestige of Rumania in Paris and it hardly seemed likely that the French would now keep their promise made to M. Argentoianu to give pecuniary assistance to Rumania, unless they were allowed to exert a control which would be tantamount to applying to Rumania the status of what in its essence would be a colonial dependency. Such measures, if their acceptance were advocated by the Government, would weaken its prestige to such an extent that it could no longer maintain itself in power, even if it enjoyed royal support. The weakening of its authority was manifested by its decision not to allow the holding of municipal elections which were to take place in

RUMANIA

645 [666] [644] June, 1932, a measure which is resented by all political parties as a formal violation of the constitution.

From the above it will be clear that whatever popularity the Iorga-Argentoianu Cabinet may have enjoyed, and whatever the hopes to which it may have given rise on its formation, these have now been totally dispelled. This is not without causing a distinct prejudice to Rumania, for undoubtedly, Prof. Iorga is one of the most distinguished Rumanians and represents an immense moral asset for the country. He would have proved an ideal chief for a broad coalition of all political parties, and his presence, owing to his integrity as well as to his erudition would have immensely strengthened the position of such a popularly elected government.

000 Owing to the marked " lipsandry " from which Rumania is suffering, it was an unpardonable mistake on the part of her ruler to expose an eminent personality like that of Prof. Iorga to risk his reputation, and by trading on his sentiments of devotion to the throne to force him to join a team headed by an Argentoianu, who, according to General Averescu, ought to be in the dock, and not on the Ministerial bench.[1]

665 With the passing of time, and with the worsening of the situation, attacks on the present régime have become more virulent. General Averescu, who under Rumania's former kings was often appealed to on difficult circumstances, and who feels that he has been undeservedly ousted by the Iorga-Argentoianu combination, continues his vehement attacks on both Government and King, whom he threatens with the fate of Prince Cuza, deposed forcibly in 1866. Far more significant, however, is the attitude of the National Peasant Party, which so far has maintained a very dignified attitude. All of a sudden on May 15th, 1932, the " Patria," the organ of the Transylvanian section of the party, launched a virulent attack on the régime, denouncing the scandalous exploitation to which Transylvania is being subjected and threatening with a demand for autonomy. This campaign,

[1] In June, 1932, the "Dreptatea" repeatedly accused Argentoianu of having appropriated 20 million lei of public money, of which, 12 millions between May 17th and 31st, and eight millions on June 3rd and 4th, after he had resigned from office.

National Peasant Party, though it polled less than 50% of 666
the votes cast, secured 272 seats against 114 won by the Opposition. (The Liberals obtained 28, and the section of the party led by M. G. Bratianu, 14 mandates.)

M. Vaida-Voevod having discharged the duty assigned to 646
him retired from office; but as the National Peasant Party possessed a working majority in the newly-elected Chamber, it was called upon to assume power. The Opposition attempted to challenge the right of the National Peasant Party to govern the country owing to the smallness of the poll it secured at the elections, though it was the Liberal party itself, now heading the Opposition, which introduced the law conferring a majority of seats in the Chamber on the party which would poll 40% of the votes.

M. Maniu was besought by his partisans to resume once 645
more the premiership, but after several interviews with the King, declared himself unable to do so. He recommended, however, M. Vaida-Voevod to undertake the task, and accordingly a Cabinet headed by the latter was formed which includes both M. Mihalache and M. Madgearu, and other prominent members of the party. The 652
government thus formed proceeded to secure a loan of 50 million swiss francs, wherewith to pay its officials for the time being, and to publish its program, which in the main lines aims at: Reforming the present electoral law, reintroducing administrative decentralization, and reorganizing the railway administration. Equitable treatment of minorities is promised, as well as a modification of the law concerning the conversion of agrarian debts. At the same time State finances are to be reorganized with the co-operation of the League of Nations.

This last plan, however, will not work out so smoothly, 652
for the Opposition will do its utmost to stir up popular feeling 648
against it. Even when two League delegates arrived in June, 1932, to examine the economic situation, the Press was unanimous in deprecating this public investigation and treating it as an offence against the country's dignity. The most widely read paper, having a daily circulation of some 40,000 copies, appeared with a leading article entitled "the day of shame."

RUMANIA

652 648 Though there may be nothing derogatory in foreign supervision of Rumanian finances, Rumanian politicians will insist on decrying it as an affront to the *amour propre* of their country, because such control will prevent them from embezzling public funds. However, one may well question whether the League of Nations is the most suitable authority to take in hand such a difficult task after its lamentable failures in Bulgaria and Hungary, where the proceeds of the loans raised under its aegis served mainly to bolster up reactionary governments. After such a disastrous experience—at least so far as British subscribers to these loans are concerned, who have lost two thirds of their capital—it is doubtful whether the League of Nations would again venture to appeal with any hope of success for funds on behalf of its prospective ward. All the more so, since the League is not cut out for dealing with such a mendacious and elusive body of political mountebanks as it will have to transact business with in Rumania. M. Maniu's refusal to reassume the premiership is to be interpreted as a failure on his part to secure from the King implicit assurances that constitutional practices would not be tampered with again, so that the League will not know whom it will have to face when the National Peasant Party is once more turned out of office. It would be better apparently if this formidable job of cleansing Rumania's Augean stables were tackled by a single country, like France, which owing to its ascendancy as an ally, could exert the requisite authority. If the French were given a free hand, they would see at least that their money served its purpose, and they would take adequate precautions to counter-check effectively all the evasions and underhand manoeuvres in which Rumanian politicians are past masters.

RUMANIA

[166] late C. M. Stephanov, who was also a member of the
657 Rumanian Senate. The main cause of the effervescence that
563 still subsists is this ill-advised scheme of planting the destitute
[647] Kutso-Vlachs on the farms of the aboriginal inhabitants, proof of which has been given by M. Georoceanu in a booklet he has published. M. Georoceanu was formerly a member of the Rumanian Senate during M. Maniu's tenure of office.

It may be added that the Bulgarians complain of not
[68] having a single school in their villages, and that when they presented petitions for opening such their signatories had
[65] been prosecuted. Bulgarian priests are no longer allowed to be nominated, and those that still remain are being gradually replaced by Rumanians who officiate naturally in their own language which is not understood by their flocks. A lesser
[204] wrong which receives the condemnation only of the intellectuals, is the ban on Bulgarian newspapers and periodicals. Their introduction into Rumania is prohibited, and though a few months ago the Bucarest press announced that this embargo would be raised, yet as late as April, 1932 the police authorities in the Dobrudja had received no intimation of this commendable measure. It is obvious that all these
563 grievances could easily be removed with a little goodwill on
● 648 the part of the Rumanian government, and to the westerner
657 it is incomprehensible that the latter should make no effort to safeguard the happiness of hundreds of thousands of human beings whose destiny has been entrusted to its hands. For it is not only the elementary duty of a government to care for its subjects, but in this case even political reasons dictate the following of a more humane and civilized policy. The bulk of the population being Bulgarian, and having for forty years enjoyed an independent existence, is utterly unaccustomed to such maladministration as it is now experiencing. It is therefore natural that it should be soliciting the intercession of the Bulgarian government under whose suzerainty it lived until recently. This is a course that creates friction between the two governments, keeps open an old sore, and embitters and strains relations between Bulgaria and Rumania. The former country would incur every sacrifice in order to ensure Rumania's friendship, and

10: Logic S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

it is most regrettable that Rumania, on account of this constitutional impassibility from which she suffers, should neglect the accomplishment of a simple duty that would simultaneously ensure the pacification of a province and the friendship of a neighbouring State. Even Sir Ian Hamilton in one of his books extended this advise to Rumania: "If she values her life let her make it up with Bulgaria whilst she is in the gate." (The Friends of England, p. 130). But so far this soldierly exhortation has not been heeded.

Bessarabia.

"Twelve years of Rumanian rule has alienated Bessarabia more than a century of Russian administration," declared Constantine Stere, the veteran Bessarabian politician who may be considered as the mouthpiece of the population of that hapless region. If one wishes indeed, to form an idea of what the combined evils of corruption, ineptitude, nepotism, and inefficiency can bring upon a land he should visit Bessarabia. It is a standing disgrace, a festering sore, a danger point that will cause a fresh conflagration the moment the Russians across the Dniester can divert their attention from their economic plans to engage in world politics. Such is the desperation of the local population, their utter aversion to Rumanian misrule, the pessimism with which they regard every scheme emanating from Bucarest, that if the Russians would decide to cross the Dniester they would be hailed as liberators.

Not that the Bessarabians cherish any particular affection for the Russians and for communistic dogmas, but because there is after all a limit to human endurance to evils arising from such glaring maladministration. There is no hope for any amelioration; the Bucarest administration has demonstrated its incapacity to reform itself, and the only hope there may be of placating Bessarabia is the granting of a regional autonomy that may save her from casting longing glances at Bolshevik Russia across the Dniester. As the writer does not wish to be accused of exaggeration or of being imbued with unfriendly feelings towards Rumania, he will proceed to give a description of the position in Bessarabia by an interpolation of various excerpts culled from newspapers that he

for reasons easily understood, is incapable of competing 439
against her northern neighbour. Having to face likewise in the grain trade the formidable competition of the trans-oceanic countries which have industrialized their agricultural production, Rumania finds herself to-day in a most unenviable position, which explains why she is so desperately anxious to conclude preferential agreements with European industrial countries, so that she may have the possibility of disposing of her products at better prices than those at which similar Russian goods are being offered.

In order to market the 1931 harvest the Rumanian Government was obliged to grant a subsidy of 1,000 lei per ton of cereals exported, but after paying about one milliard lei in subsidies, it found that the system constituted too great a strain on its resources and the subsidy was suddenly suspended, many exporters not even receiving their due. The real ratio of exchange between raw materials and manufactured articles, which has lately shifted so markedly in favour of the latter, is another powerful factor which, added to her difficulties in exporting her produce, is making for the industrialization of Rumania.

As this policy of industrialization, which has been followed [439]
since the conclusion of the war, has not given the expected
results, its continued pursuit and intensification can only be 471
persisted in through State intervention, which is also growingly exerted in organizing the exports. Control of exchanges, the clearing system, quotas, and inter-state barter are all gradual stages leading to the ultimate elimination of individual initiative in commercial intercourse and its substitution by collectivist methods. From this stage to the adoption of integral communism is an easy transition, and in view of the close proximity of the Russian example no surprise should be shown if it be imitated not only by Rumania, but by other Near Eastern States, if no other way of escape out of their present difficulties be offered them. The prospect of these States adopting Bolshevism is quite within the domain of possibilities, and this can hardly constitute a very reassuring portent for our Western democracies.

The visit of Ismet Pasha to Moscow in April, 1932, for the 646
purpose of seeing at close quarters how the Communist

administrative machinery worked, should serve as an eye-opener to the sceptic. Already, early in June, the Constantinople *Journal d'Orient* has announced that Ismet was intent on applying Russian methods to agriculture in Turkey, and that his Government had decided to create a textile industry on the Russian model and with Russian help. Subsequently the Turkish Press has announced that Russian experts had arrived to choose sites for the proposed works. For this reason it is to be deeply regretted that at the recent Grain Conferences, held in Paris and Rome, the delegates of the British Government did not adopt a more sympathetic attitude towards the views set forth not only by Rumania but also by her neighbouring countries, all of which are faced with the same difficulties. Their demand for preferential treatment with regard to their cereals may run counter to the 'most favoured nation' clause, yet there are methods by which such difficulties as may arise from such complications can eventually be circumvented, and the agreement reached between Rumania and France on May 26th, 1932, which grants the former country a total annual quota of 80,000 tons of wheat with a 40 per cent reduction in duties, is a case in point. This agreement brought into force automatically the long-talked-of preferential treaty with Germany,[1] which gives to Rumania an annual quota of some 200,000 to 250,000 tons of maize and of 400,000 to 500,000 teons of barley, with a 60 per cent reduction for the former and one of 50 per cent for the latter, and also secures for Rumania the right to export to Germany 7,000 head of cattle and 70,000 pigs per annum. Of course Rumania has had to grant corresponding advantages to Germany for certain of her industrial products, so that, taking into account that Great Britain is the largest grain-importing country, importing on an average three or four times as much as Germany, it would seem that it would be to our advantage and within our means to conclude similar arrangements. In 1931 we imported a total of 222 million bushels, of which 50 millions came from Canada, 39 from the Argentine, and 21 from the

[1] In August, 1932, a trade agreement between Italy and Rumania was signed, both countries making mutual concessions in their tariffs.

TRADE

EXPORTS TO:— 439

Country	Tons.	Value in 1,000 Lei.	Percentage of total.
England	995,382	3,230,452	11.33
Austria	425,175	2,588,536	9.07
Czechoslovakia	308,552	1,985,011	6.96
Germany	1,422,698	5,263,396	18.80
Hungary	1,187,651	2,127,371	7.46
Italy	1,260,742	3,674,836	12.88
Poland	95,499	452,250	1.58
France	607,302	1,968,960	——
Greece	218,049	686,169	——
Yugoslavia	242,750	509,556	1.79
Bulgaria	142,554	362,246	——
Holland	453,576	1,356,742	——
Egypt	544,911	1,194,361	——
Belgium	284,881	905,519	——

IMPORTS FROM:—

Country	Tons.	Value in 1,000 Lei.	Percentage of total.
England	54,303	1,873,712	8.13
Austria	41,412	2,678,949	11.63
Czechoslovakia ...	138,226	3,370,354	14.63
Germany	135,911	5,776,751	25.07
Hungary	60,817	908,111	3.94
Italy	38,367	1,825,419	7.92
Poland	134,675	983,301	4.27
France	——	——	——
Greece	——	——	——
Yugoslavia	23,532	79,600	0.34
Bulgaria	——	——	——
Holland	——	——	——
Egypt	——	——	——
Belgium	——	——	——

An examination of the above figures will readily convince 439 the reader that Rumania, which exports 90 per cent of its 648 cereals and 75 per cent of its oil, outside the Danubian countries, can find little inducement to participate in such a scheme as that of the Danubian economic federation proposed by France. Even members of the Government paid lip-service to M. Tardieu's plan, and if there was no outspoken criticism of it this was due mainly to the desire to avoid hurting French susceptibilities. The promised financial

439 aid was the only attractive feature of the scheme, and if this
448 plan materializes it may be taken for granted that the pecuniary assistance implied is the reason for its acceptance, and even then it is clearly indicated that such co-operation between the Danubian countries is to serve only as a prelude to a vaster project, namely that of a European Customs Union. A few figures will, however, show that this plan is not practicable. Thus Austria in 1930 imported 765,600 tons and Czechoslovakia 592,600 tons of cereals, while Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia annually disposed of 3,350,000 tons on an average during the years 1928–1930, or about two million tons more than the two industrial countries of the Danube basin could absorb, for the quantity of cereals these two countries buy from other than the Danubian States is infinitesimal. They likewise import 90 per cent of the meat they require from Hungary, Poland, and Rumania, so that the available margin for an increase on this item is also very limited. Concerning petroleum, Rumania exported in 1930 a total of 3,850,000 tons, of which only 1,150,000 tons were absorbed by Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, so that she had to dispose of the rest elsewhere. Apparently there is no inducement whatever for Rumania to join this proposed Danubian Union, and it is only the bait of financial aid and the desire not to ruffle France that will induce her to adopt a benevolent attitude towards it. In fact Rumania will be adversely affected, for she can only increase her sales to the other Danubian countries to a very limited extent, while she will be obliged to extend a preferential tariff to Austrian and Czechoslovakian manufactured goods which, on the one hand, will injure her own industry, and on the other, will affect adversely the import of manufactured goods of other countries, since they will have to pay higher duties than those on the corresponding Austrian and Czechoslovakian articles. It is certain, now that the preferential treaty with Germany has come into force, that the latter country will not regard with equanimity the realization of a Danubian Customs Union, which is likely to debar her from the advantages her trade arrangement with Rumania actu-
000 ally confers on her. All these considerations go to show that

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 Ml Romania Ml

RACIAL ASPECTS OF ROMANIA'S CASE

175 648 On June 26, 1940, the Soviet Government delivered an ultimatum at Bucharest demanding the immediate cession of the province of Bessarabia, which had been under Russian domination for a brief century of its existence, as well as of the northernmost districts of Bucovina. Many Romanian patriots counseled resistance and hoped for assistance from the Western democracies; but those with longer memories recalled the non-arrival of the British and French aid solemnly promised in the treaty under which Romania entered the first World War, and the more recent fate of Czechoslovakia. Not merely was aid uncertain and remote, but once the Romanian Army was engaged on the Russian frontier, attacks were certain to follow on the western Transylvanian border. So with a heavy heart Romania yielded to overwhelming force and onte more a blow such as Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland had experienced succeeded in its impact.

000 Only a month earlier I myself had given a lecture in Romanian in the huge, filled to overflowing Eparchial Hall of the Bessarabian capital, and had thus had recent and vivid experience of the cultural upswing given by the Romanians to a city I had first known in 1919 as a sleepy provincial center, for generations victim of administrative neglect and with even Russian schools few and far between. Some ten years ago I had had the privilege of being present at the dedication of a school in a large Russian village in Bessarabia and had been keenly impressed by the good feeling between Russians and Moldavians evidenced by the ceremony and the celebration afterward.

175 648 The Communist aggression of 1940, establishing Russia at the mouth of the Danube and a step nearer the Dardanelles, affected not merely Romania but the entire continent of Europe, upsetting as it did the balance at a traditional danger spot. It was not merely a warning to Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Turkey that a new campaign of aggression had started, with no more justification than the right of the stronger, but it focussed German attention on that part of the world and evidently led the German strategists to feel that a stronger bulwark against future Russian aggression was needed than would be furnished by the Pruth or the Sereth rivers. The Carpathians were obviously the new line of resistance, and subservient Hungary was only too ready to act as the German tool. It is tragic to reflect that a genuine policy of reconciliation on the Kremlin's part, which by creating a loyal border zone all the way from the White Sea and the Baltic to the Black Sea might even perhaps have prevented this war, was sacrificed to imperialistic ambitions that have since plunged mankind in its bloodiest struggle.

11: Clark 8-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

175
648

Anxious to guard against the new Russian move, the Germans gave Romania no credit for her correct attitude in holding aloof from the appeals of Romanian fractions of the Carpathian Ukraine to be annexed to Transylvania, just as later she maintained the same correctness by turning a deaf ear to similar prayers from Romanian communities in the break-up of Yugoslavia. To the Germans also this attitude was merely evidence of weakness, and a weakness of which the Hungarians have never been guilty. Accordingly, Berlin and Rome encouraged the Hungarians by the Vienna Award to seize parts of Transylvania where the Romanians have always been in a majority not contested even by the Hungarian census figures; and Magyar troops not merely occupied the territory, but with the utmost ruthlessness expelled the Romanian intellectual élite whose rights had been guaranteed by the Award, and with their traditional barbarity even put a considerable number of them to death.

Romania had to yield to force, the German-Russian pact still holding. But the next turn of the kaleidoscope, the break between Hitler and Stalin, gave her the cherished chance of recovering her lost provinces of Bessarabia and Bucovina. And here Romania has again given proof of her sense of justice by refraining from lodging claim to territorial expansion east of the Dniester into the Ukraine notwithstanding the hundreds of thousands of Romanians forcibly settled there in the century of Czarist rule over Bessarabia.

Opposed to expansion at the expense of her neighbors, Romania is not less determined to protect her natural and historic limits against encroachment and to bring within them the greater part of such Romanian masses as still live under other régimes. With the recovery of the territory lost in the east, the Romanian nation once more feels free to look with hope to a solution of its western problem. True enough, after a searching inquiry the claims of Hungary to Transylvania had been definitely denied by the concert of Europe in 1920. Nor was the right of Romania to Transylvania thus affirmed on historical grounds alone. In 1920, and doubtless more so today, the right of all peoples to a government of their own choosing and the exercise of this right for the whole by the decision of a majority could not be denied. The Romanians are fortunately able to establish by facts and figures that every historical subdivision of their homeland has an uncontested Romanian majority. The proof consists of the scientific data collected by an American-trained staff during the population census of 1930. Their authenticity rests not only on the fact that nationality was not determined arbitrarily by the

175
648

census taker but by the free statement of each inhabitant; it is confirmed by the consonance of the findings whether taking race, language or religion as criteria, as well as by comparison with the official population statistics of Austria-Hungary and Russia.

121

Inasmuch as the Award of Vienna was necessarily an expedient, I have thought it useful to give here a comprehensive abstract of Romania's racial figures together with historical outlines of her border regions, in the conviction that no lasting solution of European unrest could afford to disregard or minimize the racial realities of the continent's perennial danger zones.

C. U. C.

North Hatley, P. Q.
October 20, 1941.

BUCOVINA

648

The latest trial of the population of Bucovina at the hands of a powerful neighbor emphasizes the possible fate of every small nation intent on peaceful progress. By her ultimatum of June 26, 1940, Russia attempted to justify her demands on northern Bucovina, to which she had never had a vestige of title, as "a means of securing indemnity even in an insignificant degree for the great damage inflicted upon the Soviet Union and the population of Bessarabia by twenty-two years of Romanian domination." It is far more convincingly described as an act of unprovoked aggression by the very terms which Russia herself had subscribed to at London, July 3, 1933.[a]

[a]Convention for the Definition of Aggression, between the U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan, Esthonia, Latvia, Persia, Poland, Rumania and Turkey, Art. 2: "Shall be deemed aggressor in an international conflict . . . the state that first shall commit one of the following acts: 1. declaration of war on another state; 2. invasion by its armed forces, even without a declaration of war; 3. attack with its land, naval or air forces even without a declaration of war, against the territory, vessels or airships of another state; 4. naval blockade of the shores or harbors of another state; 5. aid to armed bands which from its territory shall invade the territory of another state . . ." Art. 3: "No consideration of a political, military, economic or any other nature shall serve as an excuse or justification of aggression as defined in Art. 2."

Satu Mare and Maramures, or 408,438 souls. The remainder of 43,000 Hungarians in the territory recently awarded Hungary live scattered over a region containing not less than 274,240 Romanians, besides other races. 162 728

Clearly, a permanent solution of the Hungaro-Romanian problem would have had to recognize this geographical distribution and treat each group on its merits.

The western group of 408,438 Hungarians forms 30.0% of the total population (1,361,996) of the region containing them; the Romanians there number 742,509, or 54.5%, and other nationalities 211,049, or 15.5%. At the preliminary conference* held in the early Summer of 1940 at Turnu Severin between Hungarian and Romanian delegates seeking a direct amicable settlement of the dispute, the Romanian delegation could not fail to point out that by an equitable rectification of the then existing frontier and an exchange of populations a settlement could be reached that would in effect reduce to a minimum the number both of Hungarians in Romania and of Romanians in Hungary. But the Hungarian delegation, instructed to claim the whole of Transylvania, would not entertain a practical and real settlement. As a consequence, 742,509 Romanians and 211,049 other nationalities, or a total of 953,558 non-Hungarians, were turned over to a bitter foster-government to make possible the repatriation of the 408,438 Magyars of Western Transylvania. As beneficiary of a settlement that delivers to her two unwilling aliens for every one of her nationals, Hungary has proved again that she is not interested in the creation of conditions that would insure a firm peace, but in an expansion which, at the cost of her neighbors, will enable her to assume the role of Hapsburg Austria in the East. 648 [728]

The central Hungarian group in Transylvania poses a different problem. This group, non-contiguous with the Hungarian frontier traced in 1920, had even before that date shown but little interest in Hungary, to them a distant country; their concern had mostly been in Moldavia, adjoining and familiar territory where they often sought and found profitable employment. There are thus grounds to doubt that they could find satisfaction in their present position, isolated as it is by the new Vienna boundary from main railway connections, from their natural economic outlet of Brasov and the opportunities of steady employment in Romania. Nor, seemingly, could they find comfort in an embittered atmosphere, in the close everyday contact with the 159,684 Romanians living among them or in the solid block of 273,839 Romanians that divide them in the north from their kinsmen. 162

* [preceeding the Vienna[19] agreement in 1940 -- --Analyst]

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

563 leges. In 1919 they accepted the union of Transylvania with the Old Kingdom. In the inter-war period the Germans in Rumania enjoyed a far better treatment than any other minority, and in Transylvania they were by far the most prosperous community. Nevertheless, the pan-German policy of National-Socialism found many supporters in their ranks.

131 648 [161] *Vienna Award.* Before the Vienna Award of 1940 Transylvania covered an area of 24,600 square miles and had a population of over 3,250,000, including 200,000 Jews. The decision of the German and Italian Foreign Ministers in Vienna split Transylvania in two, a measure never before carried out during the eventful history of the principality and certainly harmful and unjust to all the parties concerned. There is no doubt that this 'solution', which has only complicated the Transylvanian question and made its real solution more difficult, was made deliberately in order to make both Hungary and Rumania more dependent on Germany's support.

133 *Geography and Products.* The Transylvanian highlands are surrounded on three sides by the high mountain chains of the Carpathians. In the south-west the border is formed by the 'Western Mountains' (Muntii Apuseni), and in the north-west by the hills which eventually merge into the Hungarian plain. The Rivers Mures, Somes and Tarnava divide the highland in three distinct parts, the steppe, the hills and the forests. Parallel with the outer ring of the Eastern Carpathians there runs a belt of volcanic mountains with many small valleys. In the south-east there is the fertile and hilly district of Trei-

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Bukovina]

[Bessarabia]

000 small deposits of coal, gold and lead, but the industry of the province is well developed.

361 The capital of the Bukovina is Czernowitz (Cernauti[R]) with over 100,000 inhabitants. The town is situated on a high hill near the Pruth and is a great commercial centre. Here branches of the Austrian banks and some big Viennese businesses remained. The population of Czernowitz, like that of the rest of the province, is very mixed. Economically important as a junction of several trade-routes, Czernowitz has also become a great industrial town during the last fifty years.

648 In June 1940 the Northern Bukovina, including Czernowitz, altogether about 2,260 square miles, was ceded by Rumania to the U.S.S.R. Thereby over 550,000 people, mostly Ukrainians and many Jews, became Soviet citizens.

131 161 **BESSARABIA.** For over twenty years the province of Bessarabia was the eastern frontier region of Greater Rumania. It covers an area of 17,760 square miles and has a population of 3,000,000.[1] Bessarabia is surrounded by natural frontiers: in the north and east by the River Dniester, in the south by the Black Sea and the Danube, and in the west by the Pruth.

133 The north of Bessarabia is formed by a highland about 1,000 ft. high, consisting of fertile arable land which belongs to the 'black-earth' region of the Ukraine. The central area is hilly country, divided

[1] To which were added 120,000 Polish and Ukrainian villagers transplanted from Eastern Poland by the Soviet authorities shortly before their retreat before the German attack in 1941.

6

12: Kosmos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

000 down after heavy fighting and the burning of many villages.

635 563 [452] The political situation[1] in Bessarabia was partly the cause and partly the effect of economic conditions. Agricultural credit for those peasants who had received land was non-existent. Communications were neglected and allowed to fall into complete decay. There was only a small amount of trade, which was largely in the hands of the Jews. This encouraged the spread of anti-Semitic propaganda which was fostered by the Government. The Ukrainian and Russian population was deprived of all cultural rights. The German minority was the best treated, but even the Rumanians of Bessarabia were regarded by the central government with suspicion.

635 648 Following a demand by the Soviet government, which had never recognized the annexation of Bessarabia, Bessarabia was ceded by Rumania to the U.S.S.R. in June 1940. When Rumania joined Germany in the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina were again occupied by Rumanian troops.

[1] [ie: the frequency of popular uprisings – Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

From the very beginning three factors influenced the new State. The territorial gains of Rumania put the country into the ranks of the 'satisfied' powers whose main aim was the preservation of the *status quo*. Moreover, the foreign policy of Rumania had to be based upon the support of Britain and France, who were interested in the strengthening of those States which had been created or enlarged as a result of Allied aid. Another decisive influence was the presence of great numbers of minorities within the borders of Greater Rumania. Apart from the internal problems involved, this was also a continuous source of trouble with at least two of the neighbouring States—Hungary and the Soviet Union. The third, and by no means least important, was the question of social reform and the unification of the administrative machinery.

FOREIGN POLICY.[1] All parties in the State agreed upon the foreign policy to be pursued. Support of French interests in South-Eastern Europe coincided with those of the ruling classes of Rumania. The defensive alliance with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia against the revisionist claims of Hungary, known as the 'Little Entente', was sponsored by France, concluded in 1920 and maintained up to September 1938 when Czechoslovakia was forced to make territorial concessions to Germany, Hungary and Poland. In 1921 Rumania concluded a defensive alliance with Poland directed against any westward advance of the Soviet Union and later joined the 'Balkan Entente', whose purpose it was to prevent Bulgaria from regaining territories taken from her. Rumania was throughout the ally of France.

[1] [Of the period from 1919 to 1939--Analyst]

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

665 to blame other factors for whatever might go wrong
565 as there was no *boiar*-class left. The invisible, but
662 much more effective, financial control, continued to assure the rule of the same classes who had governed the country before.

665 Soon the Liberal Party again took over the government. I. Bratianu was the undisputed chief
648 of his party and had the confidence of the king. His whole policy was directed towards the strengthening of the power of the interests he represented. This, combined with his hostility towards the Soviet Union and Hungary had serious consequences which, however, became apparent only several years after his death.

643 THE MONARCHY. King Ferdinand, who had been
665 crowned at Alba Julia in 1923, died in 1927. This caused a serious crisis, for two years earlier the Crown Prince Carol had been forced to abdicate in favour of his infant son Michael. After Ferdinand's death a Regency Council of three was appointed to act in the king's name until he came of age. The Regents were naturally strongly influenced by Bratianu, but, when he died in 1928, the leader of the National Peasant Party was entrusted with the formation of a new government. Maniu secured a great electoral victory and his tenure of office was expected to bring about far-reaching changes. The new administration set about solving the minority question and the serious economic problems resulting from the incomplete land reform which instead of bettering had often worsened the lot of the peasants. Unfortunately at that time the world crisis had reached its worst stage. Although his

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

mentary seats. This device, combined with the 666
electoral methods adopted, normally assured the 665
continuance of the government in power.[1] In
Foreign Affairs the Liberals supported the French [648]
Alliance and the League of Nations in whose councils the Foreign Minister, N. Titulescu, had considerable influence.

The National Peasant Party led by Maniu and 665
Mihalache had the support of the rural population and represented the Left Wing of Rumanian politics. The party stood for a genuine Land Reform. It was not, however, a homogeneous party. From the first it had a Right and a Left Wing. As time went on, and especially when the political situation became more confused in the late thirties, the Right Wing tended to sympathize with the Iron Guard against the Royal dictatorship and the Left Wing with the Communists. The failure of the National Peasant Party to hold power after 1928 was due to the lack of confidence in the people, the fear of radical changes favoured by many sections of the population and hesitation to attack the firmly entrenched vested interests resolutely.

Although Rumania had a parliamentary constitu- 661
tion the country was ruled by anything but democratic methods. Parliamentary representatives, ministers and the press could be made to advocate and carry out any measure if adequately paid by interested parties. The corruption of the lower civil service seemed as nothing compared with that on the top. State contracts, exemption from taxes and

[1] It failed only twice: in 1928 when the National Peasant Party gained an electoral victory and in 1937 when Tatarescu's government fell.

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

661 preferential legislation, the right to exploit natural resources under State control, could all be and were secured by Rumanian and foreign trusts for comparatively small sums. The mismanagement and appropriation of public money by government officials, including the court, had ruinous consequences for the population which knew about these things, but was unable to do anything about it. [651] Indirect taxation, heavier and more ingenious than anywhere else in Europe, provided an inexhaustible source of income for those in power. The 'aviation-stamp', for example, which had to be affixed on every bill, theatre- and cinema-ticket, etc., was supposed to secure a strong Rumanian Air Force. In fact Rumania possessed hardly any aircraft at all as the funds were misappropriated throughout.

648 661 **THE ROYAL DICTATORSHIP.** The instability of Rumania's economic and political life and her geographical position made the country extremely sensitive to any changes in Central Europe. Therefore the rise to power of the National Socialists in Germany, the risings of February and June 1934 in Austria and world reactions to these events had [668] immediate repercussions in Rumania. The Liberal Prime Minister Duca was assassinated in December 1933 by members of the Iron Guard. Tatarescu took over and decreed a state of siege, which has not been lifted since, ostensibly to repress and destroy the Iron Guard. In fact exactly the opposite course was adopted. The democratic forces which began to rally in order to fight Rumanian Fascism were persecuted by the government whilst the terrorists were allowed to continue their activities.

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

662 attracted personalities who were willing to abjure
643 their political faith and serve the Crown.

While continuing to pay lip-service to the League
643 of Nations, he supported the Italian campaign in
● 648 Abyssinia by sending food and war material to Italy. During the Spanish Civil War propaganda in favour of Franco was allowed and supported, while anything in favour of the Republican cause was banned.[1]

The result of the elections in December 1937, on
643 the eve of Hitler's seizure of Austria, precipitated
665 events. The government of the day, headed by the Liberal Tatarescu, failed to secure the necessary 40% of the votes and resigned.[2] Carol refused to entrust Maniu with the formation of a government; and the Iron Guard had by now assumed such a hostile attitude towards the king that a compromise with them was out of the question. Consequently Carol called the 'National Christian Front' to power, an anti-Semitic and Fascist organization led by the poet Goga and Professor Cuza. Goga became Prime Minister and his cabinet contained former members of the Liberal and Peasant Parties who now went over to the absolutist camp, as well as the future 'Conducator'[3] Antonescu.

[1] General Cantacuzino and several legionaries joined Franco and when two of them were killed their coffins were carried all over Rumania with great processions and interred at the headquarters of the Iron Guard in the presence of German, Italian, Spanish and Japanese representatives. At the same time collectors for the Republican cause were imprisoned. Nevertheless there were many Rumanians fighting for the Republicans in the 'Dimitrov' battalion.

[2] The result was: Government 35·9%, Peasant Party 20·4%, Iron Guard 15·5%, National Christian Front 9·1%.

[3] Leader.

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

643 found guilty in a libel action. The only immediate
• [648] danger, the revisionist claims of Hungary and Bulgaria, was to be eliminated by an even friendlier attitude towards Italy and Germany, and Carol's tour of the European capitals, including London, was intended to reassure the democracies.

643 Beneath the surface, however, the struggle between the Iron Guard and Carol continued. While Carol was on his tour, Codreanu and thirteen of his legionaries were shot by their prison guards. The Minister of the Interior, Calinescu, a former member of the National Peasant Party, who succeeded to the premiership after Miron Cristea's death in March 1939, ordered further repressive measures and was himself assassinated by Iron Guardists in the autumn of the same year.

563 THE FIFTH COLUMN. Nazi Germany found an ex-
668 tremely fertile soil for its propaganda not only among the Rumanian Fascist parties and some generals and industrialists, but also amongst the many Germans living in Rumania. They were economically prosperous and the best treated of all minorities in Rumania. The most important communities were the settlements in Transylvania and in the Banat. At first Nazi propaganda was not very successful owing to the economically favourable position of these Germans and their comparatively strong religious feeling.[1] But as time went on it had great successes. Under the cloak of cultural associations Nazi cells were formed which soon spread into every German village. Unwilling Germans were

[1] The 'Saxons' are Protestants, the 'Aelpler', also in Transylvania, and the 'Schwaben' of the Banat Roman Catholics.

12: Kosmos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

forced into these organizations by social and economic pressure. Combatant units, armed and trained, consisted of youths who learned the Nazi doctrine in their schools. Financial assistance came from the German banks in Rumania: they supported the transactions of the 'Association for Export to Germany', which secured a virtual monopoly in the export trade of grain, cattle and pigs to Germany and Italy, as well as the hemp-growing scheme, which met with considerable success in the Banat. 563 448

Similarly the German papers published in Rumania soon passed under Nazi control. Their information was received from news agencies in Germany which also supplied them with commentaries and feature articles. Naturally the Rumanian Fascists were supported by the German-Rumanian Nazis who acted as go-betweens and agents of their masters in the Reich.[1]

The pro-Nazi Germans of Rumania who had always possessed good economic, industrial and financial connexions were able to render valuable assistance in the economic penetration of the country by German trusts. In 1933, for example, the fusion of several chemical firms in the Banat and in Wallachia brought them entirely under German control. That they produced semi-finished material for explosives enhanced their value. The iron and 563 471

[1] The outrages of the Iron Guard, such as the desecration of Jewish synagogues and cemeteries, destruction of Jewish shops, political murder and blackmail, were aided and abetted by the German Nazi agents. A series of fires and bomb-explosions in Timisoara in November 1938, as well as other terrorist acts, were committed by members of the Iron Guard jointly with some German youths who were known to the public but escaped punishment. 648

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
E1 Rumania ED1

578 of this class and those who wanted to secure this
565 dominant position for themselves.

665 These divisions were complicated by the personality of King Carol and the attitudes of different sections of the ruling circles to his personal regime. One group put its trust in the royal dictatorship and included supporters of the pro-French and pro-British wing. Many prominent politicians from both great parties were attracted to this camp, the Liberals Tatarescu and Micescu, for example, and the peasant leaders Vaida-Voevod and Calinescu. Another group went over to the extreme Right Wing and supported the Iron Guard and similar but smaller organizations, and these inclined to a pro-German foreign policy. There were naturally some who tried to steer a middle course.[1]

665 Economic and financial considerations played an important and often decisive part in this political
648 alignment. The Liberals had a great interest in a pro-Allied policy as they were closely connected with British, French and American investments in Rumania. The extreme Right Wing counted on support from Germany, which was readily given, and in return it facilitated the growth of Germany's political and economic influence. Both groups had discarded both the cloak and the spirit of democracy, and their leanings towards dictatorship, varying in form but not in substance, facilitated the victory of

[1] C. Bratianu, leader of the Liberals, joined Carol's 'party' but only in order to keep his great industrial and financial interests. Maniu, the leader of the Peasant Party, remained passive. He showed sympathy to the Iron Guard in their opposition to the king's dictatorship and later joined Bratianu in seeking to restrain them: but he retained his pro-French leanings.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

the pro-Nazi group. This, combined with the 665
developments in the regions bordering on Rumania, 648
and the changes in the international situation, explain the seemingly inexplicable migration of the majority of the Rumanian ruling class from the Allies' to the Axis camp. The real rulers of Rumania depended to a great extent on foreign support: when the power of Britain and France seemed on the wane they had to look for new protectors, and many, though not all, therefore became pro-German.

THE LAST DAYS OF GREATER RUMANIA. The year 661
1939 opened ominously for Rumania. The align- 648
ment of power on the continent of Europe had its counterpart in the grouping of Rumania's political forces, and the impending Great War threw its shadow on the sombre scene of Rumanian politics. After the assassination of Codreanu in November 1938 a wave of terror and repression swept the whole country, which resulted in a series of wholesale murders committed both by Iron Guards and the police. The new 'Party of the Nation' which had replaced the 'Front of National Renaissance' was an artificial veil for the manipulations of Carol and the court. The unstable political edifice, erected by the king tottered, in spite of the British Government's guarantee of 13 April 1939, which promised to assist in the defence of Rumania's independence. Germany increased her pressure to obtain a greater hold on Rumania's natural resources, while Britain and France tried to maintain their economic position.

At the outbreak of hostilities in September 1939 Rumania, although allied to France and Poland, remained neutral. The internal situation deteriorated

3

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

661 with alarming speed. The assassination of Calinescu,
648 who had been responsible for the murder of Codreanu and others, was followed by yet another series of savage reprisals. The collapse of Poland brought a flood of refugees into the country and made Rumania's international position even more difficult. Many Poles were interned, many managed to bribe their way through to a port or across the frontiers.

648 In the economic field the Rumanian government tried to repeat the policy which its predecessor had pursued in the period 1914–16, when it profited from deals concluded with both belligerent camps. This time, however, German penetration was much more thorough and the economic agreements concluded between Germany and Rumania reinforced Germany's capacity to wage war very considerably. This naturally led to important consequences in the field of internal politics. In spite of the very recent repressive measures against the Iron Guard, Carol now adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards this organization. Now that Codreanu had been eliminated, he sought to strengthen his position by including Iron Guards in his government, amongst them Horia Sima who had become their leader. This seemed all the more necessary as the king's isolation in internal politics had its counterpart in the country's isolation in the international field. The revisionist claims of Rumania's neighbours were raised again, and Carol tried to rally the people by embarking on an intensive policy of rearmament for the defence of Greater Rumania. Distrust in the king and the general disintegration had, however, gone so far that the continuance of the whole régime

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

648

became impossible. The last blow came with the fall of France in June 1940. For over a century the Rumanian middle class had depended on French support. The cultural, economic and military ties between the two countries had always given the Rumanian bourgeoisie a feeling of security. The defeat of France therefore had immediate and profound reactions in Rumania. The pro-German wing, whose policy now seemed more justified than ever before, was triumphant; and the former adherents of the Allies transferred their allegiance more or less reluctantly to the victorious Nazi camp.

THE END OF GREATER RUMANIA. The collapse of the whole framework of the European Settlement, upon which Rumanian foreign policy had relied, occurred in the summer of 1940. The problems which had confronted the new State when it arose after the First World War had not been solved. On the contrary. The question of the minorities had become more complicated and acute; social conditions were in some respects worse than before 1914. In the sphere of foreign affairs the vacillating attitude of subsequent governments had left Rumania completely isolated. The sympathies of Britain and America had been lost; France was defeated; Germany looked upon Rumania as a valuable prize which she intended to seize and exploit; Hungary and Bulgaria were waiting for an opportunity to recover the territories lost to Rumania; Yugoslavia was already under indirect German domination; Czechoslovakia and Poland had disappeared from the map of Europe. The attitude of the Rumanian ruling class to the Soviet Union

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

648 had remained bitterly hostile in spite of the resumption of diplomatic relations in 1934. The question of Bessarabia had never been solved, and it was this issue which eventually opened the last chapter in the history of Greater Rumania.

THE U.S.S.R. TAKES BESSARABIA. Ever since the annexation of Bessarabia to Rumania, the Soviet Union had demanded the return of this province and had repeatedly proposed to ascertain the will of the population by a plebiscite. These proposals were always rejected by the Rumanian government. On 26 June 1940 the Soviet government addressed a note to Rumania which demanded the return of Bessarabia and the cession of the Northern Bukovina.[1] While the Soviet claim to Bessarabia was based on historical titles, the claim to the Northern Bukovina was made on the ground that the majority of the people were Ukrainian. The Rumanian government first tried to obtain the backing of Germany to oppose the Soviet demands. When this was refused, in virtue of the German-Soviet Pact then in force, it had no choice but to hand over the territories demanded. Soviet troops marched into

[1] The Soviet note stated *inter alia* '...in 1918 Rumania took advantage of the military weakness of Russia and robbed the Soviet Union by force of part of her territory, namely Bessarabia, and thus broke the century-old unity of Bessarabia (principally occupied by Ukrairians) and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic...the handing over of the Northern Bukovina may be regarded as a compensation, though only in a small degree, for the tremendous loss which the population of the Soviet Union and the population of Bessarabia have suffered through twenty-two years of Rumanian rule in Bessarabia'.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina on 28 June; 648 ● although some local resistance was offered, the occupation was completed swiftly. As soon as the population learned of the impending incorporation of Bessarabia in the U.S.S.R., many peasants flocked into the towns and ejected officials under whose rule they had suffered. Many political prisoners were freed after years of confinement. Some families from Moldavia and other adjoining areas crossed the Pruth and Danube into the new Soviet territories. A number of Rumanians, especially recent settlers, military and administrative personnel and their families fled into the Old Kingdom; most of the German colonists of Bessarabia were evacuated under an agreement with the German authorities and were later re-settled in Poland and Alsace-Lorraine. There were numerous deserters from the Rumanian Army who, instead of returning with their units, remained in Bessarabia and in the Northern Bukovina.

By the cession of Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina, Rumania lost a territory of about 20,000 square miles with a population of nearly 3,500,000. Further, this meant a diminution of Rumanian arable land by about one-quarter, and of livestock by 15%.

THE VIENNA AWARD. The reunion of Bessarabia with the Soviet Union encouraged the Hungarian government to raise once more its claims to the western provinces of Greater Rumania and to Transylvania. The Hungarians had never at any time since 1919 abandoned their hopes for the recovery of these districts.

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

648 Carol realized that some attempt to reach a settlement had to be made, for Hungary's claims were now backed by Germany. Negotiations between Hungary and Rumania began at Turnu-Severin, but they soon broke down. Eventually the representatives of both countries were summoned to a conference at Vienna and Ribbentrop and Ciano imposed upon them the Vienna Award on 30 August 1940. By this decision, Rumania was forced to cede an area of about 17,000 square miles with a population of some 2,500,000 to Hungary. Rumania thereby lost the Maramures and parts of Crisana and Transylvania.[1] The partition of Transylvania has not only not solved the national and economic problems of this area; it has seriously aggravated them. The motives behind this German move were undoubtedly: to prevent an armed clash between Hungary and Rumania; to put Hungary under an obligation of gratitude to Germany; and to leave Rumania with the recovery of Bessarabia as the only possible compensation for her humiliating loss. The success of this artful policy facilitated Hitler's designs, when in the following year he compelled both Hungary and Rumania to take part in his invasion of the Soviet Union.

The loss of the greater part of Transylvania meant much more than the loss of some thousands of square miles of arable land, livestock, natural resources and valuable factories. The Rumanians regard Transylvania as the cradle of the nation and the

[1] According to Rumanian figures the population of the ceded territory was 2,395,153, of which the Rumanians numbered 1,176,433 (based on 1930 linguistic census). The Hungarian figures (1941) give the total as 2,577,291, of whom 1,066,353 were Rumanians.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

heart of their homeland. Their desire to recover Bessarabia, to which their claim was far more contestable, was fanned by German propaganda in order to deflect them from their real aims and interests. Their feeling for Transylvania is a natural one, rooted in the tradition of many centuries.[1]

The transfer of Transylvania to Hungary had serious economic as well as social and political consequences for the population. Rumanian peasants were expropriated and their land was given to Hungarian landowners, who have recovered many of their pre-1918 positions. The treatment of the Transylvanian Rumanians by Hungary has led to many incidents. There is a continuous exchange of accusations and denunciations going on in the press of Hungary and Rumania.[2]

Following the cession of Transylvania Bulgaria demanded the return of the Southern Dobrudja, which was agreed to at Craiova on 7 September 1940. This involved the loss of a further 2,960 square miles with a population of some 350,000.

So in less than two months the inflated Rumania of the Peace Settlement had lost an area of nearly 40,000 square miles and a population of over

[1] Lord Halifax declared on 5 September 1940: '. . . the [the British Government] are unable to accept the settlement now announced of the Hungarian-Rumanian dispute over Transylvania, since that settlement is the result of an award by the Axis Powers and imposed under duress on Rumania.' On the other hand, the return of the Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria did not meet with criticism on the side of the Allies.

[2] There have been numerous demonstrations in Transylvania both for and against Hungarian occupation, and trials of Rumanian patriots and alleged Communists. The atmosphere in that area is extremely tense.

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

•648 6,250,000.[1] Greater Rumania had ceased to exist.

668 **THE FLIGHT OF THE KING.** The territorial losses and the disintegration of Greater Rumania were only the outward signs of internal decay. The vigour and strength of the people, however, were not yet broken. The cession of Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina aroused feelings which fortified the popular movement. Demonstrations were held in all the big Rumanian towns demanding the abdication of Carol and the creation of a truly democratic government. At the same time territorial concessions to Hungary were opposed; and when it became known that the Vienna Award was to be accepted, in spite of the vigorous protests of almost all well-known Rumanian statesmen, police and soldiers had to be employed against thousands of indignant demonstrators in order to maintain 'peace and order'.

Popular discontent and fury against the king were cleverly exploited by the Right Wing. The Iron Guard, whose opposition to his personal rule was well known, turned the popular feeling to good account. They were the loudest in demanding the abdication of Carol, but naturally not in order to enable the formation of a democratic regime. This

131 162 [1] The remaining territory covered an area of less than 80,000 square miles; the population had shrunk to about 14,000,000. Official Rumanian figures state that Rumania's population in 1942 was over 16,000,000, of which over 13,000,000 lived on the land (Wallachia, 6,200,000; Moldavia, 2,800,000; Bessarabia, 2,700,000; Bukovina, 800,000; Dobrudja (without Southern Dobrudja), 500,000; Rumanian Transylvania, 2,400,000; Banat, 1,000,000).

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

so-called national and revolutionary movement 668
betrayed its German inspiration by supporting and approving the handing over of Transylvania to Hungary, but opposing the cession of Bessarabia to the U.S.S.R.

The king's Prime Minister, Gigurtu, resigned on 668
4 September and Carol summoned General An- 643
tonescu, who was at the time imprisoned in Bistrita, and charged him with the formation of a new government. This step was all the more remarkable as the German Minister at Bucarest had been able to communicate with Antonescu while he was in prison. Antonescu at once demanded Carol's abdication and obtained it after two days' continuous and heated discussions and negotiations. On 6 September Carol, accompanied by his mistress Mme Lupescu and his aide Udureanu, left Rumania. His son Michael succeeded for the second time to the unstable throne.

Carol's abdication was due to many different 643
factors. The occupation of Bessarabia by the Red 668
Army and the acceptance of the Vienna Award 648
showed how brittle and hollow was his widespread kingdom. Everybody knew how great the king's share in the weakening of the country had been. The ten years of his reign had led to disastrous consequences. The will of the people, voiced for the first time for many years, had a decisive influence on the events leading to the abdication. Another important factor was Hitler's distrust for a man whose country he intended to take under complete domination. The king's renunciation of the British Guarantee was unable to win him Germany's confidence. Since Carol assumed the throne in 1930

12: Kosmos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

643 he had played off one political party against the
668 other in order to strengthen his position. In foreign
648 politics he followed the same tactics. He ended by completely isolating Rumania internationally and undermining her internally.

It may be said in extenuation of his inglorious behaviour, that the dismemberment of Greater Rumania was inevitable, once the whole balance of power had shifted against the Western Allies, whose settlement had created it. But it is at least equally tenable that a democratic and united Rumania, which had succeeded in winning the loyalty of any considerable elements among its minorities, might have held out against the cession of territory to Hungary, by obliging the Hungarians and Germans to use force to effect it at a time when Hitler was anxious to avoid war in the Danubian area. This might have rallied Rumania with Yugoslavia and Greece, who showed a more heroic spirit, to the Allies' camp. In fact, the king's policy only aggravated the internal situation and sharpened the conflict of parties.

642 **RUMANIA GOES TO WAR.** General I. Antonescu,
661 having obtained Carol's abdication, pronounced himself 'Conducator', that is, 'Leader', and proclaimed the creation of the 'Legionary State'. His government was composed of generals, leaders of the Iron Guard and civil servants. Codreanu's successor, Horia Sima, became vice-premier and at once organized an unprecedented regime of terror throughout the whole of Rumania. His henchmen assassinated numerous prominent opponents of the Iron Guard. The looting of shops and the beating
[Sept 6, 1940 -- Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

up of Jews became the favourite occupation of the 661
legionaries. The resulting confusion helped many 642
minor officials as well as influential business men in
acquiring valuable property.

But it soon became obvious that the real masters 648
of Rumania were the Germans. In October 1940 642
Antonescu invited German troops into the country
as instructors for the Rumanian Army. German 669
trade delegations began organizing Rumania's economy and German specialists were appointed to important positions in various ministries. Although Antonescu had included the Iron Guard in his government, the struggle for power between him and Horia Sima continued. In January 1941 the Iron Guard, supporting the latter, made a last bid. The legionaries rose in revolt and succeeded in gaining several strong positions in Bucarest and in some provincial towns. The army, however, sided with Antonescu, who was also aided by the Germans, and within a short time the 'Conducator' emerged as victor. He at once proceeded to the establishment of a completely military administration and based his whole regime on the army.

His[1] success in the fight against the Iron Guard 721
was influenced decisively by the German desire to create a stable Rumanian government which would join in the attack on the Soviet Union. Antonescu did not fail his German masters. On 22 June 1941 Rumanian troops, together with German divisions, crossed the Soviet frontier. Thanks to German 721
support, Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina 727
were re-occupied within a short time. Both provinces were put under a military administration and ruled quite separately from the rest of Rumania.

[1] [Q: Antonescu -- Analyst]

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

148 Both the political and the economic life of
241 Rumania was subject to complete German domination. The agriculture of the country had to supply the German and Rumanian armies in the field. The area of arable land was feverishly enlarged so as to provide more food. This met with considerable success. In 1941 the country produced almost as much wheat as the whole of Greater Rumania in 1935. Exports almost reached the pre-1940 level.[1] By 1943 the area under wheat had been increased to 3,000,000 hectares and that under maize to 4,000,000 hectares. Even more important is the extension of the land used for the growing of rape seeds[2] and of oil-bearing plants.[2] Rumanian agriculture served a double purpose: the provision of food for the Rumanian and German armies and the supply of Germany's war industry with valuable raw material. The introduction of the soya bean into Rumania, the delivery of thousands of iron ploughs, tractors and other agricultural machinery from Germany only served to further this aim. Exploitation of the peasantry was the immediate consequence; but, if the ploughs and machinery remain when the Germans have gone, Rumanian agriculture is bound to benefit.

433 **OIL AND INDUSTRY.** The output of the chemical, textile and heavy industries were increased considerably. Consumer goods, however, are scarce and very expensive. The yearly production of oil has not

[439] [1] Export of wheat in 1940, 379,000 tons; in 1941, 2,500 tons; export of maize in 1940, 564,000 tons; in 1941, 117,000 tons. Both have since risen.

[2] 1942: 350,000 hectares grew rape seeds and 600,000 hectares oil-bearing seeds.

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

511 435 the economic position of the rural population appears to be lamentable.

648 722 THE POLITICAL SCENE. Both the internal and external policies of Rumania have been shaped by events on the battle fronts, and more particularly by the war on the Eastern front. The fact that Rumania is fighting side by side with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union has had effects upon the national life of which the consequences are inescapable. The artificial stimulation of public opinion against the U.S.S.R., intended to galvanize the people into a fervent nationalism and unreserved support for Antonescu, proved no small embarrassment to him when the tide of battle turned so catastrophically against his Allies. Further, Rumania's position is also anomalous in the extreme. The severest blow which the country suffered during the past decades was the loss of two-fifths of Transylvania to Hungary.[1] Yet Rumania has been fighting in alliance with Hungary against the Soviet Union. At the same time friction between Hungary and Rumania has been one of the gravest problems in the

511 435 credits the farmers are unable to meet their most urgent obligations and, if no solution is found, an agrarian crisis is imminent which must influence the whole national economy.' A Bucarest paper stated in January 1944: '...there are two million farms without milk cows, 160,000 without hogs and 200,000 without even a single chicken. Unfortunately the Ministry of Agriculture with only two and a half per cent of the budget can do little to alleviate the peasants' lot.'

[1] The Czechoslovak President, Dr Benes, stated in London in March 1944 that the Soviet Union would insist on the return of the territories which Hungary stole from her neighbours, including Transylvania.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

Axis camp. Clashes between armed Rumanians and Hungarians have been very frequent, and the Press of both countries has kept up an unabating series of violent accusations. 722 648

The swift advance of the Red Army during the great winter offensive of 1943–4 had by the end of March brought Soviet troops well into Rumanian territory. Hastily-made arrangements for the evacuation of the Rumanian-administered province of 'Transdnistria', actually part of the Ukraine, and of the Bukovina and Bessarabia, in all of which an intensive policy of Rumanization during the past few years had failed to bear fruit, were thereby thrown into complete confusion. 722

The position of the Rumanian government at the time of writing can only be a matter of speculation. The old political parties have failed to provide an effective opposition to the dictatorship of Antonescu, though Maniu and Bratianu have indeed addressed several notes of protest to the 'Conducator'. The strength of the Rumanian underground movement is difficult to assess. There have been several clashes with the Germans,[1] some sabotage and lately also partisan activities.[2] Clandestine organizations

[1] Of the 500,000 Germans in the present reduced Rumania, over 42,000 have joined the Nazi S.S. divisions. Germans from the Banat and Transylvania make up the greater part of the S.S. division *Prinz Eugen*, which has been fighting against Tito's Army of Liberation in Yugoslavia for some time.

[2] There are also reports of stronger activity by the Communist Party of Rumania of which several members have been arrested. It is said that opponents of the Antonescu regime, of various party allegiances, have succeeded in forming the beginnings of a united 'national liberation movement,' of which the title suggests Communist leadership.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

722 amongst railway workers and in the industrial areas around Brasov, Ploesti and Bucarest have lately gained some influence.

648 RUMANIA AND THE WESTERN ALLIES. The American air attacks on the oil district of Ploesti first made the Rumanians realize that the war was drawing near them. The capitulation of Fascist Italy was the second blow. But the decisive and all-important factor was, and remains, the advance of the Soviet troops. The last hope of the present government and its supporters lay in a conflict between the Western Powers and the U.S.S.R. They have frequently protested that they do not consider Rumania to be really at war with Britain and the United States. Therefore, the decisions of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences were regarded by them as blows directed against their very existence. Subsequent Press statements, however, show that they still hoped to gain the sympathy of Britain and America; and the journey of Prince Stirbey to Turkey and Egypt in March 1944 could have no other explanation. (This gentleman owns most of the land around Ploesti.) Recently a prominent Rumanian journalist wrote that the country's present position is similar to the pre-revolutionary era of 1917. Then, he said, the worst was averted by granting certain concessions to the people, and he went on to demand that a similar step be taken now for the same purpose. Unwittingly, this Rumanian propagandist has truly summed up the position of his class. It is prepared to do anything to keep its privileges and its powers. Its representatives will side with whoever assures them of the continuance of their rule. As

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

will be seen from the Appendix[1] M. Molotov, in a speech made on 2 April 1944, professed the intention of the Soviet Government to leave the existing social structure of Rumania unaltered. But Marshall Stalin's Order of the Day of 30 April contained an appeal to the people of Rumania, as of Hitler's other Allies, to revolt. 648

[1] [See pp. 117-120 -- Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p. 112

CONCLUSION

175 648 This short survey of the different phases of the long and unhappy history of Rumania and the Rumanians discloses a number of factors which, in one form or another and with varying intensity and effect, have decisively contributed to the damaging result of events both upon the land and upon the people. The Rumanians and their country, more than many other nations and States, have on the whole been rather the passive object than an active subject of history.

This involuntary passivity characterized the very emergence of the Rumanian nation and has not yet been overcome. The first attempts to form the basis of a national existence were frustrated, and postponed for many centuries, owing to the invasion of Europe by the Magyars. When the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were eventually created in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the emergence of these two primitive States was chiefly due to the pressure of the Hungarians in Transylvania; it was made possible owing to the decay of the Slavonic States south and west of the Danube. Moldavia and Wallachia during the subsequent centuries were the battle-grounds of Great Powers or were exploited as colonies. The nineteenth century saw the rise of Rumanian nationalism with the aim of the union of all Rumanians in one State. This aspiration was warped and misused by rival empires in order to strengthen their position in South-Eastern Europe. When this union became a reality after the First World War, it was achieved not so

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

much by the Rumanian people as by the intervention of Rumanian and foreign statesmen, whose interests did not coincide with those of the majority of Rumanians. The history of Rumania during the period between the two Great Wars and during the present war is another and more vivid illustration of this passivity of a people, caught in the titanic struggle between Great Powers. 175 648

The economic and political effects of this development can be seen in the exploitation to which the people have been subjected for centuries, chiefly by foreign merchants and trusts, aided and abetted by a greedy and corrupt ruling class, and in the almost suicidal situation into which the nation has been manœuvred in recent times by its short-sighted leaders.

Psychologically, many centuries of political oppression and of economic exploitation have had an even more serious effect in the attitude of many sections of the people to life in general and to their own fate in particular. Generations of Rumanians have been methodically robbed of the fruits of their work for centuries. Their fate was not greatly affected by superficial changes, such as their elevation from serfs to peasants. This explains that they are reluctant to produce more food than they themselves can eat; for it is certain that the money-lender, the tax-collector, their own or some foreign army will take it from them. This fatalism, and the ignorance which their rulers have shown no great enthusiasm to remedy, explain the backwardness of the great masses of the people. But it would be quite wrong to assume that this implies an exhaustion of their latent powers. The Rumanians have often 181

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

class over the countryside. The union of all Rumanians in one State was a long-cherished dream. Its realization was only partly due to the actions of the people; Greater Rumania was the result of the greediness of the country's rulers, supported by the anti-Soviet policy of many countries. It carried the seed of its own destruction; and, when disruption came and the popular forces rose to assert their will in 1940, they were again defeated. In place of the royal dictatorship came the dictatorship of Rumanian and German Fascism: in place of partial economic domination by the west came complete domination by Germany.

One of the greatest barriers to the progress and well-being of Rumania and the Rumanians has been the fact that the geographical position and the wealth of the country have made it the victim of the ambitions of Great Powers. Rumanian governments have sided more often than not with the national enemies of their people and have at best tried to play off one of their foreign protectors against the other.

Yet it is exactly the geographical position and the great wealth of Rumania, combined with the hardiness and strength of its inhabitants, which hold out the promise of a happier future. The material and human resources for such a development are abundant. What is necessary is the liberation of these material and human forces under disinterested leadership. If that happens, if the unlucky chain of unsuccessful revolutions is broken; if these forces conquer those of their corrupt rulers, and the unhealthy social system of exploitation and oppression is replaced by the government of the people for the

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p 117

Appendix

STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS WITH REGARD TO RUMANIA

I

On 2 April 1944, Mr Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Commissar, addressing representatives of the Press, announced that the Red Army had crossed the river Pruth at various places and had entered Rumania. 648

In his statement, which was later broadcast from Moscow, Mr Molotov declared:

'The Red Army, as a result of a successful offensive, has reached the river Pruth, which is the State frontier between the U.S.S.R. and Rumania. Thus the full re-establishment of the Soviet State frontier as fixed in 1940, in accordance with the agreement between Soviet Russia and Rumania, has been begun.

'This agreement had been treacherously violated by the Rumanian Government in alliance with Hitlerite Germany.

'At the present time the Red Army is carrying out the clearance of Soviet soil of all the enemy still there, and the time when the entire Soviet frontier with Rumania will be completely restored is not far off.

'The Soviet Government hereby declares that the advancing units of the Red Army, pursuing the German armies and their allied Rumanian troops

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

648 have crossed the river Pruth in several sectors and have entered Rumanian territory.

'The Supreme Command of the Red Army has given orders to the advancing Soviet troops to pursue the enemy until his final rout and capitulation.

'At the same time the Soviet Government declares that it does not pursue the aim of acquiring any part of Rumanian territory, or of altering the social structure of Rumania as it exists at present.

'The entry of Soviet troops into the boundaries of Rumania is dictated exclusively by military necessities, and the continuing resistance of enemy troops.'

II

In a May Day Order of the Day to the Soviet fighting forces and the nation Marshal Stalin declared on 30 April 1944:

'...Under the blows of the Red Army the *bloc* of Fascist Powers is breaking and falling to pieces. Fear and confusion reign among the Rumanian, Hungarian, Finnish and Bulgarian "allies" of Hitler. These henchmen of Hitler, whose countries have been or are being occupied by the Germans, cannot fail to see that Germany has lost the war.

'Rumania, Hungary, Finland and Bulgaria have only one chance left to them to escape catastrophe—to break with Germany and withdraw from the war. But it is hardly to be expected that the present Governments of these countries are capable of breaking with Germany. It is to be supposed that the people of these countries will have to cope themselves with the task of their liberation from

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

the German yoke. The sooner the people of these countries realize the *impasse* into which they have been driven by the Germans the sooner they will stop all assistance to their German oppressors and to their henchmen quislings in their own countries. The more they do themselves, the more they can count on the understanding of democratic countries....' 648

III

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and the United States issued the following declaration on 12 May 1944:

'Through the fatal policy of their leaders, the people of Hungary are suffering the humiliation of German occupation. Rumania is still bound to the Nazis in a war now bringing devastation to its own people. The Governments of Bulgaria and Finland have placed their countries in the service of Germany and remain in the war at Germany's side.

'The Governments of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States think it right that these people should realize the following facts:

(1) The Axis satellites, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland, despite their realization of the inevitability of a crushing Nazi defeat and their desire to get out of the war, are by their present policies and attitudes contributing materially to the strength of the German war machine.

(2) These nations still have it within their power, by withdrawing from the war and ceasing their collaboration with Germany and by resisting the forces of Nazism by every possible means, to shorten the

2

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

648 European struggle, diminish their own ultimate sacrifices, and contribute to the allied victory.

(3) While these nations cannot escape their responsibility for having participated in the war at the side of Nazi Germany, the longer they continue at war in collaboration with Germany the more disastrous will be the terms which will be imposed upon them.

(4) These nations must therefore decide now, while yet there is time for them to contribute to the inevitable allied victory, whether they intend to persist in their present hopeless and calamitous policy of opposing that victory.'

RUMANIA AS A GERMAN ALLY

●648 433 To Germany Rumania has been an invaluable if expensive ally—invaluable mainly for her oil production, which accounts for one-third of total Axis supplies; expensive because, in order to exploit the country's usefulness to the full, it has been necessary to provide goods, such as oil-well equipment, agricultural machinery, machine tools, etc., all of which she can ill spare on account of the need for them both in her own country and for supply to her other satellites. To ensure smooth working of the oil-well region German troops have been established in the Ploesti district. Apart fom oil German expectations have come to very little in Rumania—her demands for cereals, soya beans, sunflower-seed, etc., have not been fulfilled due to bad harvests, labour shortage and peasant hoarding, and livestock deliveries have been affected by fodder shortage and illegal slaughterings.

As to further German demands on Rumanian economy, the most outstanding were for man-power in the form of troops for the Eastern front, and the use of the country for transit of troops and war materials to the battle zones. Both these facilities have been of considerable material value to the enemy, though in order to make use of Rumanian troops Germany has had to provide the bulk of the equipment, as Rumanian industry is not adequate to supply more than the barest minimum; and even where she has the available facilities, raw materials are lacking.

[489] To exploit the country successfully from the transport angle it has been necessary to set up a control organisation to direct transit traffic, and, in addition, to supply and repair locomotives and rolling stock.

GERMAN PENETRATION

648 439 For a great many years, Germany has been the natural supplier of engineering and consumption goods which Rumania was unable to produce for herself, and has provided a ready market for her surplus agricultural produce. Following the coming into power of the Nazi Government, Germany succeeded in acquiring Rumanian trade to an increasing extent at the expense of other countries. With the outbreak of war, Rumania has become even more dependent on Germany as a supplier of manufactured goods in general, and iron and steel products in particular.

648
439

In 1940 an economic agreement was signed between the two countries, by which in exchange for raw materials a ten-year plan for the development of Rumanian economy was formed. Germany agreed to the following main conditions :—

(1) The granting of extensive long-term credits.

(2) The supply of tools and machines for agricultural development.

(3) The provision of technical and financial aid for industry.

(4) The provision of extensive supplies for the development of the transport system.

(5) To put technical experts at Rumania's disposal.

(6) To make capital available for the development of industry and the banking system.

457
471

Germany has exploited Rumania's dependence on her to the full by providing the minimum of goods, so that she owes her an ever-increasing sum in the clearing. German financial interests have gained tremendous impetus since the removal of British and American competition, together with the acquisition of the actual interests of occupied countries, such as France, Holland, and Czechoslovakia. To cite the most important example, in the oil industry German capital has increased from 0.5 per cent. of total investments in 1939 to about 38 per cent. in 1942, while in the heavy industry the Hermann Goeringwerke have achieved a footing in the main engineering firms of Reşiţa and Malaxa, as well as in the aircraft industry and in the shipbuilding yards at Galaţi. The motor-vehicle assembly industry is almost entirely in the hands of the German companies, and German capital is to be found in the banks, in the timber and textile industries, in a number of transport and trading companies, and behind the attempted expansion of the mineral resources.

ITALIAN PENETRATION

There is also some considerable Italian financial penetration in Rumanian industry, though on nothing like the same scale as German; it is mainly confined to the oil, building, timber and textile industries and to various cereal export companies.

[4c]

315 Two additional pipelines, each of 10 in. diameter, constructed largely of material removed from France, have been built between Ploesti and Giurgiu, each with a capacity of over three quarters of a million tons a year.

New refinery and drilling equipment, which prior to the war Rumania used to import largely from the United States, has now to be obtained from Germany. The financial terms on which this equipment is obtained are unfavourable to Rumania and deliveries are slow.

2. German Influence on the Oil Industry

315 German pressure upon Rumania to obtain
648 greater supplies of oil has been largely exerted by means of commercial penetration into the oil
473 industry, but there is evidence that Nazi diplomats have laid particular emphasis on the German need for oil, suggesting that larger supplies might be available if production was increased and internal consumption reduced.

German penetration into the Rumanian oil industry began to take aggressive form some time before the war. The Germans first acquired a minority holding in Creditul Minier, then in 1939 secured control of Petrol-Block. The collapse of France afforded further opportunities of encroachment, and through Kontinental Oel A.G. control of Concordia and Colombia was secured; similarly, by assuming arbitrary control of Dutch interests the Germans now direct the policy of Astra-Română, the largest of the producing companies. In all, German influence through financial control now extends to about 50 per cent. of the industry, and 60 per cent. of productive capacity, quite apart from the pressure the Germans can exert through control of transport out of the country. The actual effect of this influence is not easily assessed, modified as it is by Rumania's nationalistic oil legislation—particular privileges are reserved under the new mining laws for companies which can show that 75 per cent. of their capital is in Rumanian hands—and the instinctive aversion of the Government to outside control. It is, however, sufficient to ensure that German requirements have a definite priority, and nationalistic as some parts of the new mining law may be, any measures serving to increase immediate production, under whatever pretext they are taken, are beneficial to Germany's interests. Tables I and II on pages 15 and 16 show the approximate strength of the oil groups by nationalities in 1940 and 1942. 1

3. War-time Restrictions

315 Nearly 70 per cent. of Rumanian petroleum
135 consumption is represented by fuel oil, and a theoretical saving could be brought about by the use of coal and natural gas. Coal resources, however, are limited, and in any event a greatly increased use of coal is restricted also by the speed at which locomotives and power plants can be converted from oil to coal burning.

315 In November 1942 a petrol-rationing scheme
434 was introduced, and although the allowances were on a liberal scale, the regulations do not appear to have been observed and the scheme as a whole was ineffective. In March 1943 this was admitted by the announcement that the scheme would be more strictly enforced and new ration cards issued. Simultaneously regulations were published concerning the use of taxis, and a time limit of September 1943 was set for the conversion of boiler plant.

In general, attempts to restrict consumption either by the announcement of new regulations

1 [Cf. cat. 315, pp. 15c and 16a - Analyst]

[14b]

505 trade is carried on the Danube to European markets, Germany in particular, and, with the
439 exception of an exceedingly limited traffic with Turkey, and a few intermittent shipments of oil to enemy ports in the Aegean Sea, Rumania's foreign sea-borne trade has been brought virtually to a standstill.

In addition to traffic in the Black Sea with U.S.S.R., Bulgarian and Turkish ports, Rumania in pre-war days had important commercial relations with most European and other countries overseas, the trade routes being via the Dardanelles, Mediterranean, Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar.

2. Mercantile Marine

505 All merchant-shipping activities are controlled
[652] by the Ministry of Air and Marine. Rumania's ocean-going mercantile marine in 1939 was constituted as follows :—

		G.R.T.
6	cargo and passenger motor vessels	27,061
16	cargo steamers	67,193
3	steam tankers	14,737
25	Total	108,991

[655] Of the 19 cargo steamers and tankers, 11 were oil-fired and 8 coal burners. Fourteen of these vessels were owned by the Rumanian State Maritime Service (*Servicial Maritim Român*), the principal shipping company in Rumania, whilst the three tankers belonged to the Steaua Romana Petroleum Company of Bucarest. The remainder were privately owned.

●[648] Consequent upon her entry into the war Rumania's mercantile marine came under Axis control and most of her vessels are trading for German and Italian account, partly in the Adriatic and Aegean, and partly in the Black Sea.

A statement of Rumania's estimated non-tanker merchant-shipping resources on the 30th April, 1943, follows :—

ESTIMATED RUMANIAN MERCANTILE MARINE RESOURCES (NON-TANKER) UNDER AXIS CONTROL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA AT 30TH APRIL, 1943.

Tonnage Category	*No. of Vessels*	*Total G.R.T.*
100/499	3	578
500/999	—	—
1,000	2	2,708
2,000	2	4,966
3,000	3	10,170
4,000	—	—
5,000	2	11,395
6,000	3	20,220
Aggregate ..	15	50,147

[725] As to her tanker tonnage, two vessels aggregating 11,765 G.R.T. were seized and are now in Allied service, whilst the third, of 3,032 G.R.T., was sunk in December, 1941, in the Aegean Sea.

3. Ports

504 The chief ports for sea-going vessels are Constanta on the Black Sea and Brăila and Galați on the Danube, which both handle river shipping as well.

[42b]

133 trained pilots is compulsory, while the barge tows
502 have to be broken up into smaller units. This sector of the Danube cannot be negotiated at night, which constitutes an enormous hindrance for large-scale traffic. In order to speed up the traffic, the use of suspension railways and locomotives on rails laid along the river bank was introduced before the war, but the system has met with only moderate success.

[503] Navigation in the Maritime sector of the Danube is affected by silting up—particularly in the autumn—and constant dredging has to be carried out in the Sulina branch to maintain sufficient depth for passage of vessels up to Galați. The depth of this sector was 24 ft. in 1938, permitting the entry of vessels of medium draught only. Danube navigation is held up for varying periods between November and March by ice, averaging 30-50 days, and occasionally even for 90 days.

499 There are no permanent bridges on the Danube to connect Rumania with Bulgaria. However, a Rumanian-Bulgarian Commission was established in 1942 to remedy this deficiency by arranging for the construction of a bridge, which will take five years to complete, between Giurgiu and Ruse. In the meantime a ferry system is in use between Giurgiu and Ruse carrying important supplies of oil for the German forces in Greece.

3. River Ports

503 There are in all some 38 river ports, of which the
504 most important, all on the Danube (from west to east), are as follows :—

Moldova	Oltenița
Orșova	Brăila
Turnu Severin	Galați
Giurgiu	Sulina

Since the war started considerable improvements have already been made on the Danube. This is of special significance for, though this waterway is of little use for Rumanian internal traffic, since the closing of the sea route between Rumania and North Germany, it has become vitally important for the carrying of bulky transport. As early as 1940 a scheme for the rationisation of Danube traffic was put into operation, and the installations of Giurgiu, the main Danube port for oil transport, were improved.

To avoid congestion at Giurgiu, the Danube ports of New Moldova and Orșova have been enlarged. Internal traffic has been diverted to Oltenița, which is also used for the unloading of incoming traffic. The construction of new harbour installations is being carried out by a German-Rumania company.

4. Organisation of Inland Water Shipping

508 Rumanian Danube shipping is under State
656 control, and organisation is carried out by firms which are partly State-owned and partly owned
[555] by private individuals. The most important company is the State-owned "N.F.R." (*Navigațiunea Fluvială Română*), and of lesser importance are the privately owned companies "S.R.D." (*S.A.R. de Navigație pe Dunăre*) and "Sind" (*Società Italiana di Navigazione Danubiana*).

505 All Rumanian shipping companies are members
● 648 of the Danube Shipping Pool, which is under German supervision, headed by the *Deutsche Donauschiffahrtsgruppe*, which is closely connected with the Hermann Goering-Werke für Binnenschiffahrt. The importance of the Danube Pool (exclusive of the Tanker Pool) will be realised when it is borne in mind that between 1932-1937 the freight carried annually by its vessels on the

505 648 Danube nearly doubled. The Rumanian river traffic is now in fact under German control, which is enforced through a number of official and semi-official bodies. German transport officers operating in the main river-ports are regulating all river shipping.

Working in close collaboration with the German railways and the *Frachtleitstelle Südost*, Berlin (the office which controls river and sea navigation) the Rumanian authorities are bound to the orders given by this office, which must immediately receive reports of any transport exceeding 1,000 tons between Rumania and other countries. Oil transports are excepted as these are handled centrally by a special body which collaborates with the Rumanian Railway Administration and with the Danube Shipping Agencies.

5. The Inland Fleet

505 At the beginning of 1940, the Rumanian inland fleet consisted of the following craft :—

Passenger boats ...	25	
Tug boats ..	127	
Cargo barges ..	553	with a capacity of 469,546 tons
Tankers	66	with a capacity of 41,603 tons

Accurate figures of the Rumanian tonnage park have not been published recently, but press reports at the end of 1942 stated that shipping under the Rumanian flag on the Danube carried only 28 per cent. of Rumania's Danube traffic.

III. Administration of the Danube

505 648 Before the war the administration of the Danube was in the hands of two Commissions, the C.I.D. (International Danube Commission) in charge of the Danube from Brăila to Ulm, a distance of 2,417 km. (1,500 miles), and the C.E.D. (European Danube Commission) in charge of the Danube delta—i.e. from Brăila to the Black Sea—a distance of 171 km. (106 miles). Both these Commissions were established by the Treaty of Paris as long ago as 1856.

[728] After the 1914-18 war, the two Commissions were reconstituted under the Treaty of Versailles, and the constitution, powers and functions of each laid down in Articles 331-339 and 346-353 of that Treaty.

C.I.D. (International Danube Commission)

Under the Treaty of Versailles this Commission was composed of the following riparian States :—

2 members from Bavaria and Württemberg.

1 each from Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria.

In addition, the three non-riparian members of the C.E.D., viz., Great Britain, France and Italy, were each allocated one representative.

This Commission was only a provisional one, intended to function pending the creation of a permanent régime. This was accomplished in July, 1921, and under the Statute of the 23rd July of that year, the Powers having representation were identical with those prescribed by the Versailles Treaty.

Article 1 of the Statute provides that the Danube from Ulm to the Black Sea must be free and open to all flags without any discrimination whatsoever. The functions and powers of the C.I.D. are laid down in Articles 9-42, and are concerned with the drawing up of programmes of improved works, the levying of customs dues, police regulations and the control of revenues resulting from customs and navigation dues.

[45a]

505 648 [651] It is a cardinal principle of the Statute that the customs dues levied on goods must not be higher than the duties levied at frontier stations of the country concerned. The cost of improvements was to be met by navigation dues, these being assessed on the tonnage of ships, and not based on the goods transported.

Bratislava was fixed as the Headquarters for the Commission for the first five years, and it was laid down that thereafter, for five-year periods, other Danube towns were to be selected in rotation.

Since the outbreak of this war, Germany has virtually controlled the Danube, has abolished the C.I.D., and set up the "Controlling Committee for Danube Affairs above Brăila."

C.E.D. (European Danube Commission)

[503] This Commission was constituted under the Treaty of Paris in 1856 with Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey as members, for the express purpose of dredging the mouths of the Danube below Isaccea, and leaving the various channels free from all obstructions to navigation. It was apparently expected that this preliminary task would take two years, and the life of the Commission was originally fixed for that period; but, by a series of later treaties, it was kept in being up to the outbreak of the Great War.

In 1918 the Central Powers set up their own Danube Commission, membership naturally being restricted to those Powers and their allies.

By the Treaty of Versailles the European Commission was reconstituted with Great Britain, France, Italy and Rumania as provisional members; and by the Convention of July 21st, 1921, was placed on a more permanent basis. The provisional membership of the four countries was confirmed and all the powers of the original Commission restored. A proviso added that any nation whose commercial interests in that part of the river warranted their being represented on the Commission could be admitted. In fact, no country was admitted under this proviso until the inclusion of Germany in August, 1938.

In August, 1938, an arrangement was signed at Sinaia relative to the exercise of the Powers of the C.E.D. In effect the Powers of the Commission were transferred to the Rumanian Government who were to set up a "Maritime Danube Board." This board, under Article 5, was "to be responsible for the preparation and execution of plans for works on the maritime Danube and at the mouths for levying dues and dispensing of the yield thereof."

In September, 1940, Germany summoned a conference at Vienna for the purpose of regulating Danube shipping anew, and eliminating Great Britain and France from membership of the Commission.

[113] [For further information see *La Commission Européenne du Danube et son Œuvre de 1856 à 1931* (Paris 1931); Treaty of Versailles, Articles 331-339, 346-353; Treaty Series No. 38 (1939) Cmd. 6068, and Treaty Series 38 (1939), Cmd. 6069.]

E. TELECOMMUNICATIONS

I. Pre-War Situation

1. Telegraph and Telephones

206 The telegraph system of Rumania was controlled by the Ministry of Communications, the telephone by the Societatea Română de Telefoane, a subsidiary of the International Telephone and

[45b]

CHAPTER X

652 722 1941, subscriptions were made compulsorily, and in 1942 a Reintegration Tax was levied on all persons who failed to subscribe the amounts allotted to them. In spite of all this the loan had only raised some 18 milliard lei by September, 1942.

A further attempt to borrow from the public was made at the end of 1942, when the Minister of Finance was authorised to issue short term 4 per cent. Treasury Bills to a value not exceeding 10 milliard lei. As with the long term loan, interest from this loan was free from taxation.

In spite of these measures, however, considerable amounts have had to be borrowed direct from the National Bank—partly on account of extra-budgetary credits for non-military purposes, but more especially to finance the war with Russia which—at the beginning at least—was done entirely outside the budget.

In June 1941 when miscellaneous advances to the Government already amounted to 10 milliard lei, the National Bank was authorised to derogate from the provisions of its statutes and to advance any amounts necessary to cover exceptional needs. In this way a further 12 milliard lei credit on this account was put at the disposal of the Government to finance the Russian war. This credit was, however, exhausted by January 1942, but the National Bank's miscellaneous advances continued to rise, reaching nearly 30 milliard lei by June 1942. After June 1942, borrowing on this account fell considerably, only to rise at the end of the year and the beginning of 1943.

4. External Position of the Leu

652 Rumania is still officially on the gold standard, the parity of the leu having been fixed in 1929 at 1 leu=0.009 g. fine gold or 111.111 lei per kg. gold.

This parity has, however, no practical significance, since from 1935 onwards it has been the practice to pay premiums for gold over and above the official price. In order to encourage domestic production of gold additional premiums are paid to domestic gold producers, so that the effective internal price of gold varies, according to the productivity of the mine, from 400,300 lei to 867,500 lei per kg. fine gold. (*See* also section on gold, page 23.) Official dealing in "hard" currencies, too, is done not at parity but at parity plus a premium. From December 1935 to February 1940, the premiums were fixed at 38 per cent., from March 1940 to March 1941 at 107 per cent., and after the latter date at 90 per cent.

652 The last reduction of premiums from 107 per cent. to 90 per cent. was made under German ●648 pressure, on the grounds that the RM., on which no premium was paid, was undervalued in relation to "hard" currencies. And at the same time as the effective rates for such currencies were lowered (in the case of the $ from 211.65—217.97 to 187.60—196 lei per $); the RM. rate was raised from 50 lei=1 RM. to 60 lei=1 RM., at which level it has since remained.

5. Prices and Price Control

435 As a result of the world depression there was a severe fall in prices during the early 1930's. Both wholesale prices and the cost of living reached their lowest level in the years 1933 and 1934. In the following years there was a gradual recovery, which became increasingly marked after 1939.

The retail price index has increased during the war as follows:—

August, 1939	100.
January, 1940	116.6.

652 453 This was largely due to the advances of the National Bank both to exporters with claims on the Rumanian-German clearing, and for the maintenance of German troops stationed in the country (see below).

Among the fairly numerous other State or State-controlled banks, two of the most important are the Central Savings Bank and the National Institute for Industrial Credit. This latter was founded in 1923, but its size and scope have been greatly extended since the outbreak of war, and it is now entrusted with the so-called "Rumanisation" of industry.

2. Commercial Banks

453 There are six important commercial banks in Rumania—viz., Banca Românească, Banca de Credit Român, Banca Commercială Română, Societatea Bancara Română, Banca Commerciala Italiana şi Română, Banca Chrissoveloni—and a fairly large number of other smaller banks. In the big banks there were considerable French, German, Italian and, to a lesser extent, British interests.

The position of the banks was very seriously affected by the collapse of the Österreichische Creditanstalt in 1931.

Between 1930 and 1934 current account deposits in commercial banks fell from 18·2 milliard lei to 7·9 milliard lei and time deposits from 35·1 milliard lei to 10·4 milliard lei, representing a 64 per cent. fall in total deposits. In subsequent years there was a recovery and now inflation contributes a large share to the further increase in deposits. Deposits in commercial banks with a capital of more than 60 milliard lei rose from 10·6 milliard lei at the end of 1934 to 28·8 milliard lei in August, 1942.

In May 1934 a law was passed affecting domestic and foreign banks operating in the country. According to this law a Supreme Banking Council was set up to supervise all banks; minimum capital was fixed according to the locality in which the bank operated; rates of interest were fixed, and conditions of liquidity laid down. This law is still in operation, but certain of its provisions have been relaxed since the outbreak of war—the first time in February 1942, and a second time early in 1943. The alterations principally concerned the proportions of deposits to capital—in each case the maximum limit for deposits being increased.

As a result of the activities of the Supreme Banking Council a large number of small banks has ceased to operate and the banking system in general has been put on a much sounder footing.

3. German Infiltration and Financial Exploitation

453 648 Apart from penetration into other branches of industry, there has been a considerable amount of buying up of shares by Germans in Rumanian banks and insurance companies. Already before the war the Societatea Bancara Romana was controlled by the Dresdner Bank, while the Commerzbank and the Deutsche Bank had a minority holding in the Banca Commercială Română. This latter holding was increased in 1941 to 60 per cent., and in the same year the *Reichskreditgesellschaft* acquired a minority holding in the Banca de Credit Român, and the Berliner Handelgesellschaft in the Banca Chrissoveloni. In 1942 the Bank der Deutschen Arbeit acquired a holding in the Bukarester Handelsbank. Thus, since the Banca Commerciala Italiana şi Romana is a subsidiary of the Banca Commerciala Milan, five out of the six important banks are to a greater or lesser extent Axis-controlled. In addition there are

453
642
456
648

certain fairly important *Volksdeutsche* saving banks operating in Rumania.

In the case of insurance, too, German companies had considerable interests in Rumanian companies even before the war. These interests have been greatly increased, the most important acquisitions being a majority holding in the Dorna Vatra company acquired by Jasch and Hübener in 1941, a similar holding in the "Franco-Romana" taken over from French hands by the Nordstern Versicherungs A.G. in the same year, and a holding taken over from French hands by a Viennese company in the "Nationala" General Insurance Company—also in 1941.

652
648
722

Though the great increases in budgetary expenditure since 1939 can be attributed indirectly to Germany, the chief instruments of German financial exploitation have taken the form of advances from the Rumanian National Bank for the maintenance of German troops in the country, and for the clearing (i.e. forcing the Rumanian National Bank to make advances to Rumanian exporters whose exports were not balanced by corresponding imports from Germany).

4. Advances for Maintenance of German Troops

It was originally agreed that 1 milliard lei per month should be advanced—against an equivalent RM. credit in Berlin—to the German troops in Rumania. In fact, however, the Germans drew sums in excess of this amount, and continued to do so even after the majority of troops had left the country.

In October 1941, therefore, the National Bank refused to grant any further advances of lei for the use of the German troops. The Germans, however, brought pressure to bear by refusing to honour Rumanian invoices for goods they had received, and by borrowing from the banks through the medium of the firms which they controlled. The situation appears to have remained unchanged until January 1942, when it seems that a new agreement was reached, the National Bank once again undertaking to advance a fixed monthly sum, and in addition to make up arrears in payment. It is reported that towards the end of 1942 the National Bank had advanced some 40 milliard lei on this account.

5. The German-Rumanian Clearing

In addition to this German debt there is a further one of probably at least equal magnitude which has accrued in the clearing.

Precise figures of the actual German clearing debt to Rumania are not available and estimates vary very greatly. The amount of the debt at the end of 1942 has been variously reported at anything between 30 milliard and 100 milliard lei.

It is, therefore, reasonable to assume a minimum clearing debt at the end of 1942 of 30 milliard lei, and a minimum total debt (clearing and advances in the National Bank to the German military authorities) of 70 milliard lei—or approximately £117,000,000.

It is, however, quite possible that there is some justification for the German claim to the effect that clearing and similar debts are not wholy indicative of German commercial practices, inasmuch as certain German exports are made against long-term credits which do not enter into the clearing until several years have elapsed. In the case of Rumania, Germany is known to have granted in recent years two credits of RM. 600 million each (36 milliard lei), but it is not known to what extent actual production for the German export market made it possible for Rumanian importers to utilise these facilities.

[53b]

B. LABOUR POSITION DURING THE WAR

1. Military Conscription

701 The age limits for mobilisation are 19-50, while youths from 17-18 are liable for pre-military training.

During 1941 there have been several indications of the strain which further mobilisation was putting on Rumania's manpower; for example, in April 1941 the sentences on political prisoners were suspended and they were called into the army, while from July of that year onwards there has been a constant revision of previous exemptions and a tightening of control over the granting of leave and call-up. Military service, which previously had been obligatory for Rumanian citizens only, was made compulsory for all non-nationals* resident in the country, and further a decree was passed mobilising all Rumanians of military age resident abroad.

[563]

It is calculated that it has never been possible for Rumania to have more than 800,000 men properly equipped under arms at one period. The actual strength of the army has fluctuated considerably during the last two years, as has the number on the eastern front, but a reasonable average figure would be 500,000, of which 200,000 on the eastern front.

727 964 Rumanian casualties are difficult to assess. One estimate at the end of 1941 put casualties at 150,000, while total casualties up to May 1943 have been estimated at 350,000. Military mobilisation will probably have meant a loss of some 800,000 men to the general labour supply.

2. Recruitment for Germany

464 167 The recruitment of workers for Germany has been on a small scale, which is not surprising, as Rumania's military contribution has been considerable, and the military mobilisation has already reduced the supply of labour needed for the Rumanian armament industry to a minimum. Such labour as might be available for export is unskilled and therefore of less value to Germany. The total number of Rumanian workers in Germany in December, 1942, was estimated at 14,000. Of these 10,000 were young Rumanians 18-19, who were recruited at the end of 1941 to be "trained" in German metallurgical factories, 1,000 are women employed as domestic servants, and the rest are mainly unskilled general workers.

3. Foreign Workers in Rumania

648 463 In addition to the German administrators and directors, who are in certain of the key positions in Rumanian industry, there is also evidence of skilled German technicians in Rumanian armament factories. In 1942 there was a nucleus of the German Todt organisation, and Italian builders, in the country.

727 About 40,000 Russian prisoners of war are employed, chiefly in agriculture, though also in mining and navvying work.

C. GENERAL LABOUR DEVELOPMENTS

464 722 In 1937 the average unemployment figure was 12,000. The dislocation of trade and industry on the outbreak of war temporarily caused a general increase of unemployment, which was rapidly absorbed by the military call-up and increased activity in the armaments industry. In March

* The German minority was already liable for military service, either in the Rumanian or German army and in December, 1940, it was announced that there were 30,000 Volksdeutsche in the Rumanian Army.

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Bulgaria EE1
Rumania ED1

B
697
466

There is an austere puritanical fanaticism about the regulations which is difficult for an American, inured to doing what he pleases, to comprehend.

Virtually all potential foes of the Communist regime in Bulgaria have been sent to such camps, which means that any person who deviates in the slightest degree from the established Communist norm invites the public prosecutor to get on with incarcerating him. It is difficult to believe that the system is as far-flung and well established as it is; but the Communist authorities themselves have made available a substantial amount of information on its extent. There are at least thirty slave-labor camps in Bulgaria, and it has been estimated that at least 500,000 persons have been confined in them during the seven years of Communist rule. Among the inmates have been whole families—men, women, and children. Before we condemn the Bulgarian Churches for cowardly behavior it may be well to ask what we ourselves might have done in the circumstances.

162]

II

R
648
642
669]

Rumania was not fully subordinated to the Communist Party until the close of 1947. On the eve of the invasion of the country, which had been the only one to lend full support to the Nazi cause, young King Michael overthrew the Iron Front government and its strong man, General Antonescu, by a *coup d'état*. The new Government, in which a general also served as Premier, accepted the terms of armistice. Nevertheless by March 6, 1945, the Communists were unmistakably in control, although a fellow traveler, Dr. Petru Groza, was selected to head a government in which they had the upper hand. At the Potsdam Conference the United States, Great Britain, and Russia agreed to sign a treaty of peace with Rumania as soon as a government should be formed which was "broadly repre-

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

sentative of all democratic elements of the population." Later, 648
at the Moscow Conference, the Western powers declared that 642
they would believe such a government existed as soon as repre-
sentatives of two political parties other than the Rumanian 666
Workers' Party had been named to ministerial posts, and as soon as satisfactory guarantees had been given that freedom of speech and assembly as well as the right to vote without constraint had been assured. Dr. Groza complied by appointing the two desired ministers to the Cabinet without portfolio and by announcing that free elections would be held soon; but, as was to be anticipated in view of the fact that the Russian Army held the country in an iron grip, the Rumanian Workers' Party received 90-odd per cent of the vote. The ministers without portfolio promptly resigned, and there was nothing the Western powers could do about it save to register an emphatic protest. This they did in language suitably designed for the occasion.

The elections referred to were held on November 19, 1946. [697]
Almost precisely a year later the leader of the principal opposition party, Dr. Juliu Maniu, was sentenced to life imprisonment for high treason. Unquestionably this able and farsighted man, who had served the government and the people of Rumania well over many years and had been identified with every movement for reform and justice, was the foremost of the nation's citizens. King Michael abdicated on December 30 of [643]
the same year and fled from his native land. Thereupon the "People's Republic" was proclaimed, and every source of potential opposition to it was ferreted out and suppressed. A Constitution of the usual kind was adopted on April 13, 1948.
Now no obstacle barred the way for putting the Soviet paradise [491]
plan into effect. The principal productive enterprises were declared the property of the State, and this likewise became the sole arbiter of the educational system. Collective farming was introduced. A novelty was that new elections were held during

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

made for the Jews, the Orthodox Church dealt with other confessions in an irenic manner. 795

Rumania profited greatly if temporarily from its sponsorship of the Allied cause during World War I. Territories were assigned to it which had traditionally belonged to Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia, presenting the government with a number of problems with which it had not previously been concerned. Transylvania, taken from Hungary, had a population divided almost equally between Roman Catholics and Protestants. The Russian Orthodox Church was predominant in Bessarabia, once deeded to the Czar by the West. The Rumanians dealt with the situation in a manner both intelligent and conciliatory. After the favored status of the Greek Orthodox Church had been defined, laws regulating the Confessions were passed during April, 1928. They carefully safeguarded the rights of the State and specifically forbade clergymen to embark on seas of foreign policy of their own charting, but acknowledged the right of the Churches to give religious instruction in public and private schools, and to conduct charitable enterprises. The government also signed a Concordat with the Holy See in 1927, with which the Vatican had no reason to be dissatisfied. 659 795 648

The Concordat conceded to the Catholic Church in all its branches, regular and secular, a large measure of legal protection. Stipulating that ecclesiastical properties must be used for the benefit of Rumanian citizens, and that the income therefrom was subject to audit by the government, it authorized the Church to create a "Sacred Diocesan Fund" to be administered by the Hierarchy. It also promised to add to the Fund if this proved to be inadequate to meet the expenses of necessity incurred by religious foundations. The Catholic clergy were asked to take an oath of allegiance to the King, to the Constitution, and to the laws of the nation. The government agreed not 659 648 794 793

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

653 to intervene to secure the appointment of clergymen, but re-
648 quested that it be informed in each instance. These laws were
794 modified under the rule of the Iron Front, in order to make
793 possible the persecution of the Jews. Christian communions appear, however, not to have been affected.

659 When a pro-Communist government was formed in Ru-
177 mania, the situation changed immediately and radically. The
671 laws adopted in 1928 were repealed by a decree of August 4, 1948. As usual in Soviet-inspired constitutions, freedom of conscience, of religion, and of worship was assured. Freedom was conceded to all creeds to organize and conduct their own ecclesiastical endeavors so long as they did nothing to jeopardize "public security and public order." The last proviso was, as always, the Trojan horse by means of which the conquerors would enter the citadel. For what were public security and order? The government reserved the right to determine; and in this case the "government" was and could only be the local soviet under which a poor cleric was to live and move and have his being. As a matter of fact, the system under which the Rumanian Communist Party functioned was simplicity itself. The list of electors registered in 1946 was kept up to date by striking off the names of all who had in some manner or other manifested hostility to the "people." The possessor of a name thus purged might retain the right to worship wherever he pleased, but was of course deprived of any opportunity to draw a salary from the State or to hold a position of public trust.

671 Indeed, the law went much further. Article 25 provided that
793
659 the Ministry of Religious Affairs shall suspend any decision, instruction, or directive, as well as any order having an ecclesiastical character, whether administrative, cultural, educational, or caritative, or pertaining to endowments, if it is not in keeping with the status of the denomination in the act by which it has been established, or is inimical to public security, public order or morals. Pastoral and circular letters

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

Communists gained control of a satellite country; but in Rumania it could be attained with relative ease. 659 798

The first blow was struck in July, 1948, when the Concordat with the Holy See was revoked. Other decrees subordinating the Church to the State were passed soon thereafter. The Catholic Bishops manifested heroic valor and steadfastness. When their schools were expropriated, their caritative enterprises forbidden, their press closed down, and their religious orders suppressed, they protested. It did not seem meet and just to them that children should be prevented from coming to church, faithful men and women carted off to labor camps on trumped-up charges, or that loud-speakers should blare from one end of the day to the other accusatory comments which were in essence monstrous blasphemies. Our time has grown accustomed to thinking that only patriotic feeling, only the sense of solidarity with the nation to which we belong, can engender the resolution to make every sacrifice that becomes necessary. Therefore the spectacle of a few elderly men who accept every scourge of tyranny with patience because the Lord Jesus has willed that they do so has for us a quality which transcends fortitude—a quality which is the ultimate secret aura of what men for thousands of years have called freedom of conscience. This freedom, perhaps more than any other, is the counterpart of obedience—*usque ad mortem*, even to the death, as the Catholic liturgy says over and over. [648]

Here is just one quotation, from a letter addressed by the Bishops to the President of the People's Republic: 659 793

> We believe, Your Excellency, that the moment has come when we should no longer keep silence by reason of patriotic considerations, but should rather give expression to our sorrow. The measures which have been taken by the Government are extremely injurious to the welfare of the citizens of the Rumanian People's Republic. Nor should we abstain from making an emphatic protest against what has taken place

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania. EDI

XXII

"LET THE SPARROWS TWITTER"

Governments are things that happen in cities. Ignazio Silone, "Fontamara"

000 HAPPY, they say, is the people that has no history. The history of the independent state of Rumania has ended, but it would be brash to say that Rumanians are happy. They are only mute.

648 The terminal date of Rumania's independence can be variously fixed. She was an Axis satellite during the war, and was supposed to have been liberated when Marshal Tolbukhin's armies drove out the Nazis and their puppet government. Whether she ever truly regained her independence, and if so just when she lost it again, is a question, but there will be little dispute that today she comes nearer being a constituent member of the U.S.S.R. than any other of the satellite states. Day by day the Rumanian bulge on the silhouette of the Soviet boa-constrictor grows smaller and smaller as the Communist digestive juices do their work, and today it looms not much larger than that caused by, say, the Ukraine. Moscow still permits Rumania to receive American, British, French and other diplomats in Bucharest; but their numbers are strictly limited, and they are forbidden to enter about two-thirds of the Rumanian national territory, including the Banat, the Bukovina, Moldavia and the Dobrudja. Similarly, she is allowed to maintain diplomatic missions of roughly equivalent size in the respective Western capitals. On the other hand, though the Ukrainian People's Soviet Republic is not qualified in Moscow's view to entertain foreign diplomats in Kiev even *à la Roumaine*, it does approach independence closely enough

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Romania EDI

(as Stalin argued persuasively at Yalta) to deserve separate membership in the United Nations. The voice of the Ukraine is therefore heard at Flushing Meadows—and is not to be despised, even though it is the voice of Jacob rather than Esau, for usually it has been that of Mr. Manuilsky, one of the most experienced revolutionary debaters extant. The voice of the Rumanian People's Republic is not heard there and is not paid much if any attention anywhere. 648

Before long the question will come up whether Rumania deserves even the title of satellite. This might be settled by Moscow's decision to bring her into the Soviet Union as one of the constituent member republics. Until now an argument against this has probably been the hope that she might one day be elected to membership in the United Nations, in exchange for Moscow's acceptance of some Western-sponsored candidate like Ireland or Portugal. But meanwhile the orbit in which she moves has so much shrunk that she no longer shines even by reflected light, and the chance that she might be considered entitled to membership in any world assembly of independent nations has greatly diminished. Foreign newspaper men no longer are allowed to report directly on what is occurring in the country. If elements of national resistance still exist we hear little or nothing of their activities.

Bucharest might have hoped to claim glory as the capital of the Cominform, which she supposedly became when the organization moved out of Belgrade. Even this is denied her, for the Cominform no longer meets regularly, in Bucharest or anywhere else. Perhaps the Soviet leaders see no further value in the organization. Perhaps Stalin has made up his mind not to permit any alternate center of power, even minor, to the Kremlin. Some persons think that the Cominform was created originally in order to deal specifically with the Jugoslav situation, and having fulfilled this function, though far from successfully, is now retained simply as a paper organization for possible use some time in the future. Today its principal activity is as a printing press. To the extent that glory attaches to being a printing press Bucharest has it. The Cominform journal, *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!*, is printed there in some 15 languages. 665 668

The Cominform journal may even be written largely in Bucharest. 000

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania EDI

treaties of 1919 and 1920.[1] The treaties as actually signed on 728
February 10, 1947, were no better. The Western Powers tried to arrange that some respect be paid to the principle of self-determination, by plebiscite or otherwise, in settling the ownership of territories in dispute between former Axis states or between them and the victors. They met with no success.

In Rumania's case several important territories were at stake, 648
including Bessarabia, a part of the Bukovina, the northern part of 728
Transylvania and the Southern Dobrudja.

Bessarabia had come into Russian possession first in 1812; had been transferred to Rumania (largely on ethnic grounds) in 1918; and had been retaken by Russia in June 1940, pursuant to an agreement between Ribbentrop and Molotov a year earlier. Rumanians have since asserted that the Rumanian Government of 1940 did not formally consent to the Russian annexation but merely evacuated the territory under threat of force. At Paris the Soviet delegates referred to the 1940 transfer as "an agreement," said it had been confirmed by the armistice and made clear that possession was nine-tenths of the law. The peace treaty confirmed this reasoning. The case of Northern Bukovina was somewhat different, though the decision of the peace conference regarding it was the same. Northern Bukovina never in history had been Russian. The province had not been specifically mentioned in the Molotov-Ribbentrop deal of 1939; but Germany had not protested when the Soviets took it over in 1940. The Soviets argued that, as in the case of their territorial demands on the Czechs and the Finns, they required the area for strategic purposes of defense. The bear must protect itself against the carnivorous lamb.[2]

One decision was to Rumania's advantage. In 1940 Ciano and Ribbentrop had handed over the northern part of the Rumanian province of Transylvania to their protégés the Hungarians. When Vyshinsky installed Groza in power in Bucharest on March 6, 1945, he felt that he must give the new Prime Minister some success to

[1] John C. Campbell, "The United States in World Affairs, 1945–1947." New York: Harper's, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1947, p. 134.

[2] Rumania ceded the Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria September 7, 1940. The Peace Conference confirmed this also. The United States had favored this arrangement in 1919 and approved it in 1940.

648 advertise to the Rumanian masses, most of whom had never heard
728 his name. On March 8, therefore, Groza was told to ask Stalin for northern Transylvania, and by return telegram he received it as a "present." The Nazis had not yet been expelled from Budapest, so there was nobody there for Moscow to take into account. The Western Allies were not consulted. As a matter of fact, they had no objection to the return of at least most of Transylvania to Rumania, but would have preferred that it be done after study as to whether or not there should be frontier rectifications in favor of Hungarian ethnic groups; and they certainly would have considered it more suitable that the transfer be made after agreement among the Allies rather than unilaterally by one of them.

665 The steps by which the Communist-dominated Rumanian Gov-
668 ernment became an absolute Communist dictatorship need not be detailed here.[3] In the beginning there certainly were some non-Communist elements which favored a clean sweep of the old order even though the representatives of the new order were Communists and protégés of the hated Russians. Seizure of the large properties still left in Rumania after the land reforms following the First World War was popular in principle. Rumanian régimes of the inter-war period had not been noted for efficiency or probity, and the Communists hastened to identify all Rumanian statesmen who held democratic beliefs and had a Western orientation with the "old gang" of profiteers and politicians who had mocked the Constitution in the dissolute days of King Carol and had ended by taking Rumania into the war as the ally of the Nazis. The fact that Maniu, the country's leading statesman, was famous for his incorruptibility and stubborn devotion to the Constitution did not deter Communist propaganda from picturing him also as a corrupt relic of the old dictatorial order. The Socialists were, of course, completely outbid by Communist promises of pie in the sky.

665 But although these tactics had some success at first the only one
241 of them that was based on anything substantial, the gift of land to
423

[3] For a fuller outline of the postwar evolution in Rumania as well as other parts of Eastern Europe, and of relevant negotiations (if they can be called that) between the Soviets and the Western Powers, see Campbell, *op. cit.*, also volumes for 1947–48 and 1948–49 in the same series by the same author, and the volume for 1949 by Richard P. Stebbins.

185 Output of oil is to be doubled, of iron and steel nearly doubled. Though the socialization of agriculture is of course to be pushed, Mme. Pauker said nothing about class warfare in the villages nor did she emphasize the leading rôle of the industrial proletariat, as had been done by other satellite leaders as well as by her own colleagues in the Central Committee, Georgescu and Luca.

185 Perhaps geography supplies an answer to why Moscow slated
●648 Rumania but not Jugoslavia and Bulgaria for industrialization. The latter are more distant from Soviet Russia and would be much more exposed to enemy air attack in case of war. Rumania adjoins the Soviet Union; and although it is true that her oil fields were bombed from North Africa and Italy in the last war, they could be given air protection more easily than could the industrial installations in the other two countries. The same considerations apply, though in less degree, to Hungary; but in any case industrialization there was already considerably advanced. Rumania and Hungary, moreover, were destined in the Soviet planning to remain indefinitely under occupation by Soviet troops.

The favor shown by Soviet planners for developing heavy industry even in situations where it seems particularly unnatural, as in Rumania, is partly inspired, of course, by their desire to proletarianize the population as quickly as possible. But more important, perhaps, it also will increase the dependence of the satellites on the Soviet Union. Where else but in Russia can they hope to dispose of the product?

565 626 Despite all their adversities, present and planned, the peasants nevertheless remain the great—probably the only—obstacle to Rumania's full Sovietization. All over Southeast Europe farming is more a way of life than an occupation, and nowhere is this truer than in Rumania. Coercion will gradually break the Rumanian peasant of this way of life. As we have seen, however, the régime has so far made no claims to spectacular progress. Evidence that formidable difficulties are being encountered is found in the fact that while Georgescu, Luca and others stress complete proletarianization as the goal and hint at violent methods to attain it, they make excuses for not proceeding faster; and at the same time there continues to be conciliatory talk about getting the "freely given consent of the peasants."

Bulgaria EE1
Rumania ED1

B 342 233

with straw roofs. They are rarely plastered with mud. In western Sredna Gora, transportable sheep pens are used (Gellert, 1937: 169).

RUMANIA

R 361 175 177 648

In Rumania there exists a marked difference between settlements in the lowlands and those of the Carpathian Mountain region. While topography and the presence or absence of such building materials as stone, wood or clay are important factors, political considerations also played a significant role. With the beginning of the 18th century Greek influence became predominant in Moldavia and Wallachia. The Porte set up Greek rulers in these principalities, thus in reality the Rumanians were as much under Turkish dominion, although indirectly, as were the people of the Balkans. It was only after the rebellion of 1821 that Rumanian rulers were reinstated. During all periods of unrest and foreign invasion the mountains and forests served as areas of refuge; the Serbian hajduk has his counterpart in the Rumanian heydoick (Stratilesco, 1907: 30-34).

R 361 R [133] R [491] R [621]

Location and Types of Settlements. The older settlements were in the nature of hamlets (catăn). These were generally not built on the top of hills, but rather in depressions, on the edge of forests, and away from the military roads (Grothe, 1907: 54). In the hilly regions of Oltenia and Moldavia the villages were located close to a river or on the slope of a hill. Farmsteads are generally spaced fairly far apart, in no definite order. Villages may extend over two or three hills facing one another (Stratilesco, 1907: 205). Villages in the Wallachian plains are located close to the roads. The prevalent type is the road village; buildings are located on either side of the highway which forms the main road of the village. Larger villages may have additional cross-roads (Jänecke, 1918: 7). While mountain villages average a population of 350, the largest being around 700, villages of the plains average 700 and may reach 2000 (Grothe, 1907: 55).

R 342 R [335]

House Types. Due to the scarcity of wood and stone in the plains, buildings are generally constructed of wicker and daub, in which technique the Rumanians are masters. The roof is made first, the walls afterwards. The principle posts are first set into the ground, then the studs of the outer walls and inner partitions are spaced at 1 to 2 foot intervals. After the roof has been formed walls are built up. Mud is kneaded down with the feet, mixed with straw, and shaped into lumps that take the place of bricks. These lumps are then set between the studs and left to dry (Stratilesco, 1907: 208). More often walls are of wickerwork, plastered inside and out with a mixture of mud, straw and cowdung to a thickness of 15-25 centimeters (Jänecke, 1918: 10). The rough walls are smoothed out by applying thinner and thinner layers of mud and cowdung mixture. They are then whitewashed inside and out. Floors of timber are recent; the floor is commonly of tamped earth.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

433 and services than it gave, the difference being gained by the towns.[9]
433 According to these views, trade relations were actually detrimental
241 to the rural areas, which were being drained by the towns and industries.

It is not necessary here to discuss the theoretical question whether there is any absolute disadvantage to the countryside in its commerce with the towns. If during a period of change toward industrialization the countryside's position declines in relation to the town, it is quite possible for a number of other factors—which may be "short term" or even noneconomic—to convert this relative disadvantage into an absolute loss in income. Such factors may include the inelasticity of agricultural supply, the immobility of agricultural labor, and the increase in agricultural population. Finally, governmental and political policies may favor industry at the expense of agriculture. This last point requires further elucidation, as it was quite important in
●651 Rumania.
433 Rumanian industry was created in the shelter of high protective tariffs, which undoubtedly served to increase the costs of agriculture and to benefit industry at its expense. These tariffs have been justified by the "infant industries" argument, and in part they were brought about by the agricultural protectionist policy of the European industrial states. But the combination of protectionism and the development of cartels did give industry a monopolistic position in the internal Rumanian market which worked to the disadvantage of agriculture. In addition to tariff protection, Rumania had a long tradition of direct encouragements to industry—such as exemptions from taxation and special transport rates—which persisted in the interwar period and were expanded in the 1930's.

433 The protective tariffs, by restricting foreign imports, had the
651 effect of bringing in foreign capital for investment in local industry.
457 But while foreign capital has been of great importance in the development of Rumania's larger industries and in the creation of its transportation system, the effect on the total economy has been somewhat one-sided, partly because the capital was naturally attracted to industries working for export: "Without depreciating the influence of foreign capital in stimulating industrialization, it is to be underlined that the benefits of invested foreign capital do not for the most part serve to create purchasing power in the national market

[113] 9. M. Manoilescu, "Das wirtschaftliche und soziale Dreieck der Agrarstaaten: die Stadt, das Dorf, das Ausland," *Internationale Agrarrundschau*, No. 6 (Berlin, 1940), also cited in Hugo Böker, "Agriculture's Share in the National Income and the Agricultural Situation," *International Review of Agriculture*, 32, No. 1 (January, 1941), 22. For a discussion of M. Manoilescu's views, see below, pp. 193–197.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

433 and do not contribute to increasing the supply of capital, since they
● 651 are exported." [10]

457 A comparison of industrial manufacture, industrial imports, and
consumption of manufactured goods between 1927 and 1938 shows
433 that while the percentage of industrial consumption which was provided for by Rumanian industry rose from 63.5 per cent to 78.6 per cent, the total consumption of industrial products dropped from about 98 billion lei in 1927 to 88 billion lei in 1938. That is, the increase in industrial production (from 59 to 69 billion lei) was more than balanced by the fall in industrial imports (from 34 to 19 billion lei).[11]

From this the conclusion might be drawn that Rumanian industrialization, instead of increasing purchasing power, was reducing it. Such indeed was Madgearu's opinion: "It is certain that the position of quasi-monopoly created by the system of protection of the national industry is the principal cause of the state of inferiority into which agriculture in general and peasant agriculture in particular have been driven." [12]

If the desirability of a policy of industrialization is granted, it is clear that since industries do not materialize from thin air and are not created by amiable fairy godmothers energy and resources must be diverted from other fields to the creation of industry, at least during the period of its inception and establishment. But the ultimate effect, presumably, is to raise the whole level of the economy; perhaps the agricultural sector will not advance as rapidly or as far, but in the long run at least the whole community should benefit. If Madgearu's conclusion is correct, such was not the result of Rumanian industrialization; instead, the industrial sector pulled away from the rest of the economy, was not directed to satisfying its needs, and may actually have reduced the over-all power of consumption.

Admittedly, twenty-five years may be too brief a period in which to judge such a development. Moreover, as has been mentioned before, a great many external influences had a powerful effect upon the Rumanian economy. The first years after 1921 were spent in recover-

[113] 10. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 204. In this connection see also Joso Tomasevich's chapter on "Foreign Economic Relations," in *Yugoslavia*, ed. Robert J. Kerner (Berkeley: Los Angeles, 1949), which expresses substantially the same view regarding the role of foreign investment in Yugoslavia.

11. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

12. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 259. Madgearu's conclusions, however, are not altogether disinterested. As an old National Peasant who had attacked the protectionist policy of the Liberal party and had lowered tariffs when he was Minister of Finance, he was always of the opinion that industrial development in Rumania had been artificially forced and was battening on the peasant.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 Nevertheless it may be said that Liberal policy harmed rather than
241 aided agriculture. The more important question, however, is whether the sacrifices exacted from agriculture were more than balanced by benefits to the whole of the economy. Final judgment of Liberal economic policy must rest on this question, which will be examined presently.

Liberal neglect of Rumanian agriculture was criticized by Constantin Garoflid, Minister of Agriculture in the Averescu cabinet of 1926: "It is not normal that our country should possess a *Crédit Industriel*, while agriculture is deprived of a financial institution when its needs are at their greatest."[49] The limited supplies of capital were directed by the government and the banks into industrial channels where they were promised better returns. Indeed, facilities for agricultural credit were less than before the First World War.[50] The absence of credit, only in part a consequence of policy, drove the peasants to the usurers and into chronic indebtedness. The handling of payments and compensation for land transferred in the agrarian reforms served to drain money from the agricultural sector of the economy. Peasants were urged to make full payment as rapidly as possible, while the funds received were not devoted to the amortization of the long-term bonds owing to the expropriated landowners but became a source of revenue for the state.[51]

[651] A serious drag on agriculture was the tariff policy pursued by the Liberals. The import tariffs, especially the duties on agricultural implements and textiles, raised the operating costs of the peasant.[52] Even more crippling were the export duties which primarily affected agricultural products, the chief Rumanian export. On some occasions these duties equalled 50 per cent of the value of the product.[53] They were not only a heavy burden on agriculture but completely disorganized the grain trade. Since the smaller peasants were producing primarily for their own consumption, the export duties did not affect them directly, but as the tariffs were aimed at maintaining a low cost of living they affected those particular commodities which the small peasant did supply to the local market.

Against these disadvantages, the Liberal party offered very little

49. *L'Economiste roumain*, 2, No. 5 (May, 1926), 160. During his short term in office Garoflid attempted to establish such an institution but was unable to put it into effect.

50. Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, p. 425.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 421.

52. The duty on ploughs was 20–30 per cent ad valorem, that on imported sacks was about 50 per cent.

53. Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 426.

RUMANIA

665 Rumania. The paper concluded by an exhortation addressed
574 to Bessarabians to evict Inculeţ from the political arena of Bessarabia where he had operated as though this region had been an African colony, and the appeal concluded with the hortatory incitation "Eject this putrefaction from Bessarabia."

661 In spite of the severe financial crisis which afflicted this region, the fiscal agents of the government insisted on
563 collecting taxes even when in years of drought the peasantry
661 was destitute and utterly unable to pay. The methods employed were so barbarous that they provoked several interpellations in the Rumanian Chamber. During its sitting of Dec. 10th, 1926, M. V. Madgearu denounced the abusive and inquisitorial methods by which Bessarabian tax-payers had been sold up and his arraignment was confirmed by similar indictments formulated by a member of the (then) government majority.

423 In October, 1930, a revolt broke out in southern Bess-
563 arabia. The peasants of the village of Baimaklia, near the town of Kagui, revolted and burned down the residence of a
661 big landowner because certain grazing lands were given to him by the State instead of being distributed among the peasants. That similar abuses are current may be inferred from an article in the "Aurora" of June 3rd, 1926, which is headed "The pauperization and humiliation of the Bessarabians," and in which it is related how certain State lands were put up for sale at Balţi, and though the peasantry of six adjoining villages had combined and offered 400,000 lei more than three big landowners, the lands were allocated to the latter, obviously through favouritism. That State functionaries often act with an arbitrariness and brutality
563 inconceivable in a civilized State may be illustrated by
661 the Soroca affair, which is of quite recent occurrence. In January, 1932, six Jewish youths, inhabitants of Soroca, on the Dniester, after coming to terms with the frontier-guards as to the amount of the bribe they would have to pay to be allowed to escape into Russia, and after they had paid 40,000 lei, were ambuscaded and shot down. In order to instil terror into the local population, their bodies were hurled pell-mell on a sledge which was driven by a soldier

647 are certainly no insuperable obstacles to the removal of what
466 constitutes a drain on the strength and probity of the country,
661 which is being visibly weakened in every sphere of administration.

The following article, which was published in the "Lupta" of Dec. 17th, 1931, is instructive as to the manner in which public functionaries behave in order to supplement the scanty salary they draw from the State and which generally does not suffice to keep them alive.

647 It is obvious that no civilized State would tolerate methods
651 which in Rumania are benevolently winked at. There is no doubt that the evil could easily be remedied if functionaries
499 were decently paid. The increased outlay for the State
661 which this would involve would be largely compensated by a more conscientious performance of duty by the administrative staff. For instance, it is well known that owing to the high duties in force, smuggling on a colossal scale is being carried on with the connivance of officials, with the result that the State is defrauded of millions. M. V. Madgearu, former Minister of Finances, openly admits it in his book "Rumania's New Economic Policy," published in English, on page 39 of which we come across this astounding statement: "It has been shown that while pre-war Rumania imported about 70,000 kilos of natural silk, united Rumania registered the importation of only 1,000 kilos in 1927. It is well understood that the rest has been imported through smuggling." On a rough computation this item alone would account for an annual loss of some 50 million lei to the revenue.

But, apparently, blackmail is even more lucrative than smuggling, according to the article referred to in the "Lupta":—

647 "Truly, *smuggling* constitutes a source of big revenues for
651 the State. Not bona-fide smuggling which involves the introduction of goods into the country without the disburse-
661 ment of duties. This latter sort of smuggling is never discovered, or if discovered is rapidly hushed up with the connivance of the ablest pillars of the Ministry. The principal sources of revenue from smuggling are derived from the hypothetical variety, when for instance an anony-

mous letter of denunciation reaches the Ministry concerning 647
a commercial or industrial firm. This is immediately followed 651
by a close investigation of the firm's books. Though no 661
trace of contraband may have been found, yet rumours of high fines to be imposed on this firm get into circulation. Its owners make desperate efforts to dissipate them. The firm's bank announces that its overdraft will be suspended until the matter is cleared up. The merchant who cannot wait for a judicial examination of the charge brought against him, nor engage in protracted discussions with the Ministry, finding his credit at the bank has been suspended, endeavours to strike a bargain. He will offer 10%, occasionally even only 1% of the amount of the fine with which he has been threatened. The State pockets 80% of the sum thus offered and the zealous inspector who has "discovered" the reported contraband appropriates the remaining 20%. Why should these sums indeed be rejected? Such tactics, when employed by a clever functionary or inspector, will soon allow him to become the owner of palaces and buildings in the capital. Such is the just reward of labour!"

And in conclusion the "Lupta" advises the Ministry of Finance as to the measures it ought to take to prevent merchants from suffering unduly from the blackmailing activities of its financial inspectors!

That blackmailing and extortion are not unusual practices 647
may be inferred from the following announcement appearing 661
in a Bucarest daily on 15th March, 1929:—"The tribunal of 697
Cluj having received an endless number of complaints and denunciations against Lieut.-Colonel Mihai, of the gendarmery, lately occupying the post of Police-Prefect at Cluj during the Liberal régime, has transmitted them to the judicial procurator. The investigations which are being pursued prove that the charges are well founded and that this Liberal terrorist had extorted moneys through blackmail from high class people while he was police prefect in the capital of Transylvania. Those who suffered most from the exercise of the functions of the accused (sic), were merchants, who, if they failed to deliver to the prefect the sums or goods demanded, were subjected to tortures and heavy fines and were threatened with the closing of their

439 tions on a credit basis so hazardous that they have prac-
452 tically ceased, to the great discomfiture of Rumanian merchants, who have seen their activities completely paralysed.

426 As matters stand, a creditor is at the mercy of his debtor,
452 and if the latter refuses to honour his engagements there is nothing to be done but to accept whatever compromise may
651 be offered, for a recourse to tribunals would be tantamount
686 to a total loss not only of the amount involved, but of the supplementary expenses arising from legal disbursements and inordinately high judicial taxes which unlucky creditors will have to defray.

[439] What is singular is a tax imposed by the State on all bankruptcies to the amount of 20 per cent of the total assets declared, so that this explains, though it can hardly justify, the State's manifest indifference to the undermining of the country's commercial reputation through fraudulent bankruptcies, the frequency of which is positively alarming, for it derives corresponding advantages from this impost on bankruptcies. Instead of attempting to circumscribe this evil it would appear that the State has done much to encourage it, especially where foreigners are involved. Apparently it is actuated by the shortsighted view that the loss of the foreigner is to the benefit of the country in general, since through bankruptcies foreign capital is transferred to its own nationals. At any rate, bankruptcies have been regarded as a means of raising revenue, and the State as a privileged party has always secured its 20 per cent impost plus other legal taxes, and the debtor has usually managed to alienate a good part of his assets so as to safeguard himself in a very satisfactory manner, while the wretched creditor not only gets nothing but usually finds he is being called upon to make further disbursements on account of legal formalities involved. The *Argus* of June 15th and 16th, 1931, commenting on the law of the "Concordat préventif," qualified it as disastrous, and added: "Among the principal obstacles which prevent the development and normalization of our commerce this law stands in the front rank. . . . it has given free rein to the unscrupulous debtor, permitting him to carry out his underhand manœuvres without any risks, to sell the goods he bought with-

out paying for them, spoliating thereby his creditor and underselling and ruining the honest trader."

The paper advocated a revision of the law and demanded that debtors should be obliged to make a composition on the basis of the ratio existing between the assets and the liabilities, or with a variation of only 10 or 20 per cent of this proportion. As matters now stand a dishonourable merchant is entitled to file a demand for a "Concordat préventif" though his assets may far exceed his liabilities. He is then allowed to pay 40 or 60 per cent of his debts, and after they have been thereby considerably reduced is even accorded a delay of several years to pay them off. With such facilities at hand the majority of merchants did not scruple to avail themselves of the opportunity of repudiating their engagements and so getting rich quickly. The consequence is that commerce has been completely dislocated through the complete suppression of credit which naturally followed. The Under-Secretary of Justice in the Iorga-Argentoianu Government, M. N. Lenguceanu, overtly admitted in the *Neamul Romanesc*, September 5th, 1930, that the above-mentioned law "had permitted merchants, 98 per cent of whom were foreigners, overtly to despoil their creditors." Another very serious defect from which Rumanian legislation suffers is the tendency to enact laws with retroactive effect, which permits the invalidation of contracts, thus creating a state of instability that affects most adversely all commercial and financial operations. For how can foreign investors risk their capital in a country where uncertainty and instability have become its distinguishing features?

Senator Marino, on February 26th, 1932, deplored the disrespect shown for contracts, criticized the State for various measures passed undermining confidence, among which was the moratorium of 1919–1920 by which foreigners had lost some 7 milliard lei, and demanded the granting of serious guarantees which would instil confidence once more. Similar pronouncements by public men abound, for the serious consequence of the present policy are obvious to all.

Professor Flinders Petrie once stated (*Contemporary Re-*

426 gradually imbued people with the conviction that engage-
686 ments and promises need not be considered seriously, and that on the contrary, elusion of obligations is a mundane affair and a fashionable art which should be cultivated assiduously. As a result, not only debtors always find means to
687 avoid paying, but taxpayers also use every possible stratagem to avoid payment of taxes. There are huge arrears of taxes that remain uncollected, every imaginable trick being resorted to by taxpayers in order to escape from their monetary obligations to the State. The present tremendous falling off in the revenue should mainly be ascribed to this reason, as well as to the venality of the tax-collectors, whose leniency is secured by a slight gratification whenever they tend to become over sedulous in the execution of their duties. M. N. Petrascu, a fashionable speaker, while delivering an address at the Rumanian Social Institute in Bucarest on May 18th, 1932, asserted, "we should explain the non-realization of the budgetary revenue forecasts by the fact that our civic consciousness is not sufficiently developed to allow us to understand that by paying our taxes we fulfil an elementary duty; this is also the reason why fiscal frauds have attained extraordinary and unimaginable proportions. . . ."

675 The utter disregard of contracts and formal engagements
454 can hardly be better illustrated than by the attitude of the State Railways administration in rescinding contracts with metallurgical establishments at Arad, Braila, and Reşiţa, contracts on the basis of which these very workshops were built. Another flagrant case of repudiation of solemn promises by an official organization is that of the municipality of Cluj which, after confirming a contract with the society "Electrobel" for a duration of fifty years, and after the Brussels firm had carried out 80 per cent of the work it had undertaken to perform, was requested by the municipality, hardly one year after signature of contract, to alter its provisions which had received the royal assent and had been unanimously approved and passed by the municipal council. The municipality brazenly demanded a reduction in the time period of the concession originally granted, namely from 50 years to 15, an increase in the royalty payable to the municipality from 3 per cent to 6 per cent, and

cent. It can easily be understood that no enterprises could 426
possibly bear the burden of such interests, and that if foreign 433
capital was to be excluded it would be necessary to have 454
recourse to artificial encouragements in order to create and
foster the industries it was contemplated to set up. Protec- 431
tion in its extremest form, therefore, was resorted to, and a 477
tariff wall, the highest in Europe, was erected to protect the
budding of these hot-house industries. In order to start a
new industry the theoretical case for Protection is admittedly
strong. Temporarily the new industry needs help, and even-
tually the country as a whole may gain from its creation,
though in the meantime it has to bear the burden. The im-
mediate effect is to increase the costs of the various articles
produced locally to an extent that places them beyond the
reach of a poor community such as the rural population of
Rumania. The repercussion of an increase in the costs of
articles required by the agrarian population naturally
causes a rise in the costs of production of agricultural pro-
duce, which renders less easy its marketing in neutral mar-
kets in which the Rumanian peasant can neither enjoy nor
demand the favour of a protective duty. So that eventually
protection has proved an arm which has turned against him.
In the case of Rumania, most of the industries which have
been created proved to be clearly detrimental to the State.
Certainly the textile industries, which import the totality of
their raw material in the form of yarn from abroad, confer
no benefit except to their proprietors. The raw material is 651
usually allowed free admission, or pays a very light duty,
while the finished article is sold at a price corresponding to
that of a similar foreign product on which a duty amounting
to as much as 300 per cent is occasionally imposed. Almost
the whole of the difference is pocketed by the manufacturer,
and the native purchaser gets no benefit whatever. On the
contrary, he usually gets an inferior home-made article at
almost the same price as he would pay for a foreign one
generally of better quality. In this arrangement the State is
deprived of a very important source of revenue since it
desists from collecting the tariff dues it would otherwise
have received if, instead of raw materials imported free,
foreign dutiable manufactured articles had been imported.

RUMANIA

651 As a result the revenue from Customs, which formed one of the basic sources of revenue for the State, has gradually ceased to function as such. Revenue from this head gradually declined from 9,243 million lei in 1927 to 2,516 million lei in 1931, though this decrease is also attributable to other causes, such as the lowering or elimination of export taxes.

651 661 Probably one of the most acrimonious criticisms that ever appeared in the Press concerning the excessive Protectionism obtaining in Rumania was published in the *Cuvantul* for March 3rd, 1931, and the following quotation from it is worth retaining as it casts a lurid light on the inner machinery of government:

"A Rumanian State, in the true and proper meaning of the word, is non-existent. For the essential functions of this State have been usurped by certain gangs whose main preoccupation is to furnish their members with money wrested from the taxpayer. The national revenue is annually amputated of an exorbitant portion in the form of taxes, with which the State does no good. The State administration functions from bad to worse while hordes of politicians wax fat on the public treasury. The State administration has been annexed by the party bosses and the public budget has been confiscated for the benefit of the clients of these parties. And when the resources of the State revenues have no longer sufficed for these highwaymen, other means have been devised in order to rob the citizens and provide for the upkeep of these harpies. A scandalous legislation, characterized by a Protectionism without parallel in Europe, and aiming at the protection of a parasitic industry, was voted for the benefit of profiteers, who are intimately interested in all the pecuniary calculations of the politicians. Under the aegis of this Protectionism the most rapacious trusts flourish to-day in Rumania and exploit the consumer. Instead of aiding agriculture, the latter has been dislocated and ruined by the extreme favours lavished on this artificial industry, and all this for the sole purpose of satisfying the exorbitant pretensions of the industrial bandits, who have known how to turn governments and parliaments into docile instruments for fleecing the consumer. . . ."

That the extreme Protectionism adopted by Rumania is

+ That the extreme Protectionism adopted by Rumania is

not approved by the public may also be seen from the following excerpts culled from an article published by the same paper on May 15th, 1932: "There is a profound difference between industries which utilize local raw materials and such pseudo-industries which import from abroad semi-manufactured materials and finish them off in this country. . . . The importation of semi-manufactured goods is in the great majority of cases carried on solely to evade the Customs tariffs, and if we do not see things as they are, this is on account of private interests, for the sake of which we allow a prejudicial system to continue to function. . . ." 651 661 431

The *Argus*, too, several times attempted to call public attention to the nefarious results of the policy of bolstering up artificial industries, and especially in the case of the textile industry, on which it wrote as follows: "Why are clothing materials so costly? Because our protected textile industry sells its products at the same price as the goods imported from abroad. The encouragement given to the textile industry has resulted in increasing the cost of wearing apparel because industrialists are not content with a reasonable profit, and as a result a woollen suit to-day is a luxury. When our Custom tariff is to be revised the interests of industrialists alone should not be considered, but also those of the consumers."

As one may infer from the above, this policy of industrialization was a wild scheme which materialized on a large scale, chiefly because various politicians had been directly interested in the manufacturing concerns which had been started. 661 [651] 289 477

The case of the paper industry may be cited as an example. All the paper mills belonged to or were controlled by friends or relatives of the Bratianus. In order to secure big profits an import duty of 50 per cent was placed on paper, creating thereby a virtual monopoly of the paper trade on behalf of the owners of the mills. As they could dictate their will to the Chamber, the high duty was maintained in spite of the protest of the Opposition. For not only the public at large suffered by the high price of such an essential commodity as paper, but political interests were equally affected. Opposition parties had to pay high prices

647 could be dismissed without the working of the administra-
652 tive machine being impaired in any way, and several instances are given of the plethora of officials. M. Bratanescu, deputy for Tighina, for example, pointed out in the Chamber that in his town, with a population of 31,698, there were 130 teachers, but as there were not enough children for each to have a full class, whenever an inspector came down, each teacher used to borrow children from the other classes in order to complete the number of his own so that he might escape being reprimanded by the inspector.

652 Another head on which various economies could be
657 effected is pensions, which absorb about one-fifth of the total revenue, and many of which are served out to people who have not the slightest justification for drawing them. The tendency to spend overmuch for the upkeep of the social services is a characteristic trait of Rumania and was noticed and commented on many years ago by one of her distinguished social writers, M. C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, in his work "Neoiobâgia." Referring to the period 1910–1911, he pointed out that the State budget and those of the communes absorbed over one-third of the national revenue, and what remained for the subsistence of the population amounted to 123 gold lei per head, or almost 4,000 lei, a figure closely approximating to the 3,955 lei which, according to the calculations given above, represented the net income per head for
647 1930. The above-cited writer condemned very caustically
652 the profligate methods of the administration as likely to bring the State to ruin:

"By withdrawing annually from production these big sums and lavishing them on a parasitic bureaucracy, the State sets the example of a mad waste . . . by letting the bureaucracy spend extravagantly what the other classes create by hard toil, people form the illusion that this country is very prosperous and that it is easy to live in it comfortably. . . . This hypertrophy of the State organism is one of the most pernicious sicknesses which attack modern societies." (p. 455.)

647 It is indeed a great pity that no political party ever en-
651 deavoured to tackle the problem of thoroughly overhauling the administrative machine of the country, but that instead

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

a policy of drift has so far been practised. The alarming falling-off in the revenue receipts is nevertheless a disquieting sign which ought to impress sufficiently the Rumanian authorities, and rouse them from their apathy, if they are to avoid the disaster they are heading for. For the drying up of the revenue is not entirely due to fraud, but also to the gradual pauperization of the masses. The *Cuvantul* of December 29th, 1928 wrote as follows:

"There is no country where fiscal fraud is so intensely practised as in Rumania . . . though fraud is due partly to the unjust distribution of the fiscal charges. A sound fiscal policy should take into consideration that the ratepayer is poor. We should not be far wrong if we affirmed that at least 80 per cent of the population are in debt. If these 80 per cent of the population toil in order to pay off their debts, or only the interest on their debts, how can the State expect to raise from them what it needs for the public services? . . ."

Rumania's main source of income is her export trade. All other items are of secondary importance and can hardly offset the important payments she is obliged to make on behalf of her indebtedness abroad. During the years 1930 to 1931 there was an excess of exports over imports which enabled her to meet her payments abroad, all the more so since foreign capital invested in Rumania is no longer productive and therefore next to no interest on it is being actually remitted. On the contrary, it may be said that, owing to the crisis, foreign enterprises in Rumania require financial aid which is being supplied from abroad, a process which helps to offset the total of foreign payments Rumania has to make. An automatic equilibrium has therefore been attained which allows Rumania to face her payments abroad without drawing on her gold reserves or necessitating her to have recourse to foreign borrowing, and this situation will be maintained so long as she continues to have plentiful harvests as those of 1930 and 1931 and her population remains in its present state of poverty, which prevents it from purchasing foreign articles, a state of things which explains the present excessively low figure of imports. Of course these recent years cannot be taken as representative of normal times, and for this purpose a table showing the balance of payments during

AGRICULTURE

It was the policy of imposing export taxes on all agricultural produce, which despoiled the peasantry of all the legitimate profit they should have made on the marketing of their grain, and which not only tended to discourage them from increasing the area under cultivation but prevented them from consolidating their position as independent farmers. Indeed, had not the Rumanian peasant been unduly burdened with taxes during the years following the conclusion of the war, when cereals fetched highly remunerative prices, he would undoubtedly have been able to make sufficient money to equip himself with the necessary instruments and cattle for his farm, avoided running into debt, and he would even have been able to constitute a small reserve on which to draw in the lean years. But these possibilities were frustrated by the culpable negligence of his rulers. And yet there were plenty of men who clearly foresaw and foretold the disastrous outcome for agriculture of such negligence, and protested against this system as well as against the undue partiality accorded by Government circles to industry in general. Certain organs of the Press continued for years to warn the public, and to deprecate the disastrous policy that was being followed. But it was in vain, the Bratianus would accept no counsel from anyone. The *Argus* on October 21st, 1926, commenting on this theme, drew the following conclusions:

"From the above-cited appreciations one may infer that on one hand the prices obtained by the producers are below those they secured before the war, while on the other hand the prices of the articles they need for their upkeep are at about 70 per cent above the pre-war level. In spite of these facts all these taxes which burden production are being maintained, and agriculture is placed not only in an impossible situation for developing itself but in a state of inferiority when compared with that of other countries which export cereals."

In another article published by the same paper on October 10th, 1926, we find a similar pessimistic strain: "From the above figures it becomes obvious that agriculturalists instead of making a profit have lost money, both this year and in previous years of drought. Such a result has completely discouraged them, especially the 101 younger among them..!"

000 previous years of drought. Such a result has completely discouraged them, especially the younger among them. . . ."

489 241 And it was not only the export taxes which impeded the development of agriculture, but also the deplorable state of the whole transport system. The shortage and deficiencies of the latter would have been very easily remedied with foreign aid, but the Bratianus were deaf to all such suggestions, though the imperative necessity of eliminating these defects was daily insisted on in the Press. Here is yet another excerpt from the *Argus* of October 8th, 1926, and it will be found both apposite and illuminating on this subject:

"So long as the Railway Administration does not dispose of adequate funds to obtain the necessary rolling stock, nothing can be done. Without locomotives, without trucks, without warehouses, a transport system is helpless in a country like ours, which cannot develop without exports. In order to stimulate and encourage the production of our soil, the subject of the re-establishment of our means of communication by land and water ought to be constantly in the minds of our governing circles. We have paid no heed to this truth during the eight years following the war, and as a result, if we except Russia, our country is the hindermost in Eastern Europe as far as transport is concerned. For this reason, in almost all railway stations quantities of grain remain for months waiting for trucks, to the immense prejudice of the producers and the merchants. The capital which is thus immobilized for so long a time, when interest rates are soaring fantastically, the warehouse dues, the loss in quantity and quality of the cereals through exposure and theft, are some of the factors which are contributing to the ruin of our agriculture and of our commerce in cereals. . . ."

651 241 To these complaints and remonstrances, however, the Government turned a deaf ear, and it even went farther and threatened to impose still heavier burdens on this harassed industry by an increase in the land tax. The injustice of this contemplated measure was exposed at length by Dr Ernest Ene in the *Argus*, who marshalled figures and facts to prove that, in comparison with other industries, agriculture had so far been treated as a Cinderella, although it had furnished

to the State a very notable portion of its revenues. According to the figures cited, the total value of the products of industry during 1924 was about 20,000,000,000 lei, while the taxes derived from industry amounted to 488,858,000 lei only. But even this yield was only apparent, for the preferential rates granted for the transport of local industrial products and other subsidies more than absorbed this sum. Agriculture, on the other hand, with an output amounting to 60,000 million lei, contributed revenue to the extent of 7,000 million lei to the State, of which more than 761 millions was in the form of the land tax. Another writer in the *Argus* of November 26th, 1926, is equally indignant at this threatened increase in the land tax, and finds that the 8,000 million lei which the peasantry contributed indirectly to the State revenue, mainly through the export taxes, is already a disproportionate burden. In fact by 1929 agriculture, including cattle rearing, was reckoned to contribute 122 milliard lei to the national revenue, which was calculated to amount to a total of 175 milliards. The remissness the Government displayed towards the agricultural population was bound to have yet further regrettable results, namely, the decrease in the quantity and quality of the yield of cereals. Devoid of means, the small farmers (whose average holdings amounted to less than 5 hectares and represented 60 per cent of the cultivated area and 90 per cent of the rural population) were unable to buy decent seed grain, so that the quality of the cereals grown deteriorated and the yield per hectare steadily decreased. This fact was persistently pointed out by intelligent agriculturalists in the Press. Commenting on the increasing deterioration of the maize crop, a writer in the *Argus* of November 10th, 1926, stated: "The average yield of maize per hectare for the last five years has sunk to 10 hectoliters, while in the United States it is 22.7 and individual farmers who apply more rational methods obtain more than 40 hectoliters. . . . It should be noted that both the climate and the soil of the U.S. are far inferior to ours. . . ." Yet another agricultural engineer, in a series of articles published in the *Argus* in November, 1926, asserted that if good seed corn were distributed to the peasantry there would be an immense increase in the yield

the price of the quantity of maize grown on it would fetch only 40 lei; nevertheless the peasant owner persisted in cultivating his patch of land because he felt ashamed to allow it to lie fallow, having always been accustomed to cultivate it, and buy the maize he needed instead, for which, however, he would probably have to pay a somewhat higher price than the 40 lei at which he could have sold his own (p. 111). So that, far from exerting an adverse influence on production, the breaking up of the large estates has, on the contrary, proved to be the salvation of the industry, for were it not for the abnegation and attachment of the individual smallholder to his farm, agriculture would have been completely ruined by the policy imposed by the Bratianus. Indeed, one cannot but admire this profound devotion of the peasant to the land and his dogged persistence in carrying on, despite the odds which confronted him and the utter lack of encouragement he met with from the State. We may take it for granted that the small farm of five hectares was more productive than the large estates, even from official statistics. This peculiarity was commented on in the *Cuvantul* of July 23rd, 1927, which at the same time decried the maladministration of the then Finance Minister, M. Vintila Bratianu, and his threat to increase the land tax. That paper contested the official statement that the land tax in Rumania amounted to one gold franc per hectare, as this affirmation would cast a slur on the country. In fact it was estimated that in 1924 the export taxes on cereals had yielded the equivalent of a tax of 8 gold francs per hectare.

The determined perseverance of the peasantry could not undo the harm caused by the erroneous agrarian policy pursued, and the situation could not but grow worse with time.

So that when finally the National Peasant Party assumed power at the end of 1928, the situation had become so hopeless that the Rumanian Government even contemplated organizing a mass emigration to France and her colonies in order to relieve the strain. Early in 1929 the Press, commenting on this unexpected decision of the Government to encourage emigration, admitted that the cause of the disastrous condition agriculture had reached in Rumania could

RUMANIA

241 311 The following table indicates the proportions of lands devoted to the various cultures and the distribution among the different provinces, according to official statistics for the year 1930:

Arable land in:	Area in hectares.	Percentage of total.
Old Kingdom	6,515,995	22.09
Bessarabia	2,915,941	9.88
Bucovina	311,616	1.06
Transylvania	3,113,500	10.55
Total of arable lands ...	12,857,112	43.58
Meadows and pastures ...	4,054,475	13.75
Orchards and Vineyards ...	613,614	2.08
Forests	7,134,200	24.18
Unproductive lands, roads, sites of buildings, rivers, mines, etc.	4,837,399	16.41
Total Area	29,496,700	100.00

From the above it will be seen that there is little scope for bringing more land under cultivation, and that an expansion in the output must be sought by improving the method of cultivation. Of course there is a vast expanse of marshes along the Danube which may be reclaimed—the total area of these is computed at two million hectares—and if they were turned to account they would considerably augment the arable area. It may be added that similar works of reclamation have been undertaken in Bulgaria and Greece and have been reported to be remunerative.

241 249 Besides cereals, industrial plants such as hemp, colza, sun-flower, tobacco, sugar-beet are grown, some 399,506 hectares being sown with them. The sugar-beet industry is sufficiently developed to provide for the total requirements of the country and to allow even for an export surplus. There are 14 sugar refineries, with invested capital of 3,300 million lei and occupying some 15,000 workmen. It was reported in the *Argus* of February 20th, 1932, which took up the defence of the industry and emphasized the necessity of granting it adequate protection (since it prevented some 700 million lei from being annually remitted abroad), that the State [651] obtained a revenue of 13.70 lei per kg., or 42 per cent of the official price at which sugar was sold; that agriculturalists obtained 20 per cent, merchants 5 per cent, manufacturing and packing accounted for the remaining 33 per cent. But when expenses were deducted the net profit available to the

RUMANIA

315
382

Production in millions of barrels

	1931	1930	1929
U.S.A.	856	898	1007
Russia	158	135	99
Venezuela	118	137	137
Rumania	48	42	35
Persia	47	45	42

315 According to a report published by the *Adeverul* of Janu-
382 ary 21st, 1932, of which a summary is given below, there
● 651 are no signs of an early improvement:

"The recent abrogation of the law extending certain subsidies to small producers has created much dissatisfaction, for this enactment, while rescinding the advantages already granted, maintained taxes recently imposed. Only a few of the producers who possessed refineries of their own had so far been able to secure the subsidies that the law had allocated to them, and that only indirectly, as they have been simply credited with these sums, which they will eventually be allowed to use against payment of taxes to the State. As the situation of the public finances is unsatisfactory, one can scarcely hope that these subsidies will be paid out shortly to the rest of the producers.

315 Another question which preoccupies the industry is the
382 marketing of the heavy oil residues, the output of which in 1930 amounted to 1,959,371 metric tons. Though this residue constitutes an excellent fuel, its manipulation is difficult and necessitates a large expenditure for the construction of special receptacles. Some companies, in order to get rid of their accumulated big stocks, had recourse to a new method, that of destroying them by fire. This is a disastrous solution for all concerned, and many members of the industrial community affirm that the problem could be solved if our railway administration would reduce its transport charges, so as to permit the marketing of this product abroad at the prevailing world prices. As the railway administration, however, refuses to make concessions in the matter, the oil companies see no other solution than to construct a new special pipe-line to Constantsa, though this scheme meets with violent opposition from railway circles. . . ."

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

661 preferential legislation, the right to exploit natural resources under State control, could all be and were secured by Rumanian and foreign trusts for comparatively small sums. The mismanagement and appropriation of public money by government officials, including the court, had ruinous consequences for the population which knew about these things, but was unable to do anything about it. [651] Indirect taxation, heavier and more ingenious than anywhere else in Europe, provided an inexhaustible source of income for those in power. The 'aviation-stamp', for example, which had to be affixed on every bill, theatre- and cinema-ticket, etc., was supposed to secure a strong Rumanian Air Force. In fact Rumania possessed hardly any aircraft at all as the funds were misappropriated throughout.

648 THE ROYAL DICTATORSHIP. The instability of Ru-
661 mania's economic and political life and her geographical position made the country extremely sensitive to any changes in Central Europe. Therefore the rise to power of the National Socialists in Germany, the risings of February and June 1934 in Austria and world reactions to these events had [668] immediate repercussions in Rumania. The Liberal Prime Minister Duca was assassinated in December 1933 by members of the Iron Guard. Tatarescu took over and decreed a state of siege, which has not been lifted since, ostensibly to repress and destroy the Iron Guard. In fact exactly the opposite course was adopted. The democratic forces which began to rally in order to fight Rumanian Fascism were persecuted by the government whilst the terrorists were allowed to continue their activities.

CHAPTER I

228 in private waters. Supplemented by some 4,000 tons of imported fish, this provided nearly 1 kg. (2·2 lb.) per head of population, but, in fact, almost all the fish was consumed by the 5 million persons living in towns. The principal fish caught were sturgeon, carp, pike, eels and crayfish, the main fishing centres being Brăila, Tulcea and Ismail.

6. Food Industries

256 The chief food and agricultural-processing industries are milling, sugar manufacture, oilseed crushing and tobacco curing. While the milling industry was dispersed widely about the country in more than 15,000 small mills employing altogether over 37,000 persons (at 1930 census), the sugar industry was for the most part concentrated in the plain of the Old Kingdom. Of the 17 sugar 257 factories employing 10,000 workers, only one was in the Transylvanian districts lost to Hungary and five in the areas temporarily lost to the U.S.S.R. 258 The vegetable-oil industry, located chiefly in Bessarabia, was only partly carried on in factories, of which there were (on January 1st, 1939) 117, employing 2,026 workers. Among these, 34 were fitted both to extract crude oil and to refine it, six were exclusively refineries, while the remainder produced only crude oil. The rest of the industry consisted of some 2,000 hand, or animal-driven presses mostly owned by individual peasants or by shopkeepers. These primitive presses extracted only a low percentage of oil from the seeds, and consequently the cake—mainly sold for export—had an unusually high oil content. As regards 277 tobacco, both curing and cigarette manufacture [656] were subject to government licence and control. There were 29 factories (in 1930) employing 9,720 workers, but tobacco cultivation subsequently declined, so also doubtless did the numbers employed.

7. Agricultural Organisation

452 The history of the organisation of Rumanian 241 farmers is one of not too successful co-operatives 474 becoming transformed more and more into agencies for the execution of Government Control Schemes. [654] For many years there had been throughout the country a network of agricultural credit societies, co-operative in form but in practice directed by the State. These played an important rôle during the period of the Land Reform in helping the peasants by advances to buy and equip their newly acquired holdings. There was even some co-operative cultivation for a time, until the new peasant-owners could muster sufficient draught animals and implements. Besides this, there have been strong local co-operative unions especially among the [162] minority nationalities—the Hungarians in Transylvania, the Swabian and Saxons in the Banat and the Russian and Polish Jews in the Bucovina.

243 The credit societies revived in importance when, 474 after 1933, the Rumanian Government began the organisation of grain marketing. They became 452 the local agents of a Central Marketing Board through which all sales of grain had to be made 654 both for home consumption and for export. Whereas formerly grain prices slumped immediately after the harvest, most peasants, being obliged to sell their grain quickly, under the new scheme prices were stabilised throughout the year, and this brought a great improvement to peasants' [651] receipts. But the scheme and the societies were also used to collect the peasants' taxes (paid in grain) which did not increase the popularity of co-operation.

[8a]

505 648 It is a cardinal principle of the Statute that the customs dues levied on goods must not be higher than the duties levied at frontier stations of the country concerned. The cost of improvements was to be met by navigation dues, these being assessed on the tonnage of ships, and not based on the goods transported. [451]

Bratislava was fixed as the Headquarters for the Commission for the first five years, and it was laid down that thereafter, for five-year periods, other Danube towns were to be selected in rotation.

Since the outbreak of this war, Germany has virtually controlled the Danube, has abolished the C.I.D., and set up the "Consulting Committee for Danube Affairs above Brăila."

C.E.D. (European Danube Commission)

This Commission was constituted under the Treaty of Paris in 1856 with Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey as members, for the express purpose of dredging the mouths of the Danube below Isaccea, and leaving the various channels free from all obstructions to navigation. It was apparently expected that this preliminary task would take two years, and the life of the Commission was originally fixed for that period; but, by a series of later treaties, it was kept in being up to the outbreak of the Great War. [503]

In 1918 the Central Powers set up their own Danube Commission, membership naturally being restricted to those Powers and their allies.

By the Treaty of Versailles the European Commission was reconstituted with Great Britain, France, Italy and Rumania as provisional members; and by the Convention of July 21st, 1921, was placed on a more permanent basis. The provisional membership of the four countries was confirmed and all the powers of the original Commission restored. A proviso added that any nation whose commercial interests in that part of the river warranted their being represented on the Commission could be admitted. In fact, no country was admitted under this proviso until the inclusion of Germany in August, 1938.

In August, 1938, an arrangement was signed at Sinaia relative to the exercise of the Powers of the C.E.D. In effect the Powers of the Commission were transferred to the Rumanian Government who were to set up a "Maritime Danube Board." This board, under Article 5, was "to be responsible for the preparation and execution of plans for works on the maritime Danube and at the mouths for levying dues and dispensing of the yield thereof."

In September, 1940, Germany summoned a conference at Vienna for the purpose of regulating Danube shipping anew, and eliminating Great Britain and France from membership of the Commission.

[113] [For further information see *La Commission Européenne du Danube et son Œuvre de* 1856 *à* 1931 (Paris 1931); Treaty of Versailles, Articles 331-339, 346-353; Treaty Series No. 38 (1939) Cmd. 6068, and Treaty Series 38 (1939), Cmd. 6069.]

E. TELECOMMUNICATIONS

I. Pre-War Situation

1. Telegraph and Telephones

206 The telegraph system of Rumania was controlled by the Ministry of Communications, the telephone by the Societatea Română de Telefoane, a subsidiary of the International Telephone and

[45b]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

457 conditioned by the fact that it was an agricultural country developing with the aid of foreign capital. A positive balance of trade was usually devoted to covering the invisible exports—interest on state borrowings and returns on foreign capital invested in the country. Under postwar circumstances, the fairly stable situation which had obtained before 1914 was thrown out of equilibrium as a consequence of war losses, the incurrence of war debts, and the decline in cereal exports. German investments, which had been of major importance before the war, were cut off and were not replaced by an equivalent influx from the West. Despite Rumania's generally favorable balance of trade, the balance of payments was negative.

458 Rumania's financial position was further weakened by the chronic
• 653 instability of the leu. Following the First World War the leu depreciated until 1927. It was legally stabilized in 1929 with the aid of an international loan of $100 million. This effort, however, was wrecked by the depression and the collapse of central European finance in 1931. In the 1930's Rumania, though at a somewhat later date than the other Balkan states, was forced to introduce exchange controls and suspend a considerable portion of the foreign debt payment. The gradual move toward increasing financial and commercial controls was largely a consequence of exchange difficulties. Despite the relatively favorable commercial position, Rumania was even less successful than the other Balkan states in achieving monetary stability, and the value of the leu continued to decline. By 1939 the Rumanian monetary situation was altogether chaotic, and the diversity of the rates of the leu made it impossible to ascertain the real value of the money.[20]

It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze the tortuous course of Rumanian financial and monetary policy, which was extremely complicated, subject to frequent change, and not successful in achieving its aims. In general, the financial field showed Rumanian administration at its worst. While the real difficulty was basically that of an immature economy attempting to catch up with a world economy —itself in serious crisis—the fact that Rumania, although in a somewhat better commercial position than the other Balkan states, was even less successful in its financial policy must be attributed largely to the political circumstances of the 1930's.

452 To some extent Rumania's financial vicissitudes by-passed the peasant in so far as he was leading a self-subsistent, nonmonetary life. He was principally affected in his requirements for credit. Although, as has been mentioned above, the Rumanian peasant was not in a

20. Madgearu, op. cit., p. 223.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

share, because of stricter tax collection, and were receiving less in the way of public benefits.

665
178

2. RECOVERY

In tackling the problem of economic recovery the Liberal Minister of Finance, Vintilă Brătianu, adopted a policy of stern but primitive retrenchment. A dogged and truculent nationalism was manifest in the futile effort to revalorize the leu, in the restrictive tariff schedules, and in the suspicious attitude toward the investment of foreign capital. While his policy did achieve some desirable financial housecleaning, it was a strait jacket on the Rumanian economy and signally failed in its major aims. The fault, perhaps, lay not so much with his ideas as such, which did show a sturdy desire that Rumania should stand on its own feet, as with the fact that his goals and technique were not in accord with the potentialities of the Rumanian economy and administration.

665
652

One of Vintilă Brătianu's paramount aims was a balanced budget, which he saw as the keystone to the country's economic well-being. Between 1919 and 1922 the budgets, even though they made no provision for servicing the national debts, showed deficits which were covered by new issues of paper currency. He set about to balance the budget by cutting expenses to the bone, by covering expenses solely from the normal resources of the state, and by giving the budget sufficient elasticity to meet the fluctuations of the currency. Beginning with the fiscal year 1922–23 the budget showed a constant surplus of revenues over expenditures. Later reports of the French technical adviser to the National Bank indicate, however, that the announced surpluses in this period were in fact either nonexistent or far smaller than would appear from the accounts.[40] He also succeeded in consolidating part of Rumania's considerable foreign indebtedness by means of a British loan and in arranging for regular meals of payment of a portion of the nation's debts.[41] These measures were necessary in clearing up the complete economic chaos of the war years; they did not, however, succeed in really strengthening the economy.

40. According to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Balkan States: I. Economic*, p. 48, somewhat the same thing occurred in all the Balkan states. After 1924 most of them showed a budgetary equilibrium that was, in fact, largely fictitious, partly because of doubtful accounting techniques, and the continued increase of expenditure even after the *de facto* stabilization of the currencies, indicating that the budget equilibrium was dependent upon continued rising prices.

41. V. V. Baduleseu, "La Dette publique roumaine," *L'Economiste roumain*, 2, No. 4 (April, 1926), 111–114.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 652 Vintilă Brătianu was particularly unsuccessful in his efforts to revalorize the leu, which had been one of the chief reasons for his budget policy. The currency had been badly hit by the war, by the unbalanced budgets which had led to state borrowing from the National Bank, and by the unfavorable balance of payments. In 1923, however, with the balanced budget and the funding of some of the foreign debts, the currency ceased to depreciate, although it remained very unsteady. His severe deflationist policy, which was to restore the leu to its prewar gold level in the course of ten or fifteen years, had a depressing effect upon production; the restriction of currency led to a stringency in credit and a great rise in the interest rate. The leu did not recover but wobbled in such a manner as to create an atmosphere of chronic uncertainty in trade and industry. As the years passed there was increasing clamor for a stable currency. Vintilă Brătianu was reluctant to seek the aid of foreign powers or the League of Nations in stabilizing the currency, largely, it appears, because of a fear of external interference and supervision over internal financial policy.[42] In 1927, however, the original plan of revalorization was abandoned, and the last hectic year of the Liberal regime was spent in attempting to secure a foreign loan to stabilize the currency. But by that time the internal political situation had placed Vintilă Brătianu in the center of a vicious circle: the political crisis impeded his foreign negotiations and his delay in obtaining the loan undermined his position in the country.

The same exaggerated and self-defeating rigidity is to be seen in the field of foreign commerce. Immediately after the war, when production was low and demand great, export trade was put under severe controls and restrictions, though imports were unrestricted. The resulting great excess of imports over exports was checked in 1921 by rising tariffs. After the Liberals came to power the import tariff became increasingly an instrument of industrial protection. Tariffs were raised in 1924 and again in 1926 and 1927. By the end of the Liberal regime, Rumania had one of the highest tariff systems in Europe. This policy was in accord with the whole tenor of Liberal thinking with its emphasis upon the protection of industry.

More surprising, however, was the policy on exports. After 1922 the initial system of export prohibitions and quotas was dropped but was replaced by high export duties. There were several reasons for these export restrictions and duties. They were designed in a period of shortage to keep down the internal cost of living as an anti-inflationary move. They facilitated the process of directing the trade of

42. *L'Economiste roumain*, 3, No. 9 (June 15, 1927), 164.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

the new territories away from Austria, Hungary, and Russia and 665
into the domestic market. Most important, perhaps, they came to be 652
an important source of fiscal revenue. Since they were payable in gold or foreign currency, they supplied the government with funds for foreign debt payments.[43] Between 1923 and 1926 they yielded a greater revenue than the import duties; the government was naturally reluctant to part with them. They had, however, an altogether depressing effect upon Rumanian commerce and upon agriculture. Since exports were really the sole means by which Rumania could improve its adverse balance of payments, these duties, in their effect of reducing exports, appear to have very little justification.

Export duties were dropped in 1927, and Vintilă Brătianu announced, "The progressive reduction of these taxes until their final suppression forms, as you know, part of our governmental program." At this time he took the position that Rumania was at last ready to move on to a new stage of activity. "If up to the present I have been obliged to perform the work of a doctor in healing the wounds of the past, I hope to be able to resume in the future my profession as engineer—which is to create." [44] Whether or not one accepts his assertion that the Liberals had planned these changes all along, it must be admitted that the Liberals were remarkably adept at reversing themselves and then assuming credit for farsightedness.

To summarize, the Liberals' policy for recovery was only in part successful. Despite an almost puritanical view toward the economy and the desire to improve "through ourselves," their program had a way of destroying on the one hand what it attempted to create with the other. The Brătianus' injunction that Rumania get a firm grip on itself seemed likely to lead to self-strangulation.

3. INDUSTRIALIZATION AND EXPLOITATION OF RESOURCES

665
432

The Liberals not only tried to bring about economic recovery, they were also intent upon exploiting the natural resources of the country and creating a national industry, primarily by state encouragement. In 1927 Vintilă Brătianu defined the principal factors in the development of the nation's riches as "the state, professional chambers, official bodies, and private action, individually or in association." [45] A law for the encouragement of national industry, already passed in 1912, was extended to the whole of Rumania in 1921. Industries

43. Pasvolsky, *Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States*, p. 452.
44. Vintilă Brătianu, exposé de motifs for the 1928 budget, *L'Economiste roumain*, 5, No. 10 (December 1, 1927), 398.
45. *L'Economiste roumain*, 3, No. 4 (April 1, 1927), 83.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

of impurities. An improvement was undoubtedly desirable. Yet the 665 low quality of exported grain was but a symptom of the generally bad 656 condition of agriculture. Attacking the problem at the level of exports 141 was indicative of the Liberals' attitude. The opposition sharply criticized the law as missing the point: "We are not suffering from a commercial crisis," said Mihalache, "but from a crisis of production. The problem of production must be solved first." [88]

In July, 1928, shortly before the Liberals fell they passed a co- [652] operative code which had little effect except to reorganize previous cooperative organizations and to increase the direct control of the state. On the whole, as has been mentioned, the cooperative movement was and remained weak and ineffectual. In 1923–24 the National Bank granted 600 millions of lei credit to the whole of the cooperative movement, whereas private bankers received 7,500 millions.

A "battle for production" was inaugurated in 1928 by the Minister of Agriculture, Argetoianu, and in March an agricultural congress voted a resolution which is striking in its complete emphasis upon technical improvements: better seeds, more rational crop rotation, more fertilizers, the expansion of experimental stations. The resolution opposed a further extension of the area under wheat and recommended an effort to raise the output per hectare. In no case, however, did it penetrate to the level of agrarian reforms, as defined in the preceding chapter, but was wholly occupied with desiderata, which were simple enough to call for but very difficult to achieve.

These final efforts of 1928 were, however, of little import, as they were in large part a belated effort to meet the challenge of the opposition which was on the point of coming to power.

It is not easy to judge the successes and failures of the Liberals' economic policy. It seemed easier immediately after their defeat to see their errors and particularly their shortcomings in the agrarian question. But with the failure of subsequent administrations to improve agriculture or to provide a stable economy the nature of the Liberal failure becomes less obvious. Moreover, many of the economic practices of the Brătianus, regarded as heretical at the time, have become generalized not only in the Balkans but throughout Europe; state-supported industrialization has become a commonplace and has received a substantial body of theoretical justification. Yet with all these added qualifications, it may be concluded that the Liberal policy failed.

88. Quoted in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 482.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 foreign capital is to be sought to repair the national economy. Thirdly, if not as an afterthought at least not underlined, agriculture is to be assisted. Considering the battle against Liberal arbitrariness and the general clamor for a stable currency and foreign capital, such an order of emphasis is not surprising, but it does indicate that direct interest in the welfare of the peasantry was qualified by other, though not necessarily unrelated, considerations.

In the general elections of December 12 the National Peasants, allied with the German party and the Social Democrats, won an overwhelming victory in what is conceded to have been a free and fair election. They gained about 80 per cent of the votes and 348 seats in the chamber (333 seats to the National Peasants, 7 to the German party, and 8 to the Social Democrats). The Liberals obtained only 13 seats; the Averescu-Iorga coalition 5; the Magyars 16; Dr. Lupu's dissident peasants 5; the Peasant Labor party (a Communist organization) and Cuza's anti-Semitic Christian League failed to gain the necessary 2 per cent of the votes. Despite their criticism of the 1926 electoral law, the National Peasants did not repeal it when they came into office and, like the other parties, took advantage of the government premium.

665 The first major step was the stabilization of the leu. Vintilă Brătianu's foreign negotiations were resumed, and an agreement was 652 reached in Paris on February 3, 1929.[2] A $72,000,000 loan for stabilization and railway construction was floated in Washington, London, and Paris; a further $30,000,000 was secured against a concession of the Rumanian match monopoly to a Swedish group. The security of the loan was based on the revenues of the Institute of State Monopolies, created for the purpose. Orders for railway equipment were to be made in the countries floating the loan. The French economist, Charles Rist, who had informed Maniu in December that the loan was dependent upon a reorganization of the treasury, went to Bucarest to supervise the loan and the operation of Rumanian finances. All these conditions were, of course, precisely what Vintilă Brătianu had hoped to avoid through his unsuccessful policy of revalorization. On February 8 the Rumanian assembly passed a law fixing the leu at 10 milligrams gold, 167.18 lei to the dollar.[3]

The government worked hard to attract foreign capital and to set

2. Largely for reasons of prestige, Brătianu, unlike the governments of the other Balkan states, had not gone to the League of Nations for the stabilization loan but had sought it through independent negotiations. Maniu felt obliged to continue this course, although it was reported that he could have obtained better terms through the League.

3. For a detailed account of the monetary reform, see Alexandre-Ionesco Ivanof, *La Réforme monétaire roumaine* (Paris, 1929).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

internal finances in order. In March the 1924 mining law was revised to give more favorable treatment to foreign concessions. State expenditures were reduced through the elimination or consolidation of several ministries.[4]

For all their energetic beginning, before the National Peasants had been in power a year, the first flush of enthusiasm was beginning to fade. The badly defeated opposition undertook to rally its forces and started a press campaign of villification and sensational rumors. After the passage in July of the administrative reform bill, which attempted to reduce excessive centralization and place greater authority in the hands of local administrations, both the Liberals and General Averescu's party withdrew from the assembly. In the same month was uncovered an absurd fascist plot among army officers to overthrow the government. To defend the regime against these fascist currents, some of the party's younger followers set up their own paramilitary bodies.

At the same time that the Right was increasing its activities, the government came into conflict with the Left. Bessarabia was still a trouble zone; there were frequent reports of Soviet espionage teams crossing the Dniester. In February, 1929, A. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, son of the old Social Democratic leader and himself a former leader of the Rumanian Communists, was arrested and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment for secretly returning to Rumania from the U.S.S.R. In August a strike broke out among 3,800 coal miners in the Jiu Valley. Troops were called and when the strikers attempted to take over the electric plant of the Lupeni mines the troops fired, killing over a score of miners. The massacre in the Jiu Valley has often been cited as an example of the perfidy of the National Peasants, but it should be said that when the government investigated the event, it not only blamed the miners for having violated the law but also censored the mining companies for permitting the conditions which had led to the strike. It dismissed all the police and military officials connected with the affair.

A couple of months later an attempt was made on Vaida Voevod's life. In the investigation which followed, one suspect, who was later proved to have been innocent, was horribly beaten and crippled by the police. Again there was a public scandal and the government

4. The bewildering changes in the names and numbers of Rumanian ministries seem to be largely a result of the need to provide portfolios for persons or groups who have supported the administration. The Ministry of Fine Arts has been the favorite post to be granted as a political reward.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241 cial organization. But the agrarian policy had other defects. In the
665 first place, the National Peasants fell into the old Rumanian fallacy
656 of counting too greatly upon an act of legislation to cure any problem.[56] Much more serious however was the fact that while the National Peasants had an agrarian policy it was scarcely a peasant policy. The measures actually taken were not of the kind that could greatly help the poor peasant. The modifications of the party programs between 1921 and 1926 foreshadowed this attitude, but even so the more far-reaching parts of the 1926 program were not carried out.

665 Measures intended to benefit agriculture were not, however, limited
241 to agricultural legislation. The new tariff policy inaugurated by the
● 652 National Peasants on August 1, 1929, was specifically designed to assist the farmer. The National Peasants had consistently attacked the Liberals' (and the People's party's) tariff policy, which was highly protectionist, raised the cost of agricultural equipment, and was "in its technical structure a feeble instrument of negotiation for securing markets for our export products."[57] The new tariff was, as Madgearu announced, based on the recommendations of the Geneva Conference of 1927. It created a more elastic customs system to permit commercial conventions with other states. Duties on goods were divided into two groups: 1) irreducible minimum duties for goods produced within the country and requiring protection; these could not be reduced through convention; 2) duties on all other articles, which could be reduced through mutual arrangement with other states. Even before signing any customs conventions the government reduced the duties on agricultural equipment.

In thus lowering the cost of imported agricultural equipment as well as in reducing tariffs on articles of mass consumption, the 1929 tariff undoubtedly benefited the peasant. As to the protection of industry, "it was in general calculated so as not to exceed the difference by which the conditions of local production were more difficult than conditions of foreign production, and only for branches of industry which had the possibility of sound development in the country."[58] The tariffs did not renounce industrial protection but tried

56. Note, for example, Madgearu's remark, "Up to 1920 agricultural instruction in Rumania was based on no uniform principle, nor was it adapted to the situation, since its organization was not based on legislation which could solve the problem as a whole." *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 13. Clearly the real reasons for Rumania's lack of adequate agricultural education were not to be found in the absence of a uniform legal code.

57. Madgearu, *Op. cit.*, p. 89.

58. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești*, p. 231.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

to protect only those industries showing "natural" promise of development and to promote the necessary rationalization of these industries which had been permitted to become inefficient behind the Liberal tariff.

Throughout Madgearu's exposition of the 1929 tariff there is an evident desire to increase international cooperation and trade, and an altogether friendly attitude toward the great capitalist powers—an attitude quite different from Vintilă Brătianu's cautious and rather grudging admission of the need for increased trade and foreign capital. This attitude is most clearly shown in the laws of 1929 modifying the Liberal acts of 1924 on mines and the commercialization of state-owned enterprises.[59] The National Peasants criticized the 1924 laws as chauvinistic and failing to promote the exploitation of natural resources. "The aggressive nationalist policy exemplified in the Mining Act of 1924, which did so much harm to the country, bringing it into a state of financial and economic disorganization, could not continue without grave consequences for our economic future. A policy of sincere co-operation with international capital is the only means of improving the situation."[60] The new laws threw open the doors to foreign capital. With the exception of requiring that 75 per cent of the personnel (both administrative and subordinate) be Rumanians, no restrictions were placed on the percentage of foreign capital in the companies or upon the nationality of directors and chief officials.

These laws were in marked contrast not only to the attitude of the Liberals but also to the policy recommended by Constantin Stere in 1921.[61] Stere, with his hostility to "vagabond capital" and the menace of imperialist great powers, opposed foreign capital investments in the Rumanian petroleum industry, since all profits passed beyond the frontiers. Nor was foreign capital concerned with satisfying the needs of the population but only with raking in a profit. He was, however, aware that without foreign capital the resources simply could not be developed. He disapproved of the Liberals' policy of "nationalizing" petroleum and creating concessions with a majority of Rumanian capital. Having no confidence in the Liberal plutocracy's willingness or ability to defend the nation's interests, Stere advocated state operation of the petroleum industry. Foreign capital

59. A detailed comparison of Liberal and National Peasant policy on this question, from a pro-Liberal position, is given by Alexandre G. Georgescu, *Le Régime juridique et financière des capitaux étrangers en Roumanie* (Paris, 1932).

60. Madgearu, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 30.

61. C. Stere, *Naționalizarea Industriei de Petrol: Cuvântare rostită în ședința Adunării deputaților din 28 Martie 1921* (Bucarest, 1921).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

652 should be obtained not through investments but through loans under-
665 taken by the state. In this way Rumania would have full control over the allocation of capital and would not, except for the interest on loans, see the profits from the oil industry go abroad. The petroleum policy of the National Peasants, as formulated in 1929, was even more removed from Stere's recommendations than from the Liberals' policy. It was, however, perfectly consistent with their economic outlook during their term in office.

665 Rumanian transportation and communications had been in no-
652 toriously bad condition since the First World War, and the Liberals'
496 policy of retrenchment had been particularly damaging to the rail-
464 way system. The 1929 stabilization loan allocated $34,000,000 for
471 railway expansion and $9,000,000 to pay off overdue railway debts.
491 By a law passed in July, 1929, the National Peasants transferred the state railways to an autonomous public body, "to be administered
206 according to commercial principles."[62] They also undertook to repair and extend the highway network, and abolished the primitive *corvée* which was still being used for road maintenance. In 1930 the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation received a concession for the construction of the Rumanian telephone network.

665 The stabilization loan required a reform of the National Bank and of the state accounting system. In March, 1929, the government passed a series of new statutes for the bank; the principal changes were the abolition of the ceiling on the issue of currency, established by the Liberals' in 1925, and the limitation of the influence of the state in the appointment of directors. The bank was given somewhat greater independence from state control and powers to maintain the newly achieved stability of the currency. In July, 1929, the government passed a law reforming the state accounting system and the organization of the budget. There was no doubt that Rumanian state finances needed reform and modernization. The accounting system had been that of France of 1860, plus the accretion of a number of purely Rumanian practices, with the result that the actual condition of government finances at any given time was never known with any exactness. The new law, in reorganizing the preparation of the budget, exerted more stringent control over the expenditures of various ministries. While this law was well intended, its actual results in rationalizing Rumanian finance methods seem to have been very

62. Madgearu, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 50. The organization of Rumanian railways after 1918 had been altogether hectic. In 1925 the Liberals had given some autonomy to the railways; this policy was reversed by the People's party in February, 1927, and reestablished by the Liberals in August of that year.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

439 656 and 1931, Rumania was somewhat less pressed financially than the other states, and was indeed the last of the Balkan countries to introduce foreign exchange controls and to declare a partial moratorium on foreign debts.[11]

652 Nevertheless, Rumania was the slowest to show signs of recovery, an indication that something in addition to the general causes for the depression was having an effect. Such was the opinion of the French foreign advisers to the Rumanian National Bank, MM. Rist and Auboin. According to Auboin, in his report of 1935, a distinction should be drawn between the causes of disequilibrium arising from the world crisis and those proper to Rumania itself. In his opinion the first were predominant between 1929 and 1932 in the fall in prices and the disruption of international credit. But local causes became manifest, especially after 1932, despite a certain easing of international conditions. The two principal evils, in his view, were the weaknesses in the whole Rumanian credit system and the unstable budget position, both of which had afflicted Rumania since the First World War. As a financial adviser he was particularly indignant that the Rumanian government should try to enjoy all the benefits and amenities of a modern state through its expenditures but should still rely upon primitive means of organizing state finances: "It is necessary to adopt and apply not merely the methods of expenditure but also the methods of receipt of modern states."[12]

The fall in prices and the reduction of credit presented the Rumanian peasant with a serious debt load which he was in no position to discharge. The advocates of small peasant agriculture have contended that one of the principal advantages of this form of cultivation was the peasant's resistance to crises through his ability to cut expenses, reduce his relations to the market, and live on his own. It is true that debts contracted for agricultural investment were quite small in Rumania as compared with other European states.[13] Never-

11. Rumania introduced exchange controls on February 27, 1932; Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Austria, Bulgaria, and Greece had introduced them between August and October, 1931. Rumania declared a partial moratorium in January, 1933; Greece, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia had done so in 1932.

12. Roger Auboin, *Rapport annuel sur la situation financière et monétaire de la Roumanie* (Bucarest, 1935), p. 36. Auboin was primarily concerned with Rumania's ability to honor its foreign obligations, and hence stressed the need of tightening state finances and creating a sound budget, perhaps at the expense of local requirements. Nevertheless, his, and Rist's, reports are devastating in their picture of the irresponsibility of Rumanian financial administration, its slovenliness, and tendency to make increasingly complex and meaningless regulations.

13. Comparative figures in the International Institute of Agriculture's *Farm Accountancy Statistics for 1928–29* (Rome, 1932), show very little investment and very little debt for Rumanian farms as contrasted with those of other European states. These

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

theless the peasant did have a burden arising from purchases of land after the agrarian reform or from debts incurred for consumption, and it is necessary to emphasize that the size of the greater number of peasant holdings put their owners on the margin of subsistence. These debts had been contracted during years of rising prices and at a high rate of interest. When the depression came the debts, in many cases not used for productive purposes but merely to keep the peasant going, quite exceeded his capacity to pay. Thus, in 1931, the average indebtedness per hectare, in an investigation of 60,000 farms, was computed at 3,218 lei. Since for an indebtedness of 3,500 lei per hectare the interest averaged 700 lei per hectare, and the average gross income was 2,000 lei per hectare, 35 per cent of the gross income was absorbed by interest on debts.[14]

The figures for 1932 were even bleaker. In that year the number of debtors owning less than 10 hectares who applied for debt relief was 2,474,781 or 64 per cent of all small proprietors.[15] The total land owned by those peasants amounted to 5,696,000 hectares, or 60 per cent of the total of small properties. The total debt was 37.4 billion lei, 15,000 lei per debtor, or 6,585 lei per hectare. It may be concluded that the smaller peasants were the more involved in debt since by these figures the average size of properties under 10 hectares was 2.5 hectares, whereas the average size of the debtors' properties was 2.3 hectares. Of this debt 24.21 per cent was owed to popular banks and cooperatives, 43.58 per cent to private banks, 31.42 to private individuals, and 0.79 to other institutions. A League of Nations inquiry into agricultural credit in central and eastern Europe, made at about this time, found that in Rumania banks of agricultural credit charged 9–13 per cent; private banks 12–15 per cent plus a quarterly commission of 1–3 per cent; and private lenders from 12 to 22 per cent and even up to 30 per cent.[16]

---

figures mean nothing statistically, however, as they cover only 63 Rumanian farms having an average area of 30 hectares; 30 of them are forest-farming combinations with an average area of 50 hectares. This point is worth mentioning only because Frederick Hertz, in his study, *The Economic Problems of the Danubian States* (London, 1947), p. 111, takes these figures as representative and expresses his surprise that in the depression the Rumanian peasant should have been regarded as debt-ridden.

14. Nicolae Cornăţeanu, "Effects of the Agricultural Crisis on Peasant Farms in Rumania," *International Review of Agriculture*, 22, No. 7 (Rome, 1931), 211E. In 1928 the gross income had been 6,000–7,000 lei, which would make the interest charge only 10–11 per cent.

15. G. Costanzo, "Credit Conditions and the Indebtedness of Agriculture in Central and Eastern Europe," *International Review of Agriculture*, 24 (1933), 288E; Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

16. International Labor Organization, *Industrial and Labor Information*, 41, No. 1 (January 4, 1933), 22.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

652 In addition to the debts of small farmers, 15 billion lei were owed by debtors owning over 10 hectares (who had applied for debt relief in 1932), making a total of 52.4 billion lei of agricultural debts.[17] Some 17,000 middle and large proprietors contrived to run up a debt 40 per cent as large as that of 2½ million peasants. The size of the debt apparently increased with the size of the property: 524 debtors (those owing 5,000,000 lei or more), with average properties of 200 hectares, owed over 40 per cent of the total debt of proprietors of over 10 hectares. Moreover, the average size of property of debtors owning more than 10 hectares was 53 hectares, whereas the average size of all properties over 10 hectares (according to Ministry of Finance figures which appear to be those used) was only 30 hectares.

It would thus seem that the weight of the debt load fell upon the extremely small and the large properties, whereas the middle peasantry was less affected. That is, the peasant owning about 10 hectares was in a relatively good position to weather the crisis, a fact of only limited relevance, however, to Rumania. The figures also show that Rumania's agricultural debt was of two essentially different types: debts of the small peasants who were unable to create or maintain a self-subsistent holding in the ten years after the agrarian reforms, and the debts of the larger properties, which were probably suffering directly from the fall in world grain prices which hit them as exporters.

As the finances of the state were badly weakened by the depression, its power of direct assistance to agriculture was limited. Since the peasants' plight was a result of their debts and low prices, the obvious tasks of the government in Rumania and elsewhere in the Balkans were to support the price of grain, to try to obtain more favorable export conditions, and to provide for a conversion or moratorium of agricultural debts. These remedies did not represent any particular program but were rather specific measures passed under an increasingly severe situation with growing indications of peasant unrest.

By the time of Maniu's resignation in October, 1930, the agricultural crisis had become acute and there was growing agitation for a reduction of debts. Three prominent economists, Madgearu, Manoilescu, and Argetoianu, each published a plan for a readjustment of agricultural indebtedness; in each plan the state was to assume responsibility for part of the burden. Nothing was done at this time,

17. Constanso, *op. cit.*, p. 288E, taken from the Rumanian Ministry of Justice, *Conversiunea datorilor agricole* (Bucarest, 1932).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

partly because the plans required large sums of liquid capital, which was not on hand. 652

The Mironescu National Peasant government attempted to improve the situation from the credit side. It undertook negotiations in Paris for an agricultural loan to provide for the establishment of an agricultural mortgage bank, a long-cherished aim of the National Peasants who hoped to facilitate thereby the transfer of agricultural debts into long-term obligations less onerous as to time of payment and rate of interest. Eventually agreement was reached on a second development loan, modeled after that of 1929, of 1.3 billion francs, of which 200 million was to go to the creation of the Agricultural Mortgage Institute and the remainder for railway, roads, and Treasury working capital. The loan met with much local criticism; there was general resentment at the continuation of foreign financial supervision which it entailed; the director of the National Bank fought the loan so stubbornly that the government was obliged to dismiss him; Titulescu and Argetoianu opposed the whole idea of borrowing foreign capital for a land bank at a time when such an institute could be only a palliative for the agricultural crisis. Indeed, the *Credit Agricol Ipoteca* was formed on the eve of the credit crisis which hit Europe in 1931.

In a final flurry of legislation, just before its fall, the Mironescu government passed two other measures designed to improve agricultural credit: a law to keep down the interest rate of agricultural credit institutions and a law against usury, prohibiting exaggerated rates of interest by private lenders. These laws, which were in the spirit of the National Peasant program, were altogether inadequate. The credit problem in Rumania was not to be solved by attempting to prohibit what was a secondary symptom. Like much Rumanian legislation, they were an effort to improve the weather by adjusting the dial on the barometer. Furthermore, they did not touch the question of the existing agricultural debt load which was becoming unsupportable. [65L]

In December, 1931, the chamber, with all major parties concurring, voted a moratorium for agricultural debts. From 1932 to 1934 appeared a series of laws for the relief of agricultural indebtedness. These laws, passed by successive governments in turn, were in part political measures and in part concessions progressively extorted by the deepening depression. As at the time of the land reforms of 1917–21, political competition plus popular pressure forced the parties toward more and more extensive measures. No party dared

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

652 come out against debt relief when the more radical groups, including the irrepressible Dr. Lupu, were demanding a complete moratorium or a cancellation of debts. But if the necessity of relief was admitted, the methods were by no means agreed upon. Banks opposed debt cancellation as ruinous to future credit and as throwing a heavy burden on them. The state proposed relieving the banks of their losses, but this in turn evoked protests from foreign creditors who maintained that increasing the state's indebtedness contravened the loan agreements. The simple fact, of course, was that there was no solution that would hurt no one; against the damage to the credit structure had to be set the obvious inability of the peasant to pay his debts and the certain social dangers of undertaking foreclosures.

671 In April, 1932, the Iorga government passed a law by which debts of all properties under 10 hectares were reduced by half, the remainder to be paid over a period of thirty years at 4 per cent interest. Debts of properties over 10 hectares were to be diminished by the reduction of accumulated interest or by special legal procedure, if 60 per cent of the borrowed capital had been used for agricultural purposes. Although in 1930 Iorga had stated his opposition to assuming charge of the debts of the larger landowners,[18] the law framed by his government was immediately abused by the big owners, who employed it to slough off debts acquired, as it was said, on the green cloth rather than on the green fields.[19] The law also had the effect of increasing the demands of urban and other nonagricultural debtors.

652 In October, 1932, the Vaida Voevod government suspended this conversion law and introduced a system of moratoria. To prevent
671 misuse the debtor had to prove that agriculture provided 60 per cent of his total income, that the money borrowed had been for agricultural purposes, and that the debt did not exceed 20,000 lei per hectare of arable land.

This measure, which was largely a delaying action, was supplemented by the law of April, 1933, which abrogated the act of 1932 and granted a five-year moratorium with a 1 per cent interest charge. If the creditor offered a 50 per cent reduction of the debt the moratorium ceased to apply. In this case the remaining 50 per cent was to be paid off in half-yearly installments. Holdings between 10 and

18. *Adevarul*, September 9, 1930, cited in G. C. Logio, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

19. According to Logio, *ibid.*, pp. 170–171, the larger landowners were the most insistent that agricultural debts should be converted and were intended to be the principal beneficiaries. In his opinion the controls exerted over the peasants who took advantage of the law—the prohibition of mortgages and the direction of cultivation—would further undermine their position.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

50 hectares were also granted a five-year moratorium, with the possibility of the creditor offering a 33 per cent reduction in the debt. Holdings of over 50 hectares were granted a six-month moratorium and a possible reduction of 25 per cent of the debt. The debtor, if he wished, was permitted to abandon his holding, retaining one-fifth of it for himself, the remainder to go to meet his debts. The law was an improvement over its predecessor in scaling the provisions in accordance with the size of the holding.

A year later, in April, 1934, the Liberal government passed a new law whereby all agricultural debts without respect to size of property were reduced by 50 per cent, the residue to be paid in 34 half-yearly installments at 3 per cent interest. For payments in advance debtors were to receive a 6 per cent annual reduction on their debts. Debts paid off within two years were to benefit from a 70 per cent reduction of the total, those paid off in five years gained a 60 per cent reduction. While the creditor had a theoretical right to refuse conversion he was obliged to make a formal declaration of the fact and to accept a ten-year moratorium which could be prolonged for an additional five years. This law was more sweeping than its predecessors, especially in its pressure on the creditor, and it did provide the peasant with an incentive for a quick liquidation of his debt.

These laws, for all the political bickering which accompanied them, were a necessary consequence of the crisis and progressively extended the scope of conversion. They were negative measures, however; while they eased the peasants' debt load they in no way improved his basic situation or remedied the condition which had led to his plunging so hopelessly into debt.[20]

Besides reducing peasant debts, the governments of the depression years tried to maintain the price of grain and to secure favorable export markets. As with the other acts of those years, their efforts were hesitant and often inconsistent. During its period in office the Mironescu government had accelerated the National Peasant party's policy of removing the remaining export duties on agricultural products, and in April, 1931, it passed a law for the valorization of

20. Madgearu, while admitting that the Liberal law of 1934 had meant a benefit for all farmers, maintained that the peasant debtor was still in a sufficiently difficult position which excluded him from obtaining the credit necessary to rationalize his cultivation. According to his estimate, peasant credit available after the conversion was only one-seventh of what it had been before. He also pointed out that the peasants as shareholders in the cooperative banks lost 2¾ billion lei through the conversion. *Op. cit.*, p. 84. This, however, would not hit the poorer peasant who never had the funds to invest in the first place.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

652 671 farm products, aimed principally at maintaining the prices in the home market by the reduction of various charges and taxes. The Iorga government, however, at once superseded this measure by inaugurating in July, 1931, an export bounty of 10,000 lei for 10,000 kilograms of wheat and 16,000 lei for flour, the cost to be met by a bread tax. The government, however, discovered that it lacked the funds to carry out this measure and discontinued it in 1932. Moreover, it turned out to be largely for the benefit of the export houses rather than the producers and merely tempted Rumanian exporters to engage in wheat dumping. On the other hand the tax on bread, which was to pay the bount[illegible] was borne largely by the peasant consumer.[21] In 1933 and 1934 a different method was tried; the last Vaida Voevod cabinet set up a State Cereal Commission by which the government appeared on the market as a consumer to support wheat prices.

Like debt conversion, the price-supporting measures, which were taken up by the various governments in turn, were not the result of any over-all plan but were simply steps to counteract the depression. In fact, in their effect they ran against all plans for agrarian improvement. The parties, in their programs and writings, had all agreed that the future of Rumanian agriculture lay in intensive farming and in persuading the peasant to abandon extensive cereal cultivation for which his small holding was obviously ill-suited. The bounties on wheat had precisely the opposite effect and led to an even greater emphasis upon cereal production. Between 1930 and 1935 the area under wheat showed a definite, if highly irregular, tendency to rise.

439 648 The governments also undertook to obtain more favorable foreign markets. The first effort, under the National Peasants, was by means of collaboration with the other eastern European states in an agrarian bloc. Through the series of conferences in 1930 the agrarian states attempted to create a program of common action to gain preferential treatment from the industrial states for their agricultural products. Although the agrarian bloc pleaded its case at various meetings of the League and at international conferences between 1930 and 1932, it failed to open markets for agriculture. Its requests were opposed by the maritime states and overseas grain producers as contrary to free trade and the most-favored-nation principle. Madgearu, one of the most eloquent spokesmen for the bloc, declared that the agrarian states did not demand permanent preferential treat-

21. Manoilov, *La Reconstruction économique et financière de la Roumanie et les partis politiques*, p. 284.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

656 To the protective tariffs, which were greatly increased in the 1930's,
457 was added the system of import quotas and restrictions, plus a 12 per cent tax for all imports. Together these provided a high protective wall for the development of the national industry. Their effectiveness is shown by the fact that between 1933 and 1938 the percentage of imports of manufactured and semimanufactured goods dropped markedly, whereas that of machines and raw materials rose sharply.[31]

Protection alone, however, was not the only device employed to aid the expansion of industry; other forms of assistance included exemptions from taxation, state subsidies, special transport rates, the obligatory use of certain locally produced goods, and monopolies granted to industries considered nationally desirable.

652 Since the inflow of new foreign capital stopped during the depression, the supply of capital for industry had to come largely from internal sources. In part this was achieved through the tariffs, which diverted purchases toward local industry, and by the increasing state expenditures for armaments, which amounted to a tax on the public. In 1934 a 12 per cent tax on the construction of new buildings was imposed in an effort to divert investment toward industry and away from nonproductive expenditures. To a considerable extent the foreign funds frozen in Rumania at the time of the depression were subsequently employed in industrialization.[32]

The political implications of this economic policy—which was by no means a plan but rather the result of the depression and the deepening international tensions plus the steady pressure of interested industrial groups—were very similar to those observed above in the

---

rency stability or a price equilibrium, despite the relatively favorable balance of trade and rich resources, may be laid to bad management and political reasons, to which one could add that in many cases the measures taken were employed for purposes quite different from those for which they were presumably intended.

31. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 252. Madgearu took a selected group of key imports and calculated their volume by percentage as follows:

	In per cent of total imports	
	1930	*1938*
Raw materials	5.86	12.82
Semifabricated	23.01	7.56
Machines	1.27	4.00
Manufactured goods	12.02	8.34

32. Oscar Jaszi, "The Economic Crisis in the Danubian States," *Social Research* (February, 1935), pp. 98–116, attributed a major role to captive capital in the creation of Rumanian industry. According to Madgearu (*op. cit.*, p. 353), foreign credit continued to serve those industries created by international capital, but in his opinion the most important source of industrial credit was the National Bank.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

case of Manoilescu.[33] The trend toward heavy industry was a forced 652 development, carried on by monopolies subsidized and protected by the state—probably the only way in which such industries could have been created in short order. It did not reflect a growing individual domestic demand, as the state was the principal consumer for the new products. The increased industrial production was largely balanced by continued low imports. Thus, over the eleven years from 1927 to 1938, industrial production rose from 59 to 69 billion lei, but total industrial consumption fell from 93 to 88 billion because of a fall in imports from 34 to 19 billion lei.[34]

On the short run at least, and relatively if not absolutely, this forced development was at the expense of agriculture. Funds which might have gone into agriculture went into industry; the peasant as a consumer was obliged to pay high prices for industrial products. The relation between agricultural prices and the price of industrial [435] products necessary to agriculture, which had dropped from an index of 100 in 1929 to 53.4 in 1934, climbed only to 63.9 by 1937. Clearly such a policy was exposed to opposition from an electorate consisting largely of peasants—if the representative parliamentary system functioned. The economic policy of these years by its very nature 665 implied an extension of control over political activity. The Tătărescu regime was the last effort to carry on politics in the traditional manner, through a quiet perversion of the constitutional system, but the growing differences between Tătărescu and the old guard of the

33. An excellent example of the political and social implications of this industrial drive is to be seen in a resolution of a congress of the Rumanian Federation of Manufacturers, held in Bucarest on February 3–6, 1936. The congress considered the industrialization of Rumania necessary not only for the development of the country's natural resources but to provide employment and meet the requirements of national defense and the balance of payments. It demanded a stable system favorable to the development of industry; privileges on tariffs and railway rates; legislation requiring public authorities to obtain all their supplies from Rumanian industry; statutory recognition of agreements between industrialists having the object of "improving production and sales by lawful means." In the field of social legislation the congress demanded that employers should be relieved of all charges which did not correspond "either to the workers' real needs or to the capacity of Rumanian industry." Specifically, it proposed that representation of employers and workers in social insurance schemes should be proportional to the amount shared in their support, the repeal of payments to employees for the first seven days' illness, and the repeal of the employers' civil liability to an insured worker in case of accident. The supervisory rights of the Chambers of Labor should be limited to small manufacturers and they should not be permitted to "tyrannize over employers in large-scale industry." Finally, it demanded that the Federation of Manufacturers be consulted on all laws and regulations affecting industrial life. ILO, *Industrial and Labor Information*, 57, No. 13 (March 30, 1936).

34. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 257. There was, however, a rise in imports between 1934 and 1937 from 13 to 19 billion lei, corresponding to the general economic recovery.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1981 EDl Rumania EDl

subject of a number of heated disputes at international conferences, 433
and it would be very difficult to make a reliable estimate.[24] That the 648
drain was serious is indicated by the fact that as early as 1945 some Rumanian Communists, with more than the average amount of economic insight and less than the usual blind devotion to the Soviet Union, were in despair over the effect of the Russian withdrawals upon the country's economy and their own political position. The glaring contradiction between Russia's efforts to woo Rumania and to secure some measure of popularity for the Communist party and its rather frantic removal of goods and equipment has puzzled many observers. The explanation may simply be that the policy of this monolithic state was not consistent, or rather, that two different policies were here overlapping.

Rumania's foreign trade was greatly reduced after the war; by 439
1948 the value of its exports was only 50 per cent of the 1938 figure (in 1947, 21 per cent), and its imports 69 per cent (in 1947, 57 per cent).[25] The bulk of the trade was with the generally similar economies of the other eastern European states, which were being increasingly linked by a network of trade agreements.

The combination of low output, armistice obligations and war costs, 652
and the general political uncertainty of the postarmistice months led to a fearful inflation. Rumanian currency had never been sound since the First World War and had showed a tendency toward inflation in the 1930's and the war years; between 1945 and the summer of 1947, when a drastic stabilization was achieved, prices rose to dizzying heights. The cost of living index increased from a base of 100 in 1938 to 145.0 in 1940, 413.9 in 1943, 3,678.7 in 1945, 46,140 in December, 1946, and 525,688 in July, 1947.[26]

24. At the time of the Paris Peace Conference the American delegate, Willard L. Thorp, complained that the Rumanian delegation had been of no assistance in supplying information on this point, but he estimated that the total cost to Rumania of its defeat would be about $2,000,000,000. As of 1946 he estimated that about $1,030,000,000 had already been transferred: $325,000,000 for the maintenance of occupation troops, $100,000,000 for reparations based on the 1938 price level, $175,000,000 for property restitution, and $450,000,000 for requisitions. U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin, 15*, No. 379 (October 6, 1946). In July, 1948, General Radescu, in exile in the United States, stated that since Thorp's estimate Rumania had paid an additional $735,000,000. *New York Times*, July 18, 1948. Some attempts have been made to relate these withdrawals to Rumania's national income, but both figures would by necessity be exceedingly uncertain.

25. United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*, Table XVI.

26. Institutul Central de Statistică, *Comunicări statistice, No. 19* (Bucarest, January 31, 1948).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

manian industries, especially secondary industries. Both Russia and Rumania, however, are still industrializing economies and there seems to be little evidence, in the Rumanian case at least, of a desire to check the industrialization of the latter.[31] 439

The turning point in the economic policy of the immediate post-war period was the stabilization of the currency in August, 1947, which more or less liquidated the old financial structure and served as a vast economic leveler. On the fifteenth of that month, the leu was devalued (to 150 to the dollar) and the old money was ordered to be exchanged immediately at the rate of one new leu for 20,000 old lei. Peasants were limited to exchanging 5,000,000 lei; workers to 3,000,000; and other persons to 1,500,000. That is, at the official new rate, peasants could receive in exchange $1.67, workers $1.00, and others $0.50. Gold and foreign currency were entitled to full value but had to be declared under penalty of life imprisonment. This drastic measure, which came at a time of continued commodity shortages, inevitably caused widespread hardship. There were numerous reports of resistance by the peasants who felt as usual that they were being sacrificed to the benefit of the towns. The government hurled many charges of speculation and exchange violation, and part of the brutal behavior of the regime in the course of 1947 is to be associated with, if not explained by, this Draconian financial reorganization.[32] 652

Along with the tightening of political control the Groza government now entered a new phase of economic policy marked by the progressive nationalization of industry, collectivization of agriculture, and the beginning of economic plans. In 1947 pressure against private industry consisted primarily in assuming control over certain specific enterprises, supervising industrial activity, and making accusations of sabotage against foreign-owned concerns. At the beginning of 1948 Gheorghiu-Dej launched a general attack on private capital, which dominated industry, banking, and insurance: "Our democratic regime has been very patient with private enterprise, but private owners do not make capital investment, nor do they renew equipment. They transfer capital abroad and openly sabotage reconstruction." In January the concession of the Rumanian match monopoly to the Swedish firm (this concession had been granted at the time of the stabilization loan of 1929) was declared invalid and 185 471

31. See also below, pp. 327–329.

32. A defense of the stabilization, written by the National Bank, is published as "La Réforme monétaire en Roumanie, 15 août 1947," in *Les Archives internationales*, Doc. 604.

still abroad, was summarily dismissed. Peasant risings, a movement for autonomy in Transylvania, and general instability led to the nomination of General Averescu to office, owing to the reputation he enjoyed of being a strong man, having taken an active part in suppressing the peasant rising of 1907.

General Averescu's government passed the enactment dealing with the distribution of land to the peasants, while his Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Take Jonescu, laid the foundation of the Little Entente by concluding alliances with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. General Averescu attempted to open pourparlers with Russia, so as to prepare the recognition of Rumania's right to Bessarabia, and there was a fair chance of his succeeding, but he was baulked of his aim, for the King vetoed his plan.

To M. Titulescu was assigned the task of reorganizing the country's finances. This was deemed to be an intrusion into the special domain of the Bratianus, and so by provoking their hostility, brought about Averescu's downfall. M. Take Jonescu was his successor, but he was able to maintain himself in office only for a month. A government constituted by the Bratianu party followed in January, 1922, and remained in power until March, 1926. Owing to the disunion among the Opposition groups the Bratianu party was allowed to carry into effect its nefarious project of securing complete control of the economic resources of Rumania. The whole legislation passed during its tenure of office was of a purely economic character, and under the pretext of consolidating the finances of the country they merely consolidated their own financial dominance.

Popular dissatisfaction was steadily growing in the meanwhile, as instead of relieving the money stringency, the economic policy of the government did nothing but intensify the evil from which the country was suffering. On the other hand the Opposition was closing its ranks and organizing mass demonstrations throughout the country. A monster meeting of peasants was held at Alba-Julia in May, 1925, followed up by vigorous onslaughts against the government. The latter, unable to obtain a foreign loan which would have enabled it to stabilize the currency and relieve

[The Liberal Party, headed by John Bratianu--Analyst]

[652] the economic crisis which had become endemic, sought to
665 withdraw for a brief period from office in order that popular
661 indignation might be appeased. As it had become obvious, however, that the Opposition, headed by the Transylvanian and peasant groups of the old kingdom aided by the Bessarabians, would sweep the polls and deprive the Bratianu party of the privileges it had arrogated to itself during its last tenure of office, the government manoeuvred to appoint in its stead a political group on whose subservience it could count. The choice fell on General Averescu, who could not pretend to independence of action owing to the numerical weakness of his group, and who was forced to act in leading strings held by the Bratianus on account of his absolute dependence on their support. As a consequence of the prevailing exasperation throughout the country it could be foreseen with certainty that it would be impossible to secure a favourable majority at the election following the exit from office of the Bratianus, even if use was made of the devices habitually employed on such occasions.

666 Before the dissolution of the Chamber, therefore, the
646 Bratianus passed a law reforming the electoral system then in use, which completely altered the very essence of democratic government. By the new system a party obtaining 40% of the total votes cast secured 70% of the seats in the Chamber, and thereby a party which did not possess the support of the majority of the electors might nevertheless secure an imposing majority in the Legislative Chamber. Through the passing of this measure into law, the coming to power of unpopular parties and royal favourites has been made possible, for owing to the malpractices and abuses current at elections, it is relatively easy in Rumania for any person in control of the state-machine to secure the requisite 40% of the votes necessary to ensure him complete domination of the Chamber.

666 In ordinary circumstances there would have been no necessity for this electoral law, since the public has usually a very wholesome respect for whatever party is in power, allowing it to organize the elections to suit its wishes, and permitting it to exert a dominating influence on the polls so that it may be said that the elections are always "made."

661 state administrations a certain degree of autonomy which,
[662] effectively amputated the central government of many of its prerogatives, and having filled these administrations with their own partisans they still exerted an influence which could, if necessary, paralyse the governments destined to succeed them in office.

In his electoral manifestoes, Averescu had held out to the Rumanians the most seductive inducements, among others that of a flow of foreign capital into the country. Time passed, however, and so, without any sign of an impending materialization of these assurances, the public began to chafe and inveigh against him. The resentment which the Liberals had aroused against themselves was thus deftly diverted on to the heads of their successors. This result having been duly effected, the Liberals emerged from the seclusion they had hitherto voluntarily imposed on themselves, and now appeared on the scene in the guise of indispensable factors for the restoration of the order and legality so grievously compromised by their incompetent henchman! The King was induced to demand General Averescu to form a coalition Ministry, but after a fruitless effort he was summarily dismissed and replaced by Prince Stirbey, who a fortnight later retired, making way for a Bratianu Government, so that the transition might not appear too brusque.

663 King Ferdinand died in July, 1927, and as the crown passed to his grandson, Michael, a boy of six, a Regency Council was nominated. Ferdinand's son, the notorious Prince Carol, had been excluded from the throne owing to Ferdinand's conviction that Rumania's prestige would suffer if a person with Carol's record became King. A similar opinion seems to have been held by our Foreign Office, for when Prince Carol came over to England in 1925 he received a polite but firm request to leave our shores.

665 Unhappily for the Liberals, their leader, John Bratianu, died suddenly in November, 1927. His was a strong willed and dominating personality, capable, but not over scrupulous in the choice of methods. The leadership then passed to his brother, who until then had been Minister of Finance.

665 The rising storm of popular exasperation caused by the
652 financial policy of the Liberal party, which had brought the

country to the verge of a catastrophe, proved, however, to be too much for the less experienced hands of Vintila Bratianu. Unable to secure a foreign loan, the need of which had become imperative, he had no choice but to allow the transfer of the reins of power in November, 1928, to the Opposition, represented by M. Maniu and the National Peasant party. The elections which followed took place in freedom, and though this time the minorities did not all vote for the government, nevertheless the latter secured for itself about 78% of the total number of votes cast, which may be taken as an infallible proof of its popularity. This assured it of a compact majority of 348 seats in the Chamber. The Opposition was insignificant, and was composed of sixteen Magyars, thirteen Liberals, and ten seats distributed amongst various groups. This election disposed of the fiction that Communism had a hold on the Rumanian people, for the total Communist vote attained only 35,000 out of a total of 2,840,660, and it thus became evident that the bogey of Bolshevism had been cleverly exploited by the Bratianu dictatorship, in order to justify its terroristic methods in Bessarabia, as well as for the purpose of winning the goodwill of the Western Powers for its alleged attempts to repress it. The most pressing need the Maniu government had to face was the obtention of a foreign loan in order to avoid the certain catastrophe with which the finances of the country were threatened. The funds obtained, however, barely sufficed for stabilizing the currency, and were altogether inadequate for the task of reconstruction, and even for the purpose of paying off the most pressing debts left by the former régime, so that a further loan had to be secured in 1931.

Unfortunately the country was in a derelict condition, and with the banking institutions under the control of its adversaries, determined to undermine the work of the new government, the latter had an exceedingly difficult task to tackle. The government passed several liberal measures, such as the suppression of the censorship, the abrogation of military law in Bessarabia, the reduction of the personnel of the gendarmerie (chiefly employed by Bratianu for dragooning the population at election times), and set about

RUMANIA

645 functions have been left undisturbed. We have a plethora
645 of functionaries drawing starvation wages instead of a body of well-selected officials decently rewarded. You who have no party and no party attachments to satisfy, and who always attacked political parties, might have effected this change easily, but you have not done so. The reductions in the Budget were necessary, yet they ought not to have cut into the very vitals of the country. The financial policy of M. Argentoianu may be qualified as the policy of bankruptcy. No institution, however strong its foundations, can resist it. You have destroyed the schools and disorganized the army by a criminal reduction of credits. In the name of the Liberal party I must affirm that we cannot accept a constitutional theory which, if it be applied, will debilitate our political life, and by the elimination of political parties vitiate the expression of the national will in its essence, expose the Crown dangerously to attack, and even provide the possibility of irremediably compromising it."

871 The indictment with regard to the schools found in the above rebuke refers to the decision taken by the Government
652 to shift on to the municipalities 50 per cent of the educational charges. As the Municipal authorities cannot balance their budgets, and as an example the community of Solca was cited, which with a total annual budget of 430,000 lei would have been obliged to incur an additional expenditure of 400,000 lei in order to provide for the maintenance of its primary school, the deputies admitted that such charges were beyond the resources of the municipalities to bear, and the proposed legislation was at last rejected after a most strenuous opposition from the National Peasant Party supported by the Liberal deputies who had hitherto sided with the Government.

871 Another cause likely to prejudice education in Rumania is the non-payment of salaries to teachers. During the
875 sitting of the Chamber on April 4th, 1932, a case was reported of certain teachers, who are all State functionaries in Rumania, who had not received their pay for seven months. Associations of teachers in various localities have called meetings and have addressed telegrams of protest on the subject to the King. Thus, those of the region of Radauţi on

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

May 7th, 1932, solicited the King's intervention, and demanded that their emoluments, already four months in arrears, should be paid. Those of Balţi appealed to the Press on the same date, complaining that nothing had been paid them during the last five months. A general strike of the members of the teaching profession is being talked about if a remedy is not found. They are incensed by the fact that while public money is being squandered on useless objects and worthless individuals at Bucarest, humble functionaries in the provinces are left to famish. 871 875

The "Adeverul" of Jan. 19th, 1932, takes the Government to task for paying regularly its superior functionaries and neglecting the lower grades as well as its pensioners, and proceeds to relate particulars as astounding as they are scandalous, namely details about famishing teachers who are forced to beg for morsels of bread from their pupils! Such facts are really staggering, and when one recollects that France is generously advancing in instalments a loan of over one hundred million francs for the exclusive purpose of enabling the Rumanian State to pay its functionaries and pensioners, one demands what has become of this money and whether these funds have not again been diverted in the habitual manner to other purposes or pockets than those destined by the original providers of these sums? 652 647 871

The inept waste of public money at this critical period is simply revolting. The press daily reveals cases of gross extravagance and profligacy, while in the Chamber it has been admitted that the State keeps in its employ over 50,000 redundant functionaries. The "Argus" of May 5th, 1932, for instance, points out that the Ministry of Commerce and Industry maintains without any justification a sub-secretariat with a personnel of 116, among whom are twelve solicitors, one architect, one doctor of medicine, 14 chiefs of sections, etc, at an annual cost of 15,176,900 lei to the State, while on April 1st, 1932, the paper condemned at length the waste involved in the maintenance of a Faculty of Medicine at the University of Bucarest with a staff of 400 professors and assistants, while the total number of students matriculated to this faculty reached barely 900. 652 647

The paper likewise affirmed that there was a scandalous

647 652 prodigality displayed in the lavishing of big salaries on certain functionaries occupying inferior posts, salaries which were altogether disproportionate with their functions, and that this form of favouritism was rampant in every administration. These remarks of the "Argus" are certainly not amiss, and it could be added that the faculty of Law has a greater number of Professors than the corresponding faculty of the Paris University. In its issue for the 14th May it criticizes the War Ministry for undertaking the construction of an arch of triumph in Bucarest, a matter which obviously is not one of pressing importance. The same could also be said about the Royal Palace at Bucarest, which is being enlarged and renovated. The "Curentul" of 6th May, 1932, discloses that the State maintains a school of gamekeepers at an annual cost of 1,512,000 lei and demands its prompt closure. In its issue of May 19th, 1932, it virulently condemns the Government for allowing fifty of its parliamentary supporters to undertake a voyage of relaxation to Constantinople, Jerusalem and Cairo, during the Easter holidays of 1932, at the expense of the State. It may be remarked that Rumanian governments often recompense their partisans by attaching them to various missions sent abroad so that they may enjoy free trips. Thus at the recent Balkan Conferences it was remarked that the number of Rumanian delegates often equalled the joint numbers of Albanian, Bulgarian, Greek and Yugo-Slav representatives. The "Dreptatea" of May 19th, 1932, takes the Government to task for not paying its functionaries, yet finding some 800,000 lei for the purchase of books for the public libraries, and delegating to Paris two public functionaries at a cost of 40,000 lei for making the purchase of the said books from a French publishing firm.

The "Argus" of May 6th, 1932, in a leading article insists that this costly and luxurious organization with which the Rumanian State has been endowed should be got rid of, and order and sobriety introduced, for otherwise neither loans nor assistance from without will be of any use. In 1929 and 1931, 24 milliard lei were borrowed; of this sum almost nine milliards were absorbed to cover previous deficits, and yet to-day, assures the "Argus," Rumania is no better off.

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

There is a deficit of five and a half milliards left over from the years 1930/31, and of 1,100 millions arising from the first three months of the current year. In all, a deficit of six and a half milliard lei, which is entirely due to bad management. 652 647

To these budget deficits should be added some ten milliard lei, owing by the State to various local contractors and industries, the non-payment of which has caused an enormous prejudice to the internal economy of the country, since these enterprises, having all their liquid funds "frozen up," have been obliged to stop their activities and dismiss their staffs, thereby intensifying the crisis. 652

The legislation recently passed by the Government has also had a most unfortunate repercussion on the general situation. Thus the law sanctioning the cancellation of agrarian debts has resulted in the ruin of almost every bank in the country, for, with a few rare exceptions, all have directly or indirectly advanced money to agriculturists, who by this law, promulgated in April, 1932, are dispensed from their obligations to the extent of 50 %, while the remaining 50% is rendered recoverable within 30 years. No compensation whatever is granted by the State to the banks or to private individuals who had been unfortunate enough to have advanced money to the peasants, even on the security of a mortgage. The result is that almost every banking institution and thousands of people have been ruined at one stroke. 652 426

This measure has not met with the general approval even of the peasantry, for the most prosperous and enterprising among them, who naturally had placed their savings in the banks, have thereby lost their money, since all the rural banks have been rendered insolvent. The total cessation of all credit, which has naturally followed the suspension of banking operations in the rural districts, has caused immense loss to the farmers, who can no longer borrow money even for their most pressing needs. Another law, that of the so-styled "Liquidation Judiciaire," completes and intensifies the evils fostered by that of the "Concordat preventif," rendering all commercial debts practically irrecoverable without the condescension of the debtor. Such measures are 648 652

RUMANIA

648 indicative of the complete chaos which prevails in the minds
652 of those at the helm of the State, and who, seeing the *impasse* to which they have brought the country, appealed to France to send a mission of financial experts to devise means whereby Rumania may be extricated from the morass in which she has been entangled. This mission, headed by M. Rist, former adviser to the Rumanian National Bank, has arrived at the end of April, 1932, and is preparing a report which apparently is to recommend a drastic curtailment of the government staffs, and a reorganization of the tax-collecting system. Though exceedingly discreet, these advisers could not help expressing their astonishment at the bungling methods obtaining, and several higher officials in the Ministry of Finances have been summarily dismissed in consequence of their gross incompetence. Surprise, too, has been expressed at the number of officials employed in the Ministries
[647] of War and Public Instruction, 33,533 and 82,821 respectively, staffs more numerous than in the corresponding institutions in France, a country noted for its bureaucratism. The activities of these foreign advisers, who, after all, had been invited to come, and who are rendering a signal service to the country, have given rise to an outburst of xenophobia which is truly surprising. The press, with a few rare exceptions has protested against this immixture in the internal affairs of the State, which it pretends to regard as an affront to the national dignity, and has not wearied of insisting that Rumania should desist from paying her external debt service, which absorbs some six milliard lei per annum. Such a solution seems natural for a State which condones the annulment of all pecuniary engagements of the most numerous class of its citizens, as is provided in the law concerning the cancellation of agrarian debts. However, the Government seems unwilling to go so far, and it declares on all occasions that it will fulfil its foreign obligations in spite of the heavy sacrifices this decision may entail. Already it has taken the cue given by the French experts, and promptly dismissed five Under-Secretaries of State, early in May, 1932. The fall of the Tardieu Cabinet, which seemed disposed to extend a loan to Rumania on certain conditions, may now induce the Rumanian government to retrace its steps to a

certain extent, as apparently the new French government will be less inclined to make financial advances. Nevertheless the Cabinet will hesitate to assume the responsibility of openly defaulting, lest such action should be resented by France and to a lesser extent by England, and bring about Rumania's political isolation in face of Russia. So that, strange as it may seem, the dread of the Bolsheviks may contribute to the respect of engagements, the repudiation of which would be applauded by the latter. 648 652

The press organ of General Averescu, the "Indreptarea," in its issues of 12th and 18th May, 1932, contains some interesting comments on the findings of the French experts. It thus affirms that the experts have ascertained that there is a lack of control in the handling of the public funds, that there is a great redundancy of officials, and that huge frauds are committed at the expense of the State revenues. As an example, the case of the revenue from the Customs was given, which was estimated at 1,200 million lei, yet only yielded 400 millions, the balance of 800 millions having been fraudulently diverted to other pockets than that of the State. M. Rist, affirms the "Indreptarea," had recommended a compression of the expenses through the dismissal of a large number of functionaries, and the creation of a control of all payments made to the State so as to eliminate the numerous frauds to which the Budget deficit is principally due. If these reforms were effected, Rumania, according to M. Rist, could fulfil her external obligations. However, the findings of the experts were not likely to enhance the prestige of Rumania in Paris and it hardly seemed likely that the French would now keep their promise made to M. Argentoianu to give pecuniary assistance to Rumania, unless they were allowed to exert a control which would be tantamount to applying to Rumania the status of what in its essence would be a colonial dependency. Such measures, if their acceptance were advocated by the Government, would weaken its prestige to such an extent that it could no longer maintain itself in power, even if it enjoyed royal support. The weakening of its authority was manifested by its decision not to allow the holding of municipal elections which were to take place in 648 652 E 47 648 652 648 666 645

668 resound from the province across the Carpathians are not isolated. The whole country is agitated by this discontent which may explode at any moment."

The above statements should not be taken as outbursts of spite, for even in official publications, such as the bulletin of the Constantsa Chamber of Commerce, we come across similar pronouncements: "We are facing a complete economic disaster. All the productive forces of the country are exhausted. All private savings lent on credit are lost owing to general insolvency. The State is unable to collect even one fourth of the direct taxes it imposes. We have arrived at this state of affairs owing to the irrational financial policy of post-war governments . . . . . Great mistakes were committed, and this fact should be admitted before we start on the right path. Many of our rulers were incompetent and dissipated, not to say that they acted as profiteers." (February, 1932, p. 23–26.)

645 Since proofs were submitted the following events have
[652] occurred in Rumania:

Owing to the growing discontent among public functionaries, pensioners and officers at their not receiving their pay, the King felt constrained to enjoin the Cabinet to satisfy forthwith the legitimate claims of these public servants. The government, unable to comply with this behest, tendered its resignation early in June, whereupon the King once more convoked M. Titulescu to Bucarest, and bade him form a coalition cabinet. M. Titulescu's efforts proved again fruitless; for while the National Peasant Party did not refuse its co-operation, the Liberal Party asked that it should be entrusted with a mandate to form a government, as it pretended to be strong and capable enough to deal singly with the situation.

666 As, however, no party possessed a majority in the Chamber, it was decided to dissolve it, and to appeal to the electorate. M. Vaida-Voevod, who is known to be strongly opposed to gerrymandering, and other electoral abuses in vogue in Rumania, formed a provisional government to supervise the elections. These were held in July, and the

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

National Peasant Party, though it polled less than 50% of 666
the votes cast, secured 272 seats against 114 won by the Opposition. (The Liberals obtained 28, and the section of the party led by M. G. Bratianu, 14 mandates.)

M. Vaida-Voevod having discharged the duty assigned to 646
him retired from office; but as the National Peasant Party possessed a working majority in the newly-elected Chamber, it was called upon to assume power. The Opposition attempted to challenge the right of the National Peasant Party to govern the country owing to the smallness of the poll it secured at the elections, though it was the Liberal party itself, now heading the Opposition, which introduced the law conferring a majority of seats in the Chamber on the party which would poll 40% of the votes.

M. Maniu was besought by his partisans to resume once 645
more the premiership, but after several interviews with the King, declared himself unable to do so. He recommended, however, M. Vaida-Voevod to undertake the task, and accordingly a Cabinet headed by the latter was formed which includes both M. Mihalache and M. Madgearu, and other prominent members of the party. The 652
government thus formed proceeded to secure a loan of 50 million swiss francs, wherewith to pay its officials for the time being, and to publish its program, which in the main lines aims at: Reforming the present electoral law, reintroducing administrative decentralization, and reorganizing the railway administration. Equitable treatment of minorities is promised, as well as a modification of the law concerning the conversion of agrarian debts. At the same time State finances are to be reorganized with the co-operation of the League of Nations.

This last plan, however, will not work out so smoothly, 652
for the Opposition will do its utmost to stir up popular feeling 648
against it. Even when two League delegates arrived in June, 1932, to examine the economic situation, the Press was unanimous in deprecating this public investigation and treating it as an offence against the country's dignity. The most widely read paper, having a daily circulation of some 40,000 copies, appeared with a leading article entitled "the day of shame."

RUMANIA

652 648 Though there may be nothing derogatory in foreign supervision of Rumanian finances, Rumanian politicians will insist on decrying it as an affront to the *amour propre* of their country, because such control will prevent them from embezzling public funds. However, one may well question whether the League of Nations is the most suitable authority to take in hand such a difficult task after its lamentable failures in Bulgaria and Hungary, where the proceeds of the loans raised under its aegis served mainly to bolster up reactionary governments. After such a disastrous experience—at least so far as British subscribers to these loans are concerned, who have lost two thirds of their capital—it is doubtful whether the League of Nations would again venture to appeal with any hope of success for funds on behalf of its prospective ward. All the more so, since the League is not cut out for dealing with such a mendacious and elusive body of political mountebanks as it will have to transact business with in Rumania. M. Maniu's refusal to reassume the premiership is to be interpreted as a failure on his part to secure from the King implicit assurances that constitutional practices would not be tampered with again, so that the League will not know whom it will have to face when the National Peasant Party is once more turned out of office. It would be better apparently if this formidable job of cleansing Rumania's Augean stables were tackled by a single country, like France, which owing to its ascendancy as an ally, could exert the requisite authority. If the French were given a free hand, they would see at least that their money served its purpose, and they would take adequate precautions to counter-check effectively all the evasions and underhand manoeuvres in which Rumanian politicians are past masters.

661 to be paid during the year. Nevertheless the Ministerial Council had decreed that the amount payable should be reduced by yet another 110 millions. This was considered unfair, all the more so since the critical condition of the pension fund is due to the fact that a mass of politicians having no right whatever to pensions have been awarded very generous ones, while men who had devoted their whole life to the service of the State ran the risk of dying of hunger.

The Bank of Industrial Credit.

652 The "Cuvantul" of 11th March, 1929, published an article revealing the unsound character of the expedients which are occasionally resorted to in order to secure temporary alleviation for the Treasury, and some of the results of this policy.

"The management of the public finances was so irregular during these three last years that the State was obliged to conclude a foreign loan in order to pay its debts to local contractors. This was not only a period of financial insincerity, but also one in which the conception of honestly meeting one's pecuniary obligations was undermined. The bad example of the State proved contagious to commerce in general. The "Industrial Credit" was created to enable the National Bank to obtain relief from a mass of bills that found their way to it to be rediscounted at a time when the State had obtained the maximum amount of credit from local industry, and when the latter was no longer in a position to pay the excessive interest on State debts which the banks insisted on charging when discounting the said debts. The irregular payment of State debts created other inconveniences. Local industries, to protect themselves from being ruined, were obliged to increase the price of the articles supplied. The cost of materials furnished to the State was thereby very sensibly increased. To prevent foreign industrialists from under-selling local producers, who were thus forced to sell their products at inflated prices, it became necessary to impose excessive protective duties, the burden of which fell ultimately on the inarticulate masses."

RUMANIA

652 The first pressing task which the Government had to face[1] was the unification of the currency. It was decreed that the
457 roubles circulating in Bessarabia, and the Austro-Hungarian crowns hitherto used in Transylvania, Banat, and Bucovina, were to be exchanged against Rumanian lei, at the rate of one lei per rouble and one lei per two crowns. It had been roughly estimated that the amount needed for the conversion of these roubles and crowns would be approximately 2,500 million lei. Unfortunately, owing to the dilatory fashion in which the redemption of these foreign currencies proceeded, it became possible for smugglers and speculators to introduce into the country huge sums of these notes from the adjoining States, since the announced rate of exchange in Rumania was far above the intrinsic value of these notes in their respective countries of origin. Of course, this vast fraud was only rendered possible through the connivance of politicians and functionaries, but it resulted in a net loss to the State of some 5,000 million lei. For the conversion of these roubles and crowns, instead of the 2,500 million lei originally estimated, absorbed a sum of over 7,000 million lei. A similar fraud was perpetrated in the case of the notes issued by the Banca Generala during the Austro-German occupation. Further quantities were introduced clandestinely into the country from Germany. Though the original notes had been re-stamped by the Rumanian Government, this proved no deterrent to the smugglers, who with great ease proceeded to forge the Rumanian special stamp and affix it to their notes before putting them into circulation. These notes of the Banca Generala were secured by sums deposited in the Reichsbank, but, owing to the depreciation of the mark, the Germans took advantage to contest the Rumanian claim for the return of these deposits, offering as a pretext that they were in marks and had therefore become worthless.

The unification of the currency was completed by the end of 1921, the State assuming thereby a formidable financial burden which very seriously undermined the stability of its currency. Besides the loss caused by the redemption of these unsecured notes, the State had to reckon with the forfeiture of 315 million gold lei belonging to the reserves of

[1] [after World War II -- Analyst]

the National Bank which had been removed during the War for safety to Moscow, and which the Bolsheviks now refused to return. 652 457

Another factor which further militated against a quick recovery was the state of utter destitution in which the Germans had left that part of the country which they had occupied, and which they had taken care to despoil of everything of value that was removable. Production being utterly disorganized, the requirements of the population had to be satisfied by mass import from abroad, which necessarily caused a drain on the exiguous gold reserves. This, coupled with the fiduciary increase necessitated by the redemption of the roubles, crowns, and banknotes issued by the Austro-Germans, depreciated steadily the Rumanian currency between 1919 and 1926.

Yet another cause which retarded the economic recuperation of the country was the agrarian reform, which during its initial stages naturally disorganized production, and imposed on the State a huge load of debt due to the necessity of providing funds wherewith the former owners of the land might be at least partially indemnified. All these causes contributed to the inflation of the fiduciary circulation, which from 4,431 million lei at the end of 1919 passed gradually to 20,126 millions in 1926, causing a corresponding depreciation of the leu, which, from its pre-war parity of five leu to the dollar, passed to 55 in 1920, 86 in 1921, 150 in 1922, and to as much as 220 in 1926. Since that date it has steadily improved until its stabilization in February, 1929, when the rate was fixed at 167 to the dollar or 31 lei to one Swiss franc, or 81.359 lei to the (gold) pound. This instability of the currency that had lasted until 1929, had created an atmosphere of uncertainty extremely detrimental to commerce and industry, and had seriously retarded their revival. And the precariousness of the situation was further accentuated by the serious budgetary deficits during the years 1919–1922. If it be remembered that during these years Rumania was confronted by other serious problems, the solution of which demanded an immense outlay incommensurate with the resources of the country, it must be admitted in fairness to the Rumanians that in spite of the very inade- 652 458 652

652 quate means at their disposal they yet succeeded in achieving a certain measure of success, and notwithstanding the tremendous difficulties with which they had to cope. Some of the issues demanding attention were the reorganization of the administrative machinery in the newly-annexed territories, the complete overhauling of means of communication, the readjustment of agriculture, the reconstruction of the oil industry, which had greatly suffered during the war, and the necessity of providing for the needs of the army owing to the exposed geographical position of the country.

RUMANIA'S ECONOMIC POLICY

186 454 Until the advent to power in 1928 of the National Peasant Party under M. Maniu, the policy of the country was inspired by an uncompromising nationalism that tended to the complete exclusion of foreign capital so necessary for the development of Rumania. The chief instigators of this policy were the late brothers John and Vintila Bratianu, who had raised the maxim "prin noi insine" (by ourselves alone) to the sanctity of a religious dogma. The governments that had succeeded each other since the conclusion of the war, with the exception of the one presided over by M. Vaida-Voevod, were either formed by the Bratianu, or so-called Liberal Party, or by some nominees of theirs who were quite amenable to their views, so that a certain sequence in the policy pursued may be detected throughout this period, in spite of the change of persons at the helm of the State, while any divergence in their pronouncements from the original programme may be explained by the desire to allay the mistrust engendered by the Bratianu policy. The principal aim of this policy was the attainment of self-sufficiency through the industrialization of the country. This found expression in extensive legislation dealing with the development of national resources, the chief enactment being the special mining law promulgated in July, 1924.

382 471 315 The subsoil resources had already been declared national property, and the special mining law, which was aimed par-

10: Logic S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

060

victions to those of the prevailing party in power, but with all the extreme brilliancy of his argumentation he will hardly shake the convictions at which one arrives concerning the results of Protectionism in Rumania, and which may best be summarized in J. Novicov'c pronouncement on the subject: "*Le système protecteur est une spoliation mutuelle autorisée par la loi . . . il est non seulement une spoliation mutuelle des citoyens d'un même pays, mais une spoliation mutuelle des citoyens de tous les pays. . . . Tout gaspillage dans les frais de production diminue la masse des richesses existantes et par consequent la masse du bien-être general. . . .*" (*Luttes entre Sociétés humaines*, p. 208.)

In a lecture M. Manoilescu delivered in Bucarest during January, 1932, under the auspices of the Rumanian Social Institute, he still harped on his favourite theme, namely, that Rumania was exchanging the labour of 600,000 men engaged in agriculture for that of 60,000 men engaged in industry and that this was the source of Rumania's wretchedness. The Russian Five-Year Plan seems to have been obsessing his fancy, for he exhorted his audience "to draw inspiration from the methods of others so as to apply them in their own midst under a controlled economic system," assuring them that "the industrialization of Rumania would invigorate its agriculture to such an extent that the latter would be able to absorb the products of its industry. . . ." According to him an agricultural people could develop only if it pursued the fostering of its agriculture parallel with its industry, as had been demonstrated by the example of Russia. It is difficult to gauge the impression created on Rumanian intellectuals by M. Manoilescu's fine spun and twisted logic, but his advocacy of applying Russian nationalization methods to Rumania is undoubtedly an example of the attraction the former country is beginning to exert in the Near East, and the gradual dispelling of the misgivings that were once entertained about Russia's economic future.

STATE FINANCES

652

On the attainment of her independence Rumania was obliged to endow her economic organization with the necessary equipment. Owing to the primitive economic condition

652 in which she subsisted it was impossible for her to provide out of her budget the requisite means for the construction of roads and railways, ports, etc., and she therefore began to seek foreign loans in order to finance these productive works, which of course could yield no returns for some years. The State budget, therefore, was burdened at first with heavy charges on these loans while it derived no corresponding revenue from the expenditure involved. This will explain why, up to 1905, the budgets closed usually with a deficit. From 1905 to 1914, however, the situation changed, and every year showed a surplus varying from 41 to 110 million gold lei, a sum that represented about one-fifth of the total budget revenue. This favourable state of affairs naturally changed radically after the war. For the period 1919 to 1922, though the budgets did not contain any provisions for the service of the national debt, they nevertheless showed an excess of expenditure over revenue that was alarming. These budgetary deficits were covered by an increase in the fiduciary circulation that naturally tended to depress still further the value of the national currency. The steady depreciation of the leu rendered the balancing of the budget an exceedingly difficult process, as it was impossible to estimate beforehand the exact amount of expenditure which increased as the leu fell, seeing that the State had to make payments abroad in gold, while the revenue was also adversely affected owing to the losses suffered by tradesmen through currency depreciation and its inevitable corollaries—curtailment of credit and abnormally high rates of interest.

From 1923 onwards the Liberal Party attempted to put some order in the national finances, and by a drastic policy of compression it managed apparently to balance the budgets. There were many who condemned this policy of excessive economy that tended to cut down all expenses, even on items that were essential for the development of the country's resources.

The Bratianus' economic policy was inspired by two main principles. One was doing without foreign aid, and the other that of achieving the revalorization of the leu, two aims that mutually excluded one another. The revalorization of the leu was to be achieved by balancing the budget, and the

method adopted was to cut down expenditure indiscriminately. Essential credits for the maintenance and repairing of roads and railways were drastically curtailed until the means of communication became almost useless. The salaries of State functionaries were reduced to an extent which no longer sufficed to keep them alive, and consequently the public service became completely disorganized and corrupted, for the functionaries had, after all, to make up for the inadequacy of their emoluments either by indulging in peculations or by accepting bribes. The rabid xenophobia of the Bratianus was in no way shared by the thinking public, as may be inferred from the following article published by the *Argus* while they were in office:

"From our first appearance in history until the present moment we have done nothing but change masters, and nevertheless we have not perished. Why should we not appeal for help to the capital reserves of civilized States so that we may raise ourselves to their level? Instead of copying Western civilization we have, after the war, pursued an economic policy which has placed us in a situation parallel to that of Russia. We have broken up the large estates in order to create small rural holdings without practically indemnifying the owners. In Russia the same thing was done without any indemnity being paid. We have severed our commercial relations with Germany without creating new ones. We have placed the control of the nation's economic life in the hands of the State. We have concentrated public wealth in the hands of a minority. We have disorganized the system of transport. All these measures have been applied in one form or another in Russia, but nowhere else in civilized Europe. We are determined partisans of Western civilization as we are conscious of the necessity of orientating ourselves after the ideals of the West and not those of the East. The policy of abusing and vilipending foreign capital is due to a misunderstanding. The modernization of our State with the aid of foreign capital is an indispensable and vital necessity. The economic decadence of our people brought about through this policy of isolation will bring about the decadence of the State organism. A weak State will not secure immunity from the Bolshevik bacillus. If we

652 do not assimilate our conditions and life to those of the West we shall be forced to assimilate them to those ruling in the East. We must emphatically reject such an ideal. . . ."

By 1928 this policy had brought the country to a complete deadlock, and foreign financial aid had to be appealed to in order to get it out of the *impasse* into which it had been driven. Not only trade and industry had been brought to a standstill, but the public treasury was also in desperate straits through the disorder and dissimulation that had been practised. The much-advertised budget surpluses of 1924 and 1925 were found out to be fictitious, and instead they left a deficit of three and a half milliard lei to be dealt with, while the year 1928 was threatening to close with a deficit of 6½ milliards.

The National Peasant Party which came to power at the end of 1928 secured two foreign loans in 1929 and 1931, of a total amount of 24 milliard lei. They were used up in the stabilization of the currency, the paying off of pressing debts, and the liquidation of budgetary deficits, while a small part was earmarked for the improvement of the railways. Owing to the prevailing maladministration, the loans failed to restore the economic situation of the country, and, as the *Argus* of May 6th, 1932, declared, "to-day, barely three years since we contracted the loan of 1929, we are as badly off as we were before we borrowed the money, for we have to face 6½ milliards of deficits due to our bad management. . . ." The situation, unhappily, is far worse than may be inferred from the above statement. For the policy of dissimulation and insincerity in public accounts which was constantly practised, in order to conceal expenditure of public money on unjustifiable purposes, has led to an accumulation of a huge deficit of some 21 milliard lei. Thus, between the budget revenue forecasts and the actual receipts there is a tremendous deficit of 6,583 millions in 1928, 682 millions in 1929, 6,295 millions in 1930, and 7,370 millions in 1931, and it may be added that the current year 1932 will also close with a deficit of at least some 6½ milliard lei. This policy of making exaggerated revenue forecasts was dictated by the desire to justify expenditure on certain heads of the budget which might have been reduced or suppressed.

STATE FINANCES

It is true that a drastic retrenchment was effected in the expenditure of 1931, and that the whole 35,305 millions provided for were not spent, so that the difference of 7,370 millions between the revenue forecast and the actual revenue will not correspond to the real deficit for that year, which will be smaller than that figure. The 1928 budget deficit, too, was partly covered by the proceeds of the 1929 loan, but these modifications will hardly alter the desperate situation which the Rumanian Exchequer has reached, and owing to which the salaries of State functionaries are in many cases seven months in arrears. For besides the budget deficits, there are some 10 milliard lei which the State owes to contractors, outstanding Treasury bills of an approximate value of one milliard, and various sums the Exchequer has borrowed from autonomous public institutions such as the Pensioners' Fund, Savings Banks, Chambers of Commerce, in order to face certain pressing needs. No real estimate of these sums can be made owing to the unparalleled confusion reigning in the public accounts, which are deliberately doctored in order to cover up the malversations and the continuous dissipation of public money. What is even more serious is the multiform nature of the guarantees the State has given concerning the debts contracted by the various autonomous administrations such as that of the Monopolies, the Railways, etc., as well as the charges it has explicitly assumed towards other establishments. Thus it is estimated that the guarantee extended to the National Bank, securing it against losses through the application of the law concerning the cancellation of agrarian debts will involve the State in a loss of at least some 5 milliard lei, and this is not the only loss the State will incur on this head, for similar commitments were entered into with various other establishments. Such squandering of public funds and such utter disregard of the consequences of this phenomenal profligacy have certainly no counterpart among European nations, and they clearly show that the only hope of salving the country is to place its finances under a rigorous and severe foreign control. For no party has proved itself immune from this mania of squandering the national patrimony. In fact it would be strange and something bordering on the miraculous if any

did so, for by nature the Rumanian is a jolly wastrel, and economy is foreign to his idiosyncrasy. If Rumanian finances during a brief period prior to the war were on a sound basis, this must be attributed to the energetic supervision of the late King Charles I, who would tolerate no nonsense on this head.

THE BUDGET, NATIONAL REVENUE, & PUBLIC DEBT

1931 BUDGET.

	Lei.
Revenue:	
Direct taxation	9,310,000,000
Indirect taxation: Customs	4,575,000,000
Alcohol and spirituous liquors ...	1,250,000,000
Other consumption taxes	2,589,960,546
Turnover tax	2,000,000,000
Theatres, etc.	100,000,000
Stamp and registration fees	4,150,000,000
Surplus from Monopolies and State commercial enterprises	5,477,917,747
Exploitation of State properties	767,500,522
Ministry of Finance	850,583,674
,, the Interior	37,968,000
,, Justice	146,950,000
,, Foreign Affairs	70,000,000
,, Agriculture and Domains	196,490,000
,, Labour, Health and Social Welfare	24,262,476
,, Industry and Commerce	167,370,000
,, the Army	124,269,352
,, Public Works and Communications	12,650,000
,, Education and Cults	29,011,354
Total	31,879,953,671
Sum resulting from reduction of salaries of employees at the Ministries, Monopolies and State Enterprises ...	3,426,000,000
Grand total	35,305,953,671
Expenditure:	Lei
Ministry of Finance	12,289,590,039
,, the Interior	1,716,234,526
,, Justice	1,314,876,270
,, Foreign Affairs	262,140,000
,, Agriculture and Domains	919,680,116
,, Labour, Health and Public Welfare	1,267,659,541
,, Industry and Commerce	405,028,771
,, War	10,204,029,661
,, Public Works and Communications	131,857,420
,, Education and Cults	8,419,666,227
Presidency of the Council of Ministers	75,191,000
Total	35,005,953,671
Fund for extraordinary and supplementary credits ...	300,000,000
Grand total	35,305,953,671

BUDGET AND NATIONAL REVENUE

652

The forecasts for the revenue were not realized, revenue receipts for the year 1931 attaining 27,616 millions, from which 2718 millions should be deducted as this sum was obtained by a curtailment in the salaries of officials. The 1932 budget was prepared on the basis of the revenue receipts for 1931, since it had become evident that this yield would not be exceeded. It is balanced at the approximate figure of 24½ milliard lei. The forecasts for the revenue, however, have so far not been realized, the first five months having yielded only 6,700 millions. Owing to the serious decrease in the revenue receipts it was decided that a sufficient sum should be set aside each month to meet the requirements of the debt service, and the balance only would be distributed to the various ministries to allow them to face their most urgent necessities. In consequence, strict orders were issued that no expenses were to be incurred beyond the sum thus available. During the first months of the year some 1,250 millions were thus allocated monthly for the purpose of paying salaries and pensions, 505 millions were earmarked for the public debt, and another 250 millions were assigned for the purchase of materials, etc., but owing to the continuous diminution of the revenue even this very limited expenditure cannot be maintained, and the administration has been obliged to suspend the payment of salaries, which in certain cases are seven months in arrears.

The above budget figures do not show the total amount of State expenditure, for there are autonomous administrations which have independent budgets of their own, as, for instance, the railways, post office, monopolies, etc., and only the net results of the operation of these autonomous administrations are included in the budgets. The total amount of these autonomous budgets for 1931 was 21,888,333,272 lei. At the same time the grand total of the budgets of these administrations and that of the State for the year 1932 amounts to about 52 milliard lei. The service of the public debt for 1932 absorbs 6,764 millions, which does not seem to be a disproportionate charge as compared with a grand total public expenditure of 52 milliards, all the more so seeing that 2,150 millions are payable by the autonomous administrations of the monopolies on account of the service of

652 the loans concluded in 1929 and 1931, and some 930 millions are for the service of the internal debt.

The national revenue for the years 1926–1928 was computed at an average of 171 milliard lei annually, of which 110 milliards, or 64 per cent, were contributed by agriculture. The revenue *per capita* was computed at 9,709 for 1927, 11,324 for 1928, 10,400 for 1929, 7,875 for 1930, and at only 5,523 lei for 1931, the fall recorded being due to the drop in the prices of raw materials. State expenditure, as represented by the budget for 1931, absorbs approximately 25 per cent of the national revenue, but this is not the only expenditure which has to be faced. Thus for the year 1930, the last year for which complete figures are available, enabling us to form a true estimate of the total social expenditure incurred, we have:

Budgets of the State and of the Autonomous Administrations: 59,908,750,553 lei.

Budgets of the Communes, Municipalities, and Departments: 10,156,051,778 lei.

These sums represent a total charge *per capita* of 3,920 lei, while the national revenue was estimated at a *per capita* charge of 7,875 lei. This amounts to a charge of approximately 50 per cent for social expenditure, an altogether disproportionately heavy burden which largely accounts for the catastrophic decrease in the revenue, and points to the 439 gradual pauperization of the country. This inference may 652 also be drawn from the fact of the steady diminution of imports, which have declined enormously since 1927, not only in value but also in bulk, which proves that the buying power of the people has been gravely impaired, as may be seen from the following figures, the diminution in quantity indicating that the fall was in no way due to the drop in prices:

		Value	*Tons*
Imports for 1927	...	33,428 million lei	1,008,069
,, 1930	...	22,541 ,,	773,745
,, 1931	...	15,858 ,,	564,338

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

BUDGET AND NATIONAL REVENUE

It is obvious that the present administrative machinery is too sumptuous an affair and that Rumania cannot afford to continue to live on such an ostentatious scale. Retrenchment is imperatively needed as well as a rapid return to methods of austerity, however disagreeable these may be to a people who are naturally inclined to profligacy. A drastic economy could be effected by the dismissal of well over 50,000 State functionaries who are superfluous. The *Revista Functionarilor publici*, their mouthpiece and organ, admits that in 1914 the number of State functionaries was 90,334. The war brought about a territorial increase of 216 per cent, so that proportionately the number of functionaries should be 195,133, but by 1930 there were as many as 245,187, or about 50,000 more than necessary. But apparently this total does not disclose the whole truth, for the writer was able to ascertain that while, according to the figures published in the above paper, the Ministries of Public Instruction, Home Affairs, and War had respectively 68,977, 28,894, and 32,630 public officials at the end of 1931, the numbers figuring on their respective pay-lists were 82,821, 31,318, and 33,533. To these enormous armies of officials should be added the staffs employed by the municipalities, etc., which would bring the total number up to nearly half a million. That public opinion is fairly alert on the matter and expects a drastic cutting down may be inferred from the following open letter published in the *Argus* for 16th May, 1932, which is of particular interest from many points of view:

"Rumania has a population of 18 millions, of which only 13 millions are Rumanians by race. Out of the 500,000 public functionaries 99 per cent are Rumanians by race, and a bare 1 per cent is recruited from among Hungarians, Germans, Jews, and Ukrainians. The proportion of the non-Rumanian elements in the public services is therefore infinitesimal, which proves that some 5 millions of people can live without constituting a charge to the budgets of the State, municipalities, and 'régies.' Why should not Rumanian functionaries once dismissed from the public services be able to fend for themselves as do those members of the ethnic minorities who receive no support from the budgets?"

It is admitted publicly that over 100,000 functionaries

647 could be dismissed without the working of the administra-
652 tive machine being impaired in any way, and several instances are given of the plethora of officials. M. Bratanescu, deputy for Tighina, for example, pointed out in the Chamber that in his town, with a population of 31,698, there were 130 teachers, but as there were not enough children for each to have a full class, whenever an inspector came down, each teacher used to borrow children from the other classes in order to complete the number of his own so that he might escape being reprimanded by the inspector.

652 Another head on which various economies could be
657 effected is pensions, which absorb about one-fifth of the total revenue, and many of which are served out to people who have not the slightest justification for drawing them. The tendency to spend overmuch for the upkeep of the social services is a characteristic trait of Rumania and was noticed and commented on many years ago by one of her distinguished social writers, M. C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, in his work "Neoiobâgia." Referring to the period 1910–1911, he pointed out that the State budget and those of the communes absorbed over one-third of the national revenue, and what remained for the subsistence of the population amounted to 123 gold lei per head, or almost 4,000 lei, a figure closely approximating to the 3,955 lei which, according to the calculations given above, represented the net income per head for
647 1930. The above-cited writer condemned very caustically
652 the profligate methods of the administration as likely to bring the State to ruin:

"By withdrawing annually from production these big sums and lavishing them on a parasitic bureaucracy, the State sets the example of a mad waste . . . by letting the bureaucracy spend extravagantly what the other classes create by hard toil, people form the illusion that this country is very prosperous and that it is easy to live in it comfortably. . . . This hypertrophy of the State organism is one of the most pernicious sicknesses which attack modern societies." (p. 455.)

647 It is indeed a great pity that no political party ever en-
651 deavoured to tackle the problem of thoroughly overhauling the administrative machine of the country, but that instead

BUDGET AND NATIONAL REVENUE

From the above it may be seen that Rumania, in order to meet her foreign debt payments, requires that her favourable trade balance should attain 7½ milliards and even further expand. The surplus of 1929 is to be attributed to the proceeds of the loan floated during that year. The surplus of 1930 is ascribable not only to the inflow of foreign capital but also to the very substantial excess of exports over imports. As an even more important excess of exports over imports was registered in 1931 (6,226 millions), that a considerable inflow of money followed upon the conclusion of a loan in Paris, and as, further, there was little or no outflow of money on account of foreign private capital invested in the country, it may be safely surmized that the balance of payments for 1931 must have shown an even more favourable result than that of the preceding year. 457

Owing to the deplorable plight of the Exchequer and its inability to find the means wherewith to pay the salaries of State officials, the view has been gaining ground that the State ought to suspend the payment of its debt service. The majority of the Press have widely approved and encouraged this idea, which is becoming exceedingly popular, as might be naturally supposed in a community which has deliberately fostered contempt for all engagements. Both public and Press, taking into consideration the default of adjoining States, find that it would be quite natural for Rumania to follow in their footsteps, since she has been equally affected by the present crisis. The fact that Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, and Hungary have been obliged to suspend their foreign payments abroad because they are unable to secure the requisite foreign currencies while Rumania, at least for the present, is not faced with any difficulties concerning the question of transfer, is entirely lost sight of. Even newspapers closely connected with the Government have joined in this campaign, and seeing that former Ministers like M. Junian, of the National Peasant Party, have openly indicated this measure as a panacea for the evils from which the country is suffering, it may be that eventually the question may be raised by the Government and foreign bondholders sounded on the subject. Should such be the case this delicate question will require to be handled with great tact and 652 457

RUMANIA

457 suavity, as the susceptibilities of France have to be carefully
652 considered, for her political support is necessary to Rumania, and the latter cannot afford to jeopardize it for the sake of such transient monetary relief as the suspension of her public debt service might afford. Should this contingency arise and foreign bondholders be confronted with a demand for an alleviation in the charge of the actual debt (a revision of which may be justifiable to a certain extent, because the fall in world prices has increased the burden of the world's debts by at least 30 per cent, and has therefore correspondingly improved the position of creditors), then it would be well if British bondholders would keep in mind that the depreciation in sterling has already effected this readjustment so far as *they* are concerned. In fact this fall in sterling has brought about an annual saving of some 450 to 500 million
000 lei to the Rumanian Exchequer. This matter is alluded to because in recent negotiations, British delegates have meekly accepted the same terms as were offered to other creditor States, the currency of which had not sustained a loss of some 30 per cent of its intrinsic value. The agreement reached on the Bulgarian loans issued under the auspices of the League of Nations may be taken as an example. French and American creditors will be receiving 50 per cent of the stipulated interest in francs and dollars, while the British investor will be receiving this 50 per cent in his depreciated currency, so that in reality he will be receiving only 35 per cent. At first sight it would seem that our official delegates might have stood up and insisted on equality of treatment with other countries and not contented themselves with a settlement which is distinctly more favourable to others. They might also have seized this opportunity and done something for the commercial debts due to our of foreign credits, and under pressure from French bankers, has been obliged to use her slender monetary resources for nationals, which are 'frozen hard,' because Bulgaria, devoid the payment of her State rather than of her private debts. This unilateral way of meeting obligations is certainly not to our advantage as a nation, for these commercial debts owing to our exporters constitute their capital, and so long as they are deprived of this money they must find it impossible to
France other exports from this country.

finance other exports from this country.* The total amount of private foreign capital invested in Rumania is estimated at some 28,300 million lei, according to the figures supplied to the League of Nations for 1930, but it seems to have been somewhat underestimated, judging from the amount of interest annually payable on foreign investments, which has always been computed at a much higher figure than 2860 or 2931 millions for 1929 and 1930 as is the case of the above-mentioned report.

The following table gives particulars of the Public Debt on January 1st, 1932, totalling 175,559,644,622 lei, of which 162,182,471,062 represent the external debt payable in foreign currency. The *per capita* indebtedness would therefore amount to 9,753 lei, on the basis of a population of 18 millions.

PUBLIC DEBT IN LEI

	Nominal amount.	Amount outstanding.
Pre-war loan	1,725,812,000	410,337,300
National Loan 1916 5%	400,000,000	354,194,800
District Railways Loan	39,000,000	23,678,413
Non-redeemable Loans:		
4% 1900 Brasov Schools	963,500	963,500
5% 1910 Pasturages	20,000,000	20,000,000
4% 1912 Mortmain	34,894,487	10,541,849
Union Loan 5% 1919	1,143,143,800	1,030,607,500
Reconstruction 5% 1920	2,730,911,000	2,477,280,000
" " " (unblocked) ...	315,000,000	306,899,000
Expropriation Loan 5% 1922 redeemable ...	6,500,000,000	6,500,000,000
" " " " non-redeemable	800,000,000	800,000,000
" Mortgage Debt	560,000,000	560,000,000

DEBTS DEVOLVING FROM THE PEACE TREATIES

Annuities owing to Arad-Temiscora Rly. ...	11,843,765	8,796,618
Pre-war Austro-Hungarian loans stamped in Rumania	146,089,353	146,089,353
Rumanian quota of 3½% 1897 Hungarian Loan	37,926,002	37,926,002
Austrian Loan for Rly. Cernauti—N. Sulita	2,306,800	2,306,800
Loans of Bucovina 4% 1894 and 1910 ...	6,242,600	6,242,600

FLOATING DEBTS

Internal Treasury Bonds	687,652,430	687,652,430

*Our exporters to countries which have placed restrictions on exchange operations suffer yet from another disability, in so far as what available foreign exchange there may be is granted to local importers of raw materials in order that the native industry may not be stinted of its supplies. Naturally there is no foreign exchange left for importers of manufactured goods after the former have been supplied.

457
152

RUMANIA

	Currency.	Nominal amount.	Outstanding amount of debt on Jan. 1st, 1932, in foreign currency.	Amount in lei.
PUBLIC DEBT IN FOREIGN CURRENCIES.				
Unified Stock 4% Paris Agreement	Gold Francs	433,000,000	290,256,540	9,363,095,467
" " 5% " "	" "	87,000,000	69,165,170	2,231,130,054
" " 4½% London "	" lei	60,000,000	57,343,670	1,849,792,107
" " 4% Berlin "	" "	425,000,000	118,551,225	3,824,225,416
" " 1889, 4%	" "	21,000,000	6,475,680	208,892,485
" " 4½%	" "	133,500,000	77,092,795	2,486,859,381
" " 5%	" "	57,000,000	18,172,590	586,211,408
" " Consolidated 1922. London 4%	£ sterling	35,000,000	25,774,730	20,970,062,581
" "	"	2,500,000	1,613,760	1,312,938,998
" " 6% 1925	Italian Lire	41,145,300	27,619,200	242,993,721
" " 5% 1926 (for purchase of private rys)	£ sterling	680,315	646,115	525,672,702
" " " " (" " of Maramures rys) ...	"	8,630	8,280	6,736,525
" " " " (" " of Arad-Cenad rys) ...	"	111,890	107,410	87,387,702
" " " " (" " of Somes rys)	"	148,740	139,710	113,666,658
WAR DEBTS.				
War Debt to Great Britain	£ sterling	31,295,000	30,395,000	24,729,068,080
" " " U.S.A.	Dollars	122,506,260	119,806,260	20,029,210,555
" " " Italy	Italian Lire	247,500,000	173,500,000	1,526,453,000
" " " France	Gold Francs	924,105,350	659,562,566	21,276,169,270
" damages, Petroleum, 1916	£ sterling	16,475,818	15,361,050	12,497,596,670
DEBTS OF RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILISATION.				
Loan 7% 1926	Italian Lire	200,000,000	165,495,566	1,456,029,989
" " 1929 Stabilisation	£ sterling	2,000,000	1,945,500	1,582,839,345
" " " "	Dollars	69,000,000	67,172,200	11,229,848,396
" " " "	French Francs	561,638,000	546,320,600	3,587,399,930
" 7½% 1919 Reconstruction	" "	1,325,000,000	1,322,250,000	8,660,737,500

10: Loglo 3-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Romania ED1

1157
652

	Currency.	Nominal amount.	Outstanding amount of debt on Jan. 1st, 1932, in foreign currency.	Amount in lei.
DEBTS DEVOLVING FROM THE PEACE TREATIES.				
Perpetual Stock 4%	Fl. gold	143,884,877	47,482,009	3,829,186,849
4½% 1913 Hungarian amort.	Gold Crowns	35,368,906	9,903,313	335,434,323
Perpetual 1910 Hungarian 4%	,, ,,	63,195,660	17,694,784	599,328,286
4½% Stock 1914 Amort.	,, ,,	103,426,037	28,962,090	980,972,066
Annuities to Ry. Coe.	French Francs	30,555,500	23,860,596	156,286,909
Agrarian "A" Optants	Crowns	25,735,728	16,979,987	575,127,472
Rys. St. E.G.	French Francs	71,941,574	17,077,230	580,677,285
Loans, liberated in Crowns and Florins	Swiss ,,	42,500,000	42,500,000	1,370,965,000
VARIOUS				
Rumanian quota of Danube Com. Loan	Gold Francs	2,125,000	1,087,500	38,666,875
Relief Bonds, England	£ sterling	3,703,012	2,976,575	2,421,711,654
,, ,, Australia	,,	201,962	182,258	123,093,323
,, ,, Denmark	Danish Crowns	201,962	154,785	6,934,810
,, ,, France	French Francs	824,781	662,964	4,342,415
,, ,, Norway	Norv. Crowns	84,159	64,423	2,869,504
,, ,, Norway	£ sterling	3,266	2,500	2,099,265
,, ,, Sweden	Swed. Crowns	151,486	118,668	5,201,166
,, ,, Switzerland	Swiss Francs	269,310	206,350	6,657,406
William Pyton and Anne du Pont Pey, New York	Dollars	548,911	152,600	35,511,063
G. & D. Perkins, New York	,,	543,297	152,600	25,511,063
Paul Steppel, New York	,,	1,269,291	314,990	53,660,073
Cie Franc. d'Etudes et d'Entr. Coloniales	£ sterling	19,614	4,255	3,543,257
Marché Central de Cuirs, Peaux et Laines	,,	17,269	4,315	3,917,962
Bca d'Italia Roma	Italian Lire	13,731,290	1,716,400	18,106,257
New York Trust Co., New York	£ sterling	2,107	948	771,669
Heirs of Anton Dimon	,,	9,854	2,457	1,996,909
Co-op. Wholesale Society, Manchester	,,	991,023	740,818	602,722,023
Banque Belgo-Helvetique, Brussels	Belg. Francs	63,454,655	12,814,660	59,516,510

497 mained stationary, the revenue was inferior by some 1,600 million lei. Since then it has been announced that the deficit had attained 2,000 millions, and that the year 1932 would [652] also close with an equally large deficit. One of the causes of these huge deficits is that the State never pays its debts to the railway administration, in spite of the formal undertakings it assumed when the 1929 loan was floated. On the other hand the State insists on the railway administration paying into the State Treasury the savings it has effected by the reduction of the salaries of its officials. At the end of March, 1929, M. Vidrighin, a former director of the railways, published in the *Argus* a series of articles which explain some of the reasons why the exploitation of the railways is carried on at a loss. He thus pointed out that there are about four and a half millions of persons who make regular use of the railways, but of these some 800,000 are deputies, officials, pensioners, and military, who benefit by great reductions in the current fares, as do their families. So that some 1,200,000 persons, or about one-third of the regular users of the railways, are carried at a loss. Further, the law encouraging national industries provides that raw materials needed for them are to be carried to the factories at a rebate of 30 per cent, while goods despatched from these factories are to enjoy a 45 per cent reduction from the usual tariff. Thus a large part of the goods transported is handled at a loss. Losses are also incurred on official transport, which is mainly gratuitous.

To make good these losses the administration had hit on the simple contrivance of increasing the rates on goods as well as passenger fares, which expedient has resulted in a steady decrease in revenue. Thus in 1929 the total revenue amounted to 12,375,669,870 lei, in 1930 it had decreased to 11,291,600,463, and for 1931 it is reported that the revenue would again decrease by another 1,600 million lei. Passenger rates were so abnormally high that peasants could scarcely afford to travel by rail. For example, for a distance of 40 kms. a peasant would have to disburse 60 lei, a sum which it would have taken him two days to earn. To put a stop to the decrease in the traffic a drastic reduction of 40 to 60 per cent in the transport rates was recommended again

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

433 Resita works and in the Copsa-Mica concern. The
471 most important Rumanian group, representing both German and British interests, was that of Malaxa-Auschnitt. The centre of Rumania's heavy industry is the region around Brasov.

The chemical industry, drawing to some extent on the unexported surplus of agricultural produce, developed substantially, thanks especially to attempts to make Rumania independent of imports. This industry, too, was controlled to a great extent by foreign, chiefly German, interests.

433 The textile industry, although handicapped by old-fashioned machinery imported from Germany, was the most prosperous. Production and value of output increased, as did the number of employees, but wages decreased.

433 Rumania's total industrial production was
511 doubled in the years 1924–36, but this was not re-
435 flected by a corresponding improvement in trade or in the standard of living. The general index of wholesale prices fell by almost a third and that of agricultural produce by nearly half; the prices of manufactured goods decreased by only a little over one-sixth. By 1933 the value of exports and imports had fallen to about 25,600 million lei and was only one-third of that of all foreign trade in 1926. Real wages in the period from 1929 to 1939 fell by over one-fifth, while the cost of living in 1939 was indexed at 138 points in relation to 100 points in 1933.

652 By 1937 Rumania's national debt had reached 257 million pounds sterling of which only one-fifth was represented by internal loans. Interest on foreign loans in 1932 amounted to about one-quarter of the country's budget and in 1937 to about 16%.

A. PUBLIC FINANCE

652

The financial situation in Rumania during the 1930's was very like that of other south-east European countries, being influenced by similar factors.

During the years of depression at the beginning of the period, the situation was dominated by the sharp fall in agricultural prices on the world markets, and the existence of a very considerable foreign debt—amounting in 1935 to about 80 per cent. of the total national debt, which amounted to 139 milliard lei in March of that year.

After 1935, however, when prices began to rise, and various agreements had been reached with creditor countries regarding the service of the foreign debt, a distinct improvement was noticeable, which continued until the outbreak of war, when the heavy expenditure necessary for the maintenance of the armed forces on active service once again strained the financial resources of the country to the utmost.

1. The Budget in Pre-War Years

The budget years from 1930 to 1934/35 inclusive all showed heavy deficits, the largest being registered in 1931 and 1933/34.

In 1935/36 expenditure on the ordinary budget amounted to 20.7 milliard lei, and on the special national defence budget to 1.9 milliard lei—giving a total expenditure of 22.6 milliard lei, as against revenue of 23.09 milliard lei. It was, however, the practice to grant certain credits outside the budget, which, in so far as budget surpluses were insufficient, were covered by borrowing.

The main single items of expenditure in the ordinary budget were the Ministry of Finance (including the debt service), the Ministry of Defence (excluding the special national defence budget), and the Ministry of Education and Culture, accounting for approximately 35 per cent., 23 per cent. and 20 per cent. respectively of the total expenditure.

Expenditure on National Defence amounted to 30 per cent. of the combined total of the ordinary and National Defence Budgets.

By far the greater part of expenditure was covered by normal resources. Indirect taxes, customs duties and stamp and registration duties accounted for approximately 40 per cent. of the total revenue, profits from State monopolies and State enterprises 25 per cent. and direct taxes 15 per cent., the remainder being supplied by other administrative revenue and special resources.

By 1938/39 expenditure on the ordinary budget and the special National Defence budget (excluding any extra budgetary credits in respect of which there is no information) had risen to about 34 milliard lei—with expenditure on National Defence still accounting for some 30 per cent. of the total. In the same year total revenue amounted to approximately 35.5 milliard lei, of which some 45 per cent. came from indirect taxes, 17 per cent. from profits from State monopolies and enterprises, and 25 per cent. from direct taxes.

From March 1935 to March 1939 while the foreign debt dropped by 45 milliard lei, the domestic debt rose by 16.1 milliard lei—from 24.7 milliard lei to 40.8 milliard lei. This rise was

652

largely due, first, to the conversion in 1937, of the foreign debt held by Rumanian nationals into domestic debt, and, secondly, to credits granted outside the budget and not covered by normal revenue. The drop in the foreign debt, while partly due to this conversion, was mainly due to the fact that war debts were excluded from the total.

652
722

2. Expenditure in Wartime

After the outbreak of war, expenditure—particularly that on national defence—continued to rise. In 1941/42 a technical change was made in the budgetary system; instead of including profits from State enterprises in the ordinary budget a separate budget was published for State enterprises. Thus expenditure was divided into three categories, (1) the ordinary budget, (2) the special national defence budget and (3) budget for State enterprises. In addition in 1942/43 and 1943/44 separate budgets were published for Bessarabia and Bucovina.

The following table shows the budget estimates for expenditure on these four accounts for the budget years from 1941/42 to 1943/44.

		milliard lei		
		1941/42	1942/43	1943/44
Ordinary budget	..	44.9	72.5	88
Special National Defence budget	..	16.0	21.0	84
Budget for State Enterprises	..	55.0	113.0	192
Budget for Bessarabia and Bucovina	..	—	6.0	10
Total	..	116.0	212.5	374

The first nine months of the Russian war fell in the Budget year 1941/42. Actual expenditure in that year was 74 milliard lei higher than the estimates, since 90 milliard instead of 16 milliard lei was spent on the special national defence budget and 12.5 milliard from the ordinary budget was allocated to Defence. Thus published expenditure on national defence accounted for over 75 per cent. of all budgetary expenditure (excluding that on State enterprises) as against 30 per cent. in 1938/39.

It is officially stated that in 1941/42 slightly over 50 per cent. of all expenditure was covered by normal resources, and the remainder by loans.

Since the outbreak of war the yield from taxation has increased, partly as a result of inflationary conditions, and partly as a result of increased rates of taxation and the imposition of new taxes.

The burden of taxation was, however, already so heavy that an increase sufficient to cover expenditure could not be achieved, and large scale borrowing became necessary.

3. Government Borrowing during the War

Early in 1941 a "Reintegration Loan" with no fixed limit for subscription was issued. It was in two parts, the one bearing 4½ per cent. interest and maturing in 30 years, the other—designed principally for agriculturalists—bearing 5 per cent. interest with 5 years' maturity. Despite the various attractions offered (freedom from taxation on interest, premiums, etc.) the response to this loan was very poor. The final date for subscriptions was repeatedly postponed; in September,

[51 c]

CHAPTER X

652 722

1941, subscriptions were made compulsorily, and in 1942 a Reintegration Tax was levied on all persons who failed to subscribe the amounts allotted to them. In spite of all this the loan had only raised some 18 milliard lei by September, 1942.

A further attempt to borrow from the public was made at the end of 1942, when the Minister of Finance was authorised to issue short term 4 per cent. Treasury Bills to a value not exceeding 20 milliard lei. As with the long term loan, interest from this loan was free from taxation.

In spite of these measures, however, considerable amounts have had to be borrowed direct from the National Bank—partly on account of extra-budgetary credits for non-military purposes, but more especially to finance the war with Russia which—at the beginning at least—was done entirely outside the budget.

In June 1941 when miscellaneous advances to *the Government already amounted to 20 milliard* lei, the National Bank was authorised to derogate from the provisions of its statutes and to advance any amounts necessary to cover exceptional needs. In this way a further 12 milliard lei credit on this account was put at the disposal of the Government to finance the Russian war. This credit was, however, exhausted by January 1942, but the National Bank's miscellaneous advances continued to rise, reaching nearly 30 milliard lei by June 1942. After June 1942, borrowing on this account fell considerably, only to rise at the end of the year and the beginning of 1943.

4. External Position of the Leu

652

Rumania is still officially on the gold standard, the parity of the leu having been fixed in 1929 at 1 leu=0.009 g. fine gold or 111.111 lei per kg. gold.

This parity has, however, no practical significance, since from 1935 onwards it has been the practice to pay premiums for gold over and above the official price. In order to encourage domestic production of gold additional premiums are paid to domestic gold producers, so that the effective internal price of gold varies, according to the productivity of the mine, from 400,300 lei to 867,500 lei per kg. fine gold. (*See* also section on gold, page 23.) Official dealing in "hard" currencies, too, is done not at parity but at parity plus a premium. From December 1935 to February 1940, the premiums were fixed at 38 per cent., from March 1940 to March 1941 at 107 per cent., and after the latter date at 90 per cent.

652 648

The last reduction of premiums from 107 per cent. to 90 per cent. was made under German pressure, on the grounds that the RM., on which no premium was paid, was undervalued in relation to "hard" currencies. And at the same time as the effective rates for such currencies were lowered (in the case of the $ from 211.65—217.97 to 187.60—196 lei per $); the RM. rate was raised from 50 lei=1 RM. to 60 lei=1 RM., at which level it has since remained.

5. Prices and Price Control

435

As a result of the world depression there was a severe fall in prices during the early 1930's. Both wholesale prices and the cost of living reached their lowest level in the years 1933 and 1934. In the following years there was a gradual recovery, which became increasingly marked after 1939.

The retail price index has increased during the war as follows:—

August, 1939	100.
January, 1940	116.6.

[52 a]

435

June, 1940	137.1.
January, 1941	149.5.
June, 1941	190.9.
January, 1942	290.6.
June, 1942	306.9.
January, 1943	377.6.
March, 1943	403.9.

The less marked rise in 1942 was due principally to the fact that for the first 6 months of the year prices were almost stationary; in the autumn, however, indirect taxes were increased and prices once again rose steeply.

These percentages represent only increases in official prices; the cost of living is in fact considerably higher owing to the prevalence of the Black Market, where prices are very much in excess of the official limits.

The first attempts at price control were made almost immediately after the outbreak of war. In September 1939 an anti-profiteering law was passed, and in November of the same year an anti-speculation law followed, which fixed the maximum prices of all articles in general use and limited wholesalers' profits to 10 per cent. and retailers' to 12 per cent.

The regulations were further tightened up by the price control laws of March, 1941, and the sabotage law of October, 1940.

Control, however, remained largely ineffective, and in October 1941 a stabilisation law was passed. This law, which borrowed much from the existing German laws, laid down a general price stop. Maximum prices and wages were fixed at the level prevailing on 1st September, 1941, and alterations could be made only with the permission of the Minister of Economics.

In addition the State set up goods distribution centres which, among other functions, supervised producers' prices, profit margins and consumers' prices.

Since August 1942 the supervision of prices has been in the hands of a General Commissariat for Price Control, and the local offices subordinate to it. It is evident that corruption among price-control officials was by no means a negligible [661] factor in the very unsatisfactory development of the control system in general. In the autumn of 1942 it was announced that all existing price controllers were to be dismissed and replaced by members of the teaching, legal and literary professions.

B. BANKING

1. State and State-Controlled Banks

652 453 The National Bank of Rumania was set up in 1880 with a capital of 30 million lei, of which one-third was in the hands of the State. By 1929 this had been raised to 600 million lei. Under the present statute the State may not hold more than ten per cent. of the capital; the remaining ninety per cent. must be held by private shareholders. This bank has the sole right of note issue for the country.

From the end of 1930 to the end of 1938 the note circulation rose from 19·6 milliard lei to 34·9 milliard lei. In the next four years, however, the increase was very much greater as the following table shows:—

		Milliard lei
1939—	January	34·1
	June	38·7
1940—	January	48·4
	June	54·2
1941—	January	65·7
	June	77·1
1942—	January	95·6
	June	98·7
1943—	January	117·0

[52 b]

652
453 This was largely due to the advances of the National Bank both to exporters with claims on the Rumanian-German clearing, and for the maintenance of German troops stationed in the country (see below).

Among the fairly numerous other State or State-controlled banks, two of the most important are the Central Savings Bank and the National Institute for Industrial Credit. This latter was founded in 1923, but its size and scope have been greatly extended since the outbreak of war, and it is now entrusted with the so-called "Rumanisation" of industry.

2. Commercial Banks

453 There are six important commercial banks in Rumania—viz., Banca Românească, Banca de Credit Român, Banca Commercială Română, Societatea Bancara Română, Banca Commerciala Italiana şi Română, Banca Chrissoveloni—and a fairly large number of other smaller banks. In the big banks there were considerable French, German, Italian and, to a lesser extent, British interests.

The position of the banks was very seriously affected by the collapse of the Österreichische Creditanstalt in 1931.

Between 1930 and 1934 current account deposits in commercial banks fell from 18·2 milliard lei to 7·9 milliard lei and time deposits from 35·1 milliard lei to 10·4 milliard lei, representing a 64 per cent. fall in total deposits. In subsequent years there was a recovery and new inflation contributes a large share to the further increase in deposits. Deposits in commercial banks with a capital of more than 60 milliard lei rose from 10·6 milliard lei at the end of 1934 to 28·6 milliard lei in August, 1942.

In May 1934 a law was passed affecting domestic and foreign banks operating in the country. According to this law a Supreme Banking Council was set up to supervise all banks; minimum capital was fixed according to the locality in which the bank operated; rates of interest were fixed, and conditions of liquidity laid down. This law is still in operation, but certain of its provisions have been relaxed since the outbreak of war—the first time in February 1942, and a second time early in 1943. The alterations principally concerned the proportions of deposits to capital—in each case the maximum limit for deposits being increased.

As a result of the activities of the Supreme Banking Council a large number of small banks has ceased to operate and the banking system in general has been put on a much sounder footing.

3. German Infiltration and Financial Exploitation

453 Apart from penetration into other branches of industry, there has been a considerable amount of
648 buying up of shares by Germans in Rumanian banks and insurance companies. Already before the war the Societatea Bancara Romana was controlled by the Dresdner Bank, while the Commerzbank and the Deutsche Bank had a minority holding in the Banca Commercialì Romànd. This latter holding was increased in 1941 to 50 per cent., and in the same year the *Reichskreditgesellschaft* acquired a minority holding in the Banca de Credit Roman, and the Berliner Handelgesellschaft in the Banca Chrissoveloni. In 1942 the Bank der Deutschen Arbeit acquired a holding in the Bukarester Handelsbank. Thus, since the Banca Commerciala Italiana şi Romana is a subsidiary of the Banca Commerciala Milan, five out of the six important banks are to a greater or lesser extent Axis-controlled. In addition there are

453
442
456
648

certain fairly important *Volksdeutsche* saving banks operating in Rumania.

In the case of insurance, too, German companies had considerable interests in Rumanian companies even before the war. These interests have been greatly increased, the most important acquisitions being a majority holding in the Dorna Vatra company acquired by Jauch und Hübener in 1941, a similar holding in the "Franco-Romana" taken over from French hands by the Nordstern Versicherungs A.G. in the same year, and a holding taken over from French hands by a Viennese company in the "Nationala" General Insurance Company—also in 1941.

652
648
722

Though the great increases in budgetary expenditure since 1939 can be attributed indirectly to Germany, the chief instruments of German financial exploitation have taken the form of advances from the Rumanian National Bank for the maintenance of German troops in the country, and for the clearing (i.e. forcing the Rumanian National Bank to make advances to Rumanian exporters whose exports were not balanced by corresponding imports from Germany).

4. Advances for Maintenance of German Troops

It was originally agreed that 1 milliard lei per month should be advanced—against an equivalent RM. credit in Berlin—to the German troops in Rumania. In fact, however, the Germans drew more in excess of this amount, and continued to do so even after the majority of troops had left the country.

In October 1941, therefore, the National Bank refused to grant any further advances of lei for the use of the German troops. The Germans, however, brought pressure to bear by refusing to honour Rumanian invoices for goods they had received, and by borrowing from the banks through the medium of the firms which they controlled. The situation appears to have remained unchanged until January 1942, when it seems that a new agreement was reached, the National Bank once again undertaking to advance a fixed monthly sum, and in addition to make up arrears in payment. It is reported that towards the end of 1942 the National Bank had advanced some 40 milliard lei on this account.

5. The German-Rumanian Clearing

In addition to this German debt there is a further one of probably at least equal magnitude which has accrued in the clearing.

Precise figures of the actual German clearing debt to Rumania are not available and estimates vary very greatly. The amount of the debt at the end of 1942 has been variously reported at anything between 30 milliard and 100 milliard lei.

It is, therefore, reasonable to assume a minimum clearing debt at the end of 1942 of 30 milliard lei, and a minimum total debt (clearing and advances in the National Bank to the German military authorities) of 70 milliard lei—or approximately £117,000,000.

It is, however, quite possible that there is some justification for the German claim to the effect that clearing and similar debts are not wholly indicative of German commercial practices, inasmuch as certain German exports are made against long-term credits which do not enter into the clearing until several years have elapsed. In the case of Rumania, Germany is known to have granted in recent years two credits of RM. 600 million each (96 milliard lei), but it is not known to what extent actual production for the German export market made it possible for Rumanian importers to utilise these facilities.

[53b]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

from 2 to 10 billion lei (in quantity from one million to 2.2 million metric tons).

Two qualifications should be made however. The emphasis upon wheat exports and upon the improvement of quality was primarily for the benefit of the middle and large producer, though the maintenance of the price of grain did help agriculture as a whole. In the second place, as has been mentioned in connection with the depression, the premiums on wheat served to extend the area under wheat cultivation, in direct contradiction to the recommendations of agricultural experts, who continued to believe that "peasant agriculture should no longer limit itself, in imitation of the old system, to the culture of cereals; its success will come from a parallel development of the resources of the field and of livestock raising."[38] This contradiction, which shows the absence of any real coherence to the agrarian program of the Liberal government, had two obvious sources: wheat, for all its decline after the First World War, was important commercially and from the point of view of foreign commerce there was a strong incentive to support it. Moreover, the wheat growers were the larger farmers and were in a better position to make felt their wishes than were the small maize-producing peasants.

The government did, however, make certain efforts to increase the variety of agricultural production. The most elaborate was the creation, with the assistance of I. G. Farbenindustrie, of the "Soya" company, which was authorized to import soybeans, distribute them to cultivators, provide equipment, and purchase the entire crop for export to Germany. The area under this crop expanded rapidly, especially in Bessarabia: 1,465 hectares in 1934, 20,411 hectares in 1935, 58,037 hectares in 1936, and 102,000 hectares in 1937. The government through price guarantees and subsidies also furthered the cultivation of sugar beet, tobacco, rice, and textile plants.

These measures to diversify agriculture did not, despite all the publicity given to them, achieve very great importance. They were only a drop in the bucket compared with the vast area under peasant cereal cultivation, and their rate of expansion seemed unlikely to produce any general amelioration for a very long time. Moreover, the introduction of such industrial crops, whose main purpose—almost exclusively so in the case of soya—was for export, shows the persistent if natural effort to solve the agrarian question by a sort of legerdemain. The soybean had been an old favorite, and as early

38. G. Ionescu-Sisești and N. Constănescu, *La Réforme agraire en Roumanie et ses conséquences*, p. 72.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241 as 1910 Dobrogeanu-Gherea had some harsh words to say of the
433 men who thought it could magically solve the deep-rooted ills of Ru-
● 654 manian agriculture.[36]

The Tătărescu government, following precedent, also reorganized agricultural credit and the cooperative system, set up more experimental stations, and devoted funds to the raising of better livestock and the purchase of tractors, but those measures seem to have been only of marginal benefit.

423 The government did try in the law of March, 1937, for the encouragement of agriculture to grapple with the problem of land tenure. It regulated the transfer and mortgage of rural lands and undertook to enforce the indivisibility of property as a means of preventing the progressive subdivision of peasant holdings. The effort was unsuccessful. The two-hectare minimum, which in any case was too small for a self-subsistent holding, was not observed; the prohibition extended only to properties obtained from the state or with the state's assistance. An attempt was also made to promote the consolidation of peasant properties, but this met with too great opposition in the chamber and was dropped.[37] The government also exerted its right of preemption on sales of agricultural land for the purpose of providing land for the peasants but its achievements were insignificant. Between April 1, 1934, and August 1, 1938, of the 325,200 hectares put on sale the government used its right of preemption on only 12,250 hectares, 3.8 per cent of the total.[38]

241 In brief, if the position of agriculture was somewhat better in the
654 years of the Tătărescu regime than in the depression it was largely
656 a consequence of general economic recovery. Agriculture did benefit from the protective measures applied and extended by the government, although part of these benefits was lost by the continued depreciation of the leu, and some efforts were made to raise the level of agriculture and diversify production. Nevertheless, the government's chief interest was industry and commerce and the principal benefits to agriculture were those which corresponded to this interest. The desperate problem of the millions of small peasants owning less than 3 hectares, unable to support themselves and their families, dividing their land into smaller and smaller fragments, suffering from pellagra —this problem was scarcely touched.

654 It must be said, however, that in the 1930's there was a notable
511

36. C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *Neoiobăgia*, p. 284.

37. Valeriu Bulgăreanu, "Divizibilitatea proprietăţii ţărăneşti," *Problema agrară* (Bucarest, 1946), pp. 77–87.

38. G. Ionescu-Sisești, "Le Nouvel Aspect du problème agraire en Roumanie," *Archives pour la science et la réforme agraires*, 16, Nos. 1–4 (1942), 264.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

increase in scientific investigations of village life—sociological studies undertaken by Professor Gusti and his students, farm accountancy studies, examinations of rural health and diet—which brought into clear light the deplorable living conditions of the peasants. It was at this time too that the factor of overpopulation was brought into prominence, although as early as 1907 Constantin Garoflid had warned of its approach. Unfortunately, the real fact of overpopulation was too easily employed as a scapegoat, and one finds a growing tendency from the middle of the 1930's to place upon it all the responsibility for the plight of the peasant.

654 511

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

642 and a couple of days later, with the agreement of Maniu and Constantin Brătianu, demanded his abdication. Carol fled the country, with Mme Lupescu and Colonel Urdareanu, the core of his camerilla. For Rumania, however, the absurd result was that popular indignation over the loss of Transylvania at the hands of the Axis merely placed in power an ardently pro-Axis government which immediately recognized the Vienna Decree.

Economic and Agrarian Policy

178 In the economic sphere the years of the Carolist dictatorship show four important characteristics:

1) a continued emphasis upon industrialization;

2) a reaction against small peasant agriculture and a growing agricultural paternalism;

3) increasing regimentation of the economy, both for economic planning and for military preparedness;

4) the growing dominance of Germany in Rumanian economic life.

The policy of industrialization which had got under way after the depression continued its course of expansion under the dictatorship, with the additional stimulus of the menace of war. After the outbreak of war the restriction of trade channels and raw material imports reduced industrial production somewhat. The loss of territory in 1940 produced, of course, a general dislocation of the economy. Industrial policy, however, was merely the culmination of the whole trend of the Carolist regime.

In the field of agrarian policy there was a noticeable reaction against small peasant holdings and renewed talk of creating a middle peasantry. As has been seen, the policy of all Rumanian governments on this question has been confused and contradictory. The National Peasants in 1929, by relaxing regulations for the transfer of peasant property, had hoped to create more prosperous and self-sustaining holdings, but their action had rather the effect of dispossessing the small peasant. On the other hand, the debt conversions of 1932–34 had the opposite effect and in a negative way were, as Garoflid called them, a new peasant resettlement in that they limited the effect of the economic crisis in weeding out the weaker peasants. The Tătărescu government had attempted to colonize relatively underpopulated areas with medium holdings and by the law of 1937 had tried, ineffectually, to check the subdivision of land.

642 654 Under the Carol dictatorship somewhat more extensive measures

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

were initiated, at least on paper. The 1938 Constitution, by prohibiting any public discussion of redistribution of property, showed the regime's attitude toward further expropriation as a remedy to the agrarian question. During the interwar years the governments were accustomed to state that large estates had virtually disappeared through the reforms of 1918–21, but after 1938 increased attention was paid to medium and large properties.[4] In the law of December 5, 1938 (amended January 7, 1939) the government established a Bank for the Industrialization and Valorization of Agricultural Products (BINAG), one of the recurrent efforts to provide agricultural credit. It is to be noted, however, that by Article 6 of this law the main credit functions of this bank applied only to farms of over 5 hectares, thus overlooking the majority of the peasantry.[5]

The spirit of the regime is well shown in an article by the agricultural economist Valeriu Bulgariu,[6] who announced that King Carol, "the first farmer in the land," had plans to change completely the existing conditions in agriculture by a twofold effort to organize small farming on rational lines and to encourage owners of medium-sized estates to increase the area of their holdings.

> When the great land division took place after the war, the agrarian reform went too far. . . . It assigned land to a very large number of villagers, and as a result subsequent successive divisions had increased the excessive subdivision of land. Reaction was necessary, and to-day economists and sociologists are in favor of the concentration of scattered property, a policy adopted by the government and all its agents.[7]

The desirability of concentrating peasant holdings was no new discovery, and Carol's regime for all its new direction was not a bit more successful than previous regimes in doing anything about it. The policy of creating larger holdings, also no novelty, was faced as always by the difficulty of creating them without dispossessing peasants in the process. According to Bulgariu,

4. See, for example, Aureliu Lapedatu's article, "A Technical Study in Rumanian Cereals," *Correspondance économique roumaine* (April–June, 1938), pp. 1–28, in which the author discussed the manifest advantages of the large Rumanian farms in the use of technical equipment for rational cultivation.

5. The same thing is to be seen in the case of the cooperatives. According to A. Galan, "General Survey of the Co-operative Movement in Rumania," *Correspondance économique roumaine* (January–May, 1939), pp. 1–65, in 1939 one farmer in three was affiliated with one of the several agricultural cooperatives. Unquestionably the other two-thirds included the poorer peasants.

6. Valeriu Bulgariu, "Agrarian Policy in Rumania," *The Banker*, 49 (March, 1939), 344–348.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 346.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

311 44 per cent of the forest land, 27 per cent of the orchards, and 37
433 per cent of the vineyards. Of the area devoted to wheat (as of 1939) it lost 37 per cent, to maize 30 per cent, to sunflower 75 per cent, to hemp 43 per cent, and 86 per cent of the area devoted to soya. The regions, chiefly Bessarabia, in which the new industrial crops had been most intensively cultivated were lost. Finally, the whole economy was put on a war footing, first for Germany and then for Rumania itself.

185 Notwithstanding all Carol's laws and decrees, no real solutions
433 were found to the agrarian question. It is illuminating to look through the volumes of the *Enciclopedia Românei*, published in the last years of Carol's reign as a monument to the Rumanian rebirth. Amid all the fanfare of Rumania's marvelous progress and glowing future, the articles on agriculture and land tenure strike a discordant and often deeply pessimistic note.

To be sure, the trend in the 1930's was toward increasing industrialization as the solution to Rumania's economic difficulties, and in the long run, had the war not intervened, this might have brought beneficial results even to agriculture. As it was, however, much of the industrialization was achieved at the expense of agriculture, and for all its expansion it was neither bringing agriculture any great technical improvements nor beginning to absorb the excess agricultural population. The five-year plan and the laws to rationalize land tenure and consolidate holdings might have provided a healthier foundation for agriculture had they been carried out conscientiously, but there is little evidence that they meant anything more than many previous legislative acts which clutter the Rumanian statute books. It is doubtful whether the peasant would have benefited greatly from a plan ordained by divine providence if it had been left to the Carol administration to execute it. With all its attacks on "outworn" parties and its praise for the younger generation, the Carol dictatorship lacked the stature to be a modernizing dictatorship along the lines of Kemal Ataturk's regime. The new German orientation might have benefited Rumanian agriculture, but given the power relations it is more likely that Rumania would have become the object of an efficient colonial policy.

● 154 Among the social studies undertaken in the period of Carol's dictatorship there was one which makes a fitting conclusion to the Carolist period, and indeed illustrates the failure to master the agrarian question during the interwar years. In the summer and autumn of 1939 a Rumanian research team made a field study of the *plasă* (an administrative unit in a judeţ) Dâmbovnicul, in the south of the

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

judeţ of Argeş.[26] This plasă was selected and is of interest for a number of reasons. It lay midway between the Carpathians and the Danube Valley and was in the heart of Wallachia. Having closer communications than many regions with roads leading to the capital, it had long been under the commercial influences which have so profoundly affected Rumanian society; it was not a primitive untouched district but was showing the full effect of what the investigators called "Americanization." Its population was almost entirely Rumanian and almost entirely devoted to agriculture. It lay near Răteşti, the family estate of the Brătianus, and Topoloveni, Mihalache's town, and had consequently received a good deal of attention from the parties in their political campaigns. Hence, Dâmbovnicul, if not the average Rumanian plasă, was an excellent representative of an agricultural community of the Old Kingdom and displayed the principal problems peculiar to Rumania.

What were the conditions in this community in the summer of 1939? Over nine-tenths of the population was engaged in agriculture; in the remaining tenth there were more public officials than merchants, tradesmen, or artisans. Of the 9,400 heads of families, about two-thirds (6,681) were cultivators on their own land or estate owners; 772 worked the land in dijma, that is, under the old crop-sharing tenure; 571 were agricultural day laborers, 144 were farm hands, and only 30 were tenants. About 87 per cent of the land was agricultural; forests which had once been extensive had by this time been reduced below the local needs for firewood and timber. Wheat, maize, and oats occupied almost three-fourths of the arable land.

The density of agricultural population was somewhat below the average for Rumania, but there were just under 70 inhabitants dependent upon agriculture per square kilometer of agricultural land. Evidence of overpopulation was seen in the use of practically all the land for cereals, the small size of exploitations, and in the search for auxiliary sources of income. About 23 per cent of the families had less than one hectare of land, and 56 per cent less than 3 hectares. These small holdings were further subdivided into numerous strips; the properties between one and three hectares, for example, were composed on the average of 6 plots of .3 hectares each. For the level of cultivation in this region, 4–5 hectares were the minimum adequate to feed a family of 4–5 members, but only 22 per cent of the properties were over 5 hectares. Competition for land was intense, the terms for land worked in dijma were becoming increasingly severe,

26. Mihai Pop and A. Golopenţia, *Dâmbovnicul, o plasă din sudul Judeţului Argeş* (Bucarest, 1942).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

proposed measures was very similar to those brought forward repeatedly by various Rumanian governments in the preceding twenty-five years. Great publicity was given to state-operated agricultural machine stations which were to enable the peasant to mechanize his cultivation; from the beginning, however, this measure was regarded as a powerful potential lever in the hands of the state to direct agriculture. The promise of an agricultural machine industry was also a familiar item of earlier programs. Other recognizable projects were land reclamation, the creation of better experimental stations, improved agricultural education, more credit, a vigorous cooperative movement, development of agricultural industries, a scientific land survey, and the encouragement of animal husbandry.[28]

185 241

In 1945 the government created a National Cooperative Institute to assist agriculture, but its principal function appears to have been grain collection.[29] In November, 1946, appeared a new organ, REAZIM, an autonomous administration for developing agriculture, animal husbandry, and the use of agricultural machinery. REAZIM took over most of the state functions for agrarian improvement, rationalizing cultivation, supplying seeds and equipment, executing production plans, and managing agricultural machine stations.

[647 654]

Although many of these projects resembled those proposed by earlier regimes, it was obvious that the Communists had no intention of permitting Rumanian agriculture to proceed in its traditional rut. Even in the first phase of ostentatious silence about collective agriculture, the nature of the reforms, or rather the absence of certain reforms, provided an indication of developments to come. In its plans for agricultural improvement, the regime appears to have laid little stress on the desirability of consolidating holdings in private ownership, and the 1948 census showed the fragmentation of properties to be just as extreme as in 1941. The emphasis was upon increasing cereal output through mechanization rather than upon the intensified and diversified cultivation suitable to peasant farming. When, as a consequence of the 1946–47 famine, poor peasants began to sell their holdings, the government took steps to cancel sales to rich farmers. All these moves showed that it had no intention of fostering the growth of an independent, potentially capitalist peasantry on the

28. See, for example, the two pamphlets outlining the government's plans for intensifying livestock raising and for land reclamation: *Intensificarea creşterii animalelor în cadrul refacerii economice* (Bucarest, 1946), and *Îmbunătăţirile funciare în agricultura românească* (Bucarest, 1946).

29. In 1945 INCOOP was granted 57 billion lei for the collection of grain, of which 13 billion was for deliveries to the U.S.S.R., 8 billion to supply Soviet troops, 1 billion to supply the Rumanian army, and 35 billion for the civil population.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

231 For the majority of Rumania's peasants the most
433 valuable of all animals are his sheep, of which Greater Rumania possessed about 12,000,000. Both the wool and the meat of Rumanian sheep are, however, of a lower quality than those of Great Britain or New Zealand. Sheep's milk, and the cheese made from it, supplement the monotonous diet of the peasant.

[439] Of the 3,000,000 pigs in Greater Rumania most were kept in the New Territories and a large proportion of the country's pork production was exported. Apart from the Rumanian Mangalita, English Berkshires were bred in great numbers.

241 Considered as a whole the agriculture of Greater Rumania, favoured by good climatic conditions and great soil fertility, remained undeveloped owing to the general economic conditions. The peasantry did not possess the necessary implements, buildings or animals which could have secured profitable ex-
[452] ploitation of the soil. Financial help was difficult to obtain, and the loans that were granted were ruinous to the peasant, owing to the high rate of interest.
[453] Co-operatives were few. Some agricultural banks and associations confined to the German colonists in the Banat and in Transylvania were the only ones
[435] which succeeded. Agricultural prices were low and the peasant was often forced to sell his produce before the harvest to export trusts which dominated
[454] the market. The only assistance given by the government consisted in loans and seeds at reduced prices for the growing of certain crops, such as soya beans, for export in order to fulfil international trade
[439] agreements. During the last fifteen years Germany secured an ever greater influence upon Rumania's agriculture and took most of its exports.

CHAPTER I

228 in private waters. Supplemented by some 4,000 tons of imported fish, this provided nearly 1 kg. (2·2 lb.) per head of population, but, in fact, almost all the fish was consumed by the 5 million persons living in towns. The principal fish caught were sturgeon, carp, pike, eels and crayfish, the main fishing centres being Brăila, Tulcea and Ismail.

6. Food Industries

256 The chief food and agricultural-processing industries are milling, sugar manufacture, oilseed crushing and tobacco curing. While the milling industry was dispersed widely about the country in more than 15,000 small mills employing altogether over 37,000 persons (at 1930 census), the sugar industry was for the most part concentrated in the plain of the Old Kingdom. Of the 17 sugar 257 factories employing 10,000 workers, only one was in the Transylvanian districts lost to Hungary and five in the areas temporarily lost to the U.S.S.R. 258 The vegetable-oil industry, located chiefly in Bessarabia, was only partly carried on in factories, of which there were (on January 1st, 1939) 117, employing 2,026 workers. Among these, 34 were fitted both to extract crude oil and to refine it, six were exclusively refineries, while the remainder produced only crude oil. The rest of the industry consisted of some 2,000 hand, or animal-driven presses mostly owned by individual peasants or by shopkeepers. These primitive presses extracted only a low percentage of oil from the seeds, and consequently the cake—mainly sold for export—had an unusually high oil content. As regards 277 tobacco, both curing and cigarette manufacture [656] were subject to government licence and control. There were 29 factories (in 1930) employing 9,720 workers, but tobacco cultivation subsequently declined, so also doubtless did the numbers employed.

7. Agricultural Organisation

452 The history of the organisation of Rumanian 241 farmers is one of not too successful co-operatives 474 becoming transformed more and more into agencies for the execution of Government Control Schemes. [654] For many years there had been throughout the country a network of agricultural credit societies, co-operative in form but in practice directed by the State. These played an important rôle during the period of the Land Reform in helping the peasants by advances to buy and equip their newly acquired holdings. There was even some co-operative cultivation for a time, until the new peasant-owners could muster sufficient draught animals and implements. Besides this, there have been strong local co-operative unions especially among the [162] minority nationalities—the Hungarians in Transylvania, the Swabian and Saxons in the Banat and the Russian and Polish Jews in the Bucovina.

243 The credit societies revived in importance when, 474 after 1933, the Rumanian Government began the organisation of grain marketing. They became 452 the local agents of a Central Marketing Board through which all sales of grain had to be made 654 both for home consumption and for export. Whereas formerly grain prices slumped immediately after the harvest, most peasants, being obliged to sell their grain quickly, under the new scheme prices were stabilised throughout the year, and this brought a great improvement to peasants' [651] receipts. But the scheme and the societies were also used to collect the peasants' taxes (paid in grain) which did not increase the popularity of co-operation.

241
654

Alongside this organisation the State ran certain technical services for agriculture, distribution of tested seeds, control of weights and measures, provision of bull and stallion services from its own stud farms. This work, however, remained less developed than in other S.E. European countries.

8. Agricultural Exports

241
231
439

Rumania was the largest grain exporter in Europe. By value, grain accounted for over half the total of agricultural exports. Livestock products, mainly live pigs and cattle, amounted to approximately one-fifth of the total, the remainder consisting of peas, beans, oilseeds, oil and oilcake, eggs and small quantities of fruit. Quantities exported on the average in the years 1935 to 1938 are shown below :—

	*Exports of Principal Agricultural Commodities** *Average 1935-38* ('000 *metric tons*)
Wheat	686
Maize	543
Barley	297
Peas	21
Beans	43
Oilseeds	108
Vegetable oils ..	5
Oilcake	103
Cattle ('000 head) ..	48
Pigs ('000 head) ..	222
Eggs	10

* Pre-1939 frontiers.

241
439

It is of interest to note that, despite German hopes of a development in oilseed cultivation and exports, no increase had been achieved up to the eve of the war. German interest had succeeded in stimulating production and exports of soya beans, but there was no expansion in total oilseed exports owing to a decline in rape seed and to an increase in domestic consumption of oil.

German purchases of Rumanian agricultural exports were increasing in recent pre-war years. In 1939 the territories of Greater Germany took 25 per cent. of the wheat exports, half the feed grain and the bulk of the oilseeds. Italy also took appreciable quantities of grain.

9. Food Consumption

146
262

The Rumanian diet is perhaps the worst-balanced in south-east Europe. The outstanding feature is its high dependence on grain, which provides three-quarters of the calories and 70 per cent. of the protein. In the towns white wheat bread is eaten except by the very poor, whilst in the country wholemeal bread or maize is usual. Over large areas, particularly in the Old Kingdom, maize forms the chief food. (Taking the country as a whole maize consumption is two-thirds higher than wheat.) During the summer months, when work is very heavy, peasant families may eat as much as 3 kg. (6½ lb.) a head daily, almost always in the form of *mămăliga* (a kind of porridge).

The rest of the rural dietary consists chiefly of beans, some potatoes (especially in Transylvania), cabbage, beetroots, carrots, onions and a certain amount of cheese and milk. Consumption of all these foods is much too low by nutritional standards. Meat is rarely eaten, except at Christmas time when a pig is killed—for the rest of the year small amounts of fat salted pork are used, more or less as a flavouring. Some fish is eaten in villages near rivers. Vegetable oils—mainly sunflower—and pig fats are used for cooking; butter is rarely eaten.

ticularly at the oil industry, prescribed the manner in which they were to be exploited. The development of these resources was to be entrusted to corporations or "régies" in which the Government as well as private capital, both Rumanian and foreign, would participate, but in such a way as to permit of the majority of shares being controlled by the Rumanian Government. At the same time laws were enacted for increasing the utilization of methane gas (C.H.4) which was already in use both for lighting and heating purposes in Transylvania, and which is available as a large source of industrial power, its output being calculated to amount to as much as 2,000 million cubic metres per annum, the consumption of which for 1930 reached over 503 million c. metres. The methods used by the Liberal Party to secure a mainhold of the supplies of methane gas are particularly illuminating of the mentality of the leaders of that party, as they were revealed by M. Madgearu in the Rumanian Chamber in 1929. An exclusive monopoly was conferred on a group of "Liberals," who supplied the gas to industrialists at arbitrary prices so as to force the latter out of the market and leave this to rival firms belonging to adepts of the "Liberal" Party. All the efforts of the Liberal Party to promote the nationalization of this gas were aimed at securing the economic mastery of Transylvanian industries. A similar law was also passed dealing with water power, the reserves of which are estimated at 5,206,225 H.P., of which amount 735,425 h.p. represent 50 per cent of the force produced at the Iron Gates by the Danube, 1,422,465 h.p. by the tributaries of the Theiss, 2,164,748 h.p. by the Danube tributaries between the Timish and the Sereth, and the remaining 884,665 h.p. by the Sereth and its tributaries. Of all this potential force only about 52,000 h.p. is actually in use. The State owned practically the totality of the railway lines, most of the extensive fisheries in the marshes and delta of the Danube, the salt mines of Ocnele Mari, Slanic, Uioara and Targu Ocna, which are exploited as a State monopoly and assure to it a revenue of some 700 million lei per annum, over 75 per cent of the entire vast timberlands, several coal and iron mines, the gold mines in the Bihor mountains, the annual output of which is about 2,500 to 3,000 kilogrammes,

471 315 382 375 471 666 376 471 665 655

1 July, 1924 — Ana 125

655 maritime and fluvial shipping companies, the docks, ports, warehouses, and grain elevators of Braila, Galatz, and Constantsa.

661 Laws were drafted aiming at the commercialization and
471 exploitation, either independently or in co-operation with the State, of these State-owned properties, as well as of other
186 national resources. But the purpose which actuated the entire economic legislation enacted by the Bratianu Governments was that of preventing foreign capital from acquiring a dominant position in the country. This policy of restraining the activities of foreign capital by legal restrictions was not due to the fact that Rumania might be imperilled by foreign capital securing a preponderating influence, but mainly because the Bratianu party aimed at reserving for themselves the monopoly of such profits as could be made through the exploitation of the national resources. The direct result of this policy was to sink whatever Rumanian capital existed in big enterprises, while agriculture was entirely neglected, and to deplete completely the liquid assets of the country to such an extent that its credit organization was dislocated.

433 It is sad to record that during the years when there was a
457 plethora of capital seeking investment which could have been easily attracted to Rumania with the object of endowing her with an adequate equipment for the development of her immense resources, such narrow and selfish views should have prevailed among her rulers. Indeed, had the opposite policy been adopted it would have secured prosperity to her even during the lean years which are now upon us. Foreign capital naturally fought shy, and refused to be enticed into enterprises in which it was not allowed to exercise legitimate control, which in many instances would have proved both salutary and indispensable. Rumania's natural wealth certainly provides a basis for industrial activity, there is an abundance of raw material, fuel, as well as a supply of cheap labour, but there is a serious deficiency of capital, which is reflected by the high rates of interest
426 prevalent. Commercial bills were discounted at rates vary-
437 ing between 18 per cent and 30 per cent, and first mortgages
454 were concluded on the basis of an average interest of 20 per

241 the peasants and the reduced 1942 sowings both
656 of grain and of sugar-beet indicated continued
435 dissatisfaction. Finally, by the spring of 1943 a wiser ratio was reached, agricultural prices being four times as high as in 1939 and wholesale prices in general three and a half times as high. Nevertheless, this very considerable measure of inflation
[453] has shaken public confidence in the value of money so that peasants increasingly resort to barter transactions.

●[655] In the hope of obtaining better control over grain supplies the Government in the autumn of 1942 nationalised the grain trade, later they relaxed this to the extent of leaving the export business to a few selected firms and the internal collection to the Army and to the National Institute of Co-operation. This body handled the pre-war grain marketing scheme, and their
[563] activities—because of the expulsion of Jews from wholesale and retail trade—have recently developed rapidly in the supply of seeds to peasants (80,000 tons of seed distributed in 1942) as well as consumers' goods to peasants and townspeople. But it still proved difficult to extract enough food from the peasants to feed the towns. For the 1943 harvest detailed regulations were made concerning the quantities the peasant might keep for seed, for his family and for his animals, and threshing operations were subjected to inspection. Yet these rules could not in practice be administered.

423 It is now generally agreed in Rumania that the
471 smallness of the holdings has been a principal obstacle to effective organisation of agriculture in war-time, and that a change to larger units of production is needed. Any approach to collectivisation on the Soviet model, however, would be regarded as contradictory to the land reform policy and a threat to the Rumanian State. The official policy, though it has not yet taken its final form, is to maintain private property but to proceed no further with expropriation and division of large estates, and to maintain existing medium holdings by prohibiting their sub-division for inheritance or other reasons. Schemes for the consolidation of strips are also contemplated for a more opportune moment. Further, in order to
474 increase production and to improve the peasants' methods and standards of life, communal farming associations, known as *obştii*, are to be formed. In these associations, farming equipment is to be pooled so that the small-holder would have the same resources as the large farmer. Each *obştie* is to embrace a village and perform all the functions of a co-operative, including joint purchase and sale, use of breeding animals, processing of crops, etc. Villages which are prepared to form themselves into *obştii* and to undertake to work the land according to State directions, are promised tractors, seed and breeding stock without payment. In this way it is hoped that some of the advantages of collectivisation may be achieved while retaining those of individual ownership. But, unless accompanied by far-reaching industrial development, the plan can but aggravate rural unemployment. It is not known how this innovation has been received by the peasants. It was reported in April 1943 that 270 of these communal associations had been formed—an insignificant number—and it is believed that the Government is allocating to them some of the tractors imported from Germany in the war years.*

241 The success of the *obştii* plan, and indeed of any plan for up-grading Rumanian agriculture, depends

* In June, 1943, a temporary ban was placed on the formation of any new *obştie*, because there was insufficient agricultural machinery to supply to them.

CHAPTER IV

327 compared with the following annual pre-war figures:

Year	'000 tons
1936	225
1937	241
1938	326
1939	383

4. Iron and Steel Consumption

The limited native iron and steel production, which was never sufficient to keep the consuming industries fully supplied, became an increasing impediment with the rapid development of these industries during the last few years. Iron and steel products had therefore to be imported at [433] the rate of 2/300,000 tons a year. The outbreak of war in Europe, and consequent restriction of supplies meant a falling off of imports, so that an acute shortage developed. During 1942, however, the situation improved somewhat in that Germany was reported to have sent a total of 130,000 tons of iron and steel products to Rumania.

5. German Penetration

327 A small degree of penetration into the Ru-
manian iron and steel industry has been achieved
439 by the Hermann Göring Werke, which, after the
partition of Czechoslovakia, acquired Czech in-
473 terests in Reşiţa amounting to 6 per cent., which were later increased to 20 per cent.

In 1941 a company with 50 per cent. German and the remainder Rumanian capital, was formed to take over the management of Reşiţa and its associated companies. The Malaxa Works later also came under the organisation of this company.

C. LEAD AND ZINC

1. General

328 In pre-war years Rumania was practically
439 self-sufficient in lead but not in zinc, since she possessed no zinc-smelting facilities. Her production of zinc concentrates was exported, mainly to Poland, part of the metal content being re-imported after smelting. Belgium and Poland were her chief suppliers of metallic zinc.

2. Mines and Plant

316 The mining of lead and zinc constituted only a small industry in Rumania. Part of the production, almost 50 per cent. in the case of lead, was obtained incidentally to the working of gold and silver ores. The principal producers were [655] the State-owned mines Baia Sprie, Capnic, Văratec, Valea Roşie, Dealul Crucii, and the Herja mine owned by Phœnix S.A.; all are situated in the Baia Mare district in North Transylvania. The Herja ores averaged approximately 8 per cent. lead and 14 per cent. zinc, whilst ores from the other mines averaged only 4 per cent. lead and 10 per cent. zinc.

135 There are other deposits in the Transylvanian Erzgebirge, where galena and blende are associated with gold occurrences, in the Hunedoara, Banat, and Severin districts, and at Cârlibaba in the Bucovina.

328 Rumania possessed two lead smelters for the treatment of her production of concentrates: the Phœnix plant at Lucaci, with a capacity for about 5,000 tons of crude lead and 3,000 tons of refined lead, and a plant at Feriza belonging to Uzinele Metallurgica din Firiza de Jos. There

[22a]

399 In the middle of 1941, under German influence, the Rumanian Government proceeded to rationalise the industry, and a Board was set up to control the country's most important armaments and aircraft factories. Under this scheme German managers or supervisors went into the aircraft factories and their main activity has since been the repair of damaged aircraft, though some new production continues. For instance, in August 1942 it was reported that an order for 200 I.A.R. fighter aircraft with 1,200 h.p. engines had been placed on behalf of the Rumanian Air Force.

[439] Rumania is still buying Italian (Savoia Marchetti) aircraft, German gliders, and various components from Germany and Switzerland.

Apart from the aircraft factories listed below, facilities for complete overhauls of airframes and engines exist at the Aviation Arsenal in Bucarest, and it has been reported that a former jute factory in Bucarest is now utilised for repair work, and that the Asam-Pipera works, also in Bucarest, are repairing engines.

Information regarding the number of workers engaged in the aircraft industry is too fragmentary to enable any estimate of their total number to be made.

[655] The main producing companies are as follows :—

(a) *I.A.R.* (*Industria Aeronautică Română*), the principal Rumanian aircraft company, is State-owned. It has a factory at Braşov (87 miles N.N.E. of Bucarest) for the manufacture of aircraft and aero-engines, and also produces high-precision tools of a very good quality. The factory occupies a site of some 125 acres, adjoining an airfield about 3 or 4 miles north-east of the central station of Braşov. It is a well-equipped plant and possessed considerable stocks of tools and raw materials at the beginning of the war.

The aircraft, produced before the war at a rate of about 8 monthly, consisted mainly of Potez 25 and I.A.R. 15 and 16 single-seater fighters and an I.A.R. type of four-seater commercial aircraft. The engine department produced under licence, at the rate of 25 monthly, an adaptation of the Gnôme-et-Rhône 14N. A licence was also held for Jumo 211 engines, but none of these appear to have been built.

[439] Since the war this factory has been under German control, exercised through a branch of the Hermann Göring Works. The main types of aircraft produced are I.A.R. 80 and 101 single-engined fighters and the Potez 63. Engine production appears to range between 20 and 30 a month, though the German management is trying to double that figure. Airframe output recently appears to have been about 20 monthly. In addition, a good deal of repair work is done for Germany.

The company depends largely upon imported components. It has a propeller department which, about the end of 1941, was transferred to a former paper factory in Azuga; its output, however, does not appear to have been equal to requirements, for in July, 1942, propellers were being imported from Germany.

(b) *S.E.T.* (*Societatea pentru Exploatări Tehnice Industria Naţională Aeronautică S.A.R.*) known up till September 1938 as I.N.A., i.e., *Industria Naţională Aeronautică S.A.R.* This company was founded in 1937, sponsored by

[27 b]

A. TEXTILES AND TEXTILE FIBRES

248 In the years preceding the war, Rumania had been making efforts, with some success, to reduce the degree of her previous dependence on imports of textile fibres. The cotton crop of fair average quality, though still far short of the expanded mill capacity, was gradually increasing, while [236] indigenous wool supplies—though chiefly of coarse quality—were in the main enough for peasant clothing. Home-grown crops of hemp and flax were sufficient for internal needs, while jute, coir and hard hemps were imported to complete the requirements of industrial fibres.

248 439 The cessation of imports and loss of territory to her neighbours have entirely changed the supply picture, and combined with demands by Germany for imports have greatly reduced the textile "standard of living."

1. Cotton

With the development of her processing industry, Rumania had increased raw cotton imports and was successfully encouraging domestic cotton production. By 1938, imports at some 21,000 tons were about five times larger than those of 1932, and the domestic crop yield, less than 20 tons in 1932, had risen to about 600 tons. The principal sources of raw cotton were Egypt, the U.S.A., and Great Britain.

With the outbreak of war, Rumanian imports generally were curtailed, the combined total of raw cotton and cotton materials being 14,700 tons in 1940, and 13,800 tons in 1941. Thereafter, Rumania was dependent on such supplies as she could obtain by barter, lower grade cotton from Turkey and Italy and cotton and staple fibre union cloth from Italy.

248 Since 1938 the Rumanian cotton crop has continued to increase, though it is still very short of normal requirements, while the cession of some 8,000 ha. (20,000 acres) of cotton land to Bulgaria in 1940, and unfavourable weather conditions, tended to restrict the cotton-growing programme.

Prior to the territorial changes of 1940, cotton was grown close to the Danube at Craiova, and especially in the Southern Dobruja. With the cession of most of this land to Bulgaria, cotton is now mostly grown on the north bank of the Danube, at Banloc near Timisoara in the Banat and in the districts of Teleorman, Vlasca and Ialomita. The crop in 1939 was 2,200 tons from less than 10,000 ha. (24,000 acres) and in 1942 was estimated at 5,000 tons from about 20,000 ha. (50,000 acres). A further increase in area has been planned, but the harvest, particularly in the north, is largely dependent upon climatic conditions. The type of cotton now produced is considered superior to Indian, and similar in quality to American.

288 The chief mill centres are at Arad, Bucarest, Cluj, Iasi, Lugoj and Timisoara; of these, Cluj is the only one to have been affected by the transfer of territory. Cotton supplies are dis- [655] tributed under the direction of the Department of Industry and Trade by "Romacotin," which also has a monopoly of purchase from producers at prices fixed by the General Price Commissariat. Cotton may be sold only to these Government agencies to whom it has to be delivered by

288 31st December. There appears to be a good deal of passive resistance and hoarding.

Cotton spindles had increased from 35,600 in 1927 to 250,000 in 1938, and altogether there were 18 mills of some importance. Power looms in 1938 are believed to have amounted to about 16,000. The apparent disproportion of spindle compared with loom capacity was due to Rumania being a fairly important buyer of foreign yarns, imports being 23,000 tons in 1936, 27,000 in 1937, 14,000 in 1938 and 15,000 in 1939. About 70 per cent. of these yarns were of coarse cotton, called "peasants' yarns," for use in the handicraft industry only, and imported mainly from Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy and Great Britain.

2. Wool

236 Rumania, which had the largest wool-growing industry in S.E. Europe, was also the most important consumer. Production of raw wool in 1938 was about 20,000 tons (greasy) and imports were about 1,000 tons, and of wool yarn about 2,500 tons. On account of its coarse quality, not much more than one-third of the domestic wool clip is ordinarily used in the mechanised industry, the bulk being consumed in village handicraft. Since the war and subsequent loss of territory, [233] the sheep population of Rumania is believed to have declined by some 25 to 30 per cent., and all imports have ceased, so that the industry is now entirely dependent upon the reduced domestic clip.

288 Rumania was never a large importer of woollen cloth, and the weaving industry was always more highly developed than the spinning. The output of cloth in 1936 and 1937 being 6,000 tons and 6,600 tons respectively. In 1938, there were 127,000 mechanised spindles and 4,300 looms, the chief mill centres, in order of importance, being at Buhusi (district of Neamţi), Braşov, Timişoara, Bacău, Bucarest and Sibiu.

655 Both the raw material and the woollen-textile
236 industry are nominally under strict Government
288 control, as by a decree in April 1942, the numbers of sheep and lambs and the quantity of shorn wool must be declared each year, and the wool itself must be surrendered to collecting centres at specified dates. As the due date for the 1942 collection had to be extended month by month up till January 10th, 1943, and all penalties abrogated, the success of the scheme appears to have been doubtful. No wool can be bought or sold except by permit of the Ministry of National Economy, and distribution to the mills is entrusted to an organisation known as "OFIL" (*Oficiul Lânei*), a company with a capital of 10 million lei, and including all firms concerned in the preparation of wool.

3. Hemp

248 In 1937 the area under hemp, which is grown chiefly in the Banat, was 50,000 ha. (123,000 acres) and the outturn 27,000 tons, most of which was consumed internally. Exact details of wartime plantings are not known, but are reported as 45,000 ha. (112,000 acres) and 32,500 ha. (80,300 acres) in 1941 and 1942, and the yield at about 21,000 and 20,000 tons respectively. For 1943, farmers have been urged to plant more hemp—the "national textile"—in order to cover clothing,

A. RAILWAYS

I. Pre-War Conditions

496

1. Communications

Before the outbreak of the present war, the Rumanian State Railways' system was as follows:

	km.	miles
Total	11,375	7,053
of which:		
Standard gauge ..	10,715	6,643
Narrow gauge ..	660	410

More than half of this mileage had been acquired following the 1914-18 war, when

5,324 km. (3,299 miles) in Transylvania
1,234 km. (765 miles) in Bessarabia
555 km. (344 miles) in Northern Bucovina

were transferred to Rumania. As a break of gauge existed between the railways of old Rumania and those in the former Russian State of Bessarabia, conversion to the 4ft. 8½in. gauge had to be undertaken. Short sections of line are owned by 17 private companies, but all the lines of any importance are State-owned.

[655]

Rumania was relatively well furnished with railway communications. The length of railway line per 100 sq. km. in 1936 was 3.8 km. (6.3 miles per 100 sq. miles), the same as in Yugoslavia, while in Bulgaria it was 3.2 km. (5.1 miles per 100 sq. miles), and the commercial requirements of the country were adequately served thereby. Since the 1914-18 war, the difficulties connected with the unification of three different systems of railway (Hungarian, Russian and Rumanian) were gradually overcome, and with the conversion of the Russian-gauge track in Bessarabia, the railway organisation became more or less standardised. Three of Rumania's five frontiers were crossed by main lines and the other two by branch lines.

1. *Polish Frontier*

This was crossed by the main Bucarest-Cernăuţi line at Cernăuţi, and was formerly the direct line for through traffic from Bucarest to Warsaw, but the conversions of the railway system in Russo-Poland from standard to 5 ft. gauge in the autumn of 1939, rendered through traffic to Warsaw by this district route impossible without transhipment.

2. *Hungarian Frontier*

The main lines Bucarest—Arad—Curtici and Bucarest—Oradea—Episcopia Bihor provided direct communication between Bucarest and Western Europe via Budapest.

3. *Yugoslavian Frontiers*

Through traffic from Bucarest to Western Europe via Italy and the Simplon Tunnel was served by the main-line route, Bucarest—Timişoara—Jimbolia.

4. *Bulgarian Frontier*

The only direct railway connection between Bucarest and Sofia was by a roundabout route from Bucarest through the Dobruja. The shortest route was by train to Giurgiu, whence ferry steamers cross the Danube to the Bulgarian railway at Ruse.

5. *Russian Frontier*

There was only one frontier crossing, at Tighina—Tiraspol, served by the main line to Iaşi.

[39 b]

496 whence there was a slow train service to Tighina. Change of gauge took place at Tighina and Tiraspol, necessitating transhipment of both passenger and goods traffic at one or other of these points.

From a strategic point of view, the railway system of Romania suffered from three main disabilities :—

(a) Out of the total of 11,375 km. (7,063 miles) only 491 km. (304 miles) were double tracked.

(b) The railway system of the country was originally constructed to serve the needs of Romania and Hungary individually, and on account of topographical and political difficulties communications between the two countries were limited to the minimum requirements. As a result, communications across the Carpathian Mountains were quite inadequate, consisting only of three single-line railways.

(c) The railway system of Transylvania was constructed with a view to the defence of the old Hungarian eastern frontier along the Carpathians, and is, in consequence, particularly ill-adapted for north-to-south movements.

[655] The Rumanian State Railways (*Regia Autonomă a Căilor Ferate Române*—in short C.F.R.), set up in 1929, was directed by an Administrative Council in Bucarest, consisting of 11 members, including a representative of the Minister of Communications. In addition, there was a delegate of the Minister of War and a Government Commissioner with an advisory voice and the right to veto all decisions of the Council. For administrative and maintenance purposes, the railways were divided up into four separate Managing Directions at Bucarest, Timişoara, Cluj and Iaşi.

2. Principal Routes

The principal railway routes are set out below :—

1. Jimbolia (Yugoslav frontier)—Timişoara—Craiova—Bucarest, of comparatively recent reconstruction and relatively well maintained.

2. Curtici—Arad—Vintul-de-Jos—Sighişoara—Braşov—Bucarest, which is a main route from the Hungarian frontier.

3. Episcopia Bihor—Cluj—Teiuş—Sighişoara—Braşov—Bucarest, a main route from the Hungarian frontier Episcopia Bihor (Budapest and Vienna) to Bucarest, using, between Teiuş and Bucarest, the same line as route 2.

4. Orăşeni—Cernăuţi—Paşcani—Adjud—Mărăşeşti—Buzau—Ploeşti—Bucarest. This was formerly the direct route between Bucarest and Warsaw, and is a natural route for traffic between Eastern and Central Rumania (including the oilfields) and Eastern and Northern Germany.

5. Chişinău—Iaşi—Tecuci—Buzău—Bucarest. This line, as from Iaşi, was reconstructed a few years ago.

6. Chişinău—Reni—Galaţi—Brăila—Buzău—Bucarest.

7. Constanţa—Feteşti—Cuiniţa—Bucarest. This line, connecting Bucarest with the Black Sea port of Constanţa, was reconstructed a few years ago.

[39c]

505 trade is carried on the Danube to European
439 markets, Germany in particular, and, with the exception of an exceedingly limited traffic with Turkey, and a few intermittent shipments of oil to enemy ports in the Aegean Sea, Rumania's foreign sea-borne trade has been brought virtually to a standstill.

In addition to traffic in the Black Sea with U.S.S.R., Bulgarian and Turkish ports, Rumania in pre-war days had important commercial relations with most European and other countries overseas, the trade routes being via the Dardanelles, Mediterranean, Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar.

2. Mercantile Marine

505 All merchant-shipping activities are controlled
[652] by the Ministry of Air and Marine. Rumania's ocean-going mercantile marine in 1939 was constituted as follows :—

		G.R.T.
6	cargo and passenger motor vessels	27,062
16	cargo steamers	67,193
3	steam tankers	14,737
25	Total	108,992

[655] Of the 19 cargo steamers and tankers, 11 were oil-fired and 8 coal burners. Fourteen of these vessels were owned by the Rumanian State Maritime Service (*Servicial Maritim Rumân*), the principal shipping company in Rumania, whilst the three tankers belonged to the Steaua Romana Petroleum Company of Bucarest. The remainder were privately owned.

[648] Consequent upon her entry into the war Rumania's mercantile marine came under Axis control and most of her vessels are trading for German and Italian account, partly in the Adriatic and Aegean, and partly in the Black Sea.

A statement of Rumania's estimated non-tanker merchant-shipping resources on the 30th April, 1943, follows :—

ESTIMATED RUMANIAN MERCANTILE MARINE RESOURCES (NON-TANKER) UNDER AXIS CONTROL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA AT 30TH APRIL, 1943.

Tonnage Category	*No. of Vessels*	*Total G.R.T.*
300/499	3	378
500/999	—	—
1,000	2	2,798
2,000	2	4,976
3,000	3	10,170
4,000	—	—
5,000	2	11,395
6,000	3	20,230
Aggregate ..	15	50,147

[723] As to her tanker tonnage, two vessels aggregating 11,705 G.R.T. were seized and are now in Allied service, whilst the third, of 3,032 G.R.T., was sunk in December, 1941, in the Aegean Sea.

3. Ports

504 The chief ports for sea-going vessels are Constanța on the Black Sea and Brăila and Galați on the Danube, which both handle river shipping as well.

[42b]

133 trained pilots is compulsory, while the barge tows
502 have to be broken up into smaller units. This sector of the Danube cannot be negotiated at night, which constitutes an enormous hindrance for large-scale traffic. In order to speed up the traffic, the use of suspension railways and locomotives on rails laid along the river bank was introduced before the war, but the system has met with only moderate success.

[503] Navigation in the Maritime sector of the Danube is affected by silting up—particularly in the autumn—and constant dredging has to be carried out in the Sulina branch to maintain sufficient depth for passage of vessels up to Galaţi. The depth of this sector was 24 ft. in 1939, permitting the entry of vessels of medium draught only. Danube navigation is held up for varying periods between November and March by ice, averaging 30-50 days, and occasionally even for 90 days.

497 There are no permanent bridges on the Danube to connect Rumania with Bulgaria. However, a Rumanian-Bulgarian Commission was established in 1942 to remedy this deficiency by arranging for the construction of a bridge, which will take five years to complete, between Giurgiu and Ruse. In the meantime a ferry system is in use between Giurgiu and Ruse carrying important supplies of oil for the German forces in Greece.

3. River Ports

503 There are in all some 38 river ports, of which the
504 most important, all on the Danube (from west to east), are as follows :—

Moldova	Oltenița
Orşova	Brăila
Turnu Severin	Galaţi
Giurgiu	Sulina

Since the war started considerable improvements have already been made on the Danube. This is of special significance for, though this waterway is of little use for Rumanian internal traffic, since the closing of the sea route between Rumania and North Germany, it has become vitally important for the carrying of bulky transport. As early as 1940 a scheme for the rationisation of Danube traffic was put into operation, and the installations of Giurgiu, the main Danube port for oil transport, were improved.

To avoid congestion at Giurgiu, the Danube ports of New Moldova and Orşova have been enlarged. Internal traffic has been diverted to Oltenița, which is also used for the unloading of incoming traffic. The construction of new harbour installations is being carried out by a German-Rumania company.

4. Organisation of Inland Water Shipping

508 Rumanian Danube shipping is under State
656 control, and organisation is carried out by firms
[255] which are partly State-owned and partly owned by private individuals. The most important company is the State-owned "N.F.R." (*Navigațiunea Fluvială Română*), and of lesser importance are the privately owned companies "S.R.D." (*S.A.R. de Navigație pe Dunăre*) and "Sind" (*Società Italiana di Navigazione Danubiana*).

505 All Rumanian shipping companies are members
648 of the Danube Shipping Pool, which is under German supervision, headed by the *Deutsche Donauschiffahrtsgruppe*, which is closely connected with the Hermann Goering-Werke für Binnenschiffahrt. The importance of the Danube Pool (exclusive of the Tanker Pool) will be realised when it is borne in mind that between 1932-1937 the freight carried annually by its vessels on the

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

that an endless series of palliatives and half-measures would take the place of real reforms, even so vigorous a critic of Rumanian institutions as Dobrogeanu-Gherea held that the presence of liberal institutions set Rumania in favorable contrast to tsarist Russia.[31]

In short, while economic and social tensions precipitated the 1907 revolt, the political situation prevented it from becoming more than a social eruption. It remained a revolt and not the initial stage of a revolution.

The Aftermath of 1907

The peasant uprising frightened the rulers of Rumania into attempting some measures of reform. A law on agricultural contracts was designed to protect the peasant by regulating agreements between him and the landlord or tenant, by prohibiting certain forms of rent in labor, by instituting communal grazing lands, and by establishing regional committees to fix agricultural wages and rents. This law was never really applied and quickly fell altogether into disuse. The proprietors preferred informal and unwritten agreements, which the law did not cover, and few peasants dared to demand application of the law for fear of being driven from the estate.[32]

A second law created a state-supported Rural Office to aid in the transfer of land from large properties to the peasants. Up to the beginning of 1912, however, the Rural Office had bought only 76,000 hectares, had divided up 15,000 hectares, and had sold to the peasants only 6,500 hectares.[33] A third law, by limiting the size of leases to 4,000 hectares of cultivable land, attacked the large agricultural trusts held in lease. A fourth law established cooperatives for renting land. It was probably the most successful; between 1908 and 1916 the land rented by the cooperatives increased from 133,000 hectares to 410,000 hectares.[34]

Although these laws were heralded as introducing a new conception into Rumanian life, *socialism de stat*—state intervention on behalf of the peasants—they really provide only examples of Rumanian legislative escapism. They but scratched the surface of the problem and were "fated to disappear without trace in the quicksand of Rumanian public life." [35] The state socialism proclaimed by the Liberals had very little to do with socialism in any Western sense of the term but more closely resembled the paternalistic policies of mercantilism.

31. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
32. Ilie S. Disconescu, *Chestiunea ţărănească în Romînia* (Bucarest, 1926), p. 118.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 120.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
35. Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

and the collapse of the Eastern Front, Rumania was in a hopeless military position, and in March, 1918, it sued for peace. The pro-German Alexandru Marghiloman, who had remained behind in Bucarest, was entrusted with a new government. This government dissolved the constituent assembly, and Marghiloman declared that "the whole agrarian problem must be taken up anew from the beginning." 175 423

During the brief term of the Marghiloman government, Constantin Garoflid, Minister of Agriculture, introduced a series of agrarian measures: obligatory leases, the reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture, and the organization of agricultural workers. Garoflid, though a Conservative and a landowner, had long been opposed to the latifundiary system in Rumania and desired to build up a prosperous medium peasantry. He regarded the 1917 amendment as "not a scientific work but an electoral manifesto." Although previously recognizing the need for expropriation, he considered such an extreme measure unsuited to wartime conditions and advocated forced leases of land to the peasants as a temporary solution. Much in Garoflid's program was conducive to a rational development of Rumanian agriculture. He may even have had in mind a progressive series of reforms, but his proposals were open to the criticism that in Rumania a policy advocating such moderation and gradualness most often meant doing nothing at all. His program, however, was not even to be begun.

The collapse of the Central Powers in the autumn of 1918, Rumania's reentry into the war, and the withdrawal of Mackensen's forces again reversed the situation. The Marghiloman government was dismissed and its laws declared null and void. With the breakdown of the Central Powers, chaos spread through eastern Europe. Revolutionary conditions prevailed in Russia, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In Rumania a dry year, combined with the dislocations caused by the war and the German occupation, left the peasants hard pressed for food. The action of the Marghiloman government in dissolving the constituent assembly had increased their doubts in the good faith of any government. Tension was heightened by the revolutionary activity among the Rumanians in the neighboring regions of Transylvania, Bucovina, and Bessarabia, which had been or were shortly to be incorporated in Greater Rumania. [178]

The Agrarian Reforms of 1918–21

Immediately after the armistice, on November 12, 1918, King Ferdinand issued a new proclamation reaffirming his pledge of 1917. 175 423 656

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 Under the pressure of events the government did not bother to follow
656 the formalities prescribed in the 1917 amendment but quickly drafted
423 a decree-law, to be ratified subsequently by the parliament. This decree-law of December 15, 1918, laid down the norms under which land was immediately to be expropriated. Some of the leading provisions were as follows:[8]

a) As in the constitutional amendment, arable crown and mortmain land as well as foreign and absentee properties were completely expropriated.

b) The amount of 2,000,000 hectares was to be expropriated on a sliding scale from private properties of over 100 hectares. This rather arbitrary scale did represent an advance upon the 1917 amendment in limiting all properties to 500 hectares, but it made no provision for geographical differences, relative land hunger, or rational organization of estates. The law based the expropriation on properties rather than on proprietorship, to the benefit of the landowner with multiple holdings. Moreover, the relation between the scale of expropriation and the 2,000,000 hectares to be obtained was not accurately computed, and the expropriation actually fell short by some 450,000 hectares.

c) Compensation for expropriated land was to be based on a number of factors: price of sale in the region for five years prior to 1916, regional level of rent, evaluation by credit institutions, net income per hectares, etc., but was not to exceed twenty times the regional rental rate. Payments to proprietors were to be made by 5 per cent state bonds, redeemable in fifty years. The state was to contribute up to 85 per cent of the cost.

d) Peasant associations were to be created to serve as temporary recipients of the transferred land. The law went into little detail as regards resettlement, which was covered later by the law of 1921.

175 Ion I. C. Brătianu, who had headed the government on Decem-
423 ber 14, 1918, resigned on September 27, 1919, in a dispute with the
185 Allies on the peace settlement. King Ferdinand accepted the resignation and formed a nonparty cabinet under General Vaitoianu to hold a general election. This election, virtually the first to be uncontrolled in Rumanian history, produced surprising results. The Liberals lost most of their seats in the Old Kingdom, and after some delay a bloc made up of the newly formed Peasant party and the National party of Transylvania assumed office.

During its brief term this government, with the Transylvanian Vaida-Voevod as Premier and Ion Mihalache as Minister of Agricul-

8. Full summaries of this and the subsequent agrarian law of 1921 are given in Vlaccoseca, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-204, and Mitrany, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-182.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 433 covered by this law were permitted to purchase public land at a discount, were exempted from duties on imported machinery, and received reduced transportation rates and cheap fuel. In 1923 the Liberals introduced a National Industrial Credit Association for the purpose of granting credit to manufacturers and of encouraging industrial development; the government owned 20 per cent of its stock, the National Bank 30 per cent, and private investors 50 per cent. Tariffs, as has been mentioned, were designed to protect industry from foreign competitors.

665 656 In their industrial activities the Liberals most clearly demonstrated their suspicion of foreign capital. This suspicion was nothing new. In the 1890's the Liberals, then in opposition, had led a successful campaign against granting concessions to the Standard Oil-Diskonto Gesellschaft consortium.[46] In the 1920's they maintained they were not hostile to foreign capital but would not be dominated by it. In 1923 Vintilă Brătianu protested to a foreign correspondent:

> It would be madness to suppose that we can develop the country without the help of foreign capital. We need it in every form to develop mineral resources, water power, and industry. We also require things which must be paid for in foreign money. But we want this capital to operate within the lines of a general policy which is approved of by the state and which accords to the interests of the country. We do not want the type of investor who comes to exploit the country simply to make money, but one who has a feeling for our national evolution and keeps our interests at heart. We want to be treated as an adult and not as a minor.[47]

[671] Nevertheless, the Brătianus were accused both by the opposition in Rumania and by foreign investors of being economic xenophobes. The accusations are based largely on a series of four "nationalization" laws passed in 1924:[48] a law for the commercial exploitation of state enterprises (June 6, 1924), laws on water power (June 23) and other sources of energy (July 1), and a mining law (July 3).

These laws, which covered a wide range of industrial activities—hydroelectric power, natural gas, petroleum, mines, railroads, river navigation, postal services, telephones and telegraphs, and government monopolies—had generally the same provisions. Invested foreign capital in the enterprises could not exceed 40 per cent; the remaining 60 per cent was to be covered by state and private Rumanian

46. C. G. Rommenhöller, *Groß-Rumänien* (Berlin, 1926), p. 434.
47. *Times* (London), May 19, 1923.
48. A French text of these four laws is given in *L'Économiste roumain*, Nos. 2-6 (1924).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

capital. At least three-fourths of the personnel and two-thirds of the boards of directors were to be Rumanians. Since the subsoil had been nationalized under the constitution, all mines and oil wells were in the form of concessions which would ultimately revert without indemnity to the state, although existing enterprises were to be guaranteed their holdings for a period of fifty years. Because of its importance to the oil industry, the mining law created the greatest stir and the most complaint from foreign investors.

The Liberals' suspicion of foreign capital was not altogether groundless; pre-1914 foreign investments in the Balkans, while of vital importance to their development, were entangled in the play of power politics. In view of subsequent actions in other states and in Rumania itself, the 1924 laws must be considered as quite mild. But at the time they were regarded as inhospitable and evoked formal protests from abroad and lavish criticism at home. Essentially, however, the question was not whether the Liberals were justified in their suspicions nor whether the opposition was right in charging the Liberals with personal greed, but whether Rumania was in a position at that time to develop at the desired rate without the benefit of foreign capital. From the subsequent turn of events it would appear it was not. The limitation of foreign capital, together with the stringent monetary policy and the impediments to agriculture united in stifling the economy. When the People's party took office in 1926 it promised better relations with foreign capital, and when the Brătianus returned in 1927 their tone underwent a change. Foreign observers spoke of Vintilă Brătianu's more cooperative attitude, and *L'Économiste roumain*, his faithful echo, wrote hopefully of increased foreign interest in Rumanian enterprises.

4. AGRARIAN POLICY

The general economic program of the Liberals did not make for a constructive agrarian policy. Not only was agriculture relegated to second place in the attentions of the administration but several of the courses pursued were directly inimical to it. The encouragement of industry was at the expense of agriculture; the commercial and financial policy impeded the rehabilitation of farming after the war and the dislocations of the agrarian reform.

Of course, many of agriculture's woes were not the fault of the Liberal policy. As has been seen in the preceding chapter, the underlying sources of the agrarian problem are numerous and deep-rooted. Rumania, for all its natural resources, was a poor country and no government could have established a flourishing peasantry overnight.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

in the way of concrete benefits. Liberal agrarian policy can be divided under two heads: measures taken in supplementing or amending the agrarian reforms and measures for the improvement of agriculture.

Of the land reforms, only that for Translyvania had provided for the expropriation of forest land. Article 132 of the 1923 Constitution approved the principle of expropriating forest land in the Old Kingdom, Bessarabia, and Bucovina for firewood and construction purposes. The law implementing this article was published on July 1, 1924. Where woodland was needed and was not available from state holdings, it could be expropriated from private owners leaving them a minimum of 100 hectares. Communal woodlands were to be created, the exploitation of which was to be under the control of the state.[54]

By the law of March 13, 1925, and the executive regulation of April 15, which abrogated Articles 120–124 of the 1921 law, the Liberals, to safeguard peasant holdings, considerably stiffened requirements for the sale and purchase of agricultural property. The state was given the right of preemption on lands received not only under the 1918–21 reforms but under earlier distributions of state domain. If this right were not exerted, purchases could be made only on the following conditions:

1. The purchaser was to be a Rumanian citizen, a cultivator of the land or a graduate of an agricultural school, and residing and working in the commune in which the holding was situated.

2. Holdings could be sold in minimum blocs of 2 hectares in the plains and 1 hectare in the hills.

3. Sales could be made only five years after their owner had received definite title to his property following full payment of its price.

4. The purchaser could not own more than 25 hectares of cultivated land, including the area to be purchased. Houses and gardens, up to one hectare, could not be mortgaged or sold; land up to 25 hectares could be mortgaged only to certain authorized institutions.

The detailed instructions in the accompanying administrative regulation made the act of sale quite complicated by requiring numerous forms, proofs of domicile, and evidence of proper ownership. While the Liberals did not make peasant land inalienable they did render the process of transfer slower and more difficult and extended the state's rights of preemption to a large proportion of peasant properties. This law was in harmony with the tight-laced spirit of the Liberals in 1924–25 and showed the same restrictive view of property as the mining law of 1924. Historically, the reversion toward inalien-

54. See Discorescu, *Chestiunea țărănească în România*, pp. 266–272, for analysis of the text of the law.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

423 ability was an aftermath of nearly all the land reform measures. It is
666 characteristic of the liberalism of the Liberal party that it should
656 have feared—though perhaps correctly—the consequences of free
241 and uninhibited sales of land.[55]
671

The Liberals, in the law of April 14, 1925, instituted chambers of
241 agriculture, modeled on the chambers of commerce, and united in a Union of Chambers of Agriculture. At first sight these organs appeared to have very important functions: to be the official representatives of agricultural interests, to give advice on agricultural legislation, to supervise agricultural schools, to collaborate with the administration in the application of laws, to improve livestock, to aid in the advancement of agricultural techniques, to prepare statistics, and to organize fairs. They were also to elect members to the senate.

Unhappily, the chambers accomplished very little. Their budgets depended upon the Ministry of Agriculture, and they were not supplied with sufficient funds to carry out the work delegated to them.[56] They were not even representative of the whole of the peasantry. Each chamber was composed of 17 elected members and 11 appointed functionaries. But since only proprietors with a minimum of 3 hectares of arable land, or tenants with 10 hectares were permitted to vote for members, a large percentage of the poor peasants was not represented at all.[57] (In 1930, 52 per cent of the peasant farms were of less than 3 hectares.) Worst of all, the chambers, with their right to elect senators, became hopelessly entangled in politics. Under the law creating them, the government could dissolve the chambers for serious irregularities or bad faith in the accomplishment of their legal work or for activities against the interests of the state. Inevitably, the chambers were repeatedly dissolved on any pretext for the purpose of facilitating the election of senators.

665 In May, 1928, the Liberals passed a law for the classification of
656 cereals, designed to improve the quality of grain destined for export
241 and to reduce the number of middlemen between producer and foreign consumer. There had been frequent complaints of the inferior quality of exported Rumanian grain and the presence of an excessive amount

55. In 1911 the Liberal program has spoken of the desirability of creating a medium property by natural selection, that is, by the purchase and sale of land. The 1924 law certainly represents a retreat from that position. On the other hand, as will be seen below, the National Peasants revised the 1925 law, for the purpose of permitting "natural selection," but with unfortunate results for the poorer peasants.

56. P. E. Manolion, *La Reconstruction économique et financière de la Roumanie et les partis politiques* (Paris, 1931), p. 159.

57. Filip Chefner, "Camerile agricole în România," *M.A.B.: Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, 8 (1936), 86.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

of impurities. An improvement was undoubtedly desirable. Yet the 665 low quality of exported grain was but a symptom of the generally bad 656 condition of agriculture. Attacking the problem at the level of exports 241 was indicative of the Liberals' attitude. The opposition sharply criticized the law as missing the point: "We are not suffering from a commercial crisis," said Mihalache, "but from a crisis of production. The problem of production must be solved first." [58]

In July, 1928, shortly before the Liberals fell they passed a cooperative code which had little effect except to reorganize previous cooperative organizations and to increase the direct control of the state. On the whole, as has been mentioned, the cooperative movement was and remained weak and ineffectual. In 1923–24 the National Bank granted 600 millions of lei credit to the whole of the cooperative movement, whereas private bankers received 7,500 millions. [652]

A "battle for production" was inaugurated in 1928 by the Minister of Agriculture, Argetoianu, and in March an agricultural congress voted a resolution which is striking in its complete emphasis upon technical improvements: better seeds, more rational crop rotation, more fertilizers, the expansion of experimental stations. The resolution opposed a further extension of the area under wheat and recommended an effort to raise the output per hectare. In no case, however, did it penetrate to the level of agrarian reforms, as defined in the preceding chapter, but was wholly occupied with desiderata, which were simple enough to call for but very difficult to achieve.

These final efforts of 1928 were, however, of little import, as they were in large part a belated effort to meet the challenge of the opposition which was on the point of coming to power.

It is not easy to judge the successes and failures of the Liberals' economic policy. It seemed easier immediately after their defeat to see their errors and particularly their shortcomings in the agrarian question. But with the failure of subsequent administrations to improve agriculture or to provide a stable economy the nature of the Liberal failure becomes less obvious. Moreover, many of the economic practices of the Brătianus, regarded as heretical at the time, have become generalized not only in the Balkans but throughout Europe; state-supported industrialization has become a commonplace and has received a substantial body of theoretical justification. Yet with all these added qualifications, it may be concluded that the Liberal policy failed.

58. Quoted in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 452.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

through the agrarian reforms.[45] The new law, which was designed to facilitate the transfer of land and to further a "process of selection among the peasant cultivators," abolished certain of the restrictions and delays imposed by the Liberals and greatly simplified the procedure of sale, although maintaining safeguards to keep land in the hands of actual cultivators and limiting purchases to Rumanian citizens having not over 25 hectares of land. 665 241 671

The idea that a "process of selection" would enable peasants with "superior competitive efficiency" to create prosperous holdings has had considerable popularity not only in Rumania but in other eastern European states.[46] For such a process to have beneficial consequences, however, it is necessary, first, that superior efficiency on tiny holdings will actually result in sufficient capital accumulation to buy out less efficient peasants, and, second, that the peasants displaced in the process have some alternative means of employment. Otherwise the poorer peasants would be reduced to a landless proletariat and the land taken over by the wealthier peasants. Such seems to have been the effect of the National Peasants' law, although it was not the sole cause; the survey of sixty Rumanian villages made in 1938 reported that the law of 1929 had intensified the differentiation in the peasantry by building up the category of middle peasants on the one hand and of increasing the agricultural proletariat on the other.[47] It was this law perhaps more than any other single act which gave 656 665 671

45. See above, p. 125.

46. Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe*, p. 106, cites a Greek author (C. Evelpedis, *La Réforme agraire en Grèce*, Athens, 1926), as an advocate of this view. In Rumania the alienation of peasant property has had a tangled political history in which at one time or another almost all political parties have reversed their positions. Up to the 1918–21 reforms, official policy tended toward inalienability, whereas the older reformers, such as Dobrogeanu-Gherea and Garofild, demanded alienation as a necessary step to creating an independent peasantry. The Liberals in 1911 came out for a "process of selection," but in 1925 they restricted the transfer of land. The Peasant party, on the contrary, in 1921 was for government control of all sales, whereas in 1929 it moved toward freer purchase. The Communists, it may be added, roundly condemned the National Peasants for their 1929 law, but Lenin, in his agrarian writings before the Russian revolution, was strongly for alienation. The Communist position is seen in Pătrăşcanu's interpretation of the 1929 law: "From the point of view of opening a way for capitalism in the villages and of differentiation within the rural strata, the measure represented an advance in comparison with the past. But what was the cost of this progress? The land of the poorest and economically most feeble layers of the peasants quickly became the principal object, the prey on which urban banking capital and the village bourgeoisie threw themselves." Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, *Sous trois dictatures* (Paris, 1946), p. 108. [113]

47. *60 Sate romînesti*, II, 6. The depression doubtless intensified this effect. During the 1946 famine in Moldavia the same thing occurred: peasants who had obtained land under the 1945 reform began to sell to the larger peasants at such a rate that the government was obliged to pass a law nullifying these sales.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

656 rise to the charge that the National Peasants really represented the
665 richer peasants and the village bourgeoisie.[48]
671 A similar attitude appears in the other principal agrarian measures of the National Peasants; the law for the organization of cooperation, of March 28, 1929, and the law for the organization of rural mortgages and agricultural credit of July 29, 1929. These laws were acclaimed at the time as proof of the government's concern for the peasant, but they need not be considered in great detail here.[49] Laws for credit and cooperation are hardy perennials in Rumanian legislative history, but none of them appears to have accomplished much. These particular laws were quickly blighted by the onset of the depression.

474 The law for the organization of cooperation abrogated the act passed by the Liberal government in July, 1928, which the National Peasants thought gave the state too much control over the cooperative movement. The new code was designed to broaden the legal frame "to offer the cooperatives the freedom of movement which every economic enterprise needs if it is to develop in the present economic world." [50] Notwithstanding this effort to assure greater autonomy and independence, a foreign observer concluded in 1930 that even the new regime had not abandoned the idea that the cooperatives were a government maid of all work.[51] The real difficulty, as has been mentioned before, was that the poor peasant, that is, the average Rumanian, had very little to offer in a cooperative movement. Until the level of the peasantry was raised above the margin of subsistence, the cooperative movement was bound to be a name rather than a reality and to be altogether dependent upon the state for financial support and direction.

452 The law for the organization of rural mortgages and agricultural credit was intended to improve the channels supplying credit to agriculture, which had been seriously undernourished during the Liberal

48. This charge is given some weight when one considers Madgearu's remark, made in 1930: "With farms of medium size, limited to 25 hectares, the agricultural credit granted will be used in a more economical way and will bear fruit in a degree hitherto unknown in our agrarian organisation." *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 11. In a country where 75 per cent of all agricultural holdings were under 5 hectares, and 92 per cent under 10 hectares, reference to farms of medium size could have only an extremely limited application.

49. Analyses of the law for the organisation of cooperatives may be found in Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, pp. 409-411, and in F. E. Manoliu, *La Réconstruction économique et financière de la Roumanie et les partis politiques*, pp. 236-237, and of the law for the reorganisation of agricultural credit in Manoliu, pp. 239-242.

50. From the exposé de motifs, cited in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 409.

51. "Rumania: The State as Co-operator," *Yearbook of Agricultural Co-operation, 1930*, pp. 404-408.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

regime. New institutions were set up to provide credit suitable to agriculture's particular wants. It was hoped that these would stimulate the influx of foreign capital "to satisfy the needs of agricultural financing." [52] In its form the new law was better adjusted to the needs of agriculture, but the depression completely halted the desired flow of capital. It may be doubted if this law was of primary benefit to the poor peasant, who was of necessity a bad risk and whose impoverished condition prevented him from employing credit profitably.[53]

In addition to these financial measures, the National Peasants passed acts for the organization and reform of agricultural instruction intended to spread and popularize better agricultural techniques and to prevent trained agriculturalists from being completely absorbed by the bureaucracy; a law of July, 1929, for the reclamation of the inundated region of the Danube; measures for leasing agricultural machinery to cultivators and developing seed selection stations; and a law to promote systematic colonization in areas of sparse population. These measures, while desirable in themselves, could be of only marginal benefit.

Although the National Peasants' concern with agriculture is shown by the fact that the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture in 1929 was double that of any of the preceding postwar years,[54] the general results are somewhat flat and uninspiring. According to Madgearu ten years later, the National Peasants, because of the difficult circumstances under which they had received the stabilization loan and because of the increasingly unfavorable international economic situation, had been unable to carry out all their financial plans but had been forced to limit themselves to certain priority tasks: assuring the liquidity of the National Bank's portfolio, liquidating the state's floating debt, reconstructing the railways, and making certain productive investments. "The necessary means were lacking to create an agricultural mortgage bank." [55]

Doubtless, financial difficulties and the lack of capital were important obstacles, and the depression washed away what might have been promising beginnings toward improvement in agricultural finan-

52. Madgearu, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 9.

53. Manoilescu, *op. cit.*, p. 242, was of the opinion that certain measures of inspection and control, included in the law to safeguard the credit societies, would have the effect of discouraging the small cultivator and diminishing his productive efforts.

54. According to Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 458, after the First World War the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture had not exceeded 22,500,000 gold lei until the advent of the National Peasants. In 1929 it reached the figure of 73,500,000 gold lei.

55. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești*, p. 306.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

941 cial organization. But the agrarian policy had other defects. In the
665 first place, the National Peasants fell into the old Rumanian fallacy
●656 of counting too greatly upon an act of legislation to cure any problem.[56] Much more serious however was the fact that while the National Peasants had an agrarian policy it was scarcely a peasant policy. The measures actually taken were not of the kind that could greatly help the poor peasant. The modifications of the party programs between 1921 and 1926 foreshadowed this attitude, but even so the more far-reaching parts of the 1926 program were not carried out.

665 Measures intended to benefit agriculture were not, however, limited
241 to agricultural legislation. The new tariff policy inaugurated by the
652 National Peasants on August 1, 1929, was specifically designed to assist the farmer. The National Peasants had consistently attacked the Liberals' (and the People's party's) tariff policy, which was highly protectionist, raised the cost of agricultural equipment, and was "in its technical structure a feeble instrument of negotiation for securing markets for our export products." [57] The new tariff was, as Madgearu announced, based on the recommendations of the Geneva Conference of 1927. It created a more elastic customs system to permit commercial conventions with other states. Duties on goods were divided into two groups: 1) irreducible minimum duties for goods produced within the country and requiring protection; these could not be reduced through convention; 2) duties on all other articles, which could be reduced through mutual arrangement with other states. Even before signing any customs conventions the government reduced the duties on agricultural equipment.

In thus lowering the cost of imported agricultural equipment as well as in reducing tariffs on articles of mass consumption, the 1929 tariff undoubtedly benefited the peasant. As to the protection of industry, "it was in general calculated so as not to exceed the difference by which the conditions of local production were more difficult than conditions of foreign production, and only for branches of industry which had the possibility of sound development in the country." [58] The tariffs did not renounce industrial protection but tried

56. Note, for example, Madgearu's remark, "Up to 1929 agricultural instruction in Rumania was based on no uniform principle, nor was it adapted to the situation, since its organization was not based on legislation which could solve the problem as a whole." *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 12. Clearly the real reasons for Rumania's lack of adequate agricultural education were not to be found in the absence of a uniform legal code.

57. Madgearu, *ibid.*, p. 89.

58. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei romînești*, p. 221.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 serve as a clearing house to establish common ties and to exchange
575 information.[65] In its general lines it represented an attempt to defend the eastern European peasantry against the more highly organized forces of industrialism and the dynamic inroads of Soviet communism.

In 1926 and 1927 the Rumanian and Finnish Peasant parties joined the Green International. There were no real meetings until 1928, when the bureau was formally constituted. After that annual congresses were held until the movement was engulfed by the depression and the political storms of the 1930's. Eventually it came to include peasant parties from Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Austria, Switzerland, Poland, France, the three Baltic states, and Finland. Although Mihalache had spoken of the rising peasant tide in eastern Europe, and Madgearu and Lupu contributed articles to the later issues of the bulletin of the Green International, it appears to have had no effect upon the course of internal Rumanian politics, and the Rumanians were among the less active members of the bureau.

A far more active, though in its aim unsuccessful, international effort was the agrarian bloc of eastern European states, in which Madgearu played a prominent part. This bloc had its origins in the growing agricultural crisis of 1930. The failure to obtain any favorable action at the first preliminary international conference for concerted economic action (held in Geneva, February 17 to March 24, 1930) led some of the agrarian states of eastern Europe, with the Little Entente at the core, to act together in defense of their interests. A series of conferences at Strbske Pleso, Bucarest, and Warsaw during the summer of 1930 were attended by representatives from Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. The attempt was made to coordinte the economic policy of the members of the bloc and to obtain better commercial conditions from the industrial states. The failure of the bloc to achieve its aims belongs, however, in the more general framework of the depression.[66]

665 The economic, agrarian, and administrative policy of the National
● 656 Peasants in 1929 and 1930 has definite homogeneity. A prevailing emphasis upon decentralization and autonomy appears in the administrative reform, in the laws for mines and state enterprises, in the reorganization of the cooperatives. An attempt to relax restric-

65. Karl Meßy, "Le Bureau International Agraire," *M.A.B.: Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, i (1926), 26–29.

66. See below, pp. 184–185.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

tions and to permit a natural circulation is seen in the abolition of the censorship and state of siege, in the 1929 tariff, in the law permitting the free sale and purchase of peasant property. A friendly attitude toward foreign capital appears in all the laws on trade and the exploitation of natural resources and in the important concessions granted to foreign firms. Finally, a concern for agriculture is shown not merely in the agrarian laws but in the tariff and financial policy. While many of these measures failed to produce the anticipated results, and some were applied inefficiently, still, taken together, they constitute a recognizable policy and one quite different from that pursued by the Liberals. The conflict between the National Peasants and the Liberals was not merely a struggle for office and a place at the feeding trough, although it is not difficult to cite instances where *mirosul fripturei* ("the fragrance of the roast joint") played an important part.

Two questions, however, must be answered. Was it a peasant program? Was it adequate to the economic needs of Rumania, and in particular did it provide a solution to the agrarian question?

From the preceding discussion of the development of the party's ideology, its modifications of program, and its actual policy there can be little doubt that the National Peasant government was not very "peasantist" either in its composition or in its activities. That is not to say that the National Peasants lacked an agrarian program or that they were indifferent to the peasant; certainly the party regarded itself as the spokesman of the peasantry. But in the course of the party's evolution, from its inception after the war to its arrival in power, a significant change had taken place. Perhaps it was mostly a change in emphasis. Initially as was so well shown in Mihalache's speeches, which are more representative than Stere's more sophisticated arguments, stress was upon the peasant and upon the measures which should be taken to improve his condition. When the party came to power, the chief concern was for greater political democracy and more economic liberty, from which the peasant was to benefit. To some extent this shift showed the influence of the Transylvanians with their middle-class and professional interests, but the Peasant party itself had gone a long way in this direction. Moreover, this change was quite natural, given the passage of time and the subsiding of social ferment. But if such a change was natural, it was also dangerous: in Rumania, if the peasant did not command first attention it was too easy for him not to be taken into consideration at all.

The most important reason for this change, and it has been a fatal defect of most peasant parties, is that a purely peasant movement

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

and Rumania as agricultural exporter. The average price per metric ton of Rumanian exports fell in 1934 by 62 per cent of its 1922–30 average, whereas the price of imports fell by only 33 per cent in 1936. Internally agricultural prices dropped to 44 per cent of the 1929 level, industrial prices to 62 per cent.[9] The situation was further aggravated by the inauguration at this time of an agrarian protectionist policy by the European industrial states. After 1928 Germany introduced high agricultural tariffs; Italian grain and flour duties reached prohibitive levels between 1929 and 1931; France imposed heavy tariffs on cereals. 439

In May, 1931, the failure of the Austrian Kredit-Anstalt unleashed the financial crisis which swept across Europe and ended the flow of foreign capital to Rumania. Inevitably, the fall in grain prices, the disappearance of foreign markets for agricultural produce, and the stoppage of foreign credit had a disastrous effect upon the Rumanian economy. State finances, never on a very steady foundation, and having just been reorganized in 1929, were hit by the decline in revenues (direct taxes dropped from 8.6 billion lei in 1930 to 3.4 in 1933), and there was a budget deficit each year between 1930 and 1934.[10]

One peculiarity should be observed in the Rumanian depression. In several respects Rumania was in a better position than the other Balkan states. Because of a series of good harvests in 1929, 1930, and 1931, and because of petroleum exports, it was able to maintain a considerably better balance of trade. Moreover, because of the acquisition of a good deal of foreign capital in the loans of 1929 439 656

9. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești*, p. 90, and *Bréviaire Statistique de la Roumanie* (Bucarest, 1940), p. 238: [430]

	Wholesale agricultural prices	*Industrial prices*	*Prices of industrial products required by agriculture*
1929	100	100	100
1930	68.2	93.9	[illegible]
1931	50.8	72.0	[illegible]
1932	47.7	63.2	[illegible]
1933	44.9	63.2	81.1
1934	44.1	63.4	[illegible]
1935	48.4	73.2	90.2

10. As a matter of fact, a budgetary deficit in Rumania is a very relative term; many of the so-called budget surpluses of the 1920's were quite fictitious. See Ludovic Isvoracki, *L'Equilibre budgétaire en Roumanie de 1919 à 1932* (Paris, 1933). I doubt if the budget deficits can in any way be regarded as a planned attempt to counter the depression, since all the governments promised balanced budgets and the deficit appeared as the result of altogether undirected and uncontrolled expenditures through a number of channels.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

439 and 1931, Rumania was somewhat less pressed financially than the
● 656 other states, and was indeed the last of the Balkan countries to introduce foreign exchange controls and to declare a partial moratorium on foreign debts.[11]

652 Nevertheless, Rumania was the slowest to show signs of recovery, an indication that something in addition to the general causes for the depression was having an effect. Such was the opinion of the French foreign advisers to the Rumanian National Bank, MM. Rist and Auboin. According to Auboin, in his report of 1935, a distinction should be drawn between the causes of disequilibrium arising from the world crisis and those proper to Rumania itself. In his opinion the first were predominant between 1929 and 1932 in the fall in prices and the disruption of international credit. But local causes became manifest, especially after 1932, despite a certain easing of international conditions. The two principal evils, in his view, were the weaknesses in the whole Rumanian credit system and the unstable budget position, both of which had afflicted Rumania since the First World War. As a financial adviser he was particularly indignant that the Rumanian government should try to enjoy all the benefits and amenities of a modern state through its expenditures but should still rely upon primitive means of organizing state finances: "It is necessary to adopt and apply not merely the methods of expenditure but also the methods of receipt of modern states."[12]

The fall in prices and the reduction of credit presented the Rumanian peasant with a serious debt load which he was in no position to discharge. The advocates of small peasant agriculture have contended that one of the principal advantages of this form of cultivation was the peasant's resistance to crises through his ability to cut expenses, reduce his relations to the market, and live on his own. It is true that debts contracted for agricultural investment were quite small in Rumania as compared with other European states.[13] Never-

11. Rumania introduced exchange controls on February 27, 1932; Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Austria, Bulgaria, and Greece had introduced them between August and October, 1931. Rumania declared a partial moratorium in January, 1932; Greece, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia had done so in 1932.

12. Roger Auboin, *Rapport annuel sur la situation financière et monétaire de la Roumanie* (Bucarest, 1935), p. 36. Auboin was primarily concerned with Rumania's ability to honor its foreign obligations, and hence stressed the need of tightening state finances and creating a sound budget, perhaps at the expense of local requirements. Nevertheless, his, and Rist's, reports are devastating in their picture of the irresponsibility of Rumanian financial administration, its slovenliness, and tendency to make increasingly complex and meaningless regulations.

13. Comparative figures in the International Institute of Agriculture's *Farm Accountancy Statistics for 1928-29* (Rome, 1932), show very little investment and very little debt for Rumanian farms as contrasted with those of other European states. These

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

partly because the plans required large sums of liquid capital, which 652
was not on hand.

The Mironescu National Peasant government attempted to improve the situation from the credit side. It undertook negotiations in Paris for an agricultural loan to provide for the establishment of an agricultural mortgage bank, a long-cherished aim of the National Peasants who hoped to facilitate thereby the transfer of agricultural debts into long-term obligations less onerous as to time of payment and rate of interest. Eventually agreement was reached on a second development loan, modeled after that of 1929, of 1.3 billion francs, of which 200 million was to go to the creation of the Agricultural Mortgage Institute and the remainder for railway, roads, and Treasury working capital. The loan met with much local criticism; there was general resentment at the continuation of foreign financial supervision which it entailed; the director of the National Bank fought the loan so stubbornly that the government was obliged to dismiss him; Titulescu and Argetoianu opposed the whole idea of borrowing foreign capital for a land bank at a time when such an institute could be only a palliative for the agricultural crisis. Indeed, the *Credit Agricol Ipoteca* was formed on the eve of the credit crisis which hit Europe in 1931.

In a final flurry of legislation, just before its fall, the Mironescu [65L] ●
government passed two other measures designed to improve agricultural credit: a law to keep down the interest rate of agricultural credit institutions and a law against usury, prohibiting exaggerated rates of interest by private lenders. These laws, which were in the spirit of the National Peasant program, were altogether inadequate. The credit problem in Rumania was not to be solved by attempting to prohibit what was a secondary symptom. Like much Rumanian legislation, they were an effort to improve the weather by adjusting the dial on the barometer. Furthermore, they did not touch the question of the existing agricultural debt load which was becoming unsupportable.

In December, 1931, the chamber, with all major parties concurring, voted a moratorium for agricultural debts. From 1932 to 1934 appeared a series of laws for the relief of agricultural indebtedness. These laws, passed by successive governments in turn, were in part political measures and in part concessions progressively extorted by the deepening depression. As at the time of the land reforms of 1917–21, political competition plus popular pressure forced the parties toward more and more extensive measures. No party dared

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

industrial states naturally stimulated Rumania, as it did the other Balkan states, to create its own industries. The growing international tension in the 1930's led to a heavy demand for arms and munitions. In 1937 the president of the Rumanian union of metallurgical and mineral industries stated that the principal characteristic of the years of recovery had been the large industrial investments, especially for the purpose of creating a powerful armaments industry.[27]

But if the depression and the demand for armaments stimulated industrialization, they in turn assisted in the rise of very powerful industrial interests, which progressively dominated not only the economic but the political scene.[28] These years witnessed the rise of such industrial giants—giants at least in Rumania—as Max Ausnit and Nicolae Malaxa. These men represented a different type of influence from that of the Brătianus. The latter, through their position in the banks, had equated the Liberal party with a policy of industrial advance through the financial institutions, but they were primarily politicians. Ausnit and Malaxa, on the other hand, were primarily industrialists who were able political manipulators but whose field of action was outside the political arena. It might be added that King Carol himself, who operated "outside" politics, was by no means disinterested in industrialization and had a large personal stake in the new industries.[29]

Rumanian industries, and especially the new heavy industry, required both protection and capital. Industrial protection had marked the whole history of Rumanian tariff policy, and even the National Peasant tariff of 1929 did not renounce it. But the new devices, developed as defenses during the depression, became far more potent weapons than any which had existed heretofore. Indeed, they were far more effective in assisting industry than in fulfilling their ostensible function of safeguarding national finances and the currency.[30]

27. Quoted in Pătrăşcanu, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

28. An example is the Skoda scandal of 1935, in which a storm was raised over a contract for armaments made by the National Peasants with the Czech Skoda works in 1930. Although an effort was made to involve some National Peasant ministers in charges of graft, the real cause of the scandal appears to have been that the contract had been made "without regard for the law concerning national armament activity."

29. For obvious reasons it is difficult to ascertain the extent of Carol's industrial interests. According to Pătrăşcanu (*op. cit.*, p. 48), in published reports of enterprises in which he was a shareholder Carol held 30 to 35 per cent of the shares of the Malaxa works, and almost as much in several smaller industries. Four of the largest sugar mills were in his hands, as well as a beer factory. He had important shares in the gold mines and the telephone company and a large control of Banca de Credit Român.

30. Rumania's exchange position and the leu never achieved any stability despite the most elaborate series of measures. I would agree with Antonin Basch's conclusion (*The Danube Basin*, p. 148) that the signal failure of Rumania either to achieve ex-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

656 To the protective tariffs, which were greatly increased in the 1930's, 457 was added the system of import quotas and restrictions, plus a 12 per cent tax for all imports. Together these provided a high protective wall for the development of the national industry. Their effectiveness is shown by the fact that between 1933 and 1938 the percentage of imports of manufactured and semimanufactured goods dropped markedly, whereas that of machines and raw materials rose sharply.[31]

Protection alone, however, was not the only device employed to aid the expansion of industry; other forms of assistance included exemptions from taxation, state subsidies, special transport rates, the obligatory use of certain locally produced goods, and monopolies granted to industries considered nationally desirable.

652 Since the inflow of new foreign capital stopped during the depression, the supply of capital for industry had to come largely from internal sources. In part this was achieved through the tariffs, which diverted purchases toward local industry, and by the increasing state expenditures for armaments, which amounted to a tax on the public. In 1934 a 12 per cent tax on the construction of new buildings was imposed in an effort to divert investment toward industry and away from nonproductive expenditures. To a considerable extent the foreign funds frozen in Rumania at the time of the depression were subsequently employed in industrialization.[32]

The political implications of this economic policy—which was by no means a plan but rather the result of the depression and the deepening international tensions plus the steady pressure of interested industrial groups—were very similar to those observed above in the

---

rency stability or a price equilibrium, despite the relatively favorable balance of trade and rich resources, may be laid to bad management and political reasons, to which one could add that in many cases the measures taken were employed for purposes quite different from those for which they were presumably intended.

31. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 232. Madgearu took a selected group of key imports and calculated their volume by percentage as follows:

	In per cent of total imports	
	1930	*1938*
Raw materials	5.96	12.88
Semifabricated	28.01	7.59
Machines	1.27	4.00
Manufactured goods	13.69	8.24

32. Oscar Jaszi, "The Economic Crisis in the Danubian States," *Social Research* (February, 1933), pp. 99–118, attributed a major role to captive capital in the creation of Rumanian industry. According to Madgearu (*op. cit.*, p. 233), foreign credit continued to serve those industries created by international capital, but in his opinion the most important source of industrial credit was the National Bank.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 Liberal party are indicative of the move toward a less inhibited industrial drive.

During the four years, then, between the depression and the inauguration of the Carolist dictatorship, it is possible to find inside Rumania, not to mention the external influences, three quite distinct factors making for the destruction of parliamentary government and the creation of an authoritarian regime:

1) Carol's own personality and his streamlined interpretation of the old-fashioned prerogatives of a monarch;

2) The unrest and growing extremism in broad sections of the population, which was finding a mouthpiece in the Iron Guard;

3) The economic policy of neoliberalism, which not only carried overtones of a more authoritarian state but through the centralization of economic power and control increased the possibilities of creating such a state.

656 435 While the general atmosphere of these years of neoliberalism resembled Manoilescu's teachings in its industrial protectionism, increasing economic nationalism, and growing corporatism, there was an important difference: contrary to Manoilescu's thesis, agricultural protection was maintained and extended. During the years 1935 to 1937 there was a complex system of minimum prices, state purchases, and export bounties for wheat. By the law of 1935 the government paid a minimum price of 35,000 lei for 10 metric tons of wheat weighing 75 kilograms per hectoliter. An export premium financed by a tax on milling, paid 10,000 lei per ten-ton truckload of wheat, and 12,000 lei per truckload of flour. This premium was dropped with the rise in agricultural prices but was reapplied in [447] 1938. A Wheat Valorization Office was formed to supervise these payments and to improve the quality of wheat. Similar steps were taken for medicinal plants, textile plants, and wool.

439 435 In 1936 Rumania signed a series of wheat export agreements with Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, and other states. Foreign trade in grains was also assisted by an extremely complicated system of taxing imports to pay for export bounties and permitting the exporter to keep a portion of the free exchange obtained by his exports. In general these measures, which were aimed at maintaining the commercial balance, had a beneficial effect in supporting the price of agricultural products and in increasing exports. Between 1934 and 1937 agricultural prices rose from 44.1 (1929 = 100) to 64.6; the value of agricultural production increased from 42 to 62 billion lei; the value of cereal exports rose

3: Roberts S-4 f(no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241 as 1910 Dobrogeanu-Gherea had some harsh words to say of the
433 men who thought it could magically solve the deep-rooted ills of Ru-
654 manian agriculture.[36]

The Tătărescu government, following precedent, also reorganized agricultural credit and the cooperative system, set up more experimental stations, and devoted funds to the raising of better livestock and the purchase of tractors, but those measures seem to have been only of marginal benefit.

423 The government did try in the law of March, 1937, for the encouragement of agriculture to grapple with the problem of land tenure. It regulated the transfer and mortgage of rural lands and undertook to enforce the indivisibility of property as a means of preventing the progressive subdivision of peasant holdings. The effort was unsuccessful. The two-hectare minimum, which in any case was too small for a self-subsistent holding, was not observed; the prohibition extended only to properties obtained from the state or with the state's assistance. An attempt was also made to promote the consolidation of peasant properties, but this met with too great opposition in the chamber and was dropped.[37] The government also exerted its right of preemption on sales of agricultural land for the purpose of providing land for the peasants but its achievements were insignificant. Between April 1, 1934, and August 1, 1938, of the 326,200 hectares put on sale the government used its right of preemption on only 12,250 hectares, 3.8 per cent of the total.[38]

241 In brief, if the position of agriculture was somewhat better in the
654 years of the Tătărescu regime than in the depression it was largely
● 656 a consequence of general economic recovery. Agriculture did benefit from the protective measures applied and extended by the government, although part of these benefits was lost by the continued depreciation of the leu, and some efforts were made to raise the level of agriculture and diversify production. Nevertheless, the government's chief interest was industry and commerce and the principal benefits to agriculture were those which corresponded to this interest. The desperate problem of the millions of small peasants owning less than 3 hectares, unable to support themselves and their families, dividing their land into smaller and smaller fragments, suffering from pellagra —this problem was scarcely touched.

654 It must be said, however, that in the 1930's there was a notable
511

36. C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *Neoiobăgia*, p. 294.

37. Valeriu Bulgaria, "Dezbilăcirea proprietăţii ţărăneşti," *Problema agrară* (Bucarest, 1946), pp. 77–97.

38. G. Ionescu-Sisești, "Le Nouvel Aspect du problème agraire en Roumanie," *Revue pour la science et la réforme sociales*, 18, Nos. 1–4 (1942), 204.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

manian peasant,[17] under his dictatorship the overriding concerns were mobilizing agriculture for the war, compensating for the lost territories (though part of these were regained after 1941), and maintaining production against the drain on manpower and the requisitioning of equipment and livestock for military purposes. The majority of acts were specific war measures: price controls, export controls, laws against agricultural sabotage and speculation, control of livestock, state requisitioning of cereals, crop planning, and the mobilization of agricultural labor. Most of the measures had been initiated in Carol's reign under the trade agreement with Germany and the five-year plan for agriculture, but the war intensified them and put them on a directly military footing. By necessity there was an increase in the mobilization of agricultural labor. Field commandos and labor gangs were sent about the country under the supervision of gendarmes and rural agents of the Ministry of Agriculture.

An attempt was made to compensate for the shortage of manpower and livestock by increasing agricultural equipment, largely through import from Germany. If the figures are to be trusted imports in 1941 and 1942 were quite extensive:[18]

	1941	*1942*
Tractors with ploughs	1,000	2,814
Animal-drawn ploughs	20,000	40,000
Sowing drills	4,000	1,400
Harvesters	2,000	2,230
Hoes	10,000	30,000
Harrows	4,000	9,200
Threshers	200	250

By a law of June 22, 1942, for the organization of agricultural associations, the government attempted to overcome the disadvantages of small strip farming by means reminiscent of the Iorga law of 1931. By this act a group of at least fifteen cultivators residing in the same commune could constitute an agricultural association, authorized to purchase farm machinery, seeds, fertilizers, etc., sell produce in common, purchase or lease land, and obtain credit. The association was not an independent body however. It was to be man-

17. According to an admiring German biography, Antonescu first attracted attention during the 1907 uprising when, as a young lieutenant, he succeeded, without firing a shot, in persuading a crowd of rebellious peasants to disband.

18. Brief accounts of the measures undertaken up to 1943 are given by N. D. Cernăţeanu, "International Chronicle of Agriculture: Rumania," *International Review of Agriculture*, 32 (Rome, July–August, 1941), 267E–254E; and 34 (April, 1943), 156E–164E.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

156 241 aged by five trustees; the Ministry of Agriculture was to supervise its business transactions, and technical and administrative control lay in the hands of the chief of the agricultural district. Members were obliged to conform to the requirements of the government crop plan. It was reported in 1944 that about 200 such associations had been established.[19]

This law did not really represent anything new in Rumania but was merely one of the various measures which had been applied from time to time to overcome the agrarian impasse. It represents, however, a somewhat different approach from that emphasized by either the National Peasants or the Carolist dictatorship. The National Peasants had placed greatest stress upon credit, cooperatives, and diversification of production, with a view to creating the small peasant on the Western model. The Carolist regime, in its activities of 1938 and 1939, was aiming at consolidation and the creation of middle properties. The law of 1942 was an attempt to improve the situation on the basis of existing circumstances, of utilizing in the most efficient way possible the uneconomic system of land holdings. To be sure, all the approaches overlapped somewhat, but in a way the 1942 act was a bridge to the agricultural policy of the post-1945 government.

311 185 The Germans, for their own reasons, were anxious to develop Rumanian agriculture as part of the economy of the new order, although their estimate of what could be achieved in Rumanian agriculture was relatively modest. A wartime analysis by some German experts[20] presented a very dismal picture of Rumanian farming as of 1940. According to their report the principal difficulties lay in the low yield resulting from the small size of the majority of the holdings (they noted that most of the large properties were cultivated in metayage) and in the inadequacy of the transport system, both the general network and the village roads. They doubted whether agriculture itself

19. Otto von Franges, "Agricultural Labour Communities in South Eastern Europe," *International Review of Agriculture, 35* (January–February, 1944), 22E–32E. Von Franges was heartily in favor of these associations, of which similar types had been established in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. In his opinion they corresponded to traditional labor associations of the Balkan peasants and showed an admirable balance between individualism and collectivism, between control and liberty. He sharply contrasted these associations with agricultural cooperatives. The latter, while having a useful function, were obliged to neglect the poorer peasant. The associations, he felt, were the only possible compensation for the fragmentation of peasant properties and the only means of obtaining a decent improvement of productivity until the slow process of consolidation could take place.

20. H. L. Fensch and O. Thiel, *Rumänien, Untersuchung über die Betriebs- und Ernährungswirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse der Landwirtschaft.* (I have seen only a manuscript Rumanian translation of this study.)

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

culture is growing apace."[32] Nevertheless, in the spring of 1948 Gheorghiu-Dej was denying rumors that the land would be taken back from the peasants, and a decree in March permitted peasants possessing more land than they could till to employ day laborers.[34]

By the summer, however, the government was emphasizing the need of "sharpening the class struggle in the countryside, organizing agricultural laborers, and fighting the rich peasant." It introduced progressive scales of taxation and forced grain delivery aimed at preventing accumulation of grain or wealth by kulak or estate owner and ultimately undermining their economic position. It set up "village information offices" with instructions to "unmask all the dishonest kulaks and inform the farmers of their duties."

On March 2, 1949, the regime, on the simple sweeping charge of sabotage and failure to comply with regulations, seized the land, livestock, and inventory which had been left to the large landowners under the 1945 reform. In this action, carried out abruptly and without prior notification, some 17,000 families were evicted from their homes at night and sent to various resettlement areas. The government now directed all its energies against the rich peasants.[35] Lenin's dictum that "Small-scale exploitation generates capitalism and the bourgeoisie constantly, daily, hourly, in an elemental way, and on a mass scale," again made its appearance and became the leitmotiv for innumerable articles.

Embroidering on this theme, Gheorghiu-Dej marked out the party line for 1949. In 1945 the landlords had been liquidated as a class, but this act fostered small-scale economic activity in agriculture. "It follows that the complete victory of socialism is impossible so long as private property in the means of production, in the towns and in the countryside, including private property in land, continues to exist." The Communist party, therefore, had a number of important

32. *East Europe* (February 18, 1948).
34. *Ibid.* (April 1, 1948).
35. The distinction between poor, middle, and rich peasant, or kulak, is not based on size of holding or amount of wealth alone and seems to take on different meanings under different political circumstances. In simplest terms, the rich peasant is one who hires labor or charges rent for machinery and equipment; the middle peasant uses only family labor but produces enough, or more than enough, to support his household; the poor peasant is unable to support himself on his holding and is on the verge of drifting into the agricultural proletariat. In 1941, 12 per cent of the land in Rumania was farmed solely by paid labor, and 21.8 per cent by a mixture of paid and family labor. The first category, in the main, represented the properties of estate owners, the second the holdings of the richer peasants. In 1948, according to Gheorghiu-Dej, 57 per cent of the rural population belonged to the small peasantry and 33 per cent to the middle peasantry.

241

*Production of Principal Crops**
Average 1935-38
('000 metric tons)

Wheat	3,677
Rye	436
Barley	1,072
Oats	604
Maize	5,215
Potatoes ..	2,020
Sugar beet† ..	570
Peas	45
Beans	230
Tobacco ..	12
Sunflower seed	277
Soya beans ..	42
Rape seed ..	48

* Pre 1939 frontiers.
† This produced 110,000 m. tons of raw sugar.

4. Livestock

231 One of the chief weaknesses of Rumanian agriculture is the low density of livestock. Numbers of cattle per 100 acres of farm land are less than half those of this country and Germany; about half the farms possess no cows. A large proportion of the cattle, moreover, are draught animals which require land to feed them but which yield little saleable produce. Moreover, the annual milk [234] yield per cow averages less than 1,350 litres (300 gallons) as compared with over 700 gallons in Denmark.

Of pigs, the numbers and quality compare even less favourably with those of other countries. Only in the Banat district is there an approach to an interlocking of grain production with pig-raising. Sheep are an important source of income to the peasants of the Transylvanian mountains, a region where water buffaloes are kept as draught animals since they require no sustenance other than a daily cold bath and a few maize stalks.

Livestock numbers in 1938, and the production of livestock products in 1935-38, were as follows:—

*Livestock Numbers**
'000 head

Horses	2,158
Cattle	4,161
(including cows)	(2,030)
Buffaloes ..	165
Sheep	12,768
Goats	399
Pigs	3,165
Poultry ..	34,666

* Pre-1939 frontiers.

*Production of Livestock Products**
Average 1935-38
('000 metric tons)

[234]

Milk‡	3,000
Butter	20
Cheese	30
Beef and veal ..	120
Mutton and lamb	20
Pork	152
Poultry meat ..	60

* Pre-1939 frontiers.
‡ Cows, buffaloes, sheep and goats.

5. Fish

228 All fishing along the Danube, including the mouths of the delta, and along the western shores [656] of the Black Sea coast, is controlled by the State Fisheries Administration. The total annual catch in State-owned waters averaged 15,000 tons in the years immediately preceding the war, of which fresh-water fish contributed more than two-thirds. This does not, however, represent the total catch, as fairly large quantities were caught

228 in private waters. Supplemented by some 4,000 tons of imported fish, this provided nearly 1 kg. (2·2 lb.) per head of population, but, in fact, almost all the fish was consumed by the 5 million persons living in towns. The principal fish caught were sturgeon, carp, pike, eels and crayfish, the main fishing centres being Brăila, Tulcea and Ismail.

6. Food Industries

256 The chief food and agricultural-processing industries are milling, sugar manufacture, oilseed crushing and tobacco curing. While the milling industry was dispersed widely about the country in more than 15,000 small mills employing altogether over 37,000 persons (at 1930 census), the sugar industry was for the most part concentrated in the plain of the Old Kingdom. Of the 17 sugar 257 factories employing 10,000 workers, only one was in the Transylvanian districts lost to Hungary and five in the areas temporarily lost to the U.S.S.R. The vegetable-oil industry, located chiefly in 258 Bessarabia, was only partly carried on in factories, of which there were (on January 1st, 1939) 117, employing 2,026 workers. Among these, 34 were fitted both to extract crude oil and to refine it, six were exclusively refineries, while the remainder produced only crude oil. The rest of the industry consisted of some 2,000 hand, or animal-driven presses mostly owned by individual peasants or by shopkeepers. These primitive presses extracted only a low percentage of oil from the seeds, and consequently the cake—mainly sold for export—had an unusually high oil content. As regards 277 tobacco, both curing and cigarette manufacture [656] were subject to government licence and control. There were 29 factories (in 1930) employing 9,720 workers, but tobacco cultivation subsequently declined, so also doubtless did the numbers employed.

7. Agricultural Organisation

452 The history of the organisation of Rumanian 241 farmers is one of not too successful co-operatives 474 becoming transformed more and more into agencies for the execution of Government Control Schemes. [654] For many years there had been throughout the country a network of agricultural credit societies, co-operative in form but in practice directed by the State. These played an important rôle during the period of the Land Reform in helping the peasants by advances to buy and equip their newly acquired holdings. There was even some co-operative cultivation for a time, until the new peasant-owners could muster sufficient draught animals and implements. Besides this, there have been strong local co-operative unions especially among the [162] minority nationalities—the Hungarians in Transylvania, the Swabian and Saxons in the Banat and the Russian and Polish Jews in the Bucovina.

243 The credit societies revived in importance when, 474 after 1933, the Rumanian Government began the organisation of grain marketing. They became 452 the local agents of a Central Marketing Board through which all sales of grain had to be made 654 both for home consumption and for export. Whereas formerly grain prices slumped immediately after the harvest, most peasants, being obliged to sell their grain quickly, under the new scheme prices were stabilised throughout the year, and this brought a great improvement to peasants' [651] receipts. But the scheme and the societies were also used to collect the peasants' taxes (paid in grain) which did not increase the popularity of co-operation.

CHAPTER 1

more than half the normal, but the efforts in 1943 to recover to a more average crop may have succeeded.

3. Fish

The general food shortage in Rumania gave a great fillip to the fishing industry. In the 12 months April 1942 to March 1943, some 40,000 tons of fish were caught in State waters besides 13,000 tons in rented and private waters. This is almost double the largest pre-war catch. During 1942 some 6,000 tons were salted down for winter use. In order to promote and introduce better organisation into the fishing industry a German-Rumanian Company has been established, the "Marea-Neagrâ," which will devote special attention to developing the Black Sea fisheries.

4. Agricultural Exports

The pre-war level of grain exports was well maintained in 1939; wheat in particular was prominent with over a million tons. The exports of 1940, however, showed an immediate reflection of territorial changes and war shortages. Total grain exports in that year barely reached a million tons compared with the pre-war average of about 1·6 million tons. The following year showed a still sharper decline, wheat reaching only 5,000 tons and maize 120,000 tons. In 1942, despite the recovery of Bessarabia, it is most unlikely that even this level was maintained.

Oilseed exports, despite direct German intervention aiming at an expansion of the crop, also fell below pre-war levels. Sunflower-seed exports, the principal oilseed, fell from an average of 30,000 tons in 1935-38 to 12,000 tons in 1940 and to 5,000 tons in 1941. Exports following the 1942 crop, though probably better, were not at all commensurate with the increased production, for a serious shortage of edible oil and fat had meanwhile developed in Rumania owing to decreased supplies of pig fat and to the retention by the peasants of their seed for consumption at home, or for disposal on the Black Market.

5. Administrative Control

Not even the most complete and efficient system of administrative control could have assured the country's food supplies and exports at normal levels during these three unfavourable years, but it is clear that Rumania's food difficulties have been aggravated by mistakes in economic policy and inadequate control measures. Bureaucratic methods of handling the peasants aroused antagonism and resistance. Supplies of tested seed and other farm requisites were not made available in time. On the collection and supply side, too much power was left in the hands of local prefects. But the most serious shortcoming of the official administration was the failure to establish a price control, and an appropriate relationship between agricultural prices and the cost of the things farmers buy. (In the absence of effective discipline this ratio needs to be strongly in the producers' favour if production and marketing of foodstuffs is to be maintained.) Prices of consumers' goods rose rapidly, owing to shortages, while the Government pegged the prices of farm produce at comparatively low levels. Consequently, the peasants curtailed production and sought better prices by selling much of their produce through Black Market channels. The mistake was officially admitted in the autumn of 1941 when grain prices were more than doubled, but the position still remained unfavourable to

241 the peasants and the reduced 1942 savings both
656 of grain and of sugar-beet indicated continued
435 dissatisfaction. Finally, by the spring of 1943 a wider ratio was reached, agricultural prices being four times as high as in 1939 and wholesale prices in general three and a half times as high. Nevertheless, this very considerable measure of inflation
[458] has shaken public confidence in the value of money so that peasants increasingly resort to barter transactions.

[655] In the hope of obtaining better control over grain supplies the Government in the autumn of 1941 nationalised the grain trade, later they relaxed this to the extent of leaving the export business to a few selected firms and the internal collection to the Army and to the National Institute of Co-operation. This body handled the pre-war grain marketing scheme, and their
[563] activities—because of the expulsion of Jews from wholesale and retail trade—have recently developed rapidly in the supply of seeds to peasants (80,000 tons of seed distributed in 1942) as well as consumers' goods to peasants and townspeople. But it still proved difficult to extract enough food from the peasants to feed the towns. For the 1943 harvest detailed regulations were made concerning the quantities the peasant might keep for seed, for his family and for his animals, and threshing operations were subjected to inspection. Yet these rules could not in practice be administered.

423 It is now generally agreed in Rumania that the
471 smallness of the holdings has been a principal obstacle to effective organisation of agriculture in war-time, and that a change to larger units of production is needed. Any approach to collectivisation on the Soviet model, however, would be regarded as contradictory to the land reform policy and a threat to the Rumanian State. The official policy, though it has not yet taken its final form, is to maintain private property but to proceed no further with expropriation and division of large estates, and to maintain existing medium holdings by prohibiting their sub-division for inheritance or other reasons. Schemes for the consolidation of strips are also contemplated for a more opportune moment. Further, in order to
474 increase production and to improve the peasants' methods and standards of life, communal farming associations, known as *obştii*, are to be formed. In these associations, farming equipment is to be pooled so that the small-holder would have the same resources as the large farmer. Each *obştie* is to embrace a village and perform all the functions of a co-operative, including joint purchase and sale, use of breeding animals, processing of crops, etc. Villages which are prepared to form themselves into *obştii* and to undertake to work the land according to State directions, are promised tractors, seed and breeding stock without payment. In this way it is hoped that some of the advantages of collectivisation may be achieved while retaining those of individual ownership. But, unless accompanied by far-reaching industrial development, the plan can but aggravate rural unemployment. It is not known how this innovation has been received by the peasants. It was reported in April 1943 that 270 of these communal associations had been formed—an insignificant number—and it is believed that the Government is allocating to them some of the tractors imported from Germany in the war years.*

241 The success of the *obştii* plan, and indeed of any plan for up-grading Rumanian agriculture, depends

* In June, 1943, a temporary ban was placed on the formation of any new *obştie*, because there was insufficient agricultural machinery to supply to them.

248 439 Paper, and paper mixed with hemp, are now used to substitute jute.

Although a comparatively large producer of soft hemp, Rumania normally needed to import about 2,300 tons of other hemps for special purposes, and the sources of these imports have been severed since her entry into the war.

Comparatively negligible amounts of coir were also imported in peacetime.

8. Clothes Rationing

288 291 434 Unlike almost all other Enemy and Occupied countries, Rumania possesses no official clothes-ration card, although purchases are restricted to a specific number of garments per year. Since 1940 the Government, anxious to avoid the necessity for a card rationing system, has adopted various means in an endeavour to overcome the shortage of textiles, particularly of cotton and wool.

Standardisation of fabrics and fixed prices were introduced in 1940, but clothing of standardised material was frequently unobtainable since the price did not leave the retailer a profit.

Army demands soon called for a great increase in clothing production, thereby reducing the stocks and greatly raising prices of civilian clothing—those for overcoats rose by 300 per cent. and for knitted goods by 400 per cent.—and the difficulty of importing raw materials soon reacted on the industry, so that by 1941 the textile shortage, particularly of bed linen, had become serious. Later in the same year, the Ministry of Supply blocked the sale of all semi-manufactured or manufactured blankets.

Early in 1942 the Government requested the public to purchase only necessities, ordering the industry at the same time to use cotton allocations for the manufacture of standardised bed linen and clothing only. Later in 1942 it was decreed that the annual allotment of garments per head of the population was two suits or frocks, one overcoat, three shirts, 12 handkerchiefs, three pairs of socks or stockings, one sheet, three towels. The sale of standard cloth was restricted to three metres per person per annum. For this arrangement, however, clothing coupons were not issued and purchasers were requested to produce their identity cards and a signed certificate of need if the purchase exceeded 300 lei.

291 435 Non-standard articles are still obtainable, but their exorbitant prices make them accessible to a limited section of the public only. Retailers are known to have refused the sale of standard cloth even when displayed, in order to secure, if possible, the higher profit margin for non-standard goods.

[565] The members of the public most severely affected by clothing shortage and high prices are industrial workers and the poorer urban population. Though the large firms are supposed by law to supply their employees with clothing (as well as food) at cheap prices, it is thought that this is not being widely practised.

Prices of all materials for men's garments have risen to such an extent that people cannot afford to buy even such goods as are available in the shops.

248 656 To counteract shortage of clothing fibres, peasants are being encouraged by the Government to increase cultivation of flax and hemp for production of the rough cloth suitable for peasant clothing.

313 Present fellings are not known, but a considerable shortage of forest workers and draught animals, coupled with poor transport conditions generally, are making it impossible to fell and to distribute sufficient timber to meet all home demands. These have been considerably increased by the need for timber for military purposes both in the country and at the front, and for reconstruction work in the war-damaged areas of Bessarabia, Bucovina and Transnistria. The result is a heavy and at times serious shortage of supplies.

[439] Exports, which had already fallen to about 360,000 cubic metres in 1940, further declined after the loss of Transylvania and were only some 220,000 cubic metres in 1941, but of these about 180,000 cubic metres were old accumulated stocks of sawn goods which were sold to Germany and the U.S.S.R. at the beginning of that year. No information has yet been received concerning 1942 exports, but the increasing difficulties of production make it unlikely that these were of any importance, and probably did not exceed 50,000 cubic metres.

[656] The forests are now placed under Government control and many decrees have been published regulating and defining the quantities and dimensions of trees that may be felled. Maximum prices have been fixed for all classes of timber, and a strict rationing of firewood introduced, whilst in 1942 an export embargo was placed on several categories of timber, principally soft woods.

After the cession of Northern Transylvania, German forestry experts visited the country to advise on proper forestry methods, and although there is no real evidence of what was decided, there are indications that the country is now more forestry-minded, and that more regard is being paid to reafforestation and other necessary work. These are, however, long-term policies and can have very little immediate effect or improvement on the country's present difficult situation.

TABLES

1. Details of Cut and Ownership, 1938

[423]

	State	*Communes*	*Private*	*Total*
Timber	(in '000 *solid cubic metres*)			
Conifers ..	570	2,450	2,850	5,870
Beech ..	1,080	300	480	1,860
Oak, etc. ..	350	390	520	1,260
Firewood ..	2,820	2,130	6,930	11,880
Total ..	4,820	5,270	10,780	20,870

2. Distribution of Timber Industry, 1938

	Units	*Personnel*
Total timber industry ..	713	43,326
of which:		
Sawmills	478	37,693
Distribution of total timber industry by administrative regions:—		
Olt	18	1,756
Bucegi	159	7,177
Maros	3	38
Dunarea de Jos ..	29	932
Nistru	3	109
Prut	67	6,222
Sucesava	110	6,555
Mures	155	9,196
Someş	83	7,163
Timiş	86	4,178

282 cattle hides collected in September, October and November, 1941, were for this purpose. The remaining 32 per cent., plus the horsehides, pigskins and goatskins, could be used for civilian purposes. The result was that very soon insufficient sole leather was available for civilians, and repairs to footwear became difficult.

282 At present 80 per cent. of the cattle hides weighing over 16 kilos (35 lb.), and 20 per cent. of
656 the hides weighing less than 16 kilos, are reserved for the Army. This leaves the civilians very short of sole leather, normally manufactured from heavy hides.

At the end of 1941, the Ministry of Supply ordered the registration of all leather stocks, and thereafter leather could not be sold without a permit. The entire purchasing and control of raw hides and skins and also the distribution of leather was placed in the hands of the "ORAP" (*Oficiul Român de Aprovizionare şi Distribuire a Produselor de Piele*).

In the autumn of 1941 private dealings in sheep- and lambskins were forbidden, the Army Supply Minister having sole right of disposal. Owing to the comparatively important domestic output such a measure should not have been necessary, but was due to the Rumanian, and probably German, demands for warm clothing on the Russian front. Evidence received in 1942 shows that 80 per cent. of the skins are now reserved for the Army.

In July, 1942, leather transmission-belting, etc., was brought under control and made subject to certain restrictions.

295 Civilian rationing of footwear was introduced
434 early in 1942 and new shoes could be sold only against permits issued to persons declaring possession of only one other pair of serviceable shoes. Repair cards were also issued. Requisition cards for new shoes are limited to one a year, and repair cards to one every four months. Children under 14 years of age can obtain two requisition cards yearly for new footwear.

The issue of permits does not, however, guarantee footwear supplies, and only about 50 per cent. of repair or purchase demands appear to be met.

The above regulations have been slightly modified from time to time, but remain intrinsically the same. The production of footwear of substitute materials, such as wooden soles, soles of artificial leather, leather waste, buna, etc., has gradually increased.

295 Despite the various government regulations
435 the footwear Black Market flourished, and while the average pre-war price for a pair of men's shoes was 800 lei, in October, 1941, the official prices were fixed at about 1,500 lei for a standard pair of men's shoes and about 1,200 lei for a standard pair of women's shoes. In March, 1942, however, the Black Market price for men's shoes was 7/8,000 lei a pair, and this has now gradually risen to 10/12,000 lei. Complete soleing and heeling of men's footwear costs 1,250 lei officially, and women's 1,000 lei. The official price of soleing leather is 530 lei per kilo, whereas the Black Market price is 34,000 lei.

2. Tanning Materials

282 Before the war Rumania never made use of her
439 own barks for tanning, as it was more economical to import extracts from overseas. During the war she has made attempts to employ her oak, chestnut, spruce and pine barks for tanning materials, but

282
439

without much success, and has therefore reverted to her former practice of importing them.

In February 1942 it was reported that with imports from Italy, Turkey and Croatia, Rumania had an eight months' supply in hand.

Under the 1942/43 Italo-Rumanian agreement, Italy is providing her with 1,750 tons of chestnut extract, 1,000 tons of sumach and 735 tons of other materials. Turkey also agreed to supply her in 1942 with 1,000 tons of valex and 2,500 tons of valonea.

D. BUILDING MATERIALS AND CEMENT

339

The building materials industry in Rumania is on a small scale and not highly mechanised, employing a total of 16,000 workers in 1937, while the value of production in that year amounted to 1·6 milliard lei, about 2½ per cent. of total industrial production. In the decade before the war, cement, which is the most important branch of this industry, had a steadily increased output reaching in 1939 a total of 531,000 tons, with an 800,000 ton capacity. Small quantities had to be imported.

The most important cement firms are at Cernavodă, Turda, Dudeşti, and Fieni. Since the war, due to limited building activity, consumption of cement has decreased, and was reported to have been 314,000 tons for the first ten months of 1942 the bulk of which was used for military requirements.

[727]
339
656

After the recapture of Northern Bucovina and Bessarabia in mid-1941, a considerable amount of repair work had to be undertaken as a result of war destruction; but at the beginning of 1943 due to raw material and labour shortage, all further reconstruction in these two provinces was forbidden. Later, in February, 1943, a decree

339 [656] came into force forbidding construction throughout the country for the duration of the war of private buildings requiring either iron, steel girders, sheet-iron or other sheet-metal roofing.

In 1942 production of bricks and tiles was reported to have been sufficient to meet the reduced requirements. During the war period there have been considerable exports of asphalt and tarred board for roofing, the latter mainly to Italy. [439]

E. GLASS

323 The glass industry employed 6,600 workers in 1937 in 19 glass factories and 20 glassware factories, the most important of which were the Vitrometan Fabrica de Sticlarie S.A. of Mediaş and the Fabrica de Sticlarie Turda S.A. of Turda, both producing sheet-glass and hollow-ware.

Production did not cover the requirements of specialised types, which were imported from Germany and Czechoslovakia. During the war period window-pane production has been adequate for requirements and small quantities have been manufactured for Germany; while under the 1942 Turco-Rumanian Trade Agreement Rumania agreed to supply both window-panes and glassware.

F. CERAMICS

The ceramic industry employed 1,600 workers in 1937 in 33 factories, and the value of production was 212 million lei. Most of the raw materials for this industry are found in the country, and there has been no difficulty in supplying these during the war period. Apart from the mechanised industry, ceramics are produced in normal times on a comparatively large scale by the peasants. The principal factories are the Nitrogen S.A. in Tărnăveni, the Crinul S.A. in Timişoara and the Uzinele Ceramice S.A. in Ploeşti.

505 trade is carried on the Danube to European
439 markets, Germany in particular, and, with the exception of an exceedingly limited traffic with Turkey, and a few intermittent shipments of oil to enemy ports in the Aegean Sea, Rumania's foreign sea-borne trade has been brought virtually to a standstill.

In addition to traffic in the Black Sea with U.S.S.R., Bulgarian and Turkish ports, Rumania in pre-war days had important commercial relations with most European and other countries overseas, the trade routes being via the Dardanelles, Mediterranean, Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar.

2. Mercantile Marine

505 All merchant-shipping activities are controlled
[152] by the Ministry of Air and Marine. Rumania's ocean-going mercantile marine in 1939 was constituted as follows:—

		G.R.T.
6	cargo and passenger motor vessels	27,061
16	cargo steamers	67,103
3	steam tankers	14,737
25	Total	108,991

[155] Of the 19 cargo steamers and tankers, 11 were oil-fired and 8 coal burners. Fourteen of these vessels were owned by the Rumanian State Maritime Service (*Servicial Maritim Roman*), the principal shipping company in Rumania, whilst the three tankers belonged to the Steaua Romana Petroleum Company of Bucarest. The remainder were privately owned.

[418] Consequent upon her entry into the war Rumania's mercantile marine came under Axis control and most of her vessels are trading for German and Italian account, partly in the Adriatic and Aegean, and partly in the Black Sea.

A statement of Rumania's estimated non-tanker merchant-shipping resources on the 30th April, 1943, follows:—

ESTIMATED RUMANIAN MERCANTILE MARINE RESOURCES (NON-TANKER) UNDER AXIS CONTROL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA AT 30TH APRIL, 1943.

Tonnage Category	*No. of Vessels*	*Total G.R.T.*
100/499	3	578
500/999	—	—
1,000	2	2,798
2,000	2	4,946
3,000	3	10,170
4,000	—	—
5,000	2	11,395
6,000	3	20,220
Aggregate ..	15	50,147

[72a] As to her tanker tonnage, two vessels aggregating 11,705 G.R.T. were seized and are now in Allied service, whilst the third, of 3,032 G.R.T., was sunk in December, 1941, in the Aegean Sea.

3. Ports

504 The chief ports for sea-going vessels are Constanta on the Black Sea and Brăila and Galaţi on the Danube, which both handle river shipping as well.

[42b]

133 trained pilots is compulsory, while the large towns
502 have to be broken up into smaller units. This sector of the Danube cannot be negotiated at night, which constitutes an enormous hindrance for large-scale traffic. In order to speed up the traffic, the use of suspension railways and locomotives on rails laid along the river bank was introduced before the war, but the system has met with only moderate success.

[503] Navigation in the Maritime sector of the Danube is affected by silting up—particularly in the autumn—and constant dredging has to be carried out in the Sulina branch to maintain sufficient depth for passage of vessels up to Galați. The depth of this sector was 24 ft. in 1939, permitting the entry of vessels of medium draught only. Danube navigation is held up for varying periods between November and March by ice, averaging 30-50 days, and occasionally even for 90 days.

499 There are no permanent bridges on the Danube to connect Rumania with Bulgaria. However, a Rumanian-Bulgarian Commission was established in 1942 to remedy this deficiency by arranging for the construction of a bridge, which will take five years to complete, between Giurgiu and Ruse. In the meantime a ferry system is in use between Giurgiu and Ruse carrying important supplies of oil for the German forces in Greece.

3. River Ports

503 There are in all some 38 river ports, of which the
504 most important, all on the Danube (from west to east), are as follows :—

Moldova	Oltenița
Orșova	Brăila
Turnu Severin	Galați
Giurgiu	Sulina

Since the war started considerable improvements have already been made on the Danube. This is of special significance for, though this waterway is of little use for Rumanian internal traffic, since the closing of the sea route between Rumania and North Germany, it has become vitally important for the carrying of bulky transport. As early as 1940 a scheme for the rationisation of Danube traffic was put into operation, and the installations of Giurgiu, the main Danube port for oil transport, were improved.

To avoid congestion at Giurgiu, the Danube ports of New Moldova and Orșova have been enlarged. Internal traffic has been diverted to Oltenița, which is also used for the unloading of incoming traffic. The construction of new harbour installations is being carried out by a German-Rumania company.

4. Organisation of Inland Water Shipping

505 Rumanian Danube shipping is under State
●656 control, and organisation is carried out by firms which are partly State-owned and partly owned
[655] by private individuals. The most important company is the State-owned "N.F.R." (*Navigațiunea Fluvială Română*), and of lesser importance are the privately owned companies "S.R.D." (*S.A.R. de Navigație pe Dunăre*) and "Sind" (*Società Italiana di Navigazione Danubiana*).

505 All Rumanian shipping companies are members
648 of the Danube Shipping Pool, which is under German supervision, headed by the *Deutsche Donauschiffahrtsgruppe*, which is closely connected with the Hermann Goering-Werke für Binnenschiffahrt. The importance of the Danube Pool (exclusive of the Tanker Pool) will be realised when it is borne in mind that between 1932-1937 the freight carried annually by its vessels on the

563 would obtain equal grants, while officials would be nomin-
664 ated proportionately to the numbers of each nationality.

Count Bethlen, however, desired to justify the millions spent on the revisionist campaign and demanded the revision of frontiers, namely the retrocession of the Hungarian towns bordering on the frontier (Arad, Oradea-Mare, and Satu Mare). The advisers of King Carol considered that the present frontiers of Rumania were final, and in order that the idea of a personal union be rendered acceptable to the Rumanian people, all reference to a revision of frontiers should be dropped as it was sure to provoke a fiasco, all the more so since the Liberal party was known to be hostile to the idea of a personal union. The Rumanians would accept the scheme only in case Hungary agreed to recognize the actual frontiers without rectification and in exchange for the other concessions. It was on this point that the negotiations came to a standstill. Count Bethlen was bound by engagements towards the revisionist group. According to his conception, only Transylvania was to remain under Rumanian rule as a Duchy, while other parts were to revert to Hungary."

In conclusion the paper stated that "the interview left painful recollections with Count Bethlen who now talks of an alliance with Italy and Austria."

The Dobrudja.

563 If the state of the minorities in Transylvania may be stated
166 to be relatively satisfactory, taking into consideration the
657 general shortcomings of the Rumanian administrative
647 system, it is to be regretted that as much cannot be said of the Dobrudja, where both the Turkish and Bulgarian minorities, living in compact masses, have well-founded grievances. One of the main causes of dissatisfaction has been the ill-considered plan of the Rumanian Government to colonize southern Dobrudja with Kutso-Vlachs from Macedonia. Without making any adequate preparations to provide these people with dwellings, food and clothing, it proceeded to billet them in the small cottages of the Bulgarian and Turkish farmers which were barely sufficient for their owners. The newcomers being destitute, had no alternative to that of

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1
Dobrudja

563
166
657
647

a life of rapine, a matter which led to bloody encounters followed by mass arrests of the local population. The latter had been further embittered by the State seizing one-third of their lands, no compensation whatever being given, even in cases of these lands carrying growing crops. Such was the tension that had been created that on the advent of the Maniu government, both M. M. Vaida-Voevod and Mihalache considered it imperative to intervene in order to put a stop to the abuses and the provocations that both Turks and Bulgarians were subjected to. The intercession of the leaders of the National Peasant Party caused extreme ill-feeling in Chauvinist circles which fomented a violent agitation against what was represented as treachery to the Rumanians. This culminated in the assassination of an under-secretary of State by a hot-headed student. The Maniu government had delegated a commission to study on the spot the complaints of the population of the Dobrudja and prepare a report, a summary of which was published in the "Adeverul" of March 4th, 1929. In this we read that "the enterprise of colonizing the Dobrudja had been left without control and had become a means of exploitation and the furthering of personal interests," that the system of quartering the colonists on the Bulgarian and Turkish inhabitants "led to an unbearable state of affairs causing endless conflicts." As for the situation of the colonists, the report shows that the ineptitude of the Rumanian authorities transcends all imagination, "out of 10,000 heads of families only 15 had received monetary help from the government, the lands that were to be allotted to the colonists remained in possession of State functionaries. The colonists had no houses nor timber wherewith to construct them." As a consequence of this report the Maniu Government created a special commissariat for building houses for the colonists, 1,257 of which were built in 1929, 938 during 1930, and 1,200 in the course of 1931, at an average cost of 44,000 lei each.

The situation, unfortunately has not improved, and murders of Turks and Bulgarians by the Kutso-Vlachs are frequent. What is most regrettable is that they are left practically unpunished, as has been the case with the murderer of one of the leaders of the Bulgarian minority, the

RUMANIA

[146] late C. M. Stephanov, who was also a member of the
657 Rumanian Senate. The main cause of the effervescence that
563 still subsists is this ill-advised scheme of planting the destitute
[647] Kutso-Vlachs on the farms of the aboriginal inhabitants, proof of which has been given by M. Georoceanu in a booklet he has published. M. Georoceanu was formerly a member of the Rumanian Senate during M. Maniu's tenure of office.

It may be added that the Bulgarians complain of not
[158] having a single school in their villages, and that when they presented petitions for opening such their signatories had
[159] been prosecuted. Bulgarian priests are no longer allowed to be nominated, and those that still remain are being gradually replaced by Rumanians who officiate naturally in their own language which is not understood by their flocks. A lesser
[204] wrong which receives the condemnation only of the intellectuals, is the ban on Bulgarian newspapers and periodicals. Their introduction into Rumania is prohibited, and though a few months ago the Bucarest press announced that this embargo would be raised, yet as late as April, 1932 the police authorities in the Dobrudja had received no intimation of
563 this commendable measure. It is obvious that all these
648 grievances could easily be removed with a little goodwill on
667 the part of the Rumanian government, and to the westerner it is incomprehensible that the latter should make no effort to safeguard the happiness of hundreds of thousands of human beings whose destiny has been entrusted to its hands. For it is not only the elementary duty of a government to care for its subjects, but in this case even political reasons dictate the following of a more humane and civilized policy. The bulk of the population being Bulgarian, and having for forty years enjoyed an independent existence, is utterly unaccustomed to such maladministration as it is now experiencing. It is therefore natural that it should be soliciting the intercession of the Bulgarian government under whose suzerainty it lived until recently. This is a course that creates friction between the two governments, keeps open an old sore, and embitters and strains relations between Bulgaria and Rumania. The former country would incur every sacrifice in order to ensure Rumania's friendship, and

10: Logio 3-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

it is most regrettable that Rumania, on account of this constitutional impassibility from which she suffers, should neglect the accomplishment of a simple duty that would simultaneously ensure the pacification of a province and the friendship of a neighbouring State. Even Sir Ian Hamilton in one of his books extended this advice to Rumania: "If she values her life let her make it up with Bulgaria whilst she is in the gate." (The Friends of England, p. 130). But so far this soldierly exhortation has not been heeded.

Bessarabia.

"Twelve years of Rumanian rule has alienated Bessarabia more than a century of Russian administration," declared Constantine Stere, the veteran Bessarabian politician who may be considered as the mouthpiece of the population of that hapless region. If one wishes indeed, to form an idea of what the combined evils of corruption, ineptitude, nepotism, and inefficiency can bring upon a land he should visit Bessarabia. It is a standing disgrace, a festering sore, a danger point that will cause a fresh conflagration the moment the Russians across the Dniester can divert their attention from their economic plans to engage in world politics. Such is the desperation of the local population, their utter aversion to Rumanian misrule, the pessimism with which they regard every scheme emanating from Bucarest, that if the Russians would decide to cross the Dniester they would be hailed as liberators.

Not that the Bessarabians cherish any particular affection for the Russians and for communistic dogmas, but because there is after all a limit to human endurance to evils arising from such glaring maladministration. There is no hope for any amelioration; the Bucarest administration has demonstrated its incapacity to reform itself, and the only hope there may be of placating Bessarabia is the granting of a regional autonomy that may save her from casting longing glances at Bolshevik Russia across the Dniester. As the writer does not wish to be accused of exaggeration or of being imbued with unfriendly feelings towards Rumania, he will proceed to give a description of the position in Bessarabia by an interpolation of various excerpts culled from newspapers that he

F

647 could be dismissed without the working of the administra-
652 tive machine being impaired in any way, and several instances are given of the plethora of officials. M. Bratanescu, deputy for Tighina, for example, pointed out in the Chamber that in his town, with a population of 31,698, there were 130 teachers, but as there were not enough children for each to have a full class, whenever an inspector came down, each teacher used to borrow children from the other classes in order to complete the number of his own so that he might escape being reprimanded by the inspector.

652 Another head on which various economies could be
657 effected is pensions, which absorb about one-fifth of the total revenue, and many of which are served out to people who have not the slightest justification for drawing them. The tendency to spend overmuch for the upkeep of the social services is a characteristic trait of Rumania and was noticed and commented on many years ago by one of her distinguished social writers, M. C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, in his work "Neoiobâgia." Referring to the period 1910–1911, he pointed out that the State budget and those of the communes absorbed over one-third of the national revenue, and what remained for the subsistence of the population amounted to 123 gold lei per head, or almost 4,000 lei, a figure closely approximating to the 3,955 lei which, according to the calculations given above, represented the net income per head for
647 1930. The above-cited writer condemned very caustically
652 the profligate methods of the administration as likely to bring the State to ruin:

"By withdrawing annually from production these big sums and lavishing them on a parasitic bureaucracy, the State sets the example of a mad waste . . . by letting the bureaucracy spend extravagantly what the other classes create by hard toil, people form the illusion that this country is very prosperous and that it is easy to live in it comfortably. . . . This hypertrophy of the State organism is one of the most pernicious sicknesses which attack modern societies." (p. 455.)

647 It is indeed a great pity that no political party ever en-
651 deavoured to tackle the problem of thoroughly overhauling the administrative machine of the country, but that instead

563 Tyrol, or the Ukrainians in Poland, for they at least possess a large number of schools and churches, mainly in communes [65] in which they form the majority of the population. At a time when the Rumanian government has been obliged for reasons of economy to close down several hundreds of schools and colleges, it would not be fair to impugn it for a shortage [423] of Magyar schools in Transylvania. The burning grievance, of course, remains the agrarian reform, not only because it has dispossessed Hungarian and German owners, but also because the depreciation of the Rumanian currency has practically nullified the paltry compensation they were accorded. Furthermore, religious establishments possessed extensive domains which likewise were expropriated and [65] have thereby lost most of their revenues which formerly were employed in the upkeep of churches, educational missions, and benevolent societies. This naturally constitutes a source of bitter recriminations, for both Hungarians and Germans are inclined to ascribe the treatment meted out to their religious establishments as dictated by the desire of the Rumanians to discourage their cultural activities, and to hinder the normal development of their nationality by depriving it of pecuniary resources. It is a great pity that so far no law has been framed to define the status of minorities in Rumania though this has been persistently promised them. Such an enactment would formulate once and for all the respective privileges and duties of both parties, and there would be no further grounds for recrimination except in the case of a patent violation of its clauses. The National Peasant party had prepared such a scheme which, if enacted, would have gone a long way to settle this vexed question; unfortunately after its abandonment of power it has apparently been forgotten.

With the advent of the Iorga-Argentoianu government the laudable initiative of creating a sub-secretariat for minorities was taken, to which post, M. Brandsch, a member of the German minority was appointed. He seems to have carried out his duty very conscientiously, as he has repeatedly been attacked by the ultra-nationalist press of Bucarest for his disregard of the superior interest of the Rumanian cause, and for overduly favouring the minorities. There seems to

RUMANIA

[146] late C. M. Stephanov, who was also a member of the
657 Rumanian Senate. The main cause of the effervescence that
563 still subsists is this ill-advised scheme of planting the destitute
[647] Kutso-Vlachs on the farms of the aboriginal inhabitants,
proof of which has been given by M. Georoceanu in a booklet
he has published. M. Georoceanu was formerly a member
of the Rumanian Senate during M. Maniu's tenure of office.

It may be added that the Bulgarians complain of not
[658] having a single school in their villages, and that when they
presented petitions for opening such their signatories had
[659] been prosecuted. Bulgarian priests are no longer allowed to
be nominated, and those that still remain are being gradually
replaced by Rumanians who officiate naturally in their own
language which is not understood by their flocks. A lesser
[204] wrong which receives the condemnation only of the intellec-
tuals, is the ban on Bulgarian newspapers and periodicals.
Their introduction into Rumania is prohibited, and though
a few months ago the Bucarest press announced that this
embargo would be raised, yet as late as April, 1932 the police
authorities in the Dobrudja had received no intimation of
563 this commendable measure. It is obvious that all these
648 grievances could easily be removed with a little goodwill on
657 the part of the Rumanian government, and to the westerner
it is incomprehensible that the latter should make no effort
to safeguard the happiness of hundreds of thousands of
human beings whose destiny has been entrusted to its hands.
For it is not only the elementary duty of a government to
care for its subjects, but in this case even political reasons
dictate the following of a more humane and civilized policy.
The bulk of the population being Bulgarian, and having for
forty years enjoyed an independent existence, is utterly
unaccustomed to such maladministration as it is now
experiencing. It is therefore natural that it should be
soliciting the intercession of the Bulgarian government under
whose suzerainty it lived until recently. This is a course
that creates friction between the two governments, keeps
open an old sore, and embitters and strains relations between
Bulgaria and Rumania. The former country would incur
every sacrifice in order to ensure Rumania's friendship, and

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

241
874
658
871

at last been compelled to assume at its own expense the professional training of its youth.

It is sad to record that even in educational institutions the remissness which has characterized Rumanian administration has not been adequately grappled with, and it is not surprising that the laxity manifested in this particular domain should appear especially odious to the national minorities in Rumania, which have a different moral conception of life than that of the predominating nationality. That there is much to be done in this department is obvious to all, owing to the persistence of the complaints. A storm of indignation was raised by the scandalous condition of the College of Salonta, in Transylvania, in which some 400 Hungarian and Rumanian students were being educated. Of this number of students, 50 per cent were incapacitated, owing to the disgusting lack of hygiene prevailing, and the anarchic system on which it was conducted. The parents of the students had to petition the Minister of Education to obtain amelioration of the methods in vogue, and the details exposed were so revolting that the *Cuvantul* of March 28th, 1929, commenting on them, more or less admitted that such facts justified the opprobrious epithet of "putrid Wallachs" conferred on the latter by the Hungarians.

241
565

From this it may be deduced that agriculture had already been ruined through the culpable remissness of Rumania's rulers before the present crisis made itself felt. The country was caught like some disabled ship by the economic hurricane which suddenly sprang up, and materially it is suffering intensely, because in its battered condition it finds it difficult to weather the storm. Fortunately, the peasantry has been used to a life of suffering and hard toil; the peasants are patient and long-suffering to an extent inconceivable in the West. Docile and good-humoured, they put up with a situation that a Westerner would long since have found intolerable and against which he would have revolted. Poverty-stricken and unguided, the peasant has not only been left to provide the means wherewith to develop his farm, but at the same time he has been forced to supply from his own scanty resources the needs of the urban populations and the bulk of the funds requisite for carrying on the administration

000 (the ruler) and members of the "Sfatul Tarii" (country's Assembly).
795 In general, the Romanian Orthodox Church has been since the
642 foundation of the "United Principalities" in 1859 considered
175 the predominant church and had a priority over other churches. This situation continued when the Kingdom of Romania was formed after 1866 (hereafter called Old Kingdom in contrast to Romania after 1919). Nevertheless, the religious practices of other churches were tolerated and undisturbed. The Romanian Orthodox [798] Church did not consider itself universal, was not animated by any spirit of proselytism and was rather passive and tolerant towards other creeds and rites. For this reason and because of the small number of persons professing other religions in the Kingdom of Romania, the situation did not call for any special legislation on freedom of religion prior to World War I.

II. From World War I to the End of World War II

1. General Regime of Churches

●659 The necessity for special legislation regulating the status of churches other than the Romanian Orthodox has arisen after World War I.

175 The Romanian Kingdom emerged after World War I with
671 an enlarged territory. The newly incorporated provinces were hitherto governed by different laws. Bulgarian law prevailed in Banat and Maramurosh, the same law with some specific provisions was also in force on Transylvania; Austrian law was

175 in force in Bukovina and the Russian law, with some specific
671 local rules, was in force in Bessarabia.

175 The population of the newly incorporated provinces was
162 predominantly Romanian but, in view of the long separation from the Old Kingdom, was somewhat different. Moreover, there were also other ethnological groups and a variety of churches and even sects.

The population of Transylvania and Banat, for instance, was divided mainly among the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches. The population of Bukovina and Maramures was either of Catholic (Uniates) or Orthodox religion and had an important Jewish minority. In Bessarabia, in addition to the Eastern Orthodox Church, there was a real conglomerate of creeds and and rites, many of them originating back in the 17th century and subsequent reforms of the Russian Orthodox Church.

659 A new Constitution was adopted in 1923. It declared
[642] the principle of freedom of religion which needed to be developed in details and put into effect by special laws. This did not follow immediately but, instead, the Romanian Government carried out, in 1925, the unification and hierarchical reorganization of the Romanian Orthodox Church (see <u>infra</u>).

This step increased the pressure of the numerous other churches and rites practiced within the new frontiers. They intervened seeing that their status be defined and that their relations with the higher church authorities abroad, as well as with the Romanian State and the Orthodox Church, be settled by

659 law. For these reasons the Law No. 54, on the general regulation of the religious denominations, was enacted on April 22, 1938.

The State assured to all religious denominations an equal freedom and protection provided their practice did not endang public order and are not contrary to the laws and morals. (This principle, as well as the provisions of Article 24 regarding the establishment of religious associations have been repealed by Law No. 431 of 1943.).

Any disturbance of the free practice of any religion was declared subject to punishment under the Penal Law. (This provision was later stated in the new Penal Code of March 18, 1938, which in Articles 308 to 312 provides severe penalties for those impeding the free practice of religious creeds recognized by law.)

The religious belief does not prevent a person from acquiring and practicing civil and political rights and does not relieve anyone from the obligations imposed upon him by law.

The positive law has priority over the canonic.

Political organizations on a confessional basis are forbidden.

No church is allowed to entertain relations of dependency with any foreign church authority or organization except relations imposed by the dogmatic and canonical principles of the church. The jurisdiction of the domestic religious authorities should

659 not extend beyond the frontiers of the country and, vice versa, no foreign church may have jurisdictional powers over any denomination in Romania. Moreover, any material support granted and accepted from outside must be communicated to the Romanian Government.

793 The clergymen, the heads of the religious organizations and their officers must be Romanian citizens or they must apply for naturalization. A foreign citizen may be admitted only by special authorization and specifically if otherwise the existence and the functioning of a religious community would be imperilled.

As in the case of the Orthodox Church, the heads of [698] all religious denominations and their clergymen are triable for cannon and political offenses by the High Court of Cassation and Justice (not by ordinary courts). However, the disciplinary cases in church matters shall be tried by their own Synods.

The organizations of the historical churches (infra) are legal entities.

794 The religious denominations freely administer their assets as well as establish and manage as many charitable and educational institutions as they wish or need. The same is true of schools for preparation of the clergy. These, however, must communicate to the Ministry of Religious Affairs concerning their curricula.

871] Each church has the right to give religious instruction to their youth of the given denominations in either public or private schools, as well as to men on active service.

659

The keeping of vital statistics (Civil Status Records) was assigned to civil authorities and was governed by civil law. Thereby this matter became uniformly regulated for the whole of Romania.

795
659

By the provisions of the Law No. 54 of 1928 and its amendments (see infra) a general regime for the religious denominations was well established. However, from the point of view of a status the denominations were divided into several groups as follows:

1) National Churches: this term was applied to the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church.

2) Roman Catholic Church had its own status defined by the Concordat with the Holy See of 1927 which was also applied to the Uniate Church.

3) Historical but not National Churches: Calvinist, Evangelic-Lutheran, the Unitarian, the Armenian-Gregorian, Jewish and Mohammedan religions.

4) The so-called religous associations which are also called minor denominations. This term was applied to a variety of sects. Since 1933 this group became divided into two categories;

a) those which acquired the status of a legal entity under the law concerning non-profit corporations and were officially recognized and allowed to function;

b) those which were considered as dangerous for the public order and morality and therefore prohibited.

The Law No. 54 of 1928 was applied to the Romanian

795
659

Orthodox Church only insofar as its provisions are not contrary to the Organic Law of this Church enacted in 1925 (infra). The same law reserved the regulation of the status of the Roman Catholic Church, including the Uniate Church, to the Concordat which was already agreed upon in 1927 but which was ratified in 1929.

The Jewish religion did not have a central organization at the time when the Law No. 54 of 1928 was enacted. Thus the law postponed the regulation of its status until such central organization was formed. Such organization was achieved only about 1930. Its primary purpose was to obtain a representation in the Senate (upper Chamber) because the law provided for the right of each national and historical church for such representative.

With these exceptions the Law No. 54 of 1928 was applicable to the status of the churches enumerated above under the category of historical churches. Besides, the law provided for the possibility of recognition of other or new religious denominations provided they comply with the provisions of the Law No. 54 and its tenets and practices are not contrary to the public order, the Constitution or the laws and morals. These are the other salient provisions of the Law No. 54.

659

In principle the State retains the right of supervision and control over all denominations. Their heads, whether elected or appointed, must be approved by the King and take an oath of allegiance to Him and to the Constitution.

●659 794 Besides their own revenues, the Churches were entitled to ask for contribution from their parishioners to cover the expenses of maintenance. In case of need the State may supply the amounts required for specified needs; in this case it reserved the right to verify that they are lawfully used.

[798] Articles 43 and 44 provided that since the Constitution guaranteed to all citizens the freedom of religion and conscience every individual has the right to belong to any religious denomination he desires, as well as to change his religion after he reaches the age of 18 years.

659 Up to the end of World War II the Law No. 54 was amended several times.

[793] The first amendment was caused by the fact that some sects carried on a progaganda which was considered to affect the public order. Thus by Decree No. 2752 of August 3, 1929 the Government introduced more severe penalties for clergyman who induced their flock to disobey the laws of the country.

798 659 Moreover, the decree allowed for the same reasons to withdraw from a religious association the authorization to function. The same fact induced the Government to make further a distinction among the religious associations which were not enumerated as historical in the Law No. 54 of 1928.

The Order (Decizüne) No. 114, 119 of 1933 of the Ministr of Religious Affairs made a distinction between the permitted religious associations and those forbidden on the grounds of

798 being dangerous to public order. The list of the latter was
●659 later expanded or reduced according to the evolution of the political concept of "public order". During World War II, for instance, several rites of the Russian Orthodox Church were forbidden because they became mere tools for the policy of Soviet propaganda.

The second amendment was made by Decree No. 3286 of October 2, 1940, promulgated by the rightist (Iron Guard) Government. By this act all religious orders and congregations not duly permitted to function at the time of enactment of the Law No. 54 of 1928 were forbidden. The primary purpose of these provisions was to outlaw the Jewish religion because the provisions of the Law No. 54 of 1928 could be interpreted as not providing for its definite status (see supra).

[793] In addition, this act restated the requirement of Romanian citizenship for clergymen of all denominations and fixed a certain period of time within which the clergymen had either to comply with this rule or leave the country.

Finally, all religious associations were obliged to register with the Ministry of Religious Affairs which had the right to refuse the registration of any one of these bodies.

A further amendment by Decree-Law No. 711 of April 21, 1941, forbade the admittance to other denominations of people of Jewish religion.

The Law No. 927 of December 30, 1942, changed the procedure for establishment of religious associations provided for in Article 24 of the Law No. 54 of 1928. The authorization

798 for their establishment was to be done by Order of the Cabinet.
659 No motivation was required if the Cabinet decided to repeal a previously issued authorization.

Finally, the fight against sects (suspected of spying for the enemy) reached its climax by the Law No. 431 of July 9, 1943, which forbade the practice of religions other than the "historical denominations", specified by the Law No. 54 of 1928. The Government was empowered to suppress, by order of the Cabinet, the spreading of a specific sectarian cult and to expropriate its assets.

The further fate of all those laws and decrees is discussed infra.

128 A few words seem to be appropriate to explain the organization of material dealing with the status of individual churches. In the present part of the study devoted to the period before World War II, only the status of the Romanian Church, of the Roman Catholic Church and of the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church is discussed.

The problem of the status of other religious groups acquired special significance only after World War II. Therefore, even the historical aspect of these denominations is treated in the third part of the present study dealing with the communist period (see infra III, 5).

795 2. Organization of the Romanian Orthodox Church
659 After World War I the unification and reorganization of the Romanian Orthodox Church became a stringent necessity because,

795
659

within the new frontiers, there were several orthodox churches governed by various hierarchical authorities, in addition to the Romanian Orthodox Church of the Old Kingdom. This was done by Law No. 1402 of May 6, 1925. It provided not only for the organization and procedure but it also stated that, since the

[142]

Romanian Orthodox Church is the religion of the great majority of the Romanian people (72.6 percent, according to returns of the census of 1930, in 1930), it is considered, in comparison with the other religions of the country, as the dominant religion. In its relations with the other Orthodox churches, it was declared autocephalous, that is, administratively independent.

By this law the role of the Romanian Orthodox Church as a national church has been reiterated. The salaries of the clergy were paid by the State out of budgetary appropriations.

As the Law of 1925 was silent on this point, the dioceses of the Orthodox Church were granted the status of legal entities by a separate law of May 3, 1929.

793
659

By th Law No. 1002 of May 4, 1926, Article 21 of the Law of 1925 was amended defining the status of the Orthodox clergy. Since they were paid by the Treasury there was a question as to whether the clergymen were civil employees.

The amendment clearly stated that clergymen enjoy all the rights and benefits of public servants only as far as the pay is concerned, In all other respects (appointment, promotion, discipline, etc) they remained under the rules of church law and the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastic authorities.

793 They were subject to church law and to disciplinary authority
659 of the Synod. At the same time, the amendment provided that the State shall pay, besides the salaries, all the other administrative expenses of the Orthodox Church.

3. The Status of the Roman Catholic Church

795 There are two jurisdictions within the Roman Catholic Church in Romania: the Roman Catholics in the strict sense and the so-called Greek Catholics or Uniates. Both are under the supreme authority of the Holy See and the Uniates are considered a rite within the Roman Catholic Church. It is proper, therefore, to begin the study with the status of the Roman Catholic Church in general.

The Catholic Church appeared for the first time in the Romanian provinces (Moldavia and Wallachia) toward the end of the 14th century and, in fact, it did not have any kind of diocesan organization before the beginning of the 17th century. During this time its organization consisted merely of several Catholic missions. From 1611 until 1919, the Catholic Church was organized into two dioceses: one for Moldavia with a bishop in Iassy and another for Wallachia governed by an archbishop in Bucharest who was also the highest dignitary for Romania.

[162] After 1919, the Catholic population from the provinces incorporated after World War I merged with that of the Old Kingdom and, according to the census of 1930, made up a Catholic minority of 6.8 percent of the total Romanian population. The Catholic Church insisted upon recognition as a National Church and upon

795 the granting of broader rights and a corresponding status.
[659] After long negotiations between the Vatican and the Romanian Government an agreement was reached on May 10, 1927, known as the Concordat, and it was ratified by the Parliament on May 29, 1929.

659 The most important provisions of this Concordat[1] which refer to the relations between the Romanian State and the Catholic Church are the following:

The Catholic Church in Romania is recognized to have the status of a legal entity in conformity with the general laws of the country. This status is granted to all Catholic organizations, including the orders and congregations which are legally established both in accordance with the canon law and the laws of Romania.

794 The right of property in all assets of any kind is
659 recognized and guaranteed to the Church by the State in conformity with the Constitution and the laws of the country. The property and other assets for religious, educational, charitable and similar purposes for which they were originally established must be used according to their initial destination, and the proceeds must be used exclusively within Romanian territory. The property may be alienated or hypothecated only in accordance with the rules established by the laws of Romania and the canon law.

In conformity with the provisions of the Law on legal entities, the Government maintains the right of supervision over the material resources of the Catholic Church and the use made of them.

1 [ratified by Parliament, May 29, 1929 --Analyst]

794
659

The Catholic Church is authorized to form, in Romania, a "Sacred Diocesan Fund" composed of the bonds belonging to the Church, its congregations and religious organizations. This fund shall be administered by the Diocesan Bishops' Council and it is destined to cover the expenses required by religious and educational activities as well as for salaries to be paid to the Catholic clergy. In case the fund should become insufficient for these expenses, the Romanian Government assumes the obligation of allocating the necessary subsidies from budgetary appropriations.

Besides the "Sacred Fund", there are two other funds to which the status of a legal entity has been granted as well. They are:

a) the General Catholic Fund for religion; and

b) the General Catholic Fund for education.

The administration of properties belonging to schools, educational institutions, etc., is conferred upon the Catholic diocesan authorities.

The Catholic Church has the right to open as many schools or charitable institutions of any kind as is desired. Since they are entitled to issue publicly recognized diplomas, these schools had to be supervised by the Ministry of Education.

000 The religious instruction of Catholics in all kind of

794 659 871

The religious instruction of Catholics in all kind of schools, including government schools, is conducted according to directives issued by the Catholic Bishop. The directives are to be communicated also to the Ministry of Education.

The Bishop has the right to request the dismissal of teachers of Catholic religion in public or private schools, even where such teachers are appointed and paid by the Government, if the Bishop considered the teacher unqualified for this task.

[874]

Finally, the Catholic Church has the right to establish all kinds of Divinity Schools for preparing the Catholic clergy. The curriculum of those schools is established by the competent Catholic Church authorities.

793 659

The Catholic bishops and their assistants, appointed by the Vatican, must be Romanian citizens and are obliged to take an oath of allegiance to the King, the Constitution and the laws of the country. Those who are not citizens are allowed to apply for citizenship within a reasonable period of time.

The appointment of the clergy is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Church authorities. However, an appointment must be communicated, in advance, to the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

Article 23, the last article of the Concordat, states that "The two contracting parties reserve the right to denounce this Concordat after notice has been served six months in advance."

659

An additional Protocol was signed on May 30, 1932 (Official Gazette No. 180 of August 3, 1932 and ratified by Decree-Law No. 659 (Official Gazette No. 52 of March 2, 1940) pertaining to the

659 interpretation of Article of the Concordat dealing with the use of property which did not alter or restrict the original provisions.

[208] In any event, the Concordat granted the Catholic Church unlimited possibilities of religious propaganda since it provided that the Romanian Government would not oppose the establishment of new Catholic parishes whenever this would be requested by a minmum of 400 worshippers or even less.

According to these provisions and those of the Law No. 54 of 1928, the Catholic Church has been treated as a national church on equal footing with the Romanian Orthodox Church. The Concordat ruled also on the status of the Armenian, Greek-Ruthenian and Greek Catholic Churches in Romania insofar as they were considered as Catholic rites. Some specific information on the two last named denomination are given in the next chapter.

4. The Greek Catholic Church

795 It must be borne in mind that in addition to the Roman Catholic Church in the strict sense there were three churches in Romania which, though originated as Church of the Eastern Christian Orthodoxy were, in the long run, united with the Roman Catholic Church under the supremacy of the Pope.

These churches generally called Uniates were as follows:

a) Romanian Uniates called in Romania Greek Catholics.

b) Russian or, rather, Ukrainian Uniates, called in Romania Greek Ruthenians, mostly inhabitants of Bukovina and

175 The Greek Catholic fraction was amalgamated into
195 the hierarchy of the Roman Church and became simply a rite within that church. At the very beginning, this church was organized as a single diocese with the rank of a Bishopric but, later on, the number of dioceses was raised to three. Nevertheless, during a period of approximately 90 years from the time of the union, the Uniate bishops were supervised and controlled by Jesuit monks sent from Rome. In 1855, the Greek Catholic Church was raised to the rank of a Mitropoly and the Jesuitic control was withdrawn.

175 Until the Concordat of 1929, the status of this church
659 was based mainly on the provisions of the Act of Union of 1698. Both the Constitution of 1923 and the Law No. 54 of 1928 granted it priority above all the other religious minorities. It has been reorganized since the conclusion of the Concordat and was given all rights and privileges of the Catholic Church. The
[193] highest dignitaries of the Greek Catholic Church were equally senators ex officio of the Romanian Parliament as were those of the Roman Catholic Church. The clergy has been paid by the State. For preparing its clergy the church was maintained three theological academies. The returns of the census of 1930
[162] showed that 7.9 percent of the population of Romania belonged to the Greek Catholic faith.

642
798
794

Article 27 of this fundamental law reads as follows:

Article 27

Freedom of conscience and freedom of religious worship shall be guaranteed by the State.

Religious creeds shall be free to organize themselves and may freely function provided their ritual and practice are not contrary to the Constitution, public security and morality.

No religious denomination, congregation or community may open or maintain institutions for general education, but may only run special schools for training personnel necessary to the Cult under State control.

The Romanian Orthodox Church is autocephalous and unitary in its organization.

The way of organising and functioning of the religious creeds will be established by law." (Italics supplied.)

Consequently, three main principles are to be retained:

a) The freedom of religious worship is guaranteed by the State;

b) The organizing and functioning of religious creeds is, with specified exceptions, free;

c) The various creeds are entitled to run special school for training their clergy.

However, these constitutional provisions do not reflect the true situation which will be brought to light only after the analysis of laws later enacted and analyzed in subsequent chapters.

2. The Regime of the Religious Denominations

A. General Survey

●659

After World War II. the original law for the regulation of the religious creeds (No. 54 of 1928) suffered only one major

659 amendment; namely, by Law 62 of March 2, 1948. Its main provisions were as follows:

[421] All reorganized denominations were ordered to take detailed inventory of their assets and communicate it to the Ministry of Religious Affairs in order to enable the latter to exert an easier control over their material resources. Further, the denominations were obliged to hold religious services every time the Government so ordered.

[793] The heads of the Churches, elected or appointed, shall be recognized only upon taking of an oath of allegiance to the newly established People's Republic. By this oath they promised not only to obey the laws, but also to enforce them, to compel their subordinates to obey them and defend the Republic against "any enemies from within or without."

[421] Finally, the Ministry of Religious Affairs was empowered to control and verify all assets and revenues of all kinds belonging to any church, as well as the use made of them.

It is clear that by this amendment the Government took quite a different attitude towards the church. Its existence is justified in the eyes of the government and protected only insofar as the church organizations enforce the law of the country and defend its political order. This amounts rather to bestowing executive and police powers upon the churches and to force upon them to practice political discriminations instead of religion.

There is a novel provision according to which the Government is entitled to control the use made by the churches of their

assets and incomes without drawing a distinction, as the Law No. 54 of 1928 did, between the assets owned by the church and the State subsidies. 659

Yet, soon after these amendments had been made, the law No. 54 of 1928 was repealed in its entirety by the Decree No. 177 of August 4, 1948. This decree establishes a new regime governing the practice of religion in Romania, presumably in accordance with the principles set up in the new Constitution and interpreting them.

The first five articles of the decree proclaim that the State guarantees the freedom of conscience and the freedom of religion and punishes the hatred engendered on account of a religious creed. The religious belief does not impede anyone from his duties and obligations under the law nor is it an obstacle to acquiring and exercising civil and political rights. Yet, no mention is made about the State assuring equal protection under law to all religous creeds. 659 798

In contrast with the Law No. 54 of 1928 no distinction is made any longer between the national, historical or minor denominations. Articles 6 to 9 of the Decree No. 177 provide, in general, that all religious creeds are free to organise and function, provided their practice and ritual are not contrary to the Constitution, the morals and (this is a new criterion) "the public security or public order".

The religious creeds are free to establish and organise endowments, associations, orders and congregations, according to their own rules, teachings, canons and traditions. However, in

order to be organized and to function, the religious denominations must be recognised and granted permission to do so by decree of the Presidium of the Great National Assembly upon proposal of the Cabinet. 659 798

> "In well-founded cases, the recognition can be withdrawn in the same way" (Article 13).

Consequently, the existence of a religious denomination, including all its orders, congregations, etc., is left entirely at the discretion of the political authorities.

Only the recognised religious denominations and their local organizations possess the status of legal entities. Such status may be granted to their civil associations and endowments, pursuing religious aims, as well as their orders and congregations if they comply with all requirements provided by the Law for legal entities (Article 28).

The heads of the religious denominations as well as the dignitaries of their churches and the entire personnel must be Romanian-citizens and "enjoy fully the exercise of civil and political rights" (Article 20). No mention is made with regard to the situation or fate of those dignitaries who are not, or not as yet, citizens. 659 793

As to who has the full exercise of the civil rights is clearly defined by the Civil Law. But a different situation exists with regard to the political rights. Although those rights are well defined the statutory provisions, the final and only proof that a person enjoy the political rights is the fact that he has

659
793

been registered in the electoral list in 1946 and that his name was still there subsequently. In other words, only those clergymen and officers of the church are admitted to serve their churches who came successfully through all purges practiced by the Communist Government since 1945. Since the beginning of 1949, the lists are checked annually and are kept by the local People's Soviets which enjoy almost unlimited administrative and political powers. So far these local soviets were not elected but were appointed by the Communist Party's machinery and it stands to reason that nobody is entered on the electoral lists who is not completely trusted by the Party. Other usual reasons to strip a citizen of his political rights are: "undemocratic attitudes", "People's foe", "traitor", etc. Therefore, the political capacity is no longer a status granted to every citizen by the Constitution which could be exceptionally taken away for great and precisely defined offenses against the State after due process in courts, but it may be taken away by the decision of the Communist Party alone. Moreover, Article 33 of the Decree No. 177 provides that a clergyman of a recognised church who shows an "anti-democratic attitude", may be deprived, totally or in part, of the right to draw salary.

The requirement of oath established by the Law No. 62 of 1948 is maintained also in the new law and every minister of religion or officer of any church must take it before the admissio to this office.

Article 25[1] provides that:

659
793
671

"the Ministry of Religious Affairs shall suspend any decision, instruction or directive, as well as any order (of a church authority) having a church administrative, cultural, educational or a charitable character or pertaining to endowments if it is contrary to the status of the denomination, to the act of its establishment, to public security or public order or morals. The pastoral and circular letters shall be communicated in advance to the Ministry of Religious Affairs." (Italics supplied.)

The religious denominations and their endowments, associations, etc., must submit a full report on their financial situation for approval and verification by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The law provides that the salaries of clergymen and the officers of the church shall be paid by the State. But, in contrast to the Law No. 1002 of 1936, Article 34 of the Decree No. 177 suggests that these persons are on the same footing with other government employees in all respects. This article reads:

Article 34

Placing on the payroll of the clergymen and officers of the religious denominations shall be done according to the general rules.

The "general rules" of government employment referred to here (Code of Civil Service of 1946) makes clear that everybody who draws salary from the Government treasury enjoys all rights and has all of the duties of a governmental employee.

Several provisions deal with the disposal of property of parishes where a part of the parishioners decided to choose

659
425

[1. Law No. 62, Article 25, 1948- Analyst]

another denominational jurisdiction. Disregarding the ecclesiastical rules of the denomination, the decree provides that the assets of the parish are transferred to the denomination chosen by the parishioners who leave the parish in proportion to their number as compared with those remaining in the parish. In case 75 percent leave a creed, its entire assets, including the church building, are transferred to that adopted by the parishioners. The implication of this rule is discussed <u>infra</u> under 5. 659 425

The religious denominations may maintain with other countries only such relations as are of a religious nature and they must be carried after approval of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and through the medium of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. These provisions were intended to interrupt direct contact between the Roman Catholic Church in Romania and the Holy See, required by the dogma and organization of the Roman Catholic Church. 659 648 794

Any direct communication by Catholic prelates in Romania with the Holy See could be brought, in view of these provisions, under the provisions of the Decree of August 12, 1950, on state security which threatens with the death penalty:

a) "Treason to the country, rendering service to the enemy or causing prejudice to the power of the state;

b) Procurement and the transmission of state secrets to a foreign or enemy power;. . ."

Unfortunately, there were several instances in which expulsion or conviction was imposed upon the prelates and minister

of the Roman Catholic Church in connection with these provisions. 659
Reference is made to the case of Archbishop O'Hara, Monsignor 648
Guido Del Mesti and Monsignor J. Kirk expelled on July 6, 1950, and other members of nunciature who were convicted on July 4, 1950, the case of Bishop Augustino Pasche, on September 10, 1951, and four other Catholic priests on September 7, 1951.

By Decree No. 178 (Official Gazette No. 178 of August 4, 659
1948) the ~~Minister~~ of Religious Affairs was reorganized to fit the new tasks and was empowered to exert complete control over all religous denominations in the country.

Later on, by Decree No. 37 (Official Gazette No. 30 of February 5 1949) its administration has been simplified in fulfillment of a general order requiring the dismissal of a number of public servants.

After this reduction in personnel, the Ministry of Religious Affairs concentrated only on control and laic matters and dissolved divisions dealing with some spiritual questions, documentation and studies.

The law for general regulation of the creeds has been, 659
later on, implemented by Decree No. 243 (Official Gazette 217 795
of September 18, 1948) by which the number of dioceses for each recognised creed was strictly fixed on the basis of 750,000 worshippers per diocese, as follows:

Greek Orthodox	17 dioceses
Greek Catholic	2 dioceses
Roman Catholic	2 dioceses

Christians of old rite:	1 diocese	659
Protestants:	1 bishop and 1 superintendent.	795

The other religious denominations must endh have one central organization.

B. Church Property

659

The general Decree No. 177 on religious denominations grants the recognized denominations and their parishes the status of a legal entity. The institutions, orders, congregations, associations and establishments organized by the Church may, however, obtain such status only upon a special petition in a procedure established for granting the legal entity in general. It may also be observed that under the Law No. 54 of 1928 the status of legal entities was recognized automatically to a broad group of churches enumerated therein as national or historical denominations. The Decree No. 177 does not grant to any denomination automatic recognition by virtue of the law. Recognition of any denomination is within the discretion of the government which is not limited in its decision. Consequently, a denomination must petition to be recognized and only if the recognition is granted, it acquires the status of a legal entity.

The most salient point, however, lies in the expressly state right of the Ministry of Religious Affairs "to verify and control" the inventory of all church property and its budget (Articles 29, 30 of Decree No. 177). — 659 425

In addition, it may be borne in mind that some churches,

659 425

in particular the Roman Catholic Church, were already deprived of their funds. This was a result of practices supported by legal provisions.

[423]

In the first place, it refers to land. Agricultural land still possessed by the church after the land reform of 1919 was in fact taken away in direct violation of the law.

[671]

Article 8 of Law No. 187 of March 23, 1945, on agrarian reform provided that:

> "agricultural land belonging to monasteries, mitropolies, bishoprics, parishes as well as clerical endowments are excepted, from expropriation, and left in the ownership of the present title holders."

Likewise, certain categories of land, such as vineyards and forests, were generally exempted from expropriation. Nevertheless, most of Catholic landed property, including forests, vineyards, etc., were commandeered early in 1945 and thereafter seized by various "local committees" and, eventually, divided into small holdings. The remainder was seized in its entirety in February 1949 without compensation. This time the Government did not even take pains to issue a decree legalizing the actual seizure.

[454]

The "Sacred Fund" of the Catholic Church (see supra) also lost its value. It was composed almost exclusively of governmental bonds and were given after 1919 to the religious Catholic bodies in Transylvania as compensation for estates expropriated at that time. The terrific inflation of 1944-1947, swept out their value. Then, just before the monetary stabilisation of August 14, 1947 government bonds were compulsorily called in and paid for in inflated lei, only an insignificant part of which was exchanged after the monetary stabilisation for new currency.

currency. 000

In this way, most of the material means of the Catholic Church for support of its religous, educational and charitable program disappeared. 659 425

These successive expropriations have been applied to all religious denominations. However, the Russian Church ("Christians of Old Rite" and the parishes included later on in the Ukrainian Vicariate) was exempted from such measures. If the Romanian Orthodox Church possesses today some material means, these were either granted subsequently by the Government or were transferred by the government from the seized assets of other religious denominations. [798]

C. Church and School

The right to establish and run schools of all kinds granted to all religious denominations by the Law No. 54 of 1928 and in particular to the Roman Catholic Church by the Concordat was abolished. The same is true of the right to administer religious instruction in private and public schools. This is the result of a series of decrees. 659 971

The first step toward this goal was to suppress the denominational schools and those supported in some way by churches. The Government started by suppressing all foreign schools existing in Romania by Order No. 191,653 (Official Gazette No. 176 of August 2, 1948). Many of these schools were, to a certain extent, connected with the religious denominations.

The next step was a reform of the school system

659 871 [671]

accomplished by Decrees No. 175 and 176 (Official Gazette No. 177 of August 3, 1948). By Article 35 all denominational schools were taken over by the government. It reads as follows:

Decree No. 175 of 1948

Art. XXXV. All the denominational and private schools shall become governmental schools.

Decree No. 176 of 1948

Art. 1. For a better organization of the public education, as well as the expansion and democratization of the educational system, all personal and real properties that belonged to the churches, congregations, religious communities, non-profit organizations and trade corporations and, in general, to individuals or legal entities which were destined to serve as support...to denominational schools, are transferred to the government ownership and shall be used for educational needs.

This provision covers school buildings, dwelling for professors, boarding houses and students' homes, etc., as well as funds, estates, and legacies serving educational purposes. No compensation was to be paid for them. A list of over 2,000 denominational and private schools of all kinds, from kindergartens to colleges, which were thus expropriated, was attached to Decree No. 176. The provisions quoted make plain that no denominational school may be opened in the future which conclusion is supported by the fact that a subsequent Decree No. 177 of August 4, 1948 regulating the religious denominations does not mention the right of the church to open general schools. It deals with schools in Chapter VI but provides exclusively for divinity schools.

These decrees affected especially the Roman Catholic Church to which belonged the majority of the denominational schools. [198]

000

schools.

Neither the Decrees No. 175,176 and 177 nor any other law or decree mention the religious instruction in any way. The officially approved curricula of secondary and higher educational institutions do not provide for religious instruction. Nowhere is mentioned the right of the church to supervise religious instruction in case it would be given in general schools. 659 871

The only kind of schools allowed to the church are the special divinity schools for the training of clergymen and auxiliary personnel. These schools are in all aspects, including that of the curriculum, under the supervision of the Ministries of Religious Affairs and of Education. The Ministry of Religious Affairs may, among other things, dismiss at any time the professors appointed by the church whenever it deems that "public order and the security of the State" so requires. 659 871 793

Article 49 of the Decree No. 177 limited the number of Schools of Divinity of university rank in the whole country to: two for the Orthodox Church, one for the Catholic Church and one for all Protestant Churches. But a subsequent order of the Ministry of Religious Affairs reduced further the number of divinity and clerical schools of all denominations and did not mention the establishment of any Roman Catholic Divinity Schools. All of this shows the intention of the government to bar the opportunity for training of the ministers of religion.

It must also be mentioned that no general education may be given at the Divinity Schools. Notwithstanding according

to the curricula approved by the government, an important place is given to three special subjects of "general education", viz., Constitution and law of the Romanian People's Republic, Russian language, and History of Russian Theology. 659 871 793

By the Order No. 42,898 (Official Gazette No. 226 of November 15, 1948) the curricula were approved for the divinity schools of the following denominations: Greek Orthodox, Protestant (including Evangelist, Reformed and Unitarian), Jewish, Baptist, Adventist and Moslems. No mention is made of any curricula for the Roman Catholic Divinity Schools. The same is true of the "Christian Church of Old Rite" but for a different reason (see infra).

3. Status of the Romanian Orthodox Church 659

No new general law on the Romanian Orthodox Church was enacted and it continues to be regulated by the provisions of the Law for the Organization and Unification of May 6, 1925, as amended, since 1947 (see infra). Yet, an interesting question seems to remain open; viz., is it still the dominant church in the State, e. g., the National Church or not? As it has been mentioned previously, the Organic Law of 1925 provided that, since the Greek Orthodox Creed is the religion of the majority of the Romanian people, the Romanian Orthodox Church is dominant in the country. The new amendments of the law of 1925 did not directly affect this provision. But this principle has been taken from the old Constitution of 1923 which, in Article 22, paragraph 4, specifically stressed its role as a 795 659 195 642

659
795
642

national church. The old Constitution has been repealed and replaced by the Constitution of April 11, 1948 and its Article 27, paragraph 4, provides only that "the Romanian Orthodox Church is autocephallous and unitary in its organization." Article 15 of Decree No. 177 of 1948 has similar provisions. However, no mention is made in the new regulation of religious creeds as it was done in the repealed Law No. 54 of 1928 that the Romanian Orthodox Church shall also be directed by its principles, provided they are not contrary to its organic law.

659
795

There are strong reasons to believe that the Romanian Orthodox Church is no longer considered a national church since such status is based on the text of an ordinary law which only implemented a constitutional provision no longer in force. According to the new Constitution and more recent legislation, it appears rather that the Orthodox Church is only one of the recognized denominations and is on an equal footing with the others. This treatment could be the result of the revival of the old Russian Church in Romania (infra) that would not accept a second-rank role in a satellite country.

The contradiction between the new constitution and the Law of 1928 may be explained by the fact that the present government did not yet come to revise all the laws in order to bring them in harmony with the new Constitution. Only the following amendments of the Law of 1928 were enacted thus far.

The Law No. 187 of May 30, 1947, changed the procedure in filling the vacancies in membership of the Diocesan Councils.

659
795

Such councils are governing bodies of dioceses and consist of clergymen and laymen elected by the Council itself. Under the Law of 1928 several candidates used to be nominated. Under the Law No. 187 only one candidate is nominated, who must have, in advance, a specific motivated approval by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In this way the Government succeeded in staffing these bodies with members who, afterwards, in their turn, elected such church dignitaries who would be obedient to the present political regime. Furthermore, the National Church Council which convenes for the election of Bishops, Archbishops and Mitropolitans has been enlarged to include all the members of the Cabinet, the Under Secretaries, as well as members of the Parliament, elected from the districts of the Diocese for which the vacancy occurred. The result was that the laymen members outnumbered the clergymen and thus the Government could be sure of the outcome of the elections.

Law No. 60 of March 2, 1948 and Presidential Decree No. 133 of February 5, 1949, brought only minor changes in the church organization.

4. Present Status of the Roman Catholic Church and Other Religious Denominations

A. The Denunciation of the Concordat of 1927

As previously stated, the Roman Catholic Church organizations, as well as its congregations, institutions and assets were administrated and run according to principles laid down in the Concordat of 1927 and its subsequent implementations. The Roman Catholic Church administered in 1939 the following

establishments: 177 churches; 21 chapels; 669 parishes; 2,002 prayer stations; 9 divinity schools; 6 students' homes led by nuns; 5 orphans' asylums; 1 hospital; 32 pious conventions; 26 Franciscan monasteries; 56 nuns' cloisters; 18 high schools; 5 students' homes; and 1 Ursulines Institute (these figures are derived from an article by Professor Olimp Cracium "Cultele religioase" in Enciclopedia Romanici, vol. 2, Bucharest, 1939). 659 795

The Concordat set up definite limits to the supervision by the Romanian government over the Catholic Church in Romania.

By Decree No. 151 (Official Gazette No. 164 of July 19, 1948) the Romanian Government denounced the Concordat and its additional Protocols and briefly stated that the application of all these agreements ceased on the day of the publication of the decree in the Official Gazette. Yet, Article XXIII of the Concordat provided that its denunciation by either side must be preceded by a notice served six months in advance. During this period, the agreement continued to apply but negotiations concerning a new agreement could be initiated.

Thus, the manner in which the Romanian Government chose to denounce the Concordat obviously disregarding this provision could mean only a mere rupture of agreement and relations.

The Decree No. 151 did not mention at all whether the Catholic Church was to be guided by the provisions of the law regulating religious denominations in general, or of any other law and thus left this church without a regulation by law. This refers not only to the Roman Catholic Church but also to its rites, congregations, assets, etc. In fact, the steps 659 795 798

659
795
798

subsequently taken by the Government demonstrated that the Decree meant to deprive them of legal protection. The Roman Catholic Church was practically barred from any educational activities and deprived of its funds (see supra III 2, B and C). The expropriation of schools was followed by the disbanding of the Catholic organizations.

The first step was taken through the Orders of the Cabinet No. 1677 and 1679 (Official Gazette No. 299 of December 25, 1948) by which eleven main associations and endowments and all their branches were suppressed and their assets transferred to the State. The same steps were taken by the Order of the Cabinet No. 1770 (Official Gazette No. 10 of January 13, 1949) against additional eleven Roman Catholic and Reformed non-profit organizations and all their branches. [425]

Order of the Cabinet No. 161 (Official Bulletin No. 48 of February 26, 1949) suppressed also sixteen main religious and professional Catholic associations and all their district branches. Their assets were transferred to the Ministry of Interior.

Finally, the Order of the Cabinet No. 810 (Official Bulletin No. 51 of August 1, 1949) suppressed the existing Roman Catholic Orders and Congregations with all their dependent institution, regardless of the form in which they were organized. Herein were included the eleven congregations and four orders of the Catholic Church in Romania. Only two monasteries for monks and three convents for nuns were excepted where the clerical numbers of the disbanded congregations were allowed to continue their monastic life. Those who were not Romanian citizens were summoned to appear before the local police for arranging the formalities concerning their leaving the country. Those who

659
795
798

refused to join the monasteries and convents, were given the choice either to request internment in public poor houses (that is, the old people) or to be trained for a handicraft and afterwards assigned to work by the Office for Distribution of Labor Forces. Each member was obliged to communicate in writing his decision to the Ministry for Religious Affairs within 20 days.

It should be also mentioned that under the Law of November 3, 1948, providing for the nationalization of private hospitals, sanatoria and similar health institutions, a number of important Catholic hospitals were taken over by the government from the Church.

175
795

5. Greek Catholic (Uniate) Churches
(Romanian, Ruthenian, Armenian)

As it was mentioned supra II, 4., there were three Uniate churches in Romania. The origin and status of the so-called Greek Catholics, i.e., Romanian Uniates, was described there. The adherents of this church inhabit Transylvania. The members of Armenian Uniate Church (Roman Catholics of Armenian rite) inhabit also in Transylvania (bishopric in Gherla). The third Uniate church, so-called Greek Ruthenian, embraces only Ukrainian (i.e., Russian) population in Bukovina and Maramuresh. Its origin is dated from the Brest Church Council of 1596 when the prelates of the Orthodox Church then within the confines of Poland accepted the union with the Holy See on conditions similar to those accepted subsequently by the Romanian Church in 1698 (see supra II, 4).

To this Church belonged the Ukrainian population of the northern part of Bukovina and of Galicia--which incorporated in the Soviet Union after World War II--and also the Ukrainian and Belorussian population of these provinces. However, the latter population was officially incorporated into the Russian Church by the decree of Emperor Nicholas I in 1839. 175 795

All three Uniate churches in Romania were until now branches of the Roman Catholic Church and after the Concordat was denounced found themselves in a similar position, i.e., without a regulation by law. The members of all three churches experienced a pressure on the part of the government to induce them to "return", so to speak, to the Orthodox Church and to break with the Holy See. The disbandment of the Uniate parishes or rather their transformation into Orthodox parishes was indirectly stimulated by the Order No. 39,380 of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Official Gazette No. 242 of October 18, 1948). Under the previous decree No. 177 of 1948, if members of a parish select another church they carry with them a part of the assets of the parish proportionate to their number. If 75 percent of the parishioners decide to join another church, the church building is transferred to the newly selected one. The Order No. 39,380 provided that, in counting such members, only the heads of each family are taken into account. Thus the counting was greatly facilitated and expedited. 175 795 659 [1425]

No decrees were disclosed dealing especially with the Armenian Uniate Church.

But the Decree No. 358 (Official Gazette No. 281 of December 2, 1948) suggests that the Greek Catholic Church ceased to be a separate ecclesiastic body in Romania and there may be only separate parishes. The Order reads as follows: 659 795 [671]

Article 1

Subsequent to reverting of the local Greek Catholic Parishes to the Romanian Orthodox Church and in conformity with the Article 13 of Decree 177/1948, its central organization and those provided by its Constitution shall cease to exist.

The Order says that the assets of the Greek Catholic Church shall become the property of the Romanian State, without any compensation, and shall be assigned partly or wholly to the Romanian Orthodox Church or to its various constituent parts. [425]

The Government obviously has made use of the provisions of Article 13 of the Law for Religious Denominations of 1948 to withdraw recognition from this church which, after the denunciation of the Concordat, lacked a definite status.

The wording of this article shows, beyond any doubt, that the Greek Catholic Church has been since July 1948 absorbed by the Romanian Orthodox Church by Administrative Order.

The fate of the Ukranian (Ruthenian) Uniate Church was different. The Concordat of 1927 provided for the establishment of this church of a separate diocese within the Roman Catholic Church with the seat to be designated later. It may be mentioned in this connection that the Uniate churches in Galicia and the northern part of Bukovina-now incorporated in the Soviet Uni[illegible] [illegible]re declared united with the Russian Church

659
795

headed by the Moscow Patriarchy in 1947 and 1948. Thereafter, the Ministry for Religious Affairs of Romania issued the Order No. 34,695 (Official Gazette No. 76 of December 2, 1949) which authorized the creation of a "Ukrainian Orthodox Vicariate General" whose task is to organize and have jurisdiction over all Ukrainian Orthodox parishes in Romania. (The original order mentioned a Ruthenian Vicariate, but a note published in the Official Gazette No. 61 of December 16, 1949, substituted for the word "Ruthenian" the word "Ukrainian."

The Ukrainian Vicariate is "an organization independent of any Orthodox diocese and it depends upon the Patriarchy of the Romanian Orthodox Church being directed by the provisions established by the Law on Organization and functioning of the Romanian Orthodox Church (of 1925). (Article 2) The scheme of organization of the Vicariate is reserved for future regulation by the Vicariate with the approval of the Romanian Patriarchy and the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

It must be borne in mind that there are no Ukrainian (or Ruthenian) Orthodox parishes in the present Romania other than the Uniates. The Orthodox parishes with Ukrainian parishioners were only in Bessarabia and a few in Northern Bukovina; but these provinces are now within the Soviet Union. Thus, the Vicariate will obviously embrace the Uniate parishes. In this way, the Greek Ruthenian Uniate Church in Romania is detached from the Holy See and brought within the Romanian Orthodox Church as the Uniates in Galicia and Northern Bukovina were brought within the Russian Orthodox Church.

and any obligation toward the State including taxes and military service. In any event, those who settled abroad broke away from any administration connection with the Moscow hierarchy but did not join any other established Eastern Orthodox Church. Only a part of those remaining in Russia reunited with the official Russian Orthodox Church in the 1930's. These are the so-called "edinovertsi." 795 563

However, those who settled in the Romanian Eastern provinces and their descendants continued their life in religious communities separately from the Romanian society and from the Russian Church. As they were opposed to any assimilation or unification with the Romanian Orthodox Church, they have been treated as a separate religious denomination. The religious tolerance has been granted by documents several times.

This church succeeded in organising closed religious communities in parishes, in building churches, establishing monasteries and in some sects even establishing a certain hierarchy. But the movement did not have its own Divinity Schools and many sects were not willing to train the priests in Romanian or Russian schools. [793]

After the enactment of the Law No. 54 of 1928, the dignitaries of the Church of the Old Rite prepared a Constitution and by-laws and submitted it to the Romanian Government for approval in order to become recognised as a denomination. Up until 1942 they repeatedly tried to get this recognition and thus transform a de facto tolerance into the de jure recognition. Because of political reasons and suspicions of disloyalty, this status has never been granted. 795 659

After World War II. Russia became interested in this Russian minority in Romania and its organisation and helped it to become recognized by the Romanian Government, although not all of the Lipovan communities were willing by now to take such a step under the Soviet tutelage. The recognition was done by Law No. 728 of 1946 (Official Gazette No. 212 of September 13, 1946). 795 659

The status of legal entity was granted to the hierarchical organizations of the Christians of the Old Rite, including their monasteries.

Yet, the law provides that the Romanian State does not in contrast to the statutory provisions of the Law No. 54 of 1928 grant any kind of subsidies to this denomination, either for maintaining its organisation and institutions or for paying its clergy.

It must be borne in mind that under the present setup the government, by taking upon itself the financial support of the churches, makes thereby the churches dependent upon it. Therefore, the abovementioned provision of the Law No. 728 may be considered a privilege of the Lipovan Church and a token of its independence from the government.

Besides a complete hierarchical independence, this church is enabled to establish and direct by itself parish schools for the young believers with teachers appointed by the Parish Assemblies. 794 659

Those schools are neither controlled in any way by

the Ministries for Education and for Religious Affairs nor are they obliged in the least to send the curricula for approval (Article 73). 794 659

Consequently, the Christian Church of the Old Rite is not under the control of the Ministry for Religious Affairs with reference to its organisation and cult as other denominations are. 795 659

Nor are its assets and financial status checked upon by the government authorities as are the assets of other denominations. [454] Finally, it is permitted to establish and manage denominational schools independent of any kind of supervision exercised by the Department of Education. No other denomination has such a right.

It may be assumed that the Soviets have taken a special interest in this denomination and therefore its status-as any other matter of interest for the Soviets-is not subject to Romanian law.

563 Tyrol, or the Ukrainians in Poland, for they at least possess a large number of schools and churches, mainly in communes [65] in which they form the majority of the population. At a time when the Rumanian government has been obliged for reasons of economy to close down several hundreds of schools and colleges, it would not be fair to impugn it for a shortage [423] of Magyar schools in Transylvania. The burning grievance, of course, remains the agrarian reform, not only because it has dispossessed Hungarian and German owners, but also because the depreciation of the Rumanian currency has practically nullified the paltry compensation they were accorded. Furthermore, religious establishments possessed extensive domains which likewise were expropriated and [65] have thereby lost most of their revenues which formerly were employed in the upkeep of churches, educational missions, and benevolent societies. This naturally constitutes a source of bitter recriminations, for both Hungarians and Germans are inclined to ascribe the treatment meted out to their religious establishments as dictated by the desire of the Rumanians to discourage their cultural activities, and to hinder the normal development of their nationality by depriving it of pecuniary resources. It is a great pity that so far no law has been framed to define the status of minorities in Rumania though this has been persistently promised them. Such an enactment would formulate once and for all the respective privileges and duties of both parties, and there would be no further grounds for recrimination except in the case of a patent violation of its clauses. The National Peasant party had prepared such a scheme which, if enacted, would have gone a long way to settle this vexed question; unfortunately after its abandonment of power it has apparently been forgotten.

With the advent of the Iorga-Argentoianu government the laudable initiative of creating a sub-secretariat for minorities was taken, to which post, M. Brandsch, a member of the German minority was appointed. He seems to have carried out his duty very conscientiously, as he has repeatedly been attacked by the ultra-nationalist press of Bucarest for his disregard of the superior interest of the Rumanian cause, and for overduly favouring the minorities. There seems to

RUMANIA

[146] late C. M. Stephanov, who was also a member of the
657 Rumanian Senate. The main cause of the effervescence that
563 still subsists is this ill-advised scheme of planting the destitute
[647] Kutso-Vlachs on the farms of the aboriginal inhabitants, proof of which has been given by M. Georoceanu in a booklet he has published. M. Georoceanu was formerly a member of the Rumanian Senate during M. Maniu's tenure of office.

It may be added that the Bulgarians complain of not
[65] having a single school in their villages, and that when they presented petitions for opening such their signatories had
[65] been prosecuted. Bulgarian priests are no longer allowed to be nominated, and those that still remain are being gradually replaced by Rumanians who officiate naturally in their own language which is not understood by their flocks. A lesser
[204] wrong which receives the condemnation only of the intellectuals, is the ban on Bulgarian newspapers and periodicals. Their introduction into Rumania is prohibited, and though a few months ago the Bucarest press announced that this embargo would be raised, yet as late as April, 1932 the police authorities in the Dobrudja had received no intimation of
563 this commendable measure. It is obvious that all these
648 grievances could easily be removed with a little goodwill on
667 the part of the Rumanian government, and to the westerner it is incomprehensible that the latter should make no effort to safeguard the happiness of hundreds of thousands of human beings whose destiny has been entrusted to its hands. For it is not only the elementary duty of a government to care for its subjects, but in this case even political reasons dictate the following of a more humane and civilized policy. The bulk of the population being Bulgarian, and having for forty years enjoyed an independent existence, is utterly unaccustomed to such maladministration as it is now experiencing. It is therefore natural that it should be soliciting the intercession of the Bulgarian government under whose suzerainty it lived until recently. This is a course that creates friction between the two governments, keeps open an old sore, and embitters and strains relations between Bulgaria and Rumania. The former country would incur every sacrifice in order to ensure Rumania's friendship, and

H: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

659 AS recently as twelve years ago, no inquiry into the population of the provinces of post-War Romania would have been possible without reference to five separate censuses taken at different times by varying methods and criteria peculiar to the administrative systems and inclinations of five independent states. There were the Bulgarian census of 1910 for southern Dobrudja (Dobrogea); the Romanian census of 1912 for the Old Kingdom; the 1910 Hungarian census for Transylvania with the Banat, Crisana and Maramures; the 1910 Austrian census for Bucovina and the 1897 Russian census for Bessarabia. To make matters worse, population statistics were often deliberately distorted to minimize racial problems or bolster the fiction of national states. Old Romania alone, with its small foreign population and no minorities problem, made no provision for the registration of aliens in her 1912 census.

The first census to lift the racial complexion from conjecture to fact was carried out in Romania on December 29, 1930. This was a scientific undertaking by American-trained specialists headed by Dr. Sabin Manuila and aided by a Demographic Institute established with the American aid of the Rockefeller Foundation. The collating of the material gathered in one day took four years, and has since been recorded in ten quarto volumes of some 800 pages each.

Volume II of the series (*General Census of the Population of Romania of December 29, 1930: Nationality, Mother Tongue, Religion.* Published by Dr. Sabin Manuila, Director of the Census; Central Institute of Statistics, Bucharest: Monitorul Oficial, 1938) deals exclusively with racial statistics, a summary of which is offered in the following pages as evidence of the preponderance of the Romanian element throughout Romania. To insure the accuracy of this evidence, the Romanian Census Bureau adopted at the time a number of safeguards described by Dr. Manuila in his Preface to volume II.

To begin with, the determination of the nationality of each inhabitant was left in his own hands. Every person was required to declare the nationality to which he or she belonged, nationality being simply defined as "the race to which one felt bound by tradition and sentiment." The Bureau felt reasonably certain that, for example, no Romanian would declare himself a Hungarian and that no German would claim to be a

659 Russian. Nevertheless, further to insure the exactness of these declarations, four separate criteria, "among the most complete of those known to modern demographic science," were adopted, and the inhabitants were asked to give in every instance in addition to (1) their nationality according to the definition above outlined, (2) the language they had learned in their homes from their parents and were speaking in preference to all others; (3) their religion, "which for certain races is a means of positive ethnical identification and for others a relative one, but always of value in conjunction with other data," and lastly (4) their citizenship.

Given these four separate checks, to question the accuracy of the broad conclusions of the 1930 census would have implied, Dr. Manuila points out, to question the census record of any given locality. To meet this contingency the complete population data collected on December 29, 1930, and classified not according to the names of individuals who naturally move from place to place, but according to streets, buildings and stable households, have been permanently stored in the Central Institute of Statistics at Bucharest, where they are freely accessible to the general public. Since 1930, if Romanian nationalists have occasionally criticized the Census authorities for having permitted the listing of Jews and Szeklers as Hungarians, it is a fact that scientists remain unanimously agreed on the unimpeachable authenticity of the Romanian figures which, incidentally, gives the key to the otherwise inexplicable unwillingness of all Hungarian irredentists to rest their case on the ethnical realities of Transylvania.

•

000 Of the general tables that follow, those numbered I to VI correspond exactly to tables A, E, H, L, O and S, volume II of the census, pp. xxxii-cii, also available in the Statistical Yearbook of Romania for 1937-38, pp. 58-75. They are in fact summaries showing for each county (*judet*) the population of which volume II provides a far more comprehensive record not by counties alone but for every township (*plasa*) in every county and every village in each township down to the smallest hamlet. These county summaries are stated both in actual figures and in percentages that reveal at a glance the racial situation in any given place, and list the population of Romania according to nationality (tables I and II), language (III and IV) and religion (V and VI).

For the more limited area of ceded Transylvania we are able to give in table VII, pp. 44-49, a somewhat more detailed picture of the nationality of the population in the urban centers and the rural area of every township in each of the counties affected by the Vienna Award. This table

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

565 ease of behaviour, a keen sense for music and popular art and a dogged belief in its capacity to achieve progress.

The life of the Rumanian peasant is simple and [262] hard. His main nourishment consists of *Mamaliga*, a dish prepared of maize-flour, similar to the Italian *Polenta*. This forms his staple diet; meat and other [272] luxuries are very rare indeed. The national drink is *Tuica* (brewed from plum juice). The Rumanian [291] men are dressed in white trousers and a long white tunic fastened by a belt, a short jacket, and a fur cap or hat. Footwear, if any, consists of simple leather sandals strapped to the legs, called *Opinci*, similar to those of the Greek and Yugoslav peasants. In the comparatively rich regions short boots are worn. Gay embroidery, whose colouring and pattern vary according to districts, adorns all garments, especially the women's shirts and headcloths, and the aprons [342] which they wear fore and aft. In contrast to their gay dress the houses of the Rumanian peasants are usually small, badly built cottages of sun-dried brick and straw, whitewashed and occasionally [346] decorated with woodwork. The churches too are built in a similar fashion except in the mountain districts where stone and wood are used.

795 **RELIGION.** Most Rumanians belong to the Orthodox Church, but many Transylvanian Rumanians are Uniates, that is, Catholics of the Byzantine Rite. They form a link between the Latin and Orthodox 659 Churches. The Rumanian Orthodox Church is strongly national. The Uniate Church was used in the past by the Hungarian rulers of Transylvania as a means of assimilating the Rumanians in the Hun-

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

garian Kingdom, as by the Habsburgs for their purposes; but it has a very distinctive vitality of its own. 659

The Patriarch of the Rumanian Orthodox Church is a person of great importance in the State and was one of the Council of Regency during the present king's minority. He, the Metropolitans, the Bishops of the Orthodox Church and those of the Rumanian Uniate Church were Senators for life: so were the heads of other Churches having over 200,000 members.[1] 659 798

The village priest, *Popa*, plays a leading part in the life of the Orthodox community. There is great veneration of certain saints—especially the Blessed Virgin and the Saint of the parish—and their ikons. Many of the strongest traditions of the country people are those connected with the seasons, and the Church has christianized many of the old pagan customs. The funeral rites, in particular, only part of which are conducted by the priest, are full of strange symbolism. There is a widespread belief in vampires and other evil spirits and the need of exorcizing them. But though religious practice hovers upon the borderline between faith and superstition, the standard of personal morality among the peasantry is on the whole a high one; the family counts for a great deal and the honour of women is closely guarded. 771 [764]

[1] According to the 1938 census, 13,200,000 belonged to the Orthodox Church (Rumanians, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgars and other Slavs); 2,628,813 were Roman Catholics (Latin Rite, mostly Magyars and Germans, 1,200,000; Greek Rite 1,426,313); 1,195,000 belonged to Protestant Churches (including 400,000 German Lutherans); 1,500,000 were Jews and 260,000 Mohammedans. There were 140,000 'others'. 162

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

made for the Jews, the Orthodox Church dealt with other confessions in an irenic manner. 795

Rumania profited greatly if temporarily from its sponsorship of the Allied cause during World War I. Territories were assigned to it which had traditionally belonged to Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia, presenting the government with a number of problems with which it had not previously been concerned. Transylvania, taken from Hungary, had a population divided almost equally between Roman Catholics and Protestants. The Russian Orthodox Church was predominant in Bessarabia, once deeded to the Czar by the West. The Rumanians dealt with the situation in a manner both intelligent and conciliatory. After the favored status of the Greek Orthodox Church had been defined, laws regulating the Confessions were passed during April, 1928. They carefully safeguarded the rights of the State and specifically forbade clergymen to embark on seas of foreign policy of their own charting, but acknowledged the right of the Churches to give religious instruction in public and private schools, and to conduct charitable enterprises. The government also signed a Concordat with the Holy See in 1927, with which the Vatican had no reason to be dissatisfied. 659 795 648

The Concordat conceded to the Catholic Church in all its branches, regular and secular, a large measure of legal protection. Stipulating that ecclesiastical properties must be used for the benefit of Rumanian citizens, and that the income therefrom was subject to audit by the government, it authorized the Church to create a "Sacred Diocesan Fund" to be administered by the Hierarchy. It also promised to add to the Fund if this proved to be inadequate to meet the expenses of necessity incurred by religious foundations. The Catholic clergy were asked to take an oath of allegiance to the King, to the Constitution, and to the laws of the nation. The government agreed not 659 648 794 793

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania ED1

659 648 794 793

to intervene to secure the appointment of clergymen, but requested that it be informed in each instance. These laws were modified under the rule of the Iron Front, in order to make possible the persecution of the Jews. Christian communions appear, however, not to have been affected.

659 177 671

When a pro-Communist government was formed in Rumania, the situation changed immediately and radically. The laws adopted in 1928 were repealed by a decree of August 4, 1948. As usual in Soviet-inspired constitutions, freedom of conscience, of religion, and of worship was assured. Freedom was conceded to all creeds to organize and conduct their own ecclesiastical endeavors so long as they did nothing to jeopardize "public security and public order." The last proviso was, as always, the Trojan horse by means of which the conquerors would enter the citadel. For what were public security and order? The government reserved the right to determine; and in this case the "government" was and could only be the local soviet under which a poor cleric was to live and move and have his being. As a matter of fact, the system under which the Rumanian Communist Party functioned was simplicity itself. The list of electors registered in 1946 was kept up to date by striking off the names of all who had in some manner or other manifested hostility to the "people." The possessor of a name thus purged might retain the right to worship wherever he pleased, but was of course deprived of any opportunity to draw a salary from the State or to hold a position of public trust.

671 793 659

Indeed, the law went much further. Article 25 provided that

> the Ministry of Religious Affairs shall suspend any decision, instruction, or directive, as well as any order having an ecclesiastical character, whether administrative, cultural, educational, or caritative, or pertaining to endowments, if it is not in keeping with the status of the denomination in the act by which it has been established, or is inimical to public security, public order or morals. Pastoral and circular letters

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

shall be communicated in advance of publication to the Ministry of Religious Affairs. [71] 733 659

While thus making apparent that the Church was deprived of all liberty of action in areas of moral judgment concerning actions taken by the public authority, the law further stipulated that the salaries of "clergymen and officers of the religious denominations" would be paid in accordance with the regulations governing the civil service. In this fashion it was determined that all clergymen, on the one hand, had the rights accorded to the civil service but, on the other, assumed corresponding obligations—among them an oath of allegiance to the national Constitution.

Subsequently, on August 12, 1950, a decree dealing with the [687] security of the State imposed the death penalty for the following offenses: treason to the nation; rendering "service to the enemy, or causing prejudice to the power of the state"; and procuring or transmitting state secrets to a foreign or an enemy power. The decree was directed primarily against the dignitaries of the Roman Catholic Church, because they were in communion with Rome. On July 6, 1950, another decree had provided a basis for expelling from Rumania the Papal Nuncio, Archbiship O'Hara, and his two assistants, Monsignor Kirk and Monsignor Del Mesti. Most of the Rumanian members of the Nuncio's staff were sentenced to imprisonment. Therewith an initial climax was reached in two years of fierce attack on the Churches and on the Roman Catholic Church in particular.

At this point a more detailed review of the religious situa- 735 tion in Rumania may help to clarify what has happened. Prior 162 to the outbreak of the Second World War, the 70 per cent of Rumanians adhering to the Orthodox Church were affiliated with the Patriarchate of Constantinople but enjoyed ecclesiastical autonomy. This Church, directed by a Holy Synod pre-

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

795 162 sided over by a Patriarch, had 7,833 parishes, fifty-seven religious foundations for men, and twenty-six similar foundations for women. The two Churches in union with Rome served some 3,000,000 persons, slightly more than half of whom practiced according to the Greek rite. Catholics following the Latin rite had fifty-seven religious foundations for men, and eighty-one for women. Those of the Greek rite (usually termed, as we have seen, Uniates) had seven foundations for men, and five for women. Such statistics indicate that the Latin branch, in which the clergy are bound by the law of celibacy, manifested far more interest in monasticism, though the number of parishes available to them (638 in number) was much smaller than the number of those which served Catholics professing the Greek rite. It is therefore evident that any attempt to suppress the religious orders would strike at a vital nerve of Catholic life. Protestants were somewhat fewer than 6 per cent of the population, and the Jews were about the same. One may also note that Protestants were almost equally divided between Lutherans and Calvinists, the first being ethnic Germans and the second ethnic Hungarians residing in territories taken from Hungary at the close of the First World War.

653 795 In outward appearances, the position of the Orthodox Church was not greatly affected by the Communist seizure of power. It is true that changes in the pertinent legislation gave the government, and therewith of course the Communist Party, control over all nominations and elections to Church offices. This meant that all those who exercised authority would come to be snugly tucked under the thumb of the Party. The most notable illustration in Rumania is the Patriarch Justinian, who has not hesitated to declare that the Christian Gospel has much in common with the doctrines of Marx and Lenin. It is hardly necessary to inquire how and why a prelate of his character acquired rank and station. The Orthodox Church was by no

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

means abject or corrupt; but the tradition of ecclesiastical elections to which it subscribed provided the Communists with a golden opportunity of which they took full advantage. 659 795

To make clear the situation in which the clergy of the Orthodox Church have found themselves, a report by an eyewitness who has escaped from Rumania may be cited. On October 30, 1950, the clergy met in conference. A huge portrait of Dimitrov adorned the assembly room. No symbol of religion was anywhere to be seen. The Minister of Culture spoke concerning the relations between Church and State. He attacked the spirit of opposition which, he contended, still flourished in some sections of the clergy. A priest, he said, had reported that obedience to Georgi Dimitrov was out of the question because he might very well command that the cross be removed from the tower of the cathedral in order to make room for the half-moon. Thereupon the assembled clergymen were called upon to give a rousing cheer for Dimitrov. Later, the question rose whether the editor of the principal Church journal should be elected or appointed. Some one objected that if election were abandoned the editor might conceivably prove to be a man wholly without faith. When the matter was put to a vote only twenty clergymen expressed a preference for appointment. Nevertheless the chairman announced that a substantial majority favored this method. One priest arose and said, "It is obvious that dictatorial methods are being employed here." No one else ventured to interpose an objection. 659 793

Having taken the Orthodox Church in tow in this manner, the Communists began to bring pressure on Catholics professing the Greek rite to secede from the Holy See and to embrace Orthodoxy. Short shrift, indeed, was made of sundry legal scruples. The heavy hand of suppression was felt almost immediately: Bishops were arrested and sent to labor camps. A 659 793 798

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

659 decree of December 2, 1948, stated tersely and bluntly: "Sub-
793 sequent to the reverting of the Greek Catholic parishes to the
798 Rumanian Orthodox Church, and in conformity with Article 13 of Decree 177/1948, its central organization . . . shall cease to exist." All properties belonging to this Church were transferred either to the State or to the Orthodox Synod. The subsequent martyrdom of the Greek clergy rivaled the witnessing of early Christian days. All the bishops were arrested for deportation, and two, Monsignor Vasile Aftenie and Monsignor Valeriu Frentiu, are known to have died in prison. Courageous members of the lower clergy are reported to have gone into hiding in order to minister secretly to the faithful. According to persons who fled the country, such priests were hunted down as ruthlessly as the clergy of southern France in the days of Danton and Robespierre.

659 Therewith the time had also come to attempt the liquidation
798 of Catholics who worshiped according to the Latin rite. Their Church was the only one which had not expressed complete satisfaction with the state of religious freedom in Rumania on June 24, 1949. The first important and ominous debate between the government and the Catholic Bishops had begun in the summer of 1948, when they stated in answer to an inquiry that it would not be possible for them to repudiate the Primacy of the Holy See. The Minister of Culture replied that he entertained no objection to an understanding with Rome on dogma, although such discussions were necessarily subject to the scrutiny of the Ministries of Culture and Foreign Affairs, but that any other kind of dependence on the Papacy was illegal. When the Hierarchy failed to concur, the government launched against it a press campaign of the greatest vehemence, which made it very evident that the goal set was the absorption into a "National Church" of Catholics who worshiped according to the Latin rite. Such a goal has always been envisaged whenever

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

Communists gained control of a satellite country; but in Rumania it could be attained with relative ease. 659 798

The first blow was struck in July, 1948, when the Concordat with the Holy See was revoked. Other decrees subordinating the Church to the State were passed soon thereafter. The Catholic Bishops manifested heroic valor and steadfastness. When their schools were expropriated, their caritative enterprises forbidden, their press closed down, and their religious orders suppressed, they protested. It did not seem meet and just to them that children should be prevented from coming to church, faithful men and women carted off to labor camps on trumped-up charges, or that loud-speakers should blare from one end of the day to the other accusatory comments which were in essence monstrous blasphemies. Our time has grown accustomed to thinking that only patriotic feeling, only the sense of solidarity with the nation to which we belong, can engender the resolution to make every sacrifice that becomes necessary. Therefore the spectacle of a few elderly men who accept every scourge of tyranny with patience because the Lord Jesus has willed that they do so has for us a quality which transcends fortitude—a quality which is the ultimate secret aura of what men for thousands of years have called freedom of conscience. This freedom, perhaps more than any other, is the counterpart of obedience—*usque ad mortem*, even to the death, as the Catholic liturgy says over and over. [648]

Here is just one quotation, from a letter addressed by the Bishops to the President of the People's Republic: 659 793

> We believe, Your Excellency, that the moment has come when we should no longer keep silence by reason of patriotic considerations, but should rather give expression to our sorrow. The measures which have been taken by the Government are extremely injurious to the welfare of the citizens of the Rumanian People's Republic. Nor should we abstain from making an emphatic protest against what has taken place

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

659 793 in so far as the Catholic Church in Rumania is concerned. We must rather manifest our profound indignation. Millions of citizens have been deliberately wounded in the innermost core of their human feeling by the very authority to which there has been entrusted, in the presence of the nation and of the whole world, the defense of the interests of the people. Internecine strife is being fostered, the country is in tears over rampant injustice, and a wound gapes which cannot be healed over except by doing away with laws and measures which have struck and are now striking at the Catholic Church in the Rumanian People's Republic.

[687] All the Bishops who signed this and similar fruitless appeals have since been sentenced. The initial blow was struck at all dioceses save those of Alba Iulia and Iasi. In June, 1949, the Bishops of these sees also were arrested on charges of high treason. There remained only Bishop Augustin Pacha, more than eighty years old, who in turn was found guilty and sentenced to forced labor. Some of the prelates are said to have been deported to Russia; and of the whereabouts of nearly all of them nothing definite is known. Thus the Roman Catholic Church was stripped of leadership, the government recognizing only the Vicars-general of two dioceses in Transylvania. These likewise refused to conform with Communist directives. Thereupon a ruthless assault on the lower clergy was inaugurated. On the basis of reports received by the Vatican, it is estimated that at least six hundred priests and religious have been arrested, tried, and sentenced. Thus there was made manifest exemplary and moving fidelity.

793 That some would prove less steadfast was to be anticipated, 659 and in due time the government found a man willing to be the 795 leader of a "National Church"—Andreas Agotha, an unfortunate priest whom the Holy See promptly excommunicated. Under him a congress was convened at Targul-Mures, on April 27, 1950, which created the "National Catholic Church,"

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

urged the clergy to support the Stockholm Peace Resolution, 793
and endorsed the formation of a "Catholic Committee of Ac- 659
tion" to support the policies of the "People's Republic." The 795
participants were few, and one of the Vicars-general still in office ordered the clergy of the diocese of Iasi to read a declaration denouncing the congress. He was promptly arrested and has died in prison. A second congress convened at Gherghani five months later, after an appeal by Agotha to all "peace-loving" priests and faithful. Months of open persecution and of [798]
strenuous pro-government campaigning followed. Under the protection of the government, the "Rumanian National Catholic Church" convened at Cluj on March 14, 1951, and took over the administration of all Roman Catholic establishments. Some 225 clerical and lay delegates attended and set up a "Council" of 27 members which declared its readiness to cooperate with the government in every manner desired. Delegates who approved of this capitulation received salaries and other benefits. Those who resisted were hounded down and imprisoned.

Meanwhile, under a decree of August 1, 1949, action was 792
taken against religious orders and communities. Five convents 659
and monasteries were designated as the places in which all monks and nuns doing educational or welfare work should live in accordance with rules laid down by the Minister of Culture. Once there were as many as 1,800 nuns in Rumania. Virtually all have returned to their families or are active as isolated
parish workers. The majority of the monks are in prison. It is 798
safe to say that by the close of 1950 the Roman Catholic Church 659
was a flock dispersed, without shepherds, harried by the secret police and exposed to the constant threat of enslavement in forced-labor camps. Sometimes the actions taken against the surviving faithful have a flavor which is not only bitter but melodramatic and grimly ludicrous. Thus a priest was sentenced to a prison term for referring in a sermon to the destruc-

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

798 tion of Jerusalem by the Emperor Titus—which was deemed
●659 to be a cryptic reference to Marshal Tito. More generally every device of propaganda and repression is used to curtail the influence of religion. Popular religious festivals are forbidden, electric power failures interfere with the work of well frequented parishes, and frequenting the Sacraments makes a man subject to investigation.

659 The chronicle of the Church which worships according to
738 the Greek rite is quite as harrowing. On October 1, 1948, the
733 government announced that the 1,500,000 persons loyal to this Church had been summarily turned over to Orthodoxy. This action followed a campaign of vilification and suppression rare even in the annals of Communism. It is described in part in a letter signed jointly by the Greek Catholic Bishops at the time:

> During this campaign [i.e., during the week following September 26, 1948] Iuliu Hossu, Bishop of Cluj, was confined to his residence, so that he could not communicate with the Uniate clergy or in any way protest against the actions to which our Church was subjected. In Cluj all priests and layfolk who ventured to disregard the measures taken against the Bishop, and who came to call on him, were arrested. In like manner all those who witnessed his arrest were taken into custody. Moreover Bishop Suciu of Blajm was arrested by the Security Police just as he was leaving the Church at Copacel, which he had just consecrated. He was taken to an unknown destination and kept in a cave during two days, so that he could be prevented from getting in touch with the clergy and the faithful. . . .
>
> We think that prudence suggests that we do not at this time enumerate all the abuses and acts of violence of which the clergy, the priests and archpriests, have been made the victims in an endeavor to obtain their signatures. They were warned and threatened, as Bishop Suciu also was, to remain silent concerning everything that had happened.

These appeals were naturally of no avail. The government prepared to convene a "Congress" at Cluj which would ratify

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

union with the Orthodox establishment. The meeting was held on October 1, 1948, and the thirty-eight canons, prelates, and priests who had been "elected" to represent the Church did as they were ordered to do. The government press reported that they had approved "unanimously and with great enthusiasm" union with the Orthodox Church and "the definitive severance of ties with Papal Rome." On December 2, 1948, still another decree transferred all the property of the Uniate Church to the Rumanian State without compensation. Much of it was subsequently turned over to the Orthodox Church. All the Bishops have been jailed or have disappeared. It is known that two, Vasile Aftenie and Valeriu Frentiu, have died in prison. The Pastoral Letter signed by the Episcopacy on June 29, 1948 (The Feast of Saints Peter and Paul), is surely one of the most touching and spiritually stirring of the documents which chronicle the persecution of the Church by the Communists. After summarizing the reasons why the Uniates had acknowledged the supremacy of the See of Peter, recalling the sufferings which had been borne by past generations for the sake of unity with Rome, and dealing with the present controversies, the Letter said:

659 798 793

> We must suffer for the Gospels of our Redemption in order to possess the merit of having for our part met the test, just as our fathers did as, looking upon the Rood of the Lord, they heard in their hearts these words: *Dico enim vobis: Omnis quicumque confessus fuerit me coram hominibus, et Filius hominis confitebitur illum coram angelis Dei; Qui autem negaverit me coram hominibus, negabitur coram angelis Dei.**
>
> The ties which bind us to the Pope, the Bishop of Rome, are not of human making but are of Divine origin; and it is our duty to bear

* The passage cited is from the twelfth chapter of the Gospel according to St. Luke and reads in translation: "And I say to you, whosoever shall confess me before men, him shall the Son of man also confess before the angels of God. But he that shall deny me before men, shall be denied before the angels of God."

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania ED1

659 738 733 by reason of them outrage and blows and threats and imprisonment and, it may be, destitution. These things truly mean glorifying the Lord Jesus. They will prove that we desire to insure for ourselves, even in this day of passing suffering, an eternal meed of renown which will be beyond weight or measure.

[697] The men who signed this Letter all have witnessed to the faith they thus professed. And in their company stand devoid 466 of eloquence but not of holiness and fidelity, the many, many thousands, chosen from amidst the humble and the poor, who have suffered persecution and enslavement in Vhalitza or in the region between the Danube and the Black Sea. In order that we may understand their ordeal, let me quote from eyewitness accounts of the camps built to house those who toil at digging a canal in the Dobrouja:

> Approximately 30,000 prisoners are stationed there. The majority of them are intellectuals. They are digging a canal between the Danube and the Black Sea, or are building roads, bridges, and so forth. Practically all the work is done by hand in the same manner and with the same methods as those which were employed for the erection of the Egyptian pyramids. The food is very poor. As a rule, the daily menu consists of corn meal with a soup made of onions or beans. The sanitary conditions are indescribable, and for this reason the death toll is extremely high. Prisoners work more than twelve hours a day. Some of them were sentenced by the courts. Others were not. But this makes no difference, for even those who did receive sentences are not released when their terms are over.

000 The Uniate Churches are not among the great religious bodies of the world. But we might well pause in reverence while passing their temples of worship to commemorate those who in far-off countries have so nobly and sacrificially clung to their faith. Such a tribute would by no means preclude one from bearing in mind that others, too, have felt the crushing weight of Ru-

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

manian tyranny—Lutherans, Armenians, and Moslems among them. 000

All the news which has trickled out of Rumania during recent years merely indicates that the trends thus established continue. The Patriarch Justinian and the Holy Synod subservient to him tirelessly echo Soviet propaganda in every form. Thus they released, on April 3, 1952, a violent attack on the use of biological warfare in Korea, which reads in part as follows: 659

> After the savage destruction of towns and villages, hospitals and schools, monuments of art and places of worship, the enemies of mankind, greedy for world domination, dropped huge quantities of insects, bearers of death by plague, cholera, typhus and other frightful diseases on the territory of the Korean Democratic People's Republic and a part of Northern China.
>
> The indignation of the faithful is all the greater because recourse to this weapon, which not even the Fascists dared to employ, is the most odious infringement of the rules of international law, and the most criminal assault upon humanity. . . .
>
> As worshipers of the Creator of life and not of death, the servants of the Lord of Peace and not of enmity, we demand the immediate prohibition of bacteriological warfare, which we condemn with all our vigor as a weapon which devastates the earth.

This same Patriarch has supported every Communist maneuver with the most abject servility since early in 1950. Then, at his behest, the Orthodox Church officially joined the National Rumanian Committee for the Defense of Peace, and organized more than 8,000 local committees "to explain to the faithful the problems of the partisan peace movement." He did everything possible to drum up support for the Stockholm Peace Plea, and his attacks on the Anglo-American warmongers and imperialists are legion.

Meanwhile the effort to promote the Communist view of 000

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 on well together, and it was generally believed that Brătianu had
665 forced the king to exclude Carol.

[661] Communal elections were held in February in an atmosphere of political excitement. The government, for all its electioneering techniques, did badly, especially in the larger towns. It won only one-third of the seats in the Bucarest municipal council. In Bessarabia the United Opposition won all lists. The government was defeated in most Transylvanian towns, notwithstanding its pact with the Magyar party; it won most of the rural Transylvanian communes through official pressure and the aid of the gendarmerie.

175 In March the Brătianu cabinet reached the end of its four-year
671 term. In the last session of parliament it passed a new electoral law,
666 whose unusual provisions were to make Rumanian elections even less representative of public opinion. Deputies had previously been elected on a proportional basis. According to the new act, modeled on Mussolini's law of January 7, 1923, the party gaining a plurality and at least 40 per cent of the votes was declared the majority party: it was to receive, as a premium, half the seats in the chamber plus a number of the remaining seats corresponding to its percentage of the total vote. Thus, a party gaining 40 per cent of the votes would occupy 70 per cent of the seats in the chamber (50 per cent plus two-fifths of the remaining 50 per cent). The remainder of the seats was divided proportionally among the other parties; a party failing to gain 2 per cent of the total votes obtained no representation.

According to the Liberals, there was nothing extraordinary about this law. A bill for electoral reform had been part of the Liberal program and had been stipulated in the 1923 Constitution.[19] In a country with such a multitude of unstable parties it might be argued that the "premium," as it was called, was a necessary device to give the party in office a sufficiently strong parliamentary majority to enable it to carry on its business.

Nevertheless, given the idiosyncrasies of Rumanian politics, the law had two very unfortunate effects. Since it was the practice for the crown to summon a government, which then proceeded to hold, or "make," elections with the aid of the administrative apparatus, the electoral law increased the opportunity for the selected group to swing the elections in its favor. On the other hand, the failure of a party obtaining less than 2 per cent of the votes to gain any repre-

19. According to Article 138 of the constitution, the current national assembly (i.e., the Liberal majority) could function after the promulgation of the constitution until the expiration of its mandate. During that period an electoral law was to be passed in accordance with the principles laid down in the constitution.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

sentation was a natural incentive for such parties to abandon the parliamentary track altogether. The timing of the law led the opposition parties to charge that it was merely part of the Liberals' plan of grooming General Averescu to replace them, since his party was obviously weak in popular support. There is no question that in 1924 and 1925 Averescu had not cooperated with the other opposition parties but had worked in some measure with the Liberals.

On March 27, 1926, Brătianu resigned amid rumors that he favored General Averescu as his successor. The opposition was still fumbling in its efforts to unite; negotiations between the Transylvanian Nationalists and the Peasant party had broken down again on March 22 over a disagreement on the distribution of cabinet posts. The king, on March 29, consulted the leaders of the Transylvanian National, Peasant, and People's parties and requested a coalition cabinet; apparently the Peasants and the Nationalists agreed. But on the following day, much to their chagrin, King Ferdinand called on General Averescu to form a government.

The reasons for the king's action are not altogether clear. The Nationalists and the Peasants had blundered in not mending their differences earlier and achieving a solid coalition. On the other hand, the king had been responsible for their dismissal in 1920 and was probably quite doubtful of their ability to govern properly and likely to accept the advice of Brătianu. Brătianu of course denied that his party had any agreement with General Averescu but his disclaimer is not convincing. "All we did," he said, "was to prepare the atmosphere in order to bring into power a government which would present a guarantee for the continuity of the work accomplished by us. Apart from this we are the declared opponents of the present government." [20] It was generally believed, and probably correctly, that Brătianu had strongly urged the king to install General Averescu.

Averescu held elections in May. The National party and the Peasants, still unable to achieve fusion, agreed to collaborate in the election. Despite the premium Averescu faced quite a task in overcoming his party's numerical weakness, but he acted resolutely and altogether successfully in one of the more outrageous Rumanian elections. Military officers on active service were appointed as prefects of a number of districts. Circulation of vehicles and persons was strictly controlled. The leaders of the opposition were unable to get in touch with their constituents; even Ion Brătianu was blocked on one trip, and Mihalache was arrested by gendarmes in his own electoral district. Gendarmes supervised public gatherings and were directed to intervene

20. *Times* (London), April 21, 1926.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

661 if anyone attempted "to excite the people." Political manifestoes and
666 slogans required the approval of the prefect. On the day of the election, numerous opposition delegates were arrested and not permitted to supervise the voting or the counting. There was some violence and a few deaths.[21] Averescu, by these means, obtained 52 per cent of the votes, but under the premium he gained 292 out of 387 seats in the chamber, the Opposition block held 69 seats, the Liberals 16, Cuza's League of Christian Defense (an anti-Semitic formation) 10; the socialists and the Communist-sponsored workers' bloc, having obtained less than 2 per cent of the votes, were not represented.

665 After the election the National and Peasant parties continued their
175 efforts to unite. In September delegates of the two parties voted for fusion into a National Peasant party with Maniu as president and Mihalache as vice-president. Iorga, however, declined to vote, and the Peasant leader Dr. Lupu opposed the decision. The fusion was confirmed by the general congress held on October 10.

A new crisis arose with the serious illness of King Ferdinand in November, 1926, and the renewed controversies over the succession, Carol's renunciation, and the regency. The National Peasants, who believed that King Ferdinand had been an instrument of the Liberals, were dissatisfied with the succession and were reluctant to regard Carol's renunciation as final. All parties, however, felt that in the king's failing condition the Averescu cabinet was not sufficiently representative to govern alone. Brătianu sounded opposition leaders on the possibilities of forming a national cabinet. General Averescu made several unsuccessful efforts to achieve a coalition with the National Peasants, perhaps in an effort to free himself from his dependence upon the Liberals. Having failed to create a coalition he was obliged to resign on June 3, 1927.

A new "impartial" cabinet under Prince Barbu Ştirbey (a relative by marriage of the Brătianus and periodically proposed as the head of a caretaker cabinet, the last time in 1945) came to office and included some Liberals and Dr. Lupu, who had split with the National Peasants in February and formed an independent peasant group. After negotiations with the National Peasants, three members of Maniu's party joined the coalition. The principal object of this cabinet, which was in effect a temporary Liberal-National-Peasant coalition, was to preside over new and free elections. However, negotiations between Maniu and Brătianu broke down. Maniu refused Brătianu's proposal for a common list of candidates in the coming election with

21. The electoral abuses were brought up by opposition leaders in parliamentary interpellations after the elections.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 internal finances in order. In March the 1924 mining law was revised to give more favorable treatment to foreign concessions. State ex-
652 penditures were reduced through the elimination or consolidation of several ministries.[4]

665 For all their energetic beginning, before the National Peasants had been in power a year, the first flush of enthusiasm was beginning to fade. The badly defeated opposition undertook to rally its forces and started a press campaign of villification and sensational rumors. After the passage in July of the administrative reform bill, which attempted to reduce excessive centralization and place greater authority in the hands of local administrations, both the Liberals and General Averescu's party withdrew from the assembly. In the same month was uncovered an absurd fascist plot among army officers to overthrow the government. To defend the regime against these fascist currents, some of the party's younger followers set up their own paramilitary bodies.

665 At the same time that the Right was increasing its activities, the government came into conflict with the Left. Bessarabia was still a
661 trouble zone; there were frequent reports of Soviet espionage teams crossing the Dniester. In February, 1929, A. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, son of the old Social Democratic leader and himself a former leader of the Rumanian Communists, was arrested and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment for secretly returning to Rumania from the U.S.S.R. In August a strike broke out among 3,800 coal miners in the Jiu Valley. Troops were called and when the strikers attempted to take over the electric plant of the Lupeni mines the troops fired, killing over a score of miners. The massacre in the Jiu Valley has often been cited as an example of the perfidy of the National Peasants, but it should be said that when the government investigated the event, it not only blamed the miners for having violated the law but also censored the mining companies for permitting the conditions which had led to the strike. It dismissed all the police and military officials connected with the affair.

A couple of months later an attempt was made on Vaida Voevod's life. In the investigation which followed, one suspect, who was later proved to have been innocent, was horribly beaten and crippled by the police. Again there was a public scandal and the government

4. The bewildering changes in the names and numbers of Rumanian ministries seem to be largely a result of the need to provide portfolios for persons or groups who have supported the administration. The Ministry of Fine Arts has been the favorite post to be granted as a political reward.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

was charged with bad faith. The National Peasants reprimanded the 665
offending officials and maintained that such police brutality was an 661
evil inheritance which they were attempting to eradicate. Such incidents are of importance here only in showing the tenacity with which old habits persisted under the new order.

The failure of the economy to rally provided the really vulnerable 665
point for opposition attacks. The stabilization of the currency had 175
given rise to overly sanguine hopes that money would become plentiful—the Bucarest Jockey Club on the strength of it had doubled its bridge points—but much of the funds went to paying old debts. Crops [433]
had been bad in 1927 and 1928, and one of the first tasks of the Maniu government had been to send relief supplies to Bessarabia. The 1929 harvest was excellent, one of the best in the interwar years, but exports were not great, and world grain prices were already beginning the long descent which was to continue until 1934.

The death in October, 1929, of one of the regents, Buzdugan, produced a typical Rumanian crisis. The Liberals contended that the two other regents should select the third member. The National Peasant assembly, however, elected the new regent, Constantin Sarateanu, thus laying the party open to the same criticism that it had made of the Liberals in the creation of the regency in the first place. Moreover, Maniu seems to have failed to inform some of the Peasant members of the person to be selected and rumors spread, assisted by wishful opposition thinking, that the Transylvanians were forming an inner cabinet in the government. The principal result of the regency affair, however, was to arouse general dissatisfaction over such an arrangement and to increase talk of Carol's return.

In 1930 the situation was even less favorable. Economic improvement failed to round the corner. The opposition press increased its polemics by publishing wild reports of Soviet mobilization on the frontier, Communist uprisings in Bessarabia, and the government's secret intention to devalue the leu. This technique, long familiar in Rumania, was designed to rattle the government into making a false step, and did succeed in driving it to pass a law establishing a prison sentence for persons found guilty of spreading tendentious rumors likely to damage the credit of the state. Under this law the government confiscated several newspapers.

The municipal elections of March, 1930, showed an increase in Liberal strength, as the National Peasants led only by two to one. In May by-elections government candidates were returned in five constituencies, but were defeated in Cernăuţi by a Ukrainian Nationalist

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

change, in Rumania as elsewhere, from a paralyzed economic liberal- 178
ism to increasing controls in commercial, financial, and industrial activity.

King Carol's own role in all these developments is rather elusive. 661
In the intricate game of political maneuvering his shrewdness is seen in the fact that starting from a weak position he not only established himself but drove all other political groups into the wilderness or prison. But for all his adept political manipulations and his flamboyant propaganda there is something unsubstantial about his reign, and nothing seems less real than his dictatorship. While he was not, as king, the frothy playboy the international press had depicted, he did not, either in his ideas or actions, show himself to be a statesman of any magnitude. He had a strong bent for personal rule, to which he attached some rather inconsequential corporatist clichés and an exaltation of the "younger generation." He seems to have had no coherent set of economic ideas beyond a romantic notion of himself as the first peasant, the first laborer, and the first public servant of his realm. The real economic direction came not from Carol but from the increasingly powerful industrialists who came to the fore in the years after the depression.

Survey of Political Events

Between Maniu's resignation in October and the accession of the 175
Liberals in November, 1933, Rumanian political and economic life was more than usually bewildering and confused. The depression was undoubtedly largely responsible for the feeling of panic and uncertainty apparent in the governments of these years. At the same time, the political events were not wholly a reflex of the immediate economic influence but had a certain logic of their own. Rumania's quasi-parliamentary party system was beginning to crumble, extraparliamentary groups were moving into the foreground, and Carol made his first if not successful effort to reorganize political life according to his own lights. These developments proceeded from sources deeper than the depression, though they were intensified by it; they were a part of that profound social crisis which has stricken most of the world in the last thirty years.

The National Peasant cabinet, reconstituted under Mironescu after Maniu's resignation, had a brief and unhappy career. Mironescu was an altogether colorless figure; the government during his term in office was halting and hesitant in its actions, and showed none of the enthusiasm of 1929. Carol was known to feel that the old parties—

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 648 tle Entente remained, the Balkan Entente was formed, and people were heard to say that the Balkans were beginning to mature. It was only a lull before the storm but it was perceptible.

175 661 The political history of these years is relatively uneventful. In the elections of December 20, 1933, the Liberals obtained a handsome majority in the chamber. After Duca's assassination and the creation of a cabinet under Tătărescu, a period of comparative quiet ensued. That this period was not one of tranquillity is shown by the repeated prolongations of the state of martial law, which had been applied after Duca's death and remained in force throughout the Tătărescu administration. In reality an intense tug-of-war was going on between the king and Tătărescu on the one hand and the Iron Guard on the other. It was less a conflict than a competition to gain a monopoly on the increasingly nationalist and extremist atmosphere which was pervading Rumania.

The relations between the Carol regime and the Iron Guard were equivocal, to say the least. Duca, leader of the Liberals, was assassinated by the Iron Guard, and yet the efforts of his successor to control the movement were certainly not convincing.[3] The Guard was officially dissolved but it quickly reappeared in a new guise as the All for the Fatherland party and continued to flourish. Even one of the Liberal members of the cabinet, Iamandi, ascribed the growth of the Iron Guard to the fact that since 1929 successive governments, including the Liberals, had tolerated or halfheartedly encouraged it in the hopes that they could deflect it from its more violent aims and find in it allies for combating communism.

Tătărescu said in 1936 that there was an abyss between the Liberals and the extreme Right, both in methods and concepts, but added, rather obscurely, that only a policy of conciliation was possible in a country where one-third of the population was minorities.[4] He held that the Liberals were tolerant of all parties, if they obeyed the law, but could not permit movements favoring either a red or a white dictatorship. There was all the difference in the world, however, between the earnest and efficient manner in which the government pursued the Communist party,[5] and the obvious indulgence

3. In the trial of the assassins, for example, it was well known that the Guardist leader, Codreanu, was closely implicated in the murder but he was acquitted.

4. *Times* (London), April 24, 1936.

5. It was in 1936 that Ana Pauker, now Rumanian Foreign Minister, was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, along with 18 associates, on the charge of propagating communism. She gained a good deal of publicity at this time because of public criticism of her treatment in prison and because of a newspaper dispute between *Dimineata* and *Universul* over her trial.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

with which the Iron Guard and the other fascist formations were treated. 175 661

By the 1930's the Iron Guard had become the manifestation of a quite powerful current in Rumanian life, a current arising out of the strains and dislocations in the society and intensified by the depression. The government, instead of opposing the current, tried to become master of it, and during these years it took on many of the attitudes and paraphernalia of the extreme Right. Early in its term in office the cabinet pressed for powers to issue decree-laws during parliamentary recess, ostensibly to improve efficiency. In the same year, 1934, the government announced that supervision of telephone calls—wire tapping—was to be extended from international to local and interurban calls. Compulsory labor brigades were introduced in 1936. Carol, for his part, was more and more the flamboyant father of his people. To counter the Iron Guard youth formations he created in 1934 his own youth movement, *Straja Țării*. Carol's own activities may in part be ascribed to his willful and arbitrary character, his belief that the king should be more than a passive symbol, and his dislike and distrust of the Rumanian party system,[6] but the atmosphere of the time unquestionably nurtured these inclinations. [575]

In 1936 the temporary calm showed signs of breaking and a new element, foreign relations, began to play its decisive role in determining Rumanian politics. It was only a relative change; Rumania has always been exceedingly sensitive to the reverberations of international events, and the rise of the extremist fascist parties in the 1930's was certainly associated with other similar movements elsewhere in Europe. Nevertheless, it may be said that up to 1936 the most important factors in the Rumanian political scene had been internal: the failure of the democratic parties to establish themselves, the long-standing social tensions and the chronic misery of the peasantry, and the personal influence of King Carol and his entourage. These internal forces continued to exert an important influence but the uneasy equilibrium of 1934 and 1935 was broken by the ascendancy of the European fascist states and the mounting international crisis leading to the Second World War.

Titulescu, the strong advocate of the League and of the Versailles system, and at that time advocate of Little Entente-Soviet collaboration, was removed from the Foreign Office in August, 1936. His fall 648

6. In 1937, in an interview with the journalist Wickham Steed, Carol said that in his own country political parties were sterile and their leaders fit only to criticise. It would be his business as king to discipline them and harness them to constructive work. Notes on the interview are quoted in Pavel Pavel, *Why Rumania Failed* (London, n.d.), p. 142.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

agrarian problem, which in its broadest sense is the reverse side of 642
the question of industrialization.

On the other hand, the tortuous history of Carol's last three years 661
as king is of less interest here. Internally, it was the confused un- 642
raveling of the peculiar relations between Carol and the Iron Guard, a vicious if ambiguous struggle between two dictatorial movements. Externally, it was the attempt to ride out the rapidly mounting tempest of the Second World War. Carol, who had mastered the internal situation, was ultimately destroyed by outside events. So while the tumultuous events of the years 1938 to 1940 are of the greatest importance to Rumanian history in general, their relevance to the agrarian question is largely external. Unlike the fall of the Liberals in 1928, the collapse of the peasantist *esprit*, and the creation of a dictatorial regime, all of which are causally related to the agrarian question, Carol's fall was a political and diplomatic rather than an economic transition.

Immediately after removing the Goga cabinet and installing under martial law his new Government of National Union, Carol moved rapidly to create his new order. He abolished the 1923 Constitution and on February 20 promulgated a new corporatist constitution, subsequently ratified by a farcical popular referendum. The new constitution greatly augmented the king's powers, dwarfed the role of the legislative bodies, and did away with the party system. Ministers were selected by and responsible solely to the king and had to be of Rumanian nationality for at least three generations. The franchise was limited to citizens over thirty who practiced either agriculture or manual labor, industry or commerce, or intellectual activity; a corporatist concept of the voter replaced universal suffrage. The spirit of organic nationalism pervaded the whole document, stressed the responsibilities of the individual Rumanian to the nation, and circumscribed guarantees of civil rights and liberties. The economic and social outlook of the constitution is shown in Article 7, whereby no Rumanian could advocate by word or letter any changes in the form of the government (all constitutional amendments had to be initiated by the king), the division or distribution of property, exemption from taxes, or class hatred.

At the same time that Carol unseated the old parties by destroying their constitutional base, he attacked the Iron Guard, and in 1938 and 1939 directed an increasingly violent suppression of its formations. The Guard was outlawed, Codreanu was arrested, tried, and imprisoned. In November, 1938, he and thirteen of his followers were shot "while attempting to escape." In September, 1939, the Prime

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

●661 Minister, Armand Calinescu, the strongest man in the Carol dic-
642 tatorship and the executor of the campaign against the Guard, was assassinated. His death was followed by murderous mass reprisals against the Legionaries. Carol seemed to be thoroughly the master of his country.[1]

In place of the disbanded parties he concocted in December, 1938, a single body, the Front of National Rebirth. Through 1938 and 1939 he added the various regalia associated with a corporatist state, but there is little evidence that anyone took these trappings seriously. Administrative and political corruption, always healthy plants in Rumania, blossomed in full splendor in these years; public ethics hit a new low.

648 Meanwhile, however, the international situation was closing in and
642 here Carol was caught, as it proved, in a hopeless dilemma. While throughout the 1930's the Rumanian state took on an increasing resemblance to the fascism of the Axis powers, and men of the extreme Right advocated a pro-Axis foreign policy, Rumania, with its interest in maintaining the Versailles system—the guarantor of its territorial integrity—could not be really happy in Axis company. Regardless of internal political developments, and Carol himself repeatedly stressed the difference between internal and external policy, Rumania had strong reason to rely on the Western powers. Germany, however, was clearly in the ascent and the Western powers were pursuing the policy of appeasement. With the collapse of Czechoslovakia after the Munich Conference the Little Entente broke down. In November, 1938, Carol visited both London and Berchtesgaden in an effort to maintain his balance.

The great blow to Rumania's position came with the Soviet-German pact of August, 1939, which forecast common action between the two

1. It is impossible to attempt here to clear up the obscurities in the struggle between Carol and the Iron Guard. Numerous interpretations have been made, of which two might be mentioned. The British correspondent, A. L. Easterman, in his book *King Carol, Hitler, and Lupescu* (London, 1942), was of the opinion that in assuming the dictatorship Carol was fighting fire with fire, that he was really anti-Guardist and anti-German. Under this interpretation he was attempting to preserve Rumania from German advances, and his fight against the Guardists, who are regarded as simple German tools, was a part of this national defense. A more complex interpretation is provided by the Rumanian Communist Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu in *Sous trois dictatures*. Briefly, his thesis is that Carol had given secret support to the Guard on his road to the dictatorship, as a means of destroying the bourgeois-democratic parties, but had turned against it because of the potential social ferment it engendered and because the Guard was explicitly pro-Axis, whereas Carol was attempting to play a noncommittal game. Pătrăşcanu attributed the increasing violence of the measures employed by Carol against the Guard to the simple fact that having set up a dictatorship himself Carol had no weapon against another dictatorial movement except crude police repression.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 cal of traditional Rumanian politics and for several years had been in touch with the extremists advocating a "regeneration" of public life.[14] Moreover, while the Iron Guard had been harried under Carol, had lost its top level of leaders as well as much of its popular support, it still had its fighting cadres who felt that their day had come. The army, the only effective opposing force, was at this time badly demoralized by its inaction during the loss of Bessarabia and Transylvania.

665 In the cabinet formed on September 15 Antonescu was head of
● 661 the state; Horia Sima, leader of the Guard, was Deputy Prime Minister; five other ministers were members of the Guard and the rest personal friends of Antonescu. The Guard was declared the sole legal party, responsible for the moral and material uplift of the Rumanian people. While Antonescu had been on good terms with Codreanu for several years and was at this time wearing the Legionary green shirt, tension quickly developed between him and his unruly allies. As a military man he wanted to reestablish law and order, whereas the Guard was champing for its revolution. Within the Guard itself were a number of factions, moderate and extreme, which were disputing Codreanu's mantle.

The pentup violence of the Guard, which had not found satisfaction at the time of Carol's abdication and had not been diverted into other channels, finally broke loose at the end of November, apparently with Horia Sima's approval but without Antonescu's knowledge. The Legionaries incited bloody Jewish pogroms and attempted to wipe out the politicians and civil servants of the previous regime. The army prevented the successful completion of this undertaking, but the Guard did succeed in killing the historian Iorga, the economist Virgil Madgearu, and in massacring sixty-four political prisoners in the Jilava Prison, most of whom had been Carol's agents and police chiefs instrumental in repressing the Legion.

By this time, however, German influence had become decisive. In October, 1940, German troops came into Rumania, ostensibly to reorganize the army; a German economic mission arrived to coordinate the Rumanian economy with the German war machine. The Third Reich's greatest interest was in increasing Rumania's output, and

---

ness to fight the Russians, won Hitler's confidence and trust to a surprising degree. See Dr. Paul Schmidt, *Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, 1923–45; Erlebnisse der Chefdolmetschers im Auswärtigen Amt mit den Staatsmännern Europas* (Bonn, Athenäum-Verlag, 1949), pp. 511–512, 538, 548–549, 574.

14. Harald Laeuen, *Marschall Antonescu* (Essen, 1943), p. 27.

3. Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

for this it required a degree of stability, not the hectic atmosphere created by Guardist terror squads. Consequently, when Antonescu in December began to take measures to bring the Guard to heel, he had German support, although the Legionaries refused to believe that the Germans would desert their most ardent allies. Antonescu proceeded to disarm their formations and to strengthen the army. Seeing their position undermined, the Guard on January 21, 1941, attempted to revolt. They were suppressed by the army after three days of savage fighting in which they outdid themselves in committing bestial atrocities. On January 27 Antonescu formed a new cabinet composed almost entirely of military officers. The Iron Guard was dissolved, the Legionary state abolished, and a firm military dictatorship under the *Conducator* came into being. Thus fell one of the first fascist movements in Europe and, ironically enough, at just the time Nazi Germany achieved complete predominance in Rumania.

Under the Antonescu dictatorship political life ceased altogether; the army and the Germans were in complete control. A couple of plebiscites provided the necessary stamp of legality and the government, with very few changes, remained in power for the next three years. In June, 1941, Antonescu joined Hitler in the war against the Soviet Union. Maniu and Constantin Brătianu supported the war until the recovery of Bessarabia and Bucovina, though they protested against the dictatorship. After Rumanian troops crossed the Dniester, they dispatched notes of protest to Antonescu demanding Rumania's withdrawal from the war. But by this time he was too deeply involved in the German adventure. In October, 1941, he annexed Transnistria, that part of the Ukraine lying between the Dniester and Bug rivers and including Odessa. Rumanian troops went on and on until they reached Stalingrad. Then began the slow retreat.

Well before his overthrow Antonescu, now a Marshal, realized that the war was lost but was unwilling to take the steps to extricate Rumania, although he permitted envoys of the political parties to establish contact with the Allies. In the absence of effective opposition he was able to maintain power until the Russians, who had been checked in northern Moldavia in the spring of 1944, resumed their offensive in the late summer. With the imminent threat of Rumania becoming a battlefield and being further devastated by increasing American bombing raids, King Michael seized the initiative, arrested him, and sought an armistice.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175
661

The Groza regime, bolstered by the simulacrum of popular support gained in the elections and faced by an opposition unwilling to accept an unwarranted minority position in parliament, undertook in 1947 to wipe out all unfriendly or doubtful political organizations. In the spring it unleashed a new wave of arrests of opposition leaders, arrests made suddenly, at night, and with no explanation. The Communist Minister of Justice, Pătrăşcanu, expressed his belief that an uprising was being plotted but said "there was no evidence on hand fixing the responsibility upon former Premier Iuliu Maniu as leader of preparations for a revolution."[11] In July a number of National Peasant leaders, including Mihalache, were caught in an attempt to flee the country; the government arrested Maniu and the top party leadership and outlawed the party, an action which apparently evoked no popular response one way or the other.

Amid much publicity the regime, in November, tried Maniu and his followers, primarily on the charge of conspiring with "Anglo-American imperialism"; as the Communist paper, *Scânteia*, remarked, the United States was really the "twentieth defendant." Some damaging evidence was produced at the trial; observers seem generally to agree that certain members of the National Peasant party were shown to have been in contact with American intelligence officers to discuss means of overthrowing the regime.[12] Maniu, the principal defendant, while perfectly frank in his opinion of the government's illegitimacy and admitting attempting to smuggle National Peasants out of the country for the purpose of organizing resistance abroad, maintained that his opposition was within the framework of international agreements concerning Rumania, agreements which the government had flagrantly violated. But since the regime had effectively blocked any possibility of parliamentary opposition, underground planning—whether actually envisaging violence or not—was the only alternative to complete passivity.

The trial itself was conducted in a manner unhappily too familiar these days: the judge, Colonel Petrescu, was reportedly the director general of all prisons and concentration camps under the Antonescu dictatorship. Maniu and Mihalache were sentenced to terms of life imprisonment, the other leaders to terms ranging from one to twenty-five years. Whatever weight one may attach to the demands of *raison*

11. See his interview with W. H. Lawrence, *New York Times*, June 25, 1947.

12. As a matter of fact, as early as the spring of 1945 a number of Rumanians, some of whom had close connections with the Liberal and National Peasant parties, were developing underground plans for ousting the Groza government and sought to enlist American support. The charges of plots against the regime were not pure concoctions, whatever the purpose of the trial may have been.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 *d'état*—and it is obvious that Maniu and Mihalache did represent a threat to the Groza government—it is absurd to regard in any manner their sentences as an act of justice.

661

While the Maniu trial was in progress, the controlled press raised a clamor against Tătărescu and pointed out, quite correctly, that many anti-Groza elements were being sheltered in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic service. Tătărescu's position had been weakening for some time. In June, 1947, he had circulated a memorandum which contained a fifteen-point proposal for changing internal and external policy: he assailed the government's economic policy, expressed alarm over the country's low economic output, which was still at only 48 per cent of the 1938 level, requested better treatment of foreign capital and less stifling state intervention, and criticized the number of preventive arrests and the poor prison conditions. The Communists were naturally displeased by this note which clearly exceeded the conventions of "criticism and self-criticism." Rumors circulated of Tătărescu's resignation, and in September he was obliged to dismiss several hundred employees in the Foreign Office. On November 5 the parliament passed a vote of no confidence in him; the following day he and the other Dissident Liberal cabinet members were removed from their posts, to be replaced by Ana Pauker at the Foreign Office and Vasile Luca at the Ministry of Finance. (In December Bodnaraş took over the Ministry of War. The real rulers of the country were at last assuming governmental positions.)

Thus ended the political career of an able if unscrupulous man, who had first attracted attention in the early 1920's for his efficient action against the Communists and who had threaded a devious course through Carol's reign. Though disliked and mistrusted by all political groups, he seems to have had a rather Talleyrandian interest in the welfare of Rumania as he saw it.

Plans for the merger of the Social Democratic and Communist parties were announced in the autumn of 1947, though this amalgamation, which was in effect the complete absorption of the Social Democrats within a Leninist-Stalinist organization and ideology, was not completed until the following spring. It seems to have met with the sincere if ineffectual opposition of most of the socialists, some of whom joined Titel Petrescu's Independent Socialist party.[13] The Petrescu faction, however, was subject to increasing attack and

13. For an account of this last, faltering episode in the career of the Social Democratic party, see Valentin Thoma, "Wie es zur Liquidierung des rumänischen Sozialismus kam," *Die Zukunft* (July, 1949).

3: Roberts, S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 charged with illegally distributing political leaflets; on May 6, 1948, Petrescu was arrested and kept in prison without trial.

661 On December 30, 1947, King Michael, an anomalous monarch in a universe of burgeoning people's democracies, was suddenly and rather unexpectedly forced to abdicate. At the time he said his abdication was voluntary but subsequently, after his departure from Rumania, announced that it had been made under duress and he could not regard it as binding. Government propaganda became increasingly unfriendly to the king and listed with great relish the castles, forest land, and industrial shares that reverted to the nation. Following the overthrow of the monarchy the government at once announced the creation of the Rumanian People's Republic (Republica Populară Română) and prepared the draft of a new constitution.

Having thus eliminated the monarchy and all overt political opposition, the Communists then turned to the task of removing disaffected or doubtful elements in their own ranks. In the autumn of 1947 Gheorghiu-Dej, commenting on the rapid growth of the Rumanian Communist party to 700,000 members, had criticized the "low political and ideological level of our cadres and the presence of chauvinism among party members." In the course of a three-day congress of Communists and Social Democrats, assembled in February, 1948, to ratify their unification in a United Workers party, Minister of the Interior Teohari Georgescu launched an attack on the Communist Minister of Justice Pătrăşcanu, whom he charged with falling under bourgeois influence and overestimating the forces of the enemy, the Western powers. Pătrăşcanu was removed from his post and from the Central Committee of the party; later reports have suggested his being a likely candidate for a purge trial such as the other people's democracies have enjoyed.

There had been friction between Pătrăşcanu, a local Communist, and the "Muscovites," Pauker and Luca, since before the installation of the Groza regime. They found him too nationalistic and he was undoubtedly alarmed by the heavy, mechanically brutal tactics of the new order, its complete disregard of the nation's sensitivities, and its absolute subservience to Soviet state demands. Without question, many of the same elements which created Titoism and similar national heresies in the Communist camp were present in the Rumanian party, but because of the basic weakness of the Communist movement in Rumania and the ineluctable dependence upon the Soviet Union they never had a chance of obtaining control.

668 In February, 1948, the Communists concocted a new Democratic Popular Front, comprising the United Workers party; the Plough-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

men's Front, which had absorbed the dissident National Peasants to become a united peasant party; the National Popular party, which dissolved itself a year later on the grounds that the intellectuals and representatives of the middle class supporting this artificial organization should henceforth work within the cadres of the "mass parties"; and the Hungarian Popular party, controlled by the Communists but presumably designed to represent the Hungarian minority. On March 28 this bloc conducted and won elections, against a wholly spurious opposition, for a new assembly to vote on the constitution. 668

The Constitution of 1948 closely resembled the 1947 Constitution of the Bulgarian People's Republic and was clearly derived from and inspired by the Soviet Constitution of 1936. Apart from the fact that the latter is concerned with the union of a number of constituent republics, the principal differences reflect the transitional character of the so-called popular democracy. The People's Republic is defined as arising from the struggle against fascism, reaction, and imperialism rather than from the overthrow of landlords and capitalists. Private property is still recognized as one form of ownership of the means of production, though it is circumscribed by the "general interest" and subject to expropriation and nationalization. The Communist party does not have the preeminent status it enjoys in the U.S.S.R. As in the Soviet constitution stress is laid upon the right to work, to have leisure, and to receive an education; civil liberties, freedom of the press and of speech are guaranteed, but clearly for proletarian purposes; the right of association may not be directed against the democratic order established by the constitution. The supreme organ of the state is the unicameral Grand National Assembly, headed by a Presidium; the executive branch of the government is the Council of Ministers.[14] 642

Since the adoption of the constitution there have been few important structural changes in the government but rather a consolidation of the regime, the reorganization of the administration and the army (which apparently now exceeds treaty limits), and a running fight to eliminate the remnants of political opposition and to subdue sporadic uprisings brought about by the extensive new economic activities. A series of well-advertised public trials continued through 1948 and 1949, against Liberals, industrialists, military officers, students, Catholic and Uniate clergy, and Zionists, all categories that might cause the regime trouble or embarrassment. The new legal apparatus, including the addition of "people's assessors" to assure 661 642

14. For a recent study of constitutional developments within the Soviet sphere, see Andrew Gyorgy, *Governments of Danubian Europe* (New York, 1949).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

•661 proletarian justice and the introduction of the death penalty for treason, espionage, and economic sabotage, proved an efficient weapon
642 in this attack. The creation, announced in January, 1949, of People's Councils as the organs of local government was to provide the basic
[647] unit for the administrative hierarchy and to pave the way to a socialist society. In September, 1949, a State Control Commission was formed "to develop the spirit of responsibility toward public property, to wipe out bureaucracy, to verify the carrying out of government decrees, and to prevent sabotage in the work of building socialism." Avram Bunaciu, Pătrăşcanu's tougher successor at the Ministry of Justice, became head of this commission, which promised to be a very formidable instrument.

642 Along with the consolidation and coordination of the political and administrative apparatus came a marked shift in the party line from what it had been at the end of the war. The original program sought a government friendly to the U.S.S.R. and in which the workers' front would operate in coalition with middle-class parties. After 1947 not only the fact but even the pretense of collaboration was dropped. At the end of that year Gheorghiu-Dej said,

> The resignation of Tătărescu and his group means the removal of the last representatives of the reactionary bourgeoisie from the government; it means that the proletariat and its allies no longer share state power with the representatives of the exploiting classes. . . . The proletarian vanguard, in close alliance with the peasants and the progressive intelligentsia, is the backbone of the government.[15]

By 1949 the People's Democracy was explicitly defined as fulfilling the functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was distinguished from the Soviet form because it was possible, through the assistance of the U.S.S.R., to establish the dictatorship without civil war. In the People's Democracy, unlike the Soviet, the old state apparatus was not immediately smashed; bourgeois elements were retained for a time.

> But only with the establishment of People's Councils—local organs of state power built on broad democratic lines—will the new state apparatus be created, corresponding from top to bottom in every way with the aims and tasks of the new state and adjusted to the tasks of building Socialism. . . . The establishment of the People's Councils signifies

15. *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy* (January 1, 1948). (Published in Belgrade until December, 1948; subsequently in Bucarest.)

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

culture is growing apace."[33] Nevertheless, in the spring of 1948 Gheorghiu-Dej was denying rumors that the land would be taken back from the peasants, and a decree in March permitted peasants possessing more land than they could till to employ day laborers.[34]

By the summer, however, the government was emphasizing the need of "sharpening the class struggle in the countryside, organizing agricultural laborers, and fighting the rich peasant." It introduced progressive scales of taxation and forced grain delivery aimed at preventing accumulation of grain or wealth by kulak or estate owner and ultimately undermining their economic position. It set up "village information offices" with instructions to "unmask all the dishonest kulaks and inform the farmers of their duties."

On March 2, 1949, the regime, on the simple sweeping charge of sabotage and failure to comply with regulations, seized the land, livestock, and inventory which had been left to the large landowners under the 1945 reform. In this action, carried out abruptly and without prior notification, some 17,000 families were evicted from their homes at night and sent to various resettlement areas. The government now directed all its energies against the rich peasants.[35] Lenin's dictum that "Small-scale exploitation generates capitalism and the bourgeoisie constantly, daily, hourly, in an elemental way, and on a mass scale," again made its appearance and became the leitmotiv for innumerable articles.

Embroidering on this theme, Gheorghiu-Dej marked out the party line for 1949. In 1945 the landlords had been liquidated as a class, but this act fostered small-scale economic activity in agriculture. "It follows that the complete victory of socialism is impossible so long as private property in the means of production, in the towns and in the countryside, including private property in land, continues to exist." The Communist party, therefore, had a number of important

33. *East Europe* (February 19, 1948).

34. *Ibid.* (April 1, 1948).

35. The distinction between poor, middle, and rich peasant, or kulak, is not based on size of holding or amount of wealth alone and seems to take on different meanings under different political circumstances. In simplest terms, the rich peasant is one who hires labor or charges rent for machinery and equipment; the middle peasant uses only family labor but produces enough, or more than enough, to support his household; the poor peasant is unable to support himself on his holding and is on the verge of drifting into the agricultural proletariat. In 1941, 12 per cent of the land in Rumania was farmed solely by paid labor, and 24.8 per cent by a mixture of paid and family labor. The first category, in the main, represented the properties of estate owners, the second the holdings of the richer peasants. In 1948, according to Gheorghiu-Dej, 57 per cent of the rural population belonged to the small peasantry and 33 per cent to the middle peasantry.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

423 tasks. The first was to restrict the kulaks and dislodge them from
565 their position. Then it would be possible "when conditions are ripe,
661 to pass over to the policy of the complete liquidation of the kulaks."[36] He anticipated, of course, that the kulaks would resort to underground struggle, sabotage, and criminal acts in an effort to avert their approaching fate.

185 The second task was to undertake propaganda convincing the poor
241 and middle peasants of the need to unite in collective farms. When that task had been achieved, when all the land belonged to the collectives in perpetuity, the goal of making the land public property and bringing about the socialist transformation of the countryside would be reached. Gheorghiu-Dej emphasized, however, the necessity of making this transition gradually, by means of persuasion, and with the voluntary support of the peasant. The poor peasants should not be driven into collectives, the middle peasant should not be identified with the kulak, and the whole process must be paced by the development of agricultural machinery, machine tractor stations, and the expansion of the network of consumer and producer cooperatives as broad mass movements.[37] These words of caution presumably reflect the wisdom gained from the Soviet experiment in collectivization.

Gheorghiu-Dej concluded his remarks with the inevitable "self-criticism": in the past the party had not provided a clear political line for work in the countryside and had failed to popularize the notion of uniting the working peasantry into collective farms, and had even ignored or denied this goal.[38] That these so-called errors were the fault of the Rumanian Communists is, of course, nonsense. The party line, emanating from Moscow, had shifted, and in this instance a strong case can be made that the change had been planned long in advance. The Communists could have had no intention of stopping at the stage of small peasant cultivation which had, in any event, reached a cul-de-sac in Rumania.

474 The creation of collective farms got under way in 1949, and by the end of the year, according to the glowing account of a Russian visitor, 56 *kolkhozi* comprising 4,000 peasant families had been estab-

36. As in Russia representatives of the restricted and soon to be liquidated kulak class are not to be admitted to the collective farms.

37. The cooperatives, however, must rid themselves of capitalist elements, must intensify their collaboration with the state trading organs, and must promote the spirit of "socialist emulation" among the peasants.

38. G. Gheorghiu-Dej, "Tasks of the Rumanian Workers Party in the Struggle for the Socialist Reorganization of the Countryside," *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy* (Bucarest, March 15, 1949).

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

still abroad, was summarily dismissed. Peasant risings, a [668] movement for autonomy in Transylvania, and general instability led to the nomination of General Averescu to 642 office, owing to the reputation he enjoyed of being a strong 648 man, having taken an active part in suppressing the peasant rising of 1907.

General Averescu's government passed the enactment [423] dealing with the distribution of land to the peasants, while his Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Take Jonescu, laid the foundation of the Little Entente by concluding alliances with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. General Averescu attempted to open pourparlers with Russia, so as to prepare the recognition of Rumania's right to Bessarabia, and there was a fair chance of his succeeding, but he was baulked of his aim, for the King vetoed his plan.

To M. Titulescu was assigned the task of reorganizing the 652 country's finances. This was deemed to be an intrusion into 665 the special domain of the Bratianus[1], and so by provoking 661 their hostility, brought about Averescu's downfall. M. Take Jonescu was his successor, but he was able to maintain himself in office only for a month. A government constituted by the Bratianu party followed in January, 1922, and remained in power until March, 1926. Owing to the disunion among the Opposition groups the Bratianu party was allowed to carry into effect its nefarious project of securing complete control of the economic resources of Rumania. The whole legislation passed during its tenure of office was of a purely economic character, and under the pretext of consolidating the finances of the country they merely consolidated their own financial dominance.

Popular dissatisfaction was steadily growing in the meanwhile, as instead of relieving the money stringency, the economic policy of the government did nothing but intensify the evil from which the country was suffering. On [664] the other hand the Opposition was closing its ranks and organizing mass demonstrations throughout the country. A monster meeting of peasants was held at Alba-Julia in May, 1925, followed up by vigorous onslaughts against the government. The latter, unable to obtain a foreign loan which would have enabled it to stabilize the currency and relieve

1 [The Liberal Party, headed by John Bratianu--Analyst]

RUMANIA

[652] the economic crisis which had become endemic, sought to
665 withdraw for a brief period from office in order that popular
661 indignation might be appeased. As it had become obvious, however, that the Opposition, headed by the Transylvanian and peasant groups of the old kingdom aided by the Bessarabians, would sweep the polls and deprive the Bratianu party of the privileges it had arrogated to itself during its last tenure of office, the government manoeuvred to appoint in its stead a political group on whose subservience it could count. The choice fell on General Averescu, who could not pretend to independence of action owing to the numerical weakness of his group, and who was forced to act in leading strings held by the Bratianus on account of his absolute dependence on their support. As a consequence of the prevailing exasperation throughout the country it could be foreseen with certainty that it would be impossible to secure a favourable majority at the election following the exit from office of the Bratianus, even if use was made of the devices habitually employed on such occasions.

666 Before the dissolution of the Chamber, therefore, the
646 Bratianus passed a law reforming the electoral system then in use, which completely altered the very essence of democratic government. By the new system a party obtaining 40% of the total votes cast secured 70% of the seats in the Chamber, and thereby a party which did not possess the support of the majority of the electors might nevertheless secure an imposing majority in the Legislative Chamber. Through the passing of this measure into law, the coming to power of unpopular parties and royal favourites has been made possible, for owing to the malpractices and abuses current at elections, it is relatively easy in Rumania for any person in control of the state-machine to secure the requisite 40% of the votes necessary to ensure him complete domination of the Chamber.

666 In ordinary circumstances there would have been no necessity for this electoral law, since the public has usually a very wholesome respect for whatever party is in power, allowing it to organize the elections to suit its wishes, and permitting it to exert a dominating influence on the polls so that it may be said that the elections are always "made."

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

The elections which followed in May, 1926, were among the 666
most violent which had been witnessed in Rumania. Though 661
the Averescu group had secured the support of the Magyars, Germans, Jews, Bulgarians and Turks by holding out to them the most alluring promises, it in no way felt secure, and therefore had recourse to extensive terrorist methods. Most Opposition leaders were arrested. Opposition leaders like Maniu and Vaida-Voevod were prevented from holding meetings. Mihalache was set upon by gendarmes and beaten at his home at Topoloveni. The Bessarabian leaders, Stere and Halippa, while travelling to Bessarabia were ignominiously thrown out of their train at Floresti, placed under an escort of gendarmes and conveyed on foot to Cetatea-Alba, a distance of 300 kilometers, despite the fact that they were both in a poor state of health at the time. The army and gendarmerie were mobilized and ordered to see to it that Rumanian citizens did their duty (such as it was conceived to be by the government of H.M. King Ferdinand of Rumania). One of the manifestos issued and distributed broadcast by army air-planes at the time read:—"If you trust in the King then you must trust in his government." As for the way royalty in Rumania conceived its duty of 643
guarding the letter and spirit of the Constitution, one may 666
judge by the fact that the King, aware of the violence to be committed, and knowing that as the supreme arbiter in the country he would be besought from all sides to intervene and put a stop to it, could think of nothing better than to elude his responsibilities by betaking himself to his yacht, and cruising on the Danube for a whole week so as not to be importuned by the complaints of his liege subjects!

In spite of the unprecedented violence employed the 666
government obtained only 54% of the total votes cast, but it must be remembered that this percentage included almost the whole of the votes cast by the minorities.

For some time Averescu meekly followed the lead of 642
Bratianu. He surprised nobody, however, when he began 661
to show manifest signs of insubordination, but to no avail.

For the Liberals, knowing the shifty customer with whom they were dealing, had taken their precautions. During their four years of office they had bestowed on most of the

661 state administrations a certain degree of autonomy which,
[642] effectively amputated the central government of many of its prerogatives, and having filled these administrations with their own partisans they still exerted an influence which could, if necessary, paralyse the governments destined to succeed them in office.

In his electoral manifestoes, Averescu had held out to the Rumanians the most seductive inducements, among others that of a flow of foreign capital into the country. Time passed, however, and so, without any sign of an impending materialization of these assurances, the public began to chafe and inveigh against him. The resentment which the Liberals had aroused against themselves was thus deftly diverted on to the heads of their successors. This result having been duly effected, the Liberals emerged from the seclusion they had hitherto voluntarily imposed on themselves, and now appeared on the scene in the guise of indispensable factors for the restoration of the order and legality so grievously compromised by their incompetent henchman! The King was induced to demand General Averescu to form a coalition Ministry, but after a fruitless effort he was summarily dismissed and replaced by Prince Stirbey, who a fortnight later retired, making way for a Bratianu Government, so that the transition might not appear too brusque.

643 King Ferdinand died in July, 1927, and as the crown passed to his grandson, Michael, a boy of six, a Regency Council was nominated. Ferdinand's son, the notorious Prince Carol, had been excluded from the throne owing to Ferdinand's conviction that Rumania's prestige would suffer if a person with Carol's record became King. A similar opinion seems to have been held by our Foreign Office, for when Prince Carol came over to England in 1925 he received a polite but firm request to leave our shores.

665 Unhappily for the Liberals, their leader, John Bratianu, died suddenly in November, 1927. His was a strong willed and dominating personality, capable, but not over scrupulous in the choice of methods. The leadership then passed to his brother, who until then had been Minister of Finance.

665 The rising storm of popular exasperation caused by the
652 financial policy of the Liberal party, which had brought the

671 preparing a system of regional decentralization which would largely have satisfied the desires of the minorities.

662 Having to rely upon an inefficient administrative staff, with the various autonomous State departments still filled with supporters of the Opposition, and the latter hampering and undermining the government's attempt to clear up the mess in which the country had been left, it was hardly possible to expect that the government of M. Maniu could effect the miraculous change that was expected of it. In order to counteract the underhand machinations of its Liberal opponents, who did not scruple even to sap its credit 642 abroad by circulating scurrilous attacks on it among foreign 643 banking institutions, while at home they brought pressure 661 to bear on the Regency (which had been elected at their dictation) to create irritating hindrances to the smooth working of the government's plans, the latter at last allowed itself to be won over to what at the time was a fairly popular view, namely that of permitting the former Crown Prince Carol to return and ascend the throne. His advent was reckoned as likely to strengthen the hands of the Government, for he shared with the National Peasant Party the hostility of the Bratianus. Carol II, however, after his accession to the throne on June 8th, 1930, began to manifest a distinct predilection for autocratic measures. He arbitrarily removed from his post the able Rumanian Minister in Paris, M. Diamandi, a man who had distinguished himself for years by his devoted and brilliant service to his country, and nominated a personal friend whose sole qualification for this important diplomatic post was that he was a racing man. He estranged both M. M. Maniu and Vaida-Voevod by unconstitutionally interfering in the government, and thereby provoked the resignation of both. As he did not yet feel himself strong enough to dissolve the Chamber he allowed the National Peasant Party to form another Cabinet with M. Mironescu at its head, but he imposed on them as colleague an outsider in the person of M. Manoilescu, another personal friend of his. An attempt was made to form a Coalition Cabinet to be presided over by M. Titulescu, but as this failed the Mironescu Cabinet was tolerated for a time because it was conducting negotiations for a loan, and a premature

disclosure of the impending adoption of a dictatoral régime 642 might have influenced them adversely. Once the loan was 643 obtained, and when it was deemed that the favour with 644 which the National Peasant Party was regarded had somewhat subsided, owing to the unpopular budget measures it had adopted, M. Mironescu was forced to resign, and death having removed in the meantime the most determined adversary of the King, M. Vintila Bratianu, the former now proceeded to unfold his plan of action.

M. Titulescu was once more summoned to Bucarest and asked to form a broad Coalition Cabinet; but as the National Peasant Party refused to lend its support to a cabinet which would have contained two royal favourites, Manoilescu and Argentoianu, M. Titulescu wisely abandoned the task and returned to London.

The next step of Carol was an attempt to follow the nefarious example of his brother-in-law, the Serbian monarch, and form a military cabinet, but the Spanish revolution which broke out at the time induced him hastily to alter his plans.

M. Argentoianu, who had in the meantime become the 645 favourite adviser of the King, opted for the dissolution of the Chamber and the formation of a cabinet of "technical" experts to shore up the tottering framework; himself to occupy the two most important posts, those of the Ministry of Finances and of the Interior. The technical capacities of M. Argentoianu are of peculiarly sinister character, judging from what former colleagues of his have to say of his activities. Thus General Averescu, in whose cabinet he held the post of Minister of Finances ad-interim, accuses him of unconstitutionally squandering £1,500,000, of thereby defrauding the State, and rendering himself liable to penalties provided in Art. 326 of the Rumanian penal code, as well as in Art. 3 of the law regarding ministerial responsibilities—infractions that had been established by the Judicial authorities in 1923, if we are to trust General Averescu's affirmations as they were published and reproduced in a series of articles in all the principal Bucarest newspapers during January, 1932. Another ex-Finance Minister, M. Virgil Madgearu, on whose integrity we may rely, likewise

POLITICS.

POLITICAL PARTIES.

The Liberal or Bratianu Party.—The regular system of party government composed of two great political parties, the Liberal and Conservative, which had ruled alternatively in Rumania during the reign of Charles I, came to a close with the Great War, which brought about the dismemberment of the Conservatives. It was an arrangement based on the "spoils" system, and entailed a change of the majority of state officials with every change of government. This instability of tenure of all posts in the Civil Service necessarily encouraged corruption, but it may be said that it was a political system which for the time being made on the whole for stability and assured to Rumania an immunity from revolts and crimes by which other States of South Eastern Europe had distinguished themselves during the same period. 665 647

It is regrettable that both parties had neglected to create a contented class of peasant proprietors which would have constituted a sound bulwark against the onset of disintegrating forces let loose by the war. Instead, great land and financial monopolies closely connected with the personnel of these two political parties were fostered. 665

The agrarian revolution led to the elimination of the Conservatives, while the Liberal party retained its vigour owing to its grip on the economic life of the country. Owing to the absence of a powerful rival, the Liberal party became the supreme arbiter in the land during the first decade following the conclusion of the war. But, from a political party it had degenerated into a coterie aiming solely at the exploitation of the country for the benefit of its partisans, and, as such, though firmly established in the old kingdom, seeing that it constituted the main avenue by which one could accede to political life, it was unable to extend its influence in the newly incorporated provinces, where, fortunately, other political conceptions prevailed. 661 665

It had identified itself with the Bratianu family, which exerted an autocratic sway over it. After John Bratianu's death, in 1927, the leadership passed to his brother Vintila 665

RUMANIA

668 vinces, and in the murmur of this growing dissolution one
665 hardly hears the voice of the national conscience, one and undivided. The nation is in the midst of disquieting social and economic troubles, and is being conducted by inexperienced and unprepared men, deprived of intuition and without inspiration. In such solemn moments you ask for my guidance. I shall offer you none. You have both intelligence and conscience. I pray you to revere the memory of the sufferings which brought about the consummation of the national unity. I beg of you that momentary incitations should not be allowed to trouble the purity of your devotion to the ideal of the unity of our State. . . . Uphold the unity of the National Peasant Party because it is by its aid that we shall revert to a democratic and constitutional life and extricate the peasantry and the whole social structure from its present wretchedness. Do not forget that you have to fight for a policy of equity towards the provinces. . . . . We have the advantage of having a youthful king of our own generation. We have received him with justified enthusiasm, and we believe that thanks to the qualities with which he is endowed, he will respond to the people's heartfelt desire and lead it accordingly."

665 This policy of passivity, hitherto followed, seems to have reached its close, for all of a sudden on May 14th, 1932, the "Patria" published a vehement attack on the government which may be taken as the preliminary move in a systematic campaign aiming at its removal. This fulminating article created a sensation in Bucarest, and hopes were expressed that this rebellious attitude of the Transylvanian section of the National Peasant party would not meet with the approval of its partisans in the old kingdom, but fortunately for the Rumanian people these forebodings were soon dispelled when the Bucarest organ of the party, the "Dreptatea," announced that this campaign had the full support of the party behind it. A concise summary of the above mentioned article in the "Patria" is given below as it indicates very clearly not only the wrongs inflicted on Transylvania, but also that the patience of the people is at an end.

●661 "Transylvania and the Banat have been reduced to the
668 state of colonies left to the discretion of illiterate exploiters.

POLITICAL PARTIES

Eighty-six per cent of the State revenue is being raised this 661
year in our province. Transylvania forms one-third of the 668
total territory of Rumania, and possesses only one-fifth of the total wealth of the country; how then can this imposition of 86% of the total burden of taxation on our province be justified?

This oligarchy at Bucarest constitutes a gigantic swindle which has transgressed all limits and which in any other civilized State would long since have been blown up from its very foundations, so that every trace of this moral ugliness which disgraces this country should be removed. We do not enjoy equality of treatment with other Rumanians, for we have been excluded from appointments in the army, the customs, the railways, the post, the administration and the magistrature. We are far from being autonomists, but we will ask whether under such circumstances it is possible to stem for long the claim for autonomy. In all corners of the country people begin to display restlessness. They demand that a campaign be opened not only against the government but also especially against the present régime which aims at despoiling the nation of its birth-rights. This campaign will soon begin and citizens will have the privilege of sacrificing themselves for the purpose of securing the return of a constitutional régime. It will be a campaign of extreme violence in the course of which nobody will be spared.

The present economic disaster which we are experiencing is to a great part due to the disorderly conduct of State affairs from which Rumanians of the provinces have been excluded. For decades the provinces have been subjected to a policy of pauperization and political serfdom. We raise a solemn protest and warning that the time is not distant when Rumanians of the provinces will no longer tolerate these adventurers and political mountebanks who treat the provinces as colonies fit only to be exploited." . . . . . .

This overt and frank criticism of Bucarest circles naturally 661
excited a certain indignation in the Rumanian capital, yet independent papers like the "Adeverul" were courageous enough to express a certain sympathy. In its issue of 15th May, 1932, the latter journal regrettfully admitted "it is probable that this warning from across the Carpathians will

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

have no effect. Not even now, when events in Yugoslavia should serve as a lesson to us."

General Averescu's "People's Party."—General Averescu had distinguished himself during the war and on its conclusion initiated a campaign demanding the taking of severe sanctions against all those who by their ineptitude or moral falterings had contributed to bring humiliation on Rumania during the war. His appeal rallied to his side the majority of the ex-soldiers, mainly peasants, and this led him to espouse their demand for a rapid distribution of the land among them. He is a determined upholder of an iron-hand policy and it is owing mainly to his advocacy of strong measures that he was called to the government in 1920, at a time when the country was threatened with upheavals brought about by the dilatory fashion in which the allocation of the land to the peasants was being conducted. His maintenance in office for almost two years at the time was due mainly to the support given to him by M. Take Jonescu, who acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs in his Cabinet.

This group is a purely personal coterie and has no enduring connection with any section of the people. Whenever it has assumed office it has done so by support other than that of the people. General Averescu expected that on the return of King Carol II from exile, he would be entrusted with the task of putting things in order in Rumania. But hope deferred has shattered his faith in his sovereign's capacity of discernment, and at last his chagrin at being shunned has led him to take up an uncompromising attitude towards the Crown, against which he has launched a vehement press campaign. Some of his partisans, headed by his former lieutenant Goga, have in consequence receded from the party and have founded a separate political organization. Goga is in intimate relation with the Palace, and it is rumoured that the Iorga-Argentoianu Cabinet may eventually be replaced by a political combination including the triumvirate Goga, Lupu, and Argentoianu

Dr Lupu's Peasant Party.—This is another small personal coterie which for some time had adhered to the National Peasant Party. It is practically of no importance, but by lending its feeble support to reaction it can help to turn the

RUMANIA

323 bought at random during his brief stays in Rumania. These
647 quotations have not been specially selected and they may be considered as generally descriptive of what is being said on Bessarabia in the Rumanian press. If one were to study the latter assiduously there is no doubt that a vast quantity of incriminating matter could easily be adduced to form a most damning indictment of the incapacity of Rumanian governments.

661 "Lupta," Dec. 8th, 1931 :—After the union, the men who
563 were most compromised were dispatched there to work for
647 the spiritual unification of the nation; at any rate they were individuals utterly incapable of understanding the ideal or the scope of the mission which had been confided to them. The administrative authorities were constituted entirely of the scum of the political parties of the old kingdom. It is to these social dregs that the errand of infusing into the Bessarabians a sentiment of confidence in us was entrusted. How they fulfilled this mission, how they alienated even those who trusted us, is well known. Bessarabia was and remains a sort of land of promise for those desirous to grow rich quick . . . not by honest means . . . after a self-imposed exile accepted solely for this purpose. Enrichment being the sole initial and final aim of these propagandists sent out from the old kingdom, they inaugurate a state of affairs which conforms with their pursuits. Persecutions of all sorts, inquisitorial constraints of all manifestations of collective and individual liberty. All corners of Bessarabia were represented as fertile for the culture of Bolshevism. For thirteen years we have heard of nothing else concerning this province save terrorist plots and communist actions all purporting to aim at the dissolution of the Rumanian State. Those interested, created purposely a state of affairs that completely denaturalized existing facts and finally succeeded in imposing their conception on "the administrative machinery of Bessarabia," &c. The paper concludes by relating how workmen and intellectuals are persecuted, imprisoned, subjected to all sorts of vexations by the Rumanian authorities at Kichineff and at other urban centres.

The "Cuvantul" of Feb. 20th, 1929, designates Bessarabia as "the sick man of Rumania." The Bratianu

1 [of Bessarabia with Rumania — Analyst] 2 [Bessarabia — Analyst]

régime had consummated Bessarabia's ruin, and its people were dying of hunger. The irruption of the Rumanian army was not the triumphal arrival of a liberator but the invasion of a hunger-stricken horde. The requisitions for obtaining supplies both for the army and for the population of Moldavia, on account of the haste and disorder with which they were carried out, assumed the aspect of revolting spoliations and led the natives to ask "what sort of brothers are these hogs and these robbers?" 563 647 661

"Our army's attitude was both offensive and aggressive, in conformity with the usages of war, in short, that of an army of occupation in an enemy country. When the time came to organize the civil administration of Bessarabia, very few of the regular functionaries agreed to be transferred to a remote and unsafe province. . . . Adventurers, those who had nothing to lose and who were under the threat of being dismissed or imprisoned, accepted to join in this "campaign to Siberia" in the hope of being rehabilitated or of becoming rich. For a long time the transfer of a civil functionary to Bessarabia was considered as a redoubtable disciplinary sanction. . . . ."

"The Bessarabians have found out what elements we can contribute to the restoration of their former material prosperity. These are poverty, demoralization, political debauchery, a decade of violence, fraud and illegality. Hence the permanent hostility with which they regard us; a state of irritability which is maintained owing to the prevailing wretchedness."

The main responsibility for this astounding state of affairs should be ascribed to the Bratianus, who inaugurated and maintained this system for ten years. When finally they were ejected from office, their Bessarabian partisans began to quarrel among themselves and attack most virulently their former regional leader, M. Inculeţ. They started a paper called "The Voice of Bessarabia" in 1929, in which their former leaders were denounced as vulgar and dangerous adventurers, robbers and criminals. As for their former local chief Inculeţ, he was accused of having retired to Jassi in order to enjoy in peace the thousands of millions he had accumulated by a triple betrayal of Russia, Bessarabia, and 665 578

RUMANIA

665 Rumania. The paper concluded by an exhortation addressed
574 to Bessarabians to evict Inculeţ from the political arena of Bessarabia where he had operated as though this region had been an African colony, and the appeal concluded with the hortatory incitation "Eject this putrefaction from Bessarabia."

661 In spite of the severe financial crisis which afflicted this region, the fiscal agents of the government insisted on
563 collecting taxes even when in years of drought the peasantry
661 was destitute and utterly unable to pay. The methods employed were so barbarous that they provoked several interpellations in the Rumanian Chamber. During its sitting of Dec. 10th, 1926, M. V. Madgearu denounced the abusive and inquisitorial methods by which Bessarabian tax-payers had been sold up and his arraignment was confirmed by similar indictments formulated by a member of the (then) government majority.

423 In October, 1930, a revolt broke out in southern Bess-
563 arabia. The peasants of the village of Baimaklia, near the town of Kagui, revolted and burned down the residence of a
661 big landowner because certain grazing lands were given to him by the State instead of being distributed among the peasants. That similar abuses are current may be inferred from an article in the "Aurora" of June 3rd, 1926, which is headed "The pauperization and humiliation of the Bessarabians," and in which it is related how certain State lands were put up for sale at Balţi, and though the peasantry of six adjoining villages had combined and offered 400,000 lei more than three big landowners, the lands were allocated to the latter, obviously through favouritism. That State functionaries often act with an arbitrariness and brutality
563 inconceivable in a civilized State may be illustrated by
661 the Soroca affair, which is of quite recent occurrence. In January, 1932, six Jewish youths, inhabitants of Soroca, on the Dniester, after coming to terms with the frontier-guards as to the amount of the bribe they would have to pay to be allowed to escape into Russia, and after they had paid 40,000 lei, were ambuscaded and shot down. In order to instil terror into the local population, their bodies were hurled pell-mell on a sledge which was driven by a soldier

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1
Bessarabia

563
661

sitting on the corpses through the streets of Soroca and conveyed to the mortuary. Such barbarous conduct naturally aroused bitter indignation which was re-echoed in the Bucarest press and was qualified "as a premeditated massacre," and the Rumanian Government was severely censured for providing Russia by such acts, good motives for anti-Rumanian propaganda. ("Adeverul" 10th Jan. 1932.) Such cases do not seem to be rare, for the same journal in its issue for the 20th Jan. reports the perpetration of a similar outrage at Balți, when two persons were shot down by the frontier guards after they had secured their tacit permission to cross into Soviet Russia. It is obvious that if Russia exerts such a magnetic attraction on the Bessarabians as to incite them to abandon their belongings, disburse considerable sums in tolls, and endanger their lives in order to gain admittance to what they consider a haven of comparative repose, conditions in Bessarabia must be truly unendurable. At any rate the Iorga-Argentoianu Government has not so far shown any disposition to grapple more vigorously than its predecessors in office with this aggravating question of Bessarabian maladministration; on the contrary it has followed meekly in the footsteps of its predecessors. Thus, in the "Adeverul" for Jan. 28th, 1932, we read of a protest of Bessarabian intellectuals who denounced the favouritism shown by the Government for two of its political friends, who, after being munificently supplied with funds, were dispatched to Bessarabia in order to start the publication of a newspaper whose ostensible object was the spreading of Rumanian culture in that province. This dilapidation of government funds in favour of "budgetivorous" persons having no connection whatever with Bessarabia was strongly resented by Bessarabian intellectuals, who deemed themselves the sole persons qualified to carry on such propaganda in what they considered as their private domain. Bucarest governments have always shown themselves incapable of facing grave questions seriously, and one ought not to be surprised at their dalliance with the question of Bessarabia. Their latest device for placating the Bessarabians was to create two new Under-Secretaries of State and fill these posts with natives of Bessarabia. "The new system,"

563 ironically remarked the "Adeverul," "of dealing with
661 the woes of Bessarabia consists of appointing a Minister for Bessarabia at Bucarest, while a Bessarabian whose sole qualification is that of having published a book of poems is nominated to the post of Under-Secretary of State to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. This is the government's conception of putting a stop to the agitation in Bessarabia, but alas ! the satisfaction of two vanities does not mean that the problems appertaining to the region between the Pruth and the Dniester are approaching solution."

In another article the "Adeverul" takes the Government to task for creating fresh sinecures and sarcastically exclaims that Bessarabia must be happy since she has now two ministers. The Government felt constrained to declare that these two new posts would not create a very heavy additional charge on the budget as it had arranged that the Governor of Bessarabia would give up his salary to his new colleague, but the "Adeverul" retorted that if the Governor gave up his salary, he being a general, would draw a pension, so that there would still be an increase in expenditure, all the more so, since a salary had to be provided for the new Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. That the creation of posts for new under secretaries of State is highly unpopular may be seen from a report of a sitting of the Senate early in April, 1932, when Senator Banescu formally demanded the abolition of five such posts declaring that it was a shame to create new charges when the State had not the means wherewith to pay its pensioners. The Opposition was reported to have loudly applauded him, shouting "it is tragic, people are dying of hunger."

433 The dissatisfaction existing in Bessarabia has been intensified through the economic crisis which had become endemic in that province since its separation from Russia, and which the Rumanian authorities so far have done nothing to alleviate or to assuage. Bessarabia was one of the most fertile and productive provinces of the Russian Empire, the latter providing a ready market for Bessarabian produce. Its orchards and vineyards were famous and provided annually some 28,800 tons of fruit of a value of 5 milliard

INNER GLIMPSES OF THE ADMINISTRATION.

It is with no desire to cast discredit on the Rumanians that 000 the following political happenings related in this chapter are being published, but with the intent of giving, judging from the past, a rough idea of the mentality of the ruling classes and what may be expected of them in the future. It would be utterly unfair if we were to judge them after our western conceptions and by accepting our standard of morality as a criterion. "The moral standards of a people are evolved in correspondence with the practical needs of that people," wrote our distinguished philosopher, the late L. T. Hobhouse, in his remarkable treatise "Mind in Evolution," and the auspices under which Rumania evolved were peculiarly unpropitious if we are to judge from Dr. Seton Watson's weighty pronouncement that "the Phanariot régime reduced the national and religious life of the peninsula to utter stagnation and has left its corroding mark upon the politics of every Balkan nation." ("Europe in the Melting-pot.") And the Phanariot influence was more deep rooted and 565 lasting in Rumania than in any other country in South- 641 Eastern Europe. In all these countries except Rumania it 661 was a transient phenomenon, it was a virus which thought it had inculcated its poison deep within the tissues of the native plant, yet nevertheless, owing to the inherent qualities of the latter, the scourge was tenaciously fought and was being slowly eliminated. But in Rumania, unfortunately, the bane went much deeper, for the Phanariots and their retainers had come in their thousands and settled in the country for good, and their numerous descendants form to-day the *élite* of the ruling classes of the old kingdom. The basic conception of the State held by the Phanariot was that it was the best and shortest avenue to personal advancement and enrichment. He applied and lived by the maxim of his Turkish patron of yore:

> "Dovleten mali denŭz
> Yemeyen onou domŭz,"

which may be translated by "the goods of the State are as vast as the sea, and he who does not help himself to them is no better than a pig."

RUMANIA

000 no better than a pig." If we take into consideration that according to L. T. Hobhouse "the whole system of moral tradition governing the life of a society is evolved from the practical impulses and feelings at work in the past and present," we may easily comprehend that the aspects of social life as revealed by current events in Rumania, show a natural process which could not be altered or deflected except by titanic efforts of re-education. We have no right, therefore, to blame the Rumanians for what we may consider to be grave lapses, but which they prefer to interpret differently, for after all, as A. R. Wallace affirms in his "Social Environment and Moral Progress," "morality is not wholly due to any inherent perception of right or wrong conduct, but is to some extent a matter of convention varying with the degree and kind of social development attained." And this opinion is confirmed by L. T. Hobhouse, who, in his book "Morals in Evolution" states "the instinctive in human morality is by no means an unfailing power implanted by nature in all men to distinguish right from wrong." Rumanian youth continues to cherish the traditional 461 Phanariot ambition of enriching itself through access to a 565 public post; other careers are neglected and looked askance at. They are left to the more enterprising Jewish element, which owing to its energy and capacity has taken complete control of Rumanian trade and banking. Through the neglect of the commercial professions, Rumanians have hampered the formation of a middle class which, more than any other element, is conducive to the creation of stability 647 and a vigilant public opinion. The public functionary class 465 is an unstable element, and as it enjoys no security of office but depends for its tenure on the favours of politicians in 661 power, it naturally follows that it easily lends itself to corruption, and all the more so seeing that it is disgracefully underpaid. In a lettter published by the "Argus" on 16th May, 1932, it was averred that the number of public functionaries amounted to 500,000. (Including the staff employed by municipalities). The number could easily be halved, and the administration would stand to gain both in efficiency and thoroughness by such a reduction. Greece, with a population amounting to one-third that of Rumania, had a

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

total of only 43,943 functionaries (exclusive of those employed by municipalities. Even this figure was considered excessive, and a decree was enacted prohibiting for a series of years the creation of fresh posts and the nomination of new functionaries to vacant posts in order that their number might be reduced. In Rumania such a measure is hardly likely to be enacted, for every politician must have the possibility of providing the more important of his electors with sinecures, for otherwise how would he induce them to vote for him? This is how the principle of public solidarity is understood and applied! Amongst us, state functionaries are considered as the servants of the public, in fact their function is revealed by the appellation under which they are designated; they are, in fact as well as in name, public servants. Rumanian functionaries are, one must admit, on the whole both courteous and obliging, especially to strangers, but such services as are rendered must be requited. Since the State barely remunerates them, it is obvious they have to secure their means of livelihood somewhere. Of course no tariff is posted up in Government offices as to the amount of pecuniary compensation expected for the services demanded; *that* is a matter left to the discretion of the person soliciting the service, but a solatium of some sort has to be given to the functionary, as otherwise you will be made to feel the tediousness of waiting in a usually stuffy office. It is not surprising that such methods have gradually evinced probity from amongst the administrative personnel and made room for a venality which is occasionally exhibited so brazenly as to impel such an attentive observer as Mr Charles Wood to declare "there is nobody and nothing in Rumania who and which cannot be bought with money." (Contemporary Review, February, 1921.) Though the country teems with acts of maladministration there are yet many excellent, honest and plodding functionaries, who are all the more meritorious since they are neither properly remunerated nor encouraged for their loyal service to the State. This proves that if the Civil Service was placed beyond the withering influence of politics, stability of occupation guaranteed, and decent remuneration offered, a remedy for the ills which afflict Rumania would easily be devised. There

647 are certainly no insuperable obstacles to the removal of what
466 constitutes a drain on the strength and probity of the country,
661 which is being visibly weakened in every sphere of administration.

The following article, which was published in the "Lupta" of Dec. 17th, 1931, is instructive as to the manner in which public functionaries behave in order to supplement the scanty salary they draw from the State and which generally does not suffice to keep them alive.

647 It is obvious that no civilized State would tolerate methods
651 which in Rumania are benevolently winked at. There is no
499 doubt that the evil could easily be remedied if functionaries were decently paid. The increased outlay for the State
661 which this would involve would be largely compensated by a more conscientious performance of duty by the administrative staff. For instance, it is well known that owing to the high duties in force, smuggling on a colossal scale is being carried on with the connivance of officials, with the result that the State is defrauded of millions. M. V. Madgearu, former Minister of Finances, openly admits it in his book "Rumania's New Economic Policy," published in English, on page 39 of which we come across this astounding statement: "It has been shown that while pre-war Rumania imported about 70,000 kilos of natural silk, united Rumania registered the importation of only 1,000 kilos in 1927. It is well understood that the rest has been imported through smuggling." On a rough computation this item alone would account for an annual loss of some 50 million lei to the revenue.

But, apparently, blackmail is even more lucrative than smuggling, according to the article referred to in the "Lupta":—

647 "Truly, *smuggling* constitutes a source of big revenues for
651 the State. Not bona-fide smuggling which involves the
661 introduction of goods into the country without the disbursement of duties. This latter sort of smuggling is never discovered, or if discovered is rapidly hushed up with the connivance of the ablest pillars of the Ministry. The principal sources of revenue from smuggling are derived from the hypothetical variety, when for instance an anony-

mous letter of denunciation reaches the Ministry concerning 647
a commercial or industrial firm. This is immediately followed 651
by a close investigation of the firm's books. Though no 661
trace of contraband may have been found, yet rumours of high fines to be imposed on this firm get into circulation. Its owners make desperate efforts to dissipate them. The firm's bank announces that its overdraft will be suspended until the matter is cleared up. The merchant who cannot wait for a judicial examination of the charge brought against him, nor engage in protracted discussions with the Ministry, finding his credit at the bank has been suspended, endeavours to strike a bargain. He will offer 10%, occasionally even only 1% of the amount of the fine with which he has been threatened. The State pockets 80% of the sum thus offered and the zealous inspector who has "discovered" the reported contraband appropriates the remaining 20%. Why should these sums indeed be rejected? Such tactics, when employed by a clever functionary or inspector, will soon allow him to become the owner of palaces and buildings in the capital. Such is the just reward of labour!"

And in conclusion the "Lupta" advises the Ministry of Finance as to the measures it ought to take to prevent merchants from suffering unduly from the blackmailing activities of its financial inspectors!

That blackmailing and extortion are not unusual practices 647
may be inferred from the following announcement appearing 661
in a Bucarest daily on 15th March, 1929:—"The tribunal of 697
Cluj having received an endless number of complaints and denunciations against Lieut.-Colonel Mihai, of the gendarmery, lately occupying the post of Police-Prefect at Cluj during the Liberal régime, has transmitted them to the judicial procurator. The investigations which are being pursued prove that the charges are well founded and that this Liberal terrorist had extorted moneys through blackmail from high class people while he was police prefect in the capital of Transylvania. Those who suffered most from the exercise of the functions of the accused (sic), were merchants, who, if they failed to deliver to the prefect the sums or goods demanded, were subjected to tortures and heavy fines and were threatened with the closing of their

:47 shops and the confiscation of their goods." The most sensa-
697 tional administrative affair in Rumania was undoubtedly
that of the prison scandals of 1926, which gave rise to lively
661 press comments throughout the continent and thanks to
which the author of these scandals won widespread notoriety.

The following details concerning the methods in vogue in penitentiaries were given by the Bucarest "Socialismul" on May 16, 1926, on the occasion of the reported arrest of the notorious Cernat. . . . . "Directors and warders, seeking to grow rich rapidly, divide among themselves the moneys destined for the prisons. They appropriate both the food and the clothing set apart for those under arrest, they extort money from those better off, receive bribes in exchange for privileges, or force prisoners to work for them. The arrest of Major Cernat, who was appointed Director-General of Prisons while awaiting his appointment as Chief of the State Police Service, is no satisfaction for us. For we know that this man will be as well off in prison as at his home. We know further that in a few weeks or in a few months he will walk out free, with his head erect, for in our well-ordained country a big swindler has never been condemned or imprisoned, indeed it would be a crying injustice were such a thing to happen, since all our rulers have made their fortunes by similar dishonest practices."

697 The "Aurora" of June 3rd, 1926, reported the arrest of the directors of the penitentiaries of Doftana and Galatz, and gave details concerning the sums embezzled by these worthies. The system of imprisonment inaugurated by these clever rogues, however, deserves being enlarged upon as it is both amusing and illuminating. The following lucid and jocund report appeared in the French newspaper "Paris-Midi" on 17th June, 1926:—

"The Thousand and one joys of Rumanian Prisons."

"Bucarest. June 17th. Major Cernat, Director-General of Rumanian prisons, as well as the directors of several other penitentiary establishments, have been arrested. They are accused of failing to carry out their duties and of having shown too great indulgence towards the prisoners. Bucarest newspapers publish astounding details following on the

insatiable passion for the means wherewith they may be 000
secured.

Venomous rivalries are engendered and mortal envies 662
excited in the pursuit of such narrow and base aims. Antagonism between political men in Rumania is bitter and uncompromising because they are brought into mutual conflict by personal motives. They are always absorbed in their ambitions and grievances, and they reject all compromise, ready as they are to destroy if possible their opponents, for to them they naturally ascribe the same base motives by which they themselves are impelled. As they are seldom inspired by loyalty and devotion to any higher ideal they cannot recognize that their antagonists may pursue other than purely egoistic motives. Hence the intolerance and bitterness of the feuds among political factions.

In such an environment it is the unscrupulous and the 661
unprincipled who float to the top, and by a system of 565
alliances between big business and political bosses that smacks of American methods, the whole machinery of State is attuned to the express purpose of exploiting the masses for the benefit of the oligarchy at the head of affairs. No wonder that such methods check the vitality and the progress of any society within which they should happen unfortunately to appear, all the more so since there is a tendency to perpetuate themselves and become a permanent system.

Professor E. A. Ross, of Wisconsin, in his "Social 000
Psychology," says: "The men society allows to succeed and to be honoured are taken as models by the rising generation. It is in this that society receives its just punishment when it allows bad men to float to the top. Being imitated by the young, they spread their virus throughout the social body. Not the crook in the alley is the greater menace, but the crook in office."

Corruption has been instilled from above and it is hopeless to expect salvation from these upper strata of Rumanian society so far as the old kingdom is concerned. Transylvania, the cradle of the Rumanian people, which fortunately has not been contaminated by the Phanariot taint may perhaps prove the source from which eventually there may be regeneration from below by helping to reopen the sluices and

corner of Europe, has been allowed to become the prey of 642
odious vampires, who have sucked everything dry and have 668
even robbed us of our hope of possible salvation. Nevertheless, Providence hath granted the return of our long expected King," etc.

One is justified in expressing doubts as to the expediency 641
of applying fascist methods in Rumania as one fails to per- 565
ceive the dominating personality who might control and 661
direct such a policy; one may also ask, where are the indispensable coadjutors to be recruited from? It can hardly be said of King Carol that he has been able to live down his unfortunate reputation so as to assume with some hope of success such a formidable task. As for his likely collaborators who, presumedly, are to be selected from among the Rumanian ruling circles, one need only peruse the posthumous memoirs of the late Rumanian Prime Minister, Marghiloman, in order to be convinced of the utter abjectness of this class. M. Pamfil Seicaru, who may be likened to the late Henry Labouchere of "Truth" for his fearless criticisms, when writing on the boundless vista of putridity disclosed by this compilation, stigmatized in the "Cuvantul" of July 17th, 1927, in the following scathing terms the leading circles of his country :—" These memoirs form a vast archive concerning turpitudes of a whole ruling class . . . the majority of this class which remained in the territory occupied by the enemy openly practised with him . . . while those in Moldavia offered a spectacle of the most trying moral bankruptcy. A parliament of speculating fugitives revealing a criminal insensibility in face of the tragedy of a whole country; one cannot imagine a more sinister divorce between a ruling class and a nation in arms. . . . And who amongst them can indict the others for their subversion of the national ideal? Can the aristocratic fugitive fragment which took refuge in Moldavia or Russia claim to represent a higher standard of morality than the section which remained in the occupied territory meekly to serve the enemy? They both form two aspects of the same filth."

As recently as May 6th, 1932, Octavian Goga, an ex- 565
Minister and presently in intimate relation with the King, 641
who publicly brags of being the successor designate of Prof.

MISTAKES AND MUDDLES

661 The supreme mission of a Rumanian Government seems to consist in providing posts for its adherents and of furnishing means to its members and leading partisans of amassing fortunes. The psychology of such a governing clique is strangely akin to that of the predatory wolf-pack which is held together by the common pursuit of prey which is more easily secured by collective rather than by individual effort.

The mainspring of political activity seems to be the quest for the "odoriferous exhalation of the roast joint," *Mirosul Fripturei*, a sentence coined by Prof. Iorga whose integrity has had the effect of a centrifugal force on the main body of politicians. And it could hardly be otherwise since the Government plan of action is strictly adapted to conform to the necessity of satisfying the greed of its adherents before proceeding much farther. This constitutes a dire necessity, for if the appetites of the herd are not appeased the leaders run the risk of being repudiated and left in the lurch, the main body of their followers hastening to take up a more promising trail.

000 The maxim of "*primum vivere, deinde philosophari*" is observed in the letter. The experience of Prof. Iorga, one of the most honourable and respected figures of present day Rumania who had the temerity to invert the order of this popular dictum and exact of his followers a strict application of it in its reversed form, prevented him from ever forming a political following numerous enough to exert an influence on the political life of the country, and this in spite of his high and almost unique personal merits.

The following casual compilation of haphazard events, as reported at random in the Rumanian press, will enable the reader to form a general idea of the particularities of the political life of the country. No pains have been taken to prepare this selection except that of collecting reports of such piquant events whenever the writer had time to indulge in the reading of an odd Rumanian newspaper that might from time to time come into his possession. There is no doubt,

however, that a somewhat prolonged sojourn in Rumania 000 might offer untold opportunities to the inquisitive for compiling volumes of records of intrigue and sharp practice. One indeed cannot but deplore the waste of so much intelligence, overreaching itself, and becoming cleverness, exhausting itself in mutual conflict, exercising itself anarchically without conscience or social motive to achieve in the end nothing but destruction and ruin. For this reason no surprise should be expressed at the repeated failures of all attempts to form a broad Coalition Government which might have extricated Rumania out of the financial quagmire in which she is wallowing. To secure this goal it would have been necessary to supply the unifying purpose of an elevated ideal, but instead of this only sordid and base aims such as provoke lamentable and fatal division have so far been available, and out of such poor material, an imposing edifice of unity and harmony can never be constructed.

The paternal solicitude of the Averescu Government for the endowment of its supporters. 661

According to the "Cuvantul" of June 17th, 1927, Goga, the Minister of the Interior decided to take a census in Transylvania. He entrusted this task to his brother who was also a deputy, assigning to him 28 million lei. As this operation consisted merely of printing forms, public agents being instructed to distribute them, the newspaper finds that M. Goga may well merit inclusion in the list of "honourable" men. We read in the "Cuvantul" of 15th August, 1927:

"Like master, like man."

"The disciplinary commission of the State Railways had ordered at its workshops a sumptuous writing desk. During an inspection, General Jonescu, who then occupied the post of Under-Secretary of State for the Railways, was seen using this desk. To-day this desk is to be found in the General's house, and has been placed in his dining room.

Since General Averescu departed from the Presidency of the Council, taking with him the furniture, why should not General Ionescu follow the example set by his chief ?"

The Bucarest press was rather hard on General Averescu,

661 and failed to discern the true motives behind this somewhat singular act. The General was so attached to his duties that he felt most keenly his dismissal, all the more so since it came so unexpectedly. In order to assuage his feelings he must have thought that it was best to indulge in the illusion that he was still at the head of the Government. To carry out such an idea it was necessary to furnish one of his rooms in the same style as his office at the Ministry. Whence, probably the decision to transfer the furniture from the latter place to his home. The correctness of this interpretation cannot of course be vouched for, but it will be admitted that it is more generous than that offered by the Rumanian press at the time. The latter, too, showed itself particularly unpleasant towards another colleague of the General, dubbing him "Vacuum cleaner" because he managed to dispose, prior to his withdrawal from his ministerial post, of the total annual credits allocated to his department, although several months had still to elapse before the completion of the year. His successor in office, finding that the funds allotted to his department had been completely expended, had to ask for the provision of a supplementary credit of several million lei in order to meet current expenditure which had already been voted and the requisite funds supplied by the Treasury.

"A new scandalous affair at the Ministry of Public Instruction." The wife of General Averescu secures the exclusive right . . . of supplying the workshops of the professional schools with materials.

The "Cuvantul" of Sept. 27th, 1926, published an article with the above title in large type and protested against the manifest favouritism which such decisions entail and the flagrant viol tions of the law which they imply.

"The Pica Affair" and the Ministry of Public Instruction.
"From one affair to another."

The "Cuvantul" of 3rd Oct., 1926, published two articles with the above titles and protested against the decision of the Ministry to compel school children to buy their clothes exclusively at the shop "Pica." It relates that the price

asked for a mantle and a hat is as high as 1,650 and 500 lei 661
respectively, whilst in other shops both these articles may be obtained easily for 1,000 lei. The "Cuvantul" is naturally indignant that the Ministry should permit school children to be so shamefully exploited.

In the second article the paper narrates how pupils have been ordered to obtain their school uniforms at a particular tailor's shop in Bucarest and protests against the creation of such monopolies for the benefit of a few individuals and to the detriment of the public interest.

In its issue of Oct. 8th, 1926, the "Cuvantul" publishes an open letter to the Minister of Public Instruction, ironically greets him on his arrival from Carlsbad, and demands his immediate attention to twelve different "affairs" which it enumerates in turn. The paper concludes in the following style: "Shall we continue farther? it has sufficed for you to absent yourself for a month in order that your ministry should become a daily purveyor to the press of abuses and scandals. You have done well to come at last. We are awaiting you. We wish you to get to work, . . .with the broom and the birch." . . .

In the same issue the "Cuvantul" publishes a lengthy article on another affair characterized as a "Panama of tens of millions of lei." An individual enjoying political protection had secured the right to supply all schools with icons at the modest price of 600 lei each, plus 25 lei for transport charges. Every single schoolroom had to be furnished with one. The paper ends up by declaring ironically "this holy icon intended to maintain the sacred fire of faith and morality should also have been placed in all barracks, hospitals, and tribunals, for people gather together in such buildings, and the moral and religious education of these people might be improved by the sight of this same icon."

The Army Supplies Scandal.

During the Chamber's session on 15th March, 1926, M. Virgil Madgearu attacked the Liberal Government for supplying the army with aeroplanes which were unfit for service, and qualified this act as criminal. He stated that the guilty party sat on the Ministerial bench, that a com-

661 mission of 30 million lei had been pocketed, amounting to 25% of the total amount of the order. This had been confirmed by the Royal Commissary, while General Hentescu had asserted that there were no orders placed without commissions being received. The Minister of War, General Mardarescu, was directly involved in this affair and he should be made to accept full responsibility. The latter's defence was exceedingly lame. The "Cuvantul" of 7th July, 1927, relates how it had been decided to repair the defective motors of the aeroplanes. After remaining for two years at Bucarest they were shipped to France, where on examination they were found to have deteriorated to such an extent that they were useless. They were nevertheless superficially repaired and shipped back, at a total cost to the State of twelve million lei, wasted money as the paper declares. In its issue of 28th Sept., 1927, the same paper, commenting on the mortal accidents which recently befell Rumanian aviators, vehemently condemns the Liberals for supplying the army with such worthless planes, and accuses the ministers of being actuated solely by the desire to pocket commissions and of showing no consideration for the human lives that are imperilled. The order for these aeroplanes had been placed by the Ministry in spite of the advice of the Technical Committee.

During the year 1929, the press enlarged on the contract for the supply of sanitary material, amounting to 400 truck-loads. Many irregularities were pointed out, and the question came to be referred to as the "syringe affair." Such grave derelictions of duty on the part of those in authority have resulted in the army being placed in a state
[701] of utter unpreparedness, as was revealed by a speech of the Minister of War, General Mircescu, delivered in the Chamber on September, 1927, and in the course of which he was reported to have said: "We have no aeroplanes, no rifles, no machine guns; neither poisonous gases, nor gas masks; we have no artillery, we have no tanks; we have no navy, even sufficient for our defence. No seaplanes. We have not enough non-commissioned officers; our reserves are not trained; we have no horses, no equipment, no medicinal supplies. We just have enough troops to marshal at parades

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

when foreigners are received, and to maintain internal order." 661

The Reşiţa Affair.

The Reşiţa is the largest metallurgical establishment of Rumania, and being in close proximity to the iron and coal mines of the Banat, is susceptible of rapid development. Its shares, which fetched 809 lei in 1929, have dropped to 402 in 1930, 205 in June, 1931, and 130 lei in 1932. The "Epoca" of 24th Oct., 1930, reported the following details on the management which may partially explain this depreciation, but at any rate they serve to show on what principles limited companies are generally run in Rumania :- 661 327

"We published during May details as to the amount of directors' remuneration distributed. This amounted to 83 million lei, while 86 millions were distributed among the shareholders. The director, Prince Barbu Stirbey, received over 10 millions annually. In other countries such particulars would have created consternation. With us nothing happened, because Stirbey's dictature is all-powerful. To-day the Reşiţa is at the mercy of the Credit Anstallt, of Vienna, owing to the manner the Company was administered, the interest of the shareholders being always the last consideration. Secret conventions were signed by Prince Stirbey who drew tens of millions of lei annually for travelling expenses. The ordinary revenue was insufficient to face such wastefulness, even with the 200% subsidy furnished by the State, and therefore recourse to loans from the Credit Anstallt was necessary, the Reşiţa being on the threshold of bankruptcy. The great Viennese bank has put a stop to the scandalous remuneration received by Stirbey and has increasingly taken control of the Company."

Prince Stirbey was one of the leading pillars of the Liberal party and took a prominent part in exiling the (then) Crown Prince Carol from the country. The Reşiţa seems to be associated with scandal. In 1921 it was disclosed that some eighty deputies and senators had received shares in the concern in order to support interests inimical to the Rumanian State, and these disclosures provoked at the time tumultuous debates in the Chamber. 661

RUMANIA

661 *The Exploitation of the Forest of Bucovina.*

The "Cuvantul" of the 3rd–8th Oct., 1926, in a series of articles, enlarges on a contract passed for the exploitation of the forests of Bucovina on the basis of a fictitious price which would cause an approximate loss of 120 million lei to the State domains. After exposing in detail this shady affair, the author, a deputy named Florescu, asks whether in view of the enormous prejudice caused to the State such a contract should be upheld, as it was concluded in violation of the law and of all principles of honour.

Frauds in the Banat and the Maramureş.

In the above-mentioned numbers of the "Cuvantul" one meets the story of how 280 truckloads of maize, destined for the relief of the famine-stricken population of the Maramureş Province, were disposed of for the benefit of some big party bosses. . . "Of the 280 trucks, 120 were distributed, but only after the maize had become unfit for use; as for the remaining 160 trucks, no one knows where they have gone. But people whisper that three big rats have eaten them up and their names are well known." Another article is devoted to the fraudulent activities of a personage who, after embezzling moneys and engaging in contraband, was, instead of being thrown into prison, nominated by politicians to the post of Prefect of Temişoara. Yet another case of a corrupt and inefficient, but officially shielded functionary !

Irregularities in the Bucarest Municipality.

The "Cuvantul" in December, 1926, published a series of articles giving full details of a mass of important frauds committed to the detriment of the public, and it appealed to the Minister of the Interior to put a stop to the scandals.

The Activities of certain Directors of the National Bank of Rumania.

The "Cuvantul" of 8th Dec., 1926, published a leader on M. Oromolu, appointed to the post of Director of the National Bank through political intervention, and who by extending his protection to a dishonest individual permitted the latter to commit numerous frauds. The National Bank

was finally involved to the tune of 40 million lei, and the "Cuvantul" vents its wrath on M. Oromolu. In its issue of 10th November, 1926, the same paper relates how another director, Ghiorghiu, took under his protection the brothers Berkovitz, who had a bank at Bucarest and who committed various frauds and engaged in contraband. Whenever they were found out, politicians intervened to hush up the matter, but finally, owing to the "Cuvantul's" campaign, the financial inspectors succeeded in proving that these sharpers kept two sets of books, one for themselves and one intended for the inspection of the financial authorities, in order to avoid paying too much in taxation.

The Failure of the Bank Cetatea of Braşov.

The "Cuvantul" of 17 June, 1931, expatiates upon the activities of this bank and its association with prominent members of the National Peasant Party, who however are in no way implicated in the disaster. The bank, in order to extricate itself from its difficult position, spent more than 13 million lei in developing a stone quarry for the purpose of providing the material for the refection of the whole system of roads of the State. Political influences were brought to bear, but the onerous contract for the construction of these State roads was rejected by the Chamber, in spite of the fact that the National Peasant Party had a large majority in it. Thus one may come now to understand why the much-talked of Stewart contract concerning the roads was concluded; the tension that existed between the National Peasant Party and the Director of the National Bank, M. D. Burillianu, is likewise explained. The latter refused to come to the aid of the Cetatea bank as the institution was too deeply involved and could not be saved. This is yet another example of the nefarious results arising from alliances between business and politics.

The Complaints of State Pensioners.

The "Adeverul" of 28th Jan., 1932, reports the proceedings of the congress of pensioners. The budget provided for a reduction of 390 million lei on the total amount of pensions

661 to be paid during the year. Nevertheless the Ministerial Council had decreed that the amount payable should be reduced by yet another 110 millions. This was considered unfair, all the more so since the critical condition of the pension fund is due to the fact that a mass of politicians having no right whatever to pensions have been awarded very generous ones, while men who had devoted their whole life to the service of the State ran the risk of dying of hunger.

The Bank of Industrial Credit.

652 The "Cuvantul" of 11th March, 1929, published an article revealing the unsound character of the expedients which are occasionally resorted to in order to secure temporary alleviation for the Treasury, and some of the results of this policy.

"The management of the public finances was so irregular during these three last years that the State was obliged to conclude a foreign loan in order to pay its debts to local contractors. This was not only a period of financial insincerity, but also one in which the conception of honestly meeting one's pecuniary obligations was undermined. The bad example of the State proved contagious to commerce in general. The "Industrial Credit" was created to enable the National Bank to obtain relief from a mass of bills that found their way to it to be rediscounted at a time when the State had obtained the maximum amount of credit from local industry, and when the latter was no longer in a position to pay the excessive interest on State debts which the banks insisted on charging when discounting the said debts. The irregular payment of State debts created other inconveniences. Local industries, to protect themselves from being ruined, were obliged to increase the price of the articles supplied. The cost of materials furnished to the State was thereby very sensibly increased. To prevent foreign industrialists from under-selling local producers, who were thus forced to sell their products at inflated prices, it became necessary to impose excessive protective duties, the burden of which fell ultimately on the inarticulate masses."

MISTAKES AND MUDDLES

The Congress of Egg Exporting Firms.

Astounding details of the corruption prevalent in Rumania were disclosed at this congress held at Bucarest in 1931, to discuss the standardization of eggs, a measure imposed by the Government. No export permits were obtainable without the payment of bribes. The names of several officials who extorted sums from the egg exporting firms were mentioned, and the delegates of the latter did nothing but criticize this Government measure which resulted in a falling off in egg exports by 50 %. One of the delegates ironically declared that the only advantage secured was the standardization of bribes !

Frauds Committed by Oil Firms.

The "Cuvantul" of 14th May, 1932, relates how the State had been defrauded of several milliard lei during the last few years. Invoices of all oil exported had to be stamped with revenue stamps amounting to 1.32% of the value declared on the invoices. In 1922 it was decreed that the sums represented by these stamps should be paid direct to the State. Recent investigations showed that there had been a systematic evasion of this impost by almost all oil exporting companies since 1922, and that they would now be fined. Though the State could not recover the sums of which it had been defrauded during the years 1922–1927 (owing to the time limit for claims having elapsed) yet after 1927 the sums involved could be recovered, and these would certainly amount to several milliards of lei.

Other Frauds and Scandals.

The "Cuvantul" of May 16th, 1932, gives sensational details concerning the arrest of a Chief Constable who carried on simultaneously with his official profession the more lucrative one of a ringleader of a band of housebreakers and pickpockets.

In another article it reveals extensive frauds which are taking place at the Bucarest Municipality in the town-planning department, etc. While yet in another column it enlarges on the discovery of a fraud of 12 million lei perpetrated by certain functionaries in the tax-collecting department of Constantsa.

655 maritime and fluvial shipping companies, the docks, ports, warehouses, and grain elevators of Braila, Galatz, and Constantsa.

661 Laws were drafted aiming at the commercialization and exploitation, either independently or in co-operation with 471 the State, of these State-owned properties, as well as of other 186 national resources. But the purpose which actuated the entire economic legislation enacted by the Bratianu Governments was that of preventing foreign capital from acquiring a dominant position in the country. This policy of restraining the activities of foreign capital by legal restrictions was not due to the fact that Rumania might be imperilled by foreign capital securing a preponderating influence, but mainly because the Bratianu party aimed at reserving for themselves the monopoly of such profits as could be made through the exploitation of the national resources. The direct result of this policy was to sink whatever Rumanian capital existed in big enterprises, while agriculture was entirely neglected, and to deplete completely the liquid assets of the country to such an extent that its credit organization was dislocated.

433 It is sad to record that during the years when there was a 457 plethora of capital seeking investment which could have been easily attracted to Rumania with the object of endowing her with an adequate equipment for the development of her immense resources, such narrow and selfish views should have prevailed among her rulers. Indeed, had the opposite policy been adopted it would have secured prosperity to her even during the lean years which are now upon us. Foreign capital naturally fought shy, and refused to be enticed into enterprises in which it was not allowed to exercise legitimate control, which in many instances would have proved both salutary and indispensable. Rumania's natural wealth certainly provides a basis for industrial activity, there is an abundance of raw material, fuel, as well as a supply of cheap labour, but there is a serious deficiency of capital, which is reflected by the high rates of interest 426 prevalent. Commercial bills were discounted at rates vary- 433 ing between 18 per cent and 30 per cent, and first mortgages 454 were concluded on the basis of an average interest of 20 per

65 As a result the revenue from Customs, which formed one of the basic sources of revenue for the State, has gradually ceased to function as such. Revenue from this head gradually declined from 9,243 million lei in 1927 to 2,516 million lei in 1931, though this decrease is also attributable to other causes, such as the lowering or elimination of export taxes.

65 66 Probably one of the most acrimonious criticisms that ever appeared in the Press concerning the excessive Protectionism obtaining in Rumania was published in the *Cuvantul* for March 3rd, 1931, and the following quotation from it is worth retaining as it casts a lurid light on the inner machinery of government:

"A Rumanian State, in the true and proper meaning of the word, is non-existent. For the essential functions of this State have been usurped by certain gangs whose main preoccupation is to furnish their members with money wrested from the taxpayer. The national revenue is annually amputated of an exorbitant portion in the form of taxes, with which the State does no good. The State administration functions from bad to worse while hordes of politicians wax fat on the public treasury. The State administration has been annexed by the party bosses and the public budget has been confiscated for the benefit of the clients of these parties. And when the resources of the State revenues have no longer sufficed for these highwaymen, other means have been devised in order to rob the citizens and provide for the upkeep of these harpies. A scandalous legislation, characterized by a Protectionism without parallel in Europe, and aiming at the protection of a parasitic industry, was voted for the benefit of profiteers, who are intimately interested in all the pecuniary calculations of the politicians. Under the aegis of this Protectionism the most rapacious trusts flourish to-day in Rumania and exploit the consumer. Instead of aiding agriculture, the latter has been dislocated and ruined by the extreme favours lavished on this artificial industry, and all this for the sole purpose of satisfying the exorbitant pretensions of the industrial bandits, who have known how to turn governments and parliaments into docile instruments for fleecing the consumer. . . ."

That the extreme Protectionism adopted by Rumania is

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

+ That the extreme Protectionism adopted, Rumania is

not approved by the public may also be seen from the following excerpts culled from an article published by the same paper on May 15th, 1932: "There is a profound difference between industries which utilize local raw materials and such pseudo-industries which import from abroad semi-manufactured materials and finish them off in this country. . . . The importation of semi-manufactured goods is in the great majority of cases carried on solely to evade the Customs tariffs, and if we do not see things as they are, this is on account of private interests, for the sake of which we allow a prejudicial system to continue to function. . . ." 651 661 431

The *Argus*, too, several times attempted to call public attention to the nefarious results of the policy of bolstering up artificial industries, and especially in the case of the textile industry, on which it wrote as follows: "Why are clothing materials so costly? Because our protected textile industry sells its products at the same price as the goods imported from abroad. The encouragement given to the textile industry has resulted in increasing the cost of wearing apparel because industrialists are not content with a reasonable profit, and as a result a woollen suit to-day is a luxury. When our Custom tariff is to be revised the interests of industrialists alone should not be considered, but also those of the consumers."

As one may infer from the above, this policy of industrialization was a wild scheme which materialized on a large scale, chiefly because various politicians had been directly interested in the manufacturing concerns which had been started. 661 [651] 289 477

The case of the paper industry may be cited as an example. All the paper mills belonged to or were controlled by friends or relatives of the Bratianus. In order to secure big profits an import duty of 50 per cent was placed on paper, creating thereby a virtual monopoly of the paper trade on behalf of the owners of the mills. As they could dictate their will to the Chamber, the high duty was maintained in spite of the protest of the Opposition. For not only the public at large suffered by the high price of such an essential commodity as paper, but political interests were equally affected. Opposition parties had to pay high prices

for the paper necessary for their pamphlets and newspapers, while the Bratianus' Press organs naturally enjoyed preferential rates. Another deplorable result of this monopoly was the high cost of books. The same book published in Bulgaria cost about half as much as in Rumania, and this explains to some extent the high percentage of illiterates in the latter country, which according to the *Lupta* of May 18th, 1932 reached as high a percentage as 70 per cent of the total population. The creation of industries, the raw material of which is not indigenous, is likely in the long run to prove extremely wasteful. They are clearly of a parasitic nature, and their maintenance will not only continue to be a charge on the Revenue but is likely to continue to handicap very seriously Rumania's staple industry, agriculture. The initial costs of installation are necessarily high, for foreign experts have to be called in to set up the machinery, supervise, and train the native workpeople, since there is a lack of experienced workmen. Moreover the stringency of monetary resources and the high rates of interest ruling necessitate a high return on capital that can be secured only by selling the manufactured article at the highest possible price, a level which is usually fixed by the cost of the corresponding foreign article, on which a heavy duty has been imposed. The high prices will forcibly curtail output since the latter is adjusted to the capacity of the local market, the possibilities of which are restrained owing to the low buying power of the peasantry. The more consumption is reduced the more manufacturers will endeavour to recoup themselves by further raising their prices, which can be attained only by increasing the protective duty. Thus a vicious circle is created, to the great disadvantage of the peasantry, who constitute 80 per cent of the population and who have to defray in the same proportion the expenses of these experimental attempts to industrialize Rumania. It is obvious that the high prices paid by the peasantry for manufactured articles affect adversely the cost of agricultural produce; even the transport rates of the latter stand high in order to compensate for the low preferential rates granted to local manufactures. One need not, therefore, be surprised if Rumanian agriculturalists can no longer market their pro-

AGRICULTURE

As a result of the legislative measures enacted in 1917 and 1921 Rumania, which was a country of vast latifundia, was transformed into one of smallholdings. Fear, rather than generosity or a desire to promote the country's welfare, prompted the initiation of these enactments. The Russian example which was nigh would have proved contagious had a policy of repression been adopted similar to that of 1907, when over 11,000 Rumanian peasants were ruthlessly massacred in their vain attempt to secure more humane treatment at the hands of their landlords. The landed classes had therefore to yield much in order to retain at least a little. Besides, the initiative had already been taken by Bessarabia, prior to her final declaration of union with Rumania in 1918, of enacting the expropriation of the large estates, and Rumania was confronted with the dilemma of following suit or of seeing Bessarabia demand the annulment of the act of union just passed, for it was impossible for the latter to rescind this measure. 423

That no high motives were behind this policy of expropriation may be inferred from the perfunctory manner in which it was applied, and the absence of a rational plan for putting it into operation. In fact, one of the reasons for the sudden dismissal of the first Vaida-Voevod administration in 1920 was apprehension lest Mihalache, the then Minister of Agriculture, would have seen to the thorough and rational execution of the expropriation decrees. It could have been easily foreseen that the peasantry, who until then had been in a state akin to serfdom, were destitute and had not the capital wherewith to exploit the lands that were being allotted them. It was the imperative duty of the State to find the means necessary to endow the peasantry with the indispensable agricultural equipment for the cultivation of their lands. The Governments presided over by the Bratianus, however, were busy reserving the exploitation of the natural resources of the country for their partisans, and the peasants were left to fend for themselves as best they could. The Bratianus would suffer no harm from the fact that the State was 661 423

neglecting the peasants; on the contrary, they saw in them a numerous and profitable crowd of clients for the banks, the majority of which were under their control. The less pecuniary aid the peasant obtained from the State, the greater would be his need of the private bank or usurer. And so well did the latter entangle the peasants in their tentacles that within ten years of the enactment of the Land Distribution Act the debts contracted by the peasants had surpassed the value of their lands. Thus the much-belauded agrarian revolution in Rumania was threatened with complete failure, and so another revolutionary measure had to be passed, the strangely-termed "law for the sanitation of agrarian debts," in order to save the peasantry from being dispossessed of their land.

The *Argus* of 13th February, 1932, published the following table which shows how the land was actually distributed:

Area of properties.	Total hectares.	Percentage of area.	Number of proprietors.	Percentage of total. Owners.	Average area of farm for each category.
Up to 5 hectares ...	6,280,993	43.60	3,731,403	84.20	1.94
5 to 10 hectares ...	2,919,863	20.20	435,715	11,30	6.70
10 to 50 hectares ...	2,392,689	16.60	148,860	3.90	16.07
50 to 250 hectares ...	1,505,257	10.40	18,122	0.50	83.06
Over 250 hectares ...	1,305,670	9.10	2,597	0.10	502.00
Total ...	14,404,462,	100.00	3,836,757	100.00	3.75

As one hectare sown to wheat yields approximately 1,200 kg. of wheat, and the average price of wheat during 1931 was about 2.25 lei, the revenue per hectare may be reckoned at about 2,700 lei. As the average holding of 84 per cent of the peasantry is about 2 hectares, the paper assumed that the revenue of each peasant household amounted approximately to some 5,400 lei, or about 160 gold francs. For the year 1931 the total revenue from agriculture was computed at 46,500 million lei, of which 21 milliards were derived from the cattle-rearing industry, 21 milliards from cereals, and 4½ milliards from other plants. Other crops were even less profitable; thus the average price of maize was 1.50 lei per kg. and the yield 1,500 kg. per hectare, so that the revenue per hectare amounted to 2,250 lei, and the figures for barley were respectively 2 lei, 1,400 kg., and 2,800 lei.

496 and the unification of the whole system can only be realized by the construction of connecting lines between what so far has been three distinct systems. The laying of double tracks on trunk lines is also imperatively needed in certain sections, such as that of Constantsa-Feteşti. Several offers by foreign groups were made for the reorganization of the railways, but the Rumanian Government would not agree to the stipulations set forth by foreign capitalists, namely, that they should exercise control over the expenditure and that they should be guaranteed repayment. It is indeed strange that financiers should be expected to advance funds without adequate security, especially to an administration which has been characterized by disorder and waste, and that to an extent surpassing what is customary even in Rumania. The methods employed in running the railway system are generally indicative of the chaotic manner in which the whole machinery of government is being run, and will serve to show that there is little hope for real improvement so long as there is no outside control.

496 (61) The whole railway system had been endowed with an autonomous administration in 1925 by the Bratianu Government, but, as was to be expected, the chief purpose of the initiators of this measure was to create as many "cushy jobs" for the veterans of the party as possible, so that instead of a simplification and co-ordination there ensued a complication bordering on chaos. The disorder rendered control difficult, or well nigh impossible, and has facilitated fraud to an unprecedented extent. No year has passed without discoveries being made of sensational embezzlements perpetrated to the detriment of the railway administration, through which the latter was despoiled of important sums. Even as late as March, 1932, the Press was publishing details of a fresh scandal through which the State railways had been defrauded of several millions. The *Cuvantul* of May 15th, 1932, related that the chief cashier of the railways at Brasov had embezzled over a million lei. On September 7th, 1927, the *Argus* published an article by a former Minister of Communications in which the latter stated that "he estimated the loss suffered by the railways through lack of control to be about 25 per cent of their gross revenue," and he referred

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

to methods of fraud applied on a wholesale scale at Galatz 496 by which the railways had been systematically defrauded. 661 For instance, whole truckloads of timber forwarded from Bucovina and destined for Giurgiu, on their arrival at Galatz were fraudulently diverted to another destination, so that the consignee at Giurgiu had to be indemnified by the railway administration for the loss of his goods. In another article, published two days later, the writer enlarged on the lack of co-ordination among the different departments of this administration and the total absence of reliable data on which to form an estimate of the situation, a state of affairs that was positively chaotic. As an illustration of this he cited the fact "that while the Under-Secretary of State affirmed that the year 1926 showed a deficit of one milliard and a half lei, the General Manager of the Railways averred on the contrary that there was a surplus of 200 millions"!

Another paper, the *Cuvantul*, which had undertaken a vigorous campaign against the disgraceful disorder prevailing on the railways, referred in its issue of July 24th, 1927, to the following statement of the Under-Secretary of State for Communications: "It is enough to say that according to the accounts there ought to be one milliard and a half of cash, but instead I am 500 millions in debt. This situation is due to the fact that the profit and loss accounts of preceding years have not yet been closed." The *Cuvantul* proceeded to compliment the Under-Secretary for his outspokenness and to condemn M. V. Bratianu for having deliberately misled the public by affirming that the working of the railways was quite normal and that it had been carried on at a profit for the State. Both the *Argus* and the *Cuvantul* continued to publish articles emphasizing the necessity of foreign loans being obtained so that the railway system might be properly reorganized, and laying stress on the disastrous consequences for the country arising from the actual disorganization. According to these articles, the lines were in complete decay and were almost useless. "The rails of one-fourth of the track were so worn out that it was a miracle that trains could run on them. The number of rotten sleepers exceeded imagination. There were three times less locomotives than the normal average, and the railway junctions were

continually blocked up. . . ." On October 27th, 1927, the *Cuvantul* related how extensive frauds were found to have been committed by higher railway officials in Transylvania, and that the affair was being hushed up so that these persons might not be incriminated.

On March 3rd, 1928, the same paper enlarged on the collapse of the railway bridge over the Milcov, near Focşani, the construction of which had been entrusted to a favourite of M. V. Bratianu who, so far, instead of being punished, had been appointed to another post. The *Argus* of February 20th, 1929, in an article entitled "What has been done with the Railways?" cites the following facts: "It was decided to illuminate the railway cars with methane gas, and lamps and instruments were bought for this purpose. All these remain unused in the warehouses because it has since been found out that methane gas could not be used for such a purpose. . . . Lathes of a value of 40 millions were ordered; this is a quantity likely to suffice for a period of ten to fifteen years. . . . There are some 280 trucks loaded with corrugated iron. As the annual requirements of the railway administration are about two to three truckloads, this stock is likely to last a century. . . ."

With the advent of the National Peasant Party to power a slight improvement set in, but it was too much to expect that a system which had become traditional could be altered in the course of a few years. The *Cuvantul* of March 31st, 1929, commenting on the resignation of the general manager of the railways, declared that this was a good beginning. "So far our railways were not an institution for furthering travel and facilitating transport, but a counting-house for the sale, at exorbitant prices, of all kinds of manufactures of the various industrial firms associated with the Liberal Party. . . ." In previous articles the *Cuvantul* had described how the railway administration, being under the control of partisans of the Liberal Party, the latter had done everything in its power to promote the interests of members of that party to the detriment of those of the State. The carelessness and remissness of the railway administration may be gauged by the fact that it positively discouraged traffic on its own lines, and diverted it to foreign countries

by a policy of high rates. Thus in January, 1927, the *Argus* complained that timber exports from Bucovina, instead of being forwarded for shipment via Galatz, were being diverted to Dantzig because (owing to the new rates) the cost of transport for one truckload of timber to the first port amounted to 9,500 lei, while the freightage to the second port cost only 4,400 lei. In another article the complaints of the Transylvanian industrialists were aired, and these likewise complained that owing to high rates and lack of trucks they were losing their foreign trade. It was affirmed that only one-fifth of the number of trucks necessary for Transylvania had been allotted to that region, and that the shortage was made more acutely felt owing to the manifest favouritism attending the allocation of trucks. Moreover, trucks which had been slightly injured were not repaired promptly but shunted on to sidings, where they were left to rot and fall to pieces.

The neglect with which the traffic requirements of Transylvania were treated led industrialists of that region to the conclusion that this was a deliberate policy so that their rivals in the old kingdom might be protected from the influx of goods from Transylvania. (*Argus*, November 27th, 1926.)

A policy of excessive transport rates has been applied, which has wrought incredible harm to the railways by reducing traffic and fostering the development of motor road transport, which is rapidly increasing. The latter is proving a formidable rival to the railways, and competition has become so keen that the railway administration has thought of making use of motor railcars on some lines in order to provide increased services and attract some of the traffic it has lost back again, but though this scheme was mooted several years ago it was only recently that an order for a few steam railcars was given to a Birmingham firm.

In fact the railway administration has since 1927 shown a loss every year. Thus 1927 showed a deficit of 1,278,395,915 lei, 1928 of 1,625,634,902, 1929 of 981,635,257, 1930 of 1,286,001,744, while for 1931, according to the *Adeverul* of January 28th, 1932, it was reported that the deficit would be the largest so far recorded, for while expenditure had re-

in the *Argus* of 14th May, 1932, and statistics were quoted 497
to show that since 1927 freight rates had increased by 112.5 per cent, and these charges, which were estimated in 1929 to represent 5.2 per cent of the value of the goods handled, represented in 1931 as high a percentage as 10.2. Owing to the high transport charges there was a serious falling off in traffic; thus while 18,191,860 tons had been carried in 1930, there were only 16,403,536 tons handled in 1931. The *Argus* of 24th and 25th January, 1932 affirmed that railway charges on grain exported averaged 20 per cent of its value, while the cost of carrying timber often reached 40 per cent of its value.

A further reason why the railway administration cannot 497
even cover its expenses is the high price which it has had to 661
pay for its coal. So far it seems to have been under the tutelage and grip of the "Liberal" Party, the partisans of which forced it to buy the bulk of its coal at exorbitant prices from mines which belonged to them. Thus the *Cuvantul* of December 29th, 1928, affirmed that these "Liberal" companies received annually some two milliard lei for supplying coals at the extravagant price of 1,643 lei per ton. The *Lupta*, in an article published on May 14th or 15th, 1932, asserted that while in Rumania expenditure on fuel amounts to 14½ per cent of the total expenses of the railways, Germany expended only 6 per cent on this head, Poland 8 per cent, and Italy, a country totally deprived of coal, spends only 9½ per cent. The paper also complained that expenditure for the upkeep of rolling stock was inordinately high, amounting to 30.6 per cent. in Rumania, as against 12.7 per cent in Germany, 14.7 per cent in Austria, and 17.7 per cent in Poland.

The *Argus* of 24th April, 1932, relates how political influences are being exerted to bring pressure to bear on the railway administration so that it should place orders for a supply of lignite from mines in the valley of the Jiu, at a cost of some 100 millions per annum. This fuel was shown to be useless, and had to be burned mixed up with crude oil in the locomotives. Its purchase constitutes a downright waste, "but when repeated and weighty interventions are resorted

497 661 to we understand why the railway administration has not yet excluded lignite from among the fuels of which it makes use. . . ." A close examination of the items of the expenditure would probably reveal undue liberality under certain heads. Thus the total expenditure for 1930 amounted to 12,577,602,209 lei, of which 2,700 millions were devoted to the upkeep and repair of rolling stock, 746 millions to the upkeep of the lines, 1,830 millions to fuel, 6,743 millions to salaries, wages, etc.

496 Out of the proceeds of the 1929 loan, some 4,751 million lei were earmarked for the reconditioning of the railways. The sum was to be employed for the renewal of the tracks, the purchase of rolling stock, the construction of new lines, and for the improvement and enlargement of workshops. Expenditure on this last item was exceedingly ill-advised, for the railway administration had entered into engagements with certain foreign firms, on the strength of which the latter had built repair-shops, such as the "Astra" Company at Arad, the "Lemaître" workshops at Reşiţa, and the Franco-Romana Co. at Braila. In 1929 there still remained four outstanding contracts expiring in 1935, and guaranteeing a yearly expenditure of 640 millions for constructing locomotives, and two other contracts expiring in 1939 which provided for the repairing of locomotives, of a value of 335 millions. As soon as the railway administration was able to use its new workshops it proceeded to disregard these contracts, and as a result these private firms had to close down and dismiss their workmen. The *Argus* of 11th May, 1932 denounces the railway administration for its indefensible attitude in the following terms:

"These industries have suffered immense losses. Their staff had to be dismissed, and they have been rendered incapable of meeting their engagements. All of them will put in claims for damages, and we can hardly doubt that Justice, taking into consideration the contracts made with the railways, will be found to pronounce in their favour. Who is to pay the damages? Naturally the State, which is also going to lose the taxes which it would have raised on the contracts had they been carried out. But the greatest loss consists in

the loss of confidence which this stupid policy of disregarding legal engagements entails for the State and its administrations." 496

The *Dreptatea* of May 19th, 1932, gives an example of the prevailing favouritism in the granting of contracts by the railway administration. Thus tenders were invited for the renovation of the signalling apparatus on the line Feteşti–Cernavoda in August, 1931, but as the administration desired to favour a certain firm no contract was passed, but finally the order was placed with this particular firm at a price of eleven million lei when other firms had undertaken to do the work for only six and a half millions. Naturally the *Dreptatea* takes the Director-General, M. Ionescu, to task for his attitude, and declares that no one should wonder if the railway administration runs into deficits every year. An additional cause for the losses incurred is the overstaffing of the administration, and especially the numerous sinecures that have been created for the benefit of persons enjoying official protection. A few years ago it was impossible to find out how the administration was being run, for no proper balance sheets had been drawn up for years. Fortunately, a British expert has been invited to supervise the accounts, so that data are now available up to date. But this is obviously an inadequate measure, and the railways will become a paying concern capable of responding to the necessities of the country only when and if they are placed under foreign control, or under the management of some capable and honest Rumanian effectively shielded by foreign influence from all interference by political circles. . . . The slovenly methods so far employed in the railway administration have hampered not only the internal development of the country but have also prevented it from increasing its revenues from traffic transit across Rumania; for the country controls two big trade routes, namely that from Poland and the Baltic States towards the Black Sea and the Near East, which used to be one of the great trade routes of old, and that from Central Europe through Transylvania to Constantsa. 496 661

There are two alternatives to the latter, namely the Danube and that through Yugoslavia, so that if the Rumanian railways were properly managed they could easily 496 505

RUMANIA

491 A contract was recently signed with a Swedish firm for the laying of 570 kms. of permanent and 180 kms. of semi-permanent roads by the end of 1936, but this is far from satisfying even the most urgent requirements of the country. As matters stand now there is some probability that the contract will be cancelled, for it was found out that during the winter of 1931 the roads which so far had been constructed had undergone serious deterioration through the frost. In the discussion which ensued in the Chamber the Minister of Communications accused his predecessor in office of having been bribed, and in support of this charge he adduced the fact that, while the Government delegate who was despatched to Paris to sign the contract with the company had been instructed to accept as maximum prices 618 lei per square metre for the permanent roads, and 330 lei per square metre for the semi-permanent, he exceeded his instructions and signed the contract on the basis of 740 and 426 lei respectively, thereby causing the State to lose a sum of five hundred million lei.

The accusation of bribery was denied by those involved, but it was decided that the contract would have to be revised and the matter submitted to the Law-Courts. This Swedish company is related to the Kreuger & Toll groups, and it is more than likely that the contract will now lapse.

491 The following data concerning the highways and their distribution among the different provinces, also of their condition at the beginning of 1930, is found in the statistical bulletin for that year:

Province.	Roads laid in stone. Good.	Medium.	Bad.	Roads in gravel.	Natural unlaid roads.
Old Kingdom	13,042.722	13,607.486	5,897.907	5,042.919	12,848.258
Transylvania	4,511.625	10,558.301	6,189.164	3,564.744	19,565.426
Bucovina	444.095	923.923	899.304	444.373	665.603
Bessarabia	165.851	384.281	166.640	370.378	7,069.472
Total for all Rumania in kilometres	18,165.293	25,472.991	12,054.015	9,363.414	40,188.756

6

12: Korinos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

793 The poor clergy are very active in politics and
661 public affairs generally. Their influence, and even more that of the bishops, has not infrequently been
[212] abused to further private interests.[1] The majority of the Rumanians are only semi-literate and depend for their information and guidance on the priests.
871 Education has been the weak point of almost all the Rumanian governments. But those Rumanians whose parents have been able to give them a good education have proved that this highly intelligent and gifted people can achieve success in all fields of science and the arts.

563 THE HUNGARIANS AND THE SZEKELYS. The Hungarians and Szekelys, most of whom came under Rumanian rule after the Great War, live chiefly in Transylvania and the western provinces of Greater Rumania. The forefathers of the Szekelys were brought to these territories by the Hungarian kings and charged with the task of defending and securing the Kingdom's frontiers. The Hungarian nobles and Szekelys were two of the 'Three Ruling Nations' of Transylvania.[2] They were supported and encouraged by their kin in Hungary proper, given many privileges in the economic, political and cultural spheres. Thanks to all this they were able

[1] One blatant example of this occurred about ten years ago when a shepherd, who claimed to have 'visions' and prophetic power was built up into a holy figure. The simple peasants flocked to see and hear him, bringing many gifts. The State railways organised special travel facilities and this enriched many officials and members of the clergy.

[2] The three 'united' or 'recognised nations' of Transylvania were the Hungarian nobility, the Szekelys and the Saxons.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1914
ED¹ Rumania ED1

563 similar position. Only a small number of Bulgarians in the Banat, famous as first-class market-gardeners and fruit-growers, were comparatively well off. There live in Wallachia and in the Banat a number of Serbs, settled there as frontier guards by the Austrian emperors. Some live in villages of their own, some together with German, Rumanian or Hungarian communities. They have strong ties with Yugoslavia, and have achieved comparative prosperity.

THE JEWS. The Jews, who are to be found in all Rumanian provinces and have big communities in Bessarabia and in the Bukovina, have always been a persecuted and oppressed minority. The brand of anti-Semitism encouraged by almost all Rumanian governments resembles that of Tsarist Russia. [661] Whenever something went wrong in politics or economics the Jews were blamed for it and pogroms were organized, sometimes surpassing in violence those of the Tsarist regime. This traditional anti-Semitism has its roots in the period when wealthy Rumanian absentee landlords let their estates to Jewish agents for management and tax-collection. This was a convenient means of laying the blame for exploitation at the door of the Jews, whilst the *boiars* pocketed the taxes and rents.[1] Jewish influence in Rumanian finance and trade has been very great, as was their share in introducing modern industries into the country. Many Jewish families, especially in Moldavia and Wallachia, can trace their association with Rumania back to the early Phanariots. Others have lived for many years in the

[1] Some of the Jewish managers of estates deserved all that came to them; but the resentment which they caused was frequently visited quite unjustly upon obscure Jews who did no kind of harm to their Gentile neighbours.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

On 8 April 1918 the Representative Council of Bessarabia,[1] *Sfatul Tari*, by 86 votes to 3, 36 delegates abstaining, decided to become an autonomous part of Rumania. This step was sanctioned by Germany when the Treaty of Bucarest was signed one month later. In November of the same year, 1918, after the Armistice, it was decided at a session of the Representative Council, attended by only 46 delegates, to declare for the unconditional union of Bessarabia with Rumania. The annexation of Bessarabia was not recognized by the Peace Conference at Paris; and although recognition was promised by the Conference of Ambassadors in 1920, this undertaking was never ratified by all the Powers. 635 175

During the following years Bessarabia was treated as a conquered province. All district councils and other organs of local government were abolished. The country was ruled by prefects appointed by and responsible to the central government in Bucarest. The province was strongly garrisoned and lived in a continuous state of siege. All communications over the Dniester were destroyed and anybody caught attempting to cross the frontier was either imprisoned or shot. Between 1918 and 1924 there were a hundred and thirty-five uprisings in Bessarabia, which were suppressed by the military with the utmost violence. In the course of these revolts it is estimated that over thirty thousand Bessarabians were killed, many more executed or sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. The peasant revolt of 1924 in the region around the town of Tatar-Bunar was put down after heavy fighting and the burning of many villages. 635 661 669

[1] The Council was composed of 138 deputies of whom 103 were Rumanian, 13 Ukrainian, 7 Russian, 6 Jewish, 2 Bulgarian, 1 Pole and 1 Armenian.

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

511 capital had been imported, had come to an abrupt end only a few years later. The prices of agricultural produce continued to fall and manufactured goods became comparatively more expensive. While the value of money decreased[1] and the general level of the standard of living deteriorated up to about 1930, there was a slight improvement in the period following the recovery from the general crisis.

• 661 CORRUPTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION. The lot of the people, however, did not improve. The Rumanians, to whom their government had promised an era of prosperity and national splendour, soon found that the promise held good only for some privileged classes who had not been badly off before. The whole country was ruled by a small clique which had secured the allegiance of a host of civil servants. These officials were badly paid and relied on bribes to swell their income. Before elections the voters were promised reductions of taxation and official positions. But taxes became heavier each year and the new officials' greed had to be satisfied whenever one came in touch with the State apparatus. Identification papers of every description had to be secured before a citizen could go about his business. And in order to obtain these documents one had to visit innumerable offices, fill up innumerable forms and bribe a dozen officials. Arrests were made by the underpaid police for the sole purpose of obtaining money. Officials in all positions looked upon bribes as a legitimate source of income.

The poor peasantry and the minorities were

465 [1] Level wages in 1930 were: in Rumania 39; in Britain 100.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

especially hard hit by this rampant corruption. The 661
moneyed classes, on the other hand, were well satisfied with this state of affairs which guaranteed the continuance of their rule.

The position of the minorities was unenviable. 563
In theory all non-Rumanians had the same rights 641
and duties as the Rumanians. In practice, however, things were very different. The official language was Rumanian and anybody not able to speak Rumanian was handicapped from the beginning when dealing with the authorities. It was very difficult for members of a minority to obtain schooling in their native language, for although there were some Hungarian and German schools they had to be financed by the respective communities and the fees to be paid were high. A public career for a member of a minority was very rare indeed and non-Rumanians had always to expect unfavourable treatment at the hands of the authorities. The Jews, many of whom were denied Rumanian citizenship and had to pay from time to time for the right to live in the country, were worse off than the rest. Often in addition to being persecuted for their origin they could be victimized for having a Hungarian name and speaking German as their native language.

The mass of the Rumanians did not gain by this 661
discrimination ostensibly made in their favour. At 565
best the half-educated sons of peasants could secure some minor position in the State machinery.

The economic life of the country was dominated 471
by all-powerful monopolies. The oil and heavy industries were in the hands of a few foreign and Rumanian shareholders and the enormous profits were divided between a few industrialists, ministers

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

mentary seats. This device, combined with the 666
electoral methods adopted, normally assured the 665
continuance of the government in power.[1] In
Foreign Affairs the Liberals supported the French [648]
Alliance and the League of Nations in whose councils the Foreign Minister, N. Titulescu, had considerable influence.

The National Peasant Party led by Maniu and 665
Mihalache had the support of the rural population and represented the Left Wing of Rumanian politics. The party stood for a genuine Land Reform. It was not, however, a homogeneous party. From the first it had a Right and a Left Wing. As time went on, and especially when the political situation became more confused in the late thirties, the Right Wing tended to sympathize with the Iron Guard against the Royal dictatorship and the Left Wing with the Communists. The failure of the National Peasant Party to hold power after 1928 was due to the lack of confidence in the people, the fear of radical changes favoured by many sections of the population and hesitation to attack the firmly entrenched vested interests resolutely.

Although Rumania had a parliamentary constitu- 661
tion the country was ruled by anything but democratic methods. Parliamentary representatives, ministers and the press could be made to advocate and carry out any measure if adequately paid by interested parties. The corruption of the lower civil service seemed as nothing compared with that on the top. State contracts, exemption from taxes and

[1] It failed only twice: in 1928 when the National Peasant Party gained an electoral victory and in 1937 when Tatarescu's government fell.

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

661 preferential legislation, the right to exploit natural resources under State control, could all be and were secured by Rumanian and foreign trusts for comparatively small sums. The mismanagement and appropriation of public money by government officials, including the court, had ruinous consequences for the population which knew about these things, but was unable to do anything about it. [651] Indirect taxation, heavier and more ingenious than anywhere else in Europe, provided an inexhaustible source of income for those in power. The 'aviation-stamp', for example, which had to be affixed on every bill, theatre- and cinema-ticket, etc., was supposed to secure a strong Rumanian Air Force. In fact Rumania possessed hardly any aircraft at all as the funds were misappropriated throughout.

648 661 THE ROYAL DICTATORSHIP. The instability of Rumania's economic and political life and her geographical position made the country extremely sensitive to any changes in Central Europe. Therefore the rise to power of the National Socialists in Germany, the risings of February and June 1934 in Austria and world reactions to these events had [668] immediate repercussions in Rumania. The Liberal Prime Minister Duca was assassinated in December 1933 by members of the Iron Guard. Tatarescu took over and decreed a state of siege, which has not been lifted since, ostensibly to repress and destroy the Iron Guard. In fact exactly the opposite course was adopted. The democratic forces which began to rally in order to fight Rumanian Fascism were persecuted by the government whilst the terrorists were allowed to continue their activities.

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

563 steel works of Resita and Copsa Mica, with a capital
471 of six million pounds sterling, and many other factories also passed under German control. In the
[439] fight against Franco-British and American capital in Rumania, Germany was favoured by the fact that 50% of Rumania's imports were German, and 36% of the country's exports went to Germany (1938). By 1940 the latter had reached about 70% of the total.

563 This underground activity of the German
468 minority, combined with the pro-Fascist leanings of the majority of the ruling classes, who feared to lose their privileges and were only too glad to join in the Anti-Bolshevik[1] crusade, and the corruption reigning in the army and all branches of the government apparatus, sapped the strength of the country economically, politically and morally. It had become an easy prey for the imperialism of Hitler.

661 [1] Especially savage measures were taken against workers' and intellectuals' progressive organisations, which were made illegal and had to go underground. Their members, if caught, were court-martialled and imprisoned.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

the pro-Nazi group. This, combined with the 665
developments in the regions bordering on Rumania, 648
and the changes in the international situation, explain the seemingly inexplicable migration of the majority of the Rumanian ruling class from the Allies' to the Axis camp. The real rulers of Rumania depended to a great extent on foreign support: when the power of Britain and France seemed on the wane they had to look for new protectors, and many, though not all, therefore became pro-German.

THE LAST DAYS OF GREATER RUMANIA. The year 661
1939 opened ominously for Rumania. The align- 648
ment of power on the continent of Europe had its counterpart in the grouping of Rumania's political forces, and the impending Great War threw its shadow on the sombre scene of Rumanian politics. After the assassination of Codreanu in November 1938 a wave of terror and repression swept the whole country, which resulted in a series of wholesale murders committed both by Iron Guards and the police. The new 'Party of the Nation' which had replaced the 'Front of National Renaissance' was an artificial veil for the manipulations of Carol and the court. The unstable political edifice, erected by the king tottered, in spite of the British Government's guarantee of 13 April 1939, which promised to assist in the defence of Rumania's independence. Germany increased her pressure to obtain a greater hold on Rumania's natural resources, while Britain and France tried to maintain their economic position.

At the outbreak of hostilities in September 1939 Rumania, although allied to France and Poland, remained neutral. The internal situation deteriorated

3

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

661 with alarming speed. The assassination of Calinescu, 648 who had been responsible for the murder of Codreanu and others, was followed by yet another series of savage reprisals. The collapse of Poland brought a flood of refugees into the country and made Rumania's international position even more difficult. Many Poles were interned, many managed to bribe their way through to a port or across the frontiers.

648 In the economic field the Rumanian government tried to repeat the policy which its predecessor had pursued in the period 1914–16, when it profited from deals concluded with both belligerent camps. This time, however, German penetration was much more thorough and the economic agreements concluded between Germany and Rumania reinforced Germany's capacity to wage war very considerably. This naturally led to important consequences in the field of internal politics. In spite of the very recent repressive measures against the Iron Guard, Carol now adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards this organization. Now that Codreanu had been eliminated, he sought to strengthen his position by including Iron Guards in his government, amongst them Horia Sima who had become their leader. This seemed all the more necessary as the king's isolation in internal politics had its counterpart in the country's isolation in the international field. The revisionist claims of Rumania's neighbours were raised again, and Carol tried to rally the people by embarking on an intensive policy of rearmament for the defence of Greater Rumania. Distrust in the king and the general disintegration had, however, gone so far that the continuance of the whole régime

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

643 he had played off one political party against the
668 other in order to strengthen his position. In foreign
648 politics he followed the same tactics. He ended by completely isolating Rumania internationally and undermining her internally.

It may be said in extenuation of his inglorious behaviour, that the dismemberment of Greater Rumania was inevitable, once the whole balance of power had shifted against the Western Allies, whose settlement had created it. But it is at least equally tenable that a democratic and united Rumania, which had succeeded in winning the loyalty of any considerable elements among its minorities, might have held out against the cession of territory to Hungary, by obliging the Hungarians and Germans to use force to effect it at a time when Hitler was anxious to avoid war in the Danubian area. This might have rallied Rumania with Yugoslavia and Greece, who showed a more heroic spirit, to the Allies' camp. In fact, the king's policy only aggravated the internal situation and sharpened the conflict of parties.

642 RUMANIA GOES TO WAR. General I. Antonescu,
661 having obtained Carol's abdication,[1] pronounced himself 'Conducator', that is, 'Leader', and proclaimed the creation of the 'Legionary State'. His government was composed of generals, leaders of the Iron Guard and civil servants. Codreanu's successor, Horia Sima, became vice-premier and at once organized an unprecedented regime of terror throughout the whole of Rumania. His henchmen assassinated numerous prominent opponents of the Iron Guard. The looting of shops and the beating

[1] [Sept 6, 1940 -- Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

up of Jews became the favourite occupation of the 641
legionaries. The resulting confusion helped many 642
minor officials as well as influential business men in
acquiring valuable property.

But it soon became obvious that the real masters 648
of Rumania were the Germans. In October 1940 642
Antonescu invited German troops into the country
as instructors for the Rumanian Army. German 649
trade delegations began organizing Rumania's economy and German specialists were appointed to important positions in various ministries. Although Antonescu had included the Iron Guard in his government, the struggle for power between him and Horia Sima continued. In January 1941 the Iron Guard, supporting the latter, made a last bid. The legionaries rose in revolt and succeeded in gaining several strong positions in Bucarest and in some provincial towns. The army, however, sided with Antonescu, who was also aided by the Germans, and within a short time the 'Conducator' emerged as victor. He at once proceeded to the establishment of a completely military administration and based his whole regime on the army.

His success in the fight against the Iron Guard 721
was influenced decisively by the German desire to create a stable Rumanian government which would join in the attack on the Soviet Union. Antonescu did not fail his German masters. On 22 June 1941 Rumanian troops, together with German divisions,
crossed the Soviet frontier. Thanks to German 721
support, Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina 727
were re-occupied within a short time. Both provinces were put under a military administration and ruled quite separately from the rest of Rumania.

[Q: Antonescu -- Analysis]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

Crimea and Kharkov in 1941. But they became alarming when the Red Army began the great counter-offensive in the Caucasus and at Stalingrad, where five Rumanian divisions under General Lascar were wiped out or put out of action. In May 1943 Antonescu said the Rumanian losses were 500,000, referring apparently to killed and prisoners only. Since then the great German retreat has probably caused many more Rumanian losses. During 1943 the government's action in sending Rumanian troops beyond the old frontier was repeatedly condemned by the leaders of the opposition—Peasants and Liberals. The Minister of War answered these objections by saying, 'It is lucky for us that the war is so far away. If we had to fight so powerful an opponent on the Dniester or the Pruth, all Rumania would be ruins.' But within a year the avenging fate had not rested on the Pruth.

OPPRESSION AND EXPLOITATION. The effects of Antonescu's dictatorial regime showed themselves in all spheres of Rumanian life. Politically the country was ruled by the army generals and in all other fields by Rumanian and German big business. Military administrators replaced local government in the provinces and the towns. The Rumanian industrialists and bankers found it very profitable to work for the German war economy. Their political enemies were liquidated or driven under-ground. In the economic field their exploitation of the people and of the country's resources was only limited by Germany's interests.

Both the political and the economic life

435

June, 1940	137.1.
January, 1941	149.5.
June, 1941	190.9.
January, 1942	200.6.
June, 1942	306.9.
January, 1943	377.6.
March, 1943	403.9.

The less marked rise in 1942 was due principally to the fact that for the first 6 months of the year prices were almost stationary; in the autumn, however, indirect taxes were increased and prices once again rose steeply.

These percentages represent only increases in official prices; the cost of living is in fact considerably higher owing to the prevalence of the Black Market, where prices are very much in excess of the official limits.

The first attempts at price control were made almost immediately after the outbreak of war. In September 1939 an anti-profiteering law was passed, and in November of the same year an anti-speculation law followed, which fixed the maximum prices of all articles in general use and limited wholesalers' profits to 10 per cent. and retailers' to 12 per cent.

The regulations were further tightened up by the price control laws of March, 1941, and the sabotage law of October, 1940.

Control, however, remained largely ineffective, and in October 1941 a stabilisation law was passed. This law, which borrowed much from the existing German laws, laid down a general price stop. Maximum prices and wages were fixed at the level prevailing on 1st September, 1941, and alterations could be made only with the permission of the Minister of Economics.

In addition the State set up goods distribution centres which, among other functions, supervised producers' prices, profit margins and consumers' prices.

Since August 1942 the supervision of prices has been in the hands of a General Commissariat for Price Control, and the local offices subordinate to it. It is evident that corruption among price-control officials was by no means a negligible [661] factor in the very unsatisfactory development of the control system in general. In the autumn of 1942 it was announced that all existing price controllers were to be dismissed and replaced by members of the teaching, legal and literary professions.

B. BANKING

1. State and State-Controlled Banks

652 453 The National Bank of Rumania was set up in 1880 with a capital of 30 million lei, of which one-third was in the hands of the State. By 1929 this had been raised to 600 million lei. Under the present statute the State may not hold more than ten per cent. of the capital; the remaining ninety per cent. must be held by private shareholders. This bank has the sole right of note issue for the country.

From the end of 1930 to the end of 1938 the note circulation rose from 19·6 milliard lei to 34·9 milliard lei. In the next four years, however, the increase was very much greater as the following table shows:—

		Milliard lei
1939—	January	34·1
	June	38·7
1940—	January	48·4
	June	54·2
1941—	January	65·7
	June	77·1
1942—	January	95·6
	June	98·7
1943—	January	117·0

E. THE JEWISH POPULATION

162 The Jewish population of Rumania for 1938 is given as 800,000, and for July, 1942, as 270,000. This reduction came about as follows :—

Total, 1938	800,000
Lost to Hungary	200,000
[728] Taken to Russia from Bessarabia and Bucovina by Russians	130,000
Expelled from Bessarabia and other areas by Rumanians to Transnistria, and deaths from unnatural causes in Rumania	200,000
[661] Total losses	530,000
Total, 1942	270,000

The occupational distribution of the Jews in 1930 :—

			Per cent.
Agriculture			4·1
Industry and trade	32·8	}	81·1
Commerce and credit	48·3		
Transport			2·4
Professions and Public Services ..			2·7
Army			1·9
Miscellaneous			7·8

It is calculated that in 1939 at least one-sixth of the industrial and half of the commercial population were Jews. During the war Rumanian policy has been to exclude Jews from business and from 563 commercial and professional activity. This process of Rumanisation, while pursued ruthlessly in 661 the provinces of Bessarabia and Bucovina, has been limited in the more industrial areas such as Bucarest by the simple fact that Rumanian industry and trade are dependent to such an extent on Jewish capital and leadership, and there is no doubt that the shortage of labour in industry has been seriously aggravated by the anti-Jewish policy. The degree of Rumanisation so far achieved is given by the following examples :—

Bucarest :—

Number of firms employing Jews, November 1940	8,126
Number of firms employing Jews, December 1942	4,301

Such Jews as are deemed necessary for war production are granted labour permits, whereby they may remain in their profession, but are subject to heavy taxation. Jews who are expelled from their normal activity are compulsorily enrolled in the Jewish labour service and employed chiefly on road work, or, alternatively, they are sent to concentration camps.

(*See* also "Note on Jews in Rumania," Part II, Chapter VIII.)

F. WAGES

1. General

465 The average wage (industrial, commercial and agricultural professions) in 1938 was 1,853 lei per month. The highest average wages were found in the mining, food and transport industries, followed by commerce, textiles, skins, glass and stone, while in the metallurgical industry wages were below the average. The most noticeable feature of pre-war Rumanian wage statistics is the great regional variations, the extreme averages being 889 and 3,059 lei per month.

During the war, various attempts at fixing the wage level have failed to keep pace with the rising cost of living. On the whole it would have been surprising if a wage stop could have been successfully applied in Rumania, because of the great

704 648* *

pean Front ended, it became a major factor in the new Romanian Army. The Horia-Closca-Crisan Division was organized later and did not become quite so important in the War but it also provided much thoroughly indoctrinated personnel for the Communist regime.

701 648*

Another group of ex-PW officers returned long after the war was over. In 1946 the Communists sent back 500 specially selected and indoctrinated officers. Those 500 officers were led by the then Colonel Victor Draganescu, a career artillery officer who has since become Major General, Ministerial Councillor in the Ministry of Interior, and commander of security troops. These 500 officers were greeted by big Communist-sponsored demonstrations and their return was presented as a token of Soviet magnanimity. Draganescu said, "We express our gratitude toward Generalissimo Stalin, because of his large understanding granted the Rumanian Government in allowing Rumanian prisoners to return even before the conclusion of peace."[27]

Re-trained PW's were thus one major source of Communist officers. Another source was a para-military force organized beginning in the autumn of 1944 by Emil Bodnaras. This was the "Guard of Patriotic Defense." It was equipped by the Soviet Occupation Army from captured German supplies. At the same time a law was passed incorporating all "anti-fascist fighters" into the Romanian Army in a bloc. "Actually the number of Partisans operating in Rumania during the war against Germany had been infinitesimal."[28] They were mainly organized afterwards by the Communists who decided who was to be considered as having been an anti-fascist fighter. Under this law such leading Communist politicians as Emil Bodnaras, Vasile Luca, George Vasilichi, and Ana Pauker became generals.

Another special force which the Communists built was that of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, (for a while divorced from that Ministry and placed in a separate Ministry of State Security, but perhaps now recombined.) The government of the Romanian People's Republic has devoted much attention to these special security forces. Some measure of their importance is revealed by the fact that a couple of years ago the budget for these troops was considerably larger than that of the Ministry of Armed Forces.[29] A more satisfactory index of relative size is troops. The troops under the Ministry of Interior number at least 120,000, but probably 160,000, while the regular army was estimated by Tito as 300,000 in 1950, but is probably only 225,000.

*

701 648* 661

While the ranks of the officers corps were being filled with Communists, regular officers were dismissed <u>en masse</u> after the War. The first purge had already occurred with the coup d'état of August 1944 even before the Communists were involved. The Sanatescu government formed at that time was staffed largely by generals who had not been closely identified with the previous Antonescu regime or who, like Generals Radescu and Aldea, had opposed it. The generals

9: Pool S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania ED1

*701 *648 661 and admirals who had been most intimately associated with Antonescu were arrested and several, among them Generals Antonescu, Pantazi, and Vasiliu, were taken to the Soviet Union, where they were questioned and held until their trials in Bucharest in 1946.

With the end of the War the purge went further. Procedures for elimination of war criminals and collaborators were laid down in 1945 and numerous trials were held in 1946. At the same time the size of the army was being cut and many officers were simply dismissed. The Treaty of Paris in 1946 provided that the total military forces of Romania (including land, air, and marine force as well as frontier guards) could not exceed 138,000. The actual number of troops in active service at one time fell as low as 90,000. These were culled from fifteen regular divisions and two Communist divisions which had fought the Germans. The reduction in force was pushed as an ideal opportunity to get rid of political opponents.

The Communist take-over did not occur without resistance. The years from 1945 through 1950 were marked by a series of successively more stringent Communist demands for control.

668 643 The first prime minister after the coup was General Sanatescu. He was not sufficiently acceptable to the Russians and on December 6, 1944, he was replaced by General Nicolae Radescu, who had been known as an opponent of Antonescu and the Nazis and had spent some time in a concentration camp. Radescu, however, was by no means a pro-Communist or a Communist tool and he also lasted only briefly, being ousted on February 27, 1945 at the demand of Vyshinski, the Russian representative in Romania. A few days later a government was formed by Dr. Petru Groza who also had not been a Communist. He was indeed one of the wealthiest men in Romania and had been something of a collaborator with the Nazis, but he was sufficiently pliable to be used by the Russians for a considerable period. It was not until June 2, 1952, that he was replaced as Prime Minister by a top Communist leader, Gheorghiu-Dej. Groza is still a figurehead in Romanian politics under the title of President of the Presidium.

*701 *648 661 With the formation of the Groza government there came the first major shake-up in the army command. During the succeeding twelve months thousands of officers were removed. General Ion Negulescu, Minister of National Defense, was replaced by General Constantin Rascanu, a man who had been Chief of the Military Police under the Antonescu regime and later was disgraced and sent home from the front for engaging in black market operations. He ingratiated himself with the Communists by leading the group of officers who forced Radescu out of office.

During 1946 the non-Communist officers showed increased resistance to the sovietization of the army and the country. Toward the end of the year the Communists decided upon a further shake-up. Rascanu was discharged as Minister of the Armed Forces and replaced by General Mihail Lascar, former prisoner of war, who had served in the Horia-Closca-Crisan Division. Before that he had fought well on

the German side as commander of a brigade on the Russian front. He was then a major general and was decorated by the Germans with the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and promoted to the rank of General of the Army. Before his capture he was often called the 'hero of Stalingrad.' After his capture by the Russians, however, he co-operated well with them. Lascar served as Minister of Armed Forces until replaced by Emil Bodnaras in the next major shake-up on December 24, 1947. Lascar then became Inspector General of the Army and First Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces, a position which he held until the subsequent shake-up in March of 1950.

Of all these turning points perhaps the most important was that of December 1947, the Romanian counterpart of the Prague coup of a month and a half later. In December 1947 Emil Bodnaras took over and at the same time King Michael was forced to abdicate. That was the decisive shift in both the political and military spheres. General Lascar, Bodnaras' predecessor, had been a career officer even if an indoctrinated one. Bodnaras, on the other hand, was a long-time Communist whose military career had ended in disgrace.

Bodnaras was born in the early 1900's in Bucovina. According to the usual story his father was a Ruthenian peasant of Ukrainian background and his mother a German. One of our informants who knew him indicates, however, that that is not so, and it seems that we have here one of the many cases in which interested refugee circles prefer to label current Communist leaders as foreigners rather than admit that their own nationals can be traitors.

In the middle 1920's Bodnaras went to military school and was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1927. From 1927 to 1930 he took an artillery course and in the latter year was promoted to first lieutenant. At the time he became involved in Communist espionage, and when caught fled to Russia. He was tried in absentia for desertion and espionage and sentenced to five years imprisonment. In 1933 h attempted to slip back into Romania, was caught and served the years from 1933 to 1936 in prison. At that time he escaped and again went to live in the U.S.S.R. During World War II Bodnaras was assigned to party organizational and propaganda activities rather than to fighting the Germans. When the war was over, the Communists placed him as Secretary of State in the office of the Prime Minister, a job concerned with the secret intelligence service. He was in this position until the Soviets decided to take complete control of the army and to communize and develop it.

When Bodnaras took over, he brought in a new group of deputy ministers and changed many commands. The end result of his activities to date is a situation in which Communist party militants control the very top positions but quite a few career officers remain in posts just below them. This result was reached in a zigzag course of three stages.

1. The reorganization in the period from December 1947 to 1950

9t Pool S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania ED1

*701 *648 paralleled what was happening in all the satellites at the same period. The army was reorganized according to Soviet patterns, and supplies and equipment were brought into uniformity with Soviet standards. Instrumentalities were developed for strict political surveillance within the military forces. Provision was made for an elaborate program of political indoctrination and the Guard of Patriotic Defense was integrated in 1949 with the troops operating under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The process of purging hit old Communists, officers of the Tudor Vladimirescu and Horia-Closca-Crisan Divisions, and career officers alike, but it was most vigorously directed against the latter. Still career officers continued to play a role at all levels. It is not clear from our sources whether there were at that time the usual three or perhaps four deputy ministers of the armed forces, but of these three or four deputy ministers two continued to be career officers until March 1950.[30]

2. In March 1950 party militants came to fill all the deputy minister posts and from then until 1952 the emphasis seemed to be on Bolshevisation.

*701 *648 ●661 3. The most recent major shake-up came in April of 1952 when five fliers of the Romanian Air Force flew to Yugoslavia. At that time the discharges hit not only prewar career officers, but also many of the Communist officers. These included the Vice-Minister of the Armed Forces, Major General Constantin Doncea, who is reported to have been executed, and Major General Villiam Suder, Inspector General of the Army and also Vice-Minister of the Armed Forces. Suder then became Minister of the Coal Industry, from which position he has now been dismissed, and he is presumably in disgrace. The military shake-up of 1952 is not well covered in the data yet available outside Romania. We, however, may take the discharge of two vice-ministers as a sign of a rather far-reaching and drastic shake-up at other levels too. The shake-up of late 1952 may well have marked a reaction to the dominance of incompetent politicians in favor of professional soldiers. The refugee Buletinul Militar of October 1953 informs us that "For about 6 months the Communist Party has made big efforts through the Ministry of Armed Forces to recruit career military men who had been previously removed as dangerous. They are promised either directly or indirectly very attractive advantages if they apply for recall in the active cadres of the Army." At the same time Communist officers are apparently being purged, and in typical Soviet fashion the charge leveled at the victims is that of doing precisely what the regime itself is doing. The nature of the regime's policy is thus camouflaged. "Numerous officers converted from civilians by the Party have been found guilty of conniving with career officers. Some of those, guilty of sincerity and naivete, have been thrown into Communist jails."[30a]

Whatever the latest trend, however, the period since 1948 was notable both for the retention of a significant number of career officers

Rumania ED1

89 701 * 648* 661

and for their subordination to a group of Communist generals who in turn took their orders from Soviet officers.

C. The Leading Cadres of the Present Romanian Army

Let us attempt a somewhat more detailed analysis of the two main identifiable groups of present general officers: the career officers and the old Communists.

We have biographies on ninety-one generals who have been in the army at some time since the Russian forces reached Romania toward the end of the last war. Of these forty-four have not been purged as of our latest information. Among these forty-four generals who are still in good repute with the regime, twenty-four are career officers and only twenty are new Communist officers. The reliance upon prewar cadres becomes even more clear when we note that five of the twenty Communist officers are no longer active in military positions but have transferred back to civilian political work and nine are in security posts not under the Ministry of Armed Forces. Thus our sample of Communist militants currently active in army affairs is reduced to six. The table below gives a breakdown of the sample of postwar officers.

TABLE 5

Romanian Generals in the Sample

Career officers who have not been purged	24	
Communist officers who have not been purged	20	
Total who have not been purged		44
Career officers purged in 1944	8	
Career officers purged in 1945	14	
Career officers purged in 1946	5	
Career officers purged in 1947	4	
Career officers purged in 1948	4	
Career officers purged in 1949	2	
Career officers purged in 1950	4	
Career officers purged in 1951	3	
Career officers purged in 1952	1	
Total career officers purged	45	
Communist officers purged	2*	
Total purged		47
Grand total		91
Total career officers	69	
Total Communists	22	

*One in 1952, one in 1953.

*701 *648 661

While the ranks of the career officers have been ruthlessly purged, the purging has been selective. What criteria have been applied in selecting officers who have been reprieved and continue to be tolerated even now? The outstanding criterion has been Soviet experience. The Russians have trusted those officers whom they captured and indoctrinated during World War II. Of the forty-four officers who have been purged, only four (i.e. 9 percent) are known to have been prisoners of war. At least nine of the twenty-four officers still in office were such indoctrinated prisoners and at least one more fought under the Russians (i.e. 42 percent). We do not know the complete wartime careers of certain generals in the sample. If we did the contrast might well be still more striking. Within our sample only one career officer still in a position of command can definitely be established as not having been a Russian prisoner of war. Russian experience seems to be the passport of a considerable majority of the career officers whom the Russians have continued to trust in important military posts.

*701 *648

When we turn to the Communists we also find that Russian experience and Russian affiliations are an important element in advancement. Of the twenty Communist generals who retain positions of power we know that at least nine have had Soviet experience and regarding the other half we are simply uninformed. Probably many of these have also been in Russia. Four of the twenty Communist generals in our sample are themselves Russians camouflaged as Romanians. Two others were in Russia as Communists and helped organize the Romanian Communist divisions, as did also one of the two purged Communists.

As in Poland, Communist generals are heavily concentrated in the political administration of the army and in the special security troops. The lines between posts reserved for Communists and other posts are not drawn quite so sharply in Romania as they have been in Poland. Four of the twenty-four officers in our current career officer sample have security or police jobs rather than regular military jobs. One, Major General Nicolae Dobre, career artillery officer, is reported to be Chief of Staff of the security troops. A second career artillery officer is Major General Victor Draganescu, ex-prisoner of war of the Russians. He was reported in 1952 to be in command of security troops. One career general, Major General Alexander Petrescu, is president of the political department of the Military Court of Justice. He qualified himself for this job by a record as the outstanding war criminal under the Nazis. During the Antonescu regime he was Director General of concentration camps and also had sentenced several Communists to death. He was dismissed from service in 1944 but one year later he was again president of the political section of the Bucharest Military Tribunal. In that position he presided when the Communists tried Iuliu Maniu, the Peasant party leader.

While these few career men hold jobs in the security field, most such jobs are held by Communists and a considerable number by Russians disguised as Romanian Communists. There are four of the

8: Armstrong 3-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania ED1

661 electoral results a coalition government should be set up, and in this they secured the Ministry of the Interior and thus made ready to stage a coup at the opportune moment. That moment came in May 1947. Maniu's turn came in July 1947. He was arrested, the National Peasant Party was dissolved, and three months later he was put on trial before a military court presided over by Colonel Alexandru Petrescu. This officer had worn many uniforms and (as W. H. Lawrence who covered the trial for *The New York Times* recalled) had once filled the same judicial office under the pro-Nazi Antonescu dictatorship when the prisoners in the dock usually were Jews or were charged with being Communists or anti-Fascists, equally reprehensible in those days. After a two-week trial which travestied anything that we would call a judicial proceeding, Maniu was convicted and given solitary imprisonment for life. With him were sentenced Ion Mihalache, Vice President of the National Peasant Party, and other associates.

By the end of 1947 the Communists had dealt with all political rivals in Eastern Europe who had particular influence with the peasant masses. Whether the peasant leaders temporized or were rigid, collaborated or fought back, their fate was different only in degree: for some death, for some prison, for some exile.

Six weeks after Maniu was sentenced, King Michael, who had struggled to diminish his royal prerogatives to the point where they might be combined with a Communist dictatorship, and who occasionally seemed to be succeeding, was ordered to abdicate and leave the country. The Rumanian People's Republic was proclaimed December 30, 1947. No political focus of opposition was left—reactionary, bourgeois, agrarian, democratic or Socialist.

[642]

665
661

Moscow even so did not feel that the situation in Rumania was all it should be. A core of nationalist sentiment seemed to remain inside the Communist organization itself, and it was ordered cut out. The man selected to serve as an example was an old Party stalwart and cabinet member, Lucretiu Patrascanu. He had been a Communist member of Parliament in the twenties, a leader of the Communist underground during the war and head of the commission sent to Moscow to negotiate the Rumanian armistice. In the cabinets preceding Groza's he had been Minister of Justice, and Vyshin-

R: Armstrong 2-4 (no date) 1961 EF1 Yugoslavia EF1
Rumania. ED1

R
665
661

sky thought him sufficiently reliable to allot him the same important position in the new setup. *The Daily Worker*[4] praised him in those days "for his staunch defense of leading anti-Fascists, such as Professor Constantinescu-Iasi, Ana Pauker and the railway strike leaders before the military and civil Rumanian tribunals," and added the information that he had joined the Rumanian Communist Party when it was first organized in 1920 and had been editor of the official Party organ, *Scanteia*, from 1921 to 1924. Patrascanu's administration of the Rumanian judicial system continued to be satisfactory at least to the end of 1947, for he was retained in the same post in the new republican cabinet formed after Michael's abdication.

Less than two months later, at a Congress when the rump groups still calling themselves "Social Democratic" joined the Communists to form the new Rumanian Workers' Party (Communist), Teohari Georgescu, Minister of the Interior, suddenly rose to assail Patrascanu as a deviationist. Like the accused, the accuser was a member of the Central Committee of the Party. Georgescu's complaint was that Patrascanu had fallen "under the influence of the bourgeoisie" and "had become an exponent of bourgeois ideology." As this happened at the end of February 1948, when only the innermost circle of Cominform authorities knew that Moscow was stigmatizing Tito as a bourgeois deviationist, we cannot tell whether the two developments were connected or whether Patrascanu merely happened to reveal some tendency toward independence at an unfortunate moment.

R
665
661
Y
618

Tito had been in Bucharest at the end of December 1947 to sign the Jugoslav-Rumanian pact of friendship and mutual assistance, and half a million persons had assembled at an open-air rally to hear him speak. "It was a great triumph," Mosha Pijade has written—in fact, Pijade admits, too great a triumph, "for it started personal jealousy where none of us expected it." He adds: "When Comrade Tito achieved triumphs during his visits to Warsaw, Prague, Sofia, Bucharest and Budapest, it was too much for them. Sick vanity threw the interests of world Socialism into the dirt."[5] If Patrascanu

[4] New York, November 11, 1944.
[5] *Borba*, Belgrade, September 26 and 29, 1949.

R: Armstrong 3-4 (no date) 1951 RF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania EM

R 661 665 Y 648

had not heard that Tito was in danger, he might have made up to him too openly. Maybe he happened to be one of those to whom Tito mentioned the troubles he was having with the Soviets, and maybe some informer transmitted a sympathetic comment to Moscow. A few days after Tito left Bucharest, Dimitrov arrived to sign a similar treaty of friendship on behalf of Bulgaria. This was the occasion where the exuberant Rumanian welcome is supposed to have gone to Dimitrov's head, leading him to speak imprudently about forming a wide federation of East European states as an offset to Soviet hegemony. Was Patrascanu implicated in the indiscretions for which the Bulgarian Prime Minister apologized so abjectly after returning to Sofia? Perhaps the international events merely coincided with Patrascanu's fall. Perhaps he was purged simply because his background was Rumanian rather than Muscovite (he apparently never was in Moscow until 1944), and suspects were being gotten rid of everywhere in preparation for the showdown with Tito. He had spent the war in the Rumanian underground and Rumanian jails and knew the country as Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca and other Moscow-trained Communists did not. He may easily have had ideas about the importance of Rumanian national feelings and perhaps even a feeling of his own for Rumanian national interests which would have been alien to the Muscovites. Whether this or something more specific accounts for his disgrace must remain speculation. What is on record is that he was denounced as a bourgeois and nationalist and expelled from the Party to which he had belonged for 28 years.

R 661 665

The purge begun with Patrascanu went wide and deep. In the Cominform journal for February 10, 1950, the Secretary-General of the Central Committee, Alexandru Moghiorosh, reported that the "ever sharpening class struggle" had necessitated a thorough housecleaning of "bestial, alien and opportunist elements." In all, he said, 18 percent of the Party members had been dropped. On the date when the remnants of the so-called Social Democratic parties merged with the Communists, the combined strength of the new Rumanian Workers' Party was said to be about a million. This would indicate a purge of something like 180,000 individuals found to be lacking in Communist zeal or trustworthiness. Moghiorosh warned that "the

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania ED1

Anglo-American imperialists and their Titoist agents" would try to disrupt the Party in the future as in the past, and he asked for redoubled revolutionary vigilance against "all deviations from the Party line." 661 665

Those who were not purged were vigorously educated in the same ideas which Dimitrov, Bierut and Revai had brought to the attention of their followers. They were informed that in Rumania as elsewhere one of the touchstones of conformity to the new Moscow line was to be the attitude of the Parties toward the peasants. In the early days of their power, the Rumanian Communists had aimed to make private ownership of land unpopular by proving it unprofitable. As in the other satellites, they had set high tax rates on land, imposed high indirect taxes on salt, matches and other commodities which the peasant could not avoid buying, fixed high prices for manufactured goods in comparison with agricultural produce, offered special favors to peasants who joined collectives and in other ways demonstrated the hazards and costs of independent farming with a view to bringing the peasants to favor collectivization, as it were of their own accord. Minister of the Interior Georgescu signalled the end of this era of persuasion, if it can be called that, in the spring of 1949. 661 665 565

Georgescu joined the ranks of Dimitrov, Bierut and Revai with a contribution to the Cominform journal for June 1, 1949. As an article there would be read abroad as well as at home he used more discreet language than, for instance, Revai had felt necessary in addressing the comrades in Budapest. In the main, however, his definitions and instructions followed the same pattern. There was to be "a sharpening of the class struggle in town and countryside," and he made plain, as Revai had done, that although "the main ally of the working class is the working peasantry" the working class always reserves to itself "the leading rôle." He also agreed that a civil war would not be necessary to bring in the full dictatorship of the proletariat. In Rumania as in Hungary the Soviet Army was always there "to support us." Vasile Luca, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party (Communist), followed soon afterwards with an article speaking of "the ever sharpening class struggle" and "acute class struggle in the countryside in par- 665 565

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Maniu naturally refused the offer, and Vintilă Brătianu declared his intention to continue as head of the government. 175 665

In the winter and spring of 1927–28, the National Peasants extended their attacks on what they called the usurping government. Maniu embarrassed the government in its efforts to obtain a foreign stabilization loan by declaring on December 22, that his party disapproved of the new budget and that a government without the support of the nation was not in a position to receive foreign loans.[24] In January, 1928, the National Peasants sent representatives abroad, to Paris, London and Berlin, to persuade foreign opinion that the Liberals lacked national approval.

Large protest meetings were held throughout Rumania, climaxed by a massive peasant demonstration in Alba Iulia on May 6. This demonstration aroused great excitement and some apprehension, but it ended in a slightly ludicrous vein. Thousands of peasants came from all over Rumania, though principally from Transylvania, to attend a dramatic denunciation of the Liberals, but at the conclusion of the rally the leaders were at a loss as to what should be done next—a problem that always plagued the Peasant leaders. Some of the more ardent ones wanted to prepare a "March on Rome," and indeed a column of peasants did march off in the direction of Bucarest, but dispersed on the way. Other leaders favored a moderation in sharp contrast to the violence of the oratory, which had blasted the government as the "enemy of the people." Most humiliating, the National Peasants were forced to appeal to the government to provide rail transport to return the peasants to their homes. But despite this touch of *opéra bouffe*, the demonstration was an impressive display of the opposition's ability to call out the peasantry. 175 662

It is quite possible, however, that the government was less worried by the direct threat of these measures than by their effect in increasing the difficulty of obtaining a stabilization loan, the principal preoccupation of Vintilă Brătianu during his year in office and his principal excuse for remaining in power. In the summer of 1928 the loan threatened to be the rock which would wreck the government. In July Vintilă Brătianu convoked the chamber in extraordinary session to report on his negotiations and to get authorization to obtain an external loan of up to $250,000,000. The National Peasant depu-

24. It should be added, however, that Maniu had not blocked discussion or voting on the budget. On December 27 the National Peasant representatives Madgearu and Popovici, while repeating that the Liberal government did not have legal authority to contract foreign loan, stated that if it did succeed the National Peasants would not subsequently refuse to recognise the undertaking, but would respect engagements taken, however unjustifiably, in the name of the state.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 ties boycotted the assembly, formed their own gathering, and resolved that laws passed by the Liberal chamber could not bind the Ru-
● 663 manian nation. Vintilă Brătianu tried to persuade the regency that he should remain in office until the loan negotiations were completed. Ultimately, his delays and in particular his request that even after the completion of the negotiations he be permitted to retain office to supervise the application of the loan brought him into conflict with the regents, who were anxious to calm the political situation. Overestimating his position, he resigned on November 3 and dropped the negotiations.

To his surprise his resignation was accepted. The regents consulted Maniu and Averescu on the formation of a coalition cabinet; Maniu would make no agreement except on the basis of new and free elections. The regents requested Titulescu to form a coalition cabinet; Titulescu failed. Finally, the regents were obliged on November 9 to call upon Maniu to form his own cabinet.

Thus ended the long regime of the Brătianus. The combination of two failures contributed to their defeat. Politically they failed to obtain the mass support of the peasants, necessary under universal suffrage, but were unwilling, or unable, to adopt measures to prevent the rise of an effective opposition. Economically, they were unable to restore either the national finances or the condition of agriculture. The stabilization loan and the bad harvest of 1928 directly contributed to their downfall, but the continuing economic uncertainty and instability of the postwar years always gave the opposition a long stick with which to belabor them.

Composition and Political Principles of the Liberals

665 Although the National Liberal party[23] was pleased to trace its origins to the group of young Rumanian intellectuals who had been inspired by the ideals of the French Revolution of 1848, the temper of the Brătianu party in the 1920's bore a far greater resemblance to the rigid and narrowly conceived liberalism of Guizot in the latter years of the July monarchy. In both cases there was the same curious combination of a not unimpressive austerity with the crassest manifestations of the spirit of "enrichissez-vous." The limitations of the Brătianus' conception of political liberty should be evident from

23. This was the party's official title. The word national has usually been omitted in this paper to avoid possible confusion with the term, National Peasant, which indicates the actual fusion of two distinct parties.

671 preparing a system of regional decentralization which would largely have satisfied the desires of the minorities.

662 Having to rely upon an inefficient administrative staff, with the various autonomous State departments still filled with supporters of the Opposition, and the latter hampering and undermining the government's attempt to clear up the mess in which the country had been left, it was hardly possible to expect that the government of M. Maniu could effect the miraculous change that was expected of it. In order to counteract the underhand machinations of its Liberal opponents, who did not scruple even to sap its credit
642 abroad by circulating scurrilous attacks on it among foreign
643 banking institutions, while at home they brought pressure
661 to bear on the Regency (which had been elected at their dictation) to create irritating hindrances to the smooth working of the government's plans, the latter at last allowed itself to be won over to what at the time was a fairly popular view, namely that of permitting the former Crown Prince Carol to return and ascend the throne. His advent was reckoned as likely to strengthen the hands of the Government, for he shared with the National Peasant Party the hostility of the Bratianus. Carol II, however, after his accession to the throne on June 8th, 1930, began to manifest a distinct predilection for autocratic measures. He arbitrarily removed from his post the able Rumanian Minister in Paris, M. Diamandi, a man who had distinguished himself for years by his devoted and brilliant service to his country, and nominated a personal friend whose sole qualification for this important diplomatic post was that he was a racing man. He estranged both M. M. Maniu and Vaida-Voevod by unconstitutionally interfering in the government, and thereby provoked the resignation of both. As he did not yet feel himself strong enough to dissolve the Chamber he allowed the National Peasant Party to form another Cabinet with M. Mironescu at its head, but he imposed on them as colleague an outsider in the person of M. Manoilescu, another personal friend of his. An attempt was made to form a Coalition Cabinet to be presided over by M. Titulescu, but as this failed the Mironescu Cabinet was tolerated for a time because it was conducting negotiations for a loan, and a premature

563 did little to foster their civic development at the time when Transylvania formed a part of their kingdom, and this has been most lucidly exposed by Dr Seton-Watson in his book, "Corruption and Reform in Hungary." Nevertheless, this intercourse, whatever its momentary drawbacks may have been in the past, has influenced very favourably the Rumanian element, a matter that would seem to confirm once more the theory of Professor Wm. McDougall that "the development of the group spirit in general and of national self-consciousness in particular is favoured by, and indeed dependent upon, conditions similar to those which develop the self-consciousness of individuals, by intuition, by conflict, by compulsion, and by co-operation." (V. "The Group Mind," page 165.)

563 662 In general, it may be admitted that the minorities have been more favoured by the Bucarest Government than the Rumanian majority of Transylvania, for the latter, except during the time the Maniu Government was in power, was always in the ranks of the Opposition, and as such it could not reckon on obtaining any bounties, while the support of the minorities was very often secured by the dispensation of various privileges. Even in the economic field the minorities could reckon on a certain financial support which Budapest generously granted to their industrial and banking firms, while corresponding Rumanian establishments in Transylvania were stinted of all help from Bucarest because it was the policy of the Bratianus to stifle every enterprise that had not come within the orbit of the Liberal party, and for this purpose they did not hesitate to employ the most unscrupulous methods.

563 668 The Magyar minority is undoubtedly better off than the Rumanians of Transylvania from many points of view, and this is the reason why all Magyar propositions for offering the Hungarian throne to King Carol II have not been viewed favourably at Bucarest. It is felt that the Rumanian population has not yet been able to rise overmuch, from both the cultural as well as the economic point of view, and that it is still dominated by the Magyars. It is felt also that a personal union with Hungary under the common sceptre of a Rumanian King would mean the consolidation of the

insatiable passion for the means wherewith they may be secured.

Venomous rivalries are engendered and mortal envies excited in the pursuit of such narrow and base aims. Antagonism between political men in Rumania is bitter and uncompromising because they are brought into mutual conflict by personal motives. They are always absorbed in their ambitions and grievances, and they reject all compromise, ready as they are to destroy if possible their opponents, for to them they naturally ascribe the same base motives by which they themselves are impelled. As they are seldom inspired by loyalty and devotion to any higher ideal they cannot recognize that their antagonists may pursue other than purely egoistic motives. Hence the intolerance and bitterness of the feuds among political factions.

In such an environment it is the unscrupulous and the unprincipled who float to the top, and by a system of alliances between big business and political bosses that smacks of American methods, the whole machinery of State is attuned to the express purpose of exploiting the masses for the benefit of the oligarchy at the head of affairs. No wonder that such methods check the vitality and the progress of any society within which they should happen unfortunately to appear, all the more so since there is a tendency to perpetuate themselves and become a permanent system.

Professor E. A. Ross, of Wisconsin, in his "Social Psychology," says: "The men society allows to succeed and to be honoured are taken as models by the rising generation. It is in this that society receives its just punishment when it allows bad men to float to the top. Being imitated by the young, they spread their virus throughout the social body. Not the crook in the alley is the greater menace, but the crook in office."

Corruption has been instilled from above and it is hopeless to expect salvation from these upper strata of Rumanian society so far as the old kingdom is concerned. Transylvania, the cradle of the Rumanian people, which fortunately has not been contaminated by the Phanariot taint may perhaps prove the source from which eventually there may be regeneration from below by helping to reopen the sluices and

12: Kosmos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

who eventually joined forces and formed the National Peasant Party, pressed for the extension and enactment of the agricultural reforms promised in 1917. This was delayed owing to the pressure of the great landed interests who, after the disappearance of the pro-German Conservative Party, had found a new champion in the Liberals. The elections, however, brought a decisive defeat for the Liberals, and King Ferdinand had to entrust the formation of a new government to the victorious Peasant Block. In it were Dr Lupu, who in 1917 had opposed the plans for land reform on the ground that they were inadequate, Vaida-Voevod, a close collaborator of Maniu, and Mihalache, who as Minister of Agriculture proceeded to carry out the land reform.

General Averescu left this new administration within a few days in order to create a new party in opposition to the Peasant Block. Intrigues at court soon secured the fall of the government, which was succeeded by an administration headed by Averescu whose personality was a guarantee that nothing would be done to abrogate the real power of the privileged classes. At the very efficiently 'managed' subsequent elections the General secured 209 out of 369 parliamentary seats. It was obvious that he was dependent on the support of the Liberals and the bureaucracy who preferred, for the time being, not to step into the foreground. Averescu's Minister of Agriculture, Garoflid, was the spokesman of the big landowners and it was he who finally put the land reform into practice. The social structure of the country was not basically altered. Moreover, the transfer of land to the peasants now made it possible

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

665 to blame other factors for whatever might go wrong
565 as there was no *boiar*-class left. The invisible, but
662 much more effective, financial control, continued to assure the rule of the same classes who had governed the country before.

665 Soon the Liberal Party again took over the
648 government. I. Bratianu was the undisputed chief of his party and had the confidence of the king. His whole policy was directed towards the strengthening of the power of the interests he represented. This, combined with his hostility towards the Soviet Union and Hungary had serious consequences which, however, became apparent only several years after his death.

648 THE MONARCHY. King Ferdinand, who had been
665 crowned at Alba Julia in 1923, died in 1927. This caused a serious crisis, for two years earlier the Crown Prince Carol had been forced to abdicate in favour of his infant son Michael. After Ferdinand's death a Regency Council of three was appointed to act in the king's name until he came of age. The Regents were naturally strongly influenced by Bratianu, but, when he died in 1928, the leader of the National Peasant Party was entrusted with the formation of a new government. Maniu secured a great electoral victory and his tenure of office was expected to bring about far-reaching changes. The new administration set about solving the minority question and the serious economic problems resulting from the incomplete land reform which instead of bettering had often worsened the lot of the peasants. Unfortunately at that time the world crisis had reached its worst stage. Although his

12: Kosmos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

government had the majority of the peasants behind it, Maniu was handicapped by sabotage on the part of the bureaucracy, the banks and the great industrialists. Moreover he found it very difficult to work with the Regency Council, especially in such a critical time, as very frequently it could not reach a unanimous decision.

All these circumstances seemed to make the restoration of Carol inevitable. Maniu therefore arranged for the return of Carol to Rumania, but made his accession to the throne conditional upon several undertakings, amongst which was a royal promise to respect the Constitution. Carol returned by plane on 8 June 1930 and was proclaimed King, his son Michael being unceremoniously relegated to the position of Crown Prince. Many high hopes were pinned on Carol whose youth and intelligence were held to be qualities which should make him a good ruler. But the head-strong young monarch, with his ideas of personal rule, soon disillusioned those who had enabled him to return. Before long Maniu resigned and the first period of Carol's personal regime began.

THE PEOPLE. During all these years the people of Rumania had hoped for an improvement of their position. After the first few years of adjustment to the changes consequent upon the World War, it had become apparent that all misfortunes could not be blamed upon the war. The Agrarian Reform which was to have cured all ills had turned out to be a very questionable blessing. The recovery of industry which had a promising start in the middle twenties, when considerable amounts of foreign

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

The Iron Guard was originally part of the Mol- 668
davian and Bessarabian anti-Semitic movement led by Professor Cuza. Amongst his pupils was Codreanu who formed the 'Legion of the Archangel Michael', a terrorist organization modelled on the Fascist and Nazi pattern and supported by Germany and Italy. Codreanu began his political career with the assassination of the prefect of police of Jasi, the blackmail of Jews and the persecution of progressive organizations. His adherents were poor students of the type which in Germany formed the core of the Nazi movement, the lower clergy, army officers and civil servants. His anti-Semitic and anti-Bolshevik slogans sounded attractive to certain big business men, high army officers and the higher clergy who gave him their support. The king regarded the Iron 643
Guard with favour, for it seemed an excellent 668
weapon for weakening the country's democratic forces and preparing the way for his own, undisguised dictatorship. Accordingly the crimes of the Iron Guard were not punished and the activities of her adherents remained unchecked.

In order to exploit the international situation, 643
which was only too favourable for dictatorship, 208
Carol began with an intensive propaganda, taking the slogans of Fascism, National Socialism and the Iron Guard, and laying particular stress upon his desire to rule with the help of the young generation. The schools and universities were militarized and the defence of the country made one of the daily watchwords. By ruling with non-party cabinets and 643
playing off one party against the other Carol under- 662
mined the strength of the Liberals and the adherents of Maniu and Mihalache. From both parties he

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

EΓ1 Rumania ED1

662 attracted personalities who were willing to abjure
643 their political faith and serve the Crown.

While continuing to pay lip-service to the League
643 of Nations, he supported the Italian campaign in
648 Abyssinia by sending food and war material to Italy. During the Spanish Civil War propaganda in favour of Franco was allowed and supported, while anything in favour of the Republican cause was banned.[1]

The result of the elections in December 1937, on
643 the eve of Hitler's seizure of Austria, precipitated
665 events. The government of the day, headed by the Liberal Tatarescu, failed to secure the necessary 40% of the votes and resigned.[2] Carol refused to entrust Maniu with the formation of a government; and the Iron Guard had by now assumed such a hostile attitude towards the king that a compromise with them was out of the question. Consequently Carol called the 'National Christian Front' to power, an anti-Semitic and Fascist organization led by the poet Goga and Professor Cuza. Goga became Prime Minister and his cabinet contained former members of the Liberal and Peasant Parties who now went over to the absolutist camp, as well as the future 'Conducator'[3] Antonescu.

[1] General Cantacuzino and several legionaries joined Franco and when two of them were killed their coffins were carried all over Rumania with great processions and interred at the headquarters of the Iron Guard in the presence of German, Italian, Spanish and Japanese representatives. At the same time collectors for the Republican cause were imprisoned. Nevertheless there were many Rumanians fighting for the Republicans in the 'Dimitrov' battalion.

[2] The result was: Government 35·9%, Peasant Party 20·4%, Iron Guard 15·5%, National Christian Front 9·1%.

[3] Leader.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

but only by a new and popular force united around a man representing the "principle of discipline."[4] This yearning after discipline and order usually manifested itself in all parties when once they came to power, but was especially noticeable in those men or groups who were in office, not through the operation of the electoral system—however unreliable it may have been—but through some special circumstance. General Radescu, who was Prime Minister in the winter of 1944–45, was the last and most pathetic example. This call for discipline was an attempt to compensate for Rumania's underlying political instability. In most instances it was directed against the Left and the doctrine of class warfare.

Elections were held in May, 1920, and produced, not unexpectedly, a resounding success for Averescu's party, which obtained 209 out of 369 seats in the chamber. Averescu had made an electoral pact with Take Ionescu and had been joined by a splinter group of Transylvanians under the poet and subsequent fascist, Octavian Goga. He was also supported by a number of Conservatives and Liberals who, it was unkindly observed, felt the need of finding new bottles for their old wine. There is also evidence, however, that he did attract a fairly large popular vote from the peasants.[5] The new cabinet included Take Ionescu as Foreign Minister, and Nicolae Titulescu, well known later in the League of Nations, as Minister of Finance. The Conservative landowner Constantin Garoflid was Minister of Agriculture and Domains, and the sinister and cynical Constantin Argetoianu, an accomplished election manipulator, was Minister of the Interior. The position of the National Liberal party at this time is not altogether clear. While Averescu had attacked the Liberals, they were willing to accept his election. Doubtless they were not reluctant to stay in the background until the storms of popular discontent had been subdued.

The two principal actions of the Averescu government were the agrarian reform law of 1921, already discussed, and the suppression of Left-wing activity. In October, 1920, an abortive general strike was crushed, and the socialists who had voted for affiliation with the Third International arrested.[6] Tension aroused by the general strike and its suppression was augmented by a bomb explosion in the Ru-

4. *Ibid.*, p. 18. The position of some of the men in Averescu's group, notably Manoilescu, came to be known as neoliberalism and provided a transition from the policy of the old Liberals to the leading ideas of the Carolist period.

5. Mihalache admitted as much, saying that in 1919 a great many peasants had confused General Averescu with the Peasant party and thought that he was working with the peasants against the landlords. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

6. For further discussion of socialist activities at this time see below, pp. 246–247.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

664 manian senate on December 9, 1920, which killed several persons and led to a temporary state of siege in Bucarest. This type of violence was less characteristic of Rumanian than of Bulgarian or Serbian political life, but was a foreshadowing of the political degeneracy of the 1930's.

665 175 Having served his purpose as man of the hour, Averescu's position gradually deteriorated in 1921, partly because of blunders in the cabinet but largely because the various groups which had installed him now deserted and turned against him. The Liberals, who had accepted him, withdrew their support and retired from parliament, on the rather disingenuous grounds that the government was not representative and had mishandled the Liberals' land reform. Whatever the occasion, it was apparent that with the passing of the postwar turmoil the Liberals were prepared to resume their traditional leadership. General Averescu resigned on December 17, 1921. Take Ionescu attempted to form a cabinet but failed to obtain a vote of confidence. On January 19, Ion I. C. Brătianu took over the government.

With the exception of an interlude between March, 1926, and June, 1927, the Liberals were in office from 1922 to 1928. They retained a hold on the key administrative and financial posts and exerted a decisive influence over King Ferdinand in his last years. Perhaps their strongest bulwark was the dominating personality of Ion I. C. Brătianu. This masterful old politician, who had fought stubbornly throughout the war and the peace negotiations for the realization of Greater Rumania, ruled his party and the country in an arbitrary patrician manner, and until his death the Liberals were firmly established.

On the other hand, there is little evidence that they commanded extensive popular support during these years, practically none outside the Old Kingdom. Part of their success lay in the failure of the other parties to create or maintain a united and effective opposition. Although the Liberals did resort to crude electoral manipulations and to repressive police measures, usually in connection with periodic Communist scares, they were still an old-fashioned party and had not developed these procedures to the unhappy perfection now so familiar.[7] Under sufficient pressure they preferred to retire rather than to overthrow the constitution. But it required several years for the National party of Transylvania and the Peasant party of the Old Kingdom to form the consolidated opposition which ultimately dislodged them.

[113] 7. A somewhat sensational glimpse of the dark side of the Liberal administration is given in C. G. Costa-Foru's *Aus den Folterkammern Rumäniens* (Vienna, 1926), an exposé of the terrorist methods employed by the Rumanian secret police, the *Siguranja*.

still abroad, was summarily dismissed. Peasant risings, a [66] movement for autonomy in Transylvania, and general instability led to the nomination of General Averescu to 642 office, owing to the reputation he enjoyed of being a strong 648 man, having taken an active part in suppressing the peasant rising of 1907.

General Averescu's government passed the enactment [423] dealing with the distribution of land to the peasants, while his Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Take Jonescu, laid the foundation of the Little Entente by concluding alliances with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. General Averescu attempted to open pourparlers with Russia, so as to prepare the recognition of Rumania's right to Bessarabia, and there was a fair chance of his succeeding, but he was baulked of his aim, for the King vetoed his plan.

To M. Titulescu was assigned the task of reorganizing the 652 country's finances. This was deemed to be an intrusion into 665 the special domain of the Bratianus[1], and so by provoking 661 their hostility, brought about Averescu's downfall. M. Take Jonescu was his successor, but he was able to maintain himself in office only for a month. A government constituted by the Bratianu party followed in January, 1922, and remained in power until March, 1926. Owing to the disunion among the Opposition groups the Bratianu party was allowed to carry into effect its nefarious project of securing complete control of the economic resources of Rumania. The whole legislation passed during its tenure of office was of a purely economic character, and under the pretext of consolidating the finances of the country they merely consolidated their own financial dominance.

Popular dissatisfaction was steadily growing in the meanwhile, as instead of relieving the money stringency, the economic policy of the government did nothing but intensify the evil from which the country was suffering. On [664] the other hand the Opposition was closing its ranks and organizing mass demonstrations throughout the country. A monster meeting of peasants was held at Alba-Julia in May, 1925, followed up by vigorous onslaughts against the government. The latter, unable to obtain a foreign loan which would have enabled it to stabilize the currency and relieve

[1] [The Liberal Party, headed by John Bratianu.—Analyst]

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

642 these "antiquated" forms and sancrosanctly adopted the constitutional tenets of Stalinism.[2]

Compared to the earlier document the new Constitution contains certain features which seem to corroborate the complete Sovietization of the country. In fact, were it not for political expediency in the field of foreign affairs, the incorporation of the People's Republic of Rumania into the USSR as a constituent member would be only a matter of sheer formality, necessitating merely the amending of the USSR Constitution.

[648] Short of this final step, however, the new Rumanian Constitution provides, in an almost unique manner in constitutional law, for the freezing of Rumania's foreign policy by incorporating in the text friendship and alliance with the USSR. Whereas the former Constitution completely failed to mention the USSR, the present document refers to the Soviet Union and the Red Army not less than five times. The USSR is depicted as the liberator of the country, whose friendship ensures "the independence, state sovereignty, development, and flourishing" of Rumania (Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Introductory Chapter and Article 3).

[565] The basic features of the new society are outlined in Chapter I. It defines the People's Republic of Rumania as a "state of the working people of town and countryside" (Article 1). The political foundation of the state is the "alliance of the working class with the working peasantry . . . in which the leading role is held by the working class" (Article 2). Thus, for the first time in a Rumanian constitution, the preponderance of the working class is formally acknowledged. Furthermore, the central strategic position of the Communist 665 Party and its implicit identification with the state is, as in the USSR, legally 642 declared (Article 86). In fact, notwithstanding the discrepancies existing between the constitutions of the people's republics, their main difference from the Stalin Constitution has thus far concerned the legal position of the Party. Whereas Article 126 of the USSR Constitution openly refers to the Party as the vanguard in "the struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system," the satellite constitutions typically make no mention of its role. The Hungarian Constitution of 1949, which until lately was considered as the most advanced, faintly refers to it in Article 56. In reference to the right of organizing, this Article asserts that the state "in fulfilling its tasks . . . bases itself . . . on the working class, led by its *advanced guard* (emphasis supplied) and supported by the democratic unity of the whole people." Even the new Polish Constitution of 1952 fails to acknowledge the exclusive role of the Communist Party. Although the provisions of Article 72 have merely theoretical importance, as

642 [2] In fact, all component chapters of the Constitution proper—the Social Structure, the Supreme Organ of State Power, the Organs of State Administration, the Local Organs of State Power, the Courts and the Prosecutor's Office, the Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens, the Electoral System, the Arms, Flag and Capital of the Rumanian People's Republic and the Procedure for Amending the Constitution—have an equivalent in the Soviet Constitution. Indeed, some of the articles have been copied verbatim.

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

in practice no open opposition is permitted in Poland, they nevertheless "legalize" the existence of other political organizations. 665 642

The constitutional legalization of the Communist Party's exclusive control of state power in Rumania is based on the contention that with the complete eradication of the active opposition in the country the Party no longer needs to hide under the paraphernalia of tactical secrecy. The Party's "legal" control of the state apparatus is assured by its exclusive right to nominate candidates in the elections of deputies to the Grand National Assembly (Article 100). This control is further facilitated by the provisions of the new Electoral Law restricting the right of certain groups of people considered inimical to the regime to participate in the national elections. In this respect, the 1936 Constitution of the USSR (Article 135) is more liberal; it removed all discriminatory provisions—religious, economic, and political—formerly applied against non-Bolsheviks. This distinction is based on the supposition that, unlike the USSR, Rumania as well as the other popular republics, advanced as they are, are still in the presocialistic stage of development, which necessitates an incessant waging of the class-struggle against the "enemies of the working class."

Theoretically, the people exercise their power through duly elected organs, 642 the Grand National Assembly and the People's Councils. These, in turn, appoint the necessary administrative and judiciary bodies, the Presidium, the Council of Ministers, the higher echelon of the judiciary, and the Executive Committees of the People's Councils respectively. Though the constitutional theory of exclusive legislative power in the Grand National Assembly is constantly maintained, Soviet and satellite legislative history reveals the preponderance of the Council of Ministers. While the Council is formally appointed by, and theoretically subordinate to, the Grand National Assembly, its members in reality are chosen by the Central Committee of the United Workers' (Communist) Party from among its leading functionaries. The primary function of the Council of Ministers is to effectuate the policies of the Party through the vast bureaucratic apparatus it controls; that of the Grand National Assembly is the ratification of governmental decrees.

Justice in the People's Republic of Rumania, according to the new Constitution, is administered by the Supreme Court, the Regional Courts, the People's Courts, and the Special Courts. Their main function is the defense of the political regime and the protection of communal property and of the rights of citizens (Article 65). Unless otherwise provided for by law, all judicial cases are tried with the participation of people's assessors (Article 66). [692]

The supreme supervisory power over the observance of law by all central and local governmental organs of state power and administration as well as by all officials and citizens is vested in the Procurator General of the Rumanian People's Republic (Article 73). He is appointed by the Grand National Assembly for a term of five years, and he in turn, appoints his deputies and the procurators of the local units for a term of four years (Article 74). Whereas the organs of the Procurator's Office are independent of all local governmental 693 642

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

642 of these institutions naturally became mere façades to conceal a much cruder reality. Party politics, for example, bore a very superficial re-
665 semblance to those of nineteenth-century England: two principal parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, alternated in office. But the reality behind this two-party system was altogether different. Politics were based on a very narrow franchise,[30] the parties themselves tended to be coteries surrounding a dominant personality or family, and there were constant factions and party splits. Both the Conservatives and the Liberals obtained their support from the landowners, the principal distinction between them being that the Conservatives were usually the explicit spokesmen of the large agrarian interests, whereas the Liberals were increasingly interested in making Rumania a strong modern (i.e., commercial and industrial) state and held the controlling positions in the growing financial institutions.

671 In the field of law the Rumanians demonstrated what Dobrogeanu-Gherea correctly called a "mania for legislation." A flood of laws was
177 continually being passed—elegantly rendered by men who had taken their law course at Paris—but with remarkably little effect. Some were inapplicable at the outset, few were administered properly, and most were soon forgotten by all concerned, with no effort made to examine their consequences. Other examples could be cited from the fields of public finance, civil rights, and the press to illustrate the abyss lying between political and constitutional forms and actual practice. The persistence of this dualism right up to the 1940's has undoubtedly had a corrupting effect upon Rumanian politics and society.

566 Notwithstanding these contradictions, which have struck all for-
177 eign observers in the past century, the very introduction of Western paraphernalia had certain important positive effects. A peasant who had been inducted, under universal conscription, into the army, who could read in the press (or have read to him) about agrarian disturbances in Sicily, Ireland, or Russia, or who heard the charges and countercharges of the political parties, however rhetorical these may have been—such a peasant was moving out of the closed circle of the village. This is evidenced in the active role played by ex-army ser-
185 geants, clerks, and schoolteachers in the 1907 uprising. Moreover, the mere existence of constitutional and legal devices, however in-
177 operative they may have been, provided potential channels for change and increased the flexibility of the existing order. Thus, in spite of the fact that changes were apt to prove illusory rather than real,

30. A system of electoral colleges, rather like that of Prussia before 1918, assured a preponderant strength in the assembly to the landowners and the wealthy urban groups.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

page 89

V

POLITICS IN GREATER RUMANIA

THE political history of Rumania since 1922 has been extraordinarily involved and unstable, frequently verging on the absurd but ultimately tragic. Economic circumstances as outlined in the preceding section have contributed to the continuing instability both through the tangle of political issues which they have produced and through the demoralizing effect upon political life of widespread and chronic poverty. Two important qualifications must be made, however. 178

While it is true that the task of finding remedies to Rumania's economic difficulties was forced upon all successive administrations, the governments rarely acted on the basis of purely economic considerations. A strong economic nationalism, in part arising from the desire to defend the acquisitions of Greater Rumania against Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Russian irredentism, determined policy during most of the years after the First World War.[1] 565 665

The unhealthy condition of politics stemmed not merely from the poverty of the peasants but from the fact that they were not really included in the political life of the nation. In 1924 Professor Rădulescu-Motru observed that "The passivity of the peasantry has been the principal cause of Rumania's immorality."[2] Even the Peasant party had its ideological origins in a literary movement, and the leaders of the party were, in the main, professional men and intellectuals. To be sure, in all countries there is a divergence between the direction and active membership of a political party and the mass of the electorate, but it was carried to an extreme in Rumania because of the vast gulf which had existed for centuries between the peasant and his rulers. Parliamentary politics, including even the names of parties, had been copied from the West in the nineteenth century by sections of the ruling groups anxious to modernize Rumania. Since these imported parties had little to do with the great majority of the

1. For a discussion of the effects of national interests upon the economic policy of all the Danubian states in the 1920's see Leo Pasvolsky, *Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States* (New York, 1928). Antonin Basch, *The Danube Basin and the German Economic Sphere* (London, 1944), gives a sympathetic appreciation of the difficulties confronting these states in shaping their economic policy.

2. C. Rădulescu-Motru, *Țărănismul, un suflet și o politică* (Bucarest, 1924), p. 87.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

565 inhabitants, they had remained a field for partisan skirmishes among
665 the different factions of the boyars and the growing financial and industrial interests. The limited ambit of politics was not, however, altogether the responsibility of the boyars, though most of them certainly cannot be charged with equalitarian leanings.

829 Much has been written in Rumania on the primitive state of the
642 peasant, his inability to govern himself, and the necessity for his
621 gradual, supervised initiation into the mysteries of government. While such writings often conceal an *arrière pensée*, they contain one element of truth: the economic role of the peasant, as a relatively self-contained and self-sufficient producer, does confine the orbit of his interests to his village. This limitation of interests has nothing to do with any shortcomings on the part of the peasant, but merely means that his economic and social life does not extend into many of the fields which comprise the necessary activities of modern governments. The immediate and obvious wishes of the peasant—such as more land, more lenient credit, and lower taxes—cannot be the satisfactory basis of a political program unless they can be related to some means of realizing them. The possibility of their direct and immediate fulfillment in Rumania was limited; the indirect measures which could ultimately improve his status—the over-all increase of the nation's productivity and capital—involved questions quite beyond his understanding as a peasant, if not as an individual.

565 In all states there is a gap between the desires of the average voter and the complexities of economic and administrative activity; in Rumania this gap was accentuated by the fact that almost four-fifths of the population was of the peasantry. Moreover, since such a large percentage of the population was devoted to one occupation, there was relatively little scope for the diversified play of economic and social interests in politics such as characterizes a more advanced society. Rumanian writers, regretting the division of their society between a formless mass of peasants and an oligarchic ruling group, have perennially pined for the emergence of a middle class. During the interwar period the base for political activity broadened somewhat through increasing industrialization, through the growth of a more numerous middle peasantry, and through strong regional interests in the new provinces, but the great bulk of the electorate was still the poor peasantry, whose chief historical means of declaring its wishes had been in sporadic and unsuccessful uprisings.

666 Partly for these reasons the extension of the suffrage after the First World War did not lead to political democracy. Politics, which retained a distinctly Phanariot flavor, was the art of taking advan-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

tage of the amorphous character of the peasantry. Rumanian elections were notorious for their corruption, ballot stuffing, and general unreliability as measures of public sentiment. Perhaps only two elections in the entire period were at all free and fair, and both produced a marked upset in political life. In most cases elections were "made" in advance. Many governments were in power through no popular mandate whatsoever but merely through political arrangements; dismissals were equally arbitrary and only occasionally resulted from the loss of popular confidence. It would be futile and misleading to attempt to explain the course of Rumanian politics by an analysis of the elections.

The most notable shifts in the political pattern in the years immediately after the First World War were the disappearance of the Conservative party and the rise of a number of new political formations, some of which were very short-lived. The position of the Conservatives had been declining even before the war, partly because of periodic crises in the selection of leaders.[3] The question of land reform and Rumania's participation in the war completely split the party; after 1918 there were two principal factions, the Conservative Democrats under Take Ionescu and the Progressive Conservatives under Alexandru Marghiloman. Ionescu participated in the Averescu cabinet of 1920–21, and after its fall attempted unsuccessfully to form a government; he died in 1922 and his followers subsequently joined Maniu's National party. Although Marghiloman confidently declared in 1923 that the "conservative doctrine is enjoying a flowering and an extraordinary vigor throughout the world,"[4] his party disappeared shortly and was absorbed by other groups.

Perhaps too much social significance has been attributed to the disappearance of the Conservatives as a sign of the uprooting of the old boyar class through the land reform and the extension of the suffrage. Considering the ease with which Rumanian parties were concocted from thin air and parliamentary majorities obtained, equal emphasis should be placed upon internal party weaknesses and schisms and upon the consequences of the Germanophile attitude of many Conservatives during the war. To be sure, the Conservative doctrine, if there was such, had little to offer. Marghiloman could insist that *natura non facit saltum* and urge the importance of tradition and natural development, but in plain fact Rumania was pro-

3. "The history of the Conservative Party in Rumania has been the history of struggles for chiefs." Rădulescu-Motru, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

4. A. Marghiloman, "Doctrina conservatoare," in Institutul Social Român, *Doctrinele partidelor politice* (Bucarest, n.d.), p. 111.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 gressing by irregular leaps and everyone was inclined to ridicule and revile the unhappy past. The Young Conservatives (Junimists) in the latter years of the nineteenth century had broken with the old-fashioned traditions of the great boyars, and before the war the party had included an increasing number of nonlandholding elements. In short, "conservatism" ceased to be a particularly promising political label.

A multitude of new parties made their appearance, ranging from the quickly outlawed Communists to a variety of fascist and anti-Semitic groups. Some of the parties, such as General Averescu's People's party and the historian Nicolae Iorga's National Democratic party, were little more than a coterie around a prominent man; some, notably the Peasant party and the Rumanian National party of Transylvania, had a relatively broad popular basis. Small parties represented the Jewish, German, Magyar, and Ukrainian minorities.

As the years passed the number of parties increased, often through schisms and regroupings, and the significance of political activity came to be in inverse proportion to the multiplicity of parties. The weak popular support of most of the parties, together with the extravagance of interparty squabbles, had the inevitable consequence of increasing political indifference among the mass of the people and of lending a certain plausibility to the claims of those who stood "above politics." From the beginning of the period there were appeals to "social harmony" and "solidarism" which were to reconcile political differences. Two institutions in particular served as foci for this "nonpolitical" current: the crown and the army. Although Rumania was a constitutional monarchy the crown had a strong position in both the Constitution of 1866 and the Constitution of 1923. From the days of Prince Cuza and Carol I there had been a tradition of the king father to his people, protecting them against the machinations of politicians; under Carol II this paternalism was to reach an extreme form in a monarchist dictatorship. The army played perhaps a less prominent role in Rumania than in the other Balkan states, but it was always in the background as a defender of law and order. In times of crisis or of transition, a general often appeared as head of the government; the Antonescu dictatorship was the culmination of the army's participation in politics.

Despite the multitude of parties and the general political confusion, five major currents, which successively dominated Rumania, can be discerned: the Liberal, the Peasantist, the Carolist, the Fascist, and the Communist. Chronologically, these currents overlapped and all were present throughout the period. In general, however, the

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Liberals dominated the years between 1922 and 1928. The National Peasants came to power in the latter year and were in complete control for about two years. After 1930, although they formed a government as late as 1933, their position was completely undermined by the depression, by Carol II's activities, and by internal weaknesses. Carol reigned from 1930 to 1940. The first three years, during which he was establishing himself, were altogether muddled politically; eight cabinet crises arose between June, 1930, and December, 1933. From 1933 to 1937 the Liberals, under Gheorghe Tătărescu, were again in power, but they were scarcely the party they had been under the Brătianus and were overshadowed by the king. After 1937 Carol broke up the political parties and instituted a royal dictatorship. He was ruined by the international developments which led to the loss of Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina, Northern Transylvania, and Southern Dobrogea. Marshal Ion Antonescu came to power in 1940, initially with the support of the Iron Guard, and maintained a military and fascist dictatorship until Rumania's defeat in 1944. The first governments following the armistice were coalitions, but after March, 1945, the Communists held effective power in the nominally coalition cabinet of Petru Groza.

This division of the years since 1922 into five periods, each with its dominant political current, is, of course, somewhat arbitrary. It oversimplifies the complexity of the actual political scene, and at the same time is apt to give a false impression of coherence and distinctness to these selected currents. All the parties had certain points in common, arising from the nature of Rumanian society. Parties out of power tended to raise the same objections and complaints; when they came into office they began to pursue the same practices as their predecessors. The same clichés—and this is especially the case in the agrarian question—reappear in the literature of all parties. In addition, there was a steady flow of individuals, for opportunist or other reasons, from one party to another. Nevertheless, with all these limitations, the division used here does appear to correspond to the main lines of development in the segment of Rumanian history under consideration.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

page 94

VI

THE LIBERAL PERIOD, 1922–28

Survey of Political Events

175 •665 RUMANIAN politics did not really "return to normal" until Ion I. C. Brătianu and the National Liberal party took office in January, 1922. The coalition government under Vaida Voevod, which had come in as a result of the first postwar elections in the autumn of 1919, had been arbitrarily ousted by the king in March, 1920,[1] and the war hero General Averescu was called to form a government. Averescu, who had widespread popularity among the troops and was of peasant origin, appears to have played a double role. In 1918 he had formed his People's League as a rallying point against the established corruption and inefficiency of the old parties; he had even engaged in negotiations with the extreme Left.[2] In 1919 he had temporarily joined the Vaida government; on his political campaigns he had promised five hectares of land to every peasant cultivator, a demagogic promise quite impossible of fulfillment. When he came to power, however, as leader of his People's party, it was as the restorer of order, or, as he said, "the last reserve of the Rumanian bourgeoisie."[3]

If the Averescu movement can be said to have had any leading idea at all, it was, as General Cantacuzino put it, that the reforms which were required could not be carried out by the old Liberal party

[113]

1. For the circumstances surrounding the fall of the Vaida government see above, p. 27. According to the Liberals in 1922, the Vaida government collapsed because of a rising bolshevist current: "public opinion demanded General Averescu." *Istoricul Partidului Naţional Liberal de la 1848 şi până astăzi* (Bucarest, 1923), p. 226. While there was doubtless a great deal of social unrest at this time, especially since the Socialists had refused to recognise the 1919 elections, there seems to be no reason to doubt that the downfall of the Vaida government was a direct result of collusion between King Ferdinand and the landowners to check Mihalache's proposed agrarian bill.

2. According to the socialist Titel Petrescu (*Socialismul în România*, p. 314), after the armistice Averescu had consulted with the socialists on the prospects of collaboration and had even discussed the possible overthrow of the monarchy.

3. L. Trotsky and Ch. Rakovsky, *Ocherki politicheskoi rumynii* (Moscow, 1923), p. 126. In a debate in the chamber Mihalache inveighed against Averescu's group: "Your party is a heterogeneous conglomeration, without a program, without a clear vision, and without consistency. Your party is based solely on the popularity of General Averescu, and will last only as long as that popularity endures. . . . You are purely and simply covering troops for the old parties of the ruling classes." Mihalache, *Partidul Ţărănesc în politica jărei* (Bucarest, 1925), pp. 17–18.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

but only by a new and popular force united around a man representing the "principle of discipline."[4] This yearning after discipline and order usually manifested itself in all parties when once they came to power, but was especially noticeable in those men or groups who were in office, not through the operation of the electoral system—however unreliable it may have been—but through some special circumstance. General Radescu, who was Prime Minister in the winter of 1944–45, was the last and most pathetic example. This call for discipline was an attempt to compensate for Rumania's underlying political instability. In most instances it was directed against the Left and the doctrine of class warfare.

Elections were held in May, 1920, and produced, not unexpectedly, a resounding success for Averescu's party, which obtained 209 out of 369 seats in the chamber. Averescu had made an electoral pact with Take Ionescu and had been joined by a splinter group of Transylvanians under the poet and subsequent fascist, Octavian Goga. He was also supported by a number of Conservatives and Liberals who, it was unkindly observed, felt the need of finding new bottles for their old wine. There is also evidence, however, that he did attract a fairly large popular vote from the peasants.[5] The new cabinet included Take Ionescu as Foreign Minister, and Nicolae Titulescu, well known later in the League of Nations, as Minister of Finance. The Conservative landowner Constantin Garofiid was Minister of Agriculture and Domains, and the sinister and cynical Constantin Argetoianu, an accomplished election manipulator, was Minister of the Interior. The position of the National Liberal party at this time is not altogether clear. While Averescu had attacked the Liberals, they were willing to accept his election. Doubtless they were not reluctant to stay in the background until the storms of popular discontent had been subdued.

The two principal actions of the Averescu government were the agrarian reform law of 1921, already discussed, and the suppression of Left-wing activity. In October, 1920, an abortive general strike was crushed, and the socialists who had voted for affiliation with the Third International arrested.[6] Tension aroused by the general strike and its suppression was augmented by a bomb explosion in the Ru-

4. *Ibid.*, p. 18. The position of some of the men in Averescu's group, notably Manoilescu, came to be known as neoliberalism and provided a transition from the policy of the old Liberals to the leading ideas of the Carolist period.

5. Mihalache admitted as much, saying that in 1919 a great many peasants had confused General Averescu with the Peasant party and thought that he was working with the peasants against the landlords. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

6. For further discussion of socialist activities at this time see below, pp. 246–247.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

664 manian senate on December 9, 1920, which killed several persons and led to a temporary state of siege in Bucarest. This type of violence was less characteristic of Rumanian than of Bulgarian or Serbian political life, but was a foreshadowing of the political degeneracy of the 1930's.

●665 175 Having served his purpose as man of the hour, Averescu's position gradually deteriorated in 1921, partly because of blunders in the cabinet but largely because the various groups which had installed him now deserted and turned against him. The Liberals, who had accepted him, withdrew their support and retired from parliament, on the rather disingenuous grounds that the government was not representative and had mishandled the Liberals' land reform. Whatever the occasion, it was apparent that with the passing of the postwar turmoil the Liberals were prepared to resume their traditional leadership. General Averescu resigned on December 17, 1921. Take Ionescu attempted to form a cabinet but failed to obtain a vote of confidence. On January 19, Ion I. C. Brătianu took over the government.

With the exception of an interlude between March, 1926, and June, 1927, the Liberals were in office from 1922 to 1928. They retained a hold on the key administrative and financial posts and exerted a decisive influence over King Ferdinand in his last years. Perhaps their strongest bulwark was the dominating personality of Ion I. C. Brătianu. This masterful old politician, who had fought stubbornly throughout the war and the peace negotiations for the realization of Greater Rumania, ruled his party and the country in an arbitrary patrician manner, and until his death the Liberals were firmly established.

On the other hand, there is little evidence that they commanded extensive popular support during these years, practically none outside the Old Kingdom. Part of their success lay in the failure of the other parties to create or maintain a united and effective opposition. Although the Liberals did resort to crude electoral manipulations and to repressive police measures, usually in connection with periodic Communist scares, they were still an old-fashioned party and had not developed these procedures to the unhappy perfection now so familiar.[7] Under sufficient pressure they preferred to retire rather than to overthrow the constitution. But it required several years for the National party of Transylvania and the Peasant party of the Old Kingdom to form the consolidated opposition which ultimately dislodged them.

[113] 7. A somewhat sensational glimpse of the dark side of the Liberal administration is given in C. G. Costa-Foru's *Aus den Folterkammern Rumäniens* (Vienna, 1925), an exposé of the terrorist methods employed by the Rumanian secret police, the *Siguranja*.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

In March, 1922, the Liberals made an election in which they contrived to win 260 seats, as against 17 in the 1920 elections (General Averescu's party dropped to 11 seats). The opposition parties challenged the validity of the elections and withdrew from parliament.

A sharp controversy arose over the coronation of King Ferdinand on October 15, 1922. The opposition parties contended that the coronation should be sponsored by a coalition of all parties. Despite the fact that the coronation was held in the Transylvanian town of Alba Iulia to celebrate the unity of all Rumanian lands, the Transylvanian National party boycotted the ceremony.[8]

When the Liberals called for the March, 1922, elections they announced that one of the main tasks of the new assembly would be the preparation of a new constitution. Following the coronation, they proceeded to push through this act in the session opening in November. The legality of such a one-party procedure was denied by the opposition as contrary to the guarantees of autonomy in the original contracts made between the representative bodies of the new territories and the government of the Old Kingdom.[9] The opposition parties temporarily attended the parliamentary debates on the constitution, but the tumultuous sessions did not block its passage in March, 1923.

The 1923 Constitution was based on that of 1866, which it followed in many respects.[10] Because of the acquisition of such extensive new territories, a new constitutional document was deemed necessary. The following are some of its more controversial points:[11]

8. It is illustrative of the antagonism created by the centralising policy of the Liberals that none of the chief figures responsible for the union of the new provinces with the Old Kingdom was present at the Coronation.

9. The arbitrary action of the Liberals was particularly resented in Transylvania, where the National party was undoubtedly the strongest political group. The regional autonomy of the province had already been infringed upon when General Averescu quite illegally abolished the Transylvanian Consiliu Dirigent in 1920.

10. The 1866 Constitution, closely patterned after the Belgian model, had been significantly amended on three occasions before 1923: 1) In 1879, in accordance with the stipulations of the Congress of Berlin, religious beliefs were removed as an obstacle to naturalization. This amendment was introduced to prevent the exclusion of Jews from citizenship. 2) In 1884 the number of electoral colleges for the chamber was reduced from four to three, thus broadening the franchise somewhat for the benefit of the growing urban middle class. 3) In 1914 the Liberals initiated measures for electoral and agrarian reforms. This work, which was delayed by the war, was carried out by the constitutional assembly in Iaşi in 1917. Article 19 was amended to permit land expropriation for purposes of agrarian reform; Articles 57 and 67 established universal suffrage and proportional representation for the chamber.

11. For a French translation of the text with commentary see P. R. and P. Dareste, *Les Constitutions modernes* (4th ed., 6 vols., Paris, 1928–34), II, 855 ff.; for a bibliography of Rumanian commentaries, *ibid.*, III, 228–229. An examination of some of its shortcomings was made by David Mitrany, "The New Rumanian Constitution," *The*

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

6) District and local councils had both elected members and members introduced by the national assembly. The ratio of the two types of members was not fixed (in the original draft of the new constitution, appointed members were limited to one-fifth the total) and permitted an indeterminate amount of central control over local councils. 642

7) The powers of the crown, while confined to those enunciated in the constitution, were considerable and included the right to summon, prorogue, and dissolve the assembly, appoint and dismiss ministers, and sanction or veto laws. In many constitutional monarchies the crown has similar powers, which are formalized or limited by custom; in Rumania the crust of tradition was quite thin and the crown was actually in a position to exert a great deal of influence.

8) "In case of danger to the state, martial law, partial or general, may be established by means of a bill" (Article 128).

In summary, the constitution was relatively brief (138 articles), vague on many points, and left important details to be determined by subsequent laws. There were a number of loopholes whereby civil rights guarantees could be evaded and arbitrary executive action imposed. To be sure, in most constitutions qualifying clauses recognize the state's right to take exceptional measures for its own preservation, but whereas these exceptional measures are usually understood to be applicable only in cases of emergency, the situation in Rumania was such as to make exceptional measures—arrests without warrant, violation of privacy of correspondence, and prolonged states of siege—more or less standard practice. The omissions and evasions in the Rumanian constitution were of less importance than the spirit in which the document was interpreted.

Although the opposition parties hotly attacked the Liberals, denounced the new constitution, and boycotted the assembly, they were by no means united in their actions or purposes; in 1924 and 1925 there was a frequent regrouping of party alignments. The most important question was the course to be taken by the National party of Transylvania. All parties desired to gain the support of this well-organized body; since it had been formed as a regional Rumanian party in opposition to the Magyars, rather than on a social basis, its position in the political system of united Rumania was somewhat ambiguous. In 1920 General Averescu had tried without success to gain its adherence; when Brătianu came to power in 1922 he offered Maniu three portfolios in the cabinet but Maniu refused the offer. 175 665

In June, 1924, it was announced that the National party of Transylvania and the Peasant party had officially united, but shortly

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 thereafter they drifted apart again.[13] In January, 1925, the National
● 66 party of Transylvania temporarily fused with the historian Iorga's National Democratic party (to which Argetoianu now belonged). In May, 1925, a United Opposition, including Iorga's group, Maniu's Transylvanians, and the Peasant party, was temporarily established and demanded the resignation of the government. Averescu did not join the opposition bloc and it was rumored that he had a secret understanding with the Liberals to succeed them. In elections to the newly created Chambers of Agriculture,[14] 44 out of 75 districts were won by the United Opposition, 27 by the government, and 4 by the People's party. The tide seemed to be turning against the Liberals.

One reason the Liberals were able to maintain their position in the face of a growing if uncoordinated opposition during the years from 1922 to 1925 was the perennial fear of bolshevism, which in turn served to weaken or discredit all radical or reformist movements. On
648 the international level Soviet-Rumanian relations were very bad be-
175 cause of the unresolved Bessarabian dispute. A conference held in Vienna in April, 1924, failed to bring any agreement between the two disputants.[15] Each side accused the other of plotting aggression and each took measures which aggravated the tension. The creation in 1924 of a Moldavian Soviet Republic on the left bank of the Dniester and ominous Soviet speeches forecasting the ultimate reunion of all Moldavians increased Rumanian anxiety. At the same time, in February, 1925, Vintilă Brătianu, Minister of Finance and brother of Ion I. C. Brătianu, stated his opposition to returning Wrangel's fleet to the U.S.S.R. because of the danger of a strong Soviet Black Sea fleet, and announced that negotiations were in progress for the cooperation of British, French, and Rumanian capital in the establishment of an armaments and munitions factory in Rumania.[16] Such an announcement obviously matched the Soviet thesis that the Western bourgeois powers were using the eastern European states as advanced bases for an assault upon the U.S.S.R.

13. For a discussion of the union of the Transylvanian National party and the Peasant party see below, pp. 140–141.

14. Chambers of agriculture were established in each district in 1925, with a mixed membership of elected and appointed members. In addition to their agricultural functions, they elected members to the senate. They soon became political instruments and were of very little value in the improvement of agriculture.

113 15. According to Louis Fischer, on the basis of information obtained from Christian Rakovsky, Litvinov and Trotsky were willing to accept the loss of Bessarabia, but Stalin, Rakovsky, and Chicherin were not. The latter hoped that by means of the Bessarabian issue they could "keep Rumania perennially on tenterhooks." Louis Fischer, *Men and Politics* (New York, 1941), pp. 184–185.

16. *Times* (London), February 7, 1925.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

In July, 1924, by order of the Commander of the Second Army Corps, the Communist party in Rumania and its associated organizations were dissolved for having violated state of siege regulations and for endangering the security of the state. 648 175

Bessarabia naturally suffered badly in the conflict; reports of foreign observers in these years present a desolate picture of rotting commerce, depressed agriculture, miserable administration and widespread fear and disaffection. The province had been continuously under martial law since 1919. The Rumanians reported frequent Soviet raids, plots, and instigations to violence; the Russians reported brutally suppressed peasant uprisings. Both were taking place. In the notable rising at Tatar Bunar in 1924, which involved a whole village, there is ample evidence of Communist agitation, yet an entire community does not participate in a revolt without serious occasion. 668 175

Tension was not limited to Bessarabia; in December, 1924, some 400 persons described as Communist terrorists were arrested throughout Rumania. In September, 1925, 28 members of committees of "red" unions were arrested in Bucarest. Disturbances, however, were not solely the result of Left-wing activity. Several anti-Semitic outbreaks occurred, with the usual attacks on synagogues and Jewish shops. On October 27, 1924, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, later the leader of the Iron Guard movement, achieved his first prominence by shooting the chief of police of Iaşi; he was subsequently acquitted.[17] 665 175

Under these circumstances, in which opposition to the government could so convincingly be depicted as anti-Rumanian, the Liberals, self-appointed guardians of Rumanian patriotism, were somewhat strengthened, whereas the Peasants were continually forced to protest their loyalty and to defend themselves against the charge of bolshevism.

At the beginning of 1926, however, the opposition to the Liberals became more intense. The announcement on December 28, 1925, of Prince Carol's renunciation of his right to the crown in favor of his infant son Michael [18] brought protests from the Transylvanian Nationalists and the Peasants. While expressing their continued loyalty to King Ferdinand, they refrained from voting on the bill of renunciation on the grounds that they had not been consulted on the appointment of the regency which was to govern during Michael's minority. It was widely known that Brătianu and Carol had not got

17. For the origins of the Iron Guard movement see below, pp. 226–228.

18. Carol had gone abroad with Mme Lupescu. Upon King Ferdinand's demand that he return, without her, Carol refused and renounced his right to the throne.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 on well together, and it was generally believed that Brătianu had
665 forced the king to exclude Carol.

[661] Communal elections were held in February in an atmosphere of political excitement. The government, for all its electioneering techniques, did badly, especially in the larger towns. It won only one-third of the seats in the Bucarest municipal council. In Bessarabia the United Opposition won all lists. The government was defeated in most Transylvanian towns, notwithstanding its pact with the Magyar party; it won most of the rural Transylvanian communes through official pressure and the aid of the gendarmerie.

175 In March the Brătianu cabinet reached the end of its four-year
671 term. In the last session of parliament it passed a new electoral law,
666 whose unusual provisions were to make Rumanian elections even less representative of public opinion. Deputies had previously been elected on a proportional basis. According to the new act, modeled on Mussolini's law of January 7, 1923, the party gaining a plurality and at least 40 per cent of the votes was declared the majority party: it was to receive, as a premium, half the seats in the chamber plus a number of the remaining seats corresponding to its percentage of the total vote. Thus, a party gaining 40 per cent of the votes would occupy 70 per cent of the seats in the chamber (50 per cent plus two-fifths of the remaining 50 per cent). The remainder of the seats was divided proportionally among the other parties; a party failing to gain 2 per cent of the total votes obtained no representation.

According to the Liberals, there was nothing extraordinary about this law. A bill for electoral reform had been part of the Liberal program and had been stipulated in the 1923 Constitution.[19] In a country with such a multitude of unstable parties it might be argued that the "premium," as it was called, was a necessary device to give the party in office a sufficiently strong parliamentary majority to enable it to carry on its business.

Nevertheless, given the idiosyncrasies of Rumanian politics, the law had two very unfortunate effects. Since it was the practice for the crown to summon a government, which then proceeded to hold, or "make," elections with the aid of the administrative apparatus, the electoral law increased the opportunity for the selected group to swing the elections in its favor. On the other hand, the failure of a party obtaining less than 2 per cent of the votes to gain any repre-

19. According to Article 138 of the constitution, the current national assembly (i.e., the Liberal majority) could function after the promulgation of the constitution until the expiration of its mandate. During that period an electoral law was to be passed in accordance with the principles laid down in the constitution.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

sentation was a natural incentive for such parties to abandon the 175
parliamentary track altogether. The timing of the law led the op- 671
position parties to charge that it was merely part of the Liberals' 666
plan of grooming General Averescu to replace them, since his party was obviously weak in popular support. There is no question that in 1924 and 1925 Averescu had not cooperated with the other opposition parties but had worked in some measure with the Liberals.

On March 27, 1926, Brătianu resigned amid rumors that he fa- 665
vored General Averescu as his successor. The opposition was still 175
fumbling in its efforts to unite; negotiations between the Transylvanian Nationalists and the Peasant party had broken down again on March 22 over a disagreement on the distribution of cabinet posts. The king, on March 29, consulted the leaders of the Transylvanian National, Peasant, and People's parties and requested a coalition cabinet; apparently the Peasants and the Nationalists agreed. But on the following day, much to their chagrin, King Ferdinand called on General Averescu to form a government.

The reasons for the king's action are not altogether clear. The Nationalists and the Peasants had blundered in not mending their differences earlier and achieving a solid coalition. On the other hand, the king had been responsible for their dismissal in 1920 and was probably quite doubtful of their ability to govern properly and likely to accept the advice of Brătianu. Brătianu of course denied that his party had any agreement with General Averescu but his disclaimer is not convincing. "All we did," he said, "was to prepare the atmosphere in order to bring into power a government which would present a guarantee for the continuity of the work accomplished by us. Apart from this we are the declared opponents of the present government." [20] It was generally believed, and probably correctly, that Brătianu had strongly urged the king to install General Averescu.

Averescu held elections in May. The National party and the Pea- 661
sants, still unable to achieve fusion, agreed to collaborate in the elec- 666
tion. Despite the premium Averescu faced quite a task in overcoming his party's numerical weakness, but he acted resolutely and altogether successfully in one of the more outrageous Rumanian elections. Military officers on active service were appointed as prefects of a number of districts. Circulation of vehicles and persons was strictly controlled. The leaders of the opposition were unable to get in touch with their constituents; even Ion Brătianu was blocked on one trip, and Mihalache was arrested by gendarmes in his own electoral district. Gendarmes supervised public gatherings and were directed to intervene

20. *Times* (London), April 21, 1926.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

661 if anyone attempted "to excite the people." Political manifestoes and
666 slogans required the approval of the prefect. On the day of the election, numerous opposition delegates were arrested and not permitted to supervise the voting or the counting. There was some violence and a few deaths.[21] Averescu, by these means, obtained 52 per cent of the votes, but under the premium he gained 292 out of 387 seats in the chamber, the Opposition block held 69 seats, the Liberals 16, Cuza's League of Christian Defense (an anti-Semitic formation) 10; the socialists and the Communist-sponsored workers' bloc, having obtained less than 2 per cent of the votes, were not represented.

665 After the election the National and Peasant parties continued their
175 efforts to unite. In September delegates of the two parties voted for fusion into a National Peasant party with Maniu as president and Mihalache as vice-president. Iorga, however, declined to vote, and the Peasant leader Dr. Lupu opposed the decision. The fusion was confirmed by the general congress held on October 10.

A new crisis arose with the serious illness of King Ferdinand in November, 1926, and the renewed controversies over the succession, Carol's renunciation, and the regency. The National Peasants, who believed that King Ferdinand had been an instrument of the Liberals, were dissatisfied with the succession and were reluctant to regard Carol's renunciation as final. All parties, however, felt that in the king's failing condition the Averescu cabinet was not sufficiently representative to govern alone. Brătianu sounded opposition leaders on the possibilities of forming a national cabinet. General Averescu made several unsuccessful efforts to achieve a coalition with the National Peasants, perhaps in an effort to free himself from his dependence upon the Liberals. Having failed to create a coalition he was obliged to resign on June 3, 1927.

A new "impartial" cabinet under Prince Barbu Ştirbey (a relative by marriage of the Brătianus and periodically proposed as the head of a caretaker cabinet, the last time in 1945) came to office and included some Liberals and Dr. Lupu, who had split with the National Peasants in February and formed an independent peasant group. After negotiations with the National Peasants, three members of Maniu's party joined the coalition. The principal object of this cabinet, which was in effect a temporary Liberal-National-Peasant coalition, was to preside over new and free elections. However, negotiations between Maniu and Brătianu broke down. Maniu refused Brătianu's proposal for a common list of candidates in the coming election with

21. The electoral abuses were brought up by opposition leaders in parliamentary interpellations after the elections.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

a majority of the seats going to the Liberals. The Liberals resigned from the Ştirbey cabinet on June 21, stating that it had failed in its mission.

665 175

On June 22 the king called Brătianu, who formed an all-Liberal government, with the addition of Dr. Lupu, Argetoianu, and Titulescu, and issued a manifesto: [22]

> The mission of the Government headed by M. Barbu Ştirbey to achieve an understanding and collaboration between the various political parties has not succeeded, and because of the differences of views in the midst of the cabinet, the electoral campaign threatened to become the occasion of agitation favoring political passions and subversive currents. In these conditions, a government was required which could be upheld by a solidly organized and experienced party and could assume entire responsibility for the situation. His Majesty the King has entrusted us with this heavy responsibility. We desire the sincere application of the laws guaranteeing the liberty of elections. We will not permit the disturbance of order nor the violation of law, and will not tolerate anarchist tendencies. Closely united with our collaborators in the parties which assure us their co-operation we will carry out our program which the country knows well.

This manifesto is a nice epitome of the Liberals' politics. Presenting themselves as the solid defenders of the law and the constitution, they had actually achieved, with the cooperation of the king, a very neat coup. By breaking the Ştirbey coalition and relying on the king's mistrust of the opposition, Brătianu had driven the National Peasants back into the wilderness without the slightest popular justification. The references to "subversive currents" and "anarchist tendencies," while conjuring up the specter of communism, cannot be taken very seriously unless the whole mass of the peasantry was to be considered subversive. It is not surprising that the National Peasants should have seen all the complicated political maneuvers of those years, including the schisms in their own ranks, as Brătianu machinations.

The Liberals dropped their talk of a national cabinet, and conducted the elections of July 7, 1927, in the usual manner; they won 298 out of 387 seats in the chamber; Dr. Lupu was rewarded for his cooperation with 22 seats. The National Peasants managed to obtain 49; Averescu's People's party and Iorga's group failed to obtain even the minimum of 2 per cent of the votes. The political picture

22. *L'Économiste roumain* (Organ de l'Institut Économique Roumain et de l'Association des Banques Roumaines) (July 1, 1927), p. 171.

[113]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665
175

was reverting to a two-party system, in the Rumanian style, with the National Peasants the only significant opponents of the Liberals.

Two deaths, however, were to undermine the position of the Liberals. On July 20, 1927, King Ferdinand died;[28] he was succeeded by the five-year-old Michael under a regency comprising Ferdinand's second son Prince Nicholas, the Patriarch Miron Cristea, and the first president of the Court of Cassation, Buzdugan. All parties recognized the regency but Maniu immediately demanded the resignation of the Liberals and new elections. With the death of Ferdinand, the Carol issue again insinuated itself into the conflict between the National Peasants and the Liberals. The National Peasants maintained a somewhat equivocal attitude toward the regency and while not demanding Carol's return, gave no indication that they would not welcome it. Carol, on his part, was issuing ambiguous statements from abroad, saying that he was making no plans for return but that if the people called him he would not be deaf to their appeal. The government accused the National Peasants of duplicity and prohibited their political meetings. Maniu responded by a call for a popular movement to oust the Liberals by all legal parliamentary and extraparliamentary means. In October, 1927, Mihail Manoilescu, who had been associated with General Averescu's People's party and who was to blossom into a well-known political economist, was arrested by the government on the charge of carrying political letters from Carol to Rumanian opposition leaders. The government brought him to trial, but he was acquitted, much to the Liberals' discomfiture. During the trial the government quoted letters to show that Carol had abdicated of his own will; Manoilescu in his defense maintained that Ferdinand had wanted Carol to return but that efforts at reconciliation had been thwarted by the Brătianus.

On November 24, 1927, Ion I. C. Brătianu died. With his death, following close upon that of the king, the Liberals began to lose their grip, although they remained in power for another year. There was no change in the government; Vintilă Brătianu became head of the cabinet and leader of the party. Although he had been a conscientious minister and had determined the party's economic policy, he lacked the political stature of his elder brother. Feeling the insecurity of his position, he proposed collaboration with the National Peasants, on the basis of an equal division of cabinet posts and a common list in new elections with 55 per cent of the seats going to the Liberals.

28. For a resumé of events after Fedinand's death see "La Situation politique en Roumanie après la mort du roi Ferdinand I," *M.A.B.* (*Mezinárodní Agrární Bureau*) *Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, No. 1 (Prague, 1928), pp. 55–69.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Maniu naturally refused the offer, and Vintilă Brătianu declared his 175
intention to continue as head of the government. 665

In the winter and spring of 1927–28, the National Peasants extended their attacks on what they called the usurping government. Maniu embarrassed the government in its efforts to obtain a foreign stabilization loan by declaring on December 22, that his party disapproved of the new budget and that a government without the support of the nation was not in a position to receive foreign loans.[24] In January, 1928, the National Peasants sent representatives abroad, to Paris, London and Berlin, to persuade foreign opinion that the Liberals lacked national approval.

Large protest meetings were held throughout Rumania, climaxed 175
by a massive peasant demonstration in Alba Iulia on May 6. This 662
demonstration aroused great excitement and some apprehension, but it ended in a slightly ludicrous vein. Thousands of peasants came from all over Rumania, though principally from Transylvania, to attend a dramatic denunciation of the Liberals, but at the conclusion of the rally the leaders were at a loss as to what should be done next—a problem that always plagued the Peasant leaders. Some of the more ardent ones wanted to prepare a "March on Rome," and indeed a column of peasants did march off in the direction of Bucarest, but dispersed on the way. Other leaders favored a moderation in sharp contrast to the violence of the oratory, which had blasted the government as the "enemy of the people." Most humiliating, the National Peasants were forced to appeal to the government to provide rail transport to return the peasants to their homes. But despite this touch of *opéra bouffe*, the demonstration was an impressive display of the opposition's ability to call out the peasantry.

It is quite possible, however, that the government was less worried by the direct threat of these measures than by their effect in increasing the difficulty of obtaining a stabilization loan, the principal preoccupation of Vintilă Brătianu during his year in office and his principal excuse for remaining in power. In the summer of 1928 the loan threatened to be the rock which would wreck the government. In July Vintilă Brătianu convoked the chamber in extraordinary session to report on his negotiations and to get authorization to obtain an external loan of up to $250,000,000. The National Peasant depu-

24. It should be added, however, that Maniu had not blocked discussion or voting on the budget. On December 27 the National Peasant representatives Madgearu and Popovici, while repeating that the Liberal government did not have legal authority to contract foreign loan, stated that if it did succeed the National Peasants would not subsequently refuse to recognise the undertaking, but would respect engagements taken, however unjustifiably, in the name of the state.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 ties boycotted the assembly, formed their own gathering, and resolved
663 that laws passed by the Liberal chamber could not bind the Rumanian nation. Vintilă Brătianu tried to persuade the regency that he should remain in office until the loan negotiations were completed. Ultimately, his delays and in particular his request that even after the completion of the negotiations he be permitted to retain office to supervise the application of the loan brought him into conflict with the regents, who were anxious to calm the political situation. Overestimating his position, he resigned on November 3 and dropped the negotiations.

To his surprise his resignation was accepted. The regents consulted Maniu and Averescu on the formation of a coalition cabinet; Maniu would make no agreement except on the basis of new and free elections. The regents requested Titulescu to form a coalition cabinet; Titulescu failed. Finally, the regents were obliged on November 9 to call upon Maniu to form his own cabinet.

Thus ended the long regime of the Brătianus. The combination of two failures contributed to their defeat. Politically they failed to obtain the mass support of the peasants, necessary under universal suffrage, but were unwilling, or unable, to adopt measures to prevent the rise of an effective opposition. Economically, they were unable to restore either the national finances or the condition of agriculture. The stabilization loan and the bad harvest of 1928 directly contributed to their downfall, but the continuing economic uncertainty and instability of the postwar years always gave the opposition a long stick with which to belabor them.

Composition and Political Principles of the Liberals

● 665 Although the National Liberal party[25] was pleased to trace its origins to the group of young Rumanian intellectuals who had been inspired by the ideals of the French Revolution of 1848, the temper of the Brătianu party in the 1920's bore a far greater resemblance to the rigid and narrowly conceived liberalism of Guizot in the latter years of the July monarchy. In both cases there was the same curious combination of a not unimpressive austerity with the crassest manifestations of the spirit of "enrichissez-vous." The limitations of the Brătianus' conception of political liberty should be evident from

25. This was the party's official title. The word national has usually been omitted in this paper to avoid possible confusion with the term, National Peasant, which indicates the actual fusion of two distinct parties.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665

the preceding section; they consistently rigged elections, were masters at backstage maneuvers, exerted a decisive influence over King Ferdinand, and maintained the unholy reputation of the gendarmerie. In their economic policy they displayed few of the characteristics normally associated, at least in Anglo-Saxon countries, with classical economic liberalism. The state took the lead in economic activity through monopolies and subsidies, tariffs were highly protectionist, agriculture was subjected to export duties, and foreign capital was viewed with marked suspicion.

It is perhaps too easy to dismiss the liberalism of the Liberals as pure hypocrisy having no relation to their actual practices, or to conclude, as did Mihalache, that "the Liberal party has had the tactic of bringing to its bosom the most advanced elements and of uniting them with the most conservative and reactionary elements. For the advanced elements it has one task: to write principles into the program; for the reactionary elements it has another: not to carry them out!" [26] The divergence between creed and reality cannot be attributed solely to hypocrisy and double-dealing. The Brătianus, for all their highhanded and arbitrary ways, were not unprincipled, nor are the distortions of Rumanian liberalism simply a product of personal ambitions and selfishness.

Historically, the two factors which gave Rumanian liberalism its particular bent were nationalism and the absence of a middle class. From the very beginning the Liberals were ardent nationalists and desired above all to transform Rumania into an independent modern state. A liberal creed was attached to this nationalist aim largely because of the general association in the mid-nineteenth century of liberalism with the various European national liberation movements; the Rumanian principalities in 1850 were surrounded by three autocratic empires, and it was altogether natural that liberalism should have been regarded as a weapon in the movement for independence. At the same time, liberalism in the West was intimately related to the rise of the urban bourgeoisie. In Rumania, as this element was conspicuously absent, the state was the only organ which could assume the functions of this bourgeoisie. Hence from the very outset the Liberals relied upon the state as a principal medium for economic and political progress.

In its composition the Liberal party was based originally, as were all the early political formations, upon the landowning class, perhaps primarily upon the smaller landowners, who were in opposition to the great boyars but who were scarcely representatives of a bour-

26. Mihalache, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

● 665 geoisie. In the course of time it gained additional support from the growing professional and bureaucratic groups, which made their appearance with the development of the state. With their interest in commerce and finance the Liberals obtained control of the principal banking institutions, such as the National Bank, founded in 1880, and the Banca Românească, founded in 1911. These institutions, along with the possession of important administrative posts, came to be the real strongholds of the party. Because of their predominantly nationalist outlook and their ambition to modernize the Rumanian economy, the Liberals desired to create a strong national industry. Since a nascent industry was faced with strong foreign competition, the Liberals were high tariff advocates and disciples of Friedrich List. Moreover, although Rumania was sorely lacking in capital, mistrust of imperialism—which in any Balkan state was not altogether unfounded—led the Liberals to adopt a very grudging attitude toward foreign capital. By the beginning of the twentieth century the Liberals had already formulated the phrase which was to be associated with Vintilă Brătianu's economic policy: "prin noi însine"—through ourselves.

While the development of Rumanian liberal principles does, then, find at least a partial explanation in the conditions of the country, it led to some very serious consequences. Since the state, which was controlled by a narrow oligarchy, was the principal and perhaps indispensable vehicle for economic progress, business and bureaucracy became identical. Aspirants to financial and to political success scrambled up the same ladder. Just as the state represented a concentration of political power in the hands of a restricted number, so Rumanian industry, instead of developing through the interplay of competitive producers, was created by fiat and state subsidy and was highly concentrated. These circumstances favored the worst forms of corruption. The size of the individual's income did not depend upon his productivity or even upon his economic acumen, but was more easily increased through influence, deals, and state-granted monopolies. At the same time, the total national income was so low that the vastly expanding bureaucracy which accompanied the growth of the state was inevitably underpaid and was driven to graft, bribes, and the concoction of new variations on the traditional methods of obtaining bakshish.

The main lines of the Liberal party's policy and outlook had been established before the First World War, and the Liberal regimes between 1922 and 1928 attempted to continue the party's traditions under the altered circumstances of the post-1918 world. In this they

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

were faced with a dilemma, partly of their own making. In the narrow 665
political life of the Old Kingdom, with its restricted franchise and small ruling class, the Liberals had been most successful in retaining power for the greater part of Rumania's independent existence; with the Conservatives as a foil they were even able to appear as the supporter of progressive forces, and did indeed attract a number of peasant leaders and socialists into their ranks.

With the agrarian reform, however, and the appearance of a new electorate under universal suffrage, their situation became less comfortable. It was not that they were driven to the Right—on the whole their attitude showed a marked consistency—but that their actual policy now appeared in more obvious contrast to their theoretical principles. After the agrarian reform they could no longer pose as opponents to the boyars; they became quite clearly the advocates of industry as opposed to agriculture. Since the great majority of the population were peasants, universal suffrage was bound to produce mass parties opposed to the financial and industrial domination of the Liberals, whose only defense was a perversion of the electoral process. Under these circumstances, it is rather surprising that the Liberals should have been the agents for the introduction of both the agrarian reform and universal suffrage. Two explanations may be offered. In the first place, the Liberals' initiative in these matters was by no means as great as they proclaimed it to be. They were intelligent enough to see which way the wind was blowing and realized that an attempt to block electoral and agrarian reform would merely produce a violent social upheaval. Their initiative was largely in adapting themselves to the course of events. At the same time, a closer examination of their action shows that they attempted to avoid the full implications of these reforms. Their dilatory tactics in the history of the agrarian reform have already been described. The same evasiveness is apparent in their electoral policy.

In 1913 Ion I. C. Brătianu did come out for electoral reform, but 665
his intention seems to have been the unification of all electors in one 666
college rather than three, not universal suffrage. The franchise ap- 642
parently would have been limited to literates, which would have excluded the greater part of the peasantry. In 1914, according to Mihalache,[27] Constantin Brătianu, third brother of Ion I. C. Brătianu and leader of the Liberals in the last decade, declared universal suffrage to be an aberration. The 1917 amendment, passed under the pressure of social unrest, provided for "proportional" representation. The Constitution of 1923 omitted this term, and the electoral law

27. Mihalache, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

●665 of 1926 introduced the system of the majority party premium. In
666 these developments, as Mr. Mitrany has observed, one can detect a
642 "subtle reactionary alchemy."

665 On the other hand, the Liberals' agrarian and electoral policy may not have been altogether opportunistic. There is ample reason to believe that they really regarded western European society as a model for Rumania. Many of them had been trained in Paris and in their personal lives they strove to be as Western as possible. Hence, they probably quite honestly felt that ultimately the western European peasant cultivator who enjoyed the franchise should find his replica in Rumania. Unfortunately, this goal had little to do with present Rumanian realities, and the Liberals were confronted with the alternative of Balkanizing their Western ideals or of being overthrown by them. They chose the former course.

The disparity between liberal theory and Liberal party practices in the post-1918 period appears clearly in a lecture on the "Liberal Doctrine" delivered in 1923 by I. G. Duca, who later became leader of the party on the death of Vintilă Brătianu.[28] After taking pains to refute the prevalent belief that between Rumanian parties there were only differences of persons and ambitions, not of conceptions and doctrines, Duca defined the Liberal credo in the following formula: "Progress in all forms but within the framework of the concept of individual property." Progress, however, could be realized only "through order, through democracy, through nationalism, and through social harmony." By order he meant the avoidance of anarchy, not the absence of change. He defined democracy as government of the people, by the people, and for the people, and in antithesis to demagogy. While opposing excessive or exclusive nationalism, he held that progress was possible only through the developments of national forces; economic nationalism expressed the instinct of self-preservation and was a means "to safeguard the material individuality of each nationality, to prevent its destruction by elements superior in strength or in organization." Collaboration with foreign powers or even with foreign capital was not excluded but it should be on terms which corresponded with national interests. He regarded social harmony as a necessary counterbalance to the doctrine of class struggle.

Duca then went on to show that liberalism was not a rigid doctrine, but had adapted itself to changing circumstances. It had abandoned the classical idea of property as sacred and inviolable and had accepted the principle of property as a social function, allowing for such measures as expropriation and the nationalization of the subsoil. In the field of political economy Rumanian liberalism had

[28] I. G. Duca, "Doctrina Liberală," *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, pp. 108–110.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665

dropped Manchesterian laissez faire and had recognized the right of state intervention to protect the weak against the strong. "Interventionism has arisen from the complexity of modern economics not merely as a condition of progress but as a means of avoiding violent conflicts and anarchy." Finally, in the social realm, Rumanian liberalism had advanced beyond unlimited individualism to the recognition that the individual had responsibilities for the preservation of justice and general equilibrium.

Duca recognized the far-reaching implications of these modifications and granted that "To-day there exists an antinomy between the formulae of classical liberalism and those of modern liberalism. . . . Liberty is not a sufficiently broad or inclusive concept to embrace everything which the present liberal doctrine represents." But, he maintained, the Liberal party was right in keeping its name, as a symbol forever associated with the renaissance of the Old Kingdom and the creation of Greater Rumania.

The difficulties of Duca's exposition are obvious. In so far as he defined liberalism along recognizable and customary lines, it clearly did not describe the Rumanian Liberal party. In modifying the doctrine to explain the interventionist and "state socialist" policies of the party, he so altered it that there was little reason—beyond sentiment and patriotism—to label the result "liberal." Understandably, he did not become involved in the even more difficult task of providing a liberal explanation for the electoral practices of his party.[29]

The divergence between liberal theory and the realities of the administration was too great to be overlooked, but was usually explained on the grounds of expediency. For example, in 1924, I. N. Angelescu, general secretary of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, justified state economic intervention as a temporary necessity:

> As soon as the elements of the national wealth have developed, intervention of state economic policy is quite useless. National output would reach a maximum, and its utilization on the international market would be achieved in the best conditions without the state's intervention. Until then, however, the state's economic needs and far-reaching aims may be in contradiction to the momentary needs of economic freedom.[30]

29. Rumanian Liberals have frequently resorted to the theory, so ably developed by the Italian philosopher, Benedetto Croce, that liberalism is not really a party program but rather a regulative principle standing above parties, with the duty of assuring that political and social changes are made in conformity with the requirements of liberty. Whatever the virtues of this theory, it is obvious that the Rumanian Liberal party was scarcely in a position to be considered as a detached regulative principle.

30. I. N. Angelescu, "The Increase of Production and Its Influence on the National Currency of Roumania," *Correspondance économique roumaine*, published by the Rumanian Ministry of Industry and Commerce (January–February, 1924).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 A more realistic defense of the role of the Liberal party as the leading exponent of the Rumanian bourgeoisie was provided by Stefan Zeletin.[31] Zeletin, however, did not approach the subject from the point of view of liberal principles but employed a quasi-Marxian analysis, though for purposes that were certainly not Marx's. He contended that Rumania was actually in the process of duplicating the course of capitalist development which had taken place in the western European states a century or more earlier. In his view capitalism passed through three stages, each with its own political and social system:

a) commercial capitalism—mercantilism
b) industrial capitalism—liberalism
c) finance capitalism—imperialism.

Rumania was now in the mercantilist phase, which implied energetic state intervention in the economic life of the nation.[32] High protectionist tariffs were justified as proper mercantilist measures, as was the fight against foreign capital.

The leading force in Rumania's economic development, according to Zeletin, had been the smaller boyars who, in the nineteenth century, had entered commerce and finance and by the twentieth century had become a real bourgeois class. He identified the history of the Rumanian bourgeoisie with the history of the Liberal party, which was and remained the "classical party of liberalism." As for the unhappy condition of the peasants, Zeletin held that a period of peasant misery was to be expected as a necessary phase in the transition to capitalism; just as the expansion of the British economy at an earlier date had been accompanied by enclosures and the destruction of the yeomanry, so the backward mass of the Rumanian peasantry had to suffer in the rise of Rumanian capitalism. The peasant was destined to play a secondary role in social movements and none at all in politics. In short, Zeletin was a stout defender of the Rumanian bourgeoisie, whose standard-bearer was the Liberal party, as an indispensable and inevitable element not only of past but of future progress. He condemned the Socialists on the grounds that since Rumanian capitalism was still in the process of formation and had

[113] 31. Zeletin's two most important studies, which led to lively controversies in the 1920's, were *Burghezia română, origine şi rolul ei istoric* (Bucarest, 1925), and *Neo-liberalismul* (Bucarest, 1927). An extensive criticism was made by the Social Democrat Şerban Voinea in *Marxism oligarhic* (Bucarest, 1926). A brief appraisal of Zeletin along with other Rumanian political and economic writers is given in Ion Veverca's review article, "L'Evolution économique de la Roumanie, *Archives pour la science et la réforme sociales*, 16, Nos. 1–4 (Bucarest, 1948), 523–537.

32. Zeletin, *Burghezia română*, p. 19.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

a revolutionary character, "a proletariat pursuing its own revolutionary goals is nonsense." 665

Although Zeletin's thesis, because of its callousness and low regard for the potentialities of the peasantry, could scarcely have been employed as a party doctrine, it was at least closer to the real situation than Duca's interpretation of Rumanian liberalism and did attempt to provide a justification—if only in terms of historical necessity—for the actual practices of the Liberals, the tariff policy, the economic nationalism, the supremacy of the financial oligarchy, the lack of interest in the peasants, and the hostility to radical or revolutionary politics. Nevertheless, Zeletin's defense of Rumanian liberalism, if it may be called such, will not bear critical examination. Apart from the arbitrary assumption that historical developments must follow a set course, his assertion that Rumania was retracing the path of the mercantilist states of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was based upon very questionable examples and forced parallels. The entire histories of eastern and western Europe display important social, political, and economic differences; the circumstances giving rise to mercantilism in the West were altogether different both internally and externally from those of nineteenth-century Rumania. The development of Rumanian capitalism had been continually and decisively affected by contemporary influences from the West. The curious formation of the Rumanian financial and industrial oligarchy was not a replica of the rise of the bourgeoisie in western Europe but was a particular product of Rumanian society, though similar in many respects to developments in other eastern European states. Nor is Zeletin's dismissal of the impoverishment of the peasantry as a universal necessity a tenable proposition; in some countries it did occur, but in others, such as central Germany, Bohemia, and Switzerland, industrialism developed along with a free and prosperous peasantry.

The position and activities of the Rumanian Liberals cannot satisfactorily be explained in terms of "liberal" principles, as Duca attempted to do, nor can the party be regarded simply as the sign of the rising bourgeoisie in the mercantilist phase, as Zeletin would contend. More than any other party the Liberals bear the mark of the intermingling of Western and traditional elements which so characterizes modern Rumania. The resultant anomaly led to numerous disheartening social and political consequences:

Unfortunately, our glorious urban institutions, for all their liberal-democratic techniques, are pure falsehoods. . . . We have introduced

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 liberal commercial laws, but with anti-semitism at their base; we have introduced universal suffrage, but with ballot stuffing; we have ruined rural households in order to increase credit institutions, but we have not permitted free competition among these institutions, but have favored some—those belonging to us—and have attacked others—those belonging to our adversaries; we have encouraged national industry, but not for the benefit of the rural population, as would have been right, since they made the sacrifices, but for the benefit of politicians who are pensioners of this national industry; we have centralized the administration of the country, but not in the hands of a trained bureaucracy but in the hands of the party and its partisans; in a word, we have aped the European bourgeoisie in form, but at bottom we have persisted in the sycophantic habits of the past. In this way we have transformed political life into a hopeless turmoil.[33]

Economic and Agrarian Policy

665 178 The 1911 program of the Rumanian Liberal party stated that "The agrarian question has undoubtedly been the chief preoccupation of the Liberal Government," but, significantly, went on to say, "A country in such geographic conditions and with its natural wealth cannot remain exclusively an agrarian country." [34] The second phrase was to be the dominant theme of the Liberals, and in the guidance of their actual conduct certainly overshadowed whatever agrarian preoccupations they may have had.

In November, 1921, just before its return to power, the party held a general congress and adopted a new program, suitable to the needs of Greater Rumania.[35] Like most political programs it attempted to promise all things to all people. The workers were to have an increased share in the benefits of industry. The agrarian question was seen as not merely one of property relations but of production. Better farming techniques were to be introduced, and the party undertook to encourage agricultural education, expand peasant credit, and organize the sale of agricultural products on a cooperative basis. Measures would be taken to enable the peasant to make use of forest land. As regards general economic policy:

The point of view of the National Liberal Party has long been known: the development of the wealth of the country, principally by labor, initiative, and Rumanian capital. This policy assured the economic inde-

33. C. Rădulescu-Motru, *Țărănismul, ca suflet și o politică*, p. 42.
34. *Istoricul Partidului Național-Liberal*, pp. 196–199.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 231–234.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

pendence of Little Rumania; it will assure the economic independence of Greater Rumania. Such a policy does not exclude the collaboration of foreign capital, but it wishes to have relations of sincere collaboration with such capital, not relations that will degenerate into a monopoly, dangerous to the national sovereignty and leaving the Rumanian nation poor in one of the richest lands of Europe.

As in 1911, the 1921 program combined a professed interest in the agrarian sector with a determination to develop the wealth of the nation—i.e., to industrialize—primarily through local initiative and capital.

Facing this optimistic program was the bleak reality of Rumania, devastated by the war but with extensive new territories whose economies were as yet unintegrated. Because of the campaign against Bela Kun's Hungarian Soviet republic in 1919, the war had lasted a year longer than in the West. By 1921 some recovery had been made and the first postwar budget presented, but the principal work of recovery and unification still lay ahead. The Liberals attempted to achieve recovery and industrialization simultaneously; in this effort, which strained Rumania's limited economy, interest in agriculture occupied a second place.

1. UNIFICATION OF THE ECONOMY

Before the First World War, the Old Kingdom, Bessarabia, Bucovina, and Transylvania had belonged to entirely distinct economic organizations, and their amalgamation after the war involved not merely administrative and financial readjustments but a complete reorientation in transport, commerce, and communications. The process of reorganization required a number of years, and indeed was not really completed by the end of the interwar period. Western Transylvania and the Banat suffered from the disruption of their ties with the Hungarian plain, the more so as industry was moved toward eastern Transylvania for reasons of security. Bessarabia seems never to have recovered from the loss of the Russian market for its agricultural produce.

A number of steps toward unification had been made before the Liberals came to office. Administrative centralization began under General Averescu in 1920; the various agrarian reform laws had been coordinated in some measure. In 1920 Russian rubles and Austro-Hungarian crowns had been exchanged for lei. This process was carried forward under the Liberals. The law of February 23, 1923, unified the tax system for the whole of Rumania. Banks of the Old King-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

965
178

dom, many of which were controlled by the Liberals, extended their influence into the new territories, either by absorbing local banks or by setting up branch offices.[86] The nationalization laws of 1924, which will be discussed presently, increased the participation of the Old Kingdom in the industrial life of the new provinces. These measures evoked threefold criticism: the provinces complained that they were being exploited to the benefit of the Old Kingdom; the minorities, especially the Hungarians, complained that they were suffering discrimination; the opposition parties charged the Liberals with using their official status and banking connections for the personal advantage of party members. Although it is next to impossible to find the core of truth in Rumanian financial scandals, there is little reason to doubt that the acts of unification and centralization were to the advantage of the Old Kingdom as against the provinces, of the Rumanians as against the minorities, and of the Liberal party as against all comers.

Transylvania with its relative wealth was the happy hunting ground for such activities (Bessarabia suffered wretchedly from the administrative centralization, but seems rather to have been a place of exile for unsuccessful administrators and political black sheep). National Bank credits were more generously supplied to Rumanian than to Magyar banks.[87] In 1929 the National Peasant economist, Virgil Madgearu, charged the Liberals with having introduced the law for the nationalization of methane gas for the purpose of gaining control over Transylvanian industries.[88] On the other hand, as Mr. C. A. Macartney has pointed out, the actual effect of "nationalization" upon the minority firms in Transylvania was less than might have been expected because of the generally lax way in which the measure was applied.[89] With respect to taxes there was a general belief among the Transylvanians that they were paying more than their

86. Alfred Bonafous, "Les grandes banques d'affaires de Roumanie," *Revue d'économie politique*, 38 (Paris, 1924), 229-243.

87. C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors*, p. 323.

88. G. C. Legio, *Romania*, p. 136. According to Madgearu, an exclusive monopoly for the production of methane was given to a Liberal group, who supplied gas to industrialists at excessive prices, forcing them out of the market and leaving it free for rival firms belonging to Liberal confreres.

89. "The 'nationalization' of the minority firms has consisted in the practice of putting in a few Rumanian directors, who are given a packet of free shares or allowed to buy them at a nominal rate. After this, the average Rumanian director has been perfectly content to fill the role of guinea pig, his contribution to the business being to protect it against the Government. As most of these directors are Liberal politicians, they have usually been able to do so effectively. The activities of the 'Special Economic Commissions' have thus, paradoxically enough, been the strongest defence for the minority firms." Macartney, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665
178

share, because of stricter tax collection, and were receiving less in the way of public benefits.

2. RECOVERY

665
652

In tackling the problem of economic recovery the Liberal Minister of Finance, Vintilă Brătianu, adopted a policy of stern but primitive retrenchment. A dogged and truculent nationalism was manifest in the futile effort to revalorise the leu, in the restrictive tariff schedules, and in the suspicious attitude toward the investment of foreign capital. While his policy did achieve some desirable financial housecleaning, it was a strait jacket on the Rumanian economy and signally failed in its major aims. The fault, perhaps, lay not so much with his ideas as such, which did show a sturdy desire that Rumania should stand on its own feet, as with the fact that his goals and technique were not in accord with the potentialities of the Rumanian economy and administration.

One of Vintilă Brătianu's paramount aims was a balanced budget, which he saw as the keystone to the country's economic well-being. Between 1919 and 1922 the budgets, even though they made no provision for servicing the national debts, showed deficits which were covered by new issues of paper currency. He set about to balance the budget by cutting expenses to the bone, by covering expenses solely from the normal resources of the state, and by giving the budget sufficient elasticity to meet the fluctuations of the currency. Beginning with the fiscal year 1922–23 the budget showed a constant surplus of revenues over expenditures. Later reports of the French technical adviser to the National Bank indicate, however, that the announced surpluses in this period were in fact either nonexistent or far smaller than would appear from the accounts.[40] He also succeeded in consolidating part of Rumania's considerable foreign indebtedness by means of a British loan and in arranging for regular means of payment of a portion of the nation's debts.[41] These measures were necessary in clearing up the complete economic chaos of the war years; they did not, however, succeed in really strengthening the economy.

40. According to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Balkan States: I. Economic*, p. 48, somewhat the same thing occurred in all the Balkan states. After 1924 most of them showed a budgetary equilibrium that was, in fact, largely fictitious, partly because of doubtful accounting techniques, and the continued increase of expenditure even after the *de facto* stabilization of the currencies, indicating that the budget equilibrium was dependent upon continued rising prices.

41. V. V. Badulescu, "La Dette publique roumaine," *L'Economiste roumain*, 2, No. 4 (April, 1928), 111–114.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

665 652 Vintilă Brătianu was particularly unsuccessful in his efforts to revalorize the leu, which had been one of the chief reasons for his budget policy. The currency had been badly hit by the war, by the unbalanced budgets which had led to state borrowing from the National Bank, and by the unfavorable balance of payments. In 1923, however, with the balanced budget and the funding of some of the foreign debts, the currency ceased to depreciate, although it remained very unsteady. His severe deflationist policy, which was to restore the leu to its prewar gold level in the course of ten or fifteen years, had a depressing effect upon production; the restriction of currency led to a stringency in credit and a great rise in the interest rate. The leu did not recover but wobbled in such a manner as to create an atmosphere of chronic uncertainty in trade and industry. As the years passed there was increasing clamor for a stable currency. Vintilă Brătianu was reluctant to seek the aid of foreign powers or the League of Nations in stabilizing the currency, largely, it appears, because of a fear of external interference and supervision over internal financial policy.[42] In 1927, however, the original plan of revalorization was abandoned, and the last hectic year of the Liberal regime was spent in attempting to secure a foreign loan to stabilize the currency. But by that time the internal political situation had placed Vintilă Brătianu in the center of a vicious circle: the political crisis impeded his foreign negotiations and his delay in obtaining the loan undermined his position in the country.

The same exaggerated and self-defeating rigidity is to be seen in the field of foreign commerce. Immediately after the war, when production was low and demand great, export trade was put under severe controls and restrictions, though imports were unrestricted. The resulting great excess of imports over exports was checked in 1921 by rising tariffs. After the Liberals came to power the import tariff became increasingly an instrument of industrial protection. Tariffs were raised in 1924 and again in 1926 and 1927. By the end of the Liberal regime, Rumania had one of the highest tariff systems in Europe. This policy was in accord with the whole tenor of Liberal thinking with its emphasis upon the protection of industry.

More surprising, however, was the policy on exports. After 1922 the initial system of export prohibitions and quotas was dropped but was replaced by high export duties. There were several reasons for these export restrictions and duties. They were designed in a period of shortage to keep down the internal cost of living as an anti-inflationary move. They facilitated the process of directing the trade of

42. *L'Economiste roumain*, 3, No. 9 (June 15, 1927), 164.

3: Roberts -4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

the new territories away from Austria, Hungary, and Russia and into the domestic market. Most important, perhaps, they came to be an important source of fiscal revenue. Since they were payable in gold or foreign currency, they supplied the government with funds for foreign debt payments.[43] Between 1923 and 1926 they yielded a greater revenue than the import duties; the government was naturally reluctant to part with them. They had, however, an altogether depressing effect upon Rumanian commerce and upon agriculture. Since exports were really the sole means by which Rumania could improve its adverse balance of payments, these duties, in their effect of reducing exports, appear to have very little justification.

665 652

Export duties were dropped in 1927, and Vintilă Brătianu announced, "The progressive reduction of these taxes until their final suppression forms, as you know, part of our governmental program." At this time he took the position that Rumania was at last ready to move on to a new stage of activity. "If up to the present I have been obliged to perform the work of a doctor in healing the wounds of the past, I hope to be able to resume in the future my profession as engineer—which is to create." [44] Whether or not one accepts his assertion that the Liberals had planned these changes all along, it must be admitted that the Liberals were remarkably adept at reversing themselves and then assuming credit for farsightedness.

To summarize, the Liberals' policy for recovery was only in part successful. Despite an almost puritanical view toward the economy and the desire to improve "through ourselves," their program had a way of destroying on the one hand what it attempted to create with the other. The Brătianus' injunction that Rumania get a firm grip on itself seemed likely to lead to self-strangulation.

3. INDUSTRIALIZATION AND EXPLOITATION OF RESOURCES

665 433

The Liberals not only tried to bring about economic recovery, they were also intent upon exploiting the natural resources of the country and creating a national industry, primarily by state encouragement. In 1927 Vintilă Brătianu defined the principal factors in the development of the nation's riches as "the state, professional chambers, official bodies, and private action, individually or in association." [45] A law for the encouragement of national industry, already passed in 1912, was extended to the whole of Rumania in 1921. Industries

43. Pasvolsky, *Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States*, p. 482.
44. Vintilă Brătianu, exposé de motifs for the 1928 budget, *L'Economiste roumain*, 5, No. 10 (December 1, 1927), 328.
45. *L'Economiste roumain*, 5, No. 4 (April 1, 1927), 82.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 433 covered by this law were permitted to purchase public land at a discount, were exempted from duties on imported machinery, and received reduced transportation rates and cheap fuel. In 1923 the Liberals introduced a National Industrial Credit Association for the purpose of granting credit to manufacturers and of encouraging industrial development; the government owned 20 per cent of its stock, the National Bank 30 per cent, and private investors 50 per cent. Tariffs, as has been mentioned, were designed to protect industry from foreign competitors.

665 656 In their industrial activities the Liberals most clearly demonstrated their suspicion of foreign capital. This suspicion was nothing new. In the 1890's the Liberals, then in opposition, had led a successful campaign against granting concessions to the Standard Oil-Diskonto Gesellschaft consortium.[46] In the 1920's they maintained they were not hostile to foreign capital but would not be dominated by it. In 1923 Vintilă Brătianu protested to a foreign correspondent:

> It would be madness to suppose that we can develop the country without the help of foreign capital. We need it in every form to develop mineral resources, water power, and industry. We also require things which must be paid for in foreign money. But we want this capital to operate within the lines of a general policy which is approved of by the state and which accords to the interests of the country. We do not want the type of investor who comes to exploit the country simply to make money, but one who has a feeling for our national evolution and keeps our interests at heart. We want to be treated as an adult and not as a minor.[47]

[671] Nevertheless, the Brătianus were accused both by the opposition in Rumania and by foreign investors of being economic xenophobes. The accusations are based largely on a series of four "nationalization" laws passed in 1924:[48] a law for the commercial exploitation of state enterprises (June 6, 1924), laws on water power (June 23) and other sources of energy (July 1), and a mining law (July 3).

These laws, which covered a wide range of industrial activities—hydroelectric power, natural gas, petroleum, mines, railroads, river navigation, postal services, telephones and telegraphs, and government monopolies—had generally the same provisions. Invested foreign capital in the enterprises could not exceed 40 per cent; the remaining 60 per cent was to be covered by state and private Rumanian

46. C. G. Rommenhöller, *Gross-Rumänien* (Berlin, 1926), p. 484.
47. *Times* (London), May 19, 1923.
48. A French text of these four laws is given in *L'Économiste roumain*, Nos. 2-6 (1924).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

capital. At least three-fourths of the personnel and two-thirds of the boards of directors were to be Rumanians. Since the subsoil had been nationalized under the constitution, all mines and oil wells were in the form of concessions which would ultimately revert without indemnity to the state, although existing enterprises were to be guaranteed their holdings for a period of fifty years. Because of its importance to the oil industry, the mining law created the greatest stir and the most complaint from foreign investors.

The Liberals' suspicion of foreign capital was not altogether groundless; pre-1914 foreign investments in the Balkans, while of vital importance to their development, were entangled in the play of power politics. In view of subsequent actions in other states and in Rumania itself, the 1924 laws must be considered as quite mild. But at the time they were regarded as inhospitable and evoked formal protests from abroad and lavish criticism at home. Essentially, however, the question was not whether the Liberals were justified in their suspicions nor whether the opposition was right in charging the Liberals with personal greed, but whether Rumania was in a position at that time to develop at the desired rate without the benefit of foreign capital. From the subsequent turn of events it would appear it was not. The limitation of foreign capital, together with the stringent monetary policy and the impediments to agriculture united in stifling the economy. When the People's party took office in 1926 it promised better relations with foreign capital, and when the Brătianus returned in 1927 their tone underwent a change. Foreign observers spoke of Vintilă Brătianu's more cooperative attitude, and *L'Économiste roumain*, his faithful echo, wrote hopefully of increased foreign interest in Rumanian enterprises.

4. AGRARIAN POLICY

The general economic program of the Liberals did not make for a constructive agrarian policy. Not only was agriculture relegated to second place in the attentions of the administration but several of the courses pursued were directly inimical to it. The encouragement of industry was at the expense of agriculture; the commercial and financial policy impeded the rehabilitation of farming after the war and the dislocations of the agrarian reform.

Of course, many of agriculture's woes were not the fault of the Liberal policy. As has been seen in the preceding chapter, the underlying sources of the agrarian problem are numerous and deep-rooted. Rumania, for all its natural resources, was a poor country and no government could have established a flourishing peasantry overnight.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665
241

Nevertheless it may be said that Liberal policy harmed rather than aided agriculture. The more important question, however, is whether the sacrifices exacted from agriculture were more than balanced by benefits to the whole of the economy. Final judgment of Liberal economic policy must rest on this question, which will be examined presently.

Liberal neglect of Rumanian agriculture was criticized by Constantin Garoflid, Minister of Agriculture in the Averescu cabinet of 1926: "It is not normal that our country should possess a *Crédit Industriel*, while agriculture is deprived of a financial institution when its needs are at their greatest."[49] The limited supplies of capital were directed by the government and the banks into industrial channels where they were promised better returns. Indeed, facilities for agricultural credit were less than before the First World War.[50] The absence of credit, only in part a consequence of policy, drove the peasants to the usurers and into chronic indebtedness. The handling of payments and compensation for land transferred in the agrarian reforms served to drain money from the agricultural sector of the economy. Peasants were urged to make full payment as rapidly as possible, while the funds received were not devoted to the amortization of the long-term bonds owing to the expropriated landowners but became a source of revenue for the state.[51]

[651]

A serious drag on agriculture was the tariff policy pursued by the Liberals. The import tariffs, especially the duties on agricultural implements and textiles, raised the operating costs of the peasant.[52] Even more crippling were the export duties which primarily affected agricultural products, the chief Rumanian export. On some occasions these duties equalled 50 per cent of the value of the product.[53] They were not only a heavy burden on agriculture but completely disorganized the grain trade. Since the smaller peasants were producing primarily for their own consumption, the export duties did not affect them directly, but as the tariffs were aimed at maintaining a low cost of living they affected those particular commodities which the small peasant did supply to the local market.

Against these disadvantages, the Liberal party offered very little

49. *L'Economiste roumain*, 2, No. 5 (May, 1926), 160. During his short term in office Garoflid attempted to establish such an institution but was unable to put it into effect.

50. Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, p. 425.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 421.

52. The duty on ploughs was 20–30 per cent ad valorem, that on imported sacks was about 50 per cent.

53. Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 436.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

in the way of concrete benefits. Liberal agrarian policy can be divided under two heads: measures taken in supplementing or amending the agrarian reforms and measures for the improvement of agriculture. 665 241

Of the land reforms, only that for Translyvania had provided for the expropriation of forest land. Article 132 of the 1923 Constitution approved the principle of expropriating forest land in the Old Kingdom, Bessarabia, and Bucovina for firewood and construction purposes. The law implementing this article was published on July 1, 1924. Where woodland was needed and was not available from state holdings, it could be expropriated from private owners leaving them a minimum of 100 hectares. Communal woodlands were to be created, the exploitation of which was to be under the control of the state.[54] 423

By the law of March 13, 1925, and the executive regulation of April 15, which abrogated Articles 120–124 of the 1921 law, the Liberals, to safeguard peasant holdings, considerably stiffened requirements for the sale and purchase of agricultural property. The state was given the right of preemption on lands received not only under the 1918–21 reforms but under earlier distributions of state domain. If this right were not exerted, purchases could be made only on the following conditions: 423 665 656 241 671

1. The purchaser was to be a Rumanian citizen, a cultivator of the land or a graduate of an agricultural school, and residing and working in the commune in which the holding was situated.

2. Holdings could be sold in minimum blocs of 2 hectares in the plains and 1 hectare in the hills.

3. Sales could be made only five years after their owner had received definite title to his property following full payment of its price.

4. The purchaser could not own more than 25 hectares of cultivated land, including the area to be purchased. Houses and gardens, up to one hectare, could not be mortgaged or sold; land up to 25 hectares could be mortgaged only to certain authorized institutions.

The detailed instructions in the accompanying administrative regulation made the act of sale quite complicated by requiring numerous forms, proofs of domicile, and evidence of proper ownership. While the Liberals did not make peasant land inalienable they did render the process of transfer slower and more difficult and extended the state's rights of preemption to a large proportion of peasant properties. This law was in harmony with the tight-laced spirit of the Liberals in 1924–25 and showed the same restrictive view of property as the mining law of 1924. Historically, the reversion toward inalien-

54. See Disconescu, *Chestiunea țărănească în România*, pp. 266–272, for analysis of the text of the law.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

423 665 656 241 671

ability was an aftermath of nearly all the land reform measures. It is characteristic of the liberalism of the Liberal party that it should have feared—though perhaps correctly—the consequences of free and uninhibited sales of land.[55]

665 241

The Liberals, in the law of April 14, 1925, instituted chambers of agriculture, modeled on the chambers of commerce, and united in a Union of Chambers of Agriculture. At first sight these organs appeared to have very important functions: to be the official representatives of agricultural interests, to give advice on agricultural legislation, to supervise agricultural schools, to collaborate with the administration in the application of laws, to improve livestock, to aid in the advancement of agricultural techniques, to prepare statistics, and to organize fairs. They were also to elect members to the senate.

Unhappily, the chambers accomplished very little. Their budgets depended upon the Ministry of Agriculture, and they were not supplied with sufficient funds to carry out the work delegated to them.[56] They were not even representative of the whole of the peasantry. Each chamber was composed of 17 elected members and 11 appointed functionaries. But since only proprietors with a minimum of 3 hectares of arable land, or tenants with 10 hectares were permitted to vote for members, a large percentage of the poor peasants was not represented at all.[57] (In 1930, 52 per cent of the peasant farms were of less than 3 hectares.) Worst of all, the chambers, with their right to elect senators, became hopelessly entangled in politics. Under the law creating them, the government could dissolve the chambers for serious irregularities or bad faith in the accomplishment of their legal work or for activities against the interests of the state. Inevitably, the chambers were repeatedly dissolved on any pretext for the purpose of facilitating the election of senators.

665 656 241

In May, 1928, the Liberals passed a law for the classification of cereals, designed to improve the quality of grain destined for export and to reduce the number of middlemen between producer and foreign consumer. There had been frequent complaints of the inferior quality of exported Rumanian grain and the presence of an excessive amount

55. In 1911 the Liberal program has spoken of the desirability of creating a medium property by natural selection, that is, by the purchase and sale of land. The 1924 law certainly represents a retreat from that position. On the other hand, as will be seen below, the National Peasants revised the 1925 law, for the purpose of permitting "natural selection," but with unfortunate results for the poorer peasants.

56. F. E. Manoliu, *La Reconstruction économique et financière de la Roumanie et les partis politiques* (Paris, 1931), p. 159.

57. Filip Chefner, "Camerile agricole în România," *M.A.B.: Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, 2 (1926), 86.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

of impurities. An improvement was undoubtedly desirable. Yet the low quality of exported grain was but a symptom of the generally bad condition of agriculture. Attacking the problem at the level of exports was indicative of the Liberals' attitude. The opposition sharply criticized the law as missing the point: "We are not suffering from a commercial crisis," said Mihalache, "but from a crisis of production. The problem of production must be solved first." [58]

In July, 1928, shortly before the Liberals fell they passed a cooperative code which had little effect except to reorganize previous cooperative organizations and to increase the direct control of the state. On the whole, as has been mentioned, the cooperative movement was and remained weak and ineffectual. In 1923–24 the National Bank granted 600 millions of lei credit to the whole of the cooperative movement, whereas private bankers received 7,500 millions.

A "battle for production" was inaugurated in 1928 by the Minister of Agriculture, Argetoianu, and in March an agricultural congress voted a resolution which is striking in its complete emphasis upon technical improvements: better seeds, more rational crop rotation, more fertilizers, the expansion of experimental stations. The resolution opposed a further extension of the area under wheat and recommended an effort to raise the output per hectare. In no case, however, did it penetrate to the level of agrarian reforms, as defined in the preceding chapter, but was wholly occupied with desiderata, which were simple enough to call for but very difficult to achieve.

These final efforts of 1928 were, however, of little import, as they were in large part a belated effort to meet the challenge of the opposition which was on the point of coming to power.

It is not easy to judge the successes and failures of the Liberals' economic policy. It seemed easier immediately after their defeat to see their errors and particularly their shortcomings in the agrarian question. But with the failure of subsequent administrations to improve agriculture or to provide a stable economy the nature of the Liberal failure becomes less obvious. Moreover, many of the economic practices of the Brătianus, regarded as heretical at the time, have become generalized not only in the Balkans but throughout Europe; state-supported industrialization has become a commonplace and has received a substantial body of theoretical justification. Yet with all these added qualifications, it may be concluded that the Liberal policy failed.

58. Quoted in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 452.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

For all their opportunism, favoritism to party members, and questionable economic ethics the Liberals had an economic policy. It was not a "liberal" policy and it was not altogether self-consistent, but it was manifest in almost all the economic legislation passed between 1922 and 1928, in agriculture as well as in industry, finance, and commerce. It was based upon a strong nationalism and upon a greatly simplified view of the nature of economic progress. Failing to realize the double-edged nature of most economic decisions, the Liberals had a rather naive faith in the possibility of creating things by fiat. They spoke of Rumania's natural resources as though they were something to be garnered with a little diligent shoveling; they expected the currency to regain its prewar gold level by a mechanical correction of the budget and the balance of trade; in so far as they concerned themselves with agriculture they attempted improvements at the level of export trade or of Chambers of Agriculture. The same attitude was shown in their tendency to restrict movement: currency issues were held below the level necessary for normal business transactions; both imports and exports were inhibited; sales of agricultural land were impeded.

This Liberal attitude should not be confused with "planning." There is little evidence that the Liberals had a comprehensive view of the economy. Industry undoubtedly expanded at the expense of agriculture, yet the policy of export duties on agricultural produce would not indicate a consistent program of nourishing industry through the proceeds of agriculture.

The Liberals fell between two stools. They were unwilling, more for nationalist than for economic reasons, to accept the consequences of a free economy; they feared it would keep Rumania a weak agrarian state at the mercy of foreign capital and unable to provide the means for its own defense. But they were not fully aware of the far-reaching consequences of a directed policy of forced industrialization. In a country as poor and as small as Rumania, a successful policy of development "through ourselves"—and not merely a policy whereby a minority skims off the cream at the expense of the majority—would have involved a long-range program of organized forced savings quite beyond the powers of the Brătianu regime.

The Liberals' economic program had a decisive effect upon their political position. Under the best of circumstances, it would be difficult to persuade a peasant electorate that agriculture should pay for the advancement of industry. In Rumania, with a very primitive peasantry on the one hand and a not very public-minded group of industrialists on the other, it was impossible, especially when there

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

was a large and articulate Peasant party vociferously criticizing "artificial industries." The Liberals, however, were unwilling to accept the logical consequences of this contradiction and make a clean break with democratic procedures. They preferred to pervert them and when, in 1928, that failed they fell from power. In the 1930's there was to be less squeamishness in this matter.

665

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

VII

THE PEASANTIST PERIOD, 1928–30

Survey of Political Events

• 665 175 PERHAPS the most disheartening episode in Rumanian history between the wars was the failure of the National Peasant party during its brief term of office after the fall of the Liberals. The period between the formation of the Maniu government in November, 1928, and Maniu's resignation in October, 1930, is a watershed: 1928 was the culmination of a political struggle which had been going on since the end of the First World War; 1930 was the beginning of the long descent into the abyss of 1940 and 1941. The inability of the National Peasants either to relieve the agrarian question or to maintain their political power ended the prospect o a peasant democracy.

When the regents, on November 9, called upon Maniu to form his own government, the National Peasants came into office on a wave of national enthusiasm and optimism. There were widespread rejoicings over the "bloodless revolution"; not only peasants but even business circles and some Liberals were happy to escape from the confining atmosphere of the Brătianu regime. On November 11 Maniu formed an all National Peasant cabinet, including in its important posts: Vaida Voevod at the Interior, G. Mironescu, a wealthy Moldavian who had come from Take Ionescu's party, in the Foreign Office; Ion Mihalache at Agriculture; and Virgil Madgearu at Commerce and Industry. On the following day he announced that "Our first aim will be to give the principles of the Constitution their real meaning and impart a character of strict legality to the working of the administration." [1] He went on to say that he would not disrupt his predecessors' work in the negotiations for a stabilization loan, that he would organize agricultural credit, and give greater power to local institutions. Certain ministries were to be abolished, martial law and censorship to be suspended.

665 In these initial statements the general aims of the new government are apparent: the primary stress is upon restoring, or rather creating for the first time, a truly constitutional regime. Secondly, the aid of

1. *Times* (London), November 12, 1928.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 foreign capital is to be sought to repair the national economy. Thirdly, if not as an afterthought at least not underlined, agriculture is to be assisted. Considering the battle against Liberal arbitrariness and the general clamor for a stable currency and foreign capital, such an order of emphasis is not surprising, but it does indicate that direct interest in the welfare of the peasantry was qualified by other, though not necessarily unrelated, considerations.

In the general elections of December 12 the National Peasants, allied with the German party and the Social Democrats, won an overwhelming victory in what is conceded to have been a free and fair election. They gained about 80 per cent of the votes and 348 seats in the chamber (333 seats to the National Peasants, 7 to the German party, and 8 to the Social Democrats). The Liberals obtained only 13 seats; the Averescu-Iorga coalition 5; the Magyars 16; Dr. Lupu's dissident peasants 5; the Peasant Labor party (a Communist organization) and Cuza's anti-Semitic Christian League failed to gain the necessary 2 per cent of the votes. Despite their criticism of the 1926 electoral law, the National Peasants did not repeal it when they came into office and, like the other parties, took advantage of the government premium.

665 652 The first major step was the stabilization of the leu. Vintilă Brătianu's foreign negotiations were resumed, and an agreement was reached in Paris on February 3, 1929.[2] A $72,000,000 loan for stabilization and railway construction was floated in Washington, London, and Paris; a further $30,000,000 was secured against a concession of the Rumanian match monopoly to a Swedish group. The security of the loan was based on the revenues of the Institute of State Monopolies, created for the purpose. Orders for railway equipment were to be made in the countries floating the loan. The French economist, Charles Rist, who had informed Maniu in December that the loan was dependent upon a reorganization of the treasury, went to Bucarest to supervise the loan and the operation of Rumanian finances. All these conditions were, of course, precisely what Vintilă Brătianu had hoped to avoid through his unsuccessful policy of revalorization. On February 8 the Rumanian assembly passed a law fixing the leu at 10 milligrams gold, 167.18 lei to the dollar.[3]

The government worked hard to attract foreign capital and to set

2. Largely for reasons of prestige, Brătianu, unlike the governments of the other Balkan states, had not gone to the League of Nations for the stabilization loan but had sought it through independent negotiations. Maniu felt obliged to continue this course, although it was reported that he could have obtained better terms through the League.

3. For a detailed account of the monetary reform, see Alexandre-Ionesco Ivanof, *La Réforme monétaire roumaine* (Paris, 1929).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDI

665 internal finances in order. In March the 1924 mining law was revised
652 to give more favorable treatment to foreign concessions. State expenditures were reduced through the elimination or consolidation of several ministries.[4]

665 For all their energetic beginning, before the National Peasants had been in power a year, the first flush of enthusiasm was beginning to fade. The badly defeated opposition undertook to rally its forces and started a press campaign of villification and sensational rumors. After the passage in July of the administrative reform bill, which attempted to reduce excessive centralization and place greater authority in the hands of local administrations, both the Liberals and General Averescu's party withdrew from the assembly. In the same month was uncovered an absurd fascist plot among army officers to overthrow the government. To defend the regime against these fascist currents, some of the party's younger followers set up their own paramilitary bodies.

665 At the same time that the Right was increasing its activities, the government came into conflict with the Left. Bessarabia was still a
661 trouble zone; there were frequent reports of Soviet espionage teams crossing the Dniester. In February, 1929, A. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, son of the old Social Democratic leader and himself a former leader of the Rumanian Communists, was arrested and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment for secretly returning to Rumania from the U.S.S.R. In August a strike broke out among 3,800 coal miners in the Jiu Valley. Troops were called and when the strikers attempted to take over the electric plant of the Lupeni mines the troops fired, killing over a score of miners. The massacre in the Jiu Valley has often been cited as an example of the perfidy of the National Peasants, but it should be said that when the government investigated the event, it not only blamed the miners for having violated the law but also censored the mining companies for permitting the conditions which had led to the strike. It dismissed all the police and military officials connected with the affair.

A couple of months later an attempt was made on Vaida Voevod's life. In the investigation which followed, one suspect, who was later proved to have been innocent, was horribly beaten and crippled by the police. Again there was a public scandal and the government

4. The bewildering changes in the names and numbers of Rumanian ministries seem to be largely a result of the need to provide portfolios for persons or groups who have supported the administration. The Ministry of Fine Arts has been the favorite post to be granted as a political reward.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

was charged with bad faith. The National Peasants reprimanded the 665 ●
offending officials and maintained that such police brutality was an 661
evil inheritance which they were attempting to eradicate. Such incidents are of importance here only in showing the tenacity with which old habits persisted under the new order.

The failure of the economy to rally provided the really vulnerable 665
point for opposition attacks. The stabilization of the currency had 175
given rise to overly sanguine hopes that money would become plentiful—the Bucarest Jockey Club on the strength of it had doubled its bridge points—but much of the funds went to paying old debts. Crops [433]
had been bad in 1927 and 1928, and one of the first tasks of the Maniu government had been to send relief supplies to Bessarabia. The 1929 harvest was excellent, one of the best in the interwar years, but exports were not great, and world grain prices were already beginning the long descent which was to continue until 1934.

The death in October, 1929, of one of the regents, Buzdugan, produced a typical Rumanian crisis. The Liberals contended that the two other regents should select the third member. The National Peasant assembly, however, elected the new regent, Constantin Sarateanu, thus laying the party open to the same criticism that it had made of the Liberals in the creation of the regency in the first place. Moreover, Maniu seems to have failed to inform some of the Peasant members of the person to be selected and rumors spread, assisted by wishful opposition thinking, that the Transylvanians were forming an inner cabinet in the government. The principal result of the regency affair, however, was to arouse general dissatisfaction over such an arrangement and to increase talk of Carol's return.

In 1930 the situation was even less favorable. Economic improvement failed to round the corner. The opposition press increased its polemics by publishing wild reports of Soviet mobilization on the frontier, Communist uprisings in Bessarabia, and the government's secret intention to devalue the leu. This technique, long familiar in Rumania, was designed to rattle the government into making a false step, and did succeed in driving it to pass a law establishing a prison sentence for persons found guilty of spreading tendentious rumors likely to damage the credit of the state. Under this law the government confiscated several newspapers.

The municipal elections of March, 1930, showed an increase in Liberal strength, as the National Peasants led only by two to one. In May by-elections government candidates were returned in five constituencies, but were defeated in Cernăuţi by a Ukrainian Nationalist

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 175

candidate and in Roman by a fascist. The Communist candidate in Timişoara polled over 25,000 votes. Here were the seeds of the political upheavals of the next decade.

665 175 643

At this point, when the National Peasants still commanded a strong majority but were suffering a perceptible loss of popularity and a slackening of impetus, Carol dramatically returned to Rumania on June 6, 1930. His return was not a surprise, as there had been rumors about it for weeks, so many in fact that the government had forbidden the mention of his name in the press. Maniu, after announcing that the government had sanctioned his return, resigned and was replaced by Mironescu, who annulled the act excluding Carol from the throne. He then resigned and a brief period of confusion ensued. The Liberal party split on the question; Vintilă Brătianu sharply opposed Carol's return and expelled a section of the party under Gheorghe Brătianu, the historian and adopted son of Ion I. C. Brătianu, who had come out for Carol. After two days, during which Marshal Presan attempted unsuccessfully to create a coalition cabinet, Maniu was recalled and formed a new National Peasant government, much the same as his first but with the addition of the economist Manoilescu, who had worked diligently for Carol's return.

The details of Carol's spectacular return are not altogether clear. Apparently the initiative had been his but Maniu had welcomed him.[5] As has already been noted, the National Peasants had never been satisfied with Carol's renunciation of the crown. The disadvantages inherent in the regency, which still had many years to go before Michael reached his majority; the hope of having a king on their side as Ferdinand had been on the Liberals'; the increasing difficulties of the party and the portents of waning popularity; and finally the obvious popular approval of Carol's return—all these combined to make the National Peasants accept the fatal step. At that the party

5. Ten years later Maniu wrote an article in the journal *Timpul* (September 14, 1940), describing his attitude toward Carol's return: "Ever since 1926 I was against Prince Carol's retirement and favored his return, not only in order to satisfy public opinion—which manifested this desire increasingly—but also to insure the continuity of the dynastic order and the normal government of the country. . . . Therefore, in my capacity as Prime Minister I favored the return of Prince Carol, but only under certain well-defined conditions which were to be put into force from the very beginning. However, after only a few weeks of his reign, I realized to my regret that these conditions were not being fulfilled. Thus, among other things the Coronation of King Carol II and of Queen Helen, arranged for the month of September 1930, was indefinitely postponed. Instead, and in defiance of Christian morals, he compromised his reign by leading a life against which I protested unceasingly for ten years. Having arrived at the conclusion that under these conditions I could no longer accept responsibility for Prince Carol's return and for his rule, I resigned, but maintained my attitude of energetic and continuous protest."

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

leaders were not in complete agreement. Some desired Carol's immediate proclamation as king, some were hostile to him, and others advocated his entering the regency. Maniu himself was opposed to proclaiming him king until Carol should leave Mme Lupescu and achieve a reconciliation with his wife. "But," he said later, "I could not force my views in face of public opinion." [6] 665 175 643

The newly constituted government was short-lived. When Maniu learned that Mme Lupescu had returned to Rumania contrary to what he believed to be Carol's agreement, he resigned in protest on October 6. A new National Peasant cabinet was formed under the wealthy but colorless Mironescu, without Maniu or Vaida Voevod. Although this cabinet remained in office until the following April, its dismissal was only a matter of time. Carol had announced his desire to create a coalition government, and as soon as the National Peasants had completed a new loan agreement they were removed from office. The second National Peasant government of 1932–33 will be discussed later in connection with the depression.

Maniu's resignation in October, 1930, was a significant event as it marked, when viewed in retrospect, the conclusion of Rumania's brief experiment with responsible government. In so far as his action was a protest against royal irresponsibility and bad faith, Maniu was remaining true, as he did always, to his conception of legality and constitutionality. But as a protest against the king's moral standards it was misdirected. "Bourgeois sexual morality," Mr. Hugh Seton-Watson has said, "is probably less esteemed in Rumania than anywhere else on the Continent. It was not the right issue on which to base the whole conflict between Democracy and Dictatorship." [7]

The episode is inexplicable without some insight into Maniu's personality, which, in its rather cold incorruptibility, was in the sharpest possible contrast to the laxness and opportunism of Rumanian public life. Born in Transylvania in 1873, Iuliu Maniu had studied law in Vienna. He had been attorney of the Uniate Metropolitanate of Blaj and professor of law at the Blaj Theological Academy. As deputy to the Hungarian parliament he had gained a reputation as a stubborn and doughty opponent of Hungarian policy in Transylvania. The clerical atmosphere of Blaj and the parliamentary atmosphere of the Budapest chamber had a lasting influence. Maniu 159

6. John Gunther, *Inside Europe* (London, 1936), pp. 367–368, includes an unpublished speech by Maniu which was to have been delivered in 1934 and which provides some additional details concerning the National Peasant leader's position on Carol's return.

7. Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918–1941* (2d ed., Cambridge University Press, 1946), p. 204.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

159 was renowned as the man in permanent opposition and as one whose acts were always directed by what he considered to be the judgment of posterity. From the very beginning of postwar politics his strength of character gave him an influence which is otherwise difficult to explain. He has always been a source of tremendous admiration to his followers and of singular exasperation and hatred to his opponents.

Those traits, however, which contributed to Maniu's very considerable stature had two serious disadvantages. His personal probity not only led him into politically untenable positions, such as making a political issue of Mme Lupescu, but was far too elevated for his party to emulate. There was always a noticeable divergence between Maniu's precepts and the activities of rank and file of the party, and while Maniu cannot bear the responsibility for the foibles and shortcomings of his followers, it left him, as leader of the party, open to charges of hypocrisy. A more serious drawback was the negativeness and passivity, though not from weakness, of Maniu's attitude; he was always withdrawing, retiring, and resigning, frequently on occasions which demanded a more positive response. Characteristic of this attitude and showing both an admirable democratic belief in his compatriots, together with the absence of any constructive action, is a speech he delivered later, in February, 1932:

> To-day the nation is deprived of its constitutional rights; we are on the threshold of bankruptcy, both economic and moral; we see anarchy enthroned in men's souls and hatred fomented in the provinces, and in the murmur of this growing dissolution one hardly hears the voice of the national conscience, one and undivided. . . . In such solemn moments you ask for my guidance. I shall offer you none. You have both intelligence and conscience. I pray you to revere the memory of the sufferings which brought about the consummation of the national unity.[8]

165 More, however, was involved in Maniu's resignation than personal differences between two individuals. In effect, the leader of a government which had come into power with a tremendous—and authentic—majority of votes surrendered its authority to a monarch who had assumed the crown only four months earlier. Admittedly, there was nothing unconstitutional in this, since the king had the right to appoint and dismiss ministers, but it did bring out the implicit contradictions in the Rumanian constitution between the powers of the monarch and representative government. More than that, it raises

8. Quoted in G. C. Legio, *Rumania*, pp. 59-60.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665

serious doubts as to the significance of representative government in a country such as Rumania.

The National Peasant defeat, for such it proved to be, is open to two interpretations. Either the party ineptly permitted itself to be eased out of office, thus failing to maintain its responsibilities as the representatives of the great majority of the electorate, or the true sources of power and influence in Rumania were not embodied in the electoral process which had so strongly shown its approval of the National Peasants. Both interpretations, of course, are largely true. The full significance of Maniu's resignation could not be apparent immediately, and it could well have been a tactic of *reculer pour mieux sauter* for which he was well known. Nor was Carol's ultimate overthrow of the parliamentary system necessarily implicit in his initial activities, although it was widely known that he favored a coalition cabinet under the parental eyes of the monarch and disliked the wrangling of politicians. Nevertheless, the surrender of delegated authority rather than resistance to Carol's arbitrary moves is the responsibility of the National Peasants and especially of Maniu.[9]

On the other hand it would be difficult to gauge the relative strength —if it had come to a clear-cut decision—of the National Peasants, for all their popular majority, and the king. The issue, if it had become such, would have been between the "constitutional" elements of Rumanian political life—i.e., the actual strength residing in a party honestly elected by a majority of politically illiterate voters —and the nonconstitutional or apolitical elements, i.e., the rallying power of the crown itself, the attitude of the army, and all the backstage, Byzantine aspects of Rumanian politics. Such an issue would have been in doubtful balance, and it is quite possible that the National Peasants could have won out only if they had undertaken a more dynamic course, including recourse to force. This in turn would have been a denial of Maniu's whole concept of constitutionality and legality, and might indeed have led to the dictatorial practices he had combated so long.

9. Admittedly, this is an oversimplification. There was a great difference, in degree if not in kind, between Carol's refusal to give up Mme Lupescu and his subsequent abrogation of the 1923 Constitution. Furthermore, since Maniu's views on the Lupescu issue were essentially ethical rather than political, it would have been difficult for him to have obtained the support of the government or the nation; under the circumstances resignation was his only move. This retirement, however, deprived Rumania of the one man who was in a position to stop Carol's political encroachments.

But even had it been a different issue Maniu's response by resignation was likely, as his whole political outlook came close to passive resistance.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Actually the question never presented itself in such a formal manner. Moreover, the most important factor which was to wreck the National Peasants was the onset of the great depression, which not only undermined the popularity of the party but destroyed its economic program and weakened its political defenses against the attacks of the opposition. When one regards the general collapse of parliamentary institutions—many of them far stronger than the fragile structure in Rumania—throughout central and eastern Europe during the depression years, it is quite obvious that the fall of the National Peasants was not solely the consequence of Maniu's personal differences with King Carol, although this dispute did provide the particular pattern in Rumania.

By the time of Maniu's resignation the world agrarian crisis had begun and was especially disastrous in Rumania which had not made a complete recovery from the First World War. The 1930 harvest was good but prices were ever lower. The stabilization of the leu failed to bring about the anticipated business revival. Ten years later Virgil Madgearu concluded,

> To have obtained the favorable results which were expected from the stabilization of the leu it would have been necessary for this operation to have coincided with a period of international economic prosperity. In fact it was made too late, only eight months before the outbreak of the world crisis which was to produce general disequilibrium and disorganization of international economic life. Thus, the world economic crisis surprised Rumania in a moment of convalescence, achieved by artificial means, annihilated all the favorable results obtained in the course of 1929, and accentuated to the extreme the evils under which the national economy had suffered before the stabilization.[10]

With stabilization and the fall in world agricultural prices, the peasants who had borrowed during the period of inflation and rising prices found themselves with an overwhelming burden of indebtedness. A cry went up for the reduction of debts, a league against usury was formed, riots broke out in Moldavia and Bessarabia, accompanied by attacks on Jewish money lenders. Worse years were yet to come but this foretaste of depression was clearly involved in the decline of the National Peasants.

In addition to these two external factors—the arrival of Carol on the political scene and of the depression on the economic scene—the National Peasants were also laid low by internal weaknesses and contradictions. These derived a) from the dual origin of the party,

[10] Virgil Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei romînești*, p. 309.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

b) from certain shortcomings inherent in the peasantist philosophy, and c), as a result of a) and b), a watering down of this philosophy into a somewhat eclectic position which lacked the strength to oppose the onrush of the Rightist authoritarian doctrines of the Carolist era.

Origins and Composition of the National Peasant Party

The National Peasant party was created by the amalgamation of the Rumanian National party of Transylvania and the Peasant party of the Old Kingdom at a general congress of both parties held in October, 1926. Other political formations had had temporary affiliations (Iorga's National Democratic party) or had been absorbed (Take Ionescu's faction of the Conservatives and the Bessarabian Peasant party), but the strength of the party lay in these two organizations. The origins and composition of the National party and the Peasant party were quite different and explain some of the characteristics of the National Peasants' policy when in power.

The Peasant party of the Old Kingdom appeared during the troubled months after the First World War. Some of its leaders had been members of the ephemeral Party of Labor which arose during the constituent assembly of 1917 to vote against the terms of the agrarian reform amendment.[11] The principal figures of the Peasant party were Ion Mihalache, a schoolteacher of peasant origin and a man of considerable intelligence and integrity; Dr. Lupu, a country doctor with a long record of interest in peasant problems, but a rather erratic politician who veered from extreme radicalism to blatant opportunism; the Bessarabian writer and political philosopher, Constantin Stere, an intermittent member; and the economist Virgil Madgearu, its principal theorist on economic affairs. Although of this group, only Mihalache could be said to have been a peasant, the party in its first years was a radical agrarian movement, similar in its general lines and purposes to the other agrarian currents which appeared in the states of eastern Europe immediately after the First World War.

The Rumanian National party of Transylvania had its origins in

11. A group of progressive deputies broke away from the Liberal party to form a Labor group. They opposed the limitations of the agrarian reform and desired to extend expropriation to all properties over 100 hectares. The Party of Labor soon dissolved, however; some of the group went into General Averescu's People's League, others returned to the Liberal party, but the rest, including Dr. Lupu, helped to found the Peasant party.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 the Hungarian parliament in the first years of the twentieth century as spokesman of the Transylvania Rumanians against the policy of the Magyars. By the time of the creation of Greater Rumania it had a long experience with parliamentary practice and had become the leading party in Transylvania. Its two outstanding leaders were Alexandru Vaida Voevod, an ardent Rumanian nationalist, and Iuliu Maniu. The National party was the defender of the Rumanian peasants against the Magyar overlords and advocated extensive agrarian reform, but it was more nationalist than peasantist in its outlook, and its leaders were from the middle class. It was a vertical rather than a horizontal organization and while it had great support among the Transylvanian peasants, it was also representative of the Rumanian intellectuals, professional men, and small tradesmen.

The difference in the two parties' origins was reflected in the attacks they directed against the Liberals, their common enemy. To the Peasant party the Liberals were the spokesmen of the ruling classes, the ciocoi, and the financial interests; to the National party the Liberals were the advocates of administrative centralism, of Old Kingdom primacy, of unconstitutional and arbitrary politics. While the National party and Peasant party were joined in the brief Vaida Voevod government of 1919–20, it would be a mistake to regard this coalition as an immediate prelude to fusion. After the fall of the Vaida government, the parties drifted apart and despite periodic reports of union did not unite until October, 1926, more than six years later. In the meantime the National party had absorbed Take Ionescu's Conservatives and had even merged for a time with Iorga's party, which temporarily included the sinister Argetoianu. In a lecture delivered in 1923 Mihai Popovici, one of the Transylvanians and later Minister of Finance in the National Peasant government, was quite critical of the Peasant party and denied that it could reconcile its individualist principles with its social radicalism.

In 1924 there was an attempt at fusion but it failed, according to Madgearu, because "certain intriguers in the Camerilla found favorable ground among certain formerly conservative elements in the National Party." [12] Actually, King Ferdinand himself seems to have opposed the union of the two parties.

On the advice of the King that the Rumanian National Party should unite with other parties, the fusion with the party of the late Take Ionescu and later with that of Iorga was carried through and only on

12. Virgil Madgearu, "Fuziunea Partidului Ţărănesc cu Partidul Naţional," *M.A.B. Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, 4 (1928), 6.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665

the wish of the King was the fusion with the Peasant Party frustrated after Maniu had succeeded in moving the Peasant Party to accept his ten-point program, by which he had rendered not only the crown but the country a great service, for the Peasant Party as a result gave up its idea of the class struggle and its republican sentiments.[13]

Ultimately the common interests of the two parties proved greater than their differences, but even after their amalgamation they were not altogether in harmony, as is shown in the case of Dr. Lupu's break from the National Peasants in February, 1927. According to Dr. Lupu, the National party had virtually the same social views as the Liberals, the 1926 electoral pact between the Peasants and the Transylvanians was only a "non-aggression pact between two political adversaries," the National party had absorbed reactionary elements and was too regional.[14] Madgearu, in rebuttal, accused Dr. Lupu of opportunism:

> In reality, Dr. Lupu has broken from our party because he no longer believed possible the arrival of a constitutional democratic regime and because he found it necessary to employ opportunist tactics, to collaborate with no matter whom in no matter what fashion in order to participate in the government of the country . . . One can well understand the true character of Dr. Lupu's effort, which he represents as a reconstitution of the old Peasant Party. . . . If he succeeds he will give the Liberal Party the occasion of garnishing its future government with a "Peasant" appendix.[15]

Although Dr. Lupu's subsequent participation in the Liberal government smacked of opportunism,[16] his contention that the two parties did not represent the same social views was not unfounded.

After the National Peasants came to power, there was occasional friction between the Peasant and Transylvanian ministers, but largely through the personalities of Maniu and Mihalache the party remained united, and indeed the worst schism after the party's fall from power was not along these lines but occurred when Vaida Voevod's Ru-

13. V. V. Tilea, *Iuliu Maniu, der Mann und das Werk* (Hermannstadt, 1927), p. 24.

14. See the defense of Dr. Lupu's action in Petre P. Suciu, "La Scission dans le parti national paysan roumain," *M.A.B.: Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, 2 (1927), 71–73.

15. V. N. Madgearu, "Essai d'une scission dans le parti national paysan roumain," *M.A.B.: Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, 2 (1927), 69–70.

16. It is interesting to note that two decades later, in 1945, Dr. Lupu repeated the same move. He again left the National Peasant party (which he had rejoined in 1933) on the grounds that it was reactionary, formed a new peasant party, and collaborated with the Communists in the National Democratic Front.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

● 665 manian nationalism led him to introduce an excessive chauvinism into the party's platform.

The principal effect of the dual origin was not, however, party instability but the ambiguity which it imparted to National Peasant policy. This effect should not be overemphasized because, as will be seen presently, the Peasant party's policy was by no means fixed and had undergone important modifications even before the amalgamation.

The Peasant Ideology

The political and economic principles of the National Peasant party displayed a number of inconsistencies, part of which stemmed from the dual origin of the party. A more fundamental difficulty, however, lay in the party's professed "peasantism" (*țărănismul*). The Peasant party is usually regarded as the spiritual descendant of the populist (*poporanist*) movement which flourished in Rumania at the turn of the twentieth century and which was to some extent derived from the Russian *narodniki* of the latter years of the nineteenth century. Although this genealogy is not altogether incorrect it is quite misleading. Before the National Peasants had come to power and indeed before the two sections of the party had united, the populist doctrines had been significantly modified, and for a very good reason. In so far as a thoroughgoing and coherent populism was formulated, it proved incapable of facing contemporary problems; and conversely the working program developed by the Peasant party, not to speak of its actual practices, contained a number of extraneous elements, some of which were quite incompatible with a consistent populist outlook. This transformation is quite apparent in the development of the peasantist doctrine through such men as Constantin Stere, Ion Mihalache, and Virgil Madgearu.

A powerful current of rather diverse agrarian ideas, known broadly as populism, *narodnichestvo*, sprang up among Russian intellectuals in the second half of the nineteenth century, and was associated with the "going to the people" movement and the formation of the Land and Liberty party. Russia and Rumania, as has already been observed, had numerous social and economic similarities in the years before the First World War. Both were countries of large latifundiary estates, and of recently emancipated but land-hungry peasants who lived in a state of semiservitude. (The Rumanian term neoiobăgia, neoserfdom, finds a close parallel in the Russian *polukrepostnoe sostoyanie*, semibondage.[17] To be sure, the Russians were concerned with

17. Cf. Lancelot A. Owen, *The Russian Peasant Movement, 1906–1917* (London, 1937), p. 9.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665

certain problems that were less important in Rumania. The narodniki, for example, were involved in the conflict between Slavophiles and Westerners; in Rumania nearly all writers looked to the West, and the principal manifestation of an anti-Western feeling was the Fichtean nationalism of some of the populists. In Russia the peasant commune was more important than in Rumania and was the focal point of the semisocialist ideas of the narodniki. Finally, Russia was an autocracy and the narodniki tended to split on the question whether to advocate revolution and violence or reform and propaganda; in Rumania the weak international position of the new state, together with the presence of a constitutional government, however unsatisfactory, served to dampen the revolutionary side of populism. Despite these important differences, the agrarian problems in the two states were much the same, as was the challenge of Western capitalism.

Although Russian populism had a number of strands, its principal thesis, so far as it concerns this study, was that the future of Russia lay in the peasantry, especially in the development of the communal institutions; that Russia could not hope to industrialize because its capitalism had arrived on the scene too late to capture the external markets which were regarded as the necessary stimulus for further advance. From this it was concluded that Russia should progress to a sort of agrarian socialism by avoiding the path of industrial capitalism with its attendant social miseries and evils. To be sure, not all populists accepted all these arguments, and in later years the Social Revolutionaries, who were something of a hybrid, admitted the possibilities of industrialization but continued to deny that agriculture was destined to follow the course of capitalist development.

A direct transfer of the ideas of the Russian narodniki into the Rumanian poporanist movement is to be seen in the writings of Constantin Stere, although this Russian influence was by no means the only source of Rumanian populism, which had an indigenous development for the same reasons that caused its rise in Russia.[18] Stere,

18. Rumanian populism was also a literary movement reflecting the growing national consciousness and desire to create a national language and literature. H. Sanielevici, in a series of articles collected as *Poporanismul reacţionar* (Bucarest, 1921), made a highly critical survey of the literary and philosophical sides of populism. In his unfriendly opinion, it was an escapist and reactionary movement, displaying a medieval turn of mind and an unwillingness to face reality. The socialist Dobrogeanu-Gherea, while admiring certain sincere if misguided aspects of the populist position, regarded it as a dangerous movement because it could be used by the ruling groups to conceal the real misery in Rumania behind an idyllic mask. Populism could mean anything or nothing: "The whole country is covered with populists and populism, civil and military populists, lay and clerical populists, men and women populists, liberal populism, conservative populism, government populism, opposition populism, national populism, anti-semitic populism, democratic populism, socialist populism, and populist populism properly speaking." *Neoiobăgia*, p. 229.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

●665 however, was the most brilliant of the populist writers and through his journal *Viața românească* exerted a far-reaching influence. He was born in Bessarabia of a boyar family, had associated with the narodniki, and had been banished to Siberia for his activities.[19] He later came to Rumania where he joined the nascent socialist movement. In 1899 he broke with the socialists on the question of collaboration with the Liberals, and in 1900 led a group into the Liberal camp.[20]

The best exposition of Stere's populist ideas was a series of articles, entitled "Social Democracy or Populism," published in *Viața românească* shortly after the 1907 peasant uprising.[21] The articles were primarily a polemic against the Social Democrats, but they provide the main lines of Stere's thought. Stere denied the Marxist analysis of the economic position of the peasant and held that the peasantry was neither proletarian nor bourgeois but a distinct social category. "The peasantry, as the undifferentiated base of society, constitutes a separate social category, upon whose back are raised all other social classes, not excepting even the industrial proletariat."[22] In a peasant society there could be no class struggle; since the elements of production were not differentiated, there would be no classes. Consequently, the elements leading to class struggle had been introduced via the superstructure of differentiated classes standing above the peasantry. The only way to progress in a peasant society lay through strengthening the peasant economically by means of cooperation and by introducing a true "rural Rumanian democracy."[23]

With regard to industrialization, Stere started from the premise that different countries could evolve in different manners, that the "thorny road of capitalist industrialism" was not the only way. To the question whether "industrialization after the European model was inevitable or even possible in Rumania," his response was negative. Industrialization could not develop without foreign markets, and

19. Trotsky and Rakovsky, *Ocherki politicheskoi Rumynii*, p. 123.

20. C. Titel Petrescu, *Socialismul în România*, pp. 150–151. The socialists of course regarded Stere as a renegade. The problem which faced the Rumanian socialists was that which faced socialists elsewhere, but worse. The party had spent years in the wilderness with little prospect of achieving any effective power. Stere felt that since there was no hope of a revolution, it was wise to collaborate with the more progressive of the existing parties—the Liberals. For some years he was regarded as the unofficial adviser of I. I. C. Brătianu.

21. The articles, "Socialdemocratism sau poporanism," appeared in six issues of *Viața românească:* August, 1907, pp. 170–198; September, 1907, pp. 318–341; October, 1907, pp. 15–48; November, 1907, pp. 173–208; January, 1908, pp. 49–75; and April, 1908, pp. 59–80.

22. *Ibid.* (September, 1907), p. 338.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 341.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Rumania, a backward state, had small chance of capturing them from the great industrial powers.[24] 665

An economically backward country, by the very fact of its backwardness, inevitably finds itself in a state of painful inferiority. . . . For this reason, the simple fact that the industrial development of a country has been delayed itself serves as an impediment in the battle for markets.[25] . . . Thus, from theoretical deductions confirmed by the critiques of capitalism made by K. Marx himself, and from the sad experience of our industrial protectionism, we reach the conclusion that Rumania *cannot follow* the industrial development of Western Europe.[26]

Having denied the possibility of Rumanian industrialization, Stere proceeded to develop his own theory of progress, which was based upon a view of Rumanian society as a cultural and historical entity with its own "national genius." In this connection he was particularly incensed by the socialists who would insist that nothing good could arise in Rumania until after the triumph of socialism in the West. Stere's organic nationalism, while deploring "vulgar or ferocious" anti-Semitism, saw the Jews as alien elements and agents of "vagabond capital," who by their increasing numbers and wealth threatened to disrupt the inchoate cultural development of the Rumanian nation. He realized that the struggle for political democracy in Rumania could be achieved only through "determined, conscious and organized action—but this way is, unfortunately, still in large part closed to our peasantry." [27] He would therefore seek political support in the wealthier peasants, the village petty bourgeoisie, and the intelligentsia.

As to the economic goal, the conditions in Rumania demanded "the organization of the whole national economy on a peasantist foundation: a vigorous peasantry, master of the land on which it works, and for which—through the organization of a perfected system of cooperative societies—the advantages of small properties are united with all the technical advantages to-day available only to large property." [28] Stere did not deny the desirability of any industry whatsoever, but recommended a type of industrial organization which could make use of the peasants' free time in the winter months; in other

24. Although this argument closely resembles that of the narodniki, nowhere in these articles does Stere cite a Russian authority. Most of his arguments are culled from the German Social Democrats and from Marx and Engels themselves.
25. *Ibid.* (October, 1907), p. 86.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.* (January, 1908), p. 59.
28. *Ibid.* (April, 1908), p. 59.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 words, a form of peasant household industry designed to satisfy internal consumption.[29] He was opposed to the Liberals' effort to create a national industry by means of a protectionist tariff. Small urban industries should remain as crafts and serve as accessories to agriculture. Existing large industries, such as the petroleum industry, should be nationalized, not socialized, and become a state monopoly. In summary, he advocated:

> A free peasantry master of its land, the development of crafts and small industries, with the aid of an intense cooperative movement in the villages and in the towns; state monopoly of large industry (with the exception of special cases which are able to develop on their own without prejudice to the economy): this is the formula for our economic and social progress, which the very conditions of our national life impose upon us.[30]

Although Stere's thesis is well argued, it presents serious difficulties. In the first place, his initial premise that the peasant is the "undifferentiated base of society" has altogether negative implications, since it is precisely by a "differentiation" of society, by surmounting the primordial peasant, that the dynamic process of economic advance has been achieved. Moreover, while he could point to the undoubted obstacles confronting Rumania in any attempt to emulate the West, the actual fact was that Rumania had long since been caught in the toils of the West; the cash nexus had even penetrated agriculture through the commerce in cereals and had, as has been seen, contributed to the serious plight of the peasantry. His ideal of a prosperous small peasant was based on the models of Denmark and Switzerland—favorite paradigms of the populists—the structure of whose markets and economies was altogether different from that of Rumania. His recommendation that industry should take the form of household crafts, to occupy the peasant during the winter months, has also had much popularity but is of limited value. The separation of cottage industry from agriculture has generally been the mark of advancing cultivation. Any industry run on such an intermittent basis would be forced to remain on a primitive and inefficient level. Moreover, the winter unemployment was in part a consequence of the extensive nature of Rumanian agriculture; a more labor-intensive form of peasant cultivations would diminish this seasonal difference. Above all, cottage industries have shown small powers of resistance

29. *Ibid.*, p. 60.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951- EDl Rumania EDl

to the competition of machine-made goods.[31] Stere's theory really provides no adequate solution to the problem of improving the level of agriculture or the status of the peasant.

In addition to these shortcomings, Stere's populism contained certain very dangerous implications which were to be realized in the 1930's. Along with his desire for a rural democracy and a rustic economy, there is also the persistent note of organic nationalism, with its eloquent love of the "national genius" embodied in the Rumanian peasant, its fear of the alien cultural and economic intrusion of the Jew, its belief that Rumania had its own particular destiny to fulfill, and its desire to avoid the "Golgotha of capitalism." In Stere these elements appeared in a relatively moderate and balanced guise, but taken together and intensified they closely resemble the driving impulses of the Iron Guard.

The connection between certain aspects of populism and the Rumanian fascism of Codreanu is not accidental but is closely bound to the question of Rumania's relation to Western industrial society. Rumanians faced by the impact of the West with its power, high material level, and more articulate cultural development, have always been in peril of being driven to one of two emotional extremes: either abject imitation of the West or rejection. In general, imitation has prevailed, though frequently with quite un-Western consequences. In Stere, however, there is the element of rejection, although it is moderated by an effort at a rational analysis of the actual relations between Rumania and the industrial West. In the Iron Guard, on the other hand, the rational element is dissolved, leaving only the emotional reaction in a singularly malignant form. Therein lies the danger of this type of populism: in so far as it fails to provide a solution to Rumania's social and economic questions, it is apt to erupt into a wildly irrational and negative movement.

While these potentially dangerous qualities appear in Stere's work, it would be a mistake to read them into the future Peasant party. Indeed, as will be shown presently, the Peasant party, despite Stere's affiliation with it and despite the persistence of the populist ideology, did not pursue a populist course but followed a different line, which

31. The Peasant party economist, Madgearu, conceded that the populist writers were incorrect in their views on cottage industry (*op. cit.*, pp. 11–12). These arguments have nothing to do with the question of the value of decentralized industrialization based upon household units, since with the use of electric power such industries might be quite feasible. Cf. League of Nations, *Industrialization and Foreign Trade*, p. 50. But the introduction of such things as electric power presupposes a whole series of developments not included in the populist theory.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

● 665 also led to difficulties but of another kind. An indication of this difference appears as early as 1920 when a Peasant party deputy said: "We are not against industry, and not against towns, and not against 'foreigners,' and we have nothing in common with the populism of *Viața românească*." [32]

In the remarkable parliamentary speeches of the Peasant leader Ion Mihalache in 1920 and 1921 one finds a quite different attitude from that expressed in Stere's writings. Mihalache was at once more authentically peasant and more pragmatic than Stere. In his attack on the existing order and the ruling class he showed the anger of the peasant against the boyars and a profound distrust in the willingness or ability of the old parties to defend him. He violently assailed the temptation of "social harmony"—"Social harmony is the seductive song by which the naïve are put to sleep; while they are sleeping the ruling class satisfies its own class interests"—and announced that the peasants must organize for their own defense. He thus granted the existence of social classes and of a class struggle. He did not, however, erect either the concept of classes or the class struggle into theoretical principles, but said they were merely names for what was obviously happening in Rumania:

"Class struggle," the parties of social harmony shout at us. "So be it," we reply if that is the only means by which the peasantry can guarantee the realization of its needs.

"You are not a class party. The peasantry is not a social class," the socialists shout at us. "So be it," we also answer the socialists; we are very little interested in the definition whether we are or are not a class party.[33]

Mihalache stated that the peasantry had a class attitude toward the large proprietors because its goal was the elimination of large estates and the establishment of the peasant as master of the land. He did not, however, regard the peasantry as the exclusive class. "The Peasant party is not opposed to the development of all other social classes; in contrast to the Socialist party which proposes to dissolve the bourgeoisie and replace it with a single social class, the Peasant party considers legitimate the existence of other social classes, industrialists, merchants, etc." [34] His concept of the function of the

32. Sanielevici, *op. cit.*, p. 432. The deputy, unnamed, was protesting against the anti-populist line of Sanielevici's periodical *Curentul Nou*.
33. Mihalache, *Partidul Țărănesc în politica țării*, p. 32.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

peasant lacked the overtones which are found in Stere and at the same time he did not endow the class struggle with an independent vitality as the mainspring of history. 665

He had a pragmatic view toward industry; while he opposed the control exerted by the Liberals over the nation's economy, he did not adopt Stere's view that Rumania must follow a different course of development from the West. He did not even deny the socialists' contention that in the long run increasing industrialization might introduce capitalist development into the countryside, but present politics could not wait for that eventuality:

> It is possible that in the future it will be as you believe. I do not come with prejudices against socialism. It is possible that mechanization will make such great progress in agriculture that personal equipment, individual initiative, and the personality of the man will not be the essential factors in agricultural production they are to-day . . . and then it may occur that the notion of individual property will suffer a great blow and socialism will come to the peasantry. It is possible. But gentlemen, in politics we must base our actions not on what might happen in decades or in future centuries. A healthy policy is the management of current needs, of the real necessities of the existing society.[35]

This essentially practical tone ran through Mihalache's pronouncements, and his thesis was the simple and straightforward one that the great majority of the Rumanian peasants had been deprived of land and kept out of power by the greed and selfishness of the boyars. His aim was to correct that state of affairs by organizing the peasants to protect themselves (he admitted the assistance of intellectuals, but without the connotations of Stere's intelligentsia) by redistributing agricultural land, by establishing small peasant farms which he believed were more efficient than the large estates, and by increasing peasant cooperation. In pursuing this line he attacked the parties of "social harmony" for their hypocrisy and the socialists for their doctrinaire denial of the role of the peasantry. While a patriot and a monarchist, he displayed little of Stere's organic nationalism. The principal limitation to Mihalache's position was that he did confine himself largely to the immediate agrarian question, and did not really explore the connections between agriculture and the whole economic complex.

Turning to the Peasant party economist Virgil Madgearu, one

35. *Ibid.*, p. 85.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

● 665 finds a broader if less intense view of the economic scene. By a series of articles in the early 1920's [36] Madgearu established himself as one of the leading spokesmen of the Peasant party, although unlike Mihalache there was little of the peasant about him. He had a Leipzig doctorate and was a professor at the Academy of Commercial Studies in Bucarest.

Madgearu, like Stere and Mihalache, argued that agricultural development, in contrast to the views of the Marxists, was from large holdings to small peasant properties, which could demonstrate a higher level of productivity. He also maintained that the peasantry constituted a separate social category; while granting that some peasants employed labor and others were virtually an agricultural proletariat, he denied that this proved a lack of homogeneity in the peasantry.[37] On the other hand, Madgearu's writings displayed a spirit quite different from Stere's. He saw that the populists had been wrong in their belief that agrarian countries would evolve without becoming involved in industrialism, since in fact capitalist industry in the form of factories, cartels, and trusts was developing by leaps and bounds in the agrarian states. The peasant *mystique* which appeared in Stere's populism was lacking in Madgearu. Indeed, Madgearu's "peasantism" was founded upon a set of ideas which were typically "liberal" in the Western sense of the word.

He granted the existence of the class struggle, but for him it was not a dynamic concept but a mere statement of fact. It was not the peasants who preached social discord but the false exponents of "political harmony," the old oligarchy, who had created the antagonisms[38]. He denied that Rumanian liberalism could develop an adequate peasant policy, but for the reason that real liberalism had perished. Contemporary Rumanian liberalism was founded on a financial oligarchy, financial trusts, and a despotic militaristic state. He opposed the industrial policy being followed in Rumania, not from the populist desire to avoid a "capitalist Golgotha," but because industrialization was not developing on the basis of free competition. "If peasantism does not have an inherent tendency against

36. Some of these include *Ţărănismul* (Bucarest, n.d.), "Doctrina Ţărănistă," in *Doctrinele partidelor politice, Revoluţia agrară şi evoluţia clasei ţărăneşti* (Bucarest, 1923), *Agrarianism—un discors parlamentar* (Bucarest, 1927).

37. *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, p. 72. However, in his last work written in 1940, Madgearu admitted that in Rumania there was a tendency toward a differentiation between the middle peasantry and the agricultural proletariat. *Evoluţia economiei româneşti*, p. 84.

38. Madgearu, *Ţărănismul*, p. ii. On several occasions he quoted with approval Guizot's remark, "The class struggle is not a hypothesis, not a theory, but purely and simply a reality."

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665

industrial development, it is, on the other hand, against tariff protectionism, the creator of hot-house industries, trusts and cartels."[39] He denied any contradiction between agrarianism and industrialization; he admitted the necessity of developing Rumania's industries and natural resources but rejected those industries which required continued artificial support. Wherever public utilities or basic industries showed signs of becoming monopolies they should be regulated by the state.

In the political sphere, the peasant was important not because of any innate rustic virtues but because he represented the great majority of Rumanian citizens. He should not be deprived of his share in the government for any theoretical reason, whether coming from the Left or the Right. Socially the peasant was important because of his threefold role as producer, consumer, and citizen.

The peasant, having become a small proprietor of land, through allotment or purchase on his own, has an interest in earning from the cultivation of his lot the greatest product which can be obtained in the shortest time, to endow his holding with equipment and livestock, and to provide enough for himself and his family. This presupposes an organization of production which guarantees a maximum return and an organization of sales, which, by doing away with intermediaries, gives the villager the whole value of his produce. . . . The peasantry forms the most numerous strata of consumers. It is therefore directly interested in the industrial regime. Understanding the necessity of encouraging the progress of a national industry, it cannot admit a protection based on a prohibitive tariff system which artificially maintains certain industries that lack any favorable conditions for their development. . . . Finally, as citizen the peasant has an interest in living in a community of free men, who administer their interests through elected representatives.[40]

Madgearu's criticism of the Social Democrats, while to some extent based on their hostility or indifference to the peasantry, was along lines quite different from Stere's. He opposed Social Democracy primarily because in Rumania it was apt to produce extremist repercussions either to the Left or to the Right:

It is problematic whether a Social Democratic party could soon succeed in penetrating the peasant masses, not so much because the mentality of the latter, attached to the idea of private property, is closed to the socialist ideology, as because the economic influence of the parties of "social

39. *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, p. 85.
40. Madgearu, *Ţărănismul*, pp. 21–27.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 harmony" over the villages, along with their means of propaganda, would be able to frustrate any serious action by the Social Democrats among the peasants. As long as the Social Democratic party was unsuccessful in attracting the peasant masses, it could only be a spectator, condemned to a passive role. In periods of burgeoning "ministerialism" in its ranks, it would be in the situation of seeing its leaders agreeing to collaborate in the governments of the bourgeois parties, of the capitalist oligarchy. This would lead to breaking the unity of the socialist movement and to strengthening the revolutionary syndicalist and communist currents, the adversaries of political democracy. A change in direction away from political democracy and toward a proletarian dictatorship would, however, give rise to reaction in the cadres of the parties of order and social harmony, a restriction of public liberties through a state of siege, courts martial and censorship, with the tendency to install a white dictatorship. Whoever has closely observed the course of events in recent years can foresee the fate of the Rumanian people if it were to be their lot to oscillate between the rule of the financial oligarchy in a democratic form and the same rule of the financial oligarchy installing a political dictatorship every time it appeared to be in danger of being ousted or destroyed by a dictatorship of the proletariat. Cannot the entry of peasantism into the political arena determine a new orientation to social evolution? [41]

In these prophetic words, Madgearu's criticism of the Social Democrats is seen to be altogether practical and was really meant as a plea for cooperation from the Social Democrats in defeating the financial oligarchy of the Liberals and in fending off Leftist excesses.

In his foreign economic policy, Madgearu displayed none of the populist mistrust of the West. He believed in freeing trade channels and giving a friendly reception to foreign capital, and he heartily opposed Vintilă Brătianu's economic xenophobia.

Clearly, the spirit prevailing in Madgearu's writings is quite unlike that of the earlier populists. Peasantism has become a radical democratic movement. In many respects Madgearu's position is a great advance over Stere's populism. It shows none of the irrational and primitive strains and is thoroughly aware of the twentieth century. It avoids integral nationalism and advocates international cooperation. Above all, it realizes that the peasant cannot remain isolated but is involved in the complex of the world economy. It was Madgearu's principal desire to keep the peasant from being exploited in this economy.

41. *Ibid.*, pp. 15–16.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665

But in thus escaping the limitations of populism Madgearu's peasantism contained its own weaknesses. In the first place, this rationalization of the peasantist philosophy, which gave it an almost middle-class flavor, was in danger ultimately of depriving it of its fighting strength. A more serious drawback, though Madgearu was scarcely at fault, was that the ideals and indeed the society on which Madgearu based his argument and which he was trying to translate into Rumanian terms were on the verge of suffering a terrible setback throughout Europe. A third and more specific danger was that the very broadening of Madgearu's concepts with their acceptance of a number of nonpeasant elements (especially the qualified support of industry and the interest in foreign capital) would, in the course of time, lead these elements to claim first attention.

An analogous shift in direction is observable in the series of Peasant party programs of 1921, 1922, 1924, and 1926, as may be illustrated by comparing the passages on agrarian affairs, industry, and foreign capital.[42] Rumanian political programs should not be taken very seriously as a guide to probable action, but as each of these was prepared while the party was in opposition they do at least show the Peasants' changing views on Rumanian economic policy.

The projected program of 1921 is quite radical in tone but vague and loosely formulated in its contents.[43] It affirms that the land must belong to those who cultivate it and that the state should have constitutional right to continue to purchase large and medium properties and transfer them to the actual cultivators. Expropriation should follow the model of the Bessarabian agrarian reform (i.e., all properties over 100 hectares) and be applied by bodies elected by the peasantry. Only the state should have the right to purchase land, peasant holdings should not be larger than a peasant family could cultivate with its own labor, and measures should be taken to prevent the reappearance of large properties.

The 1922 program is generally similar in tone. It omits the right of the state to purchase medium and large properties and merely

42. *Proectul de program al Partidului Ţărănesc din România* (Bucarest, 1921); Partidul Ţărănesc, *Programul şi Statutele* (Bucarest, 1922); Partidul Ţărănesc, *Programul General şi Statutele* (Bucarest, 1925); Partidul Naţional-Ţărănesc, *Principiile programul şi statutul* (Bucarest, 1926). A projected program was voted by a congress of the party on November 20–21, 1921; a definitive program was passed in the general congress of Iaşi on November 26–28, 1922, and was modified by a congress in Bucarest on October 26–27, 1924. A new program was adopted in the congress of October 10, 1926, when the National and Peasant parties fused.

43. It contains a large number of Slavonic words, which were later replaced by more sedate words derived from French or Latin. The whole document bears the impression of Stere's influence.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 says that the state should assist the process of evolution toward "properties of cultivation." It would extend expropriation to properties of over 100 hectares with the exception of model farms necessary for the improvement of small cultivation. (This qualification was omitted in 1921.) It is less explicit on restrictions on sale of land, but goes into greater detail on the question of communal pastures and forests, agricultural education, experimental stations, and credit.

The 1924 program omits reference to the land belonging to him who cultivates it, and stresses the need for correction of abuses of the agrarian reform. It would extend expropriation to properties over 100 hectares, unless they were organized farms with their own inventory and equipment, in which case they could be 250 hectares in regions with demands for land, and 500 hectares in regions where the need for land had been satisfied. It shows greater interest in rationalizing peasant holdings through establishing norms for the sale and purchase of land, preventing the fragmentation of property, and consolidating small properties.

The 1926 program—after the fusion of the National and Peasant parties—is substantially the same. It emphasizes the need for completing the land allotments and for raising the level of production. It makes one significant addition, however, in advocating freedom of purchase and sale of agricultural land—after a period of transition—to promote the "natural selection of serious cultivators."

The four programs show a consistent trend away from a radical agrarian policy advocating a leveling out of properties and determined to maintain family cultivated plots, to a more elastic concept with less emphasis upon land distribution than upon the improvement of production. The principal changes occurred before the union of the Peasant party with the Transylvanians.

The 1921 program takes a very narrow view of industry. "Agriculture cannot advance if it is not aided by the establishment of certain industries . . . but industry to be successful must be based only on those things which can be made from what is found in the country." It recommends cottage industries which could occupy the peasant after the completion of his work in the fields. It recognizes the need of a national industry and of tariffs, but the latter should not be excessive.

The 1922 program follows the same lines, but adds the need of state control over the exploitation of natural resources. It opposes the support of "artificial" industries, protection of monopolies which raise the cost of living, and state monopolies.

The 1924 program for industry is brief and presents fewer restric-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

tions. It still favors small and cottage industries but approves the encouraging of large industries, especially those which use agricultural products. 665

The 1926 program is still briefer. However, in contrast to the 1924 program on the utilization of sources of energy, which stresses the need for public control, it "encourages private initiative and capital." This is a complete reversal of the 1922 program which criticized the "anarchic exploitation" of sources of energy for "private capitalist interests."

With respect to foreign capital, the preface to the 1921 program has some very unpleasant things to say about "capitalist imperialism which has achieved world domination." While it admits the value of foreign loans to repair the railway system, "we must have, however, great care when it is a question of taking loans from bankers of other countries. We must take the precautions of the mouse when it goes for food that it is not seized by the cat!"

The 1922 program omits the prefatory harangue against capitalist imperialism. It rejects foreign railway concessions but grants the need of foreign credit to repair transport and consolidate the national debt. The suspicious note is still present: while Rumania needs foreign credit, the party recognizes the tendency of the large capitalist states to exploit through concessions the riches of backward agrarian states such as Rumania. "We are fully aware of the great difficulties and dangers of the immediate future."

The 1924 program drops this attitude completely and has a special section on collaboration with foreign capital, the necessity of attracting it to repair the economy and to develop the natural riches of the country. It favors equal treatment to foreign and Rumanian capital, an attack on the policy of the Liberals.

The chapter on collaboration in the 1926 program is identical with that of 1924, except in its omission of the phrase, in speaking of attracting foreign capital, "in a form corresponding to the national economic interests." The phrase probably sounded too much like a Liberal party pronouncement.

From these examples it should be quite clear that the policy of the Peasant party underwent an important and perhaps fundamental evolution from its radical origins of 1921.[44] Moreover, the bulk of changes occurred before the fusion of 1926, a fact which would con-

44. Similar changes are observable in most sections of the programs. For example, the programs through 1924 demanded the dissolution of the security police and the rural gendarmes, and the inauguration of the eight-hour day. These points were dropped in the 1926 program.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 firm the supposition that the principles of the Peasant party itself were unstable. The evolution traced here was to be carried even farther when the National Peasants came to power in 1928.

Economic and Agrarian Policy

[113] A fair illustration of the economic interests of the National Peasant government is to be found in Virgil Madgearu's little book, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, published in 1930. Of the 63 pages of text, 14 are devoted to agriculture, 22 to the exploitation of state enterprises and the reform of the mining law, ten to foreign trade policy, and eleven to the improvement of transport. The fact that the booklet was published in England and designed for foreign readers merely underlines the preoccupation with affairs other than agricultural. As has been seen, this broadening of interests was the result of the pressing demands of financial, monetary, and commercial matters in 1928–30, but also of the internal trend away from a purely agrarian outlook.

665 241 The most striking feature of the agrarian policy of the National Peasant government was the things it neglected to do or even to consider doing. While the party's attitude toward further redistribution of land had become increasingly moderate, nevertheless in 1926 the program of the united party called for expropriation of properties over 100 hectares. Not a step was taken toward carrying out this measure. To be sure, many reasons militated against such a move. Agriculture was still in the process of readjustment from the previous reforms. Expropriation would undoubtedly have caused a political furor since the mere passage of time was serving to consolidate the previous reform, with all its shortcomings and abuses. Moreover, since the 1917 act was entered in the constitution, it could be modified only by a constitutional amendment, which was forbidden under a regency. Quite obviously, however, the National Peasant party by 1928 was not the radical agrarian movement which had attempted to introduce the reform bill under the Vaida government of 1920.

A second omission was the failure to take any active steps toward the consolidation of peasant strips, a measure which was virtually a precondition for any effective improvement of agriculture. Again, this would have been unsettling and peasant support for this particular reform was by no means certain.

665 241 671 The only serious measure taken in connection with agricultural property relations was an act passed in 1929 which amended the Liberals' law of 1925 concerning the alienation of allotments obtained

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

through the agrarian reforms.[45] The new law, which was designed to facilitate the transfer of land and to further a "process of selection among the peasant cultivators," abolished certain of the restrictions and delays imposed by the Liberals and greatly simplified the procedure of sale, although maintaining safeguards to keep land in the hands of actual cultivators and limiting purchases to Rumanian citizens having not over 25 hectares of land.

The idea that a "process of selection" would enable peasants with "superior competitive efficiency" to create prosperous holdings has had considerable popularity not only in Rumania but in other eastern European states.[46] For such a process to have beneficial consequences, however, it is necessary, first, that superior efficiency on tiny holdings will actually result in sufficient capital accumulation to buy out less efficient peasants, and, second, that the peasants displaced in the process have some alternative means of employment. Otherwise the poorer peasants would be reduced to a landless proletariat and the land taken over by the wealthier peasants. Such seems to have been the effect of the National Peasants' law, although it was not the sole cause; the survey of sixty Rumanian villages made in 1938 reported that the law of 1929 had intensified the differentiation in the peasantry by building up the category of middle peasants on the one hand and of increasing the agricultural proletariat on the other.[47] It was this law perhaps more than any other single act which gave

45. See above, p. 125.

46. Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe*, p. 105, cites a Greek author (C. Evelpedis, *La Réforme agraire en Grèce*, Athens, 1926), as an advocate of this view. In Rumania the alienation of peasant property has had a tangled political history in which at one time or another almost all political parties have reversed their positions. Up to the 1918–21 reforms, official policy tended toward inalienability, whereas the older reformers, such as Dobrogeanu-Gherea and Garofiid, demanded alienation as a necessary step to creating an independent peasantry. The Liberals in 1911 came out for a "process of selection," but in 1925 they restricted the transfer of land. The Peasant party, on the contrary, in 1921 was for government control of all sales, whereas in 1929 it moved toward freer purchase. The Communists, it may be added, roundly condemned the National Peasants for their 1929 law, but Lenin, in his agrarian writings before the Russian revolution, was strongly for alienation. The Communist position is seen in Pătrăşcanu's interpretation of the 1929 law: "From the point of view of opening a way for capitalism in the villages and of differentiation within the rural strata, the measure represented an advance in comparison with the past. But what was the cost of this progress? The land of the poorest and economically most feeble layers of the peasants quickly became the principal object, the prey on which urban banking capital and the village bourgeoisie threw themselves." Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, *Sous trois dictatures* (Paris, 1946), p. 106.

47. *60 Sate romînesti*, II, 6. The depression doubtless intensified this effect. During the 1946 famine in Moldavia the same thing occurred: peasants who had obtained land under the 1945 reform began to sell to the larger peasants at such a rate that the government was obliged to pass a law nullifying these sales.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

656 rise to the charge that the National Peasants really represented the
665 richer peasants and the village bourgeoisie.[48]
671 A similar attitude appears in the other principal agrarian measures of the National Peasants; the law for the organization of cooperation, of March 28, 1929, and the law for the organization of rural mortgages and agricultural credit of July 29, 1929. These laws were acclaimed at the time as proof of the government's concern for the peasant, but they need not be considered in great detail here.[49] Laws for credit and cooperation are hardy perennials in Rumanian legislative history, but none of them appears to have accomplished much. These particular laws were quickly blighted by the onset of the depression.

474 The law for the organization of cooperation abrogated the act passed by the Liberal government in July, 1928, which the National Peasants thought gave the state too much control over the cooperative movement. The new code was designed to broaden the legal frame "to offer the cooperatives the freedom of movement which every economic enterprise needs if it is to develop in the present economic world."[50] Notwithstanding this effort to assure greater autonomy and independence, a foreign observer concluded in 1930 that even the new regime had not abandoned the idea that the cooperatives were a government maid of all work.[51] The real difficulty, as has been mentioned before, was that the poor peasant, that is, the average Rumanian, had very little to offer in a cooperative movement. Until the level of the peasantry was raised above the margin of subsistence, the cooperative movement was bound to be a name rather than a reality and to be altogether dependent upon the state for financial support and direction.

452 The law for the organization of rural mortgages and agricultural credit was intended to improve the channels supplying credit to agriculture, which had been seriously undernourished during the Liberal

48. This charge is given some weight when one considers Madgearu's remark, made in 1930: "With farms of medium size, limited to 25 hectares, the agricultural credit granted will be used in a more economical way and will bear fruit in a degree hitherto unknown in our agrarian organization." *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 11. In a country where 75 per cent of all agricultural holdings were under 5 hectares, and 92 per cent under 10 hectares, reference to farms of medium size could have only an extremely limited application.

49. Analyses of the law for the organization of cooperatives may be found in Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, pp. 409–411, and in F. E. Manoliou, *La Réconstruction économique et financière de la Roumanie et les partis politiques*, pp. 236–237, and of the law for the reorganization of agricultural credit in Manoliou, pp. 239–243.

50. From the exposé de motifs, cited in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 409.

51. "Rumania: The State as Co-operator," *Yearbook of Agricultural Co-operation, 1930*, pp. 404–428.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

regime. New institutions were set up to provide credit suitable to agriculture's particular wants. It was hoped that these would stimulate the influx of foreign capital "to satisfy the needs of agricultural financing."[52] In its form the new law was better adjusted to the needs of agriculture, but the depression completely halted the desired flow of capital. It may be doubted if this law was of primary benefit to the poor peasant, who was of necessity a bad risk and whose impoverished condition prevented him from employing credit profitably.[53]

In addition to these financial measures, the National Peasants passed acts for the organization and reform of agricultural instruction intended to spread and popularize better agricultural techniques and to prevent trained agriculturalists from being completely absorbed by the bureaucracy; a law of July, 1929, for the reclamation of the inundated region of the Danube; measures for leasing agricultural machinery to cultivators and developing seed selection stations; and a law to promote systematic colonization in areas of sparse population. These measures, while desirable in themselves, could be of only marginal benefit.

Although the National Peasants' concern with agriculture is shown by the fact that the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture in 1929 was double that of any of the preceding postwar years,[54] the general results are somewhat flat and uninspiring. According to Madgearu ten years later, the National Peasants, because of the difficult circumstances under which they had received the stabilization loan and because of the increasingly unfavorable international economic situation, had been unable to carry out all their financial plans but had been forced to limit themselves to certain priority tasks: assuring the liquidity of the National Bank's portfolio, liquidating the state's floating debt, reconstructing the railways, and making certain productive investments. "The necessary means were lacking to create an agricultural mortgage bank."[55]

Doubtless, financial difficulties and the lack of capital were important obstacles, and the depression washed away what might have been promising beginnings toward improvement in agricultural finan-

52. Madgearu, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 9.

53. Manoliu, *op. cit.*, p. 242, was of the opinion that certain measures of inspection and control, included in the law to safeguard the credit societies, would have the effect of discouraging the small cultivator and diminishing his productive efforts.

54. According to Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 458, after the First World War the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture had not exceeded 33,500,000 gold lei until the advent of the National Peasants. In 1929 it reached the figure of 78,500,000 gold lei.

55. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei romînești*, p. 308.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

241 cial organization. But the agrarian policy had other defects. In the
665 first place, the National Peasants fell into the old Rumanian fallacy
656 of counting too greatly upon an act of legislation to cure any problem.[56] Much more serious however was the fact that while the National Peasants had an agrarian policy it was scarcely a peasant policy. The measures actually taken were not of the kind that could greatly help the poor peasant. The modifications of the party programs between 1921 and 1926 foreshadowed this attitude, but even so the more far-reaching parts of the 1926 program were not carried out.

665 Measures intended to benefit agriculture were not, however, limited
241 to agricultural legislation. The new tariff policy inaugurated by the
652 National Peasants on August 1, 1929, was specifically designed to assist the farmer. The National Peasants had consistently attacked the Liberals' (and the People's party's) tariff policy, which was highly protectionist, raised the cost of agricultural equipment, and was "in its technical structure a feeble instrument of negotiation for securing markets for our export products." [57] The new tariff was, as Madgearu announced, based on the recommendations of the Geneva Conference of 1927. It created a more elastic customs system to permit commercial conventions with other states. Duties on goods were divided into two groups: 1) irreducible minimum duties for goods produced within the country and requiring protection; these could not be reduced through convention; 2) duties on all other articles, which could be reduced through mutual arrangement with other states. Even before signing any customs conventions the government reduced the duties on agricultural equipment.

In thus lowering the cost of imported agricultural equipment as well as in reducing tariffs on articles of mass consumption, the 1929 tariff undoubtedly benefited the peasant. As to the protection of industry, "it was in general calculated so as not to exceed the difference by which the conditions of local production were more difficult than conditions of foreign production, and only for branches of industry which had the possibility of sound development in the country." [58] The tariffs did not renounce industrial protection but tried

56. Note, for example, Madgearu's remark, "Up to 1929 agricultural instruction in Rumania was based on no uniform principle, nor was it adapted to the situation, since its organization was not based on legislation which could solve the problem as a whole." *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 12. Clearly the real reasons for Rumania's lack of adequate agricultural education were not to be found in the absence of a uniform legal code.

57. Madgearu, *Ibid.*, p. 39.

58. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei romînești*, p. 221.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

to protect only those industries showing "natural" promise of development and to promote the necessary rationalization of those industries which had been permitted to become inefficient behind the Liberal tariff.

Throughout Madgearu's exposition of the 1929 tariff there is an evident desire to increase international cooperation and trade, and an altogether friendly attitude toward the great capitalist powers—an attitude quite different from Vintilă Brătianu's cautious and rather grudging admission of the need for increased trade and foreign capital. This attitude is most clearly shown in the laws of 1929 modifying the Liberal acts of 1924 on mines and the commercialization of state-owned enterprises.[59] The National Peasants criticized the 1924 laws as chauvinistic and failing to promote the exploitation of natural resources. "The aggressive nationalist policy exemplified in the Mining Act of 1924, which did so much harm to the country, bringing it into a state of financial and economic disorganization, could not continue without grave consequences for our economic future. A policy of sincere co-operation with international capital is the only means of improving the situation."[60] The new laws threw open the doors to foreign capital. With the exception of requiring that 75 per cent of the personnel (both administrative and subordinate) be Rumanians, no restrictions were placed on the percentage of foreign capital in the companies or upon the nationality of directors and chief officials.

These laws were in marked contrast not only to the attitude of the Liberals but also to the policy recommended by Constantin Stere in 1921.[61] Stere, with his hostility to "vagabond capital" and the menace of imperialist great powers, opposed foreign capital investments in the Rumanian petroleum industry, since all profits passed beyond the frontiers. Nor was foreign capital concerned with satisfying the needs of the population but only with raking in a profit. He was, however, aware that without foreign capital the resources simply could not be developed. He disapproved of the Liberals' policy of "nationalizing" petroleum and creating concessions with a majority of Rumanian capital. Having no confidence in the Liberal plutocracy's willingness or ability to defend the nation's interests, Stere advocated state operation of the petroleum industry. Foreign capital

59. A detailed comparison of Liberal and National Peasant policy on this question, from a pro-Liberal position, is given by Alexandre G. Georgesco, *Le Régime juridique et financière des capitaux étrangers en Roumanie* (Paris, 1932).

60. Madgearu, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 30.

61. C. Stere, *Naţionalizarea Industriei de Petrol: Cuvântare rostită în şedinţa Adunării deputaţilor din 28 Martie 1921* (Bucarest, 1921).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

652 should be obtained not through investments but through loans under-
665 taken by the state. In this way Rumania would have full control over the allocation of capital and would not, except for the interest on loans, see the profits from the oil industry go abroad. The petroleum policy of the National Peasants, as formulated in 1929, was even more removed from Stere's recommendations than from the Liberals' policy. It was, however, perfectly consistent with their economic outlook during their term in office.

665 Rumanian transportation and communications had been in no-
652 toriously bad condition since the First World War, and the Liberals'
496 policy of retrenchment had been particularly damaging to the rail-
464 way system. The 1929 stabilization loan allocated $34,000,000 for
471 railway expansion and $9,000,000 to pay off overdue railway debts.
491 By a law passed in July, 1929, the National Peasants transferred the state railways to an autonomous public body, "to be administered
206 according to commercial principles."[62] They also undertook to repair and extend the highway network, and abolished the primitive *corvée* which was still being used for road maintenance. In 1930 the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation received a concession for the construction of the Rumanian telephone network.

665 The stabilization loan required a reform of the National Bank and of the state accounting system. In March, 1929, the government passed a series of new statutes for the bank; the principal changes were the abolition of the ceiling on the issue of currency, established by the Liberals' in 1925, and the limitation of the influence of the state in the appointment of directors. The bank was given somewhat greater independence from state control and powers to maintain the newly achieved stability of the currency. In July, 1929, the government passed a law reforming the state accounting system and the organization of the budget. There was no doubt that Rumanian state finances needed reform and modernization. The accounting system had been that of France of 1860, plus the accretion of a number of purely Rumanian practices, with the result that the actual condition of government finances at any given time was never known with any exactness. The new law, in reorganizing the preparation of the budget, exerted more stringent control over the expenditures of various ministries. While this law was well intended, its actual results in rationalizing Rumanian finance methods seem to have been very

62. Madgearu, *Romania's New Economic Policy*, p. 50. The organization of Rumanian railways after 1918 had been altogether hectic. In 1925 the Liberals had given some autonomy to the railways; this policy was reversed by the People's party in February, 1927, and reestablished by the Liberals in August of that year.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 slight. In 1929, 1930, and 1931 there was an increasing disparity between budget revenue forecasts and actual receipts.

Certain late measures of the National Peasants will be considered presently in connection with the depression. But from the above it should be evident that during their brief term in office they passed a great deal of legislation, generally consistent in aim, and definitely reversing the main lines of the Liberals' policy. The most important measures, however, were not in the field of agriculture.

665 575 A word might be said on the relation of the National Peasants to foreign agrarian movements. Throughout eastern Europe a strong agrarian current appeared after the First World War. More or less extensive land reforms took place in the belt of states between Soviet Russia and central Europe, and peasant parties of varying political shades made their appearance. In 1921, on the initiative of the Bulgarian Peasant Prime Minister, Alexander Stambuliski, and with the support of the Czech agrarian leaders, Antonin Švehla and Milan Hodža, was formed the International Bureau of Agriculture, known as the Green International. Initially the bureau, which established its headquarters in Prague, was an organization for cooperation among the agrarian parties of the Slavic states of eastern Europe. In 1923, Virgil Madgearu, in discussing the international policy of the Rumanian Peasant party, showed a lukewarm attitude toward the Green International. In his opinion, its purposes were not clearly defined and it displayed a tendency toward Pan-Slavism which would scarcely recommend it to the Rumanians. Above all, he felt that international peasant action had only limited value. "The nation is a decisive factor in determining social progress, since no political party can form itself on an international base. Internationals can be annexes to the development of political action; they cannot become supranational." [63]

The Green International broadened somewhat in the following years. In 1925 Hodža defined the scope of the movement: "We know that agrarian democracy . . . is the strong bond which will create of the peoples an international unity, a formal, organic and psychological unity against which all attacks, whether directed by the imperialist right or the bolshevist left will be shattered." [64] The bureau's secretary Karl Mečir pointed out that the peasantry by their very nature and strong local attachments were not to be organized into a rigid international. The purpose of the movement in his eyes was to

63. *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, p. 88.

64. Milan Hodža, "La Politique étrangère et l'organisation internationale des agriculteurs," *M.A.B.: Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, 2-3 (1925), 32.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 575 serve as a clearing house to establish common ties and to exchange information.[65] In its general lines it represented an attempt to defend the eastern European peasantry against the more highly organized forces of industrialism and the dynamic inroads of Soviet communism.

In 1926 and 1927 the Rumanian and Finnish Peasant parties joined the Green International. There were no real meetings until 1928, when the bureau was formally constituted. After that annual congresses were held until the movement was engulfed by the depression and the political storms of the 1930's. Eventually it came to include peasant parties from Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Austria, Switzerland, Poland, France, the three Baltic states, and Finland. Although Mihalache had spoken of the rising peasant tide in eastern Europe, and Madgearu and Lupu contributed articles to the later issues of the bulletin of the Green International, it appears to have had no effect upon the course of internal Rumanian politics, and the Rumanians were among the less active members of the bureau.

A far more active, though in its aim unsuccessful, international effort was the agrarian bloc of eastern European states, in which Madgearu played a prominent part. This bloc had its origins in the growing agricultural crisis of 1930. The failure to obtain any favorable action at the first preliminary international conference for concerted economic action (held in Geneva, February 17 to March 24, 1930) led some of the agrarian states of eastern Europe, with the Little Entente at the core, to act together in defense of their interests. A series of conferences at Strbske Pleso, Bucarest, and Warsaw during the summer of 1930 were attended by representatives from Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. The attempt was made to coordinte the economic policy of the members of the bloc and to obtain better commercial conditions from the industrial states. The failure of the bloc to achieve its aims belongs, however, in the more general framework of the depression.[66]

665 656 The economic, agrarian, and administrative policy of the National Peasants in 1929 and 1930 has definite homogeneity. A prevailing emphasis upon decentralization and autonomy appears in the administrative reform, in the laws for mines and state enterprises, in the reorganization of the cooperatives. An attempt to relax restric-

65. Karl Meïr, "Le Bureau International Agraire," *M.A.B.: Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, 4 (1926), 26-29.

66. See below, pp. 184-185.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

tions and to permit a natural circulation is seen in the abolition of the censorship and state of siege, in the 1929 tariff, in the law permitting the free sale and purchase of peasant property. A friendly attitude toward foreign capital appears in all the laws on trade and the exploitation of natural resources and in the important concessions granted to foreign firms. Finally, a concern for agriculture is shown not merely in the agrarian laws but in the tariff and financial policy. While many of these measures failed to produce the anticipated results, and some were applied inefficiently, still, taken together, they constitute a recognizable policy and one quite different from that pursued by the Liberals. The conflict between the National Peasants and the Liberals was not merely a struggle for office and a place at the feeding trough, although it is not difficult to cite instances where *mirosul fripturei* ("the fragrance of the roast joint") played an important part.

Two questions, however, must be answered. Was it a peasant program? Was it adequate to the economic needs of Rumania, and in particular did it provide a solution to the agrarian question?

From the preceding discussion of the development of the party's ideology, its modifications of program, and its actual policy there can be little doubt that the National Peasant government was not very "peasantist" either in its composition or in its activities. That is not to say that the National Peasants lacked an agrarian program or that they were indifferent to the peasant; certainly the party regarded itself as the spokesman of the peasantry. But in the course of the party's evolution, from its inception after the war to its arrival in power, a significant change had taken place. Perhaps it was mostly a change in emphasis. Initially as was so well shown in Mihalache's speeches, which are more representative than Stere's more sophisticated arguments, stress was upon the peasant and upon the measures which should be taken to improve his condition. When the party came to power, the chief concern was for greater political democracy and more economic liberty, from which the peasant was to benefit. To some extent this shift showed the influence of the Transylvanians with their middle-class and professional interests, but the Peasant party itself had gone a long way in this direction. Moreover, this change was quite natural, given the passage of time and the subsiding of social ferment. But if such a change was natural, it was also dangerous: in Rumania, if the peasant did not command first attention it was too easy for him not to be taken into consideration at all.

The most important reason for this change, and it has been a fatal defect of most peasant parties, is that a purely peasant movement

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 is almost impossible to sustain both because of the nature of its support and the limitations of its program. Because of their relative physical isolation and simple, often primitive, way of life, the peasants are exceptionally difficult to organize politically. A peasantist philosophy has proved to be uncertain and ambiguous in its aims; it can provide mood and feeling, and is a natural inspiration to poster art, but it becomes confused on the more practical level and for a very fundamental reason. Those elements which are celebrated in the peasant—the primordial qualities, the roots planted deep in the earth—represent everything which the modern world is not. In so far as the peasant is defined in these terms, he provides no clue to the solution of the manifold problems confronting contemporary society.

Therefore one can either reject the peasant outright as an essentially neutral or negative factor, as was the tendency among the Liberals and the Social Democrats,[67] or attempt to broaden the peasant concept by adding, often quite eclectically, other principles. This, in fact, has happened to most peasant movements in practice. Various types of alliances can be made, sometimes with conservatism [68] or with socialism.[69] The actual course which the Rumanian peasant movement took was to absorb Western political and parliamentary democracy together with some of the forms of liberal capitalism—the "trust-busting" capitalism, which believes in free enterprise but favors state intervention to prevent the formation of trusts and monopolies. By this means the peasantry, comprising the greatest numbers of citizens, became identified with the majority will of political democracy, and the economic welfare of the peasant with the belief in economic advance through the free competition of an idealized capitalism.

Apart from internal reasons, such as the conflict with the Liberal

67. Thus, the super-Liberal Zeletin said: "The peasant is the very personification of the principle of inertia: he wishes to be just as his ancestors were. For him tradition is sacred. . . . Capitalism raises itself on the ruins of the agrarian classes, peasants and boyars." *Neoliberalismul*, pp. 16, 20. The Social Democrat Ilie Moscovici concluded that the peasant "cannot be a factor of progress as producer, cannot give new methods of production, cannot enrich society. The peasantry has no immediate interest in changing social forms; by its individual property, its isolated work, its narrow horizon, it forms a conservative element, almost the most conservative in contemporary society." "Lupta de clasă şi transformarea socială," *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, p. 202.

68. C. Rădulescu-Motru thought there was a natural alliance between the peasantry and the enlightened conservatives. He sought to develop this idea in his study, *Ţărănismul, un suflet şi o politică*.

69. In Rumania this effort took two forms: an internal alliance with the socialists, if the latter would drop their doctrinaire attitude toward the peasantry; or externally, seeing in the Western proletariat an ally in the common struggle against the domination of Western industrial capitalism.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

party, certain external circumstances help to explain this particular development. In the years immediately after the First World War Germany was in eclipse, the Soviet Union was in the midst of a social experiment of which none of the Peasant leaders wanted any part, and the Western powers, particularly Great Britain and the United States, were clearly the dominant states. As a result one finds among the writings of the National Peasants a rather curious Anglo-Saxon overlay, both in political and economic affairs.

665

The National Peasants are not necessarily to be reproached for having thus donned a somewhat eclectic garment; the narrowness of pure peasantism rendered some such addition necessary, especially when the party came into office. But it may be doubted whether in fact this combination was able to help the peasantry. In the first place, one of the most profound evils in Rumanian society has been the abyss between the peasant and the governing and urban classes. Although Rumania was not a caste-bound society, but had a constant if not very voluminous movement up from the peasantry, the transition—symbolized by discarding the *opinci* (peasant footwear) for shoes and acquiring a knowledge of French—was very sharp, and the persons who had crossed the line were all too tempted to escape as far as possible from their peasant origins. Under these conditions the Peasant party's absorption of nonpeasant principles was the beginning of its actual alienation from the peasantry. Indeed, in the 1930's and 1940's the National Peasants, as a party, became increasingly removed from their rural origins.[70]

In the second place, it is doubtful whether free competition is unqualifiedly beneficial in Rumania's case. Internally, the policy of "natural selection" among the peasants had as its aim the creation of a prosperous middle peasantry. The drawbacks of this policy in a country of small holdings under 3 hectares with an increasing pressure of population have already been discussed. It might of course be maintained that such a process of selection—whatever its hardships on the submarginal cultivators—was a necessary step to creating a sound peasant economy. But for political if not for other reasons this created a serious contradiction between the National Peasant party's role as standard-bearer of the peasantry and the actual effects of

70. The National Peasants whom I met in 1944, in Bucarest or at their country estates, could hardly have been called representatives of the peasantry. Many of them were democrats politically (though some were not) but one had the feeling that they regarded the "good peasants" as something essentially *other*. They were mostly middle-class lawyers, doctors, engineers, and business men who regarded Mihalache's continued use of peasant clothes with gentle amusement as rather quaint.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 such a policy upon a large percentage of the peasants.[71] Externally, the approach toward freer trade and the abandoning of industries unless they were capable of "natural" development (though Madgearu was not against protection of infant industries) had certain shortcomings. Recent economic analysis, admittedly still under debate, has considerably modified the definition of the natural development of industry through the idea of "social marginal net profit" and "external economies."[72] It has also raised doubts whether a small backward state should regard classical free trade as an ideal policy. Aside from the theoretical aspects of the question, it is obvious that the success of such a policy is dependent upon a congenial atmosphere in the realm of international trade and finance.

It was the unhappy fate of the National Peasants to have based their policy upon a world situation which was just on the brink of collapsing in the great depression and which, to date, shows little sign of returning to those conditions upon which their foreign commercial policy was founded.[73] Of course, the National Peasants can hardly be blamed for not foreseeing the consequences of the world collapse. Nevertheless the fact that they had thus committed themselves to a pattern which was to be shaken to the ground had fatal consequences for their internal position. They had abandoned the narrowness of the original radical peasantism of 1920–22 for a more promising set of ideas, and when these collapsed their economic program was bankrupt.

Similarly, in the political field they had rested their hopes upon political democracy—again by a somewhat too formal acceptance of Western principles. When Carol and the rising antiparliamentary movements began to come into action in 1930 and 1931, they were defenseless. In 1928 the National Peasants won much praise for the orderly behavior of their mass demonstration at Alba Iulia and their official disavowal of the one column of peasants which had half-heartedly started a march to Bucarest. This very spirit, which was

71. The Communists, of course, have seen in this contradiction a betrayal of the peasantry by a party which had come to represent the lower middle class and the wealthy peasants. Admitting the contradiction, this charge can be judged only in connection with the success of the Communists' efforts at a solution. See below, pp. 323–327.

72. Cf. P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe," *The Economic Journal*, *53* (1943), 202–211, and a criticism by Yuan-Li Wu, "A Note on the Post-War Industrialization of 'Backward' Countries and Centralist Planning," *Economica*, *12*, New Ser. (1945), 173–178.

73. In 1930 Madgearu said: "A new economic ideology was spreading over Europe—the spirit of international economic co-operation, which asserted itself so impressively at the Geneva Economic Conference in May 1927. Rumania understood the spirit of Geneva . . . " *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 39.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665

essential to their constitutional and legal principles, helped to cause their subsequent downfall. In abandoning, perhaps inevitably, the strong peasant fervor in favor of majority parliamentary support they failed to preserve their ultimate point of support.

The combination of their political and economic principles, which clearly had a mutual effect upon one another, thus led to their overthrow under the impact of the depression and in the particular circumstances of Maniu's quarrel with King Carol.

In comparing the Liberals and National Peasants, in many ways antithetical, one is struck by a curious parallel between them. Both were somehow out of phase with world developments. The Liberals embarked on a policy of economic nationalism and semiautarky during just the years Europe was making a last if unsuccessful effort to restore the old economic order. The National Peasants, when they came into office, attempted to reverse Rumanian policy at just the time when the European economy was moving into a new stage of economic nationalism. Both parties fell into contradictions arising from their Western preoccupations and the realities of the Rumanian situation. The Liberals in attempting to copy Western capitalism ceased to be "liberal" in the process; the Peasants in attempting to copy parliamentary democracy ceased to be "peasants." The Peasants' economic policy bore a far greater resemblance to traditional liberalism than did that of the Liberals, whereas the Liberals' economic policy—at least in its restrictions and hostility to Western capital—had points in common with the initial attitude of the Peasants.

The following decade was to witness an attempt to overcome these contradictions by carrying certain of the implications to an extreme degree. The Liberals' economic policy, if it was to be realized, implied a move toward corporatism and more state control: this was to be the line followed by the neoliberalism of the Carolist period. On the other hand, the failure of the National Peasants to safeguard the peasant was the cause, in part at least, of the upsurge of the Iron Guard. In both cases the parliamentary pattern was dropped.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

mirers. His individualism, or perhaps his vanity, had made him an uncertain political ally, and he took to himself the role of mentor and guardian of the Rumanian national consciousness. His efforts in politics, however, were far less impressive than his output as a historian.[1]

The government's term in office was not edifying.[2] As the economic situation deteriorated, the complete absence of any organized political support made itself felt when all the other parties began a violent press campaign; the Liberals belabored Argetoianu's financial policy as one of bankruptcy; the Transylvanian press threatened a demand for autonomy; the aging Marshal Averescu, bitterly disappointed by Carol's failure to select him as man of the hour, assailed both the government and the king. A crisis rose between Carol and the government over the salaries of state officials. The government, faced by a bad deficit and the failure to obtain an additional loan from France, was attempting to reduce official salaries. Carol opposed this and forced Iorga's resignation on June 6, 1932.

After an unsuccessful effort by Titulescu, the National Peasants, under Vaida Voevod, were recalled for their second term of office. In the elections of July they obtained only 45 per cent of the votes, a great decline from their 80 per cent of 1928, but sufficient to give them the premium. The Iron Guard and other fascist groups showed gains and won some additional seats, primarily in Bessarabia, the region of deepest discontent. An effort was made to bring Maniu out of retirement; he did resume leadership of the party but was unable to reach an understanding with Carol.

The program of the new National Peasant government was along the same lines as its predecessors and included the reintroduction of the administrative decentralization law, which had been revoked by the Iorga government; a modification of the electoral law, which all parties promised to change but which they somehow did not get around to when in power; and a reduction of taxes and expenditures. The party had an initial success in obtaining a Swiss loan of 50 million francs for the payment of back salaries of state officials. In October, however, Vaida Voevod resigned after a disagreement with the influential Titulescu on the question of Rumanian-Soviet nego-

1. For a recent tribute to Iorga, who was assassinated by the Iron Guard in 1940, see John Campbell, "Nicholas Iorga," *The Slavonic and East European Review*, 26, No. 66 (November, 1947), 46–58.

2. For a particularly jaundiced account of the Iorga-Argetoianu administration see G. C. Logio, *Rumania*, pp. 39–52. Logio, as a foreign business man, was especially bitter on the subject of Rumanian business ethics and heartily disliked Carol, "who promulgates rascally laws defrauding the unwary foreign investor and trader."

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 175 tiations,[3] and was replaced by Maniu, with Titulescu as Foreign Minister. On January 8, 1933, Maniu again broke with Carol, and on January 14 Vaida Voevod returned to head the government.[4]

By this time the National Peasants were badly disorganized. With Carol's assistance a definite split in the party leadership between Maniu and Vaida Voevod was developing and was to lead to a rupture in 1934. The government itself had not only lost its peasant enthusiasm but under Vaida Voevod's leadership was rapidly drifting into the political habits of the Liberals. On the first of February 448 oil workers at Ploeşti struck over a wage decision, and a fight en- 665 sued between strikers and troops. At the same time in Bucarest some 175 7,000 workers in the state railway shops went on strike. The government hastily proclaimed martial law in Bucarest, Cernăuţi, Galaţi, Iaşi, Timişoara, Ploeşti, and the oil fields. The Communist party and its affiliates were again dissolved, the government passed laws against antisocial and antistate organizations, and over 200 Communists were arrested throughout Rumania. This brought a protest demonstration from the railway workers, troops were called out, and there was a vicious street fight.

To some extent this tension was a fatal by-product of the deepening depression, and the strikes, while obviously having their roots in the misery of the Rumanian industrial workers, were not confined solely to economic demands. Indeed, since the installation of the Groza regime, the Communists have played up the revolutionary elements of the railway strike and the guiding role of the Communist party in it. Even so, the government all too hastily resorted to the 175 665 very measures for which it had so long taken the Liberals to task.

Moreover, while Vaida Voevod was thus combating labor unrest,

[448] 3. Rumania and Soviet Russia had not resumed diplomatic relations since the First World War because of their inability to reach any agreement on Bessarabia. In January, 1932, the Poles, with French urging, had signed a treaty of friendship and nonaggression with the U.S.S.R. Now Poland and France were pressing Rumania to do the same. Vaida Voevod, apparently without consulting Titulescu, had instructed the Rumanian representative in Warsaw to negotiate with Litvinov. Titulescu had heard of his move and had objected to the manner in which the negotiations were being conducted and especially to the possibility that Bessarabia might be recognized as a subject of dispute. In this disagreement Titulescu was sufficiently influential to squeeze out Vaida Voevod.

4. In this instance the specific difficulty arose over the dismissal of Colonel Marinescu, Prefect of Bucarest. Carol had been installing military officers in a number of civil posts. The National Peasant government undertook to replace them by civilians. Colonel Marinescu, in a circular letter, denied rumors that he was about to be removed and said that since he was appointed by the king, only the king could remove him. Mihalache, Minister of the Interior, then demanded his resignation, and failing to obtain it resigned himself. Maniu supported Mihalache and the cabinet resigned.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

he was on good terms with the up-and-coming Iron Guard. Indeed, a year later he said, under oath, that as early as 1929, when he had been Minister of the Interior, he had been in touch with the Iron Guardists for the purpose of directing their youthful enthusiasm toward less extreme ends and "of drawing the attention of the organization to the necessity of combating Communism."[5] In 1934 Vaida Voevod, after failing to get the National Peasants to accept his "numerus Valachicus"—a device to oust non-Rumanian minorities, especially the Hungarians, from posts in the government and in "nationally important enterprises"—abandoned the party and formed his own hypernationalist, semifascist political group.[6]

In November, 1933, the Vaida government resigned, partly at least because of the king's dissatisfaction with its handling of the increasing fascist activity and its failure to prevent attacks directed against himself, Mme Lupescu, and his entourage.[7] After five years out of power the old Liberals, under Duca, came into office on November 14. Duca, who, like Vaida Voevod, stated that he had tried to "channelize" the energies of the Iron Guard, undertook to dissolve the movement on the eve of the new elections. On December 29 he was assassinated by three Iron Guardists at the Sinaia railway station. After several days' confusion, Gheorghe Tătărescu became head of the Liberal cabinet which was to remain in office until November, 1937.

During these three years of hectic political changes, five main developments are observable:

1) The growing influence of the king. While Carol was unsuccessful in establishing a government of personalities, he was making rapid progress in unraveling the old political fabric and undermining and splitting the leadership of the major parties. He was also increasing his extraparliamentary influence through his camerilla and through his appointees in administrative posts.

2) The increasing paralysis and confusion of the National Peasants. As has been seen already, their decline was more or less implicit in the situation as of 1930, and during the following years the

5. *Patria*, March 31, 1934, quoted in Pătrăşcanu, *Sous trois dictatures*, p. 76.

6. See C. A. Macartney's account of a conversation with Vaida Voevod on the "numerus Valachicus," *Hungary and Her Successors*, p. 298.

7. Although internally Rumanian politics were moving to the Right, the Vaida government did, in July, sign the London Convention defining aggression, to which the U.S.S.R. was also a signatory. This step, which marked a slight improvement in Rumanian-Soviet relations, was a part of the realignment of forces after the rise of Hitler.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

page 187

IX

THE CAROLIST PERIOD: NEOLIBERALISM, 1934–37

Survey of Political Events

THE term neoliberalism, which may appear a gross misnomer for these singularly unliberal years, is descriptive of two facts: 1) The Liberal party returned to office and, what is more, remained there for the full term of four years, thus repeating its record as the only party under the 1923 Constitution to achieve such a feat of endurance. Nevertheless, the Liberal cabinet of the 1930's was not the same as the party of Ion I. C. and Vintilă Brătianu. Not only did King Carol really hold the leading strings of political power but within the Liberal party itself (not to speak of Gheorghe Brătianu's Young Liberals) there was a growing cleavage between Gheorghe Tătărescu, the head of the government, and Constantin Brătianu, the third of the elder Brătianu brothers, who was party chief. This split did not become open until later, but Tătărescu as a king's man was clearly moving away from the old lines of the Liberals. 2) The leading ideas of the administration at this time have a certain relation to the doctrine of so-called neoliberalism, which was advanced in the 1920's but which at that time was associated with Averescu's People's party.[1] 665

The years 1934 and 1935 were a kind of plateau in the troubled history of the 1930's. The depression leveled off and there was a slow move toward recovery. The political party system, while basically completely unstable, did at least pause from the rapid changes of government which had marked the years 1931–33. King Carol seemed less bent on securing a personal political dictatorship. Even on the international scene there was a temporary, if uneasy, breathing spell. The first impulse of fascism which had brought Hitler to power had not set all of east Europe tumbling as had been feared. Rumania reestablished diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.[2] The Lit- 175 648

1. The People's party was a melange of "regenerated" liberalism combined with an emphasis upon order and discipline, plus a great deal of crass opportunism.

2. Without, however, obtaining a clear statement of recognition of its possession of Bessarabia. For a discussion of this point see Philip E. Mosely, "Is Bessarabia Next?" *Foreign Affairs*, 18, No. 3 (New York, April, 1940), 557–562.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

648 appears to have been the consequence of personal differences but presaged a shift in Rumania's international orientation. As Rumania had been one of the principal gainers in the First World War, all the governments up to this time had a similar foreign policy, pro-French and against any treaty revision, which indeed was the only way Rumania could preserve its new territories from Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Soviet claims. When it became clear that the Western powers had lost the initiative, foreign policy became less simple. The extreme Right was vociferously pro-German. Carol personally would have preferred to stay clear of German influence, since only the Western attachment gave promise of guaranteeing all the territories acquired by the war. But if Britain and France weakened, he was inclined to improve his relations with Germany. Rumania's relations with the U.S.S.R. had improved somewhat in the 1930's, but it was a negative improvement—a hope of assurance against Soviet attack. The underlying hostility between the two powers was deep and so pervasive as scarcely to require any discussion. Thus in 1937 Carol stated to Wickham Steed that the chief difficulty of Rumania's position lay in the fact that "the immense weight of Russia was always bearing upon her and she had to withstand it as best she could. Russia was, so to speak, the hereditary enemy. As regards Hitler, he felt admiration for Hitler, whom he did not look upon as a sinister or dangerous man." [7]

● 665 From 1936 on, as a consequence of this shift in the international balance, the extreme Right became more and more blatant; anti-Semitic activities increased in extent and vileness; university students showed the advantages of their education by attacking Jewish shops; hostility and scorn for the decadent democracies became the vogue; defections from the old parties decreased their strength and added to the forces of the Right.

During this time the National Peasant party, as the principal nonfascist opposition to the government showed little strength or determination. Mihalache did attempt to reinvigorate the peasantist element in the party's ideology and formed a "peasant guard" to protect National Peasant meetings from fascist bullies. In May, [668] 1936, there was a demonstration of some 80,000 peasants in Bucarest, directed against the Liberals, demanding better conditions for peasants and workers and decrying the tolerance shown to the fascists. These efforts, however, had no significant results.[8]

7. Quoted in Pavel Pavel, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

8. According to Pătrăşcanu (*Sous trois dictatures*, p. 114), the National Peasants had planned a large demonstration in November, 1933, but had canceled it upon Carol's promise that the Liberal government was about to fall and that they would succeed it.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

In November, 1937, the Liberal government reached the end of its term and resigned. Carol requested Mihalache to form a new cabinet, on the unacceptable condition that he collaborate with Vaida Voevod. On his refusal, Tătărescu was recalled to form a cabinet and prepare for elections. He obtained Iorga's collaboration and made an electoral pact with Vaida Voevod's nationalist group. Then, to the general surprise, it was announced that Maniu and the Iron Guard leader Codreanu (and also Gheorghe Brătianu) had formed a non-aggression pact to insure free elections. This pact in recent years has been loosely used by the Communists to prove Maniu a pro-fascist. Such an interpretation obviously will not hold water, and there is no reason to doubt that his purpose in making the pact was as he defined it: to guarantee that Tătărescu could not employ the usual method of fixing the election. It was not a political agreement nor were joint lists established. It might also be added that the Rumanian Communist party gave its support to the National Peasants even after the pact with the Iron Guard.[9]

175 665

Nevertheless, the pact was a blunder. It was bound to have a demoralizing effect upon democratic elements struggling for survival to see an alliance between Maniu and the frank and open enemy of democratic and parliamentary institutions, especially since the National Peasant electoral campaign could not be directed against the Iron Guard. Codreanu certainly had much more to gain from such a pact in being able to associate his name with Maniu's. Above all it showed the National Peasants' own loss of confidence in themselves or their ideas, and was in the sharpest contrast to their refusals to make any deals on the road to power in 1927 and 1928. The defection of some of the outstanding leaders of the party in the following months was a further indication of the disruption of the party.

The pact was, however, successful in its immediate aim; by the balancing of forces which it achieved the elections were relatively free (though they elicited a low turnout of the electorate, a sign, perhaps, of the decline of parliamentarism).[10] For the first time in Rumanian history, and the last, a government in power failed to get the 40 per cent of the votes necessary for the premium. The government obtained 36 per cent, the National Peasants 21 per cent, the

9. *Ibid.*, p. 185.

10. Whereas in the 1928 elections 77.4 per cent of the registered voters actually voted, the percentage dropped off steadily in subsequent elections; in 1937 the figure was only 66 per cent. It is possible, and it has been suggested, that government pressure in 1937 kept people from the polls in some areas. A very interesting analysis of this election is given by C. Enescu, "Semnificaţia alegerilor din decemvrie 1937 în evoluţia politică a neamului românesc," *Sociologie Românească*, 5, Nos. 11–12 (November–December, 1937), pp. 513–526.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 Iron Guard 16 per cent, and the National Christian party (the fu-
●665 sion of Goga's and Cuza's nationalist, anti-Semitic parties) 9 per cent. Rumania's curious electoral system had broken down. The Liberals' failure was clearly a loss of confidence. The National Peasants or the Iron Guard seemed the most likely alternatives.

At this point, however, Carol moved in and on December 28, 1937, called upon the Transylvanian poet and lyrical fascist, Octavian Goga, to form a cabinet. Carol's own explanation of this surprising decision, which was in fact the immediate prelude to his personal dictatorship, was that he had no alternative. He could not bring back the Liberals; he did not want the Iron Guard in power, so his only move was to spike the guns of the extreme Right by putting in another but less dynamic Rightist party. There was, of course, another solution: to have called in the National Peasants, but the personal feud between Carol and Maniu precluded that course. There is no evidence, however, that Carol was at all reluctant to take power into his own hands.

Goga was installed with a rather heterogeneous cabinet including Gen. Ion Antonescu and three runaways from the National Peasants, chief of whom was Armand Calinescu. This government had a brief and hectic career, notable chiefly for arousing foreign protests because of its anti-Jewish activities but for little else. On February 10 Carol ended the farce, dismissed Goga, and set up a government of National Union under the Patriarch Miron Cristea, including an assortment of old worthies: Averescu, Vaida Voevod, General Vaitoianu, Mironescu, Iorga, Tătărescu, Argetoianu, Calinescu, and General Antonescu. It was a strange collection when one considers Carol's advocacy of the "younger generation." The period of explicit royal dictatorship had started.

Economic and Agrarian Policy

642 If the drift toward a royal dictatorship was induced by the victories of fascism throughout Europe and by the political conflict within Rumania itself, a third reason was the economic policy pursued after the depression. While much of the dictatorial paraphernalia of these years may be attributed to Carol's personal tastes or to the political desirability of making use of the nationalist and fascist sentiments of the times, a quite separate impulse toward an authoritarian, corporatist society was contained in the economic policy of neo-liberalism.

159 Perhaps the clearest illustration of this impulse is to be found

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

in the writings and career of the economist-politician Mihail Manoilescu, a man who never achieved his political ambitions in Rumania but whose unorthodox economic writings have attracted a fair amount of international attention. Trained as an engineer, he became engaged in politics after the First World War as a member of General Averescu's People's party. In 1927 he was arrested by the Liberal government for his efforts to bring Carol back to Rumania; he was later rewarded by being foisted on the Mironescu cabinet as Minister of Industry and Commerce. Although he held a number of cabinet posts in the governments of the 1930's, he did not fare as well under Carol as he had hoped. He was, however, called to the foreign ministry in 1940, and had the unpleasant privilege of signing the Vienna Decree by which Rumania lost Northern Transylvania.[11]

Manoilescu began his political career as a neoliberal and as an opponent of the peasantism (țărănismul) of the radically inclined Peasant party of 1922.[12] At that time he announced democracy to be his ideal and the essential truths of liberalism to be valid and timeless. He criticized the peasantist doctrine, elaborated by Madgearu and Stere, as anachronistic and self-contradictory. Since the land reform had already been achieved, the Peasant party, born too late, had lost its *raison d'être*. Like all opponents of the Peasants, he denied the homogeneity of the peasantry and its ability to act successfully as a class. He deplored the party's current emphasis upon class struggle, as beyond the powers of the peasantry to master and as dangerous to society. As for liberalism, he felt that its historical manifestations—as distinct from its essential principles—had been altogether too limited by an atomistic concept of society, by the passive role assigned to the state, and by the narrow definition of private property. Superficially, in his opposition to peasantism and his reformulation of liberalism, he was not far from the Liberal Duca.

But if one examines his neoliberalism of 1922 and 1923, certain very important differences appear. In the first place, he openly attacked the Rumanian Liberal party and was thus not obliged, as was Duca, to reconcile liberalism to the party of the Brătianus. Unlike Duca, who pleaded for "social harmony," Manoilescu was for a "political equilibrium" of the various independent productive groups which form society; he advocated vertical rather than horizontal parties. The principal difference, however, lay in Manoilescu's em-

11. A brief biography is given in the bibliography of his works: Florin Em. Manolescu, *Bibliographie des travaux du Professeur Mihail Manoilescu* (Bucarest, 1936).

12. His two principal studies in this connection are *Țărănism și democrație* (Bucarest, 1922), and "Neoliberalismul," in *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, a lecture delivered in February, 1923.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665
159

phasis upon economic productivity: "In order to live as a civilized state, Rumania requires the political and social form which will realize its energies to the maximum."[13] This emphasis had a decisive effect upon his whole line of thought. The peasant, because of his relatively low productivity, could not be the dominant factor in Rumanian social and economic life. On the contrary, Manoilescu defended the old Rumanian oligarchy which had been the necessary advance guard in the national awakening. Above all he saw society as a planned work of engineering. "To-morrow the principles of scientific organization will dominate the whole of society and will be applied to the entire system of national production as to a single enterprise."[14]

It was this ideal, and not any "regeneration of liberalism," which marked the real divergence of Manoilescu's neoliberalism from the views of the old Liberal party. This distinction is quite important. As has been seen, the Liberals had taken over nineteenth-century liberalism largely for nationalist reasons. In the course of applying it to Rumania, they had warped it beyond recognition, especially in regard to economic nationalism and state control. Nevertheless, it remained a derivative, if a perverted one, of the liberalism of the nineteenth century. As a result the Liberals were caught in a contradiction between their actual policy and their political philosophy, and it has been noted that the Liberal leaders justified their economic policy on grounds of temporary necessity or because of Rumania's backward condition. Even in their stress upon industry the old Liberals held a somewhat simple view of the exploitation of natural resources coupled with a nationalist desire to have a strong Rumania.[15]

In Manoilescu, on the other hand, economic productivity, that is, industrialization, was the focal point of his thought, and drove him entirely away from liberalism toward a doctrine of corporatism. Manoilescu's best known work, *The Theory of Protection and International Trade*,[16] shows a notable evolution from his articles of the

13. *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, p. 181.

14. *Tărănism şi democraţie*, p. 50.

15. In this connection it should be noted that Zeletin's neoliberal defense of Rumanian liberalism (see above p. 114) has a rather retrospective air, justifying Rumanian economic policy in terms of the earlier mercantilist behavior of the western European states. Zeletin also wrote a book on *Neoliberalismul*, but his point of view was quite different from Manoilescu's and really referred to the modifications of liberalism mentioned by Duca and appearing in the 1923 Constitution. Zeletin approached the subject in a quasi-Marxist fashion and regarded the development from liberalism to neoliberalism as one of historical necessity. Manoilescu, on the other hand, displays a marked voluntarism.

16. The book was first published in French, *Théorie du protectionisme et de l'échange international* (Paris, 1929); an English translation appeared in 1931; a

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

early 1920's although many of the changes were implicit in the earlier writings. In 1923 he had wanted to reformulate liberalism to meet contemporary requirements. By 1930 he was attempting a total refutation of the classical theory of international trade as it had come down from Ricardo. The core of his new theory, which he reiterated incessantly, was that "the product of the labor of an industrial workman is almost always exchanged for the product of the labor of several agricultural workmen." [17] From this premise he concluded that international exchange was only to the benefit of the industrial country and furthered the economic domination of the European industrial states.

The economic domination of a country signifies the economic state which allows the produce of the labor of its workmen to be exchanged for the produce of a larger number of workmen of other countries. In the life of nations, as in the life of individuals, wealth never comes only from one's own labor. "Make others work for you" has always been the classical means of becoming wealthy.[18]

If an agricultural country is absolutely unable to produce industrial goods it is obliged to make this disadvantageous exchange, but if it can produce an industrial article—even at a permanently higher cost than a foreign industrial state—it should do so rather than import. Thus, even though it might require the labor of 300 Rumanian workmen to produce a quantity of cloth that could be produced by the labor of 100 British workmen, it would still be advantageous to do so, if, to import the cloth, Rumania was obliged to export a quantity of wheat which had required the labor of 500 workmen. With his theory of permanent protection, Manoïlescu was quite critical of those protectionists, such as List, who had gone only halfway and rested their argument on the fostering of infant industries. He demanded protection, however, only for those industries whose "productivity surpasses the average productivity of the country." He opposed autarky, which he thought defensible only as a measure of preparedness for war, and did believe in an international division of labor, but one which was based upon specialization within different branches of the more productive industries.[19]

---

revised and expanded version later appeared in German, *Die nationalen Produktivkräfte und der Aussenhandel* (Berlin, 1937).

17. Manoïlescu, *Theory of Protection*, p. vi.

18. *Ibid.*, p. vii.

19. It is unnecessary here to give an account of his quite lengthy effort to provide a mathematical refutation of the principles of free trade. His chief attack was upon

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

829 Regardless of the theoretical merits or fallacies in Manoilescu's 665 analysis, it is obvious that he had made a clean break with economic liberalism. Moreover, he flatly denied the premise upon which the Peasantist economists had based their argument.

> An agricultural country cannot raise itself by increasing slowly and uniformly the income of all its agricultural producers. Economic progress never spreads in a similar manner in all parts of a country. All the work of progress begins through a *center* or *nucleus of progress* and these nuclei are formed by the industries which represent a superior productivity.[20]

Far from admitting the Peasants' attack on "artificial industry," he held the artificiality of the support to be of no consequence so long as his rather loosely defined "productivity" increased.

The principal danger in Manoilescu's doctrine lay not in its stress upon industry nor in its denial of the ability of Rumanian agriculture to lift its own level of productivity. Industrialization in some form appears to be a necessary element in raising the miserable economic conditions of the peasant states of southeastern Europe, and it is quite unlikely that remedies sought in the agricultural sphere alone can produce an adequate alleviation. But in Rumania the critical question in many cases is not what is to be done but who is to do it.

In a country with such marked social and economic inequalities, with industry monopolized in the hands of a narrow, state-subsidized group, Manoilescu's doctrine of protectionism would have the fatal

---

the famous Ricardan cloth and wine example of comparative costs in the determination of exports. In my opinion he gains little in attempting to make a logically watertight demonstration, and indeed by trying to establish an absolute argument on the basis of a much oversimplified model he weakens the argument that in practice the operation of free trade has caused backward agricultural countries very serious difficulties. In particular he seems to underestimate the problems involved in the task of increasing the productivity and capital intensity per worker and assumes that protectionism alone is an adequate stimulus for the industrialization of a backward country. To be sure some of his contentions, such as the distinction between "national gain" and "individual profit," have been considerably elaborated in recent years, and the recognition of the extent of hidden unemployment in a peasant society has led to numerous recommendations that planned industrialization is the only remedy; but such recommendations (e.g., K. Mandelbaum's *The Industrialization of Backward Areas*) are based upon premises quite different from Manoilescu's. For a critical appraisal of Manoilescu's theory see J. B. Condliffe's review in *The Economic Journal*, 43 (1933), 143-145, and Jacob Viner's review in the *Journal of Political Economy* (1932). M. Kalecki's review of the German edition of Manoilescu's work, in *The Economic Journal*, 48 (1938), 708-711, is relatively favorable as regards Manoilescu's recognition of the plight of backward countries, though critical of his theoretical approach.

20. Manoilescu, *Theory of Protection*, p. 30, n. 1.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

effect of increasing this inequality and extending the power of the industrial groups. Moreover, the policy of extending protection exclusively to industry and not to agriculture—whatever its intrinsic benefits for the national economy—would mean increased costs for the agricultural sector, uncertain markets, and, at best, a forced transfer of personnel from agriculture into industry. Furthermore, if over three-fourths of the electorate belongs to the peasantry, it is difficult to see how such a process could be achieved within the framework of a representative government.

829 665

Manoilescu's response, quite naturally, was to abandon liberal politics and take up corporatism on the Italian model. In the 1930's he wrote a number of articles on the "Century of Corporatism." In 1934, for example, he made a comparison of the liberal, the Communist, and the corporative societies.[21] Corporate society "is characterized by *organization*. It allows freedom of individual possession of the means of production. The corporative economy assumes that the maximum of social welfare is realized by the discipline of economic activities in harmony with the ends of the state. Its motto is: National interest; its representative type: the organizer." Employing a quasi-scientific jargon, Manoilescu defined "corporative space" as a

> space where the egoistic impulses of the individual do not cease to exist and always represent active forces, but where, in addition to these forces [which are the sole qualities of a "liberal space"] there is a system of forces which direct individual actions toward a common goal created by the ends of the state. . . . Corporative space is a "magnetic field" dominated by national "lines of force" directed uniformly toward the ends assigned by the state.[22]

It is not necessary to take Manoilescu's utterances on this line very seriously or to inquire who was to determine these all-powerful state aims. He welcomed the coming of the royal dictatorship as the embodiment of the necessary revolution against outworn forms.[23] Apart from the vanity and opportunism which runs through his work, the significance of his writings lies:

1) in the evolution they display from the neoliberalism of the 1920's to the more thoroughgoing corporatism of the 1930's, and

21. *L'Espace corporatif* (Paris, 1934).
22. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
23. It is somewhat ironic that Manoilescu, who had boasted of his friendship with Mussolini and the Germans, should have been forced as Minister of Foreign Affairs to sign the Vienna Award in 1940, by which his fascist friends obliged Rumania to give up Northern Transylvania. The blow was so great that he collapsed at the conference table.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

829 665 2) the distinctly undemocratic implications of this evolution in economic ideas, at least in their Rumanian context.

It would be absurd to suppose that the actual development of Rumanian economic policy was based upon any such theoretical considerations, but there is a reasonably close parallel between the progress of Manoilescu's ideas and the development of the economic and industrial policy of the Rumanian government from that of the old Liberals under Vintilă Brătianu to that of the Liberal government of the 1930's. Although the old Liberals had favored a program of industrialization with state support, it was handled primarily through the private banks, controlled by the Liberals, and was directed chiefly toward extracting natural resources and creating secondary industries. Moreover, the tight-fisted fiscal policy of Vintilă Brătianu had served as a check on economic activity.

178 433 After 1933 industrialization proceeded at a much more rapid tempo and in a somewhat different direction. The private banks after the depression played a less important part in financing industry; the principal initiative was by the National Bank or the state itself, both through state-owned corporations and through the growing importance of the state as consumer of industrial products. Expansion was most extensive in heavy industry; large cartels appeared and there was a notable concentration of industrial activity. Between 1933 and 1938 the number of "large" industrial concerns (i.e., with at least 20 workers and more than 10 horsepower) increased only from 3,487 to 3,767, whereas the installed horsepower increased from 529,965 to 746,789, and the employed personnel from 184,777 to 289,117.[24] The horsepower employed in capital goods industries increased from 287,266 in 1932 to 452,870 in 1937, as contrasted with a more modest increase from 237,442 to 289,666 in consumer goods industries. The output in quantity of capital goods had by 1937 increased by 57.4 per cent over the 1927 level, consumer goods by 45 per cent.[25] The production of steel, which had hit a high of 143,511 metric tons in 1928, and dropped to a low of 103,046 in 1932, rose from 144,766 tons in 1933 to 276,532 in 1938.[26] There was no doubt that the policy was directed toward heavy industry and was having results.

Two important reasons for this industrialization were, of course, the depression and the rearmament program. The collapse of the grain market and the spread of agrarian protectionism among the

24. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești*, p. 149.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
26. *Breviaire statistique de la Roumanie* (1940), p. 164.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

case of Manoilescu.[33] The trend toward heavy industry was a forced development, carried on by monopolies subsidized and protected by the state—probably the only way in which such industries could have been created in short order. It did not reflect a growing individual domestic demand, as the state was the principal consumer for the new products. The increased industrial production was largely balanced by continued low imports. Thus, over the eleven years from 1927 to 1938, industrial production rose from 59 to 69 billion lei, but total industrial consumption fell from 93 to 88 billion because of a fall in imports from 34 to 19 billion lei.[34] 652

On the short run at least, and relatively if not absolutely, this forced development was at the expense of agriculture. Funds which might have gone into agriculture went into industry; the peasant as a consumer was obliged to pay high prices for industrial products. The relation between agricultural prices and the price of industrial products necessary to agriculture, which had dropped from an index of 100 in 1929 to 53.4 in 1934, climbed only to 63.9 by 1937. Clearly such a policy was exposed to opposition from an electorate consisting largely of peasants—if the representative parliamentary system functioned. The economic policy of these years by its very nature implied an extension of control over political activity. The Tătărescu regime was the last effort to carry on politics in the traditional manner, through a quiet perversion of the constitutional system, but the growing differences between Tătărescu and the old guard of the [435] 665

33. An excellent example of the political and social implications of this industrial drive is to be seen in a resolution of a congress of the Rumanian Federation of Manufacturers, held in Bucarest on February 3–6, 1936. The congress considered the industrialisation of Rumania necessary not only for the development of the country's natural resources but to provide employment and meet the requirements of national defense and the balance of payments. It demanded a stable system favorable to the development of industry; privileges on tariffs and railway rates; legislation requiring public authorities to obtain all their supplies from Rumanian industry; statutory recognition of agreements between industrialists having the object of "improving production and sales by lawful means." In the field of social legislation the congress demanded that employers should be relieved of all charges which did not correspond "either to the workers' real needs or to the capacity of Rumanian industry." Specifically, it proposed that representation of employers and workers in social insurance schemes should be proportional to the amount shared in their support, the repeal of payments to employees for the first seven days' illness, and the repeal of the employers' civil liability to an insured worker in case of accident. The supervisory rights of the Chambers of Labor should be limited to small manufacturers and they should not be permitted to "tyrannize over employers in large-scale industry." Finally, it demanded that the Federation of Manufacturers be consulted on all laws and regulations affecting industrial life. ILO, *Industrial and Labor Information*, 57, No. 13 (March 30, 1936).

34. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, p. 257. There was, however, a rise in imports between 1934 and 1937 from 13 to 19 billion lei, corresponding to the general economic recovery.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 Liberal party are indicative of the move toward a less inhibited industrial drive.

During the four years, then, between the depression and the inauguration of the Carolist dictatorship, it is possible to find inside Rumania, not to mention the external influences, three quite distinct factors making for the destruction of parliamentary government and the creation of an authoritarian regime:

1) Carol's own personality and his streamlined interpretation of the old-fashioned prerogatives of a monarch;

2) The unrest and growing extremism in broad sections of the population, which was finding a mouthpiece in the Iron Guard;

3) The economic policy of neoliberalism, which not only carried overtones of a more authoritarian state but through the centralization of economic power and control increased the possibilities of creating such a state.

656 While the general atmosphere of these years of neoliberalism re-
435 sembled Manoilescu's teachings in its industrial protectionism, increasing economic nationalism, and growing corporatism, there was an important difference: contrary to Manoilescu's thesis, agricultural protection was maintained and extended. During the years 1935 to 1937 there was a complex system of minimum prices, state purchases, and export bounties for wheat. By the law of 1935 the government paid a minimum price of 35,000 lei for 10 metric tons of wheat weighing 75 kilograms per hectoliter. An export premium financed by a tax on milling, paid 10,000 lei per ten-ton truckload of wheat, and 12,000 lei per truckload of flour. This premium was dropped with the rise in agricultural prices but was reapplied in
[647] 1938. A Wheat Valorization Office was formed to supervise these payments and to improve the quality of wheat. Similar steps were taken for medicinal plants, textile plants, and wool.

439 In 1936 Rumania signed a series of wheat export agreements with
435 Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, and other states. Foreign trade in grains was also assisted by an extremely complicated system of taxing imports to pay for export bounties and permitting the exporter to keep a portion of the free exchange obtained by his exports. In general these measures, which were aimed at maintaining the commercial balance, had a beneficial effect in supporting the price of agricultural products and in increasing exports. Between 1934 and 1937 agricultural prices rose from 44.1 (1929 = 100) to 64.6; the value of agricultural production increased from 42 to 62 billion lei; the value of cereal exports rose

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Yet the Iron Guard collapsed, not without some horrible spasms 668
and death throes, but collapsed whenever a strong hand was raised against it. When Carol attacked it in 1938, despite the lash-back in the assassination of Calinescu, he had it under control. In 1940 he was overthrown by it only because his regime had been completely discredited. In January, 1941, the Guard was to show its ineffectiveness against Antonescu's army.

This strange weakness lay not in the fact that the Iron Guard was an artificial body, completely unrepresentative, but because it was all too indigenous. Its effectiveness seemed to be inversely related to its nearness to power. In opposition and under Carolist persecution, it seemed powerful and menacing; martyrdom became it well. When it came close to power it showed itself inept and maladroit. In the face of real problems, whether of government or of maintaining power, its aura vanished and its new men proved to be nothing but pillagers and thugs with no idea how to master a country, much less run it. The very negativeness of the Iron Guard, which gives it its particular interest, was its own undoing.

The Dictatorships

The Iron Guard enjoyed a brief period of triumph from Septem- 665
ber, 1940, to January, 1941, during which time it shared power with Gen. Ion Antonescu in a "National-Legionary State." Carol fell because the Germans lacked confidence in him but also because all political groups, including the National Peasants and the old Liberals, detested his regime which had discarded political freedom for the presumed interests of the nation and then had failed to make a move in its defense. At the last hour he had summoned Antonescu, a talented and forceful officer, but a man whose stern ambition both Carol and the Guardists failed to appreciate. After Carol's abdication and Michael's accession to the throne, Maniu and Constantin Brătianu supported Antonescu in the hope and on the condition that he would reestablish a constitutional regime. Such a hope had no chance of realization. Although Antonescu had been known as pro-French in the 1930's, he had by this time made his peace with Hitler and was thoroughly committed to a pro-Nazi policy.[18] He had long been criti-

18. It is evident, however, from the recently published memoirs of the former chief interpreter in the German Foreign Office that Antonescu's attitude was not one of obsequious servility. He vehemently criticised the Vienna Award to Hitler's face and expressed his desire to win back Northern Transylvania by force of arms. Apparently his outspoken attitude, which enabled him to match the Führer's harangues ("Er monologisierte genau wie dieser") plus his enthusiastic hatred of the Slavs and willing-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 cal of traditional Rumanian politics and for several years had been in touch with the extremists advocating a "regeneration" of public life.[14] Moreover, while the Iron Guard had been harried under Carol, had lost its top level of leaders as well as much of its popular support, it still had its fighting cadres who felt that their day had come. The army, the only effective opposing force, was at this time badly demoralized by its inaction during the loss of Bessarabia and Transylvania.

665 661 In the cabinet formed on September 15 Antonescu was head of the state; Horia Sima, leader of the Guard, was Deputy Prime Minister; five other ministers were members of the Guard and the rest personal friends of Antonescu. The Guard was declared the sole legal party, responsible for the moral and material uplift of the Rumanian people. While Antonescu had been on good terms with Codreanu for several years and was at this time wearing the Legionary green shirt, tension quickly developed between him and his unruly allies. As a military man he wanted to reestablish law and order, whereas the Guard was champing for its revolution. Within the Guard itself were a number of factions, moderate and extreme, which were disputing Codreanu's mantle.

The pentup violence of the Guard, which had not found satisfaction at the time of Carol's abdication and had not been diverted into other channels, finally broke loose at the end of November, apparently with Horia Sima's approval but without Antonescu's knowledge. The Legionaries incited bloody Jewish pogroms and attempted to wipe out the politicians and civil servants of the previous regime. The army prevented the successful completion of this undertaking, but the Guard did succeed in killing the historian Iorga, the economist Virgil Madgearu, and in massacring sixty-four political prisoners in the Jilava Prison, most of whom had been Carol's agents and police chiefs instrumental in repressing the Legion.

By this time, however, German influence had become decisive. In October, 1940, German troops came into Rumania, ostensibly to reorganize the army; a German economic mission arrived to coordinate the Rumanian economy with the German war machine. The Third Reich's greatest interest was in increasing Rumania's output, and

---

ness to fight the Russians, won Hitler's confidence and trust to a surprising degree. See Dr. Paul Schmidt, *Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, 1923–45; Erlebnisse des Chefdolmetschers im Auswärtigen Amt mit den Staatsmännern Europas* (Bonn, Athenäum-Verlag, 1949), pp. 511–512, 538, 548–549, 574.

14. Harald Laeuen, *Marschall Antonescu* (Essen, 1943), p. 27.

3. Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

for this it required a degree of stability, not the hectic atmosphere created by Guardist terror squads. Consequently, when Antonescu in December began to take measures to bring the Guard to heel, he had German support, although the Legionaries refused to believe that the Germans would desert their most ardent allies. Antonescu proceeded to disarm their formations and to strengthen the army. Seeing their position undermined, the Guard on January 21, 1941, attempted to revolt. They were suppressed by the army after three days of savage fighting in which they outdid themselves in committing bestial atrocities. On January 27 Antonescu formed a new cabinet composed almost entirely of military officers. The Iron Guard was dissolved, the Legionary state abolished, and a firm military dictatorship under the *Conducator* came into being. Thus fell one of the first fascist movements in Europe and, ironically enough, at just the time Nazi Germany achieved complete predominance in Rumania.

Under the Antonescu dictatorship political life ceased altogether; the army and the Germans were in complete control. A couple of plebiscites provided the necessary stamp of legality and the government, with very few changes, remained in power for the next three years. In June, 1941, Antonescu joined Hitler in the war against the Soviet Union. Maniu and Constantin Brătianu supported the war until the recovery of Bessarabia and Bucovina, though they protested against the dictatorship. After Rumanian troops crossed the Dniester, they dispatched notes of protest to Antonescu demanding Rumania's withdrawal from the war. But by this time he was too deeply involved in the German adventure. In October, 1941, he annexed Transnistria, that part of the Ukraine lying between the Dniester and Bug rivers and including Odessa. Rumanian troops went on and on until they reached Stalingrad. Then began the slow retreat.

Well before his overthrow Antonescu, now a Marshal, realized that the war was lost but was unwilling to take the steps to extricate Rumania, although he permitted envoys of the political parties to establish contact with the Allies. In the absence of effective opposition he was able to maintain power until the Russians, who had been checked in northern Moldavia in the spring of 1944, resumed their offensive in the late summer. With the imminent threat of Rumania becoming a battlefield and being further devastated by increasing American bombing raids, King Michael seized the initiative, arrested him, and sought an armistice.

still abroad, was summarily dismissed. Peasant risings, a [46] movement for autonomy in Transylvania, and general instability led to the nomination of General Averescu to 642 office, owing to the reputation he enjoyed of being a strong 648 man, having taken an active part in suppressing the peasant rising of 1907.

General Averescu's government passed the enactment [423] dealing with the distribution of land to the peasants, while his Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Take Jonescu, laid the foundation of the Little Entente by concluding alliances with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. General Averescu attempted to open pourparlers with Russia, so as to prepare the recognition of Rumania's right to Bessarabia, and there was a fair chance of his succeeding, but he was baulked of his aim, for the King vetoed his plan.

To M. Titulescu was assigned the task of reorganizing the 652 country's finances. This was deemed to be an intrusion into 665 the special domain of the Bratianus, and so by provoking 661 their hostility, brought about Averescu's downfall. M. Take Jonescu was his successor, but he was able to maintain himself in office only for a month. A government constituted by the Bratianu party followed in January, 1922, and remained in power until March, 1926. Owing to the disunion among the Opposition groups the Bratianu party was allowed to carry into effect its nefarious project of securing complete control of the economic resources of Rumania. The whole legislation passed during its tenure of office was of a purely economic character, and under the pretext of consolidating the finances of the country they merely consolidated their own financial dominance.

Popular dissatisfaction was steadily growing in the meanwhile, as instead of relieving the money stringency, the economic policy of the government did nothing but intensify the evil from which the country was suffering. On [664] the other hand the Opposition was closing its ranks and organizing mass demonstrations throughout the country. A monster meeting of peasants was held at Alba-Julia in May, 1925, followed up by vigorous onslaughts against the government. The latter, unable to obtain a foreign loan which would have enabled it to stabilize the currency and relieve

[the Liberal Party, headed by John Bratianu--Analyst]

RUMANIA

[652] the economic crisis which had become endemic, sought to
665 withdraw for a brief period from office in order that popular
661 indignation might be appeased. As it had become obvious, however, that the Opposition, headed by the Transylvanian and peasant groups of the old kingdom aided by the Bessarabians, would sweep the polls and deprive the Bratianu party of the privileges it had arrogated to itself during its last tenure of office, the government manoeuvred to appoint in its stead a political group on whose subservience it could count. The choice fell on General Averescu, who could not pretend to independence of action owing to the numerical weakness of his group, and who was forced to act in leading strings held by the Bratianus on account of his absolute dependence on their support. As a consequence of the prevailing exasperation throughout the country it could be foreseen with certainty that it would be impossible to secure a favourable majority at the election following the exit from office of the Bratianus, even if use was made of the devices habitually employed on such occasions.

666 Before the dissolution of the Chamber, therefore, the
646 Bratianus passed a law reforming the electoral system then in use, which completely altered the very essence of democratic government. By the new system a party obtaining 40% of the total votes cast secured 70% of the seats in the Chamber, and thereby a party which did not possess the support of the majority of the electors might nevertheless secure an imposing majority in the Legislative Chamber. Through the passing of this measure into law, the coming to power of unpopular parties and royal favourites has been made possible, for owing to the malpractices and abuses current at elections, it is relatively easy in Rumania for any person in control of the state-machine to secure the requisite 40% of the votes necessary to ensure him complete domination of the Chamber.

666 In ordinary circumstances there would have been no necessity for this electoral law, since the public has usually a very wholesome respect for whatever party is in power, allowing it to organize the elections to suit its wishes, and permitting it to exert a dominating influence on the polls so that it may be said that the elections are always "made."

661 [2+2] state administrations a certain degree of autonomy which, effectively amputated the central government of many of its prerogatives, and having filled these administrations with their own partisans they still exerted an influence which could, if necessary, paralyse the governments destined to succeed them in office.

In his electoral manifestoes, Averescu had held out to the Rumanians the most seductive inducements, among others that of a flow of foreign capital into the country. Time passed, however, and so, without any sign of an impending materialization of these assurances, the public began to chafe and inveigh against him. The resentment which the Liberals had aroused against themselves was thus deftly diverted on to the heads of their successors. This result having been duly effected, the Liberals emerged from the seclusion they had hitherto voluntarily imposed on themselves, and now appeared on the scene in the guise of indispensable factors for the restoration of the order and legality so grievously compromised by their incompetent henchman! The King was induced to demand General Averescu to form a coalition Ministry, but after a fruitless effort he was summarily dismissed and replaced by Prince Stirbey, who a fortnight later retired, making way for a Bratianu Government, so that the transition might not appear too brusque.

643 King Ferdinand died in July, 1927, and as the crown passed to his grandson, Michael, a boy of six, a Regency Council was nominated. Ferdinand's son, the notorious Prince Carol, had been excluded from the throne owing to Ferdinand's conviction that Rumania's prestige would suffer if a person with Carol's record became King. A similar opinion seems to have been held by our Foreign Office, for when Prince Carol came over to England in 1925 he received a polite but firm request to leave our shores.

● 665 Unhappily for the Liberals, their leader, John Bratianu, died suddenly in November, 1927. His was a strong willed and dominating personality, capable, but not over scrupulous in the choice of methods. The leadership then passed to his brother, who until then had been Minister of Finance.

665 652 The rising storm of popular exasperation caused by the financial policy of the Liberal party, which had brought the

country to the verge of a catastrophe, proved, however, to 665
be too much for the less experienced hands of Vintila Brati- 652
anu. Unable to secure a foreign loan, the need of which had
become imperative, he had no choice but to allow the transfer
of the reins of power in November, 1928, to the Opposition,
represented by M. Maniu and the National Peasant party.
The elections which followed took place in freedom, and 666
though this time the minorities did not all vote for the 665
government, nevertheless the latter secured for itself about
78% of the total number of votes cast, which may be taken
as an infallible proof of its popularity. This assured it of a
compact majority of 348 seats in the Chamber. The Opposition was insignificant, and was composed of sixteen Magyars, thirteen Liberals, and ten seats distributed amongst various groups. This election disposed of the fiction that Communism had a hold on the Rumanian people, for the total Communist vote attained only 35,000 out of a total of 2,840,660, and it thus became evident that the bogey of Bolshevism had been cleverly exploited by the Bratianu dictatorship, in order to justify its terroristic methods in Bessarabia, as well as for the purpose of winning the goodwill of the Western Powers for its alleged attempts to
repress it. The most pressing need the Maniu government 652
had to face was the obtention of a foreign loan in order to avoid the certain catastrophe with which the finances of the country were threatened. The funds obtained, however, barely sufficed for stabilizing the currency, and were altogether inadequate for the task of reconstruction, and even for the purpose of paying off the most pressing debts left by the former régime, so that a further loan had to be secured in 1931.

Unfortunately the country was in a derelict condition, and with the banking institutions under the control of its adversaries, determined to undermine the work of the new government, the latter had an exceedingly difficult task to
tackle. The government passed several liberal measures, 671
such as the suppression of the censorship, the abrogation of military law in Bessarabia, the reduction of the personnel of the gendarmerie (chiefly employed by Bratianu for dragooning the population at election times), and set about

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

A very unfavourable impression was created by the dismissal of the Chamber controlled by the National Peasant Party, the only standard-bearer of democracy in the country. It is probable that the electorate would have reacted with more spirit if the people had not foreseen that the thwarting of the royal will would have entailed the abolition of even the semblance of a Parliamentary system, and the proclamation of a pure dictatorship. Though not to an overwhelming extent, violence and illegality were pretty freely employed, to judge from the cases reported in the Press, yet in spite of all these artifices and the mass abstention of its opponents the elements supporting the Iorga-Argentoianu Coalition secured only 48% of the total votes cast; a very meagre performance indeed if it be remembered that even the Liberal party figured among its supporters.

That the Iorga-Argentoianu Cabinet did not fulfil the hopes placed in it by the King became obvious when he again summoned M. Titulescu, early in 1932, to Bucarest, and asked him to form a broad coalition cabinet. No real coalition cabinet truly representative of the national will could be formed without the inclusion of the National Peasant Party, and the leaders of the latter, when sounded, replied in a truly dignified manner that so long as constitutional methods were not observed they would abstain from participation. M. Titulescu gave up the mission and once more returned to his ambassadorial duties in London. Even those who by their votes helped the Cabinet to install itself in office seemed to have turned against it, for during a sitting of the Rumanian Senate on December 5th, 1931, M. Pillat, belonging to the Liberal party, delivered the following trenchant criticism on the Cabinet: "When you came to power you had promised three principal things: 1st, reduction of the Budget and a lightening of taxation through economies; 2nd, a redressing of the financial and economic situation and of the agrarian crisis; 3rd, penalties for all abuses. But what has been realised? The policy of feigned economies has not stopped the practice of dissipation, aggravated by fresh injustices. In a time of such poverty you have not only maintained old sinecurist in office but you have created even new ones. Favourites of other régimes who exert cumulative

645 functions have been left undisturbed. We have a plethora
665 of functionaries drawing starvation wages instead of a body of well-selected officials decently rewarded. You who have no party and no party attachments to satisfy, and who always attacked political parties, might have effected this change easily, but you have not done so. The reductions in the Budget were necessary, yet they ought not to have cut into the very vitals of the country. The financial policy of M. Argentoianu may be qualified as the policy of bankruptcy. No institution, however strong its foundations, can resist it. You have destroyed the schools and disorganized the army by a criminal reduction of credits. In the name of the Liberal party I must affirm that we cannot accept a constitutional theory which, if it be applied, will debilitate our political life, and by the elimination of political parties vitiate the expression of the national will in its essence, expose the Crown dangerously to attack, and even provide the possibility of irremediably compromising it."

871 The indictment with regard to the schools found in the above rebuke refers to the decision taken by the Government
652 to shift on to the municipalities 50 per cent of the educational charges. As the Municipal authorities cannot balance their budgets, and as an example the community of Solca was cited, which with a total annual budget of 430,000 lei would have been obliged to incur an additional expenditure of 400,000 lei in order to provide for the maintenance of its primary school, the deputies admitted that such charges were beyond the resources of the municipalities to bear, and the proposed legislation was at last rejected after a most strenuous opposition from the National Peasant Party supported by the Liberal deputies who had hitherto sided with the Government.

871 Another cause likely to prejudice education in Rumania
875 is the non-payment of salaries to teachers. During the sitting of the Chamber on April 4th, 1932, a case was reported of certain teachers, who are all State functionaries in Rumania, who had not received their pay for seven months. Associations of teachers in various localities have called meetings and have addressed telegrams of protest on the subject to the King. Thus, those of the region of Radauţi on

RUMANIA

645 June, 1932, a measure which is resented by all political
[664] parties as a formal violation of the constitution.
[644]

From the above it will be clear that whatever popularity the Iorga-Argentoianu Cabinet may have enjoyed, and whatever the hopes to which it may have given rise on its formation, these have now been totally dispelled. This is not without causing a distinct prejudice to Rumania, for undoubtedly, Prof. Iorga is one of the most distinguished Rumanians and represents an immense moral asset for the country. He would have proved an ideal chief for a broad coalition of all political parties, and his presence, owing to his integrity as well as to his erudition would have immensely strengthened the position of such a popularly elected government.

000 Owing to the marked "lipsandry" from which Rumania is suffering, it was an unpardonable mistake on the part of her ruler to expose an eminent personality like that of Prof. Iorga to risk his reputation, and by trading on his sentiments of devotion to the throne to force him to join a team headed by an Argentoianu, who, according to General Averescu, ought to be in the dock, and not on the Ministerial bench.[1]

665 With the passing of time, and with the worsening of the situation, attacks on the present régime have become more virulent. General Averescu, who under Rumania's former kings was often appealed to on difficult circumstances, and who feels that he has been undeservedly ousted by the Iorga-Argentoianu combination, continues his vehement attacks on both Government and King, whom he threatens with the fate of Prince Cuza, deposed forcibly in 1866. Far more significant, however, is the attitude of the National Peasant Party, which so far has maintained a very dignified attitude. All of a sudden on May 15th, 1932, the "Patria," the organ of the Transylvanian section of the party, launched a virulent attack on the régime, denouncing the scandalous exploitation to which Transylvania is being subjected and threatening with a demand for autonomy. This campaign,

[1] In June, 1932, the "Dreptatea" repeatedly accused Argentoianu of having appropriated 20 million lei of public money, of which, 12 millions between May 17th and 31st, and eight millions on June 3rd and 4th, after he had resigned from office.

which is supported by the bulk of the party, may prove salutary for the country, as it is the only peaceful means by which a reversion to constitutional practice may be secured. A similar campaign has been launched by the Liberal or Bratianu party, for the elimination of the present régime, and it is possible that the force of circumstances may lead eventually to a close co-operation between these two political parties in order to attain this common object which at the present moment each is attempting to secure independently. That such a contingency is well within the domain of possibility, is clear owing to the widespread dislike and unpopularity the present régime is encountering, which is apparent from the persistent attacks it is subjected to by the Press; even independent newspapers like the "Lupta" and "Adeverul" joining in them. In fact nothing could better characterize the prevailing discontent than the following excerpts from articles published by the above mentioned newspapers on 17th May, 1932. "Whither this sort of government has brought us is made clear by a perusal of the newspapers published in all regions of the country. They show that the laws promulgated by the Government are either inapplicable or prove the source of new unforeseen confusions, explainable by the lack of forethought or the haste of those in authority. Their incompetence has undermined confidence amongst all classes of the population and has created a state of moral depression which shows itself in regrettable violent agrarian manifestations, in protests by members of the teaching profession and the frequent suicides committed all over the country, the majority of which are due to poverty.

The Government, which since its assumption of the reins of power has not even once had the moral courage to verify whether it enjoys the confidence of the nation or not, should comprehend from these manifestations that it has lost even the ultimate justification for continuing its activities, namely the hope of obtaining an amelioration of the present situation."

While the "Adeverul," commenting on the campaign launched by the Transylvanian section of the National Peasant Party affirms: "The echoes of discontent which

POLITICS.

POLITICAL PARTIES.

The Liberal or Bratianu Party.—The regular system of party government composed of two great political parties, the Liberal and Conservative, which had ruled alternatively in Rumania during the reign of Charles I, came to a close with the Great War, which brought about the dismemberment of the Conservatives. It was an arrangement based on the "spoils" system, and entailed a change of the majority of state officials with every change of government. This instability of tenure of all posts in the Civil Service necessarily encouraged corruption, but it may be said that it was a political system which for the time being made on the whole for stability and assured to Rumania an immunity from revolts and crimes by which other States of South Eastern Europe had distinguished themselves during the same period.

It is regrettable that both parties had neglected to create a contented class of peasant proprietors which would have constituted a sound bulwark against the onset of disintegrating forces let loose by the war. Instead, great land and financial monopolies closely connected with the personnel of these two political parties were fostered.

The agrarian revolution led to the elimination of the Conservatives, while the Liberal party retained its vigour owing to its grip on the economic life of the country. Owing to the absence of a powerful rival, the Liberal party became the supreme arbiter in the land during the first decade following the conclusion of the war. But, from a political party it had degenerated into a coterie aiming solely at the exploitation of the country for the benefit of its partisans, and, as such, though firmly established in the old kingdom, seeing that it constituted the main avenue by which one could accede to political life, it was unable to extend its influence in the newly incorporated provinces, where, fortunately, other political conceptions prevailed.

It had identified itself with the Bratianu family, which exerted an autocratic sway over it. After John Bratianu's death, in 1927, the leadership passed to his brother Vintila

665 Bratianu, the inspirer of that rabid xenophobia to which may be ascribed the major part of the woes from which the country is suffering to-day. On his death, the conduct of the party was entrusted to M. Duca, but there is a small dissident fraction of the party which is led by M. George
665 Bratianu. The split was due to the fact that the majority of
642 the party was opposed to the return of the present King Carol II, and to their taking up an altogether intransigent attitude on the subject which was considered impolitic by M. G. Bratianu. After M. Vintila Bratianu's death, however, the party's relations with the Crown considerably improved, and it even went so far as to lend its concourse to the election and maintenance in power of the Iorga-Argentoianu Cabinet in order to emphasize its determination to maintain good relations with the King. It changed its tactics as regards the Government after the latter had been in office for a year, and opened a violent campaign aiming at its overthrow, as it considers that this régime is causing much harm to the country, and apprehends that it may be succeeded by yet other political combinations enjoying royal favour, thus perpetuating a system which would tend towards the elimination of political parties from participation in the government of the country.

Speeches made by M. M. Duca and Tatarascu, a prominent member of the party, at a political meeting held at Braila on May 15th, 1932, give a clear indication of the attitude of the party. It was explained at this meeting that the support extended to the Iorga-Argentoianu government was due to the desire to avoid all difficulties to the king, and allow the latter to carry on the experience he wished to initiate without embarrassment. After a year's trial, however, it became obvious that it was imperative to remove this Government which was bringing disaster to the country, to change the methods and system of government, and to revert to constitutional practice.

665 *The National Peasant Party.*—The agrarian reform which had been carried out on the conclusion of the peace led to the emergence of an agrarian political party of ultra-radical tendencies. It formed. however, an amorphous mass that required the demagogic activities of a leader such as the late

POLITICAL PARTIES

Bulgarian Prime Minister Stambuliiski, in order to weld it together and impart to it the driving energy of a revolutionary party. Fortunately for Rumania, its peasantry was led by a man who is remarkable not only for his common sense, but also for his extreme frankness, sincerity and modesty, and who in the midst of unparalleled corruption leads and insists on living a clean life. His devotion to the ideal he serves explains his readiness to relegate himself to the background whenever he believes that his self-effacement can be conducive to the advancement of his party or to the welfare of his country. He grasped the dangers inherent in an extremist policy for a country which had not yet firmly consolidated its various constituent segments, nor secured the spiritual unity of its people, and instead of following the easy course of giving a free rein to the hotheads of his party, he used his authority instead to curb their revolutionary zeal. M. Ion Mihalache, a former teacher by profession, foresaw that the wisest policy was to secure the adherence to the Peasant Party of various groups and public men who by their moral standing might add to its prestige, and by their influence help to exert a restraining force on its revolutionary activities. Such individuals were unfortunately inexistent in the old kingdom with the solitary exception of Prof. Iorga, who for over forty years had been performing the combined functions of a national tribune and a moralist. Mihalache, therefore, had to turn to the newly incorporated provinces, though his decision to co-operate with outsiders and facilitate their access to the government of the country created intense resentment in the old kingdom. Of the new territories, Transylvania alone had been distinguished for its tenacious defence of its nationality under Hungarian rule. It possessed a National party which for fifty years had battled heroically against Magyar despotism, and had been purified and tempered through the endless persecution it had been subjected to. Such a political group was ideally designed to serve as the nucleus of a larger party aiming at the emancipation of the Rumanian people from the oligarchy which persisted in exploiting it both politically and economically. The National Party of Transylvania, though naturally including intellectuals, was mainly a peasant party itself.

[186] 665 since it was a purely Rumanian party and represented proportionately all strata of the population, while Transylvania formed part of Hungary. Those of its adherents who pursued their personal advancement rather than that of their party had deserted it, and on the union of Transylvania with Rumania they joined the ranks of the various political groups of the old kingdom, believing that such conduct would be conducive to more rapid promotion for them. The party had thereby been purged of all doubtful elements, and those who remained could be considered as absolutely devoted to their ideal, namely the emancipation of the Rumanian democracy from a tyranny, which, though no longer Magyar, was to liberal-minded men perhaps even more stifling and more repulsive than that exerted of old [187] from Budapest. The Transylvanian National Party should not be mistaken on account of its name, for a group permeated by narrow nationalistic views; on the contrary, in respect to treatment of racial minorities in Rumania, it aims at securing for them the widest possible autonomy compatible with the maintenance of the Rumanian State. The majority of its rank and file being composed of peasants, its union with the Peasant party of Rumania was an occurrence which was bound to happen, fostered as it was through a community of suffering and an identity of desires. From every point of view the fusion of these two parties may be regarded as the most hopeful portent in Rumanian political life in recent times.

It was particularly felicitous also for the Transylvanian section since it afforded it an opportunity to repudiate the charge of cherishing separatist tendencies. The new group undoubtedly represents the most numerous and sanest elements in Rumania. The predominance of the Transylvanian intellectuals in it is due to the fact that these men are conscious of their civic duties, that they are resolved to serve their less developed peasant brethren and to bear their burdens in common, rather than to hoist themselves up into oligarchic groups intent on exploiting the rural masses. When the intellectuals of the old kingdom learn to subordinate their personal interest to that of their country, they will

10: Logic S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1
Transylvania

undoubtedly be eager to follow the example set by M. M. Maniu and Vaida-Voevod.

The fusion of the two parties was officially proclaimed on Oct. 10th, 1926, and led to enthusiastic demonstrations. The only regret formulated at the time was that Prof. Iorga had not seen his way to accept the presidency of the new party.

His abstention was most regrettable since his presence in the party would have added immensely to its moral prestige, and the disappointment caused was all the keener since he had potently helped to bring about the fusion. Apparently at the last moment he must have been frightened by the undue preponderance of the peasant element in the party and have come to the conclusion that it would not be possible to maintain its policy within strictly constitutional bounds, nor impose on the more restive elements of the party the discipline and authority he is accustomed to exert on his own small party, composed entirely of the intellectual *élite* of Rumania absolutely devoted to his views. Prof. Iorga's apprehensions seem to have been partly justified, for prior to the National Peasant Party's accession to power in November, 1928, it traversed several internal crises which caused the shedding of several members, but fortunately these difficulties were finally surmounted, thanks to the self-sacrifice and circumspection shown by its leaders.

The program of the party is extremely radical and distinguished by its liberality for the ethnic minorities to which it promises the granting of complete satisfaction concerning their cultural desiderata. It aims at the adoption of a system of regional autonomy, an excellent measure which would go a long way to allay the dissatisfaction caused by the excessive centralization so far exerted from Bucarest. Another important object is the stabilization of the status of public functionaries which naturally will remove them from the influence of the politicians. In the economic domain its scope is to subordinate the interests of an excessive and artificially created industrialism to agriculture, which it considers as the country's mainstay. The concourse of foreign capital being considered an indispensable condition for the country's development, a régime of complete legality was to be introduced and foreign and local capital were to be treated on an

E

RUMANIA

665 equal footing. The development of railway communications was to be achieved by the granting of complete and effective autonomy to the railway administration, and in certain cases even the construction and exploitation of new lines was to be left to private enterprise.

M. Maniu, the leader of the party, has temporarily withdrawn from political life as a sign of protest against the unconstitutional methods adopted by the King. In spite of persistent and recurring demonstrations on the part of his followers, M. Maniu has refused to reconsider his decision, but his post of president of the party is being kept vacant in the belief, that eventually a return to constitutional methods will permit him to emerge from his self-imposed exile in Transylvania and to resume his political activities. The latter region, having evolved under Magyar rule an alert public opinion, has recently been the scene of imposing political manifestations, in the course of which the most profound and touching attachment for M. Maniu has been evinced. The latter has consistently counselled moderation to his followers, expressing his confidence that the King would in time perceive his mistake and return to constitutional methods. The Transylvanians form the better educated and more enlightened section of Rumania's population, and therefore it should not be surprising that they should be both more vigilant and restive. Already voices are raised advocating the abandonment of the passive policy of dignified abstention as prescribed by M. Maniu, and a revision of the tactics hitherto followed is demanded. It is probable that the whole party will come round to this view, as Bucarest has been incapable of either formulating a generous policy or, what is even more difficult, of carrying it
186 into effect. This latent possibility of the appearance of a
665 militant opposition headed by the National Peasant Party is not, it seems, too remote, for the Transylvanians are dissatisfied not only with the present régime, but also with the general attitude adopted towards them by politicians of the old kingdom. In a congress of the Transylvanian section of the party, held at Cluj at the end of March, 1932, M. Vaida-Voevod declared "we clearly see that there exists a conspiracy which premeditates the undermining of the forces of

Transylvania, so that by impoverishing us they may exploit and lord over us."

Both M. M. Maniu and Vaida-Voevod are known for their moderation and circumspection and through the "Patria," the mouthpiece of the Transylvanian section of the party, they have endeavoured to impose silence on their more turbulent followers and on the advocates of militant methods. But if a new political combination is imposed on the country from above, it seems that their hands will be forced and a more combative attitude adopted, which may well be the signal for radical changes in Rumania. The Transylvanian peasantry is far from being prone to allow the Rumanian goverment to ride roughshod over its constitution, and the absence so far, of subversive movements in that province is solely due to the demureness and composure of M. M. Maniu and Vaida-Voevod and should not be taken as indicative of a peaceful disposition. On the contrary, the Press campaign of General Averescu against the present régime has been widely approved and the peasantry is openly expressing sympathy with him. He is in fact becoming a very popular figure. Owing to the severe crisis which the province is traversing, which is more acutely felt than in the old kingdom because from the cultural point of view it several stages ahead of the latter, it would not require much effort to turn the brewing dissatisfaction into open revolt. Already the peasants are beginning to manifest their disapproval of M. Maniu's attitude, and are more and more insistently demanding that he should abandon his present seclusion and explain the reasons for the passivity he has so far shown. Apparently they believe that the time has come for more drastic methods. A speech from M. Maniu delivered in February, 1932, to a delegation of his party, which went to greet him at his country retreat at Badacin and ask him to resume his duties as leader of the party, is characteristic of the efforts he employs to assuage the militant ardour of his supporters. He refused to accept anew the leadership, and among other things he is reported to have declared: "To-day the nation is deprived of its constitutional rights; we are on the threshold of bankruptcy, both economic and moral; we see anarchy enthroned in men's souls and hatred fomented in the pro-

RUMANIA

668 vinces, and in the murmur of this growing dissolution one
665 hardly hears the voice of the national conscience, one and undivided. The nation is in the midst of disquieting social and economic troubles, and is being conducted by inexperienced and unprepared men, deprived of intuition and without inspiration. In such solemn moments you ask for my guidance. I shall offer you none. You have both intelligence and conscience. I pray you to revere the memory of the sufferings which brought about the consummation of the national unity. I beg of you that momentary incitations should not be allowed to trouble the purity of your devotion to the ideal of the unity of our State. . . . Uphold the unity of the National Peasant Party because it is by its aid that we shall revert to a democratic and constitutional life and extricate the peasantry and the whole social structure from its present wretchedness. Do not forget that you have to fight for a policy of equity towards the provinces. . . . . We have the advantage of having a youthful king of our own generation. We have received him with justified enthusiasm, and we believe that thanks to the qualities with which he is endowed, he will respond to the people's heartfelt desire and lead it accordingly."

665 This policy of passivity, hitherto followed, seems to have reached its close, for all of a sudden on May 14th, 1932, the "Patria" published a vehement attack on the government which may be taken as the preliminary move in a systematic campaign aiming at its removal. This fulminating article created a sensation in Bucarest, and hopes were expressed that this rebellious attitude of the Transylvanian section of the National Peasant party would not meet with the approval of its partisans in the old kingdom, but fortunately for the Rumanian people these forebodings were soon dispelled when the Bucarest organ of the party, the "Dreptatea," announced that this campaign had the full support of the party behind it. A concise summary of the above mentioned article in the "Patria" is given below as it indicates very clearly not only the wrongs inflicted on Transylvania, but also that the patience of the people is at an end.

661 "Transylvania and the Banat have been reduced to the
668 state of colonies left to the discretion of illiterate exploiters.

have no effect. Not even now, when events in Yugoslavia should serve as a lesson to us."

General Averescu's "People's Party."—General Averescu had distinguished himself during the war and on its conclusion initiated a campaign demanding the taking of severe sanctions against all those who by their ineptitude or moral falterings had contributed to bring humiliation on Rumania during the war. His appeal rallied to his side the majority of the ex-soldiers, mainly peasants, and this led him to espouse their demand for a rapid distribution of the land among them. He is a determined upholder of an iron-hand policy and it is owing mainly to his advocacy of strong measures that he was called to the government in 1920, at a time when the country was threatened with upheavals brought about by the dilatory fashion in which the allocation of the land to the peasants was being conducted. His maintenance in office for almost two years at the time was due mainly to the support given to him by M. Take Jonescu, who acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs in his Cabinet.

This group is a purely personal coterie and has no enduring connection with any section of the people. Whenever it has assumed office it has done so by support other than that of the people. General Averescu expected that on the return of King Carol II from exile, he would be entrusted with the task of putting things in order in Rumania. But hope deferred has shattered his faith in his sovereign's capacity of discernment, and at last his chagrin at being shunned has led him to take up an uncompromising attitude towards the Crown, against which he has launched a vehement press campaign. Some of his partisans, headed by his former lieutenant Goga, have in consequence receded from the party and have founded a separate political organization. Goga is in intimate relation with the Palace, and it is rumoured that the Iorga-Argentoianu Cabinet may eventually be replaced by a political combination including the triumvirate Goga, Lupu, and Argentoianu

Dr Lupu's Peasant Party.—This is another small personal coterie which for some time had adhered to the National Peasant Party. It is practically of no importance, but by lending its feeble support to reaction it can help to turn the

scales against a popular government as was the case with 665
General Averescu's party in 1926. Dr Lupu refutes the imputation levelled against him of being an opportunist and has declared on a memorable occasion that the maxim "the wolf may change his skin but not his habits," was wrongly applied to him. His subsequent conduct, however, belied to a certain extent this solemn declaration which he made in October, 1926. It is to be hoped that he may dispel such misgivings as may exist and show himself in action as staunch a friend of the peasantry as he is in speech. Though his advocacy of inflation and of non-payment of the State's foreign debts is a policy that does not inspire overmuch confidence in his political discernment.

The Socialist and Communist Parties.—These are altogether insignificant and unlikely to exert in influence on the destinies of the country so long as they fail to attract the peasantry within their orbit. . . . A vigorous and well-organized peasant group such as the existing National Peasant party is the safest barrier against Communism.

The Minority Parties.—These have been constituted as a means of defence of the cultural life of the various national minorities in Rumania. Once the cultural life of these finds its desiderata satisfied, the representatives of the minorities would probably be absorbed by the Rumanian political parties, as there would remain no reason for their continuing a separate political existence.

So long, however, as the legitimate aspirations of these are not satisfied, their political representatives will not scruple to strike bargains with any reactionary force through whose patronage they may hope to snatch some particles of the rights which are being denied them. It is surprising that Bucarest politicians should be so obtuse as to fail to perceive how indispensable it is to grant satisfaction to the minorities if they are really intent on effectively disarming reaction in Rumania which so far has found in these groups an ever-ready and potent support.

Anti-Semite organizations presided over by M. A. C. Cuza.—Among these the most important is the L.A.N.C. 665 563
group (Christian League for National Defence). One may judge of the moral standing of this individual by an article

665 published in the "Cuvantul" of May 29th, 1927, in which it
563 was reported that the ecclesiastical authorities of Bucovina as well as those of Jassy had refused to collaborate with M. Cuza, because he had converted the club-house of his party at Jassy into a brothel. The paper proceeded to give various unsavoury, as well as pungent, details of the regulations prevailing in this "Christian" League club—regulations, which, according to the "Cuvantul" had been drafted by M. Cuza himself, to the immense benefit of the institution and its "pensionnaires." According to this paper this document serves as a striking testimonial to the organizing capacity possessed by this . . . . gentleman. M. Cuza has been elected as a deputy and early in October, 1931, he delivered a violent diatribe against the League of Nations; a very inconsiderate proceeding seeing that Rumania's salvation may well depend on the League and the aid of international finance.

THE ETHNIC MINORITIES AND THEIR GRIEVANCES

563 Rumania shares with Czechoslovakia and Esthonia the distinction of treating her ethnic minorities with a spirit of tolerance that speaks much in favour of the Rumanian people, who, as most impartial observers will admit, are distinguished by their kindliness and good humour. Most of the complaints one hears of, and they are numerous, arise mainly from the general maladministration from which all sections of the community suffer, and for this reason it is not the Hungarians, nor the Germans, nor the Bulgarians of the Dobrudja who are most vociferous in their lamentations, but strange to say, the Rumanians of Bessarabia. A whole book could easily be written on their tribulations, and as their woes are representative in an intensified form of those endured by other sections of the community, it may be judicious to dwell on them rather than on grievances specifically formulated by Magyars or Bulgarians, as one will thus avoid the imputation of partiality for the latter.

563 Without wishing to cast any disparaging reflections on
642 Rumania one cannot help deploring the failure to take

régime had consummated Bessarabia's ruin, and its people were dying of hunger. The irruption of the Rumanian army was not the triumphal arrival of a liberator but the invasion of a hunger-stricken horde. The requisitions for obtaining supplies both for the army and for the population of Moldavia, on account of the haste and disorder with which they were carried out, assumed the aspect of revolting spoliations and led the natives to ask "what sort of brothers are these hogs and these robbers?"

"Our army's attitude was both offensive and aggressive, in conformity with the usages of war, in short, that of an army of occupation in an enemy country. When the time came to organize the civil administration of Bessarabia, very few of the regular functionaries agreed to be transferred to a remote and unsafe province. . . . Adventurers, those who had nothing to lose and who were under the threat of being dismissed or imprisoned, accepted to join in this "campaign to Siberia" in the hope of being rehabilitated or of becoming rich. For a long time the transfer of a civil functionary to Bessarabia was considered as a redoubtable disciplinary sanction. . . . ."

"The Bessarabians have found out what elements we can contribute to the restoration of their former material prosperity. These are poverty, demoralization, political debauchery, a decade of violence, fraud and illegality. Hence the permanent hostility with which they regard us; a state of irritability which is maintained owing to the prevailing wretchedness."

The main responsibility for this astounding state of affairs should be ascribed to the Bratianus, who inaugurated and maintained this system for ten years. When finally they were ejected from office, their Bessarabian partisans began to quarrel among themselves and attack most virulently their former regional leader, M. Inculeţ. They started a paper called "The Voice of Bessarabia" in 1929, in which their former leaders were denounced as vulgar and dangerous adventurers, robbers and criminals. As for their former local chief Inculeţ, he was accused of having retired to Jassi in order to enjoy in peace the thousands of millions he had accumulated by a triple betrayal of Russia, Bessarabia, and

RUMANIA

665 Rumania. The paper concluded by an exhortation addressed
574 to Bessarabians to evict Inculeţ from the political arena of Bessarabia where he had operated as though this region had been an African colony, and the appeal concluded with the hortatory incitation "Eject this putrefaction from Bessarabia."

In spite of the severe financial crisis which afflicted this
651 region, the fiscal agents of the government insisted on
563 collecting taxes even when in years of drought the peasantry
661 was destitute and utterly unable to pay. The methods employed were so barbarous that they provoked several interpellations in the Rumanian Chamber. During its sitting of Dec. 10th, 1926, M. V. Madgearu denounced the abusive and inquisitorial methods by which Bessarabian tax-payers had been sold up and his arraignment was confirmed by similar indictments formulated by a member of the (then) government majority.

423 In October, 1930, a revolt broke out in southern Bess-
563 arabia. The peasants of the village of Baimaklia, near the town of Kagui, revolted and burned down the residence of a
661 big landowner because certain grazing lands were given to him by the State instead of being distributed among the peasants. That similar abuses are current may be inferred from an article in the "Aurora" of June 3rd, 1926, which is headed "The pauperization and humiliation of the Bessarabians," and in which it is related how certain State lands were put up for sale at Balţi, and though the peasantry of six adjoining villages had combined and offered 400,000 lei more than three big landowners, the lands were allocated to the latter, obviously through favouritism. That State functionaries often act with an arbitrariness and brutality
563 inconceivable in a civilized State may be illustrated by
661 the Soroca affair, which is of quite recent occurrence. In January, 1932, six Jewish youths, inhabitants of Soroca, on the Dniester, after coming to terms with the frontier-guards as to the amount of the bribe they would have to pay to be allowed to escape into Russia, and after they had paid 40,000 lei, were ambuscaded and shot down. In order to instil terror into the local population, their bodies were hurled pell-mell on a sledge which was driven by a soldier

10: Logic S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1
RWS

Jewish element to gain a place of importance in the life of the 563
community, which has unfortunately provoked the resent- 641
ment and jealousy of their Christian co-nationals and created a Jewish problem in Rumania. To counteract their economic influence they were refused political rights by the Rumanian Constitution of 1866, and though the Congress of Berlin obtained the abolition of this law, such obstacles were placed in the way of Jews wishing to acquire naturalization that only a few hundreds succeeded in obtaining this privilege by 1914. According to the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities which Rumania finally signed, the Rumanian nationality is conferred on all Jews in Rumania. The Jews have not 665
followed the example of the Magyars and Germans, who 563
have created political parties of their own, yet prejudice against them is pretty strong and has led to the formation of political groups which are purely anti-Semitic. The supporters of anti-Semitism are mainly recruited among students, and the universities have often been the scenes of ruthless and barbarous acts of violence. The leaders of the anti-Semitic leagues are unscrupulous individuals, who by pandering to the lowest instincts of the mob see a way to secure personal advantages for themselves. Thus the chief henchman of Cuza, the anti-Semitic leader, an individual named Codreanu, gained notoriety by shooting the Police Prefect of Jassi while the latter was doing his duty in suppressing a pogrom that had been organized in the capital of Moldavia.

The Jewish problem is purely economic, and this is the 554
reason why student circles are so anxious to impose the 563
" numerus clausus " in the Rumanian universities. They wish to eliminate potential rivals in the liberal professions as far as they possibly can. In many of these the Jewish element has certainly distinguished itself, especially in law and in medicine. Rumanian youth feels that the prominent position Jews hold in society is a serious obstacle to its advancement, and the methods adopted to eliminate this hindrance are certainly not always commendable. It should be added, however, that where Jews do not exist other races occupy their place, so that it is always the non-Rumanian elements which fill the more lucrative posts in the urban

ticularly at the oil industry, prescribed the manner in which 471
they were to be exploited. The development of these re- 315
sources was to be entrusted to corporations or "régies" in 382
which the Government as well as private capital, both Rumanian and foreign, would participate, but in such a way as to permit of the majority of shares being controlled by the Rumanian Government. At the same time laws were 375
enacted for increasing the utilization of methane gas (C.H.4) 471
which was already in use both for lighting and heating 665
purposes in Transylvania, and which is available as a large source of industrial power, its output being calculated to amount to as much as 2,000 million cubic metres per annum, the consumption of which for 1930 reached over 503 million c. metres. The methods used by the Liberal Party to secure a mainhold of the supplies of methane gas are particularly illuminating of the mentality of the leaders of that party, as they were revealed by M. Madgearu in the Rumanian Chamber in 1929. An exclusive monopoly was conferred on a group of "Liberals," who supplied the gas to industrialists at arbitrary prices so as to force the latter out of the market and leave this to rival firms belonging to adepts of the "Liberal" Party. All the efforts of the Liberal Party to promote the nationalization of this gas were aimed at securing the economic mastery of Transylvanian industries. A 376
similar law was also passed dealing with water power, the 471
reserves of which are estimated at 5,206,225 H.P., of which 665
amount 735,425 h.p. represent 50 per cent of the force produced at the Iron Gates by the Danube, 1,422,465 h.p. by the tributaries of the Theiss, 2,164,748 h.p. by the Danube tributaries between the Timish and the Sereth, and the remaining 884,665 h.p. by the Sereth and its tributaries. Of all this potential force only about 52,000 h.p. is actually in use. The State owned practically the totality of the railway 655
lines, most of the extensive fisheries in the marshes and delta of the Danube, the salt mines of Ocnele Mari, Slanic, Uioara and Targu Ocna, which are exploited as a State monopoly and assure to it a revenue of some 700 million lei per annum, over 75 per cent of the entire vast timberlands, several coal and iron mines, the gold mines in the Bihor mountains, the annual output of which is about 2,500 to 3,000 kilogrammes,

1 July, 1924 -- Analysis

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

563 **THE MINORITIES.** The presence of large numbers of
177 non-Rumanians in the new State affected the fate of Rumania decisively. While the leaders of the Transylvanian Rumanians, who had themselves had a long experience of foreign rule, advocated a just and liberal policy, the politicians of the Old Kingdom,[1] and especially the Right Wing, persisted in a policy of Rumanization and de-nationalization contrary to the Minority Treaties. In Bessarabia this policy was excused by stressing the danger of the spread of revolutionary movements which threatened the safety of the State, and was carried out by the military. In the territories acquired from Hungary the position of the dominant and dominated sections of the people had been reversed so suddenly and so decisively that the change necessarily had violent consequences. Moreover, here the question of the treatment of minorities was closely interlocked with that of administrative unification. The laws and regulations of the Old Kingdom and of the New Territories[2] had to be equalized. The majority of the civil servants in Transylvania were Hungarians and most of these were replaced by Rumanians from the Old Kingdom. Some of the old officials had to be retained, owing to the shortage of trained personnel, and the doubt about their loyalty to the new regime was exploited to strengthen the case for complete centralization.

[1] [Provinces of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Dobrudja--Analyst]
[2] [Territories acquired after World War I--Analyst]

665 **SOCIAL REFORM.** The problem of social reform was
565 the most urgent and the most hotly contested of all. The Transylvanian National Party under the leadership of Maniu, and the Peasant Party of Mihalache,

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

who eventually joined forces and formed the 665
National Peasant Party, pressed for the extension 565
and enactment of the agricultural reforms promised in 1917. This was delayed owing to the pressure of the great landed interests who, after the disappearance of the pro-German Conservative Party, had found a new champion in the Liberals. The elections, however, brought a decisive defeat for the Liberals, and King Ferdinand had to entrust the formation of a new government to the victorious Peasant Block. In it were Dr Lupu, who in 1917 had opposed the plans for land reform on the ground that they were inadequate, Vaida-Voevod, a close collaborator of Maniu, and Mihalache, who as Minister of Agriculture proceeded to carry out the land reform.

General Averescu left this new administration 665
within a few days in order to create a new party in 565
opposition to the Peasant Block. Intrigues at court 662
soon secured the fall of the government, which was succeeded by an administration headed by Averescu whose personality was a guarantee that nothing would be done to abrogate the real power of the privileged classes. At the very efficiently 'managed' subsequent elections the General secured 209 out of 369 parliamentary seats. It was obvious that he was dependent on the support of the Liberals and the bureaucracy who preferred, for the time being, not to step into the foreground. Averescu's Minister of Agriculture, Garoflid, was the spokesman of the big landowners and it was he who finally put the land reform into practice. The social structure of the country was not basically altered. Moreover, the transfer of land to the peasants now made it possible

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

665 to blame other factors for whatever might go wrong
565 as there was no *boiar*-class left. The invisible, but
442 much more effective, financial control, continued to assure the rule of the same classes who had governed the country before.

665 Soon the Liberal Party again took over the
648 government. I. Bratianu was the undisputed chief of his party and had the confidence of the king. His whole policy was directed towards the strengthening of the power of the interests he represented. This, combined with his hostility towards the Soviet Union and Hungary had serious consequences which, however, became apparent only several years after his death.

643 THE MONARCHY. King Ferdinand, who had been
665 crowned at Alba Julia in 1923, died in 1927. This caused a serious crisis, for two years earlier the Crown Prince Carol had been forced to abdicate in favour of his infant son Michael. After Ferdinand's death a Regency Council of three was appointed to act in the king's name until he came of age. The Regents were naturally strongly influenced by Bratianu, but, when he died in 1928, the leader of the National Peasant Party was entrusted with the formation of a new government. Maniu secured a great electoral victory and his tenure of office was expected to bring about far-reaching changes. The new administration set about solving the minority question and the serious economic problems resulting from the incomplete land reform which instead of bettering had often worsened the lot of the peasants. Unfortunately at that time the world crisis had reached its worst stage. Although his

12: Kosmos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

government had the majority of the people behind it, Maniu was handicapped by sabotage on the part of the bureaucracy, the banks and the great industrialists. Moreover he found it very difficult to work with the Regency Council, especially in such a critical time, as very frequently it could not reach a unanimous decision.

All these circumstances seemed to make the restoration of Carol inevitable. Maniu therefore arranged for the return of Carol to Rumania, but made his accession to the throne conditional upon several undertakings, amongst which was a royal promise to respect the Constitution. Carol returned by plane on 8 June 1930 and was proclaimed King, his son Michael being unceremoniously relegated to the position of Crown Prince. Many high hopes were pinned on Carol whose youth and intelligence were held to be qualities which should make him a good ruler. But the head-strong young monarch, with his ideas of personal rule, soon disillusioned those who had enabled him to return. Before long Maniu resigned and the first period of Carol's personal regime began.

THE PEOPLE. During all these years the people of Rumania had hoped for an improvement of their position. After the first few years of adjustment to the changes consequent upon the World War, it had become apparent that all misfortunes could not be blamed upon the war. The Agrarian Reform which was to have cured all ills had turned out to be a very questionable blessing. The recovery of industry which had a promising start in the middle twenties, when considerable amounts of foreign

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

471 of State and foreign concessionaires. State-monopolies, such as the manufacture and sale of explosives, tobacco, etc., were often leased to foreign trusts. Road building, for example, was in the hands of a Swedish company. So was the manufacture of matches sold by the State. The whole telephone system was installed and operated by a subsidiary of the American financial trust of Morgans. Nine-tenths of the oil industry were in British hands, the armaments works of Transylvania were controlled by British, French, Czech and German interests. The newly developed chemical industry of the country soon passed into German hands. As for agriculture, the export of produce was effectively controlled by several banks who were partly or wholly owned by foreign financial houses. During the nineteen-thirties pharmaceutical goods were imported almost exclusively from Germany.

445 565 THE GOVERNMENT. The most powerful of all political parties were the Liberals who were entrenched in influential positions of the administration, the army, finance and industry. Led traditionally by a member of the Bratianu family, whose name at one time was almost synonymous with that of Rumania, the Liberal Party was able to rule the country directly or indirectly up to a very short time ago. Her adherents had very little in common with the Liberals of the West, representing, as they did, the Right Wing of the numerically weak but financially 445 and politically powerful Rumanian bourgeoisie. An 446 electoral law introduced by the Liberal Government in 1926 stipulated that the party which had secured 40% of the votes should obtain 60% of all parlia-

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

mentary seats. This device, combined with the 666
electoral methods adopted, normally assured the 665
continuance of the government in power.[1] In
Foreign Affairs the Liberals supported the French [648]
Alliance and the League of Nations in whose councils the Foreign Minister, N. Titulescu, had considerable influence.

The National Peasant Party led by Maniu and 665
Mihalache had the support of the rural population and represented the Left Wing of Rumanian politics. The party stood for a genuine Land Reform. It was not, however, a homogeneous party. From the first it had a Right and a Left Wing. As time went on, and especially when the political situation became more confused in the late thirties, the Right Wing tended to sympathize with the Iron Guard against the Royal dictatorship and the Left Wing with the Communists. The failure of the National Peasant Party to hold power after 1928 was due to the lack of confidence in the people, the fear of radical changes favoured by many sections of the population and hesitation to attack the firmly entrenched vested interests resolutely.

Although Rumania had a parliamentary constitu- 661
tion the country was ruled by anything but democratic methods. Parliamentary representatives, ministers and the press could be made to advocate and carry out any measure if adequately paid by interested parties. The corruption of the lower civil service seemed as nothing compared with that on the top. State contracts, exemption from taxes and

[1] It failed only twice: in 1928 when the National Peasant Party gained an electoral victory and in 1937 when Tatarescu's government fell.

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ET1 Rumania ED1

642 attracted personalities who were willing to abjure
643 their political faith and serve the Crown.

While continuing to pay lip-service to the League
643 of Nations, he supported the Italian campaign in
648 Abyssinia by sending food and war material to Italy. During the Spanish Civil War propaganda in favour of Franco was allowed and supported, while anything in favour of the Republican cause was banned.[1]

The result of the elections in December 1937, on
643 the eve of Hitler's seizure of Austria, precipitated
665 events. The government of the day, headed by the Liberal Tatarescu, failed to secure the necessary 40% of the votes and resigned.[2] Carol refused to entrust Maniu with the formation of a government; and the Iron Guard had by now assumed such a hostile attitude towards the king that a compromise with them was out of the question. Consequently Carol called the 'National Christian Front' to power, an anti-Semitic and Fascist organization led by the poet Goga and Professor Cuza. Goga became Prime Minister and his cabinet contained former members of the Liberal and Peasant Parties who now went over to the absolutist camp, as well as the future 'Conducator'[3] Antonescu.

[1] General Cantacuzino and several legionaries joined Franco and when two of them were killed their coffins were carried all over Rumania with great processions and interred at the headquarters of the Iron Guard in the presence of German, Italian, Spanish and Japanese representatives. At the same time collectors for the Republican cause were imprisoned. Nevertheless there were many Rumanians fighting for the Republicans in the 'Dimitrov' battalion.

[2] The result was: Government 35·9%, Peasant Party 20·4%, Iron Guard 15·5%, National Christian Front 9·1%.

[3] Leader.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p 89

CHAPTER VI

UNDER GERMAN CONTROL

The nineteen-thirties saw an acute sharpening of 565
the conflict between the popular forces and the Ru- 578
manian ruling class which was mirrored in all spheres 445
of the country's life. Neither of these two was
undivided. On the one side was the majority of the people—the peasants and workers and some intellectuals. On the other the court, the generals, the vast bureaucracy, the professional politicians, industrialists, bankers and big landowners. The peasantry was hardly organized and was split by national divisions, as a part of the non-Rumanian rural population supported Minority parties which were mostly opposed to united action with the corresponding Rumanian parties. The workers' movement suffered from similar divisions and from splits caused by ideological differences. Numerically it was weak owing to the small number of industrial workers. Moreover all workers' organizations were subject to the most severe restrictions.[1] The ruling class of Rumania was united in its determination to prevent any measures harming its interests. The divisions in its ranks were due to differences as to the best means of maintaining its privileged position and to competition between the established section

[1] The most vigorous Left Wing Party were the Communists, whose organizations, though illegal, continued in spite of repressive measures. They were most influential in Bessarabia, the Bukovina and the industrial regions.

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
E⌐1 Rumania ED1

578 of this class and those who wanted to secure this
565 dominant position for themselves.

665 These divisions were complicated by the personality of King Carol and the attitudes of different sections of the ruling circles to his personal regime. One group put its trust in the royal dictatorship and included supporters of the pro-French and pro-British wing. Many prominent politicians from both great parties were attracted to this camp, the Liberals Tatarescu and Micescu, for example, and the peasant leaders Vaida-Voevod and Calinescu. Another group went over to the extreme Right Wing and supported the Iron Guard and similar but smaller organizations, and these inclined to a pro-German foreign policy. There were naturally some who tried to steer a middle course.[1]

665 Economic and financial considerations played an
648 important and often decisive part in this political alignment. The Liberals had a great interest in a pro-Allied policy as they were closely connected with British, French and American investments in Rumania. The extreme Right Wing counted on support from Germany, which was readily given, and in return it facilitated the growth of Germany's political and economic influence. Both groups had discarded both the cloak and the spirit of democracy, and their leanings towards dictatorship, varying in form but not in substance, facilitated the victory of

[1] C. Bratianu, leader of the Liberals, joined Carol's 'party' but only in order to keep his great industrial and financial interests. Maniu, the leader of the Peasant Party, remained passive. He showed sympathy to the Iron Guard in their opposition to the king's dictatorship and later joined Bratianu in seeking to restrain them: but he retained his pro-French leanings.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

the pro-Nazi group. This, combined with the 665
developments in the regions bordering on Rumania, 648
and the changes in the international situation, explain the seemingly inexplicable migration of the majority of the Rumanian ruling class from the Allies' to the Axis camp. The real rulers of Rumania depended to a great extent on foreign support: when the power of Britain and France seemed on the wane they had to look for new protectors, and many, though not all, therefore became pro-German.

THE LAST DAYS OF GREATER RUMANIA. The year 661
1939 opened ominously for Rumania. The align- 648
ment of power on the continent of Europe had its counterpart in the grouping of Rumania's political forces, and the impending Great War threw its shadow on the sombre scene of Rumanian politics. After the assassination of Codreanu in November 1938 a wave of terror and repression swept the whole country, which resulted in a series of wholesale murders committed both by Iron Guards and the police. The new 'Party of the Nation' which had replaced the 'Front of National Renaissance' was an artificial veil for the manipulations of Carol and the court. The unstable political edifice, erected by the king tottered, in spite of the British Government's guarantee of 13 April 1939, which promised to assist in the defence of Rumania's independence. Germany increased her pressure to obtain a greater hold on Rumania's natural resources, while Britain and France tried to maintain their economic position.

At the outbreak of hostilities in September 1939 Rumania, although allied to France and Poland, remained neutral. The internal situation deteriorated

9: Pool S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania ED1

* 701 * 648

dence was also that he had participated with General Pretorian and a few others in signing the letter against Radescu which forced him out of power. After this act he was appointed Chief of the State Security Administration in the Ministry of Interior, a position in which he had abundant opportunity to prove his cruelty and adaptability to Communist demands and maneuvers. He remained Chief of the General Staff until March 1950, when a party militant took his place. He has since left military activities.

Below the ministerial level career generals continue in such posts as Inspector of Artillery, Deputy Chief of Staff, two commanders of military regions, Commander of the Military Academy, three division commanders, one commander of an army corps, one of an artillery corps, and one of an armored corps, Chief of Staff of the Security Troops, Commander in Chief of the Navy, etc. Our sample of twenty-four includes at least five lieutenant generals.

Typical of the remaining career officers is General Alexander Gavrilescu, Commander of the second military region with headquarters in Bucharest. General Gavrilescu is an artillery officer and a graduate of the War College in prewar Romania. In the fall of 1944 he was Chief of Staff of the Fourth Army fighting on the Eastern Front. When the Fourth Army turned upon the German and Hungarian troops in Transylvania and Hungary, General Gavrilescu denounced the Commander of the Army, General Avranescu, and his own deputy chief of staff to the Soviet Commander of their front, Marshal Malinovski. Both these officers were imprisoned and Gavrilescu succeeded to the command of the Fourth Army.

Two other top career officers in the present Romanian Army are Lieutenant Generals Stere Stefanescu and Iacob Teclu. Both these men are former prisoners of war of the Russians. Stefanescu is now Commander of the first military region with headquarters at Iasi and had been Commander of the second military region before Gavrilescu. He was also an artillery officer in the prewar Romanian Army and took part in the formation of the Horia-Closca-Crisan Division in the Russian prison camps. Lieutenant General Teclu was a colonel when he was captured in 1942. He then served as Chief of Staff of the Horia-Closca-Crisan Division.

It may be noted that most of the present general officers retained from the prewar Romanian Army were colonels until the Communists promoted them. We have information on the pre-Communist rank of ten career officers and of these eight were colonels and only two were already generals. The single most important distinguishing feature of the career officers who remain in the army, however, is the large proportion among them who are indoctrinated prisoners of war.

* 701 • 665

2. Communist Officers

When Bodnaras became Minister of the Armed Forces, he immediately put a Communist in as Deputy Minister in charge of the

9: Pool 8-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania ED1

701
665

Political Department. This is not surprising. It is indeed surprising that the Communists had permitted Major General Mihail Maltopol, a career officer, to hold this position until that time even though General (then Colonel) Maltopol had been a prisoner of war whom they indoctrinated and who joined the Tudor Vladimirescu Division. Still only a trusted Communist could be permitted to head the Political Department so Maltopol was made chief of the Military Museum.

Maltopol was replaced by Lieutenant General Petre Borila, the first of a series of prominent Communists to hold the position of Deputy Minister in charge of the Political Department. General Borila is a Romanian of Russian origin. He participated in the rebellion of Tatar Banar in Bessarabia in 1923-24, and was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. After five years he escaped from prison and went to Russia, where he joined the secret police. He came to Romania in 1944 as an agent of the NKVD with the rank of major. He became an instructor in the Directorate of Education, Culture, and Propaganda. Shortly after Bodnaras took office he promoted Borila to Major General and Deputy Minister. Since then Borila has left military work and his latest known position is with the Presidium of the State Control Commission or in other words, a purger. He was succeeded by Major General Mihail Florescu, Spanish Civil War veteran, who is now Minister of Chemical Industry, then by Major General Gheorghe Stefanescu, and finally by Major General Nicolae Ceausescu, who had previously been Deputy Minister of Agriculture.

General Ceausescu perhaps owes his position to an association with Prime Minister Gheorghiu-Dej going back to the thirties when they were railroaders together. Ceausescu joined the Communist party in 1932 when he was about twenty-nine but had no prominent record of activity until after the war. In 1944 he was a foreman in the Crivitza engine works of the State Railway. In 1947 he became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist party and in 1948 of the Orgburo. On March 18, 1950 he was given the rank of major general although he had no previous military experience. In 1952 he was promoted to lieutenant general. He is regarded as Gheorghiu-Dej's man and a check on Bodnaras. The power of his position is indicated by the fact that he, not Bodnaras, attended Stalin's funeral.

Altogether there were in 1952 nine generals among the forty-six members of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist party. A typical one of them and one of the most important is Lieutenant General Leontin Salajan, Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces and Chief of the General Staff. According to our information General Salajan is a Hungarian born in Transylvania, his original name being Szilagy. He was a worker having worked both as a cobbler and as a steel turner. At the age of nineteen he became a Communist sympathizer. Two years later he joined the party. In 1926,

9; Pool 3-4 (no date) 1954 E1 Europe
Rumania ED1

*701 665 the same year that he joined the Communist party, he entered his military service as an infantryman. Somehow he managed to escape a criminal record in Romania although he continued in Communist activity working in an airplane factory. During the war, if not earlier, he was in Russia though his activities there cannot be determined. After the war he turned up as secretary of the Communist party in the city of Oradea, which is located in the disputed border territory between Hungary and Romania. This section, which was at that time Hungarian, was in fact under the rule of the Red Army. It was returned to Romania after the Groza government was formed and the Soviets were satisfied that they could completely control the Romanian regime. By that time (1947) he was secretary of the Communist party of Salaj County, the province of his birth. In 1949 he became president of the army's Control Commission. In the same year he was also Deputy Minister of Justice and then Deputy Minister of Construction. He had still never been an officer. Then on March 18, 1950, he was made Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces and Chief of Staff. At the same time he was given the rank of major general and was promoted the following year to lieutenant general. In 1950 he was also given the Order of the Defense of the Fatherland. In 1952 he became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist party. According to some reports Salajan owes his ascendance for the most part to his friendship with the Prime Minister of Romania Georghiu-Dej. These sources claim that he is Georghiu-Dej's man, placed as Chief of Staff as a check on Bodnaras. Whether these rumors have any foundation or not, it is clear that Salajan's function as Chief of Staff must be primarily political and not military. A Western observer may wonder how such a man with his meagre knowledge of the arts of war can be Chief of Staff. The reason that Salajan can do without professional military competence is that the real Chief of Staff is not Salajan but the representative of the Russian General Staff for the Romanian Army. That, however, is a solution only for the moment.

*701 E. Prospects of Romanian Military Development

If our analysis of the trends in the satellite armies is correct, we must regard the present situation in the Romanian Army as an unstable and transitory one. Power is shared between a small group of utterly incompetent and unprofessional political Communists at the very top and some career officers who have been indoctrinated by the Communists (largely in PW camps) immediately below them. At the same time Russian officers perform many functions behind the scenes (not as in the Polish Army being openly integrated into the regular normal chain of command). This is not a satisfactory situation from the Soviet point of view either in terms of efficiency or in terms of loyalty. Both the Communist militants and the career officers are lacking in some respects.

(as Stalin argued persuasively at Yalta) to deserve separate membership in the United Nations. The voice of the Ukraine is therefore heard at Flushing Meadows—and is not to be despised, even though it is the voice of Jacob rather than Esau, for usually it has been that of Mr. Manuilsky, one of the most experienced revolutionary debaters extant. The voice of the Rumanian People's Republic is not heard there and is not paid much if any attention anywhere. 648

Before long the question will come up whether Rumania deserves even the title of satellite. This might be settled by Moscow's decision to bring her into the Soviet Union as one of the constituent member republics. Until now an argument against this has probably been the hope that she might one day be elected to membership in the United Nations, in exchange for Moscow's acceptance of some Western-sponsored candidate like Ireland or Portugal. But meanwhile the orbit in which she moves has so much shrunk that she no longer shines even by reflected light, and the chance that she might be considered entitled to membership in any world assembly of independent nations has greatly diminished. Foreign newspaper men no longer are allowed to report directly on what is occurring in the country. If elements of national resistance still exist we hear little or nothing of their activities.

Bucharest might have hoped to claim glory as the capital of the Cominform, which she supposedly became when the organization moved out of Belgrade. Even this is denied her, for the Cominform no longer meets regularly, in Bucharest or anywhere else. Perhaps the Soviet leaders see no further value in the organization. Perhaps Stalin has made up his mind not to permit any alternate center of power, even minor, to the Kremlin. Some persons think that the Cominform was created originally in order to deal specifically with the Jugoslav situation, and having fulfilled this function, though far from successfully, is now retained simply as a paper organization for possible use some time in the future. Today its principal activity is as a printing press. To the extent that glory attaches to being a printing press Bucharest has it. The Cominform journal, *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!*, is printed there in some 15 languages. 665 668

The Cominform journal may even be written largely in Bucharest. 000

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania EDI

648 advertise to the Rumanian masses, most of whom had never heard
728 this name. On March 8, therefore, Groza was told to ask Stalin for northern Transylvania, and by return telegram he received it as a "present." The Nazis had not yet been expelled from Budapest, so there was nobody there for Moscow to take into account. The Western Allies were not consulted. As a matter of fact, they had no objection to the return of at least most of Transylvania to Rumania, but would have preferred that it be done after study as to whether or not there should be frontier rectifications in favor of Hungarian ethnic groups; and they certainly would have considered it more suitable that the transfer be made after agreement among the Allies rather than unilaterally by one of them.

665 The steps by which the Communist-dominated Rumanian Gov-
668 ernment became an absolute Communist dictatorship need not be detailed here.[3] In the beginning there certainly were some non-Communist elements which favored a clean sweep of the old order even though the representatives of the new order were Communists and protégés of the hated Russians. Seizure of the large properties still left in Rumania after the land reforms following the First World War was popular in principle. Rumanian régimes of the inter-war period had not been noted for efficiency or probity, and the Communists hastened to identify all Rumanian statesmen who held democratic beliefs and had a Western orientation with the "old gang" of profiteers and politicians who had mocked the Constitution in the dissolute days of King Carol and had ended by taking Rumania into the war as the ally of the Nazis. The fact that Maniu, the country's leading statesman, was famous for his incorruptibility and stubborn devotion to the Constitution did not deter Communist propaganda from picturing him also as a corrupt relic of the old dictatorial order. The Socialists were, of course, completely outbid by Communist promises of pie in the sky.

665 But although these tactics had some success at first the only one
241 of them that was based on anything substantial, the gift of land to
423

[3] For a fuller outline of the postwar evolution in Rumania as well as other parts of Eastern Europe, and of relevant negotiations (if they can be called that) between the Soviets and the Western Powers, see Campbell, *op. cit.*, also volumes for 1947–48 and 1948–49 in the same series by the same author, and the volume for 1949 by Richard P. Stebbins.

8: Armstrong 3-4 (no date) 1951 EP1 Yugoslavia
Rumania ED

the peasants, was a boomerang. The land reforms of 1919–21 had distributed about 14 million acres among about 1,400,000 peasants. The new Communist expropriations distributed an additional 2,750,000 acres among about 1,100,000 peasants. It has been calculated that as a result more than half of the land holdings in Rumania consisted of less than seven and a half acres per family. Most farms of this size were insufficient to support independent farmers. Now this may have been as the Communists planned, for it enabled them to point out the advantages of collectivization to peasants who lacked even the minimum of tools and draft animals to cultivate their small private holdings. But when they did so they lost the popularity they had gained, both with peasants who worked ancestral lands and with those who had just shared in the expropriated estates.

The Communists thus felt it necessary to make their political position more secure, in particular to head off their natural rivals in the countryside, the formidable National Peasant Party headed by Maniu. In December 1945 a correspondent of the London *Times* had written critically of Maniu's "rigidity" and unwillingness to accept a modern "radical policy," and had blamed his "unbending attitude" for the "inevitable" political crisis. Less than a year later (October 18, 1946) the same or another correspondent of the *Times* reported from Bucharest that Maniu was "more popular than ever in his long career." The dispatch continued: "His past mistakes and weaknesses are forgotten. He stands now not for any program or ideology but for the idea of national independence. He is the symbol of the Rumanian nation."

As the Rumanian nation was to be destroyed, Maniu had to be destroyed.

This was the period for dealing with peasant rivals to the Communists in all the agrarian satellite states. In Bulgaria, the leader of the Peasant Party, Petkov, was arrested in June 1947 and hanged in September. In Poland, the leader of the Peasant Party, Mikolajczyk, was harried from the political scene and in October 1947 was forced to flee to London. In Hungary, the Soviets had made the mistake of permitting free elections and had lost them to Nagy's Smallholders Party; but they had stipulated that regardless of the

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania ED1

661 electoral results a coalition government should be set up, and in this they secured the Ministry of the Interior and thus made ready to stage a coup at the opportune moment. That moment came in May 1947. Maniu's turn came in July 1947. He was arrested, the National Peasant Party was dissolved, and three months later he was put on trial before a military court presided over by Colonel Alexandru Petrescu. This officer had worn many uniforms and (as W. H. Lawrence who covered the trial for *The New York Times* recalled) had once filled the same judicial office under the pro-Nazi Antonescu dictatorship when the prisoners in the dock usually were Jews or were charged with being Communists or anti-Fascists, equally reprehensible in those days. After a two-week trial which travestied anything that we would call a judicial proceeding, Maniu was convicted and given solitary imprisonment for life. With him were sentenced Ion Mihalache, Vice President of the National Peasant Party, and other associates.

By the end of 1947 the Communists had dealt with all political rivals in Eastern Europe who had particular influence with the peasant masses. Whether the peasant leaders temporized or were rigid, collaborated or fought back, their fate was different only in degree: for some death, for some prison, for some exile.

Six weeks after Maniu was sentenced, King Michael, who had struggled to diminish his royal prerogatives to the point where they might be combined with a Communist dictatorship, and who occasionally seemed to be succeeding, was ordered to abdicate and leave the country. The Rumanian People's Republic was proclaimed [642] December 30, 1947. No political focus of opposition was left—reactionary, bourgeois, agrarian, democratic or Socialist.

665 661 Moscow even so did not feel that the situation in Rumania was all it should be. A core of nationalist sentiment seemed to remain inside the Communist organization itself, and it was ordered cut out. The man selected to serve as an example was an old Party stalwart and cabinet member, Lucretiu Patrascanu. He had been a Communist member of Parliament in the twenties, a leader of the Communist underground during the war and head of the commission sent to Moscow to negotiate the Rumanian armistice. In the cabinets preceding Groza's he had been Minister of Justice, and Vyshin-

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 IF1 Yugoslavia & F1
Rumania EDI

R 665 661

sky thought him sufficiently reliable to allot him the same important position in the new setup. *The Daily Worker*[4] praised him in those days "for his staunch defense of leading anti-Fascists, such as Professor Constantinescu-Iasi, Ana Pauker and the railway strike leaders before the military and civil Rumanian tribunals," and added the information that he had joined the Rumanian Communist Party when it was first organized in 1920 and had been editor of the official Party organ, *Scanteia*, from 1921 to 1924. Patrascanu's administration of the Rumanian judicial system continued to be satisfactory at least to the end of 1947, for he was retained in the same post in the new republican cabinet formed after Michael's abdication.

Less than two months later, at a Congress when the rump groups still calling themselves "Social Democratic" joined the Communists to form the new Rumanian Workers' Party (Communist), Teohari Georgescu, Minister of the Interior, suddenly rose to assail Patrascanu as a deviationist. Like the accused, the accuser was a member of the Central Committee of the Party. Georgescu's complaint was that Patrascanu had fallen "under the influence of the bourgeoisie" and "had become an exponent of bourgeois ideology." As this happened at the end of February 1948, when only the innermost circle of Cominform authorities knew that Moscow was stigmatizing Tito as a bourgeois deviationist, we cannot tell whether the two developments were connected or whether Patrascanu merely happened to reveal some tendency toward independence at an unfortunate moment.

R 665 661 Y 648

Tito had been in Bucharest at the end of December 1947 to sign the Jugoslav-Rumanian pact of friendship and mutual assistance, and half a million persons had assembled at an open-air rally to hear him speak. "It was a great triumph," Mosha Pijade has written—in fact, Pijade admits, too great a triumph, "for it started personal jealousy where none of us expected it." He adds: "When Comrade Tito achieved triumphs during his visits to Warsaw, Prague, Sofia, Bucharest and Budapest, it was too much for them. Sick vanity threw the interests of world Socialism into the dirt."[5] If Patrascanu

[4] New York, November 11, 1944.
[5] *Borba*, Belgrade, September 26 and 29, 1949.

R: Annenberg 8-6 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia

R 661 665 Y 648

had not heard that Tito was in danger, he might have made up to him too openly. Maybe he happened to be one of those to whom Tito mentioned the troubles he was having with the Soviets, and maybe some informer transmitted a sympathetic comment to Moscow. A few days after Tito left Bucharest, Dimitrov arrived to sign a similar treaty of friendship on behalf of Bulgaria. This was the occasion where the exuberant Rumanian welcome is supposed to have gone to Dimitrov's head, leading him to speak imprudently about forming a wide federation of East European states as an offset to Soviet hegemony. Was Patrascanu implicated in the indiscretions for which the Bulgarian Prime Minister apologized so abjectly after returning to Sofia? Perhaps the international events merely coincided with Patrascanu's fall. Perhaps he was purged simply because his background was Rumanian rather than Muscovite (he apparently never was in Moscow until 1944), and suspects were being gotten rid of everywhere in preparation for the showdown with Tito. He had spent the war in the Rumanian underground and Rumanian jails and knew the country as Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca and other Moscow-trained Communists did not. He may easily have had ideas about the importance of Rumanian national feelings and perhaps even a feeling of his own for Rumanian national interests which would have been alien to the Muscovites. Whether this or something more specific accounts for his disgrace must remain speculation. What is on record is that he was denounced as a bourgeois and nationalist and expelled from the Party to which he had belonged for 28 years.

R 661 665

The purge begun with Patrascanu went wide and deep. In the Cominform journal for February 10, 1950, the Secretary-General of the Central Committee, Alexandru Moghiorosh, reported that the "ever sharpening class struggle" had necessitated a thorough housecleaning of "bestial, alien and opportunist elements." In all, he said, 18 percent of the Party members had been dropped. On the date when the remnants of the so-called Social Democratic parties merged with the Communists, the combined strength of the new Rumanian Workers' Party was said to be about a million. This would indicate a purge of something like 180,000 individuals found to be lacking in Communist zeal or trustworthiness. Moghiorosh warned that "the

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania E01

Anglo-American imperialists and their Titoist agents" would try to disrupt the Party in the future as in the past, and he asked for redoubled revolutionary vigilance against "all deviations from the Party line." 661 665

Those who were not purged were vigorously educated in the same ideas which Dimitrov, Bierut and Revai had brought to the attention of their followers. They were informed that in Rumania as elsewhere one of the touchstones of conformity to the new Moscow line was to be the attitude of the Parties toward the peasants. In the early days of their power, the Rumanian Communists had aimed to make private ownership of land unpopular by proving it unprofitable. As in the other satellites, they had set high tax rates on land, imposed high indirect taxes on salt, matches and other commodities which the peasant could not avoid buying, fixed high prices for manufactured goods in comparison with agricultural produce, offered special favors to peasants who joined collectives and in other ways demonstrated the hazards and costs of independent farming with a view to bringing the peasants to favor collectivization, as it were of their own accord. Minister of the Interior Georgescu signalled the end of this era of persuasion, if it can be called that, in the spring of 1949. 661 665 565

Georgescu joined the ranks of Dimitrov, Bierut and Revai with a contribution to the Cominform journal for June 1, 1949. As an article there would be read abroad as well as at home he used more discreet language than, for instance, Revai had felt necessary in addressing the comrades in Budapest. In the main, however, his definitions and instructions followed the same pattern. There was to be "a sharpening of the class struggle in town and countryside," and he made plain, as Revai had done, that although "the main ally of the working class is the working peasantry" the working class always reserves to itself "the leading rôle." He also agreed that a civil war would not be necessary to bring in the full dictatorship of the proletariat. In Rumania as in Hungary the Soviet Army was always there "to support us." Vasile Luca, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party (Communist), followed soon afterwards with an article speaking of "the ever sharpening class struggle" and "acute class struggle in the countryside in par- 665 565

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania ED1

665
565

ticular," and referring to the workers "as the sole guiding force in the country." * Nevertheless he seemed slightly on the defensive over the fact that after having had a free hand longer than any other Party in Eastern Europe the Rumanian Communists had only succeeded in forming to date 6,732 coöperatives of all types (consumer as well as producer coöperatives). He stressed that "mass collectivization" must wait on increased industrialization to supply needed farm machinery. And as if to forestall the jibes of Jugoslav Communists he attacked their achievements in collectivization as not only wrong in substance but as having been produced at a wrong tempo.

241
[162]
565

The hope of basing Communist rule on the dominance of the industrial proletariat over the peasantry seems especially ambitious in Rumania, where only about five percent of the population are industrial workers and 80 percent are peasants. It is true that agrarian overpopulation exists in Rumania and therefore a gradual shift of some rural elements to city pursuits must occur. The Communist expropriations failed (as the Communists had expected) to solve the agrarian problem because the properties still remaining undivided were insufficient to supply all landless peasants with land or to give those receiving land sufficient acreage to make them self-supporting. Mechanization of agriculture, so much emphasized in the satellite countries, will not solve the problem but will merely aggravate it by increasing the peasant's dependence on a single crop marketed under strict state control. The solution is to raise the standard of living of the peasants. This could be done by improving seeds and livestock, diversifying crops, developing home industries, improving methods of marketing, building roads, providing facilities for local food processing to avoid wastage, and consolidating separated family strips of land into efficient farming units. As rural living standards rise productivity would increase, and this would permit concurrent rises in the living standards of the industrial workers. These objective facts of the Rumanian economic structure rule out any other procedure unless it is frankly based on injustice and is indifferent to human unhappiness on a tremendous scale.

The Communists cannot, however, favor a program like the one

* *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!*, Bucharest, August 1, 1949.

648, 665, 642, 433

Rumania ED1

[For the economic and political position of Rumania under Soviet control since the death of Stalin, see 85: Zinner, R1 Soviet Union, category 116, Pp. 157B-163B.]

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

National Assembly on June 2, 1952, concerning the "Organization of the Judicature." Article 1 of the Law emphatically states that the function of the judiciary is the defense of the socio-economic structure of the state and of the rights and interests of state institutions and organizations. Furthermore, it is emphasized that the aim of the judiciary is the "education" of the citizens "in the spirit of devotion to the fatherland and in the spirit of the construction of socialism" (Article 2). 177 669 692

The people's assessors perform in practice a much greater function in judicial proceedings than those specified by the Constitution. The Minister of Justice is authorized to detail them from one court to the other whenever circumstances require. Thus, there are actually special teams of "people's judges" which the Ministry of Justice can use in accordance with the political interests of the Party. 692

Article 9 of Law No. 5 of 1952 also authorizes the courts to hear cases outside their seats if this is required "to fulfil the educational purpose of justice." Furthermore, hierarchically superior courts may take away from subordinate courts any case "in order to hear it themselves or have it heard by another court."

The required impartiality of judges is furthermore impaired by limitations imposed by the electoral laws on the right to participate in the election of people's judges. The privilege is restricted to the "democratic" elements only (Article 13, Paragraph 7, of Law No. 5). This is coupled with the provisions confining the nomination of candidates to the United Workers' (Communist) Party or to its affiliated mass organizations (Article 13, Paragraph 1). [666]

In discussing the new role of justice and law, Vasilescu-Alba, a jurist of the Rumanian People's Republic, asserted that "all legal rules, being the expression of the will of the working class, must be understood and interpreted in the light of the class struggle." Justice is thus "an executive organ of the will of the working class." Positive law, when in disagreement with this principle, must make room for the "legal conscience of the proletariat."[3] [565]

The fundamental rights and duties of citizens are enumerated in a special chapter. The primacy of social rights over individual rights is, as in the USSR, both functional and political.[4] Most of the rights and freedoms stipulated by the Constitution are either programmatic, circumscribed by escape clauses, or outright illusory. Thus, for instance, the provision relating to freedom of the press, speech, and assembly, as stated by Article 85, (a word-by-word replica of Article 125 of the Soviet Constitution of 1936), emphatically denies 641

---

[3] "Statul Poliţienesc" Cronica Românească, October 1, 1950, p. 25.

[4] Professor Boris Mirkine-Guetzevitch, while recognizing the dictatorial character of all the constitutions in the Soviet sphere, makes nevertheless a distinction between the declarations of rights of the Soviet constitutions and those of the satellite constitutions. According to Professor Mirkine, whereas the declarations of the People's Republics establish the "functional" primacy of social rights over individual rights, those of the Soviet republics establish "political" primacy. See Boris Mirkine-Guetzevitch, Les Constitutions Européennes, 2 vol. Paris, 1951.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

565 665 inhabitants, they had remained a field for partisan skirmishes among the different factions of the boyars and the growing financial and industrial interests. The limited ambit of politics was not, however, altogether the responsibility of the boyars, though most of them certainly cannot be charged with equalitarian leanings.

829 642 621 Much has been written in Rumania on the primitive state of the peasant, his inability to govern himself, and the necessity for his gradual, supervised initiation into the mysteries of government. While such writings often conceal an *arrière pensée*, they contain one element of truth: the economic role of the peasant, as a relatively self-contained and self-sufficient producer, does confine the orbit of his interests to his village. This limitation of interests has nothing to do with any shortcomings on the part of the peasant, but merely means that his economic and social life does not extend into many of the fields which comprise the necessary activities of modern governments. The immediate and obvious wishes of the peasant—such as more land, more lenient credit, and lower taxes—cannot be the satisfactory basis of a political program unless they can be related to some means of realizing them. The possibility of their direct and immediate fulfillment in Rumania was limited; the indirect measures which could ultimately improve his status—the over-all increase of the nation's productivity and capital—involved questions quite beyond his understanding as a peasant, if not as an individual.

565 In all states there is a gap between the desires of the average voter and the complexities of economic and administrative activity; in Rumania this gap was accentuated by the fact that almost four-fifths of the population was of the peasantry. Moreover, since such a large percentage of the population was devoted to one occupation, there was relatively little scope for the diversified play of economic and social interests in politics such as characterizes a more advanced society. Rumanian writers, regretting the division of their society between a formless mass of peasants and an oligarchic ruling group, have perennially pined for the emergence of a middle class. During the interwar period the base for political activity broadened somewhat through increasing industrialization, through the growth of a more numerous middle peasantry, and through strong regional interests in the new provinces, but the great bulk of the electorate was still the poor peasantry, whose chief historical means of declaring its wishes had been in sporadic and unsuccessful uprisings.

● 666 Partly for these reasons the extension of the suffrage after the First World War did not lead to political democracy. Politics, which retained a distinctly Phanariot flavor, was the art of taking advan-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

tage of the amorphous character of the peasantry. Rumanian elections were notorious for their corruption, ballot stuffing, and general unreliability as measures of public sentiment. Perhaps only two elections in the entire period were at all free and fair, and both produced a marked upset in political life. In most cases elections were "made" in advance. Many governments were in power through no popular mandate whatsoever but merely through political arrangements; dismissals were equally arbitrary and only occasionally resulted from the loss of popular confidence. It would be futile and misleading to attempt to explain the course of Rumanian politics by an analysis of the elections.

The most notable shifts in the political pattern in the years immediately after the First World War were the disappearance of the Conservative party and the rise of a number of new political formations, some of which were very short-lived. The position of the Conservatives had been declining even before the war, partly because of periodic crises in the selection of leaders.[3] The question of land reform and Rumania's participation in the war completely split the party; after 1918 there were two principal factions, the Conservative Democrats under Take Ionescu and the Progressive Conservatives under Alexandru Marghiloman. Ionescu participated in the Averescu cabinet of 1920–21, and after its fall attempted unsuccessfully to form a government; he died in 1922 and his followers subsequently joined Maniu's National party. Although Marghiloman confidently declared in 1923 that the "conservative doctrine is enjoying a flowering and an extraordinary vigor throughout the world,"[4] his party disappeared shortly and was absorbed by other groups.

Perhaps too much social significance has been attributed to the disappearance of the Conservatives as a sign of the uprooting of the old boyar class through the land reform and the extension of the suffrage. Considering the ease with which Rumanian parties were concocted from thin air and parliamentary majorities obtained, equal emphasis should be placed upon internal party weaknesses and schisms and upon the consequences of the Germanophile attitude of many Conservatives during the war. To be sure, the Conservative doctrine, if there was such, had little to offer. Marghiloman could insist that *natura non facit saltum* and urge the importance of tradition and natural development, but in plain fact Rumania was pro-

3. "The history of the Conservative Party in Rumania has been the history of struggles for chiefs." Rădulescu-Motru, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

4. A. Marghiloman, "Doctrina conservatoare," in Institutul Social Român, *Doctrinele partidelor politice* (Bucarest, n.d.), p. 111.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 665 [661] on well together, and it was generally believed that Brătianu had forced the king to exclude Carol.

Communal elections were held in February in an atmosphere of political excitement. The government, for all its electioneering techniques, did badly, especially in the larger towns. It won only one-third of the seats in the Bucarest municipal council. In Bessarabia the United Opposition won all lists. The government was defeated in most Transylvanian towns, notwithstanding its pact with the Magyar party; it won most of the rural Transylvanian communes through official pressure and the aid of the gendarmerie.

175 671 ● 666 In March the Brătianu cabinet reached the end of its four-year term. In the last session of parliament it passed a new electoral law, whose unusual provisions were to make Rumanian elections even less representative of public opinion. Deputies had previously been elected on a proportional basis. According to the new act, modeled on Mussolini's law of January 7, 1923, the party gaining a plurality and at least 40 per cent of the votes was declared the majority party: it was to receive, as a premium, half the seats in the chamber plus a number of the remaining seats corresponding to its percentage of the total vote. Thus, a party gaining 40 per cent of the votes would occupy 70 per cent of the seats in the chamber (50 per cent plus two-fifths of the remaining 50 per cent). The remainder of the seats was divided proportionally among the other parties; a party failing to gain 2 per cent of the total votes obtained no representation.

According to the Liberals, there was nothing extraordinary about this law. A bill for electoral reform had been part of the Liberal program and had been stipulated in the 1923 Constitution.[19] In a country with such a multitude of unstable parties it might be argued that the "premium," as it was called, was a necessary device to give the party in office a sufficiently strong parliamentary majority to enable it to carry on its business.

Nevertheless, given the idiosyncrasies of Rumanian politics, the law had two very unfortunate effects. Since it was the practice for the crown to summon a government, which then proceeded to hold, or "make," elections with the aid of the administrative apparatus, the electoral law increased the opportunity for the selected group to swing the elections in its favor. On the other hand, the failure of a party obtaining less than 2 per cent of the votes to gain any repre-

19. According to Article 188 of the constitution, the current national assembly (i.e., the Liberal majority) could function after the promulgation of the constitution until the expiration of its mandate. During that period an electoral law was to be passed in accordance with the principles laid down in the constitution.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

sentation was a natural incentive for such parties to abandon the parliamentary track altogether. The timing of the law led the opposition parties to charge that it was merely part of the Liberals' plan of grooming General Averescu to replace them, since his party was obviously weak in popular support. There is no question that in 1924 and 1925 Averescu had not cooperated with the other opposition parties but had worked in some measure with the Liberals.

On March 27, 1926, Brătianu resigned amid rumors that he favored General Averescu as his successor. The opposition was still fumbling in its efforts to unite; negotiations between the Transylvanian Nationalists and the Peasant party had broken down again on March 22 over a disagreement on the distribution of cabinet posts. The king, on March 29, consulted the leaders of the Transylvanian National, Peasant, and People's parties and requested a coalition cabinet; apparently the Peasants and the Nationalists agreed. But on the following day, much to their chagrin, King Ferdinand called on General Averescu to form a government.

The reasons for the king's action are not altogether clear. The Nationalists and the Peasants had blundered in not mending their differences earlier and achieving a solid coalition. On the other hand, the king had been responsible for their dismissal in 1920 and was probably quite doubtful of their ability to govern properly and likely to accept the advice of Brătianu. Brătianu of course denied that his party had any agreement with General Averescu but his disclaimer is not convincing. "All we did," he said, "was to prepare the atmosphere in order to bring into power a government which would present a guarantee for the continuity of the work accomplished by us. Apart from this we are the declared opponents of the present government." [20] It was generally believed, and probably correctly, that Brătianu had strongly urged the king to install General Averescu.

Averescu held elections in May. The National party and the Peasants, still unable to achieve fusion, agreed to collaborate in the election. Despite the premium Averescu faced quite a task in overcoming his party's numerical weakness, but he acted resolutely and altogether successfully in one of the more outrageous Rumanian elections. Military officers on active service were appointed as prefects of a number of districts. Circulation of vehicles and persons was strictly controlled. The leaders of the opposition were unable to get in touch with their constituents; even Ion Brătianu was blocked on one trip, and Mihalache was arrested by gendarmes in his own electoral district. Gendarmes supervised public gatherings and were directed to intervene

20. *Times* (London), April 21, 1926.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

661 if anyone attempted "to excite the people." Political manifestoes and
666 slogans required the approval of the prefect. On the day of the election, numerous opposition delegates were arrested and not permitted to supervise the voting or the counting. There was some violence and a few deaths.[21] Averescu, by these means, obtained 52 per cent of the votes, but under the premium he gained 292 out of 387 seats in the chamber, the Opposition block held 69 seats, the Liberals 16, Cuza's League of Christian Defense (an anti-Semitic formation) 10; the socialists and the Communist-sponsored workers' bloc, having obtained less than 2 per cent of the votes, were not represented.

665 After the election the National and Peasant parties continued their
175 efforts to unite. In September delegates of the two parties voted for fusion into a National Peasant party with Maniu as president and Mihalache as vice-president. Iorga, however, declined to vote, and the Peasant leader Dr. Lupu opposed the decision. The fusion was confirmed by the general congress held on October 10.

A new crisis arose with the serious illness of King Ferdinand in November, 1926, and the renewed controversies over the succession, Carol's renunciation, and the regency. The National Peasants, who believed that King Ferdinand had been an instrument of the Liberals, were dissatisfied with the succession and were reluctant to regard Carol's renunciation as final. All parties, however, felt that in the king's failing condition the Averescu cabinet was not sufficiently representative to govern alone. Brătianu sounded opposition leaders on the possibilities of forming a national cabinet. General Averescu made several unsuccessful efforts to achieve a coalition with the National Peasants, perhaps in an effort to free himself from his dependence upon the Liberals. Having failed to create a coalition he was obliged to resign on June 3, 1927.

A new "impartial" cabinet under Prince Barbu Ştirbey (a relative by marriage of the Brătianus and periodically proposed as the head of a caretaker cabinet, the last time in 1945) came to office and included some Liberals and Dr. Lupu, who had split with the National Peasants in February and formed an independent peasant group. After negotiations with the National Peasants, three members of Maniu's party joined the coalition. The principal object of this cabinet, which was in effect a temporary Liberal-National-Peasant coalition, was to preside over new and free elections. However, negotiations between Maniu and Brătianu broke down. Maniu refused Brătianu's proposal for a common list of candidates in the coming election with

21. The electoral abuses were brought up by opposition leaders in parliamentary interpellations after the elections.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

were faced with a dilemma, partly of their own making. In the narrow 665
political life of the Old Kingdom, with its restricted franchise and small ruling class, the Liberals had been most successful in retaining power for the greater part of Rumania's independent existence; with the Conservatives as a foil they were even able to appear as the supporter of progressive forces, and did indeed attract a number of peasant leaders and socialists into their ranks.

With the agrarian reform, however, and the appearance of a new electorate under universal suffrage, their situation became less comfortable. It was not that they were driven to the Right—on the whole their attitude showed a marked consistency—but that their actual policy now appeared in more obvious contrast to their theoretical principles. After the agrarian reform they could no longer pose as opponents to the boyars; they became quite clearly the advocates of industry as opposed to agriculture. Since the great majority of the population were peasants, universal suffrage was bound to produce mass parties opposed to the financial and industrial domination of the Liberals, whose only defense was a perversion of the electoral process. Under these circumstances, it is rather surprising that the Liberals should have been the agents for the introduction of both the agrarian reform and universal suffrage. Two explanations may be offered. In the first place, the Liberals' initiative in these matters was by no means as great as they proclaimed it to be. They were intelligent enough to see which way the wind was blowing and realized that an attempt to block electoral and agrarian reform would merely produce a violent social upheaval. Their initiative was largely in adapting themselves to the course of events. At the same time, a closer examination of their action shows that they attempted to avoid the full implications of these reforms. Their dilatory tactics in the history of the agrarian reform have already been described. The same evasiveness is apparent in their electoral policy.

In 1913 Ion I. C. Brătianu did come out for electoral reform, but 665
his intention seems to have been the unification of all electors in one 666
college rather than three, not universal suffrage. The franchise ap- 642
parently would have been limited to literates, which would have excluded the greater part of the peasantry. In 1914, according to Mihalache,[27] Constantin Brătianu, third brother of Ion I. C. Brătianu and leader of the Liberals in the last decade, declared universal suffrage to be an aberration. The 1917 amendment, passed under the pressure of social unrest, provided for "proportional" representation. The Constitution of 1923 omitted this term, and the electoral law

27. Mihalache, op. cit., p. 28.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 of 1926 introduced the system of the majority party premium. In
666 these developments, as Mr. Mitrany has observed, one can detect a
642 "subtle reactionary alchemy."

665 On the other hand, the Liberals' agrarian and electoral policy may not have been altogether opportunistic. There is ample reason to believe that they really regarded western European society as a model for Rumania. Many of them had been trained in Paris and in their personal lives they strove to be as Western as possible. Hence, they probably quite honestly felt that ultimately the western European peasant cultivator who enjoyed the franchise should find his replica in Rumania. Unfortunately, this goal had little to do with present Rumanian realities, and the Liberals were confronted with the alternative of Balkanizing their Western ideals or of being overthrown by them. They chose the former course.

The disparity between liberal theory and Liberal party practices in the post-1918 period appears clearly in a lecture on the "Liberal Doctrine" delivered in 1923 by I. G. Duca, who later became leader of the party on the death of Vintilă Brătianu.[28] After taking pains to refute the prevalent belief that between Rumanian parties there were only differences of persons and ambitions, not of conceptions and doctrines, Duca defined the Liberal credo in the following formula: "Progress in all forms but within the framework of the concept of individual property." Progress, however, could be realized only "through order, through democracy, through nationalism, and through social harmony." By order he meant the avoidance of anarchy, not the absence of change. He defined democracy as government of the people, by the people, and for the people, and in antithesis to demagogy. While opposing excessive or exclusive nationalism, he held that progress was possible only through the developments of national forces; economic nationalism expressed the instinct of self-preservation and was a means "to safeguard the material individuality of each nationality, to prevent its destruction by elements superior in strength or in organization." Collaboration with foreign powers or even with foreign capital was not excluded but it should be on terms which corresponded with national interests. He regarded social harmony as a necessary counterbalance to the doctrine of class struggle.

Duca then went on to show that liberalism was not a rigid doctrine, but had adapted itself to changing circumstances. It had abandoned the classical idea of property as sacred and inviolable and had accepted the principle of property as a social function, allowing for such measures as expropriation and the nationalization of the subsoil. In the field of political economy Rumanian liberalism had

[28] I. G. Duca, "Doctrina Liberală," *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, pp. 108–110.

RUMANIA

[652] the economic crisis which had become endemic, sought to
665 withdraw for a brief period from office in order that popular
661 indignation might be appeased. As it had become obvious, however, that the Opposition, headed by the Transylvanian and peasant groups of the old kingdom aided by the Bessarabians, would sweep the polls and deprive the Bratianu party of the privileges it had arrogated to itself during its last tenure of office, the government manoeuvred to appoint in its stead a political group on whose subservience it could count. The choice fell on General Averescu, who could not pretend to independence of action owing to the numerical weakness of his group, and who was forced to act in leading strings held by the Bratianus on account of his absolute dependence on their support. As a consequence of the prevailing exasperation throughout the country it could be foreseen with certainty that it would be impossible to secure a favourable majority at the election following the exit from office of the Bratianus, even if use was made of the devices habitually employed on such occasions.

666 Before the dissolution of the Chamber, therefore, the
646 Bratianus passed a law reforming the electoral system then in use, which completely altered the very essence of democratic government. By the new system a party obtaining 40% of the total votes cast secured 70% of the seats in the Chamber, and thereby a party which did not possess the support of the majority of the electors might nevertheless secure an imposing majority in the Legislative Chamber. Through the passing of this measure into law, the coming to power of unpopular parties and royal favourites has been made possible, for owing to the malpractices and abuses current at elections, it is relatively easy in Rumania for any person in control of the state-machine to secure the requisite 40% of the votes necessary to ensure him complete domination of the Chamber.

666 In ordinary circumstances there would have been no necessity for this electoral law, since the public has usually a very wholesome respect for whatever party is in power, allowing it to organize the elections to suit its wishes, and permitting it to exert a dominating influence on the polls so that it may be said that the elections are always "made."

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

The elections which followed in May, 1926, were among the 666
most violent which had been witnessed in Rumania. Though 661
the Averescu group had secured the support of the Magyars, Germans, Jews, Bulgarians and Turks by holding out to them the most alluring promises, it in no way felt secure, and therefore had recourse to extensive terrorist methods. Most Opposition leaders were arrested. Opposition leaders like Maniu and Vaida-Voevod were prevented from holding meetings. Mihalache was set upon by gendarmes and beaten at his home at Topoloveni. The Bessarabian leaders, Stere and Halippa, while travelling to Bessarabia were ignominiously thrown out of their train at Floresti, placed under an escort of gendarmes and conveyed on foot to Cetatea-Alba, a distance of 300 kilometers, despite the fact that they were both in a poor state of health at the time. The army and gendarmerie were mobilized and ordered to see to it that Rumanian citizens did their duty (such as it was conceived to be by the government of H.M. King Ferdinand of Rumania). One of the manifestos issued and distributed broadcast by army air-planes at the time read:—"If you trust in the King then you must trust in his government." As for the way royalty in Rumania conceived its duty of 643
guarding the letter and spirit of the Constitution, one may 666
judge by the fact that the King, aware of the violence to be committed, and knowing that as the supreme arbiter in the country he would be besought from all sides to intervene and put a stop to it, could think of nothing better than to elude his responsibilities by betaking himself to his yacht, and cruising on the Danube for a whole week so as not to be importuned by the complaints of his liege subjects!

In spite of the unprecedented violence employed the 666
government obtained only 54% of the total votes cast, but it must be remembered that this percentage included almost the whole of the votes cast by the minorities.

For some time Averescu meekly followed the lead of 642
Bratianu. He surprised nobody, however, when he began 661
to show manifest signs of insubordination, but to no avail.

For the Liberals, knowing the shifty customer with whom they were dealing, had taken their precautions. During their four years of office they had bestowed on most of the

country to the verge of a catastrophe, proved, however, to 665
be too much for the less experienced hands of Vintila Brati- 652
anu. Unable to secure a foreign loan, the need of which had
become imperative, he had no choice but to allow the transfer
of the reins of power in November, 1928, to the Opposition,
represented by M. Maniu and the National Peasant party.
The elections which followed took place in freedom, and 666
though this time the minorities did not all vote for the 665
government, nevertheless the latter secured for itself about
78% of the total number of votes cast, which may be taken
as an infallible proof of its popularity. This assured it of a
compact majority of 348 seats in the Chamber. The Opposition was insignificant, and was composed of sixteen Magyars, thirteen Liberals, and ten seats distributed amongst various groups. This election disposed of the fiction that Communism had a hold on the Rumanian people, for the total Communist vote attained only 35,000 out of a total of 2,840,660, and it thus became evident that the bogey of Bolshevism had been cleverly exploited by the Bratianu dictatorship, in order to justify its terroristic methods in Bessarabia, as well as for the purpose of winning the goodwill of the Western Powers for its alleged attempts to
repress it. The most pressing need the Maniu government 652
had to face was the obtention of a foreign loan in order to avoid the certain catastrophe with which the finances of the country were threatened. The funds obtained, however, barely sufficed for stabilizing the currency, and were altogether inadequate for the task of reconstruction, and even for the purpose of paying off the most pressing debts left by the former régime, so that a further loan had to be secured in 1931.

Unfortunately the country was in a derelict condition, and with the banking institutions under the control of its adversaries, determined to undermine the work of the new government, the latter had an exceedingly difficult task to
tackle. The government passed several liberal measures, 671
such as the suppression of the censorship, the abrogation of military law in Bessarabia, the reduction of the personnel of the gendarmerie (chiefly employed by Bratianu for dragooning the population at election times), and set about

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

A very unfavourable impression was created by the dismissal of the Chamber controlled by the National Peasant Party, the only standard-bearer of democracy in the country. It is probable that the electorate would have reacted with more spirit if the people had not foreseen that the thwarting of the royal will would have entailed the abolition of even the semblance of a Parliamentary system, and the proclamation of a pure dictatorship. Though not to an overwhelming extent, violence and illegality were pretty freely employed, to judge from the cases reported in the Press, yet in spite of all these artifices and the mass abstention of its opponents the elements supporting the Iorga-Argentoianu Coalition secured only 48% of the total votes cast; a very meagre performance indeed if it be remembered that even the Liberal party figured among its supporters.

That the Iorga-Argentoianu Cabinet did not fulfil the hopes placed in it by the King became obvious when he again summoned M. Titulescu, early in 1932, to Bucarest, and asked him to form a broad coalition cabinet. No real coalition cabinet truly representative of the national will could be formed without the inclusion of the National Peasant Party, and the leaders of the latter, when sounded, replied in a truly dignified manner that so long as constitutional methods were not observed they would abstain from participation. M. Titulescu gave up the mission and once more returned to his ambassadorial duties in London. Even those who by their votes helped the Cabinet to install itself in office seemed to have turned against it, for during a sitting of the Rumanian Senate on December 5th, 1931, M. Pillat, belonging to the Liberal party, delivered the following trenchant criticism on the Cabinet: "When you came to power you had promised three principal things: 1st, reduction of the Budget and a lightening of taxation through economies; 2nd, a redressing of the financial and economic situation and of the agrarian crisis; 3rd, penalties for all abuses. But what has been realised? The policy of feigned economies has not stopped the practice of dissipation, aggravated by fresh injustices. In a time of such poverty you have not only maintained old sinecurist in office but you have created even new ones. Favourites of other régimes who exert cumulative

10: Logio 8-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

certain extent, as apparently the new French government will be less inclined to make financial advances. Nevertheless the Cabinet will hesitate to assume the responsibility of openly defaulting, lest such action should be resented by France and to a lesser extent by England, and bring about Rumania's political isolation in face of Russia. So that, strange as it may seem, the dread of the Bolsheviks may contribute to the respect of engagements, the repudiation of which would be applauded by the latter.

The press organ of General Averescu, the "Indreptarea," in its issues of 12th and 18th May, 1932, contains some interesting comments on the findings of the French experts. It thus affirms that the experts have ascertained that there is a lack of control in the handling of the public funds, that there is a great redundancy of officials, and that huge frauds are committed at the expense of the State revenues. As an example, the case of the revenue from the Customs was given, which was estimated at 1,200 million lei, yet only yielded 400 millions, the balance of 800 millions having been fraudulently diverted to other pockets than that of the State. M. Rist, affirms the "Indreptarea," had recommended a compression of the expenses through the dismissal of a large number of functionaries, and the creation of a control of all payments made to the State so as to eliminate the numerous frauds to which the Budget deficit is principally due. If these reforms were effected, Rumania, according to M. Rist, could fulfil her external obligations. However, the findings of the experts were not likely to enhance the prestige of Rumania in Paris and it hardly seemed likely that the French would now keep their promise made to M. Argentoianu to give pecuniary assistance to Rumania, unless they were allowed to exert a control which would be tantamount to applying to Rumania the status of what in its essence would be a colonial dependency. Such measures, if their acceptance were advocated by the Government, would weaken its prestige to such an extent that it could no longer maintain itself in power, even if it enjoyed royal support. The weakening of its authority was manifested by its decision not to allow the holding of municipal elections which were to take place in

RUMANIA

645 June, 1932, a measure which is resented by all political
[666] parties as a formal violation of the constitution.
[644]

From the above it will be clear that whatever popularity the Iorga-Argentoianu Cabinet may have enjoyed, and whatever the hopes to which it may have given rise on its formation, these have now been totally dispelled. This is not without causing a distinct prejudice to Rumania, for undoubtedly, Prof. Iorga is one of the most distinguished Rumanians and represents an immense moral asset for the country. He would have proved an ideal chief for a broad coalition of all political parties, and his presence, owing to his integrity as well as to his erudition would have immensely strengthened the position of such a popularly elected government.

000 Owing to the marked "lipsandry" from which Rumania is suffering, it was an unpardonable mistake on the part of her ruler to expose an eminent personality like that of Prof. Iorga to risk his reputation, and by trading on his sentiments of devotion to the throne to force him to join a team headed by an Argentoianu, who, according to General Averescu, ought to be in the dock, and not on the Ministerial bench.[1]

665 With the passing of time, and with the worsening of the situation, attacks on the present régime have become more virulent. General Averescu, who under Rumania's former kings was often appealed to on difficult circumstances, and who feels that he has been undeservedly ousted by the Iorga-Argentoianu combination, continues his vehement attacks on both Government and King, whom he threatens with the fate of Prince Cuza, deposed forcibly in 1866. Far more significant, however, is the attitude of the National Peasant Party, which so far has maintained a very dignified attitude. All of a sudden on May 15th, 1932, the "Patria," the organ of the Transylvanian section of the party, launched a virulent attack on the régime, denouncing the scandalous exploitation to which Transylvania is being subjected and threatening with a demand for autonomy. This campaign,

[1] In June, 1932, the "Dreptatea" repeatedly accused Argentoianu of having appropriated 20 million lei of public money, of which, 12 millions between May 17th and 31st, and eight millions on June 3rd and 4th, after he had resigned from office.

668 resound from the province across the Carpathians are not isolated. The whole country is agitated by this discontent which may explode at any moment."

The above statements should not be taken as outbursts of spite, for even in official publications, such as the bulletin of the Constantsa Chamber of Commerce, we come across similar pronouncements: "We are facing a complete economic disaster. All the productive forces of the country are exhausted. All private savings lent on credit are lost owing to general insolvency. The State is unable to collect even one fourth of the direct taxes it imposes. We have arrived at this state of affairs owing to the irrational financial policy of post-war governments . . . . . Great mistakes were committed, and this fact should be admitted before we start on the right path. Many of our rulers were incompetent and dissipated, not to say that they acted as profiteers." (February, 1932, p. 23–26.)

645 [652] Since proofs were submitted the following events have occurred in Rumania:

Owing to the growing discontent among public functionaries, pensioners and officers at their not receiving their pay, the King felt constrained to enjoin the Cabinet to satisfy forthwith the legitimate claims of these public servants. The government, unable to comply with this behest, tendered its resignation early in June, whereupon the King once more convoked M. Titulescu to Bucarest, and bade him form a coalition cabinet. M. Titulescu's efforts proved again fruitless; for while the National Peasant Party did not refuse its co-operation, the Liberal Party asked that it should be entrusted with a mandate to form a government, as it pretended to be strong and capable enough to deal singly with the situation.

666 As, however, no party possessed a majority in the Chamber, it was decided to dissolve it, and to appeal to the electorate. M. Vaida-Voevod, who is known to be strongly opposed to gerrymandering, and other electoral abuses in vogue in Rumania, formed a provisional government to supervise the elections. These were held in July, and the

National Peasant Party, though it polled less than 50% of the votes cast, secured 272 seats against 114 won by the Opposition. (The Liberals obtained 28, and the section of the party led by M. G. Bratianu, 14 mandates.) 666

M. Vaida-Voevod having discharged the duty assigned to him retired from office; but as the National Peasant Party possessed a working majority in the newly-elected Chamber, it was called upon to assume power. The Opposition attempted to challenge the right of the National Peasant Party to govern the country owing to the smallness of the poll it secured at the elections, though it was the Liberal party itself, now heading the Opposition, which introduced the law conferring a majority of seats in the Chamber on the party which would poll 40% of the votes. 646

M. Maniu was besought by his partisans to resume once more the premiership, but after several interviews with the King, declared himself unable to do so. He recommended, however, M. Vaida-Voevod to undertake the task, and accordingly a Cabinet headed by the latter was formed which includes both M. Mihalache and M. Madgearu, and other prominent members of the party. The government thus formed proceeded to secure a loan of 50 million swiss francs, wherewith to pay its officials for the time being, and to publish its program, which in the main lines aims at: Reforming the present electoral law, reintroducing administrative decentralization, and reorganizing the railway administration. Equitable treatment of minorities is promised, as well as a modification of the law concerning the conversion of agrarian debts. At the same time State finances are to be reorganized with the co-operation of the League of Nations. 645 652

This last plan, however, will not work out so smoothly, for the Opposition will do its utmost to stir up popular feeling against it. Even when two League delegates arrived in June, 1932, to examine the economic situation, the Press was unanimous in deprecating this public investigation and treating it as an offence against the country's dignity. The most widely read paper, having a daily circulation of some 40,000 copies, appeared with a leading article entitled "the day of shame." 652 648

regional differences into account. The persistent endeavour 642
to create a strong centralization has been accompanied by 563
parallel attempts to choke all natural expression of local life, contributing thereby to the drying up of the springs of national vitality and instilling in the mass of the people a spirit of apathy or of scarcely disguised hostility. Had the reverse policy been adopted, there is little doubt that the various provinces would have fostered local institutions on their own lines, and would have given a better structure to the whole system of administration by providing it with a backbone of local interest and control which it otherwise will continue to lack. At any rate it becomes daily more obvious that the decision taken at Versailles to transfer high-cultured communities completely out of harmony with Rumanian methods to Rumanian rule, without securing for them a certain degree of autonomy, was particularly unfelicitous for their members.

Whenever general elections are impending, the ethnic 66
minorities are solicited by the various Rumanian parties for
their votes, in exchange for which they secure assurances 563
that their aspirations will be completely satisfied. The election over, however, these alluring promises are forgotten, as are also similar electoral pledges made to Rumanian electors. If the hopes of the ethnic minorities were not elated every now and then by such extravagant engagements they would feel less keenly the injustice that had been inflicted on them. As matters stand, Rumanian parliamentary candidates at election time serve to keep this wound open, which, with a little more skilful handling on their part, would have had a better chance of healing.

The main grounds for complaints in the case of Hungarians 563
and Germans is the subject of their language. They find that a too exclusive use of the Rumanian tongue is insisted on in the various administrations as well as in the Tribunals, and that their children do not enjoy the same facilities to pursue their studies in their vernacular as when Transylvania formed a part of Hungary. All this is true, but it cannot be gainsaid that the Hungarian and German minorities are infinitely better off than is the German minority in the Italian

supremacy which the Magyar still retains, and such an 563
eventuality is fraught with danger for the Rumanian element 668
in general, as it would tend to recreate a state of affairs similar to that existing before the war. Hungarian advances purporting to bring about the realization of such an eventuality have so far been coldly received, even those made by Count Bethlen to King Carol in person at Temişoara have not evoked a hearty response among Rumanians, either of Transylvania or of the old kingdom. The Magyar pre- 666
ponderance in urban districts of Transylvania became 563
evident by the criticism with which the alteration of the law concerning the election of advisers in the Chambers of Commerce was met in 1929, when all these posts became elective instead of being partially nominatival. It was then reported that in the town of Cluj the Rumanians could count on only 20% in the commercial, and on only 30% in the industrial section of the Chamber, and it was proclaimed that measures ought to be taken to remedy the position of inferiority in which the Rumanian element had been placed, all the more so, since in other commercial and industrial centres, the position of the Rumanians was even worse than at Cluj.

Concerning these reported pourparlers for a personal union 563
between Hungary and Rumania, it may be of interest to 668
record what a Hungarian paper, the "Friss Hirek," published at Cluj, had to say on the meeting which took place at Temişoara between Count Bethlen and King Carol in 1932. In its issue of May 8th, 1932, dilating on this interview it stated among other things:—

"The negotiations concerning the personal union met with complete success and were based on the granting of independence to Transylvania under the leadership of Prince Michael, whose seat would be at Cluj, common Ministers for Foreign Affairs, War, and Finance. These matters were definitely agreed to. King Carol was to take up his residence for six months at Budapest and for six months at Bucarest.

The independence of Transylvania satisfied Count Bethlen as it would solve the minority problem. Transylvanians would enjoy equal rights and the various denominations

565 641 Iorga, spoke as follows at Bucau: "The upper class is totally devoid of an ideal, and of a moral mainspring, while the masses are not only tired and exhausted but impregnated by sullen dissatisfaction. The whole body of the State is in a condition of molecular dissolution." And this worthy, who according to the "Dreptatea" of May 19th, 1932, "compensated himself by seizing thirteen million lei on the evacuation of his tenure of the Ministry of the Interior in 1927," a feat which won for him at the time the appropriate name of "Vacuum cleaner," had the effrontery to conclude his oration with an appeal to the youth of the country to rally round him:—"We must change the moral structure of the country, but such a change cannot proceed from the old. We must appeal to the young intellectuals to join in the building of a new structure around us. Their place is not in the building which is tumbling down, but in those which are being built up. Come on, we are sure to win." If, indeed, Carol II has set his heart on saving his country by the help of such sorry individuals, we may well pity Rumania.

PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS:
THE ELECTORAL LAW

646 666 The present electoral law, which confers a premium on the party which secures 40% of the total votes cast at an election and enables it to secure 70% of the mandates in the Chamber, was due to the initiative of the Bratianus who in 1926 aimed at installing General Averescu in office. They themselves had no need of this law, as at the elections which took place in 1927, 62% of the electors voted for them. It is a law that is favourable to groups devoid of popular support, as they can very easily, when in control of the administrative machinery, so manipulate the elections as to secure the requisite 40% which would confer on them a majority of 70% in the Chamber. So that as long as this law is not repealed there is little chance of a really popular party being elected to office, except if it be entrusted beforehand by the Crown with a mandate to call a general election.

It forms actually the great obstacle to a return to constitutional government, for, thanks to it, any coterie appointed to

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

power by the Crown can install itself in office, with the semblance of popular support, since it is relatively an easy matter for it to win the requisite 40%. It is somewhat surprising that the two main parties have not so far combined to secure the repeal of this law, which is the main instrument by which unpopular governments can be maintained in office, but their attitude may be explained by the fact that each is doubtful in present circumstances of obtaining a clear majority, while if by chance one of them were to be granted a mandate to call a general election it would easily gain a big majority through the existing law.

The present law is even unfavourable to the formation of a coalition government, for any one of the constituent parties obtaining 40% of the votes at an election would secure a majority which would dispense it from the obligation of co-operating any longer with other parties. The only way in which the present law could remain operative would be to decide beforehand on the allocation of the seats between the groups forming the coalition, but this is hardly within the bounds of possibilities as each party would insist on securing the largest number of seats for itself, and endless conflicts would be engendered over the allotment of ministerial posts and other functions which would endanger the very existence of the coalition.

Neither is it possible to form a government from among prominent members of the various parties without the participation of the latter, as these would object to being weakened and would react against their former leaders, undermining their prestige and authority, so that in the end such a government would be opposed by the political parties and consequently lose its popularity.

The difficulties inherent in the present electoral law have become obvious through the repeated failures of M. Titulescu to form a Coalition Government and the only explanation we may find for its maintenance is that the King finds in it a useful instrument wherewith to support his nominees in power. In fact, during the (1932) spring session of the Chamber some deputies moved that the law be revised, and the government at first condescended, but later, owing probably to palace influences, the matter was dropped.

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

471 of State and foreign concessionaires. State-monopolies, such as the manufacture and sale of explosives, tobacco, etc., were often leased to foreign trusts. Road building, for example, was in the hands of a Swedish company. So was the manufacture of matches sold by the State. The whole telephone system was installed and operated by a subsidiary of the American financial trust of Morgans. Nine-tenths of the oil industry were in British hands, the armaments works of Transylvania were controlled by British, French, Czech and German interests. The newly developed chemical industry of the country soon passed into German hands. As for agriculture, the export of produce was effectively controlled by several banks who were partly or wholly owned by foreign financial houses. During the nineteen-thirties pharmaceutical goods were imported almost exclusively from Germany.

445 THE GOVERNMENT. The most powerful of all poli-
565 tical parties were the Liberals who were entrenched in influential positions of the administration, the army, finance and industry. Led traditionally by a member of the Bratianu family, whose name at one time was almost synonymous with that of Rumania, the Liberal Party was able to rule the country directly or indirectly up to a very short time ago. Her adherents had very little in common with the Liberals of the West, representing, as they did, the Right Wing of the numerically weak but financially
445 and politically powerful Rumanian bourgeoisie. An
446 electoral law introduced by the Liberal Government in 1926 stipulated that the party which had secured 40% of the votes should obtain 60% of all parlia-

12: Kosmos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

mentary seats. This device, combined with the 666
electoral methods adopted, normally assured the 665
continuance of the government in power.[1] In
Foreign Affairs the Liberals supported the French [648]
Alliance and the League of Nations in whose councils the Foreign Minister, N. Titulescu, had considerable influence.

The National Peasant Party led by Maniu and 665
Mihalache had the support of the rural population and represented the Left Wing of Rumanian politics. The party stood for a genuine Land Reform. It was not, however, a homogeneous party. From the first it had a Right and a Left Wing. As time went on, and especially when the political situation became more confused in the late thirties, the Right Wing tended to sympathize with the Iron Guard against the Royal dictatorship and the Left Wing with the Communists. The failure of the National Peasant Party to hold power after 1928 was due to the lack of confidence in the people, the fear of radical changes favoured by many sections of the population and hesitation to attack the firmly entrenched vested interests resolutely.

Although Rumania had a parliamentary constitu- 661
tion the country was ruled by anything but democratic methods. Parliamentary representatives, ministers and the press could be made to advocate and carry out any measure if adequately paid by interested parties. The corruption of the lower civil service seemed as nothing compared with that on the top. State contracts, exemption from taxes and

[1] It failed only twice: in 1928 when the National Peasant Party gained an electoral victory and in 1937 when Tatarescu's government fell.

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

sentative of all democratic elements of the population." Later, 648
at the Moscow Conference, the Western powers declared that 642
they would believe such a government existed as soon as representatives of two political parties other than the Rumanian 666
Workers' Party had been named to ministerial posts, and as soon as satisfactory guarantees had been given that freedom of speech and assembly as well as the right to vote without constraint had been assured. Dr. Groza complied by appointing the two desired ministers to the Cabinet without portfolio and by announcing that free elections would be held soon; but, as was to be anticipated in view of the fact that the Russian Army held the country in an iron grip, the Rumanian Workers' Party received 90-odd per cent of the vote. The ministers without portfolio promptly resigned, and there was nothing the Western powers could do about it save to register an emphatic protest. This they did in language suitably designed for the occasion.

The elections referred to were held on November 19, 1946. [687]
Almost precisely a year later the leader of the principal opposition party, Dr. Juliu Maniu, was sentenced to life imprisonment for high treason. Unquestionably this able and farsighted man, who had served the government and the people of Rumania well over many years and had been identified with every movement for reform and justice, was the foremost of the nation's citizens. King Michael abdicated on December 30 of [642]
the same year and fled from his native land. Thereupon the "People's Republic" was proclaimed, and every source of potential opposition to it was ferreted out and suppressed. A Constitution of the usual kind was adopted on April 13, 1948.
Now no obstacle barred the way for putting the Soviet paradise [491]
plan into effect. The principal productive enterprises were declared the property of the State, and this likewise became the sole arbiter of the educational system. Collective farming was introduced. A novelty was that new elections were held during

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

●666

December, 1950. As a matter of course, only one party appeared on the ballot. Some 80,000 persons appointed to local soviets were duly elected.

181

One of the distinguishing characteristics of this "uprising of the proletariat" was the extreme paucity of Communists. Another was the fact that the population had no democratic tradition to fall back upon. The country had lived under a fascist type of dictatorship without sensing that it had been very differently treated than it would no doubt have been under a liberal regime. When the war was over, most of Antonescu's Iron Men simply transformed themselves into a different metal. We may say without hesitation that opportunism and not conviction made Rumania's transition to Sovietism so absurdly simple. Nobody had believed it possible that a man like Dr. Maniu could be clapped into jail, brought before the courts on a trumped-up charge, and sentenced. But the People's Democracy managed even that, and it was small wonder that the average citizen began to think earnestly about his own throat.

795

As we ponder the evil fortunes which lay ahead for religious confessions in Rumania, it is helpful to bear in mind that this country, the easternmost colony of the Roman Empire, learned to know Christianity as early as the second century of the present era. Congregations formed there were represented at some of the earliest councils of the Church. Subsequently, after wars and invasions had run their course, the Rumanian ecclesiastical establishment was affiliated with the Eastern, or Byzantine, Patriarchate. As a result Greek Orthodoxy became the confession to which the great majority of the people subscribed after the independence of the nation had been achieved in 1878. The Church thus established occupied a position in the life of the country which was not unlike that of the Orthodox Church in Bulgaria. The clergy participated in the official affairs of the nation. In general, exception having been duly

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

I

PEASANT AGAINST LANDOWNER

The Peasant Revolt of 1907

175
668

IN MARCH, 1907, the peasants in northern Moldavia, not far from the Russian frontier, arose in revolt.[1] Initially the uprising was directed, perhaps as a result of anti-Semitic instigation, against certain Jewish tenants renting large estates, but in its rapid extension south and west into Muntenia and along the Danube into Oltenia it became an increasingly violent assault upon all large tenant farmers and absentee landowners. The peasants not only demanded an amelioration of their labor contracts but in some districts seized land and organized revolutionary bands. The poorer peasants, those with insufficient holdings to support themselves, seem to have been the first to revolt, but they were soon joined by the more prosperous villagers. Indeed, subsequent investigations revealed that the active heads of the movement, in so far as it received any direction, had been village leaders, ex-army sergeants, clerks, and schoolteachers.[2]

For a time neither the central authorities in Bucarest nor the local administrations were able to cope with the spreading unrest, but after the dismissal of the Conservatives a Liberal government, perhaps under the threat of foreign intervention by Austria, took vigorous countermeasures. Troops under General Averescu, later a war hero and political figure, descended on the countryside and after some sharp conflicts restored order. Reprisals in districts where there had been peasant violence were extremely severe. It has been estimated that upward of 11,000 peasants were killed in the course of the revolt and its suppression.

Although the uprising lasted less than a month and was completely subdued, it was, and was felt to be, an event of frightening significance. Here was no by-product of foreign invasion, the frequent

[113]

1. For an account of the revolt see Radu Rosetti, *Pentru ce s'au răsculat ţăranii* (Bucarest, 1908). A recent novel by Leo Katz, *Seedtime* (New York, 1947), is based on this uprising. Many aspects of the revolt are obscure, and the dossiers relating to its suppression are reported to have disappeared subsequently from the Ministry of War. In 1948, however, under the auspices of the Groza government, Mihail Roller edited a collection of state documents regarding the 1907 uprising. This new material, which may contain important additional information, was not available when this chapter was written.

2. C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *Neoiobăgia* (Bucarest, 2d ed., n.d.), p. 204.

[p. 1 is blank]

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175
668

occasion of many of Rumania's woes, nor a national revolt against an alien dominant class, but the unmistakable sign of a deep cleft within Rumanian society. The explosive culmination of a situation which had been building up during the preceding half-century, it rendered explicit and obvious the political dangers of the unresolved agrarian question. The outbreak had been foreshadowed by local uprisings in 1888, 1889, 1894, and 1900, and a few observers had predicted trouble. On the whole, however, an atmosphere of optimism and complacency had prevailed in the years following Rumania's emergence as a united and independent state. In 1906 the Minister of Domains had proudly declared in the Rumanian senate: "Gentlemen, you know that Rumania is one of the countries in Europe in which the small holding is more widespread than elsewhere, where the relation between the large and the small proprietor is more to the advantage of the latter than even in democratic France." [3]

The brief but intense convulsion of 1907, which in the eyes of terrified contemporaries had threatened Rumania's existence as a state and had nearly become a civil war, broke this complacency and gave rise to some soul searching. Politicians and writers ardently debated the causes of the revolt. Indeed, the stimulus of this unsettling event produced some of the most original social writings that have appeared in Rumania. For those who were unwilling or unable to see the full import of the uprising, it was most simply explained as the result either of "instigation" or of "peasant misery." The Conservatives accused the Liberal party of instigating the revolt to overthrow the Cantacuzino government. Despite the vagaries of Rumanian politics, it seems unlikely that the Liberals, many of whom were large landowners themselves, should wittingly have used such a dangerous device, although there is evidence of Liberal agitation directed against the Jewish *fermiers*.

The Liberals in turn charged that the revolt was the work of foreign revolutionaries: "The Rumanian authorities have discovered that the peasant uprisings are the fruits of a secret propaganda carried on among the peasants by a revolutionary group, in which teachers, priests, and Russian seamen of the cruiser "Potemkin" are taking part." [4] They expelled from the country some 880 persons, in-

3. Quoted in G. D. Creangă, *Grundbesitzverteilung und Bauernfrage in Rumänien*, 3 Teile, in *Staats- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen*, Hefte 129, 140 (Leipzig, 1907, 1909), I, 25.

4. Const. Titel Petrescu, *Socialismul în Romînia* (Bucarest, n.d.), p. 198. In 1905 the Russian cruiser "Potemkin," after the mutiny, eventually sailed to Constanța, where the crew debarked as political refugees.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

cluding Christian Rakovsky, one of the leaders of the Rumanian socialist movement.

175
668

Although signs of revolutionary activity and organization had been observed in certain districts, and some inflammatory pamphlets from Bessarabia had circulated in Rumania, the spontaneous spread of the revolt and the lack of evidence of careful preparation would argue against any important significance of such activity. The Rumanian socialists, who were in an extremely weak position, opposed the uprising. In 1892 the party program had declared that a backward country like Rumania was in no position to initiate a social revolution, and in 1907 the party advised the peasants against revolting: "Uprisings benefit only the boyars. The peasants afterward become even weaker and more depressed. . . . Peasants, you will not be delivered by uprisings, you will achieve profitable and lasting results not through violence and plundering but through seeking to destroy the political power of the boyars, landowners, and tenants." [5] In any event, the charge of instigation is a superficial one which, if sustained, explains the spark, not the conflagration.

Neither is peasant misery, while clearly a necessary ground for the revolt, a sufficient explanation. Extreme misery "dulls the mind, numbs the soul, destroys energy and the spirit of revolt, and leads to resignation and blind submission—a state of mind diametrically opposed to that which leads to revolt." [6] Moreover, the 1906 harvest had been exceptionally good. The important part played by village leaders and wealthy peasants would indicate that the revolt was more than a simple reaction to misery.

Certain contemporaries, notably G. D. Creangă, Radu Rosetti, Constantin Garoflid, and C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, made more penetrating analyses of the problem. Creangă, by his statistical studies of property holdings, provided concrete evidence of the high percentage of land occupied by great estates. Rosetti, after an extensive historical survey of the agrarian question, concluded that "the latifundia is the enemy," that the true instigators of the rising were not Liberals or foreign agents but the "egoism, greediness, lack of scruple and lack of foresight on the part of the ruling classes both old and new." [7] Garoflid, an agrarian expert and himself a landowner, held that the acknowledged maldistribution of land was a consequence of a basic crisis in the system of agricultural production. The socialist

5. *Ibid.*, p. 196.
6. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *op. cit.*, p. 179.
7. Rosetti, *op. cit.*, p. 624.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

175 ●568 Dobrogeanu-Gherea argued that a state of permanent crisis in Rumania was being effected by the impact of Western political and economic forms upon the traditional Rumanian pattern. The result was an unfortunate hybrid, *neoiobăgia* (neoserfdom), the form of liberal-bourgeois institutions superimposed upon a feudal reality. Although Dobrogeanu-Gherea placed excessive trust in neoiobăgia as an all-inclusive explanation, he correctly realized that Rumania's contact with the Western world had a dynamic and by no means simple effect upon the existing economic and social structure.[8]

Economic and Social Roots of the Agrarian Problem[9]

311 An extreme concentration of land in large estates, an excessive fragmentation of small holdings, and the insignificance of medium-sized properties were the most obvious elements of the Rumanian agrarian problem at that time. In 1905 the disparity between large and small holdings probably exceeded that of any state in Europe, including Russia. On the basis of his investigations, which are probably the most accurate available, G. D. Creangă estimated that Rumanian properties were divided in the following manner: in the terminology of the time, small properties (0–10 hectares), comprising over 95 per cent of all properties, covered 40 per cent of the arable and grazing land; medium properties (10–100 hectares), comprising 4 per cent of all properties, occupied 11 per cent; whereas about 5,000 large and latifundiary estates held nearly 50 per cent.[10] If forests, orchards, and vineyards are included, the area covered by large property exceeded 57 per cent. These figures on property do not, of course, include the landless peasants. Creangă estimated that there were at that time about 300,000 peasants without land and

8. For a further analysis of Dobrogeanu-Gherea's ideas in connection with Rumanian Social Democracy, see below, pp. 276–280.

9. More extensive, and in some respects conflicting, discussions of the economic background of the agrarian problem are given in David Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Economic and Social History of the World War" (London; New Haven, Yale University Press, 1930), and Marcel Emerit, *Les Paysans Roumains depuis le traité d'Andrinople jusqu'à la libération des terres (1829–1864)* (Paris, 1937).

10. In numbers the division was as follows:

Size of holdings in hectares	*Number of holdings*	*Area in hectares*
0–10	920,939	3,153,645
10–100	38,723	862,300
Over 100	5,385	3,810,351
	965,047	7,826,796

For more detailed figures on the distribution of property see the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

of property relations followed a different course from that in the West, and in both countries contact with the West created a steadily increasing crisis which the legislative measures of the nineteenth century did not solve and in some respects exacerbated. In neither case did peasant emancipation lead to the healthy development of small holds but rather to the appearance of the land-hungry cultivator still in a position of dependence on the landowner.[26]

While there were these similarities in Russian and Rumanian social and economic life, and more than a casual parallel in the development of agrarian relations, the political and international positions of the two states were entirely different. This difference explains in part some of the very great divergences in the recent history of these countries.

Political Aspects of the Agrarian Question

Although Rumanian economic and social relations were such as to create a dangerous tension in the countryside, politically, in marked contrast to tsarist Russia, there was relatively little revolutionary activity. This difference has often been attributed to the lethargy and supineness of the Rumanian peasant or to his Daco-Roman stability and love of order and hard work. National qualities may have played some part, though the violence of the 1907 revolt was damaging to many such theories. A more substantial reason would appear to lie in the contrast between the political and international situations of the two states.

Russia, a great empire, was assured of its independence as a nation. Existing institutions were firmly fixed. Russian social reformers could direct their energies toward internal issues without being preoccupied with the question of national survival. For these reasons the climate was favorable to a revolutionary spirit. Quite opposite conditions obtained in Rumania, a newly created state whose position in the community, or anarchy, of nations was by no means secure. Many Rumanians were not as yet included within the country's

26. The sensitivity in Rumania to developments in Russia would suggest the presence of common characteristics. The Russian emancipation of 1861 was followed by Prince Cuza's Act of 1864. There is evidence that the Rumanian rising of 1889 was aroused by a rumor that the tsar had ordered land to be divided among the peasants. The Russian Revolution of 1905 found a reflection in the 1907 revolt in Rumania, and of course the Russian Revolution of 1917 had a direct bearing upon the Rumanian agrarian reforms of 1918–21. The correlation of these events is certainly more than a chronological coincidence. It might be added that Stolypin's program to reform Russian agriculture by creating a class of strong peasant holdings resembles some of the recommendations put forward by the Conservative agrarian expert Constantin Garofid.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

boundaries. Consequently, national aims and ambitions tended to receive first attention from all articulate Rumanians.

Whatever may be the answer to the much debated question of Rumanian origins, the two principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, did not make their appearance until the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. After a couple of centuries of precarious independence they fell under the domination of the Ottoman Empire. For a time native princes maintained some degree of internal authority; later Phanariot Greeks became the *hospodars* of the principalities; but the two provinces were not united until 1862, and the remnants of Turkish suzerainty were not shaken off until the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. While the Rumanians did contribute to achieving their national independence, the rise of a united Rumania was largely conditioned by events beyond their control: the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the repulse of Russia in the Crimean War, and the equilibrium established by the Concert of Europe at the Congress of Berlin. Rumania's independence and existence as a national state were thus externally determined, at least in the negative sense of permitting the Rumanians to enjoy some freedom of action in the nineteenth century.

The national progress of Rumania did not correspond with the social or material progress of the peasantry. On the contrary, the high points in Rumanian history from the national point of view often marked a decline in the peasant's status. The process of social differentiation which followed the foundation of the principalities seems to have led to a further subjugation of the peasant to the boyar. Under Michael the Brave, who for a short period ruled over all Rumanian lands, the peasants were definitely bound to the land. The Organic Statutes represented an advance constitutionally but also granted full proprietorship to the boyars and rendered the peasants' tenure even more precarious. To be sure, such a process is not unusual; in a society which is becoming more articulated the emerging ruling elements, which from a national aspect represent an advance by strengthening and organizing the state, may achieve their position at the expense of the more amorphous body of that society.

Because of the weakness and precarious position of the Rumanian state, preoccupation with national prestige outweighed and often ran counter to concern for social reform. In the abortive revolution of 1848 the young revolutionaries, educated in France, were undoubtedly fired by ideals of freedom and the rights of man, but more from desire to create in Rumania a proper modern state than from direct interest in the sufferings of the peasant. The manifestoes issued by the Muntenian revolutionaries promised land but at the same time,

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

423 permitting the sale of small property, on certain conditions and after five years. Article 122, however, limited purchases to 25 hectares in the hills and 100 hectares in the plains.[11]

423 185 In general, the 1921 law was more carefully drafted than that of 1918 and did attempt to remedy some of the technical errors of previous legislation. The economic effects of these land reforms, which together were reported officially to have expropriated nearly 2,800,000 hectares of land in the Old Kingdom, will be discussed in a later chapter.[12] The acts of 1918 and 1921 were, however, essentially defensive political rather than economic measures. As Mihalache said in his critique of the decree-law of 1918,

> it is not the work of a social concept, not the response to a social ideal, not the work of conviction; under the threat of the events of 1917, it is the continuation of a series of land settlements on the model of 1881 and 1889, it is the over-simplified concept that a new equilibrium between large property and small property must be stabilized in order that there be future peace.

In his opinion, "The ruling class has made only such concessions as were necessary to assure its own existence. The reforms have been a kind of safety valve."[13]

The safety valve, however, was successful. Despite its very precarious position, Rumania passed through the revolutionary storm in eastern Europe without an overthrow of the established order. Several reasons explain this success. A decisive factor, doubtless, was the flexibility of the ruling groups. Notwithstanding the obduracy of many members of the landed oligarchy and in spite of efforts to avoid or delay the reform, the landowners did at least yield sufficiently to prevent an outbreak. Their recalcitrance between 1917 and 1921 was in inverse ratio to the amount of peasant unrest. Moreover, the king, although conservative socially, was able to take the correct 423 steps at two critical moments, in April, 1917, and in November, 1918.

186 Apart from the flexibility of the landowners, certain other forces 668 were at work. Among the Conservatives, the stronghold of the landed interests, there were such men as Garoflid who recognized the failings of Rumanian agriculture and desired to make thorough-going changes, though along lines different from those followed. In the

11. For subsequent modifications, in 1925 and 1929, of these provisions for sale, see below, p. 125 and pp. 156–157.

12. The difficult task of discovering just what the land reforms accomplished in redistributing property is discussed below, pp. 48–49, and in the Appendix.

13. Mihalache, *op. cit.*, pp. 5, 29.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Liberal party, the primary interest was in the expansion of industry, commerce, and finance, and since 1918 the party had officially stood for expropriation. In several respects the Liberal position was unfortunate since it had neither the reforming zeal of the new Peasant party nor the Conservatives' interest in the improvement of agriculture. The Liberals tended to regard land as a bone to be thrown to the peasants when the howls of the latter seemed menacing or detrimental to the national interest. Such a view was apt to neglect the economic aspects of the agrarian problem and to reduce it to a question of finding more land for distribution. Nevertheless, this Liberal attitude did make for change. Finally, once the question of land reform became the order of the day, the mere pressure of politics led the parties, if only for electoral reasons, to make the appearance of favoring reform.

A second factor was that the land laws, despite delays and omissions, were sufficiently extensive to pacify the peasants. A great deal of land changed hands, and the Rumanian reform was the most far-reaching of all the postwar agrarian measures in eastern Europe (excluding Russia, of course).

A third factor was concern for the national interest, which, as noted above, has usually been of primary importance in determining Rumanian internal policy. Notwithstanding military defeats, enormous human losses, and devastation of land, Rumania emerged from the war a victorious power with doubled population and territory.[14] The mere fact of being victorious and having achieved the national aim of Greater Rumania undoubtedly served to mitigate social tensions. The parties were in agreement in glorifying and protecting the new national unity; since Rumania was surrounded by states from which it had obtained territory, the defense of the new frontiers was a major concern of all postarmistice governments.

The very violence of the Russian Revolution, particularly the Bolshevik Revolution, served to create an opposing reaction in Rumania, heightened by the territorial dispute over Bessarabia. The political parties, including the Peasant party, were exceedingly hostile to bolshevism, which became the ultimate term of abuse in political debates. Mihalache had been sent to Bessarabia during the war to carry on antibolshevist propaganda, and one of his appeals for a more extensive land reform was that in the future the peasants should not be tempted to look beyond Rumania's frontier on the Dniester for better conditions. Fear of Soviet communism was one of the cardinal fea-

14. The area of Rumania in 1915 was 137,900 square kilometers; in 1919, 294,000 square kilometers. Its population in 1918 was 7,625,000; in 1919, 15,500,000.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

423 185 668

tures of Rumanian policy for the next twenty-five years, and in the international councils Rumania was to stress its role as the European bulwark against bolshevism.[15]

175 423

Agrarian Reform in the New Territories

Thus far only the agrarian reform in the Old Kingdom has been considered, and it does provide the central thread of the agrarian question in the interwar period. But as a result of the war Rumania also acquired Bessarabia from Russia, Bucovina from Austria, and Transylvania from Hungary. The agrarian problems in these three provinces were different in several respects from that of the Old Kingdom; the separate laws passed for each of the provinces further increased the complexity of the Rumanian agrarian situation after the First World War.

1. BESSARABIA

Bessarabia, which had formed a part of the principality of Moldavia, was ceded by the Turks to Russia in 1812 at the Treaty of Bucarest, in return for the evacuation of the remainder of Moldavia and Wallachia.[16] Three southern districts were returned to Moldavia after the Crimean War, but reverted to Russia after the War of 1877. The population was predominantly Rumanian, though large numbers of Ukrainians and Bulgarians inhabited the southern districts. In the last decades of the nineteenth century the tsarist regime undertook to Russify Bessarabia but without marked success. The Moldavian boyars in Bessarabia were notoriously obscurantist, and the province was a "natural breeding ground of such movements as the Black Hundreds." [17]

15. F. Borkenau, in his study, *The Communist International* (London, 1938), p. 99, attaches great importance to the Rumanian agrarian reform in this connection: "The agrarian reform in Rumania was perhaps the strongest single obstacle that opposed the advance of Bolshevism towards the West. It was very far from solving all problems, even for the peasantry, but for a decade it took the sharp edge off them. Revolutionary trends among the proletariat remained, but the proletariat alone was nothing in Rumania, and revolutionism among its members was more of a convulsion than a clearly defined movement."

16. The current Soviet interpretation of this event appears to be that in the eighteenth century the Moldavian and Wallachian boyars had sought the incorporation of the principalities in Russia as the sole means of escaping the Turkish yoke. This act of liberation was taking place during the Turko-Russian war of 1806. The threat of Napoleon, however, forced Tsar Alexander to come to terms with the Turks, so that only Bessarabia was fortunate enough to be liberated and incorporated in the tsarist empire. See A. Dolnik, *Bessarabiya pod vlastyu Rumynskikh boyar, 1918–1940 gg.* (Moscow, 1945), p. 5.

17. R. W. Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 568.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

In July, 1924, by order of the Commander of the Second Army Corps, the Communist party in Rumania and its associated organizations were dissolved for having violated state of siege regulations and for endangering the security of the state. 648 175

Bessarabia naturally suffered badly in the conflict; reports of foreign observers in these years present a desolate picture of rotting commerce, depressed agriculture, miserable administration and widespread fear and disaffection. The province had been continuously under martial law since 1919. The Rumanians reported frequent Soviet raids, plots, and instigations to violence; the Russians reported brutally suppressed peasant uprisings. Both were taking place. In the notable rising at Tatar Bunar in 1924, which involved a whole village, there is ample evidence of Communist agitation, yet an entire community does not participate in a revolt without serious occasion. 668 175

Tension was not limited to Bessarabia; in December, 1924, some 400 persons described as Communist terrorists were arrested throughout Rumania. In September, 1925, 28 members of committees of "red" unions were arrested in Bucarest. Disturbances, however, were not solely the result of Left-wing activity. Several anti-Semitic outbreaks occurred, with the usual attacks on synagogues and Jewish shops. On October 27, 1924, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, later the leader of the Iron Guard movement, achieved his first prominence by shooting the chief of police of Iaşi; he was subsequently acquitted.[17] 665 175

Under these circumstances, in which opposition to the government could so convincingly be depicted as anti-Rumanian, the Liberals, self-appointed guardians of Rumanian patriotism, were somewhat strengthened, whereas the Peasants were continually forced to protest their loyalty and to defend themselves against the charge of bolshevism.

At the beginning of 1926, however, the opposition to the Liberals became more intense. The announcement on December 28, 1925, of Prince Carol's renunciation of his right to the crown in favor of his infant son Michael [18] brought protests from the Transylvanian Nationalists and the Peasants. While expressing their continued loyalty to King Ferdinand, they refrained from voting on the bill of renunciation on the grounds that they had not been consulted on the appointment of the regency which was to govern during Michael's minority. It was widely known that Brătianu and Carol had not got

17. For the origins of the Iron Guard movement see below, pp. 226–228.

18. Carol had gone abroad with Mme Lupescu. Upon King Ferdinand's demand that he return, without her, Carol refused and renounced his right to the throne.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 tiations,[3] and was replaced by Maniu, with Titulescu as Foreign
175 Minister. On January 8, 1933, Maniu again broke with Carol, and on January 14 Vaida Voevod returned to head the government.[4]

By this time the National Peasants were badly disorganized. With Carol's assistance a definite split in the party leadership between Maniu and Vaida Voevod was developing and was to lead to a rupture in 1934. The government itself had not only lost its peasant enthusiasm but under Vaida Voevod's leadership was rapidly drifting into the political habits of the Liberals. On the first of February
● 668 oil workers at Ploeşti struck over a wage decision, and a fight en-
665 sued between strikers and troops. At the same time in Bucarest some
175 7,000 workers in the state railway shops went on strike. The government hastily proclaimed martial law in Bucarest, Cernăuţi, Galaţi, Iaşi, Timişoara, Ploeşti, and the oil fields. The Communist party and its affiliates were again dissolved, the government passed laws against antisocial and antistate organizations, and over 200 Communists were arrested throughout Rumania. This brought a protest demonstration from the railway workers, troops were called out, and there was a vicious street fight.

To some extent this tension was a fatal by-product of the deepening depression, and the strikes, while obviously having their roots in the misery of the Rumanian industrial workers, were not confined solely to economic demands. Indeed, since the installation of the Groza regime, the Communists have played up the revolutionary elements of the railway strike and the guiding role of the Communist party in it. Even so, the government all too hastily resorted to the
175 very measures for which it had so long taken the Liberals to task.
665 Moreover, while Vaida Voevod was thus combating labor unrest,

[668] 3. Rumania and Soviet Russia had not resumed diplomatic relations since the First World War because of their inability to reach any agreement on Bessarabia. In January, 1932, the Poles, with French urging, had signed a treaty of friendship and nonaggression with the U.S.S.R. Now Poland and France were pressing Rumania to do the same. Vaida Voevod, apparently without consulting Titulescu, had instructed the Rumanian representative in Warsaw to negotiate with Litvinov. Titulescu had heard of his move and had objected to the manner in which the negotiations were being conducted and especially to the possibility that Bessarabia might be recognized as a subject of dispute. In this disagreement Titulescu was sufficiently influential to squeeze out Vaida Voevod.

4. In this instance the specific difficulty arose over the dismissal of Colonel Marinescu, Prefect of Bucarest. Carol had been installing military officers in a number of civil posts. The National Peasant government undertook to replace them by civilians. Colonel Marinescu, in a circular letter, denied rumors that he was about to be removed and said that since he was appointed by the king, only the king could remove him. Mihalache, Minister of the Interior, then demanded his resignation, and failing to obtain it resigned himself. Maniu supported Mihalache and the cabinet resigned.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

648 appears to have been the consequence of personal differences but presaged a shift in Rumania's international orientation. As Rumania had been one of the principal gainers in the First World War, all the governments up to this time had a similar foreign policy, pro-French and against any treaty revision, which indeed was the only way Rumania could preserve its new territories from Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Soviet claims. When it became clear that the Western powers had lost the initiative, foreign policy became less simple. The extreme Right was vociferously pro-German. Carol personally would have preferred to stay clear of German influence, since only the Western attachment gave promise of guaranteeing all the territories acquired by the war. But if Britain and France weakened, he was inclined to improve his relations with Germany. Rumania's relations with the U.S.S.R. had improved somewhat in the 1930's, but it was a negative improvement—a hope of assurance against Soviet attack. The underlying hostility between the two powers was deep and so pervasive as scarcely to require any discussion. Thus in 1937 Carol stated to Wickham Steed that the chief difficulty of Rumania's position lay in the fact that "the immense weight of Russia was always bearing upon her and she had to withstand it as best she could. Russia was, so to speak, the hereditary enemy. As regards Hitler, he felt admiration for Hitler, whom he did not look upon as a sinister or dangerous man." [7]

665 From 1936 on, as a consequence of this shift in the international balance, the extreme Right became more and more blatant; anti-Semitic activities increased in extent and vileness; university students showed the advantages of their education by attacking Jewish shops; hostility and scorn for the decadent democracies became the vogue; defections from the old parties decreased their strength and added to the forces of the Right.

During this time the National Peasant party, as the principal nonfascist opposition to the government showed little strength or determination. Mihalache did attempt to reinvigorate the peasantist element in the party's ideology and formed a "peasant guard" to protect National Peasant meetings from fascist bullies. In May, [668] 1936, there was a demonstration of some 80,000 peasants in Bucarest, directed against the Liberals, demanding better conditions for peasants and workers and decrying the tolerance shown to the fascists. These efforts, however, had no significant results.[8]

7. Quoted in Pavel Pavel, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

8. According to Pătrăşcanu (*Sous trois dictatures*, p. 114), the National Peasants had planned a large demonstration in November, 1935, but had canceled it upon Carol's promise that the Liberal government was about to fall and that they would succeed it.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

page 223

XI

THE FASCIST PERIOD, 1940–44

Rumanian Fascism

THE term fascist period, here used to cover the years of the Iron Guard and Antonescu dictatorships is not altogether satisfactory except in the general sense of describing a dictatorial regime in military alliance with Hitler Germany. The government of Marshal Antonescu, especially after his victory over the Iron Guard in January, 1941, was really a military dictatorship, in many respects like the numerous other military dictatorships in Balkan history, although it took over many of the trappings and practices of fascism. The word fascism itself has been given any number of meanings and nuances. To some it is the death rattle of monopoly capitalism; to others, anti-Semitism and racial glorification; to others, a form of national chauvinism; and to others merely a synonym for dictatorship plus hooliganism. It would be fruitless here to attempt an exact definition of fascism, especially for Rumania where, at one time or another, practically every party has had the word "fascist" hyphenated to it by its opponents. 468

For all the vagueness of the term there was in Rumania a political current, appearing in a relatively unadulterated form in the Iron Guard and as a more or less important element in other political formations, which is quite recognizable and for which fascism is as good a name as any. Perhaps it can best be approached negatively, for ultimately it was a negative spirit. In the preceding sections the effort has been made to extract the positive content of several political currents and to examine their significance in terms of the problems of Rumanian society. It has been seen that the agrarian question was a perennial and chronic affliction deeply rooted in Rumanian society and to a very considerable extent the product of Rumania's contacts with Western industrial society. Along with the various attempts to find a positive solution—however inadequate or misdirected they may have been—there was also an impulse to a negative response. Indeed it is possible to say that fascism represents an irrational reaction against an unsolved problem in the body politic or, more precisely, in the context of an industrial or industrializing

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

● 668 economy. It is something like a cancerous growth in an organism which arises from some chronic irritation, takes on a life of its own, displays great dynamism for a time, and ultimately is destructive of the body which produced it. If such an analogy be fair, it is necessary not to confuse an analysis of the unsolved problem with a justification of the fascist response, or to regard fascism as an inexplicable evil possessing the body of an innocent.

In its resort to the nonrational, fascism makes an appeal to the spontaneous, the organic, the primitive, and the mythical, to the instinctive rather than the logical aspects of human and social experience. From these it gains its emotional force and appeal. At the same time, the appeal to the natural and the traditional is itself an artificial and somewhat self-conscious act; the effort to reinvoke the spontaneous is itself not a wholly spontaneous act. Thus, fascism does not originate in the lowest and most backward strata of society but is usually in its initial stages an intellectual movement. In its origins at least it is not the creation of a nation or a social group which is at the bottom of the heap, but rather appears among those nations, social groups, or individuals which have advanced to the extent of being aware of their position and at the same time of being resentful and frustrated.

563 668 Conditions favorable to the various manifestations of fascism were certainly not lacking in Rumania. The struggle to achieve an independent national existence, the prolonged insecurity as a small state, the effort not only to escape the shadow of the great powers but to maintain a position in the scrambling of the Balkan states—all these led to an intense political nationalism which easily boiled over into chauvinism. The ethnic confusion of southeastern Europe and especially Rumania's sense of isolation in the "great sea of Slavs" produced a strong ethnic nationalism. Anti-Semitism had been endemic in Rumania since its appearance as an independent state; the Congress of Berlin had obliged the new Rumanian government to amend the constitution to grant Jews citizenship. The Jewish problem in Rumania was not a simple one. Especially in Moldavia there had been a rapid influx of Jews, largely from Russian Poland, in the nineteenth century; the population of the urban centers was largely Jewish; most of the commercial activities were carried on by the Jews. This situation, combined with Rumanian nationalism and the désire for self-assertion, produced the perfect atmosphere for anti-Semitism. The national literary movement at the end of the nineteenth century had a strong anti-Semitic tone. Professor Cuza, the Rumanians liked

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

to say, was preaching the gospel of anti-Semitism while Hitler was still an infant.

But if nationalism and anti-Semitism are the constant handmaids of fascism, they do not wholly describe it. The element in fascism giving it its significance to the twentieth century is its response to the challenge of industrialism. It is for this reason that of the various political currents of pre-1914 Rumania populism had the closest affinity to some of the later manifestations of Rumanian fascism.[1] The populist response to this challenge, for all the specific rational arguments it may have advanced regarding the economic advantages of peasant farming, was fundamentally negative in its idealization of the unspoiled peasant and in its hostility to industry and the capitalist Golgotha. To these it added a strong cultural nationalism, a tendency to anti-Semitism, and that special characteristic of later fascism, a hatred of Marxism. To be sure, fascism is not generally anti-industrial. The tensions of contemporary industrial society impinge in different ways on different countries. But in the case of Rumania, with its particular position vis-à-vis industrial society, the fascist response in its most characteristic form involved this negation and an exaltation of the peasant.

During the interwar period Rumanian fascism developed in two phases. A number of fascist groups appeared immediately after the First World War, principally among students and the military, as a part of the general social turmoil brought about by the war. At that time fascism developed its leadership but did not become a mass movement. A second phase appeared with the depression; fascism broadened its influence and in the course of the 1930's increasingly dominated the political horizon. It took innumerable forms in Rumania: as an element in a larger political party, as a conscious imitation of foreign fascism, or as an authentic Rumanian fascist movement. In the first case, various manifestations of fascism, such as extreme chauvinism or anti-Semitism, appeared as a tendency in one of the established parties and often led to a schism. The defections of Octavian Goga and later of Vaida Voevod from the National Peasants may be taken as examples. In those cases where it took the form of an imitation of foreign fascism it was merely following the Rumanian practice of borrowing from the more developed European states.

An interesting example of borrowed fascism was the short-lived Fascia Națională Română, which began as a student organization

1. See above, p. 147.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

668 in Bucarest in 1923 and was later absorbed by Cuza's League of Christian Defense. This movement, which was never of any importance, was explicitly modeled on Italian fascism.[2] Its program had all the formulae of early fascism, but smelled of the candle and was a rather unimaginative academic exercise. A rabid anti-Semitism was the core of the program, which included detailed plans of the best ways to rid Rumania of the Jews. The Fascia was to be highly nationalistic, anticapitalist, antisocialist, anti-Communist, and antiparliamentarian.

But after a parade of these sentiments, with appropriate quotations from Mussolini, Barrès, and Maurras, and the promise of a two-year dictatorship to eradicate rotten politicians, the actual economic program was reminiscent of populism. Rumania should be an exclusively agricultural country; industrial states were less happy and had social upheavals. Agrarian reform should limit property to 100 hectares and land should belong only to those who cultivated it. Proposed agricultural improvements included the familiar clichés, model farms, cooperation, more machinery, more fertilizer, and better seed. Industry should not be protected; cottage crafts should be fostered. The commercial policy was quite simple: no imports without twice as many exports; this it was felt would assure a safe balance of trade. The program was clearly intended to appeal to peasants, workmen, and, above all, to the army, but in general it gives the impression of being the outpouring of a rather vicious schoolboy, which in all probability it was.[3]

Of far greater importance than this jejune attempt at fascism was the Iron Guard, or, more properly, the Legion of the Archangel Michael, which, while it had a number of similar traits and copied certain Italian and German features, was an authentic Rumanian fascist movement. Its founder Corneliu Zelea Codreanu was born in Iaşi in 1899.[4] Physically he was extremely impressive, tall, very handsome, with powerful and compelling features. He had received a good deal of military training in his youth and had absorbed the nationalist doctrines of Cuza and Iorga. In the spring of 1919 he began his career

2. Titus P. Vifor, *Doctrina fascismului romîn, şi antiproiectul de program* (Bucarest, 1924).

3. The only really original proposal was that the clubhouses of the disbanded political parties should be converted into state-supervised brothels.

4. There was a great controversy whether Codreanu was really a Rumanian or not. His opponents pointed out that his mother was of German origin and his father had changed his name from Zelinski to Zelea in 1902. Codreanu's supporters maintained that the name Zelinski had been forced upon his forebears because they had lived in southern Galicia under the Austrians, and pointed out that both sides of the family had belonged to the Orthodox Church, a sign of their Rumanian nationality.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

by organizing a group of companions in the Moldavian border town of Huşi to fight the Communists. In the same year he entered the law faculty at the University of Iaşi, where his principal activity was fomenting student riots against Jews and Communists. Codreanu was not of peasant origin; his father was a teacher, an active politician, and colleague of Professor Cuza. Codreanu not only studied at Iaşi but in 1922 attended lectures at the University of Berlin and later studied law at Grenoble.

In 1923 Professor Cuza founded his anti-Semitic party, the League of National Christian Defense; Codreanu became one of the party organizers. He was soon imprisoned for preparing a list of prominent politicians and Jewish leaders to be liquidated. While in prison he conceived the idea of the Legion of the Archangel Michael, taking the name from a statue of the saint in the prison chapel at Văcăreşti. Initially the Legion was a youth movement attached to the League of Christian Defense. Codreanu first gained national recognition in October, 1924, when he shot the police chief of Iaşi who had tried to break up his anti-Semitic activities. He was acquitted in a much-publicized trial which only augmented his popularity in anti-Semitic circles.

After 1924 Codreanu broke with Cuza. He always recognized his debt to the older man's teachings but felt that Cuza was tied to parliamentary politics and failed to see the need of a more dynamic policy. After a stay in France he founded, in 1927, an independent Legion of the Archangel Michael. In 1930 he created the Iron Guard as a combat unit to fight communism. In effect it was identical with the Legion, although intended to be its military branch and to include other groups desiring to enter the crusade.

When Vaida Voevod was Minister of the Interior in the National Peasant government he gave Codreanu a measure of unofficial support and even granted him permission to take a column of Guardists across the Prut to preach the archangelic gospel in darkest Bessarabia.[5] Mihalache, who replaced Vaida Voevod in 1930, took a sterner attitude and on January 11, 1931, attempted to dissolve the Legion and the Iron Guard. By this time the movement was gaining a strong mass following. In August, 1931, Codreanu won a seat in the chamber. The Liberal leader Duca again dissolved the Guard in 1933, for which he was assassinated, with Codreanu's knowledge and approval. In November, 1934, the movement assumed a new label, the All for the Fatherland party (Totul pentru Ţara), under the nominal leadership of General Cantacuzino. The Legion continued to grow in

5. Klaus Charle, *Die eiserne Garde* (Berlin; Vienna, 1939), p. 23.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

668 strength and by the time of the 1937 elections it appeared to be the outstanding force in Rumanian politics.

With Carol's sudden counterattack in 1938 it collapsed in surprising fashion. On February 21, 1938, Codreanu disbanded the movement to avoid, he said, unnecessary loss of blood. This may have been a purely tactical retreat, but it was certainly an anticlimax to the blood and thunder of Legionary oratory. The following day he sent a letter to all the old ministers who participated in Carol's coup, protesting against the dictatorship, which he saw as a dead form, and complaining that the older generation had betrayed its own ideals of legality. In the spring he was arrested, on a charge of libel against Iorga, condemned, and imprisoned. In November, 1938, he was shot by the Siguranta "while attempting to escape."

What was the Legionary movement? In some respects it was a copy of Italian fascism and German national-socialism, with its colored shirts, Roman salutes, paramilitary formations, and cult of a leader—*Capitanul*. Its anticommunism, anti-Semitism, and antiparliamentarianism, however, were home-grown. Codreanu used to say that he had adopted these principles before he had ever heard of Hitler, and that indeed when he had been in Berlin in 1922 he was able to show the light to several Germans who later became prominent Nazis. Codreanu's anti-Semitism had something of the frenzied quality one finds in the authentic Nazi—he professed to be physically stricken at the sight of Jews. His anticommunism was in part a corollary to his anti-Semitism, in that he considered communism a vehicle of international Jewish machinations.

The anticommunism of the Legion cannot, however, be explained wholly in terms of anti-Semitism. To some extent at least it was a reaction against what might be called the outrageous logicality of Marxism. Like fascism, Marxism was a response to the tensions of contemporary society but in its critique it attacked not only bourgeois society but also all the popular coexisting romantic and traditional attachments: its internationalism outraged national sensibilities; its dialectical materialism robbed the world of its myths and its homely beliefs. Fascism was based precisely upon these nonrational but deep sentiments. Hence, despite their mutual assault upon bourgeois society and their similarity in tactics there was a mortal enmity between the two movements.

In these qualities, however, the Iron Guard was merely the Rumanian manifestation of a European phenomenon. It had, in addition, certain more specifically Rumanian features. While the Nazis

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

and the Italian Fascists were not on good terms with the churches,[6] the Legion of the Archangel Michael was avowedly an Orthodox Christian movement and was fully aware of its distinctiveness in this respect. Guardist meetings were preceded by a religious service. The employment of religious symbolism and mysticism was not merely a tactical device of the Legion but was an integral part of its ideology. This religious element was undoubtedly of importance in the diffusion and quality of the Iron Guard's influence in Rumania, especially among the peasantry.

A second quality of the Guard was its cult of the primitive; not, however, the German primitivism of an ancient golden age in the *Urwald* but the primitivism of contemporary Rumanian peasant life. Reacting against the frustrations and anomalies of Rumanian society the Guard invoked the unspoiled soul of the peasant, sometimes even to the extent of glorifying his illiteracy. Such a reaction is not difficult to understand. Anyone who has visited Bucarest and seen the pseudo-French culture of the wealthy, the overeager imitations in art, architecture, and thought, and then contrasted them with the attractive side of Rumanian peasant life, the strange but moving music, the magnificent taste and sensibility of peasant handwork and folk ballads, is strongly tempted to condemn the former and wish wistfully that something authentic and real could develop from this peasant culture. At best there is something touching in this attempt to restore a national integrity permitting the flowering of native potentialities in place of a bastard culture, derivative, and without life of its own.[6]

Unfortunately this problem cannot be solved by simply eradicating foreign influences and reverting to the simplicity of the peasant: "Those who have a Fall behind them can never become innocent again."[7] Rumanian folk culture, if left to itself for an indefinite period of time, might have evolved its own advanced cultural forms but it was not. The Rumanian peasant today adds a sheet iron roof to his picturesque hut, tops his traditional costume with a battered felt hat, and pins up a cheap photograph with his icons and wood

6. In this connection it is of interest to note that in his analysis of the 1937 elections, C. Enescu observed that the purely anti-Semitic vote (i.e., in the districts with a large Jewish population) tended to go to the Cuza-Goga party rather than to the Iron Guard, which seemed to gain its votes from a more general dissatisfaction with the whole of Rumanian public life. *Sociologie Româneasca*, 2, Nos. 11–12 (November–December, 1937), p. 828.

7. Alfred Weber, *Farewell to European History*, trans. R. F. C. Hull (London, 1947), p. 192.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

● 668 carvings without the slightest feeling of incongruity. An attempt to take away the sheet iron, the manufactured hat, the photograph, and all which they imply would be a retrograde step.

A third, and less attractive, characteristic of the Legionary movement was a marked morbidity and cult of death. To some extent this derived from the Christian belief that death must precede resurrection. It was also an aspect of the idea of sacrifice and self-abnegation to be found in other fascist movements. It stimulated the "heroic assassination" and the "death squads" and contributed to the series of political murders which convulsed the 1930's.

According to the Legionary code the unit was not the individual but the "nest," a collectivity that included not only living Legionaries but ancestors and those yet unborn. This spirit led to the Legionary practice of continually exhuming and exalting dead comrades. The code included also the less distinctive commandments of loyalty, comradeship, obedience, discipline, work, and honor.

Such were the emotional drives of the Iron Guard. It is not surprising that the program of such a movement should have been vague. In fact, the Legion was against programs. "The country is going to ruin," said Codreanu, "not for lack of programs but for lack of men." [8] All the old parties had a superfluity of programs which had achieved nothing. Before a program could be meaningful, it was necessary to develop the new man, free from the corruption of the past. "Today the Rumanian people do not need a great politician, as is erroneously believed. The Rumanian people today need a great teacher and leader, who will overcome the powers of darkness and destroy the brood of Hell." [9] In their slogans the Legionaries used such phrases as *Omul şi pogonul* (the man and the pogon) and *Hectarul şi sufletul* (the hectare and the soul) but these should be understood not as an agrarian program but rather as a symbol of the peasant's deep ties with mother earth.

In 1937 Codreanu did create the Battalion of Legionary Commerce, the purpose of which was to replace the Jews in trade and to prove that Rumanians, too, could be good merchants. Restaurants and shops were set up which were to be the core of a new economic spirit. In Italy, fascism had formed an alliance with corporatism, and in Rumania a similar mingling took place in some of the fascist currents. But it is interesting to note that Codreanu did not take up corporatism. In spite of the fact that Manoilescu was a good friend of the Legion and had been elected to the senate on its list, his efforts

8. Codreanu, *Eisernes Garde* (Berlin, 1939), p. 272.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 273.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

to incorporate his economic doctrines had little effect. Moţa, one of Codreanu's lieutenants and theoretician for the movement—his initial scholarly contribution had been the translation of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion into Rumanian—had written that corporatism was "entirely colorless from a folk point of view." [10] Corporatism should not come before the basic reform, the creation of the new man, since it would only solidify the existing corruptions in society. It should come afterward if at all.

This distrust of corporatism is not without importance, for it reinforces the supposition that in the 1930's the corporatist current, which so characterizes the latter half of Carol's reign, was in its origins quite different from Guardist fascism, although both were antiparliamentary and in many cases made political alliances. Corporatism was a consequence of an economic outlook, the Guard was an emotional and evangelical reaction against the existing order.

In its initial stages the Iron Guard found its principal support in student circles and in discontented elements on the fringes of society. In the 1930's it became a mass movement, as is shown—in rough approximation at least—by comparing its popular vote of 30,783 (1.2 per cent) in 1931 with the 478,378 (16.5 per cent) votes it received in 1937.[11] It obtained a following in the peasantry and in urban middle class and working circles. Its most active members were the social misfits, unemployed intellectuals, dismissed civil servants, a number of the members of the old boyar families, plus an assortment of plain toughs and hooligans. The Communists, in attempting to relate this movement to the class struggle, have held that the active support for the Iron Guard came from the interstitial groups, the declassés—the broken aristocracy, the petty bourgeoisie, and the *Lumpenproletariat*.[12] While it is not to be denied that the Iron Guard would have a special appeal to the dispossessed and uprooted, the terms "petty bourgeois" and Lumpenproletariat are notoriously evasive and too easily become catchalls for phenomena not fitting into the Marxist scheme. A somewhat simpler approach would be to see Rumanian society as a whole suffering from general dislocation and the fascist current as a reaction to that dislocation, taking on greater intensity in those parts of society most seriously affected. This would accou

10. Charle, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

11. In the same interval Cuza's League, initially the larger, rose only from 113,863 to 281,107, an accurate reflection of greater effectiveness of the Iron Guard's dynamism.

12. Cf. Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, *Problemele de bază ale României* (3d ed., Bucarest, 1946), pp. 259–262. While his argument contains a good deal of truth it suffers from the necessity he feels to prove that the proletariat proper and the peasantry proper could not be activists in a fascist movement.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

648 for the peculiar venom of the declassés as contrasted with the less fanatical support of the impoverished which arose more specifically from the depression.

It is difficult to obtain reliable evidence concerning the calculated support given to the Iron Guard by interested groups, but there are numerous indications that government ministers in the 1930's, such as Vaida Voevod and Tătărescu, did support the Legion unofficially and did not greatly hamper its activities. Undoubtedly in the vast underworld of Rumanian police life, Siguranța officials found it a useful organization for combating Left-wing labor movements. Perhaps one should not place too great stress upon such Machiavellian motives. It is tempting to see in ministers, police chiefs, and mysterious financial interests absolutely cold and calculating individuals who were not in the slightest affected by the atmosphere of their surroundings. But after all both Vaida Voevod and Duca had said that apart from the battle against communism they had hoped to harness what they felt was constructive in the Iron Guard and divert it to less violent activities. It would seem reasonable to assume that they, too, were moved by some of the same sentiments which impelled the Guardists.

648 As to foreign support, there is no question that Hitler regarded
668 Codreanu as his ally, and for good reason. In November, 1937, for example, Codreanu made his celebrated electoral declaration that he was against the Western democracies, against the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente, against the League of Nations, against bolshevism, and in favor of the Rome-Berlin Axis: "Forty-eight hours after our victory we shall have an alliance with Germany and Italy." There is also evidence that in later years, at least, the Germans gave financial support to the Iron Guard, although some of the proofs produced by the Carol dictatorship are suspect. It would be wrong to conclude, however, that the Iron Guard was nothing more than a German fifth column. It was a very significant aspect of Rumanian social and political life.

Rumanian writers of various political beliefs have sought, understandably enough, to prove—by calling the Legion a tool either of the Germans, or of intriguing police chiefs and politicians, or of a class—that it did not represent the Rumanian people. Granted that the Rumanian people are not by nature fascist beasts, nevertheless the Iron Guard cannot be written off as a superficial phenomenon. In its way it was the nemesis of all the false constitutionalism and pseudo-democracy which have been observed in the course of recent Rumanian history.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Yet the Iron Guard collapsed, not without some horrible spasms and death throes, but collapsed whenever a strong hand was raised against it. When Carol attacked it in 1938, despite the lash-back in the assassination of Calinescu, he had it under control. In 1940 he was overthrown by it only because his regime had been completely discredited. In January, 1941, the Guard was to show its ineffectiveness against Antonescu's army.

This strange weakness lay not in the fact that the Iron Guard was an artificial body, completely unrepresentative, but because it was all too indigenous. Its effectiveness seemed to be inversely related to its nearness to power. In opposition and under Carolist persecution, it seemed powerful and menacing; martyrdom became it well. When it came close to power it showed itself inept and maladroit. In the face of real problems, whether of government or of maintaining power, its aura vanished and its new men proved to be nothing but pillagers and thugs with no idea how to master a country, much less run it. The very negativeness of the Iron Guard, which gives it its particular interest, was its own undoing.

The Dictatorships

The Iron Guard enjoyed a brief period of triumph from September, 1940, to January, 1941, during which time it shared power with Gen. Ion Antonescu in a "National-Legionary State." Carol fell because the Germans lacked confidence in him but also because all political groups, including the National Peasants and the old Liberals, detested his regime which had discarded political freedom for the presumed interests of the nation and then had failed to make a move in its defense. At the last hour he had summoned Antonescu, a talented and forceful officer, but a man whose stern ambition both Carol and the Guardists failed to appreciate. After Carol's abdication and Michael's accession to the throne, Maniu and Constantin Brătianu supported Antonescu in the hope and on the condition that he would reestablish a constitutional regime. Such a hope had no chance of realization. Although Antonescu had been known as pro-French in the 1930's, he had by this time made his peace with Hitler and was thoroughly committed to a pro-Nazi policy.[13] He had long been criti-

13. It is evident, however, from the recently published memoirs of the former chief interpreter in the German Foreign Office that Antonescu's attitude was not one of obsequious servility. He vehemently criticized the Vienna Award to Hitler's face and expressed his desire to win back Northern Transylvania by force of arms. Apparently his outspoken attitude, which enabled him to match the Führer's harangues ("Er monologisierte genau wie dieser") plus his enthusiastic hatred of the Slavs and willing-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

The Agrarian Question

● 668 The agrarian policy of the Iron Guard may be dismissed briefly. The Legionaries prided themselves on having no formal program and they were in power only five months. During its years of growth the Iron Guard had gained extensive influence among the peasants because of its range of emotional appeals and even more because of its extravagant if nebulous promises to provide land. As has been said, however, the slogan, omul şi pogonul was less a directive—which would have been absurd, since a pogon equals half a hectare—than an emotional rally. For example, one of the Legionary writers, A. Balota, said that there should be a return to the village, not "to seek under false democratic pretexts social justice for the worker on the land, but to achieve ethnic justice for the peasant."[15]

The activities of the Guard during its five months in office appear to have been little more than pillage and extortion. Some of the actions purported to be in the Robin Hood tradition of taking from the rich to give to the poor, but the taking was far more evident than the giving. The Guard was active in the villages; there were incessant parades, processions and ceremonies but no constructive action. The only important land measure was a decree converting Jewish-held rural property into state property, in exchange for "interest-bearing securities." Land thus obtained was to be used to provide for refugees from Bessarabia, Transylvania, and Bucovina. The abysmal failure of the Guard, for all its *flos* and promises, to achieve anything for the peasant increased the skepticism among the peasants, if such was possible, that anything good could come from the powers above.[16] The importance of the Iron Guard to the agrarian question does not lie in anything which it achieved, for it achieved nothing, but in evidence it affords of the dead rot in Rumanian society.

Although Antonescu frequently expressed his love for the Ru-

15. A. Balota, *Satul îmar de viaţa romînească*, quoted in Pătrăşcanu, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

16. In this connection I recall a conversation with a group of peasants in the village of Hanga in the Moldavian Carpathians in January, 1945. Like most mountain villagers they were desperately land hungry, and were particularly resentful that several thousand hectares of land, mostly forest, belonged to one large landowner. At that time they were curious to learn more about the activities of Petru Groza's Ploughmen's Front, whose organizers had not yet reached them. They were of course interested in the prospects of having more land but stated they were very skeptical of such promises. A number of the men in the village had joined the Iron Guard in the hopes of obtaining land; they had not received any land but had been imprisoned when the Guard was suppressed.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

manian peasant,[17] under his dictatorship the overriding concerns were mobilizing agriculture for the war, compensating for the lost territories (though part of these were regained after 1941), and maintaining production against the drain on manpower and the requisitioning of equipment and livestock for military purposes. The majority of acts were specific war measures: price controls, export controls, laws against agricultural sabotage and speculation, control of livestock, state requisitioning of cereals, crop planning, and the mobilization of agricultural labor. Most of the measures had been initiated in Carol's reign under the trade agreement with Germany and the five-year plan for agriculture, but the war intensified them and put them on a directly military footing. By necessity there was an increase in the mobilization of agricultural labor. Field commandos and labor gangs were sent about the country under the supervision of gendarmes and rural agents of the Ministry of Agriculture.

An attempt was made to compensate for the shortage of manpower and livestock by increasing agricultural equipment, largely through import from Germany. If the figures are to be trusted imports in 1941 and 1942 were quite extensive:[18]

	1941	*1942*
Tractors with ploughs	1,000	2,814
Animal-drawn ploughs	20,000	40,000
Sowing drills	4,000	1,400
Harvesters	2,000	2,230
Hoes	10,000	30,000
Harrows	4,000	9,200
Threshers	200	250

By a law of June 22, 1942, for the organization of agricultural associations, the government attempted to overcome the disadvantages of small strip farming by means reminiscent of the Iorga law of 1931. By this act a group of at least fifteen cultivators residing in the same commune could constitute an agricultural association, authorized to purchase farm machinery, seeds, fertilizers, etc., sell produce in common, purchase or lease land, and obtain credit. The association was not an independent body however. It was to be man-

17. According to an admiring German biography, Antonescu first attracted attention during the 1907 uprising when, as a young lieutenant, he succeeded, without firing a shot, in persuading a crowd of rebellious peasants to disband.

18. Brief accounts of the measures undertaken up to 1943 are given by N. D. Cornăţeanu, "International Chronicle of Agriculture: Rumania," *International Review of Agriculture*, 32 (Rome, July–August, 1941), 267E–284E; and 34 (April, 1943), 135E–144E.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

page 242

XII

THE COMMUNIST PERIOD: THE ADVENT TO POWER, 1944–45

ON August 23, 1944, King Michael, with the cooperation of a four-party bloc comprising the National Peasants, the Liberals, the Socialists, and the Communists overthrew Marshal Antonescu through a skillful palace coup d'état. On September 12 Rumania signed an armistice with the Allies. Six months later, on March 6, 1945, the Groza government, nominally a coalition but dominated by the Communist party, came into office and has remained in power since that date.

The sudden flowering of the Rumanian Communist party, the result of external rather than internal influences, marks a definite break in the continuity of Rumanian politics. Communism was not totally lacking a past in Rumania, and the Communist program had a relevance to Rumanian problems, but without the direct and active intervention of the Soviet Union the Groza government would not have obtained office. To be sure, the Conservative Marghiloman cabinet of 1918 was the direct consequence of Germany's military successes on the Eastern Front; the return of Brătianu in the same year was made possible by the Allied victory. The fall of Vintilă Brătianu and the success of the National Peasants in 1928 were to some extent connected with Rumania's foreign financial relations. Above all, Carol's fall and the Iron Guard and Antonescu dictatorships were certainly conditioned by the Nazi hegemony over southeastern Europe. Rumania has always been affected in its internal politics by direct or indirect foreign influences. Nevertheless, there is a difference.

All the preceding political changes hitherto considered were effected by parties or groups, which, if they were not popular, were at least associated with important Rumanian institutions. Thus the Liberals, the extent of whose popular support was doubtful, formed the oldest party in Rumania and were in control of the nation's banking and financial apparatus. Carol made use of the institution of the monarchy and its tradition of royal paternalism. Antonescu relied upon the army. The National Peasants, less well connected with the institutional framework, one of their weaknesses, were, in their period of growth, the representatives of a broad mass movement in the peas-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

antry. As for the Iron Guard, while its rise was in part fostered by sympathetic politicians and its temporary success after Carol's fall was with the approval of the Germans, it was in its insane way the culmination of a widespread indigenous fascist impulse which had been building up in the interwar years.

The Rumanian Communists, on the other hand, while not altogether without support, enjoyed neither wide popularity (party membership in 1944 was approximately 1,000) nor control of the instruments of power, and they could not, in 1945 at least, have gained the latter without the aid of the Soviet Union. Admittedly, the previous political movements had by 1945 become rather threadbare, either through internal disintegration, senility, or public failure, and one might argue that a break with the past was salutary. But that the Communists were to create the new dispensation was in no way a Rumanian decision. Whatever the merits or shortcomings of communism as such, the Groza government was a Soviet creation. The implications of this fact will be considered shortly.

History of Marxist Parties in Rumania

In the first half of the nineteenth century there were slight signs of pre-Marxist socialism in the Rumanian principalities.[1] Some of Fourier's and Louis Blanc's ideas had been picked up by Rumanian students in Paris, and indeed a short-lived phalanstery was formed at Scaeni near Ploeşti. Marxist socialism, however, came to Rumania by way of Russia. In the 1870's Iaşi, capital of Moldavia, was a meeting place and haven for Russian revolutionaries. In 1879 the first Rumanian socialist newspaper, *Basarabia*, was published; its editorials were along Bakuninist-anarchist lines, with a strange flavor of anti-Semitism. In 1881 the first small socialist group in Iaşi was disbanded by the Rumanian authorities upon the demand of the Russian government.

Between 1887 and 1897 the socialist movement in Rumania revived and developed. Like many currents of foreign thought, Marxism in Rumania was something of a fad. All manner of people employed the terminology. Its political content was loosely defined and combined with anarchist and populist ideas. The intellectual leader of Rumanian socialism was the Russian emigré Constantin Dobrogeanu-

1. For a brief account of the socialist movement in Rumania, cf. N. Ghiulea, "Labour Organisations in Rumania," *International Labour Review*, 9, No. 1 (January, 1924), 31–49. C. Titel Petrescu has a lengthy but scrappily organised account in *Socialismul în Romînia*. Trotsky was in Bucarest in 1913; his articles on the Rumanian socialist movement are collected in *Ocherki politicheskoi Rumynii*.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

668 175 Gherea, whose stream of articles defining Marxism and applying it to Rumania had a lasting influence not only upon Rumanian socialism but upon Rumanian thought in general. In 1884 a socialist study group appeared in Bucarest, and in the following year a newspaper, *Rights of Man*. In 1890 a socialist club began to enter candidates in local and national elections. In 1893 was founded the Rumanian Social Democratic party with a program based upon that of the German Social Democrats. Rumania was recognized as a backward country which could not take the initiative in the socialist movement. The work of the Rumanian socialists was to be preparatory, their tactics moderate and legal. The demands of the program were universal suffrage, administrative decentralization, abolition of the standing army, separation of church and state, equal conditions for women, secularization of schools, equal application of laws, the right of association, limitation of the royal prerogative, a progressive income tax, and an eight-hour day. The program was explicitly antirevolutionary. The new party attempted to organize workers in the few industrial centers of the country, Bucarest, Galaţi, Brăila, and Ploeşti, and to anchor the socialist movement to the nascent trade unions. It also tried in 1897 to spread socialism in the villages, but this effort was immediately suppressed by the Conservative government. For the most part, however, in this period the socialist movement was confined to intellectuals, who had made a good deal of progress toward formulating a program which they felt suitable to Rumania's special needs.

Between 1898 and 1900 the socialists hit a crisis. A section of the party, weary of the political wilderness and seeing no future in isolation, were tempted by the devil, collaboration. In 1899, under their influence, the party changed its name from Social Democrat to National Democrat on the grounds that Rumania was not ripe for socialism. In 1900 Constantin Stere, later the populist leader, split the party by taking a group into the Liberal camp. By the turn of the century the first effort at creating a socialist party had collapsed in confusion and disagreement.

The Russian revolution of 1905 and the significant increase in urban and labor population led to a second revival of socialism. In this phase the party found a broader base of support; it had more contact with the working class and the trade unions, and a talented leader in Christian Rakovsky, a doctor of Bulgarian-Dobrogean origin with international socialist connections. The tactics of the party were still reformist. While labor groups in a few towns sided with the peasants in the 1907 uprising, the Social Democratic party

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

took an altogether negative view and admonished the peasants to retire, as they were only playing into the hands of their adversaries. Nevertheless, in the repression that followed, the Liberal government suppressed the Social Democratic party and expelled Rakovsky from the country as an undesirable alien. He was later readmitted by the Conservative government.

The Rumanian Social Democrats campaigned against the Balkan wars, against Rumania's participation, and against the annexation of the Dobrogean quadrilateral. They came out for a federative republic of all the Balkan states, including Turkey. When the First World War came they maintained their antiwar stand and demanded Balkan neutrality. An inter-Balkan socialist conference held in Bucarest in July, 1915, issued a resolution favoring the German antiwar Socialists, Liebknecht and Luxemburg, and the Russian Left-wing socialists; opposing class collaboration and "social patriotism"; and criticizing the passivity of the Bureau of the Second International. On June 15, 1916, just before Rumania's entry into the war, the workers of Galați demonstrated against Rumanian participation. After Rumania entered the war, the Social Democrats remained opposed but ineffective. Party papers were confiscated, meetings disbanded, and Rakovsky arrested and imprisoned.

A new phase appeared with the outbreak of the 1917 revolution in Russia. On the first of May Russian troops liberated Rakovsky from the prison at Iași, and during the period of complete confusion on the Eastern Front in 1917 and 1918 the Rumanian socialist movement more or less merged with the Russian revolution. Rakovsky himself took an increasingly important part in the Russian revolution, becoming president of the Ukrainian Sovnarkom in 1919. Rumanian Social Democrats, under Mihai Gheorghiu Bujor, formed a Rumanian revolutionary battalion with its headquarters in Odessa. Inside Rumania itself, however, the socialists were repressed, both in Iași, held by the Rumanian government, and in Bucarest, occupied by the Germans.

At the end of the war, in the autumn of 1918, the social situation in Rumania was unsettled, and three years later Rakovsky observed, oversanguinely, that "the prospects of a revolutionary movement were excellent, the position of the administration was critical."[2] Within the country new radical parties sprang up, expressing the widespread dislike of Ion I. C. Brătianu, who was considered responsible for Rumania's involvement in a ruinous war. Externally revolutions were stirring in Austria, Hungary, and Germany. On the other

2. Trotsky and Rakovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

668
175

hand, the steps taken toward agrarian reform in 1917 and 1918 provided a safety valve for peasant unrest. Rumania was among the victorious powers and Brătianu was soon to fight for its territorial rewards. The Bessarabian issue was already introducing a national element into the relations with Bolshevik Russia. At the same time Brătianu took firm measures against signs of social upheaval.

On December 13, 1918, the government harshly repressed a labor manifestation at the National Theater in Bucarest.[3] Social tension continued through 1919 and 1920 and reached a final climax in the abortive general strike of October 20–28, 1920. The strike was set off by the restrictive measures of the Averescu government, which had been called in as a party of discipline and order. The general council of the Social Democratic party and leaders of the labor syndicates had presented the government with demands to respect the right of association, to recognize work councils in industrial establishments, to remove troops from all factories, and to abolish the state of siege and censorship. The government responded by arresting the socialist and labor leaders, including the deputies to the chamber. The general strike which followed was precipitated by an independent strike of the workers in the railway shops, always the most militant section of Rumanian labor. The strike lasted only seven days and the government had little trouble in breaking it.

After the failure of the general strike the Rumanian socialist movement split, the more radical section forming the Communist party and the moderates the Social Democratic party. Before 1914 the Rumanian socialists had followed the moderate policy of the Second International and were perhaps even more moderate because of Rumania's situation as a backward agrarian state. The war, however, had the effect of associating the party with the more radical section of the international socialist movement. This trend to the Left was not for doctrinal reasons; the Rumanian socialists had not taken a Leninist position. Rather it was because the big Social Democratic parties in the West, in France and Germany, had become involved in the war and because the Russian Marxists, with whom the Rumanian socialist leaders had close personal contacts, were becoming the standard-bearers of militant socialism. Moreover, the antiwar stand of the Rumanian socialists had put them into conflict with the authorities and driven many of them into illegal activity. Finally, the Russian revolution itself produced a wave of enthusiasm which quite

3. According to the socialist leader Moscovici, the demonstration had no revolutionary intent, had occurred more or less by accident, and the socialist leaders had not known of it in advance. Petrescu, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

overpowered any doubts about the "ripeness" of east European countries for the socialist revolution. Thus, such men as Rakovsky and Al. Dobrogeanu-Gherea (the son of the socialist leader), who had been reformists before the war, joined the Communist camp.[4]

According to Rakovsky, the program of the party congress of April, 1919, accepted the basic theses of the Third International, but this trend was opposed by the Social Democratic leaders of Bucovina and Transylvania who were closer to the traditions of Austrian and Hungarian Social Democracy.[5] In 1920 a group of Rumanian delegates was sent to Moscow—solely as observers according to the socialist Petrescu—to examine the situation in Russia and to inform themselves on the principles of the Comintern. This group returned in January, 1921, and it transpired that they had affiliated the Rumanian party with the Third International. A general council met in February, at which the Communists gained control (according to Petrescu, the socialist leaders were in prison as a result of the general strike) and called a general congress for May, 1921. The government now stepped in and arrested for high treason all the delegates to the congress who voted for affiliation, some 70 in number.

After 1921 the Social Democrats and the Communists went their separate ways. In 1922 the Communists attempted to establish a united front in the trade union movement but were defeated. At a general council, the trade unions maintained their political independence; trade union members could belong to any party but party activity within the unions was to be prohibited. In 1925 the General Council of Trade Unions affiliated with the Amsterdam International Federation. The Communists in retaliation set up a "United" Trade Union General Council which never achieved a substantial following but which rendered any trade union activity liable to government repression.

The history of Rumanian Social Democracy between the wars is not inspiring, and the party never achieved a large following. It based itself upon the trade unions, a rather narrow foundation for a political party in Rumania. Moreover, it was never quite clear what the relations between socialism and the trade unions should be. Most of the Social Democratic leaders were trade union officials but in many cases they favored complete separation of political and union activities. There is little evidence that the Socialists had any success

4. This enthusiastic and nondoctrinal support of revolution was of course the cause of later friction when the Third International undertook to impose the Leninist outlook on the member parties.

5. Trotsky and Rakovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

668
175

in improving labor conditions, partly because of their anxiety lest their actions be considered subversive.[6] The Rumanian trade union movement remained weak,[7] legislation passed to assist labor was not applied, and the representatives of industry were successful in impeding labor reforms on the grounds of national interest.[8]

As a political party the Social Democrats had a fundamental handicap. In their interpretation of Marxism they believed that Rumania had not yet reached the stage where it could embark upon or even directly prepare for the socialist revolution. The hopes of the party lay not in Rumania itself but in the advanced states of the West. One of the party leaders, Ilie Moscovici, said in 1923: "Lacking the objective factors—the concentration of capital, sufficient development of industry, and a large proletarian mass—and not having the subjective factors—education and a class conscious proletariat—Rumania suffers all the contradictions of the capitalist regime without having the necessary factors for social transformation."[9] Such a passive outlook, which was admittedly depending upon developments beyond Rumania to realize its ideals, was scarcely likely to win an enthusiastic following. The Social Democrats considered it their principal function to remove the obstacles set by the oligarchy to the free industrial and capitalist development of Rumania, to lift the cultural level of the masses, to bring democracy to Rumania, and to foster international cooperation of labor.

Because of their weak position the Socialists wobbled between maintaining doctrinal purity and collaborating with other parties. They

6. For example, M. Flueraş, in 1926, felt it necessary to explain rather apologetically that the great interest shown by the workers in labor legislation should not be interpreted as a revolutionary tendency. ILO, *Industrial and Labor Information*, *17*, No. 7 (February 15, 1926), 231.

7. Trade union membership increased only from 25,000 in 1919 to 42,000 in 1929. Transylvania and the Banat had, in 1929, 25,000 members, the Old Kingdom only 11,000, Bucovina, 6,000, and Bessarabia, 790. *Ibid.*, *33*, No. 8 (February 24, 1930), 265.

8. In 1934 the Rumanian Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry submitted a memorandum to the Ministry of Labor which said, among other things, "The improvement of the living conditions of workers can only be gradually achieved. Any defiance of this rule must be detrimental to the national economy in that it would bring about both a weakening of the credit of the state and an increase in unemployment, thus leading to a worsening of social conditions. The present limits of economic possibility can only be exceeded by means of an increase of production brought about through the formation of new capital and through an increase in the productive capacity of labor on a sound economic basis." *Ibid.*, *49*, No. 11 (March 12, 1934), 852. To a degree, of course, this statement was perfectly true. On the other hand, the constant reports of employers' infringements of labor laws, such as the weekly rest act, leave no doubt that their actions were hardly determined by any such general considerations. Cf. *Ibid.*, *52*, No. 11 (December 10, 1934), 325, report by the Rumanian Chamber of Labor on the application of labor laws.

9. "Lupta de clasă şi transformarea socială," *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, p. 302.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

worked with the National Peasants in the 1926 communal elections in an effort to oust the Liberals, and again in the general elections of 1928 which established the Maniu government. A dissenting splinter group broke away to form an Independent Socialist party, somewhat to the Left of the Social Democrats and advocating collaboration with "legal" Communists. Collaboration between the National Peasants and the Social Democrats ceased shortly after the former came to power. The Socialists charged the Maniu government with betraying the working class; at a party congress held in 1930 collaboration was condemned and the party reaffirmed its independence and single-minded loyalty to the workers.

In the years leading up to the Carolist dictatorship the Social Democrats were altogether ineffective and powerless. They drafted numerous resolutions against fascism and in favor of democracy, but were in no position to do anything about either. In 1935 and 1936, when courted by the Communists, who had adopted the Popular Front, they replied that they were unwilling to sign any agreement with the various Communist-front organizations and that common action was possible only if the Communists came into the open and renounced their illegal activities. In the 1937 elections they refused to have anything to do with the National Peasants because of the pact with Codreanu, and succeeded only in reuniting with the Independent Socialists, an achievement of little consequence.

After the overthrow of the parliamentary regime in 1938, the Social Democrats folded up. The collaborationist spirit again made its appearance. The party reexamined its theoretical principles and altered its definition of the state, which was no longer seen as a class instrument but as "an instrument useful and necessary to all." [10] Two of the Social Democratic leaders, Flueraş and Mirescu, entered the labor commission of the Goga-Cuza government. When Carol replaced the trade unions by corporatist bodies, the General Confederation of Labor was absorbed into the Front of National Rebirth, and one of the Socialist leaders, Grigorovici, became an undersecretary in the Ministry of Labor under the dictatorship.[11]

If the Social Democrats found agrarian Rumania an unpromising

10. This change was expressed in an article by Lotar Rădăceanu in *Gândul Vremii* (March–June, 1938), cited in Pătrăşcanu, *Problemele de bază*, p. 269. Pătrăşcanu was very critical of the theoretical position adopted by Rădăceanu and stated that it cleared the way to accepting the Carolist dictatorship. Still, such facility has its advantages. Rădăceanu is now in the Groza government whereas Pătrăşcanu was discharged from the Ministry of Justice and ousted from the Communist party.

11. Titel Petrescu, while admitting a good deal of opportunism in these actions, defends them as necessary to preserve what rights still remained to labor.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

668
175

environment for their moderate Marxism and their reliance upon the urban working class, the Communists encountered far more serious obstacles. In Rumania the question of communism was completely entangled in the issue of Soviet-Rumanian relations. More than in most European countries communism and high treason were regarded as completely synonymous terms. This national conflict, which the Rumanian Communists could not begin to overcome, dogged their efforts from the start. Rumania's relations with Russia had never been very good; tsarist Russia may have acted as protector of the Balkan Christians, but its own interests in the Black Sea littoral had always been a source of anxiety to the Rumanian principalities. The dispute over Bessarabia, beginning in 1812 and heightened by the territorial transfers of 1856 and 1878, was a constant source of irritation. Because of the Rumanian occupation of Bessarabia in 1918, the Soviet Union and Rumania did not resume full diplomatic relations until 1934.

In addition to this territorial dispute, the Communists faced another difficulty. The Third International was founded in the hope and expectation that the disasters and havoc of the First World War would create sufficient social upheaval to bring about the proletarian revolution. But as has been seen, while revolution threatened to gain the upper hand in many eastern European states, Rumania stood fast and indeed sent troops to put down Bela Kun's Soviet regime in Hungary. As a result Rumania, perhaps more than any state of eastern Europe, regarded itself as the bulwark against bolshevism, both against Soviet territorial advance and against the Communist revolutionary doctrine. All sides were in agreement on the point. Rumanian authors repeatedly referred to the agrarian reform as the most effective protection against communism. At the League of Nations and other international meetings, Rumania exerted a good deal of diplomatic pressure on the grounds of its importance as an outpost against the Soviet Union. For their part the Russians saw in Rumania one of the key points of the *cordon sanitaire*, an advance base for the malevolent capitalist states.

Where were the Communists to find their support in such a country? They sought it among the proletariat, the small peasants, and the national minorities. The proletariat, as the Social Democrats discovered, was too small to be effective, although the Communists did obtain their few nuclei in the industrial centers. As for the small peasants, the Communists, unlike the Social Democrats, tried hard to penetrate the countryside but the land reforms had weakened its revolutionary potentialities. Besides, the Peasant party was much more likely to obtain the support of the peasantry, and did. The

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

Communists did have some success with the minorities (the present leaders of Rumanian communism, Pauker, Luca, and Bodnaraş are all from the ethnic minorities), but any success in this direction would only intensify the feeling that they were an antinational and treasonous party.

Finally, the Communists were handicapped by the fact that almost from the outset they were an illegal party and with but occasional relaxations remained so throughout the interwar period. Although most of the Rumanian governments were not averse to having the Communists as a whipping boy, the Communists brought a good deal of their difficulties on their own heads by their tactics, which were devious, disingenuous, and unsuccessful. In 1921 Rakovsky remarked with some bitterness that General Averescu was arresting not only the "illegal" party workers but those working "lawfully."[12] In a similar spirit a Communist pamphlet of 1925, describing the uprising at Tatar Bunar in Bessarabia, castigated the cordon sanitaire and the provocative accusations that the Soviet Union was stirring up trouble, but went on to say, "Not only the free booters of Bucarest, but the capitalists of the whole world are trembling before the convulsions of the proletarian giant. They fear that the red wave rolling out of the East will burst the Dniester dam and flood onward to the coast of the Atlantic Ocean."[13] Although this dual policy of pursuing both legal and illegal activities received a brilliant defense and elaboration in Lenin's pamphlet, *Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, it has probably, in the long run, done the Communists far more harm than good. It may be, as Lenin said, that a good warrior should know all his weapons, legal as well as illegal, parliamentary as well as revolutionary, but such a military plan of campaign should have remained a highly classified document, not a broadside, and was bound to lose effectiveness with repetition. As soon as the enemy became aware of this tactic the Communists were left open to the charge of bad faith no matter what course they followed. In the case of Rumania, of course, they had very little opportunity for any legal activity in their own name, but their efforts to achieve fronts of one complexion or another in the 1920's and 1930's were all unsuccessful.

The Rumanian Communist party got off to an unfortunate start. The arrest in 1921 of the delegates who had voted for affiliation with the Third International deprived it of many of its leaders. Among

12. Ch. Rakovsky, "The Communist Movement in Roumania," *The Communist International*, No. 13 (n.d.), pp. 112–114.

13. *Bessarabia . . . The Roumanian Hell*, published in English by the British Section of the International Class War Prisoners Aid (London, n.d.), p. 13.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

668
175

the active members who took their place was Ana Pauker, a young Jewish schoolteacher from Moldavia who had joined an illegal group in the Social Democratic party in 1918. She had married Marcel Pauker, son of a leading Rumanian publisher.[14] Elected to the Central Committee she became one of the party's most determined fighters. In 1924 when the party was definitely outlawed, she was arrested, but was subsequently released and left the country.

The directives of the Comintern did not facilitate the work of the Rumanian Communists. For example, the resolution on the national question, passed by the Fifth World Congress of the Communist International, stated that under the Versailles system a number of small imperialist states had been created in eastern Europe to fight the proletarian revolution.[15] The states had been formed by the annexation of large territories with foreign populations.

> At the same time the struggle of the oppressed peoples against national oppression has become a struggle against the power of the imperialistic bourgeoisie who were victorious in the world war, since the strengthening of the new imperialist powers means the strengthening of the forces of world imperialism. The importance of the struggle against national oppression is still further augmented by the fact that the nationalities oppressed by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Greece, in their social composition are largely peasants, and the struggle for their national liberation is at the same time the struggle of the peasant masses against foreign landlords and capitalists.

Under these conditions, the resolution declared, the general formula, "The right of every nation to self-determination even to the extent of separation," should be rendered more specific: "The political separation of oppressed peoples from Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Greece." The resolution noted with disapproval that certain Communist parties were falling into deviations on this question, that their slogans were not directed against the states founded on national oppression but toward partial reform and autonomy within existing boundaries.

The resolution was even more specific on the Ukrainian question, an evident example of the overlapping of Soviet and Comintern aims. The congress declared that the Ukrainian national problems in Po-

14. C. G. Costa-Foru, *Aus den Folterkammern Rumäniens*, p. 21; C. Bobrovskaya, "Two Bolshevik Heroines," *The Communist International*, 14, No. 3 (1937), 958–960.

15. "Resolution of V. World Congress of Comintern on National Question in Central Europe and Balkans," *The Communist International*, New Ser., No. 7 (December, 1924–January, 1925), pp. 93–99.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

land, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia formed one Ukrainian problem demanding a common solution for all three countries. In this case it opposed slogans of autonomy for Carpathian Russia, the western Ukraine, Bessarabia, and Bucovina because they were directed toward forming a coalition with the wealthy strata of the Ukrainian peasantry. The congress, therefore, considered it necessary "for the Communist Parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania to launch the general slogan of separation of the Ukrainian lands from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, and their union with the Soviet Ukraine and through it with the U.S.S.R." As for Transylvania and Dobrogea, the congress merely recommended that these areas be separated from Rumania and made independent regions.

Much of the nationalities program of the congress was admirable, its opposition to the hypernationalism of the Balkan states, its championing of national equality and cultural and educational rights for minorities. But these reform measures were clearly of less importance than the demand for separation. It is difficult to see how a party advocating the loss of Transylvania, Dobrogea, Bessarabia, and Bucovina was going to gain much popularity in Rumania, especially when the majority of the population in these areas (with the exception of Bucovina) and much the greatest number of peasants were Rumanians. With such instructions the Rumanian Communist party was never able to shake off the imputation of being an antinational party.

In addition to handing out such uncomfortable assignments, the Comintern heckled the Rumanian Communists for lapsing into any number of deviations. Because the party had been forced underground, it had been unable to conduct the necessary educational campaign to bolshevize itself, with the result that there were deplorable signs of "ultra-left and right liquidatorial tendencies." [16] The Sixth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in 1926 felt called upon to rebuke the Rumanian Communists and directed them to correct their errors. Specifically the party was to issue a journal, fight the Right-wing deviations, and "struggle against even the smallest sectional manifestations."

At this time the party was troubled by two questions, the trade union issue and a united front against the Liberals. With regard to the "unitary" trade unions and their relations to the Amsterdam Union, the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist party issued the following orders:

16. Al. Badulescu, in a review of the Rumanian party organ *Lupta de Clasă*, *The Communist International*, 4, No. 15 (October 15, 1927), 311–312.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

668
175

The duty of mobilizing the working class masses to insure the legality of the unitary trade unions is a primary one for us Communists. Although the unitary trade unions are not by any means a Communist organization and still less a Communist Party organization, as the Social Democrats and the bourgeoisie together maintain, they are the one legal organization based on the class struggle, and it is the duty of the Communists to use all their influence in the unitary and reformist trade unions, in the workshops and factories, for rousing the worker to fight for the legality of the unitary trade unions.

With this approach it is not surprising that the Social Democrats should have complained that wherever the Communists showed an interest in trade union matters, it was disastrous to the unions.

The Sixth Plenum criticized the Rumanian Communist party for its tactical errors in the 1926 communal elections when the party had preached the tactics of the united front of the working class with all opposition bourgeois parties against the Liberal oligarchy. This policy was considered to involve a serious misreading of the Rumanian situation. The error—it was an error in 1926 at any rate—lay in failing to realize that the Liberals were the most highly developed section of the Rumanian bourgeoisie, and that no real anti-Liberal bloc on the side of the opposition parties (i.e., the National Peasants) was possible. The effort to create such a bloc was a serious error, since it "obscures the class-consciousness of the working class, it gives rise to illusions which prevent the crystallization of the one social force which is actually capable of putting an end to the dictatorship of the Liberals: the united front of the proletariat with the broad masses of the peasantry, liberated from the guardianship of the opposition bourgeoisie." In effect this meant that the Communists were not to work with the National Peasants in ousting the Liberals but were rather to attract the peasants away from them.

In terms of the Rumanian situation this tactical directive of the Comintern was absolutely hopeless, although in a negative way it was correct in forecasting the difficulties in ousting the Liberals from their entrenched positions in the Rumanian economy. It must also be admitted that the Communists foresaw the dangers of Carol's return. "The 'Persecution and Exile of Prince Carol,' " said *Lupta de Clasă*, the party organ, "utilized politically by the opposition bourgeoisie can win over petty-bourgeois sections and create the illusion among many workers that a Rumanian 'Mussolini' regime would be in a position to change the miserable conditions of the masses. That Prince Carol is closely associated with the fascist organizations in Rumania is an open secret."

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

As might be expected, the victory of the National Peasants in 1928 caused no rejoicing among the Communists. In later years they wrote of the National Peasants as having come in on a wave of popular protest against the Liberals; but the Communists themselves were hostile to the National Peasants before 1928 and fought with them throughout their term in office. Under the National Peasants Bessarabia remained a center of discontent and international friction; Vaida Voevod courted the Iron Guard as allies against the Communists.

To some extent at least this conflict arose from the fact that the National Peasants came to office at just the time the Comintern went off on an ultra-Left tangent, denouncing socialists as social-fascists, and appeared firmly convinced that the Western powers were preparing an immediate assault upon the Soviet Union.[17] During this period Rumania was considered to have a foremost place in the anti-Soviet plans of the Western imperialists. All the energies of the National Peasants were described as being employed against the U.S.S.R., and even the feeble Rumanian Social Democrats were called warmongers.[18]

The Comintern again felt called upon to rebuke the Rumanian comrades. "In spite of the most savage terror, the Communist Party lives and becomes stronger. The only obstacle in the path to the growth of its influence over the proletariat and the toiling masses lies in the *slow* surmounting of *right opportunist* conceptions in some sections of its work, particularly in the field of the peasant movement." [19] The error here was the old heresy of regarding the peasantry as a social unit and failing to split the poor peasants from the kulaks. Counting on the depression to produce a revolutionary situation—although the swing to the Left had preceded the depression—the Comintern apparently had hopes of bringing social issues to the boil. "The increasing upsurge of the class struggle creates a basis on which the Communist Party could win the trust of the toiling masses, establish its hegemony. . . . With a correct policy the Communist Party can become a factor for the acceleration of the approach of a revolutionary situation." [20]

In retrospect this ultra-Left tactic of the early 1930's must be regarded as a disaster which wrought a great deal of damage. The

17. Of course these suspicions were fed by such events as Maniu's reported request in 1930 that the British survey the Black Sea coast with a view to constructing a strong naval base near Constanța. Pavel Pavel, *Why Rumania Failed*, p. 240.

18. T. Marin, "The Role of Rumania in Intervention against the U.S.S.R.," *The Communist International*, 7, No. 10 (May 15, 1931), 300.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 302.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 303.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

668 175 veering from Right to Left in the Comintern in the 1920's had brought no results but had merely caused the local parties to be regarded as altogether untrustworthy and treacherous political allies. The tactics in 1930 of smearing all non-Communist groups as fascist certainly did nothing to prevent the rise of fascism. It is hard to say how important this was in Rumania. The Rumanian Communist party was clearly on the fringes of politics and failed to make any appreciable headway. By its irresponsible behavior, however, it enabled the parties of the Right to use the Communist label as a means of discrediting all working class activity.

The last effort of the Rumanian Communists to pursue a revolutionary line was the Grivița railway strike of 1933, in which many of the later Communist leaders—Gheorghiu-Dej, Vasile Luca, and Pătrășcanu—were involved and arrested. This strike, which began with economic demands, quickly assumed a political character. Vaida Voevod's National Peasant government violently suppressed it. After that, as Pătrășcanu said, the radicalization of the masses served to fortify the Iron Guard and the labor movement was put on the defensive.

The rise of Hitler and the realization that the fascist onslaught was not necessarily the immediate prelude to the Communist revolution was belatedly met by a shift in the party line, officially inaugurated at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International held in the summer of 1935. Gheorghe Dimitrov, in the leading speeches, criticized the previous practice of calling Social Democrats social-fascists and came out for a popular front of democratic forces against fascism. Reflecting this change was an article by one of the Rumanian Communist leaders, Boris Stefanov.[21] "We are basing ourselves," he said, "upon the undoubted fact that the overwhelming majority of the working population of Rumania and even a considerable section of the bourgeoisie are opposed to fascism." What was required was a concentration of democratic forces, including the bourgeois parties, in an anti-fascist Popular Front. The Social Democrats were requested not to remain aloof and even the National Peasants received moderate praise: "The National Tsaranist (Peasant) Party is one of the biggest mass democratic forces in Rumania. Despite all the waverings and reactionary tendencies of some of its leaders, despite its great sins in the past in its relation to the Ru-

21. Boris Stefanov, "The Concentration of Democratic Forces in Rumania," *The Communist International*, *14*, No. 3 (1937), 948. Stefanov, in 1920, had been one of the members of the general council of the Socialist party who signed the ultimatum for the general strike.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

manian people, the National Peasant Party is nevertheless today one of the most important anti-Fascist forces." Stefanov undertook to refute criticisms that the Communist party was undemocratic, illegal, and antinational. As to the charge that it put forward irredentist slogans aimed at separating the new provinces from Rumania he replied that while the Communist party was against national oppression and for national self-determination it was the sworn enemy of the fascists who were trying to utilize the national issue to tear away Transylvania and Dobrogea and subject them to the fascist yoke. Significantly, even in this reconciliatory mood there was no mention of Bessarabia.

This change of tactics had no important results in the course of Rumanian politics. The Social Democrats remained suspicious and aloof. A Democratic Union was set up in the last years of the Tătărescu cabinet for the purpose of achieving a broad coalition against the extreme Right but, as Pătrăşcanu said, while it was a legal movement it worked "in the ideological cadres of the Communist Party."[22] The Tătărescu government dealt severely with the Communists. In November, 1934, the party, with all its affiliates, was again dissolved; although it had never been reinstated after 1924 its front, the Workers and Peasants bloc, had participated in elections in the early 1930's. In 1936 was held the much publicized trial of nineteen Communists, including Ana Pauker who received a sentence of ten years' imprisonment.

At the time of the 1937 elections the Communists again attempted to create a Popular Front. This effort was foiled by the Maniu-Codreanu pact and by the Social Democrats' refusal to cooperate with either the National Peasants or the Communists. The Communists eventually threw their modicum of support to the National Peasants, a move which was later regarded as a mistake.[23] In retrospect it is indeed lamentable that some sort of Popular Front was not created in 1937, the last relatively free election which Rumania was to enjoy, but certainly the Communists by their previous activity had contributed to rendering such a front impossible and must share the responsibility for the breakdown of Rumanian parliamentary government.

Shortly after the German-Soviet pact, in December, 1939, Boris Stefanov, the same who had ardently supported the Popular Front

22. Pătrăşcanu, *Sous trois dictatures*, p. 110.

23. According to Pătrăşcanu, the Communists should have forced collaboration upon the Social Democrats, who, in his view, could not easily have refused; if the Social Democratic leaders had later tried to break away, they could have been unmasked. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

668 175 and had denied that the Communist party was antinational, wrote an article in *The Communist International* attacking British and French capital and its attempt to drag Rumania into the imperialist war, insisting that Rumania's interests demanded a treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union (presumably modeled after the Soviet treaties with the Baltic states which involved the establishment of Russian bases and armed forces in these countries) and directing the Rumanian Communists to work for the right of self-determination in the annexed provinces (Bessarabia, Bucovina, Transylvania, and Dobrogea), even if this meant their political separation from Rumania. Although the Soviet Foreign Office publicly denied that Stefanov represented the views of the Soviet government, the article provides some evidence that the Russian interest in Rumania at this time was not limited solely to the recovery of Bessarabia. When this province and Northern Bucovina were taken over in the summer of 1940, the Rumanian Communists naturally defended the action and placed the blame on Carol for his bellicose declaration in the spring that he would fight for these areas. One other event, of importance for the future, occurred in 1940: Ana Pauker, who had been in a Rumanian prison since 1936, was exchanged for two members of the Rumanian parliament who had been picked up in Bessarabia when the Russians moved in.

After Hitler's declaration of war on the Soviet Union, the Rumanian Communists again shifted their tactics and called for resistance to the German aggression, but unlike the Communists in Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia they seem to have achieved very little in the way of partisan activity or sabotage.[24]

The Formation of the Groza Government

In 1944 a four-party bloc headed by Iuliu Maniu for the National Peasants, Constantin Brătianu for the Liberals, C. Titel Petrescu for the Social Democrats, and Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu for the Communists collaborated with King Michael and his intimate advisers in preparing for the coup d'état of August 23 which ousted Marshal Antonescu, expelled the Germans from Bucarest, and brought Rumania to the side of the Allies. Negotiations for a Rumanian capitulation had been carried on sporadically in various neutral capitals since 1943, generally in Maniu's name, and in some cases with the knowledge of Marshal Antonescu and his Foreign Minister Mihai An-

24. In 1944 there was a good deal of vague talk about their deeds of derring-do, but I could never obtain any specific examples.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

168 175 tonescu. These negotiations were not successful and were impeded principally by the Rumanians' understandable if unrealistic reluctance to face the fact that they must surrender to the Soviet Union and the Red Army. Their repeated requests for an Anglo-American landing in the Balkans or for some type of Western protection against the foe to the East had no possibility of success, given the strategic and political arrangements arrived at by the Big Three, and could only serve to intensify the suspicions of the Russians, who were in an increasingly powerful position as their forces drove westward into Europe. The coup finally came after a Soviet offensive broke the German lines in northern Moldavia in the summer of 1944. Following the coup a provisional government was formed under General Sanatescu; the four party chiefs were ministers but most of the cabinet posts went to army officers, in the expectation, apparently, that the first days of the government would be far more seriously threatened by conflict with the Germans than proved to be the case.

By the terms of the armistice signed in Moscow on September 12 Rumania was to join the Allies against Germany, supply twelve infantry divisions, intern German and Hungarian forces, and provide free passage for Soviet troops. It was obliged to face three economic obligations: provide for the Allied Command in Rumania, pay to the U.S.S.R. reparations of $300,000,000 over six years, and restore all loot taken by Rumanian troops from the Soviet Union during the war. The 1940 Soviet-Rumanian frontier was reestablished, but the Vienna Award giving northern Transylvania to Hungary was nullified. All persons arrested for favoring the United Nations or for racial reasons were to be released; war criminals were to be arrested; and fascist and Hitlerite formations disbanded. The application of the armistice was to be supervised by an Allied Control Commission operating under the Allied (Soviet) High Command. The term in parenthesis was clearly the ultimate authority

175 With the arrival of the Russians the Rumanian Communist party took on new life and a new leadership in Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, and Emil Bodnaraş, all of whom had learned their communism the hard way and had spent many years in the Soviet Union.[25] In Rumania as in the other eastern European states a distinction may be made between the purely local Communists, many of whose connections had been primarily with Western Communist parties, and the Moscow-trained group. The difference is somewhat difficult to define, since

25. In the beginning none of the three assumed official posts; Ana Pauker was occupied with high policy, Luca, among other things, edited the party organ *Scînteia* (*The Spark*), and Bodnaraş appears to have been busy preparing his armed squads.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

one case by a Soviet order, in the other by a strike of the printers' union. Tochari Georgescu refused to take orders from Radescu and demanded that the officials in the Ministry of Interior pay no attention to the general. 175

The crisis reached a climax on February 24 when, at the conclusion of a large National Democratic Front demonstration, the crowd moved into the palace square and headed toward the Ministry of the Interior. Shots were fired, several people were killed, and that night in a rash—and final—broadcast General Radescu roundly abused the Communist leaders Pauker and Luca, and called on the army to stand by him.[29] Certainly Radescu was a greatly provoked man but owing his appointment to an agreement of the four parties he was not in a position to take an independent stand when this coalition broke down under the Communist attack. Moreover, by his rather intemperate language and appeal to the army he left himself open to damaging attacks from the National Democratic Front and the Russians.

The Soviet Union, in the person of Deputy Commissar Andrei Vyshinsky, now stepped in and demanded General Radescu's immediate resignation. After some hesitation King Michael agreed and started consultations for a new cabinet; again Vyshinsky intervened and demanded that a National Democratic Front government under Petru Groza be installed.[30] Meanwhile the Soviet command had taken the necessary precautions. There was at that time only one Rumanian force capable of resisting the National Democratic Front's armed formations—the army. The Russians ordered the Rumanian units stationed in and near Bucarest to be sent to the front, and the capital was denuded of troops. The following weekend witnessed another mass demonstration which was clearly in a position to take over the government forcibly if need be. In the midst of the demonstration it was announced that the king had accepted the Groza government. On March 6, 1945, it was installed, as a coalition of the groups making up the National Democratic Front, and also including an insignificant 175 648 668

29. This riot is to me a particularly discouraging example of the difficulty of writing history *wie es eigentlich gewesen*. This incident, as it later proved, was the event which led to the overthrow of the Radescu government and the installation of the Groza cabinet. I had watched the procession and was in the crowd no more than fifty feet from the first shots. Yet at that time and since I have been unable to discover precisely what happened. I do know that the government had kept Rumanian troops off the street that day to avoid inciting trouble. The crowd did move toward the Ministry of the Interior building, although it showed little signs of direction. The first shots were fired from a small piece and from somewhere in the crowd, but by whom and for what purpose I do not know, although there has been no lack of stories and explanations.

30. An account of Vyshinsky's actions, taken from official American sources, is given in James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York; London, 1947), pp. 50–55.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

668
648
175

dissident National Peasant party and a Liberal fraction under the opportunist Gheorghe Tătărescu, whose government in 1936 had sentenced Ana Pauker to ten years' imprisonment.

Why did the Groza government come to power? This question is difficult to answer, even though many of the facts are reasonably well established, because it involves the intentions behind the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. In the first place, the Groza regime was directly and positively installed by the Soviet Union, in an explicit manner by Vyshinsky, but even before that by the Soviet decision to break up the Radescu government through the National Democratic Front. Although there is no convincing evidence that the National Democratic Front possessed broad popular support, it was not without effective strength in Bucarest. Before it came to office it was able to assemble large crowds of demonstrators, which were really quite impressive despite the tendency of Tass and the Communist press greatly to inflate their numbers. Moreover, it had special squads of armed guards, which had obtained weapons in preparation for the August 23 coup and had subsequently refused to relinquish them, much to the dismay of the National Peasants and Liberals. Nevertheless, they could not have stood up against the Rumanian army had General Radescu been given the opportunity to employ it. In no sense, however, did the National Democratic Front represent the will of the people, although it must be said that at the time there was a general political vacuum in Rumania. It is doubtful whether the historical parties represented the will of the people except in the purely negative sense of being anti-Russian.

In the second place, the U.S.S.R. did not overthrow the Radescu government because the Rumanians were sabotaging the armistice agreement, or to guarantee the lines of communication to the Hungarian front, or because the Radescu government could not maintain order. If the latter was true it was because Radescu had been deprived of the means. This is not to say that the Rumanians of the historical parties were behaving in a manner satisfactory to the Russians. Hatred of Russia among these parties was bitter and profound. There was a constant hope that somehow the Western powers would come to their rescue. Well before the end of the war, and indeed immediately after the armistice, many nonfascist Rumanians expressed the belief that a conflict betwen the Soviet Union and the Western powers was the only hope for Rumania. Nor were the Rumanians altogether reasonable in their fulfillment of the armistice conditions. There were numerous cases where they tried to squirm out of a delivery by means of elaborate legal technicalities in a manner inevitably highly ex-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

asperating to the Soviet authorities. In a word, many Rumanians did not realize the implications of the new situation and were doing everything in their power to avoid the consequences of their military defeat. Undoubtedly this attitude was well known to the Russians; it would have been difficult to have missed it.

Nevertheless, as far as may be judged from the evidence available, conditions in Rumania and the behavior of non-Communist Rumanian politicians were not a primary factor in determining Russian action; Soviet initiative in installing the National Democratic Front government did not arise from Soviet-Rumanian relations but was an aspect of Soviet policy regarding the pattern of the postwar world and Russia's relations with the Western powers, Great Britain, and the United States. It might be well here to review briefly some of the information which has come to light on Rumania's place internationally in the last part of the Second World War. The Soviet Union was certainly interested in preserving its gains made in eastern Europe before Hitler's attack, and as early as 1941 was pressing the British and American governments, without success, for an agreement on postwar territorial boundaries. Soviet frontiers with Rumania were to be those of 1940, i.e., Bessarabia and northern Bucovina being reincorporated in the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet regime desired special facilities for bases in Rumania.[31] On April 2, 1944, however, as Soviet troops advanced into northern Rumania, Molotov gave a reassuring announcement: "The Soviet government declares that it does not pursue the aim of conquering any part of Rumanian territory or of changing the existing social order in Rumania."

In May, 1944, the British government proposed to Russia a division of areas of predominant interest, whereby, "in the main, Rumanian affairs should be the concern of the Soviet Government and the Greek affairs the concern of United Kingdom. This British-Russian understanding would apply only to war conditions and would not affect the rights and responsibilities which each of the three great powers would have to exercise at the peace settlement."[32] On the condition that it be limited to three months' trial and definitely did not establish postwar spheres of influence, President Roosevelt gave

31. Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (2 vols., New York, 1948), II, 1167. In connection with the request for bases in Rumania, one might note that in 1943 the Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain, Maisky, stated that the U.S.S.R. probably would not oppose a Balkan federation, provided it excluded Rumania, another indication, perhaps, of a special status for Rumania in Soviet plans. Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History* (New York, 1948), p. 714.

32. Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 1451–1455. Roosevelt's approval was given without Hull's knowledge and against his wishes.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

175 charged with illegally distributing political leaflets; on May 6, 1948, Petrescu was arrested and kept in prison without trial.

661 On December 30, 1947, King Michael, an anomalous monarch in a universe of burgeoning people's democracies, was suddenly and rather unexpectedly forced to abdicate. At the time he said his abdication was voluntary but subsequently, after his departure from Rumania, announced that it had been made under duress and he could not regard it as binding. Government propaganda became increasingly unfriendly to the king and listed with great relish the castles, forest land, and industrial shares that reverted to the nation. Following the overthrow of the monarchy the government at once announced the creation of the Rumanian People's Republic (Republica Populară Română) and prepared the draft of a new constitution.

Having thus eliminated the monarchy and all overt political opposition, the Communists then turned to the task of removing disaffected or doubtful elements in their own ranks. In the autumn of 1947 Gheorghiu-Dej, commenting on the rapid growth of the Rumanian Communist party to 710,000 members, had criticized the "low political and ideological level of our cadres and the presence of chauvinism among party members." In the course of a three-day congress of Communists and Social Democrats, assembled in February, 1948, to ratify their unification in a United Workers party, Minister of the Interior Teohari Georgescu launched an attack on the Communist Minister of Justice Pătrăşcanu, whom he charged with falling under bourgeois influence and overestimating the forces of the enemy, the Western powers. Pătrăşcanu was removed from his post and from the Central Committee of the party; later reports have suggested his being a likely candidate for a purge trial such as the other people's democracies have enjoyed.

There had been friction between Pătrăşcanu, a local Communist, and the "Muscovites," Pauker and Luca, since before the installation of the Groza regime. They found him too nationalistic and he was undoubtedly alarmed by the heavy, mechanically brutal tactics of the new order, its complete disregard of the nation's sensitivities, and its absolute subservience to Soviet state demands. Without question, many of the same elements which created Titoism and similar national heresies in the Communist camp were present in the Rumanian party, but because of the basic weakness of the Communist movement in Rumania and the ineluctable dependence upon the Soviet Union they never had a chance of obtaining control.

668 In February, 1948, the Communists concocted a new Democratic Popular Front, comprising the United Workers party; the Plough-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

men's Front, which had absorbed the dissident National Peasants to become a united peasant party; the National Popular party, which dissolved itself a year later on the grounds that the intellectuals and representatives of the middle class supporting this artificial organization should henceforth work within the cadres of the "mass parties"; and the Hungarian Popular party, controlled by the Communists but presumably designed to represent the Hungarian minority. On March 28 this bloc conducted and won elections, against a wholly spurious opposition, for a new assembly to vote on the constitution. 668

The Constitution of 1948 closely resembled the 1947 Constitution of the Bulgarian People's Republic and was clearly derived from and inspired by the Soviet Constitution of 1936. Apart from the fact that the latter is concerned with the union of a number of constituent republics, the principal differences reflect the transitional character of the so-called popular democracy. The People's Republic is defined as arising from the struggle against fascism, reaction, and imperialism rather than from the overthrow of landlords and capitalists. Private property is still recognized as one form of ownership of the means of production, though it is circumscribed by the "general interest" and subject to expropriation and nationalization. The Communist party does not have the preeminent status it enjoys in the U.S.S.R. As in the Soviet constitution stress is laid upon the right to work, to have leisure, and to receive an education; civil liberties, freedom of the press and of speech are guaranteed, but clearly for proletarian purposes; the right of association may not be directed against the democratic order established by the constitution. The supreme organ of the state is the unicameral Grand National Assembly, headed by a Presidium: the executive branch of the government is the Council of Ministers.[14] 642

Since the adoption of the constitution there have been few important structural changes in the government but rather a consolidation of the regime, the reorganization of the administration and the army (which apparently now exceeds treaty limits), and a running fight to eliminate the remnants of political opposition and to subdue sporadic uprisings brought about by the extensive new economic activities. A series of well-advertised public trials continued through 1948 and 1949, against Liberals, industrialists, military officers, students, Catholic and Uniate clergy, and Zionists, all categories that might cause the regime trouble or embarrassment. The new legal apparatus, including the addition of "people's assessors" to assure 661 642

14. For a recent study of constitutional developments within the Soviet sphere, see Andrew Gyorgy, *Governments of Danubian Europe* (New York, 1949).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

year plan for recovery, was inaugurated in 1949. It was to involve 185
the expenditure of 82,000 million lei, including 7,000 million for the completion of work started in 1948, and was to achieve a 40 per cent increase in the level of production over 1948. The capital expenditure was to be invested, percentage-wise, as follows: mining and manufacturing, 47; transportation and roads, 21; agriculture, 9; housing and public services, 21; other, 2. Throughout the year the government issued reports of various portions of the plan being "fulfilled and over-fulfilled," but no absolute quantities were mentioned, only percentage gains over 1948, a singularly uninformative year. In the summer of 1949 the government announced that a budget surplus rendered available several billion additional lei which would be used to begin construction of the Danube–Black Sea Canal.[45] The plan for 1950 appears to be still a preliminary rather than a long-term development program.

Viewed abstractly, and hence, as all Leninists know, incompletely, Communism has three aspects which might commend it to the Rumanian situation: its emphasis upon the importance of industry, its equalitarianism, and its insistence that a backward society can make meaningful progress through its own efforts. Previous Rumanian political movements lacked one or more of these aspects. The Liberals and the neoliberals of the Carolist regime saw the desirability of industrialization, but it proved to be largely for the benefit of a narrow oligarchy. The National Peasants were far more democratic but they tended to be, if not hostile to industry, at least opposed to forced industrialization, which was probably the only way to bring industry to Rumania. Feeling that their country was too weak for such an effort, they turned to foreign capital for assistance, but their hopes for international economic progress "in the spirit of Geneva" were blighted by the depression. The Iron Guard had nothing to offer in this connection. The Social Democrats recognized the importance of industry as well as the necessity of achieving a truer democracy in Rumania, but they were unable to see how their socialist goals could be gained in Rumania with its peasant economy.

The Russian Bolsheviks under Lenin's influence achieved a re- 185
markable tour de force in uniting these elements. They were aware 668

45. Along with the growing similarity of the Rumanian economy to that of the Soviet Union, there have been a number of reports of forced labor, primarily in connection with the Danube–Black Sea Canal. It may be relevant to note that by a law of January 21, 1939, the Carolist regime established an Administration for the Exploitation of Penal Labor; on May 31, 1945, the Groza regime transferred this administration from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Interior.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

185
608

of the political importance of the peasantry, but refused to accept the rural ideals of populism; they saw the need for industrialization but were not going to let industry fall into the hands of a capitalist oligarchy. Having achieved their revolution they set about to prove that it was possible to achieve socialism in one state, be it a backward state such as Russia. Whether this revolution and this socialism were what Karl Marx had in mind is a different matter.

The question remains, of course, whether the Bolshevik achievement was anything more than a tour de force. One can maintain that it succeeded simply because it has survived and expanded under exceptionally difficult circumstances. On the other hand, the shadow of repression which darkens the Soviet state, the heavy weight of a bureaucracy forming its own hierarchy, and the vast extension of forced labor, under whatever guise, would indicate that the Leninist synthesis did not reveal a magical solution for the economic problems of a backward state and that the Soviet Union has paid dearly for its ambition to build socialism in a single and relatively retarded country.

Aside from these problems of the Soviet economy, the installation of a Communist regime in Rumania involves additional difficulties. The mere fact that the Groza government was externally imposed has stigmatized it as an alien intruder. To say that this is of no moment except to the nationalist middle classes is but casuistry. It is significant that while one may find certain justifications for the Soviet action in Rumania—in the strategic importance of the area, in the pronounced hostility displayed by Rumanian regimes since 1917, in the advantages of coordinating the eastern European states in one large economic region—Soviet and Rumanian Communist apologists unfailingly fall back upon the one explanation which simply is not true, that the Groza government represents and is supported by the overwhelming majority of the Rumanian people. This does not mean that it will be vigorously and permanently resisted; alien domination is an old familiar in eastern Europe, and history tends to overlook the many cases when national independence, crushed to earth, remained there. But it does mean, for the near future at least, the blighting of whatever democratic tendencies may be contained in the theory of communism. Those Rumanian Communists who were known to have a Rumanian rather than a Soviet point of view were dropped from their posts and eliminated from the political scene well before the Titoist heresy became a public issue.

As to the economic prospects, there is, of course, the general advantage of participating in a large economic space. People of nearly all political outlooks have felt that the multitude of small states cre-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

ated in eastern Europe after the First World War did not represent a rational economic solution. The principal, and decisive, differences arose over the nature of the union or federation which should be inaugurated.

On the other hand, Rumania is now in the position of being a junior partner in a belt-tightening association. There is no question that in blatant contrast to the Soviet political aim of creating an eastern European coprosperity sphere, the actual Soviet activities, largely under the terms of the armistice, have thus far constituted a heavy drain on the Rumanian economy. There is no need to attribute malevolent intentions to this drain. The Russians were badly in need of supplies and equipment to restore their economy, and it is altogether natural that they should have accorded a higher priority to their needs than to Rumania's, and given the power relations they were perfectly able to do so. Unfortunately, this pressure in one form or another, most probably in relation to military requirements, may last for an indefinite period of time.

Ultimately, the development of the Rumanian Communist party and the fate of the People's Republic will depend upon the Soviet Union's relations with the Western powers. The Groza government was installed for reasons of international policy and its future rests with the fruits of that policy.

728 made, that "it is to be hoped that such exaggerated demands will be disallowed at the future Conference. The possession of Arad, with its poignant sentimental associations for the Magyar race, would be a permanent challenge to Hungary and would embitter tenfold her relations with Rumania, which must at the best be strained for many years to come." ("Rumania and the Great War," page 96.)

With regard to Bucovina, Rumania secured more advantageous frontiers than those the Allies had promised to concede her in 1916. She obtained the line of the river Dniester as her northern frontier.

The decision with regard to the Banat was not so favourable for Rumania, for the Yugoslavs insisted on incorporating the western part, which was peopled mainly by Serbs, and they protested against the allotment to another Power of a territory which stretched right up to their capital, Belgrade, and would have placed the latter under a permanent menace from another state. In consequence the experts of the Conference had to adjust the frontier as best they could, guided mainly by the principle of nationality. The arrangement is not particularly auspicious, as a small Yugoslav enclave cuts the railway line Temesvar (Temişoara)—Bazias, and leaves the latter town isolated from Rumania. The various nationalities inhabiting the Banat are, however, so intermingled that it was next to impossible to reach a more satisfactory solution.

THE POST-WAR PERIOD.

668 On Bratianu's[1] resignation, in consequence of the
648 presentation of an ultimatum by the Allies in October,
[728] 1919, King Ferdinand formed a Cabinet presided over by General Vaitoanu, with a mandate to call a general election.

A strong majority composed of heterogeneous left groups was returned, out of which a Cabinet presided over by Dr Vaida-Voevod was formed. He entered upon the difficult and ungrateful task of dispelling misunderstandings with the Entente and signing the Peace treaties. No sooner, however, had this been accomplished, than Dr Vaida-Voevod, while

1 [head of Rumanian delegation to the peace conference, acting prime minister, and leader of Liberal Party -- Analyst]

still abroad, was summarily dismissed. Peasant risings, a movement for autonomy in Transylvania, and general instability led to the nomination of General Averescu to office, owing to the reputation he enjoyed of being a strong man, having taken an active part in suppressing the peasant rising of 1907. [668] 642 648

General Averescu's government passed the enactment dealing with the distribution of land to the peasants, while his Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Take Jonescu, laid the foundation of the Little Entente by concluding alliances with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. General Averescu attempted to open pourparlers with Russia, so as to prepare the recognition of Rumania's right to Bessarabia, and there was a fair chance of his succeeding, but he was baulked of his aim, for the King vetoed his plan. [423]

To M. Titulescu was assigned the task of reorganizing the country's finances. This was deemed to be an intrusion into the special domain of the Bratianus[1] and so by provoking their hostility, brought about Averescu's downfall. M. Take Jonescu was his successor, but he was able to maintain himself in office only for a month. A government constituted by the Bratianu party followed in January, 1922, and remained in power until March, 1926. Owing to the disunion among the Opposition groups the Bratianu party was allowed to carry into effect its nefarious project of securing complete control of the economic resources of Rumania. The whole legislation passed during its tenure of office was of a purely economic character, and under the pretext of consolidating the finances of the country they merely consolidated their own financial dominance. 652 665 661

Popular dissatisfaction was steadily growing in the meanwhile, as instead of relieving the money stringency, the economic policy of the government did nothing but intensify the evil from which the country was suffering. On the other hand the Opposition was closing its ranks and organizing mass demonstrations throughout the country. A monster meeting of peasants was held at Alba-Julia in May, 1925, followed up by vigorous onslaughts against the government. The latter, unable to obtain a foreign loan which would have enabled it to stabilize the currency and relieve [664]

1 [The Liberal Party, headed by John Bratianu--Annotat.]

which is supported by the bulk of the party, may prove salutary for the country, as it is the only peaceful means by which a reversion to constitutional practice may be secured. A similar campaign has been launched by the Liberal or Bratianu party, for the elimination of the present régime, and it is possible that the force of circumstances may lead eventually to a close co-operation between these two political parties in order to attain this common object which at the present moment each is attempting to secure independently. That such a contingency is well within the domain of possibility, is clear owing to the widespread dislike and unpopularity the present régime is encountering, which is apparent from the persistent attacks it is subjected to by the Press; even independent newspapers like the "Lupta" and "Adeverul" joining in them. In fact nothing could better characterize the prevailing discontent than the following excerpts from articles published by the above mentioned newspapers on 17th May, 1932. "Whither this sort of government has brought us is made clear by a perusal of the newspapers published in all regions of the country. They show that the laws promulgated by the Government are either inapplicable or prove the source of new unforeseen confusions, explainable by the lack of forethought or the haste of those in authority. Their incompetence has undermined confidence amongst all classes of the population and has created a state of moral depression which shows itself in regrettable violent agrarian manifestations, in protests by members of the teaching profession and the frequent suicides committed all over the country, the majority of which are due to poverty.

The Government, which since its assumption of the reins of power has not even once had the moral courage to verify whether it enjoys the confidence of the nation or not, should comprehend from these manifestations that it has lost even the ultimate justification for continuing its activities, namely the hope of obtaining an amelioration of the present situation."

While the "Adeverul," commenting on the campaign launched by the Transylvanian section of the National Peasant Party affirms: "The echoes of discontent which

668 resound from the province across the Carpathians are not isolated. The whole country is agitated by this discontent which may explode at any moment."

The above statements should not be taken as outbursts of spite, for even in official publications, such as the bulletin of the Constantsa Chamber of Commerce, we come across similar pronouncements: "We are facing a complete economic disaster. All the productive forces of the country are exhausted. All private savings lent on credit are lost owing to general insolvency. The State is unable to collect even one fourth of the direct taxes it imposes. We have arrived at this state of affairs owing to the irrational financial policy of post-war governments . . . . . Great mistakes were committed, and this fact should be admitted before we start on the right path. Many of our rulers were incompetent and dissipated, not to say that they acted as profiteers." (February, 1932, p. 23–26.)

645 [652] Since proofs were submitted the following events have occurred in Rumania:

Owing to the growing discontent among public functionaries, pensioners and officers at their not receiving their pay, the King felt constrained to enjoin the Cabinet to satisfy forthwith the legitimate claims of these public servants. The government, unable to comply with this behest, tendered its resignation early in June, whereupon the King once more convoked M. Titulescu to Bucarest, and bade him form a coalition cabinet. M. Titulescu's efforts proved again fruitless; for while the National Peasant Party did not refuse its co-operation, the Liberal Party asked that it should be entrusted with a mandate to form a government, as it pretended to be strong and capable enough to deal singly with the situation.

666 As, however, no party possessed a majority in the Chamber, it was decided to dissolve it, and to appeal to the electorate. M. Vaida-Voevod, who is known to be strongly opposed to gerrymandering, and other electoral abuses in vogue in Rumania, formed a provisional government to supervise the elections. These were held in July, and the

[186] 665

Transylvania, so that by impoverishing us they may exploit and lord over us."

665 668

Both M. M. Maniu and Vaida-Voevod are known for their moderation and circumspection and through the "Patria," the mouthpiece of the Transylvanian section of the party, they have endeavoured to impose silence on their more turbulent followers and on the advocates of militant methods. But if a new political combination is imposed on the country from above, it seems that their hands will be forced and a more combative attitude adopted, which may well be the signal for radical changes in Rumania. The Transylvanian peasantry is far from being prone to allow the Rumanian goverment to ride roughshod over its constitution, and the absence so far, of subversive movements in that province is solely due to the demureness and composure of M. M. Maniu and Vaida-Voevod and should not be taken as indicative of a peaceful disposition. On the contrary, the Press campaign of General Averescu against the present régime has been widely approved and the peasantry is openly expressing sympathy with him. He is in fact becoming a very popular figure. Owing to the severe crisis which the province is traversing, which is more acutely felt than in the old kingdom because from the cultural point of view it is several stages ahead of the latter, it would not require much effort to turn the brewing dissatisfaction into open revolt. Already the peasants are beginning to manifest their disapproval of M. Maniu's attitude, and are more and more insistently demanding that he should abandon his present seclusion and explain the reasons for the passivity he has so far shown. Apparently they believe that the time has come for more drastic methods. A speech from M. Maniu delivered in February, 1932, to a delegation of his party, which went to greet him at his country retreat at Badacin and ask him to resume his duties as leader of the party, is characteristic of the efforts he employs to assuage the militant ardour of his supporters. He refused to accept anew the leadership, and among other things he is reported to have declared: "To-day the nation is deprived of its constitutional rights; we are on the threshold of bankruptcy, both economic and moral; we see anarchy enthroned in men's souls and hatred fomented in the pro-

668 vinces, and in the murmur of this growing dissolution one
665 hardly hears the voice of the national conscience, one and undivided. The nation is in the midst of disquieting social and economic troubles, and is being conducted by inexperienced and unprepared men, deprived of intuition and without inspiration. In such solemn moments you ask for my guidance. I shall offer you none. You have both intelligence and conscience. I pray you to revere the memory of the sufferings which brought about the consummation of the national unity. I beg of you that momentary incitations should not be allowed to trouble the purity of your devotion to the ideal of the unity of our State. . . . Uphold the unity of the National Peasant Party because it is by its aid that we shall revert to a democratic and constitutional life and extricate the peasantry and the whole social structure from its present wretchedness. Do not forget that you have to fight for a policy of equity towards the provinces. . . . . We have the advantage of having a youthful king of our own generation. We have received him with justified enthusiasm, and we believe that thanks to the qualities with which he is endowed, he will respond to the people's heartfelt desire and lead it accordingly."

665 This policy of passivity, hitherto followed, seems to have reached its close, for all of a sudden on May 14th, 1932, the "Patria" published a vehement attack on the government which may be taken as the preliminary move in a systematic campaign aiming at its removal. This fulminating article created a sensation in Bucarest, and hopes were expressed that this rebellious attitude of the Transylvanian section of the National Peasant party would not meet with the approval of its partisans in the old kingdom, but fortunately for the Rumanian people these forebodings were soon dispelled when the Bucarest organ of the party, the "Dreptatea," announced that this campaign had the full support of the party behind it. A concise summary of the above mentioned article in the "Patria" is given below as it indicates very clearly not only the wrongs inflicted on Transylvania, but also that the patience of the people is at an end.

661 "Transylvania and the Banat have been reduced to the
668 state of colonies left to the discretion of illiterate exploiters.

POLITICAL PARTIES

Eighty-six per cent of the State revenue is being raised this 661
year in our province. Transylvania forms one-third of the 668
total territory of Rumania, and possesses only one-fifth of the total wealth of the country; how then can this imposition of 86% of the total burden of taxation on our province be justified?

This oligarchy at Bucarest constitutes a gigantic swindle which has transgressed all limits and which in any other civilized State would long since have been blown up from its very foundations, so that every trace of this moral ugliness which disgraces this country should be removed. We do not enjoy equality of treatment with other Rumanians, for we have been excluded from appointments in the army, the customs, the railways, the post, the administration and the magistrature. We are far from being autonomists, but we will ask whether under such circumstances it is possible to stem for long the claim for autonomy. In all corners of the country people begin to display restlessness. They demand that a campaign be opened not only against the government but also especially against the present régime which aims at despoiling the nation of its birth-rights. This campaign will soon begin and citizens will have the privilege of sacrificing themselves for the purpose of securing the return of a constitutional régime. It will be a campaign of extreme violence in the course of which nobody will be spared.

The present economic disaster which we are experiencing is to a great part due to the disorderly conduct of State affairs from which Rumanians of the provinces have been excluded. For decades the provinces have been subjected to a policy of pauperization and political serfdom. We raise a solemn protest and warning that the time is not distant when Rumanians of the provinces will no longer tolerate these adventurers and political mountebanks who treat the provinces as colonies fit only to be exploited." . . . . . .

This overt and frank criticism of Bucarest circles naturally 661
excited a certain indignation in the Rumanian capital, yet independent papers like the " Adeverul " were courageous enough to express a certain sympathy. In its issue of 15th May, 1932, the latter journal regrettfully admitted "it is probable that this warning from across the Carpathians will

3 did little to foster their civic development at the time when Transylvania formed a part of their kingdom, and this has been most lucidly exposed by Dr Seton-Watson in his book, "Corruption and Reform in Hungary." Nevertheless, this intercourse, whatever its momentary drawbacks may have been in the past, has influenced very favourably the Rumanian element, a matter that would seem to confirm once more the theory of Professor Wm. McDougall that "the development of the group spirit in general and of national self-consciousness in particular is favoured by, and indeed dependent upon, conditions similar to those which develop the self-consciousness of individuals, by intuition, by conflict, by compulsion, and by co-operation." (V. "The Group Mind," page 165.)

563 662 In general, it may be admitted that the minorities have been more favoured by the Bucarest Government than the Rumanian majority of Transylvania, for the latter, except during the time the Maniu Government was in power, was always in the ranks of the Opposition, and as such it could not reckon on obtaining any bounties, while the support of the minorities was very often secured by the dispensation of various privileges. Even in the economic field the minorities could reckon on a certain financial support which Budapest generously granted to their industrial and banking firms, while corresponding Rumanian establishments in Transylvania were stinted of all help from Bucarest because it was the policy of the Bratianus to stifle every enterprise that had not come within the orbit of the Liberal party, and for this purpose they did not hesitate to employ the most unscrupulous methods.

563 668 The Magyar minority is undoubtedly better off than the Rumanians of Transylvania from many points of view, and this is the reason why all Magyar propositions for offering the Hungarian throne to King Carol II have not been viewed favourably at Bucarest. It is felt that the Rumanian population has not yet been able to rise overmuch, from both the cultural as well as the economic point of view, and that it is still dominated by the Magyars. It is felt also that a personal union with Hungary under the common sceptre of a Rumanian King would mean the consolidation of the

supremacy which the Magyar still retains, and such an 563
eventuality is fraught with danger for the Rumanian element 668
in general, as it would tend to recreate a state of affairs similar to that existing before the war. Hungarian advances purporting to bring about the realization of such an eventuality have so far been coldly received, even those made by Count Bethlen to King Carol in person at Temişoara have not evoked a hearty response among Rumanians, either of Transylvania or of the old kingdom. The Magyar pre- 666
ponderance in urban districts of Transylvania became 563
evident by the criticism with which the alteration of the law concerning the election of advisers in the Chambers of Commerce was met in 1929, when all these posts became elective instead of being partially nominatival. It was then reported that in the town of Cluj the Rumanians could count on only 20% in the commercial, and on only 30% in the industrial section of the Chamber, and it was proclaimed that measures ought to be taken to remedy the position of inferiority in which the Rumanian element had been placed, all the more so, since in other commercial and industrial centres, the position of the Rumanians was even worse than at Cluj.

Concerning these reported pourparlers for a personal union 563
between Hungary and Rumania, it may be of interest to 668
record what a Hungarian paper, the " Friss Hirek," published at Cluj, had to say on the meeting which took place at Temişoara between Count Bethlen and King Carol in 1932. In its issue of May 8th, 1932, dilating on this interview it stated among other things :—

" The negotiations concerning the personal union met with complete success and were based on the granting of independence to Transylvania under the leadership of Prince Michael, whose seat would be at Cluj, common Ministers for Foreign Affairs, War, and Finance. These matters were definitely agreed to. King Carol was to take up his residence for six months at Budapest and for six months at Bucarest.

The independence of Transylvania satisfied Count Bethlen as it would solve the minority problem. Transylvanians would enjoy equal rights and the various denominations

563 would obtain equal grants, while officials would be nomin-
668 ated proportionately to the numbers of each nationality.

Count Bethlen, however, desired to justify the millions spent on the revisionist campaign and demanded the revision of frontiers, namely the retrocession of the Hungarian towns bordering on the frontier (Arad, Oradea-Mare, and Satu Mare). The advisers of King Carol considered that the present frontiers of Rumania were final, and in order that the idea of a personal union be rendered acceptable to the Rumanian people, all reference to a revision of frontiers should be dropped as it was sure to provoke a fiasco, all the more so since the Liberal party was known to be hostile to the idea of a personal union. The Rumanians would accept the scheme only in case Hungary agreed to recognize the actual frontiers without rectification and in exchange for the other concessions. It was on this point that the negotiations came to a standstill. Count Bethlen was bound by engagements towards the revisionist group. According to his conception, only Transylvania was to remain under Rumanian rule as a Duchy, while other parts were to revert to Hungary."

In conclusion the paper stated that "the interview left painful recollections with Count Bethlen who now talks of an alliance with Italy and Austria."

The Dobrudja.

563 If the state of the minorities in Transylvania may be stated
166 to be relatively satisfactory, taking into consideration the
657 general shortcomings of the Rumanian administrative system, it is to be regretted that as much cannot be said of
647 the Dobrudja, where both the Turkish and Bulgarian minorities, living in compact masses, have well-founded grievances. One of the main causes of dissatisfaction has been the ill-considered plan of the Rumanian Government to colonize southern Dobrudja with Kutso-Vlachs from Macedonia. Without making any adequate preparations to provide these people with dwellings, food and clothing, it proceeded to billet them in the small cottages of the Bulgarian and Turkish farmers which were barely sufficient for their owners. The newcomers being destitute, had no alternative to that of

lei which was absorbed by Russia. Through the latter 433
country an annual surplus of over a million tons of cereals was also marketed, as an excellent network of railway lines connected Odessa and the chief towns of Russia with Bessarabia. Further, under the Russian régime credit facilities 452
were obtainable and a capital of some 10 million roubles or 10 milliard lei was at the disposal of the agriculturalists, while now it is reckoned that the Rumanian banks do not dispose of even 1½ milliard lei for this purpose, and in spite of the fact that the present requirements of the population are incomparably greater, since with the breaking up of the large estates, it was indispensable to provide the peasantry with funds wherewith they might buy implements and cattle for their farms.

It would appear that any civilized government, however 489
vague its conception of its duty might be, would have proceeded to endow this province with a network of roads and railways to aid the population by thus facilitating the transport of its produce to the ports, since Odessa, the former outlet, is no longer available for this purpose. But strange to say, the Rumanian authorities have done nothing whatever; though even the construction of a few short connecting lines permitting a partial reorientation of the existing railway tracks and the construction of a grain elevator at the Danubian town of Reni would have gone a long way to relieve the strain. Even the deepening of the bed of the Pruth as far as Ungheni might have provided cheaper transport facilities to a large percentage of the available grain, which was often left to rot in the fields because overland transport charges, in the absence of roads, were found prohibitive.

Even out of mere solicitude for the safety of the State the Rumanian government ought to have provided means of communication whereby its army might in an emergency be concentrated on an ever-exposed frontier, in a region where a perpetual state of war exists. But even this weighty consideration has not sufficed to rouse the Bucarest Government from its self-complacency. There are, of course, persons 668
who would explain the continual agitation brewing in Bessarabia and the predilection of its inhabitants for Russian rule 177
by the assertion that these dunces of Moldovans (as the

668 Bessarabians are popularly called) forming the most back-
177 ward section of the Rumanian people are mentally incapable of appreciating at their true value all the qualities which the Rumanian administration exhibits in its conduct towards populations whose goodwill it has set out to win. For the organs of the Rumanian State are inspired by a high purpose, that of converting these Moldovans of Bessarabia into loyal Rumanians, by inculcating in them a consciousness of the collective national will. When they shall finally see eye to eye with the various cultural missionaries which Bucarest has so far dispatched for their edification, then at last will loyalty and love follow, for loyalty after all is but the consciousness of oneness, and it is this consciousness of oneness that the Bucarest "Kulturträger" are attempting to impress on the Bessarabians.

668 These altruistic efforts, however, seem unavailing, for in January, 1932, a pan-Bessarabian congress of all parties and creeds was held at Kichineff, and delegates resolved to create a united Bessarabian front so as to impose on the Government which had done nothing for this province since its union with Rumania, the taking of certain measures designed to ameliorate the situation. M. Batsaria, a veteran Rumanian journalist, commenting on this congress in the "Adeverul" stated that a member of the cabinet had confided to him that this discontent was not peculiar to Bessarabia, but existed in all the new provinces. An atmosphere, which was in no way favourable to the realization of a complete spiritual unity among the inhabitants of Great Rumania had been created. And so long as the legitimate rights of all were not respected, and their just grievances remained unredressed, so long would unity be unattained.

The Jews.

[162] The Jewish minority numbers some 800,000 souls (accord-
563 ing to Winckler's racial statistics, 778,094) who are mainly
641 concentrated in the urban districts of Bessarabia, Moldavia, Bucovina, and the province of Maramureş. As petty trading, commerce and, to a large extent, banking is in their hands, all the more important towns have a numerous Jewish element in their population. The manifest disinclination of the Rumanians for commerce has permitted the

000 letting in the flow of the great body of people to the offices of government.

642 668 But there are those of course who mistrust democracy and who would prefer to seek renovation by other methods. Corruption among the political parties in Serbia prepared the way to the dictatorship. A similar trend has been discernible lately in Rumania, and among the exponents of despotism we find university professors such as M. Paul Negulescu. In his "Treatise of Rumanian administrative law," the second volume of which appeared late in 1930, we read that "most of the politicians being incompetent, and occupying high posts thanks to party influence, sympathize with men of similar mentalities, and look askance at men of independent character. . . . By the intervention of politicians in the administration its personnel is demoralized, as also by the creation of sinecures for party friends." The author proceeds to demonstrate that the authority of the State is compromised by such habits and indicates as a remedy . . . . a Government appointed by the King and responsible solely to him.

Political corruption brings grist to the fascist mill, scandals and incompetence are adduced as justifying the adoption of another system of government. The following article, which appeared in the "Epoca" for Oct. 24th, 1930, a newspaper with conservative traditions, reveals how gravely the system of parliamentary government has been undermined by the dishonest practices of Rumanian politicians:—"The task of reconstruction was incontestably easier for Rumania than for other States. First, owing to the similarity of race, language and religion in the annexed provinces, and secondly, owing to the immense resources possessed by our country.

Thanks to odious and dishonest party politics we have lived through an era of continuous descent into wretchedness more and more acute. Every party that has acceded to office has left behind it an abyss of hopelessness and of ever increasing poverty, empty State coffers, and a growing disgust in the mind of the taxpayer. Political persons speculating on the naivity of the masses have accumulated colossal fortunes which have been placed in safety beyond the danger of possible judicial revisions. This country, blessed in all by the Lord, which ought to have been the most prosperous

corner of Europe, has been allowed to become the prey of 642
odious vampires, who have sucked everything dry and have 668
even robbed us of our hope of possible salvation. Nevertheless, Providence hath granted the return of our long expected King," etc.

One is justified in expressing doubts as to the expediency 641
of applying fascist methods in Rumania as one fails to per- 565
ceive the dominating personality who might control and 661
direct such a policy; one may also ask, where are the indispensable coadjutors to be recruited from? It can hardly be said of King Carol that he has been able to live down his unfortunate reputation so as to assume with some hope of success such a formidable task. As for his likely collaborators who, presumedly, are to be selected from among the Rumanian ruling circles, one need only peruse the posthumous memoirs of the late Rumanian Prime Minister, Marghiloman, in order to be convinced of the utter abjectness of this class. M. Pamfil Seicaru, who may be likened to the late Henry Labouchere of "Truth" for his fearless criticisms, when writing on the boundless vista of putridity disclosed by this compilation, stigmatized in the "Cuvantul" of July 17th, 1927, in the following scathing terms the leading circles of his country :—"These memoirs form a vast archive concerning turpitudes of a whole ruling class . . . the majority of this class which remained in the territory occupied by the enemy openly practised with him . . . while those in Moldavia offered a spectacle of the most trying moral bankruptcy. A parliament of speculating fugitives revealing a criminal insensibility in face of the tragedy of a whole country; one cannot imagine a more sinister divorce between a ruling class and a nation in arms. . . . And who amongst them can indict the others for their subversion of the national ideal? Can the aristocratic fugitive fragment which took refuge in Moldavia or Russia claim to represent a higher standard of morality than the section which remained in the occupied territory meekly to serve the enemy? They both form two aspects of the same filth."

As recently as May 6th, 1932, Octavian Goga, an ex- 565
Minister and presently in intimate relation with the King, 641
who publicly brags of being the successor designate of Prof.

241 565 of the State. It is this utter lack of consideration for this hard-pressed mass of humanity that raises the indignation of the foreign observer against those who, through the cruel irony of fate, have been called upon to look after the destinies of this luckless people. The selfishness, incapacity, and corruption of which they have given proof can only be compared to that moral disintegration existing under the Tsarist régime, and one should not feel surprise if finally the same developments supervene. The rural population is absolutely sick of the present system and has lost all faith in its politicians.

An important meeting was held early in 1932 at Focşani [668] by fruit-growers and viticulturists, who may be considered to represent the more intelligent classes of the rural population, and the prevalent opinion expressed by the delegates was to the effect that no alleviation could be expected so long as the present system was maintained, and that Bolshevism held out better prospects. This did not cause any alarm, and passed almost unheeded, save for some mild criticism from one of the veterans of journalism in Rumania, M. Batsaria, who, in an article which appeared in the *Adeverul* on January 20th, 1932, admitted that this attitude was significant, yet opined that it was not aimed against the Crown, which at the time was being very roughly handled by General Averescu in the Press campaign the latter had just launched.

241 433 In spite of the culpable neglect with which agriculture has always been treated, the industry remains Rumania's mainstay and sole hope of survival. The whole social life of the country, even its future existence, depends on the normal development of agriculture, which provides not only the food, but also the raw materials for the more promising sections of the country's budding industries, and the means wherewith Rumania can pay for the indispensable articles she imports from abroad, as well as for the payment of interest on her public debt. It is a matter of grave concern, therefore, that the average yield of cereals per hectare should have steadily diminished in the last nine years and sunk below the pre-war average of 1,130 kg. per hectare. If nothing be done to remedy this evil Rumania,

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

661 preferential legislation, the right to exploit natural resources under State control, could all be and were secured by Rumanian and foreign trusts for comparatively small sums. The mismanagement and appropriation of public money by government officials, including the court, had ruinous consequences for the population which knew about these things, but was unable to do anything about it. [651] Indirect taxation, heavier and more ingenious than anywhere else in Europe, provided an inexhaustible source of income for those in power. The 'aviation-stamp', for example, which had to be affixed on every bill, theatre- and cinema-ticket, etc., was supposed to secure a strong Rumanian Air Force. In fact Rumania possessed hardly any aircraft at all as the funds were misappropriated throughout.

648 661 **THE ROYAL DICTATORSHIP.** The instability of Rumania's economic and political life and her geographical position made the country extremely sensitive to any changes in Central Europe. Therefore the rise to power of the National Socialists in Germany, the risings of February and June 1934 in Austria and world reactions to these events had [668] immediate repercussions in Rumania. The Liberal Prime Minister Duca was assassinated in December 1933 by members of the Iron Guard. Tatarescu took over and decreed a state of siege, which has not been lifted since, ostensibly to repress and destroy the Iron Guard. In fact exactly the opposite course was adopted. The democratic forces which began to rally in order to fight Rumanian Fascism were persecuted by the government whilst the terrorists were allowed to continue their activities.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

The Iron Guard was originally part of the Mol- 668
davian and Bessarabian anti-Semitic movement led by Professor Cuza. Amongst his pupils was Codreanu who formed the 'Legion of the Archangel Michael', a terrorist organization modelled on the Fascist and Nazi pattern and supported by Germany and Italy. Codreanu began his political career with the assassination of the prefect of police of Jasi, the blackmail of Jews and the persecution of progressive organizations. His adherents were poor students of the type which in Germany formed the core of the Nazi movement, the lower clergy, army officers and civil servants. His anti-Semitic and anti-Bolshevik slogans sounded attractive to certain big business men, high army officers and the higher clergy who gave him their support. The king regarded the Iron 643
Guard with favour, for it seemed an excellent 668
weapon for weakening the country's democratic forces and preparing the way for his own, undisguised dictatorship. Accordingly the crimes of the Iron Guard were not punished and the activities of her adherents remained unchecked.

In order to exploit the international situation, 643
which was only too favourable for dictatorship, 208
Carol began with an intensive propaganda, taking the slogans of Fascism, National Socialism and the Iron Guard, and laying particular stress upon his desire to rule with the help of the young generation. The schools and universities were militarized and the defence of the country made one of the daily watchwords. By ruling with non-party cabinets and 643
playing off one party against the other Carol under- 662
mined the strength of the Liberals and the adherents of Maniu and Mihalache. From both parties he

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

643 found guilty in a libel action. The only immediate
[648] danger, the revisionist claims of Hungary and Bulgaria, was to be eliminated by an even friendlier attitude towards Italy and Germany, and Carol's tour of the European capitals, including London, was intended to reassure the democracies.

643 Beneath the surface, however, the struggle between the Iron Guard and Carol continued. While Carol was on his tour, Codreanu and thirteen of his legionaries were shot by their prison guards. The Minister of the Interior, Calinescu, a former member of the National Peasant Party, who succeeded to the premiership after Miron Cristea's death in March 1939, ordered further repressive measures and was himself assassinated by Iron Guardists in the autumn of the same year.

563 THE FIFTH COLUMN. Nazi Germany found an ex-
668 tremely fertile soil for its propaganda not only among the Rumanian Fascist parties and some generals and industrialists, but also amongst the many Germans living in Rumania. They were economically prosperous and the best treated of all minorities in Rumania. The most important communities were the settlements in Transylvania and in the Banat. At first Nazi propaganda was not very successful owing to the economically favourable position of these Germans and their comparatively strong religious feeling.[1] But as time went on it had great successes. Under the cloak of cultural associations Nazi cells were formed which soon spread into every German village. Unwilling Germans were

[1] The 'Saxons' are Protestants, the 'Aelpler', also in Transylvania, and the 'Schwaben' of the Banat Roman Catholics.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

forced into these organizations by social and economic pressure. Combatant units, armed and trained, consisted of youths who learned the Nazi doctrine in their schools. Financial assistance came from the German banks in Rumania: they supported the transactions of the 'Association for Export to Germany', which secured a virtual monopoly in the export trade of grain, cattle and pigs to Germany and Italy, as well as the hemp-growing scheme, which met with considerable success in the Banat. 563 668

Similarly the German papers published in Rumania soon passed under Nazi control. Their information was received from news agencies in Germany which also supplied them with commentaries and feature articles. Naturally the Rumanian Fascists were supported by the German-Rumanian Nazis who acted as go-betweens and agents of their masters in the Reich.[1]

The pro-Nazi Germans of Rumania who had always possessed good economic, industrial and financial connexions were able to render valuable assistance in the economic penetration of the country by German trusts. In 1933, for example, the fusion of several chemical firms in the Banat and in Wallachia brought them entirely under German control. That they produced semi-finished material for explosives enhanced their value. The iron and 563 471

[1] The outrages of the Iron Guard, such as the desecration of Jewish synagogues and cemeteries, destruction of Jewish shops, political murder and blackmail, were aided and abetted by the German Nazi agents. A series of fires and bomb-explosions in Timisoara in November 1938, as well as other terrorist acts, were committed by members of the Iron Guard jointly with some German youths who were known to the public but escaped punishment. 648

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

563 steel works of Resita and Copsa Mica, with a capital
471 of six million pounds sterling, and many other factories also passed under German control. In the
[439] fight against Franco-British and American capital in Rumania, Germany was favoured by the fact that 50% of Rumania's imports were German, and 36% of the country's exports went to Germany (1938). By 1940 the latter had reached about 70% of the total.

563 This underground activity of the German minority, combined with the pro-Fascist leanings
668 of the majority of the ruling classes, who feared to lose their privileges and were only too glad to join in the Anti-Bolshevik[1] crusade, and the corruption reigning in the army and all branches of the government apparatus, sapped the strength of the country economically, politically and morally. It had become an easy prey for the imperialism of Hitler.

661 [1] Especially savage measures were taken against workers' and intellectuals' progressive organizations, which were made illegal and had to go underground. Their members, if caught, were court-martialled and imprisoned.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

648 6,250,000.[1] Greater Rumania had ceased to exist.

668 **THE FLIGHT OF THE KING.** The territorial losses and the disintegration of Greater Rumania were only the outward signs of internal decay. The vigour and strength of the people, however, were not yet broken. The cession of Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina aroused feelings which fortified the popular movement. Demonstrations were held in all the big Rumanian towns demanding the abdication of Carol and the creation of a truly democratic government. At the same time territorial concessions to Hungary were opposed; and when it became known that the Vienna Award was to be accepted, in spite of the vigorous protests of almost all well-known Rumanian statesmen, police and soldiers had to be employed against thousands of indignant demonstrators in order to maintain 'peace and order'.

Popular discontent and fury against the king were cleverly exploited by the Right Wing. The Iron Guard, whose opposition to his personal rule was well known, turned the popular feeling to good account. They were the loudest in demanding the abdication of Carol, but naturally not in order to enable the formation of a democratic regime. This

131 162 [1] The remaining territory covered an area of less than 80,000 square miles; the population had shrunk to about 14,000,000. Official Rumanian figures state that Rumania's population in 1942 was over 16,000,000, of which over 13,000,000 lived on the land (Wallachia, 6,200,000; Moldavia, 2,800,000; Bessarabia, 2,700,000; Bukovina, 800,000; Dobrudja (without Southern Dobrudja), 500,000; Rumanian Transylvania, 2,400,000; Banat, 1,000,000).

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

so-called national and revolutionary movement 668
betrayed its German inspiration by supporting and approving the handing over of Transylvania to Hungary, but opposing the cession of Bessarabia to the U.S.S.R.

The king's Prime Minister, Gigurtu, resigned on 668
4 September and Carol summoned General An- 643
tonescu, who was at the time imprisoned in Bistrita, and charged him with the formation of a new government. This step was all the more remarkable as the German Minister at Bucarest had been able to communicate with Antonescu while he was in prison. Antonescu at once demanded Carol's abdication and obtained it after two days' continuous and heated discussions and negotiations. On 6 September Carol, accompanied by his mistress Mme Lupescu and his aide Udureanu, left Rumania. His son Michael succeeded for the second time to the unstable throne.

Carol's abdication was due to many different 643
factors. The occupation of Bessarabia by the Red 668
Army and the acceptance of the Vienna Award 648
showed how brittle and hollow was his widespread kingdom. Everybody knew how great the king's share in the weakening of the country had been. The ten years of his reign had led to disastrous consequences. The will of the people, voiced for the first time for many years, had a decisive influence on the events leading to the abdication. Another important factor was Hitler's distrust for a man whose country he intended to take under complete domination. The king's renunciation of the British Guarantee was unable to win him Germany's confidence. Since Carol assumed the throne in 1930

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

643 he had played off one political party against the
668 other in order to strengthen his position. In foreign
648 politics he followed the same tactics. He ended by completely isolating Rumania internationally and undermining her internally.

It may be said in extenuation of his inglorious behaviour, that the dismemberment of Greater Rumania was inevitable, once the whole balance of power had shifted against the Western Allies, whose settlement had created it. But it is at least equally tenable that a democratic and united Rumania, which had succeeded in winning the loyalty of any considerable elements among its minorities, might have held out against the cession of territory to Hungary, by obliging the Hungarians and Germans to use force to effect it at a time when Hitler was anxious to avoid war in the Danubian area. This might have rallied Rumania with Yugoslavia and Greece, who showed a more heroic spirit, to the Allies' camp. In fact, the king's policy only aggravated the internal situation and sharpened the conflict of parties.

642 **RUMANIA GOES TO WAR.** General I. Antonescu,
661 having obtained Carol's abdication,[1] pronounced himself 'Conducator', that is, 'Leader', and proclaimed the creation of the 'Legionary State'. His government was composed of generals, leaders of the Iron Guard and civil servants. Codreanu's successor, Horia Sima, became vice-premier and at once organized an unprecedented regime of terror throughout the whole of Rumania. His henchmen assassinated numerous prominent opponents of the Iron Guard. The looting of shops and the beating

1 [Sept 6, 1940 -- Analyst]

* 701 and admirals who had been most intimately associated with Anton-
*648 escu were arrested and several, among them Generals Antonescu,
Pantazi, and Vasiliu, were taken to the Soviet Union, where they
661 were questioned and held until their trials in Bucharest in 1946.

With the end of the War the purge went further. Procedures for elimination of war criminals and collaborators were laid down in 1945 and numerous trials were held in 1946. At the same time the size of the army was being cut and many officers were simply dismissed. The Treaty of Paris in 1946 provided that the total military forces of Romania (including land, air, and marine force as well as frontier guards) could not exceed 138,000. The actual number of troops in active service at one time fell as low as 90,000. These were culled from fifteen regular divisions and two Communist divisions which had fought the Germans. The reduction in force was pushed as an ideal opportunity to get rid of political opponents.

The Communist take-over did not occur without resistance. The years from 1945 through 1950 were marked by a series of successively more stringent Communist demands for control.

• 668 The first prime minister after the coup was General Sanatescu.
He was not sufficiently acceptable to the Russians and on December
643 6, 1944, he was replaced by General Nicolae Radescu, who had been known as an opponent of Antonescu and the Nazis and had spent some time in a concentration camp. Radescu, however, was by no means a pro-Communist or a Communist tool and he also lasted only briefly, being ousted on February 27, 1945 at the demand of Vyshinski, the Russian representative in Romania. A few days later a government was formed by Dr. Petru Groza who also had not been a Communist. He was indeed one of the wealthiest men in Romania and had been something of a collaborator with the Nazis, but he was sufficiently pliable to be used by the Russians for a considerable period. It was not until June 2, 1952, that he was replaced as Prime Minister by a top Communist leader, Gheorghiu-Dej. Groza is still a figurehead in Romanian politics under the title of President of the Presidium.

* 701 With the formation of the Groza government there came the first
major shake-up in the army command. During the succeeding twelve
*648 months thousands of officers were removed. General Ion Negulescu,
Minister of National Defense, was replaced by General Constantin Ras-
661 canu, a man who had been Chief of the Military Police under the Antonescu regime and later was disgraced and sent home from the front for engaging in black market operations. He ingratiated himself with the Communists by leading the group of officers who forced Radescu out of office.

During 1946 the non-Communist officers showed increased resistance to the sovietization of the army and the country. Toward the end of the year the Communists decided upon a further shake-up. Rascanu was discharged as Minister of the Armed Forces and replaced by General Mihail Lascar, former prisoner of war, who had served in the Horia-Closca-Crisan Division. Before that he had fought well on

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Romania EDI

(as Stalin argued persuasively at Yalta) to deserve separate membership in the United Nations. The voice of the Ukraine is therefore heard at Flushing Meadows—and is not to be despised, even though it is the voice of Jacob rather than Esau, for usually it has been that of Mr. Manuilsky, one of the most experienced revolutionary debaters extant. The voice of the Rumanian People's Republic is not heard there and is not paid much if any attention anywhere. 648

Before long the question will come up whether Rumania deserves even the title of satellite. This might be settled by Moscow's decision to bring her into the Soviet Union as one of the constituent member republics. Until now an argument against this has probably been the hope that she might one day be elected to membership in the United Nations, in exchange for Moscow's acceptance of some Western-sponsored candidate like Ireland or Portugal. But meanwhile the orbit in which she moves has so much shrunk that she no longer shines even by reflected light, and the chance that she might be considered entitled to membership in any world assembly of independent nations has greatly diminished. Foreign newspaper men no longer are allowed to report directly on what is occurring in the country. If elements of national resistance still exist we hear little or nothing of their activities.

Bucharest might have hoped to claim glory as the capital of the Cominform, which she supposedly became when the organization moved out of Belgrade. Even this is denied her, for the Cominform no longer meets regularly, in Bucharest or anywhere else. Perhaps the Soviet leaders see no further value in the organization. Perhaps Stalin has made up his mind not to permit any alternate center of power, even minor, to the Kremlin. Some persons think that the Cominform was created originally in order to deal specifically with the Jugoslav situation, and having fulfilled this function, though far from successfully, is now retained simply as a paper organization for possible use some time in the future. Today its principal activity is as a printing press. To the extent that glory attaches to being a printing press Bucharest has it. The Cominform journal, *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!*, is printed there in some 15 languages. 665 668

The Cominform journal may even be written largely in Bucharest. 000

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania ED1

648 advertise to the Rumanian masses, most of whom had never heard
728 his name. On March 8, therefore, Groza was told to ask Stalin for northern Transylvania, and by return telegram he received it as a "present." The Nazis had not yet been expelled from Budapest, so there was nobody there for Moscow to take into account. The Western Allies were not consulted. As a matter of fact, they had no objection to the return of at least most of Transylvania to Rumania, but would have preferred that it be done after study as to whether or not there should be frontier rectifications in favor of Hungarian ethnic groups; and they certainly would have considered it more suitable that the transfer be made after agreement among the Allies rather than unilaterally by one of them.

665 The steps by which the Communist-dominated Rumanian Gov-
668 ernment became an absolute Communist dictatorship need not be detailed here.[3] In the beginning there certainly were some non-Communist elements which favored a clean sweep of the old order even though the representatives of the new order were Communists and protégés of the hated Russians. Seizure of the large properties still left in Rumania after the land reforms following the First World War was popular in principle. Rumanian régimes of the inter-war period had not been noted for efficiency or probity, and the Communists hastened to identify all Rumanian statesmen who held democratic beliefs and had a Western orientation with the "old gang" of profiteers and politicians who had mocked the Constitution in the dissolute days of King Carol and had ended by taking Rumania into the war as the ally of the Nazis. The fact that Maniu, the country's leading statesman, was famous for his incorruptibility and stubborn devotion to the Constitution did not deter Communist propaganda from picturing him also as a corrupt relic of the old dictatorial order. The Socialists were, of course, completely outbid by Communist promises of pie in the sky.

665 But although these tactics had some success at first the only one
241 of them that was based on anything substantial, the gift of land to
423

[3] For a fuller outline of the postwar evolution in Rumania as well as other parts of Eastern Europe, and of relevant negotiations (if they can be called that) between the Soviets and the Western Powers, see Campbell, *op. cit.*, also volumes for 1947–48 and 1948–49 in the same series by the same author, and the volume for 1949 by Richard P. Stebbins.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

for this it required a degree of stability, not the hectic atmosphere created by Guardist terror squads. Consequently, when Antonescu in December began to take measures to bring the Guard to heel, he had German support, although the Legionaries refused to believe that the Germans would desert their most ardent allies. Antonescu proceeded to disarm their formations and to strengthen the army. Seeing their position undermined, the Guard on January 21, 1941, attempted to revolt. They were suppressed by the army after three days of savage fighting in which they outdid themselves in committing bestial atrocities. On January 27 Antonescu formed a new cabinet composed almost entirely of military officers. The Iron Guard was dissolved, the Legionary state abolished, and a firm military dictatorship under the *Conducator* came into being. Thus fell one of the first fascist movements in Europe and, ironically enough, at just the time Nazi Germany achieved complete predominance in Rumania.

Under the Antonescu dictatorship political life ceased altogether; the army and the Germans were in complete control. A couple of plebiscites provided the necessary stamp of legality and the government, with very few changes, remained in power for the next three years. In June, 1941, Antonescu joined Hitler in the war against the Soviet Union. Maniu and Constantin Brătianu supported the war until the recovery of Bessarabia and Bucovina, though they protested against the dictatorship. After Rumanian troops crossed the Dniester, they dispatched notes of protest to Antonescu demanding Rumania's withdrawal from the war. But by this time he was too deeply involved in the German adventure. In October, 1941, he annexed Transnistria, that part of the Ukraine lying between the Dniester and Bug rivers and including Odessa. Rumanian troops went on and on until they reached Stalingrad. Then began the slow retreat.

Well before his overthrow Antonescu, now a Marshal, realized that the war was lost but was unwilling to take the steps to extricate Rumania, although he permitted envoys of the political parties to establish contact with the Allies. In the absence of effective opposition he was able to maintain power until the Russians, who had been checked in northern Moldavia in the spring of 1944, resumed their offensive in the late summer. With the imminent threat of Rumania becoming a battlefield and being further devastated by increasing American bombing raids, King Michael seized the initiative, arrested him, and sought an armistice.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

page 242

XII

THE COMMUNIST PERIOD: THE ADVENT TO POWER, 1944–45

669 ON August 23, 1944, King Michael, with the cooperation of a four-party bloc comprising the National Peasants, the Liberals, the Socialists, and the Communists overthrew Marshal Antonescu through a skillful palace coup d'état. On September 12 Rumania signed an armistice with the Allies. Six months later, on March 6, 1945, the Groza government, nominally a coalition but dominated by the Communist party, came into office and has remained in power since that date.

668 The sudden flowering of the Rumanian Communist party, the result of external rather than internal influences, marks a definite break in the continuity of Rumanian politics. Communism was not totally lacking a past in Rumania, and the Communist program had a relevance to Rumanian problems, but without the direct and active intervention of the Soviet Union the Groza government would not have obtained office. To be sure, the Conservative Marghiloman cabinet of 1918 was the direct consequence of Germany's military successes on the Eastern Front; the return of Brătianu in the same year was made possible by the Allied victory. The fall of Vintilă Brătianu and the success of the National Peasants in 1928 were to some extent connected with Rumania's foreign financial relations. Above all, Carol's fall and the Iron Guard and Antonescu dictatorships were certainly conditioned by the Nazi hegemony over southeastern Europe. Rumania has always been affected in its internal politics by direct or indirect foreign influences. Nevertheless, there is a difference.

All the preceding political changes hitherto considered were effected by parties or groups, which, if they were not popular, were at least associated with important Rumanian institutions. Thus the Liberals, the extent of whose popular support was doubtful, formed the oldest party in Rumania and were in control of the nation's banking and financial apparatus. Carol made use of the institution of the monarchy and its tradition of royal paternalism. Antonescu relied upon the army. The National Peasants, less well connected with the institutional framework, one of their weaknesses, were, in their period of growth, the representatives of a broad mass movement in the peas-

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

duced a radical land reform and legislation for the 175
provision of general public instruction. Cuza's reforms were only partly put into practice when a palace revolution, engineered by some of the *boiars*, and by army officers, deposed him and forced him into exile.

CAROL I.[1] The unificaiton of the two principalities was now achieved. It had been accomplished from above, by the same class, greatly strengthened by Rumanized Greeks and others, who for the past centuries had served foreign rulers and exploited the peasantry. It was based on the very real and strong desire of the whole people to live in a State of its own, but the achievement of this aim was completed as a result of international diplomacy and intrigues at home, not by a genuine national revolution.

The rule of Carol I was the period of the consolidation of the new State. He introduced a constitution based on the Belgian model and after fighting the Russo-Turkish War on Russia's side was recognized by the Powers as the first King of Rumania.

During his reign[1] there was considerable progress 175
in economic life assisted by great investments of 669
foreign capital which enriched many landowners, 565
a number of Rumanian capitalists and the corrupt bureaucracy, who together became organized in the Conservative and Liberal Parties: they ruled Rumania between them. In achieving nominal independence Rumania did not succeed in ridding itself of the old social system, resting on the pre-

[1] Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Prince of Rumania 1866, King 1881.
‡ [i.e. King Carol I (1881-1914) -- Analyst]

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

175 669 565 dominance of a small, wealthy and powerful land-owning class. The situation led in 1907 to one of the bloodiest peasant revolutions of modern times which was put down brutally by General Averescu. Significantly the peasant rising began with pogroms against the Jews who had become very unpopular as the agents of the landowners: it has often been found profitable in Rumania to divert discontent into anti-Semitic channels.

175 In 1913 Rumania joined in the Second Balkan War against Bulgaria and thereby gained the whole of the Dobrudja. During the period preceding the outbreak of the last Great War Rumania became an ally of the Central Powers through a secret Alliance made by King Carol I with Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1883. After the death of Carol and the accession of Ferdinand in 1914 the Rumanian Government remained neutral, until it entered the Great War on the side of the Allies on 27 August 1916.

GREATER RUMANIA. This decision was taken owing to the territorial gains which Russia and the Western Powers offered as an inducement and which were embodied in another Secret Treaty signed on 17 August, and also to the pro-French feeling of the ruling class. As a result, though swiftly defeated and overrun by the Germans and Bulgarians, Rumania was able, after the war, to satisfy her territorial claims against Hungary and Austria, and the weakness of Soviet Russia enabled her to annex Bessarabia. Thanks, therefore, to her Allies, Rumania emerged from the Peace Settlement doubled in area and in population.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

On 8 April 1918 the Representative Council of 635
Bessarabia,[1] *Sfatul Tari*, by 86 votes to 3, 36 dele- 175
gates abstaining, decided to become an autonomous part of Rumania. This step was sanctioned by Germany when the Treaty of Bucarest was signed one month later. In November of the same year, 1918, after the Armistice, it was decided at a session of the Representative Council, attended by only 46 delegates, to declare for the unconditional union of Bessarabia with Rumania. The annexation of Bessarabia was not recognized by the Peace Conference at Paris; and although recognition was promised by the Conference of Ambassadors in 1920, this undertaking was never ratified by all the Powers.

During the following years Bessarabia was treated 635
as a conquered province. All district councils and 661
other organs of local government were abolished. 669
The country was ruled by prefects appointed by and responsible to the central government in Bucarest. The province was strongly garrisoned and lived in a continuous state of siege. All communications over the Dniester were destroyed and anybody caught attempting to cross the frontier was either imprisoned or shot. Between 1918 and 1924 there were a hundred and thirty-five uprisings in Bessarabia, which were suppressed by the military with the utmost violence. In the course of these revolts it is estimated that over thirty thousand Bessarabians were killed, many more executed or sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. The peasant revolt of 1924 in the region around the town of Tatar-Bunar was put down after heavy fighting and the burning of many villages.

[1] The Council was composed of 138 deputies of whom 103 were Rumanian, 13 Ukrainian, 7 Russian, 6 Jewish, 2 Bulgarian, 1 Pole and 1 Armenian.

This state of affairs led to the great and bloody peasant revolt of 1907 which was ruthlessly crushed by the Bratianu government with the help of troops commanded by General Averescu. Yet, even after this the rulers of Rumania were unwilling to carry out reforms which were already overdue. Only in 1917, when the position on the Rumanian front seemed completely hopeless and when the Russian Revolution found more and more adherents among the peasant soldiers, did the government of King Ferdinand decide to carry out a thorough land reform. Although this was the most far-reaching of any measures ever carried out in Rumania, it bore all the marks of a step adopted unwillingly, under the pressure of external events. Although the Bratianu government, composed of many big landowners, consented to carry out the land reform, it was violently opposed by many of the government's supporters. The reforms, as finally applied in the early nineteen-twenties in both the Old Kingdom and in the New Territories, differed considerably from the original plans of 1917. They did, however, bring about important changes. Whereas before the Great War half of all the arable land belonged to a few *boiars*, by 1930 about nine-tenths belonged to small holders and only one-tenth to big landowners.

565
471
669
423

In Bessarabia many of the big estates remained untouched; land was given to reliable farmers, Germans and Rumanian colonists, but not to the landless who needed it most. In Transylvania the land reform was used to strengthen the Rumanian as against the Magyar elements of the population. But many of the holdings remained too small to

471
565
423

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

up of Jews became the favourite occupation of the 661
legionaries. The resulting confusion helped many 642
minor officials as well as influential business men in acquiring valuable property.

But it soon became obvious that the real masters 648
of Rumania were the Germans. In October 1940 642
Antonescu invited German troops into the country as instructors for the Rumanian Army. German 669
trade delegations began organizing Rumania's economy and German specialists were appointed to important positions in various ministries. Although Antonescu had included the Iron Guard in his government, the struggle for power between him and Horia Sima continued. In January 1941 the Iron Guard, supporting the latter, made a last bid. The legionaries rose in revolt and succeeded in gaining several strong positions in Bucarest and in some provincial towns. The army, however, sided with Antonescu, who was also aided by the Germans, and within a short time the 'Conducator' emerged as victor. He at once proceeded to the establishment of a completely military administration and based his whole regime on the army.

His[1] success in the fight against the Iron Guard 721
was influenced decisively by the German desire to create a stable Rumanian government which would join in the attack on the Soviet Union. Antonescu did not fail his German masters. On 22 June 1941 Rumanian troops, together with German divisions, crossed the Soviet frontier. Thanks to German 721
support, Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina 727
were re-occupied within a short time. Both provinces were put under a military administration and ruled quite separately from the rest of Rumania.

[1] [I e. Antonescu -- Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

181 shown that they possess qualities equal to those of other nations, and they still do. These forces are dormant, covered, as it were, by a thick skin which has grown as a result of blows which had to be suffered and could not be parried. If and when the strain becomes too great, and when opportunity comes, then this people may discover its power and, if it be well led, form a healthy State.

669 186 Up to now this[1] has never happened: the people has never won against its oppressors. And this is a factor which has been ever present in Rumanian history. The peasant revolt which broke out amongst the Rumanians in Transylvania in 1785, four years before the French Revolution, ended in complete defeat. The national movement of Tudor Vladimirescu in 1820 resulted in little more than the appointment of Rumanian, instead of Greek, princes to the thrones of Moldavia and Wallachia. The revolutions of 1848 were speedily crushed by the combined forces of the great empires and, in the case of the Rumanians of Transylvania, were used in the most cunning way to defeat the national movement of another people. The union of Wallachia and Moldavia, one of the most genuine aims of the whole Rumanian people, was achieved in the end less by popular forces than by intrigues and international diplomacy. The Great Peasant Revolt of 1907 was put down by the military and cost thousands of peasants' lives. The Land Reforms of 1917 were accepted by a parliament which contained not one single peasant; and they were carried out by one of the richest landowners of Rumania, who, with his associates, had certainly no intention of applying them in such a way as to diminish the power of his

[1] [i.e: the formation of a healthy State -- Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

class over the countryside. The union of all Rumanians in one State was a long-cherished dream. Its realization was only partly due to the actions of the people; Greater Rumania was the result of the greediness of the country's rulers, supported by the anti-Soviet policy of many countries. It carried the seed of its own destruction; and, when disruption came and the popular forces rose to assert their will in 1940, they were again defeated. In place of the royal dictatorship came the dictatorship of Rumanian and German Fascism: in place of partial economic domination by the west came complete domination by Germany.

One of the greatest barriers to the progress and well-being of Rumania and the Rumanians has been the fact that the geographical position and the wealth of the country have made it the victim of the ambitions of Great Powers. Rumanian governments have sided more often than not with the national enemies of their people and have at best tried to play off one of their foreign protectors against the other.

Yet it is exactly the geographical position and the great wealth of Rumania, combined with the hardiness and strength of its inhabitants, which hold out the promise of a happier future. The material and human resources for such a development are abundant. What is necessary is the liberation of these material and human forces under disinterested leadership. If that happens, if the unlucky chain of unsuccessful revolutions is broken; if these forces conquer those of their corrupt rulers, and the unhealthy social system of exploitation and oppression is replaced by the government of the people for the

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Bulgaria EE1
Rumania ED1

B
697
466

There is an austere puritanical fanaticism about the regulations which is difficult for an American, inured to doing what he pleases, to comprehend.

Virtually all potential foes of the Communist regime in Bulgaria have been sent to such camps, which means that any person who deviates in the slightest degree from the established Communist norm invites the public prosecutor to get on with incarcerating him. It is difficult to believe that the system is as far-flung and well established as it is; but the Communist authorities themselves have made available a substantial amount of information on its extent. There are at least thirty slave-labor camps in Bulgaria, and it has been estimated that at least 500,000 persons have been confined in them during the seven years of Communist rule. Among the inmates have been whole families—men, women, and children. Before we condemn the Bulgarian Churches for cowardly behavior it may be well to ask what we ourselves might have done in the circumstances.

162]

II

P
648
642
669]

Rumania was not fully subordinated to the Communist Party until the close of 1947. On the eve of the invasion of the country, which had been the only one to lend full support to the Nazi cause, young King Michael overthrew the Iron Front government and its strong man, General Antonescu, by a *coup d'état*. The new Government, in which a general also served as Premier, accepted the terms of armistice. Nevertheless by March 6, 1945, the Communists were unmistakably in control, although a fellow traveler, Dr. Petru Groza, was selected to head a government in which they had the upper hand. At the Potsdam Conference the United States, Great Britain, and Russia agreed to sign a treaty of peace with Rumania as soon as a government should be formed which was "broadly repre-

the German side as commander of a brigade on the Russian front. He was then a major general and was decorated by the Germans with the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and promoted to the rank of General of the Army. Before his capture he was often called the 'hero of Stalingrad.' After his capture by the Russians, however, he co-operated well with them. Lascar served as Minister of Armed Forces until replaced by Emil Bodnaras in the next major shake-up on December 24, 1947. Lascar then became Inspector General of the Army and First Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces, a position which he held until the subsequent shake-up in March of 1950.

Of all these turning points perhaps the most important was that of December 1947, the Romanian counterpart of the Prague coup of a month and a half later. In December 1947 Emil Bodnaras took over and at the same time King Michael was forced to abdicate. That was the decisive shift in both the political and military spheres. General Lascar, Bodnaras' predecessor, had been a career officer even if an indoctrinated one. Bodnaras, on the other hand, was a long-time Communist whose military career had ended in disgrace.

Bodnaras was born in the early 1900's in Bucovina. According to the usual story his father was a Ruthenian peasant of Ukrainian background and his mother a German. One of our informants who knew him indicates, however, that that is not so, and it seems that we have here one of the many cases in which interested refugee circles prefer to label current Communist leaders as foreigners rather than admit that their own nationals can be traitors.

In the middle 1920's Bodnaras went to military school and was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1927. From 1927 to 1930 he took an artillery course and in the latter year was promoted to first lieutenant. At the time he became involved in Communist espionage, and when caught fled to Russia. He was tried in absentia for desertion and espionage and sentenced to five years imprisonment. In 1933 he attempted to slip back into Romania, was caught and served the years from 1933 to 1936 in prison. At that time he escaped and again went to live in the U.S.S.R. During World War II Bodnaras was assigned to party organizational and propaganda activities rather than to fighting the Germans. When the war was over, the Communists placed him as Secretary of State in the office of the Prime Minister, a job concerned with the secret intelligence service. He was in this position until the Soviets decided to take complete control of the army and to communize and develop it.

When Bodnaras took over, he brought in a new group of deputy ministers and changed many commands. The end result of his activities to date is a situation in which Communist party militants control the very top positions but quite a few career officers remain in posts just below them. This result was reached in a zigzag course of three stages.

I. The reorganization in the period from December 1947 to 1950

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

693 agencies, being subordinate only to the Procurator General, the latter is
642 responsible to the Grand National Assembly, and in the interim between its sessions, to the Presidium (Article 75).

[671] The powers and functions of the Procurator General are specified by Law No. 6 of June 2, 1952, concerning the "Setting up and Organization of the Procuratura of the Rumanian People's Republic." The Procurator General has the right to take part, "with a consultative vote," in the meetings of the Presidium and of the Council of Ministers (Article 4). He is empowered to see to it that the decisions and rules issued by the central and local agencies of state power and administration conform with the laws of the country. Charged with the administration of justice, he supervises the activities of the agencies of penal investigation; he may ask for the dossier at any stage of the investigation, and has the right to "issue compulsory instructions with regard to the development of penal investigation and inquiry and to be present at any act of penal investigation or to carry it out himself" (Article 7, Paragraph a).

642 The Supreme Court, whose chief function is the supervision of the judicial activities of all the courts (Article 72), is elected by the Grand National As-
692 sembly for a term of five years (Paragraph 1 of Article 67). The judges, theoretically independent and subject only to the law (Article 70), and the people's assessors are elected in accordance with the provisions of a special law (Paragraph 2 of Article 67). All judicial proceedings are conducted in the Rumanian language, with special provisions for the use of other languages in areas inhabited by compact groups of other nationalities or minorities. Persons not knowing the language in which the judicial proceedings are conducted are constitutionally guaranteed the right to acquaint themselves with the material of the case and the privilege to use their own language in the summation of their case (Article 68).

Unlike the Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme Tribunal of the People's Republic of Rumania, like its Soviet counterpart, has no power of constitutional interpretation and is more of an auxiliary than an independent branch of government.

177. The constitutional provisions regarding the administration of justice, how-
69 ever "progressive" they may sound, conceal the true nature of the Marxist-
692 Leninist concept of justice, which has been adopted by the People's Republic of Rumania as well as by the other countries in the Soviet orbit. The modern principles of penal law (*"nullum crimen sine lege; nulla poena sine lege"*) applied and observed in all civilized countries, have been replaced by the concept of "class-justice." Marxist doctrinaires assert that the purpose of "proletarian class justice" is the maintenance of the regime of the dictatorship of the working class and the complete elimination of all "reactionary" and "anti-democratic" elements.

Although the principle of "class-justice" has not been embodied in the two Rumanian constitutions framed under the regime of popular democracy, it nevertheless has found clear expression in Law No. 5 passed by the Grand

000 795 642 175 (the ruler) and members of the "Sfatul Tarii" (country's Assembly). In general, the Romanian Orthodox Church has been since the foundation of the "United Principalities" in 1859 considered the predominant church and had a prioity over other churches. This situation continued when the Kingdom of Romania was formed after 1866 (hereafter called Old Kingdom in contrast to Romania after 1919). Nevertheless, the religious practices of other churches were tolerated and undistrubed. The Romanian Orthodox [798] Church did not consider itself universal, was not animated by any spirit of proselytism and was rather passive and tolerant towards other creeds and rites. For this reason and because of the small number of persons professing other religions in the Kingdom of Romania, the situation did not call for any special legislation on freedom of religion prior to World War I.

II. From World War I to the End of World War II

1. General Regime of Churches

659 The necessity for special legislation regulating the status of churches other than the Romanian Orthodox has arisen after World War I.

175 671 The Romanian Kingdom emerged after World War I with an enlarged territory. The newly incorporated provinces were hitherto governed by different laws. Bulgarian law prevailed in Banat and Maramurosh, the same law with some specific provisions was also in force on Transylvania; Austrian law was

175 in force in Bukovina and the Russian law, with some specific
● 671 local rules, was in force in Bessarabia.

175 The population of the newly incorporated provinces was
162 predominantly Romanian but, in view of the long separation from the Old Kingdom, was somewhat different. Moreover, there were also other ethnological groups and a variety of churches and even sects.

The population of Transylvania and Banat, for instance, was divided mainly among the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches. The population of Bukovina and Maramurosh was either of Catholic (Uniates) or Orthodox religion and had an important Jewish minority. In Bessarabia, in addition to the Eastern Orthodox Church, there was a real conglomerate of creeds and and rites, many of them originating back in the 17th century and subsequent reforms of the Russian Orthodox Church.

659 A new Constitution was adopted in 1923. It declared
[642] the principle of freedom of religion which needed to be developed in details and put into effect by special laws. This did not follow immediately but, instead, the Romanian Government carried out, in 1925, the unification and hierarchical reorganization of the Romanian Orthodox Church (see <u>infra</u>).

This step increased the pressure of the numerous other churches and rites practiced within the new frontiers. They intervened seeing that their status be defined and that their relations with the higher church authorities abroad, as well as with the Romanian State and the Orthodox Church, be settled by

Article 25[1] provides that: 659 793 671

"the Ministry of Religious Affairs shall suspend any decision, instruction or directive, as well as any order (of a church authority) having a church administrative, cultural, educational or a charitable character or pertaining to endowments if it is contrary to the status of the denomination, to the act of its establishment, to public security or public order or morals. The pastoral and circular letters shall be communicated in advance to the Ministry of Religious Affairs." (Italics supplied.)

The religious denominations and their endowments, associations, etc., must submit a full report on their financial situation for approval and verification by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The law provides that the salaries of clergymen and the officers of the church shall be paid by the State. But, in contrast to the Law No. 1002 of 1936, Article 34 of the Decree No. 177 suggests that these persons are on the same footing with other government employees in all respects. This article reads:

Article 34

Placing on the payroll of the clergymen and officers of the religious denominations shall be done according to the general rules.

The "general rules" of government employment referred to here (Code of Civil Service of 1946) makes clear that everybody who draws salary from the Government treasury enjoys all rights and has all of the duties of a governmental employee.

Several provisions deal with the disposal of property of parishes where a part of the parishioners decided to choose 659 425

[1. Law No. 62, Article 25, 1948 - Analyst]

659
425

in particular the Roman Catholic Church, were already deprived of their funds. This was a result of practices supported by legal provisions.

[423]

In the first place, it refers to land. Agricultural land still possessed by the church after the land reform of 1919 was in fact taken away in direct violation of the law.

[671]

Article 8 of Law No. 187 of March 23, 1945, on agrarian reform provided that:

> "agricultural land belonging to monasteries, mitropoles, bishoprics, parishes as well as clerical endowments are excepted, from expropriation, and left in the ownership of the present title holders."

Likewise, certain categories of land, such as vineyards and forests, were generally exempted from expropriation. Nevertheless, most of Catholic landed property, including forests, vineyards, etc., were commandeered early in 1945 and thereafter seized by various "local committees" and, eventually, divided into small holdings. The remainder was seized in its entirety in February 1949 without compensation. This time the Government did not even take pains to issue a decree legalizing the actual seizure.

[454]

The "Sacred Fund" of the Catholic Church (see supra) also lost its value. It was composed almost exclusively of governmental bonds and were given after 1919 to the religious Catholic bodies in Transylvania as compensation for estates expropriated at that time. The terrific inflation of 1944-1947, swept out their value. Then, just before the monetary stabilization of August 14, 1947 government bonds were compulsorily called in and paid for in inflated lei, only an insignificant part of which was exchanged after the monetary stabilization for new currency.

accomplished by Decrees No. 175 and 176 (Official Gazette No. 177 of August 3, 1948). By Article 35 all denominational schools were taken over by the government. It reads as follows: 659 871 [671]

Decree No. 175 of 1948

Art. XXXV. All the denominational and private schools shall become governmental schools.

Decree No. 176 of 1948

Art. 1. For a better organization of the public education, as well as the expansion and democratization of the educational system, all personal and real properties that belonged to the churches, congregations, religious communities, non-profit organizations and trade corporations and, in general, to individuals or legal entities which were destined to serve as support...to denominational schools, are transferred to the government ownership and shall be used for educational needs.

This provision covers school buildings, dwelling for professors, boarding houses and students' homes, etc., as well as funds, estates, and legacies serving educational purposes. No compensation was to be paid for them. A list of over 2,000 denominational and private schools of all kinds, from kindergartens to colleges, which were thus expropriated, was attached to Decree No. 176. The provisions quoted make plain that no denominational school may be opened in the future which conclusion is supported by the fact that a subsequent Decree No. 177 of August 4, 1948 regulating the religious denominations does not mention the right of the church to open general schools. It deals with schools in Chapter VI but provides exclusively for divinity schools.

These decrees affected especially the Roman Catholic Church to which belonged the majority of the denominational schools. [798]

But the Decree No. 358 (Official Gazette No. 281 of December 2, 1948) suggests that the Greek Catholic Church ceased to be a separate ecclesiastic body in Romania and there may be only separate parishes. The Order reads as follows: 659 175 [611]

Article 1

Subsequent to reverting of the local Greek Catholic Parishes to the Romanian Orthodox Church and in conformity with the Article 13 of Decree 177/1948, its central organization and those provided by its Constitution shall cease to exist.

The Order says that the assets of the Greek Catholic Church shall become the property of the Romanian State, without any compensation, and shall be assigned partly or wholly to the Romanian Orthodox Church or to its various constituent parts. [425]

The Government obviously has made use of the provisions of Article 13 of the Law for Religious Denominations of 1948 to withdraw recognition from this church which, after the denunciation of the Concordat, lacked a definite status.

The wording of this article shows, beyond any doubt, that the Greek Catholic Church has been since July 1948 absorbed by the Romanian Orthodox Church by Administrative Order.

The fate of the Ukranian (Ruthenian) Uniate Church was different. The Concordat of 1927 provided for the establishment of this church of a separate diocese within the Roman Catholic Church with the seat to be designated later. It may be mentioned in this connection that the Uniate churches in Galicia and the northern part of Bukovina-now incorporated in the Soviet Uni[illegible] [illegible]e declared united with the Russian Church

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

642 of these institutions naturally became mere façades to conceal a much cruder reality. Party politics, for example, bore a very superficial re-
665 semblance to those of nineteenth-century England: two principal parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, alternated in office. But the reality behind this two-party system was altogether different. Politics were based on a very narrow franchise,[30] the parties themselves tended to be coteries surrounding a dominant personality or family, and there were constant factions and party splits. Both the Conservatives and the Liberals obtained their support from the landowners, the principal distinction between them being that the Conservatives were usually the explicit spokesmen of the large agrarian interests, whereas the Liberals were increasingly interested in making Rumania a strong modern (i.e., commercial and industrial) state and held the controlling positions in the growing financial institutions.

671 In the field of law the Rumanians demonstrated what Dobrogeanu-Gherea correctly called a "mania for legislation." A flood of laws was
177 continually being passed—elegantly rendered by men who had taken their law course at Paris—but with remarkably little effect. Some were inapplicable at the outset, few were administered properly, and most were soon forgotten by all concerned, with no effort made to examine their consequences. Other examples could be cited from the fields of public finance, civil rights, and the press to illustrate the abyss lying between political and constitutional forms and actual practice. The persistence of this dualism right up to the 1940's has undoubtedly had a corrupting effect upon Rumanian politics and society.

566 Notwithstanding these contradictions, which have struck all for-
177 eign observers in the past century, the very introduction of Western paraphernalia had certain important positive effects. A peasant who had been inducted, under universal conscription, into the army, who could read in the press (or have read to him) about agrarian disturbances in Sicily, Ireland, or Russia, or who heard the charges and countercharges of the political parties, however rhetorical these may have been—such a peasant was moving out of the closed circle of the village. This is evidenced in the active role played by ex-army ser-
185 geants, clerks, and schoolteachers in the 1907 uprising. Moreover, the mere existence of constitutional and legal devices, however in-
177 operative they may have been, provided potential channels for change and increased the flexibility of the existing order. Thus, in spite of the fact that changes were apt to prove illusory rather than real,

30. A system of electoral colleges, rather like that of Prussia before 1918, assured a preponderant strength in the assembly to the landowners and the wealthy urban groups.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

are far too complex for inclusion here. Whatever the origins of the 175
Transylvanian population, at the outbreak of the First World War the Rumanians constituted a majority of the inhabitants of this region; with the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the Transylvanian Rumanians, along with the other ethnic groups in the empire moved to break away. On October 12, 1918, the Rumanian National party of Transylvania drafted a resolution demanding the right of self-determination. A national assembly was called at Alba Iulia on December first and passed a resolution in favor of the union of all Rumanians. The basis of this union was to be:

1) full national liberty for all races;
2) full autonomy for all regions;
3) a democratic regime with general, direct, equal, and secret elections;
4) complete liberty of press, assembly, and association;
5) radical agrarian reform;
6) equitable conditions for industrial workers.

A Governing Council (*Consiliul Dirigent*), under Iuliu Maniu, was established as the temporary administration. The Treaty of Trianon assigned Transylvania and the adjacent regions of Maramureş, Crişana, and the Banat to Rumania.

Servile tenures had been abolished somewhat earlier in Transylvania than in the Old Kingdom, and the relative importance of medium properties reflected the generally higher level of cultivation. [566] 311
Nevertheless, there was a great disparity between large and small properties, a disparity intensified by the national question. The Rumanians were almost entirely peasants, and most of the large estates belonged to Hungarians. Reliable information, however, is lacking regarding the distribution of land either by size of property or by nationality; according to Hungarian critics of Rumanian statistics, no exact figures have ever been available for the land distribution in 1919 in the total area annexed by Rumania.[24] The Rumanians have claimed that they held only 24 per cent of the total area and that 98 per cent of the properties over 100 cadastral yokes (the yoke, used in Transylvania, equals .58 hectares) were held by non-Rumanians. While this claim may have been extreme, Hungarian sources grant that 87 per cent of the owners of properties exceeding 100 yokes were Magyars.

The project for the land reform, prepared in thirty-two sittings 671
of the Governing Council, became a decree-law on September 12, 423

24. C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors* (Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 316, n. 2.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

671 423 1919, and was subsequently ratified by the law of July 23, 1921. In Transylvania, where economic life was more advanced and extensive cereal cultivation played a less dominant role than in the Old Kingdom, the agrarian reform while radical in intent was more broadly conceived and had numerous exceptions and exemptions. It expropriated in full: estates of foreigners, estates of certain public and private institutions, estates which had been leased for more than twelve consecutive years, and any estate land of more than 500 cadastral yokes. Below 500 yokes, land was expropriated on a sliding scale down to an exempted minimum of 200 yokes. If, however, further land were needed, property below 200 yokes could be expropriated. Multiple holdings by one proprietor were considered one. The size of allotments was not fixed. The order of preference was determined primarily by war service rather than by land need, but peasants owning more than 5 yokes were not to receive land until other demands had been satisfied. The Transylvanian reform went beyond the others in its provisions for communal woodlands, which were not created for the Old Kingdom, Bessarabia, and Bucovina until a law for the expropriation of forests was passed in 1924. Compensation for expropriated land was subject to less rigid limits and the payment to the landowner was prompter. According to official statistics about 1,664,000 hectares were expropriated in Transylvania.[25]

423 The Rumanian land reforms, in the years 1918–21, did not, then, represent a unified program but varied considerably, depending upon geographical differences, previous agrarian conditions, and political circumstances. The reforms in Bessarabia and Transylvania reflected the more revolutionary spirit in those provinces; the complexities of the Transylvanian law and the attempt to relate it to the whole economy correspond to the generally higher level of Transylvanian agriculture and the presence of a nascent industry.

Notwithstanding these differences, however, which make it impossible to give a simple summary of the agrarian reform, the laws have certain common features: they were all based on expropriation in the "public interest" for the purpose of increasing peasant properties and communal pastures; although the decline of the leu in the 1920's almost destroyed the value of the compensation, the reforms were not planned as confiscations; and despite economic provisions of varying merit, the laws were not primarily economic reforms but social measures designed to appease the peasants' land hunger. More-

25. For further statistics on the effects of the reform in Transylvania see the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 665 on well together, and it was generally believed that Brătianu had forced the king to exclude Carol.

[661] Communal elections were held in February in an atmosphere of political excitement. The government, for all its electioneering techniques, did badly, especially in the larger towns. It won only one-third of the seats in the Bucarest municipal council. In Bessarabia the United Opposition won all lists. The government was defeated in most Transylvanian towns, notwithstanding its pact with the Magyar party; it won most of the rural Transylvanian communes through official pressure and the aid of the gendarmerie.

175 ● 671 666 In March the Brătianu cabinet reached the end of its four-year term. In the last session of parliament it passed a new electoral law, whose unusual provisions were to make Rumanian elections even less representative of public opinion. Deputies had previously been elected on a proportional basis. According to the new act, modeled on Mussolini's law of January 7, 1923, the party gaining a plurality and at least 40 per cent of the votes was declared the majority party: it was to receive, as a premium, half the seats in the chamber plus a number of the remaining seats corresponding to its percentage of the total vote. Thus, a party gaining 40 per cent of the votes would occupy 70 per cent of the seats in the chamber (50 per cent plus two-fifths of the remaining 50 per cent). The remainder of the seats was divided proportionally among the other parties; a party failing to gain 2 per cent of the total votes obtained no representation.

According to the Liberals, there was nothing extraordinary about this law. A bill for electoral reform had been part of the Liberal program and had been stipulated in the 1923 Constitution.[19] In a country with such a multitude of unstable parties it might be argued that the "premium," as it was called, was a necessary device to give the party in office a sufficiently strong parliamentary majority to enable it to carry on its business.

Nevertheless, given the idiosyncrasies of Rumanian politics, the law had two very unfortunate effects. Since it was the practice for the crown to summon a government, which then proceeded to hold, or "make," elections with the aid of the administrative apparatus, the electoral law increased the opportunity for the selected group to swing the elections in its favor. On the other hand, the failure of a party obtaining less than 2 per cent of the votes to gain any repre-

19. According to Article 138 of the constitution, the current national assembly (i.e., the Liberal majority) could function after the promulgation of the constitution until the expiration of its mandate. During that period an electoral law was to be passed in accordance with the principles laid down in the constitution.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

sentation was a natural incentive for such parties to abandon the parliamentary track altogether. The timing of the law led the opposition parties to charge that it was merely part of the Liberals' plan of grooming General Averescu to replace them, since his party was obviously weak in popular support. There is no question that in 1924 and 1925 Averescu had not cooperated with the other opposition parties but had worked in some measure with the Liberals.

On March 27, 1926, Brătianu resigned amid rumors that he favored General Averescu as his successor. The opposition was still fumbling in its efforts to unite; negotiations between the Transylvanian Nationalists and the Peasant party had broken down again on March 22 over a disagreement on the distribution of cabinet posts. The king, on March 29, consulted the leaders of the Transylvanian National, Peasant, and People's parties and requested a coalition cabinet; apparently the Peasants and the Nationalists agreed. But on the following day, much to their chagrin, King Ferdinand called on General Averescu to form a government.

The reasons for the king's action are not altogether clear. The Nationalists and the Peasants had blundered in not mending their differences earlier and achieving a solid coalition. On the other hand, the king had been responsible for their dismissal in 1920 and was probably quite doubtful of their ability to govern properly and likely to accept the advice of Brătianu. Brătianu of course denied that his party had any agreement with General Averescu but his disclaimer is not convincing. "All we did," he said, "was to prepare the atmosphere in order to bring into power a government which would present a guarantee for the continuity of the work accomplished by us. Apart from this we are the declared opponents of the present government." [20] It was generally believed, and probably correctly, that Brătianu had strongly urged the king to install General Averescu.

Averescu held elections in May. The National party and the Peasants, still unable to achieve fusion, agreed to collaborate in the election. Despite the premium Averescu faced quite a task in overcoming his party's numerical weakness, but he acted resolutely and altogether successfully in one of the more outrageous Rumanian elections. Military officers on active service were appointed as prefects of a number of districts. Circulation of vehicles and persons was strictly controlled. The leaders of the opposition were unable to get in touch with their constituents; even Ion Brătianu was blocked on one trip, and Mihalache was arrested by gendarmes in his own electoral district. Gendarmes supervised public gatherings and were directed to intervene

20. *Times* (London), April 21, 1926.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 covered by this law were permitted to purchase public land at a dis-
433 count, were exempted from duties on imported machinery, and received reduced transportation rates and cheap fuel. In 1923 the Liberals introduced a National Industrial Credit Association for the purpose of granting credit to manufacturers and of encouraging industrial development; the government owned 20 per cent of its stock, the National Bank 30 per cent, and private investors 50 per cent. Tariffs, as has been mentioned, were designed to protect industry from foreign competitors.

665 In their industrial activities the Liberals most clearly demonstrated
656 their suspicion of foreign capital. This suspicion was nothing new. In the 1890's the Liberals, then in opposition, had led a successful campaign against granting concessions to the Standard Oil-Diskonto Gesellschaft consortium.[46] In the 1920's they maintained they were not hostile to foreign capital but would not be dominated by it. In 1923 Vintilă Brătianu protested to a foreign correspondent:

> It would be madness to suppose that we can develop the country without the help of foreign capital. We need it in every form to develop mineral resources, water power, and industry. We also require things which must be paid for in foreign money. But we want this capital to operate within the lines of a general policy which is approved of by the state and which accords to the interests of the country. We do not want the type of investor who comes to exploit the country simply to make money, but one who has a feeling for our national evolution and keeps our interests at heart. We want to be treated as an adult and not as a minor.[47]

[671] Nevertheless, the Brătianus were accused both by the opposition in Rumania and by foreign investors of being economic xenophobes. The accusations are based largely on a series of four "nationalization" laws passed in 1924:[48] a law for the commercial exploitation of state enterprises (June 6, 1924), laws on water power (June 23) and other sources of energy (July 1), and a mining law (July 3).

These laws, which covered a wide range of industrial activities—hydroelectric power, natural gas, petroleum, mines, railroads, river navigation, postal services, telephones and telegraphs, and government monopolies—had generally the same provisions. Invested foreign capital in the enterprises could not exceed 40 per cent; the remaining 60 per cent was to be covered by state and private Rumanian

46. C. G. Rommenhöller, *Gross-Rumänien* (Berlin, 1926), p. 434.
47. *Times* (London), May 19, 1923.
48. A French text of these four laws is given in *L'Économiste roumain*, Nos. 2–6 (1924).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

in the way of concrete benefits. Liberal agrarian policy can be divided under two heads: measures taken in supplementing or amending the agrarian reforms and measures for the improvement of agriculture.

Of the land reforms, only that for Translyvania had provided for the expropriation of forest land. Article 132 of the 1923 Constitution approved the principle of expropriating forest land in the Old Kingdom, Bessarabia, and Bucovina for firewood and construction purposes. The law implementing this article was published on July 1, 1924. Where woodland was needed and was not available from state holdings, it could be expropriated from private owners leaving them a minimum of 100 hectares. Communal woodlands were to be created, the exploitation of which was to be under the control of the state.[54]

By the law of March 13, 1925, and the executive regulation of April 15, which abrogated Articles 120–124 of the 1921 law, the Liberals, to safeguard peasant holdings, considerably stiffened requirements for the sale and purchase of agricultural property. The state was given the right of preemption on lands received not only under the 1918–21 reforms but under earlier distributions of state domain. If this right were not exerted, purchases could be made only on the following conditions:

1. The purchaser was to be a Rumanian citizen, a cultivator of the land or a graduate of an agricultural school, and residing and working in the commune in which the holding was situated.

2. Holdings could be sold in minimum blocs of 2 hectares in the plains and 1 hectare in the hills.

3. Sales could be made only five years after their owner had received definite title to his property following full payment of its price.

4. The purchaser could not own more than 25 hectares of cultivated land, including the area to be purchased. Houses and gardens, up to one hectare, could not be mortgaged or sold; land up to 25 hectares could be mortgaged only to certain authorized institutions.

The detailed instructions in the accompanying administrative regulation made the act of sale quite complicated by requiring numerous forms, proofs of domicile, and evidence of proper ownership. While the Liberals did not make peasant land inalienable they did render the process of transfer slower and more difficult and extended the state's rights of preemption to a large proportion of peasant properties. This law was in harmony with the tight-laced spirit of the Liberals in 1924–25 and showed the same restrictive view of property as the mining law of 1924. Historically, the reversion toward inalien-

54. See Diaconescu, *Chestiunea țărănească în România*, pp. 266–272, for analysis of the text of the law.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

423 665 656 241 671 ability was an aftermath of nearly all the land reform measures. It is characteristic of the liberalism of the Liberal party that it should have feared—though perhaps correctly—the consequences of free and uninhibited sales of land.[55]

665 241 The Liberals, in the law of April 14, 1925, instituted chambers of agriculture, modeled on the chambers of commerce, and united in a Union of Chambers of Agriculture. At first sight these organs appeared to have very important functions: to be the official representatives of agricultural interests, to give advice on agricultural legislation, to supervise agricultural schools, to collaborate with the administration in the application of laws, to improve livestock, to aid in the advancement of agricultural techniques, to prepare statistics, and to organize fairs. They were also to elect members to the senate.

Unhappily, the chambers accomplished very little. Their budgets depended upon the Ministry of Agriculture, and they were not supplied with sufficient funds to carry out the work delegated to them.[56] They were not even representative of the whole of the peasantry. Each chamber was composed of 17 elected members and 11 appointed functionaries. But since only proprietors with a minimum of 3 hectares of arable land, or tenants with 10 hectares were permitted to vote for members, a large percentage of the poor peasants was not represented at all.[57] (In 1930, 52 per cent of the peasant farms were of less than 3 hectares.) Worst of all, the chambers, with their right to elect senators, became hopelessly entangled in politics. Under the law creating them, the government could dissolve the chambers for serious irregularities or bad faith in the accomplishment of their legal work or for activities against the interests of the state. Inevitably, the chambers were repeatedly dissolved on any pretext for the purpose of facilitating the election of senators.

665 656 241 In May, 1928, the Liberals passed a law for the classification of cereals, designed to improve the quality of grain destined for export and to reduce the number of middlemen between producer and foreign consumer. There had been frequent complaints of the inferior quality of exported Rumanian grain and the presence of an excessive amount

55. In 1911 the Liberal program has spoken of the desirability of creating a medium property by natural selection, that is, by the purchase and sale of land. The 1924 law certainly represents a retreat from that position. On the other hand, as will be seen below, the National Peasants revised the 1925 law, for the purpose of permitting "natural selection," but with unfortunate results for the poorer peasants.

56. F. E. Manoliou, *La Reconstruction économique et financière de la Roumanie et les partis politiques* (Paris, 1931), p. 159.

57. Filip Chefner, "Camerile agricole in România," *M.A.B.: Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, 2 (1926), 36.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 firm the supposition that the principles of the Peasant party itself were unstable. The evolution traced here was to be carried even farther when the National Peasants came to power in 1928.

Economic and Agrarian Policy

[113] A fair illustration of the economic interests of the National Peasant government is to be found in Virgil Madgearu's little book, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, published in 1930. Of the 63 pages of text, 14 are devoted to agriculture, 22 to the exploitation of state enterprises and the reform of the mining law, ten to foreign trade policy, and eleven to the improvement of transport. The fact that the booklet was published in England and designed for foreign readers merely underlines the preoccupation with affairs other than agricultural. As has been seen, this broadening of interests was the result of the pressing demands of financial, monetary, and commercial matters in 1928–30, but also of the internal trend away from a purely agrarian outlook.

665 241 The most striking feature of the agrarian policy of the National Peasant government was the things it neglected to do or even to consider doing. While the party's attitude toward further redistribution of land had become increasingly moderate, nevertheless in 1926 the program of the united party called for expropriation of properties over 100 hectares. Not a step was taken toward carrying out this measure. To be sure, many reasons militated against such a move. Agriculture was still in the process of readjustment from the previous reforms. Expropriation would undoubtedly have caused a political furor since the mere passage of time was serving to consolidate the previous reform, with all its shortcomings and abuses. Moreover, since the 1917 act was entered in the constitution, it could be modified only by a constitutional amendment, which was forbidden under a regency. Quite obviously, however, the National Peasant party by 1928 was not the radical agrarian movement which had attempted to introduce the reform bill under the Vaida government of 1920.

A second omission was the failure to take any active steps toward the consolidation of peasant strips, a measure which was virtually a precondition for any effective improvement of agriculture. Again, this would have been unsettling and peasant support for this particular reform was by no means certain.

665 241 671 The only serious measure taken in connection with agricultural property relations was an act passed in 1929 which amended the Liberals' law of 1925 concerning the alienation of allotments obtained

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

through the agrarian reforms.[45] The new law, which was designed to facilitate the transfer of land and to further a "process of selection among the peasant cultivators," abolished certain of the restrictions and delays imposed by the Liberals and greatly simplified the procedure of sale, although maintaining safeguards to keep land in the hands of actual cultivators and limiting purchases to Rumanian citizens having not over 25 hectares of land.

The idea that a "process of selection" would enable peasants with "superior competitive efficiency" to create prosperous holdings has had considerable popularity not only in Rumania but in other eastern European states.[46] For such a process to have beneficial consequences, however, it is necessary, first, that superior efficiency on tiny holdings will actually result in sufficient capital accumulation to buy out less efficient peasants, and, second, that the peasants displaced in the process have some alternative means of employment. Otherwise the poorer peasants would be reduced to a landless proletariat and the land taken over by the wealthier peasants. Such seems to have been the effect of the National Peasants' law, although it was not the sole cause; the survey of sixty Rumanian villages made in 1938 reported that the law of 1929 had intensified the differentiation in the peasantry by building up the category of middle peasants on the one hand and of increasing the agricultural proletariat on the other.[47] It was this law perhaps more than any other single act which gave

45. See above, p. 125.

46. Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe*, p. 105, cites a Greek author (C. Evelpedis, *La Réforme agraire en Grèce*, Athens, 1926), as an advocate of this view. In Rumania the alienation of peasant property has had a tangled political history in which at one time or another almost all political parties have reversed their positions. Up to the 1918–21 reforms, official policy tended toward inalienability, whereas the older reformers, such as Dobrogeanu-Gherea and Garoflid, demanded alienation as a necessary step to creating an independent peasantry. The Liberals in 1911 came out for a "process of selection," but in 1925 they restricted the transfer of land. The Peasant party, on the contrary, in 1921 was for government control of all sales, whereas in 1929 it moved toward freer purchase. The Communists, it may be added, roundly condemned the National Peasants for their 1929 law, but Lenin, in his agrarian writings before the Russian revolution, was strongly for alienation. The Communist position is seen in Pătrăşcanu's interpretation of the 1929 law: "From the point of view of opening a way for capitalism in the villages and of differentiation within the rural strata, the measure represented an advance in comparison with the past. But what was the cost of this progress? The land of the poorest and economically most feeble layers of the peasants quickly became the principal object, the prey on which urban banking capital and the village bourgeoisie threw themselves." Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, *Sous trois dictatures* (Paris, 1946), p. 106.

47. *60 Sate romînesti*, II, 6. The depression doubtless intensified this effect. During the 1946 famine in Moldavia the same thing occurred: peasants who had obtained land under the 1945 reform began to sell to the larger peasants at such a rate that the government was obliged to pass a law nullifying these sales.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

656 rise to the charge that the National Peasants really represented the
665 richer peasants and the village bourgeoisie.[48]

●671 A similar attitude appears in the other principal agrarian measures of the National Peasants; the law for the organization of cooperation, of March 28, 1929, and the law for the organization of rural mortgages and agricultural credit of July 29, 1929. These laws were acclaimed at the time as proof of the government's concern for the peasant, but they need not be considered in great detail here.[49] Laws for credit and cooperation are hardy perennials in Rumanian legislative history, but none of them appears to have accomplished much. These particular laws were quickly blighted by the onset of the depression.

474 The law for the organization of cooperation abrogated the act passed by the Liberal government in July, 1928, which the National Peasants thought gave the state too much control over the cooperative movement. The new code was designed to broaden the legal frame "to offer the cooperatives the freedom of movement which every economic enterprise needs if it is to develop in the present economic world."[50] Notwithstanding this effort to assure greater autonomy and independence, a foreign observer concluded in 1930 that even the new regime had not abandoned the idea that the cooperatives were a government maid of all work.[51] The real difficulty, as has been mentioned before, was that the poor peasant, that is, the average Rumanian, had very little to offer in a cooperative movement. Until the level of the peasantry was raised above the margin of subsistence, the cooperative movement was bound to be a name rather than a reality and to be altogether dependent upon the state for financial support and direction.

452 The law for the organization of rural mortgages and agricultural credit was intended to improve the channels supplying credit to agriculture, which had been seriously undernourished during the Liberal

48. This charge is given some weight when one considers Madgearu's remark, made in 1930: "With farms of medium size, limited to 25 hectares, the agricultural credit granted will be used in a more economical way and will bear fruit in a degree hitherto unknown in our agrarian organization." *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 11. In a country where 75 per cent of all agricultural holdings were under 5 hectares, and 92 per cent under 10 hectares, reference to farms of medium size could have only an extremely limited application.

49. Analyses of the law for the organization of cooperatives may be found in Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, pp. 409–411, and in F. E. Manoliou, *La Réconstruction économique et financière de la Roumanie et les partis politiques*, pp. 236–237, and of the law for the reorganization of agricultural credit in Manoliou, pp. 239–243.

50. From the exposé de motifs, cited in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 409.

51. "Rumania: The State as Co-operator," *Yearbook of Agricultural Co-operation, 1930*, pp. 404–428.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

to protect only those industries showing "natural" promise of development and to promote the necessary rationalization of those industries which had been permitted to become inefficient behind the Liberal tariff.

Throughout Madgearu's exposition of the 1929 tariff there is an evident desire to increase international cooperation and trade, and an altogether friendly attitude toward the great capitalist powers—an attitude quite different from Vintilă Brătianu's cautious and rather grudging admission of the need for increased trade and foreign capital. This attitude is most clearly shown in the laws of 1929 modifying the Liberal acts of 1924 on mines and the commercialization of state-owned enterprises.[59] The National Peasants criticized the 1924 laws as chauvinistic and failing to promote the exploitation of natural resources. "The aggressive nationalist policy exemplified in the Mining Act of 1924, which did so much harm to the country, bringing it into a state of financial and economic disorganization, could not continue without grave consequences for our economic future. A policy of sincere co-operation with international capital is the only means of improving the situation."[60] The new laws threw open the doors to foreign capital. With the exception of requiring that 75 per cent of the personnel (both administrative and subordinate) be Rumanians, no restrictions were placed on the percentage of foreign capital in the companies or upon the nationality of directors and chief officials.

These laws were in marked contrast not only to the attitude of the Liberals but also to the policy recommended by Constantin Stere in 1921.[61] Stere, with his hostility to "vagabond capital" and the menace of imperialist great powers, opposed foreign capital investments in the Rumanian petroleum industry, since all profits passed beyond the frontiers. Nor was foreign capital concerned with satisfying the needs of the population but only with raking in a profit. He was, however, aware that without foreign capital the resources simply could not be developed. He disapproved of the Liberals' policy of "nationalizing" petroleum and creating concessions with a majority of Rumanian capital. Having no confidence in the Liberal plutocracy's willingness or ability to defend the nation's interests, Stere advocated state operation of the petroleum industry. Foreign capital

59. A detailed comparison of Liberal and National Peasant policy on this question, from a pro-Liberal position, is given by Alexandre G. Georgesco, *Le Régime juridique et financière des capitaux étrangers en Roumanie* (Paris, 1932).

60. Madgearu, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 30.

61. C. Stere, *Naționalizarea Industriei de Petrol: Cuvântare rostită în ședința Adunării deputaților din 28 Martie 1921* (Bucarest, 1921).

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

652 come out against debt relief when the more radical groups, including the irrepressible Dr. Lupu, were demanding a complete moratorium or a cancellation of debts. But if the necessity of relief was admitted, the methods were by no means agreed upon. Banks opposed debt cancellation as ruinous to future credit and as throwing a heavy burden on them. The state proposed relieving the banks of their losses, but this in turn evoked protests from foreign creditors who maintained that increasing the state's indebtedness contravened the loan agreements. The simple fact, of course, was that there was no solution that would hurt no one; against the damage to the credit structure had to be set the obvious inability of the peasant to pay his debts and the certain social dangers of undertaking foreclosures.

●671 In April, 1932, the Iorga government passed a law by which debts of all properties under 10 hectares were reduced by half, the remainder to be paid over a period of thirty years at 4 per cent interest. Debts of properties over 10 hectares were to be diminished by the reduction of accumulated interest or by special legal procedure, if 60 per cent of the borrowed capital had been used for agricultural purposes. Although in 1930 Iorga had stated his opposition to assuming charge of the debts of the larger landowners,[18] the law framed by his government was immediately abused by the big owners, who employed it to slough off debts acquired, as it was said, on the green cloth rather than on the green fields.[19] The law also had the effect of increasing the demands of urban and other nonagricultural debtors.

653 In October, 1932, the Vaida Voevod government suspended this conversion law and introduced a system of moratoria. To prevent 671 misuse the debtor had to prove that agriculture provided 60 per cent of his total income, that the money borrowed had been for agricultural purposes, and that the debt did not exceed 20,000 lei per hectare of arable land.

This measure, which was largely a delaying action, was supplemented by the law of April, 1933, which abrogated the act of 1932 and granted a five-year moratorium with a 1 per cent interest charge. If the creditor offered a 50 per cent reduction of the debt the moratorium ceased to apply. In this case the remaining 50 per cent was to be paid off in half-yearly installments. Holdings between 10 and

18. *Adeverul*, September 9, 1930, cited in G. C. Logio, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

19. According to Logio, *ibid.*, pp. 170–171, the larger landowners were the most insistent that agricultural debts should be converted and were intended to be the principal beneficiaries. In his opinion the controls exerted over the peasants who took advantage of the law—the prohibition of mortgages and the direction of cultivation—would further undermine their position.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

50 hectares were also granted a five-year moratorium, with the possibility of the creditor offering a 33 per cent reduction in the debt. Holdings of over 50 hectares were granted a six-month moratorium and a possible reduction of 25 per cent of the debt. The debtor, if he wished, was permitted to abandon his holding, retaining one-fifth of it for himself, the remainder to go to meet his debts. The law was an improvement over its predecessor in scaling the provisions in accordance with the size of the holding.

A year later, in April, 1934, the Liberal government passed a new law whereby all agricultural debts without respect to size of property were reduced by 50 per cent, the residue to be paid in 34 half-yearly installments at 3 per cent interest. For payments in advance debtors were to receive a 6 per cent annual reduction on their debts. Debts paid off within two years were to benefit from a 70 per cent reduction of the total, those paid off in five years gained a 60 per cent reduction. While the creditor had a theoretical right to refuse conversion he was obliged to make a formal declaration of the fact and to accept a ten-year moratorium which could be prolonged for an additional five years. This law was more sweeping than its predecessors, especially in its pressure on the creditor, and it did provide the peasant with an incentive for a quick liquidation of his debt.

These laws, for all the political bickering which accompanied them, were a necessary consequence of the crisis and progressively extended the scope of conversion. They were negative measures, however; while they eased the peasants' debt load they in no way improved his basic situation or remedied the condition which had led to his plunging so hopelessly into debt.[20]

Besides reducing peasant debts, the governments of the depression years tried to maintain the price of grain and to secure favorable export markets. As with the other acts of those years, their efforts were hesitant and often inconsistent. During its period in office the Mironescu government had accelerated the National Peasant party's policy of removing the remaining export duties on agricultural products, and in April, 1931, it passed a law for the valorization of

20. Madgearu, while admitting that the Liberal law of 1934 had meant a benefit for all farmers, maintained that the peasant debtor was still in a sufficiently difficult position which excluded him from obtaining the credit necessary to rationalize his cultivation. According to his estimate, peasant credit available after the conversion was only one-seventh of what it had been before. He also pointed out that the peasants as shareholders in the cooperative banks lost 2¾ billion lei through the conversion. *Op. cit.*, p. 84. This, however, would not hit the poorer peasant who never had the funds to invest in the first place.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

652 farm products, aimed principally at maintaining the prices in the
671 home market by the reduction of various charges and taxes. The Iorga government, however, at once superseded this measure by inaugurating in July, 1931, an export bounty of 10,000 lei for 10,000 kilograms of wheat and 16,000 lei for flour, the cost to be met by a bread tax. The government, however, discovered that it lacked the funds to carry out this measure and discontinued it in 1932. Moreover, it turned out to be largely for the benefit of the export houses rather than the producers and merely tempted Rumanian exporters to engage in wheat dumping. On the other hand the tax on bread, which was to pay the bounty, was borne largely by the peasant consumer.[21] In 1933 and 1934 a different method was tried; the last Vaida Voevod cabinet set up a State Cereal Commission by which the government appeared on the market as a consumer to support wheat prices.

Like debt conversion, the price-supporting measures, which were taken up by the various governments in turn, were not the result of any over-all plan but were simply steps to counteract the depression. In fact, in their effect they ran against all plans for agrarian improvement. The parties, in their programs and writings, had all agreed that the future of Rumanian agriculture lay in intensive farming and in persuading the peasant to abandon extensive cereal cultivation for which his small holding was obviously ill-suited. The bounties on wheat had precisely the opposite effect and led to an even greater emphasis upon cereal production. Between 1930 and 1935 the area under wheat showed a definite, if highly irregular, tendency to rise.

439 The governments also undertook to obtain more favorable for-
648 eign markets. The first effort, under the National Peasants, was by means of collaboration with the other eastern European states in an agrarian bloc. Through the series of conferences in 1930 the agrarian states attempted to create a program of common action to gain preferential treatment from the industrial states for their agricultural products. Although the agrarian bloc pleaded its case at various meetings of the League and at international conferences between 1930 and 1932, it failed to open markets for agriculture. Its requests were opposed by the maritime states and overseas grain producers as contrary to free trade and the most-favored-nation principle. Madgearu, one of the most eloquent spokesmen for the bloc, declared that the agrarian states did not demand permanent preferential treat-

21. Manoilou, *La Reconstruction économique et financière de la Roumanie et les partis politiques*, p. 284.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

439 ing agreements and bilateral trade, again in the effort to find markets.
648 In 1931 a trade convention was made with Germany which reduced its duties on Rumanian maize and barley; in 1932 agreements were reached with France for the export of maize and with Germany for meat.

All these steps, however, were defensive efforts to protect agriculture against the depression. It is less easy to find much evidence of attempts to get at the roots of the agrarian question. The different cabinets passed a variety of laws, some of them transparent vote-catchers, others old favorites which each new Rumanian government seemed to pass as a matter of routine. All the cabinets announced their goal of increasing the use of agricultural machinery: the Mironescu government passed an act reducing the import duties on agricultural equipment by two-thirds, the Iorga government in 1932 and the Liberals at the beginning of 1934 granted credits for the purchase of agricultural machinery. To judge from the figures on the consumption of agricultural equipment the results were very slight, at least until 1934 with the beginning of recovery.

The only apparent effort at overcoming the disadvantages inherent in Rumania's system of strip cultivation was a law for the establishment of agricultural associations passed by the Iorga cabinet in July, [671] 1931. By this law cultivators whose separate properties formed an economic whole could combine to cultivate their land more rationally by the introduction of mechanical cultivation, use of fertilizers, selected seeds, and other technical improvements. Funds required by the associations for this purpose could be obtained through the cooperative and agricultural banks, the state to assume 6 per cent interest on the loans on the condition that the association follow a plan approved by the Ministry of Agriculture. Nothing seems to have come of this law, and a very similar semicollective state-sponsored proposal was attempted by the Antonescu regime a decade later.

In general, 1931–33 were years of steady retreat before the onslaught of the depression. In the course of this retreat a number of economic devices were developed, in Rumania as elsewhere, which were to take on increasing importance in the years to follow. To a considerable extent they had been introduced to protect agriculture, but they were soon to find pleasanter and more lucrative employment.

country to the verge of a catastrophe, proved, however, to 665
be too much for the less experienced hands of Vintila Brati- 652
anu. Unable to secure a foreign loan, the need of which had become imperative, he had no choice but to allow the transfer of the reins of power in November, 1928, to the Opposition, represented by M. Maniu and the National Peasant party. The elections which followed took place in freedom, and 666
though this time the minorities did not all vote for the 665
government, nevertheless the latter secured for itself about 78% of the total number of votes cast, which may be taken as an infallible proof of its popularity. This assured it of a compact majority of 348 seats in the Chamber. The Opposition was insignificant, and was composed of sixteen Magyars, thirteen Liberals, and ten seats distributed amongst various groups. This election disposed of the fiction that Communism had a hold on the Rumanian people, for the total Communist vote attained only 35,000 out of a total of 2,840,660, and it thus became evident that the bogey of Bolshevism had been cleverly exploited by the Bratianu dictatorship, in order to justify its terroristic methods in Bessarabia, as well as for the purpose of winning the goodwill of the Western Powers for its alleged attempts to repress it. The most pressing need the Maniu government 652
had to face was the obtention of a foreign loan in order to avoid the certain catastrophe with which the finances of the country were threatened. The funds obtained, however, barely sufficed for stabilizing the currency, and were altogether inadequate for the task of reconstruction, and even for the purpose of paying off the most pressing debts left by the former régime, so that a further loan had to be secured in 1931.

Unfortunately the country was in a derelict condition, and with the banking institutions under the control of its adversaries, determined to undermine the work of the new government, the latter had an exceedingly difficult task to tackle. The government passed several liberal measures, 671
such as the suppression of the censorship, the abrogation of military law in Bessarabia, the reduction of the personnel of the gendarmerie (chiefly employed by Bratianu for dragooning the population at election times), and set about

671 preparing a system of regional decentralization which would largely have satisfied the desires of the minorities.

662 Having to rely upon an inefficient administrative staff, with the various autonomous State departments still filled with supporters of the Opposition, and the latter hampering and undermining the government's attempt to clear up the mess in which the country had been left, it was hardly possible to expect that the government of M. Maniu could effect the miraculous change that was expected of it. In order to counteract the underhand machinations of its Liberal opponents, who did not scruple even to sap its credit 642 abroad by circulating scurrilous attacks on it among foreign 643 banking institutions, while at home they brought pressure 661 to bear on the Regency (which had been elected at their dictation) to create irritating hindrances to the smooth working of the government's plans, the latter at last allowed itself to be won over to what at the time was a fairly popular view, namely that of permitting the former Crown Prince Carol to return and ascend the throne. His advent was reckoned as likely to strengthen the hands of the Government, for he shared with the National Peasant Party the hostility of the Bratianus. Carol II, however, after his accession to the throne on June 8th, 1930, began to manifest a distinct predilection for autocratic measures. He arbitrarily removed from his post the able Rumanian Minister in Paris, M. Diamandi, a man who had distinguished himself for years by his devoted and brilliant service to his country, and nominated a personal friend whose sole qualification for this important diplomatic post was that he was a racing man. He estranged both M. M. Maniu and Vaida-Voevod by unconstitutionally interfering in the government, and thereby provoked the resignation of both. As he did not yet feel himself strong enough to dissolve the Chamber he allowed the National Peasant Party to form another Cabinet with M. Mironescu at its head, but he imposed on them as colleague an outsider in the person of M. Manoilescu, another personal friend of his. An attempt was made to form a Coalition Cabinet to be presided over by M. Titulescu, but as this failed the Mironescu Cabinet was tolerated for a time because it was conducting negotiations for a loan, and a premature

691 tice could not comprehend this 'artist of the grand style,' who obviously stood above common-place regulations!"

671 Disrespect for the law is pretty general in high circles in Rumania, for there are two weights and measures, and it is only the lowly who are made to feel the heavy hand of the law when it strikes them. This is due to the reciprocal toleration among the political parties of legal infractions which "de facto" have abrogated ministerial responsibility.

In fact peculation and misappropriation of funds are considered as mere peccadilloes. Interference in this practice is strongly resented, thus, in 1927, when one of the regents, the Patriarch Miron Christea, evinced a desire to investigate into the stewardship of the Minister of the Interior, strongly suspected of having misappropriated several million lei, he was severely reproved and given to understand that it was no business of his.

Commenting on the utter disregard of law by politicians, the "Argus" of March 3rd, 1929, wrote:—

"A real new era, a true revolution in our spirit and our customs as well as in our public life will dawn only on the day when penal responsibility for illegalities, abuses and frauds committed by our rulers will be enforced as provided in the Constitution and the special law of 1879. The threat of penalties will constitute the most effective check on the abusive use of authority and the personal dishonesty of partisans."

As a check to the frauds perpetrated, a bill was submitted to the Chamber in April, 1932 providing for the control of fortunes of functionaries and other State dignitaries. Fears were expressed in the Press, however, that such a bill would never be passed and that eventually it would either be emasculated by the Chamber, or rejected by the Senate. The inspirer of this proposal was M. Mihalache; his party, however, had showed no haste to pass such a bill into law while it was in office.

000 In such an environment, integrity and good faith are finally discarded, for they are taken as tokens of mental dullness, while such respect as may still subsist is transformed into servility. The absence of higher spiritual ideals leads to a craving for more material enjoyments and the latter to an

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania ED1

659 to intervene to secure the appointment of clergymen, but re-
648 quested that it be informed in each instance. These laws were
794 modified under the rule of the Iron Front, in order to make
793 possible the persecution of the Jews. Christian communions appear, however, not to have been affected.

659 When a pro-Communist government was formed in Ru-
177 mania, the situation changed immediately and radically. The
671 laws adopted in 1928 were repealed by a decree of August 4, 1948. As usual in Soviet-inspired constitutions, freedom of conscience, of religion, and of worship was assured. Freedom was conceded to all creeds to organize and conduct their own ecclesiastical endeavors so long as they did nothing to jeopardize "public security and public order." The last proviso was, as always, the Trojan horse by means of which the conquerors would enter the citadel. For what were public security and order? The government reserved the right to determine; and in this case the "government" was and could only be the local soviet under which a poor cleric was to live and move and have his being. As a matter of fact, the system under which the Rumanian Communist Party functioned was simplicity itself. The list of electors registered in 1946 was kept up to date by striking off the names of all who had in some manner or other manifested hostility to the "people." The possessor of a name thus purged might retain the right to worship wherever he pleased, but was of course deprived of any opportunity to draw a salary from the State or to hold a position of public trust.

671 Indeed, the law went much further. Article 25 provided that
793
659 the Ministry of Religious Affairs shall suspend any decision, instruction, or directive, as well as any order having an ecclesiastical character, whether administrative, cultural, educational, or caritative, or pertaining to endowments, if it is not in keeping with the status of the denomination in the act by which it has been established, or is inimical to public security, public order or morals. Pastoral and circular letters

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

shall be communicated in advance of publication to the Ministry of Religious Affairs. 671 733 659

While thus making apparent that the Church was deprived of all liberty of action in areas of moral judgment concerning actions taken by the public authority, the law further stipulated that the salaries of "clergymen and officers of the religious denominations" would be paid in accordance with the regulations governing the civil service. In this fashion it was determined that all clergymen, on the one hand, had the rights accorded to the civil service but, on the other, assumed corresponding obligations—among them an oath of allegiance to the national Constitution.

Subsequently, on August 12, 1950, a decree dealing with the [687] security of the State imposed the death penalty for the following offenses: treason to the nation; rendering "service to the enemy, or causing prejudice to the power of the state"; and procuring or transmitting state secrets to a foreign or an enemy power. The decree was directed primarily against the dignitaries of the Roman Catholic Church, because they were in communion with Rome. On July 6, 1950, another decree had provided a basis for expelling from Rumania the Papal Nuncio, Archbiship O'Hara, and his two assistants, Monsignor Kirk and Monsignor Del Mesti. Most of the Rumanian members of the Nuncio's staff were sentenced to imprisonment. Therewith an initial climax was reached in two years of fierce attack on the Churches and on the Roman Catholic Church in particular.

At this point a more detailed review of the religious situa- 735 tion in Rumania may help to clarify what has happened. Prior 162 to the outbreak of the Second World War, the 70 per cent of Rumanians adhering to the Orthodox Church were affiliated with the Patriarchate of Constantinople but enjoyed ecclesiastical autonomy. This Church, directed by a Holy Synod pre-

out paying for them, spoliating thereby his creditor and underselling and ruining the honest trader."

The paper advocated a revision of the law and demanded that debtors should be obliged to make a composition on the basis of the ratio existing between the assets and the liabilities, or with a variation of only 10 or 20 per cent of this proportion. As matters now stand a dishonourable merchant is entitled to file a demand for a "Concordat préventif" though his assets may far exceed his liabilities. He is then allowed to pay 40 or 60 per cent of his debts, and after they have been thereby considerably reduced is even accorded a delay of several years to pay them off. With such facilities at hand the majority of merchants did not scruple to avail themselves of the opportunity of repudiating their engagements and so getting rich quickly. The consequence is that commerce has been completely dislocated through the complete suppression of credit which naturally followed. The Under-Secretary of Justice in the Iorga-Argentoianu Government, M. N. Lenguceanu, overtly admitted in the *Neamul Romanesc*, September 5th, 1930, that the above-mentioned law "had permitted merchants, 98 per cent of whom were foreigners, overtly to despoil their creditors." Another very serious defect from which Rumanian legislation suffers is the tendency to enact laws with retroactive effect, which permits the invalidation of contracts, thus creating a state of instability that affects most adversely all commercial and financial operations. For how can foreign investors risk their capital in a country where uncertainty and instability have become its distinguishing features?

Senator Marino, on February 26th, 1932, deplored the disrespect shown for contracts, criticized the State for various measures passed undermining confidence, among which was the moratorium of 1919–1920 by which foreigners had lost some 7 milliard lei, and demanded the granting of serious guarantees which would instil confidence once more. Similar pronouncements by public men abound, for the serious consequence of the present policy are obvious to all.

Professor Flinders Petrie once stated (*Contemporary Re-*

gradually imbued people with the conviction that engagements and promises need not be considered seriously, and that on the contrary, elusion of obligations is a mundane affair and a fashionable art which should be cultivated assiduously. As a result, not only debtors always find means to avoid paying, but taxpayers also use every possible stratagem to avoid payment of taxes. There are huge arrears of taxes that remain uncollected, every imaginable trick being resorted to by taxpayers in order to escape from their monetary obligations to the State. The present tremendous falling off in the revenue should mainly be ascribed to this reason, as well as to the venality of the tax-collectors, whose leniency is secured by a slight gratification whenever they tend to become over sedulous in the execution of their duties. M. N. Petrascu, a fashionable speaker, while delivering an address at the Rumanian Social Institute in Bucarest on May 18th, 1932, asserted, "we should explain the non-realization of the budgetary revenue forecasts by the fact that our civic consciousness is not sufficiently developed to allow us to understand that by paying our taxes we fulfil an elementary duty; this is also the reason why fiscal frauds have attained extraordinary and unimaginable proportions. . . ."

The utter disregard of contracts and formal engagements can hardly be better illustrated than by the attitude of the State Railways administration in rescinding contracts with metallurgical establishments at Arad, Braila, and Reşiţa, contracts on the basis of which these very workshops were built. Another flagrant case of repudiation of solemn promises by an official organization is that of the municipality of Cluj which, after confirming a contract with the society "Electrobel" for a duration of fifty years, and after the Brussels firm had carried out 80 per cent of the work it had undertaken to perform, was requested by the municipality, hardly one year after signature of contract, to alter its provisions which had received the royal assent and had been unanimously approved and passed by the municipal council. The municipality brazenly demanded a reduction in the time period of the concession originally granted, namely from 50 years to 15, an increase in the royalty payable to the municipality from 3 per cent to 6 per cent, and

the right of the municipality to demand a revision of the 454
price of the electric current supplied by the "Electrobel" 675
whenever and as often as the municipality might think fit!

The "Electrobel" had completed the work contracted for to the extent of 80 per cent and had sunk millions in the undertaking in hand. Naturally it had made its calculations for a return on its capital on the terms of the original contract. If the clauses of the latter are to be so radically and arbitrarily altered it is bound to incur a huge loss. Such treatment meted out to the foreign capitalist has had the result of frightening him away for good, though his aid would have proved of inestimable value in helping Rumania to-day to surmount the difficulties with which she is confronted.

Owners of real property have also been very unjustly hit 675
by a law promulgated in February, 1932, decreeing that all 426
rents should be reduced by 25 per cent to 30 per cent, all 427
existing contracts being rendered void. Most owners were already in a precarious situation, for they had built with borrowed money, and the recent drop in rents made it impossible for them to meet their engagements and pay off their mortgages, and as a consequence of this an immense number of buildings were being sold up for default, as the *Adeverul* for January 21st, 1932 records. This law, therefore, will complete the ruin of another class of the urban population, and will impress on the minds of all intending investors that it is as risky a proceeding to invest one's money in Rumania as in Soviet Russia. Various municipalities are doing their best to attract unwary investors by holding out to them the most alluring prospectuses and dazzling promises, and it would be well to sound a note of warning so that no more British capital be enticed into Rumanian enterprises, which have proved a veritable bottomless pit.

The writer also committed the folly of relying on the relative immutability of the law, as is customary in other European countries, and leased a certain site in a fashionable Rumanian resort for the purpose of constructing certain dwellings and letting them, all buildings to revert to the original owner of the site after the expiration of a ten-year period. The law reducing rents forces down the revenue by

426 25 to 30 per cent, but on the other hand, no corresponding
675 increase in the time limit of the lease can be secured, and
427 there is no authority to which one may appeal. Besides, how can one possibly expect to receive more favourable treatment than the banks, which have been ruined by the enforcement of the law cancelling agrarian debts. What is truly surprising is that the Government had been seriously considering the passing of yet another law, cancelling all private urban debts, which, after all, would only have been the natural complement of the agrarian prototype, but this it was prevented from doing by the French financial experts! Rumanian politicians seem to be grievously deficient in the conception of what constitutes right, for otherwise it is impossible to explain the enactment of laws which not only undermine the very foundations of credit but also of property. That this
693 is so may also be inferred from the not very high standing of the judicial administration, which, if the scandals of 1926 be recollected, certainly needs to be overhauled. The then Government of General Averescu, under pressure of an outraged public at the scandalous venality of some judges, was obliged to dismiss several magistrates, including the President of the Bucharest Court, on account of "acts which were found incompatible with the dignity of magistrates," to quote the *Argus* of October 30th and the *Cuvantul* of October 23rd, 1926. Nor can one pass in silence the undignified attitude of the highest magistrate in Rumania, the then President of the highest Court of Appeal, who, setting at naught the findings of the Court, attempted by all imaginable subterfuges and chicanery to evade its verdict, which was unfavourable to him. (See an article headed "When you apply the law, and when it is applied to you" in the *Cuvantul*, October 6th, 1926). . . .

000 Professor Henry Sedgwick, in his "Elements of Politics," opines that "in determining a nation's rank in political civilization no test is more decisive than the degree in which justice, as defined by law, is actually realized in its judicial administration." Judged by this criterion, Rumania must indeed stand very low in the scale of nations, for the law is sadly deficient, as is woefully admitted even by Rumanians themselves. The *Adeverul* of March 3rd, 1932 wrote: "By

439 tions on a credit basis so hazardous that they have prac-
452 tically ceased, to the great discomfiture of Rumanian merchants, who have seen their activities completely paralysed.

426 As matters stand, a creditor is at the mercy of his debtor,
452 and if the latter refuses to honour his engagements there is nothing to be done but to accept whatever compromise may
651 be offered, for a recourse to tribunals would be tantamount
686 to a total loss not only of the amount involved, but of the supplementary expenses arising from legal disbursements and inordinately high judicial taxes which unlucky creditors will have to defray.

[439] What is singular is a tax imposed by the State on all bankruptcies to the amount of 20 per cent of the total assets declared, so that this explains, though it can hardly justify, the State's manifest indifference to the undermining of the country's commercial reputation through fraudulent bankruptcies, the frequency of which is positively alarming, for it derives corresponding advantages from this impost on bankruptcies. Instead of attempting to circumscribe this evil it would appear that the State has done much to encourage it, especially where foreigners are involved. Apparently it is actuated by the shortsighted view that the loss of the foreigner is to the benefit of the country in general, since through bankruptcies foreign capital is transferred to its own nationals. At any rate, bankruptcies have been regarded as a means of raising revenue, and the State as a privileged party has always secured its 20 per cent impost plus other legal taxes, and the debtor has usually managed to alienate a good part of his assets so as to safeguard himself in a very satisfactory manner, while the wretched creditor not only gets nothing but usually finds he is being called upon to make further disbursements on account of legal formalities involved. The *Argus* of June 15th and 16th, 1931, commenting on the law of the "Concordat préventif," qualified it as disastrous, and added: "Among the principal obstacles which prevent the development and normalization of our commerce this law stands in the front rank. . . . it has given free rein to the unscrupulous debtor, permitting him to carry out his underhand manœuvres without any risks, to sell the goods he bought with-

out paying for them, spoliating thereby his creditor and underselling and ruining the honest trader."

The paper advocated a revision of the law and demanded that debtors should be obliged to make a composition on the basis of the ratio existing between the assets and the liabilities, or with a variation of only 10 or 20 per cent of this proportion. As matters now stand a dishonourable merchant is entitled to file a demand for a "Concordat préventif" though his assets may far exceed his liabilities. He is then allowed to pay 40 or 60 per cent of his debts, and after they have been thereby considerably reduced is even accorded a delay of several years to pay them off. With such facilities at hand the majority of merchants did not scruple to avail themselves of the opportunity of repudiating their engagements and so getting rich quickly. The consequence is that commerce has been completely dislocated through the complete suppression of credit which naturally followed. The Under-Secretary of Justice in the Iorga-Argentoianu Government, M. N. Lenguceanu, overtly admitted in the *Neamul Romanesc*, September 5th, 1930, that the above-mentioned law "had permitted merchants, 98 per cent of whom were foreigners, overtly to despoil their creditors." Another very serious defect from which Rumanian legislation suffers is the tendency to enact laws with retroactive effect, which permits the invalidation of contracts, thus creating a state of instability that affects most adversely all commercial and financial operations. For how can foreign investors risk their capital in a country where uncertainty and instability have become its distinguishing features?

Senator Marino, on February 26th, 1932, deplored the disrespect shown for contracts, criticized the State for various measures passed undermining confidence, among which was the moratorium of 1919–1920 by which foreigners had lost some 7 milliard lei, and demanded the granting of serious guarantees which would instil confidence once more. Similar pronouncements by public men abound, for the serious consequence of the present policy are obvious to all.

Professor Flinders Petrie once stated (*Contemporary Re-*

000 moval of this stigma on Rumania's honour, but also more weighty considerations concerning her very national existence. In the long run no community, however impervious to contamination, can survive with a stinking cesspool in its midst.

426 The late Minister of Justice, M. Hamangiu, in June, 1931, addressed a circular to the judges reprimanding them for their remissness, and calling upon them to supervise more strictly the carrying out of the law in the case of abuses committed by dishonest merchants and manufacturers. His rescript contained the following passage: "The lack of sanctions against defaulters threatens the security of the country's credit. The gravest infractions are committed in bankruptcy cases. So far the magistracy has been too lenient; this becomes obvious from bankruptcy statistics of the last four years, the returns of which amount to thousands of millions of lei, and compositions are concluded on the basis of payment to the extent of 3 per cent to 8 per cent. What is particularly staggering is the excessive indulgence shown in the repression of penal offences in cases of simple or fraudulent bankruptcy. . . ." The Minister concluded by stating that this could no longer be tolerated, and gave instructions for restricting these abuses.

The opportuneness of radical reform in judicial methods 686 is more than urgent since an unscrupulous debtor by force 696 of chicanery is allowed to postpone the hearing of his case by the courts for years, during which time he not only has every opportunity of alienating his assets by overtly transferring them to relatives and friends, but what is most revolting, he has often the possibility by dexterous manipulation of subordinate officials, of making away with the most incriminating documents which his unsuspecting adversary has submitted to the Court for its enlightenment.

000 The late M. Hamangiu, whose untimely death all friends of Rumania must deplore, was a bosom friend of Prof. Iorga and as such fully recognized the imperative necessity of maintaining a high standard of justice in the country. In this respect he undoubtedly shared the opinion of one of our distinguished historians, Mr. Ramsay Muir, that "in the Western view no people can be called fully civilized until

there is widely diffused among its members the sense of their obligations, not merely to obey the law but to obey it willingly and to co-operate in enforcing and maintaining it. Because the law embodies the common conscience and also the common interest" (*v.* 'Nationalism and Internationalism.')

What hope there may have been for an improvement in this respect has at least for the present vanished with M. Hamangiu's decease, for his successor was nominated mainly with the object of placating public feeling in Transylvania, which region did not possess a single representative in the Iorga-Argentoianu Cabinet. The selection, however, of M. Valer Pop let loose a storm of indignation in independent Transylvanian circles, so that one may take it for granted that he was not the appropriate person for this high post. As the *Patria*, a newspaper of Cluj, wrote in January, 1932, "The men who have recently entered the Government do not represent even a part of the population, nor even a petty clan; they do not even form a part of the *élite* of their profession. . . ." At any rate, he has so far not manifested any inclination to follow the commendable initiative of his predecessor in office. On the contrary, he is responsible for the so-styled law of "judicial liquidation," which intensifies all the evils contained in the law of the "Concordat préventif" which it supplants. In fact this law prolongs indefinitely the liquidation of all ramshackle enterprises which were bound to go bankrupt, and puts off the reimbursement of creditors for an indefinite period without any guarantee whatever for them. The *Argus* of April 24th, 1932, commenting on this, wrote as follows: "Serious commercial circles consider this law as a new, corrected, and aggravated edition of the "Concordat préventif," a direct invitation addressed to traders in general not to pay. Immediately upon the promulgation of the latter law one witnessed a steeplechase of merchants taking advantage of it in order to escape the rigours of the bankruptcy law. We shall now witness the same mass-rush of those who do not wish to pay and who desire to avail themselves of this new law so that they may escape the opprobrium of bankruptcy and the loss of civil rights. . . ." Naturally these laws, which annul formal engagements, have

gradually imbued people with the conviction that engagements and promises need not be considered seriously, and that on the contrary, elusion of obligations is a mundane affair and a fashionable art which should be cultivated assiduously. As a result, not only debtors always find means to avoid paying, but taxpayers also use every possible stratagem to avoid payment of taxes. There are huge arrears of taxes that remain uncollected, every imaginable trick being resorted to by taxpayers in order to escape from their monetary obligations to the State. The present tremendous falling off in the revenue should mainly be ascribed to this reason, as well as to the venality of the tax-collectors, whose leniency is secured by a slight gratification whenever they tend to become over sedulous in the execution of their duties. M. N. Petrascu, a fashionable speaker, while delivering an address at the Rumanian Social Institute in Bucarest on May 18th, 1932, asserted, "we should explain the non-realization of the budgetary revenue forecasts by the fact that our civic consciousness is not sufficiently developed to allow us to understand that by paying our taxes we fulfil an elementary duty; this is also the reason why fiscal frauds have attained extraordinary and unimaginable proportions. . . ."

The utter disregard of contracts and formal engagements can hardly be better illustrated than by the attitude of the State Railways administration in rescinding contracts with metallurgical establishments at Arad, Braila, and Reşiţa, contracts on the basis of which these very workshops were built. Another flagrant case of repudiation of solemn promises by an official organization is that of the municipality of Cluj which, after confirming a contract with the society "Electrobel" for a duration of fifty years, and after the Brussels firm had carried out 80 per cent of the work it had undertaken to perform, was requested by the municipality, hardly one year after signature of contract, to alter its provisions which had received the royal assent and had been unanimously approved and passed by the municipal council. The municipality brazenly demanded a reduction in the time period of the concession originally granted, namely from 50 years to 15, an increase in the royalty payable to the municipality from 3 per cent to 6 per cent, and

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

sentative of all democratic elements of the population." Later, 648
at the Moscow Conference, the Western powers declared that 642
they would believe such a government existed as soon as representatives of two political parties other than the Rumanian 666
Workers' Party had been named to ministerial posts, and as soon as satisfactory guarantees had been given that freedom of speech and assembly as well as the right to vote without constraint had been assured. Dr. Groza complied by appointing the two desired ministers to the Cabinet without portfolio and by announcing that free elections would be held soon; but, as was to be anticipated in view of the fact that the Russian Army held the country in an iron grip, the Rumanian Workers' Party received 90-odd per cent of the vote. The ministers without portfolio promptly resigned, and there was nothing the Western powers could do about it save to register an emphatic protest. This they did in language suitably designed for the occasion.

The elections referred to were held on November 19, 1946. [687]
Almost precisely a year later the leader of the principal opposition party, Dr. Juliu Maniu, was sentenced to life imprisonment for high treason. Unquestionably this able and farsighted man, who had served the government and the people of Rumania well over many years and had been identified with every movement for reform and justice, was the foremost of the nation's citizens. King Michael abdicated on December 30 of [642]
the same year and fled from his native land. Thereupon the "People's Republic" was proclaimed, and every source of potential opposition to it was ferreted out and suppressed. A Constitution of the usual kind was adopted on April 13, 1948.
Now no obstacle barred the way for putting the Soviet paradise [471]
plan into effect. The principal productive enterprises were declared the property of the State, and this likewise became the sole arbiter of the educational system. Collective farming was introduced. A novelty was that new elections were held during

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

shall be communicated in advance of publication to the Ministry of Religious Affairs. 671 793 659

While thus making apparent that the Church was deprived of all liberty of action in areas of moral judgment concerning actions taken by the public authority, the law further stipulated that the salaries of "clergymen and officers of the religious denominations" would be paid in accordance with the regulations governing the civil service. In this fashion it was determined that all clergymen, on the one hand, had the rights accorded to the civil service but, on the other, assumed corresponding obligations—among them an oath of allegiance to the national Constitution.

Subsequently, on August 12, 1950, a decree dealing with the [687] security of the State imposed the death penalty for the following offenses: treason to the nation; rendering "service to the enemy, or causing prejudice to the power of the state"; and procuring or transmitting state secrets to a foreign or an enemy power. The decree was directed primarily against the dignitaries of the Roman Catholic Church, because they were in communion with Rome. On July 6, 1950, another decree had provided a basis for expelling from Rumania the Papal Nuncio, Archbiship O'Hara, and his two assistants, Monsignor Kirk and Monsignor Del Mesti. Most of the Rumanian members of the Nuncio's staff were sentenced to imprisonment. Therewith an initial climax was reached in two years of fierce attack on the Churches and on the Roman Catholic Church in particular.

At this point a more detailed review of the religious situation in Rumania may help to clarify what has happened. Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, the 70 per cent of Rumanians adhering to the Orthodox Church were affiliated with the Patriarchate of Constantinople but enjoyed ecclesiastical autonomy. This Church, directed by a Holy Synod pre- 785 162

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

659 in so far as the Catholic Church in Rumania is concerned. We must
793 rather manifest our profound indignation. Millions of citizens have been deliberately wounded in the innermost core of their human feeling by the very authority to which there has been entrusted, in the presence of the nation and of the whole world, the defense of the interests of the people. Internecine strife is being fostered, the country is in tears over rampant injustice, and a wound gapes which cannot be healed over except by doing away with laws and measures which have struck and are now striking at the Catholic Church in the Rumanian People's Republic.

• [687] All the Bishops who signed this and similar fruitless appeals have since been sentenced. The initial blow was struck at all dioceses save those of Alba Iulia and Iasi. In June, 1949, the Bishops of these sees also were arrested on charges of high treason. There remained only Bishop Augustin Pacha, more than eighty years old, who in turn was found guilty and sentenced to forced labor. Some of the prelates are said to have been deported to Russia; and of the whereabouts of nearly all of them nothing definite is known. Thus the Roman Catholic Church was stripped of leadership, the government recognizing only the Vicars-general of two dioceses in Transylvania. These likewise refused to conform with Communist directives. Thereupon a ruthless assault on the lower clergy was inaugurated. On the basis of reports received by the Vatican, it is estimated that at least six hundred priests and religious have been arrested, tried, and sentenced. Thus there was made manifest exemplary and moving fidelity.

793 That some would prove less steadfast was to be anticipated,
659 and in due time the government found a man willing to be the
795 leader of a "National Church"—Andreas Agotha, an unfortunate priest whom the Holy See promptly excommunicated. Under him a congress was convened at Targul-Mures, on April 27, 1950, which created the "National Catholic Church,"

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

in practice no open opposition is permitted in Poland, they nevertheless "legalize" the existence of other political organizations. 665 642

The constitutional legalization of the Communist Party's exclusive control of state power in Rumania is based on the contention that with the complete eradication of the active opposition in the country the Party no longer needs to hide under the paraphernalia of tactical secrecy. The Party's "legal" control of the state apparatus is assured by its exclusive right to nominate candidates in the elections of deputies to the Grand National Assembly (Article 100). This control is further facilitated by the provisions of the new Electoral Law restricting the right of certain groups of people considered inimical to the regime to participate in the national elections. In this respect, the 1936 Constitution of the USSR (Article 135) is more liberal; it removed all discriminatory provisions—religious, economic, and political—formerly applied against non-Bolsheviks. This distinction is based on the supposition that, unlike the USSR, Rumania as well as the other popular republics, advanced as they are, are still in the presocialistic stage of development, which necessitates an incessant waging of the class-struggle against the "enemies of the working class."

Theoretically, the people exercise their power through duly elected organs, 642 the Grand National Assembly and the People's Councils. These, in turn, appoint the necessary administrative and judiciary bodies, the Presidium, the Council of Ministers, the higher echelon of the judiciary, and the Executive Committees of the People's Councils respectively. Though the constitutional theory of exclusive legislative power in the Grand National Assembly is constantly maintained, Soviet and satellite legislative history reveals the preponderance of the Council of Ministers. While the Council is formally appointed by, and theoretically subordinate to, the Grand National Assembly, its members in reality are chosen by the Central Committee of the United Workers' (Communist) Party from among its leading functionaries. The primary function of the Council of Ministers is to effectuate the policies of the Party through the vast bureaucratic apparatus it controls; that of the Grand National Assembly is the ratification of governmental decrees.

Justice in the People's Republic of Rumania, according to the new Constitution, is administered by the Supreme Court, the Regional Courts, the People's Courts, and the Special Courts. Their main function is the defense of the political regime and the protection of communal property and of the rights of citizens (Article 65). Unless otherwise provided for by law, all judicial cases are tried with the participation of people's assessors (Article 66). [642]

The supreme supervisory power over the observance of law by all central and local governmental organs of state power and administration as well as by all officials and citizens is vested in the Procurator General of the Rumanian People's Republic (Article 73). He is appointed by the Grand National Assembly for a term of five years, and he in turn, appoints his deputies and the procurators of the local units for a term of four years (Article 74). Whereas the organs of the Procurator's Office are independent of all local governmental 693 642

l: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 EDl Rumania EDl

693 agencies, being subordinate only to the Procurator General, the latter is
642 responsible to the Grand National Assembly, and in the interim between its sessions, to the Presidium (Article 75).

[671] The powers and functions of the Procurator General are specified by Law No. 6 of June 2, 1952, concerning the "Setting up and Organization of the Procuratura of the Rumanian People's Republic." The Procurator General has the right to take part, "with a consultative vote," in the meetings of the Presidium and of the Council of Ministers (Article 4). He is empowered to see to it that the decisions and rules issued by the central and local agencies of state power and administration conform with the laws of the country. Charged with the administration of justice, he supervises the activities of the agencies of penal investigation; he may ask for the dossier at any stage of the investigation, and has the right to "issue compulsory instructions with regard to the development of penal investigation and inquiry and to be present at any act of penal investigation or to carry it out himself" (Article 7, Paragraph a).

642 The Supreme Court, whose chief function is the supervision of the judicial activities of all the courts (Article 72), is elected by the Grand National As-
692 sembly for a term of five years (Paragraph 1 of Article 67). The judges, theoretically independent and subject only to the law (Article 70), and the people's assessors are elected in accordance with the provisions of a special law (Paragraph 2 of Article 67). All judicial proceedings are conducted in the Rumanian language, with special provisions for the use of other languages in areas inhabited by compact groups of other nationalities or minorities. Persons not knowing the language in which the judicial proceedings are conducted are constitutionally guaranteed the right to acquaint themselves with the material of the case and the privilege to use their own language in the summation of their case (Article 68).

Unlike the Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme Tribunal of the People's Republic of Rumania, like its Soviet counterpart, has no power of constitutional interpretation and is more of an auxiliary than an independent branch of government.

177. The constitutional provisions regarding the administration of justice, how-
69 ever "progressive" they may sound, conceal the true nature of the Marxist-
692 Leninist concept of justice, which has been adopted by the People's Republic of Rumania as well as by the other countries in the Soviet orbit. The modern principles of penal law (*"nullum crimen sine lege; nulla poena sine lege"*) applied and observed in all civilized countries, have been replaced by the concept of "class-justice." Marxist doctrinaires assert that the purpose of "proletarian class justice" is the maintenance of the regime of the dictatorship of the working class and the complete elimination of all "reactionary" and "anti-democratic" elements.

Although the principle of "class-justice" has not been embodied in the two Rumanian constitutions framed under the regime of popular democracy, it nevertheless has found clear expression in Law No. 5 passed by the Grand

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

National Assembly on June 2, 1952, concerning the "Organization of the Judicature." Article 1 of the Law emphatically states that the function of the judiciary is the defense of the socio-economic structure of the state and of the rights and interests of state institutions and organizations. Furthermore, it is emphasized that the aim of the judiciary is the "education" of the citizens "in the spirit of devotion to the fatherland and in the spirit of the construction of socialism" (Article 2). 177 69 692

The people's assessors perform in practice a much greater function in judicial proceedings than those specified by the Constitution. The Minister of Justice is authorized to detail them from one court to the other whenever circumstances require. Thus, there are actually special teams of "people's judges" which the Ministry of Justice can use in accordance with the political interests of the Party. 692

Article 9 of Law No. 5 of 1952 also authorizes the courts to hear cases outside their seats if this is required "to fulfil the educational purpose of justice." Furthermore, hierarchically superior courts may take away from subordinate courts any case "in order to hear it themselves or have it heard by another court."

The required impartiality of judges is furthermore impaired by limitations imposed by the electoral laws on the right to participate in the election of people's judges. The privilege is restricted to the "democratic" elements only (Article 13, Paragraph 7, of Law No. 5). This is coupled with the provisions confining the nomination of candidates to the United Workers' (Communist) Party or to its affiliated mass organizations (Article 13, Paragraph 1). [666]

In discussing the new role of justice and law, Vasilescu-Alba, a jurist of the Rumanian People's Republic, asserted that "all legal rules, being the expression of the will of the working class, must be understood and interpreted in the light of the class struggle." Justice is thus "an executive organ of the will of the working class." Positive law, when in disagreement with this principle, must make room for the "legal conscience of the proletariat."[3] [565]

The fundamental rights and duties of citizens are enumerated in a special chapter. The primacy of social rights over individual rights is, as in the USSR, both functional and political.[4] Most of the rights and freedoms stipulated by the Constitution are either programmatic, circumscribed by escape clauses, or outright illusory. Thus, for instance, the provision relating to freedom of the press, speech, and assembly, as stated by Article 85, (a word-by-word replica of Article 125 of the Soviet Constitution of 1936), emphatically denies 641

---

[3] "Statul Poliţienesc" Cronica Românească, October 1, 1950, p. 25.

[4] Professor Boris Mirkine-Guetzevitch, while recognizing the dictatorial character of all the constitutions in the Soviet sphere, makes nevertheless a distinction between the declarations of rights of the Soviet constitutions and those of the satellite constitutions. According to Professor Mirkine, whereas the declarations of the People's Republics establish the "functional" primacy of social rights over individual rights, those of the Soviet republics establish "political" primacy. See Boris Mirkine-Guetzevitch, Les Constitutions Européennes, 2 vol. Paris, 1951.

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

in practice no open opposition is permitted in Poland, they nevertheless "legalize" the existence of other political organizations. 665 642

The constitutional legalization of the Communist Party's exclusive control of state power in Rumania is based on the contention that with the complete eradication of the active opposition in the country the Party no longer needs to hide under the paraphernalia of tactical secrecy. The Party's "legal" control of the state apparatus is assured by its exclusive right to nominate candidates in the elections of deputies to the Grand National Assembly (Article 100). This control is further facilitated by the provisions of the new Electoral Law restricting the right of certain groups of people considered inimical to the regime to participate in the national elections. In this respect, the 1936 Constitution of the USSR (Article 135) is more liberal; it removed all discriminatory provisions—religious, economic, and political—formerly applied against non-Bolsheviks. This distinction is based on the supposition that, unlike the USSR, Rumania as well as the other popular republics, advanced as they are, are still in the presocialistic stage of development, which necessitates an incessant waging of the class-struggle against the "enemies of the working class."

Theoretically, the people exercise their power through duly elected organs, 642 the Grand National Assembly and the People's Councils. These, in turn, appoint the necessary administrative and judiciary bodies, the Presidium, the Council of Ministers, the higher echelon of the judiciary, and the Executive Committees of the People's Councils respectively. Though the constitutional theory of exclusive legislative power in the Grand National Assembly is constantly maintained, Soviet and satellite legislative history reveals the preponderance of the Council of Ministers. While the Council is formally appointed by, and theoretically subordinate to, the Grand National Assembly, its members in reality are chosen by the Central Committee of the United Workers' (Communist) Party from among its leading functionaries. The primary function of the Council of Ministers is to effectuate the policies of the Party through the vast bureaucratic apparatus it controls; that of the Grand National Assembly is the ratification of governmental decrees.

Justice in the People's Republic of Rumania, according to the new Constitution, is administered by the Supreme Court, the Regional Courts, the People's Courts, and the Special Courts. Their main function is the defense of the political regime and the protection of communal property and of the rights of citizens (Article 65). Unless otherwise provided for by law, all judicial cases are tried with the participation of people's assessors (Article 66). [642]

The supreme supervisory power over the observance of law by all central and local governmental organs of state power and administration as well as by all officials and citizens is vested in the Procurator General of the Rumanian People's Republic (Article 73). He is appointed by the Grand National Assembly for a term of five years, and he in turn, appoints his deputies and the procurators of the local units for a term of four years (Article 74). Whereas the organs of the Procurator's Office are independent of all local governmental 693 642

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

693 agencies, being subordinate only to the Procurator General, the latter is
642 responsible to the Grand National Assembly, and in the interim between its sessions, to the Presidium (Article 75).

[671] The powers and functions of the Procurator General are specified by Law No. 6 of June 2, 1952, concerning the "Setting up and Organization of the Procuratura of the Rumanian People's Republic." The Procurator General has the right to take part, "with a consultative vote," in the meetings of the Presidium and of the Council of Ministers (Article 4). He is empowered to see to it that the decisions and rules issued by the central and local agencies of state power and administration conform with the laws of the country. Charged with the administration of justice, he supervises the activities of the agencies of penal investigation; he may ask for the dossier at any stage of the investigation, and has the right to "issue compulsory instructions with regard to the development of penal investigation and inquiry and to be present at any act of penal investigation or to carry it out himself" (Article 7, Paragraph a).

642 The Supreme Court, whose chief function is the supervision of the judicial activities of all the courts (Article 72), is elected by the Grand National As-
692 sembly for a term of five years (Paragraph 1 of Article 67). The judges, theoretically independent and subject only to the law (Article 70), and the people's assessors are elected in accordance with the provisions of a special law (Paragraph 2 of Article 67). All judicial proceedings are conducted in the Rumanian language, with special provisions for the use of other languages in areas inhabited by compact groups of other nationalities or minorities. Persons not knowing the language in which the judicial proceedings are conducted are constitutionally guaranteed the right to acquaint themselves with the material of the case and the privilege to use their own language in the summation of their case (Article 68).

Unlike the Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme Tribunal of the People's Republic of Rumania, like its Soviet counterpart, has no power of constitutional interpretation and is more of an auxiliary than an independent branch of government.

177. The constitutional provisions regarding the administration of justice, how-
69 ever "progressive" they may sound, conceal the true nature of the Marxist-
692 Leninist concept of justice, which has been adopted by the People's Republic of Rumania as well as by the other countries in the Soviet orbit. The modern principles of penal law (*"nullum crimen sine lege; nulla poena sine lege"*) applied and observed in all civilized countries, have been replaced by the concept of "class-justice." Marxist doctrinaires assert that the purpose of "proletarian class justice" is the maintenance of the regime of the dictatorship of the working class and the complete elimination of all "reactionary" and "anti-democratic" elements.

Although the principle of "class-justice" has not been embodied in the two Rumanian constitutions framed under the regime of popular democracy, it nevertheless has found clear expression in Law No. 5 passed by the Grand

426 675 427 25 to 30 per cent, but on the other hand, no corresponding increase in the time limit of the lease can be secured, and there is no authority to which one may appeal. Besides, how can one possibly expect to receive more favourable treatment than the banks, which have been ruined by the enforcement of the law cancelling agrarian debts. What is truly surprising is that the Government had been seriously considering the passing of yet another law, cancelling all private urban debts, which, after all, would only have been the natural complement of the agrarian prototype, but this it was prevented from doing by the French financial experts! Rumanian politicians seem to be grievously deficient in the conception of what constitutes right, for otherwise it is impossible to explain the enactment of laws which not only undermine the very foundations of credit but also of property. That this 693 is so may also be inferred from the not very high standing of the judicial administration, which, if the scandals of 1926 be recollected, certainly needs to be overhauled. The then Government of General Averescu, under pressure of an outraged public at the scandalous venality of some judges, was obliged to dismiss several magistrates, including the President of the Bucharest Court, on account of "acts which were found incompatible with the dignity of magistrates," to quote the *Argus* of October 30th and the *Cuvantul* of October 23rd, 1926. Nor can one pass in silence the undignified attitude of the highest magistrate in Rumania, the then President of the highest Court of Appeal, who, setting at naught the findings of the Court, attempted by all imaginable subterfuges and chicanery to evade its verdict, which was unfavourable to him. (See an article headed "When you apply the law, and when it is applied to you" in the *Cuvantul*, October 6th, 1926). . . .

000 Professor Henry Sedgwick, in his "Elements of Politics," opines that "in determining a nation's rank in political civilization no test is more decisive than the degree in which justice, as defined by law, is actually realized in its judicial administration." Judged by this criterion, Rumania must indeed stand very low in the scale of nations, for the law is sadly deficient, as is woefully admitted even by Rumanians themselves. The *Adeverul* of March 3rd, 1932 wrote: "By

000 moval of this stigma on Rumania's honour, but also more weighty considerations concerning her very national existence. In the long run no community, however impervious to contamination, can survive with a stinking cesspool in its midst.

426 The late Minister of Justice, M. Hamangiu, in June, 1931, addressed a circular to the judges reprimanding them for their remissness, and calling upon them to supervise more strictly the carrying out of the law in the case of abuses committed by dishonest merchants and manufacturers. His rescript contained the following passage: "The lack of sanctions against defaulters threatens the security of the country's credit. The gravest infractions are committed in bankruptcy cases. So far the magistracy has been too lenient; this becomes obvious from bankruptcy statistics of the last four years, the returns of which amount to thousands of millions of lei, and compositions are concluded on the basis of payment to the extent of 3 per cent to 8 per cent. What is particularly staggering is the excessive indulgence shown in the repression of penal offences in cases of simple or fraudulent bankruptcy. . . ." The Minister concluded by stating that this could no longer be tolerated, and gave instructions for restricting these abuses.

The opportuneness of radical reform in judicial methods 686 is more than urgent since an unscrupulous debtor by force 696 of chicanery is allowed to postpone the hearing of his case by the courts for years, during which time he not only has every opportunity of alienating his assets by overtly transferring them to relatives and friends, but what is most revolting, he has often the possibility by dexterous manipulation of subordinate officials, of making away with the most incriminating documents which his unsuspecting adversary has submitted to the Court for its enlightenment.

000 The late M. Hamangiu, whose untimely death all friends of Rumania must deplore, was a bosom friend of Prof. Iorga and as such fully recognized the imperative necessity of maintaining a high standard of justice in the country. In this respect he undoubtedly shared the opinion of one of our distinguished historians, Mr. Ramsay Muir, that "in the Western view no people can be called fully civilized until

mous letter of denunciation reaches the Ministry concerning 647
a commercial or industrial firm. This is immediately followed 651
by a close investigation of the firm's books. Though no 661
trace of contraband may have been found, yet rumours of high fines to be imposed on this firm get into circulation. Its owners make desperate efforts to dissipate them. The firm's bank announces that its overdraft will be suspended until the matter is cleared up. The merchant who cannot wait for a judicial examination of the charge brought against him, nor engage in protracted discussions with the Ministry, finding his credit at the bank has been suspended, endeavours to strike a bargain. He will offer 10%, occasionally even only 1% of the amount of the fine with which he has been threatened. The State pockets 80% of the sum thus offered and the zealous inspector who has "discovered" the reported contraband appropriates the remaining 20%. Why should these sums indeed be rejected? Such tactics, when employed by a clever functionary or inspector, will soon allow him to become the owner of palaces and buildings in the capital. Such is the just reward of labour!"

And in conclusion the "Lupta" advises the Ministry of Finance as to the measures it ought to take to prevent merchants from suffering unduly from the blackmailing activities of its financial inspectors!

That blackmailing and extortion are not unusual practices 647
may be inferred from the following announcement appearing 661
in a Bucarest daily on 15th March, 1929:—"The tribunal of 697
Cluj having received an endless number of complaints and denunciations against Lieut.-Colonel Mihai, of the gendarmery, lately occupying the post of Police-Prefect at Cluj during the Liberal régime, has transmitted them to the judicial procurator. The investigations which are being pursued prove that the charges are well founded and that this Liberal terrorist had extorted moneys through blackmail from high class people while he was police prefect in the capital of Transylvania. Those who suffered most from the exercise of the functions of the accused (sic), were merchants, who, if they failed to deliver to the prefect the sums or goods demanded, were subjected to tortures and heavy fines and were threatened with the closing of their

shops and the confiscation of their goods." The most sensational administrative affair in Rumania was undoubtedly that of the prison scandals of 1926, which gave rise to lively press comments throughout the continent and thanks to which the author of these scandals won widespread notoriety.

The following details concerning the methods in vogue in penitentiaries were given by the Bucarest "Socialismul" on May 16, 1926, on the occasion of the reported arrest of the notorious Cernat. . . . . "Directors and warders, seeking to grow rich rapidly, divide among themselves the moneys destined for the prisons. They appropriate both the food and the clothing set apart for those under arrest, they extort money from those better off, receive bribes in exchange for privileges, or force prisoners to work for them. The arrest of Major Cernat, who was appointed Director-General of Prisons while awaiting his appointment as Chief of the State Police Service, is no satisfaction for us. For we know that this man will be as well off in prison as at his home. We know further that in a few weeks or in a few months he will walk out free, with his head erect, for in our well-ordained country a big swindler has never been condemned or imprisoned, indeed it would be a crying injustice were such a thing to happen, since all our rulers have made their fortunes by similar dishonest practices."

The "Aurora" of June 3rd, 1926, reported the arrest of the directors of the penitentiaries of Doftana and Galatz, and gave details concerning the sums embezzled by these worthies. The system of imprisonment inaugurated by these clever rogues, however, deserves being enlarged upon as it is both amusing and illuminating. The following lucid and jocund report appeared in the French newspaper "Paris-Midi" on 17th June, 1926:—

"The Thousand and one joys of Rumanian Prisons."

"Bucarest. June 17th. Major Cernat, Director-General of Rumanian prisons, as well as the directors of several other penitentiary establishments, have been arrested. They are accused of failing to carry out their duties and of having shown too great indulgence towards the prisoners. Bucarest newspapers publish astounding details following on the

inquiry ordered last week throughout all the prisons of the kingdom by the Minister of the Interior.

Galatz, the paradise of prisoners.

The most typical example of these queer Rumanian prisons in which incarceration is only relative, is Galatz.

Prisoners had the possibility of communicating with the outside world on payment of a small sum, but if a larger bribe was given to the Director, which in justice was more important for the wealthier prisoners, permission could be obtained to leave the prison so that urgent affairs might be attended to. When an even larger gratification was forthcoming, the administration would benevolently overlook even an absence of several days. One of the prisoners who had been able to win the goodwill of the penitentiary staff lived practically in freedom in a room he had hired in town. He was tactful enough to turn up at times and spend an hour in prison chatting with the warders so that his presence might be recorded. Another inmate of the establishment, on whom the severity of the law had imposed a sojourn of five years, made use of such persuasive arguments that he was able solemnly to celebrate his marriage in the cathedral of that town and peacefully enjoy his honeymoon. So far as the small fry were concerned, on whom weighed sentences of a few months, they figured nominally only on the registers of the prison.

The pretty servants of the compassionate Director.

The judicial authorities had already protested against Dr Cocea's behaviour, but such sanctions as had been ordered were never applied, owing to Major Cernat's intervention on behalf of this tender-hearted official. A curious figure indeed, this Dr Cocea, who had no scruples for old-fashioned conventions ! The judicial inquiry established that in the prison, the rigours of which he knew so well how to mitigate, this Director had engaged some young girl servants of exceptional beauty, whose only business consisted in setting off by their presence and graceful deportment the brilliant charm of the parties fines to which he invited the distinguished guests who were in his custody. But alas ! implacable Jus-

691 tice could not comprehend this 'artist of the grand style,'
671 who obviously stood above common-place regulations!"

Disrespect for the law is pretty general in [illegible] circles in Rumania, for there are two weights and measures, and it is only the lowly who are made to feel the heavy hand of the law when it strikes them. This is due to the reciprocal toleration among the political parties of legal infractions which "de facto" have abrogated ministerial responsibility.

In fact peculation and misappropriation of funds are considered as mere peccadilloes. Interference in this practice is strongly resented, thus, in 1927, when one of the regents, the Patriarch Miron Christea, evinced a desire to investigate into the stewardship of the Minister of the Interior strongly suspected of having misappropriated several millions lei, he was severely reproved and given to understand that it was no business of his.

Commenting on the utter disregard of law by politicians, the "Argus" of March 3rd, 1929, wrote:—

"A real new era, a true revolution in our spirit and our customs as well as in our public life will dawn only on the day when penal responsibility for illegalities, abuses and frauds committed by our rulers will be enforced as provided in the Constitution and the special law of 1879. The threat of penalties will constitute the most effective check on the abusive use of authority and the personal dishonesty of partisans."

As a check to the frauds perpetrated, a bill was submitted to the Chamber in April, 1932 providing for the control of fortunes of functionaries and other State dignitaries. Fears were expressed in the Press, however, that such a bill would never be passed and that eventually it would either be emasculated by the Chamber, or rejected by the Senate. The inspirer of this proposal was M. Mihalache; his party, however, had showed no haste to pass such a bill into law while it was in office.

000 In such an environment, integrity and good faith are finally discarded, for they are taken as tokens of mental dullness, while such respect as may still subsist is transformed into servility. The absence of higher spiritual ideals leads to a craving for more material enjoyments and the latter to an

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

659 by reason of them outrage and blows and threats and imprisonment
738 and, it may be, destitution. These things truly mean glorifying the Lord
733 Jesus. They will prove that we desire to insure for ourselves, even in this day of passing suffering, an eternal meed of renown which will be beyond weight or measure.

[697] The men who signed this Letter all have witnessed to the faith they thus professed. And in their company stand devoid
466 of eloquence but not of holiness and fidelity, the many, many thousands, chosen from amidst the humble and the poor, who have suffered persecution and enslavement in Vhalitza or in the region between the Danube and the Black Sea. In order that we may understand their ordeal, let me quote from eyewitness accounts of the camps built to house those who toil at digging a canal in the Dobrouja:

> Approximately 30,000 prisoners are stationed there. The majority of them are intellectuals. They are digging a canal between the Danube and the Black Sea, or are building roads, bridges, and so forth. Practically all the work is done by hand in the same manner and with the same methods as those which were employed for the erection of the Egyptian pyramids. The food is very poor. As a rule, the daily menu consists of corn meal with a soup made of onions or beans. The sanitary conditions are indescribable, and for this reason the death toll is extremely high. Prisoners work more than twelve hours a day. Some of them were sentenced by the courts. Others were not. But this makes no difference, for even those who did receive sentences are not released when their terms are over.

000 The Uniate Churches are not among the great religious bodies of the world. But we might well pause in reverence while passing their temples of worship to commemorate those who in far-off countries have so nobly and sacrificially clung to their faith. Such a tribute would by no means preclude one from bearing in mind that others, too, have felt the crushing weight of Ru-

659 not extend beyond the frontiers of the country and, vice versa, no foreign church may have jurisdictional powers over any denomination in Romania. Moreover, any material support granted and accepted from outside must be communicated to the Romanian Government.

793 The clergymen, the heads of the religious organizations and their officers must be Romanian citizens or they must apply for naturalization. A foreign citizen may be admitted only by special authorization and specifically if otherwise the existence and the functioning of a religious community would be imperilled.

[678] As in the case of the Orthodox Church, the heads of all religious denominations and their clergymen are triable for cannon and political offenses by the High Court of Cassation and Justice (not by ordinary courts). However, the disciplinary cases in church matters shall be tried by their own Synods.

The organizations of the historical churches (infra) are legal entities.

794 The religious denominations freely administer their assets as well as establish and manage as many charitable and educational institutions as they wish or need. The same is true of schools for preparation of the clergy. These, however, must communicate to the Ministry of Religious Affairs concerning their curricula.

871] Each church has the right to give religious instruction to their youth of the given denominations in either public or private schools, as well as to men on active service.

874 THE TECHNICAL or Trade School is one of forty such schools in the country. The Minister of Education has ordered this number to be doubled. The boys come from all districts and can go on to a higher grade Trade School. There is a still higher grade of school in Roumania called the Academy, from which pupils are turned out as teachers.

IN THIS TRADE School at Curtea de Argeş the boys live in and pay an inclusive fee of 4,500 lei per annum; those attending as day boys pay only 760 lei per annum. Two-thirds of these fees must be paid at the beginning of the session; the cost of material is not included.

Boys can enter between the ages of 11 and 15; the number taken is 100. They are divided into four classes. The subjects taught are Woodwork, Pottery and Tailoring. In woodwork, when the boys leave they are considered to have qualified in all the processes of house-building and furnishing. [32] In pottery, the chief industry of this town, the *traditional* shapes, colouring and decoration (mostly of ships) are charming, but *modern* designs and shapes are less good and often tasteless.

[33] THE CLASSROOMS are airy and heated by stoves. The boys sit in couples. The walls are hung with pictures of Roumanian history and of architectural interest, e.g. York Minster, Notre Dame, the Forum, etc. Each room has a religious picture. The woodwork room is large; each bench has a wooden vice; the wood is neatly stacked on a large shelf a few feet from the roof. Few tools were seen, as they were being prepared for next session. There is a room set apart for exhibiting the work done. All articles are for sale, and the pupil gets most of the money. Both the french polishing and the chip carving reach an excellent standard.

[7] THE MILITARY SERVICE required from boys attending Trade Schools is of one year's duration only. There are in the country five Higher Trade Schools—at Bucureşti, Braşov, Craiova, Iassi and Turgul Mureş.

N. H. S.

661 mission of 30 million lei had been pocketed, amounting to 25% of the total amount of the order. This had been confirmed by the Royal Commissary, while General Hentescu had asserted that there were no orders placed without commissions being received. The Minister of War, General Mardarescu, was directly involved in this affair and he should be made to accept full responsibility. The latter's defence was exceedingly lame. The "Cuvantul" of 7th July, 1927, relates how it had been decided to repair the defective motors of the aeroplanes. After remaining for two years at Bucarest they were shipped to France, where on examination they were found to have deteriorated to such an extent that they were useless. They were nevertheless superficially repaired and shipped back, at a total cost to the State of twelve million lei, wasted money as the paper declares. In its issue of 28th Sept., 1927, the same paper, commenting on the mortal accidents which recently befell Rumanian aviators, vehemently condemns the Liberals for supplying the army with such worthless planes, and accuses the ministers of being actuated solely by the desire to pocket commissions and of showing no consideration for the human lives that are imperilled. The order for these aeroplanes had been placed by the Ministry in spite of the advice of the Technical Committee.

During the year 1929, the press enlarged on the contract for the supply of sanitary material, amounting to 400 truckloads. Many irregularities were pointed out, and the question came to be referred to as the "syringe affair." Such grave derelictions of duty on the part of those in authority have resulted in the army being placed in a state [701] of utter unpreparedness, as was revealed by a speech of the Minister of War, General Mircescu, delivered in the Chamber on September, 1927, and in the course of which he was reported to have said: "We have no aeroplanes, no rifles, no machine guns; neither poisonous gases, nor gas masks; we have no artillery, we have no tanks; we have no navy, even sufficient for our defence. No seaplanes. We have not enough non-commissioned officers; our reserves are not trained; we have no horses, no equipment, no medicinal supplies. We just have enough troops to marshal at parades

B. LABOUR POSITION DURING THE WAR

1. Military Conscription

701 The age limits for mobilisation are 19–50, while youths from 17–18 are liable for pre-military training.

During 1942 there have been several indications of the strain which further mobilisation was putting on Rumania's manpower; for example, in April 1942 the sentences on political prisoners were suspended and they were called into the army, while from July of that year onwards there has been a constant revision of previous exemptions and a tightening of control over the granting of leave and call-up. Military service, which previously had been obligatory for Rumanian citizens only, was made compulsory for all non-nationals* resident in the country, and further a decree was passed mobilising all Rumanians of military age resident abroad.

[563]

It is calculated that it has never been possible for Rumania to have more than 800,000 men properly equipped under arms at one period. The actual strength of the army has fluctuated considerably during the last two years, as has the number on the eastern front, but a reasonable average figure would be 500,000, of which 200,000 on the eastern front.

727 464 Rumanian casualties are difficult to assess. One estimate at the end of 1941 put casualties at 150,000, while total casualties up to May 1943 have been estimated at 350,000. Military mobilisation will probably have meant a loss of some 800,000 men to the general labour supply.

2. Recruitment for Germany

464 167 The recruitment of workers for Germany has been on a small scale, which is not surprising, as Rumania's military contribution has been considerable, and the military mobilisation has already reduced the supply of labour needed for the Rumanian armament industry to a minimum. Such labour as might be available for export is unskilled and therefore of less value to Germany. The total number of Rumanian workers in Germany in December, 1942, was estimated at 14,000. Of these 10,000 were young Rumanians 18–19, who were recruited at the end of 1941 to be "trained" in German metallurgical factories, 1,000 are women employed as domestic servants, and the rest are mainly unskilled general workers.

3. Foreign Workers in Rumania

648 463 In addition to the German administrators and directors, who are in certain of the key positions in Rumanian industry, there is also evidence of skilled German technicians in Rumanian armament factories. In 1942 there was a nucleus of the German Todt organisation, and Italian builders, in the country.

727 About ~~40,000 Russian prisoners~~ of war are employed, chiefly in agriculture, though also in mining and navvying work.

C. GENERAL LABOUR DEVELOPMENTS

464 722 In 1937 the average unemployment figure was 12,000. The dislocation of trade and industry on the outbreak of war temporarily caused a general increase of unemployment, which was rapidly absorbed by the military call-up and increased activity in the armaments industry. In March

* The German minority was already liable for military service, either in the Rumanian or German army and in December, 1942, it was announced that there were 30,000 *Volksdeutsche* in the Rumanian Army.

[55a]

9: Pool S-4 (no date) 1954 E1 Europe
Rumania ED1

726 *648 to the German military campaigns against the southern regions of the Soviet Union. Numbering approximately thirty divisions, the Romanians first achieved the reconquest of territory which Russia had recently severed from Romania. The Romanian forces were then moved across the Dniester to support the Germans in the successful campaign against Odessa. The Romanian Army was in large measure responsible for the successful siege of Sebastopol and the capture of the Crimea. In the autumn and winter of 1942 an estimated Romanian force of fifteen divisions fought alongside the German troops in the offensive against Stalingrad. Like the Germans, the Romanians suffered extremely heavy losses at Stalingrad, and their military strength on the Eastern Front was never again brought up to the level existing prior to that campaign.

[727] By August 1944 Romania had lost 110,000 men killed and 180,000 captured, though she still had twenty divisions active on the front and nine divisions stationed in the interior of Romania. By that time it had become clear that Germany was not going to win the war and that Romania had chosen the wrong side. The pro-Nazi government of Marshal Ion Antonescu was overthrown on August 23, 1944, by a coup d'état engineered by King Michael. Romania immediately changed sides in the war. The former enemy, Russia, became a military ally and the Axis associates of three years past became enemies. The Romanians faced the immediate task of clearing the country of the more than half million German troops remaining there. This was accomplished relatively quickly. The Red Army was in Bucharest by the last day of August. Then in co-operation with Soviet forces the Romanians participated in the campaigns against the German and Hungarian Armies in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

● 704 *648 Along with the regular Romanian troops used in these actions there were two divisions of Romanians which had been organized by the Soviets primarily out of prisoners of war and which for some time had already been fighting on the Soviet side. The members of these divisions gave their oath of allegiance to the "new order" not to the Romanian king.[26]

These two divisions were culled from among a much larger number of Romanian PW's. Besides the 180,000 PW's in August 1944, another 280,000 Romanians were seized and sent to Russia thereafter even though Romania was presumably Russia's ally. Of these hundreds of thousands the large majority never returned. A substantial portion of those who did return were the members of the divisions formed in the PW camps. These units were named the Tudor Vladimirescu and Horia-Closca-Crisan Divisions. The former was under the command of Nicolae Cambrea, a lieutenant colonel who had been captured at Stalingrad and who had been won over by the efforts of Ana Pauker and other Romanian Communists who worked in the prison camps. After the fighting on the Central Euro-

704 648*

pean Front ended, it became a major factor in the new Romanian Army. The Horia-Closca-Crisan Division was organized later and did not become quite so important in the War but it also provided much thoroughly indoctrinated personnel for the Communist regime.

*

701 648*

Another group of ex-PW officers returned long after the war was over. In 1946 the Communists sent back 500 specially selected and indoctrinated officers. Those 500 officers were led by the then Colonel Victor Draganescu, a career artillery officer who has since become Major General, Ministerial Councillor in the Ministry of Interior, and commander of security troops. These 500 officers were greeted by big Communist-sponsored demonstrations and their return was presented as a token of Soviet magnanimity. Draganescu said, "We express our gratitude toward Generalissimo Stalin, because of his large understanding granted the Rumanian Government in allowing Rumanian prisoners to return even before the conclusion of peace."[27]

Re-trained PW's were thus one major source of Communist officers. Another source was a para-military force organized beginning in the autumn of 1944 by Emil Bodnaras. This was the "Guard of Patriotic Defense." It was equipped by the Soviet Occupation Army from captured German supplies. At the same time a law was passed incorporating all "anti-fascist fighters" into the Romanian Army in a bloc. "Actually the number of Partisans operating in Rumania during the war against Germany had been infinitesimal."[28] They were mainly organized afterwards by the Communists who decided who was to be considered as having been an anti-fascist fighter. Under this law such leading Communist politicians as Emil Bodnaras, Vasile Luca, George Vasilichi, and Ana Pauker became generals.

Another special force which the Communists built was that of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, (for a while divorced from that Ministry and placed in a separate Ministry of State Security, but perhaps now recombined.) The government of the Romanian People's Republic has devoted much attention to these special security forces. Some measure of their importance is revealed by the fact that a couple of years ago the budget for these troops was considerably larger than that of the Ministry of Armed Forces.[29] A more satisfactory index of relative size is troops. The troops under the Ministry of Interior number at least 120,000, but probably 160,000, while the regular army was estimated by Tito as 300,000 in 1950, but is probably only 225,000.

*

701 648* 661

While the ranks of the officers corps were being filled with Communists, regular officers were dismissed <u>en masse</u> after the War. The first purge had already occurred with the coup d'état of August 1944 even before the Communists were involved. The Sanatescu government formed at that time was staffed largely by generals who had not been closely identified with the previous Antonescu regime or who, like Generals Radescu and Aldea, had opposed it. The generals

(a) *Constanța*

504
505 Constanța, which is situated on the Black Sea and is Rumania's most modern port, is, in fact, her only port actually on the coast, and before the war was, therefore, of some considerable importance. Since the Russian campaign, however, its significance has dwindled enormously, due to the presence of Russian submarines in the Black Sea and to the curtailment of Rumania's overseas markets, which means that trade is mainly carried on the Danube and by rail.

Exports from Constanța consisted mainly of petroleum products which came by pipe-line from the Ploești district. A considerable portion of the country's general trade, including some cereal export, was also handled here.

[503] Heavy draught ships can anchor in Constanța harbour, but continued dredging is necessary inside the harbour to maintain the various depths. The estimated daily general-cargo discharging capacity of the port is about 7,200 tons. Total capacity for oil storage is about 660,000 tons at and in the vicinity of Constanța.

(b) *Brăila*

Braila, which is situated on the left bank of the Danube, is the normal limit of navigation on the Danube for ocean-going vessels. It is the principal port for grain export and is well equipped with grain-handling facilities, such as silos, elevators, etc. Small quantities of timber are also handled.

The width of the river channel at Brăila is normally 330 yards, though greater during the spring floods.

The estimated daily general-cargo discharging capacity is about 3,000 tons.

Grain is usually loaded into ocean-going vessels by floating elevators, the working capacity of which is estimated to be about 150 tons per hour under normal working conditions.

Total warehouse capacity of all the warehouses in the dock basin section for storing goods is 6,400 tons.

(c) *Galați*

[712] This port is also situated on the left bank of the river Danube and is the chief inland port of entry into Rumania, as well as being the headquarters of the Rumanian navy. It is the centre of the timber export trade, being situated just below the junction of the Siret River down which most of the wood from the Carpathians is floated. It is also well situated for the receipt of timber by rail from the Bucovina and from North Moldavia.

[43c]

CHAPTER XI

463 industrial labour. One-third of all workers en-
438 gaged in industry are independent artisans, on whom the community is dependent for its services, but who do not play any important part in war production. In certain of the larger armament works German controllers have effected a considerable degree of rationalisation.

3. Mining

316 There is a shortage of miners; Russian prisoners
727 of war have been employed in mining during 1942. Many miners were reported to have been included in the territory transferred to Hungary.

4. Armament Works

719 There is a general shortage of labour in metal
464 and engineering factories, particularly of skilled labour. A 12-hour day was legalised at the beginning of 1942, but it is doubtful if in fact a 12-hour day is ever worked.

5. Timber

313 There is a shortage of labour, both for lumbering
464 and for timber manufacture.

6. Textiles and Clothing

464 The total number of workers in these industries
288 has probably fallen considerably, due to reduction of available raw materials. The delivery of supplies
294 to individual mills seems to be somewhat erratic, and there is evidence of considerable part-time work, for instance in a survey of some 43 factories, in December, 1942, 11 were working full time, 21 on a reduced scale, and 11 at a very reduced scale.

7. Building

499 The extent of fortification building and general
712 road and rail construction in Rumania is unknown, but in the second half of 1942 there was evidence
464 of a scarcity of general labour for such projects, and of Russian prisoners of war working on rail construction.

438 In the other branches of occupation, transport
464 services, etc., there is no evidence of labour shortage, apart from doctors, many of whom have
[759] been mobilised for the army.

D. CONTROL OF LABOUR

1. The Youth Labour Service

466 A youth labour service founded on the German
883 model was established in March 1941. The leaders were trained in Germany, but it was only in April 1942, that the labour camps began to function. Youths are called up in their 19th–20th year, and the period of service lasts 7 months.

(*See* Part II, Chapter V.B. for further details.)

2. Civil Mobilisation

466 A general civil mobilisation decree was passed in May 1941 by which (1) employment cards were introduced; (2) men and women aged 20-57 were liable to compulsory employment if not employed.

Two subsequent decrees were published in March and May 1943, one for the reorganisation of agriculture, forestry and fishing, and the second for the reorganisation of industry. Each of these decrees gave full powers to the appropriate authorities for the mobilisation and transfer of labour.

In addition to the general labour decrees which have so far had little influence on the labour situation, there have been regional decrees applying to individual localities, e.g. in Bessarabia, in February 1942, all the inhabitants aged 12-70 were called upon for compulsory agricultural labour unless already employed.

The roof is steeper than in the plains and protrudes further over the house. The support is in the form of a collar. The rafters tend to be too widely spaced, which results in slight bending of the battens; but, while it makes for a weaker roof, this results in softer and more pleasing lines. The four corners are not sharp but tend to be rounded (fig. 62). Wooden shingles are almost exclusively used for roof covering. They are about 15 centimeters wide and may be as long as 3 meters. They overlap two to four times. Shorter shingles form 6-10 rows. The smaller shingles may have their ends in the form of swallow tails or other decorative shapes. The ridge shows a special development. On the windward side the first layer of shingles is made to protrude over the ridgepole (fig. 62). These shingles also have excised patterns and are very ornamental. The ridgepoles may extend slightly over the hip and have a small gabled roof, one shingle in height (fig. 62). This provides an opening for the smoke to escape through. Ornamental poles rise at either end of the ridgepole (fig. 61). 342 [335] [531]

Chimneys are lacking and the smoke may escape through openings at the ridge or otherwise through the roof, which then shows all shades of gray to black. In some areas of Oltenia in southwestern Rumania one finds wooden chimneys (fig. 65). These are made of wicker and daub and are covered with shingles. [354] [184]

A special development in the foothills of the Southern Carpathian Mountains is the privy, which is in the form of an annex located at the end of the veranda (fig. 64b). [184] [514]

In general the buildings in the mountain districts show a greater variation than those of the plains. The woodwork is superior, and shows a great deal of inventiveness. The construction, however, is irregular, sloppy and often not functional. Pillars that carry no weight may be very thick, while those that must support much weight may be much too slender (Jänecke, 1918: 35-43). 342 184 [335]

Kulas (fig. 67) are found only in the mountainous regions of Oltenia in the district of Mehedinti, Gorj and Râmnicu-Vâlcea. They were built by the boyars, the wealthy landowners. The oldest ones come from the period when the Rumanian rulers were paying tribute to the sultan. The ground plan is a square 7 by 12 meters in length. The width of the walls is 30-70 centimeters. The kula (fig. 67) may have three or four stories, each about 2.5 meters in height. Each story has one room. The ground floor is used for storage; sometimes a well is built into it, and occasionally there is a subterranean escape passage. The upper floors may also be used for storage, but are mainly living quarters. Windows are generally found only on one side; the other walls are provided with loopholes. On the top floor there is generally an open veranda (ĉerdak) about 3 meters wide, the roof over which is supported by pillars (fig. 67). The exposure is toward the valley and the south. On the side opposite the ĉerdak there is a simple wooden balcony under the eaves (fig. 67). Many kulas have a privy tower attached to them. 342 712 [184] [556] [175] [312] [514]

342 The stairway, about 1.25 meters wide made of massive logs, is
•712 generally on the inside of the buildings; when it is located on the outside it leads onto the wooden balcony. The exterior is white-
[531] washed. In addition, the surface is decorated with molded bands around each story division. There may also be a vertical division, thus creating a number of large panels. While these areas are symmetrical, neither they nor the molded bands that enclose them have any relation to the placing of windows or pillars (Jänecke, 1918: 62-63).

342 In 1895 there still existed about 55,000 earth huts (bordei)
[175] which were inhabited by the poorest population, generally Gypsies
[563] (fig. 63). They are common in the Danubian plain. Over an excavation 1-3 meters deep is placed a gabled roof. The roof is made of boards over which earth is laid. Sometimes reeds are placed over the boards before the earthen cover is added. The entrance is on one of the gabled sides, generally with a southerly exposure, and a window is placed on each gable side (Jänecke, 1918: 4).

343 Farm Buildings. In the lowlands the buildings are arranged in
351 no definite order; though generally the house is closest to the road. The corn-house (coşar) is either opposite to or at right angles to the house so that it can be watched. The yard and orchard are surrounded by a fence. The simplest fence is made of wickerwork between wooden poles. More often, however, it is made of boards
[556] that have intricate excised designs (fig. 60). The wealthy people
[563] may add an imposing gateway with a small door. Flower or vegetable
[244] gardens are rare, and the latter are called bulgări, since they are generally kept by immigrant Bulgarians who grow all the vegetables
[247] for town consumption (Stratilesco, 1907: 233). The farmstead is surrounded by shady trees, and there is generally a plum orchard at
[245] the back of the farm buildings (Jänecke, 1918: 8-9).

In the mountain regions the arrangement of the buildings in the
[184] yard differs from that of the lowlands. The stables and other buildings are arranged on the border of the yard in a horseshoe form to serve as protection for the house. The yard is usually very small, and has a strong high palisade with a massive gateway, the whole giving the farm a fortress-like appearance (the author points to the presence of bears in summer and wolves in winter) (Jänecke, 1918: 32-35).

343 In the lowlands there are generally not many additional farm
[184] buildings in the yard, and this fact is correlated with the pattern of building additional annexes to the house, a more economical and practical procedure. Stables are of the simplest lathwork or wickerwork, covered with a straw roof. Sheds for the storage of straw, hay and cornstalks are absent, for the latter are stacked into tall round piles in the open. The baking oven for summer use, made of mud and bricks, has a hipped roof supported by four pillars.

393
439 Present requirements for the Armed Forces for such articles as wireless, field-telephones, etc., and electrical equipment for the oil companies are imported from Germany, as are civilian requirements, though imports for the latter by no means cover the demand. Sweden and Switzerland both supply small quantities of electrical goods of various types.

B. ARMAMENTS

1. General Development

●719 Rumanian armament works were for many years badly organised and equipped. In 1936 the Government made the first serious attempt to organise the industry, and selected some eight engineering works for conversion to extensive war production, particularly of shells. Much of this and of subsequent expansion of the industry was carried out under the supervision of foreign concerns, notably Schneider, Skoda and the Ceskoslovenska Zbrojovka, who were not only responsible for equipping the Rumanian works, but also for providing technical and trained personnel.

By 1939 and 1940 a number of new factories came into production, and others either increased their output or adapted their organisation to war production. Despite this expansion, however, the present-day (1943) level of production cannot fulfil the whole of the needs of the Armed Forces, and Rumania has been forced to import war material from Germany, France, Switzerland and elsewhere.

The industry suffers from a lack of certain essential raw materials and of facilities for the production of machine tools, power units and other important engineering components, for which the Rumanians are largely dependent on their already hard-pressed Allies.

719

2. Small Arms and Mortars

The principal small arms factory is the Cugir branch of the Copşa Mica şi Cugir Company, which was developed by Zbrojovka of Brno and came into full-scale production in 1938. Apart from the small arms section, which specialises in the ZB 30 type of machine gun, there is also a small arms ammunition plant, and a branch at Copşa Mica which was designed for the production of various types and calibres of artillery and shells.

The production of trench mortars is almost entirely confined to the Voina works at Braşov, which specialises in the Brandt 60 mm. and 81 mm. types. Vulcan of Bucarest also is believed to be engaged on similar work, but on a smaller scale. The Braşov works produce mortar bombs also, but the filling is carried out at Satu-Lung.

3. Artillery Production

Artillery or artillery-component production is believed to be carried out by some five or six firms. The Astra-Vagoane works at Braşov was taken over by the Reşiţa Iron and Steel concern in 1936 for the assembly and finishing of various types, including the 37 mm. A.Tk. gun and the 75 mm. A.A. gun, the barrels being received in the rough state from Reşiţa. There are also facilities for the manufacture, assembly and (it is believed) filling, of various types and calibres of shells. Certain tank components may also be made.

The parent company at Reşiţa, in which Skoda is believed to have an interest, manufactures guns and carriages up to 150 mm. calibre and shell cases. There is an important branch at Orăştie for filling and assembling shells. The Concordia works at Ploeşti was converted by Schneider in 1939 for the production of 37 and 47 mm. A.Tk. guns in addition to various calibres of shells and cartridge cases. The Malaxa factory in Bucarest is also engaged on gun production, but is probably of more importance as a shell producer, particularly as it also possesses an important shell filling and assembly plant at Tohanul Vechiu. The branch at Brăila is believed to have been turned over to gun and shell manufacture in recent years. According to reports, both this works and that in Bucarest produce tanks or tank components.

Apart from the shell and filling plants already mentioned, both the State Pyrotechnical Institute and the State Military Arsenal in Bucarest are important shell and small arms ammunition producers. A new works at Avrig, which was still under construction in July 1941 was to be one of the leading shell-filling and assembly plants in Rumania, accounting for some 40 per cent. of the total output. There are a number of metal-works, such as Metrom and Farola of Braşov, Laromet of Bucarest and Costinescu of Sinaia, which add a valuable contribution by supplying components to the main shell producers.

Despite its many shortcomings, the Rumanian armament industry has in recent years become one of the most important in S.E. Europe.

399

4. Aircraft Industry

Rumania before the war possessed a small but active aircraft industry capable of producing about 500 aircraft yearly, which was, however, to a great extent, dependent upon foreign suppliers of aero-engines and aircraft components. There were three airframe factories, one of which also produced engines, output of the latter being sufficient to equip about two-thirds of the aircraft built in the country.

[27a]

463 industrial labour. One-third of all workers en-
438 gaged in industry are independent artisans, on whom the community is dependent for its services, but who do not play any important part in war production. In certain of the larger armament works German controllers have effected a considerable degree of rationalisation.

3. Mining

316 There is a shortage of miners; Russian prisoners
727 of war have been employed in mining during 1942. Many miners were reported to have been included in the territory transferred to Hungary.

4. Armament Works

719 There is a general shortage of labour in metal
464 and engineering factories, particularly of skilled labour. A 12-hour day was legalised at the beginning of 1942, but it is doubtful if in fact a 12-hour day is ever worked.

5. Timber

313 There is a shortage of labour, both for lumbering
464 and for timber manufacture.

6. Textiles and Clothing

464 The total number of workers in these industries
288 has probably fallen considerably, due to reduction
294 of available raw materials. The delivery of supplies to individual mills seems to be somewhat erratic and there is evidence of considerable part-time work, for instance in a survey of some 43 factories in December, 1942, 11 were working full time, 21 on a reduced scale, and 11 at a very reduced scale.

7. Building

499 The extent of fortification building and general
712 road and rail construction in Rumania is unknown,
464 but in the second half of 1942 there was evidence of a scarcity of general labour for such projects, and of Russian prisoners of war working on rail construction.

438 In the other branches of occupation, transport
464 services, etc., there is no evidence of labour
[759] shortage, apart from doctors, many of whom have been mobilised for the army.

D. CONTROL OF LABOUR

1. The Youth Labour Service

466 A youth labour service founded on the German
883 model was established in March 1941. The leaders were trained in Germany, but it was only in April 1942 that the labour camps began to function. Youths are called up in their 19th–20th year, and the period of service lasts 7 months.

(*See* Part II, Chapter V.B. for further details.)

2. Civil Mobilisation

466 A general civil mobilisation decree was passed in May 1941 by which (1) employment cards were introduced; (2) men and women aged 20–57 were liable to compulsory employment if not employed.

Two subsequent decrees were published in March and May 1943, one for the reorganisation of agriculture, forestry and fishing, and the second for the reorganisation of industry. Each of these decrees gave full powers to the appropriate authorities for the mobilisation and transfer of labour.

In addition to the general labour decrees which have so far had little influence on the labour situation, there have been regional decrees applying to individual localities, e.g. in Bessarabia, in February 1942, all the inhabitants aged 22–70 were called upon for compulsory agricultural labour unless already employed.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

up of Jews became the favourite occupation of the 661
legionaries. The resulting confusion helped many 642
minor officials as well as influential business men in acquiring valuable property.

But it soon became obvious that the real masters 648
of Rumania were the Germans. In October 1940 642
Antonescu invited German troops into the country
as instructors for the Rumanian Army. German 669
trade delegations began organizing Rumania's economy and German specialists were appointed to important positions in various ministries. Although Antonescu had included the Iron Guard in his government, the struggle for power between him and Horia Sima continued. In January 1941 the Iron Guard, supporting the latter, made a last bid. The legionaries rose in revolt and succeeded in gaining several strong positions in Bucarest and in some provincial towns. The army, however, sided with Antonescu, who was also aided by the Germans, and within a short time the 'Conducator' emerged as victor. He at once proceeded to the establishment of a completely military administration and based his whole regime on the army.

His[1] success in the fight against the Iron Guard 721 •
was influenced decisively by the German desire to create a stable Rumanian government which would join in the attack on the Soviet Union. Antonescu did not fail his German masters. On 22 June 1941 Rumanian troops, together with German divisions, crossed the Soviet frontier. Thanks to German 721
support, Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina 727
were re-occupied within a short time. Both provinces were put under a military administration and ruled quite separately from the rest of Rumania.

[1] [i.e. Antonescu -- Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

721 Those sections of the population which had sup-
727 ported the Soviet regime were ruthlessly persecuted and the punitive measures are almost identical with those carried out in 1919.[1]

721 Politically the advance of Rumanian troops into the Ukraine and as far afield as the Caucasus put Antonescu and his propagandists in an awkward position. In order to justify the entry of Rumania into the war[2] he pointed to the necessity of recovering Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina. The Rumanian advance farther east was defended alternatively by the assertion that the land beyond the Dniester was really Rumanian, and by the argument that Rumania could never be safe whilst the Soviet Union existed. The former line of argument carried no conviction: the latter had at first some popularity in view of the wound which the loss of Bessarabia and Bukovina had inflicted on the national pride.

While the German and Rumanian armies continued their advance into Soviet territory these excuses and justifications were accepted without public criticism, although, apart from the few out-and-out Fascists, there is no Rumanian who would really believe that he has any claim to land east of the Dniester. But the ever mounting losses of the Rumanians began to disturb the people. Losses had already been heavy in the capture of Odessa, the

[1] According to Soviet reports over 50,000 Jews and 30,000 Bessarabians have been killed since the re-occupation by Rumanian troops.

[2] Great Britain declared war on Rumania on 7 December 1941, and the United States of America followed suit on 5 June 1942.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

Crimea and Kharkov in 1941. But they became alarming when the Red Army began the great counter-offensive in the Caucasus and at Stalingrad, where five Rumanian divisions under General Lascar were wiped out or put out of action. In May 1943 Antonescu said the Rumanian losses were 500,000, referring apparently to killed and prisoners only. Since then the great German retreat has probably caused many more Rumanian losses. During 1943 the government's action in sending Rumanian troops beyond the old frontier was repeatedly condemned by the leaders of the opposition—Peasants and Liberals. The Minister of War answered these objections by saying, 'It is lucky for us that the war is so far away. If we had to fight so powerful an opponent on the Dniester or the Pruth, all Rumania would be ruins.' But within a year the avenging fate had not rested on the Pruth. 721

OPPRESSION AND EXPLOITATION. The effects of Antonescu's dictatorial regime showed themselves in all spheres of Rumanian life. Politically the country was ruled by the army generals and in all other fields by Rumanian and German big business. Military administrators replaced local government in the provinces and the towns. The Rumanian industrialists and bankers found it very profitable to work for the German war economy. Their political enemies were liquidated or driven under-ground. In the economic field their exploitation of the people and of the country's resources was only limited by Germany's interests. 661 642

Both the political and the economic life of 000

5

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

511 435 the economic position of the rural population appears to be lamentable.

648 722 **THE POLITICAL SCENE.** Both the internal and external policies of Rumania have been shaped by events on the battle fronts, and more particularly by the war on the Eastern front. The fact that Rumania is fighting side by side with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union has had effects upon the national life of which the consequences are inescapable. The artificial stimulation of public opinion against the U.S.S.R., intended to galvanize the people into a fervent nationalism and unreserved support for Antonescu, proved no small embarrassment to him when the tide of battle turned so catastrophically against his Allies. Further, Rumania's position is also anomalous in the extreme. The severest blow which the country suffered during the past decades was the loss of two-fifths of Transylvania to Hungary.[1] Yet Rumania has been fighting in alliance with Hungary against the Soviet Union. At the same time friction between Hungary and Rumania has been one of the gravest problems in the

511 435 credits the farmers are unable to meet their most urgent obligations and, if no solution is found, an agrarian crisis is imminent which must influence the whole national economy.' A Bucarest paper stated in January 1944: '. . . there are two million farms without milk cows, 160,000 without hogs and 200,000 without even a single chicken. Unfortunately the Ministry of Agriculture with only two and a half per cent of the budget can do little to alleviate the peasants' lot.'

[1] The Czechoslovak President, Dr Benes, stated in London in March 1944 that the Soviet Union would insist on the return of the territories which Hungary stole from her neighbours, including Transylvania.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

Axis camp. Clashes between armed Rumanians and Hungarians have been very frequent, and the Press of both countries has kept up an unabating series of violent accusations. 722 648

The swift advance of the Red Army during the great winter offensive of 1943–4 had by the end of March brought Soviet troops well into Rumanian territory. Hastily-made arrangements for the evacuation of the Rumanian-administered province of 'Transdnistria', actually part of the Ukraine, and of the Bukovina and Bessarabia, in all of which an intensive policy of Rumanization during the past few years had failed to bear fruit, were thereby thrown into complete confusion. 722

The position of the Rumanian government at the time of writing can only be a matter of speculation. The old political parties have failed to provide an effective opposition to the dictatorship of Antonescu, though Maniu and Bratianu have indeed addressed several notes of protest to the 'Conducator'. The strength of the Rumanian underground movement is difficult to assess. There have been several clashes with the Germans,[1] some sabotage and lately also partisan activities.[2] Clandestine organizations

[1] Of the 500,000 Germans in the present reduced Rumania, over 42,000 have joined the Nazi S.S. divisions. Germans from the Banat and Transylvania make up the greater part of the S.S. division *Prinz Eugen*, which has been fighting against Tito's Army of Liberation in Yugoslavia for some time.

[2] There are also reports of stronger activity by the Communist Party of Rumania of which several members have been arrested. It is said that opponents of the Antonescu regime, of various party allegiances, have succeeded in forming the beginnings of a united 'national liberation movement,' of which the title suggests Communist leadership.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

722 amongst railway workers and in the industrial areas around Brasov, Ploesti and Bucarest have lately gained some influence.

648 **RUMANIA AND THE WESTERN ALLIES.** The American air attacks on the oil district of Ploesti first made the Rumanians realize that the war was drawing near them. The capitulation of Fascist Italy was the second blow. But the decisive and all-important factor was, and remains, the advance of the Soviet troops. The last hope of the present government and its supporters lay in a conflict between the Western Powers and the U.S.S.R. They have frequently protested that they do not consider Rumania to be really at war with Britain and the United States. Therefore, the decisions of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences were regarded by them as blows directed against their very existence. Subsequent Press statements, however, show that they still hoped to gain the sympathy of Britain and America; and the journey of Prince Stirbey to Turkey and Egypt in March 1944 could have no other explanation. (This gentleman owns most of the land around Ploesti.) Recently a prominent Rumanian journalist wrote that the country's present position is similar to the pre-revolutionary era of 1917. Then, he said, the worst was averted by granting certain concessions to the people, and he went on to demand that a similar step be taken now for the same purpose. Unwittingly, this Rumanian propagandist has truly summed up the position of his class. It is prepared to do anything to keep its privileges and its powers. Its representatives will side with whoever assures them of the continuance of their rule. As

146 Largely because of its cost, the consumption of
262 sugar is very low, except among the well-to-do in the towns. (To encourage sugar-beet growing, a high price was set by the Government.)

[785] The diet is further impoverished by the long religious fasts—seven weeks before Easter, six weeks before Christmas, two shorter summer periods, plus Wednesdays and Fridays of each week. The diet during the fast includes practically no food of animal origin. Children under 10 years do not normally observe these fasts and, in fact, usually have a better diet during these periods since more milk, eggs and butter are available for them.

The diet, though fairly adequate in energy value, is short of animal protein, fats and calcium; moreover, where maize is the principal cereal lack of vitamin B_2 may be very serious. Various symptoms of vitamin and mineral deficiencies are [165] observed, and the high infant-mortality rate—the highest in Europe—is also partly due to malnutrition. One of the most serious effects of the poor diet is the nervous disease pellagra, caused by this deficiency of the vitamin B_2 factor. In Moldavia, where maize is the staple food, about 5 per cent. [164] of the rural population suffers from pellagra every spring. In the whole country about 3,000 deaths occur each year from this disease (compared with 4,000 in the maize-eating southern states of U.S.A.).

The average annual pre-war food consumption of Rumania is shown in the following table, with comparative figures for the United Kingdom.

Average per Head Consumption

	Rumania		*United Kingdom*	
	Kg.	*Lb.*	*Kg.*	*Lb.*
Wheat and rye	104	229	129	285
Maize	160	305	—	—
Potatoes	50	110	84	185
Sugar	5	11	43	95
Meat	17	37	63	139
Milk	70	123*	94	165*
Butter	1	2	11	24
Pig fat	4	10	5	11
Vegetable oil	1·5	3	—	—
Margarine	—	—	4	10
Calories per day	2,700		3,100	

*Pints

B. WAR-TIME CHANGES

1. Territorial Changes

728 The net effect of the territorial changes which
241 have occurred since 1939 is the loss of Northern Transylvania to Hungary and of Southern Dobruja
311 to Bulgaria. For two seasons' crops, 1940 and 1941, Rumania was without Bessarabia, but in the late summer of 1941 she not only regained Bessarabia but acquired administrative control of the Soviet territory now styled Transnistria, and this has made small contributions to the food supplies of Rumania in 1942-43. Ignoring Transnistria, however, Rumania lost 12 per cent. of her former arable area and grain production. The Transylvanian areas ceded to Hungary, though not rich agriculturally, probably needed only small imports of grain to supplement their own production, while south Dobruja, though a surplus producing area, contributed only a fraction to Rumania's total agricultural production. The country's potential agricultural export remains, therefore, substantially what it was before the war.

2. Agriculture in War Years

241 Germany, at the outbreak of the war, looked to
722 the Danube countries, and to Rumania in particu-

241 722 lar, for grain, oilseeds and livestock products to provide the balance of food and fodder requirements which she could not obtain from her own agriculture. The normal grain surplus and the potential output of sunflower and other oilseeds appeared sufficiently large to provide a solid basis for these expectations. Owing, however, to wartime dislocations of economic life, to the absence of adequate administrative control of farming, to the lack of co-operation by the peasants, and, above all, to a succession of unfavourable seasons, these hopes have been almost entirely falsified.

Firstly, in 1940, Rumania lost Bessarabia, her principal surplus region, to the U.S.S.R., and with it all that year's crops. When she regained it in 1941 she obtained no surplus out of that harvest, and, because of disorganisation, little in 1942. In rump Rumania, in 1940 and 1941, the grain harvests were substantially below the average owing to reduced sowings (partly caused by mobilisation) and to disappointing yields. A determined effort was made by propaganda and the release of labour to bring sowings back to normal for the 1942 season. But the early onset of an unusually severe winter again reduced the sowings, while a serious drought in the summer of 1942 reduced the yields.

722 [243] There was a deficiency in wheat sowings of over a million hectares, while grain yields were barely 60 per cent. of the average. The out-turn of the year was consequently worse than that of the two preceding years. Wheat and rye yielded only 1·3 million tons compared with an average for the territory of 3·6 million tons. The maize crop was a little less than 3 million tons compared with an average of 4·7 million tons. The total grain production was about 5·5 million tons, a quantity inadequate to meet the requirements of food and fodder at any approach to normal levels.

[24] Other crops were more successful in 1942, but they could not appreciably offset the disastrous grain results. The potato crop reached an average level for the first time during the war years, and part of it was used to stretch the deficient wheat for bread making. There was also a good crop of beans and peas, largely because as their prices were not controlled, they were very remunerative crops. The sunflower crop, though sowings failed to reach the ambitious target and yields were only 60 per cent. of normal, was of record dimensions. Soya, rape and sugar beet declined, however, from earlier levels. (A significant supplementary supply of sugar is now being obtained from Transnistria.)

[243] These for the most part poor crop results, besides curtailing the supplies available for human consumption and exports, also brought about a reduction in livestock numbers at the end of 1942. Livestock numbers may, however, have increased somewhat in 1940 and 1941, for it was reported that peasants held back more grain than usual in those years for livestock feeding. If this is true, numbers would now probably be little different from those of pre-war years.

[244] Crop prospects for 1943 point to a more normal result. The winter of 1942-43 was late and mild, making it possible to sow a near-average acreage of winter crops. Preparatory work for spring sowings was also done in good time, and on the whole the weather subsequently has not been unfavourable.

722 249 Tobacco cultivation appears to have declined in the war years, principally because the prices were even more unattractive than those of grain. In 1942 the area sown was reported to be little

CHAPTER I

722 more than half the normal, but the efforts in 1943 [249] to recover to a more average crop may have succeeded.

3. Fish

[208] The general food shortage in Rumania gave a great fillip to the fishing industry. In the 12 months April 1942 to March 1943, some 40,000 tons of fish were caught in State waters besides 13,000 tons in rented and private waters. This is almost double the largest pre-war catch. During 1942 some 6,000 tons were salted down for winter use. In order to promote and introduce better organisation into the fishing industry a German-Rumanian Company has been established, the "Marea-Neagrâ," which will devote special attention to developing the Black Sea fisheries.

4. Agricultural Exports

439 The pre-war level of grain exports was well 243 maintained in 1939; wheat in particular was prominent with over a million tons. The exports of 1940, however, showed an immediate reflection of territorial changes and war shortages. Total grain exports in that year barely reached a million tons compared with the pre-war average of about 1·6 million tons. The following year showed a still sharper decline, wheat reaching only 5,000 tons and maize 120,000 tons. In 1942, despite the recovery of Bessarabia, it is most unlikely that even this level was maintained.

439 Oilseed exports, despite direct German interven- 249 tion aiming at an expansion of the crop, also fell below pre-war levels. Sunflower-seed exports, the principal oilseed, fell from an average of 30,000 tons in 1935-38 to 12,000 tons in 1940 and to 5,000 tons in 1941. Exports following the 1942 crop, though probably better, were not at all commensurate with the increased production, for a serious shortage of edible oil and fat had meanwhile developed in Rumania owing to decreased supplies of pig fat and to the retention by the peasants of their seed for consumption at home, or for disposal on the Black Market.

5. Administrative Control

241 Not even the most complete and efficient system 656 of administrative control could have assured the 435 country's food supplies and exports at normal levels during these three unfavourable years, but it is clear that Rumania's food difficulties have been aggravated by mistakes in economic policy and inadequate control measures. Bureaucratic methods of handling the peasants aroused antagonism and resistance. Supplies of tested seed and other farm requisites were not made available in time. On the collection and supply side, too much power was left in the hands of local prefects. But the most serious shortcoming of the official administration was the failure to establish a price control, and an appropriate relationship between agricultural prices and the cost of the things farmers buy. (In the absence of effective discipline this ratio needs to be strongly in the producers' favour if production and marketing of foodstuffs is to be maintained.) Prices of consumers' goods rose rapidly, owing to shortages, while the Government pegged the prices of farm produce at comparatively low levels. Consequently, the peasants curtailed production and sought better prices by selling much of their produce through Black Market channels. The mistake was officially admitted in the autumn of 1941 when grain prices were more than doubled, but the position still remained unfavourable to

CHAPTER II

3. Transport

315 For the transport of oil both for internal consumption and for export, Rumania relied largely upon railways, and except between the wells and the refineries, only a relatively small proportion was transported by pipeline. The three main pipelines were State-owned and were laid mainly for the transport of oil for export: one for white products from Ploeşti to Constanţa with a capacity of 810,000 tons per annum, and two lines for crude and heavy residue from Ploeşti to Giurgiu with a combined capacity of 300,000 tons per annum.

The total quantity of oil through three lines in 1938 was 800,000 tons; 13 per cent. of the exports from Constanţa and 17 per cent. of those from Giurgiu were handled in this way as well as the internal transport of some 184,000 tons of crude [497] oil. The Rumanian fleet of 8,000 tank cars was ample to handle all the oil transported by rail.

The main channel for exports was Constanţa on the Black Sea, through which 3·3 million tons were exported in 1938, as compared with only 935,000 tons through Giurgiu for transport up the Danube.

C. THE INDUSTRY IN WAR-TIME

1. General

315 ●722 The war has completely altered the orientation of the Rumanian oil industry: normal export trade routes through Constanţa and the Mediterranean were cut and exports to most countries in Continental Europe came under German control as soon as the Germans were astride the Danube at Belgrade, and the main railways through Poland and Yugoslavia. Not only were normal export channels disrupted, but the Rumanian oil industry lost the services of all its foreign technical experts, and could no longer get from the United States supplies of drilling and refinery equipment on which it had very largely relied.

The inevitable result of all this was that in spite of the urgent need for increased production and all German efforts to obtain this, the downward production trend was not halted in 1941, and only 5.483 million tons were produced. That year was, however, one of abnormal difficulties owing to the necessity for reorganising the industry on a war-time basis, rapidly rising prices of almost everything but oil, shortage of man-power owing to Rumanian mobilisation, the difficulty of getting equipment, and above all an abnormally severe winter which hampered transport so severely that production had to be restricted for lack of storage. By dint of continuous German pressure and increased control of the industry, production in 1942 probably reached 5.6 million tons.

Internal consumption has, however, not decreased and is thought to be running at a rate of 2 million tons a year, which leaves between 3 and 3½ million tons available for the Axis and neutral countries in Europe. Italy gets approximately one million tons a year, Germany two million tons, and small quantities go to Switzerland, Sweden and Turkey.

315 439 Except during the winter months when navigation on the Danube is suspended, the majority of exports to Italy go by pipeline to Giurgiu and thence by barge to river ports in Yugoslavia or Hungary for transhipment to Italy by rail-tank car. One of the results of the reorientation of Rumania's oil export trade has been the greatly increased use made of the river port of Giurgiu.

[14a]

(b) *Passengers*

497 In 1938, 48.7 million passengers were carried over a total distance of 3,765 million km. (2,339 million miles) for an average journey of 77 km. (48 miles).

II. War-time Changes

1. Territorial Changes

496 722 Few railways have so far undergone greater changes, both on account of territorial transfers and alterations in traffic flows as a result of the war than the Rumanian State Railways. Firstly, in 1940 the system suffered considerable dismemberment, in June 1,665 km. (1,032 miles) of standard and 65 km. (40 miles) of narrow gauge in Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina were taken over by the U.S.S.R.; then in September the Vienna Award resulted in the transfer of a large part of Transylvania, including 1,750 km. (985 miles) of standard and 355 km. (220 miles) of narrow gauge line to Hungary, and 70 km. (43 miles) of the Southern Dobruja line were ceded to Bulgaria. Following the German attack on the U.S.S.R. in June, 1941, the Bessarabian and Northern Bucovina lines were recovered in the early autumn of that year and, at the beginning of 1942, the Germans placed the control and operation of the railways in the newly created province of Transnistria in the hands of the Rumanian State Railways. The Transnistrian system consists in essence of the Odessa-Zhmerinka section of the Odessa-Kiev-Lwow main line and all branches (including the Zhmerinka-Mogilev line) on both sides as far as the Dniester (frontier with Rumania) in the west, and the Bug (frontier with the Ukraine) in the east.

Apart from Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina and Transnistria, the Rumanian State Railways have not so far suffered any substanti direct physical damage. The Russians on their occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina in June 1940 at once converted all lines from the standard European to the Russian gauge, a task which was made easier by the fact that the system had, prior to 1920, been Russian gauge. The Russians, in spite of the resultant difference in gauge, insisted on taking over all standard-gauge locomotives and rolling-stock formerly in use in the territories, even where this had already been withdrawn by the Rumanians. The Russians during their subsequent evacuation of these provinces, and also of Transnistria, withdrew or destroyed virtually all their locomotives and rolling-stock, and on the whole effectively damaged or destroyed the track, bridges, stations and equipment. The Rumanians, therefore, found themselves faced with the task of reconstructing and reconverting back to standard gauge the lines taken over, and of providing the necessary locomotives, rolling stock equipment and staff to work the traffic. The Transnistrian system from the railway point of view represented a liability rather than an asset.

It was not until the end of 1941 that the lines in Bessarabia and Bucovina were all re-opened, and until early in 1942 that traffic was being worked to and from Transnistria. The Transnistrian system possesses a measure of autonomy, believed in practice to be mainly legal and financial, but for practical purposes the lines are operated as an integral part of the Rumanian system. The transfer of the Transylvanian lines to Hungary and the Southern Dobruja line to Bulgaria were effected without any physical damage and, as far as is known, no locomotives or rolling-stock were handed over by the Rumanians in either case. The change was primarily administrative, but

496 normal traffic was disorganised for several weeks
●722 owing to troop movements, the transfer of population, evacuation of equipment and other problems incidental to the transfer of the territory.

497 All these changes of necessity caused con-
722 siderable problems, particularly administrative and considerably affected traffic working. Of the four Divisions in 1939, most of the Cluj Division including Cluj itself and the Tunel-Cluj-Oradea section of the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Cluj-Oradea-Budapest main line, together with part of the Timişoara Division, were transferred to Hungary. Half of the Cernăuţi Division, including Cernăuţi itself and a section of the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Cernăuţi-Lwow main line, was transferred to the U.S.S.R., and parts of the Bucarest Division were transferred to all three countries. The operation of the system was reorganised and centralised under a military directorate in Bucarest, to which German liaison officers have been attached to co-ordinate working and ensure that all German requirements are met. While these officers must presumably have certain powers, and there are also German officers—thought to be equivalent to R.T.O.—at the more important junctions and traffic centres, there is no evidence that the Rumanian State Railways have ever been under direct German control, or that their autonomy has been seriously impaired.

The Rumanian Authorities have had to cope with all these territorial changes and resultant administrative problems during a period when traffic was both considerably heavier than, and the flows entirely different from, before the war. The closing of the sea routes between Rumania and Germany in September 1939—and since June 1940 largely with Italy and the Northern Mediterranean coast—resulted in the transfer to the Danube or to the direct rail routes, of all traffic between Rumania and Germany, Italy and the rest of Europe. Owing to the closing of the Bucarest - Ploeşti - Cernăuţi - Lwow - Przemysl - Cracow-Silesia main line from September 1939 to December 1941 (except for a trickle of traffic for a few months) on account of the occupation of Eastern Poland by the U.S.S.R., the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Braşov-Copşa Mică-Teiuş-Cluj-Oradea or Teius-Arad-Curtici, and Ploeşti-Bucarest-Orşova-Timişoara lines were called upon to handle all this traffic. An exception was that sent via the Danube, which had to be rail-hauled to and from the Danube ports, particularly Giurgiu and Orşova. Oil has been, apart possibly from military movements, the most important single traffic; and, in general, German traffic has been sent via the Ploeşti-Teiuş-Oradea and Arad routes and Italian traffic via the Bucarest-Timişoara route.

From early in 1941 when the Germans began to move into the Balkans, first for the Yugoslav Greek and then the Russian campaign, the Rumanian railways have had to carry in addition large numbers of troops and quantities of supplies. During the Yugoslav campaign when all routes to Greece and Bulgaria via this latter country were closed, the only all-rail route (apart from ferries over the Danube) into Bulgaria was that via the Cernavodă Bridge and the Dobruja. Rumania served an important rôle as a base for the attack on the Ukraine, and as the German front moved eastwards the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Buzău-Cernăuţi, Buzau-Galaţi-Teghina and Bucarest-Constanţa lines became important as supply routes to the Eastern Front.

2. New Construction and Improvements of the Railway System

499 The lines, which with the exception of the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Câmpina and Ploeşti-Buzău sec-

[41 a]

499 tions, were virtually all single track, were never designed or equipped to carry traffic on this scale. An elaborate programme of new construction and improvement works, certain features of which had been contemplated by the Rumanians for some years, was put in hand to increase the capacity of the various routes. On the routes to the west, the doubling of the Câmpina-Brașov section was pressed forward rapidly and completed by January, 1941, and work is also reported to be in hand on the doubling of sections of the Brașov-Sighișoara-Copșa Mică-Teiuș line. On the routes to the east, the Ploești-Buzău double-track section has been extended as far as Adjud on the Cernăuți line and N. Filipescu on the Galați-Tighina line. In addition, extra sidings and new passing loops have been built, and improved signalling and telegraph and telephone circuits have been installed to increase the capacity of the single-track sections. A considerable mileage of line has also been relaid with heavier rails to permit of the use of more powerful locomotives. Work is also in hand on the construction of a number of new lines, including a new line 202 km. (125 miles) long from Bucarest via Videle-Roșiori-Caracal to Craiova, to shorten and relieve the existing route via Pitești; new lines from Bumbești to Livăseni and Deva to Vîscău; a new line from Ploești to Târgoviste and certain new routes in Bessarabia. Work on several of these lines is understood to be well advanced, and the Bumbești-Livăseni and Bucarest-Caracal-Craiova lines are, according to the latest evidence, likely to be completed in the autumn of 1943. Also the long-projected train-ferry between Giurgiu and Ruse was finally brought into use in June, 1941.

497 In spite of the relief granted by these improvements, the heavy volume of oil, military and other
● 722 urgent traffic could be worked only by severe restrictions on ordinary passenger and freight traffic. The restrictions have inevitably varied from time to time and been most severe during periods of heavy military movements and during the winter when the weather has made operating difficult. Passenger-train services are more or less on a skeleton basis, and are at about one-third of pre-war level; yet the principal long-distance trains still carry restaurant and sleeping-cars. Certain restrictions ahve been imposed on travel and the restrictions on freight traffic have had serious economic consequences, particularly on the distribution of firewood. The shortage of locomotives and wagons, particularly since the recovery of Bessarabia and Northern-Bucovina and the taking over of Transnistria, has been acute. In the early part of the war the tank-wagon position was very difficult, but this has been eased by the construction of new vehicles by Germany, and by German requisitioning of wagons from the occupied countries; but apart from this the wagon position has been continually difficult, though a factor of considerable assistance has been that many of the military and supply movements have been into or through Rumania from Germany, and in consequence the Rumanian State Railways have not had to supply the wagons for these trains. The locomotive position has been met by the transfer of locomotives into Rumania by Germany; in addition to German locomotives, requisitioned French locomotives are said to be stationed at various sheds in Rumania.

The Rumanian State Railways are now in an anomalous position. Although a large programme of new construction and improvements has been carried out, heavy claims are being made on the system by Axis war traffic, with the result that the facilities available for ordinary commercial traffic

[41b]

CHAPTER VIII

497 and for passenger travel are severely limited. However, unless there is severe destruction in the later stages of the war, in the long run the Rumanians are bound to benefit from the capital investment in railways, and from the new construction and improvements which have been carried out to meet Axis needs. These improvements though planned long ago, could never have been carried out with the limited financial and technical resources previously available, and could not have been executed so quickly but for German assistance.

722

B. ROADS

491 Rumania's road system was, by Western European standards, very poorly developed before the war, there being only one International motor road which formed the continuation of the route from Hungary via Oradea Mare—Cluj—Sibiu—Brasov—Bucarest—Giurgiu and a branch line Bucarest—Olenita. Apart from this one major road, the system consists of untarred roads, many of which are in a poor state of repair.

The total length of the road system was reported early in 1943 to be 82,098 km. (51,070 miles), with only 12 per cent. in good state of repair, 22 per cent. being mediocre and the remainder in bad condition. Ownership of the total network is divided as follows :—

State roads ..	11,465 km.	(7,128 miles)
Provincial roads ..	26,181 km.	(16,272 miles)
Communal roads ..	44,452 km.	(27,620 miles)

in 1936 there were some 34,000 cars registered.

The development of the road system has long been the dream of Rumanian propagandists, particularly as a stimulus to tourist traffic, but before the war no large-scale development could be embarked upon because of the lack of available capital.

499 Since the war, work has been started on an ambitious programme of road development, the objects of which are to improve communications between urban systems and to link the system with the International road network.

An Italo-Rumanian road company has started work on the Rumanian sector of one of the future trans-European roads, Trieste—Beograd—Turnu Severin—Bucarest—Constanta, while under a five-year plan, with an expenditure of 75 md. lei, some 5,000 km. (3,100 miles) of road are to be modernised with the help of German and Italian contractors.

C. SHIPPING

1. Introduction

505 A high percentage of Rumania's foreign trade
439 is water-borne (55 per cent. in 1937), as not only is she situated on the Black Sea, but the Danube traverses the full west to east length of the country, forming an important traffic route and link with Central Europe.

The following table shows comparative tonnages for sea and river traffic in 1937 and 1938 :—

	1937	1938
	'000 *metric tons*	
Sea :		
Imports	622	540
Exports	6,918	5,222
River :		
Imports	1,890	1,588
Exports	3,161	2,688

As a result of the cutting-off of overseas markets since 1940 an increasing share of the country's

[42a]

CHAPTER VIII

487
505
439

of transit traffic (mainly downstream). Traffic with other riparian states was apportioned as follows :—

	From Rumania	*To Rumania*
	'000 *tons*	
Germany ..	220	40
Austria ..	390	20
Czechoslovakia ..	440	30
Hungary ..	300	150
Yugoslavia ..	200	—
Bulgaria ..	80	3
	1,630	243

The composition of inland-water traffic has been fully analysed only at the Iron Gates, at the western end of the Danube's Rumanian course. In the traffic shown below, the upstream traffic consisted mainly of Rumanian exports, while the downstream traffic was made up of imports and transit traffic in approximately equal proportions.

Traffic in '000 metric tons at the Iron Gates :—

	1938	1939
	Upstream	
Total	1,362·5	1,864·[illegible]
of which (main items only) :		
Timber	20·1	11·[illegible]
Iron	21·1	13·4
Wheat	30·3	300·6
Barley	49·8	68·[illegible]
Maize	25·1	125·[illegible]
Petroleum and its products	787·7	1,046·1
Salt	30·8	31·7
	Downstream	
Total	489·3	771·2
of which (main items only) :		
Iron	77·2	22·2
Timber	67·6	86·5
Wheat	74·4	363·0
Maize and oats	79·6	28·2

505
439
722

Little is known about traffic since Rumania finally joined the Axis in 1941. As a whole, it is below pre-war level as a result of a great decrease in the amount of grain coming forward. This has been partly, but certainly not entirely, counterbalanced by a slight increase in oil traffic, by the probable diversion of rail traffic to the Danube and by military traffic. The most important individual traffics at the present time are as follows :—

(*a*) Oil shipments from Giurgiu (i) upstream to Italy (50-70,000 tons a month), to Germany (possibly 30-50,000 tons a month), and (ii) downstream to German forces in South Russia (quantity unknown, but may be substantial).

(*b*) Downstream supplies of (i) coal to Rumanian railways (part only of total supply), and of (ii) military equipment, stores, etc., to South Russia (quantities unknown).

(*c*) Upstream supplies of (i) some S. Russian products, including grain (perhaps 20,000 tons a month) and possibly iron and manganese ore (quantities unknown), as well as of (ii) some small quantities of Rumanian exports of agricultural products.

2. Navigation

133
502

The Iron Gate Sector of the Danube between Orşova and Turnu Severin, with its rapids and reefs causing violent currents, is particularly difficult for navigation, and the use of specially

[44a]

206 Rumania was connected by telegraph to Prague, Istanbul, Odessa and Belgrade.

2. Submarine Cables

There was a submarine telegraph cable from Constanța to Kilvos, which was used on the Bucarest—Istanbul telegraph circuit.

3. Wireless.

207 Rumania was fairly well equipped with wireless stations, but after the Government took them over from "Air France," who originally installed them, their working became less efficient. At the beginning of the war there were three broadcasting stations, of which the most powerful was the Radio Rumania, a 150-kW station at Bragov; 14 wireless stations for civil airlines, and a number of radio beacons, government and commercial stations and police wireless stations.

II. War-time Developments

1. Telegraph and Telephones

206 ● 722 It was reported in 1941 that the Germans had laid a telephone cable from Berlin to Bucarest through Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

2. Wireless

207 722 In May 1942 it was reported that the wireless headquarters in S.E. Europe for the "Lufthansa" was at Bucarest. Budapest, Venice, Rome, Belgrade, Zagreb and Sofia are all controlled from this headquarters. An internal Rumanian network for purely military purposes is also worked from Bucarest.

It was learnt in 1943 that there was a plan for the construction of four new medium-wave transmitters to replace existing stations. The new stations were to be at Iași and Timișoara and in Bucarest and Transylvania. A new 50-kW. short-wave transmitter for foreign broadcasts is also planned.

18. Notes

439

1. *Materials for Heat, Light, etc.*—Though only the most important consumers are shown in the table, nearly all European countries were purchasers.

2. *Cereals and Pulses.*—The figures for one year are but small guide to an export dependent upon harvests in buyers' and sellers' countries, but there never has been any doubt as to Rumania's importance as a European granary. Wheat was normally about one-half and maize one-sixth of the class, and Germany usually bought about one-third of the whole export, which lately ranged between 25 per cent. and 33 per cent. of all exports.

3. *Timber.*—This lost much of its importance between 1925 and 1933, when exports fell to 1 milliard lei. The recovery was gradual, though steady. Exports accounted in recent years for between 9 per cent. and 11 per cent. of total exports.

4. *Livestock* increased in value from 1.3 milliard lei in 1937 to 1.8 milliard in 1939, representing a rise from 4.2 per cent. to 6.7 per cent. of all exports. Pigs consistently composed half the class and cattle one quarter.

5. *Seeds* at 1.1 milliard lei in 1938 maintained the class at 5 per cent. of total export trade. Oilseeds represented three-quarters of the class, and of these Germany bought more than half.

6. *Edible Animal Products* increased 50 per cent. in value from 1938 to 1939, reaching a total of 958 million lei, of which nearly one-half was eggs and one-quarter fresh meat (chiefly pork). While the sales of these two commodities were advancing year by year, those of poultry and lard steadily declined.

In 1939 Germany displaced U.K. as the best buyer.

D. WARTIME CHANGES

439
●722

Inclusion in the blockade area and consequent severance from former overseas markets has made Rumania increasingly dependent on Germany, both as a market for her exports and as a supplier of essential raw materials and machinery.

Rumania's export surplus has been very considerably reduced during the war period. The

[50b]

459
722

chief pre-war exports have all suffered. Agricultural produce particularly has been affected, as a result of poor harvests. The export of wheat and maize, which averaged a total of 1.32 million tons between 1935 and 1938, did not amount to 100,000 tons from the 1942 harvest. Timber exports, which ranked third before the war, have dwindled to less than 5 per cent. of the quantities exported in 1937 and 1938.

Oil exports now take first place, amounting to 63 per cent. of the 1940 total by value, though, due to reduced production, the total tonnage available is below that of the peak years immediately preceding the war.

Germany's participation in Rumania's foreign trade has increased from 23 per cent. in 1937 to 46 per cent. in 1940, and during 1941 and 1942 had increased to approximately 70 per cent. of both imports and exports. German exports, however, by no means balance her imports, so that there is an ever mounting clearing balance in Rumania's favour, which was reported to amount to 30 milliard lei in December, 1942, and which causes considerable anxiety in Rumanian financial circles. However, in June 1942 an agreement was signed between the two countries by which war essential trade has to be maintained irrespective of the state of the clearing.

The chief products imported from Germany are agricultural and other machinery, iron and steel semi-manufactured and finished products, and chemicals.

Oil has become Rumania's principal export to Germany, representing in 1940 about 58 per cent. of the total value.

Italy takes second place in Rumania's foreign trade, accounting in 1941 for 11.8 per cent. of Rumanian exports and 16.1 per cent. of imports. Trade is regulated by agreements renewed annually and petroleum products constitute the principal Rumanian export, other commodities being agricultural products and livestock, both in small quantities. Italian exports in return include textiles, sulphur, fruit and military supplies.

Trade with other European countries has been on a very reduced scale. Agreements were concluded with Slovakia, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark and Finland, the exchanges following obvious lines.

[50 c]

652 largely due, first, to the conversion in 1937, of the foreign debt held by Rumanian nationals into domestic debt, and, secondly, to credits granted outside the budget and not covered by normal revenue. The drop in the foreign debt, while partly due to this conversion, was mainly due to the fact that war debts were excluded from the total.

2. Expenditure in Wartime

652
722

After the outbreak of war, expenditure—particularly that on national defence—continued to rise. In 1941/42 a technical change was made in the budgetary system; instead of including profits from State enterprises in the ordinary budget a separate budget was published for State enterprises. Thus expenditure was divided into three categories, (1) the ordinary budget, (2) the special national defence budget and (3) budget for State enterprises. In addition in 1942/43 and 1943/44 separate budgets were published for Bessarabia and Bucovina.

The following table shows the budget estimates for expenditure on these four accounts for the budget years from 1941/42 to 1943/44.

	milliard lei		
	1941/42	1942/43	1943/44
Ordinary budget ..	44.9	72.5	88
Special National Defence budget ..	16.0	21.0	84
Budget for State Enterprises ..	55.0	113.0	192
Budget for Bessarabia and Bucovina ..	—	6.0	10
Total ..	116.0	212.5	374

The first nine months of the Russian war fell in the Budget year 1941/42. Actual expenditure in that year was 74 milliard lei higher than the estimates, since 90 milliard instead of 16 milliard lei was spent on the special national defence budget and 12.5 milliard from the ordinary budget was allocated to Defence. Thus published expenditure on national defence accounted for over 75 per cent. of all budgetary expenditure (excluding that on State enterprises) as against 30 per cent. in 1938/39.

It is officially stated that in 1941/42 slightly over 50 per cent. of all expenditure was covered by normal resources, and the remainder by loans.

Since the outbreak of war the yield from taxation has increased, partly as a result of inflationary conditions, and partly as a result of increased rates of taxation and the imposition of new taxes.

The burden of taxation was, however, already so heavy that an increase sufficient to cover expenditure could not be achieved and large scale borrowing became necessary.

3. Government Borrowing during the War

Early in 1941 a "Reintegration Loan" with no fixed limit for subscription was issued. It was in two parts, the one bearing 4½ per cent. interest and maturing in 30 years, the other—designed principally for agriculturalists—bearing 5 per cent. interest with 5 years' maturity. Despite the various attractions offered (freedom from taxation on interest, premiums, etc.) the response to the loan was very poor. The final date for subscriptions was repeatedly postponed in September,

[51 c]

CHAPTER X

652 1947, subscriptions were made compulsorily, and in 1942 a Reintegration Tax was levied on all
●722 persons who failed to subscribe the amounts allotted to them. In spite of all this the loan had only raised some 18 milliard lei by September, 1942.

A further attempt to borrow from the public was made at the end of 1942, when the Minister of Finance was authorised to issue short term 4 per cent. Treasury Bills to a value not exceeding 10 milliard lei. As with the long term loan, interest from this loan was free from taxation.

In spite of these measures, however, considerable amounts have had to be borrowed direct from the National Bank—partly on account of extra-budgetary credits for non-military purposes, but more especially to finance the war with Russia which—at the beginning at least—was done entirely outside the budget.

In June 1941 when miscellaneous advances to the Government already amounted to 10 milliard lei, the National Bank was authorised to derogate from the provisions of its statutes and to advance any amounts necessary to cover exceptional needs. In this way a further 12 milliard lei credit on this account was put at the disposal of the Government to finance the Russian war. This credit was, however, exhausted by January 1942, but the National Bank's miscellaneous advances continued to rise, reaching nearly 30 milliard lei by June 1942. After June 1942, borrowing on this account fell considerably, only to rise at the end of the year and the beginning of 1943.

4. External Position of the Leu

652 Rumania is still officially on the gold standard, the parity of the leu having been fixed in 1929 at 1 leu=0.009 g. fine gold or 111.111 lei per kg. gold.

This parity has, however, no practical significance, since from 1935 onwards it has been the practice to pay premiums for gold over and above the official price. In order to encourage domestic production of gold additional premiums are paid to domestic gold producers, so that the effective internal price of gold varies, according to the productivity of the mine, from 400,300 lei to 867,500 lei per kg. fine gold. (See also section on gold, page 23.) Official dealing in "hard" currencies, too, is done not at parity but at parity plus a premium. From December 1935 to February 1940, the premiums were fixed at 38 per cent., from March 1940 to March 1941 at 107 per cent., and after the latter date at 90 per cent.

652 The last reduction of premiums from 107 per
648 cent. to 90 per cent. was made under German pressure, on the grounds that the RM., on which no premium was paid, was undervalued in relation to "hard" currencies. And at the same time as the effective rates for such currencies were lowered (in the case of the $ from 211.68—217.97 to 187.60—196 lei per $), the RM. rate was raised from 50 lei=1 RM. to 60 lei=1 RM., at which level it has since remained.

5. Prices and Price Control

435 As a result of the world depression there was a severe fall in prices during the early 1930's. Both wholesale prices and the cost of living reached their lowest level in the years 1933 and 1934. In the following years there was a gradual recovery, which became increasingly marked after 1939.

The retail price index has increased during the war, as follows:—

August, 1939	100.
January, 1940	116.6.

[52 a]

453
642
456
648

certain fairly important Volksdeutsche saving banks operating in Rumania.

In the case of insurance, too, German companies had considerable interests in Rumanian companies even before the war. These interests have been greatly increased, the most important acquisitions being a majority holding in the Dorna Vatra company acquired by Jauch und Hübener in 1941, a similar holding in the "Franco-Romana" taken over from French hands by the Nordstern Versicherungs A.G. in the same year, and a holding taken over from French hands by a Viennese company in the "Nationala" General Insurance Company—also in 1941.

652
648
722

Though the great increase in budgetary expenditure since 1939 can be attributed indirectly to Germany, the chief instruments of German financial exploitation have taken the form of advances from the Rumanian National Bank for the maintenance of German troops in the country, and for the clearing (i.e. forcing the Rumanian National Bank to make advances to Rumanian exporters whose exports were not balanced by corresponding imports from Germany).

4. Advances for Maintenance of German Troops

It was originally agreed that 1 milliard lei per month should be advanced—against an equivalent RM. credit in Berlin—to the German troops in Rumania. In fact, however, the Germans drew sums in excess of this amount, and continued to do so even after the majority of troops had left the country.

In October 1941, therefore, the National Bank refused to grant any further advances of lei for the use of the German troops. The Germans, however, brought pressure to bear by refusing to honour Rumanian invoices for goods they had received, and by borrowing from the banks through the medium of the firms which they controlled. The situation appears to have remained unchanged until January 1942, when it seems that a new agreement was reached, the National Bank once again undertaking to advance a fixed monthly sum, and in addition to make up arrears in payment. It is reported that towards the end of 1942 the National Bank had advanced some 40 milliard lei on this account.

5. The German-Rumanian Clearing

In addition to this German debt there is a further one of probably at least equal magnitude which has accrued in the clearing.

Precise figures of the actual German clearing debt to Rumania are not available and estimates vary very greatly. The amount of the debt at the end of 1942 has been variously reported at anything between 30 milliard and 100 milliard lei.

It is, therefore, reasonable to assume a minimum clearing debt at the end of 1942 of 30 milliard lei, and a minimum total debt (clearing and advances in the National Bank to the German military authorities) of 70 milliard lei—or approximately £117,000,000.

It is, however, quite possible that there is some justification for the German claim to the effect that clearing and similar debts are not wholly indicative of German commercial practices, inasmuch as certain German exports are made against long-term credits which do not enter into the clearing until several years have elapsed. In the case of Rumania, Germany is known to have granted in recent years two credits of RM. 600 million each (36 milliard lei), but it is not known to what extent actual production for the German export market made it possible for Rumanian importers to utilise these facilities.

[53 b]

B. LABOUR POSITION DURING THE WAR

1. Military Conscription

701 The age limits for mobilisation are 19–50, while youths from 17–18 are liable for pre-military training.

During 1942 there have been several indications of the strain which further mobilisation was putting on Rumania's manpower; for example, in April 1942 the sentences on political prisoners were suspended and they were called into the army, while from July of that year onwards there has been a constant revision of previous exemptions and a tightening of control over the granting of leave and call-up. Military service, which previously had been obligatory for Rumanian citizens only, was made compulsory for all non-nationals* resident in the country, and further a decree was passed mobilising all Rumanians of military age resident abroad.

[563]

It is calculated that it has never been possible for Rumania to have more than 800,000 men properly equipped under arms at one period. The actual strength of the army has fluctuated considerably during the last two years, as has the number on the eastern front, but a reasonable average figure would be 500,000, of which 200,000 on the eastern front.

727 Rumanian casualties are difficult to assess. One estimate at the end of 1941 put casualties at 150,000, while total casualties up to May 1943 have been estimated at 350,000. Military mobilisation will probably have meant a loss of some 800,000 men to the general labour supply.

464

2. Recruitment for Germany

464 The recruitment of workers for Germany has been on a small scale, which is not surprising, as Rumania's military contribution has been considerable, and the military mobilisation has already reduced the supply of labour needed for the Rumanian armament industry to a minimum. Such labour as might be available for export is unskilled and therefore of less value to Germany. The total number of Rumanian workers in Germany in December, 1942, was estimated at 14,000. Of these 10,000 were young Rumanians 18–19, who were recruited at the end of 1941 to be "trained" in German metallurgical factories, 1,000 are women employed as domestic servants, and the rest are mainly unskilled general workers.

167

3. Foreign Workers in Rumania

648 In addition to the German administrators and directors, who are in certain of the key positions in Rumanian industry, there is also evidence of skilled German technicians in Rumanian armament factories. In 1942 there was a nucleus of the German Todt organisation, and Italian builders in the country.

463

727 About 40,000 ~~Russian prisoners~~ of war are employed, chiefly in agriculture, though also in mining and navvying work.

C. GENERAL LABOUR DEVELOPMENTS

464 In 1937 the average unemployment figure was 12,000. The dislocation of trade and industry on the outbreak of war temporarily caused a general increase of unemployment, which was rapidly absorbed by the military call-up and increased activity in the armaments industry. In March

722

* The German minority was already liable for military service, either in the Rumanian or German army and in December, 1942, it was announced that there were 30,000 *Volksdeutsche* in the Rumanian Army.

[55a]

464 722 1941 there were 2,000 unemployed, while in December 1942, it was announced that the Office of Unemployment Statistics had been abolished, as there were no unemployed. Though Rumania's military mobilisation and losses have been extensive, her labour reserves are theoretically still considerable. On the other hand, there is no doubt that both industry and agriculture are suffering a noticeable labour shortage. This is attributable to the low level of mechanisation, internal economic organisation and to the cumbersome administration, so that comparison with western countries is impossible.

1. Agriculture.

464 241 The proportion of the working population engaged in agriculture is extremely high, so that military recruitment has been principally from this source. The structure of Rumanian agriculture, which is mainly peasant farming with a low output per head, has meant that the withdrawal of some 550,000 men has been more serious than it would have been in a country where more up-to-date methods are used, and the remaining labour supply is more mobile. The normal sources of supplementary wartime labour have been drawn on—*i.e.*, the temporary demobilisation of soldiers, employment of children during the summer holidays, and presumably an increased employment of women, although there is no evidence of women having been forcibly transferred to agriculture.

[727] The most valuable supplementary labour, however, has been the employment of Russian prisoners of war, and the demand for their services has exceeded the supply. The number employed in March 1942 was 40,000. These measures to improve the agricultural labour position do not as yet appear to have had much effect.

2. Industry

162 438 178 According to the latest official census figures (relating to the year 1930) 620,000 persons were employed in industry. The following table shows in column 1 the total number employed in the main branches, and in columns 2 and 3 the numbers working in factories employing ten or more people. A comparison between columns 2 and 3 gives an indication of the growing industrialisation of the country.

	1	2	3
	1930	1930	1937
Food	122,000	25,200	34,700
Textiles and Clothing	155,000	34,800	70,500
Metallurgy	101,000	32,000	49,500
Timber..	94,000	31,000	44,000
Mining	53,000	n.a.	n.a.

Allowing for the increased industrialisation during the years 1930–39, and for the general increase in the total population to some 20,000,000, it is estimated that by 1939 the number of industrial workers in Greater Rumania would have risen to some 750,000.

With the loss of part of the provinces of Transylvania, Crişana and Maramureş, Rumania suffered a fairly considerable loss in industrial workers, so that added to the expulsion of Jews, repatriation of Germans, etc., and military mobilisation, it is estimated that at the end of [464] 1942 the numbers engaged in industry would not exceed 550,000.

As in the case of agriculture, the structure of Rumanian industry tends to prevent a thorough rationalisation and concentration of the available industrial labour.

[55b]

505 trade is carried on the Danube to European
439 markets, Germany in particular, and, with the exception of an exceedingly limited traffic with Turkey, and a few intermittent shipments of oil to enemy ports in the Aegean Sea, Rumania's foreign sea-borne trade has been brought virtually to a standstill.

In addition to traffic in the Black Sea with U.S.S.R., Bulgarian and Turkish ports, Rumania in pre-war days had important commercial relations with most European and other countries overseas, the trade routes being via the Dardanelles, Mediterranean, Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar.

2. Mercantile Marine

505 All merchant-shipping activities are controlled
[652] by the Ministry of Air and Marine. Rumania's ocean-going mercantile marine in 1939 was constituted as follows :—

		G.R.T.
6	cargo and passenger motor vessels	27,061
16	cargo steamers	67,103
3	steam tankers	14,737
25	Total	108,991

[653] Of the 19 cargo steamers and tankers, 11 were oil-fired and 8 coal burners. Fourteen of these vessels were owned by the Rumanian State Maritime Service (*Serviciul Maritim Román*), the principal shipping company in Rumania, whilst the three tankers belonged to the Steaua Romana Petroleum Company of Bucarest. The remainder were privately owned.

[648] Consequent upon her entry into the war Rumania's mercantile marine came under Axis control and most of her vessels are trading for German and Italian account, partly in the Adriatic and Aegean, and partly in the Black Sea.

A statement of Rumania's estimated non-tanker merchant-shipping resources on the 30th April, 1943, follows :—

ESTIMATED RUMANIAN MERCANTILE MARINE RESOURCES (NON-TANKER) UNDER AXIS CONTROL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA AT 30TH APRIL, 1943.

Tonnage Category	*No. of Vessels*	*Total G.R.T.*
100/499	3	578
500/999	—	—
1,000	2	2,798
2,000	2	4,986
3,000	3	10,170
4,000	—	—
5,000	2	11,395
6,000	3	20,220
Aggregate ..	15	50,147

[726] As to her tanker tonnage, two vessels aggregating 11,705 G.R.T. were seized and are now in Allied service, whilst the third, of 3,032 G.R.T., was sunk in December, 1941, in the Aegean Sea.

3. Ports

504 The chief ports for sea-going vessels are Constanța on the Black Sea and Brăila and Galați on the Danube, which both handle river shipping as well.

[42b]

their own initiative and directly to the Romanian and Hungarian officers themselves, not to foreign powers. In Czechoslovakia and Poland the Soviets were bound by wartime commitments to the United States and Britain to treat with the governments-in-exile and with their forces as genuine and legitimate parts of the new postwar regimes. When the Soviets repudiated these promises and eliminated the old non-Communist leadership from all significant power positions, the Western world was horrified and bitter. There was less Western support for the old leadership in Romania and Hungary. Few objected, for example, when Army General Nicolae Macici, who was held responsible for the cruelty of the administration of Odessa by Romanian occupation, was tried as a war criminal and sentenced to death, a sentence which was then commuted to twenty-five years ~~of hard~~ labor. This was a relatively noncontroversial act, even though he was among the most capable of the Romanian officers and, when Romania switched sides, brilliantly commanded the Romanian forces against the Germans. Many of the Romanian and Hungarian officers, like Macici, were viewed in the West as war criminals or at least as doubtful characters.

Nevertheless the Soviets did use many former officers. In Romania and Hungary, just as in Czechoslovakia, a considerable segment of the old army leadership was retained for a while.

In Romania, the prewar officers are still retained as generals in fairly considerable numbers. In Hungary, as we shall see, they were retained for a while, but few remain. In this respect the current situation in Romania is like that in Czechoslovakia, and the current situation in Hungary like that in Poland. There are a number of reasons for the difference. We have already referred to such factors as traditional national attitudes toward Russia, World War II records, willingness to collaborate, etc. But here we wish to note another factor: social composition. We have already noted the strong aristocratic element in the Polish officer corps. Below we shall note some different but relevant facts about the gentry in the Hungarian Army. In Czechoslovakia and Romania the available army leaderships were less tied to social strata due for Soviet liquidation. In Romania after World War I a deliberate effort was made to make officer careers available to peasants' sons. Stipends were offered making military education financially feasible for persons of modest means. The resulting officer corps lacked some of the group morale of the Polish, for example. For this and other reasons it was also a corps with a rather low reputation for integrity. It was widely asserted that many Romanian officers could be bought. Both the social and the moral characteristics of the Romanian officers helped the Russians find among them men acceptable for their purposes, and so they continue to use them.

B. The Evolution of the Present Romanian Army

From 1941 on the Romanian Army made substantial contributions

9: Pool S-4 (no date) 1954 E1 Europe
Romania ED1

726 to the German military campaigns against the southern regions of
*648 the Soviet Union. Numbering approximately thirty divisions, the Romanians first achieved the reconquest of territory which Russia had recently severed from Romania. The Romanian forces were then moved across the Dniester to support the Germans in the successful campaign against Odessa. The Romanian Army was in large measure responsible for the successful siege of Sebastopol and the capture of the Crimea. In the autumn and winter of 1942 an estimated Romanian force of fifteen divisions fought alongside the German troops in the offensive against Stalingrad. Like the Germans, the Romanians suffered extremely heavy losses at Stalingrad, and their military strength on the Eastern Front was never again brought up to the level existing prior to that campaign.

[727] By August 1944 Romania had lost 110,000 men killed and 180,000 captured, though she still had twenty divisions active on the front and nine divisions stationed in the interior of Romania. By that time it had become clear that Germany was not going to win the war and that Romania had chosen the wrong side. The pro-Nazi government of Marshal Ion Antonescu was overthrown on August 23, 1944, by a coup d'état engineered by King Michael. Romania immediately changed sides in the war. The former enemy, Russia, became a military ally and the Axis associates of three years past became enemies. The Romanians faced the immediate task of clearing the country of the more than half million German troops remaining there. This was accomplished relatively quickly. The Red Army was in Bucharest by the last day of August. Then in co-operation with Soviet forces the Romanians participated in the campaigns against the German and Hungarian Armies in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

704 Along with the regular Romanian troops used in these actions
*648 there were two divisions of Romanians which had been organized by the Soviets primarily out of prisoners of war and which for some time had already been fighting on the Soviet side. The members of these divisions gave their oath of allegiance to the "new order" not to the Romanian king.[26]

These two divisions were culled from among a much larger number of Romanian PW's. Besides the 180,000 PW's in August 1944, another 280,000 Romanians were seized and sent to Russia thereafter even though Romania was presumably Russia's ally. Of these hundreds of thousands the large majority never returned. A substantial portion of those who did return were the members of the divisions formed in the PW camps. These units were named the Tudor Vladimirescu and Horia-Closca-Crisan Divisions. The former was under the command of Nicolae Cambrea, a lieutenant colonel who had been captured at Stalingrad and who had been won over by the efforts of Ana Pauker and other Romanian Communists who worked in the prison camps. After the fighting on the Central Euro-

such methods the conviction is instilled among the humble 000
and meek that sanctions, and punishments as provided by
the law are only destined for them, while the higher classes
are exempt from penalties. . . ."

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION FOLLOWING THE WAR

At the end of the War Rumania was confronted with a 647
series of problems, the magnitude and difficulty of which
might well have strained an economic organization far more [727]
powerful than her own. The assimilation of the various segments that had belonged to the neighbouring States, of a total area and population about as large as that of the pre-war kingdom, was a formidable task that necessarily demanded the utmost exertions and self-sacrifice on the part of the Central Government. The impossibility of recruiting an adequate administrative staff for the newly-annexed territories, forced the central authorities to draw on their own of the old kingdom, with the result that the vacancies created were filled with inexperienced persons whose appointment was, according to the prevailing fashion, mainly due to favouritism. This resulted in a serious lowering of the standard of the Civil Service, which even during pre-war times had never been distinguished for its efficiency. There were plausible arguments for avoiding the enlistment of men of ex-enemy nationality at times when it was necessary to guard above all against every subversive movement against the integrity of the State; but at the same time the pressing of men into the service of the State who were in no way proof against the seductions of easily-acquired wealth involved risks that were equally detrimental to the State. On the one hand it undermined the financial stability of the State by deflecting from the national exchequer to the pockets of its servants resources destined for the former; and on the other hand, these shortcomings of its agents gravely compromised the prestige of the State in the newly-annexed regions, where such a system of subornation and corruption was something of a novelty.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p 71

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL HISTORY, 1919–39

The crushing defeats which the Rumanians suffered 727
at the hands of the German and Bulgarian armies in 1917, and the provisions of the Treaty of Bucarest, had left the country in a state of utter helplessness and confusion. The only 'compensation' was the annexation of Bessarabia. But in the autumn of 1918, after the collapse of the German, Bulgarian and Austrian fronts in the Balkans and the advance of Allied troops, Rumania re-entered the war. The pro-German government was dismissed and the Francophile leader of the Liberal Party, I. Bratianu, became Prime Minister.

At about the same time the Austro-Hungarian 642
Empire began to disintegrate. Following the 727
example of other minorities, the Rumanians of Transylvania and Hungary formed a National Assembly which, at its session on 1 December 1918 at Alba Julia, voted for the union of Transylvania and the Banat with the Old Kingdom. Among the members of the Directive Council of Transylvania, under the presidency of the peasant leader Maniu, were many politicians who afterwards played a prominent part in Rumanian public life.

The retreat of the German army of occupation 727
from Rumania, which took with it everything it could lay hands on, and the collapse of Austria-Hungary opened a period of great confusion. The former subject-peoples of the Dual Monarchy asserted their national independence while the

3

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

727 socially oppressed sections of the population, stimulated by the Russian Revolution, rose in many regions. The reconstituted Rumanian Army embarked upon a campaign against the Communist government of Hungary and was supported by Allied commanders. An offensive launched in April 1919 led to the capture of Budapest by 4 August. The Hungarian capital was occupied by about 170,000 Rumanian troops. By helping to defeat the Hungarian Revolution they prepared the way for Admiral Horthy's counter-revolutionary régime which has survived to the present day. The Rumanian campaign against Hungary coincided with fierce repressive measures against revolutionary groups in Bessarabia, Moldavia, in the Bukovina, in Eastern Muntenia and in the Banat. Under the pretext of re-establishing peace and order the Rumanian government crushed all the revolutionary forces whose existence might have endangered it.

728 THE NEW STATE. The long drawn-out negotiations in Paris which were to shape the final form of the Peace Treaties found Rumania in a very unfavourable position. The forceful personality of I. Bratianu, who put forward excessive and unreasonable demands for the expansion of Rumania, and the excesses of the Rumanian troops in Hungary, who requisitioned and transferred great quantities of railway and other materials to the Old Kingdom, estranged many of Rumania's friends. In spite of that, and thanks to the intervention of Queen Marie, Rumania emerged as the greatest and most populous of all Balkan States.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

up of Jews became the favourite occupation of the 661
legionaries. The resulting confusion helped many 642
minor officials as well as influential business men in acquiring valuable property.

But it soon became obvious that the real masters 648
of Rumania were the Germans. In October 1940 642
Antonescu invited German troops into the country
as instructors for the Rumanian Army. German 669
trade delegations began organizing Rumania's economy and German specialists were appointed to important positions in various ministries. Although Antonescu had included the Iron Guard in his government, the struggle for power between him and Horia Sima continued. In January 1941 the Iron Guard, supporting the latter, made a last bid. The legionaries rose in revolt and succeeded in gaining several strong positions in Bucarest and in some provincial towns. The army, however, sided with Antonescu, who was also aided by the Germans, and within a short time the 'Conducator' emerged as victor. He at once proceeded to the establishment of a completely military administration and based his whole regime on the army.

His[1] success in the fight against the Iron Guard 721
was influenced decisively by the German desire to create a stable Rumanian government which would join in the attack on the Soviet Union. Antonescu did not fail his German masters. On 22 June 1941 Rumanian troops, together with German divisions, crossed the Soviet frontier. Thanks to German 721
support, Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina 727
were re-occupied within a short time. Both provinces were put under a military administration and ruled quite separately from the rest of Rumania.

[1] [i e: Antonescu -- Analyst]

3

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

721 Those sections of the population which had sup-
● 727 ported the Soviet regime were ruthlessly persecuted and the punitive measures are almost identical with those carried out in 1919.[1]

721 Politically the advance of Rumanian troops into the Ukraine and as far afield as the Caucasus put Antonescu and his propagandists in an awkward position. In order to justify the entry of Rumania into the war[2] he pointed to the necessity of recovering Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina. The Rumanian advance farther east was defended alternatively by the assertion that the land beyond the Dniester was really Rumanian, and by the argument that Rumania could never be safe whilst the Soviet Union existed. The former line of argument carried no conviction: the latter had at first some popularity in view of the wound which the loss of Bessarabia and Bukovina had inflicted on the national pride.

While the German and Rumanian armies continued their advance into Soviet territory these excuses and justifications were accepted without public criticism, although, apart from the few out-and-out Fascists, there is no Rumanian who would really believe that he has any claim to land east of the Dniester. But the ever mounting losses of the Rumanians began to disturb the people. Losses had already been heavy in the capture of Odessa, the

[1] According to Soviet reports over 50,000 Jews and 30,000 Bessarabians have been killed since the re-occupation by Rumanian troops.

[2] Great Britain declared war on Rumania on 7 December 1941, and the United States of America followed suit on 5 June 1942.

728 of requirements for sulphuric-acid production.
[135] Of lesser importance were the salt and coal deposits.

The forest resources of Northern Transylvania
[313] are estimated to have accounted for as much as 25 per cent. of pre-war timber production. Apart from timber the food and leather industries appear to have been the most developed. This
[311] area was principally made up of forests and pastures; the arable land provided no surplus after local needs had been covered. Of livestock
[233] losses the most outstanding feature was nearly 2 million sheep.

[496] The railway system, and particularly the railway administration, was severely handicapped by the change of frontiers, which in places cut one part of Rumania off from the other.

Caliacra and Durostor, the two ceded Dobrujan provinces, are mainly agricultural, and though producing a small surplus, contributed little to Rumania's total agricultural output. Of more significance is the cotton-growing area. There are no known mineral deposits, and industry in this area is on a very small scale, relying mainly on handicrafts.

TRANSNISTRIA

●727 Transnistria is the name which has been given to the territory lying between the Dniester and the Bug, which was given to Rumania to administer in 1941 subsequent to its capture from the U.S.S.R. by Rumanian and German troops. Transnistria is part of the Southern Ukraine and is mainly agricultural, while such industry as existed has been of no use to the Rumanians on account of the heavy destruction carried out by the Russians. It is probably true to say that this territory has been more of a financial liability than an asset to Rumania on account of the heavy expenditure entailed in repairs, particularly of railways and bridges. Some little advantage has, however, been gained from the harvest of 1942–3.

282
439

without much success, and has therefore reverted to her former practice of importing them.

In February 1942 it was reported that with imports from Italy, Turkey and Croatia Rumania had an eight months' supply in hand.

Under the 1942/43 Italo-Rumanian agreement Italy is providing her with 1,750 tons of chestnut extract, 1,000 tons of sumach and 735 tons of other materials. Turkey also agreed to supply her in 1942 with 1,000 tons of valex and 2,500 tons of valonea.

339

D. BUILDING MATERIALS AND CEMENT

The building materials industry in Rumania is on a small scale and not highly mechanised, employing a total of 16,000 workers in 1937, while the value of production in that year amounted to 1·6 milliard lei, about 2½ per cent. of total industrial production. In the decade before the war cement, which is the most important branch of this industry, had a steadily increased output reaching in 1939 a total of 531,000 tons, with an 800,000 ton capacity. Small quantities had to be imported.

The most important cement firms are at Cernavodă, Turda, Dudeşti, and Fieni. Since the war, due to limited building activity, consumption of cement has decreased, and was reported to have been 314,000 tons for the first ten months of 1942, the bulk of which was used for military requirements.

[727]
339
656

After the recapture of Northern Bucovina and Bessarabia in mid-1941, a considerable amount of repair work had to be undertaken as a result of war destruction; but at the beginning of 1942, due to raw material and labour shortage, all further reconstruction in these two provinces was forbidden. Later, in February 1943, a decree

B. LABOUR POSITION DURING THE WAR

1. Military Conscription

701 The age limits for mobilisation are 19–50, while youths from 17–18 are liable for pre-military training.

During 1942 there have been several indications of the strain which further mobilisation was putting on Rumania's manpower; for example, in April 1942 the sentences on political prisoners were suspended and they were called into the army, while from July of that year onwards there has been a constant revision of previous exemptions and a tightening of control over the granting of leave and call-up. Military service, which previously had been obligatory for Rumanian citizens only, was made compulsory for all non-nationals* resident in the country, and further a decree was passed mobilising all Rumanians of military age resident abroad. [563]

It is calculated that it has never been possible for Rumania to have more than 800,000 men properly equipped under arms at one period. The actual strength of the army has fluctuated considerably during the last two years, as has the number on the eastern front, but a reasonable average figure would be 500,000, of which 200,000 on the eastern front.

727 Rumanian casualties are difficult to assess. 464 One estimate at the end of 1941 put casualties at 150,000, while total casualties up to May 1943 have been estimated at 350,000. Military mobilisation will probably have meant a loss of some 800,000 men to the general labour supply.

2. Recruitment for Germany

464 The recruitment of workers for Germany has 167 been on a small scale, which is not surprising, as Rumania's military contribution has been considerable, and the military mobilisation has already reduced the supply of labour needed for the Rumanian armament industry to a minimum. Such labour as might be available for export is unskilled and therefore of less value to Germany. The total number of Rumanian workers in Germany in December, 1942, was estimated at 14,000. Of these 10,000 were young Rumanians 18–19, who were recruited at the end of 1941 to be "trained" in German metallurgical factories, 1,000 are women employed as domestic servants, and the rest are mainly unskilled general workers.

3. Foreign Workers in Rumania

648 In addition to the German administrators and 463 directors, who are in certain of the key positions in Rumanian industry, there is also evidence of skilled German technicians in Rumanian armament factories. In 1942 there was a nucleus of the German Todt organisation, and Italian builders in the country.

727 About 40,000 ~~Russian prisoners~~ of war are employed, chiefly in agriculture, though also in mining and navvying work.

C. GENERAL LABOUR DEVELOPMENTS

464 In 1937 the average unemployment figure was 722 12,000. The dislocation of trade and industry on the outbreak of war temporarily caused a general increase of unemployment, which was rapidly absorbed by the military call-up and increased activity in the armaments industry. In March

* The German minority was already liable for military service, either in the Rumanian or German army and in December, 1942, it was announced that there were 30,000 *Volksdeutsche* in the Rumanian Army.

[55a]

464 722 1942 there were 2,000 unemployed, while in December 1942, it was announced that the Office of Unemployment Statistics had been abolished, as there were no unemployed. Though Rumania's military mobilisation and losses have been extensive, her labour reserves are theoretically still considerable. On the other hand, there is no doubt that both industry and agriculture are suffering a noticeable labour shortage. This is attributable to the low level of mechanisation, internal economic organisation and to the cumbersome administration, so that comparison with western countries is impossible.

1. Agriculture.

464 241 The proportion of the working population engaged in agriculture is extremely high, so that military recruitment has been principally from this source. The structure of Rumanian agriculture, which is mainly peasant farming with a low output per head, has meant that the withdrawal of some 550,000 men has been more serious than it would have been in a country where more up-to-date methods are used, and the remaining labour supply is more mobile. The normal sources of supplementary wartime labour have been drawn on—*i.e.*, the temporary demobilisation of soldiers, employment of children during the summer holidays, and presumably an increased employment of women, although there is no evidence of women having been forcibly transferred to agriculture.

[727] The most valuable supplementary labour, however, has been the employment of Russian prisoners of war, and the demand for their services has exceeded the supply. The number employed in March 1942 was 40,000. These measures to improve the agricultural labour position do not as yet appear to have had much effect.

2. Industry

162 438 178 According to the latest official census figures (relating to the year 1930) 620,000 persons were employed in industry. The following table shows in column 1 the total number employed in the main branches, and in columns 2 and 3 the numbers working in factories employing ten or more people. A comparison between columns 2 and 3 gives an indication of the growing industrialisation of the country.

	1 1930	2 1930	3 1937
Food	122,000	25,200	34,700
Textiles and Clothing	155,000	34,800	70,500
Metallurgy	101,000	32,000	49,500
Timber..	94,000	31,000	44,000
Mining	53,000	n.a.	n.a.

Allowing for the increased industrialisation during the years 1930–39, and for the general increase in the total population to some 20,000,000, it is estimated that by 1939 the number of industrial workers in Greater Rumania would have risen to some 750,000.

With the loss of part of the provinces of Transylvania, Crişana and Maramureş, Rumania suffered a fairly considerable loss in industrial workers, so that added to the expulsion of Jews, repatriation of Germans, etc., and military mobilisation, it is estimated that at the end of 1942 the numbers engaged in industry would not exceed 550,000. [464]

As in the case of agriculture, the structure of Rumanian industry tends to prevent a thorough rationalisation and concentration of the available industrial labour.

5

[55b]

CHAPTER XI

463 438 industrial labour. One-third of all workers engaged in industry are independent artisans, on whom the community is dependent for its services, but who do not play any important part in war production. In certain of the larger armament works German controllers have effected a considerable degree of rationalisation.

3. Mining

316 727 There is a shortage of miners; Russian prisoners of war have been employed in mining during 1942. Many miners were reported to have been included in the territory transferred to Hungary.

4. Armament Works

719 464 There is a general shortage of labour in metal and engineering factories, particularly of skilled labour. A 12-hour day was legalised at the beginning of 1942, but it is doubtful if in fact a 12-hour day is ever worked.

5. Timber

313 464 There is a shortage of labour, both for lumbering and for timber manufacture.

6. Textiles and Clothing

464 288 294 The total number of workers in these industries has probably fallen considerably, due to reduction of available raw materials. The delivery of supplies to individual mills seems to be somewhat erratic, and there is evidence of considerable part-time work, for instance in a survey of some 43 factories in December, 1942, 11 were working full time, 21 on a reduced scale, and 11 at a very reduced scale.

7. Building

499 712 464 The extent of fortification building and general road and rail construction in Rumania is unknown, but in the second half of 1942 there was evidence of a scarcity of general labour for such projects, and of Russian prisoners of war working on rail construction.

438 464 [759] In the other branches of occupation, transport services, etc., there is no evidence of labour shortage, apart from doctors, many of whom have been mobilised for the army.

D. CONTROL OF LABOUR

1. The Youth Labour Service

466 883 A youth labour service founded on the German model was established in March 1941. The leaders were trained in Germany, but it was only in April 1942 that the labour camps began to function. Youths are called up in their 19th–20th year, and the period of service lasts 7 months.

(*See* Part II, Chapter V.B. for further details.)

2. Civil Mobilisation

466 A general civil mobilisation decree was passed in May 1941 by which (1) employment cards were introduced; (2) men and women aged 20–57 were liable to compulsory employment if not employed.

Two subsequent decrees were published in March and May 1943, one for the reorganisation of agriculture, forestry and fishing, and the second for the reorganisation of industry. Each of these decrees gave full powers to the appropriate authorities for the mobilisation and transfer of labour.

In addition to the general labour decrees which have so far had little influence on the labour situation, there have been regional decrees applying to individual localities, e.g. in Bessarabia, in February 1942, all the inhabitants aged 12–70 were called upon for compulsory agricultural labour unless already employed.

9: Pool S-4 (no date) 1954 E1 Europe
Rumania ED1

726 *648 to the German military campaigns against the southern regions of the Soviet Union. Numbering approximately thirty divisions, the Romanians first achieved the reconquest of territory which Russia had recently severed from Romania. The Romanian forces were then moved across the Dniester to support the Germans in the successful campaign against Odessa. The Romanian Army was in large measure responsible for the successful siege of Sebastopol and the capture of the Crimea. In the autumn and winter of 1942 an estimated Romanian force of fifteen divisions fought alongside the German troops in the offensive against Stalingrad. Like the Germans, the Romanians suffered extremely heavy losses at Stalingrad, and their military strength on the Eastern Front was never again brought up to the level existing prior to that campaign.

[727] By August 1944 Romania had lost 110,000 men killed and 180,000 captured, though she still had twenty divisions active on the front and nine divisions stationed in the interior of Romania. By that time it had become clear that Germany was not going to win the war and that Romania had chosen the wrong side. The pro-Nazi government of Marshal Ion Antonescu was overthrown on August 23, 1944, by a coup d'état engineered by King Michael. Romania immediately changed sides in the war. The former enemy, Russia, became a military ally and the Axis associates of three years past became enemies. The Romanians faced the immediate task of clearing the country of the more than half million German troops remaining there. This was accomplished relatively quickly. The Red Army was in Bucharest by the last day of August. Then in co-operation with Soviet forces the Romanians participated in the campaigns against the German and Hungarian Armies in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

704 *648 Along with the regular Romanian troops used in these actions there were two divisions of Romanians which had been organized by the Soviets primarily out of prisoners of war and which for some time had already been fighting on the Soviet side. The members of these divisions gave their oath of allegiance to the "new order" not to the Romanian king.[26]

These two divisions were culled from among a much larger number of Romanian PW's. Besides the 180,000 PW's in August 1944, another 280,000 Romanians were seized and sent to Russia thereafter even though Romania was presumably Russia's ally. Of these hundreds of thousands the large majority never returned. A substantial portion of those who did return were the members of the divisions formed in the PW camps. These units were named the Tudor Vladimirescu and Horia-Closca-Crisan Divisions. The former was under the command of Nicolae Cambrea, a lieutenant colonel who had been captured at Stalingrad and who had been won over by the efforts of Ana Pauker and other Romanian Communists who worked in the prison camps. After the fighting on the Central Euro-

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania EDI

000 The typical articles by Communist leaders provide statistical material appropriate to the various circumstances, but whether they are signed by Signor Togliatti, M. Duclos, President Bierut, Herr Ulbricht or Mme. Ana Pauker they employ the standard vocabulary and are of standard cut. What might be called the ceremonial articles—marking anniversaries, hailing Stalin on his divine birthday, claiming this or that achievement of science or culture for Russia—are uniformly couched in a language of such vulgarity, turgidity, repetitiousness and monotony that they almost surely must emanate from a single brain. Possibly, of course, they merely reveal a uniform barrenness of thought and poverty of expression in Communist literary circles everywhere. If not, the central brain in Bucharest seems to be exhausted after executing so many changes of direction, doubling back so often on past tracks, discovering so many old enemies to be friends and firing the old epithets against so many old friends suddenly discovered to be enemies.

As I read through copies of *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!* for chance statements of interest or indications of shifts of emphasis in the Party line I find myself wondering what would be thought of them by some master polemicist like Bukharin, Radek or another of the old professionals with a subtle mind, a knowledge of history and a feeling for human psychology. What would they have thought of this wearying succession of hammering adjectives as a method of conveying the power and sincerity of a great revolutionary purpose to the far parts of the earth? Certainly it is a convenience for us who fight that purpose that every great pen of the Russian revolution has been stilled by time or Stalin's hangmen.

121 642 The independence which Rumania was supposed to have regained when the Red Army occupied the country in August 1944 was formally guaranteed by the Declaration on Liberated Europe adopted by Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill at Yalta. The same instrument guaranteed the Rumanian people their domestic liberties, including the right to choose their own government. But hardly were the "Big Three" back in their capitals from the Crimea before that independence and those freedoms were clearly jeopardized by the appearance of a Communist-dominated minority government in Bucharest. The manner in which this was accomplished

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
CD1

was as significant as the result. The Soviet Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Vyshinsky, simply flew down to Bucharest from Moscow on February 27, 1945, and gave King Michael the necessary orders. By Vyshinsky's direction the King ignored the representatives of the two largest political organizations in the country, the National Peasant Party headed by Iuliu Maniu and the National Liberal Party headed by Dinu Bratianu, and entrusted power to the man of Vyshinsky's choice, Petru Groza. The United States and Great Britain protested. Informed of the painful impression which his interference in Rumanian domestic politics had created in Western capitals, Vyshinsky commented only: "Let the sparrows twitter."

Public opinion in the West was not well informed about this development, or indeed about current developments in any of the areas which came under the occupation of the Red Army. Few Western newspapermen were on the spot in Rumania or Bulgaria, and those who were had limited means of communication. So far as American public opinion was concerned, the State Department did not consider it wise, on the eve of the San Francisco Conference, to release the reports of highhanded Soviet actions which it was receiving from those countries. The hope was that when Soviet Russia had assumed her official place in world councils she would become responsive to world opinion and begin behaving like a responsible member of international society. It was considered inadvisable to exacerbate Stalin's feelings by too violent complaints of the farce being made of his Yalta promises at the very moment he was sending Molotov, Gromyko and Sobolev to a great international conference to assume world responsibilities in an organization based on the ideals of the Atlantic Charter and the Moscow Declaration of 1943. The State Department complained about violations of the Yalta Agreement in its notes to the Soviet Government; but officials refrained from stressing their anxiety and anger in comments to the press.

Western protests mounted in urgency as time passed and the Soviet halter, far from being released, was drawn closer around the necks of states occupied by the Red Army. In Rumania, Maniu and Bratianu had refused to submit to the minority control of the Communists and their stool-pigeons. At the time, Maniu in particular was criticized in liberal circles abroad for a lack of "realism"

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania : EDI

in failing to recognize that new "progressive" forces were at work and in refusing to coöperate with them. In Hungary, Ferenc Nagy's Smallholders Party coöperated with the Communists in a coalition government, and Petkov coöperated in the Fatherland Front in Bulgaria. These were applauded as signs of superior liberalism and far-sightedness. In neither case, as we have seen, was the end result satisfactory. It was not different in Rumania. The United States and British Governments made efforts to hold the governments concerned and their Soviet patrons to the terms of the Yalta Agreement. They succeeded only in revealing a distressing lack of power behind the written and verbal messages which their diplomats delivered at the respective foreign offices. To this extent it can be said that they actually damaged the native national forces which they aimed to help.

The Western Powers protested, as mentioned, against Vyshinsky's interference in Rumanian affairs and quite properly refused to recognize the Groza Government. Encouraged by this, King Michael in August 1945 appealed to the three signatories of the Yalta Agreement to help him create a "recognized democratic government." The Agreement provided that if differences arose about how democratic and representative régimes were to be created the three signatories should consult. The American and British Governments demanded that a consultation now take place about Rumania. Moscow replied that no differences existed except with regard to Rumanian domestic affairs and that therefore a consultation would be not only superfluous but highly improper. That was that. Soviet troops were in occupation of Rumania, and the Western Powers did not propose to go to war to replace Mr. Groza with Mr. Maniu. Other protests over other infringements of the Yalta undertaking were similarly rebuffed. It was right in one view to make them "for the record." The immediate result, however, was that the Western democracies lost face and non-Communist elements were weakened.

Simultaneously negotiations had been begun looking to the conclusion of peace treaties with Italy and the former Axis satellites. The peace conference opened in Paris on July 29, 1946. One staff member of the American delegation has said that the draft treaties there presented compared unfavorably with even the maligned

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

control over the situation. Admittedly the postwar attitude to be adopted by the Soviet Union was by no means clearly foreseen in 1944–1945, and as suggested above it may not have been altogether fixed, but if, as it appeared in 1950, any effort at American-Soviet agreement in eastern Europe involved fitting a square peg in a round hole there was not, during the period of uncertainty, even an effort to shave off some of the sharper edges of the peg.

In any event, whatever slight chances there might have been of resolving the Rumanian political crisis, through international agreement and peaceful internal adjustment, had disappeared by the time the elections were held. The National Peasants and Liberals naturally refused to accept the results, and their delegates did not occupy their seats in the parliament. In a formal communiqué of November 25, 1946, Maniu and Brătianu, after enumerating the electoral outrages, concluded: "Our parties consider that they can no longer authorize their representatives to continue to collaborate with the present government, the perpetrator of fraudulent and blood stained elections, with which they can have no solidarity whatsoever." [9] The United States and Great Britain did not accept the elections as representing the opinion of the Rumanian people or as complying with the assurances given by the Groza government.

The peace treaty with Rumania, which had been drafted by the Council of Foreign Ministers in the course of 1946 and was finally signed on February 10, 1947, did not materially alter the situation. Although Article 3 obliged Rumania to secure for all persons "the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press, of publication, of religious worship, of political opinion, and of public meeting," it was in nowise observed.[10]

9. See the annex to the booklet published by the Rumanian National Committee, *Suppression of Human Rights in Rumania* (Washington, D.C., September, 1949), a hostile but heavily documented indictment of the Groza regime.

10. Some of the main points of the treaty, which in general followed the lines of the 1944 armistice, were: frontiers to be as of January 1, 1941, except for the Hungarian frontier which remained as of January 1, 1938; the obligation to repeal and henceforth not to pass any measures discriminating against persons for sympathizing with the United Nations; dissolving and not permitting in the future any organization of a fascist type or other organization conducting propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union or other United Nations; limitation of the army to 120,000 persons; reparations in kind to the U.S.S.R. to the amount of $300,000,000, payable in eight years from September, 1944; guarantee of economic and property rights of United Nations nationals; German assets in Rumania to go to the Soviet Union; free commercial navigation on the Danube for all states; Allied forces to be withdrawn from the country within ninety days of the treaty's coming into force, except for the Soviet right to retain forces necessary to maintain the line of communication with the Soviet Zone in Austria.

imposed on Rumania. The territorial losses Rumania had to suffer were comparatively light as contrasted with the draconian economic clauses of the treaty, and comprised the cession of the entire Dobrudja, and of a district of 2,920 sq. miles along the mountain passes of the Carpathians. Rumania as a solace, was allowed to annex Bessarabia, which had already been abandoned by Russia and had demanded its union with Rumania in March, 1918. The ratification of the treaty was delayed, however, King Ferdinand anticipating an Entente victory which would liberate Rumania from the onerous clauses the Germans sought to impose on her. 175

The collapse of the Bulgarian front and the victorious Allied offensive in the west soon justified these hopes. The Rumanians thereupon assumed the offensive on Nov. 9th, 1918, re-occupied Wallachia, re-entered Transylvania which had in December, 1918, proclaimed its union with Rumania, marched into Bucovina, the Rumanians of which province had formed a provisional government on Oct. 27th, 1918, and had invoked the assistance of the Rumanian troops, and by April, 1919, reached the line of the river Theiss. Rumania's definite frontiers, however, were to be traced by the diplomats after protracted and unedifying wranglings in Paris.

RUMANIA AND THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

It is usual to accuse the Rumanians of having evinced at the Peace Conference an intolerance and superciliousness that did not at all accord with the services they had rendered to the Allied cause. The Entente Powers alleged that the Rumanians, having concluded a separate peace with the enemy, had thereby forfeited their rights to the territories which had been originally promised them. Besides, President Wilson had taken up a most determined attitude against all secret treaties, and as Rumania's claims were based on them it is easy to understand that immense difficulties were encountered before a settlement was effected. 728

728 The Rumanians might well have retorted that the disaster they had suffered was due mainly to the absence of the assistance the Entente had pledged itself to grant, and that to evoke the case of the peace of Bucarest, which after all had not been ratified by King Ferdinand, was tantamount to making use of a legal flaw in order to avoid moral obligations, an attitude that might be appropriate to the narrow conceptions ruling at a county court, but unworthy of the proceedings of a world areopagus.

Much bitterness was engendered by the arrogance manifested by the delegates of the Great Powers and the arbitrary character of most of their decisions. Thus Rumania was allowed to appoint two delegates to the Conference, while Yugoslavia, with a smaller population, was permitted to send three. Throughout the sittings of the Conference the Rumanian delegates were practically ignored, decisions in matters that interested them were taken over their heads, and injunctions and intimations were transmitted to Bucarest instead of being handed to them, who, after all, were the only competent persons to receive them. Drafts of the treaty with Germany and Austria had been communicated to several journalists while the Rumanian delegation received incomplete summaries, though the conditions imposed on Austria were of vital interest to Rumania. How and for what reasons the Triumvirate, composed of Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Wilson, adopted such a slighting attitude towards not only Rumania, but also towards our lesser allies, is only explainable on psychological grounds.

They were obviously unfit to exert such limitless powers as had been conferred on them, and their sudden elevation had apparently obscured their intelligence. For otherwise how could they ignore the clauses of the treaty which had been concluded with Rumania in 1916, which provided that "Rumania shall have the same rights as the Allies in the peace preliminaries and negotiations, and also in discussing the issues which shall be laid before the Peace Conference for its deliberations?"

It must be admitted, however, that M. Bratianu, the head of the Rumanian delegation, and acting prime minister, owing to his arbitrary and intolerant disposition, was not a

728

person whose immixture in these difficult negotiations could exert any auspicious influence upon them. The arrogance with which he rejected the Serbian arguments in favour of the revision of the Russo-Rumanian treaty concerning the Banat, which was characteristic of his attitude, will partly explain why he was not in special favour with President Wilson, who was likewise endowed with a rather intolerant disposition. Thus the "Isvestia" of Jan. 19th, 1918, reported that when the Serbian Minister, with the consent of the Russian statesman Milyukov, had approached Bratianu in order to obtain a revision of this treaty, the latter arrogantly replied that he would also ask for the Timok valley across the Danube, which had always formed an integral part of Serbia.

But that which most incensed the Rumanians was the attitude adopted by the Supreme Council on the question of the disposal of the Banat, which had been promised in its entirety to Rumania. Owing to the presence of iron and coal mines in the eastern part of the Banat, a certain group of capitalists who were powerful enough to bring influence to bear on the members of the Supreme Council, came in close contact with Bela Kun, the Hungarian dictator, and secured from him the promise of the bestowal of concessions on their group for the exploitation of these mines, should Hungary be left in possession of the Banat. Thereupon the Supreme Council assumed an attitude which was more than friendly towards Hungary's Bolshevik dictator, and everything was done to thwart the Rumanians from attaining their aim. Though the plan miscarried, owing to the fall of Bela Kun, brought about by Rumania's military intervention, carried out despite the injunctions of the Supreme Council, this intrigue was followed by yet another attempt to set up an independent republic of the Banat, which, owing to its extreme weakness, would have proved very amenable to the will of these international financiers. Then, as if these disgraceful manoeuvres were not enough to inspire disgust at the way the affairs of the Peace Conference were conducted, the Rumanian delegates were pressed to grant industrial concessions to Jewish-American financiers, failing which Rumania was threatened with the loss of America's

728 active support. So cocksure were these gentry of their omnipotence that they even sent representatives to Rumania to earmark in advance whatever enterprises seemed lucrative for them to exploit. It is even averred that finally a note was addressed to the Rumanian delegates enjoining them to grant certain concessions, as otherwise neither diplomatic nor financial help would be forthcoming from the United States.

The spirit of mercantilism which seemed to dominate the decisions taken by the Supreme Council would have sufficed to ruffle the susceptibilities of men of more tolerant disposition than Messrs Bratianu and Mishu. In view of the high stakes at play they did their best to put up with the discourtesies which were showered on them, but when they were prevented from taking part in discussions that affected Rumania directly (thus M. Clemenceau did not hesitate to exclaim in a sitting of the Council to M. Bratianu that the latter was there to listen and not to comment), the Rumanian delegates were obliged to conclude that it consorted better with the maintenance of their dignity to depart, after M. Bratianu had delivered a trenchant attack against the pretensions of the Great Powers to settle the fate of Europe guided uniquely by their own private interests.

These reprehensible altercations go a long way to explain the causal complex of that rabid xenophobia which subsequently inspired the policy of M. Bratianu and his followers. In justice to them it must be conceded that after the treatment meted out to them in Paris they had good reason to eye with grave suspicion any offer of co-operation emanating from western financiers, since at the Peace Conference an attempt had been made to exploit them economically, even blackmail having been employed for the attainment of this object. Nothing has been done to dispel the deplorable impression thus created. On the contrary, the behaviour of their powerful allies at the Spa Conference, where a disproportionally low percentage of reparation payments had been allocated to the Rumanians, could only further confirm their suspicions as to the motives that usually actuate westeners, and this notwithstanding the latters' clever efforts to cloak their mercantilism with a profusion of ethical con-

siderations all professing to aim at the regeneration of the country to which they were to be applied. 728

M. Bratianu, by the determination and strength of will displayed in his efforts to counter certain decisions taken by the Supreme Council, whose utter ignorance of the prevailing state of affairs in the Near East was more than manifest, rendered unwittingly a signal service to Europe.

Thus it is really incomprehensible that the members of the Supreme Council should have gone so far as to attempt to propitiate that band of adventurers who under the mask of Bolshevism had usurped the government of Hungary, and to have even allowed them to threaten for a time the very existence of Czechoslovakia. So certain was Bela Kun of enjoying the patronage of the Supreme Council that he did not hesitate to launch an attack on the Rumanian army guarding the banks of the Theiss in July, 1919.

Fortunately for Europe the soldiers of the Magyar Soviet Republic were defeated, and the Rumanians, flouting the objurgations and fulminations hurled at them by the Supreme Council sitting in Paris, completed their victory by occupying Budapest within a fortnight, shattering the government of Bela Kun and removing a grave danger to Europe by extirpating this nest of Bolshevism in its midst.

The inconceivable partiality of the Supreme Council for the Magyar Bolsheviks had created such a parlous state of affairs in the East of Europe that had the Rumanians failed to occupy the city of Budapest it is more than likely that the Magyar Bolsheviks would have joined hands with the Russians over the prostrate bodies of Czechoslovakia and Rumania, with the most dire consequences for the fate of our continent.

The Rumanian occupation of Budapest further envenomed their relations with the Supreme Council. Instead of evacuating the city as they were enjoined to do, the Rumanians (having been entirely despoiled by the Austro-Germans, while the latter had occupied Rumania) now attempted to recuperate some of their losses. They therefore refused to depart before they had secured delivery of at least a part of the goods of which they had been despoiled. It was natural for the Rumanians to resent allied intervention

728 in this matter, for at the time that their country was being plundered by the Germans and their allies the Entente had not interposed to protect them. It may be further mentioned that the Rumanians had asked to be allowed to send delegates to Germany to point out to the inter-allied authorities the objects of which they had been defrauded, but their request had been rejected; so that we should not be surprised if on this occasion they decided to take justice into their own hands. The Magyars have of course bitterly complained of the exactions they suffered at the hands of the Rumanians, but, whatever their severity they never attained the magnitude of those suffered by Rumania. Rumania, for instance, possessed 932 locomotives at the time the Austro-Germans occupied her territory, and they left behind them on their departure only fifty!

After the demonstrative departure of M. Bratianu from Paris, the Rumanian government refused to sign the treaties of St Germain, and that relative to the protection of minorities, since its plenipotentiaries had hardly been consulted in their framing, and as a result diplomatic relations between Rumania and the Entente became exceedingly strained. The Supreme Council finally addressed a note in the form of an ultimatum to Rumania, ordering her to withdraw her troops to the frontiers that had been fixed in the meanwhile at Paris, and to sign the Peace treaties, failing which diplomatic relations were to be severed and all further financial aid suspended. M. Bratianu tendered his resignation in guise of a protest, and King Ferdinand thereupon entrusted the government of the country to Dr Vaida-Voevod, who complied with the demands of the Entente, thereby putting an end to the misunderstandings which had arisen. He further succeeded in securing from the Allies the recognition of Bessarabia's union with Rumania, a demand which had previously been put forward by M. Bratianu, but which the Supreme Council had refused to grant, as at the time it was making advances to the Bolsheviks, and striving by every means to secure their goodwill. It was indeed deplorable for the future pacification of the Near East that the Entente Powers had not fallen in at the time with M. Bratianu's request, but only accepted it subsequently, for

M. Bratianu had coupled it with the offer of retroceding 728 southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria, an offer that would have propitiated the Bulgarians and secured their friendship to Rumania, a friendship that is of inestimable value to her. At the same time the retrocession of this territory would have enabled Bulgaria to carry out the financial obligations that had been imposed on her by the Treaty of Neuilly, and the taxpayers of the Western Powers would later have been absolved from the privilege of contributing funds for propping up yet another state, rendered insolvent by the ineptitude of their own diplomats, who by this heedless act of theirs also deprived our own exporters and manufacturers of a small but valuable market.

Concerning the final frontiers which the Peace Conference at Paris fixed for Rumania, though in certain cases they were not as favourable as those promised by the Entente Powers in 1916, nevertheless it must be admitted that they are drawn more in accordance with the principle of nationality. Rumania was not granted the line of the river Theiss as she had been promised, as this would have incorporated within her territory a yet larger number of Hungarians. It would have been even better for Rumania if her western frontiers had not extended so far as to include preponderatingly Magyar urban populations such as those of Arad, Grosswardein (Oradea Mare) and Satmar (Satu Mare) the assimilation of which is bound to prove exceedingly difficult, and whose incorporation is likely to be a burden rather than an asset to her exchequer. Even such a sincere friend of Rumania as Dr Seton Watson did not approve of the annexation of these towns, and long before the frontiers were drawn he warned the Rumanians not to allow themselves to be influenced by their super-nationalists. It is highly unfortunate that such an authoritative warning and counsel as is contained in the following lines was not heeded at least by those who were entrusted by our fellow-citizens with the task of looking after the welfare of our continent at the Peace Conference. Yet the admonition was as clear as it was convincing. Dr Seton Watson did not hesitate to affirm, even at the time when Rumania was being cajoled into joining the Allies, and when lavish promises were being

728 made, that "it is to be hoped that such exaggerated demands will be disallowed at the future Conference. The possession of Arad, with its poignant sentimental associations for the Magyar race, would be a permanent challenge to Hungary and would embitter tenfold her relations with Rumania, which must at the best be strained for many years to come." ("Rumania and the Great War," page 96.)

With regard to Bucovina, Rumania secured more advantageous frontiers than those the Allies had promised to concede her in 1916. She obtained the line of the river Dniester as her northern frontier.

The decision with regard to the Banat was not so favourable for Rumania, for the Yugoslavs insisted on incorporating the western part, which was peopled mainly by Serbs, and they protested against the allotment to another Power of a territory which stretched right up to their capital, Belgrade, and would have placed the latter under a permanent menace from another state. In consequence the experts of the Conference had to adjust the frontier as best they could, guided mainly by the principle of nationality. The arrangement is not particularly auspicious, as a small Yugoslav enclave cuts the railway line Temesvar (Temişoara)—Bazias, and leaves the latter town isolated from Rumania. The various nationalities inhabiting the Banat are, however, so intermingled that it was next to impossible to reach a more satisfactory solution.

THE POST-WAR PERIOD.

668 648 [728] On Bratianu's[1] resignation, in consequence of the presentation of an ultimatum by the Allies in October, 1919, King Ferdinand formed a Cabinet presided over by General Vaitoanu, with a mandate to call a general election.

A strong majority composed of heterogeneous left groups was returned, out of which a Cabinet presided over by Dr Vaida-Voevod was formed. He entered upon the difficult and ungrateful task of dispelling misunderstandings with the Entente and signing the Peace treaties. No sooner, however, had this been accomplished, than Dr Vaida-Voevod, while

1 [head of Rumanian delegation to the peace conference, acting prime minister, and leader of Liberal Party -- Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

727 socially oppressed sections of the population, stimulated by the Russian Revolution, rose in many regions. The reconstituted Rumanian Army embarked upon a campaign against the Communist government of Hungary and was supported by Allied commanders. An offensive launched in April 1919 led to the capture of Budapest by 4 August. The Hungarian capital was occupied by about 170,000 Rumanian troops. By helping to defeat the Hungarian Revolution they prepared the way for Admiral Horthy's counter-revolutionary régime which has survived to the present day. The Rumanian campaign against Hungary coincided with fierce repressive measures against revolutionary groups in Bessarabia, Moldavia, in the Bukovina, in Eastern Muntenia and in the Banat. Under the pretext of re-establishing peace and order the Rumanian government crushed all the revolutionary forces whose existence might have endangered it.

728 THE NEW STATE. The long drawn-out negotiations in Paris which were to shape the final form of the Peace Treaties found Rumania in a very unfavourable position. The forceful personality of I. Bratianu, who put forward excessive and unreasonable demands for the expansion of Rumania, and the excesses of the Rumanian troops in Hungary, who requisitioned and transferred great quantities of railway and other materials to the Old Kingdom, estranged many of Rumania's friends. In spite of that, and thanks to the intervention of Queen Marie, Rumania emerged as the greatest and most populous of all Balkan States.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

From the very beginning three factors influenced the new State. The territorial gains of Rumania put the country into the ranks of the 'satisfied' powers whose main aim was the preservation of the *status quo*. Moreover, the foreign policy of Rumania had to be based upon the support of Britain and France, who were interested in the strengthening of those States which had been created or enlarged as a result of Allied aid. Another decisive influence was the presence of great numbers of minorities within the borders of Greater Rumania. Apart from the internal problems involved, this was also a continuous source of trouble with at least two of the neighbouring States—Hungary and the Soviet Union. The third, and by no means least important, was the question of social reform and the unification of the administrative machinery. 728

FOREIGN POLICY.[1] All parties in the State agreed upon the foreign policy to be pursued. Support of French interests in South-Eastern Europe coincided with those of the ruling classes of Rumania. The defensive alliance with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia against the revisionist claims of Hungary, known as the 'Little Entente', was sponsored by France, concluded in 1920 and maintained up to September 1938 when Czechoslovakia was forced to make territorial concessions to Germany, Hungary and Poland. In 1921 Rumania concluded a defensive alliance with Poland directed against any westward advance of the Soviet Union and later joined the 'Balkan Entente', whose purpose it was to prevent Bulgaria from regaining territories taken from her. Rumania was throughout the ally of France. 648

[1] [Of the period from 1919 to 1939--Analyst]

A HISTORICAL OUTLINE

UNTIL 1940 Romania, a strong force for peace, contained within her boundaries all her historical domain and most of her people. In 1940, amid world-wide changes, she saw her racial and territorial unity shattered in a partition involving not less than one-third of her population of 20,000,000 and of her territory of 113,917 square miles. 131

The beneficiaries of this forcible division were Russia and Hungary.[1] On July 3, 1940, following an ultimatum, Russia invaded northern Bucovina, part of the Moldavian county of Dorohoi, and all of Bessarabia, altogether some 17,000 square miles with upward of 3,750,000 inhabitants. On September 13, 1940, following the Vienna arbitration decision of August 30, Hungary occupied half of Romanian Transylvania, again some 17,000 square miles with almost 2,400,000 inhabitants. 728

The two squeezes from east and west, timed to coincide with the collapse of the last vestiges of the European system of regional guarantees, could not be opposed by Romania. The retirement of her armies from Bucovina and Bessarabia reflected the realities of the situation, but did not imply a renunciation of her historic rights to the lost provinces, nor was this loss ratified formally by her parliament. On the contrary, Premier General Ion Antonescu, several times in his earliest official statements, reasserted Romania's claim to the whole of Transylvania; and less than one year later, on June 22, 1941, he led the Romanian armies in the liberation of Bucovina and Bessarabia. [186]

The problems which the action of Russia and Hungary has restored to an acute phase are as old as the ideologies that give them form. Heretofore, as local problems, they have been allowed to smolder under temporary solutions enforced in high-handed and arbitrary manner. Today, as obstacles to the peace and progress of the world, they have become world problems. As such they require a lasting solution that must accord with 000

[1] A rectification of the frontier of Dobrudja accepted by Romania and Bulgaria as a permanent settlement of the differences between them was effected by the treaty signed at Craiova September 7, 1940. The treaty provided for the return to Bulgaria of the two counties of Caliacra and Durostor ceded by her to Romania at Bucharest, July 27, 1913, at the end of the Balkan wars from which Bulgaria emerged with a net territorial gain of 6,052 sq. mi. Provision was also made for a wide exchange of populations. Bulgaria also undertook to pay Romania one billion lei as indemnity for losses resulting from the territorial transfer and to take over the maintenance of the Romanian graves and battle monuments dating from the 1877-78 war to which Bulgaria owes the restoration of her statehood.

175 was then pointed out to her, was in effect but a specious plea for the perpetuation of a 1000-year old injustice."

162 That claim had been based mainly on historical, geographical and
728 economic arguments. Whatever effort was made to present it from the viewpoint of the populations whom it would have affected referred in the main to the compact mass of the Szekelys, the twelfth century colonists inhabiting today the exact geographical center of post-War Romania. Romania contended that the cession to Hungary of this mass of aliens would have carried with it an even greater number of Romanians living in the territory separating the Szekelys from Hungary. As long as it will stand, the Award of Vienna will serve to prove the Romanian contention of twenty years ago. In figures the picture is as follows:

Census of 1930
Racial Composition of the Population Ceded to Hungary

County	Romanian	Hungarian	German	Jewish	Others	Total
1. Bihor	136,351	130,127	2,101	20,420	16,549	305,548
2. Ciuc	20,976	120,627	439	2,383	1,381	145,806
3. Cluj	141,607	85,284	2,669	16,057	11,034	256,651
4. Maramures	93,207	11,174	3,239	33,828	20,127	161,575
5. Mures	115,773	121,282	11,271	9,848	11,564	269,738
6. Nasaud*	103,897	7,488	21,211	6,450	6,528	145,574
7. Odorhei	5,430	112,375	454	1,250	2,475	121,984
8. Salaj	192,821	107,662	16,010	13,380	13,474	343,347
9. Satu Mare	178,523	74,191	9,530	23,967	8,664	294,875
10. Somes	169,942	33,870	351	10,546	4,646	219,355
11. Tarnava Mare	270	62	656	7	15	1,010
12. Tarnava Mica	131	1,580	3	42	165	1,921
13. Trei Scaune	17,505	105,834	760	707	2,963	127,769
Total	1,176,433	911,556	68,694	138,885	99,585	2,395,153

*Inclusive of the population, numbering 1,443, of the villages of Cosna and Carlibaba Noua transferred from the County of Nasaud to the County of Campulung, Bukovina, as of September 25, 1925.

The recovery by Hungary of 911,556 of her nationals thus caused Romania to lose a population of 1,176,433 Romanians. (An official 1940 estimate based on current vital statistics lists 978,074 or 37.1% Hungarians and 1,304,903 or 50.2% Romanians in the ceded territory.) The recovered Hungarian population lies broadly in two groups: a central group, mainly Szekelys, as we have seen, in the counties of Ciuc, Odorhei and Trei Scaune, extending also into the county of Mures, or in all 460,118 souls; and a western group in the border counties of Cluj, Salaj, Bihor,

*Letter of A. Millerand, President of the Peace Conference, replying on behalf of the Allies, May 6, 1920.

[cession of territory by Vienna agreement in 1940- --Analyst]

Satu Mare and Maramures, or 408,438 souls. The remainder of 43,000 Hungarians in the territory recently awarded Hungary live scattered over a region containing not less than 274,240 Romanians, besides other races. 162 728

Clearly, a permanent solution of the Hungaro-Romanian problem would have had to recognize this geographical distribution and treat each group on its merits.

The western group of 408,438 Hungarians forms 30.0% of the total population (1,361,996) of the region containing them; the Romanians there number 742,509, or 54.5%, and other nationalities 211,0 9, or 15.5%. At the preliminary conference* held in the early Summer of 1940 at Turnu Severin between Hungarian and Romanian delegates seeking a direct amicable settlement of the dispute, the Romanian delegation could not fail to point out that by an equitable rectification of the then existing frontier and an exchange of populations a settlement could be reached that would in effect reduce to a minimum the number both of Hungarians in Romania and of Romanians in Hungary. But the Hungarian delegation, instructed to claim the whole of Transylvania, would not entertain a practical and real settlement. As a consequence, 742,509 Romanians and 211,049 other nationalities, or a total of 953,558 non-Hungarians, were turned over to a bitter foster-government to make possible the repatriation of the 408,438 Magyars of Western Transylvania. As beneficiary of a settlement that delivers to her two unwilling aliens for every one of her nationals, Hungary has proved again that she is not interested in the creation of conditions that would insure a firm peace, but in an expansion which, at the cost of her neighbors, will enable her to assume the role of Hapsburg Austria in the East. 648 [728]

The central Hungarian group in Transylvania poses a different problem. This group, non-contiguous with the Hungarian frontier traced in 1920, had even before that date shown but little interest in Hungary, to them a distant country; their concern had mostly been in Moldavia, adjoining and familiar territory where they often sought and found profitable employment. There are thus grounds to doubt that they could find satisfaction in their present position, isolated as it is by the new Vienna boundary from main railway connections, from their natural economic outlet of Brasov and the opportunities of steady employment in Romania. Nor, seemingly, could they find comfort in an embittered atmosphere, in the close everyday contact with the 159,684 Romanians living among them or in the solid block of 273,839 Romanians that divide them in the north from their kinsmen. 162

* [preceeding the Vienna[19] agreement in 1940 -- --Analyst]

TERRITORIAL LOSSES

728 In 1940 Rumania suffered serious loss of territory. First in August, Bessarabia and the Northern Bucovina were occupied by the Russians, then a few weeks later Northern Transylvania was given to Hungary by the Vienna Award, following which the Southern Dobruja was ceded to Bulgaria by the Treaty of Craiova. However, in 1941 Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina were regained so that the loss of these territories was of only temporary significance.

Territory	Area sq. km.	Population in millions	Date of Loss
[151] [161] Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina	50,000	3.3	August 1940
Northern Transylvania	43,700	2.75	Sept. 1940
Southern Dobruja	7,700	0.38	Sept. 1940

The temporary loss of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina had serious repercussions on the economic situation of the country, which were of wider effect than might be supposed from the limited time of the annexation, because of the loss of the harvests of both 1940 and 1941, the "scorched earth" policy of the Russians and the dislocation of the transport system caused by the necessary re-conversion to standard European gauge from the Russian gauge.

The cession of Northern Transylvania, apart from the mere physical loss of territory and population, caused a severe disruption of the economic system on account of the valuable raw materials involved, and the loss of industry which had been built up on the basis of these raw materials. The capital invested in industry in this area represented some 13 per cent. of total investments in industry in the whole country. The main features were the mineral resources of the Baia Mare district, containing lead, zinc, gold, silver and small quantities of copper, with lead-refining plants attached. In this area deposits of pyrites were fairly considerable and supplied the bulk

728 125

728 of requirements for sulphuric acid production.
[135] Of lesser importance were the salt and coal deposits.

The forest resources of Northern Transylvania are estimated to have accounted for as much as
[313] 25 per cent of pre-war timber production. Apart from timber the food and leather industries
[311] appear to have been the most developed. This area was principally made up of forests and pastures; the arable land provided no surplus
[233] after local needs had been covered. Of livestock losses the most outstanding feature was nearly 2 million sheep.

[496] The railway system, and particularly the railway administration, was severely handicapped by the change of frontiers, which in places cut one part of Rumania off from the other.

Cahacra and Durostor, the two ceded Dobrusan provinces, are mainly agricultural, and though producing a small surplus, contributed little to Rumania's total agricultural output. Of more significance is the cotton-growing area. There are no known mineral deposits, and industry in this area is on a very small scale, relying mainly on handicrafts.

TRANSNISTRIA

727 Transnistria is the name which has been given to the territory lying between the Dniester and the Bug, which was given to Rumania to administer in 1941 subsequent to its capture from the U.S.S.R. by Rumanian and German troops. Transnistria is part of the Southern Ukraine and is mainly agricultural, while such industry as existed has been of no use to the Rumanians on account of the heavy destruction carried out by the Russians. It is probably true to say that this territory has been more of a financial liability than an asset to Rumania on account of the heavy expenditure entailed in repairs, particularly of railways and bridges. Some little advantage has, however, been gained from the harvest of 1942-3.

146 Largely because of its cost, the consumption of
262 sugar is very low, except among the well-to-do in the towns. (To encourage sugar-beet growing, a high price was set by the Government.)

[785] The diet is further impoverished by the long religious fasts—seven weeks before Easter, six weeks before Christmas, two shorter summer periods, plus Wednesdays and Fridays of each week. The diet during the fast includes practically no food of animal origin. Children under 10 years do not normally observe these fasts and, in fact, usually have a better diet during these periods since more milk, eggs and butter are available for them.

The diet, though fairly adequate in energy value, is short of animal protein, fats and calcium; moreover, where maize is the principal cereal lack of vitamin B_2 may be very serious. Various symptoms of vitamin and mineral deficiencies are [165] observed, and the high infant-mortality rate—the highest in Europe—is also partly due to malnutrition. One of the most serious effects of the poor diet is the nervous disease pellagra, caused by this deficiency of the vitamin B_2 factor. In Moldavia, where maize is the staple food, about 5 per cent. [164] of the rural population suffers from pellagra every spring. In the whole country about 3,000 deaths occur each year from this disease (compared with 4,000 in the maize-eating southern states of U.S.A.).

The average annual pre-war food consumption of Rumania is shown in the following table, with comparative figures for the United Kingdom.

Average per Head Consumption

	Rumania		*United Kingdom*	
	Kg.	*Lb.*	*Kg.*	*Lb.*
Wheat and rye	104	229	129	285
Maize	166	365	—	—
Potatoes	50	110	84	185
Sugar	5	11	43	95
Meat	17	37	63	139
Milk	70	123*	94	165*
Butter	1	2	11	24
Pig fat	4	10	5	11
Vegetable oil	1·5	3	—	—
Margarine	—	—	4	10
Calories per day	2,700		3,100	

*Pints

B. WAR-TIME CHANGES

1. Territorial Changes

●728 The net effect of the territorial changes which
241 have occurred since 1939 is the loss of Northern
311 Transylvania to Hungary and of Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. For two seasons' crops, 1940 and 1941, Rumania was without Bessarabia, but in the late summer of 1941 she not only regained Bessarabia but acquired administrative control of the Soviet territory now styled Transnistria, and this has made small contributions to the food supplies of Rumania in 1942-43. Ignoring Transnistria, however, Rumania lost 12 per cent. of her former arable area and grain production. The Transylvanian areas ceded to Hungary, though not rich agriculturally, probably needed only small imports of grain to supplement their own production, while south Dobruja, though a surplus producing area, contributed only a fraction to Rumania's total agricultural production. The country's potential agricultural export remains, therefore, substantially what it was before the war.

2. Agriculture in War Years

241 Germany, at the outbreak of the war, looked to
722 the Danube countries, and to Rumania in particu-

[9a]

328 was no zinc-smelting capacity until 1940, when the "Sonemin" concern (Societatea Nationala de Exploatări Miniere şi Industriale S.A.R.) erected a plant at Copşa Mica with a capacity for 6,000 tons of crude zinc annually. The smelter has three retorts fired by natural gas, treating concentrates first roasted at the Phœnix works.

3. Pre-War Production and Trade

Ore production increased over the years 1934-1938, statistics available are conflicting, but it is certain that 1938 production in terms of lead content was not less than 7,000 tons. Smelter production also increased from 4,000 tons to about 7,000 tons, and averaged about 5,000 tons over the period. Exports and imports of lead were very small.

Ore production in terms of zinc content varied between approximately 4,000 tons and 8,000 tons. The concentrates were all exported, chiefly to Poland. Metallic zinc was imported almost entirely from Belgium and Poland.

The small output of lead and zinc was of little importance other than to Rumania herself.

4. War-time Development

[728] [439] As practically the whole of the Rumanian lead-zinc industry passed to Hungary when she acquired the Baia Mare district under the Vienna Award, Rumania became largely dependent on imports for the satisfaction of her lead and zinc requirements. However, she retained the Transylvanian Erzgebirge and other areas containing lead-zinc deposits, some of which she is now endeavouring to exploit. For instance, it was reported in December 1942 that deposits in the Banat, near Agadici, and in the Hunedoara district, were being developed. The Copşa Mica zinc smelter has remained in Rumanian hands.

D. MICA

316 135 The Germans are taking considerable interest in the mica deposits discovered in the Mehedinţi district, though little is believed to be of high quality. The present annual rate of production is estimated to be about 150 tons.

E. BAUXITE

135 Rumania possessed reserves of bauxite situated in the Bihor Massif and estimated by German experts in 1940 at some 40 million tons. The main deposits are located in the Poiana, Crisul Repede and Jad Valleys, and in the Galbina valley south-east of Beiuş. Small deposits exist around Remetea and Bratca, in the district around Piatra and near Turda.

316 Despite the size of her ore reserves, Rumania's production of bauxite has never been important, largely because of its unsuitability for the Bayer process, which is mostly operated in European alumina plants. Pre-war output never exceeded 10,000 tons annually, and was mostly consumed at home in the manufacture of cement and refractory bricks.

Mining operations were carried on before the war by three companies:—

(a) *Bauxita S.A.R.*, a subsidiary of the Swiss Aluminium Industrie A.G. Chippus, which owned mines at Dobreşti and produced small quantities of bauxite for the Rumanian cement industry.

[226]

328 The Rumanian production of argentiferous ores was treated by refineries at Baia Mare and Zlatna and at the Phœnix refinery at Satu Mare, all of which are in the area ceded to Hungary.

2. Pre-War Production

Silver production increased at a much higher rate than gold production over pre-war years; 1937 silver output was nearly double that of 1935, and more than four times as great as that of 1932. However, there was a considerable fall from 824,480 in 1937 to 502,890 troy ounces (metal in ore), in 1938.

3. War-time Developments

728 316 A Rumanian authority has estimated that with the loss of the Baia Mare (Nagybanya) area under the Vienna Award, Rumania was deprived of as much as 87 per cent. of her silver production. Efforts are being made, however, to increase production from the considerable deposits still remaining under Rumanian control. Increased premiums are also being paid on silver mined as from the 1st January, 1943.

505 648 Danube nearly doubled. The Rumanian river traffic is now in fact under German control, which is enforced through a number of official and semi-official bodies. German transport officers operating in the main river ports are regulating all river shipping.

Working in close collaboration with the German railways and the *Frachleitstelle Südost*, Berlin (the office which controls river and sea navigation) the Rumanian authorities are bound to the orders given by this office, which must immediately receive reports of any transport exceeding 1,000 tons between Rumania and other countries. Oil transports are excepted as these are handled centrally by a special body which collaborates with the Rumanian Railway Administration and with the Danube Shipping Agencies

5. The Inland Fleet

505 At the beginning of 1940, the Rumanian inland fleet consisted of the following craft :—

Passenger boats ..	25	
Tug boats ..	127	
Cargo barges ..	553	with a capacity of 469,546 tons
Tankers	66	with a capacity of 41,603 tons

Accurate figures of the Rumanian tonnage park have not been published recently, but press reports at the end of 1942 stated that shipping under the Rumanian flag on the Danube carried only 28 per cent. of Rumania's Danube traffic.

505 648 **III. Administration of the Danube**

Before the war the administration of the Danube was in the hands of two Commissions, the C.I.D. (International Danube Commission) in charge of the Danube from Brăila to Ulm, a distance of 2,417 km. (1,500 miles), and the C.E.D. (European Danube Commission) in charge of the Danube delta—i.e. from Brăila to the Black Sea—a distance of 171 km. (106 miles). Both these Commissions were established by the Treaty of Paris as long ago as 1856.

● 728 After the 1914-18 war, the two Commissions were reconstituted under the Treaty of Versailles, and the constitution, powers and functions of each laid down in Articles 331-339 and 346-353 of that Treaty.

C.I.D. (International Danube Commission)

Under the Treaty of Versailles this Commission was composed of the following riparian States :—

2 members from Bavaria and Württemburg.

1 each from Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria.

In addition, the three non-riparian members of the C.E.D., viz., Great Britain, France and Italy, were each allocated one representative.

This Commission was only a provisional one, intended to function pending the creation of a permanent régime. This was accomplished in July, 1921, and under the Statute of the 23rd July of that year, the Powers having representation were identical with those prescribed by the Versailles Treaty.

Article 1 of the Statute provides that the Danube from Ulm to the Black Sea must be free and open to all flags without any discrimination whatsoever. The functions and powers of the C.I.D. are laid down in Articles 9-42, and are concerned with the drawing up of programmes of improved works, the levying of customs dues, police regulations and the control of revenues resulting from customs and navigation dues.

A. POPULATION

1. General

161 Before discussing the labour situation in Rumania, it is essential to point out that a number of substantial changes have taken place between 1939 and 1942. The results of all these are shown in the table below. The last official census (in 1930) showed the total population of Greater Rumania as 18,057,000. Allowing for natural increase, the population for 1939 was probably about 20,000,000.

161 728 In August 1940 the U.S.S.R. occupied Northern Bucovina and Bessarabia with a combined population of 3·67 million, while in July 1941 these areas were regained with a reduced population of 3·30 million, the reduction of ·37 million being due to Russian deportations.

In September 1940 Hungary acquired northern Transylvania, including the provinces of Crisana and Maramures and a population of 2·75 million. This was followed by a further loss of the southern Dobruja to Bulgaria with a population of 0·38 million. Some 200,000 Germans were repatriated from eastern Rumania, mainly to Poland.

161
728

the northern sections of Transylvania and Crişana to Hungary, though it should be noted that a considerable block of Rumanians, of whom over 200,000 have returned as refugees, were placed within Hungary by the new frontier. The German minority was little affected by the territorial changes, but some 200,000 from Eastern Rumania were "repatriated," mainly to Poland. The remaining 350,000 are situated chiefly in the Banat and in southern Transylvania. The Jewish population was distributed as follows :—

[162]

Bessarabia and Bucovina	300,000
Moldavia	158,000
Muntenia	87,000
Transylvania, Crişana and Maramureş	180,000

(*See* paragraph on Jewish population on page 56.)

The Bulgarian minority has been returned to Bulgaria partly by the new frontier in the Dobruja and partly by the exchange of Bulgarian and Rumanian nationals which has taken place since 1940.

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943 ED1 Rumania ED1

161
728

TABLE SHOWING POPULATION CHANGES BETWEEN 1939-1942

	Losses	Gains	Population
Greater Rumania, 1939	—	—	20,000,000
U.S.S.R.	3,670,000	3,300,000	—
Hungary	2,750,000	200,000	—
Bulgaria	380,000	—	—
Germany	200,000	—	—
Natural increase in population, 1939-December 1942	—	400,000	—
Totals	7,000,000	3,600,000	—
Population of Rumania, December, 1942	—	—	16,900,000

[54d]

16: Great Britain G-4 (no date) 1943

ED1 Rumania ED1

162 **2. Effect of the Population Changes on the Nationality Distribution**

In 1930 only 72 per cent. of the total population was of Rumanian origin. The largest minority groups were Hungarians (8 per cent.) Germans (4 per cent.), Jews (4 per cent.), Ukrainians (3·2 per cent.) and Russians (2·3 per cent.).

162 728 As a result of the territorial changes since 1939 over 85 per cent. of the population are now of Rumanian extraction, and there has been a change in the relative importance of the various minorities. The Hungarian minority has been largely reduced by the cession of the province of Maramureş and

[54e]

162
728

As a result of these changes it would appear that the largest minority groups are now the Germans, Russians and Ukrainians.

162

3. Occupational Distribution

There is no satisfactory official occupational breakdown. Though the 1930 census gives an industrial and commercial breakdown, figures for agriculture and other occupations are lacking. Using such official figures as are available combined with other unofficial information, the following occupational breakdown (column A) has been drawn up for 1936, taking into account increased industrialisation since 1930.

[54f]

E. THE JEWISH POPULATION

162 The Jewish population of Rumania for 1938 is given as 800,000, and for July, 1942, as 270,000. This reduction came about as follows :—

Total, 1938	800,000
Lost to Hungary	200,000
[728] Taken to Russia from Bessarabia and Bucovina by Russians	130,000
[661] Expelled from Bessarabia and other areas by Rumanians to Transnistria, and deaths from unnatural causes in Rumania	200,000
Total losses	530,000
Total, 1942	270,000

The occupational distribution of the Jews in 1930 :—

			Per cent.
Agriculture			4·1
Industry and trade	32·8	81·1	
Commerce and credit	48·3		
Transport			2·4
Professions and Public Services ..			2·7
Army			1·9
Miscellaneous			7·8

It is calculated that in 1939 at least one-sixth of the industrial and half of the commercial population were Jews. During the war Rumanian policy has been to exclude Jews from business and from commercial and professional activity. This process of Rumanisation, while pursued ruthlessly in the provinces of Bessarabia and Bucovina, has been limited in the more industrial areas such as Bucarest by the simple fact that Rumanian industry and trade are dependent to such an extent on Jewish capital and leadership, and there is no doubt that the shortage of labour in industry has been seriously aggravated by the anti-Jewish policy. The degree of Rumanisation so far achieved is given by the following examples :—

563
661

Bucarest :—

Number of firms employing Jews, November 1940	8,126
Number of firms employing Jews, December 1942	4,301

Such Jews as are deemed necessary for war production are granted labour permits, whereby they may remain in their profession, but are subject to heavy taxation. Jews who are expelled from their normal activity are compulsorily enrolled in the Jewish labour service and employed chiefly on road work, or, alternatively, they are sent to concentration camps.

(*See* also "Note on Jews in Rumania," Part II, Chapter VIII.)

F. WAGES

1. General

465 The average wage (industrial, commercial and agricultural professions) in 1938 was 1,853 lei per month. The highest average wages were found in the mining, food and transport industries, followed by commerce, textiles, skins, glass and stone, while in the metallurgical industry wages were below the average. The most noticeable feature of pre-war Rumanian wage statistics is the great regional variations, the extreme averages being 889 and 3,059 lei per month.

During the war, various attempts at fixing the wage level have failed to keep pace with the rising cost of living. On the whole it would have been surprising if a wage stop could have been successfully applied in Rumania, because of the great

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania EDI

727 in failing to recognize that new "progressive" forces were at work
642 and in refusing to coöperate with them. In Hungary, Ferenc Nagy's Smallholders Party coöperated with the Communists in a coalition government, and Petkov coöperated in the Fatherland Front in Bulgaria. These were applauded as signs of superior liberalism and far-sightedness. In neither case, as we have seen, was the end result satisfactory. It was not different in Rumania. The United States and British Governments made efforts to hold the governments concerned and their Soviet patrons to the terms of the Yalta Agreement. They succeeded only in revealing a distressing lack of power behind the written and verbal messages which their diplomats delivered at the respective foreign offices. To this extent it can be said that they actually damaged the native national forces which they aimed to help.

The Western Powers protested, as mentioned, against Vyshinsky's interference in Rumanian affairs and quite properly refused to recognize the Groza Government. Encouraged by this, King Michael in August 1945 appealed to the three signatories of the Yalta Agreement to help him create a "recognized democratic government." The Agreement provided that if differences arose about how democratic and representative régimes were to be created the three signatories should consult. The American and British Governments demanded that a consultation now take place about Rumania. Moscow replied that no differences existed except with regard to Rumanian domestic affairs and that therefore a consultation would be not only superfluous but highly improper. That was that. Soviet troops were in occupation of Rumania, and the Western Powers did not propose to go to war to replace Mr. Groza with Mr. Maniu. Other protests over other infringements of the Yalta undertaking were similarly rebuffed. It was right in one view to make them "for the record." The immediate result, however, was that the Western democracies lost face and non-Communist elements were weakened.

728 Simultaneously negotiations had been begun looking to the conclusion of peace treaties with Italy and the former Axis satellites. The peace conference opened in Paris on July 29, 1946. One staff member of the American delegation has said that the draft treaties there presented compared unfavorably with even the maligned

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia

treaties of 1919 and 1920.[1] The treaties as actually signed on 728
February 10, 1947, were no better. The Western Powers tried to arrange that some respect be paid to the principle of self-determination, by plebiscite or otherwise, in settling the ownership of territories in dispute between former Axis states or between them and the victors. They met with no success.

In Rumania's case several important territories were at stake, 648
including Bessarabia, a part of the Bukovina, the northern part of 728
Transylvania and the Southern Dobrudja.

Bessarabia had come into Russian possession first in 1812; had been transferred to Rumania (largely on ethnic grounds) in 1918; and had been retaken by Russia in June 1940, pursuant to an agreement between Ribbentrop and Molotov a year earlier. Rumanians have since asserted that the Rumanian Government of 1940 did not formally consent to the Russian annexation but merely evacuated the territory under threat of force. At Paris the Soviet delegates referred to the 1940 transfer as "an agreement," said it had been confirmed by the armistice and made clear that possession was nine-tenths of the law. The peace treaty confirmed this reasoning. The case of Northern Bukovina was somewhat different, though the decision of the peace conference regarding it was the same. Northern Bukovina never in history had been Russian. The province had not been specifically mentioned in the Molotov-Ribbentrop deal of 1939; but Germany had not protested when the Soviets took it over in 1940. The Soviets argued that, as in the case of their territorial demands on the Czechs and the Finns, they required the area for strategic purposes of defense. The bear must protect itself against the carnivorous lamb.[2]

One decision was to Rumania's advantage. In 1940 Ciano and Ribbentrop had handed over the northern part of the Rumanian province of Transylvania to their protégés the Hungarians. When Vyshinsky installed Groza in power in Bucharest on March 6, 1945, he felt that he must give the new Prime Minister some success to

[1] John C. Campbell, "The United States in World Affairs, 1945–1947." New York: Harper's, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1947, p. 134.

[2] Rumania ceded the Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria September 7, 1940. The Peace Conference confirmed this also. The United States had favored this arrangement in 1919 and approved it in 1940.

648 advertise to the Rumanian masses, most of whom had never heard
728 his name. On March 8, therefore, Groza was told to ask Stalin for northern Transylvania, and by return telegram he received it as a "present." The Nazis had not yet been expelled from Budapest, so there was nobody there for Moscow to take into account. The Western Allies were not consulted. As a matter of fact, they had no objection to the return of at least most of Transylvania to Rumania, but would have preferred that it be done after study as to whether or not there should be frontier rectifications in favor of Hungarian ethnic groups; and they certainly would have considered it more suitable that the transfer be made after agreement among the Allies rather than unilaterally by one of them.

665 The steps by which the Communist-dominated Rumanian Gov-
668 ernment became an absolute Communist dictatorship need not be detailed here.[3] In the beginning there certainly were some non-Communist elements which favored a clean sweep of the old order even though the representatives of the new order were Communists and protégés of the hated Russians. Seizure of the large properties still left in Rumania after the land reforms following the First World War was popular in principle. Rumanian régimes of the inter-war period had not been noted for efficiency or probity, and the Communists hastened to identify all Rumanian statesmen who held democratic beliefs and had a Western orientation with the "old gang" of profiteers and politicians who had mocked the Constitution in the dissolute days of King Carol and had ended by taking Rumania into the war as the ally of the Nazis. The fact that Maniu, the country's leading statesman, was famous for his incorruptibility and stubborn devotion to the Constitution did not deter Communist propaganda from picturing him also as a corrupt relic of the old dictatorial order. The Socialists were, of course, completely outbid by Communist promises of pie in the sky.

665 But although these tactics had some success at first the only one
a41 of them that was based on anything substantial, the gift of land to
423

[3] For a fuller outline of the postwar evolution in Rumania as well as other parts of Eastern Europe, and of relevant negotiations (if they can be called that) between the Soviets and the Western Powers, see Campbell, *op. cit.*, also volumes for 1947–48 and 1948–49 in the same series by the same author, and the volume for 1949 by Richard P. Stebbins.

543 through a corner of the fair-ground as it begins its journey northwards. The fair-ground extends from the bridgehead, where in former times there must have been a ford, southwards for an indefinite distance between river and railway. A tributary stream which joins the Argeş at the bridge is named, after the fair, Valea *Târgul*. From the bridge a lane winds southwards to the rows of buildings and sheds which
256 constitute the permanent nucleus of the fair. Here is the corn mill, perhaps once dependent on power from the river, but now driven by electricity. We may note in passing that among the many survivals in the Carpathians is the horizontal water-wheel, used here as in Norway to turn corn mills. The mill consists of a log-hut erected directly over a stream
543 or a branch of a river. The sale of cereals, chiefly maize, is
443 also conducted by the mill, at the entrance to the fair, and there are stores of building materials, fruit, rock-salt and charcoal.

Rows of permanent open-sided sheds face each other along the "main street" of the fair, and are hired for the duration by merchants and caterers. Other goods—mostly those brought by peasants—are displayed in improvised booths or exposed on the ground by the wayside. Further on, the inevitable amusements are concentrated in a corner of their own, the stalls in this section increasing in number throughout the week, until pleasure becomes the chief business by the last days of the fair. This is the natural culmination of events which begin with the sale of cattle in the opening days; the "order of the fair" is a traditional feature of such gatherings everywhere.

543 But in Roumania there is another element which contributes
326 to the variety of the fair—the gipsies who pitch their camps
563 behind the booths and hawk trinkets or unobtrusively engage in metal-work and wood-carving. They appear to keep apart from the rest. To them the food-stallholders bring their copper pots, used for boiling fat, for retinning, while the peasants drive up the draught oxen which may need to be reshod. The tinning is done over an improvised hearth and a handful of charcoal; the shoeing—by the bridge-head—requires somewhat more elaborate equipment in the shape of
● [735] a forge and a post and ropes for felling the oxen. Finally, squatting by the wayside, or actively exhibiting their sores, there are the beggars and cripples, who complete the human picture.

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDI Rumania EDI

MEDICAL CONDITIONS AT CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

CURTEA DE ARGEŞ is a small town of 6,831 inhabitants (in 1930), situated in the valley of the River Argeş, at an altitude of 1,400 feet.

A SERIES of wells supply the town with water, there being no system of pipes to supply running water. The drainage system is necessarily of a primitive type, the dry closet type being the one in use.

THE TOWN possesses two hospitals:

(1) A general hospital with pavilion for epidemic cases.
(2) Home for incurables—a branch of a nerve clinic in Bucharest.

THE GENERAL HOSPITAL is situated in the centre of the town on a slight eminence, a few yards from the main street. It consists of two wards, one for men and one for women. The cases are mixed, medical and surgical cases being nursed in the same ward. There are fifteen beds for men and fifteen for women. In addition there are two small wards for clean surgical cases, each containing two beds.

THE BEDS are of the usual hospital type, but placed close together about three feet apart. The mattresses and pillows are stuffed with straw and are very hard. The patients wear their own clothes. This being summer, less than one half of the beds were in use. The villagers refuse to come to hospital in summer, when there is work to be done in the fields, unless in cases of stern necessity. A belief in witchcraft and secret remedies is prevalent, so that progress as regards treatment is hampered. Epidemics of dysentery and typhoid are common. Tuberculosis is widespread, and goitre is found in all the villages in this valley. Cretinism in the children is untreated, and most villages contain cases. No medication of the water supply is undertaken. Pulmonary tuberculosis is treated in sanatoria, but other cases of tuberculosis are admitted here. Cancer is also common, but is not dealt with here—the cases are sent to Bucharest for radium treatment.

164 Rickets is unknown, and difficult labour among peasant women is rare, though puerperal fever is common. In some instances, if there is a midwife, she is shared by several [847] villages. A law has recently been passed forbidding attempts at abortion, but it is not strictly enforced. There are a good many infant deaths. Maternal morbidity is not high, in [142] spite of the prevalence of puerperal fever. The women as a whole are robust, of good physique and inured to hardship. [757] The French treatment of sepsis by induced (turpentine) abscess is common and is found to be very successful, the fever running its course in 7-8 days, with low mortality rate. [855] Children are breast-fed, feeding bottles being unknown. The feeding continues until the age of one year or longer. Infantile paralysis is unknown in this district, though it does occur in other parts of the country. Rheumatism and arthritis are common.

743 752 A SMALL operating theatre is attached to the hospital for emergency cases like suppurating appendices and ruptured hernia, other cases being sent to the hospitals in larger towns. Small surgical operations are also performed. The table is convenient, in that it can tilt at any angle from head to foot, but it cannot be lowered or raised at will. The only light is a small electric globe high up in the ceiling, with no facilities for lowering. Operations are, however, mostly done in daylight. If necessary, lamps or even candles are requisitioned. A small room for sterilising purposes opens off the theatre.

●743 164 THE PAVILION for infectious cases is situated about twenty feet from the main building, in close proximity to the staff house and kitchen. Its beds were empty at the moment of inspection. Scarlet fever is the most common epidemic in this vicinity, and the beds were full one month ago. Epidemics of dysentery and typhoid also occur. Typhus is not known here, though frequent in Bessarabia. Diphtheria is fairly common.

759 THERE ARE a medical doctor and a surgeon in attendance, the latter being only part-time.

743 THE HOME for the incurables was next visited. It is a handsome villa, situated near the main street, but farther from the centre of the town. As before stated, it is a branch of the nerve clinic in Bucharest, and is under the supervision of

1 [in Curtea De Arges -- Analyst]

743 Prof. Dr. Cantacuzene, who visits it two or three times yearly. A doctor is in charge with a Sister of Mercy as nurse and two untrained local nurses, one for the men and one for the women. There are thirty male beds and twenty female
764 beds. The cases are mainly paralytic and epileptic, with a certain number of war invalids and diabetics. The beds were mostly empty when seen, as the cases are ambulant.

BATHROOM and lavatory accommodation in both hospitals is necessarily primitive.

759 THERE ARE three other doctors in the town—one for the
744 military, another for the insurance societies, and a third for the direction of general sanitary work, corresponding to a British Medical Officer of Health. The headquarters of the last-named are at the Mayor's office. Medical inspection takes place once a month in the schools, each child being examined thoroughly each time. There are no dentists in the town, extraction of teeth, etc., being performed by the
751 local doctors. Vaccination is obligatory and is done when the child is one month old. At the age of seven, on entry into school, a second vaccination is required, and in the case of a boy, at the age of 18, when he begins his premilitary service.

758 As REGARDS payment for medical treatment, poor people who cannot afford to pay are treated free, otherwise 10-20 lei is charged for a consultation and 20-30 lei per day in hospital. Most of the patients are insured against sickness by paying regular contributions under State guidance.

759 DOCTORS RECEIVE their training in one of the three centres, Cluj, Bucharest or Jassy. Cluj is considered the best equipped. So far there are no medical text-books in Roumanian. German text-books and German medical traditions are followed at Cluj, while French text-books and French traditions are in use at Bucharest and Jassy. One year is spent in preparation, Chemistry, Physics, etc., being studied. Five years of actual medical work, theoretical and practical, follow. For the past eight years a further course of two years in specialised work at a hospital has been insisted upon.

N. H. S.

[in Curtea De Arges -- Analyst]

743 Prof. Dr. Cantacuzene, who visits it two or three times yearly. A doctor is in charge with a Sister of Mercy as nurse and two untrained local nurses, one for the men and one for the women. There are thirty male beds and twenty female [164] beds. The cases are mainly paralytic and epileptic, with a certain number of war invalids and diabetics. The beds were mostly empty when seen, as the cases are ambulant.

BATHROOM and lavatory accommodation in both hospitals is necessarily primitive.

759 THERE ARE three other doctors in the town—one for the 744 military, another for the insurance societies, and a third for the direction of general sanitary work, corresponding to a British Medical Officer of Health. The headquarters of the last-named are at the Mayor's office. Medical inspection takes place once a month in the schools, each child being examined thoroughly each time. There are no dentists in the town, extraction of teeth, etc., being performed by the [751] local doctors. Vaccination is obligatory and is done when the child is one month old. At the age of seven, on entry into school, a second vaccination is required, and in the case of a boy, at the age of 18, when he begins his premilitary service.

758 AS REGARDS payment for medical treatment, poor people who cannot afford to pay are treated free, otherwise 10-20 lei is charged for a consultation and 20-30 lei per day in hospital. Most of the patients are insured against sickness by paying regular contributions under State guidance.

759 DOCTORS RECEIVE their training in one of the three centres, Cluj, Bucharest or Jassy. Cluj is considered the best equipped. So far there are no medical text-books in Roumanian. German text-books and German medical traditions are followed at Cluj, while French text-books and French traditions are in use at Bucharest and Jassy. One year is spent in preparation, Chemistry, Physics, etc., being studied. Five years of actual medical work, theoretical and practical, follow. For the past eight years a further course of two years in specialised work at a hospital has been insisted upon.

N. H. S.

[in Curtea De Arges -- Analyst]

743 Prof. Dr. Cantacuzene, who visits it two or three times yearly. A doctor is in charge with a Sister of Mercy as nurse and two untrained local nurses, one for the men and one for the women. There are thirty male beds and twenty female [164] beds. The cases are mainly paralytic and epileptic, with a certain number of war invalids and diabetics. The beds were mostly empty when seen, as the cases are ambulant.

BATHROOM and lavatory accommodation in both hospitals is necessarily primitive.

759 744 THERE ARE three other doctors in the town—one for the military, another for the insurance societies, and a third for the direction of general sanitary work, corresponding to a British Medical Officer of Health. The headquarters of the last-named are at the Mayor's office. Medical inspection takes place once a month in the schools, each child being examined thoroughly each time. There are no dentists in the town, extraction of teeth, etc., being performed by the [751] local doctors. Vaccination is obligatory and is done when the child is one month old. At the age of seven, on entry into school, a second vaccination is required, and in the case of a boy, at the age of 18, when he begins his premilitary service.

758 As REGARDS payment for medical treatment, poor people who cannot afford to pay are treated free, otherwise 10-20 lei is charged for a consultation and 20-30 lei per day in hospital. Most of the patients are insured against sickness by paying regular contributions under State guidance.

759 DOCTORS RECEIVE their training in one of the three centres, Cluj, Bucharest or Jassy. Cluj is considered the best equipped. So far there are no medical text-books in Roumanian. German text-books and German medical traditions are followed at Cluj, while French text-books and French traditions are in use at Bucharest and Jassy. One year is spent in preparation, Chemistry, Physics, etc., being studied. Five years of actual medical work, theoretical and practical, follow. For the past eight years a further course of two years in specialised work at a hospital has been insisted upon.

N. H. S.

[in Curtea De Arges -- Analyst]

164 Rickets is unknown, and difficult labour among peasant women is rare, though puerperal fever is common. In some instances, if there is a midwife, she is shared by several [847] villages. A law has recently been passed forbidding attempts at abortion, but it is not strictly enforced. There are a good many infant deaths. Maternal morbidity is not high, in [142] spite of the prevalence of puerperal fever. The women as a whole are robust, of good physique and inured to hardship. [757] The French treatment of sepsis by induced (turpentine) abscess is common and is found to be very successful, the fever running its course in 7-8 days, with low mortality rate. [855] Children are breast-fed, feeding bottles being unknown. The feeding continues until the age of one year or longer. Infantile paralysis is unknown in this district, though it does occur in other parts of the country. Rheumatism and arthritis are common.

743 A SMALL operating theatre is attached to the hospital for
● 752 emergency cases like suppurating appendices and ruptured hernia, other cases being sent to the hospitals in larger towns. Small surgical operations are also performed. The table is convenient, in that it can tilt at any angle from head to foot, but it cannot be lowered or raised at will. The only light is a small electric globe high up in the ceiling, with no facilities for lowering. Operations are, however, mostly done in daylight. If necessary, lamps or even candles are requisitioned. A small room for sterilising purposes opens off the theatre.

743 THE PAVILION for infectious cases is situated about twenty
164 feet from the main building, in close proximity to the staff house and kitchen. Its beds were empty at the moment of inspection. Scarlet fever is the most common epidemic in this vicinity, and the beds were full one month ago. Epidemics of dysentery and typhoid also occur. Typhus is not known here, though frequent in Bessarabia. Diphtheria is fairly common.

759 THERE ARE a medical doctor and a surgeon in attendance, the latter being only part-time.

743 THE HOME for the incurables was next visited. It is a handsome villa, situated near the main street, but farther from the centre of the town. As before stated, it is a branch of the nerve clinic in Bucharest, and is under the supervision of

[in Curtea De Arges -- Analyst]

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDI Rumania EDI

MEDICAL CONDITIONS AT CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

CURTEA DE ARGEŞ is a small town of 6,831 inhabitants (in 1930), situated in the valley of the River Argeş, at an altitude of 1,400 feet.

A SERIES of wells supply the town with water, there being no system of pipes to supply running water. The drainage system is necessarily of a primitive type, the dry closet type being the one in use.

THE TOWN possesses two hospitals:

(1) A general hospital with pavilion for epidemic cases.
(2) Home for incurables—a branch of a nerve clinic in Bucharest.

THE GENERAL HOSPITAL is situated in the centre of the town on a slight eminence, a few yards from the main street. It consists of two wards, one for men and one for women. The cases are mixed, medical and surgical cases being nursed in the same ward. There are fifteen beds for men and fifteen for women. In addition there are two small wards for clean surgical cases, each containing two beds.

THE BEDS are of the usual hospital type, but placed close together about three feet apart. The mattresses and pillows are stuffed with straw and are very hard. The patients wear their own clothes. This being summer, less than one half of the beds were in use. The villagers refuse to come to hospital in summer, when there is work to be done in the fields, unless in cases of stern necessity. A belief in witchcraft and secret remedies is prevalent, so that progress as regards treatment is hampered. Epidemics of dysentery and typhoid are common. Tuberculosis is widespread, and goitre is found in all the villages in this valley. Cretinism in the children is untreated, and most villages contain cases. No medication of the water supply is undertaken. Pulmonary tuberculosis is treated in sanatoria, but other cases of tuberculosis are admitted here. Cancer is also common, but is not dealt with here—the cases are sent to Bucharest for radium treatment.

164 Rickets[1] is unknown, and difficult labour among peasant women is rare, though puerperal fever is common. In some instances, if there is a midwife, she is shared by several [847] villages. A law has recently been passed forbidding attempts at abortion, but it is not strictly enforced. There are a good many infant deaths. Maternal morbidity is not high, in [142] spite of the prevalence of puerperal fever. The women as a whole are robust, of good physique and inured to hardship. [757] The French treatment of sepsis by induced (turpentine) abscess is common and is found to be very successful, the fever running its course in 7-8 days, with low mortality rate. [853] Children are breast-fed, feeding bottles being unknown. The feeding continues until the age of one year or longer. Infantile paralysis is unknown in this district, though it does occur in other parts of the country. Rheumatism and arthritis are common.

743 752 A SMALL operating theatre is attached to the hospital[1] for emergency cases like suppurating appendices and ruptured hernia, other cases being sent to the hospitals in larger towns. Small surgical operations are also performed. The table is convenient, in that it can tilt at any angle from head to foot, but it cannot be lowered or raised at will. The only light is a small electric globe high up in the ceiling, with no facilities for lowering. Operations are, however, mostly done in daylight. If necessary, lamps or even candles are requisitioned. A small room for sterilising purposes opens off the theatre.

743 164 THE PAVILION for infectious cases is situated about twenty feet from the main building, in close proximity to the staff house and kitchen. Its beds were empty at the moment of inspection. Scarlet fever is the most common epidemic in this vicinity, and the beds were full one month ago. Epidemics of dysentery and typhoid also occur. Typhus is not known here, though frequent in Bessarabia. Diphtheria is fairly common.

759 THERE[1] ARE a medical doctor and a surgeon in attendance, the latter being only part-time.

743 THE HOME for the incurables[1] was next visited. It is a handsome villa, situated near the main street, but farther from the centre of the town. As before stated, it is a branch of the nerve clinic in Bucharest, and is under the supervision of

1 [in Curtea De Arges -- Analyst]

872 size of the classes varies from 40 to 50 children; there are five teachers. The Head takes a different class each year. The hours are from 9 to 12 and from 2 to 4. Some preparation is done at home. Holidays are generous—eight weeks in the summer, two at Easter, two at Christmas. There are no fees, but children buy their books if they can. The time-table and the syllabus are drawn up by the Minister of Education, and are the same for all schools. Inspectors visit frequently. There [758] is a full medical inspection of each child at the beginning of the year and then each subsequent month. In the first four years the curriculum resembles that of an English elementary school; in the fifth and sixth years the girls combine with general subjects either a commercial, an industrial or a housewifery course. In the seventh year they concentrate on vocational subjects and open their morning working away from school.

We saw some good examples of handwork, clay modelling, paper-cutting pictures, dolls in national dress, etc., and in Class I—the seven-year-olds—some most amusing pictures for the teaching of numbers. Religion is taught daily; there is a religious service on the first day of each month and the children go together to church with one teacher every Sunday.

874 If a girl wishes to become a teacher in a primary school, after four years in such a school she must spend eight in an Ecole Normale and then teach for three years before obtaining her full diploma. For secondary school teaching, after eight years in a lycée the girl goes, at nineteen, to the university for three or four years, and then spends four months in a lycée pédagogique. She then takes her "examen de capacité."

The Theological College, housed in a large red-brick building now being enlarged, takes 260 boys, many of whom come from a distance; all are boarders. The course lasts eight years: four years in the High School (12-16); four years in the College (16-20). Entrance is by means of an examination in Religion, Roumanian, Mathematics and History; there were in 1936 100 candidates for 40 places. The boys are worked very hard; lessons are from 8 to 12 and 2 to 4; preparation from 6 to 7.30 a.m. and from 7 to 9 p.m. In the High School the languages taken are Latin and French; in the College the course includes Greek, German, Pedagogy, Philosophy, Psychology, Sociology, Church History. The course at the College is followed by four years at a university.

743 Prof. Dr. Cantacuzene, who visits it two or three times yearly. A doctor is in charge with a Sister of Mercy as nurse and two untrained local nurses, one for the men and one for the women. There are thirty male beds and twenty female [164] beds. The cases are mainly paralytic and epileptic, with a certain number of war invalids and diabetics. The beds were mostly empty when seen, as the cases are ambulant.

BATHROOM and lavatory accommodation in both hospitals is necessarily primitive.

759 744 THERE ARE three other doctors in the town—one for the military, another for the insurance societies, and a third for the direction of general sanitary work, corresponding to a British Medical Officer of Health. The headquarters of the last-named are at the Mayor's office. Medical inspection takes place once a month in the schools, each child being examined thoroughly each time. There are no dentists in the town, extraction of teeth, etc., being performed by the [751] local doctors. Vaccination is obligatory and is done when the child is one month old. At the age of seven, on entry into school, a second vaccination is required, and in the case of a boy, at the age of 18, when he begins his premilitary service.

758 As REGARDS payment for medical treatment, poor people who cannot afford to pay are treated free, otherwise 10-20 lei is charged for a consultation and 20-30 lei per day in hospital. Most of the patients are insured against sickness by paying regular contributions under State guidance.

759 DOCTORS RECEIVE their training in one of the three centres, Cluj, Bucharest or Jassy. Cluj is considered the best equipped. So far there are no medical text-books in Roumanian. German text-books and German medical traditions are followed at Cluj, while French text-books and French traditions are in use at Bucharest and Jassy. One year is spent in preparation, Chemistry, Physics, etc., being studied. Five years of actual medical work, theoretical and practical, follow. For the past eight years a further course of two years in specialised work at a hospital has been insisted upon.

N. H. S.

[in Curtea De Arges -- Analyst]

164 Rickets is unknown, and difficult labour among peasant women is rare, though puerperal fever is common. In some instances, if there is a midwife, she is shared by several [847] villages. A law has recently been passed forbidding attempts at abortion, but it is not strictly enforced. There are a good many infant deaths. Maternal morbidity is not high, in [142] spite of the prevalence of puerperal fever. The women as a whole are robust, of good physique and inured to hardship. [757] The French treatment of sepsis by induced (turpentine) abscess is common and is found to be very successful, the fever running its course in 7-8 days, with low mortality rate. [855] Children are breast-fed, feeding bottles being unknown. The feeding continues until the age of one year or longer. Infantile paralysis is unknown in this district, though it does occur in other parts of the country. Rheumatism and arthritis are common.

743 752 A SMALL operating theatre is attached to the hospital for emergency cases like suppurating appendices and ruptured hernia, other cases being sent to the hospitals in larger towns. Small surgical operations are also performed. The table is convenient, in that it can tilt at any angle from head to foot, but it cannot be lowered or raised at will. The only light is a small electric globe high up in the ceiling, with no facilities for lowering. Operations are, however, mostly done in daylight. If necessary, lamps or even candles are requisitioned. A small room for sterilising purposes opens off the theatre.

743 164 THE PAVILION for infectious cases is situated about twenty feet from the main building, in close proximity to the staff house and kitchen. Its beds were empty at the moment of inspection. Scarlet fever is the most common epidemic in this vicinity, and the beds were full one month ago. Epidemics of dysentery and typhoid also occur. Typhus is not known here, though frequent in Bessarabia. Diphtheria is fairly common.

759 THERE ARE a medical doctor and a surgeon in attendance, the latter being only part-time.

743 THE HOME for the incurables was next visited. It is a handsome villa, situated near the main street, but farther from the centre of the town. As before stated, it is a branch of the nerve clinic in Bucharest, and is under the supervision of

743 Prof. Dr. Cantacuzene, who visits it two or three times yearly. A doctor is in charge with a Sister of Mercy as nurse and two untrained local nurses, one for the men and one for the women. There are thirty male beds and twenty female [764] beds. The cases are mainly paralytic and epileptic, with a certain number of war invalids and diabetics. The beds were mostly empty when seen, as the cases are ambulant.

BATHROOM and lavatory accommodation in both hospitals is necessarily primitive.

759 744 THERE ARE three other doctors in the town, one for the military, another for the insurance societies, and a third for the direction of general sanitary work, corresponding to a British Medical Officer of Health. The headquarters of the last-named are at the Mayor's office. Medical inspection takes place once a month in the schools, each child being examined thoroughly each time. There are no dentists in the town, extraction of teeth, etc., being performed by the [751] local doctors. Vaccination is obligatory and is done when the child is one month old. At the age of seven, on entry into school, a second vaccination is required, and in the case of a boy, at the age of 18, when he begins his premilitary service.

758 As REGARDS payment for medical treatment, poor people who cannot afford to pay are treated free, otherwise 10-20 lei is charged for a consultation and 20-30 lei per day in hospital. Most of the patients are insured against sickness by paying regular contributions under State guidance.

759 DOCTORS RECEIVE their training in one of the three centres, Cluj, Bucharest or Jassy. Cluj is considered the best equipped. So far there are no medical text-books in Roumanian. German text-books and German medical traditions are followed at Cluj, while French text-books and French traditions are in use at Bucharest and Jassy. One year is spent in preparation, Chemistry, Physics, etc., being studied. Five years of actual medical work, theoretical and practical, follow. For the past eight years a further course of two years in specialised work at a hospital has been insisted upon.

N. H. S.

[in Curtea De Arges -- Analyst]

463 438 industrial labour. One-third of all workers engaged in industry are independent artisans, on whom the community is dependent for its services, but who do not play any important part in war production. In certain of the larger armament works German controllers have effected a considerable degree of rationalisation.

3. Mining

316 727 There is a shortage of miners; Russian prisoners of war have been employed in mining during 1942. Many miners were reported to have been included in the territory transferred to Hungary.

4. Armament Works

719 464 There is a general shortage of labour in metal and engineering factories, particularly of skilled labour. A 12-hour day was legalised at the beginning of 1942, but it is doubtful if in fact a 12-hour day is ever worked.

5. Timber

313 464 There is a shortage of labour, both for lumbering and for timber manufacture.

6. Textiles and Clothing

464 288 294 The total number of workers in these industries has probably fallen considerably, due to reduction of available raw materials. The delivery of supplies to individual mills seems to be somewhat erratic, and there is evidence of considerable part-time work, for instance in a survey of some 43 factories in December, 1942, 11 were working full time, 21 on a reduced scale, and 11 at a very reduced scale.

7. Building

499 712 464 The extent of fortification building and general road and rail construction in Rumania is unknown, but in the second half of 1942 there was evidence of a scarcity of general labour for such projects, and of Russian prisoners of war working on rail construction.

438 464 [759] In the other branches of occupation, transport services, etc., there is no evidence of labour shortage, apart from doctors, many of whom have been mobilised for the army.

D. CONTROL OF LABOUR

1. The Youth Labour Service

466 883 A youth labour service founded on the German model was established in March 1941. The leaders were trained in Germany, but it was only in April 1942 that the labour camps began to function. Youths are called up in their 19th–20th year, and the period of service lasts 7 months.

(*See* Part II, Chapter V.B. for further details.)

2. Civil Mobilisation

466 A general civil mobilisation decree was passed in May 1941 by which (1) employment cards were introduced; (2) men and women aged 20-57 were liable to compulsory employment if not employed.

Two subsequent decrees were published in March and May 1943, one for the reorganisation of agriculture, forestry and fishing, and the second for the reorganisation of industry. Each of these decrees gave full powers to the appropriate authorities for the mobilisation and transfer of labour.

In addition to the general labour decrees which have so far had little influence on the labour situation, there have been regional decrees applying to individual localities, e.g. in Bessarabia, in February 1942, all the inhabitants aged 12-70 were called upon for compulsory agricultural labour unless already employed.

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

garian Kingdom, as by the Habsburgs for their purposes; but it has a very distinctive vitality of its own. 659

The Patriarch of the Rumanian Orthodox Church is a person of great importance in the State and was one of the Council of Regency during the present king's minority. He, the Metropolitans, the Bishops of the Orthodox Church and those of the Rumanian Uniate Church were Senators for life: so were the heads of other Churches having over 200,000 members.[1] 659 793

The village priest, *Popa*, plays a leading part in the life of the Orthodox community. There is great veneration of certain saints—especially the Blessed Virgin and the Saint of the parish—and their ikons. Many of the strongest traditions of the country people are those connected with the seasons, and the Church has christianized many of the old pagan customs. The funeral rites, in particular, only part of which are conducted by the priest, are full of strange symbolism. There is a widespread belief in vampires and other evil spirits and the need of exorcizing them. But though religious practice hovers upon the borderline between faith and superstition, the standard of personal morality among the peasantry is on the whole a high one; the family counts for a great deal and the honour of women is closely guarded. 771 [764]

[1] According to the 1938 census, 13,200,000 belonged to the Orthodox Church (Rumanians, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgars and other Slavs); 2,628,813 were Roman Catholics (Latin Rite, mostly Magyars and Germans, 1,200,000; Greek Rite 1,426,313); 1,195,000 belonged to Protestant Churches (including 400,000 German Lutherans); 1,500,000 were Jews and 260,000 Mohammedans. There were 140,000 'others'. 162

361 towns, stands a church in a fortified enclosure, and the town
133 has been laid out beyond this. It is possible to infer that a similar process has worked itself out, but to a lesser degree, both in the Saxon villages of Transylvania and in such cases
361 as that of Curtea de Argeş. Here the church-and-castle
471 nucleus is as usual the focus of roads, the principal one of which runs along the terrace as already mentioned. Two others lead down towards the river, one on each side of the fortification, but not exactly to the bridge, the position of which is rather determined by gravel banks where the small seasonal brook referred to above joins the river. Some other roads or trackways branch off in a bunch just east of the nucleus and stretch up into hills of unconsolidated material, their woodland cover increasing with altitude and becoming practically continuous forest at about 600 m. altitude over sea. Where the woods are not continuous there is pasture up to which animals may be drawn every day in summer. One of these roads leads past a little old church of S. Mary and appears to be an old track leading obliquely up the hill and over into the next valley to the east. Along the beginning of this trackway are the homes of numerous craftsmen, especially potters, but we did not get evidence of a guild or zunft of potters. We are not here dealing with quite the same scheme of organisation as that of a trade in a street within a walled town. The main business part of the town has lain between the bridge end and the road on the terrace, 10-20 m. above the river, and the town has been physically constrained to spread along that road. The extension southwards has an interesting eighteenth century house overlooking a square set out quite recently. The extension northwards towards the monastery gives a ribbon of buildings mostly modern.

367 On the whole, one has the impression of a focus of peasant
443 life with fairs and markets and opportunities of sale of craft products, especially pots, to country folk. There is evidence of considerable quite modern growth, and also apparently of growth one to two centuries ago, a growth which it is tempting to associate with agricultural development gathered around the spread of maize and potato, but proof is lacking.

361 Curtea de Argeş owes a great deal of its importance to its
771 religious and princely associations, and both the Biserica Domneasca and the monastery church are important here. The latter, near a ford, may well have more ancient associa-

[in Curtea de Arges -- 25 Analyst]

361 tions, but we know of nothing there before 1510. To the
771 existence of the monastery, which is the seat of a bishop, is due the development of a seminary.

161 THE POPULATION[1] in 1930 was 6,831. In 1931 there were 181
163 births, 24 infant deaths (under one year), 20 still-births, and 125 deaths from all causes. Marriages numbered 61 and divorces 4. The birth-rate is thus high, the infant death-rate considerable, but not so high as might be expected; still-births are numerous.

H. J. F.
E. E. E.

1[of Curtea de Arges -- Analyst]

415

BROWN CLAY.
WHITE & GREEN SLIP.

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

garian Kingdom, as by the Habsburgs for their purposes; but it has a very distinctive vitality of its own. 659

The Patriarch of the Rumanian Orthodox Church is a person of great importance in the State and was one of the Council of Regency during the present king's minority. He, the Metropolitans, the Bishops of the Orthodox Church and those of the Rumanian Uniate Church were Senators for life: so were the heads of other Churches having over 200,000 members.[1] 659 793

The village priest, *Popa*, plays a leading part in the life of the Orthodox community. There is great veneration of certain saints—especially the Blessed Virgin and the Saint of the parish—and their ikons. Many of the strongest traditions of the country people are those connected with the seasons, and the Church has christianized many of the old pagan customs. The funeral rites, in particular, only part of which are conducted by the priest, are full of strange symbolism. There is a widespread belief in vampires and other evil spirits and the need of exorcizing them. But though religious practice hovers upon the borderline between faith and superstition, the standard of personal morality among the peasantry is on the whole a high one; the family counts for a great deal and the honour of women is closely guarded. 771 [764]

[1] According to the 1938 census, 13,200,000 belonged to the Orthodox Church (Rumanians, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgars and other Slavs); 2,628,813 were Roman Catholics (Latin Rite, mostly Magyars and Germans, 1,200,000; Greek Rite 1,426,313); 1,195,000 belonged to Protestant Churches (including 400,000 German Lutherans); 1,500,000 were Jews and 260,000 Mohammedans. There were 140,000 'others'. 162

CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

133 361 REFERENCE has already been made to the bridging of the Olt and the Argeş about 20-25 km. from the mountain-edge and to the rise near these bridges of the towns of Ramnicu Valcea and Curtea de Argeş. It has also been explained that terraces on the left bank of the Argeş swing near the river to give an effective bridge-end site capable of defence. Curtea de Argeş is one of the oldest settlements in Muntenia.

[490] AT THE BRIDGE the river is over 420 m. above sea, and from its western end an old trackway, now a main road, follows approximately the 440 m. contour on what appears to be a terrace against which the river swings about 1½-2 km. north of the bridge. Here also gravel reaches, connected with the junction of a brook with the main stream, provide a ford; [7 8] and at this spot on the east side of the river there is the monastery of royal associations founded in 1510 and celebrated as a place of pilgrimage. Beyond this the road goes on up a tributary valley towards the east. The bridge and town however grew up not at this ford, but at a point farther south, where the north-south residual ridge bounding the Argeş valley on the east sends a spur almost to the actual river but just cut off by a seasonal tributary brook. The end of this spur shows two marked terraces, one just slightly above the river, the other some 12 m. above it and rising, as was said [340] above, to about the 440 m. contour. On the end of the spur is a ruined Roman Catholic church, built for Marghita, wife of Prince Basarab. The Wallachian princes of these days appear to have had a habit of marrying Catholic women. One seems to see faint indications that the site of this church has been to a slight extent developed artificially. In 1390 this church served as a cathedral for Catholics in Wallachia, and the see lasted until 1602, by which time many Catholics had become Orthodox and the Catholic bishopric was removed to Dacau.

[491] REFERENCE has already been made to the north-south road on the terrace, no doubt a modernisation of an old trackway, with the town near the end of the spur and the bridge, and the monastery to the north. Near the end of the spur, and

Churches and Religion

Romania

Digest

175
195
[179]

I. Prior to 1919

The available evidence indicate that Christianity had been well established on the territory of the present day Romania in the second century. The region designated as Dacia, a province of the Roman Empire, had, between 106 and the end of the third century, an organized church with an established hierarchy. A bishop of "Gothic Dacia", (the name of this region after the withdrawal of the Roman legions) took part at the first Ecumenical Council at Nicea 325 A.D. Also, a Gothic Dacian bishop is mentioned among those present at the second Ecumenical Council of Constantinople, 381 A. D. We do not possess any particular information concerning the Christianity in this region from the 5th until the 13th century. This was the period of barbarian invasion which destroyed organized social life and forced the great majority of the population to seek refuge in the mountains.

The available informations for the beginning of the 13th century show the church of that region as being a part of the Eastern Orthodox Church. From that time on and until the second half of the 19th century the Romanian Eastern Orthodox Church was under the ecumenical Patriarchy of Constantinople. This applies not only to the canonical and dogmatic matters but also to the investiture (appointment of high dignitaries of the

795 part of Northern Bessarabia.

c) Armenian Uniates called also Roman Catholic of Armenian rite.

Each of these churches came under the supremacy of the Pope at a different time and under slightly different conditions. Only the Romanian Greek Catholics are dealt with in the present chapter (for others see infra III, 5).

175 795 ●779 The union of the Greek Orthodox Romanians by nationality with the Roman Catholic Church was accomplished by an agreement in 1698 between the Vatican and the Orthodox Bishopric of Alba-Julia, ratified later, by the Pope. In joining the Catholic Church, this fraction of the Greek Orthodox Church, however, reserved, among other things, the right to officiate at the services in the Romanian language, and the right of the clergymen to marry. In exchange, the Uniates admitted four dogmatic points of the Catholics, among which the more important were the acceptance of the Pope's supremacy and the Filioque. This union was a result of a compromise accepted by the Holy See in view of circumstances which prevailed in Hungary in particular in Transylvania and Banat in the 17th century. Several political causes contributed to this union. To mention the principal ones, the Hungarian kings endeavored to convert the Romanian minority to Catholicism and thus to detach it from the influence of Romanian Principalities. The spreading of protestantism among the German minority in Transylvania presented a possibility of swaying the Romanians to the same religion.

146 Largely because of its cost, the consumption of
262 sugar is very low, except among the well-to-do in the towns. (To encourage sugar-beet growing, a high price was set by the Government.)

●[785] The diet is further impoverished by the long religious fasts—seven weeks before Easter, six weeks before Christmas, two shorter summer periods, plus Wednesdays and Fridays of each week. The diet during the fast includes practically no food of animal origin. Children under 10 years do not normally observe these fasts and, in fact, usually have a better diet during these periods since more milk, eggs and butter are available for them.

The diet, though fairly adequate in energy value, is short of animal protein, fats and calcium; moreover, where maize is the principal cereal lack of vitamin B_1 may be very serious. Various symptoms of vitamin and mineral deficiencies are
[165] observed, and the high infant-mortality rate—the highest in Europe—is also partly due to malnutrition. One of the most serious effects of the poor diet is the nervous disease pellagra, caused by this deficiency of the vitamin B_2 factor. In Moldavia, where maize is the staple food, about 5 per cent.
[164] of the rural population suffers from pellagra every spring. In the whole country about 3,000 deaths occur each year from this disease (compared with 4,000 in the maize-eating southern states of U.S.A.).

The average annual pre-war food consumption of Rumania is shown in the following table, with comparative figures for the United Kingdom.

Average per Head Consumption

	Rumania		*United Kingdom*	
	Kg.	*Lb.*	*Kg.*	*Lb.*
Wheat and rye	104	229	129	285
Maize	166	305	—	—
Potatoes	50	110	84	185
Sugar	5	11	43	95
Meat	17	37	63	139
Milk	70	123*	94	165*
Butter	1	2	11	24
Pig fat	4	10	5	11
Vegetable oil	1·5	3	—	—
Margarine	—	—	4	10
Calories per day	2,700		3,100	

*Pints

B. WAR-TIME CHANGES

1. Territorial Changes

728 The net effect of the territorial changes which
241 have occurred since 1939 is the loss of Northern Transylvania to Hungary and of Southern Dobruja
311 to Bulgaria. For two seasons' crops, 1940 and 1941, Rumania was without Bessarabia, but in the late summer of 1941 she not only regained Bessarabia but acquired administrative control of the Soviet territory now styled Transnistria, and this has made small contributions to the food supplies of Rumania in 1942-43. Ignoring Transnistria, however, Rumania lost 12 per cent. of her former arable area and grain production. The Transylvanian areas ceded to Hungary, though not rich agriculturally, probably needed only small imports of grain to supplement their own production, while south Dobruja, though a surplus producing area, contributed only a fraction to Rumania's total agricultural production. The country's potential agricultural export remains, therefore, substantially what it was before the war.

2. Agriculture in War Years

241 Germany, at the outbreak of the war, looked to
722 the Danube countries, and to Rumania in particu-

RUMANIA ED I

342 Windows are generally double even in the simpler houses, one opening to the inside, the other to the outside. They are always barred and set in a wooden frame (Jänecke, 1918: 27-28).

342 531 The Rumanian house is noteworthy for its exterior decorations. Special attention and much imagination is given to the woodwork. Much art is evident in the pillars supporting the roof over the veranda (fig. 57d), lintels supporting the eaves, the railings of the veranda and the window and door frames. The corners of houses may have designs in low relief. Painted designs may be placed on the wall in great abundance (figs. 57a, 57b). Because of the lesser opportunity of embellishment through woodwork and because whitewashed walls lend themselves well to painting, painting of the exterior is characteristic of the plains. The Rumanian does not shy away from bright colors. Ultramarine is most popular, for it is said to scare away evil spirits. Combinations of red, blue and yellow are common, and dark green shades are also favored (Jänecke, 1918: 23). [789] [822]

342 [184] [341] The basic difference between the house of the lowlands and those of the mountain region is that the latter are of two-story construction (fig. 64a). Building materials in the mountains are stone and wood rather than wicker and mud. When houses are built on an incline a high stone foundation forms the ground floor (pivnita). This can be used for stables, storage rooms and also as a wine cellar. This form persists even when the terrain is flat. The higher house is appreciated for its better view, greater security and suitability for defense.

While the floor plan often consists of a row of rooms similar to that of the lowlands, a number of changes have taken place. The anteroom with its large hearth is generally left out (fig. 64b). This is due to the fact that the bricks that line the hearth are not available, and the wooden walls are more inflammable than the predominantly mud ones of the plains. Where the hearth is present it is put into a special annex. Instead of the hearth an oven-stove (a combination stove and oven) is used, which permits the main room to be used as living room and sleeping room as well as a kitchen. [354]

The two-room house predominates; due to the absence of the connecting anteroom, each room has a door to the veranda (čerdak) (fig. 66). Sometimes the veranda at the top of the stairway is expanded into a hall-like structure (foişor) (fig. 64a) covered by a hipped roof at right angles to the main roof. In summer most activities take place there.

The foundation is made of rocks or of large pebbles from the river. Walls are made of horizontal logs or boards which cross at the corners, each fitting into a notch in the other. A mud or lime plaster is never omitted, and to facilitate this plastering thin laths are nailed diagonally across the beams.

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

urged the clergy to support the Stockholm Peace Resolution, 793
and endorsed the formation of a "Catholic Committee of Ac- 659
tion" to support the policies of the "People's Republic." The 795
participants were few, and one of the Vicars-general still in office ordered the clergy of the diocese of Iasi to read a declaration denouncing the congress. He was promptly arrested and has died in prison. A second congress convened at Gherghani five months later, after an appeal by Agotha to all "peace-
loving" priests and faithful. Months of open persecution and of [798]
strenuous pro-government campaigning followed. Under the protection of the government, the "Rumanian National Catholic Church" convened at Cluj on March 14, 1951, and took over the administration of all Roman Catholic establishments. Some 225 clerical and lay delegates attended and set up a "Council" of 27 members which declared its readiness to cooperate with the government in every manner desired. Delegates who approved of this capitulation received salaries and other benefits. Those who resisted were hounded down and imprisoned.

Meanwhile, under a decree of August 1, 1949, action was 792
taken against religious orders and communities. Five convents 659
and monasteries were designated as the places in which all monks and nuns doing educational or welfare work should live in accordance with rules laid down by the Minister of Culture. Once there were as many as 1,800 nuns in Rumania. Virtually all have returned to their families or are active as isolated
parish workers. The majority of the monks are in prison. It is 798
safe to say that by the close of 1950 the Roman Catholic Church 659
was a flock dispersed, without shepherds, harried by the secret police and exposed to the constant threat of enslavement in forced-labor camps. Sometimes the actions taken against the surviving faithful have a flavor which is not only bitter but melodramatic and grimly ludicrous. Thus a priest was sentenced to a prison term for referring in a sermon to the destruc-

175
195
[642]

church). The Romanian church has become independendent from this Patriarchy only as a result of a long and complex process which began when the independent Romanian State came into being in 1859 as "the United Romanian Principalities." The first constitution of the kingdom of Romania of 1866 stated (Article 21) that "the Romanian Orthodox Church is independent." But the recognition of its autocephaly by the Patriarchy of Constantinople was declared only in 1885. Nevertheless, the Romanian Church has continued to maintain its unity with the ecumenical church of the East. This relation was, however, confined to the purely religious aspect. The Romanian church considered to be its duty to consult Constantinople Patriarchy on difficult questions of dogmas, canons, and cults whenever it was necessary.

Thus, it may be observed that the independence of the Romanian church was a consequence of the political independence of the Romanian State. The independence of the church signified the achievements of the sovereignty of the Romanian people and the church organization rendered important help and support to the incipient state.

[793]

The Romanian clergy took part in the government administration and in political life. The clergymen could be elected to the parliaments and seats in some important governmental bodies were reserved to it. This was rather a consituation of the established tradition because in the past the representatives of the clergy had always been counsellors of the "domnitor" (the ruler) and members of the "Sfatul Tarii" (country's Assembly).

659 not extend beyond the frontiers of the country and, vice versa, no foreign church may have jurisdictional powers over any denomination in Romania. Moreover, any material support granted and accepted from outside must be communicated to the Romanian Government.

793 The clergymen, the heads of the religious organizations and their officers must be Romanian citizens or they must apply for naturalization. A foreign citizen may be admitted only by special authorization and specifically if otherwise the existence and the functioning of a religious community would be imperilled.

As in the case of the Orthodox Church, the heads of [678] all religious denominations and their clergymen are triable for common and political offenses by the High Court of Cassation and Justice (not by ordinary courts). However, the disciplinary cases in church matters shall be tried by their own Synods.

The organizations of the historical churches (infra) are legal entities.

794 The religious denominations freely administer their assets as well as establish and manage as many charitable and educational institutions as they wish or need. The same is true of schools for preparation of the clergy. These, however, must communicate to the Ministry of Religious Affairs concerning their curricula.

871] Each church has the right to give religious instruction to their youth of the given denominations in either public or private schools, as well as to men on active service.

659
794 Besides their own revenues, the Churches were entitled to ask for contribution from their parishioners to cover the expenses of maintenance. In case of need the State may supply the amounts required for specified needs; in this case it reserved the right to verify that they are lawfully used.

[798] Articles 43 and 44 provided that since the Constitution guaranteed to all citizens the freedom of religion and conscience every individual has the right to belong to any religious denomination he desires, as well as to change his religion after he reaches the age of 18 years.

659 Up to the end of World War II the Law No. 54 was amended several times.

[793] The first amendment was caused by the fact that some sects carried on a propaganda which was considered to affect the public order. Thus by Decree No. 2752 of August 3, 1929 the Government introduced more severe penalties for clergymen who induced their flock to disobey the laws of the country.

798
659 Moreover, the decree allowed for the same reasons to withdraw from a religious association the authorization to function. The same fact induced the Government to make further a distinction among the religious associations which were not enumerated as historical in the Law No. 54 of 1928.

The Order (Decizune) No. 114, 119 of 1933 of the Ministr of Religious Affairs made a distinction between the permitted religious associations and those forbidden on the grounds of

798
659

being dangerous to public order. The list of the latter was later expanded or reduced according to the evolution of the political concept of "public order". During World War II, for instance, several rites of the Russian Orthodox Church were forbidden because they became mere tools for the policy of Soviet propaganda.

The second amendment was made by Decree No. 3286 of October 2, 1940, promulgated by the rightist (Iron Guard) Government. By this act all religious orders and congregations not duly permitted to function at the time of enactment of the Law No. 54 of 1928 were forbidden. The primary purpose of these provisions was to outlaw the Jewish religion because the provisions of the Law No. 54 of 1928 could be interpreted as not providing for its definite status (see supra).

[793] In addition, this act restated the requirement of Romanian citizenship for clergymen of all denominations and fixed a certain period of time within which the clergymen had either to comply with this rule or leave the country.

Finally, all religious associations were obliged to register with the Ministry of Religious Affairs which had the right to refuse the registration of any one of these bodies.

A further amendment by Decree-Law No. 711 of April 21, 1941, forbade the admittance to other denominations of people of Jewish religion.

The Law No. 927 of December 30, 1942, changed the procedure for establishment of religious associations provided for in Article 24 of the Law No. 54 of 1928. The authorization

795
659

within the new frontiers, there were several orthodox churches governed by various hierarchical authorities, in addition to the Romanian Orthodox Church of the Old Kingdom. This was done by Law No. 1402 of May 6, 1925. It provided not only for the organization and procedure but it also stated that, since the [162] Romanian Orthodox Church is the religion of the great majority of the Romanian people (72.6 percent, according to returns of the census of 1930, in 1930), it is considered, in comparison with the other religions of the country, as the dominant religion. In its relations with the other Orthodox churches, it was declared autocephalous, that is, administratively independent.

By this law the role of the Romanian Orthodox Church as a national church has been reiterated. The salaries of the clergy were paid by the State out of budgetary appropriations.

As the Law of 1925 was silent on this point, the dioceses of the Orthodox Church were granted the status of legal entities by a separate law of May 3, 1928.

• 793
659

By the Law No. 1002 of May 4, 1936, Article 21 of the Law of 1925 was amended defining the status of the Orthodox clergy. Since they were paid by the Treasury there was a question as to whether the clergymen were civil employees.

The amendment clearly stated that clergymen enjoy all the rights and benefits of public servants only as far as the pay is concerned. In all other respects (appointment, promotion, discipline, etc) they remained under the rules of church law and the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastic authorities.

●793 They were subject to church law and to disciplinary authority
659 of the Synod. At the same time, the amendment provided that the State shall pay, besides the salaries, all the other administrative expenses of the Orthodox church.

3. The Status of the Roman Catholic Church

795 There are two jurisdictions within the Roman Catholic Church in Romania: the Roman Catholics in the strict sense and the so-called Greek Catholics or Uniates. Both are under the supreme authority of the Holy See and the Uniates are considered a rite within the Roman Catholic Church. It is proper, therefore, to begin the study with the status of the Roman Catholic Church in general.

The Catholic Church appeared for the first time in the Romanian provinces (Moldavia and Wallachia) toward the end of the 14th century and, in fact, it did not have any kind of diocesan organization before the beginning of the 17th century. During this time its organization consisted merely of several Catholic missions. From 1611 until 1919, the Catholic Church was organized into two dioceses: one for Moldavia with a bishop in Iassy and another for Wallachia governed by an archbishop in Bucharest who was also the highest dignitary for Romania.

[162] After 1919, the Catholic population from the provinces incorporated after World War I merged with that of the Old Kingdom and, according to the census of 1930, made up a Catholic minority of 6.8 percent of the total Romanian population. The Catholic Church insisted upon recognition as a National Church and upon

794 659 871 The religious instruction of Catholics in all kind of schools, including government schools, is conducted according to directives issued by the Catholic Bishop. The directives are to be communicated also to the Ministry of Education.

The Bishop has the right to request the dismissal of teachers of Catholic religion in public or private schools, even where such teachers are appointed and paid by the Government, if the Bishop considered the teacher unqualified for this task.

[874] Finally, the Catholic Church has the right to establish all kinds of Divinity Schools for preparing the Catholic clergy. The curriculum of those schools is established by the competent Catholic Church authorities.

●793 659 The Catholic bishops and their assistants, appointed by the Vatican, must be Romanian citizens and are obliged to take an oath of allegiance to the King, the Constitution and the laws of the country. Those who are not citizens are allowed to apply for citizenship within a reasonable period of time.

The appointment of the clergy is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Church authorities. However, an appointment must be communicated, in advance, to the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

Article 23, the last article of the Concordat, states that "The two contracting parties reserve the right to denounce this Concordat after notice has been served six months in advance."

659 An additional Protocol was signed on May 30, 1932 (Official Gazette No. 180 of August 3, 1932 and ratified by Decree-Law No. 659 (Official Gazette No. 52 of March 2, 1940) pertaining to the

175
795 The Greek Catholic fraction was amalgamated into the hierarchy of the Roman Church and became simply a rite within that church. At the very beginning, this church was organized as a single diocese with the rank of a Bishopric but, later on, the number of dioceses was raised to three. Nevertheless, during a period of approximately 90 years from the time of the union, the Uniate bishops were supervised and controlled by Jesuit monks sent from Rome. In 1855, the Greek Catholic Church was raised to the rank of a Mitropoly and the Jesuitic control was withdrawn.

115
659 Until the Concordat of 1929, the status of this church was based mainly on the provisions of the Act of Union of 1698. Both the Constitution of 1923 and the Law No. 54 of 1928 granted it priority above all the other religious minorities. It has been reorganized since the conclusion of the Concordat and was given all rights and privileges of the Catholic Church. The [713] highest dignitaries of the Greek Catholic Church were equally senators ex officio of the Romanian Parliament as were those of the Roman Catholic Church. The clergy has been paid by the State. For preparing its clergy the church was maintained three theological academies. The returns of the census of 1930 [162] showed that 7.9 percent of the population of Romania belonged to the Greek Catholic faith.

659 amendment; namely, by Law 62 of March 2, 1948. Its main provisions were as follows:

[421] All reorganized denominations were ordered to take detailed inventory of their assets and communicate it to the Ministry of Religious Affairs in order to enable the latter to exert an easier control over their material resources. Further, the denominations were obliged to hold religious services every time the Government so ordered.

[793] The heads of the Churches, elected or appointed, shall be recognized only upon taking of an oath of allegiance to the newly established People's Republic. By this oath they promised not only to obey the laws, but also to enforce them, to compel their subordinates to obey them and defend the Republic against "any enemies from within or without."

[421] Finally, the Ministry of Religious Affairs was empowered to control and verify all assets and revenues of all kinds belonging to any church, as well as the use made of them.

It is clear that by this amendment the Government took quite a different attitude towards the church. Its existence is justified in the eyes of the government and protected only insofar as the church organizations enforce the law of the country and defend its political order. This amounts rather to bestowing executive and police powers upon the churches and to force upon them to practice political discriminations instead of religion.

There is a novel provision according to which the Government is entitled to control the use made by the churches of their

order to be organized and to function, the religious denominations must be recognized and granted permission to do so by decree of the Presidium of the Great National Assembly upon proposal of the Cabinet. 659 798

"In well-founded cases, the recognition can be withdrawn in the same way" (Article 13).

Consequently, the existence of a religious denomination, including all its orders, congregations, etc., is left entirely at the discretion of the political authorities.

Only the recognized religious denominations and their local organizations possess the status of legal entities. Such status may be granted to their civil associations and endowments, pursuing religious aims, as well as their orders and congregations if they comply with all requirements provided by the Law for legal entities (Article 28).

The heads of the religious denominations as well as the dignitaries of their churches and the entire personnel must be Romanian-citizens and "enjoy fully the exercise of civil and political rights" (Article 20). No mention is made with regard to the situation or fate of those dignitaries who are not, or not as yet, citizens. 659 793

As to who has the full exercise of the civil rights is clearly defined by the Civil Law. But a different situation exists with regard to the political rights. Although those rights are well defined the statutory provisions, the final and only proof that a person enjoy the political rights is the fact that he has

659
793

been registered in the electoral list in 1946 and that his name was still there subsequently. In other words, only those clergymen and officers of the church are admitted to serve their churches who came successfully through all purges practiced by the Communist Government since 1945. Since the beginning of 1949, the lists are checked annually and are kept by the local People's Soviets which enjoy almost unlimited administrative and political powers. So far these local soviets were not elected but were appointed by the Communist Party's machinery and it stands to reason that nobody is entered on the electoral lists who is not completely trusted by the Party. Other usual reasons to strip a citizen of his political rights are: "undemocratic attitudes", "People's foe", "traitor", etc. Therefore, the political capacity is no longer a status granted to every citizen by the Constitution which could be exceptionally taken away for great and precisely defined offenses against the State after due process in courts, but it may be taken away by the decision of the Communist Party alone. Moreover, Article 33 of the Decree No. 177 provides that a clergyman of a recognized church who shows an "anti-democratic attitude", may be deprived, totally or in part, of the right to draw salary.

The requirement of oath established by the Law No. 62 of 1948 is maintained also in the new law and every minister of religion or officer of any church must take it before the admissio to this office.

Article 25[1] provides that:

659
793
671

"the Ministry of Religious Affairs shall suspend any decision, instruction or directive, as well as any order (of a church authority) having a church administrative, cultural, educational or a charitable character or pertaining to endowments if it is contrary to the status of the denomination, to the act of its establishment, to public security or public order or morals. The pastoral and circular letters shall be communicated in advance to the Ministry of Religious Affairs." (Italics supplied.)

The religious denominations and their endowments, associations, etc., must submit a full report on their financial situation for approval and verification by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The law provides that the salaries of clergymen and the officers of the church shall be paid by the State. But, in contrast to the Law No. 1002 of 1936, Article 34 of the Decree No. 177 suggests that these persons are on the same footing with other government employees in all respects. This article reads:

Article 34

Placing on the payroll of the clergymen and officers of the religious denominations shall be done according to the general rules.

The "general rules" of government employment referred to here (Code of Civil Service of 1946) makes clear that everybody who draws salary from the Government treasury enjoys all rights and has all of the duties of a governmental employee.

Several provisions deal with the disposal of property of parishes where a part of the parishioners decided to choose

659
425

[1. Law No. 62, Article 25, 1948 - Analyst]

000

schools.

Neither the Decrees No. 175,176 and 177 nor any other law or decree mention the religious instruction in any way. 659 871 The officially approved curricula of secondary and higher educational institutions do not provide for religious instruction. Nowhere is mentioned the right of the church to supervise religious instruction in case it would be given in general schools.

The only kind of schools allowed to the church are the special divinity schools for the training of clergymen and auxiliary personnel. These schools are in all aspects, including that of the curriculum, under the supervision of the Ministries of Religious Affairs and of Education. The Ministry of Religious Affairs may, among other things, dismiss at any time the professors appointed by the church whenever it deems that "public order and the security of the State" so requires. 659 871 793

Article 49 of the Decree No. 177 limited the number of Schools of Divinity of university rank in the whole country to: two for the Orthodox Church, one for the Catholic Church and one for all Protestant Churches. But a subsequent order of the Ministry of Religious Affairs reduced further the number of divinity and clerical schools of all denominations and did not mention the establishment of any Roman Catholic Divinity Schools. All of this shows the intention of the government to bar the opportunity for training of the ministers of religion.

It must also be mentioned that no general education may be given at the Divinity Schools. Notwithstanding according

to the curricula approved by the government, an important place is given to three special subjects of "general education", viz., Constitution and law of the Romanian People's Republic, Russian language, and History of Russian Theology. 659 871 793

By the Order No. 42,898 (Official Gazette No. 226 of November 15, 1948) the curricula were approved for the divinity schools of the following denominations: Greek Orthodox, Protestant (including Evangelist, Reformed and Unitarian), Jewish, Baptist, Adventist and Moslems. No mention is made of any curricula for the Roman Catholic Divinity Schools. The same is true of the "Christian Church of Old Rite" but for a different reason (see infra).

3. Status of the Romanian Orthodox Church 659 795

No new general law on the Romanian Orthodox Church was enacted and it continues to be regulated by the provisions of the Law for the Organization and Unification of May 6, 1925, as amended, since 1947 (see infra). Yet, an interesting question seems to remain open; viz., is it still the dominant church in the State, e. g., the National Church or not? As it has been mentioned previously, the Organic Law of 1925 provided that, since the Greek Orthodox Creed is the religion of the majority of the Romanian people, the Romanian Orthodox Church is dominant in the country. The new amendments of the law of 1925 did not directly affect this provision. But this principle has been taken from the old Constitution of 1923 which, in Article 22, paragraph 4, specifically stressed its role as a 659 795 642

and any obligation toward the State including taxes and military service. In any event, those who settled abroad broke away from any administration connection with the Moscow hierarchy but did not join any other established Eastern Orthodox Church. Only a part of those remaining in Russia reunited with the official Russian Orthodox Church in the 1830's. These are the so-called "edinovertsi." 795 563

However, those who settled in the Romanian Eastern provinces and their descendants continued their life in religious communities separately from the Romanian society and from the Russian Church. As they were opposed to any assimilation or unification with the Romanian Orthodox Church, they have been treated as a separate religious denomination. The religious tolerance has been granted by documents several times.

This church succeeded in organizing closed religious communities in parishes, in building churches, establishing monasteries and in some sects even establishing a certain hierarchy. But the movement did not have its own Divinity Schools and many sects were not willing to train the priests in Romanian or Russian schools. [793]

After the enactment of the Law No. 54 of 1928, the dignitaries of the Church of the Old Rite prepared a Constitution and by-laws and submitted it to the Romanian Government for approval in order to become recognized as a denomination. Up until 1942 they repeatedly tried to get this recognition and thus transform a de facto tolerance into the de jure recognition. Because of political reasons and suspicions of disloyalty, this status has never been granted. 795 659

6

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

garian Kingdom, as by the Habsburgs for their purposes; but it has a very distinctive vitality of its own. 659

The Patriarch of the Rumanian Orthodox Church is a person of great importance in the State and was one of the Council of Regency during the present king's minority. He, the Metropolitans, the Bishops of the Orthodox Church and those of the Rumanian Uniate Church were Senators for life: so were the heads of other Churches having over 200,000 members.[1] 659 793

The village priest, *Popa*, plays a leading part in the life of the Orthodox community. There is great veneration of certain saints—especially the Blessed Virgin and the Saint of the parish—and their ikons. Many of the strongest traditions of the country people are those connected with the seasons, and the Church has christianized many of the old pagan customs. The funeral rites, in particular, only part of which are conducted by the priest, are full of strange symbolism. There is a widespread belief in vampires and other evil spirits and the need of exorcizing them. But though religious practice hovers upon the borderline between faith and superstition, the standard of personal morality among the peasantry is on the whole a high one; the family counts for a great deal and the honour of women is closely guarded. 771 [764]

[1] According to the 1938 census, 13,200,000 belonged to the Orthodox Church (Rumanians, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgars and other Slavs); 2,628,813 were Roman Catholics (Latin Rite, mostly Magyars and Germans, 1,200,000; Greek Rite 1,426,313); 1,195,000 belonged to Protestant Churches (including 400,000 German Lutherans); 1,500,000 were Jews and 260,000 Mohammedans. There were 140,000 'others'. 162

6

12: Korinos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

793 The poor clergy are very active in politics and
661 public affairs generally. Their influence, and even more that of the bishops, has not infrequently been
[212] abused to further private interests.[1] The majority of the Rumanians are only semi-literate and depend for their information and guidance on the priests.
871 Education has been the weak point of almost all the Rumanian governments. But those Rumanians whose parents have been able to give them a good education have proved that this highly intelligent and gifted people can achieve success in all fields of science and the arts.

563 **THE HUNGARIANS AND THE SZEKELYS.** The Hungarians and Szekelys, most of whom came under Rumanian rule after the Great War, live chiefly in Transylvania and the western provinces of Greater Rumania. The forefathers of the Szekelys were brought to these territories by the Hungarian kings and charged with the task of defending and securing the Kingdom's frontiers. The Hungarian nobles and Szekelys were two of the 'Three Ruling Nations' of Transylvania.[2] They were supported and encouraged by their kin in Hungary proper, given many privileges in the economic, political and cultural spheres. Thanks to all this they were able

[1] One biatant example of this occurred about ten years ago when a shepherd, who claimed to have 'visions' and prophetic power was built up into a holy figure. The simple peasants flocked to see and hear him, bringing many gifts. The State railways organized special travel facilities and this enriched many officials and members of the clergy.

[2] The three 'united' or 'recognized nations' of Transylvania were the Hungarian nobility, the Szekelys and the Saxons.

295 by imported boots and shoes, whilst socks and stockings bought at the local fairs are beginning to be preferred to the traditional method of bandaging the feet (see Appendix V).

WOOD.

313 THE most characteristic of the other local occupations are concerned with wood. Each peasant is allowed a certain amount of timber annually, the cutting of which is arranged by the Forestry Co-operative Society, but for every tree [531] felled a new one has to be planted. Among the men of the village the making of wooden spoons, jugs and plates, often elaborately carved, is a favourite pursuit, though it is being threatened by cheap imported metal goods, so that in this, as in other ways, a rapid transition from medieval to modern conditions seems likely to occur in the near future.

THE GREEK CATHOLIC PRIEST.

● 793 ALTHOUGH primarily concerned with the spiritual welfare of his flock, the Greek Catholic (Uniate) priest in Corbu, as elsewhere in Roumania, is intimately bound up with the economic life of the community. Following the rule of the Eastern and Uniate Churches for their secular clergy with a cure of souls, the priest is married and depends to a considerable extent upon his land for his maintenance. He is often trusted with public and private business on behalf of the commune and its members. To him the peasants may bring their maize to be ground, their sunflower seeds to be crushed, their timber to be sawn and their cloth to be scoured. The water of the Bistricioara that runs past the priest's house is harnessed to provide power at Corbu for these operations, and from the services he thus renders to the villagers the priest gets part of his income.

IV. THE FUTURE

C790 IT IS CLEAR from the foregoing account that Corbu is a mountain community that is rapidly approaching a crisis in its history. The old economic self-sufficiency is being undermined by the insidious influence of the journeyman, and the cheapness of the new wares that he is introducing will tend to increase the amount of leisure that the peasant already enjoys by releasing labour that he has hitherto expended on

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

made for the Jews, the Orthodox Church dealt with other confessions in an irenic manner. 795

Rumania profited greatly if temporarily from its sponsorship of the Allied cause during World War I. Territories were assigned to it which had traditionally belonged to Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia, presenting the government with a number of problems with which it had not previously been concerned. Transylvania, taken from Hungary, had a population divided almost equally between Roman Catholics and Protestants. The Russian Orthodox Church was predominant in Bessarabia, once deeded to the Czar by the West. The Rumanians dealt with the situation in a manner both intelligent and conciliatory. After the favored status of the Greek Orthodox Church had been defined, laws regulating the Confessions were passed during April, 1928. They carefully safeguarded the rights of the State and specifically forbade clergymen to embark on seas of foreign policy of their own charting, but acknowledged the right of the Churches to give religious instruction in public and private schools, and to conduct charitable enterprises. The government also signed a Concordat with the Holy See in 1927, with which the Vatican had no reason to be dissatisfied. 653 795 648

The Concordat conceded to the Catholic Church in all its branches, regular and secular, a large measure of legal protection. Stipulating that ecclesiastical properties must be used for the benefit of Rumanian citizens, and that the income therefrom was subject to audit by the government, it authorized the Church to create a "Sacred Diocesan Fund" to be administered by the Hierarchy. It also promised to add to the Fund if this proved to be inadequate to meet the expenses of necessity incurred by religious foundations. The Catholic clergy were asked to take an oath of allegiance to the King, to the Constitution, and to the laws of the nation. The government agreed not 659 648 794 793

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

to intervene to secure the appointment of clergymen, but requested that it be informed in each instance. These laws were modified under the rule of the Iron Front, in order to make possible the persecution of the Jews. Christian communions appear, however, not to have been affected.

When a pro-Communist government was formed in Rumania, the situation changed immediately and radically. The laws adopted in 1928 were repealed by a decree of August 4, 1948. As usual in Soviet-inspired constitutions, freedom of conscience, of religion, and of worship was assured. Freedom was conceded to all creeds to organize and conduct their own ecclesiastical endeavors so long as they did nothing to jeopardize "public security and public order." The last proviso was, as always, the Trojan horse by means of which the conquerors would enter the citadel. For what were public security and order? The government reserved the right to determine; and in this case the "government" was and could only be the local soviet under which a poor cleric was to live and move and have his being. As a matter of fact, the system under which the Rumanian Communist Party functioned was simplicity itself. The list of electors registered in 1946 was kept up to date by striking off the names of all who had in some manner or other manifested hostility to the "people." The possessor of a name thus purged might retain the right to worship wherever he pleased, but was of course deprived of any opportunity to draw a salary from the State or to hold a position of public trust.

Indeed, the law went much further. Article 25 provided that

> the Ministry of Religious Affairs shall suspend any decision, instruction, or directive, as well as any order having an ecclesiastical character, whether administrative, cultural, educational, or caritative, or pertaining to endowments, if it is not in keeping with the status of the denomination in the act by which it has been established, or is inimical to public security, public order or morals. Pastoral and circular letters

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

shall be communicated in advance of publication to the Ministry of Religious Affairs. 671 793 659

While thus making apparent that the Church was deprived of all liberty of action in areas of moral judgment concerning actions taken by the public authority, the law further stipulated that the salaries of "clergymen and officers of the religious denominations" would be paid in accordance with the regulations governing the civil service. In this fashion it was determined that all clergymen, on the one hand, had the rights accorded to the civil service but, on the other, assumed corresponding obligations—among them an oath of allegiance to the national Constitution.

Subsequently, on August 12, 1950, a decree dealing with the [687] security of the State imposed the death penalty for the following offenses: treason to the nation; rendering "service to the enemy, or causing prejudice to the power of the state"; and procuring or transmitting state secrets to a foreign or an enemy power. The decree was directed primarily against the dignitaries of the Roman Catholic Church, because they were in communion with Rome. On July 6, 1950, another decree had provided a basis for expelling from Rumania the Papal Nuncio, Archbiship O'Hara, and his two assistants, Monsignor Kirk and Monsignor Del Mesti. Most of the Rumanian members of the Nuncio's staff were sentenced to imprisonment. Therewith an initial climax was reached in two years of fierce attack on the Churches and on the Roman Catholic Church in particular.

At this point a more detailed review of the religious situa- 735 tion in Rumania may help to clarify what has happened. Prior 162 to the outbreak of the Second World War, the 70 per cent of Rumanians adhering to the Orthodox Church were affiliated with the Patriarchate of Constantinople but enjoyed ecclesiastical autonomy. This Church, directed by a Holy Synod pre-

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

means abject or corrupt; but the tradition of ecclesiastical elections to which it subscribed provided the Communists with a golden opportunity of which they took full advantage. 659 795

To make clear the situation in which the clergy of the Orthodox Church have found themselves, a report by an eyewitness who has escaped from Rumania may be cited. On October 30, 1950, the clergy met in conference. A huge portrait of Dimitrov adorned the assembly room. No symbol of religion was anywhere to be seen. The Minister of Culture spoke concerning the relations between Church and State. He attacked the spirit of opposition which, he contended, still flourished in some sections of the clergy. A priest, he said, had reported that obedience to Georgi Dimitrov was out of the question because he might very well command that the cross be removed from the tower of the cathedral in order to make room for the half-moon. Thereupon the assembled clergymen were called upon to give a rousing cheer for Dimitrov. Later, the question rose whether the editor of the principal Church journal should be elected or appointed. Some one objected that if election were abandoned the editor might conceivably prove to be a man wholly without faith. When the matter was put to a vote only twenty clergymen expressed a preference for appointment. Nevertheless the chairman announced that a substantial majority favored this method. One priest arose and said, "It is obvious that dictatorial methods are being employed here." No one else ventured to interpose an objection. 659 793

Having taken the Orthodox Church in tow in this manner, the Communists began to bring pressure on Catholics professing the Greek rite to secede from the Holy See and to embrace Orthodoxy. Short shrift, indeed, was made of sundry legal scruples. The heavy hand of suppression was felt almost immediately. Bishops were arrested and sent to labor camps. A 659 793 798

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

659 decree of December 2, 1948, stated tersely and bluntly: "Sub-
• 793 sequent to the reverting of the Greek Catholic parishes to the
798 Rumanian Orthodox Church, and in conformity with Article 13 of Decree 177/1948, its central organization . . . shall cease to exist." All properties belonging to this Church were transferred either to the State or to the Orthodox Synod. The subsequent martyrdom of the Greek clergy rivaled the witnessing of early Christian days. All the bishops were arrested for deportation, and two, Monsignor Vasile Aftenie and Monsignor Valeriu Frentiu, are known to have died in prison. Courageous members of the lower clergy are reported to have gone into hiding in order to minister secretly to the faithful. According to persons who fled the country, such priests were hunted down as ruthlessly as the clergy of southern France in the days of Danton and Robespierre.

659 Therewith the time had also come to attempt the liquidation
798 of Catholics who worshiped according to the Latin rite. Their Church was the only one which had not expressed complete satisfaction with the state of religious freedom in Rumania on June 24, 1949. The first important and ominous debate between the government and the Catholic Bishops had begun in the summer of 1948, when they stated in answer to an inquiry that it would not be possible for them to repudiate the Primacy of the Holy See. The Minister of Culture replied that he entertained no objection to an understanding with Rome on dogma, although such discussions were necessarily subject to the scrutiny of the Ministries of Culture and Foreign Affairs, but that any other kind of dependence on the Papacy was illegal. When the Hierarchy failed to concur, the government launched against it a press campaign of the greatest vehemence, which made it very evident that the goal set was the absorption into a "National Church" of Catholics who worshiped according to the Latin rite. Such a goal has always been envisaged whenever

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

Communists gained control of a satellite country; but in Rumania it could be attained with relative ease. 659 798

The first blow was struck in July, 1948, when the Concordat with the Holy See was revoked. Other decrees subordinating the Church to the State were passed soon thereafter. The Catholic Bishops manifested heroic valor and steadfastness. When their schools were expropriated, their caritative enterprises forbidden, their press closed down, and their religious orders suppressed, they protested. It did not seem meet and just to them that children should be prevented from coming to church, faithful men and women carted off to labor camps on trumped-up charges, or that loud-speakers should blare from one end of the day to the other accusatory comments which were in essence monstrous blasphemies. Our time has grown accustomed to thinking that only patriotic feeling, only the sense of solidarity with the nation to which we belong, can engender the resolution to make every sacrifice that becomes necessary. Therefore the spectacle of a few elderly men who accept every scourge of tyranny with patience because the Lord Jesus has willed that they do so has for us a quality which transcends fortitude—a quality which is the ultimate secret aura of what men for thousands of years have called freedom of conscience. This freedom, perhaps more than any other, is the counterpart of obedience—*usque ad mortem*, even to the death, as the Catholic liturgy says over and over. [648]

Here is just one quotation, from a letter addressed by the Bishops to the President of the People's Republic: 659 793

> We believe, Your Excellency, that the moment has come when we should no longer keep silence by reason of patriotic considerations, but should rather give expression to our sorrow. The measures which have been taken by the Government are extremely injurious to the welfare of the citizens of the Rumanian People's Republic. Nor should we abstain from making an emphatic protest against what has taken place

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

659 in so far as the Catholic Church in Rumania is concerned. We must
793 rather manifest our profound indignation. Millions of citizens have been deliberately wounded in the innermost core of their human feeling by the very authority to which there has been entrusted, in the presence of the nation and of the whole world, the defense of the interests of the people. Internecine strife is being fostered, the country is in tears over rampant injustice, and a wound gapes which cannot be healed over except by doing away with laws and measures which have struck and are now striking at the Catholic Church in the Rumanian People's Republic.

[687] All the Bishops who signed this and similar fruitless appeals have since been sentenced. The initial blow was struck at all dioceses save those of Alba Iulia and Iasi. In June, 1949, the Bishops of these sees also were arrested on charges of high treason. There remained only Bishop Augustin Pacha, more than eighty years old, who in turn was found guilty and sentenced to forced labor. Some of the prelates are said to have been deported to Russia; and of the whereabouts of nearly all of them nothing definite is known. Thus the Roman Catholic Church was stripped of leadership, the government recognizing only the Vicars-general of two dioceses in Transylvania. These likewise refused to conform with Communist directives. Thereupon a ruthless assault on the lower clergy was inaugurated. On the basis of reports received by the Vatican, it is estimated that at least six hundred priests and religious have been arrested, tried, and sentenced. Thus there was made manifest exemplary and moving fidelity.

793 That some would prove less steadfast was to be anticipated,
659 and in due time the government found a man willing to be the
795 leader of a "National Church"—Andreas Agotha, an unfortunate priest whom the Holy See promptly excommunicated. Under him a congress was convened at Targul-Mures, on April 27, 1950, which created the "National Catholic Church,"

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

urged the clergy to support the Stockholm Peace Resolution, 793
and endorsed the formation of a "Catholic Committee of Ac- 659
tion" to support the policies of the "People's Republic." The 795
participants were few, and one of the Vicars-general still in office ordered the clergy of the diocese of Iasi to read a declaration denouncing the congress. He was promptly arrested and has died in prison. A second congress convened at Gherghani five months later, after an appeal by Agotha to all "peace-loving" priests and faithful. Months of open persecution and of [798]
strenuous pro-government campaigning followed. Under the protection of the government, the "Rumanian National Catholic Church" convened at Cluj on March 14, 1951, and took over the administration of all Roman Catholic establishments. Some 225 clerical and lay delegates attended and set up a "Council" of 27 members which declared its readiness to cooperate with the government in every manner desired. Delegates who approved of this capitulation received salaries and other benefits. Those who resisted were hounded down and imprisoned.

Meanwhile, under a decree of August 1, 1949, action was 792
taken against religious orders and communities. Five convents 659
and monasteries were designated as the places in which all monks and nuns doing educational or welfare work should live in accordance with rules laid down by the Minister of Culture. Once there were as many as 1,800 nuns in Rumania. Virtually all have returned to their families or are active as isolated
parish workers. The majority of the monks are in prison. It is 798
safe to say that by the close of 1950 the Roman Catholic Church 659
was a flock dispersed, without shepherds, harried by the secret police and exposed to the constant threat of enslavement in forced-labor camps. Sometimes the actions taken against the surviving faithful have a flavor which is not only bitter but melodramatic and grimly ludicrous. Thus a priest was sentenced to a prison term for referring in a sermon to the destruc-

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

798 tion of Jerusalem by the Emperor Titus—which was deemed
659 to be a cryptic reference to Marshal Tito. More generally every device of propaganda and repression is used to curtail the influence of religion. Popular religious festivals are forbidden, electric power failures interfere with the work of well frequented parishes, and frequenting the Sacraments makes a man subject to investigation.

659 The chronicle of the Church which worships according to
798
733 the Greek rite is quite as harrowing. On October 1, 1948, the government announced that the 1,500,000 persons loyal to this Church had been summarily turned over to Orthodoxy. This action followed a campaign of vilification and suppression rare even in the annals of Communism. It is described in part in a letter signed jointly by the Greek Catholic Bishops at the time:

> During this campaign [i.e., during the week following September 26, 1948] Iuliu Hossu, Bishop of Cluj, was confined to his residence, so that he could not communicate with the Uniate clergy or in any way protest against the actions to which our Church was subjected. In Cluj all priests and layfolk who ventured to disregard the measures taken against the Bishop, and who came to call on him, were arrested. In like manner all those who witnessed his arrest were taken into custody. Moreover Bishop Suciu of Blajm was arrested by the Security Police just as he was leaving the Church at Copacel, which he had just consecrated. He was taken to an unknown destination and kept in a cave during two days, so that he could be prevented from getting in touch with the clergy and the faithful. . . .
>
> We think that prudence suggests that we do not at this time enumerate all the abuses and acts of violence of which the clergy, the priests and archpriests, have been made the victims in an endeavor to obtain their signatures. They were warned and threatened, as Bishop Suciu also was, to remain silent concerning everything that had happened.

These appeals were naturally of no avail. The government prepared to convene a "Congress" at Cluj which would ratify

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

union with the Orthodox establishment. The meeting was held on October 1, 1948, and the thirty-eight canons, prelates, and priests who had been "elected" to represent the Church did as they were ordered to do. The government press reported that they had approved "unanimously and with great enthusiasm" union with the Orthodox Church and "the definitive severance of ties with Papal Rome." On December 2, 1948, still another decree transferred all the property of the Uniate Church to the Rumanian State without compensation. Much of it was subsequently turned over to the Orthodox Church. All the Bishops have been jailed or have disappeared. It is known that two, Vasile Aftenie and Valeriu Frentiu, have died in prison. The Pastoral Letter signed by the Episcopacy on June 29, 1948 (The Feast of Saints Peter and Paul), is surely one of the most touching and spiritually stirring of the documents which chronicle the persecution of the Church by the Communists. After summarizing the reasons why the Uniates had acknowledged the supremacy of the See of Peter, recalling the sufferings which had been borne by past generations for the sake of unity with Rome, and dealing with the present controversies, the Letter said:

659
798
793

> We must suffer for the Gospels of our Redemption in order to possess the merit of having for our part met the test, just as our fathers did as, looking upon the Rood of the Lord, they heard in their hearts these words: *Dico enim vobis: Omnis quicumque confessus fuerit me coram hominibus, et Filius hominis confitebitur illum coram angelis Dei; Qui autem negaverit me coram hominibus, negabitur coram angelis Dei.**
>
> The ties which bind us to the Pope, the Bishop of Rome, are not of human making but are of Divine origin; and it is our duty to bear

* The passage cited is from the twelfth chapter of the Gospel according to St. Luke and reads in translation: "And I say to you, whosoever shall confess me before men, him shall the Son of man also confess before the angels of God. But he that shall deny me before men, shall be denied before the angels of God."

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania E,D1

C69
788
●793

by reason of them outrage and blows and threats and imprisonment and, it may be, destitution. These things truly mean glorifying the Lord Jesus. They will prove that we desire to insure for ourselves, even in this day of passing suffering, an eternal meed of renown which will be beyond weight or measure.

[697]
466

The men who signed this Letter all have witnessed to the faith they thus professed. And in their company stand devoid of eloquence but not of holiness and fidelity, the many, many thousands, chosen from amidst the humble and the poor, who have suffered persecution and enslavement in Vhalitza or in the region between the Danube and the Black Sea. In order that we may understand their ordeal, let me quote from eyewitness accounts of the camps built to house those who toil at digging a canal in the Dobrouja:

> Approximately 30,000 prisoners are stationed there. The majority of them are intellectuals. They are digging a canal between the Danube and the Black Sea, or are building roads, bridges, and so forth. Practically all the work is done by hand in the same manner and with the same methods as those which were employed for the erection of the Egyptian pyramids. The food is very poor. As a rule, the daily menu consists of corn meal with a soup made of onions or beans. The sanitary conditions are indescribable, and for this reason the death toll is extremely high. Prisoners work more than twelve hours a day. Some of them were sentenced by the courts. Others were not. But this makes no difference, for even those who did receive sentences are not released when their terms are over.

000

The Uniate Churches are not among the great religious bodies of the world. But we might well pause in reverence while passing their temples of worship to commemorate those who in far-off countries have so nobly and sacrificially clung to their faith. Such a tribute would by no means preclude one from bearing in mind that others, too, have felt the crushing weight of Ru-

659 not extend beyond the frontiers of the country and, vice versa, no foreign church may have jurisdictional powers over any denomination in Romania. Moreover, any material support granted and accepted from outside must be communicated to the Romanian Government.

793 The clergymen, the heads of the religious organizations and their officers must be Romanian citizens or they must apply for naturalization. A foreign citizen may be admitted only by special authorization and specifically if otherwise the existence and the functioning of a religious community would be imperilled.

As in the case of the Orthodox Church, the heads of [678] all religious denominations and their clergymen are triable for cannon and political offenses by the High Court of Cassation and Justice (not by ordinary courts). However, the disciplinary cases in church matters shall be tried by their own Synods.

The organizations of the historical churches (<u>infra</u>) are legal entities.

794 The religious denominations freely administer their assets as well as establish and manage as many charitable and educational institutions as they wish or need. The same is true of schools for preparation of the clergy. These, however, must communicate to the Ministry of Religious Affairs concerning their curricula.

871] Each church has the right to give religious instruction to their youth of the given denominations in either public or private schools, as well as to men on active service.

659
794 Besides their own revenues, the Churches were entitled to ask for contribution from their parishioners to cover the expenses of maintenance. In case of need the State may supply the amounts required for specified needs; in this case it reserved the right to verify that they are lawfully used.

[798] Articles 43 and 44 provided that since the Constitution guaranteed to all citizens the freedom of religion and conscience every individual has the right to belong to any religious denomination he desires, as well as to change his religion after he reaches the age of 18 years.

659 Up to the end of World War II the Law No. 54 was amended several times.

[793] The first amendment was caused by the fact that some sects carried on a progaganda which was considered to affect the public order. Thus by Decree No. 2752 of August 3, 1929 the Government introduced more severe penalties for clergymen who induced their flock to disobey the laws of the country.

798 Moreover, the decree allowed for the same reasons to
659 withdraw from a religious association the authorization to function. The same fact induced the Government to make further a distinction among the religious associations which were not enumerated as historical in the Law No. 54 of 1928.

The Order (Decizune) No. 114, 119 of 1933 of the Ministr of Religious Affairs made a distinction between the permitted religious associations and those forbidden on the grounds of

795 the granting of broader rights and a corresponding status.
[659] After long negotiations between the Vatican and the Romanian Government an agreement was reached on May 10, 1927, known as the Concordat, and it was ratified by the Parliament on May 29, 1929.

659 The most important provisions of this Concordat[1] which refer to the relations between the Romanian State and the Catholic Church are the following:

The Catholic Church in Romania is recognized to have the status of a legal entity in conformity with the general laws of the country. This status is granted to all Catholic organizations, including the orders and congregations which are legally established both in accordance with the canon law and the laws of Romania.

● 794 659 The right of property in all assets of any kind is recognized and guaranteed to the Church by the State in conformity with the Constitution and the laws of the country. The property and other assets for religious, educational, charitable and similar purposes for which they were originally established must be used according to their initial destination, and the proceeds must be used exclusively within Romanian territory. The property may be alienated or hypothecated only in accordance with the rules established by the laws of Romania and the canon law.

In conformity with the provisions of the Law on legal entities, the Government maintains the right of supervision over the material resources of the Catholic Church and the use made of them.

1 [ratified by Parliament, May 29, 1929 --Analyst]

794
659

The Catholic Church is authorized to form, in Romania, a "Sacred Diocesan Fund" composed of the bonds belonging to the Church, its congregations and religious organizations. This fund shall be administered by the Diocesan Bishops' Council and it is destined to cover the expenses required by religious and educational activities as well as for salaries to be paid to the Catholic clergy. In case the fund should become insufficient for these expenses, the Romanian Government assumes the obligation of allocating the necessary subsidies from budgetary appropriations.

Besides the "Sacred Fund", there are two other funds to which the status of a legal entity has been granted as well. They are:

a) the General Catholic Fund for religion; and

b) the General Catholic Fund for education.

The administration of properties belonging to schools, educational institutions, etc., is conferred upon the Catholic diocesan authorities.

The Catholic Church has the right to open as many schools or charitable institutions of any kind as is desired. Since they are entitled to issue publicly recognized diplomas, these schools had to be supervised by the Ministry of Education.

000 The religious instruction of Catholics in all kind of

794 The religious instruction of Catholics in all kinds of
659 schools, including government schools, is conducted according
871 to directives issued by the Catholic Bishop. The directives are to be communicated also to the Ministry of Education.

The Bishop has the right to request the dismissal of teachers of Catholic religion in public or private schools, even where such teachers are appointed and paid by the Government, if the Bishop considered the teacher unqualified for this task.

[874] Finally, the Catholic Church has the right to establish all kinds of Divinity Schools for preparing the Catholic clergy. The curriculum of those schools is established by the competent Catholic Church authorities.

793 The Catholic bishops and their assistants, appointed
659 by the Vatican, must be Romanian citizens and are obliged to take an oath of allegiance to the King, the Constitution and the laws of the country. Those who are not citizens are allowed to apply for citizenship within a reasonable period of time.

The appointment of the clergy is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Church authorities. However, an appointment must be communicated, in advance, to the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

Article 23, the last article of the Concordat, states that "The two contracting parties reserve the right to denounce this Concordat after notice has been served six months in advance."

659 An additional Protocol was signed on May 30, 1932 (Official Gazette No. 180 of August 3, 1932 and ratified by Decree-Law No. 659 (Official Gazette No. 52 of March 2, 1940) pertaining to the

642 Article 27 of this fundamental law reads as follows:

798

794

Article 27

Freedom of conscience and freedom of religious worship shall be guaranteed by the State.

Religious creeds shall be free to organize themselves and may freely function provided their ritual and practice are not contrary to the Constitution, public security and morality.

No religious denomination, congregation or community may open or maintain institutions for general education, but may only run special schools for training personnel necessary to the Cult under State control.

The Romanian Orthodox Church is autocephalous and unitary in its organization.

The way of organizing and functioning of the religious creeds will be established by law." (Italics supplied.)

Consequently, three main principles are to be retained:

a) The freedom of religious worship is guaranteed by the State;

b) The organizing and functioning of religious creeds is, with specified exceptions, free;

c) The various creeds are entitled to run special school for training their clergy.

However, these constitutional provisions do not reflect the true situation which will be brought to light only after the analysis of laws later enacted and analyzed in subsequent chapters.

2. The Regime of the Religious Denominations

A. General Survey

659 After World War II. the original law for the regulation of the religious creeds (No. 54 of 1928) suffered only one major

another denominational jurisdiction. Disregarding the ecclesiastical rules of the denomination, the decree provides that the assets of the parish are transferred to the denomination chosen by the parishioners who leave the parish in proportion to their number as compared with those remaining in the parish. In case 75 percent leave a creed, its entire assets, including the church building, are transferred to that adopted by the parishioners. The implication of this rule is discussed infra under 5. 659 425

The religious denominations may maintain with other countries only such relations as are of a religious nature and they must be carried after approval of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and through the medium of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. These provisions were intended to interrupt direct contact between the Roman Catholic Church in Romania and the Holy See, required by the dogma and organization of the Roman Catholic Church. 659 648 794

Any direct communication by Catholic prelates in Romania with the Holy See could be brought, in view of these provisions, under the provisions of the Decree of August 12, 1950, on state security which threatens with the death penalty:

a) "Treason to the country, rendering service to the enemy or causing prejudice to the power of the state;

b) Procurement and the transmission of state secrets to a foreign or enemy power;. . ."

Unfortunately, there were several instances in which expulsion or conviction was imposed upon the prelates and minister

After World War II. Russia became interested in this Russian minority in Romania and its organization and helped it to become recognized by the Romanian Government, although not all of the Lipovan communities were willing by now to take such a step under the Soviet tutelage. The recognition was done by Law No. 728 of 1946 (Official Gazette No. 212 of September 13, 1946). 795 659

The status of legal entity was granted to the hierarchical organizations of the Christians of the Old Rite, including their monasteries.

Yet, the law provides that the Romanian State does not in contrast to the statutory provisions of the Law No. 54 of 1928 grant any kind of subsidies to this denomination, either for maintaining its organization and institutions or for paying its clergy.

It must be borne in mind that under the present setup the government, by taking upon itself the financial support of the churches, makes thereby the churches dependent upon it. Therefore, the abovementioned provision of the Law No. 728 may be considered a privilege of the Lipovan Church and a token of its independence from the government.

Besides a complete hierarchical independence, this church is enabled to establish and direct by itself parish schools for the young believers with teachers appointed by the Parish Assemblies. 714 651

These schools are neither controlled in any way by

the Ministries for Education and for Religious Affairs nor are they obliged in the least to send the curricula for approval (Article 73). 794 659

Consequently, the Christian Church of the Old Rite is not under the control of the Ministry for Religious Affairs with reference to its organization and cult as other denominations are. 795 659

Nor are its assets and financial status checked upon by the government authorities as are the assets of other denominations. Finally, it is permitted to establish and manage denominational schools independent of any kind of supervision exercised by the Department of Education. No other denomination has such a right. [454]

It may be assumed that the Soviets have taken a special interest in this denomination and therefore its status-as any other matter of interest for the Soviets-is not subject to Romanian law.

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

made for the Jews, the Orthodox Church dealt with other confessions in an irenic manner. 795

Rumania profited greatly if temporarily from its sponsorship of the Allied cause during World War I. Territories were assigned to it which had traditionally belonged to Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia, presenting the government with a number of problems with which it had not previously been concerned. Transylvania, taken from Hungary, had a population divided almost equally between Roman Catholics and Protestants. The Russian Orthodox Church was predominant in Bessarabia, once deeded to the Czar by the West. The Rumanians dealt with the situation in a manner both intelligent and conciliatory. After the favored status of the Greek Orthodox Church had been defined, laws regulating the Confessions were passed during April, 1928. They carefully safeguarded the rights of the State and specifically forbade clergymen to embark on seas of foreign policy of their own charting, but acknowledged the right of the Churches to give religious instruction in public and private schools, and to conduct charitable enterprises. The government also signed a Concordat with the Holy See in 1927, with which the Vatican had no reason to be dissatisfied. 659 795 648

The Concordat conceded to the Catholic Church in all its branches, regular and secular, a large measure of legal protection. Stipulating that ecclesiastical properties must be used for the benefit of Rumanian citizens, and that the income therefrom was subject to audit by the government, it authorized the Church to create a "Sacred Diocesan Fund" to be administered by the Hierarchy. It also promised to add to the Fund if this proved to be inadequate to meet the expenses of necessity incurred by religious foundations. The Catholic clergy were asked to take an oath of allegiance to the King, to the Constitution, and to the laws of the nation. The government agreed not 659 648 794 793

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania ED1

659 to intervene to secure the appointment of clergymen, but re-
648 quested that it be informed in each instance. These laws were
•794 modified under the rule of the Iron Front, in order to make
793 possible the persecution of the Jews. Christian communions appear, however, not to have been affected.

659 When a pro-Communist government was formed in Ru-
177 mania, the situation changed immediately and radically. The
671 laws adopted in 1928 were repealed by a decree of August 4, 1948. As usual in Soviet-inspired constitutions, freedom of conscience, of religion, and of worship was assured. Freedom was conceded to all creeds to organize and conduct their own ecclesiastical endeavors so long as they did nothing to jeopardize "public security and public order." The last proviso was, as always, the Trojan horse by means of which the conquerors would enter the citadel. For what were public security and order? The government reserved the right to determine; and in this case the "government" was and could only be the local soviet under which a poor cleric was to live and move and have his being. As a matter of fact, the system under which the Rumanian Communist Party functioned was simplicity itself. The list of electors registered in 1946 was kept up to date by striking off the names of all who had in some manner or other manifested hostility to the "people." The possessor of a name thus purged might retain the right to worship wherever he pleased, but was of course deprived of any opportunity to draw a salary from the State or to hold a position of public trust.

671 Indeed, the law went much further. Article 25 provided that
793
659

> the Ministry of Religious Affairs shall suspend any decision, instruction, or directive, as well as any order having an ecclesiastical character, whether administrative, cultural, educational, or caritative, or pertaining to endowments, if it is not in keeping with the status of the denomination in the act by which it has been established, or is inimical to public security, public order or morals. Pastoral and circular letters

Churches and Religion Romania

1. Digest

I. Prior to 1919

175
795
179]

The available evidence indicate that Christianity had been well established on the territory of the present day Romania in the second century. The region designated as Dacia, a province of the Roman Empire, had, between 106 and the end of the third century, an organized church with an established hierarchy. A bishop of "Gothic Dacia", (the name of this region after the withdrawal of the Roman legions) took part at the first Ecumenical Council at Nicea 325 A.D. Also, a Gothic Dacian bishop is mentioned among those present at the second Ecumenical Council of Constantinople, 381 A. D. We do not possess any particular information concerning the Christianity in this region from the 5th until the 13th century. This was the period of barbarian invasion which destroyed organized social life and forced the great majority of the population to seek refuge in the mountains.

The available informations for the beginning of the 13th century show the church of that region as being a part of the Eastern Orthodox Church. From that time on and until the second half of the 19th century the Romanian Eastern Orthodox Church was under the ecumenical Patriarchy of Constantinople. This applies not only to the canonical and dogmatic matters but also to the investiture (appointment of high dignitaries of the

175
●195
[642]

church). The Romanian church has become independendent from this Patriarchy only as a result of a long and complex process which began when the independent Romanian State came into being in 1859 as "the United Romanian Principalities." The first constitution of the kingdom of Romania of 1866 stated (Article 21) that "the Romanian Orthodox Church is independent." But the recognition of its autocephaly by the Patriarchy of Constantinople was declared only in 1885. Nevertheless, the Romanian Church has continued to maintain its unity with the ecumenical church of the East. This relation was, however, confined to the purely religious aspect. The Romanian church considered to be its duty to consult Constantinople Patriarchy on difficult questions of dogmas, canons, and cults whenever it was necessary.

Thus, it may be observed that the independence of the Romanian church was a consequence of the political independence of the Romanian State. The independence of the church signified the achievements of the sovereignty of the Romanian people and the church organization rendered important help and support to the incipient state.

[793]

The Romanian clergy took part in the government administration and in political life. The clergymen could be elected to the parliaments and seats in some important governmental bodies were reserved to it. This was rather a consituation of the established tradition because in the past the representatives of the clergy had always been counsellors of the "domnitor" (the ruler) and members of the "Sfatul Tarii" (country's Assembly).

000 (the ruler) and members of the "Sfatul Tarii" (country's Assembly).
795 In general, the Romanian Orthodox Church has been since the
642 foundation of the "United Principalities" in 1859 considered
115 the predominant church and had a priority over other churches. This situation continued when the Kingdom of Romania was formed after 1866 (hereafter called Old Kingdom in contrast to Romania after 1919). Nevertheless, the religious practices of other churches were tolerated and undistrubed. The Romanian Orthodox [798] Church did not consider itself universal, was not animated by any spirit of proselytism and was rather passive and tolerant towards other creeds and rites. For this reason and because of the small number of persons professing other religions in the Kingdom of Romania, the situation did not call for any special legislation on freedom of religion prior to World War I.

II. From World War I to the End of World War II

1. General Regime of Churches

651 The necessity for special legislation regulating the status of churches other than the Romanian Orthodox has arisen after World War I.

175 The Romanian Kingdom emerged after World War I with
671 an enlarged territory. The newly incorporated provinces were hitherto governed by different laws. Bulgarian law prevailed in Banat and Maramuresh, the same law with some specific provisions was also in force on Transylvania; Austrian law was

659 The keeping of vital statistics (Civil Status Records) was assigned to civil authorities and was governed by civil law. Thereby this matter became uniformly regulated for the whole of Romania.

●795 659 By the provisions of the Law No. 54 of 1928 and its amendments (see infra) a general regime for the religious denominations was well established. However, from the point of view of a status the denominations were divided into several groups as follows:

1) National Churches: this term was applied to the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church.

2) Roman Catholic Church had its own status defined by the Concordat with the Holy See of 1927 which was also applied to the Uniate Church.

3) Historical but not National Churches: Calvinist, Evangelic-Lutheran, the Unitarian, the Armenian-Gregorian, Jewish and Mohammedan religions.

4) The so-called religous associations which are also called minor denominations. This term was applied to a variety of sects. Since 1933 this group became divided into two categories;

a) those which acquired the status of a legal entity under the law concerning non-profit corporations and were officially recognized and allowed to function;

b) those which were considered as dangerous for the public order and morality and therefore prohibited.

The Law No. 54 of 1928 was applied to the Romanian

795 659 Orthodox Church only insofar as its provisions are not contrary to the Organic Law of this Church enacted in 1925 (infra). The same law reserved the regulation of the status of the Roman Catholic Church, including the Uniate Church, to the Concordat which was already agreed upon in 1927 but which was ratified in 1929.

The Jewish religion did not have a central organization at the time when the Law No. 54 of 1928 was enacted. Thus the law postponed the regulation of its status until such central organization was formed. Such organization was achieved only about 1930. Its primary purpose was to obtain a representation in the Senate (upper Chamber) because the law provided for the right of each national and historical church for such representative.

With these exceptions the Law No. 54 of 1928 was applicable to the status of the churches enumerated above under the category of historical churches. Besides, the law provided for the possibility of recognition of other or new religious denominations provided they comply with the provisions of the Law No. 54 and its tenets and practices are not contrary to the public order, the Constituti n or the laws and morals. These are the other salient provisions of the Law No. 54.

659 In principle the State retains the right of supervision and control over all denominations. Their heads, whether elected or appointed, must be approved by the King and take an oath of allegiance to Him and to the Constitution.

798 for their establishment was to be done by Order of the Cabinet.
659 No motivation was required if the Cabinet decided to repeal a previously issued authorization.

Finally, the fight against sects (suspected of spying for the enemy) reached its climax by the Law No. 431 of July 9, 1943, which forbade the practice of religions other than the "historical denominations", specified by the Law No. 54 of 1928. The Government was empowered to suppress, by order of the Cabinet, the spreading of a specific sectarian cult and to expropriate its assets.

The further fate of all those laws and decrees is discussed infra.

128 A few words seem to be appropriate to explain the organization of material dealing with the status of individual churches. In the present part of the study devoted to the period before World War II, only the status of the Romanian Church, of the Roman Catholic Church and of the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church is discussed.

The problem of the status of other religious groups acquired special significance only after World War II. Therefore, even the historical aspect of these denominations is treated in the third part of the present study dealing with the communist period (see infra III, 5).

●795 2. Organization of the Romanian Orthodox Church
659

After World War I the unification and reorganization of the Romanian Orthodox Church became a stringent necessity because,

795 659 within the new frontiers, there were several orthodox churches governed by various hierarchical authorities, in addition to the Romanian Orthodox Church of the Old Kingdom. This was done by Law No. 1402 of May 6, 1925. It provided not only for the organization and procedure but it also stated that, since the [162] Romanian Orthodox Church is the religion of the great majority of the Romanian people (72.6 percent, according to returns of the census of 1930, in 1930), it is considered, in comparison with the other religions of the country, as the dominant religion. In its relations with the other Orthodox churches, it was declared autocephalous, that is, administratively independent.

By this law the role of the Romanian Orthodox Church as a national church has been reiterated. The salaries of the clergy were paid by the State out of budgetary appropriations.

As the Law of 1925 was silent on this point, the dioceses of the Orthodox Church were granted the status of legal entities by a separate law of May 3, 1928.

793 659 By th Law No. 1002 of May 4, 1936, Article 21 of the Law of 1925 was amended defining the status of the Orthodox clergy. Since they were paid by the Treasury there was a question as to whether the clergymen were civil employees.

The amendment clearly stated that clergymen enjoy all the rights and benefits of public servants only as far as the pay is concerned. In all other respects (appointment, promotion, discipline, etc) they remained under the rules of church law and the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastic authorities.

793 They were subject to church law and to disciplinary authority
659 of the Synod. At the same time, the amendment provided that the State shall pay, besides the salaries, all the other administrative expenses of the Orthodox church.

3. The Status of the Roman Catholic Church

795 There are two jurisdictions within the Roman Catholic Church in Romania: the Roman Catholics in the strict sense and the so-called Greek Catholics or Uniates. Both are under the supreme authority of the Holy See and the Uniates are considered a rite within the Roman Catholic Church. It is proper, therefore, to begin the study with the status of the Roman Catholic Church in general.

The Catholic Church appeared for the first time in the Romanian provinces (Moldavia and Wallachia) toward the end of the 14th century and, in fact, it did not have any kind of diocesan organization before the beginning of the 17th century. During this time its organization consisted merely of several Catholic missions. From 1611 until 1919, the Catholic Church was organized into two dioceses: one for Moldavia with a bishop in Iassy and another for Wallachia governed by an archbishop in Bucharest who was also the highest dignitary for Romania.

[162] After 1919, the Catholic population from the provinces incorporated after World War I merged with that of the Old Kingdom and, according to the census of 1930, made up a Catholic minority of 6.8 percent of the total Romanian population. The Catholic Church insisted upon recognition as a National Church and upon

795 the granting of broader rights and a corresponding status.
[659] After long negotiations between the Vatican and the Romanian Government an agreement was reached on May 10, 1927, known as the Concordat, and it was ratified by the Parliament on May 29, 1929.

659 The most important provisions of this Concordat[1] which refer to the relations between the Romanian State and the Catholic Church are the following:

The Catholic Church in Romania is recognized to have the status of a legal entity in conformity with the general laws of the country. This status is granted to all Catholic organizations, including the orders and congregations which are legally established both in accordance with the canon law and the laws of Romania.

794 659 The right of property in all assets of any kind is recognized and guaranteed to the Church by the State in conformity with the Constitution and the laws of the country. The property and other assets for religious, educational, charitable and similar purposes for which they were originally established must be used according to their initial destination, and the proceeds must be used exclusively within Romanian territory. The property may be alienated or hypothecated only in accordance with the rules established by the laws of Romania and the canon law.

In conformity with the provisions of the Law on legal entities, the Government maintains the right of supervision over the material resources of the Catholic Church and the use made of them.

1 [ratified by Parliament, May 29, 1929 --Analyst]

659 interpretation of Article of the Concordat dealing with the use of property which did not alter or restrict the original provisions.

[208] In any event, the Concordat granted the Catholic Church unlimited possibilities of religious propaganda since it provided that the Romanian Government would not oppose the establishment of new Catholic parishes whenever this would be requested by a mimmum of 400 worshippers or even less.

According to these provisions and those of the Law No.54 of 1928, the Catholic Church has been treated as a national church on equal footing with the Romanian Orthodox Church. The Concordat ruled also on the status of the Armenian, Greek-Ruthenian and Greek Catholic Churches in Romania insofar as they were considered as Catholic rites. Some specific information on the two last named denomination are given in the next chapter.

4. The Greek Catholic Church

795 It must be borne in mind that in addition to the Roman Catholic Church in the strict sense there were three churches in Romania which, though originated as Church of the Eastern Christian Orthodoxy were, in the long run, united with the Roman Catholic Church under the supremacy of the Pope.

These churches generally called Uniates were as follows:

a) Romanian Uniates called in Romania Greek Catholics.

b) Russian or, rather, Ukrainian Uniates, called in Romania Greek Ruthenians, mostly inhabitants of Bukovina and

795 part of Northern Bessarabia.

c) Armenian Uniates called also Roman Catholic of Armenian rite.

Each of these churches came under the supremacy of the Pope at a different time and under slightly different conditions. Only the Romanian Greek Catholics are dealt with in the present chapter (for others see <u>infra</u> III, 5).

175 795 179 The union of the Greek Orthodox Romanians by nationality with the Roman Catholic Church was accomplished by an agreement in 1698 between the Vatican and the Orthodox Bishopric of Alba-Julia, ratified later, by the Pope. In joining the Catholic Church, this fraction of the Greek Orthodox Church, however, reserved, among other things, the right to officiate at the services in the Romanian language, and the right of the clergymen to marry. In exchange, the Uniates admitted four dogmatic points of the Catholics, among which the more important were the acceptance of the Pope's supremacy and the Filioque. This union was a result of a compromise accepted by the Holy See in view of circumstances which prevailed in Hungary in particular in Transylvania and Banat in the 17th century. Several political causes contributed to this union. To mention the principal ones, the Hungarian kings endeavored to convert the Romanian minority to Catholicism and thus to detach it from the influence of Romanian Principalities. The spreading of protestantism among the German minority in Transylvania presented a possibility of swaying the Romanians to the same religion.

175
195 The Greek Catholic fraction was amalgamated into the hierarchy of the Roman Church and became simply a rite within that church. At the very beginning, this church was organized as a single diocese with the rank of a Bishopric but, later on, the number of dioceses was raised to three. Nevertheless, during a period of approximately 90 years from the time of the union, the Uniate bishops were supervised and controlled by Jesuit monks sent from Rome. In 1855, the Greek Catholic Church was raised to the rank of a Mitropoly and the Jesuitic control was withdrawn.

175
659 Until the Concordat of 1929, the status of this church was based mainly on the provisions of the Act of Union of 1698. Both the Constitution of 1923 and the Law No. 54 of 1928 granted it priority above all the other religious minorities. It has been reorganized since the conclusion of the Concordat and was given all rights and privileges of the Catholic Church. The [7.13] highest dignitaries of the Greek Catholic Church were equally senators ex officio of the Romanian Parliament as were those of the Roman Catholic Church. The clergy has been paid by the State. For preparing its clergy the church was maintained three theological academies. The returns of the census of 1930 [162] showed that 7.9 percent of the population of Romania belonged to the Greek Catholic faith.

of the Roman Catholic Church in connection with these provisions. 659
Reference is made to the case of Archbishop O'Hara, Monsignor 648
Guido Del Mosti and Monsignor J. Kirk expelled on July 6, 1950, and other members of nunciature who were convicted on July 4, 1950, the case of Bishop Augustino Pasche, on September 10, 1951, and four other Catholic priests on September 7, 1951.

By Decree No. 178 (Official Gazette No. 178 of August 4, 659
1948) the Minister of Religious Affairs was reorganized to fit the new tasks and was empowered to exert complete control over all religous denominations in the country.

Later on, by Decree No. 37 (Official Gazette No. 30 of February 5 1949) its administration has been simplified in fulfillment of a general order requiring the dismissal of a number of public servants.

After this reduction in personnel, the Ministry of Religious Affairs concentrated only on control and laic matters and dissolved divisions dealing with some spiritual questions, documentation and studies.

The law for general regulation of the creeds has been, 659
later on, implemented by Decree No. 243 (Official Gazette 217 795
of September 18, 1948) by which the number of dioceses for each recognized creed was strictly fixed on the basis of 750,000 worshippers per diocese, as follows:

Greek Orthodox	17 dioceses
Greek Catholic	2 dioceses
Roman Catholic	2 dioceses

Christians of old rite: 1 diocese 659

Protestants: 1 bishop and 1 superintendent. 795

The other religious denominations must each have one central organization.

B. Church Property

The general Decree No. 177 on religious denominations grants the recognized denominations and their parishes the status of a legal entity. The institutions, orders, congregations, associations and establishments organized by the Church may, however, obtain such status only upon a special petition in a procedure established for granting the legal entity in general. It may also be observed that under the Law No. 54 of 1928 the status of legal entities was recognized automatically to a broad group of churches enumerated therein as national or historical denominations. The Decree No. 177 does not grant to any denomination automatic recognition by virtue of the law. Recognition of any denomination is within the discretion of the government which is not limited in its decision. Consequently, a denomination must petition to be recognized and only if the recognition is granted, it acquires the status of a legal entity. 659

The most salient point, however, lies in the expressly state right of the Ministry of Religious Affairs "to verify and control" the inventory of all church property and its budget (Articles 29, 30 of Decree No. 177). 659 425

In addition, it may be borne in mind that some churches,

to the curricula approved by the government, an important place is given to three special subjects of "general education", viz., Constitution and law of the Romanian People's Republic, Russian language, and History of Russian Theology. 659 871 793

By the Order No. 42,898 (Official Gazette No. 226 of November 15, 1948) the curricula were approved for the divinity schools of the following denominations: Greek Orthodox, Protestant (including Evangelist, Reformed and Unitarian), Jewish, Baptist, Adventist and Moslems. No mention is made of any curricula for the Roman Catholic Divinity Schools. The same is true of the "Christian Church of Old Rite" but for a different reason (see infra).

3. Status of the Romanian Orthodox Church 659

No new general law on the Romanian Orthodox Church was enacted and it continues to be regulated by the provisions of the Law for the Organization and Unification of May 6, 1925, as amended, since 1947 (see infra). Yet, an interesting question seems to remain open; viz., is it still the dominant church in the State, e. g., the National Church or not? As it has been mentioned previously, the Organic Law of 1925 provided that, since the Greek Orthodox Creed is the religion of the majority of the Romanian people, the Romanian Orthodox Church is dominant in the country. The new amendments of the law of 1925 did not directly affect this provision. But this principle has been taken from the old Constitution of 1923 which, in Article 22, paragraph 4, specifically stressed its role as a 795 659 795 642

national church. The old Constitution has been repealed and replaced by the Constitution of April 11, 1948 and its Article 27, paragraph 4, provides only that "the Romanian Orthodox Church is autocephallous and unitary in its organization." Article 16 of Decree No. 177 of 1948 has similar provisions. However, no mention is made in the new regulation of religious creeds as it was done in the repealed Law No. 54 of 1928 that the Romanian Orthodox Church shall also be directed by its principles, provided they are not contrary to its organic law. 659 795 642

There are strong reasons to believe that the Romanian Orthodox Church is no longer considered a national church since such status is based on the text of an ordinary law which only implemented a constitutional provision no longer in force. According to the new Constitution and more recent legislation, it appears rather that the Orthodox Church is only one of the recognized denominations and is on an equal footing with the others. This treatment could be the result of the revival of the old Russian Church in Romania (infra) that would not accept a second-rank role in a satellite country. 659 795

The contradiction between the new constitution and the Law of 1925 may be explained by the fact that the present government did not yet come to revise all the laws in order to bring them in harmony with the new Constitution. Only the following amendments of the Law of 1925 were enacted thus far.

The Law No. 167 of May 30, 1947, changed the procedure in filling the vacancies in membership of the Diocesan Councils.

659
795

Such councils are governing bodies of dioceses and consist of clergymen and laymen elected by the Council itself. Under the Law of 1925 several candidates used to be nominated. Under the Law No. 167 only one candidate is nominated, who must have, in advance, a specific motivated approval by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In this way the Government succeeded in staffing these bodies with members who, afterwards, in their turn, elected such church dignitaries who would be obedient to the present political regime. Futhermore, the National Church Council which convenes for the election of Bishops, Archbishops and Mitropolitans has been enlarged to include all the members of the Cabinet, the Under Secretaries, as well as members of the Parliament, elected from the districts of the Diocese for which the vacancy occurred. The result was that the laymen members outnumbered the clergymen and thus the Government could be sure of the outcome of the elections.

Law No. 60 of March 2, 1948 and Presidential Decree No. 133 of February 5, 1949, brought only minor changes in the church organisation.

4. Present Status of the Roman Catholic Church and Other Religious Denominations

A. The Denumciation of the Concordat of 1927

As previously stated, the Roman Catholic Church organizations, as well as its congregations, institutions and assets were administrated and run according to principles laid down in the Concordat of 1927 and its subsequent implementations. The Roman Catholic Church administered in 1939 the following

establishments: 177 churches; 21 chapels; 669 parishes; 2,002 prayer stations; 9 divinity schools; 6 students' homes led by nuns; 5 orphans' asylums; 1 hospital; 32 pious conventions; 26 Franciscan monasteries; 56 nuns' cloisters; 18 high schools; 5 students' homes; and 1 Ursulines Institute (these figures are derived from an article by Professor Olimp Cracium "Cultele religioase" in Encyclopedia Romaniei, vol. 2, Bucharest, 1939). 659 795

The Concordat set up definite limits to the supervision by the Romanian government over the Catholic Church in Romania.

By Decree No. 151 (Official Gazette No. 164 of July 19, 1948) the Romanian Government denounced the Concordat and its additional Protocols and briefly stated that the application of all these agreements ceased on the day of the publication of the decree in the Official Gazette. Yet, Article XXIII of the Concordat provided that its denunciation by either side must be preceded by a notice served six months in advance. During this period, the agreement continued to apply but negotiations concerning a new agreement could be initiated.

Thus, the manner in which the Romanian Government chose to denounce the Concordat obviously disregarding this provision could mean only a more rupture of agreement and relations.

The Decree No. 151 did not mention at all whether the Catholic Church was to be guided by the provisions of the law regulating religious denominations in general, or of any other law and thus left this church without a regulation by law. This refers not only to the Roman Catholic Church but also to its rites, congregations, assets, etc. In fact, the steps 659 795 798

659
795
798

subsequently taken by the Government demonstrated that the Decree meant to deprive them of legal protection. The Roman Catholic Church was practically barred from any educational activities and deprived of its funds (see supra III 2, B and C). The expropriation of schools was followed by the disbanding of the Catholic organizations.

The first step was taken through the Orders of the Cabinet No. 1677 and 1679 (Official Gazette No. 299 of December 25, 1948) by which eleven main associations and endowments and all their branches were suppressed and their assets transferred to the State. The same steps were taken by the Order of the Cabinet No. 1770 (Official Gazette No. 10 of January 13, 1949) against additional eleven Roman Catholic and Reformed non-profit organizations and all their branches. [425]

Order of the Cabinet No. 161 (Official Bulletin No. 48 of February 26, 1949) suppressed also sixteen main religious and professional Catholic associations and all their district branches. Their assets were transferred to the Ministry of Interior.

Finally, the Order of the Cabinet No. 810 (Official Bulletin No. 51 of August 1, 1949) suppressed the existing Roman Catholic Orders and Congregations with all their dependent institution, regardless of the form in which they were organized. Herein were included the eleven congregations and four orders of the Catholic Church in Romania. Only two monasteries for monks and three convents for nuns were excepted where the clerical numbers of the disbanded congregations were allowed to continue their monastic life. Those who were not Romanian citizens were summoned to appear before the local police for arranging the formalities concerning their leaving the country. Those who

refused to join the monasteries and convents, were given the choice either to request internment in public poor houses (that is, the old people) or to be trained for a handicraft and afterwards assigned to work by the Office for Distribution of Labor Forces. Each member was obliged to communicate in writing his decision to the Ministry for Religious Affairs within 20 days. 659 795 798

It should be also mentioned that under the Law of November 3, 1948, providing for the nationalization of private hospitals, sanatoria and similar health institutions, a number of important Catholic hospitals were taken over by the government from the Church.

5. Greek Catholic (Uniate) Churches (Romanian, Ruthenian, Armenian) 175 795

As it was mentioned supra II, 4., there were three Uniate churches in Romania. The origin and status of the so-called Greek Catholics, i.e., Romanian Uniates, was described there. The adherents of this church inhabit Transylvania. The members of Armenian Uniate Church (Roman Catholics of Armenian rite) inhabit also in Transylvania (bishopric in Gherla). The third Uniate church, so-called Greek Ruthenian, embraces only Ukrainian (i.e., Russian) population in Bukovina and Maramuresh. Its origin is dated from the Brest Church Council of 1596 when the prelates of the Orthodox Church then within the confines of Poland accepted the union with the Holy See on conditions similar to those accepted subsequently by the Romanian Church in 1698 (see supra II, 4).

To this Church belonged the Ukrainian population of the northern part of Bukovina and of Galicia--which incorporated in the Soviet Union after World War II--and also the Ukrainian and Belorussian population of those provinces. However, the latter population was officially incorporated into the Russian Church by the decree of Emperor Nicholas I in 1839. 175 795

All three Uniate churches in Romania were until now branches of the Roman Catholic Church and after the Concordat was denounced found themselves in a similar position, i.e., without a regulation by law. The members of all three churches experienced a pressure on the part of the government to induce them to "return", so to speak, to the Orthodox Church and to break with the Holy See. The disbandment of the Uniate parishes or rather their transformation into Orthodox parishes was indirectly stimulated by the Order No. 39,380 of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Official Gazette No. 242 of October 18, 1948). Under the previous decree No. 177 of 1948, if members of a parish select another church they carry with them a part of the assets of the parish proportionate to their number. If 75 percent of the parishioners decide to join another church, the church building is transferred to the newly selected one. The Order No. 39,380 provided that, in counting such members, only the heads of each family are taken into account. Thus the counting was greatly facilitated and expedited. 175 795 659 [425]

No decrees were disclosed dealing especially with the Armenian Uniate Church.

But the Decree No. 358 (Official Gazette No. 281 of December 2, 1948) suggests that the Greek Catholic Church ceased to be a separate ecclesiastic body in Romania and there may be only separate parishes. The Order reads as follows: 659 175 [611]

Article 1

Subsequent to reverting of the local Greek Catholic Parishes to the Romanian Orthodox Church and in conformity with the Article 13 of Decree 177/1948, its central organization and those provided by its Constitution shall cease to exist.

The Order says that the assets of the Greek Catholic Church shall become the property of the Romanian State, without any compensation, and shall be assigned partly or wholly to the Romanian Orthodox Church or to its various constituent parts. [425]

The Government obviously has made use of the provisions of Article 13 of the Law for Religious Denominations of 1948 to withdraw recognition from this church which, after the denunciation of the Concordat, lacked a definite status.

The wording of this article shows, beyond any doubt, that the Greek Catholic Church has been since July 1948 absorbed by the Romanian Orthodox Church by Administrative Order.

The fate of the Ukranian (Ruthenian) Uniate Church was different. The Concordat of 1927 provided for the establishment of this church of a separate diocese within the Roman Catholic Church with the seat to be designated later. It may be mentioned in this connection that the Uniate churches in Galicia and the northern part of Bukovina-now incorporated in the Soviet Uni[illegible] [illegible]e declared united with the Russian Church

659
795

headed by the Moscow Patriarchy in 1947 and 1948. Thereafter, the Ministry for Religious Affairs of Romania issued the Order No. 34,695 (Official Gazette No. 76 of December 2, 1949) which authorized the creation of a "Ukrainian Orthodox Vicariate General" whose task is to organize and have jurisdiction over all Ukrainian Orthodox parishes in Romania. (The original order mentioned a Ruthenian Vicariate, but a note published in the Official Gazette No. 81 of December 16, 1949, substituted for the word "Ruthenian" the word "Ukrainian."

The Ukrainian Vicariate is "an organization independent of any Orthodox diocese and it depends upon the Patriarchy of the Romanian Orthodox Church being directed by the provisions established by the Law on Organization and funtioning of the Romanian Orthodox Church (of 1925). (Article 2) The scheme of organization of the Vicariate is reserved for future regulation by the Vicariate with the approval of the Romanian Patriarchy and the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

It must be borne in mind that there are no Ukrainian (or Ruthenian) Orthodox parishes in the present Romania other than the Uniates. The Orthodox parishes with Ukrainian parishioners were only in Bessarabia and a few in Northern Bukovina; but these provinces are now within the Soviet Union. Thus, the Vicariate will obviously embrace the Uniate parishes. In this way, the Greek Ruthenian Uniate Church in Romania is detached from the Holy See and brought within the Romanian Orthodox Church as the Uniates in Galicia and Northern Bukovina were brought within the Russian Orthodox Church.

795
563

6. The Christians of Old Rite

The name "Christians of Old Rite" is applied to a group of dissenters who originally belonged to the Muscovite Orthodox Church, broke away from it to some extent in the 17th century and, because of persecution, left Russia and settled at various times on the territory of the present day Romania. They are generally called in Russian raskolniki (shismatics) staroobriadtsi (old believers or followers of the old rite), and in Romanian Lipovani (from the name of Bessarabian town Lipova) or muscali. They Russians by nationality of the great Russian Branch and in the new place of settlement up to the present time preserved their language, dress, habits and customs. The schism was the result of the revision of the church books undertaken in the middle of the 17th century by Moscow Patriarch Nicon. The idea of the reform was to eliminate from the liturgical books in circulation in Russia erroneous deviations from the books used in other Eastern Orthodox Churches and correct in the same some local departure from the established ritual. "The Christians of the Old Rite" are the descendants of those Russians who refused to accept these corrections and stubbornly adherred to the practices hitherto customary in the Russian Church. Originally, there were no dogmatic or canonical differences. But with the time those adhering to the old customs became divided into a large number os sects, some of which went very far from the teachings of the Orthodox Church and even Christianity. There are among them sects which completely deny priesthood, sacraments

and any obligation toward the State including taxes and military service. In any event, those who settled abroad broke away from any administration connection with the Moscow hierarchy but did not join any other established Eastern Orthodox Church. Only a part of those remaining in Russia reunited with the official Russian Orthodox Church in the 1830's. These are the so-called "edinovertsi." 795 563

However, those who settled in the Romanian Eastern provinces and their descendants continued their life in religious communities separately from the Romanian society and from the Russian Church. As they were opposed to any assimilation or unification with the Romanian Orthodox Church, they have been treated as a separate religious denomination. The religious tolerance has been granted by documents several times.

This church succeeded in organizing closed religious communities in parishes, in building churches, establishing monasteries and in some sects even establishing a certain hierarchy. But the movement did not have its own Divinity Schools and many sects were not willing to train the priests in Romanian or Russian schools. [795]

After the enactment of the Law No. 54 of 19[illegible] the dignitaries of the Church of the Old Rite prepared a Constitution and by-laws and submitted it to the Romanian Government for approval in order to become recognized as a denomination. But until 1942 they repeatedly tried to get this recognition and thus transform a de facto tolerance into the de jure recognition. Because of political reasons and suspicions of disloyalty, this status has never been granted. 795 659

After World War II. Russia became interested in this Russian minority in Romania and its organization and helped it to become recognized by the Romanian Government, although not all of the Lipovan communities were willing by now to take such a step under the Soviet tutelage. The recognition was done by Law No. 728 of 1946 (Official Gazette No. 212 of September 13, 1946).

795 659

The status of legal entity was granted to the hierarchical organizations of the Christians of the Old Rite, including their monasteries.

Yet, the law provides that the Romanian State does not in contrast to the statutory provisions of the Law No. 54 of 1928 grant any kind of subsidies to this denomination, either for maintaining its organization and institutions or for paying its clergy.

It must be borne in mind that under the present setup the government, by taking upon itself the financial support of the churches, makes thereby the churches dependent upon it. Therefore, the abovementioned provision of the Law No. 728 may be considered a privilege of the Lipovan Church and a token of its independence from the government.

Besides a complete hierarchical independence, this church is enabled to establish and direct by itself parish schools for the young believers with teachers appointed by the Parish Assemblies.

714 vol 1

Those schools are neither controlled in any way by

the Ministries for Education and for Religious Affairs nor are they obliged in the least to send the curricula for approval (Article 73). 794 659

Consequently, the Christian Church of the Old Rite is not under the control of the Ministry for Religious Affairs with reference to its organisation and cult as other denominations are. 795 659

Nor are its assets and financial status checked upon by the government authorities as are the assets of other denominations. Finally, it is permitted to establish and manage denominational schools independent of any kind of supervision exercised by the Department of Education. No other denomination has such a right. [454]

It may be assumed that the Soviets have taken a special interest in this denomination and therefore its status-as any other matter of interest for the Soviets-is not subject to Romanian law.

V.—PEOPLES AND SETTLEMENTS: THE POST-ROMAN PERIOD

101 MOUNTAIN REGIONS are often regarded as the refuges of conquered peoples and the repositories of cultures that once flourished in the plain, but although the highlands of Roumania have, from time to time, absorbed groups of folk for whom the lowlands offered insufficient security, the population of the Carpathian valleys must not be regarded as racial sweepings from the broad human highways of the Steppe. The long period of invasions that followed the withdrawal of the Roman legions from Dacia led to a concentration of Roumanians within the mountain areas of either Transylvania, whence they spread later to reoccupy the plain, or the Balkans, where their descendants, the Vlachs, still maintain their traditional form of life; but, since those early days, their numbers in the former region have been considerably diluted by Saxons and Szeklers who have come in not as refugees but as outposts against Tatar and Turk in what for long remained an eastward frontier zone of western Christianity.

125 OUR KNOWLEDGE of events during the Dark Ages is necessarily scanty, but it is clear that settled life on the open grasslands where, indeed, it was possible at all, was subject to constant interruptions. One of these interruptions, the result of Magyar pressure, is of special significance for the history of Roumania from both a political and a cultural point of view. The Magyar invaders of central Europe in the ninth century penetrated far to the west before meeting with any serious resistance. After their defeats at Merseburg in 933 and at Augsburg in 955, however, they fell back towards the Hungarian Plain, and about A.D. 1000 their Szekler advanced guards began to penetrate the hill country of 175 Transylvania. In spite of their comparatively recent Asiatic 195 origin, the Szeklers introduced certain features of western civilisation into their newly-acquired territory, particularly feudalism, which appears to have been the chief concomitant of the Roman Catholicism that they had adopted while in the plain.

THE spread of Roman Catholicism towards the east brought it into conflict in the eastern Carpathians with the Greek

175 Orthodox Church, which was extending its influence north-
795 westwards. The ensuing struggle continued until the seventeenth century, when a compromise was effected and a new church, the Uniate, arose. Strictly speaking, this was a new branch of Roman Catholicism, for its members recognised the suzerainty of the Pope, although they kept the ritual of the Eastern Church (see Figure 7).

175 THESE contacts with the west were strengthened in the thirteenth century, when groups of Saxon crusaders settled in Transylvania at the invitation of the Magyar kings. They became established first of all near Alba Julia (Karlsburg), in the Mureş valley, and later on in the region of Mediaş (Medgyes) on the Tarnava Mare (Nagy küküllö); in the neighbourhood of Sibiu, which they named Hermannstadt; and near the mines of Rodna in the north. Feeling that the Carpathian frontier to the east and south was still insecure, Andrew II invited the Teutonic Knights to occupy strategic points that were undefended, with the result that Kronstadt (Braşov), commanding the Prahova valley, and Campulung were built. The Teutonic Knights quarrelled with the Magyar king, however, and left this area, which was taken over by the Saxons. The defence of the eastern Carpathians, with their two important passes of Ghimeş (Grymes) and Oituz (Oitoz), was entrusted to the Szeklers (see Figure 4).

BEHIND these frontier posts the Saxons were organised in seven colonies under the authority of a count, and they enjoyed various civil privileges in return for the military duties which they performed. The Szeklers were at first grouped in three colonies of a similar character in the tectonic basin of Treiscaune, but they were dislodged by the Tatars in the thirteenth century and sought refuge in the lowlands of Ciuc and Giurgiu where they are still numerically strong (see Figure 7).

DURING the early Middle Ages, the Roumanians were organised in semi-autonomous local groups, each village being under the charge of a chieftain or "kneas" (*pl.* knesi) who combined the functions of military leader, administrator and judge. Although stock-raising was the main occupation of these villagers, arable farming was also practised, and the meagre stretches of cultivable land were divided up amongst

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 EDI Rumania EDI

162
795

Actual figures

Table V—Population

COUNTY	TOTAL	Greek-Orthodox	Greek-Catholic	Roman-Catholic	Reformed-Calvinist	Protestant-Lutheran	Unitarian	Armenian-Gregorian
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
ROMANIA	**19,057,028**	**13,100,127**	**1,427,091**	**1,324,151**	**718,706**	**598,759**	**69,257**	**18,083**
Oltenia	**1,512,175**	**1,498,005**	**960**	**6,726**	**620**	**1,089**	**18**	**89**
Dolj	481,149	477,274	299	3,318	328	702	6	32
Gorj	306,339	300,610	61	585	35	60	—	—
Mehedinti	283,078	280,809	155	1,330	30	148	1	4
Romanati	271,096	270,124	129	357	72	79	8	5
Valcea	360,713	360,268	297	1,107	160	329	3	12
Muntenia	**4,839,808**	**3,820,478**	**17,379**	**98,238**	**16,287**	**16,996**	**634**	**3,334**
Arges	357,870	353,153	94	155	206	211	4	35
Braila	119,831	105,740	324	3,717	307	300	13	113
Buzau	309,403	300,960	311	748	156	115	41	35
Dambovita	309,676	306,301	372	1,065	191	260	18	4
Ialomita	203,352	201,050	183	377	182	86	7	0
Ilfov	999,362	844,763	15,160	30,007	7,557	12,609	390	2,838
Muscel	149,797	148,777	63	482	105	75	1	2
Olt	183,900	182,675	39	65	148	79	1	3
Prahova	477,790	468,370	2,042	5,050	1,143	2,094	123	123
Rimnicu Sarat	186,096	182,930	68	240	70	39	0	0
Teleorman	347,794	343,840	63	282	94	78	3	—
Vlasca	296,412	294,300	152	582	173	112	2	16
Dobrogea	**815,475**	**599,339**	**940**	**7,739**	**843**	**7,592**	**85**	**4,383**
Caliacra	168,911	117,356	61	331	131	200	21	761
Constanta	253,093	199,180	600	4,320	537	6,210	44	2,774
Durostor	211,433	116,256	93	126	101	82	16	479
Tulcea	184,038	157,829	93	2,762	34	1,084	2	180
Moldova	**3,453,196**	**3,165,693**	**3,433**	**199,983**	**1,682**	**3,919**	**133**	**974**
Baia	201,019	197,862	333	47,139	270	310	14	178
Bacau	157,501	146,294	189	1,497	11	179	—	6
Botosani	218,258	195,071	103	1,460	36	110	1	93
Covurlui	210,086	182,781	363	6,088	462	722	33	311
Dorohoi	211,554	195,267	53	579	13	98	1	4
Falciu	115,093	108,662	24	5,655	3	23	—	1
Iasi	275,796	226,188	239	6,335	110	633	29	98
Neamt	198,221	179,314	292	6,528	52	632	6	10
Putna	196,108	182,767	285	7,152	330	160	3	158
Roman	151,500	110,980	90	32,462	45	111	3	61
Tecuci	150,400	150,595	57	2,493	75	96	7	16
Tutova	144,821	139,715	35	373	78	130	10	5
Vaslui	170,500	153,662	8	272	17	53	1	3
Bessarabia	**2,864,482**	**2,599,048**	**983**	**13,587**	**737**	**74,979**	**38**	**1,396**
Balti	386,721	345,323	86	3,226	14	1,325	3	127
Cahul	196,602	181,135	1	166	—	8,530	—	15
Cetatea Alba	341,170	309,688	15	2,865	600	12,686	1	600
Hotin	392,430	341,012	81	1,382	4	116	—	4
Ismail	228,500	196,290	67	570	30	658	—	32
Lapusna	419,021	361,110	398	2,112	142	2,263	11	550
Orhei	270,292	257,739	131	383	17	90	3	45
Soroca	316,368	288,252	183	1,175	28	228	2	18
Tighina	306,592	274,100	40	1,734	28	9,190	3	30
Bucovina	**683,009**	**613,388**	**19,286**	**98,347**	**836**	**20,688**	**67**	**129**
Campulung	94,816	84,711	781	16,040	10	1,186	1	5
Cernauti	306,194	205,286	11,666	30,687	103	5,219	47	32
Radauti	108,778	111,503	2,098	26,037	410	6,249	1	9
Suceava	100,806	132,730	3,271	15,189	5	1,976	10	1
Dorohoi	121,327	97,124	1,680	10,296	6	6,023	2	103

162
795

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

According to Religion

Actual figures

Armenian-Catholic 10	Lipovan 11	Adventist 12	Baptist 13	Mosaic 14	Moham-medan 15	Others 16	Atheists 17	Not declared 18	COUNTY 1
1,440	57,288	16,192	60,362	756,930	188,486	7,434	6,604	6,686	*ROMANIA*
12	1	695	82	3,828	713	189	88	98	**Oltenia**
—	—	602	38	2,357	133	155	53	38	*Dolj*
—	—	41	—	106	7	1	8	1	*Gorj*
10	1	165	30	456	466	12	12	31	*Mehedinti*
—	—	45	10	197	52	11	14	2	*Romanati*
2	—	42	4	407	54	10	1	26	*Valcea*
74	2,159	5,396	1,157	94,216	3,193	637	1,367	1,141	**Muntenia**
5	—	45	1	671	113	46	15	23	*Arges*
13	1,825	300	107	7,259	462	22	21	88	*Braila*
—	1	230	11	1,697	34	9	1	17	*Buzau*
—	—	463	5	788	95	44	18	28	*Dambovita*
—	304	86	68	342	204	14	78	10	*Ialomita*
52	29	667	620	76,545	1,485	208	998	758	*Ilfov*
—	—	113	43	29	23	34	11	39	*Muscel*
—	—	81	9	195	15	1	2	22	*Olt*
4	—	811	168	4,743	117	130	216	130	*Prahova*
—	—	229	9	1,124	60	24	130	4	*Rimnicu Sarat*
—	—	2,048	104	255	400	77	65	6	*Teleorman*
—	—	332	16	268	165	8	12	26	*Vlasca*
28	17,945	561	1,234	4,931	180,488	197	78	294	**Dobrogea**
4	3	80	10	445	47,067	25	31	94	*Caliacra*
13	2,386	223	852	1,981	33,039	32	27	158	*Constanta*
—	317	249	5	401	95,289	17	12	32	*Durostor*
1	15,239	9	367	1,204	5,093	123	8	10	*Tulcea*
42	2,618	3,977	254	162,268	477	1,332	686	654	**Moldova**
3	—	284	3	14,305	22	9	66	31	*Bacau*
—	1,425	46	—	7,770	8	24	2	48	*Baia*
6	100	368	44	20,092	6	555	103	42	*Botosani*
19	42	166	69	20,617	201	17	80	114	*Covurlui*
—	13	188	81	14,874	12	112	15	48	*Dorohoi*
—	1	96	2	3,627	7	123	8	11	*Falciu*
6	594	211	31	41,120	103	63	48	188	*Iasi*
—	11	183	5	13,214	9	26	18	23	*Neamt*
7	—	81	18	7,084	43	8	30	32	*Putna*
1	146	75	—	7,464	25	136	4	27	*Roman*
—	—	74	—	2,955	9	17	—	11	*Tecuci*
—	2	127	1	4,184	32	58	27	7	*Tutova*
—	276	178	—	4,992	—	184	5	72	*Vaslui*
81	31,344	1,927	18,861	306,958	148	3,836	676	977	**Basarabia**
38	1,963	92	2,205	31,916	7	343	8	47	*Balti*
—	950	90	1,230	4,444	4	101	—	27	*Cahul*
1	167	175	2,970	11,400	7	219	241	69	*Cetatea Alba*
1	3,809	1,233	7,321	36,132	20	718	224	75	*Hotin*
2	17,085	41	1,718	6,433	22	394	121	170	*Ismail*
22	689	101	698	50,603	60	472	62	336	*Lapusna*
7	781	—	395	19,566	8	117	—	61	*Orhei*
8	3,498	101	983	29,310	13	318	4	32	*Soroca*
2	2,432	94	1,341	16,954	7	354	16	140	*Tighina*
234	3,318	918	1,148	93,101	49	427	997	554	**Bucovina**
4	23	110	29	7,748	3	22	123	22	*Campulung*
121	37	564	227	31,681	35	70	241	390	*Cernauti*
3	2,085	68	261	11,578	7	119	329	52	*Radauti*
99	498	42	336	15,397	4	16	57	37	*Storojinet*
7	603	114	292	6,697	—	200	247	53	*Suceava*

162
795

Table V—Population

Continued

COUNTY	TOTAL	Greek-Orthodox	Greek-Catholic	Roman-Catholic	Reformed Calvinist	Protestant, Lutheran	Unitarian	Armenian-Gregorian
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Transylvania	**3,217,986**	**993,176**	**1,661,527**	**413,224**	**497,861**	**244,766**	**67,832**	**91**
Alba	212,749	108,590	67,258	7,225	15,946	7,007	2,580	2
Brasov	168,125	82,040	6,042	10,681	12,765	46,675	2,324	9
Ciuc	145,806	1,879	20,072	118,535	1,947	257	85	15
Cluj	324,991	64,343	142,993	29,716	72,739	2,601	3,495	9
Fagaras	86,039	47,487	22,093	1,642	2,506	11,141	312	2
Hunedoara	332,118	213,233	61,386	30,318	15,086	3,328	1,359	5
Mures	289,546	41,919	93,897	35,037	87,713	11,319	7,651	5
Nasaud	144,131	19,960	86,746	3,371	5,153	22,331	35	—
Odorhei	130,282	4,777	1,443	45,035	48,739	1,002	26,882	—
Salaj	343,347	15,183	180,608	41,757	87,350	1,172	30	2
Sibiu	194,619	101,129	24,746	7,832	4,250	54,092	371	1
Someu	219,355	32,881	139,31[illegible]	9,955	28,008	238	78	19
Tarnava Mare	147,904	54,169	15,369	5,696	9,186	38,005	2,934	13
Tarnava Mica	149,482	24,826	60,906	6,828	24,817	29,264	3,009	10
Trei Scaune	136,122	19,911	3,119	49,139	55,250	1,105	6,277	4
Turda	183,282	60,606	77,532	7,457	26,389	269	8,188	5
Banat	**959,956**	**527,393**	**33,672**	**321,426**	**20,987**	**13,980**	**169**	**33**
Caras	200,929	141,162	10,336	43,211	1,265	917	23	1
Severin	235,586	180,643	9,459	35,731	7,367	1,282	31	4
Timis Torontal	499,443	205,488	13,877	242,494	12,305	11,781	95	28
Crisana and Maramures	**1,390,417**	**511,887**	**350,266**	**212,691**	**177,522**	**15,669**	**309**	**57**
Arad	425,649	246,576	17,766	112,097	23,180	13,546	109	49
Bihor	510,218	253,942	54,438	52,899	107,269	1,531	162	3
Maramures	161,575	8,469	104,132	10,609	2,935	137	37	—
Satu Mare	294,875	12,880	173,910	37,286	44,138	455	41	5

11: Clark . S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

According to Religion

Continued

162
795

Armenian-Catholic 10	Lipovan 11	Adventist 12	Baptist 13	Mosaic 14	Mohammedan 15	Others 16	Atheists 17	Not declared 18	COUNTY 1
965	—	2,933	10,206	81,503	125	708	1,329	1,452	**Transylvania**
2	—	16	830	3 101	12	21	123	36	*Alba*
1	—	141	148	2,778	12	110	36	313	*Brasov*
239	—	94	96	2,525	3	—	5	54	*Cluc*
39	—	475	1,178	17,655	33	41	118	354	*Cluj*
—	—	231	114	445	1	35	11	18	*Fagaras*
1	—	193	1,888	4,829	13	86	77	132	*Hunedoara*
15	—	542	472	10,497	14	101	200	162	*Mures*
2	—	29	30	6,375	5	5	20	69	*Nasaud*
1	—	180	607	1,604	—	16	123	53	*Oderhei*
4	—	46	7,881	13,754	10	141	252	137	*Salaj*
—	—	67	408	1,237	20	35	84	97	*Sibiu*
539	—	111	427	15,619	5	15	68	78	*Scueu*
—	—	213	200	1,104	3	23	32	57	*Turncu Mare*
119	—	398	469	1,705	7	36	58	39	*Turncu Ilica*
—	—	37	245	949	—	6	28	52	*Trei Scaune*
3	—	164	296	2,233	—	34	83	21	*Turda*
—	8	143	6,776	14,945	193	183	453	665	**Banat**
—	—	13	3,046	725	14	83	39	72	*Caras*
—	—	38	2,267	2,329	80	46	152	137	*Severin*
—	8	70	1,437	10,98[illegible]	99	54	242	456	*Timoi Torontal*
4	3	1,457	20,773	97,287	91	725	1,810	651	**Crisana and Maramures**
2	3	436	9,017	10,021	41	215	436	135	*Arad*
1	—	254	11,087	27,807	24	459	233	209	*Bihor*
—	—	710	289	34,089	11	39	170	119	*Maramures*
1	—	32	380	25,370	15	12	162	188	*Satu Mare*

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

162
795

Percentages

Table VI—Population

COUNTY	TOTAL	Greek-Orthodox	Greek-Catholic	Roman-Catholic	Reformed, Calvinist	Protestant, Lutheran	Unitarian	Armenian-Gregorian	Armenian-Catholic	Lipovan	Adventist	Baptist	Mosaic	Mohammedan	Others	Atheists	Not declared
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
ROMANIA	**100.0**	**72.6**	**7.9**	**6.8**	**3.9**	**2.3**	**0.4**	*	*	**0.3**	*	**0.3**	**4.2**	**1.0**	*	*	*
Oltenia	**100.0**	**99.0**	*	**0.4**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	**0.2**	*	*	*	*
Dolj	100.0	98.4	*	0.7	*	0.1	*	*	–	–	*	*	0.8	*	*	*	*
Gorj	100.0	99.6	*	0.2	*	*	–	–	–	–	*	–	*	*	*	*	*
Mehedinti	100.0	99.0	*	0.5	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.2	0.2	*	*	*
Romanati	100.0	99.6	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	–	–	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Valcea	100.0	99.0	0.1	0.4	*	0.1	*	*	*	–	*	*	0.2	*	*	*	*
Muntenia	**100.0**	**94.8**	**0.4**	**1.3**	**0.3**	**0.6**	*	*	*	*	**0.1**	*	**2.3**	*	*	*	*
Arges	100.0	98.1	*	0.5	*	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	0.3	*	*	*	*
Braila	100.0	93.6	0.1	1.2	0.1	0.3	*	*	*	0.2	0.1	*	3.3	0.2	*	*	*
Buzau	100.0	98.8	0.1	0.2	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	*	0.5	*	*	*	*
Dambovita	100.0	98.9	0.1	0.3	*	*	*	*	–	–	0.1	*	0.3	*	*	*	*
Ialomita	100.0	99.3	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	–	0.1	*	*	0.2	*	*	*	*
Ilfov	100.0	84.5	1.3	3.7	0.2	1.2	*	0.3	*	*	*	*	7.7	0.1	*	*	*
Muscel	100.0	99.5	*	0.3	*	*	*	*	–	–	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Olt	100.0	99.5	*	0.2	*	*	–	*	–	–	*	*	0.1	*	*	*	*
Prahova	100.0	96.0	0.5	1.2	0.2	0.6	*	*	*	–	0.2	*	1.0	*	*	*	*
Ramnicu Sarat	100.0	98.9	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	–	–	0.1	*	0.6	*	*	*	*
Teleorman	100.0	99.0	*	*	*	*	*	–	–	–	0.6	*	*	0.1	*	*	*
Vlasca	100.0	99.4	*	0.2	*	*	*	*	–	–	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*
Dobrogea	**100.0**	**72.3**	**0.1**	**0.9**	**0.1**	**0.9**	*	**0.5**	*	**2.2**	*	**0.2**	**0.5**	**22.1**	*	*	*
Caliacra	100.0	70.4	*	0.2	*	0.2	*	0.5	*	*	*	*	0.3	28.3	*	*	*
Constanta	100.0	78.9	0.3	1.8	0.2	0.2	*	1.1	*	0.9	*	0.3	0.8	15.1	*	*	*
Durostor	100.0	54.0	*	*	*	*	*	0.2	–	0.1	*	*	0.2	45.1	*	*	*
Tulcea	100.0	86.8	*	1.5	*	0.5	*	0.1	*	8.3	*	0.2	0.7	2.6	*	*	*
Moldova	**100.0**	**88.2**	*	**4.5**	*	**0.1**	*	*	*	**0.1**	*	*	**6.7**	*	*	*	*
Bacau	100.0	76.8	0.2	18.1	0.1	0.1	*	*	*	–	0.1	*	5.5	*	*	*	*
Baia	100.0	98.9	0.1	1.0	*	0.1	*	*	–	0.9	*	–	4.9	*	*	*	*
Botosani	100.0	89.4	*	0.7	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.2	*	9.2	*	0.5	*	*
Covurlui	100.0	87.0	0.2	1.9	0.2	0.5	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	9.2	*	*	*	*
Dorohoi	100.0	92.4	*	0.3	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	*	7.0	*	*	*	*
Falciu	100.0	91.7	*	4.9	*	*	–	*	–	*	*	*	8.2	*	0.1	*	*
Iasi	100.0	82.0	*	4.3	*	0.2	*	*	*	0.2	*	*	14.9	*	*	*	*
Neamt	100.0	90.6	0.1	2.3	*	0.3	*	*	–	*	*	*	6.7	*	*	*	*
Putna	100.0	94.2	0.2	1.6	0.1	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	3.6	*	*	*	*
Roman	100.0	75.3	*	21.4	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	–	4.9	*	*	*	*
Tecuci	100.0	96.3	*	1.6	*	*	*	*	–	–	*	–	1.9	*	*	–	*
Tutova	100.0	96.5	*	0.5	*	*	*	*	–	*	*	*	2.9	*	*	*	*
Vaslui	100.0	93.7	*	0.2	*	*	*	*	–	0.2	0.1	–	5.6	–	0.1	*	*
Bessarabia	**100.0**	**87.6**	*	**0.5**	*	**3.6**	*	*	*	**1.1**	*	**0.7**	**7.2**	*	**0.1**	*	*
Balti	100.0	89.3	*	0.2	*	0.3	*	*	*	0.5	*	0.6	8.3	*	*	*	*
Cahul	100.0	98.1	*	*	–	4.3	–	*	–	0.4	*	0.6	4.5	*	*	–	*
Cetatea Alba	100.0	79.0	*	0.8	0.1	18.4	*	0.1	*	*	*	0.2	5.3	*	*	*	*
Hotin	100.0	87.0	*	0.3	*	*	–	*	*	1.0	0.2	1.9	8.2	*	0.2	*	*
Ismail	100.0	87.9	*	0.5	*	0.5	–	*	*	7.6	*	0.2	3.9	*	0.2	*	*
Lapusna	100.0	86.1	*	0.5	*	0.4	*	0.1	*	0.3	*	0.2	12.1	*	0.1	*	*
Orhei	100.0	92.3	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	0.3	–	0.1	7.0	*	*	–	*
Soroca	100.0	88.6	*	0.4	*	*	*	*	*	1.1	*	0.2	9.2	*	0.1	*	*
Tighina	100.0	89.4	*	0.6	*	3.0	*	*	*	0.8	*	0.4	5.5	*	0.1	*	*

*: Less than 0.1.

RACIAL STATISTICS OF ROMANIA

According to Religion

Continued

162
795

COUNTY	TOTAL	Greek-Orthodox	Greek-Catholic	Roman-Catholic	Reformed, Calvinist	Protestant, Lutheran	Unitarian	Armenian-Gregorian	Armenian-Catholic	Lipovan	Adventist	Baptist	Mosaic	Mohammedan	Others	Atheists	Not declared
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
Bucovina	**100.0**	**71.9**	**2.3**	**11.5**	*	**2.4**	*	*	*	**0.4**	**0.1**	**0.1**	**10.9**	*	*	**0.1**	*
Campulung	100.0	68.8	0.8	16.9	*	6.8	*	*	*	*	0.1	*	8.8	*	*	0.1	*
Cernauti	100.0	67.0	5.7	10.0	*	1.7	*	*	*	*	0.2	*	16.9	*	*	*	0.1
Radauti	100.0	70.6	1.2	16.8	0.2	2.6	*	*	*	1.5	*	0.2	7.8	*	*	0.2	*
Storojinet	100.0	78.1	1.9	9.1	*	1.9	*	*	*	0.3	*	0.2	9.1	*	*	*	*
Suceava	100.0	80.1	1.4	8.4	*	3.3	*	*	*	0.8	*	0.2	5.3	–	0.2	0.2	*
Transylvania	**100.0**	**27.8**	**31.1**	**12.8**	**15.5**	**7.6**	**2.1**	*	*	–	*	**0.3**	**2.5**	*	*	*	*
Alba	100.0	61.0	31.8	5.4	7.5	3.3	1.8	*	*	–	*	0.4	1.6	*	*	*	*
Brasov	100.0	48.8	8.4	9.9	7.6	27.8	1.4	*	*	–	*	*	1.7	*	*	*	0.2
Ciuc	100.0	1.3	15.8	81.3	1.2	0.8	*	*	0.2	–	*	*	1.7	*	–	*	*
Cluj	100.0	18.3	48.7	8.8	21.7	0.8	1.0	*	*	–	0.1	0.4	8.3	*	*	*	0.1
Fagaras	100.0	88.8	98.7	1.9	2.9	18.9	0.4	*	–	–	0.2	0.1	0.6	*	*	*	*
Hunedoara	100.0	64.8	18.8	9.1	4.5	1.0	0.8	*	*	–	*	0.6	1.6	*	*	*	*
Mures	100.0	14.4	38.4	18.1	30.3	3.9	8.6	*	*	–	0.2	0.2	3.6	*	*	*	*
Namaud	100.0	15.8	60.8	8.3	3.6	16.4	*	–	*	–	*	*	4.4	*	*	*	*
Odorhei	100.0	3.7	1.1	34.6	37.4	0.8	20.8	–	*	–	0.1	0.6	1.1	–	*	*	*
Salaj	100.0	4.4	58.6	18.9	88.4	0.2	*	*	*	–	*	0.8	4.0	*	*	*	*
Sibiu	100.0	68.0	18.7	4.0	8.8	87.8	0.2	*	–	–	*	0.8	0.8	*	*	*	*
Somes	100.0	18.0	68.6	8.8	18.8	0.1	*	*	0.2	–	*	0.8	4.8	*	*	*	*
Tarnava Mare	100.0	36.6	10.4	4.5	6.8	38.8	2.0	*	–	–	0.1	0.1	0.7	*	*	*	*
Tarnava Mica	100.0	16.6	40.7	4.8	16.6	16.8	8.3	*	*	–	0.3	0.3	1.1	*	*	*	*
Trei Scaune	100.0	14.8	8.2	36.1	40.6	0.8	4.8	*	–	–	*	0.2	0.7	–	*	*	*
Turda	100.0	33.1	48.3	4.1	14.4	0.1	4.6	*	*	–	*	0.3	1.8	–	*	*	*
Banat	**100.0**	**36.1**	**3.6**	**34.2**	**2.2**	**1.5**	*	*	–	*	*	**0.7**	**1.5**	*	*	*	*
Caras	100.0	70.3	6.1	21.8	0.6	0.6	*	*	–	–	*	1.6	0.4	*	*	*	*
Severin	100.0	78.4	3.9	14.9	3.1	0.6	*	*	–	–	*	0.2	1.0	*	*	*	*
Timis Torontal	100.0	41.1	8.8	46.8	8.6	2.4	*	*	–	*	*	0.3	8.8	*	*	*	*
Crisana and Maramures	**100.0**	**36.8**	**25.2**	**15.3**	**12.8**	**1.1**	*	*	*	*	**0.1**	**1.8**	**7.0**	*	*	*	*
Arad	100.0	68.8	4.8	90.8	8.4	3.8	*	*	*	*	0.1	9.1	8.4	*	*	0.1	*
Bihor	100.0	49.8	10.7	10.4	81.0	0.8	*	*	*	–	*	8.8	8.4	*	*	*	*
Maramures	100.0	6.8	64.4	9.4	1.8	*	*	–	–	–	0.4	0.8	81.1	*	*	0.1	*
Satu Mare	100.0	4.4	84.0	18.6	16.0	0.8	*	*	*	–	*	0.1	8.8	*	*	*	*

*) *Less than 0.1.*

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

565 ease of behaviour, a keen sense for music and popular art and a dogged belief in its capacity to achieve progress.

The life of the Rumanian peasant is simple and [262] hard. His main nourishment consists of *Mamaliga*, a dish prepared of maize-flour, similar to the Italian *Polenta*. This forms his staple diet; meat and other [272] luxuries are very rare indeed. The national drink is *Tuica* (brewed from plum juice). The Rumanian [291] men are dressed in white trousers and a long white tunic fastened by a belt, a short jacket, and a fur cap or hat. Footwear, if any, consists of simple leather sandals strapped to the legs, called *Opinci*, similar to those of the Greek and Yugoslav peasants. In the comparatively rich regions short boots are worn. Gay embroidery, whose colouring and pattern vary according to districts, adorns all garments, especially the women's shirts and headcloths, and the aprons [342] which they wear fore and aft. In contrast to their gay dress the houses of the Rumanian peasants are usually small, badly built cottages of sun-dried brick and straw, whitewashed and occasionally [346] decorated with woodwork. The churches too are built in a similar fashion except in the mountain districts where stone and wood are used.

795 **RELIGION.** Most Rumanians belong to the Orthodox Church, but many Transylvanian Rumanians are Uniates, that is, Catholics of the Byzantine Rite. They form a link between the Latin and Orthodox 659 Churches. The Rumanian Orthodox Church is strongly national. The Uniate Church was used in the past by the Hungarian rulers of Transylvania as a means of assimilating the Rumanians in the Hun-

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

666

December, 1950. As a matter of course, only one party appeared on the ballot. Some 80,000 persons appointed to local soviets were duly elected.

181 One of the distinguishing characteristics of this "uprising of the proletariat" was the extreme paucity of Communists. Another was the fact that the population had no democratic tradition to fall back upon. The country had lived under a fascist type of dictatorship without sensing that it had been very differently treated than it would no doubt have been under a liberal regime. When the war was over, most of Antonescu's Iron Men simply transformed themselves into a different metal. We may say without hesitation that opportunism and not conviction made Rumania's transition to Sovietism so absurdly simple. Nobody had believed it possible that a man like Dr. Maniu could be clapped into jail, brought before the courts on a trumped-up charge, and sentenced. But the People's Democracy managed even that, and it was small wonder that the average citizen began to think earnestly about his own throat.

• 795 As we ponder the evil fortunes which lay ahead for religious confessions in Rumania, it is helpful to bear in mind that this country, the easternmost colony of the Roman Empire, learned to know Christianity as early as the second century of the present era. Congregations formed there were represented at some of the earliest councils of the Church. Subsequently, after wars and invasions had run their course, the Rumanian ecclesiastical establishment was affiliated with the Eastern, or Byzantine, Patriarchate. As a result Greek Orthodoxy became the confession to which the great majority of the people subscribed after the independence of the nation had been achieved in 1878. The Church thus established occupied a position in the life of the country which was not unlike that of the Orthodox Church in Bulgaria. The clergy participated in the official affairs of the nation. In general, exception having been duly

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

made for the Jews, the Orthodox Church dealt with other confessions in an irenic manner. 795

Rumania profited greatly if temporarily from its sponsorship of the Allied cause during World War I. Territories were assigned to it which had traditionally belonged to Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia, presenting the government with a number of problems with which it had not previously been concerned. Transylvania, taken from Hungary, had a population divided almost equally between Roman Catholics and Protestants. The Russian Orthodox Church was predominant in Bessarabia, once deeded to the Czar by the West. The Rumanians dealt with the situation in a manner both intelligent and conciliatory. After the favored status of the Greek Orthodox Church had been defined, laws regulating the Confessions were passed during April, 1928. They carefully safeguarded the rights of the State and specifically forbade clergymen to embark on seas of foreign policy of their own charting, but acknowledged the right of the Churches to give religious instruction in public and private schools, and to conduct charitable enterprises. The government also signed a Concordat with the Holy See in 1927, with which the Vatican had no reason to be dissatisfied. 659 795 648

The Concordat conceded to the Catholic Church in all its branches, regular and secular, a large measure of legal protection. Stipulating that ecclesiastical properties must be used for the benefit of Rumanian citizens, and that the income therefrom was subject to audit by the government, it authorized the Church to create a "Sacred Diocesan Fund" to be administered by the Hierarchy. It also promised to add to the Fund if this proved to be inadequate to meet the expenses of necessity incurred by religious foundations. The Catholic clergy were asked to take an oath of allegiance to the King, to the Constitution, and to the laws of the nation. The government agreed not 659 648 794 793

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

shall be communicated in advance of publication to the Ministry of Religious Affairs. 671 793 659

While thus making apparent that the Church was deprived of all liberty of action in areas of moral judgment concerning actions taken by the public authority, the law further stipulated that the salaries of "clergymen and officers of the religious denominations" would be paid in accordance with the regulations governing the civil service. In this fashion it was determined that all clergymen, on the one hand, had the rights accorded to the civil service but, on the other, assumed corresponding obligations—among them an oath of allegiance to the national Constitution.

Subsequently, on August 12, 1950, a decree dealing with the [687] security of the State imposed the death penalty for the following offenses: treason to the nation; rendering "service to the enemy, or causing prejudice to the power of the state"; and procuring or transmitting state secrets to a foreign or an enemy power. The decree was directed primarily against the dignitaries of the Roman Catholic Church, because they were in communion with Rome. On July 6, 1950, another decree had provided a basis for expelling from Rumania the Papal Nuncio, Archbiship O'Hara, and his two assistants, Monsignor Kirk and Monsignor Del Mesti. Most of the Rumanian members of the Nuncio's staff were sentenced to imprisonment. Therewith an initial climax was reached in two years of fierce attack on the Churches and on the Roman Catholic Church in particular.

At this point a more detailed review of the religious situa- 735 tion in Rumania may help to clarify what has happened. Prior 162 to the outbreak of the Second World War, the 70 per cent of Rumanians adhering to the Orthodox Church were affiliated with the Patriarchate of Constantinople but enjoyed ecclesiastical autonomy. This Church, directed by a Holy Synod pre-

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

795 162 sided over by a Patriarch, had 7,833 parishes, fifty-seven religious foundations for men, and twenty-six similar foundations for women. The two Churches in union with Rome served some 3,000,000 persons, slightly more than half of whom practiced according to the Greek rite. Catholics following the Latin rite had fifty-seven religious foundations for men, and eighty-one for women. Those of the Greek rite (usually termed, as we have seen, Uniates) had seven foundations for men, and five for women. Such statistics indicate that the Latin branch, in which the clergy are bound by the law of celibacy, manifested far more interest in monasticism, though the number of parishes available to them (638 in number) was much smaller than the number of those which served Catholics professing the Greek rite. It is therefore evident that any attempt to suppress the religious orders would strike at a vital nerve of Catholic life. Protestants were somewhat fewer than 6 per cent of the population, and the Jews were about the same. One may also note that Protestants were almost equally divided between Lutherans and Calvinists, the first being ethnic Germans and the second ethnic Hungarians residing in territories taken from Hungary at the close of the First World War.

653 795 In outward appearances, the position of the Orthodox Church was not greatly affected by the Communist seizure of power. It is true that changes in the pertinent legislation gave the government, and therewith of course the Communist Party, control over all nominations and elections to Church offices. This meant that all those who exercised authority would come to be snugly tucked under the thumb of the Party. The most notable illustration in Rumania is the Patriarch Justinian, who has not hesitated to declare that the Christian Gospel has much in common with the doctrines of Marx and Lenin. It is hardly necessary to inquire how and why a prelate of his character acquired rank and station. The Orthodox Church was by no

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

means abject or corrupt; but the tradition of ecclesiastical elections to which it subscribed provided the Communists with a golden opportunity of which they took full advantage. 659 795

To make clear the situation in which the clergy of the Orthodox Church have found themselves, a report by an eyewitness who has escaped from Rumania may be cited. On October 30, 1950, the clergy met in conference. A huge portrait of Dimitrov adorned the assembly room. No symbol of religion was anywhere to be seen. The Minister of Culture spoke concerning the relations between Church and State. He attacked the spirit of opposition which, he contended, still flourished in some sections of the clergy. A priest, he said, had reported that obedience to Georgi Dimitrov was out of the question because he might very well command that the cross be removed from the tower of the cathedral in order to make room for the half-moon. Thereupon the assembled clergymen were called upon to give a rousing cheer for Dimitrov. Later, the question rose whether the editor of the principal Church journal should be elected or appointed. Some one objected that if election were abandoned the editor might conceivably prove to be a man wholly without faith. When the matter was put to a vote only twenty clergymen expressed a preference for appointment. Nevertheless the chairman announced that a substantial majority favored this method. One priest arose and said, "It is obvious that dictatorial methods are being employed here." No one else ventured to interpose an objection. 659 793

Having taken the Orthodox Church in tow in this manner, the Communists began to bring pressure on Catholics professing the Greek rite to secede from the Holy See and to embrace Orthodoxy. Short shrift, indeed, was made of sundry legal scruples. The heavy hand of suppression was felt almost immediately. Bishops were arrested and sent to labor camps. A 659 793 798

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

659 in so far as the Catholic Church in Rumania is concerned. We must
793 rather manifest our profound indignation. Millions of citizens have been deliberately wounded in the innermost core of their human feeling by the very authority to which there has been entrusted, in the presence of the nation and of the whole world, the defense of the interests of the people. Internecine strife is being fostered, the country is in tears over rampant injustice, and a wound gapes which cannot be healed over except by doing away with laws and measures which have struck and are now striking at the Catholic Church in the Rumanian People's Republic.

[687] All the Bishops who signed this and similar fruitless appeals have since been sentenced. The initial blow was struck at all dioceses save those of Alba Iulia and Iasi. In June, 1949, the Bishops of these sees also were arrested on charges of high treason. There remained only Bishop Augustin Pacha, more than eighty years old, who in turn was found guilty and sentenced to forced labor. Some of the prelates are said to have been deported to Russia; and of the whereabouts of nearly all of them nothing definite is known. Thus the Roman Catholic Church was stripped of leadership, the government recognizing only the Vicars-general of two dioceses in Transylvania. These likewise refused to conform with Communist directives. Thereupon a ruthless assault on the lower clergy was inaugurated. On the basis of reports received by the Vatican, it is estimated that at least six hundred priests and religious have been arrested, tried, and sentenced. Thus there was made manifest exemplary and moving fidelity.

793 That some would prove less steadfast was to be anticipated,
659 and in due time the government found a man willing to be the
● 795 leader of a "National Church"—Andreas Agotha, an unfortunate priest whom the Holy See promptly excommunicated. Under him a congress was convened at Targul-Mures, on April 27, 1950, which created the "National Catholic Church,"

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

urged the clergy to support the Stockholm Peace Resolution, 793
and endorsed the formation of a "Catholic Committee of Ac- 659
tion" to support the policies of the "People's Republic." The 795
participants were few, and one of the Vicars-general still in office ordered the clergy of the diocese of Iasi to read a declaration denouncing the congress. He was promptly arrested and has died in prison. A second congress convened at Gherghani five months later, after an appeal by Agotha to all "peace-loving" priests and faithful. Months of open persecution and of [798] strenuous pro-government campaigning followed. Under the protection of the government, the "Rumanian National Catholic Church" convened at Cluj on March 14, 1951, and took over the administration of all Roman Catholic establishments. Some 225 clerical and lay delegates attended and set up a "Council" of 27 members which declared its readiness to cooperate with the government in every manner desired. Delegates who approved of this capitulation received salaries and other benefits. Those who resisted were hounded down and imprisoned.

Meanwhile, under a decree of August 1, 1949, action was 792
taken against religious orders and communities. Five convents 659
and monasteries were designated as the places in which all monks and nuns doing educational or welfare work should live in accordance with rules laid down by the Minister of Culture. Once there were as many as 1,800 nuns in Rumania. Virtually all have returned to their families or are active as isolated parish workers. The majority of the monks are in prison. It is 798
safe to say that by the close of 1950 the Roman Catholic Church 659
was a flock dispersed, without shepherds, harried by the secret police and exposed to the constant threat of enslavement in forced-labor camps. Sometimes the actions taken against the surviving faithful have a flavor which is not only bitter but melodramatic and grimly ludicrous. Thus a priest was sentenced to a prison term for referring in a sermon to the destruc-

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

641 tional culture" from the Leninist-Stalinist point of view is a culture *national*
563 *only in form* and *socialist in content* and aims at the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat.[10]

In fact, this principle has been legally formulated in Paragraph (j) of Article 17 of the new Rumanian Constitution according to which the state

> "ensures the development of the culture of the Rumanian people and of the culture of the national minorities, *socialist in content, national in form*." (emphasis supplied)

641 Women are given equal rights with men in all spheres of cultural, economic,
[563] or political activities. The institution of marriage and the family is protected by the state, which grants aid to mothers of large families and unmarried mothers (Article 83). Freedom of conscience and religious worship is guaranteed. The school is separated from the church; except for the training of the personnel of the religious denominations, no congregation may open or maintain
[798] institutions of general study (Article 84). The constitutional provisions relating to freedom of conscience are rendered practically meaningless by virtue of Decree No. 177, Establishing General Regulations for Religious Cults, of August 3, 1948, and the Law on the Organization of the Ministry of Cults, of February 5, 1949. According to the Decree, all religious cults must be recognized by the Presidium, which must approve the statute of organization of the respective cult. The Ministry of Cults, the organ through which the Party exercises its control over religious denominations, is empowered to "supervise and control all religious cults and their institutions, and the special religious education for the training of all personnel of religious cults, the property and funds of any nature belonging to cults, as well as to confirm (or deny) the appointment of the entire permanent and temporary staff of religious cults, and to act as intermediary for relations and exchanges of information between cults in the country and abroad" (Article 1 of the Law for the Organization of the Ministry of Cults). The implementation of these provisions has resulted in the unequivocal subserviency of the cults to the regime.[11]

641 The inviolability of the home, the privacy of correspondence (Article 88) and of the citizen is guaranteed. No person may be placed under arrest without the decision of a court or "of the procurator" (Article 87). This assurance of the inviolability of the person is subject to the exclusive privilege of the Party or of its affiliated organizations to nominate candidates in the election of judges and the arresting power of the Prosecutor General, which is independent of the courts. Since there can be no writ of habeas corpus against the Procurator General—always a loyal servant of the Party—it evidently follows that extrajudicial arrest of any individual is within his discretion (see Article 8 of Law No. 6 of June 2, 1952).

Hand-in-hand with the rights enumerated above, the Constitution specifies

---

[10] J. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (1942) 207.

[11] For details see "Persecution of Religion in Rumania" published by the Rumanian National Committee, Washington, D. C., 1949.

000 (the ruler) and members of the "Sfatul Tarii" (country's Assembly).
795 In general, the Romanian Orthodox Church has been since the
642 foundation of the "United Principalities" in 1859 considered
175 the predominant church and had a prioity over other churches.
This situation continued when the Kingdom of Romania was formed
after 1866 (hereafter called Old Kingdom in contrast to Romania
after 1919). Nevertheless, the religious practices of other
churches were tolerated and undistrubed. The Romanian Orthodox
[798] Church did not consider itself universal, was not animated by
any spirit of proselytism and was rather passive and tolerant
towards other creeds and rites. For this reason and because
of the small number of persons professing other religions in
the Kingdom of Romania, the situation did not call for any
special legislation on freedom of religion prior to World War
I.

II. From World War I to the End of World War II

1. General Regime of Churches

651 The necessity for special legislation regulating the
status of churches other than the Romanian Orthodox has arisen
after World War I.

175 The Romanian Kingdom emerged after World War I with
671 an enlarged territory. The newly incorporated provinces were
hitherto governed by different laws. Bulgarian law prevailed
in Banat and Maramurosh, the same law with some specific pro-
visions was also in force on Transylvania; Austrian law was

659 794 Besides their own revenues, the Churches were entitled to ask for contribution from their parishioners to cover the expenses of maintenance. In case of need the State may supply the amounts required for specified needs; in this case it reserved the right to verify that they are lawfully used.

[798] Articles 43 and 44 provided that since the Constitution guaranteed to all citizens the freedom of religion and conscience every individual has the right to belong to any religious denomination he desires, as well as to change his religion after he reaches the age of 18 years.

659 Up to the end of World War II the Law No. 54 was amended several times.

[793] The first amendment was caused by the fact that some sects carried on a propaganda which was considered to affect the public order. Thus by Decree No. 2752 of August 3, 1929 the Government introduced more severe penalties for clergymen who induced their flock to disobey the laws of the country.

798 659 Moreover, the decree allowed for the same reasons to withdraw from a religious association the authorization to function. The same fact induced the Government to make further a distinction among the religious associations which were not enumerated as historical in the Law No. 54 of 1928.

The Order (Decizune) No. 114, 119 of 1933 of the Ministr of Religious Affairs made a distinction between the permitted religious associations and those forbidden on the grounds of

798
659

being dangerous to public order. The list of the latter was later expanded or reduced according to the evolution of the political concept of "public order". During World War II, for instance, several rites of the Russian Orthodox Church were forbidden because they became mere tools for the policy of Soviet propaganda.

The second amendment was made by Decree No. 3286 of October 2, 1940, promulgated by the rightist (Iron Guard) Government. By this act all religious orders and congregations not duly permitted to function at the time of enactment of the Law No. 54 of 1928 were forbidden. The primary purpose of these provisions was to outlaw the Jewish religion because the provisions of the Law No. 54 of 1928 could be interpreted as not providing for its definite status (see supra).

[793] In addition, this act restated the requirement of Romanian citizenship for clergymen of all denominations and fixed a certain period of time within which the clergymen had either to comply with this rule or leave the country.

Finally, all religious associations were obliged to register with the Ministry of Religious Affairs which had the right to refuse the registration of any one of these bodies.

A further amendment by Decree-Law No. 711 of April 21, 1941, forbade the admittance to other denominations of people of Jewish religion.

The Law No. 927 of December 30, 1942, changed the procedure for establishment of religious associations provided for in Article 24 of the Law No. 54 of 1928. The authorization

798 659 for their establishment was to be done by Order of the Cabinet. No motivation was required if the Cabinet decided to repeal a previously issued authorization.

Finally, the fight against sects (suspected of spying for the enemy) reached its climax by the Law No. 431 of July 9, 1943, which forbade the practice of religions other than the "historical denominations", specified by the Law No. 54 of 1928. The Government was empowered to suppress, by order of the Cabinet, the spreading of a specific sectarian cult and to expropriate its assets.

The further fate of all those laws and decrees is discussed infra.

128 A few words seem to be appropriate to explain the organization of material dealing with the status of individual churches. In the present part of the study devoted to the period before World War II, only the status of the Romanian Church, of the Roman Catholic Church and of the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church is discussed.

The problem of the status of other religious groups acquired special significance only after World War II. Therefore, even the historical aspect of these denominations is treated in the third part of the present study dealing with the communist period (see infra III, 5).

795 659 2. Organization of the Romanian Orthodox Church

After World War I the unification and reorganization of the Romanian Orthodox Church became a stringent necessity because,

III. Churches under the Communist Regime

1. Basic Provisions

175
642

Although Romania has been ruled by Soviet Russia since its surrender in August 1944 and is actually governed by a Communist Cabinet appointed by Moscow in March 1945, the beginning of the Communist regime is set as of January 1, 1948, e. g., after the King's abdication and the creation of a People's Republic, since the main revolutionary social reforms have been enacted after that date.

648
798

Romania signed and ratified the Peace Treaty with the Allied Nations (Official Gazette No. 199 of August 30, 1947). According to clear stipulations of the treaty Romania is bound to translate into national legislation its main provisions and apply them strictly. Article 3 of the Peace Treaty reads:

> "Romania shall take all measures necessary to secure to all persons under Romanian jurisdiction, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship..." (Italics supplied.)

The freedom of religious worship was, therefore, considered as a fundamental one and the Romanian Government was supposed to make no discrimination between the different churches of rites of various denominations existent and practiced within its boundaries.

642
798

The first attempt to comply with these provisions was made through the new Romanian Constitution enacted on April 11, 1948.

642 Article 27 of this fundamental law reads as follows:

● 798

794

Article 27

Freedom of conscience and freedom of religious worship shall be guaranteed by the State.

Religious creeds shall be free to organize themselves and may freely function provided their ritual and practice are not contrary to the Constitution, public security and morality.

No religious denomination, congregation or community may open or maintain institutions for general education, but may only run special schools for training personnel necessary to the Cult under State control.

The Romanian Orthodox Church is autocephalous and unitary in its organization.

The way of organizing and functioning of the religious creeds will be established by law." (Italics supplied.)

Consequently, three main principles are to be retained:

a) The freedom of religious worship is guaranteed by the State;

b) The organizing and functioning of religious creeds is, with specified exceptions, free;

c) The various creeds are entitled to run special school for training their clergy.

However, these constitutional provisions do not reflect the true situation which will be brought to light only after the analysis of laws later enacted and analyzed in subsequent chapters.

2. The Regime of the Religious Denominations

A. General Survey

659 After World War II. the original law for the regulation of the religious creeds (No. 54 of 1928) suffered only one major

assets and incomes without drawing a distinction, as the Law No. 54 of 1928 did, between the assets owned by the church and the State subsidies. 659

Yet, soon after these amendments had been made, the law No. 54 of 1928 was repealed in its entirety by the Decree No. 177 of August 4, 1948. This decree establishes a new regime governing the practice of religion in Romania, presumably in accordance with the principles set up in the new Constitution and interpreting them.

The first five articles of the decree proclaim that the State guarantees the freedom of conscience and the freedom of religion and punishes the hatred engendered on account of a religious creed. The religious belief does not impede anyone from his duties and obligations under the law nor is it an obstacle to acquiring and exercising civil and political rights. Yet, no mention is made about the State assuring equal protection under law to all religous creeds. 659 178

In contrast with the Law No. 54 of 1928 no distinction is made any longer between the national, historical or minor denominations. Articles 6 to 9 of the Decree No. 177 provide, in general, that all religious creeds are free to organize and function, provided their practice and ritual are not contrary to the Constitution, the morals and (this is a new criterion) "the public security or public order".

The religious creeds are free to establish and organize endowments, associations, orders and congregations, according to their own rules, teachings, canons and traditions. However, in

order to be organized and to function, the religious denominations must be recognized and granted permission to do so by decree of the Presidium of the Great National Assembly upon proposal of the Cabinet. 659 7980

"In well-founded cases, the recognition can be withdrawn in the same way" (Article 13).

Consequently, the existence of a religious denomination, including all its orders, congregations, etc., is left entirely at the discretion of the political authorities.

Only the recognized religious denominations and their local organizations possess the status of legal entities. Such status may be granted to their civil associations and endowments, pursuing religious aims, as well as their orders and congregations if they comply with all requirements provided by the Law for legal entities (Article 28).

The heads of the religious denominations as well as the dignitaries of their churches and the entire personnel must be Romanian-citizens and "enjoy fully the exercise of civil and political rights" (Article 20). No mention is made with regard to the situation or fate of those dignitaries who are not, or not as yet, citizens. 659 793

As to who has the full exercise of the civil rights is clearly defined by the Civil Law. But a different situation exists with regard to the political rights. Although those rights are well defined the statutory provisions, the final and only proof that a person enjoy the political rights is the fact that he has

currency. 000

In this way, most of the material means of the Catholic Church for support of its religous, educational and charitable program disappeared. 659 425

These successive expropriations have been applied to all religious denominations. However, the Russian Church ("Christians of Old Rite" and the parishes included later on in the Ukrainian Vicariate) was exempted from such measures. If the Romanian Orthodox Church possesses today some material means, these were either granted subsequently by the Government or were transferred by the government from the seized assets of other religious denominations. [798]

C. Church and School

The right to establish and run schools of all kinds granted to all religious denominations by the Law No. 54 of 1928 and in particular to the Roman Catholic Church by the Concordat was abolished. The same is true of the right to administer religious instruction in private and public schools. This is the result of a series of decrees. 659 871

The first step toward this goal was to suppress the denominational schools and those supported in some way by churches. The Government started by suppressing all foreign schools existing in Romania by Order No. 191,653 (Official Gazette No. 176 of August 2, 1948). Many of these schools were, to a certain extent, connected with the religious denominations.

The next step was a reform of the school system

accomplished by Decrees No. 175 and 176 (Official Gazette No. 177 of August 3, 1948). By Article 35 all denominational schools were taken over by the government. It reads as follows: 659 871 [671]

Decree No. 175 of 1948

Art. XXXV. All the denominational and private schools shall become governmental schools.

Decree No. 176 of 1948

Art. 1. For a better organization of the public education, as well as the expansion and democratization of the educational system, all personal and real properties that belonged to the churches, congregations, religious communities, non-profit organizations and trade corporations and, in general, to individuals or legal entities which were destined to serve as support...to denominational schools, are transferred to the government ownership and shall be used for educational needs.

This provision covers school buildings, dwelling for professors, boarding houses and students' homes, etc., as well as funds, estates, and legacies serving educational purposes. No compensation was to be paid for them. A list of over 2,000 denominational and private schools of all kinds, from kindergartens to colleges, which were thus expropriated, was attached to Decree No. 176. The provisions quoted make plain that no denominational school may be opened in the future which conclusion is supported by the fact that a subsequent Decree No. 177 of August 4, 1948 regulating the religious denominations does not mention the right of the church to open general schools. It deals with schools in Chapter VI but provides exclusively for divinity schools.

These decrees affected especially the Roman Catholic Church to which belonged the majority of the denominational schools. [798]

establishments: 177 churches; 21 chapels; 669 parishes; 2,002 prayer stations; 9 divinity schools; 6 students' homes led by nuns; 5 orphans' asylums; 1 hospital; 32 pious conventions; 26 Franciscan monasteries; 56 nuns' cloisters; 18 high schools; 5 students' homes; and 1 Ursulines Institute (these figures are derived from an article by Professor Olimp Cracium "Cultele religioase" in Encyclopedia Romaniei, vol. 2, Bucharest, 1939). 659 795

The Concordat set up definite limits to the supervision by the Romanian government over the Catholic Church in Romania.

By Decree No. 151 (Official Gazette No. 164 of July 19, 1948) the Romanian Government denounced the Concordat and its additional Protocols and briefly stated that the application of all these agreements ceased on the day of the publication of the decree in the Official Gazette. Yet, Article XXIII of the Concordat provided that its denunciation by either side must be preceded by a notice served six months in advance. During this period, the agreement continued to apply but negotiations concerning a new agreement could be initiated.

Thus, the manner in which the Romanian Government chose to denounce the Concordat obviously disregarding this provision could mean only a mere rupture of agreement and relations.

The Decree No. 151 did not mention at all whether the Catholic Church was to be guided by the provisions of the law regulating religious denominations in general, or of any other law and thus left this church without a regulation by law. This refers not only to the Roman Catholic Church but also to its rites, congregations, assets, etc. In fact, the steps 659 795 798

659
795
798

subsequently taken by the Government demonstrated that the Decree meant to deprive them of legal protection. The Roman Catholic Church was practically barred from any educational activities and deprived of its funds (see supra III 2, B and C). The expropriation of schools was followed by the disbanding of the Catholic organizations.

The first step was taken through the Orders of the Cabinet No. 1677 and 1679 (Official Gazette No. 299 of December 25, 1948) by which eleven main associations and endowments and all their branches were suppressed and their assets transferred to the State. The same steps were taken by the Order of the Cabinet No. 1770 (Official Gazette No. 10 of January 13, 1949) against additional eleven Roman Catholic and Reformed non-profit organizations and all their branches. [425]

Order of the Cabinet No. 161 (Official Bulletin No. 48 of February 26, 1949) suppressed also sixteen main religious and professional Catholic associations and all their district branches. Their assets were transferred to the Ministry of Interior.

Finally, the Order of the Cabinet No. 810 (Official Bulletin No. 51 of August 1, 1949) suppressed the existing Roman Catholic Orders and Congregations with all their dependent institution, regardless of the form in which they were organized. Herein were included the eleven congregations and four orders of the Catholic Church in Romania. Only two monasteries for monks and three convents for nuns were excepted where the clerical numbers of the disbanded congregations were allowed to continue their monastic life. Those who were not Romanian citizens were summoned to appear before the local police for arranging the formalities concerning their leaving the country. Those who

659
795
798

refused to join the monasteries and convents, were given the choice either to request internment in public poor houses (that is, the old people) or to be trained for a handicraft and afterwards assigned to work by the Office for Distribution of Labor Forces. Each member was obliged to communicate in writing his decision to the Ministry for Religious Affairs within 20 days.

It should be also mentioned that under the Law of November 3, 1948, providing for the nationalization of private hospitals, sanatoria and similar health institutions, a number of important Catholic hospitals were taken over by the government from the Church.

175
795

5. Greek Catholic (Uniate) Churches (Romanian, Ruthenian, Armenian)

As it was mentioned supra II, 4., there were three Uniate churches in Romania. The origin and status of the so-called Greek Catholics, i.e., Romanian Uniates, was described there. The adherents of this church inhabit Transylvania. The members of Armenian Uniate Church (Roman Catholics of Armenian rite) inhabit also in Transylvania (bishopric in Gherla). The third Uniate church, so-called Greek Ruthenian, embraces only Ukrainian (i.e., Russian) population in Bukovina and Maramuresh. Its origin is dated from the Brest Church Council of 1596 when the prelates of the Orthodox Church then within the confines of Poland accepted the union with the Holy See on conditions similar to those accepted subsequently by the Romanian Church in 1698 (see supra II, 4).

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

means abject or corrupt; but the tradition of ecclesiastical elections to which it subscribed provided the Communists with a golden opportunity of which they took full advantage. 659 795

To make clear the situation in which the clergy of the Orthodox Church have found themselves, a report by an eyewitness who has escaped from Rumania may be cited. On October 30, 1950, the clergy met in conference. A huge portrait of Dimitrov adorned the assembly room. No symbol of religion was anywhere to be seen. The Minister of Culture spoke concerning the relations between Church and State. He attacked the spirit of opposition which, he contended, still flourished in some sections of the clergy. A priest, he said, had reported that obedience to Georgi Dimitrov was out of the question because he might very well command that the cross be removed from the tower of the cathedral in order to make room for the half-moon. Thereupon the assembled clergymen were called upon to give a rousing cheer for Dimitrov. Later, the question rose whether the editor of the principal Church journal should be elected or appointed. Some one objected that if election were abandoned the editor might conceivably prove to be a man wholly without faith. When the matter was put to a vote only twenty clergymen expressed a preference for appointment. Nevertheless the chairman announced that a substantial majority favored this method. One priest arose and said, "It is obvious that dictatorial methods are being employed here." No one else ventured to interpose an objection. 659 793

Having taken the Orthodox Church in tow in this manner, the Communists began to bring pressure on Catholics professing the Greek rite to secede from the Holy See and to embrace Orthodoxy. Short shrift, indeed, was made of sundry legal scruples. The heavy hand of suppression was felt almost immediately. Bishops were arrested and sent to labor camps. A 659 793 798

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe

Rumania ED1

659 decree of December 2, 1948, stated tersely and bluntly: "Sub-
793 sequent to the reverting of the Greek Catholic parishes to the
•798 Rumanian Orthodox Church, and in conformity with Article 13 of Decree 177/1948, its central organization . . . shall cease to exist." All properties belonging to this Church were transferred either to the State or to the Orthodox Synod. The subsequent martyrdom of the Greek clergy rivaled the witnessing of early Christian days. All the bishops were arrested for deportation, and two, Monsignor Vasile Aftenie and Monsignor Valeriu Frentiu, are known to have died in prison. Courageous members of the lower clergy are reported to have gone into hiding in order to minister secretly to the faithful. According to persons who fled the country, such priests were hunted down as ruthlessly as the clergy of southern France in the days of Danton and Robespierre.

659 Therewith the time had also come to attempt the liquidation
798 of Catholics who worshiped according to the Latin rite. Their Church was the only one which had not expressed complete satisfaction with the state of religious freedom in Rumania on June 24, 1949. The first important and ominous debate between the government and the Catholic Bishops had begun in the summer of 1948, when they stated in answer to an inquiry that it would not be possible for them to repudiate the Primacy of the Holy See. The Minister of Culture replied that he entertained no objection to an understanding with Rome on dogma, although such discussions were necessarily subject to the scrutiny of the Ministries of Culture and Foreign Affairs, but that any other kind of dependence on the Papacy was illegal. When the Hierarchy failed to concur, the government launched against it a press campaign of the greatest vehemence, which made it very evident that the goal set was the absorption into a "National Church" of Catholics who worshiped according to the Latin rite. Such a goal has always been envisaged whenever

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

Communists gained control of a satellite country; but in Rumania it could be attained with relative ease. 659 798

The first blow was struck in July, 1948, when the Concordat with the Holy See was revoked. Other decrees subordinating the Church to the State were passed soon thereafter. The Catholic Bishops manifested heroic valor and steadfastness. When their schools were expropriated, their caritative enterprises forbidden, their press closed down, and their religious orders suppressed, they protested. It did not seem meet and just to them that children should be prevented from coming to church, faithful men and women carted off to labor camps on trumped-up charges, or that loud-speakers should blare from one end of the day to the other accusatory comments which were in essence monstrous blasphemies. Our time has grown accustomed to thinking that only patriotic feeling, only the sense of solidarity with the nation to which we belong, can engender the resolution to make every sacrifice that becomes necessary. Therefore the spectacle of a few elderly men who accept every scourge of tyranny with patience because the Lord Jesus has willed that they do so has for us a quality which transcends fortitude—a quality which is the ultimate secret aura of what men for thousands of years have called freedom of conscience. This freedom, perhaps more than any other, is the counterpart of obedience—*usque ad mortem*, even to the death, as the Catholic liturgy says over and over. [648]

Here is just one quotation, from a letter addressed by the Bishops to the President of the People's Republic: 659 793

> We believe, Your Excellency, that the moment has come when we should no longer keep silence by reason of patriotic considerations, but should rather give expression to our sorrow. The measures which have been taken by the Government are extremely injurious to the welfare of the citizens of the Rumanian People's Republic. Nor should we abstain from making an emphatic protest against what has taken place

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

urged the clergy to support the Stockholm Peace Resolution, 793
and endorsed the formation of a "Catholic Committee of Ac- 659
tion" to support the policies of the "People's Republic." The 795
participants were few, and one of the Vicars-general still in office ordered the clergy of the diocese of Iasi to read a declaration denouncing the congress. He was promptly arrested and has died in prison. A second congress convened at Gherghani five months later, after an appeal by Agotha to all "peace-loving" priests and faithful. Months of open persecution and of [798] strenuous pro-government campaigning followed. Under the protection of the government, the "Rumanian National Catholic Church" convened at Cluj on March 14, 1951, and took over the administration of all Roman Catholic establishments. Some 225 clerical and lay delegates attended and set up a "Council" of 27 members which declared its readiness to cooperate with the government in every manner desired. Delegates who approved of this capitulation received salaries and other benefits. Those who resisted were hounded down and imprisoned.

Meanwhile, under a decree of August 1, 1949, action was 792
taken against religious orders and communities. Five convents 659
and monasteries were designated as the places in which all monks and nuns doing educational or welfare work should live in accordance with rules laid down by the Minister of Culture. Once there were as many as 1,800 nuns in Rumania. Virtually all have returned to their families or are active as isolated parish workers. The majority of the monks are in prison. It is 798
safe to say that by the close of 1950 the Roman Catholic Church 659
was a flock dispersed, without shepherds, harried by the secret police and exposed to the constant threat of enslavement in forced-labor camps. Sometimes the actions taken against the surviving faithful have a flavor which is not only bitter but melodramatic and grimly ludicrous. Thus a priest was sentenced to a prison term for referring in a sermon to the destruc-

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

798 tion of Jerusalem by the Emperor Titus—which was deemed
659 to be a cryptic reference to Marshal Tito. More generally every device of propaganda and repression is used to curtail the influence of religion. Popular religious festivals are forbidden, electric power failures interfere with the work of well frequented parishes, and frequenting the Sacraments makes a man subject to investigation.

659 The chronicle of the Church which worships according to
738 the Greek rite is quite as harrowing. On October 1, 1948, the
733 government announced that the 1,500,000 persons loyal to this Church had been summarily turned over to Orthodoxy. This action followed a campaign of vilification and suppression rare even in the annals of Communism. It is described in part in a letter signed jointly by the Greek Catholic Bishops at the time:

> During this campaign [i.e., during the week following September 26, 1948] Iuliu Hossu, Bishop of Cluj, was confined to his residence, so that he could not communicate with the Uniate clergy or in any way protest against the actions to which our Church was subjected. In Cluj all priests and layfolk who ventured to disregard the measures taken against the Bishop, and who came to call on him, were arrested. In like manner all those who witnessed his arrest were taken into custody. Moreover Bishop Suciu of Blajm was arrested by the Security Police just as he was leaving the Church at Copacel, which he had just consecrated. He was taken to an unknown destination and kept in a cave during two days, so that he could be prevented from getting in touch with the clergy and the faithful. . . .
>
> We think that prudence suggests that we do not at this time enumerate all the abuses and acts of violence of which the clergy, the priests and archpriests, have been made the victims in an endeavor to obtain their signatures. They were warned and threatened, as Bishop Suciu also was, to remain silent concerning everything that had happened.

These appeals were naturally of no avail. The government prepared to convene a "Congress" at Cluj which would ratify

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

union with the Orthodox establishment. The meeting was held on October 1, 1948, and the thirty-eight canons, prelates, and priests who had been "elected" to represent the Church did as they were ordered to do. The government press reported that they had approved "unanimously and with great enthusiasm" union with the Orthodox Church and "the definitive severance of ties with Papal Rome." On December 2, 1948, still another decree transferred all the property of the Uniate Church to the Rumanian State without compensation. Much of it was subsequently turned over to the Orthodox Church. All the Bishops have been jailed or have disappeared. It is known that two, Vasile Aftenie and Valeriu Frentiu, have died in prison. The Pastoral Letter signed by the Episcopacy on June 29, 1948 (The Feast of Saints Peter and Paul), is surely one of the most touching and spiritually stirring of the documents which chronicle the persecution of the Church by the Communists. After summarizing the reasons why the Uniates had acknowledged the supremacy of the See of Peter, recalling the sufferings which had been borne by past generations for the sake of unity with Rome, and dealing with the present controversies, the Letter said:

659 798 793

> We must suffer for the Gospels of our Redemption in order to possess the merit of having for our part met the test, just as our fathers did as, looking upon the Rood of the Lord, they heard in their hearts these words: *Dico enim vobis: Omnis quicumque confessus fuerit me coram hominibus, et Filius hominis confitebitur illum coram angelis Dei; Qui autem negaverit me coram hominibus, negabitur coram angelis Dei.**
>
> The ties which bind us to the Pope, the Bishop of Rome, are not of human making but are of Divine origin; and it is our duty to bear

* The passage cited is from the twelfth chapter of the Gospel according to St. Luke and reads in translation: "And I say to you, whosoever shall confess me before men, him shall the Son of man also confess before the angels of God. But he that shall deny me before men, shall be denied before the angels of God."

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania EDI

659 by reason of them outrage and blows and threats and imprisonment
● 798 and, it may be, destitution. These things truly mean glorifying the Lord
793 Jesus. They will prove that we desire to insure for ourselves, even in this day of passing suffering, an eternal meed of renown which will be beyond weight or measure.

[697] The men who signed this Letter all have witnessed to the faith they thus professed. And in their company stand devoid
466 of eloquence but not of holiness and fidelity, the many, many thousands, chosen from amidst the humble and the poor, who have suffered persecution and enslavement in Vhalitza or in the region between the Danube and the Black Sea. In order that we may understand their ordeal, let me quote from eyewitness accounts of the camps built to house those who toil at digging a canal in the Dobrouja:

> Approximately 30,000 prisoners are stationed there. The majority of them are intellectuals. They are digging a canal between the Danube and the Black Sea, or are building roads, bridges, and so forth. Practically all the work is done by hand in the same manner and with the same methods as those which were employed for the erection of the Egyptian pyramids. The food is very poor. As a rule, the daily menu consists of corn meal with a soup made of onions or beans. The sanitary conditions are indescribable, and for this reason the death toll is extremely high. Prisoners work more than twelve hours a day. Some of them were sentenced by the courts. Others were not. But this makes no difference, for even those who did receive sentences are not released when their terms are over.

000 The Uniate Churches are not among the great religious bodies of the world. But we might well pause in reverence while passing their temples of worship to commemorate those who in far-off countries have so nobly and sacrificially clung to their faith. Such a tribute would by no means preclude one from bearing in mind that others, too, have felt the crushing weight of Ru-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

"Wallachia," which I use, is a foreign word not used by the Rumanians and rather disliked. On the other hand, of their words for this region between the Danube and the Carpathians, "Ţara Românească" might be misleading, and I preferred to restrict "Muntenia" to its narrower meaning as the region east of the Olt River, in contrast to Oltenia to the west. Bucarest (Bucureşti) is the only city which I have anglicized, though I might have used Jassy instead of Iaşi (the capital of Moldavia). With regard to personal names, I attempted to follow the most familiar usage and avoid odd-sounding distortions. Thus, King Michael instead of Mihai, but Carol, Ion, and Iuliu rather than Charles, John, and Julius.

I have spelled Rumanian words with their diacritical marks. The following English equivalents may serve as a guide to pronunciation:

	suggests pronouncing a back "u" without rounded lips
ă	= like the "e" in "suffer" or the "u" in "burn"
i	= final "i" is usually not pronounced but softens the preceding consonant
u	= "oo" as in "food"
c	= before "e" or "i" like English "ch" or "tch"; otherwise like "k"
â, î	= have no English equivalent; like the Russian "ы"; one grammar
g	= before "e" or "i" like English "j" or "g" in "gentle"; otherwise hard as in "garden"
ş	= "sh"
ţ	= "ts" as in "hats"

The following are the American equivalents to the weights and measures used in this book:

1 kilometer (km.) = 0.62 mile
1 square kilometer (km.^{2}) = 0.386 square mile
1 hectare (ha.) = 2.47 acres
1 cadastral yoke (used in Transylvania) = 1.4 acres = 0.58 hectare
1 pogon = approximately ½ hectare (5012 square meters)
1 kilogram (kg.) = 2.20 lbs. avoirdupois
1 quintal = 220.46 lbs. avoirdupois
1 metric ton = 1.1023 short tons
1 hectoliter = 2.84 U.S. bushels

In the measurement of crop yields it is difficult to convert quintals into bushels, since the first is a measure of weight and the second of capacity. The weight of the bushel varies according to the crop. shelled corn, or maize, 48 lbs. of barley, 56 lbs. of rye, and 32 lbs. of Roughly, one U.S. bushel is equivalent to 60 lbs. of wheat, 56 lbs. of

3: Roberts S-- (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

804 oats. Hence one quintal of wheat is approximately 3.67 bushels, and a yield of 10 quintals per hectare equals 14.9 bushels per acre. A quintal of corn is about 3.94 bushels, and a yield of 10 quintals per hectare equals 16.0 bushels per acre.

436 Because of the instability of Rumanian money it is difficult to make satisfactory conversions of the *leu* to the dollar. Before the First World War the leu at par was equal to 19.3 cents U.S. gold (old parity), the value of all currencies in the Latin Monetary Union to which Rumania belonged. After the postwar inflation the leu was stabilized in 1929 at 10 milligrams of gold, .900 fine; one leu was equal to .598 U.S. cents. In 1936 the gold content was reduced, and the leu was equal to 1.0127 U.S. cents (new parity). In August, 1947, after a terrific inflation, the leu was restabilized at 6.6 milligrams of gold, or .66 U.S. cents.

342 Windows are generally double even in the simpler houses, one opening to the inside, the other to the outside. They are always barred and set in a wooden frame (Jänecke, 1918: 27-28).

342 531 The Rumanian house is noteworthy for its exterior decorations. Special attention and much imagination is given to the woodwork. Much art is evident in the pillars supporting the roof over the veranda (fig. 57d), lintels supporting the eaves, the railings of the veranda and the window and door frames. The corners of houses may have designs in low relief. Painted designs may be placed on the wall in great abundance (figs. 57a, 57b). Because of the lesser opportunity of embellishment through woodwork and because whitewashed walls lend themselves well to painting, painting of the exterior is characteristic of the plains. The Rumanian does not shy away from bright colors. Ultramarine is most popular, for it is [789] said to scare away evil spirits. Combinations of red, blue and [822] yellow are common, and dark green shades are also favored (Jänecke, 1918: 23).

342 [184] [341] The basic difference between the house of the lowlands and those of the mountain region is that the latter are of two-story construction (fig. 64a). Building materials in the mountains are stone and wood rather than wicker and mud. When houses are built on an incline a high stone foundation forms the ground floor (pivnita). This can be used for stables, storage rooms and also as a wine cellar. This form persists even when the terrain is flat. The higher house is appreciated for its better view, greater security and suitability for defense.

While the floor plan often consists of a row of rooms similar to that of the lowlands, a number of changes have taken place. The anteroom with its large hearth is generally left out (fig. 64b). This is due to the fact that the bricks that line the hearth are not available, and the wooden walls are more inflammable than the predominantly mud ones of the plains. Where the hearth is present [354] it is put into a special annex. Instead of the hearth an oven-stove (a combination stove and oven) is used, which permits the main room to be used as living room and sleeping room as well as a kitchen.

The two-room house predominates; due to the absence of the connecting anteroom, each room has a door to the veranda (ĉerdak) (fig. 66). Sometimes the veranda at the top of the stairway is expanded into a hall-like structure (foisor) (fig. 64a) covered by a hipped roof at right angles to the main roof. In summer most activities take place there.

The foundation is made of rocks or of large pebbles from the river. Walls are made of horizontal logs or boards which cross at the corners, each fitting into a notch in the other. A mud or lime plaster is never omitted, and to facilitate this plastering thin laths are nailed diagonally across the beams.

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

p.418

THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF RUMANIA

642
829 The new Constitution of the People's Republic of Rumania of September, 1952 will in all probability become a landmark in the constitutional history

1: Braham S-4 (no date) 1954 ED1 Rumania ED1

of the Soviet world. It is the first document to reconcile the conflict hitherto existing between the satellite constitutions and two Soviet official theories: the one, relating to the essence and character of the "New Democracies," emphasizes in its latest version the substantial identity of the political and economic structures of the two types of "Soviet" and "popular" democracies; the other, the Soviet theory on constitutional law, supports the thesis that there can be no divergence between constitution and society in a "socially advanced and progressive" state. Previous satellite constitutions, however, in contradiction to Soviet legal theory that the constitution is a mirror reflecting changing reality—the legal crystallization of existing arrangements—did not correspond to the fundamental changes occurring in the state. 642 829

The new Rumanian Constitution,[1] however, assumes to reflect the enormous transformations that have taken place in the political and socio-economic life of the country since March, 1948, when the first Constitution of the People's Republic of Rumania was adopted. In the interval, the means of production, transportation, and banking have been nationalized; the "socialist sector" of agriculture has been widened by the ever-growing influence of the state through the establishment of state farms ("sovchozi") and tractor stations; collectivization of land has been consistently pursued through a policy aiming at the elimination of the "kulak" elements and the support of the lower and middle strata of the peasantry; two monetary reforms have completely changed the financial status of the population—while the leu has been stabilized and pegged to the ruble, the people have been deprived of their savings; the structure and functions of the central and local governmental agencies and of the judiciary has gradually developed along Soviet lines; the opposition has been eliminated and the rank-and-file of the Communist Party purged of "unreliable" or "deviationist" elements. 642 178

The new Constitution, as a whole, very closely approximates to its Soviet prototype. While the Constitution of 1948—advanced as it was at the time from the Soviet legal point of view—preserved some outward manifestations of "bourgeois constitutionalism," particularly in its technique and its neo-latin legal style, the framers of the new Constitution carefully avoided 642

[1] The new Constitution of the People's Republic of Rumania was adopted by the Grand National Assembly on September 24, 1952. It differed little in substance from the original Draft submitted to the Assembly (March 27, 1952) by the Constitutional Commission headed by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, President of the Council of Ministers and Secretary-General of the United Workers' (Communist) Party. Out of the 18,836 "suggestions for amendments" offered by the population, only 34 were accepted. Of these 28 were primarily editorial, 2 changed the composition of the Council of Ministers, one stipulated the tax-levying authority of the Grand National Assembly, and one provided for the inclusion of the initials RPR (Rumanian People's Republic) in the country's emblem. Two amendments, however, were more significant. One eradicated the peasantry's personal property rights, granted in the Draft, to the land and farm implements which they brought into the collectives; the other, seeking to dissipate the democratic world's allegations that the country had obviously become a "Soviet province," purports to establish the principle of complete sovereignty by the inclusion of the provision that Rumania is a "unitary, sovereign, and independent" state. 642

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

565 665 inhabitants, they had remained a field for partisan skirmishes among the different factions of the boyars and the growing financial and industrial interests. The limited ambit of politics was not, however, altogether the responsibility of the boyars, though most of them certainly cannot be charged with equalitarian leanings.

829 642 621 Much has been written in Rumania on the primitive state of the peasant, his inability to govern himself, and the necessity for his gradual, supervised initiation into the mysteries of government. While such writings often conceal an *arrière pensée*, they contain one element of truth: the economic role of the peasant, as a relatively self-contained and self-sufficient producer, does confine the orbit of his interests to his village. This limitation of interests has nothing to do with any shortcomings on the part of the peasant, but merely means that his economic and social life does not extend into many of the fields which comprise the necessary activities of modern governments. The immediate and obvious wishes of the peasant—such as more land, more lenient credit, and lower taxes—cannot be the satisfactory basis of a political program unless they can be related to some means of realizing them. The possibility of their direct and immediate fulfillment in Rumania was limited; the indirect measures which could ultimately improve his status—the over-all increase of the nation's productivity and capital—involved questions quite beyond his understanding as a peasant, if not as an individual.

565 In all states there is a gap between the desires of the average voter and the complexities of economic and administrative activity; in Rumania this gap was accentuated by the fact that almost four-fifths of the population was of the peasantry. Moreover, since such a large percentage of the population was devoted to one occupation, there was relatively little scope for the diversified play of economic and social interests in politics such as characterizes a more advanced society. Rumanian writers, regretting the division of their society between a formless mass of peasants and an oligarchic ruling group, have perennially pined for the emergence of a middle class. During the interwar period the base for political activity broadened somewhat through increasing industrialization, through the growth of a more numerous middle peasantry, and through strong regional interests in the new provinces, but the great bulk of the electorate was still the poor peasantry, whose chief historical means of declaring its wishes had been in sporadic and unsuccessful uprisings.

660 Partly for these reasons the extension of the suffrage after the First World War did not lead to political democracy. Politics, which retained a distinctly Phanariot flavor, was the art of taking advan-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

early 1920's although many of the changes were implicit in the earlier writings. In 1923 he had wanted to reformulate liberalism to meet contemporary requirements. By 1930 he was attempting a total refutation of the classical theory of international trade as it had come down from Ricardo. The core of his new theory, which he reiterated incessantly, was that "the product of the labor of an industrial workman is almost always exchanged for the product of the labor of several agricultural workmen." [17] From this premise he concluded that international exchange was only to the benefit of the industrial country and furthered the economic domination of the European industrial states.

The economic domination of a country signifies the economic state which allows the produce of the labor of its workmen to be exchanged for the produce of a larger number of workmen of other countries. In the life of nations, as in the life of individuals, wealth never comes only from one's own labor. "Make others work for you" has always been the classical means of becoming wealthy.[18]

If an agricultural country is absolutely unable to produce industrial goods it is obliged to make this disadvantageous exchange, but if it can produce an industrial article—even at a permanently higher cost than a foreign industrial state—it should do so rather than import. Thus, even though it might require the labor of 300 Rumanian workmen to produce a quantity of cloth that could be produced by the labor of 100 British workmen, it would still be advantageous to do so, if, to import the cloth, Rumania was obliged to export a quantity of wheat which had required the labor of 500 workmen. With his theory of permanent protection, Manoilescu was quite critical of those protectionists, such as List, who had gone only halfway and rested their argument on the fostering of infant industries. He demanded protection, however, only for those industries whose "productivity surpasses the average productivity of the country." He opposed autarky, which he thought defensible only as a measure of preparedness for war, and did believe in an international division of labor, but one which was based upon specialization within different branches of the more productive industries.[19]

---

revised and expanded version later appeared in German, *Die nationalen Produktivkräfte und der Aussenhandel* (Berlin, 1937).

17. Manoilescu, *Theory of Protection*, p. vi.

18. *Ibid.*, p. vii.

19. It is unnecessary here to give an account of his quite lengthy effort to provide a mathematical refutation of the principles of free trade. His chief attack was upon

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

829 665 Regardless of the theoretical merits or fallacies in Manoilescu's analysis, it is obvious that he had made a clean break with economic liberalism. Moreover, he flatly denied the premise upon which the Peasantist economists had based their argument.

> An agricultural country cannot raise itself by increasing slowly and uniformly the income of all its agricultural producers. Economic progress never spreads in a similar manner in all parts of a country. All the work of progress begins through a *center* or *nucleus of progress* and these nuclei are formed by the industries which represent a superior productivity.[20]

Far from admitting the Peasants' attack on "artificial industry," he held the artificiality of the support to be of no consequence so long as his rather loosely defined "productivity" increased.

The principal danger in Manoilescu's doctrine lay not in its stress upon industry nor in its denial of the ability of Rumanian agriculture to lift its own level of productivity. Industrialization in some form appears to be a necessary element in raising the miserable economic conditions of the peasant states of southeastern Europe, and it is quite unlikely that remedies sought in the agricultural sphere alone can produce an adequate alleviation. But in Rumania the critical question in many cases is not what is to be done but who is to do it.

In a country with such marked social and economic inequalities, with industry monopolized in the hands of a narrow, state-subsidized group, Manoilescu's doctrine of protectionism would have the fatal

---

the famous Ricardan cloth and wine example of comparative costs in the determination of exports. In my opinion he gains little in attempting to make a logically watertight demonstration, and indeed by trying to establish an absolute argument on the basis of a much oversimplified model he weakens the argument that in practice the operation of free trade has caused backward agricultural countries very serious difficulties. In particular he seems to underestimate the problems involved in the task of increasing the productivity and capital intensity per worker and assumes that protectionism alone is an adequate stimulus for the industrialization of a backward country. To be sure some of his contentions, such as the distinction between "national gain" and "individual profit," have been considerably elaborated in recent years, and the recognition of the extent of hidden unemployment in a peasant society has led to numerous recommendations that planned industrialization is the only remedy; but such recommendations (e.g., K. Mandelbaum's *The Industrialization of Backward Areas*) are based upon premises quite different from Manoilescu's. For a critical appraisal of Manoilescu's theory see J. B. Condliffe's review in *The Economic Journal, 43* (1933), 143–145, and Jacob Viner's review in the *Journal of Political Economy* (1932). M. Kalecki's review of the German edition of Manoilescu's work, in *The Economic Journal, 48* (1938), 708–711, is relatively favorable as regards Manoilescu's recognition of the plight of backward countries, though critical of his theoretical approach.

20. Manoilescu, *Theory of Protection*, p. 30, n. 1.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

829 665

effect of increasing this inequality and extending the power of the industrial groups. Moreover, the policy of extending protection exclusively to industry and not to agriculture—whatever its intrinsic benefits for the national economy—would mean increased costs for the agricultural sector, uncertain markets, and, at best, a forced transfer of personnel from agriculture into industry. Furthermore, if over three-fourths of the electorate belongs to the peasantry, it is difficult to see how such a process could be achieved within the framework of a representative government.

Manoilescu's response, quite naturally, was to abandon liberal politics and take up corporatism on the Italian model. In the 1930's he wrote a number of articles on the "Century of Corporatism." In 1934, for example, he made a comparison of the liberal, the Communist, and the corporative societies.[21] Corporate society "is characterized by *organization*. It allows freedom of individual possession of the means of production. The corporative economy assumes that the maximum of social welfare is realized by the discipline of economic activities in harmony with the ends of the state. Its motto is: National interest; its representative type: the organizer." Employing a quasi-scientific jargon, Manoilescu defined "corporative space" as a

> space where the egoistic impulses of the individual do not cease to exist and always represent active forces, but where, in addition to these forces [which are the sole qualities of a "liberal space"] there is a system of forces which direct individual actions toward a common goal created by the ends of the state. . . . Corporative space is a "magnetic field" dominated by national "lines of force" directed uniformly toward the ends assigned by the state.[22]

It is not necessary to take Manoilescu's utterances on this line very seriously or to inquire who was to determine these all-powerful state aims. He welcomed the coming of the royal dictatorship as the embodiment of the necessary revolution against outworn forms.[23] Apart from the vanity and opportunism which runs through his work, the significance of his writings lies:

1) in the evolution they display from the neoliberalism of the 1920's to the more thoroughgoing corporatism of the 1930's, and

21. *L'Espace corporatif* (Paris, 1934).
22. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
23. It is somewhat ironic that Manoilescu, who had boasted of his friendship with Mussolini and the Germans, should have been forced as Minister of Foreign Affairs to sign the Vienna Award in 1940, by which his fascist friends obliged Rumania to give up Northern Transylvania. The blow was so great that he collapsed at the conference table.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

829
665

2) the distinctly undemocratic implications of this evolution in economic ideas, at least in their Rumanian context.

It would be absurd to suppose that the actual development of Rumanian economic policy was based upon any such theoretical considerations, but there is a reasonably close parallel between the progress of Manoilescu's ideas and the development of the economic and industrial policy of the Rumanian government from that of the old Liberals under Vintilă Brătianu to that of the Liberal government of the 1930's. Although the old Liberals had favored a program of industrialization with state support, it was handled primarily through the private banks, controlled by the Liberals, and was directed chiefly toward extracting natural resources and creating secondary industries. Moreover, the tight-fisted fiscal policy of Vintilă Brătianu had served as a check on economic activity.

178
433

After 1933 industrialization proceeded at a much more rapid tempo and in a somewhat different direction. The private banks after the depression played a less important part in financing industry; the principal initiative was by the National Bank or the state itself, both through state-owned corporations and through the growing importance of the state as consumer of industrial products. Expansion was most extensive in heavy industry; large cartels appeared and there was a notable concentration of industrial activity. Between 1933 and 1938 the number of "large" industrial concerns (i.e., with at least 20 workers and more than 10 horsepower) increased only from 3,487 to 3,767, whereas the installed horsepower increased from 529,965 to 746,789, and the employed personnel from 184,777 to 289,117.[24] The horsepower employed in capital goods industries increased from 287,266 in 1932 to 452,870 in 1937, as contrasted with a more modest increase from 237,442 to 289,666 in consumer goods industries. The output in quantity of capital goods had by 1937 increased by 57.4 per cent over the 1927 level, consumer goods by 45 per cent.[25] The production of steel, which had hit a high of 143,511 metric tons in 1928, and dropped to a low of 103,046 in 1932, rose from 144,766 tons in 1933 to 276,532 in 1938.[26] There was no doubt that the policy was directed toward heavy industry and was having results.

Two important reasons for this industrialization were, of course, the depression and the rearmament program. The collapse of the grain market and the spread of agrarian protectionism among the

24. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești*, p. 149.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
26. *Breviaire statistique de la Roumanie* (1940), p. 164.

3: Roberts S-- (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

000

ier peasants. As a matter of fact, both these contentions were true to a certain degree, as has been seen above in Chapter 3. But the Communists greatly exaggerated the extent both of large estates and of differentiation, and their statistical efforts to prove their point were either inaccurate or patently false.[35]

●829
241
185

The adoption of the Popular Front in 1935 led to a corresponding modification in the Communist agrarian policy. While ultimate aims of socialism were not renounced, a distinction was drawn between socialist reforms and reforms designed to restore democracy. The militant revolutionary note of the early pronouncements was dropped. The new policy appears in Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu's study of the basic problems of Rumania, *Problemele de bază ale României*, written during the war but showing the influence of the Popular Front tactic. Pătrăşcanu was no proletarian but the son of a socialist intellectual and himself a lawyer. He was not Moscow-trained, and while his writings were based upon Lenin, they have a certain Western outlook. He led the Rumanian Communist party in 1944, was Minister of Justice in the coalition governments and in the Groza cabinet until the beginning of 1948. His influence in the party diminished steadily after the return of the comrades who had been in Moscow, and he was eventually discharged from his position because he had become "the exponent of bourgeois ideology and detached himself from the masses and from the ideology and principles of the working class."

Much of Pătrăşcanu's analysis of the Rumanian agrarian problem is sound and illuminating, although on many points of fact he obviously relied on the information compiled by the National Peasant economist Virgil Madgearu. He was fully aware, of course, of the unhealthy state of Rumanian agriculture, the persistence of extensive cereal cultivation and low level of productivity, the failure of the 1918–1921 land reforms to establish a prosperous peasantry, the persistence of metayage and other semiservitudes, the proletarization of the poorer peasantry, and the inability of a great number of Rumanian peasants to support themselves on their meager holdings. In trying, however, to adapt this promising material to perfect Marxist-Leninist categories he overtaxed the evidence; he exaggerated the failure of the 1918–1921 reforms to equalize land holdings, he probably gave too much importance to the differentiation between the poor and the rich peasants, and in attempting to demonstrate the

35. Two such examples are S. Timov, "Wird Rumänien agrarsiert oder industrialisiert?" *Agrarprobleme*, International Agrarinstitut Moskau, Band 2, Heft 2 (1929), pp. 310–346; and Tatarow, "Die Agrarkrise in Rumänien," *Agrarprobleme*, Band 4, Heft 2 (1931), pp. 44–80.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

prevalence of agricultural laborers he definitely mishandled his statistics.[36] 829 241 185

Pătrăşcanu was at his best in showing that the optimistic statements of official Rumanian spokesmen during the interwar years were altogether unjustified, and at his worst in reducing the agrarian question to an oversimplified formula. He was too intent upon proving that all difficulties could be laid at the door of Rumanian capitalism, with the support of the moribund but sinister boyar class. There is of course a certain amount of truth in this contention, but it served to distort his analysis. For example, "overpopulation" as a cause of economic misery was obviously unwelcome to him since it put the blame outside the realm of political economy and made it an act of God. He was correct in maintaining that Rumanian officialdom had all too eagerly seized upon overpopulation in recent years as a perfect scapegoat for the prolonged failure to improve agriculture, but it cannot be written off as an unimportant factor. Pătrăşcanu, however, felt obliged to attack it and devoted considerable attention to destroying the "myth" of overpopulation. He distinguished, quite properly, between absolute or biological overpopulation and an overpopulation resulting from economic circumstances. In his view there were three principal causes of this relative, or economic, overpopulation:

1) the existence of large properties, whereby 25,000 families held a quarter of the arable land, thus depriving hundreds of peasants of the possibility of creating a holding (according to the 1930 census 25,000 exploitations of over 50 hectares occupied only 18.8 per cent of the arable surface);

2) under semiservile conditions labor was intensively exploited; consequently one man was driven to accomplish the work on a piece of land which normally would provide a living for three;

3) the extensive use of women and children in place of men on boyar estates produced the appearance of overpopulation.

While these conditions, all of which he associated with the existence of large properties, doubtless had some effect—especially the first—they were certainly not the major reasons for Rumanian agrar- 185 241

36. Virgil Madgearu (*Evoluţia economiei româneşti*, p. 358), making use of some calculations of the agrarian economist Roman Cresin, stated that while small cultivators under 5 hectares had an excess of labor power, middle and large properties required additional labor, evaluated at 190 million days a year. Of this, 40 per cent (around 371,300) was undertaken by paid agricultural laborers, and 60 per cent represented supplementary work performed by the families of small proprietors. Pătrăşcanu, however (*op. cit.*, p. 85), took this figure of 40 per cent of paid agricultural laborers, equated it with the fact that 40 per cent of the arable land in Rumania in 1930 was in holdings over 10 hectares, and gave the quite unjustified impression that in effect agricultural laborers were responsible for the cultivation of all land over 10 hectares.

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania ED1

Meanwhile the effort to promote the Communist view of
829 life through the schools and the youth organizations continues
861 unabated. It has often been pointed out that this program of indoctrination has three aspects. The first is a compendium of all the arguments against religious belief which have been formulated by psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists in many countries. On the one hand, the compendium joins forces with Marx by viewing religions as derivatives from the class struggles of the past. On the other hand, it reflects a pseudo-Nietzschean quest for a new morality. The second aspect is the identification of religion with "capitalism," the most detested of all enemies, and the contention that the Churches are mere pious instrumentalities through which the "warmongers" rouse the masses to hatred of "democracy." On this level the Communists seek to identify their view of life with "peace," and thus to confuse persons who have been taught to consider Christianity as the Gospel of Love. The third aspect is one which also characterized Nazism. The Christian Churches, the Roman Catholic in particular, are described as sappers of the virility of mankind, prevented by yearning for eternal bliss from getting the necessary work done on this earth. By comparison the Stalinist-Leninist doctrines are described as the sole ideological foundations on which society can rest.

There is nothing anyone resident there can do about this tidal wave of propaganda save to endure it in silence.

462 In the Carpathians, while some stâne are inhabited by
233 families of shepherds, others have men only, and purely "feminine" stâne are not unknown. There appear to be regional differences based perhaps on the varying requirements of the lowland crops, and all forms are said to be of some antiquity; it cannot be shown that the "masculine" stâne represent an older type than those where both sexes
[834] take part, or vice versa. But it is significant that in some parts there is a definite *tabu* against women, and the shepherds must have no relations with them in the prescribed season, from the arrival at the stână to July 20th (St. Eloi). In the areas we visited, while the shepherds were exclusively male, women from the villages occasionally ride up with messages or food, and may stay at the hut for a day or two.

234 On reaching the pastures, to resume, the sheep are divided
233 into separate flocks—milkers and non-milkers, lambs and wethers. Only the milkers are kept in the immediate neighbourhood of the stână, the rest being driven uphill or to the shelter of the forest's edge, according to their requirements. Two milkings are usual, about 6 o'clock morning and evening. The sheep are driven into the *strunga*, a fenced enclosure near the hut, where the shepherd-boy introduces them one by one into a narrow roofed exit at which the milkers sit. The milk is forthwith poured into a copper cauldron over which the *baciu*[2] stands at the fireside, stirring
[326] the contents with the peeled, spiked top of a spruce. The copper pot is tinned inside, this work being done by the gipsies. Into the simmering milk the *baciu* throws a pinch of rennet, and then works the curds into a thick pulp. A simple press—a canvas bag twisted with a tourniquet and weighted with a stone—next comes into use, and after three days salt is added and the cheese is finally kneaded and stored in a sheepskin which has been specially prepared by drying and scraping. This is cheese of the first quality (brânză), a poorer quality (urdă) being obtained from the whey left in the copper after taking out the curds. The urdă is often stored in small skins, e.g. rabbit, or in containers made of bark or hollowed branches. Much of the cheese in these days is bought by co-operative societies.

262 It is the duty of the *baciu*,[2] further, to prepare food for the shepherds. Onions, beans and paprika make vegetable soup, and maize-bread and cheese complete a diet which may be varied now and again with smoked mutton. Another task

1 [For explanatory footnote see pp.49, Ct. 116 - - Analyst]
2 [cheese maker of the Stâna -52- Analyst]

164 Rickets is unknown, and difficult labour among peasant women is rare, though puerperal fever is common. In some instances, if there is a midwife, she is shared by several [847] villages. A law has recently been passed forbidding attempts at abortion, but it is not strictly enforced. There are a good many infant deaths. Maternal morbidity is not high, in [142] spite of the prevalence of puerperal fever. The women as a whole are robust, of good physique and inured to hardship. [757] The French treatment of sepsis by induced (turpentine) abscess is common and is found to be very successful, the fever running its course in 7-8 days, with low mortality rate. [853] Children are breast-fed, feeding bottles being unknown. The feeding continues until the age of one year or longer. Infantile paralysis is unknown in this district, though it does occur in other parts of the country. Rheumatism and arthritis are common.

743 752 A SMALL operating theatre is attached to the hospital for emergency cases like suppurating appendices and ruptured hernia, other cases being sent to the hospitals in larger towns. Small surgical operations are also performed. The table is convenient, in that it can tilt at any angle from head to foot, but it cannot be lowered or raised at will. The only light is a small electric globe high up in the ceiling, with no facilities for lowering. Operations are, however, mostly done in daylight. If necessary, lamps or even candles are requisitioned. A small room for sterilising purposes opens off the theatre.

743 164 THE PAVILION for infectious cases is situated about twenty feet from the main building, in close proximity to the staff house and kitchen. Its beds were empty at the moment of inspection. Scarlet fever is the most common epidemic in this vicinity, and the beds were full one month ago. Epidemics of dysentery and typhoid also occur. Typhus is not known here, though frequent in Bessarabia. Diphtheria is fairly common.

759 THERE ARE a medical doctor and a surgeon in attendance, the latter being only part-time.

743 THE HOME for the incurables was next visited. It is a handsome villa, situated near the main street, but farther from the centre of the town. As before stated, it is a branch of the nerve clinic in Bucharest, and is under the supervision of

1 [in Curtea De Arges -- Analyst]

164 Rickets is unknown, and difficult labour among peasant women is rare, though puerperal fever is common. In some instances, if there is a midwife, she is shared by several [847] villages. A law has recently been passed forbidding attempts at abortion, but it is not strictly enforced. There are a good many infant deaths. Maternal morbidity is not high, in [142] spite of the prevalence of puerperal fever. The women as a whole are robust, of good physique and inured to hardship. [757] The French treatment of sepsis by induced (turpentine) abscess is common and is found to be very successful, the fever running its course in 7-8 days, with low mortality rate. [855] Children are breast-fed, feeding bottles being unknown. The feeding continues until the age of one year or longer. Infantile paralysis is unknown in this district, though it does occur in other parts of the country. Rheumatism and arthritis are common.

743 752 A SMALL operating theatre is attached to the hospital for emergency cases like suppurating appendices and ruptured hernia, other cases being sent to the hospitals in larger towns. Small surgical operations are also performed. The table is convenient, in that it can tilt at any angle from head to foot, but it cannot be lowered or raised at will. The only light is a small electric globe high up in the ceiling, with no facilities for lowering. Operations are, however, mostly done in daylight. If necessary, lamps or even candles are requisitioned. A small room for sterilising purposes opens off the theatre.

743 164 THE PAVILION for infectious cases is situated about twenty feet from the main building, in close proximity to the staff house and kitchen. Its beds were empty at the moment of inspection. Scarlet fever is the most common epidemic in this vicinity, and the beds were full one month ago. Epidemics of dysentery and typhoid also occur. Typhus is not known here, though frequent in Bessarabia. Diphtheria is fairly common.

759 THERE ARE a medical doctor and a surgeon in attendance, the latter being only part-time.

743 THE HOME for the incurables was next visited. It is a handsome villa, situated near the main street, but farther from the centre of the town. As before stated, it is a branch of the nerve clinic in Bucharest, and is under the supervision of

1 [in Curtea De Arges -- Analyst]

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania ED1

Meanwhile the effort to promote the Communist view of
829 life through the schools and the youth organizations continues
861 unabated. It has often been pointed out that this program of indoctrination has three aspects. The first is a compendium of all the arguments against religious belief which have been formulated by psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists in many countries. On the one hand, the compendium joins forces with Marx by viewing religions as derivatives from the class struggles of the past. On the other hand, it reflects a pseudo-Nietzschean quest for a new morality. The second aspect is the identification of religion with "capitalism," the most detested of all enemies, and the contention that the Churches are mere pious instrumentalities through which the "warmongers" rouse the masses to hatred of "democracy." On this level the Communists seek to identify their view of life with "peace," and thus to confuse persons who have been taught to consider Christianity as the Gospel of Love. The third aspect is one which also characterized Nazism. The Christian Churches, the Roman Catholic in particular, are described as sappers of the virility of mankind, prevented by yearning for eternal bliss from getting the necessary work done on this earth. By comparison the Stalinist-Leninist doctrines are described as the sole ideological foundations on which society can rest.

There is nothing anyone resident there can do about this tidal wave of propaganda save to endure it in silence.

659 not extend beyond the frontiers of the country and, vice versa, no foreign church may have jurisdictional powers over any denomination in Romania. Moreover, any material support granted and accepted from outside must be communicated to the Romanian Government.

793 The clergymen, the heads of the religious organizations and their officers must be Romanian citizens or they must apply for naturalization. A foreign citizen may be admitted only by special authorization and specifically if otherwise the existence and the functioning of a religious community would be imperilled.

As in the case of the Orthodox Church, the heads of [678] all religious denominations and their clergymen are triable for cannon and political offenses by the High Court of Cassation and Justice (not by ordinary courts). However, the disciplinary cases in church matters shall be tried by their own Synods.

The organizations of the historical churches (infra) are legal entities.

794 The religious denominations freely administer their assets as well as establish and manage as many charitable and educational institutions as they wish or need. The same is true of schools for preparation of the clergy. These, however, must communicate to the Ministry of Religious Affairs concerning their curricula.

[871] Each church has the right to give religious instruction to their youth of the given denominations in either public or private schools, as well as to men on active service.

794 The religious instruction of Catholics in all kind of
659 schools, including government schools, is conducted according
871 to directives issued by the Catholic Bishop. The directives are to be communicated also to the Ministry of Education.

The Bishop has the right to request the dismissal of teachers of Catholic religion in public or private schools, even where such teachers are appointed and paid by the Government, if the Bishop considered the teacher unqualified for this task.

[874] Finally, the Catholic Church has the right to establish all kinds of Divinity Schools for preparing the Catholic clergy. The curriculum of those schools is established by the competent Catholic Church authorities.

793 The Catholic bishops and their assistants, appointed
659 by the Vatican, must be Romanian citizens and are obliged to take an oath of allegiance to the King, the Constitution and the laws of the country. Those who are not citizens are allowed to apply for citizenship within a reasonable period of time.

The appointment of the clergy is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Church authorities. However, an appointment must be communicated, in advance, to the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

Article 23, the last article of the Concordat, states that "The two contracting parties reserve the right to denounce this Concordat after notice has been served six months in advance."

659 An additional Protocol was signed on May 30, 1932 (Official Gazette No. 180 of August 3, 1932 and ratified by Decree-Law No. 659 (Official Gazette No. 52 of March 2, 1940) pertaining to the

currency. 000

In this way, most of the material means of the Catholic Church for support of its religous, educational and charitable program disappeared. 659 425

These successive expropriations have been applied to all religious denominations. However, the Russian Church ("Christians of Old Rite" and the parishes included later on in the Ukrainian Vicariate) was exempted from such measures. If the Romanian Orthodox Church possesses today some material means, these were either granted subsequently by the Government or were transferred by the government from the seized assets of other religious denominations. [798]

C. Church and School

The right to establish and run schools of all kinds granted to all religious denominations by the Law No. 54 of 1928 and in particular to the Roman Catholic Church by the Concordat was abolished. The same is true of the right to administer religious instruction in private and public schools. This is the result of a series of decrees. 659 871

The first step toward this goal was to suppress the denominational schools and those supported in some way by churches. The Government started by suppressing all foreign schools existing in Romania by Order No. 191,653 (Official Gazette No. 176 of August 2, 1948). Many of these schools were, to a certain extent, connected with the religious denominations.

The next step was a reform of the school system

accomplished by Decrees No. 175 and 176 (Official Gazette No. 177 of August 3, 1948). By Article 35 all denominational schools were taken over by the government. It reads as follows: 659 871 [671]

Decree No. 175 of 1948

Art. XXXV. All the denominational and private schools shall become governmental schools.

Decree No. 176 of 1948

Art. 1. For a better organization of the public education, as well as the expansion and democratization of the educational system, all personal and real properties that belonged to the churches, congregations, religious communities, non-profit organizations and trade corporations and, in general, to individuals or legal entities which were destined to serve as support...to denominational schools, are transferred to the government ownership and shall be used for educational needs.

This provision covers school buildings, dwelling for professors, boarding houses and students' homes, etc., as well as funds, estates, and legacies serving educational purposes. No compensation was to be paid for them. A list of over 2,000 denominational and private schools of all kinds, from kindergartens to colleges, which were thus expropriated, was attached to Decree No. 176. The provisions quoted make plain that no denominational school may be opened in the future which conclusion is supported by the fact that a subsequent Decree No. 177 of August 4, 1948 regulating the religious denominations does not mention the right of the church to open general schools. It deals with schools in Chapter VI but provides exclusively for divinity schools.

These decrees affected especially the Roman Catholic Church to which belonged the majority of the denominational schools. [798]

000

schools.

Neither the Decrees No. 175,176 and 177 nor any other law or decree mention the religious instruction in any way. The officially approved curricula of secondary and higher educational institutions do not provide for religious instruction. Nowhere is mentioned the right of the church to supervise religious instruction in case it would be given in general schools. 659 871

The only kind of schools allowed to the church are the special divinity schools for the training of clergymen and auxiliary personnel. These schools are in all aspects, including that of the curriculum, under the supervision of the Ministries of Religious Affairs and of Education. The Ministry of Religious Affairs may, among other things, dismiss at any time the professors appointed by the church whenever it deems that "public order and the security of the State" so requires. 659 871 793

Article 49 of the Decree No. 177 limited the number of Schools of Divinity of university rank in the whole country to: two for the Orthodox Church, one for the Catholic Church and one for all Protestant Churches. But a subsequent order of the Ministry of Religious Affairs reduced further the number of divinity and clerical schools of all denominations and did not mention the establishment of any Roman Catholic Divinity Schools. All of this shows the intention of the government to bar the opportunity for training of the ministers of religion.

It must also be mentioned that no general education may be given at the Divinity Schools. Notwithstanding according

to the curricula approved by the government, an important place is given to three special subjects of "general education", viz., Constitution and law of the Romanian People's Republic, Russian language, and History of Russian Theology. 659 871 793

By the Order No. 42,898 (Official Gazette No. 226 of November 15, 1948) the curricula were approved for the divinity schools of the following denominations: Greek Orthodox, Protestant (including Evangelist, Reformed and Unitarian), Jewish, Baptist, Adventist and Moslems. No mention is made of any curricula for the Roman Catholic Divinity Schools. The same is true of the "Christian Church of Old Rite" but for a different reason (see infra).

3. Status of the Romanian Orthodox Church 659

No new general law on the Romanian Orthodox Church was enacted and it continues to be regulated by the provisions of the Law for the Organization and Unification of May 6, 1925, as amended, since 1947 (see infra). Yet, an interesting question seems to remain open; viz., is it still the dominant church in the State, e. g., the National Church or not? As it has been mentioned previously, the Organic Law of 1925 provided that, since the Greek Orthodox Creed is the religion of the majority of the Romanian people, the Romanian Orthodox Church is dominant in the country. The new amendments of the law of 1925 did not directly affect this provision. But this principle has been taken from the old Constitution of 1923 which, in Article 22, paragraph 4, specifically stressed its role as a 795 659 795 642

EDUCATION IN CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

871 368 IN THE TOWN there are five primary schools—three mixed, one for girls and one for boys. In the latter there is a kindergarten class for children between five and seven. There are two vocational secondary schools, the Theological College and the Technical School; these are for boys only. The nearest lycée for girls is at Piteşti, 37 kilometres away. Boys also must leave the town for ordinary secondary education.

872 The kindergarten was founded in 1928 by the Orthodox National Society of Roumanian Women. There is a special local committee of management. The room used is large; part of it serves as a cloakroom and for washing; the children use the same playground and offices as the boys.

[876] THERE ARE two teachers and about fifty-five children. Careful records of the progress of each child are kept. The children work in groups in low chairs at tables; no individual work is taken. Froebel's principles are followed, but Dr. Montessori's sense-training apparatus is used and Dr. Decroby's principles of teaching arithmetic are adopted.

INTERESTING HANDWORK is taken: paper-cutting pictures, modelling in clay and in paper, lace, crochet, etc. The first twenty minutes of each morning are set apart for the care of plants and animals and of the classroom. Speech training, physical exercises, free-play and singing are taught; as the school has no musical instrument, much depends on the musical ability of the mistress. The training is similar to that of primary school teachers; the salary is fixed by the local committee.

[346] THE PRIMARY SCHOOL for girls that we visited is housed in a large building of one storey, standing in its own grounds; it contains, all leading out of a central hall, four large and lofty classrooms, a teachers' small-room and an art room; there are no cloakrooms, the children hang their clothes on stands in the classrooms. These rooms are rather bare, but very light; they are heated by a big porcelain stove and the desks take three children. In summer classes are held in the garden. The

645 functions have been left undisturbed. We have a plethora
665 of functionaries drawing starvation wages instead of a body of well-selected officials decently rewarded. You who have no party and no party attachments to satisfy, and who always attacked political parties, might have effected this change easily, but you have not done so. The reductions in the Budget were necessary, yet they ought not to have cut into the very vitals of the country. The financial policy of M. Argentoianu may be qualified as the policy of bankruptcy. No institution, however strong its foundations, can resist it. You have destroyed the schools and disorganized the army by a criminal reduction of credits. In the name of the Liberal party I must affirm that we cannot accept a constitutional theory which, if it be applied, will debilitate our political life, and by the elimination of political parties vitiate the expression of the national will in its essence, expose the Crown dangerously to attack, and even provide the possibility of irremediably compromising it."

871 The indictment with regard to the schools found in the above rebuke refers to the decision taken by the Government
652 to shift on to the municipalities 50 per cent of the educational charges. As the Municipal authorities cannot balance their budgets, and as an example the community of Solca was cited, which with a total annual budget of 430,000 lei would have been obliged to incur an additional expenditure of 400,000 lei in order to provide for the maintenance of its primary school, the deputies admitted that such charges were beyond the resources of the municipalities to bear, and the proposed legislation was at last rejected after a most strenuous opposition from the National Peasant Party supported by the Liberal deputies who had hitherto sided with the Government.

871 Another cause likely to prejudice education in Rumania
875 is the non-payment of salaries to teachers. During the sitting of the Chamber on April 4th, 1932, a case was reported of certain teachers, who are all State functionaries in Rumania, who had not received their pay for seven months. Associations of teachers in various localities have called meetings and have addressed telegrams of protest on the subject to the King. Thus, those of the region of Radauţi on

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

May 7th, 1932, solicited the King's intervention, and demanded that their emoluments, already four months in arrears, should be paid. Those of Balţi appealed to the Press on the same date, complaining that nothing had been paid them during the last five months. A general strike of the members of the teaching profession is being talked about if a remedy is not found. They are incensed by the fact that while public money is being squandered on useless objects and worthless individuals at Bucarest, humble functionaries in the provinces are left to famish. 871 875

The "Adeverul" of Jan. 19th, 1932, takes the Government to task for paying regularly its superior functionaries and neglecting the lower grades as well as its pensioners, and proceeds to relate particulars as astounding as they are scandalous, namely details about famishing teachers who are forced to beg for morsels of bread from their pupils! Such facts are really staggering, and when one recollects that France is generously advancing in instalments a loan of over one hundred million francs for the exclusive purpose of enabling the Rumanian State to pay its functionaries and pensioners, one demands what has become of this money and whether these funds have not again been diverted in the habitual manner to other purposes or pockets than those destined by the original providers of these sums? 652 647 871

The inept waste of public money at this critical period is simply revolting. The press daily reveals cases of gross extravagance and profligacy, while in the Chamber it has been admitted that the State keeps in its employ over 50,000 redundant functionaries. The "Argus" of May 5th, 1932, for instance, points out that the Ministry of Commerce and Industry maintains without any justification a sub-secretariat with a personnel of 116, among whom are twelve solicitors, one architect, one doctor of medicine, 14 chiefs of sections, etc, at an annual cost of 15,176,900 lei to the State, while on April 1st, 1932, the paper condemned at length the waste involved in the maintenance of a Faculty of Medicine at the University of Bucarest with a staff of 400 professors and assistants, while the total number of students matriculated to this faculty reached barely 900. 652 647

The paper likewise affirmed that there was a scandalous

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

at last been compelled to assume at its own expense the professional training of its youth. 241 874

It is sad to record that even in educational institutions the remissness which has characterized Rumanian administration has not been adequately grappled with, and it is not surprising that the laxity manifested in this particular domain should appear especially odious to the national minorities in Rumania, which have a different moral conception of life than that of the predominating nationality. That there is much to be done in this department is obvious to all, owing to the persistence of the complaints. A storm of indignation was raised by the scandalous condition of the College of Salonta, in Transylvania, in which some 400 Hungarian and Rumanian students were being educated. Of this number of students, 50 per cent were incapacitated, owing to the disgusting lack of hygiene prevailing, and the anarchic system on which it was conducted. The parents of the students had to petition the Minister of Education to obtain amelioration of the methods in vogue, and the details exposed were so revolting that the *Cuvantul* of March 28th, 1929, commenting on them, more or less admitted that such facts justified the opprobrious epithet of " putrid Wallachs " conferred on the latter by the Hungarians. 658 871

From this it may be deduced that agriculture had already been ruined through the culpable remissness of Rumania's rulers before the present crisis made itself felt. The country was caught like some disabled ship by the economic hurricane which suddenly sprang up, and materially it is suffering intensely, because in its battered condition it finds it difficult to weather the storm. Fortunately, the peasantry has been used to a life of suffering and hard toil; the peasants are patient and long-suffering to an extent inconceivable in the West. Docile and good-humoured, they put up with a situation that a Westerner would long since have found intolerable and against which he would have revolted. Poverty-stricken and unguided, the peasant has not only been left to provide the means wherewith to develop his farm, but at the same time he has been forced to supply from his own scanty resources the needs of the urban populations and the bulk of the funds requisite for carrying on the administration 241 565

6

12: Kornos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

793 661 The poor clergy are very active in politics and public affairs generally. Their influence, and even more that of the bishops, has not infrequently been [212] abused to further private interests.[1] The majority of the Rumanians are only semi-literate and depend for their information and guidance on the priests. • 871 Education has been the weak point of almost all the Rumanian governments. But those Rumanians whose parents have been able to give them a good education have proved that this highly intelligent and gifted people can achieve success in all fields of science and the arts.

563 **THE HUNGARIANS AND THE SZEKELYS.** The Hungarians and Szekelys, most of whom came under Rumanian rule after the Great War, live chiefly in Transylvania and the western provinces of Greater Rumania. The forefathers of the Szekelys were brought to these territories by the Hungarian kings and charged with the task of defending and securing the Kingdom's frontiers. The Hungarian nobles and Szekelys were two of the 'Three Ruling Nations' of Transylvania.[2] They were supported and encouraged by their kin in Hungary proper, given many privileges in the economic, political and cultural spheres. Thanks to all this they were able

[1] One blatant example of this occurred about ten years ago when a shepherd, who claimed to have 'visions' and prophetic power was built up into a holy figure. The simple peasants flocked to see and hear him, bringing many gifts. The State railways organized special travel facilities and this enriched many officials and members of the clergy.

[2] The three 'united' or 'recognized nations' of Transylvania were the Hungarian nobility, the Szekelys and the Saxons.

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 EDl Rumania EDl

EDUCATION IN CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

871 368 In the town there are five primary schools—three mixed, one for girls and one for boys. In the latter there is a kindergarten class for children between five and seven. There are two vocational secondary schools, the Theological College and the Technical School; these are for boys only. The nearest lycée for girls is at Piteşti, 37 kilometres away. Boys also must leave the town for ordinary secondary education.

872 The kindergarten was founded in 1928 by the Orthodox National Society of Roumanian Women. There is a special local committee of management. The room used is large; part of it serves as a cloakroom and for washing; the children use the same playground and offices as the boys.

[876] There are two teachers and about fifty-five children. Careful records of the progress of each child are kept. The children work in groups in low chairs at tables; no individual work is taken. Froebel's principles are followed, but Dr. Montessori's sense-training apparatus is used and Dr. Decroby's principles of teaching arithmetic are adopted.

Interesting handwork is taken: paper-cutting pictures, modelling in clay and in paper, lace, crochet, etc. The first twenty minutes of each morning are set apart for the care of plants and animals and of the classroom. Speech training, physical exercises, free-play and singing are taught; as the school has no musical instrument, much depends on the musical ability of the mistress. The training is similar to that of primary school teachers; the salary is fixed by the local committee.

[346] The primary school for girls that we visited is housed in a large building of one storey, standing in its own grounds; it contains, all leading out of a central hall, four large and lofty classrooms, a teachers' small-room and an art room; there are no cloakrooms, the children hang their clothes on stands in the classrooms. These rooms are rather bare, but very light; they are heated by a big porcelain stove and the desks take three children. In summer classes are held in the garden. The

●872 size of the classes varies from 40 to 50 children; there are five teachers. The Head takes a different class each year. The hours are from 9 to 12 and from 2 to 4. Some preparation is done at home. Holidays are generous—eight weeks in the summer, two at Easter, two at Christmas. There are no fees, but children buy their books if they can. The time-table and the syllabus are drawn up by the Minister of Education, and are the same for all schools. Inspectors visit frequently. There [758] is a full medical inspection of each child at the beginning of the year and then each subsequent month. In the first four years the curriculum resembles that of an English elementary school; in the fifth and sixth years the girls combine with general subjects either a commercial, an industrial or a housewifery course. In the seventh year they concentrate on vocational subjects and open their morning working away from school.

We saw some good examples of handwork, clay modelling, paper-cutting pictures, dolls in national dress, etc., and in Class I—the seven-year-olds—some most amusing pictures for the teaching of numbers. Religion is taught daily; there is a religious service on the first day of each month and the children go together to church with one teacher every Sunday.

874 If a girl wishes to become a teacher in a primary school, after four years in such a school she must spend eight in an École Normale and then teach for three years before obtaining her full diploma. For secondary school teaching, after eight years in a lycée the girl goes, at nineteen, to the university for three or four years, and then spends four months in a lycée pédagogique. She then takes her "examen de capacité."

The Theological College, housed in a large red-brick building now being enlarged, takes 260 boys, many of whom come from a distance; all are boarders. The course lasts eight years: four years in the High School (12-16); four years in the College (16-20). Entrance is by means of an examination in Religion, Roumanian, Mathematics and History; there were in 1936 100 candidates for 40 places. The boys are worked very hard; lessons are from 8 to 12 and 2 to 4; preparation from 6 to 7.30 a.m. and from 7 to 9 p.m. In the High School the languages taken are Latin and French; in the College the course includes Greek, German, Pedagogy, Philosophy, Psychology, Sociology, Church History. The course at the College is followed by four years at a university.

794 The religious instruction of Catholics in all kind of
659 schools, including government schools, is conducted according
871 to directives issued by the Catholic Bishop. The directives are to be communicated also to the Ministry of Education.

The Bishop has the right to request the dismissal of teachers of Catholic religion in public or private schools, even where such teachers are appointed and paid by the Government, if the Bishop considered the teacher unqualified for this task.

[874] Finally, the Catholic Church has the right to establish all kinds of Divinity Schools for preparing the Catholic clergy. The curriculum of those schools is established by the competent Catholic Church authorities.

793 The Catholic bishops and their assistants, appointed
659 by the Vatican, must be Romanian citizens and are obliged to take an oath of allegiance to the King, the Constitution and the laws of the country. Those who are not citizens are allowed to apply for citizenship within a reasonable period of time.

The appointment of the clergy is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Church authorities. However, an appointment must be communicated, in advance, to the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

Article 23, the last article of the Concordat, states that "The two contracting parties reserve the right to denounce this Concordat after notice has been served six months in advance."

659 An additional Protocol was signed on May 30, 1932 (Official Gazette No. 180 of August 3, 1932 and ratified by Decree-Law No. 659 (Official Gazette No. 52 of March 2, 1940) pertaining to the

872 size of the classes varies from 40 to 50 children; there are five teachers. The Head takes a different class each year. The hours are from 9 to 12 and from 2 to 4. Some preparation is done at home. Holidays are generous—eight weeks in the summer, two at Easter, two at Christmas. There are no fees, but children buy their books if they can. The time-table and the syllabus are drawn up by the Minister of Education, and are the same for all schools. Inspectors visit frequently. There [758] is a full medical inspection of each child at the beginning of the year and then each subsequent month. In the first four years the curriculum resembles that of an English elementary school; in the fifth and sixth years the girls combine with general subjects either a commercial, an industrial or a housewifery course. In the seventh year they concentrate on vocational subjects and open their morning working away from school.

We saw some good examples of handwork, clay modelling, paper-cutting pictures, dolls in national dress, etc., and in Class I—the seven-year-olds—some most amusing pictures for the teaching of numbers. Religion is taught daily; there is a religious service on the first day of each month and the children go together to church with one teacher every Sunday.

●874 If a girl wishes to become a teacher in a primary school, after four years in such a school she must spend eight in an Ecole Normale and then teach for three years before obtaining her full diploma. For secondary school teaching, after eight years in a lycée the girl goes, at nineteen, to the university for three or four years, and then spends four months in a lycée pédagogique. She then takes her "examen de capacité."

The Theological College, housed in a large red-brick building now being enlarged, takes 260 boys, many of whom come from a distance; all are boarders. The course lasts eight years: four years in the High School (12-16); four years in the College (16-20). Entrance is by means of an examination in Religion, Roumanian, Mathematics and History; there were in 1936 100 candidates for 40 places. The boys are worked very hard; lessons are from 8 to 12 and 2 to 4; preparation from 6 to 7.30 a.m. and from 7 to 9 p.m. In the High School the languages taken are Latin and French; in the College the course includes Greek, German, Pedagogy, Philosophy, Psychology, Sociology, Church History. The course at the College is followed by four years at a university.

●874 THE TECHNICAL or Trade School is one of forty such schools in the country. The Minister of Education has ordered this number to be doubled. The boys come from all districts and can go on to a higher grade Trade School. There is a still higher grade of school in Roumania called the Academy, from which pupils are turned out as teachers.

IN THIS TRADE School at Curtea de Argeş the boys live in and pay an inclusive fee of 4,500 lei per annum; those attending as day boys pay only 760 lei per annum. Two-thirds of these fees must be paid at the beginning of the session; the cost of material is not included.

BOYS can enter between the ages of 11 and 15; the number taken is 100. They are divided into four classes. The subjects taught are Woodwork, Pottery and Tailoring. In woodwork, when the boys leave they are considered to have qualified in all the processes of house-building and furnishing. [32] In pottery, the chief industry of this town, the *traditional* shapes, colouring and decoration (mostly of ships) are charming, but *modern* designs and shapes are less good and often tasteless.

[33] THE CLASSROOMS are airy and heated by stoves. The boys sit in couples. The walls are hung with pictures of Roumanian history and of architectural interest, e.g. York Minster, Notre Dame, the Forum, etc. Each room has a religious picture. The woodwork room is large; each bench has a wooden vice; the wood is neatly stacked on a large shelf a few feet from the roof. Few tools were seen, as they were being prepared for next session. There is a room set apart for exhibiting the work done. All articles are for sale, and the pupil gets most of the money. Both the french polishing and the chip carving reach an excellent standard.

[ ] THE MILITARY SERVICE required from boys attending Trade Schools is of one year's duration only. There are in the country five Higher Trade Schools—at Bucureşti, Braşov, Craiova, Iassi and Turgul Mureş.

N. H. S.

231 owner's farm, where the cows are kept in sheds, and the sheep, which are more hardy, are penned on the arable land, particularly on the maize stubble. Both sheep and cattle are fed on fodder crops during the winter. The surplus animals are sold at the autumn fair, and form a source of revenue.

876 [236] [234] WHILST ON the high pastures the sheep are clipped twice, and the wool is divided amongst the peasants in proportion to the number of animals sent up. The cheese is usually shared by the owners of the animals in the same way, the mayor and his committee being responsible for the correct apportionment. In the Valley of the Argeş co-operative dealers from Bucharest frequently buy the cheese "in bulk" direct from the commune, and the monetary value is shared between the owners of the animals.

231 OXEN ARE used almost exclusively for draught purposes, the numbers kept in this district being somewhat in excess of the farmers' requirements, owing to their use for lumbering (see below).

241 [369] [438] PEASANT FARMING in the Valley of the Argeş is no longer entirely on a subsistence basis. Two factors have tended to modify it. Firstly, the position of the valley, opening as it does directly on the Wallachian Plain, with its rich grain lands and containing the capital Bucharest, has allowed commercial intercourse to develop. The Argeş peasant no longer cultivates wheat; he does not mind if his maize crop is good enough for fodder only, for he can buy both wheat and maize from the plain. Further, he finds a ready market and so a money income in Bucharest for his surplus fruit, 313 particularly apples, and cheese. Secondly, the forests form a valuable asset to the peasant. During the winter felling takes place in the upper basin of the Argeş; in spring and summer the timber is transported, and work in the State mill in Curtea goes on all the year round. Practically every household has somebody working in the timber trade, and the money so earned (as much as 100 lei per day for a man supplying his own yoke of oxen) reduces the dependence of the family on the farm.

● 874 242 AT CURTEA DE ARGEŞ is the School of Agriculture, Regina Elizabeta. Although only a small percentage of its pupils is local, it is gradually influencing the farming of the neighbourhood. Experiments in cultivation, plant breeding and

the use of machinery are carried on at the school. Advisers are sent out to the farms, and seeds and plants, as well as artificial manure, are supplied to the peasants at a very low cost. Machinery is also loaned out cheaply. The average peasant, however, is very conservative, and progress is slow.

SOME DETAILS OF TWO FARMS: AUGUST 1936

FARM A

SIZE: one half-hectare approximately. This farm is situated approximately two miles north of Curtea de Argeş.

THE HOLDING consists of a narrow rectangular strip, bounded on one of its long sides by a rough lane and on its short side by the main road. The ground is fairly level and sufficiently above the river to be well drained. (See Plan A for utilization of land and arrangement of buildings.)

Animals

2 milking cows, 2 calves (at farm), but no oxen (this was unusual).
10 sheep, away on high pastures.
3 pigs, at farm.
10 geese, 6 ducks, 50 hens.

FARM B

SIZE: Five hectares approximately. This farm is situated at Corbeni, several kilometres north of Curtea de Argeş, at a point where the river valley widens out and the river braids. The farm is situated on the second terrace. The plot is rectangular, with its narrow side bordered by the road and its long side running parallel to the river, thus giving a well-drained but flat holding. The son of the owner holds a diploma for agriculture and the farm shows every evidence of prosperity. See PLAN B for utilization of land and arrangement of buildings.

241 be clearly traced to the carelessness with which the law of
423 land distribution had been drafted, and to the utter neglect
[511] to provide financial means for its rational application, as well
167 as to the export taxes on agricultural produce. The outcome was appalling, as may be judged from an article in the *Cuvantul* in which, after dilating on the causes that had brought about this disaster, it was asserted: "We are obliged to admit that the entire rural population had reached a state of pauperism at a time when we should reasonably have expected it to be thriving, since it had been endowed with lands. It seems a paradox, yet we have only wrecked the old system of production, founded on the unjust system of latifundia, in order to replace serfdom by pauperism. At the time of the large estates the rural worker had no need to emigrate; on the contrary, there was a shortage of labour, and foreign labourers had to be admitted from neighbouring countries. To-day, however, we are forced to direct the rural population abroad so as to save it from starvation; that is the situation we have reached ten years after the enactment of the expropriation laws. . . ." According to the *Adeverul* of March 29th, 1929, the Minister for Agriculture, speaking about the state of that industry, drew a very dark picture and lamented the wretched condition to which agricultural production had fallen. Rumanian agriculture, once the source of wealth and the economic basis of the State, was, he said, on the verge of ruin. The Minister not only condemned the culpable manner in which the land distribution law had been carried out, but also denounced the laxity and incapacity of the functionaries who had been appointed to show the peasants new methods of cultivation. According to him, the so-called model school farms were a positive disgrace. . . . Apparently matters have not improved since, for
241 as late as March, 1932, one could read in the *Ellenzek*, a
874 paper published in Hungarian at Cluj, that the Hungarian Cultural Association of Transylvania had decided to present a petition to the League of Nations to demand the creation of an agricultural school destined exclusively for sons of Rumanian citizens of Hungarian nationality. One ought not to feel surprise that the Hungarian minority, convinced of the glaring ineptitude of the Rumanian administration, had

at last been compelled to assume at its own expense the professional training of its youth. 241 874

It is sad to record that even in educational institutions the remissness which has characterized Rumanian administration has not been adequately grappled with, and it is not surprising that the laxity manifested in this particular domain should appear especially odious to the national minorities in Rumania, which have a different moral conception of life than that of the predominating nationality. That there is much to be done in this department is obvious to all, owing to the persistence of the complaints. A storm of indignation was raised by the scandalous condition of the College of Salonta, in Transylvania, in which some 400 Hungarian and Rumanian students were being educated. Of this number of students, 50 per cent were incapacitated, owing to the disgusting lack of hygiene prevailing, and the anarchic system on which it was conducted. The parents of the students had to petition the Minister of Education to obtain amelioration of the methods in vogue, and the details exposed were so revolting that the *Cuvantul* of March 28th, 1929, commenting on them, more or less admitted that such facts justified the opprobrious epithet of "putrid Wallachs" conferred on the latter by the Hungarians. 658 871

From this it may be deduced that agriculture had already been ruined through the culpable remissness of Rumania's rulers before the present crisis made itself felt. The country was caught like some disabled ship by the economic hurricane which suddenly sprang up, and materially it is suffering intensely, because in its battered condition it finds it difficult to weather the storm. Fortunately, the peasantry has been used to a life of suffering and hard toil; the peasants are patient and long-suffering to an extent inconceivable in the West. Docile and good-humoured, they put up with a situation that a Westerner would long since have found intolerable and against which he would have revolted. Poverty-stricken and unguided, the peasant has not only been left to provide the means wherewith to develop his farm, but at the same time he has been forced to supply from his own scanty resources the needs of the urban populations and the bulk of the funds requisite for carrying on the administration 241 565

RUMANIA

645 functions have been left undisturbed. We have a plethora
665 of functionaries drawing starvation wages instead of a body of well-selected officials decently rewarded. You who have no party and no party attachments to satisfy, and who always attacked political parties, might have effected this change easily, but you have not done so. The reductions in the Budget were necessary, yet they ought not to have cut into the very vitals of the country. The financial policy of M. Argentoianu may be qualified as the policy of bankruptcy. No institution, however strong its foundations, can resist it. You have destroyed the schools and disorganized the army by a criminal reduction of credits. In the name of the Liberal party I must affirm that we cannot accept a constitutional theory which, if it be applied, will debilitate our political life, and by the elimination of political parties vitiate the expression of the national will in its essence, expose the Crown dangerously to attack, and even provide the possibility of irremediably compromising it."

871 The indictment with regard to the schools found in the above rebuke refers to the decision taken by the Government
652 to shift on to the municipalities 50 per cent of the educational charges. As the Municipal authorities cannot balance their budgets, and as an example the community of Solca was cited, which with a total annual budget of 430,000 lei would have been obliged to incur an additional expenditure of 400,000 lei in order to provide for the maintenance of its primary school, the deputies admitted that such charges were beyond the resources of the municipalities to bear, and the proposed legislation was at last rejected after a most strenuous opposition from the National Peasant Party supported by the Liberal deputies who had hitherto sided with the Government.

871 Another cause likely to prejudice education in Rumania
875 is the non-payment of salaries to teachers. During the sitting of the Chamber on April 4th, 1932, a case was reported of certain teachers, who are all State functionaries in Rumania, who had not received their pay for seven months. Associations of teachers in various localities have called meetings and have addressed telegrams of protest on the subject to the King. Thus, those of the region of Radauţi on

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

May 7th, 1932, solicited the King's intervention, and demanded that their emoluments, already four months in arrears, should be paid. Those of Balţi appealed to the Press on the same date, complaining that nothing had been paid them during the last five months. A general strike of the members of the teaching profession is being talked about if a remedy is not found. They are incensed by the fact that while public money is being squandered on useless objects and worthless individuals at Bucarest, humble functionaries in the provinces are left to famish. 871 875

The "Adeverul" of Jan. 19th, 1932, takes the Government to task for paying regularly its superior functionaries and neglecting the lower grades as well as its pensioners, and proceeds to relate particulars as astounding as they are scandalous, namely details about famishing teachers who are forced to beg for morsels of bread from their pupils ! Such facts are really staggering, and when one recollects that France is generously advancing in instalments a loan of over one hundred million francs for the exclusive purpose of enabling the Rumanian State to pay its functionaries and pensioners, one demands what has become of this money and whether these funds have not again been diverted in the habitual manner to other purposes or pockets than those destined by the original providers of these sums ? 652 647 871

The inept waste of public money at this critical period is simply revolting. The press daily reveals cases of gross extravagance and profligacy, while in the Chamber it has been admitted that the State keeps in its employ over 50,000 redundant functionaries. The "Argus" of May 5th, 1932, for instance, points out that the Ministry of Commerce and Industry maintains without any justification a sub-secretariat with a personnel of 116, among whom are twelve solicitors, one architect, one doctor of medicine, 14 chiefs of sections, etc, at an annual cost of 15,176,900 lei to the State, while on April 1st, 1932, the paper condemned at length the waste involved in the maintenance of a Faculty of Medicine at the University of Bucarest with a staff of 400 professors and assistants, while the total number of students matriculated to this faculty reached barely 900. 652 647

The paper likewise affirmed that there was a scandalous

5: Fleure S-5 (no date)1939 ED1 Rumania ED1

EDUCATION IN CURTEA DE ARGEŞ

871 368 IN THE TOWN there are five primary schools—three mixed, one for girls and one for boys. In the latter there is a kindergarten class for children between five and seven. There are two vocational secondary schools, the Theological College and the Technical School; these are for boys only. The nearest lycée for girls is at Piteşti, 37 kilometres away. Boys also must leave the town for ordinary secondary education.

872 The kindergarten was founded in 1928 by the Orthodox National Society of Roumanian Women. There is a special local committee of management. The room used is large; part of it serves as a cloakroom and for washing; the children use the same playground and offices as the boys.

● [876] THERE ARE two teachers and about fifty-five children. Careful records of the progress of each child are kept. The children work in groups in low chairs at tables; no individual work is taken. Froebel's principles are followed, but Dr. Montessori's sense-training apparatus is used and Dr. Decroby's principles of teaching arithmetic are adopted.

INTERESTING HANDWORK is taken: paper-cutting pictures, modelling in clay and in paper, lace, crochet, etc. The first twenty minutes of each morning are set apart for the care of plants and animals and of the classroom. Speech training, physical exercises, free-play and singing are taught; as the school has no musical instrument, much depends on the musical ability of the mistress. The training is similar to that of primary school teachers; the salary is fixed by the local committee.

[346] THE PRIMARY SCHOOL for girls that we visited is housed in a large building of one storey, standing in its own grounds; it contains, all leading out of a central hall, four large and lofty classrooms, a teachers' small-room and an art room; there are no cloakrooms, the children hang their clothes on stands in the classrooms. These rooms are rather bare, but very light; they are heated by a big porcelain stove and the desks take three children. In summer classes are held in the garden. The

CHAPTER XI

463, 438 industrial labour. One-third of all workers engaged in industry are independent artisans, on whom the community is dependent for its services, but who do not play any important part in war production. In certain of the larger armament works German controllers have effected a considerable degree of rationalisation.

3. Mining

316 727 There is a shortage of miners; Russian prisoners of war have been employed in mining during 1942. Many miners were reported to have been included in the territory transferred to Hungary.

4. Armament Works

719 464 There is a general shortage of labour in metal and engineering factories, particularly of skilled labour. A 12-hour day was legalised at the beginning of 1942, but it is doubtful if in fact a 12-hour day is ever worked.

5. Timber

313 464 There is a shortage of labour, both for lumbering and for timber manufacture.

6. Textiles and Clothing

464 288 294 The total number of workers in these industries has probably fallen considerably, due to reduction of available raw materials. The delivery of supplies to individual mills seems to be somewhat erratic, and there is evidence of considerable part-time work, for instance in a survey of some 43 factories, in December, 1942, 11 were working full time, 21 on a reduced scale, and 11 at a very reduced scale.

7. Building

499 712 464 The extent of fortification building and general road and rail construction in Rumania is unknown, but in the second half of 1942 there was evidence of a scarcity of general labour for such projects, and of Russian prisoners of war working on rail construction.

438 464 [759] In the other branches of occupation, transport services, etc., there is no evidence of labour shortage, apart from doctors, many of whom have been mobilised for the army.

D. CONTROL OF LABOUR

1. The Youth Labour Service

466 883 A youth labour service founded on the German model was established in March 1941. The leaders were trained in Germany, but it was only in April 1942 that the labour camps began to function. Youths are called up in their 19th–20th year, and the period of service lasts 7 months.

(*See* Part II, Chapter V.B. for further details.)

2. Civil Mobilisation

466 A general civil mobilisation decree was passed in May 1941 by which (1) employment cards were introduced; (2) men and women aged 20-57 were liable to compulsory employment if not employed.

Two subsequent decrees were published in March and May 1943, one for the reorganisation of agriculture, forestry and fishing, and the second for the reorganisation of industry. Each of these decrees gave full powers to the appropriate authorities for the mobilisation and transfer of labour.

In addition to the general labour decrees which have so far had little influence on the labour situation, there have been regional decrees applying to individual localities, e.g. in Bessarabia, in February 1942, all the inhabitants aged 12-70 were called upon for compulsory agricultural labour unless already employed.